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Representative government and the private social welfare agencies : a case study of participation of… MacLaren, Phyllis Eileen 1963

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REPRESENTATIVE G O V E R N M E N T AID'THE PRIVATE SOCIAL WELFARE AGENCIES A Case Study of of Labour Groups i n Processes of Vancouver Pa r t i c i p a t i o n the Policy-Making Red Feather Agencies hy PHYLLIS EILEEN MCLAREN JOHN GORDON RAE MGLELLAN and JAMES CHARLES QUIKN Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment of the Requirements f o r the Degree of MASTER OF SOCIAL WORE i n the School of Social Work Accepted as conforming to the standard required f o r the degree of Master of Social Work School of Social Work 1963 The University of B r i t i s h Columbia In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l , make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I further agree that per-mission for extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. I t i s understood that copying, or p u b l i -c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not. be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia,. Vancouver 8 , Canada.' Date I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r -m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s m a y b e g r a n t e d b y t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r b y h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g , o r p u b l i -c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f ^olxXriA jJ^3(3^-3^ T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o r a m b i a , V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a . D a t e I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r . e e t h a t p e r -m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s m a y b e g r a n t e d b y t h e H e a d o f m y D e p a r t m e n t o r b y h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g , o r p u b l i -c a t i o n o f " t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t b e a l l o w e d w i t h o u t m y w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , . V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a . ^ t e 6 f?U<^L,. i v Abstract This study i s concerned with the government of private s o c i a l welfare agencies, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , with the measure of agreement that the conduct of t h e i r government shows with the p r i n c i p l e s of p o l i t i c a l representation. Diverse and, as yet, imperfectly reconciled theories exist as to the nature of representativeness i n government, but f o r the purposes of t h i s investigation the concept has been specified i n terms of a number of selected propositions that would probably be taken as axiomatic i n the p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n s of western countries. These include the notions that a l l enfranchised members of a p o l i t i c a l society should enjoy the e f f e c t i v e right to p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the choice of t h e i r government; that the representative himself i s charged to act with a view to the good of the whole group and not with p a r t i a l i t y towards some pa r t i c u l a r and subordinate interest within i t ; and that the membership has a right to require an accounting from the representative f o r the manner of his performance i n o f f i c e . The examination of these questions has been annexed i n the present study to the special case of the representa-t i o n on the boards of directors of the private welfare agencies of the segment of the organized, labour movement f a l l i n g into the relevant j u r i s d i c t i o n . Among the methods used i n making the investigation were: ( l ) a review of the c r i t e r i a of membership recognized by the private agencies both i n th e i r formal constitutions and i n t h e i r procedural t r a d i t i o n s ; (2) an assessment of the conduct of the agencies' feneral meetings when viewed as a mechanism of accountability; 3 ) an analysis of the composition of the agency boards by certain occupational categories; and ( 4 ) a number of i n t e r -views with selected union o f f i c i a l s , themselves differentiated, on the basis of whether they were members of agency boards or not. The findings of the study are that there i s a pervasive ambiguity about the status of the agencies i n re-l a t i o n to the formal categories of "private" and "public", that the agencies are unable to render a consistent or plausible account of the theory of p o l i t i c a l organization to which they hold themselves bound, and that t h e i r i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l processes f a i l to s a t i s f y even those cr i t e r i a , of legitimacy that they themselves volunteer. The question of the representation of labour groups was held i n abeyance for want of agreement i n any quarter as to what would constitute evidence f o r an answer to i t . V Acknowledgement For his generous contribution of provocative and valuable suggestions, we wish to acknowledge our debt to Mr. Adrian Marriage, School of Social Work, University of B r i t i s h Columbia. We owe him much f o r the stimulating experience our work with him has been. We are also indebted to both s t a f f and lay personnel of those member agencies of the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, who so w i l l i n g l y helped us with information, ideas and opinions. We want to stress our f e e l i n g of deep gratitude to them, and to share with them our appreciation that ours i s a system whereby a free exchange of ideas and opinions i s not only possible but also desirable. Mr. Howard Haphthali, Executive Director of the Community Chest and Councils, i s due our sincere thanks f o r his courtesy and cooperation, as i s Mr. Charles E. Lamarche, Labour Staff Representative, who so ably introduced us to the perp l e x i t i e s and complexities of our subject. To our respective spouses, who have lent encourage-ment and patient support to t h i s undertaking, we express our gratefulness. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. The Problem Defined p a p, ( Representativeness as C r i t e r i o n and Task. Representativeness i n the Setting of the I n s t i t u t i o n of Social Welfare. The Complimentarity of Empirical and A n a l y t i c a l Perspectives. The Uncertain Status of Representativeness as an A r t i c l e of Administrative Theory. The Place of the Private Agency i n the Structure of Social Welfare Services. Role of Private Agencies. Implications f o r the Local Welfare Scene. How Private are the Private Agencies? Are They Pr i v a t e l y Funded? To Whom are Private Agencies Accountable? The Scope of the Local Private Agencies. Community Power Structure, Oligopoly, and Conspiracy.... 1 Chapter 2. Some Constitutional Questions The Voluntary Association as an Ideal Type. Membership. Meetings. The Executive. The Red Feather Agencies as Private Associations. The Case of the Community Chest. The Membership Problem and the Public Perception of the Agencies ..................37 Chapter 3» The Function and Composition of Agency  Boards Function. Composition 55 Chapter 4« The Labour Viewpoint: A Report on the Opinions of a Sample of ¥nion O f f i c i a l s The Nature of the P o l l . Board Members with Union Status. Non-Participating Union O f f i c i a l s . What the Respondents Agreed on — And What They had i n Common 80 Chapter 5. Retrospect and Prospect Public vs. Private: The Unreal Terms of a Real Problem. Bureaucracy and the Private Agency. Problems of Representation and Accountability 118 i i i Appendices: A. C. D. E. P.. G e Community Chest and Councils of Greater Vancouver Area Analysis of Agencies Budgetted Income 1961 The Qualifications, Responsibilities and Relation-ships of the Local Labor Representative on the Staff of a Community Agency as Described by AFL-CIO-CSA. Job Description Labour Staff Representative Community Chest and Councils of Greater Vancouver Area, June 1, 1962. Resolution on Welfare Services (Canadian Labour Congress) Basic Welfare P r i n c i p l e s Adopted by the APL-CIO Executive Council, February, 1956. Methodology Bibliography TABLES AND CHARTS IN THE TEXT Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. (a) Tables . Page Total of Budgetted Income of Community Chest and Councils Agencies According to"Sources ...... 26 Deployment of Funds According- to Services C l a s s i f i e d by Clientele 30 Description of Services by Problems ............. 31a (b) Charts Chart 1. Occupational Groups by Percentages as seen on Boards of Directors and i n the Labour Force .. 79a Chart 2 Board Membership by Occupational Grouping 1962 •'. 75a REPRESENTATIYE GOVERNMENT MP THE PRIVATE SOCIAL WELFARE AGENCIES A Case Study of P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Labour Groups i n the Policy-Flaking Processes of Vancouver Red Feather Agencies CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM DEFINED A. Representativeness as C r i t e r i o n and Task Although, the received s o c i a l doctrines of North America remain, even today, unflinchingly entrepreneurial and i n d i v i d u a l -i s t i c , our l i f e i n the course of the l a s t century and a h a l f has become increasingly c o l l e c t i v e i n character, and has witnessed the emergence of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of formal associations, — economic, s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s . Corporations, companies, professional societies of vast dimensions, have pro-l i f e r a t e d and extended t h e i r complexities into every phase of human experience. At the same time, the f l u i d organization and e f f e c t i v e functioning of these groups and the associated problems of an increasingly complex and changing s o c i a l l i f e have taxed our inventive capacities to t h e i r l i m i t s . One of the most power-f u l l y i n f l u e n t i a l theories of s o c i a l organization to arise from the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l experiments made necessary by t h i s h i s t o r i c a l experience i s that which goes by the name of representative democracy, — a term which may be taken to include a complex method of popular government together with a system of strongly held b e l i e f s which "guarantee" both i t s i n s t i t u t i o n a l v i a b i l i t y and i t s moral cogency. However f a r short of the i d e a l they may f a l l i n p a r t i c u l a r times and places, the western nations almost uniformly defer to the tests of p o l i t i c a l action embodied i n the democratic creed. 2 Yet the elevation of the democratic creed to the o f f i c e of p o l i t i c a l North Star does le s s to solve the problems of s o c i a l administration than i t does to define the nature of the problems that need to be solved. It indicates the d i r e c t i o n of the journey to be taken, but i t leaves the t r a v e l l i n g s t i l l to be done. For example, few problems l i e so close to the heart of p o l i t i c a l l i f e and p o l i t i c a l theory as does, that of "representation", — one of the cardinal p r i n c i p l e s of the democratic method. Compounded bf many subtle and fundamental issues, i t has been one of the running;"themes i n the dialogue of p o l i t i c a l philosophy f o r centuries. Moreover, whatever the v i c i s s i t u d e s of i t s i n t e l l e c t u a l career, there can be no doubt that i t has been instrumental i n guiding the conduct of c o l l e c t i v e l i f e through such well-accepted and long established p r i n c i p l e s as that he who claims to be acting on our behalf, or i n our i n t e r e s t , and demands something of us f o r that reason, must expect to be required, or must expect to be subject to the requirement that he show that he i s i n fact doing so. Of equally axiomatic status would be the statement that i n a p o l i t i c a l society i n which democratic forms of government are proclaimed as having general v a l i d i t y , those who govern, whatever the i n s t i t u t i o n a l setting, must show why they should be exempt from the provisions Of the general rule of p r i n c i p l e . Moreover, quite apart from the various entailments of democratic theory, i t has been a matter of common experience 3 that representative i n s t i t u t i o n s o f f e r the best prospects of maintaining an e f f e c t i v e system of communication between the ruled and t h e i r rulers i n a mass society, and thus of ensuring the necessary conditions of p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . Put at i t s simplest, one may say that there i s a p r e v a i l i n g confidence i n our society i n the e f f i c a c y of the representative relationship as a way of managing human a f f a i r s r a t i o n a l l y and j u s t l y . A l l t h i s may be said without excessive fear of d i s -agreement. But to move from concurrence i n the p r i n c i p l e to the question of whether i t i s being honoured properly i n any given instance, or to formulate (for example) the e l e c t o r a l procedures which w i l l ensure that i t i s so honoured, i s to enter a new realm of d i f f i c u l t y . Democracy, — as George Orwell said of love — i s damned hard work; and l i k e a woman's, i t i s never done. B. Representativeness i n the Setting of the Institutions  of S o c i a l Welfare I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n affects the demands f o r , and supply and organization of the welfare services i n c r u c i a l ways, — and among the ways which must be evident to even the most casual student of our times i s the f a c t that welfare services and i n s t i t u t i o n s constitute one of the major instrumentalities of s o c i a l administration i n the modern state.1 Indeed, the kinds of instruments and i n s t i t u t i o n s through which Wilensky, H.L. and C.N. Lebeaux. Ind u s t r i a l Society  and Social Welfare. Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1958, p. 168 4 a society i s able to ef f e c t planned adaptations to changing economic and s o c i a l conditions comprise i n general a fas t grow-ing body of knowledge and p r a c t i s i n g competence; though one i n which, needless to say, much remains controversial, obscure and unpredictable. S o c i a l work, as just one of these instruments of homeostasis, may be seen as an innovation of western society; a complex and somewhat heterogeneous cluster of a c t i v i t i e s and services having i n common the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y formalized role of problem solving i n the inelegantly but comprehensively designated f i e l d of " s o c i a l dysfunction". I t now has behind i t more than a century of usable experience, as well as a t r a d i t i o n of d i s c i p l i n e d concern f o r the welfare of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n which i s consistent with (no doubt because i t i s i n part a product of) the root values of western democratic l i b e r a l i s m . I t possesses, moreover, a growing armamentarium of methods and techniques to serve i t i n i t s purpose of meeting human need within a c a r e f u l l y preserved framework of h i s t o r i c a l continuity. One of the axiomatic p r i n c i p l e s of s o c i a l work theory i s to be found i n the emphasis placed on the capacities of individuals, groups and communities to seek and f i n d s a t i s f y i n g solutions f o r t h e i r problems, — a p r i n c i p l e which i s the profession's own s p e c i a l l y i n f l e c t e d version of that b e l i e f i n 5 the ultimate p o s s i b i l i t y of popular wisdom which underlies the democratic f a i t h . As a r e l a t i v e l y young member of the so-call e d helping professions, s o c i a l work, through a process which varies between formal experiment and hopeful t r i a l and error, i s of necessity s t i l l engaged i n the task of finding a role f o r i t s e l f which i s consonant with the f l u i d i t y which characterizes today's s o c i a l structure and, equally, with the ethic of an open society. I t i s thus f u l l y i n accord with i t s t r a d i t i o n of democratic values that the profession should be constantly seeking opportunities to enhance and strengthen those competencies of individuals, groups and communities which allow f o r the f u l l e s t possible r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r p o t e n t i a l i t i e s f o r s e l f maintenance, s e l f regulation and s e l f knowledge• It might well be said, therefore, that accurately to perceive and understand the meaning of a community's mode of problem solving i s a step towards formulating the requirements of a helping r o l e . That i s the nature of the purpose under-l y i n g the present investigation. By means of t h i s study, i t i s our hope that some l i g h t may be shed on the problem of the in t e r - r e l a t i o n s , — i n s t i t u t i o n a l , i d e o l o g i c a l and moral — between the.voluntary helping services i n t h i s community and th e i r appropriate publics; as well (by inference) on the comparable problems of other communities. In p a r t i c u l a r , we 6 are interested i n the question of the "representativeness" of t h e i r forms and methods of government; and more especially, i n the extent to which the voice of one major segment of the public (the labour unions) i s heard i n their'councils. C. The Complementarity of Empirical and A n a l y t i c a l Perspectives While representativeness as an i d e a l of democratic government remains, as i t has long been, a matter of contro-versy and debate i n p o l i t i c a l theory, i t has only recently begun to command int e r e s t and attention as a subject of enquiry f o r s o c i a l science. Thus, prefacing a comparatively recent and e s s e n t i a l l y " s c i e n t i f i c " a r t i c l e on t h i s subject, Turk and Lefcowitz 1 attribute the obstacles to i t s systematic and successful study to a general and long standing confusion i n theory about actual group relationships and the categories into which they f a l l . A f t e r reviewing what they evidently believe to be the inadequacies of t r a d i t i o n a l attempts to define the representative r o l e , they pass with approval to the " s o c i o l o g i c a l " approaches of Talcott Parsons and S.F. Hadel, synthesizing the views of these two scholars i n the following summary. Relations between groups as actors are most often conducted through specialized representative r o l e s . Action i n each role i s on behalf of the group that defines i t , and i s seen as the action 1Turk, H., and M. lefcowitz, Towards a Theory of Representation Between Groups, Social Forces, May, 1962. 7 of the c u l t u r a l group. The functional implications of representative interaction f o r inter-group and intra-group relations are based on variables of power and legitimation.1 They suggest that the representative role i s strategic f o r under-standing inter-group r e l a t i o n s , and go on to depict representa-t i o n as one of the social, processes which serves to channel and mediate in t e r - a c t i o n between groups. S p e c i f i c a l l y , the representative behaves as i f the group acts through him; his duties and rights are subject to c o l l e c t i v e sanction, and there i s an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d expectation that the group w i l l accept his behaviour as t h e i r own. An empirical examination, then, of representation as i t operates between trade unions i n the private voluntary agencies, while i t can only supplement, and not supplant, the t r a d i t i o n a l philosophical approach, necessitates reference to a number of factors concerning the intra-group r e l a t i o n s of both agencies and trade unions which might otherwise be neglected. (Heedless to say, some of these l i e beyond available techniques of any kind, and many more beyond the time scope of our investigation, so that they can be treated only i n an impressionistic and s u p e r f i c i a l way). One important assumption we can make, on the basis of o the Pennington and Walker study, i s the existence of a wide range of c r u c i a l consensual problems concerning s o c i a l welfare "^loc. c i t . 2Pennington, E.J. and I. Walker, The Role of Trade  Unions i n Social Welfare, Unpublished Master's Thesis, -School of S o c i a l VJork, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1962. 8 within the trade unions themselves, — a si t u a t i o n we take to be t y p i c a l f o r many other s o c i a l groups as well. In that study, the existence of marked differences between o f f i c i a l national p o l i c y (as expressed by the Canadian labour Congress 1) and the s e n t i -ments of l o c a l labour o f f i c i a l s , on a variety of s o c i a l welfare questions, was c l e a r l y i n evidence. While acknowledging the danger of generalizing from a single study, i t appears reasonable to assume that these differences within labour groups occur f a i r l y frequently, and further, that they could also be d i s -covered i n other segments of the general public. This single f a c t reveals that the question as to whether the "r u l e r " or "agent" i s acting i n the interest of the groups f o r whom he i s supposed to speak, (a question which i s held by many scholars to be one of the main c r i t e r i a of a representative r e l a t i o n s h i p ) , can only be pr e c i s e l y resolved when proper account i s taken of what these groups and th e i r component sub-groups deem t h e i r " i n t e r e s t " i n fac t to be. A simple observation of t h i s kind should serve to demonstrate the case f o r a descriptive, no les s than a purely philosophical, approach to the problems of representativeness. The case i s perhaps even stronger when we leave the sphere of formal and sovereign government and turn our attention to the more d i f f u s e l y organized p o l i t i c a l sub-systems, — where as often as not the facts are as hard to come by as the p r i n c i p l e s are to a r t i c u l a t e . Resolution of Welfare Services. Canadian Labour Congress, Ottawa. 9 D« -Eke Uncertain Status of Representativeness as an A r t i c l e  of Administrative Theory Views supporting the importance and d e s i r a b i l i t y of achieving representativeness through the inclusion of major community organizations and intere s t groups are to be found i n most standard community organization textbooks, and i n that branch of the s o c i a l welfare l i t e r a t u r e which i s directed to the professional agency executive. This d i r e c t i o n may be as s p e c i f i c as the one con-tained i n Wayne McMillen's community organization text of 1945, i n which he marks the trend i n s o c i a l agencies toward broaden-ing that base of community inter e s t , understanding and concern on which s o c i a l action i s supposed to be based. Ideally, the private s o c i a l agency should be con-t r o l l e d by persons representing diverse interests i n the community. (If the agency i s nonsectarian the major r e l i g i o u s sects - Catholic, Jewish, Protestant should be represented. This does not necessarily mean that clergymen should be selected as board members nor does i t imply that every church i n town must have a representative. I t does mean that the r e l i g i o u s a f f i l i a t i o n s of the board members should be s u f f i c i e n t l y varied to e s t a b l i s h c l e a r l y the nonsectarian character of the organization.) There should be recognition of the various economic, p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l and r a c i a l groupings i n the community. The following l i s t suggests some of the kinds of interests that should be taken into consideration i n selecting a board: an editor, a fi n a n c i e r , a trade union leader, certain public o f f i c i a l s such as the superintendent of schools, a county commissioner.,3- (women's groups, service groups, f r a t e r n a l societies etc..) On the other hand, t h i s excerpt i s an excellent i l l u s t r a t i o n of McMillen, Wayne, Community Organization f o r Social Welfare, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1945. pp. 69-70 10 the pervasive ambiguity that seems to attach to most published attempts at formulating the c r i t e r i a by which one i s supposed to determine the representativeness of agency boards. Thus a concept which carries with i t certain unmistakable connotations of popular democratic government i s here annexed procedurally to the notion of selection rather than e l e c t i o n . I t invokes the legitimations of the New England town meeting while somehow suggesting a p o l i t i c a l ethic which i s almost "managerial". We suspect that the uncertainty of posture may be ch a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r the f i e l d . A survey of the relevant professional l i t e r a t u r e w i l l reveal many instances of a similar discrepancy between the unequivocality of the good intentions and the imprecision of the formal p o l i t i c a l r elations envisioned therein. Hillman, f o r example, writing on p o l i c y making and administration i n welfare councils says: Methods of building Council membership w i l l vary but the p r i n c i p l e of securing as wide a base of representation as possible should be clos e l y observed. The Council should be a 'people's movement' and everything possible should be done to include as many of the 'ordinary f o l k s ' i n the organization as possible. He goes on to say A major trend i s toward the inclusion of more lay people and a more representative cross-section of the community i n welfare planning... A major development i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n of wider p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s the a c t i v i t y of labour unions i n the broad f i e l d of community s e r v i c e s . 2 1Harper, E.B., and A. Dunham, eds., Community  Organization i n Action, Association Press, New York, 1959, p.'234 p l o c . c i t . 11 I f we assume that the need f o r a broader base of representation i s accepted i n p r i n c i p l e , we s h a l l want to know a good deal more than i s presently available about the mechanisms by which i t i s supposed to be achieved. Alexander and McCann1 show an unusual awareness of t h i s problem when they acknowledge that there are contradictions i n the current usage of the term "representative" i n agency and inter-agency a f f a i r s . They comment s i g n i f i c a n t l y that the word i s "...philosophically reassuring and accepted as consistent with democratic theory". They go on to propose that two kinds of ideas about representativeness be recognized: one carrying the notion of authorized functioning or acting by one person i n behalf of another or others; the other, described as s t a t i s t i c a l , having the quality of being t y p i c a l or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a given c l a s s . Furthermore, they draw attention to the misconceptions and dangers of the continued and u n c r i t i c a l use of "representative" i n the s t a t i s t i c a l sense. They argue that f o r the f u n c t i o n a l l y adequate performance of the role of representa-t i v e , ("adequate", f o r example, i n that i t reduces confusion, and leads to e f f e c t i v e committee work), the use of the word i t s e l f be r e s t r i c t e d to those individuals who are appointed f o r a c l e a r l y defined purpose which i n turn constitutes a part of .3 legitimate group expectations. ^Alexander, CA., and McCann, Charles, "The Concept of Representativeness i n Community Organization", Social Work. Vol. 1, No. 1, January, 1956. 2 op. c i t . Jop. c i t . 12 Hewstetter 1, i n o u t l i n i n g his somewhat exotic concept of the "intergroup process", depicts representation as a • phenomenon involving two ways of looking at the a c t i v i t i e s of the "intergroup", i t s e l f composed of representatives of separate groups. The f i r s t focus i s directed to interpersonal r e l a t i o n s of the intergroup, and the other to the goals selected "by the intergroup out of community and s o c i e t a l needs. He evaluates the representative role i n the intergroup process i n terms of that i n t e r a c t i o n between responsibly represented groups which produces movement towards the desired goals, "A 2 responsible relationship i s one i n which there i s response." He then goes on to discuss the role of the s o c i a l worker i n a s s i s t i n g the intergroup process and i t s movement towards the desired goal. While t h i s may o f f e r some insight into the representative process, i t adds to, rather than reduces the problem of conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n of the term. Pierce Atwater , a pioneer i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l work administration, writing about the problems of maintaining e f f e c t i v e relationships between the paid, professionally-trained agency executive and the agency's board of directors, begins promisingly by asserting that the board i s the responsible governing body of the agency, but then confuses matters by discussing the value of the executive's c o n t r i -bution to the selection of the board. He says: 1Harper, E.B., and A. Dunham, eds., Community  Organization i n Action. Association Press, New York, 1959, pp. 180-191. 2 I b i d j3Atwater, Pierce, Problems of Administration i n Social Work, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 1940, p. 51. 13 I t should he assumed i n theory that i t i s highly improper f o r an executive to have anything to do with the appointment or el e c t i o n of his board member s.-*-While a warning i s thus issued that "playing p o l i t i c s " i n his own inte r e s t would be improper behaviour for the agency executive, Atwater notes that theory and practice are two d i f f e r e n t matters, and seeks to j u s t i f y his hydra-headed approach by commenting that the professional has an important stake i n what kind of board his agency gets and valuable suggestions to make as to how i t ought to be selected. So important i s t h i s factor that probably few public or private boards are appointed without the executive's being i n some way consulted. 