UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Grammar and logic Fielding, David Anthony 1963

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GRAMMAR AND LOGIC by David Anthony F i e l d i n g B.A., U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e , Keele, 1959. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A. i n the Department o f PHILOSOPHY THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1963. I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y shall'make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and- s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r -m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g or p u b l i -c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Philosophy The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia,. Vancouver 8, Canada. Date 22nd May, 1963* f ABSTRACT The s t r u c t u r e o f our world i s given i n the grammar o f our n a t i v e tongue. I f so people whose n a t i v e tongue has q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t grammar must be l i v i n g i n a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t world. A l o g i c such as A r i s t o t l e ' s may seem u n i v e r s a l to the speakers o f Greek, i n f a c t i t may seem u n i v e r s a l to speakers of any Indo-European tongue, but the l o g i c w i l l h old good o n l y f o r the 'universe' of the language or language-family i n q u e s t i o n . This i m p l i e s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between l o g i c and grammar r a t h e r l i k e the one R u s s e l l and Whitehead -claimed f o r mathematics and l o g i c . T h e i r P r i n c i p i a Mathematica t r i e d t o show t h a t the mathematical n o t i o n of number r e s t s on, o r a r i s e s out o f , the l o g i c a l n o t i o n o f c l a s s , t h a t i s , we come to understand what a number i s through our grasp of what a c l a s s i s . This t h e s i s i s a k i n d o f P r i n c i p i a L o g i c a : i t suggests t h a t the whole framework o f common sense l o g i c r e s t s on, or a r i s e s out o f , the grammatical s t r u c t u r e of the language the l o g i c was conceived i n or took shape i n terms o f . And i f so l o g i c a l c r i t e r i a come i n t o being and take shape i n s i d e a language or language-family, and are dependent f o r t h e i r v a l i d i t y and even f o r t h e i r meaning on the s t r u c t u r e o f the language i n qu e s t i o n . To t e s t , o r to t r y to t e s t , a mode of thought or an argument form against a l o g i c a l system would be to put the c a r t before the horse: the l o g i c o n l y makes sense because the form o f argument or mode of thought was there a l r e a d y . I f so philosophers and l o g i c i a n s ought to t h i n k of the words 'world', 'universe' and ' u n i v e r s a l ' w i t h tongue i n cheek. In so f a r as ( i i i ) a judgment seems to us u n i v e r s a l l y t r u e i t i s u n l i k e l y to ho l d good f o r the world o f an a l i e n language f a m i l y . I f our world i s not the only world anybody w r i t i n g l o g i c o r philosophy down ought to make i t c l e a r whose world he has i n mind - and to do t h i s i t may be enough to make sure i t i s addressed to somebody i n p a r t i c u l a r . Western philosophers seem to have addressed themselves to the whole world, or to mankind, or God. This t h e s i s shows, i f nothing e l s e , how hard i t can be to address even one other human being. To sum up w i t h another analogy; i t seems to me, as a s i n g l e man, t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between one and two i s grea t e r than the d i f -ference between any other two numbers. There may be a world of d i f f e r e n c e between zero and one, but between one and two there's a l l the d i f f e r e n c e i n the world - and t h a t ' s the d i f f e r e n c e that matters. Perhaps the only way 1,000 d i f f e r s from 1,001, as Frege puts i t , i s i n the expression on i t s f a c e . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n o f the L e t t e r and the Common Sense I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Grammarian's P o s i t i o n were w r i t t e n on the t r a i n from Montreal to Vancouver on Christmas Day, 1962. The Abstract and Summing-Up, were w r i t t e n t h i s E a s t e r , 1963, here i n Quebec. The r e s t was w r i t t e n soon a f t e r Christmas a t Vancouver at the homes of Mr. Harry Dickson and h i s f a t h e r . I would e s p e c i a l l y l i k e to thank h i s w i f e , f o r her c o r r e c t i o n s and suggestions, and h i s mother f o r her h o s p i t a l i t y and great kindness. Without them I would never have got t h i s done. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page The L e t t e r 1 Preface 6 The Grammar 1 0 B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l Remarks 1 5 A Common Sense I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the Grammarian's P o s i t i o n 27 An Argument Between the Grammarian and the L o g i c i a n .42 Summing-Up 5 1 L i t e r a t u r e C i t e d 5 5 S t . Anne de B e l l e v u e , E a s t e r , 1963-Dear Dr. Brown, " I can say 'I know what you are t h i n k i n g ' but not 'I know what I'm t h i n k i n g ' " . In a remark l i k e t h i s W i t t g e n s t e i n claims to have condensed a whole cloud of philosophy i n t o a drop of grammar. I'm going to t r y to give a sketch of t h i s grammar and t e l l you what I imagine you would t h i n k about i t i n the hope t h a t by doing so j u s t what i t i s I t h i n k about t h i s cloud of philosophy w i l l come c l e a r to both of us. I w i l l t r y t o set down the grammar i n the way I t h i n k W i t t g e n s t e i n might do i t , not i n the form of an argument, but i n a set of paradigms or models of proper t h i n k i n g about the q u e s t i o n . I w i l l t r y t o set out your i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the way I t h i n k you would do i t , t h a t i s to say i n a sober, s c i e n t i f i c , o r e m p i r i c a l , or l o g i c a l way. Now since your way o f doing t h i n g s seems to me t o belong to the very cloud of philosophy which i s i n question my e f f o r t s to t e l l you what you t h i n k may not be a l t o g e t h e r sympathetic or f a i r . But we may hope at l e a s t to f i n d t h a t there i s a genuine d i f f e r e n c e between us and perhaps f i n d where t h i s d i f f e r e n c e l i e s . We may not be able t o agree about j u s t what the nature of the d i f f e r e n c e i s , t h a t ' s perhaps too much to expect. But we ought to be able to grasp what s o r t of t h i n g i s happening when we f a i l to agree, and what s o r t of a problem we are up a g a i n s t . We ought t o approach t h i s problem i n terms of the d i f f e r e n c e between the people i n the d i s p u t e , the l o g i c i a n and the grammarian, and - 2 -before we begin we ought to know what these people are l i k e . The l o g i c i a n has h i s r e s e r v a t i o n s about modern l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s , but e s s e n t i a l l y , f o r the time being at l e a s t , t h i s i s what he p r a c t i c e s . He sympathizes, again w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s , with what we might c a l l the modern progressive s c h o o l : l i b e r a l i s m , humanism, and the s o r t o f t h i n g s t h a t u s u a l l y go along w i t h a cautious confidence i n s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g . Cautious because reason so o f t e n i s , and perhaps i n the end ought only to be the s l a v e of the p a s s i o n s , but a confidence nevertheless because he b e l i e v e s t h a t i f we are going to t h i n k at a l l we ought t o give i t a l l the detachment or i m p a r t i a l i t y we are honestly capable o f . His v i c e s - he would be the f i r s t to admit they are v i c e s - go hand i n hand wi t h h i s v i r t u e s : a temptation to put o f f committments or d e c i s i o n s u n t i l enough evidence i s brought t o bear, even when there can never be enough evidence; and a preoccupation w i t h small or remote issues while keeping an open-minded n e u t r a l i t y about the f i r s t questions and t h i n g s t h a t r e a l l y matter. The grammarian i s a p r i m i t i v i s t . To c a l l him old-fashioned' would be a m i s l e a d i n g understatement. He d i s t r u s t s everything modern, e s p e c i a l l y the s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g which e x p l a i n s s i n s as e r r o r s ; but he l a c k s the grace of the more C h r i s t i a n part of our humanist t r a d i t i o n which f o r g i v e s e r r o r s as s i n s . As a r e s u l t , t r u e to the t r a d i t i o n idea of a grammarian, he i s always f i n d i n g f a u l t and making a personal i s s u e out of e v e r y t h i n g . I t ' s o n l y to be expected t h a t i n a modern s c i e n t i f i c world a t r a d i t i o n a l grammarian w i l l f i n d h i m s e l f at logger-heads w i t h h i s world: not only w i t h i t s conclusions and assumptions but - 3 -w i t h i t s very way of p u t t i n g t h i n g s . But there i s one s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s grammarian and the old-f a s h i o n e d grammarian as p o p u l a r l y conceived. In the popular view the grammarian i n s i s t s t h a t there i s only one c o r r e c t way to t a l k -the grammatical way - j u s t as there i s o n l y one c o r r e c t way to t h i n k - the l o g i c a l way. And he may go on to say t h a t t h i s way, d e f i n a b l e i n terms of a set of r u l e s , i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y b i n d i n g on us i f any proper t a l k i n g or coherent t h i n k i n g i s to go on at a l l . The more p r i m i t i v e grammarian of t h i s t h e s i s on the other hand agrees t h a t f o r every speaking or t h i n k -i n g person there i s a proper way t o t a l k , or at l e a s t he would say t h a t i n any given s i t u a t i o n there i s , and agrees t h a t t h i s i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y b i n d i n g . But he would go on to say t h a t what c o n s t i t u t e s correctness i s determined by the grammar p e c u l i a r to the people the speaker i s born i n t o . This holds good f o r d i a l e c t s and slangs as w e l l as languages: whatever the speech-form i s i t s grammatical r u l e s are bindi n g on i t s speakers. This c l a i m y i e l d s a c a t e g o r i c a l imperative o f a s p e c i a l k i n d : r i g h t behaviour i s rooted i n the proper speaking of our n a t i v e tongue, the language we were brought up i n . Taking a l a r g e view t h i s would con-dense a whole cloud of moral philosophy i n t o the question of how to speak. To the grammarian e t h i c s i s a way o f p u t t i n g o f f doing what we don't want to do, or becoming the kind of person we ought to be but don't have the nerve t o . Taking a c l o s e r view you might t h i n k of i t as the S o c r a t i c n o t i o n t h a t r i g h t l i v i n g begins i n knowing our own minds - knowing what we mean by f i n d i n g out what i t i s we want to say. I t h i n k of i t as the Confucian n o t i o n t h a t r i g h t conduct i n p u b l i c and i n p r i v a t e l i f e begins - 4 -i n f i n d i n g the exact d e f i n i t i o n o f what we f e e l . E i t h e r way the grammarian's t e x t i s a d i c t i o n a r y r a t h e r than a sermon or t r e a t i s e . Doesn't the grammarian's p o s i t i o n i n v o l v e him i n paradoxes? On the one hand i t seems to imply t h a t what i s r i g h t and wrong can vary from one l i n g u i s t i c group t o another, and i n f a c t must change as the language of the group changes. This seems such an unsteady n o t i o n o f m o r a l i t y as not to be m o r a l i t y at a l l . On the other hand i t seems too s t a t i c : the ideas of r i g h t and wrong we i n h e r i t from our parents when we l e a r n t h e i r language seem to be, at l e a s t f o r us, t h e i r c h i l d r e n , f i x e d and immutable, we can never hope to improve on them. And can t h i s be t r u e m o r a l i t y , when we have o n l y to do what we are t o l d ? The f a c u l t y of moral judgment, which has seemed to many philosophers of the western world a considerable part of what makes man man seems to have no place i n the Grammarian's framework of t h i n k i n g at a l l . I have no s u b t l e r e s o l u t i o n of t h i s problem. From i n s i d e the l o g i c i a n ' s framework o f t h i n k i n g t h i s i s p a r a d o x i c a l ; from i n s i d e the grammarian's i t i s not. In Montreal the French Canadians f e e l i t matters t h a t they should be able to conduct t h e i r a f f a i r s i n t h e i r n a t i v e tongue. The grammarian would be on t h e i r side on the grounds t h a t a man's mind can't work f r e e l y and as i t should i n a f o r e i g n tongue even when we are word p e r f e c t i n i t . The French Canadians and the French tongue belong to one another, they are one f l e s h . They resent an enforced c o h a b i t a t i o n w i t h E n g l i s h i n t h e i r own p u b l i c a f f a i r s . As a f o r e i g n e r i n Quebec and one who has been s t r u g g l i n g w i t h French f o r y e a r s ' I t h i n k I know j u s t how - 5 -they f e e l . But as a student of western philosophy I'm hard put to i t t o know how to say anything i n t h a t would do j u s t i c e t o t h e i r complaint. I hope t h i s has made i t c l e a