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The psychology of rational thought : a critical estimate of current views and an hypothesis concerning… Towell, Albert Seymour 1931

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RATIONAL THOUGHT A Q r i t i c a l Estimate of Current Views An Hypothesis Concerning the Role of Lan i n the Structure of Human Reason Albert Seymour. Towell A Thesis submitted for the Degree of MASTER OP ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY The University of B r i t i s h Columbia' and A p r i l , 1931. CONTENTS Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Doctrines Past and Present Chapter 3. Some Approaches to the Problems of Psychology Chapter 4. The Comparative, Genetic, and Functional Viewpoints Chapter 5. Thought Pr i o r to Language Chapter 6. The Relation of the Symbolic Processes to Human Reason Bibliography. Chapter 1 1STR0DU0TI0I The l a t e Willis® James said of psychology i n a pass-age that has often been quoted: "This' 1® no science, I t i s 1 only the hope of a science I t Is probably true, of course, that no single department of human knowledge can be said to be based upon foundations that are absolutely; unassailable. I t i s also true with respect to advances i n any f i e l d that the solving of on© problem at ©nee brings fresh problems to l i g h t . We learn n©i«? f a c t a ; sre modify our formulations of s c i e n t i f i c laws and hypotheses so that they become better statements of the r e l a -tions that are observed to hold between phenomena; we study things that have hitherto puzzled ns and one by one we bring these things into harmony with the r e s t of our knowledge — we 'explain' them, that I s . But as often as not, each such advance brings !nto view further discrepancies which irast be studied and i n turn explained. Hone the less the gains that have been made i n the physical sciences are very r e a l j these sciences are now w e l l based on self-consistent systems of p r i n c i p l e s . The case i s very d i f f e r e n t with regard to psychology. Spearman points ont that while i n physics and chemistry the divergences of opinion "always remain confined to points of 1Psychology, B r i e f e r Course; p.468. d e t a i l ; i n psychology they reach out to the very foundations, even to the whole terminology i t s e l f . " The same writer Is also very sceptical as to whether certain changes that orthodox psychologists have made i n the statements of their doctrines constitute any r e a l ad-vance. He says that "we f i n d the doctrine of 'f a c u l t i e s ' everywhere mentioned i n terms of the keenest reprobation. Such h o s t i l i t y , however, shows i t s e l f on closer examination to be curiously concentrated against the name. Just the same actual doctrine i s s t i l l f reely accepted under very numerous synonyms, as 'powers', 'capacities', ' a b i l i t i e s ' , 'properties', and so forth." Certainly, he admits, attempts are being made to formulate more acceptable theories; but the sole "serious r i v a l to the doctrine of separate f a c u l t i e s i s that which.... \ ....has t r i e d to resolve a l l knowing ultimately Into sensation and a l l thinking into nothing more than associative reproduc-tion;" a theory which "breaks down by reason of i t s flagrant 1 c o n f l i c t with the actual facts." ; He i s no better s a t i s f i e d with attempts to connect psychology with evolutionary theory and t e l e o l o g i c a l biology, for these lead to the shirking of genuinely.psychological explanations and the substitution of " g l i b references to 'situations', 'environment', 'responses', and so forth." We do not, however, often see i t e x p l i c i t l y recog-nized that there Is very good reason for this state of a f f a i r s , 1The Nature of Intelligence; pp. 24 f f . since no matter how complex and d i f f i c u l t are the problems of physics, astronomy, or chemistry, those presented by the study of the human mind are incomparably more b a f f l i n g . As Osborn remarks, "Of . a l l incomprehensible things i n the uni-verse Man stands i n the front rank, and of a l l Incomprehens-i b l e things i n Man the supreme d i f f i c u l t y centers i n human In t e l l i g e n c e , human memory, human aspirations, human powers of discovery, research, and conquest of obstacles." When the data of a science have been reduced to a form i n which they are susceptible to mathematical treatment we can get to grips with i t s problems; but i n psychology there Is l i t t l e or nothing that we can lay hold of i n that way -- everything i s elusive, nebulous, b a f f l i n g ; i t s very terms, 'mind1, 'image', •attention', ' i n s t i n c t ' , ' v o l i t i o n ' , and so on, are vague and are defined i n as many differ e n t ways as there are psycholo-gists . We must not omit to point out, on the other hand, that i n certain f i e l d s experimenters are obtaining results which are r e l a t i v e l y d e f i n i t e and precise. Psycho-physics i s accumulating information on the quantitative aspects of the sensations r e s u l t i n g from certain s t i m u l i , the 'two-point 1 linen' , and the l i k e . Many workers are applying s t a t i s t i c a l methods to the measurement of in t e l l i g e n c e and of learning. The neurologists are gradually working out the physiological 1 In his foreword to "The Brain from Ape to Man", by P. Tilney. 4 basis of psychological phenomena. Valuable results are being secured by the 'objective' study of behavior. In spite of a l l this work, we f i n d when we come to consider what are known as the higher forms of mental a c t i v i t y -- reasoning, judgment, inference, and so on -- that the re-sults obtained by the experimental psychologists seem not to contribute greatly towards genuinely psychological explanations of the processes involved. As Brown says, " i f we turn to almost any standard textbook of psychology we f i n d that more than half the book i s concerned with the study of lower forms of the mental processes, and that only a few concluding chap-ters are devoted to the consideration of the highest forms of mental a c t i v i t y , such as deliberation, choice, v o l i t i o n and 1 character-formation." A moment's thought w i l l convince one that this statement of Brown's i s true of the usual textbook i n psycho-logy. We f i n d long and detailed chapters on Sensation, Per-ception, Memory, Habit, I n s t i n c t , Association, Emotion, and so forth; and i n the main the treatment of these topics Is careful and s c i e n t i f i c , i t embodies the results of much ex-perimentation and painstaking observation. But the conven-t i o n a l handling of the higher mental processes i s much less satisfactory, and o r d i n a r i l y receives rather summary treatment i n three or four chapters. Yet these same higher mental pro-cesses constitute precisely the human part of psychology; 1 Mind and Personality; p . l . 5 much of what Is said of sensation, habit, and the rest applies almost as much to animals as i t does to human beings. We are nov? i n a position to state what i s to be the subject-matter of this thesis. I t w i l l attempt to examine the present state of the science of psychology with respect to these d i s t i n c t i v e l y human mental functions, c o l l e c t i v e l y characterized as the thought processes. We s h a l l give some account of obstacles and misconceptions that appear to us to have hindered the development of an adequate psychology of the higher mental processes; and we s h a l l attempt to show that within the l a s t few years some new view-points have been stated which give considerable promise of putting us on the right track at l a s t . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the thesis w i l l deal with the r e l a t i o n of language to thought (the word language being taken i n i t s widest sense to include the symbolic a c t i v i t i e s i n general, and a l l the means of s o c i a l intercommunication — written and. spoken words, gestures, etc.) In order to prevent misconception at the outset, i t w i l l be well to supplement t h i s general statement by making clear what we s h a l l not try to prove: namely, that funda-mentally thinking i s l i n g u i s t i c behavior, that to have ideas means to speak aloud or s i l e n t l y , that thought consists i n vestlgeal laryngeal movements. Nor on the other hand s h a l l we try to prove that the structure of thought can be discov-ered i n the s o c i a l , conventional, s y n t a c t i c a l , or l o g i c a l 6 6 organization of language or other symbolic processes. Both these doctrines have been held, and are held today; but this thesis w i l l take the ground that neither of these two approach-es to the problem has proved f r u i t f u l , and the more closely they are examined the less l i k e l y i t seems that they w i l l lead to a solution. What we s h a l l maintain Is that thought i s p r i o r to l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t y ; that i t s appearance and gradual r i s e may be traced i n evolving mental a c t i v i t y as i t becomes more and more diff e r e n t i a t e d i n successively higher forms of l i v i n g organisms. But we s h a l l also maintain that i t i s through the agency of the l i n g u i s t i c processes that thought i s reconstit-uted into human reason. Throughout we s h a l l hold fast to a functional and a genetic viewpoint. 7 Chapter 2 DOCTRINES PAST AND PRESENT The t i t l e of t h i s chapter i s not to be taken as i n d i c -ating that we are about to embark on a detailed survey or c r i t -icism of the very numerous accounts which have been given of the phenomena of the higher forms of mental a c t i v i t y . Obvious-l y no such survey can be attempted i n one b r i e f chapter. I t i s our purpose to view the f i e l d In only a very general way, so as to e s t a b l i s h a background for what i s l a t e r to be said. I t was remarked above that the ordinary textbook i n psychology devotes only a few b r i e f concluding chapters to the subject of reasoning. Is I t to be taken that this branch of the whole subject has been neglected i n comparison with the attention that has been devoted to the lower mental processes such as sensation? By no means; on the contrary i t has re-ceived more attention, and from the ablest thinkers, than has any other branch of the science; but the result has been that today disagreements are perhaps deeper and more fundamental than they have ever been i n the past. This state of a f f a i r s Is s u f f i c i e n t evidence of the complexity and d i f f i c u l t y of the subject. Twenty-five hundred years ago the Greeks were deeply interested i n the problems presented by the study of the mental l i f e of man. Their enquiries, however, were more of a philo-sophical than a psychological nature; and having accepted the concept of an entity c a l l e d 'mind' which was conceived as 8 8 discontinuous and separate from the world of matter, they con-fined their investigations largely to formulating a descrip-tion of the modes of a c t i v i t y of this e n t i t y . Out of th i s investigation there naturally arose the science of Logic as a separate d i s c i p l i n e . Prom the Greeks we derive, too, an idea which has persisted ever since and which has played an import-ant part In the history of speculative thought; the idea, namely, that a true philosophy can be achieved through an ex-amination and manipulation of words. It i s v i t a l to understanding of the relationship between contemporary schools of psychology that we should re a l i z e how persistently t h i s doctrine of a separate mental, psychic, or s p i r i t u a l entity works i t s e l f into our phraseology and descriptions. We are compelled to omit any attempt to trace the past workings of this conception, and to confine ourselves instead to the present state of a f f a i r s i n the f i e l d of psychology; but we must comment very b r i e f l y on the effects that various schools of philosophy, metaphysics, and epistem-ology have had on the development of psychology. We s h a l l consider f i r s t that type of philosophical theory known as Idealism. This theory has been worked on, examined, and expounded for many centuries; some of the pro-foundest systems of thought are based upon i t . I t i s exceed-ingly d i f f i c u l t to f i n d any self-inconsistency i n the greatest of these systems -- yet we f i n d them leading often f i n a l l y to conclusions that can only be cal l e d preposterous, as, for 9 example, solipsism. Or again, as Broad remarks, "No one i n M s senses can i n practice regard h i s arm-chair or his poker as being l i t e r a l l y societies of s o i r i t s or thoughts i n 1 the mind of God," In other words, some of these systems f a l l to the ground by a sort of reductio ad absurdum. We need not, of course, take the stand that a Naive Realism i s the only philosophical theory that i s worthy of serious consideration; on the contrary we have ample evidence from modern physics and chemistry that things are very far from being what they seem from the naive standpoint. But we s h a l l maintain that where a theory leads to conclusions which are preposterous from the point of view of science and of common sense, even though the theory may be supported by a d i a l e c t i c structure which seems as unshakeable as the pyramids, then we do have a re a l case of reduction to absurdity; the theory may be as self-consistent as one pleases but unless i t i s also consistent with empirical observation i t must be re-jected. In other words the philosophical basis of this thesis i s an Empirical Realism. We are aware that i n saying these things we are making assertions of the most dogmatic kind. This cannot be helped, for any real attempt to j u s t i f y the position we have taken would require a whole book of i t s e l f . We may, however, give some s l i g h t hint as to the reasons for this p o s i t i o n . 1 The Mind and i t s Place i n Nature; p.5. 