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Royal government in Guyenne during the first war of religion 1561-1563 Birch, Daniel R. 1968-08-10

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ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE DURING THE FIRST WAR OF RELIGION: 1561 - 1563 by DANIEL RICHARD BIRCH B.R.E., Northwest B a p t i s t T h e o l o g i c a l C o l l e g e , i960 B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1963 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of H i s t o r y We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA March, 1968 In p resent ing t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study . I f u r t h e r agree that permiss ion f o r ex tens i ve copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s represen t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be al lowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department of H i s t o r y  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date March 2 1 , 1968 - ABSTRACT - The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s was to i n v e s t i g a t e the p r i n c i p a l c h a l l e n g e s t o r o y a l a u t h o r i t y and the means by which r o y a l a u t h o r i t y was maintained i n France d u r i n g the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n (1561-1563). The l a t t e r h a l f of the s i x t e e n t h century was a c r i t i c a l p e r i o d f o r the French monarchy. Great noble f a m i l i e s attempted t o r e - e s t a b l i s h t h e i r f e u d a l power at the expense of the crown. F r a n c i s I I and C h a r l e s IX, kings who were merely boys, succeeded s t r o n g monarchs on the throne. The kingdom was im p o v e r i s h e d by f o r e i g n wars and overrun by veteran s o l d i e r s , i l l - absorbed i n t o c i v i l l i f e . C a l v i n i s m spread r a p i d l y and became not only a r e l i g i o u s but a p o l i t i c a l movement drawing i d e o l o g i c a l and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l support from Geneva. The powerful Hapsburg monarch, P h i l i p I I , watched a f f a i r s i n France with a s u s p i c i o u s eye and f r e q u e n t l y manipulated matters a f f e c t i n g the French c o u r t . Not only were h i s border t e r r i t o r i e s i n the Pyrenees threatened but the Spanish k i n g r i g h t l y f e a r e d th a t r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n i n France would have r e p e r c u s s i o n s i n h i s r i c h low country t e r r i t o r i e s . The p r o v i n c e of Guyenne was chosen as a s e t t i n g f o r t h i s study because i t was the p r o v i n c e of the f i r s t p r i n c e of the blood, i t was c l o s e to the Spanish kingdom, i t had a h i s t o r y of concern f o r l o c a l p r e r o g a t i v e s , and i t had a l a r g e number of Huguenot b e l i e v e r s and c o n g r e g a t i o n s . i i i Not l e a s t among the reasons f o r choosing Guyenne i n which to study r o y a l government was the a v a i l a b i l i t y of abundant documentary so u r c e s . T h i s t h e s i s i s based p r i m a r i l y upon the examination of memoirs and correspondence. Most important of the memoirs are those of B l a i s e de Monluc, l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of Guyenne. The c r i t i c a l e d i t i o n of these together with a biography and a study of the h i s t o r i c a l accuracy and s i g n i f i c a n c e of Monluc Commentaires have been prepared by P r o f e s s o r P a u l C o u r t e a u l t . Among the documents a v a i l a b l e i s the ex t e n s i v e correspondence of Cat h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , the l e t t e r s of Antoine de Bourbon, those of Monluc, and many l e t t e r s of C h a r l e s IX and of p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c e r s R oyal government i n France was not based on a f i n a n c i a l , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e or m i l i t a r y f oundation adequate f o r the k i n g to fo r c e h i s w i l l upon h i s s u b j e c t s . I n t e r e s t groups a l l i e d to the k i n g had p o p u l a r i z e d an i d e o l o g y of r o y a l a u t h o r i t y which served r o y a l i n t e r e s t s . P e r s o n a l contact w i t h h i s s u b j e c t s , e s p e c i a l l y with the n o b i l i t y enhanced r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . The b a s i s of r o y a l government, however, was the g o o d w i l l and c o - o p e r a t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l s i n p o s i t i o n s of i n f l u e n c e . King C h a r l e s IX and Cathe r i n e de M e d i c i s , the queen mother, c o n s t a n t l y sought to gain and maintain such g o o d w i l l and support. They granted o f f i c e s and honours which c a r r i e d with them the o p p o r t u n i t y of p r o f e s s i o n a l advancement and p e r s o n a l enrichment. An e x t e n s i v e i v correspondence tended t o maintain t h e i r knowledge of a f f a i r s throughout the kingdom and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e over t h e i r s u b j e c t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s they had to balance i n d i v i d u a l noble a g a i n s t noble, f a c t i o n a g a i n s t f a c t i o n , Parlement a g a i n s t governor i n constant n e g o t i a t i o n to m a i n t a i n r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the personnel who r e p r e s e n t e d the k i n g i n Guyenne r e v e a l s ways i n which p r o v i n c i a l r e s o u r c e s c o u l d be m o b i l i z e d f o r the crown and a g a i n s t the crown. In a p e r i o d of c i v i l war the m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n of the r o y a l army w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e was of c r i t i c a l importance p a r t i c u l a r l y when the army was l a r g e l y l o c a l . L o c a l n o t a b l e s appointed o f f i c e r s , r e c r u i t e d s o l d i e r s and commanded the f o r c e s . Just as important to the crown were the f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of the p r o v i n c e . As with the m i l i t a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s , i t i s e s s e n t i a l to determine the ways i n which those i n s t i t u t i o n s f a c i l i t a t e d r o y a l government and the ways i n which they c o u l d be made to serve the p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups other than the crown. The d e s i g n a t i o n " a b s o l u t e " as a p p l i e d to the s i x t e e n t h - century French monarchy must be somewhat q u a l i f i e d as a r e s u l t ' : o f an examination of the f u n c t i o n i n g of l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s : v o l u n t a r y ( l e a g u e s ) , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ( E s t a t e s ) and appointed (Parlement). I t i s t o the nature of that monarchy that the present study i s addressed. The p r o v i n c e of Guyenne and the f i r s t years of c i v i l war p r o v i d e the h i s t o r i c a l setting,, TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT . . 1 Absolute Monarchy . 1 The Great Nobles L The Guise Regency 6 Cat h e r i n e de M e d i c i s as Regent . . . 8 Prelude t o C i v i l War . . . . . 9 Huguenot O r g a n i z a t i o n 11 C a t h e r i n e ' s View of the Monarchy 17 Royal A u t h o r i t y i n Guyenne 22 I I . PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE 24 P r i n c e s of the Blood 26 L i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l kO Governors of C i t i e s 53 I I I . MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL AUTHORITY . . . . 63 M i l i t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n and Forces i n Guyenne . . . 67 L " O r d i n a i r e des Guerres 68 L * E x t r a o r d i n a i r e des Guerres 78 Recruitment and Appointments 86 Command 93 IV. FINANCE AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 99 v i CHAPTER PAGE V. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY 132 The F i r s t War of R e l i g i o n - Summary of Events . . 132 C a t h o l i c Leagues i n Guyenne 139 L o c a l E s t a t e s l*+7 The Parlement of Bordeaux 152 C o u n c i l s and Commissions 158 Summary and C o n c l u s i o n 161 BIBLIOGRAPHY 166 PROVINCES OF FRANCE CHAPTER I THE MONARCHY AND CHALLENGES TO ROYAL GOVERNMENT A b s o l u t e Monarchy The F r e n c h monarchy of the m i d - s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y was as p o w e r f u l as at any time i n h i s t o r y . L o u i s X I I (1498-1515)i F r a n c i s I (1515-1547) and Henry I I (154-7-1559) each c o n t r i b u t e d to the p r e s t i g e and a u t h o r i t y of the crown. W i d e l y h e l d p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t the k i n g r e c e i v e d h i s s o v e r e i g n t y from God and was the law i n c a r n a t e . In s p i t e of the p e r s i s t e n t t r a d i t i o n t h a t t h e y must l i v e on the revenue from t h e i r own domain, these monarchs i n c r e a s e d t h e i r a b i l i t y t o t a x s u b j e c t s a t w i l l . At the same time t h e y extended r o y a l c o n t r o l over f i n a n c i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l e g i s l a t i o n and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d great f e u d a l r i v a l s were e l i m i n a t e d and t h e i r l a n d s r e t u r n e d t o the crown. Georges Pages e x p r e s s e d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of many h i s t o r i a n s i n the words, " F r a n c i s I and Henry I I were as p o w e r f u l as any o t h e r k i n g s of F r a n c e ; i t was at the b e g i n n i n g of the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a t the a b s o l u t e monarchy tri u m p h e d . " ^ The term " a b s o l u t e " a p p l i e d t o the F r e n c h monarchy of the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y must be c a r e f u l l y q u a l i f i e d . The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n Quoted by J . R u s s e l l M a j o r , R e p r e s e n t a t i v e I n s t i t u t i o n s  i n R e n a i s s a n c e F r a n c e , 1421-1559 (Madison:. U n i v e r s i t y of W i s c o n s i n P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ) , p. 3. encompassed t e n or tw e l v e thousand o f f i c e r s and was the l a r g e s t i n Europe.*'" A p r o f e s s i o n a l army g a r r i s o n e d f o r t i f i e d p l a c e s and 2 e n c l o s e d c i t i e s throughout the kingdom. N e v e r t h e l e s s , the k i n g ' s a b i l i t y t o e n f o r c e h i s w i l l from one end of h i s e x t e n s i v e kingdom t o the o t h e r was l i m i t e d . By the time of Cateau-Cambresis i n 1559 decades of war i n I t a l y had extended r o y a l c r e d i t to the b r e a k i n g 3 p o i n t and the monarchy was deeply i n debt. On the one hand the f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of the crown l i m i t e d the patronage t h a t c o u l d k be d i s p e n s e d . O f f i c e r s went unremunerated sometimes f o r y e a r s . On the o t h e r hand more o f f i c e s were c r e a t e d . f o r the revenue t h e y would b r i n g . The s a l e of o f f i c e s was f i r s t s y s t e m a t i z e d under F r a n c i s I and grew i n , s p i t e of p e r i o d i c - l e g i s l a t i o n t o the c o n t r a r y T h i s v e n a l i t y of o f f i c e s l i m i t e d r o y a l power s i n c e an o f f i c e - h o l d e r c o u l d o n l y be removed by r e p u r c h a s i n g h i s o f f i c e or by means of a l e n g t h y t r i a l . R o y a l c o n t r o l over o f f i c e - h o l d e r s was f u r t h e r l i m i t e d s i n c e men named t h e i r own s u c c e s s o r s or r e s i g n e d i n fa v o u r """Roland Mousnier, Les X V I e et X V I i e S i e c l e s ( V o l . I v of H i s t o i r e G enerale des C i v i l i s a t i o n s , ed. Maurice C r o u z e t , 3rd e d i t i o n ; P a r i s : P r e s s e s U n i v e r s i t a i r e de F r a n c e , 1961), p. 116. 2 I b i d . ^ H e n r i Hauser, "The European F i n a n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559," J o u r n a l of Economic and B u s i n e s s H i s t o r y , I I ( F e b r u a r y , 1930). 4 Alphonse de Rub l e , A n t o i n e de Bourbon et Jeanne d ' A l b r e t ( P a r i s : Adolphe L a b i t t e , 1882), I I I , 261. 5 Mousnier, op. c i t . , pp. 118-119* 3 of men of their choice. The. large number of royal officers was thus a mixed blessing and important tasks were frequently committed to the holders of short-term commissions. A second qualification must be placed upon the term "absolute" when i t is applied to the monarchy of 1559' The monarchy was personal in nature; i t was no abstract kingship to which the French bowed. When the king'-s power was exercised by someone else on his behalf, other great persons refused to obey. Factions formed, at the court, r iva lry for power ensued and those exercising royal power were accused of holding the sovereign as a prisoner."'" The personal nature of the monarchy was recognized by Francis I and Henry II who sought to capitalize on i t . Only upon the death of Henry II and the accession of Francis II and Henry III as minors did this characteristic of the monarchy become a serious drawback. Before speaking of an "absolute monarchy" i t is essential to identify at least a third l imitat ion. The French kingdom was far from homogeneous, in fact, i t was made up of many states within the state. A man was Gascon or Breton before he was French and consequently the authority of local institutions and local notables could be much greater than that of orders from a distant capital . This characteristic of the kingdom could be exploited by James W. Thompson, The Wars of Religion in France, 1559- 1576 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909), p. lTTT the monarch who maintained local institutions and directed them to his purposes. Similarly royal power was enhanced when i t was exercised by men of the most prestigious local houses. On the other hand, local off ic ia ls and local institutions could become preoccupied with local privileges and on occasion, acted in local rather than royal interests. The Great Nobles The old feudalism based on the granting of fiefs was complemented by a "new feudalism" in which the lord-vassal relationship was replaced by a patron-client relationship. A few great nobles were able to gain tremendous power through the size and importance of their followings. Economic conditions forced many of the lesser nobility to seek advancement in the service of these great lords.''' The client offered loyal service in exchange for advancement 'and protection before the law. The clients of a great lord occupied positions ranging from minor household posts and men of arms in his company to captains of chateaux and 2 officers in the royal service. To three noble families, Guise, Montmorency and Bourbon, practical ly a l l the nobility were a l l ied by ties of vassalage, J . Russell Major, "The Crown and the Aristocracy in Renaissance France," American Historical Review, Vol . 69 (Apri l , 1964), pp. 630-646. 2 I b i d . family or clientage. In 1559 the Guises were most powerful and they dominated a l l the provinces of the east: Champagne, Lorraine, Bourgogne, Lyonnais and Dauphin!. From the border of Artois to the Pyrenees the Bourbon name was obeyed. In the southwest Antoine de Bourbon was king of Navarre and governor of Guyenne while north of the Loire the prince de CondS governed or had a large following in Picardie, the Ile-de-France, Normandie, Orleanais, Vendomois, Touraine and Bretagne. The Guises were al l ied by marriage to the crowns of France, Scotland and Denmark. Under Henry II they enjoyed royal favour and gained great wealth. The Bourbon ties were ties of blood and Antoine de Bourbon,^ the f irst prince of the blood was next in line for the throne after the sons of the king. Unlike the Guises, the Bourbon family was disunited and the younger brother, Condi*, possessed greater character and a stronger following but lacked the authority of the f irst prince of the blood. The third great family was the house of Montmorency and i t s influence f e l l between Bourbon and Guise, both geographically and in the pol i t ics of the court. The constable Anne de Montmorency was the.greatest landholder in the kingdom. Consequently his support came from the large number of vassals who held fiefs from him. His family lacked the blood and the t i t l e s of Bourbon or Guise and they owed everything to Francis I and Henry II. Hence Lucien, Romier, Le Royaume de Catherine de Medicis (Paris: Perrin, 1922), I, 223. 6 they were above a l l , l o y a l t o the crown. Guise and Bourbon a m b i t i o n s were i n c o m p a t i b l e and t o support e i t h e r house was t o a l i e n a t e the o t h e r . T h e r e f o r e , the Montmorency f a m i l y h e l d the balance of power.''' The Gui s e Regency Immediately upon the death of Henry I I the Gu i s e s s e i z e d and s u r r o u n d e d the pers o n of the new k i n g , F r a n c i s I I . They were a b l e t o g a i n c o n t r o l p a r t l y t h r o u g h t h e i r n i e c e Mary S t u a r t , F r a n c i s ' queen. S i n c e the new k i n g was f i f t e e n and t e c h n i c a l l y of age, the G u i s e s had him announce t h a t " h i s u n c l e s were t o 2 manage h i s a f f a i r s . " The p r i n c e s of the b l o o d were sent t o F l a n d e r s and S p a i n on s t a t e a f f a i r s . B e f o r e the f i r s t p r i n c e of the b l o o d was summoned the c o n s t a b l e was b a n i s h e d from the c o u r t t o p r e v e n t a meeting of two n o b l e s who might pose a t h r e a t t o the government of the due de Guise and h i s b r o t h e r , the c a r d i n a l of L o r r a i n e . The duke took charge o f m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s and the c a r d i n a l c o n t r o l l e d f i n a n c i a l and s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F r a n c i s I I was a minor i n f a c t , i f not i n law, and the G u i s e s e x e r c i s e d a b a d l y v e i l e d r e g e n c y . L e g a l l y , i n the m i n o r i t y of a k i n g the regency belonged t o the f i r s t p r i n c e of the b l o o d . Hence the p e r s o n i n the best p o s i t i o n t o c h a l l e n g e Guise a u t h o r i t y 1 I b i d . , p. 228. 2 Thompson, Wars of R e l i g i o n , p. 6. was Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre, and he lacked the fortitude to make such a challenge. Because of their weakness and to buy support the Guises distributed a number of governor ships to keep certain notables happy.""" Many offices and dignities were distributed among the Guise family and following so the Guises determined to placate their cr i t i c s by requesting the king to create two new gouvernements in the centre of the kingdom for princes of the blood. The due de Montpensier was made governor of Touraine-Anjou-Maine and the prince de l a Roche-sur-yon was granted Orleans-Berry. The appointments were l i t t l e more than a farce since for the f i r s t time lieutenants were appointed over the governors. Thus giving them governorships in central France served to keep these princes of the blood under surveillance and 2 to l imit their authority. The office of governor is an important one in the sixteenth century. In the two preceding centuries members of the royal family had been granted apanages, large territories administratively detached from the kingdom in which those princes had become virtual monarchs. In the century to follow certain of the great nobles were to approximate royal power in the office of governor. The new gouvernements created by the Guises were fashioned from the Gaston Zel ler, "Gouverneurs de provinces au XVI e s iecle," Revue historique, CLXXXV (1939), p. 225. 2 Ib id . , p. 2^7. cf. Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 62-63-8 territory of the last apanagists. The Estates-General of 1561 was called by gouvernements for the f irst time indicating that the entire kingdom was thus divided."*" Catherine de Medicis as Regent In March, 1560 the il l-conceived conspiracy of Amboise directed against the Guises was overthrown. In November Conde was condemned for alleged complicity in the plot but the death of Francis II on December 5 brought about a shift in power and the freeing of the prince. Charles IX was only ten years of age and no f ict ion could make him anything but a minor. A regency was required. The position rightly belonged to Antoine de Bourbon 2 although there was a precedent for a regency of the queen mother. Catherine de Medicis acted decisively, associated Antoine with her as lieutenant-general of the kingdom and claimed the position of regent herself. Catherine had the guardianship of the person of the king. She out-maneuvred the Guises in a l l their attempts to recapture a measure of control. She governed as i f she were king. She appointed to offices and to benefices; she granted pardon; she kept the seal; she had the last word to say in council; she opened the letters of the ambassadors and other ministers. "*"Zeller, "Gouverneurs . . . , " p. 231. 2 e.g. During the imprxsonment of Francis I following the battle of Pavia his mother acted as regent. Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France (Paris: Hachette, 1904), V:2, 37-38. ^Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 75* The Estates-General met at Orleans in December, I56O and recommended a general pardon for those accused of heresy through out the kingdom. The Estates were asked to seek a solution to the financial problems of the monarchy for the king's debts totalled more than forty million francs."'" L i t t l e was accomplished although the way was prepared for large revenues from the clergy over a period of five years. The delegates were to return to their regions and new elections were to be held for a meeting of the Estates-General at Pontoise in May. Prelude to C i v i l . War In A p r i l , I56I with secret encouragement from his Catholic majesty, Phil ip II of Spain, a famous association of strongly Catholic nobles was formed. It became known as the Triumvirate in reference to i t s most important members, the due de Guise, the 2 constable Montmorency and the marshal Saint-Andre. This coalition was a blow to Catherine and the appeal of the Triumvirate to Phil ip II was a further threat to her authority. The association was implacable in i t s opposition to the Huguenots who had rapidly increased in numbers and gained confidence after the death of Henry II . Nevertheless, the Edict of July was promulgated reserving ""Ibid., p. 8 l . 2 I b i d . , p. 9? . 10 judgment for heresy to ecclesiastical courts and l imiting sentences. The Huguenot movement continued to spread and incidents of unrest were more common than ever. The king of Navarre was susceptible to promises to restore the Spanish portion of his kingdom or to give him compensation for i t . Consequently, under the influence of the Spanish ambassador, he inclined increasingly towards the Catholic rel igion and towards the Triumvirate.^ It would seem that the parties were extremely unequal for Montmorency and Guise had effected a reconciliation and Antoine de Bourbon was inclined towards them, leaving leadership of the Huguenot cause to his brother Conde. A spl i t in the Montmorency ranks, however, evened the sides somewhat. The constable's three nephews, the Chatillon brothers, Gaspard de Coligny, Francois d'Andelot and Odet, cardinal of ChStil lon, had a l l espoused the 2 Huguenot cause. Catherine hoped to effect a reconciliation between the leaders of the Catholics and the Protestants in September, I56I when the clergy met at the colloquy of Poissy while the other two estates met at Pontoise. Her efforts were doomed to disappointment."^ She was no more successful in effecting peace through the tolerant Edict of January. The kingdom was hastening Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV. See the pieces justificatives for examples of Spanish influence over Antoine. 2 Romier, Le Royaume.•., p. 2 2 9 . ^Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 109 -114 . 11 down the path to c i v i l war and the spark was ignited by an incident which took place at Vassy in Champagne. The soldiers of the due de Guise discovered a Huguenot congregation meeting in a barn, wounded and k i l l ed a number of them. "Charles, cardinal of Lorraine, at the colloquy of Poissy had made union between the two faiths impossible. His brother, the duke of Guise, by the massacre at Vassy had made war inevitable." "" Huguenot Organization The efficient military organization of the Huguenots and their rapid mustering of forces for the f irst War of Religion is impressive and for i ts achievement required both an ecclesiastical organization readily adaptable to the support of a military effort and a plausible rationale with the support, or at least apparent support, of the regent. Individual Calvinist churches were governed by minister and elders who together formed the disciplinary committee known as the consistory. Ministers and elders from a number of neighbouring churches formed a colloquy, a committee concerned with matters referred to i t by individual churches and with the general supervision of the churches in the area. Over the consistories and colloquies of a larger region such as a province, authority was exercised by a synod and, in France, a national synod capped the organizational pyramid. Common ties with Geneva tended further to Bernerd C. Weber, "The Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157^)" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1935), P. 57. 12 strengthen and unify the Huguenot churches. The synodal organ ization was ideally adapted to the development of a concomitant military organization. Protestant po l i t i ca l ideas were expressed and gained wide attention when Anne du Bourg, imprisoned by Henry II, wrote an attack on the legitimacy of any monarch who tried to force his subjects to l ive contrary to the wi l l of God."'" Beza's publication, On the Authority of the Magistrate in the Punishment of Heretics, written in 155*+ contained in embryonic form justif ication of the right of a prince to resist superior authority on religious issues. At the time of the Conspiracy of Amboise, an abortive attempt to overthrow the Guise regency, the highest leaders of the Reformed church including Calvin himself expressed the conviction that the revolt would have been legal had i t been led by a prince of the blood and preferably by the f irst prince of the blood. Predictably, in 1562 when Conde in fact led the revolt, Calvin supported his cause. The Huguenots of France had articulated clearly the doctrine of legal resistance led by a prince of the blood. The organizational structure for the rais ing of an army was inherent in the church organization and a doctrine of resistance had been articulated, only the actual mobilization remained and Robert M. Kingdon, Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of  Religion in France, 1555-1565 (Vol. XXII of Travaux d'Humanisme  et Renaissance; Geneva: Droz, 1956), p. 64. 13 this was init iated long before the f irst War df Religion. The churches of Guyenne in November, 1560, were ordered by the Synod of Clairac to begin organizing military cadres. One year later the Synod of Upper Guyenne at Sainte-Foy chose military commanders for the provinces of Bordeaux and Toulouse. The hierarchy of command included colonels over each colloquy and captains responsible for the forces of each church. Thus forces were organ ized and ready to respond quickly to Condi's summons in 1562.""' The Huguenot military leaders found war more acceptable i f they could represent their actions as expressing loyal support of the sovereign. In this Catherine de Medicis unwittingly gave them assistance for she requested the Huguenot delegates returning from the Colloquy of Poissy to make a survey of their churches to determine the military force they could muster. Wholehearted support was expressed by 2,150.churches and the survey was followed by guarded instructions to muster military forces of both foot and 2 horse. On March 16, against the orders of the queen mother, the due de Guise entered Paris with two or three thousand men. He was loudly acclaimed as the champion of Catholicism and the provost of merchants offered him two mill ion in gold to serve in defence of the Catholic re l ig ion . On the same day, Condi returned to Paris from the court with seven or eight hundred men. The situation Ib id . , p. 109. Ib id . , p. 106. 14 was explosive and Conde withdrew to Orleans where he mustered an army. Catherine was not permitted to take the young king to Orleans but was detained by the Guise faction as a virtual 1 prisoner. Once more Catherine helped the Huguenot cause for with the young king she was detained i f not imprisoned by the Triumvirate and she exchanged a secret correspondence with s 2 • Conde, seeking his support. Conde was to publish extracts from her letters in days to come to justify his military actions as an attempt to free the king and the regent. Catherine had no doubt wanted Conde merely to return unarmed to the court for had he done so the Triumvirate would have had no excuse to remain in Paris under arms and continued detention of the king would only have been possible by arms, a crime of lese-majeste. Conde however, did not obey but from Orleans he offered asylum to Catherine and Charles IX.^ The Huguenot army at Orleans was augmented by the arr iva l of contingents from the provinces of the west and south. Again Catherine contributed for when the comte de la Rochefoucauld, ^Lucien.Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a la Cour de  Charles IX (Paris: Perrin, 1924), p. 328. Hector de l a Ferriere, ed., Lettres de Catherine de  Medicis (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1880), I, 282n. 283. "^Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots, pp. 330-333• 15 Conde's brother-in-law, sent his lieutenant, Jean de Mergey, to seek orders from her, the regent assured him he would cause no di f f icul ty by joining the prince. She was to spend much of her energy in ensuing months negotiating with Conde and i t may be that, expecting to gain his support, she wished him to have sufficient authority to enable her to withstand the threats of the Triumvirate. The Catholic party had hoped that la Rochefoucauld, an old lieutenant of the due de Guise, would not take arms against his former captain and that the vicomte de Rohan, cousin of Jeanne d'Albret, would not resist the authority of the king of Navarre. But very soon after the taking of Orleans news reached the court that these two lords were making their way from Poitou and Bretagne respectively, leading troops which the l ing's lieutenants were powerless to stop. The comte de la Rochefoucauld arrived on Apri l 20, 1562 with about four hundred men, mounted and armed. Wherever, fighting took place Gascon soldiers were to be found and 4,000 Gascon foot soldiers soon arrived in Orleans under the leadership of the comte de Gramont to be followed by 1,200 soldiers from Languedoc Catherine de Medicis maneuvred desperately in the attempt to avert war and to bolster her own control of af fa irs . While Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 152ff. messengers and envoys were shuttling between Orleans and the court, Catherine sent a message to Jeanne d'Albret, en route from Meaux to Vendome. The message was twofold, a letter merely requested the queen of Navarre to ask Conde to lay down his arms and return to court but the bearer brought a message orally because Catherine had been obliged to write her letter under the eyes of Francois d'Escars, the confidante of the king of Navarre. Orally, the messenger was reported to have stated that Catherine desired the opening of host i l i t ies and the triumph of the Huguenots and that she requested Jeanne to go to Amboise and take the young brother and sister of the queen as hostages to Conde in Orleans."'" The web of negotiations was indeed a tangled one. Even as Conde's army increased at Orleans and the royal army was amassed to meet i t and as both sides sought reinforcements from neighbouring countries, fighting was going on throughout the kingdom. The king's lieutenant in Dauphine, l a Motte-Gondrin, was 2 ki l l ed by rebel forces under the baron des Adrets. The commanders in-chief both of the Huguenots and of the Catholics, were to be plagued throughout the war by the problems inherent in attempting to mount a major army while at the same time protecting the home terri tories of their adherents and satisfying the ambitions of Alphonse de Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre Civi le (Paris: Libraires de la Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), 1^  189. ^Romier, op. c i t . , p. 3*+5• !7 local chiefs. The war took on the appearance of many local wars and often of gueril la warfare. In fact the strategy of the Triumvirate early in the contest was to divide their forces and separate Conde from his reinforcements to the west. Conde found i t d i f f i cu l t to recruit adequate foot soldiers for the Huguenot army while on the Catholic side royal demands for reinforcements were to go long unheeded.""" Meanwhile Huguenot and Catholic forces would wage war in Guyenne as armies semi-independent of central authority, recruited local ly , under local command and maintained in their home region by local exigencies. It is under these circumstances that the nature of royal government in Guyenne must be studied. Catherine's View of the Monarchy Catherine de Medicis recognized the financial d i f f icu l t ies of the crown. She saw clearly the personal nature of French king ship and the absolute necessity of personal encounter between the king and the nobi l i ty . Perhaps more clearly than anyone else she knew that the monarch must recognize local differences, local privi leges. In short, she realized that the power of the throne was grounded upon the goodwill of men throughout the kingdom. Her concern was to gain the goodwill of strategically valuable men Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, p. 291. 18 and through them to control others. A few months after the Peace of Ambolse Catherine had the majority of the young king Charles IX declared and soon thereafter she dictated for him a long letter on the methods by which he could best restore his kingdom to complete obedience."'' The queen mother's letter revealed those things which she felt needed to be restored. Beginning with the routine and pomp of court l i f e , Catherine dealt with the conduct of court business, the secretaries, the Council, dispatches, audiences, and concluded with clear directions on the question of royal patronage. The queen mother reviewed in her mind the events of the preceding three years encompassing the brief reign of Francis II during which she had been excluded from government by the Guises and the f irs t years of the reign of Charles IX in which religious differences coupled with rivalry among the great nobles had erupted into bitter c i v i l war. As she looked back in time these events seemed l ike a bad dream to be blamed on the minority of Francis II, and Catherine was anxious to forget that bad dream and recapture the conditions which had prevailed in the reigns of Francis I and Henry II . Charles must re-establish the Church and through the administration of justice he must cleanse the kingdom and recover royal authority and obedience to the royal w i l l . The routine of court l i f e Catherine considered as essential to restoring confidence Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 9 0 - 9 5 . 