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Eskimo political organization: a behavioural approach Babcock, Douglas Robert 1965

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ESKIMO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH by DOUGLAS ROBERT BABCOCK B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1953 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1965 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference and study. I further agree that per-mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that, copying or publi-cation of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Sociology and Anthropology The University of British Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada Date March 1. 1965 . ABSTRACT The state-stateless dichotomy i n p o l i t i c a l anthropology, based on the c r i t e r i o n of government i n a l e g a l - s t r u c t u r a l sense, leads to the "ordered anarchy" designation of some primitive s o c i e t i e s such as the Eskimo. The dichotomy apparently stems from a pre-occupation with Western forms of government. This ethnocentric, s t r u c t u r a l bias i n v a l i d a t e s many of the conclusions to be found i n the l i t e r a t u r e regarding primitive s o c i e t i e s , and has important implications for current research methods. A tentative analytic framework i s outlined f o r p o l i t i c a l organization, here construed as a process rather than a substantive structure, u t i l i z i n g the i n t e r r e l a t e d concepts of power or influence, and decision-making. Influence or power, defined as the a b i l i t y to get others to act, think, or f e e l as one intends, i s an a t t r i b u t e of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Its dimensions include sources, means, scopes, extension, amount, costs, and strength. P o l i t i c a l organization i s regarded as the process by which decisions of group range are effected by i n f l u e n t i a l s ( i . e . , i n d i v i d u a l s wielding power or influence). Some of the l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g to the p o l i t i c a l organization of Eskimo groups i s reviewed and found to be i i i unanimous i n i t s a p o l i t i c a l designation of the Eskimo. Five cases, u t i l i z i n g published behavioral data, i l l u s t r a t e the usefulness of the power-decision framework fo r p o l i t i c a l organization, but serious l i m i t a t i o n s are imposed by the incomplete range of the data. A s p e c i f i c Eskimo aggregation f o r which con-siderable background material i s available i s then considered i n i t s p o l i t i c a l aspects, and within the l i m i t s of the range of data, support i s again provided f o r the present framework. The methodological truism that basic assumptions should guide but not predetermine research conclusions i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the foregoing. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I ON THE MEANING OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION . . . 1 II ESKIMO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 13 Conclusion hi III ESKIMO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: POWER AND DECISION-MAKING ^3 Case I: A Public Confession 5h Case I I : An Execution 6 l Case I I I : Revenge 65 Case IV: Camp Migration Among the Eskimos. . 67 Case V: The Messenger Feast . 71 Conclusions 80 IV THE CONTEXT - KAPUIVIK 89 H i s t o r y 89 Economy 93 S o c i a l Organization . . . . . . . 105 Iglulingmiut Kinship Terminology 108 Kinship Behavior 110 S o c i a l Groupings . . . . . 116 Power i n Kinship 121 Kapuivik . 122 V POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AT KAPUIVIK 129 Lower V i l l a g e 135 Upper V i l l a g e 13o The Total V i l l a g e 136 Conclusion ihh VI THE STRUCTURAL BIAS IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS . . 1^8 APPENDIX . 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY 158 V LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE PAGE I COMPOSITION OF KAPUIVIK, SPRING 1 9 6 1 . . . 12k II LOWER VILLAGE IDEAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE. . 1 3 1 I I I UPPER VILLAGE*IDEAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE. . 1 3 1 IV LOWER VILLAGE ACTUAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE . 1 3 2 V UPPER VILLAGE ACTUAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE . 1 3 3 VI KAPUIVIK ACTUAL AUTHORITY "STRUCTURE . . . \ 1 3 ^ LIST OF MAPS I EAST CENTRAL ARCTIC, Place names' . . . . '  86 II IGLULIK REGION, Place names . . . . . . . 87 III IGLULIK REGION, Habitation s i t e s . . . . . * 88 CHAPTER I ON THE MEANING OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION The study of p o l i t i c a l organization i n primitive s o c i e t i e s has commonly centred on such problems as the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of authority, the boundaries of p o l i t i c a l units, mechanisms of dispute settlement, the nature of sanctions, the organization of warfare, and so on. D i f f e r -ent conceptualizations of p o l i t i c a l organization have var i a b l y emphasized p o l i t i c a l structure, p o l i t i c a l processes or p o l i t i c a l functions. A considerable array of concepts, often undefined, enters i n t o discussions of p o l i t i c a l organization: power, leadership, authority, c o n t r o l , influence, coercion, state, anarchy, and so f o r t h . Much of the e a r l i e r anthropological l i t e r a t u r e p a r t i c u l a r l y seems, i n retrospect, overly burdened with l e g a l i s t i c or philosophic assumptions derived from the analysis of Western forms of government; and a l l the p i t f a l l s of ethnocentric bias i n p o l i t i c a l analysis have not yet been exposed. An abiding problem f o r p o l i t i c a l analysts i s the lack of a reasonably w e l l - a r t i c u l a t e d d e f i n i t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d (Easton 1 9 5 9 * 2 1 3 ) . Different analysts at d i f f e r e n t times have constrained or widened the p o l i t i c a l purview, and these varying approaches often constitute trends both i n p o l i t i c a l science and anthropology. Recent analyses of p o l i t i c a l systems, e s p e c i a l l y by s o c i o l o g i s t s and" 2 p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , have emphasised the making of decisions i n p a r t i c u l a r contexts as t h i s i s affected by a va r i e t y of persons and groups wielding influence. This approach to p o l i t i c a l organization, which stresses process rather than structure, would appear to have special relevance to those soc i e t i e s which by ce r t a i n c r i t e r i a are termed "stateless" or "acephalous" (or, even worse, "ordered anarchies"). Eskimo society has been so designated: i n 1865 H a l l said that among the Innuit "there i s absolutely no p o l i t i c a l organization" (1865:523); and a century l a t e r Bohannan referred to Eskimo society as an ordered anarchy (1963:269). It would seem that a ce r t a i n image of the Eskimo pre v a i l s which may not do jus t i c e to the s o c i a l r e a l i t y . I s h a l l attempt i n the next chapter to examine the creation of t h i s image, and assess i t s v a l i d i t y . But f i r s t , the implications of the decision-influence approach to p o l i t i c a l organization should be considered. As a point of departure, consider Wallace's d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l organization as that c u l t u r a l process by which e f f e c t i v e decisions are made concerning the behavior of a t e r r i t o r i a l l y definable group (1957:301). Wallace i s equating "organization" with "process" i n F i r t h f s sense of s o c i a l organization as people getting things done by planned action . . . the arrangement of action i n sequences i n conformity with selected 3 s o c i a l ends • • . the systematic ordering of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s by acts of choice and decision (1956:36, *f0). " E f f e c t i v e " also places the emphasis on decisions which are acted out, rather than those that are merely stated or formulated as plans f o r goal-oriented future behavior. (The l a t t e r may be termed "formal" decisions). The d i s t i n c t i o n between formal and e f f e c t i v e decisions allows f o r a possible lack of congruence between what people say and what they i n f a c t do. ( c f . Lasswell and Kaplan 1 9 5 0 : x v i i i " . . . formal power must often be distinguished from the e f f e c t i v e control with which i t purports to be i d e n t i c a l " ) . This p a r a l l e l s Belshaw*s d i s t i n c t i o n between po t e n t i a l and e f f e c t i v e demand f o r goals or values, the former being u n s a t i s f i e d preferences, the l a t t e r , current wants and preferences r e f l e c t e d i n action (Belshaw 1 9 5 9 ) . Wailace ,s concern with group rather than i n d i v i d u a l behavior stays within the t r a d i t i o n a l f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l analysis as the study of the management of a society*s public a f f a i r s . "Group" i s s u f f i c i e n t l y vague, however, that any unit may f o r purposes of analysis be treated as a p o l i t i c a l unit. Thus a family, lineage, community, or society may be said to have a p o l i t i c a l system i n the sense that decisions bearing on these t o t a l units are formulated or enacted. Wallace l i m i t s h i s d e f i n i t i o n to l o c a l groups and i t i s here that we diverge: t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s only one of many possible group frameworks or boundaries; others may be common int e r e s t s or a c t i v i t i e s , age grades, kinship, and so on. Thus various non-local groups (Service's " s o d a l i t i e s " 1 9 6 2 : 2 1 - 2 3 ) may display p o l i t i c a l a t t r i b u t e s : t e r r i t o r i a l i t y i s therefore not a necessary element of a p o l i t i c a l unit i n the sense used here. A decision i s often conceived i n simple terms as the act or the outcome of making up one*s mind. In t h i s sense of the act or outcome of choosing or selecting from among al t e r n a t i v e s , the emphasis i s on the r a t i o n a l and formal aspects of decision-making. Reference has already been made however to e f f e c t i v e decisions i n the sense of goal-oriented behavior, following a formal decision, thus broadening the conception. I f the al t e r n a t i v e s , and the evaluation of them, are also considered, i t would seem more r e a l i s t i c to regard a decision as the product of a process, the decision-making process, which does not necessarily end with a formal choice, but may be carried i n t o action. Furthermore, the concern here i s with group rather than private decisions, so that the process involves the i n t e r -action of various persons viewing the alternatives somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y and holding somewhat d i f f e r e n t preferences. The process at t h i s l e v e l may resemble bargaining, with the decision arrived at constituting consensus. Barth ( 1961) provides an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the decision-making process i n a camp of nomadic herders: out 5 of a set of p o t e n t i a l l y c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s , needs, and preferences must aris e the d a i l y and unavoidable decisions on which the persistence of the group i t s e l f depends concern(ing) whether to break camp and to migrate, by which route to migrate, and where to pit c h the new camp (1961:43), In a camp composed of economically autonomous "tents" or households lacking an o v e r a l l authoritative leader, the decision-making process involves endless, vague discussion and the avoidance or suspension of a formal decision. But consensus i s usually achieved; the e f f e c t i v e decision only becomes apparent to the observer when the camp members break camp and move on (or do not) the following morning (l96l:Mt-4-5).• Analyses of the decision-making process are often cast i n a r a t i o n a l i s t i c means-ends framework which t y p i c a l l y includes the following elements or "steps" (Hilsman 1959:362; Lindblom 1959:79): (a) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a schedule of values or goals arranged according to p r i o r i t y (b) s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a range of alte r n a t i v e means f o r achieving the important values (c) assessment of the e f f i c i e n c y of each alternative means f o r achieving the primary values (d) comparison of the alternative means as to t h e i r possible costs and outcomes (value s a t i s f a c t i o n ) (e) selection of the best alternative means. 6 Recent empirical research has indicated that i n f a c t t h i s i s not how decisions are made. Even i f we accept f o r a moment the assumption that decision-makers are motivated s o l e l y by r a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t , i t would appear that actors do not o r d i n a r i l y rank th e i r preferences e x p l i c i t l y as a guide to decision-making, nor are they usually aware of many alternative means to s a t i s f y t h e i r values. Furthermore (c) and (d) assume a high degree of computing s k i l l and the time to exercise i t . In short, not only i s r a t i o n a l i t y imputed, decision-makers are assumed to be v i r t u a l l y omniscient. In r e a l i t y , men are i n part un-consciously motivated, th e i r information i s often inadequate, and they do not maintain a sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between means and ends. In view of these and other considerations, i t would appear that rather than t r y to determine whether one e f f e c t i v e decision i s better than another, i t i s more f r u i t f u l to t r y to determine the costs and rewards of any decision, and how these are d i s t r i b u t e d (Polsby Dentler Smith 1 9 6 3 : 3 3 6 - 3 3 8 ) . And rather than t r y to separate out the values and alternatives involved i n the decision-making process, t ry to establish who p a r t i c i p a t e s i n i t , to what extent, and with what success. These l a t t e r problems lead us to a consideration of leadership, power, and authority i n a group, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these factors to the decision-making process. 7 Easton ( 1 9 5 3 : 1 ^ 6 ) has defined p o l i t i c a l science as the study of the authoritative a l l o c a t i o n of values as i t i s influenced by the d i s t r i -bution and use of power. Thus a p o l i t i c a l system i s not equated with a "power structure", but t h i s i s implicated i n the analysis of a group*s decision-making process. Power and influence are here treated as equivalent terms (although they are sometimes distinguished) meaning the a b i l i t y to get others to act, think, or f e e l as one intends (Banfield 1 9 6 1 : 3 ) . Authority i s r i g h t f u l or legitimate power and i s therefore a correlate of normative structures (e.g., the wielding of influence i s an expected component of c e r t a i n r o l e s ) . In these terms, a leader i s an " i n f l u e n t i a l " , one who wields s i g n i f i c a n t influence i n a given area or scope. Only recently have analysts systematically attempted to delineate the dimensions of power or influence. Dahl ( 1 9 5 7 ) f o r example distinguishes the source, /means, scope, amount and extension of power. Thus A uses money (source) to bribe B (means) to vote f o r him (scope). The p r o b a b i l i t y that B w i l l a c t u a l l y do so (amount) may be quite high. I f A s i m i l a r l y bribes C, D, E, . . . n, h i s power i s extended. The mere access to " p o l i t i c a l resources" per se does not however indicate power i n A*s rela t i o n s h i p s with others: he may not use these resources and means to 8 influence others, choosing to u t i l i z e them i n other ways. Dahl therefore proposes that only the c r i t e r i a of scope, amount and extension of power be used as an index of an actor*s power or influence. More recently Harsanyi (1962) has introduced the notion of cost to the analysis without which a measure of power i s inadequate. Thus A may bribe B to vote f o r him, while X may simply ask Y to vote f o r him. A*s higher costs to influence B to perform t h i s act indicate that he has less power or influence over B than X has over Y ( i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r scope). S i m i l a r l y , the costs to B and Y of r e s i s t i n g or refusing must be examined. Actor B's costs may simply amount to the bribe money foregone, while Y's costs may involve a prison sentence (assuming X possesses some p o t e n t i a l l y damaging information about Y). The costs of r e s i s t i n g influence therefore r e f l e c t the "strength" of the influence. Thus two further dimensions are added to the concept: cost and strength. While i t i s convenient to speak of powerful or i n f l u e n t i a l persons ("leaders"), these expressions tend to be ambiguous and misleading; ambiguous because i t i s not clear whether such a person has the pot e n t i a l to be i n f l u e n -t i a l ( i . e . has such sources as wealth, o f f i c e , friendship, status) or does i n f a c t influence others; and misleading because the implication i s that power i s a qual i t y of, or 9 inheres i n , persons. Power i s rather a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and the noun " i n f l u e n t i a l " ( i . e . , powerful person) therefore means that an actor i n h i s r e l a t i o n s with c e r t a i n others (extension) a c t u a l l y does induce them (amount) to act i n s p e c i f i a b l e ways (scope) on the basis of definable sources and means of power, and that so doing involves c e r t a i n costs to the i n f l u e n t i a l which w i l l tend to vary inversely to the strength of h i s influence, ( c f . Lasswell 1 9 ^ 8 : 9 1 " . . . power i s not a b r i c k that can be lugged from place to place, but a process that vanishes when the supporting responses cease.") Authority i t was suggested above i s legitimate power, whatever the bases of legitimacy, these may con-veniently be included among the sources of power. Thus an "authority" (e.g., a recognized holder of an o f f i c e ) may command (means) several others (extension) to perform an act (scope), but they may a c t u a l l y obey because of other sources of power (e.g., popularity) to which the "authority" has access. As Lasswell puts i t , power e n t a i l s e f f e c t i v e control over p o l i c y , authority does not. I t should be noted i n passing that force or coercion i s only one of many possible means at the disposal of i n f l u e n t i a l s . Thus we do not i n v a r i a b l y i d e n t i f y force and power as, f o r example, Malinowski appears to do ( 1 9 ¥ + : 1 6 5 ) . 10 What bearing do these points have on the concept of a power "structure"? Structure unfortunately has an equivocal referent i n s o c i a l science; F i r t h ( 1 9 5 6 : 3 0 - 3 1 ) distinguishes several i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s : "the network of a l l person-to-person r e l a t i o n s i n a society", or the "rel a t i o n s between major groups i n a society", or the "expected" or " i d e a l " r e l a t i o n s rather than the actual r e l a t i o n s i n a society. His own view i s that s o c i a l structure consists of those s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s which seem to be of c r i t i c a l importance f o r the behavior of members of the society, so that i f such r e l a t i o n s were not i n operation, the society could not be said to e x i s t i n that form ( 1 9 5 6 : 3 1 ) . Since power i s an a t t r i b u t e of most interpersonal r e l a t i o n s , the f i r s t two formulations of structure appear to be re s p e c t i v e l y too broad and too r e s t r i c t e d . The "expected" or " i d e a l " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would be a useful conceptualization of authority structure rather than power structure. Following F i r t h , s formulation, we might define a power structure as those c r i t i c a l power re l a t i o n s h i p s which give a society i t s d i s t i n c t i v e form. But the scopes of power referre d to above immediately suggest that to speak of a power structure i n the singular i s too f a c i l e . The power structure i n domestic a c t i v i t i e s , for example, we might expect to be quite unlike the power structure i n ceremonial or hunting a c t i v i t i e s . Furthermore, i n view of what was said 11 about the other dimensions of power, p a r t i c u l a r l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of exploiting sources f o r ends other than power, we might expect the structure to be somewhat more f l e x i b l e than a f i x e d hierarchy of positions ranked from "most powerful" to "least powerful". The l a t t e r i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n however appears to be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of R a d c l i f f e -Brown's ( 1 9 6 1 : 1 1 ) approach to structure ("an arrangement of persons i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y controlled or defined r e l a t i o n s h i p s " ) , which i s consistent with h i s concern f o r authority (rather than power) formally allocated i n the analysis of p o l i t i c a l systems ( 1 9 ^ 0 ) . Now i f we assume that e f f e c t i v e decisions bearing on t o t a l groups must be made ( i f only from time to time) and that p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h i s process i s a function of the e f f e c t i v e use of both the bases and means of power, the basic questions about p o l i t i c a l systems can be translated i n t o the concepts outlined above. Thus, one of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of government, the problem of who governs, becomes who mainly influences group decisions, how do they accomplish t h i s , and why (Dahl 1 9 6 0 : 2 5 ) . Answers to these questions w i l l involve a consideration of the scopes or areas of decision-making and the patterns and d i s t r i b u t i o n of power i n these scopes. To sum up, the following assumptions about p o l i t i c a l systems w i l l guide the analysis which follows. 12 P o l i t i c a l organization i s a s o c i a l process of decision-making which i s effected by i n f l u e n t i a l s (leaders). P o l i t i c a l decisions are those bearing on the t o t a l group ("the p o l i t i c a l unit") the boundaries of which may be a r b i -t r a r i l y established. Decisions may be formal or e f f e c t i v e ; i n either case, values or preferred goals are implicated and allocated. Power or influence i s an at t r i b u t e of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n which involves the a b i l i t y of one person to get another (or others) to act, think, or f e e l as he intends. The aspects of power i n -clude i t s bases, means, scopes, amount, extension, costs and strength. E f f e c t i v e decisions arise out of the i n t e r a c t i o n of persons wielding i n -fluence. CHAPTER II ESKIMO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW Since there i s currently wide v a r i a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l terminology, and c e r t a i n l y great terminological change over the decades, a semantic d i f f i c u l t y intrudes at th i s point: unless an author e x p l i c i t l y uses the terms " p o l i t i c a l organization" or "government", how does one decide what to consider under the above heading? Chapter I was i n part an attempt to get past t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by setting up a conceptual framework for p o l i t i c a l organiza-t i o n . Therefore, a l l data which turns on such concepts as power (status, influence, authority, p r e s t i g e ) , leadership (Headman, c h i e f ) , or decisions ( p o l i c i e s , commands, coopera-tion) w i l l be considered relevant. In h i s foreword to The Eskimos (Birket-Smith 1 9 5 9 ) , Forde points out that the Eskimos are probably the most widely known of the world's primitive peoples. The l i t e r a t u r e i n both scholarly and popular form has now achieved immense proportions; everyone knows something about the Eskimos. But the very u n i v e r s a l i t y of the Eskimo "image" masks some serious gaps and misconceptions i n our knowledge of these people. Much of what has been written i s d e r i v a t i v e ; the proportion of f i r s t - h a n d accounts by trained field-workers i s r e l a t i v e l y small. I t i s the purpose of 11+ t h i s chapter to examine one aspect of the Eskimo image, the lack of p o l i t i c a l organization, as i t has been set out i n the l i t e r a t u r e . Damas (196*+) has recently pointed out the un-fortunate dichotomy in.Eskimo research: one phase consists of extensive ethnographic description, the other of theoretic systematization, the l a t t e r phase c a r r i e d out "by t h e o r i s t s f a r removed i n time and place from the f i e l d of observation." ( I 9 6 l t : l ) . Only recently have the ethnographer and theorist been combined so that i n v e s t i g a t i o n could be c a r r i e d out systematically i n a theoretic perspective. It i s i n the l i g h t of t h i s more recent research, and the per-spective of recent p o l i t i c a l analysis that a reappraisal of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization i s possible. The image-makers to be c i t e d below consist of early t r a v e l l e r s i n the A r c t i c (Parry, H a l l ) , followed by ethnographers such as Nelson, Rasmussen, Jenness, B i r k e t -Smith, Mathiassen and Lantis. Non-Eskimologist "systematizers" include Weyer, 1 Murdock, Mirsky, Hoebel, Steward, and Service. Recent th e o r e t i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d field-workers w i l l also be c i t e d : Van den Steenhoven, Spencer, Willmott, P o s p i s i l and Laughlin. The t r a d i t i o n a l point of view i s f o r t h r i g h t l y stated by H a l l (1865), after two years* t r a v e l among the Eskimos of southern B a f f i n Island. 1 Weyer c a r r i e d out fieldwork i n Alaska, but The Eskimos (1922) i s e s s e n t i a l l y a review of the l i t e r a t u r e . 15 Though i n old times there were chiefs among the Innuits, there are none now. There i s absolutely no p o l i t i c a l organization among them. In every community, with them as with a l l the rest of the world, there i s some one who, i n consideration of h i s age, shrewdness, or personal prowess i s looked up to, and whose opinions are received with more than usual deference; but he has no authority whatever, and an Innuit i s subject to no man's control ( 1 8 6 5 : 5 2 3 - 5 2 4 ) . H a l l despairingly r e f e r s to thi s Eskimo t r a i t often i n h i s journal; no matter how anxious he might be to push on, h i s Eskimo crew could not r e s i s t giving chase to whatever game might appear, "regardless of my wants and wishes. . . . the Innuits are like, eagles—untameable" ( 1 8 6 5 : 3 5 0 ) . And l a t e r , attempting to account f o r the i r unwillingness to submit to h i s wishes, H a l l wrote: They are independent of every other human being, and w i l l never brook co n t r o l , no matter what engagements they enter into • • . . They are born free as their native wilds; they have no one to check or control them; they roam about as they w i l l ; and, while they have to f i n d subsistence as best they can, i t would be almost too much to expect any subservience from them to a stranger, e s p e c i a l l y when he i s alone ( 1 8 6 5 : 3 8 2 - 3 § 3 ) . Parry ( 1 8 2 4 ) had e a r l i e r reached similar conclusions about the I g l u l i k Eskimos. Besides the natural authority [ s i c ] of parents and husbands, these people appear to admit no kind of superiority among one another, except a c e r t a i n degree of superstitious reverence f o r t h e i r ANGETKOOKS (shamans) and t h e i r t a c i t l y following the counsel or steps of the most active seal-catcher on the i r hunting excursions . . . . 16 . . . Being a sociable people, they unite i n considerable numbers to form a settlement f o r the winter; but on the return of spring they again separate i n t o several p a r t i e s , each appearing to choose h i s own route with-out regard to that of the r e s t , but a l l making the i r arrangements without the s l i g h t e s t disagreement or difference of opinion that we could ever discover. In a l l t h e i r movements they seem to be actuated by one simultaneous f e e l i n g that i s t r u l y ad-mirable (18 2^:53*+). I t i s of i n t e r e s t to note' the recurrence of these themes i n Birket-Smith*s more recent summation of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization. We speak of Eskimo t r i b e s ; but i n a p o l i t i c a l sense there are r e a l l y no t r i b e s ; groups are merely geographic i n nature . . . there i s no state . . . no government to r e s t r i c t their l i b e r t y of action . . . . There i s no rank or class . . . a l l are of equal s o c i a l p o s i t i o n and the one does not need to do what the other does . . . however . . . practice does not always accord with r e a l i t y . . . and i n r e a l i t y , there w i l l usually be an e s p e c i a l l y prominent personality at the settlement whom the others t a c i t l y . • . h a l f unconsciously, acknowledge as the f i r s t among equals. Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y he i s among the Central tribes c a l l e d ISUMATAQ, he who thinks, the implication being he who thinks f o r the others. But submission i s quite voluntary and i f f o r some reason or other he loses h i s authority he merely resumes h i s former p o s i -t i o n ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 ^ - 1 ^ - 5 ) . Except for a possible disagreement over the term "authority", Birket-Smith merely elaborates what H a l l said e a r l i e r . One of the e a r l i e s t accounts of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization by an ethnographer i s provided by Nelson ( 1 8 9 9 ) 17 who delineates some of the sources of "influence" among the Alaskan Eskimos. These people, he says, have no recognized chiefs except such as gain c e r t a i n influence over th e i r fellow-v i l l a g e r s through superior shrewdness, wisdom, age, wealth, or shamanism. The old men are l i s t e n e d to with respect, and there are usually one or more i n each v i l l a g e who by the i r extended acquaintance with the t r a d i t i o n s , customs and r i t e s connected with the f e s t i v a l s , as well as being possessed of an unusual degree of common sense, are deferred to and act as chief advisors of the community. A l l Eskimo v i l l a g e s have a headman, whose influence i s obtained through the general b e l i e f of h i s f e l l o w - v i l l a g e r s i n h i s superior a b i l i t y and good judgement. These men possess no f i x e d authority, but are respected, and t h e i r directions as to the movements and occupations of the v i l l a g e r s . a r e generally heeded. Sometimes they obtain a stronger i n -fluence over the people by combining the o f f i c e s [ s i c ] of shaman with those of headman ( i n Weyer 1 9 3 2 : 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 ) . Nelson's preoccupation with formal roles ("offices") i n the context of p o l i t i c a l organization apparently takes precedence over the informal nature of h i s data. A similar view i s expressed by Rasmussen ( 1 9 2 7 : 2 8 3 ) regarding the Copper Eskimos of Union and Dolphin S t r a i t : The Eskimos of these regions, l i k e those further east, have no regular c h i e f s , but each settlement has one man who acts as a sort of general advisor and leader i n common undertakings. 18 In h i s e a r l i e r d e s c r i p t i o n of Copper Eskimo s o c i a l organization, Jenness ( 1 9 2 2 ) also examines various bases of influence i n the community, and goes on to consider the sources of cohesion i n the absence of centralized c o n t r o l . One of the most noticeable features i n Eskimo society almost everywhere i s the absence of c h i e f s , and the Copper Eskimos are no excep-t i o n . A man acquires influence by h i s force of character, h i s energy and success i n hunting, or h i s s k i l l i n magic. As long as these l a s t him age but increases h i s influence, but when they f a i l h i s prestige and authority vanish ( 1 9 2 2 : 9 3 ) . Jenness describes some of the leaders who exhibited these t r a i t s and the size of t h e i r following ("the natives of Bathurst i n l e t seemed to obey him without question") but suggests that such strong leaders are a f o r t u i t o u s phenomenon: Even I l a t s i a k . . . w i l l probably lose h i s authority when i n f i r m i t y overtakes him, and when he i s gone there w i l l be no one to take h i s place (1922:9*0. (We note parenthetically that I l a t s i a k was very f r i e n d l y with the missionaries, " a l l h i s influence . . • being exerted on their behalf." May we not assume a quid PXO fluo*?) Jenness generalizes: The Eskimo i s i n t o l e r a n t of anything l i k e r e s t r a i n t . Every man i n h i s eyes has the same r i g h t s and the same p r i v i l e g e s as every other man i n the community. One may be a better hunter, or a more s k i l f u l dancer, or have greater control over the s p i r i t u a l 19 world, but t h i s does not make him more than one member of a group i n which a l l are free and t h e o r e t i c a l l y equal (1922:9*+). Yet Jenness does not pronounce t h i s an anarchy. The inhabitants of a settlement are a l l , or nearly a l l , NUATKATTAIT, connected, that i s , by either blood or by marriage. Since no one person has any recognized authority over the r e s t , i t i s t h i s bond of r e l a t i o n -ship that keeps the people united and maintains peace and harmony i n the community. The v i c i s s i t u d e s of l i f e , too, i n these regions tend to prevent any discord, f o r there are many occasions, both i n summer and i n winter, when sickness or i l l - l u c k i n hunting w i l l make a family dependent f o r a time on i t s neighbours. The NUATKATTAIT owe spe c i a l duties to one another. They must provide f o r each other i n sickness, take care of the aged and i n f i r m , the widows and the orphans, and support each other i n the blood-feud. This gives the community i t s s o l i d a r i t y ( 1 9 2 2 : 8 6 ) . Mathiassen ( 1 9 2 8 ) , on the other hand, finds community s o l i d a r i t y among the Iglulingmiut a r i s i n g from the force of t r a d i t i o n . Like the other Eskimo t r i b e s , the I g l u l i k Eskimos form no p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l unity. They are only a group of f a m i l i e s , related by the same manner of l i v i n g , the same forms of implements and clothing, the same methods and customs, to some extent connected by blood t i e s . There i s no superior authority, but custom and habit and t r a d i t i o n provj.de  c e r t a i n rules which must be observed. In p a r t i c u l a r i t i s the numerous taboo regula-tions which have a profound e f f e c t upon t h e i r manner of l i v i n g , some of them being general, having become established upon t r a d i t i o n from generation to generation, others imposed temporarily by a shaman fo r a p a r t i c u l a r occasion, to heal a sick person, to ensure good hunting, and so on ( 1 9 2 8 : 2 0 9 my emphasis). 20 Mathiassen also considers the p o s s i b i l i t y of a community leader, a theme already found i n the views of H a l l and Birket-Smith above. Within each settlement, which as a ru l e comprises a few f a m i l i e s , often connected by kinship, there i s as a r u l e an older man who enjoys the respect of the others and who decides when a move i s to be made to another hunting centre, when a hunt i s to be started, how the sp o i l s are to be divided, when the dogs are to be fed, etc. He i s c a l l e d ISUMAITOQ, "he who thinks". I t i s not always the oldest man, but as a rule an e l d e r l y man who i s a clever hunter or, as head of large family, exercises great authority. He cannot be c a l l e d a chief; there i s no obligation to follow h i s counsel: but they do so i n most cases, p a r t l y because they r e l y upon h i s experience, p a r t l y because i t pays to be on good terms with t h i s man. At I t i b d j e r i a n g , Ingnertoq and I g l u l i k older men were ISUMAITOQA; on Southhampton Island Audlanaq, who was only 35 years old. had attained that d i g n i t y by h i s s k i l l ( 1 9 2 8 : 2 0 9 my emphasis). It i s noteworthy that Mathiassen here l i n k s k i n -ship and authority, that one*s geneological p o s i t i o n i s a source of power as. are s k i l l and age. However, Mathiassen*s views are sub s t a n t i a l l y i n accord with those presented above: If . . . regulations are broken, the person concerned i s regarded as one who, by h i s '., behaviour, has been the cause of new mis-fortunes; but he i s not punished i n any other manner. There Is no executive authority, but on the other hand there i s a sort of j u d i c i a l authority: the shaman ( 1 9 2 8 : 2 0 9 ) . 21 In her description of the s o c i a l organization of the Nunivak Eskimos, Lantis (19l+6) c a r r i e s the analysis of p o l i t i c a l organization much further than her predecessors, although many of her conclusions are the same. Because there are so few o f f i c e s i n Nunivak society, so few well-defined r i g h t s and duties, so l i t t l e organizational coercion, one cannot o b j e c t i f y and l i s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s and functions as one can f o r many cultures. Descriptive generalizations with a statement of the negatives and exceptions (exceptions to something that scarcely e x i s t s ! ) are a l l that one can produce under the heading of Nunivak p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , economic organi-zation (l9*+6:2kk). Having said that there i s " r e a l l y no p o l i t i c a l organization" among these people (21+8), Lantis delineates what she considers to be i t s components: (1) a t e r r i t o r i a l unit (2) standardized relationships between leaders or o f f i c i a l s and their following or constituency ( 3 ) an ideology of group action and of i n d i v i d u a l action a f f e c t i n g the group (h) means (agencies) of control or coercion, to enforce that ideology and those relationships (19^6:2^9). The formal, ethnocentric bias of t h i s conception of p o l i t i c a l organization i s obvious; the items may e a s i l y be translated i n t o the more f a m i l i a r Western concepts of nation-state, c o n s t i t u t i o n , government, and so on; but t h i s conceptual framework predictably allocates Eskimo society to an a p o l i t i c a l limbo: Lantis e a s i l y demonstrates that the Nuniwagamiut do not have t h i s sort of p o l i t i c a l organization, 22 just as the preceding observers had done with other Eskimo groups. Two important differences separate Lantis from the others however; she has e x p l i c i t l y stated her conceptions, whereas the others merely assumed them; and she does not stop at a generalized description of informal leadership, but goes on to consider the sources, means, and scopes of influence, a l b e i t i n an impressionistic way. The consideration of "bases f o r prestige, influence, dominance" echoes and extends what e a r l i e r ethnographers (e.g., Nelson, Jenness) have said. A l l of the following must be recognized: (1) age of the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s knowledge of the experience and lore of past genera-tions; ( 2 ) s p e c i f i c a b i l i t i e s , s p e c i a l experience and achievement; (3) personality t r a i t s apart from the foregoing; (4) wealth and handling of wealth, e s p e c i a l l y generosity; (5) family. One might also add (6) closeness to group opinion and group standards. How-ever, t h i s would function i n at l e a s t three of the other f i v e . The Nuniwagamiut them-selves recognized a l l of these, although they appreciated the importance of personality probably l e a s t of a l l . They even recognized the contribution of the f a m i l y — r a t h e r the lineage—toward the securing and maintenance of p o s i t i o n by the i n d i v i d u a l (1946:247). Thus the i n f l u e n t i a l among the Nunivak Eskimos tended to be the older (but not senile) man who was a successful hunter and who d i s t r i b u t e d h i s catches with largesse and was " h e l p f u l " to others. His p o s i t i o n would be strengthened by the public recognition that h i s agnatic ancestors were successful and generous, and that he knew the 23 songs and r i t u a l of h i s pat r i l i n e a g e . Such men were known as 0 K I ,S»KAX, which Lantis translates "chief", but she i s quick to point out that t h i s was only a t i t l e , not an o f f i c e , because none of these men had o f f i c i a l r i g h t s or authority except the ri g h t to dominate others as a person, on the basis of prestige (1946:248). Lantis believes that t h i s t i t l e was f i r s t conferred on men when they were successful p r i n c i p a l hosts at the Messenger Feasts ( i . e . , they gave away goods to guests from other v i l l a g e s on such a scale that these guests were shamed). The nearest thing to an o f f i c e was NOGA*£PEAX, "boss of the k a z i g i " (men's ceremonial house), a man who apparently took the i n i t i a t i v e i n suggesting that the k a z i g i be cleaned or repaired and assigned young men to do the work, superintended preparations f o r f e s t i v a l s , entertained guests from other v i l l a g e s (248). The two t i t l e s were sometimes conferred on the same man and used interchangeably. In prosperous v i l l a g e s of a hundred or more members there might be two or three ceremonial houses, each having i t s "boss" and as many "ch i e f s " . Although shamans had access to power sources ex-ceeding those of "laymen", they were often feared, rather than respected. Certain shamans however did e l i c i t pride i n 2k their f e l l o w - v i l l a g e r s and gained a following; these men might combine the roles of shaman and k a z i g i "boss". Shamans thought to be malicious were occasionally put to death: It i s i n t e r e s t i n g that here i s the only s i t u a t i o n i n which the community as a whole or even a large part of i t would decide that an i n d i v i d u a l should be eliminated, would p l o t and carry out h i s murder ( 2 5 2 ) . The means of exerting influence varied with the sources, and i t i s noteworthy that Lantis considers the means that women might use to wield influence (e.g., gossip, hard work, generosity, domination of an important man); but a l l t h i s was u n o f f i c i a l , i n d i r e c t , and v a r i a b l e . Hence only the men*s rol e s are formally stated ( 2 ^ 6 ) . Other means included r i d i c u l e , discussion, approval and disapproval i n many forms, magic, and so on; but coercion or force could not be l e g i t i m a t e l y used. Some scopes of power are indicated. The probable scopes of the k a z i g i "boss" were quoted above. Shamans and " c h i e f s " directed r i t u a l a c t i v i t i e s such as the feasts and public confessions but with plenty of comment and assistance from the other older men of the community (2^9)» In the preparation and conduct of war, some men would enjoy more influence than others, but one man 25 d i d not necessarily dominate the whole expedition or defense. He would win one point only to lose another (2*+7)« Lantis* summary conclusions bring out sa l i e n t features of the foregoing and attempt to explain community cohesion. S o c i a l control was achieved by family r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and a series of personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s rather than by community organization. No war chief, no hunt c h i e f , no v i l l a g e c h i ef, no c r a f t guilds, no graded secret society—although there i s some evidence of a men*s society i n -timidating women and c h i l d r e n — n o c o u n c i l , no slavery. I t i s questionable whether there was anything which could be c a l l e d p o l i t i c a l organization. There were leaders i n the kazigis or men*s houses who were outstanding f o r t h e i r personal s k i l l (and that of th e i r fathers) and for the wealth which they had accumulated. However, every older man had a r i g h t to state h i s opinion, exert what influence he could ( 2 5 6 ) . As one would expect, there were no organized agencies of control or coercion. How did the community function i n the absence of authoritative chief, c o u n c i l , or police? Public opinion, guided by t r a d i t i o n or the personal opinion of a strong-minded, sharg-tongued i n d i v i d u a l , the power of /AM-COA (a deity) to punish or the compulsive force of material n e c e s s i t y — t h e s e regulated conduct (2*+9)• Before proceeding with the syntheses of non-Eskimologists, i t would perhaps be as well to consider the assumptions about p o l i t i c a l organization which guided the foregoing statements. It i s apparent that i n spite of a span of more than a century, there i s considerable 26 homogeneity i n the views expressed. I s h a l l contend that t h i s flows from a shared set of assumptions as much as from an inherent homogeneity i n the data. These assumptions may be b r i e f l y summarised as follows: (1) P o l i t i c a l organization consists of a structure of formal roles or o f f i c e s to which f i x e d legitimate power (authority) attaches (2) P o l i t i c a l power i s e s s e n t i a l l y coercive (3) P o l i t i c a l behavior i s substantively d i s t i n c t from s o c i a l , f a m i l i a l , r e l i g i o u s , or economic behavior (k) P o l i t i c a l organization i s supported by a p o l i t i c a l ideology (5) P o l i t i c a l organization functions to maintain s o c i a l order (6) T e r r i t o r i a l i t y provides the framework for each p o l i t i c a l unit ( 7 ) P o l i t i c a l organization i s an exclusively male preserve. It was suggested above that these assumptions derive from experience with Western p o l i t i c a l systems, and whether or not they have any v a l i d i t y even i n regard to those systems i s a moot point. They r e f l e c t a concern with l e g a l , c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , specialized governmental structures to the neglect of informal, extra-legal structures and processes. This f o r m a l i s t i c approach to p o l i t i c a l enquiry dominated the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century i n the West and took the form of a quest f o r the locus of "sovereign-ty" i n p o l i t i c a l systems. In t h i s century, concern for the 27 way governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s 1 , r e a l l y work" gave r i s e to the study of l e s s obvious processes, the actual operation and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , the locus of e f f e c t i v e power, and the r o l e of non-governmental i n s t i t u -tions i n p o l i t i c a l systems. Recently attempts have been made to r e l a t e p o l i t i c a l processes to the t o t a l environment— ph y s i c a l , s o c i a l , and p s y c h o l o g i c a l — i n a f u n c t i o n a l i s t approach (Easton 1953*ch 6 , 7 , 8 ) . Yet the almost exclusive concern with governmental forms p e r s i s t s , and i t appears to be t h i s perspective which informed the views of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization given above. As we have seen, these assumptions have given r i s e to a range of questionable assertions about Eskimo society. Thus, A r i s t o t l e notwithstanding, the Eskimo i s by nature an a p o l i t i c a l animal ( e s p e c i a l l y Eskimo women). Order i n t h i s society arises from habit or custom, or from supernatural sanctions, which (unless these are r e i f i e d ) implies that Eskimos have i n t e r n a l i z e d the same values to a very high degree. Thus, harmonious, orderly, and cooperative human r e l a t i o n s are f a c i l e l y explained by invoking t r a d i t i o n , although experience suggests that such r e l a t i o n s are d i f f i c u l t for men to achieve and must be striv e n f o r , whether among k i t h , k i n , or neighbors. And yet Eskimos are con-sidered to be i n d i v i d u a l i s t s ! The quest f o r Leviathan r e s u l t s i n an overemphasis on the headman or ISUMATAQ, who, i f he were a genuine headman 28 would be able to issue coercive commands, but does not. Even when influence rather than authority i s discussed, the approach i s to locate the main, generalized i n f l u e n t i a l i n the group, and to ignore or mute the f a c t that everyone (women included, as the sole female ethnographer pointed out) has access to some power resources. And, perhaps understandably i n generalized ethnographies, influence i s treated usually i n only one of i t s aspects, i t s sources. In short, an image of a people has been created, based, i t would seem, on a d i s t o r t e d self-image. From o r i g i n a l sources such as the foregoing have arisen more th e o r e t i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d syntheses of Eskimo society which because of t h e i r probable wider readership, have been p a r t i c u l a r l y potent i n perpetuating the a p o l i t i c a l image of the Eskimo. Weyer's ( 1 9 3 2 ) work provides a useful review of the l i t e r a t u r e on Eskimo culture and some of h i s own data gathered i n Alaska. However, there i s no entry i n h i s index f o r " p o l i t i c a l organization" f o r the s o c i a l organization of the Eskimos i s so simple . . . that there are no s t r i c t l y defined t r i b a l groups. The Eskimo i s un-acquainted with the o f f i c e of c h i e f t a i n i n i t s ordinary sense. Leadership exists only i n a very elementary and r e s t r i c t e d form. And since there i s no rule of exogamy [ s i c ] . . . there i s n a t u r a l l y a strong bond of kinship i n each settlement. Societal cohesion i s r e s t r i c t e d to narrow spheres. This f a c t w i l l be better understood i n the 29 l i g h t of the extremely rudimentary character of the regulative mores . • . (1932:20*+, 2 0 8 - 2 0 9 ) . A few years l a t e r , Mirsky ( 1 9 3 7 ) examined the l i t e r a t u r e on the Ammassalik of Eastern Greenland f o r patterns of cooperation and competition. She concluded that these people have achieved a society that i s highly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c . Each couple i s a s e l f -s u f f i c i n g economic unit i n a community with a minimum of s o c i a l forms, and there are no e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l sanctions to regulate murder, competition f o r women, or economic a c t i v i t i e s . There are occasions fo r cooperation which are i m p l i c i t i n the i r environment, but when they occur actual cooperation i s minimized. . . . S o c i a l cohesion i s at a minimum. There i s no s o c i a l coercion, no judgement i s passed and no man's importance i s considered r e l a t i v e to that of another. Within t h i s open f i e l d an i n d i v i d u a l i s allowed a l a t i t u d e few soc i e t i e s could tolerate (1937* 7 7 - 7 8 ) . In times of sc a r c i t y a man i s free to leave (the communal winter house) whenever he pleases. This freedom makes i n t e l l i g i b l e the r o l e of the "headman", whose authority i s l i m i t e d to acting as host when strangers a r r i v e and to determining the d i v i s i o n and arrangement of the s t a l l s within the house ( 1 9 3 7 : 5 8 ) . Hughes ( 1 9 5 8 b ) has recently re-examined Mirsky rs sources, as well as previously unpublished material and demonstrated the degree of caricature, the "standardization of error", i n Mirsky's paper. 30 The f i r s t e d i t i o n of Murdock's widely-read c u l t u r a l survey also appeared i n the t h i r t i e s and included a chapter on the Polar Eskimos of Greenland. Here one f i n d s a f a m i l i a r theme. The only s o c i a l unit larger than the family . . . i s the v i l l a g e , an impermanent and s h i f t i n g aggregation. There i s no clan organization, no system of age-grades or secret s o c i e t i e s . A r t i f i c i a l s o c i a l d i s -t i n c t i o n s do not e x i s t . There i s no chief-tainship, no p o l i t i c a l organization of any sort. *The Polar Eskimo i s h i s own master i n everything he does, and he permits no interference from others. 1 ( 1 9 3 4 : 2 1 0 ) . During the t h i r t i e s Steward developed h i s concept of the composite hunting band which Service ( 1 9 6 2 ) l a t e r applied to Eskimo society. Steward himself ( I 9 6 I ) con-sidered the Eskimos an example of a "family l e v e l of i n t e g r a t i o n " ( 1 9 6 1 : 1 0 1 , 119)? which i s characterized by dispersed family groups i n which p r a c t i c a l l y a l l features of the r e l a t i v e l y simple culture were integrated and func-tioned on a family l e v e l . The family was the reproductive, economic, educational, p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s unit. It reared i t s child r e n i n comparative i s o l a t i o n , obtained i t s own food, and cared f o r i t s members at b i r t h , sickness, death, and other c r i s e s . I t made i t s own decisions on v i r t u a l l y a l l matters. Family dependence upon outsiders was rare and i t s patterns r e s t r i c t e d . The family sometimes c a l l e d a shaman to treat the sick, co-operated with other f a m i l i e s i n communal hunts and dances, and v i s i t e d r e l a t i v e s and f r i e n d s when the opportunity permitted. But i t could and did e x i s t during most of the year without these extra-f a m i l i a l r e l a t i o n s . E x t r a - f a m i l i a l 31 dependency represented only a s l i g h t tendency toward a higher l e v e l of organization; patterns of multifamily unity had not become f i x e d ( 1 9 6 l : 5 l O « The Eskimos and the Shoshonean-speaking Indians of the a r i d Great Basin exemplify t h i s simple l e v e l of inte g r a t i o n . Why t h i s was so i n the case of the Shoshoneans i s explainable l a r g e l y i n terms of t h e i r c u l t u r a l e c o l o g i c a l adaptations. Owing to the nature of the natural environment of the Great Basin area and to the simple hunting and gathering techniques f o r exploiting i t , i t was ine v i t a b l e that the i n d i v i d u a l family or at the most two or three related f a m i l i e s should l i v e i n i s o l a t i o n during most of the year ( 1 9 6 1 : 1 0 2 ) . Thus, the t y p i c a l Shoshonean family was an autonomous p o l i t i c a l unit most of the year ("perhaps during eighty or ninety per cent of the time") but, because these units associated, intermarried and cooperated with other f a m i l i e s , the Shoshoneans represent a family l e v e l of s o c i o c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n only i n a r e l a t i v e sense. I c l a s s i f y the Shoshoneans as an exemplifi-cation of a family l e v e l of so c i o c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n because i n the few forms of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t y the same group of f a m i l i e s did not co-operate with one another or accept the same leader on successive occasions. By another d e f i n i t i o n , however, i t might be e n t i r e l y permissible to view t h i s ever-changing membership and leadership as a sp e c i a l form of suprafamilial integra-t i o n . While the Shoshoneans represent a family l e v e l of s o c i o c u l t u r a l i n t e g r a t i o n 32 i n a r e l a t i v e sense, th e i r suprafamilial patterns of integration involved no permanent s o c i a l groups of f i x e d membership despite several kinds of i n t e r f a m i l i a l co-operation ( 1 9 6 1 : 1 0 9 ) . The only prolonged a c c e s s i b i l i t y of f a m i l i e s to one another occurred i n the winter en-campments . . . . The scattered f a m i l i e s were able to v i s i t one another to dance, gamble, and exchange gossip, and the men occasionally co-operated i n a deer or mountain sheep hunt. Although dances and c o l l e c t i v e hunts required co-ordination, the leaders had no authority outside the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i v i t y . . . . In addition to the leaders of s p e c i a l a c t i v i t i e s , each v i l l a g e or l o c a l area of scattered winter houses usually had a man of some importance whom modern Shoshonean informants frequently c a l l the * v i l l a g e c h i e f 1 . So f a r as 'chief* implies permanent authority over an i d e n t i -f i a b l e group, t h i s term i s a complete misnomer, fo r t h i s man had no authority and he served only one function . . . . It was to act as a clearing-house of information about where foods could be found . . . . The winter v i l l a g e cannot be considered a genuine supra-f a m i l i a l form of s o c i a l i ntegration because i t lacked permanent membership and even permanent lo c a t i o n . . . . Leaders were accepted by common consent to control such c o l l e c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s as required co-ordination. It was only i n the few regions of uncommonly abundant and r e l i a b l e food that a group of f i x e d membership occupied one or more permanent v i l l a g e s throughout most of the year and had a true v i l l a g e chief and permanent leaders of other a c t i v i t i e s ( 1 9 6 I : 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 ) . The substantive conceptualization of leadership i s clear i n the foregoing; i t would appear that Steward shares the same set of assumptions about p o l i t i c a l organization as the Eskimologists considered e a r l i e r , with the difference that Steward conceives of the nuclear family as a p o l i t i c a l unit. It would seem also that Steward's type-portrait i n i t s 33 application to Eskimo society over-stresses the summer phase of the hunting cycle when small groups were indeed widely scattered and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t . The nature of thi s cycle w i l l however be considered i n d e t a i l at a l a t e r time. Steward ( l 9 6 l:l 1+3) uses the term "composite" i n contrast to the term ' u n i l i n e a l ' — p a t r i -l i n e a l or m a t r i l i n e a l — t o designate c e r t a i n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s which consist of many unrelated nuclear or b i o l o g i c a l f a m i l i e s . These are integrated to form v i l l a g e s or bands of hunters, f i s h e r s , gatherers, and simple farmers on the basis of constant association and co-operation rather than of actual or alleged kinship. . . . Like the p a t r i l i n e a l band, i t i s p o l i t i c a l l y autonomous and controls the p r i n c i p a l resource i n i t s hunting t e r r i t o r y , but i t i s much larger than the p a t r i l i n e a l band and hence, lacks band exogamy, p a t r i l o c a l residence after marriage, and p a t r i l i n e a l ! t y . I t consists of many unrelated f a m i l i e s which may intermarry within the bands. . . . Local or band exogamy was unnecessary and consanguin-i t y was the only bar to marriage ( l 9 6 l : l l + 5 -2h7). Service ( 1 9 6 2 ) reconsiders Steward's concepts and defines the' composite band as "an expedient agglomeration rather than a structured society," a group "which lacks exogamic rules and e x p l i c i t marital residence customs," to be contrasted with the p a t r i l o c a l band which i s structured by group exogamy and v i r i l o c a l marital residence ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 6 0 ) . He dispenses with Steward's "family l e v e l of int e g r a t i o n " since i t corresponds with Service's "composite band" ( 9 5 ) . Service then argues that Eskimo society o r i g i n a l l y may have 34 consisted of v i r i l o c a l bands but under the "catastrophic" influence of Euroamerican agents was reduced to the composite bands "known to modern ethnology" ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 0 7 ) . Except f o r cert a i n Alaskan groups which have p a t r i l i n e a l ( p a t r i l o c a l ? ) lineages and cross-cousin marriage . . . the Eskimo have i n h i s t o r i c times been described as remark-ably a l i k e i n their f l u i d , open communities which lack t e r r i t o r i a l exogamy and associated rule s of marital residence. The i n d i v i d u a l nuclear households are the basic economic units, and as they move with the seasons to various hunting and f i s h i n g grounds they may peacefully j o i n others i n any of those places, whether they are related or not. That i s , any v i l l a g e s or camp units are composite ( 9 9 ) . In the l i g h t of the remarks of Jenness and Mathiassen above on the composition of l o c a l groups, the v a l i d i t y of S e r v i c e d type of unstructured, composite agglomeration i s doubtful. The emphasis on the nuclear household appears to be, again, a preoccupation with the summer phase of the hunting cycle. In h i s analysis of Eskimo law, Hoebel ( 1 9 5 4 ) has helped to.sustain the a p o l i t i c a l image of the Eskimo. Chapter 5 i s t i t l e d "The Eskimo: Rudimentary Law i n a Primitive Anarchy." The Eskimo i s what some would c a l l an anarchist. He has no government i n the formal sense, either over a t e r r i t o r y or at a l l . There i s no preeminent center of authority. In t h i s Eskimo society i s notably democratic. Yet, as i s the case with every human group, s k i l l s are unequal. Some people are prone to i n i t i a t e action more frequently and f o r c e f u l l y than others. 