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Royal government in Guyenne during the first war of religion 1561-1563 Birch, Daniel R. 1968-12-31

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ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE DURING THE F I R S T WAR  OF RELIGION:  1561 - 1563  by DANIEL RICHARD BIRCH B.R.E., N o r t h w e s t B a p t i s t  Theological  B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h  College,  Columbia,  i960  1963  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER  OF ARTS  i n the Department  of History  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g to the r e q u i r e d standard  THE  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March,  1968  In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an  advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree t h a t Library  s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  available for  agree that p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e  r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y .  I  the further  copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r  scholarly  purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s  represen-  tatives.  It  financial  g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  Department of  i s understood that copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s  History  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date  March 2 1 , 1968  permission.  for  - ABSTRACT  The  purpose  of t h i s  challenges to royal authority  was  (1561-1563). critical  succeeded  half  latter  into  civil  o n l y a r e l i g i o u s but  monarch, P h i l i p  their  I I and  life.  but  the S p a n i s h k i n g r i g h t l y  and  frequently manipulated  Great  The  The  close  i n France  matters  chosen  congregations.  and  boys,  imi l l -  became  ideological  not and  Hapsburg  with a  suspicious  the F r e n c h c o u r t .  religious low  of  were m e r e l y  i n the Pyrenees  threatened  division  country  in  territories.  as a s e t t i n g  for this  first  of the blood, i t  t o t h e S p a n i s h kingdom, i t had i t had  a  families  k i n g d o m was  affecting  feared that  the p r o v i n c e of the  p r e r o g a t i v e s , and  noble  powerful  w o u l d have r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n h i s r i c h  i t was  Religion  c e n t u r y was  movement d r a w i n g  territories  p r o v i n c e o f Guyenne was  of  o v e r r u n by v e t e r a n s o l d i e r s ,  I I , watched a f f a i r s  o n l y were h i s b o r d e r  local  throne.  from Geneva.  Not  was  sixteenth  royal War  C a l v i n i s m spread r a p i d l y  and  because  first  principal  f e u d a l power a t t h e e x p e n s e  a political  support  the  which  C h a r l e s IX, k i n g s who  eye  The  of the  f o r e i g n wars and  organizational  d u r i n g the  f o r t h e F r e n c h monarchy.  Francis  by  to investigate  t h e means by  The  s t r o n g monarchs on t h e  poverished  France  and  i n France  to re-establish  the crown.  absorbed  authority  was  maintained  period  attempted  thesis  -  a large  prince  a history  study  of concern f o r  number o f Huguenot  believers  iii Not to study  least  royal  among t h e r e a s o n s  government  documentary s o u r c e s . examination  and  This thesis  of Blaise  The c r i t i c a l  a study  was t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y  edition  of the h i s t o r i c a l  Among t h e documents a v a i l a b l e  of these accuracy  Royal  government  together  i n France  force  upon h i s s u b j e c t s .  with  the n o b i l i t y  Personal  of the  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f Monluc  correspondence  of  de B o u r b o n , t h o s e o f officers  was n o t b a s e d on a f i n a n c i a l ,  foundation  adequate  f o r the king to  I n t e r e s t groups a l l i e d  contact with  enhanced r o y a l  Courteault.  IX and o f p r o v i n c i a l  k i n g had p o p u l a r i z e d an i d e o l o g y o f r o y a l interests.  important  biography  of Antoine  of Charles  or m i l i t a r y  royal  upon t h e  with a  i s the e x t e n s i v e  administrative hiswill  Most  by P r o f e s s o r P a u l  de M e d i c i s , t h e l e t t e r s  M o n l u c , a n d many l e t t e r s  o f abundant  de M o n l u c , l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l o f  C o m m e n t a i r e s have been p r e p a r e d  Catherine  Guyenne i n w h i c h  i s based p r i m a r i l y  o f memoirs and c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .  memoirs a r e t h o s e Guyenne.  f o r choosing  a u t h o r i t y which  h i s subjects,  authority.  to the served  especially  The b a s i s o f r o y a l  g o v e r n m e n t , however, was t h e g o o d w i l l and c o - o p e r a t i o n o f individuals Catherine  i n p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e .  de M e d i c i s ,  g a i n and m a i n t a i n offices  such  IX and  t h e queen m o t h e r , c o n s t a n t l y s o u g h t t o g o o d w i l l and s u p p o r t .  and h o n o u r s w h i c h c a r r i e d  professional  King Charles  advancement  with  They  granted  them t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f  and p e r s o n a l e n r i c h m e n t .  An e x t e n s i v e  iv correspondence throughout  they  had  The  their  to balance  against faction,  negotiation  king  to maintain  t h e k i n g d o m and  Nevertheless faction  tended  to maintain  of  civil  noble  a g a i n s t governor  o f t h e p e r s o n n e l who  crown and  the  military  the p r o v i n c e  was  of c r i t i c a l  army was  largely  recruited to  the  As  with  local.  s o l d i e r s and  crown  were t h e  the m i l i t a r y  the  represented  importance  financial  when t h e  officers,  J u s t as of the  to  royal  made t o s e r v e  the  than  the  important  province.  facilitated  groups other  could  army w i t h i n  particularly  forces.  the  In a p e r i o d  i t i s essential  institutions  determine government particular  crown.  d e s i g n a t i o n " a b s o l u t e " as a p p l i e d t o t h e s i x t e e n t h monarchy must be  an e x a m i n a t i o n  of the  institutions:  the  crown.  institutions  institutions,  century French  appointed  resources  Local notables appointed  o f i n d i v i d u a l s and  The  noble,  i n constant  o r g a n i z a t i o n of the r o y a l  ways i n w h i c h t h e y c o u l d be  interests  the  a g a i n s t the  commanded t h e  t h e ways i n w h i c h t h o s e  against  royal authority.  war  and  individual  affairs  their subjects.  i n Guyenne r e v e a l s ways i n w h i c h p r o v i n c i a l  m o b i l i z e d f o r the  that  i n f l u e n c e over  Parlement  identification  be  and  t h e i r knowledge of  present first  f u n c t i o n i n g of l o c a l  voluntary  (Parlement). study  years  somewhat q u a l i f i e d and  as a  result':of  provincial  ( l e a g u e s ) , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( E s t a t e s ) and I t i s t o the i s addressed.  of c i v i l  war  nature The  provide  o f t h a t monarchy  p r o v i n c e o f Guyenne the h i s t o r i c a l  setting,,  TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I.  PAGE THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT Absolute  Monarchy  1  Great  Nobles  L  The  Guise  Regency  6  Prelude Huguenot  de M e d i c i s  to C i v i l  Royal  War  as Regent  8  . . . . .  9 11  View o f t h e Monarchy  17  A u t h o r i t y i n Guyenne  22  PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE Princes  24  o f the Blood  26  Lieutenants-general  kO  Governors of C i t i e s  53  MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL AUTHORITY Military  Organization  L"Ordinaire  Recruitment  and F o r c e s  des G u e r r e s  L*Extraordinaire  . . . .  i n Guyenne  . . .  63 67 68  des G u e r r e s  78  and Appointments  86  Command IV.  . . .  Organization  Catherine's  III.  .  1  The  Catherine  II.  . .  FINANCE AND ROYAL AUTHORITY  93 99  vi CHAPTER V.  PAGE LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY The F i r s t Catholic Local  War o f R e l i g i o n  - Summary  L e a g u e s i n Guyenne  Estates  132 of Events  . . 132 139  l*+7  The P a r l e m e n t o f B o r d e a u x  152  Councils  158  and Commissions  Summary and C o n c l u s i o n BIBLIOGRAPHY  161 166  PROVINCES OF FRANCE  CHAPTER I THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT Absolute  Monarchy  The  F r e n c h monarchy o f t h e m i d - s i x t e e n t h  p o w e r f u l a s a t any t i m e i n h i s t o r y . Francis  Louis  I (1515-1547) a n d H e n r y I I (154-7-1559) e a c h  and  maintained that the king received  was t h e l a w i n c a r n a t e .  that  t h e y must l i v e  monarchs i n c r e a s e d  Widely held  h i s sovereignty  on t h e r e v e n u e f r o m t h e i r  to tax subjects  great crown.  and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e .  f e u d a l r i v a l s were e l i m i n a t e d  political f r o m God  tradition  own d o m a i n , t h e s e at w i l l .  same t i m e t h e y e x t e n d e d r o y a l c o n t r o l o v e r f i n a n c i a l legislation  contributed  In spite of the persistent  their ability  was a s  X I I (1498-1515)i  to t h e p r e s t i g e and a u t h o r i t y o f t h e crown. theory  century  At t h e  administration,  During t h i s  and t h e i r l a n d s  period  returned  t o the  G e o r g e s P a g e s e x p r e s s e d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f  many h i s t o r i a n s i n t h e w o r d s , " F r a n c i s p o w e r f u l a s any o t h e r  kings  the  that  s i x t e e n t h century The  term " a b s o l u t e "  s i x t e e n t h century  I a n d H e n r y I I were a s  o f F r a n c e ; i t was a t t h e b e g i n n i n g the absolute  of  monarchy t r i u m p h e d . " ^  a p p l i e d t o t h e F r e n c h monarchy o f t h e  must be c a r e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d .  The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Q u o t e d by J . R u s s e l l M a j o r , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e I n s t i t u t i o n s i n R e n a i s s a n c e F r a n c e , 1421-1559 (Madison:. U n i v e r s i t y o f W i s c o n s i n P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ) , p . 3.  encompassed t e n or t w e l v e i n Europe.*'"  t h o u s a n d o f f i c e r s a n d was t h e l a r g e s t  A p r o f e s s i o n a l army g a r r i s o n e d f o r t i f i e d  p l a c e s and  2 enclosed  c i t i e s throughout  ability  t o enforce  h i sw i l l  t o t h e o t h e r was l i m i t e d . d e c a d e s o f war i n I t a l y  the kingdom.  Nevertheless, the king's  f r o m one e n d o f h i s e x t e n s i v e By t h e t i m e  kingdom  o f C a t e a u - C a m b r e s i s i n 1559  had e x t e n d e d r o y a l c r e d i t  to the breaking  3 p o i n t a n d t h e monarchy was d e e p l y i n d e b t . On t h e one hand t h e f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of t h e crown l i m i t e d t h e p a t r o n a g e t h a t c o u l d k be d i s p e n s e d .  O f f i c e r s went u n r e m u n e r a t e d s o m e t i m e s f o r y e a r s .  On t h e o t h e r hand more o f f i c e s were c r e a t e d . f o r t h e r e v e n u e would b r i n g .  The s a l e o f o f f i c e s  F r a n c i s I a n d grew i n , s p i t e  was f i r s t  systematized  they  under  of p e r i o d i c - l e g i s l a t i o n to the contrary  T h i s v e n a l i t y o f o f f i c e s l i m i t e d r o y a l power s i n c e a n o f f i c e - h o l d e r c o u l d o n l y be r e m o v e d by r e p u r c h a s i n g h i s o f f i c e lengthy t r i a l . limited  Royal  c o n t r o l over  s i n c e men named t h e i r  o r by means o f a  o f f i c e - h o l d e r s was f u r t h e r  own s u c c e s s o r s  or r e s i g n e d i n favour  """Roland M o u s n i e r , L e s X V I e t X V I i e S i e c l e s ( V o l . I v o f H i s t o i r e G e n e r a l e d e s C i v i l i s a t i o n s , e d . M a u r i c e C r o u z e t , 3rd e d i t i o n ; P a r i s : P r e s s e s U n i v e r s i t a i r e de F r a n c e , 1961), p . 116. e  2  Ibid.  ^ H e n r i H a u s e r , "The E u r o p e a n F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s o f 1559," J o u r n a l o f E c o n o m i c a n d B u s i n e s s H i s t o r y , I I ( F e b r u a r y , 1930).  4 A l p h o n s e de R u b l e , A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n e t Jeanne ( P a r i s : A d o l p h e L a b i t t e , 1882), I I I , 261. 5 M o u s n i e r , op. c i t . , p p . 118-119*  d'Albret  3 of men of their choice.  The. large number of royal officers was  thus a mixed blessing and important tasks were frequently committed to the holders of short-term commissions. A second q u a l i f i c a t i o n must be placed upon the term "absolute" when i t i s applied to the monarchy of 1559' The monarchy was personal i n nature; i t was no abstract kingship to which the French bowed.  When the king'-s power was exercised by  someone else on his behalf, other great persons refused to obey. Factions formed, at the court, r i v a l r y for power ensued and those exercising royal power were accused of holding the sovereign as a prisoner."'"  The personal nature of the monarchy was recognized  by Francis I and Henry II who sought to capitalize on i t .  Only  upon the death of Henry II and the accession of Francis II and Henry III as minors did this characteristic of the monarchy become a serious drawback. Before speaking of an "absolute monarchy" i t is to identify at least a third l i m i t a t i o n . far from homogeneous, within the state.  essential  The French kingdom was  i n fact, i t was made up of many states  A man was Gascon or Breton before he was French  and consequently the authority of l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and l o c a l notables could be much greater than that of orders from a distant capital.  This characteristic of the kingdom could be exploited by  James W. Thompson, The Wars of Religion in France, 1559-  1576 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909), p.  lTTT  the monarch who maintained l o c a l institutions and directed them to his purposes.  Similarly royal power was enhanced when i t was  exercised by men of the most prestigious l o c a l houses.  On the  other hand, l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and l o c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s could become preoccupied with l o c a l privileges and on occasion, acted in l o c a l rather than royal  interests.  The Great Nobles The old feudalism based on the granting of fiefs was complemented by a "new feudalism" in which the lord-vassal relationship was replaced by a patron-client r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A few  great nobles were able to gain tremendous power through the size and importance of their followings.  Economic conditions forced  many of the lesser n o b i l i t y to seek advancement i n the service of these great lords.'''  The client offered loyal service in exchange  for advancement 'and protection before the law.  The clients of a  great lord occupied positions ranging from minor household posts and men of arms i n his company to captains of chateaux and 2  officers in the royal service. To three noble families, Guise, Montmorency and Bourbon, p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the n o b i l i t y were a l l i e d by ties of vassalage,  J . Russell Major, "The Crown and the Aristocracy i n Renaissance France," American H i s t o r i c a l Review, V o l . 69 ( A p r i l , 1964), pp. 630-646. 2  Ibid.  family or clientage.  In 1559 the Guises were most powerful and  they dominated a l l the provinces of the east: Champagne, Lorraine, Bourgogne, Lyonnais and Dauphin!.  From the border of Artois to  the Pyrenees the Bourbon name was obeyed.  In the southwest  Antoine de Bourbon was king of Navarre and governor of Guyenne while north of the Loire the prince de CondS governed or had a large following in Picardie, the Ile-de-France, Vendomois, Touraine and Bretagne.  Normandie, Orleanais,  The Guises were a l l i e d by  marriage to the crowns of France, Scotland and Denmark.  Under  Henry II they enjoyed royal favour and gained great wealth.  The  Bourbon t i e s were ties of blood and Antoine de Bourbon,^ the  first  prince of the blood was next in line for the throne after the sons of the king.  Unlike the Guises, the Bourbon family was disunited  and the younger brother, Condi*, possessed greater character and a stronger following but lacked the authority of the f i r s t prince of the blood. and i t s  The t h i r d great family was the house of Montmorency  influence  f e l l between Bourbon and Guise, both  and i n the p o l i t i c s  of the court.  geographically  The constable Anne de Montmorency  was the.greatest landholder in the kingdom.  Consequently  his  support came from the large number of vassals who held fiefs from him.  His family lacked the blood and the t i t l e s of Bourbon or  Guise and they owed everything to Francis I and Henry I I .  Hence  Lucien, Romier, Le Royaume de Catherine de Medicis (Paris:  Perrin, 1922), I, 223.  6 t h e y were above a l l , l o y a l t o t h e c r o w n .  G u i s e and B o u r b o n  a m b i t i o n s were i n c o m p a t i b l e and t o s u p p o r t e i t h e r house was t o a l i e n a t e the other.  T h e r e f o r e , t h e Montmorency f a m i l y h e l d t h e  b a l a n c e o f power.''' The G u i s e R e g e n c y Immediately and s u r r o u n d e d  upon t h e d e a t h o f H e n r y I I t h e G u i s e s  t h e p e r s o n o f t h e new k i n g , F r a n c i s  II.  seized They were  a b l e t o g a i n c o n t r o l p a r t l y t h r o u g h t h e i r n i e c e Mary S t u a r t , Francis' of  queen.  S i n c e t h e new k i n g was f i f t e e n and  technically  a g e , t h e G u i s e s had h i m announce t h a t " h i s u n c l e s were t o  2 manage h i s a f f a i r s . "  The p r i n c e s o f t h e b l o o d were s e n t t o  F l a n d e r s a n d S p a i n on s t a t e a f f a i r s .  Before the f i r s t  p r i n c e of  t h e b l o o d was summoned t h e c o n s t a b l e was b a n i s h e d f r o m t h e c o u r t to  prevent a meeting  o f two n o b l e s who m i g h t  pose a t h r e a t t o the  g o v e r n m e n t o f t h e due de G u i s e and h i s b r o t h e r , t h e c a r d i n a l o f Lorraine.  The duke t o o k c h a r g e  cardinal controlled  o f m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and t h e  f i n a n c i a l and s t a t e  F r a n c i s I I was a m i n o r  i n fact,  administration. i f n o t i n l a w , and t h e  Guises exercised a badly v e i l e d regency. of  a k i n g the regency  belonged  L e g a l l y , i n the m i n o r i t y  t o the f i r s t  p r i n c e of the b l o o d .  Hence t h e p e r s o n i n t h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o c h a l l e n g e G u i s e  1  I b i d . , p.  2  228.  Thompson, Wars o f R e l i g i o n , p.  6.  authority  was Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, and he lacked the fortitude to make such a challenge.  Because of their weakness  and to buy support the Guises distributed a number of governorships to keep certain notables happy."""  Many offices and dignities  were distributed among the Guise family and following so the Guises determined to placate their c r i t i c s by requesting the king to create two new gouvernements princes of the blood.  in the centre of the kingdom for  The due de Montpensier was made governor  of Touraine-Anjou-Maine and the prince de l a Roche-sur-yon was granted Orleans-Berry.  The appointments were l i t t l e  more than a  farce since for the f i r s t time lieutenants were appointed over the governors.  Thus giving them governorships in central France  served to keep these princes of the blood under surveillance and 2 to l i m i t their authority. The century.  office  of governor i s an important one in the sixteenth  In the two preceding centuries members of the royal  family had been granted apanages,  large t e r r i t o r i e s  administratively  detached from the kingdom in which those princes had become v i r t u a l monarchs.  In the century to follow certain of the great nobles  were to approximate royal power in the office gouvernements  of governor.  The new  created by the Guises were fashioned from the  Gaston Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs de provinces au XVI Revue historique, CLXXXV (1939), p. 225.  e  siecle,"  2 I b i d . , p. 2^7. cf. Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 62-63-  8 t e r r i t o r y of the last apanagists.  The Estates-General of 1561  was called by gouvernements for the f i r s t time indicating that the entire kingdom was thus divided."*" Catherine de Medicis as Regent In March, 1560 the i l l - c o n c e i v e d conspiracy of Amboise directed against the Guises was overthrown.  In November Conde  was condemned for alleged complicity in the plot but the death of Francis II on December 5 brought about a shift freeing of the prince.  Charles IX was only ten years of age and  no f i c t i o n could make him anything but a minor. required.  i n power and the  A regency was  The position r i g h t l y belonged to Antoine de Bourbon 2  although there was a precedent for a regency of the queen mother. Catherine de Medicis acted decisively, as lieutenant-general regent herself. the king.  associated Antoine with her  of the kingdom and claimed the position of  Catherine had the guardianship of the person of  She out-maneuvred the Guises in a l l their attempts to  recapture a measure of control. She governed as i f she were king. She appointed to offices and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the seal; she had the last word to say in council; she opened the l e t t e r s of the ambassadors and other ministers. "*"Zeller, "Gouverneurs . . . , " p. 231. 2 e.g. During the imprxsonment of Francis I following the battle of Pavia his mother acted as regent. Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France (Paris: Hachette, 1904), V:2, 37-38. ^Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 75*  The Estates-General met at Orleans in December, I56O and recommended a general pardon for those accused of heresy throughout the kingdom.  The Estates were asked to seek a solution to  the f i n a n c i a l problems of the monarchy for the king's debts t o t a l l e d more than forty m i l l i o n francs."'"  L i t t l e was accomplished  although the way was prepared for large revenues from the clergy over a period of five years.  The delegates were to return to  their regions and new elections were to be held for a meeting of the Estates-General at Pontoise i n May. Prelude to C i v i l . War In A p r i l , I56I with secret encouragement from his Catholic majesty,  P h i l i p II of Spain, a famous association of strongly  Catholic nobles was formed.  It became known as the Triumvirate  in reference to i t s most important members, the due de Guise, the 2 constable Montmorency and the marshal Saint-Andre.  This  c o a l i t i o n was a blow to Catherine and the appeal of the Triumvirate to P h i l i p II was a further threat to her authority.  The association  was implacable i n i t s opposition to the Huguenots who had rapidly increased i n numbers and gained confidence after the death of Henry I I .  Nevertheless,  ""Ibid., p. 8 l . 2  I b i d . , p. 9 ? .  the Edict of July was promulgated reserving  10 judgment for heresy to e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  courts and l i m i t i n g sentences.  The Huguenot movement continued to spread and incidents of unrest were more common than ever.  The king of Navarre was susceptible  to promises to restore the Spanish portion of his kingdom or to give him compensation for i t .  Consequently, under the  influence  of the Spanish ambassador, he inclined increasingly towards the Catholic r e l i g i o n and towards the Triumvirate.^ It would seem that the parties were extremely unequal for Montmorency and Guise had effected a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and Antoine de Bourbon was inclined towards them, leaving leadership of the Huguenot cause to his brother Conde.  A s p l i t i n the Montmorency  ranks, however, evened the sides somewhat. nephews,  The constable's three  the Chatillon brothers, Gaspard de Coligny, Francois  d'Andelot and Odet, cardinal of ChStillon, had a l l espoused the 2  Huguenot cause.  Catherine hoped to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  between the leaders of the Catholics and the Protestants i n September, I56I when the clergy met at the colloquy of Poissy while the other two estates met at Pontoise. to disappointment."^  Her efforts were doomed  She was no more successful  through the tolerant Edict of January.  i n effecting peace  The kingdom was hastening  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV. See the pieces for examples of Spanish influence over Antoine. 2  Romier, Le Royaume.•., p.  229.  ^Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 4 .  justificatives  11 down the path to c i v i l war and the spark was ignited by an incident which took place at Vassy i n Champagne.  The soldiers of  the due de Guise discovered a Huguenot congregation meeting in a barn, wounded and k i l l e d a number of them.  "Charles, cardinal of  Lorraine, at the colloquy of Poissy had made union between the two faiths impossible.  His brother, the duke of Guise, by the massacre  at Vassy had made war inevitable." """ Huguenot Organization The efficient  m i l i t a r y organization of the Huguenots and  their rapid mustering of forces for the f i r s t War of Religion i s impressive and for i t s achievement required both an e c c l e s i a s t i c a l organization readily adaptable to the support of a military effort and a plausible rationale with the support, or at least apparent support, of the regent.  Individual Calvinist churches were governed  by minister and elders who together formed the d i s c i p l i n a r y committee known as the consistory.  Ministers and elders from a number of  neighbouring churches formed a colloquy, a committee concerned with matters referred to i t by individual churches and with the general supervision of the churches in the area.  Over the consistories and  colloquies of a larger region such as a province, authority was exercised by a synod and, in France, a national synod capped the organizational pyramid.  Common t i e s with Geneva tended further to  Bernerd C. Weber, "The Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157^)" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1935), P. 57.  12 strengthen and unify the Huguenot churches.  The synodal organ-  ization was ideally adapted to the development  of a concomitant  military organization. Protestant  p o l i t i c a l ideas were expressed and gained wide  attention when Anne du Bourg, imprisoned by Henry II, wrote an attack on the legitimacy of any monarch who t r i e d to force subjects to l i v e contrary to the w i l l of God."'"  his  Beza's publication,  On the Authority of the Magistrate in the Punishment of Heretics, written in 155*+ contained in embryonic form j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of the  right of a prince to r e s i s t superior authority on religious  issues.  At the time of the Conspiracy of Amboise, an abortive attempt to overthrow the Guise regency,  the highest leaders of the Reformed  church including Calvin himself expressed the conviction that the revolt would have been legal had i t been led by a prince of the blood and preferably by the f i r s t prince of the blood.  Predictably,  in 1562 when Conde in fact led the revolt, Calvin supported his cause.  The Huguenots of France had articulated clearly the  doctrine  of legal resistance led by a prince of the blood. The organizational structure for the r a i s i n g of an army was inherent i n the church organization and a doctrine of resistance had been a r t i c u l a t e d ,  only the actual mobilization remained and  Robert M. Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France, 1555-1565 (Vol. XXII of Travaux d'Humanisme et Renaissance; Geneva: Droz, 1956), p. 64.  13 this was i n i t i a t e d long before the f i r s t War df Religion.  The  churches of Guyenne i n November, 1560, were ordered by the Synod of Clairac to begin organizing m i l i t a r y cadres.  One year later  the Synod of Upper Guyenne at Sainte-Foy chose military commanders for the provinces of Bordeaux and Toulouse.  The hierarchy of  command included colonels over each colloquy and captains responsible for the forces of each church.  Thus forces were organ-  ized and ready to respond quickly to Condi's summons in 1562.""' The Huguenot military leaders found war more acceptable i f they could represent their actions as expressing loyal support of the sovereign.  In this Catherine de Medicis unwittingly gave them  assistance for she requested the Huguenot delegates returning from the Colloquy of Poissy to make a survey of their churches to determine the military force they could muster.  Wholehearted  support was expressed by 2,150.churches and the survey was followed by guarded instructions to muster military forces of both foot and 2 horse.  On March 16, against the orders of the queen mother, the  due de Guise entered Paris with two or three thousand men.  He was  loudly acclaimed as the champion of Catholicism and the provost of merchants offered him two m i l l i o n in gold to serve in defence of the Catholic r e l i g i o n .  On the same day, Condi returned to Paris  from the court with seven or eight hundred men. I b i d . , p. 109. I b i d . , p. 106.  The situation  14  was explosive and Conde withdrew to Orleans where he mustered an army.  Catherine was not permitted to take the young king  to Orleans but was detained by the Guise faction as a v i r t u a l 1 prisoner. Once more Catherine helped the Huguenot cause for with the young king she was detained i f not imprisoned by the Triumvirate and she exchanged a secret correspondence  2  s  Conde, seeking his support.  with  • Conde was to publish extracts  from her l e t t e r s in days to come to justify his military actions as an attempt to free the king and the regent.  Catherine  had no doubt wanted Conde merely to return unarmed to the court for  had he done so the Triumvirate would have had no excuse to  remain in Paris under arms and continued detention of the king would only have been possible by arms, a crime of lese-majeste. Conde however,  did not obey but from Orleans he offered asylum  to Catherine and Charles IX.^ The Huguenot army at Orleans was augmented by the a r r i v a l of contingents from the provinces of the west and south.  Again  Catherine contributed for when the comte de l a Rochefoucauld,  ^Lucien.Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a l a Cour de Charles IX (Paris: Perrin, 1924), p. 328. Medicis  Hector de l a F e r r i e r e , ed., Lettres de Catherine de (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1880), I, 282n. 283. "^Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots, pp. 330-333•  15 Conde's brother-in-law, sent his lieutenant, Jean de Mergey, to seek orders from her, the regent assured him he would cause no d i f f i c u l t y by joining the prince.  She was to spend much of her  energy i n ensuing months negotiating with Conde and i t may be that, expecting to gain his support, she wished him to have sufficient authority to enable her to withstand the threats of the Triumvirate.  The Catholic party had hoped that l a  Rochefoucauld, an old lieutenant of the due de Guise, would not take arms against his former captain and that the vicomte de Rohan, cousin of Jeanne d'Albret, would not r e s i s t the authority of the king of Navarre.  But very soon after the taking of Orleans  news reached the court that these two lords were making their way from Poitou and Bretagne respectively, leading troops which the l i n g ' s lieutenants were powerless to stop.  The comte de l a  Rochefoucauld arrived on A p r i l 20, 1562 with about four hundred men, mounted and armed.  Wherever, fighting took place Gascon  soldiers were to be found and 4,000 Gascon foot soldiers soon arrived i n Orleans under the leadership of the comte de Gramont to be followed by 1,200 soldiers from Languedoc Catherine de Medicis maneuvred desperately in the attempt to avert war and to bolster her own control of a f f a i r s .  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 152ff.  While  messengers and envoys were shuttling between Orleans and the court, Catherine sent a message to Jeanne d'Albret, en route from Meaux to Vendome.  The message was twofold, a l e t t e r merely requested  the queen of Navarre to ask Conde to lay down his arms and return to court but the bearer brought a message o r a l l y because Catherine had been obliged to write her l e t t e r under the eyes of Francois d'Escars, the confidante of the king of Navarre.  Orally,  the  messenger was reported to have stated that Catherine desired the opening of h o s t i l i t i e s  and the triumph of the Huguenots and that  she requested Jeanne to go to Amboise and take the young brother and s i s t e r of the queen as hostages to Conde in Orleans."'" The web of negotiations  was indeed a tangled one.  Even as Conde's army increased at Orleans and the royal army was amassed to meet i t and as both sides sought  reinforcements  from neighbouring countries, fighting was going on throughout the kingdom.  The king's lieutenant  i n Dauphine, l a Motte-Gondrin, was 2  k i l l e d by rebel forces under the baron des Adrets.  The commanders  in-chief both of the Huguenots and of the Catholics, were to be plagued throughout the war by the problems inherent i n attempting to mount a major army while at the same time protecting the home t e r r i t o r i e s of their adherents and satisfying the ambitions of Alphonse de Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e (Paris: Libraires de l a Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), 1^ 189. ^Romier, op. c i t . , p. 3*+5•  !7 l o c a l chiefs.  The war took on the appearance of many l o c a l wars  and often of g u e r i l l a warfare.  In fact the strategy of the  Triumvirate early in the contest was to divide their forces and separate Conde from his reinforcements to the west.  Conde found  i t d i f f i c u l t to recruit adequate foot soldiers for the Huguenot army while on the Catholic side royal demands for were to go long unheeded."""  reinforcements  Meanwhile Huguenot and Catholic forces  would wage war in Guyenne as armies semi-independent  of central  authority, recruited l o c a l l y , under l o c a l command and maintained in their home region by l o c a l exigencies.  It i s under these  circumstances that the nature of royal government in Guyenne must be studied. Catherine's View of the Monarchy Catherine de Medicis recognized the f i n a n c i a l of the crown.  difficulties  She saw clearly the personal nature of French king-  ship and the absolute necessity of personal encounter between the king and the n o b i l i t y .  Perhaps more clearly than anyone else she  knew that the monarch must recognize l o c a l differences, privileges.  local  In short, she realized that the power of the throne  was grounded upon the goodwill of men throughout the kingdom. concern was to gain the goodwill of s t r a t e g i c a l l y valuable men  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, p. 291.  Her  18 and through them to control others.  A few months after the Peace  of Ambolse Catherine had the majority of the young king Charles IX declared and soon thereafter she dictated for him a long l e t t e r on the methods by which he could best restore his kingdom to complete obedience."''  The queen mother's l e t t e r revealed those things which  she f e l t needed to be restored.  Beginning with the routine and  pomp of court l i f e , Catherine dealt with the conduct of court business,  the secretaries,  the Council, dispatches, audiences, and  concluded with clear directions on the question of royal patronage. The queen mother reviewed in her mind the events of the preceding three years encompassing the brief reign of Francis II during which she had been excluded from government by the Guises and the f i r s t years of the reign of Charles IX in which r e l i g i o u s differences coupled with r i v a l r y among the great nobles had erupted into b i t t e r c i v i l war.  As she looked back in time these events  seemed l i k e a bad dream to be blamed on the minority of Francis II, and Catherine was anxious to forget that bad dream and recapture the conditions which had prevailed in the reigns of Francis I and Henry I I .  Charles must re-establish the Church and through the  administration of justice he must cleanse the kingdom and recover royal authority and obedience to the royal w i l l .  The routine of  court l i f e Catherine considered as essential to restoring confidence  Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II,  90-95.  19 in the monarch on the part of the n o b i l i t y and the people, and the king must be p a r t i c u l a r l y careful that the nobles be associated with him by their presence in his chamber at his r i s i n g hour, by accompanying him to mass, and by walking, r i d i n g or jousting with him.  