r why I have to ask you to accept t h i s l e t t e r as p a r t of the t h e s i s . I f the grammarian's p o s i t i o n makes sense t o anybody t h a t w i l l be because you made i t p o s s i b l e f o r i t t o be s t a t e d . So I hope i t i s c l e a r too why I have to see the t h e s i s as a P.S. to t h i s l e t t e r . I take very much to heart what Mekrassov s a i d to Demidoff when he j o i n e d the B o l s h e v i k - B o l s h e v i k s - "When a p a r t y has only one member there's l i t t l e chance that i t w i l l ever have two. But once i t has two members...." then, I t h i n k W i t t g e n s t e i n might say, i t comes i n t o b e i n g . Yours s i n c e r e l y , David F i e l d i n g . PREFACE The s t o r y goes t h a t once when G. E. Moore was g i v i n g a l e c t u r e on Common Sense Philosophy he looked up a t the blue c e i l i n g o f the l e c t u r e h a l l and s a i d , " I know I am l o o k i n g at the sky". The s t o r y i s probably untrue but i t s very existence i l l u s t r a t e s the p o p u l a r i t y o f the id e a t h a t philosophers are out of touch w i t h the way th i n g s are, and not l e a s t Common Sense philosophers. This was perhaps p a r t of Wittg e n s t e i n ' s q u a r r e l with Moore, both as a philosopher and as a person, i l l u s t r a t e d i n h i s claim t h a t we can say " I know what you are t h i n k i n g " but we can't say " I know what I am t h i n k i n g " . The l a t t e r remark might be c a l l e d grammatically odd on the grounds t h a t although i t doesn't seem to be grammatically i n c o r r e c t i n the u s u a l sense i t i s so hard to t h i n k of an occasion when i t would be the proper and u s e f u l t h i n g to say. F u r t h e r , " :I know what I am t h i n k i n g " seems t o suggest " I know my own mind" and t h i s i s n ' t o b v i o u s l y t r u e , e s p e c i a l l y among p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . And i f i t doesn't suggest t h i s i t i m p l i e s , worse, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e to the e f f e c t t h a t we know our own minds i n a way t h a t we don't and can't ever hope to know other people's. This t h e s i s takes i t f o r granted t h a t t h i s d octrine i s f a l s e and s y s t e m a t i c a l l y m i s l e a d i n g . I t assumes t h a t we on l y come to have minds a t a l l because we began as c h i l d r e n by mimicking other people who alr e a d y do; t h a t i s to say we know our own minds by analogy w i t h other people's. This i s not the argument of the t h e s i s , i t i s what the t h e s i s takes f o r granted. The t h e s i s suggests t h a t a remark, or set of remarks", questions or arguments always takes f o r granted a whole p h i l o s o p h i c a l outlook. - 7 -This " t a k i n g f o r granted" might be c a l l e d s y n t a c t i c I m p l i c a t i o n ; a remark s y n t a c t i c a l l y i m p l i e s a whole system of t h i n k i n g i n the sense t h a t the remark i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h a t system: s y n t a c t i c a l - a s opposed to o r d i n a r y - i m p l i c a t i o n , i s to do w i t h the form r a t h e r than the content of the remark. From the very form of the remark we can gather something about the frame of reference of the people doing the t a l k i n g . L o g i c a l systems are sometimes thought o f as u n i v e r s a l , or at l e a s t as n o n l o c a l . This t h e s i s has i t th a t a l o g i c a l system takes shape and makes sense i n terms o f a l o c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way of t h i n k i n g and t a l k i n g : a l o g i c a l deducation s y n t a c t i c a l l y i m p l i e s a system of thought and speech. In t h i s sense l o g i c i s the c h i l d of grammar; or more e x a c t l y , grammar i s the ground l o g i c stands on. This i s the crux of the t h e s i s . A mode of argu-ment takes f o r granted a whole framework o f t h i n k i n g which i s so r i g i d t h a t o n l y c e r t a i n s o r t s o f questions even so much as make sense i n th a t mode. So j u s t f o r example, the whole framework o f the f a m i l i a r r e l i g i o u s -a t h e i s t argument and a l l i t s v a r i a t i o n s take i t f o r granted t h a t p o l y -theism don't r e q u i r e s e r i o u s r e f u t a t i o n . There i s simply no way of r a i s i n g s e r i o u s questions about animism, magic or the gods i n r e l i g i o u s o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r i e s . So we can t a l k about the l i m i t s of the programme of a p h i l o -s o p h i c a l enquiry and n o t i c e t h a t the scope of the programme d i c t a t e s what s o r t o f questions and doubts can be r a i s e d . The programme determines the character of the kinds of enquiry i t can give r i s e t o . Conversely we can deduce the character o f the programme from the s t y l e o r phrasing o f the i n d i v i d u a l doubts and questio n s . We can harden .the n o t i o n of s y n t a c t i c I - 8 -i m p l i c a t i o n i n t o programmatic entailment; a question programmatically e n t a i l s a whole frame of reference and system of t h i n k i n g i n the sense t h a t the very act of asking i t d i s q u a l i f i e s whole ranges of questions belonging to a l i e n systems of thought. So the o b j e c t of t h i s e n t e r p r i s e i s t o show how i t would be p o s s i b l e to get i n t o a p o s i t i o n to comment on the d e f e c t s , i f there are any, i n the character of modern s c i e n t i f i c and p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g . These defects are beyond the scope of t h i s t h e s i s . The form of t h i s t h e s i s i s i n a sense a search f o r a form. The L e t t e r l i m i t s the 'universe of d i s c o u r s e ' t o our world - the world you and I take f o r granted when we understand each o t h e r . The need to keep i n mind whose world i t i s i n question i s the reason why I have t o see the whole t h e s i s as a l e t t e r addressed to somebody p e r s o n a l l y . The Preface takes as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t our* s u s p i c i o n t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i s saying something more r a d i c a l and d i s t u r b i n g than meets the eye. I t suggests t h a t he i s not a philosopher i n the same sense as most of the philosophers of the western world. And t h i s i s why the form what he says takes i s so d i f f e r e n t from most western philosophy. These tivo p a r t s form the I n t r o d u c t i o n ; the next f i v e p a r t s are the t e x t . The Grammar i t s e l f t r i e s to f o l l o w Wittgenstein's s t y l e , and sets out the t h e s i s as a s e r i e s o f remarks. The Footnote t r i e s to show how W i t t g e n s t e i n can be i n t e r p r e t e d as a grammarian, and to show how the grammar can be r e l a t e d t o some key ideas of Whorf i n m e t a l i n g u i s t i c s , Ryle i n philosophy, Kdhler i n psychology, Bultman i n Theology, S p i t z e r i n l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , and Kafka i n l i t e r a t u r e . The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the l o g i c i a n t r i e s to put the grammarian's remarks i n t o common sense - 9 -p h i l o s o p h i c a l form, p o i n t i n g out how o b j e c t i o n s might be r a i s e d as i t goes along. The Argument b r i n g s t h i s l o g i c i a n face to face w i t h the grammarian i n the hope th a t at l e a s t on some poi n t o r other they w i l l be able to s o r t themselves out. Summing-Up gives a l o g i c i a n and the grammarian a l a s t work each on the whole business, and on each o t h e r . THE GRAMMAR .0 There's no poi n t i n t r y i n g to go outside the l i m i t s of the language, or i f there i s i t i s the poi n t of s u i c i d e . Here "There's no p o i n t " "That's the p o i n t " come to the same t h i n g : there's nothing to say. .1 W i t t g e n s t e i n says: "The l i m i t s o f my language mean the l i m i t s of my wo r l d " . Do they? I f we t h i n k i n s i d e these l i m i t s how can they be grasped as l i m i t s ? I f we t r y to go ou t s i d e these l i m i t s how can the l i m i t s be phrased? .2 You can do i t only by working w i t h two grammars: the l i m i t s o f a language can be de f i n e d i n terms o f another language. As N e i l s Bohr works w i t h mutually e x c l u s i v e experimental procedures so grammatical complementarity works i n terms o f mutually e x c l u s i v e grammars. .3 O.K. A language can be used to define the l i m i t s o f another language. But s u r e l y both languages describe the same world? Yes, i t seems t h a t way from i n s i d e the l i m i t s of one language. But our world i s d i s t i n c t from t h e i r world to j u s t the extent t h a t our languages are d i s t i n c t . .31 Our world i s the world: t h a t ' s common sense. But i t ' s common sense from i n s i d e the grammar o f our language. We have t o t h i n k o f f o r e i g n e r s not only speaking an a l i e n language and t h i n k i n g i n an a l i e n way, but f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking, l i v i n g i n an a l i e n w o r ld. .4 Notice how a l l t h i s can be brought to bear on philosophers and on schools of philosophy: j u s t as languages are mutually i n s u l a t e d by t h e i r grammar so p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems are i n s u l a t e d by t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t r u c t u r e . .5 So the argument of t h i s t h e s i s i s r e l a t e d to philosophy as m e t a l i n g u i s t i c s - 1 1 -i s t o l i n g u i s t i c s : i t i s concerned not so much w i t h p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems as wi t h the character o f the framework o f t h i n k i n g t h a t those systems take shape i n . 1 An a t t a c k on a whole framework of t h i n k i n g w i l l be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g i f i t i s phrased i n the language c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h a t framework. 1 . 1 Notice the c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between q u e s t i o n i n g an argument and que s t i o n i n g a whole framework o f arguments. To question an argument i n a genuine way you have to enter i t s framwork: to question a framework i n a genuine way you have to enter another framework. 1 . 2 Descartes says t h a t a l l our t h i n k i n g may be confused by an arch-d e c e i v e r , the E v i l Demon. But i f so, says Descartes.j no t h i n k i n g can get a s t a r t at a l l , not even t h i s argument. 1 . 2 1 But the E v i l Demon i s a red h e r r i n g : i t begs the question of whether there might be another whole system of t h i n k i n g , an a l i e n syntax, from whose standpoint C a r t e s i a n t h i n k i n g might r e a l l y be c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n . 1 . 3 Genuine argument can on l y take place i n s i d e a framework o f t h i n k i n g . 1 . 3 1 The s t r u c t u r e of any one framework may beg the question o f the a u t h e n t i c i t y of another: as s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g (e.g. anthropology) begs the question o f the a u t h e n t i c i t y of a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g . 2 To a t t a c k a framework o f arguments as i f i t was j u s t another argu-ment i s a category mistake: i t i s to mistake a c l a s s o f t h i n g s f o r a member of tha t c l a s s . 2 . 1 Ryle's case against Descartes i s c i r c u l a r i n j u s t t h i s sense: i t - 12 -f a i l s t o escape from the framework t h a t i t i s t r y i n g t o a t t a c k . 2.11 I t ' s one t h i n g f o r Ryle to att a c k a number of arguments, q u i t e another s o r t o f t h i n g t o a t t a c k a whole framework o f arguments. Ryle pretends to the second but manages to do only the f i r s t . 2.12 But Ryle's a t t a c k on Descartes i s s t i l l a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a t t a c k . What makes i t c i r c u l a r ? - An a t t a c k on Descartes has to be phrased i n a C a r t e s i a n way: but an a t t a c k on the Ca r t e s i a n mode of thought can't be put i n a Ca r t e s i a n mode of argument, not without being s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . 2.121 This i s a question o f syntax: i f Ryle's syntax i s C a r t e s i a n , s e r i o u s questions about t h a t syntax go out of c o u r t . They need a d i f f e r e n t programme a l t o g e t h e r . 2.122 And j u s t l o o k at Ryle's s t y l e . What makes Ryle so angry w i t h Descartes i f not h i s own dualism? 2.2 Compare Kdhler's a t t a c k on i n t u i t i o n i s m and behaviourism. Quite a d i f f e r e n t s t y l e but a very s i m i l a r paradox: Kdhler hasn't h i m s e l f escaped from the dualism he i s t r y i n g to a t t a c k . 2.3 They are p r o t e s t i n g against the grammar of t h e i r own p r o t e s t s : o b j e c t i n g to the ground o f t h e i r own o b j e c t i o n s . 3 Questions about our own framework o f t h i n k i n g r e q u i r e s a suspension of b e l i e f i n t h a t framework. 3.1 The r e l a t i o n between a question and the framework o f t h i n k i n g the que s t i o n comes up i n , i s outside the t r a d i t i o n a l scope of philosophy. This r e l a t i o n s h i p can be c a l l e d "programmatic entailment". 3.11 A question programmatically e n t a i l s a framework o f t h i n k i n g i n the - 13 -sense t h a t to ask a q u e s t i o n i s to take the framework f o r granted. 