19 in the monarch on the part of the nobility and the people, and the king must be particularly careful that the nobles be associated with him by their presence in his chamber at his r i s ing hour, by accompanying him to mass, and by walking, r iding or jousting with him. He must oversee the discipline at the court and ensure that men discharged their duties whether those duties be l ighting torches, locking gates, guarding keys, or sending dispatches. His own existence must be as s tr ic t ly disciplined as that of his servitors. Rising at a standard hour, probably about six, Charles must admit to his chamber a l l the princes, lords, captains, knights of the order, gentlemen of the chamber, maitres d'hotel and serving men. This custom should build the confidence of the nobi l i ty . Rising accomplished, the king must go to business, having a l l leave save those particularly concerned and the four secretaries. An hour or two reading dispatches must follow after which he should go to mass accompanied by the nobi l i ty . If time permitted, a walk for his health might precede the king's dinner scheduled for eleven o'clock. Twice a week Charles should give audience to his subjects after dinner and only after that could he retire brief ly to the quarters of the queen mother. Three o'clock could be the time to walk or ride with the nobil ity two or three times weekly. The king should sup with his family and two evenings per week the bal l room was to be next on the schedule. Catherine 20 s u g g e s t e d a b o v e a l l o t h e r r e a s o n s t h a t c o u r t l i f e s h o u l d be r e g u l a t e d and d i s c i p l i n e d s o t h a t t h e p e o p l e w o u l d know what t o e x p e c t o f t h e i r k i n g a n d so t h a t t h e n o b i l i t y w o u l d be c o n t e n t e d . C a t h e r i n e i m p r e s s e d on t h e y o u n g k i n g t h a t he must c o n v e y t o h i s s u b j e c t s h i s c o n c e r n f o r them. T h i s w o u l d be p o s s i b l e by d e a l i n g i m m e d i a t e l y w i t h d i s p a t c h e s f r o m r e m o t e a r e a s o f t h e p r o v i n c e , t o c o r r e c t t h e i m p r e s s i o n r e c e n t l y g i v e n by d e l a y s o f a month o r e v e n s i x weeks i n a n s w e r i n g them. C h a r l e s must s e t a s i d e a c o n v e n i e n t h o u r d a i l y a nd r e a d d i s p a t c h e s f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n o f t h e k i n g d o m . I f t h e y s h o u l d c o n t a i n m a t t e r s f o r t h e C o u n c i l he must have t h e c h a n c e l l o r r a i s e t h e s e m a t t e r s b e f o r e a d m i t t i n g t h e ma£tres d e s r e q u e t e s f o r t h e C o n s e i l des p a r t i e s . " ' " The k i n g was t o l d t o command t h e s e c r e t a r i e s t o make a p p r o p r i a t e r e p l i e s t o d i s p a t c h e s , r e p l i e s he must e x a m i n e , s i g n a n d s e n d t h e n e x t m o r n i n g b e f o r e l o o k i n g a t a n y t h i n g new. To c o n v e y t o h i s ' p e o p l e h i s c o n c e r n f o r them, t h e k i n g must f i n d t i m e t o s e e a l l t h o s e who h a d come f r o m t h e p r o v i n c e s t o s e e k a u d i e n c e . He s h o u l d d i s c u s s w i t h them t h e i r o f f i c e s a n d t h e r e g i o n f r o m w h i c h t h e y "'"Every m o r n i n g t h e C o n s e i l E ~ t r o i t o r C o n s e i l P r i v e met f i r s t t o c o n s i d e r t h e most i m p o r t a n t m i l i t a r y , p o l i t i c a l , f i n a n c i a l a nd a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a f f a i r s . The C o n s e i l E t r o i t c o n s i s t e d o f a few g r e a t n o b l e s w i t h t h e c h a n c e l l o r p r e s e n t t o t a k e o r d e r s . R o g e r D o u c e t , L e s I n s t i t u t i o n s de l a F r a n c e a u X V I e S i d c l e ( P a r i s : P i c a r d , 1948), I I , 1 4 2 . T h e C o n s e i l d ' E t a t w i t h a w i d e r m e m b e r s h i p met t o c o n s i d e r m a t t e r s o f f i n a n c e a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . T w i c e w e e k l y i t c o n s i d e r e d p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l s a nd d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p e o p l e ( p r e s u m  a b l y a p p e a l s ) . On t h o s e o c c a s i o n s i t was c a l l e d t h e C o n s e i l d e s  P a r t i e s . D o u c e t , I n s t i t u t i o n s , I I , 1^5. 21 had come. In this way his reputation would spread throughout the kingdom. The balance of Catherine's letter dealt with patronage, a subject which assumed great importance in her mind. Louis XII was the ideal she held up before the young Charles IX for Louis XII had devised a system to eliminate importuning at the court for appointment to office. He maintained a r o l l containing the names of a l l the honours that were his to bestow. One or two of the principal officers in each province were responsible to report any vacancies, confiscations or fines to the king by express letter to be placed personally in the king's hands and not to go to the secretaries or anyone else. Louis XII then proceeded to make an appointment' on the basis of the information he possessed, attempting to reward the faithful officers who remained in their places and to deny office to any who importuned at the court. The v i ta l concern was that inf luential local notables be appointed to strategic offices where they could exercise their influence on behalf of the crown. Francis I was supposed to have made a practice of maintaining a nucleus of men in every aspect of royal government in each province. Thus the command of fort i f ied places and high ecclesiastical and judicial offices would be exercised by men who owed their position and i ts rewards directly to their king. To Charles IX, Catherine suggested that the recipients of his patronage should not be members of the nobility 22 alone but that in each city he must have the support of the principal bourgeois in order to extend his influence into municipal government. The advice emphasized by Catherine as she instructed her son in the art of government was that he should be as directly accessible to his subjects as possible and convey to them that he cared for them. Catherine was soon to ini t iate an extensive it inerary throughout the kingdom on behalf of her son precisely to implement this principle and to allow as many of his subjects as possible to gain access to him, to see him personally, and thus identify with him. Royal Authority In Guyenne In the province of Guyenne as in the rest of the kingdom royal authority depended on the personal influence of the king over the nobi l i ty . The extent of that influence depended on the extent to which particular influential nobles perceived their interests as a l l ied with those of the king. Not only must royal service be to the mutual benefit of the sovereign and his subject but the sovereign must honour the local privileges of the region. The province of Guyenne was far removed from the court and had a history of local resistance to central authority. Definitively re-united to the kingdom for l i t t l e more than a century, Guyenne was tradit ionally exempt from the gabelle or salt tax. When Henry II sought to increase his revenue by imposing the gabelle 23 on Guyenne, that province became the scene of a bloody revolt.'*' The nobil ity of Guyenne had a history of independent action and armed revolt . They also had an enviable record in royal military service. Guyenne provides a good setting for the study of royal government because i t was the gouvernement of Antoine de Bourbon, king of Navarre and f i rs t prince of the blood. Like his father- in-law, although he was as governor a representative of the crown, his personal concerns as king of Navarre played a much greater role in motivating his actions. Also like his father-in-law, Antoine was often non-resident and in his absence the royal government was exercised by lieutenants of the king who owed allegiance both to the king and to their governor, dual loyalties not always in harmony with each other. S. - C . Gigon, La Revolte de la Gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549 (Paris: Honor! Champion, 1906), pp. 11-12. CHAPTER II PERSONNEL OF ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN GUYENNE An examination of royal government in Guyenne during the di f f icul t days of c i v i l war reveals that Catherine's advice to Charles IX was in fact the p o l i t i c a l creed according to which she herself acted. She recognized the necessity of gaining the good wi l l and loyal support of influential members of the local nobi l i of both great and lesser families. And she realized that merely gaining their confidence was not sufficient for royal officers were subject to influence by local groups and institutions, by great patrons, and even by foreign powers. By judicious use of the patronage at her disposal the regent sought to maintain the support of those best able to mobilize the local resources necess ary to uphold royal authority in the province. Representatives of royal authority in Guyenne received their offices from the king and yet demonstrated remarkable independence of ..'the king in the exercise of those offices. The king did not have a completely free choice in making appointments i t was limited in relation to the highest office by the need to satisfy the f irst prince of the blood and by the increasingly hereditary nature of the office. In other appointments the king and the queen mother were limited by the desires of Antoine de Bourbon, the f irst prince of the blood, and by the necessity to 25 choose from among men of renown within the province to ensure the obedience of the local nobi l i ty . Men appointed from among the local nobil ity were able to gain support in their home province for independent action. The Parlement, the estates, the c i t ies and the nobil i ty were a l l at times mobilized on behalf of the king's representatives. The c i t ies of Guyenne found financial resources with which to reward the lieutenant-general on more than one occasion. Men who accepted appointment did not simply owe al leg iance to the monarch and to local pressure groups but also to great noble patrons including, of course, Antoine de Bourbon, the governor. The appointee might be influenced, because of personal ambitions, by a foreign monarch, Phil ip II of Spain. The degree to which the crown was able to control i ts representatives in spite of conflicting influences was the important issue in royal government in Guyenne. The men who bore the t i t l e s of governor, lieutenant, and lieutenant-general in Guyenne were of three distinct ranks. At the peak of the hierarchy, were great nobles, the Bourbon princes of the blood. These princes f i l l e d two kinds of post, that of governor and that of commissioner sent into the province on a special mission. At the second level were prominent members of the local nobility with i l lustr ious military careers behind them. The office of lieutenant-general was their charge and their t i t l e 26 was qualified with the words "in the absence o f . . . . " Since the governor was consistently absent and the highest authority was delegated to his lieutenant-general, the latter office carried with i t a great deal of prestige. The third rank was that of governors of c i t ies or of fort i f ied places and i t , too, was f i l l e d by members of the most prominent noble families or by lesser nobles of proven military ab i l i t y . This last office was one which increased in number greatly during the Wars of Religion. Princes of the Blood The most i l lustr ious and powerful nobles of the kingdom held office as governors of provinces. It was a prestigious office. During their regency in I56O the Guises divided the major offices among their own family and following. They recognized the necessity of satisfying the princes of the blood for only because the king was legally of age were the Guises able to deprive these princes of a regency that should constitutionally be theirs. To satisfy the Bourbon princes without sending them out to the frontier provinces where they could better mobilize resources against the regency, two new gouvernements were created in the centre of the kingdom. These terri tories had not previously come under the administration of governors because they had been administered as the personal 27 domains of r o y a l p r i n c e s , i . e . as apanages.^ The o f f i c e of governor was not i n t e n d e d t o c a r r y w i t h i t the degree of independ ence e x e r c i s e d by a p a n a g i s t p r i n c e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t was an o f f i c e g r a n t e d o n l y t o men of the h i g h e s t r a n k , men whose b i r t h and power demanded adequate r e c o g n i t i o n . Antoine. de Bourbon, k i n g of Navarre and f i r s t p r i n c e of the b l o o d , was governor and l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of Guyenne. H i s tenure i l l u s t r a t e s common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of appointment, n o n - r e s i d e n c e , and s u s c e p t i b i l i t y t o e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e . A l t h o u g h the post of l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l had once been a commission t o be t e r m i n a t e d a c c o r d i n g t o the k i n g ' s w i l l , i t had become an o f f i c e t o be e x e r  c i s e d much l o n g e r or even f o r l i f e . F u r t h e r m o r e , i t f r e q u e n t l y passed from a g r e a t noble t o h i s h e i r , a s i t u a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e d by e v e n t s i n Guyenne. F o r most of the second q u a r t e r of the c e n t u r y H e n r i d ' A l b r e t , k i n g of N a v a r r e , had been governor of Guyenne w i t h a u t h o r i t y e x t e n d i n g over P o i t o u , La R o c h e l l e and l ' A u n i s . A n t o i n e de Bourbon f o l l o w e d i n h i s f a t h e r - i n - l a w ' s f o o t s t e p s not o n l y as k i n g of Navarre but as governor of Guyenne and of P o i t o u , by then 2 a s e p a r a t e gouvernement. H i s a u t h o r i t y a l s o extended over La R o c h e l l e and l ' A u n i s , a r e g i o n a d m i n i s t e r e d by a s e p a r a t e l i e u t - Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 247. 2 I b i d . , p. 240. 28 enant and- sometimes r e f e r r e d to as a g o u v e r n e m e n t T h e f i r s t prince of the blood exercised the a u t h o r i t y of governor over the western coast of France from the Pyrennees to the border of B r i t t a n y . To t h i s were added the o f f i c e s of admiral of Guyenne and, from March, 1561 u n t i l h is death i n November, 1562, l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of the kingdom. Governors frequently received t h e i r o f f i c e s through i n h e r i t a n c e and the same was true i n the case of those o f f i c e r s designated "lieutenants-general en 1'absence des gouverneurs." Sebastien de Luxemburg, vicomte de Martigues, nephew of Jean de Brosse, due d'Etampes and governor of Bretagne, acted as l i e u t e n a n t - general i n the absence of h i s uncle and, when E"tampes died c h i l d - 2 l e s s , Martigues succeeded him as governor. The governorship of Provence was exercised f o r many years by Claude de Savoie, comte de Tende, a close r e l a t i v e of the Montmorency family which was very powerful i n the south of France. Upon h i s death i n I566 the o f f i c e passed to h i s son Honore de Savoie, comte de Tende and de Sommerive, who as l i e u t e n a n t had exercised more a u t h o r i t y than h i s father for s e v e r a l years and had come i n t o c o n f l i c t with him.^ In I56O under Antoine de Bourbon, Guy de D a i l l o n , comte du Lude was made L e t t r e s de Catherine de Medicis, I, 4 l 8 . 2 A L u b l i n s k a j a , ed., Documents Pour S e r v i r a l ' h i s t o i r e des  Guerres C i v i l e s en France (I56I-I563) (Moscow, I962), No. 11. Hereafter c i t e d as Documents Pour S e r v i r a..... ^ L e t t r e s de Catherine de Medicis, I, 304-305. 29 lieutenant-general of Poitou f i l l i n g an office which had been vacant for three years. In aspiring to that office he was follow ing his father, Jean de Daillon, who had been lieutenant-general under Henri d'Albret in both Guyenne and Poitou unti l his death in 1557. Certainly the most striking example of the hereditary nature of the office of governor was the succession of Henri de Bourbon, prince of Navarre, to the offices held by his father. Antoine de Bourbon died in November, 1562 of a wound received in battle and in December "pouvoir de gouverneur et lieutenant general en Guyenne" was granted by the king to the prince of Navarre. 1 The prince was a precocious lad but s t i l l short of ten years of age. and hardly ready to exercise the powers granted him. In addition to the office of governor he was given that of admiral of Guyenne and his father's company of one hundred hommes d'armes and i t was even rumoured that he would succeed his father as lieutenant- 2 general of the kingdom. A few days after having relayed that rumour to his government, the Venetian ambassador reported that the office would be left vacant, that neither the prince de Navarre nor the prince de Conde would receive i t . ' ' The granting of important offices to Antoine de Bourbon resulted from the need to satisfy Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre Civi le (Paris: Libraires de la Bibliotheque Nationale, 1897), I, 467. 2 Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 439. 5 I b i d . 30 the f i rs t prince of the blood who should by law have been regent. The multiplication of offices in the hands of his son, however, resulted as much from the desire of the regent to f i l l those offices with someone too young to exercise them as from the need to grant favours to the princes of the blood. By birth the young Prince Henry was f itted to receive high office and by granting him such offices when he was s t i l l too young to exercise them, Catherine forestalled the efforts of those who might have pressured her for appointment. At the same time she left the way open to make her own influence felt more directly in the province. Antoine de Bourbon was obsessed with the vision of himself as master of an independent kingdom and his personal ambition made him wi l l ing to sacrifice a l l else to the achievement of his goal. An essential part of his dream was the restoration of Spanish Navarre taken by Ferdinand the Catholic in 1512. His tendency to dance l ike a puppet on a string when the least promise of t e r r i t o r i a l compensation was dangled in front of him made the king of Navarre a very undependable royal servitor. Catherine knew well his weakness and sought to exploit i t but i t got beyond her control to the extent that Phil ip II.could manipulate at wi l l the f irs t prince of the blood. By making vague promises hinting that Antoine would be given Sardinia or Tunisia Phil ip gained from him the reactions he desired. The king of Navarre was the subject of extensive correspondence between Chantonnay, the 31 Spanish ambassador, and Phil ip II."'" Through Antoine de Bourbon the Spanish King was able to achieve changes in the education of Charles IX and of Prince Henri de Navarre when Chantonnay feared those youths were not receiving instruction sufficiently Catholic in flavour. Phil ip II took advantage of his influence over the Bourbon prince to have councillors changed at the French court and even to have Antoine's own wife banished from the court where in her Protestant zeal she might unduly influence the queen 2 mother. At times Catherine's policy was seriously endangered by Antoine*s enslavement to his dream and to the king of Spain. In June, 1562 with sporadic fighting throughout the kingdom, Catherine was determined to negotiate with Conde a peaceful settlement and Antoine was her representative. The two brothers agreed to decree a convention leading to a general disarmament but upon receipt of a long delayed dispatch from the king of Spain promising compensation, the king of Navarre sacrificed the peaceful convention.^ Nevertheless, Catherine found i t necessary to keep the f irst prince of the blood satisfied and, i f possible, associated with her for his support would have been invaluable to her enemies. In fact, responding to the encouragement of his wife and of his brother and seeing in i t the opportunity to "'"Numerous examples are included in the pieces justificatives of Alphonse de Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV. 2 Ib id . , 384-388, correspondence of Chantonnay. • ' ibid. , 256. 32 f u r t h e r h i s own ends, A n t o i n e de Bourbon had j o i n e d the Huguenots f o r a s h o r t time i n I56O. The a b i l i t y of P h i l i p I I and of the P r o t e s t a n t s t o i n f l u e n c e A n t o i n e show t h a t at l e a s t one governor was s u s c e p t i b l e t o p r e s s u r e s which l e d him t o a c t i n ways d i r e c t l y opposed t o r o y a l a u t h o r i t y . H e n r i d ' A l b r e t r e s i d e d not i n h i s gouvernement but i n the c i t y of Pau i n h i s domain and h i s s o n - i n - l a w and grandson i n t u r n d i d l i t t l e t o improve the r e s i d e n c e r e c o r d of the governor of Guyenne. A u t h o r i t y was e x e r c i s e d i n t h e i r absence by " l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l en l'absence des gouverneur s .'* P e r i o d i c a l l y d u r i n g t i m e s of c i v i l s t r i f e the queen d e c i d e d t o send a. commissioner as her p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e to b o l s t e r her a u t h o r i t y and t o p a c i f y the r e g i o n . L i k e the h i s t o r i c p o s i t i o n of l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l , such a commission was p r i m a r i l y , though not. e x c l u s i v e l y , m i l i t a r y and i t might c a r r y a u t h o r i t y over s e v e r a l p r o v i n c e s r a t h e r t han one a l t h o u g h the commissioner might be governor i n 2 one. As a commission, t h i s p ost was temporary and was r e v o k e d at the monarch's w i l l or t e r m i n a t e d upon the c o m p l e t i o n of the m i s s i o n . C a t h e r i n e planned such commissions f o r Guyenne t h r e e t i m e s d u r i n g the y e a r s I56I t o I563. In each case the commission was to be g r a n t e d t o a Bourbon p r i n c e of the b l o o d , t w i c e t o the p r i n c e de Conde and once t o the due de M o n t p e n s i e r . Only the due de G i g o n , La. R e v o l t e de l a G a b e l l e , p. 30. Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 227. 33 Montpensier fu l f i l l ed his commission. In August, 1562 Burie and Monluc, the king's lieutenants in Guyenne, received a tactful letter from Catherine de Medicis encouraging them and complimenting them on the work they were accomplishing in cleansing the province of rebels. She added that she had decided to send Montpensier with his company to reinforce them and also "to have more authority with the quality." To the nobil i ty, extremely conscious of a man's blood, this Bourbon prince represented much greater authority than the lieutenants. Several of the prominent nobles in Guyenne were either openly identified with the Huguenots or leaning in that direction and i t was important to the royal cause to reverse the trend. Monluc recorded that Montpensier was sent because he and Burie were hardly in good accord and added the suggestion that command should never be given to two; one lesser captain would even be better than two good ones together. Nevertheless, he concurred in the solution; he would always counsel the king to deal with a division in the army by sending a prince of the blood to take 2 overall command. Montpensier's requests of the king's council reveal his conception of the nature and importance of his commission. To Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 376. 2 Paul Courteault, ed., Comrnentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Marechal de France (Paris: Picard, I91D1 II, 524, 525- Hereafter cited as Monluc, Comrnentaires. 3^ h i s r e q u e s t s f o r m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l , m u n i t i o n s and f i n a n c e s f o r m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s the c o u n c i l r e p l i e d t h a t he would have t o l i m i t h i m s e l f c h i e f l y t o the r e s o u r c e s a v a i l a b l e i n the f i e l d t o which he was g o i n g . He i n f o r m e d - t h e c o u n c i l he would need 1 , 0 0 0 l i v r e s e v e r y month f o r the maintenance of h i s t a b l e and expenses a c c o r d i n g t o the custom of l i e u t e n a n t s of the k i n g , a statement to which the c o u n c i l r e p l i e d o n l y , " c e l l a e s t t r e s r a i s o n n a b l e . " The c o u n c i l l o r s d e c i d e d t h a t the Parlement of Bordeaux s h o u l d e l e c t two from i t s number t o f i l l the need e x p r e s s e d i n M o n t p e n s i e r ' s r e q u e s t f o r a m a i t r e de r e q u e t e s t o r e n d e r j u s t i c e and t o hear c o m p l a i n t s . A p e r s o n a l guard of t h i r t y a r q u e b u s i e r s , a monthly a l l o w a n c e f o r payment of c o u r i e r s and c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the s u s p e n s i o n of d i s l o y a l o f f i c e r s and the appointment of i n t e r i m r e p l a c e m e n t s were a l l among r e q u e s t s grante'd t o the due de Montpensier by the c o u n c i l . The f i r s t q u e s t i o n asked by M o n t p e n s i e r was which k n i g h t s of the o r d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d c a p t a i n s and o t h e r persons of note he would have f o r h i s c o u n c i l . The r o y a l a d v i s o r s , however, d i d not seem unduly concerned about the c o m p o s i t i o n of M o n t p e n s i e r ' s c o u n c i l and s uggested t h a t he would be a s s i s t e d by such men of t h i s q u a l i t y as were i n the p r o v i n c e s and t h a t he would be accompanied from the c o u r t by t h r e e n o b l e s , the s e i g n e u r s de l a Vauguyon, de Candale and de Chavigny.""' Jean Peyrusse d ' E s c a r s , s e i g n e u r de l a Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 48. 35 Vauguyon, belonged t o a f a m i l y h i g h l y favoured by A n t o i n e de Bourbon. H e n r i de F o i x , comte de Oandale, s c i o n of the f a m i l y of the n o t e d Odet de F o i x , p l a y e d a prominent p a r t i n the C a t h o l i c cause throughout the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n and at Monluc's i n s t i g a t i o n formed the league of C a t h o l i c n o b i l i t y i n the B o r d e l a i s . F r a n c o i s l e Roy, s e i g n e u r de Chavigny, was governor of the c i t y of Blaye."*" The l a t t e r two were from prominent noble f a m i l i e s of Guyenne. The due de M o n t p ensier h e l d the o f f i c e of governor of T o u r a i n e , Anjou and Maine a l o n g w i t h h i s commission as l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of Guyenne w i t h a u t h o r i t y over P o i t o u , La R o c h e l l e , and l ' A u n i s . The m u l t i p l e a l l e g i a n c e and m u l t i p l e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which c o m p l i c a t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the kingdom are i l l u s t r a t e d by the c o n c e r n m a i n t a i n e d by t h i s p r i n c e f o r c e r t a i n l a n d s of h i s 2 own i n h e r i t a n c e i n the duchy of M o n t p e n s i e r . W r i t i n g t o the l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l of the kingdom he s t a t e d t h a t he had g i v e n the government of h i s duchy of M o n t p ensier t o the s e i g n e u r d ' E f f i a t , one of h i s v a s s a l s and s u b j e c t s . T h i s v a s s a l l a b o u r e d so i n d u s t r i o u s  l y t h a t the due's chateaux of M o n t p e n s i e r and A i g u e s p e r s e and h i s town of the same p l a c e , on which the s a f e t y of the n e i g h b o u r i n g a r e a depended, were i n an e x c e l l e n t s t a t e of d e f e n c e . D ' E f f i a t , Alphonse de R u b l e , ed., Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s de B l a i s e  de Monluc ( P a r i s : Renouard, I87O), IV, 210, n o t e . H e r e a f t e r c i t e d as Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s . Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 52. 36 h a v i n g e v e r y d e s i r e t o r e s p e c t the a u t h o r i t y of monsieur de S a i n t - G e r a n , l i e u t e n a n t f o r the k i n g i n the r e g i o n i n the absence of che marechal de Sa-int-Andre, took from him c o n f i r m a t i o n of the a u t h o r i t y M o n t p ensier had g r a n t e d . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the s e i g n e u r de H a u l t f u e i l l e , e s t a b l i s h e d by S a i n t - G e r a n as governor of Clermont, R i o n , M o n t f e r r a n t and o t h e r n e i g h b o u r i n g towns, wished to i n c l u d e i n h i s commission M o n t p e n s i e r ' s town of A i g u e s p e r s e . M o n t p e n s i e r wished the k i n g of Navarre t o i n t e r v e n e , command H a u l t f u e i l l e t o keep o u t , and t h u s a l l e v i a t e the d i s o r d e r and c o n f u s i o n a r i s i n g i n the duchy.""" A f t e r u n d e r t a k i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of h i s commission Mo n t p e n s i e r r e p o r t e d t o the k i n g from P o i t i e r s . He had c o n f i r m e d the l o y a l t y of c e r t a i n c i t i e s , a d j u s t e d the s i z e o f t h e i r g a r r i s o n s , c o n s u l t e d w i t h Sansac and La Vauguy.on about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of a t t a c k i n g the Huguenot f o r c e s under the s e i g n e u r de l a R o c h e f o u c a u l d and d e c i d e d a g a i n s t i t , and had g i v e n the o r d e r t o have c e r t a i n sums of money conducted t o her m a j e s t y . A f t e r h a v i n g observed c o n d i t i o n s i n the r e g i o n , he recommended t h a t , s i n c e Bourges had been d e l i v e r e d , the m i l i t a r y f o r c e s under B u r i e r e q u e s t e d t o be 2 sent from Guyenne s h o u l d be kept i n the p r o v i n c e . Montpensier j o i n e d Monluc and B u r i e o n l y a f t e r t h e i r major I b i d . , No. 5 .^ 2 I b i d . 37 military victory over Duras at the battle of Vergt, or rather, they joined him.''" He warmly congratulated Monluc and agreed to support his request for an office and company for his brother, 2 Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux. Monluc was overjoyed at the arr iva l of a prince of the blood and gave him detailed recommendations for deployment of personnel in the province including the sending of Burie into France with the troops which had been requested.^ Montpensier, however, feeling that the work of pacification in Guyenne was proceding favourably, travelled north into Saintonge. In November Montpensier sent a represent ative to report to the court on his mission in Guyenne. The is les had been reduced to obedience, fortresses razed, arms seized, and divine service re-established. He reported with concern that La Rochelle had dispatched to the court the elu and some others armed with 4,000 or 5,000 ecus with which to reward the officers who could assist them in their attempt to be r i d of the garrison. S.uch men would surely l i e about their loyalty and the prince feared that the city would f a l l into the hands of the rebels who had already plotted to k i l l , Jarnac, their governor. Much of his report was devoted to military and financial needs but the extent of his authority was indicated by the fact that he pointed out the Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 563• Ib id . , II, 564 and Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 64. Monluc, Comrnentaires et Letcres, IV, 171. 38 necessity of commissioning men to judicial and other essential offices vacant by the absence of the holders, defeated in the rebellion or deceased."'" He did not seem to think i t necessary to make personal recommendations to those offices. Months before sending Montpensier Catherine had planned to send Conde into Guyenne with a special commission. In December, 1561 when religious passions were inflamed and Burie, the lieutenant-general, appeared incapable of pacifying them, the queen hoped that the presence of a prince of the blood would win obedience from the Catholics and that the presence of their chief 2 would calm the Huguenots. In February, 1562 preparations were almost completed. At the same time Catherine sent Crussol, f i rs t peer of France, into Languedoc and Provence with analogous powers. It may be that she did not want to place undue emphasis on her intended reliance on the Huguenot leader and, therefore, avoided making his commission unique. Conde was instructed to v i s i t the c i t i e s , restore ecclesiastics to benefices and churches usurped by the Protestants, restore to office those forced out by the seditious, punish pillagers and warn Protestants about unauthor ized publishing. To those of the reformed faith who complained "'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7^. 2 Paul Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, Blaise de Monluc (Paris: Picard, 1909), pp. 1560157. 39 about h a v i n g no p l a c e t o worship God, Conde was t o make g e n t l y u n d e r s t o o d t h a t , i f they c o u l d f i n d a p l a c e o u t s i d e the c i t i e s except i n a church or temple, he would.give o r d e r s t o the r o y a l o f f i c e r s t o t u r n t h e i r eyes the o t h e r way. Had Conde f u l f i l l e d the commission, the Huguenots might w e l l have been t r e a t e d more f a v o u r a b l y than even the r e g e n t had p l a n n e d . However, the m i s s i o n was not t o be f o r P h i l i p I I had ot h e r p l a n s and A n t o i n e de Bourbon responded t o the p r e s s u r e p l a c e d on him t o thwart C a t h e r i n e ' s p l a n s . The S p a n i s h monarch would have p r e f e r r e d the m i s s i o n t o have been conducted p e r s o n a l l y by the man whom he r e f e r r e d t o as the s e i g n e u r de VendSme, f o r he would never address him as k i n g of N a v a r r e . The S p a n i a r d s a l s o made events then t a k i n g p l a c e i n Guyenne work t o t h e i r advantage. A member of the n o b i l i t y , the baron de Furnel, had been murdered by h i s Huguenot t e n a n t s and B l a i s e de Monluc was g a t h e r i n g a m i l i t a r y f o r c e t o avenge the murder and q u e l l the l o c a l u p r i s i n g s . S p a n i s h o f f i c e r s c l a i m e d t h a t t r o o p s were b e i n g mustered f o r an a t t a c k on S p a n i s h Navarre t o be l e d by Conde. E x p l o i t i n g these c l a i m s , P h i l i p I I in f o r m e d A n t o i n e t h a t he would c o n t i n u e n e g o t i a t i o n s over the l o s s of Navarre o n l y at the p r i c e of Conde's r e t u r n i n t o P i c a r d y . A n t o i n e had been the f i r s t t o approve C o n d i ' s m i s s i o n i n t o Guyenne and he was the f i r s t t o oppose i t . As a r e s u l t the m i s s i o n d i d not take place.""" R u b l e , A n t o i n e de Bourbon, p. 5 0 f f . Lieutenants-general In the absence of the governor or of s p e c i a l commissioners r o y a l a u t h o r i t y was exercised by se v e r a l l i e u t e n a n t s - g e n e r a l . There were three or four i n the region under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Antoine de Bourbon, one for P o i t o u , one for La Rochelle and l'Aunis and two f o r Guyenne. At l e a s t Guyenne had two i n p r a c t i c e from December, 1561, and o f f i c i a l l y , from March, 1563« The career of B l a i s e de Monluc demonstrates the ambition and opportunism of a l i e u t e n a n t , and the extent to which he could mobilize l o c a l support both for the crown and on h i s own behalf. Monluc was from a noble family i n the Agenais, a family of better breeding than fortune. As a lad he served as a page i n the household of the due de Guise and i n the f i r s t years of the r e i g n of F r a n c i s I he began what was to be a b r i l l i a n t m i l i t a r y career i n I t a l y . S h o r t l y before the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis he replaced d'Andelot f o r a time as colonel-general of the i n f a n t r y , one of the highest posts i n the m i l i t a r y command. Aft e r the peace he r e t i r e d to the Chateau d ' E s t i l l a c near Agen where i n the s p r i n g of 1560, perhaps to please the Guises, he responded to the plea of some municipal o f f i c i a l s and a s s i s t e d i n the expulsion of the Protestant m i n i s t e r s of Agen. In response a band of f i v e or s i x hundred Huguenots besieged h is home. The old captain e a s i l y r e p e l l e d them but as a r e s u l t of h i s complaint Charles IX ordered the k i n g of Navarre to assure the peace of the Gascon hero."