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Colonial adolescence: a study of the Maritime colonies of British North America, 1790-1814 Whiteside, Margaret Susan 1965

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COLONIAL ADOLESCENCE: A Study o f t h e M a r i t i m e C o l o n i e s o f B r i t i s h N o r t h A m e r i c a , 1790-1814  by SUSAN WHITESIDE B.A., D a l h o u s i e , I962  A THESIS SUBMITTED I N PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n t h e Department of HISTORY We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s conforming t o t h e required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April,  1965  In presenting  this thesis i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of  the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference  and  study.  I further agree that per-  mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may  be granted by the Head of my Department or by  his representatives.  It i s understood that copying or publi-  cation of this thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain shall not be allowed without my written permission*  Department of  rf^/^*  rs  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada Date  COLONIAL ADOLESCENCE A Study of the Maritime Colonies of B r i t i s h North America 1790-1814  by  Susan Whiteside  ABSTRACT The  o r i g i n a l intention of t h i s thesis was to  study the opinions and a c t i v i t i e s of the Maritime colonies during the War of 1 8 1 2 , i n an attempt to explain the colonies' almost neutral p o s i t i o n throughout the h o s t i l i t i e s . The Maritime attitude has already been explained economic t i e s binding New England.  i n terms of  the colonies' interests with those of  This thesis was therefore directed by a  desire to ascertain whether or not such economic interests constituted the dominating influence i n Maritime p o l i c y or whether there existed equally important influences of a p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l nature.  The conclusion a t t r i b u t e s  Maritime reaction i n 1 8 1 2 to a combination of economic, p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l factors shaping the colonies' a c t i v i t i e s during the preceding twenty years.  In the  course of defining these f a c t o r s , however, the emphasis s h i f t e d from the war i t s e l f t o the preceding two decades  v  vi  which emerged as a period of experiment and adjustment—a period of confused adolescent fumbling toward the larger powers and responsibilities of adulthood. of these struggles the War  Into the midst  of 1812 was projected, to be  greeted by the Maritimers as an interruption meriting attention only in so far as i t could contribute to their provincial interests. In this thesis, therefore, the  War  of 1812 i s presented as but the epilogue illustrating the trend of Maritime interests and policy during the period 1790-1810.  It i s not the intention of this thesis to view Maritime history s t r i c t l y in terms of a cyclical development paralleling the human l i f e cycle.  However, the contradictory  character of the Maritime scene during this period, as the colonies see-sawed between dependency and self-sufficiency in their claims, resembles the confusion of adolescence and the t i t l e of Colonial Adolescence was chosen for lack of a better description of this transitional phase.  In the  study of the Maritime colonies' transitional struggles, this thesis seeks to illustrate how  the social-economic  complex of a community moulds and is reflected in i t s political l i f e . Although the period 1790-1814 was one of isolation and individualism for the colonies, the majority of Maritime communities faced similar problems in their  vii  struggles for s t a b i l i t y and i d e n t i t y . Geography had rendered them an economic unit; the B r i t i s h administration had endowed them with s i m i l a r p o l i t i c a l organizations; settlement  had produced similar s o c i a l problems.  and  This  thesis, therefore, treats i t s subject i n terms of basic economic p o l i t i c a l , and s o c i a l situations as they were faced i n the Maritimes, with whatever variations each colony might o f f e r .  The three chapters dealing with these  situations constitute the core of the t h e s i s .  In the  first  chapter an attempt has been made to set the scene of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s and administration, for i t was  i n this  context  that the colonies pursued t h e i r objectives influenced at a l l times by the changing fortunes of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s . study throughout tends to concentrate colonies of Nava Scotia and New  The  upon the mainland  Brunswick, p a r t l y because  the developments of t h i s period were centered here, since Prince Edward Island remained a backward variant; and p a r t l y because the nature of sources dictated such an approach. Research was  concentrated  mainly upon the Colonial  Office records pertaining to Maritime a f f a i r s during period.  this  These included the o f f i c i a l correspondence passing  between the Colonial Office and the c o l o n i a l governors, i n which the p o l i c y of the B r i t i s h administration and i t s c o l o n i a l deputies upon.  i s outlined and c o l o n i a l reaction commented  Also included were the journals of Assembly and Council,  viii  s h i p p i n g s t a t i s t i c s , p e t i t i o n s and memorials from i n d i v i d u a l s and a s s o c i a t i o n s i n the c o l o n i e s r e f l e c t i n g something of c o l o n i a l o p i n i o n , needs and a c t i v i t i e s . supplemented  These r e c o r d s were  by secondary s o u r c e s , drawn upon f o r an  outline  of B r i t i s h and North American a c t i v i t i e s and p o l i c i e s ; to a more l i m i t e d e x t e n t c o l o n i a l newspapers and p r i v a t e papers p r o v i d e d contemporary  comment on the Maritime s c e n e — b u t the  M a r i t i m e r s do not emerge from these r e s e a r c h e s as an articulate l o t .  TABLE OF CONTENTS  CHAPTER  PAGE 1  INTRODUCTION I.  5  THE IMPERIAL BACKGROUND i. ii. iii.  The structure of eighteenth B r i t i s h society  century-  6  The post-1784 argument f o r and against imperialism  8  The structure of B r i t i s h imperial 15  administration II.  THE MARITIME SCENE, i. J  ii.  1790-1814  34  Geography and i t s implications . . . . Economic factors and c o l o n i a l  37  interests iii.  The pattern of pre-Loyalist society  .  iv.  III.  The L o y a l i s t i n f l u x and i t s implications v. The tangled web of Maritime factionalism v i . Religion and education—a r e f l e c t i o n of the c o l o n i a l pattern and c o l o n i a l growth IN PURSUIT OF PROSPERITY i. ii.  34  Some c o l o n i a l economic problems  . . .  Some c o l o n i a l solutions; MaritimeUnited States r e l a t i o n s iii  43 46 53 77 91 91 106  iv  CHAPTER IV.  PAGE  TWENTY YEARS OF FEUD AND DEBATE i. ii. iii. iv.  V.  The background of p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . . .  122  The Nova Scotian scene  128  The New Brunswick scene  145  The Prince Edward Island scene  153  THE SPECTACLE AND OPPORTUNITY OF 1812 i. ii.  Maritime attitudes  l64 164  Maritime-United States r e l a t i o n s : commercial s e l f - i n t e r e s t  iii.  122  Wartime p o l i c y and a c t i v i t y  CONCLUSION  170 178 I89  APPENDIX  191  BIBLIOGRAPHY  197  INTRODUCTION  During B r i t a i n ' s struggles of the Napoleonic era the interests of her c o l o n i a l possessions were subordinated to the imperial necessities of trade and d e f e n c e — n e c e s s i t i e s that dictated a retrenchment of the c o l o n i a l system, with reforms and relaxations generally offered as but temporary expedients.  So f a r as they contributed to the Mother  Country's p o l i c i e s of economic and naval warfare, the colonies could command an interest i n B r i t a i n ' s l e g i s l a t i v e h a l l s and market places.  Apart from these i n t e r e s t s , how-  ever, B r i t a i n turned i n disillusionment from her c o l o n i a l charges, leaving them t o handle as best they might the problems of r e c o n c i l i n g imperial p o l i c i e s with the facts of a reconstructed and maturing empire.  In the Maritime  colonies of B r i t i s h North America these problems were of p a r t i c u l a r significance as they complicated the basic struggles of communal establishment confronting pioneer settlement.  The provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia  and Prince Edward Island that emerged from the reorganization of 1784 spread from an society already several generations old; but t h i s was an establishment suddenly expanded beyond a l l i t s resources by the aftermath of the American Revolution.  The L o y a l i s t s were t o f i n d an establishment 1  2  that could o f f e r them l i t t l e more than a design and  the  f i r s t rude foundations which were often to prove more a hindrance than a help i n subsequent construction.  The chaos  of the Napoleonic period extended a mixed o f f e r i n g of opportunity and obstruction which strongly influenced i n i t i a l e f f o r t s of the Maritime colonies to organize distinctive entities.  as  The s t r a t e g i c importance of the  colonies, their privateering opportunities and t h e i r trade privileges brought them wealth, offered them the promise of a substantial future with the experience and example to guide i t s attainment, and projected them within the sphere of Westminster's consideration.  But the European struggle also  aroused fears and prejudices to colour s o c i a l and  political  r e l a t i o n s , just as the colonies were s t r i v i n g to define and reconcile these r e l a t i o n s . The problems and opportunities confronting the Maritime colonies were l a r g e l y the product of t h e i r geographical c o n d i t i o n — a condition of s t r a t e g i c importance and yet of i n s u l a r i t y , colouring t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the Empire, t h e i r neighbours, and with one another.  The  records  of these post-Revolution years leave a strong impression  of  Maritime i n s u l a r i t y as the colonies pursued a course of s e l f interest and p r o v i n c i a l pre-occupation.  The p e c u l i a r l y  Maritime character d i r e c t i n g such a course was during the diplomatic rupture of 1812,  revealed  shrewdly described as  "an incident to B r i t a i n , a c r i s e s to Canada—and to the  3  Maritime province i t was a spectacle and an  opportunity.  M,L  L i t t l e else could be expected from the conditions of environment and h i s t o r i c a l background which set the Maritime community apart. In the p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n of 1784,  fashioned  by  the inter-play of l o c a l concerns and imperial p o l i c y , lay the roots of Maritime particularism.  The settlements  of the  Acadian peninsula, the St. John River Valley and the Island of St. John were thus freed to concentrate  on problems  peculiar to themselves, i n a manner peculiar to themselves. The necessity of co-operation and a united front was forgotten, but t h i s was  f i r s t a period of  not  self-centeredness  nurturing the p o l i t i c a l struggles that began to emerge with purpose i n these colonies around By 1790  1790.  the i n i t i a l confusion of reorganization  had been resolved and the Maritime colonies were prepared to embark on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l campaigns.  Through the s p i r i t  and expansion of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y can be traced the general development of the colonies. was  But p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y  the product, and c l o s e l y involved partner, of s o c i a l  alignments and economic enterprises during these early years of c o l o n i a l self-consciousness.  P o l i t i c a l struggles cannot  ^Whltelaw, W.M.J The Maritimes and Canada Before Confederation: Oxford University Press; Toronto, 1934;  p.  6l.  4  be evaluated  i n i s o l a t i o n , but must rather be studied as a  r e f l e c t i o n of t h e i r s o c i a l background, and f o r what they may say of that background.  CHAPTER I THE IMPERIAL BACKGROUND  To appreciate the interplay of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l factions i n the Maritime colonies daring the Napoleonic era, the arguments of the colonists must be studied within the larger context of the B r i t i s h imperial system. The influences of family character and family t r a d i t i o n were interwoven with those of c o l o n i a l environment and experience to mould the character of the Maritime communities.  No  endeavour or attitude of the colonies can be evaluated without reference to the design of the parent society, f o r i t was t h i s design that c o l o n i a l society was meant to follow. In the attempt to adopt t h i s design lay much of the c o l o n i e s  1  domestic confusion, while i n the variations produced can be read something of the Maritime character.  The merry-go-round  of B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s and the rather c y n i c a l temper of B r i t i s h imperial sentiments during this period were also factors determining the fate of c o l o n i a l ambitions.  Thus, the frame-  work of B r i t i s h society, the changing character of i t s p o l i t i c a l scene, and the p r i n c i p l e s informing both must be taken into account i f the significance of Maritime c o l o n i a l a c t i v i t i e s i s to emerge.  5  6  E i g h t e e n t h eentury B r i t i s h s o c i e t y was  one of  m e t i c u l o u s l y d e f i n e d c l a s s s t r u c t u r e , r u l e d by a code of paternalism.  Providence had ordained each rank i t s p a r t i c u l a r  power, p r i v i l e g e and o b l i g a t i o n — t h e wealthy man the poor, from whom he c o u l d expect obedience.  succoured Such was  the  r i g h t balance of r e l a t i o n s h i p s on which the r i g h t order of s o c i e t y depended. New  I n the M a r i t i m e s , where the customs of the  World had m o d i f i e d the r i g i d p r i n c i p l e s of the O l d , these  v i r t u e s were n o n e t h e l e s s r e a l , and outrage echoed  through  Governor Wentworth's b i t t e r complaint of popular r a l l i e s "convened throughout tradesmen,  the c o u n t r y , composed o f  l a b o u r e r s , and f a r m e r s , who  uneducated  from the nature o f  t h e i r l a b o u r and i n d u s t r y , cannot p o s s i b l y have any information. l H  I t was  presumptuous of such men,  real  without  t r a i n i n g or p o s i t i o n , t o assume a r o l e t h a t Providence had not o r d a i n e d , and I t c o u l d b r i n g the whole s o c i a l complex toppling.  Such was  the f e a r u n d e r l y i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s l i k e  t h a t of Edward Winslow:* One arrangement, however, I t h i n k we s h a l l have cause t o r e g r e t — o u r gentlemen have a l l become p o t a t o p l a n t e r s and our shoemakers a r e p r e p a r i n g to l e g i s l a t e . I f the o p e r a t i o n s of the l a t t e r do not t u r n out more p r o f i t a b l y than those of the former, we s h a l l c e r t a i n l y have a d....d bad t i m e .  2  iMurdock, B.: A H i s t o r y of Nova S c o t i a , or Acadle v o l . i i i ; J . Barnes; H a l i f a x , lo67; p. 261. •See  Appendix.  Raymond, W.O.: "A Sketch of the L i f e and A d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f General T. C a r l e t o n " ; Nova S c o t i a H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y , v o l . 2 2  (1899); p. 470.  7 R e v e r s a l s i n the h i e r a r c h i c a l balance of s o c i e t y would be r e f l e c t e d i n the balance of government which was  based  on  the concept of P a r l i a m e n t a r y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n v o i c e d by Jenkinson: We ought not t o b e g i n by f i r s t c o n s i d e r i n g who ought t o be e l e c t e d ; but we ought t o b e g i n by c o n s i d e r i n g who ought t o be e l e c t e d , and then c o n s t i t u t e such persons e l e c t o r s as would be l i k e l y t o produce the best e l e c t e d . 3 The  'best e l e c t e d  1  were men  from a t r a d i t i o n o f p u b l i c  s c h o o l and p u b l i c s e r v i c e — m e n possessed of the broader view whose i n t e r e s t s and l o y a l t i e s know no boundaries of c o n s t i t u e n c y or p a r t y ; and possessed t o o , o f the means t o m a i n t a i n such independence.  The o p p o s i t i o n o f the c o l o n i a l  e x e c u t i v e s i n Nova S c o t i a and New  Brunswick t o Assembly  s a l a r y demands and the o r g a n i z a t i o n of o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s was  r o o t e d i n the B u r k i a n concept of P a r l i a m e n t as "not a  congress of ambassadors from d i f f e r e n t and h o s t i l e  interests  but a d e l i b e r a t i v e assembly  from an  of one n a t i o n , d r a w n  independent and t r a d i t i o n a l governing Throughout  class.  the feuds of c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s which  b e d e v i l l e d the Maritime c o l o n i e s i n 1790,  there r a n a  p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the maintenance of order and balance as  ^The P a r l i a m e n t a r y H i s t o r y of England v o l . xxx (1792-94); Hansard; London, 1817> PP* 8 1 0 - 8 1 1 . J e n k i n s o n * s speech on P a r l i a m e n t a r y reform, May 3, 1793* ^ B r i g g s , A.J The Age Co.; London, 1959.  of Improvement: Longman's, Green  8 these were s y m b o l i z e d i n the a l l o c a t i o n o f precedence and spheres o f a u t h o r i t y .  I n the s t r u g g l e s o f the Nova S c o t i a n  o u t p o s t s w i t h H a l i f a x o f f i c i a l d o m t h e r e was  sounded a  c o n c e r n over t h e system o f p a t e r n a l i s t i c s u p e r v i s i o n t h a t was a bulwark o f i m p e r i a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the c o l o n i e s . These c o l o n i a l s t r u g g l e s were g i v e n s i g n i f i c a n c e by the v e r y r e a l c h a l l e n g e t h e y o f f e r e d the t r a d i t i o n s o f the Mother C o u n t r y .  The  s o c i a l n o b i l i t y and p a r t y i n t e r e s t s  t h a t were b e i n g i n t r o d u c e d by a m e r c a n t i l e m i d d l e  class  i n t o e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y B r i t a i n were a l s o p e n e t r a t i n g colonial society.  The  c o l o n i a l a r i s t o c r a c y of  civil  s e r v a n t s and w e a l t h y merchants s t r o v e t o p l a y a r o l e f o r which they c o u l d f i n d s m a l l support, i n colony or i n p r e o c c u p i e d B r i t a i n ; w h i l e from the s i d e l i n e s came the i n c r e a s i n g clamour o f Assembly f a c t i o n s s t r i v i n g t o a t t a i n the foremost p o s i t i o n on the c o l o n i a l  scene.  ii. The framework w i t h i n which the c o l o n i s t s o f Nova S c o t i a and New a m b i t i o n s was  Brunswick  sought the r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i r  t h a t o f the B r i t i s h E m p i r e — a framework  r a i s e d by a c c i d e n t , m a i n t a i n e d by n e c e s s i t y , and a t t h i s darkened by the gloom o f doubt and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t .  The  Empire had b r o u g h t the Mother Country w e a l t h and power, and the n e c e s s i t y o f a d e s i g n f o r the p r o t e c t i o n o f such power. To i n f o r m t h i s d e s i g n t h e r e grew a p h i l o s o p h y o f empire i n  9  which p r i d e , f e a r and a m b i t i o n were i n e x t r i c a b l y mixed; and as the f r u i t s o f empire bred s a t i s f a c t i o n , t h i s p h i l o s o p h y became a g o s p e l t h a t c o u l d be c h a l l e n g e d o n l y a t the expense of b i t t e r d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t .  J u s t such a c h a l l e n g e was  by the American R e v o l u t i o n , and as the arguments  offered  of  r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s were v i n d i c a t e d i n the days f o l l o w i n g Yorktown, doubt and c r i t i c i s m appeared among the B r i t i s h public. A n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m was born a t Yorktown where c o l o n i a l f a c t s tumbled the b a s i c assumptions o f i m p e r i a l theory and p r a c t i c e ; and i t was n u r t u r e d by an  economic  readjustment t h a t b e l i e d the dependence of B r i t i s h p r o s p e r i t y upon a system of b a r r i c a d e d p o s s e s s i o n s . Shelburne's remark i n 1778  t h a t "the moment t h a t the  independence o f America i s agreed t o by our Government the sun o f Great B r i t a i n i s s e t and we s h a l l no l o n g e r be a powerful and r e s p e c t a b l e p e o p l e , " 5 r e f l e c t e d the i n j u r e d p r i d e and the pessimism t h a t enveloped much o f England. With the American R e v o l u t i o n there came, t o o , an  awareness  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problems b e d e v i l l i n g the B r i t i s h system.  R e v o l u t i o n made men  political  q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y of  Westminster's r o l e i n B r i t a i n , and i n v o l v e d them i n the debate over Westminster's i m p e r i a l r u l e .  P r e v a l e n t among  ^ F i t z m a u r l c e : L i f e o f Shelburne v o l . i i : London, 1912, p. 14.  Macmillan and  Co.;  10  the c r i t i c s was an almost f a t a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e toward the future of Empire.  T r a d i t i o n a l virtues of imperialism, as  argued by the merchants and admirals, were rejected by men who now regarded the colonies as millstones strangling B r i t a i n ' s energies. value, arguing  They considered  Empire t o be of l i t t l e  that:  England derives l i t t l e advantage except prestige from her dependencies, and the l i t t l e she does derive i s quite over-crippled by the expense they cost her and the dissemination they necessitate of her naval and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . 0  J.S. M i l l was not alone i n h i s querulous complaint of B r i t a i n ' s i l l - r e p a i d s a c r i f i c e s , and the indifference to Empire shared by his countrymen was r e f l e c t e d i n the fate of c o l o n i a l administration during the several decades following Yorktown.  O f f i c i a l s and departments played a continual  game of musical chairs i n which c o l o n i a l considerations frequently gave place to p o l i t i c a l necessity, while p o l i t i c i a n s turned t h e i r attention to the domestic scene where renown was to be won more e a s i l y . There were many, including Burke, who regarded the loosening of Empire as an inevitable and probably advisable  process.  °Selley, W.T.: England i n the Eighteenth Century: Adam and Charles Black; London, 1949; p. 273 quoting from Knowles: The I n d u s t r i a l and Commercial Revolution i n Great B r i t a i n .  11  The . l a s t cause of t h i s d i s o b e d i e n t s p i r i t i n c o l o n i e s i s h a r d l y l e s s powerful than the r e s t as i t i s not merely moral but l a i d deep i n the n a t u r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of things. Three thousand m i l e s of ocean l i e between you and them. No c o n t r i v a n c e can prevent the e f f e c t of t h i s d i s t a n c e i n weakening government. Seas r o l l and months pass, between the order and the e x e c u t i o n , and the want o f the speedy e x p l a n a t i o n of a s i n g l e p o i n t i s enough t o d e f e a t a whole system. You have indeed winged m i n i s t e r s of vengeance who c a r r y your b o l t s i n t h e i r pounces t o the remotest verge of the sea, but there a power steps i n , that l i m i t s the arrogance of r a g i n g p a s s i o n s and f u r i o u s elements and says "So f a r s h a l t thou go and no f u r t h e r . " Who are you t h a t you should f r e t and rage and b i t e the chains o f Nature? T h i s i s the i n e v i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n , the e t e r n a l law, o f e x t e n s i v e and detached empire.7 Thus Burke d e s c r i b e d  the i n h e r e n t  geographical  Empire which he b e l i e v e d B r i t a i n had  weakness of  compounded w i t h a  r e s t r i c t i v e e c o n o m i c - p o l i t i c a l system t h a t c o u l d o n l y arouse the independent s p i r i t shared by a l l her should  subjects.  Britain  r a t h e r encourage the fundamental u n i t y of k i n s h i p  among her o f f s p r i n g by f o s t e r i n g the s p i r i t , r a t h e r than the l e t t e r , of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , even i f implementation o f such p o l i c y brought the p o l i t i c a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f Empire. L e t the c o l o n i e s always keep the i d e a of t h e i r c i v i l r i g h t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h your g o v e r n m e n t ; — t h e y w i l l c l i n g and grapple t o you, and no f o r c e under heaven would be of the power to t e a r them from t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e . But l e t i t be once understood t h a t your government may be one t h i n g and t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s a n o t h e r , t h a t these two t h i n g s may e x i s t without any mutual r e l a t i o n , the cement i s gone; the c o h e s i o n i s loosened, and e v e r y t h i n g hastens t o decay and d i s s o l u t i o n . As long as you have the wisdom t o keep the s o v e r e i g n a u t h o r i t y o f t h i s country as the s a n c t u a r y of l i b e r t y , the s a c r e d temple consecrated  TBurke, E.:  I863, p. 56.  Works (ed. F.G. Revington) v o l . i i i ; London, Burke's speech on the C o n c i l i a t i o n o f America.  12  to our common f a i t h , wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom they w i l l turn t h e i r faces toward you . . . . This i s the commodity of p r i c e , of which you have the monopoly. This i s the true act of navigation which binds to you the commerce of the colonies and through them secures to you the wealth of the world . . . . Do not dream that your l e t t e r s of o f f i c e , and your i n s t r u c t i o n s , and your suspending clauses are the things that hold together the great contexture of t h i s mysterious whole. These do not make your Government . . . . I t i s the s p i r i t of the English Constitution, which, infused through the mighty mass pervades, feeds, unites, invigorates, v e r i f i e s every part of Empire, even down to the minutest member.8 A n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t arguments were given point by the facts of the American Revolution and i t s aftermath, and received d e f i n i t i o n i n Adam Smith's c r i t i c i s m of the mercantalist theories of empire.9 echoed those of his contemporaries: authority and Parliamentary  His projected reforms an extension of  representation, proportional to  t h e i r share of f i n a n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , to the colonies  who  would thus be transformed from factious subjects to a l l i e s bound by s e l f - i n t e r e s t . similar nature i n 1778  Shelburne attempted reforms of a and again i n September 1782  when he  wrote to c o l o n i a l governors requesting a report on the  °Ibld.:  pp. 123-124.  9The 1770 3-1780's substantiated Smith's argument that to construct an economy on the monopoly of one large market was to increase v u l n e r a b i l i t y and obstruct the easy flow of economic reform and adjustment; whereas prosperity and mobility were to be found i n p r e f e r e n t i a l t i e s with a variety of f r i e n d l y markets. Varients of this argument were to be voiced i n c o l o n i a l p e t i t i o n s i n subsequent years. Smith, A.: The Wealth of Nations (ed. E. Cannon); Modern Library; New York, 1937J PP. 581-584. 1  13 working of t h e i r instructions and any c o n f l i c t s these might have with "the long established customs" of the c o l o n i e s — a report that he intended f o r use as a guide i n the reorganizat i o n of c o l o n i a l p o l i c y .  These projects of reform, however,  gathered dust i n government f i l e s and were given but vague recognition In o f f i c i a l p o l i c y .  Rather than reforms,  ministers maintained a p o l i c y of reluctant interference i n c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s — s u c h interference had only brought upheaval i n the Thirteen Colonies. After much urging they d i d follow Townshend's advice to rescind the C o a l i t i o n regulation demanding that the colonies subscribe to an oath acknowledging  the B r i t i s h Parliament as their superior l e g i s l a t i v e  authority.  I t was reluctant acquiescence, f o r few understood  the c o l o n i a l temper. Despite the protests of i t s c r i t i c s , the old imperial system maintained i t s sway amidst change at home and abroad.  Despite t h e i r pessimism, imperial administrators  were determined to make the best of what they had f o r as long as they could.  Only when piecemeal changes i n economic,  s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l practice had coalesced In the public mind as coherent, workable p o l i c y , could reform i n imperial policy be seriously entertained. The merchants and p o l i t i c i a n s i n England kept s i l e n t as they watched the course of post-war readjustment, warily avoiding commitment and d i r e c t i n g t h e i r energies to the more pressing demands of the domestic scene.  Moreover, the colonies were s t i l l taken f o r  14  granted as f i x e d objects i n the firmament, with a s t i l l powerful 'raison d'etre':  c o l o n i a l port duties constituted  a considerable a d d i t i o n to Treasury reports, the t r o p i c a l produce of the West Indies was i n strong demand, while the West Indies cotton supply was fostered as a means to lessen B r i t i s h manufacturer's dependence on the United  States.  National pride and the influence of groups with a vested interest i n c o l o n i a l empire were powerful incentives to a continuance of the 'status quo.'  I t was f e l t i n many  p o l i t i c a l and commercial c i r c l e s that the voluntary  sacrifice  of colonies was too much to ask. Such s a c r i f i c e s , though they might frequently be agreeable to the i n t e r e s t s , are always mortifying to the pride of every nation and what i s perhaps of s t i l l greater consequence, they are always contrary to the private i n t e r e s t s of the governing part of i t , who would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of t r u s t and p r o f i t , of many opportunities of acquiring wealth of d i s t i n c t i o n which possession of the most turbulent, and t o the great body of people, the most unprofitable province seldom f a i l s to a f f o r d ,  1 0  So Adam Smith summarized the motivating forces i n c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , for forces which had been given p o l i t i c a l  justifica-  t i o n by the war pressures of the Napoleonic era and which underlined the arguments i n s i s t i n g upon the necessity f o r maintaining  sea power.  During the Napoleonic era the new ideas of imperial c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s were i n the background slowly  1 0  Ibld.t  p. 581  educating,  15 and brought out f o r Implementation when diplomacy and economic necessity allowed.  These were periods of exception  however, of concession i n practice only while imperial p r i n c i p l e s stood f i r m .  O f f i c i a l B r i t i s h attitude found i t s  most e x p l i c i t expression i n the Canadian Constitutional Act of 1791  i n which were r e f l e c t e d the Secretary of State's  major considerations:  the lightening of Parliament's  f i n a n c i a l burden and the strengthening of a landed executive authority as a check on a too democratic colonists.  s p i r i t among  While the B r i t i s h administration was  prepared  to achieve the f i r s t objective with concessions to c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e powers, the implementation  of i t s second  objective often tended to l i m i t the e f f e c t of those concessions, and to provide yet another goad to the c o l o n i a l demands f o r a reorganization of imperial p o l i c y and p r a c t i c e . iii.  The background of domestic p o l i t i c s against which imperial theories were argued and c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s administered was an ever changing scene of f a c t i o n a l alignment. 1783  The C o a l i t i o n Government's East India B i l l of  brought i t to defeat and opened doors to P i t t ' s "mince  pie administration" which b e l i e d a l l prophecies and retained power f o r the next seventeen years.  Gathering around him  those recently led by Shelburne i n the Chatham t r a d i t i o n ,  16  and l a t e r those Whig factions d i s s a t i s f i e d with Foxe's advanced ideas, P i t t entered the l a s t decade of the eighteenth century with a p o l i c y of gradual reforms.  In  t h i s decade, however, B r i t a i n was confronted with a second 'democratic revolution' that was to impose upon B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s the repressive attitudes of conservative reaction. I n i t i a l l y , the French Revolution was applauded i n B r i t a i n by men who interpreted i t i n terms of 1 6 8 8 .  Pitt  f e l t that "the present convulsions i n France must sooner or l a t e r culminate i n general harmony and regular order . . . and thus circumstanced, France . . . w i l l enjoy just that kind of liberty I v e n e r a t e . B u t  as passions caught events i n  t h e i r whirlwind, and war involved national fears and r i v a l r i e s , England reacted throughout her Empire with a tightening of mercantile p o l i c y .  Those tolerated as c r i t i c s  i n I 7 8 4 were fulminated against as Jacobeans and 'agitating democrats' i n 1 7 9 4 . Although some fear of goading democratic tendencies among the colonists restrained reactionary p o l i c i e s i n imperial administration, while the extraordinary circumstances of the times superimposed a complex of temporary exceptions upon standard p o l i c y , the atmosphere of the Napoleonic era d i d subject c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s to a r i g i d i t y i n p o l i t i c a l thought.  In B r i t a i n the p o l i t i c a l  see-saw subjected c o l o n i a l administration to m i n i s t e r i a l  ^ B r i g g s , A.:  on.. ci£., p. 130.  17  fluctuations that precluded supervision.  consistent p o l i c y or conscientious  Only with the formation of Percival's government  i n 1809 was the p o l i t i c a l scene vouchsafed a measure of s t a b i l i t y , and the colonies some r e l i e f from the war preoccupations of B r i t i s h administrators. War  preoccupations complicated  the administration  of c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s already plagued by indifference and confusion. Edmund Burke had been foremost i n the cry f o r reform, and l a r g e l y upon h i s i n s t i g a t i o n the Board of Trade and Plantations was abolished i n 1 7 8 2 . * the colonies had been administered  2  U n t i l that year  by the Board, functioning  as an independent body, c h i e f l y concerned with routine administration and the c o l l e c t i n g of information f o r use by other government departments.  R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and authority  had been shared by two Secretaries of State, d i v i d i n g a f f a i r s i n t o Home and Foreign categories, the l a t t e r sub-divided  into  North and South Departments with c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s a l l o c a t e d to the North Department.  The reorganization of 1782  i n s t i t u t e d a Home Department and a Foreign Department as separate bodies with Shelburne administering including i t s c o l o n i a l business.  the l a t t e r ,  Two years l a t e r the Board  of Trade was replaced with a Committee of the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, i n s t i t u t e d along s i m i l a r l i n e s  Young, D.M.: The Colonial Office i n the Early Nineteenth Century: f o r Royal Commonwealth Society by Longmans; London, 1961; p. 10. 12  18  but as a subordinate body of the Privy Council. 1794  the Foreign Department was  In J u l y of  r e s t r i c t e d to extra-imperial  a f f a i r s , while the Home Department was replaced by  two  Secretaries of State administering domestic, and war colonial a f f a i r s .  and  However, p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s dictated  that t h i s system should be temporarily set aside to placate the Duke of Portland with the dual j u r i s d i c t i o n of domestic and c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s , leaving Dundas to administer affairs.  F i n a l l y , i n August 1801,  returned to the War  O f f i c e , now  war  c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s were  under Lord Hobart's  d i r e c t i o n , and thus they remained u n t i l reorganization within the Office i n l 8 l 0 divided the a f f a i r s of war colonies into separate departments.  and  Although reorganization  had been instigated i n the interests of reform, i t r e f l e c t e d the secondary consideration given c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s i n the public mind where they were subordinated to the interests of defence, economic retrenchment, and p o l i t i c a l expediency. Only with the sub-division of the War  Office i n 1810  the colonies be said to have returned into t h e i r A f t e r 1784  might  own.  the Committee of the Privy Council f o r  Trade and Plantations became the depository of c o l o n i a l information and the advisory body on c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s to the B r i t i s h government.  Its duties encompassed the review  of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n , the approval of c o l o n i a l administrative appointments, and the hearing of c o l o n i a l complaints.  Despite the unwritten p r i n c i p l e of post-Revolution  19  imperial p o l i c y of m i n i s t e r i a l non-interference  in colonial  a f f a i r s , these duties c a r r i e d the Committee i n t o f i e l d s of authority where i t could e f f e c t i v e l y influence the course of colonial a c t i v i t y .  Every c o l o n i a l governor was  required to  forward to England the journals of Council and Assembly, with his comments on the business of the l e g i s l a t i v e session. This material was  then referred to the government's l e g a l  counsellors f o r judgement, and i t was  only with the Privy  Council's approval that c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n could be  put  into e f f e c t and the colonies' progress with t h e i r business The executive o f f i c e r s i n the colonies had a l s o to meet the approval of the Committee, and any complaints the colonies might have about the administration of these o f f i c i a l s were referred to the Committee of the whole Council f o r judgement— usually to be dismissed as storms i n c o l o n i a l tea cups. The Committee generally confined i t s e l f to the routine a p p l i c a t i o n of the imperial system, depending upon the Secretary of State f o r the d e t a i l s of c o l o n i a l issues. He was  the awful presence uppermost i n the c o l o n i a l  conscience.  The business of the Home Department  was  described by Grey E l l i o t t , a clerk of the department, as concern with "the management and d i r e c t i o n of the business formerly transacted by the Board of Trade, e s p e c i a l l y the preparation of drafts f o r commissions, and instructions of governors and of a l l other c i v i l o f f i c e r s i n the colonies, the examination of the proceedings i n the several councils  20  and a s s e m b l i e s , the laws passed, and the correspondence  with  the committee o f the P r i v y C o u n c i l ; the p r e p a r a t i o n o f estimates o f t h e c o l o n i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s f o r P a r l i a m e n t i n g e n e r a l , the i n s p e c t i o n o f the c i v i l ,  l e g i s l a t i v e and  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e government o f the c o l o n i e s .  f , 1  3  Although the  important d e c i s i o n s r e g a r d i n g c o l o n i a l p o l i c y , as these were enunciated i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s forwarded t o the governors, were made by the S e c r e t a r y , r o u t i n e d u t i e s were r e l e g a t e d t o departmental c l e r k s , w h i l e much o f the c o l o n i a l was conducted by the Under-Secretary.  correspondence  Indeed, the Under-  S e c r e t a r y was v e r y o f t e n the B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l most f a m i l i a r t o the c o l o n i e s , p r o v i d i n g the p e r s o n a l l i n k between governors and t h e Home Department.  The r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t  o f t e n e x i s t e d between the governors and the Under-Secretary might be r e a d i n the despatches  t h a t passed between Governor  Wentworth* o f Nova S c o t i a and John K i n g , whom the former addressed as a p e r s o n a l f r i e n d and c a l l e d upon as agent t o argue the colony's case and the governor's p e r s o n a l p e t i t i o n s . Many o f these p e t i t i o n s were i n the i n t e r e s t s o f the governor's appointees and appealed t o the S e c r e t a r y ' s power of patronage~the  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f which was probably h i s  second most important f u n c t i o n .  Besides the governorship  ^ M a n n i n g , H.T.: B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l Government A f t e r the American R e v o l u t i o n 1782-1820: Yale U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ; New Haven, 1935; p . 8 5 . •See Appendix.  21  i t s e l f , the three i n f l u e n t i a l posts of P r o v i n c i a l Secretary, Provost Marshall, and Naval O f f i c e r , with senior j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s , were a t the disposal of the Secretary.  Through h i s  appointment of friends and p o l i t i c a l supporters the Secretary could secure a strong voice within the colony, and assure the imperial administration of control over one branch of the colonial  establishment. Nevertheless, the Secretary laboured under  d i f f i c u l t i e s that constituted fundamental weaknesses i n the administration of c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s .  The Home Office was a  clearing house f o r the domestic undertakings government.  