2 He goes on to support t h i s apparently contradictory p o s i t i o n by cautioning d i s c r e t i o n on the part of the executive. The point which needs to be stressed i s that an executive should neither be quixotic i n his attitude about the freedom of action of a nominating committee, nor forward i n * attempting to transact the business f o r i t . Atwater continues i n t h i s vein by emphasizing the importance of securing the proper q u a l i t i e s i n the elected board as well as i n the agency's membership, and suggests ways i n which the executive can influence the steps taken so as to ensure that he has "...someone with whom he can work i n a s p i r i t of mutual confidence, good w i l l and cooperation." He concludes: Atwater, l o c . c i t . . p. 5 1 2 T h i d. 3 I b i d . 14 While there are some who w i l l dispute the ethics of procedure herein described, few can deny that t h i s sort of executive action constantly goes on and i n fac t has con-siderable j u s t i f i c a t i o n and l o g i c behind i t , i f not carried too f a r , and i f not promoted e n t i r e l y f o r purposes of s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The word 'entirely* i s used because i t cannot be denied that any executive has a personal interest i n these matters. 1 In essence, then, i n the interests of administrative effectiveness, we are t o l d i t would be acceptable executive behaviour to of f e r discreet guidance to the nominating committee, while at the same time making clear to the committee i t s constitutional obligations and prerogatives. It i s d i f f i c u l t to r e s i s t making the comment that a l l animals are equal but some are more equal than others. E. The Place of the Private Agency i n the Structure of Social  Welfare Services : An ess e n t i a l feature of the democratic state i s the unencumbered right of i t s c i t i z e n s to associate f o r private purposes; and a ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of i n d u s t r i a l urban society i s the emergence of a phenomenal var i e t y of economic, s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s associations. The f i e l d of s o c i a l welfare has been i n no way exempt from t h i s trend. Nor i s i t to be supposed that i t i s any les s legitimate f o r private c i t i z e n s to act i n concert f o r charitable and eleemosynary purposes than i t would be i f they were associated f o r some other reason. "Atwater, ov. c i t . . p. 53 15 In f a c t , the welfare services of the western countries are i n a l l instances a combination of some kind of private and public organization. The r e l a t i v e importance of the two varies from one country to another, and confident generalizations are probably not possible without close study of the f a c t s . But i t i s not l i k e l y to be disputed that the private agencies play a p a r t i c u l a r l y important part i n the s o c i a l welfare services of the United States and Canada, and have behind them, moreover, a highly developed and widely endorsed body of theory which aims to describe and j u s t i f y t h e i r unique and c r u c i a l r o l e . The matter that gives r i s e to perplexity and concern, however, i s not the fact that the private agencies e x i s t , but the terms upon which they e x i s t . For example, no clear formula has yet been devised which would enable us to i d e n t i f y with ease the services that ought to be provided by private agencies and those that ought to be the exclusive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of some other level, of government. Again, no objective c r i t e r i a are available to make i t possible to say where a "private" a c t i v i t y has become a matter of "public" concern. Even more fundamentally, attempts to arrive at a d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l welfare i t s e l f have been something l e s s than sati s f a c t o r y , since we must take into account existing c o n f l i c t s i n the "value base" from which welfare programs are 16 formulated. Discussing dominant conceptions of s o c i a l welfare i n the united States, Wilensky and Lebeaux 1 point !bnis out i n terms of the current confusion of values respecting economic individualism and free enterprise, and t h e i r alleged incompatibility with those of security, equality and human!tarianism. At the end of a review of some of these con-f l i c t i n g viewpoints, they attempt to bring some order into the subject by of f e r i n g the following d e f i n i t i o n of s o c i a l welfare. The organized system of s o c i a l services and i n s t i t u t i o n s , designed to aid individuals and groups to a t t a i n s a t i s f y i n g standards of l i f e and health. I t aims at personal and s o c i a l relationships which permit individuals the f u l l e s t development of t h e i r capacities and the promotion of t h e i r well-being i n harmony with the needs of the community.^ In so f a r as such a d e f i n i t i o n would r e f l e c t some of the fundamental values of western society, we might assume s o c i a l welfare to be the concern of every c i t i z e n , either ex-pressly or t a c i t l y . But to f i n d expression for a sp e c i a l in t e r e s t i n s o c i a l welfare and the opportunity to act ' f e f f e c t i v e l y on i t s behalf necessarily demands deliberate and formal organization; and the private agency may thus be viewed pre c i s e l y as an attempt to f i n d concrete embodiment f o r the popular interest i n charitable a c t i v i t y through the accustomed medium of the voluntary association. Yet because s o c i a l welfare i s a matter of public concern too, the Wilensky and Lebeaux, op. c i t . , p. 139 2 I b i d . 17 pretensions, the e f f i c i e n c y , the method of organization, and, not l e a s t , the governmental processes of the voluntary association take on inte r e s t f o r us i n a way that greatly complicates the use of the word "private". I f we see the voluntary agency as a device f o r the expression of private interest and a vehicle f o r the enablement of private action"in the arena of s o c i a l welfare, we are committed at the very le a s t to an examination of the p l a u s i b i l i t y of the grounds on which such interest and such action can properly be c a l l e d "private". Obviously, a paradox l i e s i n wait for us here. For the greater the claims the voluntary agencies make regard-ing what they do, the weaker the case f o r t h e i r continuing to do i t , — the more impoverished t h e i r claims regarding the way they do i t . F. Role of Private Agencies It would be an understatement to say that the assign-ment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l services between the public and private sectors of the community i s currently both a con-troversy and dilemma.' It i s a subject of almost impenetrable obscurity and confusion. To begin with, and viewed simply as a matter of empirical record, the r o l e played by the private voluntary agency i n the s o c i a l welfare structure varies greatly from community to community, and must be seen i n a context of two main streams of change. The f i r s t a r i s i n g from an expanding 18 assessment of the needs and nature of the human personality (and hence, of the proper scope of social service); the second from the growing assumption by different levels of government of. responsibility for basic income maintenance and certain other areas of "essential" service. The rationale for the private services can therefore only be found in the concept of an interlocking responsibility with the public services. Such, at any rate, is the view of Lester Granger1, a leading pro-ponent of the values of the voluntary welfare effort. He sees the ideal public-private relationship as a "partnership" in an integral process of welfare programming. To the private agencies he assigns the virtues of f lexibi l i ty , expressed in the form of program experimentation, demonstration and validation. Free from the cumbersome bureaucracy of government, they can assume the tasks of pioneering new services, of surveying and anticipating social needs, the while remaining free to act as spokesmen for the beneficiaries of service, to express the dissident point of view, and to act as protector of citizen rights. That elements contradictory and conflictual to this ideal exist in practice, is observable in such statements as this made in 1954. Kasius, Cora, ed., New Directions in Social Work. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1954, p. 72 19 In the past, voluntary agencies have frequently taken the path of r e f l e c t i n g the l a i s s e z - f a i r e attitude of t h e i r more comfortable supporters by avoiding coming to grips with such controversial s o c i a l problems (as labour-management c o n f l i c t , technological unemployment) Wayne McMillen sees the role of the private agency i n terms of i t s capacity f o r public education, and i n t h i s l i e s i t s potential f o r promoting the objects of improved 2 s o c i a l conditions and better means of meeting human need. Bradley Bu e l l , discussing the structure of systems of health and medical care, refers to the case-finding and experimental r o l e of the private health agencies, and describes t h e i r i d e a l role t h i s way. In the intere s t of coherent development, i t i s generally agreed, the basic role of the voluntary agency should be on research, public health education and the development of new and promising procedures. When t h e i r effectiveness has been demonstrated, control procedures should be absorbed into the o f f i c i a l system.3 To sum up, we can say that while there seems to be no formula applicable to every community, i t appears to be widely held that the proper role of the voluntary agencies i s to be discovered i n t h e i r capacity f o r leadership, f o r a l e r t and sensitive adaptation to changing problems and needs, and f o r speaking with an informed and powerful voice on behalf of high standards of service. Kasius, Cora, ed., OTD. c i t . . p. 77 2McMillen, ov. c i t . . Chapters 2 and 3 Buell, Bradley, Community Planning for Human Services, Columbia University Press, New York, 1952, p. 194 20 With th i s exemplary image i n mind then, of a committed, enthusiastic, well-informed body of c i t i z e n s , working i n a cooperative and purposeful way to i d e n t i f y and f i n d methods of solution f o r the community's welfare problems, we turn to the l o c a l scene to examine i t s welfare a c t i v i t i e s . G- Implications f o r the Local Welfare Scene The task of finding viable methods of evaluating the effectiveness of the e x i s t i n g network of s o c i a l welfare pro-grams i s one which s o c i a l work i s only now, belatedly, addressing i t s e l f to. For constitutional and i d e o l o g i c a l reasons, systematic study of the general l e v e l of human welfare i n Canadian communities i s generally both infrequent and divided i n i t s aims. M. Wheeler's study of needed research i n welfare i n B r i t i s h Columbia 1 i s one of the more imaginatively conceived e f f o r t s to f i n d out what i s known of the state of welfare i n a p a r t i c u l a r community. In his study of the urban revolution and the effects of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n i n metropolitan Vancouver, Wheeler focuses on the massive problems of maladjustment and s o c i a l d i s l o c a t i o n which accompany these changes. Among the problems he draws attention to are repeated agency demands f o r better budgets to meet growing welfare needs, and rei t e r a t e d complaints of li m i t e d f a c i l i t i e s and resources. He speaks of 1Wheeler, M., A Report on Needed Research i n Welfare  i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Social Planning Section, Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, Vancouver, March 1961. 21 a general problem of segmentation and over-specialization of agency function, and adds that the co-ordination of services i s manifestly a c r u c i a l issue. He notes the widespread insistence of agencies on the need f o r "...more ef f e c t i v e leadership at professional and l a y l e v e l s to i n i t i a t e admini-s t r a t i v e changes which w i l l permit operation on a planned, e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t basis". In his concluding chapter, dealing with public attitudes and welfare services, he says The public i s confused with the d i v e r s i t y of such organizations, uncertain as to what they a l l do, and perhaps unconvinced that a l l are necessary... • The relationship between welfare and i t s various public constituencies i s now an area of wide speculation and l i t t l e knowledge. 1 This i s not the picture of a concerned and change-oriented community, a l e r t to charges of i n e f f i c i e n c y and inadequate programming that the textbooks would have le d us to expect. Wheeler comments: Whether the general public appreciates welfare services, p a r t i c u l a r l y the private services, i s nowadays a recurring theme... . I t i s complicated rather than s i m p l i f i e d by some kinds of United Fund campaigning, i f they stress successful money-raising rather than adequate standards of care.2 The questions raised by these observations have the greatest relevance f o r our study, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n so f a r as i t i s concerned with investigating the representative relationship between the private agencies and the trade unions. bp. c i t . op. c i t . 22 For i n addition to the f a c t that they are an important segment of the community i n general, the trade unions have a r i c h t r a d i t i o n of concern f o r the s o c i a l conditions of working people. This i s perhaps even truer f o r B r i t i s h Columbia than i t would be f o r many other parts of North America, since t h i s province has long been known f o r the v i t a l i t y and high l e v e l of development of i t s labour movement. I f the private agencies are out of touch with the unions, they are, ipso facto, out of touch with one of the area's most s i g n i f i c a n t associational systems. The f i r s t P r o v i n c i a l Conference of Social Welfare, which took place i n Vancouver i n May 1962, had as i t s theme the (for us) highly germane topic of " c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n " . Dr. Charles Hendry, the key-note speaker on that occasion concluded his paper by saying: New patterns of partnerships are needed be-tween c i t i z e n and government, including the creation of advisory committees and councils to ensure e f f e c t i v e communication with respect to the continuous assessment of changing s o c i a l needs and s e r v i c e s . 1 Dr. Hendry's words could well serve as a text f o r the present study. H. How Private are the Private Agencies? In what respects can a "private" agency be con-sidered to Warrant the application of that term? Does i t Proceedings, B r i t i s h Columbia Conference on  So c i a l Welfare. Vancouver, 1962, p. 9 2 3 r e f e r primarily to the method of funding? Or to a pattern of sponsorship? Does i t distinguish the e s s e n t i a l l y private nature of the agency's functions? Or i s i t intended to s i g n i f y the f a c t that the private agencies are not f u l l y accountable f o r what they do? Let us examine some of these alt e r n a t i v e s . (A) Are they P r i v a t e l y Funded? In t h i s seventh decade of the twentieth century there are few l o c a l issues which excite l i v e l i e r remark and contro-versy than the s p i r a l l i n g demand f o r money to finance the services provided by the system of p r i v a t e l y governed agencies now operating i n North American urban communities. Voluntary welfare i s said to have become "big business", by virt u e not only of i t s adoption of streamlined business procedures and elaborate organizational devices, but also by the simple f a c t of the size of i t s spending, — large enough to be measurable i n terms of the Gross National Product. 1 Member agencies of the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, number 67 i n the year 1961, were shown to have budgeted revenue from a l l sources to the p amount of $6,921,797. A recent public statement by the President of the Board of Directors of the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area indicates that i n 1962 1Dickenson, Frank, Phd. i n Voluntary Action and the State 2Chest Contributors Low i n Vancouver, News item i n The Province. March 16, 1963. 24 54 percent of Vancouver's wage-earners contributed to Chest revenues. 1 These are crude figures, but they are a suggestive index of the dimensions of the business which i s conducted under the aegis of l o c a l private agencies, and of the extent to which the ci t i z e n s of Greater Vancouver are involved as donors. It might be noted here that a continent-wide trend i s observable toward increasing d i f f i c u l t y on the part of the voluntary agencies i n meeting t h e i r campaign goals f o r funds, — a f a c t which i s of considerable interest i n i t s own ri g h t and the significance of which remains to be f u l l y assessed. That 16 percent fewer wage earners i n Vancouver contributed to the l a s t campaign than did i n Toronto i s , of course, a p r a c t i c a l problem f o r the l o c a l s o c i a l agencies. But i t i s also a revealing sign of the dependency of the private agencies on the e s s e n t i a l l y capricious and uncontrollable l e v e l s of personal charitableness. At the same time, i t i s common knowledge that the annual federated fund-raising campaigns carry i n t h e i r appeals every autumn the notion that i t i s the duty of every c i t i z e n to give. Headed by talented and i n f l u e n t i a l leaders, thousands of ci t i z e n s are enlisted to man an elaborate and highly organized campaign machine which seeks through appeal and persuasion to convince the public that i t has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to support the voluntary services of i t s community. Techniques ranging from op. c i t . , The Province 25 frank sentimental appeal to subtle attitude manipulation are studied and tested. Carefully prepared contribution schedules are distributed to the c i t i z e n i n order that he should know how much he ought to give. The cooperation of employers i n business and industry makes giving by p a y r o l l deduction as e f f o r t l e s s as income tax. Careful study and s o l i c i t a t i o n of corporation potential i s performed by volunteer business personnel. Such slogans as " f a i r share giving", "give t i l l i t hurts", "give a day's pay", "give t i l l i t helps", are f a m i l i a r exhortations, underpinned by the unvoiced threat that f a i l u r e to meet campaign quotas means the government w i l l take over. Implicit i n a l l t h i s seems to be the proposition that i f the c i t i z e n i s f o r private enterprise and freedom from government intervention, i t becomes his public duty to support the voluntary agencies. Much more could be said about the subtle coercion which operates i n gigantic fund-raising campaigns, but the point i s made that across the continent, fund-raising f o r the "private" voluntary agencies i s a community enterprise involving ever growing numbers of c i t i z e n s as participants and contributors. How private are the sources of income which make up agency revenues? B r i e f reference to the Analysis of Agencies Budgeted Income f o r 1961 w i l l enable us to i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r sources of income. 26 Table 1. Total of Budgeted Income of Community  Chest and Council Agencies according  to source Amount 1961 Total Budgeted Revenue 1961 Approximate Chest A l l o c a t i o n Other Revenue Dominion and P r o v i n c i a l Government City and Municipal Government Total Government Contribution $6,921,797. 2,385,096.37 1,880,835. 2,546,563. 115.006. 2,661,569. In short, the greatest single source of income to these private voluntary agencies i s i n fact public-tax funds, appropriated at a l l three government l e v e l s . To add to the confusion, only 30 out of the 67 agencies were e n t i r e l y dependent upon private voluntary donations. The f a c t i s that funds allocated by Community Chest amounted to roughly one-t h i r d of the t o t a l operating agencies' budgets. (B) To Whom are Private Agencies Accountable? A further question r e l a t i n g to the "privateness" of the private voluntary agency arises when the matter i s viewed from the aspect of sanction. The argument respecting the proper a l l o c a t i o n of certain functions to either the public or the private sphere does not concern us here. What concerns us i s the paradox presented by the fact that some agencies 27 s a i l under the colours of private enterprise, even though they are sanctioned and s i g n i f i c a n t l y controlled i n what they do by public authority. Several of the agencies included i n the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area perform functions which are patently public i n that the agencies i n question are authorized by statute to assume certain l e g a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The most obvious of these are the two Children's Aid Societies who are charged with the protection and care of neglected children i n Vancouver under the Protection of Children Act. That a large part of t h e i r function i s a public one i s r e f l e c t e d i n the f a c t that t h e i r sources of revenue also are overwhelmingly drawn from public funds. The provision of after-care services to discharged male prison inmates by the John Howard Society further i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s ambiguous state of a f f a i r s , where not only i s a supposedly private agency performing a function which i n many j u r i s d i c t i o n s , both i n Canada and the United States, i s under-taken by public agencies of one kind or another, but also i s spending substantial quantities of public funds. Thus, i n turn, a further set of questions arise con-cerning the agencies' obligation to account f o r t h e i r p o l i c i e s and expenditures. To whom, to what constituency are they accountable, and i n what manner i s the obligation of accountability discharged? In t h i s l a t t e r connection, the 28 remarks of Wayne McMillen are p a r t i c u l a r l y t e l l i n g . Moreover i f an agency seeks and obtains support widely i n the community i t i s under some obligation not to l i m i t control of expenditure and formulation of p o l i c y to a small group whose views may not necessarily be representa-t i v e of l o c a l thinking on s o c i a l questions. 1 Wilensky and Lebeaux, discussing the forms of s o c i a l auspice which govern the purpose and methods of s o c i a l welfare services, note that some mechanism i s required f o r the expression of public i n t e r e s t , and go on to point out that f o r public services t h i s i s simply the representative structure of government. They add: For voluntary agencies accountability i s t y p i c a l l y though less c e r t a i n l y achieved through a governing board. That some of these boards are self-perpetuating, unre-sponsive to changing needs and isolated from constituencies does not deny the pr i n c i p l e of accountability any more than oligarchy denies i t i n the public welfare arena. The p r i n c i p l e i s acknowledged i n pr i v a t e l y as well as p u b l i c l y sponsored organizations• 2 M. Wheeler i n his study of l o c a l services comments to t h i s e f f e c t on the absence of uniform, data-reporting methods. It i s important to note that the l i m i t a t i o n s i n the data available a f f e c t not only the conduct of research but also raise serious doubt as to whether the p r i n c i p l e of public accountability can have any r e a l meaning under these conditions.3 1 op. c i t . 'op. c i t . 29 Eleanor Taylor, surveying the forms of accountability i n the f i e l d of charitable trusts, both i n the United Kingdom and i n North America, observes widespread contradictions, ambiguities and differences i n p r a c t i c e . She says To the degree that information customarily given to the board i s extended to those outside the governing group, trustees and directors make i t possible f o r others than themselves to evaluate p o l i c y and program. In so doing, they provide an i n d i r e c t check on t h e i r own powers.1 She concludes that the representativeness of the board i s an important clue to the s i n c e r i t y of the organi-zation's acceptance of the duty of.accountability and the responsible use of power. I. The Scope of the Local Private Social Agencies How important are the services offered by these private agencies? To attempt to understand something of where services are offered, what they are, and the problems they attempt to solve, the following analysis i s offered. (A) T e r r i t o r i a l i t y Operating within the f i v e municipalities of the metropolitan complex, i t appears that some of the agencies of f e r the same service within a number of municipalities or neighbourhoods by means of autonomous chapters. Others main-t a i n a single administration and of f e r service from a central Vancouver o f f i c e throughout a l l or some of the municipalities. Taylor, E.R. Public Accountability of Foundation  and Charitable Trusts, p. 118 30 Some do not extend t h e i r services beyond the boundaries of the City of Vancouver i t s e l f . S t i l l others may offe r certain services i n one municipality and other services i n adjoining m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . Different agencies may o f f e r s i m i l a r services to sectarian groups. (The p a r t i c i p a t i o n of p r o v i n c i a l and national coordinating or administrative bodies would indicate the existence of some i n t r i c a t e system f o r disbursing funds. (B) By Services Developed primarily as an information guide to the ci t i z e n s of Vancouver, the Red Feather Handbook1 categorizes services according to c l i e n t e l e , and gives further information on the proportion of Community Chest contributions that go to the d i f f e r e n t categories of c l i e n t e l e - s e r v i c e . Table 2. Deployment of Funds according to  Services C l a s s i f i e d by Clientele Category of Clientele Service Percentage Family Welfare and Child Care 31.1 Leadership and Character Building 26.7 Health and Rehabilitation 25.5 Community Betterment 3.9 The remaining 12.8 percent of Community Chest funds, X962 Red Feather Handbook, p. 3 31 i t reports, go to Health and Welfare Planning (4.3); United Red Feather Appeal (4.5); Year Round Administration (4.0)., t, (C) By Problem An adequate description of the v i t a l and strategic role played by t h i s complex of services i n the solution of Vancouver's health, welfare,and recreation problems, should set them against the backdrop of public services and alongside the not inconsiderable number of non-participating agencies which function outside the United Fund scheme. Since i t i s not i n the scope of t h i s study to provide a detailed analysis of these services, a rough descriptive statement of basic services w i l l have to s u f f i c e . ' Generally speaking, we can say that the various f i n a n c i a l assistance and income maintenance programs are funded and administered by public agencies at the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of government. Varying from municipality to municipality, c h i l d welfare services are divided: the same basic services to children may be governmental or private, depending on the arrangements p r e v a i l i n g i n the municipality. Services to families also vary from municipality to municipality, as do services to the aged and other c l i e n t groups. The Metropolitan Health Committee offers a co-ordinated range of public health services, based on a number of d i f f e r e n t municipal o f f i c e s . Juvenile and family court services are p u b l i c l y financed, l o c a l l y administered, and Table 3. Non-Clas s i f i a b l e Catholic Charities Salvation Army-Vancouver 1 s Sa i l o r ' s Home Volunteer Bureau Jewish Community Council Vancouver C i v i c Unity Assn. Vancouver Housing Association Columbia Coast Mission Canadian Welfare Council B.C.S.P.C.A. Vancouver B.C.S.P.C.A. West Vancouver 11 Dependency Disabled Veterans Last Post Fund . Returned Soldiers Service West Vancouver Welfare Assn. 31a Description of Services by Problems 111 Health B.C. Epilepsy B.C. Epilepsy Van. Branch B.C. Medical Research Foundation Can. A r t h r i t i s and Rheumatism Society Can. Mental Health Assn. B.C. Div i s i o n Can. Mental Health Assn. Van. Branch Can. Mental Health Assn. North Shore Branch Cdn. Nat. Institute fo r the Blind Children's Hospital Greater Vancouver Health League St. John's Ambulance St. John's Bumaby Society f o r Advance-ment of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing Sunny'View Hospital V.O.NV V.O.N. Burnaby V.O.N. North Van. V.O.N. West Van. Cerebral Palsy Assn. of Greater Vancouver Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada Muscular Dystrophy Assn. of Canada H.C. Children's Res. 22 Maladjustment Big Brothers Association B.C. Borstal Association Catholic Children 's Aid Society Children's Aid Society Family Service Agency Children 1s Foundation Youth Counsel-l i n g Service Child Care Centre John Howard Society Working Boy's Home Society 10 Recreation Alexandra Neigh-bourhood House Boys Clubs of Van. Boys Clubs of Canada Boy Scouts of Canada Boy Scouts, Metro. Vancouver Region Boy Scouts of Canada Pro v i n c i a l Council Camp Alexandra Cedar Cottage Neigh-bourhood House E i r s t United Church Summer Camp G i r l Guides Assn. Bumaby Area G i r l Guides Van. Council Gordon Neighbourhood House Mission to Seamen Van. Branch Mission to Seamen N. Van. Branch North Shore Neighbourhood House N. Van. Memorial Community Centre Van. G i r l s Club Assn Y.M.C.A. Burnaby Y.M.C.A. Gr. Van. Y.W.C.A. 20 32 carried out according to municipal boundaries. Mental health, services under p r o v i n c i a l auspices provide diagnostic, t r e a t -ment and after-care services to the whole metropolitan area. From th i s admittedly imprecise sketch of. public services i t may be seen that wide variations i n public acceptance and assignment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y occur. Some basic services of unquestioned importance remain the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of private voluntary agencies, while others may be altogether lacking throughout the metropolitan area. An approach to the description of services according to the problems they solve (or attempt to solve) i s offered i n the framework employed by the Community Research Associates i n t h e i r search f o r ways of analysing and planning f o r community s e r v i c e s . 