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Role of cavalry in the western theatre of the American Civil War from the Battle of Shilooh to the Tullahoma… Stuart, Reginald Charles 1968

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THE ROLE OF CAVALRY IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR FROM THE BATTLE OF SHILOH TO THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN by REGINALD CHARLES STUART B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1965 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of HISTORY We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA May, 1968 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . 1 f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract i Preface i v Introduction 1 I. Concepts of the Role of Cavalry by i860 11 I I . The Battle of Shiloh and the Advance on C o r i n t h x . 32 I I I . The Summer of 1862 and the Battles of Iuka and Corinth 61 IV. The Invasion of Kentucky 8"9 V. The Stone*s River Campaign 113 VI. C i v i l War Cavalry Raids: Winter I862-I863 . . . . 139 VII. Murfreesboro Interlude and the Tullahoma Campaign 165 Conclusions 194 Bibliography 200 Appendices 209 Maps 218 ABSTRACT Problem and Thesis! This t h e s i s concerns i t s e l f with the r o l e of cavalry as i t emerged i n western campaigns i n the American C i v i l War from A p r i l 1862 to June I863. The concepts of the r o l e of cavalry that existed p r i o r to the War, both i n Europe and the United States are surveyed. This, l i k e the h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l scrutiny of cavalry studies, sets up a frame of reference f o r the reader to avoid the impression that the s i t u a t i o n i n the American C i v i l War existed i n i s o l a t i o n . The main problem was to separate role from the t o p i c s of t a c t i c a l evolutions, s t y l e s of f i g h t i n g , the e f f e c t s of weaponry, the influence of t e r r a i n , and actual t a c t i c a l employ-ment i n b a t t l e . I t i s the author's contention that these more obvious points have r e a l l y only obscured the true nature of the r o l e of mounted troops i n the American C i v i l War. These problems are important, but e n t i r e l y separate from r o l e , or the duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of an arm of the service i n war. The r o l e s of the several arms have not a l t e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y although sophis t i c a t i o n has allowed greater refinement i n approach and greater e f f i c i e n c y i n execution. Thus i t i s the main argument of t h i s t h e s i s that the r o l e of cavalry remained much the same during the American C i v i l War i n spite of surface a l t e r a t i o n s i n approach and e f f i c i e n c y i n the waging of war. - i i -Approach; The Western Theatre was chosen as the area f o r study because i t has been r e l a t i v e l y neglected i n C i v i l War H i s t o r i -ography and i t was there that the genuinely decisive b a t t l e s were fought. The fate of the South was r e a l l y sealed i n the M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y and not i n the East i n the stalemate which was the general character of the war i n that theatre. The study s t a r t s at the Battle of Shiloh, which was the f i r s t r e a l t e s t of combat i n the West, and traces Braxton Bragg*s Invasion of Kentucky. The f a i l u r e of that and the Confederate repulse at Corinth assured eventual Federal control of the West. Once the campaigns had been selected, a f a m i l i a r i t y with the studies done on cavalry was undertaken and i t was immediately obvious that the problem of the role of mounted troops had never r e a l l y been undertaken. The bulk of the research f o r reconstructing the r o l e of cavalry i n the campaigns f e l l on the O f f i c i a l Records, the mainstay of any C i v i l War research. This was buttressed by other government sources, d i a r i e s , reminiscences, memoirs, l e t t e r s and relevant secondary material. The r o l e of the cavalry on both sides emerged f a i r l y c l e a r l y from t h i s research. I t had a dual character, on the one hand being a s h i e l d oriented to the protection of the army at large and on the other hand being a dagger aimed f o r l i g h t n i n g - l i k e thrusts at vulnerable points i n the enemy*s side. This analogy successfully explains the - i i i -r o l e of c a v a l r y t h a t emerged from the campaigns s t u d i e d . As a s h i e l d c a v a l r y was defensive, subordinate, and t a c t i c a l . The r o l e of c a v a l r y as a dagger was u s u a l l y secondary to tha t as a s h i e l d , but i t was nonetheless d i s t i n c t and r e a l . Then i t was o f f e n s i v e , independent, and o f t e n s t r a t e g i c a l . Conclusions; A r o l e f o r c a v a l r y had emerged from the c l a s s i c s t u d i e s of Baron De Jomini, based on a n a l y s i s of the Napoleonic Wars and w r i t t e n t h i r t y years before. The r o l e that emerged i n the study was remarkably l i k e t h a t suggested by Jomini, although J o m i n i f s i n f l u e n c e i s not the subject of t h i s i n q u i r y . I t seems, t h a t i n t h i s manner at l e a s t , the American C i v i l War, although i t e x h i b i t e d dramatic changes i n many ways, was i n others q u i t e orthodox. The war d i d not see a s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n i n the r o l e of c a v a l r y although i t saw s h i f t s i n emphasis and approach t o t h a t r o l e as w e l l as increased e f f i c i e n c y , i n many cases, i n i t s f u l f i l m e n t . PREFACE The r e l a t i o n s h i p of the three arms of the s e r v i c e — infantry, cavalry, a r t i l l e r y — h a v e constantly s h i f t e d with time as new weapons and new techniques of f i g h t i n g have been developed. This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s often obscure i n the American C i v i l War and there i s a necessity to c l a r i f y i t so as to be better able to understand how the nature of war was affected by the American c o n f l i c t . Thus each arm must be put into i t s proper perspective and none i s more i n need of t h i s than the cavalry. This paper attempts to o f f e r some suggestions about the role of cavalry i n the American C i v i l War by an examination of campaigns i n the M i s s i s s i p p i Valley from the Battle of Shiloh i n A p r i l 1862 to the Tullahoma Campaign i n June I 8 6 3 . The role of an arm i s i t s duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and should not be confused with t a c t i c s or style of f i g h t i n g . Interest i n the l a t t e r has eclipsed the nature of the former and this;study attempts to cast new l i g h t on the role of cavalry. - i v -INTRODUCTION The American C i v i l War i s one of the most i n t e r e s t i n g c o n f l i c t s of the nineteenth century, p a r t l y because i t r e f l e c t s a state of t r a n s i t i o n i n the a r t and science of war and p a r t l y because i t was the l a s t of the romantic and the f i r s t of the modern wars, having elements of both without being r e a l l y e i t h e r . Although i t s m i l i t a r y lessons were not always immed-i a t e l y apparent and even those who saw c l e a r l y were voices crying i n a wilderness f o r several years, i t was nevertheless important. Many m i l i t a r y men i n succeeding years turned to the C i v i l War campaigns f o r i n s p i r a t i o n and i n s t r u c t i o n and antecedents to many modern concepts of war, most notably those of trench warfare that so dominated World War I and mobile, l i g h t n i n g warfare which was such a dramatic feature of the early part of World War I I , are found t h e r e . 1 The war has received considerable attention by h i s t o r i a n s because of i t s profound e f f e c t on American society and i t i s almost a cl i c h e that i t now takes longer to read about than i t did to f i g h t . Certainly the voluminous publications, encompass-ing biographies, a r t i c l e s , monographs, and r e p r i n t s of primary material, are eloquent testimony to the i n t e r e s t that the c o n f l i c t has engendered. Not a l l of these are m i l i t a r y studies by any means but the martial aspects have come i n f o r more than t h e i r f a i r share of attention, i n s p i r i n g considerable research. At the present time t h i s i n t e r e s t seems to be increasing rather than abating and more and better material appears every year as new sources are uncovered and o l d ground i s reworked. - 2 -The armies as a whole have received considerable scrutiny i n o v e r a l l examinations of campaigns but t h i s attention has seldom developed into studies of infantry, cavalry, or a r t i l l e r y as i n d i v i d u a l branches of the service. The cavalry had been examined the most but much of t h i s has done i t an i n j u s t i c e rather than a service. Seldom has there been any attempt to put the mounted forces of the American C i v i l War into any s i g n i f i c a n t context. U n t i l recently, anyone interested i n cavalry had only a few sources of questionable q u a l i t y to depend on. These were p r i n c i p a l l y regimental h i s t o r i e s and several emotional biographies of prominent cavalry leaders. Cavalry i n the C i v i l War was somewhat maligned by i t s contemporaries, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s s i s t e r arm the i n f a n t r y . There were a number of popular epithets hurled at the troopers, usually v a r i a t i o n s of "whoever saw a dead cavalryman? 1 , 2 B e l l I r v i n Wiley, whose s o c i a l h i s t o r i e s of Union and Confederate sold i e r s have become standard works, believes that the cavalry-man^ status and demeanour were pri m a r i l y responsible f o r t h i s resentment but at the same time Wiley has found that there was a great deal of jealousy mixed i n with t h i s apparent contempt.3 Certainly, f o r the f i r s t two years of the war, the Federal cavalry (which has received most of the derision) was consider-ably outshadowed by i t s Confederate counterpart and tangible evidence of i t s usefulness was s l i g h t . Also, cavalrymen were not as well d i s c i p l i n e d and not as subject to close control and many had a habit of engaging i n wide ranging i n d i v i d u a l "foraging expeditions" that did not increase the popularity of the mounted troops. In spite of t h i s the mounted service had considerable appeal and both sides flocked to j o i n cavalry u n i t s i n large numbers at the beginning of the war.^ Recruits came i n such numbers that the North found i t impossible to handle them because of the s c a r c i t y of equipment and the expense of out-f i t t i n g troopers. Simeon Cameron, the Federal Secretary of War, wrote i n 1861: An item of very heavy expense i s the large mounted force which has been organized, equipped, and made a v a i l a b l e . . . which was not computed f o r i n the estimate. While an increase of cavalry was undoubtedly necessary, i t has reached a numerical strength more than adequate f o r the wants of the service. As i t can only be maintained at great cost, measures w i l l be taken f o r i t s gradual reduction.5 H i s t o r i c a l l y the cavalry had always been an e l i t e corps and t h i s p a r t l y accounts f o r i t s a t t r a c t i o n . I t had a cert a i n snob appeal as well as was suggested by an unknown cavalryman i n the B r i t i s h army during the Napoleonic Wars who i s reputed to have said that cavalrymen were included to give tone to what would otherwise be merely a vulgar brawl. The colour and glamour of the cavalry has been picked up by h i s t o r i a n s and t h i s e l i t i s t aspect has endured. Concentration on the cavalry's tone giving q u a l i t i e s , i t s dash, gallantry, and romantic aura has obscured i t s l e s s e x c i t i n g but more important significance as an instrument of war. Three types of h i s t o r i e s of cavalry are found. There are regimental h i s t o r i e s , popular h i s t o r i e s , and the serious studies. The l a s t of these categories is the only one that, 4 along with biographies which often, have aspects of a l l three, deserves earnest attention. The other two must be mentioned however, because they have i n large measure been responsible f o r the perpetuity of the demi-myths about cavalry. Regimental h i s t o r i e s of the C i v i l War are legion but most are si n g u l a r l y undistinguished and display rampant partisanship. Some of the l e s s one-sided do o f f e r information that i s of value, but great caution must be employed i n making use of them. George F. Price's h i s t o r y of the o l d Second Cavalry regiment i s useful because i t spans almost three decades a f t e r 1 8 5 5 and thus o f f e r s something of an overview of cavalry duties i n the period surrounding the C i v i l War.^ Theo. F. RodenboughTs his t o r y of the old Second Dragoons covers from I 8 3 6 to 1 8 7 5 and includes s i g n i f i c a n t material on the employment of cavalry i n the Mexican War.^ The regimental h i s t o r i e s are i n v a r i a b l y chronicles and o f f e r l i t t l e or no int e r p r e t a t i o n but they often include l e t t e r s , reports, reminiscences, and character sketches of prominent cavalry p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n t h e i r appendices that are of considerable value and they give a f a i r l y c l e a r picture of the s o c i a l h i s t o r y of cavalry regiments as well as the more m i l i t a r y aspects. In addition, they often make e x c i t i n g reading and explain c l e a r l y why the dash and colour of the cavalry has survived so v i v i d l y . The popular h i s t o r i e s generally lack scholarly merit but some of the more responsible are a useful guide and often have s i g n i f i c a n t bibliographies although they usually lack footnotes. - '5 -John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace wrote one of these and they b e l i e v e t h a t c a v a l r y i n the t r a d i t i o n a l s t y l e never e x i s t e d i n the United States p r i o r to the C i v i l War and t h a t the mounted s o l d i e r s on both s i d e s very q u i c k l y became l i t t l e more than mounted i n f a n t r y as the c o n f l i c t progressed. James M. M e r r i l l wrote a r e c e n t l y published work t h a t i s of s i m i l a r q u a l i t y and o comes t o s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s . Both works concentrate h e a v i l y on the more prominent p e r s o n a l i t i e s and the more c o l o u r f u l f e a t u r e s of c a v a l r y s e r v i c e i n t h e i r chapters on the C i v i l War. George T. Denison was a m i l i t i a o f f i c e r i n Canada i n the 1860 fs and was f a s c i n a t e d i n the c a v a l r y s e r v i c e . H i s f a s c i n a t i o n was toned by i n s i g h t i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of c a v a l r y i n war and c a r e f u l o b s e r v a t i o n . He emerged as the f i r s t prominent exponent of the mounted i n f a n t r y theory of c a v a l r y t h a t gained considerable p o p u l a r i t y i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth century. He pub l i s h e d two books expounding h i s views, the f i r s t of these appearing i n 1868 and r e c e i v i n g very l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n . His second book on c a v a l r y was w r i t t e n i n response t o a p r i z e t h a t was o f f e r e d by the Czar of Russia and was a comprehensive h i s t o r y which asserted t h a t the mounted i n f a n t r y approach t o the employment of c a v a l r y was the climax t o c e n t u r i e s of e v o l u t i o n i n the use of the mounted arm. 1^ A l b e r t G. Br a c k e t t was a r e g u l a r and vo l u n t e e r c a v a l r y o f f i c e r both before and during the C i v i l War i n the united S t a t e s and he wrote a h i s t o r y of h i s s e r v i c e up t o I863. Although h i s work d i s p l a y s many of the v i c e s of the regimental - 6 -h i s t o r y , Brackett was at the same time a c a r e f u l observer and h i s i n t e r e s t i n cavalry i n general of ten transcends h i s more par t i san approach and makes h i s work worthy of a t t e n t i o n . I f Although Denison's study q u a l i f i e s as the f i r s t serious h i s t o r y of cavalry that included the C i v i l War, the more s c h o l a r l y e f f o r t s waited u n t i l the twentieth century to make t h e i r appearance. Alonzo Gray wrote a h i s t o r y of cavalry i n the American C i v i l War i n 1910 that was r e a l l y only a ca tagor iza t ion of the many d i f f e r e n t kinds of service that cavalry had seen. He was a cavalry o f f i c e r himself and l i k e so many i n t e r e s t e d observers and m i l i t a r y w r i t e r s i n the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth century, was concerned p r i m a r i l y with d e r i v i n g lessons that could be a p p l i e d f o r the future use of c a v a l r y . He demonstrated c l e a r l y that there was v i r t u a l l y no m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y i n which the cavalry d i d not engage i n the C i v i l War. I t d i d everything from scout and c o u r i e r duty to digging and defending t renches . Gray s u c c e s s f u l l y demonstrated the ubiquitous character of cavalry i n w a r . ^ 2 The next s c h o l a r l y study of cavalry was i n 1951 when Thomas T h e i l e inves t iga ted the organizat ion and evolut ion of mounted troops i n both theatres of the war from l £ 6 l to I863. He concluded that the cavalry was l e s s steady and r e l i a b l e than the other two arms and that i t developed more slowly as w e l l . He found that t a c t i c a l employment was f a i r l y f l e x i b l e and depended l a r g e l y on the s i t u a t i o n at hand but cautioned that the cavalry did not deserve to be dismissed as mounted infantry merely because i t displayed a penchant f o r f i g h t i n g on foot.^3 The most recent study of C i v i l War cavalry was by Stephen B. Gates who concentrated on the tra n s - M i s s i s s i p p i area. The major Confederate war e f f o r t there was four large raids and Oates focusses on these concluding that they were useful but not de c i s i v e . His most i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g i s that he believes cavalry was moving from a t a c t i c a l to a strategic r o l e and that the raids were a s i g n i f i c a n t step i n the d i r e c t i o n of the l a t t e r . l l + In addition to the monographs s p e c i f i c a l l y devoted to cavalry during the American C i v i l War there are a number of a r t i c l e s and biographies dealing with one or more aspects of the service. 1-* Most of these studies concern themselves with s p e c i f i c engagements or pe r s o n a l i t i e s and concentrate on leader-ship, weapons, organization, and t a c t i c a l employment. Few touch on r o l e i n much more than passing and even Denison, who stressed mounted infa n t r y so heavily, was r e a l l y t a l k i n g about the way i n which cavalry went about f u l f i l l i n g i t s r o l e . Most h i s t o r i a n s have tended to confuse the terms " r o l e " and " t a c t i c a l employment". The r o l e of cavalry i s important because i t , along with the t a c t i c a l employment of that arm, was i n a state of f l u x during the C i v i l War and i t i s important to see i f i t was affected by the changed conditions that saw an a l t e r a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l approaches i n so many other ways. Cavalry was involved i n v i r t u a l l y every s i g n i f i c a n t b a t t l e and most of the thousands of smaller a f f a i r s and skirmishes that occurred between major combats. A scrutiny of the t h e o r e t i c a l concepts of the use of cavalry and the r o l e that emerged i n the s p e c i f i c campaigns to be studied can o f f e r suggestions as to the nature of the American concept and i f i t d i f f e r e d i n practise from theory. I t i s tempting to associate influences of thought, both that of Europe on the United States, and i n general to s p e c i f i c practises i n the f i e l d but t h i s i s dangerous and could only be tenuously ascertained at b e s t . 1 ^ The r o l e of cavalry i n the f i e l d can be reconstructed however and t h i s may o f f e r some suggestions that w i l l e i t h e r confirm or d i s p e l many of the controversies that have centred around that most glamourous of the arms of the service. Footnotes f o r I n t r o d u c t i o n ; ^See Jay Luvaas, The M i l i t a r y Legacy of the C i v i l War! The  European I n h e r i t a n c e (Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1959) f o r an e x c e l l e n t d i s c u s s i o n of contemporary European observers and m i l i t a r y w r i t e r s i n the years immediately succeeding the C i v i l War. Luvaas found t h a t many of the important l e s s o n s of the c o n f l i c t were overlooked by Europeans who saw l i t t l e relevance i n them to t h e i r own sphere of a c t i v i t y . ^ T his phrase has been c r e d i t e d t o a number of authors. For a d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s a n t i p a t h y In F e d e r a l armies see Bruce Catton, Glorv Road (New York: Pocket C a r d i n a l E d i t i o n , I964), PP* 77-78. (Glorv Road f i r s t p u b l ished 1952) 3 B e l l I r v i n W iley, The L i f e of B i l l y Yank (New York: The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company Inc., 1952), p. 326. B e l l I r v i n Wiley, The L i f e of Johnny Reb (New York: The B o b b s - M e r r i l l Company Inc., 1943), pp. 340-341. % i l e y , L i f e of B i l l y Yank, p. 327. Wiley, L i f e of Johnny  Reb. p. 342. David Donald, "The Confederate as a F i g h t i n g Man," J o u r n a l of Southern H i s t o r y (1959), p. 178. (Hereafter c i t e d as J.S.H.) The Federal government was r e l u c t a n t t o take mounted u n i t s a t f i r s t but succumbed to pressures from the s t a t e s u n t i l c osts and s c a r c i t y of equipment f o r c e d r e v i s i o n o f p o l i c y . See U.S. War Department, War of the R e b e l l i o n : O f f i c i a l Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1880-1901), S e r i e s I I I , Volume I , 228, 377, 394, 499, 512, 529, 543. For evidence of clamping down see i b i d . . 5&0, 599, 6O5, 622, 657. I n a l l 227 regiments of c a v a l r y found t h e i r way i n t o F e deral s e r v i c e and s e v e r a l regiments of mounted i n f a n t r y and independent companies and b a t t a l i o n s as w e l l . A l b e r t G. B r a c k e t t , H i s t o r y of the United States Cavalry from  the Formation of the Federal Government to the 1st : of June. 1863 (New York: Argonaut Pr e s s , 1965), Appendix. ( F i r s t p u b lished I865) (Note: a l l subsequent c i t a t i o n s of the O f f i c i a l Records w i l l - b e O.R. and appropriate s e r i e s , volume, and page numbers.) 5Q«R.. S e r i e s I I I , Volume I , 700. The r a t i o o f c a v a l r y to i n f a n t r y was l a t e r f i x e d at 1:9* I b i d . . 921. ^George F. P r i c e , Across the Continent w i t h the F i f t h  Gavalrv (New York: The A n t i q u a r i a n Press L t d . , 1959). [ F i r s t p u b l i s h e d 1883) - 10 -7 'Theo. F. Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canon w i t h the  Second Dragoons. 1836-1875 (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1875). 8John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Storv of the U.S. Cavalry 1775-1942 (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1953)> p. 8 9 . H e r r was the l a s t c h i e f of c a v a l r y i n the United States army when there were s t i l l horses and i t i s t h e r e f o r e under-standable when he i s r a t h e r n o s t a l g i c at times. ^James M. M e r r i l l , Sours to Glory (New York: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 134. M e r r i l l ' s t i t l e i n d i c a t e s h i s general approach. 1 0 L u v a a s , The M i l i t a r y Legacy, p. 113. " ^ B r a c k e t t , H i s t o r y of U.S. Cavalry. 12 Alonzo Gray. Cavalry T a c t i c s as I l l u s t r a t e d by the War of  the R e b e l l i o n ( F o r t Leavenworth: U.S. Cavalry A s s o c i a t i o n , 1910), p t . I . Gray's work i s based almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the O.R. and h i s i n t e r e s t i s p r i m a r i l y t a c t i c a l . -^Thomas T h i e l e , "The E v o l u t i o n of Cavalry i n the American C i v i l War: 1861-1863", Unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n , Dept. of H i s t o r y , U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan, 1951, p. 545. "^Stephen B. Oates, Confederate Cavalry West of the R i v e r ( A u s t i n : U n i v e r s i t y of Texas Press, 1961), p. 154* 1 5 The many biographies and a r t i c l e s w i l l not be discussed i n d e t a i l . Most of those r e l e v a n t are c i t e d i n footnotes and a l l w i l l be i n c l u d e d i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y . Some a r t i c l e s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t are J.P. Dyer, "Some Aspects of Cavalry Operations i n the Army of Tennessee", J.S.H. (1942) and Stephen Z. S t a r r , "Cold S t e e l : The Sabre and the Union Cavalry," C i v i l War H i s t o r y (I966). ( C i v i l War H i s t o r y subsequently c i t e d as C.W.H.) Comparisons of t h i s nature are o f t e n d i f f i c u l t because s p e c i f i c r e ferences are few and except i n very broad terms i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know which sources would have been read. C e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t i e s between ideas do stand out c l e a r l y however, but again, where the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these i s h i g h l y probable, i t cannot be e a s i l y proven. This r e c e i v e s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n i n Chapter 1. CHAPTER I CONCEPTS OF THE ROLE OF CAVALRY BY i860 In Europe cavalry had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been divided according to function. Although horsemen were l a b e l l e d as cavalry and dragoons, the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two types of mounted troops had l a r g e l y disappeared. O r i g i n a l l y , dragoons had been a type of mounted infantry that were to be adapted either f o r mounted or dismounted service, but i n the Crimean War i t had been seen that the r e a l d i v i s i o n i n the regiments of horse was between l i g h t and heavy dragoons and cavalry. Generally, the l i g h t horse was armed with p i s t o l s , l i g h t sabres, lances or carbines, and mounted on l i g h t horses. I t s duties were primarily outpost and reconnaissance p a t r o l l i n g with occasional courier and escort duty. The heavy cavalry was the f o c a l point of i n t e r e s t and more attention was devoted to i t i n t r e a t i s e s on war than the l i g h t cavalry. I t was armed with a heavy sabre and a p i s t o l and often protected by defensive armour (by t h i s time usually only a breastplate and helmet) and mounted on heavier horses. I t s primary duty was to hold i t s e l f ready on the f i e l d of b a t t l e to be hurled against the enemy ranks at the appropriate moment to smash the opposition and c l i n c h the v i c t o r y by i t s sheer weight and power. I t s only defense was i n the attack and "shock action", as i t was termed, was considered the ultimate weapon of cavalry f o r most of the nineteenth century. 1 - 1 1 -- 12-The two most important t h e o r i s t s on the art of war before i860 were the Baron Henri De Jomini and General C a r l Von Clausewitz. In general, Jomini emphasized the necessity f o r manoeuver and secure bases and stressed the enemy l i n e s of communication as e s s e n t i a l targets. He saw a primary d i f f e r -entation between l i g h t and heavy cavalry, each having specialized functions. Although cavalry was only an a u x i l i a r y force he believed i t important, and wrote: "An army d e f i c i e n t i n cavalry r a r e l y obtains a great v i c t o r y , and f i n d s i t s retreats exceed-ingly d i f f i c u l t . " 2 The cavalry was p a r t i a l l y an arm of movement and i t s chief duty was to open the way f o r or complete a v i c t o r y so i t was clear i n Jomini*s mind that shock action was i t s p r i n c i p a l weapon. I t was also to be used i n guarding flanks, covering retreats, and harassing a r e t r e a t i n g enemy. As well as i t s combat duties, the cavalry was expected to mount outposts, escorts, o r d e r l i e s , and guards f o r convoys. Jomini had very l i t t l e to say about f i r e action and did not recommend i t as a general r u l e but believed that i t could be used i n certain circumstances. Whenever i t was employed i n combat, cavalry had to have supports close at hand f o r Jomini did not believe that i t could sustain i t s e l f otherwise.3 Although he stressed heavy cavalry, Jomini had s i g n i f -icant thoughts about l i g h t or i r r e g u l a r horse as w e l l . He i d e n t i f i e d mounted infantry with dragoons and believed that i f they were well trained and well l e d they could be p r o f i t a b l y employed, but again, only under certain circumstances. He - 1 3 -stressed the necessity f o r mounted commanders to have dash and elan and believed morale a very important f a c t o r . Although cavalry was c l e a r l y a subordinate arm, Jomini did not underrate i t s significance and wrote: Whatjever system of organization be adopted, i t i s certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or i r r e g u l a r , must have a great influence i n giving a turn to the events of war. I t may excite a f e e l i n g of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy*s country, i t can carry o f f h i s convoys, i t can e n c i r c l e h i s army and make h i s commun-ica t i o n s very perilous and destroy the ensemble of h i s operations.^ Cl e a r l y , Jomini saw a balance necessary i n the r o l e of mounted troops. The f o c a l point was s t i l l the charge but t h e i r duties and r o l e extended beyond that.-* There i s also an implic-ation of f i n d i n g a strategic r o l e f o r cavalry as well as the t a c t i c a l one of the b a t t l e f i e l d charge. Thus the cavalry had a dual r o l e , and i t could be an offensive force i n a l a r g e r sense than a mere t a c t i c a l one, as well as being defensive by mounting escorts, guards, and p a t r o l s . Clausewitz i s considered the major writer on the a r t of war i n the nineteenth century. Although he was not widely known i n the United States at the time of the C i v i l War he had been read, and h i s l a t e r influence was considerable. His discussions of cavalry were not as d e t a i l e d as Jomini fs but he had d e f i n i t e views on the r o l e of that arm. Infantry was the primary body and cavalry and a r t i l l e r y were subordinate and although he Relieved that a balance needed to be struck between the two subordinate arms he thought cavalry the most e a s i l y dispensed with. I t was the arm of mobility however, and great sweeping - 14-manoeuvers were implied i f the war was fought i n open country.^ Shock action was cavalry*s p r i n c i p a l weapon i n b a t t l e and the horsemen had to be shielded from enemy f i r e u n t i l the moment fo r the charge. I t was also to be used i n covering r e t r e a t s 7 and to head purusing forces.' Ciausewitz made an i n t e r e s t i n g comment on the r e l a t i o n s h i p of firepower to cavalry and d i s -played a lack of foresight at the same time. He wrote: "...cavalry has always decreased i n importance according as improvements i n the use of firearms have advanced." 0 The p o s s i b i l i t i e s that columns of horsemen could have considerable power by the use of firearms i n place of the sabre and lance, i n combination with t h e i r mobility was overlooked. Ciausewitz* concept of the r o l e of cavalry was s i m i l a r to Jomini*s. He did not d e t a i l that r o l e as much as h i s colleague but i t s p r i n c i p a l focus was as a t a c t i c a l arm on the f i e l d of b a t t l e — s h o c k a c t i o n — w i t h strategic overtones that were more muted than Jomini*s had been, but nonetheless d i s t i n c t . In addition, the cavalry was of secondary and subordinate importance alongside the i n f a n t r y . In the United States p r i o r to the C i v i l War the two most prominent indigenous writers on m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s were a H. Wager Halleck and Dennis Hart Mahan. Halleck*s book was a general t r e a t i s e on war and Mahan*s was much more s p e c i f i c , being a manual f o r detachment and outpost service. Both devoted considerable attention to the role of cavalry however, and t h e i r thoughts on the employment of that arm emerge d i s t i n c t l y . -15 -Halleck divided cavalry into l i g h t and heavy horse, the former f o r r a p i d i t y of movement and the l a t t e r "to appear on the f i e l d of b a t t l e and make the decisive charges". 1 0 Generally, cavalry was to form advanced, flanking, and rear guards f o r an army on the march and could be used either to cover a r e t r e a t i n g army or to head a pursuit. Halleck devoted considerable attention to the r o l e of cavalry i n combat and indicated that he believed i t was s t i l l a shock weapon. In b a t t l e formation, Halleck recommended f l e x i b i l i t y and pointed out that there were always a number of mitigating f a c t o r s such as the numbers and d i s p o s i t i o n s of the enemy, the nature of the ground, the quality of the troops used, and so f o r t h . < The cavalry, generally speaking, should "be formed i n echelon on the r i g h t and l e f t , and a l i t t l e i n rear of the main body, i n order to protect the flanks from the attack of the enemy*s h o r s e . " 1 1 In combat, troops of the l i n e were used and immediate supports were always to be close at hand. Cle a r l y , Halleck was t a l k i n g about heavy c a v a l r y . 1 ^ , Halleck was f a i r l y t r a d i t i o n a l i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r o l e of cavalry. He had very l i t t l e to say about outpost, reconnaissance, or escort duty but perhaps he believed those duties were automatically done by l i g h t cavalry and did not require discussion. C l e a r l y though, the sabre was the weapon and the charge the action. Halleck implied even l e s s than Clausewitz a strategic r o l e f o r cavalry and i t was a subordinate and t a c t i c a l arm f o r the most part. - 1 6 -Maha^s l i t t l e book was concerned with a l l types of detachment service. This could be performed by troops of a l l arms but the cavalry was an i n t e g r a l part of almost any operation. In combat, MahanTs view of the role of cavalry mirrored H a l l e c ^ s . The horsemen were to watch the flanks and he wrote: The cavalry must be i n readiness...to act promptly, ei t h e r against any attempt upon the flanks of the infantry, or to p r o f i t by any f a u l t s , or disorder of the enemy.... In a l l movements of the infantry, e i t h e r i n advancing or r e t i r i n g , the cavalry should be at hand to cover i t from a sudden attack.^3 The decisive action f o r cavalry was s t i l l the charge and supports had to be close at hand to sustain such action but u n t i l the moment f o r use i t was to be held i n readiness, masked from enemy f i r e . Only when cavalry was on outpost duty or on exceedingly unfavourable ground was i t to depend on f i r e action. Mahan tended to divide the mounted role between l i g h t and heavy cavalry. Light cavalry received a l l the detached service and could be c a l l e d upon to form armed reconnaissances or part of reconnaissances i n force. I t could escort i t s own convoys and mount r a i d i n g expeditions on enemy convoys.^5 Mahan believed dragoons should only be used i n mountainous country and h i s views on t h e i r role were quite c l e a r : The dragoon, when f i r s t i n s t i t u t e d to combine the functions of both the foot s o l d i e r and the c a v a l i e r , was found...to have the q u a l i t i e s of neither i n a very serviceable degree. He s t i l l r e t a i n s h i s musquetoons, and on outpost duty, and skirmishing i n broken ground, does a soldier's duty with t h i s weapon.^5 - 17-He went on to further describe very e x p l i c i t l y h i s views on the general role of cavalry: In a l l states where the m i l i t a r y art i s j u s t l y appreciated, the cavalry arm i s placed i n second rank to the i n f a n t r y . To i t an army i s often indebted f o r turning the scales of v i c t o r y , and giving a decisive character to the issue. To i t , the infantry, when exhausted by fatigue, or broken, often owes i t s safety, and through the respite gained by i t s charges, f i n d s time to breathe and reform. Without i t , much of the advanced-post duty, patroles, and detachment service requiring great c e l e r i t y would be but badly performed. But the arm of cavalry by i t s e l f can a f f o r d but l i t t l e ; and i n many circumstances, does not even s u f f i c e f o r i t s own safety. The smallest obstacles are s u f f i c i e n t to render i t powerless; i t can neither attack nor hold a post without the a i d of infantry; and at night i s alarmed... at every phantom.^7 The C i v i l War would modify Mahan*s dictums but i n the times he was writing, he was quite correct. Mahan constantly urged f l e x i b i l i t y i n the minds of commanders but at the same time i t seems that the cavalry and the d i v i s i o n of i t s functions was f a i r l y r i g i d . Cavalry was c l e a r l y divided into l i g h t and heavy horse and the t r a d i t i o n a l functions outlined by Jomini were apportioned accordingly. The heavy cavalry's r o l e was to hover on the edge of the b a t t l e waiting f o r the opportunity to charge, cover a r e t r e a t , or to pursue. The l i g h t cavalry's role was equally c l e a r and i t s duties were to secure the flanks, escort convoys, supply o r d e r l i e s , man outposts, make up the whole or part of recon-naissances, and i n general a s s i s t i n protecting the army at large. 1°" - 18-, A continuity of thought on the role of cavalry was v i s i b l e i n Halleck's and Mahan*s works and both bore a great s i m i l a r i t y to Jomini, and even parts of Ciausewitz. The r o l e s of l i g h t and heavy cavalry were d i s t i n c t and consistent threads as were the views on the role of dragoons. Curiously enough, Jomini had outlined an implied strategic r o l e f o r cavalry, either regular or i r r e g u l a r , that had found few and f a i n t echoes i n the l a t e r writings. The other writers had seen the cavalry's role as an almost exclusively t a c t i c a l one and l a r g e l y defensive except f o r b r i e f moments such as a charge on the b a t t l e f i e l d or an attack on enemy convoys. I t generally seemed to be oriented to the security of the army at large and was c l e a r l y subordinate as w e l l . American m i l i t a r y experience i n the f i e l d was f a i r l y s l i g h t p r i o r to the C i v i l War. The War of 1812 was a f a s t dimming memory and there the r o l e of mounted troops had been extremely l i m i t e d . There had been some experience i n small troop and garrison duty i n action against the Indians. Here however, uni t s seldom la r g e r than a b a t t a l i o n were employed and usually only companies formed the majority of f i g h t i n g p a t r o l s . The Mexican War offered some experience i n the use of the three arms i n battle and the Mormon War of I857-I858 was more of a long and g r u e l l i n g march than a war of combat. The Mexican War was the most important of these and i t was where a number of the o f f i c e r s who were to become prominent from 1861-I865 f i r s t made t h e i r appearance. Other than i n - 1 9 -t h i s war, the r o l e of mounted troops was l a r g e l y t h a t of a 19 m i l i t a r y p o l i c e f o r c e t h a t fought p r i n c i p a l l y as dragoons. 7 The country i n which the Mexican War was fought was i d e a l c a v a l r y t e r r i t o r y i n some ways although i t was rough i n spots and a l s o quite dry. The mounted troops nonetheless took l i t t l e p a r t i n the combats, and t h e i r a c t i v i t y was confined mainly t o scouting and e s c o r t i n g w i t h a few minor t a c t i c a l engagements i n v o l v i n g small numbers of t r o o p s . The c a v a l r y attached t o Zachary T a y l o r ' s army c o n s i s t e d of r e g u l a r dragoons and mounted r i f l e s , some Texas Rangers, and some vo l u n t e e r u n i t s . I t c o n s i s t e n t l y d i d very l i t t l e . A group of r e g u l a r dragoons on a reconnaissance had the dubious honour of shedding the American blood on American s o i l t h a t Of) was the excuse f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n of war. In the f i g h t i n g at Palo A l t o the dragoons were on the r i g h t f l a n k guarding a wagon t r a i n . T h e i r only t a s t e of combat was t o come b r i e f l y under s h e l l - f i r e . The Mexican c a v a l r y made a charge but i t was repulsed by American i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y f i r e . The a c t i v i t y of the mounted troops at the B a t t l e of Resaca de l a Palma was s i m i l a r . A small troop charged an enemy b a t t e r y and although i t overran the guns i t was not supported and withdrew i n the face of a counter-attack. The Mexican c a v a l r y seems to have feared American a r t i l l e r y as T a y l o r i n d i c a t e d i n a r e p o r t : ...the a r t i l l e r y and dragoons encountered a body of l a n c e r s about f i f t e e n hundred strong, drawn up i n a l i n e across t h e i r path, w i t h lances at r e s t ready f o r a charge. Ridgeley and Duncan...came i n t o b a t t e r y , a c t i o n f r o n t ; but the s i g h t of the dread a r t i l l e r y was too much f o r the Mexican nerve.22 - 20 -Other than t h e i r s l i g h t charge, t h i s was as close as the American c a v a l r y got t o combat. Just before Taylor reached Monterey, a regiment of Texas Volunteer Cavalry, f i g h t i n g on f o o t and h e a v i l y supported by i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y , r epulsed an a t t a c k of enemy horsemen. 2 3 This was f a r from a c a v a l r y combat however. At the B a t t l e of Buena V i s t a the opposing c a v a l r y f o r c e s d i d l i t t l e more than glower at each other. The Mexican c a v a l r y gave T a y l o r a b i t of t r o u b l e but i t seems t h a t t h i s was more a f e a r of what might happen because of the numbers of the enemy horse than because of any combat. T a y l o r q u i t a camp and chose a new s i t e where "the f e a t u r e s of the ground were such as t o n e a r l y paralyze the a r t i l l e r y and c a v a l r y of the enemy...."24 Thus the r o l e of mounted troops i n T a y l o r * s t h e a t r e was d i s t i n c t l y secondary, so much so i n f a c t , t h a t i t was almost embarrassing. When c a v a l r y had been employed i t had i n v a r i a b l y been i n a minor t a c t i c a l manner. General W i n f i e l d S c o t t ' s column t h a t marched from Vera Cruz t o Mexico C i t y had few mounted troops accompanying i t . P a r t of the Second Dragoons was landed but had so few horses t h a t only about one company could be mounted. The d i s -mounted men served as i n f a n t r y and those on horseback scouted and watched the Mexican g u e r r i l l a s . 2 - * Heavy bodies of enemy cav a l r y o f t e n appeared duri n g S c o t t * s march but only r a r e l y d i d they a t t a c k the American d i v i s i o n s and then they were i n v a r i a b l y r e p u l s e d . At Mexico C i t y , some American dragoons made a g a l l a n t but i n s i g n i f i c a n t charge and engaged i n a few - 21 -minor skirmishes. Thus again, the r o l e of mounted troops was minor and d i s t i n c t l y t a c t i c a l . The t h i r d theatre of the war was i n the f a r west where the main American columns were composed p r i n c i p a l l y of mounted troops. These men saw l i t t l e actual combat but t h e i r marches stand out as monuments of endurance i n d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s . 2 ^ The r o l e of mounted troops i n the Mexican War was quite minor on both sides. I t was c l e a r l y t a c t i c a l and defensive f o r the most part, with a few small charges that were s i g n i f i c a n t only to those that took part i n them. The main duties were scouting, escorting, and guarding. Cavalry fs r o l e generally conformed to that envisioned f o r l i g h t horsemen by the t h e o r i s t s . I t i s true that there were troops l a b e l l e d "dragoons™ and "mounted r i f l e s " but t h i s seems to have been only a semantic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . The r o l e of both types of forces was s i m i l a r and t i t l e s should not confuse that point. There were no o f f i c i a l cavalry regiments u n t i l a f t e r 1855 and by 1861 a l l three types of mounted s o l d i e r s were remarkably s i m i l a r . Albert Brackett believes that the d i f f e r -ences were i n name and armament only and that a l l three were actually l i g h t cavalry i n the European sense. 