UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The development of empiricism in modern philosophy Sibley, William Maurice 1940

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICISM IN MODE KM PHILOSOPHY THE DEVELOPMENT OF EMPIRICISM IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY 'toy W i l l i a m M a u r i c e S i b l e y A T h e s i s s u b m i t t e d i n P a r t i a l F u l f i l m e n t o f The Requirements f o r t h e Degree o f MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department o f PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY \ The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia APRIL, 1940 PREFACE. Recent t r e n d s i n p h i l o s o p h y , such as the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the n a t u r e o f language and the i n c l i n a t i o n to a f o r m a l i s t t h e o r y o f mathematics, have e n a b l e d us to r e t u r n w i t h new i n s i g h t to an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the development o f e m p i r i c i s m . The c o l l a p s e o f o l d e r s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s under t h e s t r a i n o f new d i s c o v e r i e s has n e c e s s i t a t e d a c l o s e s c r u t i n y o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f s c i e n c e . Under such c o n d i t i o n s s c i e n c e has r e t u r n e d , n o t to the systems o f the German m e t a p h y s i c i a n s o f the l a s t c e n t u r y , whose e n t e r p r i s e s a r e now g e n e r a l l y h e l d t o "be f a i l u r e s , "but to the u t i l i z a t i o n o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i s c o v e r i e s o f such e m p i r i c i s t s as B e r k e l e y and Hume. / An e x a m i n a t i o n o f the development o f modern e m p i r i c i s m i s t h e r e f o r e t i m e l y . The i n c l u s i o n i n t h i s t h e s i s o f a s u r v e y o f the work o f L o c k e , B e r k e l e y , Hume, M i l l and R u s s e l l ne-eds no j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t s i n c e an attempt to g i v e a comprehensive a c c o u n t o f a l l p r e s e n t day movements i s i m p o s s i b l e h e r e , some s e l e c t i o n has been n e c e s s a r y a t t h i s p o i n t . I n c h o o s i n g such contemporary w r i t e r s as S c h l i c k and Reichenbach, I have been g u i d e d b y the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t t h e i r work i s f a i r l y r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f modern thought, t h a t i t s i n t r i n s i c m e r i t i s h i g h , and t h a t i t i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i v to the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f the e a r l i e r p h i l o s o p h e r s s t u d i e d i n t h i s t h e s i s . I have p r e f e r r e d to t r a c e the development o f e m p i r i c i s m from as f r e s h a v i e w p o i n t as p o s s i b l e , and have c o n s e q u e n t l y made o n l y the s c a n t i e s t use o f s e c o n d a r y m a t e r i a l . The t h e s i s has been w r i t t e n a t the s u g g e s t i o n and under the d i r e c t i o n o f P r o f e s s o r J.A. I r v i n g o f the Department o f P h i l o s o p h y and p s y c h o l o g y , to whose t e a c h i n g any m e r i t s i t may have must be a t t r i b u t e d . W.M. S i b l e y . TABLE OF CONTENTS Chap t e r I . page John L o c k e : "An E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " 2 I . The Sources o f o u r Knowledge 4 I I . The Manner i n w h i c h the E x t e r n a l Wo r i d A f f e c t s o u r Senses 6 I I I . The O p e r a t i o n s of o u r M e n t a l F a c u l t i e s 7 IV. The E x a m i n a t i o n o f Substance 11 V. The C r i t e r i a o f R e a l i t y , Adequacy and T r u t h of Ideas 14 ... v i . - The E f f e c t of Language on o u r Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l W o r l d ±9 V I I . The E x t e n t o f o u r Knowledge o f Substances 24 V I I I . The R e a l i t y o f o u r Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l W o r l d 26 IX, Summary 28 C h a p t e r I I . George B e r k e l e y : "A T r e a t i s e C o n c e r n i n g the P r i n c i p l e s o f Human Knowledge" 35 r . Language and A b s t r a c t i o n 36 I I . The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r 41 I I I . The E x i s t e n c e o f S p i r i t 46 IV. The Defense o f S u b j e c t i v e I d e a l i s m 49 V. The Consequences o f S u b j e c t i v e I d e a l i s m f o r P h i l o s o p h y and S c i e n c e 52 V I . The A t t r i b u t e s o f S p i r i t u a l Substance 58 V I I . The P r e l u d e to S c e p t i c i s m 60 C h a p t e r I I I . D a v i d Hume; "A T r e a t i s e o f Human N a t u r e " 69 and "An E n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " I . The O r i g i n and A s s o c i a t i o n o f Id e a s 70 I I . The N a t u r e o f C o n c l u s i o n s from E x p e r i e n c e 71 I I I . The N a t u r e o f B e l i e f 78 IV. The A n a l y s i s o f the C a u s a l Nexus 81 V. Sense P e r c e p t i o n and the E x t e r n a l W o r l d 89 V I . The A n a l y s i s o f the Ego 93 V I I . "A M i t i g a t e d S c e p t i c i s m " 9 6 C h a p t e r IV. John S t u a r t M i l l : "An E x a m i n a t i o n o f S i r W i l l i a m H a m i l t o n ' s P h i l o s o p h y " Page 106 I . The S c o t t i s h "Common Sense S c h o o l " 106 I I . ' The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory o f the B e l i e f i n the E x t e r n a l W o r l d 110 I I I . The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory A p p l i e d to o u r B e l i e f i n M i n d 117 IV. The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory o f the P r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s o f M a t t e r 120 Chap t e r V. B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l : "Our Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l Wo r i d as a F i e l d f o r S c i e n t i f i c Method i n P h i l o s o p h y " and "The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r " 127 I . Our Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l W o r l d 128 I I . The W o r l d o f P h y s i c s and the World o f Sense 135 I I I . The E v i d e n c e f o r the T r u t h o f P h y s i c s as a Means o f Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l W o r l d 141 Chap t e r V I . ffioritz S c h l i c k : " A l l g e m e i n e j ^ r k e n n t n i s l e h r e " 150 I . The N a t u r e o f Knowledge 151 I I . The N a t u r e o f the R e a l : The »Thing-in-itself" o f S c i e n c e , 158 I I I . The N a t u r e and e x t e n t of S c i e n t i f i c Knowledge 165 IV. The V a l i d i t y o f o u r Knowledge o f R e a l i t y 171 Chap t e r V I I . Hans Reichenbach: " E x p e r i e n c e and P r e d i c t i o n " 176 1. Meaning 177 I I . I m p r e s s i o n s and the e x t e r n a l W o r l d 181 I I I . An I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g I m p r e s s i o n s 185 IV. The P r o j e c t i v e C o n s t r u c t i o n o f the W o r l d on the C o n c r e t a B a s i s 192 V. P r o b a b i l i t y and I n d u c t i o n 196 Chap t e r V I I I . E m p i r i c i s m : P a s t and P r e s e n t 202 I . E m p i r i c i s m v e r s u s M y s t i c i s m 202 I I . The Development o f E m p i r i c i s m 208 I I I , Empiricism and the F u t u r e Course o f P h i l o s o p h y B i b l i o g r a p h y 23t> CHAPTER I JOHN LOCKE: "AH ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING" -2-CHAPTER I JOHN LOCKE: "AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. " Modern p h i l o s o p h y t a k e s i t s r i s e f r om the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems r a i s e d by G a l i l e o ' s b i f u r c a t i o n o f the w o r l d i n t o measurable and non-measurable a s p e c t s ; i n t o p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s ; i n t o o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r -i s t i c s . H a l f a c e n t u r y a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n o f G a l i l e o ' s " D i s c o u r s e on Method", and h a l f a c e n t u r y a f t e r D e s c a r t e s had g i v e n c l e a r e x p r e s s i o n t o the movement i n p h i l o s o p h y known as R a t i o n a l i s m , John Locke o u t l i n e d i n h i s "Essay c o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " the e m p i r i c a l p o s i t i o n : t h a t the problem w i t h w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y had to cope was to be s o l v e d not by ap p e a l to "a p r i o r i " p r i n c i p l e s such as those o f mathematics, w h i c h had so c a p t i v a t e d the mind of D e s c a r t e s , but by r e c o u r s e to a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e s t r u c t u r e of our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d as t h a t knowledge i s brough t to us through sense p e r c e p t i o n . The doubts c a s t on the v a l i d i t y of our knowledge o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d arose from G a l i l e o ' s d i v i s i o n of t h a t w o r l d i n t o p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s , and from the d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h c o n s e q u e n t l y came to r e p l a c e the p r e v i o u s c o m f o r t a b l e a s s u r a n c e o f the m e d i e v a l s t h a t the w o r l d was f u n d a m e n t a l l y such as i t appeared to us. I f i t c o u l d not be m a i n t a i n e d t h a t we- had d i r e c t and i n t u i t i v e knowledge §f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , then the v a l i d i t y o f our knowledge o f i t c o u l d o b v i o u s l y o n l y be p r e s e r v e d by the assumption w h i c h D e s c a r t e s made, t h a t our i d e a s are f a i t h f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s and c o p i e s o f some more s u b s t a n t i a l r e a l i t y l y i n g b e h i n d and s u p p o r t i n g them. D e s c a r t e s a l s o s e p a r a t e d i n d e c i s i v e manner the two -3-s u b s t a n c e s , " r e s c o g i t a n s " and " r e s e x t e n s a " , thus c o n t r i v i n g to r e n d e r s t i l l more d i s t a n t from the mind the now r a p i d l y d i s a p p e a r i n g m a t e r i a l w o r l d . H i s Theory of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e P e r c e p t i o n , and h i s d i v i s i o n of mind and m a t t e r are i n g e n e r a l the p r e m i s e s on w h i c h Locke s t a r t s . The q u e s t i o n w h i c h t a k e s prime importance f o r Locke, i s the problem o f the sense i n w h i c h we have knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l vs/orId, and.of the v a l i d i t y o f t h a t knowledge. Locke's g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n of E m p i r i c i s m becomes e v i d e n t i n h i s famous po l e m i c a g a i n s t the e x i s t e n c e o f i n n a t e i d e a s . D e s c a r t e s b e l i e v e d , w i t h o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s b e f o r e and a f t e r him, t h a t c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the mind opera t e d could, n o t be d e r i v e d from sense experience.' These p r i n c i p l e s c o u l d be-, r e g a r d e d n e i t h e r as s u b o r d i n a t e and p o s t e r i o r to t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , nor as v o l u n t a r y c r e a t i o n s of the mind. The i d e a o f God, f o r i n s t a n c e , was. one of t h e s e i n h e r e n t n o t i o n s : a c c o r d i n g to D e s c a r t e s i t c o u l d not be t r a c e d to arty sense i m p r e s s i o n , and c o u l d not have been formed by our f i n i t e minds. C o n s e q u e n t l y i t must be " i n n a t e " : i t forms an element i n t h a t . w h i c h the mind i t s e l f b r i n g s t o knowledge. L e s s e r t h i n k e r s s e i z e d upon . t h i s d o c t r i n e , and i n g i v i n g g r e a t e r s u b s t a n t i a l i t y and g r e a t e r number to t h e s e i n n a t e i d e a s , a r r i v e d . u l t i m a t e l y at i m p o s s i b l e a b s u r d i t i e s . Locke's a t t a c k on t h e s e c r u d e r c o n c e p t i o n s i s v i g o r o u s and s u c c e s s f u l , a l t h o u g h he g i v e s no answer to the u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m of t h e n a t u r e o f the "a p r i o r i " . H i s c a r d i n a l a s sumption admits o f no compromise w i t h i n n a t e p r i n c i p l e s : "the senses' at f i r s t l e t i n p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s , exid f u r n i s h the 1 y e t empty c a b i n e t " . We commence l i f e w i t h a t a b u l a rasa, on. w h i c h t h e r e a re no tmiai. W i t h Locke's e x a m i n a t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e o f i n n a t e i d e a s we need not co n c e r n o u r s e l v e s i n any d e t a i l . H i s main purpose i n a t t a c k i n g i t i s s i m p l y to g a i n a c c e p t a n c e f o r h i s b a s i c premise as t o the o r i g i n of our knowledge, p a r t i c u l a r l y as i t i s concerned w i t h the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . I i THE SOUEGES OF CUE KNOWLEDGE. The m a t e r i a l s o f r e a s o n aiid- knowledge come from e x p e r i e n c e a l o n e . Most o f our i d e a s are d e r i v e d f r o m t h e o p e r a t i o n o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d on our sen s e s . The second bourse o f our i d e a s , i s the: p e r c e p t i o n of the o p e r a t i o n o f the mind about t h e s e sense e x p e r i e n c e s . : By " r e f l e c t i o n " Locke s t a t e s s p e c i f -i c a l l y t h a t he means " t h a t n o t i c e ydiich the mind t a k e s o f i t s 2 -own o p e r a t i o n s " , and f r o m w h i c h we o b t a i n a, s e t of i d e a s 3 such as o f p e r c e p t i o n , t h i n k i n g , r e a s o n i n g , e t c . The p r o o f t h a t our i d e a s come o n l y from these two s o u r c e s i s o b t a i n e d by h y p o t h e s i z i n g the s t a t e of knowledge a man w o u l d have i f d e n i e d a c c e s s t o any o f the so u r c e s of s e n s a t i o n . I n the r e c e p t i o n o f s i m p l e i d e a s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s f o r t h e most p a r t p a s s i v e . The mind g i v e s no la.w t o N a t u r e , but i s " f o r c e d to r e c e i v e t h e i m p r e s s i o n s and cannot a v o i d the •4 p e r c e p t i o n o f those i d e a s t h a t are annexed t o them." . 1. lo'Cke, .• "An :1ssay' Concerning- .HuMahVtFnderstan'd'ihg M ,Bk. -Chi I I , Sect. 14. ( A l l o t h e r r e f e r e n c e s a r e to the " E s s a y " 0 2. Bk. I I , Oh. I I , Seel 4. 3. The p r o b l e m o f the n a t u r e o f t h e s e " o p e r a t i o n s o f the mind" i s . a p p a r e n t l y h e l d t o be unanswerable,e.g. i n Bk. I I , Ch. IV, Sect 6, he s t a t e s t h a t " t h i n k i n g " , b e i n g a s i m p l e i d e a , cam be known o n l y by e x p e r i e n c e , and i s , t h e r e f o r e , as we s h a l l see l a t e r , u n d e f i n a b l e . 4. Bk. I I , Ch. I , Sect 25. Under the i n f l u e n c e , p o s s i b l y of B o y l e i n p a r t i c u l a r , and c e r t a i n l y o f the atomic t h e o r y i n g e n e r a l , Locke proceeds to a t h e o r y of the s t r u c t u r e o f our knowledge. The atom here i s the " s i m p l e i d e a " . L i k e the atom, i t cannot "be c r e a t e d o r d e s t r o y e d by any f i a t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . A s i m p l e i d e a may come i n t o the mind from one sense, or from more than one; from r e f l e c t i o n o n l y , o r by a l l the ways o f s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n together.- A l l o t h e r i d e a s are complex and are n e c e s s a r i l y b u i l t up from s i m p l e i d e a s ; The s i m p l e i d e a cannot be b r o k e n up i n t o s m a l l e r p a r t s and ( t h e r e f o r e ) cannot be communicated; I t can be known o n l y by e x p e r i e n c e . I f Locke h o l d s a copy t h e o r y o f knowledge i t c e r t a i n l y i s not o f the " p h o t o g r a p h i c c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " t y p e . "Whatsoever the mind p e r c e i v e s i n i t s e l f o r i s t h e immediate o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n , t h o u g h t , o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t I c a l l ' i d e a ' ; a.nd the power to produce any i d e a i n our mind, I c a l l ' q u a l i t y ' . 1 o f the s u b j e c t w h e r e i n t h a t power i s " . AS to the c o r r e s p o n d -ence between the i d e a and i t s o r i g i n a l , he says t h a t "most of those o f s e n s a t i o n ( a r e ) i n the mind no.more the l i k e n e s s o f something e x i s t i n g w i t h o u t us than the names t h a t s t a n d f o r 2 them axe the l i k e n e s s of our i d e a s " . There f o l l o w s the well-known d i v i s i o n of the q u a l i t i e s i n b o d i e s i n t o p r i m a r y and secondary, P r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s a r e those w h i c h " a r e " u t t e r l y i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m the body, i.e.-, t h o s e w i t h o u t w h i c h we cannot t h i n k of the body at a l l . They ,l.*..Bk. I I , Ch. V I I I , Sect. 8. Locke admits t h a t he does not . always adhere s t r i c t l y to t h i s t e r m i n o l o g y , as he sometimes speaks o f i d e a s "as i n the t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . " 2.BK[t.:C)t^!(.Sect. -6-a.re f i v e i n n u m b e r - - s o l i d i t y , e x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e , m otion or r e s t , and number. C o l o u r s , sounds, t a s t e s , e t c . , are secondary: t h e y are mere f u n c t i o n s i n us o f the d i s p o s i t i o n 1 o f the i n s e n s i b l e p a r t s o f t h e b o d i e s . I I . THE MANNER IN WHICH THE EXTERNAL WORLD AFFECTS OUR SENSES. I n accordance w i t h p r e v i o u s t h e o r i e s Locke h o l d s t h a t the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s "produce" i d e a s i n us by m e c h a n i c a l i m p u l s e . " S i n g l y i m p e r c e p t i b l e b o d i e s " come from the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t and are t r a n s m i t t e d t h r o u g h our own nervous mechanism to t h e b r a i n , where i n some f a s h i o n the a p p r o p r i a t e s i m p l e i d e a i s produced. Idea.s of secondary q u a l i t i e s a r i s e i n 1. I t h i n k i t i s i m p o r t a n t to c o n s i d e r the b a s i s o f b i f u r c a t i o n h e r e . (1) The p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s l i s t e d by Locke i n c l u d e the measurable and m e c h a n i c a l a s p e c t s o f the w o r l d . Are the s e p a r a t i o n and the i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the measurable a s p e c t s are the u l t i m a t e ones due merely t o a p r e j u d i c e a r i s i n g from the" s u c c e s s o f the s c i e n t i f i c t e c h n i q u e w h i c h r e s u l t e d from G a l i l e o ' s s e l e c t i o n o f thos e q u a l i t i e s as b e i n g the s u b j e c t o f m a t h e m a t i c a l and p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y ? (2) Most o f our p e r c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g i s done i n v i s u a l and t a c t u a l terms. " S i g h t ( i s ) the most comprehensive of. a l l o u r se n s e s , c o n v e y i n g to our minds the i d e a s o f l i g h t and c o l o u r s . a n d a l s o the f a r d i f f e r e n t i d e a s of space, f i g u r e and m o t i o n . " ( L o c k e , Bk. I I , Ch. I I , Sect. 9) I t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l man who had no v i s u a l , t a c t u a l o r p r e s s u r e s e n s e s , but had an e x t r e m e l y w e l l - d e v e l o p e d o l f a c t o r y sense, would t h i n k o f odor as b e i n g the. p r i m a r y q u a l i t y of the w o r l d , w i t h o u t w h i c h he c o u l d not imagine a n y t h i n g to e x i s t ; whereas when we c o n c e i v e o f an o b j e c t e x i s t i n g a p a r t from us we do so m a i n l y i n v i s u a l - t a . c t u a l images. I t has been sug g e s t e d t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n of t h e p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s i l l u s t r a t e s our p r e j u d i c e i n f a v o r of v i s u a l - t a c t u a l sense i n f o r m a t i o n , i . e . , t h a t i t i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r e j u d i c e . The argument by w h i c h B e r k e l e y negates the d i v i s i o n i s c e r t a i n l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l . _7~ s i m i l a r manner. I n t h e i r case.,-however, the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s e n s a t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to d i f f e r e n t "bodies must on t h i s t h e o r y he a t t r i b u t e d m e r e l y . t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n and c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the minute p a r t s o f the p a r t i c u l a r " e x t e r n a l body, s i n c e the secondary q u a l i t i e s have been d e n i e d the same s t a t u s as t h e p r i m a r y ones. The f u r t h e r c o n c l u s i o n drawn by Locke i s t h a t "the i d e a s o f p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s of b o d i e s a re res e m b l a n c e s o f them, and t h e i r p a t t e r n s do r e a l l y e x i s t i n t h e b o d i e s t h e m s e l v e s ; but th e * i d e a s produced i n us by t h e s e secondary q u a l i t i e s have no I ,. r esemblance o f them at a l l . " I I I . THE OPERATIONS OF OUR MENTAL FACULTIES. A l t h o u g h the p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e .which Locke s e t up had a g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on l a t e r p s y c h o l o g y , h e r e we need o n l y s k e t c h i t b r i e f l y . The f i r s t s i m p l e i d e a o f f e f l e c t i o n i s p e r c e p t i o n . .In bare p e r c e p t i o n , the mind i s " f o r the most p a r t , o n l y p a s s i v e , and what i t p e r c e i v e s i t cannot a v o i d 2 p e r c e i v i n g . " But the mind must ta k e n o t i c e o f t h e s e i m p r e s s i o n s b e f o r e t h e r e i s p e r c e p t i o n ; and i d e a s of s e n s a t i o n are o f t e n changed by the judgment. " P e r c e p t i o n i s the f i r s t o p e r a t i o n of a l l our i n t e l l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s and 3 the i n l e t o f a l l knowledge i n t o our minds." R e t e n t i o n o f the i d e a s d e r i v e d f r o m s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n i s a c h i e v e d 1. Bk. I I , Ch. V I I I , Sect 15. 2. Bk. I I , Ch. I X , Sect, I . 3. Bk. I I , Ch. IX, Sect 15. -8-i n . two ways--by c o n t e m p l a t i o n and by memory. A t t e n t i o n , r e j j e t i t i o n , p l e a s u r e and p a i n h e l p i n f i x i n g i d e a s i n the memory. Locke n o t e s the i m p o r t a n c e o f "the f a c u l t y i n the mind" w h i c h can d i s c e r n and d i s t i n g u i s h between v a r i o u s i d e a s . On t h i s f a c u l t y depend c l a r i t y of p e r c e p t i o n and t h e e v i d e n c e a.nd c e r t a i n t y o f " g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h have passed f o r 1 i n n a t e t r u t h s . " . S e c o n d l y , the mind has a f a c u l t y by w h i c h i t can compare i d e a s i n r e s p e c t of e x t e n t , t i m e , p l a c e , e t c . , t h u s g i v i n g r i s e to r e l a t i o n s . T h i r d l y , the mind can combine s i m p l e idea.s from sen s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n i n t o complex ones. The mind a l s o has the power t o a s s i g n names a,s outward marks o f i n t e r n a l i d e a s . F i n a l l y , the mind can a b s t r a c t f rom s e v e r a l e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t w h i c h i s common to a l l and at the same time independent of t h e p a r t i c u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and thus c r e a t e s u n i v e r s a l s . By c o m b i n i n g , comparing, and a b s t r a c t i n g , the mind forms from s i m p l e i d e a s , complex ones, w h i c h are o f t h r e e c l a . s s e s : modes, s u b s t a n c e s , and r e l a t i o n s . Modes are complex i d e a s w h i c h are not c o n s i d e r e d to s u b s i s t by themselves but are regarded as dependences on o r a f f e c t i o n s of s u b s t a n c e s . They a r e e i t h e r s i m p l e o r mixed. "These mixed modes, b e i n g a l s o such c o m b i n a t i o n s o f s i m p l e i d e a s as are not l o o k e d upon to be 1. Bk. I I , Ch. I I , Sect. 1. Having d e n i e d the e x i s t e n c e of i n -ate i d e a s Locke a f f i r m s the e x i s t e n c e o f a " c l e a r d i s c e r n i n g f a c u l t y of the mind" w h i c h enables us to g i v e u n i v e r s a l assent to c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n s - - s . not very h e l p f u l improvement on t h e o r i g i n a l d o c t r i n e of i n n a t e i d e a s . -9-c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l marks of any r e a l "beings t h a t have a s t e a d y e x i s t e n c e , "but s c a t t e r e d and independent i d e a s put t o g e t h e r "by the mind, are t h e r e b y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the complex i d e a s 1 of s u b s t a n c e s . " The i d e a s of s u b s t a n c e s are such c o m b i n a t i o n s of s i m p l e i d e a s as are t a k e n to r e p r e s e n t d i s t i n c t p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s s u b s i s t i n g by t h e m s e l v e s , i n w h i c h the supposed or 2 c o n f u s e d i d e a o f s u b s t a n c e . . . i s always the f i r s t and c h i e f . " R e l a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n the c o n s i d e r a t i o n and comparison of one i d e a w i t h a n o t h e r . Locke g i v e s a d e t a i l e d account of some of the s i m p l e modes and t h e i r manner of d e r i v a t i o n . Space and time he c o n s i d e r s to.be e m p i r i c a l . Thus, the simple i d e a o f space comes by our s i g h t and t o u c h . C o n s i d e r e d b a r e l y i n l e n g t h between any two b e i n g s , space i s c a l l e d d i s t a n c e ; i f c o n s i d e r e d i n l e n g t h , b r e a d t h and t h i c k n e s s i t i s c a l l e d c a p a c i t y . The i d e a of p l a c e comes from c o n s i d e r a t i o n of "the r e l a t i o n of d i s t a n c e b e t w i x t any t h i n g and any two o r more p o i n t s , w h i c h are 3 c o n s i d e r e d as k e e p i n g the same d i s t a n c e one w i t h a n o t h e r . " R e f l e c t i o n on the t r a i n o f idea.s i n our minds g i v e s u.s t h e i d e a o f s u c c e s s i o n ; D u r a t i o n i s the d i s t a n c e between any p a r t s of that' s u c c e s s i o n . Time i s d u r a t i o n s e t out by measures; E t e r n i t y i s t h e a d d i t i o n o f d u r a t i o n s p a s t or to come "ad i n f i n i t u m . " 1. Bk. I I , Ch. X X I , Sect. 1. 2. Bk. I I , Ch. X I I , Sect 6. 3. Bk. I X , Ch. X I I I , Seel 7. -10-U n i t y i s 1 an i d e a "brought i n from every o b j e c t of sense, e v e r y i d e a ; i n p r e c i s e l y what manner, Locke does not say. R e p e t i t i o n o f t h i s i d e a a.nd a d d i t i o n o f the r e p e t i t i o n s g i v e us the complex i d e a s o f the modes o f u n i t y . Locke thus endeavours to p l a c e mathematics on an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s , but makes a. c e r t a i n c o n c e s s i o n to f o r m a l i s t t h e o r i e s when he admits t h a t names are n e c e s s a r y f o r the c o n c e p t i o n and m a n i p u l a t i o n of numbers. The l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n o f the mode "power" ha.s importance from the p o i n t of view o f p s y c h o l o g y o r e t h i c s but not from an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . Locke t r a c e s the source of the i d e a to the mind's p e r c e p t i o n "of the a l t e r a t i o n o f s i m p l e i d e a s i t observes i n t h i n g s w i t h o u t " and to r e f l e c t i o n on the c o n s t a n t change o f i t s own i d e a s w i t h i n ; b u t he does not f o l l o w up h i s i n q u i r y a l o n g Hume's l i n e . Power has a t w o f o l d a s p e c t — p a s s i v e and a c t i v e , the l a t t e r f o r m i n g a g r e a t p a r t 1 o f our complex i d e a s of n a t u r a l s u b s t a n c e s . I n accordance w i t h h i s view, however, t h a t the c l e a r e s t i d e a o f a c t i v e power i s to be found by r e f l e c t i o n on the o p e r a t i o n s o f the mind r a t h e r than from e x t e r n a l s e n s a t i o n , Locke c o n f i n e s h i m s e l f m a i n l y to an e x a m i n a t i o n of the n a t u r e of v o l i t i o n . 1, Bk. . I I , Ch. X X I , Sect. 2. -11-IV. THE EXAMINATION Off SUBSTANCE. The problem o f our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d comes to c e n t r e on the n o t i o n o f "subs t a n c e " , The statement and n a t u r e o f the problem p r e s e n t l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y . Locke has red u c e d our knowledge of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d to i d e a s aroused i n us by c o r r e s p o n d i n g q u a l i t i e s and powers i n the o b j e c t s o f sense p e r c e p t i o n . We observe t h a t c e r t a i n o f t h e s e i d e a s r e g u l a r l y go t o g e t h e r and are i n s e p a r a b l e from one a n o t h e r . Not b e i n g a b l e to imagine how q u a l i t i e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to our i d e a s can s u b s i s t by t h e m s e l v e s , we c o n s i d e r t h a t they b e l o n g to "one t h i n g " and t h a t t h e y f i n d t h e i r support i n a s u b s t r a t u m w h i c h we c a l l " s u b s t a n c e . " Our n o t i o n o f pure substance a r i s e s from the need we f e e l of c o n c e i v i n g a...support f o r the q u a l i t i e s or " a c c i d e n t s " w h i c h arouse the s i m p l e i d e a s i n us* I n q u i r y i n t o the n a t u r e o f substance r e v e a l s no c l e a r n o t i o n o f i t f u r t h e r than t h a t o f b e i n g the support of c e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s found r e g u l a r l y to c o - e x i s t i n our e x p e r i e n c e . A s i m i l a r p o s t u l a . t i o n o f substance o c c u r s when we t u r n to m e n t a l e v e n t s . Erom r e f l e c t i o n we are c o n s c i o u s of the i d e a s o f t h i n k i n g , r e a s o n i n g , \>salling and o t h e r m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s . We cannot c o n c e i v e how these can s u b s i s t of th e m s e l v e s , and hence we p o s t u l a t e a t h i n k i n g substance i n wh i c h t h e y somehow i n h e r e . We have as c l e a r an i d e a o f mind as of bodyj, Locke m a i n t a i n s , s i m p l y because Y/e have a c l e a r i d e a o f n e i t h e r . . The p r i m a r y i d e a s we have of body are the c o h e s i o n of s o l i d , s e p a r a b l e p a r t s , and a power o f -12-communieating motion "by i m p u l s e . The p r i m a r y i d e a s o f s p i r i t a r e t h i n k i n g and w i l l i n g . The i d e a s o f e x i s t e n c e , d u r a t i o n and m o t i l i t y are common to. them "both. I n g e n e r a l , then, when we speak of "substance" we must l i m i t o u r s e l v e s to s p e a k i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r c o l l e c t i o n s of i d e a s . Our complex i d e a s of su b s t a n c e s a r e made up o f t h r e e s o r t s : • • • (1) The i d e a s of the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s , w h i c h are i n the b o d i e s independent of our p e r c e p t i o n of them. (2) The i d e a s of the secondary q u a l i t i e s , w h i c h a re idea, produced i n us by t h e powers t h a t s u b s t a n c e s have by v i r t u e of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e i r p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s . As s t a t e d e a r l i e r , Locke's t h e o r y n e c e s s a r i l y m a i n t a i n s t h a t the "secondary q u a l i t i e s o f b o d i e s would d i s a p p e a r , i f we c o u l d d i s c o v e r the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s o f t h e i r minute p a r t s . " (3) The i d e a of "the a p t n e s s " i n any substance to g i v e or r e c e i v e such a l t e r a t i o n s o f p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s as w i l l p roduce d i f f e r e n t i d e a s i n us from t h o s e f o r m e r l y produced. These a c t i v e and p a s s i v e powers o f sub s t a n c e s depend f i n a l l y on s e n s i b l e s i m p l e idea.s, and make up a g r e a t p a r t of our complex i d e a s of s u b s t a n c e s . 1. Bk. I I , Ch. X X I I I , Sect. 11. -13-We have, t h e n , no a b s t r a c t , c l e a r i d e a of "substance." Beyond the i d e a s w h i c h come from s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n our f a c u l t i e s cannot p e n e t r a t e . The s i m p l e i d e a i s the u l t i m a t e : i t seems p r o b a b l y t o •Locke " t h a t the s i m p l e i d e a s we r e c e i v e from s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n a r e t h e b o u d n a r i e s of our t h o u g h t s ; beyond w h i c h the mind, whatever e f f o r t s i t would make, i s not a b l e to advance one j o t ; nor can i t make any d i s c o v e r i e s , when i t would p r y i n t o the n a t u r e and 1 h i d d e n causes o f t h o s e i d e a s . " "Substance" has not been a b s o l u t e l y d e n i e d e x i s t e n c e a p a r t from p e r c e p t i o n ; but the p o s s i b i l i t y o f our h a v i n g a n y t h i n g more than the most obscure i d e a of i t has been d e n i e d . I f our knowledge extends no f u r t h e r t h a n our i d e a s , then i n o r d e r to determine the v a l i d i t y of our knowledge of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d we must examine f u r t h e r the n a t u r e , s t r u c t u r e , and degree o f correspondence o f our i d e a s w i t h the o b j e c t s they are supposed to r e p r e s e n t . We must set up s t a n d a r d s to ensure t h a t our i d e a s w i l l be " r e a l " , "adequate" and " t r u e . " To t h i s t a s k Locke now l o g i c a l l y t u r n s . 1. Bk. I I , Ch. X X I I I , Sect. 29. -14-V. THE CRITERIA OF REALITY, ADEQUACY AND TRUTH OF IDEAS, • . (1) REAL AMD FANTASTICAL IDEAS. R e a l i d e a s are d e f i n e d as those w h i c h have a " c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the r e a l b e i n g and e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s , or w i t h t h e i r 1 a r c h e t y p e s . " Simple i d e ctS B.!P G B.. 11 r e a l . As f a r as p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s are concerned, Locke h o l d s t h a t t h e i r p a t t e r n s are d i r e c t l y (though not n e c e s s a r i l y p h o t o g r a p h i c a l l y ) r e p r e s e n t -ed i n the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i d e a s we have of them.; The r e m a i n d e r o f our s i m p l e i d e a s are not images or d i r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of what does e x i s t , our i d e a s of the secondary q u a l i t i e s b e i n g merely i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s i n us o f "powers" i n the e x t e r n a l b o d i e s . By means o f s i m p l e i d e a s we know and d i s t i n g u i s h o b j e c t s . F o r t h i s purpose our i d e a s s e r v e us a.s w e l l i f t h e y are m e r e l y c o n s t a n t and r e g u l a r e f f e c t s of q u a l i t i e s i n the e x t e r n a l b o d i e s as i f they were a c t u a l p a t t e r n s . Simple i d e a s , by v i r t u e of t h i s s t e a d y correspondence they have w i t h the " d i s t i n c t c o n s t i t u t -i o n s o f r e a l b e i n g s " are t h e r e f o r e r e a l and t r u e . They cannot " i n any case be made by the mind a t w i l l , and hence are not f i c t i o n s of our f a n c y . Complex i d e a s are a d m i t t e d l y v o l u n t a r y c r e a t i o n s , mere c o l l e c t i o n s of s i m p l e i d e a s . Which c o l l e c t i o n s are r e a l , and w h i c h o n l y i m a g i n a r y ? 1. Mixed modes and r e l a t i o n s made o f c o n s i s t e n t i d e a s 1. Bk. I I , Ch. XXX, Sect 1. -ID-are r e a l . Thdse i d e a s , "being framed by the mind,, axe themselves a r c h e t y p e s , and s i n c e t h e y cannot be r e f e r r e d t o any more u l t i m a t e s t a n d a r d cannot be s a i d to be u n r e a l . The s-imple i d e a s o f w h i c h the mode i s composed must, however, be m u t u a l l y c o n s i s t e n t : o t h e r w i s e t h e mode can s c a r c e l y be s a i d even to e x i s t . 2. "Ideas o f sub s t a n c e s are r e a l , when t h e y agree w i t h the 1 e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s . " Here we must r e f e r to e x p e r i e n c e t o judge o f the r e a l i t y o f our i d e a s . I f , f o r example, we put t o g e t h e r a number of s i m p l e idea.s and o b t a i n the i d e a o f a c e r t a i n s u b s t a n c e , but can nowhere i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d f i n d a substa n c e composed of a c o l l e c t i o n of q u a l i t i e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to our c o l l e c t i o n of i d e a s , the concept we 2 formed o f t h a t s u b s t a n c e i s u n r e a l or f a n t a s t i c a l . Our complex- i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s "are ho f a r t h e r r e a l than as they a re such c o m b i n a t i o n s o f s i m p l e i d e a s as a r e r e a l l y u n i t e d , and c o - e x i s t i n t h i n g s w i t h o u t us. On the c o n t r a r y , those a re f a n t a s t i c a l w h i c h a re ma.de up o f such c o l l e c t i o n s of s i m p l e i d e a s as were r e a l l y never u n i t e d , never were found t o g e t h e r i n any s u b s t a n c e . " 1. Bk. I I , Ch. XXX, Sect. 5. 2. Locke does not i n a u i r e i n t o t he n a t u r e and v a l i d i t y o f a. body o f s c i e n t i f i c f a c t such as i s n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e d h e r e a.s the s t a n d a r d o f r e f e r e n c e . 3. Bk. I I , Ch. XXX, Sect. 5. 1 -16-( 2 ) ADEQUATE AND INADEQUATE IDEAS. Having determined what i d e a s r e a l l y have a r e f e r e n t i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d (except i n the case o f t h o s e w h i c h are a d m i t t e d l y made by the mind and are not r e f e r r e d t o a n y t h i n g e x t e r n a l ) , we must noil examine t h e s e i d e a s i n o r d e r t o d i s c o v e r how a c c u r a t e l y they can m i r r o r the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r r e f e r e n t s ; Those i d e a s are adequate "which p e r f e c t l y r e p r e s e n t t h o s e a r c h e t y p e s w h i c h the mind supposes them t a k e n from." Those i d e a s axe in a d e q u a t e w h i c h are o n l y p a r t i a l o r i n c o m p l e t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f t h e i r r e f e r e n t s . Locke f i n d s t h a t : ; 1. Simple i d e a s are a l l adequate. Each s e n s a t i o n answers to the power o p e r a t i n g on our senses. The i d e a so tut p r o d u c e d i s a r e a l i d e a , and " c a n n o t A b e adequate, s i n c e i t 1 ought o n l y to answer t h a t power."" The mind cannot frame or a l t e r t h e simple i d e a , but merely r e c e i v e s i t f rom w i t h o u t as g i v e n . S i n c e we have no o t h e r knowledge o f the r e f e r e n t i n any case except t h r o u g h the u l t i m a t e s i m p l e i d e a , i t would be l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o deny adequacy o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to i t . 2. The complex i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s are e c t y p e s o r c o p i e s o f q u a l i t i e s a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g . Such i d e a s cannot be adequate, however, because we caxmot be* s u r e t h a t any c o l l e c t i o n of s i m p l e i d e a s , w h i c h we i n t e n d s h a l l i n c l u d e a l l the q u a l i t i e s o f any e x i s t i n g s u b s t a n c e , e x s . c t l y answers t o a l l t h e q u a l i t i e s w h i c h a r e i n t h a t s u b s t a n c e . The cause of t h i s 1. Bk. I I , Ch. X X I , Seel. 1. -17-inadequa.cy i s - s i m p l y the l i m i t a t i o n o f our own knowledge of the p r o p e r t i e s o f any su b s t a n c e . We cannot have an adequate c o l l e c t i o n o f a l l the q u a l i t i e s Of the substance u n t i l we f i n d a l l t h e a l t e r a t i o n s i t would r e c e i v e f r o m o r cause i n a l l o ther s u b s t a n c e s . Thus, i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s , as c o l l e c t i o n s o f t h e i r q u a l i t i e s are a l l i n a d e q u a t e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n Locke r u l e s out the i d e a of t h e r e b e i n g any r e a l essence o f the substance w h i c h might be a r e f e r e n t f o r , our i d e a s . These r e a l essences a re always unknovm; and hence the i d e a s r e f e r r e d t o them as a r c h e t y p e s "must : be so f a r from b e i n g adequate, t h a t they cannot be supposed to be any 1 r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f them a t a l l . " We cannot, t h e n , have adequate complex i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s . 3. Idea.s of modes and r e l a t i o n s are not r e f e r r e d t o a n y t h i n g beyond t h e m s e l v e s , b u t are o r i g i n a l s and a r c h e t y p e s and hence must be adequate. (3) TRUE AND FALSE IDEA.S. Locke n o t e s t h a t , i n p r o p r i e t y o f speech, t r u t h and f a l s e h o o d b e l o n g o n l y to p r o p o s i t i o n s . No i d e a i n s o f a r as i t i s m e r e l y an appearance i n the mind can be judged to be 1. Bk. I I , Ch. XXXI, Sect. 6. -18* t r u e o r false''. "Whenever the mind r e f e r s any of i t s i d e a s to any t h i n g e x t r a n e o u s to them they are t h e n c a p a b l e to be 1 c a l l e d t r u e or f a l s e . " There are f o u r c a s e s i n w h i c h i d e a s may p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d f a l s e : I ; An i d e a i s f a l s e when judged t o agree w i t h a n o t h e r ' s i d e a s i g n i f i e d by the same -name, w i t h o u t i n r e a l i t y d o i n g so. I n s o f a r as no name i s a t t a c h e d to t h e i d e a , t h e r e i s p r o p e r l y n o t h i n g t h a t can be c a l l e d f a l s e V s i n c e the i d e a s i m p l y r e p r e s e n t s an a c t i o n , s u b s t a n c e , q u a l i t y etc;, a c t u a l l y found or i m a gined. But commonly a c c e p t e d usage s e t s up s t a n d a r d s i n names. I f , f o r example, I a t t a c h to the i d e a of a man who shuns> danger and t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f d u t y the name, "hero", my idea, i s f a l s e i n s o f a r as i t does not c o r r e s p o n d to t h a t i d e a t o which i n p r o p r i e t y o f speech the name "hero" b e l o n g s * Such f a l s i t y i s of c o u r s e o n l y f o r m a l and c o n v e n t i o n -2. An i d e a i s f a l s e when judged t o agree w i t h r e a l e x i s t e n c e w i t h o u t so d o i n g ; t h a t i s , when a, complex i d e a i s composed of such a c o l l e c t i o n o f s i m p l e ones as are never f o u n d t o g e t h e r i n n a t u r e , and y e t i s j u d g e d to agree to some s p e c i e s a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g . F o r example, a c omplejg i d e a o f a h o r s e w h i c h was made up of t h e s i m p l e i d e a s of the shape and s i z e of a h o r s e , t o g e t h e r w i t h the i d e a o f a power o f barking-l i k e a dog, would be a f a l s e i d e a o f a, h o r s e . 1. Bk.'.II, Ch. X X X I I , Sect. 4. -19-3. A n . i d e a 1 s > f a l s e when judged adequate w i t h o u t b e i n g so. The complex i d e a may u n i t e a c e r t a i n number o f i d e a s w h i c h do r e a l l y e x i s t t o g e t h e r i n N a t u r e , b u t because of our l a c k of knowledge o t h e r i d e a s e q u a l l y i n s e p a r a b l e may be o m i t t e d . I f t h i s d e f e c t i v e complex i d e a . i s n e v e r t h e l e s s judged to be adequate, i t ; i s a f a l s e - i d e a . 4. An idea, i s f a l s e when j u d g e d t o r e p r e s e n t the " r e a l essence" o f any body e x i s t i n g , when at the b e s t i t c o n t a i n s o n l y a few o f thos e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h r e s u l t from i t s r e a l essence. V I . THE EFFECT Off LANGUAGE 0N : OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD. At f i r s t s i g h t , Book I I I o f Locke's Essa.y"might seem to be i r r e l e v a n t i n answering the q u e s t i o n of the n a t u r e o f our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . Locke h i m s e l f d i d not share t h i s view. He f o u n d t h a t t h e r e was "so c l o s e ; a c o n n e c t i o n between i d e a s and words, and our abstra.ct i d e a s and g e n e r a l words have fio c o n s t a n t a r e l a t i o n t o one another, t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to speak c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y of our knowledge, w h i c h a l l c o n s i s t s i n p r o p o s i t i o n s , w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g f i r s t the n a t u r e , use, and s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f 1 language." What he i s s a y i n g , i n e f f e c t , i s t h a t the medium by w h i c h we convey i d e a s and ex p r e s s t h e i r r e l a t i o n s a f f e c t s our knowledge of the r e f e r e n t o f th o s e i d e a s * 1. Bk. I I , Ch; X X X I I I , Sect. 19. -20-I t i s o f course o b v i o u s t h a t any o b s c u r i t y or u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f words w i l l a f f e c t the c l a r i t y and v a l i d i t y o f any d i s c o u r s e c o n c e r n i n g knowledge. To a v o i d such .confusion Locke g i v e s d e t a i l e d s t i p u l a t i o n s as to the n e c e s s i t y of ac c u r a c y of r e f e r e n c e and co n s t a n c y i n meaning o f words. But f o r our-purposes t h e most i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f language i s h i s i n q u i r y i n t o ( l ) the d o c t r i n e s o f "ess e n c e s " , "genera", and " s p e c i e s " ; and (2) the n a t u r e of the s i m p l e i d e a . Prom ideas, of p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s w h i c h agree i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s we a r r i v e at g e n e r a l i d e a s w h i c h c o n t a i n , t h a t f a c t o r common to a l l the t h i n g s , and w h i c h omit t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f time and p l a c e and any o t h e r i d e a s t h a t may determine t h e t h i n g s to t h i s o r t h a t p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e . By t h i s p r o c e s s of a b s t r a c t i o n i d e a s a re made capable of r e p r e s e n t i n g more i n d i v i d u a l s than one. T h e r t e r m s - w h i c h a r i s e i n t h i s p r o c e s s o f a b s t r a c t i o n are p u r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l i n d i c a t i o n s of c o n t e n t . Thus, the terms "genera," and " s p e c i e s " appear on c l o s e e x a m i n a t i o n to have no r e a l e x i s t e n c e , whatever as s u b s i s t e n t forms. They are r&erely a r t i f i c i a l c r e a t i o n s of the under-s t a n d i n g , w h i c h uses, these c l a s s d e s i g n a t i o n s as s i g n s of the con t e n t o f c e r t a i n of i t s a b s t r a c t i d e a s . " G e n e r a l n a t u r e s " are f o r Locke nothing, more th a n complex i d e a s w i t h names a t t a c h e d t o them. Each d i s t i n c t a b s t r a c t idea, i s a d i s t i n c t "essence". The " r e a l e s s e n c e " i s the r e a l i n t e r n a l " c o n s t i t u t i o n o f 1 t h i n g s , whereon t h e i r d i s c o v e r a b l e q u a l i t i e s depend." 1. Bk. I l l , Ch. I l l , Sect 15. -21-B u t . i t i s u s e l e s s t o suppose t h a t (e.g.) substances are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r " r e a l e s s e n c e s " - - f o r t h i s i s g e n e r a l l y unknown. T h i n g s are ranked under names i n t o s o r t s or s p e c i e s o n l y a.s they agree to c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t i d e a s t o which we have annexed t h e s e names. T h i s "essence" o f each genus or s o r t i s s i m p l y t h a t a b s t r a c t i d e a f o r w h i c h the g e n e r a l name stands Locke c a l l s t h i s the " n o m i n a l " as opposed to the " r e a l " e s s e n c e , and m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h i s n o m i n a l essence i s the o n l y one w i t h w h i c h we can d e a l when we d i s c u s s s u b s t a n c e . A f u r t h e r p r o o f t h a t "essence" r e l a t e s m e r e l y to s o r t s i s shown by t h e f a c t t h a t i n so f a r as any b e i n g i s c o n s i d e r e d m e r e l y as an i n d i v i d u a l n o t h i n g i s " e s s e n t i a l " to i t . "Essence" i n v o l v e s the a b s t r a c t complex i d e a o f k i n d or s o r t . As we have seen, the* r e a l essence cannot be known. Our f a c u l t i e s , no m a t t e r what degree b f e x a c t n e s s we a c h i e v e , . w i l l never c a r r y us f u r t h e r toward.a knowledge of s u b s t a n c e s than a c o l l e c t i o n of s e n s i b l e i d e a s ; and d i f f e r e n t c o l l e c t i o n of i d e a s w i l l be* t a k e n by us a.s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of d i f f e r e n t s u b s t a n c e s . The n o m i n a l , not t h e r e a l e s s e n c e , determines the l i m i t s o f genera..and species;- Y e t , a l t h o u g h t h e s e n o m i n a l essences are made by t h e mind, t h e i r c r e a t i o n i s not e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y , f o r the mind i n " p u t t i n g t o g e t h e r " complex i d e a s must not make such c o m b i n a t i o n s as are n o t found i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . ' Erom our knowledge of. s u b s t a n c e s , t h e n , any i n q u i r y as to u l t i m a t e " n a t u r e s " or i ' r e a l e s s e n c e s " i s banned. Locke's c o n s t a n t p o s i t i o n i s t h a t our knowledge of t h e e x t e r n a l -22-w o r l d t e r m i n a t e s i n our s i m p l e i d e a s and i n t h e s t r u c t u r e a r i s i n g from them. F o r forms and s p e c i e s s u b s i s t i n g somehow as a r c h e t y p e s o u t s i d e the mind Locke a p p a r e n t l y h o l d s no b r i e f . . Form or s p e c i e s f o r him i s an a r t i f i c i a l l i m i t set by the u n d e r s t a n d i n g to i n d i c a t e d i f f e r e n t c o n t e n t . The c o n v e n t i o n a l i t y o f forms i s i n d i c a t e d by the f a c t t h a t a r t i f i c i a l t h i n g s are of d i s t i n c t s p e c i e s as w e l l a,s n a t u r a l - -e.g., on Locke's t h e o r y "watch" and " c l o c k " a r e of d i s t i n c t s p e c i e s * D i f f e r e n t c o l l e c t i o n s o f i d e a s make d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s - - ! . e ; , t h e r e i s no sharp c l e a v a g e between t h e content and the form. E x a m i n a t i o n o f the meaning and f u n c t i o n of words shows t h a t a c l a s s name i s mer e l y an a r t i f i c i a l i n d i c a t i o n o f the c o n t e n t of the annexed a b s t r a c t i d e a , i . e . , essence, and cannot p r o p e r l y b e t a k e n t o i n d i c a t e the e x i s t e n c e and t h e r e b y m i s l e a d us i n t o d i s c u s s i n g the r e a l i t y o r n a t u r e of forms, s p e c i e s , " g e n e r a l n a t u r e s " , o r " r e a l e s s e n c e s " . Eor Locke a l l such' terms are mer e l y c o n v e n t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r our communication w i t h one another. E x a m i n a t i o n i n t o the n a t u r e of language r e v e a l s an i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f Locke's s t r u c t u r a l atom, the s i m p l e i d e a - - i .e„, t h a t "the names of s i m p l e i d e a s " are u n d e f i n a b l e . Locke p r o p e r l y remarks t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o make c l e a r w h i c h elements i n our knowledge a r e d e f i n a b l e and w h i c h a r e n o t . H i s p r o o f of t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the s i m p l e i d e a r e s t s on two grounds * 1. A d e f i n i t i o n , he s a y s , i s the showing o f t h e meaning o f one word by s e v e r a l o t h e r not synonymous terms. The meaning o f any term i s shown when by o t h e r words t h e i d e a -23-denoted "by t h a t term i s r e p r e s e n t e d to the mind of another. Locke's argument i s t h a t , s i n c e the s e v e r a l terras o f a d e f i n i t i o n s i g n i f y s e v e r a l i d e a s , they can by no means a l l t o g e t h e r r e p r e s e n t an i d e a w h i c h has no c o m p o s i t i o n a t a l l . Hence t h e name of the s i m p l e i d e a cannot be d e f i n e d , s i n c e d e f i n i t i o n r e q u i r e s a complex s t r u c t u r e w h i c h can never r e p r e s e n t the non-composite s i m p l e i d e a . I n o t h e r v/ords, the s i m p l e i d e a , h a v i n g no f o r m or s t r u c t u r e whatever, i s pure c o n t e n t , w h i c h f o r l o g i c a l r e a s o n s can never be communicated. The b e a r i n g o f t h i s f a c t on our knowledge i n g e n e r a l w i l l be e l a b o r a t e d l a t e r ; 2. There i s no i n h e r e n t c o n n e c t i o n between the sound o f a word and the i d e a i t stands f o r . The word as a sound produces o n l y t h e i d e a o f tha't sound.. No f u r t h e r i d e a can be e x c i t e d i n us except by a v o l u n t a r y c o n n e c t i o n w i t h some o t h e r i d e a f o r w h i c h i n p r o p r i e t y o f speech t h a t sound i s t a k e n to s t a n d . Hence words, f o r example, cannot convey the s i m p l e i d e a o f c o l o u r t o a . b l i n d man, because he i s una b l e to make t h i s c o n n e c t i o n as a r e s u l t o f d e f i c i e n t sense e x p e r i e n c e . The name i s a.n a r t i f i c i a l d e s i g n a t i o n of a c l a s s o f appearances and has no " i n h e r e n t c o n n e x i o n " w i t h the co n t e n t o f the appearances. Content can be s u p p l i e d f r o m e x p e r i e n c e a l o n e . I n t o Locke's l e n g t h y account o f the d e f e c t s o f language and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g remedies we need, i n q u i r e o n l y b r i e f l y . H i s main p o s i t i o n i s t h a t words can be used meaning-f u l l y i n d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g knov/ledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d -24-o n l y when they r e f e r s p e c i f i c a l l y to some f e a t u r e i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d t h a t can be known to us th r o u g h s e n s a t i o n o r p e r c e p t i o n - - e . g., a term such as " r e a l essence" i s by these s t a n d a r d s m e a n i n g l e s s * To ensure t h a t our words w i l l denote c l e a r and unambiguous i d e a s w h i c h are the same f o r a l l minds, as f a r as sub s t a n c e s a r e c o n c e r n e d , we s h a l l have to employ the methods b o t h of showing and d e f i n i n g . The s i m p l e i d e a s o f su b s t a n c e s can be conveyed a d e q u a t e l y o n l y by showing. The i d e a s o f the "powers" of su b s t a n c e s can be conveyed most ade-q u a t e l y by d e f i n i t i o n . Our complex i d e a s of s u b s t a n c e s mus t be r e c t i f i e d c o n s t a n t l y by f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h i n o r d e r that they may become more a.dequate. V I I . THE EXTENT OE OUR KNOWLEDGE OE SUBSTANCES; Knowledge Locke d e f i n e s as the p e r c e p t i o n of the agreement or disagreement o f two ideas'. T h i s agreement o r disagreement i s f o u r f o l d : (1) as r e g a r d s i d e n t i t y or d i v e r s i t y ; (2) as r e g a r d s r e l a t i o n s between i d e a s ; (3) as r e g a r d s c o - e x i s t e n c e i n the same s u b j e c t ; and (4) as r e g a r d s a c t u a l r e a l e x i s t e n c e a g r e e i n g to any i d e a . Loeke m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e s e f o u r s o r t s of agreement o r disagreement c o n t a i n a l l the knowledge we are capable o f , f o r a l l we can i n q u i r e c o n c e r n i n g any o f our i d e a s comes under t h e s e heads. There are t h r e e degrees o f our knowledge: i n t u i t i v e knowledge, w h i c h i s t h e c l e a r e s t and most c e r t a i n o f a l l , and w h i c h cannot be examined o r a n a l y s e d ; dem-o n s t r a t i v e knowledge, i n w h i c h the mind p e r c e i v e s the agreement or disagreement of any two i d e a s not i m m e d i a t e l y but o n l y t h r o u g h i n t e r m e d i a t e s t e p s each r e q u i r i n g i n t u i t i o n ; and l a s t l y , s e n s i -t i v e knowledge o f p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e . Our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l -25-w o r l d , d e s p i t e t h e doubts cas t on i t s v a l i d i t y , i s a d m i t t e d to the c l a s s of " s e n s i t i v e knowledge." The g r e a t e s t and most m a t e r i a l p a r t of our knowledge c o n c e r n i n g s u b s t a n c e s l i e s i n the p e r c e p t i o n o f the agreement o r disagreement o f our ideas, " i n c o - e x i s t e n c e . " Our i d e a s of the s p e c i e s o f sub s t a n c e s are o n l y " c e r t a i n c o l l e c t i o n s o f s i m p l e i d e a s u n i t e d i n one s u b j e c t , and so c o - e x i s t i n g ' 1 t o g e t h e r " . Our f u r t h e r knowledge of these substances i s -l i m i t e d t o the d i s c o v e r y of what -other s i m p l e i d e a s do or do not c o - e x i s t , w i t h those t h a t make up the o r i g i n a l complex i d e a s . Locke finds-'.our knowledge o f substance t o be s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d , because the sim p l e i d e a s c a r r y " i n t h e i r own n a t u r e no v i s i b l e n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n or i n c o n s i s t e n c y 2 w i t h . a n y - o t h e r s i m p l e i d e a s . " The c o n n e c t i o n between secondary q u a l i t i e s i s s i m i l a r l y unknown. N e i t h e r i s t h e r e any d i s c o v e r a b l e c o n n e c t i o n between any secondary q u a l i t y and those p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s " on w h i c h i t depends. I n one sense Locke a n t i c i p a t e s Hume here when he d e c l a r e s t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o f i n d " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " between our i d e a s . "Our knowledge i n a l l these i n q u i r i e s r e a c h e s v e r y l i t t l e f a r t h e r t h a n our 3 e x p e r i e n c e . " I n t h e same s e c t i o n he s a y s : 1. Bk. IV,, Ch. I l l , Sect 9 2. -Bid; I V , Ch. I l l , Sect. 10 3 Bk.  I l l , 4. -26-"Eor, o f a l l the q u a l i t i e s t h a t are c o - e x i s t e n t i n any s u b j e c t , w i t h o u t t h i s dependence and e v i d e n t c o n n e x i o n of t h e i r i d e a s one w i t h a n o t h e r , we cannot know e : e r t a i n l y any two to c o - e x i s t any f a r t h e r than e x p e r i e n c e , "by our senses, i n f o r m s us.,~ Thus though we see the y e l l o w c o l o u r , and upon t r i a l f i n d the weight, m a l l e a b l e n e s s , f u s i b i l i t y , , and f i x e d n e s s t h a t are u n i t e d i n a, p i e c e of g o l d ; y e t , because no one o f these idea.s has any e v i d e n t dependence o r n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n w i t h the o t h e r , we cannot c e r t a i n l y know t h a t where any f o u r o f these a r e ' t h e f i f t h w i l l be t h e r e a l s o , how h i g h l y , p r o b a b l y -soever i t may be; because the h i g h e s t . p r o b a b i l i t y amounts not t o c e r t a i n t y ; Y^ithout w h i c h t h e r e can be no t r u e knowledge. For t h i s c o - e x i s t e n c e can be no f a r t h e r known than i t i s p e r c e i v e d : and i t cannot be p e r c e i v e d but e i t h e r i n p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t s by the o b s e r v a t i o ] o f / o u r sense, o r i n g e n e r a l by the n e c e s s a r y c onnexion of t h e : i d e a s t h e m s e l v e s . " B e s i d e s t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y Locke s t r e s s e s p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h l i e i n the way of an e x t e n s i o n o f our knowledge o f s u b s t a n c e s . He s a y s : " I doubt not but i f we c o u l d d i s c o v e r the f i g u r e , s i z e , t e x t u r e , and m o t i o n o f the minute c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s of any •two b o d i e s , we sh o u l d know w i t h o u t t r i a l s e v e r a l o f t h e i r , o p e r a t i o n s one upon a n o t h e r , as we do now t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f a square o r t r i a n g l e . But w h i l s t we a r e d e s t i t u t e o f senses acute enough t o d i s c o v e r the minute p a r t i c l e s of b o d i e s , and to g i v e us i d e a s of" t h e i r m e c h a n i c a l a f f e c t i o n s , we must be con t e n t t o be i g n o r a n t of t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s and ways of o p e r a t i o n . "•*- . ' V I I I * THE REALITY OE OUR KNOWLEDGE 0E THE EXTERNAL WORLD. .The o b j e c t i o n Locke has to meet he r e i s t h a t i f a l l our knowledge t e r m i n a t e s i n i d e a s , t h e r e can be no e x t e r n a l c r i t e r i o n fey w h i c h to d i s t i n g u i s h between " r e a l knowledge" and. v a i n c h i m e r a s . The answer to t h i s o b j e c t i o n was g i v e n e a r l i e r when the pr o b l e m o f the r e a l i t y of our i d e a s was d i s c u s s e d . Locke a.dmits t h a t our knowledge i s " r e a l " o n l y so f a r as t h e r e i s a c o n f o r m i t y between our i d e a s and the " r e a l i t y . o f t h i n g s . " What i s the c r i t e r i o n o f c o n f o r m i t y ? 