10 For several years now there has heen a growing suspicion that a vast deal of what has been ca l l e d 'philosophy' has been l i t t l e more than a sort of beating the a i r . I t i s also becoming apparent that the d i s c i p l i n e known as eplstemo-logy i s an a r t i f i c i a l and Insoluble problem that has been 'set up' and that has no basis whatsoever i n r e a l i t y . ©ne important piece of evidence leading to this conclusion i s that these systems of thought so frequently lead to dilemmas which are absolutely insoluble. We often hear such arguments as t h i s i Either Reality already has the form which l o g i c a l thought strives to give I t , or i t has not; i n the form-er case thought i s f u t i l e l y r e i t e r a t i v e , and i n the l a t t e r case i t i s f a l s i f i c a t o r y . One would imagine that such a re s u l t as this would lead the thinker to examine most ca r e f u l l y both h i s premises and the whole body of his i n f e r e n t i a l reasoning. This he may proceed to do -- but with the result that both premises and inference appear to be incontrovertible. Thus i t would seem that a set of premises whose truth i s unquestionable may lead by an unimpeachable process of reasoning to a dilemma which cannot be resolved, such as the controversy between Mechanism and Vi t a l i s m . Such a paradox i s too flagrant to be accepted for a moment; there must be a f a l l a c y somewhere, but where i s i t ? An instance or two w i l l probably make clear what we are try i n g to show. Let us take the epistemological problem of the r e l a t i o n of truth to r e a l i t y , the question of how far 11 the most perfect mental structure can claim to be an adequate account of that which we seem compelled to assume as the object and occasion of our ideas. Prom the naive point of view this problem does not e x i s t ; we think perfectly f r e e l y of money, sunsets, God, beauty, beef-steak, anything i n the universe whether i t be ' r e a l ' or only a mental construct such as the idea of a r e l a t i o n ; and i n practice we accept the empirical tests as the measures of the v a l i d i t y of our thinking. Dewey, i n dealing with t h i s whole question, points out that i t appears to the t r a d i t i o n a l epistemologist as though everyday man i s "rashly assuming the r i g h t to glide over a c l e f t i n the very 1 structure of r e a l i t y . " Our point i s that t h i s fact at once puts the t r a d i t i o n a l view under suspicion; that i t becomes extremely probable that the ' c l e f t ' does not exist at a l l . On closer examination of the t r a d i t i o n a l account we f i n d , says Dewey, that there a c t u a l l y i s no such c l e f t ; i t i s a purely imaginary one that has appeared because of a f a l l a c y i n the argument. What the epistemologist has done i s to take "the material -which thought selects as i t s problematic data as i d e n t i c a l with the s i g n i f i c a n t content which results from suc-cessful pursuit of enquiry He i d e n t i f i e s the f i n a l depos-i t of the thought-function with i t s own generating antecedent, and then disposes of the r e s u l t i n g surd by reference to some metaphysical consideration. "'"Essays i n Experimental Logic; p.87. 2 Op. c i t . ; p.96. 12 Here, then, i s a t y p i c a l dilemma of the kind men-tioned above; and i n this case i t seems to have arisen from a flaw i n the argument, but a flaw that was s u f f i c i e n t l y subtle to have evaded discovery. In other words, the paradox of which we spoke i s sometimes to be accounted for by the fact that the premises or the inferences, no matter how unimpeach-able they appear, do actually contain some flaw. This i s of course no new discovery; on the contrary a favorite diversion of philosophers i s findin g flaws i n one another's systems. But we may here assert our conviction that because of the re-sults of modern speculation and investigation we are now able to point out f a l l a c i e s i n various t r a d i t i o n a l systems that could not possibly have been detected i n the l i g h t of the knowledge of a century ago. As Dewey further points out,1 we are continually finding 11 that problems i n th e i r previous form of statement are insoluble because put i n terms of unreal conditions; because the real conditions have been mixed up with mental a r t i f a c t s or misconstructions. Every science i s continually learning that i t s supposed solutions are only apparent because the s o l -ution solves, not the actual problem, but one that has been 1 made up.n I f we may be permitted a short digression we may note at this point how often metaphysics serves as a haven of refuge for the psychologist or philosopher who has been driven 1 Op. c i t . ; p.101. 13 by bis own arguments into an impossible p o s i t i o n . Weiss, i n presenting a Behavioristic that seems somewhat more worthy of serious consideration than that of J . B. Watson, states that a good deal of the f u t i l i t y of t r a d i t i o n a l psychology i s due to the fact that "as soon as a discussion approaches the funda-mental assumptions upon which the controversy r e s t s , the re a l issue i s avoided by a hopeless, — 'but th i s i s .approaching the f i e l d of metaphysics with which psychology has no concern'." For the behaviorlst, he continues, metaphysics i s that form of behavior known as guessing, and "consists i n developing a verb-a l description of what would probably be observed i f more re-fined experimentation or observation were possible." A l l meta-physical discussions, he says, are i n the l a s t analysis nothing but language responses. For example, ' r e a l i t y ' i s "merely a word stimulus to "designate the fact that the responses occurring at any one. moment might be more complex and varied than they ac t u a l l y are i f the bodily response mechanism were 1 more complex than i t r e a l l y i s . " We may perhaps hesitate to agree that metaphysics i s nothing more than guessing, but we do believe that many meta-physical discussions and problems are purely verbal. This brings us to our next point: that many of the unresolvable dilemmas which we mentioned are due, not to flaws i n premises or reasoning, but to the fact that the whole argu-ment i s a purely verbal construction having no r e l a t i o n what-1 A Theoretical Basis of Hitman Behavior; pp. 39 f f . 14 soever to objective r e a l i t y . Verbal symbols can be exceeding-l y treacherous, and the r e a l i z a t i o n of this has been growing now for a good many years; so that of la t e i t has become very common to f i n d that writers of works i n a l l sorts of f i e l d s of enquiry f e e l that they must introduce t h e i r respective c o n t r i -butions by a preliminary enquiry into the misleading influence of words i n th e i r p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d . I t has even been said that this treachery of symbols i s the source' of almost a l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s which thought encounters. We cannot at this point proceed further with a general discussion of the question of verbalism, but i n a l a t e r chapter we s h a l l f i n d ourselves returning to i t . A l l sciences, as has been hinted, are troubled by i t ; physics, for example, cannot free i t s e l f from the misleading connotations which are wel l known to c l i n g to such terms as 'force', 'momentum', and the l i k e ; and even though the danger i s so generally re a l i z e d the error i s so insidious that i t creeps unobserved into even the most careful discussions of physical theory, and we f i n d these terms treated as attributes (or even hypostatized into separate existences) instead of as mere names for r e l a t i o n -ships. Psychology i s of a l l sciences the one most subject to this danger, for none of the others i s so much infected with metaphysical d i f f i c u l t i e s . Prom the point of view of t h i s thesis the important thing i s that this general uneasiness seems now to be c r y s t a l -l i z i n g into a de f i n i t e r e a l i z a t i o n of the seriousness and the 15 magnitude of the problem, and exhaustive enquiry into the 1 whole question has begun. Headway i s being made towards overcoming some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s , although as yet there i s l i t t l e sign of the results of such enquiries being made use of i n other f i e l d s . At t h i s point we s h a l l give an example to show more d i r e c t l y what i s the bearing of this discussion on contempor-ary psychological theory, using as our i l l u s t r a t i o n Bertrand Russell's well-known work, "The Analysis of Mind". Russell i s f a r more of a philosopher than he i s a psychologist; consequently we f i n d that when his enquiries bring him to the point where he has to examine his fundamental conceptions he does not evade the issue by r e f e r r i n g his d i f -f i c u l t i e s to metaphysics and abandoning them there, after the manner of too many of our w r i t e r s . Nor can he agree, with what may be c a l l e d the 'naive' school of psychologists, to take mental phenomena for granted; he i n s i s t s instead that we must examine very closely such concepts as 'mind', 'Ideas', 'consciousness', and the l i k e , and that I f possible we must determine t h e i r true nature. He finds himself led to the view that the world of experience i s composed neither of mind nor of matter, but rather of a 'neutral s t u f f more primitive than either. This primary s t u f f he te n t a t i v e l y c a l l s 'pure experience', and supposes that some arrangements of i t can be c a l l e d 'mind' "''For a detailed discussion of the whole matter see "The Meaning of Meaning", G.K.Ogden and I.A.Richards. 16 and others 'matter'. Since i t i s not our purpose to give an exposition of Russell's views we s h a l l not attempt to follow his enquiries any farther. What we desire to do 5s to state the position of this thesis with regard to h i s treatment of the subject. That position i s t h i s : We w i l l i n g l y admit that "The Analysis of Mind" i s a noteworthy piece of speculation or d i a l e c t i c , worked out by one of the acutest minds of our day; but we maintain (and there"are plenty of c r i t i c s to support our stand) that as a Contribution to psychology Russell's volume i s of very s l i g h t value. This sweeping statement i s based, on a conviction that his work i s largely v i t i a t e d by exactly such f a l l a c i e s as were b r i e f l y dealt with e a r l i e r i n t h i s chapter. For instance, his treatment of the problem of the existence of an external world i s open to attack on the ground that the problem Is stated i n terms which necessarily assume the existence of the very thing that i s called, i n question, namely, an external world. His argument involves the consideration of such terms as sense data, v i s u a l colors, etc., and i t seems that he takes these to be primitive and i r r e d u c i b l e . But these are synthetic propositions and not terms; they amount to statements that there are data which are sensed and colors which are seen; and this at once presupposes existences beyond the sensing or the seeing. Incidentally the previous paragraph i s a splendid 17 example of the sort of discussion which, however int e r e s t i n g i t may be from certain points of view, i s f u t i l e and p r o f i t -less as far as psychology i s concerned, since i t only confuses the r e a l issues. L a s t l y , we s h a l l turn to the task of outling very b r i e f l y our notion of the r e l a t i o n that formal l o g i c bears to psychology-' proper. Angell says: nWe do not o r d i n a r i l y think In s y l l o -gisms As a device for ex h i b i t i n g the source of our con-fidence In the tr u t h of the conclusion, the syllogism un-doubtedly possesses a value; f or i t makes e x p l i c i t and clear i n the fewest possible words the fundamentally important r e l a -tions among the ideas involved. I t Is , however, as a method of exposition, demonstration, and proof, rather than as a type of actual constructive thinking, that i t gets i t s chief s i g -1 nifIcance." We present t h i s quotation as i l l u s t r a t i v e of the fact that i n almost a l l recent works on psychology the writers take pains to point out that the forms, categories, and p r i n -ciples of formal l o g i c have l i t t l e bearing i n psychology. In f a c t , as M i l l e r points out, the older accounts of thinking were cast too much i n l o g i c a l terms; "descriptive psychology has paid too much attention to the relations existing between the ideas i n that series which represents the solution of a problem, and too l i t t l e attention to the mental processes 1 Psychology (4th ed., revised); p.283. 18 which, led up to the attainment of those ideas and t h e i r organ-i z a t i o n and incorporation into a movement of thought which 1 attained the solution." We believe that formal l o g i c has been a major hindrance to the development of psychology. I t i s largely responsible for a f a l l a c i o u s notion which i n s i s t s on creeping into our accounts of the higher mental processes despite our effo r t s to keep clear of i t — namely, the notion that there i s a 'thought power' which i s an abstract and general power of the mind, and which can be applied equally w e l l i n a l l sorts of situations. To i t also can be traced current attempts (known as 'structural' psychology) to analyse mental l i f e into Its elements -- sensations, images, etc., — and to describe r a t i o n a l thought In terms of a re-synthesis of such elements. An especially Insidious error i s introduced by the adoption of the terms of log i c as names f o r psychological phe-nomena. Such words as 'judgment', 'analysis', 'deduction', have clinging to them, a cluster of l o g i c a l Implications which are apt to escape our notice, and which a l l too frequently land us unwittingly i n some hopeless dilemma. Ogden and Rich-ards give us an example of what happens when we unknowingly use a word i n an ambiguous way: "By using the same term 'meaning' both for the 'Goings on' inside t h e i r heads (the images, associations, etc., which enabled them to interpret signs) and for the Referents (the things to which the signs 1 The Psychology of Thinking; p.144, 19 refer) philosophers have been forced to locate Grantchester, Influenza, the Russians, Queen Anne, and indeed the whole Uni-verse equally inside t h e i r heads — or, i f alarmed by the pro-spect of cerebral congestion, at least ' i n t h e i r minds' i n 1 such wise that a l l these objects become conveniently 'mental'". Perhaps we can make our point clearer by looking at the matter from quite another angle. I t i s precisely because formal l o g i c always has been (and i n the main s t i l l i s ) thor-oughly unpsychological that i t has constituted a hindrance to the progress of psychology. Logic i s always getting mixed up with metaphysical abstractions, and these are carried over into psychology, to the great hurt of the l a t t e r . Dewey gives an example of the sort of d i f f i c u l t y that arises; he says, "The r e l a t i o n of brain-change to consciousness is thought to be an essential part of the problem of knowledge. But i f the brain Is involved i n knowing simply as a part of the mechanism of acting, as the mechanism for coordinating p a r t i a l and com-peting s t i m u l i into a single scheme of response there i s no miracle about the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the brain i n knowing. One might as well make a problem out of the fact that i t takes 2 a hammer to drive a n a i l . " Yet l o g i c cannot be separated from psychology, which attempts among other things to discriminate those acts and 1 The Meaning of Meaning; p.29, footnote. 