*" A n t i - G u i s e sentiment had swept the country as a r e s u l t of t h e i r harsh r e p r i s a l s f o l l o w i n g the C o n s p i r a c y of Amboise, a P r o t e s t a n t p l o t to remove F r a n c i s II from the i n f l u e n c e of the G u i s e s . Seeking to take advantage of the u n p o p u l a r i t y of the government, Antoine de Bourbon had i d e n t i f i e d h i m s e l f with the Huguenot cause. For t h i s reason he was l i t t l e i n c l i n e d to favour 2 Monluc 1s a c t i o n s i n support of the C a t h o l i c o f f i c i a l s . Due F r a n c o i s de Guise to whom Monluc appealed a d v i s e d him to r e g a i n the favour of the k i n g of Navarre, advice that very n e a r l y l e d 3 to h i s d o w n f a l l . The k i n g of Navarre and h i s brother Conde were then at Nerac g a t h e r i n g about them a band of men anxious to avenge them s e l v e s a g a i n s t the Guises f o r the bloody aftermath of Amboise and to Nerac went Monluc anxious to i n g r a t i a t e h i m s e l f with Antoine d Bourbon. There he attended the p r e a c h i n g of the reformed f a i t h , convinced Beza and Jeanne d ' A l b r e t of h i s l o y a l t y to t h e i r cause and assured Conde" tha t the e f f o r t s of the p r i n c e s of the blood would tend only to the u t i l i t y of the k i n g and of the kingdom. T h i s sounded l i k e the statement of a good Huguenot, s k i l f u l at p u t t i n g the face of l o y a l t y on a c t i o n s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the Ruble, Jeanne d ' A l b r e t , I, 1 5 0 . Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 3 9 7 - 3 9 8 . ' i b i d . k2 . government of the kingdom."'" That summer the G u i s e s a r r e s t e d an agent o f A n t o i n e de Bourbon who i n h i s c o n f e s s i o n s , compromised s e v e r a l n o b l e s , , i n c l u d i n g M o n l u c , who t h e n h a s t e n e d t o the c o u r t t o c l e a r h i m s e l f . He t r i e d f e v e r i s h l y t o p rove h i s l o y a l t y t o the e x t e n t o f e s p o u s i n g t h e u n p o p u l a r G u i s e p o s i t i o n i n the c o u n c i l o f the K n i g h t s of the Order when the m a j o r i t y came t o the d e f e n c e of Vidame de C h a r t r e s , a p r o m i n e n t n o b l e a r r e s t e d f o r Huguenot o p i n i o n s . Monluc was p r e s e n t at t h e r e c e p t i o n of e i g h t e e n new members i n t o the o r d e r , members a p p o i n t e d by the G u i s e s t o r e d r e s s the Huguenot m a j o r i t y . Monluc had u n f o r t u n a t e  l y c u r r i e d the f a v o u r of N a v a r r e j u s t b e f o r e the f o r t u n e s o f t h e Bourbon p r i n c e s were e c l i p s e d , a l b e i t t e m p o r a r i l y , w i t h the i m p r i s o n m e n t and t r i a l o f Conde and the d i s g r a c e of A n t o i n e . Monluc knew t h a t he had a l i e n a t e d h i m s e l f f rom A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , and p e r h a p s he knew t h a t A n t o i n e ' s f a v o u r i t e , F r a n c o i s d ' E s c a r s 2 was i n t r i g u i n g f o r o f f i c e . C o n v i n c e d , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t he had no chance o f r e c e i v i n g an i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e i n Guyenne, he sought an a p p o i n t m e n t i n D a u p h i n e , the G u i s e gouvernement , where h i s b r o t h e r , Jean de Monluc was b i s h o p of V a l e n c e but h i s advances i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n were r e j e c t e d by the G u i s e s . Mon luc was s t i l l a t the c o u r t when the d e a t h of F r a n c i s I I C o u r t e a u l t , Un Cadet de G a s c o g n e , p . 1^9. 2 Rochambeau, L e t t r e s d ' A n t o i n e de Bourbon e t de Jehanne  d ' A l b r e t ( P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1877), N o s . CXLV, C X L V I , C X L V I I . 43 brought about a sudden change in the fortunes of the Bourbons, the Constable and the Guises. He assisted at the Estates-General of Orleans ^ and must have realized that the kingdom was not far from open war. Without having obtained office he returned to Guyenne in January where he attached himself to Burie, the lieutenant-general, and proceeded to make himself indispensable, with a view to supplanting the old officer. Charles de Coucys, seigneur de Burie, of a noble family in Saintonge, was, l ike Monluc, a veteran of the Italian wars but he was almost seventy years of age, old and t ired . His wife was a sister of one of Conde's lieutenants and he had a number of relatives in the 2 Huguenot camp, a fact Monluc was later to use against him. The old lieutenant-general had neither the strength nor the heart for the long struggle which lay ahead. In March Monluc was at Agen to play a prominent role in the assembly of the Estates of the slne'chaussee. Moderating the influence of the Huguenots and reassuring the Catholics he played the role of politique to perfection. This time he was following the policy of none less than the queen mother, a policy of toleration. In June when troubles broke out at Layrolle and Serignac, Monluc sought and was given a mission by the king and Monluc, i Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 393« Comrnentaires et Lettres, i v , 158. 44 queen to deal with them."'' The ingenuous Burie recommended him 2 as being worthy of that charge or of a greater one. No one could have been more zealous i n applying the p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n than was Monluc. He was c e r t a i n that p l e a s i n g the queen mother was the only route to an o f f i c e which would b r i n g f u r t h e r honour and r i c h e s . Catherine's p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n underlay her attempt to b r i n g about a rapprochement between the C a t h o l i c and the Huguenot cle r g y at the Colloquy of Poissy. One of those who worked hardest there to accomplish the queen mother's goals was Jean de Monluc, Bishop of Valence and brother of B l a i s e . The miscarriage of the colloquy was a setback for the p o l i c y of t o l e r a t i o n and B l a i s e de Monluc returned to the court to see which way the wind was blowing."^ When he a r r i v e d at Saint-Germain e a r l y i n December, Monluc, had at l a s t learned to commit himself only with caution, and t h i s time he received with prudent reserve Condi's e f f o r t s to r e c r u i t him. I t was not that becoming a Huguenot was repugnant i n i t s e l f for Monluc 1s guide was the a t t i t u d e of the a u t h o r i t y on whom h i s advancement depended. Some time l a t e r i n w r i t i n g to the queen he spoke with horror of the a c t i v i t i e s of the Huguenots and he assured her that he could never change h i s r e l i g i o n unless h i s """Lettres de Catherine de Medicis , I , 2 1 1 . 2 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 153. ^Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 399. 45 king changed f i r s t .^ While he was at the court word came of numerous uprisings in Guyenne and i t was then that Catherine determined to send Conde to the province. The king of Navarre wished to send letters instructing Burie to take measures to restore order in the meantime but the queen mother suggested 2 sending Monluc and Charles IX signed the patent. Monluc was empowered to use the companies from the garrisons and to raise a few hundred arquebusiers but his commission was intended only as a preliminary to the mission of Conde. However, when Conde was not sent, and Montpensier appeared only briefly many months later, Monluc's role assumed much greater importance. In recount ing his commission Monluc made no reference to the impending mission of Conde and presented his own as paral le l to that of Crussol thus exaggerating his own importance.^ With the sending of Monluc the Spanish ambassador, knowing his military reptuation and his energetic nature, wrote that Guyenne had found i ts saviour Shortly after his return to Guyenne, Monluc's attitude and actions toward the Protestants underwent an abrupt change. From toleration he turned to stern repression and bloody reprisal for acts of rebel l ion. Several factors contributed to this change of Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 237• Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 400. ' ib id . , II, 401. Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 152. 46 attitude. De Franc, lieutenant in the town of Condom revealed that the Huguenots had a plan for Monluc ! s assassination."1" Worse s t i l l , they were plotting to seize the king, his brothers, 2 the queen mother and the Guises. But, probably the most important factor to influence Monluc was the degree to which the Huguenot movement was threatening the nobi l i ty . One of the prominent nobles, the baron de Fumel, had been k i l l ed by the peasants of his own estate, a.crime Monluc was charged to investigate. The Huguenots were boasting not only that they would pay no more dimes to the Church but that they would not pay either the ta i l l e to the king or their seigneurial rents and dues to their lords.^ Like the other nobles Monluc was horrified by these threats to the very foundations of sixteenth century social order. Encouraged by the willingness of the nobility to make him their champion, Monluc counselled harsh treatment of the Huguenots. Writing to the queen and to the king of Navarre, Monluc reported that the reform had the support of no more than one-tenth of the population and that he had the solut ion; force the lords of the region to their homes, for some among them supplied Huguenot military leadership, put to death the principal ministers and banish the remainder. To accomplish this i t would be necessary to move quickly. "'"Monluc, Comme nt air es, II, 412. 2 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 161. 3 I b i d . , II, 421. 4 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 114-118. 47 I n M a r c h , 1562 when M o n l u c o f f e r e d t h i s a d v i c e , s u c h c o u n c i l s h a d some c h a n c e o f b e i n g h e a r d f o r t h e C a t h o l i c T r i u m v i r a t e o f t h e due de G u i s e , t h e c o n s t a b l e de M o n t m o r e n c y a n d t h e m a r e c h a l S a i n t - A n d r e , was g a i n i n g i n f l u e n c e a t t h e c o u r t . A c t i n g d e c i s i v e l y , M o n l u c a c h i e v e d t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f T o u l o u s e . . " ' " F i n a l l y he h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e e x p l o i t w h i c h was s u r e t o b r i n g h i m h o n o u r a n d r e w a r d . What a b l o w i t was t o f i n d t h a t d ' E s c a r s h a d b e e n a c c r e d i t e d a s l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l o f t h e p r o v i n c e w h i l e he h i m s e l f was s t i l l o p e r a t i n g w i t h o u t o f f i c e ' . I n a v i o l e n t l e t t e r t o t h e q u e e n , M o n l u c a s k e d t o be a l l o w e d t o l e a v e t h e p r o v i n c e a n d l e t d ' E s c a r s be r e s p o n s i b l e h i m s e l f f o r t h e 2 d i s a s t e r w h i c h w o u l d f o l l o w . I n t h e l i g h t o f M o n l u c ' s b r i l l i a n t s e r v i c e t h e q u e e n c o u l d n o t a l l o w t h a t s i t u a t i o n t o come a b o u t a n d d ' E s c a r s h a d t o w a i t a l m o s t a y e a r b e f o r e r e c e i v i n g a n a l t e r n a t e a p p o i n t m e n t . S h e c o n g r a t u l a t e d M o n l u c on h i s s u c c e s s , a c c o r d e d h i m 3,000 l i v r e s f o r h i s p e r s o n a l e x p e n s e s a n d a c o n f i s c a t i o n he h a d r e q u e s t e d , a n d g a v e h i m c a r t e b l a n c h e t o 3 c o n d u c t o p e r a t i o n s . M o n l u c h a d s e v e r a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o i n c r e a s e h i s p o p u l a r s u p p o r t i n G u y e n n e b y c o n t e s t i n g o r d e r s f r o m t h e c e n t r a l g o v e r n m e n t , M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s , I I , 444 -459' 2 M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s , I V , 144. ^ L e t t r e s de C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i s , I , 331-332, 339; M o n l u c , C o m r n e n t a i r e s , I I , 469-470. u s u a l l y because the o r d e r s had been based on l a c k o f knowledge o f a f f a i r s i n Guyenne. T h i s was t h e ' case i n t h e summer o f 1562 when t h e c o u r t , a p p a r e n t l y t h i n k i n g the p a c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e p r o v i n c e w e l l a d v a n c e d , commanded B u r i e t o l e a d i n t o F r a n c e numbers o f t r o o p s w h i c h would a l m o s t s t r i p Guyenne o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . I n o p p o s i n g t h e s e o r d e r s Monluc once a g a i n r a i s e d h i s s t o c k w i t h the Gascon n o b i l i t y . Monluc had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y o f w i n n i n g t h e g r a t i t u d e o f t h e a u t h o r i t i e s o f t h e c i t y o f B o r d e a u x by c o m i n g t o t h e i r d e f e n c e when an a t t e m p t was made t o s e i z e t h e c i t y . H i s p o p u l a r i t y and s u p p o r t i n the p r o v i n c e i n c r e a s e d c o n s t a n t l y among t h e C a t h o l i c s w h i l e the Huguenots h a t e d and f e a r e d h i m f o r he p r a c t i s e d j u s t i c e by e x e c u t i n g men t o make " e x a m p l e s " o f them t o the e x t e n t t h a t he was a c c o m p a n i e d by two hangmen whom p e o p l e f a c e t i o u s l y c a l l e d h i s l a c k e y s . T h r o u g h o u t September M o n l u c ' s d e s i r e was to do b a t t l e w i t h the Huguenot c h i e f , S y m p h o r i e n de D u r f o r t , s e i g n e u r de D u r a s , but B u r i e was r e l u c t a n t and t h e p r o j e c t r e q u i r e d a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s i n Guyenne. F u r i o u s w i t h t h e o l d l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l , M o n l u c wrote a n g r y l e t t e r s t o t h e queen mother m a k i n g r e f e r e n c e s t o B u r i e ' s Huguenot r e l a t i v e s . " ' " He c l a i m e d t h a t i f he had had s o l e command, two months 'would have seen him dead or M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s et L e t t r e s , I V , 160. L9 Duras defeated but that every time he had sought to do battle with the Huguenot leader Burie had ruined his plans."*" The fiery Gascon captain f inal ly got his opportunity in spite of his associate. The anticipated battle took place at Vergt on October 9, 1562 and the Catholic forces under Monluc won a decisive victory over the Huguenots. As he had done after the pacification of Toulouse, Monluc immediately attempted to exploit his victory by requesting favours from the crown. For his brother he asked a company of l ight horse and the post of 2 governor in the city of Perigueux. For himself he asked the privilege of granting decrees of pardon and the restoration of the county of Gaure, previously granted him and then taken away in a reunion of the royal domain. The king replied te l l ing him that his requests had been found unreasonable and that he should content himself with the 500 l ivres he received monthly for his tab le . 5 Early in 1563 when victory for the Catholic army seemed l ike ly , Monluc was instrumental in the formation of a Catholic association in the senechaussle of Agen ^ and the a f f i l i a t ion 1 I b i d . , IV, 158. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 63. ^Ibid. , No. 76; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. k Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 190-195« 50 of that association with the great ligue embracing a l l the territory in Languedoc and Guyenne under the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Toulouse."'' In so doing he was cementing his position as champion and spokesman for the nobil ity but he was also forming a Catholic organization to paral le l the synods of the Huguenots and to keep the latter under control when the 2 garrisons would be disbanded or reduced. A similar league was formed at Bordeaux at Monluc's suggestion by Frederic de Foix, comte de Candale, who informed the queen of i t s organization in March, I563. The Catholic nobility in a remonstrance to the crown complained that while they had been commanded to disband, the Huguenots were s t i l l allowed their assemblies.^ Catherine de 4 Medicis, hearing of the leagues, commanded Monluc to destroy them. She had recently had experience with the association formed by Conde and with the triumvirate, both avowedly loyal to the crown yet both committed to achieving a purpose, i f necessary, in spite of the crown and she was convinced that a l l leagues constituted a threat to the crown. Furthermore, l ike the Huguenot organization, the leagues were local ly formed and such a manifestation of prov- inc ia l independence could not pass unnoticed. """Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197- 2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, 344-345. ^Documents Pour Servir a. . . . , Nos. 91, 92. ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 551-552. 5 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197-51 Monluc arrived in Bordeaux in March and received not i f i c  ation of his appointment as lieutenant-general of the king in Haute-Guyenne Burie was to retain authority in that part of the province west of the River Lot. This was a source of dissatis faction to Monluc for Burie, old and sick, had retired to his lands in Saintonge the previous October. Courteault suggests that Catherine did not want to aggrandize the vain captain too much or to offend the representatives of the old Gascon families too 2 greatly by favouring this parvenu. According to his cwn none too modest account Monluc was prevailed upon to accept the appoint ment by the combined efforts of a l l the nobles and officers present in Bordeaux.5 Antoine de Noailles, governor of Bordeaux, had died just before Monluc's arr iva l in the city and his successor did not take office unti l the end of May. Burie was in Saintonge. The govern ment of the region and the execution of the edict accompanying the Peace of Amboise was left entirely to Monluc who remained in Bordeaux almost three months. In fact, in June Charles IX wrote to Monluc that he had told d'Escars that i f he did not go immediately to Bordeaux the king would send another in his place to whom he would give the office. He had also commanded Burie to Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 577. Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 197. Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 580. 52 go t o h i s gouvernement t o g i v e o r d e r and oversee the maintenance of the e d i c t . W h e n Monluc l e f t Bordeaux he had o b t a i n e d from the Parlement support f o r the demand he addressed t o the k i n g t h a t Guyenne be d i v i d e d between h i m s e l f and B u r i e by senechaussees and not by r i v e r . He had not been g r a n t e d a u t h o r i t y over the whole of the p r o v i n c e and i t would o n l y add i n s u l t t o i n j u r y i f he had t o share w i t h B u r i e a u t h o r i t y over h i s home r e g i o n , the A g e n a i s , because i t was d i v i d e d by a r i v e r . At Agen Monluc was g i v e n a t r i u m p h a l e n t r y . C i t y o f f i c i a l s p r e s e n t e d him the keys of the c i t y w h i l e one hundred costumed c h i l d r e n shouted, " V i v e l e r o i et l e s i e u r de Monluc son l i e u t e n a n t ' . " At Condom the c o n s u l s o f f e r e d him a c h a i n of g o l d w i t h the o r d e r of S a i n t - M i c h e l worth 308 l i v r e s . The E s t a t e s of Agenais which met i n June was s t r o n g l y . C a t h o l i c and p r o t e s t e d a g a i n s t the terms of the Peace of Amboise. They r e g a r d e d Monluc as t h e i r l i b e r a t o r and asked t h a t the p a r t of t h e i r s i n e c h a u s s e e l y i n g west of the Lot be t a k e n from B u r i e ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n and p l a c e d under Monluc. The d i v i s i o n of the gouvernement c o n t i n u e d t o be a bone of c o n t e n t i o n w i t h Monluc who wrote t o the queen t h a t he understood B u r i e , a f t e r l e a v i n g the o t h e r p a r t of the gouvernement, had gone t o the c o u r t and t h a t a l l the r e g i o n s t i l l B u r i e ' s was i n r e v o l t Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 107. C o u r t e a u l t , Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 205. 53 with no one doing anything about i t . "He has promised so many times to give you this gouvernement," continued Monluc ironical ly , "that you send him promptly to do his duty. As for me, I have no wish to be valet to him or to any other save the king and you; and wi l l do my duty in the charge I've been g iven. . . ." "" Monluc was to wait unti l the beginning of 1565 when Catherine and Charles IX came into the province for further reward. At that time to encourage him Catherine made him a member of the Privy Council. Immediately thereafter Burie, with impeccable timing for once, died leaving no reasonable alternative but to make Blaise de Monluc lieutenant-general of the king in the entire province, an appointment to which was added the office of vice- 2 admiral of Guyenne. Governors of Cities The third echelon of royal lieutenants in the province of Guyenne was composed of those who commanded garrisons in major c i t ies and had authority over the neighbouring regions. They were known as governors of cit ies and resided in such important 3 centres as Dax, Blaye, Bayonne and Bordeaux. The governor of a city or fort i f ied place was subordinate to the lieutenant-general though in some cases not subordinate enough to please the latter Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 218. Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 216. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 199-200. 5^ officer. Men of the leading noble families such as the Foix- Gandale were appointed to these offices, often as one of several offices they possessed. Antoine de Noailles was captain of the Chateau du Ha and governor of Bordeaux, both royal offices, and mayor of the c i ty , a municipal office. The office of mayor had been occupied previously by another royal officer, Jean de Daillon, comte du Lude, who had been lieutenant-general of the king in Guyenne and Poitou in the absence of the king of Navarre. Noailles commanded a lieutenant and one hundred men and for remuneration he received 1 0 0 l ivres monthly, twice the stipend of his lieutenant and one-fifth that of Burie or Monluc. He rendered sufficiently important service that Catherine wrote that the king was "sending him the gold chain of the order of Saint-Michel by the comte Des Cars, not wishing to leave him unremunerated for his service." Burie, the senior o f f i c ia l in the region, resented the influence of Noailles and sounded like a petulant child when he gave instructions to his representative to t e l l the king that the seigneur de Noailles was l i v ing in the Chateau du Ha where he (Burie) wished to l i v e . Should not Noailles, as mayor of the town, l ive in the mayor's residence? Burie also reported that the keys of the city were delivered nightly to Noailles and he Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, X , 8 l , 88. 55 felt that when he was in the city they should be delivered to him as lieutenant-general."'" Like any administration the govern ment of Guyenne could be hampered by the pettiness of i ts members in their relationships with one another. Antoine de Noailles had long been a faithful royal officer 2 and had served as ambassador in England. His brother, de l ' l s l e , became Bishop of Dax and later ambassador to London and to Constantinpole. Through his wife, Jeanne de Gontaut, Antoine de Noailles was related to Jean de Saint-Sulpice, the competent and influential ambassador to the court of Phil ip II . Thus Noailles was a member of a family well rewarded for faithful service to the crown. At the end of January, 1563, soon after Catherine's letter announcing to him the king's award of the chain with the order of Saint-Michel, Antoine de Noailles addressed a long memoire to the king on measures to be taken in Guyenne to assure the pacification of the province. He outlined the letters i t would be important for the king to write, the appreciation to be expressed, recompense to be promised, admonitions to be given and financial arrangements to be made. In his thorough analysis even the lieutenant-general "'"Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. 2 Edmond Cabie, Guerres de Religion dans le Sud-ouest de la  France et Principalement dans le Quercy d'apres les Papiers des  Seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 i 1590 )Albi: Imprimerie Noguies, 1906), p. 12. 56 received due attention; i t was necessary to write a very affect ionate letter to Burie for the conservation of La Rochelle and the rest of Saintonge and the Angoumois, especially the ports threatened by the English. Similar letters should be written to the la Tremoille brothers, monsieur de Pons, and to a l l the senechaux, especially the senechal of Perigord who deserved particular praise and promise of recompense. The comte de Ventadour must be cautioned to take care in the city of Limoges and other important places in Limousin. Laiazun, royal officer in the city of Bragerac, had not been residing in that city and the king should reprove him for i t . Good letters should be sent to Candale and to the marquis de Trans, men with much credit and favour in the region, who were very loyal and eager to be employed in the king's service. Candale had often offered to assist Noailles with his presence and that of his numerous followers. La Mote, lieutenant to the chateau and town of Dax, needed a letter of encouragement for his captain was i l l and i t would be well to write to the officers of the town also. Bordeaux, Noailles' f i rs t responsibil ity, required repaires to i ts walls and, above a l l , pay for i t s soldiers. The governor had held assemblies of the inhabitants several times, assisted by d'Escars in the last , and with his memoire he was sending his majesty the record of the deliberations and the dispatch of d'Escars."*" Whereas many of Monluc's letter consisted either of particular details or of Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret, I, kS9. 57 g r a n d d e s i g n s , N o a i l l e s ' memoire p r o v i d e d a t h o u g h t f u l and p r a c t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f a c t i o n s r e q u i r e d f r o m t h e k i n g t o m a i n t a i n and e x p l o i t t h e l o y a l t y o f h i s s u b j e c t s i n Guyenne. L a c k o f s u c h a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n a t t h e c o u r t a b o u t a f f a i r s i n Guyenne l e d t o many d i f f i c u l t i e s . A n t o i n e de P a r d a i l l a n , b a r o n de G o n d r i n , l e f t t h e c o u r t a t p o n t a i n e b l e a u c o n g r a t u l a t i n g h i m s e l f on h i s a p p o i n t m e n t a s g o v e r n o r o f B o r d e a u x and c a p t a i n o f t h e C h a t e a u du Ha. The r e g e n t had h e a r d h i s r e q u e s t a n d b e s t o w e d an a p p r o p r i a t e r e w a r d on t h e l o y a l n o b l e . What a b l o w i t was t o l e a r n t h a t t h e o f f i c e was n o t v a c a n t I The d e a t h o f N o a i l l e s had b e e n n o t h i n g more t h a n r u m o u r . Some t i m e l a t e r t h i s man who h a d come s o c l o s e t o o f f i c e o n l y t o be d i s  a p p o i n t e d w r o t e t o t h e queen e x p r e s s i n g h i s l a c k o f c o n f i d e n c e i n h e r g o v e r n o r s i n s e v e r a l m a j o r c i t i e s . He a s s u r e d h e r t h a t he had no u l t e r i o r m o t i v e i n s o d o i n g b u t r e m i n d e d h e r t h a t when t h e g o u v e r n e m e n t o f B o r d e a u x had n o t b e e n v a c a n t , s h e had p r o m i s e d h i m p r e f e r e n c e i n t h e n e x t s i m i l a r a p p o i n t m e n t . A f t e r t h e d e a t h o f A n t o i n e de N o a i l l e s t h e . o f f i c e was r e q u e s t e d by F r a n c o i s d ' E s c a r s and he had r e c e i v e d i t but t h e s e n d i n g o f t h e l e t t e r s p a t e n t was d e l a y e d . M o n l u c p r o t e s t e d t h e g r a n t i n g o f t h i s new f a v o u r t o 2 d ' E s c a r s and t h e d e l a y i n s e n d i n g . t h e l e t t e r s p a t e n t l e d h i m . t o """Documents P o u r S e r v i r . a . , . , ;No 86. ' 2 M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s e t L e t t r e s , I V , 209. believe that the appointment had been revoked. In addition to d'Escars and Gondrin there were at least two other candidates seeking the appointment, Noailles' son and Jean de Vai l lac , the latter supported by Monluc. Jean de Vaillac even exercised the 2 office for a time under, a commission from Monluc. A l l the candidates pressed their cases at the court, assuring the queen of the men and means they would bring to the task. Gondrin, for example, told Catherine that i f i t pleased her to make provision for him, her majesty and the king would have "a faithful subject and servitor who would have the means of making the king obeyed' .and preventing troubles, as much as any man in Guyenne," a reference to the favour he possessed and the size of his s u i t e . 5 The efforts of Vail lac and Gondrin to obtain the office were of no avail and they continued to serve as commanders of companies in the province. Appointments at each level in the royal government of the province were much sought after. Burie, already occupying a high office, the duties of which he failed to f u l f i l , enlisted the support of the due de Montpensier and requested the office of 4 admiral of Guyenne after the death of the king of Navarre. That 1 Ibid.- , IV, 243. 2 I b i d . ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 86. 4 Ibid . , No. 80. 59 office was granted to the young Prince Henry of Navarre but Burie was made vice-admiral. ' Monluc had avidly sought appointment both in Dauphine and in Piedmont before beginning his rise in Guyenne and many candidates sought appointment as governors of c i t i e s . Their eagerness stemmed from ambition or merely from avarice for each office carried financial remuneration and the multiplication of offices brought a commensurate multiplication of income. Moreover, the office carried opportunities for financial gain from groups who wished to influence the officer, and this income was much greater than the stipend i t s e l f . The financial returns alone, however, do not explain the zealous seeking after the office. For the Gascon nobility the path to honour and renown lay most often in military office and advancement. That riches should accompany honour was to be expected. In fact, Courteault said of Monluc that he could not conceive of honours without 1 money. The appointment to office required sponsors, the more influential the better. In seeking appointment Monluc attempted to enlist the support of the due de Guise, son of his original patron, and to ingratiate himself with the king of Navarre. D'Escars rel ied upon his friendship with Antoine de Bourbon who interceded for him at times with the king, the queen mother, the due de Guise and the cardinal of Lorraine. In the youth of Henry II d'Escars Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 2 0 7 . 60 had been one of h i s f a v o u r i t e s . For appointment i n the p r o v i n c e of Guyenne i t was h e l p f u l t o have some c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the g o v e r n o r , A n t o i n e de Bourbon. In 1559 A n t o i n e ' s war c o u n c i l c o n s i s t e d of B u r i e , Monluc, J a r n a c and d ' E s c a r s , a l l of whom were t o be g r a n t e d i m p o r t a n t o f f i c e s i n the r e g i o n under h i s j u r i s d i c t i o n . Appointments were made by the crown but i t would appear t h a t they were n o r m a l l y recommended by the governor f o r the crown's r a t i f i c a t i o n . Thus upon the death of the g o v e r n o r , N o a i l l e s wrote the queen a s k i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s office"'" and B u r i e wrote 2 t h a n k i n g the k i n g f o r c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s . Remuneration d i d not c o n s i s t merely of s a l a r y f o r the performance of d u t i e s . Many t h i n g s were r e q u i r e d f o r a man's honour, c h i e f l y t h a t he l i v e as b e f i t t e d h i s s t a t i o n and t h a t h i s whole f a m i l y r e f l e c t h i s honour. I t was f e u d a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t the k i n g m a i n t a i n the f a m i l i e s of h i s v a s s a l s . Monluc took advantage of h i s v i c t o r i e s t o p r e s s h i s c l a i m s upon the crown and i n a d d i t i o n to honours f o r h i m s e l f he sought them f o r h i s b r o t h e r and f o r h i s sons. Monluc was a l s o k e e n l y c o n s c i o u s of the i m p r e s s i o n he conveyed by the manner of d r e s s , by the t a b l e he s p r e a d , and by the g e n e r o s i t y he d i s p l a y e d . On one o c c a s i o n he had the o p p o r t u n i t y t o e n t e r t a i n the due de Guise and the due de Saxe i n h i s p a v i l i o n . I t was Monluc's boast t h a t a f t e r the due de G u i s e t h e r e was no Documents Pour S e r v i r a..., No. 78. """Ruble, Jeanne d ' A l b r e t , I , 466. 61 table in the camp longer or better than his. After enjoying a sumptuous repast Monluc's guests complimented him and he replied that i f they would speak to the king on his behalf for si lver vessels, the next time he would be able to serve them as they deserved. They did indeed t e l l the king, Henry I I , about the dinner, assuring him that even the king could not have provided better meats, better wines or colder and that Monluc deserved si lver vessels for his table. The king promised to provide them."*" Monluc missed few opportunities to seek tangible rewards even to the extent of replying ungraciously to letters of congratulation 2 that when he spread his table words made poor meat. When men amassed multiple offices i t was impossible for them to personally perform the accompanying duties. Indeed, some officers seem to have been l i t t l e inclined to f u l f i l l the require ments of any of their offices. The governor of Guyenne was not resident in the province. Burie and d'Escars were both rebuked by Charles IX for non-residence. Jarnac repeatedly asked permission 3 to leave La Rochelle and attend to affairs at his home. Both Burie and Jarnac were old men and the strain of events, not surprisingly, was hard on them. That they wished at times to escape from the pressure was to be expected. Even at the level of the governors of c i t ies non-residence was a problem as Noailles pointed out to the queen. Monluc seems to have been the exception among the highest "''Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I , 362-364. 