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Democritus and Epicurus : soul, thought, and theory of knowledge Darcus, Shirley Muriel Louise 1968

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DEMOCRITUS AND EPICURUS: SOUL, THOUGHT, AND THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE hy SHIRLEY MURIEL LOUISE DARCUS B.A., University of British'Columbia, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Classics We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL, 1968 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree that permiss ion f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s represen -t a t i v e s . It i s understood that copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l ga in s h a l l not be a l lowed wi thout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department nf CLASSICS The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date APRIL. 1968 ABSTRACT This t h e s i s seeks t o present a c l e a r account of the teachings of Democritus and Epicurus on the soul (mind), thought, and the source of knowledge through an examination of the extant remains of t h e i r works and the reports of t h e i r teachings made hy other authors. Democritus b e l i e v e d that the soul was a substance l i k e f i r e but not f i r e i t s e l f . He taught that the mind and the soul were i d e n t i c a l . The soul (mind) was d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the whole body and was the seat of both thought and sensation. Thought was a "change" caused by i d o l s entering the body and i t s nature was dependent upon the condition of the body i t s e l f . Democritus b e l i e v e d that a l l sensible q u a l i t i e s had no objective existence; they were empty " a f f e c t i o n s " {na&T)) of the senses — only the atoms and void e x i s t e d i n r e a l i t y . Democritus postulated two forms of knowledge: "bastard" cognition which was equivalent t o sensation; "genuine" cognition which could grasp the r e a l i t i e s of the atoms and v o i d . Although Democritus considered the evidence of the senses u n r e l i a b l e , he d i d use the senses as the s t a r t i n g point f o r gaining "genuine" knowledge. He a l s o b e l i e v e d that the mind, by using sensible objects, could grasp the r e a l i t i e s l y i n g within the obgects themselves but there i s no c l e a r evidence on how he thought t h i s happened. i i Epicurus taught that the soul was composed of four very subtle elements; one like air, one like fire, one like wind and a fourth nameless element. The soul had two parts, the animus located in the breast and the aniraa distributed throughout the body. A l l four elements of the soul were present in both the animus and anima. The fourth element present in the anima caused sensation to take place in the sense-organs themselves. Epicurus believed that the mind was stirred in some.."way with each impression made upon the sense-organs. The mind was also struck directly by idols too fine to affect the senses. Epicurus taught that a l l sense-impressions were true; sensation was a criterion of truth. A second criterion of truth was the prolepsis. This was a general concept of a class of objects which was derived from sensation and stored within the mind. Epicurus believed that error arose not because the sense-impression was false, but because the mind formed an incorrect opinion of the nature of the sensible object. One had to pay attention to a "clear view" (evapY"nna) of the sensible object to determine the truth of any opinion formed by the mind. In the case of objects which could not be perceived close at hand, any opinion of their nature which was not contradicted by the senses could be accepted as true. Epicurus believed that a l l sense-impressions were true but the "clear" (evapynO sensations were more valuable for determining the exact nature of the sensible object. Besides the forms of thought caused by sensation, Epicurus believed that the mind was capable of reasoning. This activity of the mind played an important role in determining the nature of imperceptible things. Epicurus taught that the mind used "signs" provided by sensible objects to form hypotheses about xa a&rjXa and that i t checked these hypotheses with the evidence of the senses. If the hypothesis was confirmed or not contradicted by sensation, i t could be accepted as true. Epicurus believed i t was by this method that a knowledge of the atoms and the void could be obtained. The ETHPO\T) xfjc; Oiavoiac,, which the later Epicureans added as a criterion of truth, appears to have been used hy Epicurus to refer to the apprehension by the mind of idols too fine to affect the senses. There is also evidence that the euiBoXT) of the mind signified the selection by the mind of concepts existing within i t . The £nl(3o\r) was important, not for any role in establishing the nature of xa aor|A.a, but as a special form of sensation. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor H. G. Edinger who acted as my adviser in the preparation of this thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABBREVIATIONS v i PREFACE v i i i CHAPTERS 1 DEMOCRTTUS: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND THOUGHT 1 2 DEMOCRITUS: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE l6 3 EPICURUS: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL k6 k THE TWO CRITERIA: SENSATION AND PROIEPSIS. . . 63 5 KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY 127 ABBREVIATIONS Adv. Col. : Plutarch, Adversus Colotem. AJP : American Journal of Philology. Contr. Epic. Beat. : Plutarch, "Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum," Moralia, ik. CQ : Classical Quarterly. CW : Classical Weekly. D.A. : "Lehre" (Democritus) in Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Fifth Edition.. Berlin 1952. Reprinted Berlin 1959. Volume. :2. D.B. : "Fragmente" (Democritus) in Diels and Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Fifth Edition. Berlin 1952. Reprinted Berlin 1959. Volume 2. De An. : Aristotle, De Anima. De Gen. et Corr.: Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione. De Nat. Deor.: Cicero, De Natura Deorum. De Sens. : Theophrastus, De Sensibus. Diogenes Laertius: "Epicurus," Vitae Philosophorum, Book 10. Pox. Gr. : H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci. Third Edition. Berlin I879. Reprinted Berlin 1958. Ep. H. : Epicurus, Epistula ad Herodotum, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 10, 35-^3. Ep. M.i„ : Epicurus, Epistula ad Mendfceum, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 10, 122-135. Ep. P. : Epicurus, Epistula ad Pythoclem, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 