1. BK. IV, Cfc. \\\, Sect 15. -27-(1) *A11 s i m p l e i d e a s must agree to the r e a l i t y of t h i n g s . The mind cannot make them hut must r e c e i v e them from w i t h o u t . Simple i d e a s may not image or p h o t o g r a p h i c a l l y r e p r e s e n t the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , hut they c a r r y " w i t h them a l l the c o n f o r m i t y w h i c h i s n e c e s s a r y , s i n c e t h e y enable us to d i s t i n g u i s h and use p a r t i c u l a r s u b s t a n c e s . .And " t h i s c o n f o r m i t y between our s i m p l e i d e a s and the e x i s t e n c e of 1 t h i n g s i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r r e a l knowledge." (2) " A l l our complex i d e a s except those of sub s t a n c e s b e i n g a r c h e t y p e s o f the mind's own making, not i n t e n d e d to be the ; c o p i e s o f any t h i n g 5 , nor r e f e r r e d t o the e x i s t e n c e o f a n y t h i n g , a.s to t h e i r o r i g i n a l s , cannot want any 2 c o n f o r m i t y n e c e s s a r y t o r e a l knowledge." (3) The case o f complex i d e a s o f su b s t a n c e s p r e s e n t s d i f f i c u l t y , f o r here the i d e a s are r e f e r r e d to a r c h e t y p e s i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . We have seen t h a t our i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s are always d e f i c i e n t and may r e p r e s e n t c o l l e c t i o n s o f q u a l i t i e s not a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g , i n the su b s t a n c e s i n q u e s t i o n . The c r i t e r i o n o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y w i l l not p r e v e n t us f r o m j o i n i n g i d e a s t o g e t h e r when t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g q u a l i t i e s are not so j o i n e d i n the s u b s t a n c e s , s i n c e we can 1. Bk. IV, Ch. IV, Sect. 4 2. Bk. I V , Ch. I V , Sect. 5. -28 f i n d no "necessary c o n n e x i o n " between our i d e a s . I n s o f a r as our complex i d e a s agree w i t h t h e i r a r c h e t y p e s , so f a r our knowledge c o n c e r n i n g them i s r e a l , even though t h i s knowledge does n o t , as shown p r e v i o u s l y , r e a c h v e r y f a r . l o c k e reminds us t h a t " i n our i n q u i r i e s about substances we must c o n s i d e r i d e a s and not c o n f i n e our thoughts to names 1 or s p e c i e s supposed s e t out by names." The do c t r i n e t h a t s p e c i e s and t h e i r essences are a n y t h i n g e l s e than m e r e l y our a b s t r a c t i d e a s w i t h names annexed to them, he b e l i e v e s to be a " g r e a t o b s t a c l e to our c l e a r and d i s t i n c t knowledge, 2 e s p e c i a l l y i n r e f e r e n c e ' t o s u b s t a n c e s . " I X . SUMMARY We are now i n a p o s i t i o n to summarize the answer Locke gave to the p r oblem of the sense i n w h i c h we have knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; F i r s t , and a l l i m p o r t a n t , knowledge extends no f u r t h e r than our i d e a s , s i n c e the mind has no o t h e r immediate o b j e c t except i t s own i d e a s . Of t h e s e t h e r e ere two o r i g i n a l s o u r c e s : s e n s a t i o n , and r e f l e c t i o n , by the l a t t e r o f w h i c h i t i s i m p o r t a n t to note Locke means " t h a t not i c e 1, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, Sect. 13. Z, Bk. IV, Ch. IV, Sect. 17. -29-1 w h i c h t h e mirfd t a k e s o f i t s own o p e r a t i o n s , " and from w h i c h i t d e r i v e s the i d e a s o f t h i n k i n g , w i l l i n g , p e r c e i v i n g , e t c . I n the r e c e p t i o n o f t h e s e i d e a s the mind i s f o r the 2 most .part w h o l l y p a s s i v e . . The u n i t of knowledge' i s the s i m p l e i d e a . .As we have seen, t h i s can come o n l y from e x p e r i e n c e . S i n c e i t i s non-composite, i t cannot he d e f i n e d or cammunicated by means o f language, f o r language employs complex s t r u c t u r e s i n o r d e r to e f f e c t communication. The s i m p l e i d e a i s u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and hence i s ato m i c . From t h i s elementary c o n s t i t u e n t o f knowledge t h e mind b u i l d s complex i d e a s by v i r t u e o f i t s powers o f c o m b i n a t i o n , comparison,and a b s t r a c t i o n . Locke's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the s i m p l e i d e a i s u n d e f i n a b l e i s i m p o r t a n t f o r a r e a s o n a l r e a d y mentioned—-i.e., our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d must be a knowledge o n l y o f s t r u c t u r e and r e l a t i ons e x i s t i n g i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , i n s o f a r as our knowledge i s t o be communic a b l e and hence worthy of the name. lie does not s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e , i n so many words, t h a t i t i s l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o communicate c o n t e n t , but the re a s o n s he advances t o prove t h a t the s i m p l e i d e a i s u n d e f i n a b l e show t h a t he r e a l i z e s t h i s f a c t . 1. Bk, I I , Ch. I , Seet. 4 2. Bk. I I , Ch. I X , Sect. 1. -30-The s t r e s s oh s t r u c t u r e i s f u r t h e r "borne out by the e x p l i c i t r e j e c t i o n of the p o s s i b i l i t y o f any knowledge of "essences" o r " n a t u r e s " or even of s u b s t a n c e i n g e n e r a l , w h i c h had so long- formed a p a r t o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y I "The t r u e method'of advancing knowledge i s by c o n s i d e r i n g our a b s t r a c t i d e a s . We must t h e r e f o r e , i f we w i l l p r o c e ed a.s r e a s o n a d v i s e s , adapt our methods of i n q u i r y to t h e n a t u r e of . the i d e a s we examine, and the t r u t h we s e a r c h a f t e r . G e n e r a l and c e r t a i n t r u t h s are o n l y founded i n the h a b i t u d e s and r e l a t i o n s o f a b s t r a c t i d e a s . A s a g a c i o u s and m e t h o d i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f our t h o u g h t s , f o r the f i n d i n g out t hese r e l a t i o n s , i s the o n l y way to d i s c o v e r a l l t h a t can be p u t , w i t h t r u t h and c e r t a i n t y , c o n c e r n i n g them, i n t o g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . By what s t e p s we are to p r o c e e d i n t h e s e , i s to be l e a r n e d i n the s c h o o l s o f the m a t h e m a t i c i a n s , who, from v e r y p l a i n ' and easy b e g i n n i n g s , by g e n t l e d e g r e e s , and a c o n t i n u e d c h a i n o f r e a s o n i n g s , p r o c e e d to the d i s c o v e r y and d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t r u t h s t h a t appear at f i r s t s i g h t beyond human c a p a c i t y . I t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t Locke's e f f o r t to p l a c e mathematics a l o n g w i t h e v e r y t h i n g e l s e on an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s was u n s u c c e s s f u l , b u t at any r a t e h e r e i s e vidence of the f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y of m a t h e m a t i c a l or l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s to d i s c o v e r v a l i d r e l a t i o n s a.nd t h e i r p r o p e r c o m b i n a t i o n i n o r d e r to ensure t h a t adequate o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e "atomic f a c t s " w h i c h i s the t a s k o f every s c i e n c e . One o t h e r consequence, w h i c h comes i n p a r t from t h i s s t r e s s on the s t r u c t u r a l n a t u r e of our knowledge, i s t h a t 1. Bk. I V , Ch. X I I , Sect. 7. -31-" n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y " g i v e s us what B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l would c a l l - " p o w e r knowledge." Speaking o f the l i m i t a t i o n s of our - a b i l i t y to o b t a i n knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d Locke says.: "Experiments and h i s t o r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s we may have, from w h i c h we may draw advantages of. ease and h e a l t h , and t h e r e b y i n c r e a s e our s t o c k of -conveniences f o r t h i s l i f e ; but beyond t h i s I f e a r our t a l e n t s rea.ch n o t , nor are , our f a c u l t i e s , as I guess, a b l e . t o advance." I f knowledge a f t e r any "essences" o r "magna, a r c a n a " i s d e c l a r e d v a i n , t h i s s t r e s s on the p r e d i c t i v e and p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge soon f o l l o w s . There i s a p r a g m a t i c t o u c h i n Locke's acceptance of the s i m p l e i d e a as r e a l . As we n o t e d , Locke m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h the s i m p l e i d e a may not p h o t o g r a p h i c a l l y image, i t s r e f e r e n t , y e t t h e c o n s t a n t and dependable r e l a t i o n between them i s a l l t h a t "our s t a t e r e q u i r e s " , s i n c e by means of t h i s we can d i s t i n g u i s h s u b s t a n c e s , " d i s c e r n the s t a t e s they are i n . . . t a k e them f o r our n e c e s s i t i e s and a p p l y them to our 2 uses " . Our knowledge o f the s t r u c t u r e o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s c o n s i d e r e d by Locke to be ex t r e m e l y l i m i t e d . " C e r t a i n t y and d e m o n s t r a t i o n are t h i n g s we must n o t , i n these m a t t e r s , p r e t e n d t o . " 3 I t i s l i m i t e d f o r t h e o r e t i c a l reasons 1. Bk. IV, Ch. X I I , Sect. 10. 2. Bk. IV, Ch. IV, Sect. 4. 3. Bk. IV, Ch. I l l , Sect. 26. -32-because we cannot tra.ce " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " betv/een the i d e a s we have of b o d i e s . But i t i s the p r a c t i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h Locke i s i n c l i n e d to s t r e s s - - e . g . the minuteness o f the p a r t s of b o d i e s and our l a c k of i n s t r u m e n t s to cope w i t h such.minuteness. Such l i m i t a t i o n s , Locke would be f o r c e d to admit, are l a r g e l y overcome by the t e c h n i q u e s of modern atomic p h y s i c s , w h i c h has a t t a i n e d a degree of i n s i g h t t h a t Locke would p r o b a b l y nave adeemed i m p o s s i b l e . The " r e a l i t y " o f our knowledge i s a s s u r e d i n the case of s i m p l e i d e a s , and of a l l complex i d e a s except t h o s e of s u b s t a n c e s . I n our complex i d e a s o f s u b s t a n c e s our knowledge i s r e a l i n s o f a r as our c o l l e c t i o n s of i d e a s a g r e e . w i t h a r c h e t y p e s w i t h o u t us. The c r i t e r i o n o f adequacy or inadequacy of our i d e a s i s r e s p e c t i v e l y t h a t o f complete or d e f e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i r . r e f e r e n t s . . T r u t h and f a l s i t y b e l o n g not to i d e a s but to p r o p o s i t i o n s , s i n c e no i d e a qua, i d e a i s c a p a b l e o f t r u t h o r f a l s i t y . The d e t a i l e d r e q u i r e m e n t s o f r e a l i t y , adequacy and t r u t h of our i d e a s or p r o p o s i t i o n s have been o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r . Through e x p e r i e n c e , t h e n , we are s u p p l i e d w i t h i d e a s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to q u a l i t i e s e x i s t i n g i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; 1. Bk. IV, Ch. I l l , Sect. 26. -33-and by o r g a n i z i n g these ideas- i n t o r e l a t i o n s i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n r e q u i r e m e n t s we can a r r i v e at a. l i m i t e d but n e v e r t h e l e s s r e a l and adequate knowledge of the s t r u c t u r e of t h a t e x t e r n a l w o r l d . CHAPTER I I GEORGE BERKELEY: "A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE . " ' CHAPTER I I GEORGE BERKELEY: "THE PRINCIPLES OE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE." Locke pushed h i s i n q u i r y i n t o the n a t u r e o f substance s c a r c e l y f u r t h e r than the mere statement o f the problem i n v o l v e d ; I n i t s o r i g i n , t he p h i l o s o p h y of h i s s u c c e s s o r , B e r k e l e y , c o n s i s t s s i m p l y i n a s u b t l e and d e s t r u c t i v e a n a l y s i s o f t h i s n o t i o n o f " m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . " But the consequences a t t e n d a n t upon h i s severe r e f i n e m e n t o f m a t t e r l e d the g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r - t h e o l o g i a n to develop a system of " S u b j e c t i v e I d e a l i s m " w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s a r a d i c a l d e p a r t u r e from Locke's g e n e r a l p o s i t i o n ; w h i l e the weapon o f a n a l y s i s t h a t he f o r g e d i n the f i r e of h i s eagerness to d e s t r o y M a t e r i a l i s m became, i n the hands o f D a v i d Hume, a t o o l f o r the f i n a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f ' e m p i r i c i s m i n t o a p r o f o u n d l y s e a r c h i n g S c e p t i c i s m . -36-I . LANGUAGE IMP ABSTRACT ION.. Locke had b a n i s h e d from d i s c u s s i o n any s u c h terms as "essences" o r " g e n e r a l n a t u r e s " . F o r him "essence" meant m e r e l y " a b s t r a c t i d e a " . B e r k e l e y , however, i n h i s " I n t r o d u c t i o n " t o The P r i n c i p l e s o f Human Knowledge," i m m e d i a t e l y q u e s t i o n s even the p o s s i b i l i t y o f our f r a m i n g " a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a s " . H i s n o m i n a l i s t i c t h e s i s i s t h a t a l l genuine knowledge o f t h i n g s may be i n d i v i d u a l i z e d . I n s o f a r as h i s argument r e s t s on examjjles w h i c h prove the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f our f r a m i n g a b s t r a c t images, B e r k e l e y i s o b v i o u s l y c o r r e c t , s i n c e an a b s t r a c t image o f any one q u a l i t y i s c l e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e * F o r example, I cannot f o r m an a b s t r a c t i d e a o f c o l o r i n g e n e r a l , s i n c e I am always f o r c e d to t h i n k o f some p a r t i c u l a r c o l o r * The g e n e r a l a b s t r a c t i d e a of man, f o r i n s t a n c e , i s supposed to be d e r i v e d by f r a m i n g an i d e a i n w h i c h a l l p a r t i c u l a r s o f any number o f i n d i v i d u a l men e q u a l l y p a r t a k e , " a b s t r a c t i n g e n t i r e l y f r om and c u t t i n g o f f a l l those c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h 1. might d e t e r m i n e i t t o any p a r t i c u l a r e x i s t e n c e . " T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n cannot be " f i l l e d o u t " i n i m a g i n a t i o n , s i n c e e v e r y image i n v o l v e s a c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r shape, c o l o u r , s i z e , e t c . I t i s : i p o s s i b l e to a b s t r a c t i n one sense, B e r k e l e y a d m i t s , f o r I can c o n s i d e r c e r t a i n p a r t s of a bo<^y s e p a r a t e d from o t h e r s ; but then any p a r t I c o n s i d e r 1. P r i n c i p l e s o f Human Knowledge, S e c t . 9. I n l r o d . (All future references are to the "Principles'.'). -37-must have some d e f i n i t e shape, c o l o u r , e t c . The b e l i e f i n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of f r a m i n g a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a s a r i s e s f r o m the s u p p o s i t i o n " t h a t the making 1 use o f words i m p l i e s the h a v i n g g e n e r a l i d e a s . " But B e r k e l e y m a i n t a i n s t h a t "a word becomes g e n e r a l by b e i n g made the s i g n , not of an a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a , but of s e v e r a l p a r t i c u l a r i d e a s , any one o f w h i c h i t i n d i f f e r e n t l y I s u g g e s t s to the mind." I n geometry, f o r i n s t a n c e , a p a r t i c u l a r l i n e i s employed i n a d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; but i t may become g e n e r a l i z e d by b e i n g made the " s i g n " of a l l p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s whatever, and c o n s e q u e n t l y what i s demonstrated o f i t w i l l h o l d f o r any o t h e r l i n e . J u s t as a p a r t i c u l a r l i n e beeomes g e n e r a l because i t i s made a " s i g n " , so the name " l i n e " w h i c h by i t s e l f i s p a r t i c u l a r , by b e i n g made a " s i g n " becomes g e n e r a l . G e n e r a l i t y m e r e l y i m p l i e s t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s are i n d i f f e r e n t l y denoted. U n i v e r s a l i t y does not c o n s i s t i n "the a b s o l u t e , p o s i t i v e n a t u r e o r c o n c e p t i o n o f a n y t h i n g , but i n the r e l a t i o n i t b e a r s t o the p a r t i c u l a r s s i g n i f i e d or r e p r e s e n t e d by i t : by v i r t u e whereof i t i s t h a t t h i n g s , names,or n o t i o n s , b e i n g i n t h e i r own n a t u r e p a r t i c u l a r , are r e n d e r e d u n i v e r s a l . " The p r o blem o f c o u r s e o c c u r s : How can t h a t w h i c h 1. ''Ivtyii:-' Sect-)J,.L-oc. 2. Ihtwid. Sect. 15. -38-i s not demonstrated o f an a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a , but of a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , h o l d u n i v e r s a l l y ? To use B e r k e l e y ' s example, i f I demonstrate t h a t the t h r e e a n g l e s of an i s o s c e l e s r e c t a n g u l a r t r i a n g l e are eq u a l to two r i g h t ones, •how can I extend t h i s p r o p e r t y to a l l t r i a n g l e s ? - - f o r u n l e s s I can, I w i l l have to -examine every i n d i v i d u a l t r i a n g l e s e p a r a t e l y i n o r d e r to determine whether t h i s p r o p e r t y h o l d s t r u e o f i t . Must I then demonstrate t h i s p r o p e r t y o f the " a b s t r a c t i d e a " o f a t r i a n g l e ? But we have agreed t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to frame such an a b s t r a c t i d e a . The escape from t h i s apparent dilemma i s to be found i n the f a c t t h a t what I demonstrate o f any p a r t i c u l a r t r i a n g l e h o l d s good f o r a l l t r i a n g l e s , p r o v i d e d t h a t I do not b r i n g i n t o my d e m o n s t r a t i o n any f e a t u r e s o f the t r i a n g l e w h i c h are conne c t e d w i t h i t s p a r t i c u l a r s i z e , shape, and a n g l e s . S i n c e the p a r t i c u l a r f e a t u r e s are i g n o r e d i n t h e d e m o n s t r a t i the c o n c l u s i o n can be a p p l i e d u n i v e r s a l l y . B e r k e l e y concedes t h a t a man "may c o n s i d e r a. f i g u r e m e r e l y as t r i a n g u l a r , w i t h o u t a t t e n d i n g to the p a r t i c u l a r q u a l i t i e s o f t h e a n g l e s , or r e l a t i o n s o f the s i d e s ; So f a r he may a b s t r a c t ; b u t t h i s w i l l never p r o v e t h a t he can frame an 1 a b s t r a c t , g e n e r a l , i n c o n s i s t e n t i d e a of a t r i a n g l e . " He g r a n t s t h a t w i t h o u t " a b s t r a c t i o n " t h e r e can be no s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of t h i n g s ; but by the term a b s t r a c t i o n we can im p l y o n l y e x c l u s i v e a t t e n t i o n t o the common a t t r i b u t e s a r r e l a t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s . :1. I n t r o d . S e c t . 26. -39-B e r k e l e y f i n d s , w i t h Locke, t h a t t h e source o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e r r o r o f t e n l i e s i n language. The n o t i o n o f a b s t r a c t i o n a r i s e s f r om the f a c t t h a t i n speech we have u n i v e r s a l s i g n s ; We tend to r e g a r d these s i g n s , or words, as h a v i n g p r e c i s e and s e t t l e d s i g n i f i c a t i o n or r e f e r e n c e ; and c o n s e q u e n t l y come to t h i n k t h a t t h e r e are " c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t , d e t e r m i n a t e i d e a s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e the t r u e and o n l y immediate s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f each g e n e r a l name, and t h a t i t i s by the m e d i a t i o n of these a b s t r a c t i d e a s t h a t a 1 g e n e r a l name comes t o s i g n i f y any p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . " A g e n e r a l name, however, does not s t a n d f o r one p r e c i s e s i g n i f i c a t i o n , b u t , as we have a l r e a d y seen, i n d i f f e r e n t l y r e p r e s e n t s a g r e a t number of p a r t i c u l a r s . Even d e f i n i t i o n does not l i m i t a name to one c e r t a i n s i g n i f i c a . t i o n - - e . g . , a t r i a n g l e i s d e f i n e d as "a p l a i n s u r f a c e comprehended by t h r e e r i g h t l i n e s , " b u t no r e s t r i c t i o n i s p l a c e d on the s i z e 01- the r e l a t i o n s o f the a n g l e s and s i d e s to one an o t h e r . B e r k e l e y r e j e c t s the ac c e p t e d o p i n i o n t h a t e v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t name n e c e s s a r i l y s t a n d s f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g i d e a , s i n c e t h i s p r e m i s e l e a d s to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c e r t a i n names, w h i c h are not r e g a r d e d as c o m p l e t e l y " i n s i g n i f i c a n t " ( i . e . , m e a n i n g l e s s ) , but w h i c h do not d e s i g n a t e p a r t i c u l a r and c o n c e i v a b l e i d e a s , must t h e r e f o r e s t a n d f o r a b s t r a c t n o t i o n s . 1• I n t r o d . S e c t . 18. -40-Kames need r e p r e s e n t n o t h i n g at a l l , he a s s e r t s . I n communication by language we may use words as we do l e t t e r s i n a l g e b r a , where a l t h o u g h each l e t t e r denotes a p a r t i c u l a r q u a n t i t y , i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t h a t at every s t e p each l e t t e r s h o u l d suggest the i d e a of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r q u a n t i t y 1 i t d e n o t e s . B e r k e l e y ' s c o n s t a n t w a r n i n g , here and thro u g h o u t , i s t h a t we s h o u l d not be m i s l e d i n our i n q u i r i e s c o n c e r n i n g knowledge by the abuse of words. To seek f o r the meaning o f any p h i l o s o p h i c a l term we need s i m p l y t o a t t e n d c l o s e l y to the i d e a s t h a t pass i n our own u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . So l o n g as we c o n f i n e our t h o u g h t s t o i d e a s d i v e s t e d of the accompanying words, we can make no m i s t a k e s . Words w i l l then be unable to impose on us the d e l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e are any a b s t r a c t g e n e r a l i d e a s ; and f u r t h e r , s i n c e w e know t h a t names do not always s i g n i f y i d e a s , we need not l o o k f o r such i d e a s where t h e r e a r e none to be found* 1. E e r k e ^ p o i n t s out w i t h g r e a t f o r c e and c l a r i t y t h a t words are used not o n l y f o r the purposes o f communication o f i d e a s , but a l s o to induce emotions and c o r r e s p o n d i n g moods i n our l i s t e n e r s . O r i g i n a l l y the i d e a aroused by the word i n i t s t u r n aroused the emotion: b u t h a b i t " s h o r t c i r c u i t s " t h i s c h a i n so t h a t the word d i r e c t l y evokes the emotion. Even p r o p e r names are used t o su r r o u n d i d e a s w i t h an a u t h o r i t y not n e c e s s a r i l y t h e i r own--cf. the S c h o l a s t i c s " p r a c t i c e o f c i t i n g A r i s t o t l e as an i n d i c a t i o n of the t r u t h or f a l s i t y o f c o n t r o v e r s i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s . -41-I I . THE ANALYSIS OE MATTER* B e r k e l e y ' s famous account of the n a t u r e of m a t t e r r e q u i r e s l i t t l e space f o r i t s p r e s e n t a t i o n . F o l l o w i n g Locke, he m a i n t a i n s t h a t the o b j e c t s o f human knowledge are always i d e a s : e i t h e r ( l ) i d e a s " i m p r i n t e d on the senses"; o r (2) such a.s are p e r c e i v e d by a t t e n d i n g to the o p e r a t i o n s o f the mind; o r (3) i d e a s formed by comparing, compounding, a b s t r a c t i n g o r o t h e r w i s e m a n i p u l a t i n g those i d e a s o r i g i n a l l y d e r i v e d f r o m s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n . E x p e r i e n c e l e a d s us to b i n d t o g e t h e r i n one c o l l e c t i o n c e r t a i n i d e a s w h i c h always accompany one a n o t h e r . We g i v e t h i s c o l l e c t i o n one name, and come to r e g a r d i t as one " t h i n g " . Now i t i s u n i v e r s a l l y a d m i t t e d t h a t any i d e a s formed by the i m a g i n a t i o n cannot e x i s t w i t h o u t the mind. But B e r k e l e y p o i n t s out t h a t the v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s ( i . e . , i d e a s i m p r i n t e d on the senses) "however b l e n d e d or combined t o g e t h e r ( t h a t i s , whatever o b j e c t s they compose) cannot 1 e x i s t o t h e r w i s e than i n a, mind p e r c e i v i n g them." O b j e c t s are m e r e l y c o l l e c t i o n s o f i d e a s . Ideas cannot e x i s t apart f r om b e i n g p e r c e i v e d ; c o n s e q u e n t l y o b j e c t s must s i m i l a r l y depend f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e on p e r c e p t i o n . I f we g i v e meaning to our terms, we s h a l l see t h a t when we say "A t h i n g e x i s t s , " we mean o n l y , " C e r t a i n i d e a s have been p e r c e i v e d . " "The a b s o l u t e e x i s t e n c e of u n t h i n k i n g t h i n g s w i t h o u t any 1 . ' ' P r i n c i p l e s S e c t . 3» -42-r e l a t i o n t o ' t h e i r h e i n g p e r c e i v e d . . * i s p e r f e c t l y u n i n t e l l i g -i b l e . T h e i r esse i s p e r c i p i , nor i s i t p o s s i b l e they should have any e x i s t e n c e out of the minds or t h i n k i n g t h i n g s w h i c h 1 p e r c e i v e them." B e r k e l e y , who c o n t i n u a l l y poses as the champion o f the views of o r d i n a r y common sense a g a i n s t the s o p h i s t i c a t e d d o c t r i n e s of p h i l o s o p h e r s , r e g a r d s the whole h y p o t h e s i s o f m a t t e r as depending on the d o c t r i n e o f a b s t r a c t i d e a s . A b s t r a c t i o n d i s t i n g u i s h e s the e x i s t e n c e of s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s f r o m t h e i r b e i n g p e r c e i v e d and p r o f e s s e s to e n a b l e us to c o n c e i v e o b j e c t s as e x i s t i n g u n p e r c e i v e d . B u t , l i k e a good g e n e r a l , B e r k e l e y has c a r e f u l l y mapped out h i s p l a n o f a t t a c k , and has p r e f a c e d h i s whole t r e a t i s e by e x p r e s s l y d e n y i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y of such extreme a b s t r a c t i o n . We cannot s e p a r a t e i n thought the b e i n g o f a s e n s i b l e t h i n g from i t s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . One o b j e c t i o n i m m e d i a t e l y a r i s e s at t h i s p o i n t , w h i c h might be e x p r e s s e d as f o l l o w s : G r a n t e d t h a t o b j e c t s are f o r us m e r e l y c o l l e c t i o n s o f i d e a s ; and g r a n t e d t h a t i d e a s "depend f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e " on p e r c i p i e n t minds: i s i t not y e t p o s s i b l e t h a t o b j e c t s i n themselves may e x i s t i n some u n t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e , and t h a t our i d e a s are " c o p i e s " o r "resemblances" o f s u c h o b j e c t s i n themselves? B e r k e l e y sees no d i f f i c u l t y i n answering t h i s q u e s t i o n . An i d e a can 1. S e c t . 3. -4-3-be l i k e n o t h i n g hut an i d e a - a c o l o u r o r f i g u r e can he l i k e n o t h i n g but another c o l o u r or f i g u r e . Mow the supposed t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s must be e i t h e r p e r c e i v a b l e or n o t . I f t h e y are p e r c e i v a b l e , they must be i d e a s , s i n c e we have p e r c e p t i o n o n l y of idea.s, and hence t h e y cannot e x i s t i n any u n t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e . But i f they are not p e r c e i v a b l e , how can i d e a s p i c t u r e them or r e p r e s e n t them, f o r an i d e a can be l i k e n o t h i n g b u t a.n i d e a , and something not p e r c e i v a b l e would be u n l i k e an i d e a . F o r example, a c o l o u r cannot be l i k e something w h i c h i s i n v i s i b l e ; "hard" o r 1 " s o f t " cannot a p p l y to something w h i c h i s i n t a n g i b l e . A n other form of t h i s o b j e c t i o n , i . e . , t h a t e x t e r n a l b o d i e s may be independent of our p e r c e p t i o n o f them, appears i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s . As we have seen, Locke c o n s i d e r e d t h a t e x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e , m o t i o n or r e s t , s o l i d i t y and number are " r e a l l y " i n t h e e x t e r n a l b o d i e s "whether we p e r c e i v e them or n o t " ; whereas secondary q u a l i t i e s a d m i t t e d l y depend on our p e r c e p t i o n of them. Our i d e a s o f the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s are p a t t e r n s o r e f f e c t s o f t h i n g s w h i c h e x i s t w i t h o u t the 1« B e r k e l e y t a k e s many p r o p e r t i e s o f the " i d e a " f o r g r a n t e d . The b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g beyond phenomena of sense a r i s e s t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s of c a u s a l i n f e r e n c e the v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h Hume was l a t e r to ck. -44-mind i n an u n t h i n k i n g s u b s t a n c e c a l l e d "matter". By "matter" i s meant, on t h i s t h e o r y , "an i n e r t , s e n s e l e s s s u b s t a n c e , i n w h i c h e x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e and m o t i o n do a c t u a l l y s u b s i s t . " But B e r k e l e y p o i n t s out t h a t e x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e and m o t i o n are o n l y i d e a s e x i s t i n g i n the mind; and an i d e a can be l i k e n o t h i n g b u t another i d e a . C o nsequently n e i t h e r t h e s e i d e a s nor t h e i r a r c h e t y p e s (which are n e c e s s a r i l y l i k e them) can e x i s t i n an u n p e r c e i v i n g s u b s t a n c e . S i n c e the above d e f i n i t i o n of "matter" i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , the p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s cannot s u b s i s t w i t h o u t the mind i n any i n a c t i v e s u b s t a n c e . A g a i n , i t has been agreed by a l l t h a t secondary q u a l i t i e s are s e n s a t i o n s e x i s t i n g i n t h e mind a l o n e . I f , t h e n , we can show t h a t secondary and p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s a re i n s e p a r a b l e , we s h a l l p r o v e , from another p o i n t of view, t h a t p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s cannot e x i s t w i t h o u t the mind. But t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y t h e c a s e ; f o r by no a b s t r a c t i o n can I s e p a r a t e , f o r example, the e x t e n s i o n of a body f r o m secondary q u a l i t i e s such as c o l o u r . S i m i l a r l y i t i s agreed t h a t s u c h terms as " g r e a t " and " s m a l l " , " s w i f t " and "slow" are r e l a t i v e to us and e x i s t nowhere w i t h o u t the mind. A c c o r d i n g l y the e x t e n s i o n w h i c h i s supposed to e x i s t w i t h o u t the mind " i s n e i t h e r g r e a t nor s m a l l , the m o t i o n n e i t h e r s w i f t nor s l o w , t h a t i s t h e y a r e n o t h i n g 1 at a l l . " Number i s s i m i l a r l y r e l a t i v e - - e . g . , "the same 1. S e c t . 11. . 1 I -45-e x t e n s i o n i s one, t h r e e , or t h i r t y - s i x a c c o r d i n g as the mind c o n s i d e r s i t w i t h r e f e r e n c e to a y a r d , a f o o t , o r an 1 i n c h . " f i n a l l y , the arguments by w h i c h i t wa.s shown t h a t , f o r example, heat and c o l d are secondary q u a l i t i e s a p p l y a l s o to f i g u r e and e x t e n s i o n . I f we co n c l u d e from the f a c t t h a t the same body appears warm t o one hand ( o r person) and c o l d to a n o t h e r , t h a t heat and c o l d are t h e r e f o r e " a f f e c t i o n s " i n the mind; then we must a l s o c o n c l u d e , from, the f a c t t h a t t h e same f i g u r e appears l a r g e t o one p e r c i p i e n t b e i n g , o r from one v i e w p o i n t , and s m a l l to another p e r c i p i e n t b e i n g , o r from another v i e w p o i n t t h a t f i g u r e and e x t e n s i o n are a l s o e x i s t e n t o n l y i n the mind. I n s h o r t , B e r k e l e y ' s argument i s t h a t a l l the q u a l i t i e s o f m a t t e r must be r e s o l v e d i n t o phenomena o f sense, w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e . f o r t h e i r v e r y e x i s t e n c e a p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t . By " m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e " the most a c c u r a t e p h i l o s o p h e r s mean n o t h i n g except the i d e a o f "being i n g e n e r a l , t o g e t h e r 2 w i t h the r e l a t i v e motion o f i t s ' s u p p o r t i n g a c c i d e n t s ' " . T h i s " g e n e r a l i d e a o f B e i n g " i s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e . The idea, of " s u p p o r t " o b v i o u s l y cannot be t a k e n t o i m p l y o r d i n a r y " p h y s i c a l s u p p o r t ; but no o t h e r a c c u r a t e meaning can be g i v e n to t h i s term. Even i f i t were p o s s i b l e f o r " s o l i d , f i g u r e d , moveable s u b s t a n c e s " •L • Ssct/« 1.2< 2. S e c t . 17. -46-to e x i s t w i t h o u t the mind, how c o u l d we know t h i s ? Sense b r i n g s us no such i d e a . Reason can b r i n g i t o n l y by i n f e r e n c e . But s i n c e t h e r e i s no "n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " between b o d i e s and our i d e a s , why need we b e l i e v e i n the e x i s t e n c e o f b o d i e s w i t h o u t t h e mind? I n i l l u s o r y e x p e r i e n c e , such as i n " dreams, we do not c o n s i d e r t h a t any e x t e r n a l b o d i e s are n e c e s s a r y f o r the p r o d u c t i o n of such i d e a s as then o c c u r . Why, t h e n , i n o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e do we make, the s u p p o s i t i o n of e x t e r n a l b o d i e s e x i s t i n g w i t h o u t the mind? F i n a l l y , even though the e x i s t e n c e of b o d i e s were assumed, we c o u l d never know how they produce i d e a s i n us, and hence the assumption would be q u i t e v a l u e l e s s . B e r k e l e y 1 s p o i n t i s o b v i o u s : i f _ o b j e c t s of sense are " n o t h i n g b u t " c o n g e r i e s o f i d e a s , and i f i d e a s are m e r e l y appearances i n the mind, then e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s can e x i s t o n l y when p e r c e i v e d . I I I . THE EXISTENCE OF SPIRIT. B e r k e l e y ' s p r o o f o f S p i r i t d e v e l o p s d i r e c t l y f r om h i s t h e o r y o f m a t t e r . A l l our i d e a s , s e n s a t i o n s , n o t i o n s , or whatever i s b e f o r e our minds are m a n i f e s t l y " i n a c t i v e . " C o n sequently one i d e a can never produce or make any a l t e r a t i o n i n an o t h e r . The v e r y b e i n g of an i d e a i m p l i e s i n e r t n e s s and p a s s i v i t y . E x t e n s i o n , f i g u r e , and m o t i o n , b e i n g i d e a s , cannot be the cause o f our s e n s a t i o n s . I t i s p l a i n , moreover, t h a t we do have a c o n t i n u a l s u c c e s s i o n -47-o f i d e a s , s i n c e some are changed, some d i s a p p e a r and o t h e r s r e - a p p e a r ; F u r t h e r , t h e r e must he some cause o f t h i s change. But t h i s cause cannot be a q u a l i t y , o r an i d e a , o r a c o m b i n a t i o n of i d e a s . " I t must t h e r e f o r e be a s u b s t a n c e ; but i t has been shown t h a t t h e r e i s no c o r p o r e a l or m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e : i t remains t h e r e f o r e t h a t the cause of i d e a s i s an i n c o r p o r e a l a c t i v e substance or 1 s p i r i t . " The o b j e c t i o n s to t h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the e x i s t e n c e of: " S p i r i t " a r e of c o u r s e o b v i o u s . M a t e r i a l substance has been d e c l a r e d to be n o t h i n g more t h a n a c o n g e r i e s o f mental phenomena. Why then, does B e r k e l e y a s s e r t t h a t an i n c o r p o r e a l substance o r S p i r i t i s something more than a s i m i l a r c o n g e r i e s o f phenomena? The answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n i s t h a t he i s g o i n g on the assumptions t h a t an " i d e a " cannot e x i s t w i t h o u t the mind; t h a t i t i s i n a c t i v e ; and most i m p o r t a n t o f a l l , t h a t i t must have some "cause". B e r k e l e y c o n c e i v e s of mind as " s u p p o r t i n g " i d e a s i n the same way i n w h i c h any m a t e r i a l i s t c o n c e i v e d o f m a t t e r as " s u p p o r t i n g " q u a l i t i e s . He has f o r b i d d e n t h e m a t e r i a l i s t to seek the "cause" o f i d e a s i n m a t t e r , on the ground t h a t t h e r e i s no " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " between the e x i s t e n c e o f b o d i e s and '" 2 our i d e a s . Yet he r e t a i n s the s e a r c h f o r a cause when he p o s t u l a t e s an a.ctive s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e i n w h i c h i d e a s e x i s t 1.. S e c t . 26. 2. S e c t . 18. -48-and on w h i c h they depend. But t o go i n t o t h i s m a tter more f u l l y i s to a n t i c i p a t e Hume's a n a l y s i s . "A S p i r i t i s one s i m p l e , u n d i v i d e d , a c t i v e b e i n g - - a s i t p e r c e i v e s i d e a s i t i s c a l l e d the U n d e r s t a n d i n g , and as i t produces or o t h e r w i s e o p e r a t e s about them i t i s c a l l e d the 1 W i l l . " I d e a s , b e i n g p a s s i v e and i n e r t , cannot r e p r e s e n t a c t i v e s p i r i t . The terms " w i l l " , " s o u l " , and " s p i r i t " do not s t a n d f o r i d e a s a t a l l , b ut f o r ag e n t s , w h i c h are not comparable w i t h i d e a s and cannot be r e p r e s e n t e d by them. But s i n c e we know o r un d e r s t a n d the meaning o f these words, B e r k e l e y concedes t h a t we have some n o t i o n o f s p i r i t o r mind. I t i s a. m a t t e r o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t some i d e a s can be e x c i t e d and v a r i e d at p l e a s u r e . But the i d e a s p e r c e i v e d by sense are not s i m i l a r l y dependent on the w i l l . When I .2 open my eyes, I cannot h e l p s e e i n g . The i d e a s o f sense must t h e r e f o r e be produced by some o t h e r w i l l or s p i r i t . F u r t h e r m o r e , such i d e a s a re "more s t r o n g , l i v e l y and d i s t i n c t " t han those f o r m e d by i m a g i n a t i o n ; and th e y e x h i b i t a " s t e a d i n e s s , o r d e r and coherence" w h i c h r e v e a l s t h e i r d i v i n e o r i g i n . Those s e t r u l e s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the d i v i n e mind e x c i t e s i n us the i d e a s o f sense are c a l l e d by us laws of n a t u r e , and are r e v e a l e d to us o n l y t h r o u g h e x p e r i e n c e . We do not . a r r i v e at t h e s e laws by d i s c o v e r i n g any "necessary c o n n e x i o n " between our i d e a s but o n l y by 1. S e c t . 27. 2. But even i n o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e ( t o say n o t h i n g of h y s t e r i a -rfeuroses) what we see and hear i s to a g r e a t extent determined by what we w i s h to see o r h e a r ; w h i c h i s i n t u r n determined by our r e s p e c t i v e ; i A p p e r c e p t i v e masses." -49-o b s e r v a t i o n of n a t u r e . The " i d e a s i m p r i n t e d on the senses" by the d i v i n e mind are c a l l e d " r e a l t h i n g s . " Those e x c i t e d by the i m a g i n a t i o n are images o f t h i n g s , which they copy and r e p r e s e n t . The f a c t t h a t the i d e a s o f sense are more s t r o n g , o r d e r l y and coherent than those c r e a t e d by t h e mind i s no argument, i n B e r k e l e y ' s o p i n i o n , f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f u n t h i n k i n g t h i n g s apart from p e r c e p t i o n . IV. . THE DEFENSE Off SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM. B e r k e l e y was w e l l aware t h a t he would ha,ve to a l l a y the i n t e l l e c t u a l , d i s c o m f o r t w h i c h r e s u l t e d from h i s th e o r y of m a t t e r . He advances and d i s p o s e s of no l e s s than f o u r t e e n p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n s t o h i s e x p o s i t i o n . Some of the more i m p o r t a n t o f t h e s e we may b f i e f l y n o t e . The f i r s t o b j e c t i o n , t h a t h i s w o r l d would have nothing-r e a l and s u b s t a n t i a l i n i t , i s e s s e n t i a l l y the one o f f e r e d by Dr. Johnson, when he k i c k e d h i s f o o t a g a i n s t a stone i n the b e l i e f t h a t t h i s s u b t l e form o f p r o c e d u r e viiould d i s p r o v e B e r k e l e y . The l a t t e r , however, would not i n the l e a s t deny the h a r d n e s s o f the stone. A l l he would do would be to p o i n t out t h a t i n t h i s case the meaning of m a t t e r to Dr. Johnson w a s v p a i n i n the f o o t . The e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s p e r f e c t l y r e a l . A l l t h a t B e r k e l e y c l a i m s t o deny i s the r e a l i t y o f t h a t vague a b s t r a c t i o n w h i c h we c a l l m a t t e r . He i s w i l l i n g to " a s s e r t t h e e v i d e n c e o f sense as h i g h as you 1 p l e a s e . " There i s no need t o doubt the e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . But t h e t e s t i m o n y of sense can never be o f f e r e d as a p r o o f f o r the e x i s t e n c e of " m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e , " 1. S e c t . .40. -50-f o r t h i s i s n ever p e r c e i v e d by sense. A g a i n , i t might be s a i d t h a t s i n c e we see t h i n g s a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g w i t h o u t u s , they c o u l d not be s a i d to e x i s t i n the mind.. B e r k e l e y ' s answer to t h i s o b j e c t i o n i s ' found i n h i s account of v i s i o n . D i s t a n c e or " o u t n e s s " i s not i m m e d i a t e l y p e r c e i v e d by s i g h t b u t ' i s a complex judgment formed from v a r i o u s sense cues which'we l e a r n to g a t h e r o n l y t h rough e x p e r i e n c e . I n r e a l i t y , i d e a s of s i g h t , when by them we j udge d i s t a n c e and t h i n g s p l a c e d at a d i s t a n c e , "do not suggest o r mark out to us t h i n g s a . c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g a t a d i s t a n c e , b u t o n l y admonish us what i d e a s of t o u c h w i l l be i m p r i n t e d on our minds at such and such d i s t a n c e s of t i m e , 1 and i n consequence o f such and such a c t i o n s . " A h y p o t h e t i c a l man who was b o r n b l i n d and r e c e i v e d s i g h t l a t e r i n l i f e would not have any c o n c e p t i o n of d i s t a n c e but would r e g a r d a l l phenomena as c o n t a i n e d i n h i s eye. F o r B e r k e l e y t h e c a t e g o r y o f e x t e r n a l i t y i s merely a p s y c h o l o g i c a l judgment. Another o b j e c t i o n of common sense i s t h a t , s i n c e the e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s depends s o l e l y on p e r c e p t i o n , they must d i s a p p e a r whenever we cease to p e r c e i v e them. B e r k e l e y t u r n s t h i s o b j e c t i o n i n t o a p r o o f o f the e x i s t e n c e o f God. I t i s t r u e t h a t o b j e c t s e x i s t o n l y when p e r c e i v e d : but even when we do not p e r c e i v e them the d i v i n e mind does. 1. S e c t . 44. -51-B e r k e l e y i n s i s t s t h a t h i s t h e o r y o f m a t t e r does not i n v a l i d a t e s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i n any way. To e x p l a i n a phenomenon " i s a l l one as to show why, upon such and such 1 o c c a s i o n s , we are a f f e c t e d w i t h such and such i d e a s . " In any c a s e , phenomena are accounted f o r not i n terms of c o r p o r e a l s u b s t a n c e , hut i n terms o f f i g u r e , m otion and 2 ot h e r q u a l i t i e s - - i . e., i n terms of i d e a s . I s i t p o s s i b l e to argue t h a t , i f we were p o s s e s s e d of o t h e r s enses, we would p e r c e i v e m a t t e r , i n the same way t h a t a b l i n d man g i v e n t h e sense of s i g h t would p e r c e i v e c o l o r ? Not at a l l , says B e r k e l e y ; a new sense c o u l d o n l y g i v e us new i d e a s o r s e n s a t i o n s , and we would then have the same o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e i r e x i s t i n g i n an u n p e r c e i v i n g s u b s t a n c e as had a l r e a d y been brought a g a i n s t the e x i s t e n c e o f m o t i o n , c o l o u r , f i g u r e , e t c . , i n an u n p e r c e i v i n g s u b s t a n c e . 1. S e c t . 50. 2. B e r k e l e y devotes s e v e r a l s e c t i o n s here to d e f e n d i n g t h e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s t h a t seem to be undermined by h i s d o c t r i n e o f m a t t e r - ~ i n p a r t i c u l a r , he has to show tha.t the "argument from d e s i g n " i s not i n v a l i d a t e d . -52-V. THE.CONSEQUENCES Off SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM ffOR PHILOSOPHY • AED SCIENCE. I n h i s twofold, c a p a c i t y as e c c l e s i a s t i c and p h i l o s o p h e r , B e r k e l e y c l a i m s to have l a i d once and f o r a l l the g h o s t s o f b o t h a t h e i s m and s c e p t i c i s m . As l o n g as we suppose a "two-f o l d e x i s t e n c e of the o b j e c t s of sense--the one i n t e l l i g i b l e o r i n the mind: - t h e o t h e r r e a l and w i t h o u t the mind" then 1 "are we i n v o l v e d a l l i n s c e p t i c i s m . " I f our knowledge of the w o r l d i s r e a l o n l y i n s o f a r as i t i s conformable to r e a l t h i n g s y i t f o l l o w s t h a t we cannot be c e r t a i n of any r e a l knowledge at a l l ; f o r i f the r e a l t h i n g e x i s t s u h p e r c e i v e d , t w e t h a h nevertbe:ig.ssured t h a t what we. p e r c e i v e conforms to t h a t r e a l t h i n g * Locke's answer t o t h i s o b j e c t i o n was made. from a p r a g m a t i c s t a n d p o i n t . He took the view t h a t , s i n c e we cannot c r e a t e the s i m p l e i d e a and s i n c e i t i s dependable and unchanging, i t c a r r i e s w i t h i t an adequacy s u f f i c i e n t f o r r e a l knowledge. But i f we do away w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n g s and i d e a s , B e r k e l e y a s s u r e s us t h a t we have immediate and adequate knowledge of r e a l i t y . A l l our i d e a s are p e r f e c t l y known, and n o t h i n g e x i s t s beyond them w h i c h i s not p e r c e i v e d , s i n c e t h e b e i n g o f a n y t h i n g c o n s i s t s s o l e l y i n i t s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . The i d e a s i m p r i n t e d on the senses are " r e a l t h i n g s " and " r e a l l y e x i s t " , 1. S e c t . 86-87. -53-but t h e y cannot e x i s t a p a r t f rom b e i n g p e r c e i v e d by mind or s p i r i t . A l l i n q u i r y i n t o the q u e s t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n i s f o r B e r k e l e y c o m p l e t e l y m e a n i n g l e s s . .There are o n l y two k i n d s o f B e i n g — s p i r i t s , and i d e a s . We cannot p e r c e i v e s p i r i t s , b u t we do have "some knowledge or n o t i o n of our own minds, of s p i r i t s and a.ctive b e i n g s - -whereof i n a s t r i c t sense we have not i d e a s ; I n l i k e manner, we know and have a n o t i o n of r e l a t i o n between t h i n g s or i d e a s - - w h i c h r e l a t i o n s are d i s t i n c t f r o m the i d e a s or t h i n g s r e l a t e d , inasmuch as the l a t t e r may be p e r c e i v e d by 1 us w i t h o u t our p e r c e i v i n g the f o r m e r . " S p i r i t s are a c t i v e , i n d i v i s i b l e s u b s t a n c e s ; i d e a s are i n e r t , f l e e t i n g , o r dependent b e i n g s w h i c h are " s u p p o r t e d by" these s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e s . As we have seen, B e r k e l e y f e l t t h a t the. e x p u l s i o n o f " m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e " from p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n would put an end to a l l s c e p t i c i s m and a t h e i s m . But another g r e a t source of e r r o r and d i f f i c u l t y w i t h r e g a r d to knowledge r e m a i n s - - i . e t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e of a b s t r a c t i d e a s . C o n s i d e r , f o r example, t i m e , pla.ce and m o t i o n J taken i n the c o n c r e t e , everyone knows what they mean. But when, f o r i n s t a n c e , we attempt to frame a s i m p l e i d e a of t i m e , a b s t r a c t e d f r om the s u c c e s s i o n of i d e a s i n our minds, we become i n v o l v e d i n a b s u r d c o n c l u s i o n s and i n s o l u b l e problems. A b s t r a c t e d from t h i s s u c c e s s i o n o f i d e a s , time i s n o t h i n g . The d u r a t i o n of any f i n i t e s p i r i t must t h e r e f o r e be e s t i m a t e d i n terms of "the number of i d e a s o r a c t i o n s s u c c e e d i n g each o t h e r i n t h a t 2 same s p i r i t or mind." Time i s t h e r e f o r e not a b s o l u t e but 1. S e c t . 89. 2. S e c t . 98. -54-r e l a t i v e to each i n d i v i d u a l . J u s t as the essence of t h i n g s i s p e r c i p i , so the esse of s p i r i t s i s p e r c i p e r e . The e x i s t e n c e o f a s p i r i t cannot "be ab.stracted from i t s " c o g i t a t i o n . " S i m i l a r l y i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to c o n s i d e r e x t e n s i o n and m o t i o n i n the a b s t r a c t . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o a b s t r a c t e x t e n s i o n f r o m a l l o t h e r s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s - ~ i . e.j, to have an a b s t r a c t image of e x t e n s i o n ; and i n the second p l a c e i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o a b s t r a c t the e n t i t y of e x t e n s i o n from i t s b e i n g p e r c e i v e d . A g a i n , we cannot frame an a b s t r a c t i d e a o f h a p p i n e s s a p a r t f r o m a l l p a r t i c u l a r p l e a s u r e , or of goodness a p a r t from e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s good. I t i s the d o c t r i n e of a b s t r a c t i o n w h i c h r e n d e r s the study of m o r a l i t y a l s o d i f f i c u l t and of s m a l l use. B e r k e l e y c o n s t a n t l y i n s i s t s t h a t we s h o u l d t h i n k i n c o n c r e t e terms and s h o u l d a s s i g n e m p i r i c a l meaning to our words. The b e g i n n i n g and the end o f p h i l o s o p h y i s the s u b s t i t u t i o n of f a c t s f o r empty a b s t r a c t i o n s . B e r k e l e y ' s views on " n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y " are i n t e r e s t i n g . The g r e a t inducement t o s c e p t i c i s m i s the b e l i e f t h a t "every-t h i n g i n c l u d e s w i t h i n i t s e l f the cause o f i t s p r o p e r t i e s ; or t h a t t h e r e i s i n each o b j e c t an i n w a r d essence which i s the s o u r c e whence i t s d i s c e r n i b l e q u a l i t i e s f l o w , and whereon 1 they depend." But n e i t h e r o c c u l t q u a l i t i e s nor m e c h a n i c a l c a u s e s , such as f i g u r e and m o t i o n , can e x p l a i n the p r o d u c t i o n o f appearances i n us. No i d e a , s i n c e i t i s i n e r t , can ever be a s s i g n e d as the cause of another i d e a . B e r k e l e y makes some sharp remarks i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n about the p r o c e d u r e o f 1. S e c t . 102. e x p l a i n i n g a phenomenon by m e r e l y a s s i g n i n g a name to d e s i g n a t e i t ; Thus i t i s s a i d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t a stone f a l l s to the e a r t h or t h a t "the s e a s w e l l s towards the moon" because of t h e p r i n c i p l e of " a t t r a c t i o n . " But t h i s name me r e l y s i g n i f i e s the manner o f the tendency and the e f f e c t i t s e l f , and g i v e s no c l u e as to the n a t u r e o f the a c t i o n where-by the e f f e c t i s produced. The t a s k o f s c i e n c e i s to d i s c o v e r "harmonies" and "agreements" i n n a t u r e and to e x p l a i n p a r t i c u l a r e f f e c t s - - i . e., to reduce them to g e n e r a l r u l e s . Y et B e r k e l e y s t i l l does not b a n i s h c o m p l e t e l y the i d e a of c a u s a t i o n b e h i n d e v e n t s . He s i m p l y a s s i g n s e f f i c i e n t c a u s a t i o n t o the w i l l of a s p i r i t i n s t e a d o f to the f o r c e s of m a t t e r . Consequently he b e l i e v e s t h a t the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of f i n a l causes forms a l e g i t i m a t e pa.rt of s c i e n c e . B e r k e l e y t a k e s i s s u e w i t h the a b s o l u t e space, a b s o l u t e time and a b s o l u t e m otion of Newton's " P r i n c i p i a . " Time he has a l r e a d y examined. M o t i o n he h o l d s t o be s i m i l a r l y r e l a t i v e . I f o n l y one body e x i s t e d i t c o u l d not p o s s i b l y be moved, s i n c e the c o n c e p t i o n of m o t i o n demands at l e a s t two b o d i e s whose d i s t a n c e and p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to each o t h e r v a r y ; t h a t i s , t h e i d e a of motion n e c e s s a r i l y i n c l u d e s r e l a t i o n . I n o r d i n a r y l i f e we do not go beyond the e a r t h to d e f i n e t h e p l a c e of any body; "and what i s q u i e s c e n t i n 1 r e s p e c t o f t h a t i s a c c o u n t e d a b s o l u t e l y to be s o . " But s c i e n c e f i n d s t h a t the e a r t h moves as w e l l as do b o d i e s on i t s s u r f a c e , and i n o r d e r to e s t i m a t e i t s m o t i o n c o n c e i v e s "the 1. S e c t . 114. -56-C o r p o r e a l World as f i n i t e , and the utmost unmoved w a l l s or s h e l l t h e r e o f to be the p l a c e whereby t h e y e s t i m a t e t r u e 1 m o t i o n s . " T h i s e s t i m a t e , however, g i v e s us not the a b s o l u t e m otion of the e a r t h but o n l y i t s motion r e l a t i v e to the f i x e d s t a r s . B e r k e l e y a l s o d e n i e s the e x i s t e n c e o f any a b s o l u t e space d i s t i n c t from tha.t w h i c h i s p e r c e i v e d by sense and r e l a t e d to b o d i e s . We cannot even frame an a h s t r a c t i d e a o f pure space independent of a l l body. "Pure" space s i m p l y means t h a t no r e s i s t a n c e i s o f f e r e d to the movement of body. But i f a l l body were a n n i h i l a t e d "then 2 t h e r e c o u l d be no m o t i o n , and c o n s e q u e n t l y no Spa.ce. " B e r k e l e y a g a i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s between a b s t r a c t i d e a s , w h i c h he m a i n t a i n s are i n c o n c e i v a b l e and n o n - e x i s t e n t , and u n i v e r s a l i d e a s . Geometry does i n d e e d d e a l w i t h u n i v e r s a l i d e a s , but o n l y i n the sense t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s and f i g u r e s in;, any d i a g r a m s t a n d f o r innumerable o t h e r s which t h e y " i n d i f f e r e n t l y denote." S i n c e the p a r t i c u l a r l e n g t h of any g i v e n l i n e i s not i n v o l v e d i n a g e o m e t r i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h a t l i n e becomes u n i v e r s a l i n i t s s i g n i f i c a t i o n . S i n c e no m a t t e r how many v i s i b l e p a r t s we a s s i g n t o a l i n e we can imagine a l i n e w h i c h would have a g r e a t e r number of p a r t s , we c o n s i d e r t h a t any l i n e i n v o l v e d i n a d e m o n s t r a t i o n c o n t a i n s ©n-! i n f i n i t e number o f p a r t s , i n o r d e r t h a t what i s demonstrated of i t w i l l h o l d t r u e f o r any o t h e r l i n e whatever. The p a r t i c u l a r l i n e e x i s t i n g oh paper, however, does not c o n t a i n an i n f i n i t e number of p a r t s . The p r o p e r t y o f c o n t a i n i n g an i n f i n i t e number of p a r t s i s a p r o p e r t y w h i c h we a r b i t r a r i l y 1. SectTKh 2. S e c t . 116. -57-a s s i g n to that, l i n e i n o r d e r t h a t i t may become u n i v e r s a l i n i t s s i g n i f i c a t i o n . "But men, not r e t a i n i n g t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e i r t h o u g h t s , s l i d e i n t o a b e l i e f that t h e s m a l l p a r t i c u l a r l i n e d e s c r i b e d on paper c o n t a i n s i n i t s e l f p a r t s 1 i n n u m e r a b l e . " The f a i l u r e to r e t a i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n r e s u l t s i n the t e n e t t h a t I n f i n i t e d i v i s i b i l i t y of f i n i t e e x t e n s i o n i s a n e c e s s a r y concept f o r geometry. B e r k e l e y c o n s i d e r s t h a t geometry, l i k e a r i t h m e t i c , i s to be pursued o n l y f o r the sake of whatever i s u s e f u l i i r ; i t . He wishes t h a t "men o f g r e a t a b i l i t i e s and o b s t i n a t e a p p l i c a t i o n would draw o f f t h e i r t h o u g h t s " from "the more i n t r i c a t e and s u b t l e p a r t s o f S p e c u l a t i v e Mathematics" and devote themselves to 2 "the s t u d y o f such t h i n g s as l i e n e a r e r the concerns of l i f e . " 1. S e c t . 127. 2. S e c t . 131. VI-. THE ATTRIBUTES OE SPIRITUAL .SUBSTANCE. The f a c t t h a t we are unable- to form an i d e a o f s p i r i t o r mind i s not to be c o n s i d e r e d as a. d e f e c t i n our under-s t a n d i n g . S p i r i t i s an a c t i v e , - i n d i v i s i b l e s u bstance. I d e a s , w h i c h are i n e r t and p a s s i v e , w h i c h can be l i k e n o t h i n g but i d e a s , w h i c h depend f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e on b e i n g p e r c e i v e d , cannot resemble s p i r i t , an agent e x i s t i n g i n i t s e l f * T h i s s o u l or s p i r i t u a l s ubstance B e r k e l e y e x p r e s s l y i d e n t i f i e s w i t h the term " I " . As we have n o t e d , he admits t h a t " i n a l a r g e sense i n d e e d , we may be s a i d t o have an i d e a o r r a t h e r a n o t i o n o f s p i r i t , " s i n c e " o t h e r w i s e we c o u l d not a f f i r m or • ' 1 deny a n y t h i n g o f i t . " F u r t h e r , j u s t as we c o n c e i v e of the i d e a s i n the minds of o t h e r s p i r i t s by means of our own, i n f e r r i n g a resemblance between them, i n the same way, "we know.other s p i r i t s by means o f our own s o u l - - w h i c h i n t h a t 2 sense i s t h e innage o r i d e a o f them. " The s o u l , w h i c h i s " i n d i v i s i b l e , i n c o r p o r e a l , unextended" cannot be a f f e c t e d by b o d i e s , w h i c h are merely p a s s i v e i d e a s i n the mind--i.e., the s o u l i s " n a . t u r a l l y i m m o r t a l . " 1. S e c t . 14G. 2. Sect-HO. B e r k e l e y ' s manner o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r our knowledge o f s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e by a s s e r t i n g t h a t we have a " n o t i o n " o f i t , does not e x c l u d e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of our hav i n g a " n o t i o n " o f m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . a l s o . -59-The d o c t r i n e of the e x i s t e n c e of a b s t r a c t i d e a s i n t r o d u c e s a b s u r d i t i e s i n t o our knowledge of s p i r i t u a l t h i n g s a l s o . B e r k e l e y a t t a c k s t h e views of those p h i l o s o p h e r s who imagined t h a t they c o u l d frame a b s t r a c t n o t i o n s of "powers" o r " f a c u l t i e s " i n the mind, and who p r o f e s s e d to be able to c o n s i d e r these f a c u l t i e s a p a r t not o n l y f r o m the mind or s p i r i t i t s e l f but from t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e o b j e c t s and e f f e c t s as w e l l . N e e d l e s s c o n t r o v e r s i e s and s e r i o u s e r r o r s have a l s o a r i s e n by the a p p l i c a t i o n o f p h y s i c a l a n a l o g i e s i n an e f f o r t to comprehend t h e o p e r a t i o n s of the mind. We know t h e e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r s p i r i t s o n l y by i n f e r e n c e from the i d e a s they e x c i t e i n us. We know the e x i s t e n c e o f God by i n f e r e n c e from our i d e a s o f sense, i v h i c h a c c o r d i n g to B e r k e l e y r e q u i r e the p o s t u l a t i o n by our reason of a s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e o t h e r t h a n our own minds i n w h i c h they s u b s i s t . God i s a s c c e r t a i n l y known to e x i s t as i s our f e l l o w human b e i n g , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f b o t h m e r e l y b e i n g i n f e r r e d f r om the e x i s t e n c e of i d e a s i n our minds. The problem of communication between i n d i v i d u a l minds i s s e t t l e d by a vague r e f e r e n c e to the agency o f God, who " m a i n t a i n s t h a t i n t e r c o u r s e between s p i r i t s whereby they are a b l e t o p e r c e i v e 1 the e x i s t e n c e of each o t h e r . " Those o c c u r r e n c e s i n the w o r l d w h i c h do not i n d i c a t e t h a t the hand of an i n t e l l i g e n t c r e a t o r has been at work, are e x p l a i n e d on the ground t h a t t h e r e must n e c e s s a r i l y be s i m p l e , g e n e r a l , and immutable r u l e s o f n a t u r e , i n o r d e r t h a t we may not o n l y f i n d g u i d a n c e i n the a f f a i r s of l i f e , but a l s o a t t a i n 1. S e c t . 147. -60-i n s i g h t i n t o the s e c r e t s o f the u n i v e r s e . Such immutable r u l e s may cause " i n c o n v e n i e n c e s " i n n a t u r e , to use B e r k e l e y ' s e u p h e m i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n ; but they are n e c e s s a r y f o r the v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f our r e a s o n , w h i c h c o u l d hot o p e r a t e i f the ( p h y s i c a l ) w o r l d were c h a o t i c . B e r k e l e y a l s o advances the a n c i e n t e x p l a n a t i o n " t h a t those p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s w h i c h , c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e m s e l v e s , appear t o be e v i l , have t h e n a t u r e o f good, when c o n s i d e r e d as l i n k e d w i t h the whole system of b e i ng s. " ¥11. THE PRELUDE TO SCEPTICISM. A f u l l e x a m i n a t i o n osf t h i s I d e a l i s m would n e c e s s a r i l y a n t i c i p a t e the c r i t i c i s m t h a t Hume brought a g a i n s t B e r k e l e y ' s d o c t r i n e o f s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e . But even a p a r t from Hume's a n a l y s i s , w h i c h i n a sense i s merely the development o f B e r k e l e y one s t e p f u r t h e r , t h e r e are s e v e r a l c r i t i c i s m s to be brough t a g a i n s t B e r k e l e y ' s t h e o r y o f knowledge. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the term " i d e a " i s so amiably P r o t e a n t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to p i n i t down to one d e f i n i t e s i g n i f i c a t i o n . Locke uses i t va g u e l y to mean whatever the mind has b e f o r e i t when i t t h i n k s * But B e r k e l e y , u n l i k e L o cke, i s an e n t h u s i a s t and an e x t r e m i s t ; and when he pushes h i s s harp a n a l y s i s to the p o i n t o f d e n y i n g the e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g except " i d e a s " and " s p i r i t s " , i t i s s u r e l y time to q u e s t i o n the meaning of " i d e a " v e r y c l o s e l y . I n s o f a r as the word " i d e a " i s a term i d e n t i c a l i n meaning w i t h s i m p l e appearances o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of sense, i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o l . S e c t . 