UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Nikias : an Athenian general of the fifth century B.C. Postgate, Marion Myfanwy 1966

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1967_A8 P68.pdf [ 5.57MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0104660.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0104660-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0104660-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0104660-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0104660-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0104660-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0104660-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0104660-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0104660.ris

Full Text

NIKIAS: AN ATHENIAN GENERAL OF THE FIFTH CENTURY B.C. by Marion Myfanwy Postgate B. Ed., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1962  A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l F u l f i l l m e n t of the Requirements f o r the Degree of Master of Arts  i n the Department of Classics  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1966  In presenting  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s  f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia,, I agree t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e study,  and  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t permission., f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s  t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  I t i s understood that  copying  or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t he a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  permission.  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Columbia  ABSTRACT My thesis i s a biography of Nikias, an Athenian gene r a l and p o l i t i c i a n who l i v e d from c.  *+70  to  *+13  ter I gives an account of the sources I have used Thucydldes' H i s t o r y ) family.  y  Chap-  (chiefly  and Chapter II information about h i s  The remaining chapters are a chronological account  of h i s c a r e e n  Chapter III dealing with the f i r s t portion of  the Peloponnesian War known as the Archidamian War ^21)1  B.C.  (*+31-  Chapter IV, the Peace of Nikias C+21) and the following  uneasy years of truce; and Chapter V, the S i c i l i a n Expedition  C+15-^13), the  second portion of the Peloponnesian War, which  was not concluded u n t i l hdk.  Parts of the thesis cover mat-  e r i a l not d i r e c t l y pertaining to Nikias but needed f o r an understanding of h i s actions. I have intended as my theme a defence of h i s career. Most scholars are agreed that Nikias was a respectable man, but decry h i s a b i l i t i e s as a general and p o l i t i c i a n .  They  think of h i s f i n a l disgrace i n S i c i l y and analyse the e a r l i e r portions of h i s career i n l i g h t of h i s eventual failure5 not considering that Nikias was by then changed into an o l d and sick man.  I t i s impossible to recreate Nikias as a b r i l l i a n t  p o l i t i c i a n and s t r a t e g i s t ;  he was not.  Nevertheless I hope  my account w i l l make readers judge him more f a i r l y than they perhaps have done before.  TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. II. III. IV. V.  PAGE  THE AUTHORITIES  1  NIKIAS AND HIS FAMILY  5  NIKIAS AND THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR  16  THE PEACE OF NIKIAS  1+7  THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION  63  BIBLIOGRAPHY  90  APPENDIX A.  GENEALOGICAL TABLE  97  APPENDIX B.  A LIST OF GENERALS: 14-31-^22  98  1.  CHAPTER I THE AUTHORITIES The major primary source f o r the l i f e o f N i k i a s i s Thucydides' H i s t o r y o f my  t  t h e s i s on t h i s .  Books I I I t o V I I , and I have based much There I s some disagreement among modern  a u t h o r i t i e s about Thucydides' treatment o f Nikias$ De  Sanctis  and Grote e s p e c i a l l y f e e l t h a t he i s f a r too l e n i e n t , but I tend to the l e s s common and opposing view, as expressed by Westlake, t h a t Thucydides i s q u i t e i m p a r t i a l and does not h e s i t a t e t o r e p o r t N i k i a s ' f a i l i n g s , as w e l l as h i s good p o i n t s , i n character  and behaviour, without any apology.  I must s t a t e a t the o u t s e t t h a t I f i n d the amount o f space t h a t Thucydides devotes t o speeches made by N i k i a s most extraordinary.  Even i f the speeches a r e i m a g i n a t i v e  artistic  d e v i c e s , and were not i n f a c t d e l i v e r e d (which seems h i g h l y u n l i k e l y i n view o f Thucydides' statement i n I , 2 2 ) , purpose i s the same: to emphasize c r i s i s .  their  While P e r i k i e s '  speeches are more important documents o f p o l i t i c a l i d e a l s , N i k i a s ' speeches a r e more numerous, and perhaps a r e meant by Thucydides t o d e p i c t h i s views on the l o s s e s o f A t h e n i a n power and i d e a l s .  F o r example, N i k i a s ' f i r s t  s t a i d , safe p o l i c y f o r maintaining  J-Thucydides, V I ,  speech" - o u t l i n e s a 1  an empire, a p o l i c y t h a t  2.  i s a c l o s e i m i t a t i o n y e t Inadequate r e f l e c t i o n o f P e r i k l e s ' lofty aspirations.  Nikias' l a s t speech  2  l o o k s back a t t h e  former grandeur o f t h e A t h e n i a n f o r c e s and hopes t h e power o f Athens may be c r e a t e d a g a i n .  Some o f h i s o t h e r speeches a r e  m e r e l y e x h o r t a t i o n s t o h i s army, b u t , l i k e those o f B r a s i d a s , s t i l l c o n t a i n p o l i t i c a l sentiments t h a t a r e o f i n t e r e s t t o u s . A second p r i m a r y source i s A r i s t o p h a n e s ' comedies, i n w h i c h t h e r e e x i s t s l i t t l e doubt about t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f Nikias.  The e p i g r a p h i c evidence augments Thucydides and  J  Aristophanes. Other p r i m a r y sources o f l e s s e r v a l u e a r e P l a t o and Xenophon.  O c c a s i o n a l r e f e r e n c e s a r e found i n A i s c h i n e s , Pseudo-  Andokides, A r i s t o t l e , L y s i a s , and Demosthenes.  Some o f t h e s e  are e i t h e r d i a l o g u e s o r f o r e n s i c speeches, and t h e i r  evidence  may be p r e j u d i c e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r theme. Two i m p o r t a n t secondary doros o f S i c i l y .  sources a r e P l u t a r c h and D i o -  I n P l u t a r c h ' s A l k l b i a d e s and N i k i a s a r e  r e c o r d e d anecdotes c o n c e r n i n g N i k i a s t h a t a r e n o t found  else-  where b u t c a n presumably be t r a c e d through P h i l i s t o s and  2  T h u c y d i d e s , V I I , 77.  ^ I d i s a g r e e w i t h C r o i s e t ' s view ( A r i s t o p h a n e s and t h e P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s a t Athens [London, 1909], p. 77) t h a t N i k i a s i s n o t one o f t h e g e n e r a l s i n t h e K n i g h t s .  Ehrenberg (The  People o f A r i s t o p h a n e s [ O x f o r d , 195l] , p. 270) s u p p o r t s my position.  3.  Timaios, sources he names i n the beginning o f h i s account of N i k i a s , and through the comic p o e t s . Diodoros' H i s t o r y . Books X I I and X I I I , i s important c h i e f l y f o r an account o f the S i c i l i a n e x p e d i t i o n , although b a s i c a l l y i t i s a shortened e d i t i o n o f Thucydldes. work a l s o shows the i n f l u e n c e o f Timaios and  Diodoros  1  Ephoros, * 1  In the l a s t century l i t t l e has been w r i t t e n about N i k i a s except what i s t o be found i n g e n e r a l h i s t o r i e s .  For  the f i r s t h a l f o f h i s c a r e e r many modern h i s t o r i a n s ^ argue t h a t Thucydldes was  p r e j u d i c e d a g a i n s t Kleon and t r i e d to  d e t r a c t from h i s a b i l i t i e s and s u c c e s s e s .  As a r e s u l t they  In t u r n t r y t o r e h a b i l i t a t e Kleon and i n the process o f t e n decry Nikias*  achievements.  W r i t i n g about the second h a l f of h i s c a r e e r they s u f f e r from no need t o obscure N i k i a s ; he p a l e s e a s i l y I n comparison  w i t h the b r i l l i a n c e and c o l o u r of A l k i b i a d e s .  **Nepos' L i f e o f A l k i b i a d e s adds n o t h i n g to our knowledge o f N i k i a s . % o r examples see the works o f Adcoek, Gomme, Grote, Grundy, and Henderson, as c i t e d I n the B i b l i o g r a p h y . 6  A.G.  Woodhead, "Thucydldes' P o r t r a i t o f C i e o n " ,  Mnemosvne, X I I I ( i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 2 8 9 - 3 1 7 ,  c i t e s most of the pre-  ceding l i t e r a t u r e and p r o v i d e s the b e s t s u b s t a n t i a t e d argument In o p p o s i t i o n to my  view.  However, Thucydides does not pass over the end of N i k i a s  1  career l i g h t l y and h i s opinion should not be ignored. In the following chapters I give more detailed r e f e r ences.  A f u l l l i s t of the sources may be found i n the B i b l i o -  graphy. Throughout my study I use my own translations unless I note otherwise.  I employ Greek s p e l l i n g except f o r those  names that are very common i n t h e i r l a t i n i z e d forms.  5*  CHAPTER I I NIKIAS AND HIS FAMILY Nikias was the son of Nikeratos, from the deme Kydantidai.l  No other information about h i s ancestors i s recorded.  Not even h i s mother's name was known i n Plutarch's time.  2  Nikias was apparently older than the philosopher Sokrates and was therefore born before the year h69 B.C.3 He seems to have come not from an a r i s t o c r a t i c but from a wealthy family, although no ancient author gives any d e t a i l s * Since no source describes him as having acquired great wealth while he was a young man - a type of story that would appeal k e s p e c i a l l y to Plutarch - and since he c e r t a i n l y was wealthy •••For the evidence see J . Kirchner, P.A. 2  T  I I , no. 10808.  P l u t a r c h , A l k i b l a d e s 1. f  3plato, Laches 186c. The dramatic date of t h i s d i a T  logue should be set between the b a t t l e of Delion i n 2 k  and the b a t t l e of Mantineia i n l 8 , when Laches died. k  k  (l8lb) In the  dialogue Plato describes Nikias as older than Sokrates; he also describes Sokrates as a young man, an u n l i k e l y term f o r a man of f i f t y years, so we cannot r e l y on h i s accuracy, k Plutarch compares N i k i a s  1  l i f e with that of Crassus.  He recounts In great d e t a i l the ways by which Crassus acquired wealth and might well have done the same for Nikias i f he had possessed any such knowledge.  6,  toy Athenian standards,^ possibly he did inherit his money and possessions.  However, Nikias was bora soon after th©  mining of silver at Laurelon increasedj and perhaps he ac6  quired his own fortune. Many sources t e l l us of Nikias wealth.. He evidently 1  paid for a number of public choral and gymnastic displays, and made dedicatory offerings In both Athens and Delos.7 While other rich men performed similar duties, few seem to have been as noted for their munificence as Nikias was. Plutarch reports that In his day monuments dedicated by Nikias were s t i l l standing, one a statue of Pallas Athene on the Acropolis and the other a shrine In the precinct of Dionysos.  In addition he describes the reorganization of the cere-  monies at Delos by Nikias,  This event has been linked with  ^"Callias, the richest Athenian of the Perielean period, was popularly reputed to possess 200 talents and Nieias 100, but these sums are probably gravely exaggerated ' 1  (M.N. Tod, C.A.H... V [Cambridge, 1927]* p. 32). 6  But R.J. Hopper ("The Attie Silver Mines i n the  Fourth Century B.C., "B.S.A., XLVIII [1953]» p. 2^6) states* "It also appears unlikely that the mines were the sole or o r i ginal source of the wealth of those of considerable financial standing, though many trierarchs appear In the l i s t of those engaged i n the mines." ^Plutarch, Nikias. 3$ Plato, Gorgias  t  *4-72a.  7.  the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f D e l o s by the A t h e n i a n s i n *+26, as by Thucydides  (III,10 ). k  reported  8  P l u t a r c h a l s o remarks t h a t N i k i a s , t r y i n g t o win f a v o u r o f the A t h e n i a n p u b l i c , was and  informers a l i k e .  the  e x t r e m e l y generous t o f r i e n d s  T h i s l a s t tendency was  c i t e d with glee  by  the comic poets ( P l u t a r c h quotes T e l e k l e i d e s , E u p o l i s , A r i s t o phanes, and P h r y n i c h o s as e x a m p l e s ) , but n e v e r r e l a t e d t o specific events,  9  "Both Thucydides' and P l u t a r c h ' s accounts i n c l u d e name o f the i s l a n d of Rheneia and s a c r i f i c e s , and o f f e r i n g s . t i o n N i k i a s o r any  the  a d i s c u s s i o n of choruses,  A l t h o u g h Thucydides does not men-  other i n d i v i d u a l i n connection with  the  choruses p e r f o r m i n g a t the s a c r e d games, p o s s i b l y N i k i a s s h o u l d be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h them, s i n c e the renewed c e l e b r a t i o n o f games c o u l d have been r e c o r d e d i n d e t a i l and Plutarch.  the  a v a i l a b l e to  On the o t h e r hand, L. K i r t l a n d ( " N i k i a s  1  Display  o f G r e a t W e a l t h a t D e l o s , " P.A.P.A., LXIX [1938], p. x l i ) n o t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t P l u t a r c h ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f N i k i a s ' w e a l t h may  be i n a c c u r a t e , s i n c e he has a s s i g n e d t o N i k i a s  t h i n g s such as the bronze palm t r e e , p r o b a b l y s e t up by  the  N a x i a n s , and a p l o t o f l a n d , a c t u a l l y bought a t the end of f o u r t h century, who  t h a t s h o u l d be a s s i g n e d t o men  l i v e d a f t e r the time o f the ^Plutarch, Nikias,  3-5.  general.  the  called Nikias  8.  P l u t a r c h says t h a t most o f N i k i a s ' w e a l t h  consisted  o f t h e s i l v e r o b t a i n e d by h i s s l a v e s i n t h e mines t h a t he leased at L a u r e i o n . b a b l y Xenophon.  1 0  The s o u r c e o f h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was  pro-  The l a t t e r r e p o r t s as common knowledge t h e  f a c t t h a t N i k i a s "once owned a thousand men i n t h e mines and l e t them out t o S o s i a s t h e T h r a k i a n on c o n d i t i o n t h a t p a i d him an o b o l a day a man, and f i l l e d a l l v a c a n c i e s occurred."^  Sosias as t h e y  Elsewhere he s t a t e s t h a t N i k i a s was s a i d " t o  have g i v e n a whole t a l e n t f o r a manager o f h i s s i l v e r m i n e . " At the death o f N i k i a s  1  1 2  son N i k e r a t o s , ^ i t was d i s -  covered t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y N i k i a s had l e f t , e x p e c t e d t o be n o t l e s s than a hundred t a l e n t s , had d w i n d l e d t o n o t more than f o u r t e e n t a l e n t s , none o f i t i n s i l v e r o r g o l d . ^ x  Despite t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , i t i s obvious t h a t  1 0  Plutarch, M & s ,  i:L  Nikeratos  h.  Xenophon, V e c t i e a l i a . *+, ih.  M.N.  Tod n o t e s t h a t  t h i s would amount t o t e n t a l e n t s a n n u a l l y . (C.A.H.. V, p. 12  1  X e n o p h o n , MempraplUa,, I I , 5,  2.  3piato, R e p u b l i c . 327c; Laches. 200d; L y s i a s , 18,  Xenophon, H e l l e n i k a  T  l ^ y s i a s , 19,  I I , 3, ^7.  39;  9),  D i o d o r o s , X I V , 5.  6;  9.  a l s o was known f o r h i s w e a l t h and d e s i r e f o r w e a l t h , I n Xenophon's Symposium he i s p o r t r a y e d p o k i n g f u n a t h i m s e l f because o f t h i s weakness. " 'As a r e s u l t , t o some people might seem t o be r a t h e r fond o f money.'  I  Thereupon everyone  l a u g h e d , c o n s i d e r i n g him t o t e l l o n l y t h e t r u t h . N i k i a s h i m s e l f had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o a c q u i r e a good e d u c a t i o n , ^ but we know l i t t l e about i t . 1  P l a t o , i n the  L a c h e s , c h a r a c t e r i z e s him as a t l e a s t b e i n g w e l l a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e d i a l e c t i c s t h a t S d k r a t e s employed, and as b e i n g i n t e r e s t e d i n new forms o f s c h o o l i n g and t r a i n i n g . N e v e r t h e l e s s h i s son N i k e r a t o s seems t o have been given a thorough s c h o o l i n g o f the t r a d i t i o n a l s o r t .  He was  r e p o r t e d t o have s a i d , "My f a t h e r , t a k i n g c a r e t h a t I s h o u l d become a f i n e man, made me l e a r n a l l o f Homer.  Even now I  can r e p e a t the whole I l i a d and Odyssey by h e a r t . "  1 8  Yet  N i k i a s would have l i k e d S o k r a t e s t o i n s t r u c t h i s s o n , presuma b l y I n modern d i a l e c t i c s , i f P l a t o does n o t  exaggerate.  1 9  S o k r a t e s d i d s u p p l y him w i t h a t e a c h e r o f music f o r N i k e r a t o s -  15 'Xenophon, H e l l e n i k a , I I , 3, •^Xenophon, Symposium, ^ P l a t o , Laches. l8  X  186c.  X e n o p h o n , Symposium. 3?  9piato,  hj,  L a c h e s . 200d.  5.  39.  10.  Damon, a p u p i l o f Agathokles. ® 2  N i k e r a t o s must have competed i n r h a p s o d i c  competitions.  A r i s t o t l e mentions an amusing s i m i l e used t o d e s c r i b e him when he was defeated by a c e r t a i n P r a t y s .  2 1  N i k i a s had two b r o t h e r s , Eukrates and Dlognetos. Eukrates was a b r o t h e r - i n - l a w t o K a l l i a s , who married a s i s t e r of A n d o k i d e s . his  He was e v i d e n t l y younger than N i k i a s , s i n c e  22  sons are d e s c r i b e d as being c h i l d r e n when N i k e r a t o s  (Nikias  grandson) was a c h i l d . 3  1  2  the b a t t l e o f Aigospotamoi, Thirty Tyrants. ^ 2  1  son  He was e l e c t e d g e n e r a l a f t e r  and f i n a l l y put t o death by the  N i k e r a t o s a l s o was put t o death by the  2 0  P l a t o , Laches, l 8 0 d .  2 1  Aristotle,  Rhetoric  Hat TOV NtwipaTOY  l 13a8: k  T  (pavat <l>tX0KTivniv eTvat &eot}Ytt.evov urro IIpaTuo*;, aicraep eTnacre etpaaou-yiax ? 0  i6a>v TOV Ninnparov nTTnp-evov VKO Uporuo?  pat^&ouvTa, HOUSVTO 6e na* auxwpov 22  eft.  A n d o k i d e s , De M v s t e r i i s , 1, 7 . K  This i s a l i n k  between N i k i a s and Andokides t h a t c o u l d cause him t o p o r t r a y Nikias sympathetically. 2  ^ L y s i a s , 18, 10.  Xenophon's Symposium  Nikeratos  2, 3.  T  2  L y s i a s , 18, . k  ? L y s l a s , 18, 5-6.  b r i d e Is mentioned i n  T h i s d i a l o g u e i s s e t about 2 0 ,  although i t was w r i t t e n about 380. 2 k  1  k  11.  Thirty.  Diognetos l e f t the city as an exile at this time but  returned to Athens In ^03•  He apparently died soon a f t e r .  26  The two sons of Eukrates, and Diomnestos, the son of Diognetos, were serving as trlerarens when they were prosecuted about 3 9 6 T h e property of the family must have been considerable even at this time. The grandson of Nikias, also called Nikias, i s mentioned by L y s i a s , sj.azouaai. 9 2  g  y  ea  28  and perhaps by Aristophanes in his Ekkle-  ance i t i s known that he and his son Nikera-  tos owned mining property.^  These two served as trlerarens.3^  26  Lysias, 18, 9*  Probably this case can be dated to  396, since i t preceded the Corinthian war.  Diognetos must  have died or he would have been present to guard the property belonging to Eukrates' sons (his nephews) and his own son, Diomnestos. L y s l a s , 18, 10. L y s i a s , 18, 10* 29  27  28  7  Aristophanes, fffrHles&agQusaA, **26-M-30» V^era TOUTO fofvuv etmpeni\%  XeuKO<5 XPH 3  veavfes  tn<; aY&nf\br\a , Suoto? NtntV ,  irapa6ouvai  Tal? tuvat^t  rr\v  JTOMV.  °R.J. Hopper, "The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth  Century B.C.," B.S.A... XLVIII (1953), P » 2»*3. 3*1.G.. Il2, 807,b25 809,c20,dll3? 8ll,bl63$  8W8.  12.  This last-named Nikeratos, a great-grandson of Nikias the general, was discussed by Demosthenes.  He was apparently  of good character but physically weak. He had no children at that time.3  2  The evidence for the later p o l i t i c a l sympathies of the family i s slim.  