3.2 Programmatic entailment i s not an o r d i n a r y l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . The s t r u c t u r e of the framework programmes a l l the t h i n k i n g going on i n s i d e the framework: l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s come i n s i d e frameworks not between them. 3.21 The way t h i n k i n g i s o r i e n t e d , ordered or c o n t r o l l e d i n any framework -the kinds of questions and doubts t h a t make sense there - i s i m p l i c i t i n the syntax of t h a t t h i n k i n g . 3.3 Is your s c i e n t i f i c framework of t h i n k i n g p r i v i l e g e d ? Or i s i t open to q u e s t i o n j u s t l i k e any other framework? I t can't be open to s c i e n t i f i c q u e s tion - t h a t would be question-begging. 4 We can e n t e r t a i n an a l i e n framework by e n t e r i n g i n t o the s p i r i t o f an a l i e n world. 4.1 "The s p i r i t o f an a l i e n world"? That doesn't sound very s c i e n t i f i c . I t i s not s c i e n t i f i c o r u n s c i e n t i f i c : imagine t a l k i n g about "entering i n t o the s p i r i t of s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g " (e.g. 17th century E n g l i s h , or modern c e n t r a l A f r i c a n schoolboys). 4.11 But i f i t ' s not s c i e n t i f i c can i t be exact? W e l l , t h i n k of v a r i o u s modern t r a n s l a t i o n s of Homer, can't they be more o r l e s s exact? And i s n ' t t h i s a q uestion o f whether or not they manage to enter i n t o the s p i r i t of Homer? 4.111 Ah, but we can never hope f o r a p e r f e c t t r a n s l a t i o n - This i s l i k e saying we can never know other minds, and j u s t as s i l l y . 4.2 Or compare Bultman's programme of demythologizing the New Testament. His d i s t i n c t i o n between the p r i m i t i v e and the modern world i s - 14 -s y s t e m a t i c , a d i f f e r e n c e of whole frameworks. 4.21 There i s no l o g i c a l e x i t from the modern world. Bultmann wants to i n t e r p r e t the p r i m i t i v e framework of the o l d world s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , t h i s t h e s i s wants t o question the s c i e n t i f i c framework from a p r i m i t i v e standpoint. 5 There i s a ready-made p r i m i t i v e framework i m p l i c i t i n the syntax of o r d i n a r y language. 5.1 S p i t z e r suggests t h a t t r a c e s of p r i m i t i v e t h i n k i n g are f o s s i l i z e d i n modern languages i n a n i m i s t i c grammatical forms. The argument of t h i s t h e s i s works i n terms of these grammatical forms. 5.2 So j u s t as " I t h i n k " seems to imply " I am" - a t h i n k i n g s u b j e c t ; " I t occured to me" seems to imply, by the same token, a p r e s c i e n t i f i c f o r c e or power, an " I t " r e s p o n s i b l e f o r my thought. 5.21 I f you can work i n terms of the p r e s c i e n t i f i c " i t occured to me" syntax you may be i n a p o s i t i o n to grasp the l i m i t a t i o n s of the whole framework of s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g from the o u t s i d e . 5.3 You can keep the argument i n s i d e the l i m i t s o f the E n g l i s h tongue simply by working w i t h these two mutually e x c l u s i v e grammatical forms, s c i e n t i f i c and a n i m i s t i c . 5.31 These are mutually e x c l u s i v e l i m i t e d w o r lds, both a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f our language. 5.4 The syntax of " I t occured to me" i s a means of undermining the C a r t e s i a n mode of argument; but i t a l s o e x h i b i t s the a n i m i s t i c s t r u c t u r e o f our everyday t h i n k i n g . 6 "In the f i g h t between y o u r s e l f and the w o r l d , back the world.." BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REMARKS Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s and Tractatus Logico- P h i l o s o p h i c u s . At the end of the Tractatus W i t t g e n s t e i n seems to t h i n k t h a t there i s the "unspeakable", namely the m y s t i c a l . There i s no room ' f o r the m y s t i c a l i n the argument o f t h i s t h e s i s . I t may sometimes be tempting to c a l l t h i n g s unspeakable, but when W i t t g e n s t e i n says "there i s indeed the unspeakable" t h i s sound grammatically odd, to say the l e a s t . On the other hand, when he says "the l i m i t s of my language mean the l i m i t s of my world" t h i s seems to make good sense. And the very i d e a o f t a l k i n g about such l i m i t s seems to suggest t h a t i t makes sense to t a l k of what i s beyond our world and our words, even i f t h a t t u r n s out to be simply nothing. I s n ' t t h i s grammatically odd too? Probably W i t t g e n s t e i n thought t h a t there was nothing beyond those l i m i t s i n which case, yes, i t does seem odd t o t a l k about them. This t h e s i s argues t h a t there i s something, namely other languages, f o r e i g n e r ' s "worlds", a l i e n frameworks of t h i n k i n g , u n f a m i l i a r frames of r e f e r e n c e , and, i n t h a t sense, other minds. The l i m i t s of t h e i r languages mean the l i m i t s of t h e i r worlds. This t h e s i s i s more concerned w i t h the s t r u c t u r e of our world and w i t h the l i m i t a t i o n s o f our system of t h i n k i n g considered as a system. I t l o c a t e s the s t r u c t u r e i n , o r i n t e r p r e t s i t as, a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c syntax or phraseology. I t proceeds i n terms of mutually e x c l u s i v e p h r a s e o l o g i e s : i f the grammars of E n g l i s h and Hopi are mutually e x c l u s i v e the l i m i t a t i o n s of each have to be grasped from w i t h i n the grammar of the other. - 1 6 -B. L. Whorf, 'An American Indian Model of the Universe' i n C o l l e c t e d  Papers i n M e t a l i n g u i s t i c s . Whorf i s not concerned w i t h the u n t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y , i f t h a t ' s the word, of i n d i v i d u a l words, concepts, notions or what have you, so much as the way a whole grammar or framework of t h i n k i n g systema-t i c a l l y excludes another whole framework. He sees no reason, he says, f o r supposing t h a t the Hopi have anything l i k e our n o t i o n o f , f o r example, space and time which we tend to presume are u n i v e r s a l . What we take to be i n t u i t i o n s may be a question of what i s b u i l t i n t o the s t r u c t u r e of our language and i n t o the s t r u c t u r e of our t h i n k i n g . I f so our Kantian i n t u i t i o n s o f space and time may be genuine i n t u i t i o n s and i n a sense u n i v e r s a l : but o n l y i n s i d e our language or language-family (Indo-European, or what Whorf c a l l s "Standard American European) there's no reason to suppose they are i n t e r n a t i o n a l currency. But there again these u n i v e r s a l s may t u r n out to be u n i v e r s a l and c a t e g o r i c a l o n ly when we are t h i n k i n g i n a Kantian tone of v o i c e , so to speak. I t i s not obvious t h a t everybody t h i n k s i n terms o f u n i v e r s a l s and i n t u i t i o n s at a l l , not i n a Kantian sense anyway. I t ' s hard to imagine a Cockney f o r example, or a Homeric Greek, t a l k i n g of space and time i n anything l i k e a Kantian sense, any more than they would t a l k o f c a t e g o r i c a l imperatives or the kingdom of ends. To them any general t a l k about m o r a l i t y would be q u i t e f o r e i g n and probably suspect. This suggests two mutually e x c l u s i v e ways of t a l k i n g : a moral - 17 -or Kantian way, and a Homeric o r Cockney way. We can guess what Kant would say about Odysseus - th a t he was noble but not wholly e t h i c a l , not a l l a man should be. Can we guess what a Cockney would say about Kant? He might be unable to take s e r i o u s l y any of Kant's general remarks about what we ought t o do. Once we have s t a r t e d t a l k i n g , the Cockney might say, we show t h a t we have already made our d e c i s i o n - even i f the d e c i s i o n i s to put the d e c i s i o n o f f and to keep an open mind - since m o r a l i t y i s p a r t and p a r c e l of a whole mode of l i f e . To the Cockney the Kantian mode o f speech i s part and p a r c e l of the "Oxford s c h o l a r " mode of l i f e : one which i s not concerned to d e a l w i t h problems as they come up but on l y as they are looked a t from a p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s t ance w i t h academic detachment. Not even Homer's gods on Olympus achieve Kant's degree o f detachment, and a Cockney doesn't need to have taken a course i n c l a s s i c s o r philosophy to detect the p e c u l i a r i t y o f Kant's tone. This suggests t h a t the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis i s at loggerheads w i t h Kantian t h i n k i n g i n a r a d i c a l and systematic way, not j u s t i n the way t h a t Whorf suggests about the u n i v e r s a l i t y o f our notions of space and time. And i t serves t o b r i n g out the poin t we wanted t o make about Whorf, namely t h a t h i s hypothesis can be t e s t e d not on l y between f a m i l i e s of languages but between kinds o f syntax w i t h i n a s i n g l e language, f o r example t h a t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Oxford philosophy and t h a t o f everyday C i t y of London l i f e . - 18 -G i l b e r t Ryle The Concept o f Mind. Somewhere i n The C r i t i q u e of P r a c t i c a l Reason Kant t a l k s about the " a r c h i t e c t o n i c " of h i s t h e s i s - the o v e r a l l design which holds a l l the p a r t s of h i s argument together and makes them form a whole. We wouldn't hope t o catch on t o Kant's a r c h i t e c t o n i c at f i r s t read-i n g , i t i s something which emerges i n the course o f our f a m i l i a r i z -i n g o u r s e l v e s w i t h h i s s t y l e and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode of arguments piecemeal, p o i n t by p o i n t , so t h a t f o r them what might be c a l l e d the T o t a l Kant never gets under way a t a l l . But t h i s s o r t o f t h i n g h a r d l y does Kant j u s t i c e . To get t o genuine g r i p s w i t h Kantian t h i n k i n g we ought to grasp Kant's a r c h i t e c t o n i c and come to terms w i t h t h a t as such. In what seems at f i r s t to be a s i m i l a r way Ryle s e t s out i n The Concept of Mind t o a t t a c k not j u s t the i n d i v i d u a l arguments of C a r t e s i a n dualism but what he c a l l s the " a r c h i t e c t u r e " o f the Ca r t e s i a n p o s i t i o n . And most people, Ryle says, subscribe t o the general i d e a o f t h i s dualism even though they may be s t r o n g l y opposed . to many of i t s arguments considered one by one. This t h e s i s t r i e s to t u r n t h i s argument against The Concept of Mind and show t h a t although Ryle claims to be opposed to Descartes i n t h i s r a d i c a l way, the a r c h i t e c t o n i c o f Ryle's t h i n k i n g , h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c way o f ar g u i n g , c a r r i e s him i n t o the d u a l i s t camp along w i t h Descartes. The very phraseology of modern p h i l o s o p h i c discourse programmes the arguments along d u a l i s t i c l i n e s and so disarms the a t t a c k s on - 19 -the p o s i t i o n as a whole. The stronger the a t t a c k the stronger the p o s i t i o n under a t t a c k - i t i s the same p o s i t i o n . P r e t t y c l e a r l y i t would be hard to make t h i s p o i n t by means of a modern p h i l o -° s o p h i c a l argument, but we might t r y to make use of Ryle's n o t i o n of a category mistake here. Ryle c i t e s the case o f a v i s i t o r being shown over Oxford. He sees l o t s o f c o l l e g e s and so on and then says "Where's the u n i v e r -s i t y ? " This i s wrong. I t i s a category mistake. He saw the u n i v e r s i t y when he saw t h i n g s l i k e c o l l e g e s but he mistook the c l a s s o f t h i n g s f o r another member of th a t c l a s s . The u n i v e r s i t y was not the category o f t h i n g t h a t he was l o o k i n g f o r . In ra t h e r the same s o r t o f way Ryle i s m i s t a k i n g the nature of dualism. He a t t a c k s t h i s , t h a t , and the other argument or assump-t i o n o f the d u a l i s t s and i s then s u r p r i s e d to f i n d he i s p o p u l a r l y understood to be a s o r t of l i n g u i s t i c behaviourist- - a f t e r he had been at pains t o s t r e s s t h a t behaviourism was one of the h e r e s i e s t h a t dualism l e d t o . Ryle has made a category mistake. He has t r i e d to a t t a c k dualism as a system o f philosophy without recog-n i s i n g i t as u n d e r l y i n g h i s own mode of thought and argument, without f i r s t escaping from the a r c h i t e c t o n i c o f d u a l i s t i c t h i n k -i n g as a person. His category mistake was to f a i l t o n o t i c e t h a t the dualism he was a t t a c k i n g was a q u a l i t y o f mind which pervades not j u s t C a r t e s i a n and b e h a v i o u r i s t arguments but the whole mode of modern p h i l o s o p h i c argument as such. Ryle i s not j u s t d e a l i n g w i t h d u a l i s t i c arguments, he i s d e a l i n g w i t h them d u a l i s t i c a l l y . - 20 -The c a t e g o r i e s we t h i n k i n terms o f , the ca t e g o r i e s o f our own grammar, are not j u s t one more set o f ca