1 Applying t h i s to the private voluntary agencies of the Vancouver Community Chest and Councils i t i s possible to arrive at a rough categorization of the 67 member agencies l i s t e d i n 1961. 2 See Table "5. While t h i s represents an exceedingly rough c l a s s i f i -cation, we believe i t portrays i n a graphic way what Buell •^Buell, op. c i t . . p. 194 2The reservation must be added that there i s much to c r i t i c i z e i n the crudity of our method. But i t i s arguable that i t s use i s j u s t i f i a b l e i n that i t graphically, (ifsimply), demonstrates an i n t e l l i g i b l e pattern. A number of multi-function agencies were c l a s s i f i e d according to t h e i r primary function. The miscellaneous group served either very li m i t e d c l i e n t e l e - planning needs, or such a variety of problems that they defied c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by t h i s method. 33 has to say about patterns of community service: "The structure of community services was b u i l t l a r g e l y without benefit of blueprint...Different parts were,constructed at d i f f e r e n t times....".and l a t e r " . . . i t presents a picture of such com-p l e x i t y that i t can scarcely be comprehended".1 Buell goes on to observe that there i s abundant c i t i z e n b e l i e f i n the importance of welfare services, but notes the existence of general confusion and f r u s t r a t i o n about what a coherent design of services ought to be. It i s our b e l i e f that the c i t i z e n s of Vancouver themselves hold the key to coherence i n s o c i a l welfare services. The question of how they p a r t i c i p a t e , i n what manner, and with what effectiveness, are questions of central concern to our present study. Jv Community Power Structure. Oligopoly, and Conspiracy Assuming that d e f i c i e n c i e s i n the p o l i c y and decision making structure of voluntary agencies might i n fact be found, what inferences could be made? Who does i n fac t exercise the.power, make the decisions, and set the p o l i c i e s ? Wilensky and lebeaux 1 speculate about the location and con-sequences of the power structure f o r community services and suggest that the existence of s o c i a l - c l a s s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s i n board members (for example) may have subtle influence on the al l o c a t i o n of welfare resources, thereby c o n f l i c t i n g with the larger public i n t e r e s t . That observable patterns of influence op. c i t . 34 are relevant to the form and directions of welfare services i s borne out i n such studies as that of Floyd Hunter. 1 To an i n -determinable extent, i t s findings must be q u a l i f i e d i n that the community he investigated i s i n the deep South of the United States where the influence of organized labour i s weak. But his conclusion that power resided i n a very few t o p - f l i g h t leaders who, working behind "second-rate" and "third-rate" leaders, successfully transmitted t h e i r wishes through the l a t t e r 1 s informal representation i n community organizations, i s , i f true, a finding which might very well be replicated elsewhere. The suspicion — indeed, the very notion, that decisions of such consequence should be made i n t h i s way i s so repugnant that the private agencies owe to themselves no les s than to the public to give no possible cause f o r the idea. Hunter's contribution to the understanding of urban power structure may be large i n the technical innovations of i t s method, f o r Rossi i s only one of many who have pointed out that other c i t i e s may operate d i f f e r e n t l y . His studies con-cerned northern United States c i t i e s i n the mid-west i n which he observed community influence d i s t i n c t l y divided into public and private sectors, each with i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c interests and objectives. 'Hunter, on. c i t . 35 The f u n c t i o n of the p r i v a t e s e c t o r seems to be to p r o v i d e i n n o v a t i o n and f l e x i b i l i t y i n community o r g a n i z a t i o n and to provide them more q u i c k l y than the clumsy method of n e g o t i a t i o n and t r a d i n g p rovided through r e g u l a r p o l i t i c a l machinery...a means whereby the top ranks of the s t a t u s system w i t h i n l o c a l communities, can p l a y r o l e s i n policy-making without going through the p o l i t i c a l machinery of nomination and e l e c t i o n . 1 The c o n c l u s i o n i s thus f o r c i b l y made c l e a r i n so f a r as complex p o l i t i c a l economic and s o c i a l f o r c e s may enter i n t o the governmental processes of p r i v a t e v o l u n t a r y w e l f a r e agencies, i t i s , f o r the p r o f e s s i o n a l s o c i a l worker concerned w i t h standards of community s e r v i c e s , e s s e n t i a l to possess some understanding of the u n d e r l y i n g power s t r u c t u r e . An u n d e r t a k i n g of t h a t magnitude c l e a r l y l i e s beyond the scope of the present study, but i t i s one which m a n i f e s t l y commands h i g h p r i o r i t y i f the system of p r i v a t e w e l f a r e i s t o have any claims to being, l i k e Caesar's w i f e , beyond reproach.' To sum up, then, many threads may be seen i n t e r -woven i n the s i g n i f i c a n c e of r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s as i t a p p l i e s i n the s o c i a l w e l f a r e s e t t i n g . In undertaking the necessary e m p i r i c a l study the ambiguity suggests the p r o b a b i l i t y our f i n d i n g s may be somewhat l e s s than p r e c i s e and p o i n t e d . That Pennington and Walker showed a p e r v a s i v e l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n about e x i s t i n g s e r v i c e s i n one union l o c a l , r a i s e d a number 1 R o s s i , P., Power P o l i t i c s a Road to S o c i a l Reform, S o c i a l S e r v i c e Review. December, 1961. p op. c i t y 36 of questions about the kind of involvement by Trade Union members i n the s o c i a l welfare structure of the community i s obvious. That f u l l y democratic procedures operate i n the governing of private agencies as debatable evidence of some community inattention to a m u l t i p l i c i t y of s o c i a l welfare problems i s obvious. This would indicate the existence of obstacles to forward looking vigorous p o l i c i e s . The privateness of private agencies has been questioned and contradictory role conceptions have been i d e n t i f i e d . We are l e f t with the underlying question about the part t h i s ambiguity and confusion play i n the government of these agencies. Here, then, i s a legitimate subject f o r enquiry, representativeness of the private agency as exemplified i n the representation of trade union members on agency boards. CHAPTER 2 SOME CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS A. The Voluntary Association as an Ideal Type Reference was made i n the l a s t chapter to the serious ambiguity attaching to the issue of the location of the voluntary welfare agencies i n r e l a t i o n to the co-ordinates of "private" and "public" status. A term l i k e "partnership" when used as a way of characterizing the relations between voluntary welfare agencies and governmental welfare departments, carries an elusive but oddly obstinate suggestion that the private agencies have some kind of q u a s i - o f f i c i a l , semi-sanctioned role which would make i t improper, i n more ways than the obvious one, to put them on the same footing as Bunny Clubs. We have already suggested that t h i s ambiguity (putting aside the question of where the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r creating i t l i e s ) i s often "functional" f o r the private agencies, i n as much as i t enables them to invest t h e i r fund-raising campaigns with a rhetoric of "duty" which i s questionable i f not actually specious. What we wish to turn to at t h i s point, however, i s the kind of "assessment of the voluntary agencies that becomes relevant and legitimate when they are viewed expressly as a species of private association. Just how the voluntary agencies would emerge from the sort of scrutiny they would be l i a b l e to i f they were public bodies ( i n respect, f o r example, of the p r i n c i p l e of 38 accountability) we should hardly l i k e to say; though guesses are not impossible. But i t i s easy to overlook the fact that certain standards of judgement are s t i l l available to us even i f the voluntary agencies are concluded to be wholly and unequivocally i n the private sphere. The conduct of the a f f a i r s of a private association i s not something on which comment i s rendered impossible by virtue of the fact that no rules exist to inform and guide i t . A l l i s not abandoned to caprice. Private societies are not quite so private as private v i c e s . In fact the s t i c k s f o r beating t h i s p a r t i c u l a r dog would be enough to make up a sizeable fagot. The simplest and most cogent approach, however, i s probably to be found i n the evaluative implications of the normal methods of running a private association. Private associations, as we have already (no doubt superfluously) commented, exist i n the greatest abundance and v a r i e t y i n our society. Over the course of the years, moreover, c e r t a i n l y widely — not to say u n i v e r s a l l y — honoured p r i n c i p l e s of organization have emerged, certain standards of constitutional propriety have developed, which at t h i s date have something of the force of a c r i t e r i o n of legitimation. We may say, indeed, that when a private association offends against these p r i n c i p l e s and deviates from these standards, we are not merely e n t i t l e d to surprise; we are also entitled"to an explanation. 39 Two supplementary observations are i n order. The f i r s t i s that our claims regarding the existence of genuine p r i n c i p l e s of legitimacy i n the a f f a i r s of private associations are not just wishful extrapolations of our own. They are clear and r e a l enough i n many cases to be embodied i n law. We mean, of course, that there i s scarcely a part of the c i v i l i z e d world where there i s not to be found some form of l e g i s l a t i o n specifying the constitutional p r i n c i p l e s which private associations must abide by i f they are (for example) to enjoy the priv i l e g e s of lim i t e d l i a b i l i t y . The second point to be made i s that there i s a l o g i c of associational forms from which — unlike the law — nobody can obtain exemption.' To take the simplest possible example, l e t the reader ponder f o r a moment the relations between a "delegate", the "mandate" he carri e s , and the "authority" he wields. That these notions are l i k e l y to have a stamp of i irrelevant abstraction on them i s no more than a measure of the degeneracy of the public philosophy i n contemporary North American l i f e . The fa c t remains that without some such theory, we surrender our a f f a i r s to expediency and chance. 1 > Naturally, few private associations conform i n every aspect to the constitutional and procedural norms we have been speaking of. What we propose to do, therefore, i s compile a synthetic account of the private association, something i n the ^Tussman, J.B., Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c . Oxford University Press, London, 1959 40 manner of Max Weber's "i d e a l types". Space does not allow us to go beyond a simple adumbration of what we might c a l l i t s modal ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s , but we assume i n any case that they w i l l be f a m i l i a r and i n t e l l i g i b l e enough to stay beyond the reach of controversy. (A) Membership In most private associations certain procedures must be followed before an i n d i v i d u a l i s accepted for membership. To begin with, l i m i t a t i o n s may be set as to the number of members the association can have. Another common l i m i t a t i o n takes the form of the requirement that the applicant belong to some p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o n or race, or possess some special personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , be i t no more than a p a r t i c u l a r handicap. In any event, a candidate f o r membership must s a t i s f y whatever e l i g i b i l i t y requirements the association has , l a i d down i n i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 Another procedure that i s usually, i f not i n f a l l i b l y , followed i s that the candidate f o r membership must be endorsed or sponsored by one or more "members i n good standing", or must submit his name either to the executive or to the members f o r his acceptance or re j e c t i o n to be put to a vote. Membership fees or dues are o r d i n a r i l y payable at regular and stated i n t e r v a l s , — usually once a year, the amount being determined either by the executive or the membership at large. "A f u l l y paid up member" 1The point may sound merely tau t o l o g i c a l . What we are claiming however, i s that without some reasonably precise c r i t e r i a of e l i g i b i l i t y f o r membership, l i t t l e that i s worth saying can be said about the associations purposes, composition or i n t e r n a l d i s c i p l i n e . 41 i s an expression often heard, and i n most associations the members voting rights are only,in e f f e c t i f he carries t h i s status. Membership invests the in d i v i d u a l with certain r i g h t s , obligations, and p r i v i l e g e s . He has.the r i g h t to vote, to stand f o r executive positions and other o f f i c e s i n the association, to be heard i n i t s constituted forums, and to take some determined and i n t e l l i g i b l e part i n the formulation of the association's p o l i c i e s . He also has the ri g h t to associate his name with the organization, and w i l l generally be on the mailing l i s t f o r newsletters, notices of meetings and f i n a n c i a l reports. As f o r t h e i r obligations, members are said to be "subscribers to the constitution", and are expected "...to adhere to those p r i n c i p l e s " found i n the constitution. In some cases the association may even urge i t s members to develop and l i v e the "philosophy of l i f e " which the association exists to promote or to which i t elaborately d e f e r s . 1 The member i s also urged to "back" the group's various projects, and i s constantly reminded that i t i s "his association" and that he has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to see that i t i s run properly. The rights and obligations of a member are the con-di t i o n s that give meaning to his role as a member. They-define Something to be found i n organizations as diverse as the Communist Party and the Shriners. 42 what he can or cannot do, they s p e l l out how and to what degree he i s able to participate i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the association. Indeed, there i s a sense i n which they t e l l him why he i s i n the association, and more so f o r one that i s professedly democratic i n nature. Membership, i n f a c t , i s what makes the differences between an association and a clique. Mention of the matter of the rights and obligations of membership naturally brings up the question of types of member-ship. Some associations have various categories of membership which are set down i n the constitution. Familiar examples would be active and non-active members, junior members, honorary members, corresponding members and associate members. Each class of membership has i t s peculiar rights and obligations. For example, an honorary membership may not carry, with i t the ri g h t to vote or run f o r o f f i c e . Whatever the type of member-ship, the provision f o r i t , and the degree of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the association conferred by i t are more often than not spelled out i n the constitution, as are the ways and means of acquiring such membership. There i s also provision f o r the f o r f e i t u r e of membership. This procedure i s t y p i c a l l y connected with default i n the payment of fees, but provision i s also made f o r f o r f e i t u r e of membership "...upon a charge of conduct unbecoming to the ideals and interests" of the association. This i s usually done by s t r i k i n g the offender's name from the " r o l l of membership". 43 (B) Meetings The vehicle most commonly employed f o r member p a r t i c i -pation i s the general meeting. 1 The number of meetings per year w i l l almost always be set out i n the constitution, while pro-v i s i o n i s also made f o r the c a l l i n g of "extraordinary" or "emergency" meetings. The type of business to be dealt with at both executive and general meetings i s c l e a r l y formulated, and rules are made as to what constitutes a quorum and what majority p r i n c i p l e i s to be used to pass the di f f e r e n t kinds of motions. Notice of a scheduled meeting must state the relevant time and place and must be issued s u f f i c i e n t l y well i n advance p of i t s occurrence to permit nearly universal attendance. An agenda f o r the meeting i s sent with the notice, which i s usually mailed to each member about f i f t e e n days i n advance of the meeting. At any meeting only members."in good standing" are e n t i t l e d to vote, and provision i s usually made f o r the absentee to vote on important issues by proxy. (C) The Executive To be a member of the executive of an association one must f i r s t be a "member i n good standing". The procedure f o r el e c t i o n of o f f i c e r s ( i n the respect which p r i n c i p a l l y concerns us) i s that nominations are open i n advance of the meeting, as well as at the meeting i t s e l f , when they can be placed from the Though of course there are many others, — such as serving on special committees, representing the association i n and to the "outside" world, taking part i n various a u x i l i a r y service a c t i v i t i e s and so f o r t h . 2 A matter on which the Declaration of Independence had some germane observations. 44 " f l o o r " . The nomination must be moved and seconded, and a f t e r a s u f f i c i e n t lapse of time, nominations are.closed. A b a l l o t i s then prepared and members vote f o r whom they want. The vote can be either by secret b a l l o t or show of hands. The terms ( i . e . duration) of o f f i c e f o r each executive position are stipulated i n the constitution, as are t h e i r prerogatives and duties. The chief executive i s usually called on to act as chairman at meetings, while his guide to the conduct of business at the meeting i s almost always Robert's renowned Rules of Order. We have seen how various the entailments of member-ship may be. But i t s most s i g n i f i c a n t and frequently encountered elements are subscription to the constitutions ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , to the aims of the organization),," the payment of dues, the right to participate i n the governing of the organization, or to participate i n the selection of those who do constitute i t s government, or f a i l i n g these, to s i g n i f y assent to the condition of being governed; the r i g h t of access to information concerning the a f f a i r s of the association; the reasonable assurance that those of one's interests which l i e with the association are under responsible guardianship; the ri g h t to the confident expectation of procedural r a t i o n a l i t y ; and the whole range of obligations which arises i n compli-mentary fashion to the r i g h t s . Where the main body of these conditions does not exist, "membership" i s no more than nominal or ceremonial. I t serves as a cheap symbolic reward 45 f o r acquiescence i n some half improper exaction. It employs the grammar of p o l i t i c a l l i f e while i t convertly derides i t s meanings. To the extent that the voluntary welfare agencies approximate the "type" or model of the private association, they become vulnerable to what we may c a l l the judgement of discrepancy. We w i l l now therefore review the manner i n which they conduct t h e i r " p o l i t i c a l " business and suggest the ways i n which — whether the standards invoked are unashamedly i d e a l or merely customary — they may be thought to f a l l short. B. The Red Feather Agencies as Private Associations "Numerous" and "bewildering" would be apt adjectives to employ when attempting to describe the membership p o l i c i e s of the Vancouver Red Feather agencies. "Numerous" because the p o l i c i e s are almost as p l e n t i f u l as the agencies themselves; "bewildering" because the approach to the problem of membership, where i t receives the courtesy of any attention at a l l , i s inconsistent and i r r e g u l a r . In f a c t , i n a l l the various aspects of membership, ( s o l i c i t i n g , recruitment, p a r t i c i p a t i o n , payment of dues, and the r e c i p r o c a l expectations of agency and members), confusion i s always one of the over-tones, and sometimes the keynote i t s e l f . The inconsistency and i r r e g u l a r i t y we speak of exist not only i n regard to the varied approaches to membership 46 among and between the d i f f e r e n t agencies, but also within the separate agencies themselves. The c r i t e r i a of membership any one agency defers to may i n some cases be f u l l y met; but more often than not, t h e i r observance w i l l be intermittent, incom-plete and h a l f hearted. In the extreme instance, the existence of membership w i l l be limited to the printed word i n the con-s t i t u t i o n . Most agencies do indeed l a y claim to having some form of membership.1 But the procedures followed i n s o l i c i t i n g and r e c r u i t i n g a membership seems to be whimsically variable. Some agencies have application forms attached to t h e i r "public r e l a t i o n s " brochures, and advise the (presumably fortuitous) reader that membership can be acquired by f i l l i n g i n the form and enclosing "X" d o l l a r s . The rights and obligations of membership are r a r e l y made e x p l i c i t ; and the only c r i t e r i o n of a d m i s s i b i l i t y , f o r the most part, seems to be the payment of the fee. Other agencies have stated that anybody who c o n t r i -butes to the annual Red Feather fund-raising campaign acquires, ipso facto, membership i n the agency. This procedure with i t s evocation of the common association between the l o c a l franchise and .tax-paying, has a democratic r i n g to i t . But i f examined a l i t t l e more closely, i t reveals weaknesses which v i r t u a l l y n u l l i f y any advantages i t might have. For example, how many contributors i n fact know that they have become members For d e t a i l s of the sources of our information and . our methods of c o l l e c t i n g i t , see the appendix on methodology. 47 of the agency? And i f they did know, what would the news convey to them? And i f they do not know these things how can they carry out t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and enjoy t h e i r rights as members? Furthermore, there i s something bordering on f a t u i t y i n a p r i n c i p l e of membership which i s so "open-ended" and indiscriminate that no one with the price of admission i s excluded from i t . The one thing we recognize about a man who claims that everybody i s his f r i e n d i s that he has no friends. Yet other agencies make, a practice of s o l i c i t i n g membership fees at t h e i r annual meetings. This i s usually accomplished by having a table set up near the main entrance to the meeting h a l l where memberships can be purchased, — an act which i s le s s l i k e a sacred i n i t i a t i o n than i t i s the process of stopping at the t i c k e t kiosk on the way into a theatre. When s o l i c i t a t i o n f o r membership takes place i n t h i s manner: one finds i t hard not to wonder whether i t s acquisition i s brought about through interest or embarrassment. All-out drives f o r membership are very rare; and even below that perhaps excessively optimistic standard of p r o s e l y t i z i n g zeal, there seems to be a good deal of v a r i a t i o n i n the amount of ostensible deference to the Chest's formal and informal expectations i n t h i s regard. Certain agencies, when asked f o r statements on the membership question, l a c o n i c a l l y admitted that campaigns were not carried out: i n accordance with the wishes, express and t a c i t , of the Chest. Certain others, 48 on the other hand, do s o l i c i t memberships i n an active way. Probably the best way to describe the differences i n the quality and extensiveness of the interaction between membership and the agency executive i s to view i t as a continuum. At the one end we have agencies that meet the f u l l requirements of procedural rigour and in t e r n a l v i t a l i t y that we have described i n bur "i d e a l type". At the other end, we have agencies with no membership at' a l l , or a membership which i s a respectable l e g a l f i c t i o n , or a membership which i s composed exclusively of the organization's , o f f i c e r s ; of whom i t may at le a s t be said that they r a r e l y lose touch with t h e i r constituents. Whatever the sources, composition and methods of enrollment of an .'organization's membership, i t i s s t i l l possible to ask pertinent questions about i t s l e v e l of involvements i n the organization's p o l i c i e s and a c t i v i t i e s . We have already observed that the p r i n c i p a l medium f o r the expression of the member's opinions (even i f these are limited to modest indications of preference as to whi6& persons are going to do t h e i r thinking f o r them) i s the general meeting. 1 The member-ship of most voluntary welfare agencies can be said to receive .regular notice of one meeting only, — namely the so-called Though we r e c o i l from the thought that t h i s crude "feed-back" device be accepted as anything but the barest allowable minimum. I f c r i t i c s can argue that even the B r i t i s h House of Commons i s no check on the development of o l i g a r c h i -c a l r u le, we can hardly look on the two hours per year devoted to the democratic dialogue by the average private welfare agency as the latter-day equivalent of the New England Town Meeting. 49 annual meeting. Usually, t h i s notice i s given through advertisements i n the l o c a l press, spot announcements on l o c a l radio stations, and l e t t e r s to other Chest agencies. Few agencies go to the trouble of informing t h e i r members i n d i v i d u a l l y . Putting aside the u n o f f i c i a l business transacted on such occasions (the appearance of guest speakers, etc.), three main events usually take place at the annual general meeting. F i r s t , the President's report i s given and those attending the meeting are called on to vote i t s acceptance. Then the same procedure i s carried out for the executive director's (and perhaps the Treasurer's) report. Once these reports have been read the meeting moves to the elec t i o n of o f f i c e r s . The chairman of the nominating committee i s ca l l e d on to place before the meeting the names of nominees f o r the board of dire c t o r s . I t i s a rare occurrence i f the number of names on the slate i s not i d e n t i c a l with the number of vacancies; and no case has ever come to our attention i n which two or more candidates f o r the same vacancy s o l i c i t e d the favour of the voters by describing and attempting to j u s t i f y t h e i r respective approaches to the tasks of o f f i c e . However, nominations are usually c a l l e d f o r from the " f l o o r " , and f o r a few strained minutes, something akin to fear seems to gri p the meeting with the thought that someone might dare to introduce a disordant note of factionalism by responding to the i n v i t a t i o n . Since 50 i t i s exceptional f o r anybody to do so, a motion i s put forward that nominations cease, a vote i s taken, (usually by a show of hands) and the new board members are e l e c t e d . 1 I f we are to be altogether, candid, the annual meeting partakes more of the character of r i t u a l than i t does of deliberation. Although i t would be l i t e r a l l y f a l s e to say that there i s no p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the membership, and although we r e a d i l y concede that the s t y l i z e d account of the occasion, we have given i s a compressed and impoverished version of the r e a l thing, i t would be an act of e x p l i c i t mendacity or of inexcusable innocence to suggest that proceedings such as these bear any resemblance to the democratic assembly they are supposed to be. I f we were not f a m i l i a r with the story of the Emperor's Hew Clothes, we should wonder how apparently responsible adults could continue to be accomplices i n such solemn mummery. C. The Case of the Community Chest The Chest as the "parent" agency i s naturally looked to f o r leadership, and because of t h i s might reasonably be ex-pected to set an example i n the c l a r i t y of i t s constitutional forms and the impeccability of i t s p o l i t i c a l processes. Yet we f i n d that i n many ways i t s practices are even more disingenuous than those of the constituent agencies. For example, the 1The vote, by the way, i s generally upon a motion that the report of the nominating committee be accepted. In the s t r i c t e s t sense, i t i s not an e l e c t o r a l vote at a l l . 51 constitution outlines e l i g i b i l i t y f o r ind i v i d u a l membership thus: Each contributor to the Annual Fin a n c i a l Campaign of the Society s h a l l f o r the en-suing f i s c a l year be an in d i v i d u a l member of the society and any other person may, upon approval of the Board of Directors, become an in d i v i d u a l member.1 This statement alone amkes membership half meaning-l e s s . Whatever vie~ws we might have about the membership-by-donation p r i n c i p l e , i t does at least have certain categorical boundaries. But a supplementary and residual category of membership which includes terms l i k e "any other person" (approved by the Board) i s so nebulous as v i r t u a l l y to debauch the concept of any meaning at a l l . In any case, what does i t s i g n i f y i f one does have membership i n the Chest? The number of contributors to the annual fund-raising campaign i n 1962 has been calculated at 125,000. This means that there are 125,000 members. Each year the Chest holds i t s annual meeting, and notice of i t i s d u t i f u l l y placed i n l o c a l newspapers a set number of days i n advance. What happens afte r that however, i s a great deal more l i a b l e to c r i t i c i s m . In the f i r s t place, the meeting i s held at a time of day when by f a r the greater number of members are unable to attend. Furthermore, i t i s a luncheon meeting, so that an extra contribution of $2.00 i s e f f e c t i v e l y required ^Constitution of Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, By-Law No. 1: Membership, (adopted as new Constitution and By-Laws, March 28, 1962.) 