Nikias' brothers and son obviously did not  support the r u l e of the Thirty Tyrants,  Lysias claimed that  they took the part of the demos and not the oligarchs,33 although, according to Xenophon, Theramenes said just before he was k i l l e d s eY^YvacfHOV 6e oVt 0uXXau£avop,evou NtKftpaVou TOU  NIHIOU  auTou  OUTE  nat 7tXouo*tou Hat ou6ev nvxtoxz 6/tuoTtnov TOU  7raTpo<; 7rpa^avTo<; ol  4u7v Yev^ootvTo,  TOUT<P  OUTE  Spotot OucrpeveT?  34  On the whole the family of Nikias f o r at least h i s own and the following generation was held i n high esteem. The phrase 7tXouT<j> 6s nat botxi a x e 6 o vrcpcoTov7ravT0JV *Ae/»vatcov 35 f  applied to Nikeratos, son of the general, by Diodoros f i t s other members of the family a l s o .  While the authors contem-  porary with the family - Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Andokides,  32Demosthenes, 19, 290$ 21, 165? 5 » 32. k  33Lysias, 18, 5-6, 9. 3 Xenophon, Hellenika. I I , 3» 39• k  3  ^Diodoros,. XIV, 5*  13.  and Lysias, and l a t e r Demosthenes and A r i s t o t l e - were a l l of good b i r t h , wealth, or reputation and l i k e l y to be prejudiced i n favour of t h e i r own c l a s s , t h e i r testimony should not be dismissed l i g h t l y i n view of the supporting epigraphical evidence.  Certainly r e l a t i v e s of Nikias served as t r i e r a r c h s .  Such honourable positions, because of the f i n a n c i a l burden i n v o l v e d , ^ were held by men who had enough wealth to o u t f i t a trireme f o r a year. L i t t l e i s known of Nikias' personality as a private citizen.  Everywhere we see only h i s public image, c a r e f u l l y  cultivated and advertised.  In contrast to the tales about  h i s own son or the gay young Alklbiades nothing of Nikias' childhood i s recorded that might have either endeared him or weakened him to the public vievr. Without question Nikias was noted f o r h i s opcrii. No source suggests otherwise.  While he probably added to h i s  private fortune by exploiting what some today think to have been the most unfortunate members of the Athenian slave c l a s s , the miners, h i s contemporaries would not have considered the gains or t h e i r owner with d i s t a s t e . Nikias' r e l i g i o u s devotion and conservatism, part of hisapeni , appear especially dramatized. pious or not i s d i f f i c u l t to say.  Whether he r e a l l y was  Even Thucydides describes  Aristophanes, Knights. 912-918.  3>.  him  as being " o v e r - i n c l i n e d to d i v i n a t i o n and  such t h i n g s , " 3 7  and A r i s t o p h a n e s u t i l i z e s t h i s s i d e of h i s c h a r a c t e r Kniehts.  By P l u t a r c h ' s  time the view had  been broadened to  imply t h a t N i k i a s merely used t h i s image t o impress w h i l e he s a i d he was p o l i c y he was  t a k i n g omens a t home to determine p u b l i c affairs.  reputed to d e c l i n e s o c i a l i n v i t a t i o n s i n  order t o guard h i s r e p u t a t i o n  against  long on p o l i t i c a l p r o j e c t s .  helped him  others;  a c t u a l l y t r y i n g to f u r t h e r h i s personal  Moreover, N i k i a s was  a l l day  i n the  Informers, and An a s s o c i a t e ,  m a i n t a i n the aura of p u b l i c  t o work  Hieron,  servant.  P l u t a r c h goes so f a r as to s t a t e t h a t N i k i a s ' q u a c i e s , h i s nervousness and gave him  discomfiture  inade-  i n public,3® a c t u a l l y  a l a r g e measure o f power among o r d i n a r y  c i t i z e n s , who  f e l t t h a t he d i d not d e s p i s e them. N i k i a s has  been i d e n t i f i e d as p o s s i b l y a power behind  the m u t i l a t i o n of the Herms$39 if  the s p e c u l a t i o n  i s true,  N i k i a s ' u p r i g h t , l o y a l , and r a t h e r d u l l p e r s o n a l i t y d i d have  37Thucydides, V I I , 3 Piutarch, 8  f r a g . 59  50.  M k l a s , 2,  (Edmonds, F.A.G.. pp.  h.  See Phrynichos' S p i d e r y ,  k6Q~k69)t  " A r i g h t good c i t i z e n I know he  was,  He, had no s h r i n k i n g g a i t l i k e N i c i a s . " 3 9  R u t h E. A l l e n , The  M u t i l a t i o n of the Herms? a Study  i n Athenian P o l i t i c s ( D i s s . , U n i v e r s i t y of C i n c i n n a t i ,  195D#  15.  some devious undercurrents.  Nevertheless, he always seems to  have acted not f o r s e l f i s h reasons but f o r the good of the state as he saw i t . As a r e s u l t t h i s apern i s s t i l l undisputed.  16  CHAPTER III NIKIAS AND POLITICS: 2 7 * 2 1 k  k  An Athenian strateeos i n the f i f t h century B.C. vas more than a m i l i t a r y commander.  Men were chosen by l o t f o r  most other o f f i c i a l duties i n the state and expected to serve no more than once i n each p o s i t i o n .  But a general was elected  and could be elected year after year as long as the public was pleased with h i s work.  In this way outstanding men, by serving  on the board of ten s t r a t e g o l , could obtain public eminence and p o l i t i c a l influence f o r extended periods of time. While some generals were chosen c h i e f l y f o r t h e i r m i l i t a r y knowledge alone, others were elected f o r t h e i r p o l i tical abilities.  Nikias seems to have found favour f o r both  his m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t i e s . Plutarch t e l l s us:  ... vedSrepo? oe NtK»g$ YSvoVevos «v u-ev ev rtvt Xovtp KCU U&p\nk£o\&  £O>YTO<S  Sore K&xetv«p axiarpaxhyUaat not na^'aurov 1  ap£@i  7toXXoHts  . •. •  He i s the only author who says that Nikias was a general while Perikles was a l i v e . x  I t i s commonly assumed that he i s correct.  P l u t a r e h , liki&s., 2 , 2 .  17.  Thucydldes  does n o t mention him b e f o r e the y e a r V27.  w h i l e we s h o u l d perhaps i g n o r e the f i r s t p a r t o f P l u t a r c h ' s s t a t e m e n t , the r e s t o f the s e n t e n c e , •• «nepiKXeou?  6*' &7toeavovTo<j TCDV TTXOUOUDV  r?iv  eufcix; et<; t o npatreCeiv  xa*  yvoaptV^v  a.YrtxayV'Ci  npoh^h,  y-aXtorra p>ev  UTCO  7toioup.evu)v aurov rcpoc;  KXecavd^ {sOeAuptav nat roXpav, ou pj»v aXXa nat r o v 6Xuov  eTxev euvouv n a i o u w i X o T t u o u p e v o v , ^  seems t o d e s c r i b e the p o s i t i o n o f N i k i a s d u r i n g the n e x t s i x y e a r s as shown by Thucydldes  Thucydldes  and A r i s t o p h a n e s .  f i r s t mentions N i k i a s two y e a r s a f t e r  P e r i k i e s ' death i n d e s c r i b i n g the e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t Minoa i n the summer o f V27  (III,51).  i s a young o r mature man, general.  He does not say whether N i k i a s  an e x p e r i e n c e d o r i n e x p e r i e n c e d  There i s a v e r y s t r o n g p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t P l u t a r c h  h i m s e l f has made the assumption  t h a t N i k i a s served along w i t h  P e r i k l e s , f o r the o n l y s p e c i f i c events o f N i k i a s  1  e a r l y career  named by P l u t a r c h appear t o come.in a somewhat jumbled f a s h i o n from Thucydldes.  ( P l u t a r c h a l s o s t a t e s t h a t K l e o n opposed  P e r i k l e s d u r i n g the l a t t e r ' s l i f e t i m e ; Thucydldes  i s silent.)  As L e w i s , "Double R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the S t r a t e g i a , " J.H.S.  T  LXXXI (196I), p. 121, s t a t e s , N i k i a s d i d not s e r v e as g e n e r a l for  the t r i b e A i g e l s 3  i n ^32/1 o r ^31/0.  P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s . 2, £.  18.  Many c o m p l i c a t i n g f a c t o r s are i n v o l v e d i n any t o comprehend the p o l i t i c a l scene t h e n .  One  attempt  o f the most im-  p o r t a n t i s t h a t we cannot always determine from h i s deeds what p o l i c i e s a s t r a t e g o s was  following.  F r e q u e n t l y we cannot even  determine what h i s deeds were. F o r example, d i d a s t r a t e g o s l e a d a m i l i t a r y  expedi-  t i o n whether o r not he agreed p o l i t i c a l l y w i t h the aims o f that expedition?  Sometimes, we know, a g e n e r a l asked t h e  e k k l e s i a t o a u t h o r i z e a campaign and make him l e a d e r . s a i l e d t o Thrace under such c i r c u m s t a n c e s . ^ a g e n e r a l was disapproved  At o t h e r  Kleon times  sent as l e a d e r o f an e x p e d i t i o n o f which he  f o r p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y reasons.  The  classic  example i s H i k i a s h i m s e l f l e a d i n g t h e S i c i l i a n e x p e d i t i o n . ^ O c c a s i o n a l l y a g e n e r a l seemed t o a c t e n t i r e l y upon h i s own  initiative.  i n h26  wished t o invade B o i o t i a by l a n d , he was  y  When Demosthenes, o p e r a t i n g i n the west probably  n o t a c t i n g on s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s from the a s s e m b l y . a t P y l o s i n *f25» he was  a l l o w e d t o use t h e f l e e t even though  he h e l d no o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n .  ^ T h u c y d l d e s , V,  2.  ^ T h u c y d l d e s , VI,  8;  6  7  Again,  6  T h u c y d i d e s , III,  7  VII,  There he e v i d e n t l y had  10.  IiH.  T h u c y d i d e s , IV, 2: SvTt  ittmrvi.  to  19  persuade the o t h e r m i l i t a r y commanders t h a t h i s p l a n was f e a s i b l e , and they i n t u r n d i d not have t o agree w i t h him o r g i v e him t r o o p s t h a t they f e l t were needed e l s e w h e r e . Some g e n e r a l s served i n a m i l i t a r y c a p a c i t y a l o n e , and perhaps had l i t t l e t o do w i t h the s t r a t e g y o f the war* A s o p i o s , c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h the A k a r n a n i a n s i n **28 a s a r e placement f o r h i s f a t h e r Phormion, may be an example. Commonly the o n l y d e f i n i t e i n f o r m a t i o n we have i s t h e almost f o r m u l a i c statement by T h u c y d l d e s , such ass Tou  6* aufoti ©epouq nat au-a TJJ rw  UKaxatm-  emarpareiq.;  *A©n/aTo* 6iox*^totS o>rXtVat<; l a u r a i v nat imrevav 6tanocrtoi<; e7teoTpaT6ucrav  aHp-a£ovroq  ent XaAntSeaq T o u q  TOU art TOU.  loTpaTftyet  epqtxftq n a t Bomat'ouq be.  gevotpSv 6 Eupi7ti6ou  TplTO<J a.UTO$. ® C l e a r l y we must assume the f i n a l d e c i s i o n on p o l i c y t o have r e s t e d wlthj t h e A t h e n i a n  p u b l i c , when e v i d e n c e t o the c o n t r a r y  is lacking. Another problem i s t h a t we cannot i d e n t i f y p r e c i s e l y which g e n e r a l s were e l e c t e d each y e a r .  Sometimes we know  o n l y f o u r names out o f a minimum o f ten.9  I n h2h/$ we are  °Thucydides, I I , 79. ^ O c c a s i o n a l l y we have i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with s p e c i f i c years.  For example, Lamachos i s not  mentioned b y Thucydldes a s t a k i n g any a c t i v e p a r t i n t h e h a l f o f the A r c h l d a m i a n War.  first  However, the use o f h i s name i n  20.  f a i r l y certain that thirteen were elected, but are unsure when or how by-elections were held.  We gather that one gen-  e r a l was k i l l e d , three were banished, and one was fined; that some generals were from the same tribes and probably did not serve concurrently (sometimes two d i d ) ; and that some gen1 0  erals were involved i n no campaigns or p o l i t i c s u n t i l the end of the year. Despite these d i f f i c u l t i e s we can attempt some analys i s of a p a r t i c u l a r leader's p o l i c i e s , using the facts we do have, as long as we recognize t h e i r d e f i c i e n c i e s . Over the l a s t h a l f century at least scholars have been trying to determine who succeeded p o l i t i c a l l y to P e r i k l e s '  the Acharnlans  of Aristophanes implies that i t was a by-word  for m i l i t a r y s p i r i t , and well-known to the Athenian public. Yet we can make no further deductions, e.g., that Lamachos served as a general i n the year the Acharnlans was performed or before. 10K.J. Dover, " A E K A I O S A Y T O S " J.H.S.... LXXX(1960), pp* 61-77, gives a cogent description of the problems, with special reference to the phrases 6enaTo<s a tiros and 15 ajraVroiv . D.M., Lewis, "Double Representation i n the Strategia," J.H.S.« LXXXI (I96I), pp. H8-I23, discusses the problem further.  21  The two men  most commonly supported f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n are  Kleon and N i k i a s , who t u r e as men  appear most o f t e n i n Athenian  o f eminence d u r i n g the Archidamian War.  w h i l e these two became prominent  literaNow  a f t e r P e r i k l e s ' death, i t  i s not easy t o say which o f them i n h e r i t e d and f o l l o w e d Perikles'  policies.  Few would d i s a g r e e w i t h A.B. West's d e s c r i p t i o n o f Perikles*  aims*  To r e t a i n command o f the seas, t o m a i n t a i n the empire i n t a c t , t o attempt no f u r t h e r conquests, t o a v o i d b a t t l e w i t h the s u p e r i o r f o r c e s o f the enemy on l a n d , and t o w a i t f o r war-weariness to develop i n S p a r t a , these were P e r i c l e a n policies•  S p a r t a was  war  to be t i r e d out r a t h e r than d e f e a t e d .  P e r i c l e s foresaw t h a t the Lacedaemonians, when once convinced nothing c o u l d be gained even though the war was to  fought  through  a d o u b t f u l end, would r e a d i l y consent t o a peace o f r e c o n -  c i l i a t i o n , and t h a t t h e i r a l l i e s , the commercial  r i v a l s of  Athens, would then be l e f t t o a f u t u r e o f decay and  ruin.  With Megara and C o r i n t h e l i m i n a t e d from t h i s unequal s t r u g g l e for  H e l l e n i c markets, Athens c o u l d l o o k forward t o an empire  such as no Greek c i t y had known.  Such was  the peace t h a t  22  P e r i c l e s had taught the Athenian people to e x p e c t .  11  As shown by h i s conduct of the f i r s t two years of the war, Perikles planned to carry out these aims by shutting the Athenians safely behind the walls of Athens,  He also planned  r e t a l i a t i o n f o r Spartan invasions, as evidenced by h i s exped i t i o n s to the Peloponnese,  Further, he maintained mastery  of the seas i n the west and north-east i n important trading areas.  After renewal of the t r e a t i e s with Egesta and Leontinoi  in S i c i l y  1 2  Perikles seemed to intend no conquests i n that  area during the war, perhaps because expansion of the Athenian empire was not yet feasible*  The Megarid and Euboia were more  important. It i s not d i f f i c u l t to f i n d evidence that during these six years Nikias was a very competent m i l i t a r y t a c t i c i a n who had a reputation f o r being lucky,^3  n  A.B.  West, "Pericles' P o l i t i c a l Heirs," C l a s s i c a l  PMlolo-KY, XIX (192 ), p. k  12  125.  T h e treaty with Egesta was made i n 58/7 B.C. k  I.G. j I , 19, dated by the archon[h.a]§[p]ov  See  (Raubitschek,  T.A.P.A. LXXV [19^4-], pp, 10-12, and Meritt, B.C.H., LXXXVIII T  [ 1 9 6 ] , pp. 1 3 - l 5 ) . k  k  k  The t r e a t i e s with Rhegion and Leontinoi  were signed f i r s t about ¥+8;  they were renewed i n 33/2. k  See  1*0*., I , 51 and 52 (Meritt, Class, Qu,ar1;, XL [19^6], pp. 2  a  85-91). ^Thucydides, VI,  1?.  23*  F i r s t he showed himself capable of carrying out the t a c t i c s employed under Perikles' d i r e c t i o n during the f i r s t two years of the war  - landing i n enemy t e r r i t o r y , laying  waste the nearby areas, and retreating quickly with few losses to the Athenian forces.  Nikias' campaign against Melos, l'i  Tanagra, and Lokrls i n the year 26 k  ?  is typical.  He led  similar plundering expeditions against the Korinthians at the end of the summer of 2 5 , ^ and f i n a l l y , i n 2 , on the eask  1  k  k  tern coast of the Peloponnese against the S p a r t a n s ,  17  now  demoralized by the loss of f i r s t Pylos, then Kythera, But Nikias went a step further than P e r i k l e s .  Although  Perikles seems to have considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of locating 0 tppoupiet  on the sea-coast of the Peloponnese i n order to help  with p l u n d e r i n g ,  18  he did not actually do t h i s .  Nor did any  other general u n t i l after Demosthenes' success at Pylos. Before then garrisons behind f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were used only t h u c y d i d e s , I I , 25,  26. Cf. H.D.  Westlake, "Seaborne  Raids i n Periclean Strategy," Class. Quart., XXXIX ( 1 9 5 ) , k  pp. 75-8 . k  1  ^Thucydides, I I I , 91.  l6  Thucydides, IV,  17  Thucydldes, IV,  l8  k  2.  Thucydides, I, l 2 . k  H.D.  Westlake, op. c i t .  2h.  o u t s i d e t h e Peloponnese f o r purposes F o r example, Naupaktos was  other than plundering.  e x p l o i t e d to blockade the K o r i n -  t h i a n s , and the i s l a n d o f Minoa, c a p t u r e d by N i k i a s , h e l p e d t h e b l o c k a d e a g a i n s t Megara*  But w i t h the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a g a r -  r i s o n a t P y l o s the A t h e n i a n s found an e f f i c i e n t way the P e l o p o n n e s i a n s .  N i k i a s r e c o g n i z e d good i d e a s even i f he  c o u l d not i n v e n t them. he employed the new  to h a r a s s  I n the same summer as t h e f a l l o f P y l o s  t a c t i c s by combining  the r a i d i n g a t t a c k  a g a i n s t K o r i n t h and the nearby c o a s t o f the Peloponnese w i t h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a f o r t i f i c a t i o n oh t h e p e n i n s u l a o f Methana.*  9  A g a r r i s o n l o c a t e d t h e r e was  afterwards  deployed  e f f e c t i v e l y a g a i n s t the a r e a o f T r o i z e n , E p l d a u r o s , and  Halieis.  I n the b e g i n n i n g o f t h e next y e a r N i k i a s f o l l o w e d up t h i s success w i t h t h e c a p t u r e o f K y t h e r a and the e s t a b l i s h ment o f a g a r r i s o n t h e r e t o o , i n a d d i t i o n t o r a i d s on t h e c o a s t . N i k i a s showed h i m s e l f w e l l v e r s e d i n o t h e r , more o r d i nary, m i l i t a r y p r a c t i c e s .  Simple machines o f war, such as  s c a l i n g l a d d e r s and b a t t e r i n g rams, and w a l l s f o r s i e g e o r p r o t e c t i o n were commonly used by t h e A t h e n i a n s , who f r e q u e n t l y appear more s k i l l e d i n t h e i r use than o t h e r Greeks were.  ^ F o r opposing views on t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h i s move see Adcock, C.A.H. I I I , p.  k?k.  T  V, p. 237,  and Gornme, Commentary,  25  Nikias was no exception as two campaigns described i n some d e t a i l by Thucydides demonstrate.  The one i s the capture of  Minoa, the other the investment of Skione. out e f f i c i e n t l y .  Both were carried  Nikias, however, showed no Inclination to  develop more Imaginative weapons but merely used those that were a v a i l a b l e .  2 0  Nikias also appears to have been capable In negotiating with an enemy.  He was c l e a r l y not averse to winning v i c t o r i e s  on less bloody terms than physical f i g h t i n g .  At Kythera, be-  cause of previous discussions, he quickly arranged a surrender that was advantageous to the Athenians and  Kytherelans.21  Instead of endangering h i s men by attacking the inhabitants Nikias demanded hostages.  I t i s noteworthy that the Athenians  did not condemn t h i s move when Nikias returned as they did i n similar cases concerning several other generals. Rather they took advantage of i t , confirming i t and making the islanders pay a tribute of four t a l e n t s . *  w  See Phrynichos, S o l i t a r y  T  f r a g . 22 (Edmonds, F.A.C.  T  I, pp. 58-*+59): k  &XX* unreppepMne OTpaTTjY^o?  TxXr\Gei  TCOXV TOV re  Nixiav  Ka5eupT}ucto*tv.  and Suidas, Lexicon (from a lost scholion on Aristophanes): "Now 21  you outdo Nicias at engineering feats."  Thucydides, IV, 5*K 22Thucydides, IV,  57.  26  N i k i a s was  involved i n negotiations with  t o o , w h i l e the A t h e n i a n army was  Perdikkas  investing Skione, ^  and  2  ac-  c o m p l i s h e d as much w i t h t h a t f i c k l e l e a d e r as any o t h e r Atheni a n , probably  because P e r d i k k a s w i s h e d t o be r i d o f the P e l o -  ponnesians and B r a s i d a s r a t h e r t h a n because he wanted t o h e l p N i k i a s and A t h e n s ,  L a t e r , of c o u r s e , N i k i a s was  betrayed  by  Perdikkas. ** 21  Most o f a l l N i k i a s seems t o have been t r u s t e d i n n e g o t i a t i o n s by the S p a r t a n s ,  t o such an e x t e n t t h a t  the  A t h e n i a n s were sometimes s u s p i c i o u s o f h i s m o t i v e s . ^ 2  N i k i a s showed no s p e c i a l i n s i g h t i n h i s use of navy.  the  He employed i t t o l a n d f o r c e s i n areas t h a t he w i s h e d  t o a t t a c k and d i d not p a r t a k e  i n actual sea-battles.  