t e g o r i e s l i k e Hopi o r Homeric Greek ones: they are b i n d i n g on us, c a t e g o r i c a l to us as people. We have to f i r s t come t o terms w i t h them as people before we can do any coherent t h i n k i n g a t a l l , l e t alone c a r r y out p h i l o -s o p h i c a l arguments against t h i s very system o f c a t e g o r i e s . Wolfgang Kdhler, G e s t a l t Psychology Symptomatic o f t h i s e r r o r i s a curious anger: an emotion i n excess of the f a c t s as they appear. The gentleman doth p r o t e s t too much. This po i n t can be made i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l terms. Ryle's pro-gramme i n The Concept o f Mind i s c l o s e l y matched by Kdhler's i n G e s t a l t Psychology. Both regard i n t u i t i o n i s m and behaviourism as two s i d e s o f a bad penny, whether the c o i n i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l . Both are out to a t t a c k not j u s t a number o f argu-ments but whole schools of t h i n k i n g , and both f a i l , according to t h i s t h e s i s , because t h e i r heart ( t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode of t h i n k -ing ) belongs t o the very p a r t y they were t r y i n g to a t t a c k . This f a i l u r e can be l o c a t e d , f i r s t i n a general way, i n t h e i r concern t o argue a g a i n s t the school they are a t t a c k i n g i n s t e a d of simply going ahead and p u t t i n g t h e i r own programmes i n t o p r a c t i c e , and second, more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n the presence of t h i s p e c u l i a r emotion. Ryle speaks of the " o f f i c i a l " t heory, the "dogma" of the ghost i n the machine, w i t h what he admits i s " d e l i b e r a t e abuse": enough evidence on the f i r s t page to suggest t h a t the confusion i s more than p h i l o s o p h i c a l . Kdhler speaks of a "dark pressure" which t u r n s i n t o "a f e e l i n g o f being hunted", and a t t r i b u t e s t h i s f e e l i n g - 21 -t o h i s promises to have the manuscript ready by a d e a l i n e . But t h i s i s not a very c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n - why shouldn't t h i s deadline give him a sense o f e x h i l a r a t i o n or challenge? This t h e s i s would diagnose Kdhler's dark pressure as an i n a r t i -c u l a t e f e a r t h a t h i s whole programme o f t h i n k i n g i s inadequate, o r th a t as a person he has not escaped from the system o f t h i n k i n g he i s t r y i n g to a t t a c k . The f e a r i s i n a r t i c u l a t e j u s t because i t i s h i s own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mode o f argument t h a t i s u n c e r t a i n , which i s to say t h a t none o f h i s formulations of t h a t u n c e r t a i n t y can be exact j u s t because these formu l a t i o n s would make sense i n s i d e the frame o f reference i n que s t i o n . This dark pressure might be c a l l e d dread. I t i s n ' t o r d i n a r y f e a r s i n c e f e a r i s presumably f e a r of something, and i n t h i s case i t i s by hypothesis impossible to say what i t i s t h a t i s t o be fe a r e d . And i t i s n ' t an o r d i n a r y doubt since a doubt makes sense i n s i d e a frame o f re f e r e n c e , and i n t h i s case i t i s the frame of reference i t s e l f which i s being undermined. This dread can be understood as a doubt on the analogy w i t h doubts about what we might c a l l micro frameworks such as frames of mind or p a r t i c u l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l s t r u c t u r e s of one s o r t or another. But the analogy breaks down as soon as we recognise t h a t the frame of reference i n que s t i o n here i s Kdhler's e n t i r e framework o f t h i n k i n g . So long as t h i s i s i n question Kdhler can't do any t h i n k i n g at a l l - he can't even r a i s e a doubt o r pose a coherent question - at l e a s t not the doubts or questions which would get to g r i p s w i t h what i s u p s e t t i n g him. This exact account of .dread i n terms of a doubt about our whole frame o f reference s t e e r s c l e a r of the melodramatic mysticism - 22 -of the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t ' s angst. But i t al s o has to be aware o f the oversimple commonsense o f the Cartesians and e m p i r i c i s t s who f a i l to see the c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between dread and common or garden f e a r . The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s take i t too s e r i o u s l y : the e m p i r i c i s t s don't d e a l w i t h i t at a l l . Descartes r a i s e d the p o i n t but f a i l -ed t o do i t j u s t i c e . He suggested t h a t a l l our t h i n k i n g might be going on under the s p e l l of some Wicked Superdeceiver, an E v i l Demon who i s v i t i a t i n g a l l our arguments and reasoning processes. But t h i s can't be so, says Descartes, because i t i s incompatible w i t h God's w i l l , which we know to be benign. The e m p i r i c i s t s would not put the p o i n t q u i t e t h i s way, but t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n i s i n e f f e c t much the same: i t can't be so because i t i s incompatible w i t h any common sense about anything whatever. This t h e s i s argues t h a t i t can be so: i t may be t h a t the whole framework of t h i n k i n g i n which common sense makes sense i s systema-t i c a l l y misconceived. And i f so KiJhler w i l l have t o come to terms w i t h the E v i l Demon i f he i s going to overcome h i s f e e l i n g of being hunted. Rudolph Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth. The C a r t e s i a n Demon makes sense con c e p t u a l l y i n terms of the n o t i o n o f dread: u n c e r t a i n t y about a whole frame o f re f e r e n c e . Can i t be faced m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y - i s there a way of coming to terms w i t h t h i s demon? Or to demythologise the question: can anybody r a i s e questions about h i s whole frame o f reference without presupposing t h a t framework by h i s very phrasing o f the question? Not, e v i d e n t l y , - 23 -i n s i d e the framework i n q u e s t i o n . But what he can do i s to operate b i l i n g u a l l y , so to speak, and work w i t h two whole frameworks. A f u l l -s c a l e model f o r t h i s mutual e x c l u s i o n of two whole modes of thought may be found i n Bultmann's programme of demythologizing the New Testament. Bultmann claims t h a t a proper understanding of the books o f the New Testament must begin from a r e c o g n i t i o n of the l i m i t a t i o n s of i t s w r i t e r s , not j u s t i n p o i n t s o f d e t a i l but s y s t e m a t i c a l l y , i n terms of the conceptual world they l i v e d i n . These w r i t e r s , he argues, l i v e d , moved and had t h e i r being i n a world t o t a l l y a l i e n from ours not j u s t i n i t s f u r n i t u r e and i n t e r i o r d e c o r a t i o n but i n i t s a r c h i t e c t u r e and foundations. Looking back on i t a Bultmann enlightened by s c i e n t i f i c understanding can say t h a t those w r i t e r s l i v e d i n a p r i m i t i v e world and thought i n terms o f a strange conceptual system. To those w r i t e r s , on the other hand, as human beings l i v i n g i n th a t w o r l d , the p r i m i -t i v e world was the world and t h e i r strange conceptual system was p l a i n common sense. Bultmann argues t h a t to come to g r i p s w i t h the New Testament i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o t h i n k i n terms o f t h a t conceptual system and enter i n t o the s p i r i t of th a t p r i m i t i v e world. Only then can the Gospel be demythologized and put i n t o terms t h a t make sense i n a s c i e n t i f i c w o r l d. The d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Bultmann's case are outside the scope o f t h i s paper but i t would be u s e f u l to n o t i c e the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s programme and the programme of t h i s t h e s i s . Bultmann i s p o i n t i n g out the r a d i c a l and systematic d i s t i n c t i o n between modern s c i e n t i f i c - 24 -t h i n k i n g and New Testament magical t h i n k i n g - u n t i l we do t h i s , he says, we can h a r d l y come to terms w i t h the New Testament chall e n g e . His o b j e c t i s t o recognise the New Testament challenge i n i t s own terms, to t r a n s l a t e t h i s from magical i n t o modern terms and so make the New Testament challenge a challenge f o r modern people. The obj e c t of t h i s t h e s i s on the other hand i s to recognise the r a d i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between modern and p r i m i t i v e t h i n k i n g , and then enter i n t o the s p i r i t of p r i m i t i v e t h i n k i n g so as to be i n a p o s i t i o n t o ask genuine (however p r i m i t i v e ) questions about the e n t i r e modern s c i e n t i f i c frame o f re f e r e n c e . Bultmann's aim i s to demythologise New Testament t h i n k i n g : the obje c t here i s t o mythologise, so to speak, modern s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g : to look a t i t as i f i t was a myth. Leo S p i t z e r , 'Language, the Basis of Poetry, R e l i g i o n and Science' i n Studies i n I n t e l l e c t u a l H i s t o r y . S p i t z e r ' s place i n modern l i n g u i s t i c s i s as unorthodox as Bultmann's i n theology. Bultmann i s too s c i e n t i f i c f o r those who t h i n k t h a t theology i s a l o g i c a l l y unique f i e l d o f study, w i t h i t s own p e c u l i a r modes of argument, but he i s too h i s t o r i c a l f o r those who are concerned simply w i t h e t h i c a l t eaching and moral challenge of C h r i s t i a n i t y . S p i t z e r too i s too s c i e n t i f i c and h i s t o r i c a l to be a New C r i t i c , s i n c e h i s concern i s not w i t h l i t e r a r y form j u s t f o r l i t e r a t u r e ' s sake but f o r the sake o f the most exact h i s t o r i c a l understanding p o s s i b l e . But he i s not s c i e n t i f i c enough f o r the mainstream o f modern l i n g u i s t i c s s ince he recognises no n e u t r a l - 25 -standpoint t o make o b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s of languages from. For S p i t z e r l i n g u i s t i c s i s the most exact form of l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m and he plunges f u l l y c l o t h e d - i n modern dr e s s , so to speak - i n t o the t e x t i n q u e s t i o n . His o b j e c t i s to come face to face w i t h the c h a r a c t e r of the w r i t e r i n order t o get to g r i p s w i t h the p e c u l i a r i -t i e s o f the h i s t o r i c a l moment when he i s w r i t i n g . To t h i s extent the programme of t h i s t h e s i s i s on S p i t z e r ' s s i d e . But i n h i s essay S p i t z e r t r i e s t o show t h a t language f i n d s what he c a l l s i t s highest r e a l i z a t i o n i n s c i e n c e . His argument makes use of Comte's n o t i o n of the e v o l u t i o n of human t h i n k i n g processes -a p r i m i t i v e , a metaphysical and a p o s i t i v i s t i c stage. S p i t z e r t r i e s to f i n d i l l u s t r a t i o n s o f these stages i n the words and phrases o f modern languages - f o s s i l i s e d forms of e a r l i e r stages coming to the surface i n the i r r e g u l a r topology of everyday speech. So, f o r example, the p o s i t i v i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s of the f a c t t h a t drops of water were coming down from the sky would be simply "Rain". The metaphysical stage i m p l i e d a k i n d of a b s t r a c t f o r c e or power respon-s i b l e f o r the r a i n i n the expression " I t i s r a i n i n g " . At a t h i r d stage there i s a more p r i m i t i v e form f r a c a b l e i n the Hungarian "The Rainer i s r a i n i n g " or Shakespeare's "The r a i n i t r a i n e t h every day" which suggests t h a t the r a i n i s some s o r t o f b e i n g , a person or god of the r a i n . This t h e s i s does not d i s t i n g u i s h between the animism of "the r a i n e r i s r a i n i n g " and the s y n t a c t i c i m p l i c a t i o n of " I t i s r a i n i n g " . In the sense t h a t these are a n i m i s t i c a l a r g e p a r t of o r d i n a r y t a l k - 26 -i s a n i m i s t i c . And i f the l i m i t s o f o r d i n a r y t a l k are the l i m i t s o f the world of the t a l k e r s , t h i s suggests an easy way of e n t e r i n g i n t o the s p i r i t o f an a n i m i s t i c world - j u s t by dropping our s e r i o u s s c i e n t i f i c tone and d e a l i n g w i t h the problem i n an everyday way. Once we grasp the s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s way the dispute between the grammarian and the l o g i c i a n r e s o l v e s i t s e l f i n t o a d i f f e r e n c e between the whole outlook of the academic s c i e n t i s t and t h a t of the common man. The r e s u l t t u r n s , q u i t e simply, on what syntax you use to d e a l w i t h , f o r example, t h i s t h e s i s . Franz Kafka, ' R e f l e c t i o n s on S i n ' i n Wedding Preparations i n the Country  and other p i e c e s . The aphorisms and parables of Franz Kafka o f f e r an i n f o r m a l d i s c i p l i n e i n a n i m i s t i c grammar - they a l l o w a reader to get used to t h i n k i n g i n a magical way - l i v i n g . . i n a magical world. P a r a d o x i c a l l y Kafka was alone i n h i s w o r l d , which