35 They become the nucleus f o r the organiza-tion of the community. The Eskimos recognize t h i s , and they accept the proven s k i l l s of the superior hunter or ANGAKOK as q u a l i f i c a t i o n for pointing the way f o r the group as a whole (195*+*81-82). However, Hoebel goes on to say that primitive anarchy i s not synonymous with disorder. In the p r i s t i n e state where a l l s o c i a l r e l a -tions are face to face, where the meager economic resources are open to a l l and shared by a l l , where i n t e r e s t s are simple and common, basic order i s maintained through the primary mechanisms of s o c i a l c o n t r o l . There i s l i t t l e recognized need fo r any extensive suprafamilial authority ( 1 9 5 ^ : 2 9 ^ ) . Hoebel then quotes Murdock ( 19^9*83) i n the same vein: United by r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s and bound by a common culture, the members of the community form an 'In-group*, characterized by i n t e r n a l peace, law, order and cooperative e f f o r t . Since they a s s i s t one another i n the a c t i v i t i e s which g r a t i f y basic drives, and provide one another with c e r t a i n deriva-t i v e s a t i s f a c t i o n s obtainable only i n s o c i a l l i f e , there develops among them a c o l l e c t i v e sentiment of group s o l i d a r i t y and l o y a l t y , which has been variously termed syngenism, we-feeling, e s p r i t de corps, and conscious-ness of kind. The use of such type-portraits i s more poetic than s c i e n t i f i c ; i t i s more apt to generate tautology than explain s o c i a l behavior. The l a t t e r quotation p a r t i c u l a r l y i s i n the t r a d i t i o n of the noble savage. F i n a l l y , the work of recent s o c i a l anthropologists w i l l be b r i e f l y examined i n the area of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization. 36 Spencer's ( 1 9 5 9 ) monograph on the North Alaskan Eskimo has one e x p l i c i t reference to p o l i t i c a l organization--"absence of p o l i t i c a l organization"—which reads: The extended family was IILYAGIIC. These were, f o r the i n d i v i d u a l , kin on both the maternal and paternal side. In the f i n a l analysis, this was f o r the i n d i v i d u a l a c i r c l e based wholly on actual r e l a t i o n s h i p . I t was not otherwise a formalized i n s t i t u -t i o n . There was no family chief, no structuring of power or authority i n the group. . . . the UMEALIQ, the man of wealth, the boat owner, i n keeping h i s crew . . . might be obliged to depend.on the contributions which h i s kin made to him i n return f o r h i s protection and assistance. While the UMEALIQ might be recognized leader i n the community, i t was the community which accorded him h i s post, rather than the family i t s e l f . His function was l o c a l and h i s sphere of influence l i m i t e d i t s e l f to h i s community and to h i s post of prestige among the several households making up h i s kind i n the community ( 1 9 5 9 * 6 5 ) . On the coast the UMEALIQ had great prestige i n any community but h i s actual sphere of influence extended only to the men who formally cast t h e i r l o t i n with h i s . In t h i s sense, he was not a chief or p o l i t i c a l leader. To a degree, the same was true i n the inland setting. And . . . the p o s i t i o n of the UMEALIQ depended wholly on wealth; h i s prestige arose on the basis of the goods he was able to control ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 5 2 ) . Spencer considers the re q u i s i t e s f o r attaining the status of UMEALIQ—success i n the hunt, supporting k i n , generosity, and so on—and provides a sketch of an outstanding case which throws l i g h t on several dimensions of power, p a r t i c u l a r l y the bases and extension of power. 37 He wore parkas of b e a u t i f u l l y matched skins, h i s labrets were the most expensive, and he wore a headband of green and white beads. The many whales he had taken were indicated by the tattoo marks on h i s cheeks. He i s said to have walked slowly and with great d i g n i t y , speaking seldom and then i n a measured way, and he was noted f o r h i s extreme generosity. He never boasted of h i s successes, and he sat s i l e n t l y i n the k a r i g i while others played games and made sport. He was an i d e a l character, r e c a l l e d by a l l who knew or had seen him. I t i s said that he could e n l i s t the services of any man i n the community ( I 9 5 9 : l 5 l + - l 5 5 ) . P o s p i s i l and Laughlin more recently r e f e r e x p l i c i t l y to the Nunamiut UMEALIK as a " p o l i t i c a l leader and l e g a l authority" ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 8 1 ) , but the entire discussion of p o l i t i c a l organization i s i n terms of t h i s leader. The UMEALIK or p o l i t i c a l leader of a Nunamiut band was . . . a s k i l l e d hunter who organized communal caribou drives and served as an a r b i t e r and judge i n s e t t l i n g , often informally, disputes among h i s followers. He was also a wealthy man who possessed large supplies of skins, c r y s t a l beads, food, and other valuable property. He was expected to be generous i n dispensing food and clothing to members of h i s band i n time of need, and he often, i n f a c t , provided continuing support to widows, orphans, and the f a m i l i e s of physically-handicapped or incapable hunters. To perform these functions a man aspiring to p o l i t i c a l leadership had to amass the r e q u i s i t e property, and to accomplish t h i s without the aid of h i s kindred was next to impossible. Consequently i t was i n v a r i a b l y h i s kindred upon whose support a man depended to achieve and maintain the p o s i t i o n of UMEALIK i n a Nunamiut band ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 8 7 - 1 8 8 ) . • 38 Although the i m p l i c i t assumption here involves the f a m i l i a r equation of p o l i t i c a l organization and a generalized o f f i c e of power, the coercive element has been replaced by an emphasis on welfare, which i s much closer to the contemporary image of Western government than to the nineteenth century p o l i c e - s t a t e conception. And the importance of kinship as a base of influence underscores what Spencer, Mathiassen, and Lantis pointed out e a r l i e r . A more t r a d i t i o n a l view recently expressed i s provided by Van den Steenhoven ( 1 9 5 9 ) i n h i s examination of leadership among the N e t s i l i k Eskimos of P e l l y Bay. It i s a well-known f a c t [ s i c ] that Eskimo society has no p o l i t i c a l organization: there are no formal councils, there i s no ce n t r a l power, there i s no question of state or government. Neither can we, i n respect to s o c i a l organization, speak of a N e t s i l i k ' t r i b e 1 i n "its proper sense, since they lack that f e e l i n g of unity, exceeding kinship, which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a tr i b e ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 4 o r i g i n a l emphases). With the p a r t i a l exception of successful hunters who are followed by others who wish to share i n their luck, "formal anarchy" pr e v a i l s among the Netsilingmiut at the band l e v e l . Among kin however there i s an authority structure based on the role of IHUMATAR: within the nuclear family, the husband i s ihumatar; but he i s subject to the higher authority of h i s older brother, who i s subject to h i s father, oldest uncle, grandfather, and so on. Ideally, 39 i n an agnatic extended family group, sharing the same camp, the oldest male has the r i g h t to decide f o r his kin: His authority extends not only to d a i l y hunting decisions, or moving camp, but also to the s e l e c t i o n , as soon as possible after b i r t h , of marriage candidates f o r h i s nephews and un-married brothers, adoption matters, major trading decisions, the reprimanding of trouble-makers, making the necessary d i s p o s i -tions i n case of death of a r e l a t i v e , etc. ( 1 9 5 9 : 1 8 ) . Van den Steenhoven points out that t h i s i s how authority ought to be organized among kin; the actual power d i s t r i b u -t i o n may however diverge from t h i s pattern because of s e n i l i t y , ineptitude, personality f a c t o r s , and so f o r t h . In any case, Van den Steenhoven here throws some l i g h t on a possible source of power and how i t might be negated by other f a c t o r s . Willmott ( 1 9 6 1 ) b r i e f l y considers aspects of authority and leadership among the Eskimos at Port Harrison and six outlying camps. Referring to the HudsonsBay Company inter p r e t e r , who enjoys considerable economic security and holds a key p o s i t i o n i n White-Eskimo r e l a t i o n s at Port Harrison, Willmott says . . . since he has no authority over other households than h i s own and h i s sons 1, he can hardly be described as a p o l i t i c a l leader ( 1 9 6 1 : 4 5 ) . This man organized the purchase of a trap-boat worth about $ 4 , 0 0 0 by most of the Eskimos at Port Harrison, and for h i s ko e f f o r t s was given the t i t l e "boss" (AWGAJU'KAK) of the boat (to be used f o r sealing, whaling and moving). The interpreter can be expected to wield more power i n the future over those f a m i l i e s who have a share i n the boat . . . ( 1 9 6 1 : ^ 5 ) • This s i t u a t i o n , involving as i t does a decision bearing on a t o t a l group, p r e c i s e l y f i t s the conception of p o l i t i c a l organization outlined i n Chapter I. To the extent that the interpreter p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the decision-making process i n a s i g n i f i c a n t way (he "organized and l e d " the project) he might unequivocally be termed a " p o l i t i c a l leader". I t would appear that Willmott equates p o l i t i c a l organization with authority (rather than power) and con-strues i t as suprafamilial. In h i s consideration of camp leadership, however, Willmott provides useful i n s i g h t s into the bases of power i n a context of rapid technological change. Wealth, i n cash or the i n d u s t r i a l goods i t commands, i s a potent source of influence, p a r t i c u l a r l y when an i n d i v i d u a l acquires a boat on which others come to depend. Kinship f a c t o r s appear to be relevant: Each (camp) unit had a r e l a t i v e l y strong i n d i v i d u a l who assumed some leadership at times. In one case, t h i s was a widow whose mother, sons, s i s t e r , and nephews f i l l e d . two tents ( l 9 6 l : * + 6 ) . kl The e f f e c t of White i n t e r e s t s , suggested e a r l i e r i n the Jenness data, i s also indicated: With the advent of the fur-trader . . . leaders arose because the trading companies found i t convenient to deal with one spokes-man f o r a group ( 1 9 6 1 : 4 9 ) . "Inducement g i f t s " offered to "leading men" i n various camps by the trading companies included r i f l e s , traps and boats. The power p o t e n t i a l i n such situations i s obvious. Conclusion This survey of some of the standard l i t e r a t u r e on Eskimo society as i t deals with p o l i t i c a l organization has sought to i l l u s t r a t e the grounds f o r a widely-held concep-t i o n about Eskimo society. Some of the p r i o r assumptions about p o l i t i c a l organization which account f o r t h i s conception were indicated and found to be f a i r l y constant i n a body of l i t e r a t u r e spanning nearly a century and a h a l f . The ethnocentric bias of these assumptions has been noted before. Weyer ( 1 9 3 2 ) , f o r example, c i t e s Ross applying terms of royalty to describe the s o c i a l organization of the Polar Eskimos, and quotes Kane to the same e f f e c t . . . . the ANGEKOK of the t r i b e (Smith Sound) . . . d i r e c t s the p o l i c y and movements of the l i t t l e state, and though not the t i t u l a r c h i e f , i s r e a l l y the power behind the throne (Kane i n Weyer 1 9 3 2 : 2 1 3 ) . Weyer cautions that k2 The tenor of the l a t t e r two quotations, i t scarcely needs to be remarked, i s dissonant with what i s now known of the s o c i a l organi-zation of the Eskimos and must be considered as being colored by preconceived notions based on the systems of more advanced peoples (1932:213-21*0. Preconceived notions need not be as blatant as those c i t e d by Weyer, nor need they be i n v a l i d s o l e l y be-cause they are based on other systems. The assumptions about p o l i t i c a l organization outlined i n Chapter I f o r example are derived from the analysis of Western organiza-tions and communities, but th e i r possible relevance to Eskimo society l i e s i n part i n th e i r a n a l y t i c , rather than substantive, nature. That the problem i s more than a verbal quibble involving the use of a term ( " p o l i t i c a l organization") i s implied by the foregoing. Behind the verbalism l i e s the conception, and the conception guides the observer i n h i s a nalysis: thus the preoccupation i n the l i t e r a t u r e with o f f i c e s or r o l e s , authority, coercion, custom and so.on, to the neglect of how r e a l people get things done by planned action. Rather than conclude that the Eskimos have no p o l i t i c a l system, l e t us assume that they do, but we know l i t t l e about i t . CHAPTER I I I ESKIMO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: POWER AND DECISION-MAKING The t r a d i t i o n a l views of Eskimo (lack of) p o l i t i c a l organization examined i n Chapter II were almost e n t i r e l y expressed at a f a i r l y high l e v e l of generalization, witness the recurrence of such phrases as "Eskimo society almost everywhere . . .", "as a rul e . . .", " a l l Eskimo v i l l a g e s . • .", "among the Innuits . . .", and so on. The views of Steward, involving l e v e l s of int e g r a t i o n , were of the highest order of abstraction. In short, the data had already been processed and packaged into such conceptual bundles as 1 ,leadership", "organization", and "cohesion". It was, however, the contention i n the preceding chapter that these conceptual frames, e x p l i c i t or not, prejudge the data and generate conclusions of doubtful v a l i d i t y since they rest on assumptions about Western society which are not supported by present research. When these assumptions are extended to non-Western s o c i e t i e s they are placed i n double jeopardy. Furthermore, such generalizations i n e v i t a b l y gloss over s p a t i a l and temporal variations or exceptions which are of the essence to a reformulation of p o l i t i c a l organization. . This i s scarcely the occasion f o r an analysis of the methodology of s o c i a l science, but a b r i e f excursion i n t o the "foundations" of s o c i a l science w i l l throw some l i g h t on the discussion which follows. A constantly recurring, perhaps continuous process i n s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e s i s to reappraise the conceptual apparatus each science works with. Such a process i s evident i n the two formal d i s c i p l i n e s that t h i s paper straddles, p o l i t i c a l science and s o c i a l anthropology. P o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t s , f o r example, are currently wrestling with the implications of behavioralism f o r p o l i t i c a l enquiry and are refashioning th e i r conceptual and t h e o r e t i c a l repertoire i n the process ( c f . Easton 1 9 5 3 , 1 9 5 7 ; Almond and Coleman I 9 6 0 ; Charles-worth 1 9 6 2 ) . S i m i l a r l y , anthropologists review, reappraise and r e b u i l d , sometimes i n selected f i e l d s such as law (Hoebel 1954) or s o c i a l organization ( F i r t h 1 9 5 6 ; Service 1 9 6 2 ) , or on a vaster epistemological basis (Nadel 19513; Bidney 1 9 5 3 ; Leach 1 9 6 3 ) . Underlying t h i s reappraisal process i n s o c i a l science i s the dual nature of i t s foundations—the empirical and the t h e o r e t i c a l , which give r i s e to two kinds of s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y , description and explanation (Nadel 1 9 5 3 * 2 0 ) . These are complementary, both are necessary to a complete science, but i t would appear that one kind of a c t i v i t y dominates a d i s c i p l i n e for a time, to be "corrected" by a swing to the other. This d i v i s i o n of labour was noted h5 e a r l i e r i n r e l a t i o n to the study of Eskimo society: the ethnographers and "systematizers". The Eskimo ethnographers observed behavior i n the f i e l d , they saw the " f a c t s " , but as suggested above, they reported their observations schematically; t h e o r e t i c a l orientations, e x p l i c i t or otherwise, governed their percep-t i o n , s election and presentation of the data. To t h i s .'extent, the d i s t i n c t i o n between description and explanation i s more a matter of degree than a difference i n kind. Whenever attempts are made to r e b u i l d or redefine, a common tendency i s to return to the empirical l e v e l as clo s e l y as possible, to key the conception to the f a c t s . Thus, Hoebel, i n h i s attempt to construct a v a l i d conception of law i n primitive society seeks out the case study as "the most r e l i a b l e method f o r getting sound raw materials" which would be "more sharply discriminating and detailed than are broad descriptive passages penned i n conventional ethnologies (l95 1+:^+5)," S i m i l a r l y , Banfield ( 1 9 6 1 ) i n h i s study of p o l i t i c a l influence i n Chicago avoids the reputational approach to influence and concentrates on the behavior of the participants i n six controversies; thus the case study e l i c i t s p o l i t i c a l influence "at work" rather than influence " i n repose", or as i t i s "supposed" to work ( 1 9 6 1 : 7 ) . \ 1+6 The implications of the foregoing f o r t h i s study of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization may now be considered. Since p o l i t i c a l organization i s here construed as an analytic aspect of s o c i a l behavior, the evidence f o r i t must be sought i n behavioral data as close.as possible to the descriptive l e v e l . The early ethnographies include such data conventionally c l a s s i f i e d as " r e l i g i o n " , "technology", "kinship" and so on. In t h i s chapter, such descriptive passages w i l l be selected and the p o l i t i c a l implications spelled out i n terms of the power-decision framework presented e a r l i e r . Unfortunately t h i s procedure w i l l produce r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d b i t s or fragments of p o l i t i c a l behavior but nothing resembling a p o l i t i c a l system, for the empirical data tend to be of t h i s atomistic nature. The problem of synthesis or systematization w i l l be addressed i n the following chapters. Before considering the behavioral data In the l i t e r a t u r e , i t w i l l be i n s t r u c t i v e to consider the relevance of the power-decision approach i n the context of Eskimo society. Vallee's (1962) recent publication on the Eskimos i n the Baker Lake area contains an e x p l i c i t application of the concepts of power and decision-making to the Eskimo context. Vallee defines power thus: h7 When we say that a person has power, we mean simply that he can w i l l that c e r t a i n actions should take place and that either he or others then carry out these actions. Where power i s legitimate we c a l l i t authority ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 9 1 ) . Vallee i l l u s t r a t e s with a f a m i l i a r example: a factory owner has the authority to close h i s factory, and only a superior authority (the state) can open i t against h i s w i l l . On the other hand a workman has the power to close the factory (e.g., by blowing i t up), "but t h i s i s not authority, i t i s simply the i l l e g i t i m a t e use of power." Following Bierstedt, Vallee distinguishes three sources of s o c i a l power, numbers, organization, and access to resources. A l l other things equal, the majority i s more powerful than the minority. Where two or more groups are equal i n number and resources, the one which i s organized i s more powerful than the other. • • . Where two organized groups are equal i n number, the one with the most control over resources i s more powerful than the other. What resources are s i g n i f i c a n t depends on the s i t u a t i o n i n which a p a r t i c u l a r group finds i t s e l f . In one group, access to the s p i r i t world may be a resource which i s l i m i t e d only to a few people; i f the s p i r i t world i s of outstanding significance i n that group, those with a monopoly of access to i t are very powerful indeed. Among other resources which may be of significance power-wise are money, property, s k i l l and knowledge. In no society does every person have equal access to a l l resources ( 1 9 6 2 : 1 9 1 - 1 9 2 ) . 48 Vallee's main concern at t h i s point i s to demon-strate the powerlessness of the Eskimo majority v i s - a - v i s the "Kabloona" or White minority ( i . e . , the l a t t e r are better organized and command greater resources), but he refe r s to the indigenous Eskimo power structure and decision-making process because of t h e i r relevance to the contemporary s i t u a t i o n . Before considering these, however, i t should be pointed out that Vallee's conception of power involves only one dimension, the sources of power, and cannot be therefore considered adequate. Furthermore, he maintains the dichotomy of authority and "naked power", tending to equate the former s o l e l y with power involved i n roles or o f f i c e s , the implication being that a l l other forms of power are " i l l e g i t i m a t e " . With such a conceptual framework, h i s propositions about the r e l a t i v e power of .groups appear vague and u n r e a l i s t i c . And the power po s i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n groups cannot be analysed s o l e l y i n terms of sources: shamans who have access to the s p i r i t world are not necessarily "very powerful indeed"; i f they are, the other dimensions of t h i s power need to be considered (e.g., the scopes, extension, strength, and so on) or the impression .is created that t h i s i s a generalized diffused power. F i n a l l y , because of the unidlmensional consideration of power, i t s locus appears to be i n i n d i v i d u a l s rather than i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The inequality of access to resources found i n a l l s o c i e t i e s , which Vallee notes, should also be emphasized i n l i g h t of the discussion which follows. >+9 As i n t r a d i t i o n a l times, i n the camps today the exercise of authority i s based on f a m i l i a l r o l e s : parents can t e l l children what to do; older brothers can t e l l younger brothers, and so on. Where the father i s i n f i r m or the older brother grossly incom-petent, some other person w i l l be i n charge. In camps which are not complete kinship units, leadership i s taken by some person who by common consent i s a successful hunter and who knows best the t e r r a i n i n the v i c i n i t y , provided that the person i s not conspicuously younger than the other men, although he does not have to be the oldest of the group. The process of selecting a leader i n these camps i s not a formal, deliberate one: leaders emerge from the give and take of i n t e r a c t i o n i n such camps. The word f o r leader i s "isyumatah". It i s customary for the isyumatah to speak on behalf of the camp, when a spokesman i s required, i n short, to represent the members of the camp. This aspect of the isyumatah r o l e was accentuated after the establishment of the fur trade, f o r the traders preferred to deal with one person on behalf of the entire camp. To some extent the government o f f i c i a l s and policeman have given support to t h i s tendency, f o r they have normally-operated through the isyumatah also. We cannot overemphasize the f a c t that what authority there i s among the Eskimos i s domestic and informal and not backed by the ultimate use of force. Authority i s exer-cised i n a muted fashion, f o r the Eskimos are averse to giving orders. Most decisions a f f e c t i n g the camp as a whole appear to emerge from quiet discussion and the exchange of views. The leader i s the one whose views are given more weight than those of other people i n the camp. There have been and are exceptions to t h i s r u l e . For instance i n a large camp where the leader was not only a great hunter and trapper but also a powerful angakok, i t i s reported that he gave commands and reached decisions without much or any consultation with others. But according to the l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s region and according to older informants, t h i s was c e r t a i n l y not 50 the t y p i c a l arrangement, and today i t does not occur at a l l , except i n a mild form at one camp where a vigorous grandfather of 53 years of age rules over h i s wives, sons, and t h e i r f a m i l i e s with unquestioned authority. Thus the basis for decision-making among the Eskimos i s informal consultation, with the domestic leader exercising s l i g h t l y more influence than the others. Another important feature of authority and decision-making i n the camps i s that the domestic authority i s l i m i t e d to the one camp. The isyumatah can speak only for those i n h i s camp; decisions arrived at by the group are binding only on members of that group. It i s of c r u c i a l importance to remember t h i s feature of Eskimo s o c i a l organization when considering problems of Eskimo leader-ship i n A r c t i c communities today. The idea of someone i n authority speaking on behalf of and giving orders to large numbers of people to whom they are not related by ki n -ship or camp membership i s a completely foreign one f o r which there are no precedents i n Eskimo h i s t o r y or culture i n t h i s region. It i s not d i f f i c u l t to see why there were no such precedents. We expect to f i n d clear l i n e s of authority and the vesting of authority i n s p e c i f i e d o f f i c e s where the group i s large; where there i s a very com-plex d i v i s i o n of labour required to do the jobs of the group; where the people i n the group are heterogeneous with respect to kinship a f f i l i a t i o n , s o c i a l c l a s s , culture etc.; and where there i s decidedly unequal access to resources so that some people control the access of others to whatever c r u c i a l resources there are. A group or society i n which these conditions p r e v a i l i s one which requires clear l i n e s of authority, vested i n o f f i c e s (such as general, mayor, chi e f , councilman, etc.) and having the backing of force. On none of these counts di d the t r a d i t i o n a l Eskimo society need such an element i n i t s organization. There were simply no large r e s i d e n t i a l groups; the d i v i s i o n of labour was r e l a t i v e l y simple, based on sex and age; the members of the 51 r e s i d e n t i a l groups were homogeneous with respect to kinship, s o c i a l c l a s s , culture; and there was equal access to resources within any given camp and between camps . . . except for the one resource of contact with the supernatural, and i t i s i n connec-tion with the l a t t e r that we f i n d the closest approach to the exercise of both naked power and formal authority among the Eskimos. The foregoing discussion i s carr i e d out i n terms of authority (legitimate power) and "leadership", the leader being the one whose views are given most weight i n the camp. Otherwise power i s not mentioned except i n r e l a t i o n to powerful ANGAKOKS cum-hunter trappers who could give orders and make a r b i t r a r y decisions, but thi s i s "naked power" ( i . e . , i n some sense i l l e g i t i m a t e ) . The dimensions of authority are explored to some extent. I t s sources include f a m i l i a l r o l e s , the roles of ISYUMATAH and ANGAKOK, hunting success or s k i l l , knowledge, and, to some extent, age. Furthermore, access to these sources may be n u l l i f i e d by i n f i r m i t y , or incompetence, f o r example. The means of exercising authority are informal and non-coercive: quiet discussion and exchange of views. When sources of authority are pyramided however, the means may include the issuing of commands which are presumably coercive. The extension of authority i s likewise suggested: the ISYUMATAH*s authority extends only to those i n h i s camp; mothers and fathers can decide f o r the i r own children, among the children, older males can command the others. However 52 the scopes, amount, cost and strength of authority are not considered. S p e c i f i c a l l y , because scopes, f o r example, are not considered, the discussion i s of generalized, unspecified authority. The p o r t r a i t of two types of society i s polar and absolute, with clear antecedents i n the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft typology. We note that i n order to maintain the d i s t i n c t i o n , Vallee mutes the unequal access to resources which he e a r l i e r suggested as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l s o c i e t i e s . Ultimately, h i s d i s t i n c t i o n hinges on the formal s t r u c t u r a l c r i t e r i o n of government, and the two types of society are i n f a c t the f a m i l i a r "state" and "stateless society" delineated by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard (19^0:Introduction). Vallee points out, f o r example, that the Eskimos formed no "tribes i n a p o l i t i c a l sense. None of these ( c u l t u r a l ) groups had or has a p o l i t i c a l super-structure." But because they are small, homogeneous, and e g a l i t a r i a n , they do not "require" a p o l i t i c a l super-structure. Furthermore, because there i s no "precedent" of impersonal extended authority vested i n c l e a r l y defined o f f i c e s i n Eskimo society, Vallee assumes that there w i l l be a d i f f i c u l t y or resistance to t h i s kind of authority when Eskimos are affected by i t . There may well be such d i f f i -c u l t y and resistance, but not simply because there i s no precedent; the imputation that members of small, homogeneous, 53 " t r a d i t i o n a l " or f o l k s o c i e t i e s are hidebound i s c l e a r . F i n a l l y , the "clear l i n e s of authority and the vesting of authority i n s p e c i f i e d o f f i c e s " apparently distinguishing p o l i t i c a l organization i n large complex, heterogeneous s o c i e t i e s , i n the l i g h t of recent research i n these systems (Dahl I 9 6 0 , 1 9 6 3 ; Banfield 1 9 6 l ; Hunter 1953) appears to be part of the distorted self-image alluded to e a r l i e r which has determined our image of the Eskimo. Dunning, on the other hand, has argued that i n apparently homogeneous, undifferentiated, subsistence-level s o c i e t i e s "a considerable area for high status positions" i s based not only on economic success, but also on kinship and supernatural power ( 1 9 6 0 : 3 2 ) . Vallee, i n short, has provided an analysis of Eskimos i n general and has supported h i s analysis l a r g e l y with a highly abstract polar typology instead of using behavioral data f o r t h i s purpose. For t h i s reason, h i s analysis i s i n the same t r a d i t i o n as Steward and the e a r l i e r ethnographers c i t e d i n Chapter I I . Although h i s use of the analytic concepts of power and decision-making i s a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , h i s e x p l i c a t i o n of these concepts i s inadequate. •I s h a l l now turn to some of the behavioral data available i n the l i t e r a t u r e and present i t i n the form of cases which provide glimpses of power and decision-making at work i n s p e c i f i c s ituations. 