He must oversee the d i s c i p l i n e at the  court and ensure that men discharged their duties whether those duties be l i g h t i n g torches, locking gates, guarding keys, or sending  dispatches. His own existence must be as s t r i c t l y disciplined as that  of his s e r v i t o r s .  Rising at a standard hour, probably about six,  Charles must admit to his chamber a l l the princes, lords, captains, knights of the order, gentlemen of the chamber, maitres d'hotel and serving men. nobility.  This custom should build the confidence of the  Rising accomplished, the king must go to  business,  having a l l leave save those p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned and the four secretaries.  An hour or two reading dispatches must follow after  which he should go to mass accompanied by the n o b i l i t y .  If time  permitted, a walk for his health might precede the king's dinner scheduled for eleven o'clock.  Twice a week Charles should give  audience to his subjects after dinner and only after that could he r e t i r e b r i e f l y to the quarters of the queen mother.  Three o'clock  could be the time to walk or ride with the n o b i l i t y two or three times weekly.  The king should sup with his family and two evenings  per week the b a l l room was to be next on the schedule.  Catherine  20 suggested  above  a l l other  reasons  that  regulated  and d i s c i p l i n e d  so that  the people  expect  of their  king  Catherine to  h i s subjects  dealing  a  he must  admitting The  king  replies next  those  hour  I f they  h a d come  with  would  that would  from remote recently them.  contain  raise  replies  he must  these  he m u s t e x a m i n e ,  at anything  f o r them,  the k i n g  from  them t h e i r  the provinces offices  new.  must  by d e l a y s  of  must s e t  from a  particular  for the  matters des  before parties."'"  appropriate  s i g n and send the  time  to his '  t o see a l l  t o seek audience.  and t h e r e g i o n  by  of the  To convey  find  convey  be p o s s i b l e  matters  f o r the Conseil  looking  contented.  Charles  dispatches  should  be  areas  given  be  know what t o  t o command t h e s e c r e t a r i e s t o make  to dispatches,  h i s concern  discuss  This  and read  t h e ma£tres d e s r e q u e t e s was t o l d  who  daily  have t h e c h a n c e l l o r  morning before  people  dispatches  the impression  of the kingdom.  Council  f o r them.  should  would  the nobility  s i x weeks i n a n s w e r i n g  a convenient  region  with  life  on t h e young k i n g  h i s concern  to correct  month o r even  aside  impressed  immediately  province,  and so that  court  from which  He  should  they  "'"Every m o r n i n g t h e C o n s e i l E ~ t r o i t o r C o n s e i l P r i v e m e t f i r s t t o c o n s i d e r t h e most i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , f i n a n c i a l and administrative affairs. The C o n s e i l E t r o i t c o n s i s t e d o f a few g r e a t nobles with the chancellor present t o take orders. Roger Doucet, L e s I n s t i t u t i o n s de l a F r a n c e a u X V I S i d c l e ( P a r i s : P i c a r d , 1948), I I , 1 4 2 . T h e C o n s e i l d ' E t a t w i t h a w i d e r m e m b e r s h i p met t o c o n s i d e r matters o f finance and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . Twice weekly i t c o n s i d e r e d p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l s and d i f f e r e n c e s between people (presumably appeals). On t h o s e o c c a s i o n s i t w a s c a l l e d t h e C o n s e i l d e s P a r t i e s . D o u c e t , I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 1^5. e  21 had come.  In this way his reputation would spread throughout  the kingdom. The balance of Catherine's l e t t e r dealt with patronage, a subject which assumed great importance in her mind.  Louis XII  was the ideal she held up before the young Charles IX for Louis XII had devised a system to eliminate importuning at the court for appointment to o f f i c e .  He maintained a r o l l containing the  names of a l l the honours that were his to bestow.  One or two of  the p r i n c i p a l officers i n each province were responsible to report any vacancies, confiscations or fines to the king by express l e t t e r to be placed personally in the king's hands and not to go to the secretaries or anyone else.  Louis XII then  proceeded to make an appointment' on the basis of the information he possessed, attempting to reward the f a i t h f u l officers who remained i n their places and to deny office to any who importuned at the court.  The v i t a l concern was that i n f l u e n t i a l l o c a l notables  be appointed to strategic offices where they could exercise their influence on behalf of the crown.  Francis I was supposed to have  made a practice of maintaining a nucleus of men i n every aspect of royal government in each province.  Thus the command of f o r t i f i e d  places and high e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and j u d i c i a l offices  would be  exercised by men who owed their position and i t s rewards d i r e c t l y to their king.  To Charles IX, Catherine suggested that the  recipients of his patronage should not be members of the n o b i l i t y  22 alone but that in each c i t y he must have the support of the p r i n c i p a l bourgeois in order to extend his influence  into  municipal government. The advice emphasized by Catherine as she instructed her son in the art of government was that he should be as d i r e c t l y accessible to his subjects as possible and convey to them that he cared for them.  Catherine was soon to i n i t i a t e an extensive  i t i n e r a r y throughout the kingdom on behalf of her son precisely to implement this principle and to allow as many of his subjects as possible  to gain access to him, to see him personally, and thus  identify with him. Royal Authority In Guyenne In the province of Guyenne as in the rest of the kingdom royal authority depended on the personal influence over the n o b i l i t y .  The extent of that influence  of the king  depended on the  extent to which particular i n f l u e n t i a l nobles perceived their interests as a l l i e d with those of the king. service be to the mutual benefit  Not only must royal  of the sovereign and his  subject  but the sovereign must honour the l o c a l privileges of the region. The province of Guyenne was far removed from the court and had a history of l o c a l resistance to central authority. re-united to the kingdom for l i t t l e  Definitively  more than a century, Guyenne  was t r a d i t i o n a l l y exempt from the gabelle or salt tax.  When  Henry II sought to increase his revenue by imposing the gabelle  23 on Guyenne, that province became the scene of a bloody revolt.'*' The n o b i l i t y of Guyenne had a history of independent action and armed r e v o l t .  They also had an enviable record in royal military  service. Guyenne provides a good setting for the study of royal government because i t was the gouvernement of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre and f i r s t prince of the blood.  Like his  in-law, although he was as governor a representative  father-  of the crown,  his personal concerns as king of Navarre played a much greater role in motivating his actions.  Also l i k e his  father-in-law,  Antoine was often non-resident and in his absence the royal government was exercised by lieutenants of the king who owed allegiance  both to the king and to their governor, dual l o y a l t i e s  not always i n harmony with each other.  S. - C . Gigon, La Revolte de l a Gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549 (Paris: Honor! Champion, 1906), pp. 11-12.  CHAPTER II PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE An examination of royal government in Guyenne during the difficult  days of c i v i l war reveals that Catherine's advice to  Charles IX was in fact the p o l i t i c a l creed according to which she herself acted.  She recognized the necessity of gaining the good-  w i l l and l o y a l support of i n f l u e n t i a l members of the l o c a l n o b i l i of both great and lesser families.  And she realized that merely  gaining their confidence was not sufficient  for royal  officers  were subject to influence by l o c a l groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s , by great patrons, and even by foreign powers.  By judicious use of  the patronage at her disposal the regent sought to maintain the support of those best able to mobilize the l o c a l resources necess ary to uphold royal authority i n the province. Representatives of royal authority in Guyenne received their offices  from the king and yet demonstrated remarkable  independence of ..'the king in the exercise of those offices.  The  king did not have a completely free choice in making appointments i t was limited i n r e l a t i o n to the highest office by the need to satisfy the f i r s t prince of the blood and by the increasingly hereditary nature of the o f f i c e .  In other appointments the king  and the queen mother were limited by the desires of Antoine de Bourbon, the f i r s t prince of the blood, and by the necessity to  25 choose from among men of renown within the province to ensure the obedience of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y .  Men appointed from among the  l o c a l n o b i l i t y were able to gain support in their home province for independent action.  The Parlement, the estates, the c i t i e s and  the n o b i l i t y were a l l at times mobilized on behalf of the king's representatives.  The c i t i e s of Guyenne found financial resources  with which to reward the lieutenant-general occasion.  on more than one  Men who accepted appointment did not simply owe a l l e g -  iance to the monarch and to l o c a l pressure groups but also to great noble patrons including, of course, Antoine de Bourbon, the governor.  The appointee might be influenced, because of personal  ambitions, by a foreign monarch, P h i l i p II of Spain.  The degree  to which the crown was able to control i t s representatives spite of c o n f l i c t i n g influences  in  was the important issue in royal  government in Guyenne. The men who bore the t i t l e s of governor, lieutenant, lieutenant-general  in Guyenne were of three distinct ranks.  the peak of the hierarchy, were great nobles, of the blood.  and At  the Bourbon princes  These princes f i l l e d two kinds of post, that of  governor and that of commissioner sent into the province on a special mission.  At the second l e v e l were prominent members of  the l o c a l n o b i l i t y with i l l u s t r i o u s military careers behind them. The office  of lieutenant-general  was their charge and their  title  26 was q u a l i f i e d with the words "in the absence o f . . . . "  Since the  governor was consistently absent and the highest authority was delegated to his lieutenant-general, with i t a great deal of prestige.  the l a t t e r office  carried  The third rank was that of  governors of c i t i e s or of f o r t i f i e d places and i t , too, was f i l l e d by members of the most prominent noble families or by lesser nobles of proven military a b i l i t y .  This last office was one which  increased in number greatly during the Wars of R e l i g i o n . Princes of the Blood The most i l l u s t r i o u s and powerful nobles of the kingdom held office as governors of provinces. office.  It was a prestigious  During their regency in I56O the Guises divided the  major offices  among their own family and following.  They  recognized the necessity of satisfying the princes of the blood for only because the king was l e g a l l y of age were the Guises able to deprive these princes of a regency that should constitutionally be t h e i r s .  To satisfy the Bourbon princes  without sending them out to the frontier provinces where they could better mobilize resources against the regency, two new gouvernements were created in the centre of the kingdom.  These  t e r r i t o r i e s had not previously come under the administration of governors because they had been administered as the personal  27 domains of r o y a l p r i n c e s ,  i . e . as a p a n a g e s . ^  g o v e r n o r was  to carry with  not  ence e x e r c i s e d office and  intended  by a p a n a g i s t p r i n c e s .  granted only  t o men  of the  The  i t the  highest  of  degree of  Nevertheless, r a n k , men  independ-  i t was  an  whose  birth  power demanded a d e q u a t e r e c o g n i t i o n .  A n t o i n e . de B o u r b o n , k i n g o f N a v a r r e and blood,  was  g o v e r n o r and  illustrates and  office  to e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e .  lieutenant-general  had  c i s e d much l o n g e r  will,  i t had  or e v e n f o r l i f e .  His  A l t h o u g h the  become an  of  tenure  post  of  terminated  office  t o be  exer-  Furthermore, i t frequently  passed from a great  noble to h i s h e i r , a s i t u a t i o n  illustrated  e v e n t s i n Guyenne.  For  of the  Henri  d'Albret,  authority de  most o f t h e  k i n g o f N a v a r r e , had  second q u a r t e r  k i n g o f N a v a r r e but  i n his father-in-law's as  and  l'Aunis.  footsteps  g o v e r n o r o f Guyenne and  not  by  century  been g o v e r n o r o f Guyenne  e x t e n d i n g over P o i t o u , La R o c h e l l e  Bourbon f o l l o w e d  the  non-residence,  once been a c o m m i s s i o n t o be  t o the k i n g ' s  prince  of Guyenne.  common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a p p o i n t m e n t ,  susceptibility  according  lieutenant-general  first  with  Antoine only  o f P o i t o u , by  as then  2 a s e p a r a t e gouvernement. Rochelle  and  l'Aunis, a region  Zeller, 2  H i s a u t h o r i t y a l s o extended over  Ibid.,  administered  " G o u v e r n e u r s . . . , " p. p.  240.  247.  by  a separate  La  lieut-  28 enant and- sometimes r e f e r r e d t o as a g o u v e r n e m e n t T h e  first  p r i n c e of the blood e x e r c i s e d the a u t h o r i t y of governor over the western coast of France from the Pyrennees to the border of Brittany.  To t h i s were added the o f f i c e s of a d m i r a l of Guyenne  and, from March, 1561 u n t i l h i s death i n November, 1562, l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of the kingdom. Governors f r e q u e n t l y r e c e i v e d t h e i r o f f i c e s  through  i n h e r i t a n c e and the same was t r u e i n the case of those d e s i g n a t e d " l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l en 1'absence des  officers  gouverneurs."  S e b a s t i e n de Luxemburg, vicomte de M a r t i g u e s , nephew of Jean de B r o s s e , due d'Etampes and governor of Bretagne, a c t e d as l i e u t e n a n t g e n e r a l i n the absence of h i s u n c l e and, when E"tampes d i e d c h i l d 2 l e s s , M a r t i g u e s succeeded him as governor.  The g o v e r n o r s h i p of  Provence was e x e r c i s e d f o r many y e a r s by Claude de S a v o i e , comte de Tende, a c l o s e r e l a t i v e of the Montmorency f a m i l y which was very p o w e r f u l i n the south of F r a n c e .  Upon h i s death i n I566 the o f f i c e  passed t o h i s son Honore de S a v o i e , comte de Tende and de Sommerive, who as l i e u t e n a n t had e x e r c i s e d more a u t h o r i t y than h i s f a t h e r f o r s e v e r a l years and had come i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h him.^ under A n t o i n e de Bourbon, Guy de D a i l l o n ,  In I56O  comte du Lude was made  L e t t r e s de C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , I , 4 l 8 . 2  A L u b l i n s k a j a , ed., Documents Pour S e r v i r a l ' h i s t o i r e des Guerres C i v i l e s en France ( I 5 6 I - I 5 6 3 ) (Moscow, I962), No. 11. H e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Documents Pour S e r v i r a..... ^ L e t t r e s de C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , I , 304-305.  29 lieutenant-general  of Poitou f i l l i n g an office  vacant for three years.  which had been  In aspiring to that office  ing his father, Jean de Daillon, who had been  he was follow-  lieutenant-general  under Henri d'Albret in both Guyenne and Poitou u n t i l his death in 1557. Certainly the most s t r i k i n g example of the hereditary nature of the office  of governor was the succession of Henri de  Bourbon, prince of Navarre, to the offices held by his father. Antoine de Bourbon died i n November, 1562 of a wound received i n battle and i n December "pouvoir de gouverneur et lieutenant  general  en Guyenne" was granted by the king to the prince of Navarre.  1  The  prince was a precocious lad but s t i l l short of ten years of age. and hardly ready to exercise the powers granted him. to the office  In addition  of governor he was given that of admiral of Guyenne  and his father's company of one hundred hommes d'armes and i t was even rumoured that he would succeed his father as lieutenant-  2 general of the kingdom.  A few days after having relayed that  rumour to his government, the Venetian ambassador reported that the office  would be l e f t vacant, that neither the prince de Navarre nor  the prince de Conde would receive i t . ' '  The granting of important  offices to Antoine de Bourbon resulted from the need to  satisfy  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e (Paris: Libraires de l a Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), I, 467.  2 Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 439. 5  Ibid.  30 the f i r s t prince of the blood who should by law have been regent. The multiplication of offices i n the hands of his son, however, resulted as much from the desire of the regent to f i l l  those  offices with someone too young to exercise them as from the need to grant favours to the princes of the blood.  By birth the young  Prince Henry was f i t t e d to receive high office  and by granting  him such offices when he was s t i l l too young to exercise them, Catherine forestalled the efforts her for appointment.  of those who might have pressured  At the same time she l e f t the way open to  make her own influence f e l t more d i r e c t l y in the province. Antoine de Bourbon was obsessed with the vision of himself as master of an independent kingdom and his personal ambition made him w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e a l l else to the achievement of his goal. An essential part of his dream was the restoration of Spanish Navarre taken by Ferdinand the Catholic i n 1512.  His tendency  to dance l i k e a puppet on a string when the least promise of t e r r i t o r i a l compensation was dangled in front of him made the king of Navarre a very undependable royal s e r v i t o r .  Catherine  knew well his weakness and sought to exploit i t but i t got beyond her control to the extent that P h i l i p II.could manipulate at w i l l the f i r s t prince of the blood.  By making vague promises hinting  that Antoine would be given Sardinia or Tunisia P h i l i p gained from him the reactions he desired.  The king of Navarre was the  subject of extensive correspondence between Chantonnay, the  31 Spanish ambassador, and P h i l i p II."'"  Through Antoine de Bourbon  the Spanish King was able to achieve changes i n the education of Charles IX and of Prince Henri de Navarre when Chantonnay feared those youths were not receiving instruction s u f f i c i e n t l y Catholic in flavour.  P h i l i p II took advantage of his influence over the  Bourbon prince to have councillors changed at the French court and even to have Antoine's own wife banished from the court where in her Protestant zeal she might unduly influence the queen  2 mother.  At times Catherine's policy was seriously endangered  by Antoine*s enslavement  to his dream and to the king of Spain.  In June, 1562 with sporadic fighting throughout the kingdom, Catherine was determined to negotiate with Conde a peaceful settlement and Antoine was her representative.  The two brothers  agreed to decree a convention leading to a general disarmament but upon receipt of a long delayed dispatch from the king of Spain promising compensation, the king of Navarre sacrificed the peaceful convention.^  Nevertheless,  Catherine found i t  necessary  to keep the f i r s t prince of the blood satisfied and, i f  possible,  associated with her for his support would have been invaluable to her enemies.  In fact, responding to the encouragement of his  wife and of his brother and seeing i n i t the opportunity to "'"Numerous examples are included i n the pieces of Alphonse de Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV.  2 I b i d . , 384-388, correspondence of Chantonnay. • ' i b i d . , 256.  justificatives  32 f u r t h e r h i s own for  e n d s , A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n  a s h o r t t i m e i n I56O.  The  ability  had  j o i n e d the Huguenots  of P h i l i p  I I and o f t h e  P r o t e s t a n t s t o i n f l u e n c e A n t o i n e show t h a t a t l e a s t was  one  governor  s u s c e p t i b l e t o p r e s s u r e s w h i c h l e d him t o a c t i n ways  directly  opposed  to royal  authority.  H e n r i d ' A l b r e t r e s i d e d not i n h i s gouvernement but i n the city  o f Pau i n h i s domain  turn did l i t t l e of  Guyenne.  and h i s s o n - i n - l a w and g r a n d s o n i n  to improve the r e s i d e n c e r e c o r d of the  A u t h o r i t y was  exercised  i n t h e i r absence  " l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l en l ' a b s e n c e des g o u v e r n e u r s .'* d u r i n g times of c i v i l  strife  the r e g i o n .  m i l i t a r y and i t m i g h t r a t h e r t h a n one  Periodically  t o b o l s t e r h e r a u t h o r i t y and  L i k e the h i s t o r i c p o s i t i o n of  g e n e r a l , such a commission  by  the queen d e c i d e d t o s e n d a. c o m m i s s i o n e r  as her p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e pacify  governor  was  to  lieutenant-  p r i m a r i l y , t h o u g h not. e x c l u s i v e l y ,  carry authority  over s e v e r a l p r o v i n c e s  a l t h o u g h the commissioner might  be g o v e r n o r i n  2 one. the  As a c o m m i s s i o n ,  t h i s p o s t was  m o n a r c h ' s w i l l o r t e r m i n a t e d upon t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e  C a t h e r i n e planned such commissions the  t e m p o r a r y and was r e v o k e d a t  y e a r s I56I t o I563.  g r a n t e d t o a Bourbon Conde and  f o r Guyenne t h r e e t i m e s  I n e a c h c a s e t h e c o m m i s s i o n was  during  t o be  p r i n c e of the b l o o d , t w i c e to the p r i n c e  once t o t h e due  de M o n t p e n s i e r .  G i g o n , La. R e v o l t e de l a G a b e l l e , p. Zeller,  mission.  "Gouverneurs...,"  p.  227.  O n l y t h e due 30.  de  de  33 Montpensier f u l f i l l e d his commission. In August, 1562 Burie and Monluc, the king's lieutenants in Guyenne, received a t a c t f u l l e t t e r from Catherine de Medicis encouraging them and complimenting them on the work they were accomplishing in cleansing the province of rebels.  She added that  she had decided to send Montpensier with his company to reinforce them and also "to have more authority with the quality."  To the  n o b i l i t y , extremely conscious of a man's blood, this Bourbon prince represented much greater authority than the  lieutenants.  Several of the prominent nobles in Guyenne were either  openly  i d e n t i f i e d with the Huguenots or leaning in that direction and i t was important to the royal cause to reverse the trend.  Monluc  recorded that Montpensier was sent because he and Burie were hardly in good accord and added the suggestion that command should never be given to two; one lesser captain would even be better than two good ones together.  Nevertheless,  he concurred  in the solution; he would always counsel the king to deal with a division in the army by sending a prince of the blood to take overall command.  2  Montpensier's requests of the king's council reveal his conception of the nature and importance of his commission.  To  Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 376.  2  Paul Courteault, ed., Comrnentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Marechal de France (Paris: Picard, I91D1 II, 524, 525- Hereafter cited as Monluc, Comrnentaires.  3^ h i s r e q u e s t s f o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , m u n i t i o n s and military limit  o p e r a t i o n s t h e c o u n c i l r e p l i e d t h a t he w o u l d have t o  himself chiefly  w h i c h he was  going.  t o the r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e He  i n the f i e l d  i n f o r m e d - t h e c o u n c i l he w o u l d need  l i v r e s e v e r y month f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e a c c o r d i n g t o the custom  o f h i s t a b l e and  two  only,  " c e l l a est tres  raisonnable."  f r o m i t s number t o f i l l  should  t h e need e x p r e s s e d i n  M o n t p e n s i e r ' s r e q u e s t f o r a m a i t r e de r e q u e t e s t o r e n d e r and t o h e a r c o m p l a i n t s . a monthly  a l l o w a n c e f o r payment o f c o u r i e r s and c l e a r  and  the appointment  f o r the suspension of  first  instructions disloyal  o f i n t e r i m r e p l a c e m e n t s were a l l  among r e q u e s t s grante'd t o t h e due The  de M o n t p e n s i e r by t h e  q u e s t i o n a s k e d by M o n t p e n s i e r was  council.  which k n i g h t s of the  o r d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d c a p t a i n s and o t h e r p e r s o n s o f n o t e he have f o r h i s c o u n c i l .  justice  A p e r s o n a l guard of t h i r t y a r q u e b u s i e r s ,  regarding his responsibilities officers  1,000  expenses  c o u n c i l l o r s d e c i d e d t h a t the Parlement of Bordeaux  elect  to  of l i e u t e n a n t s of the k i n g , a statement  to which the c o u n c i l r e p l i e d The  finances for  The  would  r o y a l a d v i s o r s , h o w e v e r , d i d n o t seem  unduly c o n c e r n e d about the c o m p o s i t i o n of M o n t p e n s i e r ' s c o u n c i l and s u g g e s t e d t h a t he w o u l d be a s s i s t e d q u a l i t y as were i n t h e p r o v i n c e s and  by s u c h men  of  t h a t he w o u l d be  this accompanied  f r o m t h e c o u r t by t h r e e n o b l e s , t h e s e i g n e u r s de l a V a u g u y o n , Candale  and  de Chavigny.""'  de  J e a n P e y r u s s e d ' E s c a r s , s e i g n e u r de l a  Documents P o u r S e r v i r a...,  No.  48.  35 Vauguyon, belonged t o a f a m i l y h i g h l y Bourbon. of the  H e n r i de F o i x ,  Antoine  Oandale, s c i o n of the  n o t e d Odet de F o i x , p l a y e d a p r o m i n e n t p a r t  Catholic  cause t h r o u g h o u t the  Monluc's i n s t i g a t i o n i n the  comte de  f a v o u r e d by  Bordelais.  governor of the  formed the  Francois  city  first  War  in  o f R e l i g i o n and  league of C a t h o l i c  l e Roy,  o f Blaye."*"  s e i g n e u r de  The  latter  de  family the at  nobility  Chavigny,  two  was  were f r o m  p r o m i n e n t n o b l e f a m i l i e s of Guyenne. The  due  de  Montpensier held  T o u r a i n e , A n j o u and general  Maine a l o n g w i t h  o f Guyenne w i t h  l'Aunis.  The  multiple  authority  the  c o n c e r n m a i n t a i n e d by  office  of g o v e r n o r  h i s c o m m i s s i o n as  over P o i t o u ,  a l l e g i a n c e and  which complicated a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by  the  multiple  of the  lieutenant-  La R o c h e l l e ,  and  responsibilities  kingdom are  this prince  of  illustrated  f o r c e r t a i n l a n d s of  his  2 own  inheritance  i n the  lieutenant-general  duchy o f M o n t p e n s i e r .  of the  k i n g d o m he  W r i t i n g to  stated that  the  g o v e r n m e n t of h i s duchy o f M o n t p e n s i e r t o t h e  one  of h i s v a s s a l s  ly  that  the  town o f t h e  and  subjects.  This  on w h i c h t h e  a r e a d e p e n d e d , were i n an  excellent  had  given  seigneur  v a s s a l l a b o u r e d so  due's c h a t e a u x o f M o n t p e n s i e r and same p l a c e ,  he  safety  of  the  d'Effiat, industrious-  A i g u e s p e r s e and the  his  neighbouring  s t a t e of d e f e n c e .  D'Effiat,  A l p h o n s e de R u b l e , e d . , C o m r n e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s de B l a i s e de M o n l u c ( P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , I87O), I V , 210, n o t e . Hereafter cited as M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s . Documents P o u r S e r v i r a...,  No.  52.  36 having every  d e s i r e to r e s p e c t the a u t h o r i t y  of monsieur  de  S a i n t - G e r a n , l i e u t e n a n t f o r the k i n g i n the r e g i o n i n the of  che m a r e c h a l  de S a - i n t - A n d r e , t o o k f r o m him  a u t h o r i t y Montpensier de H a u l t f u e i l l e , Clermont,  had  granted.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , the  wished  Haultfueille  the k i n g of Navarre  t o k e e p o u t , and  confusion a r i s i n g  town o f  the  seigneur of  o t h e r n e i g h b o u r i n g towns,  to i n c l u d e i n h i s commission Montpensier's Montpensier  c o n f i r m a t i o n of  e s t a b l i s h e d by S a i n t - G e r a n a s g o v e r n o r  R i o n , M o n t f e r r a n t and  absence  wished  Aiguesperse.  t o i n t e r v e n e , command  thus a l l e v i a t e  t h e d i s o r d e r and  i n t h e duchy."""  A f t e r u n d e r t a k i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  of h i s commission  Montpensier  r e p o r t e d t o the k i n g from P o i t i e r s .  He  the l o y a l t y  of c e r t a i n c i t i e s ,  of t h e i r g a r r i s o n s ,  c o n s u l t e d w i t h S a n s a c and  a d j u s t e d the s i z e  had  confirmed  L a Vauguy.on a b o u t t h e a d v i s a b i l i t y  a t t a c k i n g t h e Huguenot f o r c e s under t h e s e i g n e u r de l a and  d e c i d e d a g a i n s t i t , and had  sums o f money c o n d u c t e d  Rochefoucauld  g i v e n t h e o r d e r t o have  t o her m a j e s t y .  After having  of  certain  observed  c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e r e g i o n , he recommended t h a t , s i n c e B o u r g e s  had  been d e l i v e r e d , t h e m i l i t a r y  be  f o r c e s under B u r i e r e q u e s t e d  to  2 s e n t f r o m Guyenne s h o u l d be k e p t Montpensier  I b i d . , No. 2  Ibid.  i n the p r o v i n c e .  j o i n e d M o n l u c and  5^.  Burie only after  their  major  37 military victory over Duras at the battle of Vergt, or rather, they joined him.''"  He warmly congratulated Monluc and agreed to  support his request for an office  and company for his brother, 2  Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux.  Monluc was overjoyed at  the a r r i v a l of a prince of the blood and gave him detailed recommendations for deployment of personnel in the province including the sending of Burie into France with the troops which had been requested.^  Montpensier, however, feeling that the work  of p a c i f i c a t i o n in Guyenne was proceding favourably, travelled north into Saintonge.  In November Montpensier sent a represent-  ative to report to the court on his mission in Guyenne. had been reduced to obedience, divine service re-established.  The i s l e s  fortresses razed, arms seized, and He reported with concern that  La Rochelle had dispatched to the court the elu and some others armed with 4,000 or 5,000 ecus with which to reward the  officers  who could assist them in their attempt to be r i d of the garrison. S.uch men would surely l i e about their loyalty and the prince feared that the c i t y would f a l l into the hands of the rebels who had already plotted to k i l l ,  Jarnac, their governor.  Much of his  report was devoted to military and financial needs but the extent of his authority was indicated by the fact that he pointed out the Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 563• Ibid.,  II, 564 and Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Letcres, IV, 171.  No. 64.  38 necessity of commissioning men to j u d i c i a l and other offices  essential  vacant by the absence of the holders, defeated in the  r e b e l l i o n or deceased."'"  He did not seem to think i t  to make personal recommendations to those  necessary  offices.  Months before sending Montpensier Catherine had planned to send Conde into Guyenne with a special commission.  In December,  1561 when religious passions were inflamed and Burie, the lieutenant-general, appeared incapable of pacifying them, the queen hoped that the presence of a prince of the blood would win obedience from the Catholics and that the presence of their chief  2 would calm the Huguenots. almost completed.  In February, 1562 preparations were  At the same time Catherine sent Crussol,  first  peer of France, into Languedoc and Provence with analogous powers. It may be that she did not want to place undue emphasis on her intended reliance on the Huguenot leader and, therefore, avoided making his commission unique. cities,  Conde was instructed to v i s i t  the  restore e c c l e s i a s t i c s to benefices and churches usurped  by the Protestants, restore to office those forced out by the seditious,  punish p i l l a g e r s and warn Protestants about unauthor-  ized publishing.  To those of the reformed f a i t h who complained  "'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7^.  2 Paul Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, Blaise de Monluc (Paris: Picard, 1909), pp. 1560157.  39 about  h a v i n g no p l a c e t o w o r s h i p God, Conde was t o make g e n t l y  understood t h a t , i fthey could f i n d except  a place o u t s i d e the c i t i e s  i n a c h u r c h o r t e m p l e , he w o u l d . g i v e  officers to turn their Had  orders to the r o y a l  e y e s t h e o t h e r way.  Conde f u l f i l l e d  the commission,  t h e Huguenots  might  w e l l have been t r e a t e d more f a v o u r a b l y t h a n e v e n t h e r e g e n t had planned.  However, t h e m i s s i o n was n o t t o be f o r P h i l i p  o t h e r p l a n s and A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n r e s p o n d e d p l a c e d on h i m t o t h w a r t C a t h e r i n e ' s p l a n s . would  I I had  t o the pressure The S p a n i s h  have p r e f e r r e d t h e m i s s i o n t o have b e e n  monarch  conducted  p e r s o n a l l y by t h e man whom he r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e s e i g n e u r de VendSme, f o r he w o u l d  never a d d r e s s him as k i n g o f N a v a r r e .  The  S p a n i a r d s a l s o made e v e n t s t h e n t a k i n g p l a c e i n Guyenne work t o t h e i r advantage.  A member o f t h e n o b i l i t y ,  t h e b a r o n de F u r n e l ,  had been m u r d e r e d b y h i s Huguenot t e n a n t s a n d B l a i s e was  gathering a military  local uprisings. mustered  f o r c e t o avenge t h e murder and q u e l l t h e  Spanish o f f i c e r s  c l a i m e d t h a t t r o o p s were b e i n g  f o r a n a t t a c k on S p a n i s h N a v a r r e  E x p l o i t i n g these claims, P h i l i p  t o be l e d by C o n d e .  I I i n f o r m e d A n t o i n e t h a t he w o u l d  c o n t i n u e n e g o t i a t i o n s over t h e l o s s o f Navarre of  Conde's r e t u r n i n t o P i c a r d y .  approve  de M o n l u c  only at the p r i c e  A n t o i n e had been t h e f i r s t t o  C o n d i ' s m i s s i o n i n t o Guyenne and he was t h e f i r s t t o  oppose i t .  As a r e s u l t  t h e m i s s i o n d i d n o t t a k e place."""  R u b l e , A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , p . 5 0 f f .  Lieutenants-general In the absence of the governor or of s p e c i a l commissioners r o y a l a u t h o r i t y was e x e r c i s e d by s e v e r a l l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l . There were three or f o u r i n the r e g i o n under the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f Antoine de Bourbon, one f o r P o i t o u , one f o r La R o c h e l l e and l ' A u n i s and  two f o r Guyenne.  At l e a s t Guyenne had two i n p r a c t i c e from  December, 1561, and o f f i c i a l l y ,  from March, 1563«  The c a r e e r of  B l a i s e de Monluc demonstrates t h e a m b i t i o n and opportunism of a l i e u t e n a n t , and the extent  t o which he c o u l d m o b i l i z e  local  support both f o r the crown and on h i s own b e h a l f . Monluc was from a noble f a m i l y i n the A g e n a i s , a f a m i l y of b e t t e r b r e e d i n g  than f o r t u n e .  As a l a d he served as a page  i n the household of the due de Guise and i n t h e f i r s t years of the r e i g n of F r a n c i s I he began what was t o be a b r i l l i a n t career i n I t a l y .  S h o r t l y before  military  the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis he  r e p l a c e d d'Andelot f o r a time as c o l o n e l - g e n e r a l of the i n f a n t r y , one  of the h i g h e s t p o s t s i n the m i l i t a r y command.  