52 before members can take part. Not only t h i s , but personal i n -v i t a t i o n s have often been sent already to selected persons, though the basis of the sel e c t i o n and the motive f o r creating such a favoured group both remain obscure. Since the eating place can only seat approximately 500 people, t h i s means that arrangements are made for the attendance of only .04 percent of the membership. Even th i s small percentage of members has l i t t l e r e a l opportunity f o r authentic p a r t i c i p a t i o n . They are called on i n the customary manner to vote acceptance of the president's report and the executive director's report, and to endorse the slate of new members f o r the Chest Board of Directors. There i s no arrangement f o r nominations from the f l o o r of the meeting. The only way i n which the nomination of a person not on the slate can take place i s by contacting the nominating committee chairman at least twenty-four hours i n advance of the meeting. It i s true, of course, that the press i s usually i n attendance at these meetings. But i t i s also true that there i s often TV coverage of the hearings of the House Un-American A c t i v i t i e s Committee.1 I t goes without saying that we intend no comparison between the two bodies. The point we are making i s that p u b l i c i t y as such offers no guarantee that there w i l l be scrupulous and consistent observance of the pr i n c i p l e s of procedural r a t i o n a l i t y and democratic responsiveness. Sometimes, indeed, the very contrary. 53 D. The Membership Problem and the Public Perception of the  Agencies It i s a fact of more than confessional significance that a f t e r several months of careful study of these questions, we s t i l l f i n d i t impossible to formulate a clear cut statement on the theory of membership and i t s functions which, on the evidence of t h e i r practices and utterances a l i k e , we f e e l confident i n a t t r i b u t i n g to the Chest and i t s constituent agencies. What views the public at large entertains on these questions are beyond conjecture. One summary comment, however, i s unavoidable. It i s certain that the private, welfare agencies have not succeeded i n achieving a viable and inter-consistent a r t i c u l a t i o n of the various functions of membership. Some view i t as a service function - i n other words they see the job of a member as that of performing various tasks such as stenographic work, chauffeuring, helping i n arrangements fo r agency s o c i a l "• functions such as spring teas, — very much i n the manner of the Ladies' A u x i l i a r y . Others would appear to conceive a., membership as a regrettable c o r o l l a r y of the agency's status as an "open" association. A t h i r d group regards the members as a l o y a l following of retainers whose unquestioning support of the agency's a c t i v i t i e s w i l l help protect i t against impertinent c r i t i c i s m . Pew of the people who ought to know better seem to 54 recognize the governing function of membership, — the r e a l sense i n which i t i s the association's sovereign body. And many would i n fact deny th i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to members. This i s a point of view which s i t s poorly with'that democratic f a i t h which asserts the capacity, right and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of ordinary men and women to arbitrate the p o l i c i e s of the nation i t s e l f . It i s small wonder that agency directors and other professional personnel complain about the lack of public interest i n t h e i r agencies. Perhaps they should come to terms with the simple truisms that the commonest response to indifference i s more indifference, and that the easiest defence against arrogance i s s u l l e n apathy. CHAPTER 3 THE FUNCTION AND COMPOSITION OF AGENCY BOARDS A. Function It has "been pointed out above that while the concept of representation has a hallowed place i n democratic theory, i t i s also true that the term has several meanings and i s often used with woeful vagueness. In the f i e l d of s o c i a l welfare i t s employment has perhaps yet to be brought beyond the point where i t i s used s o l e l y to s i g n i f y good intentions. The problem of representation and i t s meaning come into focus quite sharply, when we consider theory and practice i n the private welfare f i e l d regarding the "selection" or "election" of board members. I t i s a prescribed stance of agencies to stress the "democratic" nature of t h e i r governing process, but on the basis of membership practices alone, we have been in c l i n e d to r a i s e serious questions about the discrepancies of profession and accomplishment. But to take the matter an obvious step further, what are we to suppose are the considerations which influence the appointment of board members? I f the democratic process at the l e v e l of membership i s not functioning e f f e c t i v e l y , and i f the voice of the general membership seems not to have the reverberant power commonly ascribed to vox populi, who ac t u a l l y chooses the board': members, and f o r what reasons? An examination of the professional l i t e r a t u r e (a s i g n i f i c a n t 56 "double entente") and the constitutions and practices of agencies, leads to the conclusion that the pr i n c i p l e s and ideas surrounding the selection of board members are heterogeneous, competitive, and of variable cogency. These p r i n c i p l e s and ideas are not usually a r t i c u l a t e d on the l o c a l scene, and are seldom made e x p l i c i t either i n constitutional form or i n the announced c r i t e r i a f o r board membership. They are nevertheless operative i n the private welfare f i e l d i n North America, and w i l l probably be recognized as being i n f l u e n t i a l i n most, i f not a l l l o c a l agency settings. One of the most i n t r i g u i n g of these p r i n c i p l e s i s that generally known as the "bellwether" p r i n c i p l e , which i s defined by Hunter, Schaffer and Sheps as the p r i n c i p l e "...that conviction on the part of leaders w i l l bring acceptance of large groups of people f o r any idea promulgated and provide a basis f o r community wide support and s o l i d a r i t y i n r e l a t i o n to the p a r t i c u l a r program under consideration." 1 Clarence "Sing applies t h i s notion to s o c i a l agency boards when he says: Probably the task which most boards do best i s sponsoring the work; giving i t prestige and s o c i a l sanction....An i d e a l board from the standpoint of prestige would include a leader from every important group i n town. Thus c o l l e c t i v e l y t h e i r various pyramids of influence would comprise the whole community.2 ^Hunter, Floyd, Ruth Connor Schaffer, and C e c i l G-. Sheps, Community Organization: Action and Inaction, p. 243 2King, Clarence, Social Agency Boards and How to  Make Them E f f e c t i v e , pp. 8 - 9 . 57 The enunciation of such a p r i n c i p l e helps to under-l i n e what we believe to be generally true i n the private welfare f i e l d : namely that there i s often keen (though generally covert) competition between s o c i a l agencies, both fo r prestige and f i n a n c i a l support. When the board is. seen as a device f o r endowing the agency with prestige and giving i t a fund-raising advantage, serious l i m i t a t i o n s to the democratic p r i n c i p l e immediately insinuate themselves. It i s a well-known p r i n c i p l e i n the competitive world of business that a company's board of directors i s not only a r e f l e c t i o n of the company's prestige and standing but also a means by which i t s prestige i s enhanced or main-tained. The assumption behind the "bell-wether" p r i n c i p l e seems to be that the private welfare f i e l d i s , and perhaps ought to be, competitive i n a similar way; and that the prestige, income, and standards of service of an agency are to be determined less by the idiosyncratic pattern of needs i n the community than by the impressiveness of the agency's board of d i r e c t o r s . The assumption also appears to be i m p l i c i t that services have somehow to be "sold" to the public, and that t h i s i s best done not by c a l l i n g attention to the needs themselves and the available ways of meeting them, but by i n v i t i n g respectful contemplation of-those who happen to be on the board. Just how f a r the "bell-wether" p r i n c i p l e i s r e -moved from democratic intention i s well i l l u s t r a t e d i n 58 Sorenson's version of i t s The reputation of the board members i s a generally accepted way of guaranteeing to the community the i n t e g r i t y of the agency. One way a community judges whether an agency i s doing what i t exists f o r , whether i t i s r e a l l y needed, and whether i t s money i s well spent i s by i t s f a i t h i n the c i t i z e n s on the board.1 In the democratic process, reputation may play some part i n the e l e c t i o n of the representative who i s to act on our behalf, though his attitudes on p o l i c y issues w i l l be of equal, i f not greater importance. But once elected his reputation becomes ir r e l e v a n t , and his performance, and his account of the p r i n c i p l e s which sustained i t , become the s i g n i f i c a n t c r i t e r i a . In addition, the p r i n c i p l e of accountability, (that the representative must answer to those who elected him f o r what he has done), assures that a repre-sentative performance i s always subject to examination." But to assume that reputation on the one hand ensures adequate performance, and on the other eliminates the necessity of determining whether i t was adequate, i s not democratic or even very i n t e l l i g e n t . Reputation actually ensures nothing more than good intentions, i f that; and while we may put " f a i t h " i n our leaders, (as we do also i n a new. dentist or an untried frozen food product), we reserve the right to remove our " f a i t h " because of what they do or do not do. Sorenson, Roy, The Art of Board Membership, p. 51 59 We w i l l say nothing at t h i s point about the frequent irrelevance to the requirements of the o f f i c e of the accomplishments by which the reputation has been achieved. It i s observable, however, that the private welfare agencies are not immune from what future p o l i t i c a l theorists may come to c a l l "The Red K e l l y f a l l a c y . " ' X second and related factor influencing the selection of board members, and one even le s s often made e x p l i c i t , i s that of the relationship between an individual's success i n business and his a c t i v i t y i n philanthropy. In a highly germane study of a Canadian c i t y , which she c a l l s W e l l s v i l l e , Aileen Ross shows convincingly ...that philanthropy, most p a r t i c u l a r l y the organization of f i n a n c i a l campaigns, i s a substantial a c t i v i t y of the successful busi-ness man. Moreover such a c t i v i t y not only f a c i l i t a t e s business careers.in ways well recognized by the f r a t e r n i t y of successful business men, but also enters as a substantial ingredient i n the public relations programs of modern corporations.! One of the indications of a s i g n i f i c a n t relationship between philanthropic a c t i v i t y and the business career was Ross's discovery of an "amazing p a r a l l e l " between a business man's position i n the campaign hierarchy and i n the business world. Ross concludes that "...there i s a decided relationship between the r i s e of a man to the top executive positions i n 2 charitable campaigns, and his r i s e in.the business hierarchy." "4toss, Aileen, D., 'Thilanthropic A c t i v i t y and the Business Career", Social Forces. Vol. 32, p. 274 2 Ibid 60 However, the f i n a n c i a l campaign i s only part of the business interest i n philanthropy, and Ross also shows that, among 67 prominent business men who had held high executive positions i n the annual Community Chest campaigns, there was an extremely high l e v e l of p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the boards of agencies. Accurate information was not available f o r a l l of the sample of 67, but data obtained f o r 46 of the 67 showed that they had held positions on 146 boards of charitable agencies. Ross gives additional information which shows that the majority of the 67 had also held senior positions on the boards of u n i v e r s i t i e s and hospitals, and concludes: ...these figures indicate that executive positions i n s o c i a l agencies are another important adjunct to the business career. Moreover, these positions mark the incumbent as a person ready-and f i t - f o r further philanthropic r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and higher business positions.1 Of course, one would never be e n t i t l e d to say — ipso facto — that because business men occupied board positions i n large numbers, the agencies themselves had become " s a t e l l i t e s " of the business world; and i t would be exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to anatomize the process of subversion even i f i t occurred. I t i s d i f f i c u l t , however, to avoid the impression that pressures probably do exist and that they are fostered i n a variety of subtle ways. 'Ross, on. c i t . . p. 280 61 There i s no question that the association between the business community and the Community Chest i s a close, one i n most c i t i e s . A I960 Community Chest and Councils of Greater Vancouver Area campaign memorandum to business leaders reminded them that "...the Community Chest i s l a r g e l y a creation of the business interests of this community."1 Whatever else one might venture to read into such a statement, there i s unquestionably a note of appeal to parental obligation i n i t . It i s also clear that i n numerical terms alone the business community dominates agency boards; a fact that acquires extra resonance when we remind ourselves that whei?e the democratic e l e c t o r a l process i s not e f f e c t i v e , the board i s l a r g e l y free to perpetuate i t s e l f or to select candidates of whom i t approves. The conception of board membership as an "adjunct" to a business career i s , of course, quite remote from any generally understood notion of democratic process. It i s also, we are i n c l i n e d to think, based on certain assumptions about the relationship between philanthropy and economic success which, i f once of some v a l i d i t y , are much more questionable now that welfare services are increasingly recognized as a necessary and basic part of the community's provisions f o r i t s c i t i z e n s . The assumptions referred to are that "...philanthropy implies economic success", and that i t i s somehow natural that there Red Feather Handbook. Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, 1962. 62 should he an acq u i s i t i o n "...of certain prerogatives and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n the control of philanthropic i n s t i t u t i o n s " by those who are economically successful, and that board members should be "vocationally s u c c e s s f u l " . 1 But what, we wonder, i s the essential connection between a man's a b i l i t y to make money and his a b i l i t y to formulate welfare p o l i c i e s ? There i s none of which we are aware, and while many people of general a b i l i t y are also f i n a n c i a l l y successful, i t cannot be assumed axiomatically that economic success i s an indication of anything more than s k i l l at making money. Nor can i t be assumed that those who are les s successful economically are less competent i n the respects which matter here, f o r opportunities and circumstances may have severely l i m i t e d t h e i r scope, or, (one may even dare to think!) t h e i r interests and 2 energies may have been channeled i n other directions. A t h i r d influence manifest i n the selection of board members i s the idea that a board member should possess some pa r t i c u l a r s k i l l or intere s t relevant to the p a r t i c u l a r agency, and by implication, should therefore be better able to serve that agency than someone else would. Hughes, E.C., "The I n s t i t u t i o n a l Office and the Person", The American Journal of Sociology. Vol. 43, p. 411. 2 I t would be disingenuous to pretend that we do not know what kinds of arguments would be offered i n answer to these remarks: fag-end phrases having to do with "meeting a weekly p a y r o l l " etc.. But t h e i r enunciation would perhaps r e -quite a brashness and candour that are not always found i n the modern corporation executive. 63 One variant of t h i s attitude i s described i n Donnison's study of Brockville, Ontario. In discussing the board of the Children's Aid Society, Donnison says that board members are selected f o r the contribution they can make to the Society, and further that: ...they are chosen to represent not the community as a whole, but those organizations within i t which have shown themselves to be interested i n the Society and w i l l i n g to support i t . Organized labor and the large f r a t e r n a l associations, f o r instance, are not represented as such. Donnison goes on to state that "...no other selection p o l i c y could have gained the talent and energy now concentrated on the board." 1 There i s at l e a s t i n t h i s case no pretence about being democratic or representative of the "community" or even (though t h i s i s not stated) to being representative of the membership of the society. I t i s clear that what i s sought i s a board member's contribution i n furthering the a c t i v i t y and work of that p a r t i c u l a r agency. A frankly u t i l i t a r i a n and " a p o l i t i c a l " p r i n c i p l e l i k e t h i s may appear at f i r s t glance to be e n t i r e l y v a l i d , since i t i s generally agreed that s o c i a l agencies do "good work" which ought to be furthered and promoted. Yet second thoughts may show that the complexity of the structure of services i n a large community, and the great number of agencies comprised i n i t demand that certain further questions be raised. Donnison, D.V., Welfare Services i n a Canadian  Community, a Study of Brockville, Ontario, p. 139. 64 For one thing, are there not certain equivocal assumptions about the aptness of the competitive posture that underlies a selection p o l i c y of what so-and-so can do :;for our agency? For a second, i s i t not equally important f o r such-and-such an in d i v i d u a l to be enthusiastic and knowledgeable about other community agencies too? Is not the task of p o l i c y -making i n part the integration of a p a r t i c u l a r agency into the whole structure of community services? And further, how impartial i s a board chosen by t h i s p r i n c i p l e l i k e l y to be when faced with an apparent community need f o r the p a r t i c u l a r agency to cut down i t s service, or go out of existence, or become a public agency? Another facet of the same p r i n c i p l e i s that board members should be selected because of certain s k i l l s , or p a r t i c u l a r experiences, which thereby make them more useful to the agency. Sorenson points out: There are members whose chief contribution i s business and f i n a n c i a l judgment. Others offer such special professional experience as law, medicine, public r e l a t i o n s , education, or engineering. Some board members are highly useful because of i n t e l l e c t u a l a b i l i t i e s and capacity f o r analysis. S t i l l others are i n a position to f e e l the pulse of much of the community's organized l i f e . Board members from large business organizations bring one kind of experience; professional people and small entrepreneurs bring another. Educators, clergy and public o f f i c i a l s o f f e r s t i l l another kind of experience. Sorenson, op. c i t . . pp. 56-57. 65 A basic assumption i n this approach seems to be that the board performs a service function for the agency, and that such things as professional s k i l l or business judgment, which would normally have to be hired, can be made available i n t h i s way at l i t t l e or no cost. Again, democratic p r i n c i p l e s are not even paid the courtesy bf being rejected: they are simply ignored. There may — l e t us admit i t — be a case f o r a government of a l l the talents. But l e t us also admit that the problems of selecting a technocratic government are not c l a r i f i e d by suggesting that they have anything to do with the problems of ele c t i n g a democratic one. There are also other ways i n which the specialized attribute or function i s seen as a c r i t e r i o n of board membership. One of these i s to be seen i n the sectarian agencies, a l l of which, i n Vancouver, have a method f o r appointing a l l or part of t h e i r board so that a p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i o u s viewpoint i s well - i f not predominantly -represented. Since we are well aware of the immense complexity of the problems of Church and State (and of a l l those problems of which i t i s the paradigm), we should not l i k e to say that the sectarian agencies are acting improperly i n doing t h i s . But we are curious to know why they remain members of a united appeal. The health agencies provide yet another application 66 of the p r i n c i p l e of specialized service to the selection of boards. It i s not unusual f o r health agencies to have a r e l a t i v e l y high proportion of doctors on t h e i r boards, on the grounds that medical people are more competent to understand and plan when the problems being dealt with are l a r g e l y medical. One health agency at l e a s t , (and perhaps others), requires that a certain fixed minimum number of board members must be either parents with children suffering from the p a r t i c u l a r a f f l i c t i o n the agency ministers to, or adults who themselves have or have had the disease. A l l of these conditions involve a hedging-round of democratic process and a r e s t r i c t i o n i n the representative character of the board, i f only i n the sense that the res u l t i s a smaller and more specialized constituency from which board members can be drawn. In no case where the p r i n c i p l e of "specialized service" operates i s the general membership of the agency seen as the p o l i t i c a l society (as i t were) from which board members should be recruited, and of which they should be representative. Even i f the system were j u s t i f i a b l e on some such ground as that of e f f i c i e n c y , i t would s t i l l be a kind of benevolent colonialism. We are led to wonder what thinking l i e s behind these practices i n the health f i e l d ; f o r though i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to speculate on what i t might be, we have not so f a r encountered any systematic account of what i t i s . 67 Perhaps a l l that can be done here i s to voice some of the questions that the practice c a l l s to mind. There i s no doubt, of course, that any board working i n the health f i e l d w i l l frequently need to seek the services, of a medical consultant. But i t i s equally clear that many of the p o l i c y issues which w i l l i nevitably arise i n the course of such work go f a r beyond purely professional and technical concerns. Again, i t seems e n t i r e l y reasonable to suppose that s k i l l and understanding i n p o l i c y formation might be found just as abundantly and e a s i l y i n people whose knowledge of the d i s a b i l i t y was minimal, but whose understanding of the need and the service and i t s wider s o c i a l implications was f a r greater. 1 And what,, too, of those agencies which stipulate that the board must include a certain number of those who are a f f l i c t e d personally or have family members so a f f l i c t e d ? In what manner would t h i s misfortune qu a l i f y one f o r p o l i c y formation? Should family agencies i n -clude a certain number of board members with serious marital problems, or should the boards of c h i l d protection agencies include a minimum number of former wards, or parents whose children' have been recently apprehended on grounds of neglect? If we discount (which perhaps we ought not to do) the strangely cynical notion that a properly developed concern f o r the victim of disease i s dependent on one having the same disease oneself, we are compelled to believe that the practice Should we be thought f r i v o l o u s i f we mentioned the name of the American Medical Association? 68 r e f l e c t s something l i k e the over-valuation of clan l o y a l t y we mentioned e a r l i e r . Evidently the agency i s seen as having an e s s e n t i a l l y competitive relationship with other agencies, and t h i s view generates the fear that a democratic election would produce directors who lacked the partisan zeal and aggression necessary to maintain the agency's place i n the sun. At the same time, we must not under-estimate the influence of simple confusion about the functions of a board; i n p a r t i c u l a r , the assumption that the board i s a sort of service department of the agency, — with more power and glory than most service departments to be sure, but nonetheless performing e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r functions. A fourth p r i n c i p l e which appears to be operative i n the selection of board members i s perhaps best evoked by a quotation from the Constitution and By-laws of the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area: In nominating persons f o r the Board of Directors, the (Nominating) Committee s h a l l ensure that the Board i s repre-sentative of the Community.1 It i s also a frequent claim of subordinate agencies that t h e i r board i s or ought to be "representative of the community." The number of questions which the use of such a phrase raises i s legion, and there can be no attempt here to investigate f u l l y a l l the issues involved. On the other hand, even the f i r s t stages of an analysis of t h i s seemingly simple p r i n c i p l e w i l l show that i t i s replete with ambiguities. "Constitution of Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area, By-Law No. 6, Section 35, Subsection 6, March 28, 1962. 69 In the f i r s t place, what exactly does the expression "representative of the community" mean? In what sense i s the term "representative" being used? Is i t i n the s t a t i s t i c a l sense, or i s i t i n the sense of "acting on behalf of"? And i f the l a t t e r , i s i t by "doing what I would do", or by "doing what I want done"? And further, given that the concepts of authorization and accountability are part of representation, by whom are the representatives authorized, and to whom are they accountable? I t i s not, apparently, the membership, f o r as has been noted already, the membership does not always manage to get to lunch on time. Then, what of the term "community"? I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that i t i s used i n preference to "membership", as though to acknowledge the la r g e l y taken character of the membership. But what "community" i s meant? Since what i s meant i s not further defined i t must be assumed that the entire geographical con-stituency served by the agency i s intended; and i n fac t the use of the term i n informal contexts by agency executives would support such an interpretation. But i f t h i s i s the correct interpretation, i t must be said that the agencies have adopted a formidable objective, — one which many informed c r i t i c s do not believe even our system of c i v i c government has yet attained. Wherever the term "representative" i s further defined i n the l i t e r a t u r e and i n informal statements by agency executives i t appears that the s t a t i s t i c a l meaning i s intended; something 70 resembling what s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s c a l l " s t r a t i f i e d sampling." I t i s not unusual to have a committee drawn from business, labor, the professions and housewives described as 'a miniature community". A t y p i c a l expression of t h i s viewpoint i s the statement of John Burt, writing i n the monthly magazine, Family Service Highlights: Our agency subscribes to the idea of including i n the board a l l elements i n the community that have a contribution to make toward the success of the service we o f f e r . Consideration should be given to representatives of management, labor, the professional services, minority groups, and of course, the all-important housewife. Ideally, we think a board should have a nearly equal r a t i o of both sexes repre-sented i n the group.1 The s t a t i s t i c a l approach i s clear i n such a statement, and we presume that i t also governs the suggestion about an equal r a t i o of the sexes on the board. One does not have to have an advanced degree i n anthropology to question the v a l i d i t y of the assumption that management, labor (organized labor i s usually meant), the pro-fessions, housewives, and minority groups, do i n fact comprise the community i n miniature. For one thing, there i s ample evidence that the occupational' structure of North American society has been changing d r a s t i c a l l y during the past few decades. Wilensky and Lebeaux have compiled impressive figures from a v a r i e t y of sources to show that there has been a rapid gain i n three areas Burt, John, "Recruitment of Board Members", Family Service Highlights, Vol. XXI, No. 5, May, I960, p. 92. 