5h Case I: A Public Confession Rasmus sen t l 9 2 9 : 1 3 1-l 1 + 3 ) records i n some d e t a i l a public confession administered to a sick woman by a "highly respected" shaman among the Aivilingmiut i n the early 1 9 2 0 *s. The confession was observed by two of Rasmussen's colleagues, and afterwards corroborated by the shaman. The Confession: The whole community was summoned to pa r t i c i p a t e i n the confession. Having invoked h i s s p i r i t f a m i l i a r s , the shaman was able to perceive dimly the acts responsible fo r the woman,s i l l n e s s . She had vi o l a t e d many taboos: she had smoked a pipe she ought not to have, eaten caribou meat at the wrong time, combed her ha i r af t e r giving b i r t h to a baby, t r i e d to keep a miscarriage secret to avoid the res u l t i n g taboos, had intercourse when she was unclean, touched a dead body without observing the consequent taboos, and so on. Many of these acts or f a i l u r e s she confessed h e r s e l f at the shaman's prompting; others were voiced by those present. As each v i o l a t i o n was stated, the p a r t i c i -pants said "Let her be released from that. Let her get we l l , " or Words to t h i s e f f e c t . The shaman was constantly concerned whether or not the blame lay e n t i r e l y with the woman—was he, or someone else responsible? No, a l l agreed with the woman that she was e n t i r e l y to blame. 55 Having exposed her many f a i l u r e s , and excused them, the gathering dispersed, but repeated the performance twice more that day, by which time the woman was scarcely able to s i t upright. Nevertheless, a l l were convinced that the woman was cleansed and would recover, and that the community was out of danger, "for such indulgence on the part of human beings tends to appease the anger of the Sea S p i r i t . " Rasmussen unfortunately does not record whether or not the confession "worked". The Analysis; The b e l i e f system e f f e c t i v e at the time of t h i s event involved the notion that sea mammals are controlled by a deity which dwells on the ocean f l o o r . Men may-capture sea mammals on condition that a multitude of taboos, believed to have been imposed by the deity, are observed. Breach of taboo i s punished by the deity with sickness or withdrawal of the sea mammal supply, so that i n d i v i d u a l deviance exposes the entire community to danger. Shamans are intermediaries between man and deity; with the aid of t h e i r s p i r i t f a m i l i a r s , shamans are thought to" be capable of journeying to the deity and p r o p i t i a t i n g i t , or of perceiving past offenses which, i f they are confessed c o n t r i t e l y , may influence the deity to l i f t the punishment. The scene was a small Eskimo v i l l a g e , the exact composition of which i s not recorded, where "everyone nearly 56 always knows a l l about everybody else, despite a l l e f f o r t s on the part of any i n d i v i d u a l to keep anything secret, and however fi r m h i s conviction that nobody knows" (Rasmussen 1 9 2 9 : 1 3 2 ) . The sick woman, h e r s e l f a shaman, was seated on a bench before the entire v i l l a g e , apparently inside the dance house. As the summary above indicates, the spectators play an important part i n the performance f o r they are expected to help the shaman "to the ultimate of the i r power i n e l i c i t i n g confessions of a l l offenses, f o r should any such be d e f i n i t e l y concealed, i t might mean disaster to the whole community" (Rasmussen 1 9 2 9 : 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 ) . The shaman i s i n a sense on t r i a l as well as the woman, for not only must he succeed i n curing her to validate h i s status, he must clear himself of any suspicion that he i s responsible f o r the woman's i l l n e s s . Several decisions were formulated and/or enacted i n the context of the public confession. There was f i r s t the decision to expend the time and energy necessary for t h i s organized a c t i v i t y . Without considering the alte r n a t i v e s , i t i s possible to see a general a l l o c a t i o n of values: security and entertainment to the spectators, restored health and a. clear conscience f o r the sick woman, and heightened prestige f o r the shaman. We do not know to what extent the woman's i l l n e s s coincided with a lack of hunting success i n the community; i n any case, the decision was probably a popular one. I t could have been proposed by the sick woman, 57 or the shaman, fo r personal reasons. Once proposed, i t became binding on the whole community i n the sense that absence from the confession could involve r i s k s f o r the absentee: a scapegoat may have been sought. The unusual presence of the anthropologists may have been a factor i n the decision, providing the shaman an opportunity to display h i s prowess, f o r example. E x p l i c i t reference to t h e i r presence was made on one occasion when the shaman asked h i s f a m i l i a r "can those here present as l i s t e n e r s be g u i l t y i n any way?" (The anthropologists had recently been examining ancient stone houses which the Aivilingmiut considered best l e f t alone.) The decisions to blame only the woman and to forgive her ( a c t u a l l y several decisions to excuse several offenses), arose from the i n t e r a c t i o n of shaman, confessor, and spectators. The alternatives of implicating the shaman himself, or someone else i n the community, or of imposing some form of penance on the woman, a l l had precedents. Although the shaman played a key r o l e i n the proceedings, i t i s easy to overemphasize h i s influence. His sources and means of power were patent: proven s p i r i t f a m i l i a r s and a high reputation gained from many such performances i n the past involving healing, p r o p i t i a t i o n and d i v i n a t i o n . He remarked to Rasmussen, f o r example, "I believe I am a better shaman than others among my countrymen. 58 I w i l l venture to say that I hardly ever make a mistake i n the things I investigate and i n what I p r e d i c t . And I therefore consider myself a more perfect, a more f u l l y -trained shaman than those of my countrymen who often make mistakes" ( 1 9 2 9 : 1 3 2 ) . We may construe "mistakes" i n two ways: a lack of congruence between the shaman1s pronouncements and subsequent events; or, equally disastrous, a lack of congruence between the shaman's demands and those of h i s p u b l i c . The l i m i t e d scope of h i s power should be emphasized, however. He was undoubtedly heeded when sickness, uncertainty, or famine beset the community. On other occasions i t would not be surprising i f other i n d i v i d u a l s enjoyed greater influence. But the amount of h i s influence i n these l i m i t e d scopes was great—he i n s i s t e d , f o r example, that the woman confess her offenses h e r s e l f (the spectators had been naming her offenses following the shaman's cues, i n d i c a t i n g that they were commonly known or e a s i l y guessed at) and he was obeyed. We can only guess at the extension of h i s power; probably he surpassed any other shaman i n that community and, i n l i g h t of h i s reputation, may have had a following throughout the region. The cost of h i s influence must be i n f e r r e d as w e l l : generally speaking a successful performance adds somewhat to a shaman's power base, while a f a i l u r e costs him p o t e n t i a l influence, although there were conventional ways 59 of minimizing the cost of f a i l u r e (e.g., a t t r i b u t i n g the f a i l u r e to the presence of White s p i r i t s ) . In view of t h i s man's apparently great reserve of prestige, however, he could "afford" a f a i l u r e . Another cost or r i s k inherent i n the wielding of power i n t h i s scope was e x p l i c i t l y raised by the shaman a number of times during the confession: "Am I responsible? Is i t due to me?" he asked, only to be re-assured by the confessor that " I t i s due to myself alone." Shamans suspected of using t h e i r power resources maliciously might be murdered. The strength of the shaman's power ( i . e . , the costs to the others of r e s i s t i n g h i s influence) was apparently high i n t h i s scope, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n h i s re l a t i o n s with the woman: the cost of disobedience f o r her could well be death, f o r the rest of the community, sickness and starvation. Thus, i n spite of h i s access to great power sources, the shaman probably did not attempt to make h i s ef f e c t i v e power wider or more absolute because of the r i s k s involved; h i s power could be "legitimately" wielded only within c e r t a i n scopes, and even then, the decisions were not h i s alone—proposal and enactment were p l u r a l i s t i c . Put another way, we might say that there i s a great deal of "slack" or p o t e n t i a l power available to the shaman, which he does not exploit on account of the possible costs. These costs can be viewed i n terms of the power sources of the 60 others i n the drama. The sick woman, by blaming the shaman, could have seriously jeopardized h i s p o s i t i o n , but probably her own as well; the spectators, or some of them, might have decided that the woman was beyond forgiveness, or that the shaman was responsible, but again, these p o s s i b i l i t i e s seem unlikel y because of the r i s k s they i n -volve. The confession, therefore, has p o l i t i c a l implica-tions, involving as i t does the making of group decisions as this process i s influenced by ind i v i d u a l s with d i f f e r e n -t i a l access to and use of power sources. The performance followed a general, t r a d i t i o n a l outline but th i s s p e c i f i c performance was not i d e n t i c a l with thousands of unique others. The variables i n each case have been suggested: the current b e l i e f s , the nature of the emergency, the composition of the group, the s k i l l and prestige of the shaman, and even the po s i t i o n i n the seasonal cycle. It i s conceivable, f o r example, that under d i f f e r e n t circumstances the sick woman would simply have been abandoned while the group moved on. Three performances might have been lavished on her because there was a gale blowing and no one could do anything else anyway. In short, each s i t u a t i o n confronting the group i s i n some degree unique, and cannot be met simply by "following custom", although t h e i r perception of custom undoubtedly provides some di r e c t i o n f o r the decision makers. 61 Case I I ; An Execution Both Rasmussen (1931:39-^1, 1927:17^-175) and Van den Steenhoven (1959:51-55) give accounts of the execution of an insane man among the N e t s i l i k . Rasmussen obtained h i s data from the executioner one year aft e r the event, while Van den Steenhoven 1s account i s based on information supplied by the executioner's son t h i r t y - f i v e years l a t e r . The l a t t e r , sixteen at the time of the execution, was not present when i t took place. The insane man, A, according to Rasmussen had murdered one of h i s fellow v i l l a g e r s a year before i n a f i t of temper. Since then he had stabbed h i s wife on several occasions, but without k i l l i n g her. A man l i k e that was dangerous to h i s surroundings, and therefore people had made up th e i r minds that he should die. It was a v i l l a g e decision, to which was attached the p e c u l i a r i t y that people considered i t natural for the brother, who was the oldest of the family, to execute the sentence. (1931:30-31, my emphasis.) The brother, U, one day went to A, informed him of the decision and gave him h i s choice of gun, knife or thong by which to die. A chose the former and U discharged h i s duty forthwith. Van den Steenhoven's account denies that A had act u a l l y murdered anyone, or that U gave A a choice i n the 62 matter. Van den Steenhoven also provides some s i t u a t i o n a l d e t a i l s that are relevant. The camp was "large", consisting of the parents and.two brothers of A and U, the brothers* father's cousin and h i s two sons-in-law, and the wives and children of these men. There were also some non-kin i n the camp. U was the camp IHUMATAR. The event occurred at the darkest time of year when the camp was preparing to move down to the sea-ice f o r winter sealing. The event was pre c i p i t a t e d by A stabbing h i s wife. She f l e d to the others who started to fear that he might stab again at someone they loved, and they discussed what should be done. The discussion was held among family [ s i c ] , and i t was f e l t that A, because he had.become a danger to them, should be k i l l e d . U said that he would carry out the verdict himself and the others agreed. (The) old father . . . was not supposed to do i t , because A was h i s own son; but i f U fo r some reason would not have done i t , the next oldest would have offered himself to do i t . After the decision was taken, U n o t i f i e d the non-relatives, because they were also a f r a i d . A l l agreed that there was no alte r n a t i v e ( 1 9 5 9 : 5 4 ) . The camp then broke up, most of i t s members heading f o r the coast. Meanwhile, U and four of h i s kinsmen went to A*s snow-hpuse, where U t o l d A that because he was insane he must die, and shot him i n the chest. Van den Steenhoven checked t h i s version with several informants present at the time of the execution and they a l l vouched f o r i t s accuracy. 63 The Analysis: The execution of A, i f Van den Steenhoven*s account i s correct, appears extreme i n the l i g h t of the offence, unless other f a c t o r s , including influence, were at work. The executioner, U, f o r example, seems to have been most i n f l u e n t i a l i n the a f f a i r and. some private motives may have been operating. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t however that the decision was reached and carried out "at the darkest time of year" and just before the movement of the camp down to the i c e : the l i t e r a t u r e abounds with examples of treachery c a r r i e d out on the t r a i l when people are pre-occupied and backs are turned. In any case, the decision, whatever i t s o r i g i n , was generally sanctioned before i t was implemented. The p o l i t i c a l aspects of kinship are also indicated: the decision was reached by A*s kinsmen f i r s t ; there could be no question of blood-feud with a l l close kin f i r m l y bound beforehand. Only aft e r t h i s group had agreed that A should die, and U, b e f i t t i n g h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p to A, had agreed to execute him, were the other members of the camp informed. What had originated as a proposal f o r action probably with A*s wounded wife, through a process of consulta-t i o n , discussion, and n o t i f i c a t i o n , became a group decision. Alternatives were undoubtedly perceived and were probably raised (e.g., abandon A; attempt to cure him) but each alternative involved r i s k s or costs, as well as advantages, 6k and these would be d i f f e r e n t i a l l y allocated throughout the community. Under the given circumstances the course adopted did not necessarily coincide with the private wants of the most i n f l u e n t i a l participants i n the decision process. For example., U afterwards said that he had been very fond of h i s brother, but had consented to execute him out of a f e e l i n g of duty to the community. On the other hand, U might have been seeking revenge f o r some past offence, or could have had designs on h i s brother's wife. In any case, the circumstances of the moment appear to have given him decisive power i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r scope: he was IHUMITAR, the case involved h i s younger brother and U was, moreover, "greatly esteemed by a l l who knew him." Had the offender been a member of the unrelated group i n the camp, U's power p o t e n t i a l would have been considerably l e s s . We might note the probable d i s t r i b u t i o n of costs and rewards flowing from the execution. There was apparently a gain i n safety by a l l those present, but p a r t i c u l a r l y by A'-.s wife; the danger of future blood-feud was avoided; indeed i f A had already murdered a man as Rasmussen says, the execution may have f o r e s t a l l e d pending r e t r i b u t i o n . The possible costs would include widowhood fo r A*s wife, the loss of a, kinsman f o r most of the camp members, the loss of an able-bodied hunter during the coming sealing season (but 65 perhaps A was a poor hunter, or h i s insan i t y was construed as a l i a b i l i t y regarding success i n the hunt), and f o r U, the pain of doing a thing "much against h i s w i l l " . This case, l i k e the preceding one, involved a threat or problem for an entire community. A number of t r a d i t i o n a l solutions were available, but the actual course of action followed arose out of a combination of p a r t i c u l a r circumstances, including the presence of various i n f l u e n t i a l s who were p a r t i a l l y defined as such by the scope of the problem. Case I I I ; Revenge Jenness ( 1 9 5 9 : 2 3 7 - 2 3 9 ) records t h i s case, which occurred during the early summer of 1915 near the western end of Coronation Gulf. A sizeable band of Copper Eskimos were camped by a shallow point i n a stream where they had constructed a stone weir. F i s h were speared, dried and cached; as the run petered out people lounged about and gossiped. As the women were gossiping inside a tent, one of the men c a l l e d out that a shoal had entered the weir. The gathering dispersed i n an instant; f o r although t h e o r e t i c a l l y food was shared i n common, the family that gathered the largest store always fared better than the r e s t , and enjoyed greater prestige. The women, therefore, rushed f o r t h e i r spears and hurried down to the stream. But as they collected on the brink and eagerly scanned the empty water, loud guffaws from the men behind advised them of 66 the hoax, and c r e s t f a l l e n , even amid their laughter, they slowly retreated to their tents again ( 1 9 5 9 : 2 3 8 ) . The following morning, while the rest of the camp s t i l l s l e p t, Jenness observed a woman go down to the weir armed with her fish-spear. As I watched her she shouted, and wading into the water, p l i e d her spear f r a n t i c a l l y to r i g h t and l e f t . Instantly the camp was i n an uproar. F i r s t the men dashed out, some naked, some half-dressed, and, racing headlong to the stream, plunged i n t o the water afte r her; but a l l the women l o i t e r e d i n the rear. Then shrieks of laughter mingled with the loud shouts and angry ejaculations of the men; the weir was empty, and the women had taken t h e i r revenge ( 1 9 5 9 : 2 3 9 ) . In the absence of data on the composition of the camp, l i t t l e can be said i n thi s case about the relat i o n s h i p of influence and the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the event allows us to i n f e r some of the aspects of p o l i t i c a l organization i n the camp. There can be l i t t l e doubt that the second hoax originated as a proposal with one or more of the women i n the camp, found considerable support among the others, and was subsequently converted i n t o a formal decision binding on a l l of them. The plan could have been formulated while a l l the women were gathered, ostensibly "gossiping", i n one of the tents; i n any case the decision was formulated i n complete secrecy from the men, and a l l of the women were party to i t . The decision involved the selection of an 67 executor as part of the strategy. Furthermore, the decision involved cer t a i n obvious costs or r i s k s as well as rewards. The case i s of i n t e r e s t because i t suggests a sexual d i v i s i o n i n patterns of influence and decision-making, and i l l u s t r a t e s what i s often neglected i n p o l i t i c a l analyses, that women too are p o l i t i c a l animals. Again, the nature of the decision and the method of a r r i v i n g at i t must be r e l a t e d to the s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n : the necessary time and opportunity were provided by a l u l l i n the current summer a c t i v i t y . Case IV: Camp Migration Among the Copper Eskimos The seasonal cycle marking the economy of Eskimo groups everywhere has been noted throughout the l i t e r a t u r e ; unfortunately l i t t l e has been said at an empirical l e v e l which lays bare the p o l i t i c a l aspects of t h i s mobility. The impression created i s that the sheer necessity of moving on i n search of game r e s u l t s i n a spontaneous movement towards a goal pre-determined by habitual p r a c t i c e . Yet, as Barth observed among the nomadic herdsmen of Persia, the frequent movements imply p o l i t i c a l organization i n the sense that they are the product of decision-making involving influence. 68 Jenness ( 1 9 2 2 : 1 1 6 ) suggests some of the factors a c t u a l l y involved i n making a decision to move camp among the Copper Eskimos thus: In the autumn, when the Eskimos are moving out to the i r sealing-grounds, they have to sta r t with t h e i r sleds before daylight i n order to reach their destinations before dark. Time i s everything at that season of the year, and often h a l f the journey i s made i n t w i l i g h t . In spring, on the other hand, there i s no need f o r haste, f o r the a i r i s mild and pleasant, and the daylight as long as the darkness has been i n the winter. No d e f i n i t e hour i s set for the migration, no d e f i n i t e day even, f o r i n a land where the only calendars are the seasons one day i s no better than the next. The natives are not accustomed therefore to plan a l l t h e i r movements beforehand, and to carry them out with the exactitude of clockwork. Conversation usually simmers on the subject f o r several days before a migration takes place, and nothing i s decided; then one evening a man w i l l suddenly announce to h i s wife that he intends to move next day. The rumour quickly spreads from house to house, and others announce the i r intention of accompanying him. Next morning everyone i s on the a l e r t . Someone enters a hut and announces that so-and-so i s packing up. Everyone begins to do the same, and soon the settlement i s a hive of industry. .And again: Marriage involves no subjection on the part of the woman. She has her own sphere of a c t i v i t y , and within that she i s as supreme as her husband i s i n h i s . A l l important matters, such as the migrating to another settlement, are discussed between them before any decision i s taken ( 1 9 2 2 : 1 6 2 ) . Jenness ( 1 9 2 2 : 1959) himself p a r t i c i p a t e d i n such a decision while he was the adopted son of the oldest couple 6 9 i n a band of twenty Eskimo kinsmen. Their quest for caribou on V i c t o r i a Island i n the l a t e spring took them to several lakes where they fished when caribou f a i l e d to appear. At one point i t was decided that the band would move to the Lake of Dancing because the summer before they had met a band of Prince Albert Sound f a m i l i e s , and cached th e i r sleds there. It was hoped that these people could be contacted again f o r purposes of trade, song exchange and gossip. Having f a i l e d to sight the other group after two days at the lake, i t was decided to move to another lake two days 1 journey away, leaving a couple and th e i r c h i l d behind to care f o r the large quantity of drying meat the band had amassed. A week after they arrived at the l a t t e r lake, two Prince Albert Sound (Tormiat) f a m i l i e s joined them, informing Jenness* group that the main body of the Tormiat people had moved further north. Four days of feas t i n g , dancing, singing, trading (and very sporadic hunting) followed i n the course of which one of the v i s i t i n g women made advances to Jenness* adoptive father i n p l a i n view of h i s adoptive mother, "Icehouse". In spite of the general r e v e l r y and abundance of food the Tormiat woman disturbed Icehouse's peace of mind. She shrank from remaining i n the same camp with her r i v a l , and entreated (her husband) to lead back our party to the Lake of Dancing. (The husband consulted Jenness), and we agreed to depart on the morrow. The 70 natives from the Great Sound joined us i n a dance of farewel l , and we started on the homeward march (Jenness 1 9 5 9 * 1 2 6 ) . According to t h i s account, three i n f l u e n t i a l s , Jenness and h i s adoptive parents, formulated the decision which was then binding on the res t of their kinsmen. We may i n f e r that the woman's anxiety was not the sole reason f o r moving i n t h i s instance (concern f o r the family back at the Lake of Dancing, f o r example, probably entered), but she obviously played a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r decision process. The woman was a shaman and loved by her kinsmen, her husband included. On t h i s occasion she e f f e c t i v e l y used her power resources f o r p o l i t i c a l ends, her means being an urgent appeal to her husband. Jenness often re f e r s to her great fluency which she occasionally turned against her husband when they quarrelled. This man undoubtedly acceded to her wishes on occasion merely to silence her. The husband and Jenness complemented one another; they were very close, and each had access to s i g n i f i c a n t resources—the husband being the oldest successful hunter, Jenness having r i f l e s and plenty of ammunition, at a time when these were s t i l l comparatively rare i n t h i s area. In t h i s case, the source of the proposal i s e x p l i c i t l y given and i t i s noteworthy that, again, i t was a woman who i n i t i a t e d a decision of group range. It would 71 appear that only the three persons considered had any di r e c t influence on the decision-making process; probably the others i n the i r band were merely informed afterwards. Before examining another case, a f i n a l note from Jenness would be apropos, i n t h i s case involving the same band discussed above confronted with a herd of caribou. The hunt strategy at such times consisted of driving the animals i n t o close range of r i f l e and bowmen by means of "fences" consisting of natural b a r r i e r s , stones, dummies, and women and children. This hunt well i l l u s t r a t e d the unity of an Eskimo band. Every i n d i v i d u a l , man, woman, and c h i l d , took part i n i t — e x c e p t the Listener's wife, who being old and feeble remained to guard the packs; and both men an.4 women, contributed to the, discussion, that decided the t a c t i c s to be employed. (Jenness 1 9 5 9 : 1 5 9 , my emphasis.) Cage V; Th,e Messenger Feast A composite account of the Messenger Feast i s given by Spencer ( 1 9 5 9 : 2 1 0 - 2 2 8 ) using data supplied by informants at Point Barrow, Alaska, who attended the l a s t feasts about 1915* The name derives from the fac t that s p e c i a l l y trained messengers were sent from a host v i l l a g e to another bearing formal i n v i t a t i o n s f o r selected guests to return with the messengers and attend a great feast which involved two or three days of song, dance, contest and gift-exchange. The feasts climaxed years of planning, 72 saving and organizing, and l i k e the potlatch on the North West Coast, were the means of attaining the pinnacle of prestige, both f o r i n d i v i d u a l hosts and host communities. Spencer traces the course of a feast from i t s inception as the ambition of a wealthy UMEALIQ (boat owner or crew boss) through i t s climax, when massive quantities of goods were handed over to the i n v i t e d guests, to the departure of the guests, who were then obliged to reciprocate as soon as possible. The s o c i a l , economic and ceremonial aspects of the feast are considered by Spencer, but the p o l i t i c a l implications are not explored, f o r as noted above i n Chapter I I , Spencer disclaims any indigenous p o l i t i c a l organization i n the Barrow area. B r i e f l y , the hig h l i g h t s of the feast are these. A wealthy UMEALIQ decided to hold a Messenger Feast, perhaps to obtain prestige f o r himself, h i s crew and h i s v i l l a g e and/or to f u l f i l l h i s obligations as a past guest at another v i l l a g e ' s feast. To amass the necessary goods required the cooperation of a l l the members of h i s v i l l a g e over a number of years. Beginning with h i s own boat crew, support f o r the venture was e n l i s t e d and saving was begun. Other UMEALIT were enl i s t e d , and as the venture came closer to r e a l i z a t i o n the o r i g i n a l UMEALIQ was i n a p o s i t i o n to t e l l each family head i n h i s v i l l a g e how much he should contribute. 