A f t e r the peace  he r e t i r e d t o the Chateau d ' E s t i l l a c near Agen where i n the s p r i n g of 1560, perhaps t o p l e a s e the G u i s e s , of some m u n i c i p a l o f f i c i a l s  and a s s i s t e d i n the e x p u l s i o n of the  P r o t e s t a n t m i n i s t e r s of Agen. hundred Huguenots besieged  he responded t o the p l e a  I n response a band of f i v e or s i x  h i s home.  The o l d c a p t a i n e a s i l y  r e p e l l e d them but as a r e s u l t of h i s complaint  C h a r l e s IX ordered  the  king  of Navarre  Anti-Guise harsh  sentiment  reprisals  Protestant Guises.  to assure had  government, A n t o i n e cause.  de  For  country  was  a result  of  their  a  i n f l u e n c e of  unpopularity  identified  he  G a s c o n hero."*"  of Amboise,  of the  B o u r b o n had reason  as  I I from the  advantage  this  of the  Conspiracy  t o remove F r a n c i s  Seeking to take  Huguenot  peace  swept t h e  f o l l o w i n g the  plot  the  himself  little  of  the the  with  inclined  the  to  favour  2 Monluc s actions  i n support  1  Francois the  de  favour  Guise  of the  t o whom Monluc  of the  king  Catholic o f f i c i a l s .  appealed  of Navarre,  advised  advice  that  him  very  Due to  regain  nearly  led  3 to  his  downfall.  The Nerac  of Navarre  gathering  selves to  king  against  Nerac  about the  and  h i s brother  them a band  Guises  f o r the  went M o n l u c a n x i o u s t o T h e r e he  attended  convinced  B e z a and  Jeanne d ' A l b r e t  assured  would This  tend  Conde" t h a t only  to the  sounded l i k e  putting  the  face  Ruble,  the  the  utility  of l o y a l t y  Jeanne  on  himself of the  with  faith,  his loyalty  to t h e i r  of  the  of  the  k i n g and  of  the  the  I,  II,  150. 397-398.  cause  blood  kingdom.  o f a good Huguenot, s k i l f u l directed  against  and  Antoine  reformed  princes  them-  o f Amboise  of  actions  d'Albret,  M o n l u c , Comrnentaires, 'ibid.  of  statement  bloody aftermath  preaching  efforts  at  a n x i o u s t o avenge  ingratiate  Bourbon.  and  the  o f men  Conde were t h e n  the  at  d  k2 government agent  o f t h e kingdom."'"  of Antoine  several  T h a t summer t h e G u i s e s a r r e s t e d  de B o u r b o n who i n h i s c o n f e s s i o n s ,  nobles,, i n c l u d i n g Monluc,  to c l e a r  himself.  He t r i e d  the e x t e n t  of e s p o u s i n g the unpopular  c o u n c i l of  the K n i g h t s  the d e f e n c e f o r Huguenot  opinions.  Guises to redress ly  curried  the  Bourbon p r i n c e s imprisonment  majority.  of Navarre  and t r i a l  noble  just before  Antoine's  arrested  at the r e c e p t i o n  the  of  unfortunate-  with  of  the  the  Antoine.  from A n t o i n e  favourite,  of  the  fortunes  temporarily,  o f Conde and t h e d i s g r a c e  he knew t h a t  came t o  M o n l u c had  he had a l i e n a t e d h i m s e l f  to  the  members a p p o i n t e d by  were e c l i p s e d , a l b e i t  M o n l u c knew t h a t and p e r h a p s  a prominent  order,  t h e Huguenot  favour  Guise p o s i t i o n i n  M o n l u c was p r e s e n t  e i g h t e e n new members i n t o t h e  court  to prove h i s l o y a l t y  o f t h e O r d e r when t h e m a j o r i t y  o f Vidame de C h a r t r e s ,  an  compromised  who t h e n h a s t e n e d t o t h e  feverishly  .  Francois  de B o u r b o n , d'Escars  2 was i n t r i g u i n g  for  office.  Convinced,  chance of r e c e i v i n g an i m p o r t a n t appointment  i n Dauphine,  the Guise  J e a n de M o n l u c was b i s h o p direction  were r e j e c t e d  M o n l u c was s t i l l  Courteault,  office  at  but  that  he had no  he s o u g h t  where h i s  h i s advances i n  brother,  that  when t h e d e a t h o f F r a n c i s  de G a s c o g n e ,  p.  1^9.  2 d'Albret  an  Guises.  the c o u r t  Un C a d e t  i n Guyenne,  gouvernement,  of V a l e n c e  by t h e  therefore,  R o c h a m b e a u , L e t t r e s d ' A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n e t ( P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1877), N o s . CXLV, C X L V I ,  de J e h a n n e CXLVII.  II  43  brought about a sudden change in the fortunes of the Bourbons, the Constable and the Guises.  He assisted at the Estates-General  of Orleans ^ and must have realized that the kingdom was not far from open war.  Without having obtained office  he returned to  Guyenne in January where he attached himself to Burie, the lieutenant-general,  and proceeded to make himself  with a view to supplanting the old o f f i c e r .  indispensable,  Charles de Coucys,  seigneur de Burie, of a noble family in Saintonge,  was,  like  Monluc, a veteran of the Italian wars but he was almost seventy years of age, old and t i r e d .  His wife was a s i s t e r of one of  Conde's lieutenants and he had a number of r e l a t i v e s  in the 2  Huguenot camp, a fact Monluc was l a t e r to use against him. old lieutenant-general  The  had neither the strength nor the heart  for the long struggle which lay ahead. In March Monluc was at Agen to play a prominent role in the assembly of the Estates of the slne'chaussee. the influence  Moderating  of the Huguenots and reassuring the Catholics he  played the role of politique to perfection.  This time he was  following the policy of none less than the queen mother, a policy of t o l e r a t i o n .  In June when troubles broke out at Layrolle and  Serignac, Monluc sought and was given a mission by the king and  Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 393« i  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, i v , 158.  44 queen t o d e a l w i t h them."'' The ingenuous B u r i e recommended him 2  as b e i n g worthy o f t h a t charge or of a g r e a t e r one.  No one c o u l d  have been more z e a l o u s i n a p p l y i n g the p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n than was  Monluc.  He was c e r t a i n t h a t p l e a s i n g the queen mother was the  only r o u t e t o an o f f i c e which would b r i n g f u r t h e r honour and r i c h e s . C a t h e r i n e ' s p o l i c y o f t o l e r a t i o n underlay her attempt t o b r i n g about a rapprochement between the C a t h o l i c and the Huguenot c l e r g y at the C o l l o q u y of P o i s s y . to a c c o m p l i s h  One o f those who worked hardest  the queen mother's g o a l s was Jean de Monluc, B i s h o p  of Valence and b r o t h e r o f B l a i s e . was  a setback  there  The m i s c a r r i a g e of the c o l l o q u y  f o r t h e p o l i c y o f t o l e r a t i o n and B l a i s e de Monluc  r e t u r n e d t o the c o u r t t o see which way the wind was blowing."^ When he a r r i v e d a t S a i n t - G e r m a i n e a r l y i n December, Monluc, had a t l a s t l e a r n e d t o commit h i m s e l f only w i t h c a u t i o n , and t h i s time he r e c e i v e d w i t h prudent r e s e r v e Condi's e f f o r t s t o r e c r u i t him.  I t was not t h a t becoming a Huguenot was repugnant i n i t s e l f  f o r M o n l u c s guide was the a t t i t u d e of the a u t h o r i t y on whom h i s 1  advancement depended.  Some time l a t e r i n w r i t i n g t o the queen  he spoke w i t h h o r r o r o f the a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Huguenots and he assured her t h a t he c o u l d never change h i s r e l i g i o n unless h i s  """Lettres de C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , I , 2 1 1 . 2  C o u r t e a u l t , Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 153. ^Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 399.  45 king changed f i r s t . ^  While he was at the court word came of  numerous uprisings in Guyenne and i t was then that Catherine determined to send Conde to the province.  The king of Navarre  wished to send l e t t e r s instructing Burie to take measures to restore order i n the meantime but the queen mother suggested 2 sending Monluc and Charles IX signed the patent.  Monluc was  empowered to use the companies from the garrisons and to raise a few hundred arquebusiers but his commission was intended only as a preliminary to the mission of Conde.  However, when Conde  was not sent, and Montpensier appeared only b r i e f l y many months l a t e r , Monluc's role assumed much greater importance.  In recount-  ing his commission Monluc made no reference to the impending mission of Conde and presented his own as p a r a l l e l to that of Crussol thus exaggerating his own importance.^  With the sending  of Monluc the Spanish ambassador, knowing his military reptuation and his energetic nature, wrote that Guyenne had found i t s saviour Shortly after his return to Guyenne, Monluc's attitude and actions toward the Protestants underwent an abrupt change.  From  toleration he turned to stern repression and bloody r e p r i s a l for acts of r e b e l l i o n .  Several factors contributed to this change of  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 237• Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , ' i b i d . , II,  400.  401.  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 152.  46 attitude.  De Franc, lieutenant  in the town of Condom revealed  that the Huguenots had a plan for Monluc s !  assassination." " 1  Worse s t i l l , they were plotting to seize the king, his brothers, 2 the queen mother and the Guises.  But, probably the most important  factor to influence Monluc was the degree to which the Huguenot movement was threatening the n o b i l i t y . nobles,  One of the prominent  the baron de Fumel, had been k i l l e d by the peasants of  his own estate, a.crime Monluc was charged to investigate.  The  Huguenots were boasting not only that they would pay no more dimes to the Church but that they would not pay either the  taille  to the king or their seigneurial rents and dues to their lords.^ Like the other nobles Monluc was h o r r i f i e d by these threats the very foundations of sixteenth century social order. by the willingness  to  Encouraged  of the n o b i l i t y to make him their champion,  Monluc counselled harsh treatment of the Huguenots.  Writing to  the queen and to the king of Navarre, Monluc reported that the reform had the support of no more than one-tenth of the population and that he had the solut ion; force the lords of the region to their homes, for some among them supplied Huguenot military leadership, put to death the p r i n c i p a l ministers and banish the remainder.  To accomplish this i t would be necessary to move quickly.  "'"Monluc, Comme nt a i r es,  II,  412.  2 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 161. I b i d . , II, 421. 4 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 114-118.  3  47 In  March,  1562 w h e n M o n l u c  had  some  chance  the  d u e de G u i s e ,  Saint-Andre,  that  d'Escars  In  a violent  leave  had been  letter  such  councils  Triumvirate of  court.  achieved  and r e w a r d .  accredited  he h i m s e l f  the province  Monluc  at the  he h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d  t o b r i n g him honour  while  advice,  de M o n t m o r e n c y a n d t h e m a r e c h a l  influence  decisively,  Finally  this  f o r the Catholic  the constable  sure  province  heard  was g a i n i n g  Acting Toulouse.."'"  of being  offered  the e x p l o i t  What  a blow  operating  Monluc  and l e t d'Escars  asked  of  w h i c h was  i t was t o  as l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l  was s t i l l  t o the queen,  the p a c i f i c a t i o n  without  find  of the office'.  t o be a l l o w e d  be r e s p o n s i b l e  himself  to  f o r the  2 disaster  which would  service and  t h e queen  d'Escars  alternate accorded  follow.  could  not allow  had t o wait  appointment.  almost  that  a year  before  and gave  brilliant  t o come  about  r e c e i v i n g an  Monluc  for h i s personal  he h a d r e q u e s t e d ,  of Monluc's  situation  She c o n g r a t u l a t e d  h i m 3,000 l i v r e s  confiscation  In the light  on h i s s u c c e s s ,  expenses  him carte  and a  blanche  to  3 conduct  operations. Monluc  support  had s e v e r a l  i n Guyenne  Monluc,  opportunities  by c o n t e s t i n g  Comrnentaires,  orders  to increase  h i s popular  from the c e n t r a l  government,  I I , 444-459'  2 Monluc,  Comrnentaires  et L e t t r e s ,  I V , 144.  ^ L e t t r e s de C a t h e r i n e C o m r n e n t a i r e s , I I , 469-470.  de M e d i c i s ,  I,  331-332, 339; M o n l u c ,  u s u a l l y because the of a f f a i r s when t h e  o r d e r s had b e e n based  i n Guyenne.  court,  T h i s was t h e ' c a s e i n t h e  apparently  province w e l l advanced,  gratitude  s t r i p Guyenne  of the  M o n l u c had t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s of the  by c o m i n g t o t h e i r d e f e n c e when an a t t e m p t H i s p o p u l a r i t y and s u p p o r t  constantly  justice  o f them t o t h e e x t e n t  two hangmen whom p e o p l e  w i t h t h e Huguenot c h i e f ,  available general,  forces  Monluc wrote  references  called his  was  F u r i o u s w i t h the to the  Monluc,  by  lackeys.  t o do  battle  seigneur  de  required a l l old  Lettres,  the  lieutenant-  He c l a i m e d t h a t  command, two months 'would have s e e n h i m dead  Commentaires et  the  queen m o t h e r m a k i n g  t o B u r i e ' s Huguenot r e l a t i v e s . " ' "  he had had s o l e  Bordeaux  increased  he was a c c o m p a n i e d  and t h e p r o j e c t  angry l e t t e r s  of  by e x e c u t i n g men t o make  S y m p h o r i e n de D u r f o r t ,  i n Guyenne.  c i t y of  was made t o s e i z e  Monluc's desire  b u t B u r i e was r e l u c t a n t  his  t h e H u g u e n o t s h a t e d and  that  facetiously  Throughout September  Duras,  of m i l i t a r y  opportunity  i n the p r o v i n c e  among t h e C a t h o l i c s w h i l e  h i m f o r he p r a c t i s e d  "examples"  1562  the  I n o p p o s i n g t h e s e o r d e r s M o n l u c once a g a i n r a i s e d  w i n n i n g the  feared  summer o f  commanded B u r i e t o l e a d i n t o F r a n c e  s t o c k w i t h the Gascon n o b i l i t y .  city.  knowledge  t h i n k i n g the p a c i f i c a t i o n of  numbers o f t r o o p s w h i c h w o u l d a l m o s t forces.  on l a c k o f  IV,  160.  if or  9  L  Duras defeated but that every time he had sought to do battle with the Huguenot leader Burie had ruined his plans."*"  The fiery  Gascon captain f i n a l l y got his opportunity in spite of his associate.  The anticipated battle took place at Vergt on  October 9, 1562 and the Catholic forces under Monluc won a decisive victory over the Huguenots.  As he had done after the  p a c i f i c a t i o n of Toulouse, Monluc immediately attempted to exploit his victory by requesting favours from the crown.  For  his brother he asked a company of l i g h t horse and the post of  2 governor i n the c i t y of Perigueux.  For himself he asked the  privilege of granting decrees of pardon and the restoration of the county of Gaure, previously granted him and then taken away in a reunion of the royal domain.  The king replied t e l l i n g him  that his requests had been found unreasonable and that he should content himself with the 500 l i v r e s he received monthly for his table.  5  Early i n 1563 when victory for the Catholic army seemed l i k e l y , Monluc was instrumental i n the formation of a Catholic association in the senechaussle of Agen ^ and the a f f i l i a t i o n  1  Ibid.,  IV, 158.  2  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 63.  ^ I b i d . , No. 76; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. k Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 190-195«  50 of that association with the great ligue embracing a l l the t e r r i t o r y i n Languedoc and Guyenne under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Parlement of Toulouse."''  In so doing he was cementing his  position as champion and spokesman for the n o b i l i t y but he was also forming a Catholic organization to p a r a l l e l the synods of the Huguenots and to keep the l a t t e r under control when the 2 garrisons would be disbanded or reduced.  A similar league was  formed at Bordeaux at Monluc's suggestion by Frederic de Foix, comte de Candale, who informed the queen of i t s organization in March, I563.  The Catholic n o b i l i t y in a remonstrance to the crown  complained that while they had been commanded to disband, the Huguenots were s t i l l allowed their assemblies.^  Catherine de 4  Medicis, hearing of the leagues, commanded Monluc to destroy them. She had recently had experience  with the association  formed by  Conde and with the triumvirate, both avowedly l o y a l to the crown yet both committed to achieving a purpose, i f necessary, in spite of the crown and she was convinced that a l l leagues constituted a threat to the crown.  Furthermore, l i k e the Huguenot organization,  the leagues were l o c a l l y formed and such a manifestation of provi n c i a l independence  could not pass unnoticed.  """Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 1972 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 344-345. ^Documents Pour Servir a. . . . , Nos. 91, 92. ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 551-552. 5 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197-  51 Monluc arrived in Bordeaux i n March and received n o t i f i c ation of his appointment as lieutenant-general Haute-Guyenne  of the king i n  Burie was to retain authority i n that part of the  province west of the River Lot.  This was a source of  dissatis-  faction to Monluc for Burie, old and sick, had r e t i r e d to his lands in Saintonge the previous October.  Courteault suggests that  Catherine did not want to aggrandize the vain captain too much or to offend the representatives  of the old Gascon families  too  2 greatly by favouring this parvenu.  According to his cwn none  too modest account Monluc was prevailed upon to accept the appointment by the combined efforts of a l l the nobles and officers present i n Bordeaux.  5  Antoine de Noailles, governor of Bordeaux, had died just before Monluc's a r r i v a l in the c i t y and his successor did not take office  u n t i l the end of May.  Burie was i n Saintonge.  The govern-  ment of the region and the execution of the edict accompanying the Peace of Amboise was l e f t entirely to Monluc who remained in Bordeaux almost three months.  In fact,  in June Charles IX  wrote to Monluc that he had told d'Escars that i f he did not go immediately to Bordeaux the king would send another in his place to whom he would give the o f f i c e .  He had also commanded Burie to  Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 577. Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197. Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 580.  52 go t o h i s g o u v e r n e m e n t t o g i v e o r d e r of the  edict.When  Monluc l e f t  the Parlement support Guyenne be not  and  B o r d e a u x he  the p r o v i n c e  He and  had  had  maintenance  obtained  not  been g r a n t e d  i t w o u l d o n l y add  B u r i e by  d i v i d e d by a  A t Agen M o n l u c was presented  him  that  senechaussees  and  a u t h o r i t y over the whole  insult  to i n j u r y  i f he had  s h a r e w i t h B u r i e a u t h o r i t y o v e r h i s home r e g i o n , t h e b e c a u s e i t was  from  f o r the demand he a d d r e s s e d t o t h e k i n g  d i v i d e d b e t w e e n h i m s e l f and  by r i v e r .  oversee the  of  to  Agenais,  river.  given a triumphal  the keys of the  c i t y while  entry.  one  City  hundred  officials  costumed  c h i l d r e n s h o u t e d , " V i v e l e r o i e t l e s i e u r de M o n l u c son l i e u t e n a n t ' . " A t Condom t h e  consuls  o f f e r e d him  S a i n t - M i c h e l w o r t h 308 i n June was  s t r o n g l y . C a t h o l i c and  the Peace of Amboise. and  taken  of t h e i r  from B u r i e ' s  d i v i s i o n of the  gouvernement  B u r i e , a f t e r l e a v i n g the c o u r t and  protested against M o n l u c as  sinechaussee  t h a t a l l the r e g i o n s t i l l  Documents P o u r S e r v i r a . . . , C o u r t e a u l t , Un  No.  a bone o f understood  g o u v e r n e m e n t , had B u r i e ' s was  107.  C a d e t de G a s c o g n e , p.  205.  the  under M o n l u c .  w r o t e t o t h e queen t h a t he of the  of  liberator  l y i n g west o f  t o be  met  the terms  their  placed  continued  other part  order  E s t a t e s of Agenais which  j u r i s d i c t i o n and  c o n t e n t i o n w i t h M o n l u c who  to the  The  They r e g a r d e d  asked t h a t the p a r t  L o t be The  livres.  a c h a i n of g o l d w i t h the  gone  in revolt  of  53 with no one doing anything about i t .  "He has promised so many  times to give you this gouvernement," continued Monluc i r o n i c a l l y , "that you send him promptly to do his duty.  As for me, I have  no wish to be valet to him or to any other save the king and you; and w i l l do my duty in the charge I've been g i v e n . . . . " """ Monluc was to wait u n t i l the beginning of 1565 when Catherine and Charles IX came into the province for further reward.  At  that time to encourage him Catherine made him a member of the Privy Council.  Immediately thereafter Burie, with impeccable  timing for once, died leaving no reasonable alternative but to make Blaise de Monluc lieutenant-general of the king i n the entire province, an appointment to which was added the office of vice-  2 admiral of Guyenne. Governors of C i t i e s The third echelon of royal lieutenants i n the province of Guyenne was composed of those who commanded garrisons in major c i t i e s and had authority over the neighbouring regions.  They  were known as governors of c i t i e s and resided i n such important 3  centres as Dax, Blaye, Bayonne and Bordeaux.  The governor of a  c i t y or f o r t i f i e d place was subordinate to the lieutenant-general though i n some cases not subordinate enough to please the l a t t e r Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 218. Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 216. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 199-200.  5^ officer.  Men of the leading noble families such as the Foix-  Gandale were appointed to these offices, offices  often as one of several  they possessed. Antoine de Noailles was captain of the Chateau du Ha and  governor of Bordeaux, both royal offices, a municipal o f f i c e .  and mayor of the c i t y ,  The office of mayor had been occupied  previously by another royal o f f i c e r ,  Jean de D a i l l o n , comte du  Lude, who had been lieutenant-general of the king i n Guyenne and Poitou i n the absence of the king of Navarre. Noailles commanded a lieutenant and one hundred men and for remuneration he received 1 0 0 l i v r e s monthly, twice the stipend of his lieutenant and one-fifth that of Burie or Monluc.  He rendered  s u f f i c i e n t l y important service that Catherine wrote that the king was "sending him the gold chain of the order of Saint-Michel by the comte Des Cars, not wishing to leave him unremunerated for his service."  Burie, the senior o f f i c i a l in the region, resented  the influence of Noailles and sounded l i k e a petulant child when he gave instructions to his representative to t e l l the king that the seigneur de Noailles was l i v i n g in the Chateau du Ha where he (Burie) wished to l i v e .  Should not Noailles, as mayor of the  town, l i v e i n the mayor's residence?  Burie also reported that  the keys of the c i t y were delivered nightly to Noailles and he  Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, X , 8 l , 88.  55 f e l t that when he was in the city they should be delivered to him as lieutenant-general."'"  Like any administration the govern-  ment of Guyenne could be hampered by the pettiness of i t s members i n their relationships with one another. Antoine de Noailles had long been a f a i t h f u l royal officer  2 and had served as ambassador in England.  His brother, de l ' l s l e ,  became Bishop of Dax and later ambassador to London and to Constantinpole.  Through his wife,  Jeanne de Gontaut, Antoine de  Noailles was related to Jean de Saint-Sulpice, the competent and i n f l u e n t i a l ambassador to the court of P h i l i p I I .  Thus Noailles  was a member of a family well rewarded for f a i t h f u l service  to  the crown. At the end of January, 1563, soon after Catherine's l e t t e r announcing to him the king's award of the chain with the order of Saint-Michel, Antoine de Noailles addressed a long memoire to the king on measures to be taken i n Guyenne to assure the p a c i f i c a t i o n of the province.  He outlined the l e t t e r s i t would be important  for the king to write, the appreciation to be expressed,  recompense  to be promised, admonitions to be given and financial arrangements to be made.  In his thorough analysis even the lieutenant-general  "'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82.  2  Edmond Cabie, Guerres de Religion dans le Sud-ouest de l a France et Principalement dans le Quercy d'apres les Papiers des Seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 i 1590 )Albi: Imprimerie Noguies, 1906), p. 12.  56 received due attention; i t was necessary to write a very affectionate l e t t e r to Burie for the conservation of La Rochelle and the rest of Saintonge and the Angoumois, especially the ports threatened by the English.  Similar l e t t e r s should be written to the l a  Tremoille brothers, monsieur de Pons, and to a l l the senechaux, especially the senechal of Perigord who deserved particular praise and promise of recompense.  The comte de Ventadour must be cautioned  to take care in the c i t y of Limoges and other important places in Limousin.  Laiazun, royal officer i n the city of Bragerac, had not  been residing i n that c i t y and the king should reprove him for i t . Good l e t t e r s should be sent to Candale and to the marquis de Trans, men with much credit and favour in the region, who were very l o y a l and eager to be employed in the king's service.  Candale had often  offered to assist Noailles with his presence and that of his numerous followers.  La Mote, lieutenant to the chateau and town of Dax,  needed a l e t t e r of encouragement for his captain was i l l and i t would be well to write to the officers of the town also.  Bordeaux,  Noailles' f i r s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , required repaires to i t s walls and, above a l l , pay for i t s s o l d i e r s .  The governor had held assemblies  of the inhabitants several times, assisted by d'Escars in the l a s t , and with his memoire he was sending his majesty the record of the deliberations and the dispatch of d'Escars."*" Whereas many of Monluc's l e t t e r consisted either of particular details or of  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I,  kS9.  57 grand  designs, Noailles'  practical and  analysis  exploit  affairs  of such  i n Guyenne  Pardaillan,  baron  congratulating and  accurate  What a b l o w  de G o n d r i n ,  of Noailles  later  this  wrote  her governors  had  no u l t e r i o r  Antoine  The r e g e n t  motive  i n so doing  i n the next  cities.  the. o f f i c e  d'Escars  2  rumour. only  was r e q u e s t e d  letters  new  the death  he  209.  him of  d'Escars  patent  was  favour t o  patent  86. IV,  her that  by F r a n c o i s  ' 2 et Lettres,  dis-  h e r t h a t when t h e  of the l e t t e r s  """Documents P o u r S e r v i r . a . , . , ;No  time  of confidence  appointment.After  i n sending.the  Monluc, Commentaires  t o be  The  she had promised  protested the g r a n t i n g of t h i s  and the d e l a y  Some  He a s s u r e d  but reminded  he h a d r e c e i v e d i t b u t t h e s e n d i n g  noble.  was n o t v a c a n t I  had n o t been v a c a n t ,  similar  of Bordeaux  on t h e l o y a l  that the o f f i c e  major  de  had heard h i s  h a d come s o c l o s e t o o f f i c e  of Bordeaux  Monluc  as governor  an a p p r o p r i a t e reward  i n several  about  the court at pontainebleau  t o t h e queen e x p r e s s i n g h i s l a c k  de N o a i l l e s  delayed.  Antoine  h a d b e e n n o t h i n g more t h a n  man who  in  preference  left  du Ha.  i t was t o l e a r n  gouvernement  difficulties.  h i m s e l f on h i s a p p o i n t m e n t  death  appointed  information at the court  l e d t o many  and bestowed  the k i n g t o maintain  o f h i s s u b j e c t s i n Guyenne.  c a p t a i n of the Chateau  request  and  of a c t i o n s r e q u i r e d from  the l o y a l t y  Lack  memoire p r o v i d e d a t h o u g h t f u l and  l e d him.to  believe that the appointment had been revoked.  In addition to  d'Escars and Gondrin there were at least two other candidates seeking the appointment, Noailles' son and Jean de V a i l l a c , l a t t e r supported by Monluc.  the  Jean de V a i l l a c even exercised the 2  office for a time under, a commission from Monluc.  A l l the  candidates pressed their cases at the court, assuring the queen of the men and means they would bring to the task.  Gondrin, for  example, told Catherine that i f i t pleased her to make provision for him, her majesty and the king would have "a f a i t h f u l subject and servitor who would have the means of making the king obeyed' .and preventing troubles, as much as any man in Guyenne," a reference to the favour he possessed and the size of his  suite.  5  The efforts of V a i l l a c and Gondrin to obtain the office were of no avail and they continued to serve as commanders of companies in the province. Appointments at each level in the royal government of the province were much sought after. a high o f f i c e ,  Burie, already occupying  the duties of which he failed to f u l f i l ,  enlisted  the support of the due de Montpensier and requested the office of  4 admiral of Guyenne after the death of the king of Navarre.  1  I b i d . - , IV, 243.  2  Ibid.  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 86. 4  I b i d . , No. 80.  That  59 office was granted to the young Prince Henry of Navarre but Burie was made vice-admiral. ' Monluc had avidly sought appointment both in Dauphine and in Piedmont before beginning his rise in Guyenne and many candidates sought appointment as governors of  cities.  Their eagerness stemmed from ambition or merely from avarice for each office  carried f i n a n c i a l remuneration and the multiplication  of offices brought a commensurate multiplication of income. Moreover, the office  carried opportunities for financial gain  from groups who wished to influence the o f f i c e r , was much greater than the stipend i t s e l f .  and this income  The financial returns  alone, however, do not explain the zealous seeking after the office.  For the Gascon n o b i l i t y the path to honour and renown  lay most often in military office and advancement. should accompany honour was to be expected.  That riches  In fact, Courteault  said of Monluc that he could not conceive of honours without 1  money. The appointment to office required sponsors, i n f l u e n t i a l the better. to enlist  the more  In seeking appointment Monluc attempted  the support of the due de Guise, son of his o r i g i n a l  patron, and to ingratiate himself with the king of Navarre. D'Escars r e l i e d upon his friendship with Antoine de Bourbon who interceded for him at times with the king, the queen mother, the due de Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine.  In the youth of Henry II d'Escars  Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 2 0 7 .  60 had  been one  of h i s f a v o u r i t e s .  For  appointment i n the  o f Guyenne i t was  h e l p f u l t o have some c o n n e c t i o n  governor, Antoine  de B o u r b o n .  consisted t o be  of B u r i e , Monluc, Jarnac  granted  important  were n o r m a l l y  the  Antoine's  war  d'Escars,  a l l o f whom were  t h e c r o w n but  recommended by t h e  ratification.  and  with  council  o f f i c e s i n the r e g i o n under h i s  A p p o i n t m e n t s were made by  the  I n 1559  province  Thus upon t h e  jurisdiction.  i t would appear t h a t  governor f o r the  death of the  they  crown's  governor, N o a i l l e s wrote  queen a s k i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s office"'" and  Burie  wrote  2 thanking  the k i n g f o r c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s .  R e m u n e r a t i o n d i d not  c o n s i s t merely of s a l a r y f o r the  performance of d u t i e s .  Many t h i n g s were r e q u i r e d f o r a man's  honour, c h i e f l y  live  t h a t he  whole f a m i l y r e f l e c t king maintain  the  as b e f i t t e d h i s s t a t i o n and  h i s honour.  I t was  feudal t r a d i t i o n  f a m i l i e s of h i s v a s s a l s .  of h i s v i c t o r i e s t o p r e s s  M o n l u c was  h i s c l a i m s upon t h e c r o w n and  c o n v e y e d by the  conscious  t h e manner o f d r e s s , by  g e n e r o s i t y he  t o e n t e r t a i n the I t was  a l s o keenly  displayed. due  On  one  de G u i s e and  Monluc's boast that a f t e r  the  Documents P o u r S e r v i r a . . . , """Ruble, J e a n n e d ' A l b r e t ,  of the  occasion  I,  due  No. 466.  that  the  in addition  and  for his  impression  t h e t a b l e he  t h e due  his  Monluc t o o k advantage  t o h o n o u r s f o r h i m s e l f he s o u g h t them f o r h i s b r o t h e r sons.  that  he  spread, had  the  de S a x e i n h i s  he and  opportunity pavilion.  de G u i s e t h e r e was  78.  by  no  61  table i n the camp longer or better than h i s .  After enjoying a  sumptuous repast Monluc's guests complimented him and he replied that i f they would speak to the king on his behalf for s i l v e r vessels, the next time he would be able to serve them as they deserved.  They did indeed t e l l the king, Henry I I , about the  dinner, assuring him that even the king could not have provided better meats, better wines or colder and that Monluc deserved s i l v e r vessels for his table.  The king promised to provide them."*"  Monluc missed few opportunities to seek tangible rewards even to the extent of replying ungraciously to l e t t e r s of congratulation 2  that when he spread his table words made poor meat. When men amassed multiple offices  i t was impossible for  them to personally perform the accompanying duties. officers seem to have been l i t t l e ments of any of their offices. resident i n the province.  inclined to f u l f i l l  Indeed, some the require-  The governor of Guyenne was not  Burie and d'Escars were both rebuked  by Charles I X for non-residence.  Jarnac repeatedly asked permission 3  to leave La Rochelle and attend to a f f a i r s at his home.  Both Burie  and Jarnac were old men and the s t r a i n of events, not surprisingly, was hard on them.  That they wished at times to escape from the  pressure was to be expected.  Even at the l e v e l of the governors of  c i t i e s non-residence was a problem as Noailles pointed out to the queen.  Monluc seems to have been the exception among the highest "''Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 362-364. 2  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, I V , 2 1 4 . ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . . , No. 5 1 .  62  officers  of Guyenne for he was always in the f i e l d even to the  extent of taking only ten days to settle a f f a i r s when his wife died.  His advice to the king's lieutenant  was to keep constantly  on the move so that men, always expecting the o f f i c e r ' s  arrival,  would be more anxious to obey.""" A l o c a l noble of great renown because of his military exploits,  the number and reputation of his c l i e n t s ,  and the  patronage he bestowed, could gain great support from the provincial Parlement, the l o c a l estates, the c i t i e s and especially from the n o b i l i t y .  At times, l i s t e n i n g to the voices around him,  he would forget that he was the representative central government.  of a far away  Although he might be the l o c a l champion,  the l i b e r a t o r , the hero, he could s t i l l be useful to the crown. In fact,  his l o c a l renown was the very factor-that made him most  useful to the crown i f he could be controlled as Monluc was by flattery and g i f t s .  Because of the absence of the king of Navarre,  the age and indecision of Burie, and the events of c i v i l war which called for the military talents of the ambitious and energetic Blaise de Monluc, he was the central figure in the drama of royal government in Guyenne during the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n . His contribution supplemented by the work of a few realists  intelligent  l i k e Antoine de Noailles went a long way toward the  maintenance of royal authority in the province.  "'"Monluc, Commentaires, II, 469.  CHAPTER I I I MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL  AUTHORITY  I n an e x t e n d e d r e m o n s t r a n c e a d d r e s s e d t o C h a r l e s offered the k i n g d e t a i l e d advice military  officers."*"  The k i n g ' s  p e r s o n a l l y was c o n s i d e r e d  be  Law r e q u i r e d  o f f i c e s as p r e s i d e n t ,  e x a m i n e d by t h e d o c t o r s  the appointment of  s o l d i e r t o be e s s e n t i a l that  c o u n c i l l o r and  a s p i r a n t s t o such lieutenant-general  o f t h e lav/ and t h e c o u n c i l l o r s o f  Parlement under t h e c h a i r m a n s h i p o f t h e c h a n c e l l o r . assumed t h a t  Monluc  w i l l i n g n e s s t o see h i s o f f i c e r s  by t h e v e t e r a n  to o b t a i n i n g l o y a l s e r v i c e . judicial  regarding  IX  Monluc  t h i s p r a c t i c e was c a r r i e d o u t and he recommended i t s  adoption f o r appointments t o m i l i t a r y  office  as w e l l .  