155* -61-d e f i n e i t or 'communicate i t , as Locke p o i n t e d out. Yet B e r k e l e y nowhere t a k e s up the q u e s t i o n o f the importance of Locke's d i s c o v e r y , a l t h o u g h communication presupposes between t h e e x t e r n a l and the i n t e r n a l , i n our e x p e r i e n c e a d u a l i s m w h i c h B e r k e l e y tends p r a c t i c a l l y t o a b o l i s h . I t i s a l s o d i s c o n c e r t -i n g to he a r B e r k e l e y s a y i n g t h a t an i d e a cannot cause another '•.ideaj t h a t a n - i d e a can e x i s t o n l y i n a p e r c e i v i n g mind; t h a t an i d e a can r e p r e s e n t o n l y t h a t w h i c h i t resembles; o r t h a t ah i d e a i s . i n e r t ahd: p a s s i v e i and so f o r t h . Locke's t h e s i s was t h a t the s i m p l e i d e a as a m e n t a l e x p e r i e n c e was known i m m e d i a t e l y and was u n d e f i n a b l e . But i f a mental e x p e r i e n c e i s u n d e f i n a b l e and incommunicable by means of language we cannot p r e d i c a t e any q u a l i t i e s o f i t i n s o f a r as our t h i n k i n g makes use of the forms o f language. What cannot be communicated by means o f language cannot be thought i n . terms of language. I f b y " i d e a " B e r k e l e y means s i m p l y a men t a l phenomenon, then he would have t o p r o v e t h a t a mental e x p e r i e n c e i s c a p a b l e of communication and hence o f d e f i n i t i o n o r q u a l i f i c a t i o n b e f o r e he c o u l d say t h a t "An i d e a i s i n e r t " r -o r i n d e e d b e f o r e he c o u l d say a n y t h i n g but "An idea, i s an i d e a . " Y e t when B e r k e l e y i s d e a l i n g w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d he does seem t o use " i d e a " f o r me n t a l appearance. On the o t h e r hand, i f he were to s a y t h a t " i d e a " means something o t h e r t h a n p l a i n , s i m p l e , i m m e d i a t e l y e x p e r i e n c e d c o n t e n t - - ! . e t h a t i t i s something f o r m a l and a b s t r a c t — h e would be g o i n g c o u n t e r t o h i s whole method. H i s p l e a i s t h a t we c o n s i d e r 1 " i d e a s d i v e s t e d of words," - - i . e . he i s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t we 1, S e c t . 22. -62-attempt to m a n i p u l a t e mental c o n t e n t apart from o r g a n i z a t i o n or form. Such a p r o c e d u r e i f r i g i d l y c a r r i e d out would reduce t h i n k i n g m e r e l y to s u c c e s s i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f sensuous i m a g e r y i (From B e r k e l e y ' s remarks on mathematics, i t i s almost a foregone c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he would r e g a r d the procedure of s y m b o l i c l o g i c as b e i n g h o p e l e s s l y a b s t r a c t and t h e r e f o r e q u i t e i n v a l i d as a t o o l f o r t h i n k i n g . ) In s h o r t , B e r k e l e y nowhere d e f i n e s the word " i d e a " ; " and yet a t every t u r n he g i v e s to i t j u s t t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h are n e c e s s a r y f o r h i s t h e o r y . H i s whole argument r a i s e s grave doubts as t o the a b i l i t y o f language to f u r n i s h t h i n k i n g w i t h a mechanism s u f f i c i e n t l y f l e x i b l e and a c c u r a t e f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t -i g a t i o n . I t i s a fundamental t e n e t i n B e r k e l e y ' s t h e o r y t h a t m a t t e r , b e i n g n o t h i n g giore t h a n assemblages of i d e a s , i s n e c e s s a r i l y p a s s i v e , i n e r t and p o w e r l e s s , and c o n s e q u e n t l y i s dependent on mind f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . T h i s p o w e r l e s s n e s s of m a t t e r was h i s main argument f o r the n a t u r a l i m m o r t a l i t y of the s o u l , w h i c h as an i n d i v i s i b l e , a c t i v e s p i r i t u a l s u b s t a n c e , cannot be a f f e c t e d i n any way by i n e r t i d e a s , i . e . , b y m a t t e r , I n o t h e r words, the "hand-body problem ceases to e x i s t f o r B e r k e l e y , s i n c e he has r e d u c e d the p h y s i c a l to the m e n t a l . But b o t h B e r k e l e y a n i s m and i t s o p p o s i t e , b e h a v i o u r i s m , w h i c h r e d u c e s the mental to the p h y s i c a l , a c c o m p l i s h t h e i r r e d u c t -i o n s a l t o g e t h e r too e a s i l y . B e r k e l e y , who c l a i m s to be w i l l i n g to a s s e r t "the e v i d e n c e o f sense as h i g h as you p l e a s e , " i g n o r e s e n t i r e l y the e v i d e n c e f o r the c o r r e l a t i o n between p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s and m e n t a l e v e n t s . P h y s i o l o g i c a l -6.3-d i s t u r b a n c e s I n an o r g a n i s m - - f o r example, a tumor of the brain--may r e s u l t i n o v e r t b e h a v i o u r which", l e a d s aus to i n f e r t h a t the m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s of t h a t o r g a n i s m have been i m p a i r e d . On B e r k e l e y ' s t h e o r y such dependence o f mind on m a t t e r i s i m p o s s i b l e . H i s d o c t r i n e at t h i s p o i n t , t h e r e f o r e , seems to be c o m p l e t e l y at v a r i a n c e w i t h the evidence o f sense and o f s c i e n c e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t such terms as "mind" and "matter s h o u l d b o t h be dropped from p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n ; but i t i s not p o s s i b l e to drop one term and r e t a i n the o t h e r w i t h o u t f a l l i n g i n t o a b s u r d i t i e s ; A t h i r d o b j e c t i o n t h a t may be r a i s e d a g a i n s t B e r k e l e y i s t h a t he does not v a l i d a t e h i s p r o c e d u r e even by h i s own s t a n d a r d s . H i s plea, i s t h a t we t u r n our minds away from empty a b s t r a c t i o n s and from m i s l e a d i n g words, and c o n s i d e r o n l y our i d e a s , w h i c h cannot f a i l t o have a c c u r a t e meaning f o r us. As a l r e a d y p o i n t e d o u t , t h i s would reduce t h i n k i n g to the mere m a n i p u l a t i o n o f imagery. T h i s p r o c e d u r e undoubted l y d e p r i v e s the a b s t r a c t term "matter" o f i t s importance by showing the d i f f i c u l t y of g i v i n g i t any c o n c r e t e meaning. But B e r k e l e y goes on s h o r t l y a f t e r w a r d s to speak of a d i v i n e mind or s p i r i t " i m p r i n t i n g i d e a s on our senses." Thus, the t r e e i s an i d e a w h i c h God i m p r i n t s on my senses. Now i n what c o n c r e t e , c o n c e i v a b l e way are the i d e a s w h i c h e x i s t i n the mind o f God t r a n s f e r r e d to my mind? B e r k e l e y ' s statement can c l a i m to have no more c l a r i t y t han the opposing view t h a t m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e " i m p r i n t s i d e a s on our senses." N e i t h e r t h e o r y i s at a l l comprehensible or m e a n i n g f u l . The " n o t i o n " t h a t can be formed of B e r k e l e y ' s s p i r i t u a l substance i s no -64-c l e a r e r than the " n o t i o n " w h i c h can he formed of m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e : p r e c i s e l y because, as Locke s a i d , n e i t h e r i s at a l l c l e a r . .Berkeley's s t r o n g p o i n t i s h i s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us to go beyond e x p e r i e n c e and s t i l l speak m e a n i n g f u l l y . The meaning o f m a t t e r i s to be found i n terms of c o l l e c t i o n s of " i d e a s " or o f c o n c e p t s . I f we say a n y t h i n g of "matter" o t h e r than i n terms whose meaning we know from e x p e r i e n c e , we are. :making m e a n i n g l e s s s t a t e m e n t s , s i n c e t h a t w h i c h has i n no way e n t e r e d i n t o our e x p e r i e n c e can ha.ve no meaning f o r us. B e r k e l e y d e n i e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f an a b s t r a c t e n t i t y " m atter" on the same grounds t h a t common sense d e n i e s the e x i s t e n c e o f a c e n t a u r - - i . e., beeause n e i t h e r i s ever p e r c e i v e d i n sense e x p e r i e n c e . Pie f i n d s t h a t the p r o p o s i t i o n "Matter e x i s t s " means merely "Something has been p e r c e i v e d " , s i n c e t h i s i s a l l the i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t e x p e r i e n c e can b r i n g to us on t h i s p o i n t , and s i n c e what i s not c o n t a i n e d i n e x p e r i e n c e i s m e a n i n g l e s s . N o t h i n g can be p o s t u l a t e d about any e x t e r n a l " t h i n g " or about "matter" except i n terms of what B e r k e l e y c a l l s " i d e a s " * He t h e r e f o r e , c o n c l u d e s t h a t "matter" does not e x i s t at a l l , u n l e s s by "matter" we mean " i d e a s " . A l l e x t e r n a l b o d i e s a r e , a c c o r d i n g to B e r k e l e y , m e r e l y c o n g e r i e s o f i d e a s , dependent f o r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e on p e r c e p t i o n . Now i t i s t r u e t h a t I can p o s t u l a t e n o t h i n g of an e x t e r n a l body except i n terms of my "ideas/ 1 of i t . But t h i s n e g a t i v e v;ay o f s t a t i n g the argument does not i m p l y a p o s i t i v e and a b s o l u t e 3 i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t w i t h -65-those i d e a s * . C o n s i d e r , f o r example,' the common e x t e r n a l o b j e c t , " t r e e " . "Tree" i s the name g i v e n to a c e r t a i n c o l l e c t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e s o f sense. Whatever i t " r e a l l y " i s , the t r e e at l e a s t r e p r e s e n t s f o r me s e n s a t i o n s w h i c h i n my normal e x p e r i e n c e are a l s o p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s f o r o t h e r o b s e r v e r s , whereas my own s e n s a t i o n s a re presumably not e x p e r i e n c e d by those o b s e r v e r s . T h i s f a c t - - t h a t what I see I c o n s i d e r to be capable of b e i n g seen by o t h e r s , - - i s a g a i n a d m i t t e d l y an " i d e a " , i n the l o o s e sense t h a t a n y t h i n g we t h i n k o r say i s an " i d e a " . The t r e e , x, has meaning i n terms of mental experience,. y_. There §>re how-ever p r o p e r t i e s o f the t r e e - - e . g . , i t s " e x t e r n a l ! t y " - - w h i c h a l s o have meaning i n terms o f y_, b u t w h i c h are not p r o p e r t i e s o f y_. I n s h o r t , an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i m p l i e s o r means f o r me c e r t a i n p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n , or o f " i d e a s " , w h i c h do not a p p l y to s e n s a t i o n i t s e l f . C onsequently we cannot a f f i r m a p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s w i t h i d e a s . I t s t i l l r emains t r u e t h a t the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t may not e x i s t a p a r t f rom p e r c e p t i o n , s i n c e i t i s a l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y to v e r i f y e x i s t -ence a p a r t from p e r c e p t i o n ; but i f p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the o b j e c t w i t h o ur i d e a s i s not p r o v e d t h i s dependence of the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t on p e r c e p t i o n w i l l be more d o u b t f u l . I t a l s o remains t r u e , t h a t , i n a n e g a t i v e way, the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t x can mean n o t h i n g to me except i n terms of sense e x p e r i e n c e , v_. But the fa.ct t h a t x has meaning i n terms o f y_ does not n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l y t h a t x has e x i s t e n c e i n terms of y_. T h i s y_ i s ah i n e s c a p -a b l e element p r e s e n t i n a l l knowledge. I t i s the f a c t of the e x i s t e n c e o f our own c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s . B e r k e l e y c a p i t a l i z e s on the f a c t t h a t a l l knowledge i s " f i l t e r e d , t h r o u g h " our own c o n s c i o u s states. -66-to an e x t e n t 'that b r i n g s him p e r i l o u s l y c l o s e to i n t e l l e c t u a l b a n k r u p t c y . I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n to B e r k e l e y , whether v a l i d o r n o t , i n v o l v e s a d u a l i s m between what i s e x t e r n a l and what i s i n t e r n a l i n our e x p e r i e n c e . The c o l l e c t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e s known as the " t r e e " , w h i c h has c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s t h a t are not s h a r e d by c e r t a i n o t h e r o f my e x p e r i e n c e s , i s s a i l to be e x t e r n a l , because i t has those same p r o p e r t i e s (presum-a b l y ) f o r o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s : w h i l e the " o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e s " , because t h e y are a p p a r e n t l y p r i v a t e , are s a i d t o be " i n t e r n a l " . The common e x t e r n a l i t y of p h y s i c a l b o d i e s i s presupposed i n our communication, f o r i f the t r e e i s not e x t e r n a l then n e i t h e r are my f e l l o w human b e i n g s * N o t h i n g i s e a s i e r than to q u e s t i o n t h i s e x t e r n a l i t y , as B e r k e l e y does, and to say t h a t " o u t n e s s " i s m e r e l y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l judgment a c q u i r e d by the 1 c o - o r d i n a t i o n of c e r t a i n v i s u a l and t a c t u a l sense e x p e r i e n c e s . But the a b o l i t i o n o f e x t e r n a l i t y c a r r i e s s e r i o u s consequences w i t h i t : f o r i f e v e r y t h i n g i s - w i t h i n my c o n s c i o u s n e s s the whole w o r l d i s l i t e r a l l y my i d e a . Does God i n s u r e t h a t what I see i s a l s o seen by o t h e r minds, and hence t h a t the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s o b j e c t i v e and r e a l ? Not a t a l l , f o r God i s merely an i d e a i n my own mind* I f e v e r y t h i n g i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n my mind, the whole c r e a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g God, i s m e r e l y my dream. Such i s the s o l i p s i s t i c view we a r e f o r c e d i n t o i f we b r i n g e v e r y t h i n g c o m p l e t e l y w i t h i n our p r i v a t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B e r k e l e y i n d e e d t r i e s to a v o i d t h i s consequence by making a c e r t a i n c o n c e s s i o n to e x t e r n a l i t y as a l o g i c a l c a t e g o r y when he says t h a t "the t h i n g s p e r c e i v e d by sense may be -67-terraed ' e x t e r n a l ' , w i t h r e g a r d to t h e i r o r i g i n , i n t h a t they are not g e n e r a t e d from w i t h i n by the mind i t s e l f , but i m p r i n t e d by a S p i r i t d i s t i n c t from t h a t w h i c h p e r c e i v e s them;-" T h i s i l l u m i n a t i n g passage shows c l e a r l y t h a t he can save e x t e r n a l i t y and o b j e c t i v i t y o n l y by an a p p e a l to God. I n f a c t , B e r k e l e y ' s p r o o f of God i s not s i m p l y a happy a f t e r t h o u g h t f o r the c o n f u s i o n of impious a t h e i s t s , but an "ad hoc" hypothesis' w h i c h i s a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y to p r e v e n t the r e s t of h i s system from c o l l a p s i n g i n t o sheer s c e p t i c i s m . But by B e r k e l e y ' s own a d m i s s i o n , when he reasons from sense e x p e r i e n c e to the e x i s t e n c e o f God he can do so o n l y by a p r o c e s s o f c a u s a l i n f e r e n c e . I f the v a l i d i t y of such i n f e r e n c e i s u n d e r c u t , and i f God i s c o n s e q u e n t l y d e n i e d e x i s t e n c e , the whole system f a l l s i n t o chaos. B e r k e l e y i n d e e d endeavours to ass u r e us, w i t h a calm t h a t i s s u s p i c i o u s l y l i k e t h a t of the c a p t a i n o f a s i n k i n g s h i p , t h a t h i s d o c t r i n e l e a v e s the r e a l i t y o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d c o m p l e t e l y untouched. But i f the t r e e i s • mer e l y a n - i d e a or a c o l l e c t i o n o f i d e a s ; Set i d e a s e x i s t o n l y i n p e r c e i v i n g minds; and i f t h e r e i s no e x t e r n a l S p i r i t i n whose mind the t r e e can e x i s t , then i t must be c o n s i d e r e d j u s t as much my c r e a t i o n as are Oberon and T i t a n i a , c e n t a u r s and g r i f f i n s , and a l l the o t h e r f i g u r e s i n mythology. B e r k e l e y a n i s m , i n s h o r t , i s mer e l y the p r e l u d e to Hume's i n t e l l e c t u a l n i h i l i s m . " 1 " 1. C o n c e r n i n g B e r k e l e y Hume s a i d - - " a n d indeed most o f t h e w r i t i n g s o f t h a t v e r y i n g e n i o u s author form the best l e s s o n s of s c e p t i c i s m , w h i c h are to be found e i t h e r among the a n c i e n t or modern p h i l o s o p h e r s , B o y l e not e x c e p t e d . " ( F o o t n o t e at the end o f S e c t i o n X I I , p a r t I o f the " E n a u i r y " . ) CHAPTER I I I . DAVID HUME: "A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE" and *AJT ENQUIRY CONCERNING- HUMAN UNDERSTANDING" CHAPTER I I I . DAVID HUMEv' "A TREATISE OE HUMAN NATURE" and "AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING." The i m p o s i n g p s y c h o l o g i c a l e d i f i c e w h i c h had been b u i l t b y the l a b o r i o u s and p a t i e n t Locke s e r v e d w i t h o n l y m i n o r r e p a i r s f o r h i s two g r e a t s u c c e s s o r s . As we have seen, however, the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e a l i s m o f Locke p a s s e d o v e r by a n a t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n i n t o the s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m o f B e r k e l e y . I n D a v i d Hume t h i s development o f e m p i r i c i s m c o n t i n u e s and reaches i t s c r i s i s . K a n t i a n s h o l d t h a t i n Hume e m p i r i c i s m reaches n o t o n l y i t s c r i s i s b u t a l so i t s end. I n K a n t ' s own time, Hume's case was a d m i t t e d l y d e s p e r a t e , s i n c e the ponderous German p h i l o s o p h e r e f f e c t i v e l y l i n e d up the A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , the ^Newtonian s c i e n c e , and the E u c l i d e a n geometry i n s u p p o r t o f h i s s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " t h e o r y o f knowledge. B u t i n the p r e s e n t age advances i n l o g i c and s c i e n c e have r e p l a c e d a l l t h r e e o f these g r e a t systems by o t h e r s , and the s u c c e s s f u l c h a l l e n g e to t h e i r u n i q u e n e s s d e s t r o y s i n g r e a t p a r t K a n t ' s d o c t r i n e o f the s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " judgment. S i n c e the d e s t r u c t i o n o f Kant i n v o l v e s to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f the e m p i r i c a l p o s i t i o n , the d e c i s i v e stage to which Hume b r o u g h t e m p i r i c i s m commands today more than a m e r e l y h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t . -70 I . THE ORIGIN AND ASSOCIATION OE IDEAS. The p r e d i l e c t i o n w h i c h we have observed i n both Locke and B e r k e l e y f o r b a s i n g p h i l o s o p h y on an a n a l y t i c a l p s y c h o l o g y i s a l s o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Hume, the t h i r d i n i t h i s b r i l l i a n t group of English e m p i r i c i s t s . The f i r s t t a s k o f p h i l o s o p h y i s to i n q u i r e i n t o the o p e r a t i o n s of the human mind: "The o n l y method of f r e e i n g l e a r n i n g , a t once, from these a b s t r u s e q u e s t i o n s , i s to e n q u i r e s e r i o u s l y i n t o the n a t u r e of human u n d e r s t a n d i n g , ' and show, from an exa,ct a n a l y s i s o f i t s powers and capa.city, t h a t i t i s by no means f i t t e d f o r 1 such remote and a b s t r u s e s u b j e c t s . " Hume overcomes i n h i s use of the term " i d e a " some of the o b j e c t i o n s to w h i c h B e r k e l e y i s open on t h i s ground. "for him, " t h o u g h t s " o r " i d e a s " are c o p i e s which m i r r o r a c c u r a t e l y but l a s s v i v i d l y our " i m p r e s s i o n s " , or more l i v e l y p e r c e p t i o n s . I m p r e s s i o n s and i d e a s resemble each o t h e r i n e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r except in. t h e i r degree of f o r c e or v i v a c i t y . I t i s a c a r d i n a l p o i n t i n Hume's t h e o r y of knowledge t h a t " a l l our i d e a s or:: more f e e b l e p e r c e p t i o n s are c o p i e s of our i m p r e s s i o n s or more l i v e l y ones." A n a l y s i s r e v e a l s t h a t the components of thoughts and i d e a s are such s i m p l e i d e a s as are " c o p i e d f r o m a. p r e c e d e n t f e e l i n g or s e n t i m e n t . F u r t h e r , a d e f e c t i n an o r g a n of sense w h i c h r e s u l t s i n the 1. Hume, "An E n q u i r y Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " , Harvard C l a s s i c s E d i t i o n , P.311, ¥ol. 37 (Hume). -71-absence of the a p p r o p r i a t e s e n s a t i o n a l s o r e s u l t s i n the absence o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g i d e a s . The s t r e n g t h and v i v a c i t y o f i m p r e s s i o n s enables us to s e t up l i m i t s between them and p r e v e n t s us from f a l l i n g i n t o any e r r o r or m i s t a k e w i t h r e g a r d t o them. S i n c e any c l e a r i d e a must have as i t s c o r r e s p o n d e n t a v i v i d " a n d c l e a r i m p r e s s i o n , where we can f i n d no i m p r e s s i o n from w h i c h the supposed i d e a i s d e r i v e d , we can assume t h a t the term d e n o t i n g t h a t i d e a i s b e i n g used w i t h o u t any meaning* T h i s r i g o r o u s t e s t o f meaning o b v i o u s l y w i l l have f a r - r e a c h i n g consequences when Hume comes to employ i t i n h i s a n a l y s i s of c a u s a t i o n . The g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n between i d e a s are reduced by Hume t o t h r e e : resemblance, c o n t i g u i t y i n t i m e or p l a c e , and cause and e f f e c t <• The e x a m i n a t i o n of t h i s l a s t p r i n c i p l e of asso c i a t i o n i n t r o d u c e s us to Hume's main thesis» I I . THI NATURE 01? CONCLUSIONS FROM EXPERIENCE. I n o p p o s i t i o n t o B e r k e l e y , who t r i e d t o put mathematics on an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s , Hume m a i n t a i n s t h a t mathematics c o n s i s t s of p r o p o s i t i o n s o f a k i n d d i s c o v e r a b l e by t h e mere o p e r a t i o n of thought w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to any e x t e r n a l e x i s t e n c e . A l l s uch i n t u i t i v e l y or d e m o n s t r a t i v e l y c e r t a i n a f f i r m a t i o n s w h i c h e x p r e s s r e l a t i o n s between i d e a s f o r m one c l a s s of o b j e c t s of our r e a s o n . I n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to t h i s f i r s t k i n d o f knowledge we may d i s t i n g u i s h a second c l a s s — k n o w l e d g e o f "matter o f f a c t and e x i s t e n c e . " The t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t h i s c l a s s must be determined by e x p e r i e n c e a l o n e . S i n c e the c o n t r a r y o f ever y p r o p o s i t i o n i n t h i s c l a s s i m p l i e s no more c o n t r a d i c t i o n than the o r i g i n a l p r o p o s i t i o n , the c o n t r a r y i s t h e r e f o r e always p o s s i b l e s and hence r e a s o n i n g s from these p r o p o s i t i o n s can never be d e m o n s t r a t i v e l y c e r t a i n * H a ving demarcated the spheres o f mathematics and e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , Hume proceeds w i t h the acumen of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l g e n i u s to. f e r r e t out and a n a l y z e the e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e on w h i c h our r e a s o n i n g w i t h r e g a r d to m a t t e r s of f a c t p r o c e e d s . T h i s p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h a l o n e makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r us to go beyond the e v i d e n c e of our memory and senses, i s the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . Even i n the " T r e a t i s e " , h i s e a r l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l work, Hume shows a c l e a r c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the importance of t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . I n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n he s a y s : " I t h i n k i t p r o p e r to g i v e w a r n i n g t h a t I have j u s t now examined one o f t h e most sub l i m e q u e s t i o n s i n p h i l o s o p h y , v i z . t t h a t c o n c e r n i n g t h e power and e f f i c a c y o f causes; where a l l the s c i e n c e s seem so much i n t e r e s t e d . " 1 Hume a f f i r m s , as a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n w h i c h admits of no e x c e p t i o n , t h a t the knowledge of t h i s r e l a t i o n i s never a t t a i n e d by a p r o c e s s o f "a p r i o r i " r e a s o n i n g , but t h a t i t a r i s e s e n t i r e l y f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . F o r i n s t a n c e , an o b j e c t on 1. Hume, "A T r e a t i s e oh Human Mature," (Ed. T. H. Green) P.451. -73-i t s f i r s t p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l r e v e a l n o t h i n g to us of i t s causes o r e f f e c t s . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n w i l l be r e a d i l y a ccepted w i t h r e g a r d to our f i r s t e x p e r i e n c e o f uncommon o b j e c t s . But the same t r u t h does not appear t o be so e v i d e n t i n the case o f f a m i l i a r e v e n ts the s t r u c t u r e o f whi c h appears a t f i r s t s i g h t to be p e r f e c t l y s i m p l e . .We, seem then to be d e a l i n g v / i t h c a u s a l s e r i e s whose members we c o u l d determine by r e a s o n alone w i t h o u t any r e g a r d t o e x p e r i e n c e . We ima g i n e , f o r example, t h a t we c o u l d i n f e r the n a t u r e o f t h e m o t i o n one b i l l i a r d - b a l l w o u l d have on b e i n g s t r u c k by a second b a l l . Custom, however, i n cases l i k e these i s merely p r e s e n t to such a h i g h degree t h a t i t c o n c e a l s not o n l y our n a t u r a l i g n o r a n c e but even i t s e l f as w e l l . G iven the problem o f s t a t i n g the e f f e c t s o f the o p e r a t i o n o f an unknown obgect, we c o u l d p r o c e e d o n l y i n the most a r b i t r a r y manner. S i n c e the e f f e c t i s t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t from i t s cause, i t can ne v e r be d i s c o v e r e d i n the cause: "a p r i o r i " , a stone might as w e l l f a l l upwards as downwards. A l l s u p p o s i t i o n s we c o u l d make as t o the e f f e c t o f a, g i v e n cause are e q u a l l y c o n c e i v a b l e and c o n s i s t e n t . Only e x p e r i e n c e can t e l l us which one i s most p r o b a b l y t o happen. Even the s o l i d and f i r m r e a s o n i n g s o f mathematics cannot a i d us h e r e , f o r "every p a r t o f mixed mathematics proceeds upon the s u p p o s i -t i o n t h a t c e r t a i n laws are e s t a b l i s h e d by n a t u r e i n her , ,1 o p e r a t i o n s . " A b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g e i t h e r a s s i s t s e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e s e l a w s , or determines t h e i r i n f l u e n c e i n t hose i n s t a n c e s i n w h i c h we can app^y q u a n t i t a t i v e methods • A l l r e a s o n i n g s c o n c e r n i n g m a t t e r s o f f a c t are founded on the' r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t . E x p e r i e n c e , i n t u r n , i s the f o u n d a t i o n o f a l l our r e a s o n i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g tha.t r e l a t i o n . But i f we push our i n q u i r y f a r t h e r what s h a l l we propose as the f o u n d a t i o n f o r a l l c o n c l u s i o n s from e x p e r i e n c e ? Hume's f i r s t answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n i s n e g a t i v e : "Even a f t e r we have e x p e r i e n c e o f the o p e r a t i o n s of Cause and E f f e c t , our c o n c l u s i o n s from t h a t e x p e r i e n c e are not founded on r e a s o n i n g , or any p r o c e s s of the 2. u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " Our senses and r e a s o n g i v e us knowledge of the super-f i c i a l q u a l i t i e s o f o b j e c t s but f a i l to i n f o r m us o f the "powers and p r i n c i p l e s " on w h i c h the i n f l u e n c e of t h o s e o b j e c t s depends. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g our ignorance- of these " n a t u r a l powers" we always presume t h a t l i k e s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s w i l l be accompanied by l i k e s e n s i b l e powers, which w i l l i n t u r n produce e f f e c t s s i m i l a r to those we have a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d . The f o u n d a t i o n o f t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n cannot be any.vknown c o n n e c t i o n between the s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s and the -secret powers, s i n c e the mind knows n o t h i n g of the n a t u r e of the l a t t e r . P r o p o s i t i o n A: "Object x has been a t t e n d e d i n p a s t e x p e r i e n c e w i t h e f f e c t a", and p r o p o s i t i o n B: " I f o r e s e e t h a t an o b j e c t s i m i l a r T. " I n q u i r y ? - P. 329 to x w i l l be 'attended i n the f u t u r e by an e f f e c t s i m i l a r to a" are f a r from b e i n g i d e n t i c a l . S i n c e the c o n n e c t i o n between these two p r o p o s i t i o n s i s not i n t u i t i v e , those who m a i n t a i n t h a t the i n f e r e n c e i s made by a, c h a i n o f r e a s o n i n g w i l l ha.ve t o produce t h a t reasoning- w h i c h would j u s t i f y such an i n f e r e n c e . T h i s t a s k Hume p r o f e s s e s to be q u i t e unable to p e r f o r m . He u t i l i z e s a g a i n h i s t w o f o l d d i v i s i o n of human r e a s o n i n g s , i . e . * (1). d e m o n s t r a t i v e r e a s o n i n g and ( 2 j t h a t c o n c e r n i n g m a t t e r s o f f a c t and e x i s t e n c e . Now s i n c e i t i s p l a i n l y c o n c e i v a b l e and i m p l i e s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n to imagine t h a t the cour s e o f n a t u r e may change, t h e r e can be no d e m o n s t r a t i v e r e a s o n i n g s i n t h i s m a t t e r , f o r any de m o n s t r a t i v e arguments o r any a b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g "a p r i o r i " always p r o c e e d upon the p r i n c i p l e of,. c o n t r a d i c t i o n . -I f r e a s o n , t h e n , i s to p r o v i d e us w i t h a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s i n f e r e n c e , i t s arguments must be o n l y p r o b a b l e , o r such as r e g a r d m a t t e r s of f act and r e a l e x i s t e n c e i n accordance w i t h our p r e v i o u s d i v i s i o n . But we have seen t h a t a l 1 arguments c o n c e r n i n g e x i s t e n c e are founded on the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ; t h a t the knowledge o f t h i s r e l a t i o n i s d e r i v e d e n t i r e l y from e x p e r i e n c e ; and t h a t a l l e x p e r i m e n t a l c o n c l u s i o n s assume t h i s c o n f o r m i t y o f the f u t u r e to the p a s t . To attempt to prove t h i s c o n f o r m i t y by p r o b a b l g arguments or by arguments r e g a r d i n g e x i s t e n c e would be merely to move i n a v i c i o u s c i r c l e . F u r t h e r , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n about t h e f u t u r e were formed by r e a s o n , i t would be as p e r f e c t and complete a f t e r one i n s t a n c e o f any event as a f t e r a number o f s i m i l a r i n s t a n c e s . But Hume f i n d s that- t h i s i s not u n i v e r s a l l y the ca.se. To say t h a t from a number o f u n i f o r m e x p e r i e n c e s we i n f e r a c o n n e c t i o n between the s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s and the s e c r e t powers i s s i m p l y to pr e s e n t the .same d i f f i c u l t y under a d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t , f o r we s t i l l have to produce the arguments on w h i c h t h i s l a s t i n f e r ' ence i s based. S i n c e i n the case of some o b j e c t s t h e r e may be a change i n the " s e c r e t n a t u r e " and i n the r e s u l t a n t e f f e c t s and i n f l u e n c e s w i t h o u t any change i n the s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s , Hume argues that we can extend t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n o f u n p e r c e i v e d change t o a l l o b j e c t s . E x p e r i e n c e once a g a i n can g i v e us no s a f e g u a r d a g a i n s t t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n . F i n a l l y , i t i s a m a t t e r o f common knowledge t h a t even a n i m a l s improve by e x p e r i e n c e and l e a r n the q u a l i t i e s o f o b j e c t s by o b s e r v a t i o n of the e f f e c t s w h i c h r e s u l t f rom them. As i t i s obvious t h a t no p r o f o u n d p r o c e s s of argument can be at work her e , i t i s p o s s i b l e to employ t h i s argument B l s o i n support of the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t i t i s not r e a s o n i n g w h i c h l e a d s us to i n f e r t h a t the f u t u r e w i l l r esemble t h e pas t . H e i t h e r a f t e r one i n s t a n c e o f an event, then, nor a f t e r s e v e r a l , can r e a s o n g i v e us any argument i n support of the i n f e r e n c e we draw from p a s t to f u t u r e . The o n l y r e m a i n i n g p r i n c i p l e w h i c h Hume can adduce as the e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s i n f e r e n c e i s m e r e l y custom o r h a b i t . The r e p e t i t i o n o f any p a r t i c u l a r act o r o p e r a t i o n s i m p l y produces a p r o p e n s i t y i n -77-our minds to c o n t i n u e i n the same course o f t h i n k i n g . P a s t t h i s p r i n c i p l e we can push our e n q u i r i e s no f a r t h e r . We can g i v e no cause o f t h i s cause, hut must r e s t c o n t e n t e d w i t h i t as" the u l t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e of a l l our c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . A f t e r , the c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n of two o b j e c t s we are determined by custom alone to expect the one f r o m the appearance of the o t h e r . " T h i s h y p o t h e s i s seems even the o n l y one w h i c h e x p l a i n s the d i f f i c u l t y , why we draw, from a thousand i n s t a n c e s , an i n f e r e n c e w h i c h we are not ab l e to draw from one i n s t a n c e , t h a t i s , i n no r e s p e c t , d i f f e r e n t from them. Reason i s I n c a p a b l e of any such v a r i a t i o n . The c o n c l u s i o n s which i t draws from c o n s i d e r i n g one c i r c l e are the same whic h i t would f o r m upon s u r v e y i n g a l l the c i r c l e s i n the u n i v e r s e . But ho man, h a v i n g seen o n l y one body move a f t e r b e i n g i m p e l l e d by an o t h e r , c o u l d i n f e r t h a t , e v e r y o t h e r body w i l l move a f t e r a l i k e i m p u l s e . A l l i n f e r e n c e s from e x p e r i e n c e , I t h e r e f o r e , are e f f e c t s o f custom, not of r e a s o n i n g . " Custom i s the "great g u i d e of human l i f e . " 'Without i t s i n f l u e n c e we c o u l d know n o t h i n g of any m a t t e r of f a c t beyond what i s i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t i n sense p e r c e p t i o n . Y e t , a l t h o u g h c o n c l u s i o n s from e x p e r i e n c e c a r r y us beyond the e v i d e n c e o f the memory and the senses to remote times and p l a c e s , some •fact must always be p r e s e n t to these f a c u l t i e s from w h i c h we f i r s t p r o c e e d i n drawing our i n f e r e n c e s . I f t h i s f a c t i s not p r e s e n t our r e a s o n i n g s are mer e l y h y p o t h e t i c a l . 1."Enquiry; P. 340 -78-I I I . THE NATURE OE BELIEF. The customary c o n j u n c t i o n o f an o b j e c t b w i t h an e f f e c t a produces i n the mind a p r o p e n s i t y to b e l i e v e t h a t when_ a i s g i v e n , b w i l l f o l l o w . ?/hat i s the n a t u r e of t h i s b e l i e f ? The i m a g i n a t i o n , a l t h o u g h i t cannot c r e a t e i d e a s o u t s i d e o f those w h i c h are o r i g i n a l l y f u r n i s h e d by s e n s a t i o n and r e f l e c t i o n , has an u n l i m i t e d power o f compounding, com-p a r i n g , s e p a r a t i n g and u n i t i n g these o r i g i n a l and p r i m a r y i d e a s . The mind can c r e a t e numberless f i c t i o n s and a s c r i b e to them any c i r c u m s t a n c e s whatever. The d i f f e r e n c e between f i c t i o n and b e l i e f cannot l i e i n any p a r t i c u l a r i d e a w h i c h accompanies .those c o n c e p t i o n s w h i c h command our a s s e n t , s i n c e the mind c o u l d j o i n t h a t i d e a at w i l l to any of i t s f i c t i o n s and thus g a i n f o r them the s t a t u s . o f b e l i e f . I t c o n s e q u e n t l y f o l l o w s t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e between f i c t i o n and b e l i e f must l i e i n some: " s e n t i m e n t " o r f e e l i n g w h i c h accompanies the l a t t e r and does not accompany the former* S i n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e to c o n c e i v e the c o n t r a r y o f even a f i r m l y h e l d m a t t e r of f a c t , o n l y some f e e l i n g c o u l d p r o v i d e the ground o f d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n c e p t i o n s to which weeggve assent and the ones w h i c h we r e j e c t . T h i s f e e l i n g cannot be dependent on the w i l l : otherwise-we c o u l d s i m i l a r l y j o i n i t to any f i c t i o n . I t i s " e x c i t e d by n a t u r e " and a r i s e s i n a p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . The whole n a t u r e of b e l i e f c o n s i s t s s i m p l y i n a complex of c o n c e p t i o n - s e n t i m e n t d i f f e r e n t f r o m the c o n c e p t i o n - s e n t i m e n t o f a f i c t i o n of the -79-i mag-in at i o n . A d e f i n i t i o n o f t h i s " s e n t i m e n t " o f b e l i e f - i s a d i f f i c u l t t a s k . F o r Hume, b e l i e f i s " n o t h i n g but a more v i v i d , l i v e l y , f o r c i b l e , f i r m .steady c o n c e p t i o n o f an o b j e c t , than whatVthe I m a g i n a t i o n alone i s ever able t o a t t a i n . " B e l i e f does not c o n s i s t i n the p e c u l i a r n a t u r e or o r d e r o f i d e a s , but i n the manner of t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n and i n t h e i r f e e l i n g to the mind. T h i s "manner o f c o n c e p t i o n " a r i s e s from a customary c o n j u n c t i o n of the c o n c e i v e d o b j e c t w i t h some f a c t d i r e c t l y g i v e n by the memory o r by sense p e r c e p t i o n . Other o p e r a t i o n s o f the mind analogous to t h i s o p e r a t i o n are to be found i n the case o f the t h r e e r e l a t i o n s w h i c h govern the a s s o c i a t i o n of i d e a s - - ! . e J . , resemblance, c o n t i n g u i t y , and cause and e f f e c t . I n e v e r y i n s t a n c e o f each o f t h e s e r e l a t i o n s i t happens t h a t when one of t h e r e l a t e d o b j e c t s i s p r e s e n t e d to the senses or memory, "the mind i s not o n l y c a r r i e d to the c o n c e p t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i v e , but rea.ches a s t e a d i e r and s t r o n g e r c o n c e p t i o n o f i t e t h a n r w h a t i o t h e r w i s e i t -would have been a b l e to- a t t a i n . " F o r example, the p i c t u r e of an absent f r i e n d by i t s resemblance e n l i v e n s our i d e a of him. To produce t h i s e f f e c t b o t h a p r e s e n t i m p r e s s i o n and a r e l a t i o n are n e c e s s a r y . A g a i n , i n the case o f the r e l a t i o n o f c o n t i g u i t y , i t i s well-known t h a t d i s t a n c e d i m i n i s h e s and approach I n c r e a s e s t h e f o r c e and v i v a c i t y of any idea, w h i c h has-to do w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t y . C a u s a t i o n has the 1.''Enquiry',. P.344. -80-same e f f e c t as the o t h e r two r e l a t i o n s . The r e l i q u e s o f a s a i n t are t r e a s u r e d "because "between them and the s a i n t t h e r e i s a s h o r t e r c h a i n of c a u s a l sequence than any o t h e r c a u s a l s e r i e s by w h i c h we l e a r n o f h i s e x i s t e n c e . I t i s i m p o r t a n t , -however, to r e c o g n i z e t h a t these r e l a t i o n s o n l y have e f f e c t by v i r t u e o f a"presupposed b e l i e f i n the e x i s t e n c e of the c o r r e l a t i v e o b j e c t . Thus, the p i c t u r e o f our f r i e n d has i n f l u e n c e on our i m a g i n a t i o n o n l y because-we b e l i e v e t h a t he once e x i s t e d . Between the course of na t u r e and the s u c c e s s i o n of our i d e a s custom s e t s up a kin d , of p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony. Necessary to our v e r y s u b s i s t e n c e and the r e g u l a t i o n of conduct i n e v e r y sphere o f . a c t i v i t y , custom alone makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r us to go beyond what i s ? i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n i n memory and s e n s a t i o n . Had the i n f e r e n c e of l i k e e f f e c t s from l i k e causes "been l e f t to the o p e r a t i o n s of our r e a s o n , we c o u l d not have s u r v i v e d infancy.. Such a n e c e s s a r y a ct of the mind c o u l d o n l y haveebeen made se c u r e by the o p e r a t i o n of some i n s t i n c t i v e and m e c h a n i c a l tendency such as custom. N a t u r e i m p l a n t s i n us t h i s m e c h a n i c a l h a b i t , w h i c h c a r r i e s thought f o r w a r d i n a cour s e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h a t o b t a i n i n g among e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . -81-IV. THE ANALYSIS OE THE CAUSAL NEXUS. The l a s t g r e a t m e t a p h y s i c a l concept w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e d r e f i n e m e n t at the hands o f p h i l o s o p h e r s was the d o c t r i n e of cause- and e f f e c t . The p r i m i t i v e " b e l i e f i n c a u s a t i o n had come down i n t o a p e r i o d as l a t e as Plume's w i t h o u t any s e r i o u s c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n . One of the b e s t ways of' g a i n i n g an i n s i g h t i n t o t h i s " b e l i e f i s to abandon the p h i l o s o p h y of c i v i l i z e d Europe and to s e a r c h among p r i m i t i v e r a c e s f o r the c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h i s the e q u i v a l e n t o f our idea, o f c a u s a t i o n . A n t h r o p o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h e s have made i t c l e a r t h a t t h i s e q u i v a l e n t among p r i m i t i v e s i s some i d e a c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e "mana", o f the P o l y n e s i a n s , a term w h i c h i s approximated by our words " f o r c e " and "power". Man a., the source o f a l l energy, i s a vague power d i f f u s e d t h r o u g h a l l n a t u r e . There are however, c e r t a i n s p e c i a l c o n c e n t r a t i o n - c e n t r e s of t h i s power. Some of t h e s e s p e c i a l c e n t r e s became the s a c r e d totems of the p r i m i t i v e t r i b e , w h i c h f e l t - the n e c e s s i t y f o r c o n t r o l l i n g by r i t u a l t h e s e c r e t and dread f o r c e s of n a t u r e . More imp o r t a n t f o r our purposes,, t h i s man a. i s c o n s i d e r e d as t r a n s m i s s i b l e . I t f l o w s from one p l a c e or from "one pe r s o n to a n o t h e r . Thus, .the man a whi ch i s i n the t i g e r can be i m p r i s o n e d i n the savage by the s i m p l e expedient o f e a t i n g the t i g e r ' s f l e s h . We would indeed r e g a r d such a b e l i e f as p r i m i t i v e , but t h e r e i s l i t t l e o r no l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between the statement "The e a t i n g o f t i g e r f l e s h w i l l g i v e -82-me b r a v e r y " and "The e a t i h g o f t h i s b e e f s t e a k w i l l g i v e me power." B o t h i m p l y a vague b e l i e f i n a s o r t of f l o w i n g power d i f f u s i b l e t h r o u g h a l l n a t u r e . T h i s b e l i e f p e r s i s t e d i n A r i s t o t l e and even l a t e n t l y i n G a l i l e o , who t a c i t l y assumed t h a t power i s t r a n s m i t t e d i n a, co u r s e o f ' p h y s i c a l e v e n t s . For ilewton, g r a v i t a t i o n was a f o r c e w h i c h h e l d h i s g r e a t a s t r o n o m i c a l systems t o g e t h e r . D e s c a r t e s sensed a f l a w i n the theory o f c a u s a t i o n , as he r e a l i z e d the d i f f i c u l t y o f a c c o u n t i n g f o r the i n t e r a c t i o n between p h y s i c a l and me n t a l energy, but h i s fondness f o r d u a l i s m l e d him to l e a v e ' t h e q u e s t i o n u n s o l v e d . Even so keen an a n a l y s t as B e r k e l e y does not q u e s t i o n c a u s a t i o n . He d i s p e n s e s w i t h the power of a b s t r a c t m a t t e r , b u t r e f e r s e f f i c i e n t c a u s a t i o n to the i n t e r p o s i t i o n o f the w i l l o f the D e i t y . " E f f e c t " s t i l l means t h a t a "cause" has i n some way added power to the s i t u a t i o n . At f i r s t s i g h t , Hume's c h a p t e r on "necessary connexion" seems out o f p l a c e . Why d i d he not d e a l w i t h i t i n the s e c t i o n where he. d i s c u s s e d the na t u r e of c o n c l u s i o n s f rom e x p e r i e n c e , f o r the two t o p i c s a re i n d u b i t a b l y connected? The answer seems t o be t h a t Hume r e a l i z e d h i s t h e o r y o f custom as the b a s i s of a l l c o n c l u s i o n s f rom e x p e r i e n c e would be opposed by some app e a l t o an e j c t e r n a l n n e c e s s i t y c o n n e c t i n g p h y s i c a l e v e n t s - - i n o o t h e r words, by an appeal to some theory of " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " between p h y s i c a l phenomena. -83-A c c o r d i n g l y lie s e t s h i m s e l f to examine terms w h i c h he ex-p r e s s l y s t a t e s are f o r him n e a r l y synonymous and e q u a l l y o b s c u r e - - i . e e f f i c a c y , agency, power, f o r c e , energy, • 1 n e c e s s i t y , c o n n e x i o n , and p r o d u c t i v e q u a l i t y . H i s method i s s i m i l a r to B e r k e l e y ' s . I n e f f e c t , he a s k s : "What i s the c l e a r and u n e q u i v o c a l meaning of t h i s term, " c a u s a t i o n ? " F i r s t o f a l l , he r e v e r t s to t h e p r o p o s i t i o n which i s the c o r n e r s t o n e , o f a l l e m p i r i c i s m - - t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us to t h i n k o f a n y t h i n g w h i c h has not been p r e v i o u s l y e x p e r i e n c e d i n e i t h e r e x t e r n a l or i n t e r n a l s e n s a t i o n . Complex i d e a s can be known by d e f i n i t i o n , which i s s i m p l y an enumeration o f the s i m p l e i d e a s o f w h i c h they are composed. But i f , a f t e r p u s h i n g our i n q u i r i e s back t o the s i m p l e i d e a s , we are s t i l l i n v o l v e d i n o b s c u r i t y , we have o n l y one method of r e n d e r i n g these i d e a s p r e c i s e and d e t e r m i n a t e , and t h a t i s , to produce "the i m p r e s s i o n s or ' 2 o r i g i n a l s e n t i m e n t s , from w h i c h the i d e a s are c o p i e d . " These i m p r e s s i o n s , b e i n g f o r c e f u l and v i v i d , w i l l e x c l u d e a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of a m b i g u i t y , I f , t h e n , we want to throw l i g h t on t h i s obscure n o t i o n o f f o r c e or " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " l e t us f i r s t o f a l l f i n d the i m p r e s s i o n f rom w h i c h i t i s d e r i v e d . From what s o u r c e s c o u l d t h i s i m p r e s s i o n come? 1 . " " T r e a t i s e P . 451 2. "Enquiry"! P. 356 -84-(1} From e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . C o n s i d e r a t i o n of the o p e r a t i o n of causes i n the case o f e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s never enables us to d i s c o v e r i n any s i n g l e i n s t a n c e whatever any power, ne c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n , or q u a l i t y w h i c h b i n d s the e f f e c t t o the cause and makes i t . a b s o l u t e l y dependent on the cause. A l l we are c o n s c i o u s of i n t h i s s i n g l e i n s t a n c e i s a s u c c e s s i o n ; event a, then event b. Because i t i s o n l y a s i n g l e case of the phenomenon, t h e mind f e e l s no "sentiment o r inward i m p r e s s i o n " from t h i s e x t e r n a l s u c c e s s i o n of o b j e c t s . From t h e s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s o f no p a r t of m a t t e r can we ever d i s c o v e r any power or energy w h i c h c o u l d a l l o w us to p r e d i c t a n e c e s s a r y r e s u l t , o f i t s working . " I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the i d e a of power can be d e r i v e d from the c o n t e m p l a t i o n of b o d i e s , i n s i n g l e i n s t a n c e s o f t h e i r o p e r a t i o n ; because no b o d i e s ever d i s c o v e r 1 any power, w h i c h can be t h e o r i g i n a l o f t h i s i d e a . " (2) From r e f l e c t i o n . Another p o s s i b l e t h e o r y of the o r i g i n of our i d e a of power i s t h a t i t i s d e r i v e d from r e f l e c t i o n on the o p e r a t i o n s of the mind, and i s c o p i e d f rom some i n t e r n a l i m p r e s s i o n . The i n f l u e n c e of the w i l l , by v/hich we v a r y i d e a s and move the p a r t s o f our b o d y , i s known i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Hence we are supposed to a r r i v e at t h e i d e a of .power o r energy. l . " E n Q u i r v f P. 356 -85-But Hume f i n d s t h i s " p r e t e n s i o n " a,s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y as the f i r s t t h e o r y . I t i s t r u e t h a t t h e motion of our body f o l l o w s upon the command of the w i l l , , but we are a b s o l u t e l y i g n o r a n t of the means by'which t h i s m o t i o n i s e f f e c t e d and the energy w h i c h makes i t p o s s i b l e . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the supposed u n i o n of s o u l w i t h body and the nat u r e o f e i t h e r , substance are b o t h e q u a l l y and c o m p l e t e l y m y s t e r i o u s . S e c o n d l y , our w i l l has a u t h o r i t y over some members of the body and hot over o t h e r s . I f we were c o n s c i o u s o f a power i n the f i r s t c ase, we c o u l d g i v e a r e a s o n f o r i t s absence i n the second. E x p e r i e n c e o n l y teaches us t h a t m o t i o n f o l l o w s the command of the w i l l , . w i t h o u t showing us t h e c o n n e c t i o n between the two. L a s t l y , p h y s i o l o g y i n f o r m s us o f such a. l o n g / s e r i e s of events between the act of w i l l , a n d the movement of the body t h a t the na t u r e of the power by which t h e whole o p e r a t i o n i s performed i s q u i t e u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . I t i s however t r u e t h a t "the animal n i s u s , w h i c h we e x p e r i e n c e , though i t can a f f o r d no a c c u r a t e p r e c i s e i d e a of power, e n t e r s v e r y much i n t o t h a t 1 v u l g a r , i n a c c u r a t e i d e a , w h i c h i s formed o f i t . " (3) Erom v o l i t i o n . 1 I t may s t i l l be p o s s i b l e t h a t we are : c o n s c i o u s o f a power o r energy i n our own minds when by an act of w i l l we, " r a i s e up" a n e w i d e a , h o l d i t f o r c o n t e m p l a t i o n , | 1."Enquiry*,.footnote P. 360. ' | ; "• . .' ' •' " • "' I • • ' • • ' ' • ' • • . i 1 s ••• • • • •• . ' . ' ' .' ' • i -86-and d i s m i s s i t at w i l l . But here a g a i n i t i s an i l l u s i o n t o imagine, t h a t we have any i m p r e s s i o n f rom w h i c h we can d e r i v e a c l e a r i d e a o f power. We know n e i t h e r the n a t u r e of the.human s o u l nor t h e n a t u r e o f an i d e a , and s t i l l l e s s the r e l a t i o n between them. F u r t h e r , i f the n a t u r e o f t h i s power were known we c o u l d a s s i g n a r e a s o n f o r the f a c t t h a t the mind can c o n t r o l some i d e a s hut not o t h e r s . As the matter stands we cannot. T h i r d l y , t h i s power o f self-command v a r i e s w i t h p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o n d i t i o n s of the body, and f o r these v a r i a t i o n s we can a g a i n a s s i g n no r e a s o n except e x p e r i e n c e . ., The d i f f i c u l t y i s not s o l v e d by r e c o u r s e to t h e o r i e s o f o c c a s i o n a l i s m or I d e a l i s m . A l t h o u g h t h e g r e a t e r p a r t of mankind r e f e r s o n l y u n u s u a l events to' the i n t e r v e n t i o n of the D e i t y , the p h i l o s o p h e r s o f these s c h o o l s r e f e r every c a u s a l s e r i e s t o the i n t e r p o s i t i o n o f the d i v i n e w i l l . But such d o c t r i n e s s u b v e r t the end they have i n ' view and are too f a n c i f u l - to c a r r y c o n v i c t i o n . More i m p o r t a n t , Hume p o i n t s out t h a t i t i s indeed, t r u e t h a t we are- i g n o r a n t of the manner of o p e r a t i o n o f b o d i e s upon one another; but we are e q u a l l y i g n o r a n t of the manner of o p e r a t i o n o f the mind. I t i s no more d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c e i v e t h a t m o t i o n may a r i s e from i m p u l s e than t h a t i t may a r i s e from v o l i t i o n . As we have seen, t h i s c r i t i c i s m a p p l i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y to B e r k e l e y ' s type o f • - -I d e a l i s m . -87-(4) Prom custom. There remains o n l y one p o s s i b l e source f o r t h i s i m p r e s s i o n . From any s i n g l e and O r i g i n a l appearance o f a n a t u r a l o b j e c t o r event i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r us to f o r e t e l l w i t h o u t e x p e r i e n c e what e f f e c t s w i l l r e s u l t from i t . But a f t e r a c o n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n of event b w i t h event a we no l o n g e r h e s i t a t e to p r e d i c t b from the appearance of a. "We t h e n . c a l l the one o b j e c t Cause; the o t h e r E f f e c t . We suppose t h a t t h e r e i s some connexion between them; some power i n the one, by w h i c h i t i n f a l l i b l y produces the o t h e r , and o p e r a t e s w i t h the g r e a t e s t c e r t a i n t y and s t r o n g e s t 1 n e c e s s i t y . " '. The i d e a o f " n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n " a p p a r e n t l y comes, then, from a number of s i m i l a r i n s t a n c e s o f the c o n j u n c t i o n o f two e v e n t s . But l o g i c a l l y a number o f i n s t a n c e s of an event p r o v i d e s n o t h i n g w h i c h i s n o t : e v i d e n t i n one i n s t a n c e . The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t r e p e t i t i o n i n d u c e s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l h a b i t i n t h e mind, w h i c h i s l e d by custom to expect and b e l i e v e t h a t event b w i l l f o l l o w event a. Hume's own statements put t h e r e a s o n i n g c l e a r l y and f o r c e f u l l y : " T h is c o n n e x i o n , t h e r e f o r e , w h i c h we f e e l i n the mind, t h i s customary t r a n s i t i o n of the i m a g i n a t i o n from one o b j e c t to i t s u s u a l a t t e n d a n t , i s the s e n t i m e n t o r i m p r e s s i o n from w h i c h we form the i d e a o f povi/er or n e c e s s a r y c o n n e x i o n . N o t h i n g f a r t h e r i s i n the c a s e . Contemplate the s u b j e c t on a l l s i d e s ; you w i l l n ever f i n d any o t h e r o r i g i n o f t h a i i d e a . T h i s i s the s o l e d i f f e r e n c e between one i n s t a n c e , f r o m w h i c h 1. ".Enquiry', P. 566. -88-we can never r e c e i v e the i d e a o f c onnexion, and a number o f s i m i l a r i n s t a n c e s , by w h i c h i t i s suggested. The f i r s t time a, man saw the communication of motion by i m p u l s e , as by the shock of two b i l l i a r d b a l l s , he c o u l d not pronounce t h a t the one event was connected: but o n l y t h a t i t was c o n j o i n e d w i t h the o t h e r . A f t e r he has observed s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s of t h i s n a t u r e , he then pronounces them to be connected. What a l t e r a t i o n has happened to g i v e r i s e to t h i s new i d e a o f connexion? • N o t h i n g but t h a t he now f e e l s t hese events to be- connected i n h i s i m a g i n a t i o n , and can r e a . d i l y f o r e t e l l the e x i s t e n c e o f one f rom the appearance of the o t h e r . "Wnen we say, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t one o b j e c t i s connected w i t h a n o t h e r , we mean o n l y t h a t they have a c q u i r e d a connexion i n our t hought, and g i v e r i s e to t h i s i n f e r e n c e , by w h i c h 1 they become p r o o f s of each o t h e r ' s e x i s t e n c e . " I n o t h e r words, the n e c e s s i t y w h i c h seems to a t t a c h to p h y s i c a l events i s a. p s y c h o l o g i c a l not a. l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y . The i d e a of c a u s a l i t y has f o r i t s o r i g i n a l i m p r e s s i o n t h a t f e e l i n g which a t t e n d s the o p e r a t i o n s of the mind when i t c o n s i d e r s two events w h i c h i n i t s e x p e r i e n c e have always been c o n j o i n e d . " N e c e s s i t y , then, i s the e f f e c t of t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n , and i s n o t h i n g ,but an i n t e r n a l i m p r e s s i o n o f the mind, or a d e t e r m i n a t i o n to c a r r y our thoughts from one o b j e c t 2 to a n o t h e r . " " E i t h e r we have no i d e a of n e c e s s i t y , or n e c e s s i t y i s n o t h i n g b u t t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the thought to pass from causes to e f f e c t s , and from e f f e c t s to causes, 3 a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r e x p e r i e n c ' d u n i o n . " T h i s a n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s the r e a l b a s i s f o r Hume's s c e p t i c i s m . A l l our r e a s o n i n g s c o n c e r n i n g m a t t e r of f a c t and e x i s t e n c e depend on the r e l a t i o n of cause and e f f e c t , and only by means of t h i s r e l a t i o n can we p r o c e e d "b.eyond what i s p r e s e n t t o the memory o r s e n s e s . Yet we cannot even g i v e a 1. " E n q u i r y " , P.367. 2. " T r e a t i s e " , P.459. 3. Ibid., P.460. -89-: d e f i n i t i o n o f a cause w h i c h shows t h a t circumstance.: i n i t w h i c h g i v e s i t a c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i t s e f f e c t . V.: SENSE PERCEPTION AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD, W i t h the more obvi o u s o b j e c t i o n s ?/hich s c e p t i c i s m c a s t s upon the ev i d e n c e of the se n s e s , Hume has i n t h i s i m p o r t a n t s e c t i o n l i t t l e concern. The C a r t e s i a n method o f doubt he - c o n s i d e r s to be d e l u s i v e , s i n c e thjere i s no o r i g i n a l p r i n c i p l e w h i c h has a p r e r o g a t i v e above a l l o t h e r s , and from w h i c h we can b u i l d up by d e d u c t i o n a f i r m e d i f i c e of knowledge. He t u r n s h i s ..attention i n s t e a d , t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n h e r e n t I n the t h e o r y of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n . Some "na.tural i n s t i n c t or p r e p o s s e s s i o n " c a r r i e s men, even b e f o r e the use o f r e a s o n , to p l a c e f a i t h i n the te s t i m o n y o f sense p e r c e p t i o n and to suppose an e x t e r n a l u n i v e r s e whibh i s q u i t e independent o f our p e r c e p t i o n s . I n t h i s s t a t e men suppose t h a t the images p r e s e n t e d by the v-senses are the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , w h i c h are p e r c e i v e d d i r e c t l y and I n a p e r f e c t l y r e a l manner. R e f l e c t i o n , however, soon d e s t r o y s t h i s o p i n i o n . The t a b l e changes shape and c o l o u r as we change p o s i t i o n : c o n s e q u e n t l y i t i s not the r e a l t a b l e , b ut i t s image o r copy w h i c h i s g i v e n i n p e r c e p t i o n . P e r c e p t i o n s are considered, by r e a s o n to be merely f l e e t i n g •• c o p i e s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f o t h e r existenc©s-;which remain u n i f o r m and inde p e n d e n t . -90-But t h i s new system can be j u s t i f i e d n e i t h e r by an appeal to n a t u r e , f o r i t i s u n n a t u r a l ; nor by an appeal to r e a s o n , f o r t h i s t a s k exceeds our c a p a c i t y . ¥e cannot prove t h a t the p e r c e p t i o n s o f the mind must be caused by e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s . I n many cases we know t h a t they do not, as- f o r i n s t a n c e i n mental d i s o r d e r s ; , and i n any c a s e , n o t h i n g i s more i n e x p l i c a b l e t h a n t h i s supposed a c t i o n of body on mind. Only e x p e r i e n c e i s ca p a b l e of d e t e r m i n i n g whether or no't e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s produce p e r c e p t i o n s i n us. "But here e x p e r i e n c e i s , and must be e n t i r e l y s i l e n t . The mind has never a n y t h i n g p r e s e n t to i t b u t the p e r c e p t i o n s , end cannot p o s s i b l y r e a c h any e x p e r i e n c e of t h e i r c o nnexion w i t h o b j e c t s . The s u p p o s i t i o n of such a connexion i s , 1 t h e r e f o r e , w i t h o u t any f o u n d a t i o n i n - ' r e a s o n i n g . " The s o l u t i o n s o f f e r e d by D e s c a r t e s and B e r k e l e y , of i n v o k i n g the D e i t y to u p h o l d the v e r a c i t y of our senses, r e p r e s e n t an i n a d m i s s i b l e p r o c e d u r e . S i n c e God c a n never d e c e i v e , our senses.would i n any case be i n f a l l i b l e . But more i m p o r t a n t , Hume.advances the o b j e c t i o n w h i c h was s e t out i n the c h a p t e r on B e r k e l e y : i.e., t h a t i f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s once c a l l e d i n q u e s t i o n , "we s h a l l be at a l o s s t o f i n d arguments by w h i c h we may prove the e x i s t e n c e o f that B e i n g o r any o f h i s a t t r i b u t e s . " On the s u b j e c t o f 1. "Snauiryr P.434. 