of the B r i t i s h  I t s Secretaries acted as coordinators of  domestic and c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s Involving the Treasury, the Board of Customs Commissioners, the Commander i n Chief, the Admiralty, and a multitude more whose independent functioning, each with i t s own p o l i c y and code of i n s t r u c t i o n s , resulted i n the confusion and c o n f l i c t that was a f a m i l i a r element i n c o l o n i a l p o l i t i c a l life.' - ' 1  4  Coordination was not always  successful and when accomodation of imperial p r i n c i p l e to c o l o n i a l circumstances  i n one department was not adopted i n  another there resulted misunderstanding s t r a i n relations.15  1 4  Ibid.:  i n the colony to  There was confusion, too, and delay i n  p. 84.  15ln 1795 Governor Wentworth, acting on B r i t i s h i n s t r u c t i o n s , imported s a l t provisions from Boston for naval use, only to have the ships captured by Customs and t i e d up i n court cases that brought b i t t e r complaints from both sides. C.O. 217/3& Wentworth-Whitehall, 1795.  22  the review and confirmation of c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i o n .  An  attempted remedy was made i n 1800 when the Committee of Trade recommended that laws not confirmed i n three years should be automatically disallowed. However, this made no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between those acts submitted f o r automatic approval and those submitted with suspending clauses. Neither did t h i s recommendation substantially a l l e v i a t e the hardships of delay, such as those suffered by New Brunswick when i t s e l e c t i o n act of 1791? necessary to the regulation of p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n the colony, was l e f t i n suspension u n t i l 1795 despite the b i t t e r protests of c o l o n i s t s . ^  Nor was the Secretary over-  burdened with assistance from h i s Cabinet colleagues who l e f t him a free hand i n c o l o n i a l policy and turned t h e i r debates t o domestic and European a f f a i r s . The p o l i c i e s emerging from the Home Office were directed by information that was often fragmentary, gathered at a distance through o f f i c i a l s whose p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l i f e of the colony was r e s t r i c t e d to channels dictated by s o c i a l structure and the character of t h e i r o f f i c e .  The  r e s u l t s very often brought complaints that McGregor was to echo i n h i s observation of several decades l a t e r : . . . nearly a l l the errors committed i n treating with foreign powers concerning His Majesty's colonies, as well as a l l the blunders which have occurred i n our c o l o n i a l p o l i c y have been the  lo  C.O. 188/5 Carleton-Dundas, June 6, 1793.  23 results of the meagre information possessed by our government.17 P o l i c i e s were a l s o clouded by confusion. d i v i s i o n of authority was  T h e o r e t i c a l l y the  to follow the t r a d i t i o n a l l i n e s of  demarcation between executive and l e g i s l a t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n s . The Mother Country was  to exercise the executive prerogatives  of advice and review, while the colony was l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e and formulation. however, the d i v i s i o n was  to enjoy  In actual p r a c t i c e ,  one of imperial and c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s  which cut across the t r a d i t i o n a l three-way d i v i s i o n .  Jurisdic-  t i o n over taxation and l o c a l administration was delegated to , the c o l o n i a l Assembly, while the imperial aspect  was  r e f l e c t e d i n the laws of trade and Admiralty courts, i n the persons of m i l i t a r y and naval commanders, customs c o l l e c t o r s , and executive o f f i c e r s . o f f i c e r s was  The authority wielded by these  i n fact a mixture of executive, l e g i s l a t i v e and  j u d i c i a l functions. Despite their p o l i t i c a l theories of non-interference and c o l o n i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , the B r i t i s h administration exerted considerable control over a l l branches of c o l o n i a l government.  Wherever the interests  of defence and external  commerce (involving as they did the powerful lobbies of Admiralty and merchant houses) were involved.the imperial authority exerted i t s e l f i n a l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l , as  ^McGregor, J . t London, I033; p.  B r i t i s h America v o l . 1; 811.  W. Blackwood;  24  well as executive, capacity.  The dependence of the  colonies  upon the Mother Country f o r t h e i r defence rendered them susceptible to pressure and ever-aware of t h e i r dependence. The presence i n some colonies, l i k e Nova Scotia, of a considerable  m i l i t a r y and naval establishment  introduced  into the colony's p o l i t i c a l l i f e an element of imperial interest quite independent of whatever pressures or l i m i t a t i o n s the Assembly might exert.  Through t h e i r c i v i l  establishments, a l s o , the colonies were susceptible, due t h e i r f i n a n c i a l incapacity.  to  Although i t had been an early  p r i n c i p l e of c o l o n i a l administration that the  colonies  should be self-supporting, that p r i n c i p l e had bowed to the facts of r e a l i t y of mid-eighteenth century.  The  British  government had relinquished i t s r i g h t to tax the colonies, apart from i t s regulation of external commerce, on the understanding that the colonies vote t h e i r revenue to the maintenance of i t s c i v i l l i s t .  However, i n the smaller  less developed colonies revenue was  and  almost non-existent and  had been supplemented by parliamentary grants.  Such a  system had kept i n B r i t i s h pay the i n f l u e n t i a l positions of Governor, Chief J u s t i c e , Colonial Secretary, Attorney General, Surveyor General, Treasury Agent, Naval O f f i c e r — o f f i c i a l s whose independence of c o l o n i a l support enabled them to maintain an i m p a r t i a l i t y i n c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s that  25 was  to the i n t e r e s t of the imperial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . ^  These  o f f i c i a l s exerted an influence a l l the stronger as most colonies suffered from a lack of men  of a b i l i t y , experience,  and education to guide a f f a i r s within the colony and to f i g h t its battles.  This was a d i s a b i l i t y which the colonies i n no  way mitigated by t h e i r r e f u s a l to vote adequate and a t t r a c t i v e s a l a r i e s for administrative o f f i c e s . 3-9 was  But i t  through the executive branch of the c o l o n i a l e s t a b l i s h -  ment, the Governor and Council, that the B r i t i s h government exerted the most e f f e c t i v e control over c o l o n i a l a c t i v i t i e s . Following the American Revolution,  British  imperial p o l i c y l a i d much emphasis upon the authority of the c o l o n i a l governor, f o r the holocaust  i n the Thirteen  Colonies was widely attributed to a weakening of the executive p o s i t i o n i n the colonies.  This viewpoint  was  summarized by an anonymous writer i n B r i t i s h North America reporting to the Colonial O f f i c e :  C.O. 217/62, P a r r - G r e n v i l l e , A p r i l 24, 1790. " I t i s to be lamented that the Justices of the Supreme Court of Judicature . . . should have been dependent on the House of Assembly f o r t h e i r support . . . must be obliged to court the Favour of the leading members of the Assembly or be l i a b l e to Complaint or Impeachment on every occasion, however f r i v o l o u s , which may present i t s e l f . " 10  3-9ln 1793 several counties of Nova Scotia submitted p e t i t i o n s complaining of a l l Supreme Court s i t t i n g s being confined to Halifax, causing inconvenience and expense to those t r a v e l l i n g i n from the outposts. Yet the Assembly had refused to provide s a l a r i e s f o r the extra judges to serve on c i r c u i t . C.O. 217/64, Wentworth-Dundas, December 4,  1793.  26  The nature of the s i t u a t i o n of the Governors i n America, the limited extent of t h e i r Authority, the dependence i n which they frequently found themselves, on the colonies even f o r t h e i r own support and maintenance, the l i t t l e consequence annexed to t h e i r S i t u a t i o n , and sometimes the character and rank of the persons sent there were but i l l adapted to remedy the defeats a r i s i n g from the absence of the Sovereign.20 If the growth of a democratic s p i r i t i n the colonies was  to  be checked, i t must be through an executive authority strengthened  i n i t s supervisory and prerogative powers when-  ever possible.21  The Governor was regarded as the bulwark  of B r i t i s h authority, one of his f i r s t duties being the defence of the Crown's prerogative against p r o v i n c i a l opposition.  Moreover, the Governor was  the only c o l o n i a l  o f f i c i a l i n d i r e c t and constant communication with the B r i t i s h administration which endowed him with blanket powers of review.  Yet this same authority was  to prove, i n  p r a c t i c e , a considerable weakness i n the governor's position. Colonial governors were chosen from the ranks of the B r i t i s h peerage, the m i l i t a r y hierarchy, or the various  20D  ocuments Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791. part 2 (ed. Short and Doughty) Canadian Archives, King's P r i n t e r ; Ottawa, 1918; sessional paper 18. A discussion of p e t i t i o n s and counter-petitions regarding the change of government i n Canada. T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Act of 1791 c a r e f u l l y enunciated the character and authority of an Executive Council to be rooted i n a landed a r i s t o c r a c y i n i m i t a t i o n of the House of Lords. 21  2?  p o l i t i c a l lobbies.  They were men  more often chosen f o r  t h e i r s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y than t h e i r administrative experience, which i t was  expected they should  acquire i n o f f i c e and with the a i d of t h e i r advisors. Unfortunately,  governors did not have adequate sources on  which to draw f o r information and advice. i n s t r u c t i o n s , by which the governor was absolutely bound, were formulated  The Home Office  supposed to be  by men  unfamiliar with  c o l o n i a l conditions, and as they depended upon the governor for a l l information the l a t t e r o f f i c i a l could hardly look to his superiors f o r constructive c r i t i c i s m .  Moreover, small  room f o r i n i t i a t i v e , to mould authority i n response to changing conditions, was  l e f t a governor always moving under  the threat of r e c a l l . An a l t e r n a t i v e source of support was  the  Executive  Council, regarded as the natural a l l y of the governor.  The  members' appointment depended upon the governor's nomination, but as they held their warrant f o r l i f e the c o u n c i l l o r s tended to form an almost unassailable coterie of business and p o l i t i c a l associates.  They functioned l e g i s l a t i v e l y as  a second chamber, and j u d i c i a l l y as the highest court of appeal, i n addition to t h e i r advisory capacity as Privy Council.  This s i t u a t i o n of mixed function was  i n part  dictated by the s c a r c i t y of e l i g i b l e o f f i c i a l s i n the colonies, and the Council thus contributed a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y to the c o l o n i a l establishment.  However, the  28  Council tended to become a family compact, monopolizing p o l i t i c a l and administrative posts (as a glance at the father-son successions i n a l l three maritime colonies, such as the Odells of New  Brunswick w i l l  illustrate),22  frequently subordinating public Interests to private concerns, and controlled by men whose occupations generally removed them from the market places of the c o l o n i a l settlements. Such a body could not be depended upon f o r impartial advice; nor could the Governor supplement t h e i r advice and simultaneously form attachments with the majority of society, by c a l l i n g to the P r i v y Council members of the Assembly, since p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e denied the co-terminus s i t t i n g of members i n the l e g i s l a t i v e and executive chambers.  The  Governor was thus informed by but h a l f of c o l o n i a l opinion, inadequately supplemented by the Assembly Speaker who  was  often controlled by the Executive. The Governor suffered further disadvantages  in  the denial of an adequate and co-operative c i v i l service, or the powers to e f f e c t i v e l y control i t . instrument of p o l i t i c a l manipulation was  The  essential  of l i m i t e d value  to c o l o n i a l governors since the Secretary of State wielded  l n Prince Edward Island p r a c t i c a l l y the whole Council, with a l l c i v i l p o s i t i o n s , were engrossed by the family network of Chief J u s t i c e Stewart and his sons John and Charles: John was Assembly Speaker and Charles was Clerk of the Council, while one son-in-law was Wm. Townshend, Customs C o l l e c t o r , with other children married to offspring of Councillor Thomas Desbrisay, and John was brother-in-law to T. Wright, Surveyor General. 2 2  29 patronage i n i t s most e f f e c t i v e areas.  Governors did enjoy  the right of nomination to o f f i c e , which i n B r i t i s h Forth American colonies l i k e Nova Scotia, during the post Revolution years, was encouraged as a means of wooing the L o y a l i s t population.  This enticement was put to e f f e c t i v e  use by many, l i k e Governor Wentworth of Nova S c o t i a , 3 but 2  was  subject always to the over-riding vote of the Home Office  which could i n f l i c t humiliating reversals upon a governor by r e j e c t i n g his nominees or suspending his o f f i c e r s . Many of the c i v i l servants i n the colonies were appointees of government departments other than the Home O f f i c e . The Treasury Board, Customs Board etc. maintained  t h e i r own  s t a f f s whose members were responsible d i r e c t l y to Whitehall. They were immune from the governor's supervision and frequently administered p o l i c i e s a t variance with his own instructions.  The Governor was surrounded by q u a r r e l l i n g  factions, himself often at odds with at least o n e — p a r t i c u l a r l y , i f he were a c i v i l i a n , with the resident naval and m i l i t a r y establishments.  His contradictory p o s i t i o n regarding  c o l o n i a l defence might be regarded as i n d i c a t i v e of the Governor's p o s i t i o n i n general.  He was held responsible f o r  the safety of the colony, yet the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s had seen f i t to s e t t l e command over the d i s c i p l i n e and  C 0 . 217/81, Uniacke-Castlereigh, June 8 , 1807. Uniacke complained of Wentworth's repeated appointments of h i s L o y a l i s t friends so that B r i t i s h and Nova Scotia born inhabitants had l i t t l e chance of o f f i c e . 2 3  30  disposition of the regular troops in the colony upon a military officer i n no way responsible to the governor, apart from a theoretical duty to keep him informed.  The  sweeping powers enjoyed by the executive authority in principle were thus greatly reduced i n practice; the weaknesses from which the Governor suffered were weaknesses undermining the general administration of colonial a f f a i r s , and were objects of complaint from the Assembly.  But this  body, with i t s machinery of local administration combined with local custom, was yet another obstacle to executive authority. The Assembly was meant to be the colonial version of the House of Commons, regarded as the voice of 'popular* opinion i n the colony.  In some respects i t served i t s duty  as the popular forum more f a i t h f u l l y than did the House of Commons--the colonists enjoyed a wider franchise than did their brothers in England, ^ and there did not exist so 2  powerful an aristocratic element exercising control over the electorate. 5 2  i n their powers, however, Assemblymen were  rather more limited, confined to purely local concerns of ^"In Prince Edward Island the early suffrage was extended to a l l male Protestants, while on the mainland freehold suffrage was enjoyed, with slightly higher property qualifications for Assembly members. MacKinnon, F.: The Government of Prince Edward Island; University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1951; P. 41. 2  5The British peerage had a weak substitute i n the wealthy merchant and o f f i c i a l class of the colonial urban centres. 2  31 which the r a i s i n g and appropriation of revenue was paramount. I f the relations of executive factions varied with their personnel, t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the Assembly maintained a steady course of dispute, both parties arguing r i v a l claims to control of the public purse as t h i s involved the d i v i s i o n of authority p r i n c i p l e .  During the post-Revolution decades  t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y the case i n the B r i t i s h North American colonies where Assemblies were only just beginning a concerted struggle for f i n a n c i a l control.  E a r l i e r , the  colonies' f i n a n c i a l troubles had rendered them dependent upon the resources and f i n a n c i a l d i r e c t i o n of the B r i t i s h administration.  Throughout the early seventeen-nineties  Governor Wentworth had l i t t l e trouble from the Nova Scotia Assembly which looked to him to guide them out of t h e i r f i n a n c i a l chaos; but by the end of the century the Assembly had acquired an independence and p o l i t i c a l sophistication that caused Wentworth to write: These general elections have during my time been very quiet and f r i e n d l y but are now i n many places thro' Mr. Tonge's interference agitated with improper zeal and animosity. He has i n s t i t u t e d corresponding S o c i e t i e s , Clubs and Committees professing reforms,, and proposing instructions as Tests f o r elections.2o Such a g i t a t i o n from the Assembly made them suspect i n England where officialdom's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of democracy was influenced by the years of revolution i n Europe and America.  26  C.O.  217/73>  Wentworth-King, November  27, 1799.  32  Yet the Assemblies sustained t h e i r arguments with reference to the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , demanding nothing more or less than the p r i v i l e g e s of the B r i t i s h House of Commons.  Governors were encouraged to r e s i s t any Assembly  demands f o r which there was no l e g a l authority or precedent, but they were not encouraged i n the old methods of coercion, and soon found such measures reversed by the Home O f f i c e . 7 2  Such a p o l i c y of c o n c i l i a t i o n may have been inspired by a fear of provoking a second Yorktown.  Officials  may have been so moved, as they viewed an international scene ridden with Jacobin argument and example, and the post-Napoleonic years were to prove t h e i r p o l i c y had been but temporary.  While i t endured, however, c o l o n i a l  Assemblies seized the opportunity to press claims to t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l heritage and to consolidate, wherever possible, a p o s i t i o n acknowledged i n various B r i t i s h judgements. ^ 2  They were to benefit also from the very weaknesses  that undermined the Executives near autocracy.  The  Assemblies might complain of the sinecure o f f i c e s b e d e v i l l i n g  27Ca stlereagh was p a r t i c u l a r l y emphatic about t h i s as he stressed the need f o r diplomacy and avoidance of provocation i n the governors' dealings with the Assembly. 28ln 1799 the Duke of Portland admitted the sole r i g h t of the New Brunswick Assembly to the d i r e c t i o n of money b i l l s ; he admitted the Assembly's claim to the right of mixing i t s grants as i t wished was not unconstitutional. C.O. I89/IO Portland-Carleton, June 9, 1796.  33  c o l o n i a l administration which escaped the provisions of Shelburne's A c t , 9 but the habit of administering 2  deputy provided  by c o l o n i a l  opportunities of establishing l o c a l custom  i n administration, while diminishing the ranks of the governor's English supporters.  Assembly and Executive  protested many of the same i n i q u i t i e s i n c o l o n i a l administrat i o n , but each sought a solution favourable  t o the extension  of i t s p a r t i c u l a r authority, and the ensuing contests  that  characterized c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s during this period were struggles to redefine and reconcile spheres of j u r i s d i c t i o n . Such was the framework of administration within which the Maritime colonies sought to develop and express themselves as mature and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t communities. Imperial t r a d i t i o n , imperial necessity, imperial argument were a l l to exert an influence upon the d i r e c t i o n of t h i s c o l o n i a l development, sometimes encouraging, sometimes obstructing.  European c o n f l i c t and B r i t i s h domestic  re-adjustment constituted the backdrop to Maritime a c t i v i t y during the Napoleonic decades, imposing a c e r t a i n pattern upon that a c t i v i t y .  I t i s , therefore, necessary t o keep this  backdrop i n view i f c o l o n i a l a c t i v i t y i s to be properly evaluated. 9 l n 1782 Shelburne had marshalled l e g i s l a t i o n requiring that appointees, i n England, to c o l o n i a l posts should serve i n the c o l o n i e s — b u t exempted were patents dated p r i o r to 1782, and the l e g i s l a t i o n was l a t e r successfully avoided by making appointments by sign manual. 2  CHAPTER II THE MARITIME SCENE, 1790-1814  The three Maritime colonies of B r i t i s h North America which stood on the threshold of t h e i r separate careers i n 1790  were communities fashioned by t h e i r  geographical condition, rendered p a r t i c u l a r l y sensitive to i t s dictates by t h e i r pioneer circumstance. was  This condition  one of i s o l a t i o n , cut off on t h e i r northern boundary by  the wilderness of the St. Lawrence 'North Shore,' and on the west by the unopened woodlands of the Maine border.  I t was  along the south and east coasts that the r e a l frontage of the Maritimes l a y , facing onto the A t l a n t i c trade routes between Great B r i t a i n and the United States.  I t was,  there-  fore, natural that the external t i e s of the Maritime colonies should be guided by these trade routes l i n k i n g them to B r i t a i n , New  England, and further south to the West  Indies; of t h e i r s i s t e r colonies i n B r i t i s h North America the Maritimes knew l i t t l e , and entertained small concern with their a f f a i r s .  As war with the United States twenty-  two years l a t e r was to i l l u s t r a t e , the interests Scotia, New  of Nova  Brunswick and Prince Edward Island were  determined by their dependence on the sea, f o r defence, l i v e l i h o o d , and communication. 34  When the Canadian colonists  35  accepted p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the c o n f l i c t of 1812, the Maritime colonies strengthened commercial r e l a t i o n s with New England i n mutual e x p l o i t a t i o n of mercantile chaos; and i t was from New England, rather than the Canadian struggles, that p o l i t i c a l ideas were borrowed f o r the Maritimers  1  own debates.  S i m i l a r l y , i t was t h e i r p o s i t i o n , rather than size or wealth, that gave the Maritime colonies significance i n the Empire.  Their command of the North A t l a n t i c lanes  rendered the Maritime ports important defence centres and commercial entrepots from which B r i t a i n might defend her concerns i n the New World and penetrate those of r i v a l powers.  During the p a r t i t i o n of Nova Scotia i n 1784 B r i t a i n  gave the Cape Breton island community a separate l e g i s l a t i v e existence, with promises of Assembly representation, out of proportion to the size and development of the community. But Cape Breton was regarded as a Gibraltar of the West to be kept under the sure d i r e c t i o n and surveillance of London, rather than the less dependable governance of H a l i f a x . Halifax h e r s e l f had been founded a t the command and expense of the B r i t i s h government as naval headquarters f o r the A t l a n t i c command, and i n 1790 she continued to enjoy a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n among the colonies with the B r i t i s h administration. I f wilderness borders and long sea runs cut Maritime t i e s with r e l a t i o n s and neighbours, these same  36  problems of geography weakened t i e s among settlements i n the colonies themselves.  Clinging to the southern t i p of Nova  Scotia, Yarmouth enjoyed easier access to Boston than to Pictou i n western Nova Scotiaj St. John preferred to conduct a f f a i r s through New York rather than Halifax, while Halifax looked f i r s t to London and the West Indies.  The s i t u a t i o n  could hardly be d i f f e r e n t where New Brunswick and Nova Scotia enjoyed but fourteen miles of common border, with even this l i n k rendered useless i n the absence of overland communications.  And Prince Edward Island led a lonely existence of  her own i n the Gulf of St. Lawrence.  Not only were they  physically i s o l a t e d , but geography varied the outlook of these colonies, and conditioned the emphasis given i n each to t h e i r external t i e s and influences.  Although New  Brunswick's  wilderness borders were poor bridges, they nevertheless i n s t i l l e d i n her a sharper awareness of continental t i e s than was entertained by her s i s t e r s .  The difference may be traced  through c o l o n i a l despatches i n which Governor Carleton* of New Brunswick strove v a i l y to impress on London and Halifax the importance of m i l i t a r y defence along the Maine b o r d e r — a necessity of lesser importance to Halifax o f f i c i a l s , secure i n their peninsular surroundings.  Their eyes were turned to  the Old Country where Nova Scotia's involvement i n the imperial interest was nourished by the naval establishment  •See Appendix.  37  and London shipping interests that guarded t h e i r concerns from her harbours.  And Prince Edward Island, without  neighbour or s i g n i f i c a n c e , was turned inward to a contemplat i o n of her own p e c u l i a r i t i e s .  Thus geography fostered a  particularism among the Maritime colonies giving each i t s sphere of p a r t i c u l a r concerns, while encompassing a l l i n a Maritime i n s u l a r i t y of detachment and preoccupation. ii. The i n s u l a r i t y that divided the Maritime colonies from the rest of B r i t i s h North America was enhanced by the economic character of the region where forces, peculiar to the Maritime s i t u a t i o n of the c o l o n i s t s , fashioned an economic milieu of pressures and problems quite d i f f e r e n t to that of t h e i r northern neighbours.  I t was through these  same economic forces that the communities of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick achieved some degree of Maritime unity, cutting across p r o v i n c i a l borders and p r o v i n c i a l differences. The Maritime colonies pursued the same primary occupations, producing the same a r t i c l e s of f i s h , timber and a g r i c u l t u r a l staples, with which they courted the same markets i n B r i t a i n , the West Indies, and New England.  Here  l a y the roots of commercial r i v a l r y , that could accent the separation of the colonies; indeed, such r i v a l r y did separate St. John and Halifax, but geography and the imperial system  38  combined to bridge such r i f t s .  In the absence of land  communications, sea t i e s determined  the d i r e c t i o n of economic  a c t i v i t y , cutting across p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s to follow the trade routes of the A t l a n t i c , the Gulf, and the Bay of Fundy. So the Annapolis V a l l e y joined the St. John River v a l l e y settlements i n designs upon the Massachusetts while Halifax looked east to London.  coasting trade,  Geography indicated a  natural sharing of trade routes and markets, as i t placed d i f f e r e n t emphasis on the d i r e c t i o n of regional interests that c a l l e d f o r interchange of export and import a r t i c l e s . But a complex of p r o v i n c i a l and imperial regulations hampered the flow of such interchange, as i t hampered the flow of external trade between the Maritimes and t h e i r natural markets.  The c o n f l i c t i n g demands of geography and  administrative p o l i c y created a tension and constant argument that became an i n t e g r a l element of Maritime c o l o n i a l l i f e . Economic s t a b i l i t y , and the maturity i t encouraged, were of slow growth, and i n some areas never achieved.  Through-  out t h i s Napoleonic period, Prince Edward Island remained an under-developed area, not yet meriting, or capable of sustaining the p o l i t i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of representative government.  Charlottetown was noted f o r i t s elegance, but  MacGregor commented upon the nature of that elegance: Charlottetown i s i n f i n i t e l y a cleaner place /than mainland settlements.7: the houses have also i n general an a i r of greater g e n t i l i t y ; the inhabitants are more fashionably dressed and have more the appearance of people who have either never been  39  engaged i n a c t i v e i n d u s t r i o u s p u r s u i t s , or who have r e t i r e d w i t h small incomes t o a country where they can l i v e cheaply.1 I t was the stagnant s o c i e t y o f a governing landowning c l a s s maintained by t h e non-productive e x p l o i t a t i o n o f i t s e s t a t e s . The  Assembly j o u r n a l s o f New Brunswick and Nova  S c o t i a r e f l e c t a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n these mainland c o l o n i e s , the l e g i s l a t i v e debates o u t l i n i n g an expanding sphere o f p r o v i n c i a l a c t i v i t i e s .  One c a n t r a c e the year by  year growth o f communities deep i n debt and s c r a p i n g a mere subsistence,  t o a s t a t e o f p r o s p e r i t y t h a t c o u l d support the  i n s t i t u t i o n s o f economic e x p a n s i o n . was  won by the a c c i d e n t s  Some o f t h i s  prosperity  o f geography and European diplomacy  which reaped a p r i v a t e e r ' s f o r t u n e during  2  the Napoleonic e r a .  f o r the Maritime  colonies  A k i n s d e s c r i b e d H a l i f a x i n 1800  as a scene of busy p r o s p e r i t y , w i t h war a t i t s h e i g h t and the P r i z e Court i n f u l l o p e r a t i o n ; 3  but Edward Winslow's  d e s c r i p t i o n o f New Brunswick i n 1793 gave a f a i r e r p i c t u r e o f the c o l o n i a l scene: Our province goes on i n the o l d way s l o w l y but t o l e r a b l y sure. The i n h a b i t a n t s g r a d u a l l y extend  •'•McGregor, J . : An H i s t o r i c a l and D e s c r i p t i v e Sketch o f the Maritime C o l o n i e s : W. Blackwood: London. 1828: p . ^79. I n 1801 H a l i f a x merchants voted £50,000 toward the establishment of a p r o v i n c i a l bank; whereas i n 1790 they could not have c o l l e c t e d £6000. Murdock: op., c i t . . p. 205. 2  3Akins, T.: "The H i s t o r y of H a l i f a x C i t y " ; Nova S c o t i a H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y ; v o l . 8; p. 129.  40  t h e i r c u l t i v a t i o n and we begin to f e e l the benefit of our exertions. We have good markets i n the towns and the inhabitants l i v e comfortably.4 Economic s t a b i l i t y was achieved slowly and f i t f u l l y , the halcyon days of privateering alternating with summers of s c a r c i t y , l i k e that of 1796 when there was not wheat enough to v i c t u a l the f i s h i n g f l e e t s .  Adverse land granting systems  were c i t e d as one cause of slow growth,5 the slow extension of communications and the absence of s u f f i c i e n t  'encouragement  f o r basic industry were others, while the shortage of money was a perennial problem.  Agriculture was the basic industry  on which a l l other economic a c t i v i t y depended, but as Governor Wentworth pointed out to the Colonial Secretary i n 1804, i t was inadequate to meet the colonies' needs, and the s e t t l e r s ' commercial transactions were concentrated, i n these early years, on securing s u f f i c i e n t supplies of staples. The growth of provisions, the indispensable basis of a l l other industry, increases greatly and w i l l soon be abundantly good and cheap, except i n bread, corn, for which there are s u f f i c i e n t lands of proper q u a l i t y to produce a superabundance of every sort as any i n America, but from want of encouragement i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y attended to and of course considerable sums of money are continually drained from thence to the United States to purchase bread and f l o u r f o r the inhabitants of.the sea port towns and to supply the King's stores." ^Cited i n Raymond:  op., c i t . : p. 470.  5ln 1790 New Brunswick had a population of 12,000 and by I803 had grown to only 2J?>000 i n which year the Assembly voted £300 toward a campaign to encourage immigration to the colony. Hannay, J . : History of New Brunswick: John Bowes; St. John, 1909. °Cited i n Murdock:  op.. £i£., p. 233.  1  41  On the other hand was  the success of the shipbuilding centres  at St. Andrews and St. Stephens, the expansion of the gypsum mining around Passamaquoddy Bay where exports of one hundred tons i n 1794  had r i s e n to fourteen hundred tons i n 1802,7 and  the steady growth of settlements  l i k e Pictou boasting some  f i v e thousand inhabitants i n 1803  where only four hundred  families had established the town i n 1790.^  I t was Murdock's  opinion that the decision of Messrs. Mortimer and Fulton to run as candidates f o r Colchester and Pictou i n the 1800 Nova Scotia e l e c t i o n was  due, not so much to the machinations of  an anti-administration part (as Governor Wentworth insisted) as  to. the natural desire for l o c a l representation on the  part of communities now grown beyond dependence upon sponsors from the c a p i t a l . 9 And with the encouragement given the timber industry i n 1810,  when B r i t a i n ' s exclusion from  continental Europe threw her back upon c o l o n i a l resources, further impetus was  given Maritime expansion as the Miramichi  and Restigouche valleys were penetrated communities and business enterprises.  by lumbering During the l a t e r years  of t h i s period the c r i e s of protest from fishermen and merchants were often those of men guard and nourish.  THannay:  9  I b i d . : p.  prosperity to  The insurance, banking, and canal building  op., c i t .  190.  with a new  42  schemes of the merchant a s s o c i a t i o n s were one  f a c e t of  c o l o n i a l i n d u s t r y ; indeed, the Committee of Merchants organized i n H a l i f a x i n 1804, was  and  promoting these schemes,  a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n the economic and  of Nova Scotia.1° Simeon P e r k i n s *  The  living  one  political  f a m i l y concerns l i k e t h a t  life  of  i n L i v e r p o o l , c o n s t i t u t e d another  facet. Through the t e r s e e n t r i e s of h i s d i a r y ,  Perkins  d e p i c t s a s m a l l s c a l e commercial e n t e r p r i s e t h a t drew on a v a r i e t y o f s t a p l e r e s o u r c e s to p r o v i s i o n a c o a s t a l  shipping  trade whose dimensions were d e f i n e d  by the needs of i t s home  p o r t and  of h i s wood l o t , the  region.  U p o n the h a r v e s t  progress of h i s wheat c r o p , and  the f o r t u n e s  of h i s f i s h i n g  v e s s e l s on the Newfoundland banks depended P e r k i n ' s for  cargoes  the West I n d i e s , from whence he would s a i l w i t h goods to  trade  f o r s t a p l e produce i n the c o a s t a l towns of the  States.  L i k e other communities of i t s k i n d , L i v e r p o o l  n e i t h e r s t a p l e s nor n a v a l Perkins'  United  s u p p l i e s enough f o r i t s use,  imports were c h i e f l y g r a i n , v e g e t a b l e s , and  p i t c h , t a r and  turpentine,  and  had and  livestock  o c c a s i o n a l l y lumber from the  0 f these merchants, G.F. B u t l e r comments "The Committee was the mouthpiece of a body of e n l i g h t e n e d t r a d e r s who r e c o g n i z e d a g r i c u l t u r e as the handmaid of commerce, and who attempted to a i d other i n t e r e s t s and to u n i t e w i t h them i n promoting the w e l l b e i n g of the P r o v i n c e . " " E a r l y Organizat i o n of the H a l i f a x Merchants"; Nova S c o t i a H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . 25 (1941); p. 2. 1 0  *See Appendix.  43  United States; from the West Indies he brought rum, molasses, and sugar for home consumption and to supply an outside trade meant t o finance the purchase of B r i t i s h manufactures that were a necessity t o a non-industrial community.  Such were the  a c t i v i t i e s occupying the energies of the t y p i c a l Maritime c o l o n i s t , l o c a l l y orientated and not infrequently a t odds with the larger merchant concerns of Halifax and St. John which they f e d .  Prom the interplay of the small and large  concerns was woven the economic-political pattern of Maritime society. iii. When the L o y a l i s t s entered Nova Scotia i n 1784, they found a population whose core was drawn from New England, mixed with a scattering of Scots, Germans, I r i s h , Acadians under the administration of B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y and c i v i l officials.  In the early days of settlement the tested and  ready made New England pioneer was preferred t o the B r i t i s h greenhorn from army transport and immigrant ship.  But with  t h e i r industry, the New Englanders brought a p o l i t i c a l precocity that offended Governor Lawrence's p a t e r n a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s of government, and from the ensuing clashes was born the Governor's p o l i c y of introducing agrarian German settlers.  From these men i n t h e i r South Shore settlements,  centered about the town of Luxenburg founded i n 1753» he could expect a quiet service to the land and laws they found,  44  unlike the r e s t l e s s a c t i v i t y of t h e i r trade minded neighbours from Massachusetts. The i n f l u x of New I76O.  England s e t t l e r s began around  These immigrants were c h i e f l y farmers and fishermen  urged from t h e i r homeland by economic pressures—the need f o r new land or easier access to the f i s h i n g banks—and they brought with them the p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s of t h e i r New England environment which were to mold the character of t h e i r new homes, and strengthened the t i e s of the A t l a n t i c communities.  The f i s h i n g population had  established i t s e l f along the South Shore of Nova Scotia, with centres at Yarmouth, Barrington and Liverpool; while the farming s e t t l e r s had spread over the Minas Basin, Annapolis River v a l l e y and Chignecto areas, establishing the small communities of Horton, Cornwallis, Annapolis, G r a n t i l l e , Truro, Onslow, Windsor.  Beyond Sackville and Amherst, which  marked the fringe of substantial settlement, there were scattered outsettlements i n the Bale Chaleur and Passamaquoddy Bay regions where small f i s h i n g and trading centres had been established, while north of St. John a sizeable trading community had been given the name of Naugerville.  This tide  of settlement i n the seventeen s i x t i e s had been followed a few years l a t e r by Alexander MacNutt's sponsored  Immigration  of Ulster I r i s h to consolidate the towns of Truro, Onslow and Londonderry;  then by the entrance of a Yorkshire group into  45  the marshy isthmus of Cumberland County; and f i n a l l y by the Scots who  settled along the peninsula shores of Northumberland  S t r a i t i n 1773,  to e s t a b l i s h the town of Pictou.  Such was the pattern of settlement i n Nova Scotia i n 1 7 8 4 — s c a t t e r e d r u r a l communities detached from t h e i r c a p i t a l at Halifax by the obstacles of geography and the differences of occupation and outlook.  Halifax was  stamped  by the character of i t s merchant houses, m i l i t a r y and naval establishments, and an o f f i c i a l class p o l i t i c a l l y and r e l i g i o u s l y orthodox.  The r u r a l settlements, on the other  hand, had retained t h e i r non-conformist  sympathies,  political  l i b e r a l i s m , and a degree of independence engendered by the conditions of settlement.  Among the settlements outside  Halifax, Luxenburg continued a small bastion of government support, while Liverpool earned a reputation as a r e s t l e s s , enterprising community of fishermen and small traders, Annapolis i n these days was a f a i r l y substantial trade centre for the Fundy region, and Windsor stood apart from i t s neighbours as the private estate of Halifax officialdom. area surrounding t h i s small town was  The  owned by government  o f f i c e r s and farmed on a tenant basis, the farms interspersed with m i l i t a r y h o l d i n g s — i t was natural that Halifax should l a t e r designate the town as the s i t e of the p r o v i n c i a l college, which must be secured against democratic and nonconformist influences. Beyond the fringes of peninsula settlement were outposts with a t r a d i t i o n of detachment from  46 Halifax governance. I t was, then, a mixed society that greeted the L o y a l i s t immigrants,  but a society characterized by a basic  dualism of Old and New England which the newcomers were to strengthen.  Sam S l i c k was to comment l a t e r that:  The old stock comes from New England, and the breed i s tolerable pure yet, near about one h a l f applesauce, and t'other h a l f molasses, a l l except to Eastard where there i s a cross of the S c o t c h . i l iv. Onto t h i s ragged patchwork of settlement was projected the L o y a l i s t immigration of 1784, to consolidate and expand settlement, i n some instances to emphasize and i n others to c o n f l i c t with the New England t r a d i t i o n s of the old s e t t l e r s , and to cause a general re-orientation of Maritime r e l a t i o n s .  