The G a s c o n  c a p t a i n a c c u s e d t h e k i n g of a w a r d i n g t h e o f f i c e s o f governor and captain  too easily,  even i n response  women he d a n c e d w i t h .  to the requests  S u c h an o f f i c e r  was e x t r e m e l y  of the important  to the defence of a c i t y  f o r he c o u l d  and  Moreover, enemies, knowing h i s w e l l -  prepare i t s forces.  deserved r e p u t a t i o n , would avoid not an  overcome i t s w e a k n e s s e s  attacking.  e x p e c t i m m e d i a t e advancement b u t s h o u l d apprenticeship  Young men  be p r e p a r e d t o s e r v e  under o l d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s .  p o s i t i o n o f governor and c a p t a i n  Monluc, Comrnentaires,  of a c i t y ,  I I I , 374-398.  should  Like the  the o f f i c e s of  marechal de camp and maitre de camp for cavalry and infantry were c r u c i a l offices  not to be l i g h t l y f i l l e d .  Men f i l l i n g them  must be neither r i v a l s nor over-dependent on each other. victory and defeat depended on these o f f i c e r s ,  Since  the king and his  lieutenants should consider repeatedly and even tremble over the appointment.'  Monluc feared that a l l these offices  l i k e the  honour of Knight of the Order were being given out too freely where once they had been t i t l e s of honour reserved for people of good name. The remedy proposed by the man who claimed to be the  oldest  captain i n the kingdom was to i n s t i t u t e an examination before a special board.  The due d'Anjou, Charles' brother, who had won  two battles even though he was s t i l l a youth, could serve as military chancellor and the panel of doctors and councillors would be composed of old, experienced captains.  Anyone who  requested office would be summoned before the examining board to give an account of himself.  He would be asked where he had  performed his apprenticeship and under whom and what deeds of honour he had won.  Only on the recommendation of the experienced  captains would any appointment be made and the king could avoid importuning for m i l i t a r y office  by making the fact known.  Monluc claimed that many benefits would result from the adoption of his recommendations.  The apprentices to the carrying  65 of arms, knowing that they couldn't enter by the window would work and study d i l i g e n t l y to impress those who must open the door to them. efforts  Those appointed to office would not slacken their for they would wish to vindicate their choice by the  captains and to ensure their continued promotion.  Appointment  of generals of cavalry and colonels of infantry would be beyond this scheme, according to Monluc, for these offices must be given to princes and great lords.  However, even youth and inexperience  on their part would riot matter provided the maitre de camp was an experienced soldier chosen with care. Since many would be anxious to advance by arms, Monluc recommended that the king keep a r o l l by province of a l l men of promise and their particular qualities so that vacancies in a province could be f i l l e d from among those- l i s t e d .  Monluc was  certain that those who knew they were on the l i s t would take heart and work hard to render service to the king and that those not on the l i s t would expose themselves to a thousand dangers to get their names placed on the l i s t .  The king must be prompt to  add the names of worthy men to the l i s t should bear the name, "book of honour." Medicis,'*'  which Monluc suggested Like Catherine de  Monluc attributed the use of this technique to Louis XII  who even handled j u d i c i a l appointments by means of a r o l l of possible candidates according to a story Monluc recalled from  Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 9 4 .  66 his  youth.  technique practice  F u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the b e n e f i t s of such f o r the a l l o c a t i o n  i n Sienna Not to  office  and  the  his as  own  governor  Montalcino.  o n l y s h o u l d t h e k i n g r e w a r d t h e f a i t h f u l by but  of h i s l o y a l  was  served  from Monluc's p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e  he s h o u l d be a c c e s s i b l e t o h i s s u b j e c t s .  word s p o k e n by t h e k i n g was  by  o f p a t r o n a g e were drawn f r o m  o f Odet de F o i x under whom M o n l u c had  a p p r e n t i c e s h i p and  a  supporters.  most i m p o r t a n t  for the  appointment A  gracious  encouragement  I f the s p o k e n word c o u l d be  accompanied  f i n a n c i a l r e w a r d so much t h e b e t t e r ! ' M o n l u c ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n that Charles  IX make t h e s e  f i n a n c i a l rewards p e r s o n a l l y .  only would i t i n c r e a s e the s u b j e c t ' s t i e s t o h i s s o v e r i e g n the award would r e a c h pass through  i t s d e s t i n a t i o n d i r e c t l y without  t h e h a n d s o f o f f i c i a l s where much was  Not  but  having  certain  to  to  stick. Monluc's suggestions  t o C h a r l e s IX r e g a r d i n g  appointments i n the p r o v i n c e s obscure  the s i t u a t i o n  t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f t h e Wars o f R e l i g i o n . a g r e a t e r degree of r o y a l c o n t r o l over Guyenne t h a n C h a r l e s IX- was exercised  the o f f i c e  responsibility over r e c r u i t i n g the events  one  o f 1561  I f t h e wrong  should bear  people  greater  a s much c o n t r o l  a p p o i n t m e n t s i n t h e p r o v i n c e a s anyone t o 1563  show.  in  such appointments i n  t h a n M o n l u c h i m s e l f f o r he had and  as i t was  His remonstrance i m p l i e s  able to a s s e r t .  o f c a p t a i n no  military  C h a r l e s IX had  apparently  as  67 rejected  the charge t h a t  of inferior  captains  Monluc r e f u s e d  he was r e s p o n s i b l e  by s h i f t i n g  to accept  t h e p r o b l e m by g r a n t i n g  people  that  g e n t l e m e n no l o n g e r  Titles  that  were once  desired  the preserve  a n d honour  t h e y were g r a n t e d  soldiers.  the o f f i c e  He f e l t  given  Organization  major  those rather  categories,  resources  and t r e s o r i e r s .  extraordinaire  t o command  now  and t h e f a c t  a small  o f the l e g i o n s  of the s i x t e e n t h  group o f  of Francis I.  century  M o n l u c , Comrnentaires,  III,  historical  ban and  the o r d i n a i r e des  des g u e r r e s c o n s i s t e d  into  w i t h i t s own  The ban a n d t h e a r r i e r e  came under  fell  d e s g u e r r e s and  des guerres,. d i v i s i o n s  The f o r m e r was p r o v i d e d  companies o f ordonnance The  b o r n were  Monluc was c o n c e r n e d  those of the o r d i n a i r e  o f the e x t r a o r d i n a i r e than l o g i c a l .  such an a p p o i n t m e n t .  and F o r c e s i n Guyenne  F r e n c h armed f o r c e s two  humble  s o l u t i o n w o u l d be t o i n c r e a s e  c o m p a n i e s t o one t h o u s a n d , t h e s i z e  Military  t h e k i n g had  t o s o many  t h e s e men r a t h e r  the authority  a partial  that  of the high  t o t h e common c a t t l e - d r o v e r .  about t h e t i t l e s that  t h e blame t o h i s l i e u t e n a n t s . ' * '  t h e blame and s t a t e d  caused  accessible  f o r t h e appointment  of bodies  of  guerres. troops  390.  Ibid. "Du temps que j e commencay a p o r t e r . l e s armes, l e t i l t r e de c a p i t a i n e e s t o i t t i l t r e d ' h o n n e u r , e t d e s g e n t i l hommes de bonne m a i s o n ne se d e s d a i g n o i e n t de l e p o r t e r . Je . n'ay p a s a p p e l l e d ' a u t r e t i l t r e mes e n f a n s . A present l e moindre p i c q u e b o e u f se f a i c t a p p e l l e r , s ' i l a eu quelque commandement."  68 i n i t i a l l y recruited for short time service but later as part of a standing army.  It operated with exceptional resources,  improvised, and was administered by special personnel.  often  Under  i t s administration fought such forces as companies of mercenaries and gens de p i e d e t de cheval, both French and foreign. L'Ordinaire des Guerres 'Of feudal o r i g i n , the ban and the arriere ban *"* consisted o a l l those who had a military obligation to the king as possessors of f i e f s .  Personal service was normal but a man unable to serve  could present a replacement and a.man i n e l i g i b l e to serve, a commoner or churchman, must pay a tax which usually amounted to one-fifth: the value of his f i e f , . This feudal military force was attached to the feudal administrative units, the bailliages and senechaussees.  Letters patent for the convocation of the ban  and the arriere ban were sent to b a i l l i s and senechaux.  Two  montres or reviews took place: a preliminary montre en robes at which the roll.;was checked, replacements presented,  defaulters  t r i e d , non-servers taxed and the taxes sent to an elected receveur and a montre en armes when the king wanted the ban to march. Units of the ban were enseignes consisting of three  For the development of the ban and the arriere ban i n the sixteenth century see Doucet, Institutions, I I , 610-617; and Gaston Z e l l e r , Les . Institutions de l a France au XVI Siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 312-314. e  69  hundred men  when on f o o t , of f i f t y  hundred a r c h e r s . unpaid as the 1484  Although the s e r v i c e had  f e u d a l due  requested that men  the s i x t e e n t h century captain, f i f t y as ensign and  hommes d'armes or of  o r i g i n a l l y been  of v a s s a l s , the E s t a t e s - G e n e r a l of the ban  that pay  be paid and  was  one  of  by the middle of  hundred l i v r e s for a  f o r a l i e u t e n a n t , f o r t y f o r l e s s e r o f f i c e r s such  bearer,  twenty f o r hommes d'armes, ten f o r  archers,  s i x to eight f o r foot s o l d i e r s .  Exemptions from s e r v i c e under the ban great and  one  extended from the  o f f i c e r s of the crown to the o f f i c e r s of sovereign  the bourgeois of major towns.  Men  who  served  courts  i n companies  of ordonnance were of n e c e s s i t y exempt since they couldn't i n two  companies at the same time.  Men  f i t f o r s e r v i c e tended  to pass i n t o the companies of ordonnance and  the ban  e f f e c t i v e n e s s as i t became comprised of o l d men s e r v i c e and  lost i t s  unfit, f o r  replacements o u t f i t t e d at the l e a s t p o s s i b l e expense.  During the f i r s t  of the c i v i l wars the due  governor of Bretagne, made repeated reference pondence to men  of the  a r r i e r e ban.  Montpensier requested troops Angoumois.^  serve  i n his corres-  In June, 1562  the due  from Etampes to a s s i s t him  Etampes wrote to Catherine  the a r r i e r e ban  d'Etampes,  that men  in  s e r v i n g under  made up the major part of h i s f o r c e s , that  'Documents Pour S e r v i r a...,  No.  26.  de  they  70 would provide the service they owed the crown but that he could not force them to serve outside the region because of the protests they would make about their p r i v i l e g e s . Catherine that i f she  However, he assured  could arrange to have them paid at the  king's expense, he would hope to be able to find both foot and horse soldiers of the a r r i l r e ban who would render good service wherever she should wish to employ them."'"  Etamp.es wrote  simultaneously to Antoine de Bourbon t e l l i n g him of Montpensier's request, surveying the scanty r e l i a b l e forces he had i n the major c i t i e s of, Bre tagne, and stating that the remainder of his ;  troops were of the a r r i l r e ban and so concerned about their privileges that he would have to fight them to make them go outside the region.  Again he stated that i f the king should care  to send him a commission and some money he would be able to 2 raise men to serve i n the region or wherever his majesty desired. A third l e t t e r of the same date was addressed to Charles IX by Ijtampes to assure the king that a good number of the noblesse of the region were most anxious to obey the king's command but that they had been awaiting his w i l l for about six weeks and would not wait much longer.  Furthermore, i f Charles should command FJtampes  to serve outside the region, these men would be unwilling to do service under the arriere ban but i f the king could see f i t I b i d . , No. 27. 2  I b i d . , No. 28.  to  71 grant their solde a good number would serve.*  Less than ten days  later Etampes wrote again to the king of Navarre stating that since Catherine and Antoine had both commanded him to go to the assistance of Montpensier and the inhabitants raised  difficulties  about the maintenance of their p r i v i l e g e s , he had undertaken to increase the forces i n his majesty's pay to a number indicated in a statement he was sending.  He promised that'othese troops  would always be ready to march at Antoine's command but that he was retaining the  "arierebans et autres forces ordinaires" of  2 the region for l o c a l  defence.  In Guyenne Monluc and Burie received royal early i n May to take the f i e l d .  instructions  They were to assemble the  noblesse of the region and the arriere ban in order to supplement the forces at their d i s p o s a l .  5  Letters patent were published at  Aix en Provence the preceding month for the convocation of the ban  and arriere ban according to the comte de Tende.  That these  troops were not raised according to his command or by him as governor i s clear from the report he sent before the queen. However, i t i s equally clear that under normal circumstances they would have been and that he considered the m i l i t a r y authority his  1  I b i d . , No.. 27.  2  I_bid., No. 30.  ^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 175« k \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 16.  72 prerogative as governor, a prerogative being usurped by his own son and lieutenant, the comte de Sommerive. The freedom of men of the arriere ban from service outside the kingdom, a privilege i n effect from 15^8 to 1557 ^ seems to have been extended, at least i n Bretagne where men of the arriere ban saw their obligation limited to service within the gouvernement Many of these men, however, were w i l l i n g to change their status, and pay, by e n l i s t i n g i n other kinds of forces for royal service. Under the administration of 1'ordinaire des guerres besides forces of the ban and the arriere ban were the companies of ordonnance..  ~~~—— " ~"~" —  —  These companies originated in the reforms of Charles  .i  VII, became- a permanent force i n the king's employ and formed the 2 nucleus of the royal army.  The gendarmerie making up the  companies were volunteers of "la qualite de gentilhomme", at least seventeen years of age for an archer and nineteen for an homme d'armes.  They were grouped i n lances, small groups arranged about  an homme d'armes armed with a lance.  Usually a company had about  half again as many archers as homines d'armes ing foot s o l d i e r s .  and many more support-  Command of these companies was reserved for  princes of the blood, great officers of the crown, and men of great reputation.  The captain's stipend was eight hundred l i v r e s ;  "''Doucet, Institutions,  II,  I I , 6l6.  2 For the companies of ordonnance see Doucet, 620-623.  Institutions,  73 the remuneration of the lieutenant who often exercised  effective  command, five hundred; of the enseigne and guidon, four hundred; of the hommes d'armes, one hundred eighty; and of the archers, ninety.*  In addition to payment i n cash from the.royal  finances,  men of these companies were supposed to receive payment i n kind from the c i t y of their garrison.  Montres for control and payment  were scheduled for every three months in February, May, August and November i n the presence of commissaires ordinaires des guerres and controleurs ordinaires.  These officers were accountable  a tresorier de 1'ordinaire des guerres  to  and a statement was  ultimately submitted to the king's council.  At the time of review  men, mounts and armour were carefully inspected and the garrison city was to provide each soldier with three month's supply of candles, vinegar and s a l t ; the c i t y was s i m i l a r l y responsible for fodder for the horses, lodging and firewood for the men.  The  companies were often required to be on the move with their i t i n e r a r i e s determined by the governor and their movements watched by a commissaire appointed by the king.  One quarter of  the men were normally on three month's leave at any time although the practice developed of granting longer leave without pay in peace time and r e c a l l i n g a l l soldiers of the company i n time of  *The scale of pay was higher during the Wars of Religion although the likelihood of receiving the pay was often remote. See Doucet, Institutions, II, 625. The pay of the hommes d'armes was raised to 400 l i v r e s and that of the archer, to 200.  74  war.  The chief officers  were expected to serve four months  annually in the company with the captain taking personal command for the period from May through August when fighting usually took place.  Companies of ordonnance were the strongest element in the  armies of Louis X I I and Francis I but development  of firearms  contributed to a decrease in the value of such troops and especially of the heavily armed hommes d'armes who were supplanted by the more mobile chevaux-legers  with modern arms.""  Companies of ordonnance in the province of Guyenne were under the command of such men as the king of Navarre, the marechal 2  de Thermes, de Terride, de Jarnac, Burie and Monluc.  As d i f f i c u l t -  ies began to mount the weight of command f e l l upon Burie and Monluc who were without money and almost without troops.  Each had a  company of f i f t y hommes d'armes and they could mobilize the company of Antoine de Bourbon, a force of one hundred lances garrisoned at Agen, and the company of the marechal de Thermes comprising f i f t y lances.  Henri de Beam, young son of the king  At this period the proportion was one and one-half archers to each hommes d'armes and the archers were l i g h t cavalry (chevaux-legers). Ferdinand Lot, Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s des Armees Francaises des Guerres d ' l t a l i e aux Guerres de Religion, 1494-1562 (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N.. 1 9 6 2 ) , p.  191.  '  2  Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 138.  •^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I , 155. De Ruble states here that Burie and Monluc each had a company of ordonnance of t h i r t y hommes d'armes but i n the Pieces J u s t i f i c a t i v e s of the same volume, pp. 427-432 there appears an "Ordonnance de Burie pour l a p a c i f i c a t i o n de l a Guyenne" given at Agen in October 156l~and signed among others by Burie and Monluc, captains of f i f t y "hommes d'armes des ordonnances."  75 of Navarre, must also have had a company for his father told Burie to ask captain Arne, guidon of Antoine'8 company, to r  mobilize what he could of his company so that the governor could command them together with Monluc's company and that of his own 1 son. Companies of ordonnance as standing forces were maintained when their commanders died and t h e i r disposition depended on the royal w i l l .  When the marechal de Thermes died his company was  divided between Francois d'Escars, favourite of the king of Navarre, and the vicomte de Martigues, nephew and lieutenant  of  2 the governor of Bretagne.  Monluc's protest to the king and queen  over this d i v i s i o n demonstrated his concern at the prospect of losing troops from Guyenne and perhaps, his jealousy for d'Escars but i t also revealed some characteristics of the company of ordonnance.  Relatives "of de Thermes, of de Bellegarde,  lieutenant  of his company, and of de Masses, his enseigne, formed the major part of the company.  In fact de Bellegarde, the lieutenant,  was  himself a brother-in-law of the marechal and de Masses, his enseigne, was s i m i l a r l y a close r e l a t i v e .  Monluc asked the  office  senechal of Toulouse for Roger de Saint-Lary, seigneur de Bellegarde, and his request was granted but his request of the Ibid.,  I, k2k.  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , de Martigues," mai, 1562.  No. 23, "Charles IX au vicomte  ? function  of v i g u i e r  convinced  f o r the  t h a t the s o l d i e r s ,  de T h e r m e s , w o u l d be divided queen, day is  and  leave  unwilling  t o s p e n d my  n i g h t here  t o make t h o s e  object  do  serve  send  lieutenant  d'Escars  of the l a t e  rich  He  served  expense.*  wrote t o t h e  Two  queen c o m p l a i n i n g  not  that Catherine  service  he  months l a t e r  about  the  were  the to  identified  o f t h e k i n g i n Guyenne w h i l e Monluc had  h i s own  to  kill  him  as  neither  rendered  and  M o n l u c once  division  service  the  grant  o b t a i n e d a commission  a p p r o p r i a t e t o the  marechal  o t h e r s whose o n l y  discontent."  had  was  company  c l o s e t o y o u . . . and  "gaiges n i e s t a t " at  Monluc  showed i n h i s l e t t e r  suggested  who  denied.  relatives  t o make g r e a t and  who  was  t o c a r r y arms i f t h e  life  o f h i s c h o l e r f o r he and  loyal  his jealousy clearly  "I wish  and  enseigne  6  o f the  again company  2 w h i c h he  called  emphasized noblesse  the  one  strategic  f o r the  hommes d'armes and their have  homes not their  regarded  as  of the  p . 5,  n.  Ibid.,  wishing  old captain  gendarmerie  more gens de p i e d .  to serve over  under d ' E s c a r s  them.  o u t s i d e r i n Guyenne  IV,  o f the  The  and  Thirty-two  f o r t y - t w o a r c h e r s o f t h e company had  * M o n l u c , Comrnentaires 2  of France.  importance  enemy had  old officers an  best  D'Escars f o r he  et L e t t r e s ,  may  but  IV,  to  r a t h e r to  have  came f r o m  gone  been  Haute  Vienne  5  132-146.  146-148.  Cabie", G u e r r e s 1.  de r e l i g i o n  dans l e s u d - o u e s t  de l a F r a n c e ,  77 but had spent most of his career at the court.  As early as 1536  he was i n the forefront among the favourites of the Dauphin, later to be Henry II."""  The situation was further complicated because  Hugues de Thermes, guidon of the company, had gone before the 2 king after his father's death to request the command.  While en  route to the court he was taken by a Huguenot band and imprisoned at Orleans.  Released by Cond^ about two and a half months l a t e r ,  he returned to Bordeaux but Burie who had heard that he was coming with fifteen commissions from the king ^ assumed that the commissions were forged and that their carrier was a Huguenot spy.  The unfortunate young baron de Thermes was imprisoned at  the Chateau du Ha and at the news of his arrest the hommes d'armes 4 devoted to the son of their old captain, abandoned the company. In spite of Monluc's protest and the ambition of Hugues de Thermes the company was divided and Masses, enseigne  of the  marechal became lieutenant of d'Escars' company while Boisjourdan, a guidon of the old company became Martigues' lieutenant.^  The  """Lucien Romier, La carriere d'un f a v o r i : Jacques d'Albon de Saint-Andre (Paris: Perrin, 1909), p. 2 5 . 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, l47n. 1. ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 5 0 , "Burie et Monluc a Antoine de Bourbon," 7 aout, 1 5 6 2 .  4 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 147. I b i d . , IV, 1 3 9 . Perhaps de Ruble f a i l e d to identify Hugues de Bazordan, seigneur de Thermes. c f . Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 441. 5  78 services of the officers  of the company, and thus of the men, were  assured by their promotion. New companies of ordonnance were created not only by the d i v i s i o n of existing ones but by royal decree and their command was a coveted p r i z e .  Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux, brother  of B l a i s e , was popular with n o b i l i t y and people. a makeshift company of the noblesse defence of Perigueux his request  After leading  against the Huguenots in the  for a company of ordonnance of  f i f t y hommes d'armes * was supported by the due de Montpensier, 2 Burie and Monluc.  Blaise de Monluc maintained that should the  sedition continue in France, he could come to the queen's aid and leave his popular brother to f i l l  his role in Guyenne.  As further  reason to grant the company, he suggested that he himself  deserved  much recompense for his services and the company for his brother could be regarded as a f i r s t instalment.  In spite of the  efforts  of his sponsors Joachim de Monluc did not receive a company of ordonnance. L'Extraordinaire des Guerres 5  Companies of gens de pied came under the administration of  ^Documents Pour Servir 5..., No. 63- "Joachim de Monluc a Antoine de Bourbon." 11 octobre, 1562. 2 I b i d . , No. 6 4 , "Le due de Montpensier a Catherine de Medicis," 14. octobre, 1562; Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 170, "Monluc a l a royne," 12 octobre, 1562. ^Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 171n.  79 1'extraordinaire des guerres.*""  Throughout the sixteenth century  their importance increased and they comprised an ever greater proportion of the armed forces.  The improvement of l i g h t  arms gave them an advantage over troops armed with lances.  fireThese  bands were raised by commissions of the king usually granted to a captain with whom he dealt d i r e c t l y .  The commission decreed the  exact number of men to be raised and the captain was expected  to  raise no more for some would be without pay, forced to l i v e off the land, and to raise no fewer for he would be making an i l l i c i t p r o f i t , pocketing the pay of the soldiers not r e c r u i t e d . Men were enrolled after being presented to commissaires and controleurs de 1 extraordinaire des,guerres. 1  They were recruited by the captain  in a designated region under the surveillance of governor, and b a i l l i s .  senechaux,  Unlike the companies of ordonnance, bands of gens de  pied usually had as captains men of war, sometimes of humble o r i g i n , who effectively  commanded their own companies.  Remuneration,  supposedly paid at monthly reviews, -consisted of one hundred six l i v r e s for the captain, f i f t y - s i x sergents and caporaux,  for the lieutenant,  twenty for  and six to nine for pikemen and musketeers.  Although Doucet states that the king dealt d i r e c t l y with the captains for the r a i s i n g of gens de pied et de cheval the practice in Guyenne and i n the other parts of the kingdom was to^grant  632-638.  For companies of gens de pied see Doucet, Institutions, !  II,  80 commissions to the governor, lieutenant-general or another great military figure i n the province.  These commissions were sometimes,  i f not always, blank so that the man to whom they were given could choose the captains and delegate the authority for r e c r u i t i n g the troops.  Monluc recounted that Catherine de Medicis and the  king of Navarre resolved to send him into Guyenne "avec patentes et permission de lever gens a pied et sicheval."*  He arrived i n  Bordeaux near the end of December 1561 and proceeded to raise two hundred arquebusiers and one hundred argoulets whom he put under 2 the command of T i l l a d e t , a protege of h i s .  Almost immediately  Burie, on Monluc's advice, asked for a supplementary levy of or six hundred arquebusiers.  five  5  The gens de pied raised by Monluc were to become^an important part of the royal army for those commanded by captain Charry became the nucleus of the f i r s t regiment of the gardes _francais established i n 1563* In similar fashion, l e t t e r s and commissions had been sent to Burie i n September for the r a i s i n g of t r o o p s .  5  On May 8, 1562  *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, I I , 3*+5« 2  5  Ibid.,  I I , 348.  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 156.  L  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 174n. Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424, piece j u s t i f i c a t i f , "Le r o i de Navarre a M. de Burie," 4 septembre, 1561, 5  81 Charles IX wrote at least eight l e t t e r s to Burie and Monluc, surely a r e f l e c t i o n of the degree of disruption i n the kingdom. Charles IX commanded them to take the f i e l d with a l l the companies of gens d'.armes at their disposal and the six or eight enseignes of gens de pied they had raised."'"  He included once again blank 2  commissions for the r a i s i n g of gens de guerre.  • Sometimes the  king's approval followed the r a i s i n g of gens de pied et de cheval rather than preceding i t .  This was certainly the case when after  the battle of Vergt Monluc recruited gens de pied and officers from the ranks of the defeated Huguenot army of Duras.^  The six  companies of gens de pied raised after the battle of Vergt were granted by Monluc to the captains Mauvesin and Peyrelongue, of Duras' best. forces,  two  When a c i t y . p r a region was taken by royal  the king's lieutenant  undertook to see that i t was  adequately garrisoned and Charles IX wrote Monluc sending the Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 21, "Memoire de'Charles IX au Burie et Monluc" includes reference to "eight ensigns that they were asked to have r a i s e d , " the editor's footnote gives an alternat reading of "seven" arid some of the l e t t e r s of 8 May, 1562 refer to six. 2 Eight l e t t e r s to Burie and/or Monluc dated 8 May, 1562 are contained i n the pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s of Ruble-, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, kkl-hk2. On the same day Charles IX wrote to Noailles and to the Parlement of Toulouse and issued instruction to Negrepelisse whom he was sending into Guyenne and Languedoc to persuade the noblesse to join Monluc and Burie. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, I 8 3 . I b i d . , IV, 315.  82 confirmation and authorization for the companies raised by the baron de Pardiant and the seigneur de La Chappelle on Monluc's orders for the defence of Lectoure.* Just as.blank commissions for the naming of officers and r a i s i n g of troops had been sent to Monluc and to Burie, so they were sent to Montpensier when.he was preparing to enter Guyenne  2 as lieutenant-general.  The king urged him strongly to send  into France under Burie's command reinforcements  fqr the royal  army and to raise new companies to be employed by Monluc in Guyenne. Among the forces of 1'extraordinaire des guerres were the chevaux-legers,  l i g h t l y armed cavalry.  Captain Peyrot de Monluc,  son of B l a i s e , was frequently entrusted with the command of 3 substantial numbers of the troops under his father's  authority.  Peyrot normally commanded a company of^ one hundred chevaux-legers. After the Peace of Amboise when Monluc was commanded to disband most of the forces in Guyenne he asked that his son's troops be converted in.to a company of f i f t y hommes d armes, a change which 1  would bring them under the ordinaire des guerres as a company of ordonnance.  k  Monluc also requested that some of the new companies  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  No. 76.  ^ u b l e , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, k^O. 3  ^  Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 187.  h  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 287.  83 be maintained and the king replied that although he would prefer to see them disbanded, Monluc might maintain as many as he should judge to be indispensable.""" In addition to the companies they commanded, some of the king's officers were granted personal guards.  Antoine de Bourbon  obtained for himself a personal guard of twenty-five  Swiss  2 soldiers.  Monluc and Burie were each authorized to have a garde  p a r t i c u l i e r e of t h i r t y hommes de pied and twenty arquebusiers a chevalIn  October and November 1563 Monluc asked that he and k  Burie be allowed to maintain their guards  but the next month he  announced that his guard had been disbanded i n accordance with the command he had received.'' The defence of f o r t i f i e d places was undertaken by special troops sometimes headed by a captain given the honorable t i t l e of governor.^  Old s o l d i e r s , wounded or otherwise incapacitated for  active service,  served under the name of mortes-payes.  7  These  •""Ibid., IV, 217. 2 Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 298. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 211 and n. 4  Ibid.,  IV, 281, 286.  5  Ibid.,  IV, 304.  ^Doucet, Institutions, I I , 64?. 7 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 290. Monluc requested the queen to see that the mortes-payes of the chSteaux de Bordeaux get their pay since they had not been paid for a year.  84  men, capable of manning firearms and performing similar defensive duties were given a reduced pay of five l i v r e s per month."''  Not  only the old and lame found opportunity for defensive m i l i t a r y service but frequently an urban m i l i t i a was formed of those untrained for m i l i t a r y service but anxious to help protect their i property and goods.  The Huguenots of Bordeaux addressed a  remonstrance to the city council i n which they expressed  their  desire to pledge themselves for service in a municipal m i l i t i a rather than entrust the defence of their c i t y to foreign troops. Soon after the outbreak of war Antoine de Bourbon,,lieutenantgeneral of the kingdom, addressed to the prevot des marchands and to the echevins of the c i t y of Paris instructions regarding measures to be taken for the constitution of a municipal m i l i t i a . The t o t a l number of troops i n Guyenne fluctuated greatly but i t may be estimated with reference to a number of sources. In 1559 the statement of payment of soldiers i n garrisons 4  enumerated one thousand ninety i n Guyenne. ordonnance  The companies of  are not mentioned in. that document and the only  garrison l i s t e d for Bordeaux was forty men under captain B a i l l a c (sic)  i n the chSteau Trampette although the payment of Noailles Doucet, Institutions,  II,  647.  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 8 4 . Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 3 9 8 . Lot, Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s , p. 254.  85 and his lieutenant  is listed.  Four years l a t e r Noailles'  garrison at the Chateau du Ha was twice the size of de. V a i l l a c ' s r  and i t may well have been so in 1559**  t-  •  From August to October,  1562 Charles urged Burie to bring into France reinforcements from Guyenne.  At the end of October Burie wrote that the king had  asked him to lead three thousand Spanish and two thousand French 2 hommes de pied.  However, he claimed that i t was very d i f f i c u l t  to make the Spaniards march.  Burie had already had an experience  with mutiny among the Spanish troops in which four or five hundred of the f i r s t had deserted their enseignes and made their way back towards Spain without a captain, an enseigne or a 3 drummer.  Now he wrote that of eleven or twelve enseignes, about  three thousand men, he had led from Gascony only about or fifteen  fourteen  hundred remained, a number which would shortly be r e -  organized into six enseignes.  In addition to the forces under  Burie, de Terride and Monluc had troops at Montauban where they were besieging the c i t y .  The Spaniards and the companies of  Charry were led into France by Louis Prevot de Sansac because Burie's attention was demanded by the uprisings "in his  gouvernement.  These troops were augmented substantially by men of the Huguenot *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 199. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , 5  I b i d . , No. 61.  No. 71.  86 army who changed sides after the battle of Vergt."''  Monluc stated  that Sansac led twenty-three enseignes of Spanish and French to the aid of the king, a force of about five thousand men. A statement for the payment'of gens de guerre a pied in the garrisons of c i t i e s and chSteaux of Guyenne i n March 1563 showed one thousand four hundred men to be paid. Recruitment and Appointments The recruitment of a l l types of troops was dependent upon the royal w i l l and the execution of that w i l l i n the province was under the authority of the governor and lieutenant-general, king's personal representative.  the  In Guyenne a second person  shared the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the lieutenant-general; Monluc exercised equal authority with Burie.  When Conde f a i l e d to accept  the commission to go into Guyenne and pacify the province, Blaise de Monluc had been sent without a definite t i t l e but with a definite mission."