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 214. ^Documents Pour Servir a. . . . , No. 51. 62 officers of Guyenne for he was always in the f ie ld even to the extent of taking only ten days to settle affairs when his wife died. His advice to the king's lieutenant was to keep constantly on the move so that men, always expecting the officer's a r r i v a l , would be more anxious to obey.""" A local noble of great renown because of his military exploits, the number and reputation of his cl ients , and the patronage he bestowed, could gain great support from the provincial Parlement, the local estates, the c i t ies and especially from the nobi l i ty . At times, l istening to the voices around him, he would forget that he was the representative of a far away central government. Although he might be the local champion, the l iberator, the hero, he could s t i l l be useful to the crown. In fact, his local renown was the very factor-that made him most useful to the crown i f he could be controlled as Monluc was by flattery and gif ts . Because of the absence of the king of Navarre, the age and indecision of Burie, and the events of c i v i l war which called for the military talents of the ambitious and energetic Blaise de Monluc, he was the central figure in the drama of royal government in Guyenne during the f irst War of Religion. His contribution supplemented by the work of a few intelligent real ists l ike Antoine de Noailles went a long way toward the maintenance of royal authority in the province. "'"Monluc, Commentaires, II, 469. CHAPTER I I I MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND ROYAL AUTHORITY I n an extended remonstrance addressed t o C h a r l e s IX Monluc o f f e r e d the k i n g d e t a i l e d a d v i c e r e g a r d i n g the appointment of m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . " * " The k i n g ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o see h i s o f f i c e r s p e r s o n a l l y was c o n s i d e r e d by the v e t e r a n s o l d i e r t o be e s s e n t i a l t o o b t a i n i n g l o y a l s e r v i c e . Law r e q u i r e d t h a t a s p i r a n t s t o such j u d i c i a l o f f i c e s as p r e s i d e n t , c o u n c i l l o r and l i e u t e n a n t - g e n e r a l be examined by the d o c t o r s of the lav/ and the c o u n c i l l o r s of Parlement under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of the c h a n c e l l o r . Monluc assumed t h a t t h i s p r a c t i c e was c a r r i e d out and he recommended i t s a d o p t i o n f o r appointments t o m i l i t a r y o f f i c e as w e l l . The Gascon c a p t a i n accused the k i n g of awarding the o f f i c e s of governor and c a p t a i n t o o e a s i l y , even i n response to the r e q u e s t s of the women he danced w i t h . Such an o f f i c e r was e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t t o the defence of a c i t y f o r he c o u l d overcome i t s weaknesses and p r e p a r e i t s f o r c e s . Moreover, enemies, knowing h i s w e l l - deserved r e p u t a t i o n , would a v o i d a t t a c k i n g . Young men s h o u l d not expect immediate advancement but s h o u l d be prep a r e d t o serve an a p p r e n t i c e s h i p under o l d e r , e x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s . L i k e the p o s i t i o n of governor and c a p t a i n of a c i t y , the o f f i c e s of Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 374-398. marechal de camp and maitre de camp for cavalry and infantry were crucial offices not to be l ight ly f i l l e d . Men f i l l i n g them must be neither r ivals nor over-dependent on each other. Since victory and defeat depended on these officers, the king and his lieutenants should consider repeatedly and even tremble over the appointment.' Monluc feared that a l l these offices l ike the honour of Knight of the Order were being given out too freely where once they had been t i t l es of honour reserved for people of good name. The remedy proposed by the man who claimed to be the oldest captain in the kingdom was to institute an examination before a special board. The due d'Anjou, Charles' brother, who had won two battles even though he was s t i l l a youth, could serve as military chancellor and the panel of doctors and councillors would be composed of old, experienced captains. Anyone who requested office would be summoned before the examining board to give an account of himself. He would be asked where he had performed his apprenticeship and under whom and what deeds of honour he had won. Only on the recommendation of the experienced captains would any appointment be made and the king could avoid importuning for military office by making the fact known. Monluc claimed that many benefits would result from the adoption of his recommendations. The apprentices to the carrying 65 of arms, knowing that they couldn't enter by the window would work and study dil igently to impress those who must open the door to them. Those appointed to office would not slacken their efforts for they would wish to vindicate their choice by the captains and to ensure their continued promotion. Appointment of generals of cavalry and colonels of infantry would be beyond this scheme, according to Monluc, for these offices must be given to princes and great lords. However, even youth and inexperience on their part would riot matter provided the maitre de camp was an experienced soldier chosen with care. Since many would be anxious to advance by arms, Monluc recommended that the king keep a r o l l by province of a l l men of promise and their particular qualities so that vacancies in a province could be f i l l e d from among those- l i s t ed . Monluc was certain that those who knew they were on the l i s t would take heart and work hard to render service to the king and that those not on the l i s t would expose themselves to a thousand dangers to get their names placed on the l i s t . The king must be prompt to add the names of worthy men to the l i s t which Monluc suggested should bear the name, "book of honour." Like Catherine de Medicis,'*' Monluc attributed the use of this technique to Louis XII who even handled judicial appointments by means of a r o l l of possible candidates according to a story Monluc recalled from Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 9 4 . 66 h i s y o u t h . F u r t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the b e n e f i t s of such a t e c h n i q u e f o r the a l l o c a t i o n of patronage were drawn from the p r a c t i c e of Odet de F o i x under whom Monluc had s e r v e d h i s own a p p r e n t i c e s h i p and from Monluc's p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e as governor i n S i e n n a and M o n t a l c i n o . Not o n l y s h o u l d the k i n g reward the f a i t h f u l by appointment to o f f i c e but he s h o u l d be a c c e s s i b l e t o h i s s u b j e c t s . A g r a c i o u s word spoken by the k i n g was most important f o r t h e encouragement of h i s l o y a l s u p p o r t e r s . I f the spoken word c o u l d be accompanied by f i n a n c i a l reward so much the b e t t e r ! ' Monluc's recommendation was t h a t C h a r l e s IX make these f i n a n c i a l rewards p e r s o n a l l y . Not o n l y would i t i n c r e a s e the s u b j e c t ' s t i e s t o h i s s o v e r i e g n but the award would r e a c h i t s d e s t i n a t i o n d i r e c t l y w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o pass t h r o u g h the hands of o f f i c i a l s where much was c e r t a i n t o s t i c k . Monluc's s u g g e s t i o n s t o C h a r l e s IX r e g a r d i n g m i l i t a r y appointments i n the p r o v i n c e s obscure the s i t u a t i o n as i t was i n the e a r l y y e a r s of the Wars of R e l i g i o n . H i s remonstrance i m p l i e s a g r e a t e r degree of r o y a l c o n t r o l over such appointments i n Guyenne t h a n C h a r l e s IX- was a b l e t o a s s e r t . I f the wrong people e x e r c i s e d the o f f i c e of c a p t a i n no one s h o u l d bear g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h an Monluc h i m s e l f f o r he had as much c o n t r o l over r e c r u i t i n g and appointments i n the p r o v i n c e as anyone as the e v e n t s of 1561 t o 1563 show. C h a r l e s IX had a p p a r e n t l y 67 r e j e c t e d the charge t h a t he was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the appointment o f i n f e r i o r c a p t a i n s by s h i f t i n g the blame to h i s lieutenants.'*' Monluc r e f u s e d to accept the blame and s t a t e d that the k i n g had caused the problem by g r a n t i n g the o f f i c e to so many humble people that gentlemen no longer d e s i r e d such an appointment. T i t l e s t h a t were once the preserve of the high born were now a c c e s s i b l e to the common c a t t l e - d r o v e r . Monluc was concerned about the t i t l e s and honour given these men r a t h e r and the f a c t that they were granted the a u t h o r i t y t o command a s m a l l group of s o l d i e r s . He f e l t a p a r t i a l s o l u t i o n would be to in c r e a s e companies t o one thousand, the s i z e of the l e g i o n s of F r a n c i s I . M i l i t a r y O r g a n i z a t i o n and Forces i n Guyenne French armed f o r c e s of the s i x t e e n t h century f e l l i n t o two major c a t e g o r i e s , those of the o r d i n a i r e des guerres and those of the e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres,. d i v i s i o n s h i s t o r i c a l r a t h e r than l o g i c a l . The former was provi d e d with i t s own res o u r c e s and t r e s o r i e r s . The ban and the a r r i e r e ban and companies of ordonnance came under the o r d i n a i r e des gue r r e s . The e x t r a o r d i n a i r e des guerres c o n s i s t e d of bodies of troops Monluc, Comrnentaires, I I I , 390. I b i d . "Du temps que je commencay a p o r t e r . l e s armes, l e t i l t r e de c a p i t a i n e e s t o i t t i l t r e d'honneur, et des g e n t i l - hommes de bonne maison ne se desdaignoient de l e p o r t e r . Je . n'ay pas a p p e l l e d'autre t i l t r e mes enfans. A present l e moindre picqueboeuf se f a i c t a p p e l l e r , s ' i l a eu quelque commandement." 68 i n i t i a l l y recruited for short time service but later as part of a standing army. It operated with exceptional resources, often improvised, and was administered by special personnel. Under i ts administration fought such forces as companies of mercenaries and gens de p iedet de cheval, both French and foreign. L'Ordinaire des Guerres 'Of feudal origin, the ban and the arriere ban *"* consisted o a l l those who had a military obligation to the king as possessors of f ie fs . Personal service was normal but a man unable to serve could present a replacement and a.man inel igible to serve, a commoner or churchman, must pay a tax which usually amounted to one-fifth: the value of his f ief , . This feudal military force was attached to the feudal administrative units, the bailliages and senechaussees. Letters patent for the convocation of the ban and the arriere ban were sent to b a i l l i s and senechaux. Two montres or reviews took place: a preliminary montre en robes at which the roll.;was checked, replacements presented, defaulters tr ied , non-servers taxed and the taxes sent to an elected receveur and a montre en armes when the king wanted the ban to march. Units of the ban were enseignes consisting of three For the development of the ban and the arriere ban in the sixteenth century see Doucet, Institutions, II, 610-617; and Gaston Zel ler , Les . Institutions de la France au XVI e Siecle (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), pp. 312-314. 69 hundred men when on foot, of f i f t y hommes d'armes or of one hundred archers. Although the service had o r i g i n a l l y been unpaid as the feudal due of vassals, the Estates-General of 1484 requested that men of the ban be paid and by the middle of the sixteenth century that pay was one hundred l i v r e s for a captain, f i f t y for a lieutenant, forty for lesser o f f i c e r s such as ensign bearer, twenty for hommes d'armes, ten for archers, and s i x to eight for foot s o l d i e r s . Exemptions from service under the ban extended from the great o f f i c e r s of the crown to the o f f i c e r s of sovereign courts and the bourgeois of major towns. Men who served i n companies of ordonnance were of necessity exempt since they couldn't serve in two companies at the same time. Men f i t for service tended to pass into the companies of ordonnance and the ban lost i t s effectiveness as i t became comprised of old men unfit, for service and replacements o u t f i t t e d at the least possible expense. During the f i r s t of the c i v i l wars the due d'Etampes, governor of Bretagne, made repeated reference i n his corres pondence to men of the arriere ban. In June, 1562 the due de Montpensier requested troops from Etampes to a s s i s t him i n Angoumois.^ Etampes wrote to Catherine that men serving under the a r r i e r e ban made up the major part of his forces, that they 'Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 26. 70 would provide the service they owed the crown but that he could not force them to serve outside the region because of the protests they would make about their privi leges. However, he assured Catherine that i f she could arrange to have them paid at the king's expense, he would hope to be able to find both foot and horse soldiers of the arr i l re ban who would render good service wherever she should wish to employ them."'" Etamp.es wrote simultaneously to Antoine de Bourbon te l l ing him of Montpensier's request, surveying the scanty rel iable forces he had in the major c i t ies of, Bre;tagne, and stating that the remainder of his troops were of the a r r i l r e ban and so concerned about their privileges that he would have to fight them to make them go out side the region. Again he stated that i f the king should care to send him a commission and some money he would be able to 2 raise men to serve in the region or wherever his majesty desired. A third letter of the same date was addressed to Charles IX by Ijtampes to assure the king that a good number of the noblesse of the region were most anxious to obey the king's command but that they had been awaiting his wi l l for about six weeks and would not wait much longer. Furthermore, i f Charles should command FJtampes to serve outside the region, these men would be unwilling to do service under the arriere ban but i f the king could see f i t to Ib id . , No. 27. 2 I b i d . , No. 28. 71 grant their solde a good number would serve.* Less than ten days later Etampes wrote again to the king of Navarre stating that since Catherine and Antoine had both commanded him to go to the assistance of Montpensier and the inhabitants raised di f f icul t ies about the maintenance of their privileges, he had undertaken to increase the forces in his majesty's pay to a number indicated in a statement he was sending. He promised that'othese troops would always be ready to march at Antoine's command but that he was retaining the "arierebans et autres forces ordinaires" of 2 the region for local defence. In Guyenne Monluc and Burie received royal instructions early in May to take the f i e ld . They were to assemble the noblesse of the region and the arriere ban in order to supplement the forces at their disposal . 5 Letters patent were published at Aix en Provence the preceding month for the convocation of the ban and arriere ban according to the comte de Tende. That these troops were not raised according to his command or by him as governor is clear from the report he sent before the queen. However, i t is equally clear that under normal circumstances they would have been and that he considered the military authority his 1 I b i d . , No.. 27. 2I_bid., No. 30. ^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 175« k \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 16. 72 prerogative as governor, a prerogative being usurped by his own son and lieutenant, the comte de Sommerive. The freedom of men of the arriere ban from service outside the kingdom, a privilege in effect from 15^8 to 1557 ^  seems to have been extended, at least in Bretagne where men of the arriere  ban saw their obligation limited to service within the gouvernement Many of these men, however, were wi l l ing to change their status, and pay, by enlist ing in other kinds of forces for royal service. Under the administration of 1'ordinaire des guerres besides forces of the ban and the arriere ban were the companies of ordonnance.. These companies originated in the reforms of Charles ~~~———"—~"~" .i VII, became- a permanent force in the king's employ and formed the 2 nucleus of the royal army. The gendarmerie making up the companies were volunteers of "la qualite de gentilhomme", at least seventeen years of age for an archer and nineteen for an homme  d'armes. They were grouped in lances, small groups arranged about an homme d'armes armed with a lance. Usually a company had about half again as many archers as homines d'armes and many more support ing foot soldiers. Command of these companies was reserved for princes of the blood, great officers of the crown, and men of great reputation. The captain's stipend was eight hundred l ivres ; "''Doucet, Institutions, II, 6l6. 2 For the companies of ordonnance see Doucet, Institutions, II, 620-623. 73 the remuneration of the lieutenant who often exercised effective command, five hundred; of the enseigne and guidon, four hundred; of the hommes d'armes, one hundred eighty; and of the archers, ninety.* In addition to payment in cash from the.royal finances, men of these companies were supposed to receive payment in kind from the city of their garrison. Montres for control and payment were scheduled for every three months in February, May, August and November in the presence of commissaires ordinaires des guerres and controleurs ordinaires. These officers were accountable to a tresorier de 1'ordinaire des guerres and a statement was ultimately submitted to the king's council. At the time of review men, mounts and armour were carefully inspected and the garrison city was to provide each soldier with three month's supply of candles, vinegar and salt; the city was similarly responsible for fodder for the horses, lodging and firewood for the men. The companies were often required to be on the move with their i t ineraries determined by the governor and their movements watched by a commissaire appointed by the king. One quarter of the men were normally on three month's leave at any time although the practice developed of granting longer leave without pay in peace time and recal l ing a l l soldiers of the company in time of *The scale of pay was higher during the Wars of Religion although the likelihood of receiving the pay was often remote. See Doucet, Institutions, II, 625. The pay of the hommes d'armes was raised to 400 l ivres and that of the archer, to 200. 74 war. The chief officers were expected to serve four months annually in the company with the captain taking personal command for the period from May through August when fighting usually took place. Companies of ordonnance were the strongest element in the armies of Louis XII and Francis I but development of firearms contributed to a decrease in the value of such troops and especially of the heavily armed hommes d'armes who were supplanted by the more mobile chevaux-legers with modern arms."" Companies of ordonnance in the province of Guyenne were under the command of such men as the king of Navarre, the marechal 2 de Thermes, de Terride, de Jarnac, Burie and Monluc. As d i f f i c u l t  ies began to mount the weight of command f e l l upon Burie and Monluc who were without money and almost without troops. Each had a company of f i f ty hommes d'armes and they could mobilize the company of Antoine de Bourbon, a force of one hundred lances garrisoned at Agen, and the company of the marechal de Thermes comprising f i f ty lances. Henri de Beam, young son of the king At this period the proportion was one and one-half archers to each hommes d'armes and the archers were light cavalry (chevaux-legers). Ferdinand Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des  Armees Francaises des Guerres d ' l ta l ie aux Guerres de Religion, 1494-1562 (Paris: S .E.V.P .E.N.. 1962), p. 191. ' 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 138. •^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 155. De Ruble states here that Burie and Monluc each had a company of ordonnance of thirty hommes d'armes but in the Pieces Justificatives of the same volume, pp. 427-432 there appears an "Ordonnance de Burie pour la pacification de l a Guyenne" given at Agen in October 156l~and signed among others by Burie and Monluc, captains of f i f ty "hommes d'armes des ordonnances." 75 of Navarre, must also have had a company for his father told Burie to ask captain Arne, guidon of Antoine'8 company, to r mobilize what he could of his company so that the governor could command them together with Monluc's company and that of his own 1 son. Companies of ordonnance as standing forces were maintained when their commanders died and their disposition depended on the royal w i l l . When the marechal de Thermes died his company was divided between Francois d'Escars, favourite of the king of Navarre, and the vicomte de Martigues, nephew and lieutenant of 2 the governor of Bretagne. Monluc's protest to the king and queen over this division demonstrated his concern at the prospect of losing troops from Guyenne and perhaps, his jealousy for d'Escars but i t also revealed some characteristics of the company of ordonnance. Relatives "of de Thermes, of de Bellegarde, lieutenant of his company, and of de Masses, his enseigne, formed the major part of the company. In fact de Bellegarde, the lieutenant, was himself a brother-in-law of the marechal and de Masses, his enseigne, was similarly a close relat ive . Monluc asked the office senechal of Toulouse for Roger de Saint-Lary, seigneur de Bellegarde, and his request was granted but his request of the Ib id . , I, k2k. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 23, "Charles IX au vicomte de Martigues," mai, 1562. ? 6 f u n c t i o n of v i g u i e r f o r the enseigne was denied. Monluc was convinced t h a t the s o l d i e r s , l o y a l r e l a t i v e s of the l a t e marechal de Thermes, would be u n w i l l i n g to c a r r y arms i f the company were d i v i d e d and h i s j e a l o u s y c l e a r l y showed i n h i s l e t t e r to the queen, "I wish to spend my l i f e c l o s e to you... and not to k i l l day and n i g h t here to make great and r i c h others whose only s e r v i c e i s to make those who do serve d i s c o n t e n t . " He i d e n t i f i e d the object of h i s c h o l e r f o r he suggested that C a t h e r i n e grant him leave and send d'Escars who had obtained a commission as l i e u t e n a n t of the k i n g i n Guyenne while Monluc had n e i t h e r "gaiges n i e s t a t " a p p r o p r i a t e t o the s e r v i c e he rendered and served at h i s own expense.* Two months l a t e r Monluc once again wrote t o the queen complaining about the d i v i s i o n of the company 2 which he c a l l e d one of the best of France. The o l d c a p t a i n emphasized the s t r a t e g i c importance of the gendarmerie and noblesse f o r the enemy had more gens de p i e d . T h i r t y - t w o hommes d'armes and forty-two a r c h e r s of the company had gone to t h e i r homes not w i s h i n g to serve under d'Escars but r a t h e r to have t h e i r o l d o f f i c e r s over them. D'Escars may have been regarded as an o u t s i d e r i n Guyenne f o r he came from Haute V i e n n e 5 *Monluc, Comrnentaires et L e t t r e s , IV, 132-146. 2 I b i d . , IV, 146-148. Cabie", Guerres de r e l i g i o n dans l e sud-ouest de l a France, p. 5, n. 1. 77 but had spent most of his career at the court. As early as 1536 he was in the forefront among the favourites of the Dauphin, later to be Henry II.""" The situation was further complicated because Hugues de Thermes, guidon of the company, had gone before the 2 king after his father's death to request the command. While en route to the court he was taken by a Huguenot band and imprisoned at Orleans. Released by Cond^ about two and a half months later , he returned to Bordeaux but Burie who had heard that he was coming with fifteen commissions from the king ^ assumed that the commissions were forged and that their carrier was a Huguenot spy. The unfortunate young baron de Thermes was imprisoned at the Chateau du Ha and at the news of his arrest the hommes d'armes 4 devoted to the son of their old captain, abandoned the company. In spite of Monluc's protest and the ambition of Hugues de Thermes the company was divided and Masses, enseigne of the marechal became lieutenant of d'Escars' company while Boisjourdan, a guidon of the old company became Martigues' lieutenant.^ The """Lucien Romier, La carriere d'un favori: Jacques d'Albon  de Saint-Andre (Paris: Perrin, 1909), p. 25. 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, l47n. 1. ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 50, "Burie et Monluc a Antoine de Bourbon," 7 aout, 1562. 4 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 147. 5 I b i d . , IV, 139. Perhaps de Ruble failed to identify Hugues de Bazordan, seigneur de Thermes. cf. Monluc, Commentaires, II, 441. 78 services of the officers of the company, and thus of the men, were assured by their promotion. New companies of ordonnance were created not only by the division of existing ones but by royal decree and their command was a coveted prize. Joachim de Monluc, seigneur de Lioux, brother of Blaise, was popular with nobil ity and people. After leading a makeshift company of the noblesse against the Huguenots in the defence of Perigueux his request for a company of ordonnance of f i f ty hommes d'armes * was supported by the due de Montpensier, 2 Burie and Monluc. Blaise de Monluc maintained that should the sedition continue in France, he could come to the queen's aid and leave his popular brother to f i l l his role in Guyenne. As further reason to grant the company, he suggested that he himself deserved much recompense for his services and the company for his brother could be regarded as a f irst instalment. In spite of the efforts of his sponsors Joachim de Monluc did not receive a company of ordonnance.5 L'Extraordinaire des Guerres Companies of gens de pied came under the administration of ^Documents Pour Servir 5..., No. 63- "Joachim de Monluc a Antoine de Bourbon." 11 octobre, 1562. 2 Ib id . , No. 64, "Le due de Montpensier a Catherine de Medicis," 14. octobre, 1562; Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 170, "Monluc a l a royne," 12 octobre, 1562. ^Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 171n. 79 1'extraordinaire des guerres.*"" Throughout the sixteenth century their importance increased and they comprised an ever greater proportion of the armed forces. The improvement of light f i r e  arms gave them an advantage over troops armed with lances. These bands were raised by commissions of the king usually granted to a captain with whom he dealt direct ly . The commission decreed the exact number of men to be raised and the captain was expected to raise no more for some would be without pay, forced to l ive off the land, and to raise no fewer for he would be making an i l l i c i t prof i t , pocketing the pay of the soldiers not recruited. Men were enrolled after being presented to commissaires and controleurs  de 1 1 extraordinaire des,guerres. They were recruited by the captain in a designated region under the surveillance of governor, senechaux, and b a i l l i s . Unlike the companies of ordonnance, bands of gens de  pied usually had as captains men of war, sometimes of humble origin, who effectively commanded their own companies. Remuneration, supposedly paid at monthly reviews, -consisted of one hundred six l ivres for the captain, f i f ty-s ix for the lieutenant, twenty for sergents and caporaux, and six to nine for pikemen and musketeers. Although Doucet states that the king dealt directly with the captains for the raising of gens de pied et de cheval the practice in Guyenne and in the other parts of the kingdom was to^grant For companies of gens de pied see Doucet, Institutions, II, 632-638. !  80 commissions to the governor, lieutenant-general or another great military figure in the province. These commissions were sometimes, i f not always, blank so that the man to whom they were given could choose the captains and delegate the authority for recruiting the troops. Monluc recounted that Catherine de Medicis and the king of Navarre resolved to send him into Guyenne "avec patentes et permission de lever gens a pied et sicheval."* He arrived in Bordeaux near the end of December 1561 and proceeded to raise two hundred arquebusiers and one hundred argoulets whom he put under 2 the command of Ti l ladet , a protege of his. Almost immediately Burie, on Monluc's advice, asked for a supplementary levy of five or six hundred arquebusiers. 5 The gens de pied raised by Monluc were to become^an important part of the royal army for those commanded by captain Charry became the nucleus of the f i r s t regiment of the gardes francais established in 1563* _ In similar fashion, letters and commissions had been sent to Burie in September for the rais ing of troops. 5 On May 8, 1562 *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, II, 3*+5« 2 I b i d . , II, 348. 5Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, 156. L Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 174n. 5Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424, piece  jus t i f i ca t i f , "Le r o i de Navarre a M. de Burie," 4 septembre, 1561, 81 Charles IX wrote at least eight letters to Burie and Monluc, surely a reflection of the degree of disruption in the kingdom. Charles IX commanded them to take the f ie ld with a l l the companies of gens d'.armes at their disposal and the six or eight enseignes of gens de pied they had raised."'" He included once again blank 2 • commissions for the rais ing of gens de guerre. Sometimes the king's approval followed the rais ing of gens de pied et de cheval rather than preceding i t . This was certainly the case when after the battle of Vergt Monluc recruited gens de pied and officers from the ranks of the defeated Huguenot army of Duras.^ The six companies of gens de pied raised after the battle of Vergt were granted by Monluc to the captains Mauvesin and Peyrelongue, two of Duras' best. When a city.pr a region was taken by royal forces, the king's lieutenant undertook to see that i t was adequately garrisoned and Charles IX wrote Monluc sending the Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 21, "Memoire de'Charles IX au Burie et Monluc" includes reference to "eight ensigns that they were asked to have raised," the editor's footnote gives an alternat reading of "seven" arid some of the letters of 8 May, 1562 refer to six. 2 Eight letters to Burie and/or Monluc dated 8 May, 1562 are contained in the pieces justif icatives of Ruble-, Jeanne d'Albret  et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, kkl-hk2. On the same day Charles IX wrote to Noailles and to the Parlement of Toulouse and issued instruction to Negrepelisse whom he was sending into Guyenne and Languedoc to persuade the noblesse to join Monluc and Burie. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, I83. Ib id . , IV, 315. 82 confirmation and authorization for the companies raised by the baron de Pardiant and the seigneur de La Chappelle on Monluc's orders for the defence of Lectoure.* Just as.blank commissions for the naming of officers and raising of troops had been sent to Monluc and to Burie, so they were sent to Montpensier when.he was preparing to enter Guyenne 2 as lieutenant-general. The king urged him strongly to send into France under Burie's command reinforcements fqr the royal army and to raise new companies to be employed by Monluc in Guyenne. Among the forces of 1'extraordinaire des guerres were the chevaux-legers, l ight ly armed cavalry. Captain Peyrot de Monluc, son of Blaise, was frequently entrusted with the command of 3 substantial numbers of the troops under his father's authority. Peyrot normally commanded a company of^  one hundred chevaux-legers. After the Peace of Amboise when Monluc was commanded to disband most of the forces in Guyenne he asked that his son's troops be converted in.to a company of f i f ty hommes d 1 armes, a change which would bring them under the ordinaire des guerres as a company of k ordonnance. Monluc also requested that some of the new companies ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. ^uble , Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, k^O. 3 ^ Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 187. h Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 287. 83 be maintained and the king replied that although he would prefer to see them disbanded, Monluc might maintain as many as he should judge to be indispensable.""" In addition to the companies they commanded, some of the king's officers were granted personal guards. Antoine de Bourbon obtained for himself a personal guard of twenty-five Swiss 2 soldiers. Monluc and Burie were each authorized to have a garde particuliere of thirty hommes de pied and twenty arquebusiers a c h e v a l I n October and November 1563 Monluc asked that he and k Burie be allowed to maintain their guards but the next month he announced that his guard had been disbanded in accordance with the command he had received.'' The defence of fort i f ied places was undertaken by special troops sometimes headed by a captain given the honorable t i t l e of governor.^ Old soldiers, wounded or otherwise incapacitated for 7 active service, served under the name of mortes-payes. These •""Ibid., IV, 217. 2 Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 298. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 211 and n. 4 I b i d . , IV, 281, 286. 5 I b i d . , IV, 304. ^Doucet, Institutions, II, 64?. 7 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 290. Monluc requested the queen to see that the mortes-payes of the chSteaux de Bordeaux get their pay since they had not been paid for a year. 84 men, capable of manning firearms and performing similar defensive duties were given a reduced pay of five l ivres per month."'' Not only the old and lame found opportunity for defensive military service but frequently an urban mi l i t i a was formed of those untrained for military service but anxious to help protect their i property and goods. The Huguenots of Bordeaux addressed a remonstrance to the city council in which they expressed their desire to pledge themselves for service in a municipal mi l i t i a rather than entrust the defence of their city to foreign troops. Soon after the outbreak of war Antoine de Bourbon,,lieutenant- general of the kingdom, addressed to the prevot des marchands and to the echevins of the city of Paris instructions regarding measures to be taken for the constitution of a municipal m i l i t i a . The total number of troops in Guyenne fluctuated greatly but i t may be estimated with reference to a number of sources. In 1559 the statement of payment of soldiers in garrisons 4 enumerated one thousand ninety in Guyenne. The companies of ordonnance are not mentioned in. that document and the only garrison l i s ted for Bordeaux was forty men under captain Bail lac (sic) in the chSteau Trampette although the payment of Noailles Doucet, Institutions, II, 6 4 7 . Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 84. Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 3 9 8 . Lot, Recherches sur les Effect i f s , p. 254. 85 and his lieutenant is l i s t ed . Four years later Noailles' garrison at the Chateau du Ha was twice the size of de. Vai l lac 's rt- • and i t may well have been so in 1559** From August to October, 1562 Charles urged Burie to bring into France reinforcements from Guyenne. At the end of October Burie wrote that the king had asked him to lead three thousand Spanish and two thousand French 2 hommes de pied. However, he claimed that i t was very d i f f icu l t to make the Spaniards march. Burie had already had an experience with mutiny among the Spanish troops in which four or five hundred of the f irs t had deserted their enseignes and made their way back towards Spain without a captain, an enseigne or a 3 drummer. Now he wrote that of eleven or twelve enseignes, about three thousand men, he had led from Gascony only about fourteen or fifteen hundred remained, a number which would shortly be re organized into six enseignes. In addition to the forces under Burie, de Terride and Monluc had troops at Montauban where they were besieging the c i ty . The Spaniards and the companies of Charry were led into France by Louis Prevot de Sansac because Burie's attention was demanded by the uprisings "in his gouvernement. These troops were augmented substantially by men of the Huguenot *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 199. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 71. 5 I b i d . , No. 61. 86 army who changed sides after the battle of Vergt."'' Monluc stated that Sansac led twenty-three enseignes of Spanish and French to the aid of the king, a force of about five thousand men. A statement for the payment'of gens de guerre a pied in the garrisons of c i t ies and chSteaux of Guyenne in March 1563 showed one thousand four hundred men to be paid. Recruitment and Appointments The recruitment of a l l types of troops was dependent upon the royal w i l l and the execution of that wi l l in the province was under the authority of the governor and lieutenant-general, the king's personal representative. In Guyenne a second person shared the responsibility of the lieutenant-general; Monluc exercised equal authority with Burie. When Conde failed to accept the commission to go into Guyenne and pacify the province, Blaise de Monluc had been sent without a definite t i t l e but with a definite mission."^ At that time he and Burie commanded companies of ordonnance of equal size, received equal stipends, were both sent commissions for the raising of troops. It was not unti l early in March 1563 that Monluc received word of his appointment as lieutenant-general with authority, l ike Burie, over half the Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, III, 53, 5^. 2 I b i d . , IV, 199. ^Monluc, Commentaires, II, kOO. 8? province,* nevertheless he had styled himself at least a month earlier as "seigneur du dit l i eu (Agenois), chevallier de l 'ordre, cappitaine de cinquante hommes d*armes de ses ordonnances, et 2 lieutenant de sa Majeste au gouvernement de Guienne." Whether or not he had the t i t l e , Monluc occupied a position and exercised a responsibil ity equivalent to those of Burie, the lieutenant- general in the absence of the king of Navarre. The office exercised by the two veteran captains of campaigns in Italy was primarily a military office. Some have held that i t was historical ly an office exclusively military and, therefore, confined to the frontier provinces and that the office spread to other provinces during the Wars of Religion because every province became a frontier in a period of c i v i l war. 5 Zeller identified the origin of these ideas in the writings of members of the sixteen th century Parlements, writers who had a r i v a l ' s interest in de-emphasizing the administrative role of •the governors. Only occasionally did the Parlement of Bordeaux venture into military matters. On one, such occasion i t seconded the lieutenant's judgment and requested the king to leave Burie Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, III, 66. 2 I b i d . , IV, 190. 5 Z e l l e r , "Gouverneurs...," p. 231. Zeller attributes this interpretation to such notable historians as Paul Viollet and Gustave Dupont-Ferrier.. 4 • Ibid'.., pp. 251-256. 88 and the three thousand Spaniards in Guyenne."'" Following the Peace of Amboise the Parlement disagreed with Monluc and recommended to the king total disarmament. In this military matter the king was inclined toward the decision of the Parlement but allowed his lieutenant to exercise his own judgment as to how 2 many troops he regarded as indispensable. The governor and lieutenant-general was the supreme military authority within the province. Since the lieutenant-general commanded military forces in the province he was in a position to dispense a considerable amount of patronage, a practice over which the king desired to maintain control. In his choice of captains for the companies he levied, . the lieutenant-general could offer incentives to local notables for the pay accompanying the office was considerable and the office offered further opportunity for honour and enrichment. At the same time he could increase he own influence by appointing men loyal to him or by gaining the loyalty of men through this patronage. Thus some of the f irs t troops raised by Monluc were placed under the command of Francois de Gassagnet de Ti l ladet , seigneur de Saint-Orens et de l a Roque, sene"chal de Bazadois, who had f i r s t borne arms under Monluc in Italy. The fortunes of Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 299. "Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 216 and.n. 89 T i l l a d e t continued to be t i e d to those of his mentor and i n 1 5 6 7 under a commission from Monluc he became colonel of the legions of Guyenne. The next year Monluc claimed for him the c o l l a r of the order as recompense for his services and in 1 5 7 5 he was mait.ce de camp i n the army of Monluc, marechal of France."'' Immediately after the f a l l of Orleans to Conde i n A p r i l 1 5 6 2 , Charles IX wrote Monluc asking him to come immediately with his own company, those of the king of Navarre and the mare'chal de Thermes, and s i x companies of gens de pied which he must r a i s e . Monluc quoted Charles as saying, "I am sending you the commissions, leaving the names of the captains blank, for you know better than 2 I who deserve i t . " Monluc l e f t Bordeaux for Agen and there assigned the s i x commissions to captains of his choice: two to Charry; two to Hugues de Bazordan, seigneur de Thermes; one to ' 3 the baron de Clermont, his own nephew; one to the captain Corne. The troops were recruited by their captains from among l o y a l men of t h e i r own region and the captains were appointed by Monluc from the ranks of men l o y a l to him. Therefore, the forces recruited and deployed i n Guyenne took on the aspect of a personal army, strongly l o y a l to Blaise de Monluc. Families frequently benefited through the influence of Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, II, 348 and n. Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 339 -340 . 'ibid., II, 441 . 90 their more i l lustr ious members. Blaise de Monluc's rise had been faci l i tated more than once by his older brother Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence. Both Jean and Blaise, in turn, 2 sponsored their younger brother Joachim, sieur de Lioux. Blaise de Monluc1s second, third and fourth sons, Pierre-Bertrand called Peyrot; Jean, chevalier de Malte; and Fabien, were a l l associated with their father in military matters. In 1560 captain Peyrot was sent from the court by the due de Guise with a message for his 3 father. When the Peace of Amboise was announced he was leading into France twelve companies of gens de pied and one of chevaux- legers. Philippe de La Roche, baron de Fontenilhes, was Blaise de Monluc's son-in-law and also guidon of his company.5 Member- ship in the family and leadership in the company were interrelated and Monluc had great confidence in his son-in-law who played an important role in the f ie ld especially at Vergt.^ The Monluc family was not unique in the practice of nepotism and i t i s not surprising that the lieutenant of Burie's company was his nephew 7 Corre. Nepotism had much to recommend i t as a useful practice *Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 133. 2 Ibid• , II, 21 and Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, I69 . 3 Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 3,98. 4 5 Ib id . , II , 592. ^Ibid. , II , 415. 6 I b i d . , II , 546-562. 7 I b i d . , I i , 4?4. 91 in military organization for, provided the relative appointed was a competent person, the likelihood of greater co-operation contributed to improved service for the monarch. That the king exercised some control over appointments was demonstrated by his refusal to grant a company of ordonnance to Joachim de Monluc in spite of his brother's lobbying and by the refusal to grant Monluc's request that Peyrot's company of chevaux-legers be converted into a company of ordonnance. The appointment of a group of noble counsellors chosen by the king to accompany a great noble on a mission was intended to increase the effectiveness of his mission. Trnas- when Montpensier was sent into Guyenne the king's council decided that he should be accompanied by the seigneurs de La Vauguyon, de Candale and de Chavigny.""" When he arrived in Guyenne these three lords were 2 with him and also the seigneurs d'Estissac and de Lauzun. Jean de Peyrusse, sieur d'Escars, comte de La Vauguyon was a member of a family in good favour with Antoine de Bourbon. Henri de Foix, comte de Candale, was the lieutenant of Belzunce who was governor of Dax.^ Francois Le Roy, seigneur de Chavigny et de la Baussoniere, comte de Clinchamp, was to become lieutenant-general of Anjou, Touraine and Maine and governor of Mans in 1564. The "^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, II, 538. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 200n. 4 Monluc, Commentaires, II, 538. 92 important office of lieutenant-general in Poitou was held by Louis Madaillan d'Estissac 1 and Francois Ier Nompar de Caumont, seigneur de Lauzun was lieutenant for the king of the chateaux, • 2 c i ty , and comte of Blaye. A l l five were prominent nobles who contributed to the dignity and authority of Montpensier's commission. The king not only saw that Montpensier was accompanied by a council of nobles on his mission into Guyenne but he attempted to send proven nobles in;to the province at other times to encourage his officers and increase the support of the noblesse. Thus in May, 1562 Charles promised Monluc and Burie that he would send into Guyenne for their assistance Biron, d'Ossun, Candale and Negrepelisse. 5 These men were sent from the court to the province because as men of prominent families in Guyenne, they had gone to the court seeking appointment and honours. In their act iv i t ies within the province they'showed l i t t l e hesitation in co-operating with Monluc as did Candale in the formation of Catholic leagues. The rais ing of troops was undertaken local ly as the Monluc, Comrnentaires, II,,538. . 2 I b i d . , II, 205. 5Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, 441. Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 214. 93 appointment of commanders for them often was. In theory, the king maintained the ultimate control since he issued letters patent and commissions and on the occasions when he had not authorized the levy or the appointment before the fact, his confirmation was given after the fact. Also in theory, control of the purse strings by the king ensured his authority over military and administrative af fa irs . However, local authorities found many opportunities to manipulate royal funds, to augment them from the spoils of war, and to use them for personal gain. Effective royal control over affairs in a disrupted and distant province was impossible to maintain. Command As in other aspects of authority military command was centralized, in theory. In practice the central command depended on local response for i ts effectiveness. As lieutenant-general of the kingdom, Antoine de Bourbonvwas supreme commander. The three Triumvirs were among his high officers: the constable was Antoine*s lieutenant; the due de Guise, chief of the avant-garde; the marechal Saint-Andre, chief of the a r r i e r e - g a r d e T h e royal army they commanded consisted of thirty thousand men, in camp or 2 promised. Three thousand German lansquenets, fourteen enseignes Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 2 3 5 . 2 I b i d . , IV, 2 8 7 . 94 of Swiss and at least three thousand Spanish troops were included in that number. These foreign troops i l lustrate the difference between an army on paper and an army in the f i e l d . The three thousand Germans represented half the number i n i t i a l l y anticipated by Antoine who decided to settle for three thousand "now" rather than six thousand "sometime." The reiters arrived at the end of July, 1562 and, after hearing from Conde, most of them changed sides and put themselves in the service of the Huguenots.* The Spanish troops entered Guyenne in September but were detained in 2 that gouvernement by Burie and Monluc. Burie found them di f f i cu l t to handle and the fact that they were unpaid contributed to their dissatisfaction. About five hundred mutinied and Monluc's s k i l l was required to pacify them. 5 At Vergt the wily Gascon commander 4 exploited the r ivalry between Spanish and Gascon. Of a l l the foreign troops expected only the Swiss .took the f ie ld rel iably as anticipated. Forces from within the kingdom were likewise d i f f icul t to deploy through a centralized command. From August, 1562 the king, the queen and the lieutenant-general of the kingdom commanded Burie to lead from Guyenne into France both the Spanish companies Ibid. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 59, 61. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 6l. Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 554-557. 95 and troops raised in Guyenne."'" Repeated letters and even a personal messenger, the seigneur de Malicorne, lieutenant of Randan's company, drew no immediate response in terms of conduct- 2 ing the troops to join with the royal army. Both local concerns and local independence postponed the active response to that request. In November the gens de pied under, Jacques Prevost, seigneur de Charry and some of the Spaniards were f inal ly led into France by Louis Prevost, seigneur de Sansac, governor of Angoumois. The pre-eminent role of the lieutenant-general in military affairs of the gouvernement was advantageous i f he was a forceful person and a competent commander* When authority was divided or the lieutenant-general was ineffectual the fact that he had theoretical authority was no advantage to the military cause in the gouvernement. The r ivalry of Burie and Monluc had few serious repercussions for the forceful Monluc was a more energetic person and a more able commander. Either they served in different parts of the province or Monluc managed to get his own way by manipulating Burie or bullying him. Rivalry in Provence had much more serious results . The governor was Claude de Savoie, comte de Tende, nephew of the constable Montmorency. His son Honore de Savoie, comte de Sommerive, was lieutenant. The latter embraced 1 r b i d . , II, 514 and n. 2 \ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 59* •^ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 77 • 96 the party of the Guises while his father was very moderate. The son raised troops i n the king's name i n spite of his father's opposition and eventually the moderate father was maneuvered into the Huguenot camp.* The tragedy lay i n the fact that both father and sori'made war, p i l l a g i n g successively the same towns, both i n the king's name. The armies engaged i n battle i n the provinces of the west and southwest of France were predominantly l o c a l l y - r a i s e d troops commanded by royal o f f i c e r s of l o c a l o r i g i n . As a result they demonstrated strong regional l o y a l t i e s and were frequently reluctant to fight beyond the l i m i t s of their own provinces. Both o f f i c e r s and men preferred to remain i n their home t e r r i t o r y although on which side they fought seems to have been of second ary importance for many. The fact that the lieutenant-general i n large measure chose the captains and recruited the troops had the advantage that a strong personal l o y a l t y to the l o c a l commander tended to unify the troops. The Gascon n o b i l i t y c e r t a i n l y united behind Monluc and expressed t h e i r confidence i n p him i n A p r i l , 1562 as the c i v i l war was just beginning. The noblesse of Guyenne were convinced that the acceptance of the new r e l i g i o n meant the overthrow of the accepted s o c i a l order and they found evidence to strengthen their conviction i n the *Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 304. 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, kkl. 97 assassination of the baron de Fumel by his own peasants, one'of the f i rs t events of the stri fe in Guyenne."'" Refusal to pay the ta i l l e s to their secular lords was a small step for those Huguenots who had refused the payment of dimes to the Roman Catholic Church. The noblesse feared that their financial and social position and even their l ives were threatened by the Reform, a fear that was heightened as most of the men of finances of Guyenne joined the Reform and many of the officers of justice of the Parlements and 2 senechaussees. The Reform i t s e l f had a dist inct ly local character because of the nature of i t s organization and leader ship. In i t s struggles the sp ir i t of provincial resistance was reborn so that in the Bordelais region the revolt of the gabelle was evoked.^ It was to be expected that the noblesse would seek in the king's lieutenant-general their champion. He was one of them and to a class, largely mil i tary, his renown as a military leader was important. Monluc, on his side, was not reluctant to court the noblesse for he was sure that the crown would have to lean increasingly on the nobility and to be their chosen leader k could only strengthen his position. During the f i rs t War of Religion Blaise de Monluc was by """Ibid., II, 400; Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 156. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, II , 395. ^Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, pp. 161-162. Sbid., pp. 164, 167-168. 98 far the most important military figure in Guyenne. He possessed a high degree of independence in the exercise of military af fa irs . He recruited men, appointed officers and even imposed taxes for the expense of the army.* Many soldiers were available and wil l ing to fight, seemingly with l i t t l e concern about which side engaged their services. ? This fact raises a serious question about . tvhe contention that the Huguenot army was merely the congregation of the faithful under arms. While the synodal organization of the Protestant Churches may have provided the skeleton of the Huguenot army, much of the flesh on that military body must have come not from the congregations but from the ranks of professional soldiers seeking employment. That situation is in accord with Romier's observation that, the many soldiers and captains from the Italian WarB could not. be threatened with the loss of their regular employment without precipitating great d i sorder . . . . On the other hand the economic and social condition created by cost ly external wars must resolve i t s e l f in an explosion of anarchy.^ The conflict in Guyenne was greatly magnified by the presence of many veteran soldiers who knew no other career and who found in c i v i l war the employment they had lost with the cessation of host i l i t i e s after the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559» Monluc, Comrnentaires, III, 420. Cf. discussion in the next chapter. 2 Lucien Romier, Les Origines Politiques des Guerres de  Religion (Paris: Perrin, 1914), pp. 235-23o\ CHAPTER IV FINANCE AND ROYAL AUTHORITY C o n t i n u a l war p l a c e d a heavy f i n a n c i a l burden upon the kingdom d u r i n g the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y . No sooner had the expense of f o r e i g n wars been removed than the expense of c i v i l war r e p l a c e d i t as a d r a i n upon the budget. These expenses l e n t impetus to f i n a n c i a l reforms and gave r i s e to new f i n a n c i a l expedients throughout the course of the century but i n s p i t e of reform and expedient the r o y a l budget was always i n the r e d . F r e q u e n t l y the k i n g was unable to meet h i s commitments, c r e d i t o r s went unpaid and e x t e n s i v e loans were r e - f i n a n c e d at higher i n t e r e s t . The most dramatic attempt to c o n s o l i d a t e the r o y a l debt was the Grand P a r t i of 1555» an attempt to s y s t e m a t i c a l l y r e t i r e the debt over a p e r i o d of only ten y e a r s . C r e d i t o r s were to be p a i d four times y e a r l y from revenues of the r e c e i p t s general of Lyon, Toulouse and M o n t p e l l i e r with i n t e r e s t at 5% per term or, 20% a n n u a l l y . In p r a c t i c e , payments remained i n a r r e a r s and f u r t h e r loans were c o n t r a c t e d . Many of these were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the Grand P a r t i so that by 1559 with other loans i t r e p r e s e n t e d a debt of more than 16,500,000 l i v r e s with annual i n t e r e s t of 3,200,000 l i v r e s . 1 The f i n a n c i a l f a i l u r e of the French monarchy was postponed Roland Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France XVI^ S i e c l e , 2 p t i e , ( P a r i s : Centre de Documentation U n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959), p. 338. 100 a year or two after that of the Spanish monarchy * but i t was 2 hastened by the sudden death of Henry II i n 1 5 5 9 . Although the royal debts were very quickly acknowledged by his successor, Francis I I , the confidence of bankers who had extended far too much credit and had recently experienced the f i n a n c i a l collapse of Spain, was shaken by the succession of a boy to the throne. Therefore, at the outset of the c i v i l wars the a b i l i t y of the monarch to raise large sums from international bankers was seriously c u r t a i l e d and f i n a n c i a l problems were to plague the monarchy constantly and to hamper i t s m i l i t a r y e f f o r t s as i t attempted to combat the challenge of r e l i g i o u s d i v i s i o n and c i v i l war. In time, of war, when the outcome depended upon the exploits of the royal troops i t was most important that t h e i r l o y a l t y and service be assured. Therefore, the extent to which the troops remained unpaid should serve as a reasonable index of the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the monarchy. .It i s an index r e l a t i v e l y easy to examine because the governors and lieutenants-general, responsible for the command of the troops and the maintenance of garrisons within their gouvernements, were greatly concerned about the payment of th e i r soldiers and that problem became a. regular 1 I b i d . , pp. 335-338. 2 For the c r i s i s of that year seeHenri Hauser, "The European Fina n c i a l C r i s i s of 1559*" Journal of Economic and Business History, II, 2 (February, 1930), 241-255-101 theme in their letters to Charles. IX and to Catherine de Medicis. The constant pleas of governors that their troops be paid probably did not arise primarily from any humanitarian concern for their soldiers but from the practical realization that unpaid troops were dissatisfied troops and i t was a small step from dissatisfaction to disloyalty. Even at the time of recruit ing, the necessary resources were not always provided. D'Escars, following the king's orders, raised a company of thirty arque- busiers for Savignac for which provision was not made so Burie met the expenses personally and asked reimbursement thereafter."*" Burie asked money for a montre in January, 1562 recognizing that i t would be necessary to maintain four or five hundred gens d'armes 2 in the Agenais a l l summer. Montpensier wrote from Poitiers that the troops were forced to pillage or starve and he asked permission to impose a levy on the inhabitants of the city."^ In August, 1562 Burie was begging the king for the solde for his company and in December he was s t i l l asking.^ The men left in garrison by the due de Montpensier had, not been paid by him and Burie did not dare decree a tax to raise their solde without the king's authorization, Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 426. "Burie au r o i , " 28 septembre,, 1561. 2 I b i d . , I, 427. "Burie au r o i , " 28 septembre, 156I. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 54. 4 Ruble, op. c i t . , I, 451. "Burie au r o i , " 29 aout, 1562. ^Ibid. , I, 466. "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1562. 102 especially since i t amounted to twenty thousand l ivres per month. At the same time the baron de Jarnac reminded Catherine that the soldiers needed for the.defence of La Rochelle had to be paid or they would turn to sack and pi l lage.* His request arrived almost simultaneously with a letter from La Rochelle, written by Burie, stating that Monpensier had left troops there without providing 2 for their payment. . The situation was so dire according to Jarnac, governor of La Rochelle that men of his company who had received no money for a year had been forced to leave for their homes penniless after having eaten their horses in the garrison. 5 Pay had been scarce for the six companies of gens d'armes raised by Monluc and for his own company of chevaux-legers. Since they hadn't been paid for over four months, the rea l i s t i c Monluc wondered i f they could be given two months' pay before they were disbanded. At the same time he pointed out that the company in garrison at Mont de Marsan and those in Bordeaux had received nothing for more than eight months and the mortes-payes had been unpaid for a year. If any funds reached the troops, they were inadequate for Monluc indicated that Peyrot's chevaux-legers had 5 received only one thousand l ivres in six months. At the normal ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79 • 2 I b i d . , No. 80. 5 I b i d . , No. 79. Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 286-290. "Monluc a la royne pour les affaires de Guyenne," octobre ou novembre, 1563. 5 I b i d . , IV, 291. 1 0 3 pay of twenty l ivres per month * twelve times as much money would have been required to pay the company excluding i t s officers. Ransom demands for prisoners prolonged the c i v i l wars in Monluc's view, however, he could not forbid the practice because "neither 2 gendarme nor soldier was paid." The problem of maintaining unpaid troops was not eliminated by disbanding them for men accustomed to earning their l i v i n g by their arms would probably continue doing so and were not l ike ly to view their employers with a theologically or po l i t i ca l ly c r i t i c a l eye. D'Etampes expressed concern over the order to demobilize some troops saying that to do so would weaken him and strengthen his enemies "for such men go where the money i s ." 5 That men should change sides to increase the likelihood of being paid is not surprising for they changed on occasion for other reasons. After the defeat of Duras at Vergt, Monluc recruited from the defeated army six companies of gens de pied with two purposes in mind: to diminish the enemy and to f i l l his own ranks with needed troops. The effects were at times as devastating i f unpaid soldiers did not desert but merely resorted to looting and robbery; a l l i e s could do as much damage to citizens and their Doucet, Institutions, II, 6 V + . Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, 478-*+79. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 3 8 . 104 cit ies as could enemies."'" The baron de Jarnac feared such conflict between soldiers and inhabitants in La Rochelle i f the men remained longer unpaid. Looting and robbery would lead to great scandal and he urged Catherine to avoid them by finding 2 the means to pay the troops. The financial system at the beginning of the century lent i t s e l f to control by an oligarchy of financial officers. Only the revenues of the Domain were centralized under the Changeur du  Trgsor and the revenues from taxes were handled by nine receipts general.^ There was no unified accounting for a l l revenues and 4 the system for effecting payment was often extremely complicated. Thus i t was extremely d i f f icu l t to co-ordinate financial matters, to determine resources available or to devise means of supplement ing resources. Francis I introduced reforms in 1523 which central ized and simplified the financial system by establishing two central agencies, the Tresorier de l'Epargne and the Tresorier des Parties casuelles, the f irs t of which became the major agency of centralization. As the pressure of f iscal operations on the Tresorier de 1'Epargne.mounted, i t was relieved by a return to earlier practices. The accounting remained centralized in his """Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. "^Doucet, Institutions, II, 597. 4 Mousnier, Etudes sur la France au XVI e SiScle, pp. 282-284. 105 hands but the administration of funds was decentralized to some degree under the local recettes generaux as funds were increas- 1 ingly spent l o c a l l y . 1 Revenues were classif ied as ordinary and extraordinary and early in the century only domainal revenues were considered ordinary. Taxes of a l l kinds were classed as extraordinary since they had originated as temporary expedients in. times of financial pressure such as the Hundred Years' War. They were to become in the course of the century classif ied as ordinary in contrast to new expedients developed to meet the financial demands of the time. Like the administration of the armed forces the supporting financial resources were divided into the receipts of 1'ordinaire' 2 des guerres and the receipts of 1'extraordinaire des guerres. The former consisted of the ta i l l e and ta i l lon sent by receveurs  generaux and receveurs du ta i l lon to the two tresoriers de 1'ordin  aire des guerres. The funds were then sent to the payeurs des  compagnies de gendarmes responsible for paying the troops. Doucet observes that the ta i l l e and the ta i l lon had both been considered historical ly as extraordinary taxes and were only Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e Siecle, p. 334. Doucet, Institutions, II, 648-649. 106 classed as ordinary resources i n r e l a t i o n to those which supplied the extraordinaire des guerres.* Funds for the finances extra  ordinaire were drawn from the Epargne i n the form of mandates carrying receipts addressed to the recettes generales. The, funds were then distributed to the soldiers by payeurs des compagnies as i n the case of the finances ordinaires. When Montpensier was sent into Guyenne he asked for a clerk of the t r e s o r i e r de 1'extraordinaire des guerres supplied with receipts and signed blanks to serve for discharge to the receveurs 2 from whom money would be taken. The royal council informed him that one hundred•thousand l i v r e s had been assigned by the tre'sorier de l'Epargne for the m i l i t a r y needs of Burie and Monluc. He was instructed to ascertain how much had been spent and to make his needs known from the f i e l d when he knew them s p e c i f i c a l l y . No one was going to receive from the royal treasury a single sou u n t i l well after he needed i t and, i n case the need should become too pressing, the due de Montpensier could take the plate from the churches, an unpopular a c t i v i t y for which the council was always ready to grant authority. The annual revenues of the crown at the beginning of the Wars of Religion amounted to about 16,000,000 l i v r e s , three- Doucet, In s t i t u t i o n s , II, 648n. Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 48 . 107 quarters from revenus ordinaires and one-quarter from revenus  extraordinaires. Of the revenus ordinaires about 6,000,000 l ivres was derived from the ta i l l e s and crues, 2,700,000 from the aides and the gabelles, and 3,500,000 from the domain. D^cimes, gi f ts , forced loans, and the sale of offices contributed to the revenus extraordinaires."*" Mousnier maintains that the people of France could well have paid higher taxes but that taxes were not raised because of the way in which they were viewed rather than because of any inabi l i ty to pay. The tax was considered as something abnormal by the sixteenth century mind for the king should l ive on the proceeds of his domain. There fore, the crown sought other expedients for meeting i ts expenses. After the credit inflation of 1559, the French court, unable to obtain the needed financing on the open market.in such banking centres as Lyon, appealed to the pope, to the king of Spain and, not least, to the-people of France for gifts and loans. Many loans were forced, especially i f a man were so indiscreet as to let i t be known that he had money available. The cardinal de Ferrare, for example, let i t be known that he was planning to send 2,000 ecus to Fabricio Serbelloni, the pope's nephew at Avignon. He found himself approached by the Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e Siecle, p. 325. 2 Ib id . , p. 326 108 queen and the due de Guise who insisted that he give this sum to the seigneur de Suze who was being sent into Dauphine by the Triumvirate. In vain did he protest that he did not yet have the money on hand for he was required to pay half immediately and to present a note for the balance.* The gift and loan requested of the pope enabled him to make certain demands upon the French court. Upon the assurance that the king would re-establish the Roman Catholic Church, punish the heretics, and send the chancellor from the court, the pope agreed to grant a gift of 100,000 ecus 2 and a loan of similar amount. Loans were often raised through the intermediary of municiapl of f ic ia ls rather than directly from individuals. When the c i v i l war entered the stage of decisive operations about the beginning of August, 1562, Catherine called the council of the city of Paris and asked for a loan of 200,000 ecus. It was opened to the inhabitants for subscription with registers in various parts of the c i ty . The f i r s t name recorded was that of the prevot, Guillaume de Marie, who gave part of his plate and another of the donors was Diane de Poit iers , mistress of the late Henry II , who brought a gift of 1,222 l i v r e s . 5 In June, 1563 the Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 198. 2 I b i d . , IV, 199. 3 I b i d . , IV, 292. 