I t was natural that the L o y a l i s t s should  have directed t h e i r f l i g h t to Nova Scotia, i n acquiescence with B r i t a i n ' s design f o r populating her northern colonies, f o r Halifax and i t s outports had long been known to the Thirteen Colonies as commercial adjuncts of the Boston and New York merchant houses. 35)000 refugees.  There came, then, a t i d e of some  The newcomers were c h i e f l y of the 'humbler'  sort, as the more i n f l u e n t i a l classes of wealthy merchants, o f f i c i a l s and professional men early migrated to England where t i e s of influence i n government and business were  1:L  H a l i b u r t o n , T.C.:  The Clockmaker.  4 ?  looked to for compensation.  Nevertheless, there were  included among the s e t t l e r s men  of a b i l i t y whose experience  at the bar and i n the l e g i s l a t u r e s of the Thirteen Colonies introduced a new  element into the Maritime p o l i t i c a l  scene.  During the following decades, the r e g i s t e r s of o f f i c i a l s and representatives were scattered with L o y a l i s t names whose bearers were to prove a mixed blessing to t h e i r communities. For the L o y a l i s t s brought problems.  With t h e i r settlement  was born the land grant controversy that plagued c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s f o r many years.  As successive waves of immigrants  over-flowed settlements and knocked awry every Halifax estimate, i n e q u a l i t i e s i n land grants ensued, to divide classes and provide an arguing point f o r i n t e r n a l dissension. Such a sudden i n f l u x threw on the shoulders of the poorly financed, inadequately staffed Halifax government the burden of providing f o r some thousands of bewildered and indignant immigrants.  The d i s p e r s a l of these newcomers  exposed a lack of communications and l o c a l administrative i n s t i t u t i o n s that rendered impossible any e f f e c t i v e system of government from H a l i f a x . Nor were these  difficulties  made easier by the companion problem of a s s i m i l a t i o n .  A  d i s p a r i t y of experience and consequent a t t i t u d e s divided old and new  s e t t l e r s who met often with mutual suspicions of  motives and p r i n c i p l e s .  The Nova Scotian Assembly p e t i t i o n  for a i d "to your Majesty's old and not less  faithful  48 subjects"- 1  2  r e f l e c t e d the old residents' resentment of the  L o y a l i s t s ' virtuous flaunting of hardship; nor had  the  resident Nova Scotians f e l t the persecution that moulded the L o y a l i s t character i n which conservatism and B r i t i s h l o y a l t y were i n t e n s i f i e d by bitterness-.  The condescension i n  Governor Parr's comment that "there i s not a s u f f i c i e n t proportion of men  of education and a b i l i t y among the  adventurers"-*^ was  but one of many i r r i t a n t s .  And  present  suspicion  grew into complaint as L o y a l i s t s accused the Halifax administration of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s and i n j u s t i c e s , born of ignorance and lack of i n t e r e s t .  Colonel T. Dundas* voiced  the discontent and suspicion that coloured L o y a l i s t attitudes concerning Nova Scotian society:  "They /fhe  L o y a l i s t s ? have experienced every possible i n j u r y from the old inhabitants of Nova Scotia, who are even more disaffected toward the B r i t i s h Government than any of the new  States  ever were.  This makes me much doubt t h e i r remaining long  dependent."  14  Similar d i f f i c u l t i e s had necessitated the  d i v i s i o n of Prince Edward Island from Nova Scotia i n 1767* and the process was  12  repeated i n 1784  when the area north of  C.O. 217/62, Assembly-Whitehall, March 18,  1790.  ^ W a l l a c e , W.S.: The United Empire L o y a l i s t s : Brooke and Co.; Toronto, 1914. Eaymond, W.O. (ed.): Winslow Papers 1776-1826: Sun P r i n t i n g Co.; St. John, 1901; p. 337. C o l . Thomas DundasE a r l Cornwallis, December 28, 1786. 14  •See Appendix.  49  the Chignecto peninsula was  separated  from the Halifax  administration and created as the province of New  Brunswick.  The L o y a l i s t s exerted a varied influence upon the character of the Maritime colonies.  With family t i e s i n New  England that outlived the bitterness of Revolution, they underlined the Nova Scotians  1  sense of divided l o y a l t i e s .  When the bickering of trans-Atlantic diplomacy strained t h i s d i v i s i o n i n following decades, Maritimers were to echo the e a r l i e r cry of Yarmouth s e t t l e r s that "we  have Fathers,  Brothers and s i s t e r s i n that country /New  England?, we  are  divided between natural a f f e c t i o n to our nearest r e l a t i o n s , and good F a i t h and Friendship to our King and Country." ^ 1  Maritime reaction to the British-American war  i n 1812  was  informed by t h i s consciousness of family t i e s . The impact of the immigrants  1  a r r i v a l varied  throughout the Maritime region with the d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e i r settlements.  A small band of L o y a l i s t s merged with  the agrarian population of Prince Edward Island, too scattered to exert an appreciable influence.  In the  peninsula of Nova Scotia they spread throughout the nine counties, favouring the more f i r m l y established a g r i c u l t u r a l areas of Annapolis, Halifax and Sidney Counties, while an  Incited i n Martin, C : The Empire and Commonwealth: studies i n Governance and Self-Government i n Canada: Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1929; p. 86. ~~~~  50 estimated 12,000, attracted by the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of Port Roseway harbour on the South Shore, established the new county and town of Shelburne.  But the majority directed  t h e i r migration toward the northern areas of the mainland colony, where land was r i c h and sparsely s e t t l e d , to e s t a b l i s h the L o y a l i s t colony of New Brunswick.  Although a few  s e t t l e d i n the most northern areas of the Mirimachie and Restigouche v a l l e y s and Bale Chaleur, the most popular regions among the L o y a l i s t s were those of the S t . John River v a l l e y and the Passamaquoddy Bay which very quickly gave evidence of the divergent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that were t o colour New Brunswick p o l i t i c s i n subsequent years.  The r i v e r  v a l l e y counties of York, Kings, Queens and Sudbury were predominantly a g r i c u l t u r a l , whereas S t . John and Charlotte Counties, covering the east shore of Passamaquoddy Bay and the offshore islands, were commercial areas.  St. Andrews was  established by s e t t l e r s from the Penobscot region of Maine, who sought a centre from which to exploit t h e i r former coastal trade and to maintain t i e s with New England, while Governor Carleton long held the c i t i z e n s of S t . John i n suspicion as commercial exploiters of dubious sentiments rather than bona f i d e L o y a l i s t s .  political I t was no  wonder, then, that L o y a l i s t o f f i c i a l s should have established t h e i r c a p i t a l at the l i t t l e settlement of St. Annes i n the  51 heart of the conservative farming community; - nor was i t 1  0  surprising that Carleton should have sought to harness St, John's opposition by the seeming l i b e r a l gesture of granting a c i t y charter.  The charter was  conservative model of New government supporters  one fashioned on the  York and administered  by  two  (G. Ludlou and W. Chipman as mayor  and recorder*). The L o y a l i s t immigration was  the basis of  Maritime development i n the following decades, but i t was a mixed contribution.  One commentator on this period regarded  the L o y a l i s t immigration as a b e n e f i c i a l addition to the Maritimes: These men brought along with them industrious habits, large sums of money, vessels, merchandise, c a t t l e and f u r n i t u r e , and most of them being i n t e l l i g e n t men, the courts of justice and the l e g i s l a t u r e s became consequently more respectable than i n most new colonies.17 But the newcomers were often unsuited for the agrarian l i v e l i h o o d offered them, and unfamiliar with the  pioneer  element that t h e i r fathers had conquered long before i n New England.  Their e f f o r t s i n establishing a new  home were  l°In the 1802 elections York, Queens and Kings voted s o l i d l y i n support of the government, St. John and Charlotte counties i n opposition, while the further removed counties of Westmorland and Northumberland were divided i n t h e i r a f f e c t i o n s . l^McGregor:  op., cit.« p.  •See Appendix.  300.  52  often pursued i n a manner that inspired the observation that agriculture was neglected, as a disreputable occupation, "fathers holding to the plow only from necessity, while sons skulked from r u r a l labours to the woods, or to seek f o r employment on board of coasting v e s s e l s . " ^ 1  The new era of  Maritime development was undertaken with dreams, but not always with the common sense required f o r t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n , and the fate of many s e t t l e r s was r e f l e c t e d i n the fate of Shelburne town.  The f i n e natural harbour of Port Roseway  attracted many who thought to reconstruct there the wealth and influence they had known i n Boston and New York.  Some  12,000 immigrants flooded the d i s t r i c t i n 1784 and raised a town whose splendour was reduced to empty houses and deserted wharves almost as quickly as i t had r i s e n .  The  reasons were summarized several decades l a t e r by R.J. Uniacke:* Remote from the other settlements of the Province, surrounded by the forest without roads, situated too f a r from the entrance of the harbour, to reap the advantages of the f i s h i n g grounds, and f i l l e d with people who were unacquainted with the mode of s e t t l i n g the wilderness, i t was impossible that such a town, so constituted could long exist.19  l 8  Ibid.:  p. 390.  •See Appendix. i^Hallburton, T.C.: A General Description of Nova Scotia: Royal Aeadian School; Halifax, 1825 j p. 379.  53 Similar mistakes and obstacles lay behind many of the struggles that occupied Maritime energies during the decades of Napoleonic c o n f l i c t . v. The Maritime scene i n 1790 presented a tangled  web  of s o c i a l factionalism, woven from the varied strands of geography, economic ooncern, and h i s t o r i c a l background. The p o l i t i c a l controversies that pursued one another across the colonial stage during the Napoleonic decades must be set against an ever-changing backdrop of f a c t i o n a l  rivalries,  personal feuds, class d i v i s i o n s , and c o n f l i c t i n g economic interests.  The basic pattern of s o c i a l character was  there:  an administrative class of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s or c o l o n i a l appointees sharing Whitehall's outlook, a merchant class that was  orientated about the few urban centres and  often  fused with officialdom, a r u r a l community engaged i n farming, f i s h i n g and small trading enterprises.  But i t was a pattern  varied by s h i f t i n g alignments where t i e s of kinship, region, and s e l f - i n t e r e s t constantly broke across another to render impossible any d e f i n i t i o n of 'party.' Although every controversy, be i t s o c i a l , economic, or personal In character, became ammunition f o r the adversaries of the l e g i s l a t i v e h a l l s , the changing  composition  of each f a c t i o n a l contest allows only a vague d e f i n i t i o n of 'the administration* and  'the opposition.'  Assembly and  54  Council remained the headquarters of the opposing camps i n each controversy; the p o l i t i c a l leaders i n each house remained r e l a t i v e l y consistent i n t h e i r positions, but the composition of their forces changed as the importance  of h i s  d i f f e r e n t t i e s varied f o r each i n d i v i d u a l , according to circumstance.  Thus, the f r i c t i o n of L o y a l i s t and pre-  Loyalist which divided Nova Scotia s o c i a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y during the early post-Revolution days gave b i r t h to the Assembly-Council  controversies that directed the colony's  p o l i t i c a l course through subsequent decades.  Yet these same  t i e s of regional o r i g i n were frequently subject to the contrary demands of l e g i s l a t i v e r i v a l l r y and personal ambition, while the gradual r e s o l u t i o n of e a r l i e r s o c i a l divisions wrought s i m i l a r changes i n p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s . Exerting pressures from the s i d e l i n e s , to vary these basic p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s , were the ever-present contests of r u r a l and urban communities, of the outpost farmer and the Halifax merchant, of the c o l o n i a l c i v i l i a n and the B r i t i s h officer. Governor Parr's comment that " i t i s not an easy matter to s a t i s f y an expecting L o y a l i s t " ^ indicated the 2  f i r s t problem faced by the Maritime communities during their early years of post-Revolution settlement.  These  were differences of outlook and experience d i v i d i n g the  20  C.O. 217/72, Parr-Napean, A p r i l 18,  1788.  55 L o y a l i s t immigrants from the established population of Nova Scotia.  The early core of New  England farmers and  had brought with them a heritage of those very  fishermen  'democratic*  ideas that had erupted into the Revolution rejected by the L o y a l i s t newcomers.  The accidents of geography and h i s t o r y  had insulated the Nova Scotia Yankee from the more extreme interpretation given those ideas by the Revolution, and from the persecution which had embittered L o y a l i s t attitudes to such ideas.  The p o l i t i c a l  consequences of these differences  were to be f e l t throughout Governor Wentworth's regime, a f t e r the i n i t i a l struggle between old and new place and power had been resolved. dictated more by p o l i t i c a l political  settlers for  That t h i s struggle was  ambition than by c o n f l i c t s of  p o l i c i e s would seem to be born out by the course  of the struggle and i t s r e s o l u t i o n . In the f i r s t skirmish, projected by the j u d i c i a l controversy of 1780,  the c o n f l i c t was  one between a L o y a l i s t  inspired Assembly and a Council and Bench dominated by the older s e t t l e r s .  Studies of t h i s period have shown the  L o y a l i s t numbers to have voted together throughout the f i r s t f i v e sessions of the Sixth Assembly (1782-1792),  21  though  without organizing as a d i s t i n c t party or enunciating a precise p o l i c y .  2 1  xvl  Ells,  M.:  (1937).  I t may have been that the immediate,  "Sparks of Liberty"; Dalhousie Review, v o l .  56  p r a c t i c a l concerns of p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s — j u d i c i a l reform, revenue control—were  too pressing to allow of the more  gradual development of a programme of p o l i t i c a l theory on which to r a i s e party s t r u c t u r e .  I t may have been, too, that  suspicion and r i v a l r y were too strong sentiments influencing the mutual reactions of L o y a l i s t and pre-Loyalist to make possible the sustained cooperation necessitated by party association.  C e r t a i n l y there was strong opposition from  both groups i n the Assembly to the idea of organizing as a d i s t i n c t party, despite the cooperation that old s e t t l e r s , l i k e Tonge Sr. and Welfoung were w i l l i n g t o give the L o y a l i s t leadership of Sterns, Taylor and Barclay* throughout the j u d i c i a l b a t t l e . L o y a l i s t ambitions  Not to be forgotten were the  2 2  of o f f i c e that required a free hand f o r  the e x p l o i t a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l s h u f f l i n g of the times. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that i n 1 7 9 2 , with the j u d i c i a l controversy scarcely forgotten, Major T. Barclay, who had spoken vigorously against the abuse of j u s t i c e by Judge Deschamps,**was giving strong support to the executive forces as Assembly Speaker. 3 2  22  Murdock:  Indeed, by the end of the  op.. ci£., p. 7 0 - 7 2 .  See Chapter Four.  *See Appendix. **See Appendix. 3 i n l a t e r years, as a recognized spokesman f o r the imperial i n t e r e s t he was appointed B r i t i s h Consul to the Eastern states, and a member of the Maine-New Brunswick boundary commission. 2  57  decade, former r e b e l l i o u s L o y a l i s t s were f i l l i n g the seats of Government.  In 1 7 9 7 Sterns was appointed Solicitor-General,  thus becoming a colleague of Chief Justice Blowers,* whom eight years before the lawyer had denounced as a t r a i t o r to the Loyalist-Assembly c a u s e .  24  By 1 8 0 3 the Executive Council  was dominated by the Loyalist-merchant f a c t i o n which had conveniently forgotten i t s e a r l i e r denunciations of executive claims, which i t now  claimed f o r i t s own. ^ 2  The regime of  Governor ?fentworth reached i t s peak of power with the consolidation of the L o y a l i s t hold on administration. The importance  of the L o y a l i s t assault, and i t s  consequences on domestic a f f a i r s , varied throughout  the  three Maritime colonies, according to the conditions of  •See Appendix. Blowers had resigned his p o s i t i o n as Assembly Speaker to take the Attorney Generalship i n 1789. Morrison, G.: "The Evolution of P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Nova Scotia"; unpublished M.A. t h e s i s , Dalhousie University, 1949. 24  ^ I n 1789 the Nova Scotia Council included J . Pemberton (Chief J u s t i c e ) , R. Bulkely (Provincial Secretary), H. Newton, A Gould, A. Brymer, I. Deschamps, T. Cochran, J . Halliburton, H. Duncan, S.S. Blowers (Attorney G e n e r a l ) — o n l y Blowers was a L o y a l i s t . But i n I803 the Council membership had changed almost completely to include S.S. Blowers (Chief J u s t i c e ; , J . Halliburton, J . Brenton, B. Wentworth (Provincial Secretary), J.B. Butter, A. Belcher, C.N. Wentworth, L. Hartshorne, N. Wallace, A. Croke, W. Forsyth. Dr. Croke was an E n g l i s h o f f i c i a l , W. Forsythe a Scottish merchant, and A. Belcher a pre-Loyalist merchant, while the remainder were of L o y a l i s t o r i g i n , merchants or lawyers by profession. In comparison, the New Brunswick Council presented a uniformly L o y a l i s t character throughout t h i s period with few changes i n membership. 2  58  L o y a l i s t settlement.  In Prince Edward Island, with i t s small  and scattered population dominated by the p o l i c i e s of a landowning minority, the impact of the L o y a l i s t immigration of small consequence.  The newcomers mingled with the  was tenant  farming community, embraced as t h e i r own the colony's land grant complaints, and added but one more small voice to the rumbling  protest.  In New  Brunswick, s e t t l e d as a homogeneous  L o y a l i s t province, the c o n f l i c t of old and new of small proportions and short duration.  settlers  was  There existed,  rather, a class struggle carried by the L o y a l i s t s from the more developed communities of New  England.  During the early  years of settlement there were murmurings of discontent from the lower c l a s s , protesting abuses i n land granting and favouritism i n o f f i c e , to which the r e s e n t f u l minority of older s e t t l e r s joined t h e i r voice.  But the protest was  of major proportions, nor did the colony experience  not  the  almost f r a n t i c campaign of o f f i c e s o l i c i t a t i o n waged by Governor Wentworth on behalf of h i s L o y a l i s t colleagues i n Nova S c o t i a . In the despatches passing between Governor Carleton and the Colonial O f f i c e there appear few of the p e t i t i o n s for Council seats, or recommendations of 'my worthy countrymen'  that form so large a part of Governor Wentworth's  correspondence.  Nor do there appear such complaints  Carleton's regime as were submitted  of  to the Colonial Office by  one anonymous c r i t i c of Wentworth's administration.  "The  59  Government of this province i s sunk to the lowest p i t c h i n the estimation of the bulk of i t s people," he affirmed, due to Wentworth's subservience to the merchant-land speculating factions of Hartshorne and Wallace who  "relieve his needs  and use h i s authority f o r t h e i r own advancement," thus successfully obstructing assembly demands regarding appropriations and land reform. ^ 2  Carleton's regime was  The greater o b j e c t i v i t y of Governor  indicated by his early judgement on the  application of Edward Winslow (a valued supporter of the New  Brunswick administration) f o r a Supreme Court  judgeship:  The colonel i s not a professional man and his talents I apprehend would not atone f o r h i s want of Low Knowledge; besides, i n a Province where there are several respectable men of the Bar, such an appointment could not f a i l to give dissatisfaction.27 Differences i n the characters of the two governors cannot be ignored, but there were a l s o differences of s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l conditions which seemingly demanded the e x p l o i t a t i o n of patronage from one and not from the other.  Certainly  Carleton was by no means adverse to the use of patronage when he considered i t necessary for the strengthening and protection of the  Executive.28  2°C.O. 217/81, Anonymous l e t t e r to Castlereagh, August 26,  1805. 2  7Raymond:  op,, c i t . . p. 447.  ^ l n 1792 Carleton demanded the sole r i g h t to nominate o f f i c i a l appointments to B r i t a i n , without interference from the Assembly with i t s 'democratic*ideas, for 'such a S p i r i t 2  60 It was with similar arguments of administrative defence that Governor Wentworth j u s t i f i e d h i s generous use of patronage.  While he might wield t h i s f o r the advancement or  remuneration of personal f r i e n d s , 9 Wentworth seems to have 2  concentrated on the less d i r e c t methods of surrounding himself with an Assembly and Council of sympathetic colleagues. On such control of government would the success of h i s administrative p o l i c i e s depend, and the importance of these to Wentworth might be seen i n the stress he l a i d upon h i s r i g h t to be consulted on a l l government appointments. not  I t was  mere pettiness, or personal pique that inspired Wentworth  to complain i n 1795> concerning the projected appointment of a Chief J u s t i c e . I named a person to you some time since, but I would wish, i f h i s friends should apply, that i t should be understood that I have good opinion of him, but that some reference to me i s thought advisable whoever may succeed.30  w i l l not f a i l to appear whenever i t i s understood the most important appointments may be obtained without Government intervention and perhaps by persons known i n the Country to be ambitious of embarrassing the administration." C O . 188/4, Carleton-Dundas, September 2 . 9 w e n t w o r t h was assiduous i n securing a m i l l i n g monopoly with control of army f l o u r contracts f o r h i s merchant friends Hartshorne and Tremaine, whose names frequently head the merchant memorials supporting government l e g i s l a t i o n . C O . 217/ , October 2 ? , 1792. 2  3°Ells, N.: "Governor Wentworth's Patronage"j Nova Scotia H i s t o r i c a l Society, v o l . 25 ( 1 9 4 2 ) .  61  He must control the composition of h i s l e g i s l a t i v e and advisory bodies i f he was to secure the administration of a stong Imperial-executive government, which was regarded by Wentworth as the only alternative to and protection from a r e p e t i t i o n of the republican chaos he had experienced i n New Hampshire. Wentworth was forever on guard against popular agitators.  Opposition to the administration could only be  regarded as s e d i t i o n , while the governor's personal enemies were invariably denounced as d i s l o y a l , as "dark and insiduous, secretly connected with seditious p u r p o s e s . S u c h  was h i s  judgement of Richard Uniacke who dared support Assembly claims against executive interference, and even stronger was Wentworth's denunciation of Cotnam Tonge J r . as a t o o l of the Devil.  From this same obsession with d i s l o y a l t y which  compelled him to manipulate an administration of t r i e d and true L o y a l i s t s , grew Wentworth's changing attitude toward the Assembly.  During the years spanning the turn of the century,  both Assembly and Council had been sympathetic toward Wentworth, and the Governor had shown l i t t l e concern over the sporadic quarrelling occasioned by the Assembly's claims to financial control.  But as the Assembly began to take an  increasingly independent lead from the Governor around  33-C.O. 217/39, Wentworth-Whitehall,  January 23,  1795.  1804,  62  and to absorb more members i n sympathy with Wentworth's enemies, the Governor's opposition to the Assembly increased, with the resultant c r i e s of 1804-07 i n a l l t h e i r b i t t e r n e s s . With the consolidation of Wentworth s regime 1  resolving the i n i t i a l d i v i s i o n of L o y a l i s t and pre-Loyalist, the stage was  freed f o r the development of the larger contest  between Council and Assembly. predecessor,  This contest grew out of i t s  the p o l i t i c a l differences embittered  and  given  character by the fears and suspicions that had inspired the i n i t i a l dispute.  This second was  chiefly a political  arguing r i v a l interpretations of the three way  contest,  d i v i s i o n of  authority outlined by the B r i t i s h Constitution.  But beneath  the r i v a l r y of l e g i s l a t u r e and executive, there lay the f r i c t i o n between colony and mother country that was voiced i n p e t i t i o n s complaining  repeatedly  of the conduct of B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l s , and of Council claims made i n the name of Imperial administration.  Throughout t h e i r campaign, Assembly members  were attempting  to secure the f u l l e s t c o l o n i a l a p p l i c a t i o n of  B r i t i s h parliamentary  p r a c t i c e , and i n so doing, they were  combatting, i n the person of the Executive Council, the Mother Country's reluctance to recognize such claims to p o l i t i c a l maturity as t h i s implied.  C o l o n i a l pride lay at  the root of much of the f r i c t i o n — a pride that chafed at maternal apron s t r i n g s , and resented the condescension of i t s elders.  63 This dispute that erupted between the Assembly and Judge Croke* of the Vice-Admiralty Court, almost from t h e i r f i r s t encounter i n 1802,  was  indicative of f e e l i n g i n the  colony toward the d i c t a t i o n of what was frequently i l l informed imperial p o l i c y .  The judge's firm intention to  educate and d i s c i p l i n e the colony i n the interests of imperial well-being was a sure goad to the i r e of h i s colonial neighbours, and even of h i s government colleagues.  32 The f r i c t i o n bedevilling r e l a t i o n s of the two Houses during the term of Croke's Council Presidency was  i n part due to  the Assembly's I d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the whole executive body and p o l i c y with Croke's p r i n c i p l e s of executive domination and complete c o l o n i a l subordination.  To accept such claims,  with t h e i r sweeping theories of the Crown's prerogative  was  to admit defeat for the p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a l c o l o n i a l l e g i s l a t i v e independence with which Cotnam Tonge his Assembly colleagues.  instructed  Although the Assembly was mistaken  i n so completely i d e n t i f y i n g the Council with t h e i r President, •See Appendix. 3 The Executive Council was moved to p e t i t i o n against Croke's disregard of the "small and poor province" where he observed " i t must frequently happen . . . that many persons are admitted members, respectable i n themselves, but c e r t a i n l y not of s u f f i c i e n t consequence to be ranked above the Judge of the Admiralty." C O . 217/77, Croke-Hobart, January 25, 1802. 2  64  for the councillors had shown a hesitancy to embrace a p o l i c y that events of previous years had rendered  impossible  reactionarianism, yet the text of certain Council complaints would seem to vindicate Assembly suspicions. scarcely a r r i v e d i n Halifax i n 1802  The judge had  when Council members  began protesting the precedence given him i n Council where he was placed second to the Chief J u s t i c e .  Their complaints  increased as Croke's demands f o r precedence i n a l l government a f f a i r s , f o r veto powers i n j u d i c i a l cases shared with c i v i l i a n courts, f o r v i r t u a l immunity from c o l o n i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n followed one upon the other.  The  Council  feared that according such precedence to Croke would destroy the Nova Scotian system of granting administrative j u r i s d i c t i o n to the senior councillor during the Governor's absence, and replace i t with the New a r b i t r a r y B r i t i s h appointment.  Brunswick system of  This system the New  Brunswick  Council had repeatedly c r i t i c i z e d as an i n s u l t to the c o l o n i a l administration members were "degraded i n the eyes of their neighbours" by such disregard,33 and noting a similar resentment among Nova Scotian o f f i c i a l s , Governor Prevost* commented on Croke's appointment as Council President i n  1808:  33c.O. 188/17, B r i t i s h Agent i n New p. 56. •See Appendix.  Brunswick-Liverpool,  65  . ". . the c i v i l government w i l l devolve upon an able though rather unpopular character, the Judge of the Admiralty . . . as he i s a new man i n the community, I have reason to believe that on his assuming the c h a i r , the Chief J u s t i c e w i l l withdraw from Council f o r a time.34 Such withdrawal, Prevost f e l t , would be most unfortunate public harmony. jealousy.  for  The Chief J u s t i c e was not alone i n h i s  The Council, too, was  moved to i t s strongest  protest, not by the Judge's behaviour during the appropriation controversy, nor by h i s r i g i d l y orthodox p o s i t i o n during the discussions concerned with Windsor College  establishment,  but by the increasing preferment shown him by B r i t a i n — y e t another instance of the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of preferment resented by native o f f i c i a l s . 3 5 I t was  just such a mixture of fear for the  i n t e g r i t y of c o l o n i a l custom and regulation, and jealousy of p o s i t i o n that activated the long standing quarrel between c o l o n i a l c i v i l i a n administrators and B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y and  3 A r c h i b a l d , A.G.: " S i r Alexander Croke"; Nova Scotia H i s t o r i c a l Society, v o l . 1-3 ( 1 8 7 8 - 8 3 ) , p. 115. 4  35while administering New Brunswick a f f a i r s , Hunter observed the resentment shared by c o l o n i a l inhabitants f o r the B r i t i s h appointee preferred over one of t h e i r own; and he suggested that more posts be f i l l e d by c o l o n i s t s . This would give the colony a greater concern with the B r i t i s h t i e and would encourage the inhabitants to look to B r i t a i n as t h e i r benefactor rather than regarding the administration as another i l l u s t r a t i o n of the gulf between the colony and B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l d o m . CO. 188/4, Hunter-Castlereagh, November 16, 1808.  66  naval o f f i c e r s i n the colonies. As the centre of m i l i t a r y and naval establishment i n the colonies, Nova Scotia again experienced this f r i c t i o n most strongly of a l l the Maritime colonies.  As a c i v i l i a n and native North American, Governor  Wentworth was continually i n c o n f l i c t with m i l i t a r y and naval advisors, snubbed by them as they considered t h e i r commands to render them v i r t u a l l y immune from c o l o n i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . The usual alignment of c o l o n i a l and imperial officialdom versus the Assembly and i t s c o l o n i a l constituents was broken across by the mutual concern of a l l c o l o n i a l factions f o r colonial interests.  Wentworth complained to the Colonial  Office that General Oglvie "sought to perplex, oppose, create d i f f i c u l t i e s , countenance those who are opposed to Government," while " i t i s impossible to reconcile either the representatives or the people to h i s manner or measure."3^ P a r t i c u l a r l y i r r e c o n c i l a b l e was c o l o n i a l opinion when the administration of imperial interests by these o f f i c i a l s clashed with c o l o n i a l economic concerns.  Much of  the f r i c t i o n i n this sphere arose when B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s claimed exemption from the regulations that assured the protection of the c o l o n i a l economy.  When Admiral Murray  requested that the excise on s p i r i t s be l i f t e d from those supplies used by the naval establishment, he was reminded  36c.0. 217/36, private l e t t e r from Wentworth to Secretary  of State, May 19,  1794.  67 by the Council that . . . " i t would derange our production and satisfactory system of finance, more than i t promises benefit to i n d i v i d u a l s . I t i s a very d i f f i c u l t and ungracious move i n the Country to grant exemptions of dutys / s i c 7 to one Class or description of people.37 Only the year before Wentworth had reported a serious dispute between the m i l i t a r y and the excise o f f i c e r s , caused by the former's r e f u s a l to allow t h e i r provision ships to be inspected i n the usual manner.  Wentworth feared that this  would undermine the Excise Laws, and arouse Assembly complaints of t h e i r l e g i s l a t i v e rights being infringed upon, with c o l o n i a l law being suppressed by m i l i t a r y — " i s i t worthwhile to destroy the peace and affectionate attachment to Government of a prospering Colony s o l e l y to g r a t i f y any m i l i t a r y ideas."3^  Under the prevailing system of imperial  administration, divided as i t was among a multitude of department with varying p o l i c i e s and limited communications, such c o n f l i c t of interests was scarcely s u r p r i s i n g . The colony was primarily concerned with i t s economic development to which i t expected a l l else t o be subordinated.  Indeed,  i t was scarcely Interested i n any other claims upon c o l o n i a l resources of goods and manpower, and could l i g h t l y r e j e c t the Admiralty's request, i n 1805, f o r an extension of impressment warrants as unimportant—at  l e a s t , i n comparison to the needs  37c.0. 217/36, Wentworth-King, January 23, 1794. 3 C.O. 217/36, Wentworth-Whitehall, June, 1793. 8  68 of the merchant f l e e t already seriously reduced by the navy's claims.39  But not so l i g h t l y had the colony greeted  Brigadier-General Murray's r e f u s a l to provide an armed corps f o r the protection of the customs schooner 'Earl of Moira' on i t s expeditions against American coastal p r i v a t e e r s . Sherbrooke encountered  Even  4-0  the obstructions of inter-departmental  jealously during his administration of Nova S c o t i a .  4 1  The  d i f f i c u l t i e s Sherbrooke experienced i n his attempts to impress the nature of c o l o n i a l defence needs upon B r i t a i n , and to procure cooperation among the various branches of administration i l l u s t r a t e d again the nature of the colony's discontent with the imperial administration and i t s o f f i c e r s , and the colony's v u l n e r a b i l i t y to the constant f a c t i o n a l s t r i f e and private feuding that was woven through its political  life.  A l l too often did private feuds dictate the course of public business, and exclusive cliques dominate p o l i t i c a l divisions.  Ties of kinship and friendship frequently cut  across alignments  of an economic or p o l i t i c a l nature.  Such  was the explanation of Governor Wentworth's changing attitude toward J.B. Butler whom he had recommended f o r a Council seat i n 1802  only to v i o l e n t l y r e j e c t that gentle-  man's claim i n 1804 when h i s mandamus of o f f i c e  39Akins: 40  threatened  op., c i t . , p. 137*  C.O. 217/36, Wentworth-Murray, May  26,  1797.  0 n one occasion Sherbrooke was refused a loan from the naval chest for much needed m i l i t a r y operations. C.O. 217/64, Sherbrooke-Croke, August 7» 1808. 4 1  69  to supercede those of Wentworth s son Charles-Mary and h i s 1  f r i e n d Hartshorn.  For months the Council was torn apart by  t h i s dispute, regarding t h i s challenge to the p o s i t i o n of two of i t s members of greater moment than the revenue dispute then pending.  Jealousy of p o s i t i o n i n such small c o l o n i a l  communities where the f r u i t s of o f f i c e were l i m i t e d , coloured the reactions of p o l i t i c a l groups and i n d i v i d u a l s to one another.  So i t coloured the i n i t i a l reaction of the Nova  Scotia Council to Cotnam Tonge J r . who offended the r u l i n g clique with the implications of an early campaign address: Gentlemen. Without family connections, p a r t i c u l a r interests or any influence but that a r i s i n g from public opinion, but encouraged by the request of many respectable members of your body, they leave with great deference singly to o f f e r myself as candidate. On your opinion of my p o l i t i c a l conduct, which has passed within your immediate observation, I rest my hope of success.42 This was only further aggravation to an enmity Tonge had unwittingly aroused i n 1792 when preferred as Naval O f f i c e r before one of Wentworth's nominees.  By such imagined i n s u l t  were p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s frequently moulded; i n such personal animosity was much of the Maritime colonies' p o l i t i c a l debate rooted. The p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n of the Maritime communities between Assembly and Council factions frequently paralled the alignments of the r u r a l f i s h i n g and a g r i c u l t u r a l  42weeklv Chronicle. October 2 3 , 1799 > c i t e d i n Murdock, op. c i t . . p. 182.  70  settlements versus the urban merchant and professional classes.  The Nova Scotian Assembly's i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Naval  Office authority and practice i n 1790  had been such an  instance of outpost complaint against the administration of Halifax officialdom. When Simeon Perkins wrote to Halifax for  instructions regarding the town of Liverpool's part i n  the controversy, he voiced the general outlook of the r u r a l areas when he commented, " i t seems the current i s against us i n Halifax, and that being the case i t i s very hard to please.Coastal  communities l i k e Liverpool had complained  of the excessive fees l e v i e d by Naval Office deputies, and the petty regulations requiring a l l ships to report to Halifax f o r the papers of each voyage.  Not only did these  communities resent the surveillance such regulations implied, but they protested the obstacles thus confronting the small shipper who  f e l t himself at even more of a disadvantage with  the larger shipping and merchant houses of H a l i f a x .  Indeed,  the small producer and trader of the outport settlements  felt  himself at a disadvantage with the urban merchant at every turn.  He considered himself exploited by the larger business  men who  controlled the bulk of the c o l o n i a l  import-export  trade.  He considered the l e g i s l a t i v e recommendation of the  Executive Council to be weighed i n favour of the metropolitan  ^Simeon Perkins: Diary (B. Fergusson ed.); Champlain Society; Toronto, 1961, January 18, 1790, p. 7.  71 merchant community which he repeatedly assailed through the voice of h i s Assembly representative. dispute of 1806  The Assembly-Council  over the regulation of f i s h bounties was a  r e f l e c t i o n of t h i s economic-regional  conflict; a reflection,  too, of the Council's concern to so regulate the export of c o l o n i a l produce as to reduce the opportunities of i l l i c i t trade with American smugglers undermining the urban merchants' economic hold on r u r a l areas.  The merchants of St. John and  Halifax pursued similar campaigns against t h i s clandestine colonial-American trade carried on i n the small border and coastal settlements.  Not only did such trade undermine  metropolitan monopoly of the West India import trade, but i t drained o f f c o l o n i a l produce that might otherwise be channelled through the warehouses of the c a p i t o l .  I t also  allowed the outport inhabitants to procure goods they would have acquired on credit from the metropolitan merchants,^ and f o r the p o l i t i c a l l y ambitious merchants of the c o l o n i a l capitols the hold of c r e d i t upon r u r a l constituencies was e f f e c t i v e a p o l i t i c a l weapon as borough purchasing was English p o l i t i c i a n .  as  to the  Simeon Perkins bemoaned the pressure  exerted by h i s Liverpool neighbours to return him to an unwanted l e g i s l a t i v e seat i n 1793•  B  u t this was  the attempt  of a r u r a l area to secure resident representation rather than remain the tools of Halifax merchants.  ^C.O.  I t was not a dream  217/74, Wentworth-Portland, July 23,  1800.  72 e a s i l y r e a l i z e d , since "some Gentlemen are so entangled Mr. Hart ^ H a l i f a x merchant who  had formerly  with  represented  Liverpool7 by promise or encouragement, that they do not go e a s i l y into the Measure. "45 The r u r a l party, to employ the term loosely, became integrated with p o l i t i c a l opposition groups when r u r a l members sought the leadership of p o l i t i c a l reformers  like  James Glenie and Cotnam Tonge J r . , whose e l e c t i o n bids had been rejected by the urban preserves of the executive cliques.  Both Glenie and Tonge were accused by t h e i r  opponents of i n s t i g a t i n g revolutionary parties i n t h e i r respective provinces.  Both men were denounced as Jacobins  and democrats, although neither at any time carried h i s demands beyond the l i m i t s of B r i t i s h parliamentary p r a c t i c e , but Glenie i n p a r t i c u l a r was regarded with suspicion f o r h i s connections with the r a d i c a l Whig party i n England. ^ 4  He  was  a Scotsman, at one time cashiered from the B r i t i s h army i n Canada f o r insubordination, but his s c i e n t i f i c a b i l i t i e s had won him reinstatement  i n the Engineers Corps and i n t h i s  service he had a r r i v e d i n St. John with the e a r l y L o y a l i s t settlers.  