Only  t w i c e a r e any s p e c i f i c n a v a l t a c t i c s o f h i s mentioned by Thucydides. used u-Tjxavat'  The  f i r s t was  from s h i p s .  actual night b a t t l e .  not u n u s u a l . The  second was  At Minoa N i k i a s not as r i s k y as  an  A t K o r l n t h h i s f l e e t s a i l e d under cover  o f darkness i n o r d e r t h a t h i s t r o o p s might make a s u r p r i s e P6  a t t a c k a t dawn.* 2 3  10  T h u c y d i d e s , IV,  2lf  T h u c y d i d e s , V, 80,83.  ^ T h u c y d l d e s , V, 2 o  132.  k6.  I n the f i n a l y e a r o f the campaign i n S i c i l y N i k i a s  showed a d i s t i n c t l a c k o f i n s i g h t i n n a v a l t a c t i c s , employing h i s f l e e t i n the G r e a t Harbour o f S y r a c u s e where i t had room t o manoeuvre.  no  27.  Nikias seemed to have few problems with logistics and discipline.  Thucydldes reports that he and Nikostratos  had difficulty in preventing their men from k i l l i n g the i n habitants of Mende when that city's gates were opened before any agreement was made for surrender, but otherwise no trouble is mentioned. As for communications, or perhaps just careful planning, in the expedition against Tanagra Nikias* forces met the troops from Athens as arranged, unlike Demosthenes' and Eippokrates* armies at Delion.  Similarly, while the army that split up  under Nikias and Nikostratos In the attack on Mende was almost defeated, both sections were able to return to camp and renew 27  their onslaught the same day. '  Two days later the same com-  manders again divided their forces and encountered no losses as a result of doing this.  Frequently ancient armies using  such tacties courted defeat because of either a breakdown in communications or ineffectiveness in carrying out plans. Clearly Nikias was considered by Thucydldes, and probably by the Athenian populace, to be a capable and fortunate commander.  While the facts do not show him to be an  outstanding military tactician, nor a commander exceptionally interested in new techniques of fighting, as the dialogue in Plato's Laches might lead one to suspect, they do demonstrate 27see Gomme, Commentary I, p. 620 T  28.  t h a t he earned h i s good r e p u t a t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t , K l e o n had l i t t l e m i l i t a r y r e p u t a t i o n o r training.  He was n o t e l e c t e d g e n e r a l u n t i l a f t e r h i s good  fortune at Pylos.  His m i l i t a r y career afterwards  noted f o r i t s b r i l l i a n c e . sidas i n inventiveness  was n o t  C e r t a i n l y he was no match f o r B r a -  orNikias i n steadiness. ^ 2  I n d i c a t i o n s t h a t N i k i a s was an adequate p o l i t i c i a n , but n o t a g r e a t l e a d e r , a r e q u i t e common i n T h u c y d i d e s . was u n f o r t u n a t e  Nikias  enough throughout h i s l e n g t h y c a r e e r t o have  one r i v a l o r a n o t h e r w i t h flamboyant q u a l i t i e s a t t r a c t i v e t o a mass o f p e o p l e , q u a l i t i e s t h a t N i k i a s l a c k e d .  A detailed  e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p e r i o d from 27 t o 21 w i l l show h i s f i r s t k  major opponent t o have been  k  Kleon. '' 2  E v e n t s a f t e r P e r i k l e s ' death suggest t h a t no one person was e i t h e r e s p e c i a l l y s t r o n g o r c l o s e t o P e r i k l e s . From A r i s 28  tophanes  we s u s p e c t t h a t a c e r t a i n E u k r a t e s may have been A.G. Woodhead, " T h u c y d i d e s  1  P o r t r a i t of Cleon,"  Mnemosvne• X I I I (i960), pp. 303-310, argues t h a t Thucydides was u n f a i r t o K l e o n i n h i s account o f t h e A m p h i p o l l t a n campaign of  k  22. must be remembered t h a t p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n t h e  modern sense d i d n o t e x i s t i n Athens a t t h i s t i m e .  Individual  l e a d e r s m e r e l y tended t o more r a d i c a l o r c o n s e r v a t i v e and  gained or l o s t supporters  outlooks,  among t h e o t h e r l e a d e r s and i n  the e k k l e s i a because o f t h e i r views on s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . ^Aristophanes,  K n i g h t s , 129, 2&+*  29.  l e a d e r i n Athens a f t e r P e r i k l e s ' d e a t h .  N o t h i n g more i s  known about him except t h a t he d i d n o t seek power f o r l o n g ; he may have been t h e f a t h e r o f t h e D i o d o t o s who spoke i n o p p o s i t i o n t o Kleon i n the M y t i l e n a l a n debate. 9 2  L y s i k l e s may have been a more l i k e l y c a n d i d a t e t o succeed P e r i k l e s than was E u k r a t e s .  From P l u t a r c h ' s d i s c u s -  s i o n 3° and Thucydldes' d e s c r i p t i o n o f h i s l a r g e t r i b u t e - c o l l e c t i n g e x p e d i t i o n to K a r i a , along v/ith f o u r other g e n e r a l s , i t may be assumed t h a t he was f a i r l y i m p o r t a n t . T h i s was i n t h e same y e a r , H28/7, I n which N i k i a s i s known w i t h o u t doubt f i r s t t o have been one o f the board o f stratpgni.  W h i l e he may have s e r v e d e a r l i e r as a c o l l e a g u e  of P e r i k l e s * ^ - t h e r e i s no c e r t a i n e v i d e n c e t h a t he d i d , o r , i f he d i d , t h a t h i s p o s i t i o n was v e r y s t r o n g .  Other g e n e r a l s  who s e r v e d d u r i n g t h e y e a r were A s o p i o s and Paches, and p e r haps N i k o s t r a t o s . 3  2 9  2  None o f t h e i r campaigns were c o n t r a r y t o  T h l s c o n j e c t u r e i s made by A.B. West, " P e r i c l e s '  P o l i t i c a l H e i r s , " C^ass. PhUsi  X I X  < 192*0, p. 132, n.  1.  30p.lutaroh, P,er$,k.les, 2**. 31pi tarch, N j k l a s , 2. u  3 I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t Eurymedon succeeded N i k o s t r a t o s 2  at the K e r k y r a i a n r e v o l t (Thucydldes, I I I , 8 1 ) . t r a t o s was g e n e r a l f o r t h e y e a r **28/7.  I f so, Nikos-  I f Eurymedon m e r e l y  j o i n e d N i k o s t r a t o s , t h e n t h e y were b o t h g e n e r a l s f o r "4-27/6.  30.  the p o l i c y of P e r i k l e s .  The  r e d u c t i o n of M y t i l e n e  i n w i t h the p o l i c y of keeping the empire i n t a c t . c o l l e c t i n g was  p r o b a b l y c a r r i e d on every y e a r .  fitted Tribute-  Asopios'  e x p e d i t i o n , a t t a c k i n g the Peloponnese and the a r e a around Akarnania,33  w a s  f o l l o w i n g i n the t r a d i t i o n of Phormion's  b l o c k a d e from Naupaktos two y e a r s  previously.^  S i m i l a r l y the e x p e d i t i o n o f N i k i a s a g a i n s t Hinoa made the b l o c k a d e o f Megara, imposed by P e r i k l e s , more e f f e c t i v e than b e f o r e . observe any  The  g a r r i s o n t h e r e , l o c a t e d on an i s l a n d , c o u l d  s h i p s l e a v i n g the e a s t e r n p a r t of Megara and  be c l o s e t o S a l a m i s and  Athens.3?  N i k o s t r a t o s ' e f f o r t s t o keep the K e r k y r a i a n c o n f l i c t under c o n t r o l , and t o s u p p o r t and c r a t s t h e r e , were not o n l y s t a t e s m a n l i k e  party-  p a c i f y the demo-  but w e l l i n keeping  33Q.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the H i s t o r y of h i s I  2  (Oxford,  1 9 6 1 ) , pp.  Age,  3 7-3 9. k  ^Thucydides, I I , ^Plutarch's  yet  k  69.  a c c o u n t of t h i s b a t t l e i s confused by  the a d d i t i o n o f the c a p t u r e o f N i s a i a , a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d out by Demosthenes t h r e e y e a r s l a t e r ( P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s , 6 ) . Diodoros a l s o b e l i e v e d that N i k i a s captured N i s a i a (Diodoros, X I I , 80).  Perhaps t h e i r i n f o r m a t i o n  common s o u r c e .  came from Ephoros, a  31.  w i t h t h e terras o f the a l l i a n c e between Athens and K e r k y r a .  36  I n c o n t r a s t h i s s u c c e s s o r , Eurymedon, seems t o have been a h e l p l e s s bystander  a t the massacre t h a t f o l l o w e d h i s  But t h e main p o i n t was t h a t the democrats were l e f t  arrival.37 i n control  of Kerkyra. There i s no e v i d e n c e  t h a t any one o f these f i v e men,  o t h e r than L y s i k l e s , was c o n s i d e r e d an o u t s t a n d i n g l e a d e r a t the time.  None o f them d e v i a t e d n o t i c e a b l y from the  t h a t P e r i k l e s had a l r e a d y s e t .  I t i s o n l y o u t s i d e the board  of generals t h a t a r i s i n g leader i s found. his  Kleon i s given  f i r s t v i v i d p o r t r a y a l by Thucydides i n a speech condemning  the M y t i l e n a i a n s . TO,  course  aXXa  TOTE  From the f i r s t he i s d e s c r i b e d as OJV nat e?  ptatOTaTO<; raiv  TCOXITIOV  7rt©avdoTaTO<5,  T $ r e 6njK*> rcapa rtokv  ev f $  a l t h o u g h he i s d e f e a t e d by  D i o d o t o s i n t h i s debate'.  I n h i s speech he uses words and  phrases r e m i n i s c e n t o f P e r i k l e s .  W h i l e h i s i d e a s may seem  h a r s h t o u s , those o f D i o d o t o s , who opposed him, were n o t  ^ T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 75-80. 3 7  Thucydides, I I I , 8 l .  3 Thueydides, I I I , 36. 8  776,  Aristophanes, Knights,  i m p l i e s t h a t Kleon had been prominent b e f o r e 2 5 i n  establishing f i s c a l  k  policies.  773-  32.  too  d i f f e r e n t , f o r b o t h were a r g u i n g about t h e most e x p e d i e n t  a c t i o n f o r Athens.  Granted t h a t t h e k i l l i n g o f t h e male  p o p u l a t i o n o f M y t i l e n e might seem an e x c e s s i v e demand, t h e p r i n c i p l e b e h i n d i t , the d e s t r u c t i o n o f a l l o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the  empire, cannot be d e s c r i b e d as a t v a r i a n c e w i t h P e r i k l e s *  aims.  The i n t e n t i o n o f P e r i k l e s , D i o d o t o s , and K l e o n was t o  keep the empire i n t a c t w i t h o u t endangering A t h e n s . In f a c t a l l t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h i s y e a r l e a d s t o the  c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e r e was no d e v i a t i o n from P e r i k l e s  1  p o l i c i e s ; e i t h e r the e k k l e s i a s t i l l agreed w i t h them o r t h e r e was no one y e t p o w e r f u l enough t o change them. a n c e ^ L y s i k l e s from t h e p o l i t i c a l  scene i s e a s i l y e x p l a i n e d  i n K a r i a , 3 9 s was A s o p i o s i n h i s cam-  s i n c e he was k i l l e d paign.  The d i s a p p e a r -  a  Paches, a t h i r d g e n e r a l f o r the y e a r , a p p a r e n t l y  1 + 0  committed s u i c i d e i n c o u r t a f t e r t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n of M y t i l e n e i n the s p r i n g o f  27.-  k  But by the b e g i n n i n g o f the n e x t o f f i c i a l y e a r , i n the  same campaigning season, t h e summer o f 2 7 , k  the e a r l i e s t  d e v i a t i o n s from P e r i k l e s ' programme can be o b s e r v e d . f i r s t indication i s slight.  ^Thucydides, I I I ,  Laches and C h a r o i a d e s were s e n t  19.  ^ T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 7. k l  Plutarch, Nikias,  The  6.  33*  to S i c i l y w i t h twenty s h i p s .  I f the Athenians sent them  because o f the o l d a l l i a n c e and ordered them o n l y t o p a c i f y a f f a i r s i n S i c i l y and d i s c o u r a g e any S i c i l i a n s from making an a l l i a n c e w i t h the Peloponnesians, they s t i l l c o u l d have worked w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f P e r i k l e s ' p l a n s . set  the terms, pouXou-evot 6 6 WTB  ayeaQat a6ro0sv T t p c T t e t p a v  But once they  OTTOV !<; ttjv KeXo«owiio*ov  r.e 7roiouu.evo* et o*q>tcrt ouvata  ettj, Tia Iv if$ StxeXtg. npaywro.  UTtoxetpta Y veo"0at» e  they were s t a r t i n g to expand beyond P e r i k l e s * N i k i a s , who of  alms** " 4  3  perhaps d e s i r e d l i t t l e a c t i v i t y beeause  the e f f e c t s o f the plague on Athenian f o r c e s , ^  appears  t o have been stung i n t o a c t i o n by the populace when he  was  not r e - e l e c t e d f o r * + 2 6 / 5 s i n c e he made a t t a c k s on Melos and Tanagra  i n May  o r June o f  ^Thucydldes, ^Thucydldes  **26.^  I I I , 86,  See a l s o D i o d o r o s , X I I , 5»t,  might have w r i t t e n these words a t a l a t e r  time when he knew o f the l a r g e e x p e d i t i o n t o S i c i l y . »N. Couch, "Some P o l i t i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s o f the Athenian Plague," T.A.P.A., LXVI ^D.M. J.H.S.. LXXXI  (1935) >  p.  101,  Lewis, "Double R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the S t r a t e g i a , "  (1961),  ^Thucydldes,  p.  120,  I I I , 91.  t h i n k s t h a t N i k i a s was  re-elected.  3 . k  There i s some disagreement about Nikias' success i n t h i s campaign.  The views range from an abortive, unsuccess-  f u l attack aimed at bringing Melos into the empire to quite successful diversionary t a c t i c s . ^ The truth probably l i e s somewhere between them. I t seems l i k e l y that Nikias d i d not have the time necessary f o r besieging and subduing Melos (although he could have been relieved by a successor), both because h i s term of o f f i c e was expiring, and because he had made arrangements to meet the Athenian army under Kipponikos and Eurymedon i n order to make the attack on Tanagra.  After a f i n a l r a i d on the coast of  Lokris, opposite Euboia, a key point i n Athenian defence, Nikias returned to Athens to surrender h i s command. Demosthenes' attack on A i t o l i a was again a move beyond Perikles  1  k  policy.  As a defence f o r Naupaktos h i s plan was  ?Grundy (Thucydides and the History of h i s Age. I  [Oxford, 19^],  p. 3 3) k  and Henderson (T^e Gre^y War Bqfrween,  Athens and Sparta [London, 1927], pp. l k 2 , 22 ff.) believe k  that the attack on Tanagra was meant to connect with Demosthenes' land-attack on B o l o t i a ,  However, Thucydides says  nothing about a connection between the two expeditions and the phrase  oveu xr\<; T S V 'AGfivatojv 6uvaVe<u<;  suggests that  Demosthenes' idea was independent of Athenian p o l i c y .  35  j u s t i f i a b l e , but Demosthenes was more ambitious: VMtXtoTa  vopicfa? aveu  f|7retpaJTot«;  YTJV  TTJ<5 TSV  ^uvkuax*? 1*e*a 0  H C t t  *A©nvat'u>vfcuvau-eux;roxq  TSV A1T<OXSV  ouvaa©at av Kara  IxeeTv etft Botcorou? ....  ^  After the r e s u l t i n g disaster there and the death of h i s c o l l e a gue Prokles, Demosthenes also did not hold o f f i c e f o r the next year, but, unlike Nikias, did not even dare return to face the Athenian p u b l i c .  k Q  Of the p o l i c i e s supported by the remaining strategoi of the year we know l i t t l e .  Laches was a f r i e n d of Nikias.5°  Hipponikos, an extremely wealthy man, had family-connections with P e r i k l e s . Although h i s fellow-commander i n 26, k  Charoiades, had  been k i l l e d , Laches must have remained i n o f f i c e that summer. His  e f f o r t s cannot have been vigorous enough f o r the new  mood of the assembly;^  1  by the following winter he was super-  seded by Pythodoros, who was to be joined i n the beginning of  ^Thucydides, I I I , 95. ^Thucydides, I I I , 98. ?°Plato, Laches. 5lSee Diodoros, XII, 5^,6$  2i+o-2¥*, 89 -997. k  Aristophanes, Wasns,  36.  s p r i n g , "+25,  by Sophokles and Eurymedon.  The new commanders  were t o use a l a r g e r f l e e t t o end t h e war q u i c k l y , and maint a i n Athenian naval e f f i c i e n c y . D e s p i t e t h e e v i d e n c e f o r more a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c i e s than P e r i k l e s ' , i n t h e y e a r V26/5 l a c k o f m i l i t a r y success seems t o have caused a r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e more r a d i c a l group o f l e a d e r s . The new g e n e r a l s i n S i c i l y a c h i e v e d l i t t l e more t h a n Laches h a d .  S t i l l t h e y were r e - e l e c t e d f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g  y e a r , presumably because t h e demos d i d n o t want t o break t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e i r campaign. N o t h i n g i s known about H i p p o k r a t e s , t h e nephew o f P e r i k l e s , except t h a t he d i d s e r v e d u r i n g t h i s y e a r .  He may  have been a s s o c i a t e d w i t h K l e o n , and was n o t e l e c t e d f o r t h e next year. The names o f A r i s t o t e l e s , H i e r o p h o n , and Slmonides are  no more h e l p f u l .  The main a c t i o n o f t h e y e a r was p r o v i d e d  by Demosthenes, who was e v i d e n t l y n o t s e r v i n g i n an o f f i c i a l capacity.  A f t e r h i s s u c c e s s f u l defence o f Naupaktos he was  asked t h a t w i n t e r by t h e A k a r n a n i a n s t o be  commander-in-chief  over t h e i r own t r o o p s and t h e A t h e n i a n g e n e r a l s A r i s t o t e l e s and H i e r o p h o n , who had a l s o been r e q u e s t e d t o h e l p i n t h e defence o f A m p h i l o c h i a n Argos a g a i n s t t h e S p a r t a n s . his  After  b r i l l i a n t coup t h e r e t h e A t h e n i a n s were happy t o e l e c t  him f o r t h e n e x t summer's campaign.  37  During the summer of h26 there also occurred the p u r i f i c a t i o n of Delos.  While t h i s f e s t i v a l might have been  supported by Nikias i n an attempt to regain favour with the Athenians, there Is no evidence that l i n k s him precisely with the e v e n t . ^  Thucydldes says that the f e s t i v a l was organized  xaTa xPn^P-ov 6iT T t v a .  Although Nikias, Nikostratos, and Autokles were elected for  the year "4-25A, a more aggressive p o l i c y was s t i l l i n  effect.  S a i l i n g around the Peloponnese i n the early summer  of h2$ Demosthenes continued h i s streak of successful a c t i v i t y by trapping four hundred and f o r t y Peloponnesian h o p l i t e s , including one hundred and twenty Spartiates, on the island of Sphakterla.  The ensuing d i f f i c u l t i e s of protecting h i s gar-  r i s o n and then capturing the Spartans on the island caused a IJIL  furore i n Athens.  The r e s u l t s , as recorded by Thucydldes,  give the f i r s t hints of any strong leadership i n Athens. When the Spartans make t h e i r f i r s t o f f e r of peace, Kleon i s the dominant f i g u r e , the man who persuades the Athenians to turn down the o f f e r .  No one seems to have opposed  him, and this i s not surprising i f one considers the terms ^Thucydldes, I I I , 1CV, Plutarch, Nikias. 3, *M Diodoros, XII,  58.  ^See Chapter II above. ^"Thucydldes, IV, 1-*M-1.  38  o f f e r e d by t h e Spartans and t h e p o s i t i o n h e l d by t h e A t h e n i a n s . Even N i k i a s , so o f t e n accused o f wanting peace on any terras, was n o t l i k e l y t o have v o t e d i n f a v o u r o f t h e S p a r t a n p r o p o s a l . ' L a t e r e v e n t s , when t h e A t h e n i a n s f i r s t r e a l i z e d t h e o b s t a c l e s they would have t o overcome a t P y l o s , a r e r e l a t e d i n some d e t a i l by T h u c y d i d e s .  The unrest, fomented by l a c k o f  a d e c i s i v e a c t i o n a t P y l o s l e d K l e o n , e v i d e n t l y i n an attempt t o g a i n p e r s o n a l power, t o a t t a c k t h e g e n e r a l s now g u i d i n g the s t a t e * s p o l i c y .  He accused t h e g e n e r a l s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y  N i k i a s , whom Thucydides  says K l e o n c o n s i d e r e d a p e r s o n a l  enemy,^6 o f n o t b e i n g men; o t h e r w i s e they would s a i l t o t h e I s l a n d and c a p t u r e t h e S p a r t a n s .  Exasperated, N i k i a s i n turn  o f f e r e d K l e o n t h e command a t P y l o s .  A f t e r some p r e s s u r e from  ^ C f . P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s , 7; P h i l o c h o r o s , f r a g . ( J a c o b y ) ; Gomme, Commentary, I , pp. ^58-^60. (1.  