109 " e c h e v i n s e t c o n s e i l l e r s de P a r i s ' * were once more r e q u e s t e d by C h a r l e s t o bor row f rom the i n h a b i t a n t s o f the c i t y , t h i s t i m e t o the tune o f 100,000 l i v r e s . " * " At the l e a s t p r e t e x t money was r a i s e d and c h a r g e d a g a i n s t a c i t y . Thus when t h e c i t y of B o u r g e s f e l l t o t h e C a t h o l i c a rmy , a c o n t r i b u t i o n o f 50,000 ecus was r e q u i r e d f o r t h e e x p e n s e s o f the w a r . The amount was l a t e r r e d u c e d t o 20,000 ecus t o be r a i s e d by a t a x on t h e r e f o r m e d 2 i n h a b i t a n t s . A l s o c a l c u l a t e d t o d e f r a y s l i g h t l y the c o s t o f m i l i t a r y e n d e a v o u r s were the t e r m s o f f e r e d the c i t y of Rouen b e f o r e i t s f a l l . That c i t y was r e q u i r e d t o pay 80,000 l i v r e s t o ransom i t s e l f f rom p i l l a g e . " ^ I n h i s a d d r e s s "A M o n s e i g n e u r " a t the b e g i n n i n g o f h i s C o m m e n t a i r e s , Monluc d i r e c t e d t o the due d ' A n j o u a p e r s o n a l d e f e n c e i n w h i c h he r e p u d i a t e d t h e charge t h a t he had a c c u m u l a t e d a g r e a t f o r t u n e . He s t a t e d t h a t he l i v e d on h i s s t i p e n d and 4 l o a n e d any e x t r a c a p i t a l out a t i n t e r e s t . At a t i m e when f o r c e d l o a n s were t h e o r d e r o f t h e day a man was e x p e c t e d t o have h i s money, and p r o b a b l y h i s p l a t e , l o a n e d f o r the k i n g ' s s e r v i c e . The tone o f M o n l u c ' s w r i t i n g s u g g e s t e d t h a t t o have too much c a s h on hand when the monarch was i n d i r e need was c o n s i d e r e d tantamount Documents Pour S e r v i r a . . . . N o . 1 0 3 . *T":uble, A n t o i n e de B o u r b o n , IV , 310. 3 I b i d . , IV , 3^6. 4 M o n l u c , C o m m e n t a i r e s , I, 14-19. 110 to treason One of the most basic expedients to supplement the resources of the monarch was the attempt to find someone else to foot the b i l l for at least part of the military effort. This was accomplish ed by making c i t ies responsible for the payment of troops garrisoned in them, a practice reinforced by royal policy in 1562. In May Charles IX wrote Negrepelisse requesting him to raise four companies of gens de pied at Toulouse to be maintained at the expense of the city and for i ts safety.* The execution of this policy was supervised by the king's council for Montpensier stated that the council had resolved that the people of Chinon and Loudun would have two hundred hommes de pied and one hundred arquebusiers  a cheval for the defence of the c i t i e s , chateaux and pais d'election of the region, two-rthirds of the expense to be borne by Loudun and one-third by Chinon. These regions, however, had not obtained 2 commissions to raise the required taxes. The troops, presumably, remained unpaid. Monluc's adjustment of the size and composition of the garrison at Lectoure was approved by the king provided that garrison was paid at the expense of the city and of the neighbour ing vil lages "suyvant la permission et octroy que j'ay faict expedier aux habitanz d' icel le pour asseoir et imposer sur eulx Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 17. Documents Pour Servir a . . . . , No. 76. I l l les sommes de deniers qui seront necessaires pour ledict pavement." After the Battle of Vergt when Burie took most of the forces from Guyenne to go into Saintonge, Monluc made use of three companies from Comminges which cost the king nothing for they were paid by 2 the bishops and the region. That the policy of local responsibility for payment of the troops was a newly enforced policy during the f irs t War of Religion is indicated by the letter of Guy Chabot de Jarnac to the queen in which he complained of the di f f icul ty in governing because of the changing of ordonnances^ a letter written within a few weeks of Montpensier's statement that La Rochelle was strongly opposed to supporting a garrison. The inhabitants of some regions demonstrated that they were wi l l ing to spend considerable time and money to avoid the expense of supporting a company in garrison. Montpensier instructed the contrQleur Ruze" to t e l l the king, the queen, and the council that since the king and queen had decided to maintain at the expense of the c i t ies and surrounding regions the soldiers necessary for their defence, the due asked that he be sent a commission and authority to impose the sums from which the pay could be taken. He was speaking of La Rochelle where a l l knowledgeable advisors stated at least eleven or twelve hundred Ib id . , No. 7k. Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 170. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. Ib id . , No. 7k. 112 men would have to be maintained and, therefore, the expense would be considerable. The leaders of the city were businessmen prepared to invest a lot of money to avoid paying for the garrison and Montpensier discovered that they had sent the elu and some others to the court bearing four or five thousand ecus and means of obtaining more to give to those in a position to help them in what they sought.* Whether they planned to approach Florimond de Robertet, sieur de Fresne, the secretary of state within whose departement the region lay, is not known. What is known is that they intended not merely to ask that they be relieved of the garrison but to offer some incentive to those able to influence the decision. Particular extraordinary taxes were used as another expedient in the attempt to meet the financial demands of c i v i l war. Local opposition to such taxes was at times aroused, especially when local interests were threatened. Catherine was informed by the baron de Jarnac that the interruption of the l iberty of commerce and traf f ic of merchandise would destroy La Rochelle for there was nothing in the region but commerce. It would also result in a serious diminution of royal revenues. Either special taxes or other restrictions were interfering with the commerce of the city and the municipal of f ic ia ls were most concerned about i t , so much ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 7k. ''Instructions du due de Montpensier au contrSleur Ruz6, 12 novembre, 1562, La Rochelle. 113 concerned that they sent a deputation to the governor at Jarnac, his home. Jarnac, the governor, in turn planned to go to the court on their behalf."'' A spate of letters from Burie and from the jurats of Bordeaux to the king and queen late in 1561 protested against the new tax of one ecu per barrel on wine. Sales of wine to England represented an important part of the economy of the city and English merchants, because of the price increase 2 dictated by the tax, were threatening to buy in Spain. Nothing st irred local sentiments against the crown l ike an unpopular tax, a fact i l lustrated by the revolt of the gabelle in Guyenne just twelve years ear l ier . A financial expedient f i r s t systematized during the reign of Francis I was the sale of offices, a practice which affected adversely royal authority. This practice enabled the king to raise large sums of money on occasion but at very high price for "each time the king sold an office, he created a creditor for the 3 state." That i s , in salary and taxes the crown paid more than i t received. At the Estates-General of Orleans, the Third Estate evaluated the salaries of new officers created by Henry II alone at 1,200,000 l ivres-tournois per year and Mousnier has calculated ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 79. "Tvuble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, 425, ^33. •^Mousnier, Etudes sur la France au XVI e Siecle, p. 300. 114 that the king paid 33% interest for the capital he received.* Even more serious than the cost was the fact that men who owned their offices could be much more independent in the exercise of them.and thus the king's control over his officers was weakened. The royal officers of Guyenne were among the leaders of the 2 rebellion according to Monluc. The venality of offices contributed also to social unrest for when the king was unable to meet his commitments for the salaries of officers, they took matters into their own hands insofar as they were able and thus abused those under their authority. Men of the church were theoretically exempt from taxation but in real i ty they contributed significantly to the expenses of the king. Decimes were classif ied as free gifts to indicate that the clergy was exempt from taxation and was contributing of i ts own free w i l l to the defence of the kingdom.5 Under Henry II the decimes increased in size and frequency and during the reign of Charles IX they were systematized by the Contract of Poissy in 1561. In the sixteen years in which the Contract was if in effect the clergy contributed 62,400,000 l i v r e s . In fact, at the Estates-General of Pontoise in 1561 only the clergy had 1 I b i d . , p. 300. 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires, IIj 4l6. 5Mousnier, Etudes sur la France au XVI e Siecle, pp. 323-324. if Doucet, Institutions, II, 837. 1 ] - 5 shown i t s e l f wil l ing to give any financial support to the king. The secular estates had proven wi l l ing to air their grievances and even to threaten the position of the queen mother but unwilling to give anything in support of the monarch, and by these actions they had condemned the Estates-General to disuse. The clergy, on the other hand, proved useful to the crown and thereby enhanced i t s own position."*" Contributions from the clergy were not only in the form of dlcimes but in the sale of the temporal holdings' of the church. For example, in July, 1563 after the Peace of Amboise when royal military strength was turned to ejecting the English from Normandy, Charles IX gave instructions to the royal officers 2 decreeing the sale of 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 ecus of the temporel of the church. Similarly, as Charles and his advisors looked for resources during the f i r s t War of Religion, the silverware of the churches seemed to hold promise as a means of rais ing funds. Governors of the provinces were instructed to take the silverware from the churches 3 to underwrite their military expenses. Several governors expressed their unwillingness to undertake such an unpopular assignment for while they might be protectors of the church they could see potential danger in duplicating the Huguenot actions of 1 J .Russe l l Major, "The Third Estate in the Estates-General of Pontoise, 1 5 6 1 , " Speculum, XXIX (195*0, 4 7 6 . Documents Pour Servir a . . . . No. 1 0 8 . ^Documents Pour Servir a t . . . , Nos. 4 3 , 4 8 , 51 "for Bretagne, Guyenne and La Rochelle et l'Aunis respectively. 116 raiding the churches, albeit with royal blessing. The due d'Etampes suggested that for such a task commissions should be sent to the bishops or the men of justice 1 and Jarnac also wished 2 to avoid being directly involved in such work. The governors and lieutenants desired to dissociate themselves from a potentially unpopular royal f i sca l policy. The governors and lieutenants-general, as important officers of the crown, were both the recipients and the distributors of patronage. The king found i t d i f f icu l t but essential to reward them for their service; d i f f icul t because the royal treasury was pressed beyond i t s resources; essential because these military leaders could be as useful to his enemies as to himself. Local groups such as the municipal leaders in a major city of a gouvernement found i t desirable to reward the king's lieutenants whom they regarded as their protectors both at the court and against the rebels. Even the Huguenots considered i t worthwhile on occasion to offer substantial sums of money to a lieutenant of the king in exchange for certain guarantees. The lieutenant- general in turn, was in a position to arrange remunerative appointments for his proteges or, at least, to recommend them to the king as worthy recipients of royal largesse. Documents ,Pour Servir a . . . . No. kj>. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 51 • 117 High office did not automatically ensure the enrichment of i t s holder, however. In fact, the officer often assumed the financial obligations of his monarch with l i t t l e immediate reward. Fifteen months after the battle of Vergt, Monluc was s t i l l writing to the king and queen to ask reimbursement for the 5 , 6 0 0 l ivres he had advanced personally in order to raise the royal companies. By the time of writing he claimed to be out of pocket not only the 5 , 6 0 0 l ivres advanced to the tresorier de 1'extraordinaire des guerres but a further 300 ecus.spent trying to recover the debt. Martiheau, Monluc*s secretary, had been at the court almost five months working on his behalf. In the same letter the old lieutenant asked for his pension of 2 , 0 0 0 l ivres for the previous year, and, concluding the let ter , he referred to a letter of ten days earlier in which he had told Catherine of the i l lness and imminent death of the bishop of Condom and had asked her to remember him in the appointment. The good bishop had recovered and Monluc relayed this news to the queen.* Later in the year a new bishop was appointed and Monluc received annually a sum of 5 , 0 0 0 francs from the bishopric for five years unt i l his third son, Jean de Monluc, received the 2 office. Throughout the period of his command in Guyenne, Blaise de Monluc complained that his services were not being Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 315• Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 17• 118 recognized with appropriate financial rewards, a consistent theme with many variations. A typical example i s found in the letter to the queen mother in which he stated that he had served faithful ly for forty-five years and was unable to show that his house was worth one ecu more than in. the beginning. Having lost hope of recompense he asked to be allowed to ret ire to his home.' Catherine found i t possible to f latter and mollify him with the granting of periodic honours. The sentiments of Monluc were echoed by other royal officers such as d'Escars who wrote that he had been forced to spend 15. or 16,000 l ivres in ten months as governor of Bordeaux and one more month would see his total ruin . That the king's personal representative should assume the king's expenses was expected and accepted by men of the time. The Parlement of Bordeaux decided that Noailles should raise three hundred men 3 part ia l ly at his own expense. The comte de Suze wrote from Avignon that for three months he had commanded sixteen ensigns and about three hundred horse and the only financial help he had received had been 2,000 ecus given him by the legate when he left the court and 10 or 12,000 francs from the city and region. He had attempted to meet his expenses through loans on his own *Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 306. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 116. "Le comte d'Escars a Catherine de 'Medicis," 6 septembre, 1563. 3 Monluc, Comrnentaires, II, kkO. 119 property. The problem facing the monarch was to maintain the loyal support of his officers, the lieutenants-general, in a time when the cash resources upon which he could draw for patronage were stretched to their l imit and beyond. Frequently the lieutenants received from one hand of the king gifts which were taken away by the other. The congratulations of the king and queen to Monluc after the battle of Vergt emboldened him to ask the return of revenues from the comte de Gaure granted him by Henry II and 2 taken away be Francis II . Charles IX replied that his inabi l i ty to reward the Gascon captain for his worthy service saddened him but the revenues of the comte de Gaure had been reclaimed for the crown in a general reunion of the domain and to set a precedent by returning them to Monluc would endanger more than one hundred thousand l ivres of r e n t e s O f f i c e s , both ecclesiastical and administrative, were granted to the lieutenants on occasion, not to be exercised directly by them but so that they might enjoy some of the revenues from the office to which they in turn appointed someone. Monluc enjoyed revenue from the bishopric of Condom and the due d'Etampes wrote Catherine thanking her for the abbey she had given in his favour and promising to see that """Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 57. 2 1 Courteault, Un Cadet de Gascogne, p. 196. ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 76. 1 2 0 appointments would be made from among loyal men.* Burie had been given the office of prevot general of Guyenne, an office which he granted to a man of arms of his company. Burie's man had resigned the office to a man who joined the Huguenots and was taken at Vergt and Burie asked the king to grant the office 2 to the bearer of his let ter , a man he did not name. While Burie may not have received revenue from the office or from i t s sale he was able in the f irst instance to use i t as part of the patronage that was his to grant. The granting of revenues from confiscations and fines was another means used by the king to reward the faithful and maintain their loyalty. Henri de Foix, comte de Candale, upon returning from a mission to England wrote to the queen of the expenses his officers had been forced to bear in the protection of his domains. He asked her to authorize a personal guard at expense of the Huguenots or at least of those who had been condemned by the Parlement of Bordeaux. This could be accomplish ed i f Catherine were to regularize the gift she had made him of the products of diverse f ines . 5 Sometimes the requests reaching the court were more specific l ike Burie's letter containing an indictment against a merchant of Villeneuve d'Agen named Taisses. ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 27. 2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 466. Pidce Justif icat ives , "Burie au r o i , " 14 decembre, 1 5 6 2 . 5 I b i d ., I, 4 5 6 . "Candale a l a reine," 3 0 septerabre, 1 5 6 2 . 1 2 1 The merchant was imploring pardon but Burie asked that the king condemn him and grant the product of confiscations pronounced against him to Burie himself."*" The motive of the lieutenant- general in condemning Taisses was certainly open to question. Monluc, too, received the gift of a fine from Catherine; in his case, a long unpaid fine levied against Colineau the receveur du 2 ta i l lon of the Bordelais. More than a year later Monluc was s t i l l trying to obviate the requirements of the chancellor in relation to forwarding the money to 11espargne and thence back to Monluc,. The only property held by Colineau was his office, worth about fifteen hundred ecus, and pledged to Monluc against the fine. The office was exercised in Monluc's name but the funds continued to go to his majesty's service and Monluc was unable to obtain authorization to take his part.'* Confiscations were granted to officers other than lieutenants-general for Charles IX wrote Monluc that he was sending him certif icates for the confiscation granted by the king to captain Monluc, his son, and to the seigneur de La Mothe-Rouge. A measure of Catherine's need to keep the f irs t prince of the blood identified with her cause was the gift from Charles IX to the.king of Navarre, only two months """Ibid.,"Burie a la reine," 6 octobre, 1 5 6 2 . 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 1 5 6 . 3 I b i d . , IV, 2 8 9 . Documents Pour Servir a. . . . . No. 7 6 . 122 before the lat ter 's fatal wounding of a l l the confiscations which would be pronounced against the rebels in the provinces of Antoine and his wife.* The tendency of the crown to reward i t s officers by granting them revenues obtained from fines and confiscations may explain in part the zeal displayed by Burie for the investigation of such revenues in order to prevent men 2 of the Parlement from unduly enriching themselves. Pensions granted by the crown rewarded loyal service in a continuing fashion and thus represented a continuing expense i f funds were found to pay them and a continuing cause of dissatis faction i f funds were not found. Monluc f irst received three thousand francs annually with another two thousand added when Henry II rewarded him with a pension for his exploits in Italy and added the collar of the order of Saint-Michel, and a rente from the royal domain of three thousand francs on the comte de Gaure. 5 A further pension of three thousand francs from Catherine when she and Charles IX were in Angouleme brought Monluc's total it-pension to eight or nine thousand francs. The gages or pay accorded a man were, of course, part of Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 4-28. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. 3 ^Monluc, Comrnentaires, I, 17; II, 192-193. In the intro duction to his Comrnentaires Monluc maintained that the pension he received from Henry II was 2,000 francs and at the end of l ivre III he stated that i t was 3,000 francs. Vbid. , I, 17. 123 the patronage accompanying the office granted him. The range was extremely broad and was represented at one extreme by Antoine de Bourbon, lieutenant-general of the kingdom, who did not underestimate his own importance in accepting two thousand five hundred l ivres monthly."*" In the camp of the royal army the two marshals of the camp and the colonel general of the infantry received three hundred l ivres monthly and the maxtres de camp, 2 two hundred. In the province of Guyenne Burie and Monluc each received five hundred l ivres ,^ half what the due de Montpensier was granted when he was sent on a special mission into the province. Noailles, governor of Bordeaux, and captain of the Chateau du Ha with one hundred men under his command, was paid one hundred l ivres per month and the services of his lieutenant 5 were valued at half that amount. The commissaires and contrdleurs who supervised the reviews of the troops each received about thirty-f ive l ivres .^ The holder of a high non- **"Ruble, Antoine de Bourbon, IV, 235* 2 I b i d . ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 200. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. .^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 199. "Estat de, ce que monte le paiement pour mois entier des gens de guerre a pied qui sont restes en garrison pour le service du ro i es v i l l e s et chasteaux de la Guyenne," Toulouse, 4 mars, 1562 (I563). The gages of Noailles and his lieutenant had doubled from the statement for 1559 found in F. ' Lot, Recherches sur les Effect i fs , p. 254. ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 201-202. 124 military office, that of f irs t president in the sovereign court of the Parlement of Bordeaux, received two hundred l ivres per 1 2 month, an income he could undoubtedly augment. The salary of a counsellor of the Parlement of Paris was 600 l ivres annually 3 as compared to 375 l ivres for the same office in Bordeaux. Salary and rewards from the crown were by no means the only source of revenue for the king's lieutenants. Major states that ''the provincial estates levied taxes to pay royal of f ic ia ls to convince the king that they were unable to pay the taxes he requested and that their respective provinces had privileges 4 that must not be overridden." Although i t i s impossible to ascertain what was expected in return, i t is clear that the city of Toulouse appreciated Monluc's efforts and offered him gratif ication of 500 l ivres per month and wished to give him the sequestered property of Pierre d'Assezat, a town councillor charged by the Parlement with the crime of lese-Majestl. D'Assezat was acquitted by the king's council and Monluc, therefore, did not 5 receive his property. There were times when representatives of ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 114. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82 . ^Mousnier, Etudes sur l a France au XVI e Siecle, p. 301. 4 J . Russell Major, "Crown and Aristocracy in Renaissance France," p. 643. 5 Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, III, 89 ; IV, 198. 125 the Huguenot o r g a n i z a t i o n o f f e r e d f i n a n c i a l inducement to the kin g ' s l i e u t n e n a n t s i n an attempt to win them over or, at l e a s t , to g a i n t h e i r promise of n e u t r a l i t y . Monluc's account of such an experience was c e r t a i n l y c o l o u r e d to make much of h i s l o y a l t y and honour but prob a b l y r e p r e s e n t e d a c t u a l events n e v e r t h e l e s s . Sums of 30,000 and 40,000 ecus were o f f e r e d Monluc on s u c c e s s i v e v i s i t s by Huguenot spokesmen i f he would merely a b s t a i n from t a k i n g arms a g a i n s t them.""" The k i n g ' s governors and l i e u t e n a n t s were i n a p o s i t i o n to dispense l i m i t e d patronage p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the form of m i l i t a r y 2 appointments. The n o b i l i t y of Guyenne sent one of t h e i r number before the k i n g s h o r t l y a f t e r the f i r s t War of R e l i g i o n to c a r r y t h e i r remonstrance. Among t h e i r c h i e f g r i e v a n c e s was the o p p o s i t i o n of the Parlement of Bordeaux to the g r a n t i n g of g i f t s t o nobles by Burie and Monluc. I t was claimed by the nobles that they were a p a r t . o f the k i n g ' s army and the n o b i l i t y of Guyenne l e d by the seigneur de B u r i e and de Monluc and t h a t these l e a d e r s , l a c k i n g f i n a n c i a l means t o reward those who were most f a i t h f u l and those put to g r e a t e s t expense i n the ki n g ' s s e r v i c e , had made them s m a l l grants of p r o p e r t y . The p r o p e r t y granted was ap p a r e n t l y t h a t taken i n war from the r e b e l s and the ki n g ' s Monluc, Commentaires, I I , 403-413. Supr_a, Chapter I I I . " 126 council supported the judgment of the Parlement, local watchdog for royal prerogatives, by ruling that no lieutenant could grant the property of someone else."*" The type of patronage most often shown by the great nobles was in recommending to office and the amount of patronage a noble could dispense depended upon the degree of influence he possessed at the court. Thus governors and lieutenants recommended individuals for recognition but the 2 king was most often the source of patronage. Even a lieutenant- general seeking office attempted to gain the support of such men as the due de Montpensier, the king of Navarre and the due de 3 Guise. There would appear to be much justif ication for the statement, "Just as the medieval king was the principal lord in the kingdom, so the Renaissance monarch was the greatest patron." ^ Monluc claimed that after a lifetime of service to the crown he could not show his house to be twenty thousand ecus richer for i t and in his remonstrance to the king, Monluc defended himself against the charge of having used his office to amass a fortune of 300,000 ecus• He suggested ironical ly that he wished the charge were true, providing the funds had ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 2 I b i d . , Nos. 63, 6k. ^Ibid. , No. 80. Burie requested the office of Admiral of Guyenne and enlisted the support of Montpensier. k Major, "Crown and Aristocracy in Renaissance France," p. 6^3. 127 been taken from t.he Huguenots. According to his own account he had taken from the Huguenots, of course, but only as legitimate spoils of war and to prevent his soldiers from revolting at the sight of a vanquished enemy treated better than they were them selves. Furthermore, he claimed, he had found i t essential to overcome a reputation as a Huguenot sympathizer. Certainly, had the royal financial officers been in his place they would have taken a mil l ion ecus where he took only three thousand. Monluc touched on the system of royal patronage to recommend that Charles IX maintain in his coffers purses contain ing various amounts with which he could personally reward his faithful subjects according to their qualite. He predicted that the royal financial of f ic ia ls would advise the king that i t was beneath his dignity to distribute purses personally. Such advice should be ignored, claimed Monluc, since i t would be offered by those whose concern was to keep the money passing through their own hands.so that some might st ick. His estimate was that the man who was granted two thousand ecus by the king received only five hundred by the time i t had passed through o f f i c i a l hands. Giving financial rewards personally would strengthen the relations between the king and his nobles provided such gifts were distributed equitably. On the latter point, Monluc suggested with a l i t t l e bitterness that someone in Guyenne had received the l ion's share. Perhaps he was alluding 128 to his long resented r i v a l , Francois Peyrusse d'Escars. It is highly probable that in spite of his spirited defence, Monluc had accumulated a fortune of at least 300,000 ecus and his own defence contributes insights into the ways in which he could have accomplished i t . Following his address to Charles IX, Monluc directed a remonstrance to the king's brother, the due d'Anjou. In that remonstrance he maintained that fame and glory were much more important to him than riches. Much evidence suggests that glory was indeed important to Monluc but there is l i t t l e to suggest, that he conceived of glory and riches as separate entit ies . Monluc observed at length that the king was the source of a l l benefits and requested that his children receive due financial recognition. He compared his own unselfish service with that of several prominent families who had served Louis XI and had been immortalized in verse. To prove his own scrupulous honesty and disinterested service Monluc recalled a l l the offices he had held and the opportunities they had presented for personal enrichment, opportunities he had eschewed, of course. Many captains of gens  de pied became rich on the pay of their soldiers and on the money provided for their victuals . With a good fourrier and a l i t t l e help i t was easy. He, Monluc, had been a captain of gens de pied seven or eight times without exploiting the opportunity. The 129 maitre de camp had even greater opportunities for he could make a deal with the commissaires des vivres. And he himself was not slow to discover where there was an opportunity for gain. He had always had a good nose. Yet he had three times held the office of maitre de camp without enriching himself. As a governor of places he always had the opportunity of taking money from eighty or a hundred men who wished to escape military service. Having held these offices as long as he had and supervised as many montres as he had in his l i f e , "avec quelque peu d'epargne, mon Dieu, quelle montagne d'or aurois-jei" Arid yet he claimed that was a mountain of gold he had not mined. As lieutenant of the king in Sienna and Montalcino, Monluc had faced great opportunities to increase his fortune. Local merchants were more than-willing to work out agreements relating to the grain supply for the soldiers and loans could be made at high interest. Nevertheless when Monluc was relieved his successor found grain s t i l l in the warehouse and the poor had been fed with the surplus. As a man progressed through the cursus honorum the opport unities for personal gain increased and Monluc indicated a few of the ways in which other governors and lieutenants-general exploited their positions. It would not be d i f f i cu l t , he maintained, to make arrangements with the receiver general of the province 130 and to f i l l one's personal coffers and to tap the money for montres, garrisons and the movement of a r t i l l e r y . Monluc could have raised many taxes, for the king had given him authority to do so, and he could have turned those taxes to his own prof i t . A third source of income could be the exaction of payment from towns and villages for the promise of exemption from the support of a garrison. On this point at least, Courteault states that there i s abundant evidence that Monluc refrained from this common practice as a matter of s c r u p l e . M o n l u c observed that he could have followed the example of others who exacted extortion from the Huguenots for the promise not to attack them even when they were l i v ing peacably on their estates in accordance with the edict. Monluc declared his innocence of a l l the artif ices he mentioned and reminded his reader that the gain he 'had had from Clairac was with the specific permission of the king. It is impossible to ascertain the extent to which Blaise de Monluc used the techniques he described to increase his estate and to what extent he increased i t by other means. Some other sources were the stipends of his offices, the pensions granted by the crown, the income from multiple offices granted to him, Monluc, Commentaires, III, 4-21, n . l . 131 gifts from ci t ies and the estates of his wives. Beyond his own fame, his chief concern was the honour and,fortune which should come to his sons and grandsons. For this reason he reminded Charles IX and the due d'Anjbu of the letter written by the king on December 3, 1570 bearing the promise, Tenez-vous tout asseure que j'auray souvenance a jamais de vos longs et grands services, desquels, s i vous ne pouvez recepvoir l a recompence condign!, vos enfans acheveront d'en c u e i l l i r le fruict , joinct qu' i ls sont tels et m'ont ja s i bien servy que d'eux-mesmes i l s ont merit! que l 'on face pour eux ce que je seray bien aise de faire, quand 1'occasion s'en presentera. Monluc, Comrnentaires, III, 411. CHAPTER V LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND ROYAL AUTHORITY The Firs t War of Religion - Summary of Events Upon the death of Francis II and the succession of Charles IX Catherine de Medicis managed to obtain the regency. She organ ized the government around herself and three Bourbon princes, Antoine de Bourbon (king of Navarre), the cardinal de Bourbon and the prince de Conde. They were assisted by the constable Anne de Montmorency, the three Chatillon brothers, the due de Montpensier and the prince de l a R o c h e - s u r - Y o n T h e Guises left the court 2 temporarily deprived of a share in government. Catherine wrote to Sebastien de l'Aubespine, her ambassador in Madrid, that "it has been found best by a l l the princes of the blood, the lords of the council, and other great personages of this realm that the principal and sovereign authority in i t should remain in my hands." Catherine was determined to preserve the monarchy and to maintain herself in power and to those ends she attempted to steer a middle course between r i v a l factions, both religious and 4 p o l i t i c a l . Her method was the method of conciliation and she Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 73. 2 I b i d . ^Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 569. 4 Franklin C. Palm, Pol i t ics and Religion in Sixteenth Century  France, (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1927), p. 11. 133 found.:,it inconceivable that there should be circumstances for which that method might prove inadequate.* In the summer of 1561 ecclesiast ical estate was convened at Poissy with both Catholic and Protestant theological leaders present. Catherine aimed to effect a reconciliation but in that she was unsuccessful. The powers of diplomacy were limited in matters of conscience. Nevertheless Catherine achieved at least an outward reconciliation s 2 between Guise and Conde.. Catherine's policy of concil iation found expression in the Edict of January, 1562. The Edict of July had forbidden judges and magistrates from pursuing the Huguenots; the new edict for the f irs t time granted them the right to meet in p u b l i c . 5 Following the massacre at Vassy in March, 1562 the Triumvirate consolidated i ts position in Paris and threatened to completely dominate the crown. Catherine desired to maintain as much independence as possible and for that purpose she attempted to maintain the support of Conde. In this attempt she contributed to the mobilization of 4 Protestant forces. Conditions in the kingdom were ripe for c i v i l war. In fact, *John Neale, The Age of Catherine de Medicis (London: Cape, 19-+3), P. 41. 