Eventually Glenie resigned h i s commission for the  greater freedom of private enterprise i n the timber  4  5 s i m e o n Perkins:  4o  op.. ci£., February 18,  C.O. 188/6, Lyman-King, A p r i l 15,  1795.  1793,  P«  trade,  210.  73  and was soon combining the careers of a deputy woods surveyor and an opposition.  Cotnam Tonge, on the other hand,  was a native Nova Scotian, born of pre-Loyalist stock, who spent most of h i s l i f e i n the service of the Naval O f f i c e , succeeding h i s father to the p o s i t i o n of Naval O f f i c e r i n 1798.  Like Glenie, Tonge was a minister of the Crown, and  the nature of t h e i r employment made the opposition of both men to executive measures a l l the more shocking to c o l o n i a l officialdom.  In numerous l e t t e r s to the Colonial O f f i c e ,  Governor Wentworth expressed h i s shock at the behaviour of Tonge who "as an O f f i c e r of Government might be expected to wish f o r peace and quiet i n the Community, "7 and might be ,l4  expected to serve government i n t e r e s t s .  I t i s not surprising  these men had to seek support i n the more sympathetic r u r a l districts.  Glenie entered p o l i t i c s i n 1793* representing  Sunbury County which harboured the largest number of preLoyalists i n New Brunswick; while Tonge entered the Nova Scotian Assembly i n 1797  as representative of Newport, having  been rejected i n h i s b i d f o r the Halifax County seat.  The  r u r a l electors were ready to l i s t e n to indictments of executive domination, f a m i l i a r as they were with the consequences of a system that drew i t s o f f i c i a l s from the urban community of the wealthy and professional.  4  7C.0. 217/13, Wentworth-King, November 24,  The  1799.  74  C o l o n i a l Office favoured the c o l o n i a l professional c l a s s , as being of "the f i r s t r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and information," whose members were equipped to control an Assembly where lack of education and experience  opened the door to demagogues.  The condescension and resentment d i v i d i n g these two factions were a l l a part of the class structure d i r e c t i n g p o l i t i c s i n t h i s period, and these attitudes proved considerable factors i n the p o l i t i c a l struggles of the colonies. elections held i n New  The  first  Brunswick had i l l u s t r a t e d t h i s i n the  battle between the upper and lower Cove factions of St. John. Ward Chipman voiced the general opinion of the v i c t o r i o u s Upper Cove professional class i n his scorn f o r the naivete with which the Lower Cove labouring class attempted to play the p o l i t i c a l game. " 4  8  A commentator on t h i s period has remarked on the regional f r i c t i o n i n Nova Scotia and i t s p o l i t i c a l consequences. A l l the members of the house, and e s p e c i a l l y those who represented the a g r i c u l t u r a l population were interested and urged by t h e i r constituents to obtain as much money as possible f o r t h i s important purpose (road construction). On the other hand, the public o f f i c e r s and c o u n c i l l o r s who were a l l residents i n Halifax f e l t the necessity of such appropriations less-having no constituents to face or r e - e l e c t i o n to look f o r , and besides had an i n t e r e s t i n securing revenue f o r s a l a r i e s , public buildings, etc. Disagreement on t h i s subject was continual and i t  ^^Raymond:  op_. c i t . , p. 4 5 2 .  75  had to do with the contest of the two chambers—the upper House were seeking to cut down the sum f o r roads, while the lower was always ready to increase it.49 A similar c o n f l i c t of interests was the cause of a dispute which arose i n 1800 between the Nova Scotian Assembly and the Halifax merchants over the question of wine duties.  Contrary  to the merchants' p e t i t i o n s , the Assembly sought to increase wine duties as a means of r a i s i n g money f o r road construction. The general opinion of urban officialdom was reflected i n Governor Wentworth's observations that the duties would be collected i n Halifax where t h e i r burden was hardly f e l t by the r u r a l population, while the greater part of the amount would be expended i n those very r u r a l d i s t r i c t s .  Moreover,  the Assembly membership showing a nine to one d i v i s i o n favouring country communities over Halifax, representatives would n a t u r a l l y be i n c l i n e d to obtain as much money as possible into their own districts.^°  This was the reverse s i t u a t i o n to  that of 1794 when Halifax representatives moved that Assembly s a l a r i e s , comprising one-eighth of provincial  expenditures,  should be charged to the towns and counties represented, thus r e l i e v i n g Halifax of a burden that was c h i e f l y r u r a l i n o r i g i n . 51  4  9Murdock:  op.. ci£., pp. 229-230.  5 0 c . 0 . 217/37, Wentworth-King, A p r i l 7, 1800. ^ C O . 217/64, Halifax c i t y petition-Assembly, A p r i l 6, 1794.  76 The controversies that so entangled Maritime society i n this period were i n large part the product of economicgeographical conditions which d i f f e r e d throughout the colonies.  As these conditions changed, or responded to  varying conditions, regional factions moved back and f o r t h across p o l i t i c a l l i n e s accordingly.  In Nova Scotia the  f r i c t i o n between r u r a l and urban interests followed a f a i r l y steady pattern of rural-Assembly a l l i a n c e versus the urbanCouncil entente.  In New  Brunswick, however, a v a r i a t i o n was  introduced by the r i v a l r y of the two sizeable urban centres, St. John and Fredricton.  From the beginning  merchant community had opposed the separate  the St. John l o c a t i o n of the  seat of government i n the i n t e r i o r centre of Fredricton. Such an arrangement forced the commercial community to conduct i t s l e g a l business  i n a distant c a p i t o l , removed the  f r u i t s of o f f i c e and opportunities of lobbying beyond easy access.  Thus i t was  that, one week the St. John merchants  might be found a l l i e d with Fredricton officialdom i n c o n f l i c t with the coastal communities over smuggling regulations, and the next week these same merchants were leading their coastal neighbours i n opposition to Government programmes of i n t e r i o r road expansion and Fredricton public works with t h e i r accompanying requests f o r p r o v i n c i a l revenue Increase.53  52c.0. 188/6, Lyman-King, A p r i l 15,  53lbid.  1795.  77  St. John also led the campaign f o r the lessening of Fredricton's administrative monopoly, joining her voice to that of Westmorland and Charlotte Counties i n demand f o r alternative s i t t i n g s of the Supreme Court i n the more accessible centre of St. John.54  The disputes of these two centres r e f l e c t e d a  complex of c l a s s , regional and p o l i t i c a l jealousies, producing a l l i a n c e s t y p i c a l of the unsettled environment of the Maritime colonies as they strove for a proper balance among the many facets of t h e i r community. vi. Behind a l l the f a c t i o n a l disputes, l a y the basic d i v i s i o n of government and opposition, r e f l e c t i n g i n many cases a c o n f l i c t between imperial t r a d i t i o n and compromise.  colonial  In t h i s debate the chief contenders sought the  support of a l l other f a c t i o n s .  Considering the p r i n c i p l e s of  Church and State a l l i a n c e as they were advocated  i n eighteenth  century B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , the question of church establishment might be expected to have figured s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l f a c t i o n a l i s m , yet i n the tangled Maritime disputes of t h i s period r e l i g i o u s controversy played a minor r o l e .  54Tne cry of these areas that "the holdings of a l l terms of t h i s Court at Fredricton has rendered the attainment of Justice so d i f f i c u l t and expensive as almost to amount to a t o t a l d e n i a l of i t , " was the cry of a community suffering the d i v i s i o n s and impediments of i t s pioneer condition. C O . 188/7, Carleton-Portland, March 3 , 1796.  78  Whether through indifference, or recognition of c o l o n i a l conditions, B r i t a i n had Introduced her p o l i c y of church establishment into B r i t i s h North America with considerable l a t i t u d e ; but reaction to the American Revolution, regarded by most of the governing body as a movement of the sectarian lower c l a s s , had greatly narrowed t h i s tolerance and consequently raised the spectre of r e l i g i o u s dispute i n B r i t i s h North America. exception.  Yet the Maritimes remained an  Certainly the r e l i g i o u s climate of New Brunswick  and Nova Scotia f e l t the e f f e c t s of the Revolution and i t s reaction, and c e r t a i n l y the varied denominational scene of the Maritimes was never free of suspicion and complaint. But denominational controversy was r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t and attempts to enforce the r i g i d p r i n c i p l e s of church e s t a b l i s h ment, with a l l i t s p o l i t i c a l consequences,  met with small  success. In 1738 the Nova Scotian Assembly established the Church of England i n the colony, but with the provision . . . that Protestants dissenting from the Church of England whether they be C a l v i n i s t s , Lutherans, Quakers or under any denomination soever, s h a l l have free l i b e r t y of conscience . . . that every popish person exercising an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n and every popish p r i e s t or person executing the function of popish p r i e s t s h a l l depart out of t h i s province on or before the twenty f i f t h day of March, 1759-55  55walsh, H.H.: The C h r i s t i a n Church In Canada; Ryerson Press; Toronto, 1956; p. 91. ~~  79  But even t h i s single discrimination was disregarded, and a Roman Catholic p r i e s t maintained to minister to the scattered Acadian and Indian population i n the colony; while i n H a l i f a x , assistance i n church building was given to other denominations. Shortly a f t e r t h i s , there appeared small pockets of Methodists i n the Yorkshire settlements of Cumberland County, of Baptists who moved as a single group from New  Hampshire to s e t t l e  Amherst and S a c k v i l l e , and Presbyterians established at the U l s t e r I r i s h settlements, and the Scots community of Pictou; but the strongest denominational  following was that of the  Congregational Church brought to Nova Scotia with the waves of New  England settlement i n the seventeen  sixties.  By the end of the American Revolution, the Congregational Church had almost disappeared from the Maritime region, and from the reasons f o r i t s d i s i n t e g r a t i o n can be derived some commentary on the peculiar needs and conditions of a pioneer community. was brought from New  The Congregational Church  England and continued to look outside  the Maritime colony to i t s old home f o r support and d i r e c t i o n . When these t i e s were cut by the Revolution the physical buttresses were undermined.  church's  But a more s i g n i f i c a n t  weakness lay i n the character of the church, which possessed a formal structure of organization and service geared to the requirements  of an organized society with t r a d i t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s , and a reasonable degree of s t a b i l i t y and  80  i n t e l l e c t u a l maturity.  Such an organization f a i l e d to meet  the needs of a new society, scattered and unstable, and preoccupied with the struggles of a subsistence economy that demanded some emotional release and re-assurance.  Congrega-  tionalism consequently f e l l v i c t i m to the r e v i v a l i s t appeal of the Newlight movement which spread from the Congregational Churches of New  England to the Maritime colony where i t was  fostered by Henry Alline*and became the most s i g n i f i c a n t r e l i g i o u s factor i n New  Brunswick and Nova Scotia during the  f i r s t decade and h a l f following the American Revolution. With i t s concentration upon the s p i r i t u a l , and i t s tendency to divorce i t s e l f from worldly concerns, the Newlight movement appealed to the r u r a l population which sought some reassurance of 'better times' that could not be found i n i t s physical environment.  Moreover, the movement's emphasis upon  the select nature of i t s membership—the chosen few who  had  achieved enlightenment and cleansing by the s p i r i t — g a v e a sense of unity to the scattered s e t t l e r s , and a sense of importance which they had not known within the formal churches guided by eighteenth century p r i n c i p l e s of class hierarchy. The i t i n e r a n t nature of the Newlight preachers, whose c i r c u i t organization brought r e l i g i o n to the people, was well suited to a society lacking adequate settlement and communications. In a l l t h i s lay the success of the Newlight movement.  •See Appendix.  81  By 1790 A l l i n e ' s 'great awakening' iiad passed the f i r s t peak of i t s success, experienced during the American Revolution, and was s e t t l i n g into Maritime society as a general r e v i v a l i s t influence.  This influence was now  expanding beyond central peninsula settlements to those of New Brunswick, i n some areas functioning as an independent organization, i n others penetrating the other sectarian congregations of Baptists and Methodists.  The Baptist  organization had been introduced to Nova Scotia from New England where i t had grown out of the Congregational Church, and i t s t i e s remained wholly with the United States during the early years of t h i s Napoleonic period.  Methodism had  been revived i n Nova Scotia by William Black,* a member of the Yorkshire community i n Cumberland County, and the movement's connections with American Methodism were l a r g e l y formed by necessity, as i t was unable to s o l i c i t missionary support from the B r i t i s h Wesleyan organization a t that time. Simeon Perkin's reference to William Black as a Methodist Newllght p r e a c h e r , ^ and to David George, a minister prominent i n Baptist development, as a Newllght  preacher,  indicates the rather confusing connections among these sects. In h i s diary Perkins followed the course of the NewlightMethodist combination, a fluctuating course of amalgamation  *See Appendix. 56perkins:  op., c i t . , May 2 8 ,  1793.  82 and dissent, as through the years a breach widened between the two and Methodism strengthened i t s ranks to become the largest denomination  i n the Maritimes.  In t h e i r e a r l y days, however, the Baptist and Methodist sects were the p a r t i c u l a r objects of suspicion from the Anglican clergy and much of c o l o n i a l officialdom. The informal nature of service and organization adopted by these denominations  scandalized Anglican congregations who  feared the effects of such enthusiasm among the lower orders. It was a shocked and aggrieved Bishop I n g l i s * who complained of Methodist ministers' influence among "people with many of whom v o c i f e r a t i o n and v i o l e n t gestures and c e r t a i n sectarian phrases are i n higher estimation than the l i t e r a r y q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , regular ordination or the decent order of our Church."57  But a more serious objection to these  dissenting congregations was created by t h e i r American connections f o r which they were held p o l i t i c a l l y suspect during the years following the American Revolution.  During  the Revolution, dissenting communities of Scots and I r i s h had been centres of American sympathy and active r e v o l t , while the r u r a l New England-Congregationalist communities had maintained a passive sympathy f o r t h e i r American cousins.  *See Appendix. 5 7 c i t e d i n Clark, S.: Church and Sect i n Canada: University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 194b.  83  The Loyalist-Anglican o f f i c i a l s remembered t h i s and were ready to heed Bishop I n g l i s ' warnings against Methodist preachers "whose attachment to our excellent Constitution i s scarcely less dubious than the soundness of t h e i r principles."^  And  religious  these warnings seemed j u s t i f i e d as  c o l o n i a l officialdom watched p o l i t i c a l opposition growing and organizing among the r u r a l dissenting settlements.  It  was with some urgency that Halifax administrators urged reinforcements f o r the Anglican church, arguing that otherwise "the inhabitants' minds would be poisoned by dissenting preachers . . . these fanatics have already had  sufficient  influence to force several members into the Assembly and should they have a majority i n the House i t i s easy to forsee that disastrous consequences must follow."59 Bishop I n g l i s ' opposition was  Perhaps  sharpened by h i s awareness of  the weaknesses of the Anglican church i n the colonies where i t was  strong only i n the older and more established centres.  The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the Church with an upper class of landowners and government o f f i c i a l s cut i t off from the r u r a l s e t t l e r s , while the Church's lack of s u f f i c i e n t missionaries and i t s r e f u s a l to adopt the c i r c u i t system of  5 C.O. 217/86, Inglis-Prevost, November 9, 8  1809.  ^ C.O. 217/86, Prevost-Whitehall, November 9» I809. In a memorial to Under-Secretary King, Lyman referred to James Glenie's supporters, such as the Pagan brothers, as 'warm dissentors and ignorant men.' CO. 188/6, A p r i l 15, 1795' 9  84  ministration did nothing to bring i t closer to the people. During tours of h i s diocese, I n g l i s was met with complaints about the clergy's shortcomings.  In the St. John area, a  centre believed strong i n Church support, the Bishop noted "the people of t h i s house complained  that Mr. S c o v i l had not  v i s i t e d t h i s part of h i s parish for upwards of a twelve month of which neglect the Methodists had availed themselves and were very assiduous i n making proselytes."6° Yet despite the suspicion and animosity colouring the r e l i g i o u s scene i n the early years of t h i s period, there were no open denominational clashes, nor p o l i t i c a l controversy f o r r e l i g i o u s reasons, and the reason f o r t h i s may be found largely i n the character of the dissenting congregations. The Newlight movement had been anti-worldly i n i t s preoccupations, i t s members shunning involvement i n p o l i t i c a l activities.  "What have the ministers of Christ to do with  the administration of c i v i l government? not of t h i s world.  Christ's Kingdom i s  We are neither magistrates nor  l e g i s l a t o r s . i n l a t e r years much of the opposition to the Baptists and Methodists, which had been directed toward the Newlight character of t h e i r teachings, was reduced as these organizations severed t h e i r t i e s with lewlightism and t h e i r  6°cited i n Clark:  op.. ci£., p. 6 8 .  ^ C i t e d i n French, G.: Toronto, 1962, p. 3 8 .  Parsons i n P o l i t i c s : Ryerson Press;  85 In 1800 the Newllght movement had waned  American sponsors.  to such a point that Governor Wentworth could laugh at 'the good bishop's fanatics "who  fears of harm done by scattered Newllght  1  are too r i d i c u l o u s to be of any sort of  consequence."62  i  n  the same year the Baptist Association was  formed i n Nova Scotia as an independent body, disavowing a l l connection with the Newlights (with whom, i n 1797> they had agreed to meet annually i n j o i n t conference) while the Methodist body transferred i t s connections from the American Convention to the B r i t i s h Wesleyan Convention.  The Methodist  congregations were henceforth ministered to by B r i t i s h missionaries who were more conservative i n opinions and action and more sympathetic toward the c i v i l administration. In December 16,  I803 Perkins noted that Mr. Marsden (Methodist  minister i n Liverpool) "took occasion to explain the nature of Government and our Excellent C o n s t i t u t i o n . 3 This was a I,G  position rather d i f f e r e n t from that of the Methodist communities i n 1790,  and i t indicated a general change of  temper marking the move of Methodism (and s i m i l a r l y , of the Baptist movement) out of the sectarian stage toward the more formal organization accepted by maturer communities.  For the  changing character of denominationalism during t h i s period  o2  C.O. 217/37, Wentworth-Colonial O f f i c e , August 29,  ^ C i t e d i n French:  op.. ci£., p. 6 l .  1800.  86  r e f l e c t e d the growth of the Maritime colonies as mature and i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c communities, no longer s a t i s f i e d with naive evangelistic teaching, nor w i l l i n g to depend on the support of another national organization. P o l i t i c a l disputes of a r e l i g i o u s nature were further avoided due to the general temper of c o l o n i a l thinking regarding church-state  affiliations.  The Maritime colonies  presented a varied denominational character and consequently opposed a system of church establishment  that sought to impose  a single pattern upon the development of society.  This  attitude became early evident when the Nova Scotia Assembly doubled the land grant provisions designated  f o r each town-  ship f o r the support of Anglican churches and schools.  Such  action enabled the s e t t l e r s to continue t h e i r practice of assigning the 'clergy reserve' l o t s to the f i r s t denomination, Anglican or Non-Conformist, that should enter the d i s t r i c t , with compensation provided f o r whichever followed a f t e r . 1812,  In  s i m i l a r opposition to the idea of Church-State  a f f i l i a t i o n was  voiced with greater firmness when the Nova  Scotia Assembly rejected B r i t a i n ' s o f f e r to a b o l i s h the quit rent system i n return f o r p r o v i n c i a l maintenance of the Anglican clergy.  Governor Sherbrooke,* r e a l i z i n g the dangers  of such a proposal, hesitated to include the proposal i n his  •See Appendix.  87  throne speech. ^" 0  His warnings were substantiated by the  Assembly's reply that . . . as the inhabitants of this colony are composed of persons professing various r e l i g i o u s sentiments a l l of whom since the f i r s t settlement of this province have been exempt from yielding any support to the church of England, except such as profess to be members of that churchj the house of assembly anxiously desirous of preserving harmony among a l l denominations of Christians, cannot agree to make provision f o r the clergy of the church of England out of the public treasury or i n any way raise taxes on other classes of Christians for the support of  the church.65  Such r e l i g i o u s - p o l i t i c a l disputes as d i d cloud the Maritime scene arose i n the f i e l d of education, where the implications of a Church-State connection was most s i g n i f i c a n t j but here, as i n every other f a c t i o n a l controversy, the argument was interwoven with other considerations. In 1783  the L o y a l i s t agents were petitioning that a  bishopric and college be established i n the Maritime region to nurture 'proper p r i n c i p l e s ' i n the colony and to strengthen the inducements to immigration offered inhabitants of the Thirteen Colonies whose p o l i t i c a l doubts might be decided by the existence of an established c h u r c h .  b4  6  DD  An i n s t i t u t i o n f o r  C.O. 217/89, Sherbrooke-Liverpool, February 14,  1812.  ^Ibid.  °°"The f i x i n g of a bishop i n Nova Scotia w i l l strengthen the attachment and confirm the l o y a l t y of the inhabitants and promote the settlement of the province." Cited i n Walsh: op. c i t . . p. 104.  88  advanced e d u c a t i o n was r e g a r d e d a s n e c e s s a r y i f the c o l o n i e s were t o produce a p r o f e s s i o n a l c l a s s n u r t u r e d i n the p r o p e r p r i n c i p l e s o f government (which would n o t be the case i f i n h a b i t a n t s had t o send t h e i r sons t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r t h e i r e d u c a t i o n ) , and t h a t t h i s s h o u l d be a n A n g l i c a n i n s t i t u t i o n was a c c e p t e d by a c l a s s t h a t r e g a r d e d r e l i g i o n as the handmaid o f government.  A memorial from New Brunswick  t o the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e i n 1701 v o i c e d t h i s a t t i t u d e i n i t s statement t h a t government encouragement o f c h u r c h i n s t i t u t i o n s "breeds up y o u t h t o f o r m i n g good p r i n c i p l e s o f r e l i g i o n and government; i t tends t o c o n f i r m c i v i l i z a t i o n and e n f o r c e s obedience t o laws."^7  Such was the p r i n c i p l e adopted i n  Nova S c o t i a where a l l s c h o o l - m a s t e r s were l i c e n c e d by A n g l i c a n c l e r g y and such was the p r i n c i p l e d i r e c t i n g t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f Windsor C o l l e g e i n I787.  Twelve y e a r s  l a t e r Governor 7/entworth wrote t o U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y K i n g t h a t the C o l l e g e p r e s i d e n t ought t o be nominated  by the B r i t i s h  government a s " i t w i l l tend t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c o n t r o l l i n g i n f l u e n c e o f Government upon e d u c a t i o n i n t h i s P r o v i n c e , which s h o u l d n e v e r be o m i t t e d . " 6 8 New  ^ similar institution i n  B r u n s w i c k , t o be known a s the F r e d r i c t o n Academy, was  c h a r t e r e d i n 1785 but i t s a c t u a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t was d e l a y e d u n t i l 1800 due t o the a p p r o p r i a t i o n s d i s p u t e between Assembly  6 7  68  C0.  188/4, L y m a n - C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , 1791.  C . O . 217/37, Wentworth-King, J u l y 3 , 1799-  89  and Council. In 1793  the New  Brunswick Assembly appropriated  £10  for each parish to be used i n the interests of education, presumably f o r the support of some system of public elementary education.  But t h i s was  establishing a new  rejected by the Council as  p r i n c i p l e contrary to eighteenth  century  ideas of education as a private concern serving class interests.  In r e t a l i a t i o n , the Assembly rejected the Council's  requests f o r a government grant to Fredricton Assembly and education was  shelved f o r another decade.  But p r o v i n c i a l  schools were the v i c t i m of more than a clash of r e l i g i o u s education p r i n c i p l e s , f o r behind the p a r t i c u l a r objections of both houses lay a complex of p o l i t i c a l , regional, and class c o n f l i c t s r e f l e c t e d i n the debates of government and opposition. In Nova Scotia, dispute arose concerning Windsor College regulations demanding a l l entrants to subscribe to the T h i r t y Nine A r t i c l e s and to sever a l l other denominational ments.  attach-  Such regulations, demanded by Dr. Croke, indicated a  s t r i c t a p p l i c a t i o n of church establishment and as such was strongly opposed throughout the colony, even by Bishop I n g l i s who  r e a l i z e d the f o l l y of i n s i s t i n g upon such a system i n the  Maritime region.  In l a t e r years t h i s issue was  to re-appear,  argued by a stronger and more c l e a r l y defined Church-State party, with a more extensive and vocal Presbyterian opposition. But such disputes belonged to a more sophisticated society i n  90  which b a s i c problems had c l e a r l y defined.  been r e s o l v e d and  party  affiliations  In the Maritime c o l o n i e s before  1812  this  stage of development had not yet been e n t i r e l y a c h i e v e d ; c o l o n i s t s were e x p e r i e n c i n g  a lull  t h a t f o l l o w s the  u n r a v e l l i n g of f a c t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t i e s  and  c e r t a i n degree of u n i t y can be a c h i e v e d  initial  party t i e s .  opposition  a l l f a c t i o n s i n Nova S c o t i a t o Dr. Croke's demands; and  development.  an i n d i c a t i o n of the  Moreover, the nature of the c o l o n i e s '  t o such B r i t i s h p r i n c i p l e s was  A  a t such p e r i o d s ,  i n d i c a t e d i n t h i s i n s t a n c e by the c o n c e r t e d  u n i t y , however temporary, was  the  of such  colony's opposition of  the  C o l o n i e s ' s t r u g g l e t o a c h i e v e a compromise of i m p e r i a l  and  c o l o n i a l demands, and was  the  y e t another i n s t a n c e  as  i n d i v i d u a l Maritime p o s i t i o n that  the o b j e c t i v e of a l l t h e i r e f f o r t s .  In the r e l i g i o u s  sphere, a t l e a s t , were the Maritime communities s u c c e s s f u l , i n some degree, i n r e s o l v i n g t h e i r f a c t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s .  CHAPTER I I I IN PURSUIT OP PROSPERITY  During the Napoleonic decades, the Maritime colonies were Insulated from the international disputes of t h e i r elders by geography and the a l l engrossing nature of t h e i r own problems.  The colonists were faced with the  problems of s e t t l i n g and developing a country whose potential was the v i c t i m of a scattered pioneer population and unopened f o r e s t s , of Imperial orthodoxy and intermittent concern, and of the r i v a l pressures of a more advanced neighbour.  Following the American Revolution the Maritime  region had been reorganized with promises of economic prosperity and p o l i t i c a l significance within the Imperial pattern.  The struggle to r e a l i z e these promises, however,  became a l a r g e l y c o l o n i a l concern, directed toward economic s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and domestic p o l i t i c a l independence.  The  interests and energies of the colonies were so concentrated upon these goals that international events were regarded as s i g n i f i c a n t only i n so f a r as they contributed to or interfered with the c o l o n i e s  1  programme.  The pursuit of their economic p o t e n t i a l was  given  p o l i t i c a l character by the colonies as i t involved them i n disputes with the imperial administration and i t s c o l o n i a l 91  92  representatives.  As the c o l o n i a l Assemblies attempted to  define the p a r t i c u l a r s of t h e i r sphere of authority, they were attempting, a l s o , to impress upon the imperial administration the f a c t s of the Maritime condition, and to adapt the d e t a i l s of imperial practice to those f a c t s . The consequent a t t i t u d e of the Maritime c o l o n i s t s to the imperial economic structure was one of variable concern with s t r i c t adherence to the d e t a i l s of t h i s structure i n some spheres, and with the necessary modification of these d e t a i l s i n other spheres, as changing conditions d i c t a t e d .  From t h i s  attitude was bred a changing temper i n the r e l a t i o n s of the colonies with t h e i r parent and their neighbours; while dependence upon fluctuations of the international scene drew the colonies into the trans-Atlantic disputes of parent and neighbour. The Maritime colonies shared many economic concerns as they contended with the problems of land granting, subsidization of basic industry, and trade regulations. Such sharing of problems and subsequent pooling of resources encouraged some sense of unity among the colonies during a period when p o l i t i c s and geography dictated p r o v i n c i a l i s o l a t i o n , and even a c e r t a i n degree of i n t e r - p r o v i n c i a l conflict.  C o n f l i c t d i d a r i s e as a r e s u l t of the subtle  differences i n the p o s i t i o n of each which existed despite the t h e o r e t i c a l equality of a l l .  The island communities of  93 Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island were barely s e t t l e d , yet enjoyed a p o l i t i c a l organization a c t u a l l y beyond the capacity of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic development.  They  could be l i t t l e more than shadows of the mainland colonies, instructed to follow the p o l i t i c a l guidance of Nova Scotia, and unashamedly dependent on t h e i r more advanced s i s t e r i n c e r t a i n spheres l i k e defence.  New  Brunswick, however, did  not so r e a d i l y accept the actual s u p e r i o r i t y of her neighbour. Nova Scotia enjoyed a s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n with the B r i t i s h administration and would seem to have been regarded by the Colonial Office as a clearing centre f o r the whole Maritime region, an agent through which the imperial a u t h o r i t i e s could issue instructions and dispense funds.1 s i t u a t i o n resented by New  This was  Brunswick whose p o l i t i c a l  a  division  from Nova Scotia had grown from physical necessity, and  the  mutual antipathy shared by the inhabitants of both regions. Governor Carleton resigned his o f f i c e i n 1799  i n anger over  the supposed i n s u l t to h i s p o s i t i o n and the province, which he believed to be implied i n the instructions to draw upon the Nova Scotia m i l i t a r y paymaster f o r a l l the defence needs.  colony*s  He demanded that the equality of the  p o s i t i o n be recognized  colony's  i n the appointment of a l l i t s own  ^-Throughout the 1812 war New Brunswick was repeatedly instructed to get i t s funds and Instructions from Sherbrooke i n Nova Scotia. C O . 188/18, Colonial Off ice-Hunter, July 4,  1812.  94  administration o f f i c e r s .  I t was with equal vigour that the  governor objected to the subordination of New  Brunswick's  defence to that of Nova Scotia, employing b i t t e r sarcasm In h i s complaints—he regarded the m i l i t a r y re-organization of 1792  as i l l - c o n s i d e r e d , removing troops from the precarious  border are'as to Nova Scotia where one regiment and  one  a r t i l l e r y detachment would be s u f f i c i e n t to protect the Halifax stores from the c i t i z e n s ' depredations to be the p r i n c i p a l duty performed there." resented the inconvenience  2  "which seem  New  Brunswick  and Insult of i t s subordination  as i t was r e f l e c t e d i n various s p h e r e s — i n economic r e l a t i o n s that channelled New  Brunswick commerce through the Halifax  customs house, even i n the minor issue of dependence on a slow and negligent Halifax Post Office.3  There was  rivalry,  too, which f l a i r e d up i n the boundary l i n e dispute that strained c o l o n i a l r e l a t i o n s f o r a p e r i o d . even i n minor issues such as New  2  C0.  3c.0.  188/5, Carleton-Major  4  I t was  evident  Brunswick's demands f o r a  General Clarke, November 20,  188/4, Carleton-Napean, October 30,  1790.  1790.  The New Brunswick-Nova Scotia dispute arose i n 1803 when revisions were suggested, threatening to cede Westmorland to Nova S c o t i a . Carleton's arguments against the plan r e f l e c t e d the basic concerns of the people—the county was 300 miles from Halifax connected to the government seat only by a water route, whereas i t enjoyed road communication with Fredricton. C O . 188/12, Carleton-Hobart, May 6, 1803. 4  95 p r o v i n c i a l c o l l e g e l i k e t h a t e s t a b l i s h e d a t Windsor (New Brunswickers Instance  regarded  the Windsor i n s t i t u t i o n as but another  o f B r i t a i n ' s p a r t i a l i t y toward Nova S c o t i a ) . ^  Yet  the r i v a l r y and resentment i n the mainland c o l o n i e s ' r e l a t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e d but a s m a l l and p a s s i n g problem i n the midst o f t h e i r s t r u g g l e s f o r p o l i t i c a l and economic establishment.  Over-shadowing these wranglings  were common  economic problems b e d e v i l l i n g the c o l o n i e s ' r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e i r i m p e r i a l s i s t e r s , and t o a more s e r i o u s e x t e n t , w i t h the U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e s p i t e t h e i r t i e s o f sympathy, born o f common o r i g i n s and e x p e r i e n c e s , the Maritime England  c o l o n i e s and t h e New  s t a t e s had been t h r u s t i n t o opposing  camps by the  R e v o l u t i o n , and what had been a p a r t n e r s h i p became a r i v a l r y . M a r i t i m e r s were made aware o f t h e i r separate i d e n t i t y , and where f o r m e r l y they had a c c e p t e d the a b s o r p t i o n o f t h e i r economic e n e r g i e s by New England i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned  e n t e r p r i s e s , they were now  w i t h the extent o f t h a t a b s o r p t i o n .  Governor Wentworth r e f l e c t e d t h i s concern i n h i s f r e q u e n t complaints  o f the e x t e n t t o which Maritime  funds were  d r a i n i n g out o f the c o l o n i e s through one-sided r e l a t i o n s , and investment  practices.  trade  I t was h i s hope t h a t  w i t h the r e s o l u t i o n o f Nova S c o t i a ' s f i n a n c i a l c o n f u s i o n ,  5c.O.  188/5,  C a r l e t o n - G r e n v i l l e , March  9? 1793.  96 the  colony might e s t a b l i s h i t s own investment concern, thus  retaining money i n the colony f o r physical expansion while simultaneously weakening yet another Maritime t i e with the United States.6 More serious attention was given by New  Brunswick  o f f i c i a l s to the Massachusetts-New Brunswick boundary question that was argued throughout t h i s period.  The  Maritime colonies were now aware of t h e i r borders as precarious barriers against a neighbour whose r i v a l r y might someday become h o s t i l i t y , and c o l o n i a l concern passed beyond t e r r i t o r i a l claims to encompass every facet of economic expansion.  This was a problem of p a r t i c u l a r concern to New  Brunswick, colouring her defence considerations, and r a i s i n g further problems i n the s e t t l i n g of the colony.  The  uncertainty of the border areas was a deterrent to settlement f o r , as William Knox explained to Portland, so long as the boundary remained undefined, men f e l t insecure i n t h e i r land grants and were loath to develop the area.7 the  From t h i s came  urgency sounded i n c o l o n i a l petitions to England f o r  some resolution of the boundary and land grant chaos. The border controversy arose over the d e f i n i t i o n of the St. Croix River boundary which had been designated i n I783 as the mainland d i v i s i o n of Massachusetts and  °C.O. 217/65, Wentworth-Whitehall, January 25, 7  C.O.  188/10, William Khox-Portland, May,  1799.  New  1795.  97  Brunswick.  The negotiators of 1783 had assumed the St. Croix*s  course to be f u l l y delineated, but for years a f t e r i t was subject to c o n f l i c t i n g intepretations of charts and as each contender  treaties,  sought ownership of the valuable timber  area i n the north-west corner of New  Brunswick; involved, too,  was the ownership of the Passamaquoddy Bay islands valued by both countries as f i s h i n g and trading s t a t i o n s .  The boundary  commission, established by order of Jay's Treaty, eventually accepted B r i t i s h Minister Liston's choice of the St. Croix's northern branch as the boundary o r i g i n a l l y intended, but the matter progressed no further toward agreement during t h i s period.  Ownership of the islands had been claimed by B r i t a i n  by r i g h t of treaty, and by the United States on the fact of accomplished  settlement, and t h i s question too remained  unresolved as repeated negotiations shelved the issue i n favour of more pressing economic and diplomatic questions. Jay's Treaty of 1794 remained s i l e n t concerning the islands and postponed the boundary problem f o r l a t e r  convention  consideration; but these conventions of 1803 and 1807 were side-tracked by t h e i r disputes over impressment and trade laws, and i n 1814 the New petitioning  Brunswick Assembly was  still  f o r consideration of the question i n pending  treaty negotiations.  The repeated shelving of t h i s issue, of  such v i t a l importance to Maritime i n t e r e s t s , may have contributed to the dampening of Maritime concern i n the  98  l a t e r Anglo-American negotiations preceding 1812. Although of p a r t i c u l a r concern to New Brunswick, the boundary question had significance f o r both mainland colonies due to i t s commercial consequences.  The Passamaquoddy  islands were of p a r t i c u l a r significance as they harboured American settlements from which clandestine trade and f i s h i n g a c t i v i t i e s might be pursued, and pursued with impunity so long as the boundary remained i n question.  But i f the islands  harboured commercial r i v a l s , watched suspiciously by B r i t i s h colonists on the mainland, they also harboured commercial opportunity.  The Maritime attitude toward the islands was a  r e f l e c t i o n of the colonies' attitude toward the general economic problem posed by the United States.  They could  welcome the islands as a bridge f a c i l i t a t i n g Maritime-New England commercial communication or they could seek ownership and thus strengthen the islands as a further b a r r i e r to such intercourse.  The colonies' choice depended upon, and varied  with, the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the Navigation Laws which governed the commercial l i f e of the B r i t i s h colonies; f o r the Maritime colonies' relations with t h e i r American neighbours were c h i e f l y of a commercial nature and consequently directed by the p r i n c i p l e s and practices of B r i t a i n ' s imperial trade system.  The boundary dispute was regarded as one of the chief  ^MacNutt, W.S.: New Brunswick: A History. 1784-1867; MacLellan and Co.; Toronto, 19&3> P» 118-143•  99  problems i n the colonies' economic l i f e , but the importance of t h i s question lay i n the further questions i t raised concerning  the whole complex of Maritime-New England  commercial r e l a t i o n s . At the heart of t h i s complex lay the B r i t i s h mercantalist code of Navigation Laws. laws stemmed from the Act of 1660  These trade and naval  " f o r encouraging and  increasing shipping and navigation."  This was an Act which  sought to secure the p r o f i t s of long shipping hauls by a d i r e c t i o n that s p e c i f i c c o l o n i a l goods might only be imported by a foreign country i n B r i t i s h ships, v i a B r i t i s h ports, while the colonies might only import European goods i n B r i t i s h ships.  At the conclusion of the American Revolution,  the United States found i t s e l f classed as a foreign country, i n terms of the imperial trade provisions. of independence was  This consequence  of great inconvenience to the United  States and to the B r i t i s h West Indies which had depended on t h e i r New  England colleagues f o r the staples they could not  produce.  