2. Ibid., ; p.435. -91-the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , then, t h i s more p r o f o u n d type o f s c e p t i c i s m w i l l always t r i u m p h ; f o r i n r e j e c t i n g the views of n a i v e H e a l i s m we a.dopt an h y p o t h e s i s (on supposedly 1 r a t i o n a l grounds) w h i c h i s i n d e f e n s i b l e hy re a s o n . l i k e B e r k e l e y , Hume p u t s the p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s of m a t t e r on the same f o o t i n g . The supposed "primary 1' q u a i l t i e s o f e x t e n s i o n and s o l i d i t y have no more t i t l e to t h a t denomination t h a n have t h e secondary q u a l i t i e s of c o l o u r , h a r d n e s s , e t c . The a s s e r t i o n t h a t the i d e a s o f these p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s are a t t a i n e d hy a b s t r a c t i o n cannot save us from t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , s i n c e t h i s n o t i o n of a b s t r a c t i o n i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e and absurd. "An e x t e n s i o n , t h a t i s n e i t h e r t a n g i b l e nor v i s i b l e , cannot p o s s i b l y be c o n c e i v e d : and a. t a n g i b l e o r v i s i b l e e x t e n s i o n , which i s n e i t h e r h a r d nor s o f t , b l a c k nor w h i t e , i s e q u a l l y beyond 1. Hume's approach t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i n the "•TreatlBj©41 i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more i n v o l v e d and a b s t r u s e . I n b r i e f , h i s argu-ment i s t h a t t h e i d e a of the continued, e x i s t e n c e o f body depends on the' i d e a o f i d e n t i t y o r the p r i n c i p l e of i n d i v i d u -a t i o n . T h i s p r i n c i p l e i n t u r n supposes b o t h the i n v a r i a b l e -ness and the u n i n t e r r u p t e d n e s s o f any o b j e c t . How i t i s a p r i n c i p l e , o f thought t h a t when two i d e a s are a s s o c i a t e d i n the ima.gina.tion by the r e l a t i o n of resemblance one i s e a s i l y m i s t a k e n f o r the o t h e r . Though i n t e r r u p t e d , our p e r c e p t i o n s do form a s u c c e s s i o n of r e l a t e d o b j e c t s , and t h i s s u c c e s s i o n p l a c e s the mind i n the same d i s p o s i t i o n , as. i f i t were s u r v e y i n g an i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t . Hence we confound s u c c e s s i o n w i t h i d e n t i t y . But the i n t e r r u p t i o n o f our p e r c e p t i o n s seems to c o n t r a d i c t t h i s i d e n t i t y , s i n c e i d e n t i t y i n v o l v e s u n i n t e r -r u p t e d n e s s . The p e r p l e x i t y a r i s i n g from t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n i s , however, d i s a g r e e a b l e to the mind. A c c o r d i n g l y the i m a g i n a t i o n u n i t e s t h e s e "broken appearances" by the f i c t i o n o f a c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e . S i n c e t h i s p r o p e n s i t y a r i s e s from s o m e " l i v e l y i m p r e s s i o n s of the memory', i t "bestows a/ v i v a . c i t y on t h a t f i c t i o n ; o r i n o t h e r words, makes us b e l i e v e the c o n t i n u ' d e x i s t e n c e o f body", s i n c e b e l i e f c o n s i s t s merely -9 2-* 1 ' 1 the r e a c h o f human c o n c e p t i o n . " I f a l l s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s a r e, then, not i n the o b j e c t but i n the mind, matter i s a n n i h i l a t e d , and i n i t s p l a c e t h e r e i s l e f t o n l y "a c e r t a i h , unknown, i n e x p l i c a b l e something, as the cause of our p e r c e p t i o n s ; a n o t i o n so i m p e r f e c t , t h a t no s c e p t i c w i l l 1 t h i n k i t w o r t h w h i l e to contend a g a i n s t i t . " i n the v i v a c i t y of an i d e a . But we encounter a, new d i f f i c u l t y . "The i m a g i n a t i o n t e l l s us, t h a t our r e s e m b l i n g p e r c e p t i o n s have a. c o n t i n u ' d and u n i n t e r r u p t e d e x i s t e n c e , and are not a n n i h i l a t e d by t h e i r absence. R e f l e c t i o n t e l l s u s, t h a t even our r e s e m b l i n g p e r c e p t i o n s are i n t e r r u p t e d i n t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , and d i f f e r e n t from e a ch o t h e r . The c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w i x t these o p i n i o n s we elud e by a new f i c t i o n , w h i c h i s conformable to. t h e hypotheses b o t h o f r e f l e c t i o n and f a n c y , by a s c r i b i n g these c o n t r a r y q u a l i t i e s to d i f f e r e n t e x i s t e n c e s ; the i n t e r r u p t i o n to p e r c e p t i o n s , and the co n t i n u a n c e t o o b j e c t s . " (P.502) From t h i s p o i n t the a t t a c k on "the p h i l o s o p h i c a l system" w h i c h s e t s up the h y p o t h e s i s o f double e x i s t e n c e and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same as i n the " E n q u i r y " . We are c e r t a i n o n l y o f those e x i s t e n c e s c a l l e d p e r c e p t i o n s . From the e x i s t e n c e of one t h i n g t o t h a t o f another we can p r o c e e d o n l y by a p r o c e s s o f c a u s a l i n f e r e n c e , but t h i s p r o c e s s i s l i m i t e d to e x p e r i e n c e . S i n c e e x p e r i e n c e j u s t i f i e s us i n c o n s i d e r i n g a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n s o n l y , we can never i n f e r a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n s and o b j e c t s . 1. " E n q u i r y " , P.436. -93-V I . THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO. The q u e s t i o n w h i c h Hume pu t s to the d o c t r i n e o f the e x i s t e n c e o f an i m m a t e r i a l substance o r s o u l i s the same q u e s t i o n put by B e r k e l e y t o t h e d o c t r i n e of matter.. " I know no b e t t e r method," says Hume,'"than to ask these p h i l o s o p h e r s i n a few words, 'what they mean by substance and i n h e s i o n ? ' " T h i s q u e s t i o n cannot be answered e i t h e r w i t h r e g a r d to mat t e r and body o r w i t h r e g a r d t o the mind o r s o u l * S i n c e every i d e a i s d e r i v e d from a prec e d e n t i m p r e s s i o n , i f we d i d have an i d e a of the substan c e o f our minds we would a l s o have an i m p r e s s i o n o f i t . : - T h i s i s i m p o s s i b l e , f o r an i m p r e s s i o n , because i t cannot r e s e m b l e " a subs t a n c e cannot r e p r e s e n t i t . F a i l u r e to show t h e i m p r e s s i o n and i t s source means f a i l u r e t o e x h i b i t t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g i d e a w i t h any degree o f c l a r i t y ; and such i s t h e case h e r e . N e i t h e r can a mere d e f i n i t i o n ( s u c h as S p i n o z a ' s ) g i v e any answer as to t h e n a t u r e o f s u b s t a n c e , f o r such a d e f i n i t i o n i s an answer i n words o n l y . As our knowledge i s a b s o l u t e l y c o n f i n e d to p e r c e p t i o n s , we c a n , t h e r e f o r e , have no knowledge whatever o f "s u b s t a n c e " o r o f " i n h e s i o n " or of any s i m i l a r s c h o l a s t i c terms. As f a r as t h e q u e s t i o n o f the cause of our p e r c e p t i o n s i s concerned, i n the " T r e a t i s e " Hume l e n d s support t o , t h e c o n t e n t i o n of M a t e r i a l i s m as a g a i n s t I d e a l i s m o r ©ccasionalis H i s argument i s t h a t , s i n c e we are never c o n s c i o u s o f any nec e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n between causes and e f f e c t s , when we -94-c o n s i d e r the m a t t e r "a p r i o r i " , a n y t h i n g may he the cause of a n y t h i n g . S i n c e a l l r e a l o b j e c t s are thus capable o f a co n s t a n t c o n j u n c t i o n , the q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h o b j e c t s are c o n j o i n e d i s p u r e l y a m a t t e r f o r e x p e r i e n c e to v e r i f y . I t i s t r u e t h a t we can f i n d "no manner of con n e x i o n b e t w i x t m otion or thought"; but t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a p p l i e s to a l l c a u s a l c o r r e l a t e s . And i n the case o f some p e r c e p t i o n s , e x p e r i e n c e does l e a d us to i n f e r a c o n n e c t i o n between thought and m o t i o n , . f o r the d i f f e r e n t s t a t e s o f the body produce a c o r r e s p o n d i n g change i n one's thoughts and s e n t i m e n t s . The n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y a l s o d i s s o l v e s under Hume's " i m p r e s s i o n t e s t . " T/e ha,ve no i d e a of any s e l f , the-d o c t r i n e s of some p h i l o s o p h e r s to the c o n t r a r y . We cannot have a c l e a r i d e a o f s e l f b e f o r e we can f i n d the co r r e s p o n d -i n g i m p r e s s i o n , and y e t t o seek f o r such an i m p r e s s i o n i s o b v i o u s l y absurd. S i n c e the s e l f i s supposed to e x i s t unchanged, any i m p r e s s i o n o f i t must be s i m i l a r l y unchanged. Yet we have no such c o n s t a n t i m p r e s s i o n . A g a i n , how are our o t h e r p e r c e p t i o n s Connected w i t h t h i s ego or s e l f ? Hume f i n d s t h a t , " f o r my p a r t , when I e n t e r most i n t i m a t e l y i n t o what I c a l l m y s e l f , I always stumble on some p a r t i c u l a r p e r c e p t i o n or o t h e r , of heat o r c o l d , l i g h t o r shade, l o v e or h a t r e d , p a i n or p l e a s u r e . I never can c a t c h m y s e l f a t any time w i t h o u t a p e r c e p t i o n , and never can observe a n y t h i n g but the p e r c e p t i o n . When my p e r c e p t i o n s are remov'd f o r any t i m e , as by sound s l e e p ; so l o n g am I i n s e n s i b l e o f m y s e l f , and may t r u l y be s a i d not to e x i s t . And i i e r e a l l my p e r c e p t i o n s remov'd by d e a t h , and cou'd I n e i t h e r t h i n k , n or f e e l , nor see, nor l o v e , nor h a t e a f t e r the d i s s o l u t i o n o f my body, I shou'd be e n t i r e l y a n n i h i l a t e d , nor do I c o n c e i v e what i s f a r t h e r r e q u i s i t e to make me a p e r f e c t -95-1 n o n - e n t i t y . "• •; The s e l f i s " n o t h i n g hut a b u n d l e or c o l l e c t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s , w h i c h succeed es.ch o t h e r w i t h an i n c o n c e i v a b l e r a p i d i t y , and are i n a p e r p e t u a l f l u x o r 1 movement." There i s no s i m p l i c i t y o r i d e n t i t y i n the mind. I t i s a k i n d o f theatre., a c r o s s the s t a g e of w h i c h p e r c e p t -i o n s pass and r e p a s s i n e n d l e s s forms and- c o m b i n a t i o n s ; "nor have we the most d i s t a n t n o t i o n o f the p l a c e , where these scenes are r e p r e s e n t e d , or of t h e m a t e r i a l s , of w h i c h 2 i t i s compos' d." I n another passage, Hume speaks o f the mind as " n o t h i n g b u t a heap or c o l l e c t i o n o f d i f f e r e n t p e r c e p t i o n s , u n i t e d t o g e t h e r by c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s , and suppos'd, t h o ' f a l s e l y , to be endow'd w i t h a p e r f e c t s i m p l i c i t y 5 and i d e n t i t y . " A t h i n k i n g b e i n g i s m e r e l y a "connected mass of p e r c e p t i o n s . " "The i d e n t i t y , 'which we a s c r i b e to the mind o f man, i s o n l y a f i c t i t i o u s one, and of a l i k e k i n d w i t h t h a t w h i c h we a s c r i b e to v e g e t a b l e s and animal 4 b o d i e s . " T h i s f i c t i o n by w h i c h we c r e a t e the n o t i o n of the i d e n t i t y o f the s e l f i s s i m i l a r i n i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n to the f i c t i o n by w h i c h we c o n c e i v e o f the c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f 5 body. S i n c e memory i s the o n l y f a . c u l t y w h i c h a c q u a i n t s us o f the c o n t i n u a n c e and e x t e n t o f our s u c c e s s i o n of p e r c e p t i o n s i t . must on t h a t account be c o n s i d e r e d as the c h i e f s o u r c e of the n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y . 1. " T r e a t i s e " , P.534. 2. Ibid,, P.535. 3. Ibid., P.495. 4. Ibid., P.540. 5. See f o o t n o t e , PP.91-92. -96-f l l . "A MITIGATED SCEPTICISM. " • • ' : '• However " s i n c e r e or i n s i n c e r e Hume may. have been i n h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e p t i c i s m , i t i s beyond doubt t h a t he never advocated the c a r r y i n g o f the r e s u l t of these r e s e a r c h e s i n t o o r d i n a r y l i f e . P r a c t i c e r e f u t e s the doubts w h i c h reason c a s t s on the v a l i d i t y of our i n f e r e n c e from past to f u t u r e . E x p e r i e n c e i s the grea.t g u i d e of l i f e , and to a c t c o n t r a r y to the p r e c e p t s i t g i v e s us i s s i m p l y to p l a y the f o o l . P h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e p t i c i s m cannot undermine " n a t u r e " , which-'-will always p r e v a i l o v er any a b s t r a c t r e a s o n i n g what-so e v e r . The p r i n c i p l e of custom by w h i c h we p r o c e e d i n r e a s o n i n g s c o n c e r n i n g m a t t e r s o f f a c t and e x i s t e n c e " w i l l p r e s e r v e i t s i n f l u e n c e as l o n g as human n a t u r e remains the 1 same." A c t i o n and employment w i l l s u b v e r t P y r r h o n i s m or e x c e s s i v e s c e p t i c i s m , and l e a v e i n i t s p l a c e a. m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m w h i c h w i l l l i m i t our e n q u i r i e s to conform w i t h the narrow c a p a c i t y o f our u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t i s a f a v o r i t e p r a c t i c e to r e f u t e a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s d o c t r i n e by p o i n t i n g out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n i t . T h i s i s nowhere e a s i e r to do than i n the case o f a p r o f e s s e d s c e p t i c , f o r at f i r s t s i g h t i t seems as i f a s c e p t i c must i n e v i t a b l y c o n t r a d i c t h i m s e l f and d e s t r o y h i s own argument. He uses r e a s o n to a r r i v e a t a c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h d e s t r o y s the v a l i d i t y of r e a s o n . How then does he know th a t h i s o r i g i n a l p r o c e s s of thought was v a l i d , s i n c e i t was i t s e l f a;, p r o d u c t of l i "Enquiry'', P. 338 -97-reason? F u r t h e r , g r e a t p h i l o s o p h e r s have a f f i r m e d that a b s o l u t e s c e p t i c i s m i s i m p o s s i b l e . Thus, D e s c a r t e s found that he c o u l d doubt e v e r y t h i n g but the f a c t o f h i s d o u b t i n g , Y/hieh -fact he a c c o r d i n g l y made the b a s i s o f h i s system. S t . Thomas Aquinas s t a t e d t h i s t r u t h i n y e t another form i n h i s aphorism: "Etiam q u i negat v e r i t a t e m esse, c o n c e d i t v e r i t a t e m esse; s i enim V e r i t a s non e s t , non verum e s t non esse v e r i t a t e m . " I t i s , however, not t r u e t h a t a l l such arguments a g a i n s t s c e p t i c i s m are sound* F o r example, c o n s i d e r the well-known case o f Epimenides t h e C r e t a n ' s s a y i n g , " A l l C r e t a n s are l i a r s . " S i n c e E p i m e n i d e s , who says t h i s , i s h i m s e l f a C r e t a n , we are supposed, i n B e r k e l e y ' s p h r a s e , to "be " i n v o l v e d a l l i n s c e p t i c i s m . " But modern l o g i c does not ac c e p t t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l r e a s o n i n g , and c o n s i d e r s an argument l i k e t h i s to be an example of the " v i c i o u s c i r c l e f a l l a c y . " L o g i c i a n s c o n s i d e r t h a t " A l l C r e t a n s a r e " l i a r s " , when used i n t h i s manner i s s t r i c t l y a m e a n i n g l e s s p r o p o s i t i o n , so t h a t the 1 whole argument becomes non-sense. We need n o t , t h e r e f o r e , assume t h a t o t h e r s i m i l a r arguments a g a i n s t s c e p t i c i s m are v a l i d : perhaps some s u b t l e l o g i c a l f a l l a c y l i e s h i d d e n i n them a l s o . I n f a c t , i t i s well-known t h a t even the g r e a t 'mathematical g e n i u s D e s c a r t e s committed a l o g i c a l f a l l a c y i n 1. Gf. Ushenko, A.P. "The Theory o f L o g i c " , (Harper & B r o s . , I.Y. 1936.) P.173: "What Epimenides s a i d cannot be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e f o r the s i m p l e r e a s o n t h a t i t i s not a p r o p o s i t i o n but merely a s t r i n g o f words." -98-h i s "Gogito ,* ergo sum'1, w h i c h i s i n r e a l i t y a p s y c h o l o g i c a l , not a l o g i c a l argument, and i t has been shown t h a t h i s 1 o n t o l o g i c a l argument i n v o l v e s y e t o t h e r f a l l a c i e s . These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c a s t doubt on the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s common charge a g a i n s t Hume's s c e p t i c i s m . But i n any case, the s c e p t i c i s m w h i c h Hume advances i s p r o b a b l y not of a k i n d to be a f f e c t e d by such a charge. A l l t h a t he c l a i m s t o do i s to show t h a t r e a s o n does not j u s t i f y our main premise i n a l l non-mathematical t h i n k i n g : i . e . , t h a t the w o r l d i s a u n i t y , bound by laws w h i c h i n e v i t a b l y a s s u r e the s i m i l a r i t y of the f u t u r e to the p a s t . We must p r o c e e d on t h i s p r e m i s e , s i n c e no o t h e r one would make our v e n t u r e even p o s s i b l e , but we cannot j u s t i f y our proced u r e on r a t i o n a l grounds. I n t h i s same v e i n , i t has f u r t h e r been urged a g a i n s t Hume t h a t h i s whole p h i l o s o p h y demonstrates t h e a c t i v i t y of t h a t t h i n k i n g s e l f the e x i s t e n c e of w h i c h he p r o f e s s e s at the c o n c l u s i o n o f h i s " T r e a t i s e " to deny. I t h i n k i t must be admitted t h a t Hume i s at h i s weakest i n the c h a p t e r on p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y . On h i s p r i n c i p l e s , he i s p e r f e c t l y r i g h t ' i n deducing t h a t we have no knowledge o f the s e l f , i f indeed there i s one. But a f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s , he t r i e s t o account f o r the r e a s o n s w h i c h l e a d us to b e l i e v e i n t h i s i d e n t i t y . Here we have- noted h i s e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i t i s the 1. Ushenko, o p . c i t . , P.163: "An i n t e r e s t i n g example of p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i i s D e s c a r t e s ' o n t o l o g i c a l p r o o f o f God's e x i s t e n c e , t a k e n t o g e t h e r w i t h h i s comments about t h i s p r o o f . " -99-memory w h i c h u n i t e s p e r c e p t i o n s and g i v e s us the n o t i o n o f i d e n t i t y . What i s t h i s "memory"? The mind i s n o t h i n g hut a heap o f i m p r e s s i o n s : i s memory p a r t of t h e mind, and t h e r e f o r e o n l y an i m p r e s s i o n , or i s i t "apart from" the mind'? Hume ad m i t t e d l a t e r t h a t he c o u l d not " e x p l a i n the p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t u n i t e our s u c c e s s i v e p e r c e p t i o n s i n our thought or c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I cannot d i s c o v e r any t h e o r y , 1 w h i c h g i v e s me s a t i s f a c t i o n on t h i s head." Reviewing h i s own account, he s a y s : "But upon a. more s t r i c t r e v i e w of the s e c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g -personal' i d e h t i t y , I f i n d m y s e l f i n v o l v ' d i n such a l a b y r i n t h , t h a t , I must c o n f e s s , I n e i t h e r know how to c o r r e c t my form e r o p i n i o n s , nor how to r e n d e r them - 2 c o n s i s t e n t . " The c o n f u s i o n of b o t h Locke's t h e o r y of the t a b u l a r a s a and Hume's account of the" s e l f l e n d p o i n t to L e i b n i z ? ' s famous a d d i t i o n to the e m p i r i c i s t d i c t u m : " N i h i l e s t i n i n t e l l e c t u quod non f u i t primum i n s e n s u — n i s i i n t e l l e c t u s i p s e . " The e m p i r i c i s t a n a l y s i s does seem to r e d uce mind to a heap of p e r c e p t i o n s , and then t h e r e i s n o p u t t i n g i t t o g e t h e r a g a i n . The sad f a t e o f Humpty Dumpty i s a case i n p o i n t , here* T h i s apparent d e f e c t i n the p r o c e d u r e of a n a l y s i s ha.s of c o u r s e been made t h e b a s i s of a f u r t h e r a t t a c k on Hume. Anal - y s i s i s s a i d to d i s t o r t R e a l i t y . Of c o u r s e , the i d e a o f d i s t o r t i o n , we c o u l d say l i k e good H e g e l i a n s , i n v o l v e s 1. ''Treatise? (Appendix), P. 559. 2. Ibid., P. 558. -100-the p r i o r i d e a o f n o n - d i s t o r t i o n . How do we know t h a t r e a l i t y i s d i s t o r t e d ( o r m i r r o r e d ) "by any view, u n t i l we know f i r s t what r e a l i t y . i s - - - o r , more i m p o r t a n t , i f i t i s ? I s " r e a l i t y " , as some have suggested, m e r e l y a name, l i k e "matter", " s u b s t a n c e " , or " u n i v e r s e " ? Whatever the c a s e , we do f i n d t h i s p o l e m i c a g a i n s t the procedure of a n a l y s i s . Goethe i n h i s " F a u s t " p u t s i t as f o r c e f u l l y as p o s s i b l e : "Wer w i l l . w a s L e b e n d i g s erkennen und b e s c h r e i b e n , ' Sucht e r s t den G e i s t heraus zu t r e i b e n , Dann hat er d i e T h e i l e i n s e i n e r Hand, E e h l t l e i d e r . ' nur das g e i s t i g e Sand, ' E n c h e i r e s i n n a t u r a e ' n e n n t ' s die. Chemie, 1 S p o t t e t i h r e r s e l b s t und w e i s s n i c h t w i e . " C e r t a i n l y i t appears t h a t even i n p h i l o s o p h y , when we a n a l y s e a u n i t y such as the mind seems to be, we l o s e the u n i t y i n the a c t o f a n a l y s i s . S i n c e we do not know what r e a l i t y i s , we cannot o f course soy whether a n a l y s i s or i n t u i t i o n g i v e s a. " t r u e r " view o f the w o r l d . But a study o f the n a t u r e of communication w i l l show us what s o r t o f knowledge about r e a l i t y e i t h e r one i s c a p a b l e o f c o n v e y i n g . And here we can say not o n l y t h a t a n a l y s i s g i v e s us t h a t type o f knowledge w h i c h i s communicable, but t h a t any c o m m u n i c a b l e • p r o p o s i t i o n , because i t i s communicating form and not c o n t e n t , i s capable of a n a l y s i s . I t i s not too much to say t h a t communicable knowledge i s a n a l y t i c a l knowledge. The m y s t i c , on the o t h e r hand, a s s e r t s w i t h e q u a l r i g h t and p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t h i s i n s i g h t i n t o 1. "Eaust" P a r t I , LL. 1936-41 -101-K e a l i t y i s j u s t as v a l i d as the l o g i c i a n ' s . Here i s the ground of h i s c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t a n a l y s i s ; f o r , s i n c e h i s i n s i g h t cannot he g i v e n form, i t i s a b s o l u t e l y incommunicable. I f he t r i e s t o communicate i t ( i . e . , a n a l y s e i t ) he f i n d s t h a t an a n a l y t i c a l p r o c e d u r e i s q u i t e i n c a p a b l e o f conveying t h a t i n s i g h t . I n t h i s view he i s c o r r e c t , f o r the net of a n a l y s i s does not c a t c h the i n s i g h t s of m y s t i c i s m . But when the m y s t i c a s s e r t s t h a t h i s view o f R e a l i t y i s t r u e r than the s c i e n t i s t ' s , he i s e n t e r i n g the r e a l m o f communicable knowledge and l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e , and must submit h i s case to the most a u t h o r i t a t i v e and b e s t e s t a b l i s h e d laws of th a t r e a l m . Here he w i l l never f i n d , and can never f i n d , any support f o r h i s c o n t e n t i o n . B o t h ways o f appr o a c h i n g tfeality, a r e , . a s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , " a b s t r e c t i oris . " N e i t h e r can ever c l a i m s u p e r i o r i t y over the o t h e r , f o r t h e r e i s no common s t a n d a r d o f a p p e a l . Another c r i t i c i s m b rought a g a i n s t Hume i n the l i g h t of Kant's " C r i t i q u e " i s t h a t Hume c o n f u s e s the or d e r of n a t u r e w i t h the n e c e s s i t y o f c a u s a t i o n . T h i s obj e c t i o n would admit t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to c o n c e i v e of the cour s e o f n a t u r e as changing, but t h a t we cannot imagine a cause o c c u r r i n g w i t h o u t some e f f e c t . I n o t h e r words, c a u s a t i o n i s a u n i v e r s a l and ne c e s s a r y c a t e g o r y of thought, and r i g h t l y h o l d s a p l a c e i n Kant's l i s t o f "a p r i o r i " c o n c e p t s . From a p u r e l y f o r m a l i s t i c p o i n t of view I t h i n k K ant does i n a sense answer Hume. Co n s c i o u s n e s s i m p l i e s change. As Hobbes, s a i d , "to p e r c e i v e the same t h i n g s always and not -102-to p e r c e i v e at a l l reduce to the same t h i n g . " Nov/ change i n i t s t u r n must i m p l y at l e a s t two e v e nts i n t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n , one o f which we d e f i n e as cause and the o t h e r a.s e f f e c t . S i n c e e x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e s the c o n s c i o u s n e s s of change as i t s p r i o r c o n d i t i o n we can p r e d i c t t h a t a l l f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e w i l l -be g i v e n i n terms o f the c a t e g o r y o f cause and e f f e c t . But o f what importance i s i t t o know t h i s ? S c a r c e l y any. I t - i n v o l v e s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n whatever to c o n c e i v e t h a t event C- i n s t e a d o f event B w i l l f o l l o w event A on i t s next o c c u r r e n c e . S i n c e Kant c o u l d not deny t h i s , we may assume t h a t the c a t e g o r y of c a u s a l i t y as he l a y s i t down--which as a c a t e g o r y i s supposed to he an a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y form of thought--does not e x c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the n o n c o n f o r m i t y of the f u t u r e course o f n a t u r e to the p a s t . F o r K a n t , the forms o f thought determine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of phenomena, but s i n c e o b v i o u s l y no f o rm o f thought r e q u i r e s us to b e l i e v e t h a t the f u t u r e w i l l resemble th e p a s t , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t such a change i n nature might e n t e r i n t o our e x p e r i e n c e . And t h i s r e a l l y was the e s s e n t i a l p o i n t o f Hume's c r i t i c i s m . Were t h e r e some ne c e s s a r y bond o r c a s u a l nexus between e v e n t s , we might be a s s u r e d of u n i f o r m i t y . But even Kant does not c l a i m to d i s c o v e r such a m a t e r i a l f a c t o r i n c a u s a l i t y . H i s argument i s p u r e l y f o r m a l , and from the v i e w p o i n t of s c i e n c e q u i t e b a r r e n of r e s u l t s . No f o r m a l argument can a s s u r e us t h a t the f u t u r e c o u r s e of e v e n t s w i l l r esemble th e p a s t except i n s o f a r as they w i l l be o r d e r e d i n terms of the c a t e g o r y of -103-c a u s a l i t y . I n t h i s sense c a u s a l i t y i s even f o r Hume a "necessary" c o n c e p t i o n , f o r he e x p l i c i t l y a f f i r m s t h a t c a u s a t i o n i s and must he the c o r n e r s t o n e of a l l our c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m e x p e r i e n c e . The consequences and, i m p l i c a t i o n s of Hume's a n a l y s i s r e q u i r e from a s t u d e n t o f p h i l o s o p h y a l o n g p e r i o d of i n t e l l e c t u a l a c c l i m a t i z a t i o n b e f o r e they can be f u l l y r e a l i z e d . Everyone would c a l l the f o l l o w i n g b e a u t i f u l d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i o n between the moon and the ocean p o e t i c a l : " S t i l l as a s l a v e b e f o r e h i s l o r d , The ocean h a t h no b l a s t ; H i s g r e a t b r i g h t eye most s i l e n t l y Up to the moon i s c a s t - -I f he may know w h i c h way to go, Eor she g u i d e s him smooth o r g r i m . " But i t i s o n l y a f t e r a l o n g p r o c e s s o f accustoming o n e s e l f to Hume's way o f t h i n k i n g t h a t one sees a n y t h i n g r e m o t e l y p o e t i c a l i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t : "The t i d e s a r e caused by the g r a v i t a t i o n a l p u l l e x e r t e d by the moon on the e a r t h . " Hume has shown c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t the i m p l i e d n o t i o n o f f o r c e . i s an u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d and u n j u s t i f i e d p r o j e c t i o n from what i s e x p e r i e n c e d to what i s not e x p e r i e n c e d . Such anthropomorphism i s u n n e c e s s a r y f o r s c i e n c e , p r o v i d e d we g i v e up the d e l u s i v e attempt to answer the q u e s t i o n "Shy?,1.1 o f any phenomenon. For example, i n t h i s esse a l l we can attempt to do i s to s t a t e t he o b s e r v e d r e l a t i o n s between the p o s i t i o n and r e v o l u t i o n s o f the moon and t h e movement o f the t i d e s . Hume c o n s t a n t l y s t r e s s e s t h i s l i m i t a t i o n o f our e n q u i r i e s : -104-"While we cannot g i v e a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e a s o n , why we b e l i e v e , a f t e r a thousand e x p e r i m e n t s , t h a t a stone w i l l f a l l , o r f i r e b u r n ; can we e v e r s a t i s f y o u r s e l v e s c o n c e r n i n g any d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Yvrhich we may form, w i t h r e g a r d to the o r i g i n of 1 w o r l d s , and the s i t u a t i o n of n a t u r e , from, and •to e t e r n i t y ? " 1 . E n q u i r y , P. 442. CHAPTER IV. JOHN STUART MILL: "AN EXAMINATION OE SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY." CHAPTER IV JOHN STUART MILL: "AN EXAMINATION OE SIR W. HAMILTON'S PHILOSOPHY." I. THE SCOTTISH "COMMON SENSE SCHOOL." A f t e r the d e c i s i v e stage to w h i c h Hume "brought p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e were o n l y two c o u r s e s l e f t f o r s u c c e e d i n g t h i n k e r s . The German p h i l o s o p h e r s , on the one hand, made a supreme attempt to g e t knowledge c o m p l e t e l y o f f an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s . They endeavoured to s i f t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n o r d e r to r e a c h the "a p r i o r i " p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the mind c o n s t r u c t e d knowledge. Granted the p o s s i b i l i t y of the e x i s t e n c e of s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " knowledge, i t was a l e g i t i m a t e procedure at the t i m e , but i n the p r e s e n t a g e , i t s f o u n d a t i o n s have been undermined. The second p o s s i b i l i t y was to accept the c o n c l u s i o n s w h i c h Hume had drawn from the p r e v a l e n t e m p i r i c a l p s y c h o l o g y , and to r e a l i z e t h a t , i f our knowledge was dependent on e x p e r i e n c e , i t c o u l d not 'after a l l t r a n s c e n d e x p e r i e n c e i n any p o s t u l a t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e s or o f a u n i f y i n g bond between phenomena. E n g l i s h and American p h i l o s o p h e r s , i n the main, have t r i e d to d e v e l o p Hume. T h e i r concern has been to r e f i n e f u r t h e r the v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s of our knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , and to seek some p r i n c i p l e which would e n a b l e them to r e c o n s t r u c t the mind from Plume's c h a o t i c "heap of p e r c e p t i o n s " i n t o some semblance of u n i t y . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n the famous a s s o c i a t i o n p s y c h o l o g y was developed and c a r r i e d to the p o i n t where i t s hypotheses became c a p a b l e o f s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n . I t has been -p o i n t e d out t h a t even the modern c o n d i t i o n e d response t h e o r y s i m p l y a t t e m p t s to p r o v i d e a n e u r o l o g i c a l r e f e r e n c e f o r the p r i n c i p l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n w h i c h these n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h i n k e r s f o r m u l a t e d . The s o - c a l l e d " S c o t t i s h S c h o o l " p r o f e s s e d to s o l v e the q u e s t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d by a.n appeal to common sense and to the u n i v e r s a l s e n t i m e n t o f mankind i n or d e r to undercut the s o p h i s t r i e s i n w h i c h m e t a p h y s i c i a n s had i n v o l v e d the s u b j e c t . They m a i n t a i n e d , i n g e n e r a l , t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s a t t e s t s d i r e c t l y the f a c t of an ego and of a non-ego i n e x p e r i e n c e . I t w i l l h e l p to s e t the theory i n a, c l e a r e r l i g h t i f we quote some passages from S i r ¥. H a m i l t o n , who i n s p i t e o f h i s i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s r e p r e s e n t s the g e n e r a l 1 p o i n t o f view o f the " i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s t " s c h o o l . "We are i m m e d i a t e l y c o n s c i o u s i n p e r c e p t i o n , " says H a m i l t o n , "of an ego and a non-ego, known t o g e t h e r , arid known i n c o n t r a s t to each o t h e r . . . I n t h i s a c t I am c o n s c i o u s o f m y s e l f as the p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t , and o f an e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y as the o b j e c t p e r c e i v e d ; and I am c o n s c i o u s o f b o t h e x i s t e n c e s i n the same i n d i v i s i b l e moment of i n t u i t i o n . . . The ego and n o n - e g o — m i n d and m a t t e r - a r e not o n l y g i v e n t o g e t h e r , but i n a b s o l u t e c o - e q u a l i t y . The one does not pre c e d e , t h e o t h e r does not f o l l o w ; and i n t h e i r mutual r e l a t i o n each i s e q u a l l y dependent, e q u a l l y independent. 2 Such i s the f a c t as g i v e n i n and by c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " 1. Two v a r i a n t t h e o r i e s may be noted b r i e f l y . Thomas R e i d (1710-1796)held a t h e o r y o f " n a t u r a l s i g n s " . "The e x t e r n a l o b j e c t i s always s a i d to be p e r c e i v e d through the medium of ' n a t u r a l s i g n s ' : these s i g n s b e i n g our s e n s a t i o n s , i n t e r p r e t e d by a n a t u r a l i n s t i n c t * " ( M i l l , "An E x a m i n a t i o n of S i r W. Hamilton's Philosophy^' P. 214. ) Our s e n s a t i o n s , by a n a t u r a l p r o c e s s o f s u g g e s t i o n , g i v e us the c o n c e p t i o n and the b e l i e f of the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . "Nature h a t h e s t a b -l i s h e d a r e a l c o n n e x i o n between the s i g n s and the t h i n g s s i g -n i f i e d , and Nature h a t h a l s o taught us the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the s i g n s — s o t h a t , p r e v i o u s t o e x p e r i e n c e , the s i g n suggests the t h i n g s i g n i f i e d , and c r e a t e s the b e l i e f of i t . " ( R e i d , " I n -q u i r y i n t o t h e Human Mind," (Works) P.131; apud M i l l , o p . c i t . , P. 217.) Thomas Brown (1778-1820) c o n s i d e r e d t h a t we have, on the o c c a s i o n of c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s , an i n s t a n t a n e o u s and i r r e s i s t i b l e c o n v i c t i o n of an outward, o b j e c t . "The mental m o d i f i c a t i o n w h i c h we e x p e r i e n c e from the presence o f an o b j e c t , r a i s e s i n us an i r r e s i s t i b l e b e l i e f t h a t the o b j e c t e x i s t s . " ( M i l l , o p . c i t . , P.198.) Brown c l a i m e d t h a t t h i s was an i n s t i n c t i v e b e l i e f i m p l a n t e d by Na t u r e . 2. S i r W. H a m i l t o n , " L e c t u r e s " , i . ?• 288- 295 , apud . M i l l ,op. c i t .^188 f f . 108-The v a r i o u s hypotheses of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n are d i s m i s s e d o u t r i g h t : "We are c o n s c i o u s of no r e f e r e n c e , o f no r e p r e s e n t a t i o n : we b e l i e v e t h a t the o b j e c t of w h i c h we are c o n s c i o u s 1 i s t h e o b j e c t w h i c h e x i s t s . " H a m i l t o n a f f i r m s f u r t h e r , t h a t we have not only a d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n of the r e a l i t y of m a t t e r but a l s o of i t s p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s - - e x t e n s i o n , s o l i d i t y , f i g u r e , e t c . : "The developed d o c t r i n e o f R e a l P r e s e n t a t i o n i s m , the b a s i s -of N a t u r a l R e a l i s m ( t h e d o c t r i n e o f the author h i m s e l f ) a s s e r t s the c o n s c i o u s n e s s or immediate p e r c e p t i o n o f c e r t a i n e s s e n t i a l a t t r i b u t e s o f M a t t e r o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g . . . W e have not merely a n o t i o n , a c o n c e p t i o n , an i m a g i n a t i o n , a s u b j e c t i v e r e p r e s e n t -a t i o n - - o f E x t e n s i o n f o r ex amp1e--c a 11e d up or sugges-. t e d i n some i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e manner to the mind, on o c c a s i o n o f an extended o b j e c t b e i n g p r e s e n t e d to the sense; but t h a t i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f such an o b j e c t we r e a l l y have, as by n a t u r e we b e l i e v e we have, an immediate knowledge of t h a t e x t e r n a l o b j e c t as extended."2 " I t i s t r u l y a n . i d l e problem to attempt i m a g i n i n g the s t e p s by w h i c h we may be supposed to have a c q u i r e d the n o t i o n o f E x t e n s i o n , when, i n f a c t , we are unable to imagine t o o u r s e l v e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h a t n o t i o n not b e i n g always i n our p o s s e s s i o n . "3 Any t h i n k e r a f t e r B e r k e l e y and Hume who h e l d such views was o f course an easy v i c t i m f o r the acute M i l l . There i s no need to examine h i s r e f u t a t i o n o f H a m i l t o n ' s v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , o r to e n t e r on a d e s c r i p t i o n o f H a m i l t o n ' s t e d i o u s and d e t a i l e d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n t t h e o r i e s w h i c h •had been advanced on the s u b j e c t of our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . M i l l comes r i g h t to the p o i n t at i s s u e . 1. S i r W. H a m i l t o n , " L e c t u r e s " , i i .P? 138-139: apud M i l l , op. c i t . , P.201 2. S i r W. H a m i l t o n , " D i s s e r t a t i o n s on R e i d " , P.894: apud M i l l , o p . c i t . , P.180. 3. S i r W,. H a m i l t o n , " D i s s e r t a t i o n s on R e i d " , P.825: apud M i l l , o p . c i t . , P.18. -109-The d i f f i c u l t y does not l i e . i n any d i s p u t e over the v a l i d i t y o f the t e s t i m o n y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s i n c e such a d i s p u t e i s i m p o s s i b l e . The p o i n t of c o n t r o v e r s y i s the d e c i s i o n as to what c o n s c i o u s n e s s does t e s t i f y t o . I n t r o s p e c t i o n can show us b e l i e f s w h i c h are accompanied by v a r y i n g degrees of d i f f i c u l t y i n accomodating thought to a d i f f e r e n t view of the 1 s u b j e c t , but mere i n t r o s p e c t i o n can never prove t h a t c e r t a i n o f these b e l i e f s are i n t u i t i v e . I n c o n t r a s t to the m e t a p h y s i c a l method of i n t r o s p e c t i o n , M i l l d i s t i n g u i s h e s a second method, the p s y c h o l o g i c a l , w h i c h he employs i n h i s own c l e a r t h e o r y of. the s o u r c e of our b e l i e f i n an e x t e r n a l v/orld. I n e n d e a v o u r i n g t o a s c e r t a i n j u s t what c o n s c i o u s n e s s does g i v e u s , we have two p o s s i b l e c o u r s e s , c o r r e s p o n d i n g to these two t h e o r i e s . We can, f i r s t , d etermine p r e c i s e l y what the i d e a s now a r e , f i n d out what c o n s c i o u s n e s s a c t u a l l y t e l l s us, and then proceed, to frame a. t h e o r y w h i c h s h a l l account f o r the o r i g i n o f the r e m a i n i n g c o n t e n t of any m ental phenomena A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we can f o l l o w Locke, and b e g i n by examining the o r i g i n o f our i d e a s . M i l l a f f i r m s t h a t t h i s second method i s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e one, and t h a t t h e . f i r s t i s d e c e p t i v e i n i t s p r o m i s e s . C o n s i d e r , f o r example, the v e r y q u e s t i o n at hand, t h a t ' o f the e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . 1. I n M i l l ' s sense, where i t i s c o n t r a s t e d w i t h " p s y c h o l o g i c a l . -110-I t i s t r u e t h a t i f we c o u l d a s c e r t a i n the co n t e n t o f the f i r s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n an i n f a n t , "whatever was p r e s e n t i n t h a i f i r s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s w o u l d he the genuine t e s t i m o n y of C o n s c i o u s n e s s , and would be as much e n t i t l e d to c r e d i t , i n d e e d t h e r e would be as l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d i s c r e d i t i n g i t , as our s e n s a t i o n s themselves. But we have no means o f now a s c e r t a i n i n g , by d i r e c t ; e v i d e n c e , whether we were c o n s c i o u s of outward and extended o b j e c t s when we f i r s t opened our eyes to the l i g h t . That a b e l i e f or knowledge o f such o b j e c t s i s i n our c o n s c i o u s -ness now, whenever we use our eyes or our mu s c l e s , i s no r e a s o n f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t i t was t h e r e f r o m the b e g i n n i n g , u n t i l vv-e have s e t t l e d the q u e s t i o n whether i t c o u l d p o s s i b l y have been brou g h t i n s i n c e . I f any mode can be p o i n t e d out i n w h i c h w i t h i n the compass of p o s s i b i l i t y , i t might have been brought i n , the hypo-t h e s i s must be examined and d i s p r o v e d b e f o r e we are e n t i t l e d to co n c l u d e t h a t the c o n v i c t i o n i s an o r i g i n a l d e l i v e r a n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " 1 The i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s t t h e o r y i s c o n s e q u e n t l y of no a v a i l i n t h e p r e s e n t i n q u i r y . We must f a l l back on t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l method, and w i t h an adequate knowledge o f the modes o f g e n e r a t i o n o f tho s e mental f a c t s w h i c h a r e a d m i t t e d l y not i n t u i t i v e l y : d i s c o v e r whether i t . i s p o s s i b l e from such p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s to frame a t h e o r y o f our b e l i e f i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d w h i c h w i l l remove t h a t b e l i e f from the r e a l m o f i n t u i t i v e f a c t s . I I . THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OE THE BEL TEE IN AN' EXTERNAL WORLD. The c h a p t e r i n J.S. M i l l ' s work w h i c h b e a r s t h i s t i t l e r e p r e s e n t s the core o f h i s th e o r y o f our b e l i e f i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s are not o r i g i n a l w i t h M i l l h i m s e l f . H i s t h e o r y i s a, c o m b i n a t i o n of B e r k e l e y a n i s m developed t o a p o i n t where t h a t form of I d e a l i s m r e c e i v e s a sounder e x p o s i t i o n * and o f the a s s o c i a t i o n p s y c h o l o g y , founded 1. M i l l , '"An E x a m i n a t i o n ofSirrWm. H a m i l t o n ' s P h i l o s o p h y " , P. 178. -111-by H a r t l e y and l a r g e l y completed by James M i l l . A g a i n s t the v a r i o u s forms of the i n t u i t i o n a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s , . M i l l attempts to show t h a t our b e l i e f i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s an a c q u i r e d p r o d u c t . H i s p r e m i s e s are o n l y two i n number. The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory p o s t u l a t e s , f i r s t , t h a t the human mind i s c a p a b l e o f E x p e c t a t i o n : i . e . , t h a t a f t e r e x p e r i e n c e o f a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n s , we can form the c o n c e p t i o n o f p o s s i b l e f u t u r e s e n s a t i o n s w h i c h we would f e e l i f c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s were p r e s e n t . I t p o s t u l a t e s , s e c o n d l y , the laws o f the A s s o c i a t i o n o f Idea s , w h i c h are f o u r i n number: (1) S i m i l a r phenomena, tend to be thought o f t o g e t h e r ; (2) Phenomena w h i c h have e i t h e r been e x p e r i e n c e d or c o n c e i v e d i n c l o s e c o n t i g u i t y to one a n o t h e r , tend to be thought o f t o g e t h e r , such c o n t i g u i t y b S i n g of two k i n d s , e i t h e r (a) of s i m u l t a n e i t y , o r (b) o f immediate s u c c e s s i o n . (3) A s s o c i a t i o n s produced by c o n t i g u i t y become more c e r t a i n and r a p i d by r e p e t i t i o n . When two phenomena have been v e r y o f t e n e x p e r i e n c e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n and have never o c c u r r e d s e p a r a t e l y e i t h e r i n e x p e r i e n c e or thought an " I n s e p a r a b l e A s s o c i a t i o n " i s produced between them. Such an a s s o c i a t i o n i s not i n e v i t a b l y i n d i s s o l u b l e , but so long- as t h e r e has been no e x p e r i e n c e o f thought w h i c h runs c o n t r a r y to t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n , i t i s i r r e s i s t i b l e . (4) When the bond between two i d e a s i s thus f i r m l y r i v e t e d , the f a c t s o r phenomena c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o those i d e a s f i n a l l y -112-come to seem I n s e p a r a b l e i n e x i s t e n c e . "Things w h i c h we a r e unable to c o n c e i v e a p a r t appear i n c a p a b l e o f e x i s t i n g a p a r t ; and the b e l i e f we have i n t h e i r c o - e x i s t e n c e , though r e a l l y a p r o d u c t , o f e x p e r i e n c e , seems i n t u i t i v e . " I n the case o f s i g h t , f o r i n s t a n c e , "we see a r t i f i c i a l l y t h a t what we see i s a.book, o r a s t o n e , ead'h of t h e s e b e i n g not m e r e l y an i n f e r e n c e , but a heap of i n f e r e n c e s , from the s i g n s w h i c h we s e e , t o t h i n g s not v i s i b l e . " Granted these p r e m i s e s , M i l l a ttempts to show t h a t the o r d e r o f our s e n s a t i o n s and of our, r e m i n i s c e n c e s o f s e n s a t i o n i n e v i t a b l y g e n e r a t e o t h e r a s s o c i a t i o n s w h i c h are the source o f our a p p a r e n t l y i n t u i t i v e b e l i e f i n an e x t e r n a l w o r l d . When we say t h a t an o b j e c t w h i c h we p e r c e i v e i s " e x t e r n a l " to us, we, mean t h a t i n our p e r c e p t i o n s t h e r e i s concerned something w h i c h does not depend f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e i n any way on our t h i n k i n g of i t . T h i s i d e a o f something w h i c h i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from our f l e e t i n g i m p r e s s i o n s by an i n v a r i a b l e -ness, a " p e r d u r a b i l i t y " , a.nd by an independence o f our awareness o f i t , c o n s t i t u t e s our n o t i o n o f e x t e r n a l substance. T h i s complex c o n c e p t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory, i s s i m p l y "the form impressed by the known laws o f a s s o c i a t i o n * upon the c o n c e p t i o n or n o t i o n , o b t a i n e d by 3 e x p e r i e n c e , o f C o n t i n g e n t S e n s a t i o n s . " 1. Ibid., P. 226. 2. Ibid., P. 22'7' -113-Ebr' example, I have an e x p e r i e n c e o f an e x t e r n a l o b j e c t , x, at a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n space and time. When I change my own p o s i t i o n i n space, t h a t phenomenon i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t to me; h u t a l l my pa s t e x p e r i e n c e l e a d s me I r r e s i s t i b l y t o suppose t h a t , g i v e n the same s e t of antecedent c o n d i t i o n s , I f I were to r e t u r n at any time to t h a t p l a c e I s h o u l d once a g a i n have the same e x p e r i e n c e . In my c o n c e p t i o n of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d my p r e s e n t s e n s a t i o n s , b e i n g t r a n s i t o r y and f u g i t i v e , p l a y a s m a l l e r r o l e than does t h i s b e l i e f 1 have i n a c o u n t l e s s v a r i e t y o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s of s e n s a t i o n . E x p e r i e n c e c o n s t a n t l y c o n f i r m s me i n my b e l i e f o f the permanence o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s . As permanent, t h e y need a s p e c i a l name to d i s t i n g u i s h them from o r d i n a r y s e n s a t i o n , and by a " f a m i l i a r e x p e r i e n c e o f our me n t a l n a t u r e " t h e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g name ( " M a t t e r " ) , a l t h o u g h i t a p p l i e s o n l y to s e n s a t i o n r e g a r d e d i n a c e r t a i n a s p e c t , comes to be c o n s i d e r e d as e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f r om s e n s a t i o n . 'These "guaranteed p o s s i b i l i t i e s " o f s e n s a t i o n have f u r t h e r Import ant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , "they have r e f e r e n c e , not t o s i n g l e s e n s a t i o n s , but to s e n s a t i o n s j o i n e d t o g e t h e r i n g r o u p s . " The n o t i o n of body conveys t o us not t h e i d e a o f some one s e n s a t i o n , but o f a g r e a t number and v a r i e t y o f s e n s a t i o n s , a l l l i n k e d t o g e t h e r by a s s o c i a t i o n , so t h a t t h e p r e s c e n c e o f one i m m e d i a t e l y s u g g e s t s t h e p o s s i b l e presence o f a l l the r e s t . S i n c e any s e n s a t i o n i n the group -114-announces e q u a l l y s t r o n g l y the p o s s i b l e presence of any o t h e r , the group as a whole p r e s e n t s i t s e l f to the mind as perman-ent, i n c o n t r a s t b o t h to the t e m p o r a r i n e s s o f our p h y s i c a l p resence and to the temporary c h a r a c t e r o f each o f t h e s e n s a t i o n s composing the group. T h i s phenomenon .suggests to us the n o t i o n o f a s u b s t r a t u m . S e c o n d l y , t h e s e groups of p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r e always g i v e n to us i n a f i x e d o r d e r of s u c c e s s i o n w h i c h , when a s c e r t a i n e d by o b s e r v a t i o n , g i v e s r i s e to the i d e a o f cause and e f f e c t . Our i d e a s o f c a u s a t i o n , power, a c t i v i t y "become connected not w i t h s e n s a t i o n s but w i t h groups of p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n . " We l e a r n to t h i n k o f Mature "as made up s o l e l y o f these groups of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and the a c t i v e f o r c e i n Nature as""manifested 1 i n the m o d i f i c a t i o n o f some o f t h e s e by o t h e r s . " A l t h o u g h our s e n s a t i o n s are the o r i g i n a l f o u n d a t i o n of our whole b e l i e f , we come to r e g a r d these "Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s " as the v e r y r e a l i t i e s o f w h i c h s e n s a t i o n s are o n l y the e f f e c t s i n us, and as i n t r i n s i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m them. F i n a l l y , our e x p e r i e n c e o f the independence o f these p o s s i b i l i t i e s on our i n d i v i d u a l w i l l s i s c o n f i r m e d by the t e s t i m o n y of our f e l l o w s . Other p e o p l e do not have our s e n s a t i o n s ; c o n s e q u e n t l y these come to be r e g a r d e d as dependent on us. But th e y do have the 1. Ibid., P. 230 -115-same p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n : " T h i s p u t s the f i n a l s e a l to our c o n c e p t i o n of the groups o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s as the fundamental r e a l i t y i n N a t u r e . The permanent p o s s i b i l i t i e s are common to us and to our f e l l o w - c r e a t u r e s ; the a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n s are n o t . That w h i c h o t h e r p e o p l e become 'aware o f when, and on. the same grounds, as I do, seems more r e a l to me tha n t h a t w h i c h they do not know of u n l e s s I t a l l them.' The w o r l d o f P o s s i b l e S e n s a t i o n s s u c c e e d i n g one ano t h e r a c c o r d i n g . t o laws, i s as much i n o t h e r b e i n g s as i t i s i n me; i t has t h e r e f o r e an e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e me; i t i s an 1 E x t e r n a l 'World." Such a. t h e o r y o f M a t t e r as a "Permanent P o s s i b i l i t y of S e n s a t i o n " obeys the s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e o f parsimony, and i f c o r r e c t i s t h e r e f o r e to be p r e f e r r e d to the i n t r o -s p e c t i v e method, w h i c h p o s t u l a t e s an unknown cause to account f o r the b e l i e f i n an e x t e r n a l w o r l d . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of M a t t e r i n c l u d e s the whole meaning a t t a c h e d t o i t by the common w o r l d . I t might be o b j e c t e d , however, t h a t s i n c e the e x i s t e n c e o f a. p e r d u r a b l e b a s i s of s e n s a t i o n s , d i s t i n c t f r om s e n s a t i o n s , i s a common c o n c e p t i o n , the v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f such a b a s i s i s p r o v e d by the f a c t o f b e l i e f i n i t . But even a s i d e from the f a c t t h a t we tend to i n f e r d i f f e r e n c e of t h i n g s from d i f f e r e n c e of names, i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory to account f o r t h i s n o t i o n of an e x i s t e n c e t r a n s c e n d i n g a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n . C o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h r e c o g -n i s e s a d i f f e r e n c e between one s e n s a t i o n and an o t h e r , enables us to form a g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f d i f f e r e n c e . S i n c e t h i s f e e l i n g o f • d i f f e r e n c e i s i n s e p a r a b l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e v e r y s e n s a t i o n we have, we a r r i v e at a sta g e where we can no l o n g e r c o n c e i v e a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t b e i n g c o m p e l l e d to form a l s o the c o n c e p t i o n of something d i f f e r e n t f r om i t . 1. Ibid., P.232. -116-"This f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the i d e a o f something d i f f e r e n t from each t h i n g we know, makes i t n a t u r a l and easy to form the notion-- of;: some t h i n g d i f f e r e n t from a l l t h i n g s t h a t we know, 1 c o l l e c t i v e l y as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l l y . " Our c o n c e p t i o n of such a t h i n g i s n e g a t i v e : h u t then our i d e a o f substance a p a r t from any r e l a t i o n " t o our i m p r e s s i o n s is_ a merely n e g a t i v e one. We t h e n submit to the tendency to m i s t a k e m e n t a l a b s t r a c t i o n s f o r s u b s t a n t i v e r e a l i t i e s . T h i s p r o p e n s i t y t o s u b s t a n t i a l i z e the Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s of S e n s a t i o n i s f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d by " t h a t u n i v e r s a l law o f our e x p e r i e n c e which i s termed the law of C a u s a t i o n . " We l e a r n i n our thought t o connect e v e r y t h i n g w i t h some antecedent c o n d i t i o n o r cause. Having found t h a t t h i s r e l a t i o n s u b s i s t s between e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l i t e m o f our e x p e r i e n c e and some o t h e r i t e m , we b e l i e v e t h a t the same r e l a t i o n must s u b s i s t a l s o between our e x p e r i e n c e as a whole, and something not w i t h i n the sphere o f e x p e r i e n c e . We then c o n s i d e r t h e "aggregate whole o f our s e n s a t i o n s " as d e r i v i n g i t s o r i g i n f r o m antecedent e x i s t e n c e s t r a n s c e n d i n g s e n s a t i o n . The i d e a of cause comes t o be i d e n t i f i e d not w i t h s e n s a t i o n s as a c t u a l l y e x p e r i e n c e d but w i t h t h e i r Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s . I t might be o b j e c t e d , f u r t h e r , t h a t the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory g i v e s no e x p l a n a t i o n of our b e l i e f i n the e x t e r n a l i t y 1. Ibid., P. 236. -117-o f t h e s e Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s . But the v e r y i d e a of a n y t h i n g out of o u r s e l v e s i s d e r i v e d s o l e l y f r o m the knowledge e x p e r i e n c e g i v e s us o f the permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s . Whi1e our s e n s a t i o n s depend f o r t h e i r n a t u r e and v e r y e x i s t e n c e on us, the e x i s t e n c e of t h e Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s of S e n s a t i o n has n o t h i n g to do w i t h our p r e s e n c e or i n t e l l e c t u a l a c t i v i t y . More i m p o r t a n t , they are and w i l l c o n t i n u e to be Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s o f S e n s a t i o n to o t h e r b e i n g s b e s i d e s o u r s e l v e s . I t i s from t h i s c o n t r a s t between our a c t u a l s e n s a t i o n s and the Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t t h e ' i d e a , o f e x t e r n a l i t y i t s e l f i s d e r i v e d . I I I . THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY APPLIED TO OUR BELIEF I F MIND. The c l a i m t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s g i v e s us an i n t u i t i o n i n p e r c e p t i o n o f a Non-Ego has been d i s m i s s e d by M i l l as f a l l a c i o u s . The p r o b l e m o f our b e l i e f i n an Ego or Mind s t i l l r e m a i n s . Does t h i s b e l i e f admit of an a n a l y s i s s i m i l a r to t h a t o f our b e l i e f i n the Non-Ego? Our n o t i o n o f M i n d , as w e l l as of M a t t e r , i s the n o t i o n of a permanent something, c o n t r a s t e d w i t h the p e r p e t u a l f l u x of the m e n t a l s t a t e s w h i c h we r e f e r t o i t . T h i s a t t r i b u t e of permanence can q u i t e r e a d i l y be r e s o l v e d i n t o a b e l i e f o f a Permanent P o s s i b i l i t y o f m e n t a l s t a t e s . Up to a c e r t a i n p o i n t , then, we might seem a b l e to r e g a r d Mind as " n o t h i n g but the s e r i e s o f our s e n s a t i o n s ( t o w h i c h must now be added our -118-i n t e r n a l f e e l i n g s ) , as they a c t u a l l y o c c u r , w i t h the a d d i t i o n 1 of i n f i n i t e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f f e e l i n g . " Such a t h e o r y cannot he o b j e c t e d to on'the grounds that i t de n i e s a l l e v i d e n c e f d r i t h e d e x i s t e n c e o f my f e l l o w c r e a t u r e s . T h i s evidence a d m i t t e d l y r e s t s on a p r o c e s s o f i n f e r e n c e , s i n c e no i n t u i t i o n i s t i n c l u d e s o t h e r minds i n h i s c a t e g o r y o f o b j e c t s ' known by d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n . I am c o n s c i o u s i n m y s e l f o f a s e r i e s of f a c t s connected by a u n i f o r m sequence: ( l ) m o d i f i c a -t i o n s o f my body; (2) f e e l i n g s ; (3) outward b e h a v i o u r ; In the case o f o t h e r human b e i n g s my senses i n f o r m me o f the f i r s t and l a s t p a r t s o f t h i s s e r i e s , and of a dependable c o n n e c t i o n between them. E x p e r i e n c e f o r c e s me to p o s t u l a t e the m i d d l e l i n k . I make the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t the m o d i f i -c a t i o n s of a,body c l o s e l y r e s e m b l i n g mine c a l l up a w o r l d o f s e n s a t i o n s i n a c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t h i s i n d u c -t i v e h y p o t h e s i s i s c o n f i r m e d by a l l o t h e r f a c t s , w i t h i n my r e a c h . Such a l o g i c a l p r o c e s s " l o s e s none o f i t s l e g i t i m a c y on the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t n e i t h e r Mind nor M a t t e r i s a n y t h i n g 2 but a permanent p o s s i b i l i t y of f e e l i n g . " Nor does the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory d e s t r o y any s i m i l a r e v i d e n c e ! , or the e x i s t e n c e o f God and of i m m o r t a l i t y at a l l . A l t h o u g h the e x t r i n s i c o b j e c t i o n s to the t h e o r y a r e e a s i l y met, t h e r e are c e r t a i n i n t r i n s i c d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h a re beyond the power o f m e t a p h y s i c a l a n a l y s i s to remove. I n 1. Ibid., P. 242. 