10, t>4-ll6. Fr. : Epicurus, Fragmenta. K.D. : Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 10, 139-I5U. v i i L u c r e t i u s : LSJ Metaph. PI. Sent. Vat. De Rerum Natura. L i d d e l l , Scott, Jones, McKenzie, Greek-English  Lexicon. Ninth E d i t i o n . Oxford 1940. A r i s t o t l e , Metaphysica. Aetius, P l a c i t a . Epicurus, SentertLae Vaticanae. Sextus Empiricus: Adversus Mathematicos. TAPA : Transactions and Proceedings of the American P h i l o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n . Usener H. Usener, Epicurea. L e i p z i g 1887. PREFACE In this thesis I have limited my topic to the teachings of Democritus and Epicurus on the nature of the mind and the manner in which the mind thinks and acquires knowledge, in particular a knowledge of what the Atomists regarded as the ultimate realities of the universe, the atoms and void. I have not discussed the role of the mind either as the seat of emotion or as the origin of the will. I have not treated separately the teachings of the Atomist, Leucippus, since i t is almost impossible to determine the exact nature of his teachings and how they differed from the views of his pupil Democritus. Most passages that do mention Leucippus link him with Democritus.-*- There is also the problem that many post-Theophrastean sources made no mention of Leucippus.^ It is possible to suppose3 that Leucippus laid the funda-mental principles of atomism and that Democritus greatly elaborated these principles, but to distinguish the two Atomists more exactly poses a serious iSee " Lehre" of Leucippus, Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Vol. 2, #67, pp. 70-79. . 2G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), P. ^02. 3B. A. Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy, Thales to Democritus (Hew York, 1923), pp. 227 -223; E. Zeller, A History of Greek Philosophy. Translated by G. Alleyne (London, I881), Vol. 2, pp. 207-200; P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnessproblems in Atterthum (Berlin, lVo%), p. 170; Kirk and Raven, op.cit., p. M-02; C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928), p. 67. See especially Cicero, Academica Priora, 2, 37, l i b . ix problem, since they are not r i g i d l y separated in the sources. In relation to Epicurus, I have adhered to the opinion of scholars5 that the works of Epicurus recorded by Diogenes Laertius are genuine. No question of the authenticity of the Epistula ad Herodotum and Epistula ad Menoeceum has arisen. The Epistula ad Pythoclem is not thought to be Epicurus' own composition but a compilation from one of his longer works made by some unknown Epicurean; the letter clearly contains teachings that are in s t r i c t accord with Epicurus' views.7 The authenticity of the Kuriai Doxai has been questioned,® but the references to these sayings of Epicurus that appear in the ancient authors^ make clear that the Kuriai Doxai were regarded in antiquity as an authentic work of Epicurus. Also in connection with Epicurus, I have followed the consensus of opinion among scholars-^ that Lucretius in the De Rerum Natura is presenting a ^Bailey, (Greek Atomists, pp. 69-108) does attempt to distinguish the teachings of the two Atomists but often in the evidence he quotes for Leucippus, Democritus is also mentioned. See R. Philippson, "Review of C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus," Gnomon 6 (1930), pp. k60-h62 and W. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, I965), p. 382 n. 2. 5H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, 1887), p. XXXVII f f . ; R. D. Hicks, "Introduction," Lives of the Eminent Philosophers (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1925), Vol. 1, p. XX; C. Bailey, Epicurus, The  Extant Remains (Oxford, 1926), p..9. b a i l e y , Epicurus, pp. 173 , 327-328. 7see Usener, op.cit., pp. XXXVII-XL and Bailey, Epicurus, p. 375. ^Usener, op.cit., pp. XLI - XLIII. 9Diogenes Laertius, 10, 138; Plutarch, Adv.CoL, 31, 1125 e, Lucian, Alexandri, kj; Cicero, De Finibus, 2, 7, 20 and Cicero, De Nat.Deor., 1, 30, •85~I See also Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 3^-3^7. !QE.Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen (Leipzig, l880),Vol.3,pp.378-80; Tohte, Epikurs Kriterien der Wahrheit (ClausFEhal, ±&lh),v. 9; R.Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophiscn.en Schriften (Leipzig, 1877, reprinted Hildesheim, 19b4j,Vol.1, p.9« n . l ; P.W.Mewaldt in Pauly-Wissowa, Realencyclopadie  der classischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart),Vol.13.2, I67O; Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, edited by W.Leonard and S.Smith (Madison, 19^2),pp.36-kl;Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, edited by C. Bailey (Oxford, I9V7),Vol.1, pp.22-30; Bailey, X s t r i c t l y accurate account of his master's teaching. In relation to Epicurus' teaching on the nature of reasoning, I have not entered into a discussion of the work of Fhilodemus, Ilepl ETJM.E twaetuv , which discusses the "methods of inference" used in the Epicurean school. As B a i l e y l l and. Merbach^ point out, this work clearly represents a develop-ment in the use of logic made hy later Epicureans in order that they might oppose the "methods of inference" employed by the Stoics.^-3 There is clear evidence 1^ that Epicurus himself rejected a l l use of formal logic. The Greek and Latin quotations that appear in this thesis are taken from the following sources. Aristotle. De Anima: Edited and translated by W. S. Hett. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1936. . De Generatione et Corruptione: Edited and translated by E. S. Forster. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1955. . Metaphysical Edited and translated by H. Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1937. 2 volumes. . Fhysica: Edited and translated by P. A. Wickstead and. F. M. Comford. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, 1929. 2 volumes. Greek Atomists, pp. 10-11. See also J. Woltjer, Lucretii Philosophia Cum Font ibus Comparata (Groningen, 1877). . ^B a i l e y , Greek Atomists, pp. 3, 229, 259 n. 1. 1 2 F . Merbach, De Epicuri Canonica (Weida, 1909), p. 28. !3Cf. P. and E. De Lacy, Philodemus: On Methods of Inference (Philadelphia, 19^1), P. 157 f f . For the fact that the opposition between Epicureans and Stoics arose after the time of Epicurus, see K. De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy (Minneapolis, 195*0, PP- 6-7 and B. Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus (LoridTon, I967), p. XI. ^Diogenes Laertius, 10, 31; Cicero, De Finibus, 1, 7, 22. xi Cicero. Actio in Verrem: Edited and translated by L. H. Greenwood. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1935. 