This was a turn of events which projected the  Maritime colonies into a new  significance as the t h i r d  corner i n the old trade t r i a n g l e of Great Britain-North America-West Indies, export concerns of New  fftiere once they had but augmented the England, the Maritimes were now  to  carry the entire burden of staple supply—an opportunity f o r economic importance and prosperity which the Maritimes accepted with an enthusiasm and confidence not shared by  100  West Indies merchants or many Whitehall o f f i c i a l s . were many sceptics who  There  c r i t i c i z e d the wasted e f f o r t s of  "peopling and planting such wretched countries as Nova Scotia and St. Johns where the inhabitants are i n danger of being frozen to death f o r nine months of the year and scarcely produce bread enough to eat the other  can  three."9  Yet s t i l l the Halifax merchants voiced t h e i r f a i t h i n a Nature that had " p e c u l i a r i l y formed a Nova Scotia to be a depot and magazine f o r the B r i t i s h Northern Colonies as well as f o r t h e i r external t r a d e . "  1 0  Consequently there  ensued a contest of r i v a l Maritime and West Indies merchant lobbies i n Westminster which produced the confusion of p o l i c y r e f l e c t e d i n the contradictory l e g i s l a t i o n of P i t t ' s American Intercourse B i l l and the C o a l i t i o n Government's Proclamation  of  1786.  In his B i l l of 1783  P i t t recognized the i n a b i l i t y  of the Maritime colonies to r e a l i z e t h e i r new  role  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y , and he sought to modify the Navigation Laws i n the i n t e r e s t s of West Indies dependence upon New staples.  England  The B i l l prescribed as permanent p o l i c y the r i g h t  of American shipping to carry American produce to the B r i t i s h West Indies and to export the Islands' products to Europe, subject to the same conditions and duties imposed on  ^MacGregor: 10  op., c i t . . p.  123.  C.O. 217/36, Wentworth-Portland, December 26,  1795*  101  B r i t i s h shipping.  The B i l l d i d not allow American traders  to carry non-American produce to the West Indies or West Indies goods to any other port of the Empire; this trade was s t i l l reserved to B r i t i s h shipping.H  However, what P i t t  wished to render a p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h trade, the Opposition wished to reduce to an emergency concession, or temporary modification of economic  practice.  The B r i t i s h C o a l i t i o n government was confident of the a b i l i t y of the various parts of the empire to meet the s t r a i n of economic readjustment. the United States  I t was confident, too, of  i n a b i l i t y to r e t a l i a t e economically a t  1  the diminution of t h e i r commercial advantage.  The Committee  of Trade had been assured that "there i s a t present i n this Country an overstock of shipping, which want of employment ....  I f t h i s great number of Sailors are not employed by  B r i t i s h Merchants, they must go into the Service of Foreigners; They w i l l , perhaps, become the Sailors of the United States."^" Consequently, the Proclamation  of 1786, l a t e r confirmed by  the Act of 1788, was issued, prohibiting with the colonies.  a l l American trade  A single exception was made f o r the  export of s p e c i f i c goods, i n B r i t i s h vessels, to the West Indies f o r as long as the B r i t i s h North American colonies were unable to supply those goods.  i:L  Schuyler:  This was l e g i s l a t i o n  op., c ^ t . , pp. 80-100.  3- Privy Council Register cxxlx, pp. 211-265 c i t e d i n Manning: OP. c i t . p. 4T7 2  T  2  102  based on p r i n c i p l e s outlined by William Knox i n h i s memorandum on Commercial Intercourse between the B r i t i s h colonies and the United States! . . . i f our North American colonies were able to supply a l l the wants of our islands as our islands ean supply them with what they want of West Indies products, the l i n e would be easy to draw; f o r i t would only be necessary to confine their trade r e c i p r o c a l l y to each other; but our North American colonies i n t h e i r present state cannot supply our islands, and therefore the United States must be c a l l e d i n to t h e i r assistance and the islands must be permitted to pay them i n t h e i r products. But whatever permissions of t h i s kind are given i t should be remembered that the object of t h i s country, i s to exclude the communication of foreigners with our Colonies and that whenever our North American colonies, s h a l l be i n a condition to supply our islands wholly the interference of foreigners i s to be prevented.13 Such was the economic structure within which the Maritime colonies were expected t o function during the next several decades.  An opportunity had been offered them, but  the means of r e a l i z a t i o n denied; and paradoxically the recognition of t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s had brought, not a i d , but a p o t e n t i a l and powerful r i v a l .  Indeed, c o l o n i a l fears of  this development were to be confirmed by l a t e r modifications of the Navigation system, fashioned by B r i t a i n i n the midst of European c o n f l i c t .  Requiring the bulk of her own shipping  f o r naval warfare, B r i t a i n was thrown back upon dependence on neutral shipping f o r the supply of her empire.  One result  ^ E x t r a - O f f i c i a l State Papers v o l . I I p. 57> c i t e d i n Schuyler, op., c i t . . p. 90.  103 of t h i s was the commercial provision of Jay's Treaty allowing American traders to export goods to the West Indies i n American ships.  Throughout this period the Maritime  colonies' chief concern was to combat t h i s competition from American shipping e i t h e r by p r o h i b i t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n or by increasing the volume of t h e i r own shipping.  Yet t h e i r  resources, were so l i m i t e d i n these e a r l y days of settlement, that the colonies could only increase t h e i r shipping by means of a re-export trade, which required further modifications of the Navigation Laws. The f i r s t breaches i n the system were made upon c o l o n i a l i n i t i a t i v e i n the f i r s t days of re-organization, as c o l o n i a l governments took advantage of emergency powers to meet the needs of the s e t t l e r s .  In January 1785* Governor  Parr explained that he had only prevented  starvation i n  Nova Scotia by issuing licences f o r imports from New England; Governor Carleton followed s u i t a few months l a t e r , and B r i t a i n sanctioned the s i t u a t i o n with her Order i n Council of A p r i l 8 , 1785 enumerating goods that might be imported upon governor's proclamation.  In subsequent years the import  l i s t was extended, i n response to p e t i t i o n s such as that from New Brunswick; . . . the c i r c u i t o u s importation of p i t c h , t a r and turpentine i n t o t h i s and the two neighbouring provinces of Quebec and Nova Scotia i s said to enhance the price to a degree that amounts almost to a p r o h i b i t i o n ; and the unenviable consequence i s that a r t i c l e s so indispensably necessary and which cannot be obtained  104  by any process from the pines and f i r s of this Country, are introduced by an I l l i c i t t r a f f i c which i h our situation can be effectually prevented by removing the temptation. In consequence, therefore, of repeated applications made to one upon this Subject by the principal merchants of New Brunswick, I beg leave to submit to your consideration and express my hope that this may be thought advisable to extend to these provinces the same permission which has been granted to a l l West Indies islands—of importing the articles above mentioned under proper restrictions and limitations directly from the American states.14 As 1790 opened, the colonists' confidence in their economic prospects was being sorely tried by the facts of economic reality.  Although British trade with the British  North America colonies had Increased four fold since the Revolution, the triangular route had yet failed to develop as envisaged.  The removal of the New England merchant fleet  had exposed inadequacies in British resources and the ships were too few, their size entailed high costs of maintenance, and the distance now to be covered prohibited the easy regulation of sailings to exploit market opportunities. In 1790 these inadequacies were being met by the i l l e g a l participation of New England shipping, just as by the same irregularities, aid was being supplied to the beleaguered Maritime colonies. In 179! the merchants of Shelburne petitioned Governor Parr:  14  C.O. 188/4, Carleton-Grenville, November 9 , 1789.  105  . . . that the s c a r c i t y of proper Timber on the shores . . . the want of Inland Navigation and of Roads of Communication with the Interior Parts of t h i s New Country . . . so greatly enhances the price of a r t i c l e s to shippers as to put i t out of t h e i r power to continue that trade without considerable l o s s . l 5 This could only be avoided by the r e v i s i o n of regulations and extention of government support.  Certainly there was  an  abundance of the f i s h and lumber demanded by her partners i n the commercial t r i a n g l e , but the colonists of Nova Scotia and New  Brunswick were unable to exploit t h e i r resources due to  the backwardness of t h e i r pioneer condition.  The lack of  communications between source and port, the i n h i b i t i o n s that land clearance placed on staple production, and the unfitness of much of the Loyalist population to meet pioneer demands e a s i l y had created a s i t u a t i o n i n which the Maritimers met  t h e i r commercial commitments only by resort to  the supplies of her neighbours.  In 1790  there passed from  American to Maritime ports some 4,000 bushels of f l o u r , 80,000 bushels of grain, and 924,980 feet of lumber—most of i t by i l l e g a l exchange along the shores of Passaraaquoddy Bay.  16  Thus, Maritime  trade rested i n 1790—dependent  upon a p r o v i n c i a l l i c e n c i n g system for the adequate supply of t h e i r home and export markets, and upon whatever 'extras  1  might be acquired through clandestine commercial dealings. ^C.O.  217/63, P a r r - G r e n v i l l e , June 28,  l°Haliburton:  op., c i t .  ?  p. 98.  I79I.  106 ii. An entry i n Simeon Perkins' diary indicates one d i r e c t i o n i n which Maritimers commercial wants.  sought r e l i e f f o r t h e i r  "H.M. R a t t l e r " had anchored o f f Liverpool,  Perkins noted, "to make us Honest as we have had a great name f o r Smuggling."I?  With trade regulations what they were,  smuggling was the inevitable r e s u l t , indeed i t was accepted as a normal part of economic enterprise.  Governor Wentworth  adopted a f a t a l i s t i c a t t i t u d e toward the outports* clandestine r e l a t i o n s with American traders, accepting a c e r t a i n amount as natural and unavoidable, and objecting that too much preventive l e g i s l a t i o n could only obstruct "the quiet current of commercial i n d u s t r y . "  18  Such  r e l a t i o n s were f a c i l i t a t e d by the 1783 provisions granting the United States f i s h i n g r i g h t s along the coasts of the Maritime colonies where many an i s o l a t e d outpost had established a depot f o r u n o f f i c i a l commercial transactions; they were f a c i l i t a t e d also by American settlements  on the  Passamaquoddy islands where f i s h i n g s t a t i o n s , warehouses, and American customs had been established.  The Bay was a  p a r t i c u l a r l y active centre of i l l i c i t trade, situated adjacent  to the New Brunswick gypsum and plaster of Paris  17Perkins: l8  op.. cl&., September 2 9 , 1790, p. 57.  C.O. 217/73, Wentworth-Whitehall.  107  mines whose products were so badly needed by New The o f f i c i a l correspondence of New  England.  Brunswick includes  frequent petitions from customs inspectors to B r i t i s h authorities i n London and the United States requesting agreements to prohibit the landing of gypsum and plaster of Paris anywhere north or east of Boston.  Such a move, i t was  f e l t , would r e s t r i c t the trade to the larger B r i t i s h shipping, eliminating the small American coaster which menaced the economic i n t e g r i t y of Passamaquoddy s h o r e s . ^ Customs Superintendent  Leonard* deplored the lack  of co-operation he received, from o f f i c i a l s and inhabitants, i n combatting i l l i c i t trade and enforcing prohibitive legislation.  With custom centres established at H a l i f a x ,  St. John, and Shelburne only deputies were l e f t i s o l a t e d i n t h e i r scattered posts along the coast, without adequate means to enforce t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and open to bribery from t h e i r neighbours.  I t was not u n t i l 1800  that Leonard  succeeded i n establishing a coastal p a t r o l system with the schooner, " E a r l of Moira," and frequently c o l o n i a l attempts to a i d the customs service became the v i c t i m of p o l i t i c a l and private feuding i n government c i r c l e s . ^ 2  ^C.O.  188/11, Leonard-Sullivan, November 10,  I t was  Leonard's  1802.  *See Appendix. I n 1802 the Nova Scotia Assembly's vote of two hundred pounds f o r Naval Office expansion was vetoed by a Council suspicious of Naval O f f i c e r Tonge. C O . 217/77, WentworthHobart, October 18, 1802. 2 0  108  opinion that there was  l i t t l e enthusiasm i n the colonies  for an extensive campaign against the American intruders. There i s l i t t l e expectation from the popular assemblies (and p a r t i c u l a r l y where most of the members are d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y concerned i n trade)to pass any act or grant supplies to suppress e l i c i t practices.21 The Superintendent  was f r e e , too, with his accusations of  complicity on the part of h i s colleagues—the i n t e g r i t y of customs o f f i c e r s was questionable, since some were known to s e l l trade licences to American captains.  Little  co-operation i n checking intercourse with the Passamaquoddy islands was  forthcoming from Nova Scotia where Liverpool  prospered from the trade and Halifax depended on American exports to supply her defence bases.22  Although the  colonies d i d pass l e g i s l a t i o n l i k e that of the New  Brunswick  Assembly i n l807> imposing high duties on goods i l l e g a l l y entered,23 such measures were infrequent, and the strongest c r i t i c i s m came from the merchant associations which were not s o l e l y motivated by imperial orthodoxy. The goods that entered the Maritime colonies through the s e t t l e r s ' clandestine a c t i v i t i e s were acquired c h i e f l y f o r the home market, i n an attempt to avoid the  21  22  C.O. 188/18, Leonard-Sullivan, December, C.O. 188/10, Leonard-Whitehall,  23Rannay:  op.. £i£., p. 293.  November,  1803. 1800.  109  high prices of B r i t i s h imports.  A certain amount of the  staple imports was also channelled into the re-export trade by which the Maritimes hoped to b o l s t e r t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n West Indies markets.  Competition here was offered by a  United States enjoying s i g n i f i c a n t advantages i n the A t l a n t i c routes over B r i t i s h and c o l o n i a l shipping.  The United  States enjoyed a proximity to the West Indies which allowed her to make frequent voyages as market conditions proved advantageous, whereas B r i t i s h vessels were limited to annual round t r i p s on which they were r e s t r i c t e d , by t h e i r s i z e , to the larger ports of the North American coast and West Indies islands.  B r i t i s h vessels also suffered higher  insurance rates and the convoy charges necessitated by war. But the s i g n i f i c a n t advantage enjoyed by American commerce over that of the Maritimes was the more advanced development of the United States which enabled her to maintain the secondary industries that fed her commerce.  The potential  abundance of the Maritime region was countered by such pioneer obstacles as the lack of roads, i s o l a t i n g New Brunswick settlements from t h e i r northern timber stands and thus compelling the s e t t l e r s to import t h e i r lumber from New England. " 24  Moreover, the colonies lacked the c a p i t a l  of the United S t a t e s . ^ 2  24  Indeed, conditions i n the colonies  C.O. 188/4, Carleton-Grenville, J u l y 15, 1791.  5wentworth was concerned about the lack of a bank i n Nova Scotia where i t could benefit the economy through the regulation of currency. C O . 217/79? Wentworth-Hobart, A p r i l 14, 1808. 2  110  were such t h a t Governor Wentworth c o u l d complain  i n 1803  t h a t the Maritimes were s t i l l rendered a f i s h i n g c o l o n y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . ^ 2  to  The Maritime s e t t l e m e n t s had e i t h e r  s e l l t h e i r produce d i r e c t l y t o the l a r g e r p o r t s of New  England, or they f o l l o w e d a t r i a n g u l a r trade route such as I n 1791 P e r k i n s noted  t h a t o u t l i n e d by Simeon P e r k i n s . ? 2  t h a t h i s b r i g "Union" had a r r i v e d back from the West I n d i e s V i r g i n i a p o r t s from which i t had c o l l e c t e d some 2,000  via  bushels of c o r n , 1^0 bushels of f l o u r and bread "so t h a t the Settlement  i s now w e l l s u p p l i e d . " ^ 2  I n 1796 he noted the  r e t u r n of a dozen s h i p s , w i t h s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n s , from the American p o r t s o f Boston, Salem, Newbury, N o r e v i s h , P h i l a d e l p h i a and B a l t i m o r e . 9 2  U n i t e d S t a t e s commerce f u r t h e r enjoyed treatment  i n West I n d i e s markets.  preferential  There were f r e q u e n t  complaints p a s s i n g from the c o l o n i e s t o B r i t a i n  concerning  the f a v o u r i t i s m accorded U n i t e d S t a t e s ' s h i p p e r s by West I n d i e s a u t h o r i t i e s who s u b j e c t e d B r i t i s h North American goods t o h i g h e r d u t i e s than those p l a c e d on American  C . O . 217/88, Wentworth-Duke of C l a r e n c e , May 2 6 , 1803. Uniacke shared such f e a r s as he p r e d i c t e d t h a t should c o n d i t i o n s be a l l o w e d t o continue there should be l i t t l e l e g i t i m a t e trade l e f t . C O . 217/79, Uniacke-Whitehall, October, 1804. 2o  2  7See Chapter I I .  28perkins:  pjp,.  September 5> 1 7 9 1 .  Ill  goods.30  The p e t i t i o n of the Halifax Merchants Association  submitted to B r i t a i n i n March, 1804 was a r e f l e c t i o n of the colony's complaint.  I t was claimed that the United States  did not suffer 2^$ duties on t h e i r exports to the West Indies, and they were aided by government bounties, whereas the Maritimers were at such a disadvantage  they could only  s e l l at reduced prices i n American ports from whence their goods were re-exported at high p r o f i t s .  Moreover, the  Maritimers were at that stage of development where they could experience rapid expansion i f not impeded, and  consequently  the merchants requested that B r i t a i n at least grant the Maritimes equal privileges to those of the United States. It was to be wondered a t , the Association commented, that the West Indies, who could now afford to s a c r i f i c e a l i t t l e p r o f i t , should be so unwilling to a s s i s t a s i s t e r colony.3* A l a t e r p e t i t i o n from the merchants was more e x p l i c i t i n i t s complaint: . . . they are concerned to be obliged to state that from various causes, so great has been the emigration of Fishermen and others from t h i s Province to the American States that the customary offers of Merchants, which i s a l l they can possibly a f f o r d , have hitherto proven i n s u f f i c i e n t to drain them back again to this Province, on the contrary, during the l a s t session even a great many industrious families have gone to that country. This has been i n  30c.0. 217/79, Wentworth-Hobart, February 25, ^C.O,  1804.  217/79, Halifax merchants-Whitehall, March,  1804.  112  a great measure, occasioned by encouragement by bounties held out by Legislatures of those States, and p a r t l y by the burthens, expenses, inconveniences, and depressions to which t h i s Trade i s p e c u l i a r i l y subject i n time of war . . . .32 The conclusion of these observations was a further p e t i t i o n that the governing a u t h o r i t i e s "take the promises into consideration and from i t s wanted zeal f o r the prosperity of the Province a f f o r d the P e t i t i o n e r s and t h e i r  Constituents  such a i d and encouragement as l i e within t h e i r power to grant.33 The Maritime colonies regarded American p r i v i l e g e s i n the West Indies as a breach of f a i t h on the part of the B r i t i s h administration.  Promises had been made i n I783 and  the colonies had fashioned t h e i r economy about these promises, only to f i n d them valueless.  The merchants explained  there  was . . . nothing so injurious to t h e i r interests as a changeable p o l i c y , which leading them with unfounded hopes into ruinous expenses w i l l keep these colonies i n perpetual infancy, disable t h i s portion of His Majesty's Dominions from serving t h e i r Mother Country or benefitting themselves and render h i s subjects both i n the West Indies and i n these Colonies forever dependent on foreigners who, r e s t l e s s and i n s a t i a b l e , can never be g r a t i f i e d by any indulgences i n the power of B r i t a i n to a f f o r d them.34 Consequently, the merchants requested  such 'exclusive  p r i v i l e g e s ' as "supplying t h e i r fellow subjects i n the West  32c.O. 217/79, December, I805. 33c.O. 217/79, Halifax merchants-Dr. Lyon, December 2 1 , 1805. 3 C.O. 217/85, Halifax merchants-Whitehall, January 3 1 , 1809. 4  113  Indies with the a r t i c l e of f i s h caught on North American coasts"—and these were p r i v i l e g e s that could only be secured by the cancellation of American-West Indies trade l i c e n c e s . 35  B r i t a i n responded with some well intentioned,  i f inadequately r e a l i z e d , instructions to West Indies officials:  American goods were to be admitted only i n  emergency, rum and molasses were to be removed from the l i s t of American exports allowed out of West Indies ports, since these were staple Maritime imports exchanged f o r f i s h products.  Unfortunately B r i t a i n ignored these instructions  a f t e r 1806, when she adopted a p o l i c y of commercial placation toward the United States. But Maritime demands f o r redress were not confined to the s p e c i f i c area of West Indies trade.  They requested  encouragement of c o l o n i a l industry, and imperial o f f i c i a l s r e p l i e d with bounties and market preferences i n a l l the colonies' staple products.  Wheat c u l t i v a t i o n , f i s h export,  and s a l t imports were encouraged by bounties, while preference was given Maritime lumber imports i n B r i t i s h markets, a f t e r continental h o s t i l i t i e s had closed B a l t i c sources.  There  was need, too, f o r a general r e v i s i o n of trade regulations to expand the colonies' sphere of trade and to allow the e x p l o i t a t i o n of every market opportunity available to  35ibid.  114 encourage infant industry. There were requests that the colonies be allowed to import d i r e c t l y from Europe and thus avoid the higher costs entailed i n B r i t i s h shipping.3&  There  were requests, too, f o r the removal of duty r e s t r i c t i o n s on commercial  intercourse between the various B r i t i s h North  American colonies.  Halifax merchants believed the Maritimes  could become the entrepot f o r B r i t i s h - B r i t i s h North American trade i f a free flow of goods among the colonies were facilitated.  Much needed Canadian grain could thus be  procured by the Maritimes to expand their West Indies trade, and New  Brunswick commercial  centres would f l o u r i s h where  once they had been i s o l a t e d from their nearest markets by duty barriers.37 And always there were the p e t i t i o n s f o r an expansion of the l i s t of enumerated goods that the Maritimes might import from the United States—demands which increased as war preparations expanded the Maritime's naval and m i l i t a r y establishments and strained the colonies' supply resources.  38 The nature of the colonies' petitions r e f l e c t e d t h e i r dual attitude to the United S t a t e s — o n the one hand, a competitor to be combatted with a l l the r i g i d i t y of the 3 6 . 0 . 217/77, Halifax merchants-Hobart, January, c  1802.  3 7 c . 0 . 217/67, Halifax merchants-Whitehall, December 26, 1794; July 8, 1794. 3 C.O. 217/64, Wentworth-Dundas, October 25, 8  1792.  115 Navigation Laws; on the other, a very necessary factor i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of Maritime ambitions.  This dualism  was  p a r t i c u l a r l y strong during the l a t e r years of the Napoleonic period, as the colonies d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between the England and West Indies spheres of commerce.  New  In the early  years of untried confidence following the American Revolution, the Maritimes advocated r i g i d commercial orthodoxy.  This  attitude was given expression i n an address of the Nova Scotia Assembly submitted to the Colonial O f f i c e : I t i s of the utmost consequence that His Majesty's Subjects now have the benefit of being Carriers of the produce of the American States to our Islands, by which the Navigation of His Majesty's dominions must increase and thereby form a nursery of Seamen to oppose any h o s t i l e p o l i c y that future events may produce against the B r i t i s h Empire.39 Yet such declarations were infrequent during the early 1790's when Maritimers were pre-oeeupied with exploiting the commercial advantages of wartime privateering, l e t t e r s of marque e t c .  The prosperity r e s u l t i n g from these  adventures  tended to blind the colonies to the inroads being made upon B r i t i s h North American trade by United States neutral shipping.  With the return of peace, however, the Maritimes  were confronted with the advantages t h e i r r i v a l s had secured.  By 1804 c o l o n i a l fortunes had plunged to the depths  and Halifax merchants were prophesizing doom:  39wentworth-Dundas, September 16, op. c i t . , p. 73•  1794  c i t e d i n Graham:  116  The Northern Colonies have struggled with a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s incident to a young Country and they are now a r r i v i n g at a Period when, i f duly encouraged they may be enabled to reap the F r u i t s of t h e i r honest labour; but burthened a l s o i n the manner here stated i n their West Indies trade, the Petitioners cannot contend with America, but look forward with the most d i s t r e s s f u l prospects, to the means of procuring a future subsistence unless His Majesty i n his goodness s h a l l be pleased to a f f o r d them protection and Relief.40 But three years l a t e r the colonies had regained confidence i n t h e i r a b i l i t i e s and t h e i r future. The resurrection of Maritime hopes was effected by the Embargo whose exclusion of American shipping from the A t l a n t i c routes freed the colonies from the pressures of competition and gave them the longed f o r opportunity to prove t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s .  The American government's s e l f -  i n f l i c t e d exclusion was begun with the passage of the  Non-  Importation Act, ordered by President Jefferson i n an attempt to a t t a i n recognition of h i s country's maritime rights by bringing economic pressure to bear upon England. This l e g i s l a t i o n was meant to prevent American consumption of B r i t i s h manufactures, and when i t proved i n s u f f i c i e n t , was  strengthened by the passage of the Embargo Act  prohibiting any ships s a i l i n g out of American ports to foreign ports f o r commercial purposes. were now  The West Indies  thrown back upon the Maritimes f o r t h e i r staple  imports, while the United States became dependent upon  4°Graham:  op.. ci£., p. 185  117  t h e i r c o l o n i a l neighbours as outlets f o r t h e i r produce. The Embargo was  passed December, 1807  and the  c o l o n i a l administrations were not slow i n e x p l o i t i n g the situation.  Lieutenant Governors Prevost and Hunter,* of  Nova Scotia and New  Brunswick, took advantage of e a r l i e r  authorization to e s t a b l i s h an emergency licence trade and opened c o l o n i a l trade to neutral shipping i n June and J u l y , 1808. 1807  An Act passed by the B r i t i s h Parliament i n August, had authorized the import of enumerated a r t i c l e s from  the United States through s p e c i f i c "free" ports, but i t had not indicated these ports.  Prevost, therefore, took t h i s  action upon himself and designated H a l i f a x , Shelburne, and St. John as free ports, receiving o f f i c i a l sanction l a t e r by the Order-in-Council of October 26,  1808.  Prevost s 1  glee at the turn of events r e f l e c t e d general c o l o n i a l . jubilation.  4 1  I cannot dissemble that my Proclamation admitting neutral vessels into the Forts of Nova Scotia with provisions of every description has been of great annoyance to the executive of the United States, i t having produced numerous attempts and uncommon exertions on the part of residents of the Seacoasts of the adjacent States to evade and v i o l a t e the nonimportation law, and also obliged the President to  •See Appendix. 41in American commented on the c o l o n i a l reaction i n the New York Evening Post. February 28, 1809: "our Embargo i s an excellent thing for this place. Every inhabitant of Nova Scotia i s exceedingly desirous of i t s continuance as i t w i l l be the making of their fortune."  118  resort to coercion i n a manner unfavourable to h i s popularity and contrary to h i s natural d i s p o s i t i o n .  4 2  And well might he exult, since a year l a t e r port s t a t i s t i c s indicated an i n f l u x of United States 3 shipping, and his 4  action brought the applause of the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  44  Such B r i t i s h accommodation of United StatesMaritime problems continued, but not without d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Act of August, 1807 had covered the period to March, 1809, by which time B r i t a i n had taken no action to renew the measure, thus returning the colonies to the r e s t r i c t e d conditions of pre-Embargo days and throwing t h e i r economy into chaos.  This confusion continued u n t i l an Order-in-  Council, October 1, l 8 l l ,  designated St. John, St. Andrews,  and Halifax as free ports; but i n the meantime, measures, l e g a l and clandestine, were taken by both New England and the Maritimes to surmount the obstacles thrown up by officialdom.  Thus, during the several years preceding the  outbreak of war i n 1812, Maritime commerce was promoted on  42  C.O. 2 1 7 / 8 2 , Prevost-Cooke, May 8 , 1 8 0 2 .  ^Graham; 44  op., c i t . , p. 2 0 6 .  C.O. 2 1 7 / 8 3 , Whitehall-Prevost.  45  One Massachusetts p o l i t i c i a n suggested that his constituents might r e t a i n t h e i r commercial t i e s with Nova Scotia by simulated 'capture' of B r i t i s h merchant vessels, f o r which the Americans would have previously deposited a bond of $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 i n Halifax. C O . 2 1 7 / 9 2 , Memorial to Sherbrooke, 1 8 1 3 .  119  an u n o f f i c i a l b a s i s as c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s j u s t i f i e d  their  e x p l o i t a t i o n of emergency a u t h o r i t y w i t h a p p e a l s t o the p r i n c i p l e s r a t h e r t h a n the d e t a i l s of B r i t i s h p o l i c y a t that time. New  These were p r i n c i p l e s t h a t sought t o encourage  England's e v a s i o n of Washington p o l i c y , and  thus under-  mine A m e r i c a n r e t a l i a t o r y e f f o r t s w h i l e s e c u r i n g a h o l d on A m e r i c a n m a r k e t s .  Such a c t i o n was  stronger  t a k e n by  British  and c o l o n i a l a u t h o r i t i e s i n the knowledge t h a t i t would be w e l l r e c e i v e d i n the New  E n g l a n d S t a t e s where o p p o s i t i o n t o  J e f f e r s o n ' s l e g i s l a t i o n was whose w e a l t h was  secured  rampant.  As a commercial c e n t r e  on the A t l a n t i c s h i p p i n g l a n e s ,  and  as the b a s t i o n of F e d e r a l i s t s u p p o r t , New  E n g l a n d had  r e a s o n f o r opposing the Embargo w h i c h was  yet another step  i n J e f f e r s o n ' s a n t i - B r i t i s h campaign. England's o p p o s i t i o n was  The  e x t e n t of  double  New  i l l u s t r a t e d i n h e r r e a c t i o n t o the  d e c l a r a t i o n of w a r — t h e M a s s a c h u s e t t s l e g i s l a t u r e , i n an a d d r e s s t o the p e o p l e , r e q u e s t e d 'loud and deep' and  Indeed, the s t a t e was  i n i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o the war  so adamant  e f f o r t that Jefferson  t o send t r o o p s t o d i s c i p l i n e the i n h a b i t a n t s . * 4  O f f i c i a l Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s during t h i s p e r i o d f o l l o w e d a f l u c t u a t i n g p a t t e r n of O r d e r s - i n - C o u n c i l  4- Adams, J.T.: New E n g l a n d i n the R e p u b l i c L i t t l e , Brown, Co.; B o s t o n , 1926, p. 269. 6  be  voiced i n a r e f u s a l to volunteer f o r  federal military service.  threatened  that their disapproval  and  I776-I85O;  6  120  enforcing l e g i s l a t i o n , never surmounting the diplomatic stalemate that met i t s only solution i n war.  But f o r the  Maritime colonies, war meant the r e i n s t a t i n g of those concessions and modifications a f f e c t i n g the c o l o n i a l adaptation of imperial trade p o l i c y which had been t h e i r economic goal throughout this period. While the Maritime colonies experienced  bitter  p o l i t i c a l feuding between the various branches of t h e i r domestic administration during these Napoleonic decades, a general harmony reigned i n a f f a i r s of external commerce. I t was not an unbroken harmony, f o r the r i v a l r y of Council and Assembly over the d i v i s i o n of authority could not f a i l to become involved i n the d i r e c t i o n of c o l o n i a l commercial provisions.  This had become evident as e a r l y as the summer  of I798 when the Nova Scotia Council had objected to the Assembly passing l e g i s l a t i o n "to prevent Clandestine Importation  of India and other Foreign Manufacturers and  Merchandise and Goods l i a b l e to Duties by the laws of t h i s Province and f o r better securing the Trade t h e r e o f " — a  field  of l e g i s l a t i o n which the Council regarded as an imperial matter delegated to the l i c e n c i n g authority of the executive It was with s i m i l a r fears of Assembly encroachment upon  4  ?C.O. 217/69, Council Minutes 1798, pp. 310-312.  12 X  executive authority that the Council objected to Assembly p e t i t i o n s and l e g i s l a t i v e motions concerning the conduct of customs, e t c .  4 o >  But i f c o l o n i a l factions d i f f e r e d over the  manner of influencing t h e i r commercial structure, they were of one opinion i n t h e i r objective of an economic system adapted to the special needs and c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Maritime colonies.  C.O. 188/13, Council Minutes, 1806, pp. 125; C.O. 217/81, Council Minutes, 1807. 48  CHAPTER IV TWENTY YEARS OF FEUD AND DEBATE  The development of the Maritime colonies as p o l i t i c a l l y mature communities began during the several decades of deceptive calm which preceded B r i t a i n ' s second clash of arms with her American o f f s p r i n g .  These were years  of chaos abroad, but so engrossed were the Maritimers with the  p o l i t i c a l debates of t h e i r own bailiwicks that they had  l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to give the international scene.  In Nova  Scotia and New Brunswick these debates followed much the same course, produced by similar f a c t i o n a l discontents and argued f o r similar reasons.  The contrast of p o l i t i c a l  life  here with that i n Prince Edward Island was a contrast i n stages of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l maturity.  The Island's  •legislative scene was dominated by petty private feuds such as had characterized the mainland's infant days of the preRevolution era.  These feuds were s t i l l an i n f l u e n t i a l  element i n the mainland's p o l i t i c a l l i f e ; but the mainland communities had now achieved the educated men to lead, the experience to d i r e c t , and the r e l a t i v e leisure to allow general p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l discussion, as i t concentrated upon p r o v i n c i a l problems. yet  This stage had not  been attained by the Island s e t t l e r s . 122  123  On the mainland, f a c t i o n a l feuding remained to colour p o l i t i c a l dispute.  But during these decades, factions  broadened i n character and developed  some nucleus of policy  on which to d i v i d e — p o l i c y that took the general d i r e c t i o n of a contest for l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i o n and f i n a n c i a l control, which represented superior administrative authority. Yet, as these f a c t i o n s sought j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r their claims and canvassed for support, they formulated p o l i t i c a l theories that f e l l into the pattern of 'reform ment.'  1  versus 'the e s t a b l i s h -  This d i v i s i o n was frequently i d e n t i f i e d with that of  colony and mother country, and during t h i s century of revolution when the established order had been taught to i d e n t i f y a l l opposition with 'Jacobinism,' i t was perhaps inevitable that the party of c o l o n i a l protest should be denounced as 'republican* and even s e d i t i o u s . Ever  conscious  of t h e i r New England neighbours from whom many a Maritimer had acquired h i s education, Tory officialdom raised t h i s cry  repeatedly, thus allowing the hysteria of international  crises to confuse what was e s s e n t i a l l y a d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l principles. The three c o l o n i a l provinces which earnestly embarked on t h e i r p o l i t i c a l education i n 1 7 9 1 were i n f u l l possession of the machinery of representative government, i n accordance ?/ith the eighteenth century p r i n c i p l e that an Assembly of freeholders was indispensable i n B r i t i s h  124  provinces as "no government can properly be c a r r i e d on without such an Assembly."! established i n 1758  The Nova Scotia Assembly,  after t h i r t y years of intermittent  p e t i t i o n i n g and indignant complaint, was the model f o r her s i s t e r colonies.  It had been won by a p o l i t i c a l  determina-  t i o n that would seem at variance with the colony's l a t e r reputation as a 'docile dependency.'  This d o c i l i t y might be  explained by the interplay of o f f i c i a l p o l i c y and c o l o n i a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t which remained fundamental elements i n the Nova Scotia character, s t i l l d i r e c t i n g events i n 179°• Halifax had been founded as the key defence of B r i t i s h interests i n North America, and thus regarded as the e s s e n t i a l guardian of B r i t i s h dominion on the continent, i t s establishment was informed by a determination to assure imperial ascendency i n the colony.  This p o l i c y was  r e f l e c t e d i n the i n i t i a l encouragement of B r i t i s h immigration to the colony, i n the generous Parliamentary expenditure on the c o l o n i a l establishment, contrary to the p o l i c y of c o l o n i a l self-maintenance, and i n the preoccupation with the V i r g i n i a system of government by appointment.  The  p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p enjoyed by Nova Scotia with the Mother Country must pre-dispose a strong influence from the imperial viewpoint, while the colony's economic backwardness,  •'•Lords of Trade - Governor of Nova Scotia, May 7, quoted i n Martin: op. c i t . . p. 1.  1775 >  12*  with no immediate prospect of paying her own way further weakened incentives to l e g i s l a t i v e independence. the  Nor did  colony possess the machinery to marshall such incentives  on the l o c a l basis where they found t h e i r greatest strength. Such was the s i t u a t i o n when Nova Scotian s e t t l e r s took t h e i r f i r s t tentative steps toward domestic self-government. From i t s beginnings, Nova Scotian society was divided into the two camps of s e t t l e r s and o f f i c i a l s , advocating the d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l ideas of New England and Great B r i t a i n which r e f l e c t e d d i f f e r e n t conditions, and stood i n frequent c o n f l i c t .  The early struggle f o r township  government was such a c o n f l i c t of p o l i t i c a l aspirations, i n which v i c t o r y was again determined by the circumstances of Nova Scotia's conception.  The colony's Yankee s e t t l e r s  came from colonies o r i g i n a l l y s e t t l e d by i n d i v i d u a l groups that had had to r e l y on themselves f o r the means of defence and administration, and had thus b u i l t a society that looked to the l o c a l elective council as the nerve centre of t h e i r political activity.  But i n Nova Scotia the central  government had blazed the t r a i l , establishing p r i o r claims over the s e t t l e r s i t brought i n as agents of an Imperial design.  The subsequent dispute of colonists and o f f i c i a l s  consequently revolved about arguments of position and p r i o r i t y so dear to sensitive executive authority.  An implied promise  of the Massachusetts system was given the New Englanders i n Governor Laurence's Proclamation of January 11,  1759*  126  That the Government of Nova Scotia i s constituted l i k e those of the neighbouring colonies, the Legislature consisting of Governor, Council and Assembly and every township as soon as i t s h a l l consist of F i f t y Families w i l l be e n t i t l e d to send two representatives to the General Assembly; the Courts of Justice are also constituted i n l i k e manner to those of Massachusetts, Connetieut and the other Northern C o l o n i e s . 