26)  of A r i s t o p h a n e s , produced i n 25, k  t h e A t h e n i a n c i t i z e n s , elpiyvtj 6*  oVa>c;  I n t h e Achayalajas  D i k a i o p o l i s says o f  IOTCU npoxxwaa*  and makes h i s own p r i v a t e t r e a t y w i t h t h e S p a r t a n s . p l a y Lamachos i s mentioned  105  oudev, In t h i s  many t i m e s as a symbol o f a war-  l i k e g e n e r a l and K l e o n i s a t t a c k e d i n c i d e n t a l l y ; N i k i a s i s n o t mentioned.  Adcock, C.A.H.. V, p. 23 , k  N i k i a s must have advocated  peace.  56  T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 28.  i n s i s t s , however, t h a t  39  the demos Kleon accepted and made the rash promise of v i c t o r y within twenty days.  As i s well known, he d i d succeed, and  ever since Nikias has been blamed for h i s i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y or lack of foresight. At the time the Athenians even laughed at Kleon's assertions, or so Thucydldes says, and the "better types" were not unhappy because they thought they would either be r i d of Kleon or capture the Spartans.  When Kleon did succeed  a l l the Greeks were surprised - not at Kleon's success but at the fact that the Spartans surrendered. nothing about N i k i a s  1  But Thucydldes says  being remiss i n h i s duties.  Kemlss or not, Nikias caused a great deal of confusion. An explanation f o r h i s actions i s d i f f i c u l t to f i n d .  I f Kleon  had "inside" information from Demosthenes, i t i s u n l i k e l y that Nikias did not have the same or more.^  7  I t has also been  suggested that Nikias expected the campaign to f a i l , i n which case he might be happy to have Kleon associated with i t .  If  he expected Demosthenes to succeed, and did not wish to replace  ^Aristophanes' Knights possibly supports the conclusion that Demosthenes collaborated with Kleon since i t represents Demosthenes as cheated of h i s share of the credit f o r Pylos.  Throughout  the play Kleon i s the butt of A r i s -  tophanes' jokes and h i s chief opponents are Demosthenes and Nikias.  him i n h i s command, an a c t p r o b a b l y a g a i n s t p r o f e s s i o n a l e t h i c s , N i k i a s then had no b u s i n e s s i n v i t i n g K l e o n t o go.-*  Perhaps  8  N i k i a s , l i k e most of t h e Greeks, never c o n s i d e r e d t h a t the S p a r t i a t e s might s u r r e n d e r r a t h e r than be k i l l e d , and then how v a l u a b l e they would be as p r i s o n e r s o f t h e A t h e n i a n s . The u s u a l s o l u t i o n i s t h a t N i k i a s was e x t r e m e l y annoyed by Kleon's h e c k l i n g , and, not b e i n g as a s t u t e a p o l i t i c i a n a s K l e o n , d i d n o t f o r e s e e the p o s s i b l e consequences o f h i s a c t , f o r d e s p i t e j i b e s such as A r i s t o p h a n e s ' ^ 9  K l e o n must have  g a i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s t i g e and i n f l u e n c e a t N i k i a s  1  expense.  U n t i l t h i s time i t i s a c u r i o u s f a c t t h a t N i k i a s had never been i n v o l v e d i n a campaign beyond the west c o a s t o f t h e Peloponnese  :?  and the a r e a around A t t i c a .  W h i l e t h i s might be  A t one o t h e r time he made a s i m i l a r o f f e r , a l t h o u g h  under more g e n e r a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , when h i s o f f e r was l i k e l y t o be a c c e p t e d .  not  See T h u c y d i d e s , V I , 23.  ^ A r i s t o p h a n e s , K n i g h t s , 52-57. o G  T h e s p e c t a c u l a r assessment o f **25 <A9 i n A.T.L..  I I ) belongs e i t h e r b e f o r e N i k i a s ' a t t a c k on K o r i n t h (WadeGery and K e r i t t , "Pylos and t h e Assessment o f T r i b u t e , " A.J.P.. L V I I [1936], pp. 377-391*) o r a f t e r (M.F. McGregor, " K l e o n , N i k i a s , and the T r e b l i n g o f the T r i b u t e , " T.A.P.A., LXVI  [1935], pp. 1H6-16W) and may have been a r e s u l t o f Kleon's new  influence.  0 0  hi.  due  t o chance, i t i s noteworthy t h a t two men  w i t h him who  had  served  often  associated  i n the w e s t , Laches i n S i c i l y  and  N i k o s t r a t o s i n K e r k y r a , were r e c a l l e d from t h i s a r e a , perhaps because o f t h e i r e x c e s s i v e  caution.  C e r t a i n l y N i k i a s must have o b t a i n e d most o f h i s t i o n on S i c i l y from L a c h e s , ^ who  h i m s e l f seemed r a t h e r  l u s i o n e d about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f c a p t u r i n g i t . N i k o s t r a t o s was  informadisil-  Perhaps  aware t h a t i n t e r n a l problems a l o n e would  enough t o n e u t r a l i z e K e r k y r a  i n the w a r , ^  2  be  N i k i a s , having  a c c e s s t o t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , might have been p u r s u i n g  a more  than P e r i k l e a n programme, h o p i n g t o r e t a i n o n l y the empire i n the Aegean.  T h i s was  h i s i d e a l a t e r about S i c i l y , as we  from h i s speech i n Thucydides (VI, r e a s o n s why  k  and may  be one o f  the  he seemed t o behave so r i d i c u l o u s l y about P y l o s .  ( P o s s i b l y N i k i a s was i n 26  15),  know  defeated  i n the e l e c t i o n s f o r s t r a t e e o s  because he t o o k a s t a n d a g a i n s t an e x p e d i t i o n t o S i c i l y . ) Probably  as a counter-move t o K l e o n ' s s u c c e s s N i k i a s  made an a t t a c k on the t e r r i t o r y o f K o r i n t h s h o r t l y a f t e r . W h i l e the e x p e d i t i o n does not seem as b r i l l i a n t as the campaign  o x  D i o d o r o s s t a t e s , however, t h a t N i k i a s s e r v e d f o r the Syracusans r e s i d e n t i n Athens ( X I I I ,  7rpo£6vo<s  as 27).  62 Kerkyra the war  provided  d e s p i t e her  fleet.  l i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e t o Athens d u r i n g  te. a t P y l o s , the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a g a r r i s o n a t Methana was  not  useless s i n c e i t provided a convenient landing place f o r the Athenians."  3  n- x a  s o  showed t h a t N i k i a s c o u l d understand  and  employ a new t e c h n i q u e o f f i g h t i n g , a l t h o u g h i n h i s f a v o u r i t e t e r r i t o r y near Athens.  A t any r a t e , N i k i a s , a l o n g w i t h N i k o s -  t r a t o s and A u t o k l e s , f o l l o w e d t h i s move w i t h the c a p t u r e o f K y t h e r a i n the n e x t March, a much more n o t a b l e feat," *" 1  That i s l a n d , o f f the c o a s t o f L a k o n i a and c o n s i d e r e d v e r y i m p o r t a n t by t h e S p a r t a n s , completed e n c i r c l i n g t h e Peloponnese,  the l i n e o f bases  and enabled the A t h e n i a n s t o s a i l  to the west w i t h o u t any d i f f i c u l t y .  The S p a r t a n s seem t o  have w o r r i e d not so much about t h i s as about t h e f a c t t h a t the A t h e n i a n s c o u l d e a s i l y a t t a c k them from t h e i s l a n d  and  -'Plutarch says t h a t a f t e r t h i s b a t t l e N i k i a s renounced his  c l a i m t o v i c t o r y because he p r e f e r r e d t o send a h e r a l d  back and ask f o r the r e t u r n o f W o b o d i e s o f A t h e n i a n s t h a t had been l e f t u n n o t i c e d and o J +  unburied.  F o r t h e one hundred t a l e n t s p a i d t o N i k i a s f o r t h i s  e x p e d i t i o n on e i t h e r the f i f t e e n t h o r e i g h t e e n t h day o f t h e n i n t h p r y t a n y see I.G..  I , 32*4, I I , i n M. Lang, "The 2  Abacus  and the C a l e n d a r , " Hesp.. X X X I I I (196"+), pp. 1^6-167, and "The Abacus and the C a l e n d a r , I I , " Hesp., XXXIV (1965), pp.  22"+-2V7.  k  a l s o c u t o f f t h e g r a i n s u p p l y from Egypt.  7  3.  The r e s u l t was a  g r e a t l o s s o f morale among t h e S p a r t a n s , who had d i f f i c u l t y i n m a r s h a l l i n g t h e i r f o r c e s t o oppose t h e r a i d i n g a t t a c k s t h a t f o l l o w e d on t h e mainland f o r seven days. Whether t h i s a g g r e s s i v e p o l i c y was f o r c e d upon t h e g e n e r a l s , was what they w i s h e d , o r m e r e l y seemed b e s t under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s we do n o t know.  The A t h e n i a n s were n o t i m -  p r e s s e d enough t o e l e c t N i k i a s , N i k o s t r a t o s , and A u t o k l e s g e n e r a l s f o r t h e y e a r M-2V3*  K l e o n , who had r a i s e d t h e pay o f  j u r o r s d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g y e a r , ° was l e f t i n power, an elected general f o r the f i r s t  time.  J u s t a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t o f P y l o s the two g e n e r a l s Eurymedon and S o p h o k l e s , perhaps because o f t h e more v i o l e n t tone a t A t h e n s , p e r m i t t e d t h e K e r k y r a i a n democrats t o massacre t h e opposing p a r t y , a l t h o u g h by d e v i o u s methods.^  7  They t h e n  s a i l e d on t o S i c i l y . The f i r s t u p s e t i n t h e y e a r 2 V 3 was t h e d e c i s i o n o f k  t h e S i c i l i a n s t o make peace. did  n o t have much c h o i c e and c o n c u r r e d i n t h e s e t t l e m e n t .  D ?  VII,  A t Gela the Athenian generals  S e e Xenophon, H e l l e n i k a , I V , 8 , 7 - 8 ; and Herodotos,  235. 6 6  A p i s t o p h a n e s , K n i g h t s , 255, 7 9 7 .  67Eurymedon bad been I n v o l v e d i n a s i m i l a r t h e r e two y e a r s b e f o r e .  situation  The Athenians at home, disgruntled because they thought the generals had been bribed, banished Pythodoros and Sophokles and fined Eurymedon. In the same summer Demosthenes and Hippokrates captured Nisaia, although because of the intervention of Brasidas they did not gain Megara as they had hoped. In the following winter these same two were generals at the disaster of Delion, where Hippokrates and almost a thousand Athenians were k i l l e d .  Demosthenes' plans f o r con-  quering Boiotia had again come to nothing. A l l through t h i s time the Spartan commander Brasidas was carrying on a campaign that alarmed the Athenians greatly. He had successfully prevented them from taking Megara without even f i g h t i n g .  After a quick march through Thessaly, by means  of e f f e c t i v e combat and magnanimous offers of l i b e r a t i o n , he was managing to win over many Athenian t r i b u t a r i e s and a l l i e s i n Chalkidike, Akanthos and Amphlpolis among them.  Because  of the loss of the l a t t e r , Thucydldes, probably a replacement SO  f o r Eurymedon, was  banished.  As a d i r e c t r e s u l t of Delion and the losses to B r a s i das the Athenians must have decided that Nikias' policy was °Thucydides, IV, 10V;  A.B. West, "Notes on Athenian  Generals of the Year «+2*+-3 B.C.," A.J.P., XLV (192"+), pp.  151-152.  »*5.  vindicated and that the course of d i s c r e t i o n was to make an armistice with the Spartans f o r one year.  The Spartans too  were convinced of the advantages of an agreement.  Nikias,  Nikostratos, and Autokles appear as signatories of a truce for which Laches had been the proposer of the motion i n the assembly.^9  The opportunity f o r making a settlement similar  to the one eventually concluded i n 21  existed.  k  But Brasidas, breaking the truce, aroused a concerted reaction of anger among the Athenians.  Kleon moved that  Skione be recaptured and i t s inhabitants executed.  Nikias  and Nikeratos were prepared to undertake the expedition. The only general mentioned after t h i s time and before the Peace of Nikias i s Kleon, who during h i s campaign of 22 k  i n Thrace was k i l l e d before the walls of Amphipolis along with the opposing general, B r a s i d a s .  70  After their deaths Nikias was able to have h i s plans f o r peace carried i n the assembly.  In Thucydides  1  description  of him at t h i s time i s to be found the implication that Nikias  69  7  Thucydides, IV, 119.  °Their deaths are represented as the loss of the  "pestles of war" i n Aristophanes' Peace, which was just before peace was  concluded.  performed  h6.  always wished for peace* ... Ntwto? ulv pouXoVevoq Iv $. aTtaOn?  S<5 re  TO  nat ^ t o u r o , StaaaJCfacrOat aurnta  TTOVCUV  TTJV  eCrruxiav, nat  7ce7tauo*0at nat auToe; nat  TOU<;  7roXtTa<;  7rau0ai nat r ? peXXovTt xP° 1> KaTaXt/ceTv ovoua ax; ou6ev v  a«p^Xa<s rx\v jtoXtv SteyevETo, vop,t£cov IK T O U antvSuvou  TOUTO  {;uu.patvetv nat oVriS IXaxtcrTa Tuxfi auTov  TtapaSfScoct  TO  6e antVsuvov  TTJV  eipiyvriv 7tapexetv....  71  The description i s of Nikias in V 2 1 , however, not in h2$, and for Thucydides i s most laudatory.  Thucydldes, V, 1 6 .  ^7.  CHAPTER IV THE PEACE OF NIKIAS Thucydldes r e p o r t s t h a t a f t e r t h e deaths o f K l e o n and B r a s i d a s i n Thrace b o t h t h e A t h e n i a n s and S p a r t a n s had second thoughts about t h e i r a b i l i t i e s t o d e f e a t each o t h e r . The A t h e n i a n s had s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s d e f e a t s a t D e l i o n and A m p h i p o l i s , and were no l o n g e r c o n f i d e n t o f t h e i r good fortune.  They f e l t t h a t t h e i r a l l i e s would be encouraged t o  r e v o l t now, and w i s h e d t h e y had n o t thrown away t h e i r opport u n i t y f o r making peace a f t e r P y l o s .  Moreover, t h e i r f i g h t i n g  numbers were p r o b a b l y s t i l l d e p l e t e d from t h e ravages o f t h e plague.  1  The S p a r t a n s r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e i r b a s i c s t r a t e g y i n war - l a y i n g waste t h e enemy's l a n d - was no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e i n t h e case o f a sea-power such as A t h e n s .  They were b e i n g  r a i d e d from P y l o s and K y t h e r a , and were w o r r i e d about h e l o t s d e s e r t i n g and a l l i e s r e v o l t i n g .  2  The t h i r t y - y e a r  t r u c e between  •41.N. Couch, "Some P o l i t i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e A t h e n i a n P l a g u e , " T.A.P.A.. LXVI (1935), p. 2  101.  T h u c y d i d e s s t r e s s e s h e r e d i f f i c u l t i e s n o t emphasized  b e f o r e and makes no mention o f p o s s i b l e A t h e n i a n f i n a n c i a l problems.  k  8.  them and t h e A r g i v e s was e x p i r i n g and t h e A r g i v e s wished t o r e g a i n K y n o u r i a more than t h e y w i s h e d t o renew t h e t r e a t y . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f h a v i n g t o f i g h t b o t h Athens and Argos was f r i g h t e n i n g f o r Sparta, e s p e c i a l l y i f her Peloponnesian a l l i e s went over t o A r g o s . A c c o r d i n g l y P l e i s t o a n a x , t h e S p a r t a n k i n g , and " N i k i a s , the son o f N i k e r a t o s , who had done b e t t e r i n h i s m i l i t a r y commands t h a n anyone e l s e o f h i s t i m e , " ^ made g r e a t e f f o r t s t o a c h i e v e peace.  Thucydides n o t e s N i k i a s ' s e l f i s h  interest  I,  i n making peace.  The charge i s made l e s s s e v e r e o n l y by t h e  f a c t that h i s i n t e r e s t coincided with that of the majority o f c i t i z e n s i n 21 k  ( a s shown a l r e a d y by T h u c y d i d e s ) , and t h a t  t h e charges made a g a i n s t P l e i s t o a n a x , hoping t o a v o i d a t t a c k by h i s enemies, a r e more damning. D i s c u s s i o n s dragged on t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r and S p a r t a t h r e a t e n e d a n o t h e r i n v a s i o n and t h e b u i l d i n g o f permanent f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n A t t i c a i n an attempt t o f o r c e A t h e n i a n compliance. F i n a l l y peace was made a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f s p r i n g , k  21,  i n t h e a r c h o n s h i p o f A l k a i o s , on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t  each p a r t y would g i v e back what i t had a c q u i r e d d u r i n g t h e ^ T h u c y d i d e s , V,  16.  ^ T h u c y d i d e s , V, 16.  See Chapter I I I , ad f i n .  war, The  w i t h the e x c e p t i o n t r e a t y was  t o e x i s t f o r f i f t y y e a r s and  on b o t h s i d e s . who  t h a t Athens would r e t a i n N i s a i a . ^  ( S p a r t a had  i n v o l v e the  c a l l e d a meeting o f her  allies  allies,  v o t e d i n f a v o u r o f peace e x c e p t f o r t h e B o i o t i a n s , K o r i n -  t h i a n s , E l e i a n s , and Megarlans.)  The  g i v e n by Thucydldes i n such a way  as t o suggest t h a t he  consulted  the a c t u a l document.  terms o f the t r e a t y a r e has  N i k i a s , L a c h e s , Lamachos, and  Demosthenes were among the seventeen who  took the oath f o r  Athens•° As the l o t f e l l , the S p a r t a n s were t o r e s t o r e prizes f i r s t  7  and  they d i d immediately r e l e a s e t h e i r  'Adcock, C.A.H. V, T  N i k i a s looked  p. 253.  their prisoners  " I t i s possible that  back beyond the p o l i c y o f P e r i c l e s t o the p o l i c y  o f Cimon, and was  w i l l i n g t o make some s a c r i f i c e o f A t h e n i a n  i n t e r e s t s i n o r d e r t o r e v i v e an a n c i e n t A. Andrewes and D.M, Nikias," J.H.S  M  dualism."  L e w i s , "Note on the Peace o f  LXXVII (1957), pp. 177-180, o f f e r some i n t e r -  e s t i n g s p e c u l a t i o n s on the number o f s i g n a t o r i e s used ( s e v e n t e e n on each s i d e ) . 7  Plutareh, in Nikias  T  10,  1, r e p o r t s t h a t a c c o r d i n g  to  Theophrastos N i k i a s a c c o m p l i s h e d t h i s f o r Athens by b r i b e r y . Theophrastos seems elsewhere t o have enjoyed t h i s type o f I n P l u t a r c h " s A r i s t e l d e s , 25, ("The felt  tale.  he i s quoted s a y i n g t h a t A r i s t e i d e s  J u s t " ) , " n i c e l y just i n h i s private dealings with t h a t t h e p u b l i c advantage r e q u i r e d I n j u s t i c e .  citizens,"  50.  o f war.  They a l s o s e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o t h e T h r a k i a n area  t o i n s t r u c t K l e a r i d a s t o hand over A m p h i p o l i s t o t h e A t h e n i a n s . They m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r attempt t o g e t t h e i r a l l i e s t o agree and a c c e p t t h e t r e a t y h u t met w i t h r e f u s a l u n l e s s t h e t r e a t y s h o u l d be made "more j u s t , " o r , i n o t h e r words, more profitable of  k  5l  f o r the a l l i e s .  Argos r e f u s e d t o renew h e r t r e a t y  t o o , so f a c e d w i t h t h e p r o s p e c t o f Argos and p r o b a b l y  o t h e r P e l o p o n n e s i a n s t a t e s j o i n i n g Athens, t h e S p a r t a n s  con-  c l u d e d t h a t t h e i r b e s t course o f a c t i o n was t o make a f i f t y y e a r a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e A t h e n i a n s i n t h e hope t h a t t h e o t h e r s t a t e s would remain  quiet.  8  Why t h e A t h e n i a n s accepted t h i s i n v i t a t i o n i s d o u b t f u l . P l u t a r c h says t h a t a g a i n s t t h e o p p o s i t i o n o f A l k i b i a d e s N i k i a s persuaded  them t o do so f o r t h e sake o f peace and more s t a b l e  relations  among t h e Greek s t a t e s , 9  Possibly Nikias f e l t that  the maintenance o f u n r e s t between S p a r t a and h e r a l l i e s would b e n e f i t Athens.  Thucydides makes o n l y t h i s bare  statements  TrapovTcov ouv 7cpeoPeoov aixo T S V 'AeTivaTajv n a i fBvov,£v(av  ^uvepTioav, n o t e y e v o v T O o p n o i n a t ^uu-paxia T ( 6 S .  °Thucydides, V, 2 2 . ^ P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s , 10. 1 0  T h u c y d i d e s , V, 2 2 .  1 G  \6yarv  51.  Perhaps the Athenian s i g n a t o r i e s o f the t r u c e had remained i n Sparta f o r a few days i n the hope t h a t t h e a l l i e s would r e l e n t , f o r t h e same r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s s i g n both t r e a t y and a l l i a n c e . active.  I f so, N i k i a s c o u l d have been present and  In any case, the a l l i a n c e was concluded s h o r t l y  a f t e r the t r e a t y and bound each p a r t y t o a i d the other i f a t t a c k e d by a t h i r d p a r t y .  Soon a f t e r the Athenians  returned  the Lakedaimonian c a p t i v e s . Thucydldes g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the peace was welcomed o r r e j e c t e d , c o n s i d e r e d  stable or unstable  Athenians, o n l y t h a t N i k i a s seemed atr\o% AaKe6atiiovtou<;  onovbaw  expresses many views.  .H  by the  e l vat faSv npo<;  P l u t a r c h on the other hand  He s t a t e s : N i k i a s was the man who  r e a l i z e d t h a t Sparta was eager f o r peace while Athens was weary o f war;  N i k i a s had the support  o f o l d e r , wealthy men  and p a r t i c u l a r l y the landowners; N i k i a s won over more Athenians to h i s views and i n v i t e d the Spartans t o make o f f e r s o f peace. Furthermore, men once more t a s t e d the joys o f s e c u r i t y and the company o f f o r e i g n e r s and f r i e n d s ; f i n a l l y peace was concluded and N i k i a s was considered for  t h e i r s a v i o u r f o r he was r e s p o n s i b l e  t h e peace as P e r i k l e s had been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the war;  Xi  T h u c y d i d e s , V, *+6.  l Plutarch, Nikias, 9 2  52.  t o t h i s day t h e peace c a r r i e s h i s name.  How much o f P l u t a r c h ' s  n a r r a t i v e has been e l a b o r a t e d from T h u c y d i d e s , how much o f i t g a t h e r e d from o t h e r r e l i a b l e sources we do n o t know. The peace, a l t h o u g h observed t e c h n i c a l l y f o r almost seven y e a r s i n t h e t e r r i t o r y o f Athens and S p a r t a , was n o t observed i n t h e A r g o l i d o r elsewhere. i n t h e Peloponnese  K o r l n t h and o t h e r s t a t e s  d i d t h e i r b e s t t o t e r m i n a t e t h e agreement.  The A t h e n i a n s t o o became d i s s a t i s f i e d ^ when t h e S p a r t a n s 1  f a i l e d t o c a r r y out p a r t s o f t h e agreement.  Thucydides  him-  s e l f says t h a t t h e s e y e a r s cannot be c a l l e d a p e r i o d o f p e a c e .  1  Immediately a f t e r t h e a l l i a n c e between Athens and S p a r t a t h e K o r i n t h i a n s asked t h e A r g i v e s t o o r g a n i z e an a l l i ance among t h e o t h e r P e l o p o n n e s i a n s t a t e s .  Only I n t h i s way  c o u l d t h e K o r i n t h i a n s manage a b a l a n c e o f power s u f f i c i e n t t o n e u t r a l i z e Athens and h e r commercial p r o j e c t s .  The M a n t i n e i a n s  and t h e i r a l l i e s j o i n e d t h e proposed a l l i a n c e f i r s t .  Soon t h e  E l e i a n s , K o r i n t h i a n s , and C h a l k i d i a n s i n Thrace a l s o j o i n e d . D u r i n g t h e summer o f 20 k  communication  went on between  Athens and S p a r t a b u t w i t h mounting s u s p i c i o n s .  S p a r t a had  not r e t u r n e d A m p h i p o l l s n o r had t h e t r e a t y been r a t i f i e d by  1 3  A d c o c k , C.A.H. V, p. T  l k  T h u c y d i d e s , V,  26.  262.  53.  the Thrakian a l l i e s , Bolotians, or Korinthians. Despite promises of forcing them to do t h i s the Spartans p r o c r a s t i nated.  The Athenians i n turn refused to restore Pylos and  wished they had not returned the prisoners. The Spartans f e l t they had done t h e i r best.  They had  given up their Athenian prisoners and withdrawn t h e i r soldiers from Thrace.  They were trying to get the Boiotlans and Kor-  inthians to sign the treaty, and to return Panakton and a l l the Athenian prisoners i n B o i o t i a .  They could not give  Amphipolis back because they lacked adequate control.  In  the meantime they wanted the Athenians to surrender Pylos or withdraw the Messenians and helots and use a garrison of Athenians instead.  At length and a f t e r many conferences the  Athenians acquiesced i n t h i s request. Eventually the Spartans, now l e d by ephors, Kleobolos and Xenares, who did not favour the treaty, after several abortive proposals involving Boiotia and Argos, made an a l liance with B o i o t i a , paradoxically committing a breach of f a i t h with the Athenians i n order to uphold a treaty with the Athenians. Panakton.  They hoped to receive Pylos f o r the return of At t h i s time the Boiotlans began dismantling the  f o r t i f i c a t i o n s of Panakton. At the beginning of the next summer, the Argives feared that t h e i r f a i l u r e to renew the treaty with Sparta now meant  t h a t t h e y vrould have t o f i g h t S p a r t a , Tegea, B o i o t i a , and Athens a t the same t i m e .  Wot  grasping  the a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n ,  the d i s s e n s i o n t h a t would d e v e l o p because the agreement b e t ween S p a r t a and B o i o t i a had been made w i t h o u t A t h e n i a n a s s e n t o r knowledge, t h e y i m m e d i a t e l y attempted t o n e g o t i a t e an a l l i a n c e w i t h the S p a r t a n s , who  were o n l y t o o  willing.  D u r i n g t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s the S p a r t a n s r e t u r n e d  the  A t h e n i a n p r i s o n e r s from B o i o t i a and, a f t e r t h e d i s c o v e r y Panakton had been d i s m a n t l e d , since they considered  that  r e p o r t e d t h i s t o the A t h e n i a n s  i t s d e s t r u c t i o n e q u i v a l e n t t o handing  i t back. The had  A t h e n i a n s were e n r a g e d .  They f e l t the S p a r t a n s  shown bad f a i t h by not r e s t o r i n g Panakton I n t a c t and  by  making a s e p a r a t e a l l i a n c e w i t h the B o i o t i a n s , A t t h i s c r u c i a l time N i k i a s ' second g r e a t opponent entered was  the scene, A l k i b i a d e s , son o f K l e i n i a s ,  Alkibiades  a young man, ^ r a t h e r young t o h o l d o f f i c e i n the  opinion  1  o f T h u c y d i d e s , but from a f a m i l y and a s s o c i a t i o n s o f  •'"The s t r u g g l e between N i k i a s and A l k i b i a d e s p a r t l y one  195l], p. 210).  600.)  (V*  between the o l d and the young g e n e r a t i o n "  E h r e n b e r g , The  was  was  People of Aristophanes [ B l a c k w e l l , Oxford, C f . E u r i p i d e s ' S u p p l i a n t s . 232.  about t h i r t y y e a r s of  sge.  Alkibiades  (See K i r c h n e r , P.A..  I,  no.  55.  importance.  He thought t h a t Athens' b e s t course o f a c t i o n  was an a l l i a n c e w i t h A r g o s , so t h a t S p a r t a would have no l e i s u r e t o c r u s h t h a t s t a t e and t h e n a t t a c k Athens,  Besides,  he r e s e n t e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S p a r t a n s had n e g o t i a t e d t h e t r e a t y through N i k i a s and Laches, i g n o r i n g h i s a i d t o t h e p r i s o n e r s from P y l o s and h i s g r a n d f a t h e r ' s former a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h the Spartans. A c c o r d i n g l y A l k i b i a d e s s e n t a message t o t h e A r g i v e s s u g g e s t i n g t h a t they propose an a l l i a n c e among  themselves,  t h e M a n t i n e i a n s , and E l e i a n s , and send r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o Athens t o i n v i t e t h e A t h e n i a n s t o j o i n .  The A r g i v e s , f i n a l l y  u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n between Athens and S p a r t a , d e c i d e d t o comply.  I n a h u r r y , t h e S p a r t a n s a l s o sent d e l e g a t e s t o  Athens w i t h f u l l powers t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t .  They argued  b e f o r e t h e A t h e n i a n c o u n c i l t h a t they s h o u l d r e c e i v e P y l o s f o r Panakton and t h a t t h e i r a l l i a n c e w i t h B o i o t i a was a c c e p t a b l e because i t was n o t d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t Athens,  T h e i r speech  i n t h e bpu^e appeared so p e r s u a s i v e t o A l k i b i a d e s t h a t he thought t h e y would w i n over t h e A t h e n i a n p u b l i c when they r e p e a t e d i t b e f o r e t h e assembly.  A l k i b i a d e s was an A l k m a i o n i d on h i s mother's s i d e o f t h e f a m i l y , and a s s o c i a t e d w i t h P e r i k l e s and S o k r a t e s . See T h u c y d l d e s , V, k$.  56  He t h e r e f o r e promised t h e S p a r t a n s t h a t , i f t h e y d i d not c l a i m t o have f u l l powers b e f o r e t h e assembly, he h i m s e l f would c o n v i n c e t h e A t h e n i a n s t h a t t h e y s h o u l d g i v e P y l o s back:*  D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t he was one o f t h e l e a d e r s opposing  t h i s move, t h e S p a r t a n s o b v i o u s l y t r u s t e d him.  They were  t h i n k i n g perhaps o f t h e k i n d n e s s e s he had shown t o t h e p r i s o n e r s from P y l o s and h i s f a m i l y ' s former a s s o c i a t i o n s , perhaps he had changed h i s o p i n i o n o f N i k i a s * i d e a s .  that  R e a l i z i n g the  weakness o f t h e i r p o s i t i o n they d i d as he s u g g e s t e d , and A l k i b i a d e s p u b l i c l y accused them o f d u p l i c i t y .  His intentions  were t o d e s t r o y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between them and N i k i a s and through more e v i d e n c e o f i n s i n c e r i t y on t h e p a r t o f t h e Spartans draw t h e A t h e n i a n s i n t o a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e A r g i v e s .  His attack  was so s u c c e s s f u l t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n s were p r e p a r e d t o make an a l l i a n c e w i t h Argos t h a t v e r y day i n t h e a s s e m b l y .  1 7  B o t h N i k i a s and t h e o t h e r members o f t h e c o u n c i l must have been so d i s t r u s t f u l o f t h e S p a r t a n n e g o t i a t i o n s by now t h a t they were n o n p l u s s e d by t h e s i t u a t i o n .  The S p a r t a n s  c l e a r l y c o u l d n o t c o n t r a d i c t themselves a g a i n and e x p e c t t h e 18  Athenians t o b e l i e v e them,  1  But f o r t u n a t e l y f o r N i k i a s t h e r e  was an earthquake b e f o r e a n y t h i n g was a r r a n g e d and t h e assembly 1 7  l 8  T h u c y d i d e s , V, P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s , 10.  57  vas adjourned f o r the day. yet  On the f o l l o w i n g day N i k i a s was  Strong enough p o l i t i c a l l y t o postpone  the f i n a l d e c i s i o n .  He f e l t t h a t an a l l i a n c e w i t h Sparta was b e t t e r than one w i t h the A r g i v e s , and t h a t even j u s t d e l a y i n g the war was i n c r e a s i n g the p r e s t i g e o f Athens, l o w e r i n g t h a t o f S p a r t a .  Especially,  he r e a l i z e d t h a t Sparta had l i t t l e t o l o s e by f i g h t i n g imm e d i a t e l y - and p o s s i b l y much t o g a i n . ' He persuaded the Athenians t o send him and some o t h e r s to S p a r t a *  They would ask the Spartans t o prove t h e i r good  f a i t h by r e s t o r i n g Panakton i n t a c t , g i v i n g back Amphipolis and renouncing the t r e a t y w i t h the B o l o t i a n s .  Otherwise the  Athenians would make an a l l i a n c e w i t h the A r g i v e s , must have merely been s t a l l i n g  f o r time because  t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s would be met*  Nikias  i t was u n l i k e l y  Perhaps he hoped even  the Athenians* g i v e n time, would change t h e i r minds a g a i n ,  2 0  N i k i a s , a l r e a d y d e c e i v e d i n A l k i b i a d e s , and i n t u r n deceived by the i n f l u e n c e o f the p a r t y o f Xenares the ephor, managed t o g e t the oaths renewed b u t , o f course, n o t h i n g e l s e accomplished.  I n f e a r he r e t u r n e d home t o see the Athenians  conclude an a l l i a n c e w i t h t h e A r g i v e s , M a n t i n e i a n s , and E l e i a n s *  1 9  2G  XIX  T h u c y d i d e s , V, H6» M.F. McGregor, "The Genius o f A l k i b i a d e s ,  (1965),  p.  30,  "Phoenix*  agrees t h a t N i k i a s ' p o l i c y was "more im-  m e d i a t e l y sound," A l k i b i a d e s ' more i m a g i n a t i v e and dangerous*  58.  Over the next few years before  the S i c i l i a n  expedi-  t i o n , evidence f o r the support t h a t N i k i a s and A l k i b i a d e s had is  confusing. A l k i b i a d e s may have t e m p o r a r i l y  l o s t some i n f l u e n c e ,  e s p e c i a l l y among the A r g i v e s , when the Spartans gained an entry i n t o Epldauros.  He had advocated t h a t the A r g i v e s  conquer t h i s town f o r the convenience o f the Athenian r e i n forcements i n A i g i n a .  The A r g i v e s  complained t h a t the Athen-  ians had broken t h e i r t r e a t y by a l l o w i n g the Spartans s e a passage t o t h a t p l a c e and c o u l d make r e p a r a t i o n o n l y by p u t t i n g a f o r c e o f Messenians and h e l o t s back i n t o P y l o s .  At length  h e l o t s from K r a n i o i were sent and no f u r t h e r a c t i o n taken on  21 either side. B e f o r e the b a t t l e o f M a n t i n e i a , s e r v i n g as g e n e r a l but as 7tpeo*peuTqs , and  Laches were i n o f f i c e .  A l k i b i a d e s was n o t Instead  Nikostratos  Y e t , a f t e r the d i s a s t e r a t Man-  t i n e i a , f o r which A l k i b i a d e s may be c o n s i d e r e d  basically  r e s p o n s i b l e , the Athenians again e l e c t e d him g e n e r a l . not known how he s u r v i v e d t h i s catastrophe  It i s  and r e t a i n e d h i s  p o l i t i c a l p r e s t i g e a t t h e same time.  He must have remained  i n Argos d u r i n g the f o l l o w i n g w i n t e r ,  f o r he opposed the  A r g i v e a l l i a n c e w i t h the Lacedaimonians made then. Thucydldes, V,  %  59  N i k i a s had n o t been completely f o r g o t t e n , f o r , when an e x p e d i t i o n he was supposed to l e a d a g a i n s t  the C h a l k i d i a n s  i n Thrace and Amphipolls had t o be c a l l e d o f f because Perdikkas betrayed him and swore a l l e g i a n c e to the A r g i v e s  and S p a r t a n s ,  a f o r c e was sent t o blockade Perdikkas i n Makedonia. t h i s date a p p a r e n t l y win  N i k i a s was not f i g h t i n g Sparta  Even a t except t o  back what belonged t o Athens by the t r e a t y ' s terms* In the next summer,  "M-16,  A l k i b i a d e s completed the r e -  a l l i a n c e o f Athens and Argos w i t h the s i g n i n g o f a f i f t y - y e a r truce.  The s u b j u g a t i o n  He was a g e n e r a l during  o f Melos may have been h i s idea t o o . the year hl6 and P l u t a r c h s t a t e s t h a t  he gave h i s support i n the assembly t o the motion d e c i d i n g the execution  o f a l l a d u l t men i n M e l o s .  2 3  T h i s the Athenians  c a r r i e d out, a l s o s e l l i n g the women and c h i l d r e n as s l a v e s , as was common p r a c t i c e .  2 2  2 3  ok  T h u c y d i d e s , V, 8 3 . Plutareh, Alkibiades,  16.  Pseudo.-Andokides  (M-.22),  s t a t e s t h a t A l k i b i a d e s supported t h e motion f o r enslavement. 2k M.I.  F i n l e y , "Was Greek C i v i l i z a t i o n Based on  Slave Labour?" H i s t o r i a . V I I I  (1959),  PP-  152,  l6l.  2 2  60  During this year  one of the interesting devices of  7  the Athenian constitution, ostracism, was f i n a l l y destroyed by Alkibiades and Nikias.  Thucydldes makes no mention of an  ostracism during t h i s period but Plutarch gives a f u l l account.  'The date of t h i s ostracism formerly was linked with Alkibiades' p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r Mantineia and dated to hl7 by two statements? one by Theopompos (frag. 9 6 B , Jacoby) that Hyperboles l i v e d i n e x i l e f o r s i x years, and the other by Thucydldes  (VIII, 7 3 ) , that he was assassinated i n the  But Woodhead ("I.G.. I , 9 5 , and the Ostracism of  year kll.  Hyperbolos," Hesperia, XVIII [ I 9 H 9 ] , pp. 7 8 - 8 3 ) dates I.G*. I , 9 5 , a decree i n which Hyperbolos moves an amendment, to the tenth prytany of H 1 8 / 7 B.C. by restoring ITTI apxovros^  'AvTtg>[ovTo$  McGregor ("The Genius of Alkibiades," Phoenix,  XIX [ 1 9 6 5 3 , pp.  supports t h i s reading.  Undoubtedly  the V should be accepted along with the restoration that makes i t impossible to believe that Hyperbolos was ostracized i n the spring of hl7.  Raubitschek ("The Case against A l k i -  biades: Andocides IV," T.A.P.A., LXXIX [ l 9 * * 8 j ,  pp. 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 )  agrees that V l 6 i s the e a r l i e s t possible date f o r Hyperbolos' ostracism, but prefers *H5.  However, kl6  i s the date that  agrees best with a l l the evidence. 2 6  P l u t a r c h , Mlki&^  t  115 Alkibiades 1 3 . T  61  A l k i b i a d e s and N i k i a s were the s t r o n g e s t i n the s t a t e . h i s way  Apparently  o f l i f e and  hand was  amoral c h a r a c t e r .  f e a r e d because o f  N i k i a s on the  other  e n v i e d because of h i s r i c h e s and d i s l i k e d because  of h i s aloofness. who  A l k i b i a d e s was  politicians  He was  championed by the o l d e r A t h e n i a n s ,  wished f o r peace, w h i l e A l k i b i a d e s was  younger g e n e r a t i o n , who d e s i r e d  s u p p o r t e d by the  war.  When i t became c l e a r t h a t one o f them was be o s t r a c i z e d , the two  l i k e l y to  j o i n e d t h e i r f a c t i o n s and managed t o  o s t r a c i z e H y p e r b o l o s , a l e a d e r o f some s t a t u r e who  neverthe-  l e s s was  l a t e r thought unworthy o f the honour o f t h a t  ment.  The  27  demos was  punish-  amused or angered when i t r e a l i z e d t h a t  the p r o c e s s of o s t r a c i s m had been so abused, and never employed  2 7  P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s , II5 A r i s t e i d e s , 7.  Plutarch  a l s o c i t e s a d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n from T h e o p h r a s t o s , who s a i d t h a t H y p e r b o l o s was  o s t r a c i z e d when P h a i a x and  were c o n t e n d i n g w i t h one  another.  T h i s v e r s i o n appears t o  d e r i v e from Pseudo-Andokides, IV, 23. "The  Alkibiades  A.E.  Raubitschek,  Case a g a i n s t A l c i b i a d e s : Andocides IV," T.A.P.A., LXXIX  (19 8), pp. 191-210, s t a t e s t h a t Theophrastos c l e a r l y b e l i e v e d k  i n the a u t h e n t i c i t y o f - t h i s speech.  62  i t again.  I n the meantime two  strong p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n s  s t i l l e x i s t e d i n the c i t y , t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s  unresolved.  L. P e a r s o n , " P a r t y P o l i t i c s and F r e e Speech I n Democratic A t h e n s , " Greece and Rome V I I (1937)» pp. M.-50, T  d e n i e s t h a t o s t r a c i s m works i n p a r t y p o l i t i c s and considers  evidently  the groups l e d by A l k i b i a d e s and N i k i a s t o be  s t r o n g as a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s by the time o f the expedition.  as  Sicilian  63.  CHAPTER V THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION The f i n a l p a r t o f N i k i a s ' c a r e e r o c c u r s i n t h e S i c i l i a n expedition, kl5-k13«  The A t h e n i a n s , l o n g i n v o l v e d i n  minor a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h S i c i l y , shovred a s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n t h a t i s l a n d now, an i n t e r e s t perhaps l i n k e d w i t h a d e s i r e for wealth, Sicilians  1  a l t h o u g h they s t a t e d they wished t o p r e v e n t t h e  from a i d i n g t h e i r D o r i a n kinsmen i n S p a r t a w i t h  grain or troops, P e r i k l e a n p o l i c y appeared t o Imply no e x p a n s i o n westward even though t r e a t i e s o f a l l i a n c e had been made i n 58 k  w i t h E g e s t a and those made soon a f t e r w i t h Rhegion and Leont i n o i renewed i n 33/2. k  S t i l l t h e A t h e n i a n s had n o t f o r g o t t e n  a S i c i l i a n t h e a t r e o f o p e r a t i o n d u r i n g t h e A r c h i d a m i a n War, for  some e x p e d i t i o n s had been s e n t t h e r e , f i r s t twenty s h i p s  i n l a t e summer 2 7 under Laches and C h a r o i a d e s , w h i c h , when k  Charoiades was k i l l e d , remained under t h e s o l e command o f L a t e r , i n w i n t e r k 25A, f o r t y more s h i p s were s e n t  Laches,  under t h e command o f Eurymedon, S o p h o k l e s , and Pythodoros hut a c h i e v e d no s p e c t a c u l a r s u c c e s s e s .  When f i n a l l y t h e  made peace among themselves a t Gela i n 2 / 3 t h e  Sicilians  k  A  k  V . E h r e n b e r g , The People, o f A r i s t o p h a n e s ( B l a c k w e l l ,  Oxford, 195D,  p. 232.  6k.  A t h e n i a n commanders c o u l d do l i t t l e but a c q u i e s c e and  sail  away.  Pytho-  F o r t h i s a c t i o n the A t h e n i a n assembly  banished  p doros and Sophokles and f i n e d Eurymedon. The speech o f Hermokrates r e p o r t e d i n Thucydldes t o help accomplish t h i s settlement i n S i c i l y  3  is  interesting.  