2 volumes. . De Finibus: Edited and translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1931. . De Natura Deorum: Edited and translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1933. . Topica: Edited and translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 19^9. . Tusculanae Disputationes: Edited and translated by J. E. King. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 19^5-Diogenes Laertius. Vitae Philosophorum, Book 9? Edited and translated by R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1925. Book 10: Edited and translated by C. Bailey. Oxford, 1926. Epicurus. Epistulae, Kuriai Doxai, Sententiae Vaticanae, Fragmenta: Edited and translated by C. Bailey. Oxford, 192b. Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Edited by C. Bailey. Second Edition. Oxford, 1922. Plutarch, Adversus Colotem and Non Posse Vivi Secundum Epicurum: Edited and translated by B. Einarson and P. De Lacy in Moralia, Volume Ik. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 19&7* Sextus Empiricus. Adversus Mathematicos: in Sextus Empiricus. Edited and translated by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1935. Volumes 2, 3, 4. Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes: in Sextus Empiricus. Edited and translated by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library. London and Cambridge, Mass., 1935. Volume 1. A l l other quotations are taken from H. Diels, Die Fragmente der  Vorsokratiker, Fifth Edition, Berlin 1952, Reprinted Berlin 1959, and H. Usener, Epicurea, Leipzig 1887. CHAPTER ONE DEMOCRITUS: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL AND THOUGHT As one would expect in the system of Democritus, which explained a l l phenomena in s t r i c t l y material terms, the nature of the soul was corporeal; the soul was a "body within a body.""1' The atoms forming the soul were fine, smooth and spherical in shape. Diogenes Laertius says: E H XOLOUTWV \ £ LiOV HCll 7l£p ItpEpWV OyHGJV CTUyHEHp Co&CK. I » Hal TT)V tpUXTIV 6HOLU)C;.2 The fineness of the atoms of the soul i s also attested by Cicero: Democritum enim . . . levibus et rotundis corpusculis efficientem animum3 Illam (sc. animam) . . . individuorum corporum levium et rotundorum . . . .4 Moreover Aetius describes the soul as follows: ArmOHpixoe, TCUP<JJ6EC; avyupma EH TIOV \6yip •&£wpr|Twv, acpatpunac; (i£v E^OVTIOV TOCC; Ibiaq, TtuptvTjv 6E TTJV 6uva|j.Lv, ouEp au>|ia EIVOCI .5 •'Aristotle, De An., 1, 5, 409a 32, D.A. 104a. 2Piogenes laertius, $), 44, D.A. 1. ^Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 1, 11, 22. 4 l b i d . , 1, 18, 42. 5Aetius, PI., 4, 3, 5, D.A. 102, Pox. Gr., p. 388. 2 The soul is "like f i r e ; " the atoms forming the compound (auyHpiLia) of the soul are spherical in shape. From these passages we can conclude that the soul according to Democritus is a compound of spherical atoms, like in nature to f i r e but distinct from i t . Spherical atoms form both the soul and f i r e hut combine in such a way that the two substances are similar though not identical in nature. The point that the soul is "like f i r e " but not f i r e i t s e l f is an important one, since Democritus did not believe the soul could exist outside the body;^ wherever there was f i r e in the external world, the Atomist did not conclude that soul was present in that spot but merely a substance to which the soul was similar.7 Aristotle, however, f a i l s to maintain this distinction; he says that Democritus completely identified soul and f i r e : [AT)|I6HPI.TOC.] Xiyei 6' toe; TJ^UXT) HOC! xb^$EpLibv xauxov, xoc Ttpurca axiinaxa xuiv a9aipoei.6u)v .8 Aristotle states Democritus taught that soul and heat were the same, both being composed of atoms spherical in shape. Again Aristotle says: Ariiionpixoc; nev rcup TL HOCI 9-epnov cpriaiv auxriv eivai [TTIV cj;uxr)v]' ^aneCpuv yap ovxiov axr|p.axa)v na! axouwv xct aqpaipoei6fj uup xal cl^ uxhv Xeyzi ... xa acpaipoeL6T) cl/uXTiv [Xeyei] .9 In this passage Democritus is said to have identified the spherical atom °See Aetius, PI., k, 7, k, D.A. 109, Pox. Gr., p. 393. Cf. also Democritus' statement in D.B. 297* ?H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (New York, 1935), p. 289": ^Aristotle, De Respiratione, k, k72 a h, D.A. 106. 9Aristotle,De An., 1, 2, kOh a 1. I have followed the text of Aristotelis Opera, edited by Academia Regia Borussica (Berlin, I87O, reprinted Berlin, i960), Second Edition, Vol. 1; Aristotle De Anima, edited by R. D. Hicks (Cambridge 1907, reprinted Amsterdam 1965); Aristotle, On the Soul edited by W. S. Hett (Loeb. Classical Library, London and Cambridge, 1957); Aristotle, De Anima, edited by D. Ross (Oxford, 196l). Diels in (Leucippus) A 28 rejects the passage xa cNpaipoeI6TI . . . WV as a gloss of kOka. 16. Hicks, however, (op.cit., p. 213) notes that Themistius in his 3 with the nature of the substance it helps to form. Similarly Aristotle states: [TJ (puxhj e6oc ;e x i c u ixup E i v a i • x a l yap xouxo \eTiTOM.epeaTaxov xe x a l ndXiaxa x iov a x o i x e ^ v aawuaxov, EXI 6E x i v E i x a i X£ x a l XIVEI xa aXXa upuixwc;. ArnioHpixog 6 e na l Y^atpupcoxEpwc; Eip-nxEv auocprivai-tevoc; 6 i a TL XOUXWV exdxepov * C|JUXT)V^ |IEV yag £ i v a i xauxb x a l vouv, xouxo 6 ' E i v a i xwv Tipcoxajv x a l a 6 i a i p £ x u > v acopidx iuv , xivrjxixbv 6E 6-t-a (iixponEpEiav x a l xb a x w a ' xtov 6e axtiudxwv EuxtvTixoxaxov xb atpaircoEidEc; XEYEI ' xoibuxov 6 E i v a i xov XE vouv x a i xo n u p . , V J The reasoning behind this passage is something as follows: Democritus says that the soul consists of "primary and indivisible" atoms able to cause movement because of their fineness and their spherical shape. Like the soul, fire has the quality of being extremely easily moved and for this reason, f ire , just like the soul, is to be thought to be composed of spherical atoms. Aristotle concludes from Democritus1 statement that the Atomist taught that soul and fire were identical. Democritus' statement here, however, indicates only that he believed fire and soul were made of atoms of the same atomic shape, since both shared the qualities of extreme fineness and ease of movement. paraphrase of this passage makes reference to the content of the words which Diels rejects; this seems to indicate that the Greek commentators had these words in their text in this passage on Democritus. Ross also points out (op.cit. , pp. 174-75) that it is difficult to see how the words were inserted i f they were not in the original text. The force of the itup x i seems to indicate that Aristotle believed Democritus taught the soul was a "type of fire" as distinct from fire itself. The rest of the passage, however, indicates that the force of the x i is very weak and that Aristotle thought Democritus identified soul with f ire . 