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Western concepts of Soviet negotiating behavior Hepner, Edward Marshall Rupert 1965

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WESTERN CONCEPTS OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR by EDWARD MARSHALL HEFNER B.A. (Hons.), University of British Columbia, 1962  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER  OF ARTS  In the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  The University of British Columbia April, 1 9 6 5 .  In  presenting  the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r British  Columbia,  available mission  for  purposes his  for  I  agree  without  that  r e f e r e n c e and  extensive  this  thesis  my w r i t t e n  Department o f  degree at  study.  this  It for  is  understood  permission.?  Columbia,,  5  P  r i l  the U n i v e r s i t y shall  make i t  f u r t h e r agree thesis  for  that  3 0 , 1965  of  of freely per-  scholarly or  that, c o p y i n g or  f i n a n c i a l gain shall  P o l i t i c a l Science  A  I  fulfilment  by the Head o f my Department  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8 Canada Date  in partial  the L i b r a r y  copying of  may be g r a n t e d  of  thesis  an a d v a n c e d  representatives.  cation  this  not  be  by publi-  allowed  ABSTRACT A c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the n e g o t i a t i n g t a c t i c s used by d i p l o m a t s has been a f a c e t o f S o v i e t d i p l o m a t i c b e h a v i o r r e l a t i v e l y ignored. behavior  Russian  which has  A s u r v e y o f Western w r i t i n g s on S o v i e t  been  negotiating  i n d i c a t e s t h a t R u s s i a n d i p l o m a t s employ a wide range o f  bar-  g a i n i n g t a c t i c s i n attempts to g a i n concessions from Western n e g o t i a t o r s . These v a r i o u s b a r g a i n i n g  methods have been c l a s s i f i e d i n t h i s paper as t o  the type o f maneuver t h e y r e p r e s e n t . n e g o t i a t i n g maneuvers.  The  There are f o u r d i s c e r n i b l e S o v i e t  f i r s t maneuver i s comprised of t a c t i c s d e s i g n e d  to t u r n a c o n f e r e n c e o r p a r t t h e r e o f i n t o a forum f o r R u s s i a n propaganda. Of a l l the t a c t i c s employed those r e l a t e d t o propaganda are found most f r e q u e n t l y i n n e g o t i a t i o n s p r i m a r i l y because o f the r e l a t i v e ease w i t h which they can be u t i l i z e d ,  fi/hile some propaganda t a c t i c s are s t r a i g h t -  forward, such as s l o g a n s  e p i t h e t s , o t h e r s are s u b t l e such as the  and  of g e n e r a l r a t h e r than s p e c i f i c The  terms.  second R u s s i a n maneuver c o n t a i n s a l a r g e number o f  designed to obstruct n e g o t i a t i o n s . behavior  has  use  been the s k i l l f u l use  t i o n s e i t h e r drag on or. c o l l a p s e .  A common aspect  of S o v i e t  o f d e l a y i n g t a c t i c s so t h a t The  R u s s i a n s use  tactics diplomatic negotia-  obstructionist tac-  t i c s f r e q u e n t l y to p r e v e n t a d e c i s i o n on a p r o p o s a l which they b e l i e v e w i l l be i n i m i c a l t o S o v i e t i n t e r e s t s .  They a l s o use i t t o s t a l l f o r time  so t h a t a new  as w e l l as t o make the West concede  p o l i c y can be formulated  p o i n t s i n order The  to end  Russian  delays.  t h i r d S o v i e t maneuver i s comprised of o f f e n s i v e t a c t i c s d e s i g n e d  t o o b t a i n as many c o n c e s s i o n s  as p o s s i b l e from the West b e f o r e an agreement  i s reached on a p a r t i c u l a r p r o p o s a l .  Because t h e r e are a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e  iv number of offensive tactics, for purposes of discussion i n this paper, they have been sub-divided into three groups: overt, subtle and those which exploit the inclinations of Western diplomats. The fourth and last group of maneuvers i s comprised of Russian duplicity tactics.  According to Western observers, the Russians have  utilized a number of tactics designed to deceive Western neg§tiato:;ps;-.;,The': most prominent duplicity t a c t i c , has been the feigning of agreements. During the Second World War the Russians entered into many verbal and written agreements largely to demonstrate to the Western a l l i e s their co-operative spirit so that lend lease supplies and any post-war t e r r i t o r i a l gains promised by the West would not be jeopardized. Before the end of the war the Russians stalled on implementing most agreements but as  soon  as the war finished and lend lease supplies stopped, Soviet violations of agreements and treaties occurred frequently.  However, since Khrush-  chev enunciated the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in 1956,  the  Russians have used duplicity tactics less frequently although they have demonstrated as recently as the Cuban missile incident in 1962,  that i f  the stakes are high enough they w i l l resort to deception to gain an advantage. According to Western observers, the Russian diplomat i s more a specialized messenger or a mechanical mouthpiece than a diplomat i n the traditional sense.  The Western diplomat can comment  extemporaneously  on proposals and can advise his government on policy whereas his Soviet counterpart cannot.  When Western descriptions of their own diplomats  are compared with their descriptions of Soviet diplomats i t becomes apparent that many Western observers have black and white conceptions  V  with respect to the differences between Russian and Western behavior. Many Westerners see their diplomats as honest, polite, and cooperative whereas they see the Russian diplomat as insincere, rude and intransigent. Negotiations with the Soviet Union since 19^5 have l e f t a number of impressions upon Westerners and some of these impressions have crystallized into a number of strongly held beliefs as to how the West should negotiate with the Russians.  These four beliefs concern firmness  (temporized by prudence), an anti-conciliatory attitude!(because the Soviets supposedly look upon conciliation as appeasement), a stress on specific, written agreements, and a belief that relations between states must be based on trust.  However, i t i s suggested that trust i s not a  reliable ground upon which to base agreements between states.  Basing  agreements on mutual self-interest rather than trust might offer greater opportunities for East-West settlements. Moreover, a new Western conciliatory attitude combined with shrewdness i n the light of Sino-Soviet d i f f i c u l t i e s might help to improve East-West relations. Historical examples of Soviet negotiating behavior lend support to the beliefs of those Western observers who claim that the Russians use negotiations for more than just a method of resolving disputes and accommodating interests.  Indeed, Soviet diplomatic behavior seems to  have been generally consistent with Communist ideological beliefs on the role of diplomacy as another method for furthering international communism against "bourgeois" interests. Western diplomats who have negotiated with the Soviets describe Russian" tactics f a i r l y specifically, but rarely do they mention any use  of their own tactics.  The implication i s that many Westerners may have  a narrow view of the negotiating process. using tactics but not themselves.  That i s , they see the Russians  This dichotomy i s incorrect because  Westerners u t i l i z e negotiating tactics such as those related to propaganda and offensive maneuvers.  Two types of maneuvers which the West  has not utilized are duplicity and obstruction, neither of which are really related to the bargaining  process.  When overt acknowledgment of Western tactics occurs, East-West bargaining should not be as d i f f i c u l t , frustrating or disappointing as Westerners claim i t now i s .  A l l Soviet actions will not be construed as  vile once Westerners accept many Soviet tactics as a legitimate part of the bargaining process.  Westerners should also consider that the Soviets  are probably wary of Western negotiating tactics.  CONTENTS CHAPTER  PAGE 1  INTRODUCTION I. SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF DIPLOMACY ACCORDING TO WESTERN INTERPRETATION Ideological Base: General Concepts  8 . .  8  Ideological Base: Specific Concepts  15  Soviet Morality and Diplomacy  22  Soviet Concepts of Its Diplomacy  2k  The Soviet Diplomat and Communist Ideology . . .  25  Soviet Views of the Role of Negotiations  26  ....  27  Soviet Concepts of Western Diplomacy . Soviet Beliefs i n the Future of Communist  30  Diplomacy II. WESTERN VIEWS OF THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF  32  SOVIET DIPLOMATS III. WESTERN CONCEPTS OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR . . Western Methods of Negotiating  ...  Western Attitudes Toward Negotiations IV. SOVIET PROPAGANDA TACTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS  55 55 57 65  Soviet Diplomats Utilize a Systematic Pattern of Negotiating Tactics  65  Soviet Negotiating Tactics for Propaganda Purposes  66  ii CHAPTER  PAGE 86  V. SOVIET OBSTRUCTIONIST TACTICS VI.  112  SOVIET OFFENSIVE TACTICS Overt Tactics  112  Subtle Tactics  126  Exploitation of Western Inclinations VII.  SOVIET DUPLICITY TACTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS  VIII.  WESTERN ATTITUDES AS A REACTION TO THEIR  ....  ikl  ...  lk?  . .  163  CONCEPTS OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR IX.  CONCLUSIONS* FOOTNOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY  175 I87 217  INTRODUCTION With new leadership i n the Soviet Union there i s speculation i n the West about whether future negotiations with Soviet diplomats w i l l be different from past negotiations.  The same speculation appeared when  Malenkov followed Stalin and when Khrushchev followed Malenkov.i  The  speculation today, however, i s not as pronounced as i t was when Malenkov and Khrushchev assumed power because under these Soviet leaders the Western world saw no significant change i n Soviet strategy. tactics were modified.  Only Soviet  For example, under Khrushchev, Soviet diplomatic  style became more robust and flamboyant and even reckless, although Krushchev  proved he was as sober as Stalin when Soviet policies :were-  threatened with defeat.  Nor were actual negotiations with Soviet dip-  lomats much different under Krushchev than they were under Stalin.  Many  Western observers believe that Soviet diplomatic behavior has been consistent with Soviet attitudes toward diplomacy.  This belief leads them  to conclude that Soviet diplomatic attitudes and behavior are not likely to change significantly under Kosygin's and Brezhnev's leadership or whoever follows them.  Hence, there has evolved i n the minds of many  Western statesmen and scholars certain conceptions of Soviet attitudes toward diplomacy and diplomatic behavior. This study does not attempt to encompass a systematic analysis of the whole problem of negotiations with the Soviet Union;  for .example,  communicative d i f f i c u l t i e s such as language and translations are not analysed.  It does attempt to investigate Western conceptions of Soviet  negotiating tactics and Western conceptions of Soviet attitudes toward diplomacy.  In order to place this study i n a proper perspective, there  2 axe references to Western views on diplomacy and to Western negotiating behavior.  For example, Chapter Three discusses Western conceptions of  their own diplomatic negotiating practices i n order to show the contrast between these self-conceptions and the Western view of Soviet behavior. There i s also a discussion of American and British attitudes toward negotiating with the Soviets which are a result of their concepts of Soviet behavior.  Western observations of the general behavioral  aspects of Russian diplomats are found i n Chapter Two.  It i s appropriate  i n this introductory section to discuss briefly several Western concepts of diplomacy to indicate the Western approach to the subject. In the European tradition diplomacy i s the method of conducting relations between states, essentially on a basis of national interest."'" The function of diplomacy i s to mediate and to accommodate^ interests.  conflicts between governments  Hans J . Morgenthau says that the "task  of diplomacy i s to re-define the seemingly incompatible v i t a l interests of the nations concerned i n order to make them compatible." i s looked upon as the alternative to war.  Diplomacy  "Diplomacy tends both to  broaden the area of agreement and to increase the objectives of co5  operation among participating groups.'"  It i s an instrument for pro-  moting and establishing peaceful relations.  "For diplomacy which has  ended i n war has failed i n i t s primary objective."^ states that diplomacy i s the management of  Harold Nicolson  international relations the  purpose of which i s "to create international confidence, not to sow international distrust."'' According to Western views, the technique used i n diplomacy by  which international relations and conflicting policies are adjusted i s negotiations. Nicolson.  The art of diplomacy i s the art of negotiation says Harold  He maintains that negotiation and diplomacy are synonymous.^  Indeed, Westerners look upon negotiations as the "essence of diplomacy Q  as traditionally conceived and generally practiced." purpose of negotiation i s to reach an agreement.  The implicit  "The aim of negotiation,"  according to Caral Bell, " i s a formalized accommodation of wills and/or interests i n particular matters. . . .It recognizes an element of belief that a legitimate bargain may be struck."1°  Edwin H. Fedder expresses a  typical Western viewpoint of negotiation when he says that "negotiation i s defined to mean the process of bargaining entered into by two or more actors (individuals, groups, governments) for the purpose of mutually resolving a point or points at issue between/among them."H  Western con-  ceptions of negotiation suggest that negotiation i s almost synonymous with agreement. Many Westerners see the Western diplomat as applying tact and i n t e l l igence to the conduct of o f f i c i a l relations.  Harold Nicolson s 1  of the virtues of a diplomat i s widely accepted by Westerners.  conception The diplomat v  must be truthful, accurate, calm, patient, good tempered, modest and loyal. George Kennan conceives of the professional diplomat looking at realities and seeing the relativity of a l l national virtues, as well as seeing the need for tolerance, forbearance, dignity, generosity and integrity i n the dealings between states.  "It i s the inner grain of the inner discipline of  his diplomatic profession that exerts pressures against emotion, charlatanism;  the exploiting of ignorance and prejudice of others, and inflaming  rather than assuaging the passions of men ."13  Strong exception could be  taken to these characteristics of a diplomat, and undoubtedly, substantial evidence exists to show that many Western diplomats were (and are) not what they are supposed to be.  Throughout history diplomats have had a  public reputation for deviousness and S i r Henry Wotton, an English ambassador at the beginning of the seventeenth century, jokingly said that lk  "a diplomat i s an honest man sent abroad to l i e for his country." Although a dichotomy may exist between the actual behavior of a Western diplomat and that expected of him, no such dichotomy exists i n 'Western conceptions of diplomats.  It should be noted that these conceptions are  not only of Western diplomats but also of a l l diplomats with the s i g n i f i cant exception of Communist diplomats (although during the Second World War and shortly thereafter Western diplomats expected Soviet diplomats to behave like them.)  According to Harold Nicolson " a l l diplomatists . . .  are inclined to assume that their own conception of the art of negotiation i s shared more or less by those foreigners with whom they are negotiating. Western negotiations with Soviet diplomats have for the most part been exasperating. Western diplomats quite naturally have used their own conceptions of diplomacy and diplomatic behavior as a standard by which to judge other diplomats, but Western diplomats soon discovered that their standards did not apply to Soviet diplomacy and Soviet diplomats. Western diplomats negotiating with the Soviet Union often found themselves dealing with a form of bargaining behavior that they had not before encountered. Shortly after the United States recognized the Soviet Union i n 1933, i n  5 return for a Soviet agreement to pay Czarist debts, to stop the Comintern from interfering i n United States policies, and to allow Americans living in Russia religious freedom, Americans began to observe this different type of bargaining behavior.  Although religious freedom was observed,  the Soviet Union did not f u l f i l l i t s obligations i n respect to debts and the Comintern. Consequently, shortly after diplomatic recognition, Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, prophetically stated: We noticed a careless or indifferent observance by the Soviet government of some of the agreements and understandings our two governments had entered into. There was a disposition to haggle over l i t t l e things and to debate seriously and interminably over wholly minor matters which developed numerous pin pricks. Some questions of major importance were also to rise on which Russia's attitude was d i f f i c u l t to understand. Negotiating with Russia, therefore, was not like negotiating with other great powers. In every approach to Moscow, I had to bear these facts i n mind.16 It was during the Peace Treaty negotiations that a consensus developed among Westerners which recognized that the Russians, i n contrast to the West, had different attitudes toward diplomacy. For many Western diplomats who have negotiated with the Soviets, Soviet diplomacy and negotiating behavior have evolved into a certain pattern.  Although no systematic studies were made by Western diplomats,  many told of different tactics that they believed the Soviet diplomats had used i n negotiations with them. While Western diplomats were writing in their memoirs about Soviet diplomacy and bargaining techniques, many Western scholars were trying to discover the causal factors i n Soviet behavior by analysing what they thought to be Soviet conceptions of diplomacy. Chapter I deals with these Western conceptions of Soviet attitudes toward diplomacy. This chapter illustrates that Western statesmen and  6 scholars quote frequently from the writings of Lenin and Stalin to explain Soviet actions. For example, John Foster Dulles continually repeated Lenin's statement that "promises are like pie-crusts—-made to be broken," in order to explain Soviet improbity.  The writings of Vernon V.  Aspaturian on Soviet diplomacy suggest that every Soviet action represents some form of duplicity.  He uses lengthy quotations from Soviet  writings to substantiate his thesis.  Similarly, Nathan Leites has sur-  veyed Soviet ideological writings and has produced certain statements by Lenin and Stalin which are supposed to show why the Soviet Union can never be trusted. Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven describe actual Soviet bargaining tactics as reported by Western negotiators,  Chapter Four deals with  the various tactics the Soviet Union employs to u t i l i z e negotiations for propaganda purposes.  Chapter Five discusses the obstructionist tactics  which the Soviet Union uses to hinder negotiations.  Chapter Six dis-  cusses the offensive tactics employed by the Soviet Union i n negotiations. The offensive tactics are categorized into subtle tactics, overt tactics, and tactics which exploit the inclinations of Western negotiators to seek compromises and quick agreements.  Chapter Seven deals with Western  conceptions of Soviet duplicity i n negotiations.  Although Vernon V.  Aspaturian sees duplicity i n every Soviet action or statement, i t appears that duplicity forms only one segment of Soviet bargaining tactics. Certain segments of Soviet tactics may be described as "legitimate" bargaining tactics and not necessarily representative of duplicity. Finally, Chapter Sight discusses how Westerners have reacted to their  7 own beliefs regarding Soviet concepts of diplomacy, and to Soviet negotiating behavior. It should be noted that the term "Westerner" represents British, American and Canadian diplomats and scholars.  It should also be noted  that many sources used i n this study are from the immediate post-war years (1945-1950•) The problem arises as to whether these Western concepts are as valid today as they were i n the past.  To claim that bar-  gaining tactics, which are alleged to have been used by the Soviets, may not exist today because the cold war has abated i s wrong. I t should be remembered that i n the immediate post-war years there were a great many more foreign ministers' conferences and meetings of deputies than there were i n the 1950's and early 1960's. refer to the cold war era.  Consequently, most Western writings  The few writings there are i n the latter half  of the 1950's and the early 1960's suggest that Soviet diplomats have been consistent i n their use of bargaining tactics.  A survey of the  United States Department of State Bulletin indicates that American diplomats do not believe that the Soviet Union has greatly modified i t s bargaining tactics.  Indeed, some recent references to Soviet tactics merely  confirm, the existence of them. Finally, for purposes of this study, a tactic i s defined as any method s k i l l f u l l y or shrewdly used to gain either an advantage or an objective i n negotiations.  However, -to. avoid contro-  versy over what constitutes a s k i l l f u l tactic as opposed to a non-skillful tactic, the terms s k i l l f u l l and shrewd should not be used i n their most restrictive sense. to gain some end.  Suffice i t to say that a tactic i s a calculated move  CHAPTER I SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF DIPLOMACY ACCORDING TO WESTERN  INTERPRETATION-  In attempting to discover the reasons behind Soviet diplomatic behavior, many Western scholars suggest a direct connection between Communist ideology and Soviet behavior.  It appears that most Western  statesmen accept the views of those scholars who maintain that Communist ideology i s the main motivating influence on Soviet diplomacy. George Kennan i s an illustration of the diplomat-scholar who saw ideological overtones in almost every act of a Soviet diplomat."'" David T. Cattell states that because every speech, every article, every book and every decree i s clothed and justified i n Marxist-Leninist terms, i t i s not unreasonable to assume that Marxist methods of analysis and over-simplification have at least unconsciously affected policy; that i n effect the Soviet leaders do closely associate capitalism with depression, wage slavery, colonial exploitation and imperialist wars.^ Taking a similar view, Vernon V. Aspaturian claims that the Soviet internal social structure, which i s shaped by Communist ideology, i s reflected i n Soviet diplomacy. He maintains that "domestic standards of ethical and p o l i t i c a l conduct . . .inevitably shape standards of conduct i n diplomatic behavior."  Thus "Soviet diplomatic thinking i s related to concept-  ions of the state and i t s ruling classes."3 Ideological Base; General Concepts. Western observers of Russian Communism believe that Soviet conceptions of diplomacy revolve around three main points;  f i r s t , the  Soviets believe that there are two camps, communism and capitalism; second, the Soviets believe that between the two camps there are i r r e concilable antagonisms which w i l l lead ultimately either to the victory or defeat of one of these camps; and third, the Soviets believe that the Soviet camp represents a new system of states which releases i t from any necessity to abide by the norms of the "imperialist" states. The Soviet two camp theory i s commonly referred to by Westerners. For example, according to George Kennan, "Moscow tends to view the world as i f i t were divided into two parts—one good and the other evil;  it  has a tendency to view a l l Western governments in varying shades of k darkest tints."  The Soviets maintain that the Communist camp repre-  sents the interests of the world proletariat while the non-Communist states represent the interests of capitalism and that the two interests are in natural conflict.  "The Soviet image of the world reflects a  world of incessant conflict and change in which institutions and loyalties rise and f a l l with the dialectic-propelling i t toward a Communist future-this image i s accepted as real by Soviet leaders."5 The Communist theory of conflict i s interpreted by Westerners as a major thesis in Soviet thinking.  "It must invariably be assumed  i n Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime and therefore to the interests of the peoples i t controls."^ Furthermore, the hostility of the capitalist nations, overt or. co.vert, i s met with even greater hostility from the Soviet Union, not only for protection of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l integrity but also for revolutionary purposes. The "stress placed by the Soviets on antagonism rather than cooperation as  the primary characteristic of relations between Communist and nonCommunist states 'sets narrow limits' {for international relationsj."7 ^Because of this "innate" antagonism between the camp of:communism and the camp of capitalism, Westerners believe that Moscow assumes that any sincere cooperation between the capitalist world and i t s e l f i s impossible.  "If the Soviet Government occasionally sets i t s signature  to documents which would indicate the contrary, this i s to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible i n dealing with the enemy and should  g be taken i n the s p i r i t of caveat emptor."  Moreover, there are certain  developments which allow the relaxation of tensions between states, although even under peaceful coexistence the Russians state emphatically that the class struggle i t s e l f cannot be relaxed.  Particularly i n the  sphere of opposing ideologies "there can be no easing of the struggle, 9 no depolarization."  According to Western interpretations, the Soviet  leaders view any dealings with capitalist powers as really serving the interests of the proletariet by f u l f i l l i n g the most justified and imperative duty of any Communist state-maneuvering until the proletarian revolution ripens.  Westerners conceive of Soviet leaders looking upon  arrangements with non-Communist states as only provisional understandings. "The p o l i t i c a l strategy of the Soviet Union indicates that there i s always the silent reservation that the expediency of revolutionary evaluation of the concrete facts, conditions the provisional concurrence of interests and these concrete facts are greater than the sanctity of formal international promises."^  Soviet violations of hundreds of agreements confirm  this view i n the eyes of Westerners.  Lenin's concept of a "system of states" i s considered by Westerners to have a great influence upon Soviet leaders.  This statement of Lenin's  has been quoted frequently by Westerners concerned with Soviet diplomacy. In a report to the Central Committee at the Eighth Congress of the Bolshevik Party held on March bth 1919»  Lenin stated:  "We are living not merely i n a state, but i n a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time i s unthinkable. One or the other must triumph i n the end, and before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois state w i l l be inevit-? able.-"' 11  Interpreting Soviet doctrine, Westerners believe that the main aim of Russian policy i s to replace the nation-state system with a world Communist state. To do this, loyalties w i l l have to be shifted from the nation-state to class. "Expansionism i s thus inherent i n the LeninistStalinist ideology since the Soviet state was conceived as an ideological state without fixed geographical f r o n t i e r s . "  12  To substantiate their  view that Soviet diplomacy seeks to expand Communism rather than to acommodate conflicting national interests, Westerners point to 1920 when Lenin said that as long as capitalism and socialism exist there cannot be peace.  "In the end, either the Soviet government triumphs i n every  advanced country i n the world or the most reactionary Imperialism triumphs. . . A funeral dirge w i l l be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism . . . . One or the other must triumph. . . . There i s no middle course. 3 nl  Some Westerners take notice of the fact that Lenin  made these remarks during the C i v i l War i n Russia when "capitalist" nations had landed troops on Russian s o i l i n order to overthrow the  Bolsheviks. As the latest Soviet doctrine states that a military clash between East and West i s no longer inevitable as long as nuclear weapons are involved, there i s speculation among some Westerners that perhaps the Russian leaders are questioning the validity of other Communist doctrines as well.  However, few Westerners conclude that the Soviet leaders are  abandoning their Communist beliefs.  Frederick Neal cautions against any  popular notion that the Soviet leaders are abandoning their ideology. No greater mistake could be made than to assume that the Communists do not believe deeply and sincerely i n their basic ideology. Communist tactics are flexible, but the persistent adherence to what might be termed operational theory i s unquestionable. . . Although some Westerners have doubts about how sincere the Soviets are i n accepting their Communist doctrine, many Westerners accept the view that Dean Acheson holds: (Soviet) moves and proposals i n dealing with other 11  states are coldly and carefully calculated ta advance their own purposes, not any common purpose with the West." ^ 1  Believing that the Russians adamantly maintain that inate hostility between the Communist and non-Communist world exists, Westerners conceive of Soviet diplomacy employing a wide range of tactics i n order to weaken the West. Both Lenin and Stalin l e f t a rich heritage of practical instructions and Westerners point to them frequently.  For example, Lenin advised that  a l l forms of social activity must be mastered because a Communist must be ready to pass from one form to another i n the quickest and most unexpected way.  Stalin advised that an important task i s to determine the ways and  means, the forms and methods of fighting which correspond to the concrete  13 situation of the moment and are most certain to prepare the way for strategic success.  From the program of the Comintern, Westerners quote  statements implying that Soviet diplomacy must exploit and manipulate 16 differences which exist between capitalist states.  Although many  apparent contradictions i n Soviet foreign policy appear, Lenin's famous dictum of zig-zag diplomacy——two steps forward, one step backwards, i s quoted frequently by Westerners to explain them. According to Lenin, zig-zag tactics "will further the cause of socialist revolution, hasten i t s approach, weaken the international bourgeoisie jandj strengthen the position of working classes." '' 1  To support the view that Communist ideol-  ogy accounts for a great many Soviet diplomatic tactics, Walter Bedell Smith, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, quoted a statement by Alexandrov, the Communist Party's principal theoretician, made on January 21, 19*^6* to commemmorate the anniversary of Lenin's death. The statement said i n part?  "Our Soviet land can take pride i n i t s leaders  who, i n the f i e l d of foreign policy of our state work according to the tactics of Lenin."  Smith went on to quote directly from Lenin:  "We  have to use any ruse, dodge, trick, cunning, unlawful methods, concealment. . . . So long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live i n peace . . . ."  Clearly then, the concept i n Smith's mind, as i n  many other Western minds, i s that Soviet diplomats use tactics according to the principles l a i d down by Lenin.  Smith states:  "In the years  since Lenin's death we have yet to see this old basic program cast out. It has been modified and added to, yes, but never rejected or forgotten." ^ 1  The major works that Westerners study to account for Soviet  1.4 behavior are Lenin's Imperialism;  The Highest Stage of Capitalism and  the State and Revolution{ and Stalin's The Problems of Leninism. "Although Lenin's successors have elaborated on his doctrines, Lenin's theory of imperialism i n particular serves as the basis of both Soviet action and  19 propaganda," says David T. Cattell.  Cattell's comment represents  the typical Western view of Soviet perceptions of the capitalist world. The significance of these Western views i s that they lead many Western observers to conclude that there can never be any genuine cooperation between the West and the Soviet Union and that i t i s next to useless to deal with Soviet leaders.  Nathan Leites, for example, maintains that  both Communists and non-Communists "have essentially nothing i n common."20 This Western belief became widely accepted among Western leaders i n the 1950's and i s s t i l l strongly accepted today. For example, under Eisenhower and Dulles, the United States was reluctant to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union on the grounds that earlier discussions had proved worthless.  The United States wanted proof of Soviet good deeds  rather than their propaganda,  Dulles, for example, distrusted the Soviet  Union so much that he had an "obsessive fear of direct diplomatic encounter with the Soviet Union ^and this fear] kept American diplomacy i n a posture so frozen as often to invite ridicule."  Some groups i n Western society  have even developed a f a t a l i s t i c attitude toward dealing with the Soviet Union. For example, an American business journal says: We must drop the i l l u s i o n that East and West differences can be settled on a give and take basis . . . .The very nature of the Communist system and of the Communist faith means that they do not want an over-all settlement which would bring peace to the world.22  When John F. Kennedy became President he declared that the peace of the world was threatened by Communist expansion.  He said that "the facts of  the matter are that the Soviets and ourselves give wholly different meanings to the same words: War, peace, democracy . . . .  We have wholly  different views of right and wrong, of what i s an internal affair and what i s aggression and above a l l , we have wholly different concepts of where the world i s and where i t i s going."23  More specifically, Western  statements about the difficulty of dealing with the Soviets are based on Western conceptions of Soviet attitudes toward agreements, concessions and compromises, and quid pro quo arrangements. These three attitudes form the specific ideological base for Soviet diplomacy and are found i n the aforementioned "basic works" of Lenin and Stalin.  Ideological Base: Specific Concepts. Westerners believe that Soviet leaders are guided by Communist doctrines which say that agreements with non-Communists are required only i f they foster the Party's power. Nathan Leites sees Communist doctrine as stating emphatically that the "Party must be prepared to terminate any agreement at any time, and even expect i t s partner to violate i t . " 2 ^ Westerners believe that the Soviets view the laws and customs of international relations as "bourgeois" and do not feel themselves bound by these norms. They see the Soviet Union willing to enter into agreements with capitalist nations but only on a temporary basis because the Russians allegedly believe that international relations based on the nation state are bound to end and with them w i l l disappear a l l bourgeois  16  practices of international relations.  "This [Soviet] attitude toward  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s has persisted i n extreme form to the present time, and [this i s why, f o r exampleTI  the Soviet Union continues to  qualify i t s acceptance of the principles of international law. .  ,2S>  Western observers refer frequently to Lenin's writings on agreements. For example, Nathan Leites quotes these statements made by Lenin i n  1907 s The party must be prepared to dissolve any agreement with an outside group at any time, as well as to re-enter into an arrangement with a group with which i t had broken prior relations, . . .for a l l agreements are permissible only within the limits of a particular p o l i t i c a l line. . . . It would be mad and criminal to tie one's hands by entering into an agreement of any permanence with anybody, an agreement which i n any way could inhibit social-democracy. (Proletary. March 17. 1907) 2  6  Whenever John Foster Dulles was asked about the possibilities of agreements i n order to reduce tensions between the West and the Soviet Union, he would reply with one of his favourite quotes from Lenin's writings: "Our experience" said Dulles, "which merely confirms that of others, demonstrates that the governments dominated by international communism practice Lenin's dictum: broken'. . . , D u l l e s  'Promisee are like pie crusts, made to be was not the only Westerner pointing to  Lenin's dictum. Nathan Leites quotes Lenin directly: A l l promises go to the devil as soon as any essential interests of the fighting groups are touched. This i s the case not only i n the struggle between hostile parties, but also i n the struggle inside the Party. . . . Promises are like pie crusts. . . made to be broken. . . . (proletary,)0ctober 10, 1905) 28  17  According to Westerners, Lenin has been consistent i n his writings on agreements. At least no inconsistency i s ever pointed to nor has any inconsistency been found, Western statesmen say, i n actual Soviet behaviour.  For example, John Foster Dulles said near the end of his career: I think perhaps I am the world's greatest expert on conferences with the Russians, because, excluding meetings at the United Nations, I have attended myself no less than twelve such conferences beginning i n 19^5 and up to the last year. Now I am bound to say that^very l i t t l e has come out of these conferences, primarily because the Soviets cannot be relied,-, upon to live up to their promises. . . . 2 9 A survey of Lenin's statements on agreements appears to indicate  to Western scholars that Soviet leaders believe that agreement with any kind of "enemy" i s necessary under certain conditions just as violence i s necessary against the enemy under certain other conditions. violence and agreements have the same end: hasten the downfall of the enemy.  Both  to protect 'the Party and to  A p o l i t i c a l settlement i n the West-  ern sense i s inconceivable to the Soviets because i t implies a status quo situation.30  Furthermore, Westerners claim that Soviet leaders  believe behavior to be more important than words i n an agreement. Echoing Lenin, Stalin said that the Party must not be carried away by words of the enemy just as i t must not be carried away by i t s own words. In the spring of 1917» Lenin wrote: . . . the declaration of the Provisional Government concerning the aims of the war. . .contain not peace terms but merely general principles. . . .Translated into ordinary language, this means: The renunciation of annexations i s merely.a. . .phrase. . . . A statesman, Bismarck, once said: "To accept i n principle means i n the language of diplomacy to reject i n actuality? . . ."The Party must never forget that a partner's consent i n principle i s likely to indicate a refusal i n fact. . .".'31  This particular Soviet concept of agreements i n principle has haunted Western negotiators who have dealt with the Soviet Union.  Contrary to  Lenin's belief, however, Western diplomats believe that consent i n principle means consent i n fact. According to Vernon V. Aspaturian, Soviet doctrines sanction the use of duplicity i n agreements when dealing with the class enemy. He sees Soviet duplicity in. almost every statement and every action of Soviet diplomats.  "Duplicity, perfidy, deceit, chicanery and cruder  forms of dishonesty have characterized Soviet diplomacy. . .V^  This  2  particular Western attitude towards Soviet diplomacy, while not f u l l y accepted by Western scholars, i s nevertheless widely displayed by Western statesmen. For example;  John Gunther says that ''Roosevelt  once told the former Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, that i n dealing with Stalin "we must keep our fingers crossed."33 Henry Cabot Lodge says that'with Communists you should'nt take what they say or do at face value.  I have established that to my own satisfaction  many times over the last seven and a half years.  There i s always a  31+  hidden meaning."  Walter Bedell Smith said that "we learned the hard  way that the men at the Kremlin had carried over into peace the tactics of breaking confidence, of indulging in practices of deception,  falsifi-  cation and evasion which we had always hitherto associated only. withCr-elations between enemy states i n the time of shooting war.-?-? In a survey of alliances and non-aggression pacts, Westerners have found empirical proof that has demonstrated to them that Lenin's dictum on agreements has been practiced by Soviet diplomats.  The  conclusion seems inescapable that a l l Soviet non-aggression, neutrality, military alliances and peace treaties are merely temporary maneuvers. When "objective conditions" change i n the Soviet Union's favour, treaties are dissolved as a matter of routine.  Any typical Soviet non-aggression or  neutrality pact lasted an average of ten years hefore the Soviet Union violated i t .  The average alliance lasted only two years. (Whether or not  Stalin and other Soviet leaders believed that Western leaders took the same attitude toward agreements as a means of tactical maneuvers i s not clear i n Western thinking.)  It i s d i f f i c u l t to know whether Stalin was lying out-  right or expressing "objective conditions" when he talked of a l l i e d unity during the Second World War.  For example, even after the Soviet Union had  broken a number of pledges to i t s Allies during the war, Stalin received Air Marshall Tedder from General Eisenhower's staff to discuss the Red Army's winter offensive. Tedder had asked that the Soviet's continue their offensive until the end of March, and Stalin had discerned that, weather and road conditions permitting they would do so. Stalin mentioned this, he remarked only to emphasize the spirit of the Soviet leaders, who not only f u l f i l l e d formal obligations, but who went further and acted upon what they considered to be their moral duties to their A l l i e s .  36  The impact of Soviet treaty violations on Western public opinion has crystallized into the popular belief "that you can't trust the Russians." According to Westerners, concessions, compromises, and quid pro quo arrangements occupy an important ideological role within the Soviet concept of agreement. Using Lenin's "doctrine of f l e x i b i l i t y " i n strategy and tactics, Stalin devised the "ebb and flow" theory.  In  practice this meant that long-run conditions determined that i n certain  short-run conditions,limited cooperation with a capitalist power was necessary.  But i n order to secure capitalist cooperation, the Soviets  felt that they would probably have to compromise and make certain concessions.  But the Soviet attitude toward concessions differ from  Western notions.  Because Lenin has been more explicit than Stalin as  to what concessions mean to Communists, Westerns have quoted him more frequently. For example, one statement Lenin made on December 21, 1920 i s frequently cited: It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions i s a peaceful agreement with capitalists. It i s an agreement concerning war.37 Interpreting this Soviet attitude, Western scholars such as M. A. Fitzsimmons and Stephen D. Kertesz conclude that "leaders of the Soviet Union have l i t t l e interest i n fostering p o l i t i c a l stability. ,.38  Implied i n this statement i s that whatever concessions the Soviet Union makes, they are apt to be ones which are expendable or ones which are just used to mark time until the Soviet Union changes i t s tactics. From the Western viewpoint, there appears l i t t l e chance of procuring any genuine compromise with the Soviet Union.  Two statements by Lenin, one  made i n 1905 and the other made i n 1920, are quoted by Nathan Leites to support his belief that there i s l i t t l e likelihood of any genuine agreement between the Soviet Union and the West: It i s ridiculous to reject absolutely. . .compromises. . . . The point i s . . .to pursue one's goals. . .steadfastly under a l l circumstances. (Proletary October 10,1905) f  In his pamphlet, Left Wing Communism^ An Infantile Disorder, written i n 1920,  Lenin stated:  21 One must combine the greatest f i d e l i t y to the idea of communism the capacity to enter into a l l necessary practical compromises. . .to make agreements. . . .39 Philip Mosely, a Western scholar who has dealt directly with Soviet diplomats i n post war negotiations, states that the word "compromise" which i s a daily product of our p o l i t i c a l system, i s an " e v i l word," i n Soviet vocabulary.  Furthermore, the word "reasonable"  upon which Westerners base compromise has no real equivalent i n Russian. To a Soviet leader the very word compromise i s normally coupled with the adjective "rotten*. . . . A decision to compromise must rest on an analysis of the situation showing that further concessions are unlikely and' that time w i l l not improve one's own bargaining p o s i t i o n . ^ Westerners become cynical when the words compromise and Soviets are mentioned together.  Compromise means giving up something of one's own,  said John Foster Dulles, "but i t i s contrary to the creed of Soviet Communism to give "up anything that i s i n i t s power to take or keep."^  1  When Westerners compromise, they do not necessarily see themselves demanding a compromise of equivalent value from the other side. But they see the Soviets as always demanding a compromise based on something of equal value.  Writing in Pravda on December 21, 1920, Lenin stated  that "we must make i t a rule not to make p o l i t i c a l concessions to the international bourgeoisie. . .unless we receive i n return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie. . .'1^2  Five  years later, at the Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin propounded the quid pro quo theory.  "Our policy i s clear, i t i s based on the formula: If you  give us something, we give you something."^  Westerners claim that i t i s  naive ever to expect the Soviet Union to concede a point merely out of good w i l l .  Soviet Morality and Diplomacy* According to Westerners, Communist ideology explicitly, states that morality i s not an absolute.  In Communist doctrine, morality be-  comes something entirely devoid of i t s own Western meaning. Morality becomes a matter of class interests for Communists. According to Westerners, Communist morality i s determined by the single formula-whatever i s i n the interest of the proletariat, whatever promotes Communist objectives-is good. In practice this means that the Soviet state can adhere to a principle pne day and can 'condemn i t the next day with impunity.  It appears, however, that Westerners see the Soviet doctrine of  morality as a rationalization for expediency. To Westerners, the basic belief guiding Soviet leaders i n their attitude toward morality i s the conception of the "end justifying the meansl'.  This phrase i s the one  most often repeated by Westerners when Communist morality i s discussed. A former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union during the Second World War, observed that "the Communist standards of morality-*he end justifies the means—renders their promises and international agreements and committments of l i t t l e value. The most widely quoted ideological principle to show the basis for Soviet morality, i s taken from Lenin's pamphlet on Religion. We say that our morality i s wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat. . . .For us morality i s subordinated to the interests of the proletariat class struggle.^5 This Soviet conception of morality leads Westerners to believe that the  Soviets regard Western ethics as a weakness because they restrict Western actions.  On the other hand, Western observers see Communist  diplomats as uninhibited i n the use of tactics.  Westerners look upon  themselves as morally observant while "Soviet leaders approach their international relations without any of the inhibitions inspired by 46 morality, integrity, or any other virtues."  American Secretary of State  George Marshall told American Secretary of Defence James Forrestal privately on May 21, 19^8, that "Russian diplomatic methods are unscrupulous." ? 4  Towards the end of the Second World War, certain Western diplomats were beginning to suspect that the Soviet Union did not subscribe to Western concepts of morality i n international affairs.  This Western sus-  picion eventually crystallized into a firm Western belief.  For example,  American Under-Secretary of State during World War Two, Joseph C. Grew, wrote in a private memorandum on May 19, 19^5 The most fatal thing we can do i s place any confidence whatever in Russia's sincerity, knowing without question that she w i l l take every opportunity to profit by our clinging to our own ethical international standards. She regards and w i l l continue to regard our ethical behavior as a weakness to us and an asset to her. ° :  4  Vernon V. Aspaturian quotes a Soviet ideological writer (Korovin) to show how sophisticated the Soviets can be in explaining what Aspaturian considers"Soviet duplicity."  The quote said i n part:  A legal norm that has positive (progressive) value i n relations heiween capitalist states may, in a number of cases, acquire the opposite (reactionary) character when transferred to the relations between socialist states. Thus norms, like non-intervention, sovereignty,  diplomatic immunity, neutrality, national selfdetermination, aggression, just and unjust wars, and even annexation when involved against capitalist states are progressive and correspondingly reactionary i f employed against the interests of socialist countries. 9 4  A British diplomat and scholar, William Hayter, concludes that the Soviets have a total lack of inhibitions about truth.  "Probably most  people l i e a bit more or less, sooner or later, but few people l i e as often and as freely as a Soviet official."3° According to Westerners, Soviet morality i s synonymous with improbity.  Westerners claim that  Communist theories about the nature of morality makes Western negotiators fearful of being deceived.  This i s the reason, for example,  that disarmament cannot be accepted by the West until significant inspections of Soviet military installations are agreed to by the 51 Soviet Union. Soviet Concepts of Its Diplomacy. Westerners believe that the Soviets are convinced that their diplomacy contains formidable weapons to use against the West. They believe that the Soviets consider their diplomacy to be fortified by the scientific theory of Marxism—Leninism which discovers unshakable laws of social development.  The Russians have stated that their  understanding of historical tendencies as revealed i n Marxist—Leninist doctrines not only clarifies present conditions of international politic but permits them to lead, and not merely to follow the march of events. Westerners think the Soviets are convinced that they have a special advantage over others who do not subscribe to Marxist-Leninist doctrines'  25  But Stepehen Kertesz states that Soviet diplomacy can hardly be considered diplomacy i n the customary sense.  To Kertesz, Soviet diplomacy i s but  one branch of the Communist world organization.  To support his concept  Kertesz quotes from a definition of diplomacy made by Andrei Vyshinsky: Soviet diplomacy in»its general purpose. . .(and)its methods differs categorically {from] feudal or bourgeois diplomacy. . . . Soviet diplomacy [aims at a study] of factors of social importance. . . .Unsurpassed Marxist-Leninist methods of perception of world conditions (are at the disposal of Soviet diplomacy?] We must remember Stalin's words. . .'.'In order to avoid mistakes i n politics and not to f a l l into the circle of idle dreamers, the Party of the Proletariat must proceed in i t s activity, not from the abstract principles of human intelligence, but from the concrete conditions of material l i f e of the society as the decisive power of the social development. . . . " Here i n this foresight and recognition of present and future events, and not i n deceit and intrigues, consists the strength of Soviet diplomacy, which so b r i l l iantly justified i t s e l f during the whole history of i t s activity." It seems that Vyshinsky's statement substantiates the Western view that the Soviets consider Communist diplomacy not only to be unique but also much more advanced than Western diplomacy. The Soviet Diplomat and Communist Ideology. It appears that most Westerners accept as fact that Soviet diplomats believe i n Marxist-Leninist doctrines.  According to Westerners,  Communist diplomats are not disposed by education or training to work out compromise solutions with  non-Communists.  Stephen Kertesz says that  Soviet diplomats consider diplomatic contacts with the West as skirmishes in the great fight against a corrupt and doomed society. Soviet diplomats understand and practice international revolution, not international cooperation and peace. Kertesz says that  "a Soviet representative  executes instructions i n the strictest sense and then ceases to function as a diplomat. " ^  26  A widely quoted statement by Westerners to demonstrate the uniqueness of a Soviet diplomat's function is. Stalin's ideological guide for Soviet diplomats: A diplomats word must have no relation to action—otherwise what kind of diplomacy i s i t ? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy i s no more possible than dry water or iron wood.55 Dean Acheson's conception of Stalin's belief i n "acts rather than words" tends to confirm i n his mind that Soviet diplomats generally follow their ideology.56  At the United Nations, an interesting incident  occurred which lends support to Western concepts of the dichotomy between Soviet acts and words. One day [at the UN] when Gromyko was making a speech in praise of good works, an exasperated, semi-professional young diplomat from Australia scribbled an impertinent note to one of Mr. Gromyko's assistants. "His words would sound very fine i f he did'nt come from the most outrageous dictatorships i n the world." The message was circulated among the Soviet delegation, provoking l i v e l y interest. Immediately after the close of the Security Council meeting, a member of the Soviet delegation cornered the young diplomat and asked with disarming candor: "Do you mean you really believe what your people say here?"57 There seems to be l i t t l e controversy among Westerners that the practices of Russian diplomats do not contradict Soviet views on diplomacy. Soviet Views of the Role of Negotiations. Westerners believe that the Soviets look upon negotiations as another method to be used i n the struggle against capitalism.  In con-  trast to the Western view , which holds that negotiation i s the technique 1  for adjusting differences between states, "the Soviet Union uses the process of negotiation i t s e l f as a means of carrying on the conflict."58 Lester B. Pearson, scholar, former diplomat, now p o l i t i c a l leader, states that from his experience i n dealing with Soviet diplomats the Communists see diplomacy and negotiations generally as instruments of national policy rather than as instruments of international agreement.59  An American  diplomat, Robert Murphy, supports Pearson's thesis when he says: It i s evident that negotiations are used by our opponents for purposes other than the reaching of constructive agreement. . . .Communist tactics are ceaseless and aggressive either to gain ground or at least to keep the opponent busy defending himself. . .so that he does not have an opportunity to gain or maintain an initiative of his own. Negotiations can raise false hopes, divide friends, and create distractions.°0 Nathan Leites claims that the Soviets see negotiations as representing another form of conflict.  Only after testing the strength of the enemy  and seeing no further advances are possible will the Soviet Government negotiate an agreement. Any agreement, i n the Soviet view according to Leites, i s the result of overt conflict pursued up to the very last moment. Soviet Concepts of Western Diplomacy. Soviet conceptions of "bourgeois" diplomacy are cynical according to Western interpretations. Westerners believe that the Soviets completely mistrust the aims of Western diplomacy. For example, William Hayter maintains that: No Soviet negotiator can ever persuade himself of the sincerity of his bourgeois interlocutor. The latter must ex hypothesis be hostile to the Soviet system and must wish to destroy i t . Consequently i t i s useless and a waste of time to try to persuade or convince him by rational agreement.62  28  A typical explanation from the Western point of view of why the Soviets see Western diplomacy i n such nefarious terms i s that the Soviet leaders project to the "ruling classes" and statesmen of foreign countries their own pattern of motivations and behavior.  According to Frederick G.Barghoorn,  the Soviet leaders are reared i n an atmosphere in which politics are largely conspiracy and i n which threats, shrewd bluffing and cunning maneuvers constitute the norms of p o l i t i c a l l i f e ; they interpret the actions of their opposite numbers abroad according to the same pattern. At the same time of course, they present their own actions as the implementation of the lofty ideals appropriate to the socialist state. 3 6  Edward Crankshaw, a British journalist, says that Soviet statesmen who themselves naturally and effortlessly resort to calculated deception and duplicity as an instrument of policy. . .are bound to assume that their Western opposite numbers are behaving i n the same way. . . .The deceiver, knowing his own duplicity, ends up by being able to trust nobody.° 4  In the Soviet view, according to Westerners, diplomacy i s inseparable from and incapable of rising above the class character of the state and society i t represents.  The Soviets believe that i n " a l l diplomatic systems prior  to the Soviet, deceit and deception were characteristic devices which ruling classes employed against each other.  Capitalist diplomacy, how-  ever, i s distinguished for i t s deception of the masses as well."65 Furthermore,  Westerners claim that i n the Soviet view, "bourgeois" diplomacy  represents conflict and cooperation among ruling classes of states i n pursuit of their limited class interests, rather than in pursuit of the  interests of the nation as a whole. Consequently,while Westerners view diplomacy i n  the context of cooperation and conflict among states i n the pursuit of their own national interests, the Soviets view diplomacy i n the context of deception which they believe i s inherent i n the narrow interests of the ruling classes.  For example, Asparturian quotes Stalin as saying:  Anyone knows that , . .Kings and diplomats of a l l the countries in Europe, successfully practiced intrigue, deceit, perfidy, flattery, atrocities, bribery, murder and arson i n foreign policy. Obviously i t could not be otherwise. . . .Perfidy, treachery, bribery and similar qualities of diplomacy. . .are the characteristicasores of any capitalist diplomacy. (Bolshevik^#9 19^1, p p . 1 - 5 )  f  6 6  Moreover, i n Problems of Leninism Stalin said:  "A diplomats words must  have no relation to action. . . .It would be naive to preach morality to people who do not recognize morality. Politics.as-voi^txc&r a.3„the old,hardbitten bourgeois diplomat would say."^*  7  Westerners may be correct i n their concept of the Soviet view of deception as a matter of course for diplomats.  Winston Churchill related  an interesting incident at one of the social gatherings of the Big Three at Yalta.  Commenting on the unique Allied alliance, Churchill states  that Stalin said publicly to the gathering: In an alliance the a l l i e s should not deceive each other. Perhaps that i s naive? Experienced diplomatists may say "Why should I not deceive an ally?" But I as a naive man think i t best not to deceive an a l l y , even i f he i s a fool. Possibly our alliance i s so firm because we do not deceive each other, or i s i t not so easy to deceive each other?68 It seems a reasonable question for Westerners to ask that i f the Soviets believe that capitalist countries deceive the working classes, why should the Soviets not believe that the capitalists try to deceive the country which represents the interests of a l l the working classes? However, although the Russians may expect the Western nations to try to deceive them, there seems to be l i t t l e factual evidence to substantiate their view.  Soviet Beliefs in- the Future of Communist Diplomacy. According to Western observers, the Soviets see the system of Western diplomacy eventually disappearing.  As Hans Morgenthau put i t :  "For the Soviets diplomacy i s l i t t l e more than a stop-gap designed for a transition period before the f i n a l cataclysm ushers i n universal socialism. . . '.'69 According to Vernon V. Aspaturian, there i s a current textbook on international law i n the Soviet Union  which states  that Soviet diplomacy represents a diplomacy which i s for the f i r s t time in the history of mankind wholly serving the interests of the working class not only i n the Soviet Union but also i n the world. Aspaturian maintains that the Soviets believe that their diplomacy i s based upon the principle of proletarian internationalism which i s i n a state of continuous expansion at the expense of the "bourgeoisie" through the medium of coexistence diplomacy.70  Westerners think that the Russians  view Soviet diplomacy as transitional i n i t s contemporary setting because unlike bourgeois diplomacy i t does not seek to resolve hasic disputes.  "Rather i t assumes the eventual assimilation or liquidation 71  of the Western social system, although not necessarily by means of force." In contrast, the Western belief that any dispute can be settled by the persuasiveness of argument and reasonableness reflects the prominent role played by the legal profession i n Western diplomacy and the conception of diplomacy as a legal process.?  2  It i s not a concern of this study whether Westerners are wholly or only partially correct i n their views about Soviet conceptions of diplomacy.  As stated at the outset of Chapter One, not a l l Western  3fc scholars accept the ideological base for Soviet behavior.  Until the  Soviet Union becomes an open society where Russian scholars can freely present their own analysis of Soviet behavior, and until Soviet leaders can write their memoirs, the problem of how "ideologically-oriented" the Soviet leaders are remains pertinent.  Nevertheless, most state-  ments and explanations about Soviet behavior from Westerners have a definite theme running through them. The theme i s that Communist ideology can explain Soviet behavior, better than anything else. Indeed, many Westerners claim that the Soviet Union's behavior has been f a i r l y consistent with i t s ideological b e l i e f s . ^  Moreover, Khrushchev has said  that i f anyone i s waiting for the Soviet Union to renounce Lenin, he w i l l have to "wait for pigs to fly.'-'?  4  CHAPTER II WESTERN VIEWS OF THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS  OF  SOVIET DIPLOMATS.,  Western concepts of Soviet diplomatic negotiating behavior f a l l into two categories;  the general, that i s Western concepts of the over-  a l l characteristics of the negotiating behavior of  liJ Soviet diplomats,  such as their hyper-suspicious attitudes, and the specific, that i s , Western concepts of Soviet bargaining tactics. be discussed i n later chapters.  Bargaining tactics w i l l  This chapter deals with Western concepts  of Soviet diplomats who are ohserved f u l f i l l i n g a function which Westeners regard as very different from the role that their diplomats f u l f i l l . Most Westerners who have negotiated with the Soviets appear to believe that Soviet diplomatic behavior has evolved into an unmistakeable pattern^ During the Second World War, the "pattern" emerged strongly whenever Westerners negotiated lend-lease, and other wartime matters with the Russians.  General Deane, head of the American military mission i n  Moscow negotiating lend-lease said :"Erom my experience I believe that Soviet behavior i n the conduct of negotiations. . .will almost invariably be marked by certain characteristics."  Post-war negotiations with the  Soviet Union also confirmed the "pattern" of Soviet negotiating behavior. George Kennan states that the "phenomena" of Soviet conduct-the sensitiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose-"are here to stay in the foreseeable future."^  33  Westerners are apt to claim that former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov epitomizes Soviet diplomacy.  "No Russian represents that  {Soviet] diplomatic pattern more than Molotov." Charles Roetter says 4  5  that Soviet diplomats appear to come from the same mold as Molotov. To Westerners, Molotov epitomizes Soviet diplomats because he never revealed his personal feelings regardless of whether he was being reasonable or v i t r i o l i c .  Philip Mosely contends that a l l Soviet negot-  iators give the appearance of "woodenness."^  "With extreme s k i l l and  precision they could hurl insults one moment and exude charm the next without betraying one personal feeling."? According to Westerners, there are a number of general characteri s t i c s which mark Soviet diplomats. First, they are stubborn.  Second,  they adhere strongly to pre-conceived notions. Thirdly, they appear as mechanical mouthpieces who are unable to make even a minor decision. Fourth, they display a hyper-suspicious attitude toward Westerners. Fifth, they emphasize material issues not principles.  Sixth, they display  diplomatic bad manners. Seventh, they appear reluctant to report back Western proposals. Eighth, The Soviet diplomat negotiates as part of a chain. Soviet negotiators, according to Westerners, are stubborn. James Byrnes wrote that "experience shows that Russia's leaders are stubborn o  and resourceful negotiators." Attending the Potsdam conference, Harry 0  Truman wrote a letter to his mother on July 30, 19^9» stating: "You never saw such pig-headed people as are the Russians.  I hope I never have to  hold another conference with them, but, of course, I will."9  Instead of  attempting t© reduce the points of friction, the Soviet negotiator "often appears to his exasperated Western colleagues to take pride i n finding the maximum number of disputes and i n dwelling on each of them to the f u l l . " Commenting on war-crime negotiations with the Soviets, Sidney S.Alderman, former Assistant to Robert H. Jackson, the United States representative and Chief Counsel at the Nuremburg Trials says: Soviet representatives were always. . .characteristically stubborn on any matter i n which they took a definite position or on which apparently they were under instructions VV from Moscow. . . .They could.,;?s$i;:; tight on a matter for days and weeks, remaining totally impervious to the arguments of others. They would agree to a matter one day and repudiate the agreement the next, evidently having communicated with Moscow i n the meantime, without any appearance of embarrassment at the inconsistency and with the blandest suavity of manner. . . . ;  Conciliatory approaches or personal friendship gestures from Western negotiators have not eliminated Soviet subbornness.  12  i  n  recent dis-  armament negotiations the Soviet negotiator has appeared as stubborn as his predecessors were fifteen to twenty years ago. According to Westerners, another characteristic of Soviet negotiators i s their strict adherence to pre-conceived notions about the West and their impervious attitude to changing these notions.  Max Beloff  states that the "record of Soviet diplomacy shows an inability to distinguish between the real and the imaginary, a series of false calculations about the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. 3 nl  Harrison Salisbury wrote that he was: convinced that top Soviet leadership actually believes there i s more than half a chance that the United States might attack Russia. {Moreover] the re-action of the [Soviet] people to the l i f t i n g of the (Berlin] blockade was very significant. They were almost pathetic i n their pleasure.I 4  1 0  35 Averell Harriman's discussions with Stalin in September of 19^1,in  order  to establish lend-lease arrangements, indicates that the Soviets tended to brush aside important p o l i t i c a l factors i f they did not coincide with their pre-conceived notions of the West. Harriman told Stalin of some p o l i t i c a l resistance i n the United States against helping Russia oppose the Nazis, and how Franklin Roosevelt was concerned about American public opinion, particularly on the religious issue vis-a-vis Russia.  Stalin  seemed to show no interest in Roosevelt's need to have the support of American public opinion nor did he show any interest in helping Roosevelt to maintain i t . ' ' 1  Later i n the war, whenever Western negotiators,:;  brought up the public opinion issue, Stalin became contemptuous of i t . Stalin indicated that he believed Westerners were using the term public opinion to cover their leaders' views.  Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's special  representative i n negotiations with foreign countries, wrote that Marshal Stalin told him in May, 19^5 that he would "not attempt to use Soviet public opinion as a screen [for his p o l i c i e s ] . " ^ 1  It i s suggested that  the reason Stalin agreed to hold free elections i n Poland, knowing f u l l well that the Communists would not win any Polish elections and thus not really intending to hold any, was that they were "but a sop to the nebulous American public opinion." ? 1  At times Westerners claimed that Soviet  preconceptions of the West did the Soviets a great deal of harm. At the Paris Peace Conference in October 19^6, certain European states like France, Czechoslovakia and Norway had hoped to maintain a middle position between the Soviets and the British and Americans.  The Soviets, however,  20 drove these nations, as well as other small nations, into one camp or the other largely because the Soviets would not recognize any middle ground. The Soviet representatives stated their own case i n extreme form and denounced, the Western powers i n the most provocative and even insulting terms. These tactics alienated the nations outside the Soviet sphere and had the effect of creating, so far as voting was concerned, just that Western bloc which Soviet leaders professed to see when i t did not exist.18 James Byrnes also says that the Soviets saw a Western bloc when i n fact i t did not exist.  For example, at the Paris Peace Conference,  When the New Zealand proposal to have a l l recommendations made by a simple majority vote was defeated i n the Commission by a bare 11 to 9 votes, no one complained that the proposal had been rejected by a Soviet bloc, but when the Soviet proposal on voting proceedings i s defeated by the overwhelming vote of 15 to 6 here i n this conference, the charge i s made that the defeat was brought about by an Anglo-Saxon bloc.19 Moreover, whenever Western delegates would disagree on proposals among themselves, the Soviets would interpret this as an elaborate stage play put on for the purpose of upsetting the strategy of the Soviet Union. Frederick Osborne, American delegate to the early Atomic Energy Negotiations observed: Once when McNaughton (The Canadian representative) and the American delegate were engaged i n quite a violent argument over some point i n the plan, I'remember glancing at Gromyko and seeing an extraordinary expression of bewilderment on his face, as though he were trying to figure out whether or not the whole thing was being staged for his benefit. . . . Certainly no Soviet delegate other than Gromyko ever thought for a moment that the majority delegates did anything except on orders from the United States. In a very real sense the Soviet delegates were victims of their own indoctrination. w  And s t i l l today Westerners believe that the Soviet negotiator's firm adherence to his ideology makes him impervious not only to objectivity but  also to reason. A prominent view held by Westerners i s that the Soviet diplomat i s a mechanical mouthpiece trained to follow only centralized decisions. Harold iLaski claims that "talking to Russians one has the impression of talking to an automaton who can speak the gramaphone record that has been provided in Moscow."21 Westerners see the Soviet negotiator having to abide s t r i c t l y by the text.that Moscow gave him.  No variation of the  text, even on a minute matter i s allowed until Moscow has sent further instructions.  In June 19^7, American Senator Vandenberg, Republican  Party Foreign Policy Representative, wrote i n his diary: "John Foster Dulles brought me down to date re Paris. He says Vyshinsky. . .was a really pathetic figure i n his obvious lack of liberty to agree even to a comma without phoning Moscow."22 According to Philip Mosely, the Soviet negotiator cannot conceive of any Western representative daring to modify the sancroa'ahct  text which had been handed down to him.23  The Soviet  negotiator can hardly believe that such freedom exists for any o f f i c i a l representative. private opinion.  Moreover, the Soviet negotiator dares not express a In effect, Westerners view the Soviet diplomat as a  specialized messenger, not a diplomat i n the Western sense. Vfesterners interpret the Soviet diplomat's strict obedience to the letter of his instructions as representing fear of his leaders.  John  Foster Dulles said that he knew "two top Soviet diplomats who disappeared into outer, or rather inner darkness because they exercised a slight discretion and permitted themselves some f l e x i b i l i t y . "  2 4  George Kennan  states that because the Russians have no Anglo-Saxon tradition i n the arts of compromise and accommodation i t i s easy for the Communists to practice discipline and obedience. 5 2  This behavior of the Russian diplo-  mat causes frustration i n the pragmatic Western negotiator.  For example,  The Americans felt able to make their own decisions i n many cases without referring the question to higher authority. The Soviet negotiators were functioning under an order from a superior, and any deviation whatever required a conference with that superior, who might or might not have to seek authority from a higher level before the plan of action would be accepted. . . .When they learned that i n almost no conference with a Soviet negotiator could a decision be made, some Americans were exasperated. " 2  During the Greek border investigation i n the spring of 19^7, Mark Ethridg the United States delegate on the United Nations Commission asked A. A. Lavischev, the Soviet delegate, to look over .an American proposal. Lavischev read i t and stated that i t appeared satisfactory but added that, naturally he would have to have Moscow's approval.  Two days later  Moscow sent instructions on the American proposal and Lavischev told Ethridge that "I oppose every word of this {American proposal].  In fact,  I oppose i t twice as violently as I ever thought I could."27 Another example of the Soviet diplomats strict obedience to -  instructions occurred in December, 19^1.  Meeting at the White House,  Churchill wanted to make a minor change in the United Nations Declaration.  After the words "governments" i n the phrase "the governments  signatory hereto," he wanted to add the word "authorities" so that the Free French could sign the Declaration later.  Roosevelt agreed, but  Litvinovi the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, told Churchill that he could not approve the addition. Churchill agreed that the change was  \  39  i of a minor nature but Litvinov insisted that he had to ask Moscow's approv a l . B u t Churchill and Roosevelt wanted the text released immediately so they,felt there was no time to cable Russia.  Finally, when Litvinov could  not be persuaded to approve the change, Churchill became quite angry and told Litvinov that he was not much of an Ambassador i f he did not have the power even to add a word, especially i n war when there was no time for "long-winded" negotiations.  Litvinov said there was nothing he could do  and the text was released without the word "authorities." (Litvinov later cabled for approval to include the  word "authorities" and Moscow  . agreed to it.')^8 A consensus s t i l l exists among Westerners that the Communist i  . o f f i c i a l i s not a free agent in any Western sense of the term. Westerners agree that Western statesmen can be correctly described as entertaining varying o f f i c i a l and private attitudes and that i t would be misleading to ) depict Communist statesmen as such. Furthermore, Westerners maintain that the Russians believe that every foreign representative acts solely i n the interests of his own government, and that whatever he does i s explained by this fact.  No foreigner i s considered objectively capable  of generosity and a Soviet o f f i c i a l feels himself under no obligation to a foreigner. Former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, commented: "I now realize that any Soviet  official i s  immune to feelings of personal liking or gratitude toward any individual foreigner, and indeed would receive immediate and severe disciplinary punishment i f he  betrayed such feelings." 9 However, since the doctrine 2  of peaceful coexistence was introduced i n 1956, Russian diplomats, most  l i k e l y on orders from Moscow, are relatively friendly but s t i l l very sensitive to criticism. Western diplomats have learned not to push the Soviet representative 30 for a decision u n t i l he has had time to refer the matter back to Moscow". According to John N. Hazard, former United States Deputy-Director of Lend-Lease, "conferences with the Soviets just became the means of imparting to the Soviet negotiator some information to be reported by him to his superiors.  Decisions were reserved for another dayI  Westerners have  observed that the Soviet negotiator never agrees to anything the f i r s t time.  Firmly planted i n the mind of the Western public i s the stereotyped  image of the Soviet diplomat stoutly declaring "Nyet."  As a result of  not being able to reach decisions at f i r s t , James Reston says that: Western negotiators have adopted the tedious procedure of running over the agenda as quickly as possible so that the Russians can demonstrate to the Politbureau that they are in the proper disagreeable frame of mind. When that demonstration has been made, we can then begin to think about negotiations.32 At times Soviet negotiators appear s i l l y i n their absolute adherence to what Moscow says and does not say.  For example, on May 18, 19^5* Vanden-  berg noted that Stettinius had tried to get the Big Four to agree to a presentation of a compromise on regional powers to a conference committee but Gromyko declined to agree until he had received instructions from Moscow. He even declined to agree that the compromise could be presented 33 as an American plan. Westerners such as George Kennan believe that Soviet diplomatic training teaches mistrust of the supposed glib persuasiveness of the outside world.  Consequently Kennan maintains the Soviet negotiators are  not amenable to argument or reason emanating from outside sources.  Kennan  also believes that the foreign representative cannot hope that his words w i l l make any impression on Soviet negotiators.  "The most he can hope  for i s that they w i l l be transmitted to those at the top who are capable of changing the party line." 3  4  Moreover, because Soviet negotiators  do not comment on new proposals, Soviet "statements at conference,often seem to have l i t t l e relation to the immediate preceding statements of other delegations."35 One of the most common statements found when memoirs of Western statesmen are perused i s that during war time negotations with the Soviets, Westerners soon discovered that S&lih,was the only man to deal with ±4 foreign affairs.  William H. Standley, American Ambassador to the  Soviet Union for two years during the Second World War, said shortly after he arrived in Moscow: "I was beginning to learn. Every question of even the most minor importance, eventually passed up to Stalin for decision."3^ Averell Harriman reported i n September, 19^1 that Stalin was the only man with whom to negotiate and that to deal with others was a waste of time unless Stalin had given them previous instructions.3? Edward Stettinius, American Secretary of State at Yalta, commented after meeting Stalin that: Stalin impressed me as a man with a fine sense of humour. At the same time one received an impression of power and ruthlessness along with his humour. During the various conferences at Yalta, I noticed that the other members of the Soviet delegation would change their minds perfectly unashamedly whenever Marshal Stalin changed his.38 An example of Stalin's ability to make snap decisions i n contrast to the position taken by other high Soviet o f f i c i a l s , concerned the impasse  which was revealed at the United Nations conference i n San Francisco over the use of the veto.  On instructions from Molotov, Gromyko insisted that  the veto be applied to agenda matters.  In effect, this would have meant  that the Security Council could not discuss a dispute l e t alone enforce a settlement without unanimous consent from the five permanent members. Stettinius told Gromyko that the United States could not join in a world organization in which the discussion of a dispute was ruled out.  Truman  wired Hopkins i n Moscow and asked him to present to Stalin the Western viewpoint on the veto.  (Hopkins was i n Moscow attempting to persuade  Stalin to carry out his pledge of free elections for Poland.) As soon as our point of view had been presented, Mr.Molotov intervened to defend the Soviet position. The conversation between Marshal Stalin and his foreign minister, as interpreted by Bohlen made i t clear that the Marshal had not understood the issue involved, He told Molotov he thought i t was an insignificant matter and that the American position should be accepted. . . .t JThis demonstrated] that when matters are brought to Stalin's attention i t frequently i s possible to get a quick decision even when i t requires reversing openly the decision of his Foreign Minister.39 These Western impressions that Soviet decisions can be made only at the top and that the Soviet diplomat therefore cannot comment, add, or delete proposals, s t i l l appears valid today. For example, Khrushchev told Dag Haramerskjold the reason he had a predilection i n favour of Summit Conferences: "A Foreign Ministers'conference i s like a deep freezeyou put meat into i t and after a while when you take i t out i t i s neither better nor worse."  This Western concept of Soviet diplomatic decision-  making largely accounts for the emphasis that i s sometimes put on summit meetings by the West.  Another prominent characteristic of the Soviet negotiator, as seen by Westerners, i s his reluctance to report back to Moscow any Western proposals without f i r s t having thoroughly dissected them. "Numerous instances have shown that the Soviet negotiator i s i n mortal terror of violating any part, minor or major, of their instructions and are extremely reluctant to report to Moscow that they cannot get every point and every wording in their own d r a f t s . "  41  In presenting to his govern-  ment suggestions for compromise or reconciliation of differences which originated i n other delegations, the Soviet negotiator ©pens himself to risks and charges by the Soviet Government that he i s becoming susceptr ible to capitalism or i s considering his superiors "slightly less than omniscient."  42  Philip Mosely strongly maintains that for a Communist  trained negotiator to give up a demand once presented, even a very minor point, makes him feel that he i s losing control of his own w i l l and i s becoming subject to an alien w i l l .  Consequently,  any point which has finally to be abandoned must be given up only after a most t e r r i f i c struggle. The Soviet negotiator i s only justified i n moving on to another point v/hen a point cannot be gained. Another tug of wills then Harold Laski writes that the ,Soviet negotiator invariably has the ". . .immobile face,the solid stare, the monotonous and majestic successor of .ijast imperatives or petty minutiae, the obvious anxiety to l e t nothing pass which, however harmless might at some future date be quoted against the new found and admitted dignity of the Soviet Union.  Louis J  t  Halle bluntly says:  Every Communist negotiator below the summit negotiates with a gun i n his back. It might be fatal for him to see eye to eye with those who s i t across the table, or to report back to his home office that their agreements.have merit, or to interpret the developments i n terms of personal observation rather than doctrinal authority. 5 4  Halle further states that Soviet negotiators are barred by their own dogma from recognizing any common ground between themselves and the capitalists.  Consequently, capitalist concessions may represent i n  Soviet eyes either a retreat or a sinister p l o t . ^ 4  According to Westerners, Soviet diplomatic reaction to outside events i s never isolated but always forms part of a chain.  For example,  although i n Western diplomacy, the success or failure of military negotiations i s not related i n any way to cultural negotiations, i n Soviet diplomacy even the most unrelated negotiations, i n Western eyes, are a l l part of a general chain of negotiations for the Russians. When negotiations i n one place bog down, they bog dow|i elsewhere too even though other negotiations may be proving f r u i t f u l .  Philip Mosely  describes this method of Soviet diplomacy as "chain reaction*" ? 4  An  illustration of the chain reaction method occurred at the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting i n September 19^5.  Mr. Molotov was raising  procedural points and delaying the Council from discussing a Japanese Peace Treaty. James Byrnes, American Secretary of State and chief Western negotiator, said that the West thought that Molotov's procedural haggling was simply part of the Soviet tactic of war of nerves. But, we suddenly realized we had been wrong. The remarkable performance that had led to the breakdown of the London Conference had been stimulated by the Russian belief that they were not being consulted adequately by our o f f i c i a l s i n Japan. There was confirmation of the Russian attitude i n the fact that the Soviet military representative i n Tokyo, General Kuzman Derevyanko, had returned to Moscow. . . . 8 4  This chain reaction pattern was blatantly evident during World War  Two.  For example, Soviet reactions to American-Russian differences over Poland, the quasi-surrender negotiations between the Nazis and the British and Americans under Alexander i n Italy, and numerous wartime "incidents" over a period of time, put a "complete stop on a l l American activities within the Soviet Union. . . .Word seem  to have been passed to a l l agencies of  Government to suspend action in a l l ventures i n which Americans were involved." 9. 4  Second World War policies which were affected the mosth.  by this chain reaction behavior of the Soviets were: the cancelling of Allied use of Soviet Air bases i n Gdynia and Budapest; the cancelling of an American survey party's mission to the Amur valley, and the refusal of the Soviet C i v i l Air Administration to continue negotiations with the Americans concerning the establishment of a connecting a i r route between the United States and the Soviet Union.  No doubt there were other  reasons besides those of chai4 reaction that made the Soviet Union break off or s t a l l negotiations with i t s war-time a l l i e s .  Nevertheless, this  chain reaction may represent the f i n a l show of non-confidence i n or distrust with the other delegations.  General Deane said that the West  could expect prompt reprisals whenever i t incurred Soviet displeasure. He also said that the West could expect Soviet refusals to cooperate to extend to a l l activities in which contact with the Soviet Union was involved regardless of remoteness, and that Soviet refusals would be resorted to even though they adversely affect the immediate interests of the Soviet Union. Because of this chain reaction Westerners have found i t d i f f i c u l t to isolate the cause of the trouble.50 Today,however,this chain reaction method i s not utilized because the United States and the Soviet Union have negotiated  46 agreements regarding outer space, changing salt water to fresh water, and exchanging scientific information and cultural groups.  A l l these  agreements generally have been negotiated when other areas of East-West relations were unsatisfactory. However, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know whether the Soviet have abolished the chain method of negotiation or i f they have just suspended i t temporarily. Another prominent Western belief i s that the Soviet negotiator understands and emphasizes material issues and lacks appreciation of/or concern with,abstract principles.  This particular concept evolved  during the peace treaty negotiations and was not particularly evident In American thinking during World War II, although the British appreciated the Soviet emphasis on hard facts.  Today, both British and  American diplomats believe that the only way to talk to the Soviets!is with hard facts.  They believe that the Soviet Union can only be dealt  with on the basis of practical proposals.51  They believe that abstract  principles are foreign to the Soviet negotiator.  The term "self-  interest" i s used by Westerners to describe the Soviet emphasis on material issues. The Soviets can and will cooperate when they that i t i s i n their own interests to do so. interest i s the one line of argument-perhaps line of argument-that has proved persuasive, Western negotiators w i l l do well to remember  perceive Selfthe only and future this fact. . .  Allen Dulles wrote that when Americansnegotiate with the Soviets they must be precise and practical.53 John Foster Dulles stated that "whenver negotiations involve matters of real substance the Communists go 54 at them i n a tough, hard way."  In passing, i t should be noted that  the s e l f - i n t e r e s t concept may be used r e l a t i v e l y c o r r e c t l y to describe any country's attitude toward r e l a t i o n s and agreements with other nations. For example, there i s nothing s t a r t l i n g i n Gromyko's statement that "as f a r as the Soviet Union i s concerned, there.is only one kind of l o g i c i n foreign a f f a i r s - t h e l o g i c of what i s best f o r the Soviet Union."55 Although the s e l f - i n t e r e s t concept i s , f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, universal, Westerners appear to believe that certain abstract p r i n c i p l e s are u n i versal as w e l l .  On the other hand, Westerners believe that Soviet s e l f -  i n t e r e s t concepts are purely m a t e r i a l i s t i c and e n t i r e l y devoid of any principles. One of the most pronounced Western views of the Soviet negotiator concerns h i s hyper-suspicious attitudes toward non-Communist negotiators.5& Many Westerners accept Russian suspicion of foreigners as h i s t o r i c a l l y ingrained.  T r a i t s noted i n nineteenth century Russia by Western observ-  ers have also been noted i n the Soviets of the twentieth century.57 S t a l i n t o l d Hopkins i n 19^5 that "even though the Russians are a simple people, the West often made the mistake of regarding them as f o o l s . " Hopkins wrote that Russian complaints "revealed an extreme s e n s i t i v i t y and an amazing degree of almost i n s t i n c t i v e suspicion."58  When the West  i n s i s t e d on free elections i n Poland and refused to recognize the Sovieti n s p i r e d government of Rumania a f t e r World War Two, James Byrnes believed that Molotov thought that the reasons f o r Western refusals were embodied i n a hidden motive.  That motive, based on Western h o s t i l i t y toward the  Soviet Union, was to have unfriendly governments surround Russia. Furthermore on May 2 0 , 19^6, Byrnes t o l d the American public i n a radio address  ^8 that because the Soviets were stalling the peace conference, the matter ought to be taken before the United Nations.  When Byrnes said that "we  must take the offensive for peace as we did for war," Molotov's reaction was quick and violent.  He charged that Anglo-American capital  was instigating new aggressive wars and was aiming for world domination. The offensive for peace according to Molotov was i n reality an offensive 59 against the Soviet Union and the interests of peace.  British journalist fin  Edward Crankshaw calls Russian suspicions "deep seated, even pathological." According to Westerners, Stalin always feared during the Second World War that the British and Americans would conclude a separate peace with Nazi Germany. When the German forces in. Italy indicated that they wanted to surrender, British and American representatives met the Nazi representatives in Berne, Switzerland to arrange the date of surrender.  Even after the  Soviets were informed of the nature of the meeting, Stalin wrote Roosevelt i n "objectionable language" charging the Western a l l i e s with seeking a separate peace with the Nazis.  Roosevelt, deeply hurt at the Soviet charge,  wrote back to Stalin that he had been misinformed.^1  American scholar  Frederick Neal says that the suspicions of Russian diplomats border on paranoia.  "Even during the war the Russians were so suspicious that they  often inhibited well-meant Western efforts at assistance."°2 Although Westerners recognize that suspicion has been a historical Russian t r a i t , i t appears that most Westerners believe that Soviet suspicions are rooted i n Communist ideology as well.  It i s accepted i n the  West that both past history and present ideology account for the "ingrained" suspicious attitude of Russian Communists. ^ According to Westerners, the  Soviets have consistently held their conception of the inevitability of capitalist hostility which demonstrates that this Soviet outlook has remained the pivot of Soviet foreign policy and explains why the Soviet negotiator i s so suspicious of others.  Westerners claim that Soviet  ideology makes the "Russians probably even more suspicious and fearful of us than we are of them.""** Westerners point to a statement by Stalin i n his book Problems of Leninism to prove their point: We must remember that we are surrounded by people, classes and governments who openly express their intense hatred for us. We must remember that we are at a l l times but a hair's breadth from every manner o"f invasion. °5 In disarmament negotiations, Westerners have observed the acute suspicion with which the Soviet negotiators view Western proposals. When the Soviet Union refused to agree to international control of atomic energy i n 19^6, Westerners explained Soviet actions i n terms of suspicion of the West. James Byrnes said, for example, that: The reason the Soviets were against international control of atomic energy i s because of inspection; Gromyko stated "inspection meant unlimited power and the possibility of interfering with the internal economic l i f e of nations." Soviet suspicion i s so deep-seated that any type of ^ inspection would interfere with their internal affairs. Frederick Neal states that the Soviet Union refused to internationalize atomic energy i n 19^6 because they saw the internationalization proposal as a Western scheme to enforce a freeze on Soviet inferiority i n atomic energy.6?  The refusal of the Soviet Union to agree to present United  States disarmament proposals contained i n i t s disarmament "package" i n 1962 (where the United Nations would become a supra-national international authority and where the International Court of Justice would  50 «^lflitoMt'eidi"^putesv"«8as explained by Mr. Zorin, former chief Soviet  ;  ,  spokesman on disarmament at the United Nations i n 1962, in these terms: The supra-national authority [envisioned) by the United States would mean, i n practice, an encroachment upon the sovereign rights of one State on another and an attempt to set up an international authority acting i n favour of those who would be at the head of i t . Zorin's argument i s similar to Gromyko's argument, which explained the Soviet refusal i n 19^*6 to agree to internationalize atomic energy. Westerners today appear to believe as strongly as they did twenty years ago that Soviet diplomats display hyper-suspicious attitudes toward Western representatives and their proposals. Another prominent Western view of Soviet negotiating behavior concerns "manners." Westerners characterize Soviet negotiators, leaders or subordinates, as always displaying bad manners. According to Western observers, negotiations with the Soviets w i l l be comprised of arrogant insults.  Lester B. Pearson states that  The manners and methods of the Communist diplomat have reflected the proletarian nature of the revolution in his country. They are characterized by toughness, a brutal use of words, an obstinate refusal to admit two sides to any argument. . . .[His]methods are crudely practical, coldly pragmatic—'Unyielding, obstinate and ill-mannered.°9 Lord Vansittart bluntly says that the style of Soviet behavior i s that of "an aggressive drunk." 7 °  Graham H. Stuart, writing 14 the American  Diplomatic and Consular Practice, says that the Soviets are "churlish boors."71  The American Government's dealings with Russian o f f i c i a l s during  the Second World War caused Secretary of War Stimson to observe that the Russians were, consciously or unconsciously bad-mannered and i r r i t a t i n g  51 beyond the normal degree of permissible internationalefftiMtery?  Even  2,  though the United States was an a l l y of the Soviet Union, i t apparently d i d not have any effect on Soviet manners. Western views of Soviet bad manners should not be confused  with  t h e i r opinions regarding the Soviet Union's propensity to bluntness" when 1  i t wants to be frank.  While the B r i t i s h may not have cared f o r Russian  bluntness ( i n i t s crude form) the Americans praised i t because they themselves as frank speakers.  saw  I t seems that the Americans f e l t that  ftankness was the best diplomatic language and they believed the Russians thought so too.73  For example, American Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt's  m i l i t a r y aide, said that " S t a l i n ' s approach to our mutual problems was d i r e c t , agreeable and considerate of the viewpoints of h i s two  colleagues  {Churchill and R o o s e v e l t J — u n t i l one of them advanced some point that S t a l i n thought was detrimental to Soviet i n t e r e s t s . Then he could be bruta l l y blunt to the-point of  rudeness.?  4  Many Westerners have believed that Soviet bad manners exist only at the subordinate l e v e l and that Soviet leaders themselves would be f r i e n d l i e r and more cooperative.  Although at times S t a l i n was l e s s  mannered than h i s subordinates, he could be just as discourteous.  illFor  example, according to American Ambassador Standley: S t a l i n made no attempt at f i n e speeches or observances of diplomatic n i c e t i e s . His comments cut short flowery forensic displays by C h u r c h i l l and bored i n to the point. He was often blunt, even rude. . . .To every statement of C h u r c h i l l ' s at the 19^2 Moscow meeting S t a l i n took excepti o n with undiplomatic bluntness that was almost i n s u l t i n g . 7 5 Robert Sherwood writes that Roosevelt found himself disagreeing on a number of important points with S t a l i n whom he found much tougher than  he expected and "at times deliberately discourteous. . . '.'76 Philip Mosely claims that the involvement of top leaders like Stalin and te«shcK@v i n negotiations have "reinforced rather than watered down demands or arrogance."77  With Khrushchev, Harriman writes that the  recently deposed Soviet leader likes to boast, to bluff, and to threaten. Often he loses his temper, and his face flushes as he wags his finger under your:chin. But a moment later he i s calm again and proposes a toast to your friendship.78 Although Westerners have viewed Soviet leaders as bad mannered, i t appears from Western writings that Soviet subordinates have been somewhat more rude, more discourteous, than Stalin, Malenkov, or Khrushchev. The difference between the Soviet leaders seems to be that the subordinate can or must insult his Western opponents. For example, George Marshall, American Secretary of State, at the December, 19^7 London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers said that the conduct of Molotov and his remarks were of such a character as to make i t impossible for him or his colleagues to have respect for the Soviet Union.79  Walter Bedell  Smith, having dealt with Molotov many times, said that Molotov had been "systematically aggressive, stubborn and unyielding.  