^  At that time he and Burie commanded companies  of ordonnance of equal s i z e , received equal stipends, were both sent commissions for the r a i s i n g of troops.  It was not u n t i l  early i n March 1563 that Monluc received word of his appointment as lieutenant-general with authority, l i k e Burie, over half the  Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, III, 53, 5^. 2  Ibid.,  IV, 199.  ^Monluc, Commentaires, I I , kOO.  8? province,* nevertheless  he had styled himself at least a month  e a r l i e r as "seigneur du dit l i e u (Agenois), chevallier de l ' o r d r e , cappitaine de cinquante hommes d*armes de ses ordonnances, et 2 lieutenant de sa Majeste au gouvernement de Guienne." or not he had the t i t l e ,  Whether  Monluc occupied a position and exercised  a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y equivalent to those of Burie, the  lieutenant-  general i n the absence of the king of Navarre. The office exercised by the two veteran captains of campaigns i n Italy was primarily a military o f f i c e .  Some have  held that i t was h i s t o r i c a l l y an office exclusively military and, therefore, confined to the frontier provinces and that the  office  spread to other provinces during the Wars of Religion because every province became a frontier i n a period of c i v i l war.  5  Zeller i d e n t i f i e d the o r i g i n of these ideas i n the writings of members of the sixteen th century Parlements, writers who had a r i v a l ' s interest i n de-emphasizing the administrative role of •the governors.  Only occasionally did the Parlement of Bordeaux  venture into military matters. the lieutenant's  On one, such occasion i t seconded  judgment and requested the king to leave Burie  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, III, 66. 2  I b i d . , IV, 190.  Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 231. Zeller attributes this interpretation to such notable historians as Paul V i o l l e t and Gustave Dupont-Ferrier.. 5  4 • Ibid'.., pp. 251-256.  88 and the three thousand Spaniards in Guyenne."'"  Following the  Peace of Amboise the Parlement disagreed with Monluc and recommended to the king total disarmament.  In this military  matter the king was inclined toward the decision of the Parlement but allowed his lieutenant  to exercise his own judgment as to how 2  many troops he regarded as indispensable. lieutenant-general  The governor and  was the supreme military authority within the  province. Since the lieutenant-general  commanded m i l i t a r y forces in  the province he was i n a position to dispense a considerable amount of patronage, a practice over which the king desired to maintain c o n t r o l .  In his choice of captains for the companies  he l e v i e d , . the lieutenant-general  could offer incentives to l o c a l  notables for the pay accompanying the office the office  was considerable and  offered further opportunity for honour and enrichment.  At the same time he could increase he own influence by appointing men l o y a l to him or by gaining the loyalty of men through this patronage.  Thus some of the f i r s t  troops raised by Monluc were  placed under the command of Francois de Gassagnet de T i l l a d e t , seigneur de Saint-Orens et de l a Roque, sene"chal de Bazadois, who had f i r s t borne arms under Monluc in I t a l y .  The fortunes of  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 299. "Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 216 and.n.  89 Tilladet 1567  continued t o be t i e d to those of h i s mentor and i n  under a commission  l e g i o n s of Guyenne.  from Monluc he became c o l o n e l of the  The next year Monluc claimed f o r him the  c o l l a r of the order as recompense f o r h i s s e r v i c e s and i n 1 5 7 5 he was  mait.ce de camp i n the army of Monluc, marechal of France."''  Immediately  a f t e r the f a l l  of Orleans to Conde i n A p r i l  1562,  C h a r l e s IX wrote Monluc a s k i n g him to come immediately with h i s own  company, those of the k i n g of Navarre and the mare'chal  de  Thermes, and s i x companies of gens de pied which he must r a i s e . Monluc quoted C h a r l e s as s a y i n g , "I am sending you the  commissions,  l e a v i n g the names of the c a p t a i n s blank, f o r you know b e t t e r  than  2  I who  deserve i t . "  Monluc l e f t  Bordeaux f o r Agen and there  assigned the s i x commissions to c a p t a i n s of h i s c h o i c e : two t o Charry; two to Hugues de Bazordan,  seigneur de Thermes; one to '  the baron de Clermont, h i s own  nephew; one to the c a p t a i n  Corne.  The t r o o p s were r e c r u i t e d by t h e i r c a p t a i n s from among l o y a l of t h e i r own r e g i o n and the c a p t a i n s were appointed by Monluc from the ranks of men  l o y a l to him.  T h e r e f o r e , the f o r c e s  r e c r u i t e d and deployed i n Guyenne took on the aspect of a personal army, s t r o n g l y l o y a l to B l a i s e de Monluc. F a m i l i e s f r e q u e n t l y b e n e f i t e d through the i n f l u e n c e of  Monluc, Commentaires et L e t t r e s , I I , 348 and Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 3 3 9 - 3 4 0 . 'ibid., II, 441.  n.  men  3  90 their more i l l u s t r i o u s members.  Blaise de Monluc's rise had  been f a c i l i t a t e d more than once by his older brother Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence.  Both Jean and B l a i s e , in turn, 2  sponsored their younger brother Joachim, sieur de Lioux.  Blaise  de Monluc s second, t h i r d and fourth sons, Pierre-Bertrand called 1  Peyrot; Jean, chevalier de Malte; and Fabien, were a l l associated In 1560 captain Peyrot  with their father in military matters.  was sent from the court by the due de Guise with a message for his 3 father.  When the Peace of Amboise was announced he was leading  into France twelve companies of gens de pied and one of chevauxlegers.  Philippe de La Roche, baron de Fontenilhes, was Blaise  de Monluc's son-in-law and also guidon of his company.  5  Member-  ship i n the family and leadership in the company were interrelated and Monluc had great confidence  i n his son-in-law who played an  important role in the f i e l d especially at Vergt.^  The Monluc  family was not unique i n the practice of nepotism and i t i s not surprising that the lieutenant  of Burie's company was his nephew  7 Corre.  Nepotism had much to recommend i t as a useful practice *Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 133. 2 I b i d • , II, 21 and Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, I 6 9 . 3 Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 3,98. 4 5 I b i d . , I I , 592. ^ I b i d . , I I , 415. 6  Ibid.,  I I , 546-562.  7  I b i d . , I i , 4?4.  91 in m i l i t a r y organization for, provided the r e l a t i v e appointed was a competent person, the likelihood of greater co-operation contributed to improved service for the monarch.  That the king  exercised some control over appointments was demonstrated by his refusal to grant a company of ordonnance to Joachim de Monluc i n spite of his brother's lobbying and by the refusal to grant Monluc's request that Peyrot's company of chevaux-legers be converted into a company of ordonnance. The appointment of a group of noble counsellors chosen by the king to accompany a great noble on a mission was intended to increase the effectiveness of his mission.  Trnas- when Montpensier  was sent into Guyenne the king's council decided that he should be accompanied by the seigneurs de La Vauguyon, de Candale and de Chavigny.""" When he arrived i n Guyenne these three lords were 2 with him and also the seigneurs d'Estissac and de Lauzun.  Jean  de Peyrusse, sieur d'Escars, comte de La Vauguyon was a member of a family i n good favour with Antoine de Bourbon. comte de Candale, was the lieutenant governor of Dax.^  Henri de Foix,  of Belzunce who was  Francois Le Roy, seigneur de Chavigny et de l a  Baussoniere, comte de Clinchamp, was to become  lieutenant-general  of Anjou, Touraine and Maine and governor of Mans in 1564. ^"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 538. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 200n. 4 Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 538.  The  92 important office  of lieutenant-general  Louis Madaillan d'Estissac  1  and Francois Ier Nompar de Caumont,  seigneur de Lauzun was lieutenant •  in Poitou was held by  for the king of the  chateaux,  2  c i t y , and comte of Blaye.  A l l five were prominent nobles who  contributed to the dignity and authority of Montpensier's commission. The king not only saw that Montpensier was accompanied by a council of nobles on his mission into Guyenne but he attempted to send proven nobles in;to the province at other times to encourage his officers  and increase the support of the noblesse.  Thus i n May, 1562 Charles promised Monluc and Burie that he would send into Guyenne for their assistance Biron, d'Ossun, Candale and Negrepelisse.  5  These men were sent from the court to the  province because as men of prominent families in Guyenne, they had gone to the court seeking appointment and honours. activities  within the province they'showed l i t t l e  In their  hesitation  co-operating with Monluc as did Candale in the formation of Catholic leagues. The r a i s i n g of troops was undertaken l o c a l l y as the  Monluc, Comrnentaires, II,,538. . 2  5  Ibid.,  II, 205.  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 214.  441.  in  93 appointment of commanders for them often  was.  In theory, the  king maintained the ultimate control since he issued l e t t e r s patent and commissions and on the occasions when he had not authorized the levy or the appointment before the fact, confirmation was given after the f a c t .  his  Also i n theory, control  of the purse strings by the king ensured his authority over military and administrative a f f a i r s .  However, l o c a l authorities  found many opportunities to manipulate royal funds, to augment them from the spoils of war, and to use them for personal gain. Effective royal control over a f f a i r s i n a disrupted and distant province was impossible to maintain. Command As i n other aspects of authority military command was centralized, i n theory.  In practice the central command depended  on l o c a l response for i t s effectiveness.  As lieutenant-general  of the kingdom, Antoine de Bourbon was supreme commander. v  three Triumvirs were among his high officers: Antoine*s lieutenant;  The  the constable was  the due de Guise, chief of the avant-garde;  the marechal Saint-Andre, chief of the a r r i e r e - g a r d e T h e royal army they commanded consisted of t h i r t y thousand men, i n camp or 2  promised.  Three thousand German lansquenets,  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 2 3 5 . 2  Ibid.,  IV, 2 8 7 .  fourteen enseignes  94 of Swiss and at least three thousand Spanish troops were included i n that number.  These foreign troops i l l u s t r a t e the  difference  between an army on paper and an army in the f i e l d . The three thousand Germans represented half the number i n i t i a l l y anticipated by Antoine who decided to settle for three thousand "now" rather than six thousand "sometime."  The r e i t e r s arrived at the end of  July, 1562 and, after hearing from Conde, most of them changed sides and put themselves in the service of the Huguenots.*  The  Spanish troops entered Guyenne in September but were detained i n 2 that gouvernement by Burie and Monluc.  Burie found them d i f f i c u l t  to handle and the fact that they were unpaid contributed to their dissatisfaction.  About five hundred mutinied and Monluc's s k i l l  was required to pacify them.  5  At Vergt the wily Gascon commander 4  exploited the r i v a l r y between Spanish and Gascon.  Of a l l the  foreign troops expected only the Swiss .took the f i e l d r e l i a b l y as anticipated. Forces from within the kingdom were likewise deploy through a centralized command. the queen and the lieutenant-general  difficult  to  From August, 1562 the king, of the kingdom commanded  Burie to lead from Guyenne into France both the Spanish companies Ibid. Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  Nos. 59, 61.  Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  No. 6 l .  Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 554-557.  95 and troops raised in Guyenne."'" Repeated l e t t e r s and even a personal messenger,  the seigneur de Malicorne, lieutenant of  Randan's company, drew no immediate response i n terms of conduct2 ing the troops to join with the royal army.  Both l o c a l concerns  and l o c a l independence postponed the active response to that request.  In November the gens de pied under, Jacques Prevost,  seigneur de Charry and some of the Spaniards were f i n a l l y led into France by Louis Prevost, seigneur de Sansac, governor of Angoumois. The pre-eminent role of the lieutenant-general i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s of the gouvernement was advantageous i f he was a forceful person and a competent commander*  When authority was divided or  the lieutenant-general was ineffectual the fact that he had theoretical authority was no advantage to the m i l i t a r y cause i n the gouvernement.  The r i v a l r y of Burie and Monluc had few  serious repercussions for the forceful Monluc was a more energetic person and a more able commander.  Either they served i n different  parts of the province or Monluc managed to get his own way by manipulating Burie or bullying him. more serious r e s u l t s .  Rivalry i n Provence had much  The governor was Claude de Savoie, comte de  Tende, nephew of the constable Montmorency.  His son Honore de  Savoie, comte de Sommerive, was lieutenant.  The l a t t e r embraced  1  r b i d . , II, 514 and n.  2 \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 59* •^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 77 •  96 the p a r t y of the Guises while h i s f a t h e r was  very moderate.  The  son r a i s e d troops i n the king's name i n s p i t e of h i s f a t h e r ' s o p p o s i t i o n and e v e n t u a l l y the moderate f a t h e r was i n t o the Huguenot camp.*  The  f a t h e r and sori'made war,  maneuvered  tragedy l a y i n the f a c t that both  p i l l a g i n g s u c c e s s i v e l y the same towns,  both i n the king's name. The  armies engaged i n b a t t l e i n the p r o v i n c e s of the west  and southwest of France were predominantly  locally-raised  commanded by r o y a l o f f i c e r s of l o c a l o r i g i n .  troops  As a r e s u l t  they  demonstrated s t r o n g r e g i o n a l l o y a l t i e s and were f r e q u e n t l y r e l u c t a n t to f i g h t beyond the l i m i t s of t h e i r o f f i c e r s and men  own  provinces.  p r e f e r r e d to remain i n t h e i r home t e r r i t o r y  although on which s i d e they fought seems t o have been of ary  importance  f o r many.  The  fact  second-  that the l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l  i n l a r g e measure chose the c a p t a i n s and r e c r u i t e d the troops the advantage that a s t r o n g p e r s o n a l l o y a l t y commander tended certainly  to u n i f y the t r o o p s .  had  to the l o c a l  The Gascon n o b i l i t y  u n i t e d behind Monluc and expressed t h e i r confidence i n  p him i n A p r i l , 1562  as the c i v i l war  was  just b e g i n n i n g .  noblesse of Guyenne were convinced that the acceptance new  Both  r e l i g i o n meant the overthrow of the accepted s o c i a l  and they found evidence  The of the order  to strengthen t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n i n the  * L e t t r e s de Catherine de M e d i c i s , I, 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires,  I I , kkl.  304.  97 assassination of the baron de Fumel by his own peasants,  one'of  the f i r s t events of the s t r i f e i n Guyenne."'" Refusal to pay the t a i l l e s to their secular lords was a small step for those Huguenots who had refused the payment of dimes to the Roman Catholic Church. The noblesse feared that their f i n a n c i a l and s o c i a l position and even their l i v e s were threatened by the Reform, a fear that was heightened as most of the men of finances of Guyenne joined the Reform and many of the officers of justice of the Parlements and 2 senechaussees.  The Reform i t s e l f  had a d i s t i n c t l y l o c a l  character because of the nature of i t s organization and leadership.  In i t s struggles the s p i r i t of provincial resistance  reborn so that in the Bordelais region the revolt of the was evoked.^  was  gabelle  It was to be expected that the noblesse would seek  in the king's lieutenant-general them and to a class, leader was important.  their champion.  He was one of  largely m i l i t a r y , his renown as a m i l i t a r y Monluc, on his side, was not reluctant to  court the noblesse for he was sure that the crown would have to lean increasingly on the n o b i l i t y and to be their chosen leader k could only strengthen his p o s i t i o n . During the f i r s t War of Religion Blaise de Monluc was by  """Ibid., I I , 400; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 156. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 395. ^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, pp. 161-162. S b i d . , pp. 164, 167-168.  98 far the most important military figure i n Guyenne.  He possessed  a high degree of independence i n the exercise of military a f f a i r s . He recruited men, appointed officers and even imposed taxes for the expense of the army.* fight,  Many soldiers were available and w i l l i n g to  seemingly with l i t t l e concern about which side engaged  their services.  ?  This fact raises a serious question about . tvhe  contention that the Huguenot army was merely the congregation of the f a i t h f u l under arms.  While the synodal organization of the  Protestant Churches may have provided the skeleton of the Huguenot army, much of the flesh on that military body must have come not from the congregations but from the ranks of professional soldiers seeking employment.  That situation i s i n accord with  Romier's observation that, the many soldiers and captains from the I t a l i a n WarB could not. be threatened with the loss of their regular employment without p r e c i p i t a t i n g great d i s o r d e r . . . . On the other hand the economic and s o c i a l condition created by c o s t l y external wars must resolve i t s e l f i n an explosion of anarchy.^ The c o n f l i c t in Guyenne was greatly magnified by the presence of many veteran soldiers who knew no other career and who found i n c i v i l war the employment they had lost with the cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s after the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis i n 1559»  Monluc, Comrnentaires, III, 420. Cf. discussion i n the next chapter. 2 Lucien Romier, Les Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion (Paris: P e r r i n , 1914), pp. 235-23o\  CHAPTER  FINANCE AND  C o n t i n u a l war  placed  of  foreign  it  as a d r a i n  financial throughout  upon t h e b u d g e t .  No  These  gave r i s e  sooner  the r o y a l unable  budget  was  always  had  lent  financial  attempt  to consolidate  the  expense  war  impetus  of reform  c r e d i t o r s went  debt  to  and  Frequently  at higher i n t e r e s t .  the r o y a l  replaced  expedients  i n the r e d .  t o meet h i s commitments,  upon t h e  of c i v i l  expenses  t o new  e x t e n s i v e l o a n s were r e - f i n a n c e d  dramatic of  century.  burden  t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c e n t u r y but i n s p i t e  the k i n g was and  financial  wars been removed t h a n t h e expense  r e f o r m s and  expedient  ROYAL AUTHORITY  a heavy  kingdom d u r i n g the s i x t e e n t h  IV  was  unpaid  The  the Grand  most Parti  1555» an a t t e m p t t o s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e t i r e t h e d e b t o v e r a  period  of only  yearly  from revenues  and  Montpellier  practice,  than  Creditors  of the r e c e i p t s  with interest  payments r e m a i n e d  contracted. so t h a t  ten years.  a t 5%  were t o be  four  g e n e r a l of Lyon, p e r t e r m or, 20%  i n a r r e a r s and  further  Many o f t h e s e were i n c o r p o r a t e d  by 1559  paid  into  times  Toulouse  annually.  In  l o a n s were the G r a n d  w i t h o t h e r l o a n s i t r e p r e s e n t e d a debt  Parti  o f more  16,500,000 l i v r e s w i t h a n n u a l i n t e r e s t o f 3,200,000 l i v r e s .  The  financial  failure  o f t h e F r e n c h monarchy was  1  postponed  R o l a n d M o u s n i e r , Etudes s u r l a F r a n c e X V I ^ S i e c l e , 2 p t i e , ( P a r i s : C e n t r e de D o c u m e n t a t i o n U n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959), p. 338.  100 a year or two a f t e r that of the Spanish monarchy * but i t was  2 by the sudden death of Henry I I i n 1 5 5 9 .  hastened  Although  the  r o y a l debts were very q u i c k l y acknowledged by h i s successor, F r a n c i s I I , the confidence of bankers  who  had extended  much c r e d i t and had r e c e n t l y experienced the f i n a n c i a l of  S p a i n , was  shaken by the s u c c e s s i o n of a boy  T h e r e f o r e , at the outset of the c i v i l  f a r too collapse  to the throne.  wars the a b i l i t y of the  monarch t o r a i s e l a r g e sums from i n t e r n a t i o n a l bankers  was  s e r i o u s l y c u r t a i l e d and f i n a n c i a l problems were t o plague  the  monarchy c o n s t a n t l y and to hamper i t s m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s as i t attempted  to combat the c h a l l e n g e of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n and  civil  war. In of  time, of war,  when the outcome depended upon the e x p l o i t s  the r o y a l troops i t was most important that t h e i r l o y a l t y  s e r v i c e be assured. remained  and  T h e r e f o r e , the extent to which the troops  unpaid should serve as a reasonable index of the  f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the monarchy.  .It i s an index r e l a t i v e l y  easy to examine because the governors and l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l , r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the command of the troops and the maintenance of g a r r i s o n s w i t h i n t h e i r gouvernements, were g r e a t l y concerned the payment of t h e i r s o l d i e r s and that problem  1  about  became a. r e g u l a r  I b i d . , pp. 335-338.  2 For the c r i s i s of that year seeHenri Hauser, "The European F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559*" J o u r n a l of Economic and Business H i s t o r y ,  I I , 2 (February, 1930), 241-255-  101 theme i n their l e t t e r s to Charles. IX and to Catherine de Medicis. The constant pleas of governors that their troops be paid probably did not arise primarily from any humanitarian concern for t h e i r soldiers but from the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n that unpaid troops were d i s s a t i s f i e d troops and i t was a small step from d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n to d i s l o y a l t y .  Even at the time of r e c r u i t i n g ,  the necessary resources were not always provided.  D'Escars,  following the king's orders, raised a company of t h i r t y arquebusiers for Savignac for which provision was not made so Burie met the expenses personally and asked reimbursement thereafter."*" Burie asked money for a montre i n January, 1562 recognizing that i t would be necessary to maintain four or five hundred gens d'armes 2 i n the Agenais a l l summer.  Montpensier wrote from Poitiers that  the troops were forced to pillage or starve and he asked permission to impose a levy on the inhabitants of the city."^  In August, 1562  Burie was begging the king for the solde for his company December he was s t i l l asking.^  The men l e f t  and i n  i n garrison by the  due de Montpensier had, not been paid by him and Burie did not dare decree a tax to raise their solde without the king's authorization, Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 426. "Burie au r o i , " 28 septembre,, 1561. 2  Ibid.,  I, 427. "Burie au r o i , " 28 septembre, 156I.  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 54. 4 Ruble, op. c i t . , I, 451. "Burie au r o i , " 29 aout, 1562. ^ I b i d . , I, 466. "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1562.  102 especially since i t amounted to twenty thousand l i v r e s per month. At the same time the baron de Jarnac reminded Catherine that the soldiers needed for the.defence  of La Rochelle had to be paid or  they would turn to sack and p i l l a g e . *  His request arrived almost  simultaneously with a l e t t e r from La Rochelle, written by Burie, stating that Monpensier had l e f t  troops there without providing  2 for their payment. . The situation was so dire according to Jarnac, governor of La Rochelle that men of his company who had received no money for a year had been forced to leave for their homes penniless after having eaten their horses i n the g a r r i s o n .  5  Pay had been scarce for the six companies of gens d'armes raised by Monluc and for his own company of  chevaux-legers.  Since they hadn't been paid for over four months, the r e a l i s t i c Monluc wondered i f they could be given two months' pay before they were disbanded.  At the same time he pointed out that the company  in garrison at Mont de Marsan and those i n Bordeaux had received nothing for more than eight months and the mortes-payes had been unpaid for a year.  If any funds reached the troops, they were  inadequate for Monluc indicated that Peyrot's chevaux-legers had 5  received only one thousand l i v r e s i n six months.  At the normal  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79 • 2  I b i d . , No. 80.  5  I b i d . , No. 79.  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 286-290. "Monluc a l a royne pour les affaires de Guyenne," octobre ou novembre, 1563. 5  Ibid.,  IV, 291.  103  pay of twenty l i v r e s per month * twelve times as much money would have been required to pay the company excluding i t s  officers.  Ransom demands for prisoners prolonged the c i v i l wars in Monluc's view, however, he could not forbid the practice because "neither 2 gendarme nor soldier was paid." The problem of maintaining unpaid troops was not eliminated by disbanding them for men accustomed to earning their l i v i n g by their arms would probably continue doing so and were not l i k e l y to view their employers with a theologically or p o l i t i c a l l y c r i t i c a l eye.  D'Etampes expressed concern over the order to  demobilize some troops saying that to do so would weaken him and strengthen his enemies "for such men go where the money i s . "  5  That men should change sides to increase the l i k e l i h o o d of being paid i s not surprising for they changed on occasion for other reasons.  After the defeat of Duras at Vergt, Monluc recruited  from the defeated army six companies of gens de pied with two purposes i n mind: to diminish the enemy and to f i l l his own ranks with needed troops.  The effects were at times as devastating i f  unpaid soldiers did not desert but merely resorted to looting and robbery; a l l i e s could do as much damage to citizens and their  Doucet, Institutions,  II,  Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I ,  6V+. 478-*+79.  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 3 8 .  104 c i t i e s as could enemies."'"  The baron de Jarnac feared such  conflict between soldiers and inhabitants in La Rochelle i f the men remained longer unpaid.  Looting and robbery would lead to  great scandal and he urged Catherine to avoid them by finding the means to pay the troops.  2  The financial system at the beginning of the century lent itself  to control by an oligarchy of financial o f f i c e r s .  Only  the revenues of the Domain were centralized under the Changeur du Trgsor and the revenues from taxes were handled by nine general.^  receipts  There was no unified accounting for a l l revenues and 4  the system for effecting payment was often extremely complicated. Thus i t was extremely d i f f i c u l t to co-ordinate financial matters, to determine resources available or to devise means of supplementing resources.  Francis I introduced reforms in 1523 which central-  ized and simplified the financial system by establishing two central agencies, the Tresorier de l'Epargne and the Tresorier des Parties casuelles, the f i r s t of which became the major agency of centralization.  As the pressure of f i s c a l operations on the  Tresorier de 1'Epargne.mounted, i t was relieved by a return to e a r l i e r practices.  The accounting remained centralized i n his  """Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. "^Doucet, Institutions, II, 597. 4 Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI SiScle, pp. 282-284. e  105 hands but the administration of funds was decentralized to some degree under the l o c a l recettes generaux as funds were increas1  ingly spent l o c a l l y .  1  Revenues were c l a s s i f i e d as ordinary and extraordinary and early i n the century only domainal revenues were considered ordinary.  Taxes of a l l kinds were classed as extraordinary since  they had originated as temporary expedients in. times of f i n a n c i a l pressure such as the Hundred Years' War. They were to become i n the course of the century c l a s s i f i e d as ordinary i n contrast to new expedients developed to meet the f i n a n c i a l demands of the time. Like the administration of the armed forces the supporting financial resources were divided into the receipts of 1'ordinaire' 2  des guerres and the receipts of 1'extraordinaire des guerres. The former consisted of the t a i l l e and t a i l l o n sent by receveurs generaux and receveurs du t a i l l o n to the two tresoriers de 1'ordinaire des guerres.  The funds were then sent to the payeurs des  compagnies de gendarmes  responsible for paying the troops.  Doucet observes that the t a i l l e and the t a i l l o n had both been considered h i s t o r i c a l l y as extraordinary taxes and were only Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI S i e c l e , p. 334. e  Doucet, Institutions,  II, 648-649.  106 c l a s s e d as o r d i n a r y r e s o u r c e s i n r e l a t i o n to those which s u p p l i e d the e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres.*  Funds f o r the f i n a n c e s e x t r a -  o r d i n a i r e were drawn from the Epargne i n the form of mandates c a r r y i n g r e c e i p t s addressed t o the r e c e t t e s g e n e r a l e s .  The, funds  were then d i s t r i b u t e d to the s o l d i e r s by payeurs des compagnies as i n the case of the f i n a n c e s o r d i n a i r e s . When Montpensier was sent i n t o Guyenne he asked f o r a c l e r k of the t r e s o r i e r de 1 ' e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres s u p p l i e d with r e c e i p t s and signed blanks t o serve f o r discharge t o the receveurs  2 from whom money would be taken. that one hundred•thousand  The r o y a l c o u n c i l informed him  l i v r e s had been assigned by the  tre'sorier de l'Epargne f o r the m i l i t a r y needs of B u r i e and Monluc. He was i n s t r u c t e d t o a s c e r t a i n how much had been spent and t o make h i s needs known from the f i e l d when he knew them s p e c i f i c a l l y . No one was going t o r e c e i v e from the r o y a l t r e a s u r y a s i n g l e sou u n t i l w e l l a f t e r he needed i t and, i n case the need should become too  p r e s s i n g , the due de Montpensier  churches, an unpopular a c t i v i t y  could take the p l a t e from the  f o r which the c o u n c i l was always  ready t o grant a u t h o r i t y . The annual revenues  of the crown at the beginning of the  Wars of R e l i g i o n amounted t o about  16,000,000  Doucet, I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 648n. Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 4 8 .  l i v r e s , three-  107 quarters from revenus ordinaires and one-quarter from revenus extraordinaires.  Of the revenus ordinaires about 6,000,000  l i v r e s was derived from the t a i l l e s and crues, 2,700,000 from the aides and the gabelles, and 3,500,000 from the domain. D^cimes, g i f t s ,  forced loans, and the sale of offices contributed  to the revenus extraordinaires."*" Mousnier maintains that the people of France could well have paid higher taxes but that taxes were not raised because of the way i n which they were viewed rather than because of any i n a b i l i t y to pay.  The tax was  considered as something abnormal by the sixteenth century mind for  the king should l i v e on the proceeds of his domain.  There-  fore, the crown sought other expedients for meeting i t s expenses. After the credit i n f l a t i o n of 1559, the French court, unable to obtain the needed financing on the open market.in such banking centres as Lyon, appealed to the pope, to the king of Spain and, not l e a s t , to the-people of France for g i f t s and loans.  Many loans were forced, especially i f a man were so  indiscreet as to let  i t be known that he had money available.  The cardinal de Ferrare, for example, let i t be known that he was planning to send 2,000 ecus to Fabricio Serbelloni, the pope's nephew at Avignon.  He found himself approached by the  Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI 2 I b i d . , p. 326  e  S i e c l e , p. 325.  108 queen and the due de Guise who insisted that he give this  sum  to the seigneur de Suze who was being sent into Dauphine by the Triumvirate.  In vain did he protest that he did not yet have the  money on hand for he was required to pay half immediately and to present a note for the balance.*  The gift and loan requested of  the pope enabled him to make certain demands upon the French court. Upon the assurance that the king would re-establish the Roman Catholic Church, punish the heretics,  and send the chancellor  from the court, the pope agreed to grant a gift  of 100,000 ecus  2 and a loan of similar amount. Loans were often raised through the intermediary of municiapl o f f i c i a l s rather than d i r e c t l y from i n d i v i d u a l s .  When  the c i v i l war entered the stage of decisive operations about the beginning of August, 1562, Catherine called the council of the c i t y of Paris and asked for a loan of 200,000 ecus.  It was  opened to the inhabitants for subscription with registers various parts of the c i t y .  in  The f i r s t name recorded was that of  the prevot, Guillaume de Marie, who gave part of his plate and another of the donors was Diane de P o i t i e r s , mistress of the late Henry I I , who brought a gift of 1,222 l i v r e s .  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 198. 2  Ibid.,  IV, 1 9 9 .  3  Ibid.,  IV, 2 9 2 .  5  In June, 1563 the  109 "echevins et  c o n s e i l l e r s de P a r i s ' * were once more r e q u e s t e d  C h a r l e s t o borrow from the i n h a b i t a n t s of the c i t y , t h e t u n e o f 100,000 l i v r e s . " * "  t h i s time  to  At t h e l e a s t p r e t e x t money was  r a i s e d and charged a g a i n s t a c i t y . fell  by  Thus when t h e c i t y  of  Bourges  t o t h e C a t h o l i c a r m y , a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f 50,000 e c u s was  required  for  the expenses of the war.  The amount was  r e d u c e d t o 20,000 e c u s t o be r a i s e d by a t a x on t h e  later  reformed  2 inhabitants. military  Also c a l c u l a t e d to defray  slightly  the cost  e n d e a v o u r s were t h e t e r m s o f f e r e d t h e c i t y  before i t s  fall.  t o ransom i t s e l f  That c i t y  of  o f Rouen  was r e q u i r e d t o p a y 80,000 l i v r e s  from p i l l a g e . " ^  In h i s address  "A M o n s e i g n e u r " a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f  his  C o m m e n t a i r e s , M o n l u c d i r e c t e d t o t h e due d ' A n j o u a p e r s o n a l d e f e n c e i n w h i c h he r e p u d i a t e d t h e c h a r g e t h a t a great  fortune.  He s t a t e d t h a t he l i v e d on h i s s t i p e n d a n d 4  l o a n e d a n y e x t r a c a p i t a l out a t i n t e r e s t . l o a n s were t h e o r d e r money, a n d p r o b a b l y The  At a t i m e when  o f t h e day a man was e x p e c t e d t o have his plate,  loaned for  the k i n g ' s  tone of M o n l u c ' s w r i t i n g s u g g e s t e d t h a t  on hand when t h e m o n a r c h was i n d i r e Documents P o u r S e r v i r  Ibid.,  IV,  IV,  3^6.  4 M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s , I,  14-19.  310.  forced his  service.  t o have t o o much c a s h  need was c o n s i d e r e d  a . . . . No. 103.  *T":uble, A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , 3  he had a c c u m u l a t e d  tantamount  110 to treason One of  of the most basic expedients to supplement the resources  the monarch was the attempt to find someone else to foot the  b i l l for at least part of the m i l i t a r y e f f o r t .  This was accomplish-  ed by making c i t i e s responsible for the payment of troops garrisoned in  them, a practice reinforced by royal policy i n 1562.  In May  Charles IX wrote Negrepelisse requesting him to raise four companies of gens de pied at Toulouse to be maintained at the expense of the c i t y and for i t s safety.