71 of employmentJ i n the "white-collar mass" of school teachers, sales people, and o f f i c e workers; i n the newer professions of engineer, s c i e n t i s t , chemist, draftsman, s o c i a l worker; and i n semi-professional s p e c i a l t i e s such, as laboratory and X-ray technician, electronic technicians, and the l i k e . " L To what extent the, does the private agency concept of community structure take into account these drastic changes, The best that could be said i s that i t i s a very "open-ended" formula which c l e a r l y requires sensitive discretionary interpretation. A further point which needs to be raised concerns the basis f o r the use of such categories as business, labour, pro-fessions, housewives, minority groups. Does such a l i s t a c t u a l l y s i g n i f y representation by occupation, as one might 2 f i r s t assume? I f so, then minority groups just do not belong. Again, i s organized labour an occupational grouping? I t i s not exactly customary to c a l l i t so. What then, i s the basis f o r representation? The only other p o s s i b i l i t y seems to be that there are certain c h a r a c t e r i s t i c (and diverging?) points of view located i n these categories, so that there i s a management point of view, a professional point of view, etc,, a l l of which have to be represented. Is there also a "housewife" point of view or set of b e l i e f s and attitudes? Perhaps there i s , — even among housewives who are communists and John Birchers, "H/ilensky and lebeaux, op. c i t . 20ne i s reminded of that very common form of i n t e l l i -gence te s t , given to school children, which runs: "Put a pencil l i n e through the object i n the following l i s t which does not belong i n i t . DOGS. CATS. ELEPHANTS. APPLES." 72 Catholics and Quakers, Lithuanians and Chinese, wealthy and poor. But i n regard to the labour point of view, one of our clearest discoveries has been that there i s no such thing. The labour views expressed to us, at least on s o c i a l welfare issues, ranged over a wide spectrum of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Of course, one might indeed assume that a cohesive minority group had a f a i r l y consistent set of attitudes and b e l i e f s . But i n our society, there are so many ethnic and r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i c a l minority groups. I f i t i s impossible that a l l should be represented, then which ones should be included and which not — and on what basis? A f i f t h and f i n a l point, (though i t w i l l have been f e l t to be pervasively i n f l u e n t i a l i n everything we have examined i n the course of t h i s chapter) that helps to explain at l e a s t some of the confusion about board membership, i s that there does not appear to be a great deal of c l a r i t y about the proper function of a board of directors. There can be no doubt that one's conception of a board's function w i l l greatly influence one's notion of what constitutes a desirable board member, and by inference, the method of selection that seems most appropriate.' I f a board's function i s , even i n part, the assurance of prestige and a competitive advantage to a p a r t i c u l a r agency, then certain l i m i t s to the democratic process are both desirable and necessary. 1 Or, i f a board membership i s intended 1To assert that i t i s the board's function to bring prestige to the agency i s an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t thing from saying that i t i s desirable f o r i t 4o do so. The same would be true of cars. 73 as a hel p f u l "adjunct" to a business career, i t might well be improper to have popularly elected poets. Again, when the board i s seen as having a service function and as providing a resource f o r making case decisions, then we should have to agree that an agency could not run the notorious r i s k s of democracy i n choosing those best q u a l i f i e d to perform such service functions. But then why t a l k about the popular w i l l ? Even the concept of the board as "representative of the community" raises certain questions about function, f o r i t c l e a r l y implies that the board speaks i n some manner or other f o r the entire community. But once t h i s i s said, confusion i s compounded. What does the "community" want to have said? And what i s the nature of the relationship between the community and the membership? What are the mechanisms of representation, the methods of selection or election, the p r i n c i p l e s of authorization and accountability? We can do no more here than avow our bewilderment; but perhaps i t i s at le a s t some advance to acknowledge that there are grounds f o r experiencing i t . B. Comnosition As a feature of the empirical part of t h i s study, a l l 65 agencies receiving f i n a n c i a l support from the Community Chest of Greater Vancouver were asked to forward the names and occupations of t h e i r boards of directors. The purpose of the inquiry was to a s s i s t us i n determining the extent of 74 labour representation and at trie same time to obtain a more detailed picture of the actual composition of the boards. The usefulness of such information i s f o u r - f o l d . The r e l a t i v e size of the labour "bloc" would provide some i n d i -cation of the extent to which t h i s section of the community was represented on boards. Secondly, since occupation i s i n our society one of the most s i g n i f i c a n t determinants of income and s o c i a l status, i t would be possible on such a basis to make certain reasonable assumptions about the s o c i a l class to which board members belonged. Thirdly, an analysis, of occupational groupings could be used to develop a primitive measure of "under" and "over" representation by comparing the proportions on the boards with t h e i r d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the general population as t h i s i s revealed e.g. i n census data. F i n a l l y , information on the names of board members would permit us to examine the extent to which there i s an interlocking of directorships; that i s , where one person holds more than one p o s i t i o n . I t should be made clear that the figures were not collected on the basis of any pre-conceived notion of the manner i n which boards should aim to be representative. We have no easy answers to what appears to us to be a p r e v a i l i n g state of uncertainty about a very complex question. Rather, the figures were collected on the basis of a current assumption i n the private agency f i e l d : that business, labour, the professions and housewives together constitute a 7 5 microeosmically representative group. I f these are not, s t r i c t l y speaking, occupational categories, (as we have, indeed, argued ourselves) they can be taken as facts i n t h e i r own ri g h t from which i t i s possible to make semi-reasonable inferences about occupational status and s o c i a l c l a s s . Housewives, as i s the oddly misogynistic custom are presumed to carry the s o c i a l class of t h e i r husbands. Our figures therefore represent an attempt to of f e r a s t a t i s t i c a l outline of the agency boards i n terms of the very categories of representative-ness that Chest o f f i c i a l s have themselves cited with approval. I t can at least be said that we are not using an a n a l y t i c a l scheme the relevance of which would be disputed by those who are l i k e l y to be implicated i n the res u l t s of the analysis". Of the 6 5 agencies, 3 9 r e p l i e d with names and occupations of board members, and an additional 4 provided occupations only. I t was therefore possible to tabulate the boards of 4 3 agencies into the four categories, with an additional category of "others" f o r those who did not f i t c l e a r l y into one of the four. (See Chart 2 ) . A word i s i n order here about the method of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . Under the heading of "business" we attempted to i n -clude only those who were proprieters, o f f i c i a l s , or managers, and who thus occupied positions of r e l a t i v e l y high status and income. The terms used on the agency returns were t y p i c a l l y those of "executive", "businessman", "business proprieter", 75a ., BOAED M3HB>7HSHIP BY OCCUPATIONAL OEOUPIHG ~ 1962' CHART 1 1 o 7 6 "executive direc t o r " . Government executives were included here, but those designated simply as " c i v i l servant" were not. It was, i n most cases, f a i r l y clear as to whether or not the ind i v i d u a l occupied a managerial position, or was a proprieter or operator of his own business, and only where t h i s applied was the person c l a s s i f i e d as "business". The "professional" category was quite clear-cut, and the recognized professions were included. Those which appeared most frequently were lawyers, doctors, and chartered accountants. There was a smaller, though s t i l l considerable, representation of clergymen, but s o c i a l workers were sur-p r i s i n g l y few. There was also a smattering of teachers and univ e r s i t y professors. Under the category "labour", we included a l l who, fo r want of a better term, are usually regarded as belonging to the "working c l a s s " . White c o l l a r workers, such as those i n c l e r i c a l positions and c i v i l servants, (of whom there were very few), were not placed here, but under "others". It was usually not possible to determine whether or not a labour person was a member of a union, or was an o f f i c i a l or semi-o f f i c i a l representative of a union. There has therefore been no attempt i n our tabulations to draw these d i s t i n c t i o n s . "Housewives" were c l a s s i f i e d as such according to the agency l i s t , and no attempt was made to c l a s s i f y on the basis of a former profession or other occupation, even i f 77 t h i s information was known to us or was referred to paren-t h e t i c a l l y "by the agency. The f i n a l category of "others"-includes a l l who did not f i t c l e a r l y into the other groups. A s i g n i f i c a n t pro-portion of these were those designated by the agencies as " r e t i r e d " . Other t y p i c a l designations included here are those of " o f f i c e manager", " c i v i l servant", and "church worker". University executives, of whom there were perhaps ha l f a dozen, were also included here, though they belong i n the managerial-professional s o c i a l class area. The 43 agencies had a t o t a l board membership of 989, of which 393, or 39.73 percent, could be c l a s s i f i e d as business; 289, or 29.23 percent as professional; 32, or 3.23 percent, as labour; 159, or 16.08 percent, as housewives; and 116, or 11.73 percent, as others. These figures point to an unquestionable dominance of board positions by those i n the managerial and professional occupational groups (almost 70 percent of. the board po s i t i o n s ) , and to an extremely small labour representation (a l i t t l e over 3 percent). Add to t h i s the reasonable assumption that the majority of the housewives also belong to the managerial-professional status groups, and the picture becomes even more one-sided. 1 The same observation would no doubt apply to the r e t i r e d persons. 78 It i s worthy of note here that the Community Chest i n Vancouver conducted a survey of i t s own i n 1957, i n which i t requested a l l agencies to l i s t the names of members of trade unions, and t h e i r wives, who were serving the agency i n any capacity. Only 15 agencies r e p l i e d , 14 of which had some trade union "personnel" to report. (The 15th agency, judging by i t s reply, seemed to have misunderstood the nature of the request). Of the 14 agencies reporting trade union personnel, 9 agencies had a t o t a l of 16 trade union members on t h e i r boards, and the remaining 5 agencies had trade union people active i n other voluntary capacities. These figures are too incomplete to permit d e f i n i t e conclusions; but, assuming that most agencies did not reply because they had nothing to report, the figures do appear to confirm our own finding of a small labour representation on boards. One unknown factor which makes comparison between the two surveys even more d i f f i c u l t i s that the Community Chest survey did not include non-trade union- labour people. We have no information on which to base an estimate of the r a t i o between those labour people who are actually union o f f i c i a l s and those who are not. We suspect that a board member w i l l r a r e l y be a "labour man" without also being a union o f f i c i a l . To relate our current findings to the general population a he l p f u l guide, though one f o r which certain allowances need to be made i s found i n the Dominion Bureau of 79 S t a t i s t i c s 1961 Census of Canada B u l l e t i n 3-1-3, Labour Force. 1 This b u l l e t i n shows the business and managerial group as com-p r i s i n g 8.32 percent of the labour force, the professional and technical as 9.5 percent; labour groups make up 34.96 percent of the labour force, more s p e c i f i c a l l y c l a s s i f i e d as Transportation and Communication workers 6.06 percent; craftsmen 24.10; labourers 4.80 percent. One the other hand, the "white c o l l a r " groups larg e l y unnoticed i n most conceptions of board representation, and those composed of c l e r i c a l , sales, service and recreation personnel, t o t a l 31.52 percent of the labour force. These figures are shown compared with board membership figures i n Chart. No. 1. One further note about the s t a t i s t i c s on board member-ship relates to the matter of interlocking directorships. A tabulation of the names of the directors of the 39 agencies which i n fact provided us with names, showed a considerable, though not alarming, amount of interlocking. There were 63 directors who held two positions, 8 who held 3 positions, and 2 who held 4 positions. In other words there are 158 d i r e c t o r -ship positions held by 73 people. In addition, there were 10 husband and wife "teams", i n which a husband and wife were both serving on agency.boards, though i n most cases not on the p same board. "'"Since i t i s an urban i n d u s t r i a l centre that we are examining here, r u r a l and seasonal workers, and self-employed a g r i c u l t u r i s t s do not figure i n these proportions. 2 I t i s important to remember that these figures apply to one year of agency operations. I f the analysis covered (for example) a ten year "period, a great 1 deal more interlocking might be revealed, and the "stage army" effect might be more s t r i k i n g . The circumstances under which th i s study was carried out pre-vented, the., incl u s i o n of a longitudinal dimensions, 79a OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS BY PERCENTAGE'S AS SEEN ON BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND IN THE LABOUR FORCE 0 Business ana Management 10 Percent 20 30 40 Profession* Labour Other Housewives' CHART 1 . 1 . Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , 1961 Census of Canada, Bu l l e t i n 3 . 1 . 3 2 . Housewives constitute a special group. Figures for them are not available, but since they make up a considerable proportion of Board members, they are shown as an extended and indeterminate group. CHAPTER 4 THE LABOUR VIEWPOINT: A REPORT CN THE OPINIONS OP A SAMPLE OF UNION OFFICIALS A. The Nature of the P o l l This section of the study concerns i t s e l f with r e -porting the opinions expressed by a number of union o f f i c i a l s . These o f f i c i a l s were questioned on such diverse topics as judgment of the adequacy of labour's representation on the boards of private agencies, the meanings they assigned to the very concept of representation, t h e i r perception of the d i f f i c u l t i e s that might be held to stand i n the way of a f a i r labour representation, and the l e v e l of urgency manifest i n t h e i r formulation of those issues. We deal with t h e i r attitudes toward the private agencies generally, and with t h e i r opinions on the d i s t i n c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of a system of private welfare. It must be said at the outset that no claim can be made to the effect that the results of our p o l l would be replicated i f a s i m i l a r survey were undertaken with a d i f f e r e n t group of union o f f i c i a l s . When we speak of a "sample", we do not use the term i n i t s technical connotation. It was rather range, o r i g i n a l i t y , and (so to speak) the representative v a r i e t y of the opinions offered by t h i s group of labour people that was the most impressive. What we did f i n d was a uniformly high degree of interest i n the entire f i e l d of s o c i a l welfare, whatever the unionist's point of 81 view, — whether he was involved primarily i n i n t e r n a l union a f f a i r s , or engaged, i n addition, i n a variety of other c i v i c a c t i v i t i e s . 1 An o f f i c i a l of the Community Chest and Council, Mr. C E . Lamarche, was c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i a b l e as the key figure i n the configuration of relations between the voluntary agencies and Vancouver labour organizations. Mr. Lamarche ;occupies, at the time of writing, a permanent paid p o s i t i o n on the Community Chest and Councils s t a f f , bearing the t i t l e of Labour Staff Representative, and carrying the main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the Chest's l i a i s o n with organized labour. This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has been formulated both i n terms of encouraging labour unions to participate i n community health and welfare services and i n terms of creating labour awareness of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of •services. It could reasonably be assumed, we believed, that Mr. Lamarche, by virtue of his knowledge of community health and welfare services and through his connections,. both formal and informal, with labour groups, was the person uniquely equipped i n Vancouver to provide the main directions f o r t h i s phase of our inquiry. Proceeding on t h i s assumption, (the v a l i d i t y of which has been'confirmed by our experience) we con-ducted a number of interviews with Mr. Lamarche during September and October of 1 9 6 2 with the aim of securing an " h r o r an account of the considerations which determined the choice of our approach to the problem of "sampling", the reader i s referred to "A Note on Methodology", Appendix P .p.139 82 orientation to the structure of l o c a l union organizations and of determining the p r i n c i p a l available sources of information among s t r a t e g i c a l l y placed labour personnel. Three main questions were dealt with i n these interviews with him, namely: the inauguration and development of the position of Labour Staff Representative; Mr. Lamarche's own conception of "representation"; and the selection of a group of labour o f f i c i a l s who would be prepared to discuss t h e i r knowledge of and opinions upon the r e l a t i o n s subsisting between labour and the private agencies. Mr. Lamarche has occupied the o f f i c e of Labour Staff Representative at the Community Chest and Councils since the inception of that position, and was therefore well placed to describe the events leading up to i t s creation. He reviewed the changes which occurred i n American Federation of Labour: Congress of Industrial Organizations p o l i c i e s on s o c i a l welfare matters (following t h e i r 1955 merger), and commented on the stimulus they had given to l o c a l concern with the position taken by organized labour i n r e l a t i o n to the private agencies. During the 1955 Community Chest campaign f o r funds, he r e -c a l l e d , the interest and willingness of labour i n supporting the Community Chest and Councils was tested by seconding a labour o f f i c i a l , loaned by his company, to extend the appeal f o r funds to labour groups d i r e c t l y . Although predictions were made that labour would withhold support, the response was dramatically to the contrary. (Mr. Lamarche cited an example of 83 the organized employees of one plant increasing t h e i r c o n t r i -butions by 700 per cent). On the basis of t h i s evidence, he stated, the <. labour • loan personnel program was i n s t i t u t e d , and on the basis of his own successes i n i t , Mr. Lamarche was i n -v i t e d i n May, 1958, to j o i n the Community Chest and Councils i n the capacity of Labour Staff Representative. We questioned Mr. Lamarche about his own views on labour representation i n the private agencies. He began by c a l l i n g attention to the ambiguity inherent i n the whole notion of representativeness which we ourselves have discussed above. He observed that there was a sense i n which i t could be said that anyone from a labour union would probably be capable':; of representing the.labour interest i n s o c i a l welfare i n a general way, but i t was u n l i k e ^ that so unselective a- p r i n c i p l e could ensure the specialized knowledge and motivations which either were or ought to be a prerequisite of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the policy-making of welfare agencies. A further circumstance which made i t d i f f i c u l t to say how f a r anybody could be deemed to have a properly representative status l a y i n the lack of formal channels f o r reporting back to his "constituency". The Vancouver and D i s t r i c t Trades and Labour Council was the l o g i c a l body f o r t h i s reporting back, but t h i s again was not t o t a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y i n that a number of important and interested labour unions were not included i n t h i s organization^ Although the "Welfare Services Committee" concept (as developed 84 by the Canadian Labour Congress) has among i t s objectives "...merging the strength and resources of Labour-with those of representative groups to provide adequate health, welfare and recreation s e r v i c e s " 1 , and although t h i s formula includes p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of voluntary agencies, Mr. Lamarche saw d i f f i c u l t i e s i n putting t h i s concept into systematic e f f e c t , and conceded that i t "was not working too well". He had serious questions, moreover, about the propriety of the labour "representative" reporting back to his "parent" group, and pointed out that a number of business people on the agency boards report back to no one, — which.is to say that they function as c i t i z e n s and individuals. He suggested that i t was the unusual degree to which labour people were already organized which was responsible f o r the observable tendency "to get at" them through t h e i r organizations, and i n his view t h i s was not an e n t i r e l y appropriate mode by which to select personnel f o r agency boards. Mr. Lamarche referred to some of the problems which exist f o r labour people who possess the interest and a b i l i t y to serve on agency boards. While the f u l l - t i m e , paid labour o f f i c i a l may be made available by his union to attend meetings, d i f f i c u l t y exists f o r the rank-and-file member i n that hours of meetings often f a l l during working hours, and f o r the man on s h i f t work would almost ce r t a i n l y f a l l sometime during Canadian Labour Congress, Welfare Services Committee, Guide #1. 85 working hours. This problem arises f a r less frequently f o r the business man, who has le s s d i f f i c u l t y getting to a lunch meet-ing (for example) and loses no pay i n attending a meeting which f a l l s during business hours. I t was also pointed out that there was only a li m i t e d number even of paid fu l l - t i m e labour o f f i c i a l s with the time to do the job. At the same time, Mr. Lamarche thought that i f there were clear evidence of interest on the part of the agencies i n the views of labour, there was among the union groups an abundance of suitable candidates, w i l l i n g and able to serve on agency boards. Questioned d i r e c t l y on the matter, he offered the judgment that "...not too many agencies r e a l l y f e e l they want a labour person"; and he referred to occasions when agency executives had responded to his proposal that a labour person might be of service to an agency with a remark l i k e "we're not interested", or "we screen our people." He cited the Community Chest and Councils as the one agency known to him which had a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y requiring the board to have a given number of labour people on i t . When asked f o r suggestions as to how the s i t u a t i o n might be improved, i t was Mr. Lamarche's view that, f o r purely p r a c t i c a l reasons, the agencies should take the i n i t i a t i v e i n seeking out labour people, since the unions themselves lacked the machinery f o r proposing candidates i n a uniform, appropriate and easy way. 86 Mr. Lamarche discussed i n some d e t a i l the duties his po s i t i o n of Laboir Staff Representative places upon him. 1 He observed that the position had gradually and naturally come to embrace a variety of the questions and problems which arise i n the relations between labour people and the private agencies, and i n some instances the public agencies too. He i s frequently ca l l e d upon, fo r example, to intervene i n cases where a union member i s d i s s a t i s f i e d with the service he has been accorded by an agency, or, more often, asked to act as a source of r e f e r r a l information. We queried t h i s l a s t point i n view of the existence of a Community Information Service, and we learned that Mr. Lamarche's i d e n t i t y as a labour union man somehow seems to make him more approachable to labour people. He i s w i l l i n g to serve i n t h i s capacity, and believed that i t i s an appropriate part of his job. Another of his tasks i s to see that interested and knowledgeable labour personnel, who showed themselves w i l l i n g to take r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n voluntary agencies, were put i n touch with those private agencies that were seeking lay people to serve on t h e i r boards. As we indicated e a r l i e r , h i s assess-ment of the s i t u a t i o n i s that there exists a surplus of labour people capable of doing this kind of job, since he has been unable to place a l l of them because of lack of interest on the part of the agencies. 1When he was asked f o r a formal description of his position, Mr. Lamarche stated that the specifications as o r i g i n a l l y set f o r t h had been found to be too narrow, and were therefore being rewritten. For the up-dated sp e c i f i c a t i o n s , the reader i s referred to Appendix__C_____. p. 134. 87 Mr. Lamarche's assistance was requested i n connection with our plan to canvass the opinions of a group of suitably-chosen union o f f i c i a l s . Early i n our conversations with him, he had indicated the existence of a body of' opposition to the Community Chest and Councils i n certain quarters of the l o c a l labour movement; a si t u a t i o n which, i f true, would no doubt bear on the extent to which we found labour appearing on agency boards. Support from organized labour i s an i n t e g r a l feature of the recent re-organization of the ( s o c i a l i s t ) New Democratic Party, whose p o l i c i e s favour the extension of government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r welfare programs. V/hile we had no effe c t i v e way of assessing the influence of thi s circumstance upon labour p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n voluntary agencies, i t appeared pertinent to the main question i n our study, and to secure some measure, however crude, of i t s significance seemed highly desirable, i f not altogether e s s e n t i a l . It was manifestly impossible within the time allowable f o r t h i s study to interview a l l the labour representa-tives i n a l l the.voluntary agencies within the Community Chest and Councils membership. The decision was therefore made that the central coordinating and fund r a i s i n g agency i t s e l f was a l o g i c a l f i r s t choice f o r such a survey, and accordingly the members associated with labour interest on that agency's board were interviewed. These numbered seven. Another member of the board, though not " o f f i c i a l l y " representing labour, was 88 known to be an active and experienced community worker. 1 We further asked Mr. Lamarche to d i r e c t us to pro-minent labour o f f i c i a l s i n p r o v i n c i a l and c i t y labour organi-zations who were not active participants i n the organization of community services operating under voluntary auspices. -Mr. Lamarche suggested the names of f i v e such o f f i c i a l s , a l l of whom were interviewed. While selecting interview subjects i n t h i s manner might well be questioned on grounds of sampling procedure, we maintain that i t i s a legitimate method of obtaining a valuable d i v e r s i t y of opinion, which would serve, moreover, to highlight the range and depth of attitudes on the issues with which we are concerned. It was not to be expected' that a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s associated with the attempt to summarize these interviews could be eliminated. It may be that i n the process of summarizing, some of the complexities and shadings of opinion have been suppressed. It i s almost certain, too that the summary f a i l s to convey f u l l y the i n t r i c a t e inter-relationships between the variables of the members' union positions, t h e i r experience and knowledge of s o c i a l welfare matters, t h e i r f a m i l i a r i t y with the voluntary system of services, and t h e i r stated opinions. F i n a l l y , i t should be pointed out that the opinions expressed were so varied, so p a r t i c u l a r l y set f o r t h , and often so personal and i d i o s y n c r a t i c , that even the most 1The form of interview employed may be found described i n "A Note on Methodology" i n Appendix_F_. p. 139 2 F o r purposes of distinguishing between the two groups of labour leaders interviewed "Member" refers to those active i n private agencies, and " O f f i c i a l " to those not active. 8 9 accommodating c l a s s i f i c a t i o n scheme must seem procrustean. B. Board Members with Union Status Member A i s the secretary treasurer of the l o c a l of an international c r a f t union, and i s active On the boards of several private agencies. In the interview, he expressed an extremely positive and optimistic view of the private welfare f i e l d i n general and of labour p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r . Member A took the posi t i o n that some of the agencies currently i n the Community Chest should be under government auspices, and defined these as the ones which provide "necessary" services, (though he was not clegr as to what distinguished a necessary from a l e s s -than-necessary servic e ) . Even so, Member A was well s a t i s f i e d with the operation of the Community Chest. He said that the Chest agencies "...do good work with the money they have," and thought i t unfortunate that the Community Chest did not re-ceive wider f i n a n c i a l support. In regard to labour representation on agency boards, Member A was equally well s a t i s f i e d , and said that he thought labour was well represented on the board of the Chest i t s e l f and on the boards of the member agencies too. He thought that labour had a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to make, that labour people had a background of valuable and useful experience, and that boards offered a good opportunity f o r labour and manage-ment to meet i n a d i f f e r e n t and non-antagonistic setting.' . ' . 