In conference he Ro  seemed at times deliberately to bait and i r r i t a t e his opponents." Andrei Vyshinsky was the same as Molotov i n Western eyes.  ou  Beginning i n  19^7, "the shockingly violent charges jof Vyshinsky) against American "warmongering" accelerated the "new  diplomacy" which was characterized by the  language of the fishwife rather than that of Lord Chesterfield."  ox  particularly bad insult in Western eyes occurred at the August, 19^8  A  meeting of the Danubian conference.  It appears that the aim of Soviet  action at the Conference was to demonstrate that the Danube was not the concern of the Western powers, and that member states of the Council of Foreign Ministers had no special position i n the conference. ¥yshinsky ?  moved a resolution stating that English be excluded as an o f f i c i a l language of the conference although two of the four sponsoring governments were English-speaking. Moreover, Vyshinsky confused matters by arguing that because Russian was not a working language of the United Nations but only an o f f i c i a l language, i t was therefore not f a i r for English to be a working language at the Danube Conference while i t was not an o f f i c i a l languagei  The Eastern " s a t e l l i t e " countries supported the Soviet reso-  lution by seven to three. English was.excluded from the conference although British and American delegations were i n attendance.  82  At the United Nations Soviet attacks against the West during the cold war were so v i t r i o l i c that the President of the General Assembly Carlos P. Romulo, warned the Soviet delegates indirectly with these words: As President, I have tried ceaselessly to uphold the dignity of the General Assembly. I appeal to the delegates to adhere to the rules of decorum. I w i l l not allow the rostrum to be used i n making irrelevant, unwarranted, gratuitous or personal attacks, and declare that such statements, i f made, w i l l be expunged from the record. 82 A British diplomat believed that the Soviets lost support from p o l i t i c a l sympathizers i n the United Ma"tions because of their bad manners. For example, Very often, when a debate seems to be going badly for the West, Western delegations w i l l observe with relief that the Soviet delegate i s about to speak. They know that he can almost always be relied upon to alienate many voters by excessive vehemence and to bore others by excessive length.^ Thus, there appears to be a wide consensus among Westerners that negotiating with the Soviete means negotiating with o f f i c i a l s who w i l l be either  deliberately or unconsciously bad mannered as well as insulting.  This  characteristic of Soviet behavior has been very common, particularly since World War Two. However, since Khrushchev introduced the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, the Russians have sought better relations with the West. Today, the entente that exists between the Russians and the West helps to make Soviet diplomats relatively polite, and personable.  Never-  theless, occasionally the Soviets lapse into rudeness but their arrogance, Si|  cold war characteristic of Russian diplomats, has disappeared.  CHAPTER. I l l WESTERN CONCEPTS OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR, Western diplomats see themselves as quite different from Soviet o f f i c i a l s i n their attitudes toward negotiations and generally i n their methods of negotiating.  In fact, Western diplomats are inclined to view  negotiations i n terms of black and white and to consider their own behavi o r to be just the opposite of that of the Russians,  According to West-  erners, as the Soviets exude insults, Westerners are courteous;  while the  Soviet diplomat i s recalcitrant the Western negotiator i s cooperative; while the Soviet negotiator i s hostile, the Western diplomat i s f u l l of goodwill or at least the desire to compromise.  This chapter contrasts Western views  of their own diplomatic practices with their view of Soviet diplomatic behavior.  Both Western methods and attitudes are discussed.  Western Methods of Negotiating. There are significant operational differences which clearly distinguish Russian and Western methods of negotiating.  According to Philip Mosely,  there are six methods which are employed by Western diplomats.  First,  i n contrast to Soviet negotiators, Mosely says that Western diplomats always negotiate within the terms of an agreement i n principle.  That i s to say,  any argument i s carried on within the framework of the terms agreed to, or else the Western negotiator w i l l reopen agreements i n principle and renegotiate them.  1  His arguments w i l l never wander and be unrelated to the  points under discussion. Second, the Western negotiator i s pluralistic in his approach to a solution.  Consequently, unlike the Soviet negotiator,  the Western negotiator usually expects a series of minor shifts i n his own and others' positions.  2  Third, the Western negotiator, again unlike his  Soviet counterpart, can comment at once on new proposals or statements from the opposing negotiator. The knowledge of his government's over-all policies as well as the lack of restrictive instructions almost makes the Western diplomat a free agent.^ Fourth, the governments of Western negotiators encourage them to use discretion.  The use of discretion by Western  negotiators may facilitate the ultimate attainment of a workable compromise by giving their opposing negotiator some indication of the hard and soft spots i n Western proposals.  Unlike Soviet diplomats, Western diplomats  "have substantial latitude to work out agreed positions and drafts, at least on secondary and procedural matters. quickly by Western negotiators.  Minor differences can be resolved  Fifth, again in contrast to the Soviet  diplomat, Western negotiators present and advocate policies within their own governments. Moreover, Western diplomats may refer back to their governments with recommendations and  suggestions.  Soviet negotiators are baffled and cannot understand that their Western colleagues have both the opportunity and the responsibility for presenting and even advocating policies within their own government operations, and that withiij a broad pattern, they have considerable leeway i n finding the most effective and usually informed methods of influencing their opposite numbers i n foreign ministries or embassies.5 The sixth and final Western method of negotiating described by Mosely i s that the Western negotiator works in an environment where there i s intergovernmental and interpersonal trust between secondary members of government negotiating staffs. these staffs.  Also,there are continuous negotiations between  These "working party negotiations", to use the British term,  are essentially informal negotiations held to eliminate secondary points of friction between governments which use the working party method.  Functionally, staff officers from opposite governments consult each other and indicate what they plan to suggest to their superiors.  The working  party technique originated with the British who f i r s t used i t to solve interdepartmental problems and later applied i t to international negotiations.  Mosely implies that the Soviets have not even thought about such  a method.^ The advantages that Soviet negotiators have over Western o f f i c i a l s , Westerners believe, are the absence of public opinion- scrutiny, tivji deadlines, hurried conferences and pressures for a quick solution. The business oriented thinking of Western negotiators, that i s , negotiate pragmatically, to the point, compromise and reach a contractual agreement, makes the Western negotiator want to achieve agreement quickly. dislike delays.  Western negotiators  They are actually aware of public criticism i f they seem  to f a i l to achieve some success, particularly i n favour of the West. Russians, unlike the Western diplomats, are i n no hurry  "The  at conferences  because they have no deadlines to meet. They are prepared to go on meetingafter meeting producing proposals that the West has repeatedly declared to be unacceptable."?  Western Attitudes Toward Negotiations. The differences i n the behavior of the Western negotiator and his Soviet counterpart can be largely attributed to different attitudes toward negotiations.  Having dealt i n Chapters One and Two with Western concepts  of Soviet attitudes, this section discusses Western self-conceptions. According to Westerners, the Western diplomat approaches negotiations with five attitudes:  a spirit of cooperation, a propensity to compromise, a  desire for fairness, having good faith or sincerity, expressing good will and genuinely seeking peace.  Once again British and American views of their  approach to negotiations are the same (although the British and Americans see themselves as having different manners—both see the British as suave while they both see Americans as hearty.) Frederick Osborne, American negotiator on atomic energy with the Soviet Union, said that i n contrast to the Soviets: jWestern negotiators] were sincere, stuck to the issues, did not attack anyone's motives,. . .accepted compromise, and took responsibility for decisions within the considerable latitude allowed them by their governments. Westerners believe that a complete antithesis exists between the attitudes of the Soviet and Western negotiator. The concept of fairness i s present i n Western attitudes toward opposite negotiators,  Stephen Kertesz believes that one of the conse-  quences of the heritage of the American Constitution and the philosophy of the individual behind i t i s that i t makes American negotiators disposed to argue i n the spirit of fairness. The principle of humanitarian liberalism permeates American education and p o l i t i c a l thinking, says Kertesz, resulting i n the principles of justice and objective truth which American negotiators are apt to cling to even i f i t means disregarding the actual power-political situation.^  Senator Vandenberg believed that "scrupulous fair-play and a  super-generous attitude" toward Russia's legitimate needs would produce working agreements with the Soviet Union.  10  Another Western belief i s that negotiations should be carried out i n good faith or sincerity, or honesty ( a l l three terms are used by Westerners.) Westerners firmly believe that when they negotiate, when they  present proposals, they are doing so i n absolute good faith.  British journ-  a l i s t Edaard Crankshaw writes that, " i n the West, because of our puritannical background, we find i t :lh^&?t©'-\<ifee^ftve others until we have deceived our!  selves f i r s t . "  During war-time negotiations between Western and Soviet  1 1  negotiators, this belief i n good faith seems to have dominated Western thinking, particularly Americans.  "American negotiators approached the  Soviet leaders with unwarranted good faith and fairness.  Since they wanted  to produce prompt results i n the form of mutual agreements, they were too impatient to l i s t e n to the sobering comments of experienced advisors."12 When the Soviets violated the'Yalta and Potsdam treaties, Westerners concluded that the Russians had exploited their honesty. "At Yalta, Churchill 13 and Roosevelt made an honest and honourable attempt to deal with Russia." Time and time again "we negotiated i n good faith at Yalta only to be deceived 14 by the Soviets."  Even during war-time when relations ought to have been  closest between Russia and the West "negotiating with the Soviet government was extremely d i f f i c u l t and frustrating. 5 m1  Observing Soviet negotiators,  Westerners have come to the conclusion that the Russians have;no interest i n or compunctions about good faith. Another Western belief i s that Western o f f i c i a l s have good will rather than hostility i n their minds.  But because of the cold war,talk about  good w i l l was not heard frequently , although Eisenhower at the 1955 Summit meeting displayed this Western belief.  The most frequent reference to  Western good w i l l revolves around wartime negotiations with the Soviet Union.  Many Westerners, particularly Americans, write that they went to  Russia f u l l of goodwill and a desire to get to know and understand the  60  Russians.  A common wartime belief i n the West was that the reason for Soviet-  Western d i f f i c u l t i e s was the lack of knowing each other.  Moreover, West-  erners apparently had a naive belief i n the power of personal good w i l l . When i n Russia as American Ambassador, Admiral Standley wrote: Jl remember] when I was preparing for my mission to Moscow, . . .how I planned a new and more personalized diplomacy. I would meet the Russian.5officials. man-to-man, get to know them, their likes and dislikes, their hobbies and avocations, and thus establish a sound basis for firm personal friendship. I was beginning to realize how naive I had been. . . .1 soon discovered that an Ambassador of a powerful state could not approach the master (or masters) of the Kremlin i n a spirit of Christian humility with hat i n hand, as i f humbly seeking favours. If you did, you generally came away with only a small piece of the t a i l of your diplomatic shirt. 16 John Gunther states that Roosevelt was moved by eonsiderations of chivalry and gentlemanliness when he negotiated with the Soviets. ? 1  Cordell Hull  believed that threats would never settle anything with Russia.  He maintained  strongly that only friendly methods would win Russian friendship, Hull's belief was put i n the form of a State Department directive. As I l e f t office the policy I advocated toward Russia [was for us to] continue i n constant, friendly discussion with the Russians. Consult them at every point. \IgnoreJ "cussin matches" with them. Explain to them, again and again i f necessary, the principles upon which we f e l t peacef u l international relations would prosper.18 Interestingly, the Western idea of goodwill implies that Western negotiators are not necessarily guided by the ubiquitous quid pro quo thinking of the Soviet negotiator, As Philip Mosely says: Goodwill to the Western negotiator i s both a lubricant of the negotiating process and a valuable intangible by-product. The Western negotiator does not necessarily look for one immediate quid pro quo for each minor concession. 19  Westerners also consider that the Soviets may believe that i t i s possible for their opponents to have "subjective good w i l l " but that "objective conditions," that i s , inherent conflict i n capitalist development, cannot be n u l l i f i e d by individual acts of friendship.  20  In Western thinking, the propensity to compromise i s a permanent attitude of Western negotiators. view compromise the same way.  Both British and American negotiators  Compromise i s considered to be sensible,  f a i r , rational, and the best way to reach an agreement between two differing points of view.  21  "Compromise for the sake of getting on with the job  i s natural to American and British people,  but i t i s alien to the Communist  way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist party has striven to inculcate in i t s members^ t i a l for a peaceful society. 3 2  22  John Foster Dulles called compromise essenThe Economist, conceiving of compromise as  the most rea%ona8?Ie/>method of negotiation, says: British negotiators i n particular like to offer a compromise straight away belieiving that the other side feels a moral obligation to do likewise. Normally this i s an admirable approach. But reasonableness from the start means that there i s scarcely any room for subsequent retreat. 2.k In a study of disarmament negotiating behavior, Lloyd Jensen states that "the United States has been the more likely to reward compromising behavior either by accepting the compromise  i n toto or by offering to bridge the gap further  with a concession of i t s own on the particular issue at stake." 5 2  Westerners  view compromise as a necessary condition for agreement, stability, and progress.  In an address to the American Congress after returning from the  Crimean Conference, Roosevelt summed up the Western attitude on the role of compromise i n negotiations:  62 D e c i s i o n s w i l l o f t e n be a r e s u l t o f g i v e and take compromise. The U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l n o t always have i t s way one hundred p e r cent n o r w i l l t h e S o v i e t Union o r the U n i t e d Kingdom.26 Thus, Westerners have viewed compromise as t h e b e s t method t o f a c i l i t a t e agreement e i t h e r i n domestic The attitude.  or international negotiations.  s t r e s s l a i d upon c o o p e r a t i o n i B another Western n e g o t i a t i n g G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , b e f o r e the c o l d war Western n e g o t i a t o r s  emphasized t h e need f o r c o o p e r a t i o n . w i l l i n g n e s s to cooperate, would c o o p e r a t e  too.  d e s i r i n g t o cooperate  They b e l i e v e d t h a t i f t h e y showed  o t h e r n a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the S o v i e t Union  Indeed, t h e r e appears t o be no l a c k o f Westerners t o end East-West t e n s i o n s .  D u r i n g the Second World  War, the emphasis on c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h R u s s i a was s t r o n g e s t . t o a s t s a t Y a l t a , f o r example, Roosevelt always observed  I n t h e many  t h a t the atmosphere  o f t h e c o n f e r e n c e , b o t h b u s i n e s s and s o c i a l , was t h a t o f a f a m i l y .  " I t was  i n t h i s way t h a t R o o s e v e l t c h a r a c t e r i z e d the r e l a t i o n s among t h e t h r e e 27 countries." to  Moreover, C o r d e l l H u l l i n s i s t e d c o n t i n u a l l y t o Roosevelt and  h i s a s s o c i a t e s i n t h e S t a t e Department t h a t no c o u n t r y c o u l d have  f r i e n d l y t i e s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union u n l e s s i t c o n s u l t e d i t on any p o i n t o r d e c i s i o n t h a t was even r e m o t e l y o f i n t e r e s t t o t h e R u s s i a n s . ^ t h i s a t t i t u d e , which R o o s e v e l t p r a c t i c e d (except f o r the atomic  But even bomb}, d i d  not prevent t h e S o v i e t Union" from o c c a s i o n a l l y t a k i n g a s t e p u n i l a t e r a l l y such a s i t d i d when i t suddenly  e s t a b l i s h e d d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h the  I t a l i a n government on March 3» 1 9 ^ .  A c c o r d i n g t o Westerners, t h e near  i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r r i v i n g a t an agreement d u r i n g t h e peace t r e a t y negot i a t i o n s o f t h e e a r l y p o s t war y e a r s , corroded Western good w i l l and c o operation.  63  It i s l i t t l e short of tragedy that Russia should have withdrawn that deposit [of American goodwill] with the recklessness and the lack of appreciation shown during 0-9^+5—^Sj,' Our assumption that we could cooperate and our patience i n trying to cooperate justify the firmness we must now show. ^ 2  The theme of cooperation i n international affairs s t i l l runs through Western thinking  today.  There i s firm belief i n the West that i f only the  Soviet Union would be cooperative as the West i t s e l f wants to be, then the cold war would end.  Presidents' Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson have con-  tinually stressed that they seek peace through cooperation.  In an address  to the United Nations General Assembly on September 2 2 , 1 9 6 1 , Kennedy summed up Western diplomatic attitudes when he said that the West i s '.'trying to build the kind of world described i n articles 1 and 2 of the [United Nations) Charter."  In that same speech Kennedy claimed that the West had  tried to make "the atom an instrument of peaceful growth rather than of war" but that Western concessions and patience had been met by obstruction and intransigence.  He also claimed that while the West was "negotiating i n  good faith at Geneva, others were secretly preparing experiments in destruction. " 3 0  These attitudes i n Western thinking mean that u n t i l the  Soviet Union becomes cooperative by Western standards, the Soviet Union will be regarded by Westerners as the guilty culprit i n disputes.  Indeed, con-  ceptions of Western methods of negotiating and of the attitudes taken toward opposite negotiator's make Westerners feel that they are the antithesis of Soviet negotiators. Having observed the characteristics of Soviet diplomats, Western observers conclude that the Soviets must regard Western negotiating characteristics  as negative qualities.  As Winston Churchill expressed i t :  The Russians have no understanding of such words as "honesty", "honour" "trust" and "truth"-in fact they regard these as negative virtues. 31 A comparison of Western negotiating behavior and diplomatic attitudes with Western conceptions of Soviet negotiating behavior and diplomatic attitudes, clearly shows a marked contrast.  In fact, they are just the opposite.  These black and white conceptions clearly indicate how blameless most Westerners believe they are with regard to:-East-West differences.  So far  Westerners have ignored the crucial point about how their own diplomatic behavior i s viewed by the Russians. Once such  a study i s made i t will  probably demonstrate to Westerners how shallow some of their attitudes may be.  CHAPTER IV SOVIET PROPAGANDA TACTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS Soviet Diplomats Utilize a Systematic Pattern of Negotiating Tactics* There seems to be a wide consensus among British, American and Canadian statesmen and scholars, concerned with negotiations between the West and the Soviet Union, that Soviet negotiating behavior w i l l be consistent, systematic and well-planned.  According to Robert P. Browder,  "Soviet moves are so carefully planned that Moscow finds i t d i f f i c u l t to understand that other nations do not calculate every step with equal precision."  In his study of Soviet-American diplomacy, Browder implies  1  that the United States failed to make f u l l use of i t s opportunity to study i t s encounter with Soviet diplomats, even though as early as the f i r s t £wo years after the American recognition of the Soviet Union certain Soviet negotiating tactics appeared. In that period (1933-35) America had the opportunity to study at f i r s t hand the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Clearly revealed was Moscow's propensity for the clouding of central issues by resort to long and tedious arguments on peripheral points of misunderstanding. Evident likewise was the necessi t y of securing a simultaneous sine qua non for every concession to Russia. Promises for the. future brought only frustration and tension. . . .If they [the methods of Soviet diplomacy] were ever learned they were forgotten in 19^1 and onwards. ^ 2  Similarly, a British viewpoint asserts:  "What chance was there of an  honourable understanding with a Power whose bargaining instruments included not only the re.Cognized diplomatic devices but the whole armoury of propaganda, pettifogging, browbeating, abuse and lying?"3  It seems that John  Foster Dulles never had any illusions about negotiating with the Soviet Union*  For Dulles, negotiations with the Soviets were always long and  difficult.  4  In his many negotiations with the Soviets, particularly as  American Secretary of State, Dulles said a number of times that the Soviets have always used certain tactics i n negotiations.  For example,  Dulles stated that "you don't get agreements negotiated with the Russians which are fair and equal without a l o t of hard work and a lot of preliminary sparring, and I think things conform pretty much to pattern."5 Moreover, i n one particular instance, i t seems that the Soviets themselves implied that they used negotiating tactics to obtain certain ends. According to George Marshall, American Secretary of State from 19^7 to 19^9,  Stalin told him that the early and frustratingly d i f f i c u l t meetings  of the Council of Foreign Ministers Conference i n Moscow i n the spring of 19^7 "were only the f i r s t skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance "6 forces. A perusal of Western concepts of Soviet bargaining tactics suggest that four major types of Soviet tactics exist.  For purposes of analysis  these tactics are categorized into tactics for propaganda, tactics for purposes of obstruction, offensive tactics for the attainment of Soviet policies, and the tactics of duplicity.  Soviet tactics of obstruction,  offence and. duplicity are l e f t to later chapters while this chapter discusses the f i r s t type of Soviet tactics used i n negotiations—propaganda. Soviet Negotiating Tactics for Propaganda Purposes. In the twentieth century propaganda has become a major instrument  of national policy.  A l l nations use propaganda, some merely to explain  their national purpose, others to persuade peoples and nations to support their policies.  Some nations are more experienced and more expert at  making propaganda than are others.  In the f i e l d of diplomacy, the use of  propaganda i s now more important than ever before, particularly with so much emphasis on public conferences.  George V. Allen, former American  Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, aptly summariaed the role that propaganda occupies today when he said that "propaganda has become a conscious weapon of diplomacy."?  Propaganda i s a morally neutral device  despite i t s pejorative connotations. Regardless of i t s goals, propaganda i s a method which essentially attempts to persuade people or to manipulate them. In these attempts at persuasion, propaganda appeals to the emotions i n the form of patriotism, sentiment, and prejudice. Westerners consider the Soviet Union to be more expert at u t i l i zing propaganda than the West because the whole movement of Communism i n Russia had to depend i n large part for i t s success on propaganda. Moreover, many years before the democratic Western nations had any government departments concerned wholly with propaganda, the Soviet Union had a government department called Agitation and Propaganda.  In the United  States a framework to administer propaganda was established i n 19^8, but i t was not until 1953 that the United States Information Agency was created.  Westerner's tend to believe that Soviet diplomats u t i l i z e pro-  paganda techniques far more effectively than their own diplomats. A British viewpoint i s that "elements of pure propaganda or tactics are unquestionably present i n a l l that the Soviet rulers -say, jalthough^ sometimes g genuine elements are included." T  A firmly held Western view i s that the Soviets may want to use a series of negotiations not to settle a problem or to find common ground i n order to reduce tensions, but only to win propaganda victories.  Indeed, Westerners  are always in the position of not knowing the real intent of Soviet negotiators until negotiations with Russia are well under way.  Many Westerners  are convinced that agreeing to hold conferences with the Soviet Union merely gives i t an opportunity for further propaganda.efforts without creating any basis for agreement. Kenneth W. Thompson believes that the Soviet Union has used public forums such as the Geneva conferences and the United Nations "more for propaganda than for resolution of differences."^ Adlai Stevenson indicates that Khrushchev favoured bringing cold war problems before the United Nations Assembly rather than the Security Council because the Assembly offered a better forum to s t i r up opinion against the West. For example, on a trip to Russia i n the summer of 1959» Stevenson spoke to Khrushchev about the Middle East c r i s i s .  At f i r s t , Khrushchev,  rather than wanting private talks with other nations, preferred taking the c r i t i c a l Middle East situation before the Security Council.  Later i n the  informal discussions with Stevenson, Khrushchev changed his mind and said that the Security Council would,not be the best place to discuss the Middle East c r i s i s .  Khrushchev stated, as the reason for his change of  mind, that he would "not s i t down at the same table with the p o l i t i c a l corpse, Chaing Kai-shek. . . .But i t was apparent that the General Assembly looked to him like a better forum for a Soviet effort to mobi l i z e opinion against Britain and America."  10  It i s strongly believed  in the West that the Soviet Union utilizes the f a c i l i t i e s of the United  Nations more for propaganda than for attempts at solutions to world problems. For example, an American diplomat stated that the "Soviets are using the United Nations as a sounding board to increase world tensions."' Similar Soviet efforts at exploiting conferences or committees for propaganda have been observed by Westerners i n various positions. According to General Clay, American military Commander on the Allied Cont r o l Council for Germany,"meetings of the Council were used with increasing frequency by Soviet representatives to launch vicious and unfounded attacks on the Western representatives for propaganda purposes."  1,  American atomic energy negotiator Frederick Osborne stated that Western delegates to conferences on atomic energy "were forced to the conclusion that the Soviet delegates were more interested i n propaganda than i n negotiations, and that their propaganda was directed almost entirely at the emotions of the people on their side, rather than to the i n t e l l i gence of their audience.""^  As far as disarmament negotiations are  concerned, suffice i t to mention at this point that "propaganda has been an integral feature of much of the disarmament negotiations since 19A6."  1 4  Moreover, there i s a great deal of skepticism i n the West about  the value of summit meetings.  Because of the consistency with which  the Russians have exploited public forums for propaganda, there i s much cynicism i n the West about holding summit meetings.  Summit meetings  never seem to achieve anything concrete i n Western eyes but always seem to benefit the Soviets, through s k i l l f u l use of propaganda.  For example,  before becoming Secretary of State, Dean Rusk stated a common American viewpoint:  $Such experiences we have had with summit diplomacy does not  encourage the view t h a t i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o the advancement o f American 15 interests.*  Furthermore, Westerners b e l i e v e t h a t sometimes S o v i e t  1  d i p l o m a t s e n t e r i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h no i n s t r u c t i o n s at a l l except t o disseminate  propaganda.  " I n some n e g o t i a t i o n s t h i s has become c l e a r but  o n l y a f t e r d e l i v e r y by the S o v i e t s o f numerous charges and  accusations.  Sometimes a l l the S o v i e t n e g o t i a t o r s must do i s r e p o r t b a c k . " ^  Although  x  Westerners admit t h a t a l l n a t i o n s use propaganda, they c l a i m t h a t S o v i e t Union i s one techniques  o f the most expert  the  n a t i o n s a t u t i l i z i n g propaganda  p a r t i c u l a r l y i n negotiations.  There a r e a number o f S o v i e t t a c t i c s employed i n n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the purpose o f propaganda.Spf eif£e.allyythere appear t o be t e n d i s c e r n i b l e S o v i e t propaganda t a c t i c s .  These a r e :  (2) s e l e c t e d audience a p p e a l s ,  (1) the use o f s l o g a n s  (3) a p r e f e r e n c e  and  f o r general r a t h e r than  s p e c i f i c language, (4) r e p e t i t i o n o f statements, (5) attempts t o r e c o g n i t i o n of a p r i n c i p l e ,  v i o l a t i o n of diplomatic confidence,  The use  slogans  (8) d e l i b e r a t e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and  (10)  attempts t o blame  o b t a i n support  (9)  others  f i r s t o f t h e s e propaganda t a c t i c s i s the S o v i e t p r o p e n s i t y and  (7)  failures.  e p i t h e t s i n conferences.  S o v i e t propaganda d e v i c e s . and  been " g e n e r a l and  win  S l o g a n s and  to  e p i t h e t s are common  A s l o g a n i s a s h o r t , e x p l i c i t phrase used t o  friends.  S i n c e 1959  complete disarmament."  a prominent S o v i e t s l o g a n  A well-worn s l o g a n i s "the  S o v i e t Union s u p p o r t s a l l p e o p l e s i n t h e i r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t oppression."  secure  (6) attempts t o d i s c r e d i t the o p p o s i t i o n ,  attempts t o d i v i d e the o p p o s i t i o n ,  f o r conference  epithets,  . E p i t h e t i s a n o t h e r s h o r t , v i v i d phrase u s e d t o  foreign identify  has  countries but i n a negative sense.  To describe Westerners the Soviets use  such epithets as "decadent bourgeoisie," and "reactionaries". One purpose of epithets i s to divert criticism from the Soviet Union and to blame others for world tensions. According to Westerners, Soviet diplomatic speeches usually contain slogans and epithets. The use of these propaganda devices has made the vocabulary of Communist diplomats rather unique.17  Norman D. Palmer and  Howard C. Perkins state that Soviet vocabulary contains "purr" and "poison" words.  18  The "purr" words appear to be slogans such as "toiling masses,"  "peaceful coexistence," whereas the "poison" words appear to be epithets such as "warmongers," "Western colonialists," and "U.S.aggressors." When any Soviet diplomat makes a speech set i n "classic" or "poison and purr" form, the speech indicates to Westerners that the Soviets are using a conference for propaganda. ^ 1  Because of the present entente between East and  West, Soviet diplomatic speeches are not as crude as they once were but slogans and epithets are s t i l l included.  Epithets such as "capitalist  hyenas" and "jackals" have given way to more sophisticated terms such as "counterrevolutionary forces." Although today Soviet speeches are more restrained than ever before, i f cold war conditions return then more v i t r i o l i c Soviet speeches can be expected. The second Soviet tactic includes propaganda appeals to certain nations.  In Soviet speeches at conferences sometimes selected appeals to  particular countries are made even i f those countries are not present. According to Westerners, rather than referring to points under discussion many Soviet speeches are directed to those countries with p o l i t i c a l problems which the Soviet Union feels i t can somehow exploit to i t s own  72 advantage. This particular Soviet tactic was one of the major causes for the interminable failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to conclude a German Peace Treaty and, for a long time, an Austrian peace treaty. One reason for the relative success of this Soviet tactic i n the early meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers was that the United States policy on Germany was not solidified.  For example, exploiting American  confusion over policy regarding Germany's future, Molotov:,; i n an attempt to win German support, publicly denounced i n 19^6 any suggestion that Germany should be transformed into a predominantly agrarian state. James Byrnes, having had no forewarning from the Soviets that they had decided to reject completely the agrarian state concept of post-war Germany, was caught off balance and a l l he could do was to condemn Molotov's statement. But Byrnes negative approach hurt American prestige i n Germany.  20  John Foster Dulles, attending the peace treaty negotiations as the Republican Party's Foreign policy advisor, commented after attending the 19^7 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, that: Mr. Molotov would make a long speech of which one part was calculated to please the Poles, another part to please the Germans, a third to please the French, a fourth to please his own public opinion, and s t i l l another to promote world communism. Many of those parts were utterly inconsistent. Mr. Molotov would, for example, demand for Russia vast reparation payments from Germany and go on to promise the Germans greatly improved economic conditions. He would promise the Poles large amounts of German t e r r i tory. He would say the French should have more coal from the Ruhr and he would attack the United States, United Kingdom and France as imperialist nations. 21  Later, i n that year (19^7) another foreign ministers;': conference was held i n London and Molotov employed the same Soviet tactic of selected propaganda appeals.  George Marshall, American Secretary of State, stated  t h a t the London meeting was  s e i z e d upon l a r g e l y by the S o v i e t a u t h o r i t i e s  as an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r wide d i s t r i b u t i o n of i t s propaganda, p a r t i c u l a r l y  22 i n Germany and the s a t e l l i t e s t a t e s .  At t h i s London c o n f e r e n c e ,  Molotov  p r e s s e d f o r an immediate German Peace T r e a t y b e f o r e the i s s u e o f the o f government f o r Germany was  settled.  type  The West r e f u s e d even to c o n s i d e r  t h i s S o v i e t p r o p o s a l u n t i l the problems r e g a r d i n g the post-war German government were s e t t l e d . ing  D i s c u s s i n g the London conference  c o l l a p s e , M a r s h a l l t o l d James F o r r e s t a l ,  as i t was  near-  American S e c r e t a r y o f Defence,  about the s e l e c t e d a p p e a l t a c t i c s of the S o v i e t s . The Russians conducted t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h an eye toward German o p i n i o n . Molotov used e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o endeavor t o g i v e t h e Germans the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t they, the R u s s i a n s , were anxious t o see a u n i f i e d o r autonomous Germany but t h a t i n t h i s e f f o r t , t h e y were b e i n g b l o c k e d by the B r i t i s h , F r e n c h and Americans. 23 As the 19^7  London f o r e i g n ministers;!, c o n f e r e n c e  went i n t o i t s t h i r d week,  Molotov i n c r e a s e d h i s propaganda a p p e a l t o the Germans.  He urged  that  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the German People's Congress, which had been e s t a b l i s h e d i n B e r l i n under the a u s p i c e s o f the S o v i e t c o n t r o l l e d  Socialist  U n i t y P a r t y , be i n v i t e d t o p r e s e n t i t s views t o the C o u n c i l .  When the  West r e j e c t e d h i s s u g g e s t i o n o u t r i g h t , Molotov became t r u c u l e n t and accused  the Western powers, p a r t i c u l a r l y the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o f  "violating  the Potsdam agreement on r e p a r a t i o n s , o f s u p p o r t i n g i n d u s t r i a l monopolies i n West Germany, o f t a k i n g hidden  r e p a r a t i o n s and i n d u s t r i a l  privileges,  o f making huge p r o f i t s from the s a l e o f German c o a l and t i m b e r . t r y i n g t o use Western Germany as a s t r a t e g i c At v a r i o u s c o n f e r e n c e s  . .of  base f o r a g g r e s s i v e a i m s . "  2 4  over the y e a r s t h i s S o v i e t t a c t i c o f s e l e c t e d p r o -  paganda a p p e a l has been v e r y e v i d e n t .  Perhaps i t has been most e v i d e n t  at the United Nations where resolutions are adopted by majority vote and where diplomats are often tempted to negotiate for votes rather than for 25  a settlement of problems. The third Soviet propaganda tactic i n negotiations i s the use of general terms without reference to specific matters.  According to James  J . Wadsworth, Soviet slogans such as "general and complete disarmament. . allow them to pose as champions of disarmament but do not commit them to any specific type of verification and control."  In effect, says Wads-  worth, the Soviets have no real plan for disarmament. "They are eager, for general announcements but silent on practical details."26  The Soviet  preference for broad rather than specific negotiations seems to be aimed at winning support from the so-called uncommitted states which support broad proposals for a reduction of cold war tensions.  Some Western  scholars believe that American insistence upon the resolution of specific matters i s exploited by the Soviets i n order to make the United States appear negative and stubborn. ? 2  Sometimes the United States i s blamed for  the cold war because i t insists upon the settlement of specific issues first.  Interestingly, twenty years ago there would have been l i t t l e  Western haggling over general principles contained i n any agreement with the Soviets.  But Western post-war experience with Soviet indifference  toward principles in agreements has shown the West -that any workable agree ment with the Russians must be based solely on practical issues. Now, the West insists on basing any agreement with the Russians on tangible matters. According to Westerners another Soviet negotiating tactic i s the use of repetitive arguments and criticisms.  These repetitive arguments,  employed by Soviet diplomats, apparently serve a twofold purpose:  obstruct-  ion (see Chapter Five) and propaganda. The propaganda tactic of repetition has been used frequently by the Soviets.  Presumably Soviet diplomats  are repetitive partly because they believe that when a statement i s repeated continually i t may eventually be accepted as a fact.  For example,  at the 1 9 ^ 7 London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Molotov continually repeated that the Western powers had made huge profits from the sale of the Ruhr coal. Over Bevin's objections and indignation, Molotov also continued to accuse the West of acquiring valuable plants in Germany. Furthermore, " i t was i n this c h i l l y and tense atmosphere that Molotov plunged into reading a long prepared statement which was practically a duplicate of the one made to the Allied Control Council by Sokolovsky.  It levelled almost every inconceivable charge against the  administrative policies of the Western Powers i n Germany."28  i  na  s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of the meetings on atomic energy i n the latter half of the 1940's, Fredrick Osborne, American representative, said that: The Soviet delegate talked four times as long as any other delegate. The Soviet delegate, and only the Soviet delegate, constantly attacked the motives of the other delegates. . . . When the Soviet delegate was chairman, he interfered with the discussion far more than did any other chairman, and when he took part in the argument, did not r.dissociate his role as chairman from his role as delegate.29 According to Osborne, throughout the years of atomic energy negotiations, the Soviet delegates repeated over and over again a few simple statements. These statements were: "The United States refuses to agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon;" "the other nations have been coerced into accepting the United States plan;"  "the Soviet Union has agreed  to accept international control and inspection."-^ At the Berlin conferences of Foreign Ministers, held between June 1953 and February 195^* the Soviet tactic of repetitive statements appeared again.  According to Anthony Eden:  In a l l , we discussed the German problem at thirteen meetings of the Berlin Conference. Much of our time was spent l i s t ening to lengthy and identical repetition of the Soviet case. Mr. Molotov never allowed our treatment of this part of the agenda to. proceed from declamation to negotiation. It was apparent that he was determined to use the conference as a platform from which he could launch attacks on the European Defence Community and N.A.T.O. 31 The Soviet tactic of repeating slogans has also been very evident during the disarmament talks of the 1950's and early 1960's.  An American scholar  has studied the disarmament meetings and has concluded that the Soviet phrase ^general and complete disarmament" has been repeated interminably by the Soviets and has been coupled with general indifference to any practical implementation of such disarmament.32 Frederick Eaton, the American delegate at one series of disarmament meetings i n i960 "complained at the fourth session that i n gust three days, these noble words jgeneral and complete disarmament] had been mouthed one hundred and thirty-five 33 times i n a lesser number of minutes." Of the ten discernible Soviet negotiating tactics which are used for propaganda purposes, three of them are mentioned i n Joseph L.Nogee's study of disarmament negotiations.  These three tactics,which comprise  five, six and seven of this study, concern attempts to get recognition for a Soviet point, to discredit and to divide the opposition.  The Soviet  Union's attempt to maneuver the Western powers into public recognition of the necessity and legitimacy of i t s principal position was the f i r s t of  t h e t h r e e t a c t i c s which Nogee o b s e r v e d .  F o r example, t h e S o v i e t U n i o n  wanted t h e West t o endorse " g e n e r a l and complete disarmament."  But  f e a r i n g an endorsement would weaken i t s own p o s i t i o n on adequate disarmament c o n t r o l s , t h e West d i d n o t respond t o S o v i e t o v e r t u r e s .  I n an attempt  to force recognition o f the Soviet p r i n c i p l e ,  Z o r i n asked  Soviet delegate  f o r Western comments and amendments t o t h e ' S o v i e t p l a n f o r disarmament. The  West r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s i t and Z o r i n a c c u s e d t h e Western powers o f c  evading o r i g n o r i n g S o v i e t peace p r o p o s a l s . ^ according  The second S o v i e t  tactic,  t o Nogee, was t o p o r t r a y i t s own p l a n a s r e a l i s t i c and c o n c r e t e ;  and  conversely  t o expose the u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e Western  The  Soviets j u s t i f i e d t h e i r proposals  attempted t o d i s c r e d i t  proposals.  by t h e c r i t e r i o n o f r e a l i s m and  the Y/estern p l a n f o r disarmament by d e s c r i b i n g i t 35  as a p l a n f o r extensive, espionage i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n .  The t h i r d  tactic  Nogee observed was the S o v i e t attempt t o d i v i d e t h e Western powers and t o reinforce Soviet s a t e l l i t e s o l i d a r i t y . claimed  F o r propaganda purposes the S o v i e t s  t h a t the Western n a t i o n s a t t h e disarmament c o n f e r e n c e were merely  puppets o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . American s a t e l l i t e .  Z o r i n went on r e c o r d as c a l l i n g I t a l y an  Presumably the S o v i e t aim was t o make I t a l y  find  p o i n t s o f d i f f e r e n c e between i t and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s so t h a t I t a l y would s t r e s s them t o show i t s independence and thus weaken i t s t i e s w i t h t h e Americans.  C o n t i n u a l l y the Soviet delegates  sought t o f i n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  between statements o f each Western d e l e g a t i o n .  36 According  to  Westerners, /5&a^£t\i tactic employed by the S o v i e t s  i n c o n f e r e n c e s f o r propaganda purposes i s t h e d e l i b e r a t e of another delegations' p o s i t i o n .  misrepresentation  A common Western view i s t h a t t h e  78 Soviets apparently think nothing of ignoring or distorting facts. For example, when the United States proposed an Italian peace treaty, the Soviet Union condemned i t on the grounds that the economic clauses proposed by the United States were part of an effort to exploit enemy countries for the selfish gains of Americans.  James Byrnes, attending the  twenty-one nation Paris Peace Conference of 19^6, in which Molotov made his charges against the United States Italian treaty proposals, stated publicly: We do not object to the Soviet Government vigorously presenting i t s viewpoint on these issues before the conference . . . . But we do object to misrepresentation of our positions and our motives. In many conferences i n the late 1940's and early 1950's the Soviets represented the Truman policy of containment as a means to enslave Turkey m i l i t a r i l y and economically.  They represented American Korean; policy as  designed to keep Korea divided for the benefit of Wall Street.  West-  erners consider Soviet misrepresentation of their policies for propaganda purposes to be typical Soviet negotiating behavior. -  It should be kept i n mind that although this Western viewpoint  claims that the Soviets deliberately misrepresent positions for propaganda purposes, there may be occasions when the Soviets are sincere i n their belief about the implications of a Western proposal.  Of course, there i s  no way to t e l l whether or not the Soviets sincerely believe that Western insistence on arms control and inspections,, for instance, i s purely "... for reasons of spying.  It i s logical to assume that the Soviets do not  wish disarmament and that they use the spying argument as a rationalization.  But i t i s as logical to claim the reverse.  However, Westerners tend to  regard what they consider Soviet misrepresentation of their position at conferences as a propaganda tactic more than as a sincere objection. The ninth Soviet propaganda tactic employed in negotiations concerns the breaking of diplomatic confidence either to appeal to the people of countries over the heads of their governments or to embarrass a particular nation.  According to Westerners^ the violation of diplomatic  confidence for propaganda gains i s one of the most repugnant Soviet tactics.  Whether i t i s i n private meetings with the Soviets or an exchange  of confidential diplomatic notes, Western diplomats are never sure i f the Soviets w i l l keep their word not to break confidence.  