73 Informants r e c a l l the case of MAANIKSAW, an UMEALIQ of great wealth. Having e n l i s t e d the support of the other crew leaders i n the community, he issued a statement to each family head i n d i c a t i n g how much that family should contribute. I f a householder was un-cooperative or attempted to reduce the amount of h i s contribution, he was threatened by MAANIKSAW and h i s lieutenants and forced to comply (Spencer 1 9 5 9 * 2 1 2 ) . As i n s t i g a t o r , the o r i g i n a l UMEALIQ was regarded as the p r i n c i p a l host, which entailed a vari e t y of r i g h t s and duties during the course of the feas t , the other UMEALIT being regarded as secondary hosts. O r i g i n a l l y the amassed goods included meat, clothing, o i l , kayaks, dogs, etc. but, with the advent of White whalers and traders, such prized goods as tobacco, f l o u r , and guns became common i n the exchange. As the feast drew near, usually during the slack period i n January, the messengers, normally two respected old men,"'' were selected by the p r i n c i p a l host and rehearsed i n their duties. Each host i n v i t e d a counterpart from the guest v i l l a g e and, the formal i n v i t a t i o n , delivered by the messengers, included each host's song and a statement of the goods he expected to give and receive. Meanwhile, everyone was making preparations f o r the event--dancers, runners, drummers, seamstresses, and so on. Preparations 1 Hawkes ( 1913*7) reports that a single young man ca r r i e d the message. 7h sometimes also included the construction of a sp e c i a l k a r i g i f o r the occasion. The messengers were despatched carrying d i s t i n c t i v e s t a f f s or "asking s t i c k s " , and upon th e i r a r r i v a l at the guest v i l l a g e , they were taken to the k a r i g i of the p r i n c i p a l h o s t , s guest where the i n v i t a t i o n s were extended. The guests r e p l i e d by stating t h e i r own demands and o f f e r s , or by naming a representative (a woman, or even a dog) i f they themselves were unable to attend. Each guest then selected r e t a i n e r s , runners and dancers, amassed t h e i r g i f t s , and accompanied the messengers back to the host v i l l a g e . During the course of t h i s journey, which might require a number of days, those with duties to perform, such as the foot-runners, practised th e i r s k i l l s . The journey ended at some distance from the host v i l l a g e where the guests camped and b u i l t a community snow-house while the messengers went on to the p r i n c i p a l h o s t , s k a r i g i . Their information was conveyed r i t u a l l y : the number of guests and retainers coming and their counter-demands and o f f e r s . This news sometimes embarrassed a number of hosts who would have to scour the v i l l a g e f o r the unexpectedly required, somewhat exotic goods. On the following day, the runners, each representing a host and bearing a piece of meat impaled on a s t a f f , went out to the encamped guests, paired with the appropriate guest, and aft e r ceremonially eating and dancing, heard h i s 75 demands r e i t e r a t e d . The host and guest runners then paired and raced back to the host k a r i g i , the rest of the encampment following behind. The guests were ceremoniously welcomed outside the k a r i g i . An exchange of small g i f t s between hosts and guests took place, ending with the p r i n c i p a l host's announcement "Now that i s a l l " . I f the guest runners won most of the races, the v i s i t o r s took possession of the k a r i g i when they wished; otherwise they had to await a formal i n v i t a t i o n from their hosts. The guests quartered i n the k a r i g i and the hosts dispersed to their houses. The following day brought the climax of the feast. Beginning with random g i f t - g i v i n g by the hosts to those from either v i l l a g e who d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a ted i n the preceding a c t i v i t i e s , each host formally presented h i s i n v i t e d guest with a great number of valuable g i f t s . The guests then repeated t h e i r food demands, and these were presented to them. A series of formal dances were then staged by both sides, and followed by general fea s t i n g , dancing, singing and gossiping. On the f i n a l day there was no further exchange of g i f t s , but a kind of soccer game was contested f o r most of the day on the beach. A farewell dance took place i n the k a r i g i , and before the v i s i t o r s departed, the hosts indicated to t h e i r guests what they intended to request from them at the next feast when the roles would be reversed. 76 F i n a l l y , the k a r i g i was cleaned, or dismantled i n the case of a s p e c i a l l y constructed one. The foregoing structure or pattern presents an opportunity f o r a number of people to p a r t i c i p a t e i n decision-making and wield influence on an i n t e r - v i l l a g e l e v e l . Within t h i s structure, the bases of power are cl o s e l y defined i n terms of wealth, the giving of wealth and the r e s u l t i n g prestige, and a variety of s k i l l s such as running and dancing. Much of the influence i s legitimate i n the sense that i t conforms to what the parti c i p a n t s con-ceive as the r i g h t way to stage a Messenger Feast, but t h i s legitimate form of influence does not exhaust the p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; the parti c i p a n t s are free to manipulate the structure to t h e i r own advantage within c e r t a i n l i m i t s . But l e t us be s p e c i f i c . The p r i n c i p a l host i n i t i a t e s this highly structured process and from that moment pyramids h i s sources of power to the extent that h i s scopes and means of power are quite varied. We note that this man has access to power sources at the outset: he owns a boat, and keeps a crew l o y a l to him by means of h i s generosity. These sources i n turn give him access to wealth (e.g., whales) i f he i s lucky and/or s k i l f u l , which broadens h i s power base. He may u t i l i s e t h i s wealth to gain popularity among h i s own kin and unrelated f e l l o w - v i l l a g e r s , again a source of power which can be turned 77 to p o l i t i c a l purpose at the opportune time. At t h i s point he may formulate the decision to hold a fe a s t , assured that he has generated enough support to make a start i n the saving process. Assuming that h i s e f f e c t i v e power extends only to h i s near kin and crew (which may overlap) at the outset, once t h i s group has a tangible surplus of goods l a i d by, the UMEALIQ has another potent power source to use i n h i s negotiations with the other UMEALIT i n h i s v i l l a g e . By obtaining t h e i r support i n the venture, the p r i n c i p a l host e f f e c t i v e l y increases the sources and extension of h i s power. However, he does t h i s at a c o s t — h e i s spending h i s resources, so to speak;—for he i s becoming e f f e c t i v e l y obligated to h i s followers, indebted to them, dependent on them. At the same time, he and a l l of them, stand to share i n the ultimate pay-off--the prestige entailed i n giving a successful feast. There would appear to be a band-wagon e f f e c t , and i n case anyone remains r e c a l c i t r a n t , a massive amount of indignation operated to bring him i n t o l i n e . Once the entire v i l l a g e i s committed to the venture, the power structure i s c l e a r l y defined as a pyramid with the p r i n c i p a l host at the apex, backed by the other UMEALIT. The o v e r a l l decision i s then being ca r r i e d out and subsequent tangential decisions must adjust or accommodate to i t ( i . e . , each household must allocate so much by a c e r t a i n time). With the-dispatch of the messengers the l i n e s of influence are extended to another p o l i t i c a l unit and a kind 78 of i n d i r e c t bargaining process takes place where wealth as a source of power again i s highly relevant to the outcome, but other sources are implicated. Spencer notes, f o r example, that the i n v i t a t i o n s follow pre-existing relationships such as trading or joking partnerships, or even a Messenger Feast partnership, a l l of which imply duties and obligations ( 1 9 5 9 : 2 1 3 ) . The i n v i t a t i o n s may be viewed as formal proposals i n i t i a t e d i n the host v i l l a g e and continued by proxy i n the guest v i l l a g e . The bargaining c a r r i e d on through the messengers furthers the decision-making process and at t h i s point the power source entailed i n being a guest i s u t i l i z e d to some extent, f o r the guests are free to counter demand or offer what they w i l l (again, within l i m i t s : asking f o r the impossible v i o l a t e s the rules of the game and threatens the system; offering too l i t t l e involves a l o s s of pre s t i g e ) . Decisions of circumscribed scope within the structure of the feast are made by ind i v i d u a l s who gain access to the prescribed sources of power: hosts decide who their runners w i l l be; the members of the side winning the most races decide when the guests s h a l l enter the k a r i g i ; successful hosts decide what their l a t e guests must give them at the next feast. In a sense, the entire host community has purchased, at a considerable cost, prestige i n the eyes of. the guest v i l l a g e . This prestige can l a t e r be converted i n t o the goods of the i r choosing, and the 79 backers, as well as the hosts must be paid off i n due course, f o r debts and obligations have been incurred on a l l sides. Because of the complexity of the feast and i t s highly structured character, t h i s case comes very close to government i n the substantive sense, indeed, to a miniature p o l i t i c a l system, with c l o s e l y defined and specialized r o l e s , highly i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d procedures, and a;hierarchy of authority which allocates resources at the community l e v e l . For the present purpose, however, the case i s relevant i n that i t demonstrates again that influence and decision-making are involved i n group action, that there i s a p o l i t i c a l aspect to s o c i a l behavior. In t h i s case, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c bases and means of influence are "economic" i n the sense that they involve wealth and i t s manipulation: wealth i s the d i s t i n c t i v e power medium. But other resources are implied too: s k i l l , knowledge, prestige, kinship, t r a d i t i o n and time, for example. These resources are a l l allocated by the decision to hold a Messenger Feast, and u n t i l the decision i s implemented there i s very l i t t l e slack i n the community power system. When the feast i s over, some of the sources of power have been re-allocated: the wealthy are now poor but esteemed; the esteemed are now wealthy but obligated. Costs and rewards have been d i f f e r e n -t i a l l y allocated. 80 Conclusions The f i v e cases examined above are s p a t i a l l y scattered, and although they a l l occurred within the decade from 1915 to 1 9 2 5 , they concern quite d i s t i n c t s o c i o - c u l t u r a l groups i n the A r c t i c . As such, they are merely i s o l a t e d glimpses of how various i n d i v i d u a l s and groups dealt p o l i t i c a l l y with a variety of issues. They scarcely constitute grounds for generalization beyond the point, which they are intended to i l l u s t r a t e , that Eskimos too make decisions of group range and that t h i s process i s related to access to and manipulation of sources of power. This view does not, of course, discount the influence of psychological, e c o l o g i c a l , s o c i a l or c u l t u r a l factors on group behavior: these factors i n f a c t , are seen as the t o t a l context i n which power was wielded and decisions were effected. What i s most p a i n f u l l y evident about the cases, however, i s the paucity of data concerning the context i n each case: who was there, what sorts of re-lationships were exploited, what factors motivated given persons, what were the economic circumstances, and so on. In t h i s negative sense, the cases are of value i n tbsfc they d i r e c t attention to the kind of data required f o r an adequate analysis of p o l i t i c a l organization. It i s p r e c i s e l y because the t r a d i t i o n a l Eskimo l i t e r a t u r e f a i l s to provide t h i s data that so much of the foregoing i s hypothetical guesswork. This underscores what has been said before, that 81 there i s p o l i t i c a l behavior i n the Eskimo context, but very l i t t l e i s known about i t because i t s elements are only suggested i n the l i t e r a t u r e available. Observers and commentators have chosen rather to assign Eskimo groups to type categories on the basis of formal c r i t e r i a . Having examined f i v e situations i n their p o l i t i c a l dimensions we are i n a somewhat better p o s i t i o n to appraise the anarchist l a b e l attached to Eskimo groups i n general. "Ordered anarchy" suggests an ordered disorder, or patterned chaos. This designation i s unfortunate, f o r , besides being paradoxical, i t s l a t t e r term promotes the misleading image of extreme individualism which has i t s most emphatic expression i n Mirsky's paper. The exclusive equation of s o c i a l order and centralized authority underlies t h i s designation. When the "ordered" dimension was explored at a l l , such general abstractions as public opinion (Birket-Smith 1 9 5 9 * 1 5 1 ) , t r a d i t i o n (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 : 2 0 9 ) , kinship bonds, or mutual need (Jenness 1 9 2 2 : 8 6 ) were invoked, Lantis combining these fac t o r s with supernatural sanctions and i n d i v i d u a l influence i n the case of the Nunivak Eskimos ( 1 9 4 6 ) . The present concern i s not however with t h i s broad question of s o c i a l order i n Eskimo groups except as t h i s relates to power and decision-making. The cases c i t e d a l l deal with the way coordinated, concerted group action 82 was mobilized i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s , that i s , group decisions were successfully formulated and/or enacted. Unsuccessful attempts were not examined, but i t i s not unreasonable to assume that such occur, and that lack of agreement and concerted action are based on such general factors as public opinion, t r a d i t i o n , kinship t i e s , and so on. To view these l a t t e r f a c t o r s solely as forces operating f o r conformity, control and order i s to ignore the obvious. Furthermore, these monolithic abstractions need to be somehow keyed down to the present behavioral analysis of p o l i t i c a l organization; viewing them as p o t e n t i a l sources of power, to be exploited or not exploited by s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s bridges t h i s conceptual gap. In short, we may a n a l y t i c a l l y resolve the bases of power int o such i n t e r -r e l a t e d categories as the psychological (personality t r a i t s , motives, i n t e r e s t s ) , environmental (natural resources, climate), b i o l o g i c a l ( f e r t i l i t y , health), s o c i a l (group size , kinship), and c u l t u r a l (knowledge, s k i l l , values), these constituting the general context i n which s p e c i f i c s ituations a r i s e which involve decision-making. Each s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n (e.g., sickness, i n s a n i t y , moving camp) can be seen as a set of demands f o r some resources rather than others ( i . e . , sickness, f o r curing s k i l l ; a herd of caribou, f o r hunting prowess), that i s , c e r t a i n situations favor the wielding of power by some in d i v i d u a l s rather than others. In short,each s i t u a t i o n involves c e r t a i n scopes of influence. 83 The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the sources of power at the time a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n arises i n a given group therefore has a bearing on who w i l l influence the decision-making process. I t i s i n e v i t a b l e , i n spite of e g a l i t a r i a n i d e a l s , that there w i l l be unequal access to resources among the members of such groups as Eskimo f a m i l i e s , camps or v i l l a g e s , but i t i s equally ine v i t a b l e that every i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have access to some power sources. We may note, f o r example, the unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n of such factors as age, i n t e l l i -gence, s k i l l s , f e r t i l i t y , and so on. To argue that such groups are r e l a t i v e l y homogeneous i s to ignore the many i n t e r n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s and d i f f e r e n t i a l s which are the very source of p o l i t i c a l organization. We may characterize such groups as having a diffused d i s t r i b u t i o n of power p o t e n t i a l , and t h i s , armed with the e g a l i t a r i a n i d e a l , constitutes the l i m i t i n g framework i n which decision-making and p o l i t i c a l manoeuvering takes place. Some i n d i v i d u a l s 1 resource funds may be greater than others', (e.g., the male head of a large family who i s a s k i l l e d hunter, an ISUMATAQ and shaman and who i s both l i k e d and respected) and some resources appear to have wider currency than others (e.g., boat ownership may provide more generalized extensive influence at l e s s cost than, say, hunting s k i l l ) . Such well-endowed i n d i v i d u a l s would appear to be i n a good p o s i t i o n to wield almost unlimited power 8M-were i t not f o r the dif f u s e d i s t r i b u t i o n of other resources, and the i d e a l of equality referred to, these being r e a l l i m i t a t i o n s , or costs, attached to absolute power. These considerations underline the point that an analysis of sources alone cannot discover the e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n t i a l s i n a group, for the sources must be a c t i v e l y exploited before we have influence i n operation. In t h i s respect, not only what i s accessible, but how much or how well i t i s exploited are relevant. Reference to slack, unused resources has been made above, and i n an e g a l i t a r i a n , diffused-power context, t h i s i s apparently normal ( c f . Dahl i 9 6 0 , 1 9 6 3 ) . It i s conceivable, however, that an i n d i v i d u a l with no unusual power sources can be motivated to use them to the f u l l and thereby successfully influence a group decision (e.g., Icehouse i n Case IV). And because any in d i v i d u a l ' s access to sources varies i n time from s i t u a t i o n to s i t u a t i o n , as well as that person's perception of the costs of using resources f o r p o l i t i c a l action, there i s a clear need to analyse situations i n d i v i d u a l l y i n a l l their dimensions. This i d e a l has obviously not been met i n the f i v e cases c i t e d because of very l i m i t e d data. Nevertheless, I would contend that the term anarchy i s misapplied as a blanket characterization of Eskimo society. There may well be anarchist situations i n 85 Eskimo communities, but the implication of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy and lack of regulation as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Eskimo groups i s unwarranted. Some of the l i m i t a t i o n s on i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l action have been considered f o r t h i s reason. Another serious f a i l i n g i n the cases examined has already been suggested. They are, with the exception of the l a s t case, i s o l a t e d events and their t y p i c a l i t y can only be checked against generalized statements about the same groups. Had a l l f i v e cases dealt with the same community, there would have been some p o s s i b i l i t y of discerning r e l a t i o n s h i p s , patterns, and changes i n the variables. Since there appears to be no record of a series of group decisions i n the l i t e r a t u r e , I would suggest that t h i s i s a much-needed research project i n the A r c t i c . A p a r t i a l step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n has recently been made by Damas (1963) and t h i s work w i l l be examined i n the next chapters. MAP I. EAST CENTRAL ARCTIC, place names KAP I I . IGLUL IK REGION, p l a c e names HAP I I I . IGLULIK REGION, habitation s i t e s CHAPTER IV THE CONTEXT—KAPUIVIK The f i v e cases examined i n the previous chapter share a common d i s a b i l i t y : although the s i t u a t i o n involving decision-making i s e x p l i c i t , the context i n each case remains shadowy and vague. In t h i s chapter and the next the p o s i t i o n w i l l be to some extent reversed since con-siderable background data w i l l be presented f o r a s p e c i f i c settlement, and subsequently some s p e c i f i c decision-making situations w i l l be analysed i n the l i g h t of these data. Thus, the inferences w i l l flow from the context to the si t u a t i o n , rather than the reverse. The settlement selected i s Kapuivik on Jens Munk Island at the northern end of Foxe Basin. The selection was dictated e n t i r e l y by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data (Damas 1 9 6 3 ) . Following a b r i e f h i s t o r i c a l sketch, t h i s settlement w i l l be considered i n d e t a i l from the angle of composition and ecology and their implications for influence. 1» History The Eskimos l i v i n g i n the environs of I g l u l i k Island are termed Iglulingmiut' 1' by the surrounding people 1 Mathiassen*s "Iglulingmiut" apparently approximates Eskimo usage more c l o s e l y than.Damas1 "Igluligmiut" (Stevenson:personal communication). 90 and by themselves. Their t r a d i t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y encompasses the northern h a l f of M e l v i l l e Peninsula, the many islands (including I g l u l i k and Jens Munk) at the northern margin of Foxe Basin, and the adjoining fringes of B a f f i n Island (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 : 2 1 ) . These people have h a b i t u a l l y passed beyond these rough f r o n t i e r s f o r purposes of marriage, hunting, trade, and intercourse with neighboring people, p a r t i c u l a r l y the Tununermiut of Northern B a f f i n Island, and the Aivilingmiut to the south around Repulse Bay and Southampton Island with whom they are i n many respects c u l t u r a l l y similar (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 : 2 1 , 2 3 ) . The I g l u l i k t e r r i t o r y l i e s e n t i r e l y within the Ar c t i c C i r c l e and i s icebound f o r . a l l but two months (August, September) each year. Contacts with western culture probably began about 1718 with the establishment of the trading post at Fort C h u r c h i l l . Whaling was i n i t i a t e d i n Hudson Bay about 1 8 5 0 , and the f i r s t of many whaling vessels wintered i n Repulse Bay i n 1 8 8 9 . Trading and whaling stations were subsequently established: i n 1903 at Pond Inlet and F u l l e r -ton Harbour; i n 1912 at Ch e s t e r f i e l d I n l e t . The l a s t whale was taken from Hudson Bay i n 1 9 1 2 . The Hudson's Bay Company b u i l t trading posts at Repulse Bay ( 1921) and Southampton Island (192*+), took over the Pond Inlet station i n 1 9 2 1 , and established a post at Clyde River i n 1 9 2 3 . A pol i c e s t a t i o n was i n s t a l l e d at Pond Inlet i n 1 9 2 2 . Explorers 91 mapped the area to the south i n gradual stages (Hudson, 1 6 1 0 ; Button, 1 6 1 3 ; Bylot and B a f f i n , 1615; Munk, 1 6 2 0 ; Fox(e), I 6 3 I ; Middleton, 1742) and to the north ( B a f f i n , 1 6 1 6 ; Ross, 1818) (Mathiassen 1928:4). Parry, following h i s exploration of Northern B a f f i n Island i n 1 8 1 9 - 2 0 , was the f i r s t to penetrate the I g l u l i k t e r r i t o r y , wintering near Repulse Bay i n 1921-2 and at I g l u l i k the following winter. His journals, along with those of Lyon, h i s second-in-command, provide the f i r s t d e t a i l e d accounts of the Iglulingmiut (Parry 1 8 2 4 ; Lyon 1 8 2 4 ) . The l a t e r F r a n k l i n expedition ( 1 8 4 5 ) and subsequent r e l i e f expeditions (e.g., H a l l 1 8 6 1 - 3 , 1 8 6 4 - 6 9 ) entailed more b r i e f contacts with the Iglulingmiut, but l i t t l e information s p e c i f i c a l l y about these people. Boas compiled two reports ( 1 9 0 1 , 1 9 0 7 ) on the Eskimos of Hudson Bay and B a f f i n Island based on the observa-tions of whaling captains and a missionary which deal mainly with material culture and mythology, as well as an e a r l i e r survey ( 1 8 8 8 ) based on his, own observations at Cumberland Sound and various published reports. These reports give l i t t l e consideration to the Iglulingmiut, however. The F i f t h Thule Expedition (1921-24), headed by Rasmussen, increased exchanges during a period of i s o l a t i o n and v a s t l y increased written information of the Iglulingmiut, with the stress again on material and " i n t e l l e c t u a l " culture. (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 ; Rasmussen 1 9 2 9 ) . 92 C h r i s t i a n i t y , introduced to the Iglulingmiut i n 1920 by a convert from Pond Inle t , spread r a p i d l y and almost immediately supplanted shamanism (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 2 3 ) . Today about 60 per cent of the Iglulingmiut are Anglican, the remainder being Roman Catholic (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 2 6 ) . The whale-boat, r i f l e and st e e l trap were also introduced with the establishment of whaling and trading stations, and these innovations resulted i n alte r a t i o n s i n the aboriginal economic cycle, to be discussed below. Population l e v e l s may have declined during the whaling phase as a r e s u l t of contagious disease, but since 1930? as a r e s u l t of immigra-t i o n , and better health conditions, the population has been growing r a p i d l y , giving r i s e to several new v i l l a g e s i t e s . The i n s t a l l a t i o n of a Hudson's Bay Company trading post on I g l u l i k Island i n 1939 f a c i l i t a t e d the marketing of fox furs f o r the Iglulingmiut. Motorized whale-boats made th e i r appearance about 1 9 5 0 , and i n the l a t e r f i f t i e s two DEW l i n e s i t e s were b u i l t , one at Fox Main l e s s than f i f t y miles south of I g l u l i k , and another on Rowley Island. Although the caribou herds have diminished, e s p e c i a l l y on M e l v i l l e Peninsula, the sea mammal resources continue to meet the modern increased demands implied by a r a p i d l y growing population technologically better equipped than ever to exploit t h i s resource. 93 In short, western influences penetrated the I g l u l i k t e r r i t o r y only gradually and t h e i r o v e r a l l e f f e c t has been to i n t e n s i f y the t r a d i t i o n a l economy rather than to supplant i t . How t h i s occurred w i l l be examined i n some d e t a i l below. 