i s t o say t h a t h i s world never came i n t o b e i n g , but h i s work does show how t h i s world can be brought i n t o being. A COMMON SENSE INTERPRETATION OF THE GRAMMARIAN'S POSITION The grammarian begins by p o i n t i n g out what I take i t he t h i n k s of as a paradox i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s T r a c t a t u s . To say t h a t "the l i m i t s o f my language mean the l i m i t s o f my w o r l d " seems odd t o the grammarian because to t a l k o f the l i m i t s of a language from w i t h i n the language seems to imply a standpoint outside those l i m i t s from which the l i m i t s can be seen as such. But on Wittgenstein's own view what i s outside the language i s outside the world - i t can't be made sense of i f only because there's no way o f saying i t . This i s what the grammarian seems to be s a y i n g . Just what i t i s t h a t i s on h i s mind escapes me - perhaps i t w i l l come home to me i n the course of t h i s o u t l i n e . W ittgenstein's remark i s c e r t a i n l y p u z z l i n g : but not I should have thought i n the way t h a t the grammarian i m p l i e s . Why shouldn't we be aware of the l i m i t s of our own language? I t h i n k as l o g i c i a n s we a r e , t h a t ' s p r e c i s e l y why we devise a l o g i c . S t i l l , i t seems a b i t e a r l y to t r y to r a i s e s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n s so I ' l l shelve t h a t one and t r y to f o l l o w the next move. The grammarian now t r i e s to r e s o l v e the paradox by borrowing N e i l s Bohr's n o t i o n of complementarity and adapting i t to h i s own ends. Bohr, I gather, o f f e r e d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the E i n s t e i n - P o d o l s k i - R o s e n paradox by c l a i m i n g t h a t r e a l i t y - at a quantum l e v e l a t l e a s t - could o n l y be p r o p e r l y described by operating simultaneously w i t h two mutually e x c l u s i v e experimental procedures. I n a way which I take i t i s supposed to be analogous the grammarian r e s o l v e s the W i t t g e n s t e i n paradox by o p e r a t i n g w i t h two mutually e x c l u s i v e grammatical systems. What t h i s - 28 -b o i l s down i s I t h i n k simply t h i s . We are f a m i l i a r w i t h the popular n o t i o n t h a t the Hopi language i n some way s t r u c t u r e s the world f o r the Hopi d i f f e r e n t l y from the way European languages do f o r us. The gram-marian i s saying t h a t we recognise the l i m i t a t i o n s of European languages i n a new or unique o r perhaps a s p e c i a l way by l o o k i n g a t them from a Hopi standpoint. S i m i l a r l y , I am sure the grammarian would admit, the European, because of h i s language, i s aware of the l i m i t a t i o n s o f the Hopi language - and by i m p l i c a t i o n o f the Hopi i d e a o f r e a l i t y - i n a way t h a t a m o n o l i n g u i s t i c Hopi can't p o s s i b l y be. This already has more than a h i n t of a Sapir-Whorf tone t o i t . The grammarian now goes on t o make the connection p l a i n . He would say I t h i n k t h a t i n the sense t h a t a m o n o l i n g u i s t i c Hopi i s unaware o f the l i m i t a t i o n s of h i s n o t i o n o f r e a l i t y , the grammar of h i s language (-his way of s t r u c t u r i n g r e a l i t y ? ) i s i n s u l a t i n g him from European notions of r e a l i t y . Now the grammarian turns on the p h i l o s o p h e r s . In j u s t the way, he says, t h a t a Hopi i s l i m i t e d by h i s language a philosopher i s l i m i t e d by the p h i l o s o p h i c a l system he has adopted. In a way t h i s i s o b v i o u s l y t r u e , we are a l l l i m i t e d by our p h i l o s o p h i e s , j u s t as we are l i m i t e d , i n a r a t h e r odd sense of the word,., by not knowing Hopi and so not having the Hopi view on t h i n g s . But i f t h i s i s a l l the grammarian means i t ' s hard t o b e l i e v e i t has to be taken very s e r i o u s l y . On the face of i t the o n l y way of making us care about, f o r example, the Hopi view o f r e a l i t y would be to t e l l us why i t was so important. But t h i s , we are to gather from the grammarian's t h e s i s , i s something which i n the nature o f the case we can't do u n t i l we know Hopi. - 29 -But the grammarian now brings h i s case to bear on a s p e c i f i c p h i l o s o p h e r : Ryle i n The Concept of Mind. Ryle i s c i t e d as a p h i l o -sopher trapped by t h i s very paradox: he wants to a t t a c k an e n t i r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n w h i l e s t i l l t a l k i n g i t s language. Ryle speaks of the " o f f i c i a l theory" of mind-body dualism "with d e l i b e r a t e abuse" which i n i t s e l f makes the grammarian suspect t h a t something i n Ryle's t h i n k i n g reamins unresolved. Ryle wants to a t t a c k not j u s t one theory i n any one of i t s forms but a whole set of t h e o r i e s , or p a t t e r n of t h i n k i n g , or as Ryle c a l l s i t an " a r c h i t e c t u r e " . The grammarian l o c a t e s t h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l p a t t e r n or a r c h i t e c t u r e i n a syntax and argues t h a t Ryle i s s t i l l t a l k i n g and t h i n k i n g w i t h i n the terms of t h i s syntax i n the very business of t r y i n g to challenge i t . The r e s u l t i s s e l f - d e f e a t i n g : i f your c l a i m i s t h a t there are no such t h i n g s as dragons you stop worrying about them, you don't scour the countryside dressed i n armour c h a l l e n g i n g them t o appear. For the grammarian t h i s i s a l l a question of phraseology -e x a c t l y what i s being s a i d turns on how i t i s being s a i d . He f a i l s , i t seems, to d i s t i n g u i s h between the l o g i c and the tone o f an argument - i f the gentleman p r o t e s t s too much h i s argument, i n the grammarian's eyes, ceases to be v a l i d and i n f a c t becomes not an argument at a l l but a symptom of something. P h i l o s o p h i c a l , l o g i c a l o r l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s becomes f o r the grammarian a k i n d of l i t e r a r y a n a l y s i s : we have to concern ourselves w i t h the s t y l e - the man h i m s e l f who i s doing the arguing, not the l o g i c of the argument but i t s phraseology. As l o g i c i a n s we are used to w r i t i n g t h i s o f f as ad hominem but t h i s doesn't seem to t r o u b l e the grammarian. - 30 -He i s prepared to diagnose Kdhler's G e s t a l t Psychology f o r example as another case of Ryle's d i s e a s e , namely the anxiety which comes from t r y i n g to overthrow a whole framework o f t h i n k i n g w h i l e s t i l l o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h a t very framework. So f a r the grammarian has s a i d nothing t h a t could t r o u b l e the l o g i c i a n as a l o g i c i a n . "You don't l i k e my s t y l e , I don't l i k e yours" t h a t ' s not philosophy. But here the grammarian takes is s u e w i t h a s p e c i f i c p h i l o s o p h i c a l argument. An a t t a c k such as Ryle's o r Kdhler's he says i s not an o r d i n a r y l o g i c a l a t t a c k on an o r d i n a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l or p s y c h o l o g i c a l argument; i t i s an att a c k on a whole framework o r a r c h i t e c t u r e or syntax of t h i n k i n g . And t h i s he i n s i s t s i s a d i f f e r e n t s o r t of t h i n g a l t o g e t h e r . I t i s one t h i n g to a t t a c k or question an argument, q u i t e another to a t t a c k o r question a framework o f arguments. This he says i s where Car t e s i a n doubt has been m i s l e a d i n g us. Descartes suggests that j u s t as we can doubt any one argument we can doubt a l l arguments. Just as we may be proved wrong i n s p e c i a l cases we may be wrong a l l along the l i n e - and the proofs themselves may a l l be wrong. He goes on to add t h a t t h i s i s incompatible w i t h the w i l l of a benign d e i t y , but l o g i c a l l y the p o s s i b i l i t y i s open. But Descartes has f a i l e d to n o t i c e , says the grammarian, t h a t we can't doubt a l l arguments: t o formulate a doubt i s to take something as c e r t a i n , namely the syntax of t h e sentence the doubt was expressed i n and a l l that goes along w i t h t h a t syntax. So when A. J . Ayer, f o r example, claims t h a t Cartesian doubt i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y p o i n t l e s s because i t can be used against any and every argument - i n a way which gets us nowhere - he i s making the same - 31 -mistake as Descartes. He assumes t h a t t o t a l C a r t e s i a n doubt can be phrased without s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n , and, says the grammarian, i t can't. I must say i t seems to me there i s something convincing about t h i s argument and i t ' s one which i t ' s hard to know how to r e p l y to adequately. I f Cartesian'doubt i s incoherent as the grammarian c l a i m s , then s c e p t i c i s m seems to be incoherent on much the same grounds. And I must admit I've always thought of myself i n a way as a s c e p t i c . That's by the way. The grammarian's point i s t h a t by m i s s i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n between doubts about a s i n g l e argument and doubts about an e n t i r e framework of arguments, philosophers have committed what Ryle would c a l l a category mistake. This i s important f o r h i s case because he wants to go on to say t h a t the way to d e a l w i t h a framework of arguments (as opposed to a s i n g l e argument) i s to consider i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c phraseo-lo g y . I f we accept t h i s move we are i n danger o f being f o r c e d to concede that p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s i s a mere branch of l i t e r a r y o r grammatical a n a l y s i s ; and I f o r one have always assumed t h a t l i t e r a t u r e and grammar were q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t s o r t of t h i n g from l o g i c and s c i e n c e . I t h i n k o f l o g i c and science as i n t e r n a t i o n a l and, I'd even r i s k s a y i n g , u n i v e r s a l , not as something l o c a l and p e c u l i a r to any one n a t i o n or c u l t u r e . But the grammarian i s q u i t e f i r m here: he i n s i s t s t h a t somebody ought to r a i s e questions about the e n t i r e frameworks of p h i l o s o p h i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g . Philosophers and s c i e n t i s t s , he c l a i m s , have rendered themselves incapable o f doing i t because t h e i r very phraseology begs the question o f the nature o f t h a t framework. Somebody ought t o do i t , and the job must be a grammarian's. - 32 -The obvious r e p l y to t h i s i s t o say t h a t i f a l o g i c i a n can't r a i s e questions about h i s own framework of t h i n k i n g why should we suppose t h a t a grammarian can? And why should I take a grammarian's a n a l y s i s as somehow more v a l i d or comprehensive than a l o g i c i a n ' s ? We do have to take some s o r t of common sense f o r granted i f we are to get a s t a r t on any i n t e l l e c t u a l problem and I p r e f e r the common sense of science or l o g i c to the common sense o f grammar whatever t h a t may be. The grammarian's r e p l y here i s a r a d i c a l one. He says t h a t what i s common sense to one group may not be common sense t o the next, and that what he i s concerned w i t h i s the d i f f e r e n c e between the common sense o f s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g and t h a t of f o r example New Testament, o r Homeric, o r a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g . He puts the d i f f e r e n c e between us c l e a r l y by saying that he i s not prepared to assume t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g as such i s i n any way p r i v i l e g e d or more v a l i d i n any sense than B i b l i c a l or a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g . But to o r d i n a r y common sense l o g i c i f we can't take i t f o r granted t h a t s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g , a t l e a s t i n i t s own f i e l d , i s b e t t e r than f o r example a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g we simply do not have common terms of reference. I t ' s hard to see how we can go on conversing. But the grammarian i s not prepared to stop t h e r e . In f a c t t h i s i s where h i s argument, he c l a i m s , p r o p e r l y begins. I f i n d i t hard to know what t o say here. As a man with a c e r t a i n respect f o r common sense I can h a r d l y go any f u r t h e r . S t i l l , as a l o g i c i a n I am not o b l i g e d to l i m i t myself t o matters of common sense. Mathematicians are prepared, I gather, t o e n t e r t a i n preposterous hypotheses, why shouldn't I? A mathematical system may be b e a u t i f u l i n i t s symmetry, s i m p l i c i t y and comprehensiveness, - 33 -why shouldn't a l o g i c a l one? The grammarian's next move i s to introduce a preposterous hypothesis. Our job of making sense of i t w i l l not be s t r i c t l y speaking a l o g i c a l one, but our l o g i c a l t r a i n i n g ought to equip us to d e a l w i t h i t i n i t s own terms. The grammarian's hypothesis i s t h a t the only way to reach a c r i t i c a l d i s t a n c e from s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g