1 0 Aristot le , De An., 1, 2, 405 a 5-13, D.A. 101. •^It is likely that Democritus, in reaching his conclusion that the soul was like f ire, was also influenced by the fact that the soul provided the body with heat. See Aristotle, De An., 1, 2, k-Ok a 1-17, (Leucippus) 28. 4 Aristotle's statements concerning the identification of soul with fire must be taken in conjunction with his remark that: T t t u o v 6e xal xC exdaxou xb a x T i n a xwv axouxci -wv o u d e v ETuoiwpiaav [ AeuHiimoc, nal ATHJ.6HPI.TOS] , a\\a n o v o v xcp irupl TTJV acpaipav aiiE6wHav 1 2 Since Aristotle thought Democritus taught that the spherical atom was limited to fire alone, he appears to have concluded that in the teaching of the Atomist, "spherical atoms" and "fire" were synonymous terms. Therefore, Democritus' statement that the soul was composed of spherical atoms13 seems to have resulted in Aristotle's belief that the Atomist taught the mind was the same as fire . There is evidence, however, that Democritus did not limit the spherical atom to fire. A fragment of Aetius reads: 6 ATIHOHPITOC; Tcdvxa U,ETEXEIV <pno\ tbuxfjc; Tioiac; 1 4 Similarly Diogenes Laertius states: TOV TE Tl\LOV Hal TT}V az\r)VT\V EH TOLOUTOJV \£ tU)V Hal 7l£pL9£pcOV OYHCOV CTUYHEHp Co$OL I , Hal TT]V fyVXhv OUOLWc;'' 5 In a l l probability, these two passages indicate that Democritus thought that in each substance there was a number of spherical atoms of which the soul itself was composed. Aristotle's own account of Democritus' views on respiration-^ and its importance for preserving l i f e both by preventing the istotle, De Caelo, 3, 4, 303 a 12 as quoted in G. Kirk and J. Raven, The Fresocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957)> P. 421. ^Aristotle, De Respiratione, 4, 472 a 4, D.A. 106. See above p. 2. ^Aetius, PI., 4, 4, 7, D.A. 117, Pox. Gr., p. 390. -^Diogenes Laertius, 9, 44, P.A. 1. Cf. Albertus Magnus, Pe Lapidibus, 1, 1, 4, P.A. 164, and Pseudo-Aristotle, Pe Plantis, 1, 8T5 b l6 in Ritter and Preller, Historia Philosophiae Graecae (Gotha, 1913); ninth edition, #201, a, p. l6LT. ^Aristotle, Pe Respiratione,4, 471 b 30-472 a 18, P.A. 106; Aristotle, Pe An., 1, 2, 404 a 1-17, D.A. (Leucippus) 28. 5 escape of soul atoms and by providing new ones shows that the air must have contained soul particles, that i s , spherical atoms: ev yap ^ %$> a e p i uo\uv apt,$u.bv e u y a t TUJV TOIOUTWV a Ha'A.et [Arju-OHp ITOC; ] EHE ivoc; VOUV x a l ^ UXTJV*^ pOT)$£iav yCyveabai &upa-&£v ETCEICTIOVTUJV a\\wv TOLOUTCJV [ax'n^a'cwvj EV Ttj)otvauvELV . 18 Since Democritus taught that both f i r e and the soul were composed of spherical atoms, Aristotle inferred that the two were identical. In the system of Democritus, however, a spherical atom was merely a spherical atom; in combination with other spherical atoms or atoms of a different shape, i t could form a part of a compound (auyHpi . u a ) whose nature would depend both on the type of atoms i t contains and on the way these atoms are arranged.^ Wemesius gives a true account of the role of the spherical atom in the formation of compounds:2^ x a yap a9aipo£i&f] o"X"ni-iaTa TWV aToawv a u y x p i v o u e v a liup TE n a l ar\p tyvxhv anoTzXetv .21 Fire is one compound, the soul another, distinct in nature though similar in composition. 2 2 17Aristotle, De Respiratione, k, kj2 a 5, D.A. 106. ^ A r i s t o t l e , De An., 1, 2, hOk a 13, D.A. (Leucippus) 28. -^Kirk and Raven, op. c i t . , p. 1+20 n. 1. 2 0Cherniss, op. c i t . , p. 290 n. 1. Nemesius also states (loc. c i t . ) that Democritus said the soul was f i r e , but this statement was due to the influence of Aristotle (Cherniss, loc. c i t . ) . 2lKemesius, De Matura Hominum, 2, 28, Pox. Gr., p. 388. 22cf. W. K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge, 1965), PP. 430-432. 6 One function the soul performed was to endow the body with motion. Aristotle says that the spherical atom was chosen by Democritus to explain why the soul causes motion: xa a9at.poet.6f1 c|;uxnv, 6 i a TO u.a\iaTa 6 i a -rcavToc; 6uvaa§ai 6oa6uveLv TOI C; TOLOUTOUC; puauouc;, n a l HLVCLV TOC \0LTta Hivoutxeva n a l ^ a u T a , Ono\au|3avovTec; Tpv (PUXTIV eivat, TO uapexov TOIC, CWLOIC, TTJV Huvnaiv .?* Ht.voup.evac; yap (prjca Tag aoiaipeTOuc. acpaipacj, 6t.a TO TcetpuHevai. larioeTiOTe u e v e i v , auve<pe\He i v x a l H i v e t v TO awua Ttav.24 The exact manner in which Democritus believed the soul moved the body is not made clear in our sources. Aristotle likens Democritus to Daedalus causing the wooden statue of Aphrodite to move by f i l l i n g i t with quick silver.2 5 Thus i t appears that Democritus taught i t was the presence and very nature of the soul which imparted movement to the body. The soul also was the cause of thought and sensation. Before we can discuss these functions, however, we must examine the question of where the soul was located in the body. There is evidence that Democritus taught the soul was distributed throughout the whole body. Aristotle in c r i t i c i s i n g Democritus' views says: eiitep yap eaTLv r) <\>VXT) ev uavTL T<JJ dla-8-avouevio 26 . • - r Similarly the fact that Democritus considered the soul to be the cause of motion in the body is an indication that he believed i t was distributed throughout the body: 2 3 A r i s t o t l e , De An., 1, 2, 404 a 6, D.A. (Leucippus) 28. g l*Ibid., 1, 3, 406 b 20, D.A. 104. 2 5 l b i d . , 1, 3, 406 b 17. 2 6 I b i d . , 1, 5, 409 b 1, D.A. 104 a. 7 [ATJM.6KPI.T6C;] CDT)O"L Tac; a6ioup£TOUc; acpaipae; . . . x i v e i v TO acou.a n a v . ^ ' Furthermore Lucretius states that Democritus taught the atoms of the soul alternated with those of the body: Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis, Democriti quod sancta v i r i sententia ponit, corporis atque animi primordia, singula privis apposite alternis variare, ac nectere membra.28 There is no confirmation elsewhere of this statement of Lucretius that Democritus believed the soul and body particles were juxtaposed one to one.29 i f this is a true statement of Democritus' teachings, i t clearly shows that the soul was distributed throughout the body. Finally Proclus in his account of Democritus' teaching on the apparent coming to l i fe of dead persons mentions that the Tr}c; 6e <J>uxf)c; ot Ttepi T6V |ive\6v eVevov M r . r "1Q eti oecru,oi , J V the soul in the rest of the body had departed. We can say, therefore, that Democritus taught the soul was spread throughout the whole body. What then did he say about the mind and how did he believe i t was related to the soul? Diogenes Laertius says: xal TTJV (|>UXT)V 6|!0LU)C;' r\v xal vouv TOCUTOV eCvai.31 Aristotle says: 27Aristotle, De An., 1, 3 , 406 b 18, D.A. 104. 2 8Lucretius 3, 370-374, D.A. 108. 29cf . Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, edited by C. Bailey (Oxford, 1947), Vol. 2, p. IO56. Bailey quotes the statement of Alexander of Aphrodisias (De Mixtura, 2, D.A. 64) as support for Lucretius' statement, but Alexander is merely saying that in any compound the atoms were arranged in juxtaposition to one another; he is not referring to the relationship of the body and soul. 30proclus, In Rempublica, 2, 113, 6, D.A. 1. ^Diogenes Laertius, 9, kh, D.A. 1. 8 a\\a TOCUTO Xiyei cpuxrjv nal v o G v . 3 2 (J^UXTIV nev Y ^ P e t v a i xavxb Hal v o G v . 3 3 Philoponus states that Democritus taught the cpuxri was "without parts," thought being a process identical to sensation: ocu.£pf) yap <pT)aiv au-uriv [TTIV ipyxTiv] ATHIOHPITOC; E i v a i nal ou 7io\u6uva|iov, xauxov E i v a i \£yuv xb VOELV x(p aLa&dvea'&ai nal aixb niac; xaGxa Tipoepxea^aL 6uvdu.eu)c; . 3 4 "The mind and the soul are the same thing." The implications of this statement are clear: the soul and mind are identical in relation to composition, placement and function. The identity of soul and mind in relation to place is supported by the statement of Sextus Empiricus: ot 6e EV o\ip T(J) owaxi. [s ivai TTJV otdvoiav] , H(i%a%zp TIVEC; naxa AfmoKpiTOy .35 The mind is spread throughout the body just like the soul, the two being in fact the same thing. In relation to function, Theophrastus in describing Democritus' views on thought states that the Atomist believed the nature of thought was dependent upon the condition of the cpuxil • 3^  That which thinks and that which perceives are one and the same. There is, however, evidence which conflicts with the assertion that Democritus taught the mind, being in fact identical to the soul, was spread throughout the body. A statement of Aetius runs as follows: 3 2Aristotle, De An., 1, 2, hOk a 27, D.A. 101. 33xbid., 1, 2, 405 a 9, D.A. 101. Cf. Philoponus, De Aniina, 71, 19, D.A.-TT3". 34pniloponus, De Anima, 35, 12, D.A. 105. 35sextus Empiricus, 7, 3^ -9, D.A. 107. 36Theophrastus, De Sens., 58, D.A. 135. 9 A r i p i o H p i T O c ; , ' E u i H o u p o c . 6i|iepf) TT)V ^uxiiv, TO n e v XOYLHOV e x o u a a v e v Tcp •ftuipaHi Ha$i ,6punevov, TO 6e a \ o y o v Ha^ - '6\T iv TTJV a u Y H p i a u v TOG owLiaTOc; 6 i e a i r a p L i e v o v Bailey3® believes Aetius is correctly stating the teaching of Democritus, but Diels39 and Goedeckemeyer^O suggest that Aetius is confusing Democritus1 views with those of Epicurus. In light of the other statements of Democritus' teaching, this does seem likely. Bailey says that Democritus1 use of <1>UXT} and vouc; implies a distinction "between a perceptive and a rational element."1*'1 Democritus' use of these two words does make clear that he distinguished between the processes of sensation and thought; the fragments quoted above, however, show that he assigned both processes to the soul which was in fact identical to the mind.42 Q^ e soul (= the mind) is responsible for both thinking and sensation. Outside of the quotation of Aetius there is no evidence that Democritus believed there was a separate location in the body where the process of thought took place, that is, there is no evidence that he made the mind a separate concentration of soul atoms located in the breast that was responsible for thought. In relation to this problem, i t seems best to accept the evidence 3TAetius, PI., k, k, 6, D.A. 105, Pox, Gr., p. 390. 3^0. Bailey, The Greek.Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford,1928), pp.l$0-6l. 39pox. Gr., p. 390. ^A. Goedeckemeyer, Epikurs Verhaltnis zu Demokrit (Strassburg, 1897), p. 54. Cf. also H. Usener, Epicurea (Leipzig, lUUf), #312, p. 217. 4lBailey, Greek Atomists, p. l 6 l . 42cherniss, op. cit., p. 83. 10 of Aristotle, Diogenes Laertius and Sextus Empiricus rather than that of Aetius.^3 There are two other fragments concerning the placement of the mind in Democritus' teaching. Theodoretus states: 1 iT iKonpccTT)? Mev yap n a l Ar)u.OHp iioq x a l I R a T i o v e v iyHEcpaXu) TOGTO [TO r i ye i iovLHOV] i6pGa&ai e L p T ] H a a i v .44 D i e l s 4 5 indicates that this is an excerpt from Aetius, Placita, 4, 5, 1; this statement of Aetius must be rejected just like his statement in 4, 4, 6^ to which i t is in marked contrast i f xb r ) Y £ U O v i H O v and TO A-OytHOV are to be construed as having the same meaning, namely the "mind." It appears that Democritus has been mistakenly associated with Plato and the latter's tripartite division of the soul which attributes the intelligence to the brain.^ A similar association has probably influenced the statement in the Pseudo-Hippocratic Letters that Democritus called the brain the c p u \ a n a 6iavoir)c,. 48 B o t h Dj. ei s 49 and Mullach^0 reject the authenticity of these letters which were probably composed in 4-3cf. J. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906) , p. 255. ^Theodoretus, Graecorum affectionum Curatio, 5> 2 2 , Dox.Gr., p. 390. ^Dox. Gr., note on Placita 4, 5> 1, P. 391. See also Prolegomena, p. 4 5 . ^See above p. 9 n. 37 . ^TBeare, op.cit., pp. 254-255; Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. l 6 l n. 1. 4%ippocrates, 2 3 , 3, D.C. 6. ^ i e l s , Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, p. 225 . 5°G. A. Mullach, Fragmenta Philosophorum Grecorum (Paris, 1883) , Vol. 1, p. 335. 11 the time of Tiberius by someone who was acquainted with the writings of Hippocrates, but not those of Democritus.5^ This description of Democritus' views on the placement of the mind, therefore, can be seriously held in question. 52 We can now return to our discussion of the soul as the cause of sensation and thought. These two processes are distinct yet caused in the same fashion. Aetius says: A e u H t u u o c ; , A r m o H p LTOC; x a c ; aLa^paeic; n a l TOCC, v o r j a e u c . e x e p o u w a e u c ; eTvai TOU auuiaTOc; .53 Both thought and sensation are some "change" that takes place in the body. Similarly Aristotle says: "OXOJC; 6e 6LOC TO 6n:o\aLif3av£Lv 9P6VT)OLV HEV TTJV aUa^naLv, TaUTTJV 6' £ t voc L a \ \oLu)cav54 Theophrastus also states: ^ATJLlOHpLTOc;] EOLHE O*UVr)X0\OU$TlH£VaL TOLC. TIOLOGOLV 0\ldC. TO (ppOVELV HOCTOC TT)V a\\0 LUXJ L V^5 The cause of this change is some agent outside the body i t s e l f . Aetius states: AEUHLTCTIOC; , ATJUOHPLTOSJ 'ETCLHOUPOC. TT}V a ia&r)a iv H a l TTJV VOTIOLV yCvea&ai EL6U>\U)V E£U)#EV TipoatovTwv u r|6£v l y a p £ 7 l L p a\\£LV M.r|6£T£pav X ^ p l ? TOU TtpOCTTUirtOVTOC. EL6W\OU.56 ^ D i e l s , l o c . c i t . ; K. Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, A  Companion to Diels.Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, (Oxford, 19^9), p. 325. 52See also Goedeckemeyer, op.cit., pp. 53-5^ and Bailey, Greek  Atomists, p. l 6 l n. 1. 