9 0 Asked i f he did not think there might be business and pro-f e s s i o n a l dominance of boards, Member A replied that he did not think so, and that i n his opinion, agency boards were "...a good cross-section of the community." Member A's notion of representation was that the basis of selection should be the person's "interest i n community welfare," as shown by his service i n various community a c t i v i t i e s . In apparent contradiction to t h i s i s Member A's f e e l i n g that he does represent labour and the "labour point of view," though he emphasized that his vote was not committed. Member A used the word "delegate" to describe his representative function, so that i t appears to be the case that A sees himself as bringing to a board the point of view of an occupational and class grouping. However, he i s also t r y i n g to reconcile t h i s narrower perspective with a broader, community-wide view, and to see himself and other board members as functioning primarily i n the interests of the community rather than i n the interests of a p a r t i c u l a r group. Member B This i s a young, energetic man who holds a senior position i n an international union. He said that his p a r t i c i -pation on voluntary agency boards came about as a resu l t of his receiving requests f o r his services from the agencies them-selves. He added that as he had cleared his involvement i n voluntary agencies with the union membership, he could r i g h t l y 9 1 say that he was speaking f o r labour. He f e l t that the member-ship of the union saw him i n his role as a board member as a de facto representative of labour i n t e r e s t s . He f e l t , too, that without labour's f i n a n c i a l support, the Chest and i t s member agencies would " f o l d " . He claimed that labour was not s u f f i c i e n t l y represented on agency boards but thought that labour was pa r t l y to blame f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n . He said that too many labour leaders were p o l i t i c i a n s , devoted a l l t h e i r time and energy to p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , and had none l e f t f o r community welfare services. Another reason f o r labour's comparative absence from boards was the outmoded idea that people who work with t h e i r hands cannot also work with t h e i r heads. He said his own and other labour leaders' p a r t i c i p a t i o n on agency boards was breaking down thi s archaic stereotype. He f e l t very strongly that the major health and welfare services should be government r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . He spoke about medical care and health benefits and said that "with a stroke of the pen" the government could release an abundance of money from union health plans and other private schemes that would provide a good f i n a n c i a l base f o r a national health insurance system. He approved of private welfare agencies on the grounds that one cannot wait f o r the government to do things, f o r then i t might never get done. Although he vis u a l i z e d the government taking over most of the 92 health and welfare services i n time, he saw private agencies continuing to exist to meet emergency situations. He f e l t that labour p a r t i c i p a t i o n on private agency boards had helped ease the tension between business and labour, and that each was acquiring growing respect f o r the other. He said that i n putting f o r t h his ideas at board meetings he often received backing from "businessmen." He f e l t that labour and the Chest could co-operate i n establishing seminars and the l i k e on welfare problems, and i n t h i s way arouse a more educated interest (among labour leaders and union members) i n serving and taking an active part i n community welfare services. He thought the proper way to get labour represented on a board was f o r an agency to request a union to select the man. He also said he thought i t necessary f o r agencies to seek the s p e c i a l l y trained c i t i z e n f o r t h e i r boards, and thus bring expert opinion to bear on technical matters. Member C This senior and l i f e t i m e member of a long-established i n d u s t r i a l union f i l l s some position or another i n upwards of f i f t e e n community bodies, both public and p r i -vate, and i s well known as an outstanding figure i n Vancouver public l i f e . He considers that i t i s the c i v i c duty of every person to participate i n community a f f a i r s , and takes pride 93 i n his own contributions. It was his view that the private agencies were a sati s f a c t o r y "interim" solution f o r meeting welfare problems, and saw (and approved of) government assuming considerable added r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r meeting "basic" health, welfare and education needs. He took the position that the private agency offered opportunity f o r free expression of opinion, adding that he was aware that his views were at times unacceptable i n the private agency forum. This Member's view of and concern about the s o c i a l and economic problems of the community, i t must be noted, were at a considerably higher l e v e l of sophistication than was generally encountered i n thi s group. The Member decried what he saw as a large amount of disagreement i n labour ranks i n achieving workable p o l i c i e s i n the f i e l d of welfare. It was his opinion that labour groups had f i r s t to s e t t l e t h e i r i n t e r n a l problems before t h e i r voices i n public a f f a i r s would be properly heeded and respected. He indicated disappointment that "lack of support" had resulted i n the f a i l u r e of a proposed Union Counselling t r a i n i n g program during the previous autumn. Member C considered that as a representative of organized labour to a private agency, i t was his obligation to make regular reports to his organization; although i n ensuing remarks he conveyed the impression that he considered 94 h i s constituency to be the community at large, rather than the pa r t i c u l a r labour body he represented. 1 His involvement i n such a variety of community a f f a i r s leads to the conclusion he has a wide interest i n the community's welfare, and to substantiate his concern with the general public interest, rather than with that of a special group, he cited the maxim: "The p o l i t i c i a n i s looking out for the next election; but a statesman i s looking out f o r the next generation." His position i n the union, an elected one, he believed he held because of his experience and knowledge, which contributed also to his effectiveness as a board member. He commented that the l e v e l of understanding about welfare needs and programs within organized labour i t s e l f was limited and needed developing, and he extended th i s observation to the general public. He was s a t i s f i e d that the interests of labour were adequately represented i n the private agencies, and while he thought there was room f o r improving the extent of pa r t i c i p a t i o n of labour men i n the agencies, he offered no clear-cut proposals as to how thi s might be brought about. Member D Member D i s the secretary-treasurer of the Vancouver l o c a l of an international c r a f t union. Member D saw a much greater p a r t i c i p a t i o n of govern-ment i n the welfare f i e l d as both inevitable and desirable. He 1 T h i s i s not necessarily a contradiction. An M.P. can make reports to his constituency while s t i l l claiming ( v a l i d l y we think) that his duty i s to represent the interests of the nation. 95 defined t h i s government a c t i v i t y as including the "essential" services and the analysis of s o c i a l problems. But i n the mean-time, u n t i l the government accepted larger r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the services had to be'provided, and private welfare should be supported. When asked about labour representation on agency boards, Member D made i t clear that he regarded the question and i t s implications as inappropriate to the issue of repre-sentation. He said that a member of a union participated just as any c i t i z e n did, and that a union member should be f i r s t and foremost a c i t i z e n . Member D thought there was a tendency i n contemporary l i f e f o r special interest groups to withdraw from f u l l s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and i n order to counteract t h i s trend, he thought that labour people should "look at things as ci t i z e n s f i r s t . " 1 Member D therefore believed that the selection of board personnel should not be on the basis of occupation, class, or any other special interest grouping. It should rather, i n his view, be on the basis of interest, competence and, i n some causes, (where these would be relevant to an agency's program) s k i l l s . Member D f e l t that many labour people possessed both the general competence and the a b i l i t y to work with others that are necessary for board membership. "'"This view recommends i t s e l f to us too, but i t i s obstinately d i f f i c u l t to square i t , f i r s t , with the pr i n c i p l e s of representativeness enunciated.by Chest o f f i c i a l s , and secondly, with the presence on the Chest board of union personnel who have evidently been selected precisely because they were union members. 96 However, he was somewhat -unwilling to consider and give an opinion about the size and effectiveness of the present labour "bloc" — an unwillingness that i s not surprising i n view of Member D's strongly held (and cogent) views about the nature of representation. Member E This young member has had experience with organized labour groups since adolescence, and has recently become a board member of the Community Chest and Councils. The route to t h i s position l a y through p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the r e s i d e n t i a l section of the Community Chest campaign, which i n turn l e d to community council election and executive duties there. His current labour association i s with a large, i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a f f i l i a t e d union which has acquired something of a reputation i n recent years f o r the energetic defence of i t s members' in t e r e s t s . His views on the obligations of the representative role were stated unequivocally i n terms of the necessity to act i n accordance with the wishes of the represented group. Moreover, he claimed that at no time i n the course of his association with the Chest had he encountered any evidence to suggest that his view on t h i s matter was not the standard one, though he admitted that the question had not arisen i n a context of formal controversy and debate. In his opinion i t was also necessary to report back i n d e t a i l to the 9 7 group from which the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e r e c e i v e d h i s mandate — "they must know." 1 T h i s member was e n t h u s i a s t i c about i n c r e a s i n g the amount of p a r t i c i p a t i o n of labour people i n p r i v a t e agency a c t i v i t y , viewing i t , indeed, as a k i n d o f c i v i c duty. He was of the o p i n i o n t h a t some o b s t a c l e s e x i s t e d to s e c u r i n g the f u l l acceptance of a labour person i n the Community Chest and Co u n c i l s groups. Reference was made to such i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r s as a s u b t l e change i n a t t i t u d e when he was i d e n t i f i e d by h i s lab o u r a s s o c i a t i o n , and he compared the experience t o t h a t of coming up ag a i n s t "a drawn b l i n d " . F u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n of t h i s matter on our p a r t brought out Member E's concern w i t h what he f e l t to be a negative stereotype of h i s union and an i n -s u f f i c i e n t l y developed awareness o f i t s genuine c o n t r i b u t i o n s to community w e l f a r e . He'- had sensed, too, a s u b t l y p a t e r n a l -i s t i c a t t i t u d e on the p a r t of management i n connection with Community Chest campaign a c t i v i t y , which tended to leave the union member wit h a sense of having l e s s than f u l l c i t i z e n s h i p s t a t u s . Member. E agreed, when i t was put to him as a hypothesis, t h a t these negative a t t i t u d e s to l a b o u r were improperly g e n e r a l i z e d responses t o the a c t i v i t i e s of smal l segments of 1 I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n between Member D and Member E on the r o l e of organized l a b o u r i s a microcosmic v e r s i o n of a deep cleavage o f viewpoint as to the p l a c e of the unions i n s o c i e t y a t l a r g e . 9 8 the one hour movement, and that i t was up to labour to change i t . When asked whether he considered the' representation of labour was adequate i n the private agencies, the member was hesitant, pointing out that the Community Chest and Councils had no labour people on i t s Executive Committee, but that he did not suppose t h i s to be deliberately so. He cited the example of a labour o f f i c i a l , of undisputed competence, who had worked up to a vice-chairmanship i n the agency hierarchy and thus placed himself i n the l i n e of succession f o r the chairmanship, only to be passed over i n favour of somebody else. This Member had given some thought to the special pro-blems facing a labour representative i n a community-wide association, and offered the opinion that the demands of the po s i t i o n — considering that he would probably have had l e s s education and a narrower experience of the world than the average business man might make him f e e l that he had been thrown into the water to sink or swim, and thereby lead him to question the value of the contribution he was capable of making. It was t h i s Member's conviction that improvement was needed i n the relations between labour and the private agencies i f only i n deference to the evidence that unions lacked clear i n f o r -mation about agency services and needs. Member E was not s a t i s f i e d that the present method of securing labour representatives was e n t i r e l y e f f e c t i v e or equitable, but had no s p e c i f i c suggestions to o f f e r as a l t e r -natives. He questioned the aptness of employing occupational 99 groups at a l l as a basis of representation, and suggested that selection on a geographical basis would provide a more f a i t h f u l r e f l e c t i o n of community sentiment and int e r e s t s . Questions directed to hi s knowledge of the content and organization of existing services, and his opinions about t h e i r legitimacy and value revealed that this Member did not f e e l that he was as well informed about what the private agencies were doing as he should have l i k e d to be. For t h i s reason, he was reluctant to volunteer his opinions on the proper roles of voluntary action and public provision i n the welfare f i e l d . Member F Member F holds an executive position i n a large i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a f f i l i a t e d transportation union. Member F has always been active i n voluntary community a c t i v i t i e s at various l e v e l s , and has derived much s a t i s f a c t i o n from the stimulation and challenge of these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Moreover, the union i n which he now holds o f f i c e has a good record of voluntary community service, — a fac t of which Member F was confessedly proud. Member F saw his i n v i t a t i o n to s i t on the board of the Community Chest as an honour and an opportunity to serve, and demonstrated a strong i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the private agency structure. Member F admitted that there are sections of labour which do not support private agencies, but went on to say that s o c i a l problems existed and must be dealt 100 with, and that to ignore these facts was to " l i v e i n a dream world." It was also Member F's view that government would eventually be taking r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r many of the agencies presently i n the Community Chest; but he expressed doubts about the e f f i c i e n c y of government, and thought that the Chest was doing a better job, at less cost, than would be the case i f the services were administered by government. Member F was considerably less sanguine i n his views about the status of labour on the boards of agencies. His view was that labour i s not given "an open door" to p a r t i c i -pation, and that part of the reason f o r this was the mistaken b e l i e f of "management" that labour did not belong at the policy-making l e v e l . I t had been Member F's experience, however, that when labour was given the opportunity to play i t s part, management was usually surprised and pleased with the contribution made by the labour representatives. 1 Member F thought too that there was a stereotype of labour as meaning "trouble" which also contributed to t h i s problem of limited a.ccess. F agreed, when i t was suggested to him, that there was probably a "class" f e e l i n g on the part of the business and pro-f e s s i o n a l community, which hindered the admission of labour into policy-making c i r c l e s . We ought perhaps to apologize at this point f o r the heavy use of the device of personification i n such terms as "labour" and "management". But since any alternative would be excessively circumlocutory, and since i t i s not evident to us that any serious ambiguity i s created by our resort to thi s convention, we ask the reader to accept i t as a simple form of symbolic compression. 101 It was Member F's view that only a " f r a c t i o n " of pre-sent agency boards included labour representatives, and that the business-professional groups were "the majority by f a r " . By way of suggesting a solution to the imbalance on boards, F cited the case of the board of the United Good Neighbor Fund of New Westminster of which, according to F, at lea s t one half was composed of labour people. Member F seemed to v i s u a l i z e the community as, i n essence, comprising business and the professions on the one hand and labour on the other. He thought that an adequately representative board would be com-posed of about half from each of these two main groups. Member F appeared to be i n agreement with the method of his selection f o r the Community Chest Board, which had been made, not by the union, but by the nominating committee of the Chest. He described his representative function as being to "represent the community" rather than any special interest group. The only obligation he f e l t to the union was to report back on Chest a c t i v i t i e s . Member G This Member i s the unpaid president of a large, con-servative, i n d u s t r i a l union, and has been involved i n c i v i c a c t i v i t i e s since boyhood. Besides his board member status i n the Community Chest and Councils organization, he holds an executive position i n a-Vancouver labour coordinating body, along with an executive position i n his municipal community 102 council. I t was thi s l a t t e r position which led to his selection f o r the present position he holds on the Community Chest and Councils Board of Directors. He attributed his election to th i s p osition to the fact that there was.k "labour vacancy" on the Board, that he was known as a capable community worker, and that he was also known to be "capable of representing labour." Although his community council executive position was the apparent preliminary to his assumption of the Community Chest r o l e , i t i s noted that Member G- shares r e s p o n s i b i l i t y with the representatives.,from the labour co-ordinating body fo r formally reporting to that group on the a c t i v i t i e s of the Chest board. When questioned about how he perceived his obligations as a community council and agency board member, and asked from what set of d e f i n i t i o n s and l o y a l t i e s he took his d i r e c t i v e s , the Member G- replied that he took his directives on s o c i a l welfare matters from Canadian Labour Congress policy, even i f t h i s meant that he might be re-quired to act i n a fashion contrary to his b e l i e f s as a private c i t i z e n . This Member stressed his b e l i e f that c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s an important aspect of a l l s o c i a l welfare services, whether they operate under voluntary or governmental auspices. In discussing the basis f o r representation of the labour point of view to the voluntary agencies, Member G declared that, to be t r u l y representative, a labour member 1Q5 should he appointed or elected by the union organization. At the same time, he was frank i n saying that "the parliaments of labour" might well f a i l to select r e a l l y suitable people. He explained, i n careful d e t a i l , that the in t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of a union might res u l t i n some of the better candidates f o r such positions being unavailable because they had f a i l e d to secure o f f i c e i n the union i t s e l f . This Member was not i n favour of continued e f f o r t s to achieve representation from the unions as a special group. On the contrary, he believed that union members were i n no essential respect d i f f e r e n t from other people, and should not be singled out from other c i t i z e n s who were concerned-:.about community a f f a i r s . When questioned about the adequacy of labour repre-sentation i n the voluntary agencies, G- repl i e d that labour had a good voice i n agency a f f a i r s . By and large he was s a t i s f i e d that the d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for welfare services ( i . e . public or private) was appropriate, excepting the fact that the method of financing the c h i l d care services appeared to be inequitable. His opinion was that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r "basic services" belonged to government; whereas those requiring the "personal touch" and those pertaining to "character-building" should be private. The rationale f o r t h i s , he explained was the delicate nature of personal problems, and the serious nature of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s vested i n character-building 104 agencies. He expressed opposition to and strong concern about the trend to "bureaucratization" t y p i f i e d i n the government services, and f e l t that c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n xra.s a safeguard against t h i s . Member G- believed that much remained to be done i n educating the public on welfare needs and programs, and suggested that the Community Chest could u s e f u l l y extend i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n thi s regard. He referred s p e c i f i c a l l y to a series of seminars which he had attended, and which he believed had been the spur to his interest i n Community Chest and Councils work. He developed th i s theme even further by saying that he was convinced that education for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n community a f f a i r s was so important that i t should be b u i l t into the public school curriculum i n some way. When he was asked how well he believed his views as a labour man were received, he asserted that he was completely s a t i s f i e d that there was an open exchange of views i n meetings. Member G went so f a r as to add that he was s u f f i c i e n t l y impressed with the successes achieved by thi s process of work-ing with other interest groups to evolve cooperatively-based solutions to community problems, to v i s u a l i z e i t as a r e a l solution to problems i n labour-management r e l a t i o n s . Member H This board member holds an executive p o s i t i o n in. a l o c a l transportation union and has done so f o r many years. 105 His involvement on agency boards began many years ago and he has devoted much time and energy to various community projects. He f e l t strongly that voluntary agencies organized at the community l e v e l contributed to a better understanding between people i n a l l walks of l i f e and that voluntary agencies helped maintain the "sense of community" so necessary i n t h i s day and age. He believed that there should be more labour repre-sentation on some of the private agency boards but that labour representation on the Chest i t s e l f was s u f f i c i e n t . His ex-perience had been that labour's point of view was accepted and respected by board members, and he gave several personal examples of t h i s . He was of the opinion that many services now carried on by private agencies should be government responsi-b i l i t i e s . Services such as c h i l d care, care of the aged and the mentally i l l , should be taken over completely by government, and at once. He thought that i n time the entire health and welfare f i e l d would be taken over by government, or at l e a s t financed \>y government. He claimed that there was value i n voluntary services because they cut out "red tape", and were le s s expensive than a government service since help was given f r e e l y out of interest and dedication. He f e l t that these voluntary man-hours of work were l o s t when the government took over an agency service because people tended to withdraw t h e i r i n t e r e s t . He saw research, however, as a f i e l d that government 106 should finance and participate i n . This hoard member was f l e x i b l e i n his concept of how labour should be represented, and saw two ways i n which t h i s could be arranged. In the f i r s t , a person could be appointed to an agency board by the agency i t s e l f , yet s t i l l be expected to act as a legitimate spokesman f o r labour i n t e r e s t s . In the second way, a person from a labour organization could be nominated by the organization and then appointed to represent labour on a p a r t i c u l a r agency board or boards. He in s i s t e d that regardless of how a person was chosen, whether through the labour organization or not, the c r i t e r i a that should be used i n his selection ought to be that he had made a special study of the problems that confronted the agency; and that he was dedicated and would put the community interest f i r s t . C. Non-Participating Union O f f i c i a l s  O f f i c i a l I This person i s a senior o f f i c i a l i n the pr o v i n c i a l o f f i c e of a service union. His union position i s such that he spends a great deal of his time t r a v e l l i n g and hence has never involved himself i n l o c a l community welfare services. Unionism and "his union" are his l i f e . He was convinced that a person would have to be appointed by the l o c a l labour council i f he was to be 107 considered as representing'labour views. He said that f o r the most part the government should take over a l l health and welfare services and that the need f o r private agencies would then cease to ex i s t . As he was not active on any agency boards and never had been, he f e l t he could not say with any assurance that labour was not s u f f i c i e n t l y represented. However, he guessed that the welfare f i e l d would be l i k e other f i e l d s of private endeavour and that labour was probably not s u f f i c i e n t l y represented. O f f i c i a l J O f f i c i a l J , an o f f i c e r i n an i n d u s t r i a l union, saw a v a l i d place f o r private welfare, (though a r e l a t i v e l y minor one), but thought that government should do a great deal more i n the welfare f i e l d . J was de f i n i t e i n his view that labour was l a r g e l y unrepresented on boards at present, and f o r thi s s i t u a t i o n he blamed both management and labour. He f e l t that management dominance and control of private welfare was one factor; and on the labour side, there was a f a i l u r e of leader-ship i n developing knowledge, inter e s t , and a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n regard to welfare services. J also referred to the public stereotype of labour as something to be feared and as a c o l l e c t i o n of "thugs and bandits," and thought that t h i s stereotype served to prevent labour from giving f u l l e r service to the community. 108 O f f i c i a l J was sure that labour had the p o t e n t i a l to make a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to the welfare f i e l d and asserted that there were many people with a b i l i t y i n the ranks of labour. He f e l t that there should be arrangements with management so that employees who were engaged i n important community service could have time off work fo r t h i s purpose. O f f i c i a l J*s concept of representation was the f a i r l y common one of using already-existing occupational and interest groups as the basis of selection. He suggested such groups as management, government, labour, the Parent-Teacher Association. O f f i c i a l J also f e l t that agencies should give up t h e i r sovereignty i n the selection of t h e i r boards and should adhere to certain standards of selection as part of t h e i r public r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . This comment was apparently aimed, i n part, at what J had already spoken of as the dominance of agency boards by business people. O f f i c i a l K This young and dynamic person holds an executive position i n a l o c a l labour organization. He had never involved himself with any private welfare agency whatsoever, and regarded the f i r s t step to solving problems i n the health and welfare f i e l d as the simple a b o l i t i o n of the Chest and i t s member agencies. He stated his position i n the unequivocal declaration that "...the Community Chest i s established by the 109 employers to dodge their responsibility in paying their proper share of taxes." He went on to say that as things were, the labouring man paid the greater share for both government and private health and welfare services, and that i t was time the employer paid his f a i r share. He added that the Chest and i t s agencies were a "country of small kingdoms," and were run by people "building empires." He said he had never contributed to the Community Chest and that whenever they told him what his contribution should be 1 he sat down and wrote out a cheque for that amount and sent i t to the New Democratic Party. It was put to him that some labour o f f i c i a l s interviewed in the course of the study had f e l t that unions should stay out of po l i t i c s , and he was asked what he thought of this. He evidently conceived this point of view to be a survival of (what was for him) the obsolete belief that i t was possible to achieve realization of the goals and policies of the labour movement through cooperat-ion with the so-called "old line" parties. He had some knowledge of the various members of his own organization who were on agency boards, and said that from what they had told him labour representation on private agency boards was very small. He claimed that the only way to ensure that a person was a true representative of labour was to ask "Presumably a reference to the schedule of suggested contributions by size of income tha$ i s distributed during fund-raising campaigns. 