i s to adopt an u n s c i e n t i f i c frame of refer e n c e , t h a t i s t o say to t h i n k ourselves into a thoroughly a l i e n frame of mind and o n l y then l o o k back at s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g , from th a t d i s t a n c e . The f i r s t p art o f t h i s programme seems f a m i l i a r enough -we know roughly what i t ' s l i k e to t r y to read, say, a t r a n s l a t i o n o f Homer i n a way which does j u s t i c e to the Homeric frame of reference - the Homeric "world". In something l i k e t h i s sense Rudolf Bultmann speaks of the "world" of the New Testament which has to be taken l o c k , stock and b a r r e l before i t can be genuinely understood, demythologized, and rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e to modern b e l i e v e r s . Bultmann's c l a i m seems to be t h a t u n t i l we have faced the c a t e g o r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between the New Testament world and our modern one we can't read the New Testament f o r what i t i s , namely a n i m i s t i c and demon-ridden, - we read i n s t e a d a f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f i t . Only when we have come face to face wi t h t h i s p r i m i t i v e world are we i n a p o s i t i o n t o i n t e r p r e t i t t o a modern audience. The grammarian's programme begins i n step w i t h Bultmann's but ends f a c i n g the opposite way so to speak. Bultmann's obj e c t was to r e t u r n to the modern world i n order to r e i n t e r p r e t the h i s t o r i c a l events o f the New Testament i n modern s c i e n t i f i c demythologiz-ed terms (so t h a t the c e n t r a l i s s u e s o f the C h r i s t i a n challenge would not be confused w i t h l o c a l h i s t o r i c a l i r r e l e v a n c i e s ) . The grammarian's - 34 -o b j e c t on the other hand i s to get in t o a p r i m i t i v e frame of mind and to stay i n i t i n order t o maint a i n a c r i t i c a l d i s t a n c e from the framework and phraseology o f modern s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g . Bultmann assumes t h a t the s c i e n t i f i c frame of reference i s the v a l i d one. The grammarian on the c o n t r a r y i s t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h a frame of reference i n which s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g i s wrong t h i n k i n g . The hypothesis i s t h a t to get a proper grasp of the framework of s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g we must enter i n t o the s p i r i t of some thoroughly u n s c i e n t i f i c frame of reference and t h i n k from ther e . The programme i s presumably to p a r t i c i p a t e i m a g i n a t i v e l y i n the mental processes o f a p r i m i t i v e p r e s c i e n t i f i c people. This t a l k about "imaginative p a r t i c i p a -t i o n " and " t h i n k i n g ourselves i n t o the s p i r i t o f " something a l l sounds p r e t t y a l i e n to the l o g i c i a n . Never mind, there's nothing on the face of i t p u z z l i n g about the c h i l d ' s f a c i l i t y f o r e n t e r i n g a Jack-and-the-Bean-s t a l k w o r l d , so, by p a r i t y of reasoning, there should be nothing i n h e r e n t l y p u z z l i n g about our being asked, by Bultmann, to enter the magical world of the New Testament. This f a c i l i t y f o r a l l o w i n g the imagination p l a y i s not confined t o c h i l d r e n , and the grammarian suggests a simply com-par i s o n here with the t r a n s l a t o r . I t i s h a r d l y enough f o r the t r a n s l a t o r of f o r example P l a t o t o have a p e r f e c t command of the f o r e i g n idiom. I f he i s going to produce anything that can genuinely c l a i m to be P l a t o n i c he has f i r s t to give h i m s e l f up to P l a t o , abandon h i m s e l f , l o s e himself t o Platonism. I f the i m a g i n a t i o n has got i t s e l f a bad name i n p h i l o s o p h i c c i r c l e s through being u n d i s c i p l i n e d and useless here's one case where i t i s hard and - 35 -i n d i s p e n s i b l e d i s c i p l i n e f o r the t r a n s l a t o r who wants to do an honest and a u t h e n t i c j o b . Here the grammarian throws out a warning. The imagination i n t h i s sense i n v o l v e s the whole p e r s o n a l i t y : and en t e r i n g heart and s o u l i n t o an a l i e n frame of reference may make more of a demand on us thaii we are accustomed to expecting from the study o f philosophy o r grammar. What we would be asked t o do would be to become as l i t t l e c h i l d r e n again and become new men w i t h new minds. This has a not u n f a m i l i a r r i n g : i t sounds l i k e the s o r t of t h i n g t h a t preachers and p r o f e s s o r s have been asking us to do ever since we can remember. But t h a t ' s one o f the reasons i*hy i t ' s so hard - preachers and pr o f e s s o r s have been expecting us to pro-gress - the grammarian asks us to go back and become p r i m i t i v e men with p r i m i t i v e minds. That's the grammarian's programme as f a r as I can understand i t . Let me t r y to sum i t up. F i r s t ; i f the a t t a c k on an e n t i r e p h i l o -sophic system o f t h i n k i n g i s constructed i n the phraseology of th a t system the a t t a c k w i l l be s e l f - d e f e a t i n g . The grammarian t h e r e f o r e concerns h i m s e l f w i t h the phraseology of an argument r a t h e r than with i t s v a l i d i t y . He does so on the grounds t h a t the qu e s t i o n o f i t s v a l i d i t y doesn't a r i s e u n t i l the person arguing i s recognised f o r who he i s . He i s concerned w i t h grammar ( s t y l e ) before l o g i c ( v a l i d i t y ) . But, second, philosophers have supposed t h a t e n t i r e frameworks of t h i n k i n g can be attacked j u s t as i n d i v i d u a l arguments can, and t h i s i s a category mistake which confuses questions o f character (grammar) w i t h problems of philosophy ( l o g i c ) . But since these philosophers have i n face t r i e d - 36 -to r a i s e questions of the v a l i d i t y of e n t i r e frameworks somebody ought to s o r t them out. And since the philosophers can't h e l p themselves the grammarian i s o b l i g e d t o . But s i n c e , t h i r d , questions of e n t i r e frameworks of t h i n k i n g r e q u i r e the a n a l y s t t o stand at a c r i t i c a l distance from the frameworks i n qu e s t i o n any qu e s t i o n about our own framework of t h i n k i n g (and t h i s i s where the grammarian seems to t h i n k we ought to begin) r e q u i r e s a suspension o f b e l i e f i n our own t h i n k i n g . I t i s not obvious t h a t l o g i c i n the o r d i n a r y sense can p l a y any f u r t h e r part i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , i n f a c t , the terms of the d i s c u s s i o n seem to exclude i t c a t e g o r i c a l l y . But s t i l l , j u s t asmathematicians can e n t e r t a i n hypo-t h e t i c a l systems we as l o g i c i a n s are asked to e n t e r t a i n a h y p o t h e t i c a l system from w i t h i n which we can assess the e n t i r e framework of modern p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g . Fourth, the problem then becomes more of a p r a c t i c a l one - how a l o g i c i a n , o r indeed anybody i n h i s r i g h t mind, i s to b r i n g himself to e n t e r t a i n an u n s c i e n t i f i c framework of t h i n k i n g . We f i n d some s o r t o f guide i n Bultmann's programme o f demythology which i n s i s t s on the c a t e g o r i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between New Testament and s c i e n t i f i c systems of t h i n k i n g ; but the grammarian i n s i s t s t h a t we go f u r t h e r . He wants us to develop our arguments from w i t h i n the a l i e n frame of re f e r e n c e . F i n a l l y he suggested the analogy o f the problem c o n f r o n t i n g the t r a n s -l a t o r of Plato who has to t r y to e x t i n g u i s h h i s own p e r s o n a l i t y and t r y to enter into the s p i r i t of Pl a t o i f he i s going t o do a genuine job of t r a n s l a t i o n . This l a s t seems to be a p e r f e c t l y exact and i n t e l l i g i b l e problem even though i t i s not w i t h i n the usual scope of philosophy. Let's go on now to t r y to sketch i n the r e s t of h i s argument. - 37 -The grammarian now goes on to p o i n t out what I t h i n k I would c a l l the conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g any modern s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g person who wanted to e n t e r t a i n the grammarian's programme of p r i m i t i v i s m . This might be summed up as f o l l o w s : modern t h i n k i n g , t h a t i s to say s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g , cannot get to g r i p s w i t h p r i m i t i v e t h i n k i n g i n any genuine way because by i t s very nature - or as the grammarian would say by i t s very syntax - i t begs the question of the v a l i d i t y of p r i m i t i v e t h i n k i n g as such. The grammarian concludes, not without begging a few questions o f h i s own t o my mind, t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a set of questions and the syntax of these questions i s something not j u s t o u t s i d e the scope of philosophy: the syntax i s something on which philosophy r e s t s . He c a l l s t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p one of programmatic entailment: - a question or set o f questions programmatically e n t a i l s a p h i l o s o p h i c a l framework or syntax which i t s e l f orders o r programmes the p a t t e r n of t h i n k i n g about the question and d i c t a t e s the k i n d of answer t h a t can be given i t . The grammarian concludes t h a t t h i s o r d e r i n g or programming i s r i g h t o u t s ide the grasp of philosophy and has to be understood on the analogy of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between people as such. Now i n one sense i t seems obvious t h a t the grammarian i s g u i l t y of the very s i n he i s charging the modernists w i t h . His attack on us seems to be t h i s : t h a t by our very phraseology - s c i e n t i f i c , l o g i c a l or what have you - we are begging the question of v a l i d i t y o f a genuinely p r i m i t i v e framework. The very syntax of our t h i n k i n g precludes, he seems to be arguing, even the p o s s i b i l i t y of an a u t h e n t i c a n i m i s t i c w o r l d . There may be a sense i n which t h i s i s so, though p e r s o n a l l y I - 3 8 -am r e l u c t a n t t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s sense can be a v e r y s i n g i f i c a n t one; but what i s most b l a t a n t l y u n f a i r about h i s way of p u t t i n g t h i s - and a f t e r a l l i t does seem to be our u n f a i r n e s s to h i s p r i m i t i v i s m t h a t he i s o b j e c t i n g to - i s that the q u e s t i o n of the a u t h e n t i c i t y of modern s c i e n t i f i c l o g i c a l or e m p i r i c a l t h i n k i n g i s begged by the axiomatic nature of the grammarian's n o t i o n of animism. Worse, i t i s begged i n p r e c i s e l y the same way that the l o g i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k e r was supposed to have begged the q u e s t i o n of animism. The grammarian's only r e p l y t o t h i s i s t h a t t h i s i s how t h i n g s have to be - some questions have to be begged i f a n y t h i n g i s going to be s a i d at a l l and the question of whether or not t h i s matters - whether i t i s to be taken s e r i o u s l y or not, according to the grammarian, turns on what framework you happen to belong to - the syntax you have adopted. This seems to me to be open to a l l s o r t s o f questions and arguments which don't seem to concern the grammarian. He goes on t o ask us to suspend our d i s b e l i e f f o r the moment i n the a u t h e n t i c i t y of a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g . I ' l l shelve my o b j e c t i o n s here f o r the sake of c o n t i n u i t y and move p r o v i s i o n a l l y on to the next stage. At t h i s p o i n t the grammarian begins to sound more l i k e a grammarian. His o b j e c t , he says, i s to l o c a t e and i m a g i n a t i v e l y enter (or as he puts i t : to enter into the s p i r i t o f ) a genuinely a n i m i s t i c w o r l d. He does t h i s i n a r a t h e r odd way. F o l l o w i n g the assumption t h a t our ancestors thought i n an a n i m i s t i c way and coupling t h i s w i t h the i d e a t h a t the s t r u c t u r e of t h e i r t h i n k i n g can be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the s t r u c t u r e , o f t h e i r speech, the grammarian puts forward the hypothesis - 39 -t h a t we can enter i n t o the s p i r i t o f an a n i m i s t i c world by l e a r n i n g to t a l k (and by i m p l i c a t i o n to t h i n k ) i n terms of a genuinely a n i m i s t i c w o r l d. He consequently makes h i s undramatic entry i n t o t h i s a n i m i s t i c TO r i d by drawing a t t e n t i o n t o what we can c a l l the f o s s i l i s e d a n i m i s t i c terminology i n our language. By t h i s the grammarian means p a r t l y t h a t some of our words, i f not a l l , have as t h e i r r o o t s words which had a m a g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r our p r i m i t i v e f o r e f a t h e r s . But, more important, he also means t h a t we are t o f i n d i n everyday idioms and phrases t r a c e s of