2? One rather amusing point that Brackett noted was that the sabres of the mounted troops were almost never sharp. A d u l l sabre i s useful only as a club and i t i s curious what was i n the minds of cavalrymen who did not sharpen them.2** - 22 -Views on the role of cavalry had emerged f a i r l y c l e a r l y i n theory by i860 and further thoughts were found i n more s p e c i f i c and probably more widely c i r c u l a t e d sources than Jomini, Halleck, or Mahan. There were two important t a c t i c a l manuals (which would now be c a l l e d d r i l l manuals) and the regulations f o r both Union and Confederate armies. The Confederate regulations were copied almost d i r e c t l y from the old regular army manual of 1857 so i t i s not surprising that both North and South expressed similar views f o r the r o l e of cavalry i n these sources. Captain George B. McClellan was sent to the Crimea i n 1855 and on h i s return wrote a report encompassing h i s obser-vations with recommendations f o r American cavalry. Most of h i s book was a procedural manual f o r outpost and p a t r o l duty but i n several places he gave a clear i n d i c a t i o n of h i s views on the ro l e of cavalry as d i s t i n c t from d r i l l . In general, he recom-mended that American cavalry be organized as l i g h t horse and armed as dragoons. He believed that t h i s would meet a l l the requirements l i k e l y to ari s e i n the North American context. 2^ The s p e c i f i c duties of the cavalry were to be escorting general o f f i c e r s and convoys, protecting forage d e t a i l s , and providing advance, flank, and rear guards f o r an army on the march. When an army was i n camp the cavalry was to provide outposts and protective p a t r o l s . In addition to these purely defensive functions i t had the t a c t i c a l l y offensive role of mounting reconnaissances, forming pursuit forces, and sending out parties - 23 -to r a i d enemy convoys, forage parties, and outposts.3° McClellan did not emphasize shock action and t h i s i s under-standable because at the outset he stipulated that American horsemen should be l i g h t cavalry and concerned primarily with the defensive functions of outposts and p a t r o l s . He seemed, i n e f f e c t , to be repudiating the concepts of heavy cavalry and shock action. He was probably influenced by h i s observations of the Crimean War as i n that c o n f l i c t the only times shock action had been employed i t was noticeably unsuccessful.^ 1 M c C l e l l a n d view of the role of cavalry was that i t was defensive and t a c t i c a l , oriented to the security of the rest of the army. The second major t a c t i c a l manual that emerged at t h i s time on cavalry was by P h i l i p St. George Cooke, an o f f i c e r who had seen mounted service both on the f r o n t i e r and i n the Mexican War. He acknowledged that he owed many of h i s ideas to McClellan but he displayed a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t approach.^ 2 Cooke, l i k e McClellan, devoted much space to procedure and d r i l l , but he e s p e c i a l l y stressed sabre practise and mentioned f i r e action by mounted troops only i n skirmishing: The objects of employing skirmishers are, to cover movements and evolution, to gain time, to watch the movements of the enemy, to keep him i n check, to prevent his approaching so close to the main body as to annoy the l i n e s of march, and to weaken and harass him by t h e i r f i r e ; to prepare the way f o r the charge on infantry, by rendering them unsteady or drawing t h e i r f i r e . 3 3 Shock action was the p r i n c i p a l weapon of cavalry however, and Cooke waxed enthusiastic about the charge: - 2k -To charge i s the decisive action of cavalry. Cavalry* l i k e each of the three great arms, dependent on the others, the ba t t l e once begun awaits t h e i r a c t i o n . I t s opportunities pass i n moments. I t s successful commander must have a cavalry eve and rapid decision; once launched, i t s bravery i s s u c c e s s f u l . ^ Cooke went on to discuss various formations f o r charging, which depended on the force opposed, the type of dispositions the enemy had made, and the nature of the ground. Cooke's mind was f i x e d i n one way however, and the charge was s t i l l cavalry's decisive purpose.35 Thus cavalry f o r Cooke was heavy cavalry and l i g h t cavalry functions were given short s h r i f t . Although Cooke was opposed to McClellan i n many, ways, the r o l e of cavalry was s t i l l t a c t i c a l and subordinate. This, i n addition to the general contention that cavalry could not sustain i t s e l f i n combat, was a consistent thread i n spite of the surface confusion over the approach to the r o l e of the mounted troops. The two approaches to the ro l e of cavalry were i n c o n f l i c t before the C i v i l War and continued f o r most of the nineteenth century. I t i s clear however, that cavalrymen s t i l l thought i n terms of "light™ and "heavy" even though t h e i r experience had indicated a l l mounted troops performed e s s e n t i a l l y the same duties. On the f r o n t i e r a f t e r 1855 i t was d i f f i c u l t to dist i n g u i s h the cavalry from the dragoons and i f there had been the d i f f e r e n t troops i n the Mexican War i t i s u n l i k e l y that they would have behaved very d i f f e r e n t l y . Cavalry i n battle was c l e a r l y a subordinate arm, t a c t i c a l , and i n many ways - 25 -defensive, devoted to the security of the rest of the army. I t s offensive functions were li m i t e d , including the charge on the f i e l d of b a t t l e , and patrols against enemy outposts and pat r o l s . I t must be remembered that most of t h i s was theoret-i c a l however, and American experience with mounted troops under the conditions of war that would exi s t a f t e r 1961 had been s l i g h t . The army regulations only confirm the general tendencies that have been outlined above. There was s t i l l a d i f f e r e n t a t i o n between l i g h t and heavy cavalry, the former performing a l l duty out of the " l i n e " and the l a t t e r holding i t s e l f ready f o r the charge.3° This was c l e a r l y the kind of d i v i s i o n of function that Jomini had talked about and that had been stressed i n di f f e r e n t ways, but never uniformly, by the American wr i t e r s . The regulations also had a section dealing with partisans and although the Federals paid l i t t l e attention to t h i s the Confederacy r e l i e d on partisans and g u e r i l l a s heavily, often to the discomfort of t h e i r enemies. The description of partisan duty sounded very much l i k e the general r o l e that Jomini had set f o r t h f o r cavalry: The purpose of these i s o l a t e d corps i s to reconnoitre at a distance on the flanks of the army, to protect i t s operations, to deceive the enemy, to interrupt h i s com-munications, to intercept h i s couriers and h i s corresp-ondence, to threaten or destroy h i s magazines, to carry off h i s posts and h i s convoys, or, at a l l events, to retard h i s march by making him detach l a r g e l y f o r t h e i r protection. - 26 -Those detachments are sometimes composed of d i f f e r e n t arms, but the service belongs more p a r t i c u l a r l y to the l i g h t cavalry, which can move at a distance by rapid marches, surprise the enemy, attack unexpectedly, and r e t i r e as promptly.^ Exactly how much the Confederates were influenced by t h e i r regulations i s impossible to say but the type of a c t i v i t y that John Hunt Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest performed through-out the war.was s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to t h i s . I t also suggested a strategic approach that contradicted the purely t a c t i c a l approach that had been suggested elsewhere i n the regulations. In b a t t l e , the role of the cavalry was t r a d i t i o n a l — o c c u p y the wings and the centre when the ground was favourable and charge when the opportunity arose. I t i s clear that there was some confusion about the role of cavalry by 1861. Certain points were consistent, such as the generally t a c t i c a l r o l e with the overtones of strategic use and the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between l i g h t and heavy cavalry. A l l the Federal mounted troops were l a b e l l e d "cavalry" i n 1861 but the Confederate s t i l l d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between regulars and partisans.3^ This often gave them problems as a l e t t e r from George Randolph to Jefferson Davis i n August of 1862 indicated: The act authorizing bands of partisan rangers has been carried into execution. Apprehending that the novelty of the organization, and the supposed freedom from control would a t t r a c t great numbers i n the partisan corps, the Department adopted a rule requiring a recommendation from a general commanding a department before granting authority to r a i s e partisans. Notwithstanding t h i s r e s t r i c t i o n there i s reason to fear that the number of partisan corps greatly exceeded the requirements of the service, and that they seriously impede r e c r u i t i n g f o r regiments of the l i n e . ^ g - 2 7 -I t seems that generally the approach to the r o l e of cavalry at the outbreak of the C i v i l War i n the United States was very s i m i l a r to that suggested by Jomini. There was more stress on the a u x i l i a r y functions but by and large Jomini*s ideas seem to have remained dominant. The t h e o r e t i c a l concepts of the r o l e of cavalry have been outlined to present an idea of how m i l i t a r y men i n the nineteenth century, both i n Europe and the United States, thought about the role of cavalry. The exact influence of thought i s d i f f i c u l t to trace and not within the scope of t h i s study but i t seems f a i r l y clear that the concepts were consistent as many scholars have suggested.^ - 0 There was a t r a n s i t i o n i n evidence however, as the confusion over approach indicated. There were s i g n i f i c a n t departures from orthodoxy at the same time as there were adherences to i t . The basic r o l e of cavalry was c l e a r . I t was subordinate, defensive more than offensive, dependent, t a c t i c a l but with strategic overtones, and oriented generally to the security of the rest of the army. But most of t h i s was theory and the ro l e i n practise r e a l l y l a y ahead, a f t e r the f i g h t i n g broke out between North and South i n 1861. - 28 -FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I x T h e i l e , "Evolution of Cavalry," p. 508. George T. Denison, A History of Cavalry from the E a r l i e s t Times (London: MacMillan & Company, 1913), pp. 281-346. Luvaas. The M i l i t a r y  Legacy* pp. 4-5. Luvaas makes i t very clear that many con-temporary observers and subsequent writers disregarded the mounted infa n t r y approach of C i v i l War cavalrymen as i r r e l e v a n t . 2Baron Henri De Jomini, Summary of the Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. C r a i g h i l l (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1868), p. 304. Jomini i s generally considered to have had considerable influence on American m i l i t a r y thought p r i o r to the C i v i l War. An English t r a n s l a t i o n was available i n I854. See David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), pp.. 88-89, T. Harry Williams, " M i l i t a r y Leadership of North and South," ed. David Donald. Why the North  Won the C i v i l War (New York: C o l l i e r Books, 1962J, H. Wager Halleck, Elements of M i l i t a r y Art and Science (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1861), p. 60 believes that Jomini was one of the most valuable and i n s t r u c t i v e writers on the art of war. 3jomini, Summary, pp. 303-315 f o r general discussions. 4lbid.. pp. 313-314. 5Ibid., pp. 314-315. 6 C a r l Von Ciausewitz, On War, trans. J . J . Graham (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966j, 3 vols., I I , 13, 14. 7lbid.. I I , 20-21; I I I , 197, 199, 292. °"lbid., I I , 17. 9T. Harry Williams, Americans at War (New York: C o l l i e r Books, 1962), p. 43. ^ H a l l e c k , Elements, p. 264. 1 1 I b i d . , p. 111. 12lbid., pp. 270-271. See also pp. 127, 272. He considered the sabre the best weapon i n a mele'e. - 29 -•H. Mahan, An Elementary Treatise on Advanced-Guard.  Out-Posi and Detachment Service of Troops (New Orleans; Bloomfield & Steel, 1861), p. 33. ^ I b i d . , pp. 18-19, 20. 1 5 l b i d . , pp. 81-82, 138-139. 1^D.H. Mahan, An Elementary Treatise (New York: John Wiley, 1853), P« 42. With the exception of two additional chapters that were deleted in the later edition this i s identical to that published in 1861. (Citations hereafter w i l l include year of publication to avoid confusion.) Many observers of the C i v i l War echoed Mahan*s opinion of the value of dragoons. See Luvaas, The Military Legacy, pp. 56, 123, 118. Many more would see merit in this type of approach however. See ib i d . . pp. 56, 84-85, 109, 113, 156, 178. 17Mahan, An Elementary Treatise (1853), pp. 38-39. 1 % b i d . . pp. 42, 45. •^There are any number of histories of the Indian Wars. For a discussion of the part played by cavalry see Herr & Wallace, The U.S. Cavalry. Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canon, and Price, Across the Continent. 2 0Brackett, History of U.S. Cavalry, p. 55. 2lRodenbough, From Everglade to Canon, p. 103. Robert S. Henry, The Story of the Mexican War (New""York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1950), p. 59« 22cited on Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canon, p. 111. See p. 106 for a description of the charge on the battery. 23Henry, The Mexican War, pp. I46-I47. 24cited on i b i d . . p. 245. Henry believes that the Mexican General Ampudia was well served by his own cavalry at this time acting as a screen shielding his movements. Ibid., p. 244. See also Herr & Wallace, The U.S. Cavalry, pp. 38-39, 41. * ?Henry, The Mexican War, p. 292. See also p. 32 and Rodenbough, From Everglade to Canon, pp. 134-135 and Brackett, History of U.S. Cavalry, p. 93* - 30 -^"Otis A. Singletary, The Mexican War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960), pp. 55-70 presents an able narrative of these marches. 2 7 B r a c k e t t , History of U.S. Cavalry, pp. 158-160. The differences i n armament do not seem to have affected the r o l e of the troops. 2 % b i d . . p. 166. Stephen Z. Starr found considerable evidence of t h i s among Union cavalry regiments during the C i v i l War. See Starr, "Cold Steel", C.W.H. (1966). 2 9u.S. Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War  Communicating the Report of Captain George B. McClellan. 35th Cong., Special Sess., 1857, Rept. 916, pp. 3 , 271. 3°Ibid.. pp. 19, 23, 26, 107, 112, 168. 3lFor a discussion of the a c t i v i t i e s of the English cavalry during the Crimean War see C e c i l Woodham Smith, The Reason Why (London: Constable, 1953). 32philip St. George Cooke, Cavalry T a c t i c s : or. Regulations  f o r the Instruction, Formations, and Movements^of Cavalry i n  the Army and Volunteers f o r the United States (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1872), p.v. The book was f i r s t published i n 1862 and Cooke wrote h i s introduction i n i860. 33lbid., p. 132. 3 /»Ibid.. p. 239. 3 5 i b i d . , p. 240, 242. 3^Brackett, History of U.S. Cavalry, p. 224. on Army Regulations Adopted f o r the Use of the Army of the  Confederate States (Richmond: West and Johnson. Publishers,. 1861), p. 81. See also p. 57. J . Lucius Davis, The Trooper's  Manual or Tactics f o r Light Dragoons and Mounted Riflemen (Richmond: A. Morris, Publisher, 1861). This i s another d r i l l manual but i t s approach i s c l e a r l y indicated by i t s t i t l e . 3°Q.R.. Series I I , Volume I, 403. 3 9 i b i d . . Series IV, Volume I, 48 . - 31 -^Theodore Ropp, War i n the Modern World (New York: C o l l i e r Books, 1962), pp. 150-151, 158-160 puts Jomini i n t o a wider context. Ropp fs book i s one of the b e t t e r one volume t r e a t i s e s on the a r t of war and pp. 175-194 puts the American C i v i l War i n t o the context of the nineteenth century.. W i l l i a m s , American at War, pp. 68, 79-80 b e l i e v e s t h a t Jomini's i n f l u e n c e on American m i l i t a r y thought was profound. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t i n a l e t t e r w r i t t e n t o Abraham L i n c o l n i n December 1861, Simeon Cameron, the Federal Secretary of War, c i t e d Jomini i n d i c a t i n g t h a t p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s a l s o read m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y and theory. O.I.R.. S e r i e s I I I , Volume I , 700. CHAPTER II THE BATTLE OF SHILOH AND THE ADVANCE ON CORINTH The campaigns i n the Western Theatre of the American C i v i l War centered around the waterways of the M i s s i s s i p p i Valley during the f i r s t two years of f i g h t i n g . Control of these l i n e s of communication was v i t a l f o r both sides as they were the p r i n c i p a l transportation routes and ultimate control by the Federals allowed them to move and supply with r e l a t i v e ease the troops that dissected the Confederacy. The Battle of Shiloh was the f i r s t major clash i n t h i s area. The campaigns of 1861 and the f i r s t part of 1862 had seen several s i g n i f i c a n t f i g h t s but they had been minor i n terms of the numbers of men engaged and the resultant casualtie The combination of the Southern defeats at M i l l Springs on January 19, 1862 and the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson broke the Confederates f i r s t l i n e of defense and forced them to p u l l back and form new p o s i t i o n s . 1 Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston withdrew h i s headquarters from Columbus Kentucky about the same time that Federal General Don Carlos Bu e l l marched h i s army into Nashville, Tennessee, and set up h i headquarters. Johnston r e t i r e d south and set up h i s new l i n e centering on Corinth, M i s s i s s i p p i . 2 Corinth was the new stra t e g i c centre f o r important r a i l communications focussed there and t h i s also made i t a prime - 32 -- 33 -target f o r the Federal armies. The Union plan was to t r y and cut Southern l i n e s of supply before attempting to take the c i t y , so early i n March, General Ulysses S. Grant's army was ordered up the Tennessee River. Grant was temporarily suspended from duty at the time however, so the expedition was commanded by C F . Smith who was to f e e l out the rebel forces that were known to be concentrating around Corinth.-^ Smith was forced to turn back however because of the strong and a l e r t Confederate pickets, the bad weather, and the swollen creeks. Gradually, the segments of the Union army began to c o l l e c t around Pittsburgh Landing, on the West bank of the Tennessee River. The concentration began almost accidentally when General Lewis Wallace had l e d h i s d i v i s i o n into camp at Crump's Landing on March 12 and the other Federal d i v i s i o n s gradually moved into the same general area.^ By March 17 Grant had been restored to h i s command and had journeyed upstream from Fort Donelson to j o i n h i s army. The general plan was now to march on Corinth but Grant was cautioned by h i s superior, General Henry Halleck, to avoid any major confrontation u n t i l Buell's army could l i n k up with him. Buell had been ordered to rendezvous with Grant ei t h e r at Pittsburgh Landing or a short distance downstream, at Savannah.^ In Corinth, the Confederates were well aware that the Federals were concentrating f o r an attack but they decided to take the i n i t i a t i v e and s t r i k e f i r s t . Johnston hoped that he could move up to Grant*s army quickly, beat i t , and then be ready f o r Buell when he a r r i v e d . The b a t t l e that followed cost Johnston his l i f e and the Confederacy Corinth, however, and he was just a l i t t l e too sanguine i n h i s expectations at the end of March. There were major obstacles that prevented a rapid movement of the Confederate army i n the f i r s t place. Most of these l a y within the rebel system, f o r i t was poorly organized and the men badly trained, quite raw f o r the most part, and directed by an i n e f f i c i e n t command setup.7 Nature contributed the second obstacle i n the form of heavy rains that made the roads soggy and f a s t marching an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . Therefore, instead of being ready to attack the Union camps on A p r i l 5» as Johnston had o r i g i n a l l y hoped, the rebel army was not i n l i n e of b a t t l e u n t i l the morning of A p r i l 6. This delay allowed Buell*s army to get one day*s march closer f o r h i s rendezvous with Grant. The cavalry forces saw infrequent action but were more heavily employed on the Confederate side than on the Federal. The Union cavalry was considerably fragmented and companies and regiments were d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the d i v i s i o n s of the army i n units seldom exceeding b a t t a l i o n strength.^ Grant revealed hi s thoughts on the organization of h i s cavalry i n a cable to Smith: "...assign a r t i l l e r y and cavalry to d i v i s i o n s and leave them subject to the control of the d i v i s i o n commanders."1° Evidently there was no such thing as a central commander f o r - 35 ~ the Federal cavalry unless Grant q u a l i f i e d . A few days l a t e r a general order was issued which stated: "The a r t i l l e r y and cavalry of t h i s command w i l l hereafter form a part of d i v i s i o n s and not be attached to b r i g a d e s . " 1 1 Thus attachment to d i v i s i o n s was something of a concentration although i t s t i l l l e f t a f r a g -mented cavalry force i n the Union army. The Confederate cavalry was supposedly organized into a single brigade but i n r e a l i t y i t was dispersed piecemeal throughout the army. 1 2 The Confederate army was organized into Grand D i v i s i o n s and battalions of troopers were attached to each of these, i n addition to some unattached units that were scattered around.^ General orders issued on March 29 con-firmed the fragmentation of the rebel horse: "Divisions s h a l l consist of not l e s s than two brigades [of infantry] and one regiment of cavalry. A l l cavalry...not herinbefore assigned to d i v i s i o n s and brigades w i l l be held i n reserve...." 1^ Thus i f the rebel cavalry was to be employed i n battle i t would probably have to be i n a piecemeal fashion. P r i o r to the Battle of Shiloh the cavalry on both sides was engaged p r i n c i p a l l y i n minor skirmishing a r i s i n g out of scout and outpost duty. E a r l y i n March General "William T. Sherman had ordered out a l l h i s cavalry to attack the Memphis and Charleston Railroad but t h i s expedition proved unsuccessful due to swollen creeks and strong enemy p a t r o l s . 1 ^ On March 25 , Colonel John Kennett l e d a Federal reconnaissance from Murfreesboro to S h e l b y v i l l e , Tullahoma, Manchester, and McMinnville where some Confederate property was destroyed and - 36 -a few prisoners taken. This was country that Kennett*s men would become increasingly f a m i l i a r with over the next year. The Confederate cavalry was primarily on picket duty although John H. Morgan made h i s f i r s t appearance on a small r a i d that netted l i t t l e of consequence. Buell detached some numbers of his cavalry to guard depots and roads, thus fragmenting an already dispersed force. 1'-* Throughout March and A p r i l , there were numerous small actions of t h i s kind as the armies moved slowly around. Indiv-i d u a l l y , these combats had l i t t l e s ignificance and meant no more than a few men captured or some property destroyed. At the same time, the cavalry on both sides performed valuable chore work, guarding depots and bridges, maintaining outposts, and mounting scouts and reconnaissances. Both armies were quite amateurish at t h i s time and did not display the cool professionalism that slowly developed throughout the course of the war. Many of the problems that beset cavalrymen were evident at t h i s time. Lack of arms was a chronic problem and remained so f o r most of the war but i t was never so acute as at t h i s time. 1* 7 When he was on h i s l i t t l e r a i d , Morgan had captured a small stock of weapons and promptly d i s t r i b u t e d them to h i s men. A Federal cavalry o f f i c e r reported that the guns i n h i s command would not always f i r e and that one companyfs ammunition was spoiled because i t had been exposed to the r a i n . The reason f o r the exposure? The men had no cartridge boxes. A report - 37 -by Lieutenant Murray of the F i f t h Ohio Volunteer cavalry gave a graphic picture of the arms problem: At the same time the enemy advanced, and our men, most of whom were armed with nothing but a saber, gave way, and a general retreat followed. We have now but 7 carbineers to our company and no cartridges f o r them. We are i n possession of but 28 p i s t o l s , and they were long since condemned as wholly u n f i t f o r service. They are a spurious weapon, made out of cast i r o n , and one h a l f of the time w i l l neither cock nor revolve.19 The Confederates found conditions very similar as was revealed i n a cable that reached the o f f i c e of the Southern Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin: I have however, no sabers or p i s t o l s . Of the l a t t e r , even our r i c h enemies are d e s t i t u t e . Cavalry's found most e f f i c i e n t with double-baralled guns, and cavalry o f f i c e r s report that a f t e r a month or two sabers are u n i v e r s a l l y discarded as useless; men not thoroughly trained to the use of that arm.2Q The horse problem appeared f o r the Confederates as p a r t i c u l a r l y bothersome because of t h e i r curious approach to mounting the cavalry. Humphrey Marshall gave vent to h i s f r u s t r a t i o n i n a l e t t e r to General S. Cooper as i s revealed i n the following: Men cannot buy t h e i r horses and equipments. That day has gone by. I supposed i t was the law (and think so yet) to f u r n i s h Government horses f o r men e n l i s t i n g f o r the war, and accordingly I ordered the purchases of some seven or eight; but my attention was c a l l e d to a printed c i r c u l a r of the departmental regulations, which declares that the government w i l l not f u r n i s h cavalry horses.... ...I never would mount a volunteer upon h i s own horse or have i n cavalry service any animal but a public one. A long experience as a cavalry o f f i c e r with volunteers has made t h i s one of my f i x e d opinions. I have the equipments and sabers f o r a squadron of cavalry but no horses.21 This approach of the Confederates would rear up every once i n a while and cause considerable problems because i t meant i n - 38 -e f f e c t that each trooper had to be h i s own provider and t h i s created problems i n i l l e g a l foraging, men absent from t h e i r commands i n search of mounts, and considerable numbers of dismounted cavalry, disgruntled because they could not serve on horseback as they had intended upon enlistment. At the Battle of Shiloh i t does not appear that either side expected i t s cavalry to do much. The Union troopers were la r g e l y i nactive but t h e i r Confederate counterparts were busier, often i n excess of t h e i r orders i t seems. Sherman had h i s cavalry stationed according to the nature of the ground and f e l t that i t did not necessarily have to be i n l i n e . 2 2 The Confederates saw t h e i r cavalry as primarily a scouting and covering force f o r the advance from Corinth and other units of 23 troopers were to delay the converging Federal columns. Part of the Confederate marching orders indicated c l e a r l y that the rebel horse was to be a flanking and covering force: The cavalry, well thrown forward during the march, to reconnoitre and prevent surprise.... ...the Third Corps...supported on that flank by one-half of i t s cavalry, the l e f t flank being supported by the other h a l f . Wharton's regiment of Texas cavalry w i l l be ordered forward at once to scout.... I t w i l l annoy and harass any force of the enemy....24 In addition, the Confederate cavalry was to provide Ocouriers and make up patrols and picket l i n e s to the front of the infantry d i v i s i o n s . 2 5 On A p r i l 6 the Union army was attacked and barely had time to get into l i n e of b a t t l e before the rebel brigades crashed down on i t . For several days p r i o r to the bat t l e - 39 -there had been increased a c t i v i t y to the front but except f o r some outposts and pickets, the Union army had sat f a i r l y s t i l l . , Grant had been ordered by Halleck i n very e x p l i c i t terms not to allow himself to become engaged i n a major b a t t l e i f he could possibly avoid it. 2° The evidence indicates, as Sherman stated i n h i s memoirs: "We were a l l conscious that the enemy was c o l l e c t i n g at Corin t h . . . . " 2 , 7 but the Federals were shaken by the rebel assault that h i t t h e i r camps on A p r i l 6. The Union brigades were forced back and the f i g h t i n g was hot and heavy, with casualty figures soaring on both sides. But tone attack slowed down, and s t a l l e d with the death of Albert Sidney Johnston, and n i g h t f a l l saw both armies, bruised and bleeding, waiting f o r a renewal of the c o n f l i c t on the following day. I t could be suggested that as a scout the Federal cavalry was a dismal f a i l u r e but i n r e a l i t y i t seems to have been more the f a u l t of the senior Union d i v i s i o n commanders that more was not known of the enemy a c t i v i t y to the f r o n t . 2 ^ There were few indica t i o n s of displeasure at the behaviour of the cavalry and the duties that i t performed except f o r a few instances where Union troopers broke somewhat prematurely i n the face of the Confederate a t t a c k . 2 ^ Sherman 1s cavalry, f o r example, had had a brush with a strong enemy force and had pulled back quickly to report. Sherman noted t h i s but was skeptical that any general attack was i n the a i r and made no further e f f o r t s to f i n d out what was going on to h i s f r o n t . 3 ° The cavalry was there but good use does not seem to have been made of i t . Other Federal cavalry units were engaged i n minor duties i n the course of the b a t t l e . When the f i g h t developed to the r i g h t of John McClernand's d i v i s i o n , he had hi s cavalry screen h i s advance but there i s no record of how i t f a r e d . 3 1 Wallace's cavalry was scouting f o r him a l l the time he was absent from the f i e l d on A p r i l 6 and although i t i s unclear exactly why he was l o s t i t was probably a combination of un-aggressive cavalry scouts and lack of i n i t i a t i v e on h i s own part. 3 2 A idetachment of regular cavalrymen was broken up, par t l y to provide support f o r a battery and pa r t l y to supply couriers between the various parts of the army, an important function i n terms of s t a f f work i n the days before f i e l d telephones and wirelesses.3 3 Generals Alexander McCook and Thomas J . Wood both l e f t t h e i r cavalry forces guarding baggage t r a i n s so they could not have considered the presence of horsemen v i t a l to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n a b a t t l e . 3 4 In spite of these minor duties, the Federal cavalry was generally inconspicuous during the Battle of Shiloh. Part of the reason f o r t h i s i n a c t i v i t y stemmed from topography. The ground on which the f i g h t i n g occurred was a rough plateau, bounded on two sides by swollen streams, cut up with ravines and h i l l s , and covered with brush, boasting few open places. I t seems reasonable that t h i s i s what sparked Grant's comment? - 41 -"The nature of t h i s battle was such that cavalry could not be used i n fron t ; I therefore formed ours i n l i n e i n rear, to stop stragglers... . " 3 5 General Stephen A. Hurlbut noted the di s p o s i t i o n s of the cavalry attached to h i s command: Colonel Taylor*s F i f t h Ohio Cavalry was drawn up i n order of b a t t l e u n t i l near 1 o'clock, i n the hope that some opening might o f f e r f o r the use of t h i s arm, and none appearing, I ordered the command withdrawn from reach of shot. They were not i n action again u n t i l the afternoon of Monday when they were ordered to the front, but returned to t h e i r camps.30 I t i s clear the Hurlbut had the heavy cavalry concept firmly i n h i s mind here and would have launched the troopers i n a charge had he seen an opportunity. In addition to t h i s , some cavalrymen were assigned as o r d e r l i e s and aides, and the Federal cavalry attached to the d i v i s i o n s was ordered to whatever duty the d i v i s i o n a l commander saw f i t . There i s no evidence of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h i s system however, although the r e s u l t seems to have been a f a i r l y quiet day f o r the horse soldiers.3 7 The Confederate cavalry saw more action i n spite of the comment on an abstract of a f i e l d return which read: "The b a t t l e f i e l d was so t h i c k l y wooded that the cavalry was useless and could not operate at a l l . " 3 ^ This was f a r from the tr u t h , and although the evidence i s scanty i t indicates c l e a r l y that the rebel cavalrymen found f a i r l y frequent employment. Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest were attached to the reserve corps under General John C. Breckinridge. Forrest had been instructed to guard a ford over a creek but he soon t i r e d of t h i s and - 42 -wandered o f f i n search of a f i g h t . He found i t at the "Hornet's Nest" and charged a Federal b a t t e r y w h i l e supporting some of h i s i n f a n t r y , c a p t u r i n g i t h a n d i l y . He then scouted down near the edge of the Tennessee R i v e r and du r i n g the nigh t of A p r i l 6 camped i n f r o n t of the main army as a p i c k e t . The f o l l o w i n g day the Confederates were attacked and pushed back i n t u r n and the Confederate c a v a l r y was assigned as a covering f o r c e , F o r r e s t i n c l u d e d . At one p o i n t , F o r r e s t ' s men charged t o w i t h i n twenty paces of the enemy, f i r e d t h e i r shot-guns, and charged home w i t h p i s t o l s and sabres. The Union i n f a n t r y had f o o l i s h l y f i r e d w h i l e the r e b e l s were some distance away and the s w i f t advance of the Southern horsemen d i d not al l o w time f o r r e l o a d i n g , so Confederate c a v a l r y was able t o break Federal i n f a n t r y . M o r g a n had operated a l l through the f i r s t day on the l e f t of B r e c k i n r i d g e ' s command and had covered the f l a n k of the general advance. He was i n a c t i o n s e v e r a l times and assigned t o the covering f o r c e on A p r i l 7 when the Confederates were f o r c e d t o w i t h d r a w . ^ Se v e r a l other r e b e l c a v a l r y u n i t s a l s o saw a c t i o n at the B a t t l e of S h i l o h . Wharton spent A p r i l 7 supporting v a r i o u s Confederate a r t i l l e r y u n i t s , o f t e n f i g h t i n g on f o o t i n Skirmish formation and even attempted a charge down a road l i n e d w i t h brush on each s i d e . He was moving i n column and f o r c e d t o r e t r e a t i n the face of a Federal l i n e of b a t t l e r e g r e t t i n g "...exceedingly t h a t the face of the country deprived the Rangers from charging...."^- C o l o n e l Brewer's regiment scouted - 43 -f o r an infa n t r y brigade and fought on Polk's l e f t flank.42 Isaac Avery's Georgia Mountain Dragoons picketed on A p r i l 4, skirmished and scouted on A p r i l 5, fought i n l i n e of b a t t l e on A p r i l 6, and covered the withdrawal on A p r i l 7» A l l things considered, Avery's command was quite busy.^ Thus the Confederate cavalry was generally i n the ro l e of a t a c t i c a l assistant, much l i k e the Federal horse, but to a greater degree through more involvement i n the f i g h t i n g . The active leaders of the rebel cavalry seem to have been responsible f o r t h i s involvement f o r organization and fragmentation was s i m i l a r on both sides. In addition, the Confederate cavalry received some enthusiastic praise f o r i t s services.44 Shiloh had been a vast and confused b a t t l e and the armies had resembled mobs of men rather than organized f i g h t i n g machines. Their o f f i c e r s had herded them up together to hack and hew i n a combat that was almost medieval i n scope. Both sides suffered enormous casualties and although the Confederates had retreated neither side appeared to have won a clear cut vi c t o r y . Shiloh was t y p i c a l of many such battles-that would follow, where i t was d i f f i c u l t to see who was the winner and who the l o s e r . The Confederacy l o s t i n the long run of course, but at the time i t must have been bewildering f o r the men i n v o l v e d . ^ Even the benefit of hindsight does not always c l a r i f y the pic t u r e . Shiloh gave the Federals the upper hand however, i n that the war had f i n a l l y been carried i n a r e a l way into Confederate t e r r i t o r y . - 44 -The Federals were f a r too disorganized to immediately follow up the Confederate withdrawal from the f i e l d of Shiloh. A concentrated cavalry force might have pressed the heels of the rebels but none was a v a i l a b l e . As Grant had written to B u e l l : The great fatigue of our men, they having been engaged i n two days* f i g h t and subject to a march yesterday and f i g h t to-day, would preclude the idea of making any advance to-night without the a r r i v a l of the expected re-enforcements. My plan, therefore, w i l l be to f e e l on... u n t i l our cavalry force can be organized (...) and a s u f f i c i e n t a r t i l l e r y and infantry support to follow them are ready f o r a move.^5 The Federal cavalry did push out i n i n d i v i d u a l units, but not i n any concerted e f f o r t . Grant's Assistant Adjutant General, John Rawlins, ordered Taylor's cavalry out to scout the Corinth road and the rest of the cavalry to push on as well i f the rebels were found r e t r e a t i n g . G r a n t asked B u e l l to send forward h i s cavalry and Sherman pushed out a mixed force, h i s troopers skirmishing with the covering Confederates. The general advance and seige of Corinth took over a month and a h a l f to move twenty miles. Halleck had taken over command of the combined armies on A p r i l 11 and he i n s t i t u t e d a series of highly complex entrenching manoeuvers that consumed vast amounts of time. Halleck did not want another general engagement and by adopting t h i s strategy, which was e s s e n t i a l l y sound except that i t was so slow, he forced the Confederates i n Corinth to assault h i s numerically overwhelming army, s i t s t i l l f o r a seige that could only end i n Southern defeat, or withdraw. General P.G.T. Beauregard, whose reputation had - 45 -skyrocketed a f t e r Fort Sumter and who was now i n command at Corinth, decided to withdraw and the slow Federal advance allowed him to do so almost at h i s l e i s u r e . ^ The Federal cavalry performed a series of small chores during the seige, very similar to those before the Battle of Shiloh. Union troopers were often on picket duty and occasion-a l l y acted as m i l i t a r y policemen to r e s t r i c t the movements of both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y personnel.^ 9 The fragmentation continued and the cavalry o f f i c e r s received t h e i r orders from the infantry d i v i s i o n commanders. But on A p r i l 24 there was a general reorganization of the army and the cavalry was con-centrated under the command of General Gordon Granger. The mounted d i v i s i o n was attached to the reserve and was always to camp according to the nature of the ground. Also: Such d e t a i l s of cavalry as may be necessary to accompany the advance of the army or d i v i s i o n w i l l be designated hereafter. The commander of the cavalry w i l l d e t a i l immediately 20 o r d e r l i e s to report to each of the d i v i s i o n commanders. These detachments...will be commanded by a commissioned o f f i c e r , or by some discreet and trustworthy non-commissioned o f f i c e r . . . . 5 0 Groups of Union horsemen accompanied advance infantry units and skirmished, although not always with d i s t i n c t i o n . Sherman commanded a reconnaissance which had pushed f o r t h on A p r i l # and h i s l i n e s were broken by charging Confederate cavalry who did not share Sherman's opinion that the ground was unfavour-able f o r mounted action. His own troopers had been i n rear of h i s infantry, and both forces had crumbled i n the face of the enemy attack. Later i n the month there was a sharp skirmish - 46 -near Farmington where a Federal cavalry force retired with unseemly and embarrassing haste. A court of inquiry decided that the fault lay partly with one officer who had not co-operated sufficiently and partly with the cavalry which had broken without putting up an adequate resistance.5 2 For the most part the Union cavalry detachments were involved in minor skirmishes while on outpost or patrol duty. On April 12 and 13 the cavalry from a reconnaissance drove Confederate guards from a bridge and tore up some railroad track and telegraph lines. Granger's report for this period suggests that the Federal cavalry was generally successful in i t s brushes with the enemy, in spite of a few significant exceptions.53 Halleck also seems to have been very impressed with the Federal cavalry's behaviour and General David S. Stanley noted particularly the efforts of Colonel W.L. Eli o t ' s regiment.54 The Union horse soldiers did have some problems however, and Buell was forced to put his cavalry in the rear because of bad roads and lack of forage brought about by the unfavourable weather. Also, the terrain was often rough and thickly under-grown and therefore not ideal cavalry country. Horse problems cropped up too, as the following instructions from Grant indicated: "You w i l l please direct the arrest of the 1st Lieut, of the 3d Ohio Battery, for improperly taking three horses belonging to the 4th I l l s . Cavalry."55 - 47 -The duties of the Federal cavalry were varied and i t s horses were often employed as pack and draught animals. Troopers even found themselves doubling as engineers by building bridges, roads, earthworks f o r batteries, and r i f l e p i t s . Sometimes cavalrymen even manned the trenches, l i k e i n f a n t r y . 5 ° Cavalry seems to have been i n short supply and both B u e l l and McClemand expressed the opinion that they were short of mounted men f o r escort, scouting, and picket duty.57 The Confederate cavalry was operating l a r g e l y i n g u e r r i l l a fashion at t h i s time and i t was very quickly discovered that in f a n t r y could not catch the small bands of enemy horsemen. Cavalry was the l o g i c a l arm to employ but when so occupied i t tended to break down very s w i f t l y . O.M. M i t c h e l l made t h i s clear i n a l e t t e r to B u e l l : I hear the most deplorable accounts of the condition of our cavalry throughout my entire command. The company of scouts ... i s i n bad condition f o r service. A portion of the F i r s t Kentucky Cavalry, without proper arms, 350 i n number, i s at S h e l b y v i l l e with but 65 f i t f o r duty; men and horses are absolutely worn-out, and the Fourth Ohio and t h e i r horses nearly a l l u n f i t f o r service. . . . I...beg f o r cavalry reenforcements i f p o s s i b l e . ^ Another drain on the Federal cavalry was sickness and absentee-ism. This i s a problem that C i v i l War armies faced continually. An example of i t s e f f e c t i s seen i n a f i e l d return made by Granger which showed an aggregate strength of 4 ,237 but only showed 3,235 as f i t f o r duty.59 - 48 -Immediately a f t e r the Battle of Shiloh and a l l through the seige of Corinth, the Confederate cavalry was i n the r o l e of a covering f o r c e . General Brexton Bragg had u t i l i z e d the cavalry attached to h i s command to withdraw the a r t i l l e r y because the majority of h i s draught animals had been k i l l e d . For the same reason, the cavalry assisted i n bringing the wounded o f f the f i e l d . In addition to these tasks the rebel troopers spent t h e i r time picketing and s c o u t i n g . ^ The Confederate cavalry was i n short supply at t h i s time and i t had a vast t e r r i t o r y to cover. Therefore i t tended to be spread out too t h i n l y and t h i s broke horses down quickly from overwork. There were a number of instances where Confederate o f f i c e r s requested cavalry but few where they seem to have received any.^ 1 General Patton Anderson, i n reporting a skirmish, noted that h i s cavalry was worn out because of the muddy roads and d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n . The lack of horses became so acute that several regiments were dismounted to serve as i n f a n t r y . ^ 2 The constant wearying service and the breaking down of units would not have helped the morale of an army already i n r e t r e a t . The Federal seige had i t s desired e f f e c t and the Confederates at Corinth concluded that t h e i r p o s i t i o n was untenable. General W.J. Hardee was convinced that the Southern army could not stand a seige and i t could not attack the Federals and therefore withdrawal was the only p r a c t i c a l a lternative and Beauregard agreed on a l l these points.