53Aetius, PI., k, 8, 5, D.A. (Leucippus) 30. Dox.Gr., p. 395. 54Aristotle, Metaph., 3, 5, 1009 b 12, D.A. 112. 55Theophrastus, De Sens., 72, D.A. 135. 5^Aetius, PI., k, 8, 10, D.A. (Leucippus) 30. Dox.Gr., p. 395. 12 Similarly Cicero says: quae sequitur (scfi Epicurus) sunt tota Democriti . . . imagines, quae ei6u)\a nominant (sc. the Atomists), quorum incursione non solum videamus sed etiam cogitemus;57 These two statements support the observation of Aristotle that the Atomists f tavTct yap xa. aLa&r)xh anxa notouai.v.58 Sensation and thought result when the soul-atoms are touched and some change takes place in the state of the atoms as a result of this touch. It appears that Democritus taught that the awareness of sense-perception took place in the sense-organ itself. Alexander in describing Democritus' explan-ation of sight says that the idols impinge upon the eyes and OUTWC. TO 6pav yCvza&ai. Goedeckemeyer^0 and Zeller^ 1 maintain Democritus taught that sense-perception could only come into being, that is, one could only become aware of a particular sense-impression, after the idols affecting the particular sense-organ had travelled throughout the whole body and touched the whole soul. Theophrastus in chapter fifty-seven of the De Sensibus, the passage on which Goedeckemeyer rests his view, indicates that the whole body can be affected when one sense-organ is stimulated but he probably does not mean by this that the whole body must be stirred before a person can become aware of any particular sense-impression. There is no evidence that Democritus made the distinction 57cicero, De Finibus, 1, 6, 21. ^Aristotle, De Sensu, k, hh2 a 29, D.A. 119. 59Alexander, De Sensu, 2h, ih, D.A. (Leucippus) 29. 6°Goedeckemeyer, op.cit., p. 59. 63-E. Zeller, A History of Greek Philosophy, translated by S. F. Alleyne (London, 1801), Vol. 2, p. 266 n. 3. 13 between "perceiving" and "being aware that one is perceiving;" i t is best to assume that the Atomist, i f he did in fact make this distinction, simply assigned both these processes to the particles of the soul that were present in whatever sense-organ that was being stimulated, since our sources give us no details on this point. Concerning Democritus1 views on thought as distinct from sensation, Theophrastus gives us some evidence. uepl 6e xoG cppoveiv^enl xoaoGxov Ei'prixey ox i ' t i v e x a i auu.u.expioc; ixovov)S xfjc; ([IUX^S xaxa xr)v xpr ja iv ' ectv 6e •nepL$epp.6<; XLC, r\ -nspCfyvxpoc, yevr ixa i , \iexaWaxxeiv cjrjaL. 61*^0 XL xal^xouc; ita\aiobc; xaA.u)c; xoG$' vnoXaficiv oxi eaxlv aMocppoveCv. waxe qpavepov, 6x1 xjj xpdaei xoG awuiaxoc; uo ie i^xb cppoveCv, ouep tawc; avxy x a l xaxa \6yov eax l "owa TIOLOGVXL XTJV C|>UXT)V.62 If the soul is at a normal temperature, its thoughts will be correct; i f the soul is too hot or too cold, its thoughts will be affected and be distorted in nature. We can take in conjunction with this statement of Theophrastus the saying of Aristotle: xb yap a\r)&ec; e i v a i xb cpatvoLievov^ 61b xaXcoc; noiT)o~aL xbvw5urjpov (Lc, "Exxoop x e i x ' a\\o<ppoveu)v. By this statement, Democritus does not mean, as Aristotle supposes, that sense-perceptions in themselves are always true but that thought depends upon the nature of the body itself;64 a\\09POveiv means "to think other 62iheophrastus, p e Sens., 58, D.A. 135. 6 3 A r i s t o t l e , De An., 1, 2, kOh a 29, D.A. 101. ^cherniss, op. cit., p. 292 n. 9. Ik than normally."65 The importance that Democritus attributed to the condition of the body in sensation and thought is shown also by the statement of Sextus Empiricus: [AriHOHpiTOc;] yr\o\ yap-' ^'fiLiEic. 6E TUJ LIEV EOVTI OU6EV OCtpEHEc; 0UVLEM.EV, Ll£T(XTl ITITOV OE HOCTCC TE OOJUaTOC &ia&r\Hr)V Hal TWV EUE 10L6VTU)V Hal TO)V OCVT iaTT)p LCOVTOJV .' °o In the light of these passages we can make three statements about Democritus* teaching on the nature of thought: i t is a change in the body; this change is caused by the eu6o)\a flowing from an outside object; the nature of thought is dependent upon the condition of the body. We cannot go further, as Zeller does,^7 and say that the change caused by the £i/6u)\a was responsible for the condition of the body itself and thus for the nature of thought as well, since there is no evidence for this supposition. It is impossible to state exactly how Democritus supposed the soul (= the mind) was affected by idols so that thought as distinct from sensation arose. For spontaneous thoughts Kirk and Raven^® suggest the spherical atoms of the soul were capable of self-movement. Since, however, Aristotle says Democritus taught i t was the nature of the spherical atoms never to be at rest,6>9 We would have to suppose a special type of motion as the cause of spontaneous thought. However in absence of more detailed evidence i t would 65LOC. ci t . 66sextus Empiricus, 1, 136, D.B. 9. 67zeller, Greek Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 271. 6%irk and Raven, op. cit., p. 422. 69Aristotle, De An., 1, 3, ko6 b 17. See above p. 6. 15 be best in dealing with the topic of thought in Democritus' system simply to keep in mind a strictly corporeal process, one of atoms touching atoms and causing some sort of change, for this is actually as far as our sources will allow us to go.?0 7°See Beare, op. cit., p. 254. CHAPTER TWO DEMOCRITUS: THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE We come now to the question of Democritus1 views concerning knowledge. As we shall see, a discussion of this question V i l l of necessity he closely connected with Democritus' views on the nature of being, that is , his theory of the atoms and void; epistemology and ontology were closely associated in Democritus' teaching. 1 We must remember that Democritus' system was a strictly material one in which a l l processes were explained in terms of the atoms and the void; i t is , therefore, highly reasonable to expect that his ideas concerning knowledge were based as well on his belief that the atoms and void were the ultimate realities of the universe. An endeavour must be made to discover answers for the following questions: how did Democritus believe one could gain knowledge of the atoms and void, and upon what basis did Democritus believe knowledge rested, the senses, reason or both?2 Some of the extant fragments of Democritus certainly give him the appearance of being a sceptic, that is, one who does not believe that 1E. Weiss, "Democritus' Theory of Cognition," CQr 32 (1938), p. k9; Guthrie, op. c i t . , p. k^k. 2por the different solutions to this final question which modern scholars have proposed, see Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 177-178. 