One Western scholar  blames the Soviet Union's violation of diplomatic confidence as the main reason that the 1957 subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, comprised of France, the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union, collapsed i n failure. The purpose of unpublicizing negotiations i n closed sessions collapsed when the Russians started the practice which the West was obliged to follow of releasing their views and working proposals to the press. . . .The Soviet Union announced i t wished no further private sessions and proposed that negoiations exist in public in the General Assembly. The West refused.39 One of the classic examples of Soviet violation of diplomatic confidence for a propaganda victory occurred i n 19^8.  Walter Bedell Smith,American  Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was instructed by Secretary of State Marshall to send Molotov a confidential note outlining American Foreign policy.  Moreover, Marshall instructed Smith to state i n the note that  the United States considered the Soviet Union entirely to blame for the  cold war.  The note, however, said in part that the "door i s always open  for public discussion. . . .We i n the United States hope that the Soviet Union will take the advantage of our readiness and eagerness. . .for world stability."  Molotov immediately replied in a private note blaming  American imperialism, particularly i t s support of the European Recovery Programme, as the cause for the cold "war.. However, Molotov offered to 1  negotiate differences. Realizing the Soviet tactic of using conferences for propaganda purposes, Smith replied confidentially that i t was prof i t l e s s to discuss issues.  Smith ended his second note to Molotov with  a reiteration of American charges against the Soviet Union.  Breaking  diplomatic confidence, the Soviet Union made the confidential notes public claiming that the United States turned down Soviet offers to negotiate a reduction of cold war tensions.  Smith and the United States  were shocked over the public announcement of these secret notes. The United States was publicly embarrassed because i t truly had turned down a Soviet offer for a conference on East-West differences.  Secretary  Marshall came to Smith's support (the latter receiving criticism i n the United States for bungling the notes from Molotov) by stating adamantly that the United States did not intend to open bilateral talks with the Soviet Union. Marshall also said: "Our basic purpose was to re-affirm the formal position': of::.the (Soviet) government and to distinguish i t from the mass of unofficial statements."  40  He went on to maintain that i t was  fruitless to discuss general issues unless concrete issues such as Austria, Korea and the Allied Control Council i n Berlin were put on an agenda for discussion.  41  But the damage to the United States had been done. So  81 stunning was the Soviet announcement of the information contained i n the Molotov-Smith notes, that the British and French immediately sent their ambassadors to see Truman to find out whether or not "secret deals" had been made or were being sought by the United States with the Soviet Union. Truman reassured them and said that American policy towards the Soviet Union was s t i l l the same.  Molotov continued to accuse the West of  refusing to talk about peace and Marshall continued to state that the United States would negotiate but only i f something concrete could be obtained. 3 4  American prestige declined considerably at this particular  time and the Soviet Union exploited to the fullest i t s pose as the champion of world peace.  Ambassador Smith's reaction to this Soviet pro-  paganda victory i n 19^8 i s stated in his memoirs: When I heard Radio Moscow broadcasting the text of Mr.Molotov's reply alone, without any reference to the substance of my statement of the American position, I was surprised and ashamed because there had been i n the Department of State some who, when the original proposition of stating the American position frankly and confidentially was f i r s t considered, had anticipated the possibility that the Soviet Government might violate diplomatic confidence in order to seize, the opportunity to renew i t s propaganda peace offensive. My opinion had been asked, and I had replied that i n matters of this kind, the Soviet Government had always been meticulously correct, had never to my knowledge, violated diplomatic confidence, and there was therefore, no reason to think that i t would do so i n this instance. . . . The Soviet Government had achieved at best, only a temporary propaganda triumph, but i t did so by such highly unscrupulous methods that the world in general learned another lesson about the impossibility of attempting to deal with the Russians as we do v/ith other members of the world community. . . It appears valid to make the logical deduction that Western statesmen have been and are now quite guarded vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as to what they i  say i n private meetings and as to what they write in private notes.  The tenth Soviet propaganda tactic i n negotiations concerns an unmistakable Russian habit of always trying to shift blame to a Western delegation i f a conference ends i n failure.  It seems almost needless to  say that i f the West i s to blame for a conference failure, the Soviets w i l l exploit the maximum propaganda value from i t .  V/esterners believe that  i t i s an obsession with the Soviets to try to appear faultless and Westerners see them as willing to go to great lengths of distortion to do i t . For example, Lester B. Pearson, maintains that: The Communists are past masters of the technique of blaming others. . . .Their tactics to this end are worked out long before a conference opens, and their exploitation of failure by attributing i t to others continues long after the conference ends. 5 In the Geneva Conference of April to June 195^»  the Soviet tactic of blaming  others for conference failures appeared. Korea was the topic of discussion at the Geneva Conference. The United States proposed the immediate adoption of free elections for Korean unity and a new Korean Government, but the Soviet Union rejected the American plan and proposed instead that a joint North-South Korean Commission be established to work out a policy on unity, which would be followed later by elections•-<^i2&>jga&k£$• "c&s the Soviet method of taking over Eastern European countries as satellites by urging government coalitions and then weakening them for Communist take over, the West quickly rejected the Soviet Korean proposal.  Neither the  Soviet Union nor the United States would alter their Korean policy in any way.  The Americans considered i t futile to continue the conference when  no agreement was i n sight.  But the Soviet Union was willing to continue  the conference i f only for propaganda value.  When the West called a halt  to the conference claiming that there seemed no useful purpose i n continuing, the Soviets utilized their propaganda tactic of blaming the West (rather than at least sharing the blame) for the failure of the conference, i n the hope presumably that the Koreans would believe that the United States was to blame for the p o l i t i c a l division of their country.  An  American scholar states that, the Soviet side accused the West of deliberate obstruction, citing as proof the fact that they had refused to accept the Soviet proposals thereby showing that they had no desire to work for a peaceful solution of the Korean problem, nor to allow the establishment of an integral democratic Korean state. . . . ° Westerners believe that the Soviets will blame the West for any conference failure irrespective of the truth of the allegations. However, the West also employs this tactic of blaming others for the lack of an agreement. It i s likely that the Russians view the Western use of this tactic i n the same light as their use of i t i s viewed by the West. It i s apparent that many Westerners believe that negotiations with Russia serve ..  Soviet propaganda interests even i f an agreement i s  reached. . Also, i t seems that when any hope of a successful conclusion of Soviet-Western negotiations diminishes Soviet propaganda against the West increases.  Many Western diplomats and scholars firmly believe that the  Soviet Union participates in a number of conferences solely to spread propaganda.  This belief led John Foster Dulles to argue strongly that  before meeting with Soviet diplomats, the West must get prior Soviet agreement on an agenda.^ Otherwise, Dulles implies, the Soviets would  intro-  duce seemingly unlimited topics, a l l of which would be carefully presented  for their propaganda value.  However, even the narrow terms of an agenda  have not restricted Soviet delegates from frequently u t i l i z i n g propaganda tactics.  In Western minds, there a p p e a r s t o be no doubt that i n order to  negotiate with the Soviet Union the West must accept Soviet propaganda tactics as an integral feature of Soviet bargaining procedure. It should be noted that Westerners are not at a l l clear how much propaganda, i f any, they themselves seek to make out of diplomatic negotiations.  Some Westerners would argue strongly that because con-  ferences are places for agreements, the West approaches them i n no other way but to concentrate on reaching agreements.  Any propaganda value may  be incidental and rarely would proposals be presented with only propaganda value i n mind.  Other Westerners would claim that proposals and  propaganda go hand i n hand.  After a l l , i f a proposal i s a good idea and  i s rejected, the reasons for i t s rejection should be publicized. There are also Westerners who believe that the West does not u t i l i z e propaganda techniques fully.  Moreover, some of them suggest copying Soviet propa-  ganda tactics which to these Westerners obviously appear successful. Western diplomats have used a number of propaganda tactics-all similar to the Soviet tactics.  For example, Joseph Nogee, i n a scholarly  study of Soviet-American negotiating behavior in the ten nation disarmament meetings of  I960,  found that both the Western powers and the Soviet  Union used three similar propaganda tactics (supra).  Two other tactics  common to the Soviets and the West are selected audience appeals and attempts to blame the other side for conference failures.  On the other  hand, Westerners believe that they do not deliberately misrepresent a  Soviet negotiator's position while they believe the Soviets deliberately misrepresent theirs.  Also, Westerners believe that unlike the Soviets,  they generally use diplomatic language (although they admit that they have lapsed occasionally into using epithets such as "Communist enslavement .') . 1  Nor do Westerners believe that they use repetitive arguments or talk i n general rather than specific terms, or break diplomatic confidence as they claim Soviet negotiators do«  While Western self-conceptions of their  propaganda tactics i n negotiations are few and sometimes nebulous, their conceptions of Soviet propaganda tactics are clear and detailed.  Of a l l  the negotiating tactics that Westerners believe are employed by the Soviets, none seem so prominent and so frequently utilized as propaganda tactics. Many Soviet negotiating tactics today are related to propaganda mainly because of the ease with which these tactics can be used.  CHAPTER V SOVIET OBSTRUCTIONIST TACTICS According to many Westerners there are a number of Soviet negotiating tactics which can be classified as obstructionist.  Essentially  Soviet obstructionist tactics are those methods which are designed to I; c hinder or s t a l l negotiations.  British journalist Edward Tetlaw believes  that in any conference with the Soviets, Western negotiators inevitably find themselves enmeshed i n interminable negotiations which are deliber-s? ately planned by the Soviets.  American historian Thomas Bailey maintains  1  that Soviet negotiators, particularly Molotov, were and are "past masters in pursuance of their obstructionism."  According to Bailey, "delay i s a  2 secret weapon of the Soviets."  A statement made by Dean Acheson when  he was Secretary of State i s s t i l l representative of a common American viewpoint:  "Every step of the way we have met nothing but obstructionism  and hostility from the Soviet Union. that they seek to perpetuate chaos."3  The Soviet rulers have demonstrated In any past period of Soviet-  Western negotiations, Soviet delaying methods are evident to Westerners. For example, i n a study of the Berlin Blockade, Phillip W. Davison states that the Soviet Union used obstructionist tactics to oppose almost every measure designed to promote p o l i t i c a l integration or economiCrecovery in Western Germany. Davison maintains that obstruction was the principal weapon used by the Soviets to keep the Allied Control Council and the Council of Foreign Ministers from reaching a decision on Germany. Soviet policy in Germany was simply to obstruct rather than to seek agreement.  4  Former American President Truman's concept of Soviet obstruction i n  negotiations i s amply demonstrated by his comment on the unsuccessful postwar negotiations with the Soviets when he was President: Stalin's tactics i n negotiations followed the familiar pattern he employed i n the Polish Question. Months of delaying tactics by the Russians and the sharp exchanges between Washington, London and Moscow had hampered and almost destroyed the machinery set up at Yalta to reorganize the provisional Polish Government.5 Western politicians, particularly American, continually state that Soviet attempts to obstruct and delay the solution of problems between the Soviet Union and the United States are a major cause of world tension. An influential religious journal i n the United States, Catholic World, maintains that the Soviet Union deliberately obstructs Western diplomats in their efforts to achieve a successful conclusion of negotiations.^ John Foster Dulles believed that Soviet hindrance of negotiations,although disagreeable to Westerners, had to be faced whenever Western negotiators met Soviet diplomats.  Once, Dulles compared Russian obstructionism on '.•  the Austrian Treaty with the Greek myth of Sisphyus: I suspect that for the next two thousand years the story of Sisphyus w i l l be forgotten, while generation after generation i s told the tragic story of the Austrain State Treaty, and how we were repeatedly at the point of concluding i t when always some e v i l force manifested i t s e l f and pushed the Treaty back again. 8  Westerners, then, believe that obstructionist tactics have to be expected when conferences are held with Soviet diplomats. No doubt there are many reasons for Soviet obstruction in negotiations.  Although some of the reasons are known only to the Soviets,  there are a number which seem very evident to Westerners. There appear to be five Western explanations of Soviet obstructionist tactics.  First,  the Soviets exploit the Western diplomat's desire to seek some form of agreement when he negotiates.  Westerners believe that Soviet obstruction  i s frequently intended to impede negotiations i n order to frustrate the impatient Western negotiator so that he w i l l concede a point merely to proceed with negotiations.  When Soviet diplomats allow negotiations to  continue after a Western concession, the West has conceded a point of value while the Soviet Union has conceded nothing.  Second, Soviet  obstructionist tactics according to these observers are used sometimes to avoid discussing an item which may prove embarrassing to the Soviet Union. Third, Soviet stalling may indicate that Moscow has not yet decided upon a certain line of policy and until i t does, will delay negotiations.Fourth, obstruction may indicate that the Soviets do not intend to agree to anything but will s t i l l use negotiations i n an attempt to obtain concessions from the West. Fifth, Soviet hindrance may denote that no agreement i s possible at the moment because the Soviet Union wishes to consolidate i t s policies i n a particular area.  Consequently, i t does not wish to negot-  iate seriously until i t has a stronger base or until there i s l i t t l e chance of removal from i t s position.  Westerners believe that whenever  they negotiate with Soviet diplomats they w i l l encounter some form of obstruction or delaying tactics.  Negotiations very often become dragged  out, often ending i n disappointment for Western diplomats. After surveying Western views on Soviet negotiating behavior, i t appears that there are eleven Soviet negotiating tactics which can be classified as obstructionist.  First, the Russians argue over minor points  interminably. Second, they use questions of procedure and wrangle over  agendas to obstruct.  Third, they block agreement on non-controversial  items in order to have the West concede an unrelated issue.  Fourth,  they use repetitive arguments to ^wear down" Westerners. Fifth, they attempt to s t a l l negotiations so that any progress can be bargained off as a concession, or that credit can be claimed for allowing negotiations to proceed.  Sixth, they introduce new topics, amendments or unrelated  points i n order to delay.  Seventh, they argue a proposal item-by-item i n  order to exploit Western impatience.  Forming the eighth through eleventh  tactics are respectively; evasion, referral of decisions to Moscow, the walk-out and the veto. The f i r s t of these eleven Soviet obstructionist tactics i s the Soviet negotiators' emphasis on arguing minor or secondary points constantly.  Philip Mosely calls this behavior of Soviet negotiators the a l l -  or-nothing attitude.^  According to Mosely, i n January, 19^6, the Soviets  and the West argued every day for weeks over the phrase " i n the main" which referred to a settlement of the Yugoslav-Italian boundary around ethnic lines.10  By arguing over such a point the Russians were able to  prevent an agreement presumably hoping to gain further concessions from the West. General Deane, although negotiating allied military assistance for the Soviet Union during World War Two, also encountered this Soviet tendency to argue interminably over minor points.  For example, at one  particular meeting with the Soviets, Deane was negotiating for a communication systems between the United States and the Soviet Union.  He  drew up a draft agreement which could have been used as a basis for discussion at future meetings.  90 I thought I was being d e l p f u l , but I eould see that Fortushenko accepted my o f f e r with some reluctance. I would have done much better had I l e t Fortushenko draw up the draft agreement and then negotiated those points with which I was i n disagreement. I say t h i s because Fortushenko took exception to almost every word i n my draft, and i t required weekly meetings from A p r i l I I to June 16 to adjust our differences. The agreement was not signed u n t i l June 1 6 , 1 9 ^ , just one week before the c i r c u i t started operating.H S i m i l a r l y , at the B e r l i n Conference of 1953. Anthony Eden ran i n t o Russian intransigence over a minor issue.  The building i n which the Foreign  ministers were to hold t h e i r conference proved to be an arguing point f o r the Soviets. According to Eden, A tiresome argument with the Russians about which building to use provided a discouraging prelude f o r our conference. It i s usually prudent to be c o n c i l i a t o r y on matters of secondary importance, though i n dealing with the Russians these can add up to quite a b i l l . We gave way t o the extent of meeting a l t e r n a t e l y i n our sector and t h e i r s . 1 2  Westerners have learned to expect lengthy delays even over minor points when they negotiate with Soviet diplomats. The second obstructionist t a c t i c i s Soviet wrangling over procedure and agendas to delay a conference.  Many Western negotiators  have experienced endless quarrels over procedure and agendas when they have met Soviet o f f i c i a l s .  James Byrnes f e l t that Molotov had no equal  i n discussions of procedure.  " I t was quite common to see Molotov  arguing for hours, days, even weeks, about what subjects should be 13 placed on an agenda."  Molotov epitomizes Soviet diplomats because  the t a c t i c of wrangling over procedure and agendas i s common to a l l Soviet negotiators. For example, one reason given by the Americans f o r the f a i l u r e of disarmament negotiations i s that,  American representatives found out that the Russians were willing to spin out talks for days, weeks and months. Then, when backed up against a wall—usually on a concrete question involving inspection, verification and controls— the Soviet representative would move adjournment and come up later with some procedure wrinkle. . . , x 4  According to Philip Mosely, the Council of Foreign Ministers in the immediate post-war years was only able to begin i t s real work after the Soviet delegation had become convinced that further delay was no longer working to the advantage of Soviet interests. ^ 1  But hardly one meeting  of the Council was free from some sort of procedural wrangling by the Soviet delegates.  Even when procedural points were agreed upon, nothing guaranteed  that the Soviets would abide by the agreement.  In a number of cases,  Russian diplomats completely ignored an earlier agreement on procedure and 16 raised new procedural points or else tried to reintroduce old points.  For  example, at Potsdam, the Allied powers agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be comprised of the foreign ministers of China, France,the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.  In September 19^5,  shortly after the Italian, Balkan, and Finnish peace treaties came up for discussion in the Council of Foreign Ministers, Molotov amazed the other delegates with his surprise announcement that he had .just realized that the Council's procedure was faulty.  Molotov stated that the Chinese Foreign  Minister had no right even to be i n the room during discussions relating to the Italian peace treaty. Moreover, Molotov declared that the foreign ministers of France and China had no right to be in the room when the Balkan and Finnish peace treaties were discussed, because their nations were not parties to the surrender terms.  Accordingly JMolotov maintained] the French and Chinese foreign ministers should be compelled to withdraw, and the decisions already taken i n t h e i r presence should be rescinded because they were tainted v/ith i l l e g a l i t y . On the face of i t the question seemed procedural but i t had plenty of substance. The demand was, i n essence, that England and the United States should j o i n the Soviet Union i n p u b l i c l y humiliating the Governments of France and China. ? x  At the Foreign Ministers conference i n the f a l l of 1955, Molotov sought to separate the question of European security and German unity i n defiance of the Summit d i r e c t i v e that they be considered as one.  Molotov haggled over the  agenda so much that he caused, according t o the B r i t i s h , needless and f r u s t rating delays.  When the Soviets f i n a l l y decided to continue i n accordance  l8 with the Summit d i r e c t i v e "Dulles was cheered at t h i s progress." For years among Western diplomats the term "Palais Rose" was synonymous with the f u t i l i t y of working out agendas with Soviet negotiators. In the spring of 1951 the United States sent scholar-diplomat P h i l l i p C.Jessup to P a r i s to see i f he could work out i n concert with the ambassadors of Russia, France and the United Kingdom an agenda f o r a proposed foreign ministers meeting.  For three months and over seventy meetings, these ambass-  adors, along with Jessup, could not even reach agreement on as much as one comma of a proposed agenda.  According to one American writer, at P a l a i s  Rose "the Communists proved they were world champions of pettifogging." 9 x  Even before Jessup arrived, other deputies of the Big Four powers had met at the P a l a i s Rose to work out an agenda f o r the proposed foreign ministers conference.  These deputies spent thirteen weeks t r y i n g to reach an agenda  but to no a v a i l . At the 1955 Summit meeting, the leaders of the Big Four, along with t h e i r foreign ministers, attempted to draw up an agenda for a foreign  ministers conference scheduled to follow the Summit meeting.  Anthony Eden  suggested that the subjects f o r the foreign ministers agenda should be those that were discussed at the Summit and i n the order that they were discussed. This would have meant that German unity would have been f i r s t on the l i s t . However, f o r the foreign ministers' agenda, the Russians wanted German unity i n t h i r d place.  Eden r e s i s t e d the Russian proposal.  In h i s memoirs, Eden  said that he distrusted having r i g i d agendas with the Soviets because the Soviets i n the past, from Potsdam onwards, have refused to conclude an agreement on second agenda matters u n t i l f i r s t agenda matters were concluded.  One  i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s Soviet t a c t i c , according to Eden, was the Soviet excuse that the Austrian Treaty could not be s e t t l e d u n t i l the I t a l i a n Treaty had been concluded because the l a t t e r had preceded the former i n the Potsdam agreement. proposals  Eden said that i f the West had subscribed to the Soviet Summit f o r the foreign ministers agenda,  to consider at Geneva would be shelved i n d e f i n i t e l y . . . . We returned to t h i s point of contention again and again. . . . Marshall Bulganin. held. . .that Germany could not be reunited u n t i l a f t e r a European security pact had been concluded. . . . F i n a l l y , the Western powers declared that they could not contemplate the breakdown of the conference on a point which world opinion would consider to be procedural, even though i n fact i t was n o t . 2 0  Both Western and Soviet leaders f i n a l l y compromised on the agenda by agreeing to embrace the terms European security and German unity i n a simple paragraph. Needless to say that with the agenda so nebulous the foreign ministers conference was doomed to f a i l .  I t d i d f a i l and the so-called S p i r i t of  Geneva was dissipated by the end of 1955.  On a number of occasions Soviet arguments over procedural matters have threatened to break up a conference.  According to Westerns i t was usually the  West which conceded some point to the Soviets so that a conference could proceed. For example, in January 195^, Dulles and Bidault wanted the Big Four to issue invitations to the April Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers which was to-discuss Indo-China.  The Soviet Union refused to acquiesce to the  proposal because i t did not include China as a f u l l member of the conference from the beginning.  This Russian procedural tactic apparently proved success-  ful because Eden said i n his memoirs: It was exasperating to be baulked at this stage by an issue apparently of procedure. There was a real danger that the negotiations might break down. . . .To save the conference, the United Kingdom put forward a draft resolution which omitted any distinction between convenors and convened. 21  Sometimes Westerners believe that the Soviets will even use ridiculous procedural points i n their efforts to delay the work of a conference.  Indeed,  Westerners either unwittingly or reluctantly have become involved i n these supposedly ridiculous procedural disputes.  One such classic illustration  occurred at the 1959 Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers regarding Berlin. When the conference was about to begin the Soviet representative engaged in prolonged bickering over details, "which reduced the i n i t i a l days of the conference of the four largest powers to child-like absurdity."  22  The  details i n dispute concerned a table. The Soviet diplomats wanted a round table for the conference while the Western diplomats preferred the usual square one, with four delegates each to a side.  When neither the Soviets  nor the Americans would abandon their table demands, the United Kingdom undertook to resolve the issue.  Mr. Selwyn Lloyd met privately with  Mr. Gromyko but Lloyd's effort to solve the table problem was of no avail. On May 11, the day of the conference's formal opening, Gromyko was  still  insisting on a round table, with the West Germans and East Germans seated at i t .  With only hours remaining before the formal opening of the con-  ference the West agreed to a round table, but insisted that the two German delegates s i t at two rectangular tables separated from the round one.  Gromyko agreed but bickered about the positioning of the two tables.  He insisted that the two tables be separated from the round table by the thickness".of six pencils.  The British objected and said that the distance  should be that of six pencils end to end. won his point.  But Gromyko stood fast and he  However, to prevent the East German delegation from pushing  their table closer to the round one, the West had the tables of the German delegations bolted t o the floor.  Although Gromyko's procedural points were  absurd, they appear to have been carefully planned because the East German delegation, not recognized formally by the West, sat as an equal of West Germany at a meeting previously restricted to the delegates of the Big Four. The third obstructionist tactic i s one which occurs frequently according to Westerners who have negotiated with Soviet diplomats.  This Soviet  obstructionist tactic i s to block agreement on some non-controversial item in order to gain concessions on some other issue which i s wholly unrelated. For example, at Potsdam, the Western a l l i e s wanted, along with the Soviets, to supervise free elections i n Eastern Europe, but Molotov refused to grant this request.  In fact, he tried to avoid discussing any proposal regarding  elections in Eastern Europe until the Western a l l i e s had diplomatically recognized the new. regimes in Rumania and Bulgaria. James Byrnes resisted  t h i s S o v i e t t a c t i c by s t a t i n g t h a t r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c o u n t r y had t o be based on i t s own m e r i t s r a t h e r than o n i i t s v a l u e a s a b a r g a i n i n g p o i n t .  Molotov  e v e n t u a l l y gave up t h i s t a c t i c b u t b e f o r e he d i d he had managed t o d e l a y the c o n f e r e n c e f o r a l e n g t h y p e r i o d .  Another example o f t h i s  2 4  t a c t i c o c c u r r e d a t t h e f i r s t meeting o f t h e C o u n c i l o f F o r e i g n i n London, from September t o October 19^5. t o e s t a b l i s h three separate  Soviet Ministers  A t t h i s meeting Molotov wanted  peace c o n f e r e n c e s .  He s a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t  Union would n o t be p r e p a r e d t o d i s c u s s the I t a l i a n t r e a t y u n t i l 1946. B e v i n became peeved and asked Molotov t h e r e a s o n f o r the d e l a y ,  When  Molotov  r e p l i e d by s a y i n g t h a t i t would be e a s i e r f o r t h e S o v i e t Union t o g e t p r e p a r e d i f the Western a l l i e s agreed t o an A l l i e d C o n t r o l C o u n c i l f o r Japan. When t h e West f i r m l y r e j e c t e d t h i s S o v i e t p r o p o s a l , Molotov t h e n attempted t o g e t r e c o g n i t i o n f o r t h e t h r e e B a l k a n Governments as a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r an I t a l i a n Peace T r e a t y .  The West a g a i n f i r m l y r e j e c t e d M o l o t o v s 1  "Because we wished t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e [ I t a l i a n ]  proposal.  peace t r e a t y , [ M o l o t o v s 1  p l a n was to} d e l a y t h e t r e a t y , hoping t h e r e b y t o f o r c e u s t o agree t o v a r i o u s proposals  i n which he was i n t e r e s t e d . " 5 2  At a l l t h e f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s c o n f e r e n c e s i n which t h e matter o f r e p a r a t i o n s payments was d i s c u s s e d , Molotov seemed t o b l o c k j u s t about e v e r y Western p r o p o s a l ation issue.  i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n major Western c o n c e s s i o n s  on t h e r e p a r -  One s u c h example was t h e r e f u s a l o f t h e S o v i e t s t o s e t a date  f o r the 19^6 peace c o n f e r e n c e u n t i l t h e r e p a r a t i o n s matter was s e t t l e d . The  U n i t e d S t a t e s s a i d i t would be w i l l i n g t o re-examine t h e q u e s t i o n o f  r e p a r a t i o n s once the date o f the peace c o n f e r e n c e was s e t .  But Molotov kept  p r e s s i n g h i s p o i n t and James Byrnes t o l d Molotov t h a t he o b j e c t e d  t o being  told what he must do on other questions i n order to secure an agreement on the date of the peace conference.  Byrnes wrote later that Bevin told  Molotov that "he could not face Parliament i f he went out of this room with the implication that he had bought the peace conference from the Soviet Union for 100 million dollars."26  Similarly, when another impasse  had been reached at one foreign ministers meeting on the Italian-Yugoslav border, Molotov suggested that i f the Americans would agree to cede to Yugoslavia a l l of Venezia and Giulia, including Trieste, i t would be possible for him to take a different attitude about the African colonies of Italy and about reparations.  The American delegation refused to discuss Molotov's  proposal. Regardless of who the participants were or what type of conference was i n session, Soviet diplomats constantly employed this tactic of blocking agreement on at non-controversial item i n order to secure concessions on some other point.  At the 19^6 Peace Conference i n Paris, Bidault presented a  plan for . French control of the Saar to which Britain and the United States agreed but to which the Soviet Union refused to commit i t s e l f .  Commenting  on the implied Soviet opposition to Bidault's proposal, Byrnes wrote: "Russia w i l l maintain control of the Saar until the final hours and then seek to secure i n exchange for agreement, French support on some other question."27  Byrnes' prophecy was proven correct.  In the negotiations on  the Saar, Bidault proposed the detachment of the Saar from Germany and the creation of an economic and monetary union between France and the Saar. But no matter how hard Bidault v. pressed Molotov, he would not take a stand for or against the French proposal.  98 Molotov played with i t for days, like a cat with a mouse. . . . He obviously was trying to hold back his answer for use as a point to obtain French agreement for Soviet participation i n the control of the Ruhr. . . .Finally, on April 10, Bidault pressed for a decision. The American and British delegation voted in favour of the French proposals. Mr.Molotov countered by asking for a reply on the Soviet proposals on the Ruhr. Bidault said he was ready to discuss the Ruhr, but the question of the Saar was now before the Council and a decision had been asked for. Molotov replied coldly that he had no further remarks to make. This was a rejection of the French proposals, since i n the absence of unanimity, they went by default, and i t was a bitter p i l l for the French delegation to swallow. 20  Perhaps the greatest use of this tactic was evident i n the long and tedious Soviet obstruction of an Austrian Peace Treaty.  Over the years  from 1946 to 1955, when the treaty was finally signed, the Soviet Union put forward a l l major questions i t considered important as a prerequisite to the signing of the treaty, although most of them were unrelated to an Austrian settlement.  First the Soviet Union wanted the Austrian Treaty  tied to a German peace treaty. Then i t said that the Treaty could not be signed until the question of reparations vis-a-vis German property i n the Eastern Zone (of Germany) was settled.  Then the treaty was held up  because the West and the Soviet Union could not agree how much compensation, i f any, should be rendered to Russia for Soviet supplies and services to Austria. This was followed by the Soviet objection that because insufficient de-Nazification had occurred i n Austria, no treaty was a yet possible.  Even the question of Trieste was introduced in the  early 1950's as a prerequisite for the Austrian Treaty.  Finally, when the  Soviets apparently saw that they could benefit no longer by delaying an Austrian Peace Treaty, they dramatically announced that the Austrian Peace Treaty was not tied to a German peace treaty. Molotov then did everything possible to make out that i t was the Soviet Union's  perseverance and good w i l l which made i t possible f o r the Austrians to have t h e i r peace t r e a t y . 9 2  Another Soviet obstructionist t a c t i c i s the use of r e p e t i t i v e arguments.  These r e p e t i t i v e arguments are intended, according to West-  erners, to wear down Western negotiators, who are usually impatient, i n order to win concessions from them.  James Byrnes summarized t h i s Western  b e l i e f when he stated: "Indefinite r e p e t i t i o n o f arguments from the Soviets must be accepted as an i n e v i t a b l e preparation to n e g o t i a t e . " 3 ° David T. C a t t e l l claims that " i t i s the a r t i f i c e of the Soviet  delegate  never to r e j e c t a proposal immediately but to t a l k i t to death and hide behind secret diplomacy, that i s , u n t i l the Soviet Union can publish something favourable to i t s cause."3  X  George Marshall broke o f f - a l l  meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers i n 19*+8 because of what he c a l l e d "the dreary r e p e t i t i o n of Soviet arguments i n 325 meetings since the Spring of 19^7-  [the Moscow Conferencej'l^  2  <p Westerners, not only 0  do Soviet negotiators r a r e l y vary t h e i r arguments, but they also remain unresponsive to questions i n counter-arguments.  Soviet negotiators tend  33 to argue exhaustively one point a t a time. Westerners believe that sometimes Russian repetitiveness i s r i d i c u lous.  As an i l l u s t r a t i o n , at Bretton Woods, the Soviet delegate  insisted  upon the i n c l u s i o n of the words "reconstruction" and "restoration" i n the a r t i c l e s of agreement for the International Bank.  Even though the  Western delegates agreed that both terms were redundant,"the Soviet delegate kept repeating h i s point u n t i l the other members gave i n out of sheer exhaustion."-^  4  According  to John Foster Dulles,one explanation of  100 Soviet r e p e t i t i v e n e s s i s that Soviet o f f i c i a l s p r a c t i c e  inexhaustible  patience, w i t h h o l d i n g what t h e y may be p r e p a r e d t o g i v e u n t i l the l a s t moment i n the hope t h a t t h e y c a n get what they want without g i v i n g as much as they a r e ready t o g i v e . They a s t u t e l y take i n t o account any weakness o f t h e i r opponents such a s impatience t o g e t the n e g o t i a t i o n s over o r w i l l i n g n e s s t o t r e a t an agreement as a s u c c e s s without r e g a r d t o the c o n t e n t s and d e p e n d a b i l i t y . 3 5 S o v i e t t a c t i c s o f r e p e t i t i o n a r e not o n l y d r e a r y and i n s u l t i n g , but a l s o appear b r a z e n t o Westerners.  A l t h o u g h c e r t a i n S o v i e t statements have been  proven f a l s e , S o v i e t d e l e g a t e s s t i l l at  conferences.  l o g i c a l end.  i n s i s t on r e p e a t i n g a number o f them  But t h e i r c o n t i n u a l r e i t e r a t i o n has had a c e r t a i n psycho-  F o r example, a l t h o u g h d e l e g a t e s o f o t h e r n a t i o n s d i d n o t  b e l i e v e c e r t a i n S o v i e t statements a t f i r s t , a f t e r h e a r i n g them r e p e a t e d i n almost every speech by the Russians o r t h e i r s a t e l l i t e s over a p e r i o d o f months and y e a r s , t h e o t h e r d e l e g a t e s stopped r e f u t i n g them. I t was hopeless; i t o n l y p r o l o n g e d the debate, and gave the S o v i e t d e l e g a t e s renewed o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o r e p e a t the f a l s e h o o d [and). . .the S o v i e t s s t i l l got h e a d l i n e s i n the American p a p e r s . . . . Western d i p l o m a t s have come t o expect ;^-aae|£et±^o>B  t a c t i c s when negot-  i a t i n g with t h e i r Soviet counterparts. The f i f t h S o v i e t o b s t r u c t i o n i s t t a c t i c i s t o exhaust n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r an i s s u e and then t o a l l o w d i s c u s s i o n s to c o n t i n u e , but not b e f o r e S o v i e t d i p l o m a t s have demanded c o n c e s s i o n s (merely f o r l e t t i n g a conference continue.)  T h i s S o v i e t t a c t i c l e d James Byrnes to compare S o v i e t  d e l e g a t e s t o lawyers who r e p r e s e n t c o r p o r a t i o n s which a r e sued f o r damages. "It  i s the t a s k o f these lawyers t o p l a y f o r time i n the hope t h a t t h e  complainant w i l l g e t t i r e d o f w a i t i n g f o r a t r i a l and s e t t l e f o r a s m a l l part of h i s claim."37  Senator Vandenberg b e l i e v e d t h a t the S o v i e t s  101  thought that Western diplomats would make concessions they had not contemplated merely to end conference delays.3  8  Moreover, Soviet diplomats  may delay negotiations to the point of weary deadlock and then suddenly present proposals which w i l l allow negotiations to continue.  But i p  doing so the Soviets attempt to claim credit for seeking a solution to a problem. Furthermore, these Soviet proposals may be similar or exactly the same as presented much earlier by the Western delegates although the Soviets will treat them as their own. As James Byrnes put i t : As a rule Mr. Molotov smilingly announces that the Soviet delegation, i n order to bring about agreement, desires to make a proposal. He then presents your proposal which has been the subject of controversy for weeks,with only a few unimportant changes. Having argued the question so long, the other conferees are so anxious to get r i d of i t that they receive the announcement with pleasure. And frequently they express appreciation to Mr. Molotov for his doing what he should have done weeks or months before.39 This tactic i s used consistently by Soviet negotiators. For example, at the London meetings of 1955 on disarmament, the Soviet Union refused to budge from i t s position and accused the West of inconsistency i n i t s proposals.  Time and time again the Western delegates demonstrated that  the Western positions were consistent with earlier ones but the Soviet delegates were unresponsive.  Then, just as the conference was to recess,  "the Soviet representative suddenly whipped a paper out of his pocket and proceeded to read out a new position that paralleled the Western position in many ways."  40  T  n  e  British newspaper, The Economist,analyzed  the 1955 London Conference on disarmament and stated that the Soviet Union  102 had,  " a f t e r weeks o f s t o n e w a l l i n g .  . .put  forward as  [ i t s ] own  f o r m u l a t h a t Western n e g o t i a t o r s had been v a i n l y p r e s s i n g . que  ensures t h a t any  settlement  reached seems t o be due  the  very-  This techni-  to S o v i e t  kl i n i t i a t i v e and  t o mean d e f e a t  Soviet-American bargaining  f o r the warmonger."  behavior  In a study of  i n post-war disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  L l o y d J e n s e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t the S o v i e t Union's l a s t minute compromising a f t e r h i n d e r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s has been due ing  t o i t s not .wanting o t h e r s  plac-  blame f o r the breakdown o f disarmament n e g o t i a t i o n s uponthe S o v i e t  Union. ^ Another t a c t i c by which the S o v i e t Union obstructs-.negotiations::;: is  the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f new  discussions.  t o p i c s , amendments, o r u n r e l a t e d i s s u e s i n t o  F o r example, a t the Januarys-February 195^  f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s i n B e r l i n , Anthony Eden p r e s e n t e d the r e u n i f i c a t i o n o f Germany. the Eden p l a n . was in  Molotov c l a i m e d  t h a t the f i r s t  discuss  t h i n g to be agreed upon  East Germany should p a r t i c i p a t e  Moreover, Molotov demanded t h a t the  German Government be r e c o g n i z e d  by the West.  r e f u s e d t o debate M o l o t o v ' s p r o p o s a l s .  the  a B r i t i s h plan f o r  Molotov a t f i r s t r e f u s e d t o  t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from Bonn and d i s c u s s i o n s on Germany.  meeting of  The Western  When Molotov was  East  delegation pressed  f o r an  answer on the Eden P l a n he then proceeded to a t t a c k the European Defence Community as a g i g a n t i c American c o n s p i r a c y ive  German m i l i t a r i s m and  designed t o r e v i v e a g g r e s s -  t h r e a t e n European s e c u r i t y .  Molotov put t h e West on the d e f e n s i v e . The EDC became the i s s u e t h a t dominated the debate on Germany. . . .Molotov's a t t a c k a g a i n s t the EDC l e d t o l o n g statements by the Western f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s i n i t s d e f e n c e . . . .Molotov even o f f e r e d a p l a n f o r a p l e b i s c i t e by the German p e o p l e on the Peace  103 Treaty or the EDC. . . .Finally, on February 10, Molotov looked at the Eden plan and rejected i t . He then presented his own plan for Germany but the West refused i t .  4 4  In this case the Soviet tactic failed to make the West concede to the Russian demand that East Germany participate in the conference. Failing their objective, the Russians then quickly hindered the work of the conference by turning i t into a propaganda forum. This Soviet tactic of introducing new points i n order to delay negotiations also appeared in the discussions on Italy at the Foreign Ministers conference i n 1946.  When the West thought that the Italian  Treaty was about to be signed, 'JMolotov sprung two surprises. F i r s t , he wanted the West to supply him with reports on internal conditions i n Italy because he claimed that there was a resurgence of Italian Fascism.  Second, he wanted Italy to be invited to the con-  ference to discuss economic problems (reparations) although Italy was s t i l l a defeated nation.  Senator Vandenberg wrote:  When the session adjourned, Assistant Secretary of State Dunn told me he thought this Russian maneuver was a "tip off" as to Moscow's attitudes; that i t means Molotov w i l l delay a l l decisions as long as possible; and that we are thus in for a"war of nerves". ^6 Dean Acheson said in 1951 that the Soviet-Western record of negotiations over the subject of a German peace treaty i s one of dismal f u t i l i t y because "the Soviets have resorted to delaying tactics and have continually introduced new and irrelevant issues. . . , 7 ,,if  The  Austrian Peace Treaty negotiations i n 19^9 offer another example of this Soviet tactic.  The Soviets said that the Austrian Treaty negotiations  could not proceed further because the article on Nazism had to be  re-opened to discuss the alleged encouragement of Nazism by Austria and the West. When Molotov failed to get the already agreed-upon article on Nazism re-opened, he refused to discuss Austria further. Thus, even agreed-upon articles, as well as proposals, are subject to Soviet attempts to introduce amendments, new topics, and irrelevant issues in order to obstruct negotiations. The seventh tactic used by the Russians to s t a l l the work of a conference i n order to make Western negotiators concede points i s the discussion of a proposal i n slow item-by-item form.  In his memoirs, Walter  Bedell Smith mentioned a classic illustration of this Soviet tactic. In 19^7 many American reporters wanted to attend the Moscow foreign minister'; conference.  The American State Department chose one hundred reporters who  would be allowed to go to Moscow. However, the Soviets said only twenty would be allowed into Russia.  The State Department protested claiming  that at an earlier London Conference, Molotov said that no restrictions would be placed upon correspondents and the United States interpreted this to mean unlimited numbers could attend.  The Soviet Union said i t  could not accommodate more than twenty reporters, so Smith produced a space-saving plan whereby he reduced the o f f i c i a l delegation  from the  State Department in order to get more hotel rooms for reporters.  Also,  the State Department delegation would stay i n the American embassy. With this plan, Smith was able to make an additional twenty five rooms available to reporters, and i f the reporters doubled up, close to one hundred reporters could come to Moscow. However, the Soviets reject^d Smith's plan.  105 It was hard to get around these figures but Mr.Vyshinsky did i t . With unfailing courtesy he maintained his position, reluctantly granting permission for one reporter then another taking so long to do i t that finally the State Department was as glad as I was to compromise for an additional sixteen. 8 4  British Diplomat Charles Roetter maintains that even conferences with the Soviets that begin under the most auspicious circumstances "eventually become bogged down in some mysterious way and just go on and on." ^ 4  Roetter claims that i n disarmament negotiations the  Russian never addressed themselves to the plan as a whole. They would take one aspect of i t , discuss and debate the point for weeks and months, and then quite suddenly leave the whole matter hanging i n the a i r , ignore the fact that no conclusion was reached, and move to another point frequently to repeat the same process. This would go on until the moment when often after years of patient negotiation there would seem to be prospect of an agreement somewhere on the horizon and a likelihood that the Soviet Union would have to commit i t s e l f in detail on a system of effective controls. At that moment Soviet delegates would either walk out of the negotiations, accusing the other side of bad faith or would demand that the negotiations would have to move to another location or that another body, larger or smaller, negotiate.5° It should be remembered that for propaganda tactics the Soviet Union prefers nebulous, general terms in negotiations (see Chapter Four) while for obstruction purposes, i t prefers the slow item-by-item discussion of a proposal.  In both instances, the Russians never  address themselves to the plan as a whole. Another obstructionist tactic Westerners feel i s used by the Soviets i s the evasion of Western proposals, inquiries and diplomatic  106  notes.  