I t enumerates t h e p o i n t s l a t e r debated by N i k i a s and A l k i b i a d e s . F o r example, the A t h e n i a n s a r e d e s c r i b e d as not h a t i n g any group o r r a c e i n S i c i l y but as wanting S i c i l i a n p r o p e r t y ; as becoming a g g r e s s o r s when t h e y meet no r e s i s t a n c e ; as b e i n g a b l e t o a t t a c k o n l y from bases, i n a S i c i l y t h a t has f a i l e d t o u n i t e against foreigners. A d i p l o m a t i c e x p e d i t i o n t o S i c i l y was  s e n t by the  A t h e n i a n s a t t h e same time as K l e o n went t o Thrace,  Phaiax  and two o t h e r 7rpeoPeurot'went t o oppose the c l a i m s o f  Syracuse  over the o l i g a r c h s i n L e o n t i n o i .  They hoped t o persuade t h e  A t h e n i a n a l l i e s and r e m a i n i n g S i c e l i o t s t o j o i n i n an e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t Syracuse because o f her c o n t i n u a l a g g r e s s i o n . See Chapter I I I .  Since  Laches may a l s o have been accused  o f t a k i n g b r i b e s i n S i c i l y ; A r i s t o p h a n e s , Wasns 2"+0-2¥f; T  89^-997.  H.D.  W e s t l a k e , " A t h e n i a n Aims i n S i c i l y ,  k27-k2k  B.C.," H i s t o r i a . I X (i960), pp. 385-^02, d i s c u s s e s t h e fully. 3  Thucydides,  I V , 86.  problem  65  Phaiax was u n s u c c e s s f u l a t Gela he r e a l i z e d t h e o t h e r s t a t e s would a l s o n o t g i v e t h e i r support t o A t h e n i a n t r o o p s , so he withdrew and r e t u r n e d t o Athens. When a t l a s t t h e E g e s t a i a n s went t o war w i t h t h e i r neighbours a g a i n and d i s c o v e r e d themselves  f a c i n g even t h e  p o w e r f u l Syracusans they remembered t h e i r e a r l i e r agreement w i t h Laches and sent t o Athens f o r a i d .  They r e p e a t e d l y warned  t h a t t h e S y r a c u s a n s , once they h a d g a i n e d f u l l power i n S i c i l y , would j o i n up w i t h t h e i r D o r i a n kinsmen and t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n s I n a campaign t o d e s t r o y Athens.  B e s i d e s , t h e E g e s t a i a n s were  p r e p a r e d t o s u p p l y enough money t o pay f o r t h e war. The A t h e n i a n s , eager t o invade S i c i l y , i n t h e w i n t e r of rl6/5  g l a d l y s e i z e d t h e p r e t e x t o f a i d i n g t h e i r kinsmen  l  and a l l i e s .  They d e c i d e d t o send d e l e g a t e s t o E g e s t a t o see  f o r themselves what t h e s i t u a t i o n r e a l l y was. When t h e Atheni a n d e l e g a t e s r e p o r t e d back t h e n e x t y e a r a l o n g w i t h an embassy from Egesta c a r r y i n g s i x t y t a l e n t s o f s i l v e r t o pay f o r s i x t y s h i p s f o r one month, they encouraged t h e e x p e d i t i o n because they had been duped about t h e funds s t i l l i n Egesta,  available  Upon t h e i r r e p o r t t h e A t h e n i a n assembly d e c i d e d  t o send s i x t y s h i p s 5 t o S i c i l y under t h e command o f A l k i b i a d e s ,  T h u c y d i d e s , V, 5  Cf.  k  and 5.  I.G.. I , 98. 2  66.  N i k i a s , and Lamachos w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o h e l p t h e E g e s t a i a n s a g a i n s t t h e S e l i n o u n t i n e s , t o r e - e s t a b l i s h t h e L e o n t i n t o i and do whatever might seem i n a c c o r d w i t h A t h e n i a n i n t e r e s t s . F i v e days l a t e r when t h e assembly was making  final  arrangements about t h e e x p e d i t i o n , N i k i a s spoke a g a i n s t i t . His  v i e w was t h a t t h e e x p e d i t i o n r e a l l y aimed a t c o n q u e r i n g  the  whole o f S i c i l y , and t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n s were making a  mistake.  Thucydldes says roost o f t h e A t h e n i a n s were i g n o r a n t  about S i c i l y and i t s i n h a b i t a n t s , and d i d n o t r e a l i z e t h a t t h e y were u n d e r t a k i n g a n o t h e r f u l l - s c a l e war. N i k i a s argued t h a t t h e t i m e was wrong and S i c i l y n o t easy t o c o n q u e r .  7  Many enemies would be l e f t b e h i n d , f o r t h e  peace t r e a t y o f f e r e d no r e a l s e c u r i t y ; t h e C h a l k i d i a n s i n Thrace were n o t y e t conquered,® o t h e r s u b j e c t s w i s h e d t o r e b e l b u t c o u l d be kept down e a s i l y i f Athens d i d n o t s c a t t e r her  forces.  On t h e o t h e r hand, S i c i l y , once conquered, would  be v e r y d i f f i c u l t t o keep, and a n t a g o n i s t i c towards A t h e n s . S i c i l y under t h e c o n t r o l o f S y r a c u s e v/ould be even l e s s a  "Thucydldes, V, 9-1**. 7  the  D i o d o r o s , X I I , 83, adds t h a t N i k i a s argued t h a t even  C a r t h a g i n i a n s had been u n a b l e t o subdue  Sicily.  o  B.W. Henderson, The Great War Between Athens and S p a r t a ( M a c m i l l a n and Co. L t d . , London, 1927), p. 339> condemns N i k i a s  1  p o l i c y i n t h i s a r e a as i n almost a l l e l s e .  67.  danger than S i c i l y divided, with some states f e e l i n g l o y a l t y to Sparta,  He suggested that any attack: should he only a  b r i e f display of power i n order that the Athenians might recoup t h e i r losses i n men and money*  He summed up h i s l o g i c  by saying that the S i c i l i a n s should be l e f t i n t h e i r present condition, which was perfectly satisfactory to the Athenians, while the Athenians faced the r e a l problem of protecting themselves against the o l i g a r c h i c a l plans of Sparta. In a personal attack he also accused Alkibiades of being a s e l f i s h young man who wanted p r o f i t s to maintain h i s personal extravagances.  F i n a l l y Nikias asked f o r the expedi-  tion to be voted on again, a procedure that was perhaps a breach of the assembly's  rules.  Alkibiades, according to Plutarch (Alkibiades. 17) and Thucydides (VI, l ) the chief proponent of the expedition k  to S i c i l y (and then Carthage and Libya,9 so that I t a l y and the Peloponnese would f a l l an easy prey to Athens), spoke i n reply and f i n a l l y suggested that the Athenians should not delay but send him, s t i l l i n the strength of h i s youth, and  The idea of attacking Carthage was already scoffed at by Aristophanes i n the Knights. 1 7 , 1303-130 ; see also k  Thucydides, VI, V>\ 90.  k  68,  Nikias, with his reputation for luck, as generals.  He an-  swered the c r i t i c i s m s of strategy by claiming that S i c i l y was not united by r a c i a l t i e s or p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s and that the enemies l e f t behind could attack safely by land whether or not an expedition was i n S i c i l y , and s t i l l do no harm to the Athenian f l e e t l e f t behind. Both Alkibiades' and Nikias' estimates of the s i t u ation can be j u s t i f i e d ,  1 0  Alkibiades seemed to think that one  must add to an empire or lose i t , maintain i t ,  Nikias merely wanted to  Alkibiades f e l t that security was guaranteed  by the Athenian navy which was superior to a l l the S i c i l i a n navies put  together.  As was to be expected, the c o l o u r f u l and generous tone of Alkibiades' speech won favour, and i n a second speech i n hopes of yet deterring the e x p e d i t i o n  11  Nikias t r i e d to add  weight to h i s argument by exaggerating the armaments needed. In t h i s speech he showed quite a detailed knowledge of S i c i l y . He described i t s c i t i e s as being independent and not wanting any other governments.  Perhaps he had been given a great deal  of information by Laches, (see Chapter III) f o r , even i f he  M.F,  McGregor, "The Genius of Alkibiades," Phoenix,  XIX (1965), P P . 32-3^. ^Thucydldes, VI, 20-23.  69.  was o v e r - e s t i m a t i n g t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o be e x p e c t e d , he c l e a r l y r e a l i z e d what t h e weaknesses o f t h e A t h e n i a n e x p e d i t i o n would be.  F o r example, he knew t h e S i c i l i a n s had c a v a l r y a v a i l a b l e  to them, w h i l e t h e A t h e n i a n s would have t o g e t c a v a l r y from the Egestaians.  He knew t h a t above a l l t h e A t h e n i a n s would  need a s o u r c e o f s u p p l i e s f o r t h e f o u r months o f w i n t e r s i n c e even a messenger would have d i f f i c u l t y g e t t i n g t o Athens. I n what appears t o be foreshadowing b y Thueydides he a d m i t t e d t h a t i t would be shameful t o have t o r e t r e a t o r send back for  r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t h r o u g h n o t b e i n g w e l l enough p r e p a r e d .  The A t h e n i a n s would have t o e s t a b l i s h mastery when t h e y  first  l a n d e d o r p r e p a r e t o f i n d enemies on e v e r y s i d e . A f t e r t h i s speech, meant t o d i s c o u r a g e , t h e A t h e n i a n s o n l y became more e n t h u s i a s t i c and f e l t t h a t i n f o l l o w i n g N i k i a s ' a d v i c e t h e y were embarking on a s a f e p r o j e c t . By the time N i k i a s r e l u c t a n t l y gave l a r g e f i g u r e s f o r t h e p r o b a b l e numbers o f men and s h i p s needed, s u b j e c t t o f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n v/ith h i s c o l l e a g u e s , t h e A t h e n i a n s v o t e d t h e gene r a l s f u l l pov/ers. The i n c i d e n t o f t h e Herms f o l l o w e d .  i C  Perhaps t h e  The i n c i d e n t p r o b a b l y o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e f i r s t week i n June, a d a t e based on I.G. I T  2  , 302, which r e c o r d s payments  made t o t h e g e n e r a l s f o r t h e f i n a n c i n g o f t h e e x p e d i t i o n , and Thueydides*  d a t i n g f o r t h e d e p a r t u r e o f t h e e x p e d i t i o n , espou?  VieaouvTo? nbi\ ( V I , 30); M e r i t t , "The D e p a r t u r e o f A l k i b i a d e s for  S i c i l y , " A.J.A., XXXIV (1930), pp. 125-152.  70.  work o f o l i g a r c h s i n the c i t y , the m u t i l a t i o n o f these r e l i gious f i g u r e s on the eve  of the departure o f the  expedition  seems to have been a p l o t a g a i n s t  M e t i c s and  servants  mutilated one  the M y s t e r i e s  of those i m p l i c a t e d was  Alkibiades.  s e n s i b l e demand f o r an Immediate t r i a l g u i l t y , the generals  expedition  Alkibiades. 3 A  gave evidence t h a t o t h e r statues had  p r e v i o u s l y , and  prove him  Sicilian  been  mocked i n p r i v a t e homesj D e s p i t e h i s thoroughly to c l e a r h i s name or  were f o r c e d to s e t out w i t h  the  as planned.  In midsummer the f o r c e s s a i l e d from the P e i r a e o s . Kerkyra the g e n e r a l s  divided t h e i r forces into three,  p a r t under A l k i b i a d e s , one  under N i k i a s , and  one  In  one  under Lamachos,  so t h a t they would not be s t a t i o n e d together i n an area i n capable o f supporting  them.  Three ships sent ahead to Egesta r e t u r n e d  s h o r t l y to  the troops a t Rhegion w i t h the u n e q u i v o c a l message t h a t  the  promised funds were not a v a i l a b l e to support the A t h e n i a n s , but  j u s t t h i r t y t a l e n t s (Thucydides says t h a t N i k i a s  expecting  t h i s news).  Moreover, the people o f Rhegion  t o j o i n the e x p e d i t i o n .  1  See  the  M u t i l a t i o n of the Herms: a Study  ( D i s s . , U n i v e r s i t y of C i n c i n n a t i ,  Chapter I I , ad f i n .  refused  At the ensuing c o n s u l t a t i o n s o f  3 R u t h E. A l l a n , The  i n Athenian P o l i t i c s ,  was  195D.  71.  commanders i t became obvious that they disagreed on the method of executing t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n s . Nikias wanted to s e t t l e the immediate s i t u a t i o n either by s a i l i n g against Sellnous and then determining  further ac-  t i o n i f Egesta provided enough money f o r the whole army, or by getting together enough money from Egesta to provide the promised supplies, by forcing Egesta and Sellnous to reach an agreement, and by making a show of power (including perhaps aid to the LeontinM or agreements with other c i t i e s ) before s a i l i n g home.  He wished to take as limited a view as possible  of the purpose of the expedition. Alkibiades desired to encourage revolts and seek support from a l l the c i t i e s except Syracuse and Sellnous. He hoped especially to win over Messene and some of the S i c e l s . F i n a l l y he hoped to make an attack upon Syracuse and Selinous. Lamachos wished to attack Syracuse immediately and make a naval base at Megara, but gave i n to Alkibiades* plan.  In t h i s  way  the two courses of action that were most l i k e l y to succeed were turned down. Unfortunately after Alkibiades was r e c a l l e d to Athens Lamachos f a i l e d to impose h i s w i l l upon Nikias, either because i t was already too l a t e to use Lamachos  ,:  plan or because  Nikias prevailed i n eminence and respect, i f only i n Lamachos* opinion.  Reverting to Nikias' f i r s t plan the generals divided  72.  t h e i r f o r c e s and s e t out t o d i s c o v e r whether o r not the Egest a i a n s would produce some money and why t h e S e l i n o u n t i n e s were f i g h t i n g the E g e s t a i a n s . N i k i a s d i d c o l l e c t t h i r t y  tal-  ents and s o l d c a p t i v e s as s l a v e s f o r another one hundred  and  twenty t a l e n t s b e f o r e he r e j o i n e d the e x p e d i t i o n .  A i d was  sought from t h e S i c e l s but l i t t l e e l s e was a c c o m p l i s h e d t h a t summer. F i n a l l y the A t h e n i a n f o r c e a t t a c k e d S y r a c u s e . the  At  b e g i n n i n g o f w i n t e r the g e n e r a l s thought o f a c l e v e r p l a n ,  r e m i n i s c e n t o f A l k i b i a d e s ' i n g e n u i t y , f o r moving t h e i r t r o o p s from Katana t o Syracuse w i t h o u t f i g h t i n g a p i t c h e d  battle.  Drawing t h e Syracusan army away from i t s c i t y and t o Katana by a r u s e t h e A t h e n i a n s s a i l e d i n and e s t a b l i s h e d themselves i n a c h o i c e l o c a t i o n b e f o r e Syracuse w i t h o u t s u f f e r i n g any harm because o f t h e i r l a c k o f c a v a l r y . On the f o l l o w i n g day t h e A t h e n i a n s and Syracusans prepared f o r b a t t l e .  N i k i a s made a speech o f encouragement  to the A t h e n i a n s and q u i c k l y l e d them i n t o b a t t l e .  The S y r a -  cusans d i d n o t expect a c t i o n q u i t e so soon and t h e A t h e n i a n s broke through t h e i r l i n e a f t e r the A r g i v e s had f o r c e d t h e S i c i l i a n l e f t wing back.  The A t h e n i a n s d i d n o t f o l l o w t h e  f l e e i n g Syracusans f o r l o n g , t o a v o i d b e i n g t r a p p e d by t h e i r u n d e f e a t e d c a v a l r y ; nor d i d they p l u n d e r the temple at Olympeion, but o n l y s e t up a t r o p h y and put t h e i r own dead,  73  about f i f t y , on a p y r e .  T h i s v i c t o r y was n o t c o n s o l i d a t e d  i m m e d i a t e l y o r l a t e r , and t h e A t h e n i a n s s a i l e d back t o Naxos and Katana f o r t h e w i n t e r .  The r e a s o n g i v e n was t h a t t h e y  f e l t t h e y needed c a v a l r y and money t o make an a t t a c k i n t h e spring.  The need o f c a v a l r y , as p r e d i c t e d by N i k i a s , had been  made c l e a r i n t h e f i r s t  battle.  D u r i n g t h e w i n t e r t h e y f a i l e d t o w i n over many a l l i e s p a r t l y because o f A l k i b i a d e s : Messene, supposed t o be b e t r a y e d t o t h e A t h e n i a n s , was n o t handed over because he had a l r e a d y revealed the plan.  Kamarina r e f u s e d t o h e l p e i t h e r s i d e ,  w h i l e t h e S i c e l s o f t h e i n t e r i o r , b u t n o t t h e c o a s t , agreed t o send a i d .  I n t h e meantime A l k i b i a d e s was g e t t i n g h e l p f o r  t h e Syracusans from t h e S p a r t a n s and g i v i n g them h i s e s t i m a t e of A t h e n i a n chances f o r w i n n i n g t h e war. I n t h i s same w i n t e r t h e A t h e n i a n s moved t h e i r q u a r t e r s from Naxos t o Katana where t h e camp burned by t h e Syracusans was r e b u i l t .  P r e p a r a t i o n s f o r siege-works were made and  o v e r t u r e s o f f r i e n d s h i p t o Carthage and E t r u r i a , p l a c e s A l k i b i a d e s s t a t e d t h e A t h e n i a n s meant t o conquer a f t e r  Sicily,  D u r i n g t h e same p e r i o d t h e K o r i n t h i a n s , S y r a c u s a n s , and A l k i b i a d e s were p r o d d i n g t h e S p a r t a n s i n t o a c t i o n .  They  f i n a l l y agreed t o send G y l i p p o s , an e x p e r i e n c e d commander, to the Syracusans.  A t t h e same time t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n , N i k i a s  ancl Lamachos, had s e n t a t r i r e m e back t o A t h e n s , a s k i n g f o r  7 . k  money and c a v a l r y .  The A t h e n i a n s a l s o agreed t o g i v e t h e  help requested. I n t h e s p r i n g , a f t e r some minor e x p e d i t i o n s a g a i n s t the a r e a s o f Megara, t h e r i v e r T e r i a s , K e n t o r i p a , I n e s s a , and H y b l a , t h e A t h e n i a n s r e c e i v e d an a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e o f two hundred and f i f t y cavalrymen and t h r e e hundred silver.  talents of  I n t h e meantime t h e Syracusans had d e c i d e d t o defend  E p i p o l a i , t h e o n l y a r e a s u i t a b l e f o r an enemy t o w a l l and b e s i e g e t h e i r c i t y , b u t t h e y were t a k e n by s u r p r i s e because t h e A t h e n i a n s made a sudden a t t a c k , ascended t o E p i p o l a i and d e f e a t e d t h e d i s o r g a n i z e d t r o o p s which came o u t t o meet them. The A t h e n i a n s t h e n b u i l t a f o r t a t L a b d a l o n , on t h e edge o f E p i p o l a i , f a c i n g Megara.  L e a v i n g a g a r r i s o n t h e r e t h e y moved  on t o Syke and c o n s t r u c t e d another f o r t c a l l e d t h e C i r c l e . The Syracusans were h o r r i f i e d t o see how q u i c k l y t h e A t h e n i a n s were b u i l d i n g b e s i e g i n g w a l l s , b u t d i d n o t dare r i s k another regular b a t t l e . wall.  I n r e t a l i a t i o n they s t a r t e d b u i l d i n g a counter-  The A t h e n i a n s f i n a l l y d e s t r o y e d t h i s i n a c a r e f u l l y  a r r a n g e d r a i d w h i l e t h e remainder o f t h e army guarded a g a i n s t a t t a c k s by enemy r e i n f o r c e m e n t s . I n a second r a i d o f t h e same type Lamachos was k i l l e d . N i k i a s , l e f t behind i n t h e C i r c l e because o f i l l n e s s ,  saved  t h a t unguarded a r e a by o r d e r i n g t h e s e r v a n t s t o s e t f i r e t o t h e machines and t i m b e r s i n f r o n t o f t h e w a l l s .  The A t h e n i a n s  75.  were once a g a i n v i c t o r i o u s , but had l o s t o n e ^ g e n e r a l and 1  now were commanded by one who was i l l . The Syracusans f e l t t h e y had no chance o f p r e v e n t i n g the A t h e n i a n s from c o m p l e t i n g  their walls*  In f a c t the Athe-  n i a n s b u i l t a double w a l l and began t o r e c e i v e s u p p l i e s from a l l over I t a l y , Etruscans  Many S i c e l s j o i n e d them a t t h i s t i m e ; t h e  contributed three ships.  F o r good r e a s o n s t h e  Syracusans gave up hope and began t o d i s c u s s terms o f s u r r e n d e r among themselves and w i t h N i k i a s . G y l i p p o s , r e c e i v i n g the u n t r u e s t o r y t h a t Syracuse was c o m p l e t e l y w a l l e d i n , d e s p a i r e d o f s a v i n g S i c i l y and hurried toItaly. and d e s p i s e d  The T h o u r i a n s t h e r e f a i l e d t o s u p p o r t him  t h e s m a l l number o f h i s s h i p s .  N i k i a s made t h e  same e r r o r . The f i r s t s h i p from K o r i n t h soon r e a c h e d S y r a c u s e . I t s commander, G o n g y l o s , managed t o r e s t o r e t h e  confidence  o f t h e Syracusans w i t h t h e message t h a t G y l i p p o s  and  -'"The energy and p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t y o f Lamachos must have been o f the g r e a t e s t v a l u e throughout t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t t h e r a p i d p r o g r e s s terminated  abruptly with h i s death."  