magical t h i n k i n g . Just as, he would argue, the expression "the sun i s s e t t i n g " d e r i v e s from a preCopernican conception of the s o l a r system (and to t a l k of the " s o l a r system" i s to r e v e a l our Copernican commit-ments) so the French I I f a i t beau seems to a t t r i b u t e , to the grammarian's eyes anyway, a metaphysical o r even an a n i m i s t i c character to the " I I " i n q u e s t i o n . S i m i l a r l y the Hungarian "the r a i n e r i s r a i n i n g " (meaning i t ' s r a i n i n g ) and the Roumanian "the sun i s e n t e r i n g i n t o sainthood" (meaning i t ' s s e t t i n g ) - examples which he l i f t s from a p e r f e c t l y s c i e n t i f i c paper by Leo S p i t z e r - seem to c a r r y w i t h them t r a c e s of a n i m i s t i c t h i n k i n g . Now however s c e p t i c a l we may f e e l about t h i s form of argument -and even S p i t z e r ' s a r t i c l e seems open to a number of o b j e c t i o n s , l e t alone the grammarian's - we would have assumed t h a t h i s examples were a n i m i s t i c exceptions which proved the s c i e n t i f i c r u l e . These examples stand out j u s t because our t h i n k i n g i s i n general so d i f f e r e n t . The grammarian, on the c o n t r a r y , does not h e s i t a t e to push h i s argument i n t o another c o n f l i c t w i t h Descartes. He borrows an argument of Lichtenberg's - 40 -to the e f f e c t t h a t the C a r t e s i a n deduction of a t h i n k i n g subject from the concept of j e pense i s an i n v a l i d g e n e r a l i z a t i o n on the b a s i s of a speech h a b i t . The grammarian makes t h i s p o i n t by suggesting t h a t the form of the expression " i t occurs to me" f a m i l i a r enough i n European languages makes no such assumption of a t h i n k i n g subject capable of i n i t i a t i n g thoughts i n t o e x i s t e n c e . Instead i t i m p l i e s the existence of an a n i m i s t i c " i t " which i s i n some way i t s e l f r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the occurence of the i d e a t o me. But p u t t i n g aside f o r a moment the o b j e c t i o n s we can r a i s e against h i s case can we see what s o r t o f t h i n g the grammarian i s t r y i n g to do? C e r t a i n l y - he i s t r y i n g to show t h a t our t h i n k i n g i s i n o r i g i n (and i n p a r t s t i l l i s ) a n i m i s t i c . Our t a s k o f catching on to what i t i s l i k e to t h i n k i n an a n i m i s t i c way i s t h e r e f o r e , according to the grammar-i a n , f a i r l y simple - we have simply t o t h i n k i n terms of the a n i m i s t i c elements of our tongue. We can now s t a t e h i s c o n c l u s i o n , such as i t i s . The a n i m i s t i c syntax o f f e r s us a ready made a n i m i s t i c system of t h i n k i n g . By e n t e r i n g t h i s and t h i n k i n g i n terms of i t we can get a unique detach-ment from modern s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g . We a l s o get, thrown i n f r e e w i t h the syntax so to speak, an e x h i b i t i o n of the "programmatic r e l a t i o n s h i p " which was so hard to phrase i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l o r s c i e n t i f i c terms i n the expression " i t occurs to me". Now I have been l e a n i n g over backwards i n my e f f o r t s to do j u s t i c e to what the grammarian i s t r y i n g to say. I have the f e e l i n g t h a t the grammarian not o n l y w i l l , but must, by the l o g i c (or should I say grammar?) of h i s p o s i t i o n o b j e c t to my i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Before I l e t - 41 -him do so I would l i k e t o make i t c l e a r t h a t the l a s t t h i n g I want t o do i s to defend what I have been s a y i n g . What I would l i k e to do i s t o a t t a c k i t head on. But how can I i f t h i s i s not what the grammarian means? Perhaps the best way out o f t h i s odd p o s i t i o n would be to see now how the grammarian would answer my o b j e c t i o n s p o i n t by p o i n t . AN ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE GRAMMARIAN AND A LOGICIAN • o L o g i c i a n Having done my best to give a f a i r account of what i t i s I t h i n k you are t r y i n g to say l e t me now make i t c l e a r t h a t I t h i n k your t h e s i s , i n so f a r as i t can be understood, i s wrong. I t h i n k I could produce s e v e r a l arguments any one of which would under-mine your case. I won't develop them very f a r , I ' l l j u s t s t a t e them to g i v e you the chance to show what s o r t of response you would make. But before I do t h a t I have one p o i n t to make which I don't see how you can respond t o . I t concerns your s t a r t i n g -p o i n t and the theme of your whole argument. According to you, you and I are t a l k i n g d i f f e r e n t languages. This i s c r u c i a l because you argue t h a t i n some Whorf-Sapir sense there can be no genuine understanding between languages, f o r reasons which you've been at great pains to show. Now i f you're r i g h t we have no business to be arguing at a l l , we're wasting our time - yet here you are e v i d e n t l y w a i t i n g f o r me to stop t a l k i n g so t h a t you can r e p l y t o what I'm s a y i n g . There's something very funny about t h i s : i t seems to me your very presence c o n t r a d i c t s your case. And to put the same p o i n t a d i f f e r e n t way: according to your argument I'm supposed to be i n c a p a b l e , as a l o g i c i a n , of grasp-i n g what you're d r i v i n g a t . Yet I've j u s t done my best to give a more or l e s s l o g i c a l o u t l i n e o f what I t h i n k you're saying and you seem to be l e t t i n g i t go at t h a t . E i t h e r , i t seems to me, you should have walked away during my o u t l i n e , o r , i f you stayed you should have p r o t e s t e d t h a t my account o f your case f a i l e d t o do i t j u s t i c e . Otherwise you give away - 43 -your case before we s t a r t by a d m i t t i n g that l o g i c can cope w i t h and do j u s t i c e t o the very t h i n g you claimed i t c o u l d n ' t . Let me sum t h i s up i n a simple q u e s t i o n : are we understanding each other o r aren't we? I f we aren't why are we here: and i f we are understanding each other doesn't t h a t cut the ground from under your case? Grammarian Your question i s u n r e a l . When people disagree very r a d i c a l l y as we do you can't stop i n the middle of an argument and ask are we understanding each other? That's s i l l y , i f not rude. In an argument l i k e t h i s we have to t r y to understand each other: whether we succeed or not may not be obvious at a l l , c e r t a i n l y not immediately. For example i f we p a r t company shouting rude words at each other an observer might say t h a t genuine communication had not been achieved. But you know as w e l l as I do that people sometimes s t a r t shouting j u s t when they f e e l t h e i r p o s i t i o n being undermined. A few days l a t e r one o f us might have a change o f h e a r t . Then we might be able to say that understanding had taken p l a c e , i n s p i t e o f how t h i n g s seemed at the time. We may even f i n d ourselves us i n g each other's t u r n s o f phrase o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t y l e of debate, o r even whole arguments. I f t h i s i s not-under-standing i t ' s hard to t h i n k what i s . L o g i c i a n I t h i n k you miss my p o i n t . On your t h e s i s your t h e s i s can't be put l o g i c a l l y . I d i d put i t l o g i c a l l y . You accepted i t - 44 -the way I put i t . Therefore your t h e s i s f a l l s . I can reduce t h i s to symbolic l o g i c - j u s t what pa r t o f my argument do you want to q u a r r e l w i t h ? Grammarian You s a i d what you thought I meant. Whether you t h i n k t h i s can be s a i d or not remains to be seen. I f you t h i n k i t can i t undermines your p o s i t i o n as a more o r l e s s orthodox l o g i -c i a n . I f you decide i t can't then that a f t e r a l l i s no more than what we would have expected. L o g i c i a n I see. Your poi n t i s t h a t i f your argument i s v a l i d i t ' s v a l i d and i f i t ' s i n v a l i d my mode of expression i s inapprop-r i a t e ? Grammarian That's how i t must seem i f you i n s i s t on wanting the conclu-s i o n before you've had the argument out. L o g i c i a n You have evaded the i s s u e . I can't t e l l you how i r r i t a t i n g I f i n d t h i s s o r t of argument. But before you diagnose my i r r i t a t i o n as something or other about my l o g i c l e t me move to my next p o i n t , or r a t h e r m y " f i r s t p o i n t of s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d disagreement. This f o l l o w s very d i r e c t l y from what we have j u s t been sa y i n g . Your argument against R y l e , such as i t i s , seems to t u r n on the idea t h a t Ryle i s o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n the same frame o f reference as the Ca r t e s i a n arguments he i s t r y i n g to a t t a c k . F i r s t of a l l I don't t h i n k he i s . I t h i n k I could show he i s n ' t and I'm sure would p r o t e s t very l u c i d l y t h a t he i s n ' t . But I have no need to go t o such l e n g t h s , because I can tu r n your own mode of argument against - 45 -you. You argue t h a t to escape from the Descartes-Ryle "framework" as you c a l l i t you have to operate i n a d i f -f e r e n t idiom so to speak, not the d u a l i s t i c idiom of Carte-s i a n or Oxford philosophy, but the a n i m i s t i c idiom of every-day l i f e . But s u r e l y i f the language o f everyday l i f e i s a n i m i s t i c Ryle i s a n i m i s t i c , because i f anybody i s o p e r a t i n g w i t h the language o f everyday l i f e Ryle i s . He i s as good an example of an ordinary-language philosopher as y o u ' l l f i n d . I f your case r e s t s on o r d i n a r y language, as i t seems t o , then i t f a l l s j u s t because Ryle i s speaking your language. I f i t r e s t s on something e l s e what i s i t ? Grammarian I t r e s t s on o r d i n a r y language. Ryle doesn't speak o r d i n a r y language any more than any o f the other Ordinary Language Ph i l o s o p h e r s . You could t e l l at a glance whether Ryle was engaged i n an o r d i n a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n or whether he was doing philosophy. And that 's j u s t what puts W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t o a d i f f e r e n t world from you l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s men. W i t t g e n s t e i n maintained the tone o f a c o n v e r s a t i o n . He wrote as i f he was d e a l i n g w i t h p o i n t s as they came up, as we do i n r e a l l i f e , not as i f he was g i v i n g a l e c t u r e i n a l e c t u r e room. That's what makes W i t t g e n s t e i n more l i k e Socrates, Confucius o r Sydney Smith than l i k e the main stream of s c h o l a s t i c , r a t i o n a -l i s t and e m p i r i c i s t p h i l o s o p h e r s . The l a t t e r wrote, l e c t u r e d or preached f o r audiences; the former simply engaged i n con-v e r s a t i o n . - 46 -L o g i c i a n This i s a l l very w e l l , but j u s t what i s i t t h a t makes what W i t t g e n s t e i n says c o n v e r s a t i o n a l and r i g h t and what Ryle says academic and wrong? Is there something about Witt g e n s t e i n ' s s t y l e t h a t makes him i n some curious way i r r e f u t a b l e ? How i s i t t h a t he can make a set of d i s j o i n t e d and a l l u s i v e remarks about l o g i c and mathematics and f i n d h i m s e l f above c r i t i c i s m ? Is g u e r i l l a warfare somehow i n t r i n s i c a l l y nobler than f u l l -s c a l e f i g h t i n g ? There's no doubt i t ' s harder to say when the g u e r i l l a are defeated. This i s no joke. When I t r i e d t o make sense o f your "Grammar" I t r i e d t o do i t i n a presentable way. I t r i e d to get some s o r t o f continuous argument out of what I had grasped from your remarks. I'm prepared to b e l i e v e the job could have been done f a r b e t t e r by somebody more sympathetic t o your p o s i t i o n . But why on earth should my e f f o r t to b r i n g c o n t i n u i t y be i n i t s e l f an e r r o r ? I simply am not prepared to b e l i e v e t h a t the e f f o r t to say something coherently and c o n s e c u t i v e l y i s i n i t s e l f a v i c e . You set up your Grammar i n poi n t foxm . What, i f y o u ' l l a l l o w me to be rude, stopped you from w r i t i n g out your argument p r o p e r l y l i k e everybody e l s e , short o f l a z i n e s s , or incompetence, or both? Grammarian I t h i n k t h i s i s a very f a i r q u e s t i o n and I t h i n k I can give i t a c l e a r answer. The reason why W i t t g e n s t e i n wrote i n po i n t form and not i n essay form was t h a t he f e l t t h a t g u e r i l l a warfare as you put i t was the only kind o f warfare - 4 7 -open t o the philo s o p h e r . Since he b e l i e v e s himself out o f key w i t h h i s time he can't w r i t e c o n s e c u t i v e l y at any l e n g t h . This would be f a l s e t o t h e r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s which he knew e x i s t e d between h i m s e l f and h i s reader. He seems t o have thought too t h a t where mistakes are not being made the philosopher has nothing to do. In any case t h i s i s my view of the grammarian. I f I w