The reasons for Soviet evasion of Western inquiries and notes no  doubt are many, but the important ones seem to be that evasion i s an indirect method of saying no when the Soviets feel a direct refusal of a Western proposal would dampen Soviet prestige.  Also, evasion seems to  indicate at times that the Soviet Government has not yet decided upon a line of policy and i s stalling for time to form a policy. Furthermore, i t seems that the Soviets look upon evasion as a method by which they can keep opposite negotiators off balance and even i n a conciliatory mood. The Soviets may believe that i f Western negotiators feel that the Russians w i l l eventually agree to a point, although they are evasive at the moment, Westerners will be receptive to Soviet proposals.  Many examples are  given by Westerners to demonstrate this Soviet tactic of evasion. In the summer of 19^+5, to improve relations between the West and the Soviets, the American State Department requested an exchange of ballet dancers, theatre companies, orchestras, exhibitions, handicrafts, and architects.  However*Soviet^authorities  did not answer this request.51  Shortly after this request, Averell Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, told deputy foreign minister Vyshinsky that the Department of State would like to know whether or not the Soviet Government would approve a program of exchange students between the United States and the Soviet Union for the academic year 19^6-47. Soviet Government.52  i  n  No reply came from the  August, 19^6, the American Government proposed  to the Soviet Government a program whereby the United States would provide the Soviet Union with a complete penicillin plant, as well as a plan for mutual- exchange of scientists, especially in the medical f i e l d . Again,  107 the Soviet Government did not answer this specific inquiry. Whether United States efforts were aimed at establishing an exchange of students, professions and articles, books, research findings and films, the results were the same. The uncooperative attitude, the lack of interest, the interminable delay or absence of replies by the Soviet Union thwarted relations between the two war-time a l l i e s ^ 4  Another illustration of this Soviet evasion tactic conerns Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" plan.  Similar to the Baruch plan of 19^6,  but not as wide i n scope, Eisenhower's plan proposed international control over that amount of atomic energy which could be devoted to peaceful purposes and which could aid the under-developed countries. Eisenhower said that the Russians would have to. participate in the plan otherwise i t would not be feasible. to his plan.  He then asked the Soviet Government for an answer  The Soviets did not answer for six months. When they did,  they rejected Eisenhower's proposals.  Consequently, the Americans viewed  the delay as a Soviet tactic to gai& time because a few months after Eisenhower had announced his plan, the Soviets announced that they had made the world's f i r s t atomic furnace which was devoted exclusivelyjto generation of peaceful atomic power. That physical reality, the Soviets calculated would be far stronger propaganda i n the power starved regions of the world than any amount of talk' about peaceful atoms. Moscow accordingly dragged out the conversations by resorting to long periods of silence interspersed occasionally with sudden bursts of double talk.55 Western negotiators have come to accept Soviet evasion tactics as another facet of Soviet negotiating behavior. The ninth obstructionist method used by the Soviets i s to have a Soviet negotiator claim that negotiations cannot proceed because he has  108 not yet received instructions from Moscow regarding a certain Western propsal.  Although Soviet diplomats have a genuine reason for not being able  to comment without instructions on a proposal, some Westerners appear to believe that this genuine reason i s exploited for purposes of obstruction. For example, at the San Francisco founding meeting of the United Nations, Senator Vandenberg found i t exasperating to deal with Gromyko and Molotov because every matter, however t r i v i a l , had to be referred back to Moscow. But according to Vandenberg, the conference was needlessly delayed because i t seemed strange to him to have Gromyko say that he had no instructions from Moscow to discuss extremely important matters, such as,the veto, a French amendment, a new date for rewriting the Charter, and the choosing of deputy-secretaries.  As Vandenberg put i t :  Then came the pay off. . . .Everybody except Gromyko pretty much agreed that Stettinius:: ought to make an o f f i c i a l statement. Gromyko said he would be glad to submit to his government for instructions any proposed press statement. And i t takes him at least a week to get an answer from Moscow. And so- o - o we again adjourn while the Soviets push us around.56 It i s d i f f i c u l t to know when Soviet diplomats are genuine i n their inability to give an answer to the West on some point because Moscow has not sent them instructions.  However, Westerners believe that Soviet exploitation,  for tactical purposes, of a legitimate excuse of Soviet diplomats, accounts for a great many Soviet delays.  Westerners tend to look upon the Soviet  diplomat's excuse of "a lack of instructions"as more of an obstructionist tactic than a legitimate reason for delaying negotiations. The final two obstructionist tactics the Soviet Union employs i n negotiations, according to Westerners, are specifically related to the  109 United Nations Organization.  These tactics are the walk-out and the veto.  The walk-out i s the most drastic obstructionist tactic the Soviet Union can use in the United Nations.  The Soviets rarely use the walk-out  because i t injures their prestige among the so-called uncommitted states which firmly support the United Nations.  However, the Soviet Union has  created a precedent for walk-outs and the potential for a walk-out always ;  exists.  Two Soviet walk-outs of the United Nations have occurred, one in  19^6 and the other i n 1950.  The 1946 incident demonstrated the Soviet  Union's unwillingness to discuss i t s military occupation of Northern Iran. Iran brought a complaint before the Security Council claiming that the Soviet Union, but not removing, i t s troops after the European War finished, had violated a treaty with Iran.  had  Moreover, Iran accused the  Soviets of engaging in subversive activities.  Rather than discuss the  Iranian complaint, the Soviets tried to obstruct the work of the United Nations by walking out of the Security Council.  Similarly, i n 1950,  another Soviet walk-out occurred over the question of seating Communist China.  When the Security Council defeated a Soviet resolution to seat  Communist China in the United Nations, the Soviet delegation, mainly for the purposes of obstruction, walked out of the Security Council meeting. The final Soviet tactic i s one which i s frequently used i n the United Nations.  The Soviet Union's use of the veto to forestall any  possible decision on major questions in the Security Council has been used over one hundred times since 19^6. record.  No nation has equalled the Soviet-c  Indeed, the United States has never cast a veto and France and  110 Britain have cast only a few.  The wide use of the veto by the Russians  indicatesin part that the Soviet Union has been unsuccessful i n other less brazen and overt tactics of obstruction to thwart decisions to which i t does not want to adhere. Soviets.  The veto seems to be the "trump card" for the  It gives the Soviet Union a sense of security because i f other  Soviet diplomatic tactics are unsuccessful i t can use the United Nations legitimate veto to hinder decisions.  The use of the Soviet veto occurs  more frequently v/hen complaints of aggression and plans for pacific settlement of disputes are brought before the Security Council.  The  Soviet Union's dichotomous concept of aggression leads them to veto many Western complaints of aggression. Moreover, resolutions on the seating c?f new nations i n the General Assembly, or the Council seats, have been subject to the Soviet veto.  Another major use of the veto has been to  defeat the appointment of a person whom the Soviet Union does not like, such as Lester Pearson, to the office of Secretary General.  The veto  has become the most prominent Soviet obstructionist tactic used i n the 57 United Nations. These two tactics which the Soviet Union uses at the United Nations, combined with the other nine previously mentioned Soviet obstructionist tactics, present a formidable array of delaying methods.  Firmly  implanted i n the minds of Westerners i s the notion that the purpose of negotiations i s to reach agreement. Consequently, Westerners have no conception of their own negotiating behavior i n terms of obstruction.. They see Soviet diplomats utilizing obstructionist tactics while they  consider themselves potential victims of these Communist negotiating methods. Although there are eleven discernible Soviet tactics of obstruction, not a l l will be used i n the same round of negotiations. I f the Soviet Union decides to impede negotiations for any of the reasons previously mentioned, i t can use one or many of i t s delaying tactics. Westerners can be certain that i f the purpose of the Soviet Union i s to hinder negotiations then the Soviets w i l l accomplish their purpose.  CHAPTER  VI  SOVIET OFFENSIVE TACTICS According to Westerners who have negotiated with Soviet diplomats, the Soviet Union uses a number of negotiating tactics which can be classified as offensive, that i s , aggressive tactics which are planned mainly to obtain maximum concessions from the West. A survey of Western views suggests a three fold classification of Soviet offensive maneuvers i s possible;  namely, overt maneuvers, subtle maneuvers, and maneuvers  which exploit the inclinations of Western negotiators.  The overt classi-  fication consists of those Soviet tactics which are straightforward and immediately identifiable as offensive.  The subtle classification con-  sists of those Soviet tactics which are not recognizable at f i r s t as offensive tactics.  The third classification of Soviet tactics concerns  those negotiating tactics which are designed to exploit the of Western negotiators,  inclinations  For instance, a Western negotiator's  disposition  to seek an agreement through compromise as quickly as possible, usually because of an impatient public opinion, i s exploited by the Soviets.  Overt Tactics. The overt group of maneuvers, the f i r s t classification of Soviet offensive tactics, i s comprised of five tactics.  First, the Soviets use  the widest possible claims or demands to test Western resistance. Second, the Soviets quickly introduce a new point for acceptance when Western negotiators have just agreed upon an earlier point.  Third, the Russians  counter-attack when the West puts them on the defensive.  Fourth, the  Soviets-iuse <>/ threats and offer rewards i n order to gain concessions.  Fifth,  t h e S o v i e t s accuse the West o f p r a c t i c i n g p o l i c i e s s i m i l a r t o those  t h a t the R u s s i a n s a r e p r a c t i c i n g so t h a t t h e y a b s o l v e Western c r i t i c i s m . one  The  first  of theseovert  Soviet offensive t a c t i c s i s  which i s f r e q u e n t l y encountered by the West.  c o n s i s t s o f the use  themselves from  This overt Soviet  tactic  of widest p o s s i b l e c l a i m s t o t e s t the r e s i s t a n c e of  n e g o t i a t i n g opponents.  T h i s i s one  o f the most predominant  tactics  employed by the S o v i e t s a l t h o u g h i t i s not used e x c l u s i v e l y by the This t a c t i c represents erners  c o n s i d e r to be  Russians.  maximum S o v i e t demands which camouflage what Westt h e i r minimum t a r g e t s .  Communist n e g o t i a t o r s n o r m a l l y  "The  R u s s i a n and  begin with a proposal  other  f a r above t h e i r  minimum t a r g e t , and i f t h e i r opponents g i v e ground t h e r e f o l l o w s no r e c i p r o c a l compromise on the R u s s i a n s i d e but a s t i f f e n i n g o f a t t i t u d e . " American s c h o l a r L l o y d Jensen m a i n t a i n s t h a t " i t i s the tendency o f  x  the  S o v i e t Union t o b e g i n a round o f n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a more extreme b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n than i t i s w i l l i n g t o a c c e p t ,  l a t e r making  t o show p u b l i c o p i n i o n t h a t i t i s n e g o t i a t i n g s e r i o u s l y . " j o u r n a l i s t b e l i e v e s t h a t when Westerners i n i t i a l l y the S o v i e t s they a r e c o n f r o n t e d would "mean appeasement and  with demands which, i f met  p r i c e f o r anything  British  they concede."  4  with  by the West,  principle."3  s t a t e s t h a t " i n any n e g o t i a t i o n s the  take p a r t they w i l l demand the utmost c o n c e s s i o n s highest  A  t r y to negotiate  s a c r i f i c e o f p o s i t i o n and  B r i t i s h J o u r n a l , Round T a b l e ,  2  concessions  t h e r e a r e and ask  Charles Sulzberger  The Russians the  maintains  that: j J T h i s ^ b a r g a i n i n g f o r m u l a used by S o v i e t d i p l o m a t s seems p a r t i c u l a r l y d e r i v e d from Byzance and the M i d d l e E a s t . . . .A s t a l l - k e e p e r o f the bazaar w i l l never b e g i n by a s k i n g f o r a p r i c e o f c l o t h the p r i c e he r e a l l y e x p e c t s t o g e t . Then, as i f g r a n t i n g a f a v o u r , he w i l l g r a d u a l l y reduce the p r i c e . . . . (Soviet) methods are not d i s s i m i l a r . . . .5  Ilk Sulzberger claims that because of this Soviet negotiating tactic, "British and American diplomats. . .wring their hands to complain that jjSoviet] diplomacy i s stultifying."  According to Philip Mosely, this Soviet  tactic acts as a pressure gauge to test Western resistance.  "If pressure  in one direction yields results i t w i l l be exploited as far as appears 7 safe;  i f i t meets with resistance, i t can be relaxed."  In his memoirs,  Cordell Hull discusses a 19^3 meeting with the Russians in which he encountered this Soviet tactic.  In discussing Roosevelt's proposal for  a United Nations Organization, the question of what nations should belong was considered.  "In the midst of the discussion, Ambassador Gromyko  suddenly said that a l l sixteen Republics composing the Soviet Union should be made i n i t i a l members of the United Nations Organization. . . .He left 8  Stettinius and Cadogan breathless.  ..."  Another example of this Soviet tactic occurred at the 195^+ Berlin Conference  of Foreign Ministers.  At Berlin, Molotov s efforts were 1  directed at obtaining some kind of international recognition for Communist China.  Molotov f i r s t proposed that the West invite China for a general  discussion of world tensions at the next four-power meeting.  The West  refused but agreed to the later Soviet demand that Communist China be invited to the five-power conference on Indo-China.  But Molotov's real  intent was to have China at the Indo-China meeting;  so by settling for 9  a lesser proposal, he appears to Westerners to have compromised.  7  This Soviet tactic of opening with excessive demands also occurred frequently over the Trieste dispute.  The Soviets continually insisted  that Yugoslavia should control Trieste while the West insisted that Italy ought to control i t .  A deadlock over Trieste ensued. Finally, at the  19^6 foreign minister's conference i n New York, the Soviets and the West agreed to United Nations control over Trieste. Commenting on the Trieste compromise, the Council of Foreign Relations i n the United States stated that, in making these concessions the Soviet delegation accepted solutions which Soviet and Yugoslav representatives had said at London and Paris they would never accept. The Russians had put forward their maximum program i n September 19^5. Not until December 19^6 did they reveal the minimum program for which they would settle, When they did, agreement on the treaties was not long delayed.10 This Soviet tactic of presenting extreme demands when a conference f i r s t convenes, represents to Westerners the maximum program of the Soviet Union. After Soviet diplomats have discovered where Western resistance i s hardest, they modify their demands.  Eventually, after d i f f i c u l t and hard negot-  iating, the minimum program of the Soviet Union i s made known but only i f the Soviets wish an agreement. Although Western negotiators use this tactic of excessive demands occasionally, they do not seem to pursue this tactic as systematically as the Soviets pursue i t i n terms of maximum and minimum programs.  In their writings 'Westerners have not mentioned these  terras in relation to their own bargaining behavior. The second overt tactic i s the deliberate Soviet thrust of a new point, sometimes unrelated, for acceptance by the West when Western negotiators, have just agreed upon the point under discussion. For example, at Yalta, the West insisted that the Soviet-backed Lublin Polish Government be reorganized to contain non-Soviet oriented representatives and that  free elections be held i n Poland.  After much haggling and a near deadlock  on the Polish question, Stalin agreed to the reorganization of the Lublin Government i n order to make i t more broadly representative. But as a condition for his agreement, Stalin demanded that the last sentence i n the Western formula for Poland be dropped.  The last sentence read:  "The Ambassadors:Pjf the three powers i n Warsaw following such reorganization would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge i n regard to free and unfettered elections."  This sentence meant a practical  check was to be placed upon Soviet intentions i n Poland. against Eden's advice, dropped the sentence.  Roosevelt,  Stettinius observed i n his  memoirs that, "we preferred to have the sentence in the document but because the President was anxious to reach agreement and to expedite matters he was willing to make this concession. . . . " i i  As soon as  Roosevelt made the concession about dropping the last sentence, Molotov quickly proposed that the last part of the last paragraph of the Polish agreement contain the sentence:  "The Governments of the United States  and the United Kingdom w i l l establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union."  Stettinius and Eden  resisted this Soviet tactic by stating that before any diplomatic recognition of any Polish Government occurred, the Lublin Government had to be reorganized. At the founding conference of the United Nations in 19^5, Molotov wanted Byelorussia and the Ukraine not only to have membership i n the United Nations but also to participate i n the founding conference. Truman  ordered the American delegation to carry out Roosevelt's Yalta pledge to the Soviet Union that i t would have three votes i n the United Nations. As soon as.the American delegation agreed to uphold Roosevelt's pledge, Molotov then proposed that the Polish Lublin Government be admitted to participate i n the conference. The West rejected Molotov's proposal which "was another example of the typical Russian technique—always 12 crowding for more." Another example of this tactic appeared at the 195^ Geneva conference on Indo-China.  The Soviet Union and Communist China continually  demanded the inclusion of the Vietminh i n the conference.  The West at  f i r s t refused but under Soviet pressure to include The Vietminh, the West offered a quid pro quo arrangement.  It proposed to the Soviet Union and  China that the West would allow Vietminh participation i f the Communists would allow the evacuation of the wounded from Dien Bien Phu.  The Soviet  Union and China refused to discuss the Western proposal and s t i l l pressed for Vietminh inclusion. Chinese demands.  Finally, the West acquiesced to Soviet and  But Anthony Eden, i n his memoirs, said he foresaw that  when the Vietminh were allowed to participate i n the conference, the Russians and Chinese would also demand admission to the conference of delegations of the Communist backed Free Laotian (Pathet Lao) and Free Cambodian dKrmer Issarak) Government. As expected, the move was made at the f i r s t plenary session which the conference devoted to Indo-China on May 9. We made i t plain that this was not a question on which we would compromise. But I did not expect that Molotov and Chou-En-Iai would sabotage the entire conference by pressing the issue, stubborn as the exchanges^were. In the end, they gradually dropped i t . 3 x  118  A classic example of this Soviet tactic of quickly introducing new points for acceptance when an issue has just been agreed upon, occurred at the f i r s t meeting of the Allied Control Council i n Berlin i n July,1945. This f i r s t meeting was looked upon as a social meeting by the Americans and British who had not brought any advisors or experts with them.  But  the Russians appeared with a number of experts from coal to food. General Zhukov called the meeting to order and stated that the meeting was to be devoted to business.  Zhukov's quick utilization of the meeting for  business purposes "stunned the British and American delegations." Western delegations were unprepared and had no plan for Berlin, rather than offend the Russians they let the meeting proceed.  14  The  but The f i r s t  item the Russians wanted discussed was the creation of the Berlin Kommandatura. The Soviet Union presented the plan for the Kommandatura. With only one amendment, after quibbling with the Russians, Clay signed the document. We were going to get along with the Russians and were quite willing to start off on their own terms. 5 x  After the Kommandatura document was signed, the Soviets "immediately asked the Western delegations about the food and coal £that they were] to send to Berlin.  The Western delegations looked at each other i n consternation."•  (The Supreme Allied Headquarters of the Western forces had instructed the Western delegation that the job of feeding Berliners was a Russian responsib i l i t y because the Russians controlled the traditional food sources of Berlin;  namely, Brandenburg and Pomerania. Moreover, to supplement the  Russian food areas for Berlin, the West had turned over to the Russians the food areas of Saxony and Thuringia.)  General Clay, American Commander of  of the A l l i e d Control Council for Germany, along with  Brigadier-General  Howley, head of the American M i l i t a r y Mission i n B e r l i n , and the B r i t i s h , protested the Soviet demand that the West must feed the B e r l i n e r s .  But  Zhukov i n s i s t e d and said simply that the Russians were not going to feed the B e r l i n e r s , and at any rate, the warehouses of foods were almost exhausted. Clay said that he had to r e f e r the matter back to Washington, but i n order to save having to feed a l l the Berliners including those i n the Russian zone, Clay stated that i f "Washington agreed to feed the B e r l i n e r s , Western food supplies would only be used f o r those Berliners i n the Western zones. 17 Zhukov r e a d i l y agreed.  Thus, through use of the thrust t a c t i c , the  Soviets were able to have the West feed two  thirds of B e r l i n .  In the I960 American p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign, vice-president Richard Nixon summed up i n a number of speeches the popular American concept of t h i s Soviet negotiating t a c t i c .  Nixon s a i d :  I know that when you are dealing with a man  "I know Mr. Khrushchev, and l i k e t h i s who  engages i n the  kind of a c t i v i t i e s he does, the wrong thing to do i s to make concessions to him, because these concessions w i l l never s a t i s f y him. lead him to demand more.'  10  One  They w i l l only  of the rare times that a Soviet diplomat  ever confirmed a Soviet negotiating t a c t i c occurred i n 1952.  Maxim Litvinov  t o l d an American correspondent in'19^6, i n an interview which was publ i s h e d a f t e r L i t v i n o v ' s death i n 1952,  that one Western concession  to another Soviet demand. The correspondent asked L i t v i n o v : "Suppose the West were to grant Moscow's demands regarding T r i e s t e , the I t a l i a n colonies, the Danube and the r e s t , " I said. "Would that lead to an easing of tension?" L i t v i n o v r e p l i e d slowly, as though he were making a point which should be obvious: " I t would lead to the West being faced with the next s e r i e s of demands.'"19  leads  120 This overt offensive tactic of quickly introducing a new point for agreement just as an issue under discussion i s settled, has been consistently used by the Soviets. The third tactic concerns the counter-attack method which the Soviets employ when they are put on the defensive.  When the Russians  are faced with criticism, rather than answering the criticism or defending themselves directly, they immediately launch a counter-attack accusing the West of some charge, true or false.  James Byrnes called  this Soviet tactic "standard operating procedure."  20  During the peace  treaty negotiations, whenever the West would criticize Soviet policy, in Iran, or Poland, or anywhere i n Eastern Europe, the Soviets would immediately counter with violent criticism of Western policies i n Greece and Turkey. Even when the British put forward a study paper on Yugoslavia, the Soviets produced a series of charges against British actions in Greece.  When the Iranian representative at the United Nations  laid a complaint before the Security Council against the presence of Soviet troops i n Iran, the Soviet representative,  believing that the  British were responsible for the Iranian complaint, f i l e d a complaint against the presence of British troops i n Greece.  The Ukranian dele-  gation also.filed a similar complaint against the presence of British troops in Indonesia. Another example concerns the Moscow Declaration of 19^3 • The Soviet Government agreed i n that declaration that Austria was to be treated as a liberated area so that reparations were not to be collected from i t .  But the Soviet Union violated the declaration by  121  seizing vast Austrian assets in 19^5» claiming that they were German assets.  When the West tried to have a discussion on Austrian assets,  the Soviet Union charged the British with rebuilding the Austrian army and encouraging pro-Nazi and anti-Communist White Russian units to form with the ostensible purpose of directing them against the Soviet Union. Bevin bluntly rejected the charges.  21  In another example of this Soviet tactic, Adlai Stevenson conferred with Khrushchev in the summer of 1958, and the latter suggested a p o l i t i c a l principle of "no interference i n the internal affairs of other countries."  Khrushchev said that the principle could be approved at a  summit conference.  Stevenson shared Khrushchev's sentiments and asked  him i f he would apply that p o l i t i c a l principle to Hungary and Yugoslavia so that armed intervention and personal denunciation would end.  But  rather than answer the question directly,"Khrushchev, following the familiar Communist debating tactic of attack, assailed the United States and i t s actions around the world—in Lebanon, Jordan, Guatemala, even 22  Cuba." Another illustration of this Soviet tactic concerned American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army. Every agreement between the Soviets and the West regarding the treatment of Western liberated soldiers in Eastern Europe was violated by the Russians.  "Whenever these violations  were brought to the attention of the appropriate o f f i c i a l s , they responded with the most unfounded accusations regarding the treatment of liberated  23 Russian prisoners of war then i n British and American hands."  There  i s wide agreement among Westerners that Soviet negotiators, rather than  J22 meeting c r i t i c i s m s of t h e i r p o l i c i e s head on as Western diplomats do, ignore the c r i t i c i s m of t h e i r p o l i c i e s and plunge into  counter-attacks,  which sometimes are crude and loud, against Western p o l i c i e s .  The  Soviets s t i l l rage f u r i o u s l y whenever Westerners mention the l i b e r a t i o n of Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. The fourth Soviet overt t a c t i c i s the use of threats, friendship, and promises of a l l i a n c e s i n order to win concessions.  Sometimes t h i s  t a c t i c i s used by the Russians i n attempts to s p l i t Western a l l i e s . Occasionally the Soviets w i l l send diplomatic notes to various Western countries hinting at one thing to one of them and another thing to another one of them.  "When i t comes to meeting these Western countries,  ,24  to pursue the same tactic."'  the ground i s ready  A major post-war foreign p o l i c y goal of the Soviet Union has been the attempt to make France a neutral nation.  Negotiating with French Premier  Guy Mollett and French Foreign Minister Pineau i n Moscow i n May of 1957» Khrushchev b l u n t l y t o l d them that t h i s might be t h e i r l a s t opportunity to j o i n the Soviet Union i n a Soviet-French  alliance.  A f t e r the French  leaders p o l i t e l y refused the Soviet offer, Khrushchev threatened a possible Soviet-German a l l i a n c e , s i m i l a r to the 1939  treaty.  them with Later, at  an informal reception, Khrushchev pressed the French for reconsideration of h i s Soviet-French  a l l i a n c e proposal.  He told Mollett and Pineau:  Make use of t h i s opportunity; either you accept our f r i e n d ship or you turn against us. I f you won't accept our f r i e n d s h i p — a n d I am warning you—we w i l l reach an understanding with Germany. We are now i n 1939« The decision must be reached quickly. I f not, you w i l l be i s o l a t e d . . . .It i s Germany that i s the decisive element. This Germany wants more space. I f she i s rearmed she w i l l not turn against the  123 East because we are strong now. She will turn against Belguim, Holland and France. This Germany w i l l look for an alliance with us. You have the choice. Remember what I told you, think i t over, and calculate. Our friendship could be an element of peace in Europe. I drink to Franco-Soviet friendship. 5 2  Later i n the summer of 1957, Guy Mollett met Konrad Adenauer and the two Western European leaders talked about their conversations with Khrushchev. . Mollett told Adenauer about Khrushchev's repeated suggestion of an antiGerman Soviet-French alliance.  Adenauer then told Mollett that a similar  tactic was played upon him by the Soviet leader.  Adenauer said that  Khrushchev insisted that the best road for Germany to follow was the road of cooperation with Russia because "no one w i l l be i n a position to menace Germany i f she marches hand i n hand with the Soviet Union." In November, 1958 another Soviet threat occurred when Khrushchev threatened to sign a peace treaty with Eastern Germany in six months unless the status of West Berlin was changed to a "free city."  The West  ignored the threat and the deadline passed without incident. Westerners believe that sometimes the Soviets use threats to impress doubters and rivals at home more than to impress Western diplomats. 7 2  i  n  the main,  however, Westerners appear to believe strongly that threats or offers of rewards from the Soviets "are either to cajole or frighten others into one-sided concessions."  28  The most pronounced part of this tactic i s the  use of the threat rather than the lure of friendship. Khrushchev, for example, was very open: in his threats to nations, large and small.  "His-  tory recounts few examples of a senior statesman who squandered and blunted his power to make threats so completely as Khrushchev did."29  One  American diplomat believes that the Soviet threat tactic i s a calculated  instrument of fear i n the conduct of foreign relations.3° The Russians have threatened to destroy particular countries with long-range missiles. They either publicly inform or privately notify through diplomatic channels a certain nation that i t faces individual disaster i f i t follows 31 a certain policy.  The Soviets intend to weaken their opponents bar-  gaining position by scaring them into seeking some sort of conciliatory policy vis-ra-vis Russia.  Westerners believe that the Soviet use of  threats and friendship i n negotiations i s methodically planned as an instrument of fear or favour.  In contrast, although Westerners them-  selves have used threats in their diplomacy, such as John Foster Dulles' threat to "unleash Chiang Kai-shek" and his threat of "agonizing reappraisals" of American support toward France, the use of threats appears to be sporadic in Western diplomacy.  Moreover, no nation in the  Communist bloc, except Russia, i s threatened with selective, nuclear annihilation by the West. Although massive retaliation i s a form of Western nuclear backmail directed against the Russians, Western nations have not threatened, for example, Rumania, with devastation as the Soviet Government has threatened Norway. The f i f t h overt offensive tactic i s the tactic of absolving the Soviet Union from Western criticism by accusing the West of the very same thing that the Soviets are practicing.  To Westerners, the use of  this tactic implies that a Soviet double standard exists.  For example,  during the Korean war, the Soviets continually charged the West with mistreating North Korean and Communist Chinese prisoners of war.  To  show how prisoners were treated, the United Nations forces i n Korea allowed the International Red Cross to have access to their prisoners. In contrast, the Communists refused the Red Cross access to their prisoners, but s t i l l continued to castigate the United Nations for mistreatment of Communist soldiers.32 Another example of this Soviet tactic appeared at a series of meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.  The Soviet rep-  resentative declined to elaborate and explain certain vague and ambiguous proposals which he had put forward regarding disarmament. Even under Western pressure to c l a r i f y some points, the Soviet representative refused, charging that Western efforts to secure explanations from him were merely playing with questions and answers.33  At another disarma-  ment meeting, the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, criticized the West for tying proposals together so that they became complicated and d i f f i c u l t . He complained that the suspension of the production of nuclear weapons was unrelated to a suspension of nuclear tests and that the West was wrong to want them together i n a test-ban agreement. Although Mr. Zorin's point may have been well taken, he went on to propose the very same type of inter-connected agreement that the West sought.  Zorin said that the  Russians could not "agree to stop the further production of nuclear weapons without an accompanying declaration renouncing the use of nuclear weapons that existed.  The Economist commented on this Soviet tactic by  saying: "Thus, Zorin seems to have joined in the game of inter-relating different questions which, when the West did i t , saddened him so."3  4  126.  One of the most frequent illustrations of this tactic was the repetitive Soviet charge of American imperialism.  This Soviet charge  probably was intended to make the Western charge of Soviet colonialism in Eastern Europe appear rather weak. Philip Mosely aptly sums up the Intent of the repetitive Soviet charges of Western imperialism when he says: The technique of playing up grievances {such as bitter condemnation of Western imperialism^ i s to wear down Western negotiators, so their criticism'of Soviet satellite policy [caiD be faced with greater equanimity. Also, by these tactics the Soviet negotiators uphold their reputation for anti-colonialism. 35 This Soviet tactic of accusing the West of practicing policies similar to the Russian policies which are under Western attack i s an excellent example of psychological self-profaction operating at the nation-state level.  Subtle Tactics. The next group of Soviet offensive maneuvers can be described as subtle.  These subtle tactics are such that, unlike the other tacties,  Westerners are unaware at f i r s t that the Soviets are u t i l i z i n g them. There are six Soviet negotiating tactics which can be classified as subtle.  First, there appears to be a deliberate misuse of words by  Soviet diplomats.  Second, there i s exploitation of certain personal  characteristics of Western negotiators. Third, there i s exploitation of the slightest Western infraction in order to release the Soviets from an obligation. Fourth, there i s the tactic of abandoning one point in dispute in order to win another. Fifth, there i s the tactic  of using harmless words or phrases to gain an advantage over the West. Sixth, there i s the use of social events as sounding boards as well as a means to gain concessions. The f i r s t subtle tactic i s the deliberate misuse of words. Although Western diplomats allow for translation misunderstandings, there appears to be a feeling among Westerners that misinterpretation of meanings through translation i s exploited by the Soviet Union in order to absolve certain Soviet policies from Western criticism.  One  of the most bitter disputes which continued for years between the Soviets and the West was over a phrase used at Yalta.  During the Yalta  meetings, the Soviets repeatedly pressed the West for a reparations figure based on the amount that Germany ought to pa?  MIST  war victims.  Realizing the devastating and tragic effects that reparations had on Germany after World War I, Roosevelt and Churchill were not keen to repeat any reparation demands. On the other hand, knowing the wholesale damage that Germany had inflicted upon Russia, they believed that the Soviet Union deserved reparations, but they felt i t was wrong at that time to specify amounts. Moreover, the West insisted that any German reparations be taken out of current productiom and not out of i t s limited assets, otherwise economic chaos would follow i f Germany lost her productive capacity.  Stalin insisted on the figure of twenty b i l l i o n  dollars for reparations hut the West felt i t was too high.  The Soviet  Union i t s e l f wanted ten b i l l i o n dollars in German reparations.  Moreover,  ±t did not want to wait for reparations to come out of current German production.  The Soviets wanted to seize German assets such as machinery,  and whole factories immediately.  Finally, a compromise was reached.  128 The West agreed to accept the Soviet figure of twenty b i l l i o n dollars as a "basis of discussion."  Both the Soviets and the West agreed that the  figure of twenty-billion dollars was not to be mentioned i n the communique summing up the decisions of the Yalta Conference because the amount was only a suggestion.  "Stalin agreed there was no commitment to the amount  he suggested and he accepted the Western statement that i t was to be used as a basis for discussion."3° Although at Yalta the Soviets appeared to understand what a basis of discussion meant, for years afterwards they insisted that the West had agreed to the reparations figure of twenty b i l l i o n dollars. They would not listen to Western explanations of a "basis of discussion," and for many years the West and the Soviets b i t terly haggled over reparations.  Nevertheless, the haggling did not  prevent the Soviets from seizing huge quantities of machinery and supplies from Germany.  The Soviets applied a great deal of pressure upon the  West to accept the reparations figure mainly to justify their seizures, but the West refused.  Eventually the Soviets started to c a l l opponents 37  of their figures pro-fascist.  It i s d i f f i c u l t to know whether the  Soviets sincerely believed that "basis of discussion" meant acceptance in fact, but, according to Stettinius, Stalin knew there was no commitment.  So the suggestion that the Soviets try to exploit word differences,  seems valid. Another example of this tactic occurred at the September, 19^5 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the Soviets requested trusteeship over Tripolitania.  The Russians wanted sole trusteeship  over this Italian African colony.  A few months later the Soviets also  requested sole trusteeship over the port of Massawa i n E r i t r e a .  Molotov  asked S t e t t i n i u s , the American Secretary of State during an informal meeting, for h i s opinion about Soviet trusteeship proposals.  According to  David J . D a l l i n , S t e t t i n i u s , not r e a l i z i n g the intent of Molotov's informal conversations, stated tha£ i n h i s view the. Soviet Union was " e l i g i b l e " f o r trusteeships ship] demands on t h i s  "Molotov then t r i e d to base h i s [jb ' - -  'promise'•.  rus  t  ;ee  When James Byrnes succeeded S t e t t i n i u s ,  he met with trouble when he t r i e d to repudiate the half-pledge of his predecessor."3°  For sixteen months, the Soviets claimed that S t e t t i n i u s  had pledged to give the proposed trusteeship areas to the Soviet Union. Had i t not been f o r . . .Bevin's consistent r e j e c t i o n of the proposal, the Soviet Union might today possess substantial t e r r i t o r y i n North and East A f r i c a . When Molotov became convinced that B r i t a i n ' s opposition could not be overcome, he s h i f t e d the proposal to " c o l l e c t i v e r u l e " with I t a l y i n T r i p o l i t a n i a . This proposal was rejected. In the end none of Molotov's proposals were accepted. . . . -[Nevertheless] discussion of the issue also carried on i n the~ United Nations and l a s t e d f o r several years.39 D a l l i n s implication i s that the Soviets knew what the word " e l i g i b l e " 1  r e a l l y meant but t r i e d to exploit i t claiming word differences. Another i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s Soviet t a c t i c of d e l i b e r a t e l y misusing words occurred at the Geneva Summit meetings i n July, 1955. At Geneva the Soviets agreed that the r e u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany was to be c a r r i e d out by means o f free elections.  The Western heads of govern-  ment apparently thought that they had obtained an agreement with the Soviets f o r free elections, but the Soviets q u a l i f i e d t h e i r agreement by saying that the u n i f i c a t i o n had t o be c a r r i e d out i n conformity  with  130 the i n t e r e s t s of the German people and European s e c u r i t y .  The Soviets  also made i t p l a i n that u n i f i c a t i o n was impossible i f i t involved a b o l i t i o n of the Communist Government i n the Eastern Zone.  However, the  Soviets s t i l l maintained that they had agreed to free German e l e c t i o n s . The West was confused over these contradictory Soviet statements.  Later,  at the Foreign Ministers meeting i n November, 1955, Molotov again stated that the Soviet Union agreed to free elections and no matter what the outcome, the East German Communists had to form part of any new government.  "The Russians continued to talk of free elections but they made  i t c l e a r that the words were meaningless."  40  The r e a l Soviet purpose  of agreeing to free German elections seems to have been a desire to get diplomatic recognition for Eastern Germany based on a Western compromise i n response to the Soviet "concession" to hold free e l e c t i o n s . Another example of the Soviet misuse or twisting of words and phrases occurred at the disarmament negotiations of  I960.  In 1959 the  General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously passed a r e s o l u t i o n containing a sentence which said that the "question of general and complete disarmament i s the most important one facing the world today." The Soviets "interpreted" t h i s resolution as an endorsement of t h e i r disarmament p o s i t i o n .  The Soviet delegates at the disarmament con-  ferences of I960 t r i e d to obtain Western acceptance of general and complete disarmament, with v e r i f i c a t i o n and controls temporarily  ignored,  by claiming that the United Nations supported and even recommended the Soviet plan.  The United States representative, Frederick Eaton, com-  mented on t h i s Soviet t a c t i c :  131 I again recall, how, with diabolical s k i l l , the terms of the United Nations resolution. . .have been interpreted and distorted and how for the last six weeks that resolution has been represented as obliging us to approve a l l the Soviet proposals exactly as they stand. We have fallen into that trap once and. . .we shall not f a l l into i t again. 4l  The second subtle tactic i s Soviet exploitation of certain personal characteristics of Western negotiators i n order to win concessions.  Of a l l Soviet negotiators that Dulles had met, he con-  sidered Molotov the best.  Molotov excelled particularly i n exploit-  ing certain personal characteristics of his counterparts.  His tech-  niques were carried out with great s k i l l and shrewdness. As an observer at the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers from 19^5 to 1952, Dulles observed Molotov's performances at these  conferences  and wrote: I have seen in action a l l the great international statesmen of this .century beginning with those who met at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907* I have never seen personal diplomatic s k i l l at so high a degree of perfection as Mr. Molotov's. . .^2 Molotov's s k i l l , particularly i n the use of this subtle offensive tactic, i s illustrated by his actions toward these foreign ministers:  Bevin,  Bidault, Byrnes and Wang. American Secretary of State Byrnes spoke freely and many times extemporaneously.  According to Dulles, "he  was  able to talk men into agreement but he was not always legally precise."^ Frequently Molotov sought to exploit Byrnes' habit of. speaking extemporaneously.  He always sought to seize some phrase that Byrnes might  have carelessly uttered and which could have been of benefit to the Soviet Union. For example,  132 After Byrnes had spoken, Molotov would frequently say that he was perplexed because Mr. Byrnes had seemed to state his position i n slightly different ways. What precisely was i t that he proposed? Would hot Mr. Byrnes be good enough to c l a r i f y i t ? Molotov obviously hoped, that by evoking statements and re-statements that were extemporaneous, he might bring about a misstatement upon which he could seize. Byrnes eluded a l l dangerous p i t f a l l s . It was a game of wits that was fascinating to observe. t4i  With Bevin, Molotov adopted a different technique. The British Foreign Secretary was bluff and hearty, quickly angered but just as quickly repentant of his anger. Molotov would attempt to raise Bevin*s anger so that he would make an outburst and then he immediately sorry. After an outburst Bevin would be i n a more conciliatory mood for Molotov to obtain concessions from him.  For example,  On one occasion he provoked Bevin into saying that Molotov talked like Hitler. Molotov jumped to his feet saying that he had not come to London to be insulted by the British Foreign Minister. He l e f t his place at the table and stalked to the door. Bevin, with contrition, hastened to explain away his heated words, and, as a mark of sincerity, indicated that he would concede the point i n dispute. Molotov had been careful to open the door very slowly and got back long before the translation into Russian had been made. ^5 The Soviets never really approved of French participation at the Foreign Ministers meetings because they considered the French defeat by the Germans as a sign of weakness. It appeared to be Molotov's objective to provoke Bidault into leaving the meetings.  With this end i n  mind he played upon French sensitivity.*.-:.- which was particularly marked at this time. For the f i r s t time since the surrender of 19^0, France was sitting as an equal among the great powers. Having been excluded  from the important conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, French feeling was raw.  Molotov tried to insult French honour so that Bidault would with-  draw from the conference and Molotov would have one less opponent. Molotov used petty slights against the French to achieve this end. For example,  ,  Molotov would ask Bevin and Byrnes for a postponement by an hour of the time for a meeting and then would not t e l l Bidault. Bidault appearing punctually at the original hour, would s i t with growing impatience as no colleague appeared; or he would return to his hotel. On occasions he was on the verge of returning to Paris. But he always stopped short of falling into the trap which Molotov had set. ° Molotov also felt that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang, should not be at most of the foreign ministers conferences. Apparently the Soviets considered Chinese efforts during the Second World War as not adequate enough for i t to s i t as an equal. Molotov's technique was to ignore completely the Chinese Foreign Minister and he proceeded to act as i f Wang was absent. Wang rarely spoke and he could not be provoked. "Molotov made i t clear that China, or at least Nationalist China, was to him a cipher, and that Mr. Wang's seat might as well have been vacant." 7 4  Molotov was consistent i n his attempt to exploit personal characteristics of opposite negotiators.  His slow, impassive attitudes  often upset impatient Western negotiators. "Molotov invariably [tried] to take diplomatic advantage of a colleague who [had become emotional]. . . . His infintely slow method of bargaining. . .won him points from his impetuous friends." " 4  Even with Molotov gone, the exploitation of  personal characteristics s t i l l seems to be accepted among Westerners as  a facet of Soviet negotiating behavior.  Perhaps Soviet diplomats today  are not as clever as Molotov in u t i l i z i n g this tactic because Molotov "was a master of emotions, a clever manipulator of the passions of others. . .He was capable of inciting rage and fury, hate and anger, provoking his opponents into panic and intemperate outbursts." ^ 4  Nevertheless, Soviet charges against the West s t i l l provoke Western anger, particularly in the United Nations.  It also appears that Soviet diplomats  have a huge f i l e of information about the characteristics of Western negotiators. If i t i s true that Soviet diplomats as well as Communist Party members and sympathizers i n non-Communist countries supply the Soviet Union with information on anyone of p o l i t i c a l importance, then undoubtedly the Soviets plan to use this information.5° One such way to use this information-is through the subtle offensive Soviet negotiating tactic of exploiting the characteristics of Western negotiators. The third subtle tactic employed by the Soviets i s the attempt to exploit Western infractions so that the Soviet Union can be released from obligations. When negotiating with the Soviets, Westerners feel they must be legally precise to the 'nth degree.  