o f the blockade  Westlake, "Nicias i n  T h u c y d i d e s , " Clas,s. (faftrt*» XXXV <19kD, pp. 58-65, shows t h e blackest side of the p i c t u r e . remembered.  N i k i a s was i l l ,  i t s h o u l d be  76  reinforcements would be a r r i v i n g shortly* When the Korinthians and Spartans arrived i n Syracuse, by the route that Nikias had used f i r s t , they found that c i t y nearly cut o f f by besieging walls.  Despite only  minor losses on either side i n the f i r s t encounters between them and the Athenians, t h i s was the turning point i n the war.  Now the Athenians instead of the Syracusans were be-  coming discouraged,  Nikias began to consider a war by sea  rather than a war by land. He made his f i r s t mistake by moving h i s base to Plemmyrion, a place where water was i n short supply and the Syracusan cavalry could attack Athenian foragers at w i l l .  Shortly  afterwards the Syracusans carried one of their cross-walls past the Athenian f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , and Nikias l o s t the opportunity of blockading the c i t y . The Syracusans now sought more help, and every day of delay increased t h e i r chances of winning,  Nikias despaired  of the expedition unless i t were r e c a l l e d or a large number  77.  of reinforcements sent * " and wrote an urgent l e t t e r - * to the 1  Athenians.  1  1  Thinking of defence only, he reported the state  of a f f a i r s - that t h e i r ships could not be c a r e e n e d , t h a t slaves were deserting and mercenaries leaving.  The s i t u a t i o n  was out of h i s control to such an extent that he f e l t he would have to surrender i f h i s I t a l i a n sources of supply were cut off.  F i n a l l y he asked to be relieved of h i s command as a  A.W. Gomme, "Four Passages i n Thucydides," J.K.S..  lk  LXXI (195D, p. 72,writes: "... the o r i g i n a l expedition was splendidly adequate to i t s object; and when the unfortunate Nikias unexpectedly asked f o r large reinforcements - made necessary mainly by h i s own weakness i n command - the Athenians at home do everything, or almost everything, possible to meet h i s wishes." •^The l e t t e r has great dramatic value at this point i n Thucydides  1  narrative and, as Westlake notes, "... i t i s  scarcely credible that even Nicias can i n the o r i g i n a l report have allowed h i s incapacity to stand out so g l a r i n g l y " ("Nikias In Thucydides," C^ass, l 6  tort;.,  XXXV [19 l], p. 62). k  I n r e l a t i o n to t h i s type of d i f f i c u l t y J.F. Charles,  "The Anatomy of Athenian Sea-Power," Class. Journ., XLII (I9k6), p. 90, says: "The S i c i l i a n expedition alone proved a major disaster because there naval p r i n c i p l e s were so f a r subordinated to the convenience of the army that the f l e e t l o s t i t s e f f i c i e n c y and was f i n a l l y forced to f i g h t under most unfavourable conditions."  78.  disease of the kidneys made him u n f i t f o r service. Despite h i s graphic description ("the besiegers had become the besieged") the Athenians refused to r e l i e v e him of h i s command.  Instead they appointed two of the o f f i c e r s  there, Menander and Euthydemos, to share the command with him u n t i l two more generals, Demosthenes and Eurymedon, should arrive.  Eurymedon set out immediately with ten ships and one  hundred and twenty talents of s i l v e r ,  Demosthenes prepared  to come early i n the spring. The Korinthians and Spartans were taking heart and preparing to send more help.  The Spartans also planned an  attack against A t t i c a and the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of Dekeleia. They f e l t at t h i s point i n the war that they and not the Athenians were j u s t i f i e d i n attacking since by now they had offered to submit to a r b i t r a t i o n and the Athenians had r e fused.  (This was a d i r e c t reversal of the e a r l i e r situation.) At the beginning of spring Demosthenes s a i l e d f o r  I t a l y with a f l e e t of s i x t y - f i v e ships.  Unfortunately he  delayed, following the assembly's orders to r a i d the coast of Lakonia with Charikles. Meanwhile, i n S i c i l y , Gylippos organized a double attack upon the Athenians.  The Syracusan f l e e t assailed  the Athenian f l e e t i n the harbour.  While the Athenians had  the worst of i t i n the beginning, their superior training  79.  g a i n e d them t h e upper hand I n t h e n a v a l b a t t l e .  1 7  But the  s o l d i e r s i n Pleramyrion, who were w a t c h i n g t h e n a v a l a t t a c k , were s u r p r i s e d by G y l i p p o s ,  He c a p t u r e d t h e t h r e e f o r t s i n  t h e Plemmyrion a l o n g w i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f p r o p e r t y and s u p p l i e s . Thucydides s t a t e s t h a t t h i s l o s s was t h e g r e a t e s t cause o f d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e A t h e n i a n army because i t now had t o f i g h t to bring i n supplies. By t h i s t i m e t h e A t h e n i a n s were i n t h e anomalous s i t u a t i o n o f f i g h t i n g two wars a t t h e same times a t home Athens was l i k e a f o r t r e s s t h a t they were d e f e n d i n g ; i n S i c i l y t h e y were a t t a c k i n g S y r a c u s e , a c i t y much l i k e A t h e n s . Demosthenes was s a i l i n g t o S i c i l y , b u t i n t h e meantime t h e S y r a c u s a n s had o b t a i n e d a i d from o t h e r c i t i e s . N i k i a s p r e v e n t e d a number o f t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s from r e a c h i n g  1 7  A t t h i s t i m e n a v a l b a t t l e s were g o i n g on r e g u l a r l y ,  and Thucydides g i v e s some I n t e r e s t i n g d e t a i l s o f strategems used.  F o r example, t h e Syracusans drove p i l e s i n t o t h e water  o f t h e h a r b o u r as a b a r r i e r b e h i n d w h i c h they c o u l d s a f e l y anchor t h e i r s h i p s .  The A t h e n i a n s t o r e t a l i a t e would  sail  a b i g armoured s h i p near as p r o t e c t i o n and from s m a l l s h i p s p u l l t h e p i l e s o u t w i t h w i n d l a s s e s , o r saw them o f f beneath the water's s u r f a c e .  Some p i l e s were d r i v e n beneath t h e  s u r f a c e o f t h e water by t h e Syracusans and t h e s e a c t e d as hidden r e e f s . them o f f .  The A t h e n i a n s p a i d d i v e r s t o go down and saw  80.  Syracuse by the simple expedient of asking the S i c e l s to stop them.  The S i c e l s ambushed these troops on the march and k i l l e d  about eight hundred. to reach Syracuse,  The remaining f i f t e e n hundred managed  Almost a l l S i c i l y was uniting now against  the Athenians, but this v i c t o r y prevented an immediate attack. However, the Syracusans knew Demosthenes was on h i s way and were anxious to destroy Nikias' army before he should arrive.  They took advantage of what they had learned about  Athenian naval strategy and prepared a method of r e t a l i a t i o n , Thucydides says that they especially strengthened the prows of their boats, i n imitation of the Korinthians (or at the i n s t i g a t i o n of Ariston, a Korinthian p i l o t , according to Diodoros, XIII, 10),  i n order to be able to ram the Athenian  ships i n the prow Instead of amidships and force the Athenians to f i g h t i n the same manner.  1  On the day of the attack neither side won a decisive  ^Thucydides, VII, 36.  A.M. Shepard, Sea Power i n  Ancient History (London, 1925), p. 29, believes that t h i s t a c t i c ultimately caused the r u i n of Athens' sea-power. Plutarch, Nikias, 20, re-embarking  attributes the ruse of the Syracusans,  immediately after their meal (Thucydides, VII,  36- l), and the use of stones instead of javelins and arrows L  i n naval battles  (li&Laa,  25) to Ariston.  81.  action.  The f o l l o w i n g day N i k i a s , r e a l i z i n g t h e A t h e n i a n s  had l o s t t h e i r advantage by s e a , o r d e r e d t h e c a p t a i n s t o r e p a i r t h e i r s h i p s and t o anchor a l i n e o f merchantmen o u t s i d e the s t o c k a d e o f t h e A t h e n i a n h a r b o u r .  Cn t h e t h i r d day t h e  Syracusans t r i c k e d t h e A t h e n i a n s i n t o t h i n k i n g t h e a t t a c k was o v e r and d e f e a t e d them i n t h e melee r e s u l t i n g from an unexp e c t e d l y renewed a t t a c k .  N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e A t h e n i a n anchorage  was saved by t h e merchant s h i p s d e f e n d i n g  it.  J u s t no*/ Demosthenes a r r i v e d , and i t appeared  even  t o t h e Syracusans t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n s were a g a i n i n a p o s i t i o n to win.  Demosthenes d e c i d e d t h a t he would n o t make t h e same  m i s t a k e as N i k i a s and d e l a y i n a t t a c k i n g S y r a c u s e ,  He \<rould  e i t h e r be s u c c e s s f u l q u i c k l y o r withdraw t h e e x p e d i t i o n . G e t t i n g t h e p e r m i s s i o n o f N i k i a s and t h e o t h e r commanders he planned a n i g h t a t t a c k on E p i p o l a i , f u l i n i t s beginning only.  T h i s b a t t l e was s u c c e s s -  B e f o r e t h e a t t a c k c o u l d be c o n s o l i -  d a t e d t h e A t h e n i a n s f e l l i n t o d i s o r d e r and were r o u t e d . A f t e r t h i s d i s a s t e r Demosthenes wished t o r e t u r n imm e d i a t e l y t o Athens.  Many o f t h e men were 111 because t h e  camp was l o c a t e d on marshy ground.  Yet Nikias could not  d e c i d e what c o u r s e o f a c t i o n he s h o u l d f o l l o w .  In a public  speech he announced t h a t he was sure t h e A t h e n i a n s would n o t approve o f a w i t h d r a w a l u n l e s s t h e y had v o t e d f o r i t p r e v i o u s l y . He h i m s e l f p r e f e r r e d t o be d e f e a t e d and k i l l e d by t h e enemy  82.  r a t h e r than t o r e t u r n and be executed by h i s f e l l o w - c i t i z e n s on a trumped-up charge o f b r i b e r y .  He s t a t e d t h a t t h e S y r a -  cusans were even more dependent upon m e r c e n a r i e s t h a n t h e A t h e n i a n s and l a c k e d more f u n d s , siege.  He wished t o c o n t i n u e t h e  Thucydides says f u r t h e r t h a t N i k i a s had  accurate  i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e Syracusans were s h o r t o f money and t h a t a l a r g e group s u p p o r t e d t h e A t h e n i a n cause. Eurymedon agreed w i t h Demosthenes* o p i n i o n t h a t they s h o u l d n o t go on w i t h the s i e g e .  N i k i a s continued h i s r e s i s -  t a n c e and the o t h e r s c a p i t u l a t e d , t h i n k i n g he might have a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t he d i d n o t w i s h t o d i v u l g e . F i n a l l y t h e Syracusans p r e p a r e d a n o t h e r a t t a c k and the A t h e n i a n s r e a l i z e d t o o l a t e t h a t t h e y s h o u l d have moved t h e i r army.  Even N i k i a s was f o r c e d t o t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , a l -  though he s t i l l d i d n o t want an open v o t e on t h e s u b j e c t . Everyone p r e p a r e d s e c r e t l y t o s a i l o u t when t h e s i g n a l was given. moon.  When t h e y were r e a d y t h e r e was an e c l i p s e o f the f u l l Most o f t h e A t h e n i a n s encouraged t h e g e n e r a l s t o d e l a y  and N i k i a s ( ?jv yap xx rrpoo*Ketu.evot;  HOI  8Y<XV  ^Thucydides, VII,  and  T$  TOIOUT<I>  r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s any move u n t i l t h e y had  waited the t h r i c e nine d a y s  2 0  ©etaou^ r e n a i  2 0  recommended  by t h e  soothsayers.  50.  T h e period i s "three days" i n Diodoros, XIII,  12,  "another f u l l p e r i o d o f t h e moon" i n P l u t a r c h , N i k i a s  T  23.  83.  The Syracusans d i d not w i s h the A t h e n i a n s t o escape to another p a r t o f S i c i l y so they d e c i d e d t o f o r c e them i n t o a second " b a t t l e , by s e a .  In the f i r s t a c t i o n , d e s p i t e a  s u p e r i o r number o f s h i p s on the A t h e n i a n s i d e , the A t h e n i a n s were d r i v e n back and Eurymedon k i l l e d . The A t h e n i a n s , l e f t w i t h few p r o v i s i o n s (no more had been o r d e r e d from. K a t a n a ) , determined on a l a s t attempt t o break out o f t h e h a r b o u r .  desperate  As N i k i a s s a i d i n h i s  speech, t h e y p r e p a r e d f o r a l a n d b a t t l e on the s e a .  They  would use g r a p p l i n g i r o n s , a l a r g e number o f h o p l i t e s , f i g h t i n crowded q u a r t e r s .  and  G y l i p p o s knew t h a t under t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s t h e i r s u p e r i o r numbers would not h e l p them.  Nikias  was d r i v e n almost out o f h i s mind and t r i e d t o make up f o r t h e Inadequacy o f A t h e n i a n p r e p a r a t i o n s by e n c o u r a g i n g h i s individually.  men  The b a t t l e was f o u g h t w i t h g r e a t savagery b u t  t h e i n e v i t a b l e happened. shore and t h e men  The A t h e n i a n s were d r i v e n back on  were i n a panic,aware  t h e r e was no  safety  i n a retreat overland. The A t h e n i a n s were so overcome w i t h d e s p a i r t h a t t h e y did  n o t even ask p e r m i s s i o n t o t a k e up t h e i r dead.  Demosthenes  w i s h e d t o a t t a c k a g a i n t h e next day, f o r t h e y had s i x t y s h i p s l e f t to the Syracusans' f i f t y . them c o u l d persuade N o t h i n g was  N i k i a s agreed but n e i t h e r o f  the d e m o r a l i z e d men  even t o board the s h i p s .  l e f t except a r e t r e a t by l a n d .  Some  Syracusan l e a d e r , knowing the c e l e b r a t i n g c i t i z e n s were not prepared t o s t o p such a r e t r e a t , sent messengers t o N i k i a s s a y i n g t h a t they were f r i e n d l y and t h a t t h e A t h e n i a n s s h o u l d not attempt t o r e t r e a t t h a t same n i g h t because t h e were g u a r d i n g t h e r o a d s . t i o n was  Syracusans  The g e n e r a l s , t h i n k i n g the Informa-  genuine, postponed  t h e immediate r e t r e a t .  A f t e r t h i s f i r s t d e l a y the g e n e r a l s l i n g e r e d y e t another two days a f t e r t h e b a t t l e . l e f t b e h i n d , the dead u n b u r i e d .  The wounded and s i c k were  About f o r t y thousand  men  marched out o f camp. N i k i a s d i d h i s b e s t t o encourage them, a l t h o u g h he h i m s e l f was  i l l and seemed t o f e e l t h e r e t r e a t was  hopeless.  In a speech t o the army he gave t h i s summary o f h i s own  life.  " I m y s e l f s u r p a s s no one among you i n p h y s i c a l s t r e n g t h ( i n deed you see how  I am a f f e c t e d by t h i s i l l n e s s ) •  I think  none can be c o n s i d e r e d t o have been more f o r t u n a t e than I have been i n b o t h my p r i v a t e l i f e and i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s , but i n t r e p i d a t i o n I now here.  a w a i t t h e same danger as t h e meanest  And y e t I have worshipped  man  the gods a s s i d u o u s l y and  my  conduct towards men has been j u s t and f r e e o f r e p r o a c h . " The march t h a t f o l l o w e d was a f a n t a s t i c d i s p l a y o f t e n a c i t y and courage by N i k i a s . division leading.  The t r o o p s s e t o u t , N i k i a s  1  They r o u t e d Syracusan t r o o p s a t the Anapos  R i v e r and advanced f o u r and a h a l f m i l e s the f i r s t day.  The  n e x t day t h e y were p r e v e n t e d from advancing f u r t h e r ; i n two  85.  more days they managed to advance only h a l f a mile. During the next night Nikias and Demosthenes decided to go i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n , towards the sea.  They l i t  f i r e s to t r i c k the enemy into thinking their men were s t i l l camped and set out at night.  Nikias  1  group stayed  together  and reached the sea but Demosthenes' men f e l l into confusion and were separated.  By noon the Syracusans caught up and  attacked Demosthenes' d i v i s i o n , which was now f i v e or s i x miles behind since Nikias was trying to r e t r e a t rather than stay and f i g h t .  Naturally Demosthenes had more d i f f i c u l t i e s  because the rear-guard  was always attacked f i r s t by the enemy.  Soon h i s men were surrounded and they surrendered to the number of s i x thousand. On the seventh day the Syracusans overtook Nikias and informed him that Demosthenes had surrendered.  Nikias could  not believe the news and a truce was arranged while he sent a messenger to check*  When he received confirmation of the  message he offered to surrender only i f the Syracusans would l e t his army go. In return he offered to reimburse Syracuse for a l l the money she had spent on the war ( t h i s might have completed the f i n a n c i a l r u i n of Athens), and give hostages, at the rate of one man a t a l e n t , u n t i l t h i s was paid. course the Syracusans refused. night.  Of  Some Athenians escaped that  86  At dawn Nikias led the army forward toward the r i v e r Assinaros, but a l l d i s c i p l i n e was gone because the men wanted water so badly.  At the r i v e r i t s e l f the carnage was  tragic,  Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippos, asking that the slaughter be halted.  A l l the r e s t , including the group that had  escaped the night before, were taken prisoner.  The disaster  was much greater than had overtaken Demosthenes men,. 1  A  major part of the army had been k i l l e d , and because there had been no d e f i n i t e agreement f o r surrender a large number of men were kept captive and disposed of by i n d i v i d u a l S i c i l i a n s rather than by the state. The prisoners taken by the state were retained i n the stone quarries of Syracuse,  Nikias and Demosthenes were  put to death despite Gylippos, who wished to take the generals 21  back to Sparta  - Demosthenes being Sparta's greatest enemy,  •''Plutarch's account d i f f e r s from that of Thucydldes, He states that Hermokrates urged the two generals to commit suicide, which they did i n order to avoid public execution. Diodoros  1  account adds another v a r i a t i o n .  He states that  Gylippos hated the Athenians v i o l e n t l y and urged the execution of Nikias and Demosthenes. 28,  Also according to Plutarch, N i k i a s  T  Timaios said the generals committed suicide before they  could be executed, but P h i l i s t o s agreed with Thucydldes, Pausanlas, I, 29,12, says that N i k i a s  1  name was omitted  87.  and Nikias her best f r i e n d .  (As a r e s u l t of t h i s mutual  trust Nikias had surrendered to Gylippos.)  Because of the  Syracusans" fear that he would reveal those who had supported him, and the Korinthians' fear that he would bribe h i s way to escape, the a l l i e s were persuaded to k i l l him.  "For these  reasons or reasons very s i m i l a r Nikias was k i l l e d , a man who of a l l the Hellenes i n my time was l e a s t deserving of such an unhappy end since he spent the whole of his l i f e sideration and practice of v i r t u e . " description of Nikias.  i n the con-  This i s Thucydides  1  final  To i t must be added h i s summation of  the war i n S i c i l y : This was the greatest Hellenic action that took place during the war, and, i n my opinion, the greatest act i o n that we know o f i n Hellenic h i s t o r y - to the v i c t o r s the most b r i l l i a n t of successes, to the vanquished the most calamitous of defeats; f o r they were u t t e r l y and e n t i r e l y defeated;  their sufferings  from a l i s t of those k i l l e d i n S i c i l y because, while Demosthenes made a truce for h i s men, not f o r himself, and attempted to commit suicide when he was taken prisoner ( c f . Plutarch, Nikias, 27), Nikias surrendered v o l u n t a r i l y and was therefore an unworthy s o l d i e r . has the same account.  Pausanias also states that P h i l i s t o s  88.  were on an enormous s c a l e ; t h e i r l o s s e s were, as say, t o t a l ; army, navy, e v e r y t h i n g was out of many, o n l y few r e t u r n e d . in Such was  Sicily.  they  destroyed,  and,  So ended the e v e n t s  2 2  t h e unhappy ending o f N i k i a s  1  career.  