2 Thompson, Wars of Religion, pp. 102-103. F . A. Isambert, Recueil General des Anciennes Lois Francaises (Paris: Plon, 1882), XIV, 124-129. 4, Supra, p. 15 134 before the massacre of Vassy many parts of the kingdom had been subjected to r io t s , iconoclastic demonstrations, and a l l kinds of disorders."*' The Peace of Cateau-Cambresis flooded the kingdom with soldiers and officers from the Italian Wars. These men could not be threatened with the loss of their regular employment 2 and income without precipitating great disorder. The problem was intensified by the economic impact on the state and i t s kings of those costly foreign wars and by the fact that many of the soldiers had been converted to Protestantism during their service. The rel igious division contributed an issue for c i v i l war and Huguenot church organization contributed a basis for recruitment and organization of a military force. From Apri l to June, 1562 the king was in the control of the Guise faction and the Protestant army increased at Orleans as Conde promoted the p o l i t i c a l theory that the king was a captive 4 and the Huguenots were struggling for his release. Under those circumstances Catherine's only hope to prevent c i v i l war and lessen Guise control was to persuade Conde to disarm and return to the court, thereby removing the Guise excuse for maintaining ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 2. In January 1561 the Parlement of Bordeaux wrote to Charles IX of the "inconveniens, scismes et divisions" which continued daily in Guyenne over the religious issue. 2 Lucien Romier, Les Origins Politiques des Guerres de  Religion (Paris: Perrin, 1914), II , 235. 5 I b i d . , p. 253. 4 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 138. 135 a large force under arms. Conde's insistence on the removal of the Guise faction as a prerequisite to disarmament only ensured the continuation of preparations for war.* In seige and battle during the summer of 1562 the Catholic army regained much of the Loire region from Conde's forces. The military s k i l l and t ireless efforts of Monluc saved Toulouse and Bordeaux, the major c i t ies of the southwest from the Huguenots. That forceful Gascon officer was responsible also for regaining the city of Lectoure from the Huguenots. His victory over a large Huguenot force under Duras at the battle of Vergt (October) was particularly significant for i t prevented those Huguenots south of the Loire from joining the prince de Conde. It may thus have provided the measure of the Huguenot defeat at the crucial battle 2 of Dreux two months later . The concern of Phil ip II over affairs in France acted as a spur to the Catholic cause and repeatedly hampered Catherine's attempts at conci l iat ion. His Catholic majesty could not help but be concerned with heresy in France for that nation was a wedge between Spain and her valuable provinces of the Low Countries. Violent religious changes in France threatened the Ib id . , p. 150 2 Ib id . , p. 157« It is a commentary on the general accuracy of Monluc's colourful and egotist ical commentaries that such a careful historian as Thompson used them as the basis of this part of his narrative. 136 Netherlands. As early as January, 1561 a Spanish envoy carried to the French court the word that Phil ip II would be compelled to suppress any new sect permitted in France "to preserve the terri tories of his brother-in-law and to prevent his own dominions from being infected." Catherine wrote and attempted 2 to explain her conciliatory policy to her son-in-law. The Spanish ambassador, Chantonnay, was instrumental in the formation of the Triumvirate and exercised great influence over i t s pol icies . ' The Spanish court brought constant pressure to bear on the court of France to extinguish heresy in the kingdom. Foreign involvement in French affairs extended to England where the Huguenot appeal to Elizabeth was accompanied by the 4 promise ultimately to restore Calais to the English. Both the Spanish and the English were held back from f u l l scale involvement in France because neither could afford the r i sk of commercial injury through the breaking of their relations in Holland and Flanders.^ Nevertheless, the English occupied Havre early in October and thus goaded the Catholic forces into redoubling """Bernerd C. Weber, The Diplomatic Relations between France  and Spain during the Reign~"of Charles IX, p. 40. Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 577-578. 3 Weber, op. c i t . , p. 4-3. 4 Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI: I, 68. 5 Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. I63. 137 their efforts to take Rouen from the Huguenots. The help of a small English force was insufficient to ensure Rouen's defence but in the course of the seige Antoine de Bourbon was mortally wounded. According to the decision of the Estates-General of Orleans the prince de Conde should have succeeded the king of Navarre as lieutenant of the realm and the prince sent out commissions to a l l major officers ordering them to recognize his authority as the king's lieutenant-general and governor of France. The court and the Catholic party, however, set aside the rul ing of the Estates and no successor was immediately named. The Spanish government pressed the candidacy of the cardinal of Bourbon but expressed i t s willingness that Catherine have the entire government of a f fa irs .* In December Condi's forces faced the much larger army of the due de Guise in the battle of Dreux. In the course of the fighting the marshal Saint-Andre was k i l l ed and Conde and the constable Montmorency taken prisoner by opposite sides. The depleted Huguenot forces under Coligny, prevented from joining 2 with the English in Havre, retreated to Orleans. The assassin ation of the due de Guise in February, 1563 was a serious blow Thompson, Wars of Religion, p. 171. 2 I b i d . , pp. I8O - I8I . 138 to the Catholic forces; two of the triumvirs were dead and the th ird , a prisoner. Catherine de Medicis wanted to negotiate a peace and to unite Catholic and Huguenot against the English in the recovery of Havre. She was anxious to avoid a military victory that would enable either side to dominate the crown.'*' The prince de Conde and the constable Montmorency were freed from prison to lead negotiations for a peace settlement. On March 19, 1563 the Edict of Amboise was decreed by the king 2 and his council. It was definitely conciliatory towards the Huguenots and the Parlement of Paris objected to i t s registration as did Parlements in Rouen, Dijon, and T o u l o u s e . A l t h o u g h peace had been decreed the pacification of the kingdom did not take place overnight. Many Catholics objected to the pardoning of Huguenots and the restoration of their property. In attempting to pacify the Protestants the crown offended many Catholics. In Guyenne those who s a » themselves or their positions threatened found means of achieving their own ends. The Parlement of Bordeaux demonstrated i t s concern with the status and prerogatives of i t s members. The nobil ity continued an association o f f i c ia l ly disbanded by the crown. In both cases local institutions resisted royal orders while identifying themselves staunchly with the crown. Ib id . , p. 172. i Isambert, Recueil des Anciennes Lois, XIV, 135« Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II , i v . 139 Catholic Leagues in,Guyenne The emergence of Catholic leagues i n Guyenne and Languedoc signalled the beginning of a trend that was to have great significance for the crown as the Wars of Religion continued. In 1576 Henry III saw i n a Catholic League an organization which could provide either the opportunity for strengthening the crown or a powerful threat to royal authority. He decided to exploit the opportunity and declared himself head of the League.* The early leagues, however, were not greeted with royal enthusiasm. A Catholic league was formed at Toulouse i n March, 1563* The cardinals, Armagnac and S t r o z z i , as well as Monluc were 2 i n f l u e n t i a l i n i t s establishment. This organization, composed of many clergymen, nobles, and bourgeois of Languedoc and Guyenne, and under the direct j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Parlement of Toulouse, actually took up arms and pledged i t s e l f by oath to march wherever required for the defense of the Catholic r e l i g i o n . 5 At Agen a league was formed one month before that at Toulouse and shortly thereafter the League of Cadillac was established by Monluc's lieutenant, Candale, and named for Candale's estate, the place of i t s founding. 5 Some of the leagues formed consisted *De Lemar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39. 2 Dom Claude Devic and dom Jean Joseph Vaissete, H i s t o i r e  Generale de Languedoc (Toulouse: E. Privat, 1872-1892) , V, 249. 5Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39• 4 Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 190-1.95. (This document i s the act establishing the league, i t s charter.) 5 I b i d . , IV, 214. iko chiefly of artisans whose guilds "offered an ideal inst i tut ional structure for the organization and co-ordination of Catholic opposition to the growing Huguenot forces." """ Monluc, however, encouraged the noblesse to form an association. Such noble leagues were by no means a new phenomenon in France. "Organized resistance to royal centralization among the seigneurs of the second rank showed i t se l f in the leagues of 1314 and 1 3 1 5 T h e associations formed in southwest France during the Wars of Religion were not primarily for the defence of local rights but for the defence of feudal prerogatives. Nobles whose interests were bound up with those of the king saw that the defection of royal o f f ic ia l s to the Huguenots was undermining the royal administration of the province. Their own feudal position was similarly threatened as emboldened tenants, converted to the Huguenot cause refused the decimes to the church, the t a i l l e to the crown and their feudal dues to the n o b l e s s e N o t only did the royal cause depend upon the goodwill of the local nobil ity but the well-being of the local nobility depended upon the triumph of the crown. In leagues the Catholic Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, p. 39 and Thompson, Wars  of .Religion, pp. 212-223. 2 John Le Patourel, "The King and the Princes in Fourteenth- Century France," Europe in the Late Middle Ages, Hale, et a l , ed. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 182. ^Supra, p. 97-141 n o b i l i t y pledged person and goods to the defence of th e i r own cause. The Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n of March, 1563 forbade the establishment of new associations and commanded that those already formed be dissolved.* Catherine's firm l e t t e r to Monluc coincided with the e d i c t . She evidently regarded the formation of leagues as an inexcusable expression of p r o v i n c i a l independence. She soundly rebuked Monluc for his leadership i n the venture and 2 commanded him to undo the work he had done. In spite of Monluc's assurance that the league of Agen was dissolved, i t continued, without royal permission, and after August, 1564 came to be known as the league of Guyenne.5 In June, I 5 6 3 the king's council received a series of a r t i c l e s from the noblesse of Guyenne who had gathered i n Bordeaux and sent a representative to be th e i r spokesman at the 4 court. The queen mother had received prior n o t i f i c a t i o n for i n A p r i l , Antoine de Pardaillan, baron de Gondrin, had written to report the establishment of the association of the noblesse of *Isambert, Recueil des Anciennes Lois, XIV, 1 4 5 . Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 551-552. (March 31, 1563) 5Caleb G. Kelly, French Protestantism 1559 -1562. Series XXXVI, No. 4 of Johns Hopkins University Studies i n H i s t o r i c a l and  P o l i t i c a l Science (Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 1 8 ) , p. 79. 4 Documents Pour Servir a..., Nos. 91, 92. Ik2 Guyenne."*" His description made the association sound s i n i s t e r i n purpose for he f e l t certain that the group, formed with a common purse, represented a plot on the part of some of the leading,nobles, to foment trouble and maintain s t r i f e when the peace had just been published. Gondrin was convinced that the majority of the magistrates of Guyenne were crooked, favoured the subversive association of the n o b i l i t y , and worked hand-in- glove with them to enrich themselves. The reasons for Gondrin's opinion of the association and the nature of the association i t s e l f are c l a r i f i e d by the remaining contents of his l e t t e r . He proceed ed to speak of the "good and just quarrel" of the prince de Conde and to assure Catherine that the majority of the n o b i l i t y and sol d i e r s of the region would never have taken arms had they not been persuaded of the c a p t i v i t y of the king and the queen mother. From the tone of his l e t t e r , Gondrin had been a l l i e d with the Huguenots. As he assured Catherine of his l o y a l t y , he explained his actions during the recent h o s t i l i t i e s with the standard Huguenot ra t i o n a l e . Thus his distrust of a Catholic association i s understandable. As the promulgation of the Edict of P a c i f i c a t i o n r e f l e c t e d the royal policy of pacifying the kingdom by making concessions to the Huguenots, an association ardently committed to the Catholic cause could very well become a threat ^Documents Pour Servir a..., No. 86. Ik3 to the peace. That most of the Catholic nobil ity were disloyal to the crown, or even to the queen mother, and sought in an association an outlet for their disloyalty is an untenable suggestion. Before the outbreak of c i v i l war, Burie declared that the nobility awaited only the king's orders to give battle to a common enemy. He referred to the nobil i ty , sustained by the king, arising en masse against the rebels, seeing that their privileges, their revenues and their ancient rights were threatened.* At the outset of the war as Monluc and Burie took the f ie ld with their forces, they reported to Charles IX that Negrepelisse with a large number of gentlemen from the region of the Agenais, Armagnac, Quercy, Perigord, Ronergue, and Commenge had come before them to offer their persons and goods for the king's 2 service. Negrepelisse asked to come before the king to declare the support of the nobi l i ty . Charles IX assured him that hearing of their devotion gave him great satisfaction and then emphasized the fact that the nobil ity could do nothing better than to present themselves, well-equipped, to his lieutenants, Burie and Monluc, and serve under them. 5 The king's authority was channelled through his appointed lieutenants and not through a band of nobles, Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 150, Memoire de Burie au roi" 6 j u i l l e t , 1561. 2 Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 121. 3 Documents Pour Servir a . . . . . No. 1?. Ikk however loyal they might be. In their communication to the king, the noblesse of Guyenne maintained that they had created an association of good faith with no other purpose than to pledge themselves to employ their l ives and goods for the king's authority. 1 They attributed the queen mother's concern and suspicion to the fact that those disloyal to the king slandered anything introduced to resist them and had, therefore, attempted to make the association appear unjust. Whatever the source of Catherine's concern, however, when Monluc had made i t known to them, they had immediately obeyed and the association was dissolved "comme s i jamais tel le association n'eust eu commencement." The vicomte d'Uza, spokes man for t he noblesse, was to remind the king of the faithful service rendered by the nobles of Guyenne and to obtain letters of declaration and confirmation maintaining them in their ancient l iber t i e s , franchises and privi leges. They believed that the Huguenots had greater credit with the Parlement than they, especially with the f i rs t president. Particularly galling to the Catholic nobles were the letters received by Huguenots declaring them good and faithful servitors of the king while the loyal Catholics possessed no such declarations. Charles IX assured them he would investigate the charges against the f irs t president Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 145 of the Parlement; i f necessary he would summon the man to the court. As for declarations of their loyalty, there had never been letters patent declaring them other than good subjects as in the case of the Huguenots who had been declared rebels.* The formation of leagues was the action of men who saw their positions threatened by the growth of the Huguenot movement. Monluc saw in these associations a means of strengthening the Catholic position by compensating for the demobilization of 2 garrison troops required by the Edict of Pacification. Moreover, he found in the sponsorship of leagues an opportunity to enhance his own position as their promoter and spokesman. The immediate reason for Catherine's fear and distrust of associations may have stemmed from the actions of Conde. To unite his cohorts in their common task, the prince had them sign on Apri l 11, 1562 an act of association in four ar t ic les . By their signing they undertook to employ body and goods, to the last drop of their blood, to the deliverance of the king and queen mother, the conservation of their edicts and ordonnances and the just punishment of those who held them in contempt. Those who signed committed themselves to fight together unti l Charles IX came of age, and undertook in person the government of his kingdom.5 ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 344-345. 5Me"moires de Conde, t . I l l , p. 258. ike The avowed purpose of Conde and his associates was laudable, but under such loyal-sounding aims, they made war against the crown. Any group organized and committed to a particular purpose, i f need be in spite of the crown, represented a threat to royal authority. Catherine demanded obedience to the king and to his appointed lieutenants rather than to a charter. Another source of concern to Catherine was the news that Monluc was intriguing with the Spanish. He had threatened to invite the Catholic king into Blarn i f Jeanne d'Albret continued to support the Protestants for, he said, the nobility and a l l the region favoured the Spanish k i n g . 1 As early as October, 1562, i t was rumoured that Monluc was planning to deliver the whole of 2 Guyenne into the hands of Phil ip II . The lieutenant-general of Guyenne entered into correspondence with Phil ip II early in 1564 in which he denounced the policies of the queen mother and her chancellor. He proposed to the Spanish king the formation of a league consisting of the pope, the emperor, the king of Spain, and a l l the Catholic princes of Germany and Italy.^ Phil ip II k showed interest and sent a spy to confer with Monluc. Catherine was no doubt disturbed to find that a royal officer would intrigue "''Paul Courteault, Blaise de Monluc,' Historien (Paris: Picard, 1908), p. k?0. 2 Weber, Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain, p. 89; Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien, p. 485- ^Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 319-327. Courteault, Blaise de Monluc, Historien, p. 486. 147 with the sovereign of another state and, possible gain the support of the local nobility for a project detrimental to royal authority. That in i t s e l f was sufficient reason to be suspicious of any expression of provincial independence and to decree that associations must be dissolved.. Local Estates F irs t among the concerns of the noblesse of Guyenne was the finding of a forum for the expression of their loyalty and of their concerns."*' They asked that Bordeaux be given the privilege of holding local estates and they pointed out that most provinces and even most parts of their own province had the custom of meet ing in that way to consider what must be done for the king's service and for the conservation of the kingdom. They were concerned about being deprived of a means of making known their complaints and grievances. Charles IX was reluctant to permit such a convocation of estates and replied that he did not wish to change that which was customarily done. Thus the nobles were unable to solve through the convocation of local estates the problem they had tried to solve by the formation of an association, the problem of finding a forum in which to make their voices heard. The decision of the king's council not to convoke the Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 148 local estates in Bordeaux was reinforced in the months that followed by letters from Catherine to d'Escars and to the Archbishop of Bordeaux.* The latter had requested royal authorization for such a gathering to consider an old problem, the gabelle du se l . The reluctance of Catherine and Charles to authorize a meeting of the provincial estates in Bordeaux stemmed in part from events of 156l . The Estates of Orleans, convened the day after the death of Francis II, adjourned at the end of January with Charles IX commanding the deputies to return to their baill iages in order to find means for paying the king's debts. New assemblies were to be held in each baill iage or senechaussle in March and in the principal city of each gouvernement during 2 the same month. These assemblies were to restr ict their deliberations solely to financial questions,and to name th ir ty - six delegates, one for each order in each government, to meet in the Estates-General at Melun on the f irs t of May. Although the strictest limitations had been placed on the meetings of local estates in March, they refused to obey these l imits and restr ict consideration to the problem of paying the *Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, II, 115 and note. 2 Lucien Romier, Catholiques et Huguenots a la Cour de  Charles IX (Paris: Libraire Academique, 1924), p. 58. 149 king's debts. The assembly of the three estates in the private of Paris immediately turned i t s attention to the question of the regency even though the president had announced that they must concern themselves only with finding means to pay the debts of the king. They rejected the regency of Catherine, proposed Antoine de Bourbon, f irs t prince of the blood, as regent, and revised the l i s t of members of the privy council to exclude the Guises and a l l other seasoned supporters of the king. At the court i t was thought that this coup had been directed by the comte de La Rochefoucauld and by Antoine Fumee at Conde's . . 1 suggestion. It was not only in Paris that the estates were recalcitrant. The three estates of Guyenne, assembled at Bordeaux, similarly ignored the directive to concern themselves only with financial matters. The king had published an ordonnance (18 February, 156l) convoking the se'ne'chausse'es of Guyenne, Landes, Perigord, Quercy, Armagnac, Limousin, Agen and the baill iage of Labour, Comminges and the jugeries of Riviere-Verdun to deliberate on the propositions presented to the estates of Orleans and to name 2 their deputies. • Monluc reported to the queen on the assembly of the three estates in the city of Agen and assured her that the three representatives chosen to go to Bordeaux on the Ib id . , pp. 89-91. Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, l lOn. 150. twentieth of the month were wise, virtuous, humble, and obedient and would make their way to Bordeaux in accordance with the royal letters to give a response to the lieutenant of the king."'" Upon meeting in Bordeaux the delegates re-examined the proposals of the king's council to the estates of Orleans and then turned their attention to religious discussion and adopted a position of 2 absolute intolerance. Their views were directly opposed to the policy Catherine was following as she prepared the Edict of July and planned for the Colloquy of Poissy. The provincial assemblies were in no way helpful to the king in the solution of the financial cr i s i s and they raised barriers before royal p o l i t i c a l and religious pol ic ies . Catherine seized the only recourse available and prevailed upon Charles to annul the decisions taken, f ix the dates for electoral assemblies for May, the provincial assembly for June, and the opening of the new Estates-General for August at Pontoise.^ By the time the deputies were a l l present in Bordeaux and ready to assemble, Burie had received a letter from the king countermanding the order to convoke the assembly. The estates 1 I b i d . , pp. 110-114. 2 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , p. 38. ^Georges Picot, Histoire des Etats Generaux (2nd edition; Paris: Hachette, 1888), II , 55. 151 of Guyenne were delayed by the late arrival of several deputies and Burie received the king's letter June 13th. The king's letter indicated that the decisions of the earl ier assemblies (20 March) were sufficient. The king's council was already showing a reluctance to convoke the provincial estates for the likelihood was that their demands would be even greater than in the previous meeting. The deputies, most of whom had been waiting in Bordeaux for some time, ignored the king's letter and met anyway. The third estate showed a desire to use force to stamp out the reform but members of the nobil ity were more moderate in their attitude to the Huguenots. In fact, one representative of the second estate was Symphorien de Durfort, baron de Duras, who was to become the military leader of the Huguenots in Guyenne in the following year. But they demanded that the king convoke the Estates-General annually, and recognize i t s competence in matters of government "according to the ancient laws and observances of the kingdom." * Burie forwarded the proc^s-verbal of the assembly to the king without comment. The local estates had not proved useful but had shown themselves entirely too independent and hard to handle for the king's l i k i n g . Therefore, i t was not strange that the request of the nobility of Guyenne two years later for an assembly of the three estates Ib id . , p. kl. 152 in the senechaussee of Guyenne should bring a negative response from the king and the queen mother. The Parlement of Bordeaux Catherine de Medicis attempted to mobilize every possible resource on behalf of royal authority and in the interests of pacifying the kingdom. In 1560 she convened at Fontainebleau an assembly of notables which included the royal council, the princes, great officers of the crown and knights of the order."*' On that occasion Jean de Monluc, bishop of Valence, urged the convocation of the Estates-General and the establishment of a national council to reform the church. The following year the clergy met at Poissy with the charge of finding a common ground between Roman Catholic and Protestant. Meetings of the Estates- General at Orleans and at Pontoise were unable to achieve solutions either to the po l i t i ca l or to the religious problems of the kingdom. At the height of the f irs t War of Religion Catherine de Medicis confided to the due d'ftampes, governor of Bretagne, that since the bishops at Poissy had done nothing to appease the troubles on account of rel igion, she intended to try another strategy. She planned to "assemble many good men from the courts of Parlement to consider means of ending the troubles 2 in the kingdom and maintaining obedience to the king." Lavisse, Histoire de France, VI: I, 21-24. Lettres de Catherine de Medicis, I, 243. 153 No such assembly was held but the Parlements did play a significant role in the maintenance of the monarchy nevertheless. As a sovereign court the Parlement of Bordeaux verified and registered royal edicts, arranged for the publication of those edicts, f i l l e d gaps in legislation with i ts own decrees, took an active part in the maintenance of order and heard appeals from local courts in the province.* Generally the Parlement co operated with the governor in the maintenance of royal authority and that sp ir i t was demonstrated in a letter to Antoine de Bourbon after a Huguenot plot had threatened the c i ty . The men of the Parlement assured him that they had sent deputies before Burie to pledge themselves to the last drop of their blood and the x 2 last ecu of their purses. Jealous defence of royal prerogatives led the Parlement of Bordeaux to issue a remonstrance to Charles IX against letters patent granted by Jeanne d 'Albret . 5 Monluc called to the attention of the court letters patent by which the queen of Navarre authorized Calvinist preaching in a l l her towns and chateaux. The Parlement considered the letters patent as Gaston Zel ler , "L'administration monarchique avant les intendants," Revue historique. Vol . 197 (19*+7), pp. I85-I87 and Doucet, Institutions, I, 210-211. 2 Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 31. 5I_bid., No. 9k. k Monluc, Comrnentaires et Lettres, IV, 239-253. 154 contrary to the king's edict and derogating from the king's authority. By promulgating them through the senechal of the duchy of Albret before presentation to the Parlement Jeanne d'Albret had registered them unlawfully and had trespassed on the sovereignty of Guyenne. Men of the sovereign court took particular exception to Jeanne d'Albret's use of the words "for such is our pleasure," since their use pertained to the king alone. 1 While they awaited the king's rul ing, the men of Parlement issued a provisional decree forbidding the sene"chaux of the duchy of Albret to publish similar letters patent on 2 pain of a thousand l ivre fine. Frequently the Parlement of Bordeaux offered advice to the king. In 1561 in view of local conditions, i t counselled the return of arms to the Catholics or the organizing of bands to disarm the Protestants.^ As the archbishop of Bordeaux was about to leave for the Council of Trent, the Parlement, fearing that his leaving would bring great trouble, asked the king to '4 dispense with the t r i p . In addition to offering advice, the Parlement of Bordeaux acted to enforce the king's w i l l to such an extent that a constant stream of judgments emanated from that ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 94. 2 Monluc, Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 240, n. 1. ^Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et la Guerre C i v i l e , I, 424. 4 Ib id . , p. 461. 155 court d u r i n g the p e r i o d of c i v i l war.* Although the men of the Parlement of Bordeaux were c l e a r l y l o y a l t o the k i n g , l i k e other r o y a l o f f i c e r s they saw t h e i r o f f i c e as a means f o r p e r s o n a l advantage. Two f a c t o r s suggest that members of that s o v e r e i g n court c o u l d e x p l o i t t h e i r p o s i t i o n s . On one hand they delayed the r e g i s t r a t i o n of l e g i s l a t i o n a l i e n to t h e i r p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t s . On the other they were widely accused of e n r i c h i n g themselves from the f i n e s they l e v i e d . In a remonstrance of August 31, 1563, Parlement informed C h a r l e s IX that h i s pat e n t s r e g a r d i n g the d e p o s i t i o n of arms, the d i s s o l u t i o n of a s s o c i a t i o n s and the announcement of h i s m a j o r i t y had been p u b l i s h e d but that h i s commissioners would be prevented from e x e c u t i n g t h e i r commissions u n t i l the Parlement had r e c e i v e d an 2 answer from him on t h e i r remonstrance. T h e i r p a r t i c u l a r grievance was the l a c k of immunity p r o v i d e d f o r them under the disarmament c l a u s e s . I t g a l l e d these men, who r e f e r r e d t o themselves as the k i n g ' s " l i e u t e n a n t z n a i z , " t h a t the n o b i l i t y were exempted while they, who must render j u s t i c e not only on the t h i r d e s t a t e but on the n o b i l i t y and the c l e r g y , were r e q u i r e d t o s t r i p themselves of arms. The Parlement emphasized the f a c t t h a t i t s members re p r e s e n t e d the. k i n g ' s name and e.g. I b i d . , p. 446, " A r r e t du parlement de Bordeaux contre 104 de r e b e l l i o n , " 2 8 j u i l l e t , 1562. 156 authority in his absence and saw no reason why they should be less privileged than such extraordinaires as the prevSts de 1'h8tel . Not only did they forward a remonstrance to the king but the Parlement made i t s concerns known to Burie, Monluc and d'Escars.* The latter replied that men of the Parlement should 2 set the example in speedy obedience to the king's w i l l . The Parlements were in constant r ivalry with governors for administrative authority. 5 At the end of 1562 after four or five months in military compaigns, Burie returned to Bordeaux and became most concerned about conditions in that c i ty . The multiplication of commanders led to "monopolies, part ia l i ty and confusion so that there followed indignities, larceny and robbery even by those who should repress these things." The best solution, in Burie's eyes, was to make him solely responsible for the c i ty , to place the keys of the city in no one else's hands while he was there. The interests of the king would be best served, in fact, i f Burie were sent a commission to under take a f u l l scale investigation of the administration of justice for he was convinced that there would be a major discrepancy ^Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 114. 2 I b i d . , No. 116. 5 Z e l l e r , "L'Administration monarchique...," p. 185. 4 • X ' „ Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 82. "Instruction baillee par monsieur de Burye au thrgsorier Le Pyn pour faire entendre au roy." 157 between the record of fines and confiscations on one hand, and the amount by which the king's revenues had benefited on the other. If the king would send the commission empowering him to undertake such an investigation, Burie would choose those he thought best from the Parlement to assist him. He would also have the clerk of the court provide him immediately with a statement of a l l those convicted and subjected to fines and confiscations together with the amounts. He was sure he could recover a vast sum that had gone astray within the court, and set an example that could be followed throughout the kingdom to the king's prof i t . Charges made by the king's lieutenant against the officers of the Parlement must be balanced against the counter-charges of members of that court. Nobles in the Catholic army enriched themselves by confiscating the goods of the Huguenots. In this practice they had the blessing of their commanders who did the same. In a request addressed to the king the nobility of Guyenne declared that during the days of the c i v i l wars when the king's army and the nobility of the province were led by Burie and Monluc, those lords, lacking finances from the king to reward the most fa i thful nobles, granted them some small gifts of property. 1 The f i rs t president and members of the Parlement questioned the Documents Pour Servir a . . . , Nos. 91, 92. 158 authority of the lieutenants to make such g i f t s , and inconvenienced the receivers with summonses, arrests and fines, much to the i r annoyance. The nobles accused the court of favouring the Huguenots but the king's council sided with the Parlement. In the i r view i t was not a matter of favouring the Huguenots but of upholding law and t r a d i t i o n . The council decreed that the lieutenants had usurped a royal prerogative i n granting goods to the i r followers and that Parlement was merely defending that royal prerogative. 