2 . Economy The aboriginal Iglulingmiut were p r i n c i p a l l y sea mammal hunters, r e l y i n g to a lesser extent on caribou, bear, fox, birds and f i s h . An elaborate material culture featured a great v a r i e t y of weapons and implements designed to procure and process the A r c t i c fauna, the t r a d i t i o n a l source of food, clothing, shelter, transport and f u e l . The p r i n c i p a l sea mammals included walrus and the ringed and bearded seal. Whales were taken by kayak by the Aivilingmiut around Repulse Bay and by the Tununermiut of Pond I n l e t , but apparently not by the Iglulingmiut (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 : 5 0 ) . Whales have v i r t u a l l y disappeared from the northern Foxe Basin i n t h i s century, although of l a t e the narwhal appears to be returning. An apparently inexhaustible supply of walrus today constitutes the p r i n c i p a l basis of Iglulingmiut prosperity. Several hunting techniques are t r a d i t i o n a l . Both seal and walrus were taken from kayaks (the only aboriginal c r a f t ) i n summer and f a l l by small parties of two or more men, although hunting walrus i n t h i s manner was considered 9h very dangerous. In winter both mammals were taken through the i c e , the walrus on newly formed i c e which i t broke on emerging for a i r , the seal at breathing holes (MAULIRPUK method). Both techniques were best effected by groups of men (occasionally women) because of the walrus 1s one-ton bulk, and the number of alternative breathing holes used by the seal. Seal and walrus were also hunted at the i c e edge i n winter and spring i n groups of two or more men. The p r i n c i p a l hunting technique i n the spring, however, was the crawling (UTUQ) method: young basking seals were taken by stealth on the i c e and the y i e l d from t h i s technique normally supplied the following winter's blubber needs. A single male with a harpoon (occasionally a woman with a club) could successfully hunt i n t h i s way. Caribou were hunted i n every season, but were es p e c i a l l y sought i n summer and autumn when the hair i s short and the skin i s suitable f o r clothing. Caribou pursuit entailed a high degree of mobility and the hunting party normally consisted of one or two of the younger f a m i l i e s , the older men usually remaining on the coast or at a lake to hunt or f i s h . Mathiassen observed ( 1 9 2 8 : 5 3 ) that caribou hunting was the I g l u l i k Eskimo's favourite occupation: he would suspend any other endeavour, whether food was scarce or not, "to pursue sighted caribou and would often continue hunting them over most of the winter. Individual stalking, waiting i n kayaks at water crossings, the building of caribou fences and 95 use of women and children as dr i v e r s were techniques successfully employed. Meat was cached at convenient depots or immediately consumed. Summer hunting would normally produce a surplus which could be u t i l i z e d i n the winter when hunting was more d i f f i c u l t and l e s s remunerative. Food sharing practices were well established, and said by Damas* older informants to be community-wide, but t h i s may have been only an i d e a l norm, subject to v a r i a t i o n according to s i t u a t i o n a l factors such as current animosities, or fl u c t u a t i n g l e v e l s of surplus ( c f . Weyer 1932:Ch. 1 0 ) . Mathiassen summarizes the t r a d i t i o n a l Iglulingmiut d i v i s i o n of labour on the basis of sex, but h i s views appear to oversimplify the pattern. He does not, f o r example, consider the relevance of age, or expertise, to task per-formance, nor does he include such le s s routine tasks as curing. In any case, a c e r t a i n degree of f l e x i b i l i t y i s indicated i n the following ( 1 9 2 8 : 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 ) . The d i s t r i b u t i o n of labour between man and woman—for there i s no other d i s t r i b u t i o n of l a b o u r — i s at once apparent; the man goes hunting, procures food and skins f o r the house and he i s also the a r t i s a n who builds the house, makes the sledge, fashions h i s and h i s wife's implements, scrapes skins. The wife sews clothing, prepares the skin (except the scraping, with which the husband helps), attends to the lamp, cooks meat and looks a f t e r the children. But i t i s no rare occurrence f o r women to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the hunt, e s p e c i a l l y salmon f i s h i n g , where, 96 however, net f i s h i n g i s always the task of the men, the women f i s h i n g with the hook. At Ponds Inlet I heard of several women who were s k i l f u l seal hunters, both UTOQ and MAUPOQ hunting. The women are often clever at fox-trapping too; a woman at Ponds Inlet had caught 15 foxes i n one winter. Two older, rather lazy men at Ponds Inlet had each two clever wives who also did most of the hunting and were very s k i l f u l at catching seals, narwhales and foxes. Most of the women, however, spend nearly a l l their time i n -doors, s i t t i n g on the platform with their sewing and a l l day long singing t h e i r interminable monotone song with the eternal r e f r a i n : aja-aja-aja-a ( o r i g i n a l emphasis). The annual cycle of subsistence a c t i v i t i e s were summarized by Boas ( 1 8 8 8 : 4 4 4 ) on the basis of data gleaned from Parry ( 1 8 2 4 ) and H a l l ( 1 8 6 5 ) . As soon as the sea begins to freeze up, the natives gather on I g l u l i k , where they hunt the walrus throughout the winter. According to the po s i t i o n of the f l o e edge, I g l u l i k , P i n g i t k a l i k (Pingerqualik) or U g l i t Islands are the fa v o r i t e settlements. Later i n the winter, when new i c e i s frequently attached to the f l o e , part of the fam i l i e s move to the i c e north-east of Ig l u l i n g [ s i c ] , where seals are caught with the harpoon. Another winter settlement seems to be near Amigtoq (Amitsoq). In A p r i l young seals are hunted i n the bays and f j i o r d s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Hooper Inlet . . . . . As soon as the warm season approaches the natives go deer hunting on M e l v i l l e Peninsula or more frequently on B a f f i n iLahdr, Thus the size and composition of the l o c a l s e t t l e -ment and i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s varied with the season. The general picture appears to have been a winter 97 gathering f o r sea-mammal hunting, followed by a summer di s p e r s a l inland, but, again, s i t u a t i o n a l factors (such as the a r r i v a l of well-stocked B r i t i s h ships) could a l t e r t h i s pattern. H a l l (1879*302) counted twenty-three snow-houses on the sea-ice off I g l u l i k Island "near the walrus-grounds" i n early March I867, but Lyon (l82 l+:230) estimated that there were 120 people l i v i n g i n seventeen tents at two summer camps along a half-mile stretch of the east-coast of Turton Bay, I g l u l i k Island, on July 16, 1922. This large summer encampment may subsequently have dispersed, however, when caribou hunting probably became more intensive (see below). By the time Mathiassen arrived i n the twenties, r i f l e s and skin whaleboats had come into use, the l a t t e r being exclusively of Eskimo manufacture but modelled on the larger wooden c r a f t acquired by the Aivilingmiut to the south (Mathiassen 1928:96). Frequent shortages of ammunition, the i n c i p i e n t l e v e l of the fur trade, and the absence of wooden whaleboats r e f l e c t the r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n of the I g l u l i k area from western influences. Nevertheless, hunting e f f i c i e n c y had greatly increased. Mathiassen (1928:30) describes the economic cycle thus: The spring was spent at I g l u l i k , at Qeqertarjuk on the north-east end of I g l u l i k Island and on the i c e north of i t , hunting utoq seal. Before the i c e broke up they c a r r i e d a part of the blubber to Qupersortuaq, on the mainland south 98 of I g l u l i k , and cached i t there. In summer, walrus and seal were hunted with kayak and boat, f i r s t from I g l u l i k , Alarnang and Pingerqalik, and l a t e r , when the i c e had quite disappeared, from Arversiorvik, a l i t t l e way inside of Pingerqalik. In September the old men went to the i s l a n d Apatdleq, just west of I g l u l i k , where they continued walrus hunting, whilst the young men went caribou hunting, p a r t l y on the mainland within Richards Bay and Hooper Inlet and round H a l l ' s Lake, p a r t l y on the north side of Fury and Hecla S t r a i t . When the i c e formed and the h a i r of the caribou became too long to be suitable f o r clothing skins, the skins were taken to Apatdleq, where the sewing of caribou skins took place. About new year they assembled again at the two winter settlements I g l u l i k and Pingerqalik and hunted the walrus'from the ice edge and seals at the breathing holes. Mathiassen*s ( 1 9 2 8 : 1 7 - 1 9 ) census of f i v e Iglulingmiut v i l l a g e s during the winter of 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 provides data that Damas ( 1 9 6 3 * 5 9 - 6 6 ) was l a t e r able to organize i n kinship perspective by means of informant r e c a l l . Married Adults Unmarried Children Total I g l u l i k Pingerqalik Amitsoq Manertoq (Steensby Fjord) Pt. Elizabeth/Cape Wilson 2k 5 k 7 11 73 17 10 16 27 12 6 9 16 Total l*t3 99 In the four decades between the fieldwork of Mathiassen and Damas, wooden whaleboats made their appearance, purchased with the proceeds of the fur trade, which increased during t h i s period. During the t h i r t i e s a number of Aivilingmiut moved north in t o the I g l u l i k area because of the disappearance of the walrus around Repulse Bay. Family allowances were introduced i n 19*+8. The establishment of a trading station on I g l u l i k i n 1939 secured the supply of ammunition and f u e l f o r the boat engines and provided some short-term wage labour when the supply vessel arrived each summer. DEW l i n e construction ( 1 9 5 5 - 5 6 ) provided l i t t l e wage work f o r Iglulingmiut, but the station dumps are a constant source of highly valued material: wood, glass, and metal. Housing has gone through one revolution and i s entering another: beginning about 1 9 3 0 , permanent rectangular sod and skin (or canvas) houses gradually replaced the snowhouse i n the winter v i l l a g e s . In 1959? a w i n d f a l l i n the form of plywood from dismantled barracks began a phase of large plywood houses, but snowhouses are s t i l l b u i l t for temporary shelter. New v i l l a g e s i t e s have been occupied as the population increased, t h e i r locations determined l a r g e l y by the a v a i l a b i l i t y of sea mammals rather than,for example, the location of the trading post (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 3 2 ) . Damas ( 1 9 6 3 : 3 1 ) summarizes the present economic cycle as follows: 100 July 15 - October 1 5 —Chief period of walrus and seal hunting, by wide-ranging whale-boat from tent base camps, basking game taken on d r i f t i n g i c e pans; f o r one month (mid-August to mid-September) younger f a m i l i e s hunt caribou on B a f f i n Island i f clothing skins are required. October 15 - A p r i l 1 5 — S e a l and walrus taken at the i c e edge near winter v i l l a g e s ; groups of 2 - h men frequently hunt caribou for meat and mattresses; b r i e f trapping excursions; communal feasting. A p r i l 15 - July 1 5 —Sealing by crawling (UTUQ) technique, e s p e c i a l l y i n June and early July, large amounts of f a t stored; lengthy caribou hunts on B a f f i n Island; frequent i n t e r v i l l a g e v i s i t i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i n May. The population growth i n the I g l u l i k area between 1922 and 1961 (from 1^3 to 5l*+ persons), attributable both to immigration and a declining death rate, has witnessed an increase i n the number of winter settlements (from f i v e to fourteen). However, the maximum population of these settlements has not altered much; Mathiassen's largest v i l l a g e included seventy-three i n d i v i d u a l s , while Damas records populations of eighty-seven and sixty-four for the two largest v i l l a g e s i n the winter of 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 , but the average per v i l l a g e has increased from just under t h i r t y to thirty-seven. Damas also records ( 1 9 6 3 : 6 6 - 7 1 ) census fi g u r e s f o r June 19^9 taken by the Roman Catholic mission at I g l u l i k . The population was by then 2 8 3 , nearly double the 1922 f i g u r e , and the population was d i s t r i b u t e d among eleven v i l l a g e s , 1 0 1 two large (eighty-two and s i x t y - e i g h t ) , and nine smaller ones ranging from ten to twenty-five members; again, an o v e r a l l average close to t h i r t y . These data indicate that a l o c a l aggregation of l e s s than one hundred in d i v i d u a l s i s the "optimum size for the best ex p l o i t a t i o n of l o c a l game resources" (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 2 7 ) . Several modifications from the e a r l i e r cycle may be summarized thus: (a) Hunting techniques—kayak and skin whaleboats have been abandoned and harpoon use i s dimini-shing, supplanted by the whaleboat and r i f l e . These and other tec h n i c a l innovations have made hunting f a r more e f f i c i e n t and productive than formerly. Breathing hole sealing has been v i r t u a l l y abandoned, except where l o c a l conditions ( i . e . , i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y of open water) make i t necessary. (b) Permanent v i l l a g e s — l a r g e r surpluses of food have lengthened the sedentary phase. Winter v i l l a g e s of permanent wood or sod construction are now occupied f o r h a l f the year or longer (ten months i n places). (c) Seasonal a c t i v i t y — t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between marine and summer land hunting i s l e s s pronounced, both types extending throughout the year with b r i e f interruptions. 102 (d) Economic D i v e r s i f i c a t i o n — s u b s i s t e n c e t r a d i t i o n -a l l y based on hunting and trade now includes some wage labour, fox trapping, and government subsidies as well, each of these involving the Iglulingmiut to some degree i n the wider economy. Increased security i n the t r a d i t i o n a l economic sphere would appear to be purchased at the cost of dependence on White f a c i l i t i e s and goods. Nevertheless, the basic dependence on sea mammals and caribou continues, and the t r a d i t i o n a l pattern of winter aggregation and summer segmentation s t i l l p r e v a i l s . There i s s t i l l a great deal of c u l t u r a l value and personal joy and pride attached to the hunting l i f e . As long as the herds of walrus do not shrink markedly or the population expansion does not outstrip production of the animal, the sea-mammal-based economy w i l l continue to f l o u r i s h at I g l u l i k , and the associated settlement patterns and yearly round of economic a c t i -v i t i e s w i l l p r e v a i l . (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 3 1 . ) F i n a l l y , i t should be noted that some s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t s i n the access to and the nature of sources of power have occurred during the period of contact. ( l ) A number of White i n f l u e n t i a l s such as traders, missionaries, and government o f f i c i a l s now make u n i l a t e r a l decisions a f f e c t i n g the Iglulingmiut. An area of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has been l o s t , and t h i s , l i k e the climate or 103 sea-mammal population, constitutes another "given" i n the t o t a l context over which the Iglulingmiut have l i t t l e c o n t r o l . However, any Iglulingmio who acquires some influence regarding these White agents (e.g., l i k e d by a trader, construed as a leader by an administrator, engaged as a lay preacher by a missionary) would appear to have a source of power among h i s own people, although as Willmott ( 1 9 6 1 ) indicates at Port Harrison, this can have negative consequences. (2) Access to White money and/or goods i s necessarily a s i g n i f i c a n t source of power i n the present setting. Ultimately, value appears to reside i n such c a p i t a l goods as boats, r i f l e s , and traps, and such consumer goods as tobacco and clothing. Meat, however, remains the ne plus u l t r a , and much behavior and the values implied i n i t must be related to t h i s end. Thus, the strategic p o s i t i o n of the whaleboat owner i s indicated among the Iglulingmiut, as i t has been already i n other areas such as Port Harrison and Point Barrow. However, regular r e c i p i e n t s of government funds i n the form of family allowances and old-age pensions also have access to a source of power absent i n the t r a d i -t i o n a l economy. Successful fur trappers s i m i l a r l y constitute a new force to be reckoned with. These l a t t e r cases, mothers, pensioners, and trappers, must be considered i n the l i g h t of a l l the ambiguity the Iglulingmiut perceive i n f l u c t u a t i n g 10k fur p r i c e s , and the uneven administration of payments i n a d i f f i c u l t s e tting. In any case, generosity, perhaps combined with elements of conspicuous consumption, apparently continues as a normative aspect of the access to wealth (Stevenson, personal communication). (3) The treatment of sickness has presumably become a pressing issue i n l i g h t of the Iglulingmiut Ts exposure to many l e t h a l diseases during the contact period. The t r a d i t i o n a l curers, the shamans, appear to have succumbed to t h i s and other pressures and the supernatural as a source of power appears to have been severely discoun-ted, i f not wiped out. However, i t i s possible that the potency of t h i s source remains high i n areas other than curing (e.g., malevolence, prediction) and that the White presence has merely driven i t s practice underground. In short, the present economy i s i n many respects an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l which incorporates a number of innovations. The present economic context, l i k e the t r a d i t i o n a l , d i s t r i b u t e s resources unequally but widely: a l l have access to some resources, but some ind i v i d u a l s are more favoured than others, not only regarding a c c e s s i b i l i t y , but also i n terms of a b i l i t y to exploit resources f o r p o l i t i c a l ends. 105 3 . Social Organization The preceding sketch of the Iglulingmiut economy has provided a glimpse of a small-scale f l e x i b l e society constantly segmenting and reconstituting i n a seasonal exploitation of a severe but p o t e n t i a l l y bountiful environment. The f l e x i b i l i t y , movement and f l u i d i t y are immediately apparent and obviously r e l a t e d to ecological f a c t o r s , but what s o c i a l factors underlie t h i s mobile surface? It i s customary to begin an analysis of s o c i a l organization i n a small-scale society with a description of the kinship system. Indeed Radcliffe-Brown begins h i s Introduction to African Systems of Kinship and Marriage ( 1 9 5 0 : 1 ) with the view that: For the understanding of any aspect of the s o c i a l l i f e of an African people—economic, p o l i t i c a l or r e l i g i o u s — i t i s e s s e n t i a l to have a thorough knowledge of their system of kinship and marriage. This i s so obvious to any f i e l d anthropologist that i t hardly needs to be stated. Perhaps the inverse proposition i s more obvious today. A decade l a t e r , Leach ( i960:123-12*+) wrote of the Sinhalese of Northern Ceylon i t i s not so much that the Sinhalese order t h e i r economic l i v e s i n accord with kinship r e l a t i o n s as that their kinship r e l a t i o n s are an expression of the way i n which they order t h e i r economic l i v e s . . • s o c i a l 106 structures are sometimes best regarded as the s t a t i s t i c a l outcome of multiple i n d i v i d u a l choices rather than a d i r e c t r e f l e c t i o n of j u r a l r u l e s . Leach's l a s t remark suggests another p o s s i b i l i t y : that kinship r e l a t i o n s are, at l e a s t i n part, an expression of the way i n which people order their p o l i t i c a l l i v e s . In any case, Radcliffe-Brown's dictum points up the p r e v a i l i n g preoccupation with kinship i n s o c i a l anthropology, and s p e c i f i c a l l y with u n i l i n e a l systems of kinship, r e f l e c t e d i n the volume he introduces. The u n i l i n e a l bias i s made e x p l i c i t l a t e r i n the same introduc-ti o n when Radcliffe-Brown concludes: Cognatic ( i . e . , traced equally through males and females) systems are rare, not only i n A f r i c a but i n the world at large. The reasons have already been indicated: i t i s d i f f i c u l t to establish and maintain a wide-range system on a purely cognatic basis; i t i s only a u n i l i n e a l system that w i l l permit the d i v i s i o n of a society into separate organized kin-groups. ( 8 2 ) At almost the same time Radcliffe-Brown was writing t h i s , Murdock ( l9 1 +9) and Spoehr ( 1 9 5 0 ) were stressing the need f o r more study of non-unilineal struc-tures, and. Murdock pointed out that, f a r from being rare, 30 per cent of h i s sample of 250 s o c i e t i e s followed a "rule" of b i l a t e r a l descent ( 1 9 6 0 : 5 7 ) . Since then, the l i t e r a t u r e on cognatic systems has burgeoned ( c f . Goodenough 1955; Davenport 1 9 5 9 ; Murdock I 9 6 0 ; Freeman 1 9 6 l ; Blehr 1963) 107 and at the present time b i l a t e r a l organization i s one of the central concerns of s o c i a l anthropology. This point i s r e f l e c t e d i n the terminological confusion which presently characterizes b i l a t e r a l kinship studies ( c f . M i t c h e l l 1 9 6 3 ) . In spite of the massive l i t e r a t u r e on Eskimo culture, r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e information existed about Eskimo kinship systems u n t i l very recently. However, on the basis of scanty early reports, Spier ( 1 9 2 5 ) and Murdock (19^9) have proposed an "Eskimo type" of kinship system. Spier's type was confined to kinship terminology which he characterized thus: . . . cross and p a r a l l e l cousins are c a l l e d by the same cousin terms. There are four terms fo r parents' s i b l i n g s . Nepotic terms are usually man's brother's c h i l d , man's s i s t e r ' s c h i l d , woman's s i s t e r ' s c h i l d ; with woman's brother's c h i l d termed variously. Two terms f o r grandparents are used, "grandfather" and "grandmother", with one term for grandchild. Siblings are usually d i f f e r e n t i a t e d according to r e l a t i v e age (1925* 7 5 ) . Murdock*s "Eskimo type of s o c i a l organization" encompasses behavioral patterns and s o c i a l groupings as well as kinship terminology. In the Eskimo cousin terminology Fa Si Da and Mo Br Da (are) c a l l e d by the same terms as p a r a l l e l cousins but termino-l o g i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from s i s t e r s ; the terms fo r two cross-cousins are usually but not always the same ( l 9 * + 9 : 2 2 3 ) . By d e f i n i t i o n , the Eskimo type includes a l l so c i e t i e s with Eskimo cousin terminology and no exogamous u n i l i n e a l kin groups. In 108 addition . . . i t i s characterized by monogamy, independent nuclear f a m i l i e s , l i n e a l terms f o r aunts and nieces, the b i l a t e r a l extension of incest taboos, and the frequent presence of such b i -l a t e r a l kin groups as kindreds and demes, though these may often be unreported ( 1 9 ^ 9 : 2 2 7 ) . F i n a l l y , there i s normally a neolocal r u l e of marital residence. Subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n of Eskimo groups has revealed considerable deviation from these models ( c f . Giddings 1 9 5 2 ; Hughes 1 9 5 8 a ) . Damas* analysis of the Iglulingmiut kinship system i s a case i n point; i t w i l l be convenient to delineate t h i s system i n terms of i t s f i t with the above models. (a) Iglulingmiut Kinship Terminology (See Appendix I) Cousin terminology i s more complex than the Spier and Murdock models i n d i c a t e : opposite-sex s i b l i n g s and cousins are terminologically the same, but d i s t i n c t terms are used f o r younger s i b l i n g , older s i b l i n g , cross-cousin, m a t r i l a t e r a l p a r a l l e l cousin, and p a t r i l a t e r a l p a r a l l e l cousin of the same sex (Damas 1 9 6 3 * 3 5 )• Otherwise Spier's model i s adhered to ( i . e . , four avuncular terms, a four-phase nepotic system, two terms for grandparents, and one f o r grandchild) except that, as noted above, only same-sex s i b l i n g s are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , according to r e l a t i v e age. 109 Obviously the terminological system departs r a d i c a l l y from Murdock 1s model, s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the complex cousin terminology, and the avuncular and nepotic system, which i s not l i n e a l but bifurcate c o l l a t e r a l . In a more recent delineation of h i s Eskimo type, however, Murdock ( 1 9 6 0 : 6 ) has characterized the avuncular terminology as either l i n e a l or bifurcate c o l l a t e r a l , i . e . , no parental terms are extended to uncles or aunts. As reported by Damas ( ^ S O ^ - W , Iglulingmiut kinship terminology i s c l e a r l y symmetrical and b i l a t e r a l i n pattern. Consanguineal terms extend to the t h i r d ascending and t h i r d descending generation from ego's and i t s c o l l a t e r a l range appears to embrace second cousins, although the l i m i t s are not c l e a r l y demarcated ( 1 9 6 3 * 5 3 ) * Within t h i s personal kindred ( c f . Freeman 1961) l i n e a l and c o l l a t e r a l kin are c l e a r l y distinguished i n ego's generation (with the exception of opposite sex s i b l i n g s ) and the f i r s t ascending and descending generations. In the seven terminological generations, consanguineal terms are extended to a f f i n e s only i n the second and t h i r d ascending generations. A l l kin of ego are classed according to sex i n own and f i r s t and second ascending generations, and (own offspring excepted) according to the sex of the l i n k i n g r e l a t i v e i n the f i r s t descending generation. The emphasis on generation i s clear throughout most of the kindred terminology and i n ego's own generation 110 r e l a t i v e age of same-sex s i b l i n g s i s cle a r . Except at the second and t h i r d ascending generations, a f f i n a l terminology i s d i s t i n c t from con sang uinedl, and i t s l i m i t s are more c l e a r l y defined, extending only to spouse 1s f i r s t cousins, nieces and nephews, and ascending only to spouse's grandparents. F i n a l l y , the Iglulingmiut have, according to Damas ( 1 9 6 3 : 5 5 ) ? a single term f o r a l l r e l a t i v e s , con-sanguines as well as a f f i n e s , who f a l l within the terminologi-c a l network. This term i s ILAGIIT. However, on the basis of the kinship terminology and behavioral d i r e c t i v e s (see below), one would expect a categorical d i s t i n c t i o n between own and a f f i n a l kin. Stevenson (personal communication) suggests that there are probably two terms which sound almost i d e n t i c a l : ILAGIIT, f o r consanguines only, and ILIGIIT, for a l l kin, a f f i n a l and consangulneal. Damas has argued that because the Iglulingmiut appear to make no complete conceptual d i s t i n c t i o n between consanguineal and a f f i n a l r e l a t i v e s , the term "kindred" i n t h i s case might properly r e f e r to a l l of Ego's r e l a t i v e s ( c f . Freeman 1 9 6 1 ) . (b) Kinship Behavior Murdock*s twin c r i t e r i a of monogamy (or "lim i t e d polygamy") and the b i l a t e r a l extension of incest taboo appear to f i t Iglulingmiut kinship behavior; Although monogamy was usual i n e a r l i e r times, polygyny was practised. Par.ry (182*+: 5 2 8 ) mentions that twelve men (out of sixty adult males) had I l l two wives, while Mathiassen ( 1 9 2 8 : 1 7 - 1 9 ) records only-three polygynous marriages i n h i s 1921-2 Iglulingmiut census i n a t o t a l of f o r t y - f i v e marriages. Spouse exchange was also "common" during the early period (Mathiassen 1 9 2 8 : 2 1 1 ) ; however, since the advent of C h r i s t i a n i t y monogamy has become universal, and i f spouse-exchange p e r s i s t s , i t i s unacknowledged (Damas 1963:23-2*+; 5 2 ) . Incest taboo, i n the sense of marriage p r o h i b i t i o n , i s c l e a r l y b i l a t e r a l , but there appears to be some f l e x i b i l i t y i n i t s range. Lyon ( 1 8 2 4 : 3 5 3 ) reports that "cousins are allowed to marry, but a man w i l l not wed two s i s t e r s " , but Mathiassen ( 1 9 2 8 : 2 1 0 ) concludes that "brothers and s i s t e r s may marry" ( s i c ) and he knew of a man at Ponds Inlet who had married two s i s t e r s . According to Damas* older informants marriage was prohibited between a l l persons who f e l l within one another's terminological network, but the present i d e a l appears to be kindred exogamy (Damas 1963* 5*+). In practice, however, r e l a t i v e marriages are permitted within the Catholic segment of the population through dispensation, and i n f a c t do occur here, (but) t h i s practice i s p r a c t i c a l l y unknown i n the Anglican segment (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 1 0 9 ) . With regard to actual incest regulations, or the control of sexual r e l a t i o n s among kin, information i s lacking, but there i s evidently a looser regulation i n that area than i s found i n actual marriage control (Damas 1963*5*+). 112 •A useful -way of viewing the kinship terminology i s as a set of "role tags which make i t possible f o r a person to know what to expect from h i s kinsmen and what they expect from him" (Bohannan 1963:70). Other anthropolo-g i s t s (e.g., Davenport 1959, Edmonson 1958) prefer to view kinship as "status a s c r i p t i o n " . The point i s that a kinship system has implications for behavior i n more s p e c i f i c terms than the monogamy-exogamy t r a i t s outlined above. Damas (1963:46-57) i d e n t i f i e s several p r i n c i p l e s governing kinship behavior including respect, avoidance, joking, a f f e c t i o n , s o l i d a r i t y , and obedience. However, the key to the behavioral system, he suggests, i s the dual concept of UNGAYUK (affection) and NALARTUK (obedience) which the Iglulingmiut themselves use to describe status r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Certain relationships are e s s e n t i a l l y ungayuk, others nalartuk, with some rel a t i o n s h i p s displaying elements of both. Ungayuk r e l a t i o n s h i p s are confined to the kindred, ego's own consanguines, but nalartuk i s applied to consanguines as well as a f f i n e s , reaching i t s "quintessence" i n the l a t t e r category. Thus obedience may be expected v i s - a - v i s c e r t a i n consanguines, but i s tempered by a f f e c t i o n , whereas obedience to one's a f f i n e s i s unsoftened by the ungayuk p r i n c i p l e . Damas l i n k s the p r i n c i p l e of the " s o l i d a r i t y of the sexes" to the uneavuk p r i n c i p l e . Thus, male ego i s closer to 113 h i s brother than to h i s s i s t e r , closer to h i s p a t r i l a t e r a l p a r a l l e l male cousin than to h i s male cross cousin, and closer to h i s male cross cousin than to h i s m a t r i l a t e r a l p a r a l l e l cousin. Following the same p r i n c i p l e i n the adjacent generations, male ego i s closer to h i s father's s i s t e r than to h i s mother's s i s t e r , closer to h i s brother's ch i l d r e n than to h i s s i s t e r ' s children. For female ego the same a f f e c t i o n a l pattern following female l i n k s i s expected. Thus, following t h i s p r i n c i p l e , one's c o l l a t e r a l kin are i d e n t i f i e d with l i n e a l k i n , or as surrogates f o r parents, s i b l i n g s , or own children, with implications f o r degrees of assistance, cooperation and a f f e c t i o n . This s t r u c t u r a l arrangement, which i s congruent with the terminology^ i s complicated by the nalartuk p r i n c i p l e , which implies dominance and submission. Obedience i n general i s expected by male ego from those of descending generations, of lower r e l a t i v e age, and of females irrespec-t i v e of generation or r e l a t i v e age. Thus female ego i s close to her primary kin, but i s expected to defer to mother, father, younger and older brothers and older s i s t e r s ; t h i s a f f e c t i o n a l closeness-cum-respect i s extended i n an attenuated degree to her cousins. However, as indicated above, i t i s v i s - a - v i s spouse's consanguines that ego i s unequivocally subordinate. Thus, the in-marrying i n d i v i d u a l endures a powerless status and i s dominated by spouse's 1 1 4 terminologically d i s t i n c t i v e group. This subordination i s most c l e a r l y marked when males f u l f i l l t h e i r year of bride service at which time they are subject to the commands of wife's father and brother. Since residence i s normally v i r i l o c a l a f t e r t h i s time ( i . e . , residence i s matri-p a t r i l o c a l i n Murdock's terms) i t i s the married woman or d i n a r i l y who i s terminologically i d e n t i f i e d as subordinate. I t should be noted parenthetically that Murdock's neolocal . residence c r i t e r i o n , marital residence "independent of the loc a t i o n of the parental home of either partner, and perhaps even at a considerable distance from both" (Murdock 1 9 4 9 : 1 6 ) , does not f i t the Iglulingmiut s i t u a t i o n (see below under "Soci a l Groupings"). 