^3 The cavalry was again given the job of covering the re t r e a t . I t - 49 -was to set up pickets to guard each infantry column and was to be under the command of the chief of cavalry who was to coordinate the whole movement. When the withdrawal was effected, the cavalry units were to catch up with t h e i r assigned infantry to protect the flanks and rear. The troopers were to skirmish with the advancing Federals and destroy roads and bridges whenever possible u n t i l r e c a l l e d . ^ The l a s t rebel cavalry units pulled out of Corinth just as the Federal advance moved into the o u t s k i r t s of the c i t y . About the same time, Federal cavalry under E l l i o t raided the Southern l i n e s of communication around Booneville, M i s s i s s i p p i . A brigade of two regiments, one of which was under the temporary command of P h i l i p H. Sheridan, detached i t s e l f from the main army on May 28 and reached Booneville two days l a t e r . Sheridan l e d h a l f h i s regiment through the town to tear up some track but while he was engaged i n t h i s task he was attacked by Confederate cavalry. His reserve beat o f f the assault however and Sheridan's description of the f i g h t gave a clear i n d i c a t i o n of the mixed style of f i g h t i n g that cavalry was coming to adopt i n the C i v i l War: ...a dash was made by a squadron of rebel cavalry at our rear...but was handsomely met by the reserve under command of Captain Campbell, who dismounted a portion of h i s command and when the enemy came within range received them with a volley, which caused them to break and run i n a l l directions.6 5 The Federal cavalry wrought considerable damage before i t with-drew and although i t captured a large number of Confederate - 50 -convalescents, i t had neither the time to parole them, nor the numbers to herd them back to f r i e n d l y l i n e s so the prisoners had to be released. But several r a i l r o a d cars had been f i r e d , 100,000 rounds of small arms and 1,500 rounds of a r t i l l e r y ammunition destroyed, clothing had been burned, and some guns had been spiked. The r a i d was a notable t a c t i c a l success although there i s no evidence that i t had any serious strategic consequences.°6 The Confederates were quite embarrassed however i and set up a board of inquiry to f i n d out how such a thing could have happened. I t seems to have happened because of the i n i t -i a t i v e of the Federal cavalry, f a s t marching, and brisk f i g h t i n g when i t was demanded. Small u n i t s of cavalry headed the Federal advance f o r a short distance beyond Corinth and formed pickets and recon-n o i t e r i n g p a r t i e s . Union General James Negley was most impressed by the performance of h i s escort and wrote: "My escort...led the charge with reckless daring, dashing into the midst of the enemy, using t h e i r sabers with t e r r i b l e execution."^ 7 Negley was probably f a r more enthusiastic than the occasion i warranted but the p r i n c i p l e of shock action was s t i l l i n evidence even i f i t was on an extremely l i m i t e d scale. Major Thomas J . Jordan of the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry described another action: They [Union cavalry] continued to advance u n t i l stopped by the thick brushes, when they opened upon the enemy at 15 aces distance with t h e i r Colt's revolvers. Having but ew carbines and no ammunition to spare...I withdrew my men.••»£g - 51 -The shortage of the Confederate cavalry was again i n evidence, unlike l a t e r when the rebel boasted massive mounted forces. Bragg wrote Beauregard and stressed t h i s point, i n d i c a t i n g at the same time the value he placed i n mounted troops: The enemyfs cavalry followed us closely, and we had barely time to save our picketis and burn the bridge. No cavalry followed on my route so that i ;we had no notice.... General B e a l l I learned, passed on t h i s route with some cavalry...but l e f t none with my rear guard. This leaves my rear i n a very unprotected condition, and renders i t d i f f i c u l t to withdraw my infantry and a r t i l l e r y . Can you send me a regiment...."9 Bragg was able to extricate h i s command safely however, i n spite of a lack of cavalry and the Confederates moved to Tupelo. A f t e r t h i s the war quieted down somewhat as the F e d e r a l s were not disposed to press an active pursuit. Wars generally alternate between times of furious a c t i v i t y and r e l a t i v e calm. The casualties at the Battle of Shiloh had been f r i g h t f u l and neither side could a f f o r d too many bloodlettings of t h i s magnitude. In addition, the armies were almost i n v a r i a b l y considerably disorganized by a major batt l e and required time to r e f i t , sort themselves out, and tend t h e i r wounded before gathering f o r the next major combat. During t h i s convalescent period the cavalry forces of both armies were instrumental i n maintaining contact between the opposing forces. The nature of the ground had prevented active employment of the cavalry f o r the most part. The Confederates d i f f e r e d from the Federals however, f o r the l a t t e r seem to have taken - 52 -i t more or l e s s f o r granted t h a t mounted troops could not be used even before the f i g h t i n g s t a r t e d where the Confederates seem to have found an a c t i v e t a c t i c a l r o l e f o r t h e i r horse s o l d i e r s i n s p i t e of the l i m i t a t i o n s . The most frequent employment of c a v a l r y was on outpost and p a t r o l duty. Troopers a l s o served as e s c o r t s , guards, a i d e s , c o u r i e r s , and even engineers. There was some evidence of heavy c a v a l r y a c t i o n but t h i s was infrequent and always l i m i t e d i n scope. E f f o r t s were made t o employ: the c a v a l r y i n t h i s f a s h i o n even when the ground was obviously unfavourable, as Granger noted: The ground was much broken by h i l l s and r a v i n e s and u t t e r l y unsuited t o c a v a l r y movements, but, n e v e r t h e l e s s , upon r e c e i v i n g the order...to charge, Colonel Hatch d i v i d e d h i s force...[and] charged . . . i n s p l e n d i d s t y l e , d r i v i n g i n the strong f o r c e of the enemy's s k i r m i s h e r s and b a t t e r y support w i t h great f u r y , and completely s i l e n c i n g the f i r e of both b a t t e r i e s . . . . He r e t i r e d i n good order, but w i t h a l o s s of no l e s s than 43 k i l l e d , wounded, and m i s s i n g , besides a l a r g e number of horses. I cannot but express my c o n v i c t i o n t h a t t h i s heavy l o s s was a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the e n t i r e l y u n f i t nature of the ground..•.70 I t i s c u r i o u s why a charge would have been made i f the ground was so o b v i o u s l y u n s u i t e d . No e x p l a n a t i o n i s r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e but perhaps a quick advance on the b a t t e r i e s was necessary and c a v a l r y was used i n s p i t e of the disadvantages of t e r r a i n . The topography of the countryside was o f t e n a problem i n the employment of c a v a l r y and the M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y area was v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r the western areas of the United States or the p l a i n s of Europe.' 7 1 Swamps, brushy and broken ground, r i v e r s and streams, f o r e s t s , and a general l a c k of open - 53 -spaces as well as few roads r e s t r i c t e d troops of any kind and inclement weather often exacerbated these natural conditions. In addition, wet weather presented cavalrymen with peculiar problems because horses legs tend to. f a l l v i ctim to diseases i f the animals stand f o r any length of time i n water and inex-perienced troopers could cause the breaking down of large numbers of horses through improper care. There were other problems that beset the cavalry i n t h i s period. Arms were i n short supply, animals were scarce, and forage was often l a c k i n g . The Union, i n the long run, was able to solve many of these problems because of i t s vaster resources, but by no means completely. The Confederates, on the other hand, found themselves often at a considerable d i s -advantage, p a r t i c u l a r l y with weapons. They were able to augment t h e i r stock by seizing Federal arms but t h i s created additional problems i n ammunition supply because of the great v a r i e t y of weapons i n the hands of the troops that resulted.72 The role of the cavalry i n t h i s campaign can be e a s i l y i l l u s t r a t e d by a rough analogy. I f the army as a whole i s thought of as a single s o l d i e r , then the cavalry can be i n t e r -preted as a sh i e l d and a dagger. I t was used the same way the ancient s o l d i e r used h i s s h i e l d to protect himself from thrusts of the enemy and i n the same way that he used h i s dagger to s t r i k e at vulnerable points of h i s enemy's armour. A l l through the Shiloh and Corinth campaigns the cavalry's primary duty was to sh i e l d i t s army, and i t was even used as a dagger i n the - 54 -s t r i k e at Booneville by the Federals. Although the Federal cavalry d i d not always behave well i n b a t t l e , i t s f a i l u r e s were often due to the handling by more senior o f f i c e r s , such as Sherman before the attack on A p r i l 6. Scouts were available to the Federal commanders but they were not employed i n a meaningful manner. The Confederate cavalry was quite active t a c t i c a l l y at Shiloh but lack of numbers and mounts t o l d i n the seige of Corinth that followed and the Southern troopers c simply could not be everywhere at once. Beauregard had a huge area to cover where the Federals could pick the points where they could move. But i t seems that except f o r the Confederate shortage, the commanders on both sides were pleased, f o r the most part, with the performance of t h e i r cavalry forces. Better use on the part of the Federals would have produced better r e s u l t s however. The role of the cavalry as a s h i e l d was r e f l e c t e d i n the fragmentation of the mounted troops on both sides. Each d i v i s i o n had i t s own contingent of horse and t h i s was l o g i c a l i n some ways because each was l i k e a miniature army and needed troops to scout, picket, escort, and so f o r t h . The laclc of concentration of the Federal cavalry was an admitted handicap to Grant a f t e r Shiloh because had i t been together he could have mounted a quicker pursuit. Whether or not t h i s was necessarily desirable i s not the point. I f an enemy ret r e a t s the a l e r t and aggressive commander sends h i s mounted forces ahead to harass and delay just as the enemy commander sets up - 55 -h i s cavalry as a rear covering force. Grant could not have done t h i s even i f he had wanted to because the Union mounted troops were so scattered. The rebels too suffered from f r a g -mentation of t h e i r cavalry but i t does not seem to have prevented them from putting out a covering force f a i r l y quickly. The fragmented nature of the cavalry allowed the Confederates to employ t h e i r troopers more a c t i v e l y i n combat than the Federals d i d but t h i s was also due to the more aggressive nature of the rebel cavalry leaders, such as Forrest, Morgan, and Wharton. These men often exceeded t h e i r orders, i n an e f f o r t to get into the f i g h t i n g , i n f a c t . This does not seem to have met with disapproval however, on the part of the senior o f f i c e r s . The Confederate cavalry commands were apparently much more autonomous than t h e i r Federal counterparts. The Federal approach to the r o l e of cavalry at t h i s time did not include f i g h t i n g , as an order from Sherman made cle a r : They must guard t h e i r own camps and horses, but w i l l not be c a l l e d upon f o r working d e t a i l s or grand guards, but on h a l t i n g f o r camp the chief of cavalry w i l l report i n person f o r i n s t r u c t i o n s as to the cavalry pickets. Upon t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e and v i g i l a n c e much depends. They are not posted to f i g h t , but f o r watching the approach of an enemy at s u f f i c i e n t distance out to give early warning of danger.73 Actual employment i n b a t t l e had been l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the d i v i s i o n commanders and t h i s had resulted i n the Federal cavalry being i n the minor role of messenger, guard, etc. The r o l e of the mounted troops on both sides was f a i r l y clear however. I t was a t a c t i c a l force, oriented p r i n c i p a l l y to the security of the rest of the army. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I I x C h a r l e s P. Roland, A l b e r t Sidney Johnston ( A u s t i n : U n i v e r s i t y of Texas Press, 1964), pp. 266-267, 281. 2 l b i d . . p. 305, Don C a r l o s B u e l l , " S h i l o h Reviewed," B a t t l e s and Leaders of the C i v i l War (New York: The Century Company, 1887), I , 4^7• (Hereafter c i t e d as B a t t l e s and Leaders.) ^Beneral W i l l i a m T. Sherman, Memoirs (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1875), I , 228-229. Ulysses S. Grant to W i l l i a m T. Sherman and Don C a r l o s B u e l l t o Ulysses S. Grant, A p r i l 4 , 1862, Ulysses S. Grant Papers, Manuscript D i v i s i o n , L i b r a r y of Congress, Washington D.C, ( m i c r o f i l m copy U.B.C L i b r a r y ) , S e r i e s 5, V o l . 2, Reel #7. B a s i l W. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry (New York: The Neale P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1906), p. 75. ^Joseph W. R i c h , The B a t t l e of S h i l o h (Iowa C i t y : State H i s t o r i c a l S o c i e t y of Iowa, 1911J, p. 31. O.R*. S e r i e s I , Volume X, P a r t i , 22, 24, 26 . ( A l l subsequent c i t a t i o n s r e f e r t o S e r i e s I u n l e s s otherwise noted. Form f o r c i t a t i o n s w i l l °e O.R*. X, i (or i i ) , p.) J.F.C F u l l e r , The Generalship of  Ulvsses S. Grant (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1929), p. 95. 5 R i c h , B a t t l e of S h i l o h . p. 36, O.R.. X, i i , 51, 55, 64 . See map #1. 6p.R.. X, i , 385 . Roland, Johnston, p. 309. 7o«R«. X, i , 385. Roland, Johnston, p. 313. Bruce Catton. T e r r i b l e S w i f t Sword (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1963), pp. 225-228. F i e l d M a r s h a l l Viscount Wolseley, The Aimerican  C i v i l War An E n g l i s h View, ed. James A. Rawley ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : The U n i v e r s i t y Press of V i r g i n i a , I964), pp. 89-92. °Duke, Morgan's Cav a l r y , pp. 75-76 . Roland, Johnston. p. 326. Catton, T e r r i b l e S w i f t Sword, p. 227. 9p.R., X, i , 108. For St r u c t u r e of c a v a l r y regiments see Gray, Cavalry T a c t i c s , p. 7* For strengths see Appendix I . 1 Q0.R.. X, i i , 62 . l x | b i d . , 87-88. Orders had been i s s u e d on A p r i l 4 , 1862, which s t a t e d : " . . . c a v a l r y o f f i c e r s w i l l r e p o r t t o d i v i s i o n commanders henceforth." Ibid.,92-93. - 56 -- 57 -^ I b i d . . 363. See also i , 396. 1 3 I b i d . . i i , 319. l i f I b i d . . 371. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 75-76. G i l b e r t V. Rambaut, "Forrest at Shiloh", ed. Robert S. Henry, As They  Saw Forrest (Jackson: McCowat-Mercer Press I n c i , 1956), p. 56. 15Q..R.. X, i , 22. l 6 I b i d . . 6, 16, 17, 20, 31, 79; i i , 330, 331, 350. This represents a sampling of several of the small actions and skirmishes that the cavalry was involved i n . General Lewis Wallace even had h i s troopers corduroying a road. Ibid.. X, i , 175. 17Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956J, pp. 42^ 49-50. See also Starr, "Cold Steel", C.W.H. (1966), pp. 143-145. l g0.R.. X, i , 16. 19lbid.. 79. 2 0 I b i d . . i i , 334. 21lbid.. 323* For a further discussion of the problems besetting the Confederate cavairy see Dyer, "Cavalry Operations", J.S.H. (1942), pp. 2IO-225. 22O.R.. X, i i , 50. 23lbid.. 331. 2 4 I b i d . . i , 393-394. 25lbid.. i i , 367-368. 2 6 I b i d . , 51, 55. 2 7Sherman, Memoirs. I, 229. Catton, T e r r i b l e Swift Sword. p. 229 fin d s that Sherman received i n t e l l i g e n c e but "...dismissed the warnings with contempt." - 58 -2 gMahan, An Elementary Treatise (1861), pp. 8 2 - 8 3 , 129-130 stressed the necessity f o r scouting but the senior Federal o f f i c e r s seem to have overlooked sending out proper reconnaissance p a t r o l s . 2 9 Q . R . „ x, i i , 93, 94. Sherman, Memoirs. I, 230. See also P.G.T. Beauregard, "The Campaign of Shiloh", Battles and Leaders. I, 582-583. Catton, T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 229. 3QQ.R.. X, i , 89, 92, 249. 31lbid., 118. 3 2 I b i d . , 180, I87. 3 3 I b i d . , 169. 34ibid.. 302, 377. -^Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant i n Two Volumes (London: Sampon Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1886), I, 344* See also B u e l l , "Shiloh Reviewed," Battles and Leaders. I, 498. 3 6 Q . R . . x, i , 206. I f t h i s i s Hurlburt's idea of action f o r cavalry, i t i s l i t t l e wonder that i t was not more a c t i v e l y employed. 3 7 I b i d . . 120, 173, 179, 310, 354, 358. 3°*Ibid,, 396. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 79-80 mentions that the country was so undergrown that formations were broken up and periodic h a l t s were required to reform ranks. 3^Rambout, "Forrest at Shiloh", Henry. As They Saw Forrest, pp. 5 6 - 6 3 . J.K.P. Blackburn, Reminiscences of the Terry Rangers. ed. Charles W. Ramsdell (The University of Texas: Published by the L i t t l e f i e l d fund f o r Southern History, 1919), pp. 23-24. ^°Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 77-89. See also O.R.. X, i , 462. 4 x0.R., X, i , 528. See aslo Blackburn, Reminiscences, pp. 19-20. 4 2 0-Ik> X, i , 462. - 59 -^ I b i d . , 612. See also i b i d . . 367-368. 4 4 I b i d . . 528. / f 5 C a t t o n , T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, pp. 232-233, 238. For casualty f i g u r e s see Appendix I I I . ^ O . R . . X, i i , 96-97. 4 7 I b i d . . 97; i , 639-64O. ^ K e n n e t h P . W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952), I I I , 411-416. Catton, T e r r i b l e  Swift Sword, pp. 306-307. ^Q.R., x, i i , 100. 5 ° I b i d . . 122. 51Ibid'» i» 639-640. 5 2 I b i d . . 831-832, 832-833, 837-838. 53j .bid.. 644-645, 727-734. 5 4 I b i d . . 778; i i , 237, 267. 55iJiySses S. Grant to McKean, May 5, 1862, Grant Papers, Ser ies 5, V o l . 2, Reel #7. 5 6 O . R . . X, i , 727. 5 7 I b i d . . 267; i i , I83. Don Carlos B u e l l , "Operations i n Northern Alabama", B a t t l e s and Leaders. I I , 706. 53Q.R.. X, i i , 211-212. Although M i t c h e l l was not d i r e c t l y involved with Hal leck*s army h i s message i n d i c a t e s the problems involved i n deal ing with g u e r r i l l a s . See also i b i d . , i , 891. 59ibid.. i i , 146. 6 Q I b i d . . 405, 415, 464, 498, 518; i , 763, 765. 6 l i b i d . . i , 775; i i , 414, 433. - 60 -6 2 I b i d . , i , 801; i i , 548-551 P a s s i m . 6 3 i b i d . . 763, 775-777. W.R. Johnson, an aide-de-camp to Jefferson Davis agreed that the withdrawal from Corinth was a m i l i t a r y necessity. See also i b i d . . i i , 545-546. Catton, T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, pp. 306-307. 6/K).R.. X, i i , 766-767. 6 5 I b i d . , i , 865. 6 6 P e r s o n a l Memoirs of P h i l i p H. Sheridan (New York: Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888), I, 147-151. See also O.R.. X, i , 862-863, 774* An inventory of the destroyed property drawn up by the Confederates i n on i b i d . . 793, 797. 6 7 o ; > R . T x, i , 904. 6 6 I b i d . . 916-917. 6 q I b i d . . i i , 563. 7°Ibid.. i , 729. 71 Only small u n i t s of cavalry had operated on the Western plain s but the t r a d i t i o n a l picture of the employment of masses of cavalry came from Europe and i t i s not un l i k e l y that European conditions were what was meant when cavalry o f f i c e r s referred to the ground as eithe r favourable or unfavourable. 7 2Dyer, "Cavalry Operations", J.S.H. (1942), pp. 212-213. 7 3 Q . R . , x, i i , 269-270 CHAPTER II I THE SUMMER OF 1862 AND THE BATTLES OF IUKA AND CORINTH A f t e r Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard had been displaced from Corinth by the Federal army under General Henry Halleck, the war i n Northern M i s s i s s i p p i s e t t l e d down to a period of r e l a t i v e calm. In early June, Halleck s p l i t h i s army and reassigned i n d i v i d u a l commanders while the Confed-erates rested at Tupelo and Braxton Bragg, who succeeded Beauregard, went about reorganizing and d i s c i p l i n i n g the Southern army. The immediate Federal concern was to hold the t e r r i t o r y that had been won and open up l i n e s of communication that had been blocked. The Confederates hoped to retake what they had l o s t and the recently occupied town of Corinth became a focus f o r attention on both s i d e s . 1 Corinth was an important r a i l centre and important therefore to both the Federals and the rebels. On July 11 Halleck was r e c a l l e d to Washington to assume command of a l l Federal armies and l o c a l command devolved on General Ulysses S. Grant. Grant had several problems: he had h i s armies to keep organized and sustained, he had a vast t e r -r i t o r y to control, and he had important l i n e s of communication to keep cl e a r . The Confederates were not much help either, f o r although there were no major c o n f l i c t s u n t i l September, Grant found h i s outposts, depots, and r a i l l i n e s constantly sniped at - 61 -- 62 -by small g u e r i l l a and cavalry bands. He therefore had to commit considerable numbers of troops to holding down the land that had recently been conquered. 2 In addition to the Confederate army at Tupelo under Bragg, there was a second rebel force under General S t e r l i n g Price to the south, and a t h i r d under General E a r l Van Dorn to the west, at Vicksburg. Don Carlos B u e l l slowly put h i s army i n motion towards Chattanooga, but he moved so hes i t a n t l y that he became bogged down almost by a kind of reverse i n e r t i a and although he presented a severe enough threat to Chattanooga to cause Bragg to tra n s f e r h i s army there with extreme haste, the advance gradually ground to a h a l t . Late i n August Bragg moved north f o r h i s invasion of Kentucky and then i t was Bu e l l who had to follow and react to the Confederate moves. Price had been ordered to unite with Van Dorn i n West Tennessee and l a t e r to Join Bragg up i n Kentucky. This was to be the great Confed-erate offensive i n the West, one that would f a i l to consummate i t s e l f . The Federal forces i n M i s s i s s i p p i under Grant watched Price and Van Dorn c a r e f u l l y to prevent any northward movement to reinforce B r a g g . G r a n t had to be disposed of before the Confederates could move because h i s army was of formidable size and he would be a great danger to the rear of any army that turned and marched to l i n k up with Bragg. By August 27, a f t e r much v a c i l l a t i o n , Price and Van Dorn agreed to cooperate i n an attack on Corinth and i n the manoeuvering to unite, Price became involved i n the clash at Iuka. Grant had hoped to be able to - 63 -deal with the two Confederate armies before they could unite, but Price was able to s l i p away from William S. Rosecrans* command to meet, h i s colleague.^" The combined Confederate forces then attacked Corinth early i n October but were repulsed a f t e r two days of savage f i g h t i n g i n which losses ran high. Although badly battered, the Confederate army was able to s l i p away once again because of the tardy and half-hearted Federal pursuit. The r o l e of the cavalry i n these campaigns p a r a l l e l e d that seen i n the events surrounding the Battle of Shiloh and the seige of Corinth. I t was seldom involved i n r e a l l y heavy f i g h t i n g but i t performed important duties and often received commendation f o r i t s services. The general nature of the countryside was one i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r i n the more active employment of mounted troops. I t was wooded, often covered with thick undergrowth, interspersed with swamps, and i t had but few roads and most of these were n a r r o w . B o d i e s of cavalrymen much over b a t t a l i o n size would f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to be used. There simply was not the available open countryside to accommodate them. The organization of the cavalry forces remained r e l a t i v e -l y unchanged although there were a few minor a l t e r a t i o n s that made t h e i r appearance from time to time and changes on paper that had l i t t l e e f f e c t on things i n p r a c t i s e . On June 11, f o r example, Grant consolidated the Federal cavalry but he had second thoughts about t h i s and a week l a t e r reassigned the mounted troops - 64 -t o d i v i s i o n s , as they had been before.** I n f a n t r y commanders, had considerable d i s c r e t i o n i n the movements of the mounted f o r c e s and t h i s i s c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n a communication t h a t Rosecrans r e c e i v e d on June 22 which read: "Arrange your c a v a l r y movements as you may deem best, and e n t i r e l y independent of anything t h a t may be done from here. " 7 Grant appointed a c h i e f of c a v a l r y on June 24 and a l l r e p o r t s from the v a r i o u s mounted u n i t s were henceforth t o be made through him but t h i s f i g u r e was r e a l l y more of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e head than a t a c t i c a l l e a d e r and the c a v a l r y continued t o be spread through-out the army. The p i c t u r e was s i m i l a r i n the Confederate army although the r e b e l horse tended t o be c o n s o l i d a t e d more i n t o brigades. A l l of Bragg 1s c a v a l r y was at f i r s t under the command of James R. Chalmers. 9 In J u l y , P r i c e appointed Frank Armstrong t o head h i s t r o o p e r s , and W.H. Jackson became Van Dorn*s head cavalryman. Joseph Wheeler l a t e r succeeded an a i l i n g Chalmers as Bragg*s c h i e f of c a v a l r y . T h i s general s t r u c t u r e of brigade o r g a n i z a t i o n was maintained w i t h seme consistency throughout these campaigns and indeed throughout the war as w e l l . L a t e r , when the r e b e l horse grew to a s u b s t a n t i a l s i z e , i t was organ-i z e d i n t o corps, as the F e d e r a l c a v a l r y was, but throughout, the Confederates tended t o concentrate t h e i r cavalrymen where the Federals tended t o d i s p e r s e them. 1^ But at the time of the Iuka and C o r i n t h campaigns, n e i t h e r side had had any extensive experience w i t h c a v a l r y f o r c e s and there had been few i n d i c a t i o n s - 65 -of what i d e a l organization should be. Both had a chief of cavalry but he seems to have been more of an administrative head than a t a c t i c a l leader, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Union army. In addition to t h i s , there were always companies and battalions on detached duty, such as escorting, orderly, and courier service and i n most cases a l l cavalry u n i t s found themselves commanded by the senior i n f a n t r y o f f i c e r present. Neither cavalry force was i n very good shape i n the summer of 1862 i n northern M i s s i s s i p p i and southern Tennessee. The horse sol d i e r s were few i n number and often ill-equipped, ill-armed, and inadequately mounted. On June 22, f o r example, Lewis Wallace reported that h i s Federal troopers were broken down from hard service and four days l a t e r Grant cabelled Halleck that he had i n s u f f i c i e n t numbers of horsemen to deal with the problems created by g u e r r i l l a and small cavalry bands. General William T. Sherman reported that h i s cavalrymen were worn out and used up and a week l a t e r stated that h i s cavalry and General Stephen Hurlbut's were " . . . i n s i g -n i f i c a n t and...hardly enough f o r picket duty".1"*" He was even more eloquent about t h i s on July 7l "...but I should have some cavalry. The Fourth I l l i n o i s i s now a mere squad and i t i s worse than a toothache to c a l l upon them f o r hard work." 1 2 Rosecrans, throughout h i s career i n the West, was to display a chronic concern, almost a f i x a t i o n , about the condition of h i s cavalry and i t s inadequacy. His lengthy and frequent communications to h i s superiors often reveal a great deal - 66 -about the condition of the cavalry at that time and suggest what h i s concept of i t was. For example, on July 19 he wrote: Our cavalry i s diminishing i n numbers by contests with the superior rebel numbers on a front of 60 miles i n extent. I t i s v i t a l l y important that they be mounted and armed well. The l a t t e r , i f promptly done, w i l l give temporary r e l i e f . Twelve hundred and f i f t y Colt's army revolvers and 1,100 carbines or revolving r i f l e s are required f o r the cavalry d i v i s i o n . And again, on the following day: What we need i s that a l l the cavalry should be promptly and thoroughly armed. The utter f a t u i t y of not arming them suitably f o r service may be i n f e r r e d from the f a c t that the cost of maintaining a regiment of cavalry i n idleness f o r one month would arm them with revolving r i f l e s . The regiments should be f i l l e d . . . . The cavalry are the eyes of the army. Nay more; I do not hesitate to say that the time w i l l soon be here when a thousand cavalry w i l l do more damage to the rebels by s e i z i n g and destroying t h e i r means of subsistence than a brigade of infantry.1 3 Clearly Rosecrans saw h i s cavalry as a f i g h t i n g force and did not want i t s i t t i n g around. The arms he wanted would have given i t considerable firepower and he could only have had i n mind f o r the troopers to f i g h t i n addition to t h e i r other duties by making such demands. Grant echoed Rosecrans* fe e l i n g s and said: "There i s such a demand f o r cavalry that I w i l l have to mount infantry making secessionists f u r n i s h horses and forage". x^ This was a sound suggestion f o r augment* ing a hard pressed cavalry force, and Rosecrans did just that i n the spring of I863 but there i s no evidence that the idea got past the suggestion stage at t h i s point. A l l t h i s does indicate that the Union commanders saw value i n the mounted troops arid evidently believed that i t was capable of s i g n i f i c a n t - 67 -accomplishments. L i t t l e seems to have been done to act on the suggestions made by the f i e l d commanders however, and Rosecrans received some angry r e p l i e s from Washington where h i s demands were viewed as unreasonable. I t was clear i n h i s l e t t e r s that Rosecrans had much the same view of cavalry as a f a r ranging harassing force that had been suggested by Jomini and i n the regulations. Exactly where Rosecrans got h i s ideas i s unclear but the s i m i l a r i t y i s unmistakable. There were other problems that faced the Federal cavalry at t h i s time, one example of which was the often poor quality of the material that was received. Major John S. Mudd, fo r example, wrote: I wish to report the carbine cartridges now furnished us as being of very poor q u a l i t y . They shake to pieces i n r i d i n g and at the end of each day*s march many of the men f i n d instead of cartridges a mixed mass of powder, b a l l , and paper.15 Any picture of the Confederate cavalry i n similar terms i s sketchy at best because of the paucity of material but a few glimpses are a v a i l a b l e . Cavalry seems to have been i n short supply at times f o r the rebels, f o r early i n August there was a b r i e f exchange of l e t t e r s between Bragg and P r i c e . Price wanted more cavalrymen but Bragg r e p l i e d that he was short himself and could not spare any. On August 19, Armstrong noted that the troopers i n h i s command were inadequately armed.16 References to the condition are few however, and only a very broad picture of the cavalry i n Price's and Van Dorn's army i s possible. Things were probably very s i m i l a r to what they had - 68 -been during the Shiloh and Corinth campaigns immediately preceding. Up to the engagement at Iuka the cavalry of both sides was generally engaged i n routine picket duty, scouting, reconnaissance, and the usual occasional skirmishing. On June 20 Sherman pushed some of his cavalry out to the Tallahatchie River to scout out where some r a i l r o a d bridges had been destroyed by ra i d i n g Confederates. The next day General John McClernand reported that h i s cavalry scouts had penetrated the rebel picket l i n e s and reported on the l o c a t i o n and strength of enemy forces. Rosecrans had h i s troopers i n an arc covering h i s front and from time to time, both Sherman and Grant had t h e i r horse s o l d i e r s escorting t r a i n s . There were often l i t t l e clashes between outposts and patrols which had l i t t l e s i gnificance except f o r the men immediately involved. P h i l i p H. Sheridan made h i s f i r s t appearance i n the f i e l d at t h i s time as the colonel of a cavalry regiment and was involved 17 i n several reconnaissances. The bulk of the a c t i v i t y that the cavalry took part i n during the American C i v i l War was usually t h i s day to day duty, quite unspectacular and i n s i g -n i f i c a n t when taken i n d i v i d u a l l y but amounting to important work i n shielding, guarding, and c o l l e c t i n g information when taken as a whole. A few cavalry actions are worthy of close examination. Booneville was again the scene of a sharp l i t t l e combat when on July 1 a Federal cavalry camp under the command of Sheridan - 69 -was suddenly attacked by Chalmers and h i s r e b e l t r o o p e r s . Sheridan's men r e s i s t e d h o t l y and soon f o r c e d the a t t a c k e r s t o deploy. Dismounted f i r e a c t i o n proved able t o repulse mounted charges and Sheridan sent part of h i s command to out-f l a n k the enemy and drove the Confederates o f f a f t e r a sabre charge which h i t them i n the r e a r . Here c a v a l r y fought c a v a l r y , and the men on both s i d e s fought w e l l but the com-b i n a t i o n of Sheridan's l e a d e r s h i p and the firepower of h i s 18 troopers created a t i d y l i t t l e Federal v i c t o r y . Several c l a s s i c f e a t u r e s of c a v a l r y combat were e x h i b i t e d here as w e l l as evidence of the combination approach i n s t y l e of f i g h t i n g t h a t was t o become i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent as the war progressed. On August 26 there was a short f i g h t between some c a v a l r y under General Gordon Granger and some Confederate g u e r r i l l a s , and again there was a combination of f i r e and mounted a c t i o n by which the r e b e l s were r e p u l s e d . Granger took the opportunity t o p o i n t out the inadequacies of the Federal horse: . . . i t i s now becoming apparent to everyone th a t our present c a v a l r y f o r c e must be quintupled and armed t o the t e e t h . The small c a v a l r y we have i s not pr o p e r l y armed, and the e x t r a o r d i n a r y hard duty i t i s c a l l e d on to do i s f a s t breaking i t down.19 From August 30 t o September 1 some operations were c a r r i e d out by a mixed Union f o r c e against the M i s s i s s i p p i C e n t r a l R a i l r o a d . There were some s t i r r i n g l i t t l e clashes between mounted troops i n the course of the e x p e d i t i o n and Colonel M.D. Leggett, i t s commander, wrote v i v i d l y of one: - 70 -He [ C o l o n e l Hogg] immediately ordered h i s men t o draw t h e i r sabers, and...darting ahead of h i s men he f e l l p i e r c e d w i t h nine b a l l s . The next i n s t a n t the two maddened l i n e s came together w i t h a c l a s h of arms sublimely t e r r i b l e . The enemy wavered and gave p a r t i a l l y away, but Colonel Hogg having f a l l e n . . . a n d another o f f i c e r . . . [not y e t j assuming command, our c a v a l r y became p a r t i a l l y d i s -organized and f e l l back a short d i s t a n c e , when Capt. M.N. Musser...took command and soon put them i n shape f o r f i g h t i n g again.20 Here was an instance of c a v a l r y combat i n the o l d s t y l e , w i t h l i n e s of men charging, sabres drawn. The concept of heavy c a v a l r y was s t i l l very much i n evidence i n some cases. The Federal c a v a l r y seems t o have done i t s job w e l l d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d and the r e p o r t s of s e n i o r o f f i c e r s i n d i c a t e t h a t d i s p l e a s u r e was seldom i n evidence w i t h i t s behaviour. Rosecrans and Sherman are two examples of o f f i c e r s who b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r cavalrymen were doing a good job, notwithstanding the complaints they had made about the l a c k o f numbers and inadequacy of equipment. 2 1 Sheridan and Granger, i n t h e i r r e p o r t s of combats, o f t e n noted t h a t the Union troopers had conducted themselves w e l l . 2 2 G r e n v i l l e M. Dodge wavered i n h i s e s t i m a t i o n o f h i s c a v a l r y but g e n e r a l l y regarded i t w i t h favour. On August 16 he wrote; I must say t h a t I am very much g r a t i f i e d and disappointed T s i c ] w i t h the behaviour of a l l my c a v a l r y i n these f i g h t s . They do much b e t t e r than I expected. In only one case have they backed from any f o r c e , and I t h i n k I gave them a l e s s o n t h a t w i l l cause them always t o stand h e r e a f t e r . I d i s l i k e very much t o p a r t w i t h them, as I have j u s t got them f a i r l y t o work.23 E v i d e n t l y the F e d e r a l troopers needed some c o n d i t i o n i n g before they were f i t but at the same time they performed c r e d i t a b l y - 71 -once they had had a chance to s e t t l e i n . In g e n e r a l , the Union t r o o p e r s i n t h i s p e r i o d performed w e l l c o n s i s t e n t l y under f i r e . 2 4 T h i s was marred by some mistakes and poor conduct however. On June 2 6 , Grant wrote: "The a d d i t i o n a l e s c o r t f o l l o w e d i n the morning, and w i t h the u s u a l c a v a l r y s t u p i d i t y took the wrong road, thus l e a v i n g the t r a i n p r o t e c t e d only by 25 the e s c o r t f u r n i s h e d by General Sherman." Grant's phrasing suggests t h a t t h i s k i n d of exasperating mistake was not uncommon. An example of p l a i n poor conduct was seen i n a combat t h a t took place between some opposing c a v a l r y p a t r o l s l a t e i n August. The o f f i c e r i n charge of the F e d e r a l troops emerged as a v i r t u a l coward i n the manner i n which he l e f t the f i e l d a f t e r only a b r i e f r e s i s t a n c e . 2 ^ On the whole however, d i s p a r a g i n g comments were few and favourable references many, and the evidence suggests t h a t the Federal c a v a l r y d i d i t s job w e l l during t h i s p e r i o d . The reasons f o r t h i s are not e n t i r e l y c l e a r but they probably stemmed from a c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p . Sheridan, Granger, and Benjamin G r i e r s o n were three o f f i c e r s who d i s p l a y e d steadiness and competence i n the handling of t h e i r commands. The Confederate c a v a l r y during t h i s p e r i o d was engaged i n a c t i v i t y s i m i l a r t o t h a t of i t s Union counterpart, as a few episodes w i l l i l l u s t r a t e . On June 30, Chalmers moved towards B l a c k l a n d and the Federal outposts there and attacked Sheridan at B o o n e v i l l e on the way. He was repulsed f o r h i s pains however. - 72 -Through July and August, Armstrong was sent out front to attack any a s s a i l a b l e point i n the Union l i n e s . This type of general harassment seems to have been the main rebel approach at t h i s time as Bragg indicated i n a l e t t e r to General Edmund Kirby Smith written on July 20. He said that the Federal force was superior i n numbers and that he there-fore could do no more than menace i t "...as we constantly do with out cavalry by d r i v i n g in' h i s outposts and capturing h i s foraging parties and a l l stragglers from h i s l i n e s . " 2 , 7 The mobility of the cavalry made them i d e a l l y suited to t h i s type of action, and again, was quite s i m i l a r to what had been suggested i n the Confederate regulations. From July 25 to August 1 Wheeler l e d a small expedition from Holly Springs to Bolivar and tore up some r a i l r o a d track while keeping the Federals guessing as to where he intended to move next. He had o r i g i n a l l y intended to make a demonstration towards Jackson but was r e c a l l e d to h i s l i n e s f i r s t . 2 ^ Federal reports confirm the a c t i v i t y of the rebel horsemen at t h i s time. Leggett wrote that he had discovered from a spy that the main Confederate strategy at t h i s time was to send continual cavalry expeditions i n dashes against the Federal outposts, r a i l r o a d s , forage p a r t i e s , and provision t r a i n s . 2 9 Some i n d i c a t i o n of the success that the Confederates were having i s seen ,in the harassed tone of many of the Union reports and cables which requested cavalry to deal with these minor but annoying depredations. Grierson gave an i n d i c a t i o n - 73 -of how the rebel cavalrymen were armed even, although h i s example i s somewhat a t y p i c a l : "The enemy were well armed with breech-loading carbines and revolvers, a portion (the mounted infantry) having muskets and r i f l e s . . . . " 3 ^ As f a r as the Confederates were concerned, i t i s very l i k e l y that a l l the mounted men that Grierson was t a l k i n g about were considered cavalry. Granger made a d i s t i n c t i o n on the basis of how the men were armed but i t i s doubtful that there was any d i v i s i o n of duty of function i n r e a l i t y however. The various types of mounted troops a l l performed e s s e n t i a l l y the same duties i n the United States during the C i v i l War. Differences i n approach and armament should not obscure that f a c t . Bragg was quite enthusiastic about the small expeditions and often devoted considerable attention to them i n h i s reports. Of one he wrote: The commander of the forces i s pleased to have occasion to commend to the emulation of the cavalry o f f i c e r s of t h i s army to the i n t e l l i g e n t l y conducted and enterprising expedition recently l e d by Capt. W.C. Bacot (Forrest's cavalry), sent to reconnoiter the enemy's movements on the r i g h t f l a n k . Captain Bacot penetrated h i s l i n e s , surprised a strong picket post, and k i l l e d and captured almost the whole detachment.31 Another r a i d also received h i s eloquent praise: The commander of the forces has to announce to the army a well-planned and s o l d i e r l y executed expedition within the enemy's l i n e s by Col. W.H. Jackson, F i r s t Tennessee Cavalry...resulting i n the capture of a Federal colonel and some...officers and privates and the destruction of a locomotive and a t r a i n of cars....32 Bragg was also happy about the g u e r r i l l a s and partisans and believed that they were performing service v i t a l to the cause.33 - 74 -Much of h i s praise has an " o f f i c i a l " r i n g to i t but i t seems apparent that Bragg was pleased with h i s cavalry and believed that the harassing duty they were performing was valuable and proper. The only time that the Confederate cavalry seems to have f a i l e d was when Price was hovering around Iuka. He was i n some doubt as to the l o c a t i o n of both Van Dorn*s army and that of the enemy and h i s troopers f a i l e d f o r some time to establish the necessary l i n k s of communication.34 Generally, u n t i l the clash at Iuka, the cavalry on both sides acted p r i n c i p a l l y i n the shield aspect of i t s dual ro l e although there were examples of the dagger i n the many small r a i d s that were carried out. These small a f f a i r s had no o v e r a l l strategic importance however, and therefore do not r e a l l y c l a s s i f y completely as examples of the dagger aspect of the r o l e of cavalry. Both sides unwittingly aided the other during t h i s period f o r both had as t h e i r primary object the prevention of the departure of reinforcements to Kentucky where, by mid-September, Bragg was almost at the peak of h i s penetration of the North.35 As Price was h e s i t a t i n g at Iuka, t r y i n g to locate Van Dorn, Grant and Rosecrans conceived a plan that they hoped would r e s u l t i n the destruction of one at le a s t of the enemy*s armies.3° Federal General O.E.C. Qrd was to move on Iuka from the northwest and Rosecrans was to come i n two columns from the southwest, thereby sealing o f f a t h i r d road by which Price was - 75 -sure t o attempt to escape. The hoped f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n d i d not take place however. Rosecrans was delayed by bad weather, bad roads, and h i s own t a r d i n e s s , and Grant changed plans s l i g h t l y , d e c i d i n g t h a t Ord would a t t a c k when he heard the sound of Rosecrans*s guns i n s t e a d of at a prearranged time. Ord d i d not hear Rosecrans* guns because of unfavourable winds and the t h i r d road was not sealed. The B a t t l e o f Iuka was t h e r e f o r e l i t t l e more than a f i e r c e but small c l a s h between p a r t s of Rosecrans* army and a p a r t of P r i c e ' s . The l a t t e r was able to break contact when he found out about the formidable f o r c e s t h a t were c l o s i n g i n on him and escape on September 2 0 . 3 7 The c a v a l r y at the B a t t l e of Iuka scouted, ran messages, formed p i c k e t l i n e s , skirmished, and formed the vanguard of advance p u r s u i t and r e a r covering f o r c e s . The r e b e l c a v a l r y outnumbered i t s Union counterpart about two t o one but not a l l of e i t h e r f o r c e became engaged i n any s e r i o u s f i g h t i n g . 