2 Essays i n Experimental Logic; p.408. 2 0 attitudes of the organism that determine how knowledge actual-l y comes to be acquired. What i s needed, and what i s happening, i s that l o g i c i s turning to psychology i n order to correct i t s own fundamental notions. It may be pertinent to r e c a l l what has long been recognized, that t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c i s based on language, and especially on grammar, rather than on psychology. Sayce points out that A r i s t o t l e f e l l into the error of assuming the same laws for both thought and language; he assumed that' the subject-copula-predicate organization which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Greek along with other Aryan languages ref l e c t e d a subject-copula-predicate organization of objective r e a l i t y . There are said to be languages i n which there i s no element which corresponds to our subject or predicate. Had A r i s t o t l e spoken such a language his system of l o g i c would have been t o t a l l y different,"and his system cannot be corrected or re-placed u n t i l comparative philology has taught us to d i s t i n g -\iish between the universal and the pa r t i c u l a r i n the grammar 1 of the Greek and Aryan." We may now b r i e f l y sum up this chapter; but be-fore doing so l e t us again apologise for the sketchy and at times dogmatic nature of our treatment of the subject-matter. Our attempt to give In the course of a few pages a comprehen-sive over-view of the relations between psychology and the 1 Introduction to the Science of Languages; pp. 11 f f . 21 more speculative f i e l d s of enquiry, philosophy, metaphysics, and so on, could have l e d , however, to no other treatment. The subject would require volumes i f the positions taken were to be f u l l y expounded and adequately j u s t i f i e d . We s h a l l say, then, that i f psychology i s to progress i t had better steer as clear as possible of philosophy, meta-physics, l o g i c , and epistemology. These d i s c i p l i n e s are s t i l l infected through and through, from any s c i e n t i f i c point of view, with errors, f a l l a c i e s , f a l s e assumptions, and false conceptions. That th i s i s no exaggerated statement i s very 1 simply demonstrated by the fact that within any one of these - d i s c i p l i n e s there are divergences of opinion that are as the poles asunder; and when two schools of thought are diametric-a l l y opposed both cannot be true, at least one (and possibly both) must be fundamentally i n error. Psychology, therefore, must somehow free i t s concepts and i t s methods from the metaphysical and l o g i c a l implications that c l i n g so stubbornly to them. I t must hold fast to what can be empirically v e r i f i e d . I t has accumulated many experi-mentally determined data, especially with reference to the 'lower' mental functions. I t must now apply this knowledge to the study of the higher a c t i v i t i e s of mind; and (here i s the rub) i t must approach the study of these higher a c t i v i t i e s without philosophical preconceptions of the kind which we have been c r i t i c i z i n g . Within the l a s t few years psychology has begun to 22 do t h i s ; i t has begun to follow the example of the other sciences and to look at i t s problems objectively and i n a more unprejudiced way. There i s now ample evidence that the functional and genetic approaches offer the greatest promise; the labors of the S t r u c t u r a l i s t s have uncovered (and we hope w i l l continue to uncover) data of immense value, but th e i r results are only a n c i l l a r y to the solution of our problems and the s t r u c t u r a l i s t approach w i l l of i t s e l f lead to no r e a l increase In our understanding of the higher mental l i f e . 23 Chapter 5 SOME APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEMS OP PSYCHOLOGY One of the purposes of t h i s thesis i s to examine and b r i e f l y to estimate the present status of psychology as a science, more especially with reference to the study of the higher mental a c t i v i t i e s . In this chapter we s h a l l attempt a very general survey of the f i e l d , and s h a l l comment on some of the ways i n which the problems are being attacked. Let us consider f i r s t the Introspectionist school, since i n the work of th i s group we f i n d by far the most elab-orate and d e t a i l e d accounts of the operation of human reason. -Perhaps as t y p i c a l an example as we could choose i s Dewey's "How We Think", for I t s t i t l e indicates exactly the nature of i t s content; and while the volume leans s l i g h t l y towards a popular and untechnical treatment of the subject, i t i s the work of one of our greatest present-day thinkers. We may say of this book that i t does give simply a description of how we think. It just t e l l s what happens i n our minds when our higher mental ' f a c u l t i e s ' are acting — or perhaps better, i t t e l l s what seems to happen as far as can be seen from introspecting the process. It i s as i f a chemist were to confine his report of an experiment merely to describ-ing what was observed to occur -- an effervescence or a precip-i t a t i o n -- without going into the question of what was precip-i t a t e d or why the results were what they were. In other words there i s no explanation or reference to general p r i n c i p l e s . 24 This i s true not only of this p a r t i c u l a r book but of the work of most other psychologists of this school, William James, for instance, i n so f a r as he i s treating of the thought-process. In making these comments we have not the least thought of trying to s l i g h t or d i s c r e d i t the achievements of these men. On the contrary i t i s an indispensable preliminary to explanation that we have an accurate account of what does happen. One of the main reasons why James made the remark xvith which this thesis begins i s precisely that we are s t i l l very far from clear as to what r e a l l y happens; and while there remains considerable disagreement as to the facts themselves i t i s surely hopeless to expect any great advance i n the i n -terpretation of those f a c t s . For instance, psychologists are s t i l l arguing over what ideas are, and even as to whether they exist at a l l . U n t i l we arrive at some de f i n i t e conclusions i n such matters we cannot begin to deal with them i n any r e a l l y s c i e n t i f i c sense. There are two main reasons for this unsatisfactory state of a f f a i r s . The f i r s t i s that the vocabulary of psycho-logy i s absolutely unstandardized. When a chemist refers to ionization or a physicist refers to the composition of forces we are a l l agreed as to what they speak of; but i f two psycho-l o g i s t s speak of ' v o l i t i o n ' , the chances are that each means something quite different from the other. Attempts to arrive at a r i g i d d e f i n i t i o n of such terms have so f a r l e d to almost no r e s u l t . As Maudsley puts i t , " i t Is not possible to write • 25 a sentence concerning our highest mental functions without im-plying, i f the word have any meaning at a l l , e n t i t i e s which are merely o b j e c t i f i e d abstractions. Moreover, t h i s must also be borne i n mind, for i t aggravates our d i f f i c u l t i e s — that a word i s not merely a d e f i n i t e symbol of something, but a centre also of various associations which af f e c t e s s e n t i a l l y i t s mean-ing"; use i t then c a r e f u l l y as we may i n i t s psychological sense, we cannot detach these associations from i t s meaning, and i n spite of ourselves we are driven to raise a metaphysical 1 haze." The second reason i s , of course, the complexity, ob-s c u r i t y , and elusiveness of that which we are tr y i n g to study. There seems to be no other way of getting at i t except through introspection, and whole volumes have been written to show that introspection i s as l i t t l e r e l i a b l e as any source of i n -formation that we have. None the less there i s no other way; and, as has frequently been pointed out, the most r a d i c a l Behaviorlst In making h i s reports on what he observes i s r e a l l y introspecting while he does so. Those of the Introspectionist school, then, are mak-ing an important contribution. Although they are handicapped by the fact that the vocabulary of psychology i s such that they cannot speak except i n parables, they are gradually work-ing out a more accurate account of mental events from a des-c r i p t i v e point of view. 1 The Physiology of Mind; p.44. 26 The Behavlorists have been mentioned; l e t us turn next to them. They have been made the objects of a tremendous amount of c r i t i c i s m ; i n fact many psychologists refuse even to take them seriously, but make them the butt of 'clever' re-marks such as: "Psychology has l o s t i t s mind", or "The Poly-nesians regard thinking as 'speaking i n the stomach', thereby anticipating the conclusions of modern Behaviorism". Along with this there has been much misunderstand-ing and misrepresentation of the Behaviorist viewpoint, partly because one Behaviorist i s commonly taken as expressing the views of a l l the others -- which i s by no means the case since some of them f i n d themselves i n fundamental disagreement with J.B.Watson, who seems to be the accepted spokesman. For i n -stance some members of the school a r b i t r a r i l y rule out a l l phenomena of consciousness and a l l data of introspection from psychology, on the ground that these things are not open to s c i e n t i f i c study. But others accept introspection and regard i t as a perfectly legitimate means of obtaining reports on obscure internal reactions which are so subtle that they can be detected only by the one within whose body they are occur-ring; and their quarrel with consciousness i s merely that they claim "to render a more complete and a more s c i e n t i f i c account of human achievement without the conception of consciousness, than t r a d i t i o n a l psychology i s able to .-render with i t . The factors which t r a d i t i o n a l psychology vaguely c l a s s i f i e s as conscious or mental elements merely vanish without a remainder into the b i o l o g i c a l and s o c i a l components of the behavioristic 1 analysis." The wr i t e r just quoted (Weiss) further explains that "behaviorism i n psychology i s merely the name for that type of investigation and theory which assumes that man's edu-ca t i o n a l , vocational, and s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s can be completely described and explained as the res u l t of the same (and no other) 2 forces used i n the natural sciences." To the Behaviorists i t seems that t r a d i t i o n a l psycho-logy i s hopelessly tangled tip beyond a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of e x t r i c -ating i t s e l f , with metaphysical abstractions; and no matter how c a r e f u l l y i t s expounders i n s i s t that such terms as reason, emotion, desire, are merely c l a s s i f i c a t o r y names given to the results of analysis of mental states (which 'states' seem to the Behaviorists to be themselves very dubious e n t i t i e s ) , i t seems that these terms cannot be prevented from s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y turning into causes^ Behaviorism i s fundamentally an attempt to extricate psychology from, this metaphysical quagmire; and, as i s often the case with movements which are b a s i c a l l y pro-tes t s , i t has swung to an extreme that seems unreasonable to many students of the subject. I t i s also, however, an attempt to divert psychology from a preoccupation with analysis and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n to a functional and dynamic viewpoint. We s h a l l sum up t h i s b r i e f estimate by saying that the value of Behaviorism i s not so much, we believe, i n any Weiss, "A Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior"; preface, p . v i i . 2 Op.cit., p.7. 27 great contribution that i t has d i r e c t l y made, as i n i t s very cogent and well-founded c r i t i c i s m s of the t r a d i t i o n a l view-point. It has drawn attention very pointedly to certain marked weaknesses i n orthodox psychology, but the danger i s that orthodox psychology w i l l be so preoccupied i n demonstrat-ing that Behaviorism Is not to be taken seriously that i t w i l l f a i l to p r o f i t as i t should from these very pertinent c r i t i c -isms . Dewey propounds as an hypothesis that "thinking starts neither from an i m p l i c i t force of r a t i o n a l i t y desiring to r e a l i z e i t s e l f i n and through and against the l i m i t a t i o n s which are imposed upon I t by the conditions of our human ex-perience (as a l l Idealisms have taught), nor from the fact that i n each human being i s a 'mind' whose business i s just to 'know' — to theorize i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n sense; but rather that i t starts from an e f f o r t to get out of some trouble, 1 actual or menacing." The Behaviorist points out that ortho-dox psychology now claims to agree with this hypothesis, but that while i t states In a Preface or Foreword Its acceptance of this view i t proceeds l a t e r to contradict i t s e l f by giving what i s fundamentally an i d e a l i s t i c account of r a t i o n a l thought. We have several times mentioned that t r a d i t i o n a l psychology consists for the most part of description, analy-s i s , and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . These three things are decidedly 1 Essays i n Experimental Logic; p.23. 