1 Damas also notes the indulgence, informality and joking that characterize l i n e a l r e l a t i o n s between alternate generations (e.g., grandfather and grandson). Co-affines display cooperation and muted dominance i n their r e l a t i o n -ships and appear to constitute a "q u a s i - s i b l i n g " group. ( 1 9 6 3 : 5 1 ) This "terminological-behavioral" structure i s not, of course, i n v a r i a b l y r e f l e c t e d i n kinship behavior. 1 Dunning ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 2 ) has suggested that i t would perhaps be "more precise.to claim that no residence rule i s operative i n the case of either so-called n e o l o c a l i t y or b i l o c a l i t y . " 115 Different positions i n the l i f e cycle are r e f l e c t e d i n changing r e l a t i o n s h i p s : post-pubescent brothers and s i s t e r s •will display more mutual respect and avoidance than formerly; old men w i l l r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r r i g h t s to lead and decide to t h e i r maturing sons who hitherto obeyed them; older s i s t e r s w i l l act as mother substitutes to t h e i r young brothers. Personal idiosyncrasies can also play havoc with the system: r e b e l l i o u s children, i n d i f f e r e n t parents, indulgent in-laws, any of these are possible. In actual behavior, the closest ungayuk • (affectional} bonds appear to be those between father and son, mother and daughter, for besides the terminological d i r e c t i v e s , much of the s o c i a l i z a -t i o n of the young i s i n the hands of the same-sex* parent. Actual nalartuk (obedience) behavior, observed i n such cooperative a c t i v i t i e s as hunts and journeys, conformed most c l o s e l y to kinship expectations i n the case of son-in-law— father-in-law, and c o - a f f i n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , i . e . , the complementary ningauk-sakkiaq and aneayuneruk-nukaungruk rol e s ( 1 9 6 3 : 5 7 ) . Damas also reports that the Iglulingmiut themselves dis t i n g u i s h between the i d e a l and the actual i n kinship behavior. There i s present a rather f l u i d system of allegiance or non-allegiance to norms of behavior. The writer however, believes  that there i s perhaps a greater conformity  to norms of kinship behavior than the 116 Eskimos are themselves w i l l i n g to admit. An example of t h i s could be seen i n the v i l l a g e (Kapuivik) where I spent the longest stays during my f i e l d programme. There, one of my informants, aft e r i n -dicating the prescribed behavioural d i r e c t i v e s between him and h i s close male r e l a t i v e s i n the v i l l a g e and, as wel l , the patterns that should p r e v a i l among them, laughingly remarked that of course he and h i s close r e l a t i v e s did not follow such a system c l o s e l y . He expressed the often repeated sentiment of the I g l u l i g -miut [ s i c ] that the general f e e l i n g s of good-naturedness should be maintained i n contacts between r e l a t i v e s , and that no matter what dominance-subordinance hierarchy should be c a l l e d f o r , the l a t t e r should be secondary to the joking and warmth that should p r e v a i l i n cooperative enterprise ( 1963:57)> (my emphasis). The foregoing indicates the alternatives of regarding kinship patterns as a closed system, or as the s t a t i s t i c a l outcome of choices made i n the l i g h t of economic or p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s . Damas would appear to lean towards the f i r s t (which Murdock embraces). Within the present frame of reference, the second alternative appears to be the more f r u i t f u l . (c) Social Groupings The f i n a l c r i t e r i a completing Murdock 1s Eskimo type of s o c i a l organization are the absence of exogamous unilinear kin groups, the presence of independent nuclear f a m i l i e s , and such b i l a t e r a l kin groups as kindreds and demes. Murdock defines a deme as "an endogamous l o c a l kin group i n the absence of l i n e a r descent" ( 1 9 4 9 : 6 3 ) . A 117 kindred consists of an i n d i v i d u a l ' s recognized cognates; kindreds therefore "cannot form discrete or separate segments of the entire society" ( 1 9 ^ 9 : 6 0 ) . For t h i s reason, Freeman c a l l s the kindred a category rather than a group, which he distinguishes, however, from kindred-based groups, which may include friends and af f i n e s as well as members of one's kindred ( 1 9 6 1 : 2 0 2 ) . Blehr ( 1 9 6 3 ) has recently suggested the term k i t h f o r such action groups. Murdock apparently uses the term kindred i n both of these senses ( l 9 l + 9 : 5 6 - 5 7 , 6 0 ) . Damas' data on the Iglulingmiut only p a r t i a l l y agree with Murdock's c r i t e r i a : exogamous unilinear kin groups are absent, and the kindred ( i n both senses) i s present; but the deme, and independent nuclear f a m i l i e s do not characterise Iglulingmiut s o c i a l organization, as the following analysis w i l l attempt to show. As a preliminary, i t should be noted here that both Murdock and Damas use the term family i n the sense of a r e s i d e n t i a l group of kin ( i . e . , a household). Following Bohannan ( 1 9 6 3 : 8 6 ) the term family w i l l be used to designate a kinship group, and only t h i s ; household w i l l r e f e r to a group of persons occupying a r e s i d e n t i a l unit such as a tent, or snow-house, or a connected block of snow-houses. Thus a nuclear family consists of a conjugal pair and their children, an extended, family of two or more nuclear f a m i l i e s linked 118 d i r e c t l y by consanguineal t i e s (but not necessarily l i v i n g together). When an extended family, or other small aggrega-t i o n forms a residential/cooperative unit, (consisting of two or more households) ve s h a l l use the term, following Bohannan ( 1 9 6 3 : 9 8 ) and Dunning ( 1963 MS:2) "domestic group". The domestic group may occupy a c l u s t e r or compound of dwellings within a larger community, or i n i s o l a t i o n (e.g., a camp). Parry and Lyon provide our e a r l i e s t descriptions of Iglulingmiut households. Lyon ( l 8 2 lt : 2 8 0 ) mentions "sixteen adults and several children, arranged i n f a m i l i e s " , sharing the largest residence at I g l u l i k , while Parry ( 1 8 2 ^ : 5 0 0 ) says that when "several f a m i l i e s " resided under one roof, i t consisted usually of four domes. How usual t h i s pattern was i s not known. Mathiassen ( 1 9 2 8 : 1 2 5 - 1 2 8 ) describes snow-houses ranging from two-family single domes to blocks of i n t e r -connected domes occupied by as many as four nuclear f a m i l i e s . Rasmussen ( 1 9 2 9 ^ 6 ) describes a block of f i v e domes near Pt. Elizabeth occupied by a "large Eskimo family" consisting of eleven adults and f i v e children, the nucleus of which comprised a man and h i s married sons. From h i s survey of the early l i t e r a t u r e on the Eastern A r c t i c , Dunning (unpub. MS:5) t e n t a t i v e l y concludes that "throughout the 1 9 t h and early 2 0 t h centuries . . . the Eskimo resided f o r the most 119 part i n domestic groups of separate households averaging 4 . 6 houses and 5*6 f a m i l i e s per group. The l i t e r a t u r e mentions only r a r e l y cases of lone houses with single f a m i l i e s i n residence". These figures would point to the prevalence of single-family households but because of wide v a r i a t i o n i n the use of the term family one cannot conclude that these are necessarily nuclear. Furthermore, as Dunning acknowledges, the averaging process disguises s p a t i a l and temporal variat i o n s i n l o c a l group composition. Recently Damas ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 0 3 ) found twenty-five houses occupied by single nuclear f a m i l i e s and thirty-one dwellings housing extended f a m i l i e s , the l a t t e r comprising seventy-eight nuclear f a m i l i e s . But these figures disguise the domestic groups. Many of the nuclear family households are i n fac t l i v i n g close to other kin and cooperating intimately with them (e.g., sharing food, exchanging labour). Damas (1963:104) estimates that, on the basis of propinquity and cooperation, not more than a dozen of the 103 nuclear f a m i l i e s can be regarded as independent units, i . e . , most Iglulingmiut are presently l i v i n g i n extended family households and/or extended family domestic groups f o r most of the year. Moreover, through a combination of data supplied by Mathiassen ( 1 9 2 8 ) and informant r e c a l l , Damas was able to estimate that 6 5 per cent of the 1922 residence situations 120 were v i r i l o c a l , 67 per cent f o r the 19*+9 census, and 76 per cent for the 1961 aggregations (Damas 1 9 6 3 * 9 8 ) . Father-son and male s i b l i n g t i e s are e s p e c i a l l y prominent as factors f o r group cohesiveness, although the l a t t e r tend to s p l i t a f t e r the death of the father. Kinship endogamy (marriage within the termino-l o g i c a l network) has been, and remains, comparatively rare, with only one case i n the 1922 population, four i n 1949 > and six i n 1961 ( 1 9 6 3 : 9 8 ) . Local exogamy has been c l e a r l y predominant: only two marriages out of th i r t y - t h r e e which occurred between 1945 and i 9 6 0 were v i l l a g e endogamous, which renders Murdock's concept of the deme inappropriate. Damas concludes h i s survey of the composition of Iglulingmiut l o c a l groups thus: Throughout the forty-year period covered by my group composition data, . . . there was a continuous, or near continuous, connection of kin within most groups, the t i e s being of multiple sorts. Accordingly, ' b i l a t e r a l ! t y * rather than 'compositeness' i s t h e i r chief characterizing feature. . . . Throughout, the importance of the s i b l i n g bond i n genealogical u n i f i c a t i o n of the Igluligmiiit , [ s i c ] groups has been acknowledged ( 1 9 6 3 * 9 7 - 9 8 ; c f . Service's composite band characterization, Ch. I I ) . The purpose of the foregoing exposition of s o c i a l organization i s to provide contextual data relevant to sources of power available to the members of a s p e c i f i c community. We may now conclude with a summary of these features and attempt to r e l a t e them to the economic context considered above. 121 Ppwer JLQ Kinship 1. As i s the case everywhere, one's kin constitute a resource i n the sense that claims can be made on them fo r a i d and support. Thus the larger one's kindred, the greater one's resources, remembering of course, that claimants are subject to counter-claims. We have noted the mobility of Iglulingmiut groups as a response to ecol o g i c a l f a c t o r s . In the same way that groups locate where economic returns are promising, in d i v i d u a l s may be expected to locate where t h e i r kinship resources can be maximized, or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , that kinship t i e s w i l l be created (through marriage, or adoption) that are p o t e n t i a l l y rewarding. Thus residence, marriage, and adoption are p o l i t i c a l acts i n so fa r as they involve the a l l o c a t i o n of a source of power. 2. We have seen that power i s a b u i l t - i n aspect of ce r t a i n kinship statuses, while r e l a t i v e powerlessness attaches to c e r t a i n others. For present purposes, however, both the p r i n c i p l e s of uneayuk and nalartuk are relevant to the wielding of influence i n the decision-making process, f o r both types of relationships may be exploited for p o l i t i c a l ends. Within the perspective of kinship, women would normally appear to be at a disadvantage under the nalartuk (obedience) p r i n c i p l e (e.g., three out of four are long-term in-marrying a f f i n e s i n the predominantly v i r i l o c a l residence pattern) but t h i s d i s a b i l i t y would be to some extent offset when they bore children. 122 3. Offspring of either sex now constitute a more immediate source of power because of the payment of family allowances, but as agencies f o r widening kinship t i e s ( s p a t i a l l y as well as numerically) children constitute a p o t e n t i a l source of power. Boys continue to have the t r a d i t i o n a l advantage of eventually being able to contribute d i r e c t l y to t h e i r parents* welfare. k. Although post-contact economic d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n points to economic autonomy fo r the nuclear family (e.g., through government payments, wage labour, and fox-trapping) and through technological innovations which have increased i n d i v i d u a l returns i n the hunt, there i s s t i l l c l e a r l y a need f o r supra-familial cooperation. Families without boats need to attach themselves to those with boats, while boat-owners require crew members; i n case of l o c a l shortages, aid from more favoured kin elsewhere may be needed; t r a v e l l e r s require food and shelter i n other v i l l a g e s , and e s p e c i a l l y near the trading post on I g l u l i k Island where so many go throughout the year. The varying l e v e l s of cooperation at Kap.uivik w i l l be summarized below. Kapuivjk The v i l l a g e of Kapuivik was one of the largest aggregations i n the 1 9 6 l census, t o t a l l i n g approximately s i x t y i n d i v i d u a l s at i t s peaks during the annual cycle. Its l o c a t i o n on Jens Munk Island provides easy access to excellent 123 walrus s i t e s , as well as good trapping and hunting grounds on B a f f i n Island. Moreover, Kapuivik i s l e s s than forty-miles from the trading post on I g l u l i k Island. Damas selected t h i s community fo r h i s most intensive study and has recorded ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 1 7 - 1 2 3 ) i n considerable d e t a i l the fluctuations i n composition which occurred from August 1 , I 9 6 0 to August 1 , 1 9 6 1 . Figure 1 represents the composition of Kapuivik i n the spring of 1961 (Damas 1 9 6 3 : 1 2 0 ) when an important s i t u a t i o n developed which w i l l be discussed i n the following chapter. The following features should f i r s t be noted. 1 . With few exceptions (e.g., person 6 ) there i s a dominantly v i r i l o c a l pattern to the settlement continuing that established by the now-deceased brothers at the top of the chart. 2 . Every i n d i v i d u a l i n the settlement displays b i l a t e r a l l i n k s with every other i n d i v i d u a l , although not a l l inhabitants f a l l within any one person's terminological network. 3 . The v i l l a g e i s s p a t i a l l y and s o c i a l l y divided into two segments at the point where the l a t e r a l l i n k s are most tenuous ( i . e . , between 5*s wife and her brother 6 ) . Other kinship and pseudo-kinship bonds not revealed i n the chart l i n k the two segments but they are offset by current c o n f l i c t s . These l i n k s are: LOWER VILLAGE | = i \ r r A A A 1 I A - O if I o © 1 I I M l I I I N A A O A O A O ^ A = O O A A r A A O UPPER V I L L A G E A = 0 9 =r A =. © 15 1 n i r r i T /! i i i i i i / A = Q A==0 A — O A A O © / A = 0 © = A O A A O A © / 8 11 A A O O 0 & .'12 / / 1/ r r n O O A A O 13 o A KEY ^ jS^r Deceased A © Absent A d o p t i v e relationship ro - r FIGURE I . COMPOSITION OF KAPUIVIK, SPRING 1 9 b l . 125 (a) Person 9*s wife and 2 are aiyak-nubak to each other ( 9 , s wife and 2*s mother were adoptive second cousins), an ungayuk re l a t i o n s h i p which i d e a l l y creates a nineauk-sakkiaq (nalartuk) r e l a t i o n s h i p between 9 and 2 . (b) Person 1 0 , at present the adoptive daughter of 9 , i s a "distant r e l a t i v e " of k, and was formerly M s adoptive daughter. Persons k and 5 now give meat to 9 as compensation f o r keeping 1 0 . (c) Person 1 1 , now the adoptive son of 9» i s M s natural son, making k and 9 kittuwaneakattigiit ("those who share c h i l d r e n " ) . The s p a t i a l aspect of the v i l l a g e s p l i t takes the form of two compact domestic groups 200 yards apart. Consider able tension was observed between members of the two fa c t i o n s , and communication was minimal, confined at times to the Sunday morning (Anglican) prayer meetings at which person 9 o f f i c i a t e d . The s p l i t apparently resulted from a combination of factors which had been operative f o r some time, including the economic dependenc of M s extended family on 9 and lk (see below). Personal animosities are also involved. Whereas a l l the members of the Upper V i l l a g e segment f a l l within any one indiv i d u a l ' s terminological network, 126 such i s not the case i n the Lower V i l l a g e (e.g., person k i s terminologically isolated, from 1 and 2 ) . Regarding length of continuous residence, the s i b l i n g group 9 , 1*+ and 15 have clear precedence. Person 6 , although stigmatized as an inmarrying a f f i n e , has resided at Kapuivik since h i s marriage to 9 T s daughter i n 1951 and has prospered. Persons k, 1 , and 2 and t h e i r f a m i l i e s are recent a r r i v a l s at Kapuivik, k having four years residence, while 1 and 2 arrived only l a t e i n i 9 6 0 . The l i n e of segmentation c l e a r l y separates the entrenched residents from the recent immigrants. Since 1949> there have been two whaleboats i n the Upper V i l l a g e , both owned by person 9» When 9 acquired h i s larger second c r a f t , however, he gave the f i r s t to h i s younger brother Ik. Since the bulk of the meat f o r both men and dogs i s obtained by means of these boats, 9 and Ik have access to a c r i t i c a l source of power i n the economic sphere of the Upper V i l l a g e , and (before the a r r i v a l of 2 and h i s whaleboat) of M s domestic group. In the Lower V i l l a g e , there i s one whaleboat, smaller and l e s s powerful than 9*s second boat, owned by 2 . Upon 2*s a r r i v a l i n i 9 6 0 , k was able to switch alignment from 9 and Ik. 127 Cooperative a c t i v i t i e s i n Kapuivik are carr i e d out within a va r i e t y of s o c i a l units ranging from the nuclear family to the t o t a l v i l l a g e . These cooperative units and the associated a c t i v i t i e s may be summarized b r i e f l y as follows: (a) The nuclear family unit t y p i c a l l y c a r r i e s out such tasks as reproduction, c h i l d r a i s i n g , and food and clothing preparation, with the burden f a l l i n g mainly on the mother. Even i n extended family households separate cooking f a c i l i t i e s f o r each nuclear family are usual. Although assistance from kin outside the nuclear family i s provided i n many instances, the conjugal pair are responsible f o r these tasks. (b) Extended family households and domestic groups. Most seals are shared at t h i s l e v e l and there i s no expectation of wider sharing unless unequal success i n the hunt works a hardship on some, i n which case seal sharing i s extended to the segmental or v i l l a g e l e v e l . Caribou skins are also d i s t r i b u t e d within t h i s unit, but as with seal, wider sharing i s sometimes practised. Income from fox furs or government subsidies, on the other hand, i s shared only among members of the extended family. A d i v i s i o n of labour operates at t h i s l e v e l : while one male i s sealing, another may be repairing a sledge, and a t h i r d tending a tr a p - l i n e . (c) The v i l l a g e segment. Cooperation at the segmental l e v e l centres around the economically s i g n i f i c a n t whaleboat a c t i v i t i e s which include the summer walrus hunt, the l a t e summer caribou hunt, and the f a l l walrus hunt. It i s i n the course of these hunts that the bulk of the year's meat i s secured. Each segment maintains i t s own meat caches, v i s i t s to the caches are made exclusively by members of the appropriate segment, and sharing of the meat i s intra-segmental. (d) A l j - v i l l a g e cooperation has been rare since the schism developed. The prayer meetings apparently bring about a measure of v i l l a g e s o l i d a r i t y . Communal feasts, given by family heads, at which fresh caribou or beluga meat i s consumed, and the village-wide sharing of walrus meat taken through the sea-ice s i m i l a r l y unite the fa c t i o n s . But segment members usually form separate hunt parties on the sea-ice. The nuclear family, extended family, segment, and t o t a l v i l l a g e could be treated as p o l i t i c a l units i n the power-decision framework; however, i n the following chapter the emphasis w i l l be on the wider units, the t o t a l v i l l a g e and i t s segments. CHAPTER V POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AT KAPUIVIK It was stated e a r l i e r that Kapuivik was selected f o r a demonstration of Eskimo p o l i t i c a l organization because of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of data. Some of that data has been outlined i n the previous chapter; but Damas has gone further, providing an analysis of "the i d e a l and actual authority structures" at Kapuivik i n economic matters ( 1 9 6 3 : Ch. VI). As a preliminary to the exposition of the p o l i t i c a l organization i n Kapuivik, I s h a l l outline Damas1 analysis and indicate i t s l i m i t a t i o n s . Although Damas does not e x p l i c i t l y define authority, he equates i t with leadership (1963:149), and conceives of i t i n terms of superordinate-subordinate relationships ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 4 ) . His i d e a l authority network rests exclusively on kinship r e l a t i o n s h i p s , s p e c i f i c a l l y the nalartuk-uneavuk d i r e c t i v e s involved i n these kinship r e l a t i o n s h i p s . On the other hand, the actual authority network i s arrived at by considering other power sources (e.g., personality f a c t o r s , wealth, pseudo-kinship) and observed behavior (e.g., b u l l y i n g , deference, condescension). . Using degrees of sloping l i n e s to indicate degrees of dominance, Damas diagrams the i d e a l authority structure 130 at Kapuivik ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 5 , 165) as indicated i n Figures 2 and 3 . The only cross-segmental kinship r e l a t i o n s h i p s involve persons 2 and 5 i n the Lower V i l l a g e , 2 being i d e a l l y dominant to 9 , 5 being i d e a l l y subordinate to 6 . As Damas points out ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 6 ) 2 and 9 are i d e a l l y sakkiaq-nineauk to each other because of the adoptive cousin r e l a t i o n s h i p between 2 * 5 mother and 9*s wife. But, 2 and 9 are also consanguines (9 i s 2 Ts MoFaBrSo) creating an uvuruk-aqak rel a t i o n s h i p which i d e a l l y combines respect and informality. Thus one d i r e c t i v e tends to n u l l i f y the other. Persons 5 and 6 are i d e a l l y ningauk-sakkiaq to each other, but t h i s re l a t i o n s h i p i s , l i k e a l l the others, influenced by other non-kinship f a c t o r s . As the diagrams in d i c a t e , i d e a l l y the nalartuk p r i n c i p l e places persons 2 and 9 i n dominant positions i n t h e i r respective segments of Kapuivik. The actual authority structure (Figures 5 and 6 ) r e f l e c t s a combination of kinship and non-kinship factors ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 6 0 , 1 6 5 ) . In the case of the Lower Village,, the r e l a t i v e positions of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s remains v i r t u a l l y the same as before, the only difference being that a l l i n d i v i d u a l s are now linked to 4 , who i s ascendant on the basis of the power sources indicated. In the Upper V i l l a g e , the only s i g n i f i c a n t difference between the i d e a l and actual structures concerns the actual lower r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n of person 12 whom Damas terms a " d r i f t e r " . 1 3 1 FIGURE I I . LOWER VILLAGE IDEAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE 5 3 -5 and 3 a r e h1s s o n s -3 and 1 a r e 2' s i n - m a r r y i n g a f f i n e s -5 i s 3's o l d e r s i b l i n g -1 and 5 a r e c o - a f f i n e s ; ; o f t h e two c o n s a n g u i n e a l l y r e l a t e d w i v e s , l ' s i s t h e o l d e r FIGURE I I I . UPPER VILLAGE IDEAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE L.-iJ -9 i s o l d e r s i b l i n g t o II4., . u n c l e t o 13, f a t h e r - i n la v ; t o b, a d o p t i v e f a t h e r t o 12, f a t h e r t o 7and 8 -II4. i s f a t h e r t o 13, u n c l e t o 7 and 8, a d o p t i v e u n c l e t o 12, 6's w i f e ' s c o n s a n g u i n e -7 i s 8' c o u s i n , s o l d e r s i b l i n g , 13's o l d e r m a l e - l i n k e d s . o l d e r a d o p t i v e s i b l i n g 12' •15 -12 -6 i s 9 and 1SJ,X s y o u n g e r a d o p t i v e b r o t h e r was a d o p t e d f i r s t b y 9's u n c l e , u p o n whose d e a t h 12 was r e - a d o p t e d by 9; t h i s f o r m o f a d o p t i o n d o e s n o t i m p l y c l o s e t i e s , i s a n i n m a r r y i n g a f f i n e 132 IGURS IV. LOWER VILLAGE ACTUAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE 1 I4. has the l o n g e s t r e s i d e n c e , heads the l a r g e s t , most m a t u r e s , extended f a m i l y , i s t w e l v e y e a r s o l d e r t h a n 2, tends t o be an a g g r e s s i v e and d o m i n e e r i n g p e r s o n w i t h i n t h e Lower V i l l a g e c o n t e x t but i s not an e s p e c i a l l y e n e r g e t i c t r a p p e r . 2 owns a w h a l e b o a t , heads a l a r g e but immature n u c l e a r f a m i l y , tends t o be s e l f - e f f a c i n g and e c o n o m i c a l l y n a i v e , but i s an e n e r g e t i c h u n t e r and t r a p p e r . 5 heads a growing n u c l e a r f a m i l y , has a pseudo-c o u s i n r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 2 t o whom 5> i s c l o s e i n age. 1 i s o l d e r than 2, has been c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h him f o r a number of y e a r s and i s a l s o the a d o p t i v e b r o t h e r of 2's f a t h e r , (making 1 agaksaq t o 2) ' 3 i s younger t h a n 5 , has no c h i l d r e n , but i s an e n e r g e t i c and p e r s i s t e n t t r a p p e r . 133 IGURE V. UPPER VILLAGE ACTUAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE 9 owns a l a r g e , p o w e r f u l w haleboat, i s the o l d e s t head of the l a r g e s t , most mature, extended f a m i l y , has the l o n g e s t l o c a l r e s i d e n c e , i s . t h e r e l i g i o u s ( A n g l i c a n ) l e a d e r o f the community, i s h i g h l y i n t e l l i g e n t and i s d i g n i f i e d , somewhat a r i s t o c r a t i c i n demeanour. II4. owns a w h a l e b o a t , shares 9's l e n g t h of r e s i d e n c e , heads a l a r g e but immature extended f a m i l y and i s a widower. 15 has no c h i l d r e n , i s younger than 9 o r II4.. 13 i s an o l d e s t son, but has o n l y one d a u g h t e r , i s handicapped by d e a f n e s s and poor h e a l t h , i s f r e o x u e n t l y under o b s e r v a t i o n a t a TB s a n i t a r i u m . 7 i s an o l d e s t son of an o l d e s t son (9), heads a growing n u c l e a r f a m i l y , a n d i s a h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l t r a p p e r . r 6 i s a m o d e r a t e l y s u c c e s s f u l t r a p p e r , but i s o f t e n i s o l a t e d by h i s w i f e ' s c o n s a n g u i n e s , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f 9. 8 i s a top t r a p p e r but has o n l y one d a u g h t e r 12 moves about a g r e a t d e a l , d i v i d i n g h i s time between h i s a d o p t i v e k i n a t K a p u i v i k , h i s w i f e ' s k i n a t M a n i r t u g and h i s n a t u r a l consanguines elsewhere.• FIGURE VI. KAPUIVIK ACTUAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURE 9 d e c r e e s t h a t a l l t h r e e b o a t s s h a l l b e g i n t h e h u n t , d e c i d e s t h a t sea and w e a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s a r e r i g h t f o r the h u n t , i s s u e s i n t e r s e g m e n t a l o r d e r s d u r i n g communal h u n t i n g on t h e s e a - i c e , o r g a n i z e d and s u p p l i e d d o g - f o o d f o r a s u p p o r t p a r t y r e c r u i t e d from Lower V i l l a g e . 6 and 5's c o n t a c t s t o o r a r e t o s t r u c t u r e . 