110 labour organizations, to select the man to s i t on the board. He contended that i f the agency or board did the selecting they would choose a person who thought as they did, — which almost c e r t a i n l y would not be the way that "organized labour thought". O f f i c i a l L This knowledgeable man holds an important and i n -f l u e n t i a l position i n the major p r o v i n c i a l labour organization, and as a prominent spokesman f o r labour, i s a public figure of si g n i f i c a n c e . He expressed concern about a va r i e t y of unmet welfare needs and strong disapproval of the private agencies, which he described as i n e f f e c t u a l . His view was that the con-t r o l of voluntary welfare was i n the hands of "big business", with the consequence that the basic causes of s o c i a l problems were ignored. He described the private agencies' services as "just a p i l l , " and took the position that welfare needs could only be met by broad government programs. He charged that the voluntary welfare e f f o r t was misdirected and served merely to d i s t r a c t public attention from the need f o r the development of adequate government welfare measures. It was his contention that, as a result of t h i s lack of proper public welfare pro-grams, needy workers were being exploited. O f f i c i a l L refuses support to the Community Chest and Councils and i t s member agencies, and could envisage no I l l possible problem which could not be better dealt with by public means. He rejected the notion that voluntary e f f o r t might serve to i d e n t i f y unmet needs, and took the position that vigorous p o l i t i c a l action by the unions was essential to any r e a l progress i n the f i e l d of welfare. He was c r i t i c a l of tmion members who participated i n the a f f a i r s of the voluntary agencies, and considered them to be under the influence of management. O f f i c i a l M O f f i c i a l M, an o f f i c e r of the l o c a l of a large i n t e r -national i n d u s t r i a l union, could be interviewed f o r no more than a few minutes, but i n this b r i e f time expressed an extreme and clear-cut view about the private agencies and t h e i r re-lation s to labour. M believed that a l l welfare services should be under the auspices of government. He saw the Community Chest as management's tool to prevent government take over of welfare services, and thus to avert the higher taxes which would follow. There was no doubt i n O f f i c i a l M's mind that t h i s was a conscious and planned p o l i c y on the part of management. He saw evidence of management's use of private welfare i n the fact that the fund-raising campaigns i n • i n d u s t r i a l plants were organized and promoted by the personnel managers, who repre-sented the management point of view. When someone from the union conducted the campaign i t was usually at the i n s t i g a t i o n of management, which also permitted such p r i v i l e g e s as time off 112 work during the campaign to assure i t s f i n a n c i a l success. M. thought that i f management pressure to give was reduced and giving was made genuinely voluntary, the Chest would receive much les s f i n a n c i a l support from labour. The reaction of labour to the "conspiracy" of manage-ment ought to be, according to M, a complete withdrawal of every kind of support f o r the Community Chest. In t h i s way, he asserted, the private agencies would eventually f a i l , and government would have to step i n and take over. When asked i f he believed these t a c t i c s would be successful i n bringing about the change-over, M re p l i e d that he was sure i t would happen, and that the trend was i n the d i r e c t i o n of more government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n welfare. The question of labour's p a r t i c i p a t i o n on the boards of agencies was raised, but t h i s O f f i c i a l , i n - l i n e with his views, countered that labour should have "nothing to do with" the boards of such agencies. He said that the attempt to get labour people to serve on the boards was management's scheme to make the private welfare system appear acceptable to a l l groups i n the community. M was also asked about the so-called "charitable im-pulse," the alleged existence of which as a human "need" i s sometimes used as an argument i n favour of private welfare. It was pointed out to M that i f a l l welfare was under government auspices, there would be no scope f o r the charitable impulse. His answer was that people could express t h e i r charitable impulses "by paying t h e i r taxes". 113 D» What the Respondents Agreed On — And What They had  i n Common On the basis of these condensed interview reports, i t i s at once apparent that opinion i s c r i t i c a l l y divided on several questions which are central to the problem of labour representation on private agency boards. The whole concept of p r i v a t e l y sponsored welfare i s t o t a l l y rejected by three i n -f l u e n t i a l and key figures i n the l o c a l system of organized labour, ( O f f i c i a l s I, L, and M); and whereas O f f i c i a l K accepted the idea of private charity, he strongly opposed the voluntary welfare e f f o r t as i t i s presently organized. These o f f i c i a l s expressed the uniform conviction that the appropriate way of working f o r improvements i n the provision of welfare services was by means of p o l i t i c a l action, which they con-sidered to be'a legitimate union a c t i v i t y . On the other hand, a group of agency board members drawn from labour demonstrated obvious committment to the values of private welfare, simultaneously recognizing, i n varying degrees, the need f o r improvement i n s o c i a l welfare services, and nominating a var i e t y of c r i t e r i a by which t h e i r opinions could be vindicated. One area of consensus l a y i n the uniform opinion of the whole group that considerable extension of government r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n welfare was necessary. The scope of t h i s expected extension was seldom'specified c l e a r l y , but was des-cribed by most interviewees as involving the "necessary", 114 "basic", or "essential" services, — though what these would be i n the event was not always r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e . This vagueness about the ..desirable d i v i s i o n of re-s p o n s i b i l i t y between public;and private agencies was ref l e c t e d i n the opinions of the interviewees about the role of the private agency. A marked heterogeneity of .viewpoint was i n evidence, ranging a l l the way from straightforward a b o l i t i o n of the private agencies to f u l l support and the desire to strengthen the voluntary system as i t presently operates. Yet even those who took the l a t t e r of these two "extreme" positions were r a r e l y able to offer a convincing characteriza-t i o n of what was unique .-to the role of private agencies. Some spoke of the dangers of government "red tape," others of the peculiar appositeness of the private system i n the provision of intimate "personal" services, other again of the special capacities of the private, agencies i n e l i c i t i n g and mobilizing c i t i z e n interest and a u c t i o n i n the welfare f i e l d . Most, how-ever, — even of i t s warmest supporters — emphasized the point that i n the here-and^now i t i s the private agencies who are i n f a c t providing many important and even essential services. Another s i g n i f i c a n t point of agreement among the t o t a l group was that labour has a right and duty to be concerned about s o c i a l welfare. Views about the adequacy of labour repre-sentation f o r the most part stressed that i t was i n s u f f i c i e n t . The majority of those who indicated support f o r the private 115 agency system believed-this inadequacy to be due to a variety of factors, and c e r t a i n l y not .just to the i n h o s p i t a b i l i t y of the private agencies. One of these factors, to be sure, was said to be management's attitude to labour, an attitude characterized variously as one of "class" or of labour "not belonging" at the board l e v e l . A second factor, mentioned several times, was labour's f a i l u r e to develop the leadership and interest among i t s members which would prepare them f o r responsible board positions. A t h i r d factor was thought to be the public stereotyping of labour and the tendency to dismiss the labour person as irresponsible and a "troublemaker". On the other hand, Members A, G, and E believed that the labour point of view was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y represented. We were not always f u l l y convinced by t h i s expression of s a t i s -f a c t i o n with the status quo, although i t w i l l be remembered that E admitted to i n s u f f i c i e n t information to judge the s i t u a t i o n properly, and G was seen to be working on several fronts f o r improvements i n the l o c a l welfare f i e l d . There was v a r i a t i o n , too, i n the degree of importance our respondents attached to the very idea of having repre-sentation from labour organizations. Members D, G, and H f l a t l y disagreed with the notion that securing representation from labour, as a special group, was an appropriate basis for 116 board membership; and advanced the view that special knowledge, int e r e s t , a b i l i t y and enthusiasm i n a c i t i z e n were more r e l e -vant. E. f e l t that a system of geographical constituencies would be more appropriate. These members therefore were not unduly concerned about the "adequacy" of labour representation, and tended to see the issue as i r r e l e v a n t . Problems i n determining what was appropriate "representative" procedure were not seen, on the whole, as a concern to t h i s group. Considerable variation" i n the methods of honouring the representative p r i n c i p l e was observed. Members A, C, and H, for example, report formally to the parent union body. Members E and G- report to t h e i r community council. The general consensus appeared to be that.a labour repre-sentative's vote and opinions were not "committed" to the union constituency's point of view, and that wider community interest and l o y a l t y were of greater importance. However, there was considerable ambivalence here, and some (such as A, C, and G-) made an attempt to reconcile the ideas of representing the public interest and representing some special group i n t e r e s t . 1 I t i s noteworthy that the great majority of union leaders sub-scribed — almost as a c u l t u r a l l y determined i n t e l l e c t u a l *^It seems clear that t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n can only be achieved by invocation of some theory of p l u r a l i s t i c "balance" or (as we have suggested e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter) by c a r e f u l l y distinguishing the representative's constituency and his duties, i . e . the two senses i n which he'is a representative. We did not expect our respondents to read philosophical papers to us, any more than we considered ourselves competent to write the papers for them. A l l we aim to show i s ( l ) that confusion i s profound and widespread, and (2) that i t springs n a t u r a l l y from the speciousness and ambiguity i n t r i n s i c to the whole private welfare system i n Vancouver and (presumably) North America i n general. 117 re f l e x — to the p l u r a l i s t i c notion of representation on the basis of- special interest and occupational groupings. - There was, however, no r e a l unanimity even at that l e v e l i n t h e i r conceptions of representative behavior, but rather a d i v e r s i t y of thought and action varying according to the individual's views of his function*. There was no question i n our minds but that the union leaders were a l l v i t a l l y and conscientiously concerned about achieving welfare objectives. Equally, we had l i t t l e doubt that they were often deeply xmcertain as to what these objectives were, and — even more — as to what would be the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y appropriate and p o l i t i c a l l y legitimate methods of pursuing them. CHAPTER 5 RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT It would-be tedious to burden what has been from the outset an e s s e n t i a l l y argumentative study with a wealth of further comment. While i t i s not a competence of facts (con-tr a r y to popular b e l i e f ) to speak f o r themselves, many of the conclusions ours were capable of y i e l d i n g must already be i n evidence to the reader. Nevertheless, i t would be false to the s p i r i t of animated perplexity which has informed our investigations i f we did not at t h i s point offer- a valedictory recapitulation of the major questions that either went into or have come out of our essay. This we now proceed to do. A. PUBLIC vs. PRIVATE; The Unreal Terms of a Real Problem Reference has repeatedly been made i n the course of t h i s work to the problems of structure and process which are apparent i n the operations of the private welfare agencies. However, what seems to us from t h i s retrospective standpoint to be a matter of graver concern i s the question of what functions should constitute the proper task of the private agency. In other words, what p a r t i c u l a r role can the private agency per-form most e f f e c t i v e l y in?,a t y p i c a l system of s o c i a l welfare services? Putting aside the troublesome problems of the con-texts within which and the methods by which planning f o r ade-quate and appropriate s o c i a l welfare services should be carried out, the issue of a clear d i v i s i o n between public and private agencies must be faced. 119 It seems to us that a c r i t i c a l need': exists f o r a f a r more thorough going a r t i c u l a t i o n of the roles of public and private agencies than has been made available to us to date. The best we seem to have > a t present i s the.legitimacy-con-f e r r i n g vagueness of the formulas of spokesmen l i k e Lester Granger. We submit that four large questions ari s e i n thi s connection which are in s i s t e n t of attention. The f i r s t of these concerns the d e f e n s i b i l i t y of the continued and com-placent use of the term "private" when examined i n the l i g h t of the source of revenue upon which the private agencies depend. The fact i s that i n 1961 the Community Chest and Councils 1 contribution to the funding of these agencies comprised roughly one t h i r d of t h e i r t o t a l revenues; money from one or other l e v e l of government constituting the greater part of the r e -mainder. The situ a t i o n i s so palpably anomalous that i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive the motives that sustain i t . Whether i t i s a token acceptance of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the service by government, or a t y p i c a l l y Anglo-Saxon compromise arrangement arrived at fo r reasons of expediency, or whether some other factors of which we are not aware operate, can only be matters fo r speculation here. We believe that they are questions s u f f i c i e n t l y paradoxical to deserve answers. A further element of contradiction i s introduced when we observe the performance of function, so obviously 120 public as to be determined by statute, being carried out under the auspices of private decision-making prerogatives and being extensively financed at the same time from public revenues. At what point, i t might be asked, do the dependency of status and the scope of a c t i v i t i e s of a private agency properly make i t a public one; or i n what sense does a private agency r e t a i n a claim to the t i t l e when i t expends and administers public funds? If/hat procedures of accountability are i n s t i t u t e d to ensure the appropriate use of these funds, and how ca r e f u l l y are they followed?. What, i n essence, i s the difference be-tween a p u b l i c l y financed private agency and a government department when we eliminate the fact that the tests of accountability are les s exacting and the processes of p o l i c y formation less open to inspection i n the case of the former? A certain d o c t r i n a l tentativeness and incoherency as to how r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l welfare services should be d i f f e r e n t i a l l y assigned i s i n evidence again i n the opinions of our labour group. One fac t i o n among our respondents unequivocally repudiates the sponsorship of welfare programs by any agency other than government. Another supports the private agency system of services with certain plausible but elusive q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . "Basic," "necessary," "essential" services they say, should be provided by government. We suggest that t h i s i s not the answer so much as i t i s a respectable way of re-wording the question, and that what i s meant by "basic," necessary," and "essential" i s prec i s e l y what needs s p e c i f i c a t i o n , analysis and debate. 121 The opinions of one -union l o c a l , when a sample of i t s members was canvassed l a s t year, were rather more f o r t h r i g h t . Here i t was found that the assignment to government of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a variety of health and welfare services, including c h i l d adoption services, health insurance, recreational f a c i l i t i e s for.children and adults, services to the mentally and chronically i l l , and retirement pensions, was made by 85 percent of those p o l l e d 1 . Walker and Pennington conclude "...very l i t t l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was assigned to the private agencies, the union, or management. The federal l e v e l of government was recognized as the appropriate l e v e l of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l welfare services except recreation f a c i l i t i e s f o r children and adults, where the p r o v i n c i a l and municipal l e v e l s were assigned ,most bfothe r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ^ Against t h i s r e l a t i v e l y clear set of opinions are ranged the somewhat tenuous and q u a l i f i e d formulas offered by the labour board memberswe interviewed. The "personal touch", avoidance of "red-tape", they argued, supplies the merit of the private agency system. Yet whether the d i s c i p l i n e , s k i l l and dedica-t i o n of the professional person be i t the sympathetic capacities of the s o c i a l worker, the deft and reassuring s i c k -bed attendance of the nurse, or the thoughtful and practiced methods of the administrator are so inconstant and permeable as to be altered or impaired by differences i n organizational sovereignty, appears to us to be highly debatable, and i s cer-t a i n l y not a truth we should judge to be of the revealed kind. 'Pennington and Walker, op. c i t . , pp. 86-91 'Pennington and Walker, op. c i t . . p. 90 122 It would be seriously negligent on our part to d i s r e -gard one very r e a l problem which i s perhaps inherent i n the pre-sent method of organizing voluntary services: that i s , i t s f a i l u r e to take into account the breadth and i n t r i c a t e l y rami-\ f i e d nature of most s o c i a l problems, which tend to be seen at the l o c a l community l e v e l only i n t h e i r symptomatic aspects, and hence, generally treated there as such. The decades since World War II have brought to the s o c i a l sciences a greatly en-riched understanding of the relationshipsf:;between and the causes of s o c i a l problems...and i n pa r t i c u l a r , of th e i r organic connections with fundamental characteristics of the entire i n s t i t u t i o n a l system. In our minds, a serious question exists as to whether the organizational scope of the private agency, the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of i t s f i s c a l condition, or the range of i t s authority, are s u f f i c i e n t to render i t capable of thoroughly effective attack on these problems. 1 B. Bureaucracy and the Private Agency An additional area of concern we believe t h i s study points to i s the paradoxical character of the relationship between the organization of the private agency and it's ideology'^' I t has been pointed out above (Chapter l ) that the " o f f i c i a l p o r t r a i t " of the private agency depicts i t as a f l e x i b l e and adaptive resource, which can i d e n t i f y needs, move quickly to meet them, experiment with new methods of helping and develop exemplary standards of service. This image reveals a point of ^-Lukoff and Mecher i n c r i t i c i s i n g the assumptions on which the work of Community Research Associates i s based, make th i s point, contending that the massive problems now confront-i n g society cannot be dealt with from a "community" orientation. 123 view about the place of the voluntary association i n s o c i a l l i f e which makes sense only when referred to an equally symmetrical and fixed view of the nature of government. The notion i s that the voluntary association alone can claim the advantages of enthusiastic interest on the part of members, freedom to select and change goals and methods, a vigorous and 'grass roots' democratic process, and a proximity and s e n s i t i v i t y to the needs and problems of ordinary people. A corollary of th i s theory i s that the voluntary association performs an essential role i n society by guarding these'"'* values, a l l of which are presumed to be l o s t when a service or a c t i v i t y i s taken over by a-government bureaucracy. The converse of the picture i s an extremely tenacious and widely-held view of government as being "...to bureaucratically cumbersome to be sensitive to l o c a l 'grass root' problems," 1 impersonal and insensitive to the multiform variety of ind i v i d u a l needs, and unresponsive i f not predatory i n i t s relations with i t s constituency. This i s not the place to j o i n issue on the v a l i d i t y of t h i s assessment of the advantages of the voluntary association over government. But i t i s of relevance to point up a paradox i n the self-created image with which private agencies confront us. It l i e s i n the fa c t , which we believe could be r i c h l y documented, that voluntarj-- agencies have themselves increasingly adopted the bureaucratic practices Thomson, D., The Sun 124 they profess to deplore elsewhere, while at the same time r e -linquishing i n no respect t h e i r claims to possessing the ad-vantages which bureaucracy i s said to preclude. This state of a f f a i r s can be i l l u s t r a t e d i n a v a r i e t y of ways. For one thing, i t i s evident to anyone f a m i l i a r with the structure and operation of large private agencies that the cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of bureaucracy, both i t s strengths and weaknesses, are f u l l y developed i n s p i r i t e d independence of what the "theory" says. We do not see how the fact that a government department i s responsible to a minister of the crown and a private agency to a board of directors, i n any way changes the essence of bureaucracy, and what i s more to the point, the private agencies do not seem to have been able to either. The fa c t i s that private agencies have needed and have sought the advantages of bureaucracy, as have most large organizations i n our society, but i n doing so have put into dubiety t h e i r claim to embody the values from which they derive t h e i r legitimations. Writing on the future of voluntaryism i n s o c i a l work, Mencher says: The demand f o r e f f i c i e n c y was related to the growth of bureaucracy and resulted i n a highly professionalized service emphasizing the needs of the c l i e n t as against the p a r t i a l and personal motivations of the voluntary p a r t i c i -pant. E f f i c i e n t service became to a great degree synonymous with d i s c i p l i n i n g and even eradicating the impulse and s p i r i t of voluntary charity.1 For another thing, i t i s common among voluntary Kahn, Alfred J., Issues'in Americal Social Work. p. 226. 125 agencies f o r a great deal of stress to be placed on the agency's history and t r a d i t i o n , and thus on the values of organizational s t a b i l i t y and continuity;-: These values are c l e a r l y not i n accord with the virtues of f l e x i b i l i t y and adaptiveness so often claimed by private agencies. Again, i f true, as the l i t e r a t u r e suggests, (and as our figures on board composition, would seem to confirm)' that the s e l e c t i o n of board members i s . at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y determined by the prestige and status of the candidates, i t becomes even more d i f f i c u l t to know which i s the rule and which i s the exception i n the case. It seems reasonable to suppose, moreover that a selective bias of th i s kind w i l l encourage a high valuation of such objectives as f i s c a l and organizational s t a b i l i t y and the enterprising capture of t a c t i c a l advantage i n promoting an agency's program. But s t a b i l i t y i s pe'renially and notoriously hard to reconcile w i t h - f l e x i b i l i t y ; and f o r the ingenious-minded, so are prestige and status with "grass roots". Furthermore, the' deliberate c u l t i v a t i o n i n the board members of a "proprietary" investment i n the agency's existence and continuance, which also appears to be involved, raises the question of that imbalance of ends and means which i s known to us these days as the phenomenon bf goal displace-ment; and with i t the p o s s i b i l i t y that the organization's concern f o r i t s own existence w i l l supersede i t s concern with i t s ostensible goals and how best to achieve them. It i s not improbable, i n f a c t , that factors of t h i s sort would move an 126 agency i n the d i r e c t i o n of stereotyping i t s services or out-l i v i n g i t s usefulness, rather-than i n the d i r e c t i o n of imaginative responsiveness to changing needs and conditions. The paradox i s further increased by our discoveries about the operation and meaning of membership i n private agencies, and the apparent fact that boards are i n practice lacking i n genuine democratic authorization. There i s too great a readiness i n the published apologetics of the private agencies to equate the concept of democracy with the notion of informality; to picture democracy as a process of sub-i n s t i t u t i o n a l , face-to-face interaction i n which nobody claims prescriptive power over anybody else, rather than as a form of government i n which the e x p l i c i t a l l o c a t i o n of power is " p r e -c i s e l y the method used to secure the enjoyment of p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . The democracy they speak of i s the mutuality of f r i e n d l y neighbours. The democracy we have i n mind i s the thing the Levellers and the Chartists fought f o r . In the l a t t e r perspective the special claims made for the voluntary association are often hollow and sometimes impertinent. An additional facet of the paradox has to do with the i n t r i g u i n g questions of organization, temperament and p o l i c y . It i s frequently held that there i s an "organization man" who develops a pattern of behaviour appropriate to the r e l a t i v e l y stable, objective, and r a t i o n a l environment of a bureaucracy. I f i t i s true that the private agency structure has become bureaucratic and i s staffed by organization-oriented 127 personalities, i t i s a circumstance which would make f o r a diminished p r o b a b i l i t y that private agencies would be able to engage i n short-term s o c i a l action and to move quickly i n response to emergent needs. The personality who can do the l a t t e r often may not be the man who does well as an e f f i c i e n t and complaisant member of a large organization. The highly organized fund-raising a c t i v i t i e s of the Community Chest represent another source of d e f i n i t i o n a l tension. In the united fund concept, organizational com-pl e x i t y and e f f i c i e n c y reach a quite remarkable height, and the emphasis on voluntaryism and enthusiastic p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s l a r g e l y confined to c o l l e c t i n g and giving. Mencher, again, has pointed up the problem: The process of subordinating voluntary p a r t i c i p a t i o n to bureaucratic control i s probably most c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by the growth of the community chest and the united fund. These represent the f i n a l phase of divorcing voluntaryism from private social'welfare...The ultimate implications of the united fund are the negation of the values of voluntaryism. C. Problems of Representation and Accountability A notion often put about by the private agencies i s that t h e i r existence and the service they render are a t t r i -butable to the fact that the community w i l l s that i t be so. Inherent i n t h i s idea i s the claim that the p o l i c i e s pro-mulgated by the agency board are expressive of the popular w i l l and i n the interest of the public good. The guarantee, ahn, op. c i t . , pp. 228-229 128 or earnest, tha$ t h i s i s the case i s said to reside In the fact that agency hoards can he described as "miniature communities". One may wonder, though how r e l i a b l e a guarantee i t i s when the proportions of the occupations represented on agency boards are i n almost inverse relationship to t h e i r r a t i o s i n the community. The preponderance of businessmen on the boards raises further questions. Why i s i t that t h i s group should be so highly represented? Does i t with i t s p r o f i t and loss frame of reference have any sp e c i a l competence or prerogative i n a f i e l d of action that by d e f i n i t i o n must put the emphasis on service rather than on gain? One wonders too whether a group such as t h i s , that by id e o l o g i c a l necessity must render an optimistic account of the state of the community, i s able to face up altogether r e a l i s t i c a l l y to the fact that grave s o c i a l problems ex i s t . And to plumb the depths of cynicism, i s i t possible that businessmen see the private agencies as a symbolic vindication of the free-enterprise system, of which they are the p r i n c i p a l architects, spokesmen and beneficiaries? No note of innuendo i s intended i n those questions. The problem of whether the private agency system i s being ad-ministered i n the public interest i s a matter of independent f a c t , the determination of which l i e s outside the scope of t h i s essay. It i s a per f e c t l y legitimate observation, on the other hand, that certain concatenations of circumstance make i t more natural than would others to rais e questions about 129 t h e i r significance. The l i k e l i h o o d of such questions being put i s en-hanced, moreover, by the. fact that l i t t l e i n i t i a t i v e i s taken or zeal shown i n providing the answers whose absence makes the questions necessary. As we have remarked already, the system of accounting employed by the private agencies i s deplorably half-hearted. It i s a matter, perhaps, f o r surprise, more than anything else, that they do not seem to think i t i n t h e i r own interests to do better. We propound no theories of conspiracy and impugn no person's good w i l l . The private agencies are manifestly both staffed and governed by men and women of i n t e g r i t y and competence. Despite i t s present entanglement, moreover, i n a web of ambiguity and unction, the germinal idea and impulse of the voluntary association i s s t i l l a. v i t a l p r i n c i p l e i n the l i f e of any open society. But i f there i s any one thing that subverts the p o l i t i c a l health of North American democracy, i t i s the per-vasive uncertainty concerning the nature of the public interest and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l forms which would make' i t possible to i d e n t i f y i t , — even i f , i n the nature of our case, we can never achieve i t . So f a r as the contemporary theory and practice of private welfare contribute to t h i s uncertainty, they do us a l l the b i t t e r e s t disservice. Appendix A COMMUNITY CHEST AND COUNCILS OF GREATER VANCOUVER AREA ANALYSIS OF AGENCIES BUDGETTED INCOME 1961 Agency Dominion & 1961 Appr. 1961 Total City and Provincial Other Chest Budgetted Municipal Government Revenue All o c a t i o n Revenue Alexandra Neighbourhood House 1,000. 