29 i n v o l v e d i n t l i e s c i e n t i f i c s t u d y o f any group o f phenomena; but t h e r e i s a n o t h e r t h i n g t h a t i s a l s o i n v o l v e d , namely the detec-t i o n o f b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s t o w h i c h a l l p a r t i c u l a r phenomena can be r e f e r r e d , t h i s r e f e r e n c e c o n s t i t u t i n g ' e x p l a n a t i o n ' ; and i t i s p r e c i s e l y h e r e t h a t p s y c h o l o g y has made the l e a s t p r o g r e s s . We s h a l l d e a l b r i e f l y w i t h the few a t t e m p t s t h a t a c t u a l l y have been made i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . F i r s t , c e r t a i n B e h a v i o r i s t s (and o t h e r s ) m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e s e u l t i m a t e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s can o n l y be those of c h e m i s t r y and p h y s i c s ; t h a t t h e r e a r e no v i t a l phenomena w h i c h are u n i q u e , u n p a r a l l e l e d , and I n e x p l i c a b l e on s t r i c t l y p h y s i c a l - p r i n c i p l e s ; t h a t t h e r e i s no l i f e f o r c e w h i c h i s d i f f e r e n t from s o - c a l l e d m a t e r i a l f o r c e s ; and t h a t m e n t a l l i f e must u l t i m a t e l y be d e s c r i b e d i n terms o f movements, and o f a t t r a c t i o n s and r e -p u l s i o n s between e l e c t r o n s and p r o t o n s i n a space-time c o n t i n -uum. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s v iew we have the s e comments t o make; t h a t i n the l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e a t p r e s e n t a v a i l a b l e we a r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n a c c e p t i n g t h i s d i c t u m , f o r t h e r e are men t a l phenomena w h i c h , as f a r as we can now see, cannot be 1 f o r c e d i n t o any s u c h schema ; and t h a t whether o r not me n t a l l i f e can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f e l e c t r o n s and p r o t o n s , t h e r e seems l i t t l e p r o s p e c t f o r a l o n g time t o come of any such ex-p l a n a t i o n b e i n g f o r t h c o m i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s the movement of p s y c h o l o g y i s nov/ d e f i n i t e l y towards a m a t e r i a l i s t i c e x p l a n a -1 See b e g i n n i n g o f c h a p t e r 4, below. 30 t i o n ; purely psychic causation i s being, less and less ap-pealed to. Secondly we s h a l l mention Spearman's recent volume, "The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition". This interesting book i s an attempt to state the basic p r i n c i -ples (analogous to Newton's Laws of Motion or P r i n c i p l e of Universal Gravitation i n physics) i n terms of which a l l mental phenomena are to be explained; and i t includes also a restate-ment of the subject-matter of psychology i n terms of the basic principles l a i d down. We cannot give here even the b r i e f e s t summary of Spearman's book, for to be adequate such a summary would re-quire more space than we can afford. We s h a l l only say that thus far his cognitive principles have not been generally accepted by psychologists; and further, that they seem to imply the existence of unique mental powers of a transcend-ental nature, and are thus not i n l i n e with the current tend-ency of psychology. Thirdly we must mention that theory, exemplified mainly i n the work of E.L.Thorndike and adopted by the Behav-i o r i s t s , which explains a l l mental phenomena i n terms of the formation or reinforcement of neural 'bonds', and traces a l l learning to a process of 'conditioning'. This theory has met with a f a i r l y general accept-ance because i t s proponents have advanced a great deal of experimental evidence i n support of i t ; but there i s a growing 31 r e a l i z a t i o n that at hest i t contains no more than certain elem-ents of tr u t h . The functional and genetic schools of psycholo-gists (and especially those interested i n what i s known as the 'Gestalt' theory) have succeeded i n showing f a i r l y d e f i n i t e l y that Thorndike and the others arrived at th e i r hypothesis through having misinterpreted t h e i r experimental r e s u l t s , and that a mass of other results can be adduced which absolutely 1 c o n f l i c t with the 'bond' theory. We turn next to a b r i e f discussion of the 'Structural' viewpoint, which aims to analyse consciousness into i t s elem-ents. Of course there i s no l i t e r a l separation; these elements -are discriminated wit h i n more complex processes which are thus reduced to conglomerations of sensations, images, etc. This analytic approach has proved very f r u i t f u l i n other branches of science, and i t seems to meet something that we f e e l as a sort of l o g i c a l necessity to reduce to Its ingred-ients anything that we may be studying. But i n psychology the case seems, i n the l i g h t of our present knowledge, to be other-wise. I f we analyse a f e e l i n g , a l l we f i n d are certain q u a l i -t i e s of sensation; the a f f e c t i v e tone of the whole experience eludes us, i t cannot be explained i n terms of the individual sense q u a l i t i e s . We f i n d the same sort of thing i f we attempt to analyse perception. According to R.M.Ogden, experiments on clang-analysis have shown that i f a component of a clang i s reproduced with the exact p i t c h , i n t e n s i t y , and quality that "'"See, for example, c r i t i c i s m of Thorndike's results i n Koffka's "The Growth of the Mind", chapter 4. 32 i t had within the clang, i t nevertheless sounds quite d i f f e r e n t i n i s o l a t i o n from i t s sound as a part of the clang. " i f the clang were a mere combination of p a r t i a l tones, i t s ingredi-ents taken separately ought to have been heard as i d e n t i c a l with t h e i r separately reproduced counterparts. But this was not the case This- shows that membership i n a clang alters the phenomenal character of the p a r t i a l tones....... .A phenomenal configuration, such as a clang, i s both something more than and something diff e r e n t from the sum of i t s ingredi-ents; for these ingredients are no longer separable e n t i t i e s , 1 but members of a 'whole'". When we have analysed an experience into a l l i t s elements we f i n d that the elements, l i k e Humpty-Dumpty, cannot be put together again — that we cannot reconstitute the ex-perience out of i t s Ingredients. One reason for this may be that what is apparently the simplest sort of mental experience may r e a l l y be of a complexity that we can never hope to anal-yse. (For instance, Wheeler wrote a thousand words of i n t r o -spective analysis of his experience during a moment of indecis-ion when he was choosing whether to add or subtract two num-bers) . If this be true, i t i s probable that any analysis we do make i s extremely fa u l t y and omits essential elements that we can never hope to discriminate. But even i f this were not so -- even i f we could discriminate and state every element that enters into a con-1 Psychology and Education; pp. 149 and 150. 33 scious experience — the fact remains that the experience as a unitary whole i s more than the sum of i t s parts, that as a whole i t possesses a unique quality or 'flavor' which somehow vanishes or i s destroyed during the analysis. We s h a l l return l a t e r to this consideration; meanwhile we s h a l l say that while the S t r u c t u r a l i s t analysis can increase our fund of information, i t can never of i t s e l f lead to an explanation. Those who believe the contrary have f a l l e n into the error of regarding sensations of v i s i o n , contact, movement, etc., and also images, as the primitive data of experience out of which more and more complex phenomena are compounded; whereas the exact reverse i s the re a l state of a f f a i r s — the primitive data of experience are exceedingly vague and. confused, and i t is only l a t e r that we learn gradually to discriminate the elements we have mentioned. Since the s i t u a t i o n can be conceived i n terms of discrete s t i m u l i i t has been supposed that behavior can l i k e -wise be conceived i n terms of unitary responses, chained re-flexe s , and the l i k e ; but th i s f a l s i f i e s the data by leaving out the pattern quality which i s precisely what i s unanalys-able. The physical s i t u a t i o n and the b i o l o g i c a l response are not two things as far as psychology i s concerned; they i n t e r -act so as to form one complex. L.W.Cole says that the formula 'stimulus-reaction' i s too simple to account for human behav-i o r , that the formula i s rather 'stimulus-sensation-meaning-reaction to meaning'. Certainly we s h a l l agree with his 3 4 f i r s t statement, i f perhaps not e n t i r e l y with his second. Of Psychophysics we need say l i t t l e i n this thesi l i k e Structural psychology i t i s a useful, even an indispensa ble supplement to the work of the functional and genetic schools, to which, together with what i s called Comparative psychology, we s h a l l turn i n the next chapter. 1 y Factors of Human Psychology; p.19. 35 Chapter 4 THE COMPARATIVE, GENETIC, AND FUNCTIONAL VIEWPOINTS We have already referred to the tremendously com-pl i c a t e d nature of the f i e l d of psychology and to the frag-mentary nature of the facts at our command. The consequences of these things are, f i r s t , that i t i s impossible to give a compact and highly systematized form to t h i s science, and second, that i t i s inevitable that there be wide differences of opinion between schools of thought. Before proceeding to discuss the l i n e of approach which seems to us to give most promise of being f r u i t f u l , we s h a l l touch on certain considerations which we think must be kept i n mind. F i r s t , we must consider certain characteristics of the t o t a l reactions of organisms which, according to many observers, cannot be reconciled with any mechanical scheme. Some of these are: (a) Spontaneity; (b) the action persists a f t e r the stimulus has ceased; (c) the a c t i v i t y comes to an end after a certain purpose has been achieved; (d) behavior i s modified by previous experience. These may perhaps be summed up by saying that the organism acts as a whole, and not i n i t s various parts. Mechanical explanations such as tropisms and condi-tioned reflexes have been advanced to account for these phe-nomena. But i t i s worth noting that, as McDougall has recent-36 l y pointed out, decerebrate animals show r e f l e x a c t i v i t y but do not show conditioned reflexes; they show a meachanical regularity of behavior but a l l spontaneity has disappeared. Other observers, therefore, f i n d i t necessary to postulate some unique v i t a l force to account for the fa c t s ; and we fi n d advanced such theories as Psycho-physical P a r a l l e l -ism, Emergent V i t a l i s m , etc. The view taken i n t h i s thesis Is that while these theories are of considerable interest from the philosophical point of view, psychology has at present no concern with them; they are premature, and psychology has a long way to go before i t gets i t s data i n such shape that hypotheses of this kind can be pr o f i t a b l y examined. Nevertheless psychology must accept as one of i t s data the fact that the behavior of l i v i n g organisms i s teleo-l o g i c a l i n i t s nature. What has to be done i s to free the dangerous term ' t e l e o l o g i c a l 1 from i t s metaphysical implica-tions, and to study the facts without theoretical presupposi-tions . Secondly, we s h a l l take the ground that the fact of consciousness cannot be successfully ignored; to ignore i t would be deliberately to discard many of our data. We cannot enter upon a detailed argument i n support of t h i s position; we must simply repeat what was stated e a r l i e r , that there are facts which can be ascertained i n no other way than by i n t r o -spective report of conscious experiences. For instance, Cole 1 An Outline of Psychology; pp. 55 and 56. 37 says: "A dose of hasheesh i s said to produce not only v i v i d hallucinations but a t e r r i b l e fear of impending death. The former effect i s general but i s the l a t t e r due only to an idlosyncracy of certain nervous systems? Only further i n t r o -1 spective reports can decide," T h i r d l y , we wish to suggest that i n psychology there have been h i s t o r i c a l l y two tendencies: For a very long time i t was usual to emphasize the tremendous difference between human and animal mentality, or even to suppose that the former i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y sui generis so that i t had to be studied i n i s o l a t i o n as having l i t t l e or no r e l a t i o n to the l a t t e r . Then more recently the tendency has been to emphasize the genetic relationship between the two and to stress s i m i l a r -i t i e s much more than differences, with the result that delib-eration and thought have been reduced to 'chained reflexes' or to a mechanical matter of associations f i x e d through the operation of t r i a l and error or through the so-called Laws of Learning. We believe that psychology must take the middle ground as between these two views; or rather that i t must keep i n mind the continuity that can be traced i n behavior at a l l l e v e l s from the lowest to the highest, and at the same time i t must not lose sight of the fact that as far as we can now see there i s a great gulf between human and animal behavior. There i s nothing to be gained by ignoring the tremendous 1 Factors of Human Psychology; p.23. 