2. Ibid., .P. 244. -119-a d d i t i o n to, p r e s e n t m ental s t a t e s and p o s s i b i l i t i e s of m ental s t a t e s , ' the " t h r e a d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " c o n s i s t s as w e l l of memories and e x p e c t a t i o n s . Here we come to the s h o a l on w h i c h Hume was a d m i t t e d l y s t r a n d e d . I n themselves, memories and e x p e c t a t i o n s are o n l y p r e s e n t f e e l i n g s , and resemble c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s and f e e l i n g s of w h i c h we have had p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e . A s e n s a t i o n i n v o l v e s o n l y a b e l i e f i n i t s own p r e s e n t e x i s t e n c e , "but a remembrance of s e n s a t i o n . . . i n v o l v e s the s u g g e s t i o n and b e l i e f t h a t a s e n s a t i o n , o f which i t i s a, copy or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d i n the p a s t : and an e x p e c t a t i o n i n v o l v e s the b e l i e f , more o r l e s s p o s i t i v e , t h a t a s e n s a t i o n or o t h e r f e e l i n g to w h i c h i t d i r e c t l y r e f e r s , 1 w i l l e x i s t i n t h e f u t u r e . " How t h e s e phenomena can only be a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e d by s a y i n g " t h a t the b e l i e f they i n c l u d e i s , t h a t I m y s e l f f o r m e r l y had, o r t h a t I m y s e l f , and no o t h e r s h a l l h e r e a f t e r have, the s e n s a t i o n s remembered o r e x p e c t e d . " I f we are to speak of the mind as n o t h i n g but a s e r i e s o f f e e l i n g s , we s h a l l have to g r a n t t h a t i t i s a s e r i e s o f . f e e l i n g s w h i c h i s aware of i t s e l f as p a s t and f u t u r e . We must e i t h e r accqpt t h i s paradox, or b e l i e v e t h a t the Mind i s something d i f f e r e n t f r o m any s e r i e s o f f e e l i n g s or p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f them. The r e a l i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y i s " t h a t something w h i c h has ces.sed, o r i s not y e t i n e x i s t e n c e , can s t i l l be, i n a manner, p r e s e n t : t h a t a s e r i e s o f f e e l i n g s , the i n f i n i t e l y g r e a t e r p a r t of w h i c h i s p a s t o r f u t u r e , can be g a t h e r e d up, as i t were, i n t o a s i n g l e p r e s e n t c o n c e p t i o n , 2 accompanied by a f e e l i n g o f r e a l i t y . " T h i s i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y 1. I b i d , P. 247' 2. I b i d , P.248. -120-i s an u l t i m a t e f a c t w h i c h we can o n l y accept as i n e x p l i c a b l e . IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OE THE PRIMARY QUALITIES OE MATTER. An i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory of our b e l i e f i n an e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s i t s e x p l a n a t i o n of the source of our d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s o f m a t t e r , and o f the g e n e r a t i o n of our i d e a s o f the former. M i l l o b s e r v e d i n a p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t h a t the s e n s a t i o n s which c o r r e s p o n d t o the P r i m a r y Q u a l i t i e s are always p r e s e n t when any p a r t o f the group i s so; w h i l e c o l o u r s , t a s t e s , s m e l l s , e t c . , b e i n g more f u g a c i ous and v a r y i n g w i t h d i f f e r e n t persons are not c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g always p r e s e n t i n the e x t e r n a l body. S i n c e the s e n s a t i o n s answering t o the Secondary Q u a l i t i e s are o n l y o c c a s i o n a l i n t t h e i r ' o c c u r r e n c e and those answering t o the P r i m a r y are c o n s t a n t , we a t t r i b u t e g r e a t e r o b j e c t i v i t y to the l a t t e r . We c o n s i d e r the s e n s a t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the Secondary Q u a l i t i e s most f r e q u e n t l y i n r e l a t i o n to the s u b j e c t ; and tho s e answering to the Pri m a r y i n r e l a t i o n to some group o f Permanent P o s s i b i l i t i e s of S e n s a t i o n . I t i s of course p o s s i b l e f o r us to c o n s i d e r a l l or any o f our s e n s a t i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r obj e c t s - - i . e "to the permanent groups of p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n to which we m e n t a l l y r e f e r them." But c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s - -n o t a b l y t h o s e o f p l e a s u r e and pain--ha.ve more importance to us as f o r m i n g p a r t o f our " t h r e a d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s " than c o n s i d e r e d as marks o f something beyond our s e n s a t i o n s , so - 1 2 1 -tiia.t the r e f e r e n c e of them to an o b j e c t does not p l a y so conspicuous and predominant a p a r t as i n the case of o t h e r s e n s a t i o n s . Those o t h e r s e n s a t i o n s , w h i c h are not to any great- degree p a i n f u l o r p l e a s u r a b l e , we h a b i t u a l l y t h i n k of as p r o c e e d i n g from o b j e c t s . R e s i s t a n c e , e x t e n s i o n , -and f i g u r e — s e n s a t i o n s w h i c h on M i l l ' s t h e o r y are r e f e r a b l e to the sense o f t o u c h and to the muscles—become i n our e x p e r i e n c e the l e a d i n g and conspicuous elements i n a l l t h e . g r o u p s o f p o s s i b l e s e n s a t i o n s . They form a group w i t h i n a group; "a s o r t of i n n e r n u c l e u s , c o n c e i v e d as more fundamental than the r e s t , on w h i c h a l l the o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f s e n s a t i o n i n c l u d e d i n the group seem to depend." Co n s e q u e n t l y our c o n c e p t i o n of M a t t e r f i n a l l y comes t o c o n s i s t o f r e s i s t a n c e , e x t e n s i o n , and f i g u r e as e s s e n t i a l c o n s t i t u e n t s . A c c o r d i n g t o the P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory, r e s i s t a n c e , the most fundamental p r i m a r y q u a l i t y , i s o n l y a name f o r a s e n s a t i o n composed o f m u s c u l a r and t a c t u a l e l ements. The muscular s e n s a t i o n i n the c o n t r a c t i o n o f the arm, f o r i n s t a n c e , v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g as the consequent movement c o n t i n u e s f r e e l y or meets w i t h an impediment. When motion f o l l o w i n g muscular c o n t r a c t i o n does not r e s u l t i n t h e s e n s a t i o n o f motion i n an empty space, we have what i s c a l l e d the f e e l i n g o f r e s i s t a n c e , that i s , o f mus c u l a r m o t i o n impeded. Whenever we have t h i s s e n s a t i o n we have a l s o the s e n s a t i o n of c o n t a c t w i t h the body. Since t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n i s i n s e p a r a b l e , our s e n s a t i o n s o f touch 1. Ibid., P. 270. -122-"becorae r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the s e n s a t i o n s of r e s i s t a n c e w i t h w h i c h they h a b i t u a l l y c o - e x i s t . 1 1 The c o n s t a n t c o - e x i s t e n c e of these two s e n s a t i o n s e r e c t s the s e n s a t i o n of t o u c h i n t o a mark -or s i g n of a Permanent P o s s i b i l i t y o f the s e n s a t i o n of r e s i s t a n c e . The P s y c h o l o g i c a l Theory has more d i f f i c u l t y i n a c c o u n t i n g f o r the development of our i d e a o f the p r i m a r y q u a l i t y of e x t e n s i o n . M i l l s u b s c r i b e s to B a i n ' s t h e o r y , w h i c h r e c o g n i z e s two modes o f d i s c r i m i n a t i v e s e n s i b i l i t y i n the muscular sense; the one c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e degree of i n t e n s i t y o f the mus c u l a r e f f o r t , the- o t h e r c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the d u r a t i o n o f the same e f f o r t . From t h i s second mod.e we d e r i v e our i d e a of e x t e n s i o n . D i f f e r e n c e s i n range of movement of members o f the body can be sensed by the consequent d i f f e r e n c e s i n the d u r a t i o n o f mu s c u l a r e f f o r t . D i f f e r e n t degrees o f c o n t r a c t i o n i n the same group o f muscles enable us t o compare d i f f e r e n c e s i n l e n g t h , s u r f a c e , s i t u a t i o n and form. L e n g t h i n space, not b e i n g i n our c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r i g i n a l l y , i s c o n s t r u c t e d by the mind's laws out of t h e n o t i o n o f l e n g t h i n tim e , as i t r e s u l t s i n d i f f e r e n t m u s c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the eye, however, i n g e n e r a t i n g the n o t i o n of e x t e n s i o n a l t e r s i t s c h a r a c t e r g r e a t l y . E x t e n s i o n as b r o u g h t to us by m u s c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s i s g e n e r a t e d by a s u c c e s s i o n of s e n s a t i o n s . Y e t the eye g i v e s us a c o n c e p t i o n of e x t e n s i o n w h i c h comprehends a g r e a t number o f p a r t s of e x t e n s i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y - - a n d t h i s i s our o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t i o n 123-o f space. M i l l ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t when the s e n s a t i o n s of c o l o u r , by the p r i n c i p l e s o f a s s o c i a t i o n , "become r e p r e s e n t -a t i v e o f the t a c t u a l and m u s c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s w i t h which they are c o - e x i s t e n t , the fa.ct t h a t we can r e c e i v e a v a s t number o f s e n s a t i o n s o f c o l o u r at the same i n s t a n t ( o r what appears such to our c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) p u t s us i n the same p o s i t i o n as i f we had been a b l e to r e c e i v e t h a t number of t a c t u a l and m u s c u l a r s e n s a t i o n s i n a s i n g l e i n s t a n t . The i d e a s o f a l l the s u c c e s s i v e t a c t u a l and m u s c u l a r f e e l i n g s w h i c h accompany the passage o f the hand over the whole of the c o l o u r e d surface,- are made to f l a s h on the mind at once: and i m p r e s s i o n s w h i c h were s u c c e s s i v e i n s e n s a t i o n become co-e x i s t e n t i n t h o u g h t . From t h a t time....we t h i n k a l l the p a r t s of. e x t e n s i o n as c o e x i s t i n g , and, . . . b e l i e v e t h a t we 1 p e r c e i v e them as s uch." The t a c t u a l and m u scular s e n s a t i o n s , however, remain the b a s i c and fundamental elements i n g i v i n g us the i d e a o f e x t e n s i o n . The i d e a o f f i g u r e , f o r m or shape i s d e r i v e d as a p r o d u c t of our more p r i m i t i v e s e n s i b i l i t y to e x t e n s i o n and range. Having once g a i n e d the i d e a s o f d i s t a n c e and d i r e c t i o n from our t o u c h and muscle s e n s e s , we can a r r i v e a t the i d e a of s i t u a t i o n and l o c a l i t y . From th e s e c o n s t i t u e n t s we form the i d e a o f e x t e n s i o n , i f we t h i n k of the p a r t of space i n v o l v e d ; and o f f i g u r e i f we c o n s i d e r i t s b o u n d a r i e s , t h a t i s , i t s d e m a r c a t i o n from o t h e r space. 1. Ibid.,' P. 286. -124-There are few c o m p l e t e l y o r i g i n a l p o i n t s i n M i l l ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t h e o r y . I n h i s .treatment o f m a t t e r , he has s i m p l y d e v e l o p e d B e r k e l e y ' s argument; i n h i s a n a l y s i s o f mind he has c o n t i n u e d Hume's mode of thought; w h i l e h i s t h e o r y o f c a u s a t i o n and h i s r e c o u r s e to the p r i n c i p l e s of a s s o c i a t i o n c o n t a i n n o t h i n g w h i c h cannot he found i n the e a r l i e r e m p i r i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . I n each case,' however, he has e x p e l l e d from p r e v i o u s t h e o r i e s i n e s s e n t i a l and c o n t r a -d i c t o r y e l e m e n t s , and has s e t f o r t h the core o f the p r e c e d i n g d o c t r i n e s i n s t r o n g and d e c i s i v e f a s h i o n . F o r example, he does not p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f y m a t t e r w i t h s e n s a t i o n s , as d i d B e r k e l e y , h u t r e t a i n s a d i f f e r e n t name f o r something which i n our e x p e r i e n c e i s p l a i n l y not i d e n t i c a l w i t h s u b j e c t i v e s e n s a t i o n s * T h i s e n a b l e s him to g i v e a c o n s i s t e n t and s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l a n a t i o n o f our b e l i e f i n the e x t e r n a l i t y of m a t t e r , - a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y to a v o i d the s o l i p s i s m i n t o w h i c h B e r k e l e y ' s t h e o r y i n e v i t a b l y f a l s . A g a i n , i n h i s use o f such terms as " f e e l i n g " , " s e n s a t i o n " , and " i d e a " he i s much more p r e c i s e than was B e r k e l e y . F u r t h e r , h i s c l e a r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e p a r t p l a y e d by the e x i s t e n c e o f our f e l l o w human b e i n g s i n c o n t r i b u t i n g to the n o t i o n of e x t e r n a l i t y r e p r e s e n t s an important advance on the o r i g i n a l statement o f the i d e a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n . And f i n a l l y , ' when he comes to a n a l y s e the n o t i o n of the ego, he does not become so e n t a n g l e d as d i d Hume, whose r e c o u r s e to memory as the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the o r i g i n of our i d e a o f i d e n t i t y was r e a l l y a " p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i . " M i l l -125-shows p l a i n l y t h a t the n o t i o n o f i d e n t i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y p r i o r to any p o s s i b i l i t y o f memory or e x p e c t a t i o n . He i s then c o n t e n t to p r e s e n t the two a l t e r n a t i v e s : e i t h e r , t h a t i f mind i s a s e r i e s o f f e e l i n g s , i t i s a s e r i e s w h i c h by h y p o t h e s i s i s c o n s c i o u s o f i t s e l f ; or t h a t we must u l t i m a t e l y r e c o g n i z e the import en ce o f m e t a p h y s i c a l i n q u i r y to gra.sp the n a t u r e o f mind. I n s h o r t , M i l l ' s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l system marks the h i g h e s t p o i n t i n the development o f the e m p i r i c a l p o s i t i o n b e f o r e the advent o f new t e c h n i q u e s f i n a l l y began to make the p s y c h o l o g y on w h i c h e m p i r i c i s m was based capable of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . CHAPTER V. BERTRAM) RUSSELL: "OUR KNOWLEDGE OE THE EXTERNAL WORLD AS A EIELD EOR SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY." AND "THE ANALYSIS OE MATTER. " CHAPTER V BERT RAND RUSSELL: "OUR KNOWLEDGE OE THE EXTERNAL WORLD AS A EIELD EOR SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY" and "THE ANALYSIS OE MATTER". A f t e r the work o f the e a r l i e r E n g l i s h e m p i r i c i s t s , the next g r e a t developments i n p h i l o s o p h y came from the r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes i n l o g i c and s c i e n c e . F o r t h e a b s t r u s e t h e o r i e s o f the dominant German s c h o o l of p h i l o s o p h y s c i e n t i s t s i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y had l i t t l e c oncern. But when t h e o l d e r t h e o r i e s of p h y s i c s d e f i n i t e l y began to break under the s t r a i n o f new d i s c o v e r i e s , s c i e n t i s t s were f o r c e d to examine c l o s e l y t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l assumptions on which they had been p r o c e e d i n g . I n the a n a l y s i s o f such concepts as ma t t e r and c a u s a t i o n , f o r example, they s e r e d r i v e n t o develop a l o n g new l i n e s the i d e a s o f B e r k e l e y and Hume. I t i s i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n t h a t we come to the work of the b r i l l i a n t E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h e r , B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l . R u s s e l l , who has p i o n e e r e d i n the f i e l d s o f modern s y m b o l i c l o g i c and o f m a t h e m a t i c a l t h e o r y , has br o u g h t t o g e t h e r the f i e l d s of p h i l o s o p h y and s c i e n c e by showing the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p p l y i n g l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s and s c i e n t i f i c method i n p h i l o s o p h y . He i s by no means an e m p i r i c i s t "par e x c e l l e n c e " , as was John S t u a r t M i l l , f o r i n h i s s t r e s s on the importance of l o g i c and m a t h e m a t i c a l t h e o r y i n p h i l o s o p h y he f o l l o w s i n t h e r a t i o n a l i s t i c t r a d i t i o n o f L e i b n i z ; but he e q u a l l y r e p u d i a t e s the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t l o g i c and mathematics a l o n e can g i v e us any i n f o r m a t i o n as t o 'the r e a l n a t u r e of our w o r l d . R u s s e l l e x h i b i t s them i n t h e i r modern development as extremely, p o w e r f u l t e c h n i q u e s f o r the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and m a n i p u l a t i o n of -128^ the data'•which must s t i l l be s u p p l i e d by the e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e s . The p a r t i c u l a r p r o b lem w i t h w h i c h he copes here i s the q u e s t i o n of the - v a l i d i t y of the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l assumptions i m p l i e d i n the p r o c e d u r e of p h y s i c a l science,' and the p o s s i b i l i t y of h a r m o n i z i n g the views of modern p h y s i c s w i t h the ' i n d u b i t a b l e f a c t s o f immediate p e r c e p t i o n . I . OUR KNOWLEDGE OE THE EXTERNAL WORLD. By h i s own s t a t e m e n t , R u s s e l l ' s answer to the c o n s t a n t l y r e c u r r i n g problem of our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , as g i v e n i n the essay by t h i s name, i s not of a d e f i n i t e and dogmatic t y p e , but amounts r a t her t o an a n a l y s i s and s t a t e -ment, of the q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v e d , as those q u e s t i o n s a r e d i s e n t a n g l e d f rom each o t h e r by the l o g i c a l - a n a l y t i c method. B e r k e l e y ' s a t t a c k , as r e i n f o r c e d by our knowledge of the p h y s i o l o g y o f the s e n s e - o r g a n s , nerves and b r a i n , i s the s t a n d p o i n t f rom w h i c h . R u s s e l l approaches the q u e s t i o n of the r e a l i t y of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; The g e n e r a l problem i s : from as s l e n d e r a s t o c k o f i n i t i a l assumptions as p o s s i b l e , to c o n s t r u c t an account o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d which s h a l l p l a c e a l l t h e known f a c t s and y e t be a b l e to meet B e r k e l e y ' s a t t a c k . The mass o f common knowledge w h i c h a f f o r d s the d a t a -f o r a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s must i n the main be accepted as t r u e , s i n c e we p o s s e s s no r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t k i n d of knowled, d e r i v e d from o t h e r s o u r c e s . A l t h o u g h these p r i m a r y flatascan o n l y be c r i t i c i z e d by o t h e r d a t a , we can n e v e r t h e l e s s d i s t i n g u i s h ' v a r i o u s grades o f c e r t a i n t y i n the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f .common "'knowledge. These v a r y i n g degrees o f c e r t a i n t y a t t a c h i n g t o d i f f e r e n t d a t a are themselves p a r t of our data.; F u r t h e r a n a l y s i s o f our common knowledge r e v e a l s t h a t some of i t i s d e r i v a t i v e — i .e,, i n f e r r e d from something e l s e ; and th a t some o f i t i s p r i m i t i v e . We can a l s o s e p a r a t e p s y c h o l -o g i c a l f r om l o g i c a l p r i m i t i v e n e s s - - e . g . the i n f e r e n c e we make from the e x p r e s s i o n on a man's f a c e to. a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e m o t i o n a l s t a t e i n him i s d e r i v a t i v e p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y hut p r i m i t i v e l o g i c a l l y , s i n c e our b e l i e f i s not a c t u a l l y a r r i v e d at by a l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e hut by a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s of a s s o c i a t i o n o f i d e a s . The e x i s t e n c e o f these d i s t i n c t i o n s between p r i m i t i v e n e s s and d e r i v a t i v e n e s s l e a d s us to a, f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n between "hard" d a t a - - " t h o s e w h i c h r e s i s t the s o l v e n t i n f l u e n c e of c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n " ; and " s o f t " d a t a - ~ " t h o s e w h i c h , under the o p e r a t i o n o f t h i s p r o c e s s , become t o our minds more or l e s s d o u b t f u l . " P a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of sense and g e n e r a l t r u t h s of l o g i c are p e r f e c t l y h a r d d a t a , p a t h o l o g i c a l l y d e r i v a t i v e but l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e b e l i e f s - - e . g . our b e l i e f i n the permanence o f the e x t e r n a l w o r i d - ~ a r e m a i n l y to be c l a s s e d as s o f t data.. . T o t h e f a c t s of our own s e n s e - d a t a and the laws o f l o g i c we can add as o t h e r h a r d d a t a some f a c t s of memory; of i n t r o -s p e c t i o n ; and o f comparison and o f s p a t i a l and tempor a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n s e n s e - d a t a . ' B e l i e f i n the permanence of the -130-e x t e r n a l w o r l d and o f the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r minds, as s o f t d a t a , cannot form p a r t of the s l e n d e r s t o c k from w h i c h our r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s to p r o c e e d . With these d i s t i n c t i o n s i n mind, the problem of our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d now r e s o l v e s , i t s e l f i n t o the q u e s t i o n : "dan the e x i s t e n c e o f a n y t h i n g other, than'our own hard d a t a be i n f e r r e d from the e x i s t e n c e o f those d a t a ? " I n v o l v e d i n t h i s q u e s t i o n are two p r o b l e m s : (a) Can we know t h a t o b j e c t s o f sense, or v e r y s i m i l a r o b j e c t s , e x i s t at t i m e s when we are not p e r c e i v i n g them? (b) I f t h i s cannot be known, can we know t h a t o t h e r o b j e c t s , i n f e r a b l e f rom o b j e c t s of sense but not n e c e s s a r i l y r e s e m b l i n g them, e x i s t e i t h e r when we are p e r c e i v i n g the o b j e c t s of sense or at any o t h e r time? R u s s e l l c o n s i d e r s t h i s l a t t e r p r o b lem o f the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " f i r s t . Our p a s s i v i t y i n s e n s a t i o n , w h i c h . l e a d s us t o suppose that s e n s a t i o n s must have o u t s i d e causes, i s I r r e l e v a n t ; f o r from t h i s p a s s i v i t y we c o u l d argue o n l y t h a t our s e n s a t i o n ( a mental event c o n s i s t i n g i n our b e i n g aware o f a s e n s i b l e o b j e c t ) might have a cause i n the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t ( t h a t i s , i n the p a r t i c u l a r p a t c h o f c o l o u r seen, o r the p a r t i c u l a r hardness f e l t . ) There i s no good r e a s o n at t h i s p o i n t , then, to concur i n the common o p i n i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f w hich i s the o u t s i d e "cause o f the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t . Common sense assumes the e x i s t e n c e u o f permanent " t h i n g s " w i t h changing appearances; bu t a l l t h a t e x p e r i e n c e r e a l l y g i v e s us i s the c o r r e l a t i o n of c e r t a i n b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n s w i t h c e r t a i n o t h e r s . The assumption t h a t s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s p e r s i s t -131-when not p e r c e i v e d "may be r e p l a c e d by the statement t h a t the e f f e c t s o f s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s p e r s i s t , i . e . , t h a t what happens now can o n l y be accounted f o r , i n many ca s e s , by 1 t a k i n g account o f what happened at an e a r l i e r t i m e . " As f a r as one man's e x p e r i e n c e i s concerned, a l l the f a c t s of common sense and of p h y s i c s are e x p l i c a b l e by some such, means, s i n c e t h e i r " v e r i f i c a t i o n " c o n s i s t s merely i n the o c c u r r e n c e of an expected sense-datum. (We must d e a l l a t e r w i t h the q u e s t i o n of the t e s t i m o n y o f o t h e r s , s i n c e t h i s i n v o l v e s a knowledge of o t h e r minds, which a r e not -given i n sense.) A l t h o u g h the t h e o r y o f t h e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f as o r d i n a r i l y h e l d cannot be s u p p o r t e d , we must f i n d a t r u e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g i t , s i n c e i t i s i n o u t l i n e the t h e o r y upon w h i c h p h y s i c s and p h y s i o l o g y axe b u i l t . To do t h i s r e q u i r e s a number of c o r r e c t i o n s i n common thought. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , we must r e a l i z e t h a t t h e r e are no such t h i n g s as " i l l u s i o n s o f sense." O b j e c t s o f sense are always r e a l : the i l l u s o r y element i s due to the i n f e r e n c e s to which they g i v e r i s e . I f , on p r e s s i n g the e y e b a l l , we see two t a b l e s , then t h e r e a r e two. v i s u a l t a b l e s . I f touch t e l l s us t h e r e i s o n l y one t a c t i l e t a b l e , " a l l we are w a r r a n t e d i n s a y i n g i s t h a t , i n t h i s c a s e , the manner of c o r r e l a t i o n of 2 t o u c h and s i g h t i s u n u s u a l . " W i t h t h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the i n d u b i t a b l e momentary r e a l i t y o f o b j e c t s o f sense, R u s s e l l proceeds to frame a h y p o t h e s i s w h i c h w i l l not c o n t a i n the o b j e c t i o n s to p r e v i o u s t h e o r i e s of our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d and w h i c h - w i l l be adequate t o e x p l a i n the f a c t s . 1. B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l , "Our Knowledge of the E x t e r n a l World",P.84 2.Ibid., P.88. -152-L e t us* assume t h a t each mind l o o k s out upon the w o r l d from a p o i n t o f view p e c u l i a r to i t s e l f . E v e r y such p o i n t of view w i l l he c a l l e d a p e r s p e c t i v e . The system c o n s i s t i n g o f a l l •views of the u n i v e r s e p e r c e i v e d and u n p e r c e i v e d i s the system o f p e r s p e c t i v e s . A " p r i v a t e w o r l d " i s a p e r c e i v e d p e r s p e c t i v e ; hut there may he any number o f u n p e r c e i v e d p e r s p e c t i v e s . I n e x p e r i e n c e we f i n d t h a t two men may p e r c e i v e p e r s p e c t i v e s so s i m i l a r t h a t t h e y ca.n use the same words to d e s c r i b e them: "they say they see the same t a b l e , because the d i f f e r e n c e s between the two t a b l e s they see are 1 s l i g h t a.nd not p r a c t i c a l l y i m p o r t a n t . " I f t h e s i m i l a r i t y between two p e r s p e c t i v e s i s v e r y g r e a t , we say t h a t t h e p o i n t s o f view o f the two p e r s p e c t i v e s are near t o g e t h e r i n space. T h i s space, however, i s a r e l a t i o n b/etween the two p e r s p e c t i v e s , and can be r e n d e r e d c o n t i n u o u s by h y p o t h e s i z i n g a. whole s e r i e s of p e r s p e c t i v e s between any two s i m i l a r p e r s p e c t i v e s , such t h a t between any two members of t h i s s e r i e s , however s i m i l a r , there are o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e s s t i l l more s i m i l a r . The s i m i l a r i t y o f n e i g h b o u r i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s enables us to c o r r e l a t e o b j e c t s i n one p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h those i n another. We can now d e f i n e the momentary common-sense " t h i n g " . "Given an,object i n one p e r s p e c t i v e , f orm the system o f a l l the o b j e c t s c o r r e l a t e d w i t h i t i n a , l l the p e r s p e c t i v e s ; t h a t system may be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h , t h e momentary common-sense ' t h i n g ' . Thus an aspect o f a ' t h i n g ' i s a member o f the system of 2 aspects w h i c h i s the 'thing'; at tfoat moment." 1. Ibid.," P.88* •:..:.•.••.;.'.';•< I Ibid., P . M . -133-Since' t h e r e i s o n l y one space, i n w h i c h the p e r s p e c t i v e s themselves axe elements, we must e x p l a i n the c o r r e l a t i o n of the p r i v a t e space of a s i n g l e p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h the one a l l -embracing p e r s p e c t i v e space. P e r s p e c t i v e space i s the system of the p r i v a t e spaces themselves, w h i c h are o r d e r e d by means of t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s . I f we s t a r t from a p r i v a t e space whi ch c o n t a i n s the appearance o f a c i r c u l a r d i s c ,--e.g. f such as would be c a l l e d a penny--we csn form a whole s e r i e s of p e r s p e c t i v e s c o n t a i n i n g a g r a d u a t e d s e r i e s of c i r c u l a r a s p e cts o f v a r y i n g s i z e s . Those p e r s p e c t i v e s i n whi ch the penny l o o k s c i r c u l a r w i l l be s a i d to l i e on a s t r a i g h t l i n e i n p e r s p e c t i v e space. They w i l l be o r d e r e d on t h i s l i n e i n terms of- the v a r y i n g s i z e s o f the c i r c u l a r a s p e c t s . The p e r s p e c t i v e s i n w h i c h the penny l o o k s b i g w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d to be n e a r e r t h e penny than those i n w h i c h i t l o o k s s m a l l . JMow i f we form another s t r a i g h t l i n e o f p e r s p e c t i v e s i n which, f o r example, the penny (seen end-on) l o o k s l i k e a s t r a i g h t l i n e of a c e r t a i n t h i c k n e s s , we can say t h a t t h e p l a c e where these two s t r a i g h t l i n e s meet i s the p l a c e ( i n p e r s p e c t i v e space) where the penny i s . We can now e x p l a i n the c o r r e l a t i o n between a p r i v a t e space and the p a r t s o f p e r s p e c t i v e space. " I f t h e r e i s an aspect o f a g i v e n t h i n g i n a c e r t a i n p r i v a t e space, then we c o r r e l a t e the p l a c e where t h i s a s p e c t i s i n t h e p r i v a t e space 1 w i t h the j j l a c e where the t h i n g i s i n p e r s p e c t i v e space.' 1 "Here" i s the p l a c e , i n p e r s p e c t i v e space, w h i c h i s o c c u p i e d by our p r i v a t e w o r l d . F i n a l l y , we may d i s t i n g u i s h the two 1. Ibid*, P.89. -134-p l a c e s i n p e r s p e c t i v e space w h i c h are a s s o c i a t e d w i t h every aspect o f a t h i n g as the p l a c e at w h i c h , and t h a t from which, the aspect appears. "The ' p l a c e at which' i s the p l a c e o f the t h i n g to w h i c h the aspect b e l o n g s ; the ' p l a c e from which* 1 i s the p l a c e o f the p e r s p e c t i v e to w h i c h the aspect b e l o n g s . " Such a h y p o t h e t i c a l p i c t u r e o f the w o r l d , s i n c e i t f i t s the f a c t s , s i n c e i t i s f r e e from l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and s i n c e t h e r e i s no e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t i t , may be a c t u a l . The q u e s t i o n of the r e a l i t y o f such a w o r l d b r i n g s us back t o the q u e s t i o n o f t e s t i m o n y and the evidence f o r the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r minds. .No s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l r e f u t a t i o n of s o l i p s i s m i s p o s s i b l e . A l l the e x p e r i e n c e s of our d a l l y l i f e may be phantasms o f our own minds, s i n c e t h i s view cannot be shown to be f a l s e . The minds of o t h e r p e o p l e are among our o r i g i n a l d a t a , but the b e l i e f i n them i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y d e r i v a t i v e b e l i e f . The w e l l - known argument from analogy i s i n c o n c l u s i v e ; because any scene i n dai l y l i f e might o c c u r i n a dream, i n w h i c h case the i n f e r e n c e from the appearances o f the b o d i e s o f o t h e r p e o p l e to t h e i r minds i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d to be m i s t a k e n . The analogy i n waking l i f e i s p r e f e r a b l e to t h e t i n dreams o n l y because of i t s g r e a t e r e x t e n t and c o n s i s t e n c y . Yet t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e have minds " s y s t e m a t i z e s a v a s t body of f a c t s . . . . never l e a d s to any consequences w h i c h there i s r e a s o n to t h i n k f a l s e e n a b l e s us to extend our 1. Ibid., "P.92. -135-knowledge. o f the s e n s i b l e w o r l d by t e s t i m o n y , and thus l e a d s to the system of p r i v a t e w o r l d s which we assumed i n our hypo-1 t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . " S i n c e n o t h i n g i n e x p e r i e n c e c o n t r a d i c t s i t s v a l i d i t y , we have good r e a s o n to accept i t as a w o r k i n g h y p o t h e s i s , and t h i s acceptance p e r m i t s us to enjoy t h a t v a s t e x t e n s i o n of our knowledge, beyond our own p r i v a t e d a t a , w h i c h we f i n d i n s c i e n c e and i n common sense, I I . THE WORLD OE PHYSICS AND THE WORLD OE SENSE.. • U n l e s s t h e r e were some w h o l l y "a p r i o r i " p r i n c i p l e by w h i c h unknown e n t i t i e s c o u l d be i n f e r r e d from such as are known, the assumption o f p h y s i c i s t s t h a t they are d e a l i n g w i t h a "matter" beyond m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e s e n s e - d a t a can be j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f m a t t e r can be e x h i b i t e d as a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n from those s e n s e - d a t a . The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f p h y s i c s cannot be put on a sound b a s i s u n l e s s t h e r e i s some way to b r i d g e t h e g u l f between m a t t e r as i t appears i n p h y s i c s and t h i n g s as they appear i n s e n s a t i o n . D e s p i t e the changes brought i n t o r e c e n t p h y s i c a l theory by the p r i n c i p l e o f r e l a t i v i t y , R u s s e l l c o n s i d e r s t h a t p h y s i c s s t i l l d e a l s w i t h "a set o f i n d e s t r u c t i b l e e n t i t i e s w h i c h may be c a l l e d p a r t i c l e s , moving r e l a t i v e l y to each o t h e r i n a 2 s i n g l e space and a s i n g l e t i m e . " Over a g a i n s t t h i s p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e i s the w o r l d of immediate d a t a - - t h e w o r l d of f l u x , of numerous p r i v a t e spaces, and o f numerous p r i v a t e times. 1. Ibid,, P. 96. :.. / ...... Z . Ib Td., P . l<*» -136-I n c o n n e c t i n g the w o r l d of p h y s i c s w i t h the w o r l d o f sense, we have t h r e e main problems: (1) the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f permanent " t h i n g s " ; (2) the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a s i n g l e space; and (3) the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s i n g l e time. (1) The c o n s t r u c t i o n o f permanent " t h i n g s ^ . H i s t o r i c a l l y , the assumption o f i n d e s t r u c t i b l e " t h i n g s " arose not from any n e c e s s a r y p o s t u l a t e o f p h y s i c s but f r o m an i n s t i n c t i v e b e l i e f i n something permanent beneath a l l the changes of the s e n s i b l e w o r l d . The problem at hand i s to r e c o n s t r u c t the c o n c e p t i o n of m a t t e r w i t h o u t the a i d of any "a p r i o r i " b e l i e f s , f o r the e m p i r i c a l successes, o f t h a t c o n c e p t i o n i n d i c a t e t h a t some s i m i l a r assumption, p r o p e r l y i n t e r p r e t e d , must be v a l i d . I n g e n e r a l , our task i s to extrude from o r d i n a r y common-sense statements the n o t i o n of permanent " t h i n g s " u n d e r g o i n g changes i n time. A l l t h a t e x p e r i e n c e r e a l l y e n t i t l e s us t o a s s e r t i s t h a t c e r t a i n s e r i e s o f v e r y s i m i l a r a s p e c t s v a r y a c c o r d i n g to c e r t a i n laws. ¥e s h a l l d e f i n e a " t h i n g " as such a c e r t a i n s e r i e s of a s p e c t s . "To say t h a t a c e r t a i n a s p e c t i s an aspect o f a c e r t a i n thing-w i l l m e r e l y mean t h a t i t i s one of those w h i c h , taken s e r i a l l y , 1 are the t h i n g . " I f we s e a r c h f o r p r i n c i p l e s by w h i c h . t o s e l e c t c e r t a i n data, f r o m the chaos of s e n s a t i o n , and c a l l them a l l "appear-ances o f the same t h i n g " ( i n t e r p r e t i n g t h i s statement i n the l i g h t o f t h e f o r e g o i n g remarks) w/e s h a l l f i n d t h a t mere resemblance or c o n t i n u i t y are i n s u f f i c i e n t c r i t e r i a . From the p r o c e d u r e o f p h y s i c s , however, i t i s p o s s i b l e to f i n d an l . I b i d . , P. 10.7. -137-adequate d e f i n i t i o n o f a " t h i n g 1 1 , f o r " p h y s i c s has found i t e m p i r i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to c o l l e c t s e n s e - d a t a i n t o s e r i e s , each s e r i e s b e i n g r e g a r d e d as b e l o n g i n g to one ' t h i n g ' , a n d b e h a v i n g , w i t h r e g a r d to the laws of p h y s i c s , i n a way i n w h i c h s e r i e s not b e l o n g i n g to one t h i n g would i n g e n e r a l not behave. I f i t i s to be unambiguous whether .-two appearances b e l o n g to the same t h i n g o r n o t , t h e r e must be o n l y one way of g r o u p i n g appearances so t h a t the r e s u l t i n g t h i n g s obey the laws of p h y s i c s . . We must i n c l u d e i n our d e f i n i t i o n o f a " t h i n g * those of i t s a s p e c t s , i f any, w h i c h are not observed. Thus we may l a y down the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n : 'Things are those s e r i e s of a s p e c t s Yi/hich obey the laws of p h y s i c s . ' That such s e r i e s e x i s t i s an e m p i r i c a l f a c t , Yi/hich c o n s t i t u t e s the v e r i f i a b i l i t y of 1 p h y s i c s . " Such a d e f i n i t i o n i n v o l v e s s e r i e s o f s e n s e - d a t a , but i s not on t h a t account too s u b j e c t i v e f o r s c i e n c e . The p o i n t w h i c h i s at i s s u e h e r e i s t h a t o f the v e r i f i a b i l i t y , , not the o b j e c t i v e t r u t h , of p h y s i c s ; and v e r i f i a b i l i t y i s subj e c t i v e to t he degree t h a t i t depends upon our c a p a c i t y f o r a c q u i r i n g knowledge. P h y s i c s assumes u n v e r i f i a b l e e n t i t i e s to s i m p l i f y the statement of c a u s a l laws, but none o f these e n t i t i e s forms an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f what i s known to be t r u e i n p h y s i c s . Such h y p o t h e t i c a l e n t i t i e s can be e x h i b i t e d as l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n s of s e n s e - d a t a . To a c h i e v e c o n t i n u i t y we can p o s t u l a t e , f o r example, " i d e a l " appearances, " i d e a l " s t a t e s o f t h i n g s , and " i d e a l " t h i n g s . " I t i s u n n e c e s s a r y f o r the e n u n c i a t i o n o f the laws of p h y s i c s to a s s i g n any r e a l i t y to i d e a l elements: i t i s enough to accept them as l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , p r o v i d e d we have means 2 of knowing how t o determine when t h e y become a c t u a l . " E m p i r i c a l knowledge i s c o n f i n e d to what we a c t u a l l y observe; 1. Ibid., P.110. 2. I b i d , , p . U S . -138 and what we" a c t u a l l y observe are appearances of sense. (2) The c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s i n g l e space. The one a l l - e m b r a c i n g space o f our e x p e r i e n c e , "though c o n v e n i e n t as a. way of s p e a k i n g , need not be supposed r e a l l y to e x i s t . " D i f f e r e n t senses, ha.ve d i f f e r e n t spaces. A l l t h a t e x p e r i e n c e a s s e r t s i s t h a t t h e s e s e p a r a t e spaces can be c o r r e l a t e d by e m p i r i c a l l y d i s c o v e r e d l a w s . "The one space may t u r n out to be v a l i d as a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , compounded of the s e v e r a l s p a c e s , but t h e r e i s no good reason to assume 1 i t s independent m e t a p h y s i c a l r e a l i t y , " F u r t h e r , t h e spaces of immediate e x p e r i e n c e , i n w h i c h no p o i n t s are g i v e n , d i f f e r from t h a t o f geometry and p h y s i c s , w h i c h p o s t u l a t e an i n f i n i t e number of p o i n t s . S i n c e the r e q u i r e d p o i n t s a r e not g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e we can g e t f r o m e x p e r i e n c e o ver to the p o i n t s of geometry o n l y by means o f some l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n f rom i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n o b j e c t s . E x p e r i e n c e never p r o v i d e s us w i t h i n f i n i t e s i m a l sense-d a t a , but under the i n f l u e n c e of a t t e n t i o n we can s p l i t up what f o r m e r l y appeared as an u n d i v i d e d whole i n t o p a r t s con-t a i n e d w i t h i n t h a t whole. "This r e l a t i o n of e n c l o s u r e , by the h e l p o f some v e r y na.tural h y p o t h e s e s , w i l l enable us to d e f i n e a ' p o i n t ' as a c e r t a i n - c l a s s o f s p a t i a l o b j e c t s , namely, a l l 2 t h o s e . . .which w o u l d n a t u r a l l y be s a i d to c o n t a i n the p o i n t . " Such " p o i n t s " w i l l not be the p o i n t s of o r d i n a r y 1.V :Ibid., P. 113. — — 2. I n "The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r " R u s s e l l h o l d s t h a t as a p i e c e of l o g i c , t h i s method of r e a c h i n g .points from e n c l o s u r e -s e r i e s i s f a u l t l e s s : "but as a method w h i c h aims at s t a r t i n g w i t h t h e a c t u a l c o n s t i t u e n t s o f the w o r l d i t seems to me to have c e r t a i n d e f e c t s . " (i.e..) the q u e s t i o n of minima and maxima.) (P. 2 9 2 ) R u s s e l 1 i s c o n s e q u e n t l y "unable t o a c c e p t Dr. -139-thought, but t h e y w i l l have a l l the p r o p e r t i e s r e q u i s i t e f o r geome t r y . ' {3) The c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s i n g l e t i m e . S i n c e events o f whi c h we a r e c o n s c i o u s "do not l a s t m e r e l y f o r a m a t h e m a t i c a l i n s t a n t , but siways f o r some f i n i t e t i m e , however s h o r t , " i n s t a n t s are not among t h e data of our e x p e r i e n c e . I f , then we a r e to g e t from our e x p e r i e n c e over to a time w h i c h w i l l have the p r o p e r t i e s r e q u i s i t e f o r p h y s i c s , we s h a l l have to r e s o r t once more to some c o n s t r u c t -i o n f r o m the time r e l a t i o n s g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e . A l l t h a t e x p e r i e n c e p r o v i d e s i n t h i s case i s a knowledge of e v e n t s , o r d e r e d by the r e l a t i o n s of s i m u l t a n e i t y and s u c c e s s i o n . And y e t , " i n o r d e r to a s s i g n a date e x a c t l y , we must be a b l e , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , to determine whether any g i v e n event i s ' b e f o r e , a t , or a f t e r t h i s d a t e , and we must know t h a t any o t h e r date i s e i t h e r b e f o r e or a f t e r t h i s d a t e , 1 but not s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h i t . " By the method o f " p a r t i a l o v e r l a p p i n g " of events a.. c o m p l e t e l y a c c u r a t e d e f i n i t i o n of the time of an event can be f o u n d : "Let us t a k e a group o f e v e n t s of whi ch any two o v e r l a p , so t h a t t h e r e i s some;, t i m e , however s h o r t , when they a l l e x i s t . I f t h e r e i s any o t h e r event w h i c h i s s i m u l -taneous w i t h a l l of t h e s e , l e t us add i t to the group; l e t us go on u n t i l we have c o n s t r u c t e d a group such t h a t no event o u t s i d e of the group i s ' s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h a l l o f them, b u t a l l the events i n s i d e the group are 2 s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h each o t h e r . " Whitehead's c o n s t r u c t i o n of p o i n t s by means of e n c l o s u r e - s e r i e s a.s an adequate s o l u t i o n of t h e problem w h i c h i t i s d e s i g n e d to s o l v e . " (P.294.) 1. Ibid., P. 117. 2. I b i d . , P.118. -140-T h i s whole group, w h i c h i s d e f i n e d as an i n s t a n t o f t i m e , can he shown to have the p r o p e r t i e s we expect of i n s t a n t s : i . e . , (1) the i n s t a n t s as d e f i n e d form a s e r i e s ; (2) g i v e n any e vent, we can f i n d at l e a s t one c l a s s , s uch as we used i n d e f i n i n g i n s t a n t s , o f w h i c h i t i s a member; a.nd (3) such a s e r i e s o f i n s t a n t s i s compact--!.e.,"given any two events of w h i c h one w h o l l y p r e c e d e s the o t h e r , t h e r e are events w h o l l y a f t e r the one and s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h something w h o l l y b e f o r e the o t h e r . " The above d e f i n i t i o n o f i n s t a n t s , t h e n , i s adequate f o r mathematics, and does not assume any d i s p u t a b l e m e t a p h y s i c a l e n t i t y . Such exemplary methods o f d e f i n i n g m a t t e r , space and time as the f o r e g o i n g show t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e , by means of p u r e l y l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s , to make a w o r l d w i t h the k i n d of p r o p e r t i e s g i v e n i n the w o r l d o f sense "amenable to m a t h e m a t i c a l treatment by d e f i n i n g s e r i e s o f c l a s s e s of s e n s e - d a t a w h i c h can be c a l l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y p a r t i c l e s , p o i n t and i n s t a n t s . I f such c o n s t r u c t i o n s are p o s s i b l e then m a t h e m a t i c a l p h y s i c s i s a p p l i c a b l e to the r e a l w o r l d , i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t i t s p a r t i c l e s , p o i n t s and i n s t a n t s 2 are not to be found among a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g e n t i t i e s . " By s uch means, t h e n , we can j u s t i f y the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e of p h y s i c s . 1. Ibid., P. 120. 2. Ibid., P. 122. -141-I I I . THE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRUTH OE PHYSICS AS A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD. The q u e s t i o n o f the evidence f o r the t r u t h of p h y s i c s , i . e . , o f the r e l a t i o n of p h y s i c s t o p e r c e p t i o n , i s the t o p i c of P a r t I I o f R u s s e l l ' s "The A n a l y s i s of M a t t e r . " Common sense h o l d s t h a t p e r c e p t i o n r e v e a l s e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s t o us d i r e c t l y . S c i e n c e , w h i c h h o l d s t h a t t h e r e i s a c h a i n o f events between the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t and our p e r c e p t i o n of i t , r e q u i r e s , f o r v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i t s assumption o f the e x i s t e n c e o f the e x t e r n a l o b j e c t . "The evi d e n c e f o r the t r u t h o f p h y s i c s i s t h a t p e r c e p t i o n s occur as. the laws o f p h y s i cs would l e a d us to expect — e.g., we see an e c l i p s e when the astronomers say t h e r e wi 11 be an e c l i p s e . But p h y s i c s i t s e l f never says a n y t h i n g about p e r c e p t i o n s ; i t does not say t h a i we s h a l l see an e c l i p s e , b ut says some-1 t h i n g about the sun and moon." From common sense s c i e n c e t a k e s o v e r , among o t h e r i n f e r e n c e s , t h i s i m p o r t a n t i n f e r e n c e frora p e r c e p t i o n to u n p e r c e i v e d e n t i t i e s . Common sense makes t h i s i n f e r e n c e i n the f o r m o f a b e l i e f i n the permanence of p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t s at ti m e s v/hen t h e y are not p e r c e i v e d . Such a b e l i e f i s "a p i e c e of audacious m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r i z i n g " w h i c h a r i s e s i n i t s most p r i m i t i v e form as a. p h y s i o l o g i c a l r a t h e r than a l o g i c a l i n f e r e n c e . Y e t , s i n c e t h i s b e l i e f p e r s i s t s i n advanced s c i e n t i f i c or p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory "the i n q u i r y i n t o i t s . j u s t i f i c s t i o n i s the c e n t r a l p r o blem 1. B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s of M a t t e r " , P.7. -142-. , 1 i n the a n a l y s i s o f m a t t e r , p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d . " T h i s c o n c e p t i o n of an e x t e r n a l m a t t e r as the cause of our p e r c e p t i o n s must he examined c l o s e l y , s i n c e , i f p e r c e p t i o n s have no e x t e r n a l c a u s e s , e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y , p h y s i c s might he e x p e c t e d to c o l l a p s e . A c c o r d i n g l y the q u e s t i o n o f the e v i d e n c e f o r the t r u t h o f p h y s i c s r e s t s f u n d a m e n t a l l y on the v a l i d i t y of the c a u s a l t h e o r y of p e r c e p t i o n . The e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h i s t h e o r y and i t s a l t e r n a t i v e s forms the core o f R u s s e l l ' s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n of p h y s i c s to p e r c e p t i o n . ( l ) The c a u s a l t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n . The common-sense t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n becomes i n v o l v e d i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n s so m a n i f e s t and well-known that we can by no means agree w i t h i t s assumptions 1. When we come t o examine the c a u s a l t h e o r y of p e r c e p t i o n we cannot expect to f i n d a. l o g i c a l demonstrat i o n o f i t s a s s e r t i o n s : B e r k e l e y ' s arguments have l a r g e l y ended t h a t hope. F u n d a m e n t a l l y , says R u s s e l l , our main ground f o r i n f e r r i n g t h a t our p e r c e p t s and our r e c o l l e c t i o n s do not c o n s t i t u t e the e n t i r e u n i v e r s e i s our d e s i r e to b e l i e v e i n s i m p l e c a u s a l l a w s . The argument f o r o t h e r p e o p l e ' s p e r c e p t s , w h i c h i s presupposed i n the acceptance o f t e s t i m o n y , comes f i r s t i n l o g i c a l o r d e r when we are t r y i n g to e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e of t h i n g s o t h e r than our own p e r c e p t s . I n t h i s 1. Ibid., P.192. -143-argument t h e r e are t h r e e s t a g e s . The f i r s t stage c o n s i s t s i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f our own p e r c e p t s i n t o groups. Ve have a l r e a d y seen t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e to e l i m i n a t e r e f e r e n c e to an o b j e c t and speak o f a " p h y s i c a l object*' as a group of p e r c e p t s . I n t h e second s t a g e , we observe t h a t "the b e h a v i o u r o f t h e - p e r c e p t s we c a l l o t h e r p e o p l e ' s b o d i e s i s s i m i l a r to that 1 o f our own body i n re s p o n s e to t h i s or t h a t s t i m u l u s . " I n t h i s stage we e x p e r i e n c e the s t i m u l u s and make the same response as the o t h e r s do. But the r e a r e many i n s t a n c e s o f a t h i r d stage i n w h i c h we do not e x p e r i e n c e the s t i m u l u s but suppose, from t h e i r b e h a v i o u r , t h a t o t h e r p e o p l e have e x p e r i e n c e d i t : " T h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y p l a u s i b l e s u p p o s i t i o n i f we o u r s e l v e s e x p e r i e n c e the s t i m u l u s i n q u e s t i o n v e r y s h o r t l y a f t e r we have observed the b e h a v i o u r w h i c h l e d us to i n f e r i t . The t h i r d stage i s the more i m p o r t a n t , s i n c e i n the second we might a t t r i b u t e the b e h a v i o u r o f o t h e r s to the s t i m u l u s w h i c h we p e r c e i v e , and thus escape i n f e r r i n g u n p e r c e i v e d e x i s t e n t s , w h i l e 2 i n the t h i r d s t a g e t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s not open to us." The b e l i e f t h a t o t h e r s p e r c e i v e what we do not i s not d e m o n s t r a t i v e — b u t i t i s as v / e l l - f o u n d e d i n r e a s o n as our b e l i e f t h a t we c o u l d have a. p e r c e p t i o n o f t o u c h i f we s t r e t c h e d out our hand to an o b j e c t i n v i s u a l p e r c e p t i o n . Such a b e l i e f i n v o l v e s i n d u c t i o n , but i f i n d u c t i o n i s v a l i d at a l l we may t a k e as r e a s o n a b l y c e r t a i n the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e are e x i s t e n t s w h i c h we do not p e r c e i v e . 1. Ibid., P. 204. 2. Ibid., P.205. -144-I f we.once admit i n t o our argument the p e r c e p t s o f o t h e r p e o p l e , the s i m i l a r i t i e s between t h e i r p e r c e p t s lead; us t o accept the t h e o r y o f a common o r i g i n f o r s i m i l a r and s i m u l t a n e o u s p e r c e p t i o n s . I t i s , t r u e t h a t i n i n f e r r i n g such an o r i g i n we are i n f e r r i n g something w h i c h can never be e x p e r i e n c e d , but t h e common-sense arguments f o r an e x t e r n a l cause of. p e r c e p t i o n s are s t r o n g . Phenomenalism, f o r example, would say t h a t , except where t h e r e are p e r c i p i e n t s , space i s p u r e l y " i d e a l " . B u t the i n t e r v a l between the r e p o r t of a gun f i r e d a t A and t h e a u d i t o r y p e r c e p t i o n o f the r e p o r t at B and C i s a f u n c t i o n o f the d i s t a n c e s AB and AC. I t i s d i f f i c u l t , t h e r e f o r e , t o c o n s i d e r space as b e i n g " p u r e l y i d e a l " where t h e r e are no p e r c i p i e n t s , when space has such an a c t u a l i n f l u e n c e on p e r c e p t i o n s . , Or a g a i n , i f we were to p l a c e a d i c t a p h o n e and a h i d d e n man i n a room to r e c o r d the c o n v e r s a t i o n t a k i n g p l a e e - - i f the r e p o r t o f the man-agrees w i t h the r e c o r d o f the d i c t a p h o n e "we must suppose some c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n , s i n c e o t h e r w i s e the c o i n c i d e n c e i s i n the h i g h e s t degree i m p r o b a b l e . " By r e s o r t i n g to c e r t a i n " i d e a l " c o n s t r u c t i o n s , however, the p h e n o m e n a l i s t can p r e s e r v e t h e whole of p h y s i c s — a t •• l e a s t f o r m a l l y - - a n d he can p r e s e r v e i t w i t h the b a r e minimum of h y p o t h e s i s . But "-the g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n the above theory of ' i d e a l ' elements i s t h a t i t i s h a r d to see how a n y t h i n g merely i m a g i n a r y can be e s s e n t i a l to the statement of a c a u s a l law.. We have to e x p l a i n the d i c t a p h o n e w h i c h r e p e a t s the c o n v e r s a t i o n . We w i l l suppose t h a t i t was seen i n pla.ce b e f o r e and a f t e r the c o n v e r s a t i o n , -145-b u t not' d u r i n g i t . C o n s e q u e n t l y , on the view we are examining, - i t d i d not e x i s t at a l l d u r i n g the c o n v e r s a t i o n . C a u s a l laws, s t a t e d w i t h o u t f i c t i t i o u s elements, w i l l thus i n v o l v e a c t i o n at a d i s t a n c e i n time and space. Moreover, our p e r c e p t s are not s u f f i c i e n t to determine the cour s e o f .nature: we . d e r i v e c a u s a l laws from c l o s e o b s e r v a t i o n , and p r e s e r v e them i n o t h e r c a s e s by i n v e n t i n g ' i d e a l ' t h i n g s . T h i s would not be n e c e s s a r y i f p e r c e p t s s u f f i c e d f o r the c a u s a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f f u t u r e p e r c e p t s . Thus the view we are examining i s i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h , p h y s i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m , i n f a c t though not i n form. We c o u l d 1 m u l t i p l y d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s k i n d i n d e f i n i t e l y . " A l t h o u g h i t i s l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e to i n t e r p r e t the p h y s i c a l w o r l d i n terms of i d e a l elements, such an i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n i s , i n R u s s e l l ' s view, u n p l a u s i b l e and has no p o s i t i v e grounds i n i t s f a v o u r . The o n l y r e m a i n i n g a l t e r n a t i v e to the c a u s a l t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n i s s o l i p s i s m , w h i c h i s "the view t h a t f rom the events w h i c h I e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e i s no v a l i d method o f i n f e r r i n g the c h a r a c t e r , o r even the e x i s t e n c e of • 2 events w h i c h I do not e x p e r i e n c e . " The .escape from s o l i p s i s m i s .admittedly p r a g m a t i c , not s t r i c t l y l o g i c a l ; f o r our escape i n v o l v e s i n d u c t i o n and c a u s a l i t y , w h i c h are s t i l l s u b j e c t to the doubts r a i s e d by Hume. The assumption, however, t h a t our p e r c e p t s have e x t e r n a l causes w h i c h may e x i s t a p a r t f rom our p e r c e p t i o n s i s the p r e f e r a b l e one to make. The e s s e n t i a l assumption f o r t h i s c a u s a l t h e o r y i s t h a t a group o f p e r c e p t s formed by o r d e r i n g the p e r c e p t s o f v a r i o u s o b s e r v e r s about a c e n t r e "can be e n l a r g e d by the a d d i t i o n of o t h e r e v e n t s , ranged i n the same space about the same c e n t r e , and connected b o t h w i t h each o t h e r and w i t h the l . I b i d . , P.214. 2. Ibid., P. 298. -146-• group o f p e r c e p t s by laws w h i c h i n c l u d e the laws o f p e r s p e c t i v e . The. e s s e n t i a l p o i n t s are ( l ) the arrangement about a c e n t r e , (2) the c o n t i n u i t y between p e r c e p t s and c o r r e l a t e d e v e nts i n o t h e r p a r t s of the space d e r i v e d from p e r c e p t s and l o c o m o t i o n . The f i r s t i s a matter o f o b s e r v a t i o the second i s a h y p o t h e s i s designed to s e c u r e s i m p l i c i t y and c o n t i n u i t y i n the laws o f c o r r e l a t i o n suggested by the 1 g r o u p i n g of p e r c e p t s . " (2) The n a t u r e o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. The scope o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge where we are making i n f e r e n c e s from percepts' to u n p e r c e i v e d events i s c o n f i n e d to s t r u c t u r e o n l y . We do not need to t h i n k of any a b s o l u t e l y unknowable " D i n g - a n - s i c h " , f o r we assume t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r c e p t s i m p l y d i f f e r e n c e s i n s t i m u l i . The i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r s o f s t i m u l i . w i l l be unknown, but we can secure a g r e a t d e a l o f knowledge as to t h e i r s t r u c t u r e . The f o r m a l assumption t h a t t h e r e i s a one-one r e l a t i o n between s t i m u l u s and p e r c e p t "enables us to i n f e r c e r t a i n m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s ,of the s t i m u l u s when we know the p e r c e p t , and c o n v e r s e l y e n a b l e s us to i n f e r the p e r c e p t when we know these 2 •-m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s o f the s t i m u l u s . " We i n v e r t the maxim "same cause, same e f f e c t " i n t o the form " d i f f e r e n t c a u ses, d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s . " F o r example, when we see r e d and green t o g e t h e r , we i n f e r a d i f f e r e n c e i n s t r u c t u r e between the s t i m u l u s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the r e d p e r c e p t and that c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o the g r e e n . 1. Ibid., P. 217. . « -2 . lb i i . , ? . zzi. -147-The c o n c e p t i o n o f substance i n p h y s i c s has been l a r g e l y d i s p e n s e d w i t h , a l o n g the l i n e s s uggested e a r l i e r . A p i e c e of m a t t e r i s a connected s t r i n g o f e v e n t s , and the s t r i n g of events c o n s t i t u t i n g one m a t e r i a l u n i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r s by the e x i s t e n c e of an i n t r i n s i c c a u s a l law. "The p h y s i c a l o b j e c t to be i n f e r r e d from p e r c e p t i o n i s a group 1 o f e v e n t s , r a t h e r than a s i n g l e ' t h i n g ' " . Common sense has no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e f e r r i n g p e r c e p t s , w h i c h are always e v e n t s , to " t h i n g s " w i t h changing s t a t e s . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p h y s i c s w h i c h d i s p e n s e s w i t h permanent substance i s t h e r e -f o r e p r e f e r a b l e and has been shown to be p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e . From the s t a n d p o i n t o f p h y s i c s , a, p e r c e p t can be c o n s i d e r e d as a term i n a p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s , c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the f a c t t h a t i t has t r a v e r s e d a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n and has undergone c o r r e s p o n d i n g m o d i f i c a t i o n s - - e . g . , i n the case of a, v i s u a l p e r c e p t , t h i s r e g i o n i s the eyes, the o p t i c n e r v e , and p a r t of the b r a i n * The "prima f a c i e " d i f f e r e n c e between a p e r c e p t and a p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s can q u i t e r e a d i l y be e x p l a i n e d away, f o r the apparent g u l f (e.g.) between a l i g h t - w a v e and a v i s u a l p e r c e p t i s due to comparison o f e v e n ts o f d i f f e r e n t o r d e r s . A l i g h t - w a v e i s much more complex i n r e a l i t y than i n mathematics: we t r e a t i n p h y s i c s the whole group o f c o r r e l a t e d events as i f i t were one e v e n t , i . e . , as a l i g h t - w a v e . "There i s no t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n why a l i g h t - w a v e s h o u l d 1. Ibid,, P.247. -148-not c o n s i s t o f groups o f o c c u r r e n c e s , each c o n t a i n i n g . ,a member more o r l e s s analogous to a minute p a r t o f a v i s u a l p e r c e p t . We cannot p e r c e i v e a l i g h t - w a v e , s i n c e the i n t e r p o s i t i o n o f an eye and b r a i n s t o p s i t . We know, t h e r e f o r e , o n l y i t s a b s t r a c t m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . Such p r o p e r t i e s may b e l o n g to groups .composed o f any k i n d o f m a t e r i a l . To a s s e r t t h a t the m a t e r i a l must, be v e r y d i f f e r e n t from p e r c e p t s i s to 1 assume t h a t we know a g r e a t d e a l more than we do i n f a c t know o f the i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r o f p h y s i c a l e v e n t s . " N o t h i n g t h a t p h y s i c s t e l l s us can d i s p r o v e the s u p p o s i t i o n o f a q u a l i t a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y throughout a. p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s whose l a s t term i s a. p e r c e p t . The r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s f a c t removes the m y s t e r y w h i c h was f o r m e r l y a g r e a t o b s t a c l e to the acceptance o f the c a u s a l t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n . The g e n e r a l outcome' of R u s s e l l ' s d i s c u s s i o n has been to j u s t i f y the o r d i n a r y s c i e n t i f i c a t t i t u d e towards the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . P h y s i c i s t s can l e g i t i m a t e l y i n f e r t h a t our p e r c e p t s have e x t e r n a l causes. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l assumptions o f p h y s i c s can be defended, because i t i s p o s s i b l e by.means o f p u r e l y l o g i c a l m a n i p u l a t i o n to c o n s t r u c t from s e n s e - d a t a - p a r t i c l e s , p o i n t s and i n s t a n t s w i t h p r o p e r t i e s adequate f o r p h y s i c s . But p h y s i c a l knowledge i s p u r e l y m a t h e m a t i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l , and i s t h e r e f o r e e x t r e m e l y a b s t r a c t . S i n c e p h y s i c s l e a v e s open a l l k i n d s o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s as to the i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r o f the w o r l d to w h i c h i t s e q u a t i o n s a p p l y , "the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e a t t i t u d e about the p h y s i c a l w o r l d seems, to be one o f complete a g n o s t i c i s m as r e g a r d s a l l but i t s 2 m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . " 1. Ibid., P.263. 2. Ibid., P. 271. MOBITZ SCHLICK: CHAPTER V I . "ALLGE1EINE ERKEHHTHISLEHRE. » CHAPTER VI.. MORITZ SCHLICK: "ALLGEMEIUE ERIvSHHTHISLEPIRE. " The work of the contemporary p h i l o s o p h e r M o r i t z S c h l i c k i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f the modern movement known by t h e name of " l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m " . T h i s stream of thought, w h i c h c o n t i n u e s i n the e m p i r i c a l t r a d i t i o n o f David Hume, marks a complete b r e a k w i t h the a b s t r u s e i d e a l i s t i c and m e t a p h y s i c a l systems c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f much of the p h i l o s o p h y of the l a s t c e n t u r y . Eor S c h l i c k , the bounds o f knowledge do not f a l l o u t s i d e the sphere o f o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e and of the s c i e n c e s i n ' g e n e r a l . The g o a l of knowledge i s not a, m y s t i c a l one: we are not concerned to become a c q u a i n t e d w i t h o b j e c t s a f t e r the manner o f i n t u i t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , but r a t h e r to d i s c o v e r the. r e l a t i o n s o b t a i n i n g between those o b j e c t s . The p r o c e s s of knowledge, w h i c h e s s e n t i a l l y i n v o l v e s the s e a r c h f o r i d e n t i t y amidst d i v e r s i t y , i s c a r r i e d on by the o r d e r i n g of symbols to f e a t u r e s i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . The s e l e c t i o n and d i s p o s i t i o n o f the f i r s t symbols i n a s c i e n t i f i c s t r u c t u r e i s a. r e l a t i v e l y a r b i t r a r y p r o c e d u r e , but the d i s c o v e r y of the r e l a t i o n s w h i c h e x i s t between the o b j e c t s o r s t a t e s of a f f a i r s d e s i g n a t e d by those symbols must wai t on e x p e r i e n c e , ¥e a r e l e d to a correspondence t h e o r y of t r u t h : a t r u e judgment i s one w h i c h c l e a r l y and u n e q u i v o c a l l y d e s i g n a t e s a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . When c o n s i s t e n t l y d e v e l o p e d , t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge as a. system of s y m b o l i c d e s i g -n a t i o n g i v e s promise of s o l v i n g a number of v e x a t i o u s problems, and even i n d i c a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x t e n d i n g the q u a n t i t a t i v e methods of the exact s c i e n c e s i n t o the sphere of -151. p s y c h i c a l p r o c e s s e s . The r e s u l t i n g monism o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l method enables us t o put an end to the troublesome d u a l i s m w h i c h has dogged the f o o t s t e p s of modern p h i l o s o p h y s i n c e the time of G a l i l e o and D e s c a r t e s . •I..THE NATURE OE iQtfOWLEDGE. To g i v e an e x p o s i t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e , e x t e n t and v a l i d i t y o f knowledge w i t h o u t f i r s t making some p r o v i s i o n a l assumption as to i t s n a t u r e i s a p r o c e d u r e whi ch i s as u n f r u i t f u l o.f good r e s u l t s i n p h i l o s o p h y as i t i s i n s c i e n c e . The s i m p l e s t p o s s i b l e . e x a m p l e s from o r d i n a r y l i f e and from s c i e n c e enable us to make t h i s n e c e s s a r y assumption. We can d e f i n e knowledge as t h e r e c o g n i t i o n i n a new s i t u a t i o n of something a l r e a d y known. I n a, c e r t a i n c o l l e c t i o n o f q u a l i t i e s , f o r example, I r e c o g n i z e the c o l l e c t . i o n to w h i c h I f o r m e r l y gave the name " t r e e " . I n s c i e n c e , when we say t h a t " L i g h t i s a. form o f wave m o t i o n " we m e r e l y i n d i c a t e t h e f a c t t h a t i n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f l i g h t phenomena we r e c o g n i z e the same p r o p e r t i e s w h i c h have always appeared i n t h e p r o p a g a t i o n o f waves. The e x periments of H e r t z and o t h e r s enable us t o c a r r y t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n even f u r t h e r . On the b a s i s of the f a c t t h a t l i g h t waves have c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s i n common w i t h e l e c t r i c a l waves we can say t h a t " L i g h t i s an e l e c t r o m a g n e t i c phenomenon." -152-The f a c t t h a t we can d i s c o v e r elements a l r e a d y known i n new r e l a t i o n s means t h a t the e s s e n t i a l demand of knowledge i s f o r the r e d u c t i o n o f two p r e v i o u s l y s e p a r a t e d phenomena to an i d e n t i t y . As knowledge advances i t i s c l e a r t h a t the number of phenomena w h i c h can he e x p l a i n e d by one p r i n c i p l e w i l l grow g r e a t e r : f o r example, modern p h y s i c s has brought t o g e t h e r f i e l d of r e s e a r c h which were f o r m e r l y s e p a r a t e d . Yet we can never e x p l a i n a l l phenomena by one p r i n c i p l e o n l y , as many p h i l o s o p h e r s have t r i e d t o do, f o r such a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e because o f i t s extreme e x t e n s i o n c o u l d not e n a b l e us to d i s t i n g u i s h and c l a s s i f y i n d i v i d u a l phenomena and would t h e r e f o r e g a i n f o r us no r e a l knowledge, On t h e o t h e r hand, the mere d i s t i n c t i o n and n o m i n a t i o n of e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon would i n d i c a t e a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h , but not knowledge o f , those phenomena. Genuine knowledge, w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n the r e d u c t i o n of phenomena i n t o systems by the h e l p o f c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s , must f u l f i l two c o n d i t i o n s : i t must (1) a c h i e v e complete d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l phenomenon and (2) a c h i e v e s uch d e t e r m i n a t i o n by the h e l p of the most u n i v e r s a l c o n c e p t s . " A l l knowledge i s a r e c o g n i t i o n o r a r e d i s c o v e r y . And r e d i s c o v e r y means an e q u a t i n g o f t h a t w h i c h i s known w i t h 1 t h a t as w h i c h i t i s known." I n o r d i n a r y l i f e t h i s act of e q u a t i n g t a k e s p l a c e by means o f the comparison of p e r c e p t i o n s . 1. M o r i t z S c h l i c k , " A l l g e m e i n e E r k e n n t n i s l e h r e , " ?.14. -153-E x p e r i e n c e a s s u r e s us t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n and knowledge by means of p e r c e p t i o n s has s u f f i c i e n t a c c u r a c y f o r everyday purposes, but our p e r c e p t i o n s are too vague, t r a n s i e n t and u n r e l i a b l e f o r . s c i e n c e . F u r t h e r , one o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s t h a t we p r o c e e d on g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , s i n c e o t h e r w i s e any o r g a n i z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s i s i m p o s s i b l e . But B e r k e l e y c l e a r l y demonstrated the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a c h i n g a t r u e u n i v e r s a l by means o f t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of mere p e r c e p t -i o n s , w h i c h are always p a r t i c u l a r . To escape from the vagueness and u n c e r t a i n t y a t t e n d a n t upon p e r c e p t i o n s s c i e n c e , whi ch demands ex a c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , has r e c o u r s e to c o n c e p t s . The content and c o n s t a n c y o f a concept can be c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n e d by d e f i n i t i o n . A concept i s merely a c o n s t r u c t i o n o f thought and has o n l y the r o l e o f a. s i g n or symbol f o r the o b j e c t s i t d e s i g n a t e s . S i n c e a concept i s not a r e a l obj ect i t must be denoted i n 'actual t h i n k i n g by means o f p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s e s , but i n s p i t e o f the vagueness to w h i c h t h e s e l a s t a r e s u b j e c t such a p e r c e p t u a l i z a t i o n does not d e s t r o y the v a l u e o f a. concept p r o v i d e d we r e a l i z e t h a t the f u n c t i o n o f the p e r c e p t i o n i s s i m p l y t o r e p r e s e n t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n c e p t . The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the concept c o n s i s t s e n t i r e l y i n the f a c t t h a t i t has a d e n o t a t i v e or d e s i g n a t i v e f u n c t i o n . - F o r S c h l i c k , " d e s i g n a t i o n " ("bezeichnen") i n v o l v e s a correspondence or an o r d e r i n g . To say t h a t c e r t a i n ' o b j e c t s f a l l under a c e r t a i n concept means t h a t they are o r d e r e d to t h i s c o ncept. Beyond t h i s d e s i g n a t i v e f u n c t i o n -154-concepts have no r-eal b e i n g whatever, so t h a t we need not be l e d i n t o the "Scheinprobleme" w h i c h a r i s e from P l a t o n i c systems. . Y e t i n r e s o r t i n g to concepts as a means of exact d e s i g -n a t i o n we have o n l y postponed the d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h l e d us to abandon p e r c e p t i o n as b e i n g i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g , f o r s c i e n c e e v e n t u a l l y comes back to p e r c e p t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n . I t i s p o s s i b l e so to choose the d e f i n i n g p r o p e r t i e s o f an element, f o r example, t h a t t h i s o b j e c t i o n need not c o n s t i t u t e a p r a c t i c a l h i n d r a n c e t o s c i e n c e , b u t the problem s t i l l remains f o r e p i s t e m o l o g y . .Apparently the c o n t e n t s i n t o w h i c h the d e f i n i t i o n of any r e a l o b j e c t r e s o l v e s t h e concept a r e i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s always o f p e r c e p t u a l n a t u r e . T h i s mode of d e f i n i t i o n , o f c o u r s e , b r i n g s us back to c e r t a i n f a c t o r s of e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h are u l t i m a t e l y i n d e f i n a b l e . M a t h e m a t i c s , however, has found a w a y out o f t h i s predica.-ment. R e a l i z i n g the u n s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s o f b a s i n g the most elementary g e o m e t r i c a l c o n c e p t s on d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n or i n t u i t i o n , m a t h e m a t i c i a n s have d e v e l o p e d the system.of " i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n " , o r d e f i n i t i o n by p o s t u l a t e . I n such a system terms such as " p o i n t " , " s t r a i g h t l i n e " , " p l a n e " e t c . , have, to b e g i n w i t h , no meaning o r content whatever. They r e c e i v e meaning o n l y t h r o u g h the system of axioms, which l a y down i n s t r i c t f o r m the r e l a t i o n s of the b a s i c c o ncepts to each o t h e r . By t h i s method of d e f i n i t i o n mathematics can be removed from an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s and can be g i v e n a -155-c o m p l e t e l y s e c u r e f o u n d a t i o n . A s t r i c t l y d e d u c t i v e m a t h e m a t i c a l system i s independent o f p e r c e p t i o n . P e r c e p t u a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s are s i g n i f i c a n t s i m p l y as i l l u s t r a t i v e examples of the m a t h e m a t i c a l c o n c e p t s . The b u i l d i n g o f such a system i s a mere p l a y w i t h symbols, and i t s s t r i c t n e s s i s no l o n g e r a s s u r e d when i t i s a p p l i e d to p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n s ; but n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e o f i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n , by f r e e i n g us from the n e c e s s i t y o f r e f e r r i n g concepts to p e r c e p t i o n , e n a b l e s us to g i v e them exact d e t e r m i n a t i o n . A concept i s s i m p l y a s i g n made to co r r e s p o n d to o b j e c t s . A j u d g m e n t , , i n w h i c h two or more concepts are u n i t e d , i s a l s o a s i g n , b u t i t d e s i g n a t e s a f a c t , - - i . e . , i t a s s e r t s t h a t c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s e x i s t between o b j e c t s , e i t h e r r e a l o r c o n c e p t u a l . A f a c t i n v o l v e s a t l e a s t two o b j e c t s and a r e l a t i o n o b t a i n i n g between them. When a judgment s e r v e s as a new s i g n o f a p r e v i o u s l y u n d e s i g n a t e d s t a t e of a f f a i r s , i t i s a d e f i n i t i o n . A judgment u n i t e s c o n c e p t s , but at the same t i m e concepts u n i t e judgments hy v i r t u e of the en t r a n c e o f t h e same concept i n t o d i f f e r e n t judgments. T h i s f a c t a s s u r e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f concepts and judgments b e i n g u n i t e d i n a c o h e r e n t s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h i s an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n o f knowledge. I n t h e p r o c e s s o f knowledge the " p r e d i c a t e concept i s b u i l t up by t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n ("Kreuzung") o f a number.of it g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s . The s u b j e c t i s subsumed by judgment under e a ch o f these and i s thus determined as t h a t w h i c h i s d e s i g n a t e d by a l l of them and w h i c h p a r t i c i p a t e s i n a l l o f -156-them at the same t i m e . " I t i s i n t h i s manner t h a t g e n e r a l concepts can d e s i g n a t e a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t . "By the i n t e r -s e c t i o n " o f g e n e r a l concepts an a r e a i s marked o f f i n t h e i r I centre-, i n w h i c h n o t h i n g but t h a t o b j e c t ca.n be p l a c e d . " For example, o n l y a few g e n e r a l concepts such as "wave mo t i o n " and "cause o f v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n " are s u f f i c i e n t to d e s i g n a t e the p r o c e s s c a l l e d l i g h t . I n the exact s c i e n c e s the p r e c i s e d e m a r c a t i o n o f t h i s c o n c e p t u a l p l a c e to w h i c h the o b j e c t b e l o n g s i s b r o u g h t about c h i e f l y w i t h the a i d of qua.ntita.tive d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . F o r a. t h e o r y w h i c h c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h i n k i n g i s a system whereby we m e r e l y o r d e r symbols t o the o b j e c t s w i t h w h i c h we have to d e a l , t r u t h w i l l l i e i n the adequate and unequi-v o c a ! d e s i g n a t i o n by a judgment of a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . A f a l s e judgment i s one w h i c h f a l l s to secure t h i s u n e q u i v o c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the f a d t s i n a, s i t u a t i o n . A n e g a t i v e judgment i s m e r e l y a c o n v e n i e n t p r a . c t i c a l d e v i c e f o r i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g p o s i t i v e judgment i s f a l s e , and f i n d s no p l a c e i n a completed system. We can know w h i c h f a c t a, g i v e n judgment d e s i g n a t e s o n l y b y , v i r t u e of the p l a c e w h i c h a p r o p o s i t i o n o c c u p i e s i n a system of judgments. No d i r e c t " e v i d e n c e " can ever a s s u r e us of the t r u t h ( i . e . , t h e unambiguous r e f e r e n c e ) of a judgment. I t i s p e r f e c t l y " e v i d e n t " t h a t t h e sun goes round the e a r t h , b u t our system of knowledge t e l l s us t h a t such a statement i s f a l s e . T r u t h i s not an immanent p r o p e r t y o f a judgment, because the whole b e i n g o f a judgment c o n s i s t s i n 1. Ibid., P. 54. -157-i t s r e l a t i o n t o a g i v e n s t a l e o f a f f a i r s . By a. s u i t a b l e c h o i c e of o b j e c t s " i t i s p o s s i b l e to frame i m p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n s of such a s o r t t h a t concepts d e f i n e d by them w i l l s ecure c l e a r d e s i g n a t i o n of those r e a l 1 o b j e c t s . " "These concepts hang t o g e t h e r i n a system of judgments t h a t c o m p l e t e l y agrees w i t h the net of judgments, which}, on the b a s i s o f e x p e r i e n c e , was c o n s t r u c t e d to 1 c o r r e s p o n d a d e q u a t e l y to t h e system of f a c t s . " I n other words, i t i s j j o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a p u r e l y l o g i c a l system whose p r o p o s i t i o n s can a d e q u a t e l y d e s i g n a t e r e a l s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . When so a p p l i e d to r e a l i t y , however, a d e d u c t i v e system l o s e s i t s s t r i c t v a l i d i t y : f o r "every p r o p o s i t i o n 1 about r e a l f a c t s . . . h a s the c h a r a c t e r o f an h y p o t h e s i s . " There are o n l y two c l a s s e s of judgments, and between these two types t h e r e i s a sharp d i v i s i o n : (1) the p r o p o s i t i o n s o f l o g i c and mathematics, and (2) the s y n t h e t i c " a p o s t e r i o r i " p r o p o s i t i o n s o f s c i e n c e o r of e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l . Mathem-a t i c a l or l o g i c a l systems are p u r e l y d e d u c t i v e , t a u t o l o g i c a l and a p o d i c t i c . R e a l knowledge i s s y n t h e t i c and i s always "a. p o s t e r i o r i " . Knowledge i s not found s i m p l y i n immediate e x p e r i e n c e . I n t u i t i o n g i v e s us mere a c q u a i n t a n c e s w i t h o b j e c t s , not knowledge of them: i t - i s " b l e s s e s S r l e b e n . " To know o b j e c t s means "to f i n d one i n a n o t h e r " - - t o f i n d i d e n t i t y amidst d i v e r s i t y . We s e c u r e knowledge by o r d e r i n g symbols to o b j e c t s and by d i s c o v e r i n g f rom e x p e r i e n c e the r e l a t i o n s 1. Ibid., P. 65. -158-o b t a i n i n g between those o b j e c t s . Judgments, or complex symbols w h i c h a s s e r t r e l a t i o n s between o b j e c t s , are t r u e when they u n e q u i v o c a l l y r e p r e s e n t the c o r r e s p o n d i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s . A s c i e n c e c o n s i s t s i n a coherent s t r u c t u r e o f such judgments. I I . THE HAT DEI OE THE REAL : THE "THING- IE - IT SELE" OE SCIENCE. A l l our judgments, u n l e s s t h e y are p u r e l y a n a l y t i c a l and t a u t o l o g i c a l , c l a i m to g i v e us knowledge about " r e a l i t y " . I n S c h l i c k 1 s v i e w , the d i s c o v e r y of an adequate c r i t e r i o n of r e a l i t y i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the s t a t e o f our knowledge c o n c e r n i n g the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . We are not e n t i t l e d to frame concepts o f r e a l i t y w h i c h are o u t . o f a l l r e l a t i o n w i t h the meaning t h a t concept has. i n o r d i n a r y l i f e and i n s c i e n c e . I n everyday e x p e r i e n c e , the r e a l i s always t h a t w h i c h i s d i r e c t l y g i v e n . But common sense b e l i e v e s as w e l l t h a t the r e a l may not always be g i v e n - -mountains and r i v e r s c o n t i n u e to have r e a l e x i s t e n c e even when they a r e not p e r c e i v e d , because t h e y c o n t i n u e to have e f f e c t s w h i c h are p e r c e i v a b l e . T h i s b e l i e f i s t aken over i n p h i l o s o p h y i n the d e f i n i t i o n t h a t e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h i s r e a l i s a cause : " w i r k l i ch i s t , was w i r k t . " Yet t h e f a c t t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s s e p a r a b l e f r o m a c t i v i t y , and the f a c t t h a t B e i n g cannot be s u f f i c i e n t l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d by the e x i s t e n c e o f mere r e l a t i o n s (such as t h e c a u s a l r e l a t i o n ) r e n d e r t h i s c r i t e r i o n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . K a n t 's d e f i n i t i o n of the r e a l as " t h a t w h i c h i s bound up w i t h the m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of e x p e r i e n c e " g i v e s us the answer: r e a l i t y must be d etermined -159-i n time. ' E v e r y t h i n g w h i c h r e a l l y e x i s t s , e x i s t s f o r us a t a d e f i n i t e t i m e . Such a c r i t e r i o n i n c l u d e s as w e l l the o r i g i n a l common sense d e f i n i t i o n of r e a l i t y as t h a t which i s d i r e c t l y g i v e n , f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e of an o b j e c t at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e means s i m p l y t h a t i t i s set i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n to the "now" o f immediate e x p e r i e n c e . O r i e n t a t i o n i n time i s the c r i t e r i o n o f r e a l i t y . We can now p r o c e e d to t h e r e a l i s t i c t h e s i s w h i c h i s c e n t r a l i n S c h l i c k ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y , namely, t h a t s t r i c t p o s i t i v i s m o r what he c a l l s a " p h i l o s o p h y of immanence" i s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r s c i e n c e . I n d e a l i n g w i t h the r e a l we must employ c o n c e p t i o n s w h i c h t r a n s c e n d what i s a c t u a l l y g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e . We must, among o t h e r t h i n g s , p o s t u l a t e the e x i s t e n c e o f " t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s 1 1 . When we a f f i r m the r e a l i t y - o f an o b j e c t ( o r p r o c e s s , or s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ) w h i c h i s not d i r e c t l y g i v e n to us i n sense, ( i . e . , when we a r e f o r c e d to f i x i t i n time) we c a l l t h a t o b j e c t a " t h i n g - i n -i t s e l f . " When we say t h a t an obj ect e x i s t s " f o r i t s e l f " we s i m p l y mean t h a t i t e x i s t s even when we do not p e r c e i v e i t . The "Immanenzphilosophie" or s t r i c t p o s i t i v i s m o f e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s such as Mach and A v e n a r i us was an attempt to c r e a t e a theory, w h i c h s h o u l d not be t r o u b l e d w i t h the d i f f i c u l t i e s a t t e n d a n t upon t h e h i s t o r i c a l t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f o f Kant and o t h e r s . I n Mach's view, the w o r l d can be c o n c e i v e d s i m p l y as a c o h e r e n t s t r u c t u r e o f c o l o u r s , tones, s m e l l s , -160 t a s t e s e t c . 1 These "elements" are always hound t o g e t h e r i n .changing hut r e l a t i v e l y c o n s t a n t s t r u c t u r e s . B o d i e s do not produce s e n s a t i o n s : complexes of s e n s a t i o n s form b o d i e s . The t a s k o f s c i e n c e i s to d e s c r i b e i n the s i m p l e s t p o s s i b l e way the dependence o f t h e s e elements on one another. What are the o b j e c t i o n s to t h i s B e r k e l e y a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s c i e n c e ? The "immanence p h i l o s o p h e r " must h o l d t h a t the o b j e c t s w h i c h are not g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e and y e t about w h i c h s c i e n c e makes j u d g m e n t s — e . g . , th e o t h e r s i d e o f the m oon—are e i t h e r r e a l or u n r e a l . I n the l a t t e r case the concepts ordered to such o b j e c t s are mere " H i I f s b e g r i f f e " or a u x i l i a r y c o n c e p t s . An o b j e c t 0 i s c o n s t i t u t e d by a l l i t s a s p e c t s o r "element complexes" At A2 A 3 e t c . To ensure, c o n t i n u i t y of the " t h i n g " when i t i s not p e r c e i v e d we must p o s t u l a t e " i d e a l " a s p e c t s , and i f we are t a k i n g the f i r s t p o s i t i o n we h o l d t h a t t h o s e a s p e c t s , though not p e r c e i v e d , are n e v e r t h e l e s s i n e x i s t e n c e . S c h l i c k c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h i s t h e o r y g i v e s no adequate account o f the fundamental d i s t i n c t i o n between p e r c e i v e d and un-p e r c e i v e d a s p e c t s , and t h a t i t c o u l d not do so w i t h o u t assuming a s u b j e c t , o b j e c t and a. r e l a t i o n between them. Such t r a n s c e n d e n t assumptions are i m p o s s i b l e i n a p u r e l y immanent t h e o r y . I n the second p l a c e , t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of an o b j e c t as b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d by a l l the p o s s i b l e a s p e c t s or "element complexes" w h i c h c o u l d e x i s t f o r any b e i n g at any time f a i l s to obey the p r i n c i p l e o f parsimony, because of the c o m p l e x i t y of such an e n d l e s s number of p o s s i b l e a s p e c t s . -161-I t i s s i m p l e r to p o s t u l a t e a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f w h i c h i s a complex o f obj e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g p r o c e s e s o r s t a t e s . The complex o f p r o c e s s e s w h i c h f o r m such a t h i n g a re not to be c o n s i d e r e d as o n l y s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from the "element complexes" of Mach's t h e o r y , because these complexes o f v a r i o u s sense p e r c e p t i o n s are g i v e n i n d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e and are c o m p l e t e l y s u b j e c t i v e . The immanence t h e o r y s p r i n g s i n p a r t from the d e s i r e to d i s p e n s e w i t h r e a l i t i e s w h i c h are hot d i r e c t l y known. Yet the demand to know o b j e c t s d i r e c t l y ("kennen") i s not a c o n d i t i o n of t r u e knowledge; and i n any case the h y p o t h e t i c a l l y p o s t u l a t e d " i d e a l " aspects can never be d i r e c t l y g i v e n , so t h a t the t h e o r y f a i l s to a c h i e v e i t s p u rpose. . F u r t h e r , how do we know w h i c h "elements" form the r e a l o b j e c t ? Mach has attempted to make the o r d e r l i n e s s o f the s t r u c t u r e o f these "element-complexes" ("die Gesetzmassigkeit-i h r e s Zusammenhanges") the c o n s t a n t w h i c h u n i f i e s h i s "elements" i n t o one object.. But t h i s o r d e r l i n e s s of appear-ances cannot be equated w i t h the r e a l n a t u r e o f an o b j e c t . Such a p r o c e d u r e would e r e c t a. mere concept i n t o a. dynamic power .* "To say t h a t a t h i n g i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i_s a complex o f elements o b e y i n g l a w s , and t o say t h a t i t e x i s t s even i f the elements themselves are not g i v e n ; and to b e l i e v e t h a t we have t h e r e b y a t t r i b u t e d the same r e a l i t y to t h i n g s as a sense-datum p o s s e s s e s , i s to r e i f y a law; and the r e s u l t i n g c o n c e p t u a l p i c t u r e i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the concept of f o r c e as i t h e l d sway i n a phase o f s c i e n c e w h i c h has now p a s s e d away. The l a w - a b i d i n g n e s s o f the co h e r e n t s t r u c t u r e o f elements has become a power which s i m p l y c r e a t e s c e r t a i n elements as soon as c e r t a i n 1 c o n d i t i o n s a re g i v e n . " 1. Ibid., P.197. -162-The second p o s s i b i l i t y - - t h a t u n p e r c e i v e d o b j e c t s are u n r e a l - - i s s t i l l open to us. The p o s i t i v i s t must m a i n t a i n t h a t o n l y the a c t u a l l y g i v e n i s r e a l . A l l e l s e i s mere " H i l f s b e g r i f f . " To say t h a t "A body e x i s t s when not p e r c e i v e d " must be i n t e r p r e t e d as a symbol f o r t h e p r e d i c t i o n t h a t the "elements" w i l l a g a i n appear under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . E s s e w i l l always be p e r c i p i . I n the system o f A v e n a r i us, e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h e x i s t s i s a member of a " p r i n c i p a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " , o f w h i c h the s u b j e c t (as o r d i n a r i l y c o n c e i v e d ) i s t h e " c e n t r a l member" ( " Z e n t r a l g l i e d " ) and the o b j e c t i s the " o p p o s i t e member." ("Gegenglied.") I n such a system t h e r e would -be no p l a c e f o r any t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , f o r e v e r y t h i n g r e a l , must be a member of t h i s c o o r d i n a t i o n . . T h i s view i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n t r a d i c t s c a u s a l i t y , f o r the c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e demands a continuum of the r e a l . I f we c o n f i n e o u r s e l v e s o n l y to g i v e n e x i s t e n t s we cannot e s t a b l i s h f i r m r u l e s of c a u s a l s u c c e s s i o n . The c a u s a l s e r i e s on which a l l s c i e n c e r e s t s can be made co n t i n u o u s o n l y by the f i l l i n g -i n o f e x i s t e n t s w h i c h are not g i v e n . S i n c e the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n o n l y e x i s t s between r e a l i t i e s , these p o s t u l a t e d e x i s t e n t s must be c o n s i d e r e d a.s r e a l - - i n w h i c h case the "immanence p h i l o s o p h e r " must r e c o g n i z e a t r a n s c e n d e n t r e a l i t y -o r the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n must be d i s m i s s e d a l t o g e t h e r . The d e n i a l of t h i s r e l a t i o n , w h i c h i s the fundamental a s s u m p t i o n of a l l s c i e n c e , m e r e l y to up h o l d the p r i n c i p l e "esse i s p e r c i p i " would be the a c t of "a b l i n d and c o m p l e t e l y u s e l e s s -163-dogmatism." We have a l r e a d y seen t h a t R u s s e l l p o i n t e d out the weakness i n phenomenalism (which seems to approximate S c h l i c k ' s "Immanenzphilosophie") by showing t h a t i t was " i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p h y s i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m , i n f a c t though not i n form. " A s t r i c t l y p o s i t i v i s t i c view cannot g i v e a s a t i s f a c t o r y account even o f o b j e c t s w h i c h are p e r c e i v e d - b y s e v e r a l i n d i v -i d u a l s at the same t i m e . A v e n a r i u s s t a t e s t h a t when two p e o p l e say they p e r c e i v e the same o b j e c t t h e r e i s a common " o p p o s i t e member" i n two " p r i n c i p a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s " . Yet p h y s i c s and p s y c h o l o g y i n f o r m us t h a t no two people ever have s i m i l a r e x p e r i e n c e s - - a n d even i f t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s were c o m p l e t e l y s i m i l a r they would not be i d e n t i c a l . Mo one "element" ever o c c u r s i n two " p r i n c i p a l c o o r d i n a t i o n s " of w h i c h the " c e n t r a l members" are d i f f e r e n t : the r e a l i t y -which i s g i v e n to one i n d i v i d u a l i s never g i v e n to a n o t h e r . We are l e d to a system l i k e t h a t of the "Monadology." Ev e r y " p r i n c i p a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i s a L e i b n i z i a n monad--and "the monads have no windows." The w o r l d f a l l s i n t o as many p i e c e s as t h e r e are " c e n t r a l members", and o n l y a m e t a p h y s i c a l system such as the p r e - e s t a b l i s h e d harmony can put i t t o g e t h e r a g a i n . Yet t h e s o l e aim of the immanence t h e o r y was to a v o i d m e t a p h y s i c s and to c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o the i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n . We must t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r the concepts w i t h o u t w h i c h we cannot d e s c r i b e t h e o r d e r l y change of p e r c e p t i o n s not as mere " H i l f s b e g r i f f e " b u t as s i g n s f o r r e a l i t i e s w h i c h are -164-not d i r e c t l y g i v e n . And our c r i t e r i o n o f r e a l i t y enables us to s e p a r a t e mere f i c t i o n s from symbols which d e s i g n a t e . something r e a l . I f t h e o b j e c t d e s i g n a t e d must be a s s i g n e d to a d e f i n i t e time, i t i s r e a l . Such a " t r a n s c e n d e n t " assumption i s no more o b j e c t i o n a b l e than i s the assumption of the immanence t h e o r y i t s e l f when i t p l a c e s the pa s t i n the r e a l m o f the r e a l , - - f o r the p a s t i s not g i v e n and cannot be g i v e n a g a i n . We assume i t because we have no ground to deny i t , and because we need i t to make the p r e s e n t compre-h e n s i b l e . The t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f w h i c h we assume f o r s i m i l a r r e a s o n s i s not d i r e c t l y known ("bekannt") but the demand t h a t we should have such d i r e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h o b j e c t s e x p r e s s e s a view w h i c h b e l o n g s to a. m y s t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge. Our t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s not a permanent "substance but s i m p l y a connected complex of o b j e c t i v e p r o c e s s e s or e v e n t s . The STjace, time and sense q u a l i t i e s o f p e r c e p t i o n cannot p o s s i b l y be c o n s i d e r e d to be "obj e c t i v e " - - i .e ., the t h i n g s - i n -themselves w h i c h are t h e o b j e c t s of p h y s i c s are not i n p e r c e p t u a l space and ti m e . But on the- t h e o r y o f knowledge here o u t l i n e d the s u b j e c t i v i t y of our p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s e s g i v e s no b a s i s whatever f o r s c e p t i c i s m . On the c o n t r a r y , i f knowledge c o n s i s t s i n the d i s c o v e r y of r e l a t i o n s , the t h i n g -i n - i t s e l f i s c o m p l e t e l y knowable. I t i s a f a c t o f e x p e r i e n c e t h a t we can f i n d a s t r u c t u r e i n the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f as i t appears i n p e r c e p t i o n . The manner and means o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s a s u b j e c t f o r psychology,* -165-f or e p i s t e m o l o g y i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t h a t i t i_s r e p r e s e n t e d . Now the s t r u c t u r e o f the "phenomenon", to use Kant's term, must e i t h e r he the work o f our own minds, w h i c h i s the i d e a l -i s t i c t h e o r y o f F i e l i t e ; o r the f e a t u r e s i n t h a t s t r u c t u r e must c o r r e s p o n d p o i n t f o r p o i n t to f e a t u r e s i n the t h i n g - i n -i t s e l f . S i n c e F i c h t e ' s s o l i p s i s m makes any s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i m p o s s i b l e we must assume t h a t i n knowing the s t r u c t u r e of the phenomenon we know the s t r u c t u r e of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g noumenon as w e l l , and to as g r e a t a degree. On t h i s s t r u c t u r a l t h e o r y of knowledge, t h e r e f o r e , the d i s t i n c t i o n between d i f f e r e n t grades of r e a l i t y o r between "appearance" and " r e a l i t y " has no p l a c e o r meaning. T h i n g s -i n - t h e m s e l v e s are not temporal or s p a t i a l i n the same sense as t h i n g s i n the g i v e n w o r l d a r e , but the s p a t i a l and temporal r e l a t i o n s g i v e n i n p e r c e p t i o n can be p r e c i s e l y o r d e r e d to c o r r e s p o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s i n the t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s . I I I . THE NATURE AND EXTENT OE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. Knowledge as a system of o r d e r i n g symbols to f a c t s f i n d s i t s most p r e c i s e e x p r e s s i o n i n the q u a n t i t a t i v e methods o f the ex a c t s c i e n c e s . The o b j e c t s of p h y s i c s , f o r example, are not g i v e n i n d i r e c t s p a t i a l "and t e m p o r a l p e r c e p t i o n , s i n c e our p e r c e p t u a l spa.ces and ti m e are s u b j e c t i v e . We can d e s i g n a t e o b j e c t s o n l y by making use o f the r e l a t i o n s by w h i c h they a r e d e f i n e d f o r us. When we l o o k at a y e l l o w p e n c i l we can not l o c a l i z e the c o l o r i t s e l f at the p h y s i c a l o r " t r a n s c e n d e n t " ( i . e . , o b j e c t i v e o r r e a l ) p l a c e at w h i c h the o b j e c t i v e p e n c i l i s l o c a t e d . The -166 o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t i n g p e n c i l cannot be subsumed under the concept " y e l l o w " , — and y e t we need some concept i n o r d e r to develop an unambiguous r e f e r e n c e . We might p o s t u l a t e some unknown q u a l i t y i n the o b j e c t i v e p e n c i l to w h i c h the p e r c e p t u a l y e l l o w would c o r r e s p o n d . But i f we proceeded i n such a manner we would have t o p o s t u l a t e a q u a l i t y c o r r e s p o n d -i n g to every p o s s i b l e shade o f y e l l o w . Every shade would be "unknown"- i n our sense, f o r i t c o u l d not be brought i n t o r e l a t i o n s w i t h o t h e r shades or reduced to them. P h y s i c s , however, escapes s u c c e s s f u l l y from t h i s u n s a t i s -f a c t o r y s t a g e by o r d e r i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e concepts to q u a l i t a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n s . I n s t e a d o f unknown q u a l i t i e s , i n t h i s case i t i n t r o d u c e s the concept of v a r y i n g f r e q u e n c i e s of o b j e c t i v e l i g h t waves. We can t r a c e a s i m i l a r p r o c e s s i n the develop-ment of the p h y s i c a l t h e o r y o f heat. On the q u a l i t a t i v e l e v e l we are d e a l i n g o n l y w i t h s u b j e c t i v e s e n s a t i o n s , but by v a r i o u s d e v i c e s we s u b j e c t heat to m a t h e m a t i c a l t r e a t m e n t i n terms of the m e c h a n i c a l concepts of mass, space and t i m e . T h i s p r o c e d u r e i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c wherever exact knowledge i s g a i n e d . " Q u a l i t i e s are o n l y c o m p l e t e l y known, i . e . , c o m p l e t e l y and u n e q u i v o c a l l y d e s i g n a t e d by the c o m b i n a t i o n o f a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g c o n c e p t s , when we succeed i n r e d u c i n g 1 them q u a n t i t a t i v e l y to one a n o t h e r . " "The p o s s i b i l i t y of q u a n t i t a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s the . u n i v e r s a l and n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of f i n a l knowledge...The proc e d u r e of the e l i m i n a -t i o n of a l l q u a l i t i e s i s the c o r e o f a l l advances i n 1. Ibid., P.258. -167-1 knowledge i n the d e s c r i p t i v e s c i e n c e s . " Yet s c i e n c e does not i g n o r e q u a l i t i e s . I t merely uses c o r r e s p o n d i n g qua.ntita.tive d i f f e r e n c e s as a means of d e s i g n a t i o n of them. S c i e n c e cannot r e g a r d n a t u r e as a p l a y o f mere q u a n t i t i e s , f o r q u a n t i t y i s an a b s t r a c t i o n w h i c h presupposes a r e a l e x i s t e n t : " I t i s an i m p e r m i s s i b l e m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the s c i e n t i f i c p i c t u r e of the w o r l d , to say t h a t i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d no o t h e r q u a l i t i e s ' o b j e c t i v e l y e x i s t • except the f i n a l • i n t e n s i t i e s ' whose q u a n t i t a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s form the f o u n d a t i o n - s t o n e s of the 2 u n i v e r s e o f p h y s i c s . " We must r e g a r d the e x t e r n a l w o r l d as a m a n i f o l d o f i n f i n i t e l y v a r y i n g q u a l i t i e s , so m u t u a l l y i n t e r w o v e n and i n t e r d e p e n d e n t t h a t they can be d e s i g n a t e d or d e s c r i b e d by the q u a n t i t a t i v e systems of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . These c o n c e p t u a l systems enable us t o d e a l w i t h the o r d e r l y changes i n the q u a l i t i e s of the e x t e r n a l ' w o r l d . T h i s o r d e r l i n e s s can b e e e x p r e s s M by the f a c t t h a t to every one o f the q u a l i t i e s i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d a. concept can be o r d e r e d white. i s formed from the c o m b i n a t i o n of c o n c e p t s o f o t h e r q u a l i t i e s . We can g i v e a. c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n o f what we mean by "knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . " : "To d i s c o v e r that, o r d e r l i n e s s means 'to kno\<v the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , ' f o r by t h a t d i s c o v e r y the most g e n e r a l i s r e d i s c o v e r e d i n the p a r t i c u l a r , and the l a t t e r i s t h e r e b y known. "2 The o b j e c t s o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d — . t h e t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s - -are c o n c e i v e d i n t h i s way as o r d e r l y s t r u c t u r e s of q u a l i t i e s : 1. Ibid., P. 258. 2. Ibid., P. 260. -168-"An atom, an e l e c t r o n , i s to be c o n c e i v e d as a u n i o n o f q u a l i t i e s w h i c h a r e connected w i t h each o t h e r by-d e f i n i t e laws--not as a s u b s t a n t i a l t h i n g , w h i c h w o u l d support i t s q u a l i t i e s as a t t r i b u t e s a n d i w h i c h would be d i s t i n c t from them as t h e i r s u b s t r a t u m t . . I n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , a l l our knowledge reduces to r e l a t i o n s and dependences, not to t h i n g s or s u b s t a n c e s . " 2 E v e r s i n c e D e s c a r t e s 1 sharp s e p a r a t i o n of "res e x t e n s a " from " r e s c o g i t a n s " e p i s t e m o l o g y has had on i t s hands the problem o f the r e l a t i o n between the two. S c h l i c k a s s e r t s t h a t a p r o p e r c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge enables us to r e c o g n i z e t h i s p r o b l e m as an i l l u s o r y one. The r e a l p o i n t o f d i s p u t e i s : Where are our p e r c e p t s l o c a t e d ? Where i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? The p s y c h o l o g i s t , - no m a t t e r at what p l a c e he l o c a t e s a sense q u a l i t y , e.g., the w h i t e n e s s of a p i e c e of paper, f i n d s t h a t p l a c e a l r e a d y o c c u p i e d by the p h y s i c i s t ' s system, i n w h i c h t h e r e i s no p l a c e f o r any 1 such q u a l i t y as w h i t e n e s s . But the q u a r r e l over the l o c a t i o n of c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s a r i s e s f r om the c o n f u s i o n o f two d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of space. The space ( o r r a t h e r spa.ces) o f the p s y c h o l o g i s t are p e r c e p t u a l and a r e t h e r e f o r e the p r o d u c t o f c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . P e r c e p t u a l s p a c e r s a l r e a d y " i n " c o n s c i o u s n e s s , so t h a t i t i s m e a n i n g l e s s to ask where ( i n p e r c e p t u a l space) c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s . The o b j e c t i v e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f of the p h y s i c i s t , on the o t h e r hand, i s not i n p e r c e p t u a l space at a l l : f o r him " p l a c e " i s a p u r e l y a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t i o n . The t r o u b l e comes f r o m the erroneous assumption t h a t p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are always extended. Tet s t r i c t l y c o n c e i v e d 1. Ibid,, P. 260. 2. Ibid., P. 261 -169-"phy s i c a l " ' denotes " r e a l i t y i nsofar'a.s i t i s d e s i g n a t e d by the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l , q u a n t i t a t i v e , c o n c e p t u a l system of the 1 n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . " " P h y s i c a l " does not denote a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f r e a l i t y , but a p a r t i c u l a r mode o f d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y . A p r o p e r c o n c e p t i o n of p h y s i c a l knowledge enables us now to put our knowledge of c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s on a q u a n t i t a t i v e b a s i s . I n t r o s p e c t i o n ism and 3?echnerian psycho-p h y s i c s cannot a c h i e v e any r e a l knowledge, but p h y s i o l o g i c a l methods can. I t i s a plain f a c t of e x p e r i e n c e t h a t p s y c h i c a l p r o c e s s e s are v e r y i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h t h a t p a r t of t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d w h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d t o us i n p e r c e p t i o n as the b r a i n . P h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s can t h e o r e t i c a l l y be used to d e s i g n a t e p s y c h i c a l r e a l i t i e s . The m i s t a k e most commonly made i s the c o n f u s i o n o f the p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s , w h i c h a r e mere l y a b s t r a c t and c o n c e p t u a l , w i t h the p e r c e p t i o n s tha.t we have when, f o r example, we d i s s e c t the b r a i n . Our p e r c e p t i o n s are m e r e l y sensuous r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of those r e a l p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s and i f we confuse the two we have a l l the o l d d i f f i c u l t i e s on our hands a g a i n . S c h l i c k ' s t h e s i s can be i l l u s t r a t e d by a, s i m p l e example. Suppose we have an i n d i v i d u a l A l o o k i n g at a r e d f l o w e r , and a second i n d i v i d u a l B o b s e r v i n g A's b r a i n p r o c e s s e s . (We assume a h i g h t e c h n i c a l development of p h y s i o l o g y . ) The r e a l i t i e s and co n c e p t s i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n are as f o l l o w s : ( l ) the t h i n g - i n - i t s e 1 f ~ - 1 h e f l o w e r , w i t h w h i c h we a r e not d i r e c t l y a c q u a i n t e d but w h i c h i s d e s c r i b e d by b o t a n i c a l and 1. Ibid,, P. 269. -170-p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s . ( 2 ) the d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f A, d e s i g n a t e d by the d i r e c t p s y c h o l o g i c a l concept " e x p e r i e n c e o f r e d . " T h i s same e x p e r i e n c e can a l s o be d e s i g n a t e d by p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s — i . e . , B f i n d s t h a t the same e x i s t e n t c a l l e d by A " r e d " can a l s o be d e s i g n a t e d by the p h y s i c a l concept " p r o c e s s i n A's b r a i n . " (3) the v i s u a l e x p e r i e n c e s o f B , c o n s i s t i n g o f c e r t a i n c o l o u r s , forms, e t c . B w i l l p r o b a b l y d e s c r i b e the p a r t s of t h i s e x p e r i e n c e d r e a l i t y w i t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l names: he w i l l speak o f g r a y shapes and. round f i g u r e s , but he can app l y p h y s i c a l concepts to them a l s o . He c o u l d speak o f them a s "pr o c e s s e s i n the complexes o f m o l e c u l e s .which form the t h i n g c a l l e d 'my b r a i n ' " . As f a r as A i s concerned t h e r e i s o n l y one r e a l i t y , namely, the d i r e c t and immedi ste awareness. T h i s r e a l i t y can be d e s i g n a t e d by two d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t u a l systems: ( 1 ) by the p s y c h o l o g i c a l system o f concepts ("experience of red") o r ( 2 ) by the j J h y s i c a l system o f concepts ("process i n A's b r a i n " ) The second mode of_ d e s i g n a t i o n o f ^he r e a l i t y i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , because i t i s p h y s i c a l , l e n d s i t s e l f t o q u a n t i t a t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n and so to exact knowledge. I f S c h l i c k i s r i g h t i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t the p h y s i c a l mode o f d e s c r i p t i o n " can be a p p l i e d to a l l p a r t s of r e a l i t y , then the pr o b l e m of the knowledge o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d "per se" i s l a r g e l y removed. We have a l r e a d y observed t h a t h i s t h e o r y o f the na t u r e of knowledge makes the s c e p t i c i s m based -171-on the s u b j e c t i v i t y o f p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s e s c o m p l e t e l y i r r e l e v a n t . But f u r t h e r than t h i s , no e s s e n t i a l mode of d i s t i n c t i o n between the q u a l i t i e s o f the w o r l d can be assumed "The s e p a r a t i o n between g i v e n and not g i v e n , s u b j e c t i v e and 1 o b j e c t i v e q u a l i t i e s i s o f a c o n t i n g e n t and f a c t u a l n a t u r e . " I t i s not l e g i t i m a t e to e r e c t on t h i s f a c t a "Psychomonismus" f o r the monism S c h l i c k i s a d v o c a t i n g i s an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l monism, i . e . , the view t h a t the q u a n t i t a t i v e method of p h y s i c s can be u n i v e r s a l l y a p p l i e d as a. t o o l o f thought to a l l r e a l i t y . -There i s , o f c o u r s e , a c e r t a i n f i n a l c o n t r a s t between c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s a.nd the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , but the r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s c o n t r a s t cannot l e a d us to a d u a l i s m , but r a t h e r o n l y to the d i s t i n c t i o n and s e p a r a t i o n o f the coherent system of c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s ("Bewusstseinszusamm-enhang") from the mass o f • o t h e r coherent systems. The f a c t t h a t the u n i v e r s e i s s. t e x t u r e of i n f i n i t e l y numerous q u a l i t i e s e n a b l e s us to adopt as w e l l a, p l u r a l i s t i c view. We have a p l u r a l i s m o f "Zusammenhange" and a monism o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l method. IV. THE VALIDITY OP OUR KNOWLEDGE 0E REALITY. The phrase " v a l i d knowledge" i s a pleonasm. The p r o blem w h i c h i s at i s s u e here i s t h e q u e s t i o n as to whether or not we are i n p o s s e s s i o n of a p o d i c t i c knowledge of r e a l i t y . S c h l i c k g i v e s h i s answer i n terms of a d e t a i l e d c r i t i c i s m o f K a n t ' s e p i s t e m o l o g y . We can r e v i e w i t b r i e f l y . 1. Ibid., P.300. -172-Kant ' d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h r e e c l a s s e s of judgments: a n a l y t i c "a p r i o r i " , s y n t h e t i c "a p o s t e r i o r i " and s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " . He never q u e s t i o n e d the e x i s t e n c e o f the l a t t e r , f o r i n h i s day the E u c l i d e a n geometry, the A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c and the Newtonian s c i e n c e seemed to g i v e ample assurance of t h e i r e x i s t e n c e , and hence i t was p o s s i b l e to assume tha;t i n these d i s c i p l i n e s we c o u l d i s s u e a p o d i c t i c judgments about r e a l i t y . C o n s e q u e n t l y h i s t a s k was s i m p l y to i n v e n t a system w h i c h would account f o r the e x i s t e n c e o f the s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " . Over a g a i n s t Hume he s e t up the t h e o r y t h a t the mind i t s e l f c o n s t i t u t e d e x p e r i e n c e , b o t h by the forms of sensuous i n t u i t i o n and by the c a t e g o r i e s of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . The p o s s i b i l i t y of a p o d i c t i c knowledge r e s t s e n t i r e l y on the c o r r e c t n e s s of Kant's view. Modern advances i n l o g i c , mathematics,and p s y c h o l o g y , however, have d e s t r o y e d K a n t's e p i s t e m o l o g y at s e v e r a l v i t a l p o i n t s . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , the n a t u r e o f mathematics i s seen to be t a u t o l o g i c a l . The a n a l y t i c "a p r i o r i " p r o p o s i t i o n s of mathematics and l o g i c can never g i v e new knowledge, A judgment w h i c h i s t r u l y "a p r i o r i " i s always a n a l y t i c . F u r t h e r , p s y c h o l o g y has undermined what R u s s e l l c a l l s the " p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n n o c e n c e " o f K a n t . There i s no such t h i n g as a s u b j e c t i v e s p o c e - - t h e r e are s e v e r a l sense-spaces w h i c h are c o o r d i n a t e d o n l y by e x p e r i e n c e . I n any case, the o b j e c t i v e space of p h y s i c s i s no l o n g e r " t h e " space of p e r c e p t i o n . I t i s a c o m p l e t e l y abstra.ct c o n c e p t u a l c r e a t i o n w h i c h corresponds o n l y -173-i n c e r t a i n ' f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s to our p e r c e p t u a l space. Geometry does not proceed from s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " p r o p o s i t i o n s but from c o n v e n t i o n s . G e o m e t r i c a l systems are p e r f e c t l y v a l i d so l o n g as they remain merely a b s t r a c t , but when a p p l i e d to r e a l i t y they l o s e t h e i r s e c u r i t y . And the time o f our e x p e r i e n c e , w i t h i t s i n t e r p e n e t r s t i o n and r e a l d u r a t i o n , i s as s u b j e c t i v e as are our v a r i o u s sense-spaces. K a n t ' s c a t e g o r i e s f a r e no b e t t e r than h i s forms of sensuous i n t u i t i o n . Even such fundamental c a t e g o r i e s as s u b s t a n c e and c a u s a l i t y are not used i n Kant's sense by modern p h y s i c s . The p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s a d u r a b l e c o n s t a n t i n a l l change was f o r Kant a. p i e c e of s y n t h e t i c " a p r i o r i " knowledge w h i c h r e s u l t e d from the a p p l i c a t i o n of the c a t e g o r y of substance to the unformed m a t e r i a l g i v e n i n the forms of sensuous i n t u i t i o n . I n s t e a d o f t h i s assumption o f a permanent substance s u p p o r t i n g a t t r i b u t e s we c o n c e i v e o f an o b j e c t as an o r d e r l y "Zusammenhang" or coherent s t r u c t u r e o f q u a l i t i e s . N e i t h e r does K a n t ' s c a t e g o r y of c a u s a l i t y t u r n the edge of Hume's a n a l y s i s . There i s no o b j e c t i v e n e c e s s i t y . The laws of n a t u r e are not r e a l powers w h i c h "compel" o b j e c t s t o behave i n a c e r t a i n manner, but aire o n l y our e x p r e s s i o n s f o r t h e manner i n whi ch o b j e c t s a c t u a l l y do behave. A p o d i c t i c knowledge about r e a l i t y does not e x i s t . Hume showed c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t the c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e , w h i ch e x p r e s s e s the n e c e s s a r y assumption of a l l s c i e n t i f i c e n q u i r y , -174-s p r i n g s f r o m p s y c h o l o g i c a l a.nd b i o l o g i c a l r o o t s . To t r y to j u s t i f y i t from e x p e r i e n c e i s t o argue i n a c i r c l e . Y et i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t c a u s a l i t y i s a c o n d i t i o n of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e Kant e x p r e s s e d the core of a deep t r u t h . I t i s • open to us to r e f u s e to admit the c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e a,s an h y p o t h e s i s , but o n l y at the c o s t of a b s o l u t e l y c e a s i n g a l l s c i e n t i f i c o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l endeavour. The v a l i d i t y of the c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e and o f i n d u c t i v e l y a s c e r t a i n e d , t r u t h s must be viewed i n the l i g h t of p o s t u l a t e s w h i c h are necessa: c o n d i t i o n s of the p o s s i b i l i t y of any knowledge whatever. CHAPTER V I I , HMS RE ICHENBACH: "EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION." CHAPTER V I I . HANS RE1CHENBACH: "EXPERIENCE AND PREDICTION." "There i s no Ar chime dean p o i n t o f a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y l e f t t o w h i c h to a t t a c h our knowledge o f the w o r l d ; a l l we have i s an e l a s t i c net of p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n s f l o a t i n g i n open space. " en Hans Reichbach's book, " E x p e r i e n c e and P r e d i c t i o n " , i s an attempt to tak e s e r i o u s l y the i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h Hume's a n a l y s i s o f the i n d u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e have f o r any s c i e n t i f i c e p i s t e m o l o g y . E m p i r i c i s t s ha.ve always a d m i t t e d t h a t Hume u n f o l d e d t h e pr o b l e m of i n d u c t i o n i n a l l i t s r i g o u r , but they have f a i l e d to take h i s . c o n c l u s i o n s i n t o account i n t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s . They have remained w i t h i n the framework o f the o l d two-valued l o g i c , not r e a l i z i n g t h a t such a c o n c e p t i o n i s an i d e a l i z a t i o n o f the a.ctual s t a l e of our knowledge. We cannot f o r c e p r o p o s i t i o n s i n t o the t r u e - f a l s e dichotomy, f o r every p r o p o s i t i o n about the world of e x p e r i e n c e i n v o l v e s a p r e d i c t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e i n t h e l i g h t of Hume's c r i t i c i s m i t cannot be s t r i c t l y v e r i f i e d . Knowledge i s a system of p r o p o s i t i o n s to w h i c h v a r y i n g " w e i g h t s " are c o o r d i n a t e d i n accordance w i t h the r u l e s of s c i e n t i f i c p r o c e d u r e . A modern e p i s t e m o l o g y must g i v e a major p l a c e t o these f a c t s i n i t s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the w o r l d We must b r i d g e the gap between e x p e r i e n c e and p r e d i c t i o n . -177-I . MBA1TIEG. The " r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n " of knowledge w h i c h i s the t a s k o f e p i s t e m o l o g y can make u s e A o f the language form of t h i n k i n g . "A t heory of knowledge must c o n s e q u e n t l y b e g i n w i t h a t h e o r y o f language. Knowledge i s g i v e n by symbols--so symbols must be the f i r s t o b j e c t o f e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 1 i n q u i r y . " I n " a d d i t i o n to t h e i r p u r e l y p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s symbols have t h e p r o p e r t y of meaning, a f u n c t i o n w h i c h they a c q u i r e by b e i n g put i n t o a c e r t a i n correspondence w i t h f a c t s i n accordance w i t h c e r t a i n r u l e s of language. Symbols are a r r a n g e d i n groups of p r o p o s i t i o n s , w h i c h have t h r e e p r e d i c a t e s : meaning, t r u t h - v a l u e , and w e i g h t . By t h i s l a s t t erm we i n d i c a t e the f a c t t h a t , f o r example, p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g f u t u r e events possess, v a r y i n g degrees o f p r o b a b i l -i t y r a n g i n g between the two p o s i t i v e and n e g a t i v e t r u t h -v a l u e s . Where the sentence to be v e r i f i e d concerns a f u t u r e event, the weight may be c o n s i d e r e d as the p r e d i c t i o n a l v a l u e of the sentence, but the concept of weight can be a p p l i e d to p a s t e v e n t s as w e l l . The w e i g h t of p a s t events v / i l l o b v i o u s l y e n t e r i n t o t h e c a l c u l a t i o n s of the p r e d i c t i o n a l v a l u e s o f f u t u r e e v e n t s w h i c h are i n c a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h them. P o s i t i v i s m and pragmatism have p o i n t e d out the r e l a t i o n between meaning and v e r i f i a b i l i t y — - w h a t cannot be v e r i f i e d 1. Hans Reich e n b a c h , " E x p e r i e n c e and P r e d i c t i o n " , P.17. -178-i s m e a n i n g l e s s . T h i s " t r u t h t h e o r y of meaning" i n v o l v e s two p r i n c i p l e s 4 (1) a p r o p o s i t i o n has meaning i f , and o n l y i f , i t i s v e r i f i a b l e as t r u e or f a l s e ; and (2) two sentences have the same meaning i f they o b t a i n the same d e t e r m i n a t i o n as t r u e or f a l s e by every p o s s i b l e o b s e r v a t i o n . I f meaning i s connected w i t h v e r i f i c a t i o n , we must a n a l y s e what i s meant by " p o s s i b i l i t y " o f v e r i f i c a t i o n . P o s s i b i l i t y i s . of t h r e e k i n d s — t e c h n i c a l , p h y s i c a l , and l o g i c a l . We a r e u s u a l l y not concerned w i t h a. merely t e c h n i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of v e r i f i c a t i o n . P h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y "demands o n l y t h a t the f a c t i n q u e s t i o n be conformable to p h y s i c a l l a w s , r e g a r d l e s s of human power." Such a concept e x c l u d e s many s t a t e m e n t s : "That th e e l e c t r o n s r e v o l v e i n e l l i p t i c o r b i t s around t h e k e r n e l o f the atom, they have a s p i n , e t c . , i s p h y s i c a l l y u n v e r i f i a b l e i n the s t r i c t sense o f the term. L e t us c a l l p h y s i c a l meaning the concept of meaning as d e f i n e d by the demand of p h y s i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of v e r i f i c a t i o n . Then the g i v e n sentences have no 1 p h y s i c a l meaning." The concept of l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y e x c l u d e s o n l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y s t a t e m e n t s and i s t h e r e f o r e the w i d e s t o f t h e ' t h r e e c o n c e p t s . L o g i c a l meaning i s the concept of meaning as d e f i n e d by the demand, of l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f v e r i f i c a t i o n . Statements about the s t r u c t u r e o f the atom have l o g i c a l meaning-because i t i n v o l v e s no c o n t r a d i c t i o n t o suppose, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t we c o u l d s h r i n k to such a, degree t h a t e l e c t r o n s would have the 1. Ibid., P.40. -179-s i z e o f t e n n i s b a l l s . The concept of p h y s i c a l meaning because of i t s r i g o u r i s sounder than t h a t of l o g i c a l meaning. But we do not b e l i e v e t h a t statements about the atom are o n l y l o g i c a l l y m e a n i n g f u l , even though they are not s t r i c t l y p h y s i c a l l y v e r i f i a b l e . We can r e t a i n the concept o f p h y s i c a l meaning by i n t r o d u c i n g the n o t i o n o f " i n d i r e c t v e r i f i c a t i o n . " Those p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h cannot be d i r e c t l y v e r i f i e d but w h i c h can be reduced to o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s c a p a b l e o f d i r e c t v e r i f i c a t i o n w i l l be c a l l e d " i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s . " P o s i t i v i s m now m a i n t a i n s between the i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n A and the aggregate of d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s ( a i , a£. . . , a n ) , from w h i c h A i s i n f e r r e d , a r e l a t i o n o f e q u i v a l e n c e : A = (a}. , ag. . , a n ) T h i s a s s e r t i o n o f the e q u i v a l e n c e between the i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n and the o b s e r v a t i o n p r o p o s i t i o n s R e i c h enbach c a l l s "the p r i n c i p l e of r e t r o g r e s s i o n . " T h i s r e l a t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e , however, does not h o l d . F o r example, A can be i n f e r r e d f r om a, f i n i t e c l a s s of o b s e r v a -t i o n s ; but an i n f i n i t e -class of o b s e r v a t i o n s can be i n f e r r e d from A, so t h a t the r i g h t s i d e of the above e q u i v a l e n c e i s never c o m p l e t e l y g i v e n . F o r p h y s i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s the propo-s i t i o n A has a s u r p l u s meaning, and. the consequences i n f e r r e d from A cannot be drawn from the s e t (aj., a.