135 The two segmental structures are combined s o l e l y on the basis of 9 ls occasional influence on members of the Lower V i l l a g e , 5 and 6*s contacts being too infrequent to structure. Person 9*s many sources of power ac t u a l l y reverse the kinship d i r e c t i v e I d e a l l y a f f e c t i n g the rela t i o n s h i p between 2 and 9« Damas ( 1 9 6 3* ch. VI passim.) c i t e s the following behavioral data to support h i s s t r u c t u r a l analysis of actual authority. Lower V i l l a g e Person k i s swaggering and boastful, and p e r s i s -t e n t l y claims to be the Kapuivik ISSUMATAQ i n 9*s absence. During walrus hunts i n 2*s boat, k as steersman issues commands to the entire crew, including 2 who i s usually the engineer. Person *+ ha b i t u a l l y r i d i c u l e s 2 , whom he regards as inept, and sometimes orders 2 from Damas1 house so that he (*+) can t a l k to Damas i n private. Person h i s "concerned greatly with h i s prestige rating as compared with 9 and Ik" but shows l i t t l e concern about 2 . On cold days, k and h i s eldest son 5 stay home while h i s younger son 3 tends a t r a p - l i n e . Person 2 i s an energetic and successful hunter and trapper, but he i s careless with equipment, much of which he appears to have in h e r i t e d from h i s father who was at one time the region's foremost trapper. By forgetting 136 the l o c a t i o n of a meat cache i n the spring of 1 9 6 l he caused much hardship i n the Lower V i l l a g e . He i s consistently bettered i n economic transactions with other Eskimos. Damas sums 2 up as "one of the few r e a l l y obsequious Iglulingmiut that I knew". Upper V i l l a g e Person 9 emerges as the Upper V i l l a g e ISSUMATAQ according to Damas, but whether or not 9 i s c a l l e d by t h i s term by the members of the Upper V i l l a g e , Damas does not indi c a t e . Person 9 was observed to give commands i n various contexts: as captain of h i s large boat, while hunting on the sea i c e . Person 9 would ceremoniously mount a h i l l , observe the sea and "decree" that the three boats should begin the walrus hunt. Damas indicates however that 9*s " a r i s t o c r a t i c demeanour" (not h i s authority) causes resentment among the members of the Upper V i l l a g e , p a r t i -c u l a r l y i n h i s younger brother, lk, who i s apparently jealous of 9*s p o s i t i o n , but depends on h i s extended family as a source of manpower for h i s boat crew. Person lk i s , f o r example, quick to point out that he catches more seals than 9» The Total V i l l a g e In the spring of 1 9 6 1 , 9 organized a support party from the members of the Lower V i l l a g e f o r which 9 supplied the necessary dog food. The Lower V i l l a g e was at 137 t h i s time short of meat. At other times, however, 9 l s decisions are ignored by members of the Lower V i l l a g e , " e s p e c i a l l y i n matters of no great concern to the v i l l a g e as a whole". In summary, 9*s p o s i t i o n at the head of an economically s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t kinship unit consisting of h i s sons, son-in-law, and th e i r wives and ch i l d r e n , gives him access to sources of power unmatched by any other i n d i v i d u a l at Kapuivik. His brother 1 4 , although owning a boat, depends on h i s brother*s extended family f o r manpower. In the Lower V i l l a g e , 2 i s s i m i l a r l y dependent on M s extended family f o r crew-recruitment, and h apparently c a p i t a l i z e s on t h i s source of power and exploits i t more e f f e c t i v e l y than 2 does h i s boat ownership. In the l i g h t of the power-decision framework used i n t h i s paper, the foregoing analysis displays c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s as an exposition of p o l i t i c a l organization. As was h i s stated i n t e n t i o n , Damas has explored cooperation and authority mainly within the scope of economic a c t i v i t y . Although he has considered a va r i e t y of power sources as well as some situational-behavioral data, the kinship-s t r u c t u r a l i s t orientation pervades the analysis; underlying i t are a number of i m p l i c i t assumptions. These assumptions are r e f l e c t e d i n some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features of the analysis. It should be noted 138 immediately that a l l women and unmarried males are excluded from the authority network and t h i s exclusion apparently flows from Damas* conviction regarding the potency of kinship d i r e c t i v e s (see above, p. 1 0 3 ) i n behavior ( i . e . , the nalartuk p r i n c i p l e follows sex and age l i n e s ) . Furthermore, the authority structure presented i s e s s e n t i a l l y a hierarchy. Damas i s interested i n "ultimate leadership", the assumption being that there i s a highest authority, a generalized leader. Related to thi s i s the f a m i l i a r equation of leadership and t i t l e or o f f i c e , i n t h i s case, that of ISSUMATAQ'. F i n a l l y , the authority process i s conceived as a u n i l a t e r a l flow of command from the top of the hierarchy down. Some of these assumptions have been considered elsewhere i n t h i s paper, but I s h a l l deal with them i n turn as they r e l a t e to the case of Kapuivik. Having constructed two hierarchies of married males, an i d e a l and an actual authority network, Damas concludes: The l i n e s of authority i n the upper v i l l a g e are then almost exactly as they had been diagrammed on the chart, showing the i d e a l pattern f o r that group, thus i n d i c a t i n g the e f f i c i e n c y of kinship considerations i n  determining the co-operative and authority  structure of t h i s segment ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 6 2 , my emphasis). Damas here mistakes c o r r e l a t i o n f o r causation. Furthermore the argument i s t a u t o l o g i c a l : Damas had already assumed the 1 3 9 e f f i c i e n c y of kinship d i r e c t i v e s , h i s p r i o r ( i d e a l ) construct was based on t h i s assumption, and the subsequent considera-t i o n of other sources of power and situational-behavioral data merely served to modify somewhat, but e s s e n t i a l l y support, the p r i o r construct. The h i e r a r c h i c a l structures are based almost exclusively on sources of power, p a r t i c u l a r l y those of kinship, and consequently they end up being e s s e n t i a l l y prestige ratings for the married males of Kapuivik. The point has been made before that a consideration of power sources alone, although highly relevant to p o l i t i c a l organization, can at best indicate only p o t e n t i a l power rather than "actual" power at work. Nevertheless, these single, monolithic structures are assumed to have predictive value i n a l l economic situ a t i o n s . The amount of s i t u a t i o n a l -behavioral data i s small, and serves merely to i l l u s t r a t e conclusions already reached rather than to provide a basis f o r generalization. No decisions are examined i n process. The single hierarchy with a dominant officeholder, the ISSUMATA®, at the top would appear to r e f l e c t a quest f o r a kind of formal government at Kapuivik, roughly p a r a l l e l l i n g other formal hierarchies or power structures found elsewhere. The point was made much e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper that o f f i c e s are merely another source of power among many, and that e f f e c t i v e influence over decisions does not necessarily go to the officeholder. iko F i n a l l y , leadership viewed as a u n i l a t e r a l flow of command ignores the wide d i s t r i b u t i o n of sources of power i n Kapuivik, and the need to r e l a t e leadership to s p e c i f i c situations which redefine the r e l a t i v e importance of the many sources of power. In short, Damas provides a generalized, non-s p e c i f i c authority structure f o r the economic scope at Kapuivik which r e l i e s heavily on a single p r i n c i p l e (nalartuk); t h i s the Kapuivingmiut themselves regard as an i d e a l which, among others, they may choose to disregard. The most complete analysis of an i n f l u e n t i a l i s person 9 , the ISSUMATAQ. His many sources, and means of power (e.g., "decrees", g i f t s , payments) have been indicated. The ultimate extension of h i s power i n the economic scope i s indicated i n Figure VI, and there are suggestive points about the amount, costs, and strength of h i s influence. Regarding strength, f o r example, one could speculate about the possible costs to 1*+ of defying 9'. But the p o r t r a i t of 9 i s generalized and s t a t i c , and p o l i t i c a l organization i s a s p e c i f i c process. F i n a l l y , the words of person 2 might be c i t e d as they.bear on the monostructural approach to influence. Referring to person k9 2 said to Damas that "sometimes Qayakjuaq i s ISSUMATAQ and sometimes not ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 9 ) " . Ikl Person 2 implied that sometimes he himself was ISSUMATAQ, depending on the s i t u a t i o n . A serious s i t u a t i o n , with enormous p o l i t i c a l implications, arose at Kapuivik i n the spring of 1 9 6 l . Damas reports that the walrus stores of the lower v i l l a g e became depleted while the upper v i l l a g e s t i l l had un-tapped caches. Rather than borrow meat from the upper v i l l a g e and thus place themselves i n a p o s i t i o n of debt to the other segment, they fought to keep their dogs fed through strenuous e f f o r t s to catch seals by the UTUQ method. This attempt was only p a r t l y successful, and t h e i r animals missed many a meal i n the spring of 1 9 6 1 . In f a c t , the anthropologist had planned to h i r e a sledge from the lower v i l l a g e for a t r i p to another v i l l a g e but was t o l d that that would be possible only i f the next days 1 seal hunts were p a r t i c u l a r l y successful ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 4 ) . Damas5 uses th i s incident to i l l u s t r a t e the i n t e n s i t y of.the schism between the two segments. He also points out elsewhere ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 5 8 ) that at t h i s time 2 had forgotten the lo c a t i o n of a f u l l cache which was not d i s -covered u n t i l the summer hunt had begun. I t was also about t h i s time that person 9 organized and supplied a support party, composed of men from the Lower V i l l a g e , but whether or not t h i s was intended to r e l i e v e the s i t u a t i o n i n the Lower V i l l a g e i s not known. Thus, a serious issue faced the Lower V i l l a g e members and there would appear to have been a number of alternatives f o r meeting i t , some of which are suggested Ik2 above: borrowing from the other segment, or organizing a support party. S t i l l other alternatives were probably perceived, as Damas confirms. A t h i r d a lternative unsuccessfully t r i e d at that time was borrowing from other v i l l a g e s . Most of the other v i l l a g e s had l i t t l e to spare but, personality factors may have been involved i n r e f u s a l to give meat to the lower v i l l a g e Kapuivigmiut (personal communication). The p o s s i b i l i t y of some members leaving the Lower V i l l a g e may also have been considered, perhaps to stay with nearby kin, or to make a dash to the trading post on I g l u l i k Island. Each of the alternatives involved c e r t a i n r i s k s or costs as well as rewards. The es s e n t i a l point, however, i s that decisions were effected to meet t h i s s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n and that c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s were i n f l u e n t i a l i n the process. The decision to avoid borrowing from the Upper V i l l a g e was apparently binding on the Lower V i l l a g e segment i n spite of the heavy costs (e.g., starvation of dogs) involved. It would appear that k, because of h i s ambition and animosity, was the most l i k e l y i n f l u e n t i a l i n t h i s l a t t e r respect, but i t must be remembered that boat crews were inoperative at the time and k had l o s t an important source of power over 2. Nevertheless, Damas speculates that k was, considering personality f a c t o r s , the primary i n f l u e n t i a l and that the means used was "something approaching b u l l y i n g , on the basis of my knowledge of M s 143 character" (personal communication). Person 2 was apparently i n an unenviable p o s i t i o n because of h i s forgetfulness, but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to conceive of only one person knowing and being held responsible for the location of a meat cache. As was indicated e a r l i e r , t h i s s i t u a t i o n greatly increased the p o t e n t i a l strength of 9*s power over the lower segment, and he may have exploited the lowered cost circumstances to extend h i s influence and simultaneously provide acceptable aid to the members of the Lower V i l l a g e . In f a c t , much of t h i s speculation may be wide of the mark f o r too many in d i v i d u a l s have been ignored. Actual observation of the decision-making process might have yielded a quite d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , but unfortunately Damas did not become aware of the shortage u n t i l he t r i e d to h i r e a sledge. Equally t a n t a l i z i n g leads to other p o l i t i c a l situations are provided, however. E a r l y i n the summer of 1961 a young suitor for a daughter of 14 arrived and, by the time Damas l e f t Kapuivik i n August, Ik had given h i s approval, but the g i r l had not ( 1 9 6 3 : 1 6 2 ) . As Damas points out, the p o s i t i o n of Ik regarding manpower was considerably improved by the s u i t o r 1 s presence, and as a step towards l M s eventual emancipation from h i s older brother 9 , 14 would be l i k e l y to prolong the wait as long as possible ( i . e . , the g i r l ' s r e f u s a l might have been inspire d by her ikk f a t h e r ) . On the other hand, lk may have wanted the suitor committed to h i s year's bride-service as soon as possible but had h i s decision f o i l e d by a stubborn daughter. Person 2 was s i m i l a r l y i n a better p o s i t i o n v i s - a -v i s k during the summer when two of 2*s mature kinsmen arrived and helped to crew h i s boat. Person M s p o s i t i o n was seriously jeopardized: one of h i s sons (3) i n fa c t went over to crew f o r lk, and two others, including 5 and h i s family, moved to the north shore of Murray Maxwell Bay (1963:122), Nevertheless, there were s t i l l i ndications that k dominated 2, for the l a t t e r t o l d Damas that he wanted to set up at Siurakjuk the following September but f e l t obligated to see that k and h i s family were not l e f t h elpless (1963:159). In short, the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power sources had been altered over time, but what changes t h i s would mean i n terms of e f f e c t i v e influence i n decision-making i s not known; indeed, i t i s not known for the period under analysis. Conclusion The case of Kapuivik, l i k e the f i v e cases examined i n Chapter I I I , i l l u s t r a t e s how a lack of recorded data fr u s t r a t e s a reasonably v a l i d analysis of p o l i t i c a l organiza-t i o n . Moreover, i t i s very l i k e l y that the kind of data demanded by the power-decision framework does not exi s t i n i*+5 f i e l d notes or the ethnologist's memory. As Damas explains, a f t e r speculating about the i n f l u e n t i a l s involved i n the meat shortage s i t u a t i o n : There i s much guess-work involved here, as I did not research the s i t u a t i o n along the l i n e s that you are structuring i t (personal communication). Unless one s p e c i f i c a l l y seeks out the relevant data and asks the r i g h t questions, p o l i t i c a l organization as i t has been defined here w i l l remain a nebulous impression. How-ever, Damas has demonstrated, i n spite of the l i m i t a t i o n s indicated above, that behavior i n the economic scope conforms to ah order or pattern and that t h i s ordering i s related to the wielding of influence. This again i s the purpose of the f i v e cases i n Chapte_r..III. Furthermore, i t would appear that approaches to p o l i t i c a l organization that i n i t i a l l y u t i l i z e such abstract constructs as s o c i a l structure (Damas), f o l k society ( V a l l e e ) , family l e v e l of integration (Steward) or composite band (Service) do not y i e l d r e l i a b l e , empirically testable propositions about p o l i t i c a l organization. A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t i s suggested here that the present analytic framework applied to observable behavior w i l l y i e l d more v a l i d r e s u l t s . Applied to a l i m i t e d range of recorded data the power-decision framework has proven to be useful as a guide to what to look f o r . More importantly, i t indicates what i s not known, and suggests procedures f o r researching the relevant areas. li+6 These points might be b r i e f l y i l l u s t r a t e d by means of the s i t u a t i o n at Kapuivik involving the shortage of meat. The s i t u a t i o n could be researched through d i r e c t observation or informant r e c a l l , or a combination of these, along the following l i n e s . 1« The Nature of the Issue What people are d i r e c t l y involved, i n what ways? (e.g., Exhaustion of caches threatens the welfare of every member of the Lower V i l l a g e . Person 2 i s d i r e c t l y implicated, apparently held responsible. Upper V i l l a g e members are i n -d i r e c t l y involved i n so f a r as there i s pressure on them to help.) 2. Alternative P o l i c i e s What means of dealing with the issue are raised by those involved either i n word or action? Which individuals support and/or oppose which alternatives i n what ways? How are the alternatives communicated? What are the reasons given for support and/or opposition? (e.g., For the alterna-tives of borrowing from the other segment, or from other v i l l a g e s , organizing a support party, increasing UTUQ sealing e f f o r t s and s p l i t t i n g the lower segment a l i g n the part i c i p a n t s i n terms of opposition and support. Person k may have strenuously opposed borrowing from the Upper V i l l a g e , but favoured the UTUQ solution f o r personal reasons, and cajoled, threatened or blustered to win h i s p o i n t ) . Ik? 3. Decisions What alternatives are actually effected with what re s u l t s ? (e.g., Borrowing from other v i l l a g e s , and UTUQ solution t r i e d , the f i r s t with t o t a l lack of success, the l a t t e r with only moderate success). What costs and rewards are involved, and how are they distributed? (e.g., Loss of dogs, hunger; debt to Upper V i l l a g e avoided, autonomy retained, segment maintained). I n f l u e n t i a l s Those who successfully promoted e f f e c t i v e decisions or opposed the formal decisions are the i n f l u e n t i a l s i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n . It i s these people whose power dimensions need to be c a r e f u l l y considered, both i n a general (potential) sense, and i n the s p e c i f i c (exploited) sense of the s i t u a t i o n . 5« Other Situations Following through a number of decision situations i n a v a r i e t y of scopes would make possible the discovery of recurring patterns and relationships between the power variabl e s . A power structure constructed on t h i s basis ( i . e . , actual, e f f e c t i v e i n f l u e n t i a l s ) would presumably have greater p r e d i c t i v e value than one based on who might or ought to be i n f l u e n t i a l s . CHAPTER VI THE STRUCTURAL BIAS IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS It was suggested i n Chapter I that much of the anthropological l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i t i c a l organization displays a preoccupation for such problems as warfare, dispute settlement, sanctions and p o l i t i c a l units. This orientation i s perhaps best exemplified i n African P o l i t i c a l Systems (Fortes, Evans-Pritchard 19^0) which a r t i c u l a t e d a highly i n f l u e n t i a l approach to the comparative study of p o l i t i c a l organization. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n f l u e n t i a l were the Preface by Radcliffe-Brown, and the Introduction by the book's editors, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard. Among other things, the editors designated a typology of p o l i t i c a l systems based on the c r i t e r i o n of government ("centralised authority, administra-t i v e machinery, and j u d i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s " ) • Those so c i e t i e s possessing a government were termed "states", those without a government were c a l l e d "stateless s o c i e t i e s " . The l a t t e r r e s i d u a l category i s then subdivided i n t o s o c i e t i e s i n which: (a) p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s are coterminous with kinship r e l a t i o n s (b) a lineage structure i s the framework of the p o l i t i c a l system (19^0:6-7). li+9 Only two of these three types are i l l u s t r a t e d i n the essays that f o l l o w — s t a t e s and lineage systems. The f a m i l i s t i c type, however i s said to be found i n those very small s o c i e t i e s . . . i n which even the largest p o l i t i c a l unit embraces a group of people a l l of whom are united to one another by t i e s of kinship. • • • the p o l i t i c a l structure and kinship organiza-t i o n are completely fused. Further, the kinship type of p o l i t i c a l system would seem to be incapable of uniting such large numbers of persons into a single organization f o r defence and the settlement of disputes by a r b i t r a t i o n as a lineage system . . . . (1940:6-7). This approach to p o l i t i c a l organization based on a s t r u c t u r a l c r i t e r i o n and the r e s u l t i n g typology of p o l i t i c a l systems raises enormous problems, not the lea s t of which i s the lack of c r i t e r i a f o r determining what i s or i s not p o l i t i c a l organization. Such problems as the formal l i m i t s of a p o l i t i c a l unit, the kind of kinship system, the functions of government and the mechanics of dispute settlement would appear to flow from some basic conception of what p o l i t i c a l organization embraces. Instead, the editors omit any consideration of t h i s question, and the reader must turn to Radcliffe-Brown 1s much quoted Preface to the same volume, i n which he examines the nature of p o l i t i c a l organization. 150 The p o l i t i c a l organization of a society i s that aspect of the t o t a l organization which i s concerned with the control and regulation of the use of physical force ( 1 9 ^ 0 : x x i i i ) . Given a network of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ("the t o t a l organization"), those aspects of the r e l a t i o n s that deal with "the control and regulation of the use of physical force" may be construed as " p o l i t i c a l " . Leaving aside the concern with force f o r a moment, consider a somewhat d i f f e r e n t reading of p o l i t i c a l organization by R a d c l i f f e -Brown i n the same Preface. In studying p o l i t i c a l organization we have to deal with the maintenance or e s t a b l i s h -ment of s o c i a l order within a t e r r i t o r i a l framework, by the organized exercise of coercive authority through the use, or the p o s s i b i l i t y of use, of physical force , ( 1 9 ^ 0:xiv). Whereas the i n i t i a l d e f i n i t i o n i s functional and a n a l y t i c , the second introduces a s t r u c t u r a l concern implied i n the phrase "the organized exercise of coercive authority" (Easton 1 9 5 9 : 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 ) and the d e f i n i t i o n i s further burdened with a t e r r i t o r i a l r e q u i s i t e . Thus committed to a formal-structural conception of p o l i t i c a l organization, Radcliffe-Brown Is forced to argue l a t e r that a more c a r e f u l examination of apparently spontaneous lynchings of habitual offenders among the Bantu Kavirondo (reported by Wagner i n the same volume, 1 9 7 - 2 3 8 ) would reveal that these actions "were directed by leaders who had 151 some measure of recognized authority" (I940:xv). Since i t i s p r e c i s e l y the absence of such recognized authority and j u d i c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , or "government", that Fortes and Evans-Pritchard used to designate "stateless s o c i e t i e s " , i t i s not surprising that they f a i l to endorse R a d c l i f f e -Brown's view of p o l i t i c a l organization. Radcliffe-Brown*s other c r i t e r i o n , the use or threat of p h y s i c a l force within a p o l i t i c a l unit (law), and without (war), represents a well-established approach to p o l i t i c a l organization going back to Hobbes and Weber. Other anthropologists, including Malinowski ( 1 9 4 4 : 6 1 , 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ) , Nadel (19*+ 7 : 4 9 9 - 5 0 1) , Hoebel ( l 9 5 4:Ch. 2) and Bohannan ( 1 9 6 3 : 2 6 6 ) , subscribe s u b s t a n t i a l l y to t h i s view. In states, those s o c i e t i e s possessing formal govern-ment, the i d e n t i t y of government and the force sanction appears to be v a l i d : only the government or i t s appointed agents may l e g i t i m a t e l y imprison, execute or wage war, these c l e a r l y being examples of physical force wielded by a coercive authority. Unfortunately the sanction of physical force wielded by a coercive authority may be found i n a v a r i e t y of non-governmental contexts such as the family, trade unions, university f r a t e r n i t i e s and so on. In order to exclude these manifestations of force, and authority, Radcliffe-Brown has entered the q u a l i f i c a t i o n "within a t e r r i t o r i a l framework". Nevertheless before turning to 152 " s t a t e l e s s " s o c i e t i e s , we should note the ambiguity involved i n the term "physical force" and i t s apparent equivalent "coercion". I t would be d i f f i c u l t to decide whether a given sanction (e.g., withdrawal of support, ostracism, r i d i c u l e , f i n e s ) constituted inducement or coercion. When t h i s framework of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y — p h y s i c a l f o r c e — l e g i t i m a t e authority i s applied to the "stateless" context, the d e f i n i t i o n breaks down, for there i s an inherent contradiction i n the terms being employed: state-l e s s implies absence of formal government, whereas the Radcliffe-Brown d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l organization i s e s s e n t i a l l y formal government i n somewhat more abstract terms. Nevertheless v a l i a n t e f f o r t s are made to reconcile the i r r e c o n c i l a b l e . In the formal view, force i n the stateless context i s t y p i c a l l y resorted to "legitimately" by i n d i v i d u a l s who have suffered at the hands of others using force " i l l e g i t i m a t e l y " . Each i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d to " s e l f - h e l p " and the t a c i t approval of society i s viewed as the delegation of the force sanction into the hands of ind i v i d u a l s who act i n the name of society. I l l e g i t i m a t e use or the threat of force i s met with legitimate use or the threat of force. The c o l l e c t i v e locus of the force sanction i s also seen i n actions such as the spontaneous lynchings of offenders c i t e d e a r l i e r , which Radcliffe-Brown sees i n terms of the whole community judging and i n f l i c t i n g punishment: 153 "The punitive action i s to be regarded as the d i r e c t expression of public sentiment" (19*+0:xv). Convenient f i c t i o n s such as these are i n the t r a d i t i o n of the State, Sovereignty and Soc i a l Contract. By i n s i s t i n g on formal-legal c r i t e r i a ( t e r r i t o r i a l i t y , and authority), a single function (maintenance of order), and a single sanction ( f o r c e ) , we are l e d i n t o f u t i l e pseudo-problems such as whether or not primitives have law (or only custom), war (or only feud), states (or only kinship systems). Our conceptual apparatus becomes the primary concern, rather than the behavior of ind i v i d u a l s i n r e a l s i t u a t i o n s . The widely accepted state-stateless dichotomy provides a simple means of c l a s s i f y i n g s o c i e t i e s , but i t s implications f o r research can be disastrous. By making such an i n i t i a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n we commit ourselves to demonstra-ting that a given society i s d i f f e r e n t i n kind from another. As Leach (1963) points out, we tend to seek out the sort of data that supports our p r i o r assumption, and we construct elaborate tautologies. And t h i s i s the s t r u c t u r a l bias i n p o l i t i c a l a n a l y s i s : to go Into a society looking f o r government as a formal, s p e c i a l i z e d structure. This bias accounts f o r the anarchical image of the Eskimo which dominates the l i t e r a t u r e , and f o r some of the serious l i m i t a t i o n s i n current research 15k Damas r e f l e c t s t h i s bias to the degree that he was asking "Where i s the leader who makes the decisions?" The basic point of th i s thesis i s simple. Before we can ask who the decision-makers are, we must ask how decisions get made. Unless we view groups and their members as perpetual motion mechanisms, we must regard decision making as an obvious s o c i a l r e q u i s i t e . This being so, p o l i t i c a l organization i s implied by s o c i a l existence and the processes involved are there i f we w i l l only look at them. APPENDIX I IGLULINGMIUT KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY Third Ascending Generation AMAU - male and female consanguines and inmarrying af f i n e s Second Ascending Generation ITUK - male consanguines and inmarrying a f f i n e s NINGIUK - female consanguines and inmarrying af f i n e s F i r s t Ascending Generation  Consanguines ATAATA - father ANAANA - mother AQAK - Fa Br, FaFaBrSo, FaFaSiSo, MoFaSiSo, MoFaBrSo AIYAK - MoSi, FaMoBrDa, FaMoSiDa, MoMoBrDa, MoMo'SiDa ATTAK - FaSi, FaFaBrDa, FaFaSiDa, MoFaSiDa, MoFaBrDa ANGAK - MoBr, FaMoSiSo, FaMoBrSo, MoMoSiSo, MoMoBrSo Inmarrying Affines AI - opposite sex of Ego NINGAUK - same sex as male Ego UKKUAQ - same sex as female Ego Contemporary Generation Consanguines NAIYAK - opposite-sex s i b l i n g s and cousins (Male Ego) ANIK - opposite-sex s i b l i n g s and cousins (Female Ego) ANGAYUK - same sex older s i b l i n g NUKA - same sex younger s i b l i n g *ILLU - same sex cross-cousins ( i . e . , children of FaSi or MoBr) *ANGUTIKATTIK - same sex paternal p a r a l l e l cousins ( i . e . , children of FaBr) +ARNGNAKATTIK - same sex maternal p a r a l l e l cousins ( i . e . , c h i l d r e n of MoSi) 156 Cousin terms are extended to second cousins ( i . e . , c hildren of parents 1 cousins) with the s u f f i x a t i o n of SAQ. Inmarrving Affines Same terminology as f i r s t ascending generation. F i r s t Descending Generation IRNGNIK - son PANIK - daughter QANIAK - BrCfii^::., male cousins 1 Chi) M , ~ UYURUK - SiChi, female cousins 1 Chi) U d x e 6 U SSS** l ^ h i l  ma}B C0U£4ns! Female Ego NUBAK - SiChi, female cousins 1 Chi) m 6 Inmarrvine Affines NINGAUK - males) same f o r second and t h i r d descending UKKUAQ - females) generations NULLIQ - parents of children's spouses Second Descending Generation IRNGUTAQ - male and female consanguines Third Descending Generation ILLULIGIIK - male and female consanguines A f f i n a l Terminology (Spouse's Consanguines) Male Ego Female Ego NULLIAQ - wife UII - husband AI - wife's s i s t e r s , female AI - husband's brothers, cousins and nieces male cousins and nephews SAKKIAQ - wife's brothers, SAKKIAQ - husband's s i s t e r s , male cousins and female cousins and nephews nieces 157 Male Eeo Female Ego SAKKIK - wife's parents, uncles SAKKIK - husband's parents, and aunts uncles and aunts SAKKIKPA - wife's grandparents SAKKIKPA - husband's grandparents Co-a^fin.al Terminology (Inmarrying Affines of Spouse's Consanguines) NUKAUNGRUK - spouses of Ego's spouse's younger s i b l i n g s , cousins, and descending generation consanguines ANGAYUNGRUK - spouses of Ego's spouse's older s i b l i n g s , cousins, and ascending generation consanguines Adoptive Terminology ANGUTIKSAQ - adoptee's fo s t e r father ARNGNAKSAQ - adoptee's foster mother Otherwise consanguineal terminology with s u f f i x a t i o n of SAQ i s employed. 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