3,681. 49,485. 54,166. Big Brothers of B.C. Van. Branch — — 210. 10,854. 11,064. Boys Clubs of Vancouver — - 3,092. 89,300. 92,392. Boys Clubs of Canada — 21,000. 79,800. 5,000. 105,800. Boy Scouts of Canada, Burnaby 8 d i s t r i c t s 699. — — 7,628. 8,327. Boy Scouts of Canada, Metro. Van. Reg. — — 12,500o 51,672. 64,172. Boy Scouts of Canada, Prov. Cel. for. B.C. and the Yukon — 6,720. 71,480. 34,000. 112,200. B.C. Borstal Association — — 5,000. 14,048 19,048. B.C. Epilepsy Society - 7,335. 5,511. 2,800. 15,646. B.C. Epilepsy Society, Van. Branch - 4,700. 100. 28,272. 33,072. B.C. Medical Research Foundation — 20,000. 14,000V 12,000. 46,000. B.C.S.P.C.A. Vancouver Branch 21,800. — 31,180. 18,14-0. 71,120. B.C.S.P.C.A. West Van. Branch 6,380. — 2,610. 1,868. 10,858. Camp Alexandra 1,000. - 9,756. 14,000. 24,756. C.A.R.S. B.C. Div.-Gr. Van. & Bby. — 42,300. 48,551. 132,000. 222,851. Canadian Mental Health Assn. B.C. Div i s i o n — 10,000. 54,553. 1,279. 65,832. Canadian Mental Health Assn. Van.Br. — - 4,175. 43,362. 47,537. Canadian Mental Health Assn. North Shore Branch — - 1,000. 4,654* 5,654. C.N.I.B. ( i n c l . Burnaby) — 70,000. 104,384. 63,041. 237,425. Canadian Welfare Council — — — 8,670. 8,670. Catholic Charities - - 44,342. 64,476. 108,818V Catholic C h i l d ^ n s 1 Aid Society - 538,180.(2) 2,600. 95,438. 636,218." 131 Agency Cedar Cottage Neighbourhood House Cerebral Palsy Assn. of Gr. Van. Child Care Centre Childrens' Aid Society Childrens 1 Hospital Childrens 1 Foundation Columbia Coast Mission Disabled Veterans 1 Association Family Service Agency F i r s t United Church Summer Camp G i r l Guides Assn. Burnaby Area G i r l Guides Vancouver Council Gordon Neighbourhood House Gr. Vancouver Health League Health Centre f o r Children-Research Jewish Community Council John Howard Sooiety Last Post Fund Missions to Seamen, Van. Branch Missions to Seamen, N.Van. Branch Multiple Sclerosis Soc.ofCan. Vancouver Chapter Muscular Dystrophy Assn. of Canada North Shore Neighbourhood H ouse North Van. Memorial Comm. Centre Returned Soldiers Service St. John Ambulance St. John Ambulance, Burnaby Branch Dominion & 1961 Appr. 1961 Total City and Provi n c i a l Other . Chest Budgetted Municipal Government Revenue Al l o c a t i o n Revenue 550. 10,755. 11,305. 12,600 14,820. 35,518. 36,417. 99,355.. 3,850. —.. 39,250. 40,679. 83,779. 4,500. 1,040,812.(2) 14,866. 214,000. 1,274,178. 3,000. 530,430.' 107,397. 79,966. 720,793. — 10,950. 69,647. 23,143. 103,740. — 4,450. 18,005. 5,700. 28,155. — — 3,125. 12,778. 15,903. — — 6,250. 192,426. 198,676. — 12,800. 4,000. 16,800. _ — — 2,287. 2,287. _ 356. 4,721. 5,077. 1,200. — 14,210V 72,800. 88,210.' _ 120V 16,194.. 16,314. _ — — 48,595. 48,595.(3) — — 10,415. 29,225. 39,640. — 6,600. 1,000. 36,193. 43,793. mm — 2,961.' 2,418. 5,379V — 200. 6,830V 14,056.. 21,086. 225. 200. 50. 7,592. 8,067. mm 2,400. 8,860. 11,260.(1) _ — 8,000. 8,000.(1) _ — 11,855. 24,090. 35,945. . 4,000. 600. 10,627. 6,000. 21,227. — 1,141. 7,392. 8,533. _ — 119,091. 44,769. 163,860. — - 650. 3,540. 4,190. 132 Dominion & 1961 Appr. 1961 Total City P r o v i n c i a l Other Chest Budgetted Agency Municipal Government Revenue Al l o c a t i o n Revenue Salvation Army 6,400. 9,000. 258,178. 150,031. 423,609. Soc. f o r Adv. of Deaf & Hard of Hrg. — — 690V 5,012. 5,702, Sunny H i l l Hospital for Children 13,000. 155,883. 400. 38,500, 207,783. Vancouver C i v i c Unity Association — — 1,300. 6,026. 7,326. Vancouver G i r l s ' Club Association — — 4,646. 5,700. 10,346. Vancouver Housing Association — — -540. 3,960. 4,500. Vancouver Sai l o r s Home — 200. 38,400. 13,440. 52,040. V.O.N. Burnaby Branch 14,352V 6,150. 8,328. 15,268. 44,098. V.O.N. North Vancouver Branch 5,500. 3,500. 6,500. 20,525. 36,025. V.O.N. Vancouver Branch 13,500. 35,608. 46,750. 69,622. 165,480. V.O.N. West Vancouver Branch 2,000. 1,000. 4,010. 6,541. 13,551. Volunteer Bureau of Gr. Vancouver • — — — 9,399. 9,399. West Vancouver Welfare Assoc. — — 3,651. 3,651. Working Boys Homes Society - — 5,714. 5,294. 11,008, Y.M.C.A. Burnaby Branch - — • 5,490. 14,000. 19,490. Y.M.C.A.' of Gr. Vancouver • — — 292,555. 131,248. 423,803. Y.W.C.A. — 1,200. 216,495. 166,000. 383,695. Youth Counselling Service — 4,725. 3,200. 6.593. 14,518. 2,379,393V Group Insurance 5.703.37 115,006. 2,546,563. 1,880.835. 2,385,096.37 6,921,797. . ( l ) The Chest allo c a t i o n represents Vancouver's share of the t o t a l national budget (not shown). (2) Approximately 10$ of income shown under Federal and P r o v i n c i a l grant column i s recovered from municipalities by the Provincial Government (3) Represents the cost of preparation f o r research projects. In addition to t h i s a l l o c a t i o n the agency has a substantial grant from the B.C. Hospital Insurance Service f o r i t s h o s p i t a l program as well as Federal and Provincial funds f o r actual research projects. APPENDIX B THE QUALIFICATIONS. RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS  OF THE LOCAL LABOR REPRESENTATIVE'ON THE STIFF OF A COMMUNITY AGENCY AS DESCRIBED. .BY AFL-CIO-CSAl The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and r e l a t i o n -ships of the l o c a l labor s t a f f representative can be defined only injterms of the dynamic relationship which exists between s o c i a l welfare, organized labor and our democratic society. Because these are ever-changing elements, the best job description can only catch the bare essentials. What follows i s a minimum p r o f i l e f o r the men and women who w i l l represent labor i n t h i s important service. The l o c a l l a b o r s t a f f representative i s a community organizer. He i d e n t i f i e s the inte r e s t of the labor movement with the best inte r e s t of the broader community. He works with community groups of a l l kinds i n resolving health and welfare problems. He keeps the Central Labor Body and i t s Community Services Committee informed on s o c i a l issues as they a r i s e . He works with the Community Services Committee and with other committee groups, such as, the central health and welfare planning body, i n meeting the health, welfare and recreational needs of union members and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . The l o c a l labor s t a f f representative i s a teacher. He organizes and directs union counsellor t r a i n i n g courses. He organizes i n s t i t u t e s and conferences, bringing union men and women together with community leaders to discuss problems of mutual interest and concern i n the area of s o c i a l welfare. He discusses the community services program at union meetings of a l l kinds bringing to the union members an awareness of t h i s program and a better understanding of health and welfare pro-blems. He also appears before community groups to discuss the general approach of organized labor to s p e c i f i c community problems. The l o c a l labor s t a f f representative i s an advisor and counsellor, meeting regularly with union leaders and ad-v i s i n g them on problems which are related to the community services program. He also meets with agencies and counsels with them on problems of mutual concern. E s s e n t i a l l y , the job of the l o c a l labor s t a f f repre-sentative i s to help develop and mobilize health, welfare and recreational services, both voluntary and tax-supported, to meet the needs of people. Through his e f f o r t s union people come to know what these services are and how to use them. Through his e f f o r t s too, union people develop an awareness of these programs, parti c i p a t e i n t h e i r work and support them. AFL-CIO Community Service A c t i v i t i e s , AFL-CIO Guide  to Community Services, 9 Bast 40th Street, New York, 1956. Appendix C JOB DESCRIPTION  LABOUR. STAFP REPRESENTATIVE  COMMUNITY CHEST AND COUNCILS OP GREATEVFVMCOUVER AREA June 1. 1962 General Statement of Duties; Under the administrative supervision of the Executive Director, to encourage trade union o f f i c e r s and members to pa r t i c i p a t e i n planning, and supporting community health and "welfare services, and to develop on the part of labour an awareness of the services available i n the community and how they may be used. Typical Tasks: 1, To act as the o f f i c i a l liaison between the Central labour body, other l o c a l unions and the Community Chest and Councils, 2, Whenever possible be a member of the Central labour body "Welfare Services Committee" and act as an advisor to t h i s Committee, 3, Develop Union Counselling Courses, health and welfare i n -s t i t u t e s , special educational programs, designed to meet the needs of union members, 4, Inform union members of labour's program on welfare services by speaking to as many union groups as possible. 5, Secure opportunities f o r health and welfare agency repre-sentatives to speak before union groups on welfare services. 6, Secure opportunities f o r union members to speak before health and welfare and other community groups. 7, Develop a sound working relationship with professional and l a y leaders of a l l public and voluntary health and welfare services i n the community. 8, Act as a r e f e r r a l agent i n conjunction with the Community Information Service and also as an advisor to union members and t h e i r f a m i l i e s . 9, Advise i n the securing of union representatives to act as Board and Committee members. 134 10. Work with the Social Planning Section as required from time to time. 11. Work with the Public Relations Section as a Consultant on Public Relations of the Chest and Councils as i t r e -la t e s to labour. 12. He should be expected to assume some r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n fund r a i s i n g . In t h i s capacity he usually undertakes a combination of the following duties: a. Helps r e c r u i t labour leaders to important posts i n the campaign structure, and acts as advisor to any labour, committee i n campaign. b. Obtains endorsements from key labour leaders. c. May arrange f o r union loan volunteers to work part or f u l l time during the drive. d. Speaks at l o c a l union meetings and l o c a l plant r a l l i e s . e. Works with Chest Public Relations Department i n getting l o c a l p u b l i c i t y f o r labour's p a r t i c i p a t i o n . f . Maintains records of labour's giving to campaign. g. Meets with l o c a l union o f f i c e r s and shop stewards with the help of loaned personnel and employers to i n s t a l l p a y r o l l deduction plans and encourage better giving. h. May act as a "trouble shooter" i n combatting f a l s e rumors about agency operations and i n tracking down reports involving the f a i l u r e of an agency to give services. Desirable Qualifications f o r the Work: (1) A f f i l i a t i o n with, an extensive service at some f i e l d of organized labour. (2) A b i l i t y to f a c i l i t a t e the co-ordination of organized labour i n community health and welfare recreation agencies into a programme of mutual assistance. (3) A b i l i t y to see the job to be done and i n i t i a t e steps necessary to i t s accomplishment. (4) A b i l i t y to speak e f f e c t i v e l y before labour and other groups. A p p e n d i x D R e s o l u t i o n on Welfare S e r v i c e s  (Canadian Labour Congress) WHEREAS workers need the s e r v i c e s w e l f a r e agencies can p r o v i d e , and:. WHEREAS they o f t e n do not know what s e r v i c e s are a v a i l a b l e or how t o use them, and WHEREAS?the necessary i n f o r m a t i o n can best be provided by union 1 Welfare S e r v i c e s Committees, p r o p e r l y organized and informed, and WHEREAS such Committees can a l s o help t o secure Labour r e p r e -s e n t a t i o n on the Boards of the Welfare agencies, and to inform union members on the gaps i n s e r v i c e s and the . best way to f i l l them, by p r i v a t e e f f o r t s or by l e g i s l a t i o n : BE IT RESOLVED t h a t t h i s Convention c a l l upon the incoming Executive to s e t up a Congress Standing Committee on Welfare S e r v i c e s , t o : . 1. Encourage e q u i t a b l e l a b o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on agency boards and Committees, 2. Stimulate l a b o u r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n f o r m u l a t i n g agency p o l i c i e s and programmes. 3. Develop techniques and methods t o i n t e r p r e t f o r union members agency programmes and p r a c t i c e s . 4. A s s i s t u n i o n members, t h e i r f a m i l i e s and other c i t i z e n s i n time of need. 5. P l a n f o r union p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n c i v i l defense and d i s a s t e r r e l i e f programmes and o p e r a t i o n s . 6. Help i n the development of h e a l t h and we l f a r e s e r v i c e s such as blood banks and m u l t i p l e s c r e e n i n g . 7. Co-ordinate f u n d - r a i s i n g d r i v e s , through v o l u n t a r y ^ f e d e r a t i o n wherever p o s s i b l e , f o r v o l u n t a r y h e a l t h and welfare s e r v i c e s . 136 8. Co-operate with, other agencies i n dealing with and i n solving s o c i a l and health problems. 9 . Participate i n a l l genuine e f f o r t s designed to improve s o c i a l work standards and practices. 10. Arrange (with the Congress Education Department) f o r classes f o r union counsellors at Institutes and Seminars and the Summer School; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Canadian Labour Congress urge: 1. A l l national and international a f f i l i a t e s to estab l i s h Welfare Services Departments with fu l l - t i m e s t a f f wherever possible. 2. A l l p r o v i n c i a l Federations of Labour and Labour Councils to establish Welfare Services Committees, with f u l l - t i m e s t a f f wherever possible. 3. A l l l o c a l unions to es t a b l i s h Welfare Services Committees. 4. A l l a f f i l i a t e s to extend f u l l co-operation to the National Committee i n the development of i t s p o l i c i e s and programmes. Appendix E Basic Welfare P r i n c i p l e s Adopted by the AFL-CIO  Executive Council. February. 1956 1 1. The union member i s f i r s t and foremost a c i t i z e n of his community. 2. The union member has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to his community. He must co-operate with his fellow-citizens i n making his community a good place i n which to l i v e , to work, to rai s e children. He must be concerned about the a v a i l a b i l i t y of adequate health, welfare and recreational services f o r the whole community. 3. Unions have a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the health and welfare of t h e i r members and t h e i r families which extends be-yond the place of employment. This r e s p o n s i b i l i t y includes not only the emergency caused by s t r i k e , unemployment or disaster, but extends to helping the employed member meet his personal or family problem. 4. The community has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to i t s c i t i z e n s . I t must be prepared to meet those s o c i a l needs which individuals or families cannot meet or meet adequately with t h e i r own resources. 5. Unions have elected to finance, support and participate i n existing community s o c i a l service agencies rather than to establish d i r e c t s o c i a l services of t h e i r own. To the degree that the personnel and f a c i l i t i e s of s o c i a l agencies serve a l l the people, they serve the men and women of organized labor, and unions s h a l l be encouraged to continue t h i s p o l i c y . 6. Government has the basic r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r meeting the broad health and welfare needs of the people. 7. Voluntary or privately-sponsored s o c i a l agencies and f a c i l i t i e s occupy an important position i n meeting the s o c i a l welfare needs of the community. Major responsi-b i l i t i e s f a l l i n g within the scope of voluntary s o c i a l work are.the f i e l d s of character formation, c h i l d guidance, family counselling and youth a c t i v i t i e s , as well as i n the area of experimentation and pioneering research. " A F L - C I O Community Service A c t i v i t i e s , AFL-CIO Guide to Community Services. 9 East 40th Street, New York, 1956. 138 8. I t i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of organized labor to co-operate with other community groups i n improving the quantity and quality of s o c i a l services, while at the same time educating union members about available health and welfare services and how to use them. 9. Assistance i n whatever form should be given, on the basis of need, regardless of the cause of the need and without regard to race, colour or national origin. 10. Prevention of s o c i a l problems i s preferred to the best treatment of s o c i a l i l l s . Appendix F A NOTE OH METHODOLOGY Sources of Data on Agency Board Composition, Etc. The decision was made to request of each member agency of the Community Chest and Councils of the Greater Vancouver Area f o r the year 1962, the following information: 1. A statement of.membership requirements 2. The constitution of the agency 3. A copy of the minutes of an Annual Meeting 4. A l i s t of the names, addresses, and occupations of t h e i r boards of dire c t o r s . Presuming on the interest of the agencies i n i n -forming the students of the i r a f f a i r s , and c o l l e c t i n g i n f o r -mation i n a very limited time i n t e r v a l , we made our requests of the agencies by telephone. Where autonomous branches of the agency were operating, these also were c a l l e d . While not a l l agencies responded, and not a l l agencies were able to supply a l l the requested items of information, f o r various reasons we were g r a t i f i e d to have some items of information concerning 47 of the 72 agencies we approached. Hesitation about revealing this kind of information was expressed i n several instances. To 6 agencies l e t t e r s i n support of our request were sent. In 3 cases, the agency personnel pre-ferred personal interviews. Information concerning membership requirements was supplied by 47 agencies either verbally or i n writing, as a statement, or as part of the constitution. Responses to the 140 request f o r information about membership varied, from a eare-f u l l y worded formalized statement written into the constitution, with a detailed up-to-date count of current membership, "to such an. informal remark on the telephone as "...we don';t bother about members", (this l a t t e r from a small agency.which professes an educational function), or "...we don't go after membership because we are a Chest agency". In one case i t was explained the members were a l l members of one r e s t r i c t e d service group. Copies of thei r constitutions w e r e secured from 25 agencies, i n some/instances at considerable cost i n incon-venience and 'time:to the personnel, of whose ef f o r t s we are very appreciative. Information concerning boards of directors was obtained from 47 agencies. Not a l l items of information were complete i n a l l instances;, f o r example on agency chose to omit names of boards .of directors but supplied i t s own occupational c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . In other instances information concerning occupations was'absent. Here i t should be noted that where t h i s item of information was not supplied, the board member was c l a s s i f i e d as "Other". Copies of Annual Meeting minutes were obtained from 24 of the agencies. The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n used i n determining the occupational groupings of agency boards was derived from the "miniature community concept". In an interview with Mr. Napthali, the Executive Director of the Community Chest, he 141 employed t h i s concept and named the occupations of Business> Professional, Labour, and Housewives as the groups making up the community. The Interviews Since a major part of the tasks comprised i n this study involved conceptual analysis of both a descriptive and a formal kind, the decision was made to make extensive use of open-ended, discursive interviews aimed rather at d e t a i l and scope than at rigorous•quantification. Mr. Lamarche, the Labour Staff Representative on the Community Chest, was interviewed by the research group on three d i f f e r e n t occasions. He outlined to us his own views on the problem of representation and also reported on the views of the various labour groups i n the community. As he had an extensive knowledge of the various labour view-points and the men i n labour organizations who held them, he was able to furnish us with a l i s t of the names of 13 labour o f f i c i a l s who were considered l i k e l y to give us a good "cross-section" of the opinions labour o f f i c i a l s had on the subject under investigation. These names were divided among the research group, with two members having four interviews each, and the t h i r d member having f i v e . The interviews were for the most part carried out i n the o f f i c e s of the union o f f i c i a l s and on the average lasted from one and a half to two hours. 142 We purposely avoided a highly structured type of interview since we surmised that i f i t was addressed to calculatedly general questions we should get a truer picture of the conviction with, .which the informant spoke and a f u l l e r account of the reasons offered i n amplification of any p a r t i c u l a r stand. It was f e l t that t h i s would y i e l d not only a less inert and " f l a t " view of the opinions we sought, hut also a certain amount of supplementary material on our informants' perceptions of the relations between labour and other major community structures. Appendix G Bibliography (A) Books i AFL-CTO Community Service A c t i v i t i e s , AFL-CIO Guide to Community Services. 9 East 40th Street, New York, 1956, Atwater, P., Problems of Administration i n Social Work, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, 1940, Bernard, J ., ed., Social Problems at Mid-Century. Holt Dryden, New York, 1957, Blishen, B.-Pc.,;,', • ed-., Canadian Society; Sociological  Perspectives. McMillan Co..., Toronto, 1961.--Blau, Peter, Bureaucracy i n Modern Society. Random House, New York, 1956. Bornet, Vaughan, Welfare i n America. Rand Foundation, New York, 1961. Buell, Bradley, Community''Planning f o r Human Services Columbia University Press, New York, 1952.. Clark, S.D., ed., Urbanism and the Changing Canadian Society, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1962. Cohen, N.E., The C i t i z e n Volunteer. Harper and Brothers, New York, I960. ~~~ Cohen, N.E., Social Work i n the American Tradition. Dryden, New York, 1958. Donnison, D.V., Welfare Services i n a Canadian Community. a Study"of Brockville, Ontario. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1958. Friedlander, W.A., Introduction to Social Welfare, Prentice-H a l l , Inc. Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey, 1957. Galdston, Iago, M.D., ed., Voluntary Action and the State, International United Press, New York, 1961. Harper, E.B., and A. Dunham, eds., Community Organization  i n Action. Association Press, New York, 1959. 144' Hunter, Floyd, Ruth C. Schaffer,.and C e c i l G. Sheps, Community Organization; Action and Inaction. University Of North Carolina Press, Chapel H i l l , 1956. Hunter, Floyd, Community Power Structure. A Study of Decision Makers, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel H i l l , 1955. : . . ; Kahn, A.J., ed.. Issues i n American Social Work, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959. Kasius, Cora, ed., New Directions i n Social Work, Harper and Brothers,- New York, 1954. Keith-Lucas, Alan, Decisions About People i n Need, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel H i l l , 1957. King, Clarence, Social Agency Boards and How t o Make Them  Ef f e c t i v e . Association Press, New York, 1938. Kogan, L.S., ed., Social Science Theory and Social Work Research, National Association of Social Workers, New York, 1959. McMillen, W.,:Community Organization f o r Social Welfare, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1945. Oliver, Michael, ed., Social Purpose f o r Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1961. ! Seeley, John R. and Associates, Community Chest, A Case Study  i n Philanthropy," University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1957. S e l l t i z , C , Jahoda, M., Deutsch, M. and Cook, S., Research  Methods- i n Social Relations, Revised Edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York, March, 1961. Sorenson, Roy, The Art of Board Membership, Association Press, New York, 1950. Taylor, E.R., Public Accountability of Foundation and Charitable Trusts, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1953. Tussman, Joseph, Obligation and the Body P o l i t i c , Oxford University Press, New York, I960. > Vickers, Geoffrey, The Undirected Society, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1959* 145 Wilensky, H.L. and CN. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social  Welfare, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1958. (B) A r t i c l e s ; Alexander, CA., and McCann, Charles, "The Concept of Representativeness i n Community Organization", Social Work, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1956. ' Barkway, Michael, "The Good Community", Canadian Welfare. Vol. 36, No. 2, Ottawa, March, I960. Burt, John, "Recruitment of Board Members", Family Service  Highlights. Vol. XXI, No. 5, fey, I960. Coughlin, Bernard, S.J., "Private Welfare i n a Public Welfare Bureaucracy", Social Service Review, June, 1961. Hollander, Sidney, "The Batting Average of Board Members" i n Making Yours a Better Board, Family Service Association of America, New York, 1955. Hughes, E.C, "The I n s t i t u t i o n a l Office and the Person", The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43, November, 1937. Johnson, A r l i e n , "Public Funds f o r Voluntary Agencies", The  Social Welfare Forum 1959. Columbia University Press, New York, 1959. . Johnson, A r l i e n , "The Respective Roles of Governmental and Voluntarily Supported Social Work", Social Service Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, September, 1948. Reinke, Carl, "Interpreting Social Planning", Canadian Welfare, Vol. 37, No. 1, Ottawa, January 15, 1961. Ross, Aileen, D., "Philanthropic A c t i v i t y and the Business Career", Social Forces. Vol. 32, pp. 274-280. Stubbins, Henry, "Dilemma of the Community Chest", Canadian  Welfare. Vol. 37, No. 4, Ottawa, July 15, 1961. (C) Theses: Pennington, E.J. and I. Walker, The Role of Trade Unions i n  Social Welfare. Unpublished Master's Thesis, School of Social Work, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1962. 146 (D) Pamphlets; A Board Member's Manual, The Canadian Welfare Council,, Ottawa, 1955. Role of the Board of Directors i n the Social Agency of Today, Canadian Welfare Council, Ottawa, 1958. The Volunteer i n Our Society, The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly l e t t e r , Montreal,. August, 1962. Welfare- Services Committee, Canadian Labor Congress, Mutual Press, Ottawa. Guide No. 1 - The"Need f o r a Welfare Services Committee Guide No. 2 - The Function of a Welfare Services Committee Guide No. 3 - Union Welfare Counselling Guide No. 4 - When Unemployment Strikes Working People, i n Chests and Councils as Partners, Community  Chests and Councils'of America Inc., New York. 

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