38 difference between r e f l e x and deliberate action; and we think that at present the continuity between human and animal behav-ior i s being too strongly emphasized (perhaps In the interests of a passion for l o g i c a l s i m p l i c i t y ) . I t must not be forgot-ten that language and a time-sense (especially of the future) seem to be exclusively human, and that these to things are what make possible thoughtful, deliberate, conscious action. It may be objected that what we have just said involves a contradiction; that there cannot be at the same time a continuity and a gulf between human and animal behavior. This may be so from a l o g i c a l standpoint, but we are dealing with psychology rather than with l o g i c , (or rather with what some writers are beginning to c a l l ' b i o - l o g i c ' ) . I t would be interesting to deal with t h i s point at length, but a l l we can do here i s to explain that what resolves the apparent contradiction i s t h i s : Recent studies have gone far to show that development i s often saltatory i n character, that i n the f i e l d of mental phenomena there occur transforma-tions which involve the sudden emergence of something new and d i f f e r e n t . A f u l l e r recognition of this feature i n the evolu-t i o n of mind i s one of the things that d i f f e r e n t i a t e the 'Ges-t a l t ' from the other schools of psychology. ( I t may not be amiss to point out parenthetically that t h i s notion of s a l t a -tory development shows a parallelism with (a) mutations i n . genetics, and (b) the Quantum theory In physics). Fourthly, we maintain that as far as human psycho-39 l o g y i s concerned, s o c i a l a n t e c e d e n t s and s o c i a l c o n t e x t are among the b a s i c d e t e r m i n e r s o f b e h a v i o r . Warren and C a r m i c h a e l say t h a t a complete p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n i n v o l v e s : (a) the p h y s i c s o f the s t i m u l u s ; (b) the p h y s i o l o g y of the r e c e p t o r -n e u r o - muscular systems; (c) i n t r o s o e c t i v e l y known events of 1 m e n t a l l i f e . But we cannot agree t h a t these t h r e e c o l l e c t i v e -l y . . constitute a complete p s y c h o l o g i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n ; we i n s i s t t h a t a l l b e h a v i o r o c c u r s i_n a c o n t e x t (which c o n t e x t i n c l u d e s p a t t e r n s o f m e n t a l , p h y s i c a l , and s o c i a l e v e n t s , c o n t i g u o u s and remote i n time and s p a c e ) , and t h a t t h i s c o n t e x t i s an e s s e n -t i a l d e t e r m i n e r o f b e h a v i o r . F u r t h e r we i n s i s t t h a t a c o n t e x t i s a c o n f i g u r a t i o n w h i c h p o s s e s s e s a u n i t a r y c h a r a c t e r t h a t d e f i e s a n a l y s i s . Some of the most i m p o r t a n t ways i n w h i c h the s o c i a l c o n t e x t a f f e c t s human b e h a v i o r a r e : (a) We l e a r n t o r e a c t d i s -c r i m i n a t i v e l y t o an enormous number o f a s p e c t s of our e n v i r o n -ment w h i c h are i g n o r e d by a n i m a l s . (b) The g r e a t m a j o r i t y of the s t i m u l i w h i c h a f f e c t us a c q u i r e the c h a r a c t e r o f s i g n s o f something n ot Immediately p r e s e n t ; and i t i s t o t h i s s i g n -c h a r a c t e r r a t h e r t h a n t o the crude p h y s i c a l s t i m u l u s t h a t we r e a c t . And i n c i d e n t a l l y we can o r d i n a r i l y f i n d i n the mere p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a s t i m u l u s n o t the s l i g h t e s t c l u e t o i t s s y m b o l i c 'meaning'. A n i m a l s as w e l l as humans r e a c t t o the meanings o f s t i m u l i , b u t o n l y among humans do we f i n d a tremendous use o f c o n v e n t i o n a l l y determined meanings. (c) A 1 Elements o f Human P s y c h o l o g y ; c h a p t e r 4. 40 point which i s often overlooked i s the extent to which human actions or responses (taken i n the widest sense) serve as stim-u l i to other human beings. The degree to which this i s the case with animals i s negligible i n comparison with ourselves, and there are those who say that we have here one of the most important factors d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g human from animal behavior; upon i t depend, as a moment's thought w i l l make clear, a l l human cooperation, human education, and almost a l l human achievement i n general. We s h a l l point out f i n a l l y that i n spite of the pro-nouncement of Warren and Carmichael quoted above, psychologists cannot i n practice ignore the contextual determiners of behav-i o r . Now these contextual features are, even for r e l a t i v e l y simple items of human behavior, so hopelessly i n t r i c a t e that we cannot imagine the p o s s i b i l i t y of ever tracing them out i n their completeness; and not only so, but for no two individu-als are they a l i k e . This i s one of the main reasons why psychology i s such a tremendously complicated study, and why we s t i l l have the tremendous divergences of opinion that we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. None the less progress i s being made; and, as i n the cases of the other sciences, we are progressing to the degree i n which we can discern uniformities and general pri n c i p l e s i n the mass of part i c u l a r and seemingly accidental data. Let us no?/ indicate what appear to us to be some of the more promising lin e s of further investigation. 41 We believe that the growth of mind must be conceived genetically as successive d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s of function which arise (sometimes, as has been said, i n saltatory fashion) out of an o r i g i n a l amorphous, undifferentiated, »all-or-none' type of behavior; and that these can best be conceived as patterns of behavior that a r t i c u l a t e themselves into more and more co-herent wholes, which are not susceptible of analysis into elem-ents because analysis destroys the integrated pattern-character the unitariness of which i s essential to i t s meaning. We think, further, that the stimulus-situation must also be conceived as patterned. Psychological experimentalists have commonly analysed such stimulus-patterns into discrete s t i m u l i and have proceeded to study separately the experiential correlates of each, the assumption being that the mental phe-nomenon i s the sum of i t s parts. Such studies have had t h e i r value, but i n future there w i l l have to be taken into account the res u l t s of other work which has c l e a r l y demonstrated that the pattern I t s e l f plays an important part i n determining the 2 mental phenomena. As Koffka says, "the assumption which i s commonly made that sensation Is determined once and for a l l by i t s stimulus, w i l l simply have to be abandoned." I t i s becoming clear, also, that successive d i f f e r -1 See chapter 5 below. 2See Pavlov, "Conditioned Reflexes"; pp. 145-7. The Growth of Mind; p.137. 42 entiations of mental a c t i v i t y are functionally correlated with successively discriminated aspects of the environment, and that i t i s i n some siich sense as this that we must interpret such terms as 'adaptation' and 'teleology'. I t follows that the organism i s receptive to the integrated pattern of the environment precisely because the organism i s possessed of a counterpart i n function. I t may be that we can f i n d here the basis of the philosophical doctrine of Psycho-physical Para-l l e l i s m . Another recent advance (or rather a laying bare of previous misconceptions, which w i l l make progress possible) i s that certain mehtal elements, formerly thought to be 'primi-t i v e ' and a r i g i n a l , are now found to be secondary and deriva-t i v e . For instance, C.J.Herrick and G.E.Coghill have found i n th e i r Investigations of a salamander known as Amblystoma that i n the l a r v a l stage the animal reacts as a whole, and not u n t i l a l a t e r stage of development do we f i n d that t h i s t o t a l -reaction i s replaced by reflexes. They state that "the t y p i c -a l two neurone, s h o r t - c i r c u i t connection between dorsal and ventral root-fibers appears lat e i n development and i s 1 not to be regarded as a primitive form." Herrick says furth-er i n another connection: "The concept of the r e f l e x i s not a general master-key competent to umlock a l l the secrets of brain and mind Attention should be especially directed-1 The Development of Reflex Mechanisms i n Amblystoma. Journal of Comparative Neurology, Vol.25,' 1915; p.84. 43 to the f u t i l i t y of attempting to derive i n t e l l i g e n c e and the higher mental f a c u l t i e s i n general from reflexes, habits, or any other forms of f i x e d or determinate behavior The 1 nervous system i s more than an aggregate of reflex-arcs." A s i m i l a r instance i s the recognition that such an apparently complex perception as that of the 'friendliness' of a certai n f a c i a l expression i s far more primitive than i s the well-known 'visual sensation of a red patch' of current theory. The i n i t i a l s i m p l i c i t y of a baby's perceptions i s not that of the so-called simple sensations, which are instead the product of a higher development of the power of discrimination. I t i s on such considerations as these that were based our e a r l i e r remarks concerning the Structural viewpoint i n psychology. Such facts make i t imperative to reverse that viewpoint; i t appears that complex perceptions are not b u i l t up out of 'simple' sensations, nor complex behavior out of reflexes. The genetically primitive sensations are vague undifferentiated wholes, reacted to as wholes, out of which are l a t e r discriminated ( i n some cases) the so-called simple sensations. E a r l i e r i n t h i s thesis we mentioned errors into which psychologists have f a l l e n i n t h e i r desire for l o g i c a l s i m p l i c i t y . We s h a l l now show our idea of how the notion of the r e l a t i o n between sensation-stimulus and movement-response should be recast. 1 N e i r o l o g i c a l Foundations of Animal Behavior; p.234. ' 44 This has been thought to be of the nature of a cause-and-effeet reaction; the stimulus acted on the sensory system and resulted i n various movements of a responsive nat-ure i n the motor-affective-glandular system, the central nerv-ous system playing i n the whole process the part of a coordin-ating and integrating agent. I t now appears that the sensory and the motor systems interact so much more intimately, than was formerly realized that we can best conceive of them as forming one self-ad lusting system. Take for example the case of a lumber-man wielding an axe. The ordinary account would say that the sight of the tree, the f e e l of the handle of the axe, the lumberman's mental 'set', etc., together constitute the stimu-lus si t u a t i o n ; while the contraction of the necessary muscles constitutes the response. But the case i s not so simple. While the muscle-fibres are i n the very act of contracting, kinaesthetic sensations from them keep the lumberman informed as to the position of the various parts of his body; and i n the l i g h t of these sensations the precise pattern of innerva-tion of the muscles i s continuously kept adjusted. Meanwhile other sense organs are also adjusted to suit the needs of the momentary s i t u a t i o n , while i n turn they supply sensations which again help to adjust the muscular action. I t i s mathematically certain that the lumberman never in his whole l i f e t i m e struck two axe-blows i n which the minutest deta i l s of muscular innervation were exactly the 45 same. In other words, every time he wields his axe he does something that to an extent i s new and unprecedented. He may nevertheless have learned to use an axe with extraordinary s k i l l ; but i n the l i g h t of our statement that each stroke contains new elements, the 'chained r e f l e x ' , 'bond', and. 'association' theories are seen to be quite inadequate to ex-pl a i n learning. These theories are also found deficient on other grounds which we s h a l l pass over. We desire here only to make the point that the sensori-motor 'mechanism' i s one integrated, self-adjusting, r e c i p r o c a l l y coordinated whole; the stimulus does not simply release the response through a system of connections. No sensory learning i s without motor components, and no motor learning i s without sensory components. This i s well i l l u s t r a t e d i n the disease c a l l e d locomotor ataxia. In t h i s disease, a purely nervous disorder, the power tof walking i s impaired or destroyed; yet i t i s not the motor centres of the nervous system that are diseased, i t i s the sensory centres. The victim may partly re-learn to walk, but only by substitut-ing other senses for the ones normally used; usually he re-learns to walk by car e f u l l y watching his feet. We s h a l l turn next to the contribution that animal and child psychology can make towards the study of the mental phenomena of c i v i l i z e d adults. Without an adequate of the two former, that of the l a t t e r can never be quite satisfactory. The serious error that has been made i s that hypothe-46 ses and concepts derived from the study of adult psychology have been applied i n Interpreting the mental l i f e of children. In genetic psychology old hypotheses have been applied to the new facts. The differences that have been found i n the mental processes of children have been ascribed to a lack" of sensa-tions, images, associations, etc. The result has been, accord-ing to Koffka, that "the psychology of the human adult has not infrequently been unable to define Its problems correctly, to say nothing of a r r i v i n g at serviceable hypotheses." He re-marks further that "there i s no p r i n c i p l e of mental development which we owe d i r e c t l y to c h i l d psychology", yet there must _be a genetic psychology, and through i t we can best understand the human adult. -It i s necessary to study the c h i l d as he i s , and not to view him always as an immature adult; and we must espec-i a l l y avoid interpreting observed facts by means of ready-made hypotheses. E.Claparede makes a similar statement; he remarks that heretofore studies of the c h i l d mind have been mainly ana l y t i c , l i s t s of children's words, phrases, and errors. But, he says, " t h i s labor does not seem to have taught the psychologist exactly what he wanted to know, v i z . , why the c h i l d thinks and expresses himself i n a certain manner; why his c u r i o s i t y i s so easily s a t i s f i e d with any answer one may give or which he may give himself : why he affirms and, believes things so manifestly contrary to fact; whence comes 1 The Growth of the Mind; pp. 5 and 6. 