2  The Colony's Secretary and Chief Surveyor were to amplify t h i s i n t h e i r explanation of 1763s Upon the a p p l i c a t i o n of Settlers from New England for Townships to Governor Laurence among other promises to induce them to come, t h i s was not the least prevalent, that they should be I n t i t l e d to the same p r i v i l e g e s they enjoyed i n the other Colonies, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , that of being constructed into Townships and having o f f i c e r s chosen by the respective Towns to regulate t h e i r own a f f a i r s , t h i s would be very e s s e n t i a l to establishing peace and good order among them and promoting t h e i r welfare.3 But while the colonists were reading the Proclamation, Governor and Council were defining county boundaries and establishing the l o c a l administrative machinery of magistrates and Quarter Sessions, l a t e r firmly entrenched by the Act e n t i t l e d "An Act f o r the Choice of Town Officers and the regulating of Townships."  I t s regulations required the  Grand Jury of each township to nominate two persons f o r each administrative o f f i c e from whom the Court of Quarter Sessions would appoint o f f i c e r s .  As the judges of the  •^Harvey, D.C.: "The Struggle f o r the New England Form of Township Government i n Nova Scotia," Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Association Annual Report. 1933» P» l° r  3Ibid.  12?  I n f e r i o r Court were appointed by the Governor i n Council, i t was a system of executive c e n t r a l i z a t i o n implemented, i n B r i t i s h fashion, through l o c a l magistrates.  Such was  the  system of l o c a l administration f o r the next century, d i c t a t i n g the pattern of l o c a l society i n 1790,  when the  Nova Scotia c a p i t a l was s t i l l labouring under the primitive machinery of v i l l a g e government.  4  And the arguments that  raged during i t s establishment were repeated during the years subsequent to 1790  by d i s s a t i s f i e d colonists echoing  t h e i r fathers from Liverpool who had complained i n 1762  that  they had . . . looked upon ourselves to be freemen and under the same constitution as the rest of His Majesty King George's other subjects not only by His Majesty's Proclamation but because we were born i n a Country of Liberty i n a land that belongs to the Crown of England; therefore we concieve we have r i g h t and authority vested i n ourselves (or at least we hope we may) to nominate and appoint men among us to be our Committee and to do other Offices the Town may want. His present Excellency, your Honour and the Council of Halifax have thought proper to disrobe and deprive us of the above p r i v i l e g e s which we f i r s t enjoyed. This we imagine i n encroaching on our Freedom and Liberty and depriving us of a p r i v i l e g e that belongs to no body of people but ourselves.5 These were the sentiments long shared by the Maritime colonists and given voice i n t h e i r struggles with executive authority. I n this respect New Brunswick could boast a lead on her elder s i s t e r , as St. John was incorporated i n 1783—though yet with the mixed system of elected aldermen and Council appointed mayor, s h e r i f f , and clerk that Carleton's conservatism demanded. Raymond: op., c i t . . p. 449. 4  ^Harvey:  op., cit.« p. 20.  128  T h i s f e t t e r e d c o n d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l l i f e Maritime  colony was  prolonged  i n the  d u r i n g the immediate post-war  years of the s e v e n t e e n - e i g h t i e s by the shocked r e a c t i o n of the L o y a l i s t s , and  the p h y s i c a l h a r d s h i p s of settlement t h a t  d i s t r a c t e d e n e r g i e s and In 1790  i n t e r e s t s from p o l i t i c a l  crusades.  the c o l o n i e s were o n l y once more q u i c k e n i n g t o  political liveliness.  Indeed, Governor P a r r was  complaining  t h a t the L o y a l i s t s had brought a f a c t i o u s s p i r i t i n t o the c o l o n y , annoyed as he was  w i t h the q u e s t i o n i n g and  t h a t had r e t u r n e d t o p o l i t i c a l  life.^  The  contest  issues contested  were r o o t e d i n the s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l system t h a t p a s t circumstances  had  imposed, now  confronted with f o r c e s  p r o j e c t e d by the American R e v o l u t i o n and  imperial-colonial  reorganization. ii. The f i r s t Maritime  r e t u r n of p o l i t i c a l d i s p u t e i n the  community arose from the r i v a l r y of o l d and  s e t t l e r s — a product of the R e v o l u t i o n and  subsequent  of L o y a l i s t s i n t o the Maritime  The  concept New  colonies.  influx  Loyalists'  of the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n had been bred i n the  England  c o l o n i e s where ideas and p r a c t i c e s of government  were more advanced than i n the younger B r i t i s h North  ^Governor P a r r a t t r i b u t e d r a g i n g i n Nova S c o t i a t o "a was never known here before who brought w i t h them those  CO.  new  American  the j u d i c i a l c o n t r o v e r s y then cursed f a c t i o u s p a r t y s p i r i t which the E m i g r a t i o n of the L o y a l i s t s l e v e l l i n g republican principles."  217/62, Parr-Napean, March 18,  1790.  129 provinces.  Their experiences during the Revolution inspired  a tory r e a c t i o n among many, especially the professional and administrative classes who had l o s t most, and i n l a t e r years they were to argue a narrower version of the Constitution. Nevertheless, they arrived with expectations of the continued enjoyment of an impressive voice i n domestic c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s , which inspired the support of a reform opposition movement among the Nova Scotian Assembly members; and they a r r i v e d , too, with expectations of c o l o n i a l administrative positions to compensate f o r recent losses. The j u d i c i a l controversy i n Nova Scotia with which t h i s period opened was  summed up by Governor Parr as c h i e f l y  a move on the part of L o y a l i s t lawyers to replace s i t t i n g judges with men from t h e i r own party of new  s e t t l e r s ; but i t  was not a matter to be taken l i g h t l y f o r " i t i s not an easy matter to manage and s a t i s f y an expecting L o y a l i s t , t h e i r present want i s every o f f i c e i n t h i s Government."7 controversy began i n 1787  The  when the Assembly communicated to  the Governor complaints of maladministration of justice made by lawyers Sterns and Taylor against Supreme Court Deschamps and Brenton.  judges  Judge Brenton's reaction was that of  established o f f i c i a l d o m — i n d i g n a t i o n that the Assembly had allowed i t s e l f to be swayed by men  of i n d i f f e r e n t a b i l i t i e s  and questionable intentions. He declared he would resign  7C.0.  217-72, Parr-Napean, A p r i l 18,  1788.  130  from the Bench r a t h e r than be p a r t of a government where " j u s t i c e can o n l y be a d m i n i s t e r e d but under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a popular p a r t y . "  8  D i r e c t e d by S t e r n s and T a y l o r , the Assembly convened i n c l o s e d s e s s i o n t o review the charges, and then demanded an o f f i c i a l i n q u i r y i n t o the judges' conduct. Such methods aroused f e a r s among o f f i c i a l d o m t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m had been brought a c r o s s t h e b o r d e r : . . . whatever l o y a l t y these men have brought from the s t a t e s i s s t r o n g l y t i n c t u r e d w i t h the R e p u b l i c a n S p i r i t and i f they meet w i t h any Encouragement i t may be attended w i t h dangerous consequences t o t h i s P r o v i n c e — o n e o f them /Sterns7 aims a t being the Wilkes o f Nova S c o t i a . 9 And  t h i s s u s p i c i o n c o l o u r e d the C o u n c i l ' s a t t i t u d e  throughout  the whole a f f a i r , d e s p i t e the judges' i n s i s t e n c e that S t e r n s and T a y l o r had been suspended from the Supreme Court t h a t year f o r t h e i r l i b e l l o u s language  i n the H a l i f a x newspapers.  The ensuing b a t t l e between C o u n c i l and Assembly brought charge and counter-charge o f e x e c u t i v e tyranny and the unlawful assumption  of e x e c u t i v e a u t h o r i t y by the Assembly.  When the open t r i a l demanded by the Assembly was not f o r t h coming, the lower house accused the C o u n c i l o f o p p r e s s i n g the p e o p l e s ' r i g h t s while p r o t e c t i n g i t s own c l i q u e , and i n s i s t e d the C o u n c i l had punished the lawyers merely as scapegoats i n  C.O.  217/72,  B r e n t o n - S i r A. Hammond, A p r i l  9c.O.  217/72,  Parr-Napean,  8  March  8, 1788.  18, 1788.  131  t h e i r larger assault upon the p r i v i l e g e s of the lower house. The Council refused to accept this championship of the lawyers' case as part of a larger contest, nor would i t accept the quarrel as a c o l o n i a l issue to be resolved within the colony.  When Parr referred the case to B r i t a i n i n  1789  there was angry protest from the Assembly, with the r e s u l t that the next year Parr informed Lord Grenville that the Assembly had "with an assumption of authority and a degree of turbulence" carried out their own t r i a l of the judges a f t e r the case had been dismissed by Council and the B r i t i s h authorities.  Parr chose to ignore this mover, fearing to  arouse the Assembly f u r t h e r . the controversy was  It was Parr's contention that  the r e s u l t of the j u d i c i a l o f f i c e r s '  f i n a n c i a l dependence on the Assembly which f e l t i t could thus control and manipulate,  so destroying the e s s e n t i a l  independence of the Bench.1^ By July, 1790  the controversy had faded into the  background, Sterns having been reinstated i n the Court a f t e r apologizing to the Council.  The dispute might be regarded  as a clash of r i v a l power seeking groups, but there had been sounded a sincere protest against executive tyranny with a  l^The Governor complained: " I t i s to be lamented that Justices of the Supreme Court of Judicature . . . should have been made dependent on the House of Assembly for t h e i r support . . . u n t i l they are placed l i k e Assistant Judges i n New Brunswick upon the King's Establishment they must always either be obliged to court the Favour of leading members of the Assembly or be made l i a b l e to Complaint or Impeachment on every occasion however f r i v o l o u s , that may present i t s e l f . C O . 217/62, A p r i l 24, 1790.  132 demand for recognition of the Assembly's voice.  Whatever  Sterns' and Taylor's motives, they had been able t o command a majority i n the Assembly; while Sterns' defeat i n the Halifax elections of 1790 by a government nominee, produced day long r i o t s i n that town. A tempest i n a teapot, maybe, blowing over when tempers had cooled and pride had been s a t i s f i e d .  But i t was  a warning of the d i r e c t i o n to be taken by future contests of Assembly and Council; f o r the e s s e n t i a l Assembly p o s i t i o n was a challenging of the Council's overbearing attitude toward the d i s p o s i t i o n of administrative authority and toward the Assembly's right to an unchallenged own sphere.  regulation of i t s  Such was the tenor of the Assembly's arguments  during the f i n a n c i a l debates that  enlivened'; p o l i t i c a l l i f e  i n both mainland colonies during the f i r s t decade of the next century, as Council and Assembly each jealously defended the powers and p r i v i l e g e s of i t s p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n . A preliminary skirmish i n t h i s f i e l d took place i n Nova Scotia i n 1790. The quarrel began when the Council returned the revenue b i l l s to the Assembly with a request f o r a l t e r a t i o n s i n the appropriations; this the Assembly refused to do and there ensued a stalemate i n the future.  i:L  AkinsJ  that was to become a l l too f a m i l i a r  The Council contended that His Majesty's  op., ci£., p. 93.  133  instructions gave the Council authority to frame money b i l l s as well as the Assembly and that the lower house could not l e g a l l y refuse the a l t e r a t i o n s and amendments of the Council. But to such claims the Assembly r e p l i e d , i n i t s address to the Lieutenant Governor, that i t was . . . determined to adhere to their B i l l , conceiving at the same time that i t was one of t h e i r inherent p r i v i l e g e s , that a l l money B i l l s should originate with them, and that no interference by Council by attempting to make any a l t e r a t i o n s i n them should be admitted; t h i s inherent p r i v i l e g e the House of Assembly are determined to maintain, as e s s e n t i a l to t h e i r very existence; they are nevertheless extremely concerned that t h i s struggle f o r an undoubted priviledge /sic7 should be the means of throwing the Public into Confusion and of depriving His Majesty of an annual and e f f i c i e n t Revenue of near Ten Thousand Pounds.13 Nevertheless, despite the Lieutenant-Governor's attempted compromise that the revenue b i l l s should originate with the Assembly, with the Council retaining the r i g h t to f i n a l approval, the session did end i n impasse and  financial  'inconvenience.' P a r t i c u l a r points of dispute had been r a i s e d during the session.  In an e f f o r t to raise funds f o r the poor r e l i e f  programme, the Assembly had voted new  duties on wine  imports,  only to be met with an outcry from the Halifax merchants whose Council spokesmen argued that such a measure was contrary to commercial and imperial i n t e r e s t s . Even stronger  l^Murdock: ^c.O.  op., c i t . . p.  93»  217/62, Assembly Journal, March 30,  1790,  p.  46.  134  was the Council's protest at the Assembly's appropriations for s a l a r i e s which drew from Governor Parr the accusation of purposeful manipulation by the Assembly as a means of prolonging the session with resultant accumulation of salary.I  4  These were issues that were to reappear i n the  future, but behind each p a r t i c u l a r dispute lay the general problem of readjusting e x e c u t i v e - l e g i s l a t i v e r e l a t i o n s . Although the seventeenth century had witnessed a change i n the concept of national revenue, now regarded as the public revenue rather than the Crown's possession, with the resultant r i g h t of Parliamentary review of public expenditure, the idea and practice of such Parliamentary control had been more slowly accepted.  By mid-eighteenth century i t was a  part of established B r i t i s h parliamentary practice, but not to such an extent as to be automatically transferred to c o l o n i a l administrations, p a r t i c u l a r l y while the necessity of strong executive control remained a p r i n c i p l e of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l policy.15  Consequently, the Executive Councils of  the Maritime colonies were reluctant to accept the l e g i s l a t u r e s ' demands for the f u l l implementation of Parliamentary p r a c t i c e .  14  They feared such demands would  C.O. 217/37, Parr-Grenville, March 17,  1790.  i^Binney, J.E.D.: B r i t i s h Public Finance and Administration 1774-1792. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958.  135  upset the even tenor of t r a d i t i o n a l government; and that such sudden innovation could only renew the chaos of revolution. Beneath the petty squabbles over government procedure and l e g i s l a t i v e etiquette there l a y the deeper fear of loss of position.  1 0  In general, the early seventeen-nineties were a period of p o l i t i c a l calm i n Nova Scotia, due perhaps to i t s preoccupation with the problem of a large debt.  A l l political  factions and branches of government were united i n t h e i r desire to eliminate this debt and achieve economic  stability,  to which end they were ready t o accept Governor Wentworth s 1  d i r e c t i o n of a f f a i r s .  Simeon Perkins could comment i n 1792  that "Mr. Wentworth i s well approved of by the People i n General."17  But i t was only a temporary calm during which  forces were beginning to gather. Governor Wentworth manipulated wherever he could to prevent any discontent erupting to disturb this calm. I s h a l l strongly endeavour to avoid any questions being agitated that can afford a pretence f o r debate; at t h i s time every p o l i t i c a l discussion should be suppressed.18 l ^ l n 1790 the Council had hotly protested the Assembly presumption i n communicating i t s demands to the Council by c a l l i n g i n the Council's messenger, rather than observing t r a d i t i o n a l custom by sending i t s own messenger. Such a breach of t r a d i t i o n i t was feared was but the f i r s t step toward complete disregard of the Executive's p o s i t i o n . Murdock: op,. ci£., p. 91. 17Perkins:  op., c i t . , May 24, 1792,  p. 158.  l8c.O. 217/36, Wentworth-Whitehall, June 7,  1794.  136  And In 1795 he sought to assure a continuance of the calm byc a l l i n g the General Assembly session during the busy spring season rather than during the summer months "when members have more l e i s u r e and therefore more p o l i t i c s . " ^  But that  the Assembly was not forgetting i t s aims might be read between the  lines of t h e i r sessional Address f o r 1793.  The Council  had rejoiced . . . i n our unbroken attachment to His Majesty's person and Government, under the benign influence of which we enjoy undisturbed peace and security, the best f r u i t s of our excellent Constitution of Government.20 The Assembly, however, rejoiced i n the Constitution f o r i t s assurances of representative government, with i t s provisions for frequent elections of the popular branch of government.21 With t h i s interpretation of i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l character, i t was to gird i t s loins f o r further b a t t l e . The p o l i t i c a l calm of Nova Scotia was now disturbed by the gradual change i n Assembly membership from a body almost unanimous i n i t s sympathy with Governor Wentworth, to one adopting the leadership of government c r i t i c s l i k e Naval O f f i c e r Cotnam Tonge.  Indeed, Wentworth found cause to  complain of the 1797 session which had witnessed the  19C.0. 217/36, Wentworth-Whitehall, A p r i l , 1795 2 0 c . 0 . 217/36, Council Minutes, 179321  C.O. 217/36, Assembly Journal, 1793.  137  "insiduous attempts to arouse d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n the province" made by Tonge as he spread his ideas among the m i l i t i a and r u r a l d i s t r i c t s — ' r e v o l u t i o n a r y ' schemes which must be nipped in the b u d .  22  These murmurings of discontent Wentworth did  not take seriously at f i r s t ; but by the turn of the century, the f i n a n c i a l chaos had been resolved and dependence on Wentworth's d i r e c t i o n lightened. Moreover, the days of the seventeen n i n e t i e s , when the maritime settlements had prospered from the privateering opportunities of war, had come t o an end, and p r o v i n c i a l problems that had been forgotten under the impact of sudden wealth now reappeared, blacker than ever. In previous years Governor Wentworth appeared to have entrenched h i s administration as the only sure protection against the republican murmurings of the times.  But now  that p o s i t i o n was being challenged, and the Governor was both f e a r f u l and annoyed. These general elections have, during my time, been very quiet and f r i e n d l y , but are now i n many places thro' Mr. Tonge's interference agitated with improper zeal and animosity. He has i n s t i t u t e d corresponding S o c i e t i e s , Clubs and Committees professing reform and proposing instructions as to Tests f o r e l e c t i o n — a n d i f possible to introduce dissention into the new assembly. The prudent, sensible, long experienced members of both Houses, and other l o y a l , good people see and lament these violent schemes and are exerting their utmost care to f r u s t r a t e them. At t h i s c r i t i c a l period a l l clubs corresponding S o c i e t i e s , or Committees to regulate or influence Government under any pretence  22  C.O. 217/37, Wentworth-Whitehall, November 18, 1797-  138  whatever ought to be discouraged and vigorously suppressed. They never have yet f a i l e d of producing mischief. I t i s not eno' that people are happy, prosperous, and well disposed. The f a l l e n Angels, Milton t e l l s us were so i n Heaven. Yet Satan introduced corresponding s o c i e t i e s , I believe, and dissensions and E v i l soon followed.23 He was annoyed with such p o l i t i c a l analyses and s t i r r i n g up of p o l i t i c a l awareness among the masses. too,  He was annoyed,  at those persons challenging the sympathetic and  dependable c i r c l e of colleagues over which Wentworth had long presided at amicable council tables. In 1800 Wentworth accused Tonge of organizing campaigns throughout the r u r a l areas, with the intention of displacing the old members i n Council and Assembly.  These  new members were inspired with the programme of Assembly f i n a n c i a l control that had lapsed i n 1790, 1799  of  and the session  erupted with controversy over the formulation and  passing of money b i l l s .  A l l the arguments debated i n  previous years were presented—the Assembly rejecting the Council's claim to <the r i g h t to amend f i n a n c i a l b i l l s , while r e i t e r a t i n g i t s own r i g h t to formulate b i l l s covering a l l appropriations i n one.  composite  This f i r s t  skirmish ended i n compromise, with the Assembly agreeing to present no more composite b i l l s i f the Council would r e l i n q u i s h i t s claim to amendment r i g h t s .  2 4  23C.0. 217/73, Wentworth-King, November 4 , 24  C.O. 217/73, Assembly Journal, July 4 ,  But t h i s 1794. 1799.  139  amicability did not emerge without warnings of the future, indicated in the Assembly statement that: The House are free to confess that they have ever considered the Rights and Privileges of the Upper House to be as necessary to the support of the British Constitution as those of the Lower House. With sentiments of this kind the House of Assembly cannot help feeling hurt that His Majesty's Council should thinkfor a Moment, that the Assembly would frame b i l l s to be sent to His Majesty's Council i n such manner as to preclude His Majesty's Council from having i t i n their Power to deliberate upon. The House being well convinced that the best Rule for deciding Questions of this kind i s the Usage and Custom of both Houses, and the best Evidence of that Usage and Custom is the most frequent and authentic Precedents . . . . The House fervently pray, that no attempt w i l l ever be made by the Upper House to infringe on the constitutional privileges of the lower House and thereby compell the Assembly to depart from a System which i t w i l l be their pride and Ambition to transmit i n i t s Purity to the latest Posterity.25 In 1800 the Council contented i t s e l f with reiterating that i t s concessions to Assembly measures were but a temporary move necessitated by the existing financial crises created by the legislative impasse.26"  But in 1802 i t s objections  took a different turn as i t rejected the Assembly's appropriation of £5000 for bridge and road construction. The Council's demand for a reduction to £3500 was in part inspired by the conflict of i t s programme with that of the Assembly.  2  As representatives of rural areas, the Assembly  ^Ibid.  26  C.O. 217/93, Council Minutes, February 2 0 , l 8 0 0 .  140  majority responded to the pressure of r u r a l needs f o r physical improvements, whereas Council interests upon commercial and administrative demands. was  concentrated  But strong too  the Council's fear that such appropriations gave Assembly  members excessive control of Treasury funds, which could be drained back into t h e i r constituencies f o r patronage or pocket l i n i n g by way  of construction contracts etc.  Such a  p o s s i b i l i t y quickened the Council's demands that public works be placed under the d i r e c t i o n of Executive appointed  county  commissioners, and that the Assembly submit i t s appropriations i n separate b i l l s . 7 2  Thus the controversy continued through  the next two l e g i s l a t i v e sessions, as the Assembly  countered  every executive attempt to secure the Revenue B i l l without  an  accompanying appropriations agreement. In 1803  the Council employed yet another maneuver  as i t moved f o r a two year revenue b i l l , arguing that present yearly supply was  too precarious a system during the prevailing  period of war and sudden emergency.  There was a hint of  blackmail i n the Assembly's counter-move.  Tonge had  earlier  moved that the Assembly grant £10,000 to a i d the B r i t i s h  war  7 c . 0 . 217/78, Council Minutes, 1803. Wentworth feared that the extravagance of the appropriation was part of the Assembly's design to deplete Treasury reserves and thus render the government dependent upon the l e g i s l a t i v e branch; a fear fostered by the Assembly's comment that " i t was better to throw a l l the revenue into the sea rather than leave i t as a revenue to Government." 2  141  e f f o r t , but i n the face of Council obstinancy, the grant was rescinded i n July 27» only to be revoted when the Appropriation B i l l was passed.  The next year Governor  Wentworth was arguing the Executive's case as he asserted their right . . . to reserve to the executive government the general superintendence and d i r e c t i o n of a l l appropriations of monies granted to the crown f o r public service, and the control of such persons as should be appointed to expend the same; and these powers being prerogative r i g h t s , although they may have been i n some instances l e f t to the management of the Assembly, may be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y resumed by His Majesty's representative when he thinks the general interest requires i t . 2 o As the Assembly continued opposition, he claimed extraordinary powers to prorogue the House and revert to the o l d practice of appointing expenses from the revenue appropriations of previous years.  By 1806, however, f i n a n c i a l  a f f a i r s had become so serious that the Council abandoned i t s p o s i t i o n and passed the Appropriation B i l l s f o r 1805 and I806, thus bringing to a close t h i s c e n t r a l phase i n the colony's p o l i t i c a l  battle.  In subsequent years the issue was to reappear with lessening i n t e n s i t y as the Assembly's argument became more widely accepted, and as the pressures of war occupied men's attention.  28  Murdock:  Throughout these struggles the Assembly  op. ci£., p. 235.  142  had kept v i g i l a n t watch over i t s authority, recognizing i t s f i n a n c i a l hold as a tenuous claim to be c a r e f u l l y as the basis f o r future assaults.  nourished  Some years l a t e r Judge  Croke summed up the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of these years: . . . the p o l i t i c a l state of the Province may be comprehended i n a few words—the lower house, as usual, i s comprised l a r g e l y of farmers who have • l i t t l e leaven of democracy among them, suspicious of Government, jealous of t h e i r r i g h t s and strongly retentative of the public purse. While the Council, mainly of His Majesty's o f f i c e r s was always disposed to second the view of Government—but always with no regular parties organized under one man's direction.29 Governor Wentworth described the session of 1800  as  the worst since 17975 although he considered the f r i c t i o n asbut a matter of p r i v i l e g e being agitated out of sheer perversity by c e r t a i n factious elements.  With philosophical  resignation he commented " I t i s much to be regretted but i t i s too true i n P o l i t i c a l Societies that a l i t t l e leaven w i l l ferment a large mass."30 attributed to C.W. i n 1797 •  Now,  Tonge who  i n 1800,  acrid  Such ferment Wentworth  had entered the p o l i t i c a l ring  the Governor was  accusing Tonge of  having taken i n f i n i t e and unnecessary pains . . . to exclude several old respectable members, to produce contested elections from whence warmth and bad temper often a r i s e s . His only object was to disturb the Peace and Harmony of the Country by the t r i c k s , falsehoods, and f o l l e y s used i n popular  2 9 c . 0 . 217/34, Croke-Whitehall,  1809.  3°C.O. 217/37, Wentworth-King, A p r i l 6,  1800.  W3  elections . . . . In t h i s offensive attempt he been checked by a great Majority.31  has  Wentworth repeatedly affirmed Tonge's voice to be that only of a jealousy minority, hardly countenanced by the respectable and'sensible majority;32 yet he feared any hint of the republicanism that had upset h i s world i n 177-6, and he d i s l i k e d personally the man who In these sentiments,  i n i t i a t e d such opposition.  the Governor was  r e f l e c t i n g the general  temper of c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l d o m shared by the executive class of New  Brunswick where the p r o v i n c i a l 'opposition leader'  James Glenie suffered much the same attack as Tonge.  They  were considered, at best, annoying p o l i t i c a l quibblers, at worst, the insiduous organizers of Satanic s o c i e t i e s , a l l the more feared during t h i s period of French republican chaos. under me  "In these times i t i s r e q u i s i t e f o r a l l i n o f f i c e to be unequivocally c l e a r and a c t i v e l y decided i n  t h e i r duty to every branch and port of the King's service,"33 had been Wentworth's early proclamation of an administrative p o l i c y , i n s p i r e d by the s o c i a l - p o l i t i c a l creed that Bishop I n g l i s l a t e r outlined i n his charge to the  colony:  The return of Peace . . . secures us from the h o s t i l e attempts of France; i t were devoutly to be wished that we were equally secure from the influence of her p r i n c i p l e s which are much  31c.0.  2 1 7 / 3 7 , Wentworth-King, February 2 3 ,  32c.0.  2 1 7 / 7 6 , Wentworth-Hobart, A p r i l 2 6 ,  33c.0.  2 1 7 / 3 6 , Wentworth-Whitehall, December 7 ,  1800. 1802. 1793.  144  more dangerous. These are calculated to tear asunder the bonds of society, to unchain the worst passions of man, and to l e t loose the human race"to prey upon each other . . . . The p r i n c i p l e s of this system were aetheism, i n f i d e l i t y , and democracy on the l e v a l l i n g of a l l ranks i n S o c i e t y . 3 4  Such was the nature of Wentworth s opposition to a man 1  wielding such influence among the "less informed people i n the Interior Country who from t h e i r remote situations are more susceptible of misinformation from a r t f u l harangues, "35 men whose education, occupation and s t a t i o n i n l i f e could not f i t them f o r p o l i t i c a l pursuits which should be l e f t unchallenged i n the hands of the governing c l a s s . James Glenie disappears from New Brunswick p o l i t i c a l papers e a r l y i n this period, but Cotnam Tonge remained an important figure i n Nova Scotia p o l i t i c s throughout the f i r s t decade of the nineteenth century. He was long the butt of personal animosity which government o f f i c i a l s allowed to invade and influence p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s , 3  6  and repeatedly  suffered the obstructions of Governor Wentworth who sought to remove the opposition leader by refusing to accept Tonge as Assembly Speaker, July 1807, O f f i c e r the preceding March.  a f t e r suspending him as Naval Tonge's cardinal s i n , i n the  34c.O. 217/74, Wentworth-Hobart, 1803. A charge given by Bishop I n g l i s i n the summer of l 8 0 0 , printed at the government's request and l a t e r enclosed i n a government despatch. 35c.O. 217/80, Wentworth-Whitehall, May,  1806.  3 i n 1802 the Council rejected the Assembly's appropriations providing f o r Naval Office deputies, because they objected to Tonge as Naval O f f i c e r . 6  145  eyes of the Nova Scotian Executive, was his organization of a p o l i t i c a l opposition, centered c h i e f l y among the r u r a l districts.  The clash between town and country was  long standing, appearing during the 1790  one of  session when the  outport members of the Assembly demanded an investigation of the Naval Office as i t was administered from H a l i f a x .  Indeed,  the f r i c t i o n might be dated from the dispute over township government of some decades e a r l i e r when the outport s e t t l e ments had bid f o r municipal independence from the Halifax executive.  The dispute over f i s h bounties which bedevilled  the Nova Scotian l e g i s l a t i v e sessions of 1806 instance of t h i s regional c o n f l i c t .  and 1807  was  an  Opposing the Assembly  suggestion of an unconditional f i f t e e n s h i l l i n g s per ton bounty on a l l f i s h exports, was  the Council's demand f o r a  s h i l l i n g per q u i n t a l bounty confined to exports to B r i t a i n or the s i s t e r colonies--a condition not only designed to d i r e c t trade relations away from the Maritime-New England coastal trade of the coastal community, but also favouring the longer haul of the larger shippers.37 iii. Like Wentworth, Governor Carleton d i d not regard the early signs of controversy which appeared during the session of the New  1793  Brunswick Assembly a matter f o r serious  3 7 c . 0 . 217/82, Wentworth-Castlereagh, March 28,  1808.  146  concern.  The differences concerning  the Appropriation  Bill  had been resolved when the Assembly, despite i t s fears of establishing a precedent detrimental to t h e i r future demands, had accepted  the Council's amendments to the money b i l l s .  L i t t l e ill-temper had been s t i r r e d and Carleton predicted no i l l e f f e c t s remaining to trouble the future.3°*  Yet the  controversy did remain to disturb p r o v i n c i a l a f f a i r s f o r the next decade. was  As i n Nova Scotia, the p o l i t i c a l scene  one of contest for l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y — a contest  centering about salary appropriations on which the Assembly believed i t s very existence to depend. The arguments began e a r l i e r i n New  Brunswick than  i n Nova S c o t i a , perhaps s u r p r i s i n g l y , f o r as a homogeneous L o y a l i s t province New  Brunswick had not the r i v a l r y f o r  p o s i t i o n from which Nova Scotian controversies had sprung, nor had the colony a t r a d i t i o n of l i k e disputes which had given d i r e c t i o n to present p o l i t i c a l discussions i n Nova Scotia.  Indeed, both i t s s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e ,  New  Brunswick presents a rather more straightforward picture than her older s i s t e r j New two way  Brunswick was bedevilled by a  d i v i s i o n of r u r a l community versus urban, B r i t i s h  o f f i c i a l versus c o l o n i a l s e t t l e r , which i n Nova Scotia was further complicated  by old s e t t l e r versus new.  3 C.O. 1 8 8 / 5 , Carleton-Whitehall, June 6, 8  But  1793  the  14?  demands f o r parliamentary practice were basic to every c o l o n i a l Assembly.  New  Brunswick began t h i s period with a  b a s i c a l l y tory administration that was Carleton who  the pride of Governor  believed i t to be free of the Nova Scotian  f a u l t s that had been produced by too free an i n t r u s i o n of New  England democracy.  And Carleton d i d his best to r e t a i n  such a s i t u a t i o n . I have on every occasion cautiously avoided publishing any Ordinances i n Council which could lead to a b e l i e f i n an intention to govern without an Assembly; but I think on a l l accounts i t w i l l be best that the American S p i r i t of innovation should not be nursed among the Loyal Refugees by the introduction of Acts of the Legislature f o r purposes to which, by Common Law and the practice of the best regulated colonies the Crown alone i s acknowledged to be competent.39 For here, Carleton explained: . . . where a great proportion of people have emigrated from New York and the Provinces to the Southward, i t was thought most prudent to take an early advantage of t h e i r better habits, and by strengthening the executive powers of Government discountenance i t s leaning so much on the popular part of the Constitution.40 With the e l e c t i o n of the second Assembly i n  1793,  there entered p o l i t i c s a group of men whose habits were not so acceptable to Carleton.  The core of opposition  was  constituted by James Glenie, David Street h i s running mate i n Sunbury County, William and Robert Pagan who  3 9 c i t e d i n Raymond: 4 0  Ibid.  op,, c i t . , p.  450.  represented  the  148  r e s t i v e commercial i n t e r e s t s of the Passamaquoddy r e g i o n , S. Agnew who a l l men  v o i c e d the complaints  with personal grievances  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , who  of d i s a p p o i n t e d  landowners—  to s t i m u l a t e t h e i r  political  were j o i n e d by moderates i n the  government l i k e C o u n c i l o r Jonathon B l i s s , * and Andrew B o t s f o r d . * 4  Confronted  Speaker  w i t h demands of James G l e n i e  and h i s Assembly s u p p o r t e r s , the government hardened i n i t s t o r y i s m , apprehensive of an a t t a c k t h a t Edward Winslow l a t e r t o d e s c r i b e i n 1799  as one  was  of  . . . a n a l y z i n g a l l the p r i n c i p l e s of Government, f i x i n g the p o l i t i c a l l o n g i t u d e s and l a t i t u d e s , and e s t a b l i s h i n g the boundary l i n e between p r o r o g a t i v e and p r i v i l e g e . 4 2 The New  Brunswick Assembly began to d e f i n e these  i n 1795  i n defence of an A p p r o p r i a t i o n B i l l  s a l a r y p r o v i s i o n s f o r Assemblymen. a p p r o p r i a t i o n was of p a r l i a m e n t a r y Assembly had  regarded  The  that included  i n c l u s i o n o f such  by the C o u n c i l as an  infringement  procedure, a l l the more heinous as  f a i l e d t o provide f o r defence  On the one hand, the Assembly had  included appropriations on the  ignored such a p p r o p r i a t i o n s as the C o u n c i l  recommended.  the  expenditures.  not p r e v i o u s l y recommended by the C o u n c i l , and i t had  principles  other  had  To i n j u r y was  added i n s u l t when the Assembly  41  MacNutt:  op.. ci£.,  p.  108.  42  Raymond:  op., c i t . . p.  463.  •See Appendix.  149  quoted, i n i t s own defence, a statement issued by the Council i n 1793: It i s the undoubted r i g h t of the House of Assembly to originate a money b i l l , and to include t h e r i n not only what may be recommended from the Executive chair, but also such other sums as they think necessary f o r the public good.43 Each side accused the other of i n f r i n g i n g upon i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , while the Assembly supported i t s claims with references to ancient Parliamentary usage. The Council objected to the composition of the b i l l s i n which the Assembly mixing a l l items of expense, public services with other foreign matter, rather than presenting each item separately, which enabled the Council to veto one claim without endangering the whole revenue, and thus gave i t sweeping areas of c o n t r o l .  The government was supported  i n t h i s by Portland who did not question the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of the Assembly's claims, but rather t h e i r a d v i s a b i l i t y under existing conditions of p o l i t i c a l t e n s i o n .  4 4  The debate was  resumed during the 1796 session when the Assembly rejected the Council's appropriation amendments as an interference i n the matter of supply—and a manifest breach of t h e i r (Assembly) p r i v i l e g e s , ^ while the Council complained:  4 - 3 C . 0 . 1 8 8 / 6 , Assembly Journal, March 2 , 1 7 9 5 . ^C.O. 1 8 8 / 6 , Portland-Carleton, May 3 0 , 1 7 9 5 . ^c.O. 1 8 8 / 6 , Carleton-Portland, May 2 3 , 1 7 9 6 .  150  . . . i f they are compelled to give t h e i r assent to a l l sums directed to be paid by the Assembly without judging whether the service was necessary or advantageous to the public . . . they must acknowledge they are at a loss to know how they can be considered as a free and independent branch of the Legislative or what check they can give to any Grant, however extravagant, or to any service however unnecessary.46 Thus were the l i n e s drawn i n a pattern f a m i l i a r to a l l the mainland communities during t h i s period. At f i r s t , B r i t a i n continued to support the Council's authority to d i r e c t the actual payment of monies, while the Assembly might only designate appropriations, according to the method of separate b i l l s f o r each item.47  But the  Assembly was determined to e s t a b l i s h a precedent, and i t continued the controversy through the 1796  session, arguing  the necessity f o r . . . the reimbursement out of the Public Treasury of at least part of the expenses incurred by members of the House of Representatives during t h e i r t r a v e l l i n g to and attendance i n the General Assembly . . . to secure the existence of this branch of the Legislature and to enable the Province to enjoy an equal and free representation and that the r e j e c t i o n of such an appropriation w i l l destroy the beneficent intentions of your Majesty i n granting a General Assembly to t h i s province.48 By this time the Council had begun to weaken i n i t s opposition, r e j e c t i n g the Assembly's b i l l by a scant majority, while  4  °lbld.  47  48  C.O. 188/8, Carleton-Portland, February 25, C.O. 188/7, Portland-Carleton, June 6,  1796.  1797.  151  trying to arrange a compromise dependent on the Assembly's willingness to vote a permanent salary l i s t f o r government officials.  The Assembly was  scornful of such attempts to  sever the Council's f i n a n c i a l dependence upon the House and refused to negotiate so long as the Council rejected past precedent as mere temporary concession necessitated by the conditions of an infant  colony. 9 4  The p o l i t i c a l impasse continued, to the increasing annoyance of the imperial a u t h o r i t i e s *  0,  and the growing  restiveness of a neglected province.  At t h i s time the  boundary dispute with Massachusetts was promising to increase New  Brunswick's t e r r i t o r y , while unrest i n Vermont was  sending emmigrants across the b o r d e r — a period of calm and e f f i c i e n t public service was necessary i f the advantages of the s i t u a t i o n were to be r e a l i z e d by the colony.5^  Such was  the tenor of country p e t i t i o n s that encouraged eventual Assembly acquiescence of 1799.  