Until his last  y e a r of i l l n e s s i n S i c i l y N i k i a s had managed t o m a i n t a i n r e p u t a t i o n o f a good commander5 never b e f o r e was  he  the  associated  w i t h a d i s a s t r o u s m i l i t a r y d e f e a t , and y e t , because o f the l o s s of the A t h e n i a n army t h e r e , h i s name i s n o t e d i n h i s t o r y . He had  s e r v e d the A t h e n i a n  public, f o r at l e a s t f i f t e e n  years  w i t h the g r e a t e s t d i l i g e n c e , but j u s t f e l l s h o r t o f the i n t e l l i g e n c e and c h a r a c t e r t h a t a c c l a i m the g e n i u s of a such as P e r i k l e s .  H i s was  t i c a l c a r e e r ; r a t h e r i t vas  man  not a mediocre m i l i t a r y o r p o l i good i n s t e a d o f b r i l l i a n t .  H i s shortcomings s h o u l d perhaps be a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s moral i n t e g r i t y .  He was  shortsighted i n dealing with a  Kleon,  A l k i b i a d e s , or Eermokrates because he c o u l d not p e r c e i v e t h a t t h e y , u n l i k e him, were w o r k i n g f o r t h e i r p r i v a t e advancement and m e r e l y a i d i n g the s t a t e as a n e c e s s a r y  concomitant.  expected c l e v e r n e s s and l a c k o f t r u s t i n p o l i t i c s ; N i k i a s did  not.  " T h u c y d i d e s , V I I , 87 Peloponnesian  ( t r a n s , by Rex Warner, The  War [Penguin Books,  199+]  , p.  U88).  They  89.  I n t h e end he s u r r e n d e r e d t o G y l i p p o s w i t h t h e same n a i v e t y , e x p e c t i n g h i s men's l i v e s t o be saved I n an honourable surrender. thirstiness  He f a i l e d t o f o r e s e e t h e greed and b l o o d -  i n men t h a t p r e v e n t e d G y l i p p o s from e n f o r c i n g h i s  o r d e r s and a l l o w e d so many more A t h e n i a n s t o be k i l l e d o r made s l a v e s p r i v a t e l y , o r t h e v i c i o u s mood o f t h e S y r a c u s a n s , r e c e n t l y r e l e a s e d from f e a r o f d e f e a t and d e s i r i n g revenge a g a i n s t t h e A t h e n i a n s made p r i s o n e r by t h e s t a t e . As f o r h i s own d e a t h , N i k i a s p r o b a b l y d e s i r e d no more. He irould have no w i s h t o r e t u r n t o Athens and s u f f e r  justice  a t t h e hands o f h i s even more v e n g e f u l c o m p a t r i o t s ;  elsewhere  he had no r e a s o n t o remain a l i v e .  90  BIBLIOGRAPHY A.  ANCIENT SOURCES  Aischines. The Speeches o f Aeschines. Trans, C D . Adams, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.,  WO.  Andokides. The Minor A t t i c Orators. I; Antlphon. Andocldes. Trans. K. Maldment, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 194-1). .  On the Mysteries.  Ed. D. MacDowell (Oxford, 1962).  Aristophanes. The Comedies of Aristophanes. Rogers, 6 v o l s . (London, 1910).  Trans. B.B.  Fragments. Trans. J.M. Edmonds (The Fragments of A t t i c Cpmedv, Volume Is Old Comedy [Leiden, 19571, pp.  572-793).  J  A r i s t o t l e . Athenlenslum Resnublica. C l a s s i c a l Texts (Oxford, 1Q2OV. .  Ars Rhetorlca.  SsxJis, (Oxford, 1959).  Ed. F.G. Kenyon, Oxford  Ed. W.D. Ross, Oxford C l a s s i c a l  Demosthenes. De Corona and De Falsa Leeatione. Trans. C A . Vince and J.H. Vince, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and and Cambridge, Mass., 1958). Against Mgidlas.Androtion. A r i s t o c r a t e s Tlmoerates, Arj-S^oge^pn,. Trans. J.H. Vince, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1935). T  • Qlvnthlacs, P h i l i p p i c s . Minor Public Speeches. Speech against Lentines. Trans. J.H. Vince, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 195*0. Diodoros. PlQflflru.s of S ^ c j l y , v o l s . IV, V, VI. Trans. C H . Oldfather, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 19^6/5*0. Lysias. Lysjas. Trans. W.R. Lamb, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1930).  91.  (Cornelius) Nepos. P a r i s , I96I),  Oeuvres.  Ed. A.M. Guillemln  (2nd e d i t i o n ,  Pausanlas. Description of Greece, I. Trans. W.H.S. Jones, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1918). Plato. Opera. Ed. J . Burnet, Oxford C l a s s i c a l Texts, 5 v o l s . (Oxford, 1903/10). Plutarch. The Parallel Lives. Trans. B. P e r r i n , Loeb Class i c a l L i b r a r y l l v o l s . (Cambridge, Mass. and London,  1955).  T  . De Esu Caralum, i n Moralla. Trans. H. Cherniss and W..C. Helmbold, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge,  Mass., 1957).  Thucydides. H i s t o r i a . Eds. H.S. Jones and J.E. Powell, Oxford C l a s s i c a l Texts 2 v o l s . (2nd e d i t i o n , Oxford, 19^2). T  Xenophon. Hellenica, Books I-V. Trans. C L * Brownson, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and New York, 1918). Memorabilia and Oeconomicus. Trans. E.G. Marchant, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass.,  1938).  Scr'pta Minors. Trans. E.C. Mar chant, Loeb Class i c a l Library (London and Cambridge, Mass., 1925). Anabasis. Books IY-VII and Symposium and Apology. Trans. O.J. Todd, Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library (London and  New York, 1922).  B. Adcock, F.E.  MODERN SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS E7UTetx»o'uo<; i n the Archidamian War,"  tl  Rex,., LXI (19^7), PP. 2-7.  Class.  A l l e n , Ruth E. The Mutilation o f the Hermst a Study i n Athenian P o l i t i c s (Diss., University of C i n c i n n a t i , 1 0 ^ . 4tJ«,A«  .Tfoe American Journal Qf Archaeology.  92.  A  ?  J  i  p  n  The American J o u r n a l o f P h i l o l o g y .  Andrewes, A. and Lev/is, D.M. "Note on t h e Peace o f N i k i a s , " J.H.S.. LXXVII (1957), pp. 177-180. B a r b e r , G.L. B  The H i s t o r i a n Enhorus (Cambridge, 1938).  B u l l e t i n de Correspondance  t >ffi c  Beloch, K.J. GrlechAsc^e L e i p z i g , 192*0. B r u n t , P.A.  Hellenioue. I I , 1, 2 ( B e r l i n and  ftsschlch^e,.  "The Megarian Decree," A.J.P., L X X I I (1951),  pp. 269-282.  . "Spartan P o l i c y and S t r a t e g y i n t h e A r c h i d a m i a n War," P h o e n i x , XIX (1965), pp. 255-280. ff»S A T  f  Annual of the B r i t i s h School a t Athens.  C A , H . The Cambridge A n c i e n t H i s t o r y , V. E d s . J.B. B u r y , S.A. Cook, P.E. Adcock (Cambridge, 1927). C h a r l e s , J . F . "The Anatomy.of A t h e n i a n Sea Power," C l a s s . J o u r n . , X L I I (191*6), pp. 86-92. filfrss,  phll.  Glass 1 Quart •  Classical Philology. The C l a s s i c a l Q u a r t e r l y .  Couch, H.N. "Some P o l i t i c a l I m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e A t h e n i a n P l a g u e , " T.A.P.A., LXVI (1935), pp. 92-103. C r o i s e t , M. A r i s t o p h a n e s and t h e P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s a t Athens. T r a n s . J . Loeb ( M a c m i l l a n and Co., L t d . , London, 1909). Edmonds, J.M.  The Fragments o f A t t i c Comedy, I s O l d Comedy  ( L e i d e n , 1957).  E h r e n b e r g , V. " P e r i k l e s and h i s C o l l e a g u e s between ¥fl and h29 B.C.," A.J.P., LXVI (19k5), PP. 113-13k. .  The P e o p l e o f A r i s t o p h a n e s  1951). F.A.C.  ( B l a c k w e l l , Oxford,  See Edmonds, J.M.  F i n l e y , J.H.  ThflcytMLflflfl (Cambridge, Mass., 19 2). k  93.  F i n l e y , M.I. "Was Greek C i v i l i z a t i o n Based on S l a v e L a b o u r ? " , History, (1959), Ih5-1&.  VIII  PP. "A F o r g o t t e n F a c t o r o f Greek L I U (1933), PP. l6-2h.  Gomme, A.W., J.H.S..  T  r-'  Naval Strategy,"  A H i s t o r i c a l Commentary on T h u e v d i d e s , 3 v o l s .  ( O x f o r d , 19W 56). . "Four Passages i n T h u c y d i d e s , " J.H.S., LXXI (1951),  pp. 70-80. G r o t e , G. H i s t o r y o f G r e e c e  T  V, V I .  (London, 1907.)  Grundy, G.B. Thucydides and t h e H i s t o r y o f H i s A g e I . ( B l a c k w e l l , O x f o r d , 2nd e d . , 1910.) T  Hammond, N.G.L.  1959.)  A H i s t o r y o f Greece t o 322 B.C. ( O x f o r d ,  Henderson, B.W. The Great War between Athens and S p a r t a . ( M a c m i l l a n and Co., L t d . , London, 1927.) H i g n e t t , C. A H i s t o r y o f t h e A t h e n i a n C o n s t i t u t i o n t o t h e End o f t h e F i f t h C e n t u r y B.C. ( O x f o r d , 1Q^2.Y Hopper, R . J . "The A t t i c S i l v e r Mines i n t h e F o u r t h C e n t u r y B.C.," B . S . A X L V I I I (1953), 200-25^. M  PP.  J a c o b y , F. D j e Fraemente der g r l e c h ^ s Q h e n H i s t o r y ? , 3 v o l s , w i t h S u p p l e m e n t s , ( B e r l i n , 1923/30.) .  A t t h l S i The L o c a l C h r o n i c l e s o f A n c i e n t A t h e n s .  ( O x f o r d , 19^-9.) J.H.S.. The J o u r n a l o f H e l l e n i c S t u d i e s . Kagan, D.  " C o r i n t h i a n Diplomacy a f t e r t h e Peace o f N i k i a s , " LXXXI (i960), pp. 291-310.  A . J v P . .  Kirchner,  J  .  Frpsoppgrfiphja, A t t i c a , 2 v o l s .  ( B e r l i n , 1901/3).  K i r t l a n d , L. " N i c i a s " D i s p l a y o f Great W e a l t h a t D e l o s , " P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e American P h l l o g l c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , LXIX  9. k  Lang, M.  "The Abacus and t h e C a l e n d a r , I , " H e s n e r i a , X X X I I I  .  "The Abacus and t h e C a l e n d a r , I I , " H e s n e r i a . XXXIV  (196U-), pp. 1^-167. (1965), pp. 22H-2*f7.  L e w i s , D.M.  "Double R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e S t r a t e g i a . " J.H.S..  LXXXI (1961), pp. 118-123.  McCartney, E.S.. "Measuring S i c i l y by the Day's S a i l , " C l a s s i c a l Weekly, XXVI (1933), P . 128. M a c d o w e l l , D.M.  pp.  k  l-5l.  "Nikostratos,"  C l a s s . Quart.  f  L I X (1965),  McGregor, M.F. " K l e o n , N i k i a s , and t h e T r e b l i n g o f t h e T r i b u t e , " T.A.P.A., LXVI (1935), P P . 1^6-16^. .  "The L a s t Campaign o f K l e o n and t h e A t h e n i a n C a l e n d a r  i n 22- k 21," A . J . P k  .  T T  L I X (1938), pp. I k 5-l68.  "The P o l i t i c s o f t h e H i s t o r i a n T h u c y d i d e s , "  Phoenix  f  X (1956), pp. 93-102. "The Genius o f A l k i b i a d e s , " P h o e n i x , X I X (1965),  .  pp. 2 - 2. k  k  Mayor, H.B. "The S t r a t e g i a t Athens i n the F i f t h C e n t u r y . When D i d They E n t e r on O f f i c e ? " J.H.S., L I X (1939), pp. k  5-6 . k  M e r i t t , B.D. "Cleon's A m p h i p o l i t a n Campaign and t h e Assessment L i s t o f k 21," A.J.A., XXIX (1925), pp. 59-69. . The A t h e n i a n C a l e n d a r i n t h e F i f t h C e n t u r y . b r i d g e , Mass., 1928.) .  "The D e p a r t u r e o f A l k i b i a d e s f o r S i c i l y , " A.J.A..  xxxiv •  (Cam-  (1930), pp. 125-152.  A t h e n i a n F i n a n c i a l Documents o f t h e F i f t h  Century.  (Ann A r b o r , 1932.) . "A New Date i n the F i f t h C e n t u r y , " A.J.P., L V I I  (1936) , pp. 180-182. .  "The A t h e n i a n Assessment Decree," A.J.P., L V I I I  (1937) , P P . 152-156.  95.  M e r l t t , B.D. Documents on A t h e n i a n T r i b u t e . Mass., 19377) .  "A Mote on K l e o n ' s Assessment,"  pp. 297-300. •  (Cambridge,  A.J.P., LIX (1938),  "The A t h e n i a n A l l i a n c e s w i t h Rhegion and L e o n t i n o i , "  C l a s s , (foar^,,  X L  (I9I+6), pp. 85-91.  M e r i t t , B.D., Wade-Gery, H.T. and McGregor, M.F. The A t h e n i a n T r i b u t e Lists« h v o l s . .(Cambridge, Mass. and P r i n c e t o n ,  New J e r s e y , 1939/53.)  M e r i t t , B.D. and West, A.B. The A t h e n i a n Assessment o f B.C. (Ann A r b o r , 193*+.) M o m i g l i a n o , A. "Sea Power i n Greek Thought," C l a s s i c a l Re£i£w, L V I I I (19^f), pp. 1-7. Murray, G. A r i s t o p h a n e s and the War P a r t y . .  " R e a c t i o n s t o t h e P e l o p o n n e s i a n War  (London, 1919.) i n Greek Thought  and P r a c t i c e , " J.H.S.. LXIV (19^), pp. 1-9. T  P.A.  See K i r c h n e r , J .  P r o c e e d i n g s o f the American P h i l o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . P a r k e , H,W, "A Note on the Topography o f S y r a c u s e , " J.K.S. P.A.P.A.  LXIV (19*4t-), pp. 100-102.  T  P a u l v s R e a l - E n c v c l o p a d i e der c l a s s i s c h e n A l t e r t u m s w i s s e n s c h a f t . Sds. G. Wissowa e t . a l . ( S t u t t g a r t , from 189M-) . P e a r s o n , L. " P a r t y P o l i t i c s and F r e e Speech i n Democratic Athens," Greece and Rome. V I I (1937), PP. ^1-50. P o m e l l o , M.F.  and Zancan, P.  (V32-*K>if),» R4v» d * F U  M  "ListE degll strateghi atiensi  L V (1927), pp. 361-371.  P r i t c h e t t , W.K. "The Term o f O f f i c e o f A t t i c A.J.P., LXI (19H0), pp. h69-h7h.  Strategoi,"  P r i t c h e t t , W.K. and Neugebauer, 0. The C a l e n d a r s o f Athens. (Cambridge, Mass., 19^7.) R a u b i t s c h e k , A.E. "The Case a g a i n s t A l c i b i a d e s (Andocides I V ) , " T.A.P.A., LXXIX (19^), pp. 191-210.  96  Richmond, H.W,. "The Objects and Elements of Sea Power i n History," History, XXVIII ( 1 9 3 ) , p p . 1 - 1 6 . k  Rogers, B.B. Shepard, A.M. T A. P.4y t  f  The Knights of Aristophanes. (London, 1 9 3 0 . ) Sea Power i n Ancient History.  (London, 1 9 2 5 . )  Transactions of the American P h i l o l o g i c a l Association.  Wade-Gery, H.T. "A Note on Kleon's Finance," C l a s s i c a l Review, XLIV ( 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 1 6 3 - 1 6 5 . Wade-Gery, H.T, and Meritt. B.D. "Pylos and the Assessment of Tribute," A.J.P., LVII ( 1 9 3 6 ) , pp. 3 7 7 - 3 9 . k  West, A.B. "Pericles' P o l i t i c a l Heirs," Class. P h i l . , XIX ( 1 9 2 * 0 , pp. 1 2 H - - 1 U 6 and pp. 2 0 1 - 2 2 8 . "Notes on Athenian Generals of the Year A-J.P., XLV ( 1 9 2 * 0 , pp. 1H-1-160.  K  2H-3  B.C.,"  "Cleon's Assessment and the Athenian Budget," T.A.P.A.. LXI ( 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 2 1 7 - 2 3 9 . Westlake, H.D. "Seaborne Raids i n Periclean Strategy," Class. Quart.. XXXIX ( 1 9 5 ) , PP. 7 5 - 8 . k  k  "Niclas i n Thucydides," Class. Quart., XXXV ( 1 9 l ) , pp. 5 8 - 6 5 k  "Athenian Aims i n S i c i l y , 2 7 - 2 * f B.C.," H i s t o r i a , IX ( i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 3 8 5 - 0 2 . k  k  k  White, A.J. "Class D i s t i n c t i o n s i n Fifth-Century Athens," Greece and Rome, XIII (19*4*0, pp. 1 5 - 2 5 . Williams, B.E.G. "The P o l i t i c a l Mission of Gorgias to Athens i n 2 7 B.C.," Class. Quart., XXV ( 1 9 3 D , PP. 5 2 - 5 6 . k  Woodhead, A.G. "I.G., I , 9 5 and the Ostracism of Hyperbolos," H e s p e r i a , XVIII pp. 7 8 - 8 3 . 2  , "Thucydides' P o r t r a i t of Cleon," Mnemosyne. XIII ( I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 2 8 9 - 3 1 7 .  97.  APPENDIX A GENEALOGICAL TABLE  Nikeratos  Nikias the general (born c. M-70, died  H-13)  Eukrates (died H O )  Diognetos (died after  Two sons  Diomnestos  k  Nikeratos (died UOH-)  Nikias  Nikeratos  ^03)  98  APPENDIX B A LIST OF GENERALS: I here employed a l i s t of generals compiled from Thucydides, Beloch, Griechisehe Geschichte, II , 26*+, and A. B. West, "Notes on Athenian Generals of the Year H2V/3 B. C.," A.J.P., XLV (192*4-), pp. I*fl-l60.  I t i s useful but  by no means exhaustive since the date of o f f i c e f o r the s t r a tegol cannot be always determined from Thucydides' "summers" and "winters", which cannot be dated exactly by us: further, although a general waa elected at the beginning of the seventh Prytany, he probably d i d not enter o f f i c e u n t i l the  first  day of Hekatombaion (around the beginning of J u l y ) •  Modern  accounts working from t h i s evidence vary greatly because they assign generals to d i f f e r i n g c i v i l years. For example, H.B. the F i f t h Century.  Mayor, "The Strategi at Athens i n  When Did They Enter on O f f i c e ? "  LIX (1939), pp. k5-6k,  J.H.S.,  considers that the problem i s solved  more adequately i f a general entered o f f i c e Immediately his  after  e l e c t i o n and dokimasia. D.M.  J.H.S»  T  Lewis, "Double Representation i n the Strategia,"  LXXXI (I96D, pp. 118-123, i n contradiction to almost  a l l the preceding l i t e r a t u r e , accepts the evidence of Athenaeus, 218  b, which dates the b a t t l e of Tanagra to the archonship  99.  o f Euthydemos and 2 6 / 5 . k  That N i k i a s  1  "war p a r t y " f a i l e d  o f r e - e l e c t i o n he t h e n d e s c r i b e s as sheer f a b r i c a t i o n . 31/0  k  S o k r a t e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 23) K a r k i n o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 23) P r o t e a s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 23) Kleopompos ( T h c y d i d e s , I I , 26) P e r i k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 3D  H-30/29 P e r i k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 59)  Hagnon ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 58) Kleopompos ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 58) Phormion ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 69) Melesander ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 69) Xenophon ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 70) H e s t l o d o r o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 70) Phanomachos ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 70)  29/8  Phormion ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 103) P e r i k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I , 65) K l e i d i p p i d e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 3)  n-28/7  A s o p i o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 7) Paches ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 18) L y s i k i e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 19) N i k i a s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 51) N i k o s t r a t o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 75)  k  27/6  k  k  26/5  Eurymedon ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I . 80) Laches ( T h u c y d i d e s . I l l , 86) C h a r o i a d e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 86) Demosthenes ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 91) P r o k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 91) N i k i a s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 91) H i p p o n i k o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 91) Laches ( i m p l i e d T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 103) A r i s t o t l e ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 105) H i e r o p h o n ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 105) P y t h o d o r o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 115; I v , 2. To r e p l a c e Laches) Sophokles ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 115) Eurymedon ( T h u c y d i d e s , I I I , 115) Simonides ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 7) H i p p o k r a t e s ( C . I . A . , I , 273) ?Lamachos ( A r i s t o p h a n e s , A c h a r n i a n s . 593 f f . )  0  100.  "+25A  Eurymedon ( T h u c y d i d e s , IV, "+6) Sophokles ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , h6) P y t h o d o r o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , *+6) N i k i a s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 28) A r i s t e i d e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 50) N i k o s t r a t o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 53) A u t o k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 53) Demosthenes ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 29)  "+2V3  Eurymedon ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 65) Sophokles ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 65) P y t h o d o r o s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 65) H i p p o k r a t e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 89) Demosthenes ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 89) Demodoros ( T h u c y d l d e s , I V , 75) A r i s t e i d e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 75) Lamachos ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 75) Thucydides ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 10*+) E u k l e s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , loh) ? K l e o n ( A r i s t o p h a n e s , C l o u d s 586, T  *+23/2  N i k i a s ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 129) Nikostratos  ( T h u c y d i d e s , I V , 129)  75 D i o d o r o s , X I I , 63)  

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0104660/manifest

Comment

Related Items