47 his peculiar verbalism; and how and by what steps t h i s incohe ence i s gradually superseded by the lo g i c of adult thought. In a word, contemporary research has stated the problem clear l y but has f a i l e d to give us the key for i t s solution." The problem, he says, turns out to be one of quality and not one of quantity. "Formerly, any progress made i n the child's i n t e l l i g e n c e was regarded as the res u l t of a certain number o additions and subtractions, such as an increase of new experi ence and elimination of certain errors -- a l l of them phenom-ena which i t was the business of science to explain. Now, t h i s problem i s seen to depend, f i r s t and foremost upon the fact that t h i s Intelligence undergoes a gradual change of character." Child thought appears obscure to adults not be-cause i t lacks certain elements but because i t i s a different 1 kind of thought. A s i m i l a r statement to the above can obviously be made of animal psychology. I t i s as erroneous, somebody has said, to regard a dog as a very stupid man as i t i s to regard a man as an exceedingly clever dog. 1 E.Clapar&de, In his oreface to J.Piaget's "The Language and Thought of the Child". 48 Chapter' 5 THOUGHT PRIOR TO LANGUAGE This chapter i s a continuation of the previous one in that i t w i l l give a further statement of our conception of the functional and genetic approach to the problems of psycho-logy. Before entering on t h i s discussion, however, we should explain that i n our view human int e l l i g e n c e i s best understood as being constituted of two components which are i n t r i c a t e l y interrelated but which are d i s c r i m i n a t e for purposes of study. These are: (a) what may be called organic i n t e l l i g e n c e , which i s r e l a t i v e l y independent of s o c i a l factors and whose r i s e may be traced through the evolving forms of l i f e from lowest to highest; and (b) the symbolic processes, s o c i a l i n o r i g i n . What we s h a l l say i s to be understood, of course, i n the l i g h t of the viewpoint stated, unfortunately i n only the sketchiest and most general terms, i n the preceding chapters of this thesis. We may, without doing too much violence to the genetic continuity of i t s evolution, d i f f e r e n t i a t e three func-t i o n a l stages of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n the development of organic i n t e l l i g e n c e . These are: (1) The pattern of transmission of excitations i s transmitted by the organism as a whole. (2) In m u l t i - c e l l u l a r organisms there appears a nervous system which has the s p e c i f i c function of transmitting and correlat-ing excitations. (3) Intentions and d i s t i n c t perceptual pat-terns are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d within the processes of neural correl-49 at i o n . We s h a l l discuss each of these i n turn, and we s h a l l hope that the discussion w i l l make s u f f i c i e n t l y clear what we mean by organic i n t e l l i g e n c e without our being put to the necessity of undertaking a formal d e f i n i t i o n . Our f i r s t stage i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by the behavior of an amoeba as seen under the microscope. The protrusion and re t r a c t i o n of the pseudopodia are not random, but are integrat-ed and coordinated into patterns which are conformable with the cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of the environmental s i t u a t i o n ; the behavior i s adaptive, "there i s the establishment of a new equilibrium i n an i n d i v i d u a l organism i n r e l a t i o n to some condition which i s i t s e l f an operating factor i n i n i t i a t i n g the changes involved 1 i n the adjustment." Jennings, af t e r long and detailed study, has stated that i f the amoeba were a large and conspicuous animal we should attribute to i t states of pleasure, pain, 2 hunger, desire, etc., just as we do to a dog. I t i s noteworthy that the reaction of the amoeba i s not f i x e d i n a mechanical sort of way; i t i s more or less mod-i f i e d by the organic d i s p o s i t i o n or 'set' of the animal at the time, and by immediately preceding experience. I t i s i n th i s fact that we f i n d the genetic o r i g i n of learning and habit  formation. An example of a simple form of the second stage i s "'"F.Lorimer, "The Growth of Reason"; p.11. 2Quoted by R.M.Ogden i n "Psychology and Education"; p.34. 50 the primitive 'nerve net' i n the medusae or j e l l y - f i s h . The study of the function of such a nerve net i n f a c i l i t a t i n g adaptive behavior brings out another most important point: that neural structures originate i n , and function i n integral r e l a t i o n with, the whole organ!smic system. "The tendency to iso l a t e the treatment of neurological behavior from other types of behavior has been a cause of very serious misconcep-1 tions of i n t e l l e c t u a l functions." With the appearance of specialized conducting c e l l s we have (a) sensitiveness to a greater variety of stimu-l i ; (b) p o s s i b i l i t y of more complex responses; (c) the mechan-ism for the establishment of s p e c i f i c response patterns on a basis of mutual reinforcement between certain conduction units and mutual i n h i b i t i o n between others. At this stage there appears much more noticeably the phenomenon to the importance of which we drew attention just now: namely, the modification of the response i n accord-ance with the physiological state of the organism at the time. For instance Herrick says that "the i d e n t i c a l stimulus applied to an earthworm may at one time be followed by a forward crawling and at another time by an avoiding reaction i n the form of a quick jerk which brings into play an e n t i r e l y d i f -2 ferent set of nervous elements." The condition which i s produced within an organism 1 Lorimer; op. c i t . , p.14. 2Herrick; "Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior"; p.99. 51 when physiological equilibrium i s disturbed by stimulating conditions (with r e s u l t i n g changes i n metabolic rates, etc.,) i s usually c a l l e d a 'tensional' state. Another most s i g n i f i c -ant point i s to be noted with regard to such tensional situa-t i o n s , especially when they are sustained ( i . e . , not immediate-l y resolved back into equilibrium by some quasi-mechanical reaction). This i s that d i s t i n c t l y non-neural factors seem then to play a decisive part i n the integration of the t o t a l response -- such factors as glandular a c t i v i t y , r espiration changes, changes of muscular tonus, etc. I t seems probable that i t i s i n r e l a t i o n to such factors that the phenomena of  consciousness appear. Again, these non-neural processes are r e l a t i v e l y obscure; they are "capable of only p a r t i a l introspective report, of l i t t l e d irect instrumental experimentation, and are primar-i l y a f f a i r s of i n f e r e n t i a l discovery ( l i k e the atoms of the 1 p h y s i c i s t s ) " . Now these minute and obscure processes have exercised a peculiar role i n philosophical theory; they have been conceived of as ' s p i r i t u a l ' and as discontinuous with 'objective r e a l i t y ' , thus generating the problem of finding how the two can be brought into r e l a t i o n with each other. "The emancipation of the human mind from t h i s dilemma may f a i r -l y be said to be the greatest achievement of modern philosophy". In the t h i r d stage we f i n d the appearance of lnten-t i o n a l patterns and of perceptual patterns, and we s h a l l d i s-1 Lorimer; op. c i t . , p.19. 52 cuss these two s e p a r a t e l y . The r e l a t i v e l y obscure and i m p l i c i t p r o c e s s e s of which we have j u s t been s p e a k i n g c o n s t i t u t e the b a s i s o f the i n t e n t i o n a l p a t t e r n s . When t h e r e i s a s u s t a i n e d t e n s i o n a l s t a t e these p r o c e s s e s are m a i n t a i n e d i n a s t a t e o f s u s t a i n e d e x c i t a t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e e x e r c i s e a d o m i n a t i n g i n f l u e n c e o v e r the a r t i c \ i l a t i o n o f the s u c c e s s i v e r e a c t i o n p a t t e r n s w h i c h a r e i n i t i a t e d (as i n the case o f a hungry animal w h i c h sees f o o d t h a t i t cannot r e a c h ) . Such s u s t a i n e d e x c i t a t i o n p a t t e r n s we c a l l I n t e n t i o n s , and when t h e y are s y m b o l i z e d we may c a l l them purposes. I t f o l l o w s t h a t the r e a c t i o n - p a t t e r n s w i l l be adapt-ed t o the s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n -- they a r e s u g g e s t i o n s ; and i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the h i g h e r forms of i n t e l l i g e n c e t h a t t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s are experimented w i t h i m p l i c i t l y r a t h e r t h a n o v e r t -l y . W i t h lower forms of i n t e l l i g e n c e the r e a c t i o n p a t t e r n s t e n d t o be o v e r t , and to be p o o r l y adapted t o the s i t u a t i o n u n l e s s the p a t t e r n o f t h a t s i t u a t i o n i s one t o whi c h the organ-ism i s f u n c t i o n a l l y adapted. I n so f a r as t h i s overt b e h a v i o r i s i l l - a d a p t e d t o the s i t u a t i o n we c a l l i t 'random' or ' t r i a l and e r r o r ' b e h a v i o r . The appearance o f p e r c e p t u a l p a t t e r n s i s e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t i n r e l a t i o n t o the f i r s t b e g i n n i n g s o f what may be c a l l e d thought ( i m p l i c i t e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n ) . When a s i t u a t i o n i s p e r c e i v e d as an a r t i c u l a t e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n , the p a t t e r n o f neur-a l a c t i v i t y must c o r r e s p o n d i n some sense ( t e n d i n g towards a p o i n t - t o - p o i n t c o r r e l a t i o n ) w i t h the p a t t e r n o f the s i t u a t i o n . 53 The d e f i n i t e n e s s o f such n e u r a l p a t t e r n s w i l l range i n a grad-i e n t a l l the way from expremely vague t o r e l a t i v e l y p r e c i s e and d i s t i n c t . As d i s t i n c t n e s s i n c r e a s e s , a p o i n t w i l l be reached where I t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the n e u r a l p a t t e r n t o be r e i n s t a t e d i n the absence of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n ; and we t h e n have an i m p l i c i t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of an absent s i t u a t i o n . T h i s we may c o n s i d e r t o be the g e n e t i c o r i g i n of memory, as d i s t i n c t from the mere a f f e c t i v e tone of f a m i l i a r i t y a t t a c h i n g t o a s i t u a t i o n . There w i l l appear, t o o , the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u c h an I m p l i c i t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n f u n c t i o n i n g i n a s u s t a i n e d t e n s i o n a l s i t u a t i o n ; and t h i s i s a s o r t o f 'thought' -- i t i s the o r g a n i c i n t e l l i g e n c e o f w h i c h we spoke e a r l i e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . To g a i n a c l e a r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h i s o r g a n i c i n t e l l i -gence as i t appears i n a c t i o n , i t i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o r e a d K o h l e r ' s "The M e n t a l i t y of Apes"; and we b e l i e v e t h a t the ob-s e r v a t i o n s t h e r e d e s c r i b e d can'be u s e f u l l y i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f the above a c c o u n t . Prom t h i s book we can w e l l see the pecu-l i a r l i m i t a t i o n s of t h i s k i n d o f i n t e l l i g e n c e as i t appears i n i t s h i g h e s t m a n i f e s t a t i o n s i n the b e h a v i o r o f a group o f notab-l y i n t e l l i g e n t a n i m a l s . K o h l e r h i m s e l f says t h a t the thought of h i s apes, w h i l e i n c o r p o r a t i n g elements of absent s i t u a t i o n s , cannot oper-a t e d e t a c h e d from the immediate s i t u a t i o n ( u s u a l l y a k e e n l y 1 d e s i r e d bunch of f r u i t ) . We have r e a d elsewhere o f another 1The M e n t a l i t y o f Apes; p.282. 54 i l l u s t r a t i o n : a savage t r y i n g t o put on and l a c e up a p a i r o f b o o t s , the h y p o t h e s i s b e i n g t h a t he has no words f o r the boots or l a c e s ; n e c e s s a r i l y h i s thought would be m o s t l y u n v e r b a l i z e d but he would p r o b a b l y be t h i n k i n g q u i t e a c t i v e l y . H i s t h o u g h t , however, would be p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the t e n s i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and would be concerned w i t h m a n i p u l a t i o n s , t o u c h p e r c e p t i o n s , e t c . I t would be a k i n d o f p e r c e p t u a l t h o u g h t . The d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e o f the ' f r e e ' i n t e l l i g e n c e w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o n l y of human bein g s i s t h a t i t can h o l d i n mind a problem w h i c h i s not e n f o r c e d by the immediate p e r c e p t u a l s i t u a t i o n , and can c o n s i d e r and f r e e l y experiment w i t h s u g g e s t i o n s and i n f e r e n c e s . Moreover, i t i s our b e l i e f t h a t the s y m b o l i c p r o c e s s e s are what l i b e r a t e t h o u g h t . (We s h a l l a m p l i f y t h i s statement i n the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r ) . Dewey says t h a t i n what we have c a l l e d ' o r g a n i c ' i n t e l l i g e n c e , r e a c t i o n t o a suggested t h i n g i s much the same as i f the suggested t h i n g were a c t u a l ; e.g., an a n i m a l may r e a c t t o the scent of a man e x a c t l y as i t w o u l d to an a c t u a l man; the tendency i s towards u n c r i t i c a l a c c e p t a n c e . A t h i n g , he s a y s , means another t h i n g , i t does not mean a meaning. What i s needed i s some d e v i c e f o r s e e i n g such t h i n g s as they a r e , v i z . , as i n f e r r e d o b j e c t s ; t h e n we can get i n t o f r e e , f l e x i b l e , and e f f e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the t h i n g i n d i c a t e d . "Words are the g r e a t i n s t r u m e n t o f t r a n s l a t i n g a r e l a t i o n of_ i n f e r e n c e e x i s t i n g between two t h i n g s I n t o a new k i n d of t h i n g 55 1 w h i c h can be o p e r a t e d w i t h on i t s own a c c o u n t . " I n summarizing t h i s c h a p t e r we may remark t h a t we have had no i n t e n t i o n of g i v i n g an account of n r e - s y m b o l i c t h o u g h t . What we have t r i e d t o do i s t o i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y y e t d e f i n i t e l y the g e n e t i c o r i g i n s o f the h i g h e r mental p r o c e s s e s ; and a l s o t o i n d i c a t e ways i n w h i c h G e n e t i c p s y c h o l o g y can i l l u m i n a t e our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the p r o c e s s e s . 