3 * * By September 17 Rosecrans had set up a c o u r i e r l i n e t o Grant and h i s troopers had reconnoitered the enemy p o s i t i o n s . I t might appear t h a t the f a i l u r e of c o o r d i n a t i o n was due t o a f a i l u r e i n communications between the two columns but t h i s i s only p a r t i a l l y c o r r e c t . The reasons f o r t h i s f a i l u r e stemmed from the extreme d i f f i c u l t y of the country r a t h e r than any l a x i t y of the c a v a l r y c o u r i e r s . The t e r r a i n was rough and long detours were necessary. Grant pointed out both i n h i s r e p o r t and l a t e r i n h i s memoirs t h a t the country was almost impassable t o cavalrymen. 3 9 - 76 -The Federal c a v a l r y was mainly employed i n covering the advance and clashed w i t h the enemy p i c k e t s as the opposing f o r c e s c l o s e d . ^ 0 The Union c a v a l r y was s t i l l fragmented and there was one regiment w i t h General C.S. Hamilton's d i v i s i o n , f o u r companies of which supported a b a t t e r y , f o u r of which fought dismounted w i t h the i n f a n t r y , and the remaining f o u r of which spread out t o the f r o n t as scouts. There was some ca v a l r y i n f r o n t of Ord's d i v i s i o n but t h i s was only engaged i n very l i g h t s k i r m i s h i n g as Ord d i d not press forward u n t i l some time a f t e r the main Confederate army had withdrawn. When the Confederates s t a r t e d t o r e t r e a t Colonel Edward Hatch took s i x t e e n companies i n p u r s u i t but the r e b e l r e a r guard was strong and v i g i l a n t and he was able t o do no more than harass the withdrawing enemy. 4 1 The Federal horse again d i s p l a y e d s a t i s f a c t o r y , i f unspectacular behaviour. J.K. Mizner, Rosecrans 1 c h i e f of c a v a l r y , was quite p r a i s i n g i n h i s r e p o r t and i n the absence of c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence of any k i n d , h i s e v a l u a t i o n can be taken, w i t h a few r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r enthusiasm, as a general comment on the Federal c a v a l r y i n the B a t t l e of Iuka. He wrote: "The usefulness and e f f i c i e n c y of the c a v a l r y on t h i s occasion cannot be too h i g h l y estimated, covering as they d i d so many important movements, guarding the f l a n k s of the army, and rendering valuable s e r v i c e . . . . " ^ 2 The Confederate cavalrymen were cast i n much the same r o l e . P r i c e had f i n a l l y opened communications between hi m s e l f - 77 -and Van Dorn when he ran i n t o Rosecrans* army. 4 3 On September 19 C o l o n e l W.C. F a l k n e r * s t r o o p e r s were attacked by Federal cavalrymen deployed as s k i r m i s h e r s . There was a b r i s k f i r e exchange and Falkner charged h i s enemy, but the Union f o r c e proved too strong and he had t o p u l l b a c k . 4 4 The f i g h t i n g on September 19 was f u r i o u s , c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t only a small p a r t of each army became engaged, and t h a t evening, P r i c e was convinced t h a t he was v a s t l y outnumbered arid t h a t the only s e n s i b l e course was to withdraw, which he promptly d i d . His c a v a l r y was d i s -posed t o cover the r e t r e a t and i t apparently c a r r i e d out t h i s task w i t h some e f f i c i e n c y as i s i n d i c a t e d by one of h i s sub-ordinate general o f f i c e r s , Dabney H. Maury. Maury wrote: I d e s i r e t o acknowledge the great e f f i c i e n c y and s k i l l w i t h which the c a v a l r y f o r c e s were handled. My r e a r and f l a n k s were always securely covered and i n f o r m a t i o n was given of every movement of the enemy from the moment of our a r r i v a l at Iuka u n t i l t h a t of our r e t u r n t o t h i s point.45 The c a v a l r y had been put i n the r o l e of a s h i e l d once again here, and i t was p l a i n t h a t i t was designed to p r o t e c t the army at l a r g e . Although the c a v a l r y f o r c e s took part i n some small skirmishes t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n s prevented them from engaging i n any s e r i o u s and heavy combat. The major f i g h t i n g was almost i n v a r i a b l y between opposing i n f a n t r y f o r c e s w i t h o c c a s i o n a l examples of r e l i a n c e on the supporting arms but both c a v a l r y and a r t i l l e r y were c l e a r l y subordinate arms. The job of the c a v a l r y was t h a t of an a s s i s t a n t and i t was o r i e n t e d p r i n c i p a l l y t o the s e c u r i t y of the r e s t of the army. The c l a s h at Iuka had 78 indicated t h i s c l e a r l y but t h i s f i g h t was only a preliminary to the major b a t t l e when the Confederate assaulted the Union l i n e s at Corinth early i n October. 4^* Surprisingly enough, the Union cavalry took a f a i r l y active r o l e i n the ba t t l e considering that i t was an assault on f i x e d p o s i t i o n s . On October 3 Rosecrans had pushed out a reconnaissance to locate the enemy he knew was close at hand. Federal pickets had been so dispersed to cover a l l the approaches to Corinth and as the Confederates advanced they pushed back the Union cavalry outposts i n a series of small skirmishes. The main assault spread i t s e l f over October 3 and 4» A f t e r skirmishing on the f i r s t day, Hatch was i n action on the Union ri g h t flank where, supported by a r t i l l e r y , he held h i s ground against rebel i n f a n t r y u n t i l r e l i e v e d by h i s own foot b r i g a d e s . 4 7 Colonel Lee, who had also skirmished with the approaching enemy on October 3, was i n rear of the Union l e f t on the second day where he found i t r e l a t i v e l y quiet.48 Major Snoddy and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry were also on the l e f t and guarded a bridge, repulsing several attacks by small Confederate fo r c e s . For the most part, Snoddy reported on the enemy movements and other Federal cavalry units, often only i n company strength, helped to keep the infantry i n l i n e , gather stragglers, and generally preserve order. Some troopers were also detailed as couriers between Rosecrans* headquarters and the various parts of the f i e l d . 4 ^ I t i s clear that the cavalry was again an assistant, a l b e i t a f a i r l y active one considering the nature - 79 -of the b a t t l e , and i t s d u t i e s were g e n e r a l l y minor. Mizner was a f r a i d t h a t h i s cavalrymen would not get s u f f i c i e n t recog-n i t i o n f o r t h e i r s e r v i c e s f o r he wrote i n h i s r e p o r t t o Rosecrans: I t i s due the c a v a l r y t o remark t h a t , although the nature of t h e i r s e r v i c e i n t h i s wooded country i s such t h a t they are f r e q u e n t l y denied a p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n general engage-ments, yet those whose p r a i s e and approbation i s most to be d e s i r e d do not l o s e s i g h t of valuable s e r v i c e s performed by them.^o Mizner a l s o r e a f f i r m e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s of employing c a v a l r y i n the M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y and i t i s obvious t h a t he was t h i n k i n g about the concept of heavy c a v a l r y when he mentioned c a v a l r y i n heavy engagements. Cavalry had never been i n v o l v e d i n heavy f i r e a c t i o n although i t had o f t e n engaged i n severe s k i r m i s h i n g so any other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of M i z n e r f s meaning i s v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . The a t t a c k on C o r i n t h r e s u l t e d i n a hard fought b a t t l e t h a t was a near t h i n g at moments f o r Rosecrans, and l o s s e s were heavy on both s i d e s , but Van Dorn f a i l e d t o take the key p o i n t s on the b a t t l e f i e l d and was f o r c e d t o withdraw. Rosecrans s t a r t e d t o organize h i m s e l f f o r a p u r s u i t and i t was c l e a r t h a t he expected h i s c a v a l r y t o p l a y a c a r d i n a l p a r t i n t h i s from h i s o r ders: C o l o n e l Mizner, c h i e f of c a v a l r y , w i l l d e t a i l a b a t t a l i o n of c a v a l r y t o accompany the advance of each column, one b a t t a l i o n t o r e p o r t . . . f o r camp and g a r r i s o n guard duty; w i t h the remainder of the c a v a l r y he w i l l j o i n the p u r s u i t and dispose i t according t o circumstances, covering the f l a n k s of our column and f e e l i n g f o r those of the enemy.^ - 80 -The fragmentation continued, even i n pursuit, although the i n d i v i d u a l commanders seem to have been given a f a i r degree of l a t i t u d e i n conducting t h e i r troops. Again t h i s was a c l a s s i c r ole f o r the cavalry, and one that a l l t h e o r i s t s had talked about as an i n t e g r a l part of i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Stephen Hurlbut had been moving slowly with h i s command to reinforce Rosecrans and by the time he reached the Hatchie River he ran into the rebel rear guard and was drawn into a sharp l i t t l e f i g h t . His force was not strong enough to hold onto the Confederate army however, and Van Dorn had l i t t l e trouble i n s l i p p i n g away. Hurlbut*s cavalry had screened h i s approach, scouting f o r the enemy, and had been involved i n the f i r s t skirmishes. I t performed s a t i s f a c t o r i l y and e l i c i t e d praise i n Hurlbut*s report. He wrote: The cavalry made an i n e f f e c t u a l e f f o r t to reach the Hatchie, but I soon perceived that the force i n front was too heavy to be driven i n by cavalry alone, especially cavalry badly armed f o r t h i s service.... ...I desire e s p e c i a l l y to c a l l attention to the conduct of my cavalry and a r t i l l e r y . The F i f t h Ohio Cavalry had but an average of eight carbines to a company. As a charge i s an impossible thing i n the country over which the column passed, they were compelled to do skirmishing duty i n thick timber and undergrowth with the revolver alone. They kept f i r m l y to the front, well advanced, and covered the column. Their duty was well done....^ 2 Hurlbut revealed the d i f f i c u l t i e s of operating i n wooded country, the d e f i c i e n c i e s of armament of h i s troopers, and the fact that the concept of the heavy cavalry action was s t i l l very much i n the minds of C i v i l War o f f i c e r s . I t was also obvious that the t e r r a i n was f o r c i n g the replacement of shock action by f i r e action although sabre charges s t i l l appeared from time to time. - 81 -The Confederate c a v a l r y was l a r g e l y i n a c t i v e during the b a t t l e . Before the general advance i t had been mainly engaged i n s couting but once the f o r c e s c l o s e d , i t was l e f t t o minor d u t i e s . W i r t Adam's c a v a l r y guarded the t r a i n s and a bridge across the Hatchie R i v e r and a f t e r the Federal p i c k e t s had been d r i v e n i n Jackson's c a v a l r y was posted on the f l a n k s where i t 53 d i d very l i t t l e except watch f o r Federal movements.'J E v i d e n t l y , Van Dorn d i d not b e l i e v e t h a t the c a v a l r y would be very u s e f u l i n the a s s a u l t . L a t e r , when i t became obvious t h a t he would have to withdraw, Van Dorn sent h i s c a v a l r y ahead t o secure h i s l i n e of r e t r e a t . Van Dorn took a reasonable approach t o the employment of h i s c a v a l r y f o r whatever the r o l e of mounted tro o p s , i t was not t o a s s a u l t f i x e d and entrenched p o s i t i o n s . ^ There were s e v e r a l commendations f o r the behaviour of the c a v a l r y at t h i s time but i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see why. The Confederate troopers r e a l l y d i d very l i t t l e . Hurlbut»s men ran i n t o i n f a n t r y and not horsemen and about a l l the r e b e l c a v a l r y r e a l l y d i d was s i t s t i l l throughout the b a t t l e . E v i d e n t l y Van Dorn deemed t h i s s u f f i c i e n t however.^ The Confederates r e t r e a t e d t o H o l l y Springs, b r i e f l y f o l l o w e d i n a h a l f - h e a r t e d f a s h i o n by the Federals and then the war i n Grant's the a t r e s e t t l e d down t o r e l a t i v e calm f o r a while so tha t the armies could reorganize and c o l l e c t f r e s h s u p p l i e s and reinforcements. Both Van Dorn's and Rosecrans' commands had been badly mauled i n the a s s a u l t and the time of continuous o f f e n s i v e s had not yet a r r i v e d . The Confederates - 82 -were thrown on the defensive however, and one-half of the great Southern counter-move i n the West had been defeated. Van Dorn's repulse meant t h a t Bragg had to r e l y on h i s own resources up i n Kentucky. He could expect no reinforcements from the South. Gradually, the Federals t i g h t e n e d t h e i r g r i p on the M i s s i s s i p p i V a l l e y u n t i l piece by p i e c e , the r e b e l defense l i n e s crumbled. The c a v a l r y had been very l i g h t l y engaged at the B a t t l e of C o r i n t h and the c a s u a l t y l i s t s bear t h i s out. There had been few l o s s e s i n the c a v a l r y f o r c e s of e i t h e r side i n s p i t e of the b l o o d - l e t t i n g t h a t had c h a r a c t e r i z e d the cf. i n f a n t r y and a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . ^ Since the c a v a l r y r e c e i v e d commendation f o r i t s behaviour, i t can be suggested t h a t no one thought t h a t i t should get i n v o l v e d i n heavy f i g h t i n g , but more than one o f f i c e r , Mizner f o r example, wanted i t t o . Cavalry's r o l e was apparently o r i e n t e d p r i n c i p a l l y t o the s e c u r i t y of the r e s t of the army by scouting, r e c o n n o i t e r i n g , manning outposts, guarding the f l a n k s , heading p u r s u i t s , covering withdrawals, o r running messages. I t s r o l e d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e head-on c o n f l i c t . The analogy of the s h i e l d and dagger a p t l y describes the r o l e of the c a v a l r y i n these campaigns. As a s h i e l d i t was g e n e r a l l y a t a c t i c a l and defensive f o r c e and above a l l , c l e a r l y subordinate. As a dagger, i t s r o l e was not as c l e a r , f o r the small t h r u s t s of the Confederate c a v a l r y i n the l a t t e r p a r t of the summer of 1862, although they represented the - 83 -general Southern strategy in the area at that time, could not be termed strategic in their effect. They were annoying, but they were not significant. The concept of heavy cavalry was on the mind of several officers however, in spite of the un-favourable nature of the ground. At the same time, the terrain was forcing an increased dependence on f i r e action and several examples of this were evident. As a communications link, the cavalry laboured under the handicaps again of the rough countryside but Price's troopers seem to have been a con-spicuous failure just prior to the clash at Iuka when they fa i l e d to locate either Van Dorn or the enemy. The fragmented nature of the organization of the Federal horse seems to have allowed i t to get involved in combat more than the Confederates, but neither mounted force was conspicuous in the heavy engage-ments. Again, the restrictions of the terrain made the use of large bodies of cavalry a virtual impossibility. The Federals seem to have had the advantage in leadership in both the shield and dagger aspect of the cavalry's role, although the relative lack of significant activity by which to gauge the effect of leadership does not permit any firm conclusions in this. The role of the cavalry was clear however. It was a force oriented to the security of the rest of the army. The infantry, with the support of the a r t i l l e r y and occasionally cavalry units, was s t i l l the mainstay of any combat. The mounted troops were subordinate and a combination of assistant and guard. The cavalry was also important as a scout in this - 84 -regard and the Federals seem to have a c t i v e l y used t h e i r horse so l d i e r s to reconnoitre enemy positions and movements hdre where the Confederates, p a r t i c u l a r l y Price at Iuka and Van Dorn at Corinth, did not do so.-*7 The function of security was c a r r i e d out by mounted forces that were generally f r a g -mented. Both sides had a chief of cavalry, but he seems to have been l a r g e l y an administrative f i g u r e f o r the Federals, leading only small forces i f active on the f i e l d . For the Confederates, the chief of cavalry was usually an active leader, commanding brigade sized u n i t s . Both Price and Van Dorn did not a c t i v e l y u t i l i z e t h e i r cavalry however, and the f a i l u r e s of the Southern horse probably stemmed more from t h i s than from any i n t r i n s i c f a u l t s . The Security of the army was the general f o c a l point f o r the cavalry forces and t h i s was clear. That neither cavalry force enjoyed resounding v i c t o r i e s or humiliating defeats does not mean that t h i s job was not important, and neither does i t mean that i t was not generally competently, i f quietly, c a r r i e d out. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III •J-Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South (Boston: L i t t l e Brown & Company, I960), p. 278. Catton believes that the Federals slipped badly i n giving the Confederate breathing time a f t e r the evacuation of Corinth. On pp. 280-281 he sees a behavioral continuity to the breaking up of the Federal army a f t e r the occupation of Corinth consistent with the concentration and subsequent dispersion of armies f o r combat i n the prewar period. 2 I b i d . . pp. 290, 305. Williams, Lincoln Finds A General. IV, 2, 7, 23, 45. Thomas B. Van Home, History of the Army  of the Cumberland (C i n c i n n a t i : Robert Clarke & Co., 1875J, I, 150. Grant, Memoirs. I, 395-397. O.R.. Series I, Volume XVII, Part i i , 95-96. ( A l l subsequent O.R. c i t a t i o n s to series I unless otherwise indicated and w i l l include only volume, part, and page nos.) ^Archer Jones, Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961), pp. 77, 78, 8 3 . Jones believes that the main f a u l t lay with a lack of central d i r e c t i o n . Catton, Grant Moves South, p. 307 and Grady McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky: Braxton Bragg's Campaign of 1362," C.W.H. (I960), p. 12. ^Catton, Grant Moves South, pp. 3O9-3IO. Grant, Memoirs. I, 408. 5Q.R.. XVII, i , 22, 46, 67, 68; i i , 180,222. ^Ibid .. i i , 4, 20. For the complete organization of the Federal armies see i b i d . . 143-144* ?Ibid.. 24. 8Ibid.» 30, 148. 9 l b i d .. 629, 631. The exact nature of the d i s t r i b u t i o n i s not clear because of the scarce and incomplete records. 1 0 I b i d . , 642. ^ I b i d . , 49. For Wallace's, Grant's, and Sherman's commun-ica t i o n s see i b i d . . 25, 36, 39. - 85 -- 86 -I b i d . , 49 and see 27 - 2 8 . Sherman noted that some of h i s cavalrymen l a c k e d carbines although there were a few regiments t h a t were extremely w e l l equipped f o r so e a r l y i n the war. The Second Michigan Cavalry, f o r example, which was commanded by Sheridan, had r e v o l v i n g r i f l e s , r e v o l v e r s , and sabres. M a r s h a l l P. Thatcher, A Hundred B a t t l e s i n the West ( D e t r o i t : P u b l ished by the author, 1884J, p. 30 . 13O.R.. XVII, i i , 105, 108. Catton, Grant Moves South, p. 305 and W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General. IV? 25, conclude t h a t Grant was short of c a v a l r y at the time. 14O.R., XVII, i i , 182, 202. 1 5 I b i d . , i , 143 . l 6 I b i d . . I I , 666, 667, 675. These references are o f t e n not very h e l p f u l , merely mentioning t h a t a c e r t a i n u n i t was on p i c k e t duty. 1 7 I b i d . , 20, 21, 24, 32, 128, 169, 193, 207, are some of the references t o small combats. l g I b i d . , i , 19-20. Sheridan, Memoirs. I , I 56 - I6O. 19O.R.. XVII, i , 40 . 2 0 I b i d . , 46-47. 2 1 l b i d . . i i , 66, 84, 139. 2 2 i b i d . . i , 17, 18, 19-20. Thomas L. Snead, "With P r i c e East of the M i s s i s s i p p i , " B a t t l e s and Leaders. I I , 723. 23O.R*. XVII, i , 132. 2 4 I b i d . . 55 -57 , 59. 2 5 u i y s s e s S. Grant to Henry H a l l e c k , June 26, 1862, Grant Papers, S e r i e s 5, Volume 4 , (Reel #7). 26O.R.. XVII, i , 32 - 3 4 . 2 7 r b i d . , i i , 651 . - 87 -2 8 I b i d . , i , 2 2 - 2 5 , 2 7 ; i i , 6 4 6 . 2 9 I b i d . . i , 3 5 - 3 6 . 3 Q I b i d . . 3 5 - 3 6 , 27. ^ ^ I b i d . , i i , 6 3 6 . 3 2 I b i d . , 6 3 9 . 3 3 l b i d . , 6 4 6 . 3Z»Ibid.. 6 9 3 , 6 9 9 , 7 0 2 - 7 0 3 , 7 0 4 . P r i c e ' s l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n i s an explanation f o r h i s apparent h e s i t a t i o n at Iuka. 3 5 u i y S s e s S. Grant t o Henry H a l l e c k , September 9 , 1 8 6 2 , Grant Papers, S e r i e s 5 , Volume 5 , (Reel # 8 ) . The c a v a l r y i s not merely being p r a i s e d out of hand. In terms of the job t h a t i t was set i t apparently performed w e l l . 3 6 s n e e d , "With P r i c e , " B a t t l e s and Leaders. I I , 7 2 6 , 7 2 8 . W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General. IV, 70-71* Both P r i c e and Van Dorn were suspended i n e f f e c t at t h i s time. I t appears t h a t Van Dorn d i d not know what was going on e i t h e r but t h i s was due t o h i s own f a i l u r e t o a g g r e s s i v e l y employ h i s c a v a l r y f o r reconnaissance. Robert J . H a r t j e , Van Dorn; The L i f e and  Times of a Confederate General ( V a n d e r b i l t U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 2 1 3 . 3 7 p r a n t . Memoirs. I , 4 0 8 - 4 1 0 . Catton, Grant Moves South, p. 310 concludes t h a t the plan looked "...good on paper but i t was a l i t t l e too ambitious. 1 Wolseley, An E n g l i s h View, p. 177 b e l i e v e s t h a t the a f f a i r was poorly.timed but given the circumstances i t seems d i f f i c u l t t o see how e l s e i t could have gone. W i l l i a m M. Lamers, The Edge of G l o r y ; A Biography of  General W i l l i a m S. Rosecrans (New York; Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961), pp. 106 -110, 1 1 9 . 3 8 Q > R > , X V 1 1 t i i , 2 4 7 . See Appendices I and I I . 3 9 i b i d . . I , 6 5 . Grant, Memoirs. I , 4 1 2 . Grant found the behaviour of h i s c a v a l r y eminently s a t i s f a c t o r y . For Rosecrans* e s t i m a t i o n of h i s mounted troops see O.R.. XVII, i , 7 7 . 4°Ibid.. i , 70-77 passim. - 88 -4 1 I b i d . , 139-140. 4 2 I b i d . , 115. Mizner's report i s on i b i d . , 114-115. See also i b i d . . 115-117. 4 3 I b i d . , i i , 707-708. Snead, "With Price", Battles and  Leaders. I I , 726. 44-0.R.. XVII, i , 138. 4 5 I b i d . , 137. See also, Snead, "With Price", Battles and  Leaders. I I , 726, 733* Price had a number of dismounted cavalry serving as infantry because of a shortage of horses. Q.R.. XVII, i i , 29. 4 ^ I b i d . , i i , 258, 259. The Confederates wanted to destroy Grant's army piecemeal i f they could. Williams, Lincoln Finds  A General. IV, 85. Lamers, Edge of Glorv. pp. 133, 134-135, 142. 47O.R.. XVII, i , 243. ^ I b i d . , 242, 243. 4 9 I b i d . . 243, 244. 50lbid. 3 1 I b i d . . i i , 266. 5 2 I b i d . . i , 305-307. 3 3 I b i d . . 377, 378. Van Dora's biographer believes that one of the Confederate general's major mistakes was i n not using h i s cavalry to scout out the ground to h i s f r o n t . On the evening of October 3, while Rosecrans strengthened h i s defenses and worked hard to prepare f o r the next day's f i g h t i n g , Van Dorn was content to res t on knowledge of the ground that no longer was v a l i d . Hartje, Van Dorn. p. 218. See also, Lamers, Edge of Glorv. p. 142. 54O.R.. XVII, i , 377, 378. 55ibid . . 4O6. 5^See Appendix I I I . 5?Hartje, Van Dorn. p. 218. CHAPTER IV THE INVASION OF KENTUCKY Aft e r June 20, 1862, Braxton Bragg was i n command of the Army of Tennessee and the Union army that had taken Corinth under Henry Halleck had broken up into i n d i v i d u a l commands under Generals William S. Rosecrans, Ulysses S. Grant, and Don Carlos B u e l l . The f i r s t two commanders s e t t l e d to the task of holding onto the t e r r i t o r y that had recently been won and the army under B u e l l moved slowly on Chattanooga. Loss of that c i t y would have opened up Georgia to invasion and the Confed-erates had to make every e f f o r t to counter the Federals. Bragg moved quickly from Tupelo, transferred h i s infantry by r a i l r o a d , and once i n Chattanooga, waited f o r h i s cavalry and a r t i l l e r y to come overland. His swift movement and the harassing that B u e l l was getting at the hands of the Confederate cavalry and g u e r r i l l a s contrived to s t a l l the Federals. Actually, Bragg could have taken h i s time because Buell had moved so slowly that he could not have beaten anyone to Chattanooga. His supply l i n e s were long, getting longer, and because they lay p a r a l l e l to the Confederate front were an open i n v i t a t i o n to the rebel horsemen to r a i d r a i l r o a d l i n e s , supply t r a i n s , and forage p a r t i e s . The continued threats to h i s l i n e s of com-munication forced B u e l l to pause frequently f o r repairs and to secure v i t a l points and t h i s , when added to Bragg*s swift move and Buell*s lack of haste, saved Chattanooga f o r the Confederacy. 2 - 89 -- 90 -The Confederate cavalry was p a r t i c u l a r l y active at that time and a serious menace to the Federals. The testimony of several o f f i c e r s at the Buell Commission i n q u i r i e s bore t h i s out. The cavalry raids constantly forced B u e l l to stop. The Federal cavalry seems to have been i n f e r i o r i n numbers and generally i n poor condition and as events proved, i t was unable to cope with the active and aggressive Confederate horse. 3 T.J. Wood t e s t i f i e d : In the months of July and August l a s t the rebels were active i n organizing g u e r r i l l a bands to prowl through the country, and t h e i r cavalry force was a c t i v e l y employed i n e f f o r t s to cut our l i n e s of communications i n rear of us, and t h i s was frequently done. • • • ...I regret to say that I think the rebel cavalry generally showed much more e f f i c i e n c y and a c t i v i t y than ours d i d . ^ In early August B u e l l wrote to Halleck: "We are operating l i n e s of great depth. They are swarming with the enemy1s cavalry and can only be protected by cavalry. I t i s impossible to overrate the importance of t h i s matter."5 B u e l l mentioned h i s problems with the enemy cavalry several times, both then and l a t e r at the inquiry and although much of what he said can be discounted p a r t l y because he was making every e f f o r t to clear himself from the charges that had been l e v e l l e d , there was at l e a s t a grain of t r u t h i n what he sai d . The evidence bore out Buell*s claims to a considerable degree. Thomas Wood t e s t i f i e d to the i n f e r i o r numbers of the Federal cavalry as well as i t s i n f e r i o r q uality. He believed - 9 1 -that the rebel horse had been i n such numbers as to make i t d i f f i c u l t f o r B u e l l to secure h i s supply l i n e s on the one hand, and impossible to l i v e o f f the countryside on the other.^ The problem of the lack of Federal troopers was not helped when they were dispersed i n small units to the several garrisons that had been l e f t to secure the supply l i n e s at strategic points. Also, the brigades were broken up f i r s t f o r picket duty and then f o r escorting wagons when Buell started back to Kentucky. This escorting service wore down the Federal cavalry very quickly and by the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e about two-thirds of Buell's horse s o l d i e r s were not i n shape to take the f i e l d without extensive r e f i t t i n g . ' Buell's cavalry force received a heavy blow on August 2 1 . A large part of the Union horse had been concentrated under General Richard ¥. Johnson to track down the Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan, who had been r a i d i n g i n Kentucky and Tennessee, destroying depots and parts of Buell's r a i l l i n e s . Johnson spent some time chasing around without accomplishing much and at one point even had part of h i s force taken away from him by General Nelson. F i n a l l y , near H a r t s v i l l e , Tennessee, where Morgan had been destroying the L o u i s v i l l e and Nashville Railroad, the two forces clashed. There was a furious skirmish which resulted i n the dispersal and capture of a large part of Johnson's command. Bu e l l was quite disturbed over t h i s and wrote: "This d i s a s t e r i s most unfortunate as i t costs us the services of a valuable o f f i c e r and a large part of the small cavalry force I have."'9 Buell was r i g h t about i t being a - 9 2 -d i s a s t e r but i f he had moved quickly and resolutely on Chattanooga he would have had a substantial success i n the capture of that c i t y that would have rocked the Confederacy back on i t s heels. The Confederate cavalry at t h i s time was moving s w i f t l y , moving often, and s t r i k i n g hard. The rebel troopers always had the benefit of active and aggressive leaders and most of the more famous and able made t h e i r appearance at t h i s time. These men brought i n a series of small v i c t o r i e s that were heartening i n the face of the major setbacks that the South had been faced with at that time. Morgan's r a i d has already been mentioned. At the same time a column under Nathan Bedford Forrest, who proved to be the Confederacy's most resourceful and ferocious cavalry leader i n the course of the war, moved into Middle Tennessee and captured Murfreesboro. He then hovered around Nashville, spreading alarm and looking very menacing i n d e e d . 1 0 In addition to the two major columns there were several small expeditions and g u e r r i l l a r a i d s that were a constant nuisance to the Federals. The organization of the cavalry forces on both sides did not a l t e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from what had been seen i n e a r l i e r campaigns. The Federal cavalry was ostensibly organized into brigades but i t seems to have operated more frequently i n b a t t a l i o n sized detachments i n scouting, picketing, and escorting d u t i e s . 1 1 The Confederate horse was also organized into brigades but these seem to have acted more as t a c t i c a l - 93 units and the fragmentation that plagued the Union cavalry was not as much i n evidence. Two brigades operated with Bragg's main array, one under Joseph Wheeler attached to William J. Hardee's corps, and the other under John Wharton attached to Leonidas Polk's c o r p s . 1 2 The small g u e r r i l l a bands oper-ating at t h i s time behaved much l i k e m i l i t i a , coming together f o r a r a i d and then dispersing, and the brigades of Morgan and Forrest usually operated separately, mainly because of the highly i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c streak of t h e i r commanders.13 The exact nature of the chain of command was not always as cle a r . The Federals had a chief of cavalry i n John Kennett but he spent more time i n command of a brigade on escort duty than anything e l s e . Richard Johnson was subject to General Nelson's orders when out of Buell*s immediate reach, i n spite of h i s more general i n s t r u c t i o n s to chase r a i d e r s . It, seems that f o r the Federals the cavalry detachments were usually subject to the orders of the senior infantry o f f i c e r present and that these could supersede more general orders from higher up. There was a sim i l a r s i t u a t i o n i n the Confederate army where the hierarchy of command was fuzzy o v e r a l l but immediate command usually r e s t i n g with the most senior o f f i c e r p r e s e n t . 1 4 In l a t e August of 1862 Bragg l e d h i s army across the Tennessee River on the f i r s t stage of what was to prove a d i s -appointing venture. I t was believed that a s t r i k e into Federal t e r r i t o r y at that time could prove exceedingly embarrassing to the Union cause and Bragg was convinced that Kentucky would r i s e - 94 -and declare f o r the Confederacy once a Southern army was on her s o i l . x 5 Bragg 1s invasion was part of a general rebel counter-offensive at that time, the several parts of which would i n d i v i d u a l l y meet with f a i l u r e . B u e l l f s army was r e a l l y the immediate objective and Bragg moved so as to stay between him and a second Confederate army under General Edmund Kirby Smith which had gone up to invest the Cumberland Gap. At the same time, S t e r l i n g Price and E a r l Van Dorn were to unite and defeat Grant and a l l the armies were to ultimately unite i n Kentucky. I f the moves had been successful, the Confederacy might have won the war i n the West with a few bold strokes. The Southern hopes were dashed however, because Price and Van Dorn, a f t e r considerable v a c i l l a t i o n , were repulsed with heavy losses from t h e i r assault on Corinth early i n October. Rosecrans had conducted an able defense and i f he had not mounted an active and aggressive pursuit he had insured that Bragg*s army would not receive reinforcements from the south. At the same time, the powerful Federal armies sat triumphant i n northern M i s s i s s i p p i and southwestern Tennessee. The second part of the plan did not fare much better f o r the rebels. Bragg never suffered a clear cut defeat during the Kentucky campaign but he never won a clear cut v i c t o r y e i t h e r . His army marched hard and fought well but when the smoke of ba t t l e had cleared he was back i n Tennessee and the great events that had been hoped f o r never came to pass. The Confederates were troubled with command problems throughout and - 95 -Bragg seemed to lack decisive leadership a b i l i t i e s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s created by two armies that were supposed to cooperate rather than function under one commander bred he s i t a t i o n and lack of coordination. The people of Kentucky never did r i s e and declare f o r the Confederacy although they seemed f r i e n d l y and enthusiastic, so t h i s v i t a l part of the 17 Southern hope also crumbled. But a l l t h i s was not evident when Bragg set out i n l a t e August and the s i t u a t i o n looked favourable. Kirby Smith had defeated a raw Union force under Nelson at Richmond and had moved on triumphantly to the Cumberland Gap. Bragg Ts army marched hard and by September 14 was at Glasgow, Kentucky, where i t paused to r e s t . The Confederate cavalry played a noteworthy r o l e i n the campaign and i n almost a l l instances outshone i t s Federal counterpart. Before the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e , the majority of c o n f l i c t s were clashes between skirmish l i n e s or between out-posts and p a t r o l s . Exactly what Buell wanted h i s mounted force to do i s unclear but i t spent a good deal of time scouting and escorting t r a i n s as he marched back to Kentucky. The detachment of Kennett*s and Lewis ZahmTs brigades and Johnson fs defeat severely cut down the cavalry operating with the main Federal army. The remainder did not constitute a force s u f f i c i e n t to do more than scout and small units of horse sold i e r s were kept out constantly, keeping Buell at l e a s t p a r t l y informed although they seldom had the power to penetrate the Confederate cavalry screens. B u e l l and others noted l a t e r - 96 -that the large cavalry force of the enemy allowed Bragg con-siderable freedom of movement by providing a s h i e l d that 18 denied complete information to the Federals. There was a s l i g h t skirmish at Dunlap where a Federal cavalry p a t r o l was thrown back by Confederate pickets on August 30 and Buell*s few troopers constantly met with rebuffs of t h i s nature. The Union general was concerned more about being able to concentrate, reinforce, and resupply however, so that he could move on the enemy. 1 9 Bragg*s cavalry was r i d i n g on the crest of a wave at that time. The i n i t i a l part of the Kentucky campaign saw the Confederate troopers i n the Army of Tennessee at the height of t h e i r power and although they were formidable opposition throughout the war, they declined r e l a t i v e l y speaking, a f t e r the Battle of Murfreesboro. The effectiveness of the rebel horsemen was frequently referred to by Buell l a t e r i n the course of t e s t i f y i n g at the Commission investigating h i s conduct. At Altamont, on August 3 0 , Wheeler*s cavalry drove i n Federal pickets and on September 7 he moved close to Nashville, hovered on Buell*s flank, and made himself a constant source of concern by disrupting Union r a i l and telegraph l i n e s . By September 18" he was screening the front of Bragg *s army as i t approached M u n f o r d v i l l e . 2 0 In combat, the Confederate cavalry seems to have had l i t t l e trouble i n dispersing i t s Federal counterpart. I t i s true that the rebels were usually i n superior numbers but at the same time the leaders were much more active and aggressive than those i n the Federal army. On August 23 - 97 -there had been a skirmish at Big H i l l , Kentucky, where Union cavalrymen took to t h e i r heels i n the face of an attack by Confederate horsemen, leaving the infantry they were supposed to be supporting alone on the f i e l d . This was not merely an instance of'discreet withdrawal i n the face of superior odds either, as was indicated by the order issued subsequently to arrest f o r cowardice any member of the regiment that could be 21 found. Early i n September General Alexander McCook fs d i s -gust with the Union cavalry serving under him was p l a i n l y evident i n a note to B u e l l : " I f my cavalry do not f i g h t you w i l l never hear from them. I have given my infantry orders to shoot every one of them that runs to the r e a r . " 2 2 Much of the f a u l t f o r the Federal cavalry*s unsteadiness at that.time must be attributed to the fa c t that the troopers were, by and large, raw. James S. Jackson, a Union cavalry o f f i c e r on a scout a f t e r Nelson*s defeat, received orders not to r i s k an engage-ment because h i s troopers were mostly raw r e c r u i t s and could not be counted on i n a f i g h t . 2 3 James Negley had severe problems dealing with Confederate g u e r r i l l a s and the an t i c s of hi s inexperienced cavalrymen gave him added headaches. 2 4 -As l a t e as September 28 i t was estimated that only one-third of 2,800 cavalry present f o r duty with Buell*s army was considered effective. 2-> Most of the i n e f f e c t i v e s were composed of raw r e c r u i t s . A l l t h i s served to make the Federal cavalry very much the underdog and the only time i t was able to embarrass the Confederate horse s o l d i e r s was when Kennett had the good - 9a -fortune to be able to surround and capture i n t a c t , an entire 26 Southern cavalry regiment on picket duty. By and large though, the Confederate cavalry had the v i r t u a l run of the. country during t?he Kentucky invasion. About the middle of September things s t a l l e d f o r Bragg. Kirby Smith's army had by then taken Cumberland Gap with s l i g h t l o s s , although a Federal force under George W. Morgan had been allowed to escape. Smith had not yet linked up with Bragg however, and he was not to do so u n t i l a f t e r the B a t t l e of P e r r y v i l l e . On September 13, John Scott, the cavalry commander under Smith, rode up to the Federal garrison at Munfordville, and backed only by a brigade of troopers, had demanded that i t surrender. He was p o l i t e l y refused and soundly repulsed when he attacked. A second Confederate attack by infantry under James Chalmers was equally unsuccessful and Bragg decided that he had to make these f a i l u r e s good but the garrison's commander, John T. Wilder, did not capitulate u n t i l he was convinced that he was surrounded by the entire rebel army and that further resistance was s u i c i d a l . 2 7 Bragg then hesitated, apparently expecting B u e l l to attack him there, but the Union commander had no such intention and took advantage of the l u l l to run into L o u i s v i l l e to gather himself f o r an advance. From t h i s point on the Confederate plans began to crumble piece by piece. Confusion and indecision seemed to s e t t l e on the Confederate command. Bragg wanted to l i n k with Kirby Smith but he was some distance away and h i s forces were scattered. - 99 -In addition, Bragg took time out to attend to some p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and thus was absent from h i s army at what proved to be a v i t a l moment. Part of the Confederate problem stemmed from the confusions of the command system and part stemmed from the f a i l i n g s of the men running i t . Bragg did not l i v e up to the promises that the invasion of Kentucky had held f o r t h i n l a t e August and early September. 2^ One of Bragg*s major problems was that he d i d not know exactly what the Federals were up t o . On the surface of things he should have. He had a large and active cavalry force, which was well l e d and could be sent out to gather the necessary i n t e l l i g e n c e . But the cavalry was under the control of the wing commanders and Wheeler and Wharton were reporting d i r e c t l y to Hardee and Polk. The wing commanders were not as active as they could have been i n mounting reconnaissances and what information they d i d gather was passed on to Bragg i n a highly modified form. Bragg was c l e a r l y at f a u l t f o r not running an e f f i c i e n t command and r e l y i n g too heavily on the information obtained by h i s subordinates. The cavalry can be p a r t l y blamed f o r the lack of i n t e l l i g e n c e but i t was more a lack of d i r e c t i o n than e f f i c i e n c y i n the regiments of horse s o l d i e r s that l e d to the general darkness that the Confederate command found i t s e l f i n . In addition, the wing commanders only passed on what they thought was relevant and thus Bragg did not even have the t o t a l information that was av a i l a b l e . Polk was f a l l i n g back on Bardstown i n the f i r s t part of October and not Frankfort-as - 100 -he had been ordered to do because h i s cavalry reports had convinced him that i t was at Bardstown that the advancing Federals had to be countered. 2 9 By October 1 Buell had considered himself ready and had moved out from L o u i s v i l l e to f i n d and attack Bragg. His army moved i n four columns, each headed by a small cavalry advance. The Federal cavalry was, with the exception of a brigade under Captain Ebenezer Gay, di s t r i b u t e d throughout the 30 army i n bat t a l i o n sized units.^ Gay was acting as chief of cavalry at the time because of Kennett's absence, although there was a more senior cavalry o f f i c e r present. The advance Federal cavalry u n i t s skirmished with Confederate pickets, and supported by infan t r y and a r t i l l e r y , drove the rebels back. The two brigades under Kennett and Zahm did not j o i n B u e l l f s army u n t i l a f t e r the bat t l e and Zahm indicated whyj At l e a s t one-third of my men (Third Ohio) are dismounted, the jhorses having sore backs and given out otherwise on these long hard t r i p s of l a t e . The horses we have on hand are very much jaded and fatigued. Then the command i s without haversacks and canteens; i n a great measure many out of clothing. We likewise need more horse equipments of a l l kinds and arms.... • • • With the other two regiments...it i s about the same thing.-From the f i r s t Federal advance on October 1 u n t i l the batt l e was joined on October & there were d a i l y skirmishes. On October 3 Colonel Minor M i l l i k e n captured a small squad of Confederate pickets and the next day General George Thomas1 cavalry, reinforced by infantry, brushed with a Confederate - 101 -cavalry force and drove i t back. Joshua S i l l f s advance guard was i n considerable strength and forced John S c o t t T s cavalry pickets to r e t i r e as i t advanced. A rebel cavalry force was concentrating at La Vergne but cavalry from Negley*s d i v i s i o n , backed by powerful infantry forces, pushed i t out and took the town. A major point of contention that proved to be the s i t e of the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e was the area surrounding a few small pools of water which were very valuable i n the then dry countryside. On October 7 Gay*s brigade had driven back the Confederates rearmost pickets and taken possession of the p o o l s . 3 2 The Confederate cavalry generally proved an excellent screen f o r i t s army at t h i s time. The Federal advance guards were i n considerable strength and had infantry and a r t i l l e r y supports so the .rebel troopers could do l i t t l e more than delay as they f e l l back on the main columns then concentrating under Polk's command. The Southern horse s o l d i e r s were active and sent back i n t e l l i g e n c e constantly and t h i s seems to confirm the suspicion that the f a i l u r e lay i n the command system and did not l i e with the scouting c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Southern cavalry. Polk was highly commendatory about h i s troopers, and believed that they had been both an excellent rear guard and an excellent reconnaissance f o r c e . 3 3 There was a gap however, between what Polk learned and what Bragg learned that obviated much of the vigour and a c t i v i t y of the Confederate cavalry. - 102 -In the b a t t l e on October £ the cavalry forces on both sides played an active but often minor part. Gay's cavalry was to the front of L o v e l l H. Rousseau's d i v i s i o n and the section of a r t i l l e r y that he had as support found more employ-ment than h i s troopers. When McCook's corps came up Gay moved to the l e f t and front and occupied a piece of ground between the two i n f a n t r y commands. Gay had h i s a r t i l l e r y s h e l l the Confederate l i n e s when they f i r s t advanced but was l a t e r forced to f a l l back to conform to the movements of McCook's corps, which received a f r i g h t f u l mauling from the furious rebel a s s a u l t . 