to Council demands during the session  With the Council's agreement to cease i t s opposition  to the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s of Assembly procedure,5  2  the controversy  would seem to have been r e s o l v e d — o n l y a f a i n t echo of  4  9jbid.  5°C.O. 1 8 8 / 9 , Portland-Carleton, June 6 , ^C.O.  1 8 8 / 1 0 , Wm. Knox-Portland,  May  11,  1798. 1799.  5 C.O. 188/10, Carleton-Portland, February 12, 2  1799.  152  dissent was heard during the session of 1800.  But while the  Assembly had relinquished i t s position so f a r as the d e t a i l s of one issue were concerned, i t had not relinquished the general p r i n c i p l e of Assembly l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y — i t simply sought recognition of t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n other f i e l d s during the next few years. In 1800 Carleton reported a s p i r i t of harmony i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , but the next year the Council voiced i t s objections to the assumption of authority implied i n Assembly b i l l s that announced o f f i c e r s "appointed by this House" or d i r e c t i n g o f f i c e r s to report to the General Assembly. The Assembly might agree to discontinue such exclusive eraphasese,53 but Carleton was soon complaining that the House had presumed to appoint i t s own Assembly Clerk. T r a d i t i o n a l l y this was the r i g h t of the chief administrator who employed the clerk as h i s advisor and informant on Assembly business.  That the Assembly subsequently with  l i t t l e fuss withdrew i t s appointee i n favour o f the Lieutenant  Governors would seem to support  Carleton's  opinion that the Assembly merely wished to make the gesture i n token of i t s independence.54  But i t was an independence  53c.O. 188/11, February 2 7 , 1802.  54  C O . 188/11, Carleton-Hobart, A p r i l 2 6 , 1802; C O . 188-12, March 2 2 , 1803.  153  i t took seriously and sought to further at every opportunity, seeking i n every d i r e c t i o n to weaken the hold of the executive o f f i c e r s upon the d a i l y business of the colony.55  iv. The p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n Prince Edward Island during these decades must be contrasted to the more sophisticated controversies of the mainland communities. In the Island settlements men were so engrossed i n the basic struggles of settlement  that they scarcely heeded  the private feuds ranging among t h e i r administrative officers.  The Island was  s t i l l immersed i n the struggles of  a pioneer community to s e t t l e i t s e l f , open the land, and establish the basic instruments of community l i v i n g .  In  the journals of the Island Assembly there appear the occasional p e t i t i o n for road construction, and various b i l l s for the erection of goals, m i l l s , churches, and public f a c i l i t i e s throughout the scattered  other  settlements.  But administrative e f f e c t would seem to be sporadically given, subject to the f a c t i o n a l feuding that d i s t r a c t e d  55c.0. 188/11, Carleton-Hobart, A p r i l 26, 1802. In 1802 Carleton was seeking B r i t a i n ' s disallowance of an Assembly b i l l extending the powers of l o c a l magistrates and enlarging the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the I n f e r i o r Court of Common Pleas.  154  l e g i s l a t i v e attention i n the small c a p i t o l . of a l l was  the quarrel between s e t t l e r s and  Most d i s t r a c t i n g landowners—a  quarrel t y p i c a l of a community circumstanced as Prince Edward Island. The administrative framework has been described as too elaborate for such a small c o l o n y — " f r i c t i o n between the Governor and his colleagues were almost inevitable i n the scramble f o r the l i m i t e d power and influence afforded by local politics."*6  j  n  such a r e s t r i c t e d and under-endowed  community the chief administrator lacked s u f f i c i e n t paraphenalia was  of prestige to protect his i m p a r t i a l i t y , and  he  too c l o s e l y involved with his p o l i t i c a l environment to  remain unaligned  i n the f a c t i o n a l feuds.  I t was a s i t u a t i o n  aggravated by the shortage of educated inhabitants and inadequacy of communications which concentrated  the  the  administration i n the hands of the few Charlottetown commercial and professional family cliques who control of the s p o i l s , and of the Governor.  competed for  The  family  cliques of Chief Justice Stewart* had been opposed to Governor Patterson and thus automatically embraced the cause of Governor Fanning when he a r r i v e d to claim his o f f i c e i n 1787.  But i n t h e i r feuds these cliques required a body of  5°MacKinnon:  op., c i t . , p. 22.  •See Appendix.  155 support to dominate l e g i s l a t i v e councils, and thus they aligned themselves on either side of whatever controversial question was exciting public i n t e r e s t . the s e t t l e r s  1  I t was thus that  complaints about the land granting, quit rent  systems became the central issue i n Island p o l i t i c s during t h i s period, providing officialdom with a rough •programme' about which i t could d i v i d e .  Yet despite the relevance of  the issue to the a g r i c u l t u r a l population, the controversy seems to have been l a r g e l y confined to the p o l i t i c a l factions of the c a p i t o l regarded there as l i t t l e more than a t o o l of private i n t e r e s t s . From the beginning, the proprietor c l a s s , resident and absentee, had offered stubborn resistance to the system of quit rent c o l l e c t i o n which the B r i t i s h government had devised as the colony's  source of f i n a n c i a l support.  In  1790 "the proprietors were complaining that t h e i r lands were being sold to pay the arrears of rent, s o l e l y on the i n s t i g a t i o n of government o f f i c e r s who desired to buy up the lands and control t h e i r regranting.57  i n the same year  Governor Patterson* was supporting a party campaign i n the  57ihe proprietors asked that the issue be made a Westminster issue taken out of the sphere of c o l o n i a l administration fraught as i t was with f a c t i o n a l prejudice. C.G. 226/18, Thomas Parkes-Whitehall, November 18, 1791. •See Appendix.  156 colony's e l e c t i o n with the promise to establish a Court of Escheats and d i s t r i b u t e the land i n two hundred acre farms among the small c u l t i v a t o r s .  Was this the programme of a  popular party, or merely the stratagem of the incumbent governing group which feared that B r i t a i n , impatient with the backwardness of her colony, would re-unite the Island with the mainland and thus a b o l i s h superfluous administrative framework with i t s o f f i c e s and sinecures?  To some degree  t h i s backwardness must be attributed to the proprietors' obstruction.  The issue was shelved f o r a time a f t e r B r i t i s h  l e g i s l a t i o n placated the proprietors with a restoration of t h e i r t i t l e s ; but i n September 1802 Governor Fanning was preparing to recommend another b i l l f o r the regulation of quit rent c o l l e c t i o n . 5  8  By 1805 there had developed two d e f i n i t e and opposing sides, with the proprietors exploiting the temper of the times as they accused t h e i r c r i t i c s  of being influenced  by "French l e v e l l i n g p r i n c i p l e s , " 5 9 while Governor Desbarres* complained  of being caught between two fires.60  5 c . 0 . 226/18, 8  Fanning-Whitehall, September,  Where  1802.  59ihe anti-proprietor party had announced a p o l i c y of electing to the Assembly only such men supporting a programme of general escheat of the landed c l a s s . C.O. 226/21, Desbarres-Whitehall, November, 1805. *See Appendix.  60ibid.  157 o r i g i n a l l y , there had been animosity between the proprietors and officialdom, the l i n e s of f a c t i o n had s h i f t e d , uniting these two groups as a Council party opposed to the Assembly which had organized a Committee of Correspondence to agitate the issue.61  Thus the f a m i l i a r c o l o n i a l pattern asserted  i t s e l f , and from this point a l l l e g i s l a t i v e a f f a i r s were engrossed i n the one debate.  The f i n a n c i a l needs of road  construction, m i l i t i a organization, school establishment were made dependent on the enforcement of quit rent c o l l e c t i o n as the Assembly i n s i s t e d that the 'lower orders' could not and would not carry the whole burden. The Assembly association was  described by  one  supporter as a group of . . . respectable, l o y a l and independent men associated together on Constitutional P r i n c i p l e s under the T i t l e of Loyal E l e c t o r s , with the object to consider measures f o r the Introduction of upright independent men into the Assembly, to counteract the dangerous influence long existent i n the Island and possessed by persons engaged i n land speculation, to the discouragement of industrious settlers.62 But by i t s opponents i t was  described  as:  . . . a club of men who f i r s t come under the specious character of L o y a l i s t s but whose p r i n c i p l e s are more than doubtful. For some time Jacobinal p r i n c i p l e s  6lThe Council regarded such organization as unconstitutional and hinting of a revolutionary s p i r i t as i t referred a l l attempts to executive i n v e s t i g a t i o n . CO. 226/22, Wm. KnoxWhitehall, 1807. 62  C.O. 226/25, Wm.  Roubel's memorial to Whitehall,  l8l0.  158 have f l o u r i s h e d i n society, nourished successfully by Palmer, whose exhortations have the e f f e c t of preparing the inhabitants to receive American invasion.63 Like the officialdom of Nova Scotia, the Island Council adept at r a i s i n g the spectre of Jacobinism  was  i n i t s campaigns  against i t s personal enemies—and S o l i c i t o r General J.B. Palmer, opposition Assembly organizor and confidant of Governor Desbarres, was  i t s arch-enemy.  Palmer was  described (perhaps not u n j u s t i f i a b l y , i f rumors of h i s past as I r i s h 'con' man-land agent are to be credited)as an adventurer of Infamous character, and he was  resented f o r  the control he wielded over the e l d e r l y D e s b a r r e s .  Under  04  Palmer's d i r e c t i o n the Assembly seemed to have assumed the reins of government, i n s t i g a t i n g attempts to remove members of Council from o f f i c e , d i c t a t i n g the times of elections and l e g i s l a t i v e sessions,^5 and d i r e c t i n g government a f f a i r s from the inner committee of i t s Corresponding Society. by the end of 1812 i t s counter-attack.  But  the executive had successfully exerted In September they were able to thank  Chief Justice Calcough for his procedure against Palmer:  °3c.O. 226/26, Proprietors-Whitehall, September, 64  C.O. 226/26, J . Hill-Whitehall,'June,  1812.  1812.  6 5 H i l l complained that the General Assembly had not been called since 1810, yet i n A p r i l 1812 the Society caused the Assembly to be dissolved and an e l e c t i o n c a l l e d on a moments notice. I b i d .  159  I t i s a matter of deep regret that he should f i n d abettors i n d e r e l i c t i o n s of so gross a nature which, had they not been timely checked, might i n t h e i r consequences involve t h i s Colony i n scenes of Confusion.66 Upon his a r r i v a l i n the province some months l a t e r Governor Smith could report Palmer's departure and the return of t r a n q u i l i t y to the Colony. 67 The controversy seems to have f i z z l e d out a t this point. time.  L i t t l e more of the land complaints was heard at t h i s The Corresponding Society gradually disbanded, and  a f t e r h i s return to the Island a year l a t e r , Palmer remained i n the background  of p o l i t i c s .  During these years the debate  was argued by a Council party under the leadership of Chief Justice Thorpe* and Calcough, and an opposition party including Assembly representatives, members of the Stewart clan and a few government o f f i c e r s l i k e Attorney General McGowan.  Private animosity and r i v a l r y f o r o f f i c e raged  between individuals within these groups.  McGowan and Thorpe  were b i t t e r l y opposed i n the early days of t h e i r administrat i o n , when Thorpe antagonized more than McGowan with the attitude that . . . something might be made of t h i s Island but Government must acquire vigour and r e s p e c t a b i l i t y , the middle orders more sense and less s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , 6 6 c . 0 . 226/26, Grand Jury-Calcough, September 1, 6 7  C0.  226/26, Smith-Whitehall, November,  *See Appendix.  1813.  1812.  160  and the lower classes must be less drunken and i d l e before any good can be affected, I have had a laborious, d i f f i c u l t time here, obliged at d i f f e r e n t times to quarrel with a l l orders from f i n d i n g virtue i n none.68 McGowan's complaint that he had to watch the Chief Justice with a jealous eye, f o r the protection of h i s o f f i c e ,  was  t y p i c a l of the climate of r e l a t i o n s i n o f f i c i a l Island circles.  Indeed, the fever p i t c h of the p o l i t i c a l debate i n  i t s l a t e r years might be a t t r i b u t e d to a s i m i l a r feud fought between Chief Justice Calcough and Governor Desbarres a f t e r 1807,  instigated by the l a t t e r ' s claim to superior j u d i c i a l  authority as president of the Court of Chancery. The t a l e of Island p o l i t i c s during t h i s f i r s t decade of the nineteenth century i s hardly one of p o l i t i c a l maturity.  But i n the small compass of the Island c a p i t a l  were concentrated  and magnified the weaknesses b e d e v i l l i n g  such small and insular c o l o n i a l s o c i e t i e s as those of the Maritime colonies.  To a great extent they were weaknesses  involved i n a p a r t i c u l a r stage of s o c i a l development, and t h e i r varied incidence i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the i n d i v i d u a l colonies might be taken as one i l l u s t r a t i o n i n the contrasting advancement of these colonies.  o 8  C0.  226/20, McGowan-Whitehall,  69 MacKinnon:  op., c i t . . pp. 27-28.  1804  161  The p o l i t i c a l controversies of t h i s period were thus the product of various conditions.  On the one hand they arose  from a contest f o r authority between the executive and l e g i s l a t i v e branches of government.  Each house considered the  independence of i t s peculiar powers and p r i v i l e g e s e s s e n t i a l to the i n t e g r i t y of government, and there arose the resultant squabbles over p o l i t i c a l etiquette, and the attempts to expand, or at least make e f f e c t i v e , the s l i g h t e s t p r i v i l e g e enjoyed by either house.  Like Governor Wentworth, the executive class  believed that: Upon the steady support of t h i s body, t h e i r s e l e c t i o n and rank among themselves and i n society w i l l greatly depend the peace, prosperity and proper attachment to Great B r i t a i n of t h i s and a l l other colonies on t h i s continent.70 And the Council could i n t e r p r e t as d i s l o y a l any assaults upon i t s independence which the Assembly might make with i t s demands to inspect Council journals,71 election  or to upset Council  decisions.72 On the other hand, much of the controversy arose  from the Assembly's attempts to adopt imperial regulations to 7°Murdock: 71  op.. ci£., p. 273.  C.O. 217/78, Assembly Journal, 1803.  7 i n 1803 the Assembly declared n u l l and void the e l e c t i o n of Thomas Walker, previously sustained by Council on grounds of undue influence, a move which Wentworth feared was another step i n the campaign to replace the Council with an elected Legislative Council. C O . 217/78, Wentworth-Whitehall, J u l y 25, I803. 2  162  c o l o n i a l conditions, and to e s t a b l i s h f u l l practice i n c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s .  Parliamentary  In t h i s , the colonies  c o n f l i c t e d with the r i g i d i t y of imperial instructions and of i t s administration.  Such an administrator was Judge Croke  of the Vice Admiralty Court i n Nova Scotia who  came from  England with a p o l i c y of s t r i c t adherence to the l e t t e r of the imperial system. Every deviation from this system whether voluntary or from i r r e s i s t a b l e necessity, every licence to admit foreign vessels into B r i t i s h ports i s a n a i l driven into the C o f f i n of the B r i t i s h Empire.73 And with the determination  to instruct the c o l o n i a l s , Croke  assumed the administration of the colony during absence i n 1809,  Prevost's  suspicious of the democratic elements he  associated with the Assembly whose claims he was not prepared to recognize.  He therefore proceeded to r e j e c t the Assembly's  Appropriation B i l l which he considered too extravagant and too independent i n i t s measures (for the House had  included  provisions f o r the employment of i t s own agent i n London, independent of the government appointed and met  p r o v i n c i a l agent),  the resultant opposition with dismissal of the  Assembly and a claim to personally administer funds drawn from the Treasury without an Appropriation B i l l .  73Acadian Recorder. March 27,  1813.  In the  163  ensuing chaos? Croke was attacked f o r h i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y 4  by Assemblymen, C o u n c i l l o r s , and government o f f i c e r s a l i k e . For by now such r i g i d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of executive surveillance was earning general disapproval throughout the colonies.  Administrators who j u s t i f i e d t h e i r p o l i c y with the  argument that " i n the present state of the Province, whilst i t i s weak, poor, t h i n l y inhabited and badly cultivated there i s no hazard i n using a l l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l means to r e s t r a i n them /popular r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ^ " ? * were being replaced by men 7  l i k e Prevost and Sherbrooke.  Their more l i b e r a l p o l i c y may  be the r e s u l t of t h e i r preoccupations with gathering war clouds, but they could not have f a i l e d to notice that the Maritime  colonies were no longer so weak and poor as to  accept unprotestingly the former subordination of t h e i r popular  demands.  7 The uproar i n the Assembly chamber, as c o u n c i l l o r s , assemblymen and Croke strove to make t h e i r arguments heard, was s t i l l e d only when the House Sergeant at Arms took h i s stance before the doors and proclaimed "when s h a l l we three meet a g a i n — i n f i r e , i n thunder, or i n r a i n ? " Murdock: op., c i t . . p. 288. 4  7*C.0. 217/8*, Whitehall-Croke, February 11,  1803.  CHAPTER V THE SPECTACLE AND OPPORTUNITY OF 1812  Although the war of 1812 was fought within the c o l o n i a l confines of B r i t i s h North America i t was not of c o l o n i a l manufacture, but produced by the r i v a l r i e s and d i f f e r i n g p o l i c i e s of Mother B r i t a i n and her former rebellious daughter.  Jamis Stephen's remark that "England  was the bulwark and safeguard of a l l nations, which the ambition of many sought to conquer and destroy" was t y p i c a l 1  of the B r i t i s h superiority which goaded the pride of her r i v a l s — p a r t i c u l a r l y the pride of a vigorous nationalism that eventually l e d the United States into the c o n f l i c t s of 1812-14.  The involvement of the B r i t i s h North American  colonies i n t h i s controversy was but another consequence of t h e i r subordinate p o s i t i o n i n the North A t l a n t i c Triangle where geography and history caught them between the p o l i c i e s of t h e i r arguing k i n s f o l k .  Colonial status, as but adjuncts  to the imperial body, rendered their involvement inevitable but the character of each colony's reaction was fashioned by the nature of t h e i r i n t e r n a l condition.  Cobbett (ed.): Parliamentary Debates v o l . x x l : Hansard; London, p. 1139. Stephen's speech on Brougham's motion regarding Orders i n Council and the Licence Trade, March 3 , 1  1812.  164  165 The war was produced by a legacy of r i v a l r i e s and resentments l e f t behind by the American Revolution and aggravated by the events of the Napoleonic era, during which B r i t a i n ' s extraordinary measures of self-defence, revolving about the preservation of her naval and commercial c o n f l i c t e d with the demands of American expansion.  superiority As a  newly independent country, the United States sought a place i n the sphere of international commerce, as a means to domestic expansion and the attainment of recognition i n international p o l i t i c s .  But attainment of independence  had  involved a r e j e c t i o n of old world theories and bred contempt for old world p o l i t i c s .  The United States came into c o n f l i c t  with B r i t a i n ' s imperial trade system as outlined i n her Trade and Navigation Laws—a system that sought to exclude the United States from the markets of her B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l neighbours and the shipping routes of the A t l a n t i c .  There  was c o n f l i c t , too, with the longstanding regulations of European warfare from which the new republic wished to hold aloof. The course of Anglo-American  commercial r e l a t i o n s  was a fluctuating a f f a i r of concession and r e t a l i a t i o n governed more by temporary agreement on p r a c t i c e , than by permanent settlements of p o l i c y .  Intermingling with these  negotiations were other issues such as impressment, blockade, and neutral rights which continental warfare had projected  166  upon the h i g h seas t o Involve a l l t r a v e l l e r s .  A t the r o o t of  Anglo-American c o n t r o v e r s y l a y c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law concerning these i s s u e s .  The debate  found  e x p r e s s i o n i n the s e r i e s of n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t began w i t h Jay's m i s s i o n t o London i n 1793 h a s t y Washington conference  and ended w i t h the  final  between Munro and F o s t e r i n  A complex p a t t e r n of B r i t i s h Orders Embargo e n f o r c i n g l e g i s l a t i o n was  1812.  i n C o u n c i l and American  t r a c e d out as  Britain  t r i e d f i r s t to coerce and then to persuade from her n e u t r a l corner  ah  aggrieved united States.  Too  late did Britain  a p p r e c i a t e the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of American p o l i c y as i t demanded r e d r e s s of maritime g r i e v a n c e s , and too l a t e d i d she r e a l i z e the e x t e n t of American resentment. r e p e a l of her Orders  Britain's  i n C o u n c i l d i d not come soon enough to  soothe a p r i d e t h a t had been outraged by the Chesapeake i n c i d e n t and embittered by the Orders of American n a t i o n a l i s m was  1807.  stung by the  complacency  of a former mother country which c o u l d remark They and we are now the Two r i v a l s i n what has always g i v e n Power wherever i t has extended Commerce, but I t r u s t t h a t s t i l l and f o r a long time we s h a l l m a i n t a i n the s u p e r i o r i t y we do now. They are near us i n the Race, but i n n o t h i n g e l s e a r e they near us. We drove them i n t o being a N a t i o n when they were no more f i t f o r i t than the c o n v i c t s of Botany Bay.2  P e r k i n s , B; Prologue t o War - England and the U n i t e d S t a t e s I805-I812: F o s t e r - Lady F o s t e r . December, 1805. 2  167  It was a nationalism that sought to reaffirm i t s victory of Yorktown, and looked to i t s colonial neighbours as the nearest means of worrying the British l i o n .  The colonists  themselves were hardly objects of revenge or h o s t i l i t y , although there were elements i n the United States which looked covetously toward the north for the satisfaction of expansionist drives, or resentfully toward the eastern coastal communities as commercial r i v a l s .  From across the  border was returned a certain degree of fearful h o s t i l i t y from colonists jealous for their lands and commercial opportunities; and there lingered s t i l l some mutual enmity of Loyalist and republican. Yet such h o s t i l i t y as was exchanged along the border was that produced by the declaration of war, and nourished by subsequent border clash and privateering raids—the consequence of decisions thrust upon reluctant and preoccupied colonial communities.3 Particularly was this true of the Maritime colonies which remained detached and only faintly concerned during the earlier years of the Napoleonic era.  In 1807 reaction to the  strain in Anglo-American relations was sharp and frantic. Colonial administrators abandoned their usual business to  3For discussion of pressures and attitudes i n the United States leading to war, see Perkins; p_p,. c i t . . and Updyke, F.: Diplomacy and the War of 1812: John Hopkins Press; Baltimore, 1915.  168  put the colonies into a state of readiness f o r the expected American invasion, " and a l l three colonies could report, as 4  did Ludlow, an enthusiastic response to m i l i t i a muster.5  But  the significance given the war by the Maritime colonies, and sanctioned by B r i t a i n , was r e f l e c t e d i n the Colonial Office instructions to Prevost that i f he found New England areas disposed to private commercial arrangements he should exploit t h i s f o r purposes of introducing B r i t i s h and c o l o n i a l goods.°" Tonge had e a r l i e r indicated Maritime interest when he suggested a plan to secure a foothold i n the Penobscot area i n the event of war, as a means of penetrating New England and keeping the staples trade moving.7  Such had been the  trend of Maritime concern throughout the years preceding 1812—a s e l f - i n t e r e s t that subordinated debates on naval law to the p a r t i c u l a r s of Maritime boundary and f i s h e r y disputes, or the regulations of West Indies trade. These were the r e a l areas of f r i c t i o n between the Maritimes and t h e i r American  4  C.0.  188/13, Ludlow-Castlereagh, October 3 0 , 1807.  ^C.O. 188/13, Whitehall-Ludlow, September 5, 1807. °It was suggested Prevost might issue licences f o r the export of gypsum and coal needed by New England, and grant f i s h e r i e s concessions as an i n d i c a t i o n of B r i t a i n ' s p o l i c y of drawing d i s t i n c t i o n s between f r i e n d l y and h o s t i l e states. C O . 217/82 Whitehall-Prevost, February, 1807. ?Tonge suggested that "by a judicious combination of p o l i c y and force" the border areas could be made useful and harmless. C O . 217/81, Tonge-Whitehall, 1807.  169  neighbours, and while they remained i n the forefront of Anglo-American problems Maritime concern was strong.  But the  repeated disappointments of conventions that disregarded these issues or f a i l e d to s e t t l e p o l i c y , gradually dampened t h i s concern, and the subsequent war was regarded as of l i t t l e d i r e c t significance to the colonies. It was natural that i n a war i n which B r i t i s h North America provided but the b a t t l e f i e l d , and i n the absence of strong goads to c o l o n i a l concern, the colonies' reaction should be determined by i n t e r n a l issues, B r i t i s h pressures, and the external d i r e c t i o n of the war.  With the United  States concentrating her offensive e f f o r t s upon Canadian borders, the Maritimes were largely by-passed and suffered no physical involvement, while the strong New England element i n Maritime society produced stronger sympathies with the United States than were entertained i n the Canadian provinces. These sympathies were strengthened by economic involvement i n the areas of New England where p o l i t i c a l sentiment was  chiefly  influenced by a F e d e r a l i s t Anglophilia reluctant to press hostilities.  This was an atmosphere more conducive to  n e u t r a l i t y than that i n Upper Canada, offering l i t t l e incentive to reverse a 'me f i r s t ' p o l i c y which channeled the Maritimes' f i r s t e f f o r t s into economic e x p l o i t a t i o n of an extraordinary s i t u a t i o n .  The colonies' f i r s t problem had  been to capture the United States' carrying trade and to  170  develop the B r i t a i n - B r i t i s h North America-West I n d i e s t r a d e 'route.  War  now  o f f e r e d such an o p p o r t u n i t y — b u t o n l y i f  economic i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h New  England  c o u l d be  maintained.  ii. Throughout t h i s p e r i o d of Anglo-American t e n s i o n o f f i c i a l correspondence  p a s s i n g between the C o l o n i a l  and c o l o n i a l o f f i c e r s was England  papers—a  f i l l e d w i t h e x t r a c t s from  s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i c a t i o n of Maritime  i n and c o n n e c t i o n w i t h New the Massachusetts sentiment  England  Senator, was  affairs.  Office New interest  Timothy P i c k e r i n g ,  regarded as the v o i c e of p u b l i c  i n h i s r e g i o n when he contended t h a t  . . . i t i s e s s e n t i a l to the p u b l i c s a f e t y t h a t b l i n d confidence i n our R u l e r s should cease . . . and e s p e c i a l l y t h a t those S t a t e s whose farms are on the ocean and whose h a r v e s t s are gathered i n every sea should immediately and s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r how t o preserve them.8 No s e r i o u s o f f e n s i v e was  expected from a people  so opposed t o  t h e i r government's p o l i c i e s t h a t they c o u l d w r i t e , as d i d one c o n t r i b u t o r t o the New  York "Commercial A d v e r t i s e r "  concerning the E n f o r c i n g A c t . The Custom House O f f i c e r w i l l f i n d h i m s e l f a i d e d i n h i s arduous l a b o u r s by f r i e n d l y bands of commissioned spies I The Merchant w i l l see t h a t the mere o p i n i o n of a Board of Examiners may c o n c l u s i v e l y t r a n s f o r m h i s new New England Rum i n t o o l d Jamaican S p i r i t s I And the L a d i e s of our Seaport Towns w i l l p e r c i e v e t h a t they are k i n d l y p e r m i t t e d t o throw open t h e i r  'CO.  218/82, Hunter-Croke, A p r i l 4 ,  1807  171  parlours and bedrooms at a l l times to a genteel company of Custom House Inspectators!9 Thus reassured as to the temper of public opinion among t h e i r neighbours, c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s were assuring B r i t a i n , almost to the l a s t minute, that the actual outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s was u n l i k e l y . Maritime fears were rather concentrated upon the threat of invasion by a French f l e e t working up from the West Indies, or out of American p o r t s — f e a r s r e f l e c t e d i n the o f f i c i a l despatches, and d a i l y observations of men l i k e Simeon Perkins.  In 1804 Governor Wentworth was anxious to  prorogue the Assembly session that I t s members might return to t h e i r d i s t r i c t s to lead defence preparations against the d a i l y expected coastal i n v a s i o n ;  1 0  and i n 1807 John Howe was  sent on a spying mission to New England to ascertain the extent, character and manner of i n f i l t r a t i o n of French influence i n the United States.  C e r t a i n l y there were areas  of f r i c t i o n that roused Maritime h o s t i l i t y to t h e i r  neighbours.  Throughout much of t h i s period commercial r i v a l r y was serious, as the Maritimes resented the United States shipping advantages and New England's persistent pursuit of i l l i c i t trade and f i s h i n g ventures along Maritime  coasts.  Passamaquoddy Bay witnessed several clashes between colonists  9c.O. 217/17, Hunter-Liverpool, December 27, l 8 l l . °C.0°. 217/19, Wentworth-Whitehall, May 3 , 1804.-  172  and intruders requiring the armed intervention of Nova Scotia patrol vessels, - - while i n 1794 the expectation of a more 1  1  concerted attack from the United States was strong enough to inspire the f r a n t i c erection of St. John harbour fortifications.  1 2  Yet the p o s s i b i l i t y of attack was not  taken seriously u n t i l 1807 when Anglo-American r e l a t i o n s reached a c r i s e s over maritime issues. Washington's Non-Importation Act was regarded as a preliminary move toward h o s t i l i t i e s , and s p e c i a l sessions of the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick Assemblies were c a l l e d to organize and finance a m i l i t i a f o r c e .  Prevost meanwhile  increased h i s demands f o r a settlement of the boundary dispute, that the border areas might be properly s e c u r e d . ^ At t h i s time Prevost was instructed by the Colonial Office to keep tempers calm.  He was not to embrace every American  move as grounds f o r h o s t i l i t y , but always to seek peace,  11  C.O. 118/11, Leonard's custom report, October 10, 1801.  C.O. 118/5, Carleton-Dundas, March 6, 1794. Maritime o f f i c i a l s were growing increasingly suspicious and impatient of American good f a i t h i n the face of repeated depredations. "However sincere the American states may be i n early declaration of n e u t r a l i t y , t h e i r Government appears not to have s u f f i c i e n t energy to prevent such predatory excursions as cannot f a i l to excite serious alarm i n these provinces, and which perhaps may j u s t l y be considered as the prelude to open h o s t i l i t y . " C O . 188/5, Carleton-Dundas, August 10, 12  1793.  13c.O. 217/82, Hunter-Castlereagh, March 6, 1808; C O . 217/82, Prevost-Castlereagh, May 2 2 , 1807.  173  f i r s t making r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s t o Washington through the B r i t i s h m i n i s t e r — f o r i t was B r i t i s h p o l i c y t o r e s t r a i n a l l a c t i o n u n l e s s the U n i t e d S t a t e s made d e l i b e r a t e and systematic h o s t i l e moves. " 14  S i m i l a r i n s t r u c t i o n s preceded t h e events  of 1812 as B r i t a i n c o u n s e l l e d a n amicable d i s p o s i t i o n and l i b e r a l i n t e r c o u r s e along the Maritime  borders and c o a s t s . 15  Thus i t was t h a t a t the outbreak o f war Hunter  informed  L i v e r p o o l t h a t both mainland c o l o n i e s were observing a ban on h o s t i l i t i e s . 1 6  He had p r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d a l i k e  policy  pursued by New England c o a s t a l communities such as E a s t p o r t which had passed a r e s o l u t i o n " t o preserve a good understanding w i t h the i n h a b i t a n t s of New Brunswick and t o discountenance other."17  a l l depredations  O f f i c i a l Maritime  proclamation  upon the p r o p e r t y o f each  p o l i c y was d e c l a r e d i n the  i s s u e d by both c o l o n i a l governors on J u l y 10s  . . . I have t h e r e f o r e thought proper by and w i t h the a d v i c e o f H i s Majesty's C o u n c i l t o order and d i r e c t a l l H i s Majesty's s u b j e c t s under my Government to a b s t a i n from m o l e s t i n g and I n h a b i t a n t s l i v i n g on the shores i n those p a r t s of the T e r r i t o r i e s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s contiguous t o t h i s Province and on no account t o molest the goods or unarmed C o a s t i n g or F i s h i n g v e s s e l s belong t o the d e f e n c e l e s s I n h a b i t a n t s upon the F r o n t i e r s , so long as they s h a l l a b s t a i n on t h e i r p a r t from any a c t s o f h o s t i l i t y and m o l e s t a t i o n  14  1  C . O . 217/82, W h i t e h a l l - P r e v o s t , J u l y 6, 1807.  ^C.O. 188/18, Whitehall-Hunter,  lD  September 3 0 , 1812.  C . O . 188/18, H u n t e r - L i v e r p o o l , J u l y 4 , 1812.  ^C.O. 188/18, H u n t e r - L i v e r p o o l , June 27,  1812.  174  toward the Inhabitants of t h i s Province and of the Province of Nova Scotia who are i n a similar situation.lo This was a p o l i c y inspired by a confidence i n r e c i p r o c a l moves from the New England states, a confidence encouraged by reaction such as that of the Boston merchant houses which lowered the flags of t h e i r vessels to half-mast upon hearing of the war d e c l a r a t i o n . ^ The Maritimes did not observe a complete n e u t r a l i t y , however, nor did the ban on h o s t i l i t i e s endure  throughout  the w a r — f o r the opportunities of commercial e x p l o i t a t i o n were too essential to the colonies' interests to be e n t i r e l y ignored.  Indeed, the administrations of both New Brunswick  and Nova Scotia incurred B r i t a i n ' s censure f o r too eagerly issuing t h e i r shippers l e t t e r s of marque against American shipping.  20  Later i n the war attacks were made upon border  settlements l i k e Castine and Moose Island by Maritime  troops  who hoped to secure a foothold f o r commercial penetration of New England—a project that increased i n importance as B r i t a i n tightened her naval blockade along the eastern American coast. However, c o n c i l i a t o r y administration was maintained i n these areas where the people were believed to be f r i e n d l y and, i t was hoped, could be persuaded to change t h e i r allegiance.  l8  19  20  C.O. 188/18, Major-General  Smythe-Liverpool, J u l y , 1812.  C.O. 217/87, Sherbrooke-Liverpool, July 14, 1812. C.O. 188/18, Hunter-Liverpool, July 4, 1812.  175  Sherbrooke was not i n s i s t e n t on the r e c a l l of arms from the population he l e f t the administration i n the hands of the inhabitants, and announced a p o l i c y of issuing trade and f i s h i n g licences to those changing their a l l e g i a n c e . ! 2  Commercial  t i e s were maintained, although there i s l i t t l e  evidence of the hoped f o r oaths being taken, and i n general an amicable temper prevailed i n the r e l a t i o n s of these eastern neighbours.  Evidence of t h i s was given by the  testimonials tendered by the Eastport inhabitants upon the departure of the B r i t i s h troops who were thanked f o r t h e i r • l i b e r a l and honourable conduct toward the town shown i n the respect and attention paid to the persons and property of the i n h a b i t a n t s . '  22  The sympathy informing r e l a t i o n s between the Maritimes and t h e i r New England neighbours can be attributed to a complex of t i e s whieh Croke indicated i n h i s comment that "whatever the outward appearance of l o y a l t y , the r e l a t i o n s , the family and commercial t i e s , the property of the greater part of the province centre i n the United S t a t e s . " 3 2  Because of these t i e s , Croke held the l o y a l t y of the Nova Scotia inhabitants i n suspicion.  But throughout t h i s period  c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s gave repeated assurances of the l o y a l t y  2  l c . O . 2 1 7 / 9 3 , Sherbrooke-Bathurst, September 1 0 ,  22  2  C.O. 2 1 7 / 9 3 , August 1 9 ,  1814.  1814.  3 c . O . 2 1 7 / 8 5 , Sherbrooke-Bathurst, Febraury 1 1 ,  1808.  176  and support of the colonies whose l e g i s l a t i v e assemblies frequently produced testimonials l i k e that of 1803 when the Nova Scotia Assembly assured the Lieutenant Governor that . . . we f l a t t e r ourselves with the hope that when our exertions are c a l l e d f o r your Excellency w i l l f i n d that the hardy sons of Nova Scotia have not degenerated and that every man Is ready with h i s arms to support the c o n s t i t u t i o n which I t i s our duty to defend and our glory and happiness to enjoy.24 With the heightening of tensions a f t e r 1807,  these affirma-  tions of l o y a l t y increased—although the extent of implementation l e f t B r i t i s h authorities somewhat less confident of the colonies war  1  concern with their role i n the  effort. In 1796  Wentworth reported an enthusiastic  response to the m i l i t i a muster, indeed, the colony had oversubscribed the f o r c e ; * but i n 1805 2  the Governor was  commenting on reports of emigration to the United States by colonists who d i s l i k e d the 'impressment' into m i l i t i a duty,  0  while two years l a t e r Major General K e r r i t was  complaining of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r a i s i n g a m i l i t i a f o r c e . 7 2  Such lack of response was not the result of tepid l o y a l t y ,  24  C.O. 217/78, Assembly Journal, 1803,  p. 72.  25 CO.  217/67, Wentworth-Whitehall,  2 6 c . 0 . 217/80, Wentworth-Whitehall, 2 7  C0.  October 28, May,  180*.  217/81, Kerrit-Castlereagh, October,  1807.  1796.  177 but of a pre-occupation with other concerns that exerted p r i o r demands upon the resources and energies of the population.  Manpower was  scarce and badly needed for the  expansion of agriculture and the f i s h e r i e s , and i n recognition of these needs, m i l i t i a musters were arranged i n alternating duties between the coastal and i n t e r i o r s e t t l e ments as seasonal pressures d i c t a t e d . Governor Wentworth outlined the fundamental d i f f i c u l t y i n his explanation that: Families . . . depend altogether on men whose labours produce a Subsistence f o r women and children which their pay would be e n t i r e l y unequal t o . Labourers are not to be had to carry on i t s agriculture which now produce meat f o r the Inhabitants but not more than h a l f the Bread. Therefore any diminution i n c u l t i v a t i n g lands would immediately cause such a s c a r c i t y of food as to induce numbers to remove to the United States.28 There was a l s o a general reluctance throughout  the  colonies to expand funds and energies i n a concern that was of B r i t a i n ' s making and f e l l within the sphere of B r i t i s h responsibility.  During the early seventeen n i n e t i e s  Governor Carleton waged a continual battle with the  New  Brunswick Assembly which he considered was neglecting i t s duty to a s s i s t proportionally i n defence costs.  To t h i s  contention the Assembly p o l i t e l y r e p l i e d :  C.O. 217/6"?, Wentworth-Portland, December 20, 1794. In A p r i l , 1809 Edward Winslow told h i s son that he had seen f i t to disband the New Brunswick m i l i t i a i n the face of a g r i c u l t u r a l necessity, and had sent the men huzzaing home. W.O. Raymond: Winslow Papers, p. 619. 