17 either the senses or thought can lead to man's grasping the true nature of reality. He says: ' Xtt I T O I 6f)\0V EOTOU OT L ETET} OLOV EHCCCTTOV Y l y v w a x E i v EV ocuopt}) koxC.'J 'ET E T I |i£V VUV OT I OUOV EHaOTOV E O T L V T) OUX E O T I V ov OUVCE^EV, n o M a x i l &£&TJ\u)Tai, •' ^ *6T)\OL ( i ev 6T) x a l ouTog 6 Xoyoq OTU ETET) OU6EV " a | i £ v T i s p l ou6evoc;, a \ \ ' E T i t p O a t u L T ) E x d a T O i a i v ASoSis'S This last fragment is similar to Democritus' following statement: ' r jUEtCJ §£ T$ fi£V E O V T L OU&EV CXTpEXEC; 0 U V t £ | i £ y , |i£T(X7it7iTOv 6E x a T a TE a iouaTOc; 6ia&T)xr)v x a l TWV £Tl£ t O L OVT(JJV X a l TOJV OCVT LO"TT)p L COVTU)V . ' ^ For example, one's opinion that honey is sweet or bitter depends both upon the nature of the idols which "enter and impinge on the body" and upon the state of the body itself. We can^therefore, make no objective judgement of sense-impressions; our opinion of them is a strictly relative one. This fact is emphasized in two further fragments of Democritus: ' y u y v c u a x E L v TE xpr\' cpr ja lv ' a v & p u m o v TC*)6E T£ x a v o v i OTI ETETJC; a u i i A A a x T a i . ' 7 ' ETE'n 6e OU6EV " 6 H £ V EV Su'&ijj yap r\ akr\&£ia.,8 This last statement of Democritus is extremely important,: truth does exist but is hidden from us, lying "in the depths." 3Sextus Empiricus, 7, 137, D.B. 8. ^Ibid., 7, 136, D.B. 10. 5lbid., 7, 137, D.B. 7-6Ibid., 7, 136, D.B.. 9. 7Ibid., 7, 137, D.B. 6. ^Diogenes Laertius, 9, 72, D.B. 117. 18 These fragments give the impression that Democritus was a sceptic; other statements recorded about the Atomist appear to confirm this impression. Sextus Empiricus says: ETcei'-rceg 6 LIEV ATILIOXPLTOC; LIT)6EV OuoxELo - '&aL tprjgL TCOV aLa^r)Tu)v, GLWOL XEvona^ELac; Tivac; aia&r\aeu)v Eivai a v T i X T i c p E i c ; a u T u i v , n a l OUTE yXvKV TL u e p l TOIC; EHT05 O i x d p x E i v . ob T t i x p b v fi •S-sgjibv f) c p u x p b v fl \EUHOV r\ u . £ \ a v , o u x a \ \ o TL TWV i x a a i c p a i v o L i E v t o v • uadcuv yap f)|j.ET£pwv rjv o v o n a T a T a u T a . 9 Whatever sense-impressions we receive have no real existence but are merely names given to the "empty affections" of our senses. Sextus Empiricus also says: 01 LIEV n d v T a a v n p r j x a c r i Ta < p a i v 6 | j . £ v a , wc; 01 T i s p l Ar)U.OHpLTOV J ° AT)U.6HPLTOC; LIEV u a a a v aia&r\ir)v U7tapc;iv XEXIVTJXEVI 1 Theophrastus likewise states: Ar|LiOHpLTOC; 6E udvTa [aicr&TjTa] Ttd&T) Trjg aia^rjaecoc; TIOLU)VJ2 Theophrastus speaks also of Democritus' refusal to assign an objective existence to sensible objects: TO LIT) TIOLELV cpucuv Tiva TWV .aio&TiTiuv . - ^ These statements are elaborated when Theophrastus says: Ttov 6E a W t u v aia$r)TU)v OU6EV6C; EL vat c p u a i v , <x\\a T i d v T a Ttdftr) %r\c; aicr&rjaEioc; a W o t o u L i E V T i c ; , E£ r\c, yCveabai TTJV cpavTaaiav. ovde^yhp XOG c p u x p o u x a l TOG &Epu.oG i m d p x E L v , a M a TO a x ^ a LIETCXIILTITOV E p Y a C£a&ai x a l TTJV TJHETEpav a\A.OLCOOIV* ^ 4 9Sextus Empiricus, 8 , 1 8 4 . Cf. 7 , 2 1 3 . . - 1 0 Ibid. , 7 , 3 6 9 , D.A. 1 1 0 . l l l b i d . , 8 , 3 5 5 . 12Theophrastus, De Sens., 6 0 , D.A. 1 3 5 . 3-3 lb i d . , 7 1 , D.A. 1 3 5 . ^ I b i d . , 6 3 , D.A. 1 3 5 . Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, 9 , 1 0 6 . 19 Sensible qualities are mere "experiences" of the sense-organs: they do not possess an objective re a l i t y but only come into existence during the act of being perceived. Thus Aetius states that Democritus taught that sensations were false: Anu-OHp ixoc, ... <J;£u6eUc, eivcu xac. ata^rjae LC; . 13 Plutarch records a statement made by Colotes that Democritus asserted that an object was "no more one thing than another:" 'Eyyia'KeZ 6e rcuxio npwxov 8x i xwv 7ipaYii<xxu>v exaaxov ELTOJOV OU uaWov xoiov r\ xoiov e i v a i avyn£xwH.e xbv pt'ov.16 Cicero certainly makes Democritus appear to be a sceptic when he observes: i l l e (sc. Democritus) esse verum plane negat sensusque idem non obscuros d i c i t sed tenebricosos: sic enim appellat eos.17 According to these authorities, Democritus is said to have overthrown a l l sensible reality, called a l l sensation false, and f i n a l l y denied that truth exists at a l l . What position could be more characteristic of a sceptic? We must not, however, accept Cicero's statement. Democritus thought that truth lay "in the deep;" the true explanation of the universe could be found but i t must be sought in the objective re a l i t y lying behind the deceptive appearances of the senses. Thus Theophrastus says of Democritus: 6 uev yap nabr) uoioov xf)c. aia#r)aewc; HOC&' auxa 6LOPLCCL XTIV cpuaiv 1 ^  15Aetius, PI., k, 9 , 1, D.A. (Anaxagoras) 96, Pox. Gr., p. 396. l 6Plutarch, Adv. Col., k, 1108f, P.B. 156. 17cicero , Academica Priora, 2 , 23, 73, P.B. 165. l&Theophrastus, De Sens., 6 l , D.A. 135. 20 T h i s o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y which Democritus d e s c r i b e s as r e s i d i n g i n the o b j e c t s themselves c o n s i s t s of the atoms and v o i d . Sextus E m p i r i c u s r e c o r d s the important statement of Democri tus t h a t the atoms and v o i d a lone e x i s t " i n t r u t h : " A n u o n p i T O c ; 6t oxe uiev avatpet xa <patv6|j.eva xaiq ata^rjaeat, n a l xouxtov \eyet |iTi.6ev 9atvea&at nax^ a^r)#etav aXXa LIOVOV naxa 6o£av, aXn^ec j 6e ev xotc. o u o t v UTCctpxeiv TO axou-ouc; e t v a t x a l n e v o v . 'VOLKU' yap (pnat lyXvHv n a l vouij) T t t n g o v , vouio &epu_6vj vouto (J^uxpov, v6ti(fi XP01-1!* exen 6e a x o n a n a l n e v o v . onep eaxt, voutCexat uev e t v a t n a l 6o£aCexat x a ata ^ n x d , o u n eaxt 6e n a x ' a\rj^etav x a u x a , aXXa xa axoua uovov n a l x b n e v o v . ^ 9 The term vonoc. i n d i c a t e d f o r the Greeks what was changeable and a r b i t r a r y ; 2 0 man's c o n v e n t i o n s , h a b i t s , laws and customs, h i s vouiot v a r i e d from p l a c e t o p l a c e and from age t o age . S ince s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s v a r i e d w i t h i n d i v i d u a l s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Democri tus c o u l d w e l l d e f i n e s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s as e x i s t i n g v6|i.(d . Galen a l s o quotes Democr i tus ' statement about s e n s i b l e q u a l i t i e s and e x p l a i n s the term vouco : ' vot i io yap XP01-1!* votito yXvnv, VOLOU u t x p o v , exef j 6' axoLta n a l nevov* 6 ArniOHptxoc; cpnatv en xfjc, auvo6ou XLOV axou-wv y^YveaS-at yotitCwv aTidaac. xa? ala%r]xaq TiotoxTjxac, rig Tcp^bc, Tjnac; xouc. a t a ^ a v o t i e v o u c . a u x G v , q juaet 6' ou6ev e t v a t \ e u n b v TI n e X a v TI £av\>6v Tl e p u ^ p b v f] T t t n p b v TI yXvnv' x b yap &}) ' y o n i o ' x a u x b (3ou\exat^xtp otov ' v O L i t a x t " n a l ' Ttpbs^TNiSc; 'j ou n a x ^ auxcov^xwv TtpayM-ctxtuv XTIV 9uatv, onep a u naA.tv *ixer\' n a X e t , n a p a x b ' e x e o v ' , OTiep a\ri&ec, 6 T I \ O L , TtotTjaac; x o u v o t i a . ^ ^ ^ S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s , 7, 135, P . B . 