3 4 Gay's conduct had been commendable but aside from minor covering action he had done very l i t t l e of any consequence. The Federal cavalry as a whole did l i t t l e more than skirmish with the Confederate pickets as the two armies closed. The Southern troopers were more active and t h e i r part i n the b a t t l e was correspondingly more s i g n i f i c a n t . Wheeler and Wharton had disputed the Federal advance and fought b r i e f l y 35 over the pools of water that Gay took on October 7» Only part of both armies became engaged at the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e but Wharton was on the r i g h t and led the attack by Polk's wing. Polk wrote: "The attack was then ordered. Wharton charged the enemy's l e f t with great fury, passing over stone walls and ravines and d r i v i n g back the enemy's infantry several hundred yards." 3^ This charge allowed the Confederates to gain pos-session of a strategic point on the f i e l d . Polk attacked McCook's corps and sent i t r e e l i n g back, badly crippled but - 103 -the Federal centre stood firm and the end of the f i g h t i n g on October B saw the majority of the Federal army unscathed simply because most of i t had not been aware that a b a t t l e was taking place. Wheeler had been on the l e f t and although he was not as active i n the f i g h t i n g as Wharton he appears to have bl u f f e d an entire Federal corps into s i t t i n g s t i l l during the b a t t l e . Thomas L. Crittenden's command was to Wheeler's front and Crittenden had sent out some cavalry to scout but Wheeler had driven i t back with great fury and i t r e t i r e d s w i f t l y to i t s infantry. Crittenden then stopped and took no further action and h i s lack of i n i t i a t i v e never allowed him to discover that he was only opposed by a cavalry b r i g a d e . 3 7 The r e s u l t s of the b a t t l e were confused and uncertain. A Confederate s t a f f o f f i c e r l a t e r described i t as a favourable incident f o r the South which decided nothing and a more apt description probably could not be found. 3^ Indeed, there are few h i s t o r i a n s who would disagree f o r Bragg was not aware that a major confrontation was taking place and Buell was i n much the same p o s i t i o n . Polk's attack had e f f e c t i v e l y put McCook's command out of action f o r the moment but Bragg decided, f o r several reasons that he had to r e t r e a t . I t was clear by t h i s time that Kentucky was not about to r i s e and r a l l y to h i s support. In addition, he was short of supplies and h i s scouts had informed him that the Union forces were rapid l y concentrat-ing and being reinforced. He decided that he had to save h i s - 10'4 -army and therefore ordered a retr e a t . He l a t e r learned of Van Dorn*s repulse at Corinth and t h i s only confirmed the necessity f o r withdrawal i n h i s mind. 3 9 So, covered by h i s cavalry forces, Bragg led h i s army out of Kentucky and back into Tennessee. The Federal pursuit was scarcely worthy of the name. Buell moved very slowly, as always, and h i s advance units did no more than nip at the heels of the r e t i r i n g Confederates. Wheeler was i n command of the covering forces and he conducted an able rear guard action which often seriously delayed the advancing Union detachments. Bragg*s chief of s t a f f , George Brent, conveyed Bragg*s admiration f o r Wheeler on t h i s point i n a communication: "Your services have been most valuable and b r i l l i a n t . No cavalry force was ever more handsomely handled and no army better covered." David Urquhart, a Confederate s t a f f o f f i c e r , described Wheeler*s a c t i v i t y i n an a r t i c l e written some time a f t e r the war: General Wheeler and h i s cavalry brought up the r e a r — f i g h t i n g by day and obstructing the roads by night. Before the pursuit was abandoned...that o f f i c e r was engaged over twenty-six times. His vigilance was so well known by the infantry that they never feared a surpri se. 41 Wheeler, i n another a r t i c l e , also described h i s actions: Our cavalry at times dismounted and fought behind stone fences and h a s t i l y erected r a i l breastworks, and when opportunity offered, charged the advancing enemy. Each expedient was adopted several times each day, and when practicable the road was obstructed by f e l l i n g timber.42 - 105 -Federal o f f i c e r s i n command of the advance pursuing units con-firmed that the Confederate cavalry was active and e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s period. B u e l l l a t e r stressed t h i s point at the Commission's i n q u i r i e s and W.S. Smith, who commanded one of the leading detachments, wrote: They have obstructed the road by f e l l i n g timber so that our progress i s very slow. A cavalry force could prevent t h i s , but our infantry cannot get ahead f a s t enough. They [the Confederates'] f e l l trees u n t i l we come up to them, then f a l l back ra p i d l y and chop away a g a i n . ^ Another problem faced by the Federals was supply. Buell was forced to keep h i s cavalry back and send forward infantry because the country had been denuded of forage by the Confeder-ates and s u f f i c i e n t supplies could not be passed to the front quickly enough. 4 4 A large part of the reason f o r the f a i l u r e of a pursuit l a y with Buell however. He just lacked the decisive and aggressive character needed f o r a successful commander.43 There were a few skirmishes i n the course of the token Federal chase. On October 9 Gay occupied Harrodsburg a f t e r Bragg had withdrawn and Kennett and h i s brigade f i n a l l y caught up with the Union army and took a minor part i n the pursuit u n t i l i t was f i n a l l y c a l l e d o f f near Crab Orchard about the middle of October. Wheeler was i n charge of a l l Bragg fs cavalry by t h i s time and i n addition to covering the main army he constantly sent back information about the strength and movements of the Federal t r o o p s . 4 ^ But the end of the Perry-v i l l e campaign marked the t a c i t defeat of the Confederate counteroffensive i n the West. - 1 0 6 -B u e l l retained command of the Federal army f o r only another few weeks. Washington had f i n a l l y t i r e d of h i s d i l a t o r i n e s s and Rosecrans, fresh from h i s triumph at Corinth, was h i s replacement i n command. U n t i l Rosecrans took over there was comparatively l i t t l e contact between the opposing armies. There had been a lack of unity of purpose at t h i s time i n the operations of the Federal cavalry and t h i s had been a chronic condition a l l through the period of B u e l l f s command. The Union cavalry was highly fragmented and often i n poor condition and seems to have been directed i n a hap-hazard manner. Much of the Federal problem stemmed from the large numbers of raw r e c r u i t s and the lack of e f f e c t i v e leaders. Johnson had been incautious i n h i s pursuit of Morgan and had been drawn into an unequal combat where he was no match f o r the active and aggressive rebel r a i d e r . Kennett and Zahm had done s a t i s f a c t o r y but r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t work, f o r B u e l l could just as e a s i l y have had infantry escort the slow moving wagon t r a i n s and thus had more horse s o l d i e r s f o r scouting and reconnaissance purposes. Also, t h i s escort service wore down a highly expensive arm of the service very quickly. Gay was competent but subdued i n h i s conduct at P e r r y v i l l e and h i s a c t i v i t i e s had no genuine consequence. In combat, the Federal cavalry was almost i n v a r i a b l y beaten by i t s Confederate counter-part and only when i t was backed up by infantry and a r t i l l e r y during the advance from L o u i s v i l l e did i t show much s p i r i t . In small units on scouting d e t a i l s i t made an e f f o r t to keep Buell - 107 -informed but i t was not i n s u f f i c i e n t strength to e f f e c t i v e l y accomplish t h i s purpose. The Confederate cavalry screens were simply too strong. In spite of t h i s singularly modest a c t i v i t y , Buell praised h i s cavalry c o n s t a n t l y . 4 7 Given i t s behaviour, i t i s curious what he expected of i t that he was so e a s i l y pleased. The Confederate cavalry stood out i n marked contrast. During the advance into Kentucky and i n the rear guard actions i n which i t played so prominent a part, the Southern horse f u l f i l l e d i t s duties generally with vigour and resourcefulness. I t set up a screen that the Federals had extreme d i f f i c u l t y i n penetrating and i t served as an e f f e c t i v e force at gathering i n t e l l i g e n c e . I f the information that i t turned i n did not enlighten Bragg as i t should have t h i s was more the f a u l t of the Confederate command system and Bragg Ts lack of d i r e c t i o n than poor scouting. The Confederate cavalry lacked e f f e c t i v e d i r e c t i o n but i t was at the l e v e l of Polk and Bragg and not that of Wheeler and Wharton. The Confederate cavalry leaders were active and aggressive and c l e a r l y foreshadowed t h e i r future formidable reputations. In combat, the Confederate troopers were steady and aggressive, and the concept of heavy cavalry reared once again i n Wharton's charge on the Federal l e f t at the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e . The r o l e of both cavalry forces at t h i s time was c l e a r l y a shield oriented p r i n c i p a l l y to the security of the army at large. I t was a defensive and t a c t i c a l arm, subordinate to - 108 -the demands of the whole army. The functions of escorting, scouting, picketing, covering, and screening demonstrate t h i s c l e a r l y . There were strategic overtones i n the r a i d s of Morgan and Forrest although these were not as clear i n t h e i r form as the l a t e r raids i n December would be. This was p l a i n l y a case of the cavalry being used as a dagger, the second aspect of i t s dual r o l e , to s t r i k e at a hopefully vulnerable point. The role of the cavalry i n general was s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r once again to that suggested by Jomini and i t seems that the horse sold i e r s did give a clear i n d i c a t i o n of influencing the general events of the campaigns although t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s cannot be termed d e c i s i v e . The dual role of s h i e l d and dagger f o r the cavalry can scarcely be disputed however, and the invasion of Kentucky gives ample evidence i n support of the s u i t a b i l i t y of the analogy. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV -•-McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (I960), p. 9. Catton, T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 373. ^Catton. T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 379* Catton believes that B u e l l moved so slowly that he simply bogged himself down. O.R.. Series I, Volume XVI, Part i , 9« ( A l l subsequent O.R. c i t a t i o n s to series I unless.;Otherwise noted and form consistent with previous chapters.) 3p.R., XVI, i , 32, 34, 265, 269, 327. 4 l b i d . . 157, I64-I65. 5 lbid ., i i , 36I. See also Van Home, Army of the Cumberland. I, 150. 6p.R.. XVI, i , 158. 7 I b i d . . 327, 513, 514. See also i b i d . , i i , 564-565, 568. 8 I b i d . , i , 265. 9 I b i d . . i i , 388. Catton, T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 374 believes that the Federals languished so at t h i s time that the war deteriorated into a precarious state of balance where these small cavalry r a i d s had a disproportionate e f f e c t . See also O.R.. XVI, i , 872-873, 874-876, 878. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 146-152. 1 0 C a t t o n , T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 374. See also Stanley F. Horn. The Army of Tennessee (New York; The Bobbs-Merrill Company, I94I), p. 161. 13-0.R.. XVI, i , 265-267; i i , 484. 1 2 I b i d . , i i , 781-782. 13Basil Duke, "Morgan's Cavalry during the Bragg Invasion," Battles and Leaders. I l l , 26-28. O.R.. XVI, i , 876-877. See also Dyer, "Cavalry Operations", J.S.H. (1942), p. 211, 222. 1ZK).R.. XVI, i , 265. - 109 -- 110 -1 5 C a t t o n , T e r r i b l e S w i f t Sword, pp. 408-409. Thomas L. Connelly, The Army of the Heartland (Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1967), pp. 197-201 analyses the many f a c t o r s t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o the Confederate d e c i s i o n . l 6McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960), pp. 11-12. Horn, Army of Tennessee, pp• 160-161• 1 7 S e e McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960) f o r a complete a n a l y s i s of the campaign. l g 0.R.. XVI, i , 43. 1 9 I b i d . . 48, 455. 2 0 I b i d . , i , 893-896. 2 1 I b i d . , 885. 2 2 I b i d . . i i , 489. 23lb id . , i , 910. 2 4 i b i d . . 258. 2 5 I b i d . , i i , 552-553. 2 6 I b i d . . i , 1016-1017. The Confederate o f f i c e r i n command was l a t e r suspended and f i n e d f o r h i s negligence. 27samuel C. W i l l i a m s , General John T. Wilder (Bloomington: Indiana U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1936), p. 10. McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960), pp. 18-19. c Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 105, 108. Catton, T e r r i b l e S w i f t Sword, p. 415* Connelly, Army of the Heartland, p. 244 b e l i e v e s t h a t Bragg 1s c a v a l r y d i d not act w i t h u n i t y of purpose at t h i s time and he i s l a r g e l y c o r r e c t but the f a u l t must be put at the f e e t of the o v e r a l l commander who d i d not exe r c i s e t i g h t enough c o n t r o l over h i s f o r c e s . 2 9McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960) pp. 27-29. 3Q0.R.. XVI, i i , 591-596 passim. See Appendix I and I I . - I l l -3 1 I b i d . . 568. See a l s o i b i d . . 564-565. 3' 2IbjLd., i , 1024, 1038. ^McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960), p. 29. Connelly.• Army of the Heartland, pp. 253, 254, 258, 260-261. Both authors b e l i e v e t h a t Polk was the major c o n t r i v e r of the Confederate g r i e f a t t h i s time. I t i s evident t h a t the f a i l u r e was at the l e v e l s of high command, and not i n the r o l e of the cav a l r y or the f u l f i l l m e n t of that r o l e . See a l s o W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General. IV, 124. O.R., XVI, i , 1109. 34Gay*s r o l e was pur e l y t a c t i c a l and had no o v e r a l l s i g n i f -i c ance. O.R.. XVI, i, 1038, 1043, 1073. Thatcher, A Hundred  B a t t l e s , pp. 76-77. 35O.R.. XVI, i i , 897, 898. Joseph Wheeler, "Bragg*s Invasion of Kentucky", B a t t l e s and Leaders, I I I , 14, 15* 3 6 Q . R . . XVI, i , 1110. For c a s u a l t i e s from t h i s b a t t l e see Appendix I I I . 3 7 W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General. IV, 132. Joseph H. Parks, General Leonidas Polk C.S.A. (Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a State U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), pp. 270, 271. O.R.. XVI, i , 896, 897. McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (I960), p. 34. 3^David Urquhart, "Bragg*s Advance and Retreat", B a t t l e s  and Leaders. I l l , 603. 3 9 c atton, T e r r i b l e S w i f t Sword, p. 471. McWhiney, "Controversy i n Kentucky", C.W.H. (i960), pp. 35-36. 4°Q.R.. XVI, i i , 930. See a l s o i b i d . . 932. ^"•"•Urquhart, "Bragg*s Advance and Retreat", B a t t l e s and  Leaders. I l l , 603. 4 2Wheeler, "Bragg*s Invasion", B a t t l e s and Leaders. I l l , 19. 43O.R.. XVI, i , 1140. - 112 -^Don Carlos B u e l l , "East Tennessee and the Campaign of P e r r y v i l l e " , Battles and Leaders. I l l , 51. O.R.. XVI, i , 56, 63, 199, 515, 575. 4 5 C a t t o n , T e r r i b l e Swift Sword, p. 473• Williams, Lincoln  Finds A General. IV, 135* T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and h i s (aerierals (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), pp. 182-185 believes that Buell's assessment of the situations was generally correct but that he was too slow i n doing anything about them and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p o l i t i c a l body and the m i l i t a r y r e s u l t s i n the f i e l d was such that unsuccessful generals were i n severe danger of dismissal". Hence B u e l l was replaced by someone the authorities i n Washington believed would get things done. Williams book i s an excellent discussion of the Federal command system during the American C i v i l War. 4 6O.R«. XVI, i , 513-514; i i , 596, 600-601, 932, 943, 949, 950. 4 7 I b i d . . i , 1030. See Map #2 f o r a general picture of the area that has been under discussion. CHAPTER V HME STONE'S RIVER CAMPAIGN The B a t t l e of P e r r y v i l l e and the Kentucky campaign had been d i s a p p o i n t i n g because there had been no c l e a r cut v i c t o r y f o r e i t h e r side and a bewildered f e e l i n g pervaded the armies and p u b l i c of both North and South at i t s c o n c l u s i o n . General Braxton Bragg had l e d h i s Confederate army back t o the Murfreesboro area, hoping t o be able t o hold onto Middle Tennessee. General W i l l i a m S. Rosecrans made N a s h v i l l e h i s headquarters and s e t t l e d down t o reorganize h i s army and c o l l e c t s u p p l i e s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a new o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t the Confederates. Bragg d i d not f e e l strong enough t o take the i n i t i a t i v e on h i s own and Rosecrans was not i n c l i n e d to move u n t i l he considered t h a t e v e r y t h i n g was ready and favourable and t h e r e f o r e there was a l u l l before the next p e r i o d of major 1 campaigning. One of Rosecrans' primary concerns was h i s c a v a l r y . Throughout November and December of 1862 he c o n s t a n t l y s t r e s s e d the inadequacy of h i s mounted f o r c e i n both numbers and equip-ment. He had l o f t y ideas about what h i s c a v a l r y would be able t o do and once wrote: "My c a v a l r y are the eyes and f e e t of my o army and w i l l be i t s p r o v i d e r s . " He repeatedly requested arms and equipment and on occasion prompted annoyed r e p l i e s from Henry H a l l e c k i n Washington but h i s p e r s i s t e n c e p a i d o f f and he was able t o o b t a i n considerable numbers of arms f o r h i s cavalrymen. By the time of the Murfreesboro campaign i t was - 113 -- 114 -quite well armed. The F i r s t Tennessee Volunteer Cavalry, f o r example, 1 1 . . . i n addition to a breech loading carbine, carried a revolver and a l i g h t cavalry sabre...."^ Also, the evidence indicates that a number of repeating weapons, p a r t i c u l a r l y revolving r i f l e s , found t h e i r way into the hands of the combat troops.^ Rosecrans 1 cavalry was not as destitute of arms as h i s continual cables suggested. The Federal cavalry was not i n consistently good shape however, and therefore some of Rosecrans* concern was genuine. Early i n December 7,417 cavalrymen were shown as present i n the army but there were only 2,496 carbines f o r them. The Assistant Secretary of War, P.H. Watson, cabled on December 8: 11 ...3,600 carbines and Colt's revolving r i f l e s . . . a n d a l l the swords and p i s t o l s f o r which you have c a l l e d had been shipped."5 In addition, Rosecrans lacked a competent chief of cavalry and he spent considerable time campaigning f o r David S. Stanley to f i l l that p o s i t i o n . Stanley had f i r s t served with Rosecrans during the Seige of Corinth and at that time he was with Ulysses S. Grant's army that was beginning the f i r s t of the Vicksburg campaigns. Rosecrans prodded continuously f o r Stanley and f i n a l l y had h i s transfer effected. When he arrived, the new cavalry chief found that h i s troops "...had been badly neglected. I t £the |icavalry] was weak, undisciplined, and scattered around, a regiment to a d i v i s i o n of i n f a n t r y . " ^ He set about consolidating the mounted troops, r e l y i n g on Rosecrans to back him up when infantry o f f i c e r s balked at l e t t i n g the - 115 -troopers go. He betrayed some old- fashioned and orthodox views when he l e t i t be known that he considered the Federal cavalry poorly t r a i n e d because i t r e l i e d on f i rearms instead of on the s a b r e . 7 From the way Stanley and Rosecrans went about reorganizing and supplying the Federal cavalry , i t seemed that the troopers would do more than be the "eyes and f e e t " of the army. I t i s doubtful that Rosecrans would have gone to such lengths to arm h i s cavalry as he d i d unless he intended i t to f i g h t . A few minor e f f o r t s were made along the way to stream-l i n e Federal cavalry operat ions . In e a r l y November, Captain Elmer O t i s of the Fourth Regular Cavalry was appointed c h i e f of c o u r i e r s . A l l the mounted but unarmed men were to report to him and a l l those on c o u r i e r duty that were f u l l y equipped were to be t r a n s f e r r e d to more ac t ive s e r v i c e . At the same time, o f f i c e r s were i n s t r u c t e d to thoroughly scout the roads that they operated on and p i c k up any s t r a g g l e r s . ^ L i t t l e seems to have happened to the Confederate cavalry at t h i s t ime. I t was not as w e l l armed as the Federal horse but t h i s was nothing unusual because armament was one area where Southern s o l d i e r s were c o n t i n u a l l y forced to make do. Wharton i m p l i e d a lack of p i s t o l s i n h i s command when he wrote: The Rangers, being armed with r e v o l v e r s , are bet ter prepared to meet the enemy's cavalry than the other regiments i n the br igade . The b a t t l e of Wednesday was fought at great disadvantage on our par t , the enemy's cavalry being much more e f f i c i e n t l y armed and equipped. The proper weapon f o r cavalry has proven to be the r e v o l v e r .q - 116 -The Confederates had a v a r i e t y of weapons, many of which had been captured from the Federals and the great d i v e r s i t y t h a t r e s u l t e d presented constant problems i n ammunition supply. A l s o , the Federals had a number of breech l o a d i n g and repeat-in g weapons where the Confederates had mainly muzzle l o a d i n g muskets, carbines, and shot guns and t h e i r firepower was t h e r e -f o r e somewhat i n f e r i o r . 1 0 The o r g a n i z a t i o n of the Confederate c a v a l r y d i d not change e i t h e r and Joseph Wheeler*s brigade was s t i l l attached to Leonidas P o l k * s wing, as was John Wharton s t i l l attached to W i l l i a m Hardee*s. More and more however, the c a v a l r y commanders were coming to r e p o r t d i r e c t l y to Bragg than t o e i t h e r of the two subordinate commanders. Through November and up u n t i l Rosecrans advanced from N a s h v i l l e there was a s e r i e s of minor clashes between outposts, p a t r o l s , and forage p a r t i e s w i t h the o c c a s i o n a l s e r i o u s engage-ment. Before Stanley a r r i v e d , John Kennett had command of the Federal c a v a l r y and he screened the army*s approach t o N a s h v i l l e , cooperating w i t h General T.L. C r i t t e n d e n but having the o p t i o n of o p e r a t i n g on h i s own i f he b e l i e v e d t h a t the s i t u a t i o n warranted i t . " * " 1 In December, Rosecrans sent out l a r g e forage t r a i n s and c a v a l r y u s u a l l y formed part of t h e i r guard, o f t e n f i g h t i n g o f f r a i d i n g r e b e l s . On November 12, a group of Federal c o u r i e r s f o o l i s h l y allowed themselves t o be captured and a week l a t e r a c a v a l r y u n i t accompanying a reconnaissance from N a s h v i l l e broke and ran when Confederate p i c k e t s were encountered. 1 2 - 117 -By behaviour l i k e t h i s , the Federal cavalry did not exactly dis t i n g u i s h i t s e l f and Rosecrans excused t h i s with notes l i k e the following, penned to h i s superiors i n Washington: Our great d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l come from t h e i r numerous cavalry harassing us and cutting o f f our forage parties and t r a i n s . I am arming our cavalry, who are not much more than one-half t h e i r e f f e c t i v e force, and much cowed from that f a c t and want of arms.2.3 The Confederate cavalry, on the other hand, performed well enough i n combat but during t h i s period i t was badly handled from the top. Nashville was at the end of a long and vulnerable supply l i n e and i n the past the Confederate cavalry had proven i t s e l f very capable of seriously disrupting such l i n e s , or at least being a s u f f i c i e n t hazard to slow down t h e i r use. But a l l through November and the f i r s t part of December the Federal supply l i n e s were l e f t very much alone. Nathan Forrest's command spent i t s time harassing forage t r a i n s and during the f i r s t two weeks of December prepared f o r the projected r a i d on West Tennessee. 1 4 John Hunt Morgan's men were s i m i l a r l y employed and neither force was sent against Rosecrans 1 l i n e s of supply. 1 3 Morgan d i d descend on H a r t s v i l l e on December 7 and captured the Union garrison there which surrendered a f t e r an embarrassingly b r i e f resistance. This was a s a t i s f y i n g l i t t l e incident and increased Morgan's fame and popularity as well as making the Federals much abashed, but the a f f a i r had no genuine importance. Bragg had allowed his cavalry commanders too much freedom and t h e i r e f f o r t s at t h i s time were uncoordinated and lar g e l y wasted.1^* Part of - i i a -t h i s stemmed from Bragg fs opinion of the two men, whom he considered as f i t only f o r partisan duty. In the past however, they had demonstrated that t h e i r t a l e n t s transcended mere g u e r r i l l a - l i k e a c t i v i t y and i f Bragg had used a l i t t l e more imagination he might have been able to seriously delay the Federal advance. As i t was, Rosecrans was allowed to c o l l e c t s u f f i c i e n t supplies and secure h i s l i n e s of communication. The Southern cavalry was s t r a t e g i c a l l y i d l e at a time when i t could have made a s i g n i f i c a n t impact of the Union war e f f o r t . 1 7 The f a i l u r e seems to l i e squarely with Bragg. He did not keep t i g h t control over h i s admittedly v o l a t i l e cavalry leaders and was content to l e t them operate l a r g e l y at w i l l . Later, he sent Forrest and Morgan on large raids and both did extensive damage although only Forrest's had any genuine strategic s i g n i f i c a n c e . It would have been more l o g i c a l f o r Bragg to use h i s cavalry i n t h i s manner before Rosecrans had accumulated s u f f i c i e n t stores to give the Federal army freedom of movement, and not a f t e r . Bragg did not f e e l strong enough to take the offensive with h i s whole army but he could have taken i t with h i s cavalry columns, ably led as they were. I t appears that the Southern General overlooked the strategic p o t e n t i a l of f a r ranging mobile s t r i k e forces sent against enemy l i n e s of communication, at l e a s t at t h i s time. What the Confederate r a i d e r s did accomplish they did as much on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e as on Bragg*s d i r e c t i o n . This lack of - 119 -imagination i s curious because Bragg had had a strong i n d i c a t i o n of what cavalry could accomplish during Don Carlos Buell*s advance on Chattanooga six months before. The other part of Bragg*s cavalry was on picket duty and from the beginning of November u n t i l when Rosecrans marched h i s army out of Nashville Wheeler and Wharton were to the front i n a vast screen. Late i n December, Wheeler was ordered to push forward to see what was going on. Bragg believed that the Federals were contemplating an immediate advance and he wanted positi v e information. 1^ Bragg had been right and he received confirmation of the Union advance on December 26. Rosecrans had been under heavy pressure from h i s superiors to st a r t moving. They had had enough of slow moving generals with Buell and he had been replaced with the understanding that things would start to happen. But Rosecrans was nothing i f not deliberate and he was not i n c l i n e d to i n i t i a t e a campaign u n t i l he was convinced i n h i s own mind that everything was ready. His decision to advance l a t e i n December was therefore made f o r several reasons. One of these, of course, was the pressure from Washington. Another was the departure of a large part of Bragg*s cavalry on r a i d i n g expeditions. Rosecrans had always been v i t a l l y concerned about the i n f e r i o r i t y of h i s cavalry and when Forrest and Morgan l e f t Rosecrans had approximate p a r i t y between h i s own mounted forces and those of the enemy. This was something that he had been s t r i v i n g f o r . 1 9 Also, he had collected a - 120 -s u f f i c i e n t stockpile of supplies to allow him freedom of move-on ment i n case something happened to h i s l i n e s of supply. So Rosecrans believed that everything was ready and accordingly issued h i s marching orders. On December 26 the three corps of the Federal army moved out on three roughly p a r a l l e l routes towards Stone's River. Stanley's cavalry was divided to provide a brigade to cover the advance of each column. The Federal penchant f o r fragmenting t h e i r cavalry force appeared again but t h i s time, i t had a l o g i c a l object. I t was a function of cavalry to cover an army that was advancing and therefore only l o g i c a l that i f the army advanced i n three columns then the cavalry be so divided to provide a screening force f o r each column. In the past the Union cavalry had done t h i s as well but the f r a g -mentation had continued f a r past the immediate objects i n mind to the point where the force had been seriously weakened. The recent reorganization of the Federal cavalry suggested that changes were i n the offing.= The cavalry also had the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of maintaining communications within the army as Rosecrans' chief of s t a f f , Colonel J.P. Garesch£, indicated i n a note to Stanley: From the reserve you w i l l furnish General McCook with the means of keeping up communications with you and these headquarters.... Direct the commander of each of your cavalry detachments to keep a regular com-munication with each other and the leading d i v i s i o n s i n t h e i r rear. Make arrangements also f o r courier line.• • « o n - 121 -Federal cavalry organization seemed to be improving and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were more precise. This was the clearest statement of the duties of the mounted troops i n t h i s regard that had yet emerged. The main duty of the Federal cavalry was to scout, seek out the enemy positions, and drive i n the opposing pickets during the advance. I t was a prime r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the troopers to prevent the leading infantry units from being surprised. General Alexander McCook had confidence that the cavalry heading h i s column would do a good job: I have Colonel Zahm and three regiments of cavalry on that road, and one-half of h i s men i n the saddle p a t r o l l i n g . I w i l l have timely warning. I have cavalry i n search of Negley...Stanley w i l l attend the roads south.22 There was a series of small but brisk skirmishes as the Federal army advanced. General Jefferson C. Davis had only one company with h i s in f a n t r y brigade but he sent the horsemen ahead with " . . . i n s t r u c t i o n s to drive i n the enemy's pickets, and attack him on h i s flanks at every opportunity." 2 3 Davis may have expected rather too much from one company but t h i s shows that he was prepared to put i t to use and was not about to be s a t i s f i e d i f i t merely sat around watching the enemy. He c l e a r l y expected h i s cavalrymen to f i g h t . The Union army advanced slowly, through unfavourable country i n inclement weather, and gradually pushed the Confederate pickets back on t h e i r reserves and those i n turn back towards where Bragg was concentrating h i s army near - 122 -Stone's River. The rebel cavalry was i n some strength, as Stanley indicated: ...I met the enemy's pickets, who, as they f e l l back . before us were continually reenforced...they disputed our progress with a force of 2,500 cavalry and mounted infantry supported by four pieces of a r t i l l e r y under the command of General Wheeler.24 At one point Federal troopers made a dash and seized a bridge, holding i t u n t i l supporting infantry columns came up. Generally, there were many l i t t l e combats and cavalrymen on both sides fought both mounted and on foot, occasionally charging enemy positions on horseback. As soon as Bragg had discovered that the Federals were moving he had to concentrate h i s own army but i t was strung out i n a l i n e with Murfreesboro as the centre. He therefore needed time and he depended on h i s cavalry to buy him that time. Wheeler assured Bragg that he could delay the Federals f o r four days and the general orders that Bragg issued on December 28 made the role of the Confederate cavalry very c l e a r : Cavalry to f a l l back gradually before enemy, reporting by couriers every hour. When near our l i n e s , Wheeler w i l l move to the right and Wharton to the l e f t , to . cover and protect our flanks and report movements of enemy; Pegram to f a l l to the rear, and report to the commanding general as a reserve.25 Clearly the cavalry was a covering and a delaying force and t h i s was a job that Wheeler was p a r t i c u l a r l y adept at. He had demonstrated h i s aptitudes before the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e , during i t , a f t e r i t , and was to do so again i n t h i s campaign. - 123 -I t d i d t a k e t h e F e d e r a l army f o u r d a y s t o grope i t s •way t o S t o n e ' s R i v e r and p u t i t s e l f i n b a t t l e a r r a y b u t t h i s was n o t due t o t h e e f f o r t s o f t h e C o n f e d e r a t e c a v a l r y a l o n e . W h e e l e r d i d w e l l , and t h i s i s n o t t o d e t r a c t f r o m h i s c a r e -f u l l y c o n d u c t e d r e a r g u a r d a c t i o n b u t t h e r e were o t h e r f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . The o t h e r f a c t o r s stemmed f r o m t h e c a p r i c e s o f n a t u r e and t h e r e was r e a l l y v e r y l i t t l e t h a t c o u l d be done a b o u t t h e m . The w e a t h e r i n t h a t Tennessee w i n t e r p r o v e d t o be p a r t i c u l a r l y f o u l and more t h a n one comment f o u n d i t s way i n t o t h e o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s . D a v i s w r o t e : " . . . m y advance was o v e r a r u g g e d c o u n t r y r e n d e r e d a l m o s t i m p a s s a b l e by t h e i n c e s s a n t r a i n s . " 2 ^ McCook w r o t e on December 27: " T h e f o g i s so t h i c k i n t h e s e h i l l s t h a t I c a n n o t see 300 y a r d s i n my f r o n t . I have o r d e r e d a h a l t u n t i l t h e f o g r i s e s . " 2 7 C o l o n e l J o s e p h Dodge w r o t e : " . . . o w i n g t o t h e g r o u n d b e i n g v e r y much s o f t e n e d by t h e r a i n , t h e m e n ' s c l o t h i n g were so s a t u r a t e d w i t h w a t e r t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o . . . [ a d v a n c e ] a t t h e r a t e o f speed d e s i r e d . " 2 * * G e n e r a l George Thomas r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e r a i n s t h a t had f a l l e n one n i g h t had made t h e r o a d s t o h i s f r o n t a l m o s t i m p a s s a b l e . 2 9 A l l i n a l l , n a t u r e was n o t v e r y k i n d t o two a r m i e s t h a t were s t r u g g l i n g v a l i a n t l y t o g e t c l o s e enough t o s h o o t each o t h e r u p . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s p r o v i d e d by t h e w e a t h e r , t h e t o p o g r a p h y a l s o p r o v e d h o s t i l e . R o s e c r a n s w r o t e d e s c r i p t -i v e l y o f t h e l a y o f t h e l a n d : - 124 -. . . r o l l i n g or h i l l y routes, skirted by cedar thickets, farms, and intersected by small streams, with rocky b l u f f banks, forming serious obstacles.... • • • ...the road rough, through r o l l i n g country, skirted by b l u f f s covered with dense cedar thickets, tops open timber. . . . t h i s whole country i s a natural f o r t i f i c a t i o n . 3 0 A large army, forced to move through country l i k e t h i s , dragging a l l the impedimenta of war, i n rains that made heavy clothing heavier and more r e s t r i c t i n g on men already loaded down with knapsacks, cartridge belts, canteens, and weapons, would not have been able to move quickly. I t was no wonder that i t took Rosecrans four days to get h i s army up into position to o f f e r b a t t l e . The Battle of Stone's River, or Murfreesboro, proved to be a hard fought and bloody a f f a i r . Both generals had e s s e n t i a l l y the same plan; to hold with the r i g h t wing and str i k e with the l e f t . Bragg took the i n i t i a t i v e however and Hardee's corps drove i n on McCook's men while they were s t i l l cooking t h e i r breakfasts and watering the a r t i l l e r y teams. December 31 saw Rosecrans' army come close to a debacle, but he had faced an analogous s i t u a t i o n at Corinth and tough f i g h t i n g mixed with determination had won the day there. McCook's corps was sent r e e l i n g back, badly crippled, but the Federal centre stood firm and the Confederates lacked the reserve power to drive through to a complete v i c t o r y . The Union troops r a l l i e d and di s a s t e r was staved o f f . - 125 The Union cavalry found much active employment i n the f i g h t i n g and t h i s was perhaps one of the few times that troopers had been sent into heavy combat on the Union side. Detachments were hurled almost piecemeal into the l i n e s . Otis, who had been stationed near Rosecrans* headquarters as a reserve with a much reduced regiment, was sent galloping o f f to the r i g h t when Rosecrans f i r s t learned of McCook's p e r i l . O t is l e d h i s men i n charges and countercharges against attacking Confederate cavalry and was instrumental i n saving McCook's reserve ammunition t r a i n when i t was threatened by rebel horsemen. Otis was l a t e r reinforced by other cavalry units that had been r a l l i e d or sent from other parts of the f i e l d . 3 1 Colonel R.G.H. Minty of the Fourth Michigan Cavalry reported s p i r i t e d mounted action that suggested the old concept of heavy cavalry was not e n t i r e l y forgotten by any means, but at the same time i t displayed some new features! W . . . I charged the f i r s t l i n e on our front with the Fourth Michigan and the F i r s t Tennessee, supported on the right by a f i r e from the Fifteenth Pennsylvania.... I reformed my men and again charged." 3 2 The Federal cavalry seemed to be f i g h t i n g a dragoon kind of action here depending on i t s firearms i n combat. This impression i s confirmed i n the report of Captain Valentine Cupp of the F i r s t Ohio Cavalry, who was engaged on another part of the f i e l d : " . ..receiving three heavy charges from the enemy's cavalry, but repulsed them every time with f i r e from our ca r b i n e s . " 3 3 John Kennett reported s i m i l a r action: "I r a l l i e d - 126 -the Third Ohio...and formed i t i n rear of a fence, where volley a f t e r volley had the effect of d r i v i n g back the rebels, they [the Third Ohio] charging upon them e f f e c t u a l l y . " 3 4 This indicates f a i r l y c l e a r l y that the Federal cavalrymen were r e l y i n g on t h e i r firearms quite heavily and that f i r e action was s u f f i c i e n t to repel mounted charges. When Hardee's corps had gone forward i n the early hours of December 31 Wharton's cavalry had moved on the l e f t f lank. His troopers h i t the Federals i n the flanks and rear at the same time as the rebel infantrymen attacked the f r o n t . Wharton wrote of combat that he had l a t e r when he was faced by the Union cavalry: A heavy body of cavalry was drawn up...to give b a t t l e . . . . Ashby and Hardy were ordered to charge.... They were met by a countercharge of the enemy, supposed to be the Fourth Regulars, with drawn sabers. At the same time Harrison's command was ordered to charge.... ...2,000 horsemen were hurled on the foe. The ground was exceedingly favorable f o r cavalry operations, and a f t e r a short hand to hand c o n f l i c t , i n which the revolver was used with deadly e f f e c t , the enemy fled....35 The heavy cavalry a c t i v i t y of the Union horse was apparently mirrored on the Confederate side and i n addition revolver met sabre i n a melee, i n d i c a t i n g that the use of firearms extended to mounted as well as dismounted combat. Most of the heavy f i g h t i n g took place on the Union right on December 31 and the organization of the Federal cavalry seems to have been f a i r l y f l u i d with the troopers now operating i n b a t t a l i o n or regimental sized units, and occasionally being concentrated i n brigade s i z e . Rosecrans' cavalry was well - 127 -suited to a s s i s t i n shoring up the sagging r i g h t wing. It was well armed on the whole and highly mobile. Although much of the Union cavalry bolted at the f i r s t attack, i t was r a l l i e d and fought f a i r l y steadily t h e r e a f t e r . 3 ^ The Confederate horsemen had displayed t h e i r customary aggression and performed well f o r the most part. When the Southern advance had f i n a l l y s t a l l e d , Wharton remained temporarily on the flank as a cover-ing f o rce. There was l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on the Union l e f t but the f a i l u r e of rebel cavalry to scout a c t i v e l y and aggressively may have saved the Federal army from d i s a s t e r . The Northern cavalry force there was small and did l i t t l e except skirmish, b r i e f l y i n defense of some fords over Stone's River, but as the Confederates did not appear i n strength, t h i s did. not prove1 a very hazardous t a s k . 3 7 The Southern cavalry was under the command of John Pegram, who, u n t i l a short time before, had been Edmund Kirby Smith's chief of s t a f f . General John C. Breckinridge commanded the infantry immediately to Pegram's rear and depended on him to re l a t e what was happening to the f r o n t . Early i n the morning on December 31 Pegram d u t i f u l l y reported that Federal troops had crossed Stone's River and were moving up on Breckinridge. Rosecrans was preparing f o r his assault on Bragg's right but t h i s attack was never launched. The troops were withdrawn almost immediately when McCook was attacked but Pegram eith e r f a i l e d to notice t h i s or he f a i l e d to n o t i f y Breckinridge. I t i s not cle a r which was the case - 128 i n t h i s instance. About noon, Bragg c a l l e d on Breckinridge to send reinforcements to drive home the attack that was going so well on the l e f t wing. Breckinridge r e p l i e d that he was expecting an attack momentarily himself and therefore could not possibly spare any men. The Federals did not show up however, and by the time Breckinridge had moved forward and discovered that the Union force was f i c t i o n the attack by Hardee was beginning to run down. Exactly how much difference Breckinridge's men would have made even i f they could have arrived i n time i s only conjecture. The central point i s that as a scout, Pegram was a miserable f a i l u r e . 3 * * The remainder of the Federal cavalry was engaged escorting t r a i n s between Nashville and the fr o n t . Lewis Zahm's brigade drew t h i s assignment and i t was a job with which Zahm was quite f a m i l i a r as he had spent most of the time before the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e on escort duty. He fought several l i t t l e seesaw actions, of which, the following i s t y p i c a l : "...discovered the enemy charging up the pike i n our rear. I met them and repulsed them, they charged again. I repulsed them again and charged them back f o r two m i l e s . . . . " 3 9 Wheeler was given more active duty during the battle and he assumed the ro l e of a dagger aimed d i r e c t l y at the Federal communications. This arose out of Bragg's o v e r a l l b a t t l e plan, and demonstrated that the Confederate general had a good t a c t i c a l grasp of the use of cavalry: - 129 -Tonight, i f the enemy has gained h i s position on our front ready f o r action, Wheeler and Wharton, with t h e i r whole commands, w i l l make a night march to the r i g h t and l e f t , turn the enemy's flank, gain h i s rear, and vigor-ously a s s a i l h i s t r a i n s and rear guard, blocking the roads and impeding h i s movements i n every way, holding themselves ready to a s s a i l h i s retreating forces. Wharton had been diverted to a s s i s t Hardee but Wheeler proceeded as ordered. He went to Jefferson, La Vargne, Rock Springs, and Nolensville and i n the course of h i s r a i d destroyed an estimated one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s worth of Federal property and paroled hundreds of prisoners. His r a i d had been swift and successful but the f a s t marching had been hard on h i s horses and by the time he rejoined Wharton on the Confederate l e f t flank on the afternoon of December 31, h i s animals were quite j a d e d . 