Yet i t i s ironic for  the Soviets to insist on judging Western actions by the strict letter of the law while the Soviets themselves violate treaties with impunity. According to Thomas Bailey, "agreements are freely broken by Moscow. . . on the pretext that one i s released from a l l obligations i f one can find the other signatory guilty of the slightest infraction."5  1  An  example of how the Soviets have sought to absolve themselves from obligations when there was a Western infraction i s an agreement between  the West and the Soviets during the Second World War.  In 1942 the West  was losing a great many convoy ships going with supplies around the North Cape to Murmansk and Archangel from the north of Scotland and Iceland.  In an effort to give convoy ships to Russia more protection,  the British asked Soviet permission i f they could establish a squadron of planes i n Murmansk and i f the Soviet Government would establish quarters for five hundred officers and men.  The Soviets agreed, but when  the squadron and i t s planes arrived i n Murmansk, the Russians counted seven hundred personnel and claimed that the British had violated their agreement. The Soviet Government cancelled permission for the squadron to operate out of Murmansk.52 Even though i t was i n the interests of the Soviet Union to have the British squadron i n Murmansk to protect supply ships, the Soviet Union insisted on five hundred officers and and no more.  men  Whether they suspected that the other two hundred were  spies i s not clear.  William Standley, former American Ambassador to the  Soviet Union, warned Westerners about this Soviet tactic when he advised Western diplomats "to keep their promises or else the Russians would feel justified to break major agreements over a slight infraction."53 The sacrificing of secondary objectives for a primary one i s the fourth subtle offensive tactic.  The Soviets frequently abandon one  point i n dispute, deliberately a minor one, i n order to win an agreement on a major point. Former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, claimed that this tactic was evident throughout the negotiations of 1948 and 1949 between the Soviets and the ¥/est over the  Berlin Blockade.  By 1949, the French, British and Americans had decided  to allow their three zones i n Germany to coalesce into the German Federal Republic but the Soviets were violently opposed to a separate German state oriented toward the West. The Soviets put up the Berlin Blockade as a desperate measure to block Western plans.  The Soviet objective  of the Blockade was to force the West to postpone indefinitely the West German Constitutional Convention.  Believing that the West would not  allow West Berliners to starve, the Soviets felt that they could bargain away the blockade for a Western commitment not to allow a West German state, but the Soviets never approached the West i n this matter directly. Instead, they bickered over currency, a secondary point.  After much  haggling, the Soviets said they would abandon their currency plan i f the West dropped i t s plan for a new German state.  Smith says that this tac-  t i c was characteristic of the Soviets i n that the main issue was never approached directly or made an outright condition for the l i f t i n g of the blockade.  Instead, the question of currency, actually unimportant, was 54  treated as the main xssue. Another example of this tactic appeared i n the discussions of Austrian reparations.  The Soviets strongly supported Yugoslavia's claims  for Austrian reparations.  But i t soon became evident that Molotov was  prepared to abandon his advocacy of Yugoslavian claims i f the Soviet monetary figures for Austrian reparations to the Soviet Union were accepted by the West. The Soviet reparation charges against Austria apparently were so large that i f Austria were to have paid out the f u l l amount i t would have financially collapsed.55  As a result of this  tactic, YJesterners believe that some proposals may not be as legitimate as the Soviets make them out to he and that i n fact certain Soviet proposals may be merely intended to be bargained off for another point. The f i f t h subtle offensive tactic i s the Soviet use of seemingly harmless words i n communiques, agendas, and agreements in order to have the West unwittingly commit i t s e l f to a point.  An example of this tactic  occurred i n 1945 during the Berlin Blockade negotiations.  After a series  of meetings i n Moscow which ended i n deadlock over the blockade, Stalin wanted the West to agree to a communique which stated that the  formation  of a Western German Government was discussed and that a"mutual understanding was reached." Taken by themselves, these words would seem harmless enough to the average Western reader—indeed^ they might seem desirable as indicating a friendly understanding. But. . .the Germans and Western Europeans. . .jjaie\£jvery well that i t was impossible to reach mutual understanding unless we had secretly accepted the Soviet condition and had agreed to abandon the Western German Government idea in exchange for some blockade concessions. . . .-  >D  The Russians also used this tactic during the war crime negotiations. For example, in a paper on German war crimes against the Soviet Union, the Soviet delegates defined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as containing such areas as Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  The  Soviets wanted the West to approve the charges of war crimes upon the Soviet Union as defined but the Western delegates suspected that i f they did,  their signatures would constitute recognition of the incorporation  of the Baltic states into the U.S.S.R. Russian diplomats told the United States representatives that their signatures on the indictment  would not involve any recognition of the Baltic states.  But the chief  American legal representative, aware of the Russians having broken their oral promises i n the past, insisted that a clause stating non-diplomatic 57  recognition be added to the indictment. Soviets stated:  In another indictment  the  "In September 1941, 925 Polish officers who were  prisoners of war were k i l l e d in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk."  The  West had doubts as to the validty of the allegations but approved i t because i t was up to the Soviet Union to prove i t s charges. Moreover, the West felt that the Soviets had a right to produce the indictment. Later, however, the Soviets insisted on changing the indictment to read that 11,000 instead of 925 Polish officers were k i l l e d at Katyn. Having approved the original charge, the West had to approve the change i n the indictment.5  8  Hence, the Soviet aim was clear:  i t could now state  that the West supported the Soviet claim that the Germans were responsible for the Katyn Forest massacre, although the weight of the evidence rested upon the Soviet Union.. At the end of the i960 Ten Nation Disarmament Committee meetings, Soviet delegate. :Zorin produced a communique which summarized the Committee's activities.  It contained the seemingly harmless sentence  that "the members of the Committee recognized the need to continue, after the recess, negotiations on the working out of the basic principles and a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control i n accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution on general and complete disarmament." But the Western negotiators refused to approve the communique because  because Zorin had d e l i b e r a t e l y distorted the United Nations resolution although i t appeared to be a harmless d i s t o r t i o n .  Consequently, no  59 communique was adopted. At the 1955 Summit meeting, when discussing an agenda f o r the foreign ministers, Bulganin and Khrushchev introduced a plan f o r a nonaggression treaty between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact.  But they  wanted the foreign ministers to discuss the subject without the Big Four leaders having a chance to consider i t .  Eden said that heysaw  dangers of confusion and delay i f they had to debate the new Russian proposal which the heads of government had not even discussed.  , , D  °  However, the Russian leaders won t h e i r point and t h e i r proposal was put on the foreign ministers agenda.  The Soviet purpose seems to have  been t o claim that the West had agreed i n p r i n c i p l e to a non-aggression treaty which would then imply Western diplomatic recognition of Eastern Germany.  But the Western foreign ministers refused £„Q consider  the Soviet proposal s e r i o u s l y . The s i x t h and f i n a l Soviet offensive t a c t i c which can be c l a s s i f i e d as subtle i s the use of s o c i a l events for sounding board techniques and as a method to gain concessions.  This t a c t i c i s common to a l l  diplomats so i t i s not too revealing to say that Russian diplomats also utilize i t .  During the early period of the B e r l i n Kommandatura, a  great many s o c i a l events were held at which diplomats and o f f i c e r s of the Kommandatura attended. According  to American Commander Howley, the  American parties were held simply to s o c i a l i z e whereas the Russian  140 p a r t i e s were held for "sounding board purposes."  Howley claims that the  Russians used great amounts of vodka as a lubricant for the tongues of Western diplomats.  "On one occasion my interpreter was standing d i r e c t l y  behind Marshall Zhukov when he turned away from a woozy French and said  diplomat  [to a Soviet diplomat] disgustedly, 'come on, we've got  thing from t h i s fellow we are going to g e t .  M , D l  every-  General Deane claimed  that any party with the Soviets i n e v i t a b l y contained innumerable toasts and unlimited quantities of vodka.°  2  Winston C h u r c h i l l wrote i n h i s  memoirs about the practice of innumerable Soviet toasts and also implied that the Soviets attempted to extract information or concessions from Western diplomats with huge quantities of vodka.  A f t e r one of the  many toasts at a Soviet party, C h u r c h i l l said that: S t a l i n and I drained our glasses at a stroke. . . .After a pause, S t a l i n said, " I f you f i n d i t impossible to give us a f o r t i f i e d p o s i t i o n i n the Marmora, could we not have a base at Dedeagatch?" I contained myself with saying, "I w i l l always support Russia's glaim to the freedom of the seas a l l the year round." ** Another example of this s o c i a l t a c t i c occurred during the Y a l t a meetings.  The Soviet m i l i t a r y advisers held a dinner-party one  evening  and i n v i t e d Byrnes and Admiral King, one of Roosevelt's m i l i t a r y advisers to attend.  There was a great deal of vodka and sherry but  apparently the two Americans drank l i t t l e . At the end of dinner, the Soviet vice*admiral handed King a. . .document jon war supplies for the Soviet Union from the United States which he wanted King to s i g n ] . . . .King said he would show-it to the Secretary of the Navy, [this disappointed] the Soviet o f f i c e r s who repeatedly attempted by persuasion, f l a t t e r y and vodka to induce King to sign, but without success. The Soviet vice-admiral. . .seemed grim and downcast. . . .  141 Westerners consider not only liquor but also lavish food as part of Soviet social tactics.  At social events, "food and drink are  plentiful, for seemingly the Russians rely heavily upon the pleasures 65 of the table to attain their wishes." ^  With respect to food, apparently  lavish luncheons and dinners are a Soviet trademark, particularly for anyone who may be helpful to the Soviets.  For example, during the  Second World War, the Soviets very efficiently made studies of the routing procedures of lend-lease supplies from the United States.*'  The  Soviets sought out people, regardless of how modest their jobs were i n the lend-lease department, i n order to get favours from them regarding different items, particularly those in short supply, i n return for social invitations.  The Soviets invited these people to informal but lavish  luncheons and dinners. No one who was working constantly with Soviet o f f i c i a l s failed to appreciate that these dinners and luncheon had coincided with requests for specific items-which Soviet o f f i c i a l s believed hard to obtain.66 In recent years, Westerners have not written much about this Soviet social tactic presumably because a l l diplomats use i t and i t i s considered normal diplomatic practice. However, Westerners imply that one ought not to feel flattered i f he i s invited to a Soviet::; diplomatic social function.  Instead he should be wary.  Exploitation of Western Inclinations. The next group of Soviet offensive maneuvers can best be described as those which exploit the inclinations of Western diplomats to seek agreements quickly, to have a compromising s p i r i t , to: reward compromise  with further compromise, and to make public statements.  Also i t appears  from perusing Western writings about negotiating with Soviet diplomats, that the Russians attempt to gain concessions from the West by having their diplomats occasionally appear as Westerners would like them to appear.  That i s conciliatory, friendly, and compromising, so that i n  turn Westerners reciprocate these qualities.  There are four Soviet tac-  tics which try to exploit these Western inclinations.  First, there are  Russian compromises on part of rather than on a whole proposal.  This  tactic i s intended to embarrass the West because i f the West does not compromise or insists on more than partial agreement to a proposal, the Soviets then accuse the West of rejecting Soviet compromises and of being insincere.  Moreover, the Soviets w i l l also make out that a necessary  compromise on their part i s a major concession. compromises.  Second, there are psuedo-  In order to gain concessions from the West, the Soviets  appear to compromise when i n fact they do not.  Third, there i s exploit-  ation of different Western public statements to try to demonstrate how weak the Western negotiators position i s .  Fourth, there i s the "freeze  and thaw" method. The first tactic, that of partial compromise, has been called the "upside down negotiating technique" by James J . Wadsworth who also maintains that partial compromise i s a "time-worn tactic of Soviet negotiators."  °7  For example, at a series of meetings at Geneva in  I960  over  the suspension of nuclear tests, the Soviets presented a document which proposed a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests without referring to control and verification.  When the West refused to consider  such a document without the mention of control, the Soviets said they  would concede and then r e f e r r e d nebuously to some controls to police the ban.  But the West would not accept the document until the types of con-  trols which would be used as well as the type of organization which would police the test-ban were defined.  When the West refused the Soviet plan  and later, the Soviet "compromise," the Russians charged the West with insincerity.68 The second Soviet tactic, like the f i r s t , tries to exploit the inclination' of Western diplomats to reward an opposite negotiator's compromise with a compromise of their own.  However, this Soviet tactic,  unlike the f i r s t , only produces the appearance of a compromise.  For  example, according to Robert Murphy, during the Berlin Blockade negotiations, the Soviets proposed "outrageous conditions [which made any settlement^ impossible.  But after weeks of talk Malik receded from his  extreme position thus giving the impression of substantial Soviet concessions.""-^  A Soviet representative w i l l also try to lead his Western  counterpart into believing that he w i l l compromise as the West compromises. A classic example of this Soviet tactic occurred during the negotiations on the refugee organization.  The Russians had taken an  active interest i n the constitution of the International Refugee Organization and the West had hoped that the Soviet Union would join.  But  the Soviet Union had so many reservations about the I.R.O. that the West decided to remold the refugee . organization as the Soviets wanted i n order to have them join i t . The other powers weakened the constitution of that organization considerably in order to meet ^Soviet objections, but in the end the Soviet Union did not join. There i s now in operation, consequently, an organization that not only does not have the membership of the Soviet Union but i s much weaker than i t would have been but for Moscow's amendment.70  Another example of this tactic appeared at the 1954 Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers. Molotov had adamantly maintained at Geneva that i f any future all-German government could not reject N.A.T.O. then i t was not a sovereign government. So Eden changed his plan for German reunification, with the advice of Bidault and Dulles, to read that an all-German government would be free to reject any previously concluded agreement. But instead of approving Eden's plan with the new provision, Molotov rejected i t .  Dulles complained bitterly about Molotov's methods  of negotiating, especially after the amendment was made to Eden's plan in order to please Molotov.71 The third Soviet tactic exploits the Western tendency to disagree publicly.  The Soviets utilize different public statements made by  Western leaders in attempts to. weaken the case of Western negotiators. Inter-allied disputes are quoted frequently by Soviet diplomats who try to divide Western negotiators and weaken their bargaining position. Moreover, the public statements of Western government opposition leaders and Western scientists are quoted by the Soviets i n attempts to point out flaws of the appearance thereof i n Western positions. "Public statements about some issues involved i n negotiations give the Soviets an advantage because the Soviet representatives can see the strength with which Western positions are heldl'72  the Security Council, Henry  Cabot Lodge, former AmericanrrepEessntative,  frequently encountered this  Soviet tactic of presenting opposing Western statements i n the hope of discrediting an o f f i c i a l 'Western stand.  At one such meeting, Lodge said:  "I saw a Polish representative waving a copy of an American magazine. . .  which contained an article which happened to suit the argument he was making at the time.  He did so with the expression of triumph on his face  Westerners, however, do not mind this Soviet tactic because they ©an point to different Western views over policy as a prime example of the type of diversity that exists i n a democracy. The fourth Soviet tactic i s to act politely, then discourteously, in order to make Western diplomats think that something they said or did caused the Russians to behave i n such a manner. Westerners see themselves trying to regain Russian amiability by offering Soviet diplomats concessions.  From the early period of the Second World War,whether  conferences were in London, Washington, or Moscow, many Westerners have observed this "freeze and thaw" i n Soviet behavior.  That i s , a pleasant  f i r s t meeting with the Soviets was followed by a rude, cold second meeting which i n turn was followed by ah extremely friendly third meeting. Whenever the Big Four leaders met during the war "the same technique 74 was.  . .encountered."  To repair Soviet friendship after a depressing  second meeting, Westerners sometimes offered a concession as a peace token because they felt they had insulted the Soviets.  William Standley,  former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union aptly described this Soviet tactic: From my own experience, I believe i t i s a Soviet technique for negotiation—first day, a l l smiles, enthusiasm, visitors on top of the world; second day, the big freeze, nothing right, insults, visitors i n depths of gloom, got to give the Soviets something to mske them happy again. Third day, with or without concession, a big thaw, sunny skies, everything fine with' the world.75 Churchill encountered this Soviet tactic in his f i r s t meeting with  Stalin i n June, 1942.  Churchill had gone to Moscow specifically to t e l l  Stalin that there would be no second front i n 1942 and that he disagreed with the plans for an invasion of France. Churchill's f i r s t meeting with Stalin was pleasant, but the second meeting was blunt and cold.  At the  second meeting, Stalin castigated the Western Allies for a refusal to start a second front i n 1942.  He complained that most of the weight of  the German Army was upon Russia and he wondered i f that was the way the West preferred i t .  Presumably Stalin used this freeze amd thaw tactic  because he wanted Churchill to make amends by agreeing to an early second front, but Churchill remained adamant i n his position. Next meeting, however, Stalin was another person—courteous and complimentary. Harriman told Churchill that the reversal of attitude was probably not due to Stalin at a l l , because Eden, Beaverbrook, and Harriman himself had a l l experienced thefreeze and thaw ftethod,^ This Soviet tactic of freeze and thaw seems to have been used mainly during the Second World War. It does not appear to have been used i n the cold war. However, i t has re-appeared i n the disarmament negotiations of the past few years, so i t seems that as relations between Russia and the West improve, the freeze and thaw tactic may be more frequently encountered,., by Western negotiators.  It seems that the freeze and thaw tactic can  be effective!;, only when the West i s concerned about Soviet reactions.  CHAPTER VII SOVIET DUPLICITY TACTICS IN NEGOTIATIONS Improbity has been a major characteristic of Soviet behavior.  In  their dealings with the West, Soviet diplomats have, according to Western observers, used chicanery, deceit, perfidy, and prevarication. they do not appear disturbed at their unscrupulous behavior.  Moreover, In fact,  the practice of dishonesty seems acceptable to the Russians who defend i t on the grounds of class warfare and Communist dialectics.  1  The use of  deception i n dealing with the class enemy i s deeply imbedded i n Communist doctrine and i n practice the Soviets have been consistent with this doctrine. A l l forms of Soviet dishonesty can be described, as Vernon V. Aspaturian suggests, i n terms of duplicity. The failure of a world socialist revolution to occur after the First World War indicated to the Soviets that Russia would have to coexist, albeit temporarily, with unfriendly capitalist nations.  Having  to accommodate i t s e l f to "bourgeois diplomacy," the Soviets modelled much of their diplomatic behavior upon Engels* version of Czarist diplomacy which the Soviets believed was typical of a l l "bourgeois" diplomacy.  The  Russians maintained that bourgeois diplomacy represented the pursuit of capitalist interests.  According to the Soviet interpretation, a l l  pro-Soviet diplomacy was characterized by deception.  Indeed,  iStaTih .'S.aid isha.it deception i s a characteristic sore of capitalist diplomacy.  2  The Russians believed that Soviet diplomacy had to adopt  many of the techniques of bourgeois diplomacy, ensure the survival of their new state.  including deception, to  Their ideological approach to  deception reinforced their belief that duplicity was a characteristic of interstate relations.  Dishonesty became a major facet of Soviet behavior.  Later, i t supplemented other tactics designed to make Soviet diplomacy another instrument for advancing Communism. Vernon V. Aspaturian .aptly defines Soviet duplicity as "a calculated device to be cultivated, refined, and designed i n advance for use as a continuous instrument of 3 diplomacy i n dealing with the class enemy." Western diplomats who have negotiated with their Soviet counterparts claim that Russian deception has to be expected i n addition to other negotiating tactics.  Soviet diplomats have used duplicity tactics  largely i n attempts to take advantage of the West by simulating agreements and by not implementing the terms of an agreement.  Ironically, the tactics  of duplicity have been utilized many times v/hen relations between the West and the East were i n a state of cooperation rather than i n a state of hyper-tension.  During the Second World War, the West, particularly the  Americans, became more trusting of the Soviets, and i t was this attitude which the Soviets attempted to exploit through such methods as duplicity. In order to maintain Western friendship and aid, the Soviets f e l t that i t was necessary to agree-to Western proposals more than just occasionally. Even i f i t meant agreeing to something which the Soviets disliked, they s t i l l would agree but with the aim i n mind of withholding practical implementation until the terms of agreement were no longer pertinent. Most examples of Soviet duplicity are discovered i n the Second World War or the late 1940's.  During the 1 9 5 0 ' s and early 1960's, there  seems to have been a decline i n the usage of Soviet duplicity tactics primarily because of the few agreements that have been negotiated between the Soviet Union and the West. Also, because the cold war Baas abated and yielded to the era of peaceful coexistence, the Soviets do not seem to feel that i t i s to their advantage at this moment i n their historical development to u t i l i z e too many duplicity tactics against the West. Soviet duplicity tactics are more of a phenomenon of the Leninist-Stalinist era because these tactics have not formed a predominant Soviet behavioral pattern i n the Khrushchev era.  Recent Soviet negotiating  behavior indicates that the Soviets have used duplicity tactics sparingly, partly because they undoubtedly realize that there i s a greater awareness and suspicion of Soviet motives among Western diplomats. However, although there are not many practical illustrations available of Soviet duplicity tactics which have been used in negotiations with the West during the past ten years, some Westerners claim that the Soviets w i l l s t i l l use duplicity when they see that i t can be of benefit to them. These Westerners believe that the Soviets are s t i l l upholding Lenin's teachings that the deliberate l i e should be made an instrument of policy.  For example, Edward Crankshaw, a British journalist, wrote i n  1962 that:  v  The Communists have cultivated the deliberate l i e as an instrument of policy. . . .The traditional attitude persists. It was immeasurably fortified by Lenin. . . who exalted the deliberate l i e into a major weapon. . . . It was seized on and developed by Stalin, who carried cold-blooded deception and duplicity to positively dizzy heights. Khrushchev has upheld the tradition. . .  150 On the other hand, much of what has appeared to Westerners as Soviet d u p l i c i t y may have appeared to the Soviets as a proper d i a l e c t i c move.  To describe behavior s t r i c t l y i n terms of honesty and deceit may  sometimes be misleading when values are based upon d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l perspectives.  For example, Vernon V. Aspaturian maintains that:  The Soviet Union can simultaneously observe and v i o l a t e norms of diplomacy and international law since i t may be observing them i n the s o c i a l i s t sense and v i o l a t i n g them i n the bourgeois sense. This i s quite compatible with Soviet d i a l e c t i c s , but i n the Western mind, i t i s i n d i s tinguishable from d u p l i c i t y . 5 Nevertheless, although the Soviet Union'ssinterpretation of i t s deceptive practices may be defended to i t s own s a t i s f a c t i o n on i d e o l o g i c a l grounds, Aspaturian i s correct when he says that Westerners view such Soviet practices as s t r i c t l y deliberate deception.  However, i t i s wrong to make  a blanket claim that Soviet actions invariably are d e c e i t f u l because there are f i e l d s , such as economic trade with the West, i n which Soviet dealings are scrupulous. Many Western accusations of Soviet d u p l i c i t y during the Second World War f a i l to take into account the attitudes and practices of Westerners, p a r t i c u l a r l y Americans.  Part of the d i f f i c u l t y of dealing  with the Soviets was brought on during the Second World War by the Western i n c l i n a t i o n to t r y always to reach some form of agreement. One of the major p i t f a l l s i n wartime Anglo-American negotiations with the Soviet Union was the Western tendency to r e l y upon reaching an agreement i n p r i n c i p l e without s p e l l i n g out i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l a l l the steps i n i t s execution. After long and strenuous debates, studded with charges, accusations and suspicions, i t was undoubtedly a great r e l i e f to Westerners to reach a somewhat generally worded agreement and to go home.  This Western tendency probably encouraged the Soviets to simulate agreements.  On the other hand, even when this Western tendency changed to  one of suspicion and wariness i n the late 19^0's, Russian diplomats s t i l l attempted to u t i l i z e tactics of duplicity similar to those that were used during the Second. World War.  Stalin seems to have used more deceptive  methods than Khrushchev. For example, throughout the Berlin Blockade negotiations, Westerners claimed that Soviet duplicity was particularly marked. 6,  Former American Defence Secretary Forrestal said on September ,  19^8:  This i s the seventy-fourth day since the blockade. . . .The sheer duplicity of the Soviets during these negotiations i s beyond the experience of the experts in the State Department with the result that any future promise made by the Soviets i s to be evaluated with great caution. It appears that they do not mind lying or even our knowing that they l i e , as long as i t i s for the benefit of the State.7 Western negotiators have observed three specific Soviet tactics of duplicity.  F i r s t , there i s the Soviet tactic of agreeing to a point  verbal or written, and then violating the terms of reference.  Second,  there i s the tactic of agreeing i n principle to a point but postponing practical implementation so that the agreement i s not f u l f i l l e d .  Third,  there i s the tactic of outright lying. The f i r s t Soviet tactic of duplicity refers to a verbal or written agreement which i s subsequently violated by the Soviet Government. Perhaps the most blatant example i s the Declaration of Liberated Europe to which the Soviet Union adhered at Yalta. i s a clear example of Soviet duplicity.  This liberation declaration  It appears that the aim of the  Soviets was to appear co-operative to maintain Western friendship during the Second World War for purposes of exploitation such as the  territorial  benefits the Soviets received in the Far East agreement at Yalta.  As  soon as i t s Far East policy was approved by the West, the Soviets started to violate the Declaration of Liberated Europe. For example, contrary to the Declaration, the Soviets refused to c a l l a meeting of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania and forced the Rumanian King to appoint a pro-Communist premier.  Moreover, the Soviets refused to reorganize the  Polish Government as agreed at Yalta. When the West accused the Soviets of breaking the Declaration the Soviets bluntly rejected the charges and continued to violate the treaty. There are numerous broken Russian agreements with the West which suggest that  Soviet duplicity was well-planned largely in order to  maintain Western friendship during the Second World War.  For example,  the agreement to let each nation allow others to send military missions behind i t s lines to deal with their own liberated prisoners was never upheld by the Soviet Union.  Nor was the agreement to let Western allied  air forces use the air bases near Budapest upheld.  Even the agreement  to let the United States use Russian maritime air bases, which Stalin had promised to the Americans on six different occasions, was not f u l filled.  Neither were Western scientists allowed to v i s i t the German  submarine experimental station at Gdynia, even though Stalin had said at Yalta he would allow them. An example of Soviet duplicity concerned diplomatic recognition of Bulgaria and Rumania. In prder to have the peacemaking machinery  153 proceed, after frustrating Soviet delays i n the foreign ministers' meetings of 1945,  the Americans decided to recognize diplomatically the  Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments, providing these governments were broadened to include pro-Western opposition party members. The Soviet Union agreed to these Western conditions and allowed the peace treaty negotiations to continue.  A tripartite commission comprising the United  Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union was to check on the Rumanian Government while the "good offices of the Soviet Government" would observe and check on the Bulgarian Government. But shortly after the Soviet Union obtained diplomatic recognition from the United States for the pro-Soviet regimes of Rumania and Bulgaria, the Soviets "flagrantly violated" the agreements.  In Rumania, two opposition party members  were admitted to the Government but p o l i t i c a l freedom to maneuver was denied them. In Bulgaria, a few opposition party members were admitted into the Government but they had such restrictive conditions placed on 9 them that their role became meaningless. With the hundreds of treaties and verbal agreements that the Soviet Union has broken, there i s ample proof that this tactic of agreeing to a proposal and subsequently violating i t has been common Soviet practice.  But with the demise of Stalin and the rise of Khrushchev and  his reformist policy, along with less opportunities to utilize duplicity tactics because of wary Western diplomats, this type of Soviet duplicity in negotiations has been on the wane. However, i t seems premature to say that Soviet duplicity i s near the end in treaty-making because as  long as the Soviets appear to believe in Communist ideology and the "dialectics of duplicity," i t appears that when the rewards are great enough the Soviet Union w i l l simulate agreements. The second tactic of duplicity concerns a Soviet agreement in principle which i s followed by the postponement of the practical implementation of the terms involved so that the agreement i s never carried out.  This Soviet tactic, though very similar to the f i r s t , differs from  the f i r s t in that no practical details are agreed to which means that the agreement i s never really directly v i o l a t e d — i t i s just never carried out.  Sometimes, with this tactic the Soviets are even careful  to maintain the principle in agreement. Former President Truman said in his memoirs that "we had learned that the Russians would usually agree in principle but would rarely perform i n practice."  x0  General Clay said  that the Soviet explanation for not carrying out a proposal agreed to in principle always contained the statement that "practical implementation at the present moment i s impossible."  According to Clay, this Soviet  explanation became "a technique which was.  . .applied to many proposals."  Shortly after arriving i n Moscow during the Second World War, General Deane aptly stated the view that many Westerners eventually came to hold about the Soviet tactic.  Deane said that "approval in principle by the  Soviet Government meant exactly nothing•• j . . '  As a case in point, Deane  said that two days after he had"i made proposals about the American Air Force shuttle bombing Germany from Russian bases, Molotov announced that the Soviet Government approved the proposals in principle.  Molotov's  announcement was made i n October, 19^3, but i t was not u n t i l February, 1944, that conversations alone started on the proposals and then only a f t e r continuous pressure was applied by Roosevelt on S t a l i n and Harriman on Molotov.  This continual Western pressure, which lasted f o r months,  f i n a l l y forced the Soviets, even though i t was also f o r t h e i r benefit, to allow the American A i r Force the use of Russian bases.  By June, 19^4,  over h a l f a year a f t e r Deane had made h i s proposals, the Soviets allowed shuttle bombing to begin.  I f Western pressure had not involved Roosevelt,  who would have f e l t slighted i f the Soviets had not acted as an a l l y , perhaps the Soviets would have been successful i n t h e i r attempts to postpone the use of Russian bases by the American A i r Force.  A main reason  for the Soviet attempt to prevent American a i r force personnel from using Russian a i r bases was Soviet suspicion of Western motives. Although American bombers were to attack Germany, the Soviets must have believed that some spies were among the thirteen hundred a i r force personnel because a f t e r agreeing to allow the American personnel into Russia on group vi§as,the Soviets changed t h e i r minds and made each crew on each plane enter the Soviet Union on separate visas.  Moreover, the crews were  kept under close surveillance u n t i l they l e f t Russia. ^ x  Another example of Soviet o f f i c i a l s agreeing i n p r i n c i p l e to a proposal but l a t e r refusing any p r a c t i c a l implementation  of i t ,  concerns  the B e r l i n Blockade negotiations. This example indicates that one reason the Soviets used t h i s t a c t i c was i n order to lead Westerners i n t o belie&iiag ;that Soviet agreement i n p r i n c i p l e meant a complete- and f i n a l agreement.  I t appears that the Soviets considered that i t was a  Western tendency to ignore details once a principle was agreed to. The Russians appear to have been partially correct because Westerners eventually discovered that their inclination to conclude agreementein principle with the Soviets had to be abolished. Today not one Western diplomat negotiates purely on principles with Soviet negotiators. Negotiations are based s t r i c t l y on solid ground and the West prefers i t this way now because there i s less room for misunderstanding. During a series of negotiations over the Berlin Blockade, Stalin proposed to the West a "decision i n principl§"which would allow Soviet subordinates to work our specific matters for ending the Blockade. Stalin's decision3n?px£nteipQ£ was accepted by the West because i t represented an acceptable formula upon which the blockade could be l i f t e d . Stalin and the West agreed that a new East German mark was to be introduced into Berlin i n place of the Western mark. They also agreed that transport restrictions i n Berlin would be removed. Moreover, Stalin agreed i n principle that the Soviet Union would no longer ask for the deferment of the Western decision to establish a West German Government as a condition for the l i f t i n g of the blockade.  The Westerners respons-  ible for the Berlin negotiations were pleased that Stalin had made this agreement i n principle because i t seemed that a l l that remained i n the way of ending the blockade was crucial to the agreement.  a few specific details which were not  However, when these Westerners met Molotov,  the few specific matters of detail bogged down the meeting and Molotov acted as i f Stalin had never made his agreement i n principle.  "Time  after time, i t seemed to us that Molotov reneged on statements that Stalin  had made."  First, Molotov produced obstacles with respect to how the  new currency should be issued.  Then later, contrary to Western under-  standing with Stalin, Molotov sought to make the postponement of the decision to establish a West German government a condition for l i f t i n g the blockade.  In fact, he tried on a number of occasions to put this  condition into the formal agreement on the blockade.  Furthermore,  although Stalin i n his decision i n principle had agreed to l i f t restrictions as soon as the East German currency had been substituted for the Western currency i n Berlin, Molotov maintained that only transport restrictions placed after a certain date could be l i f t e d , which meant that a number of important, restrictions would s t i l l exist.  Moreover,  Molotov challenged the right of the Western powers to be i n Berlin.  He  proceeded to maintain that the West was i n Berlin only at the sufferance of the Soviet Union.  But his attempts to make the West feel i t was  obligated by i t s presence i n Berlin to make concessions to the Soviet Union failed. A stalemate developed and the negotations collapsed i n failure despite the Western belief that an agreement had been made because of Stalin's "decision i n principle." Lacking satisfaction with Molotov for failing to draft a treaty according to Stalin's verbal formula, the Western negotiators sought out Stalin who reiterated his formula to them. Believing that Stalin would instruct Molotov to draft a treaty speedily to end the blockade, Western hopes were high again.  However, when they met Molotov for the second  time, he repeated his earlier conditions for a settlement which were contrary to Stalin's formula.  Consequently, no agreement was reached.  Undoubtedly Stalin approved Molotov's actions because when negotiations failed Stalin made no attempt to rectify the situation. became unavailable to Western diplomats.  In fact, he  Philip W. Davison's assessment  of the Berlin Blockade negotiations led him to conclude that Soviet o f f i c i a l s were extremely s k i l l f u l i n utilizing this agreement i n principle tactic.  Davison maintains that:  Soviet proposals about Berlin had to be attractive enough to tempt the Allies to make concessions. . .but at the same time ambiguous enough so that i f the Allies refused to make such concessions, they would no longer be able to retain their position i n Berlin. Hence,. . .the device of having Stalin give verbal assurances about four power control of Berlin currency and other matters [because] i f the Western powers "saw the light" these assurances could be put into writing and possibly even implemented. If not, they could be reversed. 15 Another reason for this Soviet tactic of agreements i n principle, which were mainly- verbal, was the Soviet intention to make Western diplomats over-confident so that any delay over details would frustrate them. This frustration would, the Soviets hoped, make Western diplomats concede some important point to the Soviet Union in order to maintain the "agreement." S t i l l another reason seems related to propaganda. For example, the Soviets could claim that they had agreed to l i f t the blockade, and they could blame the West for preventing an end to this blockade through i t s obstinate refusal to accept nothing short of total abolition of travel restrictions including some not even arising out of the blockade.  A further reason for Soviet agreements i n principle and subsequent  lack of practical implementation of them, was the attempt to eradicate Western criticism and propaganda against certain Soviet policies. By leading Westerners into believing that certain Soviet policies were  159 modified i n the way  the West wanted and i n the form of an agreement, the  Soviets hoped that the West would cease t h e i r c r i t i c i s m of the Soviet Union. Presumably i f Western diplomats had stressed and had  recognized  only the written word, the Soviets would not have been able to u t i l i z e as f u l l y as they had such t a c t i c s as were used i n the B e r l i n Blockade negotiations when S t a l i n ' s verbal agreements were l a t e r reversed Soviet subordinates.  by  On the other hand, even i f Western negotiators  were as wary of the Soviets f i f t e e n to twenty years ago as they are today, Soviet d u p l i c i t y would s t i l l have existed.  Even when Westerners  stressed s p e c i f i c agreements i n written form, such as the reorganization of the P o l i s h Government contained i n the Yalta Treaty, the Soviets violated them.  V i o l a t i n g written or verbal agreements has been character-  i s t i c of Soviet behavior regardless of the wariness of Western negotiators. Nevertheless,  ihe-the past ten to f i f t e e n years, the Western stress on  written agreements with the Soviets, based on very tangible ground, has forced the Soviets to moderate t h e i r d u p l i c i t y .  Furthermore, present  day conditions do not o f f e r the Soviets the same opportunities that they had during the Second World War or the immediate post-war years for double-dealing. The t h i r d d u p l i c i t y t a c t i c concerns outright l y i n g .  Prevarication  has been a common Soviet behavioral c h a r a c t e r i s t i c but i t appeared more often during the S t a l i n era for two reasons. the Second World War  The f i r s t i s that during  there was continual Western contact with the Soviet  Government thereby giving i t more opportunity to use the l i e t a c t i c . The second reason i s . t h a t due to the domestic economic d i f f i c u l t i e s which  i6o  weakened Russia, Khrushchev wanted to create better relations with the West, so he used the l i e tactic less, although occasionally he relied upon i t to deceive the West. The use of this l i e tactic made Westerners learn that any oral agreement made by the Soviet Government was not to be taken seriously. If there was a violation of agreement not in writing the Soviets could easily deny that a promise was ever made.  For example, during the  Second World War, the Americans pressed for an Alaskan-Siberian a i r route and Stalin promised that the a i r link would be established. But when i t came to establishing the link, Soviet subordinates claimed that the a i r fields were not ready, although Stalin had hinted that the airfields were constructed, equipped and ready for use.  One year after Stalin had  agreed to the a i r route proposal, Soviet Air Force representatives told the Americans that the a i r link was not feasible.  It appears that in  the use of this tactic, Stalin was superficially willing to allow Americans on Russian s o i l in order to demonstrate his cooperative and friendly 17  attitude so that lend-lease supplies would not be jeopardized.  On the  other hand, Stalin might have readily allowed the a i r link i f Russia's European front was i n grave danger. Either way, his verbal commitment was not firm and he could proceed in opposite directions, depending on "concrete" conditions. This tactic demonstrated chat Soviet verbal commitments were most unreliable even i f they came from Stalin. The l i e tactic was^openly utilized by the Soviets after the Second World War ended and lend-lease supplies were no longer forthcoming.  For  example, in his memoirs, General Clay said that the Western members of  the Control Commission for Germany tried repeatedly to obtain information on the extent of Soviet removal of capital equipment from Germany, as well as the value of a l l Eastern German production which was sent to the Soviet Union, and the number of Germans held as prisoners of war i n Russia.  To allay Western criticism of their actions i n Eastern Germany,  the Russian representative on the Commission finally told Clay that the data he wanted would be made available at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers i n March, 19^7.  So Western criticism of Soviet policy  subsided although the Russians continued to seize capital equipment and to send large amounts of German production to the Soviet Union. When the Foreign Ministers met i n Moscow in 19^7, the West asked for the pertinent data as outlined by Clay, but the Sovietsdelegates bluntly stated that they were unable to produce the information, although i t had been promised to the West.  So the l u l l i n Western criticism of Soviet policy  was fully exploited by the Soviets whose policy in Eastern Germany v/ent 18 uncriticized for months. The most recent blatant example of Soviet lying occurred over the Cuban incident in October, 1962.  Meeting privately on more than one  ;occasion with American o f f i c i a l s , Soviet diplomats stated that Russian rockets arriving i n Cuba were purely defensive and were not capable of reaching the United States.  Indeed, Foreign Minister Gromyko and the  Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Dobrynin, personally met with President Kennedy and reassured him that Russian rockets were short-range defensive missiles.  When the United States found that Russian rockets  in Cuba were long-range offensive missiles capable of hitting Washington D.  162 the Soviet press (thus the Soviet Government) s t i l l denied the charges. So the l i e technique has appeared under Khrushchev's leadership which indicates that although Soviet prevarication has diminished since Stalin's death, i f the stakes are high enough, a calculated risk involving deception i n order to undermine the West w i l l be made. According to Aspaturian •'Soviet diplomacy w i l l continue to rely upon duplicity. . .to achieve i t s objectives. . .since this impulse i s deeply embedded i n Soviet doctrine 19  . . .  Although segments of Soviet behavior support Aspaturian's  thesis, he overstresses duplicity i n Soviet actions because of a l l the Soviet negotiating tactics employed against Western diplomats in the past ten years, those related to deception appear to have been the least used.  In the present era of East-West relations Soviet duplicity tactics  are not very common.  Although Soviet deception i s not likely to fade  away, i t appears that i t has been relegated to a position of secondary importance as Russian diplomats rely more upon other bargaining tactics to achieve advantages over the West.  CHAPTER VIII, WESTERN ATTITUDES AS A REACTION TO THEIR CONCEPTS OF SOVIET NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR, Ever since the Second World War many Westerners have formed a number of significant impressions about negotiating with Soviet diplomats.  Some of their impressions have crystallized into a few strongly  held beliefs regarding how Westerners should respond to Soviet behavior. When American or British leaders are asked on what basis the West ought to negotiate with the Soviets, invariably the same answers are given as were given fifteen years ago.  These beliefs have guided Western govern-  ments in the formation of policy vis-a-vis Russia and have guided Western diplomats i n their behavior toward their Soviet counterparts. From the Western viewpoint, the negotiating behavior of Soviet diplomats was a major factor i n forcing Westerners to change their attitudes towards Russia from amity to attitudes of enmity.  