£,. , a,n) . . We r e a l l y have not a l o g i c a l but a p r o b a b i l i t y i m p l i c a t i o n from one s i d e to the o t h e r , as the i n f e r e n c e s i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n -180-may not be a b s o l u t e l y s u r e . I t i s c o n s e q u e n t l y i m p o s s i b l e to m a i n t a i n the p o s t u l a t e o f s t r i c t v e r i f i s b i l i t y f o r i n d i r e c t s e n t e n c e s , because such sentences are never e q u i v a l e n t to a f i n i t e c l a s s of d i r e c t s e n t e n c e s . S i n c e • s c i e n c e cannot renounce i n d i r e c t sentences as m e a n i n g l e s s , we must g i v e up a b s o l u t e v e r i f i c a t i o n as the c r i t e r i o n of meaning. I n o t h e r words, we r e p l a c e the narrow t r u t h t h e o r y ,of meaning by the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y , the two p r i n c i p l e s o f w h i c h w i l l be: ( l ) a p r o p o s i t i o n has meaning i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to determine a w e i g h t , 1 .e.> a degree o f p r o b a b i l i t y , f o r the p r o p o s i t i o n ; and (2) two sentences ha.ve the same meaning i f they o b t a i n the same w e i g h t , or degree of p r o b a b i l i t y , by every p o s s i b l e o b s e r v a t i o n . T h i s p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y i s r e a l l y a c o n t i n u o u s e x p a n s i o n of the t r u t h t h e o r y of meaning. Ea.ch of these two t h e o r i e s i s a " v e r i f i a b i l i t y t h e o r y of meaning", but i n t h e second one the p o s t u l a t e of v e r i f i a b i l i t y i s t a k e n i n a. w i d e r sense. A v e r i f i a b i l i t y t h e o r y of meaning can be defended a g a i n s t the a t t a c k s from the q u a r t e r o f m y s t i c i s m , whi ch a s s e r t s the e x i s t e n c e of " s u p e r - e m p i r i c a l " meaning.. To r u l e out such a c o n c e p t i o n would be the act of a n a i v e i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m , f o r the q u e s t i o n of meaning i s not a m a t t e r o f " t r u t h - c h a r a c t e r " but of d e f i n i t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e s a. v o l i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n . We can, however, c o o r d i n a t e -181-to p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h are a s s e r t e d to have s u p e r - e m p i r i c a l meaning o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s of e m p i r i c a l meaning which have the same h e a r i n g upon our a c t i o n s , so tha.t s u p e r - e m p i r i c a l 1 meaning m e r e l y "reduces to a s u r p l u s s u g g e s t i v e e f f e c t . " " T h e ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' p r o p o s i t i o n i s d e p r i v e d o f i t s p r e t e n d e d s u r p l u s meaning and reduced to an e q u i v a l e n t n o n -metaphysical 2 p r o p o s i t i o n s " a proc e d u r e w h i c h f o l l o w s f r om the second p r i n c i p l e o f the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y o f meaning and w h i c h i s i n accordance w i t h "Occam's r a z o r . " I I . IMPRESSIONS AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD. So f a r we have assumed t h a t d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s , from w h i c h i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s are i n f e r r e d , are a b s o l u t e l y v e r i f i a b l e . But such an assumption must be g i v e n up, f o r any statement " c o n c e r n i n g a p h y s i c a l f a c t . . . n e v e r r e f e r s to. a 3 s i n g l e f a c t alone b u t always i n c l u d e s some p r e d i c t i o n s . " We cannot renounce such p r e d i c t i o n s , f o r then we would have no way o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between i l l u s i o n s and m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s , whi ch are o n l y s e p a r a t e d by means o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t s . O b s e r v a t i o n s e n tences r e f e r r i n g t o p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are t h e r e f o r e not c e r t a i n . P o s i t i v i s m m a i n t a i n s tha.t we can a r r i v e at a b s o l u t e l y v e r i f i a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s i f we c o n f i n e o u r s e l v e s to " i m p r e s s i o n s 1. Ibid., P.68. 2. I b i d . , P , n. 3. Ibid., P.85. -182-j?or example, i t i s not a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n whether the t a b l e 1 see i s "a m a t e r i a l t a b l e or the o p t i c a l image o f such a 1 t a b l e produced by a concave m i r r o r , " --but at l e a s t I see a. t a b l e . W i t h t h i s view the e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i t s e l f i s here brought i n t o q u e s t i o n . The p o s i t i v i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of the e x i s t e n c e problem h o l d s t h a t , j u s t as the e x i s t e n c e o f a b s t r a c t a can be re d u c e d t o the e x i s t e n c e of c o n c r e t a , so the e x i s t e n c e of concrete, can be reduced to the e x i s t e n c e of i m p r e s s i o n s . T h i s i d e a i s an outcome of two b a s i c c o n c e p t i o n s : ( l ) the c o n c e p t i o n of i m p r e s s i o n s as b a s i c f a c t s of knowledge, and (2) the t r u t h t h e o r y o f meaning. " P r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c o n c r e t e p h y s i c a l t h i n g s a r e , t h e r e f o r e , i n d i r e c t s e n t e n c e s r e d u c i b l e t o i m p r e s s i o n s entences as c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i r e c t s e n t e n c e s ; o n l y the l a t t e r s entences can be d i r e c t l y v e r i f i e d . A c c o r d i n g t o the p r i n c i p l e o f r e t r o g r e s s i o n , t h i s correspondence i s an equ i v -a l e n c e o f meaning; t h e r e f o r e t h i s correspondence i s a. 2 • • r e d u c t i o n . " The sentence "The t a b l e e x i s t s " means the same as the s e n t e n c e , " I have i m p r e s s i o n s of such and such k i n d s . " "We have a.lready seen, however, t h a t the r e l a t i o n between d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t sentences i s o n l y a, p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n , not an e q u i v a l e n c e . The main i d e a of the p o s i t i v -i s t i c r e d u c t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e not t e n a b l e . We must d i s t i n g u i s h between two k i n d s of r e l e t i o n s - - r e d u c t i o n and p r o j e c t i o n . 1. Ibid., P.89 2. Ibid., P.101. -183-The r e l a t i o n , f o r i n s t s n c e , between b i r d s and the atoms of w h i c h they are composed i s a " r e d u c i b l e complex", because •the e x i s t e n c e of the b i r d s s t r i c t l y i m p l i e s the e x i s t e n c e of the atoms o f t h e i r b o d i e s . I f , however, we noted c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l e f f e c t s w h i c h p r o c e e d from the b i r d s , such as t h e i r shadows, we c o u l d c o n s t r u c t a " p r o j e c t i v e complex"*. t h a t i s , e v e r y p r o p o s i t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the movement of the b i r d s c o u l d be c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h a p r o p o s i t i o n about the changes i n the shadows. The r e d u c t i o n of the b i r d s to t h e i r i n t e r n a l elements (the atoms) e x p r e s s e s an e q u i v a l e n c e ; but the p r o j e c t i o n e x p r e s s e s o n l y a mutual p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n between the b i r d s and the shadows, because n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s can never be f o r e s e e n w i t h c e r t a i n t y . Thus, i f we see the b i r d s , t h e r e i s o n l y a p r o b a b i l i t y i n f e r e n c e from them to t h e i r shadows; and i f we see the shadows, t h e r e i s o n l y a p r o b a b i l i t y i n f e r e n c e f r o m them to the b i r d s . Because s t a t e m e n t s about e x t e r n a l t h i n g s a re i n d i r e c t t h e r e i s o n l y a. p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n between p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g e x t e r n a l t h i n g s and p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g i m p r e s s i o n s . S i n c e p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n i s the d i s t i n g u i s h -i n g f e a t u r e of a p r o j e c t i o n , the r e l a t i o n between i m p r e s s i o n s and t h i n g s can be c l a s s e d as a p r o j e c t i o n , not as a r e d u c t i o n . "The e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l t h i n g s i s not r e d u c i b l e to the e x i s t e n c e o f i m p r e s s i o n s ; the e x t e r n a l t h i n g s have an 1 independent e x i s t e n c e . " I f we s t i l l r e t a i n the demand f o r a b s o l u t e v e r i f i c a t i o n , however, the p o s i t i v i s t i c c o n c l u s i o n 1. Ibid., P.111. -184-would hold.' We must admit t h a t as f a r as a b s o l u t e t r u t h o r a b s o l u t e f a l s e h o o d i s concerned observable f a c t s do not f u r n i s h a d i f f e r e n c e between the p o s i t i v i s t i c t h e o r y t h a t t h i n g s are r e d u c i b l e t o i m p r e s s i o n s and the opposing view t h a t t h e r e i s a s u r p l u s meaning i n s t a t e m e n t s about e x t e r n a l t h i n g s . On the o t h e r hand, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y c o n f e r s d i f f e r e n t w e i g h t s upon,, and t h e r e f o r e a t t r i b u t e s d i f f e r e n t meaning t o , the two t h e o r i e s . For example, s i n c e we cannot v e r i f y s t r i c t l y the a s s e r t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l t h i n g s w i l l e x i s t a f t e r our d e a t h , such a s t a t e m e n t would be meaningless f o r p o s i t i v i s m . On the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y , however, t h i s statement g a i n s a h i g h e r , weight than .does the statement t h a t e x t e r n a l t h i n g s w i l l not c o n t i n u e to e x i s t , because we observe t h a t the d e a t h o f g r e a t numbers o f p e o p l e do..es not a f f e c t the e x i s t e n c e o f e x t e r n a l t h i n g s . Now we have seen t h a t the s t r i c t l y p o s i t i v i s t i c t r u t h t h e o r y o f meaning because o f i t s e x c l u s i o n o f i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s ( s u c h as s t a tements about the s t r u c t -ure o f the atom) i s t o o narrow f o r s c i e n c e , which has 'always t a c i t l y assumed the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y . And on t h i s t h e o r y the c o n c e p t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l t h i n g s are not r e d u c i b l e to i m p r e s s i o n s b u t are i n a p r o j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n to them and have an independent e x i s t e n c e , has a g r e a t e r degree of p r o b a b i l i t y t h a n the p o s i t i v i s t i c a s s e r t i o n of e q u i v a l e n c e . The " e g o c e n t r i c language" o f p o s i t i v i s m , which a s s e r t s t h a t t h i n g s e x i s t o n l y when ob s e r v e d , cannot be s a i d to be " f a l s e " , f o r the c h o i c e between an e g o c e n t r i c language and the r e a l i s t i c language o f s c i e n c e and o r d i n a r y l i f e i s a -185-m a t t e r of v o l i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n . But the d e c i s i o n s which the acceptance of p o s i t i v i s m e n t a i l s , l e a d , as we have seen, "to a s c i e n t i f i c system of r e s t r i c t e d c h a r a c t e r w h i c h does not c o r r e s p o n d to the system c o n s t r u c t e d by the r e a l i s t i c 1 language i n i t s f u l l e x t e n s i o n . " The p o s i t i v i s t i c i n s i s t e n c e on p h y s i c a l t r u t h meaning c o n f i n e s us to an e x t r e m e l y narrow language, w h i c h i n v o l v e s the r e n u n c i a t i o n of any r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a g r e a t many human a c t i o n s and s c i e n t i f i c s t a t e m e n t s . The o n l y way to keep f r e e from such r e s t r i c t i o n s i s to choose the concept o f p r o b a b i l i t y meaning; and w i t h t h i s c h o i c e the p o s i t i v i s t i c a s s e r t i o n o f the e q u i v a l e n c e between e x t e r n a l t h i n g s and i m p r e s s i o n s no l o n g e r h o l d s . • I I I . AN INQUIRY CONCERNING IMPRESSIONS. Do we observe i m p r e s s i o n s ? ¥e agreed t h a t p h y s i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , even o f the most c o n c r e t e t y p e , can never be m a i n t a i n e d w i t h c e r t a i n t y . Now one of the ba.sic assumptions from w h i c h the p o s i t i v i s t i c r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a r t e d was t h a t " i m p r e s s i o n s " were b a s i c f a c t s , and t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s about them were capable of s t r i c t v e r i f i c a t i o n . Reichenbach d e n i e s t h i s . E or him, i m p r e s s i o n s do not have the c h a r a c t e r of o b s e r v a b l e f a c t s . We observe t h i n g s , not i m p r e s s i o n s : " I see t a b l e s , and houses, and thermometers, and t r e e s , and men, and the sun...but I have never seen my i m p r e s s i o n of these t h i n g s . I hear t o n e s , and m e l o d i e s , and speeches; but I do not hea r my h e a r i n g them. I f e e l h e a t , and c o l d , and s o l i d i t y ; but I do not f e e l 2 my f e e l i n g them." 1. Ibid., P. 147.. 2. Ibid., P. 164. -186-¥e 'do not sense i m p r e s s i o n s : we i n f e r t h e i r e x i s t e n c e : "The d i s t i n c t i o n between the w o r l d o f t h i n g s and the w o r l d o f i m p r e s s i o n s o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i s . . . t h e r e s u l t of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n . . . T h e r e i s no d i r e c t awareness o f i m p r e s s i o n s or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ; we must l e a r n to i n f e r whether the t h i n g s we observe are ' r e a l ' or 'apparent', t h i s term meaning t h a t t h e r e are p r o c e s s e s i n my body alone which are not accompanied i n the u s u a l f a s h i o n by 1 p h y s i c a l t h i n g s . " . . . "A s e n s a t i o n o f a s e n s a t i o n never o c c u r s ; t h e r e i s onl y one s e n s a t i o n , i t s o b j e c t i s an e x t e r n a l t h i n g , or a s t a t e o f our body, and t h a t t h e r e i s a s e n s a t i o n i s not obs e r v e d but i n f e r r e d . What i s g i v e n are t h i n g s , or s t a t e s of t h i n g s . ..--not i m p r e s s i o n s . "2 "The secondary e q u a l i t i e s " a r e q u a l i t i e s o f t h i n g s , not things...We never see 'the b l u e ' b u t b l u e t h i n g s ; We never t a s t e 'the b i t t e r ' , but b i t t e r t h i n g s . " 3 T h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t we observe " t h i n g s " and i n f e r " i m p r e s s i o n s " i s i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to R u s s e l l ' s view t h a t we observe s e n s e - d a t a and i n f e r t h i n g s from them. The i s s u e i s e x t r e m e l y i n v o l v e d and a. d e c i s i o n between these two approaches, i s d i f f i c u l t . I t h i n k t h a t the problem a r i s e s p a r t l y as a l e g a c y o f the seal-and-wax t h e o r y o f knowledge and p a r t l y f r om a l o o s e t e r m i n o l o g y . F o r R u s s e l l , the p r i m i t i v e p a r t , t h a t w h i c h i s epistem-o l o g i c a l l y f i r s t i n our e x i s t i n g knowledge now "fieems something l i k e t h i s : There are c o l o u r e d shapes w h i c h move, t h e r e .are n o i s e s , s m e l l s , b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n s , the e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h we d e s c r i b e as t h o s e o f touc h , and so on. There are r e l a t i o n s among these i t e m s : time r e l a t i o n s ... among a l l o f them, and space r e l a t i o n s . . . among many o f them. There are r e c o l l e c t i o n s of some of t h e s e 4 t h i n g s . .There are a l s o e x p e c t a t i o n s . " T a b l e s , c h a i r s , books, p e r s o n s are not e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e d a t a but are i n f e r e n c e s . We do not i n f e r them by any c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s ; but we cannot accept the knowledge o f 1. Ibid., P. 165 2. Ibid., P. 167 3. Ibid., P. 168 4. R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r " , P.180. -18 7-them as v a l i d , knowledge except i n so f a r as i t can be i n f e r r e d from such knowledge as i s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y p r i m i t i v e What we a c t u a l l y see i s much l e s s than we o r d i n a r i l y suppose. D i s t a n c e s , f o r example, a re not seen b u t are i n f e r r e d f r o m cues from the eye muscles w h i c h are c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h exper-i e n c e s o f m o t i o n and t o u c h . Reichenbach does not d e f i n e a " t h i n g " ; and f u r t h e r m o r e -he e x p r e s s l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e terms " i m p r e s s i o n " , " p r e s e n t a t i o n 1 " s e n s a t i o n " , and " s e n s e - d a t a " are synonymous. R u s s e l l , on the o t h e r hand, d e f i n e s c l e a r l y what he means by " s e n s a t i o n " . He s t a t e s t h a t we. must d i s t i n g u i s h between: -"(1) our s e n s a t i o n , w h i c h i s a mental event c o n s i s t i n g i n our b e i n g aware o f ' a s e n s i b l e o b j e c t , and (2) the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t o f w h i c h we are aware i n s e n s a t i o n . When-.1 speak of the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t , i t must be understood that I do not mean such a t h i n g as a t a b l e , which i s b o t h v i s i b l e end t a n g i b l e , can be seen by many p e o p l e at once, and i s more or l e s s j'ermanent. What I mean i s j u s t t h a t p a t c h o f c o l o u r w h i c h i s m o m e n t a r i l y seen when we l o o k at the t a b l e , or j u s t tha.t p a r t i c u l a r hardness w h i c h i s f e l t when we p r e s s i t , o r j u s t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r sound w h i c h i s hea r d when we rap i t . Each of these I c a l l a s e n s i b l e 2 o b j e c t , and. our awareness of i t I c a l l a s e n s a t i o n . " There are no such t h i n g s as " i l l u s i o n s o f sense". I f i n a " i l l u s i o n " we see two t a b l e s t h e n there, are two v i s u a l t a b l e s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t to note t h a t R u s s e l l d e f i n e s s e n s a t i o n as awareness o f s e n s i b l e obj e c t s - - i . e., of patc h e s o f c o l o u r , e t c . That we are aware .of such o b j e c t s can s c a r c e l y be doubted, and i f " s e n s a t i o n " i s s i m p l y a name used to d e s i g n a t e t h a t awareness i t c o u l d not be s a i d t h a t w e , " i n f e r " s e n s a t i o n s . We might say w i t h Reichenbach t h a t we observe " t h i n g s " - - b u t 1. R e i c h e n b a c h , o p . c i t . , P.89. 2. R u s s e l l , "Our Knowledge o f the E x t e r n a l World", P.76. -188-the " t h i n g s " we observe are o n l y c e r t a i n " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s . " Common sense o f c o u r s e "sees t h i n g s " ; but I c o n s i d e r that. M i l l , R u s s e l l and o t h e r s have shown q u i t e c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t the " t h i n g " i s b u i l t up u n c o n s c i o u s l y i n a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e from p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c e l h a b i t s . Perhaps the problem has a r i s e n p a r t l y as a l e g a c y o f the seal-and-wax t h e o r y of knowledge. I see a. r e d o b j e c t . P h y s i c s t e l l s us t h a t the redness i s " s u b j e c t i v e " and i s not " i n " the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . The redness o f the o b j e c t i s a c c o r d i n g l y p l a c e d " i n " the mind as an e f f e c t o r " i m p r e s s i o n " o f the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . T h i s " i m p r e s s i o n " a c q u i r e d (as w i t h Locke's i d e as) almost the s t a t u s of an e n t i t y , and we would presumably have to p o s t u l a t e an " i n n e r sense" w h i c h observes the i m p r e s s i o n . - To c o n c e i v e o f an " i m p r e s s i o n " .as an e n t i t y between the mind and the o b j e c t i s to commit the mista.ke w h i c h the German p o s i t i v i s t A v e n a r i us c a l l e d " i n t r o j s c t i o n " . I t h i n k t h a t t h i s i s the c o n c e p t i o n Reichenbach has i n mind when he says t h a t we do not "see our s e e i n g , " o r "hear our h e a r i n g . " A c t u a l l y , the c o l o u r of the o b j e c t i s no more s u b j e c t i v e than i s the shape and p o s i t i o n w h i c h the o b j e c t has i n p e r c e p t u a l space. The c o n c e p t i o n that " f i g u r e " i s a. p r i m a r y q u a l i t y a r i s e s from t h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t p h y s i c s d e a l s w i t h o b j e c t s w h i c h are extended i n space. The space o f e x t e n s i o n i s p e r c e p t u a l : the space o f p h y s i c s i s a non-sensuous, f o r m a l c o n s t r u c t i o n , as S c h l i c k p o i n t e d out. The -189 f a c t t h a t we f e e l i t i s l e s s p e r m i s s i b l e to l o c a t e the redness o f the paper at the p l a c e where we see i t i n p e r c e p t u a l space than i t i s t o l o c a t e the f i g u r e of the .paper at the same p o i n t has i t s b a s i s i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l h a b i t s , not i n l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . I f we use R u s s e l l ' s exact t e r m i n o l o g y and pay heed t o A v e n a r i u s * i n s i s t e n c e t h a t s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s are at the p l a c e where they are obser v e d i n p e r c e p t u a l space, I t h i n k we can a v o i d the " e n t i t y " c o n c e p t i o n of i m p r e s s i o n s . I t i s p e r m i s s i b l e to say t h a t we are d i r e c t l y aware of R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s ' 1 - - ! . e., p a t c h e s o f c o l o u r , hardnesses e t c . I t i s t r u e t h a t at a c e r t a i n m i d d l e stage i n e x p e r i e n c e the statement "There i s a r e d t h i n g " seems to be more d i r e c t and i n t u i t i v e than the statement "I -am aware of a r e d p a t c h " , b u t I t h i n k t h a t t h i s apparent d i r e c t n e s s i s a p r e j u d i c e o f common sense w h i c h has i t s r o o t s i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l h a b i t s . B o t h g e n e t i c a l l y and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y these s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s are p r i o r t o any " t h i n g s . " Knowledge i s t h i s d i r e c t r e l a t i o n between the s u b j e c t and the s e n s i b l e o b j e c t . Noth-i n g i s more " r e a l " , i n R u s s e l l ' s o p i n i o n , than such o b j e c t s o f sense, and c e r t a i n l y n o t h i n g can be more s t r i c t l y v e r i f i a b l e , s i n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n always c o n s i s t s i n the o c c u r r e n c e of an expected sense-datum. I f Reichenba.ch' s " i m p r e s s i o n " means R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s a t i o n " , then we have a l r e a d y d e f i n e d " i m p r e s s i o n " not as an e n t i t y but as a name f o r a c e r t a i n m ental event. I f , on the o t h e r hand, R e i c h e n -bach means by " i m p r e s s i o n " R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t " , then -190-1 cannot agree t h a t " i m p r e s s i o n s " are i n f e r r e d from t h i n g s . 1 can c o n c e i v e o f n o t h i n g more d i r e c t or p r i m a r y than R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s . " . And as we have a l r e a d y seen, • R u s s e l l does not l e a v e us w i t h a p u r e l y " p o s i t i v i s t i c " c o n c e p t i o n of a t h i n g . The t h i n g i s a s e r i e s o f e v e n t s , and i s not m e r e l y a Machi an "complex of elements" dependent on us f o r e x i s t e n c e . A n a l y s i s o f the w e i g h t o f " i m p r e s s i o n p r o p o s i t i o n s " , however, shows t h a t , even though ( i n Reichenbach's view) they are i n d i r e c t , they are n e v e r t h e l e s s more c e r t a i n than o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e s . 3?or example, " p a s s i n g from 'There i s a.n e l e c t r i c a l d i s c h a r g e f r o m a c l o u d to the ground' to 'There i s a f l a s h o f l i g h t n i n g ' i s a t r a n s i t i o n to a more c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n and, j o i n t l y , to a more i n t u i t i v e one. P a s s i n g from 'There i s a f l a s h o f l i g h t n i n g * to ' I have, the i m p r e s s i o n o f a f l a s h of l i g h t n i n g ' i s a t r a n s i t i o n , once more, toward 1 a more c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t to a l e s s i n t u i t i v e one." The t h i r d p r o p o s i t i d m i t t e d l y l e s s " n a t u r a l " f o r common sense and, r e q u i r e s a c e r t a i n e f f o r t of a b s t r a c t i o n , but t h e concept of i n t u i t i v e n e s s i s r e l a t i v e to the degree of p h i l o s o p h i c a l p e r v e r s i o n we have undergone. I t i s o n l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l h a b i t t h a t makes us c o n s i d e r i t more " i n t u i t i v e to say t h a t "There i s a. r e d t h i n g " r a t h e r than " I am aware of a r e d p a t c h . " A b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y , whatever the s t a t u s o f i m p r e s s i o n p r o p o s i t i o n s i s , can be shown to be a l i m i t w h i c h we s h a l l n ever r e a c h . Even i f " b a s i c s t a t e m e n t s " i n the most 1. R e i c h e n b a c h , op. c i t . , P.177. -191-riarrow sense were c e r t a i n , we c o u l d never f o r m u l a t e them. Every f o r m u l a t i o n o c c u p i e s a s t r e t c h of time i n w h i c h the p e r c e p t u a l f u n c t i o n may not remain c o n s t a n t and i n w h i c h memory might be u n r e l i a b l e . "Our b a s i c statements i n the narrower sense a r e , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , b a s i c statements i n the w i d e r sense i n w h i c h the i n v o l v e d time i n t e r v a l i s of s h o r t d u r a t i o n . Consequently th e r e i s o n l y an a p p r o x i m a t i o n to b a s i c statements i n the narrower sense; and t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e i s i n any u t t e r a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n only an a p p r o x i -m a t i o n to a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y . " The p r e d i c a t e o f weight t h e r e f o r e e n t i r e l y supersedes the p r e d i c a t e of t r u t h - v a l u e end remains our o n l y measure f o r j udging p r o p o s i t i o n s . I f we s t i l l speak o f s c i e n c e as a. system o f t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s we are employing a. schernatization.-. . "Eor many purposes t h i s c o n c e p t i o n may be a s u f f i c i e n t a p p r o x i m a t i o n ; b u t , f o r an exact e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l - i n q u i r y , t h i s • c o n c e p t i o n cannot f u r n i s h 1 a s a t i s f a c t o r y b a s i s . " I n e p i s t e m o l o g y we must take s e r i o u s l y t h e f a c t t h a t w e i g h t ' i s the s o l e p r e d i c a t e of a l l p r o p o s i t i o n s . "The concept o f t r u t h appears as an i d e a l i z e . -t i o n of a w e i g h t o f h i g h degree, end the concept o f meaning i s the q u a l i t y of b e i n g a c c e s s i b l e to the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a 2 w e i g h t . " Even i f we assumed that,. i m p r e s s i o n p r o p o s i t i o n s were s t r i c t l y v e r i f i a b l e , the' i n t r o d u c t i o n of the i m p r e s s i o n b a s i s does not f r e e us f r o m p r o b a b i l i t y s t a t e m e n t s . . " I t . i s not o n l y the i n f e r e n c e s f r om the b a s i s to e x t e r n a l t h i n g s w h i c h have a p r o b a b i l i t y c h a r a c t e r ; the same i s v a l i d f o r 1. Ibid., P. 198. 2. Ibid., P.188. -192-every statement c o n c e r n i n g b a s i c f a c t s . . . T h e r e i s no A r c h i -medean p o i n t o f a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y l e f t to w h i c h to a t t a c h our knowledge o f the w o r l d ; a l l we have i s an e l a s t i c net 1 of p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n s f l o a t i n g i n open space." l V r . THE PROJECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OP THE WORLD ON THE CONGRETA BASIS. I n Reichenbach's view the o r i g i n a l w o r l d f rom w h i c h our r e c o n s t r u c t i o n must s t a r t i s not the w o r l d of i m p r e s s i o n s but the w o r l d o f c o n c r e t e o b j e c t s around us. I f t h i s i s tr u e we must f i r s t examine the method by w h i c h we s e p a r a t e immediate t h i n g s i n t o s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e . P r i m i t i v e men and c h i l d r e n b e g i n w i t h the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t immediate e x i s t e n c e i s e q u i v a l e n t to o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e . B u t the laws o f n a t u r e w h i c h we c o n s t r u c t between th e s e t h i n g s l e a d ' to c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i f we c o n s i d e r the whole immediate w o r l d as r e a l . A t h i n g w h i c h has immedi ate" e x i stenoe can be assumed to have o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e as w e l l p r o v i d e d no c o n t r a d i c t i o n a r i s e s . We f a v o r the waking w o r l d as a g a i n s t the dream w o r l d because the p r e d i c t i o n s c o n s t r u c t e d on the t h i n g s of the waking w o r l d g i v e us a, much .b e t t e r r a t i o o f s u c c e s s e s . Our i n f e r e n c e s about t h e o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e o f an immediate t h i n g are of a s t a t i s t i c a l c h a r a c t e r , and a l t h o u g h they have-a h i g h weight are never a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n . A f t e r some e x p e r i e n c e s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e t h i n g s can a l s o be d i r e c t l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a " s c a l e of g r a d a t i o n of the immediate e x i s t e n c e c h a r a c t e r " , but t h i s c r i t e r i o n i s 1. Ibid., P. 192. -193-not so sure a method o f d i s t i n c t i o n . Once the e x i s t e n c e o f c o n c r e t a has been a s c e r t a i n e d , they f o r m the b a s i s of i n f e r e n c e s l e a d i n g to the e x i s t e n c e of . o t h e r t h i n g s w h i c h are h e l d t o be o b j e c t i v e even though not d i r e c t l y a c c e s s i b l e . We make p r o b a b i l i t y i n f e r e n c e s to o t h e r c o n c r e t a ; . i n f e r e n c e s to a b s t r a c t a , the e x i s t e n c e of which i s r e d u c i b l e to the e x i s t e n c e of c o n c r e t a ; and i n f e r e n c e s to t h i n g s w h i c h are not a b s t r a c t a. but whi c h f o r p h y s i c a l r easons cannot become c o n c r e t a e i t h e r - - e . g . , r a d i o waves and atoms. These Reichenbach c a l l s " i l l a t a . " The d i s j u n c t i o n of c o n c r e t a and a b s t r a c t a i s i n c o m p l e t e : "a. t h i r d term i s needed to denote t h i n g s w h i c h are n e i t h e r c o n c r e t e - - c a p a b l e 1 of immediate e x i s t e n c e — n o r a b s t r a c t — r e d u c i b l e t o c o n c r e t a . 11 I t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n . , i n t o c o n c r e t a , a b s t r a c t a and i l l a t a i s "not a m a t t e r of p r i n c i p l e but due o n l y to our p e r s o n a l s i t u a t i o n i n the p h y s i c a l w o r l d . " F o r example, i f the s t r u c t u r e o f the eye were d i f f e r e n t such an i l l s t u m as a r a d i o wave might become a concretum. A b s t r a c t a and c o n c r e t a may a c q u i r e an i n t u i t i v e c h a r a c t e r : e.g.,"we t h i n k o f p u b l i c b u i l d i n g s , of marching s o l d i e r s , of a t r i a l , w i t h the i n t e n t i o n of a t t a c h i n g the f e e l i n g s o f e x i s t e n c e to the 2 word ' s t a t e ' " . Even concreta., however, are not seen " o b j e c t i v e l y " but i n a d i s t o r t e d form: we see a " s u b s t i t u t e w o r l d . " "The d e s c r i p t i o n a l frame i n w h i c h we see the world, i s never more than a s u b s t i t u t e f o r a. c o m p l e t e l y t r u e 1. Ibid., P. 212. 2. Ibid., P. 217. -194-d e s c r i p ' t i o n and w i l l e x p r e s s o n l y c e r t a i n more o r l e s s 1 e s s e n t i a . ! f e a t u r e s of the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . " 5'or Reichenbach., the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the i n t e r n a l w o r l d must a l s o be performed on the c o n c r e t a b a s i s , s i n c e p s y c h i c a l phenomena are not o b s e r v e d but are i n f e r r e d from p h y s i c a l t h i n g s . The r e s u l t i n g c o n c e p t i o n of p s y c h o l o g y i s t h e r e f o r e e x t r e m e l y d i f f e r e n t from t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w s . "The i d e a of i n t r o s p e c t i o n i s an i l l u s i o n i f we u n d e r s t a n d by i n t r o s p e c t i o n ' an o b s e r v a t i o n o f ' p s y c h i c a l ' phenomena.; what we observe are p h y s i c a l phenomena, and the i n n e r p r o c e s s e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to 2 them are o n l y i n f e r r e d . " "Having the i n n e r p r o c e s s does not me an o b s e r v i n g the i n n e r p r o c e s s but means o b s e r v i n g the immediate thing...We do not see our i n t e r i o r p r o c e s s , b u t we 3 have i t ; and, because we have i t v we see a t h i n g o u t s i d e . " I t would be most h e l p f u l i f Reichenbach were to d e f i n e what he means by a " t h i n g " . Such s t a t e m e n t s as "we see a t h i n g o u t s i d e " , i r e d e c e i v i n g l y s i m p l e . The n o t i o n of " o u t s i d e " , f o r example, i s shown by p s y c h o l o g y to be l e a r n e d o r i n f e r r e d , not s i m p l y "seen":i.e., not due p u r e l y to v i s u a l f a c t o r s a l o n e . I would agree that we do not observe " i n n e r p r o c e s s e s . " We might say t h a t we "see t h i n g s " ; b u t the ' " t h i n g s " we a c t u a l l y see or f e e l or hear are R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s " - ~ p a r t i c u l a r p a t c h e s o f c o l o u r , p a r t i c u l a r h a r d n e s s e s , p a r t i c u l a r sounds, e t c . When Reichenbach says t h a t we observe p h y s i c a l phenomena he seems to i m p l y t h a t 1. Ibid,, P. 221. 2. I b i d . , P. 227. 3. Ibid., P. 233. -195-" p h y s i c . a l " denotes a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of r e a l i t y . S c h l i c k ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t " p h y s i c a l " denotes merely a p a r t i c u l a r mode of d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y i s i n my o p i n i o n the p r e f e r a b l e a s s e r t i o n to make. T h i s i s a l s o R u s s e l l ' s view:, f o r him, p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s are those w h i c h obey the laws o f p h y s i c s . S c h l i c k ' s assumption t h a t p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s and p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o ncepts are two d i f f e r e n t ways of d e s i g n a t i n g one immediate r e a l i t y seems to g i v e most promise of s o l v i n g the v e x a t i o u s mind-body problem, and h i s c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between p e r c e p t u a l and p h y s i c a l spa.ce e n a b l e s us to a v o i d the c o n f u s i o n w h i c h a r i s e s when we t r y to l o c a t e sensuous q u a l i t i e s . R e i c h e n bach e x p l i c i t l y a s s e r t s t h a t " s e e i n g the immediate t h i n g i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h i i h a v i n g the c o r r e s p o n d i n g 1 i n n e r p r o c e s s " ; and i n t e r n a l p r o c e s s e s "are n o t h i n g but 2 p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s . " B r o a d , on the o t h e r hand,. c o n s i d e r s t h a t i t i s " p l a i n l y n o n s e n s i c a l " t o attempt t o reduce a s e n s a t i o n o f a r e d p a t c h to a m o l e c u l a r movement: "There are some q u e s t i o n s w h i c h can be r a i s e d about the c h a r a c t e r o f . b e i n g an awareness o f a r e d p a t c h ; and c o n v e r s e l y . About a m o l e c u l a r movement i t i s p e r f e c t l y r e a s o n a b l e to r a i s e the q u e s t i o n : 'Is i t s w i f t or slow, s t r a i g h t o r c i r c u l a r , and so on?' C o n v e r s e l y , i t i s r e a s o n a b l e t o ask about an awareness of a r e d p a t c h whether i t i s a c l e a r or con f u s e d awareness; b u t i t i s nonsense to ask o f a, m o l e c u l a r movement whether i t i s a c l e a r or a c o n f u s e d movement. Thus the attempt t o argue t h a t 'being a s e n s a t i o n " o r so and so' and 'being a b i t of b o d i l y beha.viour o f such and such a k i n d ' are j u s t two names f o r the same c h a r a . c t e r i s t i c i s e v i d e n t l y h o p e l e s s . " 3 1. Ibid., P. 233. 2. Ibid., P. 237. 3. Broad's remarks here do not r e f u t e S c h l i c k ' s h y p o t h e s i s . S c h l i c k does not "reduce" the s e n s a t i o n of r e d to a m o l e c u l a r movement. He m e r e l y assumes t h a t these are two d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t s w h i c h are c o o r d i n a t e d to one immediate r e a l i t y . ( B Y O O - ( J , Cp., " the M.'nei and IB P|n<c in Moii'\ pi>it. London. on Paul, TvencK, Tru bnev A0o., Lti-, >4l!>) -196-Re i c h e r i b s c h a v o i d s such an argument by h i s t h e s i s t h a t we are not aware of q u a l i t i e s but of t h i n g s , and t h a t s i n c e the s e n s a t i o n i s not o b s e r v e d but i n f e r r e d we do not "know a n y t h i n g about i t s q u a l i t i e s except t h a t i t has a. c e r t a i n 1 correspondence to the immediate t h i n g o b served." We come back here to our former p o i n t : do we "observe t h i n g s " , o r are we d i r e c t l y aware o f p r i m i t i v e s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s such as r e d p a t c h e s ? I p r e f e r , w i t h R u s s e l l , to s t a r t w i t h the red p a t c h e s as t h a t w h i c h "comes e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y f i r s t i n my 2 e x i s t i n g knowledge now." Reichenbach, however, does not accept b e h a v i o u r i s m c o m p l e t e l y . He c o n s i d e r s t h a t " s e l f -o b s e r v a t i o n (as opposed, to the o b j e c t i o n a b l e concept of i n t r o s p e c t i o n ) i s a, u s e f u l method i n p s y c h o l o g y , but must be s u b j e c t e d to s t r i c t c o n t r o l . V. PROBABILITY AND INDUCTION. The e x p a n s i o n of knowledge p a s t our own s m a l l " o b s e r v a t i o n -a l p l a t f o r m " presupposes the concept of p r o b a b i l i t y . To remain w i t h i n a p o s i t i v i s t i c framework of s t r i c t v e r i f i c a t i o n i s to endorse s o l i p s i s m . " I t i s the concept of p r o b a b i l i t y • 3 w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s the nerve o f the system o f knowledge." When we r e a l i z e the i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f a c t , we must be r e a d y to admit a fundamental change i n the l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n o f knowledge. 1. Reichenba.ch, o p . c i t . , P. 237. 2. R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r " , P.180. 3. Reichenba.ch, op. c i t . , P. 293. -19 7-The " d i s p a r i t y c o n c e p t i o n " h o l d s t h a t t h e r e ere two d i s t i n c t t ypes of p r o b a b i l i t y : the m a t h e m a t i c a l concept, w h i c h i s i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms of f r e q u e n c y , and the l o g i c a l c oncept, whi ch i s o f a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t y p e . I t i s the p roblem o f the p r o b a b i l i t y of a s i n g l e ca.se w h i c h g i v e s r i s e t o the d i s p a r i ty c o n c e p t i o n . Thus, when we speak of the p r o b a b i l i t y of good weather tomorrow, the l o g i c a l concept o f p r o b a b i l i t y here o c c u r r i n g seems to be independent of the f r e q u e n c y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The s i n g l e - c a s e problem i s , however, a v o i d a b l e , f o r we can d e s c r i b e the event not as an i n d i v i d u a l happening, but as a member of a. c l a s s , and such a c l a s s can always be c o n s t r u c t e d . I t remains t r u e t h a t f o r a s i n g l e case the r u l e s of p r o b a b i l i t y may not g i v e a r e s u l t w h i c h i s v e r i f i e d , but i t .is b e t t e r t o b e l i e v e i n the o c c u r r e n c e of the most p r o b a b l e event as determined by the f r e q u e n c y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , because t h i s p r i n c i p l e w i l l l e a d us to the b e s t r a t i o o f s u c c e s s e s which i s a t t a i n a b l e . On t hese grounds Reichenbach d e c i d e s f o r an " i d e n t i t y c o n e e p t i o n " of p r o b a b i l i t y : t h e r e i s o n l y one p r o b a b i l i t y concept, and i t i s based on the s t a t i s t i c a l or f r e q u e n c y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . We u t t e r an i n d i v i d u a l statement n e i t h e r as t r u e , nor f a l s e , nor even- p r o b a b l e - - b u t as a " p o s i t . " We may d e f i n e "weight" as t h a t w h i c h "a degree o f p r o b a b i l i t y becomes i f i t 1 i s a p p l i e d to a s i n g l e c a s e . " "Any statement c o n c e r n i n g the 2 f u t u r e i s u t t e r e d i n the sense of a wager." We a r e o b l i g e d to be gamblers because l o g i c o f f e r s us no b e t t e r way to d e a l w i t h the f u t u r e . l . I b i d . , P. 314. 2. Ibid., P.315. -198-The p r o b a b i l i t y l o g i c which, we c o n s t r u c t on t h i s b a s i s i s not opposed to the o r d i n a r y two-valued l o g i c . I t i s s i m p l y a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f the l a t t e r , " s i n c e i t i s a p p l i c a b l e i n case the arguments form a c o n t i n u o u s s c a l e of t r u t h -1 v a l u e s . " As we have seen, "the system of knowledge i s w r i t t e n i n the language o f p r o b a b i l i t y l o g i c ; the two-v a l u e d l o g i c i s a s u b s t i t u t e language s u i t a b l e o n l y w i t h i n 2 the frame o f an a p p r o x i m a t i o n , " The laws of p r o b a b i l i t y can be reduced .to a r i t h m e t i c a l laws, and can t h e r e f o r e be f i t t e d i n t o the modern c o n c e p t i o n o f l o g i c a.s a system of t a u t o -l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . .Now the p r o b a b i l i t y statement s u s t a i n s a p r e d i c t i o n , and w i t h t h i s , f a c t we are l e d i n t o the problem of i n d u c t i o n * I n c o n t r a s t to d e d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e , w h i c h g i v e s o n l y t a u t o l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s , i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e g i v e s us new knowledge. T h i s u s e f u l q u a l i t y , however, becomes the c e n t r e o f the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of i n d u c t i o n . The two p i l l a r s of Hume's c r i t i c i s m o f the p r i n c i p l e o f i n d u c t i o n are s t i l l unshaken: (1) we have no l o g i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n f o r the v a l i d i t y o f i n d u c t i v e inference; and (2) t h e r e i s no d e m o n s t r a t i o n "a. p o s t e r i o r i " f o r the i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e ; any such d e m o n s t r a t i o n would presuppose the v e r y p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i t i s to demonstrate. "There i s no 1. I b i d , P. 324. 2. Ibid., P. 333. -199-c e r t a i n t y i n any knowledge about the w o r l d heca.use knowledge o f the w o r l d i n v o l v e s p r e d i c t i o n s o f the f u t u r e . The i d e a l o f a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n knowledge l e a d s i n t o s k e p t i c i s m - - i t i s p r e f e r a b l e to. admit t h i s than to i n d u l g e i n r e v e r i e s about 1 a, p r i o r i knowledge. 1 1 I f we are to b r i d g e the gap between e x p e r i e n c e and p r e d i c t i o n we must j u s t i f y i n a u c t i v e b e l i e f not by showing t h a t i t i s merely a h a b i t , but t h a t i t i s a good h a b i t . I f we cannot demonstrate t h i s v i t a l p o i n t , our p h i l o s o p h y i s a. f a i l u r e . • A n a l y s i s o f the s t r u c t u r e o f p r o b a b i l i t y , however, en a b l e s us t o g i v e t h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . What Hume r e a l l y has p r o v e d i s t h a t we cannot demonstrate the t r u t h o f the c o n c l u s i o n o f an i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e . In the f a c e of h i s argument we must renounce f o r a l l time the hope of any a p o d i c t i c knowledge of r e a l i t y . But "a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f an i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e does not i m p l y a p r o o f of the t r u t h of the c o n c l u s i o n . . .The i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e i s a procedure w h i c h i s to f u r n i s h us the b e s t assumption c o n c e r n i n g the f u t u r e . I f we do not know the t r u t h about the f u t u r e , t h e r e may be n o n e t h e l e s s a. b e s t assumption about i t , i . e . , a b e s t assumption 2 r e l a t i v e to what we know." Reichenbach adduces l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to show t h a t the i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e can be p r o v e d to be a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f s u c c e s s . A p r e d i c t i o n about the f u t u r e formed-on the i n d u c t i v e p r i n c i p l e embodies the s m a l l e s t p o s s i b l e r i s k . The i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e i s not a l . I b i d . , P.345. 2. Ibid., P.348. -200 t a u t o l o g y / " "but the p r o o f t h a t i t l e a d s to t h e b e s t p o s i t about the f u t u r e i s based on t a u t o l o g i e s o n l y . "This paradox i s s o l v e d by the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the 'something new f u r n i s h e d by the i n f e r e n c e i s not m a i n t a i n e d as a t r u e statement but as our b e s t p o s i t , and t h a t the d e m o n s t r a t i o n i s not d i r e c t e d toward the t r u t h o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n but to the l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n of the p r o c e d u r e to the aim of knowledg The way between the S c y l l a . of s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " t h e o r i e s of knowledge and the C harybdis of s c e p t i c i s m i s p o i n t e d out by the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y o f knowledge. "There i s n e i t h e r an a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n knowledge nor an a b s o l u t e i g n o r a n c e - - t h e r e i s a way between them p o i n t e d out by the 2 p r i n c i p l e o f i n d u c t i o n as our b e s t g u i d e . " The two-valued l o g i c i s not " f a l s e " , but i t does not a p p l y to a.ctual knowledge because the c o n d i t i o n s of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n a r e not r e a l i z e d : "The way toward an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of. the step f r om e x p e r i e n c e to p r e d i c t i o n l i e s i n the l o g i c a l s phere; to f i n d i t we have to f r e e o u r s e l v e s from one deep-rooted p r e j u d i c e : f r o m the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t the system of knowledge i s to be a system of t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s . I f we c r o s s out t h i s assumption w i t h i n the t h e o r y o f knowledge, the d i f f i c u l t i e s d i s s o l v e , and w i t h them d i s s o l v e s the m y s t i c a l m i s t l y i n g above the r e s e a r c h methods of s c i e n c e . Ve s h a l l then i n t e r p r e t knowledge as a system of p o s i t s , o r wagers; w i t h t h i s the q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n assumes -as i t s ' form the q u e s t i o n whether s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s our b e s t wager. L o g i c a l a n a l y s i s shows t h a t t h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n - can be g i v e n , t h a t the i n d u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e of s c i e n c e i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r methods o f p r e d i c t i o n as l e a d i n g to the most f a v o r a b l e p o s i t s . 1. Ibid., P.348. 2. Ibid., P.393. 2 0 1 -Thus we wager on the p r e d i c t i o n s o f s c i e n c e and wager on the p r e d i c t i o n s o f p r a c t i c a l wisdom: we wager on the sun's r i s i n g tomorrow, we wager t h a t food w i l l n o u r i s h us tomorrow, we wager t h a t our f e e t w i l l c a r r y us tomorrow. Our s t a k e i s not low; a l l our p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e , our l i f e i t s e l f , i s at s t a k e . To c o n f e s s i g n o r a n c e i n the f a c e o f the f u t u r e i s the t r a g i c duty o f a l l s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y ; h u t , i f we are e x c l u d e d from knowing t r u e p r e d i c t i o n s , we s h a l l he g l a d , t h a t a t l e a s t we know 1 the r o a d toward our b e s t wagers. 1 1 1. Ibid., P.404. CHAPTER V I I I . EMPIRICISM: PAST AMD PRESENT. -203-EMEIRICISM VERSUS MYSTICISM. ' ' What i s the b a s i c p r o blem at i s s u e when we are d e a l i n g w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f our knowledge o f t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ? I n i t s modern form, the q u e s t i o n arose from the p r e s u p p o s i t -i o n s o f s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y s c i e n c e . Greek s c i e n c e had, i n g e n e r a l , t r i e d to e x p l a i n the w o r l d l a r g e l y i n terms of c o n c r e t e e n t i t i e s w i t h w h i c h we were f a m i l i a r — i n terms o f s u c h t h i n g s as f i r e , o r w a t e r , or a i r . D e m o c r i t u s , however, t r i e d t o e x p l a i n i t i n terms o f the a b s t r a c t and the u n f a m i l i a r - - i n terms of s m a l l p a r t i c l e s f a l l i n g t h r o u g h space, and o n l y a c c i d e n t a l l y c o l l e c t i n g t o form l a r g e r b o d i e s . When s c i e n c e r e v i v e d i n the R e n a i s s a n c e p e r i o d , i t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t we c o u l d be more s u c c e s s f u l i f we adopted the l a t t e r t e c h n i q u e o f explaining''phenomena, not i n terms of the c o n c r e t e and o b v i o u s , but i n terms of the a b s t r a c t and the u n o b v i o u s . E o r the m e d i e v a l s , s t o n e s f e l l because of the q u a l i t y o f h e a v i n e s s they p o s s e s s e d , and s t o n e s were . st o n e s by v i r t u e o f t h e q u a l i t y o f s t o n e l i n e s s . Man was at home i n a. t i d y and warm u n i v e r s e of c o l o u r s and sounds. But G a l i l e o d i s p e l l e d t h i s warmth and t h i s c o l o u r by h i s c o l d and r u t h l e s s a b s t r a c t i o n . The r e a l w o r I d , the ^ o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , was not the w o r l d of e x p e r i e n c e . There was o n l y m a t t e r i n m o t i o n t h r o u g h t i m e . The success of h i s t e c h n i q u e of a b s t r a c t i o n l e d to the acceptance of h i s p r e m i s e s , and p h i l o s o p h y took up the t a s k o f t r y i n g t o get over f r o m the w o r l d of immediate e x p e r i e n c e to t h i s c o l d , -204-gray w o r l d o f m a t t e r w h i r l i n g t h r o u g h space. B e r k e l e y soon q u e s t i o n e d the v e r y e x i s t e n c e o f t h i s a b s t r a c t m a t t e r . I f we c o n f i n e d o u r s e l v e s to "hard" d a t a , we c o u l d speak o n l y o f m e n t a l e v e n t s , o f c o l o u r s and of sounds, But even B e r k e l e y does not q u e s t i o n the t e s t i m o n y of sense e x p e r i e n c e . On the c o n t r a r y , he e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e s t h a t he i s w i l l i n g to " a s s e r t the e v i d e n c e o f sense as h i g h as you p l e a s e . " There i s , however, one h i s t o r i c a l theory o f knowledge w h i c h d e n i e s the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of any "problem" i n our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d — n a m e l y , m y s t i c i s m . To throw m y s t i c i s m a.s a t h e o r y of knowledge out of c o u r t a l t o g e t h e r w i t h o u t any e x a m i n a t i o n of i t i s too n a i v e a p r o c e e d i n g , and because of the appearance of i t s t e n e t s i n v a r i o u s i n t u i t i o n a l i s t i c - t h e o r i e s such an e x a m i n a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . At the v e r y o u t s e t , however, I t h i n k i t i s p o s s i b l e t o show t h a t the m y s t i c ' s p o s i t i o n e n t a i l s c e r t a i n consequences w h i c h w i l l enable us to make a. ' v o l i t i o n a l d e c i s i o n ' i n f a v o u r o f some o t h e r s t a n d p o i n t . The m y s t i c cannot be f o r c e d to accompany the e m p i r i c i s t a l o n g the road w h i c h the l a t t e r b e l i e v e s w i l l l e a d to t r u t h , but n e i t h e r has he the r i g h t to f o r c e on the e m p i r i c i s t h i s own c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h . S i n c e the n a t u r e of r e a l i t y can never be known at the s t a r t of our v e n t u r e , the e m p i r i c i s t has as good a r i g h t to a s s e r t t h a t r e a l i t y w i l l be found i n a n a l y s i s , f o r -205-instan . E e , as the m y s t i c has to m a i n t a i n t h a t r e a l i t y ' - i s a u n i t y w h i c h a n a l y s i s d i s t o r t s . The p o i n t to n o t i c e here i s t h a t the m y s t i c ' s p o s i t i o n , however u n a s s a i l a b l e and s i g n i f i -cant i t may he, and however much the m y s t i c i s e n t i t l e d t o i t e n t a i l s an im p o r t a n t c o n s e q u e n c e — s i l e n c e . The m y s t i c a l approach does remove the pr o b l e m of our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , but i t e x a c t s a p r i c e which i f h o n e s t l y p a i d c r i p p l e s thought and c u t s the nerve of a l l endeavour. We can i n t e r p r e t and defend the e m p i r i c a l p o s i t i o n i n a much b e t t e r f a s h i o n i f we examine the m y s t i c ' s view f i r s t . M y s t i c i s m b r e a k s a l t o g e t h e r w i t h the r e a l i s t i c manner • o f appro a. c h i ng the pr o b l e m of knowledge. I t r e j e c t s common-sense d i v i s i o n s as i l l u s i o n s w h i c h are mer e l y the p r o d u c t s of our f i n i t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T r u t h i s won not by s k i l f u l d i a l e c t i c , by s u b t l e r e a s o n , by arduous a n a l y s i s , but by a quenching and c e s s a t i o n of a l l r e a s o n i n the f a c e o f im m e d i a t e l y apprehended r e a l i t y . I t fo 11 ows t h a t the m y s t i c ' r e a l i t y i s n e c e s s a r i l y one, f o r v a r i e t y when c o n s c i o u s l y f a c e d p rovokes thought and demands e x p l a n a t i o n . The w o r l d i s one because I f e e l i t a.s one. I t s oneness i s my own oneness The w o r l d i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h the knower, and hence the many are e s s e n t i a l l y i l l u s o r y . Sense e x p e r i e n c e , w h i c h r e v e a l s to us a. complex m a n i f o l d of r e a l o b j e c t s , i s t h e r e f o r e d e c e p t i v e . E v e r y t h i n g i s brought by the m y s t i c i n t o .the sphere o f the p e r s o n a l and the immediate. The A l l i s One, and the m y s t i c , by t u r n i n g away from the c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w h i c h -20 6-sense e x p e r i e n c e a r o u s e s , can f i n d r e a l i t y i n the d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s e l f . W i t h the m y s t i c ' s d e f i n i t i o n of the r e e l as t h a t w h i c h i s i m m e d i a t e l y apprehended we can have no q u a r r e l , f o r as a d e f i n i t i o n i t i s merely a m a t t e r o f c h o i c e . But why s h o u l d the m y s t i c attempt to communicate h i s views? Communication w i t h o t h e r s presupposes a c e r t a i n e x t e r n a l i t y , a c e r t a i n d u a l i s m . To communicate w i t h o t h e r s i s t o admit t h e i r r e a l i t y and to admit t h e r e w i t h that the w o r l d i s many and not one. I t i s sense e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h i n f o r m s the m y s t i c of animated shapes c a l l e d men, who presumably have minds. But i f sense e x p e r i e n c e i s d e c e p t i v e , and i f r e a l i t y i s to be found w i t h i n , why s h o u l d he converse w i t h these shadow-shapes, the mere i l l u s i o n s of h i s f i n i t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? The c o n s i s t e n t m y s t i c would seem t o be a c o m p l e t e l y s i l e n t one. ' . F u r t h e r , how c o u l d t h e m y s t i c t a l k even i f he wi s h e d t o ? When he l o o k s f o r t r u t h not i n the complex e x t e r n a l w o r l d g i v e n by sense e x p e r i e n c e but i n the depths of t h e IS s e l f h e A i n e f f e c t a s s e r t i n g t h a t knowledge i s not s t r u c t u r a l i n n a t u r e but t h a i i t s essence i s i n i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n c o n t e n t . Now i f communication presupposes s t r u c t u r e , how c o u l d the m y s t i c communicate h i s e x p e r i e n c e , which i s w i t h o u t form? But i t seems t o l e r a b l y c e r t a i n t h a t , whatever happens i n communication, i t i s not content but f o r m which i s communicated. By " c o n t e n t " we mean the g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e ; -20 7-by"form" we mean t h a t as w h i c h i t i s g i v e n . The n o t i o n . o f a "common c o n t e n t " between the sender and the r e c e i v e r of a communication i s m e a n i n g l e s s , f o r any o b s e r v e r i s n e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d to h i s own e x p e r i e n c e . Even i f an ob s e r v e r c o u l d ga.ze i n t o t h e minds of two o t h e r s and compare t h e i r c o n t e n t s , he would o n l y r e p o r t h i s own e x p e r i e n c e . Even i f he r e p o r t e d a sameness I t would s t i l l be a. sameness i n h i s e x p e r i e n c e . We a r e d r i v e n to t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t i t i s t h e r e f o r e form w h i c h i s communicated. We communicate f a c t s o r s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , i . e . , we a s s e r t t h a t e n t i t i e s of a c e r t a i n k i n d s t a n d i n c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s to e n t i t i e s of oth e r k i n d s . I n a l l t h i s t h e r e i s no p l a c e f o r the m y s t i c . H i s • e x p e r i e n c e cannot be doubted, but we have h i s t e s t i m o n y t h a t i t i s i m m e d i a t e l y g i v e n , and we have h i s a s s e r t i o n that r e a l i t y , b e i n g one, i s n e c e s s a r i l y u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . Tinder such c i r c u m s t a n c e s we are t h e r e f o r e f o r c e d to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t he i s t r y i n g to communicate the unutterable--a,nd t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y the c o m p l a i n t o f the g r e a t m y s t i c s themselves. When we speak of "our" knowledge of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , or "our" knowledge of any f a c t s whatever, i t i s obvious t h a t we presuppose communication o f some s o r t . H i s t o r i c a l l y , advances i n knowledge were c l o s e l y connected w i t h advances i n the f l e x i b i l i t y and " d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of modes of communication, ]?rom a l l t h i s sphere of the communicable the m y s t i c s h u t s h i m s e l f o u t . Yet communication i s i n one sense a more -208-u l t i m a t e concept t h a n knowledge. I f , f o r example, the m y s t i c cannot communicate what he knows, then as f a r as we are concerned, he knows n o t h i n g . The m y s t i c may assume-the p o s i t i o n t h a t the w o r l d i s r e a l l y one, t h a t o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e i s i l l u s o r y ; but the p r i c e of s i l e n c e which he must pay seems too h i g h . I do not t h i n k t h a t there i s any a b s o l u t e s t a n d a r d by w h i c h we can compate the v a l i d i t y of the m y s t i c a l approach and t h a t of the e m p i r i c a l approach, but the e n t a i l e d ' d e c i s i o n s , as f a r as communicable knowledge i s concerned, p o i n t to the l a t t e r . W i t h t h i s g e n e r a l defense of the e m p i r i c i s t r e l i a n c e on sense e x p e r i e n c e l e t us r e t u r n to a survey of the s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s i n the development of e m p i r i c i s m as t h a t development has been o u t l i n e d i n the p r e c e d i n g chapters,. I I . THE DEVELOPMENT 0E MODERN EMPIRICISM. Erom Locke to a modern " l o g i s t i c e m p i r i c i s t " such as R e i c h e n b a c h i s a l o n g j o u r n e y , b u t at l e a s t i t i s a j o u r n e y u n d e r t a k e n i n the same s p i r i t t h r o u g h o u t . Today we f i n d t h e u n i o n of two streams of thought. P h i l o s o p h y now r e c o g n i z e s two d i s c i p l i n e s : the e m p i r i c a l d i s c i p l i n e o f the s c i e n c e s , w h i c h a r e concerned w i t h the c o l l e c t i o n of the " a.tomic f a c t s " ; and the r a t i o n a l i s t i c d i s c i p l i n e of l o g i c , w h i c h d e a l s w i t h the" p o s s i b l e s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s between those f a c t s . I t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t Locke i s more, concerned w i t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t s than w i t h mathematics, w h i c h he attempted t o jpl-ace on an e m p i r i c a l b a s i s , b u t he -209-resembles' modern p h i l o s o p h e r s i n h i s c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h the s c i e n c e s o f h i s day. H i s procedure of b r e a k i n g . mental s t a t e s up i n t o atomic s i m p l e i d e a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , seems to b.e i n s p i r e d by the, atomic t h e o r y as B o y l e was a p p l y i n g i t t o c h e m i s t r y i n Locke's t i m e , w h i l e h i s g e n e t i c method of t r a c i n g the r i s e of complex i d e a s from s i m p l e ones may " been developed under the i n f l u e n c e of Sydenham, who brought i n t o prominence the c a s e - h i s t o r y t e c h n i q u e i n m e d i c i n e . However m i s t a k e n Locke may have been as to the nature of mathematics, he was c e r t a i n l y f a m i l i a r w i t h i t s use i n the 1 p h y s i c s of h i s day. I t may have been t h i s f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h mathematics w h i c h l e d Locke to p l a c e s t r e s s on the s t r u c t u r a l element i n knowledge. He r e a l i z e s , f o r example, t h a t communication i m p l i e s s t r u c t u r e . I t i s a p r o p e r t y of h i s s i m p l e i d e a t h a t i t i s incommunicable. The complex s t r u c t u r e s of language can by no means communicate the non-composite s i m p l e i d e a . F u r t h e r , he e x p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s the p o s s i b i l i t y of any knowledge of "essences" or " n a t u r e s " , e n t e r p r i s e s w h i c h ^had formed so g r e a t a, p a r t of p r e v i o u s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n q u i r y . F o r him, " g e n e r a l and c e r t a i n t r u t h s are o n l y founded i n the h a b i t u d e s and r e l a t i o n s of a b s t r a c t 2 i d e a s . " I n s o f a r as he r e c o g n i z e s t h i s r e l a t i o n a l element 1. I n h i s " E p i s t l e to the Reader", i n the "Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " Locke d e s i g n a t e s as " m a s t e r - b u i l d e r s o f th e commonwealth of l e a r n i n g " the f o u r s c i e n t i s t s , B o y l e , -.Sydenham, Huygens and Hewton. 