4 1 T i r e d horses notwithstanding, Wheeler went to the Federal rear again the following day, t h i s time reinforced by Wharton's brigade. He was able to i n f l i c t only minimal damage however because of the strong infantry guards and heavy escorts that Rosecrans had set up to protect h i s supplies. Colonel William Innes described an attack by Wharton's men on h i s p o s i t i o n while Wheeler chased a wagon t r a i n : "The enemy attacked us with great fury, making several d i s t i n c t charges upon us, attacking us on every side, mounted and on foot...but were again and again severely r e p u l s e d . . . . " 4 2 Evidently, a strongly posted infantry force could s t i l l withstand attacks by horsemen. In the course of the foray, Wheeler noted that heavy Federal reinforcements were moving up from Nashville and hi s reports to Bragg p a r t l y convinced the Confederate commander that he had to withdraw. - 130 -New Year.ls Day was comparatively quiet f o r both armies but the day following, Bragg made h i s l a s t e f f o r t to beat Rosecrans. A f t e r the b a t t l e of December 31 Rosecrans had decided that he was not going to be beaten and that he was not going to retreat and t h i s decision made the b a t t l e a Federal v i c t o r y because Bragg could not muster s u f f i c i e n t power to overthrow the Union army, although he hurt i t b a d l y . 4 3 Breckinridge's d i v i s i o n was to make an assault on the Federal l e f t and i t was to have the support of Wharton's and Pegram's cavalry. Pegram f a i l e d the infantry once again how-ever, although i t would be stretching the evidence to claim that h i s absence caused the Confederate repulse. Breckinridge had been t o l d that he was to have cavalry support and he sent off s t a f f o f f i c e r s to f i n d i t but the time f o r the attack arrived before these aides returned and Breckinridge moved o f f anyway. Pegram had been ordered to report to Wharton to cooperate i n the attack and he had endorsed the order as "received" but when the assault on the Federal l i n e s began Wharton expressed astonishment. Somewhere the l i n e s of com-munication between the several segments of the Confederate army had broken, and the point of breakage seems to have been John Pegram. Wharton, accompanied by an apparently equally surprised Pegram, rushed forward to provide a cover f o r Breckinridge's d i v i s i o n , which had been sent staggering back by heavy a r t i l l e r y and musket f i r e from the strong Federal p o s i t i o n s . 4 4 Throughout the b a t t l e , Pegram had been a singular-l y undistinguished cavalry o f f i c e r . This repulse saw the end - 131 -of the major f i g h t i n g and the next few days saw minor s k i r -mishes as Bragg, covered by h i s cavalry, pulled back to form a new l i n e along the Duck River, where he sat f o r six months before Rosecrans moved out on him again. In some respects the b a t t l e had been drawn as neither side had actually been defeated although both had suffered tremendous casualties and serious d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n . 4 ^ The p r i n c i p a l reason Rosecrans did not mount a vigorous pursuit was that h i s army was exhausted and needed to rest and r e f i t before i t could take up active campaigning again. The victory r e a l l y went to the Federals however, because Bragg pulled back and gave up t e r r i t o r y , thus presenting the appearance of a repulse although h i s army was hardly beaten. Bragg*s e f f o r t s to cut Union supply l i n e s had resulted i n considerable damage but Rosecrans had not been seriously embarrassed by the Confederate cavalry thrusts. The Federals had a considerable stockpile of supplies and r i v e r communications were soon available so Rosecrans was not immediately dependent on the r a i l r o a d s which had been Bragg*s main targets. The time f o r Bragg to send h i s cavalry against the Federal l i n e s of com-munication with t e l l i n g e f f e c t had r e a l l y passed and only Forrest*s r a i d into West Tennessee had any serious consequences. At the t a c t i c a l l e v e l , the cavalry on both sides had found frequent employment i n t h i s campaign. The Federal horse had displayed increased aggressiveness and e f f i c i e n c y and - 132 -Stanley's guiding hand i n combination with Rosecrans* l a v i s h attention seems to have had b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t s . Rosecrans was eminently pleased with the behaviour of h i s cavalry and although he was g u i l t y of an excess of enthusiasm and a s l i g h t d i s t o r t i o n of the truth, there was some substance to what he said, par-t i c u l a r l y when the Federal cavalry here was compared to the period when Don Carlos Buell was i n command.47 On the other side, Bragg credited h i s cavalry as having been the main reason why the Federal consumed so much time i n moving from Nashville to Stone's River but although Wheeler had conducted an able and inspired rear guard action he had had some assistance from the topography which favoured defense and the inclement weather which severely r e s t r i c t e d the Federal movements. In bat t l e , both cavalry forces were active and Rosecrans was the f i r s t Federal commander i n the West who displayed l i t t l e h e s i t a t i o n i n hurling h i s cavalrymen into the thick of the f i g h t . Although part of the Federal horse had bolted at f i r s t , i t had r a l l i e d and fought well f o r the most part. The dual r o l e of the cavalry was evident once again. I t was a dagger i n Wheeler's r a i d to the Federal rear and i n Morgan's thrust at H a r t s v i l l e . These were spectacular and bothersome but did not produce s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s . Wharton was also a kind of dagger when he charged the Union right on December 31• The dagger concept found immediate use i n a t a c t i c a l sense i n t h i s campaign, and i t was not u n t i l a f t e r the middle of December that Bragg attempted to use hi s mounted columns i n any meaningfully strategic manner. - 133 -The second part of the cavalry's dual r o l e was equally as apparent and c l e a r l y i n the ascendent i n t h i s campaign. The cavalry was a t a c t i c a l defensive force as well as a t a c t i c a l and strategic offensive force. A l l the duties of escorting, scouting, screening the advance of the Federal columns, and covering the concentration and retreat of the Confederate army were oriented to the protection of the main part of the forces. In t h i s the cavalry was c l e a r l y a subordinate and a u x i l i a r y arm. A clear i n d i c a t i o n of the approach to r o l e was given by the cavalry at the Battle of Stone's River as w e l l . I t was increasingly evident that the troopers were f i g h t i n g l i k e dragoons, often combining mounted and dismounted action i n a short space of time. In addition, f i r e action was considerably important, and evidence of reliance on the sabre was scant i n spite of Stanley's interest i n i t s use. Troopers on both sides used t h e i r firearms both mounted and on foot. A l l t h i s does not class the cavalry as mere mounted infantry e i t h e r . The vast majority of duties were cavalry duties, and the troopers assumed the parts of l i g h t or heavy horsemen, as the occasion demanded. Necessity was responsible f o r t h i s . Opportunities f o r heavy cavalry a c t i v i t y were few and i n previous campaigns cavalrymen had done very l i t t l e because they were often held, presumably f o r the opportune moment. I t became apparent that i t was not p r a c t i c a l to divide the mounted troops according to - 134 -function and the employment and behaviour of both Union and Confederate troopers presents implicit evidence of this. A l l the types of mounted functions were performed by the same men. In addition, the men placed increased reliance on their firearms. Improvements in weaponry, indifferent horsemanship, restricted terrain, and inexperienced officers seem to have been largely responsible for this. Although i t was never exp l i c i t l y stated, an inexperienced officer would have far better control over his men fighting on foot than fighting mounted. In spite of a l l the surface changes, and alterations in approach, the dual role of the cavalry remained essentially the same and i t can s t i l l be interpreted as a shield and dagger. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER V •J-Bruce Catton, Never C a l l Retreat (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) , p. 36. Connelly, Army of the Heartland. p. 274. Williams, Lincoln Finds A General. IV, 141, 223. tamers, Edge of Glory, p. 187. 2O.R.. Series I, Volume XX, Part i i , 9- ( A l l subsequent O.R. c i t a t i o n s i n t h i s chapter r e f e r to Series I unless other-wise noted and form w i l l be consistent with previous chapters.) 3W.R. Carter, History of the F i r s t Regiment of Tennessee  Volunteer Cavalry 1862-1865 (Knoxville: Grant Ogden Co. f 1902) f p. 6 2 . O t h e r than a few references of t h i s nature Carter's work i s of l i t t l e value. ^William B. Denison, Rosecrans* Campaigns with the 14th  Army Corns C i n c i n n a t i : Moore, Wilstach, Keys & Co., I863), pp. 25, 109. 5O.R.. XX, i i , 59, 127, 135 . ^D.S. Stanley, Memoirs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), p. 120. See also O.R.. XX, i i , 8, 30, 94 . 7Stanley, Memoirs, p. 121. A l l Stanley's early career had been i n mounted service on the f r o n t i e r . Ezra J . Warner. Generals i n Blue (Louisiana State University Press, 1964) , pp. 470-471. °0.R.. XX, i i , 23, 39-40 . 9 I b i d . . i , 969. l°Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 68, 111. See also Jac Weller, "Imported Confederate Shoulder Weapons", C.W.H. (1959), pp. 157-183. O.R.. XX, i , 28, 426; i i , 211. Brackett, History of U.S. Cavalry, pp. I06-I67 mentions that Spencer's and Sharp's carbines were favourites. See O.R.. I, 733-734 and i b i d . . Series IV, Volume I, 965. For a competent study of weapons i n general see William B. Edwards, C i v i l War Guns (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1962). 1:L0.R.. XX, i i , 8, 15, 17, 20. - 135 -- 136 -1 2 I b i d . , i , 13-14. 1 3 I b i d . , 41. 1 4Andrew Nelson L y t l e , Bedford Forrest and His C r i t t e r  Company (New York: Minton Balch & Company, 1931), p. 114. • ^ C e c i l Fletcher Holland, Morgan and His Raiders (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943), pp. I64-I65. l 6See Edwin C. Bearss, "The Battle of H a r t s v i l l e and Morgan's Second Kentucky Raid", The Register of the Kentucky  H i s t o r i c a l Society ( 1 9 6 7 ) , V o l . 6 5 , Nos. 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , f o r a detailed narrative of t h i s a f f a i r . Holland, Morgan, p. 170 believes that although the a f f a i r had no strategic significance i t provided a morale booster by providing a v i c t o r y that was sorely needed. Duke, Morgan's  Cavalry, p. 2 2 6 . O.R.. XX, i , 44, 47, 5 2 . 17O.R.. XX, i , 6 4 ; i i , 4 0 2 , 411, 4 2 0 - 4 2 1 . Holland, Morgan. p. I 6 4 states that Bragg believed Forrest and Morgan were f i t only f o r partisan duty. Dyer, "Cavalry Operations", J.S.H. ( 1 9 4 2 ) , pp. 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 . Horn, Army of Tennessee, p. 194 disagrees but the evidence does not bear t h i s out. See the following chapter f o r a more detailed discussion of the l a r g e r r a i d s . i a 0 . R » . XX, i i , 3 9 3 , 4 5 7 . ! 9 l b i d . . 219* Rosecrans wrote that the absence of Forrest and Morgan would "...materially aid us i n our movement". See also Lamers, Edge of Glory, pp. 1 9 7 , 199* Williams, Lincoln  Finds A General. IV, 2 5 3 , 2 8 5 . Jones, Confederate Strategy. p. 1 2 3 . Forrest and Morgan had about 5 , 0 0 0 men between them. See also Appendices I and I I . O.R., XX, i , 189. 2 0 C a t t o n , Never C a l l Retreat, p. 3 8 . 21Q.R,.. XX, i i , 2 4 1 . 2 2 I b i d . , 2 7 , 2 7 1 . 2 3 l b i d . . i , 2 6 2 . 2 4 I b i d . t 623 - 137 25 Ibid.. 672. See J.P. Dyer, " F i g h t i n ' Joe" Wheeler (Louisiana State University Press, 1941), P» 80. 26Q.R.. XX, i , 262. 27ibid.. 252. 28ibid., 19. 2 q I b i d . . 372. 3°Ibid.. I 8 4 . Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 39. 31Q.R.. XX, i , 618, 624, 649. Stanley, Memoirs, pp. 125-130, 32Q.R.. XX, i , 625. 3 3 I b i d . . 64O. 3 4 I b i d . , 621. 3 50 iR., XX, i , 967. See also 961. Hardee's orders to Wharton are discussed on i b i d . . 966. The reports of Union o f f i c e r s confirm that the Confederate cavalry and infantry attacked simultaneously. Ibid., 306, 314, 343, 621. 3 6Ibid., 634-^38. 3 7 l b i d . . 879. 3 g J o h n Pegram to Braxton Bragg, 10:00 A.M., December 31, 1862. The Braxton Bragg Papers, William Palmer Co l l e c t i o n , Western Reserve H i s t o r i c a l Society, Cleveland, Ohio (microfilm copy U.B.C. History Department reading room), Reel #3- O.R.. XX, i , 666, 782-783. See also Edwin C. Bearss, "Cavalry Operations i n the Battle of Stone's River", Tennessee H i s t o r i c a l  Quarterly. XIX (I960), p. 129. (Hereafter c i t e d as Bearss, "Cavalry Operations", T.H.Q. (I960). ). 39o.R., XX, i , 634. Zahm's complete report i s on i b i d . . 633-63IT See also i b i d . , 626. 4°Ibid., 672 - 138 -^ G i l b e r t C. K n i f f i n , "The Battle of Stone's River", Battles and Leaders, III^ 6l4n. Joseph Wheeler to Braxton Bragg, 8:30 and 9:00 A.M., December 31> 1862, Bragg Papers, Reel #3-^.R.. XX, i , 651. See also i b i d . , 968 f o r Wharton's report. ^Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 45. Q.R.. XX, i , 959. Bearss, "Cavalry Operations", T.H.Q. (i960), p. 139. 44Q,R«. XX, i , 688, 969 (Wharton), 790 (theoorder to Pegram endorsed "received"), and 785-787 (Breckinridge's report). Appendix III f o r casualty f i g u r e s . 4^See the next chapter f o r a more thorough discussion of the cavalry raids of t h i s period. 47Q.R.. XX, i , 634-638, 198-199. About the Federal horsemen, Wheeler said: "The cavalry we kept back with the greatest ease." Ibid.. 958. See also Lamers, Edge of Glory, p. 210 and Williams, Lincoln Finds A General. IV, 272. CHAPTER VI CIVIL WAR CAVALRY RAIDS WINTER 1862-1863 The long range cavalry r a i d has been a topic of some interes t i n C i v i l War studies. The r a i d s were usually daring, swift, and had the added a t t r a c t i o n of being conducted by dashing and romantic leaders. John Hunt Morgan and Nathan Bedford Forrest are two prominent examples of Confederate raiders whose exploits t h r i l l e d the South as they swept through Federal t e r r i t o r y , capturing small outposts, burning bridges and t r e s t l e s , destroying track, and eluding the columns of troops sent to capture them. They captured the imagination i n much the same manner as J.E.B. Stuart did by h i s famous rides around the Federal Army of the Potomac i n the Eastern theatre. Historians have often romanticized the raiders to such an extent that the r e a l r ole of the cavalry foray and the actual nature of the accomplishments have been obscured behind a veneer of heroic idealism. The cavalry raiders deserve attention, but they, l i k e the r a i d i t s e l f , must be put i n proper perspective. Many m i l i t a r y men and contemporary observers recorded thoughts on the cavalry r a i d . B.H. L i d d e l l Hart believes that the raids were only occasionally of s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t . To him, the r e s u l t s of a r a i d depended on the s k i l l of the leader, the choice of the target, and the thoroughness of the troops i n t h e i r work. 1 J.F.C. F u l l e r summed up h i s opinion of cavalry raids quite s u c c i n c t l y . He said that they were "...too distant to influence the main operations". 2 Justus Scheibert, a Prussian - 139 -- 140 -observer, believed that the importance of cavalry raids had been exaggerated and that even under i d e a l conditions they brought only l i m i t e d success. 3 Captain Charles Chesney of the Staff College i n England, another contemporary observer, also questioned the value of r a i d s and concluded that they merely wasted horseflesh. He l a t e r softened h i s opinion and admitted that cavalry could be used i n short ranged operations, but he never condoned the f a r reaching expeditions. 4 French authors displayed considerable i n t e r e s t i n the cavalry r a i d but con-trary to the general English view, believed i t to have been of s i g n i f i c a n c e . Vigo Roussillon^for example, a professor from the French S t a f f school, believed that the increased firepower evident had decreased cavalry's t a c t i c a l r ole with the main army and increased i t s strategic r o l e i n the form of the r a i d . 3 Other observers believed that the r e a l value of a command l i k e Forrest's was i n that the men were fought as infantry u t i l i z i n g t h e i r horses only f o r transportation and mobility. Some q u a l i f i e d t h e i r views and maintained that they should have been car r i e d out by regulars instead of partisans.^* How t h i s could have been done by the Americans, whose armies were com-posed overwhelmingly of c i t i z e n volunteers and conscripts which could not have been ca l l e d "regulars" u n t i l the closing days of the war, they did not say. They were presumably thinking of future relevance f o r the European context. Viscount Wolseley, who l a t e r published h i s own observations on many aspects of the war, was p a r t i c u l a r l y enthusiastic about the a c t i v i t i e s - 141 -of Forrest. He thought that Forrest's r a i d s were most successful and useful although he did not l i k e the idea that the Confederate's command was usually composed of freebooters. 7 Scholars and authors of m i l i t a r y studies subsequently have also considered the cavalry r a i d . Thomas Theile believes that the r a i d was a new concept i n the use of cavalry but one that required a number of f a c t o r s a l l melding well to be of any s i g n i f i c a n c e . He maintains that the cavalry forces seldom had s u f f i c i e n t time to do more than s u p e r f i c i a l damage to r a i l r o a d s , which were generally the main objectives. To be sure, bridges and t r e s t l e s were destroyed, track was torn up, and buildings and supplies often demolished. These were generally things that could quickly be replaced or improvised however, and the way to r e a l l y cripple a r a i l r o a d was to destroy the tunnels, but t h i s required time that the f a s t moving raiders could not spare as they were usually only a few steps ahead of superior pursuing forces and i t was axiomatic that a r a i d i n g column not get involved i n a serious f i g h t . Certainly there i s much i n what Theile says. The Federals i n p a r t i c u l a r were quite well organized i n the main-tenance of t h e i r r a i l r o a d s and the damage that was done was usually repaired quickly. With i t s superior resources and hard working engineering troops, the North had a d e f i n i t e advantage over the South i n t h i s matter. An h i s t o r i a n of Confederate strategy has discovered that the rebels planned to r e l y almost exclusively on cavalry r a i d s - 142 -early in-1863 to delay the Federal advances i n the West. There was to be an interdepartmental concentration under E a r l Van Dorn but t h i s force was diverted from i t s semi-independent role when Braxton Bragg retreated from Murfreesboro following the B a t t l e of Stone's River. I t was subsequently employed to guard the flanks of Bragg*s new p o s i t i o n s . 9 Alonzo Gray believes that the rai d s were not productive i n terms of the cost i n men and horses and he maintains that they worked best i f carried out i n f r i e n d l y t e r r i t o r y where the invaders could count on the support of the l o c a l population and that the raids had to be swift to have any chance of succ e s s . 1 0 James M. M e r r i l l , the author of one of the better popular h i s t o r i e s of cavalry, pays l i t t l e attention to the ro l e of the r a i d and concentrates h i s attention on the more romantic p e r s o n a l i t i e s . 1 1 Stephen Oates, i n h i s study of cavalry i n the trans-M i s s i s s i p p i West, concentrates on the four raids that were the main Confederate war e f f o r t there. He concludes that lack of success stemmed from f a i l u r e s i n leadership but he also believes that i t was the purpose of cavalry to operate i n s e l f - s u s t a i n i n g bodies. This i s a curious conclusion because nothing i n previous theory or experience had suggested such a role f o r cavalry, and t h i s was something that slowly developed throughout the war, seldom p l a i n l y evident at any one time. Oates does make a noteworthy point when he states that the raids were r e a l l y the - 143 -only way that the Confederates could take the offensive i n the 12 Western p l a i n s . This was evident i n several of the campaigns discussed above, and Bragg*s apparent f a i l u r e to make better and more coordinated use of h i s cavalry through November and early December of 1862 i s a possible explanation f o r the Federal success i n the Stone's River campaign. I f Rosecrans* l i n e s of communication had been h i t and broken repeatedly, he could have been delayed some time before being able to advance, but Bragg had h i s cavalry engaged i n minor or uncoordinated a c t i v i t i e s . George T. Denison, although he was the author of the d e f i n i t i v e history of cavalry i n the nineteenth century, did not attempt to examine the r o l e of the r a i d . He was concerned instead with the mounted infantry approach and style of f i g h t i n g seen i n the C i v i l War, p a r t i c u l a r l y as practised by the Confederates. 1 3 Thus the general consensus of opinion seems to be that the value of raids was s l i g h t and even those who believed that they did have significance had serious reservations about extending t h e i r unqualified support and doubted t h e i r o v e r a l l value. Presentation of a concurring, dissenting, or q u a l i f i e d judgement on the role of the cavalry r a i d can only be made on the basis of an independent examination. Certainly the r a i d did represent the ultimate i n the danger concept and i t was an e f f o r t to f i n d a strategic r o l e f o r cavalry as w e l l . Brigades and even d i v i s i o n s of horse soldiers detached themselves from - 144 -the main armies and rode hard and f a r to cut l i n e s of commun~ i c a t i o n or destroy depots of supplies. Speed was e s s e n t i a l , as the enemy garrisons soon concentrated columns of troops that came up i n pursuit, and the troopers were often involved i n several small skirmishes before the r a i d ran i t s course. The three raids examined here occurred i n the winter of I 8 6 2 - I 8 6 3 and were concurrent with the campaigns conducted i n Tennessee at the time between the armies under Bragg and William Rosecrans. Forrest's r a i d into West Tennessee was from December 1 5 , 1862 to early January I 8 6 3 and was conducted i n coordination with a r a i d on Ulysses S. Grant's supply depot at Holly Springs by a second Confederate cavalry column under Van Dorn. Morgan's second Kentucky r a i d (his f i r s t had been i n the summer of 1862) was from December 2 2 , 1862 to January 2 , I 8 6 3 and i t was an attempt to cut Rosecrans' l i n e s of supply. The sole Federal r a i d was a small expedition into East Tennessee under the command of Samuel Carter and was from December 29, 1 8 6 2 to January 2 , I 8 6 3 and i t s objective was to cut the Confederate r a i l r o a d between Eastern Tennessee and V i r g i n i a . Later i n 1 8 6 3 there were two more major raids conducted by the Federals. In A p r i l Colonel Abel Streight l e d an abortive run from Corinth to Tuscumbia which resulted only i n the capture of h i s force by Forrest who had kept up i n t o l e r a b l e pressure through one of the most aggressive and r e l e n t l e s s pursuits of the war. About the same time Benjamin Grierson l e d a Federal column south from La Grange to Baton Rouge and although he did - 145 -l i t t l e r e a l damage to the Confederacy, the psychological e f f e c t of h i s expedition on the South and i t s dramatic impact on the North were considerable. 1^ 4 -But i n December of 1862, things had not yet advanced that f a r . Grant was advancing on Vicksburg and presenting a serious menace i n the minds of the Southern high command. Vicksburg was the l a s t major c i t a d e l on the M i s s i s s i p p i River i n the hands of the Confederates and i f i t f e l l control of the whole r i v e r would f a l l to the Union. Joseph E. Johnston and Braxton Bragg thought that a move on Grant's communications by a combined cavalry movement could have a b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t and as events turned out they were r i g h t . 1 3 On December 10, Forrest received orders to march into West Tennessee and assault the r a i l r o a d s . Van Dorn was to attack Holly Springs. Forrest's command was not i n i d e a l condition and from October to early December he had been at Murfreesboro r e c r u i t i n g . His old command had been taken over by John A. Wharton and was operating with Bragg's main army. His new men were raw and i l l -equipped f o r an expedition of t h i s nature, but t h i s was p a r t i a l l y o f f s e t by Forrest's i n t r e p i d leadership and t h e i r own enthusiasm. This did not e n t i r e l y dispel the doubts that Forrest had about the proposed foray however. 1^ Forrest l e f t as ordered and arrived at C l i f t o n on the Tennessee River about December 15* There were no bridges and the command had to be crossed on flat b o a t s , the horses being swum. This consumed two days and the rebels had to keep a - 1 4 6 -sharp eye out f o r p a t r o l l i n g Union gunboats. Once on the opposite bank Forrest moved quickly. On December l£ a Federal cavalry force under Colonel Robert I n g e r s o l l was defeated near Lexington where the Union troopers were soundly routed by a charge and a large number, including I n g e r s o l l , were captured. 1 7 Both men had r e l a t i v e l y raw troops under t h e i r command but Forrest's aggressiveness and determination seem to have been the chief contributing factors to a Confederate v i c t o r y . In addition, the Federals probably laboured under a psychological disadvantage just facing a man of Forrest's formidable rep-utation. He then drove i n the Union pickets at Jackson and kept the large force there cowed while he moved on to disrupt the r a i l r o a d s . On December 20 he captured prisoners, arms, and supplies at Trenton but part of h i s force was repulsed at Humboldt.x8^ On December 23 the garrison at Union City was captured. The Federals were getting a graphic i l l u s t r a t i o n , although i t i s doubtful that they r e a l l y needed one, of the problems involved i n c o n t r o l l i n g extended l i n e s of communic-ation and the vast t e r r i t o r y that they had ostensibly conquered. The Union garrisons had been alerted to the presence of the raiders but they were generally small and not within quick supporting distance of each other. I n d i v i d u a l l y they were seldom a match f o r Forrest and by the time they had concentrated the raiders had moved on, out of immediate reach. - 147 -Forrest continued to destroy Federal property and he paroled a l l the prisoners he captured. From December 23 to 25 he hovered near the Kentucky border and demolished bridges, t r e s t l e s , and several miles of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad's track. By December 26 he was near Dresden but by now pursuing Federal columns were closing i n . On December 31 he fought a sharp l i t t l e engagement at Parker's Cross Roads where he was gaining the upper hand when a second Union force arrived and surprised h i s rear. He l o s t several hundred men and horses before he could withdraw. 1 9 On January 2 he recrossed the Tennessee River a f t e r brushing aside a cavalry force sent out by G r e n v i l l e Dodge. Forrest then rejoined the main army and l a t e r picketed around Franklin, Tennessee, on the l e f t flank of the new Confederate positions around Tullahoma. Forrest had created considerable alarm and although Grant had given i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r a l l reasonable dispositions, Forrest's a b i l i t y , the bad weather, the bad roads, and Federal 20 caution and tardiness allowed the Confederates to escape. The Federals had some reason f o r alarm as Forrest had wrought considerable damage i n the course of h i s expedition. He had captured and paroled about 1,530 prisoners, destroyed several bridges, culverts, and t r e s t l e s , and burned whatever stores he 21 was unwilling or unable to carry o f f . This r a i d was as successful s t r a t e g i c a l l y as i t was t a c t i c a l l y . In conjunction with the r a i d made on Holly Springs by Van Dorn, Forrest upset the Federal plans completely. Grant - 148 -had to postpone h i s offensive against Vicksburg and f a l l back -s on a new base at Memphis, Tennessee. 2 2 On December 23 he wrote: "Raids made upon the r a i l r o a d to my rear by Forrest northward from Jackson, and by Van Dorn...have cut me o f f from supplies, so that further advance by t h i s route i s imp r a c t i c a b l e . " 2 3 Furthermore, the second column that had been moving to cooperate with Grant under the command of William Sherman was repulsed at Chickasaw B l u f f s . Credit f o r t h i s goes to Forrest as well f o r the troops that turned the balance f o r the Confederates there had been sent from Vicksburg by John Pemberton, f o r they were no longer needed to stop G r a n t . 2 4 There were other features of Forrest's r a i d that are worthy of note. Once again the f u t i l i t y of sending infantry to catch cavalry was demonstrated. Grant did not even have much confidence i n h i s cavalry and believed that Forrest would probably escape from the infantry forces that were sent out to track him. 2 3 The r a i d exacted only a s l i g h t t o l l on the Confederates but Forrest had to rest h i s command before taking 26 up active duty once again. Also, he did not return from the r a i d as well equipped as many hi s t o r i a n s have suggested f o r he wrote i n h i s report: We have already been short of shot-gun caps, and as we captured nothing but musket-caps, a l l the men using shot-funs were out, or nearly out, of caps a f t e r the action Parker's Cross Roads] was over. Considering our want of ammunition f o r small arms and a r t i l l e r y and the worn down condition of our men and horses I determined at once to recross the Tennessee River and f i t up f o r a return. 2y The Confederates were elated over Forrest's r a i d and believed i t a huge success. Bragg effused praise: - 149 -During the time the operations at Murfreesboro were being conducted, important expeditions, under.•.Forrest and Morgan, were absent.... The reports already forwarded show the complete success which attended these....£g Bragg elaborated further on Forrest: His [Forrest's] reports a t t e s t the excellent bearing of h i s troops and show the r e s u l t s of h i s expedition to have been most b r i l l i a n t and d e c i s i v e . The enemy... have been compelled to throw back a large force from M i s s i s s i p p i and v i r t u a l l y to abandon a campaign which so seriously threatened our sa f e t y . 2 Q Certainly much of what Bragg said was true. I t does not t e l l the whole story however, and obscures some important points. I t was Van Dom's r a i d i n combination with Forrest's that had produced the dramatic effect that so pleased Bragg. At the same time as h i s l i n e of communications was cut, Grant found h i s stockpiles of supplies destroyed and the two events occurring simultaneously was more than he could handle. As noted above, Grant knew f u l l well that i t was the combination of the ra i d s that had hurt him. This does not detract from Forrest's achievement, which was of considerable strategic significance, but i t would not have had the impact i t did had i t been carried out i n i s o l a t i o n . Secondly, Bragg*s retreat a f t e r the Battle of Stone's River n u l l i f i e d the e f f e c t s of the r a i d to some extent. Bruce Catton writes: "The retreat of Bragg's army was clear announcement that those cavalry blows at Grant's communications had been mere episodes rather than a turning of the t i d e . " 3 n About the same time that Forrest was raid i n g i n West Tennessee Morgan was raiding i n Kentucky. Again, the l i n e s of - 150 -communication were the targets. Morgan moved quickly and audaciously, capturing headlines and imaginations as well as prisoners and supplies. He had a d i v i s i o n of about 3,900 men reinforced by seven guns and he l e f t Bragg Ts army on December 22. 3 1 Two days l a t e r he reached Glascow where there was a b r i e f skirmish with Union cavalry pickets. The Federals were driven back and the following day there was a series of small f i g h t s where Morgan emerged the v i c t o r . On December 26 he captured a stockade and destroyed a bridge near Nolin and the next day he moved on to Elizabethtown where he captured more prisoners. On December 28 he moved l e i s u r e l y along the r a i l r o a d and destroyed track, t r e s t l e s , and bridges as he went. In t o t a l i t was estimated that he demolished 2,500 feet of bridging, three water stations, three depots, and some miles of track as well as capturing and paroling about 2,000 F e d e r a l s . 3 2 A f t e r t h i s Morgan set about to return. Bragg had instructed him not to d a l l y and with the Federal columns closing i n around him Morgan doubtless had l i t t l e i n tention of doing that. The horsemen crossed the R o l l i n g Fork River on December 29 but not before the pursuing Union troops caught up with the rear guard and there was a b r i s k l i t t l e action. Morgan broke contact and escaped safely across the r i v e r however and by December 30 he l e f t Bardstown only a few steps ahead of more enemy forces. Once again he was able to elude h i s foes and he recrossed the Cumberland River on January 2, I863, h a l t i n g at Smithville three days l a t e r to ".. . r e s t and r e c r u i t men and horses, both t e r r i b l y used up by the raid."33Evidently a k i l l i n g - 151 -pace had been set and not a l l the troopers and t h e i r mounts were able to match up to i t . This r a i d was much l i k e Forrest's outwardly but i t lacked a decisive character. The Federals had been quite alarmed and cables had flown back and f o r t h and d i f f e r e n t garrison commanders t r i e d to marshall troops i n an e f f o r t to stop the r a i d e r . , As early as December 15 Rosecrans had suspected that Morgan was about to depart on a r a i d and four days l a t e r h i s suspicions were confirmed. 3 4 Federal o f f i c e r s were t o l d to be a l e r t although none of the small garrisons that were spread throughout the country was r e a l l y b ig enough to be a serious obstacle to Morgan's d i v i s i o n of veteran troops. 3-* General H.G. Wright had immediate command of the area and he was doubtful that the Confederates could be stopped because of the i n f e r i o r i t y of the Union cavalry. Wright became quite agitated and c a l l e d f o r more and more troops to help protect the t e r r i t o r y and r a i l r o a d . 3 ^ Although Morgan did considerable damage and withdrew hi s command la r g e l y unhurt except f o r exhaustion, h i s Kentucky r a i d cannot be c a l l e d s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . Bragg had intended the r a i d to force Rosecrans back by cutting h i s supply l i n e and thus make the campaign that culminated i n the Battle of Stone's River even more decisive, but the Confederate raider turned out to have l i t t l e more than nuisance value i n spite of h i s e f f o r t s . Colonel John Harlan had l e d some infantry i n an e f f o r t to cut Morgan o f f and commanded the force that - 152 -skirmished with the rebel rear guard near the R o l l i n g Fork River. He believed that the damage done could e a s i l y be r e p a i r e d . 3 7 More important, the severance of h i s l i n e s of communication caused Rosecrans to do l i t t l e more than change step. He was able to quickly establish communication by water as Wright mentioned: "The Cumberland i s now navigable, and supplies are being sent that way to General Rosecrans, so that the r e s u l t s of the r a i d w i l l not be very important." 3** General J.T. Boyle confirmed t h i s : I have sent boats up the Green River to Bowling Green, whence r a i l r o a d i s i n order to Nashville, with provisions f o r Rosecrans 1 army. Also sent boats up Cumberland. With control of gunboats on Cumberland, can e a s i l y supply General Rosecrans* army.39 In addition, i n s t r u c t i o n s went out almost immediately f o r r e p a i r of the r a i l r o a d and by December 30 crews were at work. On January 8, Rosecrans wrote Halleck and indicated that he was having no trouble supplying h i m s e l f . 4 0 There i s i n f a c t a touch of irony i n the whole a f f a i r because Rosecrans was e a r l i e r convinced that the absence of the cavalry d i v i s i o n s from Bragg*s army would be of material benefit to him i n the projected advance towards Murfreesboro. 4 1 Also, p r i o r to h i s advance, Rosecrans had been able to accumulate a s u f f i c i e n t reserve of supplies to enable him to s u r v i v e . 4 2 The time f o r Bragg to send h i s cavalry columns against Rosecrans* l i n e s of supply was i n l a t e November and early December. As i t was, Federal control of the waterways gave them a route of supply that the rebels could not e a s i l y injure as long as the r i v e r s remained navigable. - 153 -Thus Morgan's second Kentucky r a i d , which was hard on men and horses and deprived Bragg of close to 4,000 men on the eve of a major b a t t l e , was more apparent than r e a l i n i t s success. The shortcomings of the Federal cavalry had been demon-strated once again however as Colonel William Hoskins indicated: Our cavalry was much worn down by scouting.... They were also i n bad condition to attack a superior force, inasmuch as they were poorly armed, the Sixth Kentucky having no arms but p i s t o l s and s a b e r s . ^ Evidently Hoskins believed that cavalrymen i n combat required more than p i s t o l s and sabres. Colonel Edward Hobson was s a t i s -f i e d with the behaviour of h i s men but reported at the same time that they had to return to camp to get new arms. 4 4 Just at the end of December the Federals launched a r a i d into eastern Tennessee to cut Confederate communications to V i r g i n i a . Wright had been planning a s t r i k e f o r some time and had concluded that the r i s k to the troops was j u s t i f i a b l e . 4 - * By December 25 Samuel Carter headed 950 men on an exciting trek through Crank's Gap i n the Cumberland mountains and reached Z o l l i c o f f e r without incident. There an enemy stockade was captured and a bridge destroyed. The raiders moved on to Watauga where another bridge and a nearby saltworks were razed. Carter then retraced h i s steps and although he was occasionally f i r e d on by bushwackers h i s force was never seriously threatened. I f nothing else, Carter had proven that the Confederates were not the only ones that could r a i d enemy r a i l r o a d s although he did not r e a l l y do very much damage. As i n the Confederate raids, the expedition had a depreciative e f f e c t on the m§n and horses - 154 -and the troops had to rest and r e f i t before they could take the f i e l d a g a i n . 4 7 Carter's r a i d , although a t a c t i c a l triumph, did not have any genuine strategic value. I t was r e a l l y not much more than a gesture and was not coordinated with any of the campaigns then i n progress. Carter had moved quickly and demonstrated s k i l l i n the handling of h i s troops but the rebels had engineers out surveying the damage as early as January 1 and James Seddon, then the Confederate secretary of war, indicated that the l i n e s should be repaired as quickly as possible and that the govern-48 ment would even bear a l l of the expense. The Federal secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, was evidently impressed with the r a i d and sent glowing congratulations to Rosecrans as head of the department. 4 9 A congressman from Tennessee, Horace Maynard, quoted a column from the Richmond Dispatch that indicated the Confederates attached considerable importance to the area a t t a c k e d . T h e rebel war clerk, Jones, noted i n h i s diary that estimates f o r rep a i r i n g the damage ran to a month but the Confederates had supplies running over the route i n l e s s time than that by the simple expedient of hauling r a i l r o a d cars d i r e c t l y over the stream beds without the benefit of r a i l s . This was quite unorthodox but i t seems to have been e f f e c t i v e . ^ 1 What the Confederates lacked i n materials they evidently com-pensated f o r by imagination. A Confederate o f f i c e r that had commanded some of the forces attempting to f i n d Carter had noted that he believed the r a i d more s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms of - 155 -the encouragement t h a t ' i t gave the East Tennessee unionists than because of the damage i t caused. 3 2 Certainly Carter had caught the Confederates unawares and they had sent troops hither and yon i n a f a m i l i a r manner to t r y and track down the r a i d e r s . Colonel H.L. G i l t n e r and his cavalry regiment marched 105 miles i n just under two days without coming i n contact with the enemy.33 Carter l e d h i s men over 470 miles i n ten days with a t o t a l l o s s of n i n e t e e n . 3 4 Thus Carter's r a i d , l i k e Morgan's, was a t a c t i c a l success but also l i k e Morgan's i t had no strategic value. I f these r a i d s can be taken as t y p i c a l , and i n terms of those that were seen i n previous campaigns and those that came a f t e r there i s l i t t l e reason to doubt that they can, then the dagger aspect of the role of cavalry rarely had any genuine si g n i f i c a n c e . The value of raids was generally more apparent than r e a l and although they created a great deal of smoke there was l i t t l e damaging f i r e . Therefore, the C i v i l War cavalry r a i d s must be evaluated on two l e v e l s : the t a c t i c a l and the s t r a t e g i c . The cavalry raids had more than mere m i l i t a r y s i g n i f -icance however. Major Dunn, the Confederate o f f i c e r who commented on the encouragement given the Unionists, h i t one aspect of t h i s s i g n i f i c a n c e . One of Morgan's biographers stresses a point that i s closely r e l a t e d to t h i s f o r he believes that the raider's significance lay more i n the moral boost he gave the Confederacy than i n any m i l i t a r y e f f e c t . 3 3 Certainly - 156 -i t must have been embarrassing f o r the Federals to have columns of troops r i d i n g with apparent impunity and seeming unvulnerability through t e r r i t o r y that they were allegedly c o n t r o l l i n g . The damage done to bridges and track could be eas i l y repaired but the contributions to Southern morale could only be stripped away by pai n f u l and hard fought v i c t o r i e s . The mythical aura that these raiders had has clung to them and pervades the many biographies that have centered on t h e i r 56 e x p l o i t s . J Confederate newspapers reported the rai d s i n some d e t a i l and the news from Forrest and Morgan was one that rang of v i c t o r y i n contradistinction to the news from Bragg which was news of retreat a f t e r apparently favourable combats with the enemy. 