Although these  present beliefs have dominated Western thinking for many years, there was a period up to mid-19^7 when there was s t i l l a great hope i n the West that negotiations with the Soviets could be conducted on a cooperative, give and take, even friendly basis. Westerners consider that the period of limited cooperation and friendship between the West and the Soviets was during the Second World War.  Roosevelt considered himself sympathetic and understanding towards  Russia and he believed that his attitude reflected a large body of  164 American opinion which hoped that Russia would reciprocate the qualities that the West displayed.  Although Churchill urged caution in dealing with  the Soviets, Roosevelt's conciliatory approach toward Russia held sway. A characteristic statement by Roosevelt during the war sums up the American attitude toward the Soviets at that time: . . .1 think the Russians are perfectly friendly; they are not trying to gobble up a l l the rest of Europe or the world. They did not know us, that is. the . . .fundamental difference. They are friendly people. They have not got any crazy ideas of conquest. . .and now that theyl,:know us, they are much more willing to accept us.^ ;  v  Roosevelt's attitude reflected the American belief , that once the leaders of countries with differences met in friendly conversation the differences would be overcome. Today, however, this belief i s not as dominant as i t was twenty years ago.  Bitter disappointments over summit  meetings have weakened the American belief that their leaders, meeting with Communist leaders, could end cold war tensions.  During the Second  World War, the British attitude toward dealing with the Soviets was more cautious and firm, partly because of Churchill's convictions against Communism. Although Churchill's advice was appreciated, the Americans never accepted i t i n f u l l .  Even Churchill's Iron Curtain speech as late  as 19^6 met criticism i n the United States on the grounds that i t stirred up Soviet hostility. The American attitude toward Russia began to harden slightly under Roosevelt.  In 1945, on the advice of Churchill, Roosevelt answered  Stalin in strong terms that the Western a l l i e s had not tried to make a separate surrender to the Nazis at Berne as Stalin had charged.  Roosevelt's  answer was the beginning of the historic turning point toward unified Western behavior vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.  Churchill wrote Roosevelt  regarding the Berne incident^arid' said: . . .1 deem i t of the highest importance that a firm and blunt stand should be made at this juncture, by our two countries i n order that the air may be cleared and that the Soviets realize that there i s a point beyond which we v/ill not tolerate insult. I believe this i s the best chance of saving the future. If they are convinced that we are afraid of them and can be bullied into submission, then indeed I should despair of the future relations with them and much else.2 But i t was not until the middle of 19^7 that the Americans abolished completely their cooperative and goodwill policy toward the Soviet Union. As late as 194? the American State Department told General Clay i n Germany to avoid clashes on lesser issues with the Soviets so that minor differences would not destroy the possibility of obtaining "a concert of intent and action with Russia."3  One such example of a potential East-  West clash i n Germany concerned Clay's orders to the Western zones to stop transferring German industrial plants to Russia because i t had violated the Potsdam Treaty.  But Secretary of State Marshall ordered  Clay to hold in abeyance a l l transfers of German plants including those i n the West. Marshall stated that Clay's policy would be provocative at a time when the United States was seeking Soviet cooperation.^  By  mid 19^7, the Americans finally discarded what remnants there were of their cooperative policy toward the Soviets and supported the Truman doctrine which espoused American aid for any country resisting Communism. The American attitude eventually swung around to a more extreme position  166 than that recommended by the British when Washington refused even to talk with the Russians. There are four beliefs which are strongly held by Westerns with respect to dealing with the Soviet Union.  These four beliefs concern the  lise of firmness, conciliation, trust, and written agreements.  The f i r s t  belief i s that Soviet negotiators understand force more than they understand anything else. Westercr/negotiators  feel they must be firm with the  Soviets or otherwise be exploited by them. In order to negotiate on a basis of equality with the Russians, Westerners feel that they must use firmness and their nation must be militarily strong.  James Byrnes said  that he had learned i n his negotiations with Stalin that the importance of a country's proposal was determined by how many army divisions that country had.5 Harry Truman, explaining the reasoning behind the Truman Doctrine said i n 1947:  "Russia understands firm, decisive action much  better than diplomatic pleasantries."  Fearing a Russian invasion of  Turkey and the Russian seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean Truman said:  "Unless Russia i s faced with an iren f i s t and strong 6  language another war i s i n the making."  This belief formed the basis of  the American containment of Communism policy which as s t i l l the basis of American foreign policy today. Since 19^7 this attitude of firmness has dominated Western thinking. In a speech i n the early 1950's, Dean Acheson stated that: The only way to deal with the Soviet Union we have found from hard experience, i s to create situations of strength. Whenever the Soviet detects weakness or disunity-it i s quick to detect them-it exploits them to the f u l l . 7 i  16? John Foster Dulles had a simple maxim for negotiating with the Soviets: "Power i s the key to success i n dealing with the Soviets."^ In a campaign speech i n I960, Richard Nixon said that "when you are dealing. . .with dictators, men who are bullies essentially, above everything else, you must be stronger than they are, and second, you must l e t them know that you are not going to be pushed around."^  Adlai Stevenson, justifying the  huge American expenditures on military programs said: We must not tempt the Russians with weakness and the only safe assumption for us to make i s that the Soviet Union may use force as in Hungary and East Germany, whenever there i s no risk of general war. As I have said to Mr.Krushchev, equality of strength and equality of risk are the only starting points for disarmament questions.-^ Churchill always maintained that i n order to negotiate successfully with the Communists a country must do so from a position of equality, military equality essentially.  President Kennedy echoed Churchill's words when he  said in i960 that i f the United States maintains i t s defenses and i s second to none, i t i s in a better position to negotiate.Ii Showing historical perspective, Kennedy said: If there i s a lesson which this country should have learned in the last eight years, i t i s that the Communist system and the Communist leaders are not impressed by good w i l l missions. They are impressed by the power, strength, and de? termination of the United States and that i s what must be built. '[Applause] 3 x  Although Kennedy and the Democratic Party introduced a broader approach to American foreign policy in 19^0» the Democrats; s t i l l carried on the postwar tradition of ?ifestern stiffness toward Russia.  Repeatedly Kennedy  told the American people that there was no alternative to a policy of steadfast resistance to Communism.  "Strength i s a language the Communist  understands, so we must be firm i n our resolve and strong i n our capacity  to resist. "-13 Besides stressing firmness, the West has also stressed patience in dealing with the Soviets.  In his memoirs, Cordell Hull admits that  although he and Roosevelt were "taken in by Russia's promises and written pledges," a "policy of patience combined with firmness, inspired by calm strength" i s e s s e n t i a l . ^ James Byrnes maintained that Western policy toward Russia must be based on firmness and patience.  Recently, Senator  Fulbright has reaffirmed the American attitude of firmness and patience. Indeed, Fulbright maintains that "when the West has acted with both patience and firmness, i t has usually been rewarded by Soviet prudence." 5 x  On the other hand, i f force has to be threatened Westerners caution that the West must be prepared to carry through i t s threat otherwise the Russians will think a bluff i s intended and w i l l attempt to exploit the situation.  It i s dangerous to threaten and only occasionally follow  through with the threats because the Soviets, in attempting to exploit a Western bluff, may discover, perhaps too late for both sides, that the West was not bluffing.  The former American Commander of the Berlin  Kommandatura stated: 'The making of a bold front and then backing off when confronted by possible retaliation, i s the worst possible way to deal with the Russians and the Communists. It was always my policy never to threaten anything I did not finish. The Russians knew this, so that even a quiet word was sufficient to prevent trouble. 1 6  So far the West has not threatened beyond i t s capacity to carry out any threats that i t makes.  The next Western attitude follows the f i r s t .  To appear firm before  the Russians, Westerners have relegated conciliation to a secondary position.  Believing that the Soviets exploit their conciliatory attitudes,  Westerners maintain that conciliation appears to the Soviets as Western appeasement. Averall Harriman made the observation i n 19^7 that in his experience i n dealing with the Soviets any Western conciliatory move towards the Russians was always construed as appeasement rather than a sincere desire to work together.17  In fact, some Westerners believ©  that when Western diplomats concede a point to the Soviets, the Soviets think i t i s a sign of weakness. ^ 1  (If this view i s correct i t may help  to explain why the Soviets themselves are so stubborn about making concessions, even minor ones.) According to Robert Murphy, the Soviets view Western eagerness to get agreements as a sign that the West i s fearful of making concessions to the Soviet Union. 9  Some Westerners main-  x  tain that any cooperative spirit toward the Soviet Union only hinders negotiations because the Soviets look for hidden motives behind any Western attempts to be cooperative.  As John Deane puts i t : "{The Soviets)  had much more respect for us and acquiesced "more readily when we said-this i s what we are going to do-take i t or leave i t . " " 2 <  )  The New Statesman has  said that the Soviets even view Western reasonableness as a sign of weak21 ness.  William Standley, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,  said that any Western diplomat who approached any Soviet o f f i c i a l , regardless of rank, "in a friendly, apologetic or vacillating manner, (soon found that] the Russians (had declared] that (their) adversary was  170 weak and afraid of [them)and jthey) therefore despised and took advantage of him."  22  This Western attitude regarding the f u t i l i t y of dealing with  the Soviets on a conciliatory basis has made amicable East-West conferences almost impossible, although i t has not prevented agreements from being reached.  Because East-West enmity has not prevented the conclusion  of agreements, amiable relations need not be a prerequisite for dealing with countries i n order to negotiate treaties.  Expending energies toward  achieving Russian friendship i s not as c r i t i c a l as expending energies toward achieving a satisfactory and mutual basis for agreement. The next attitude toward negotiating with the Soviets concerns the emphasis on written agreements.  As earlier chapters indicated, Western  diplomats fifteen to twenty years ago readily accepted verbal agreements from the Soviets.  But having found verbal agreements used more as a  Soviet negotiating tactic rather than as a genuine commitment, they have come to maintain that Soviet promises or oral agreements are worthless. They claim that any workable agreement with the Soviets must be i n writing and i n specific and practical terms.  Although a written agreement i s not  a guarantee against Soviet violation, at least i t i s a document which can demonstrate whether or not the Russians have kept the terms involved. Moreover, many Western:- - diplomats believe that they themselvfs must :  avoid oral promises or verbal agreements i n order to prevent Soviet misunderstanding or exploitation.  Furthermore, they maintain that a l l  their obligations should be meticulously written so they are free from ambiguity and they must be scrupulously kept.  Finally, according to  some observers, both the West and the Soviets should have a concise grasp  171 of the terms and implications involved i n an agreement. Essentially this stress on written agreements and concise terms i s intended to minimize any misunderstanding with the Soviets. 3 2  Another common attitude held by Westerners i s that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted.  They believe that i t i's:hbpeless, to deal with the  Soviet Union because i t has violated hundreds of treaties, although Soviet claims about Western violations are often not considered.  This lack of  faith i n the Russians accounted for the reluctance of Eisenhower and Dulles to negotiate with the Soviet Union until i t had shown deeds of good intention rather than just verbal expressions about i t s intentions. According to Eisenhower and Dulles, the signing of the Austrian Treaty represented such a deed as did programs; of cultural exchanges.  Regardless  of the doubts about dealing with the Russians, the need to coexist has made the West conclude a number of agreements v/ith them. Some Westerners claim that agreements with the Soviets will be successful i f they are self-enforcing treaties, such as the nuclear test ban treaty.  As one  American diplomat puts i t : Being prudent and vigilant and recognizing the lack of moral conviction i n Soviet actions means that agreements reached with the Soviet Union must be of such character as to be self-enforcing or subject to controls and must not be based solely on faith that the Soviet Union w i l l do what i t says.24 Although Westerners admit that they do not trust the Soviets, many claim that any agreements reached with the Soviets should contain matters which are i n the Soviet Union's self-interest to keep.  Churchill told the  British House of Commons i n 19k'S> that i t i s hopeless to reason or argue  172 with Communists but they can s t i l l be dealt v/ith because they w i l l keep 25  bargains as long as i t i s i n their interests to do so.  However, few  self-enforcing agreements have been negotiatied and the belief s t i l l exists that even self-enforcing agreements will not make the Soviets more reliable. It seems very unlikely that this Western attitude of distrusting the Soviets will ever be revised i n the foreseeable future.  "If the  [American]Senate attaches as l i t t l e credence to Soviet negotiators as i s indicated i n the quoted excerpts from the[Foreign Relationsj Committee Reports, the Committee and the Senate would then look upon the results of negotiations with a rather jaundiced eye."  The consensus among  'Westerners i s that trust must form the basis of any agreement.  This  Western belief that the Soviets are untrustworthy seems to preclude the possibility of satisfactory agreements and has made the West reluctant to conclude treaties with the Soviets.  However, trust, as well as  friendship,need not be conditions for concluding agreements.  In fact,  trust may be irrelevant to the negotiating process for the resolution of differences. As Edwin Fedder says: States may enter into negotiations concerning any subject over which they have jurisdiction and about which they are willing to enter into an accommodation to each others' interests. Whether the States participating in negotiations trust each other i s unimportant. What counts i s that concessions offered are such as to promise accommodation i f resolution i s the desired outcome. Western stress on the need for Soviet sincerity as the basis for agreements must be modified. It seems more realistic to have self-interest rather than trust form the basis of agreements. After a l l . Westerners believe thattthe  173 Soviets distrust them so mutual trust i s hardly a satisfactory basis for agreements with Russia. Despite their pessimistic beliefs about dealing with the Soviets, very few Westerners refuse to negotiate v/ith them. Most Westerners feel that the alternative to talking to the Soviet Government, even though nothing concrete i n terms of agreements may be gained, i s war.  Western  leaders have always expressed a desire to negotiate at some time. Even Dulles, who maintained that negotiating with the Russians i s d i f f i c u l t , long and frustrating, said that negotiations with the Soviet Union are not totally hopeless. One of the d i f f i c u l t i e s which i s caused by these four Western beliefs i s that they cause Westerners to prejudge areas of possible accommodation with the Soviet Government. As well, they cause a l l Soviet proposals to be held suspect.  If Westerners believe that the Soviet  Government can never be trusted, they will immediately be suspicious of Soviet proposals for accommodation even though the Soviet Union may be sincere.  As a result, Western suspicion implies that Western proposals  for accommodation may be less than those that would have been offered i f the West had trusted the Soviets.  The f u l l potential of an agreement  may not be realized because accommodation on the basis of prejudgment leads to piece-meal settlements.  Edwin Fedder, explaining the implications of  Western beliefs on Western diplomatic behavior says: The Western] negotiator assumes Soviet counterpart, himself, and Soviet negotiator does not share A (actor) knows his orientation  that he understands his the subject, but that the his enlightenment. regarding A, B, and Q and i s  17k  satisfied that his perceptions of B's orientation are accurate. . . .When A believes he perceives B's duplicity then A makes subject Q suspect too. . . thus confusing things and leaving l i t t l e hope of accommodation. 28 These firmly held Western attitudes on how to deal with the Soviet Union lead Westerners into believing that any cordial entente between the West and the Soviet Union i s impossible.  Most Westerners have not  questioned the validity of their beliefs because they find them reinforced by their conviction that the Soviet leaders w i l l continually maintain that Communism and capitalism can never be compatible.  Westerners believe  that both they and the Soviets see no real accommodation possible. Consequently, the more one belief sustains another, the less likely that these Western attitudes will be seriously questioned.  CHAPTER IX CONCLUSIONS, A perusal of Western writings on diplomacy indicates that many Westerners seem to take a narrow approach to the subject.  Writers such  as Coral Bell, Hans Morgenthau, and Harold Nicolson believe that diplomacy i s the management of international relations and that negotiations are the method used to resolve disputes between states.  There i s very  l i t t l e discussion among Westerners about the tactics which are employed to achieve peaceful settlements.  Although there i s reference to  methods of persuasion and threats, there i s l i t t l e acknowledgment that the West employs formal negotiating^ tactics.  A survey of the United  States Department of State Bulletin suggests that a false dichotomy may exist in many Western observations on diplomacy.  Many Western defini-  tions of negotiations imply that formal negotiating tactics are generally not used i n mutually resolving disputes.  As a result, Western  criticism of the Soviet use of tactics implies that to many Westeners tactics are not considered, for the most part, to be within the context of negotiations.  Perhaps i t i s an unintentional implication, but the  implication exists.  When Western diplomats such as Byrnes, Marshall,  Acheson, Eden, Dulles and Pearson describe their personal  experiences  in negotiating with the Soviets, invariably they discuss Russian bargaining tactics while they rarely discuss their own tactics.  There  i s a strong indication that many ffesterners see Western diplomats merely presenting proposals for agreement, criticizing the Soviet position, defending their own, and compromising, but rarely using tactics.  It  176  appears that many Westerners see the diplomatic bargaining process i n rather one-sided terms. Part of this false dichotomy i s based on the Western belief. that the Soviet Union i s solely responsible for the tensions between East and West.  The West has a tendency to be paranoiac with regard t o the belief  that ; i t s diplomats are potential victims of Soviet negotiators and their wide range of tactics.  Barely i s there consideration of the possibility  that the Soviet diplomat may be wary of the tactics of Western negotiators. Also, i t may be that behind-the-scenes maneuvering i s not considered part of the formal bargaining process by Westerners.  Moreover, some Western  moves calculated to achieve an advantage i n the bargaining process may be unconsciously employed. For example, fearing too many Soviet advantages i f a conference i s held i n a certain place, a Western government may want locations shifted throughout the conference or a more neutral location chosen.  This choice of location i s a tactic relating to the bargaining  process but Western o f f i c i a l s may not see their insistence on having a voice i n the choice of locations i n such a way. They may see i t as a necessary defensive measure against Soviet maneuvers. This naivety i s perhaps the main contributing factor to the seemingly one-sided Western view of the bargaining process.  This naivety has resulted i n black and  white criticisms o f Soviet behavior.  L i t t l e consideration i s given to  the fact that the Soviets are u t i l i z i n g some methods similar to those that Western diplomats are u t i l i z i n g .  Furthermore, i f there i s any acknowledg-  ment of a Western tactic, Westerners usually suggest that the Soviets  u t i l i z e a similar method much more s k i l l f u l l y and shrewdly. Westerners appear to use the term tactic in a pejorative sense.  The stress on des-  cribing Soviet bargaining methods in negotiations and the conspicuous absence of any description of Western methods lends support to the view that a false dichotomy may exist i n Western thinking. Although there i s recognition that the Soviet Union believes that Western stress on cooperation i s a tactic, i t seems that l i t t l e attention i s paid to other Western actions which the Soviets could quite conceivably classify as tactics.  Much of the difficulty i n East-West conferences i n  which suspicions and charges seem inherent, i s partly caused by many Westerners who do not recognize that Soviet behavior i s largely typical of any bargaining process.  While i t appears that the Soviets expect, and encounter,  Western bargaining tactics, Western observers tend to feel, i t seems, that Soviet use of tactics i s unwarranted. Yet, i n fact, many Soviet tactics are legitimate to the bargaining process (duplicity and obstructionist tactics are not legitimate aspects of negotiations.)  Indeed, many of  these tactics appear in negotiations between Western states. For example, the French have employed evasion and threat tactics during recent NATO ministerial meetings. If there i s ever overt  acknowledgment that Western diplomats u t i l -  ize tactics, much criticism of Soviet behavior in negotiations w i l l subside bebause many Russian actions will be recognized as part, perhaps a necessary part, of the bargaining process.  If a more realistic approach  i s taken then Soviet actions w i l l not always be construed as v i l e . Less criticism might reduce Soviet defenses and allow a greater chance for agreements and reduction of tensions.  It i s up to many Westerners to  178 correct their apparent false dichotomy about the process of negotiations. Any implication that the use of tactics i s foreign to the bargaining process i s completely out of touch with reality* The area i n which Western and Soviet diplomats u t i l i z e negotiating tactics most similarly i s i n the area of propaganda. Although there are significant differences, such as the violation of diplomatic confidence, the use of negotiations as a vehicle for propaganda i s common to both the West and the Russians.  Western propaganda tactics contain maneuvers to  make the other side publicly recognize the validity of a point, to discredit the opposition and to divide them. The use of epithets and slogans as well as blaming the Russians for conference failures, are also Western propaganda tactics.  Both the Russians and the West use propaganda tac-  tics more than any other group of maneuvers because they are the most easily employed. in use.  These propaganda maneuvers are not likely to diminish  The only propaganda tactic which has diminished i s the Soviet  violation of diplomatic confidence.  The reason i s perhaps that the Soviets  feel that violating confidence today threatens their peaceful coexistence polcy.  Another difference which s t i l l distinguishes Western and Soviet  propaganda i s misrepresentation. The Russians are inclined to misrepresent Western policies far more than the West distorts Soviet policies. Western emphasis on compromise reflects the fact that Western diplomats are inclined to present a maximum program.  That i s , a higher series  of demands than what are really necessary fora settlement are introduced and when bargaining down begins, compromises occur.  The Soviets use this  tactic too, but unlike the Russians, the Westerners are not as stubborn  i n pursuing this tactic.  Westerners observe, correctly too, that the  Soviets utilize this tactic of opening v/ith excessive demands systematically and s k i l l f u l l y (although Western diplomats are no amateurs either). Moreover, Russian diplomats are recalcitrant i n the use of this tactic i n contrast to Western diplomats who tend to compromise as soon as resistance i s f e l t .  But on the other hand, both Western and Soviet diplomats  have made some compromises which they had not intended to i n order to prevent negotiations from collapsing. Soviet tactics of obstruction w i l l have to be faced whenever Russian and Western diplomats meet. Tactics such as procedural and agenda haggling, klocking agreements on an uncontentious issue i n order to gain a concession on another point, and proposing interminable amendments, have been frequently used by the Russians.  Western disarmament negotiators  have also witnessed Soviet obstructionist tactics, particularly repetitive arguments i n the last few years.  Nevertheless, the nuclear test ban  treaty i s an excellent example of how the Soviets will conclude agreements when they discover some reward in i t for them.  The less Russia wishes  an agreement the more the West w i l l encounter obstructionist tactics. However, the West should not expect negotiations with the Soviets to be free from obstruction regardless of the present entente.  The Russians have  shown that obstructive bargaining maneuvers are always part of their behavior irrespective of good or bad relations between East and West. On the other hand, Western observers do not see their own diplomats^ using obstructionist maneuvers.  Their -views are valid because Western diplomats  tend to break off negotiations when agreement i s unlikely rather than to  180  prolong them because they feel that the Soviets will take advantage of the delays.  Furthermore, Western diplomats tend to seek agreements as  quickly as possible and so are not so prone to practice obstruction. Some Soviet aggressive tactics are more prominently i n use today than are others. The exploitation of seemingly harmless words and the deliberate misuse of words i n order to gain advantages are used frequently by the Russians i n disarmament negotiations.  Moreover, to counter-  attack when criticised and to employ the widest possible demands to test the opponents resistance are tactics used constantly by Soviet diplomats. But the use of wide demands to test an opponents degree of resistance i s not a unique Russian tactic because a l l diplomats tend to use i t . Nor are threat tactics unique to the Soviets. The West has threatened massive nuclear retaliation i n order to gain advantages i n i t s negotiations with the Russians, particularly during the cold war.  Iii terms of self-concept-  ions, however, many Western observers generally do not conceive of their diplomats using aggressive tactics possibly because they are used sporadically and perhaps sometimes extemporaneously.  The Russians, however,  u t i l i z e offensive tactics far more often than the West. Perhaps the offensive tactic which i s the least important i s the Soviet tactic of using social events for sounding boards.  A l l diplomatic events appear to  be some form of "business" meeting and this social tactic i s as common to diplomatic functions as i s the use of spirits.  Each diplomat knows that  he and the other diplomats are not just socializing. Even i f the Russians believe that Western Governments are insincere and have violated agreements, the Soviet Union i t s e l f surpasses any Western nation i n the number of broken agreements. The Soviets tend to  181 defend their treaty violations as dialectically necessary because new historical conditions force revisions of old relationships.  But this  dialectic defense i s shallow because the Soviets do not allow the West the same dialectic privilege.  Even a slight Western infraction i s  exploited by the Soviets as an excuse for them not to carry out the terms of an agreement. Whenever the Soviet Union accuses Western diplomats of duplicity, Western observers ignore or condemn the charges as ridiculous because they believe that their diplomats are sincere.  On the other  hand, i f i t i s shown that a Western government has lied there i s a tendency among Western observers to attribute i t to naivety, bungling or confusion, such as Eisenhower's.false statements about the U-2 incident i n I960.  These observers maintain that Western diplomats present proposals  in good faith and keep the terms of agreements.  But the result of these  two attitudes—that the Soviets believe treaty violations are justified and that Westerners rarely break agreements—means that violation charges by each side are ignored or explained away, thereby creating a suspicious and hostile atmosphere. For example, both the West and the Russians charge each other with violating the Potsdam agreement and probably neither believes i t i s guilty as charged. Duplicity tactics, which have been a marked facet of Soviet behavior particularly during the cold war, have decreased i n use as relations between East and West have improved.  Apparently the Soviets feel that  they have more to gain from other negotiating maneuvers than from using these duplicity tactics.  Of a l l the Soviet tactics encountered by Western  diplomats, those related to propaganda occur most frequently.  They i n  turn are followed by obstructionist tactics which, in order of usage, are followed by offensive tactics. related to duplicity.  The least used Soviet maneuvers are those  It i s i n this order that Westerners can expect to  face Russian bargaining tactics. Western reactions to their concepts of Soviet negotiating behavior have led them to believe that proposals and policies backed by firmness and strength, coupled with prudence and written, specific agreements, are the only way to negotiate with the Soviet Union.  While these beliefs are  reasonable to hold in the light of Soviet behavior, i t i s unfortunate that Westerners also hold: that a conciliatory attitude i s looked upon as weakness by the Soviets.  Western anti-conciliation attitudes may make  the Soviets feel that the West will exploit their attempts to conclude an agreement.  Sino-Soviet d i f f i c u l t i e s today indicates that the West may  have something to gain by reintroducing i t s conciliatory spirit providing i t has no illusion about the effectiveness of such a s p i r i t .  The illusion  that Franklin Roosevelt and his advisers had, that Western generosity and a conciliatory spirit would win genuine Soviet friendship, resulted in bitter disappointment.  Today, shrewd conciliation may offer rewards for  the West as long as i t seeks mutual self-interest agreements rather than Soviet friendship.  It i s not necessary to have Soviet trust or friend-  ship as a reason for conciliatory attitudes.  A l l that i s needed i s a  frank, cautious appraisal that the Soviets need Western economic help and probable p o l i t i c a l help with i t s ideological and border conflicts with  China.  The p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r a form of rapprochement are becoming immense  but the Western attitude of t o t a l firmness and distrust w i l l hinder anynew,  p o s i t i v e Russian-Western  relationship.  I f Westerners believe that  Russia cannot be f r i e n d l y because of i t s ideology, then they should not expect many c o n c i l i a t o r y moves from the Soviets. The West should take the i n i t i a t i v e as i t did twenty-five years ago but be more prudent and shrewd i n i t s c o n c i l i a t o r y measures.  But a new complication i s added to East-  West r e l a t i o n s when many Western observers maintain that the Soviets do not want any permanent agreement with any " c a p i t a l i s t " nation and claim that i t i s pointless to conclude agreements with them.  Regardless of the  v a l i d i t y of t h i s view, i t hinders p o t e n t i a l Western-Soviet agreements because i t ignores the fact that basing agreements on s e l f - i n t e r e s t rather than on trust offers a much better foundation f o r settlements.  Hopefully  the trend toward self-enforcing agreements w i l l be accentuated by both sides.  I f not, many Westerners w i l l continue to f e e l that i t i s hopeless  to reach any sort of genuine understanding. Most Western concepts of Soviet negotiating behavior are f a i r l y s p e c i f i c i n describing i n d i v i d u a l Soviet tactics:.-. Over the years when a p a r t i c u l a r Soviet t a c t i c was encountered by more than one Western negoti a t o r , the description of the t a c t i c encountered was generally consistent with early descriptions.  Because many negotiations between the West and  the Russians occurred during the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers from 1945 to 19^8, a number of Western concepts of Russian diplomatic behavior are derived from a period f i f t e e n to twenty years ago, including part of the cold war.  This fact, however, does not a l t e r  184 the consistency with which the. Soviets have utilized their tactics.  There  are only a few of them which have not been used in the past few years which indicates that Russian bargaining tactics for the most part are unrelated to the type of relations existing at a particular time between East and West. Although tensions between Russia and the West have gradually declined since Stalin's death i n 1953, and since Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence in 1958, Soviet diplomats have utilized tactics found in the Stalin era.  A perusal of Western concepts of Soviet behavior during  the f i r s t eight years of peaceful coexistence indicates that only a few Soviet tactics have appeared less than others.  Most of these tactics  which the Russians have used i n the past few years were also employed five, ten, fifteen and twenty years ago.  There i s consistency, then, in  the use of Soviet negotiating tactics although the use of some of them has certainly diminished, particularly duplicity, threats,'and extreme propaganda accusations. One Soviet behavioral aspect which has changed concerns the personal;i t y of the Russian diplomat.  Unlike their attitudes during the cold war  era, Soviet diplomats today are more personable and polite.  They speak  with much less belligerence and are not so arrogantly dogmatic in their p o l i t i c a l views.  But this contemporary practice of Soviet diplomats seems  to be a change of emphasis rather than a revision i n the Soviet view of diplomacy.  The overall view that Westerners had of Soviet diplomats twenty  years ago largely applies today.  That i s , Soviet diplomats are suspicious  of Western motives, adhere closely to doctrine, and are mechanical mouth-  pieces i n the sense that they cannot comment extemporaneously on Western proposals as Western diplomats can comment on Russian proposals. The only modification noted i n the overall Western view i s that Soviet diplomats today are not as belligerent, rude, and insulting as they were i n the cold war era.  Their bad manners and arrogance are subdued at present. They  are, however, just as stubborn and argumentative as they ever were except now this obstinacy i s cloaked i n a more polite and personable manner. Because of past Soviet behavior, i t i s logical to assume that i f the Russian-Western entente ends, then the belligerent and arrogant aspects of Soviet diplomatic behavior w i l l return, although i t i s just as reasonable to claim that Soviet diplomats are more sophisticated now and that even i f the entente ends they w i l l not revert to rudeness and billegerence. It i s true that Western diplomats are pluralistic i n their approach to a solution and can comment extemporaneously on Soviet proposals before submitting them to their governments.  It i s also true that they can advise  their governments on a course of action and that they can have a part i n the formation of policy.  These Western diplomatic characteristics form a major  distinction between Soviet and Western diplomacy.  Another distinguishing  characteristic i s that Western diplomats have been consistently polite and well-mannered.  S t i l l another distinguishing characteristic has been the  impatience of the Western diplomat to reach agreement as well as his emphasis on the principle of the treaty more than on the practicability of the points involved.  Western impatience has been attributed to the practice  of Western governments sending special representatives such as Senators, Judges, military, or p o l i t i c a l advisers to negotiate with the Soviets rather than employing fully their professional diplomatic representatives. However,  this  practice  i s diminishing and apart from  186 personal summitry, Western career diplomats are negotiating more f u l l y with their Soviet counterparts. The classification of Soviet negotiating maneuvers should not be taken as representing a complete delineation of a l l Russian tactics because some of them are perhaps missing while new ones may appear. Suffice i t to say that this delineation classifies most of those tactics which Western observers believe have been used against Western diplomats. According to Western observers over a period of more than twenty years, the Russians employ bargaining maneuvers with thoroughness and s k i l l . Although many Westerners believe that their diplomats are potential victims of these shrewd Soviet maneuvers, in actual fact, the West does not seem to have been victimized that much. Whenever a Soviet tactic was observed, Western awareness and caution have increased. Generally speaking, Western methods of bargaining do not come close to the systematic and thorough Soviet utilization of negotiating maneuvers. The use of maneuvers in negotiations,Soviet or otherwise, should not be surprising.  What i s revealing i s the shrewd, calculating and s k i l l f u l  manner in which the Soviets execute them in attempts to gain the maximum advantage possible over Western diplomats.  Thus, the Western diplomat  must be wary when negotiating with his Soviet counterpart.  He should be  aware of these Soviet bargaining methods in order to prevent Western defeats at the conference table.  Also, the Western diplomat should not be  surprised i f his Russian counterpart believes that he u§@.@ tactics too, although, as a matter of pride the Soviet diplomat probably believes that he uses more of them and i s better at using them than his Western counterpart .  187 FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION 1. See Hans J . Morgenthau, "Permanent Values In The Old Diplomacy," Diplomacy i n a Changing World, eds. Stephen P. Kertesz, M.A.Fitzsimmons, Notre Dame University, 1959, p. 15• Also see S i r Pierson Dixon,"Diplomacy At The United Nations," Ibid., p.373. -" 2. See George F. Kennan, "History and Diplomacy As Viewed by a Diplomatist," Ibid., p. 106. 3.  Hans J. Morgenthau,  4.  Loc. c i t .  Ibid., p.15.  5. Quincy Wright, The Study of International Relations. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1955* pp.158-162. Also see Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, MacMillan and Co., 19^8, vol.11, pp. 1080, 1101-1102. When Japan attacked the United States Naval Fleet in Pearl Harbor Hull said: "The diplomatic phase has failed and i t i s now up to the military to save the nation." Loc. c i t . 6. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York, Alfred Knopf, 19^8, p.4l9. A book for United States diplomats says i n part: "The f i r s t and most important duty of a diplomatic representative of the United States i s to maintain friendly relations with the country to which he i s attached to." Graham H. Stuart, American Diplomatic And Consular Practice, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1952, p. 192. Also, according to Frederick C. Barghoorn, "American o f f i c i a l s . . .sometimes refer to the Department of State as the Department of Peace." Soviet Image of the United States, New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1950, p. 177.. 7.  Harold Nicolson,  8.  Loc. c i t .  Diplomacy, London, .'-Oxford Press,1960,p.2.  9. Harold and Margaret Sprout, Foundations of International Politics, New York, D. van Nostrand Co., 1962, p. 140. Also refer to Wright, The Study of International Relations, p.158. 10. Coral Bell, Negotiating From Strength, London, Chatto and Windus, 1962, p.197. See also James J. Wadsworth.The Price of Peace, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962, pp.21-22. 11. Edwin H. Eedder, "Communication and American-Soviet Negotiating Behavior," Background, Vol. 8, (August, 1954), p.106.  188  12. Nicolson, Diplomacy, p.124. Nicolson l i s t s many other qualities as well but considers those mentioned to be absolutely necessary. Invariably a l l Western conceptions of the personal characteristics of_a diplomat relate to Nicolson's. Cf., "The essential qualities of a good diplomat are common sense, good manners, understanding foreign mentalities, and precision of expression." S i r David Kelly, cited in H. A. Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol.35: (October 1956), p.43. Also cf. John Foster Dulles' concept i n "News Conference, August 6," 'Jae United States Department of State Bulletin, August 26, 1957 , p . l l l . 13. Kennan, "History and Diplomacy As Viewed By A Diplomatist," eds. Kertesz and Fitzsimmons, Diplomacy In A Changing World,• pp.106-108. 14.  Cited i n Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (19^')>y p.4l8.  15. Nicolson, Diplomacy, p. 12b. "British Statesmen are peculiarly prone to this illusion. They are accustomed, in domestic controversies, to invoke the principle of- fair dealing and to rely upon settlement by compromise. . . .They do not understand that such conceptions are not always present i n the minds of foreign negotiators." Loc. c i t . 16.  Hull,  Memoirs, p.302.  189) CHAPTER 1. FOOTNOTES  1. See George Kennan's a r t i c l e , "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign A f f a i r s , vol.25:(July 1947),pp.5bb-582. For example, '[from the Communist i d e o l o g i c a l postulate which claims that there exists i r r e c o n c i l a b l e antagonism between the Communist and c a p i t a l i s t worldsT} "flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing i n the Kremlin's conduct of foreign p o l i c y . " Ibid., p.572. 2. David T. C a t t e l l , "USSR Foreign Policy." Control of Foreign Relations i n Modern Nations. New York, W.W.Norton and Co., 1957,p.637. 3. Vernon V. Aspaturian, " D i a l e c t i c s and D u p l i c i t y X n Soviet Diplomacy," Journal o f International A f f a i r s (hereafter referred to as  JIA). v o l . 17, No.1,(1963), p.46.  4. George Kennan to Harrison. E. Salisbury, i n Salisbury's Moscow Journal. Chicago University, 1961, pp.282,325. Also see Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States, p.6; Harold Fisher. America And Russia In The World Community, Claremont College, 19^6, p.124. 5. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign P o l i c y In World P o l i t i c s , ed. Roy C. Macridis, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, c  Inc., 1958, p.143.  6. KennaA "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," (July 19^7), p.572.  Foreign A f f a i r s , vol.27,  7. J.I.Coffey, "The Soviet View of a Disarmed World," Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution,vol.8 (March.. 1964), p.4. 8. Kennan, op.cit.. p.237. 9.  Aspaturian, <£EA., v o l . 17, No.l, (I963), p.55*  10. T.A.Taracouzio, War and Peace i n Soviet Diplomacy, New York, . MacMillan Co., 1940, pp.263-265. 11. Cited i n Frederick H. Hartmamn, New York, MacMillan Co., 1957, p.444.  The Relations of Nations,  12. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy}!,;, Foreign Policy i n World P o l i t i c s , ed.. Macridis, p . l 4 l . 13. Cited i n Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States, pp.14-15. Also see William H. Chamberlin,"Old Struggle-, New Tactics," The Russian Review, vol.19 (January i960), p.3«  190 14. Union,  196*T7  Frederick W. Neal, United States Foreign Policy and the Soviet Center f o r the Study of Democratic I n s t i t u t i o n s , Santa Barbara, p.3« See also Barghoorn, op.cit,, p.9.  15. Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958, p.11. 16. See f o r example, Harry and Bonaro Overstreet, What Ife Must know About Communism, New York, W.W.Norton, 1958, pp.129-131. 17. Cited by Taracougio, War and Peace i n Soviet Diplomacy, p.265. See also Henry W. Wriston, Diplomacy i n a Democracy, New York, Harper, 1956, p.49. 18. Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years i n Moscow, New York, J.P. Lippincott Co., 1950, pp.61,315• 19. C a t t e l l , "USSR Foreign Policy,"'Control of Foreign Relations In Modern Nations,eds. Buck and Travis, p.645. 20. Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism, Glencoe, I l l i n o i s , The Free Press, 1953, pp.60-62. 21. Emmett John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power: A P o l i t i c a l Memoir of The Eisenhower Years, New York, Atheneum, 1963, p.273» See also Coral B e l l , Negotiating From Strength, p.17k; John Foster Dulles, War and Peace, New York, MacMillan, 1950, p.32. R.J.Donovan, Eisenhower, The Inside Story, New York, Harper, 1956, p.346; "Tactics of Peace}',;, The New Statesman and Nation,(October 1948), p.273. 22. "'What We Gain By Talking To The Soviets," Business Week, (June 6, 1959), p.140. See also John Foster Dulles, "Principles and P o l i t i c s In A Changing World," United States-Department of State B u l l e t i n , herea f t e r referred to as USDSB), vol.39. (December 8,1958), p.104. 23. ' Cited i n Time (June 16, 1961), p . l 6 . 24.  Leites,  A Study of Bolshevism, p.533*  25C a t t e l l , "USSR Foreign Policy," Control of Foreign Relations In Modern Nations, eds. Buck and Travis, p.645. 26.  Leites,  op.cit.,  pp.531-532.  27. John Foster'Dulles,"Our Cause W i l l Prevail]' USDSB, vol.38 (January 6, 1958), p.21; also J.F.Dulles, USDSB (December 8,1958),p.903. 25.  Leites,  A Study of Bolshevism, p.532.  29. John Foster Dulles, "The A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e , " USDSB,vol.37.. (December 23, 1957), P«989« Also see Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among 'Warriors, New York, Doubleday, 1964, p.434.  191  30.  See Leites,  31.  Cited  op. cit., pp.327-528.  by Ibid., p.530.  32. Aspaturian, JIA. vol. 17, No.l, (1963), p.42. See also Kenry L. Roberts, Russia and America, New York, Harper, 1956, p.64. 33• John Gunther, p. 334-  Roosevelt i n Retrospect.  New York, Harper, 1950,  34. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Meet the Press, NBC. September 15, i960," cited i n United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, 'Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy Joint Appearances, I960, Presidential Campaign.Rept.994, 1961, p.44, 57th Congress, 1 s t Session, Final Report, Part III, Freedom of Communication. 35* Smith, My Three Years i n Moscow, p.l57« See also Alan G.Kirk, "Disruptive Soviet Maneuvers," Vital Speeches, vol.19 (February 1,1953)1 p.229. Thomas K. Finletter, Foreign Policy: The Next Phase, 1960's, New York, Harper, i960, p.216; Frank Howley, Berlin Command, New York Putnam's Son, 1950,pp.11-12. 36. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and The Russians New York, Doubleday, 1949, p.110. P  37« Cited Overstreet, What we Must Know About Communism, p.245. See also Thomas E. Dewey, "Beware of Stalin's Smile," Colliers (January 27, 1951), p.21. 38. Stephen D. Kertesz,M.A.Fitzsimmons, eds. "General Issues" Diplomacy i n a Changing World, p.51. 39. Cited i n Leites, A Study of Bolshevism,p.527. See also X, Foreign Affairs, vol.25; (July 1947)1 p.580. 40. Philip E. Mosely, "Across the Green Table from Stalin," Current History, vol. 15- (September, 1948), p.130; also refer to Mosely's book, The Kremlin and World Politics, New York, Vintage Books, i960, p.296 i:  41.  Dulles,  War or Peace, p.30.  42.  Cited i n Overstreet's What We Must Know About Communism, p.255«  43. Loc.cit. See also Edgar E. Robinson, 'The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933-1945, New York, Lippincott, 1955, p.364, and Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia, New York, Cornell, 1950, p.296. 44. William H. Standley, Arthur Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, Chicago,Henry Regenry, Co., 1955, P«579. See also James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, New York, Harper, 1947, p.282; Dulles, War or Peace, p.20; Roberts, Russia and America, pp.64,246.  192  45. Cited i n Stephen iKertesz " E e f l e c t i o n s o n Soviet and American Negotiating Behavior," The Review of P o l i t i c s , v o l . 