*  The execution of t h i s  policy was supervised by the king's council for Montpensier stated that the council had resolved that the people of Chinon and Loudun would have two hundred hommes de pied and one hundred arquebusiers a cheval for the defence of the c i t i e s , of  chateaux and pais  d'election  the region, two-rthirds of the expense to be borne by Loudun and  one-third by Chinon.  These regions, however, had not obtained  2 commissions to raise the required taxes. remained unpaid. of  The troops, presumably,  Monluc's adjustment of the size and composition  the garrison at Lectoure was approved by the king provided that  garrison was paid at the expense of the c i t y and of the neighbouring  v i l l a g e s "suyvant l a permission et octroy que j'ay faict  expedier aux habitanz d ' i c e l l e pour asseoir et imposer sur eulx Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 17. Documents Pour Servir a . . . . , No. 76.  Ill les sommes de deniers qui seront necessaires pour l e d i c t  pavement."  After the Battle of Vergt when Burie took most of the forces from Guyenne to go into Saintonge, Monluc made use of three companies from Comminges which cost the king nothing for they were paid by 2  the bishops and the region.  That the policy of l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for payment of the troops was a newly enforced policy during the f i r s t War of Religion i s indicated by the l e t t e r of Guy Chabot de Jarnac to the queen i n which he complained of the d i f f i c u l t y i n governing because of the changing of ordonnances^ a l e t t e r  written  within a few weeks of Montpensier's statement that La Rochelle was strongly opposed to supporting a garrison. The inhabitants of some regions demonstrated that they were w i l l i n g to spend considerable time and money to avoid the expense of supporting a company i n garrison.  Montpensier instructed the  contrQleur Ruze" to t e l l the king, the queen, and the council that since the king and queen had decided to maintain at the expense of the c i t i e s and surrounding regions the soldiers necessary for their defence,  the due asked that he be sent a  commission and authority to impose the sums from which the pay could be taken.  He was speaking of La Rochelle where a l l  knowledgeable advisors stated at least eleven or twelve hundred  I b i d . , No. 7k. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 170. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , I b i d . , No. 7k.  No. 79.  112 men would have to be maintained and, therefore, the expense would be considerable.  The leaders of the c i t y were businessmen  prepared to invest a lot of money to avoid paying for the garrison and Montpensier discovered that they had sent the elu and some others to the court bearing four or five thousand ecus and means of obtaining more to give to those i n a position to help them i n what they sought.*  Whether they planned to approach Florimond  de Robertet, sieur de Fresne, the secretary of state within whose departement the region lay, i s not known.  What i s known i s that  they intended not merely to ask that they be relieved of the garrison but to offer some incentive to those able to influence the decision. Particular extraordinary taxes were used as another expedient in the attempt to meet the f i n a n c i a l demands of c i v i l war.  Local  opposition to such taxes was at times aroused, especially when l o c a l interests were threatened.  Catherine was informed by the  baron de Jarnac that the interruption of the l i b e r t y of commerce and t r a f f i c of merchandise would destroy La Rochelle for there was nothing i n the region but commerce. serious diminution of royal revenues.  It would also result i n a Either special taxes or  other r e s t r i c t i o n s were i n t e r f e r i n g with the commerce of the c i t y and the municipal o f f i c i a l s were most concerned about i t , so much  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7k. ''Instructions du due de Montpensier au contrSleur Ruz6, 12 novembre, 1562, La Rochelle.  113 concerned that they sent a deputation to the governor at Jarnac, his home.  Jarnac, the governor, i n turn planned to go to the  court on their behalf."''  A spate of l e t t e r s from Burie and from  the jurats of Bordeaux to the king and queen late i n 1561 protested against the new tax of one ecu per barrel on wine. Sales of wine to England represented an important part of the economy of the c i t y and English merchants, because of the price increase  2 dictated by the tax, were threatening to buy i n Spain.  Nothing  s t i r r e d l o c a l sentiments against the crown l i k e an unpopular tax, a fact i l l u s t r a t e d by the revolt of the gabelle i n Guyenne just twelve years e a r l i e r . A financial expedient f i r s t systematized during the reign of Francis I was the sale of offices, adversely royal authority.  a practice which affected  This practice enabled the king to  raise large sums of money on occasion but at very high price for "each time the king sold an o f f i c e ,  he created a creditor for the  3 state."  That i s , i n salary and taxes the crown paid more than  i t received.  At the Estates-General of Orleans, the Third Estate  evaluated the salaries of new officers created by Henry II alone at 1,200,000 livres-tournois per year and Mousnier has calculated ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7 9 . "Tvuble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 425, ^33. •^Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI  e  S i e c l e , p. 300.  114 that the king paid 33% interest for the c a p i t a l he received.* Even more serious than the cost was the fact that men who owned their offices could be much more independent i n the exercise of them.and thus the king's control over his officers was weakened. The royal officers of Guyenne were among the leaders of the 2 r e b e l l i o n according to Monluc.  The venality of  offices  contributed also to s o c i a l unrest for when the king was unable to meet his commitments for the salaries of o f f i c e r s , they took matters into their own hands insofar as they were able and thus abused those under their authority. Men of the church were theoretically exempt from taxation but i n r e a l i t y they contributed s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the expenses of the king.  Decimes were c l a s s i f i e d as free gifts to indicate that  the clergy was exempt from taxation and was contributing of i t s own free w i l l to the defence of the kingdom.  Under Henry II  5  the decimes increased i n size and frequency and during the reign of Charles IX they were systematized by the Contract of Poissy i n 1561.  In the sixteen years i n which the Contract was if  i n effect the clergy contributed 62,400,000 l i v r e s .  In fact,  at the Estates-General of Pontoise i n 1561 only the clergy had 1  I b i d . , p. 300.  2  Monluc, Comrnentaires, IIj 4l6. Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI S i e c l e , pp. 323-324. if Doucet, Institutions, I I , 837.  5  e  1 ]  shown i t s e l f  -5  w i l l i n g to give any financial support to the king.  The secular estates had proven w i l l i n g to air their  grievances  and even to threaten the position of the queen mother but unwilling to give anything in support of the monarch, and by these actions they had condemned the Estates-General to disuse. The clergy, on the other hand, proved useful to the crown and thereby enhanced i t s own position."*" Contributions from the clergy were not only i n the form of dlcimes but i n the sale of the temporal holdings' of the For example, in July, 1 5 6 3 after the Peace of Amboise  church.  when royal military strength was turned to ejecting the English from Normandy, Charles IX gave instructions to the royal  officers 2  decreeing the sale of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ecus of the temporel of the church. S i m i l a r l y , as Charles and his advisors looked for resources during the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n , the silverware of the churches seemed to hold promise as a means of r a i s i n g funds.  Governors of the  provinces were instructed to take the silverware from the churches 3  to underwrite their military expenses.  Several governors  expressed their unwillingness to undertake such an unpopular assignment for while they might be protectors of the church they could see potential danger in duplicating the Huguenot actions of J . R u s s e l l Major, "The Third Estate in the Estates-General of Pontoise, 1 5 6 1 , " Speculum, XXIX (195*0, 4 7 6 . 1  Documents Pour Servir a . . . . No. 1 0 8 . ^Documents Pour Servir a t . . . , Nos. 4 3 , 4 8 , 51 "for Bretagne, Guyenne and La Rochelle et l'Aunis respectively.  116 raiding the churches, albeit with royal blessing.  The due  d'Etampes suggested that for such a task commissions should be sent to the bishops or the men of j u s t i c e  1  and Jarnac also wished 2  to avoid being d i r e c t l y involved i n such work.  The governors and  lieutenants desired to dissociate themselves from a potentially unpopular royal f i s c a l p o l i c y . The governors and lieutenants-general,  as important  officers of the crown, were both the recipients and the distributors of patronage.  The king found i t d i f f i c u l t but essential  to reward  them for their service; d i f f i c u l t because the royal treasury was pressed beyond i t s resources; essential because these military leaders could be as useful to his enemies as to himself.  Local  groups such as the municipal leaders i n a major c i t y of a gouvernement found i t desirable to reward the king's  lieutenants  whom they regarded as their protectors both at the court and against the rebels.  Even the Huguenots considered i t worthwhile  on occasion to offer substantial sums of money to a lieutenant of the king i n exchange for certain guarantees.  The lieutenant-  general i n turn, was in a position to arrange remunerative appointments for his proteges or, at least, to recommend them to the king as worthy recipients of royal  largesse.  Documents ,Pour Servir a . . . . No. kj>. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 51 •  117  High office of  did not automatically ensure the enrichment  i t s holder, however.  In fact, the officer often assumed the  financial obligations of his monarch with l i t t l e reward.  immediate  Fifteen months after the battle of Vergt, Monluc was  s t i l l writing to the king and queen to ask reimbursement for the 5 , 6 0 0 l i v r e s he had advanced personally i n order to raise the royal companies. of  By the time of writing he claimed to be out  pocket not only the 5 , 6 0 0 l i v r e s advanced to the tresorier  de 1'extraordinaire des guerres trying to recover the debt.  but a further 300 ecus.spent  Martiheau, Monluc*s secretary, had  been at the court almost five months working on his behalf.  In  the same l e t t e r the old lieutenant asked for his pension of 2 , 0 0 0 l i v r e s for the previous year, and, concluding the he referred to a l e t t e r  letter,  of ten days e a r l i e r i n which he had  told Catherine of the i l l n e s s and imminent death of the bishop of  Condom and had asked her to remember him i n the appointment.  The  good bishop had recovered and Monluc relayed this news to  the queen.*  Later i n the year a new bishop was appointed and  Monluc received annually a sum of 5 , 0 0 0 francs from the bishopric for  five years u n t i l his third son, Jean de Monluc, received the 2  office.  Throughout the period of his command i n Guyenne,  Blaise de Monluc complained that his services were not being Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 3 1 5 • Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 1 7 •  118 recognized with appropriate f i n a n c i a l rewards, a consistent theme with many variations.  A t y p i c a l example i s found in the  l e t t e r to the queen mother in which he stated that he had served f a i t h f u l l y for f o r t y - f i v e years and was unable to show that house was worth one ecu more than in. the beginning.  his  Having lost  hope of recompense he asked to be allowed to r e t i r e to his home.' Catherine found i t possible to f l a t t e r and mollify him with the granting of periodic honours. The sentiments of Monluc were echoed by other royal officers spend  such as d'Escars who wrote that he had been forced to  15.  or  16,000  l i v r e s i n ten months as governor of Bordeaux  and one more month would see his t o t a l r u i n .  That the king's  personal representative should assume the king's expenses was expected and accepted by men of the time.  The Parlement of  Bordeaux decided that Noailles should raise three hundred men  3 p a r t i a l l y at his own expense.  The comte de Suze wrote from  Avignon that for three months he had commanded sixteen ensigns and about three hundred horse and the only f i n a n c i a l help he had received had been l e f t the court and  2,000  ecus given him by the legate when he  10 or 12,000  francs from the c i t y and region.  He had attempted to meet his expenses through loans on his own *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 306. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 116. "Le comte d'Escars a Catherine de 'Medicis," 6 septembre, 1563.  3  Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, kkO.  119 property. The problem facing the monarch was to maintain the l o y a l support of his o f f i c e r s , the lieutenants-general,  i n a time when  the cash resources upon which he could draw for patronage were stretched to their l i m i t and beyond.  Frequently the lieutenants  received from one hand of the king gifts which were taken away by the other.  The congratulations of the king and queen to  Monluc after the battle of Vergt emboldened him to ask the return of revenues from the comte de Gaure granted him by Henry II and 2 taken away be Francis I I .  Charles IX replied that his i n a b i l i t y  to reward the Gascon captain for his worthy service saddened him but the revenues of the comte de Gaure had been reclaimed for the crown i n a general reunion of the domain and to set a precedent by returning them to Monluc would endanger more than one hundred thousand l i v r e s of r e n t e s O f f i c e s ,  both e c c l e s i a s t i c a l and  administrative, were granted to the lieutenants on occasion, not to be exercised d i r e c t l y by them but so that they might enjoy some of the revenues from the office to which they in turn appointed someone.  Monluc enjoyed revenue from the bishopric  of Condom and the due d'Etampes wrote Catherine thanking her for the abbey she had given i n his favour and promising to see that """Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 57. 2 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. 1  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76.  120  appointments would be made from among loyal men.* been given the office  Burie had  of prevot general of Guyenne, an office  which he granted to a man of arms of his company.  Burie's man  had resigned the office to a man who joined the Huguenots and was taken at Vergt and Burie asked the king to grant the  office  2  to the bearer of his l e t t e r ,  a man he did not name.  Burie may not have received revenue from the office  While or from i t s  sale he was able i n the f i r s t instance to use i t as part of the patronage that was his to grant. The granting of revenues from confiscations  and fines was  another means used by the king to reward the f a i t h f u l and maintain their l o y a l t y .  Henri de Foix, comte de Candale, upon  returning from a mission to England wrote to the queen of the expenses his officers had been forced to bear i n the protection of his domains.  He asked her to authorize a personal guard at  expense of the Huguenots or at least of those who had been condemned by the Parlement of Bordeaux.  This could be accomplish  ed i f Catherine were to regularize the gift she had made him of the products of diverse f i n e s .  5  Sometimes the requests reaching  the court were more specific l i k e Burie's l e t t e r containing an indictment against a merchant of Villeneuve d'Agen named Taisses.  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  No. 27.  2  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 466. Pidce J u s t i f i c a t i v e s , "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1 5 6 2 . 5  I b i d . , I, 4 5 6 .  "Candale a l a reine," 3 0 septerabre,  1562.  121  The merchant was imploring pardon but Burie asked that the king condemn him and grant the product of confiscations pronounced against him to Burie himself."*"  The motive of the lieutenant-  general i n condemning Taisses was certainly open to question. Monluc, too, received the gift of a fine from Catherine; i n his case, a long unpaid fine levied against Colineau the receveur du 2  t a i l l o n of the Bordelais. s t i l l trying  More than a year l a t e r Monluc was  to obviate the requirements of the chancellor i n  r e l a t i o n to forwarding the money to 1 espargne and thence back to 1  Monluc,.  The only property held by Colineau was his office, worth  about fifteen hundred ecus, and pledged to Monluc against the f i n e . The office was exercised in Monluc's name but the funds continued to go to his majesty's service and Monluc was unable to obtain authorization to take his part.'*  Confiscations were granted to  officers other than lieutenants-general for Charles IX wrote Monluc that he was sending him c e r t i f i c a t e s for the confiscation granted by the king to captain Monluc, his son, and to the seigneur de La Mothe-Rouge.  A measure of Catherine's need to  keep the f i r s t prince of the blood i d e n t i f i e d with her cause was the gift  from Charles IX to the.king of Navarre, only two months  """Ibid.,"Burie a l a reine," 6 octobre,  1562.  2  Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 1 5 6 . 3  Ibid.,  IV, 2 8 9 .  Documents Pour Servir a . . . . . No. 7 6 .  122 before the l a t t e r ' s f a t a l wounding of a l l the  confiscations  which would be pronounced against the rebels i n the provinces of Antoine and his wife.*  The tendency of the crown to reward i t s  officers by granting them revenues obtained from fines and confiscations may explain in part the zeal displayed by Burie for the investigation of such revenues in order to prevent men of the Parlement from unduly enriching themselves.  2  Pensions granted by the crown rewarded l o y a l service in a continuing fashion and thus represented a continuing expense i f funds were found to pay them and a continuing cause of faction i f funds were not found.  dissatis-  Monluc f i r s t received three  thousand francs annually with another two thousand added when Henry II rewarded him with a pension for his exploits in Italy and added the c o l l a r of the order of Saint-Michel, and a rente from the royal domain of three thousand francs on the comte de Gaure.  A further pension of three thousand francs from Catherine  5  when she and Charles IX were in Angouleme brought Monluc's t o t a l pension to eight or nine thousand francs.  it-  The gages or pay accorded a man were, of course, part of  Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 4-28.  2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. 3 ^Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 17; II, 192-193. In the i n t r o duction to his Comrnentaires Monluc maintained that the pension he received from Henry II was 2,000 francs and at the end of l i v r e III he stated that i t was 3,000 francs.  V b i d . , I, 17.  123 the patronage accompanying the office  granted him.  The range  was extremely broad and was represented at one extreme by Antoine de Bourbon, lieutenant-general  of the kingdom, who did  not underestimate his own importance in accepting two thousand five hundred l i v r e s monthly."*"  In the camp of the royal army the  two marshals of the camp and the colonel general of the infantry received three hundred l i v r e s monthly and the maxtres de camp, 2 two hundred.  In the province of Guyenne Burie and Monluc each  received five hundred l i v r e s , ^ half what the due de Montpensier was granted when he was sent on a special mission into the province.  Noailles,  governor of Bordeaux, and captain of the  Chateau du Ha with one hundred men under his command, was paid one hundred l i v r e s per month and the services of his 5 were valued at half that amount.  lieutenant  The commissaires and  contrdleurs who supervised the reviews of the troops each received about t h i r t y - f i v e l i v r e s . ^  The holder of a high non-  **"Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 235* 2  Ibid.  ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 200. Documents Pour Servir a . . . ,  No. 48.  .^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 199. "Estat de, ce que monte le paiement pour mois entier des gens de guerre a pied qui sont restes en garrison pour le service du r o i es v i l l e s et chasteaux de l a Guyenne," Toulouse, 4 mars, 1562 (I563). The gages of Noailles and his lieutenant had doubled from the statement for 1559 found in F . ' Lot, Recherches sur les E f f e c t i f s , p. 254. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 201-202.  124  military office,  that of f i r s t president i n the sovereign court  of the Parlement of Bordeaux, received two hundred l i v r e s per month,  1  an income he could undoubtedly augment.  2  The salary of  a counsellor of the Parlement of Paris was 600 l i v r e s annually 3 as compared to 375 l i v r e s for the same office in Bordeaux. Salary and rewards from the crown were by no means the only source of revenue for the king's lieutenants.  Major states  that ''the provincial estates levied taxes to pay royal  officials  to convince the king that they were unable to pay the taxes he requested and that their respective provinces had privileges 4  that must not be overridden."  Although i t i s impossible to  ascertain what was expected i n return, i t i s clear that the c i t y of Toulouse appreciated Monluc's efforts and offered him g r a t i f i c a t i o n of 500 l i v r e s per month and wished to give him the sequestered property of Pierre d'Assezat, a town councillor charged by the Parlement with the crime of lese-Majestl.  D'Assezat was  acquitted by the king's council and Monluc, therefore, did not 5 receive his property. There were times when representatives of ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I I , 114. 2  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 8 2 .  ^Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI  e  S i e c l e , p. 301.  4  J . Russell Major, "Crown and Aristocracy i n Renaissance France," p. 643. 5  Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, I I I , 8 9 ; IV, 198.  125 the  Huguenot  king's  organization offered financial  l i e u t n e n a n t s i n an a t t e m p t  to gain t h e i r  promise  an  was c e r t a i n l y  experience  and  t o w i n them o v e r  of neutrality.  honour but p r o b a b l y  inducement  coloured  represented  by Huguenot  or, at l e a s t ,  Monluc's account  of such  t o make much o f h i s l o y a l t y a c t u a l events  nevertheless.  Sums o f 30,000 a n d 40,000 e c u s were o f f e r e d M o n l u c visits  t o the  spokesmen i f he w o u l d m e r e l y  on s u c c e s s i v e  a b s t a i n from  t a k i n g arms a g a i n s t them."""  The dispense  king's  limited  governors  a n d l i e u t e n a n t s were i n a p o s i t i o n t o  patronage p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n the form of m i l i t a r y  2 appointments. before carry  The n o b i l i t y  the k i n g s h o r t l y their  opposition  o f Guyenne s e n t  after  remonstrance. o f the Parlement  the f i r s t  Among t h e i r  by B u r i e a n d M o n l u c .  that  were a p a r t . o f t h e k i n g ' s  Guyenne l e d by t h e s e i g n e u r leaders,  lacking  faithful  and those  had  financial  apparently  War o f R e l i g i o n t o chief  grievances  I t was c l a i m e d  that taken  de B u r i e  army and t h e n o b i l i t y o f and de M o n l u c and t h a t  means t o r e w a r d t h o s e  of property.  The p r o p e r t y  III. "  I I , 403-413.  these  who were most service,  granted  i n war f r o m t h e r e b e l s and t h e k i n g ' s  Monluc, Commentaires, Supr_a, C h a p t e r  was t h e  by t h e n o b l e s  p u t t o g r e a t e s t expense i n t h e k i n g ' s  made them s m a l l g r a n t s  number  o f Bordeaux t o the g r a n t i n g o f g i f t s  to nobles they  one o f t h e i r  was  126 council supported the judgment of the Parlement, l o c a l watchdog for royal prerogatives, by r u l i n g that no lieutenant could grant the property of someone else."*"  The type of patronage most often  shown by the great nobles was i n recommending to office and the amount of patronage a noble could dispense depended upon the degree of influence he possessed at the court.  Thus governors  and lieutenants recommended individuals for recognition but the 2 king was most often the source of patronage.  Even a lieutenant-  general seeking office attempted to gain the support of such men as the due de Montpensier, the king of Navarre and the due de 3  Guise.  There would appear to be much j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the  statement,  "Just as the medieval king was the p r i n c i p a l lord  in the kingdom, so the Renaissance monarch was the greatest patron." ^ Monluc claimed that after a lifetime of service to the crown he could not show his house to be twenty thousand ecus richer for i t and i n his remonstrance to the king, Monluc defended himself against the charge of having used his to amass a fortune of 300,000 ecus•  office  He suggested i r o n i c a l l y  that he wished the charge were true, providing the funds had  ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 2  I b i d . , Nos. 63, 6k.  ^ I b i d . , No. 80. Burie requested the office of Admiral of Guyenne and enlisted the support of Montpensier. k Major, "Crown and Aristocracy in Renaissance France," p. 6^3.  127 been taken from t.he Huguenots.  According to his own account he  had taken from the Huguenots, of course, but only as legitimate spoils of war and to prevent his soldiers from r e v o l t i n g at the sight of a vanquished enemy treated better than they were themselves.  Furthermore, he claimed, he had found i t essential  overcome a reputation as a Huguenot sympathizer.  to  Certainly, had  the royal financial officers been i n his place they would have taken a m i l l i o n ecus where he took only three thousand. Monluc touched on the system of royal patronage to recommend that Charles IX maintain i n his coffers purses containing various amounts with which he could personally reward his f a i t h f u l subjects according to their qualite.  He predicted that  the royal f i n a n c i a l o f f i c i a l s would advise the king that i t was beneath his dignity to distribute purses personally.  Such  advice should be ignored, claimed Monluc, since i t would be offered by those whose concern was to keep the money passing through their own hands.so that some might s t i c k .  His estimate  was that the man who was granted two thousand ecus by the king received only five hundred by the time i t had passed through o f f i c i a l hands.  Giving financial rewards personally would  strengthen the relations between the king and his nobles provided such g i f t s were distributed equitably. Monluc suggested with a l i t t l e  On the l a t t e r point,  bitterness  Guyenne had received the l i o n ' s share.  that someone in  Perhaps he was alluding  128 to his long resented r i v a l , Francois Peyrusse d'Escars. It i s highly probable that in spite of his s p i r i t e d defence, Monluc had accumulated a fortune of at least 300,000 ecus and his own defence contributes insights into the ways i n which he could have accomplished i t .  Following his address to Charles IX, Monluc  directed a remonstrance to the king's brother, the due d'Anjou. In that remonstrance he maintained that fame and glory were much more important to him than riches.  Much evidence suggests that  glory was indeed important to Monluc but there i s l i t t l e to suggest, that he conceived of glory and riches as separate e n t i t i e s .  Monluc  observed at length that the king was the source of a l l benefits and requested that his children receive due financial recognition. He compared his own unselfish service with that of several prominent families who had served Louis XI and had been immortalized i n verse. To prove his own scrupulous honesty and disinterested service Monluc recalled a l l the offices he had held and the opportunities they had presented for personal enrichment, opportunities he had eschewed, of course.  Many captains of gens  de pied became r i c h on the pay of their soldiers and on the money provided for their v i c t u a l s . help i t was easy.  With a good fourrier and a l i t t l e  He, Monluc, had been a captain of gens de pied  seven or eight times without exploiting the opportunity. The  129  maitre de camp had even greater opportunities for he could make a deal with the commissaires des v i v r e s .  And he himself was not  slow to discover where there was an opportunity for gain. had always had a good nose. office  He  Yet he had three times held the  of maitre de camp without enriching himself. As a governor of places he always had the opportunity of  taking money from eighty or a hundred men who wished to escape military service.  Having held these offices as long as he had  and supervised as many montres as he had i n his l i f e ,  "avec  quelque peu d'epargne, mon Dieu, quelle montagne d'or a u r o i s - j e i " Arid yet he claimed that was a mountain of gold he had not mined. As lieutenant  of the king i n Sienna and Montalcino, Monluc had  faced great opportunities to increase his fortune.  Local  merchants were more than-willing to work out agreements r e l a t i n g to the grain supply for the soldiers and loans could be made at high i n t e r e s t .  Nevertheless when Monluc was relieved his  successor found grain s t i l l in the warehouse and the poor had been fed with the surplus. As a man progressed through the cursus honorum the opportunities  for personal gain increased and Monluc indicated a few  of the ways in which other governors and lieutenants-general exploited their positions.  It would not be d i f f i c u l t , he maintained,  to make arrangements with the receiver general of the province  130 and to f i l l  one's personal coffers and to tap the money for  montres, garrisons and the movement of a r t i l l e r y .  Monluc could  have raised many taxes, for the king had given him authority to do so, and he could have turned those taxes to his own p r o f i t . A third source of income could be the exaction of payment from towns and villages for the promise of exemption from the support of a garrison.  On this point at l e a s t , Courteault states that  there i s abundant evidence that Monluc refrained from this common practice as a matter of s c r u p l e . M o n l u c observed that he could have followed the example of others who exacted extortion from the Huguenots for the promise not to attack them even when they were l i v i n g peacably on their estates i n accordance with the edict. Monluc declared his innocence of a l l the a r t i f i c e s he mentioned and reminded his reader that the gain he 'had had from Clairac was with the specific permission of the king. It i s impossible to ascertain the extent to which Blaise de Monluc used the techniques he described to increase his estate and to what extent he increased i t by other means. sources were the stipends of his offices,  Some other  the pensions granted  by the crown, the income from multiple offices  Monluc, Commentaires, I I I , 4-21, n . l .  granted to him,  131 g i f t s from c i t i e s and the estates of his wives.  Beyond his own  fame, his chief concern was the honour and,fortune which should come to his sons and grandsons.  For this reason he reminded  Charles IX and the due d'Anjbu of the l e t t e r written by the king on December 3, 1570 bearing the promise, Tenez-vous tout asseure que j'auray souvenance a jamais de vos longs et grands services, desquels, s i vous ne pouvez recepvoir l a recompence condign!, vos enfans acheveront d'en c u e i l l i r le f r u i c t , joinct q u ' i l s sont t e l s et m'ont ja s i bien servy que d'eux-mesmes i l s ont merit! que l ' o n face pour eux ce que je seray bien aise de f a i r e , quand 1'occasion s'en presentera.  Monluc, Comrnentaires, III,  411.  CHAPTER V LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY The F i r s t War of Religion - Summary of Events Upon the death of Francis II and the succession of Charles IX Catherine de Medicis managed to obtain the regency.  She organ-  ized the government around herself and three Bourbon princes, Antoine de Bourbon (king of Navarre), the cardinal de Bourbon and the prince de Conde.  They were assisted by the constable Anne de  Montmorency, the three Chatillon brothers, the due de Montpensier and the prince de l a R o c h e - s u r - Y o n T h e Guises l e f t the court 2 temporarily deprived of a share in government.  Catherine wrote  to Sebastien de l'Aubespine, her ambassador i n Madrid, that "it has been found best by a l l the princes of the blood, the lords of the council, and other great personages of this realm that the p r i n c i p a l and sovereign authority i n i t should remain in my hands." Catherine was determined to preserve the monarchy and to maintain herself i n power and to those ends she attempted to steer a middle course between r i v a l factions, both r e l i g i o u s and 4 political. Her method was the method of c o n c i l i a t i o n and she  Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 7 3 . 2  Ibid.  ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 5 6 9 . 4  Franklin C. Palm, P o l i t i c s and Religion in Sixteenth Century France, (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1927), p. 1 1 .  133 found. ,it inconceivable that there should be circumstances for :  which that method might prove inadequate.*  In the summer of  1561 e c c l e s i a s t i c a l estate was convened at Poissy with both Catholic and Protestant theological leaders present.  Catherine  aimed to effect a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n but i n that she was unsuccessful. The powers of diplomacy were limited in matters of conscience. Nevertheless Catherine achieved at least an outward r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 2 between Guise and Conde.. s  Catherine's policy of c o n c i l i a t i o n found expression i n the Edict of January, 1562. The Edict of July had forbidden judges and magistrates from pursuing the Huguenots; the new edict for the f i r s t time granted them the right to meet in p u b l i c .  5  Following  the massacre at Vassy i n March, 1562 the Triumvirate consolidated i t s position in Paris and threatened to completely dominate the crown.  Catherine desired to maintain as much independence as  possible and for that purpose she attempted to maintain the support of Conde.  In t h i s attempt she contributed to the mobilization of 4  Protestant forces. Conditions i n the kingdom were ripe for c i v i l war.  In fact,  *John Neale, The Age of Catherine de Medicis (London: Cape, 19-+3), P. 41. 2 Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 102-103. F . A. Isambert, Recueil General des Anciennes Lois Francaises (Paris: Plon, 1882), XIV, 124-129. 4, Supra, p. 15  134 before the massacre of Vassy many parts of the kingdom had been subjected to r i o t s , iconoclastic of disorders."*'  demonstrations,  and a l l kinds  The Peace of Cateau-Cambresis flooded the kingdom  with soldiers and officers  from the I t a l i a n Wars.  These men  could not be threatened with the loss of their regular employment 2 and income without p r e c i p i t a t i n g great disorder.  The problem  was intensified by the economic impact on the state and i t s  kings  of those costly foreign wars and by the fact that many of the soldiers had been converted to Protestantism during their  service.  The r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n contributed an issue for c i v i l war and Huguenot church organization contributed a basis for recruitment and organization of a military force. From A p r i l to June, 1562 the king was in the control of the Guise faction and the Protestant army increased at Orleans as Conde promoted the p o l i t i c a l theory that the king was a captive 4 and the Huguenots were struggling for his release.  Under those  circumstances Catherine's only hope to prevent c i v i l war and lessen Guise control was to persuade Conde to disarm and return to the court, thereby removing the Guise excuse for maintaining ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 2. In January 1561 the Parlement of Bordeaux wrote to Charles IX of the "inconveniens, scismes et divisions" which continued daily i n Guyenne over the religious issue. 2 Lucien Romier, Les Origins Politiques des Guerres de Religion (Paris: P e r r i n , 1914), I I , 235. I b i d . , p. 253. 4 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 138.  