3 7 Diaries had entries that spoke of Morgan with awe and admiration and Jones wrote i n response to news of the second Kentucky r a i d : "Our Morgan has been i n Kentucky again.... Glorious Morgan."3** The glee and worship i n these few short phrases i s obvious. The Confederate raids were s i g n i f i c a n t i n another sense as well, because they pointed out to the Federals future keys to v i c t o r y . Rosecrans, f o r example, f e l l back on the r i v e r s f o r h i s supplies and Grant, although he was forced to switch bases and retreat, discovered that he could l i v e o f f the countryside i f necessary and t h i s proved a key to vi c t o r y i n the f i n a l operations against Vicksburg when he cut loose from h i s base e n t i r e l y . - 157 -In retrospect the raids provided evidence of a new approach to the role of cavalry. The raiders usually used t h e i r horses only f o r transportation, doing most of t h e i r f i g h t i n g on foot with firearms. To be sure, there were often mounted charges, but these were more and more rare as the war progressed.59 Viscount Wolseley noted t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y and believed that Forrest and h i s men were more l i k e old fashioned dragoons than true cavalry and believed that the topographical conditions of the theatres, the length of time available f o r the t r a i n i n g of the troops, and the t a c t i c a l r o l e s that were consequently forced on most of the commanders made the develop-ment of the mounted infantry approach quite l o g i c a l . ^ Certainly Denison would have agreed with him and the increasing evidence of the dependence of the mounted troops on t h e i r firearms underscored t h i s heavily. The r a i d s also represented an e f f o r t to f i n d a strategic role f o r cavalry and were the antecedents of the long ranged and fa s t moving s t r i k e s of mobile columns that were such a dramatic feature of the early days of World War I I . I t would be misleading to labour t h i s too heavily but i t c l e a r l y implies what the dagger concept of the role of cavalry was a l l about and how i t was evolving. The overtones i n Jomini rs suggestions, and i n the regulations had coalesced into a f a i r l y clear cut function f o r the horse s o l d i e r s . The r a i d was intended to be an independent blow, hopefully f a t a l or c r i p p l i n g and was r e a l l y a l o g i c a l extension of previous American experience i n combination - 158 -with the suggestions of t h e o r i s t s and application of some imagination on the part of the m i l i t a r y commanders. The t h e o r i s t s had never acknowledged that cavalry could be an independent arm but the p o s s i b i l i t y had always e x i s t e d . D X Henry Halleck, f o r example, had noted i n h i s t r e a t i s e that detachments of cavalry could be sent out as distant advance or flank guards and that p a r t i e s could also be detached f o r 62 reconnaissance purposes. D.H. Mahan believed that although cavalry should operate p r i n c i p a l l y with the main army i t could take part i n armed reconnaissances and f o r offensive i n t e l l i g e n c e gathering p a t r o l s . ^ 3 I t was only a small step from t h i s to having the troopers attack depots, outposts, and bridges. In the Mexican War i n the f a r west independent columns of mounted troops had formed the bulk of the war e f f o r t and although they had done l i t t l e actual f i g h t i n g the example was s t i l l there. Also, i n campaigns against the Indians, long range offensive mounted patrols was r e a l l y the most e f f i c i e n t way of dealing with the r e c a l c i t r a n t redmen. These par t i e s were admittedly small but again the example was present. The C i v i l War often saw long and exposed l i n e s of communication, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the Federals who were committed to invading the South and thus had ever lengthening supply routes. These were an open i n v i t a t i o n to sudden attack, p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r men l i k e Forrest and Morgan who had a penchant f o r operating on t h e i r own. As a strategic operation, the C i v i l War cavalry r a i d was only occasionally of genuine significance however, although - 159 -i t could be a benefit from less obvious points of view. On the tactical level the raids were almost invariably successful and usually considerable damage was caused.^ They also represented the ultimate in the dagger aspect of the dual role of cavalry and they were an attempt to find a strategic role for the horse soldiers who found the tactical scope for their employment on.the wane because of the terrain in which the war was fought. If this was not altogether successful i t must be remembered that innovations are seldom successful in their f i r s t applications and the raids were innovations, even though they were only a logical extension of what had gone before. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VI "^Luvaas, The M i l i t a r y Legacy, pp. 243-244. 2 F u l l e r , The Generalship of Grant, p. 60. ^Luvaas, The M i l i t a r y Legacy, p. 66. 4 I b i d . , pp. 104, 114-3 I b i d . . pp. 146, 148. 6 I b i d . . pp. 157, 158. ^Vi scount c¥olseley, "General Viscount Wolseley on F o r r e s t " , Henry ed., As "They Saw Forrest, pp. 41, 45. % i e i l e , "Evolution of Cavalry", pp. 532-535. 9Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 140, 142, 161. Jones believes that under the circumstances i n Bragg's theatre that t h i s was a more p r a c t i c a l employment f o r Van Dorn's cavalry. 1 0Gray, Cavalry Tactics, p. 138. 1 : L M e r r i l l , Spurs to Glorv. pp. 122-146. Herr & Wallace, The U.S. Cavalry, give the more romantic approach to the cavalry. 1 2 0 a t e s , Confederate Cavalry, pp. x v i i , 51, 87, 113, 154. 13 ^Denison, History of Cavalry. ^D. Alexander Brown, Grierson's Raid (Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1962) presents a competent study of t h i s expedition. 1 5 0*R«. Series I, Volume XVII, Part i i , 775. (Unless other-wise noted, a l l O.R. c i t a t i o n s r e f e r to series I and form w i l l be consistent with previous chapters.) L y t l e , Bedford Forrest, pp. 105-106. Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 32. Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 116-117. - 160 - 161 -1 6 J o h n A. Wyeth, L i f e of General Nathan Bedford Forrest (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1899), p. 106. Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 32. 1 7 9_iR., XVII, i , 554-555. 1 8 I b i d . , 566. l q I b i d . . 596. Wyeth, L i f e of Forrest, p. 129. Thomas J . Jordan & J.P. Pryor, The Campaigns of Lieut.-Gen. N.B. Forrest (New Orleans: Blelock & Company, 1868J, pp. 213-214. 2 0Wyeth, L i f e of Forrest, p. 142. Catton, Grant Moves  •South, p. 337. 210».R.. XX, i , 673. Wyeth, L i f e of Forrest, p. 142. Jordan & Pryor, Campaigns of Forrest, p. 221. 22 Grant, Memoirs. I, 432-433. Catton, Grant Moves South. p. 337. Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 123, 135-136. Theile, "Evolution of Cavalry", pp. 390-391. Catton, Never C a l l  Retreat, p. 33* 23O.R.. XVII, i i , 463. See also Ulysses S. Grant to Henry Halleck, January 8, I863, Grant Papers, Volume 7 (Reel #8). 2 4 C a t t o n , Never C a l l Retreat, p. 35. Catton wrote: "Between them, Forrest and Van Dorn destroyed any chance that the amphibious expedition [Sherman's] might succeed...." 2 5 Q . R . . XVII, i , 477. I t i s not clear whether t h i s i s because he lacked confidence i n i t s a b i l i t y or whether he considered i t too small. 2 % y e t h , L i f e of Forrest, p. 144* Jordan & Pryor, Campaigns  of Forrest, p. 244. Theile, "Evolution of Cavalry", pp. 218, 22o~~. 27O.R., XVII, i , 597. Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 33 believes that Forrest returned completely equipped at the expense of the Federals, but t h i s completeness i s i n some doubt. 2o0.R.. XVII, i , 591. See also i b i d . . XX, i , 672. 2 q I b i d . , XVII, i , 592. - 162 -30 J Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 46. 3 1Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 231-232. 3 2 I b i d . . pp. 239-240. O.R.. XX, i , 153, 673. 3 3Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, p. 247. Holland, Morgan, p. 188 comments on the hardship to men and horses. 34O.R.. XX, i i , 180, 200. 3 5 I b i d . , 208, 210, 222, 237. 3 6 I b i d . . 133, 233, 240. 3 7 I b i d . , i , 136-138. 3 g I b i d . . 133. 3 9 l b i d . . 134. 4°Ibid.. 186. ^ I b i d . , i i , 218-219. Lamers, Edge of Glorv. p. 199. Holland, Morgan, pp. 165-1'66. 4 2 C a t t o n , Never C a l l Retreat, p. 38. Jones, Confederate  Strategy, p. 114. 430.R.. XX, i , 145. ^ I b i d . . 148, 149. 4 5 I b i d . . 150, 199, 200, 207, 320. Thatcher, A Hundred  Battles, p. 104. 4 % b i d . . pp. 98-112. James Seddon expressed surprise at the i n i t i a t i v e of the Federals i n mounting the r a i d . O.R.. XX, i i , 484. 4 7Thatcher, A Hundred Battles, p. 112. O.R.-. XX, i , 91. 4 g I b i d . . i i , 475, 484, 486. -163 -4 9 I b i d . , 299-300. 313* Maynard was b u s i l y engaged i n c a s t i g a t i n g Halleck f o r conducting an unauthorized Raid but he d i d l i t t l e except d i s p l a y h i s own ignorance about what was going on i n the War Department. 51L.B. Jones, A Rebel War C l e r k ' s D i a r y ( P h i l a d e l p h i a : J.B. K i p p i n c o t t & Co., 1866), I , 230. Richmond D a i l y Dispatch, January 14, I863. 52O.R.. XX, i , 130. 5 3 I b i d . , 120. See a l s o i b i d . , 94, 123-124; i i , 471, 473, 480. 54ibid . , 92, 93, 94. W i l l i a m s , L i n c o l n Finds A General. IV, 261 b e l i e v e s t h a t C a r t e r ' s r a i d was daring and s u c c e s s f u l . I t s daring i s unquestioned but i t s success was l i m i t e d . H and, Morgan, p. v i i i . 5^Ibid. Wyeth, L i f e of F o r r e s t . Jordan & Pryor."-Campaigns  of F o r r e s t . ^Richmond D a i l y Dispatch. December 17, 24, 30, 1862; January 3, 15, 20, I863. Wilmington D a i l y J o u r n a l , December 22, 27, 29, 1862. Richmond Enquirer, December 23, 29, 30, 1862. Brown, Grierson's Raid, p. 10 b e l i e v e s t h a t even Northern cavalrymen i d o l i z e d the Confederate l e a d e r s t o some extent because they lacked heroes of t h e i r own. 5°"Jones, Diarv. I , 226. I b i d . . 224, 229, 244. Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from D i x i e , Ben Ames W i l l i a m s (ed.) (Boston: Houghton, M i f f l i n Company, 1961), pp. 210, 273, 353, 354-355, 434 mentions Morgan and although they are not i n connection w i t h the r a i d under d i s c u s s i o n the remarks i n d i c a t e the ho l d t h a t the r a i d e r had on imaginations. 59Luvaas, The M i l i t a r y Legacy, p. 157. Europeans were p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s . Holland, Morgan, p. 8. ^°Wolseley, ."Viscount Wolseley on F o r r e s t " , pp. 21-24. - 164 -^ xOates, Confederate Cavalry, p. 30. 6 2 H a l l e c k , Elements, pp. 99, 271. 6 3Mahan, An Elementary Treatise (1861), pp. 81, 82, 87-128, 138-139. ^Oates, Confederate Cavalry, p. 85. ^ i b i d . , pp. 114, 154. Oates has come to a s i m i l a r con-clusion about the area he studied. Morgan's Ohio r a i d and Streight's r a i d are two g l a r i n g exceptions to t h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i CHAPTER VII MURFREESBORO INTERLUDE AND THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN In early January I863 Braxton Bragg l e d h i s Confederate army into i t s new positions at Shel b y v i l l e and Tullahoma and William S. Rosecrans exhausted command staggered into the town of Murfreesboro, f o r which they had fought so hard. Although there were p r a c t i c a l l y d a i l y reconnaissances and forage d e t a i l s with many minor skirmishes and a few major a f f a i r s , the war i n Tennessee se t t l e d down to a period of r e l a t i v e calm f o r about six months. 1 By the time Bragg was forced to retreat from Tullahoma the m i l i t a r y fortunes of the Confederacy were c l e a r l y on the wane. The retreat following the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e had admitted t a c i t defeat of the Kentucky invasion and the withdrawal a f t e r the Battle of Stone's River had only confirmed the downhill s l i d e of the Southern power i n the West. By July, when Bragg had se t t l e d into Chattanooga, the m i l i t a r y outcome of the American C i v i l War had v i r t u a l l y been decided. Ulysses S. Grant had taken Vicksburg and Robert E. Lee had been repulsed from Gettysburg. I t was r e a l l y a l l over but the f i g h t i n g . During the Murfreesboro interlude Rosecrans spent much time b u i l d i n g up h i s army and he was p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about h i s cavalry, constantly beseiging Washington with requests f o r men, arms, equipments, and mounts. He was almost more persistent i n t h i s campaign than he was i n the one against the Confederates and he often provoked i r r i t a t e d r e p l i e s from - I65 -- 166 -Henry Halleck, who indicated o f f i c i a l displeasure i n no uncertain terms from time to time. 3 Rosecrans was i n s i s t e n t however, and even a f t e r the Tullahoma campaign had come to a successful conclusion reminded Washington of the necessity and importance of the cavalry: To enable t h i s army to operate successfully i n advance of t h i s p o s i t i o n [Murfreesboro} , i t was necessary, f i r s t , to e s t a b l i s h and secure a depot of supplies at t h i s point, and, second, to organize an adequate cavalry force to combat that of the enemy, protect our own l i n e of com-munication, and take advantage of the enemy should he be beaten or r e t r e a t . The depot was established...but the i n f e r i o r numbers of our cavalry and the sca r c i t y of long forage wore out our cavalry forces f a s t e r than we could replace them, and i t was not before the 15th of June that we had brought what we had available into condition.^ Rosecrans was p a r t l y interested i n excusing h i s long delay but P h i l i p Sheridan indicated that there was at lea s t a p a r t i a l truth i n h i s assertions: The feeding of our army from the base at L o u i s v i l l e was attended with a great many d i f f i c u l t i e s , as the enemy's cavalry was constantly breaking the r a i l r o a d and i n t e r -cepting our communications on the Cumberland River at d i f f e r e n t points that were e a s i l y accessible to h i s then superior force of troopers.5 The Confederate cavalry was not a s i g n i f i c a n t strategic threat to the Federals but i t had considerable nuisance value both f o r the r i v e r t r a f f i c and the constant Union forage p a r t i e s . Rosecrans* repeated requests exasperated h i s superiors and were not always necessary. On January 26 he wrote: "I wish to have cavalry enough to destroy the enemy*s cavalry, and, t h i s done, I can occupy the whole country with my forces and procure enough forage f o r my army." Four days l a t e r he pleaded - 167 -7 fo r 2,5nO breech loading or revolving r i f l e s . Halleck rebuked his requests as unreasonable and yet Rosecrans persevered and wrote again: "I want superior arms, to supply i n place of numbers. We must have cavalry arms, and the difference between the best and worst i s more than a hundred percent i n the d a i l y cost of troops." When Halleck did not respond, Rosecrans sent his requests d i r e c t l y to Edwin Stanton and stressed the necessity fo r mastering the enemy cavalry. In f a c t , he sent so many telegrams that he was p o l i t e l y requested to write more l e t t e r s to keep the cable b i l l s down. In spite of the f a c t that h i s cavalry increased both i n numbers and e f f i c i e n c y i n t h i s period Rosecrans seldom relented i n h i s demands but i t i s u n l i k e l y that any commander i n the f i e l d has ever been r e a l l y s a t i s f i e d with what h i s government did f o r him. Rosecrans was just more vocal about i t than most. "Mounted Infantry" made an o f f i c i a l appearance at t h i s time to supplement the cavalry. James A. Connolly was an o f f i c e r i n John T. Wilder*s brigade, and early i n the year h i s infantry command received horses. His l e t t e r s are often reveal-ing about the nature of mounted service and soon a f t e r h i s unit became horse sol d i e r s he wrote about a reconnaissance he had been ordered on: I knew nothing about reconnoitering, never did such a thing and didn't know how to go about i t , and here now I was to take four or f i v e hundred men with a guide, and s t r i k e out among the cedar thickets, rocks, h i l l s and ravines of t h i s abominable Stone River country to f i n d the location, strength &c of an enemy who knew the country well, and were reported to be f i v e or six thousand strong. 9 - i6a -The unknown demands of cavalry service evidently held some uncertainties f o r the neophyte horse s o l d i e r s but at the same time Connolly noted that h i s men grew accustomed to the duties f a i r l y quickly and l a t e r wrote: I t may be that I s h a l l l i k e t h i s mounted service better than I thought I would. I can't t e l l yet. There i s more l i f e , sport, adventure and good l i v i n g i n i t , with l e s s hard f i g h t i n g but more chance of capture.10 Obviously the glamour of cavalry service was s t i l l very much apparent and i t had attractions i n spite of the disadvantages. An addi t i o n a l note i s that Wilder fs brigade was armed with Spencer repeating r i f l e s and Connolly often mentioned them with awe and admiration. 1 1 In spite of the exaggerated nature of many of Rosecrans* claims the Federal cavalry did suffer from some inadequacies during the six month interlude. Union General Jefferson C. Davis, the Confederate president*s namesake, reported i n February that he had h i s troopers to the front scouting although they were i n bad shape f o r any kind of service. Andrew Johnson, the governor of Tennessee, noted that some cavalrymen he had seen had horses that were i n poor condition and the regiment 13 obviously needed time to r e f i t f o r active service. J General George Crook commanded a garrison at Carthage, Tennessee, and he wrote more than once that he was badly i n need of horse soldiers to patrol the surrounding c o u n t r y s i d e . 1 4 John Foster, who commanded the post at Henderson, Kentucky, wrote: ...I have at present only four companies of cavalry, and they very much reduced by sickness and hard service. My infantry w i l l be almost useless against the g u e r r i l l a s , unless they are mounted.15 169 Crook also wrote of the problems of dealing with g u e r r i l l a s with infantry alone: I was never completely beat out before, but I have to acknowledge that I can do nothing against t h i s cavalry with my i n f a n t r y . I cannot entrap them i n any possible way, f o r they have t h e i r spies and scouts a l l over t h i s country, and I can make no movement without t h e i r being apprised of i t before I can get to them with my i n f a n t r y . . . . Returns f o r t h i s period showed that the Federal cavalry force generally hovered around 10% i n r e l a t i o n to the rest of the army. Jomini had recommended that i n country l i k e the M i s s i s s i p p i Valley area, the proportion of cavalry should be about 16% so i f t h i s can be taken as a base, there was some j u s t i f i c a t i o n to Rosecrans 1 c l a i m s . 1 7 He was i n s i s t e n t on receiving more horses to mount infantry and remount h i s troopers, and A p r i l 12, 17, and 24 were only three of the many days that saw telegrams being sent to Washington on t h i s subject. He d i d receive considerable numbers of animals but constant use combined with lack of forage and men unused to proper care caused many of the horses 19 to become quickly u n f i t f o r service. Quartermaster General M.C. Meigs sent Rosecrans a long and patient l e t t e r which set f o r t h i n very clear terms just how many mounts had been sent and suggested that the problems of the cavalry had been some-what exaggerated. He seemed to understand the proper use f o r cavalry and wrote: The main body of cavalry should...be thrown upon the rear of the enemy, to l i v e o f f the country, cut h i s communications, and harass the country generally; take every horse seen, good or bad; shoot a l l those that cannot follow, and thus put the rebels to s t r a i t s while mounting your own men. - 170 -Operate on t h e i r communications; s t r i k e every detached post; r e l y more on infantry and l e s s on cavalry, which i n the whole war has not decided the fate of a single b a t t l e r i s i n g above a skirmish, which taxes the resources of the country, and of which we now have afoot a l a r g e r animal strength than any nation on earth. We have over one hundred and twenty-six regiments of cavalry, and they have k i l l e d ten times as many horses f o r us as f o r the rebels. 20 Meigs* l e t t e r i s quoted at some length because although much of what he said was coloured by h i s eye f o r costs, most of i t came close tto the truth about cavalry and h i s recommendations were quite r e a l i s t i c . The organization of the Federal cavalry did not change s i g n i f i c a n t l y over t h i s period but Rosecrans made some minor al t e r a t i o n s i n an e f f o r t to streamline operations. General orders issued on May 17 indicated that each corps commander was to have only one company of horse s o l d i e r s f o r escort and orderly duty. A l l the rest was to report to the chief of cavalry, General David S. Stanley, and he was to have charge of a l l the grand guards and vedettes, and i f the troopers served infantry on detached duty they were to act on the orders of the senior cavalry o f f i c e r who operated with the approval o n of the senior infantry o f f i c e r . Rosecrans was concentrating h i s cavalry on paper and attempting to make h i s command system more e f f i c i e n t . Stanley's job had two aspects f o r he was an administrative head on the one hand and a t a c t i c a l leader on the other. His duties as an administrator had some curious twists f o r at one point he was ordered to take a l l the dismounted cavalry to - 171 -L o u i s v i l l e and f i n d horses f o r them. This job could e a s i l y have been done by a subordinate but Rosecrans gave the job to S t a n l e y . 2 2 As a t a c t i c a l leader Stanley seldom handled units above a brigade i n spite of the fac t that the cavalry was organized as a corps of two d i v i s i o n s , each d i v i s i o n being composed of several brigades with a r t i l l e r y support. 2 3 The cavalry was quite consolidated at t h i s time however, as d i s t i n c t from the previous fragmentation, and detached units were seldom i n evidence. The Confederate cavalry did not receive the constant attention that i t s Federal counterpart did but i t did increase i n size because of a constant t r i c k l e of r e c r u i t s and the addition of E a r l Van Dora's brigade. With t h i s large mounted force the rebels were e a s i l y able to control the co u n t r y s i d e . 2 4 The Southern horse was constantly to the front of Bragg*s army at t h i s time and when not on one of the many small expeditions, spent i t s time on picket duty. I t s condition was often poor however, and seemed gradually to deteriorate from a lack of proper and s u f f i c i e n t supplies. Forage was often scarce and John Pegram*s brigade was forced to invade Kentucky early i n February just to support i t s e l f . 2 ^ Horses too were i n short supply and the rebel cavalry often suffered from i t s p o l i c y of not mounting men on public animals. In March, much of Van Dorn's command was inactive because the horses were worn down and there were no remounts a v a i l a b l e . 2 7 The Confederate horse sol d i e r s suffered from a dramatic lack of arms during t h i s period as well, and t h i s was not merely - 172 -a want of modern weapons but a serious deficiency i n the t o t a l number of guns i n comparison to the t o t a l numbers of men. Joseph E. Johnston had noted how poorly equipped Van Dorn's ?8 cavalry was when i t joined Bragg*s army, f o r example. Leonidas Polk noted that the cavalry i n h i s command also 29 suffered from a shortage of weapons. In A p r i l an aide-de-camp to President Davis generally found the army i n good con-d i t i o n but discovered that i t was short of arms and ammunition. In a report presented by Bragg fs chief of ordnance the cavalry showed 9,862 small arms of a l l kinds, including p i s t o l s , muskets, carbines, shot-guns, etc., and returns f o r the period indicate the strength of the mounted troops present f o r duty 30 was around 15,438. The problems created by the lack of guns were augmented by the great variety of weapons which created additional headaches about ammunition supply. The organization of the rebel horse remained much the same as i t had during the Murfreesboro campaign and i t remained under the command of Joseph Wheeler. 3 1 There were some d i s -c i p l i n e problems during t h i s period, which were symptomatic of one of the great d i f f i c u l t i e s posed to commanders by the C i v i l War cavalry forces. Kinloch Falconer, Bragg*s assistant adjutant general, wrote: The great number of men who have joined cavalry commands, and a v a i l themselves of that peculiar service to roam over the country as marauders, avoiding a l l duty, renders i t necessary that cavalry commanders should...search out such characters, and have them transferred to infantry regiments.32 - 173 -The cavalry seemed to have more than i t s share of men who had a l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the term "foraging". Some small organizational changes did occur but these had l i t t l e consequence as f a r as the employment or role of the cavalry was concerned. On February 25 two main d i v i s i o n s were created under Van Dorn and Wheeler and the cavalry now came under Bragg Ts d i r e c t control but t h i s had l i t t l e genuine significance except on paper. 3 3 By March 16 these d i v i s i o n s had become so large that they were now termed "corps" and the two commanders were instructed to carry out further i n t e r n a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . 3 4 In spite of these e f f o r t s at closer control, many of Bragg 1s cavalry leaders remained an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c l o t , the supreme example of which was Morgan when he went on h i s Ohio r a i d i n disobedience of orders. His ride was spectacular and t h r i l l i n g but i t ended with the destruction of most of hi s command and h i s own imprisonment. His once formidable force was destroyed as an e f f e c t i v e f i g h t i n g u n i t . 3 ^ In the many small a f f a i r s that characterized the s i x month interlude, the cavalry, played a prominent part. Few expeditions lacked t h e i r quota of troopers and many were composed exclusively of cavalry. In l a t e January Elmer O t i s led a r e l i e f force to rescue a wagon t r a i n that had been captured but he was only able to snare a few enemy pickets f o r his pains. R.G.H. Minty le d another Union expedition from Murfreesboro to Franklin and was involved i n a few skirmishes. He even got a chance to lead a sabre charge. 3^ - 174 -Wheeler and Forrest went on a r a i d to the Cumberland River i n l a t e January to interrupt the Union supply l i n e s and they forced a temporary suspension of water t r a f f i c but were soon forced to leave.37 Wheeler did not want to return empty handed and he determined to attack Dover, near Fort Donelson even though Forrest advised heavily against i t . The Union garrison fought stoutly and the rebels made some t a c t i c a l blunders, the combination of which resulted i n the repulse of the attackers. Several assaults had been made, both mounted and on foot before Wheeler pulled back. He was running short of ammunition and Federal reinforcements .were closing i n and he decided to retreat. 3** There was a stormy scene between Wheeler and Forrest the evening a f t e r the f i g h t where Forrest blamed hi s commander f o r the debacle and swore never to serve under him a g a i n . 3 9 Aside from t h i s i n t e r n a l dissention between the Confederate cavalry commanders, the r a i d had no genuine con-sequence, and i t was evident that the rebels could only be an i n d i f f e r e n t threat to the Union r i v e r t r a f f i c . The small, almost d a i l y a f f a i r s went on apace. The men on both sides generally behaved creditably i n these and i t was evident that the Union cavalry i n p a r t i c u l a r was s t i f f e n i n g up i n combat.^"0 On February 23, at Tuseumbia, Federal horse soldiers successfully assaulted Van Dorn Ts pickets and captured about one hundred prisoners, double that number of horses, and a quantity of s t o r e s . 4 1 On March 1 there was another brisk skirmish near Bradyville, Tennessee, where Union troopers under - 175 -Stanley saved a Federal forage t r a i n by dismounted f i r e action and a mounted p i s t o l and sabre charge that drove o f f the attacking Confederates. 4 2 Few of these small skirmishes had any o v e r a l l significance but they indicated c l e a r l y that the power of the Confederate cavalry was declining where that of the Federal horse was i n c r e a s i n g . 4 3 The Union troopers were led out and took the i n i t i a t i v e f a r more than they had i n the past and i n many cases the rebels were forced to s i t and wait i n order to counter the many enemy thrusts. I t appeared that Stanley's leadership and Rosecrans' attention were having salutary e f f e c t s . A few la r g e r combats did occur i n t h i s period but again, these had l i t t l e s t rategic s i g n i f i c a n c e . In early March there was a heavy l i t t l e combat near Spring H i l l where Van Dorn and Forrest captured most of a sizeable Union expedition a f t e r brisk f i r e action. The Union cavalry managed to escape with the a r t i l l e r y and wagons and the Federal commander blamed the unsteadiness of h i s horsemen f o r the defeat. Other testimony did l i t t l e more than obscure the issue and added the charge that the cavalrymen had not kept t h e i r commanders f u l l y informed. I t does appear that the Union troopers were pre-mature i n t h e i r departure from the f i e l d although i t could not be said that t h i s was a major cause of the d e f e a t . 4 4 The Federal commander displayed l i t t l e caution i n h i s conduct of the a f f a i r . There were a number of other actions, many of which afforded evidence of the new style of f i g h t i n g of cavalrymen. - 176 -Rosecrans was quite e c s t a t i c over a s p i r i t e d l i t t l e f i g h t that took place on a reconnaissance from Murfreesboro to Columbia and wrote: I have the pleasure to report the gallant conduct of our cavalry under the brave Colonel Minty. They drove the rebel cavalry wherever they met them, captured one of t h e i r camps, 17 wagons, and 64 prisoners. They used the saber where the carbine would d e l a y . ^ Sheridan confirmed t h i s and wrote that the "...Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry charged with the saber s p l e n d i d l y . . . . " ^ The Union horse s o l d i e r s had been supported by heavy columns of infantry on t h i s expedition and i t undoubtedly gave them added confidence. On March 19 there was another skirmish near Spring H i l l , although t h i s was much smaller than the previous one and t h i s time Union cavalrymen f i g h t i n g dismounted drove off enemy pickets. Three days l a t e r Confederate cavalry drove i n i n and captured Mount S t e r l i n g , Kentucky. Pegram invaded Kentucky again to round up some c a t t l e and although h i s l i t t l e expedition met with i n i t i a l success he was defeated near Somerset when part of h i s command broke and ran from the f i e l d . Pegram blamed t h i s cowardly behaviour f o r h i s defeat and he was 48 at l e a s t p a r t l y correct. There were more small a f f a i r s , mostly seesaw actions, and Rosecrans took every advantage to t a l k about the great work h i s cavalry was doing and how much greater i t s work would be i f the force were larger and better armed. At one point he wrote: "The cavalry appear to have behaved g a l l a n t l y , I am glad to observe, and c a l l attention to the evidences of i t s increasing effectiveness. With proper - 177 -o f f i c e r s and arms, i t w i l l soon be able to cope with i t s rebel J L Q forces e f f e c t u a l l y . " The Federal cavalry had been very well armed i n some f i g h t s however, as General Clay Smith pointed out: "The five-shooters of the Second Michigan, and the ra p i d i t y with which the Burnside carbine could be loaded, poured...a constant and deadly volley into t h e i r ranks...."50 Evidently, the Federal troopers were r e l y i n g quite heavily on t h e i r firearms i n combat. Part, of the Federal cavalry was i n s u f f i c i e n t l y armed, just as Rosecrans often claimed. General J . White noted a skirmish and wrote: ...the Second Battalion, Tenth Kentucky Cavalry, which, being armed only with p i s t o l s and sabers, i s i n t h i s mountainous region comparatively useless, except f o r guard or outpost duty. The enemy, dismounting, take the steep, broken h i l l s i d e s , which are inaccessible f o r cavalry, and, keeping out of p i s t o l range, render l i g h t cavalry l i t t l e more than spectators.52. White*s commentary i s noteworthy f o r several reasons. He evidently wanted h i s men to f i g h t i n the f i r s t place. In the second, he seemed to dis t i n g u i s h h i s men as l i g h t cavalry because of t h e i r lack of carbines but t h i s i s curious since i n the t r a d i t i o n a l sense, the term l i g h t cavalry did not have that implication at a l l . His men were r e a l l y armed as the old heavy cavalry would have been, with only p i s t o l s and sabres. Another point about White's commentary i s that f i r e action was obviously the order of the day i n broken countryside. A former member of Wilder*s brigade had some thoughts about f i r e action at a reunion held long a f t e r the war: - 178 -. . . i f the enemy have long range guns, f i g h t on foot, and take advantage of trees, stumps, fences, ditches, and barricades, you must f i g h t him dismounted, with long range guns and take l i k e advantage.... That \_ f i g h t ing massed with sabres] was a l r i g h t on the plains of Europe, where there was opportunity f o r maneuvering heavy bodies of cavalry, where the momentum of heavy cavalry columns charging en masse was d i f f i c u l t to meet or break, but i t amounted to nothing i n a new country covered with groves, mountains, marshes, ditches, stone fences, stumps and tr e e s . The conditions of battle...were e n t i r e l y changed.52 The old s o l d i e r was r i g h t . The conditions of b a t t l e had changed and so had the weapons, a fact that he recognized only i m p l i c i t l y . The role of the cavalry did not a l t e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y but the approach to that r o l e did a l t e r and more reliance was placed on f i r e than mounted sabre action. The small actions continued i n much the same manner with evidence of varied styles of f i g h t i n g . Colonel F. Cornyn com-manded some cavalry on the diversion i n favour of Abel Streight's ra i d i n g column and described the combat there: I ordered two squadrons of the Seventh Kansas, that were armed with Colt's revolving r i f l e s , to dismount and attack them on foot, supporting them with two squadrons of the Tenth Missouri (mounted)...with orders to charge with the saber as soon as the enemy's l i n e should break.53 The diversion f a i l e d to f o o l the Confederates however, and Streight's column was run to earth a f t e r a series of rear guard actions.5 4 The changing approach was evident once again and the dependence on firepower was obvious. The Federal cavalry was just beginning to place reliance on firearms i n combat, something that the rebels had been doing v i r t u a l l y since the - 179 -beginning of the war. Rosecrans saw t h i s and h i s insistence on the Federal cavalry being well armed with good weapons was evidence of h i s awareness. His dispatches indicate also that he saw h i s cavalry as a s h i e l d and a dagger although he would not have used those terms. Evidence of the recognition of the new approach to the role of cavalry a r i s e s also i n the f a c t that the Federal troopers were much more e f f i c i e n t and steady i n combat i n t h i s period. Stanley even went so f a r as to venture that h i s troopers were becoming a t e r r o r to the enemy. Although t h i s may have been overstating the case h i s men d i d perform well on a series of small expeditions which whittled away at the Confederacy's res o u r c e s . 3 3 The Union had the resources to make good i t s losses but the rebels did not and these many small a f f a i r s , although they had no strategic importance, were more costly f o r the South than the North. The Confederate cavalry commands saw s i m i l a r action, and spent most of t h e i r time on small expeditions and picket duty to the front of Bragg's army.5° Both sides sat r e l a t i v e l y s t i l l during t h i s six month interlude and there was a lack of o v e r a l l d i r e c t i o n to the operations that took place. Bragg did not f e e l strong enough to take the i n i t i a t i v e on h i s own, so the Federals had i t by default although they did l i t t l e with i t u n t i l l a t e i n June I863. Rosecrans was nothing i f not thorough and methodical and he was not i n c l i n e d to advance u n t i l he believed that every-thing was ready. Once he started to move however, he displayed - 180 -a good grasp of strategy and how to conduct a large campaign and the Tullahoma campaign saw Bragg neatly fooled and flanked out of h i s pos i t i o n s . When i t was over the Federals were that much further along-the road that l e d to ultimate Confederate defeat i n the West. 3 7 The campaign was not made any easier by the f o u l weather that unseasonably made i t s appearance i n Tennessee i n l a t e June. It rained almost continuously and a l l roads but the macadamized turnpikes became impassable except to the maximum e f f o r t s of men and animals. Stanley wrote The incessant r a i n and consequent condition of the roads rendered the operations of cavalry d i f f i c u l t and exceed-ingly t r y i n g to men and horses. The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of bringing up forage i n wagons, and the absence of feed i n the "Barrens" of the Cumberland Mountains, the constant ra i n depriving our poor beasts of t h e i r rest, has reduced the cavalry considerably. They now require some l i t t l e r e st and r e f i t t i n g . What Stanley said about the e f f e c t on the cavalry applied to the whole army. Men and animals a l i k e floundered i n a muddy morass to drag themselves forward, and i t was just l i k e the advance on Stone's River from Nashville, only worse. A f t e r a time the marching columns gave the appearance of moving i n slow motion and the Federal d i f f i c u l t i e s were compounded because of t h e i r ever lengthening supply l i n e s . The r o l e of the cavalry was s i m i l a r i n t h i s campaign to that seen i n the Stone's River operation. The Federal horse headed the advance of the columns and the rebels covered t h e i r army. Bragg's f i r s t l i n e of defense lay along the mountains and the three major gaps were Rosecrans* prime objectives. The bulk - 181 -of the cavalry under Stanley backed up by the reserve corps under Gordon Granger feinted to the r i g h t , on Guy's Gap. This was captured when the Confederate cavalry on picket duty was pushed back f a i r l y quickly. Wilder*s mounted infantry stormed into Hoover's Gap ahead of George Thomas* d i v i s i o n and took that while General Alexander McCook's corps captured Liberty Gap and t h i s l a i d Bragg*s l i n e s of communication open and he had to f i g h t i n the open or run.59 Stanley l e d h i s cavalry into Guy's Gap with determination and pushed the rebel cavalry back across the Duck River. The Confederates made l i t t l e attempt to stand and f i g h t i n t h e i r trenches but there were some s p i r i t e d actions nonetheless: The rebels f l e d to the town, where they attempted another stand...but a part of Colonel Minty*s brigade charging them on the pike, i n the teeth of t h e i r battery, and Colonel Campbell's brigade cutting of t h e i r retreat at the upper bridge over Duck's River, the enemy was over- , thrown, routed, h i s cannon and 591 prisoners captured...." 0 Here also, the Federal cavalry had the immense s a t i s f a c t i o n of f o r c i n g Wheeler to leap into the r i v e r and swim f o r h i s l i f e when he was cut o f f . Wilder captured Hoover's Gap and made Stanley's success even more r e a l . He dashed i n and pushed the Confederate pickets out rapidly and decided to hold h i s p o s i t i o n u n t i l the inf a n t r y supports came up. He then pushed on to r a i d the enemy l i n e s of communication but strong rebel guards i n combination with the bad weather did not allow him to i n f l i c t more than minimal damage. He managed to destroy some tnack and a t r e s t l e but t h i s did not 6 l impair Bragg's r e t r e a t . In these actions Wilder's mounted - 182 -infantry was behaving exactly l i k e the cavalry although i t s approach to i t s r o l e was d i f f e r e n t , as w i l l emerge below. McCook only had one regiment of mounted infantry with him, and again i t s role was exactly l i k e that of the cavalry u n i t s . I t drove i n the enemy pickets at Liberty Gap and preceded the general advance. General Richard Johnson, who had been defeated by Morgan near G a l l a t i n the previous summer, noted: ...Colonel Harrison became warmly engaged with the rebel advance. He at once communicated with me. The ground being rough and unfavorable f o r the operations of cavalry, I directed him to halt u n t i l the a r r i v a l of my F i r s t Brigade.•••52 McCook described the a c t i v i t y of h i s mounted regiment i n some d e t a i l : They l e d the advance, watched the flanks, skirmished on the 24th and 25th of June at Liberty Gap, did a l l the p a t r o l l i n g and vedette duty, kept up communication with the forces on my ri g h t ; four companies charged the enemy at Tullahoma, Winchester, and at the ford of B o i l i n g Fork of the Elk River, and accompanied Colonel Watkins on h i s reconnaissance... .£3 McCook fs testimony makes i t p l a i n l y evident that the difference between cavalry and mounted infantry was not one of role what-ever else i t was. The duties that t h i s regiment performed were c l a s s i c cavalry r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . James Connolly's l e t t e r s reveal c l e a r l y that the mounted infantrymen came to think of themselves as cavalrymen. There was a difference i n approach however, f o r h i s men immediately dismounted under f i r e and dug i n to repel the enemy counter-attacks, doing a l l of t h e i r f i g h t i n g on f o o t . ^ 4 - 183 -Colonel Robert Klein*s cavalrymen at Guy's Gap behaved s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t l y although t h e i r r o l e of covering the advance was the same as that done by the mounted infant r y . K l e i n wrote: •..my men got somewhat formed, when, f i r i n g a volley, we drew saber and charged into t h e i r ranks. They fought...desperately, using saber and clubbing muskets and p i s t o l s . The f i g h t was hand-to-hand f o r 300 yards, when both par t i e s plunged into the r i v e r . Even here we used the trusty saber with e f f e c t . Major Frank Mix reported si m i l a r action by h i s cavalrymen and i n addition shows that they operated on horseback even though the ground was unfavourable f o r mounted a c t i v i t y : Two miles out we came on the enemy's pickets. We drove them sharply f o r about a mile, when I was ordered to form my regiment i n l i n e . . . . In t h i s manner we advanced 2 miles through a dense cedar thicket over ditches and stones, almost impassable f o r our horses (and l e t me say that nearly one-third of my horses were ruined by that afternoon's scout.)5 5 Clearly Mix could have e a s i l y dismounted h i s troops, f o r i t i s un l i k e l y from h i s descriptions that progress would have been any slower and the horses would probably not have suffered as much • Several things are evident from t h i s . The role of a l l mounted troops was very much the same. They were a shi e l d screening the advance of the army and occasionally raided enemy communications, and ran messages, etc. In short, the duty of the mounted men i n the Federal army was similar to that seen i n the advance from Nashville i n December of the previous year. There was a contrast i n approach and st y l e of f i g h t i n g however f o r the mounted infantrymen dismounted and fought on foot where the cavalrymen stayed on t h e i r horses and fought with p i s t o l s - 184 -and sabres. Thus both types of troops tended to r e t a i n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l f i g h t i n g styles i n combat although there was much cross over, with cavalrymen often f i g h t i n g on foot with t h e i r firearms. The heavy cavalry concept was s t i l l a l i v e , as K l e i n noted, and even the mounted infantry adopted t h i s pose b r i e f l y , as McCook re l a t e d . Reliance on the sabre was s l i g h t however, as most of the cavalrymen had not had s u f f i c i e n t i n s t r u c t i o n i n the use of that weapon and were more of a danger to t h e i r horses and f i l e partners than the enemy.^ Thus i t seems that C i v i l War cavalrymen, mounted infantrymen, or whatever, were r e a l l y more l i k e the old fashioned dragoons i n t h e i r approach although the role of a l l was very s i m i l a r . The dragoon was a compromise, a middle path, and a l o g i c a l and p r a c t i c a l solution to the problem of the proper approach f o r American mounted troops. The Federal cavalry remained concentrated l a r g e l y on paper and the old system of fragmentation s t i l l continued. One of the d i v i s i o n commanders pointed t h i s out c l e a r l y : ...General G a r f i e l d telegraphed to Generals Brannan and Thomas to send back to camp half the cavalry force that was on the front, and ordered me to send one battalion forward to re-enforce the remaining h a l f . I sent one battalion...to the front, which, l i k e the others, was accepted, but no cavalry was sent back to camp. In t h i s manner the whole brigade was scattered i n battalions, under command of majors and lieutenant-colonels, on the front of the two army corps, the regimental and the brigade commanders remaining i n camp with twelve companies of d i f f e r e n t reg-iments, and at the head of a l l was the d i v i s i o n commander himself The fragmentation i n the handling of the Federal cavalry i n active campaigning was not much d i f f e r e n t here than i t had been i n previous operations under scrutiny. - 185 -. The Confederate cavalry was mostly on picket duty to the front of Bragg Ts army and could do l i t t l e except meet the thrusts of the Federal advance. Bragg was fooled by Rosecrans 1 f e i n t s and caught o f f guard. He lacked information about the enemy and whether t h i s was due to a f a i l u r e of h i s own i n i t i a t i v e or that of h i s cavalry o f f i c e r s i s not clear. The rebel troopers were strangely inactive just p r i o r to the Federal advance and i t probably could have been more a c t i v e l y employed on recon-naissance duty. The s i t u a t i o n was s i m i l a r to the one at P e r r y v i l l e i n many ways, where Bragg also had not taken firm enough d i r e c t i o n and insured that he was properly informed. At the same time the cavalry o f f i c e r s themselves were pa r t l y to blame f o r they did receive orders to scout but they were strangely apathetic about them. The Confederate cavalry was a competent shield and rear covering force, but i t seemed to lack something as a scouting and reconnoitering u n i t . ^ 9 In spite of t h e i r numerical superiority the power of the Confederate troopers was on the wane at t h i s time. In addition, the Federal cavalry was a more formidable threat than i t had ever been and the Confederates were hard pressed to be everywhere at once. Polk found that the rebel troopers were lacking s u f f i c i e n t strength to both guard the l i n e s of communication and carry out the normal cavalry duties. Infantry temporarily relieved the pressure, but Bragg was forced to retreat because overnight he had a major c r i s i s on h i s hands and he had neither the men nor the information to deal with i t properly. Almost before he knew what had happened, - 186--he was neatly flanked out of h i s defensive positions by a • i n • 70 numerically superior enemy. The main job of the Confederate cavalry was once again as a delaying force and Wheeler had a further chance to enhance his reputation as a coverer of r e t r e a t s . The rebel horse soldiers found themselves confronted with an active and strong enemy i n attempting to defend the gaps and could do no more than temporarily delay the Federal advance. General Bushrod Johnson found that the Union troops were i n such strength that they could hold onto h i s force with one hand and outflank him with the other. The rebel infantry brigades had to retreat^ covered by t h e i r cavalry, before they were cut o f f and destroyed. 