28  178  . . . a l t h o u g h they can c o n f i d e n t l y assure Your E x c e l l e n c y of the ready p e r s o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n of a l l H i s Majesty's s u b j e c t s i n t h i s p r o v i n c e on every o c c a s i o n i n g e n e r a l defence yet they concieve t h e i r s i t u a t i o n i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the e r e c t i o n of defences or the d e f r a y i n g of expenses a t t e n d i n g works of defence.29 By the time war  was  d e c l a r e d a t t i t u d e s had  changed somewhat  and C a r l e t o n c o u l d r e p o r t a vote of ten thousand pounds f o r defence  e x p e n d i t u r e s — a vote " q u i t e beyond t h e i r a c t u a l  a b i l i t y " and regarded as a sure pledge  t h a t "no e x e r t i o n  w i l l be wanting on t h e i r p a r t t o m e r i t t h a t support p r o t e c t i o n t o which they look w i t h c o n f i d e n c e from Mother Country."30  But i t was  and the  f e a r e d t h a t the Mother  Country d i d not always p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t support, i n or equipment, t o encourage c o l o n i a l endeavours. correspondence  of the war  years i s f i l l e d  men  The  with pleas  from  c o l o n i a l o f f i c e r s f o r more arms, more t r o o p s , even f o r such Worth American n e c e s s i t i e s as great coats f o r the sentrymen. They are l e t t e r s t r y i n g t o impress  upon B r i t a i n the  peculiar  c o n d i t i o n s of the c o l o n i e s , and the c h a r a c t e r of c o l o n i a l t h i n k i n g t h a t must be accommodated.  Sherbrooke  requested  more troops w i t h the o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t an i n s u f f i c i e n c y i n the colony would r e q u i r e a f u l l m i l i t i a muster, i n c o n v e n i e n c i n g  2  9 c . O . I 8 8 / 9 , Assembly J o u r n a l , February  3°C.O. 1 8 8 / 1 8 ,  L i v e r p o o l - H u n t e r , March 9 ,  25,  1795.  l8l2.  179  the inhabitants and arousing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among them.31 For the colonies considered the m i l i t i a as but a supplement to the regular troops, their attitude r e f l e c t e d i n the Assembly arrangements f o r m i l i t i a duty i n the event of invasion,  32 and i n the m i l i t i a ' s tendency to diminish i n strength with'every increase i n the B r i t i s h detachment. It was B r i t i s h troops who  led the defensive operations upon  the Few England border communities, while the Maritimers prepared t h e i r warehouses.  ill.  Some apprehension as to the sentiments of the Maritimers might have been s t i r r e d by the comment of one Halifax newspaper which stated bluntly that a separation from Great B r i t a i n under any circumstances Is a great calamity. But these form but a small portion i n comparison with the number whose i n c l i n a t i o n s would be guided by t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and i f those a r t i c l e s i n the Treaty of 1783 which were so injurious to these colonies should be renewed, there can be no doubt that the inhabitants of the neighbouring States w i l l possess advantages over our Colonies i n which they w i l l f e e l a strong d i s p o s i t i o n to participate and the Merchant at Halifax or Liverpool, St. Andrews or St. John who sees his Correspondent at Boston acquiring wealth from a trade i n which he i s not permitted to engage, w i l l  31c.O. 217/89, Sherbrooke-Liverpool, August 7,  1812.  ^The Nova Scotia Assembly directed m i l i t i a forces to be employed i n the driving of c a t t l e from coastal areas, should the enemy invade. C.O. 217/67, Assembly Journal, 179&.  180  f e e l a natural wish to release himself from those r e s t r i c t i o n s which deprive him of t h i s advantage— a wish that w i l l , we fear, be too strong f o r any sentiment of l o y a l t y he may entertain toward a country which he never saw. These consequences are n a t u r a l , and the a n t i c i p a t i o n of them cannot be considered a reproach upon the people who inhabit the colonies. I t only supposes that they w i l l be influenced by those motives which activates the generality of mankind.33 The writer was  sharply reprimanded by h i s brother j o u r n a l i s t s ,  but he had only voiced the 'me  f i r s t ' attitude  concentrating  Maritime concern on the commercial implications of war l8l2.  B r i t a i n had recognized  sanctioned  in  t h i s concern when she  the l i c e n s i n g trade, between the colonies and  England, that began at the outbreak of war;  New  and she further  f a c i l i t a t e d commercial exchange with the creation of free ports at St. John, St. Andrews, and H a l i f a x . 34  Such measures were infringements  of the Navigation  Laws, and B r i t a i n  was  i n s i s t e n t that they were temporary accommodations i n practice only, involving no permanent change i n p r i n c i p l e .  Whitehall  found i t necessary to impress t h i s upon Maritime governors who  had  started issuing coastal trade licences immediately  upon declaration of war,3* arousing fears i n B r i t a i n that the 33Acadian Recorder. October 29, 1814. 3 0 r d e r i n Council, October 13, 4  1812.  3?An Order i n Council of A p r i l 25, 1812 had extended Maritime-United States economic intercourse u n t i l March 25, 1815; but the colonies did not receive word of t h i s u n t i l J u l y 18, and independently renewed licences e a r l i e r i n the month.  181  colonies would exploit the war s i t u a t i o n to e s t a b l i s h a large scale trade that could be used to a f f e c t p o l i c y reversals at the peace treaty conferences.  B r i t a i n had  various reasons for wltholding unconditional sanction to the licence trade.  Where c o n f l i c t s with B r i t i s h interests  occurred the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the Navigation Laws were retained, prohibiting such American imports as s a l t beef, which had always been an important a r t i c l e i n B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l trade.  Nor did B r i t a i n give immediate approval to  the suggestion that United States shippers be allowed to export B r i t i s h and c o l o n i a l goods from the Maritimers.37  it  required time and the pressures of necessity to broaden regulations to a f u l l e r accommodation of conditions.  Only  when B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y and naval needs began to over-tax c o l o n i a l resources was the enumerated l i s t of American imports extended, while lumber was eventually added to the l i s t of the c o l o n i a l exports allowed to be shipped out i n American vessels, as an inducement to American traders to continue undertaking the expensive shipping detours  3°C.O. 217/90, Nova Scotia Council Minutes, October 8,  1812.  37 Sherbrooke f i r s t requested permission f o r this exchange on November 7, 1812 and was refused the following January, but i n July and October of 1813 B r i t a i n agreed to allow the export of gypsum and plaster of P a r i s . C O . 217/92, Committee of Trade-Sherbrooke.  182  necessitated by the Embargo.3°* The Maritime colonies p r o f i t e d by the imposition of the Embargo Act.  Not only had the Act proved a valuable  goad to New England anti-administration sentiments,  thus  assuring the Maritimes r e l a t i v e safety from United States war p o l i c i e s j but i t had removed New England shipping from the North American-West Indies trade routes where American superiority had formerly prevented  the Maritimes from  r e a l i z i n g their role as chief provisioner of the West Indian colonies.  Where once the Maritimes had played a secondary  role as suppliers f o r the New England re-export trade, i t was now American merchants who were dependent upon the Maritime ports as outlets f o r t h e i r goods.  Not only d i d the  Maritimers become entrepots f o r the re-export of American goods, but they sought to exploit the opportunities of developing markets i n the United States f o r Maritime goods, and to e s t a b l i s h themselves as middlemen i n British-American trade.  I t was therefore important  that the Maritimes do a l l  i n their power to protect t h e i r commercial t i e s with New England.  3 C.O. 217/90, Sherbrooke-Bathurst, November 6, 1812. Due to the prohibitions of the Embargo Act American ships were having to return to t h e i r home ports from Halifax v i a S t . Bartholamew i n the West Indies i n order to get v a l i d re-entry papers, and t r a v e l l i n g i n b a l l a s t was creating p r o h i b i t i v e expenses. 8  183  During the early months of the war Sherbrooke repeatedly stressed the importance of encouraging New England evasion of the Embargo, c h i e f l y by offering American ships the  protection of B r i t i s h convoys,39 n d throughout the war a  he requested customs o f f i c i a l s to give every consideration to the  New England renegades.40  At the same time Maritime  merchants complained of the lack of convoy protection and of the  impressment  of seamen from the merchant s e r v i c e .  4 1  These  were the complaints of colonists objecting t o a B r i t i s h administration that d i d not appreciate the c o l o n i a l viewpoint and persisted i n subordinating i t to the imperial interest.  B r i t a i n ' s concern f o r trade relations was dictated  by diplomacy and her own defence needs; but when these could be served by means other than trade concessions, or when defence strategy c o n f l i c t e d with commercial measures, the l a t t e r was relegated to a secondary p o s i t i o n .  The r e s u l t  was frequently a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c confusion of departmental p o l i c i e s and instructions which drew from Sherbrooke i n 1813 the  request f o r more precise customs house instructions  that r e p e t i t i o n s of h i s quarrel with o f f i c i a l s might be  39c.G. 217/89, Sherbrooke-Bathurst, August 7,  l8l2.  40  C O . 217/89, Sherbrooke-Bathurst, November 6, 1812. A request that B r i t i s h ships not molest the American shipping along Maritime coasts. 4 1  C0.  217/91, Sherbrooke-Bathurst, July 11,  1813.  184  avoided.^  Protests became b i t t e r when B r i t a i n enforced  her blockade of the A t l a n t i c coast, hindering commercial exchange just as Halifax and St. John merchants were f i l l i n g t h e i r warehouses f o r export. 3 4  These were the protests of men who  feared to be  cheated once more of the wealth that had f l o a t e d within t h e i r grasp.  War  had brought prosperity to the c o l o n i e s —  not welcomed by a l l , as prosperity had been accompanied by extravagance and speculation feared by those who  d i d not  regard the phenomena of war as a preview of enduring fortune.  One  extravagant  good  c r i t i c described the period as one of  abandon leaving Halifax at war's end with the  appearance of a town at the end of a f a i r .  4 - 4  But war did  increase domestic demand for produce, encouraging agriculture and making of the c o l o n i a l c a p i t o l s s a t i s f a c t o r y markets f o r the backlands.  The impetus given New  Brunswick timber  industry by B r i t a i n ' s exclusion from European sources  August, Customs had seized an American ship f o r the i l l e g a l import of candles and other 'unenumerated' goods which the American traders had claimed to be camouflage cargo only meant to help them evade Embargo. The Board of Trade consequently conceded to Sherbrooke's request that seizure of American ships be henceforth made his sole r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . C O . 217/92, Sherbrooke-Bathurst, A p r i l 22, 1813; C O . 217/92, Whitehall-Sherbrooke, August 17j 1813. 3 C O . 217/93, May 1814• Halifax merchants petitioned that t h e i r goods had l o s t a t h i r d i n value since the blockade, one company had one and a h a l f m i l l i o n pounds i n goods blockaded with no other adequate o u t l e t . C.O. 217/95? SherbrookeWhitehall, September 15, 1814. 4  ^Haliburton:  op. c i t . . p.  139.  185 inaugurated an expansion of settlement  i n New Brunswick.  In 1808 men and business firms flocked into the Mirimachi Valley, developing St. Stephens as t h e i r centre, and into Northumberland County.  The prosperity of war had at l a s t  brought the longed f o r expansion and consolidation of settlement  i n the colonies.  The protection of t h i s prosperity  i n the future was the concern of the colonies throughout the war years, voiced i n Assembly motions and merchant p e t i t i o n s . Early i n 1813 Sherbrooke recommended to B r i t i s h notice the Halifax Committee of Trade's p e t i t i o n of November 1812 regarding future peace negotiations, as a r e f l e c t i o n of general p r o v i n c i a l opinion.  Like p e t i t i o n s preceding and  following i t , t h i s complained of the 1783 Treaty that had l e f t border issues i n dispute, taken no s t r i c t measures against American trade i n the West Indies, and given the American f i s h e r i e s p r i v i l e g e s o f f the Maritime coasts.  The  petitioners requested that issues be r e c t i f i e d i n future arrangements, e s p e c i a l l y now the Maritimes had proven t h e i r a b i l i t y to supply the West Indies. "^ 4  These p e t i t i o n s were frequently the j o i n t e f f o r t of Assembly and Council, f o r during the war period there reigned a unanimity i n administrative c i r c l e s where a l l factions concentrated conditions.  on the e x p l o i t a t i o n of p r e v a i l i n g  The journals and o f f i c i a l correspondence of  .0. 217/93, Assembly-Council p e t i t i o n , 1814  186  these years carry l i t t l e notice of the o l d f a c t i o n a l feuds, appearing to support one newspaper commentator i n h i s contention that "we have no factions to d i s t r e s s our councils, ho contending parties to enfeeble the Spring of our government . . . . resistance."46 interest?  We are unanimous i n our designs of  Was i t unanimity i n resistance or s e l f -  Another newspaper editor was of the l a t t e r  opinion, as he chastised h i s fellow c o l o n i a l s : Happy state of Nova ScotiaI among a l l t h i s tumult we have l i v e d i n peace and security invaded only by a numerous host of American doubloons and d o l l a r s which have swept away the contents of our stores and shops l i k e a torrent, and from a detachment occupies our very treasury i n great force. Our farmers have f e l t no other effects of war but that hay s e l l s f o r ten or twelve pounds a ton, turkies for ten s h i l l i n g s each, and beef and mutton f o r ten pence a pound. Long may my country enjoy such prosperity. But i n the midst of i t she should think of her suffering brethren who are f i g h t i n g her b a t t l e s . What have we done f o r the common c a u s e why n o t h i n g — t o our shame absolutely nothing . . . . We are amusing ourselves with fine speeches about c i v i l i z i n g Indians with Bible Societies and Acadian S o c i e t i e s , and B i l l i n g s g a t e controversies about a l l these . . . . Now i s the time to r e c t i f y the egregious blunders ( i f not treachery) of 1 7 8 3 , and i n my opinion our Legislature should address the Prince Regent to that purpose.4-7 I t was also the opinion of h i s neighbours i n the Maritime colonies, and the war of 1 8 1 2 came to a close with the colonists demanding security f o r the commercial advantages  'Brittanus i n the Weekly Chronicle. July 1 0 , 1 8 1 2 . Acadian Recorder. May 14, 1 8 1 4 .  187  that had been t h e i r chief concern f o r months past. occupation with war and i t s commercial  Pre-  significance had  distracted attention from the p o l i t i c a l controversies of the pre-war years; yet these pre-occupations were but another phase i n the general struggle f o r domestic security and independence which had been the over-riding concern of the colonies during the decade of the Napoleonic era.  CONCLUSION  In l 8 l l Prevost observed that As Nova Scotia becomes sensible of her adolescence her d i s l i k e of control w i l l increase and attempts to shake o f f the Mother Country become more f r e q u e n t — her t i e s i n my estimation are those of necessity and convenience more than gratitude and a f f e c t i o n . 1 But the twenty years of p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e and economic struggle which Nova Scotia and her s i s t e r colonies had experienced by l 8 l l had already i l l u s t r a t e d the colonies' adolescent of c o n t r o l .  dislike  Certainly the colonies depended on Mother  B r i t a i n f o r support and sustenance i n many areas of t h e i r existence; but i t was  the very r e s t r i c t i o n s and  conditions  accompanying that support which repeatedly frustrated the colonies' r e a l i z a t i o n of a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y and domestic independence that could have lightened B r i t a i n ' s load. nature of B r i t i s h administration was  The  frequently a goad to  the c o l o n i s t s ' resentment of and impatience with a system they considered  i l l - i n f o r m e d and uninterested.  The p e t i t i o n s  and complaints that crossed the A t l a n t i c to Whitehall were attempts to adapt the Mother Country's c o n t r o l , and to f u l l y r e a l i z e a l l i t s advantages, rather than to shake i t o f f altogether.  ic.O.  217/88, Prevost-Whitehall,  188  May  12,  l8ll.  189  The struggles experienced by the mainland Maritime communities during these two and a h a l f decades were the f i r s t s t i r r i n g s of that awareness prophesized by Prevost. That the B r i t i s h o f f i c e r should prophesy with the voice of doom, was a r e f l e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l environment period.  of the  When government administrations were plagued by  spectres of republicanism, i t did not seem conceivable that their dependents might f i n d i t possible, even preferable, to seek r e v i s i o n rather than r e v o l t .  The Maritime colonies'  attempts to influence administrative r e v i s i o n f e l l just another victim to such apprehension, as i t was communicated to imperial deputies throughout the colonies. The colonies' endeavours were the v i c t i m of more than imperial apprehension, however.  B r i t i s h preoccupation  with her continental involvement, and the extraordinary provisions demanded by that involvement, prevented any basic revisions of imperial economic orthodoxy during t h i s period, or a lessening of the executive surveillance regarded by B r i t a i n as the necessary assurance of that orthodoxy.  More-  over, B r i t a i n d i d not share the colonies' opinion that they had already achieved a maturity meriting a greater degree of domestic independence  and more equal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n such  f i e l d s as trade and commerce.  This d i s p a r i t y of opinion  was a p r i n c i p a l factor i n the debates of c o l o n i a l and imperial representatives during these years; and while the  190  c o l o n i s t s ' arguments d i d indeed r e f l e c t a new maturity and more s e t t l e d state of society, they were a l s o f i l l e d with the contradictions and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of a society s t i l l uncertain i n i t s claims and c a p a b i l i t i e s .  Claims to the complete  paraphenalia of parliamentary practice as an assurance of domestic  independence were countered by an almost complete  dependency on the Mother Country's strong arm; demands f o r more extensive economic p r i v i l e g e s were accompanied by requests f o r economic subsidization.  Prince Edward Island  represented a s t i l l infant condition requiring the r e s t r i c t i o n s and d i c t a t i o n of the old imperial system; i t concentrated within i t s borders problems s t i l l being experienced by i t s older s i s t e r s ; i t r e f l e c t e d a s o c i a l pettiness and confusion s t i l l b e d e v i l l i n g mainland attempts to resolve i t s problems; and i t was this confusion, r e f l e c t e d i n the factionalism of Maritime society, that was probably the greatest obstacle to the colonies' r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic aims. These decades of the Napoleonic era were indeed a period of Maritime  'adolescence,' with i t s f i r s t experiments  i n a new sphere of powers, authority and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The War of 1812  might be regarded as the conclusion of these  preliminary experiments,  or as the interruption of a more  gradual development which i t deflected with extraordinary opportunities and concessions.  Certainly the three years of  war, and the several years preceding, so f a r as the Maritime  191  colonies were concerned were an exception to the ordinary rule of imperial administration.  But i n the relaxation of  the Navigation Laws and the c o n c i l i a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i v e demands much of what the colonies were pursuing was i l l u s t r a t e d , and the colonies provided with a foretaste of achievement.  Considering  the Maritimes  1  s i t u a t i o n and t h e i r  preoccupations of preceding years, i t i s not to be wondered at that they regarded the war as a spectacle and an opportunity.  I t i s i n the colonies' a c t i v i t i e s from 1790 to  1812 that an explanation of t h e i r attitude i n 1812-1814 can be found; f o r these were self-conscious, self-centered years of emergence into a d e f i n i t e communal i d e n t i t y , the war as but one more contributing f a c t o r , or i l l u s t r a t i o n of these factors.  APPENDIX  APPENDIX Biographical Notes  A l l i n e , Henry (1748-1784); born i n Rhode Island and moved to Nova Scotia i n 1760. He became an i t i n e r a n t preacher and founded the "New Light" sect i n the Maritimes. Barclay, Thomas (175*3-1830), born i n New York, educated a t Columbia University and studied law under John Jay. During the American Revolution he served as an o f f i c e r i n the Loyal American Regiment and a t the end of h o s t i l i t i e s he moved to Nova Scotia. In 178"? he was elected to represent Annapolis County i n the House of Assembly, and i n 1793 he was elected speaker of the House, In 1799 he was appointed B r i t i s h consul general i n New York and i n 1816 was appointed a commissioner under the Treaty of Ghent. Black, William (I76O-I834), born i n Yorkshire, England and came to Nova Scotia i n 1775* He became a Methodist preacher and founded the Wesleyan Methodist Church i n Nova Scotia. B l i s s , Jonathan (1742-1822), born i n Massachusetts, educated at Harvard College and studied law under LieutenantGovernor Hutchison. In 1778 he went to England having been proscribed as a L o y a l i s t . In 1785 he was appointed Attorney General of New Brunswick and s e t t l e d i n St. John. In 1809 he was appointed Chief Justice of the province. Blowers, Samuel Salter (1743-1842), born i n Boston, educated at Harvard College and served as b a r r i s t e r of the Supreme Court of Boston. He was appointed judge of the Vice Admiralty Court of Rhode Island i n 1779 and i n 1780 Solicitor-General f o r New York. In I785 he was appointed Attorney General of Nova Scotia and elected speaker of the House of Assembly. In 1788 he became a member of the Legislative Council, i n 1797 he was appointed president of the Council and Chief J u s t i c e . Botsford, Amos (1744-1812), born i n Connecticut, educated a t Yale College and c a l l e d to the bar of Connecticut. In 1782 he was appointed an agent of the B r i t i s h government i n connection with the settlement of the L o y a l i s t s i n 192  193  Nova Scotia. He represented Westmorland County i n the House of Assembly and served as speaker of the House during t h i s period. Carleton, Thomas (1735-1817), born i n Ireland and served i n B r i t i s h army. In 1776 he came to Canada and became quarter-master-general of the forces commanded by S i r Guy Carleton. On August 16, 1784 he was appointed f i r s t governor of New Brunswick; on May 20, 1786 h i s t i t l e was changed to Lieutenant Governor. In 1803 he returned to England and u n t i l 1817 the province was governed by administrators. Chipman, Ward (1754-1824), born i n Massachusetts, educated a t Harvard College, and practised law i n Boston. During the American Revolution he served as deputy muster-mastergeneral of B r i t i s h forces i n North America, and accompanied S i r Guy Carleton to England a f t e r the evacuation of New York. From 1784 to I808 he served as S o l i c i t o r General of New Brunswick. He represented f i r s t Saint John, and then Northumberland County i n the House of Assembly. In 1806 he was appointed to the . Executive Council; i n 1808 he was made a judge of the Supreme Court. Croke, S i r Alexander (1758-1842), born i n England, educated at Oxford and was c a l l e d to the bar a t the Inner Court. In 1801 he was appointed a judge i n the Vice Admiralty Court at Halifax, which position he held u n t i l 1815. Desbarres, Joseph Frederic, Wallet (1722-1824), born of Hugeunot descent, educated i n Switzerland and at the Royal M i l i t a r y College, England. He served i n the B r i t i s h army, during various North American campaigns. He published The A t l a n t i c Neptune (1777)» the r e s u l t of his surveys along the Nova Scotia coast. In 1784 he was appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Cape Breton, but was r e l i e v e d of the post i n I787, after much c o n f l i c t with the island community. In 1504 he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Prince Edward Island and held that post u n t i l  1812.  Deschamps, Isaac (1722-1801), born i n Switzerland. He s e t t l e d i n Halifax around 1752. In 1768 he was appointed a judge of the court of Common Pleas i n Prince Edward Island, then transferred to the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia i n I78O. He became Chief Justice i n 1785.  194  Fanning, Edmund (1737-1818), born i n New York, educated at Yale College, and c a l l e d to the bar of North Carolina where he was appointed judge of the Supreme Court. During the American Revolution he r a i s e d and commanded the King's American Regiment. In 1783 he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia and i n 1787 became Lieutenant Governor of Prince Edward Island, r e t i r i n g i n 1804. I n g l i s , Charles ( 1 7 3 4 - l 8 l 6 ) , born i n Ireland. He was ordained i n England, ministered i n New York, and was forced to leave the colony during the American Revolution. In 1787 he was consecrated f i r s t bishop of Nova S c o t i a . In I788 he founded King's College at Windsor which was granted a charter as the University of King's College. In 1809 he was appointed to the Nova Scotia Executive Council. Knox, William: London.  Georgia L o y a l i s t ; New  Brunswick agent i n  Leonard, George: He served as an o f f i c e r of the Loyalist Association and was appointed agent of the B r i t i s h government responsible for s e t t l i n g L o y a l i s t s i n the St. John River v a l l e y . He was appointed to the New Brunswick Executive Council, and was appointed Superintendent of F i s h e r i e s and Customs for Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Ludlow, Gabriel George (I736-I808), born i n New York. He served as a colonel i n the L o y a l i s t Regiment during the American Revolution and came to New Brunswick i n 1784. He was appointed to the New Brunswick Executive Council and i n I 0 O 3 was appointed president and administrator of the province during Carleton's absence, serving u n t i l 1808. He served as the f i r s t mayor of St. John f o r ten years. Leonard, George Duncan (1734-1808), born i n New York. He served as member of the Council of New York and as a puisne judge of the Supreme Court. He came to New Brunswick i n 1784; he was appointed to the Executive Council, and was appointed Chief J u s t i c e . Parr, John (1725-1791), born i n Ireland; joined the B r i t i s h army. In 1782 he was appointed Governor of Nova Scotia, his commission changed to that of Lieutenant Governor i n I786 when Carleton was made chief administrator of a l l B r i t i s h North America.  195 Patterson, Walter (d. I798), born i n Ireland; joined the B r i t i s h army. In 1769 he was appointed goverhor-inchief and Captain-general of Prince Edward Island; h i s commission was changed to Lieutenant Governor In I784, and i n 1787 he was r e c a l l e d to England to answer charges against him. Prevost, S i r George Bart (I767-I816). He served i n the B r i t i s h army i n the West Indies and was appointed Governor of various islands. In 1808 he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia where he a l s o served as m i l i t a r y commander, u n t i l transferred to Quebec i n l 8 l l as administrator of Lower Canada and Commander i n Chief of B r i t i s h forces during the War 1812. Perkins, Simeon (1735-1812), born i n Connecticut. He settled i n Liverpool i n 1762 where he became a prominent merchant. He served i n the Nova Scotia Assembly f o r t h i r t y - f o u r years, and as a judge of probate for t h i r t y years. Sherbrooke, S i r John Coape (I764-I83O), born i n England, served i n the B r i t i s h army. In 1811 he was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Nova Scotia; i n 1814 he led the Maritime expedition up the Penobscot to capture Maine. In 1816 he was appointed Governor of Canada. Uniacke, Richard John (I753-I83O), born i n Ireland. In 1774 he came to Nova Scotia and was admitted to the bar i n 1781. From 1783 to 1793 he sat i n the Assembly, serving as speaker from 1789-1793. In 1782 he was appointed S o l i c i t o r General, and i n 1797 he became Attorney General. In 1808 he was appointed to the Executive Council. Thorpe, Thomas (d. 1820), born i n Ireland and c a l l e d to the I r i s h bar i n 1781. He was protege of Lord Castlereagh and i n 1802 was appointed Chief Justice of Prince Edward Island. In 1805 he was appointed puisne judge of court of King's Bench of Upper Canada. Wentworth, S i r John Bart. (1737-1820), born i n New Hampshire, educated at Harvard College. In 1766 he was appointed Governor of New Hampshire. In 177° he went to Halifax and then to England*. In 1783 he was appointed Surveyor of the King's woods i n North America. From 1792 to 1808 he served as Lieutenant Governor of Nova S c o t i a .  196  Winslow, Edward (1746-1815), born i n Massachusetts, educated at Harvard College. During the American Revolution he served as muster master general of B r i t i s h forces i n America. In 1783 he came to Halifax and served f o r two years as Secretary to the Commander i n Chief i n North America. In 1?84 he was appointed to the Executive Council of New Brunswick; i n I806 he was appointed a judge of the Supreme Court; i n 1808 he served temporarily as President and Commander i n Chief of the province.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Primary Sources: 1.  Documents: C O . 217, v o l s . 36-37j 62-95j I O 8 - I 3 3 . Despatches from Nova Scotia and Cape Breton to the B r i t i s h administration. C O . 218, v o l s . 28-29.  Outgoing inter-departmental  l e t t e r s from the Secretary of State to Nova Scotia. C O . 220, Sessional papers of Nova Scotia. C O . 221, Shipping returns of Nova Scotia. C O . 188, v o l s . 1-21. Despatches from New Brunswick to the B r i t i s h administration. C O . 189, v o l s . 10-11. Outgoing inter-departmental l e t t e r s from the Secretary of State to New Brunswick. C.O. 190, Sessional papers of New Brunswick. C O . 193, Shipping returns of New Brunswick. C.O. 226, v o l s . 12-26. Despatches from Prince Edward Islands to the B r i t i s h administration. These documents constitute the core of material on which this thesis depends; indeed, the correspondence which passed between the Colonial Office and the c o l o n i a l administrators constituted almost the only first-hand material I had concerning this period i n Maritime h i s t o r y . The Maritime governors wrote frequent and often copious reports covering every facet of c o l o n i a l a f f a i r s . Admittedly, they wrote from one prejudiced viewpoint which had to be taken into account when drawing conclusions from t h e i r observations, but the governors often included newspapers, pamphlets e t c . which presented other viewpoints and arguments. Most of this material was studied i n the Public Records O f f i c e , London, England; some material was 197  198  studied through microfilm borrowed from the Dominion Archives, Ottawa, Canada. 2.  Debates: Parliamentary History: Hansard; London, 1917* A cursory reading was given the debates i n volumes xx-xxx concerning departmental reorganization i n the B r i t i s h government following the American Revolution, where t h i s involved c o l o n i a l administration, and those debates on parliamentary reform which were looked to for some r e f l e c t i o n of B r i t i s h ideas of representation and the r e l a t i o n of the executive and l e g i s l a t u r e . Parliamentary Debates (Cobbett ed.): Hansard; London. A cursory reading was given the debates i n volumes v i , x x i concerning commercial intercourse with America and the license trade i n the colonies, as these r e f l e c t e d o f f i c i a l opinion on the r e l a t i o n of neutral and c o l o n i a l commerce to B r i t a i n ' s Navigation System.  3.  Government Publications: Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada 1759-1791:(Shortt and Doughty, e d i t o r s ) : Canadian Archives - King's Printer; Ottawa, 1918. The sessional paper #18 contained i n this volume included correspondence between B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s and o f f i c i a l s i n the B r i t i s h North American colonies concerning reorganization of the Canadian p r o v i n c e s — but the ideas expressed reflected general B r i t i s h p o l i c y toward the colonies. P a r t i c u l a r l y interesting i n this respect was the unsigned and undated memorial e n t i t l e d "Discussion of P e t i t i o n s and Counter Petitions re the Change of Government i n Canada" which summarized B r i t i s h reaction to the American Revolution and i t s consequences f o r B r i t i s h North America.  4.  Newspapers: Fredericton Telegraph  I806  New  1812-1814  Brunswick Courier  Halifax Journal, excerpts included i n the Governors* despatch. Acadian Recorder  1813-1814  Weekly Chronicle  1810-1812  199  During this period only the centres of Fredricton, St. John and Halifax enjoyed the luxury of a newspaper and these publications were often l i t t l e more than advertising sheets and government b u l l e t i n s . Judging from these papers the Maritime population would not appear to have been very a r t i c u l a t e , but the occasional e d i t o r i a l r e f l e c t e d something of public opinion and discussion of the day. 5.  Pamphlets: Aitcheson, IT.:; "American Encroachments on B r i t i s h Rights"; London, 1808. Brougham:  "Orders i n Council"; London, 1808.  Halifax Merchants: "Present Claims and Complaints of America B r i e f l y and F a i r l y Considered"; London, 1806.  Stephens, J . : "War i n Disguise, or the Frauds of Neutral Flags"; London, 1805. Anonymous American: New York, 1806.  "Answer to War i n Disguise";  Anonymous American: "Remarks on the B r i t i s h Treaty with the United States"; Liverpool, 1807. None of these pamphlets were d i r e c t l y concerned with Maritime a f f a i r s , but they were of interest as background material r e l a t i n g to British-United States relations preceding 1812. Secondary Sources: 1.  Books: Ashton, T.S., An Economic History of England: The Eighteenth Century; Metheun and Co.; London, 1955 • Binney, J.E.D., B r i t i s h Public Finance and Administrat i o n 1774-1792; Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1958. Brady, A., William Huskisson and L i b e r a l Reform; Oxford University Press - Humphrey M i l f o r d ; London, 1928.  200  Briggs, A., The Age of Improvement: Longmans, Green and Co.; London, 1959. Burke, E.: Works (ed. F.G. Rivington) vol. i i i ; London, IBoJT Burt, A.L., United States, Great Britain and British North America from the Revolution to the Peace of 1812: Yale University Press: New Haven, 1 9 4 0 . Clark, S.D., Church and Sect i n Canada: University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1 9 4 8 i Coupland, R., The American Revolution and the British Empire: Longman's Green and Co.; London, 1930. Pitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne vol. II: Macmillan and Co.; London, 1912. French, G., Parsons and P o l i t i c s ; Ryerson Press; Toronto, 1 9 6 2 . Graham, G.S., Seapower and British North America 178^-1820. a study i n British Colonial Policy: Harvard University Press; Cambridge, 1941. Haliburton, T.C., An Historical and Statistical Account of Nova Scotia; Halifax, 1828. , A General Description of Nova Scotia: Printed at the Royal Acadian School; Halifax, 1 8 2 5 . Hannay, J., History of New Brunswick; John A. Bowes; St. John, 1909. Harlow, V.T., The Founding of the Second British Empire 176^-179^ vol. 1: Longman's. Green and Co.; London, 1952. Select Documents i n Canadian Economic History 178*^-l885 (Innis and Lower editors); University Knorr, E.K., British Colonial Theories 1 "370-1850; University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1944. T  MacKinnon, F., The Government of Prince Edward Island: University of Toronto Press; Toronto, 1951. MacNaughton, F., The Development of the Theory and Practice of Education i n New Brunswick 1784-1900: University of New Brunswick Historical Studies; Fredricton, I 9 4 7 .  201  MacNutt, W.S., New Brunswick: A History 1784-1867: Macmillan and Co.; Toronto, I963. Manning, H.T., B r i t i s h Colonial Government a f t e r the American Revolution 1782-1820; Yale University Press; New Haven, 1935. . The Revolt of French Canada Macmillan and Co.; London, 1962.  l800-l8^5:  Martin, C , Empire and Commonwealth. Studies i n Governance and Self-Government i n Canada; Clarendon Press; Oxford, 1929. McGregor, J . , B r i t i s h North America v o l . 1.2: Blackwood; London, 1833«  William  Mowat, E.B., England i n the Eighteenth Century; George Harp and Co.; London, 1932. Murdock, B., History of Nova Scotia or Acadie v o l . 3: J . Barnes; Halifax, 1867. Perkins, B., Prologue to War: England and the United States. 1805-1812: University of C a l i f o r n i a Press; Los Angeles, 1961. Diary of Simeon Perkins, (Ferguson, B. e d i t o r ) ; Champlain Society; Toronto, I96I. Raymond, W.O. (ed.) Winslow Papers 1776-1826: St. John; Sun Printing Co.; 1901. Schuyler, R.L., The F a l l of the Old Colonial System 1770-1870: Oxford University Press; New York, 1945. S e l l e y , W.T., England i n the Eighteenth Century; Adam and Charles Black; London, 1949. Smart, W., Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century I 8 0 1 - l 8 2 0 ; Macmillan and Co.; London, 1910. Updyke, F.A., The Diplomacy of the War of 1812; Hopkins Press; Baltimore, 1915*  John  Wallace, W.S. The United Empire L o y a l i s t s ; Brooke Co.; Toronto, 1914. Walsh, W.S., The C h r i s t i a n Church i n Canada; Ryerson Press; Toronto, 195°.  202  Whitelaw, W.M.. The Maritimes and Canada before Confederation: Oxford University Press; Toronto, 1934. Young, D.M., The Colonial Office i n the Early Nineteenth Century: Longman's, Green, Co. f o r the Royal Commonwealth Society; London, 1961. 2.  Articles: Akins, T., "History of Halifax C i t y " ; Nova Scotia H i s t o r i c a l Society Papers: v o l . 8, (1895). Archibald, A.G.. " S i r Alexander Croke"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 1-3 (I878-83). Barnestead, A.S., "Development of the Office of P r o v i n c i a l Secretary i n Nova Scotia"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 24 (1938). B e l l , H.C., " B r i t i s h Commercial P o l i c y i n the West Indies 1783-93"; English H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . 31 (1936). Burnett, E.C., "Observations of London Merchants on American Trade I783"; American H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . 18 (1912-13). Butler, G.F., "The Early Organization and Influence of the Halifax Merchants"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 25 (1941). Copp, W.R., " M i l i t a r y A c t i v i t i e s i n Nova Scotia During the War of 1812"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 24 (1938). , "Nova Scotia Trade During the War of 1812"; Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review, v o l . 18 (1937). E l l s , M., " S e t t l i n g the L o y a l i s t s i n Nova Scotia"; Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Association Annual Report, 1934. , "Governor Wentworth's Patronage"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 25 (1942). , "Nova Scotia Sparks of Liberty"; Dalhousie Review, v o l . x v i (1937). Harvey, D.C., "The Struggle f o r the New England Form of Township Government i n Nova Scotia"; C.H.A.A.R.; 1933.  203  Lingleback, A.L., "The Inception of the B r i t i s h Board of Trade"; A.H.R. v o l . 30 (July, 192*). Raymond, W.O., "A Sketch of the L i f e and Administration of General Carleton"; New Brunwick H i s t o r i c a l Society Papers, v o l . 2 ( I 8 9 8 ) . Stanley, C.F.G., "The Defence of the Maritime Provinces During the Wars of the French Revolution"; C.H.A.A.R. v o l . 14 (1936-37). Storey, N., "The Church and State Party i n Nova Scotia 1749-1851"; N.S.H.S. v o l . 27. Williams, B., "Chatham and Representation of the Colonies i n the Imperial Parliament"; E.H.R. v o l . x x l l (1907). The secondary sources were referred to c h i e f l y f o r background material on B r i t i s h administration, at home and i n her colonies, imperial theories, and the general conditions and character of the Maritime scene. Chapter I draws heavily upon those books dealing with eighteenth century B r i t a i n and the reconstruction of the Empire following the American Revolution; of p a r t i c u l a r value were H.T. Manning's book on B r i t i s h Colonial Government, G.S. Graham's book on Seapower and B r i t i s h North America, which provided the skeleton on which to hang the d e t a i l s gathered from other sources. Chapter I I , as i t studied the character of Maritime society during the post-Revolution decades, r e l i e d i n great measure upon the publications ,of T.C. Haliburton, James McGregor, Beamish Murdock, Simeon Perkin's Diary and the Winslow l e t t e r s . These are men who had l i v e d during t h i s period, or shortly a f t e r when they could s t i l l draw on the memories of men who had observed or participated i n events of the period. The material provided by these books, and the a r t i c l e s , were thus used as a guide and a supplement to C o l o n i a l Office records which provided the d e t a i l s f o r the central chapters of the t h e s i s . 3.  unpublished Theses: Butler, G.F.: "The Commercial Relations of Nova Scotia with the United States 1713-1820"; submitted to Dalhousie University f o r the Master of Arts degree i n 193*. i  204  Morrison, G.: "The Evolution of P o l i t i c a l Parties i n Nova Scotia 1783-1848"; submitted to Dalhousie University f o r the Master of Arts degree i n 1948.  

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