1 In the r i v a l r y between the Parlement and the lieutenants or governors both sides strongly supported royal authority and their own. The crown tended to favour the Parlement as i t had more to fear from the independence 2 of the governors. Councils and Commissions To a s s i s t and to control i t s o f f i c e r s the crown made use of councils. Before leaving for Guyenne Montpensier asked for a maitre des requetes to act as his j u d i c i a l assistant, to hear pleas, and to render justice to those found g u i l t y of sedition, r e b e l l i o n , and other crimes worthy of death. The royal council determined that he should be assisted by two councillors from the Parlement of Bordeaux and a blank commission for the Ibid. Z e l l e r , "L'Administration monarchique...," p. 211. 159 councillors to be elected was given to Montpensier. 1 Similarly, when Monluc was sent into the province he was accompanied by two 2 councillors from the Parlement of Paris. They soon showed 3 Huguenot sympathies and Monluc harassed them unt i l they f led. They were replaced by two men commissioned from the Parlement of Bordeaux and while awaiting them Monluc obtained the assistance of the lieutenant criminel from Agen and six councillors of that 4 senechaussee. In days of strife i t was often essential for the lieutenant to administer justice in any location and on short notice. Therefore, i t was advantageous to be accompanies by advisors who were learned in the law and experienced in t r i a l 5 procedure. During the c i v i l wars the crown depended increasingly on the use of commissions. A commission differed from an office in that i t was created for a specific mission and i t terminated with the completion of that mission or at the king's pleasure. The ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 48. 2 Monluc, Commentaires, II, 402; Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 11?. 3 Ruble, Jeanne d'Albret et l a Guerre C i v i l e , I, 163-164. 4 Monluc,. Commentaires et Lettres, IV, 123-124. ^In some provinces religious controversy penetrated and paralyzed the sovereign courts. The due d'Etampes, governor of Bretagne asked that a maitre des requites be commissioned to assist him in the administration of justice since the deadlock in the Parlement rendered i t impotent. Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No. 22. 160 use of commissions became necessary as the sale of offices and succession practices enabled officers to become entrenched and to demonstrate considerable independence in the exercise of their posts. Secondly, the conversion of royal officers to the Protestant faith left offices vacant or, more often, allowed the holders to exercise their authority on behalf of the Huguenots. F inal ly , the disruptions caused by war at times emptied offices altogether and at other times led to the claim ing of one office by several men. The Edict of Pacification of 1563 was brought to Guyenne by two men commissioned to present i t to the Parlement of Bordeaux for registration and to see to i ts execution through out the province. 1 They were delayed in the Parlement of Bordeaux because that body wished "to make remonstrance to the king for the conservation of the authority of his sovereign 2 court." The two commissioners reported immediately to the king, the queen mother and to Monluc as governor of Guyenne. The important mission of executing the Edict of Pacification was entrusted to capable and conscientious men who did their utmost to f u l f i l their responsibil ity. In such commissioners the crown placed greater confidence than in i ts regular off icers s ""Documents Pour Servir a . . . , No 109. "Memoire des commissaires royaux Antoine Fumee et Hierosme Angenoust." Angenoust was a council lor of the Parlement of Paris. Fumee was grand rapporteur of France. The Fumee family represented a veritable dynasty of'maitres de requites de l 'HStel du r o i , " Doucet, Institutions, I, 155. 2 Documents Pour Servir st..., NO . 109. 161 Summary and Conclusion In the f irst half of the sixteenth-century the position of the king in France was greatly enhanced. The power of the great feudal lords as r ivals to the king waned. In 1523 the domains of the due de Bourbon returned to the crown; the duchy of Bretagne.followed in 1532. The only remaining principality of any size was the kingdom of the Albrets in the south. The king was able to tax his subjects virtual ly at wi l l and the efficiency of financial institutions was improved. Accounting was centralized but the collection and expenditure of funds often took place on the local l eve l . The officer class increased in number and function so that most agents of public authority were the king's representatives. The king appointed great nobles as governors of provinces and when they entered into r ivalry with the Parlements, he usually supported the Parlements. Thus the power of those courts increased and the power of the great nobles was curtailed to some degree. Nevertheless, the governors were extremely important to royal government for in their provinces they were the pers.onal representatives of the king. These men had to be chosen with care but in a period of youthful kings and c i v i l war the choice was out of the king's hands in some cases. The governorship of Guyenne was held by the ruler of Navarre throughout the century. 162 This increased the base of authority upon which that prince could act; i t extended the l imits of his independence. The governor frequently resided outside his gouvernement and in his absence lieutenants-general exercised royal authority. The king appointed these lieutenants-general but they owed a dual allegiance to king and governor. The application of the royal wi l l in distant parts of the kingdom was hampered by the very distance and by the slowness of communications and c i v i l war only exaggerated such conditions. Boundaries of authority were very badly defined, both po l i t i ca l ly and geographically and frequent clashes took place between different representatives of royal authority. The sale of offices raised some revenue but contributed to the entrenchment of officers in positions which they exploited for their own benefit and from which i t was almost impossible to dislodge them. For this reason the king resorted increasingly to the use of commissions to carry out his orders at every leve l , a solution which increased not only his authority but his expenses. The Wars of Religion spl i t the kingdom over religious and p o l i t i c a l issues and the king was subjected to attack by extremists of both sides. The actions of loyal supporters of the crown could be just as detrimental to royal authority as those of enemies. Blaise de Monluc, lieutenant-general of the 163 k i n g i n Guyenne, a c t i n g o s t e n s i b l y to curb the t h r e a t to r o y a l a u t h o r i t y , i n t r i g u e d with -the k i n g of Spain and threatened t o t u r n over the p r o v i n c e of Guyenne to him. Doubtless t h i s f a c t c o n t r i b u t e d to C a t h e r i n e ' s r e l u c t a n c e to see Monluc appointed l i e u t e n a n t - g o v e r n o r . The same v a n i t y that made him re s p o n s i v e to f l a t t e r y and reward made him s u s c e p t i b l e to i n t r i g u e . Not only were extreme C a t h o l i c s a t h r e a t but nobles committed to the Huguenot cause r e c r u i t e d thousands of s o l d i e r s i n the same p r o v i n c e . Recruitment and command of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t e d to the a b i l i t y of a l o c a l strongman to act independently. He had the power to name c a p t a i n s and t o r a i s e men. Sinc e Monluc had a b r o t h e r , sons and son-in-law a l l commanding one or more companies, he had a v e r i t a b l e p r i v a t e army. Under those circumstances orders from the court were i n t e r p r e t e d with c o n s i d e r a b l e l a t i t u d e . L o c a l f o r c e s were at times marshalled e f f e c t i v e l y to oppose an unpopular r o y a l p o l i c y . When the c i t i z e n s of La R o c h e l l e opposed payment f o r the support of a g a r r i s o n i n the c i t y , they d i s p a t c h e d a d e l e g a t i o n to the court well-equipped with b r i b e money t o accomplish t h e i r purpose. Whether or not they achieved t h e i r g o a l , Jarnac r e p o r t e d that the men of the g a r r i s o n were reduced t o e a t i n g t h e i r horses before they disbanded and went 164 home. Similarly the threat of a tax on export wine united the bourgeois, nobil ity and .clergy of Bordeaux in opposition. The king, however, frequently had the last word in financial matters. In Guyenne one year the Estates voted a sum less than that asked on the pretext that inhabitants of parts of the province had already paid their quota. Therefore, Etienne Lemacon, the receiver general in Guyenne was short. Charles IX insisted that the amount be raised in spite of a l l opposition and that i t be furnished in the meantime by Francois de Lav i l l e , a colleague of Lemacon.* In spite of so many threats royal government in Guyenne was generally effective in maintaining the king's authority. The energetic Monluc and such faithful governors of cit ies as Noailles could pledge sincere allegiance to their monarch. The former practised swift retribution in the form of hanging; the latter promoted personal recognition by the sovereign by sending detailed analyses of the need to the queen mother. Both these officers had brothers who were prominent bishops, of Valence and of Dax respectively. The ab i l i ty to grant many ecclesiastical offices lay in the hands of the king and formed a small part of the patronage by which he was able to maintain his faithful off icers. The most powerful tool for the maintenance of royal Archives historique du departement de la Gironde, Vol . I l l , No. LXXX (1861), 200-203. authority lay in personal contact, personal appointment and personal reward by the king for those in a position to further his w i l l . BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY I. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS Franklin, Alfred Louis Auguste. Les sources de l 'h is to ire de  France: notices bibliographiques et analytiques des invent- aires et des recueils de documents re lat i f s a l 'h is to ire de  France ". Paris: Librair ie de Firmin-Didot et c i e . , 1877• Hauser, Henri. Les sources de l 'h i s to ire de France. XVI e si&cle . (1494-1610). 4v. Paris: Picard, 1906-1915. The standard bibliography for sixteenth-century French history. Volume III, Les guerres de rel igion (1559-1589) is invaluable for an assessment of the primary sources. Lasteyrie, Robert de, et a l . Bibliographie des travaux historiques  et archeologiques publies par les societe's savantes de la  France". 6 v.. in Collection de documents inedits sur l 'h is to ire  de France. Paris! Imprimerie nationale, 1888-1918. A l i s t of art ic les in French scholarly journals arranged geographically; updated by Rene Gandilhon so that with the accompanying volumes of Bibliographie Annuelle i t includes works published to 1940. Monod, Gabriel Jacques Jean. Bibliographie de l 'h is to ire de France. Catalogue methodique et chronologique des sources et des  ouvrages re lat i f s a l 'h is to ire de France depuis les origines  jusqu'en 1789. Paris: Hachette, 1888. Saulnier, E . and A. Martin. Bibliographie des travaux publies de  1866 a 1897 sur l 'h i s to ire de France de 1500 a 1789. 271 Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1932-1938. S o c i l t l de l 'h is to ire de France. Annuaire-bulletin. Paris, 1863- present. T i l l e y , Arthur. The Literature of the French Renaissance. 2v. Cambridge: University Press, 1904. Contains analyses of the style and content of many of the histories and memoirs. II. PRINTED DOCUMENTS 168 A. Major Collections Collection de documents inedits sur 1'histoire de France. Many v. Paris :Imprimerie nationale, l836f f . Initiated by Guizot, minister of public instruction; directed by the Comite des Travaux Historiques et Scientifiques since l 8 8 l . La Ferriere, Hector, comte de and comte Gustave Baguenault de Puchesse, eds. Lettres de Catherine de Mldicis . l l v . 1880-1943. Very important source, v . I , II and X contain letters of this period; v. XI is a general index; many letters to of f ic ia ls in Guyenne and to such confidantes of the queen mother as Sebastien de l'Aubespine, bishop of Limoges and Ambassador to the court of Phil ip II . Paris , Antoine Louis, ed. N^gociations, lettres et pieces  diverses relatives au regne de Francois II, tire~es du  portefeuille de Sebastien de l'Aubespine, eve~que de  Limoges, l84l~ Dispatches to and from the French ambassador in Spain, 1559-1561. Tommaseo, Niccolo, ed. Relations des ambassadeurs venitiens  sur les affaires de France au XVI e siecle"! 2v. I838. Off ic ia l reports; contains excellent descriptions and analyses of affairs at the French court. Michaud, Joseph Francois and Jean Joseph Poujoulat, eds. Nouvelle  collection des memoires pour servir a 1*histoire de France, depuis le XIII e siecle jusqu'a l a , fin du XVIII e ; precede's~de  notices pour caracteriser chaque auteur des memoires et son  e"poque; suivis de l'analyze des documents historiques qui s'y  rapportent. Series I, 12v.; series II, 10v.; series III, 10v.; 32v. in a l l . Paris, I836-I839. Conde, Louis de Bourbon, prince de. Memoires du prince de  Conde. Recueil des choses memorables faites et passees  pour le faict de la rel igion et estat de ce royaume,• depuis la mort du roy Henri II jusqu'en l'annee 1564. Ser. I, v. 6. Firs t compiled in Orleans to show Conde's role in suppressing the troubles; not unbiased. 169 Guise, Francois de Lorraine, due de. Memoires de Francois  de Lorraine, due d'Aumale et de Guise, concernant les  affaires de France et les negociations avec l'Ecdsse,  l ' l t a l i e et l'Allemagne, pendant les annees 15^ 7 a 1561, publies sur les manuscrits originaux. Ser. I, v. VI. La Noue, Francois de. Memoires du sieur Francois de La Noue. Ser. I, v. IX. The author was a Breton Huguenot gentleman who fought at Dreux; remarkably impartial. Petitot, Claude Bernard, Alexandre Petitot, Louis Jean Nicolas Monmerque, et_ a l , eds. Collection complete des memoires  re la t i f s a l 'h i s to ire de France, depuis le regne de Philippe  Augusta... avec des notices sur chaque auteur, et des  observations sur chaque ouvrage. 130v. in 131. Paris: Foucault, 1S20-1829. Mergey, Jean sieur de. Memoires du Sieur Jean de Mergey, gentilhomme champenois. Ser. I, v. XXXIV. These memoirs begin in 1562 when the author was serving under La Rochefoucauld; they are very brief . . Tavannes, Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de. Memoires de tres- noble et tres- i l lustre Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de  Tavannes, mareschal de France, gouverneur de Provence, conseiller du roy, et capitaine de cent hommes d'armes. Ser. I, v. XXIII-XXV. Actually written by Jean de Saulx-Tavannes to honour his father; useful for the battle of Dreux. B. Other Documents Cabie, Edmond. Guerres de rel igion dans le sud-ouest de la France  et principalement dans le Quercy, d'apres les papiers des  seigneurs de Saint-Sulpice de 1561 a 1390. A lb i : Imprimerie Noguies, 1906. Documents transcribed, helpful in establishing identity and relationships of personnel. . Courteault, Paul. Commentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Marechal de  France. 3v. Paris: Picard, 1911-1925. The definitive edition of Monluc's commentaries; used ex tensively in this study. 170 Francois, Michel, ed. Journal de l'anne'e 1562 par Pierre de  Paschal. Paris: H. Champion, 1950. . La Correspondence de Francois, Cardinal de Tournon, • 1521-1552T Paris: H. Champion, 19^6. Not an important source for t h i s period. Isambert, Francois Andre, et_ _al, eds. Recueil gene"rale des  anciennes l o i s francaises, depuis l'an 420 jusqu'a 1st  revolution de 1 7 8 9 . Paris: L i b r a i r i e de Plon Freres 1 8 8 2 - ". 2 9 v . i n 24. Important edicts of the period under study are contained i n v. XIV ( 1 5 5 9 - 1 5 8 9 ) . "Journal de ce qui s'est passe en France durant I'annee 1 5 6 2 , principalement dans Paris et a l a cour," Revue retrospective, Ser. I, V, 81-116 , 1 6 8 - 2 1 2 ; 1 8 3 4 . Written by a Catholic gentleman at the court who enjoyed the confidence of Catherine de Medicis and the cardinal of Lorraine. Lot, Ferdinand. Recherches sur l e s e f f e c t i f s des armies francaises  des guerres d ' l t a l i e au guerres de r e l i g i o n , 1 4 9 4 - 1 5 6 2 . P a r i s : S.E.V.P.E.N., 1 9 6 2 . : Contains documents showing size and type of forces, command and cost, Lublinskaja, Aleksandra Dmitrievna, ed. Documents pour s e r v i r a ' 1'histoire des guerres c i v i l e s en France, 156I-I563. Moscow: Akademia nauk SSSR, Institut i s t o r i i , 1 9 6 2 . Contains many l e t t e r s from high royal o f f i c i a l s to the court; a valuable source for t h i s study, Rochambeau, Eugene A c h i l l e Lacroix de Vimeux, comte de. Lettres  d'Antoine de Bourbon et de Jehanne d'Albret. Paris: L i b r a i r i e . Renouard, 1 8 7 7 . ~' A major source for the king of Navarre, one of the key figures of the period. Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de, ed. Comrnentaires et l e t t r e s de Blaise de Monluc. 5 v . Paris: L i b r a i r i e Renouard, 1 8 6 4 - 1 8 7 2 . This edition of the commentaries was not based on the best text and has been superseded by Courteault's; v. IV and V contain 175 l e t t e r s including such documents as the charter of a league at Agen and a statement of the m i l i t a r y expenses of Guyenne; v. IV i s a p a r t i c u l a r l y useful source. 171 S u r i a n o , M i c h e l e and Marc A n t o n i o B a r b a r o . D i s p a t c h e s , I56O-I563, t r a n s l a t e d and e d i t e d by S i r Henry L a y a r d , i n The Huguenot S o c i e t y o f L o n d o n , P u b l i c a t i o n s , V I , L y m i n t o n , I89I. Tex t and t r a n s l a t i o n ; S u r i a n o , November, I56O t o November, 1561; B a r b a r o , O c t o b e r , 1562 t o A u g u s t , 1563; some of t h e c l e a r e s t a n a l y s e s o f e v e n t s and p e r s o n a l i t i e s a t the F r e n c h c o u r t . W i l k i n s o n , M a u r i c e , e d . "Documents i l l u s t r a t i n g the wars o f r e l i g i o n , 1569-1573," E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , X X V I , 127- 138; J a n u a r y , 1911. Documents f rom the " R e g i s t r e s s e c r e t e s du p a r l e m e n t de B o r d e a u x ; " o f i n t e r e s t f o r s o u r c e r a t h e r t h a n d a t e . I I I . HISTORIES BY CONTEMPORARIES A u b i g n e , A g r i p p a d ' . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e . P u b l i c a t i o n of the s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by A lphonse de R u b l e . l O v . P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1886-1909. C l e a r l y Huguenot v i e w p o i n t ye t r e m a r k a b l y f a i r ; bo r rowed f r e e l y f rom o t h e r a u t h o r s . B e z e , Theodore d e . H i s t o i r e e c c l e s i a s t i q u e des e g l i s e s r e f o r m e e s  au royaume de F r a n c e . E d i t e d by G . Baum and E . C u n i t z . B a s e d on the o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n , I58O. 3v. P a r i s : F i s c h b a c h e r , 1883-1889. W r i t t e n f rom P r o t e s t a n t p o i n t o f v iew w i t h a p o l o g e t i c p u r p o s e ; l i k e d ' A u b i g n e , Beze bor rowed f r e e l y f rom o t h e r h i s t o r i a n s . B r a n t o m e , P i e r r e de B o u r d e i l l e , s e i g n e u r d e . Oeuvres c o m p l e t e s . P u b l i c a t i o n o f the s o c i e t e de l ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e . - E d i t e d by L u d o v i c L a l a n n e . l l v . P a r i s : R e n o u a r d , 1864-1882. C a t h o l i c w r i t e r ; v . X I i s an i n d e x , e s s e n t i a l f o r p r o f i t  a b l e use of t h i s f r a g m e n t e d w o r k . La P o p e l i n i e r e , L a n c e l o t V o i s i n , s i e u r d e . L ' h i s t o i r e de F r a n c e  e n r i c h i e des p l u s n o t a b l e s o c c u r r e n c e s s u r v e n u e s es p r o v i n c e s  de l ' E u r o p e e t pays v o i s i n s d e p u i s l ' a n 1550 j u s q u ' a c e s  t e m p s . 3v. ( A r r a s ? ) 1582. Thou , J a c q u e s August d e . H i s t o i r e u n i v e r s e l l e d e p u i s 1543 j u s q u '  en 1607, t r a d u i t s u r 1'e d i t i o n l a t i n e de L o n d r e s . I 6 v . London : and P a r i s , 1734. P o l i t i q u e p o i n t of v i e w ; g r e a t i n f l u e n c e on subsequent h i s t o r i e s o f the p e r i o d . 172 IV. GENERAL HISTORIES Lavisse, Ernest, ed. Histoire de France depuis ies origines  jusqu'a la revolution. Paris: Hachette, 1900-1911. The best general history of France; Volume V:2 (1519-1559) by Henry Lemonnier and volume VI:1 (1559-1598) by Jean H. Mariejol are useful. Mousnier, Roland. Les XVI® et XVII e siecles, v. IV in Maurice Crouzet, director, Histoire generale des c iv i l i sa t ions . Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,I96I. Contains a good summary of Mousnier's view of French absolutism in the sixteenth century. Romier, Lucien. History of France. Translated and completed by A . L . Rowse. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. A good overview; too brief to be useful for the period under study. •V. HISTORIES OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY AND OF THE WARS OF RELIGION Armstrong, Edward. The French Wars of Religion, Their P o l i t i c a l  Aspects. 2nd edition; Oxford: Blackwell, 1904. An expansion of three lectures; useful brief synthesis. Bat t i fo l , Louis. The Century of the Renaissance, v. II in The  National History of France. Edited by F r . Funck-Brentano. 6v. Translated by E . F . Buckley. London: Heinemann, 1916. Well-written survey without documentation. Grant, Arthur James. A History of Europe from 1494 to 1610, v. V in Methuen's History of Medieval and Modern Europe, London: Methuen, 1931. Livet, Georges. Les guerres de re l ig ion . Que sais-je? Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. Helpful analysis in brief form. Neale, John. The Age of Catherine de Medicis. London: Cape, 1943. An expansion of a lecture series; people and issues of the Wars of Religion clearly identif ied. 173 Thompson, James Westfall. The Wars of Religion in France, 1559- 1576; The Huguenots, Catherine de Medici:and Phil ip II . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. S t i l l the standard work on the subject; considers particular ly the diplomatic and economic aspects of the c i v i l wars. VI. BOOKS ON SPECIAL TOPICS Allen, J.W. A History of Po l i t i ca l Theory in the Sixteenth Century. London: Methuen, 1957. First published 1928, reprinted with revised bibliography 1957. Champion, Pierre. La Jeunesse de Henri III. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1941. Church, William Farr. Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth Century  France, A Study in the Evolution of Ideas, v. X in Harvard  Historical Studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19^1. Courteault, Paul. Blaise de Monluc, historien; e"tude critique sur  le texte et l a valeur historique des commentaires. Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1908. Essential source for f i l l i n g the gaps and correcting errors in Monluc's Commentaires; contains much helpful explanatory material. . Un cadet de gascogne au XVI e s iecle, Blaise de Monluc. Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1909. A biography based on the author's detailed study of the sources; brief and lacking documentation. Croze, Joseph de. Les Guises, les Valois et Philippe II . Paris: d'Amyot, 1866. Devic, dom Claude and dom Jean Joseph Vaissete. Histoire generale  de Languedoc avec des notes et les pieces just if icatives. I6v. Toulouse: E . Privot, 1872-1904. Volume XI deals with Languedoc in the sixteenth century; contains many documents useful for the events in and near Toulouse which had a bearing on Haute-Guyenne. 174 Doucet, Roger. JStude sur le gouvernement de Francois Ier dans  ses rapports avec le Parlement de Paris. 2v. Paris: Champion, 1921-1926. . Les institutions de l a France au XVie s iecle . 2v. Paris: Picard, 1948. Excellent description of origin and development of French institutions; helpful bibliography. Gigon, S. - C . La Revolte de l a gabelle en Guyenne, 1548-1549. Paris: Honore Champion, 190o. Useful for observing the continuity of conflict and concern for provincial prerogatives. Grant, Arthur James. The French Monarchy, 1483-1789. in Cambridge  Historical Series, George W. Prothero, ed. 2v. Cambridge: University Press, 1900. Hale, John Rigby, e_t a l , ed. Europe in the Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965* Contains two good articles l i s ted below on France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Herit ier , Jean. Catherine de Medici. Charlotte Haldane, trans. London: George Allen and Unwin L t d . , 1963* Translated from Catherine de Medicis. Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1959. The author interprets Catherine's po l i t i ca l aims in terms of "Machiavellism." Imbart de l a Tour, Pierre. Les origines de la reforme. 4v. Paris Hachette, 1905-1935. Jensen, De Lemar. Diplomacy and Dogmatism: Bernardino de Mendoza  and the French Catholic League. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964. Kelly, Caleb G. French Protestantism 1559-1562. Ser. XXXVI, No. 4 in Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Po l i t i ca l  Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1918. Emphasizes economic factors; of interest regarding origins of leagues. Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Coming of the Wars of Religion in France, 1555-1565"! v.22 in Travaux d'humanisme et  renaissance. Geneva: E . Droz, 1956. Invaluable for Protestant military organization and particularly for the relation of the Geneva Company of Pastors to the Huguenot movement in France. 175 Kingdon, Robert McCune. Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement, 1564-1572; a contribution to the  history of Congregationalism, Presbyterianism and Calvinist  resistance theory. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, Good bibliography. Leonard, Emile G. Histoire generale du protestantisme. 3 v . Paris: Presses Universitaires de F r a n c e , 1 9 6 1 . v. I, La Reformation, i s useful; v. I I , L'Etablissement, 1 5 6 4 - 1 7 0 0 , contains a good section on Calvinism in France. Le Patourel, John. "The King and the Princes in Fourteenth Century France," in John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe in the  Late Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Lewis, P. S. "France in the Fifteenth Century: Society and Sovereignty," in John R. Hale, et a l , ed. Europe in the Late  Middle Ages. Evanston: Northwestern University Press ,1965. Major, James Russell . The Deputies to the Estates General in Renaissance France. No. 21 in Studies presented to the Inter national Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . . The Estates General of I56O. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 5 1 . . Representative Institutions in Renaissance France, T52I-I559. No. 22 in Studies presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, i 9 6 0 . Mariejol, Jean Hippolyte. Catherine de Medicis. Paris: Hachette, 1920. Mousnier, Roland. Etat et societe sous Francois Ier et pendant le  gouvernement personnel de Louis XIV. Les Cours de Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine• Paris: Centre de document- ation universitaire, 1966. Particularly good for government, society and customs, 1515 -1547. 176 Mousnier, Roland. Etudes sur l a France au XVTe s i e c l e . 2 p t i e . Les Cours de Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine. Paris: Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1959* Good treatment of the development of royal government under Francis I and Henry II; more d e t a i l on f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s than-others. . Etudes sur l a France de 1494-1559• Les Cours de Sorbonne. Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine. Paris: Centre de documentation u n i v e r s i t a i r e , 1964. - . La venalite des o f f i c e s sous Henri IV et Louis XIII. Rouen: Maugard,1945. The standard work on t h i s topic; focuses on a l a t e r period but useful for studying development of venality. Pages, Georges, ed. Etudes sur 1'histoire administrative et  sociale de l'ancien r e g i m e " P a r i s : F e l i x Alcan, 1938. Chiefly concerned with the l a t e r years of the ancien  regime. Palm, Franklin Charles. The Establishment of French Absolutism, 1574-1610. New York: F. S. Crofts, 1928. . P o l i t i c s and Religion i n Sixteenth-century France; A Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned • King of the South. Boston: Ginn, 1927. Picot, Georges. Histoire des etats generaux consideres au point de  vue de leur influence sur le gouvernement de l a France de 1355- 1614. 2nd e d i t i o n . 5v. Paris: Hachette, 1888. Romier, Lucien. La carriere d'un f a v o r i , Jacques d'Albon de Saint- Andre, Margchai de France, 1512-1562. Paris: Perrin, 1909. Excellent example of the r i s e of a l o y a l c l i e n t of Henry I I . Catholiques et huguenots a l a cour de Charles IX, 1560- 15o*2. Paris: Perrin, 1924. . La Conjuration d'Amboise. Paris: Perrin, 1923. . Les origines politiques des guerres de r e l i g i o n . 2v. P a r i s : Perrin, 1913-1914. Le royaume de Catherine de Medicis; La France a l a v e i l l e des guerres de r e l i g i o n . 2v. Paris: Perrin, 1922. 177 Ruble, Joseph Etienne Alphonse, baron de. Antoine de Bourbon et  Jeanne d'Albret, suite de le mariage de~Jeanne d'Albret"! 4v. Paris: Adolphe Labitte, 1881-1886. v. II-IV deal with the period from the death of Henry II to the death of Antoine de Bourbon; the extensive pieces  justif icatives in each volume are the most helpful aspect of this work e.g. for the influence of Phil ip II on the king of Navarre. . Jeanne d'Albret et la guerre c i v i l e . Paris: Libraires de l a bibliotheque nationale, 1897, ~* 1~. v. I deals with the period under study; again the documents are helpful for events in Guyenne. Sutherland, N. M. The French Secretaries of State in the Reign of  Catherine de Medici, v. X in University of London Historical  Studies. London: Athlone Press, 1962. Excellent account of the l ives of these important off icers. Van Dyke, Paul» Catherine de Medicis. 2v. London: Murray, 1923* Weber, Bernerd Clarke. "The Diplomatic Relations between France and Spain during the Reign of Charles IX (1560-157*+)." Un published Doctoral dissertation, University of Cal i fornia, Berkeley, 1935. Very useful source since relations with Spain were part icularly significant for royal government in Guyenne. Weil l , Georges. Les theories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de r e l i g i o n . P a r i s : Hachette, 1891. Zeller, Gaston. Aspects de l a politique frangaise sous l'ancien  regime. P a r i s ! P r e s s e s universitaires de France,1964. Collection of Zel ler's art ic les published in various journals between 1919 and i960; includes the art ic le on the governors of provinces. . Les institutions de la France au XVie siecle. Paris: . Presses universitaires de France, 1948. Excellent brief survey. 178 VII. PERIODICAL LITERATURE Armstrong, Edward. "The po l i t i ca l theory of the Huguenots," English Historical Review, IV (January, 1889),. 13-40. Baguenault de Puchesse. "La politique de Philippe II dans les affaires de France, 1559-1598," Revue des questions  historiques, XXV (January, 1879), 5-66. Dupont-Ferrier, Gustave. "Ignorances et distractions administr- atives en France aux XIVe et XVe siecles," Bibliotheque de  l 'ecole des chartes, C (1939), 145-156. Furgeot, Henri. "L'alienation des biens du clergl sous Charles IX," Revue des questions historiques, XXIX (Apri l , l88l), 428-490. Hamilton, Blanche. "Paris under the last Valois kings," English  Historical Review, I (Apri l , 1886), 260-276. Hartung, F . and Roland Mousnier. "Quelques problemes concernant l a monarchie absolue," Relazioni del X congresso internazionale  di scienze storiche, IV, Storia Moderna (Florence, 1955), 1-55. Hauser, Henri. "Antoine de Bourbon et l'Allemagne, 1560-1561," Revue historique, XLV (January-April, 1891), 54-61. . "De l'humanisme et de la rlforme en France, 1512-1552," Revue historique, LXIV (May-August, 1897), 258-297. . "The European Financial Cris is of 1559," Journal of Economic and Business History, II (February, 1930), 241-255. . "The French Reformation and the French People in the Sixteenth Century," American Historical Review, IV (January, 1899), 217-227. . "Sur 1•authenticite des Discours de La Noue," Revue historique, LIII (September-December, 1893), 301-311. Koenigsberger, H. G. "Review of N. M. Sutherland, The French  Secretaries of State in the Reign of Catherine de Medicis," English Historical Review, • LXXIX 11964), 114-116. La Ferriere-Percy, Hector de Masso, comte de. "Catherine de Medicis et les Politiques,", Revue des questions historiques, LVI (October, 1894), 404-439. 179 " L e t t r e s patentes de C h a r l e s IX pour l e paiement, au moyen d'un virement, des gages a r r i e r e s des vice-senechaux de Guyenne et des gardes de MM. de Burye et de Monluc," A r c h i v e s h i s t o r i q u e  du departement de l a Gironde, v. I l l (l86l), No. LXXX, 200-203» Major, James R u s s e l l . "The Crown and the A r i s t o c r a c y i n Renaissance F r a n c e , " American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LXIX:3 ( A p r i l , 1964), 630-646. "Payment of the Deputies to the French N a t i o n a l Assemblies, 1*4^4-1627," J o u r n a l of Modern H i s t o r y , XXVII (1955), 217-279. . "The T h i r d E s t a t e i n the E s t a t e s - G e n e r a l of P o n t o i s e , " Speculum, XXXIX (1954), 460-474. M e r c i e r , C h a r l e s . "Les t h e o r i e s p o l i t i q u e s des C a l v i n i s t e s en France au cours des guerres de r e l i g i o n , " B u l l e t i n de l a  s o c i e t e d e ' 1 1 h i s t o i r e du P r o t e s t a n t i s m e f r a n c a i s , LXXXIII ( A p r i l - J u n e , July-September, 1934), 225-260; 381-415. Pages, Georges. "La venalite" des o f f i c e s dans l'ancienne F r a n c e , " Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CLXIX (1932), 477-495. P a i l l a r d , C h a r l e s H i p p o l y t e . " A d d i t i o n s c r i t i q u e s a 1 ' h i s t o i r e de l a c o n j u r a t i o n d'Amboise," Revue h i s t o r i q u e , XIV (September- December, 1880), 61-108; 311-355. Contains a b s t r a c t s of the correspondence of Chantonnay, the S p a n i s h ambassador i n France, w i t h Marguerite of Parma. Perroy, Edouard. "Feudalism or P r i n c i p a l i t i e s i n F i f t e e n t h Century F r a n c e , " i n U n i v e r s i t y of London, B u l l e t i n of the I n s t i t u t e of  H i s t o r i c a l Research, XX:6l (1945), 181-185. Romier, Jean B a p t i s t e L u c i e n . "Les p r o t e s t a n t s f r a n c a i s e s a l a v e i l l e des guerres c i v i l e s , " Revue h i s t o r i q u e , CXXXIV (January- A p r i l , 1917), 1-51; 225-286. Van Dyke, P a u l . " F r a n c o i s de Guise and the t a k i n g of C a l a i s , " Annual Report of the American H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e  Year 1911, 1,(1913), 101-107. Weiss, N o e l . "La maison de L o r r a i n e et l a reforme en France au XVie s i e c l e , " B u l l e t i n de l a s o c i e t e de 1 ' h i s t o i r e du  P r o t e s t a n t i s m e f r a n c a i s , LVII (January-February, 1908), 316-180 Z e l l e r , Gaston. "L*administration monarchique avant les intendants, Parlements et Gouverneurs,'* Revue historique, CXCVII ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 8 0 - 2 1 5 . . "Gouverneurs des provinces au XVI e s i e c l e , " Revue historique, CLXXXV ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 2 2 5 - 2 5 6 . 

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