r i t e an essay as i f a reader can grasp what I am saying j u s t l i k e another essay then a t best I simply m i s l e a d him. And doesn't t h i s answer your f i r s t p o i n t : W i t t g e n s t e i n can't argue w i t h modern philosophers without committing h i m s e l f to t h e i r frame o f reference? This t h e s i s i s t h a t the frame of reference i s c a t e g o r i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from any arguments i n s i d e t h a t framework. I t seems to f o l l o w t h a t f o r me to argue would be f o r me to commit a category mistake. A l l I can do i s to set out the terms and i l l u s t r a t e the mode of my s t y l e of argument. Once I engage i n argument w i t h you I enter your frame o f reference - t h a t ' s t o say I l o s e my case. L o g i c i a n So what are you doing now i f not arguing? Grammarian S o r t i n g out the grounds genuine argument can get a s t a r t on. L o g i c i a n I s t h a t why we don't seem t o be g e t t i n g anywhere? Grammarian Let me sum t h i s up then. I don't b e l i e v e i n w r i t i n g p h i l o -s o p h i c a l essays. I don't t h i n k they get anybody anywhere. Commit them to the flames. Even i f I d i d b e l i e v e i n i t I wouldn't have a sympathetic audience and i f you know your - 48 -readers don't have the same frame of reference as y o u r s e l f i t ' s s i l l y t o go on t a l k i n g as i f they do. L o g i c i a n This sounds l i k e a mixture of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and defeatism. Why are you w r i t i n g a t a l l ? L e t ' s not l o s e s i g h t of t h i s simple p o i n t : i f you are going to t r y to communicate you have t o t r y t o do as best you can. I f you are e n t e r i n g realms whereof one cannot speak, then, as I t h i n k W i t t g e n s t e i n might say, shut up. The choice i s between being coherent or fragmentary, cogent o r a l l u s i v e , consecutive o r a n e c d o t a l , readable or confused: make i t , don't make excuses. Let me ask you my f i r s t q uestion again, i t ' s r e a l l y not a hard one -Do you have something to t e l l us or don't you? Grammarian That i s - a hard q u e s t i o n and I don't know the answer. L o g i c i a n I am not s a t i s f i e d t h a t t h a t ' s honest. Let me e x p l a i n why. The next p o i n t I was going to make was that a t one stage o f your argument I d i d f e e l myself on f a m i l i a r ground and I d i d f e e l t h a t you had a strong and unusual argument. I t was the one which s a i d t h a t C a r t e s i a n doubt, and by i m p l i c a t i o n s c e p t i c i s m , was f a l s e because i t r e s t e d on a category mistake. I t confused doubts about i n d i v i d u a l questions w i t h doubts about a l l p o s s i b l e q u e s t i o n s , o r more e x a c t l y , w i t h doubts about the whole framework o f questions and answers that we normally accept. T h i s , I thought you were i m p l y i n g , .was v i c i o u s because i t obscured a genuine question about the p o s s i b i l i t y of a whole framework of doubts and questions and - 49 -answers being misconceived and being replaceable by a l t e r -n a t i v e frameworks. I f t h i s i s not what you were saying then I haven't followed you here at a l l . I f i t was what you were saying then you are capable of making y o u r s e l f understood i n which case your c l a i m that we can't understand one another o r tha t you can't meet me halfway seems to me to f a l l . Grammarian I don't know what to say. I s a i d i t the best way I knew. I f I had pretended you were going to agree with e v e r y t h i n g e l s e I s i a d we might never have got as f a r as we have got. L o g i c i a n In that case l e t me assume th a t I have seen what you were d r i v i n g at and l e t me now i n t e r c e p t the move you went on to make. You claimed t h a t once we get a glimpse of the f a c t t h a t our own n o t i o n o f common sense i s not u n i v e r s a l , unique o r p r i v i l e g e d - except i n the sense t h a t our own notions have the p r i v i l e g e o f being ours - then i t becomes p o s s i b l e f o r us to set about r a i s i n g questions of the v a l i d i t y or authen-t i c i t y of our own whole frame o f re f e r e n c e . Now your p o i n t about the category mistake which confused questions and frameworks o f questions was not n e c e s s a r i l y p o i n t l e s s . But s u r e l y t h i s i s . We are o u r s e l v e s . What we c a l l our common sense i s our common sense. I t ' s not a b l i n d scrap of good t r y i n g to hold up for judgment our own whole framework o f common sense when a l l we have to judge i t by i s t h a t same common sense. The judgment would be i n a p r i v a t e language -there would be nothing to check i t a g a i n s t . - 50 -Grammarian True. But a l l I was t r y i n g to do here was to b r i n g out a mistake I t h i n k we are i n the ha b i t o f making about the ground o f our own t h i n k i n g . Just to see t h a t our common sense i s what we have got used to as common sense and i s not somehow u n i v e r s a l o r unique may be i f not the beginning of wisdom perhaps the step t h a t has to be taken before the wisdom can get a s t a r t . SUMMING UP L o g i c i a n Now that some months have gone by perhaps we can look back on the argument of t h i s t h e s i s i n something l i k e c o l d blood. I f I say what I t h i n k o f the whole t h i n g f i r s t that w i l l give the grammarian the chance to have the l a s t word. And t h i s seems o n l y r i g h t and proper since i t i s a f t e r a l l h i s t h e s i s . I would l i k e to say two t h i n g s , one about the grammar i t s e l f and the other about the way the i s s u e has been handled here. F i r s t , i t seems t o me t h a t the grammar does not make sense: I would i n s i s t t h a t what the grammarian says as he says i t can't be pr o p e r l y understood. That i s not to say that i t i s complete nonsense and not worth t a k i n g note o f . I found i t i n t r i g u i n g and pr o v a c a t i v e and at one p o i n t at l e a s t , d i s t u r b i n g to me as a philosopher. What was t h i s p o i n t ? I t was, as I understood i t , to the e f f e c t t h a t any remark, even a remark expressing doubt, takes something as c e r t a i n . This Something has to do w i t h the syntax o r phraseology o f th a t doubt, o r of the s t r u c t u r e of t h i n k i n g t h a t t h i s doubt i s a part o f , or i s i n some way c l o s e l y t i e d up w i t h t h a t s t r u c t u r e . T h i s , to me, was the c e n t r a l i d e a o f the grammar, and i t seems to challenge a l o t of popular modern p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k -i n g . How the challenge i s to be met I f i n d i t hard to say. On the one hand i t seems to throw doubt on the commonly held b e l i e f i n e m p i r i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c o r s c e p t i c a l t h i n k i n g ; but on the other hand so f a r from making me want to give up t h i s kind of t h i n k i n g i t seems to me to be - 5 2 -i t s e l f nothing more o r l e s s than an unusually thoroughgoing kind o f s c e p t i c i s m . The question that I am l e f t w i t h i s t h i s : can I , as a s c e p t i c r a i s e doubts about my own s c e p t i c i s m ? I f I can't I'm no tru e s c e p t i c since there's something I'm not prepared to q u e s t i o n . I f I can.... my mind boggles. But second, having admitted that there may be an element o f t r u t h i n what the grammarian says - i n s p i t e of the way he has chosen to- put i t -I have a very b i g p r o v i s o . The grammarian's whole way of going about t h i n g s j u s t w i l l not do. Nor can i t be condoned as an experiment - the search, as he puts i t , for an appr o p r i a t e form. I f people are going to t a l k a t a l l they simply have to t a l k i n such a way t h a t they can be under-stood. This o b l i g a t i o n i s something l i k e the o b l i g a t i o n - dare I say i t ? -to speak grammatically. I f we don't we won't be understood. We can't be understood. In a word: the grammarian doesn't - and i s n ' t . He i s trapped i n j u s t that concept of a p r i v a t e language which he s t a r t e d , o r t r i e d t o s t a r t , out from. Grammarian F i r s t I would l i k e to thank the l o g i c i a n f o r what I hope he w i l l i allow me to c a l l h i s i n t e g r i t y , o r i n t e l l e c t u a l honesty, i n t u r n i n g h i s own s c e p t i c i s m against h i m s e l f . Let me un d e r l i n e t h i s as a f a i r i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n of what I was t r y i n g to say. As f o r the charge that what I i n f a c t say, as i t stands, doesn't make sense, I f e e l l i k e saying what Rudolf Bultmann s a i d to K a r l Jaspers i n a famous argument: any attempt to c l e a r myself would make me look absurd. But though I f e e l I have made myself r i d i c u l o u s enough already I w i l l attempt a r e p l y . The l o g i c i a n t a l k s as i f what he takes as common - 5 3 -sense i s beyond p o s s i b l e question. I t i s as i f h i s t h i n k i n g works by t a k i n g f o r granted t h a t common sense i s and can only be the same and s i n g l e common sense: h i s . Because I don't share h i s common sense my way of t h i n k -i n g i s , to h i s way of t h i n k i n g , beyond t h e . p a l e . But I see no reason f o r supposing t h a t what i s common sense to any group of philosophers i s neces-s a r i l y p r i v i l e g e d o r beyond c r i t i c i s m . I t may be beyond c r i t i c i s m to them, but t h a t ' s another matter. Yet t h i s i s j u s t what s t r i k e s me as odd about modern s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g - s c e p t i c i s m o r empiricism - those who belong to the c i r c l e don't seem to be able to imagine what i t would be l i k e to r a i s e doubts about i t . I don't know what to say about t h i s . I can on l y put i t down to the monotheistic t r a d i t i o n which i t seems to me e m p i r i c i s t s and s c e p t i c s belong t o : they have got used to w r i t i n g o f f other modes o f thought as P h i l i s t i n e - not j u s t strange but perverse and m o r a l l y suspect. The l o g i c i a n seems t o me to stand i n the shadow of an omniscient god which f o l l o w s him everywhere. A l l h i s arguments, questions and doubts - not l e a s t those c h a l l e n g i n g the god - share that omniscient syntax. That's how i t looks to the P h i l i s t i n e . I would l i k e to sum up w i t h simply a r e g r e t . I t i s a re g r e t not onl y about that modern mode of t h i n k i n g , but about the frame of mind which t h i s t h i n k i n g tends to carry with i t . This frame o f mind seems, on the face, of i t , open, awake, and ready for anything that comes. In f a c t i t i s open and ready, but i n a queer way: anything and e v e r y t h i n g that comes i s grasped o n l y i n so f a r as i t can be made to f i t the mode of thought i n q u e s t i o n . What i s queer i s that everything which can't be made to f i t i s w r i t t e n o f f not as wrong or wicked but as meaningless, u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , nameless. As a r e s u l t no t h i n k i n g can get so much as a s t a r t i n the modern world except - 55 -modern t h i n k i n g . Modern t h i n k i n g has no c h a l l e n g e r s . And t h i s i s a p i t y because from my standpoint modern t h i n k i n g i s wrong t h i n k i n g . I ' l l end by paying my respects t o a modern, somebody whose r e l i g i o n I disagree w i t h head on but who I have great regard f o r -Rudolf Bultmann. He ends h i s argument by thanking K a r l Jaspers f o r h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to t r y to communicate. In j u s t t h i s way I would l i k e to thank the l o g i c i a n f o r h i s e f f o r t s to come to terms w i t h my grammar. LITERATURE CITED Ba r t s c h , H. W. (ed). 1953 Kerygma and Myth, a t h e o l o g i c a l debate with c o n t r i b u t i o n s by Rudolf Bultmann j^and others~Tl Translated by R. W. F u l l e r , London," S.P.C.K. Jaspers, K. Kafka, F. I960 Myth and C h r i s t i a n i t y ; an I n q u i r y i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f R e l i g i o n without Myth, by K a r l Jaspers and Rudolf Bultmann. New York, Noonday Press . 1954 R e f l e c t i o n s on S i n , S u f f e r i n g , Hope and the True Way i n Wedding Preparations i n the Country and other posthumous Prose W r i t i n g s , t r a n s l a t e d by Ernst K a i s e r and Eithne..Wilkins. London, Seeker and Warburg. Kdhler, W. 1947 G e s t a l t Psychology New York, L i v e r w r i g h t . R y l e , G. 1949 The Concept of Mind. London, Hutchinson. S p i t z e r , L. 1953 Language - The Basis of Science, Philosophy and Poetry i n Studies, i n I n t e l l e c t u a l H i s t o r y . The Johns Hopkins' Pres s . Whorf, B. L. 1952 An American Indian Model of the Universe 1 i n C o l l e c t e d Papers  i n M e t a l i n g u i s t i c s . Washington, Department of S t a f f , Foreign S e r v i c e I n s t i t u t e . W i t t g e n s t e i n , L. 1953 P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s t r a n s l a t e d by G.E.M. Anscombe B. B l a c k w e l l . W i t t g e n s t e i n , L. ^ c .i960] Tractatus Logico P h i l o s o p h i c u s Translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. MacGuiness. London, Routledge & Kegan P a u l . 

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