1 E s s a y s i n E x p e r i m e n t a l L o g i c ; pp. 431 f f . 56 Chapter 6 THE RELATION OP THE SYMBOLIC PROCESSES TO HUMAN REASON In passing from the consideration of organic i n -telligence to that of the free i n t e l l i g e n c e made possible by the device known as the symbolic processes, we s h a l l have to note that there i s no clear-cut dichotomy between the tv?o, for the one shades into the other. Yet the indeterminate regiod between them i s a great deal narrower than i n the case of most of the other d i s t i n c t i o n s that psychologists make for convenience of study, (between sensation and a f f e c t i o n , for example). The d i s t i n c t i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y a sharp one, and may be said to consist i n whether thought can or cannot operate detached from the immediate perceptual s i t u a t i o n . But this d i s t i n c t i o n which we can so easily make in theory i s very hard to make i n practice, for the reason that commonly the two kinds of intelligence interact i n a very i n t r i c a t e fashion. An example i s the process of solving a geometrical exercise; i n t h i s case the thought fluctuates back and f o r t h between quite abstract inferences and the actual figure. (Yet t h i s case i s complicated by the fact that the geometrical figure with which we work i s not only a sort of perceptual s i t u a t i o n , i t i s also to an extent a symbolic device, l i k e language i t s e l f . ) When a man i s untangling a snarled length of s t r i n g , he i s using almost exclusively his perceptual, organic i n t e l l i g e n c e . We have already mentioned i t s use among animals 57 on a high plane i n the case of Kohler's apes; some very i n t e r -esting i l l u s t r a t i o n s of Its operation on a lower plane may be found i n the Peckhams' "wasps, Social and S o l i t a r y " , and the descriptions i n th i s book w i l l also make abundantly clear how f l e x i b l e can be that behavior commonly c a l l e d s t r i c t l y i n s t i n c t -ive . We know of no s p e c i f i c study that has been made of the development of the symbolic thought processes from b i r t h to maturity. E x i s t i n g accounts of c h i l d psychology have usu-a l l y been given from another angle, as was pointed out by Claparede i n the passage which we quoted above; and the work of the Sterns i s a good example of t h i s . Piaget's two recent books, "The Language and Thought of the Child" and "Judgment and Reasoning i n the Chi l d " , come nearer being the sort of study which we have i n mind; but they deal with the development of c h i l d i s h i n t e l l i g e n c e from age 6 up to near the beginning of adolescence, and at age 6 symbolie i n t e l l i g e n c e i s already well established. These books, however, bring out some very int e r e s t i n g points that have hitherto been neglected, and on that account should be read by a l l students of the subject. Even less has been done on the study of the evolution of symbolic thought from the ontogenetic (as distinguished from the phylogenetic) point of view. Such studies have usually stressed the ethnological and anthropological aspects rather 58 than the psychological; and even where they have been t r u l y psychological, the tendency has been to apply to savage races the concepts derived from t r a d i t i o n a l accounts of the mental a c t i v i t y of c i v i l i z e d adults, a method which has le d inevitably to misunderstandings and false interpretations. On the other hand we have many splendid descriptive accounts of how ra t i o n a l thought functions i n i t s developed form. As good examples as any are two works which we have already mentioned: parts of Dewey's "Essays on Experimental Logic", and for a more popular treatment, the same author's "How We Think". In no such work, however, have we found an e x p l i c i t d i s t i n c t i o n made between our two forms of i n t e l l i g e n c e . There i s an i m p l i c i t acceptance of the two aspects and casual references are made to them; but the two forms are not e x p l i c i t -l y recognized and separately treated. Rational thought i s des-cribed as i t actually operates -- as an i n t r i c a t e interplay of symbolic intelligence with what we have called 'organic' i n -tell i g e n c e . We believe that the f u l l recognition of the d i s -t i n c t i o n which we are urging would c l a r i f y some current issues i n psychology, as, for example, the d i f f i c u l t question of imageless thought. I t should be explained that we owe the idea of treating the subject of thought i n this way to P.Lorimer's "The Growth of Reason", and also that i n the previous chapter we followed to a certain extent his treatment of p r e - l i n g u i s t i c mental a c t i v i t y . 59 We s h a l l now discuss some fundamental considerations that should be taken into account i n the further study of sym-bol i c thought, I. We must recognize that symbolic thought i s by no means r e s t r i c t e d to verbal symbols, although these l a t t e r play a predominating part i n a l l except the very lowest forms of i t . Dewey, i n the works that we have just mentioned, lays very great stress on the fact that, except i n infancy, v i r t u a l l y everything that we perceive acts as an indicator of something else - - i t i s a sign. I t i s exceedingly d i f f i c u l t to conceive of a perception devoid of a l l 'meaning1. Cole gives the i l l u s -t r a t i o n of a class of psychology students being frightened at a sudden noise over t h e i r heads, u n t i l they recognized i t as snow s l i d i n g o f f the roof; but we would point out that even i n t h i s case the noise was not perceived merely as a noise, with-out s i g n i f y i n g anything at a l l ; i t s i g n i f i e d 'something to be a f r a i d o f . Another often quoted i l l u s t r a t i o n i s the exper-ience' that most of us occasionally have of perceiving a p r i n t -ed word i n a very peculiar way, as i f i t were stripped of a l l associations; the word takes on a strange and unfamiliar appearance. This universal perceiving of things as signs l i e s , of course, at the basis of a l l inference; and much work has been done on the topic. A l l that we wish to emphasize here i s our b e l i e f that some of t h i s work has got i t s e l f 'side-tracked' by theoretical presuppositions derived from metaphysics and 60 formal l o g i c . Several writers make the following d i s t i n c t i o n between the terms 'symbol' and 'sign'. Symbols Include lang-uage (spoken, written, and gestural) together with any other existences that are conventionally set aside, as i t were, to serve as indicators of other things. The term sign i s broader; i t refers to anything at a l l which i s taken as indi c a t i n g some-thing else; for example a farmer w i l l take the sudden scurrying of hens into the chicken-house as a sign of the presence of a hawk, and w i l l Immediately look into the sky. In t h i s thesis we are concerned more p a r t i c u l a r l y with language symbols, and our purpose i n this part of the chapter i s to indicate, without going into any d e t a i l , certain aspects of language as consid-ered from the psychological standpoint. I I . I t may be worth while to point out that there has long existed a doctrine with regard to the function of language, namely that language i s primarily the expression of'thought. This notion s t i l l seems to pers i s t s u f f i c i e n t l y at least to color current accounts; but i t i s being generally superseded by the theory (held by Malinowsky and many others) that primar-i l y language i s an accompaniment of action; that i t i s used secondarily to influence the action of others through the expression of desire, emotion, etc.; that i t s t e r t i a r y function i s to enable us to enter into more intimate s o c i a l r elations, with others; (the so-called 'phatic' communion); and that only after a l l these Is i t the expression of thought.. 61 I I I . Another misconception, more of a metaphysical nature, i s that language i s a duplicate or a sort of shadow-soul of r e a l i t y , a concept which dates back to the Greeks; and i t i s possibly a p a r t i a l consequence of this concept that philosophers (Descartes, for example) have thought that they could arrive at 'Truth 1 through a study and manipulation of words. We do not propose to comment on th i s idea, but i t leads to one or two considerations with regard to the general theory of sym-bolism which we s h a l l b r i e f l y mention even though they are r e a l l y a digression from our main topic. We have stated ( i n chapter 2 above) that the whole question of symbolism i s now beginning to receive a good deal of attention. I t would be possible to write an interesting thesis on the subject of language as a potent agent of mis-conception -- as an actual hindrance to thought and communica-t i o n . B a s i c a l l y the trouble with language i s that words are used without d e f i n i t e reference. Ten men use the same word, but they mean ten different things by i t ; or again, one man uses a word and another hears and interprets i t , but the thing to which the interpreter believes It to refer i s not the same as the thing which the speaker had i n mind. Yet we proceed on the general assumption that a given word 'means' the same thing to a l l who say or hear i t ; and to th i s naive assumption i s due much current controversy of the kind which we have characterized above as verbal. An i d e a l l y perfect language would provide one defin-62 i t e symbol for each d i s c r i m i n a t e entity i n the universe. Language i n the ordinary sense can of course never even re-motely approach this i d e a l ; but we may note that the symbolic device known as mathematics i_s t h e o r e t i c a l l y capable of becoming i n this sense a perfect language, and i t i s partly for t h i s reason that language i s becoming more and more a matter of mathematics as far as science i s concerned -- i n fact mathema-t i c s i s tending to become the language of science. IV. There i s another source of error to which we wish to draw e x p l i c i t attention. This i s the notion that the struc-ture of thought i s mirrored i n the form of language, so that the former can be detected by a study of the l a t t e r . This, of course, i s not to be Interpreted as a statement that language can give us no clue to thought. We must also guard, as Jesperson says, against the 1 assumption that the word i s the unit of thought; genetically the sentence i s primary and the word derivative. V. As to the psychological function of words i n en-abling us to ' f i x ' concepts by substituting for them a symbol . with which the mind can e a s i l y deal, we need say nothing here, for the sub.iect i s dealt with i n d e t a i l i n most works on psychology; yet we must not lose sight of the fact that t h i s function of words Is a basic factor i s the establishment of symbolic as contrasted with organic i n t e l l i g e n c e . I t w i l l for 1 The Philosophy of Grammar; pp.305 f f . the same reason be unnecessary for us to deal with the way i n which the meaning of a word becomes at once richer and more precise; although we may remark that we do not e n t i r e l y agree with the usual explanation of t h i s phenomenon i n terms of a sort of accretion of associations. Having thus advanced i n somewhat random fashion the above general considerations, we s h a l l conclude t h i s thesis with a b r i e f discussion of the l i n e s along which the study of symbolic thought i s proceeding. I. We mentioned lust now (p.60) that language originate i n r e l a t i o n to s o c i a l behavior. We s h a l l now supplement t h i s remark by pointing out that, although there i s as yet no s a t i s factory theory of the genesis of language, It seems probable that before there was developed any grammar, syntactical struc ture, or naming function, s o c i a l behavior was integrated with the assistance of vocal sounds of the nature of interjections and imperatives. Thus a beginning was made whereby certain s p e c i f i c sounds became the Instruments of s p e c i f i c s o c i a l adjustments. From t h i s beginning was gradually b u i l t up a condition i n which elaborate and i n t r i c a t e ways of social behavior became organized about words. Today the c h i l d i s born into an environment where this organization already ex-i s t s : consequently the c i v i l i z e d ways of l i f e and the correla-t i v e l i n g u i s t i c structure are learned together by the c h i l d . I t i s now f a i r l y generally rea l i z e d that the l i n g -u i s t i c processes overshado?