5  135 a large force under arms.  Conde's insistence on the removal of  the Guise faction as a prerequisite to disarmament only ensured the continuation of preparations for war.* In seige and battle during the summer of 1562 the Catholic army regained much of the Loire region from Conde's forces. m i l i t a r y s k i l l and t i r e l e s s efforts  The  of Monluc saved Toulouse and  Bordeaux, the major c i t i e s of the southwest from the Huguenots. That forceful Gascon officer was responsible also for regaining the c i t y of Lectoure from the Huguenots.  His victory over a large  Huguenot force under Duras at the battle of Vergt (October) was p a r t i c u l a r l y significant for i t prevented those Huguenots south of the Loire from joining the prince de Conde.  It may thus have  provided the measure of the Huguenot defeat at the crucial  battle  2 of Dreux two months l a t e r . The concern of P h i l i p II over affairs i n France acted as a spur to the Catholic cause and repeatedly hampered Catherine's attempts at c o n c i l i a t i o n .  His Catholic majesty could not help  but be concerned with heresy i n France for that nation was a wedge between Spain and her valuable provinces of the Low Countries.  Violent religious changes i n France threatened the  I b i d . , p. 150 2 I b i d . , p. 157« It i s a commentary on the general accuracy of Monluc's colourful and e g o t i s t i c a l commentaries that such a careful historian as Thompson used them as the basis of this part of his narrative.  136 Netherlands.  As early as January, 1561 a Spanish envoy carried  to the French court the word that P h i l i p II would be compelled to suppress any new sect permitted i n France "to preserve the t e r r i t o r i e s of his brother-in-law and to prevent his own dominions from being infected."  Catherine wrote and attempted 2  to explain her conciliatory policy to her son-in-law.  The  Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, was instrumental in the formation of the Triumvirate and exercised great influence  over i t s  policies.'  The Spanish court brought constant pressure to bear on the court of France to extinguish heresy in the kingdom. Foreign involvement in French a f f a i r s extended to England where the Huguenot appeal to Elizabeth was accompanied by the 4 promise ultimately to restore Calais to the E n g l i s h .  Both the  Spanish and the English were held back from f u l l scale involvement i n France because neither could afford the r i s k of commercial injury through the breaking of their relations in Holland and Flanders.^  Nevertheless,  the English occupied Havre early in  October and thus goaded the Catholic forces into redoubling """Bernerd C. Weber, The Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain during the Reign~"of Charles IX, p. 40. Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 577-578. 3 Weber, op. c i t . , p. 4-3. 4 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI: I, 68. 5  Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. I63.  137 their efforts  to take Rouen from the Huguenots.  The help of a  small English force was insufficient to ensure Rouen's defence but i n the course of the seige Antoine de Bourbon was mortally wounded. According to the decision of the Estates-General of Orleans the prince de Conde should have succeeded the king of Navarre as lieutenant of the realm and the prince sent out commissions to a l l major officers ordering them to recognize his authority as the king's lieutenant-general and governor of France.  The court and the Catholic party, however, set  aside  the r u l i n g of the Estates and no successor was immediately named.  The Spanish government pressed the candidacy of the  cardinal of Bourbon but expressed i t s willingness that Catherine have the entire government of a f f a i r s . * In December Condi's forces faced the much larger army of the due de Guise in the battle of Dreux.  In the course of the  fighting the marshal Saint-Andre was k i l l e d and Conde and the constable Montmorency taken prisoner by opposite sides.  The  depleted Huguenot forces under Coligny, prevented from joining 2  with the English i n Havre, retreated to Orleans.  The assassin-  ation of the due de Guise i n February, 1563 was a serious blow Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 171. 2  I b i d . , pp. I 8 O - I 8 I .  138 to the Catholic forces; two of the triumvirs were dead and the t h i r d , a prisoner.  Catherine de Medicis wanted to negotiate a  peace and to unite Catholic and Huguenot against the English i n the recovery of Havre.  She was anxious to avoid a military victory  that would enable either side to dominate the crown.'*' The prince de Conde and the constable Montmorency were freed from prison to lead negotiations for a peace settlement. On March 19, 1563 the Edict of Amboise was decreed by the king 2 and his c o u n c i l .  It was definitely  conciliatory towards the  Huguenots and the Parlement of Paris objected to i t s  registration  as did Parlements in Rouen, Dijon, and T o u l o u s e . A l t h o u g h peace had been decreed the pacification of the kingdom did not take place overnight.  Many Catholics objected to the pardoning of  Huguenots and the restoration of their property.  In attempting  to pacify the Protestants the crown offended many Catholics. Guyenne those who s a » themselves or their positions found means of achieving their own ends.  In  threatened  The Parlement of  Bordeaux demonstrated i t s concern with the status and prerogatives of i t s members.  The n o b i l i t y continued an association  disbanded by the crown.  officially  In both cases l o c a l institutions  resisted  royal orders while identifying themselves staunchly with the crown. I b i d . , p. 172. i  Isambert, Recueil des Anciennes L o i s , XIV, 135« Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I I ,  iv.  139 C a t h o l i c Leagues in,Guyenne The emergence of C a t h o l i c leagues i n Guyenne and Languedoc s i g n a l l e d the b e g i n n i n g of a t r e n d that was  to have great  s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the crown as the Wars of R e l i g i o n continued. 1576  Henry I I I saw  In  i n a C a t h o l i c League an o r g a n i z a t i o n which  could p r o v i d e e i t h e r the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g the crown or a powerful t h r e a t to r o y a l a u t h o r i t y .  He decided to e x p l o i t  the o p p o r t u n i t y and d e c l a r e d h i m s e l f head of the League.* e a r l y leagues, however, were not greeted with r o y a l A C a t h o l i c league was  The  enthusiasm.  formed at Toulouse i n March, 1563*  The  c a r d i n a l s , Armagnac and S t r o z z i , as w e l l as Monluc were  2 i n f l u e n t i a l i n i t s establishment. T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , composed of many clergymen, nobles, and bourgeois of Languedoc and Guyenne, and under the d i r e c t j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Parlement of Toulouse, a c t u a l l y took up arms and pledged i t s e l f by oath to march wherever r e q u i r e d f o r the defense of the C a t h o l i c r e l i g i o n . 5  At Agen a league was  formed  one month before that at Toulouse  and s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r the League of C a d i l l a c was  established  by Monluc's l i e u t e n a n t , Candale, and named f o r Candale's the p l a c e of i t s f o u n d i n g .  *De  5  Some of the leagues formed  Lemar Jensen, Diplomacy  and Dogmatism, p.  estate, consisted  39.  2 Dom Claude Devic and dom Jean Joseph V a i s s e t e , H i s t o i r e Generale de Languedoc (Toulouse: E. P r i v a t , 1 8 7 2 - 1 8 9 2 ) , V, 249. 5  J e n s e n , Diplomacy  and Dogmatism, p. 39•  4 Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 190-1.95. ( T h i s document i s the act e s t a b l i s h i n g the league, i t s c h a r t e r . ) 5  Ibid.,  IV,  214.  iko chiefly of artisans whose guilds "offered an ideal i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure for the organization and co-ordination of Catholic opposition to the growing Huguenot forces." """ Monluc, however, encouraged the noblesse to form an association. in France.  Such noble leagues were by no means a new phenomenon "Organized resistance  to royal centralization among  the seigneurs of the second rank showed i t s e l f 1314 and 1 3 1 5 T h e  associations  i n the leagues of  formed i n southwest France  during the Wars of Religion were not primarily for the defence of l o c a l rights but for the defence of feudal prerogatives. Nobles whose interests were bound up with those of the king saw that the defection of royal o f f i c i a l s to the Huguenots was undermining the royal administration of the province.  Their own  feudal position was s i m i l a r l y threatened as emboldened tenants, converted to the Huguenot cause refused the decimes to the church, the t a i l l e to the crown and their feudal dues to the noblesseNot  only did the royal cause depend upon the goodwill  of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y but the well-being of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y depended upon the triumph of the crown.  In leagues the Catholic  Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39 and Thompson, Wars of .Religion, pp. 212-223. 2 John Le Patourel, "The King and the Princes in FourteenthCentury France," Europe i n the Late Middle Ages, Hale, et a l , ed. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 182. ^Supra, p. 97-  141 n o b i l i t y pledged person and goods to the defence  of t h e i r  own  cause. The E d i c t of P a c i f i c a t i o n of March, 1563 forbade establishment of new  a s s o c i a t i o n s and commanded that those a l r e a d y  formed be d i s s o l v e d . * with the e d i c t .  She  the  C a t h e r i n e ' s f i r m l e t t e r to Monluc c o i n c i d e d  e v i d e n t l y regarded the formation of leagues  as an inexcusable e x p r e s s i o n of p r o v i n c i a l independence. soundly rebuked  Monluc f o r h i s l e a d e r s h i p i n the venture  She and  2 commanded him to undo the work he had done. assurance  that the league of Agen was  In s p i t e of Monluc's  d i s s o l v e d , i t continued,  without r o y a l p e r m i s s i o n , and a f t e r August, 1564 came to be known as the league of Guyenne. In June,  I563  5  the king's c o u n c i l r e c e i v e d a s e r i e s of  a r t i c l e s from the noblesse of Guyenne who  had gathered i n  Bordeaux and sent a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to be t h e i r spokesman at the 4 court.  The queen mother had r e c e i v e d p r i o r n o t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n  A p r i l , Antoine de P a r d a i l l a n , baron de Gondrin, had w r i t t e n to r e p o r t the establishment of the a s s o c i a t i o n of the noblesse of *Isambert,  R e c u e i l des Anciennes  L o i s , XIV,  145.  L e t t r e s de Catherine de M e d i c i s , I, 551-552. (March 31,  1563)  C a l e b G. K e l l y , French P r o t e s t a n t i s m 1559-1562. S e r i e s XXXVI, No. 4 of Johns Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y Studies i n H i s t o r i c a l and P o l i t i c a l Science ( B a l t i m o r e ; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 1 8 ) , p . 79. 5  4 Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., Nos.  91,  92.  Ik2 Guyenne."*"  H i s d e s c r i p t i o n made the a s s o c i a t i o n sound s i n i s t e r  i n purpose f o r he f e l t  c e r t a i n that the group, formed with a  common purse, represented a p l o t on the part of some of the l e a d i n g , n o b l e s , t o foment t r o u b l e and maintain s t r i f e when the peace had  just been p u b l i s h e d .  Gondrin was  convinced that the  m a j o r i t y of the magistrates of Guyenne were crooked,  favoured  the s u b v e r s i v e a s s o c i a t i o n of the n o b i l i t y , and worked glove with them to e n r i c h themselves.  The reasons  hand-in-  f o r Gondrin's  o p i n i o n of the a s s o c i a t i o n and the nature of the a s s o c i a t i o n are c l a r i f i e d by the remaining contents of h i s l e t t e r . ed to speak of the "good and  He  itself proceed-  just q u a r r e l " of the p r i n c e de Conde  and t o assure Catherine that the m a j o r i t y of the n o b i l i t y  and  s o l d i e r s of the r e g i o n would never have taken arms had they not been persuaded  of the c a p t i v i t y of the k i n g and  the queen mother.  From the tone of h i s l e t t e r , Gondrin had been a l l i e d with the Huguenots.  As he assured Catherine of h i s l o y a l t y , he e x p l a i n e d  h i s a c t i o n s d u r i n g the recent h o s t i l i t i e s with the standard Huguenot r a t i o n a l e . i s understandable.  Thus h i s d i s t r u s t As the promulgation  of a C a t h o l i c of the E d i c t  association of  P a c i f i c a t i o n r e f l e c t e d the r o y a l p o l i c y of p a c i f y i n g the kingdom by making concessions to the Huguenots, an a s s o c i a t i o n a r d e n t l y committed t o the C a t h o l i c cause c o u l d very w e l l become a t h r e a t  ^Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No.  86.  Ik3 to the peace. That most of the Catholic n o b i l i t y were d i s l o y a l to the crown, or even to the queen mother, and sought i n an association an outlet  for their disloyalty i s an untenable suggestion.  Before  the outbreak of c i v i l war, Burie declared that the n o b i l i t y awaited only the king's orders to give battle to a common enemy. He referred to the n o b i l i t y , sustained by the king, a r i s i n g en masse against the rebels, seeing that their p r i v i l e g e s , revenues and their ancient rights were threatened.*  their  At the  outset of the war as Monluc and Burie took the f i e l d with their forces,  they reported to Charles IX that Negrepelisse with a  large number of gentlemen from the region of the Agenais, Armagnac, Quercy, Perigord, Ronergue, and Commenge had come before them to offer their persons and goods for the king's 2 service.  Negrepelisse  asked to come before the king to declare  the support of the n o b i l i t y .  Charles IX assured him that hearing  of their devotion gave him great satisfaction and then emphasized the fact that the n o b i l i t y could do nothing better than to present themselves, well-equipped, to his lieutenants, and serve under them.  5  Burie and Monluc,  The king's authority was channelled  through his appointed lieutenants  and not through a band of nobles,  Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 150, Memoire de Burie au roi" 6 j u i l l e t , 1561. 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 121.  3  Documents Pour Servir a . . . . . No. 1?.  Ikk  however l o y a l they might be. In their communication to the king, the noblesse of Guyenne maintained that they had created an association of good f a i t h with no other purpose than to pledge themselves to employ their l i v e s and goods for the king's a u t h o r i t y .  1  They attributed the  queen mother's concern and suspicion to the fact that those d i s l o y a l to the king slandered anything introduced to r e s i s t them and had, therefore, attempted to make the association appear unjust.  Whatever the source of Catherine's concern, however,  when Monluc had made i t known to them, they had immediately obeyed and the association was dissolved "comme s i jamais t e l l e association n'eust eu commencement." man for t he noblesse,  The vicomte d'Uza,  spokes-  was to remind the king of the f a i t h f u l  service rendered by the nobles of Guyenne and to obtain l e t t e r s of declaration and confirmation maintaining them i n their ancient l i b e r t i e s , franchises and p r i v i l e g e s .  They believed that the  Huguenots had greater credit with the Parlement than they, especially with the f i r s t president.  P a r t i c u l a r l y g a l l i n g to the  Catholic nobles were the l e t t e r s received by Huguenots declaring them good and f a i t h f u l servitors of the king while the l o y a l Catholics possessed no such declarations. them he would investigate  Charles IX assured  the charges against the f i r s t president  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92.  145 of the Parlement; i f necessary he would summon the man to the court.  As for declarations of their l o y a l t y , there had never  been l e t t e r s patent declaring them other than good subjects as i n the case of the Huguenots who had been declared rebels.* The formation of leagues was the action of men who saw their positions threatened by the growth of the Huguenot movement. Monluc saw i n these associations a means of strengthening the Catholic position by compensating for the demobilization of 2 garrison troops required by the Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n .  Moreover,  he found i n the sponsorship of leagues an opportunity to enhance his own position as t h e i r promoter and spokesman.  The immediate  reason for Catherine's fear and distrust of associations may have stemmed from the actions of Conde.  To unite his cohorts  in their common task, the prince had them sign on A p r i l 11, 1562 an act of association i n four a r t i c l e s .  By their signing they  undertook to employ body and goods, to the last drop of their blood, to the deliverance of the king and queen mother, the conservation of their edicts and ordonnances punishment of those who held them i n contempt.  and the just Those who signed  committed themselves to fight together u n t i l Charles IX came of age, and undertook i n person the government of his kingdom.  5  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, Me"moires de Conde, t . I l l , p. 258.  5  344-345.  ike  The avowed purpose of Conde and his associates was laudable, but under such loyal-sounding aims, they made war against the crown. Any group organized and committed to a particular purpose, i f need be i n spite of the crown, represented a threat to royal authority.  Catherine demanded obedience to the king and to his  appointed lieutenants rather than to a charter. Another source of concern to Catherine was the news that Monluc was intriguing with the Spanish.  He had threatened  to  invite the Catholic king into Blarn i f Jeanne d'Albret continued to support the Protestants  for, he said, the n o b i l i t y and a l l the  region favoured the Spanish k i n g .  1  As early as October, 1562, i t  was rumoured that Monluc was planning to deliver the whole of 2 Guyenne into the hands of P h i l i p I I .  The lieutenant-general  of  Guyenne entered into correspondence with P h i l i p II early i n 1564 in which he denounced the p o l i c i e s of the queen mother and her chancellor.  He proposed to the Spanish king the formation of a  league consisting of the pope, the emperor, the king of Spain, and a l l the Catholic princes of Germany and I t a l y . ^  P h i l i p II k  showed interest and sent a spy to confer with Monluc.  Catherine  was no doubt disturbed to find that a royal officer would intrigue "''Paul Courteault, Blaise de Monluc,' Historien (Paris: Picard, 1908), p. k?0. 2 Weber, Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain, p. 89; Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien, p. 485^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 319-327. Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien, p. 486.  147 with the sovereign of another state and, possible gain the support of the l o c a l n o b i l i t y for a project detrimental to royal authority. That i n i t s e l f was sufficient  reason to be suspicious of any  expression of provincial independence and to decree that associations  must be dissolved..  Local Estates F i r s t among the concerns of the noblesse of Guyenne was the finding of a forum for the expression of their loyalty and of their concerns."*'  They asked that Bordeaux be given the privilege  of holding l o c a l estates and they pointed out that most provinces and even most parts of their own province had the custom of meeting i n that way to consider what must be done for the king's service and for the conservation of the kingdom.  They were  concerned about being deprived of a means of making known their complaints and grievances.  Charles IX was reluctant to permit  such a convocation of estates and replied that he did not wish to change that which was customarily done.  Thus the nobles were  unable to solve through the convocation of l o c a l estates the problem they had t r i e d to solve by the formation of an association, the problem of finding a forum i n which to make their voices heard. The decision of the king's council not to convoke the  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92.  148 l o c a l estates i n Bordeaux was reinforced i n the months that followed by l e t t e r s from Catherine to d'Escars and to the Archbishop of Bordeaux.*  The l a t t e r had requested royal  authorization for such a gathering to consider an old problem, the gabelle du s e l . The reluctance of Catherine and Charles to authorize a meeting of the provincial estates i n Bordeaux stemmed i n part from events of 156l.  The Estates of Orleans, convened the day  after the death of Francis II, adjourned at the end of January with Charles IX commanding the deputies to return to their bailliages  i n order to find means for paying the king's debts.  New assemblies were to be held in each b a i l l i a g e or senechaussle i n March and i n the p r i n c i p a l c i t y of each gouvernement  during  2 the same month.  These assemblies were to r e s t r i c t their  deliberations solely to financial questions,and to name t h i r t y six delegates, one for each order i n each government, to meet in the Estates-General at Melun on the f i r s t of May. Although the s t r i c t e s t  limitations had been placed on the  meetings of l o c a l estates i n March, they refused to obey these l i m i t s and r e s t r i c t consideration to the problem of paying the  *Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I I , 115 and note. 2 Lucien Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a l a Cour de Charles IX (Paris: Libraire Academique, 1924), p. 58.  149 king's debts.  The assembly of the three estates in the private  of Paris immediately turned i t s attention to the question of the regency even though the president had announced that they must concern themselves only with finding means to pay the debts of the k i n g .  They rejected the regency of Catherine, proposed  Antoine de Bourbon, f i r s t prince of the blood, as regent, and revised the l i s t  of members of the privy council to exclude the  Guises and a l l other seasoned supporters of the king.  At the  court i t was thought that this coup had been directed by the comte de La Rochefoucauld and by Antoine Fumee at Conde's . . 1 suggestion. It was not only i n Paris that the estates were r e c a l c i t r a n t . The three estates of Guyenne, assembled at Bordeaux, s i m i l a r l y ignored the directive to concern themselves only with financial matters.  The king had published an ordonnance (18 February, 156l)  convoking the se'ne'chausse'es of Guyenne, Landes, Perigord, Quercy, Armagnac, Limousin, Agen and the b a i l l i a g e of Labour, Comminges and the jugeries of Riviere-Verdun to deliberate on the propositions presented to the estates of Orleans and to name 2 their deputies.  • Monluc reported to the queen on the assembly  of the three estates i n the c i t y of Agen and assured her that the three representatives  chosen to go to Bordeaux on the  I b i d . , pp. 89-91. Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, l l O n .  150. twentieth of the month were wise, virtuous, humble, and obedient and would make their way to Bordeaux in accordance with the royal l e t t e r s to give a response to the lieutenant  of the king."'" Upon  meeting i n Bordeaux the delegates re-examined the proposals of the king's council to the estates of Orleans and then turned their attention to religious discussion and adopted a position of 2 absolute intolerance.  Their views were d i r e c t l y opposed to the  policy Catherine was following as she prepared the Edict of July and planned  for the Colloquy of Poissy.  The provincial  assemblies were in no way helpful to the king in the solution of the f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s and they raised barriers before royal p o l i t i c a l and r e l i g i o u s p o l i c i e s .  Catherine seized the only  recourse available and prevailed upon Charles to annul the decisions taken, f i x the dates for electoral assemblies for May, the p r o v i n c i a l assembly for June, and the opening of the new Estates-General for August at  Pontoise.^  By the time the deputies were a l l present i n Bordeaux and ready to assemble, Burie had received a l e t t e r from the king countermanding the order to convoke the assembly.  1  The estates  I b i d . , pp. 110-114.  2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , p. 38. ^Georges Picot, Histoire des Etats Generaux (2nd edition; Paris: Hachette, 1888), I I , 55.  151 of Guyenne were delayed by the late a r r i v a l of several deputies and Burie received the king's l e t t e r June 13th.  The king's  l e t t e r indicated that the decisions of the e a r l i e r (20 March) were s u f f i c i e n t .  assemblies  The king's council was already  showing a reluctance to convoke the provincial estates for the l i k e l i h o o d was that their demands would be even greater than i n the previous meeting.  The deputies, most of whom had been  waiting i n Bordeaux for some time, ignored the king's and met anyway.  letter  The third estate showed a desire to use force  to stamp out the reform but members of the n o b i l i t y were more moderate i n their attitude to the Huguenots.  In fact, one  representative of the second estate was Symphorien de Durfort, baron de Duras, who was to become the m i l i t a r y leader of the Huguenots i n Guyenne i n the following year.  But they demanded  that the king convoke the Estates-General annually, and recognize i t s competence i n matters of government "according to the ancient laws and observances of the kingdom." *  Burie forwarded the  proc^s-verbal of the assembly to the king without comment.  The  l o c a l estates had not proved useful but had shown themselves entirely too independent and hard to handle for the king's l i k i n g . Therefore, i t was not strange that the request of the n o b i l i t y of Guyenne two years l a t e r for an assembly of the three estates  I b i d . , p. kl.  152 in the senechaussee of Guyenne should bring a negative response from the king and the queen mother. The Parlement of Bordeaux Catherine de Medicis attempted to mobilize every  possible  resource on behalf of royal authority and in the interests of pacifying the kingdom.  In 1560 she convened at Fontainebleau  an assembly of notables which included the royal council, the princes, great officers  of the crown and knights of the order."*'  On that occasion Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, urged the convocation of the Estates-General and the establishment national council to reform the church.  of a  The following year the  clergy met at Poissy with the charge of finding a common ground between Roman Catholic and Protestant.  Meetings of the Estates-  General at Orleans and at Pontoise were unable to achieve solutions either to the p o l i t i c a l or to the religious problems of the kingdom.  At the height of the f i r s t War of Religion  Catherine de Medicis confided to the due d'ftampes,  governor of  Bretagne, that since the bishops at Poissy had done nothing to appease the troubles on account of r e l i g i o n , she intended to try another strategy.  She planned to "assemble many good men from  the courts of Parlement to consider means of ending the troubles  2 in the kingdom and maintaining obedience to the king."  Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI: I, 21-24. Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I,  243.  153 No such assembly was held but the Parlements did play a significant  role in the maintenance of the monarchy nevertheless.  As a sovereign court the Parlement of Bordeaux v e r i f i e d and registered royal edicts, edicts,  arranged for the publication of those  f i l l e d gaps i n l e g i s l a t i o n with i t s own decrees, took an  active part in the maintenance of order and heard appeals from l o c a l courts in the province.*  Generally the Parlement co-  operated with the governor in the maintenance of royal authority and that s p i r i t was demonstrated i n a l e t t e r to Antoine de Bourbon after a Huguenot plot had threatened the c i t y .  The men of the  Parlement assured him that they had sent deputies before Burie to pledge themselves to the l a s t drop of their blood and the x  last ecu of their purses.  2  Jealous defence of royal prerogatives led the Parlement of Bordeaux to issue a remonstrance to Charles IX against patent granted by Jeanne d ' A l b r e t .  5  letters  Monluc called to the  attention of the court l e t t e r s patent by which the queen of Navarre authorized Calvinist preaching in a l l her towns and chateaux.  The Parlement considered the l e t t e r s patent as  Gaston Z e l l e r , "L'administration monarchique avant les intendants," Revue historique. V o l . 197 (19*+7), pp. I 8 5 - I 8 7 and Doucet, Institutions, I, 210-211. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 31. 5  I_bid., No. 9k.  k Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 239-253.  154 contrary to the king's edict and derogating from the king's authority.  By promulgating them through the senechal of the  duchy of Albret before presentation to the Parlement Jeanne d'Albret had registered them unlawfully and had trespassed on the sovereignty of Guyenne.  Men of the sovereign court took  particular exception to Jeanne d'Albret's use of the words "for such i s our pleasure," since t h e i r use pertained to the king alone.  1  While they awaited the king's r u l i n g , the men of  Parlement issued a provisional decree forbidding the sene"chaux of the duchy of Albret to publish similar l e t t e r s patent on 2 pain of a thousand l i v r e fine. Frequently the Parlement of Bordeaux offered advice to the king.  In 1561 in view of l o c a l conditions, i t counselled the  return of arms to the Catholics or the organizing of bands to disarm the Protestants.^  As the archbishop of Bordeaux was  about to leave for the Council of Trent, the Parlement, fearing that his leaving would bring great trouble, asked the king to '4 dispense with the t r i p .  In addition to offering advice, the  Parlement of Bordeaux acted to enforce the king's w i l l to such an extent that a constant stream of judgments emanated from that ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 94. 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 240, n. 1. ^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424. 4 I b i d . , p. 461.  155 court  during  the p e r i o d  of c i v i l  A l t h o u g h t h e men loyal as  t o the king,  of the Parlement  like  other  a means f o r p e r s o n a l  members o f t h a t  war.*  royal officers  advantage.  sovereign  o f B o r d e a u x were  court  t h e y saw t h e i r  Two f a c t o r s s u g g e s t  could  exploit their  accused  personal  interests.  of enriching  themselves  a remonstrance o f August that  from  31, 1563,  h i s patents regarding  of a s s o c i a t i o n s  On t h e o t h e r  but that  executing  their  were  the f i n e s t h e y  Parlement  the d e p o s i t i o n  and t h e announcement  published  they  positions. alien  widely levied.  In  informed Charles  IX  o f arms, t h e d i s s o l u t i o n  of h i s majority  had b e e n  h i s c o m m i s s i o n e r s would be p r e v e n t e d  commissions u n t i l  office  that  On one hand t h e y d e l a y e d t h e r e g i s t r a t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i o n to t h e i r  clearly  the Parlement  from  had r e c e i v e d  an  2 answer f r o m him on t h e i r grievance  was t h e l a c k  disarmament  clauses.  the  third  estate  required  to strip  the  that  fact  contre  Their p a r t i c u l a r  o f immunity p r o v i d e d  f o r them under t h e  I t g a l l e d t h e s e men, who r e f e r r e d t o  themselves as the k i n g ' s were exempted w h i l e  remonstrance.  "lieutenantz n a i z , " that  t h e y , who must r e n d e r  b u t on t h e n o b i l i t y t h e m s e l v e s o f arms.  i t s members r e p r e s e n t e d  justice  the n o b i l i t y not only  and t h e c l e r g y , The P a r l e m e n t the. k i n g ' s  e . g . I b i d . , p . 446, " A r r e t du p a r l e m e n t 104 de r e b e l l i o n , " 2 8 j u i l l e t , 1562.  on  were emphasized  name and  de B o r d e a u x  156 authority i n his absence and saw no reason why they should be less privileged than such extraordinaires as the prevSts de 1'h8tel.  Not only did they forward a remonstrance to the king  but the Parlement made i t s concerns known to Burie, Monluc and d'Escars.*  The l a t t e r replied that men of the Parlement should 2  set the example i n speedy obedience to the king's w i l l . The Parlements were i n constant r i v a l r y with governors for  administrative a u t h o r i t y .  5  At the end of 1562 after four  or five months i n m i l i t a r y compaigns, Burie returned to Bordeaux and became most concerned about conditions in that  city.  The multiplication of commanders led to "monopolies, p a r t i a l i t y and  confusion so that there followed i n d i g n i t i e s , larceny and  robbery even by those who should repress these things." best solution, i n Burie's eyes, was to make him solely for  The responsible  the c i t y , to place the keys of the c i t y i n no one else's  hands while he was there.  The interests of the king would be  best served, i n fact, i f Burie were sent a commission to undertake a f u l l scale investigation of the administration of for  justice  he was convinced that there would be a major discrepancy  ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 114. 2  I b i d . , No. 116.  5  Z e l l e r , "L'Administration monarchique...," p. 185.  4 • X ' „ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. "Instruction baillee par monsieur de Burye au thrgsorier Le Pyn pour faire entendre au roy."  157 between the record of fines and confiscations  on one hand, and  the amount by which the king's revenues had benefited on the other.  If the king would send the commission empowering him  to undertake such an investigation, Burie would choose those he thought best from the Parlement to assist him.  He would also  have the clerk of the court provide him immediately with a statement of a l l those convicted and subjected to fines and confiscations together with the amounts.  He was sure he could  recover a vast sum that had gone astray within the court, and set an example that could be followed throughout the kingdom to the king's p r o f i t . Charges made by the king's lieutenant against the  officers  of the Parlement must be balanced against the counter-charges of members of that court.  Nobles i n the Catholic army enriched  themselves by confiscating the goods of the Huguenots.  In this  practice they had the blessing of their commanders who did the same.  In a request addressed to the king the n o b i l i t y of Guyenne  declared that during the days of the c i v i l wars when the king's army and the n o b i l i t y of the province were led by Burie and Monluc, those l o r d s , lacking finances from the king to reward the most f a i t h f u l nobles, granted them some small g i f t s of p r o p e r t y . The f i r s t president and members of the Parlement questioned the  Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92.  1  158 a u t h o r i t y of the l i e u t e n a n t s to make such g i f t s , and inconvenienced the r e c e i v e r s w i t h summonses, a r r e s t s and f i n e s , much t o t h e i r annoyance.  The nobles accused the court of  f a v o u r i n g the Huguenots but the k i n g ' s c o u n c i l s i d e d with the Parlement.  In t h e i r view i t was not a matter of f a v o u r i n g the  Huguenots but of upholding law and t r a d i t i o n .  The c o u n c i l  decreed that the l i e u t e n a n t s had usurped a r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e i n g r a n t i n g goods t o t h e i r f o l l o w e r s and that Parlement was merely defending that r o y a l p r e r o g a t i v e .  1  In the r i v a l r y between the  Parlement and the l i e u t e n a n t s or governors both s i d e s supported r o y a l a u t h o r i t y and t h e i r own.  strongly  The crown tended t o  favour the Parlement as i t had more to fear from the independence 2 of the governors. C o u n c i l s and Commissions To a s s i s t and to c o n t r o l i t s o f f i c e r s the crown made use of c o u n c i l s .  Before l e a v i n g f o r Guyenne Montpensier asked f o r  a maitre des requetes t o a c t as h i s j u d i c i a l a s s i s t a n t , t o hear p l e a s , and t o render j u s t i c e to those found g u i l t y of s e d i t i o n , r e b e l l i o n , and other crimes worthy  of death.  The r o y a l c o u n c i l  determined that he should be a s s i s t e d by two c o u n c i l l o r s from the Parlement of Bordeaux and a blank commission  f o r the  Ibid. Z e l l e r , "L'Administration  monarchique...,"  p. 211.  