2. Locke, "An Essay C o n c e r n i n g Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " .Bk.Iv'.Ch.XII, Sect. 7. -210-i n knowledge, Locke's e p i s t e m o l o g y might he s a i d to a n t i c i p a t e , even i f i n a r u d i m e n t a r y f a s h i o n , the r a t i o n a l -i s t i c d i s c i p l i n e to which the "atomic f a c t s " of s c i e n c e are s u b m i t t e d t o d a y , Locke has been c r i t i c i z e d f o r h i s " s u b j e c t i v i s t " h a b i t s . He does h o l d t h a t knowledge extends no f a r t h e r than our i d e a s , s i n c e the mind has b e f o r e i t no o t h e r immediate o b j e c t s except i t s own i d e a s . [Following up t h i s l i n e of thought Locke d i s t i n g u i s h e s between " s e n s a t i o n " as a source of knowledge and " r e f l e c t i o n " , by w h i c h he means " t h a t n o t i c e w h i c h the mind t a k e s o f i t s own o p e r a t i o n s " , and f r o m w h i c h i t d e r i v e s the i d e a s o f t h i n k i n g , w i l l i n g , p e r c e i v i n g , e t c . I t i s p r o b a b l y t h i s " i n n e r sense" t h e o r y w h i c h i s the source of most o f the o b j e c t i o n s t o Locke's s u b j e c t i v i s m . The mind i s s e t a p a r t from i t s p r o c e s s e s , w h i c h i t knows i n some way by a pro cess of r e f l e c t i o n . But even i f t h i s phase of Locke's thought i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , h i s whole s t r e s s on the a n a l y s i s o f m ental events i s of g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e . We s h o u l d remember t h a t t h i s s u b j e c t i v e a n a l y s i s was f o r c e d upon him by the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e of h i s t i m e . There was no use i n t u r n i n g to the e x t e r n a l world, to f i n d the c o l o u r s and sounds of e x p e r i e n c e , f o r G a l i l e o had b e r e f t t h a t w o r l d of a l l s uch warmth and immediacy. The t e c h n i q u e of a b s t r a c t i o n w h i c h he had i n a u g u r a t e d had been c a r r i e d t o i t s b r i l l i a n t c o n c l u s i o n by'Newton. The p o i n t at -211-w h i c h advance was i m m e d i a t e l y needed was i n the a n a l y s i s of the domain of the "mental,"- and at t h i s p o i n t Locke r e v e a l e d h i s . g e n i u s . There may he c e r t a i n c r u d i t i e s i n h i s c o n c e p t i o n s , hut he s t a r t e d p s y c h o l o g y almost s i n g l e - h a n d e d . P s y c h o l o g y may have come to the s t a g e where Locke's i n t r o -s p e c t i o n i s t methods must now he d i s c a r d e d , hut i t owes i t s v e r y e x i s t e n c e as an independent s u b j e c t to Locke. The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of Locke's p s y c h o l o g y must, a l s o be n o t e d , f o r such an a n a l y s i s was needed to o f f s e t the a r i d r a t i o n a l i s t i c systems of the c o n t i n e n t a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . There i s one p r a g m a t i c t o u c h i n Locke's e p i s t e m o l o g y w h i c h has emerged i n l a t e r thought as a s o l u t i o n of the problem of. the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . L o c ke, who c o n f i n e d h i m s e l f to i d e a s , was f o r c e d t o g i v e some, c r i t e r i o n o f t h e i r r e f e r e n c e t o the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i n o r d e r t h a t we c o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h between f a c t and f i c t i o n . H i s p o s i t i o n was t h a i s i m p l e i d e a s are o b v i o u s l y not c r e a t i o n s of the mind--e.g., a b l i n d ma,n cannot imagine the c o l o u r of r e d . But i f the mind must r e c e i v e t h e s e s i m p l e i d e a s f r o m w i t h o u t , what assurance have we t h a t t h e s e i d e a s are a c t u a l p a t t e r n s of e x t e r n a l b o d i e s ? Locke answers t h a t i t i s of no importance whether t h e y image e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s or n o t . Por the knowledge of o b j e c t s by means o f s i m p l e i d e a s we are as w e l l s e r v e d i f our i d e a s are m e r e l y constant and r e g u l a r e f f e c t s of q u a l i t i e s i n the e x t e r n a l b o d i e s as i f t h e y were a c t u a l p a t t e r n s . A l t h o u g h s i m p l e i d e a s may thus not -212-image the" e x t e r n a l w o r l d , the " c o n f o r m i t y between our s i m p l e i d e a s and the e x i s t e n c e o f t h i n g s i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r 1 r e a l knowledge." The c o n s t a n t and dependable r e l a t i o n between them i s " a l l t h a t our s t a t e r e q u i r e s . " We have seen t h i s same i d e a developed by S c h l i c k and R u s s e l l w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f . The f a c t o f p h y s i o l o g i c a l s u b j e c t i v i t y i s not d e s t r u c t i v e o f " r e a l knowledge", f o r even t h o u g h the t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s of p h y s i c s appear to us i n p e r c e p t u a l space and tim e , the r e l a t i o n s w h i c h a r e g i v e n to us i n t h a t p e r c e p t u a l space and time must co r r e s p o n d even i f i n some p u r e l y f o r m a l and a b s t r a c t way to the s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n s o b t a i n i n g between the t h i n g s - i n -t h e m s e l v e s . I n s o f a r as our knowledge i s s t r u c t u r a l , we need not speak, t h e n , of an unknowable t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , u n l e s s we adopt w i t h E i c h t e an I d e a l i s m whi ch makes the ego the c r e a t o r of a l l r e a l i t y . Such a view, however, tends t o c o l l a p s e i n t o s o l i p s i s m . L ocke was a l s o e x t r e m e l y p r e s c i e n t i n h i s s t r e s s on the importance of an a n a l y s i s o f language. On a n e a r e r approach, he f i n d s t h a t " t h e r e i s so c l o s e a- c o n n e c t i o n between i d e a s and words, and our a b s t r a c t Ideas and g e n e r a l words have so c o n s t a n t a r e l a t i o n one t o another, t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o speak c l e a r l y and d i s t i n c t l y of our knowledge, w h i c h a l l c o n s i s t s i n p r o p o s i t i o n s , w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r i n g f i r s t the 1. "Essay", Bk. IV, Ch. IV, Sect. 4, -213-1 n a t u r e , 'use, and s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f language." He c l e a r l y g r a s p s t h e f a c t t h a t words are " s e n s i b l e s i g n s n e c e s s a r y f o r communication"; t h a t they s i g n i f y i d e a s "by a p e r f e c t l y a r b i t r a r y i m p o s i t i o n " ; and t h a t general., and u n i v e r s a l terms are n o t h i n g but the " c r e a t u r e s of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " , employed to f a c i l i t a t e the p r o g r e s s o f knowledge. An a n a l y s i s of language enables him to d i s p o s e of the problem the o f A e x i s t e n c e o f the u n i v e r s a l i n s h o r t o r d e r : " A l l the g r e a t b u s i n e s s of g e n e r a and s p e c i e s , end t h e i r essences., amounts to no more but t h i s — t h a t men making a b s t r a c t i d e a s , and s e t t l i n g them i n t h e i r minds, w i t h names annexed to them, do t h e r e b y enable themselves t o c o n s i d e r t h i n g s , a.nd d i s c o u r s e o f them, as i t were, i n b u n d l e s , f o r the e a s i e r fend r e a d i e r improvement and communicat i o n of t h e i r knowledge; w h i c h would advance but s l o w l y , were t h e i r words and 2 thou g h t s c o n f i n e d o n l y to. p a r t i c u l a r s . " I n a nother p l a c e he s a y s : " I s h a l l imagine I have done some s e r v i c e to t r u t h , peace and l e a r n i n g , i f , by any enlargement on t h i s s u b j e c t , I can make men r e f l e c t on t h e i r own use o f language.« • 3 B e r k e l e y ' s s p e c t a c u l a r a n n i h i l a t i o n of m a t t e r tends to obscure the f a c t t h a t i t was r e a l l y Locke who made h i s a t t a c k p o s s i b l e . Locke showed t h a t a l l our knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d was c o n f i n e d to our i d e a s , y e t among th e s e i d e a s t h e r e was none which i n f o r m e d us of m a t t e r . He c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e u n c o m f o r t a b l e n e s s of l e a v i n g m a t t e r d e f i n e d i n t h i s vague way a.s a "something" which s u p p o r t e d ' q u a l i t i e s . B e r k e l e y , Y7ho c e r t a i n l y has the m e r i t 1. "Essay", Bk. I I , Ch. X X X I I I , Sect 19. 2. • LbWoy--', Bk. I l l , Ch. I l l , Sect. 20. 3. Ibid., Bk. I l l , Ch. V, Sect. 16.. -214-o f b e i n g r i g o r o u s , f o u n d no e v i d e n c e f o r the e x i s t e n c e of a n y t h i n g beyond our mental s t a t e s . The e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i n B e r k e l e y ' s argument i s the "mental" n a t u r e of e v e r y t h i n g we know, end o f our consequent i n a b i l i t y to prove the e x i s t e n c e o f a n y t h i n g non-mental. T h i s argument has had a. g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on l a t e r e m p i r i c a l thought, a p p e a r i n g under v a r i o u s forms such as "phenomenalism", " p h i l o s o p h y of immanence", or " p o s i t i v i s m " . The concern of Mach and o t h e r s c i e n t i s t s who took up B e r k e l e y ' s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g has been to e x t r u d e from s c i e n c e , whi ch u l t i m a t e l y depends on sense o b s e r v a t i o n , the a p p a r e n t l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e assumption of a m a t t e r w h i c h i s never g i v e n i n sense, v/hile t h i s b o l d attempt to f r e e s c i e n c e of the assumption of the e x i s t e n c e of something beyond p e r c e p t s r e s u l t s f r o m a commendable d e s i r e f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l c l e a n l i n e s s , and w h i l e i t has g r e a t l y c l a r i f i e d the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of s c i e n c e , i t seems the t some assumption i s n e c e s s a r y to t a k e the p l a c e o f t h e o l d t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f of p h i l o s o p h y or the m a t t e r o f s c i e n c e , at any r a t e i f we a r e to s e c u r e a s i m p l e statement of s c i e n t i f i c l a w s . R u s s e l l m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h the t h e o r y of t h e . t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f as o r d i n a r i l y h e l d cannot be s u p p o r t e d , we must f i n d a t r u e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the ba.sic assumption u n d e r l y i n g i t , s i n c e i t i s i n o u t l i n e the t h e o r y upon which p h y s i c s and p h y s i o l o g y are b u i l t . He admits t h a t by r e s o r t i n g to " i d e a l " c o n s t r u c t i o n s the p h e n o m e n a l i s t can p r e s e r v e t h e whole of p h y s i c s , at l e a s t -215-f o r m a l l y , But " i t i s hard to see how a n y t h i n g m e r e l y i m a g i n a r y can he e s s e n t i a l to the sta.tement of a. c a u s a l 1 law", and t h i s i s what the phenomenal i s t r e a l l y ha.s t o a s s e r t . R u s s e l l c o n s i d e r s t h a t phenomenalism i s thus i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p h y s i c a l d e t e r m i n i s m , i n f a c t though not i n form. S c h l i c k ' s . r e f u t a t i o n o f p o s i t i i v i s m comes back e s s e n t i a l l y to the same p o i n t . P o s i t i v i s m i r r e c o n c i l a b l y c o n t r a d i c t s c a u s a l i t y , f o r the c a u s a l p r i n c i p l e demands a. continuum of the r e a l . I f we c o n f i n e o u r s e l v e s o n l y to g i v e n e x i s t e n t s we cannot e s t a b l i s h r u l e s of c a u s a l s u c c e s s i o n . i<ow the e x i s t e n t s w h i c h we p o s t u l a t e i n o r d e r to f i l l i n our c a u s a l s e r i e s must be c o n s i d e r e d as r e a l , f o r the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n o n l y e x i s t s between r e a l i t i e s . But w i t h t h i s as sumption of a t r a n s c e n d e n t r e a l i t y the p o s i t i v i s t i c p o s i t i o n i s o v e r t h r o w n . S c h l i c k shows f u r t h e r t h a t s t r i c t p o s i t i v i s m l e a d s to s o l i p s i s m . Knowledge comes f r o m our sense e x p e r i e n c e , but we cannot f o r m u l a t e laws d e s c r i b i n g even the o r d e r l y change of p e r c e p t i o n s w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g c o n c e p t s w h i c h must be taken not as mere " H i I f s b e g r i f f e " but as s i g n s f o r r e a l i t i e s w h i c h are not d i r e c t l y g i v e n . R e i c h e n b a c h approaches t h e q u e s t i o n from the p o i n t of view o f a l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . The p o s i t i v i s t a s s e r t s t h a t an i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n such as "The t a b l e e x i s t s " i s e q u i v a l e n t to a s e t o f d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s about sense i m p r e s s i o n s . L o g i c a l 1. R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s of M a t t e r " , P.214. -216-a n a l y s i s shows, however, tha.t between an i n d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n and the s e t o f d i r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o in • wh i ch i t i s i n f e r r e d t h e r e i s o n l y a. mutual p r o b a b i l i t y c o n n e c t i o n . I f we were to remain s t r i c t l y w i t h i n the narrow t r u t h t h e o r y of meaning, however, the p o s i t i v i s t c o u l d not be proved wrong. There i s o n l y a h i g h p r o b a b i l i t y , no t a c e r t a i n t y , f o r the a s s e r t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s e x i s t a p a r t from p e r c e p t i o n . Thus i f we remained w i t h i n such a narrow framework as the t r u t h t h e ory of meaning e n t a i l s , we c o u l d a s s e r t t h a i B e r k e l e y had not been r e f u t e d . But on the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y o f meaning h i s argument does not h o l d . Our statements about the e x t e r n a l w o r l d cannot be c o m p l e t e l y reduced to statements about - i m p r e s s i o n s , and t h e r e i s c o n s e q u e n t l y a s u r p l u s meaning i n them. At the same tim e , I t h i n k we must g i v e Berkeley-g r e a t c r e d i t f o r making the a t t a c k on m a t t e r w i t h such c l a r i t y and r i g o u r . To q u e s t i o n the obvious as B e r k e l e y d i d i s a mark of g e n i u s i n p h i l o s o p h y . Hume's c o n t r i b u t i o n , of c o u r s e , l a y i n f e r r e t i n g out the e s s e n t i a l p r i n c i p l e on w h i c h a l l e m p i r i c a l c o n c l u s i o n s are based, namely, the p r i n c i p l e of c a u s a l i t y . H i s l e n g t h y t r a i n o f argument, i n whi c h h i s method of a t t a c k i s developed l a r g e l y along the l i n e s a l r e a d y p i o n e e r e d by B e r k e l e y , has been o u t l i n e d above and need-.not be r e p e a t e d h e r e . As Re i c h e n b a c h sums up h i s t h e o r y , Hume's main t e n e t s are (1) t h a t t h e r e i s no l o g i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n f o r the v a l i d i t y -217-of i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e , and t h a t (2) t h e r e i s no d e m o n s t r a t i o n 51 a, p o s t e r i o r i " f o r such i n f e r e n c e . Any such argument must i n e v i t a b l y presuppose the ve r y p r i n c i p l e i t i s r e q u i r e d to p r o v e , so t h a t o u r argument i s c i r c u l a r , ho one of course ever t a k e s t h i s s c e p t i c i s m i n t o p r a c t i c a l l i f e , b u t a p r a g m a t i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e of i n d u c t i c n i i s not a. l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The i n c r e a s i n g demands f o r r i g o u r i n l o g i c a l p r o c e d u r e have made i m p e r a t i v e such a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i n d u c t i o n as we f i n d i n Reichenbach's work. The r e s u l t s of Hume's a n a l y s i s have l e d e m p i r i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s ever s i n c e to put knowledge on a p r o b a b i l i s t i c b a s i s . What Hume does, i n e f f e c t , i s to put an end. t o the c o n c e p t i o n of t h e s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " , and w i t h t h i s the hope o f a p o d i c t i c knowledge v a n i s h e s . But p o s s i b l y h i s c r i t i c i s m has not shaken s c i e n c e as much as he ex p e c t e d . S c i e n c e c o n t e n t s i t s e l f w i t h a h i g h degree o f p r o b a b i l i t y and r e l i n q u i s h e s the quest f o r c e r t a i n t y . By such a r e n u n c i a t i o n i t a t once r e c o g n i z e s and escapes Hume's c r i t i c i s m . I f j as R e i c h e n b a c h a.sserts, the r e d u c t i o n o f m a t t e r to mere mental s t a t e s , as c a r r i e d o u t by B e r k e l e y and Hume, r e p r e s e n t s an i n a d m i s s i b l e p r o c e d u r e , how f a r i s Hume's a n a l y s i s of t h e ego s i m i l a r l y i n a d m i s s i b l e ? I have a l r e a d y dra.wn a t t e n t i o n to the f a c t t h a t Hume h i m s e l f was d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s t r e atment o f p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y . I t i s not i n c l u d e d -218-i n h i s l a t e r work, the " E n q u i r y " . M i l l agreed, w i t h Hume's tr e a t m e n t of m a t t e r hut h e l d t h a t t h e same a n a l y s i s was o n l y p a r t i a l l y a p p l i c a b l e to mind. The f a c t s o f memory and of e x p e c t a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d f o r M i l l the d i f f i c u l t y i n Hume's account of mind, "A remembrance of s e n s a t i o n " , he s a i d , " i n v o l v e s the- s u g g e s t i o n and b e l i e f t h a t a s e n s a t i o n , of w h i c h i t i s a copy or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d i n the p a s t ; and an e x p e c t a t i o n i n v o l v e s the b e l i e f , more or l e s s p o s i t i v e , that a s e n s a t i o n or o t h e r f e e l i n g : t o w h i c h 1 i t d i r e c t l y r e f e r s , w i l l e x i s t i n the f u t u r e . " These phenomena, i n h i s o p i n i o n , can be a d e q u a t e l y expressed o n l y When they a r e r e f e r r e d t o a u n i f i e d s e l f . We must e i t h e r b e l e i v e t h a t i f the mind i s a s e r i e s of f e e l i n g s , i t i s a s e r i e s w h i c h i s aware of i t s e l f as, p a s t and p r e s e n t ; or we must h o l d t h a t the mind i s something d i f f e r e n t f r o m any such s e r i e s or p o s s i b i l i t y of them. When we come to S c h l i c k , we f i n d t h a t , a l t h o u g h he w r i t e s i n the t r a d i t i o n o f Hume and e x p l i c i t l y acknowledges h i s g e n i u s , he n e v e r t h e l e s s a l s o h o l d s t h a t Hume's a n a l y s i s of the mind i s o n l y p a r t i a l l y t r u e . S c h l i c k i s a n t i - K a n t i a n i n most r e s p e c t s , but he c o n s i d e r s t h a i Kant was r i g h t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the u n i t y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as the fundamental p r i n c i p l e of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Without such u n i t y , e v e r y moment of e x p e r i e n c e would belon g to a s e p a r a t e c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e r e c o u l d be no bond between any two such moments. 1. M i l l , "An E x a m i n a t i o n o f S i r Wm. H a m i l t o n ' s P h i l o s o p h y " , P. -219-Even the b r i e f e s t mathema.tica.l o p e r a t i o n would be i n s e c u r e , to say n o t h i n g of more c o m p l i c a t e d mental phenomena. Only by b e l o n g i n g to one c o n s c i o u s n e s s can s e p a r a t e s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s be d i s t i n g u i s h e d , f o r the act of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t a k e s p l a c e by the r e l a t i n g o f s e p a r a t e d elements to one another. Wherever t h e r e i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h e r e i s a l s o u n i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . S c h l i c k , o f c o u r s e , i s not l e d to any m e t a p h y s i c a l assumptions about the ego by such f a c t s . He e x p r e s s l y p o i n t s out the e r r o r o f D e s c a r t e s i n t h i s r e s p e c t , whose famous " c o g i t o , ergo sum" he c o n s i d e r s to be r e a l l y a c o n c e a l e d d e f i n i t i o n of e x i s t e n c e . The c o n s c i o u s n e s s of s e l f i s not a f a c t o r w h i c h always accompanies the cou r s e of the c o n s c i o u s p r o c e s s e s b u t i s o n l y one content among 1 o t h e r s , w h i c h at times appears under s p e c i a l c i r c u m s t a.hc e s. The stream of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a p r o c e s s w h i c h s i m p l y e x i s t s ; the " I " i s i t s u n i t a r y "Zusammenhang," not a p e r s o n w h i c h observes and d i r e c t s t h i s "Zusammenhang." The u n i t y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a b a s i c f a c t . I t cannot be used as a, s p r i n g b o a r d f o r t h e o r i e s o f a s o u l - s u b s t a n c e , b u t n e i t h e r can i t be d e n i e d w i t h o u t i n v o l v i n g the s u i c i d e of the i n t e l l s c t . J u s t as the r e d u c t i o n o f m a t t e r to mental events i s a t t r a c t i v e and p l a u s i b l e on f i r s t s i g h t , but t u r n s out on e x a m i n a t i o n to have c e r t a i n d e f e c t s , so the r e d u c t i o n o f mind to a. mere s e r i e s of f e e l i n g s i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . Ho LCf. S c h l i c k , " A l l g e m e i n e E r k e n n t n i s l e h r e " , P.148. -220-e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s u c h as the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n suggested hy Hume i s adequate to account f o r the f a c t of u n i t y , S c h l i c k c r i t i c i z e s M i l l i n t u r n f o r h i s theory of m a t t e r as' a permanent p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e n s a t i o n . M i l l ' s account i s p e r f e c t l y l u c i d and r e p r e s e n t s an advance on B e r k e l e y ' s statement o f the i d e a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n , hut i n r e f e r r i n g the r e a l t o the p o s s i b l e he i s g u i l t y of a " p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i " , f o r he does not g i v e the r e q u i s i t e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the concept o f p o s s i b i l i t y . An i m p o r t a n t p o i n t i n M i l l ' s t h e o r y of m a t t e r , however, i s h i s s t r e s s on the r o l e p l a y e d hy o t h e r human b e i n g s i n h e l p i n g us to a r r i v e at the v e r y c o n c e p t i o n of an e x t e r n a l w o r l d : "The w o r l d o f P o s s i b l e ' S e n s a t i o n s s u c c e e d i n g one ano t h e r a c c o r d i n g to la w s , i s as much i n o t h e r b e i n g s as i t i s i n me; i t has t h e r e f o r e an e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e me; 1 i t i s an E x t e r n a l World." How Reichenbach's r e f u t a t i o n of the p o s i t i v i s t i c view of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d was b a s e d on t h e f a c t t h a t e x p e r i e n c e , by i n f o r m i n g us o f the apparent independence of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d o f the p e r c e p t i o n s o f o t h e r s , t h e r e b y makes i t p r o b a b l e t h a t the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s independent of a l l p e r c e p t i o n f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e . Without the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r s we would p r o b f b L l y not a t t a i n to the c o n c e p t i o n of an e x t e r n a l w o r l d independent o f our p e r c e p t i o n , o f i t . R u s s e l l shows c l e a r l y i n h i s c h a p t e r "On Our Knowledge o f t h e E x t e r n a l W o rld" t h a t the q u e s t i o n o f the r e a l i t y o f such a w o r l d does b r i n g us ba.ck to the q u e s t i o n o f 1. M i l , o p . c i t . , P. 232. -221-t e s t i m o n y and the e v i d e n c e f o r the e x i s t e n c e of o t h e r minds. H i s f i r s t assumption i n the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the w o r l d f rom our "hard" data, was s i m i l a r to t h a t o f L e i b n i z i n h i s "Monadology". E v e r y mind l o o k s out on the u n i v e r s e f r om a p o i n t o f view p e c u l i a r to i t s e l f . Assuming f o r the time b e i n g the v a l i d i t y of t e s t i m o n y , R u s s e l l then proceeds to the t a s k o f c o r r e l a t i n g the v a r i o u s p e r s p e c t i v e s i n t o a u n i f i e d system. As f a r as t e s t i m o n y i s concerned, R u s s e l l h o l d s t h a t t h e r e i s no l o g i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n to show t h a t o t h e r minds e x i s t . A n a l o g i c a l arguments are i n c o n c l u s i v e . The h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t h e r e are minds a s s o c i a t e d w i t h o t h e r b o d i l y organisms, however, does not c o n t r a d i c t e x p e r i e n c e at any p o i n t , and enables us to e x t e n d out knowledge p a s t the sphere of our own p r i v a t e w o r l d . How when we come to R e i c h e n b a c h , we do not f i n d him concerned w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f t e s t i m o n y , but we do f i n d him a t t a c k i n g the v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f " p r i v a t e w o r l d s " which are i n a c c e s s i b l e t o o t h e r minds: "There i s something i n our e x p e r i e n c e , so i t i s s a i d , w h i c h i s a c c e s s i b l e o n l y t o o u r s e l v e s , and. w h i c h cannot be communicated to o t h e r p e r s o n s . lie see the c o l o r r e d , we f e e l the'heat-, we t a s t e the sweet; bu t we cannot t e l l how we see o r f e e l or t a s t e i t . Other p e o p l e t e l l us tha.t they a l s o see the r e d and f e e l the heat and t a s t e the sweet; but we never can compare t h e s e s e n s a t i o n s w i t h o u r s , and so we do not know whether they are the same. There i s , t h e r e f o r e , an u n u t t e r a b l e r e s i d u e i n our e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s i s one o f the most f r e q u e n t l y used arguments i n f a v o r , of the e x i s t e n c e of a. p a r t i c u l a r p s y c h i c a l w o r l d w i t h i n e v e r y p e r s o n ; t h i s w o r l d i s supposed to be known o n l y to each p e r s o n and not a c c e s s i b l e l to o t h e r s . " 1. R e i c h e n b a c h , " E x p e r i e n c e and P r e d i c t i o n " , P.248. -222-The comparison of t h e i m p r e s s i o n s of two p e r s o n s cannot even he a c c e p t e d as a m e a n i n g f u l problem u n l e s s we have f i r s t some " d e f i n i t i o n o f c o - o r d i n a t i o n . " I f a l l the r e a c t i o n s of the two p e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g r e p o r t s of s e l f -o b s e r v a t i o n i n s t i m u l u s language, are the same, we may 1 d e f i n e t h e i r i m p r e s s i o n s as b e i n g the same." Such sameness, however, as R e i c henbach a d m i t s , i s not an a b s o l u t e sameness but o n l y ' the sameness e s t a b l i s h e d by the d e f i n i t i o n . The n o t i o n of "common c o n t e n t " , to use another p h r a s e , i s m e a n i n g l e s s because u n v e r i f i a b l e - - b u t does t h i s p r o v e t h a t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e which i s incommunicable? R e i c h e n b a c h a p p a r e n t l y ho 1 ds t h a t i t does : "There i s an outcome of the u s u a l erroneous c o n c e p t i o n of the p r o b l e m of i n c o m p a r a b i l i t y w h i c h we must now d i s c u s s : i t i s the i d e a t h a t t h e r e i s something i n e x p r e s s i b l e i n our e x p e r i e n c e , Known to us alone b u t not communicable to o t h e r p e r s o n s . The s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s between i m p r e s s i o n s have been, d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the" s p e c i f i c q u a l e o f each o f them; o n l y the s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , i t i s s a i d , are communicable; th e q u a l e i s known o n l y to o u r s e l v e s . The f a u l t o f t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , i t seems to me, l i e s i n the i d e a t h a t we o u r s e l v e s know more than s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . We see d i f f e r e n c e s between r e d and g r e e n ; but to say t h a t we see, i n a d d i t i o n , a. s p e c i f i c q u a l e of the r e d means n o t h i n g . . . I f we ha.d no p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b s e r v i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s , i . e . , i f t h e r e were no two s i m i l a r i m p r e s s i o n s i n the whole stream o f e x p e r i e n c e , 2 t h e i d e a of a. s p e c i f i c q u a l e would not have a r i s e n . " I n R e i c h enbach's o p i n i o n , i t i s o n l y a c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n of the power of i m a g i n a t i o n which l e a d s to the i d e a t h a t t h e r e i s s o m e t h i n g i n e x p r e s s i b l e i n our e x p e r i e n c e : 1. R e i c h e n b a c h , o p . c i t . , P.249. 2. I b i d . , PP. 253-4. -223-"We ss.y, Whoever wants to know what i s r e d must l o o k at a r e d t h i n g . But we do not say: Whoever wants to know what i s an e l e p h a n t w i t h s i x l e g s must l o o k at such a t h i n g . The r e d , t h e r e f o r e , i s c a l l e d an i n e x p r e s s i b l e q u a l e ; the s i x - l e g g e d n e s s i s n o t . T h i s i s a r a t h e r i n c o r r e c t mode of speech. We ought t o say: There a r e - c e r t a i n d i f f e r e n c e s w h i c h we cannot imagine w i t h o u t h a v i n g seen them b e f o r e . I t i s a c e r t a i n i n d i g e n c e of 1 f a n c y w h i c h we have to s t a t e here--no more." T h i s i s c e r t a i n l y a sweeping condemnation of R u s s e l l ' s monadologic a l t h e o r y and o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a s s e r t i o n of an " u n u t t e r a b l e " element i n e x p e r i e n c e . Reichenbach's a t t a c k on such views stems d i r e c t l y from h i s r e j e c t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l " p s y c h i c a l phenomena" of o l d e r p h i l o s o p h e r s . For him, p s y c h i c a l phenomena are not observed but a r e I n f e r r e d . We s<e;et'things and i n f e r i m p r e s s i o n s . T h i s b r i n g s u s back to the c o n t r o v e r s y o f the l a s t c h a p t e r . My p o s i t i o n i s t h a t we p r o b a b l y s h o u l d not r e t a i n the o l d e r mode o f e x p r e s s i o n as r e g a r d s the o b s e r v a t i o n o f i m p r e s s i o n s , s i n c e we are then l e d i n t o some " i n n e r sense" t h e o r y . But i f we are to say t h a t "We see t h i n g s " i t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t the " t h i n g s " we see are such e x i s t e n t s as R u s s e l l ' s " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s " — i . e . , p a t c h e s o f c o l o u r , sounds, h a r d n e s s e s , e t c . R u s s e l l ' s view i s t h a t these are the u l t i m a t e "hard" d a t a , t h o s e w h i c h r e s i s t f u r t h e r a n a l y s i s ; whereas the " t h i n g s " o f o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e a re " s o f t " d a t a , and can be b r o k e n up by a n a l y s i s i n t o more p r i m i t i v e elements. I h o l d f u r t h e r t h a t i f we adopt S c h l i c k ' s views w i t h r e s p e c t to the meaning o f " p h y s i c a l " as d e n o t i n g not a p a r t i c u l a r Reichenbach^. o p . c i t . , P.256. -224-k i n d o f r e a l i t y , but a p a r t i c u l a r mode o f d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y ; and i f we r e t a i n h i s c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n s between the s u b j e c t i v e space of the p s y c h o l o g i s t and the o b j e c t i v e , a b s t r a c t space o f the p h y s i c i s t , we can c a r r y t h r o u g h R u s s e l l ' s views w i t h o u t r u n n i n g i n t o i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s on the mind-body problem. R e i c h e n b a c h 1 s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a r t s out from the w o r l d as i t appears t o an o r d i n a r y i n d i v i d u a l u n t r a i n e d i n p h i l o s o p h y . Such a pers o n i s always a n a i v e r e a l i s t , and i s q u i t e sure t h a t he "sees t h i n g s . " R u s s e l l p r e f e r s t o s t a r t f r om that w h i c h comes e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y f i r s t i n h i s e x p e r i e n c e now--i.e., a f t e r c r i t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n on t h e s i t u a t i o n has l e d him t o r e j e c t the n a i v e views of common sense. H i s p r o c e d u r e of q u e s t i o n i n g t h e obvious and g e t t i n g down to "hard" data, b e f o r e he s t a r t s to r e b u i l d i s t h e one w h i c h I p r e f e r to f o l l o w i n t h i s m a t t e r . P o s s i b l y much o f Reichonba.ch's c r i t i c i s m of the t h e o r y o f the u n u t t e r a b l e element i n our e x p e r i e n c e i s t o be a c c e p t e d , but I do not t h i n k i t can be m a i n t a i n e d that t h e r e i s n o t h i n g incommunicable i n our e x p e r i e n c e . The s e p a r a t i o n between f o r m and content cannot be c a r r i e d out too r i g i d l y , b u t I c o n s i d e r t h a i we can d i s t i n g u i s h i n e x p e r i e n c e between t h e g i v e n — t h e " t h i s . " - - a n d t h a t as w h i c h i t i s g i v e n . I t i s a d m i t t e d l y somewhat l o o s e t o speak of s p e c i f i c o u a l i a . To say t h a t we see a s p e c i f i c r e d n e s s of r e d i s to r u n the r i s k o f g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n t h e meaningless, d i s c u s s i o n of "common c o n t e n t . " A l l t h a t we can communicate about the d i f f e r e n c e -225-between-red and g r e e n , f o r example, must be e x p r e s s e d i n terms of . r e l a t i o n s of s i m i l a r i t y and d i f f e r e n c e , but the f a c t t h a t t h e r e i s i n o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e a b a s i s f o r d i s t i n c t i o n i n d i c a t e s some element of g i v e n n e s s i n e x p e r i e n c e w h i c h has t o do w i t h content and not mere s t r u c t u r e . I would agree t h a t we "know" no more t h a n s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s , b u t o n l y because by "knowledge" I understand '"communicable knowledge." But i f we f o l l o w R u s s e l l ' s t h e o r y o f " s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s " i n s t e a d of a d m i t t i n g w i t h Reichenbach t h a t we see t h i n g s , i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e to be d i r e c t l y " a c q u a i n t e d " w i t h a g i v e n element i n e x p e r i e n c e . As •Reichenbach says i n the above passage, i t i s p e r f e c t l y t r u e t h a t i f we had no p o s s i b i l i t y of o b s e r v i n g s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the whole stream of e x p e r i e n c e , the n o t i o n of a s p e c i f i c q u a l e would not have a r i s e n ; but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see j u s t what e l s e c o u l d p o s s i b l y have a r i s e n e i t h e r . C e r t a i n l y " e x p e r i e n c e " i t s e l f would be a, m e a n i n g l e s s concept. F u r t h e r , the advocates o f the view t h a t t h e r e i s an incommunicable r e s i d u e l e f t i n e x p e r i e n c e a f t e r the s t r u c t u r a l p s r t i s communicated, c o u l d use t h e i r d o c t r i n e to e x p l a i n Reichenbach's example of the e l e p h a n t . For them, because the r e d i s a. g i v e n element, i t can be known o n l y i n d i r e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e , whereas, the s i x - l e g g e d n e s s , because i t has to do w i t h such t h i n g s as p a r t i c u l a r shapes and r e l a t i o n s i s of a. f o r m a l n a t u r e . -226-There are l i m i t s to i m a g i n i n g even s i x - 1 eggedriess . A b l i n d man c o u l d not r e a l i z e i n v i s u a l i m a g i n a t i o n a s i x - l e g g e d e l e p h a n t , because v i s u a l space i t s e l f must be g i v e n i n e x p e r i e n c e . I f a l l we have i n p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e i s p u r e s t r u c t u r e , why can we not imagine an elephant w h i c h would have no c o l o u r a t a l l ? I s i t not because the form i n p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e must have some co n t e n t to f i l l i t i n ? I n a l l non-mathematical t h i n k i n g , as S c h l i c k p o i n t s o u t , a b s t r a c t i o n s must be r e p r e s e n t e d i n c o n c r e t e p e r c e p t i o n s . But i n p e r c e p t i o n we never f i n d f o rm a p a r t from c o n t e n t — e . g we n e v e r f i n d a b s t r a c t v i s u a l e x t e n s i o n apart from some c o l o u r . I n one sense t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y i s u n i m p o r t a n t , because i n s o f a r as e m p i r i c i s m i s concerned, t h i s incommunicable r e s i d u e , even i f i t does e x i s t , i s l e f t out of account. R u s s e l l p o i n t s out t h a t we do not know the thotights of Bach and Shakespeare. But t h e i r t h oughts are unimportant to us. T h e i r whole s o c i a l e f f i c a c y depends on c e r t a i n b l a c k marks w h i c h they made on paper. Whatever happens i n communication i t i s c l e a r t h a t s t r u c t u r e o n l y i s communicated, and i t i s e f f e c t e d by e x t e r n a l means. Content i s i n any'case l e f t out o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . W i t t g e n s t e i n , who c e r t a i n l y c o u l d not be accused o f b e i n g tender-minded, h o l d s the view t h a t t h e r e i s an u n u t t e r a b l e element i n e x p e r i e n c e , and he c o n s i d e r s t h a t i t i s t h i s element w h i c h the m y s t i c i s endeavouring to e x p r e s s . S c h l i c k m a i n t a i n s t h a t r e a l knowledge i s concerned w i t h the s t r u c t u r e o f the symbols w h i c h we order' to r e a l i t y , but he a l s o does not deny t h a t t h e r e i s such an element i n e x p e r i e n c e •as- d i r e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e - - " b l o s s e s JSrleben."' I f Reichenbach i s c o r r e c t i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t there i s n o t h i n g i n e x p r e s s i b l e i n e x p e r i e n c e , one wonders j u s t what p l a c e t h e r e i s f o r the p o e t s . Gould Wordsworth, f o r i n s t a n c e , express h i m s e l f i n d r y - a s - d u s t l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s ? The most p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t by e v o k i n g our i m a g i n a t i v e assent he i s e n d e avouring to produce i n us the immediate, warm f e e l i n g w h i c h he has i n the presence of N a t u r e . The view t h a t Wordsworth had no immediate w o r l d 'of p r i v a t e e x p e r i e n c e would seem to r e n d e r h i s work of e q u a l v a l u e w i t h such f a s c i n a t i n g l i n e s as " A l l mimsy were the b o r o g r o v e s . " R e t u r n i n g to R u s s e l l , we must note t h a t h i s work has been s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by the n e c e s s i t y he f e e l s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h B e r k e l e y ' s a t t a c k on the e x t e r n a l w o r l d . The e m p i r i c a l s u c c e s s e s o f the n o t i o n of m a t t e r i n d i c a t e t h a t t h a t c o n c e p t i o n has some l e g i t i m a t e f u n c t i o n to p e r f o r m , y e t B e r k e l e y shows t h a t o n l y mental s t a t e s are g i v e n to us. O n l y they are "hard" data,. The problem of the knowledge of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , as R u s s e l l p u t s i t , i s to get by means of l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s from th e s e h a r d d a t a Over to e n t i t i e s w h i c h w i l l be adequate f o r s c i e n c e . While admit-t i n g that, B e r k e l e y ' s a t t a c k i s v e r y p o w e r f u l , R u s s e l l h o l d s w i t h S c h l i c k and R e i c h e n b a c h t h a t i t i s h i g h l y p r o b a b l e t h a t -228-our p e r c e p t i o n s have e x t e r n a l causes, and t h a t t h e r e i s an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d e x i s t i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y of them. The p h y s i c a l o b j e c t to be i n f e r r e d from p e r c e p t i o n , however, i s not a s i m p l e " t h i n g " b u t a group of e v e n t s . P h y s i c s can d i s p e n s e w i t h the o l d n o t i o n of permanent t h i n g s undergoing changing s t a t e s , and can r e g a r d a p i e c e of m a t t e r as a connected s t r i n g of e v e n t s . B e r k e l e y , of c o u r s e , d i d not c l a i m to be a s o l i p s i s t by m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t our p e r c e p t i o n s d i d not have e x t e r n a l causes. I f a l i v e today, he .would p r o b a b l y take out a. l i f e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . H i s argument was t h a t , s i n c e a l l . e x p e r i e n c e came to us through mental s t a t e s , the cause of t h o s e s t a t e s must be some Mind. R u s s e l l admits t h a t our h a r d data, are l i m i t e d to mental e v e n t s , but he c o n s i d e r s t h a t "the o n l y l e g i t i m a t e a t t i t u d e about the p h y s i c a l w o r l d seems to be one of complete a g n o s t i c i s m 1 as r e g a r d s a l l b u t i t s m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s . " P h y s i c a l knowledge i s • m a t h e m a t i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l , and so very a b s t r a c t t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s which i t demonstrates of phenomena might b e l o n g to groups composed of any k i n d of m a t e r i a l . Our s u b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n p r e v e n t s us from knowing what, the i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e o f the m a t e r i a l i s , but to a s s e r t , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t "must be v e r y d i f f e r e n t from p e r c e p t s i s to assume t h a t we know a. g r e a t d e a l more than we dd i n 2 f a c t know of the i n t r i n s i c c h a r a c t e r o f p h y s i c a l e v e n t s . " 1. R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s o f M a t t e r " , P.271 2. I b i d . , P.263. 229-P h y s i c s l e a v e s open a l l k i n d s of p o s i b i l i t i e s as to the i n t r i n s i c n a t u r e o f the phenomena to w h i c h i t s e q u a t i o n s a p p l y . R u s s e l l h i m s e l f f a v o r s the p o s i t i o n of n e u t r a l monism. S c h l i c k 1 s emphasis on knowledge as a, r e c o g n i t i o n i n a new s i t u a t i o n of something a l r e a d y known develops from h i s view t h a t knowledge i s not found i n t h e d i r e c t i n t u i t i o n of the m y s t i c or the d i r e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e of o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t i o n hut ths.t i t i s concerned w i t h the r e l a t i o n s o b t a i n i n g between the symbols w h i c h we c o - o r d i n a t e to f e a t u r e s i n r e a l i t y . Concepts and judgments a r e merely s i g n s made to c o r r e s p o n d to o b j e c t s and s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . T r u t h l i e s i n the o.dequate and u n e q u i v o c a l d e s i g n a t i o n by a judgment o f a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . T r u t h i s not an immanent p r o p e r t y of a judgment. A judgment i s t r u e or f a l s e o n l y by v i r t u e of i t s p l a c e i n a, system of knowledge. S c h l i c k r e j e c t s the p o s i t i v i s t i c r e d u c t i o n of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d to "element-complexes 1 1, and p o s t u l a t e s a t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f w h i c h i s a. complex o f o b j e c t i v e p r o c e s s e s . B u t we have seen t h a t t h i s t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , because knowledg d e a l s o n l y w i t h s t r u c t u r e , i s not unknowable; The t h i n g - i n -j j s e l f i s g i v e n to us i n p e r c e p t u a l space and t i m e , so t h a t we cannot "know" i t a f t e r the manner of d i r e c t a c q u a i n t a n c e , b u t the s t r u c t u r e o f the 1 appearance' we d e a l w i t h must c o r r e s p o n d i n a f o r m a l way to the s t r u c t u r e of t h e t h i n g - i n -i t s e l f , w h i c h i s t h e r e f o r e c o m p l e t e l y k-nowable. -230 The c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n which S c h l i c k makes between the space and time o f p e r c e p t i o n and the a b s t r a c t c o n c e p t u a l space-time of the s c i e n c e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h h i s view t h a t " p h y s i c a l " denotes not a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f r e a l i t y , but a p a r t i c u l a r way of d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y , enables him, as a l r e a d y shown, to suggest a p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n o f the mind-body problem. H i s assumptioni.is' t h a t p h y s i o l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l concepts are m e r e l y two ways of d e s c r i b i n g t h e one immediate r e a l i t y of awareness. A prop e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the a b s t r a c t n a t u r e of p h y s i c a l knowledge p e r m i t s us to apply the p h y s i c a l mode of d e s c r i p t i o n t o a l I p a r t s of r e a l i t y . Ho e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n betv/een the q u s . l i t i e s of the w o r l d need be assumed. F o l l o w i n g Hume i n the d e n i a l of the s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " , S c h l i c k a s s e r t s t h a t we are not i n p o s s e s i o n of a p o d i c t i c knowledge about r e a l i t y . The causa,! r e l a t i o n i s not an ^a. p r i o r i " p r i n c i p l e but i s a p o s t u l a t e t o w h i c h we must s u b s c r i b e i f knowledge i s to be p o s s i b l e a.t a l l . R e ichenbach's work i s an attempt to take i n t o account the p r o b a b i l i t y element i n our knowledge. N e a r l y a l l e m p i r i c i s t s have a d m i t t e d t h a t knowledge i s an a p p r o x i m a t i v e system w h i c h w i l l never become t r u e , but t h i s a p p r o x i m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r has not been counted among t h e essentia . 1 f e a t u r e s of knowledge. B u t the c o n c e p t i o n of knowledge as a, d e f i n i t i v e s y s t e m ' i s a. f i c t i o n , and the tr e a t m e n t of such a, sch.em.atiza.tion as r e p r e s e n t i n g the a c t u a l s t a t e of our knowledge l e a d s to s e r i o u s e r r o r s . R e i c h enbach h o l d s t h a t the key to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of s c i e n c e i s c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the problem of p r o b a b i l i t y , we have seen how he a p p l i e s the c o n c e p t i o n o f p r o b a b i l i t y i n the domain of the v e r i f l a b i l i t y t h e o r y o f meaning, where he shows the d e f i n i t e f a i l u r e of the narrow t r u t h t h e o r y of meaning and the n e c e s s i t y f o r the a d o p t i o n of a p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y of meaning. S c i e n c e cannot do w i t h o u t " i n d i r e c t 1 1 p r o p o s i t i o n s , but s i n c e these are n e i t h e r s t r i c t l y v e r i f i a b l e nor s t r i c t l y e q u i v a l e n t t o the " d i r e c t " p r o p o s i t i o n s f r om w h i c h they a r e i n f e r r e d , they can f i n d no p l a c e w i t h i n the narrow t r u t h t h e o r y of meaning, which we t h e r e f o r e r e j e c t i n f a v o u r of the p r o b a b i l i t y t h e o r y . To b r i d g e the gap between e x p e r i e n c e and p r e d i c t i o n we must g i v e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n d u c t i o n . T h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n must amount t o a: d e m o n s t r a t i o n . We cannot l e a v e the m a t t e r as Hume d i d by merely showing t h a t i n d u c t i o n i s a h a b i t * U n l e s s i t i s p o s s i b l e to show t h a t i t i s a. "good" h a b i t , our p h i l o s o p h y i s a f a i l u r e . Reichenba.ch shows t h a t s u c h a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f the i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e need not i m p l y a. pro of of t h e t r u t h of the c o n c l u s i o n , and. i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e . L o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s can be adduced to demonstrate t h a t the i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e i s a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f s u c c e s s i n p r e d i c t i o n o f the f u t u r e . The i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e i t s e l f i s not a t a u t o l o g y , b u t l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s can show t h a t i t i s the b e s t p o s i t about t h e - f u t u r e , and t h i s i s a l l the j u s t i f i c a t i o n we r e q u i r e . Knowledge i s i n t e r p r e t e d a.s a system of wagers o r p o s i t s , and "the — 2o2— i n d u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e of s c i e n c e i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from o t h e r methods of p r e d i c t i o n as l e a d i n g to t h e most f a v o u r a b l e 1 p o s i t s " about t h e f u t u r e . I I I . EMPIRICISM AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY. To attempt to f o r e c a s t any p a r t i c u l a r ' development o f p h i l o s o p h y i s r a t h e r h a z a r d o u s . 1 b e l i e v e , however, t h a t we have r e a c h e d a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n p h i l o s o p h y where i t i s p o s s i b l e to p r e d i c t the g e n e r a l t r e n d the f u t u r e w i l l t a ke. Thus i t appears p r o b a b l e , f o r one t h i n g , tha.t the f o r m u l a t i o n o f • a l l - i n c l u s i v e systems of thought such as ha.ve been found i n the c l a s s i c a l t r a d i t i o n b elongs t o a past age. \7e seem to be c o n c e n t r a t i n g more and more on s p e c i a l i z e d problems w i t h i n the f i e l d s of p h i l o s o p h y , l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c method. The extreme g u l f between p h i l o s o p h y and s c i e n c e i n the l a s t c e n t u r y tended to as s i g n to p h i l o s o p h y the r e g i o n of a i r y f a n c i e s and a b s t r u s e meta-p h y s i c s f o r i t s p r o v i n c e . But the i n q u i r e s i n t o the bases of s c i e n t i f i c p r o c e d u r e , n e c e s s i t a t e d by the c o l l a p s e of o l d e r t h o u g h t - f o u n d a t i o n s , have b r o u g h t p h i l o s o p h y and Science t o g e t h e r a g a i n . P h i l o s o p h i c a l thought has been engaged to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t than ever b e f o r e w i t h s c i e n t i f i c problems, and. the r e s u l t i n g c o n t a c t w i t h s c i e n c e has l e d to the* attempt to i n t r o d u c e s c i e n t i f i c method i n t o p h i l o s o p h y . Y/e need o n l y r e c a l l the mode of approach t o p h i l o s o p h y undertaken by such men a.s R u s s e l l , S c h l i c k and R e i c h e n b a c h , not to mention many 1. R e i c h e n b a c h , o p . c i t . , P.404. 233-o t l i e r s , t o r e a l i z e t h e i m p r e s s i v e r e s u l t s which have been ach i e v e d hy t h i s new t e c h n i q u e i n p h i l o s o p h y . The p i e c e m e a l method of a t t a c k on p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems, w h i c h i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r these r e c e n t advances, has thus tended to debar p h i l o s o p h e r s from the c o n s t r u c t i o n of g r e a t t h o u g h t - s y s t e m s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n we s h o u l d a l s o p o i n t out one i m p o r t a n t d i s c o v e r y w h i c h has been made i n our own t i m e , namely, t h a t c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e of mathematics. I n a l l ages the f a s c i n a t i o n of mathematics has l e d t h i n k e r s to pure "s p r i o r i " s p e c u l a t i o n s . I t seemed t h a t here we had p r o o f of the e x i s t e n c e of t h e s y n t h e t i c "a p r i o r i " , a.nd i f t h a t were t r u e , then why c o u l d we n o t i n o t h e r f i e l d s e r e c t f i r m systems of t r u t h , p a t t e r n e d on mathematical systems, w i t h o u t any r e f e r e n c e t o e m p i r i c a l . f a c t s ? But today the t h e o r y of mathematics as a. system'of t a u t o l o g i c a l t r a n s -f o r m a t i o n s has r u d e l y shaken i f not c o m p l e t e l y d e s t r o y e d our f a i t h i n such r a t i o n a l i s t i c e n t e r p r i s e s . We can s t i l l c o n s t r u c t those "a p r i o r i " systems, but we no l o n g e r b e l i e v e t h a t we are r e a c h i n g any new t r u t h s . Prom another, p o i n t of v i e w , t h e n , we are w i t n e s s i n g the r e t u r n of p h i l o s o p h y to e m p i r i c i s m , a l t h o u g h i t remains t r u e t h a t e m p i r i c a l systems must undergo the s t r i c t s c r u t i n y of l o g i c . I f m y s t i c i s m i s - d e a l i n g w i t h the u n u t t e r a b l e , and i f p u r e r a t i o n a l i s m i s undermined by the f o r m a l i s t t h e o r y of l o g i c , i t .is not t h e r e f o r e too hazardous a p r e d i c t i o n to say t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought w i l l c o n t i n u e , f o r at l e a s t -234-a c o n s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d , to be .dominated "by the e m p i r i c a l o u t -l o o k . I t i s t r u e t h a t even i n a n c i e n t times e m p i r i c i s t s a.nd s c e p t i c s c a s t a s p e r s i o n s on t h e t h e o r i e s of the c l a s s i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s , who c o n t i n u e d to t h r i v e n e v e r t h e l e s s , but the o l d e r e m p i r i c i s t s d i d not have s c i e n t i f i c knowledge or method to r e i n f o r c e t h e i r p o s i t i o n . To say tha.t the e m p i r i c a l a pproach w i l l p r e v a i l i s of course not to say t h a t we w i l l p r o c e e d c a l m l y and u n i n t e r r u p t e d l y on our p a t h w i t h no s u r p r i s e s . The development of s c i e n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y demand r a d i c a l a d j u s t m e n t s of our p r e s e n t v i e w s . Ho Paduan complex s h o u l d l u l l us i n t o any c o m f o r t a b l y f a l s e view of the s i t u a t i o n . S c i e n c e might -even t u a . l l y break down. We have no assurance t h a t .the w o r l d i s as r a t i o n a l as G a l i l e o assumed; i t may not be of such a n a t u r e tha.t i t can be caught i n the net of our r e a s o n . But i f by s c i e n t i f i c method we u n d e r s t a n d an ^ u n p r e j u d i c e d s e a r c h f o r t r u t h , a r e f u s a l t o f o r c e f a c t s i n t o the P r o c r u s t e a n bed of our - t h e o r i e s , and a w i l l i n g n e s s t o r e c o g n i z e t h o s e l i m i t a t i o n s of our reason:so s o b e r l y demonstrated by e m p i r i c i s t s i n a l l t i m e s , then I b e l i e v e t h a t p h i l o s o p h y must i n e v i t a b l y adopt tha.t method. The quest f o r c e r t a i n knowledge must be g i v e n up, and, as R u s s e l l p o i n t s o u t , many o f the more humanly i n t e r e s t i n g problems w h i c h have n a t u r a l l y o c c u p i e d the thought o f men at a l l times may not be answered or may be d i s c o v e r e d to be i n c a p a b l e of s o l u t i o n . But even though our p r o g r e s s seems s l i g h t i n comparison w i t h the sweeping c l a i m s put f o r t h by t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y we may -235-a t l e a s t have t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t o u r s t e p s w i l l n o t need to he r e t a k e n , and t h a t we s h a l l he a b l e to implement the modest p r o m i s e s we have g i v e n . - - 0 O 0 -BIBLIOGRAPHY. Chapter I . John L o c k e , "An Essay Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g " . London, Ward, Lock & Co., L i m i t e d . George B e r k e l e y , - " A T r e a t i s e Concerning the P r i n c i p l e s o f Human Knowledge." Ed. by Alexander Campbell E r a s e r O x f o r d , C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1901. Chapter I I I . D a v i d Hume, "A T r e a t i s e ofc Human Nat u r e " . Ed. w i t h p r e l i m i n a r y d i s s e r t a t i o n s and notes by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Hew i m p r e s s i o n , London, Hew York, Longmans, Green & Go., 1909. Da v i d Hume, "An E n q u i r y Concerning Human U n d e r s t a n d i n g The H a r v a r d C l a s s i c s . Ed. by C h a r l e s W. E l i o t . Hew Yor k , P.E. C o l l i e r & Son, 1910. V o l . 37 (Hume). Che.pter IV. John S t u a r t M i l l , "An E x a m i n a t i o n of S i r 'William H a m i l t o n ' s P h i l o s o p h y . " F o u r t h e d i t i o n , London, S a v i l l , Edwars & Co . , 1892. Chapter. V. B e r t rand R u s s e l l , "Our Knowledge o f the Externa.l World as a. F i e l d f o r S c i e n t i f i c Method i n P h i l o s o p h y . " Chicago and London, The Open Court P u b l i s h i n g Co., 1914. B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l , "The A n a l y s i s of M a t t e r . " London, Keg an P a u l , T r e n c h , Trubner & Co., L t d . Hew York, Ha.rcourt, B r a c e and Co . , Inc., 1927. Chapter VI.. M o r i t a S c h l i c k , " A l lgemeine E r k e n n t n i s l e h r e " . B e r l i n , V e r l a g von J u l i u s S p r i n g e r , 1925. Chapter V I I . Hans Re i c h e n b a c h , " E x p e r i e n c e and P r e d i c t i o n . " Chicag< The U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , 1928. 

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