/ a l l others as a medium of i n t e r -action between the individual and his soc i a l environment; and that reciprocally they furnish the great means whereby society humanizes i t s members. This social context of the language function has been much studied of l a t e . Again, the language processes occur i n a psychological context, and as we have already pointed out, most textbooks i n psychology deal at some . length with the subject of language i n th i s l a t t e r connection. What seems to be needed now i s a study of the interaction of these two sets of. processes. We must unravel "the main lines of interaction between the structure of organic intelligence and the structure of so c i a l organization, and we must recognize adequately "the role of vocal processes i n t h i s 1 interaction." Jean Piaget, i n the two works which we have prev-iously mentioned, has made a start i n th i s d i r e c t i o n ; and his investigations lead him to attribute mainly to so c i a l factors the genesis of the notion of relations between things -- es-pe c i a l l y the r e l a t i o n of causality. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , he finds that everything i s taken for granted by very young c h i l d -ren, and that i t i s not u n t i l the c h i l d r e a l l y converses with other people that he finds i t necessary to adapt himself to the view/point of others, to question h i s own b e l i e f s , to just-i f y his notions, and therefore to modify and. c l a r i f y his idea's of r e l a t i o n s . 1 F.Lorimer; op.cit., p.73. 65 I I . I t i s not p o s s i b l e f o r us t o g i v e here even an out-l i n e d account o f the development o f s y m b o l i c i n t e l l i g e n c e from i n f a n c y onward, f o r the r e a s o n t h a t t h i s development s t i l l a w a i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; and one way o f i n v e s t i g a t i n g the problem would be f o r the immense mass of m a t e r i a l t h a t has a l r e a d y been a c c u m u l a t e d by c h i l d p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o be worked over and re-examined i n the l i g h t o f the t h e o r y w h i c h we have o u t l i n e d . T h i s t h e o r y i s t h a t human r e a s o n i s o f a t w o - f o l d s t r u c t u r e , i t s components b e i n g what we have c a l l e d r e s p e c t i v e l y ' o r g a n i c ' and ' s y m b o l i c ' i n t e l l i g e n c e ; t h a t the development o f the former can be t r a c e d up t h r o u g h the r i s i n g s c a l e of a n i m a l l i f e ; but t h a t i t i s t h r o u g h the l a t t e r t h a t thought i s r e c o n s t i t u t e d i n t o human r e a s o n . We s h o u l d l i k e , however, t o g i v e an example t o show how our h y p o t h e s i s may be a p p l i e d t o the study of problems w h i c h have p r o v e d t r o u b l e s o m e . The concept of ' g e n e r a l i d e a s ' has been one o f these troublesome problems, and we s h a l l t r y t o f o r m u l a t e , i n the l i g h t o f the view t h a t we have e x p r e s s e d , a statement w h i c h seems t o g i v e promise o f a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d -i n g o f t h i s c o n c e p t . F u n c t i o n a l l y , a l l i d e a s a r e g e n e r a l , f o r they may be thought o f as b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s t h a t f u n c t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o v a r i o u s s i t u a t i o n s . The d i f f i c u l t y , t h e n , i s w i t h the con-s c i o u s r e c o g n i t i o n o f i d e a s as b e i n g g e n e r a l , and t h i s , we t h i n k , i s a p r o d u c t of a n a l y s i s . But t h i s a n a l y s i s depends on s y m b o l i c thought p r o c e s s e s , as we s h a l l now t r y t o show. 66 P r i o r to verbal thought there i s an organic i n t e l l -igence which i s i n t u i t i v e i n i t s nature, and whose operation can best be described i n terms of the Gestalt psychology. We sha l l say, then, that i n th i s sort of tho\ight the organization of an experience consists in" the discrimination and more pre-cise d e f i n i t i o n of a configuration upon a ground, and that t h i s process involves the inclusion of certain members and the exclusion of certain other elements. Now these two pro-cesses of inclusion and exclusion are the genetic basis of synthesis and analysis, but as yet there i s nothing i n them that can properly be cal l e d synthesis or analysis. I t i s a l l one process. When we are speaking of a figure becoming defined to say that certain elements are included i s the same thing as to say that certain elements are excluded; the act of includ-ing involves an act of excluding. But when an experience i s organized on the verbal lane, the configuration which has become defined i s named, i . e . , a verbal symbol i s tacked on to i t whereby i t i s made available for s o c i a l reference as well as becoming 'fixed' as an available unit of thought. I f other verbal symbols are also available, elements that are included i n the configuration can be discriminated and named, which constitutes a veritable analysis. Conversely the elements of the configuration (at-t r i b u t e s , r e l a t i o n s , and what not) can be recognized as con-s t i t u t i n g the configuration — a veritable synthesis. Config-urations which are organized on this plane we c a l l 'concepts'; p 67 t h e y are f i x e d , and are i n a s t a t e where they can e i t h e r be a n a l y s e d o r can be used i n such s y m b o l i c s t r u c t u r e s as " T h i s r a i n i s good f o r the lawns"; t h e y are the i n s t r u m e n t s of f r e e i n t e l l i g e n c e . C o n f i g u r a t i o n s w h i c h have been o r g a n i z e d on the o r g a n i c p l a n e we c a l l ' i n t u i t i o n s ' ; they are not s u s c e p t i b l e o f t h i s f r e e mental m a n i p u l a t i o n . The d i f f e r e n c e between them and the more h i g h l y ( v e r b a l l y ) o r g a n i z e d c o n f i g u r a t i o n s can be w e l l summarized by s a y i n g t h a t they are p e r c e p t s r a t h e r t h a n c o n c e n t s (and hence our p r e v i o u s use of the phrase ' p e r c e p t u a l i n t e l l i g e n c e ' as a synonym f o r ' o r g a n i c i n t e l l i g e n c e ' ; see page 54 a b o v e ) . • How the r e c o g n i t i o n o f i d e a s as b e i n g g e n e r a l i n -v o l v e s the r e c o g n i t i o n o f I d e n t i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s ; and t h i s , i t a o p e a r s , i s not p o s s i b l e w i t h ' i n t u i t i o n s ' , the i d e a s must have been o r g a n i z e d on the v e r b a l p l a n e b e f o r e t h e r e can be the n e c e s s a r y a n a l y s i s . The above a c c o u n t , as we have g i v e n . i t , i s perhaps not v e r y s a t i s f a c t o r y ; i t i s too ' s k e l e t o n i c ' , i t needs t o be expanded i n d e t a i l and s u p p o r t e d by e v i d e n c e . But our purpose was not t o prove a n y t h i n g ; i t was t o g i v e an example of how our n o t i o n o f the t w o - f o l d n a t u r e of human thought may be use-f u l i n a t t a c k i n g c e r t a i n problems t h a t i n the p a s t have proved d i f f i c u l t . I I I . We suggest f u r t h e r t h a t i f our h y p o t h e s i s be i n v e s t -i g a t e d and d e v e l o p e d , i t may w e l l b r i n g r e s u l t s t h a t w i l l be o f i n t e r e s t i n the f i e l d of mental t e s t i n g . 68 Our present intelligence tests are admittedly de-signed to operate i n a sort of 'blunderbuss' fashion; we aim a variety of tests at 'intelligence' i n the large, and the r e l a t -ive consistency of results indicates that we do succeed i n h i t t i n g something d e f i n i t e . Numerous attempts have been made, by s t a t i s t i c a l study of correlations and by other means, to discriminate constitutive elements within 'general' i n t e l l i -gence. I f we could isolate these elements our tests could be made much more sat i s f a c t o r y , and i n c i d e n t a l l y we should have a much better idea of what i t i s that we are measuring. Thus f a r , however, e f f o r t s In t h i s d i r e c t i o n have met with l i t t l e success. It i s not to be thought that we are postulating the symbolic processes as the determining factor i n the degree of intelligence shown by an individual ( h i s v I . Q . ) ; although i f our hypothesis be correct i t appears that they must be a maior contributing factor. In our present tests the assumption i s apparently that an Individual's s o c i a l environment (and con-sequently his symbolic intelligence) remains uniform, and can therefore be treated, mathematically speaking, as a constant; so that the I.Q. becomes a function of some physiological factor s\ich as Innate complexity of neAral structure or a v a i l -able amount of 'nervous energy'. Whether or not organic and symbolic i n t e l l i g e n c e . 1 See for example R.M.Ogden, "Psychology and Education"; chanter 17. 69 can be i s o l a t e d and separately measured remains to be seen. The d i f f i c u l t y i s , as we said previously (p.56), that the two interact so i n t r i c a t e l y . Many tests have been invented that were thought to be purely perceptual and non-verbal, but work has recently been done that shows f a i r l y c l e a r l y that verbal schemata function to a considerable extent even i n tests of 1 t h i s kind. In t h i s thesis we have t r i e d to do three things: (a) to estimate the present status of psychological theory i n so far as I t i s concerned with r a t i o n a l thought and to suggest certain c r i t i c i s m s of t r a d i t i o n a l views; (b) to outline some of the more promising lin e s for further study; and (c) to advance an hypothesis concerning the structure of human reason. This hypothesis i s not to be confused with the Be-h a v i o r i s t theory of thought. Bertrand R u s s e l l , r e f e r r i n g to t h i s theory, says: "True, we t a l k a great deal, and Imagine that i n so doing we are showing that we can think; but behav-i o r i s t s say that the t a l k they have to l i s t e n to can be ex-plained without supposing that people think. Where you might expect a chapter on 'thought processes' you come instead to a chapter on 'The Language Habit'. I t i s humiliating to f i n d 2 how t e r r i b l y adequate this hypothesis turns out to be." Examples 'are:- C.J.Warden, "The Relative Economy of Various Modes of Attack i n the Mastery of a Stylus Maze"; Jour, of Exp. Psych., 1924, Vol. 7, pp. 243-275; and B.T. Baldwin and E.L.Stecher, "Psychology of the Pre-school Child"; p.73. 2 The Analysis of Mind; p.27. 70 We agree with Russell that this theory seems very 'adequate', so much so that there i s probably a good deal of tr u t h i n i t . But we believe that r a t i o n a l thought cannot be reduced to merely language habits; such an hypothesis Is too simple to account for the facts, and i n t h i s respect i t i s analogous to the 'stimulus-response' formula which we also c r i t i c i z e d on the same ground of over-simplicity. L a s t l y , we hope that our estimate of t r a d i t i o n a l psychological doctrines i s not too pessimistic. We cannot convince ourselves that current theories of r a t i o n a l thought are satisfactory, nor can we blind ourselves to the tremendous d i f f i c u l t y and complexity of the problems involved; but we have t r i e d to show that much profitable work has been done, and that promising new theories are being advanced i n the l i g h t of which there can be reinterpreted the mass of valuable data that have been accumulated by investigators i n the past. BIBLIOGRAPHY o f works quoted from o r r e f e r r e d t o i n the t e x t . ANGELL, J.R. " P s y c h o l o g y " , 4 t h ed., r e v i s e d . New Y o r k , 1908. BALDWIN, B.T. and STECHER, E.L. "The P s y c h o l o g y o f the P r e -s c h o o l C h i l d " . New Y o r k , 1925. BROAD", C D . "The Mind and i t s P l a c e i n N a t u r e " . London, 1925. BROWN, W. "Mind and P e r s o n a l i t y " . London, 1926. COLE, L.W. " F a c t o r s of Human P s y c h o l o g y " . U n i v e r s i t y of C o l o r a d o , 1926. DEWEY, J . "Essays i n E x p e r i m e n t a l L o g i c " . C h i c a g o , 1916. DEWEY, J . "How We T h i n k " . B o s t o n , 1910. HERRICK, C.J. " N e u r o l o g i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s of A n i m a l B e h a v i o r " . New Y o r k , 1924. HERRICK, C.J. and COGHILL, G.E. "The Development o f R e f l e x Mechanisms i n Amblystoma". J o u r n a l of Comparative N e u r o l o g y , V o l . 2 5 , 1915. JAMES, W. " P s y c h o l o g y , B r i e f e r Course". London, 1906. JESPERSON, 0. "The P h i l o s o p h y of Grammar". London, 1924. KOFFKA, K. "The Growth o f the Mind". London, 1925. KOHLER, W. "The M e n t a l i t y o f Apes". London, 1925. LORIMER, F. "The Growth o f Reason". London, 1929. MAUDSLEY, C. "The P h y s i o l o g y o f Mind". London, 1876. MILLAR, I . E . "The P s y c h o l o g y o f T h i n k i n g " . New Y o r k , 1917. McDOUGALL, W. "An O u t l i n e of P s y c h o l o g y " . New Y o r k , 1923. OGDEN, O.K. and RICHARDS, I.A. "The Meaning of Meaning". London, 1923. OGDEN, R.M. " P s y c h o l o g y and E d u c a t i o n " . New Y o r k , 1926. PAVLOV, I.P. " C o n d i t i o n e d R e f l e x e s " . New Y o r k , 1927. PECKHAM, J . "Wasps, S o c i a l and S o l i t a r y " . B o s t o n , 1905. PIAGET, J . "The Language and Thought o f the C h i l d " . London, 1926. PIAGET, J . "judgment and Reasoning i n the C h i l d " . London, 1928. R6BACK, A.A. " B e h a v i o r i s m and Psych o l o g y . " London, 1924. RUSSELL, B. "The A n a l y s i s of Mind". London, 1921. SAYCE, A.H. " i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the S c i e n c e o f Languages", (2 v olumes). London, 1900. SPEARMAN, C. "The Nature o f I n t e l l i g e n c e and the P r i n c i p l e s of C o g n i t i o n " . London, 1923. THORNDIKE, E.L. "Animal I n t e l l i g e n c e " . New Y o r k , 1911. TILNEY, F. "The B r a i n from Ape t o Man". New Y o r k , 1928. WARDEN, C.J. " R e l a t i v e Economy o f V a r i o u s Modes of A t t a c k i n the M a s t e r y o f a S t y l u s Maze". J o u r n a l o f E x p e r i -m e n t a l P s y c h o l o g y , volume 7, 1924. WARREN, H.C. and CARMICHAEL, L. "Elements o f Human Psycho-l o g y " , ( r e v i s e d e d i t i o n ) . Cambridge, 1930. WATSON, J.B. " B e h a v i o r i s m " . New Y o r k , 1925. WEISS, A.P. "A T h e o r e t i c a l B a s i s of Human B e h a v i o r " . Columbus, 1925. 

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