7 1 Wheeler was busy, and attempted to f e l l trees i n an e f f o r t to stem the Union tide but the enemy was so strong and there were so many roads by which he could be outflanked that he was forced to abandon t h i s procedure. He r e t i r e d by stages, h i s men t i r e d and h i s horses lacking forage, but the force as a whole providing a competent and able cover f o r the 72 ret r e a t i n g army. The Confederates did not r e a l l y have to worry about a close Federal pursuit. The Union army was exhausted, more from f i g h t i n g the mud than the enemy and Rosecrans* supply t r a i n s were somewhat disorganized. In addition, he had to secure h i s l i n e s of communication and bring up new supplies before he could advance a g a i n . 7 3 In spite of Rosecrans* achievement i n the conduct of the campaign, the Confederates do not seem to have considered the l o s s of Tullahoma s i g n i f i c a n t and ce r t a i n l y , i n comparison - 187 -to the l o s s of,, Vicksburg and Robert E. Lee*s repulse from Gettysburg, the f o r f e i t u r e of Middle Tennessee seemed almost t r i f l i n g . 7 Z f Indeed, taken out of context, the Tullahoma campaign was not p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t . The losses had been s l i g h t and the Confederates had moved back to a new defense l i n e , r e l a t i v e l y unhurt, but i t indicated the general m i l i t a r y malaise that was coming to gr i p the South and i t was one more step on the road to ultimate Confederate defeat. The a b i l i t y of the Confederacy to withstand the repeated blows of the Federals grew l e s s and l e s s and most of the M i s s i s s i p p i Valley was now i n the hands of the Union. Although Rosecrans was caught f l a t - f o o t e d at Chickamauga and only narrowly escaped disaster, the C i v i l War i n the West was now l a r g e l y a matter of t i d y i n g up. The role of the cavalry i n t h i s campaign can s t i l l be explained i n terms of the shi e l d and dagger analogy. There was strong evidence of changes i n approach with the appearance of mounted infantry and the increased dependence of a l l horse sold i e r s on t h e i r firearms but t h i s does not mean that the role altered s i g n i f i c a n t l y . The mounted troops were s t i l l t a c t i c a l , defensive and subordinate, and occasionally they emerged as / strategic, offensive, and independent, but these instances were rare and not always successful. The organization of the mounted troops generally r e f l e c t e d t h i s and the fragmentation of the Federal cavalry allowed i t to f u l f i l l i t s role much more e a s i l y . In spite of i t s concentration, the Confederate cavalry was - 188 -fragmented as well i n being spread out i n front of Bragg Ts army. I t was l o g i c a l here, as before, that when an army was s p l i t into fragments each section have i t s complement of cavalry f o r there were picketing, scouting, screening, and reconnoitering duties that could only be carried out by mounted troops. The cavalry's role was consistent with what had been suggested by the t h e o r i s t s i n spite of changes i n . approach and the attempts to f i n d more of a strategic role f o r the horse s o l d i e r s . The increased dependence on f i r e action s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d the heavy cavalry concept although there were s t i l l occasionally sabre charges to be seen. Thus a l l American cavalry, both North and South, became e s s e n t i a l l y l i g h t cavalry, which was armed and fought l a r g e l y l i k e dragoons, i n a t a c t i c a l , defensive, and subordinate role on the one hand and occasionally adopted the role of a strategic, offensive, and independent force on the other. Throughout, the cavalry was a shield on the one hand and a dagger on the other. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER VII Hoiria, Army of Tennessee, p. 228. Van Home, Army of the  Cumberland. I. 288. Lamers, Edge of Glory, p. 247. Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 46. Rosecrans was seldom i n c l i n e d to move u n t i l he considered that everything was just right but he seems to have waited at Murfreesboro f o r an inordinate length of time. o Lamers, Edge of Glory, pp. 253-254. Williams, Lincoln  Finds A General. V, 155 believes that many of Rosecrans' claims were f a l s e . ^Stanley, Memoirs, p. 141. See also Appendix I. Rosecrans' cavalry was numerically i n f e r i o r but these mere numbers are deceiving, and i n terms of power, the two forces were close to p a r i t y . *O.R.. XXIII, i , 403. ( A l l O.R. c i t a t i o n s are to Series I unless otherwise noted.) ^Sheridan, Memoirs. I, 252-253. 6Q.R.. XXIII, i i , 14. 7 I b i d . . 22-23. 8 I b i d . , 34. 9James A. Connolly, Three Years i n the Army of the Cumberland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 59. x 0 I M d . , p. 65. After the Tullahoma campaign he wrote: "...with a l l i t s r i s k and privat i o n I love t h i s kind of service and would l i k e to be engaged i n i t a l l the time." Ibid., p. 99. Evidently cavalry service wove a s p e l l around Connolly f o r he had become a firm convert. n I b i d . , pp. 78, 79, 80, 83. 12O.R.. XXIII, i i , 14. ^ I b i d . , 52. - 189 -- 190 -1 4 I b i d . , 91, 99, 130. 1 5 l b i d . , 118. » . l 6 I b i d . . 157. x 7 S e e Appendix I I . Jomini, Summary, p. 304• Mahan, An Elementary Treatise. (1854), P« 39* 1^0.R.. XXIII, i i , 232, 245, 270-271. 1 9IMd.. 281, 282. 2 Q I b i d . . 303-304. 21Q.R.. XXIII, i i , 336-337. 2 2 I b i d . , 246. 2 3 I b i d . . 574-580 passim. Carter, F i r s t Regiment, p. 72. Stanley, Memoirs, p. 135 notes that by then he had put the Federal cavalry i n shape, at least i n h i s opinion. 2 4Jones, Confederate Strategy, pp. 160-161. This was part of Johnston's hope that the cavalry could be used to stop the Federals the same way Forrest and Van Dorn had done with Grant i n December of 1862. Ibid.. p. 180. Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of M i l i t a r y Operations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 161. O.R.. XXIII. i i , 633, 646. 25O.R.. XXIII, i i , 623. 2 6Braxton Bragg to William Iff. Mackall, May 26, I863, Bragg Papers (Reel #3). 27Q.R.. XXIII, i i , 715, 758-759, 764, 823, 834. Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 289, 292. 2^Johnston, Narrative. p. l 6 l . 2Q0.R.. XXIII, i i , 622-623. See also George Brant to Joseph Wheeler, March 25, I863, Bragg Papers, (Reel #3). Brent was curious about a 5,947 d i s p a r i t y between the number of eff e c t i v e troops that Wheeler had and the number of small arms he reported. 3°For arms reports see O.R.. XXIII, i i , 762-763. See Appendix I. 3 1 I b i d . . 614. - 191 -3 2 I b i d . , 636. Thatcher, A Hundred Battles, p. 123 noted that a few ne'er-do-wells could colour the reputation of a whole regiment. 33O.R.. XXIII, i i , 65O. 3^Ibid., 701. 3sDuke, Morgan's Cavalry, p. 297. Thelle, "Evolution of Cavalry", p. 475* Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, p. 281 believes that the r a i d hurt the Southern sympathizers i n Ohio and thus had posit i v e p o l i t i c a l benefits f o r the North. For a detailed narrative see A l l e n K e l l e r , Morgan's Raid (New York: The Bobbs-M e r r i l l Company, 1 9 6 l ) . 36O.R., XXIII, i , 25-27. 37 W.C. Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler and h i s Cavalry 1862- 1865 and Wheeler's Santiago Campaign 1898 (Atlanta: Hudgins Publishing Company, 1899), p. 6 9 .O.R.. XXIII. i , 40; i i , 16 . 3^Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler, p. 70. CMt., XXIII, i , 37, 40-44 . 3 9Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler, pp. 70, 7 1 . Wyeth, L i f e of  Forrest, pp. 147, 151 . 40Q.R., XXIII, i , 62, 63 . 4 1 I b i d . , 64 . 4 2 I b i d . . 65, 67, 68, 70 . ^Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 275, 287-290. Duke even believes that there was o f f i c i a l discrimination against the cavalry although there i s no evidence to substantiate t h i s and i t i s therefore d i f f i c u l t to attach much credance to his obvious-l y b i t t e r remarks. See also Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler, p. 76. ^ F o r t estimony supporting the Federal cavalry see O.R., XXIII, i , 100, 115 and Thatcher, A Hundred Battles. pp . " T I§-119 . For contrary testimony see 0^R., XXIII, i , 90, 105, 107, 117. 45O.R.. XXIII, i , 127. 4 6 I b i d . , 128. - 192 -4 7 I b i d . , I63-I65. ^IbjLd., 166-175. ^ I b i d . . 177, 178, 180. 50 Ibid.. 181. Again, Union and Confederate cavalry fought both mounted and on foot. Thatcher, A Hundred Battles, seldom f a i l s to mention the revolving r i f l e s . o f h i s troop. 51O.R.. XXIII, i , 1 9 6 . 5 2Williams, General Wilder, pp. 1 5 - 1 6 . ^O.R.. XXIII, i , 2 5 7 . See also i b i d . . 2 1 1 , 2 3 2 . ^ W i l l i a m s , Lincoln Finds A General. V, 184 - 1 9 3 - Wyeth, L i f e of Forrest, pp. 190-218. Stanley was contemptuous of the a f f a i r . See Stanley, Memoirs, pp. 131 - 1 3 2 . O.R.. XXIII, i , 281. The r a i d was m i l i t a r i l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t except f o r the loss of troops. 55O.R.. XXIII, i , 335, 338, 339, 345- Williams, Lincoln  Finds A General. V, 175. Theile, "Evolution of Cavalry", p. 466. See also OjR., XXIII, i , 349, 350-351. 5 6Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, pp. 271, 287, 292. -* 7Stanley, Memoirs, p. 1 5 0 . Horn, Army of Tennessee, p. 2 3 5 . Catton, Never C a l l Retreat, pp. 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 . Lamers, Edge of Glorv. p. 2 8 9 . Williams, Lincoln Finds A General. V, 237-238 believes that Rosecrans displayed several s i g n i f i c a n t weaknesses i n t h i s campaign. Ly t l e , Bedford Forrest, pp. I 8 4 - I 8 5 and Parks, Polk, p. 3 1 1 believe that Bragg was surprised and that he made l i t t l e r e a l e f f o r t to f i n d out what was going on to h i s f r o n t . 5 ° 0 . R XXIII, i , 5 4 1 . See also i b i d . . 4 0 3 , 4 2 6 , 4 4 2 . Henry M. C i s t , The Army of the Cumberland, (New York: Charles Scribners* Sons, 1882), p. 161. Sheridan, Memoirs. I, 2 6 3 . Stanley, Memoirs, p. 1 5 1 . Appendix I and I I . Rosecrans* cavalry had an ad-vantage i n firepower. Q.R., XXIII, i , 4 0 5 . Williams, Lincoln  Finds A General. V, 2 1 5 . - 193 -O.R.. XXIII, i , 539. See also Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler, pp. 89-92. Stanley, Memoirs, p. I48. Thatcher, A Hundred Battles, p. 133. For other Federal cavalry reports see O.R., XXIII, i , 544, 547. The Confederate reports are regrettably scarce. 6 l W i l l i a m s , General Wilder, pp. 19, 23. Q.R.. XXIII, i , 456-461. Connolly, Three Years, pp. 95-98. 62O.R.. XXIII, i , 483. 63lbid . . 468, 486. ^Connolly, Three Years, pp. 67, 77, 89-91. 65p.R.. XXIII, i , 559. 6 6 I b i d . . 56O. 6 7 S t a r r , "Cold Steel", C.W.H. (1966), f o r an author who has found considerable emphasis placed on the use of the sabre i n the volunteer regiments of Union cavalry. 6 g0.R.. XXIII, i , 553. Sparks , Polk, pp. 311, 322-323. L y t l e , Bedford Forrest, p. I83. O.R.. XXIII, i i , 891. 7 Q0.R.. XXIII, i , 621, 622, 623. 7 1 I b i d . , 589-593, 608-609. 7 2 I b i d . 615-617. Dodson, Campaigns of Wheeler, pp. 88-97. Wyeth, L i f e of Forrest, p. 235- Forrest had taken over Van Dorn's d i v i s i o n a f t e r Van Dorn had been shot by an allegedly jealous husband. See Hartje, Van Dorn. pp. 308-327. Williams, General  Wilder, p. 23. 73 '-'Stanley, Memoirs, p. 151. Lamers, Edge of Glorv. pp. 289-290. W i l l i ams, Lincoln Finds A General. V, 236, 237, 239 suggests that the destruction of Bragg rs army had not been the object of the campaign. A l f r e d Lacey Hough, Soldier i n the West: The C i v i l War Letters of Alf r e d Lacev Hough (Philadelphia; U n i v e r s i t y of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 107. 7 / fWilliams, Lincoln Finds A General. V, 236-237. O.R., XXIII, i , 584. * ; — CONCLUSION The r o l e of cavalry that emerged i n the campaigns studied i n the Western theatre of the American C i v i l War from the Battle of Shiloh i n A p r i l 1862 to the Tullahoma campaign i n June 18"63 did not a l t e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from that which had been suggested by Jomini over t h i r t y years before. Jomini had pictured cavalry as an e s s e n t i a l l y t a c t i c a l arm with strategic overtones. I t s duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were subordinate and oriented p r i n c i p a l l y to the security of the r e s t of the army through providing escorts, manning outposts, gathering i n t e l l i g e n c e both on scouting patrols and l a r g e r reconnaissance forces, and so f o r t h . In addition to these defensive functions there was another side to i t s role that was offensive and t h i s included charging on the b a t t l e f i e l d , attacking enemy outposts and convoys, and even more f a r ranging expeditions against enemy l i n e s of communication. The role of cavalry that emerged i n practise d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from t h i s . The old d i v i s i o n of cavalry i n t o l i g h t and heavy horse according to function had l a r g e l y disappeared however. Northern and Southern cavalrymen assumed " l i g h t " and "heavy" functions as the occasion demanded, and there was no o f f i c i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n although the Confederates seemed to see a d i s t i n c t i o n between "regular" and "partisan" cavalry. Confederate General Braxton Bragg demonstrated t h i s c l e a r l y i n h i s attitude towards Nathan B. Forrest and John H. Morgan and - 194 -- 195 -allowed i t to colour him to such an extent that he overlooked the broader p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f a r ranging cavalry columns employed and coordinated i n a meaningful strategic fashion. The approach to cavalry was s l i g h t l y changed i n the campaigns studied but i t was consistent f o r the most part with previous thought and p r i o r American experience. The Union and Confed-erate cavalry had many dragoon-like q u a l i t i e s and e a s i l y combined the functions of mounted riflemen and cavalry. The appearance of mounted infantry i n I863 carried t h i s one step f u r t h e r . The duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h i s force revealed that i t was e s s e n t i a l l y cavalry i n terms of i t s r o l e although i t demonstrated an attempt to f i n d a new approach and i f the styles of f i g h t i n g and the weaponry were s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t from those of cavalrymen t h i s did not obscure the f a c t that the role was s t i l l b a s i c a l l y the same. Therefore, the cavalrymen i n the American C i v i l War probably should not be g l i b l y l a b e l l e d "mounted in f a n t r y " even though they displayed a d i s t i n c t penchant f o r f i g h t i n g on foot and an increased dependence on firearms. The r e s t r i c t i v e t e r r a i n , the tendency of cavalry to be employed as skirmishers i n b a t t l e to cover an advance or a retreat, the lack of t r a i n i n g , the large number of i n d i f f e r e n t horsemen, the inexperience of the company, ba t t a l i o n , and often regimental commanders added to improvements i n both the rate and range of f i r e of weapons a l l contributed to making cavalry look very much l i k e mounted infantry although i t s duties were s t i l l e s s e n t i a l l y cavalry duties. - 1 9 6 -In terms of behaviour and leadership the Confederate cavalry c l e a r l y had the upper hand. The Federals had few distinguished cavalry leaders i n the West, with only P h i l i p Sheridan, who made a very b r i e f appearance, and David Stanley q u a l i f y i n g . The Confederates had a plethora of good leaders and i f they sometimes displayed weaknesses of character and a b i l i t y t h i s should not detract from t h e i r other q u a l i t i e s . Nathan Forrest, f o r example, seldom got along well with h i s fellow o f f i c e r s , but he operated well on h i s own and t h i s may have been part of the reason that Bragg allowed him such freedom. John Morgan also displayed b r i l l i a n c e and dash but he had a marked tendency to stretch or even disobey orders as he saw f i t . But these two men brought i n a series of small and spectacular v i c t o r i e s f o r the Confederacy. Their e f f o r t s were often i n d i v -idual however, and with a few s i g n i f i c a n t exceptions the e f f e c t s only immediate and e a s i l y r e c t i f i e d by the Federals. I t i s noteworthy that the only time there was a genuine coordination of raiding cavalry columns i n the case of Forrest's expedition to West Tennessee and E a r l Van Dorn's r a i d on Grant's supply l i n e s at Holly Springs, a d e f i n i t e a l t e r a t i o n i n Federal plans was the d i r e c t r e s u l t . The Confederate cavalry brigades i n the M i s s i s s i p p i Valley were large and well l e d i f not always well equipped but the p o t e n t i a l of mobile s t r i k i n g columns was only dimly seen at the time. There i s l i t t l e doubt that the use of cavalry on r a i d s was an e f f o r t to f i n d a strategic role f o r troops whose t a c t i c a l - 197 -p o s s i b i l i t i e s had diminished. The campaigns examined gave ample evidence of t h i s . The main functions of cavalry were s t i l l security oriented but at the same time t h i s was something of a waste f o r such an expensive branch of the service. Cavalry found some employment on the f i e l d of b a t t l e and as the imagination of commanders expanded t h i s increased but i t was most often f i g h t i n g on foot with firearms, i t s mobility wasted. Jomini had suggested a strategic role f o r mounted troops i n h i s general remarks about cavalry and the section on partisans published i n the regulations i n 1861 had been even more e x p l i c i t but the influence of thought and ideas i s d i f f i c u l t to trace. The s i m i l a r i t y between Jomini*s and the regulations* with the emerging strategic r o l e of cavalry i s nonetheless s t r i k i n g . There were several minor points about cavalry that were evident as w e l l . The horse had declined as a f i g h t i n g machine and was becoming more and more a means of transportation from combat to combat. The Confederate cavalry and John Wilder Ts mounted infantry displayed t h i s most c l e a r l y although the other Union cavalry units also showed tendencies i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n as the war progressed. Also, i n terms of t h e i r armament, horse-men i n the C i v i l War were generally armed as l i g h t cavalrymen, much as George McClellan had suggested. C i v i l War cavalry took on more duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s than McClellan had implied, but the behaviour and equipment of both Northern and Southern cavalrymen i n the campaigns examined indicates c l e a r l y that they - 198 -were very s i m i l a r to old fashioned l i g h t cavalry although t h e i r approach to t h e i r duties often had dragoon-like q u a l i t i e s . A l l the emphasis on changes i n weaponry, t a c t i c s , styles of f i g h t i n g , and so f o r t h , does not obscure the fa c t that b a s i c a l l y , the role of cavalry altered l i t t l e . Cavalry s t i l l had a dual r o l e , on the one hand being a shield by escorting o f f i c e r s , convoys, and foraging parties, manning outposts and picket l i n e s , composing scouting and reconnaissance patrols, and screening an army, whether advancing or r e t i r i n g . The minor a u x i l i a r y functions of orderly and courier duty also f i t into t h i s . On the other hand cavalry was a dagger used to strik e at enemy outposts, picket guards, convoys, supply depots, and l i n e s of communication. I t s employment on the b a t t l e f i e l d had elements of both concepts but more properly belongs i n the former. Through a l l i t s duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s the cavalry was a t a c t i c a l arm, oriented p r i n c i p a l l y to security and defense, although i t could take the t a c t i c a l offensive on the b a t t l e f i e l d and even the strategic offensive with the long range r a i d . The changes that have received so much attention from h i s t o r i a n s have tended to eclipse the fa c t that although cavalry changed i t s approach and at the same time was made more e f f i c i e n t as a f i g h t i n g arm, i t s role remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same. On the basis of t h i s study i t was dependent, subordinate, defensive, and t a c t i c a l f o r the most part, and independent, offensive, and strategic f o r the remainder. The campaigns conducted from A p r i l 1862 to June I863 d i d see a l t e r a t i o n s i n - 199 -the r e l a t i o n s h i p of these two aspects of the cavalry's dual character but they did not see changes i n the cavalry's basic duties and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The r o l e of cavalry, and the arms of the service that have taken over i t s duties, have remained e s s e n t i a l l y the same. BIBLIOGRAPHY I. PRIMARY SOURCES A. Manuscript Collections Bragg, The General Braxton, Papers. 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Memoirs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917. Thatcher, Marshall P. A Hundred Battles i n the West. Detroit : Published.by the authpr, I884. Vale, Joseph G. Minty and the Cavalry: A History of Cavalry  Campaigns i n the Western Armies. Harrisburg; Edwin K. Meyers, 1886. - 203 -Wolseley, F i e l d Marshall Viscount. The American C i v i l War  An English View. Edited by James A.. Rawley. C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : The University Press of V i r g i n i a , 1964. G. Newspapers Richmond Daily Dispatch. December 1862 - January I863. Richmond Enquirer. December 1862 - January I863. Wilmington Daily Journal. December 1862 - January I863. - 204 -I I . SECONDARY SOURCES A. General His t o r i e s and Reference Works Bruce, Robert V. Lincoln and the Tools of War. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1956. Catton, Bruce. Never C a l l Retreat. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965. Catton, Bruce. T e r r i b l e Swift Sword. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963. Clausewitz, General Carl Von. On War. 3 v o l s . Translated by Colonel J.J.Graham. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966. Denison, George T. A History of Cavalry from the E a r l i e s t  Times. London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1913. Denison, George T. Modern Cavalry: I t s Organization. Armament, and Employment i n War. London: Thomas Bosworth, 1868. Donald, David. Lincoln Reconsidered. New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 19lE~. Donald, David (ed.). Why the North Won the C i v i l War. Louisiana State University Press, I960. Edwards, William B. C i v i l War Guns. Harrisburg: The Stackpole Press, 1962. Ganoe, William A. The History of the United States Army. New York: D. Appleton Century Co. Inc., 1942. Henry, Robert S. The Storv of the Mexican War. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1950. Jomini, Baron Henri De. Summary of the Art of War. Trans-la t e d by Major O.F. Winship and L t . E.E. McLean, U.S.A. New York: G.P. Putnam & Co., 1854« Livermore, Thomas L. Numbers and Losses i n the C i v i l War  i n America I86I-I80T. New York: Houghton M i f f l i n & Company, 1901. Luvaas, Jay. The M i l i t a r y Legacy of the C i v i l War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. - 205 -M i l l i s , Walter. Arms and Men. New York: G.P. Putnams, 1956. Ropp, Theodore. War i n the Modern World. Duke University-Press, 1959. . Shannon, Fred A l b e r t . The Organization and Administration of the Union Army 1861-1865. 2 v o l s . Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1965. ( F i r s t published, 1 9 2 8 . ) Singletary, Otis A. The Mexican War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, I960. Smith, C e c i l Woodham, The Reason Why. London: Constable, 1953. Van Horne, Thomas B. History of the Army of the Cumberland. I t s Organization, Campaigns and Battles. 2 v o l s . C i n c i n n a t i : Robert Clarke & Co., 1875. Warner, Ezra J . Generals i n Blue. Louisiana State University Press, 1 9 6 4 . Warner, Ezra J . Generals i n Gray. Louisiana State University Press, 1959* Wiley, B e l l I r v i n . The L i f e of B i l l y Yank. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc., 1952. Wiley, B e l l I r v i n . The L i f e of Johnny Reb. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1 9 4 3 . Williams, Kenneth P. Lincoln Finds A General. 5 vols. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952. Williams, T. Harry. Americans at War. Louisiana State University Press, I 9 6 0 . Williams, T. Harry. Lincoln and His Generals. New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, Inc., 1 9 5 2 . B. Unpublished Material Theile, Thomas. "The Evolution of Cavalry i n the American C i v i l War: I 8 6 I - I 8 6 3 . " Unpublished Ph.D. di s s e r t a t i o n , Department of History, University of Michigan, 1 9 5 1 . - 206 -C. Monographs Brackett, Albert G. History of the United States Cavalry  from the Formation of the Federal Government to the  1st of June 186~3*I New York: Argonaut Press Ltd., 1965. ( F i r s t published, 1865.) Brown, D. Alexander. Grierson's Raid. Urbana: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1962. Catton, Bruce. Grant Moves South. Boston: L i t t l e Brown & Company, I960. Connelly, Thomas Lawrence. Army of the Heartland. The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Dyer, John P. " F i g h t i n 1 Joe" Wheeler. Louisiana State University Press, 1941* Downey, Fa i r f a x . Clash of Cavalry. New York: David McKay Company Inc., 1959-F u l l e r , Major General J.F.C. The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. Bloomington: I n d i a n a State University Press, I960. C F i r s t published, 1929.) Gray, Alonzo. Cavalry Tactics as I l l u s t r a t e d by the War  of the Rebellion. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Cavalry Association, 191°. Volume I. There i s no evidence that a Volume II was ever published. Hartje, Robert G. Van Dorn: The L i f e and Times of a  Confederate General. Vanderbilt University Press, Henderson, G.F.R. The C i v i l War: A Soldier's View. Edited by Jay Luvaas. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958. Herr, Major General John K. and Wallace, Edward S. The  Story of the U.S. Cavalry 1775-1942. Boston: L i t t l e Brown & Company, 1953* Holland, C e c i l F. Morgan and His Raiders. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1943. Horn, Stanley F. The Army of Tennessee. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941. Jones, Archer. Confederate Strategy from Shiloh to Vicksburg. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961. - 207 -Jordan, General Thomas and Pryor, J.P. The Campaigns of  Lieut.-Gen» N»B. Forrest and of Forrest's Cavalry. New Orleans: Blelock & Company, 1868. K e l l e r , A l l a n . Morgan's Raid. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-M e r r i l l Company Inc., 1961. Lamers, William M. The Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans. New York: Harcourt Brace and World Inc., 1961. L y t l e , Andrew Nelson. Bedford Forrest and His C r i t t e r  Company. New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1931* M e r r i l l , James M. Spurs to Glorv. New York: Rand McNally Company Inc., 1966. Oates, Stephen B. Confederate Cavalry West of the River. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961. Parks, Joseph H. General Leonidas Polk C.S.A. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. . Reed, Major D.W. The Battle of Shiloh and the Organiz- ations Engaged. Washington: Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1909. Rich, Joseph W. The Battle of Shiloh. Published at Iowa City Iowa by the State H i s t o r i c a l Society of Iowa, 1911* Roland, Charles P. Albert Sidney Johnston. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964* Stevenson, Alexander. The Battle of Stone's River near  Murfreesboro. Tenne~ssee, Dec. 30. 1862-Jan. 3. 1863. Boston: James R. Osgood & Company, I884. Williams, Samuel C. General John T. Wilder. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1936. Wyeth, John A l l e n . L i f e of General Nathan Bedford Forrest. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1899. D. A r t i c l e s i n P e r i o d i c a l s Bearss, Edwin C. "The Battle of H a r t s v i l l e and Morgan's Second Kentucky Raid", The Register of the Kentucky  H i s t o r i c a l Society. LXV (1967). - 208 -Bearss, Edwin C. "Cavalry Operations i n the Battle of Stone's River", Tennessee H i s t o r i c a l Quarterly XIX (I960), 23-52, 110-144. Catton, Bruce. "Glory Road Began i n the West", C i v i l War  History VI (i960), 229-237. Donald, David. "The Confederate as a Fighting Man", Journal of Southern History XXV (1959), 178-193. Dyer, J.P. "Some Aspects of Cavalry Operations i n the Army of Tennessee", Journal of Southern History VIII (1943), 2IO-225. Fish, C.R. "The Northern Railroads i n 1861", American  H i s t o r i c a l Review XXII (1917), 778-793. McWhiney, Grady. "Controversy i n Kentucky: Braxton's Bragg's Campaign of 1862", C i v i l War History VI (i960), 5-42. . . . Ramsdell, Charles W. "The Confederate Government and the Railroads", American H i s t o r i c a l Review XXII (1917), 794-810. Ramsdell, Charles W. "General Robert E. Lee's Horse Supply, 1861-1865", American H i s t o r i c a l Review XXXV (1930), 758-777. Starr, Stephen Z. "Cold St e e l : The Sabre and the Union Cavalry", C i v i l War History XI (1965), 142-159. Stonesifer, Roy P. J r . "The Union Cavalry Comes of Age", C i v i l War History XI (1965). 274-283. Weller, Jac. "Imported Confederate Shoulder Weapons", C i v i l War History V (1959), 157-183. E. Atlases Esposito, Colonel Vincent J . (ed.). The West Point At l a s  of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 2 Vols. This was the source for.the maps reproduced immediately following the appendices. They were taken from Volume I, 1689-1900, Map #76. PREFACE TO APPENDICES: Many of the figures presented i n these appendices are admittedly estimates and compromises. This does not d i s t o r t or obviate the purpose of the charts however. The intention i s not to present a highly detailed analysis of numbers and losses but rather to give general guides that w i l l help the reader better understand the nature of the campaigns by giving the r e l a t i v e sizes of the armies, the r e l a t i v e numbers engaged, and a break-down of the losses suffered by each side i n s p e c i f i c b a t t l e s . Three sources were used. The O f f i c i a l Records provided the mainstay of the s t a t i s t i c s and Thomas L. Livermore Ts Numbers and Losses i n the American C i v i l War and the a r t i c l e s and footnotes i n Battles and Leaders of the American C i v i l War provide a basis f o r comparison and compilation. The r e s u l t of consulting these three.sources i s that the figures presented here are generally correct. The returns f o r C i v i l War armies, although r e l a t i v e l y frequent i n many cases, have not a l l survived and there are often considerable gaps i n the available data. In addition, many of the returns that have survived are incomplete and t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true i n the case of the cavalry reports. Also, many of the returns are not i n very much d e t a i l and do not break down the organization s u f f i c i e n t l y to enable the numbers of cavalrymen attached to the several d i v i s i o n s , corps, and wings to always be r e a d i l y apparent. Thus, many of the figures pres-ented are often estimates or projections. Some general conclusions may be drawn from these charts that support suggestions made i n the t e x t . The casualty figures suggest that the cavalry was not heavily engaged i n combat i n comparison with the army as a whole. Even when i t was, such as at the Battle of Stone's River or during the Tullahoma Campaign, i t s casualties were s t i l l much s l i g h t e r than the r e s t of the army. This seems to stem from the f a c t that cavalry generally fought i n skirmish formation and thus was:,not a mass target l i k e a regiment of infantry i n l i n e of b a t t l e . The Confederate cavalry was usually superior to the Federal i n numbers. This was further emphasized by the Southern tendency to operate cavalry i n units of brigade s i z e . The Union cavalry generally tended to be broken up into smaller units and brigade concentrations were rare. The apparent superiority of the Union cavalry i n many of the figures that are compared i s misleading because there were a number of partisan brigades, such as those of Nathan Forrest and John Morgan, that operated intermittantly with the main army and were large and well handled, making them formidable foes f o r Union troops. - 209 -- 210 -It i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the cavalry i n William S. Rosecrans 1 army gradually grew from November 1862 to June I863 and t h i s , augmented by the f a c t that the Federal troopers were given generally more e f f i c i e n t weapons, gave the Union general approximate parity i n mounted forces, p a r t i c u l a r l y when one or,, more of the Confederate partisan brigades happened to be absent as was the case at Stone's River and the Tullahoma campaign. APPENDIX I: Proportion of Cavalry to Total Strength of Armies; Union; Confederate; The Battle of Shiloh and the Advance on Corinth: A p r i l 1862 Cavalry 8,605 - 9-0% 2,073 - 5.4% Total 95,076 38,733 May-June 1862 Cavalry 5.170 - 4.2% 4.104 - 7.7% Total 126,692 53,217 The Battles of Iuka and Corinth: July 1862 Cavalry 4,5°° - 7.8% (returns incomplete) Total 57,000 September 1862 Cavalry 7.797 - 12.0% 3.000 - 17.8% Total 64,982 16,800 October 1862 Cavalry unknown - 5.566 - 25.3% Total 23,077 22,000 The Invasion of Kentucky and the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e : July 1862 Cavalry 4.981 - 8.4% 2,431 - 8.1% Total 59,456 30,000 October 1862 Cavalry 6,399 - 11.0% 3.100 - 11.9% Total 58,000 26,000 The Battle of Stone's River: December 1 1862 Cavalry ,7,417 - 9.1% 4.674 - 10.9% •6,' Total 81,729 4 ,784 December 31 1862 Cavalry 5.916 - 9.2% 4.237 - 11.2% Total 64,035 37,712 Murfreesboro Interlude and the Tullahoma Campaign: January I863 Cavalry 6.741 - 8.4% 9.707 - 23.4% Total 80,477 41,402 February I863 Cavalry 4.295 - 7.3% 14,153 - 32.3% Total 58,112 43,692 - 211 -- 212 -March I863 Gavalrv 10.000 Total 102,136 - 10.0$ 16.247 54,305 - 31.4% A p r i l 1863 Cavalrv 7.424 Total 103,283 - 7.156 15,1?9 57,121 - 26.5% May I863 Cavalrv 7.076 Total 95,986 - 7.1% 15.096 54,950 - 27.4% June I863 Cavalrv 12.281 Total 97,142 - 12.6% 17,373 55,070 - 31.5% July 1863 Cavalrv 13.161 Total 105,655 - 12.5% 11 *m 49,876 - 23.0% Notes to Accompany Appendix I; The Battle of Shiloh and the Advance on Corinth: The cavalry was d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the Union and Confederate armies and the returns were not always complete, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the Confederates. The figures f o r May and June represent the approximate strength of P.G.T. Beauregard's army just p r i o r to the evacuation of Corinth. The Union figure f o r A p r i l represents the combined armies of John Pope, Ulysses Grant, and Don Carlos B u e l l . Not a l l of these fought at the Battle of Shiloh. See Appendix I I . The Battles of Iuka and Corinth: The July figure f o r the Union represents the t o t a l Federal forces i n the area. There i s no comparable figure available f o r the Confederates but i t was probably around 60,000 men including the armies at Vicksburg, Tupelo, and Chattanooga. See Appendix II f o r numbers engaged. The break-down of the Union cavalry i s not available but i t was probably around 2,000 men. The figure f o r the Confederate cavalry i s a composite. The Invasion of Kentucky and the Battle of P e r r y v i l l e : The figures f o r t h i s period are sparse and an accurate picture i s d i f f i c u l t to construct but the data presented i s f a i r l y close. The figure f o r the Confederate cavalry i s mis-leading because there were numerous small g u e r r i l l a bands and the partisan brigades that were not included and these repres-ented at l e a s t 5,000 men. Edmund Kirby Smith's army i s not included i n the f i g u r e . He had about 4,000 cavalry i n an army of approximately 26,000. The Battle of Stone's River: The Union figure includes a l l of Rosecrans' department. See Appendix II f o r numbers engaged at the b a t t l e . Many of these troops were scattered around i n small garrisons and each of these usually had i t s complement of cavalry f o r scouting and picket duty. The Murfreesboro Interlude and the Tullahoma Campaign: This period had the most complete returns f o r the time studied. The figures f o r the Union cavalry were probably low and the r e a l t o t a l hovered around 10,000 men. This i s indicated by the jump i n May and June. There i s no evidence that Rosecrans received such numbers of cavalry reinforcements at that time and t h i s jump probably r e f l e c t s a greater concentration of the cavalry with a correspondingly higher return. The Confederate returns were not always complete, the partisan brigades i n p a r t i c u l a r being negligent i n t h e i r paperwork. The drop i n July represents the casualties from the Tullahoma campaign and the departure of Morgan on h i s i l l - f a t e d Ohio r a i d . - 213 -APPENDIX I I : Numbers engaged i n the campaigns studied: Union: Confederate: Shiloh campaign: Grant had 37,731 men engaged on A p r i l 6, 1862, and was reinforced by Lewis Wallace's 5,000 men and about the same number from Buell*s 40,866 man army that began a r r i v i n g on A p r i l 7- The cavalry was not engaged except as escorts and or d e r l i e s or scouts. Iuka: Rosecrans and General Ord had about 17,000 men between them but only about 4,000 men of Rosecrans* army became heavily engaged. The number of cavalry probably did not exceed 1,500 although the data i s unavailable. Corinth: Rosecrans* army was from 21,000 to 23,000 with about 2,000 cavalry. The cavalry was not engaged heavily. P e r r y v i l l e : Buell*s army was 54,000 but only one-half of these was close to the scene of combat and not a l l of those were engaged. The number of cavalry with the army did not exceed 1,500 and was not heavily engaged. Stone*s River (Murfreesboro): Rosecrans marched from Nashville with about 43,400 men, including 3,200 cavalry, v i r t u a l l y a l l h i s troops becoming f a i r l y heavily engaged i n the course of the b a t t l e . There were 2,073 cavalry-men i n the 38,733 man army that marched from Corinth on the eve of the b a t t l e . The cavalry was more a c t i v e l y engaged than the Union horse. Price had about 16,800 men i n a l l and only about 4,179 of these became heavily engaged. He had about 3,000 cavalry and t h i s force was not heavily engaged. Van Dorn had 5,566 cavalry i n a t o t a l army of 22,000. The Confederate cavalry did not become heavily engaged. Bragg*s army was about 26,000 and 15,000 men bore the brunt of the combat, mostly Polk*s wing. About 3,100 cavalry were present on the f i e l d . Bragg*s army numbered 37,712 at t h i s time and included 4,300 e f f e c t i v e cavalry a f t e r Morgan and Forrest had l e f t . - 214 - 215 -The Tullahoma Campaign: Rosecrans advanced from Murfreesboro with 50,617 men. About 10,000 of these were cavalry. The actual numbers engaged were few and most of the work was done by the cavalry and a few leading infantry brigades. Bragg*s army numbered 46,665 at t h i s time and h i s cavalry was from 12,000 to 13,000. At the time, Morgan was again absent. The Confederates also had r e l a t i v e l y few men engaged, most of the work being done by the cavalry and a few infantry brigades. Note: The numbers of men presented as engaged i n the above have often been approximations but these are not out to such an extent as to warp the evidence and present a distorted p i cture. The available data i s incomplete and even contra-dictory at times. In addition, the number of men shown on returns do not a l l get up to the f i r i n g l i n e , i n spite of being l a b e l l e d "present f o r duty". Although t h i s i s the best c r i t e r i o n to follow, considerable numbers of troops guarded baggage t r a i n s , did orderly duty, acted as h o s p i t a l guards, and so f o r t h . In spite of being approximations however, the figures presented here give a reasonably accurate picture of the numbers of men i n a l l and the numbers of cavalrymen engaged i n the campaigns studied. APPENDIX I I I ; Losses i n the Campaigns studied; Percentage of Cavalry to t o t a l : Union; Confederate: Shiloh: Cavalry Total 23 13 ,047 .18% 102 -1 0 , 6 9 4 Iuka: Cavalry Total 13 790 - 1.6% 96 -1,581 Corinth: Cavalry Total ?s. 2,520 .14% 21 -4,838 P e r r y v i l l e : Cavalry Total 30 4,241 - .07% 2 -3 , 3 9 6 Stone's River Cavalry Total 404 1 3 , 2 4 9 - 3.0% H 9 -10,226 Tullahoma: Cavalry Total 139 570 - 24.3% unknown -2 , 139 Percentage of l o s s to forces engaged: Shiloh: Losses Engaged 1 3 , 0 ^ 7 47 ,731 - 27.3% 10,694. " 38,733 Iuka: Losses Engaged 790 17,000 - 4 . 6 % 16,800 Corinth: Losses Engaged 2,520 23,000 - 10 .9% 4.838 -22,000 P e r r y v i l l e : Losses Engaged 4,241 54,000 - 7.8% 2 ,39° " 26,000 Stone's River: Losses Engaged 1 3 , 2 4 9 43,400 - 3 0 . 5 % 10 .226 -37.712 Tullahoma: Losses Engaged 570 50,617 - 1.1% 2,139 -4 6 , 6 6 5 .60% .04% 4.4% 27.5% 9.4% - 21. < 13.( 30.' 4.! Percentage of Cavalry loss to Cavalry forces engaged: Shiloh: Iuka: Losses Engaged unknown 21 -102 -Losses Engaged 1,500 11 -2,073 96 -3,000 4.9% 6.4% - 216 -- 216 — Corinth: Losses Engaged 38 -2,000 1.9% 21 -5,566 .4% P e r r y v i l l e : Losses Engaged 30 -1,500 2.0% 2 -3 , 1 0 ° (negligible) Stone's River: Losses Engaged 4O4 -3,200 12. k% w -4,237 10.5% Tullahoma: Losses Engaged 139 -10,000 1.1+% unknown -13,000 -Notes: Shiloh: Most of the cavalry on the Union side was not engaged i n actual combat although much of i t was present on the f i e l d . The Confederate cavalry was r e l a t i v e l y more engaged, as i s indicated by the great d i s p a r i t y i n casualties. Iuka: The cavalry i n t h i s battle was engaged only i n minor skirmishing e i t h e r covering an advance or a r e t r e a t . See Appendix I I . Corinth: The cavalry i n t h i s b a t t l e was quite i n a c t i v e . The figures here suggest that assaulting troops suffered heavily i n comparison to the defenders. P e r r y v i l l e : The Confederate cavalry returns are so incomplete that i t i s not even possible to guess with any certitude. The two casualties c i t e d were o r d e r l i e s . The Southern cavalry was involved i n more heavy f i g h t i n g than the Union cavalry so i t i s l i k e l y that i t s casualties were correspondingly higher. Stone's River: I t i s evident here that the cavalry was involved i n combat to an unprecedented extent. Both Bragg and Rosecrans gave evidence of having no h e s i t a t i o n i n committing t h e i r mounted troops to action. The Confederate returns were not complete, John Pegram having f i l e d neither a report nor a casualty return. His brigade was not involved i n any more than minor skirmishing so the missing figures would not l i k e l y raise the l i s t s i g n i f i c a n t l y . - 217 -Tullahoma: See Appendix I I . The advance Union cavalry and the covering Confederate horse bore the brunt of the combat i n t h i s campaign which was r e l a t i v e l y bloodless generally speaking. There were not returns f o r the Confederates but t h e i r casualties i n the cavalry forces were probably s i m i l a r to the Federals. - 218 -MAP U 1: _ KENTUCKY C TENNESSEE Tennessee \ River Cumberland River F ° I ^ t e e n r y >Fort,Donelson F o r t i Heimaj_ D&ver Paris D a n v i l l e kDuck River Humboldt rJackson Tennessee River Waynesboro BetheT~XT <to Memphis) J>urdy Crump" Landing Shiloh a >avannah Pittsburgh Landing jrand Junction "MISSISSIPPI Corinth <to Tupelo) • Iuka ' TENNESSEE ALABAMA (to Chattanooga ^Florence Tuscumbia - 2 1 9 -

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