19 (January  1957), P.15. 46. John R. Deane,"Negotiating on M i l i t a r y Assistance," Negotiating: with the Russians, eds. Raymond Dennett, Joseph E. Johnson, Boston, World Peace., Foundation, 1951, p.28. 47. Walter M i l l i s , ed. The F o r r e s t a l D i a r i e s . Press, 1951. p.443.  New York, The viking  48. Joseph C. Grew, The Turbulent Era, A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1952, p.1446. See also Harry S. Truman, Memoirs; Years of T r i a l and Hope," vol.2, New York, Doubleday, 1956, p.274. 49.  Aspaturian, JIA, v o l . 17, No.l, (1963), p.57«  50. William Hayter, The Diplomacy Of The Great Powers, London, Hamish Hamilton, i960, p.30. 51. See Michael Lindsay, "Thoughts on Negotiating With the Russians," The New Republic, vol.139 (August 18, 1958), pp.16-20. See also Wadsworth, Price of Peace, p.19. 52. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign PolicyJ' Foreign Policy In World P o l i t i c s , ed. Macridis, p.l44. See also Kenneth W. Thompson, "USSjj ^ , J J S A Conf r o n t a t i o n of Interests," Foreign P o l i c y Association, Headline Series, Number 138 (i960), p. 83. :  53« A.J.Vyshinsky, Diplomacy, Moscow, 1948, pp.591-592, c i t e d i n Stephen Kertesz,"Reflections on Soviet and American Negotiating Behavior," Review of Politics.; (1957), p. 10. 54.  Kertesz,  Ibid., p p . l l  T  13.  55. Cited i n Aspaturian, "Mr.Molotov Nears the End of the Road," The Reporter, v o l . 14, ( A p r i l 5, 1956), p.36. 56. Dean Acheson, "On Dealing with Russia, An Inside View," U.S.News and World Report, v o l . 46 ( A p r i l 27, 1959), p.77. 57« Nancy A. MacLennan, "Russia's Iakov Malik," United Nations World, (March 1949), p.5758. Richard Lowenthal, "Negotiations With Russia? What's the Use?" New York Times Magazine,(September 10, 196l),p.21. 59» Lester B. Pearson, Diplomacy In the Nuclear Age, Toronto, S.J.Reginald Saunders, 1959» p.40. Also see Louis J . Halle,"The Act of Negotiating with the Russians," New York Times Magazine - (June 12,1955)&>.9.  192 60. Robert Murphy, "The Strategy of Communist Advance," USDSB.vol.59 (December 29, 1958), p.1048. 61. L e i t e s , A Study of Bolshevism, p.60. See also P h i l i p Mosely, The Kremlin and World P o l i t i c s , p.261; Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers, p.28; Wadsworth, The Price of Peace,pp.21-22. 62. . 63.  Hayter,  Ibid., p.30.  Barghoorn, The Soviet Image of the United States, p.117.  64. Edward Crankshaw, "Suspicion Is A Great Kremlin Wall',' New York Times Magazine (November 25, 1962), p.l33« See also Henry L. Stimson, McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service i n Peace and War, New York, Harper,1948.pp.644,649. 65.  Aspaturian, J I A v o l . l 7 , No.l, (1963), p . 4 7 .  66.  Cited i n I b i d . , p . 4 8 .  67.  Cited i n Ibid., p.49.  f  68. Winston C h u r c h i l l , M i f f l i n Co., 1953, p.363.  Triumph and Tragedy, Boston, Houghton and  69.  Morganthau,  P o l i t i c s Among Nations,(1948), p.429.  70.  Aspaturian,  JIA. v o l . 17, No.l,(1963), p.53«  71.  Loc. c i t .  72. See Henry Kissinger, "Reflections on American Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 3 5 , (October 1956), p.45.  Diplomacy,"  73. See Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign A f f a i r s , vol.41.(October 1962), pp.152-170. Shortly a f t e r the Second World War, on February 9 , 1946, S t a l i n declared: " I t would be incorrect to think that the war arose a c c i d e n t a l l y . The war arose as the i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t of the development of the world economic and p o l i t i c a l forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism." Cited i n Warren R. Austin, "Iceberg Resolution Discloses No Change of Heart i n Soviet P o l i c y , " USDSB,vol.23-(November 13, 1950),p.767. 74. Cited by C h r i s t i a n Herter, "The Meaning of International Obligations," USDSB, v o l . 3 9 (November 24, 1955), p . 8 0 6 .  194 CHAPTER 2. FOOTNOTES,, 1. C.L.Sulzberger, "Soviet Diplomat, Key to a Mystery," New York Times Magazine (September 22, 1946), p.12. 2. John R. Deane, "Negotiating on Military Assistance," Negotiating with the Russians.eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.27. 3. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, 1947, p.572. Also see Charles Ikle, "Portrait of the Russian As a Diplomat," New York Times Magazine , (December 9, 1962), p.27; Nicolson, Diplomacy p.130. ;  4.  Sulzberger,  Loc.cit.  5. Charles Roetter, The Diplomatic Art, Philadelphia, McRae Smith and Co., 1963, p.110. 6.  Mosely,  The Kremlin And World Politics, p.10.  7.  Loc. c i t .  8.  James Byrnes,. Speaking Frankly, p.277..  9. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Decisions, 'fol.'l, New York, Doubleday, 1955- p.102. 10. Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p.16. Also see Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers, p.55; Frank Howley, former American commander on the Berlin Kommandatura said: "You might as well try to pin down a j e l l y f i s h as to try impaling a Russian, on a reasonable question." Berlin Command, p.174. 11. Cited i n Robert H. Jackson, "Negotiations On War Crime Prosecution," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.53. 12.  See Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p.320.  13. Max Beloff, Foreign Policy And The Democratic Process, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1955, p.98. 14.  Harrison Salisbury,  Moscow Journal, p.28,  15. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, New York, Harper, 1948, p.388. 16.  Ibid.,  p.893.  17. John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, New York, Doubleday, 1962, p.54. Also see Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p.113.  195  18. Council of Foreign Relations, 1947. New York, Harper, 1 9 4 7 , p.152 19.  United States In The World 1 9 4 5 -  James Byrnes, "The Paris Peace Conference," USDSB. Vol.5  (August 1 8 , 1 9 4 6 ) ,  p.318.  20. Frederick Osborne,"Negotiations on Atomic Energy," Negotiating With The Russians, eds. Dennett & Johnson, p.217. 21. Harold Laski, "On Getting Through To The Russians," The New Republic, vol. 1 1 5 , (October 7 , 1946),p.448. 2 2 . Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr.. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1 9 5 2 , p.487. See also John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance. New York, The Viking Press, 1947,  p.301.  23.  Mosely,  The Kremlin and World Politics, p.13.  24.  Dulles,  War or Peace, p.24.  P o l i t i c s , v o l . 1 9 (January 1 9 5 7 ) ,  See also Kertesz, Review of  p.19.  2 5 . George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1 9 5 1 , p.118. 2 6 . John N. Hazard,"Negotiating Under Lend Lease',' Negotiating With The Russians, eds. Dennett & Johnson, p.33» See also Richard Gould Adams, John Foster Dulles, A Reappraisal, New York, AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc. 1 9 6 2 , p.26. 27. vol.  James Reston, "Negotiating With The Russians," Harper's Magazine, 1 9 5 (August 1 9 4 7 ) ,  28.  Sherwood,  29.  Smith,  p.98.  Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.449.  My Three Years In Moscow, p . 1 0 9 .  3 0 . See Cattell, "USSR Foreign Policy'' Control of Foreign Relations i n Modern Nations, eds. Buck and Travis, p.661. 31. Hazard, "Negotiating Lend Lease}' Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett & Johnson, p.33* "If Soviet negotiators refuse a plan i t may not be really so because i f they lack instructions they w i l l automatically be negative." Kertesz, Review of Politics, v o l . 1 9 (January 1 9 5 7 ) ,  32.  p.9.  James Reston, "Negotiating with the Russians," Harper's  Magazine,, (August 1 9 4 7 ) ,  p.99«  196  33. Vandenberg, Papers, p.197. "I learned i t was always better to make a proposal, avoid discussing i t , and indicate that I hoped the proposal would be considered and an answer forthcoming i n a few days." Deane, Strange Alliance, p.20. 34,  Kennan,  American Diplomacy, 1900-1950.  35«  Mosely,  Kremlin and World Politics,  336.  p.ll6.  pp.37-38.  Standley, Admiral Ambassador to the Soviet Union,  pp.115, 6 9 .  37* Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp.391, 7 8 9 . See also Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow, New York, Gardner, 1945» p.249, and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp.18, 4 5 , 281* 38.  StettiHias, Roosevelt and the Russians, p.171.  39« Cited i n Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 65, Ibid., p.321.  see also Stettinius,  40. Cited i n Andrew W. Cordier, "Diplomacy Today". Journal of International Affairs, vol. 1 7 , ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p.5. 41.  Mosely,  The Kremlin and World Politics, p.29.  42.  Loc. c i t .  43.  Ibid., p.32.  44.  Laski,The New Republic, vol..115 (October 7, 1 9 4 6 ) , p.447.  45. Louis J. Halle, "The Art of Negotiating With the Russians," New York Times Magazine (June 1 2 , 1955), p. 9 1 . 46. Loc. c i t . An American negotiator advised his colleagues: "Don't change your mind without new evidence otherwise you're lost. The mind which i s ever ready to change w i l l be subjected to endless argument and constant attack by the Soviet colleague who i s quick to sense the opportunity." Hazard,"Negotiating Lend Leasel^Negotiating with the Russians, p.46. Also see Deane, Strange Alliance, p.20; Philip C. Jessup, "The Soviet Pattern in the Sixth General Assembly," USDSB, vol. 26 (February l 8 , 1952), p.265. 47.  Mosely,  Kremlin World Politics, p.34.  48.  Byrnes,  Speaking Frankly,  p.108.  49.  Deane,  Strange Alliance,  p.293.  50. Ibid., pp.295, 3 4 ; Also see E.F.Penrose (1946 United States Negotiator on refugees and displaced persons), "Negotiating on Refugees and Displaced Persons," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p . l 4 5 .  197  51. See F.W.Neal, United States Foreign P o l i c y and the -Soviet Union, pp.47, 57. When Lord Beaverbrook was i n Moscow negotiating with the Russians, S t a l i n asked him about peace objectives. When Beaverbrook mentioned the eight points of the A t l a n t i c Charter, S t a l i n asked, "What about getting the Germans to pay for the damage?" Beaverbrook evaded the question. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.388 and John Lukacs, A History of The Cold War, p.48. 52. Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia, p.351. For further elaboration on Soviet s e l f - i n t e r e s t see Joseph Davies, Mission to Moscow, pp.186, 279, 307; Robert P. Browder, The Origins of SovietAmerican Diplomacy, p . 2 l 8 ; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.280; Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, p . l l 6 ; Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions, p.263; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service i n Peace and War, p.65"; S t e t t i n i u s , Roosevelt and the Russians, p.307; William J . F u l b r i g h t , Prospects for the West, Cambridge, Harvard, 1963, P«17j Mosely, Kremlin and World P o l i t i c s , p.39. 53« A l l a n Dulles, "Seven Safeguards i n Dealing with Reds," Saturday Evening Post' (October I 9 6 3 ) , p.66. 54. John Foster Dulles, "The Role of Negotiation," USDSB, v o l . 3 8 (February 3> 1958), p . ? 6 l . Also see J.F.Dulles,"Question of Negotiations with the Soviet Union,"USDSB, v o l . 3 7 (November 4, 1957), p.712. 55. Cited i n "How Far Can the United States Trust Gromyko?" U.S.News and World. Report, v o l . 55 (August 19, 1963), p.15. 56. However, Joseph E. Davies, i n Mission to Moscow, says that he observed that Soviet diplomats mistrusted each other g r e a t l y and that there was no confidence between them. See p.244. 57.  Bailey,  58.  Cited i n Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.68.  59.  Ibid.,  60. p.133.  America Faces  Russia, p.349.  pp.68,130.  Edward Crankshaw, New York Times Magazine (November 25, See also John Lukacs, A History of The Cold War, p.115.  61.  Byrnes,  62.  Neal,  1962),  op.bit., p.56. United States Foreign P o l i c y and the Soviet Union.pp.5.13.  63. For example, see J h i s L . , pp.11-13. Neal says i t i s quite natural f o r the Soviets to f e e l suspicious about Western attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The Soviets c i t e these instances: the invasion of Russia by the United States and other Western countries during the Bolshevik revolution; the Soviet exclusion from the V e r s a i l l e s Peace Conference; the non-recognition of the Soviet Union and the cordon s a n i t a i r e around it; the i n i t i a l exclusion from the League of Nations; Western rebuffs at Soviet c a l l s f o r c o l l e c t i v e security; Soviet exclusion from Munich even though Russia had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and expulsion from the League of Nations. Loc. c i t .  64. Loc. S i t . Also see Hull, Memoirs, p.304; Mosely, Kremlin and World Politics, p.106; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.391; Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp.62, 7, 319, 144. 65. Joseph Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Russian edition, English text, Moscow, 1940, p.157. 66.  Byrnes,  Speaking Frankly, pp.297,308.  67.  Neal, United States Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, p.15*  68. Cited i n J . Coffey, "The Soviet View of a Disarmed World," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 8 (March 1964), p.2. See also Walter Clemens, Jr., "Ideology i n Soviet Disarmament Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 8 (March 1954), p.7; Neal, United States Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, -.p.13; Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p.l7« 69.  Pearson,  Diplomacy i n the Nuclear Age, pp.4, 49.  70. Cited i n Frederick H. Hartmann, ed. Readings In International Relations, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1952. p.106. 71. p.199.  Graham H. Stuart,  American Diplomatic And Consular Practice,  72.  Stimson and Bundy,  On Active Service i n Peace and War, p.605.  73. For example, Deane, in The Strange Alliance, wrote on p.44, "Soviet bluntness i s new in diplomatic procedure but at times i t i s refreshing." Also see Smith, My Three Years i n Moscow, p.19; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.43. 74. William D. Leahy, 1950, p.205.  I Was There, New York, McGraw-Hill Co.,  75« Standley, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, pp.209, 505* See also Harriman's comment on Stalin's discourtesy in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.388. 76.  Sherwood,  Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.798.  77« Mosely, Kremlin and World Politics, pp.4, 7j see also John Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, p.98. 78. Averell L. Harriman, Peace with Russia? New York, Simon and Shuster, 1959, p.13. 79. Cited i n M i l l i s , ed. The Forrestal Diaries, New York, Viking, 1951, P. 354. 80. Smith, My Three Years i n Moscow, p.73« Also see Lukacs, A History of the Cold War, p.98.  199  81. Cited i n Bailey, America Faces Russia, p.320. John Foster Dulles wrote that " i n the United Nations the very intemperance of the words and the manners of Vyshinsky and other Soviet delegates made a s t r i k i n g contrast with the sober and calm attitudes of the delegates who were alleged to be lovers of violence." see Dulles, War or Peace, p.68. also see Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p.22. 82. "Soviet Domination of the Danube Conference," Documents and State Papers.USDSB. V o l . 19l/(November-December, 1948), p.489. American President Wilson c a l l e d early Soviet diplomacy "studiously i n s u l t i n g . " Cited i n Robert S-. Rifking, "The Wasted Mission," America and Russia, ed. Oliver Jensen, New York, Simon and Shuster,1962,p.l92. 83. Carlos P. Romulo, "Diplomats Mind Your Manners," United Nations World, v o l . 4* (January.,1950)» p.64. "The relations between Russia and the Western powers v/ere vituperative and bad. Meetings at fhe United Nations were often the occasion of slanging matches, never of negotiations." Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Right Honorable Anthony Eden; F u l l C i r c l e , London, C e l l , i 9 6 0 , p.9. a s s  84.  Hayter, The Diplomacy of the Great Powers, p.29.  200 CHAPTER 5. FOOTNOTES 1.  Mosely,  2.  Ibid.,  3.  Ibid.-,  4.  Ibid., •  5.  Ibid.,  6.  Ibid., •  7. Hayter, 8. Osborne Russians, eds.Dennett and Johnson, 9. 10.  p.235.  Kertesz, Review of Politics, vol. 19 (January, 1957), p.25« Vandenberg,  Private Papers, p.269.  11. Crankshaw, New York Times Magazine (November 25, 1962), p.133* "Americans are optimistic on the idealistic side. . . .We have had so much faith i n the Tightness of our motives and principles, that i t i s almost impossible for us to realize that our solemn word i s doubted." Wadsworth, Price of Peace, p.19. 12.  Kertesz, Review of Politics, vol. 19 (January 1957), p.27.  13.  Stettinius,  14.  Smith,  15.  Mosely,  16.  Standley, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, pp.163, 194, 131.  Roosevelt and the Russians, p.324.  My Three Years i n Moscow, p.28. The Kremlin and World Politics, p.40.  17. Gunther, Roosevelt i n Retrospect, p.355. See also Willard Range, Franklin Roosevelt's World Order, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1959, pp.63-68. 18. Hull, Memoirs, pp.1465, 1467. See also Truman, Memoirs, Years of T r i a l and Hope, vol. 2, p.2l4. John Beal, John Foster Dulles, New York Harper, 1957, p.195. 19.  Mosely,  Kremlin and World Politics, p.33.  201  20.  Ibid., p.4l.  21.  See Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians.PP.6. 157, 325*  22.  Mosely,  op.cit.,p.32.  23. Dulles, W a r or Peace, p.30. Also see Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, ch.15, especially p.295« Byrnes, ' Speaking Frankly, p.83; Hull, Memoirs, p.1436. 24.  "Negotiating From Hope," The Economist (May 1955)*p.447.  t  25. Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior In The Postwar Disarmament Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.7.. (September 1963), p.530. 26. Cited i n B.D.Zevin, ed. Nothing to Fear; The Selected Addresses of Franklin Roosevelt 1932-1945, Cambridge, Houghton,) Mifflin Co., 1946, p.  449. see also Truman, Memoirs, Years of Trial and Hope, p.402.  27/  Stettinius,  28.  Hull,  Roosevelt and the Russians,  p.220.  Memoirs, p.1449.  29. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.172 . 30. "Let us Call a Truce to Terror," Address by.President Kennedy before the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 196x» Department of State'Publication 7282, Washington, D.C. U.S.Government Printing' Office (October 1961) PP« 3 , 9, 10; also Eefer to p.21. 31. Winston Churchill to Marshall and Forrestal, March 10, 1946, cited in M i l l i s , ed. Forrestal Diaries, p . l 4 5 .  202  CHAPTER 4 FOOTNOTES •» 1. Robert P. Browder, Origins of Soviet and American Diplomacy, pp.215-216. 2.  Ibid.,  p. 221.  3.  "Dealing v/ith the Russians,"  The Spectator .(August. 1948). p.l65»  4. John Foster Dulles, "News Conference," USDSB. vol.3o(March 3, 1958), p.336. 5.  Dulles, "News Conference",USDSB  t  vol.39. (December 15,195bJp.951.  6. George Marshall, "Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 10-April 24,1947," USDSB, vol. 16,(May 11,1947), p.924. 7. George V. Allen, "Address at Duke University, December 10,1949," USDSB, vol. 21 (December 19, 1949), pp.93^1-943. 8.  "Negotiating from Sense,'.  1  The Economist (February; 1955)/ P«686.  9. Kenneth W. Thompson, "U.S. and USSR Confrontation of Interests," Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association (1960)#138, p.80. See also James J . Wadsworth, Price of Peace, pp.28-29. 10.  Adlai Stevenson, Friends and Enemies, New York, Harper, 1959,p«5»  11. C.D.Jackson, "Soviet Propaganda Charges Against United States Efforts to Deter Aggression i n Asia," USDSB, vol.31 (December 20, 1954),. p.957. Also see S i r Pierson Dixon, (United Kingdom Representative to the United Nations), "Diplomacy At The United Nations," Diplomacy i n a Changing World, eds. Kertesz and Fitzsimmons, and Alexander Dallin, "The Soviets and the United Nations," World Review (March,1964), p.13 f f . 12.  Lucius D. Clay,  Decision In Germany, New York, Doubleday,1950,p.157.  13. Frederick Osborne, "Negotiating On Atomic Energy," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.231. 14. Joseph L. Nogee, "Propaganda And Negotiation: The Case of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee,'-' Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.7 = (September- 1963), p.605. 15. Cited i n Andre W. Cordier, "Diplomacy Today," Journal of International Affairs, vol.17 (1963), P«5« See also Hans J. Morgenthau, "Dilemma Of The Summit," New York Times Magazine (November 11, 1962), p.25ff• 16.  Philip Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, pp.11,12,14.  17. See Norman D. Palmer, Howard C. Perkins, International Relations, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin, 1957,.pp.132-133.  203  18.  Ibid.,  p.133.  19. For example, "At the B e r l i n Conference of 1954, Molotov, i n c l a s s i c form, attacked NATO, the EDC, and the Adenauer Government i n Bonn. "•'• Richard Gould-Adams, John Foster Dulles, A Reappraisal, p.115* See, also Wadsworth, Price of Peace, pp.28-29. P h i l i p C. Jessup, "Deputies Meetings Strengthened Western Powers," USDSB, vol.25 (July 30, 1 9 5 1 ) , pp.I87-I88. I t should be kept i n mind that Soviet use of a conference f o r propaganda does not necessarily preclude any agreement from being reached. For further references consult Mosely, The Kremlin and World P o l i t i c s , pp.17-21, and Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp.139142,280.  20. Vera M. Dean, " P o l i t i c a l Technique," The Saturday Review of L i t e r a t u r e , vol.30 (October 25, 19^7), p.16. 21. Dulles, War or Peace, p.67. Moreover, sections of Molotov's speech were channeled by radio to desired r e c i p i e n t s . 22. George Marshall, "Firm and Determined Course For The Democracies," USDSB, v o l . 18 (June 6, 1948), p.745. Regarding the 1947 London Conference Marshall also said: "We are faced with a deliberate cynical propaganda campaign to a f f e c t a sincere e f f o r t on our part to e s t a b l i s h a basis f o r p r o f i t a b l e negotiations and agreements leading to a s t a b i l i zation of the world s i t u a t i o n . " Loc. c i t . 23.  M i l l i s , ed.„ The F o r r e s t a l D i a r i e s , p.354.  24.  Council of Foreign Relations, The United States In The World, New York, Harper, 1948, p . 4 6 4 . Bevin t o l d Molotov a f t e r the l a t t e r ' s abusive speech that the B r i t i s h people would c e r t a i n l y resent the r e p e t i t i o n of i n s u l t s and falsehoods. He thought that Molotov might have at least wound up h i s long speech by thanking the Western powers for the courtesy of s i t t i n g and l i s t e n i n g to him so long. L o c . c i t . 1947-1948,  25. Thomas Hovet, J r . , "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 17-,. (1963), p«32. 26.  Wadsworth,  The Price of Peace, pp.28-29.  27. See Morton Kaplan, William R e i t z e l , Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign P o l i c y 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 5 , Washington, D.C, Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , p.449. 28. Clay, Dpc-JR-ion i n Germany, p . 3 4 8 . After a series of r e p e t i t i v e charges against the West by Molotov, Marshall broke o f f the meetings, r. The Council did n o t r e e t f o r two years a f t e r the 1947 f i a s c o i n London.  29. Osborne, "Negotiating on Atomic Energy," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.236. 30.  Loc. c i t .  204 31.  Anthony Eden, Memoirs. F u l l Circle*  p.65.  32. Joseph L. Nogee, "Propaganda And Negotiations: The Case of The Nation Disarmament Committee," Journal of Conflict Resolution,vol.17 (September. 1963), p.575. 33« Loc.cit. On the other hand the West has repeated^ the need for arras control but i t seems that the repetition i s not for propaganda so much as i t i s for Western security • i n case a disarmament agreement i s reached.with the Soviets. 34. Ibid., p.5l4. Either Zorin or a delegate from a Communist country would ask repeatedly: "Why begin with controls—they are a means to an end, let us agree on the end." Loc.cit. Similarly the West tried to.get the latter to agree in public to i t s proposal for arms control as envisaged by the Americans. 35« Ibid., p.521. Likewise, the West described Soviet disarmament proposals"-' as Utopian and said that the American plan was r e a l i s t i c . 36. Loc.cit. The West also tried to find contradictions between the Soviet and Eastern European delegations. "The West did not have as much opportunity as the Soviets had," says Nogee. Moreover, according to Nogee, the West merely implied puppet relationships existed between the Soviet and Eastern European delegations. Loc.cit. 37. James Byrnes, "The Paris Peace Conference," USDSB, vol.15,, (August 25, 19^6), p.353. 38.  Palmer and Perkins,  39. Thomas K. Finletter, Harper, 1958, p.176.  International Relations, pp.l40-l4l. Foreign Policy, The Next Phase, New York,  40. See a detailed account of this incident in "U.S. and Russian Peace Feelers," U.S.News and World Report (May 21,1948), pp.11-13,69. 41.  Loc. c i t .  42.  Loc. c i t .  43.  Loc. C i t .  44.  Smith,  45.  Pearson,  My Three Years i n Moscow,  p.l66.  Diplomacy In The Nuclear Age,  p.9-  46. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1961, p.150. 47. See Emmett John Hughes, Ordeal of Power, A P o l i t i c a l Memoir of the Eisenhower Years,p.294. See also Kaplan, Reitzel and Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955, p.449; Pearson, op.cit. p.9.  205 CHAPTER 5 FOOTNOTES, 1. Edwin Tetlaw, "Can Eisenhower Make a Settlement with Stalin?" United Nations World, vol.7r. (January.. 1953), p.11. 2.  Bailey,  A Diplomatic History of the American People, p.32?»  3 . Dean Acheson, "Progress Toward International Peace and Unijby USDSB. vol. 26 (April 25, 1952), p.645. 4. Phillip? W. Davison, The Berlin Blockade, Princeton University, 1958, pp.13-18. 5. Truman, Memoirs, vol.1, p.320; also see Walter M. Kotsching, "In Review and Forecast," USDSB, vol.20 (January 21, 1949) P«52. 6. See United States Congress,Senate,Committee on Commerce, The Speeches, Remarks, Press Conferences and State Papers of VicePresident Richard Nixon, August 1-November 7 I960, Final Report, 57th Congress, Rept.994, 1961, p.785. 7. "What Russia i s Doing to Us," The Catholic World, vol.163 (September, 1946), p.541. 8. Beal, John F o s t e r D u l l e s , p.199. Regarding the myth of Sisyphus, Dulles said that:"For two thousand years now there has been a figure i n mythology which symbolizes tragic f u t i l i t y . That was Sisyphus, who, according to the Greek story, was given the task of rolling a great stone up to the top-of a h i l l . Each time, when after a great struggle, the stone was just at the brow of the h i l l , some evil force manifested i t s e l f and pushed the stone down, so poor Sisyphus had to start his task a l l over again. Loc.cit. There appears to be l i t t l e doubt i n Western minds that i f the Soviets want to agree to a proposal they can do so quickly. For example, i t took the Soviets nine days to negotiate the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact of non-aggression when overtures were f i r s t made. See Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.286. 9.  Mosely,  The Kremlin and World Politics, pp.21-22.  10.  Loc. c i t .  11.  Deane, Strange Alliance, p.70.  12.  Eden,  13.  Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.279.  14.  Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p.434.  Memoirs, F u l l Circle, p.62.  206  15.  The Kremlin and World Politics, p . 2 6 l .  Mosely,  1 6 . See Joseph B. Phillips, "Mr.Molotov Sells the Horse Twice," Newsweek (July 15, 1948), p.50. 17. Dulles, War and Peace,p.26; also see Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p.250 and his article "Peace-Making, 1946" International Organization, vol. I . (February,- 1 9 4 7 ) , p.29. 18. "The First Four Weeks," The Economist (November, 1955)^.464. Another Soviet procedural tactic to delay the work of a conference was the demand for a r o l l c a l l vote not only on a majority motion but also on minority motions. Even a two-thirds majority vote did not stop Soviet demands for a r o l l c a l l vote. See Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.156. 1 9 . Beal, John Foster Dulles, $/193; also see "Hair Splitting i n Action," The Spectator> (June 1951), p.?4l; also see George Marshall, The London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25 December 1 5 , 1947," USDSB, vol. 17 (December 2 8 , 1 9 4 7 ) , p.1245. Ten days of the 1947 London Conference were devoted to debates over procedure. 2 0 . Eden, Memoirs, F u l l Circle, p . 3 0 5 . Also see Ernest J.Simmons, "Negotiating On Cultural Exchanges," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.248. 21.  Eden,  op.cit.  y  22. "Another Conference-Another Stalemate," U.S.News and World Report, vol. 46. (May 25, 1 9 5 9 ) , pp.37-39.' 23.  Loc.dit.  24.  Byrnes,  25.  Ibid., p.104.  26.  Ibid., pp.135,128.  27.  Ibid., pp.171,279.  28.  Smith,  Speaking Frankly, p.74; also see p.159.  My Three Years in Moscow, p.219; also pp.40, 2 7 9 .  29. Truman, Memoirs, v o l . 1 passim, and Vandenberg, Papers, p.206, on the Austrian Treaty negotiations; 30. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.137. For further examples of this concept, see Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.867 and Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p.327. 31. David T. Cattell, WSSR Foreign Policy," Control of Foreign Relations in Modern Nations, eds. Buck and Travis, p.720,  20? 32. George Marshall, "The London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25-December 15,1947,V USDSB, vol.17 (December 28, 1947), p.1244; see also "Suspension of Austrian Treaty Negotiations," USDSB, vol. 18 (June 6, 1948), pp.746-747. 33. See Fred Charles Ikle, "Portrait of the Russian as a Diplomat," New York Times Magazine (December 9, 1962), p.27. 34. Raymond R. Milesell, (United States delegate to the Monetary Fund Talks), "Negotiating at Bretton Woods," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, pp.104-105. 35. John Foster Dulles, "The Role of Negotiation," USDSB,vol.38, (February 3, 1958), p . l 6 l . According to Westerners, even a Soviet proposal which has been defeated i n a subcommittee meeting usually never settles anything. The same proposal i s always introduced into the main committee and either the same or very similar speeches are repeated, See E.F.Penrose, "Negotiating On Refugees And Displaced Persons," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.l60. 36. Frederick Osborne, "Negotiating On Atomic Energy," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.234. 37.  Byrnes,  Speaking Frankly, p.2?8, see also p.176,  38.  Vandenberg,  39«  Byrnes,  40.  Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, p.755 see also p.24.  Papers, p.269.  op.cit., p.279«  41. "Negotiating from Hope," The Economist (May, 1955),p>448. See also "Bitter fords, Startled Feelings," Newsweek,, (May 20,1946), p.42. 42.- Lloyd Jensen, "Soviet-American Bargaining Behavior in the Postwar Disarmament Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.7(September, lS63-),p.530. Jensen says that "the United States i s more predisposed towards making concessions, but after a time, when these cor/cessions have not been reciprocated i t becomes disillusioned with the bargaining process and wants to terminate discussion." Loc.cit. 43. Eden's plan for German unification was based on the Big Four drafting electoral laws, supervising of free elections. An all-German election would elect an a l l German National Assembly which would then draft a constitution. 44. George Meany, "Berlin-Geneva," The American Eederationist (April 1954), pp.6-7. The Molotov Plan proposed that a provisional government of Eastern and Western Germany represent Germany at the peace treaty negotiations. All-German elections would be held later when only "democractic parties and organizations wouldfee-permittedto take part;" furthermore, Germany would be neutralized and a l l troops would be withdrawn except for police contingents.  /  208 45.  Vandenberg,  46.  Loc. c i t .  Papers,  p.290.  47. Dean Acheson, "Status of Negotiations with the Soviet Union On Proposed Foreign Ministers Meeting," USDSB, v o l . 24 (January 15, 1951), p.92. For other references regarding Soviet delaying, t a c t i c s during the German Peace Treaty Negotiations see: Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.279. Council of Foreign Relations, United States i n the World. 1947x1948,p.72: George C. Marshall, "Moscow Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, March 10, A p r i l 27, 1947," USDSB,vol.16 (May 11, 1947), p. 923; Eden. Memoirs. F u l l C i r c l e . p.?4. 48.  Smith,  My Three Years i n Moscow, pp.214-215.  49.  Roetter,  50.  Loc. c i t .  The Diplomatic Art, p.122.  51. Ernest J . Simmons, "Negotiating on Cultural Exchanges," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson,p.248. 52.  Loc.cit.  53. Ibid., p.249. See also "What' Moscow Wants," The Economist,(June, 1955), pp.1105-1107, and Michael Lindsay, "Thoughts on Negotiating with the Russians," The New Republic, vol.139 (August 18, 1958), pp.16-20. 54. See " E f f o r t s to E s t a b l i s h C u l t u r a l - S c i e n t i f i c Exchanges Blocked by the USSR," USDSB, v o l . 20, (March, 1949), p.403. Also r e f e r to Deane, Strange A l l i a n c e , pp.186, 253,203, as well as h i s discHssion on war prisoners. Also see "Status of Repatriation of German War Prisoners," USDSB, v o l . 2 0 , (January 16, 1949), p.77, and "Soviet Delays i n Repatriating German War Prisoners," USDSB, vol.33 (July 24, 1956), p.133; also r e f e r to Truman, Memoirs, v o l . 2 , p.131. Truman stated that i t was d i f f i c u l t to do business with the Russians on a "straightforward basis because i f they did not want to do business they simply delayed giving answers." Also refer to Howley^ B e r l i n Command, pp.11-12. 53>» John Lear, "Ike and the Peaceful Atom," Eisenhower As President, ed. Dean Albertson, New York, H i l l and Wang, I 9 6 3 , p.101. 56.  Vandenberg,  Papers,  p.202.  57« For a discussion of Soviet t a c t i c s i n the United Nations see Dean Acheson "Status of Negotiations with the Soviet Union on Proposed Foreign Ministers Meeting," USDSB, vol.24 (January 15, 1951) pp.92-94.  209 CHAPTER 6,, FOOTNOTES,, 1.  "Negotiating from Hope," The.Economist (May, 1955), P.447.  2. Lloyd Jensen, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.7 ..(September 1963), p.527. 3. Edward Tetlaw, "Can Eisenhower Make a Settlement v/ith Stalin?" United Nations World, vol.7 (January, 1953), p.11. 4. "A Gentle Breeze: A New Line of Soviet Diplomacy," The Round Table., (June., 1947), p.206. 5. Charles L. Sulzberger, "Soviet Diplomat, Key to a Mystery," New York Times Magazine,(September 22, 1946), pp.12-13. 6. Loc. c i t . 7.  Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p.300.  8. Hull, Memoirs, p.1678. The minimum amount of votes acceptable to the Soviet Union was three; also consult Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p»59« 9. See the article by George Meany, "Berlin-Geneva," The American Federationist, (April 24, 1954), p.710. Council of Foreign Relations, United States i n World Affairs, 1945-1947, p.449. See also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.153. 11.  Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p.252.  12. Vandenberg, Papers, p.lSl. "As soon as Molotov gets United States acquiesence on a f i r s t point. . .he will immediately follow with the other demand." Ibid., p.177. Also refer to Philip Mosely, "Peace-Making,1946," International Organization, vol.1^(February- 1947), pp.24-25. 13.  Eden,  Memoirs, F u l l Circle, p . l l 6 .  14.  gowley, Berlin Command, pp.52-54.  15.  Loc. c i t .  16.  Loc. c i t .  17. Loc. cit.Whenever strong Western resistance appeared, the Soviets would quietly drop their "thrust" proposal. 18. U.S.Congress, Committee on Commerce, Nixon, Speeches,i960 Presidential Campaign, Final Report, Freedom of Communication, Part II, Rept.994, 1961, p.61.  210 19. Richard C. Hottelet, "Why Russians Can't be Trusted," Reader's Digest, vol. 60 (April, 1952) /p.29. 20.  Byrnes,  Speaking Frankly, p.755  also see pp.279-280, 123.  21.  See Smith,  My Three Years i n Moscow, p.l62.  22.  Stevenson,  Friends and Enemies, p.7«  23. Deane, Strange Alliance, p.34. Also consult Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade, New York, Knopf, 1956, p.58. 24.  Gould-Adams, Dulles, A Reappraisal, p.113*  25. Cited i n David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1961, p.242. 26.  Ibid., p.243.  27.  See "Why Zorin Walked Out,"  New Statesman-.(July i960), p . l .  28. See "What We Gain by Talking to';the Soviets," Business Week, (June 6, 1959), p.140. 29. Fred Charles Ikle, "Portrait of the Russian As a Diplomat," New York Times Magazine^ (December 9, 1962), p.80. 30. See George V. Allan, "Perpetual Peace Through World Wide Federation," USDSB, vol. 20,, (June 19, 1949), p.801. 31. See Philip Mosely, "The Challenge of the Kremlin," In a Changing World, eds. Kertesz and Fitzsimmons, p.126.  Diplomacy  32. Refer to "Soviet Efforts to Divert and Confuse," USDSB, vol.25, (September 10, 1951), P«427« The psychological term of "projection" seems to apply to the Soviets when they use this tactic. See other examples of this Soviet tactic i n George C. Marshall, "The London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, November 25-December 15,1947," USDSB. vol. 17 (December 28, 1947), p.1246; William Leahy.I Was There, p.408; Deane, "Negotiating Lend Lease," Negotiating wi'ch the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.24. 33. Refer to "U.N.Disarmament Aims Made Clear," (April 6, 1953), p.504. 34.  "Nothing for Nothing,"  35.  Mosely,  USDSB, vol.28,  The Economist (July. 1957), p.108.  The Kremlin and World Politics,^ p . l 6 ,  f;  36. Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp.266,346. Although the reparations figure of twenty b i l l i o n dollars was not mentioned i n the communique i t was mentioned i n the protocols.  211 37.  See Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.2b0.  3b. Dallin, Byrnes, Ibid,,.  Soviet' Foreign Policy after Stalin, p.106; Also see  39. Dallin, Ibid., p.107. There i s a slightly different version of this incident. When Byrnes f i r s t became Secretary of State, following Stettinius, Molotov claimed that Stettinius had agreed i n a letter to accept Soviet trusteeship of Tripolantia. Byrnes asked to see the letter "which turned out was written by Harold Stassen. The letter said that the United States was willing to agree that Russia was potentially eligible for consideration as an administrator of trusteeships of conquered territories. Molotov insisted that this language constituted an agreement. . . ." (Byrnes to Forrestal), cited i n M i l l i s , ed. Forrestal Diaries, p.103 s  40.  Finletter,  Foreign Policy, The Next Phase, (1958), p.86.  41. Cited i n Joseph L. Nogee, "Propaganda and Negotiation: .The Case of the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee," Journal of Conflict - Resolution, vol. 7:*XSeptember,,-1963) »p«5l6» k2.  Dulles,  43.  Ibid., p.27.  War or Peace,, p.29.  kk. Loc.cit. 45.  Ibid., p.28 .  46.  Loc.cit.  47.  Ibid., p.29.  48.  Sulzberger,  .  New York Times Magazine .( September 22-: 1946)., pp. 12-13.  49. Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Mr. Molotov Nears the End of the Road," The Reporter, vol. 14, (April 5, 1956), pp.37-39•50. See Blair Fraser, "The New, McLeans (July 25, 1964), p.34.-  Quiet Soviet Spies i n Our Midst,"  51. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p.310. Bailey says that the Soviets were right with embarrassing frequency when they complained of Western infractions. See also Dulles, "The Role of Negotiation," USDSB, vol.38 (February 3, 1958),p.761. 52.  See Standley,  53.  Ibid., p.310.  54.  Smith,  55«  Ibid.,. p.226..  Admiral Ambassador to Sussia, p.196,  My Three Years in Moscow, p.253.  212 56.  Ibid., p.250.  57. Sidney S, Alderman,(Assistant to the United States Counsel at Nuremberg), "Negotiating on War Crimes," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.95. 58.  Ibid., p. 96..  59.  Nogee, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.7 (September;1963),p.516.  60.  Eden,  61.  Howley, Berlin Command, p.47.  62.  Deane, Strange Alliance, p.13.  Memoirs, F u l l Circle, p.304.  63. Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1953, p.669. At an earlier meeting Churchill had told Stalin that he favored a revision of the Montreux Convention i n Russia's favor. Marmora i s an island i n the sea of Marmora——between the Dardenelles and the Black Sea. 64. Ernest H. King, Walter W. -Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record, New York, Norton, 1952, p.593. 65.  Ibid., p.590.  66. John N. Hazard, (American Deputy-Director of Soviet Supplies, Lend Lease, 194l-45), "Negotiations under Lend Lease," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p . 4 l . 67. See Wadsworth, The Price of Peace, pp.25-26; also refer to Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.59, on Stalin's attempts to exploit Roosevelt's goodw i l l with this tactic. 68. Byrnes, Loc.cit. (August.. 1947), p.' 101.  Also consult Reston, Harpers Magazine vblil95-'  69.  Murphy,  Diplomat Among Warriors,  p.320.  70.  Reston, op.cit., p.102.  71.  Consult Meany, The American  72.  Ikle, New York Times Magazine (December 9,1962), p.27.  Federationist,(April,1954)p.7.  73. Henry Cabot Lodge, "Soviet Leaders Urged to Stop Being Afraid," USDSB, vol.23,(November 13, 1950), p.770. 74.  Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p.62,  75. Standley, Admiral Ambassador to Russia,p.214. Standley told Hull i n 1943 to be aware of this Soviet tactic; see p.497» 76.  Ibid., pp.210-213.  213 CHAPTER 7, FOOTNOTES, 1.  See Aspaturian, JIA, vol.17, No.l,(l963), pp.42-43.  2. Ibid., p.48; further elaboration on the Soviet interpretation of "bourgeois" diplomacy refer to pp.45-50* 3.  Ibid.,.p.46.  4. Crankshaw, New York Times Magazine. (November 25, 1962), p.133* See also Deanej "Negotiating on Military Assistance," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett and Johnson, p.8. 5.  Aspaturian,op.cit., p.57; also refer to p.52.  6.  Mosely, The Kremlin and World Politics, p.25.  • 7« Cited in M i l l i s , ed. Forrestal Diaries, p.482. 8. For elaboration and further examples of broken agreements see the following references: Deane, St range Allianc e,pp.157,182-200,239; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.122; Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians,flp.119, 183, 311; Wadsworth, Price of Peace, p.25. John R. Deane suggests that the Soviets made commitments and then did not f u l f i l l them because of Soviet displeasure over Western policy toward Poland. However, the lack of Soviet fulfillment of agreements goes back many years before the Second World War. For example, the 1933 diplomatic recognition agreement between the Soviets and the Americans was broken by the Russians i n 1934. So i t appears that regardless of Western policy toward Poland, the violation of wartime agreements would s t i l l have occurred. 9. The Council of Foreign Relations, United States In the World, 19451947, p.74. 10.  Truman, Memoirs, vol.2, p.130.  11. Clay, Decision in Germany, p.112. The f i r s t exposure Clay had to this tactic was i n December, 1945, when the Western a l l i e s decided to abolish travel restrictions between the three German zones. The Soviets agreed i n principle to abolish their Eastern zone restrictions but General Sokolovsky said that i t was practically impossible for the Soviets to do i t . He never said why i t was practically impossible. Nor did the Soviets ever abolish travel restrictions. Loc.cit. Also refer to Davison, Berlin Blockade, p.7. 12.  Deane,  Strange Alliance, pp.20-21.  13.  Loc.cit.  14.  See Smith, My Three Years in Moscow, pp.246-248.  21k 15. Davison, B e r l i n Blockade, p.191; also consult pp.158-162, l 8 4 . See' also Truman, Memoirs, v o l . 2 , pp.126-12?. 16. Se"'e William H. Hale, "The Road to Yalta," America and Russia, ed. O l i v e r Jensen, p.231. Also r e f e r to Standly,Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p.426, and Deane, "Negotiating, on M i l i t a r y Assistance," Negotiating with the Russians, eds. Dennett & Johnson, p.8. 17.  See Standley,  18,.  See Clay,  Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p.253«  Decision i n Germany, p . l 4 5 .  19. Aspaturian, JIA, v o l . 1 7 , No.l. (1963), p . 6 0 . Soviet d u p l i c i t y has also occurred i n Russian dealings with Eastern European countries., contrary to the "pure" r e l a t i o n s Communist States are supposed to have between one another. When the Hungarian Revolution f a i l e d i n 1956, the Nationalist-Communist Hungarian Premier, Imre Nagy, f l e d to the Yugoslav Embassy i n Budapest to avoid Russian r e p r i s a l s . The Russians t o l d Nagy and the Yugoslavs that no r e p r i s a l s were contemplated against Nagy for supporting the r e b e l l i o n . But when Nagy l e f t the Yugoslav Embassy he was promptly arrested and executed by the Russians. Also during the revolution, under the guise of negotiating with the popular Hungarian War Minister, Colonel Maleter, the Russians lured him into a trap where he was arrested by the Chief of the Russian Secret Police and executed. See Lukacs, The Cold War, pp.132-136.  215 CHAPTER 8, FOOTNOTES .  1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Informal, Extemporaneous Remarks to the Advertising War Council Conference, March 8, 1944," Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I.Rosenmann, New York, Harper, 1950, 1944-45, volume, p.99. 2. Winston C h u r c h i l l i n a l e t t e r to Roosevelt, cited i n Leahy, I Was There, p.335* 3.  Cited i n M i l l i s , ed., F o r r e s t a l Diaries, p.288.  4.  Loc. c i t .  5« Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p.28. Also r e f e r to Joseph Grew for a statement he made as early as 1945 which said i n part: "The American people were b l i n d to the fact that the only language understood by the Kremlin i s the language of strength, force and pewer." Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years. 1904-1945, Boston, Houghton, M i f f l i n Co., 1952, p.1447. 6.  Truman,  Memoirs, VTol.2., p.552; see also pp.2l4,4l2.  7. Cited i n McGeorge Bundy, ed., Pattern of Responsibility, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1951, p.30. 8.  Dulles, War or Peace, p . l 6 .  9. U.S.Congress,Senate,Committee on Commerce, Nixon, I960, Campaign Speeches, F i n a l Report, F_reedomj?X.Communication^ Part I I , Rept. 994, 1961. p.835. 10.  Stevenson, Putting F i r s t things F i r s t , p.13  11. U.S.Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Kennedy, i960 Campaign Speeches. F i n a l Report, Freedom of C^mmunicatipn, ~i.: ; i 87th Congress, 1st. Session, Part' I,*Rept.' 9 9 4 , " 1 9 6 1V"p.352. 12.  Ibid., p.934.  13.  Ibid., p.574.  14. H u l l , Memoirs, p.1739. H u l l also said i n h i s memoirs that the "United States should have adopted the p o l i c y of the mailed f i s t toward Russia right from the beginning." Ibid., p.l467. 15. William J . Fulbright, Prospects f o r the West, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard, 1963, p.7«  216' 16. Frank Howley, Your War For Peace, New York, Henry Holt, 1953, P»95«For further elaboration on this Western attitude toward negotiating with the Soviet Union consult: Leahy, I Was There, p.331; Ho.wley, Berlin Command, p.239; Nixon, I960 Campaign Speeches, U.S.Senate Report 994, pp.226, 365, 1044; Henry Cabot Lodge, "NBC TV Interview, September 24, 1960, " cited i n U.S.Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, NixonKennedy. Joint Appearances I960 Prediential Campaign, Final Report, Freedom of Communication, Part III, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Rept.994, 1961, p.65. Lawrence S. Kuter, Airman at Yalta, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955, pp.47-52; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service i n Peace and War, p.608; Standley, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, pp.517,195. When Adenauer visited Moscow i n 1955, Bulganin told him: "Don't you think you can impress us by negotiating from strength; ' Cited i n Lukacs, Cold War. p.l65; also refer to pp.111, 163, 165. -  1  17. Harriman to Forrestal, June 27, 1947; cited i n M i l l i s , ed. Forrestal Diaries, p.288. See also Vandenberg, Vandenberg Papers, pp. 272, 214, 402. 18.  See Standley, Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p.517*  19.  See Murphy, Diplomat Among W arriors, p.434.  20.  Deane,  21.  " P o l i t i c a l Sitzkrieg,"  22.  Standley,  Strange Alliance, p.141. New Statesman (April 1947),p.287.  Admiral Ambassador to Russia, p.l95«  23. For an example of this Western,view on the necessity for concise understanding of the terms of agreements, see Bernard Baruch's report to President Truman i n which Baruch utilized Churchill's ideas for a more realistic basis on which to deal with the Russians; cited i n Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p.317* 24. Richard B. Wigglesworth, "Soviet Objectives: Facts and Fancies," USDSB, vol. 40 (June 15, 1959), p.882. 25. Cited i n Edwin H. Fedder, "Communication and American Soviet Negotiating Behavior," Background, vol. 8 (August 1964), p.112. 26.  Ibid., p.115.  27.  Ibid., p.117.  28.  Ibid., p.113; see also p . l l 6 .  217 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY I.  Books. •  Acheson, Deane. Pov/er and Diplomacy. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1958. Albertson, Dean, ed. Eisenhower as President. New York, Harcourt, H i l l and Wang, 1963American Friends Service Committee. The United States and the Soviet Union. New Haven, Yale University,Press, 19^9. Bailey, Thomas A. America Faces Russia. New York, Cornell University Press, 1950. . A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York, Appleton-Century Crofts Inc.,1955. Barghoorn, Frederick C. The Soviet Image of the United States. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950. Barmine, Alexander. One 'Who Survived. New York, Putnam's Sons, 1945. Beal, John Robinson. John Foster Dulles. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957. Bell, Coral. Negotiating from Strength. London, Chatto and Windus, 1962. Beloff, Max. 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