159 councillors to be elected was given to Montpensier.  1  Similarly,  when Monluc was sent into the province he was accompanied by two 2 councillors from the Parlement of P a r i s .  They soon showed  3 Huguenot sympathies and Monluc harassed them u n t i l they f l e d . They were replaced by two men commissioned from the Parlement of Bordeaux and while awaiting them Monluc obtained the assistance of the lieutenant criminel from Agen and six councillors of that 4 senechaussee.  In days of s t r i f e i t was often essential  for  the lieutenant to administer justice in any location and on short notice.  Therefore, i t was advantageous to be accompanies by  advisors who were learned i n the law and experienced i n t r i a l 5 procedure. During the c i v i l wars the crown depended increasingly on the use of commissions.  A commission differed from an office i n  that i t was created for a specific mission and i t terminated with the completion of that mission or at the king's pleasure.  The  ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, II, 402; Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 11?.  3 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 163-164. 4 Monluc,. Commentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 123-124. ^In some provinces r e l i g i o u s controversy penetrated and paralyzed the sovereign courts. The due d'Etampes, governor of Bretagne asked that a maitre des requites be commissioned to assist him i n the administration of justice since the deadlock in the Parlement rendered i t impotent. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 22.  160 use of commissions became necessary as the sale of offices and succession practices enabled officers to become entrenched and to demonstrate considerable independence i n the exercise of their posts.  Secondly, the conversion of royal officers to the  Protestant faith l e f t  offices vacant or, more often,  allowed  the holders to exercise their authority on behalf of the Huguenots.  F i n a l l y , the disruptions caused by war at times  emptied offices  altogether and at other times led to the claim-  ing of one office by several men. The Edict of Pacification of 1563 was brought to Guyenne by two men commissioned to present i t to the Parlement of Bordeaux for r e g i s t r a t i o n and to see to i t s execution throughout the p r o v i n c e .  1  They were delayed i n the Parlement of  Bordeaux because that body wished "to make remonstrance to the king for the conservation of the authority of his sovereign 2  court."  The two commissioners reported immediately to the  king, the queen mother and to Monluc as governor of Guyenne. The important mission of executing the Edict of Pacification was entrusted to capable and conscientious men who did their utmost to f u l f i l  their r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  In such commissioners the crown  placed greater confidence than i n i t s regular o f f i c e r s  s  ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No 109. "Memoire des commissaires royaux Antoine Fumee et Hierosme Angenoust." Angenoust was a councillor of the Parlement of Paris. Fumee was grand rapporteur of France. The Fumee family represented a veritable dynasty of'maitres de requites de l ' H S t e l du r o i , " Doucet, Institutions, I, 155. 2  Documents Pour Servir st..., N O . 109.  161 Summary and Conclusion In the f i r s t half of the sixteenth-century the position of the king i n France was greatly enhanced.  The power of the  great feudal lords as r i v a l s to the king waned.  In 1523 the  domains of the due de Bourbon returned to the crown; of Bretagne.followed i n 1532.  the duchy  The only remaining p r i n c i p a l i t y  of any size was the kingdom of the Albrets i n the south.  The  king was able to tax his subjects v i r t u a l l y at w i l l and the efficiency of financial i n s t i t u t i o n s was improved.  Accounting  was centralized but the collection and expenditure of funds often took place on the l o c a l l e v e l .  The officer class increased  in number and function so that most agents of public authority were the king's  representatives.  The king appointed great nobles as governors of provinces and when they entered into r i v a l r y with the Parlements, he usually supported the Parlements.  Thus the power of those courts increased  and the power of the great nobles was curtailed to some degree. Nevertheless,  the governors were extremely important to royal  government for i n their provinces they were the pers.onal representatives  of the king.  These men had to be chosen with care  but i n a period of youthful kings and c i v i l war the choice was out of the king's hands i n some cases.  The governorship of  Guyenne was held by the ruler of Navarre throughout the century.  162 This increased the base of authority upon which that prince could act; i t extended the l i m i t s of his independence.  The governor  frequently resided outside his gouvernement and i n his absence lieutenants-general exercised royal authority.  The king appointed  these lieutenants-general but they owed a dual allegiance to king and governor. The application of the royal w i l l i n distant parts of the kingdom was hampered by the very distance and by the slowness of communications and c i v i l war only exaggerated such conditions. Boundaries of authority were very badly defined, both p o l i t i c a l l y and geographically and frequent clashes took place between different representatives  of royal authority.  The sale of  offices  raised some revenue but contributed to the entrenchment of officers i n positions which they exploited for their own benefit and from which i t was almost impossible to dislodge them.  For  this reason the king resorted increasingly to the use of commissions to carry out his orders at every l e v e l , a solution which increased not only his authority but his expenses. The Wars of Religion s p l i t the kingdom over religious and p o l i t i c a l issues and the king was subjected to attack by extremists of both sides.  The actions of l o y a l supporters of  the crown could be just as detrimental to royal authority as those of enemies.  Blaise de Monluc, lieutenant-general of the  163 k i n g i n Guyenne, a c t i n g authority, turn  over  intrigued  ostensibly  t o curb  lieutenant-governor. and r e w a r d  cause  this  fact  appointed  The same v a n i t y t h a t made h i m r e s p o n s i v e made him s u s c e p t i b l e  o n l y were extreme C a t h o l i c s a t h r e a t Huguenot  Doubtless  t o C a t h e r i n e ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o see M o n l u c  to f l a t t e r y  to royal  w i t h -the k i n g o f S p a i n a n d t h r e a t e n e d t o  t h e p r o v i n c e o f Guyenne t o h i m .  contributed  the t h r e a t  recruited  thousands  to intrigue.  but n o b l e s  of soldiers  Not  committed  to the  i n t h e same  province.  Recruitment the a b i l i t y  a n d command o f m i l i t a r y  of a l o c a l  strongman t o a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y .  t h e power t o name c a p t a i n s and t o r a i s e a b r o t h e r , s o n s and s o n - i n - l a w companies,  he had a v e r i t a b l e  circumstances considerable  Local  o r d e r s from  a l l commanding private  f o r c e s were a t t i m e s  one o r more Under  those with  royal  marshalled e f f e c t i v e l y to  policy.  When t h e c i t i z e n s  of a garrison  their  purpose.  g o a l , Jarnac r e p o r t e d that to eating their  horses  of La Rochelle  i n the c i t y ,  a d e l e g a t i o n t o the c o u r t well-equipped  money t o a c c o m p l i s h  reduced  army.  S i n c e Monluc had  t h e c o u r t were i n t e r p r e t e d  o p p o s e d payment f o r the s u p p o r t  their  men.  He had  latitude.  oppose a n u n p o p u l a r  dispatched  forces contributed to  they  with bribe  Whether o r n o t t h e y  t h e men o f t h e g a r r i s o n  before they disbanded  achieved were  and went  164 home.  Similarly the threat of a tax on export wine united the  bourgeois, n o b i l i t y and .clergy of Bordeaux i n opposition.  The  king, however, frequently had the last word in financial matters. In Guyenne one year the Estates voted a sum less than that asked on the pretext that inhabitants of parts of the province had already paid their quota.  Therefore, Etienne Lemacon, the  receiver general i n Guyenne was short.  Charles IX insisted that  the amount be raised in spite of a l l opposition and that i t be furnished i n the meantime by Francois de L a v i l l e , a colleague of Lemacon.* In spite of so many threats royal government in Guyenne was generally effective  in maintaining the king's authority.  The energetic Monluc and such f a i t h f u l governors of c i t i e s as Noailles could pledge sincere allegiance to their monarch. The former practised swift retribution i n the form of hanging; the l a t t e r promoted personal recognition by the sovereign by sending detailed analyses of the need to the queen mother.  Both these  officers had brothers who were prominent bishops, of Valence and of Dax respectively. offices  The a b i l i t y to grant many e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  lay i n the hands of the king and formed a small part of  the patronage by which he was able to maintain his f a i t h f u l officers.  The most powerful tool for the maintenance of royal  Archives historique du departement de l a Gironde, V o l . I l l , No. LXXX (1861), 200-203.  authority lay i n personal contact,  personal appointment and  personal reward by the king for those in a position to further his w i l l .  BIBLIOGRAPHY  BIBLIOGRAPHY I. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS F r a n k l i n , Alfred Louis Auguste. Les sources de l ' h i s t o i r e de France: notices bibliographiques et analytiques des inventaires et des recueils de documents r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de France ". Paris: L i b r a i r i e de Firmin-Didot et c i e . , 1877• Hauser, Henri. Les sources de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. XVI si&cle . (1494-1610). 4v. P a r i s : Picard, 1906-1915. The standard bibliography for sixteenth-century French h i s t o r y . Volume I I I , Les guerres de r e l i g i o n (1559-1589) i s invaluable for an assessment of the primary sources. e  Lasteyrie, Robert de, et a l . Bibliographie des travaux historiques et archeologiques publies par les societe's savantes de l a France". 6 v.. i n Collection de documents inedits sur l ' h i s t o i r e de France. Paris! Imprimerie nationale, 1888-1918. A l i s t of a r t i c l e s i n French scholarly journals arranged geographically; updated by Rene Gandilhon so that with the accompanying volumes of Bibliographie Annuelle i t includes works published to 1940. Monod, Gabriel Jacques Jean. Bibliographie de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. Catalogue methodique et chronologique des sources et des ouvrages r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de France depuis les origines jusqu'en 1789. Paris: Hachette, 1888. Saulnier, E . and A. Martin. Bibliographie des travaux publies de 1866 a 1897 sur l ' h i s t o i r e de France de 1500 a 1789. 271 P a r i s : Presses Universitaires de France, 1932-1938. S o c i l t l de l ' h i s t o i r e de France. present.  Annuaire-bulletin.  Paris, 1863-  T i l l e y , Arthur. The Literature of the French Renaissance. 2v. Cambridge: University Press, 1904. Contains analyses of the style and content of many of the h i s t o r i e s and memoirs.  168  I I . PRINTED DOCUMENTS A. Major Collections  Collection de documents inedits sur 1'histoire de France. Many v. P a r i s : I m p r i m e r i e nationale, l836ff. Initiated by Guizot, minister of public instruction; directed by the Comite des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques since l 8 8 l . La F e r r i e r e , Hector, comte de and comte Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse, eds. Lettres de Catherine de M l d i c i s . llv.  1880-1943.  Very important source, v . I , II and X contain l e t t e r s of this period; v. XI i s a general index; many l e t t e r s to o f f i c i a l s in Guyenne and to such confidantes of the queen mother as Sebastien de l'Aubespine, bishop of Limoges and Ambassador to the court of P h i l i p I I . P a r i s , Antoine Louis, ed. N^gociations, l e t t r e s et pieces diverses relatives au regne de Francois II, tire~es du portefeuille de Sebastien de l'Aubespine, eve~que de Limoges, l84l~ Dispatches to and from the French ambassador in Spain, 1559-1561. Tommaseo, Niccolo, ed. Relations des ambassadeurs venitiens sur les affaires de France au XVI siecle"! 2v. I838. O f f i c i a l reports; contains excellent descriptions and analyses of a f f a i r s at the French court. e  Michaud, Joseph Francois and Jean Joseph Poujoulat, eds. Nouvelle c o l l e c t i o n des memoires pour servir a 1*histoire de France, depuis le X I I I siecle jusqu'a l a , fin du X V I I I ; precede's~de notices pour caracteriser chaque auteur des memoires et son e"poque; suivis de l'analyze des documents historiques qui s'y rapportent. Series I, 12v.; series II, 10v.; series I I I , 10v.; 32v. in a l l . P a r i s , I836-I839. e  e  Conde, Louis de Bourbon, prince de. Memoires du prince de Conde. Recueil des choses memorables faites et passees pour le faict de l a r e l i g i o n et estat de ce royaume,• depuis l a mort du roy Henri II jusqu'en l'annee 1564. Ser. I, v. 6. F i r s t compiled in Orleans to show Conde's role i n suppressing the troubles; not unbiased.  169 Guise, Francois de Lorraine, due de. Memoires de Francois de Lorraine, due d'Aumale et de Guise, concernant les affaires de France et les negociations avec l'Ecdsse, l ' l t a l i e et l'Allemagne, pendant les annees 15^7 a 1561, publies sur les manuscrits originaux. Ser. I, v. VI. La Noue, Francois de. Memoires du sieur Francois de La Noue. Ser. I, v. IX. The author was a Breton Huguenot gentleman who fought at Dreux; remarkably i m p a r t i a l . P e t i t o t , Claude Bernard, Alexandre Petitot, Louis Jean Nicolas Monmerque, et_ a l , eds. Collection complete des memoires r e l a t i f s a l ' h i s t o i r e de France, depuis le regne de Philippe Augusta... avec des notices sur chaque auteur, et des observations sur chaque ouvrage. 130v. in 131. Paris: Foucault, 1S20-1829. Mergey, Jean sieur de. Memoires du Sieur Jean de Mergey, gentilhomme champenois. Ser. I, v. XXXIV. These memoirs begin in 1562 when the author was serving under La Rochefoucauld; they are very b r i e f . . Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de. Memoires de t r e s noble et t r e s - i l l u s t r e Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de Tavannes, mareschal de France, gouverneur de Provence, conseiller du roy, et capitaine de cent hommes d'armes. Ser. I, v. XXIII-XXV. Actually written by Jean de Saulx-Tavannes to honour his father; useful for the battle of Dreux. B. Other Documents Cabie, Edmond. Guerres de r e l i g i o n dans le sud-ouest de l a France et principalement dans le Quercy, d'apres les papiers des seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 a 1390. A l b i : Imprimerie Noguies, 1906. Documents transcribed, helpful i n establishing identity and relationships of personnel. . Courteault, Paul. Commentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Marechal de France. 3v. Paris: Picard, 1911-1925. The definitive edition of Monluc's commentaries; used extensively i n this study.  170 F r a n c o i s , M i c h e l , ed. J o u r n a l de l'anne'e 1562 P a s c h a l . P a r i s : H. Champion, 1950.  par P i e r r e de  . La Correspondence de F r a n c o i s , C a r d i n a l de Tournon, • 1521-1552T P a r i s : H. Champion, 19^6. Not an important source f o r t h i s p e r i o d . Isambert, F r a n c o i s Andre, et_ _al, eds. R e c u e i l gene"rale des anciennes l o i s f r a n c a i s e s , depuis l ' a n 420 jusqu'a 1st r e v o l u t i o n de 1 7 8 9 . Paris: Librairie de Plon F r e r e s 1882". 2 9 v . i n 24. Important e d i c t s of the p e r i o d under study are contained i n v. XIV ( 1 5 5 9 - 1 5 8 9 ) . "Journal de ce q u i s'est passe en France durant I'annee 1 5 6 2 , principalement dans P a r i s et a l a cour," Revue r e t r o s p e c t i v e , S e r . I, V, 8 1 - 1 1 6 , 1 6 8 - 2 1 2 ; 1 8 3 4 . W r i t t e n by a C a t h o l i c gentleman at the court who enjoyed the confidence of Catherine de Medicis and the c a r d i n a l of Lorraine. Lot, F e r d i n a n d . Recherches sur l e s e f f e c t i f s des armies f r a n c a i s e s des guerres d ' l t a l i e au guerres de r e l i g i o n , 1494-1562.Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1 9 6 2 . Contains documents showing s i z e and type of f o r c e s , command and c o s t , :  L u b l i n s k a j a , Aleksandra Dmitrievna, ed. Documents pour s e r v i r a ' 1 ' h i s t o i r e des guerres c i v i l e s en France, 1 5 6 I - I 5 6 3 . Moscow: Akademia nauk SSSR, I n s t i t u t i s t o r i i , 1962. Contains many l e t t e r s from high r o y a l o f f i c i a l s t o the c o u r t ; a v a l u a b l e source f o r t h i s study, Rochambeau, Eugene A c h i l l e L a c r o i x de Vimeux, comte de. Lettres d'Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d ' A l b r e t . P a r i s : L i b r a i r i e . Renouard, 1 8 7 7 . ~' A major source f o r the k i n g of Navarre, one of the key f i g u r e s of the p e r i o d . Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de, ed. Comrnentaires et l e t t r e s de B l a i s e de Monluc. 5 v . P a r i s : L i b r a i r i e Renouard, 1864-1872. T h i s e d i t i o n of the commentaries was not based on the best t e x t and has been superseded by C o u r t e a u l t ' s ; v. IV and V c o n t a i n 175 l e t t e r s i n c l u d i n g such documents as the c h a r t e r of a league at Agen and a statement of the m i l i t a r y expenses of Guyenne; v. IV i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l source.  171 S u r i a n o , M i c h e l e a n d Marc A n t o n i o B a r b a r o . D i s p a t c h e s , I56O-I563, t r a n s l a t e d and e d i t e d by S i r H e n r y L a y a r d , i n The Huguenot S o c i e t y of London, P u b l i c a t i o n s , V I , L y m i n t o n , I89I. T e x t and t r a n s l a t i o n ; S u r i a n o , N o v e m b e r , I56O t o N o v e m b e r , 1561; B a r b a r o , O c t o b e r , 1562 t o A u g u s t , 1563; some o f t h e c l e a r e s t a n a l y s e s o f events and p e r s o n a l i t i e s at the F r e n c h court. W i l k i n s o n , M a u r i c e , e d . "Documents i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e w a r s o f r e l i g i o n , 1569-1573," E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , X X V I , 127138; J a n u a r y , 1911. Documents f r o m t h e " R e g i s t r e s s e c r e t e s du p a r l e m e n t de Bordeaux;" of i n t e r e s t f o r source r a t h e r than d a t e .  III.  HISTORIES BY CONTEMPORARIES  Aubigne, Agrippa d ' . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e . P u b l i c a t i o n of the s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by A l p h o n s e de R u b l e . lOv. P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1886-1909. C l e a r l y Huguenot v i e w p o i n t y e t r e m a r k a b l y f a i r ; borrowed f r e e l y from other a u t h o r s . B e z e , Theodore d e . H i s t o i r e e c c l e s i a s t i q u e des e g l i s e s r e f o r m e e s au royaume de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by G . Baum and E . C u n i t z . B a s e d on t h e o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n , I58O. 3v. P a r i s : F i s c h b a c h e r ,  1883-1889.  W r i t t e n from P r o t e s t a n t p o i n t of view w i t h a p o l o g e t i c purpose; l i k e d ' A u b i g n e , Beze borrowed f r e e l y from o t h e r historians. B r a n t o m e , P i e r r e de B o u r d e i l l e , s e i g n e u r d e . O e u v r e s c o m p l e t e s . P u b l i c a t i o n o f t h e s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . - E d i t e d by L u d o v i c L a l a n n e . l l v . Paris: R e n o u a r d , 1864-1882. C a t h o l i c w r i t e r ; v . XI i s an i n d e x , e s s e n t i a l f o r p r o f i t a b l e use o f t h i s f r a g m e n t e d w o r k . L a P o p e l i n i e r e , L a n c e l o t V o i s i n , s i e u r d e . L ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e e n r i c h i e des p l u s n o t a b l e s o c c u r r e n c e s survenues es p r o v i n c e s de l ' E u r o p e e t p a y s v o i s i n s d e p u i s l ' a n 1550 j u s q u ' a c e s temps. 3v. ( A r r a s ? ) 1582. T h o u , J a c q u e s A u g u s t d e . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e d e p u i s 1543 j u s q u ' en 1607, t r a d u i t s u r 1 ' e d i t i o n l a t i n e de L o n d r e s . I 6 v . London: and P a r i s , 1734. P o l i t i q u e p o i n t of view; g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r i e s of the p e r i o d .  172 IV. GENERAL HISTORIES Lavisse, Ernest, ed. Histoire de France depuis ies origines jusqu'a l a revolution. Paris: Hachette, 1900-1911. The best general history of France; Volume V:2 (1519-1559) by Henry Lemonnier and volume VI:1 (1559-1598) by Jean H. Mariejol are useful. Mousnier, Roland. Les XVI® et XVII s i e c l e s , v. IV in Maurice Crouzet, director, Histoire generale des c i v i l i s a t i o n s . Paris: Presses Universitaires de F r a n c e , I 9 6 I . Contains a good summary of Mousnier's view of French absolutism in the sixteenth century. e  Romier, Lucien. History of France. Translated and completed by A . L . Rowse. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. A good overview; too brief to be useful for the period under study.  •V. HISTORIES OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND OF THE WARS OF RELIGION Armstrong, Edward. The French Wars of Religion, Their P o l i t i c a l Aspects. 2nd edition; Oxford: Blackwell, 1904. An expansion of three lectures; useful brief synthesis. B a t t i f o l , Louis. The Century of the Renaissance, v. II in The National History of France. Edited by F r . Funck-Brentano. 6v. Translated by E . F . Buckley. London: Heinemann, 1916. Well-written survey without documentation. Grant, Arthur James. A History of Europe from 1494 to 1610, v. V i n Methuen's History of Medieval and Modern Europe, London: Methuen, 1931. L i v e t , Georges. Les guerres de r e l i g i o n . Que sais-je? Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Helpful analysis in brief form.  Paris:  Neale, John. The Age of Catherine de Medicis. London: Cape, 1943. An expansion of a lecture series; people and issues of the Wars of Religion clearly i d e n t i f i e d .  173 Thompson, James Westfall. The Wars of Religion in France, 15591576; The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici:and P h i l i p I I . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. S t i l l the standard work on the subject; considers p a r t i c u l a r l y the diplomatic and economic aspects of the c i v i l wars.  VI. BOOKS ON SPECIAL TOPICS A l l e n , J.W. A History of P o l i t i c a l Theory in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen, 1957. F i r s t published 1928, reprinted with revised bibliography  1957.  Champion, P i e r r e . La Jeunesse de Henri III. Grasset, 1941.  Paris:  Bernard  Church, William F a r r . Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century France, A Study in the Evolution of Ideas, v. X in Harvard H i s t o r i c a l Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19^1. Courteault, Paul. Blaise de Monluc, historien; e"tude critique sur le texte et l a valeur historique des commentaires. Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1908. Essential source for f i l l i n g the gaps and correcting errors i n Monluc's Commentaires; contains much helpful explanatory material. . Un cadet de gascogne au XVI s i e c l e , Blaise de Monluc. P a r i s : Alphonse Picard, 1909. A biography based on the author's detailed study of the sources; brief and lacking documentation. e  Croze, Joseph de. Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe I I . d'Amyot, 1866.  Paris:  Devic, dom Claude and dom Jean Joseph Vaissete. Histoire generale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s . I6v. Toulouse: E . Privot, 1872-1904. Volume XI deals with Languedoc in the sixteenth century; contains many documents useful for the events in and near Toulouse which had a bearing on Haute-Guyenne.  174 Doucet, Roger. JStude sur le gouvernement de Francois Ier dans ses rapports avec le Parlement de P a r i s . 2v. Paris: Champion, 1921-1926. . Les i n s t i t u t i o n s de l a France au XVie s i e c l e . 2v. P a r i s : Picard, 1948. Excellent description of origin and development of French i n s t i t u t i o n s ; helpful bibliography. Gigon, S. - C . La Revolte de l a gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549. P a r i s : Honore Champion, 190o. Useful for observing the continuity of conflict and concern for provincial prerogatives. Grant, Arthur James. The French Monarchy, 1483-1789. in Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l Series, George W. Prothero, ed. 2v. Cambridge: University Press, 1900. Hale, John Rigby, e_t a l , ed. Europe in the Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965* Contains two good a r t i c l e s l i s t e d below on France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. H e r i t i e r , Jean. Catherine de Medici. Charlotte Haldane, trans. London: George Allen and Unwin L t d . , 1963* Translated from Catherine de Medicis. Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1959. The author interprets Catherine's p o l i t i c a l aims in terms of "Machiavellism." Imbart de l a Tour, P i e r r e . Hachette, 1905-1935.  Les origines de l a reforme.  4v.  Paris  Jensen, De Lemar. Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. K e l l y , Caleb G. French Protestantism 1559-1562. Ser. XXXVI, No. 4 i n Johns Hopkins University Studies in H i s t o r i c a l and P o l i t i c a l Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1918. Emphasizes economic factors; of interest regarding origins of leagues. Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion i n France, 1555-1565"! v.22 in Travaux d'humanisme et renaissance. Geneva: E . Droz, 1956. Invaluable for Protestant military organization and p a r t i c u l a r l y for the relation of the Geneva Company of Pastors to the Huguenot movement in France.  175  Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement, 1564-1572; a contribution to the history of Congregationalism, Presbyterianism and C a l v i n i s t resistance theory. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, Good bibliography. Leonard, Emile G. Histoire generale du protestantisme. 3 v . P a r i s : Presses Universitaires de F r a n c e , 1 9 6 1 . v. I, La Reformation, i s useful; v. I I , L'Etablissement, 1 5 6 4 - 1 7 0 0 , contains a good section on Calvinism i n France. Le Patourel, John. "The King and the Princes i n Fourteenth Century France," i n John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe i n the Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965.  Lewis, P. S. "France i n the Fifteenth Century: Society and Sovereignty," i n John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe in the Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University P r e s s , 1 9 6 5 . Major, James R u s s e l l . The Deputies to the Estates General i n Renaissance France. No. 21 i n Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . . The Estates General of I56O. University Press, 1 9 5 1 .  Princeton:  Princeton  . Representative Institutions i n Renaissance France, T52I-I559. No. 22 i n Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary I n s t i t u t i o n s . Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . Mariejol, Jean Hippolyte.  Catherine de Medicis.  Paris:  Hachette,  1920.  Mousnier, Roland. Etat et societe sous Francois Ier et pendant le gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV. Les Cours de Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine• Paris: Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1966. P a r t i c u l a r l y good for government, society and customs, 1515-1547.  176 Mousnier, Roland. Etudes sur l a France au XVT s i e c l e . 2 p t i e . Les Cours de Sorbonne. H i s t o i r e Moderne et Contemporaine. Paris: Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959* Good treatment of the development of r o y a l government under F r a n c i s I and Henry I I ; more d e t a i l on f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s than-others. e  . Etudes sur l a France de 1494-1559• Les Cours de Sorbonne. H i s t o i r e Moderne et Contemporaine. P a r i s : Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1964. -  . La v e n a l i t e des o f f i c e s sous Henri IV et Louis X I I I . Rouen: Maugard,1945. The standard work on t h i s t o p i c ; focuses on a l a t e r p e r i o d but u s e f u l for s t u d y i n g development of v e n a l i t y .  Pages, Georges, ed. Etudes sur 1 ' h i s t o i r e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e et s o c i a l e de l ' a n c i e n r e g i m e " P a r i s : F e l i x Alcan, 1938. C h i e f l y concerned with the l a t e r years of the ancien  regime.  Palm, F r a n k l i n C h a r l e s . The Establishment of French Absolutism, 1574-1610. New York: F. S. C r o f t s , 1928. . P o l i t i c s and R e l i g i o n i n S i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y France; A Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned • King of the South. Boston: Ginn, 1927. P i c o t , Georges. H i s t o i r e des e t a t s generaux consideres au point de vue de l e u r i n f l u e n c e sur l e gouvernement de l a France de 13551614. 2nd e d i t i o n . 5v. P a r i s : Hachette, 1888. Romier, L u c i e n . La c a r r i e r e d'un f a v o r i , Jacques d'Albon de S a i n t Andre, Margchai de France, 1512-1562. P a r i s : P e r r i n , 1909. E x c e l l e n t example of the r i s e of a l o y a l c l i e n t of Henry I I . C a t h o l i q u e s et huguenots a l a cour de Charles IX, 1924.  15o*2. P a r i s : P e r r i n , .  La C o n j u r a t i o n d'Amboise.  . Les o r i g i n e s p o l i t i q u e s des P a r i s : P e r r i n , 1913-1914.  Paris: Perrin, guerres de  1560-  1923.  religion.  2v.  Le royaume de Catherine de M e d i c i s ; La France a l a v e i l l e des guerres de r e l i g i o n . 2v. Paris: Perrin, 1922.  177 Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de. Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret, suite de le mariage de~Jeanne d'Albret"! 4v. Paris: Adolphe Labitte, 1881-1886. v. II-IV deal with the period from the death of Henry II to the death of Antoine de Bourbon; the extensive pieces j u s t i f i c a t i v e s i n each volume are the most helpful aspect of this work e.g. for the influence of P h i l i p II on the king of Navarre. . Jeanne d'Albret et l a guerre c i v i l e . Paris: Libraires de l a bibliotheque nationale, 1897, ~* 1~. v. I deals with the period under study; again the documents are helpful for events in Guyenne. Sutherland, N. M. The French Secretaries of State i n the Reign of Catherine de Medici, v. X i n University of London H i s t o r i c a l Studies. London: Athlone Press, 1962. Excellent account of the l i v e s of these important o f f i c e r s . Van Dyke, Paul»  Catherine de Medicis.  2v. London:  Murray, 1923*  Weber, Bernerd Clarke. "The Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157*+)." Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1935. Very useful source since relations with Spain were parti c u l a r l y significant for royal government i n Guyenne. W e i l l , Georges. Les theories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de r e l i g i o n . P a r i s : Hachette, 1891. Z e l l e r , Gaston. Aspects de l a politique frangaise sous l'ancien regime. P a r i s ! P r e s s e s universitaires de France,1964. Collection of Z e l l e r ' s a r t i c l e s published i n various journals between 1919 and i960; includes the a r t i c l e on the governors of provinces. . Les i n s t i t u t i o n s de l a France au XVie s i e c l e . . Presses universitaires de France, 1948. Excellent brief survey.  Paris:  178 VII.  PERIODICAL LITERATURE  Armstrong, Edward. "The p o l i t i c a l theory of the Huguenots," English H i s t o r i c a l Review, IV (January, 1889),. 13-40. Baguenault de Puchesse. "La politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de France, 1559-1598," Revue des questions historiques, XXV (January, 1879), 5-66. Dupont-Ferrier, Gustave. "Ignorances et distractions administratives en France aux XIV et XV s i e c l e s , " Bibliotheque de l ' e c o l e des chartes, C (1939), 145-156. e  e  Furgeot, Henri. "L'alienation des biens du c l e r g l sous Charles IX," Revue des questions historiques, XXIX ( A p r i l , l 8 8 l ) , 428-490. Hamilton, Blanche. "Paris under the last Valois kings," H i s t o r i c a l Review, I ( A p r i l , 1886), 260-276.  English  Hartung, F . and Roland Mousnier. "Quelques problemes concernant l a monarchie absolue," Relazioni del X congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, IV, S t o r i a Moderna (Florence, 1955), 1-55. Hauser, Henri. "Antoine de Bourbon et l'Allemagne, 1560-1561," Revue historique, XLV (January-April, 1891), 54-61. . "De l'humanisme et de l a rlforme en France, 1512-1552," Revue historique, LXIV (May-August, 1897), 258-297. . "The European Financial C r i s i s of 1559," Journal of Economic and Business History, II (February, 1930), 241-255. . "The French Reformation and the French People in the Sixteenth Century," American H i s t o r i c a l Review, IV (January, 1899), 217-227. . "Sur 1•authenticite des Discours de La Noue," Revue historique, LIII (September-December, 1893), 301-311. Koenigsberger, H. G. "Review of N. M. Sutherland, The French Secretaries of State i n the Reign of Catherine de Medicis," English H i s t o r i c a l Review, • LXXIX 11964), 114-116. La Ferriere-Percy, Hector de Masso, comte de. "Catherine de Medicis et les Politiques,", Revue des questions historiques, LVI (October, 1894), 404-439.  179 " L e t t r e s p a t e n t e s de C h a r l e s IX p o u r l e p a i e m e n t , au moyen d'un v i r e m e n t , des gages a r r i e r e s des v i c e - s e n e c h a u x de Guyenne e t des g a r d e s de MM. de Burye e t de M o n l u c , " Archives historique  du d e p a r t e m e n t  de l a G i r o n d e , v. I l l ( l 8 6 l ) , No. LXXX, 200-203»  M a j o r , James R u s s e l l . "The Crown and t h e A r i s t o c r a c y i n R e n a i s s a n c e France," American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LXIX:3 ( A p r i l , 1 9 6 4 ) ,  630-646. "Payment o f the D e p u t i e s t o t h e F r e n c h N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l i e s , J o u r n a l o f Modern H i s t o r y , X X V I I (1955), 217-279.  1*4^4-1627," .  "The  T h i r d E s t a t e i n the E s t a t e s - G e n e r a l of P o n t o i s e , "  S p e c u l u m , XXXIX (1954), 460-474. Mercier, Charles. "Les t h e o r i e s p o l i t i q u e s des C a l v i n i s t e s en F r a n c e au c o u r s des g u e r r e s de r e l i g i o n , " B u l l e t i n de l a s o c i e t e d e ' 1 h i s t o i r e du P r o t e s t a n t i s m e f r a n c a i s , LXXXIII ( A p r i l - J u n e , J u l y - S e p t e m b e r , 1934), 225-260; 381-415. 1  Pages, Georges.  "La v e n a l i t e " des  Revue h i s t o r i q u e ,  CLXIX  offices  dans l ' a n c i e n n e  France,"  (1932), 477-495.  P a i l l a r d , Charles Hippolyte. "Additions critiques a 1'histoire de l a c o n j u r a t i o n d'Amboise," Revue h i s t o r i q u e , XIV ( S e p t e m b e r December, 1880), 61-108; 311-355. C o n t a i n s a b s t r a c t s o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f C h a n t o n n a y , the S p a n i s h ambassador i n F r a n c e , w i t h M a r g u e r i t e o f Parma. Perroy, Edouard. " F e u d a l i s m or P r i n c i p a l i t i e s i n F i f t e e n t h C e n t u r y F r a n c e , " i n U n i v e r s i t y of London, B u l l e t i n o f the I n s t i t u t e of H i s t o r i c a l Research, XX:6l (1945), 181-185. Romier, Jean B a p t i s t e L u c i e n . "Les p r o t e s t a n t s f r a n c a i s e s a l a v e i l l e des g u e r r e s c i v i l e s , " Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CXXXIV ( J a n u a r y A p r i l , 1917), 1-51; 225-286. Van  Dyke, P a u l . " F r a n c o i s de G u i s e and t h e t a k i n g o f C a l a i s , " Annual Report of the American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e  Y e a r 1911,  1,(1913), 101-107.  Weiss, N o e l . "La m a i s o n de L o r r a i n e e t l a r e f o r m e en F r a n c e au XVie s i e c l e , " B u l l e t i n de l a s o c i e t e de 1 ' h i s t o i r e du Protestantisme francais, L V I I ( J a n u a r y - F e b r u a r y , 1908), 316-  180 Z e l l e r , Gaston. " L * a d m i n i s t r a t i o n monarchique avant l e s i n t e n d a n t s , Parlements et Gouverneurs,'* Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CXCVII ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 180-215. . "Gouverneurs des p r o v i n c e s au X V I h i s t o r i q u e , CLXXXV ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 2 2 5 - 2 5 6 .  e  siecle,"  Revue  

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