9. 20cf. T . Gomperz, Greek T h i n k e r s , a H i s t o r y of Anc ien t P h i l o s o p h y , t r a n s l a t e d by L . Magnus (London, 1901), V o l . 1, p. 320. 2lQalen, De E l e m e n t i s Secundum Hippocratem, 1, 2, D .A. 49. For t h i s statement of Democritus see a l s o S a l e n , De M e d i c i n a E m p i r i c a , 1259, D . B . 125 and Diogenes L a e r t i u s , 9, 72, D.A. 1 . C f . a l s o A e t i u s , P I . , 4", 9, 8, D.A. (Leuc ippus ) 32, P o x . G r . , p. 397. 21 What appear to he the properties of an object are actually nothing other than a variety of atoms arranged in different geometrical patterns: Ta 6' EH TOUTCOV •ftEcfEi H a l Ta£j£ i n a l axilM-ati 6tacp£povTa aXArj\cov auM.p£Sr)HOTa.22 The properties of the aia-&T)Ta correspond to no reality; i t is only the basic matter lying behind a l l appearance that can be said to exist ETEfi . Theophrastus states the principal reason for Democritus' belief that sensible qualities do not exist <pua£t : ariiieCov 6* cic; oun^etal cpua Et TO LITI T a u T a T taa t < p a t v e a - & a t TOLC; Cwtotc;, a\X' o TJM-LV, yX.UHu, TOUT ' a M o t c . rctngbv n a l e - T E p o t c , o£u x a l aUoic 6ptuu T O t c 6E c r r p u c p v o v , n a t T a aX\a o waauTcac; This statement is echoed in Sextus Empiricus' observation: EH TOU TO | i £ \ t T O t O O E |i£V TttHpOV TOta6£ 6E yXvKV < p a t v E a $ a t 6 ^EV Ariuonp tTOC, ECpT) UT1TE Y^WHU a U T O E t v a t UT)TE n tHpov.24 Since the quality perceived by the senses depends not only upon the object causing the sense-impression but also upon the condition of the person affected, i t does not have an objective existence: 6EL yap E t S s v a t u.r) uovov TO r t o t o u v , a\\a n a l TO naaxov, aMwc, T ' ' E L n a l u r i T taat v 6 auTOC, [xuubc;] b p o t a j c ; q p a t v E T a t ' n a ^ a n E g <pr)atv [A r jL iOHptTOc ; ] . ou§ev yap n u i X u E t TOV rintv Y^-UHUV E T e p o t c . T t a l TWV Cwttov E t v a t T t t n p b v n a l ETCI TWV a\\u)v 6E 6uotu)c;.25 22Aetius, PI., k, 9, 8, D.A. (Leucippus) 32, Pox. Gr., p. 397. 23Theophrastus, De Sens., 63, P.A. 135-24sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, 2, 63, P.A. 13^. 25Theophrastus, Pe Causis PIantarum, 6, 2, 1, P.A. 130. 22 Democritus1 reason for rejecting the reality of sensible qualities is stated in a different fashion by Sextus Empiricus: 6 L iev A r j L ioxp i xoc ; 6 i a x b u.r)6ev vnoKtiabai c p u a e i a t a d T y r o v , x w v ^ x a n d v x a a u y x p L v o u a w v axouxoy udcrT)c; a ia$T)xr )c ; n o i o x r j x o c ; eprmov e x o u a w v t p u a t v 26 Only atoms exist by nature; these lack every sensible quality; therefore nothing sensible can exist by nature. However, we must remember that i t was because the sensible qualities presented such conflicting appearances that Democritus stated that the atoms lacked a l l aia^rixac; uoioxrixac;. Thus, our sources make i t clear that Democritus taught that sensible qualities were completely lacking in objective re a l i t y but that atoms and void, on the other hand, existed <puae i . The question now arises: how does one come to know that atoms and void are the only realities? Sextus Empiricus gives Democritus' answer: 6 u o <pT)o*Lv E i y a i y v i u a e t g , XTJV u.ev 6 i a x w v a i a $ ^ a e a j v TT)V 6e 6 i a xrjc; 6 i a v o i a c ; , UJV XTIV^ |J.EV bia xr\<; b i a v o i a c ; YVT)O*LT|V x a \ e t , Ttpoauiapxupwv auxfi TO maxbv e t c ; a\Ti$£i"ac; x p t a u v , XTJV 6 e 6 i a x w v a i a ^ T j a e w v a x o x i r i v ovoiidCet, ^ a c p a i p o u L i e v o s aux f j c ; xb u p b c ; biayvioaiv xoG ocAn^ouc; a - i t A a v E c ; . \£yei be. x a x a \ e £ i v * 'YVCOLITIC; 6 e 6 u o e t a l v lb£ai, r) LIEV yvqaCr) f) be. a x o x L T j ' x a l a x o x o r j c ; LIEV xd6e a u u m a v x a , ocjac; a x o r ) o 6 n r ) y e u a u c ; ( p a u a t c ; , TJ 6E^YVTIOIT) , a7ioxexpi.u.evr) &e xauxT ic ; . e t x a u p o x p i v c o v xfjg a x o x u n g TTJV Y v r j a t T i v e u L c p e p e i k£ywv 'oxav TJ CTXOXIT) ( i n x e x i . 6 u v n x a i un ixe 6pT)v ETC' s\axxov U.T)XE a x o u E i v LII^ XE 6 & | i a a $ a i \if)xe y s u E a ^ a i LIT^ XE EV x f l <\>avaei a t a & d v E o ' & a i , , akk' ETII \E7tx6xspov < 6ET) CTIXELV, ^ XOXE E U L Y U V E X a t ri Y v n a i T ) a x E o p y a v o v s x o u a a xoG v w a a u A - E T i x o x E p o v ^ . ouxoGv x a l x a x a xouxov 6 A.6YOC. Hp ixr)p IOV , ov Y v n a a T j v YVCOU.TIV x a \ e t . ' 2^Sextus Empiricus, 8, 6, D.A. 59. 27lbid., 1, 138-139, D.B. 11. Unfortunately the text breaks off at a v i t a l point; the restoration here is that of Diels. 23 Democritus postulated two forms of cognition, the one trustworthy in relation to the judgement of truth, the other, subject to error. Genuine * ' pft knowledge is distinct from the crnoxiT) YVUJHT)c u which can be identified with sensation; when the senses reach the point beyond which they cannot make any further examination, true knowledge carries on the investigation with its "finer instrument" It is clear that the objects of the yvr\air) yvtidfrn are the atoms and void;29 in some fashion the "knowledge through the intelligence" goes beyond the changing, unsubstantial qualities of x<x alalia to grasp the reality which lies within them. The yvwur) of the senses is OXOXLTJ since it deals with sensible qualities that give conflicting evidence and do not exist (pUaei; the YvW|!T) 6 L a trie. 6iavOLac;, the knowledge resulting from the activity of the mind, is genuine since it grasps true being itself, the atoms and void, which exist ( p u a e t . It is only the YVWU.T) which is concerned with the ultimate realities that can be called yvT)oiT). Sextus Empiricus gives further evidence that Democritus believed the objective reality underlying sensible objects was grasped by thought: OL 6e r c e p l x b v n\dxu)ya n a l A r j u o x p L x o v n o v a x a v o r j x a OTtevoT iaav aXTj^Ti e L v a u ^ O 28YvnaL0C. means l i teral ly "legitimate," "born in wedlock;" used with •yvwnr) it therefore indicates the "true" or "genuine" form of knowledge. a x o x L O C , meaning l i teral ly "dark" is most probably used here^by Democritus in the sense of "bastard," "born in secrecy, out of wedlock" (cf. Iliad 6, 24). See A.E.Taylor, Epicurus (London, 1911), P.43. Cf. the translations of Diels, B. 11, p.lUo ("unecht"), and Freeman, op.cit . , p.309, Burnet, op.  c i t . , p.197; Bailey, Greek Atomists, p.l80 ff . and Guthrie, op.cit. , p.459 T"bast ard"). 29Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 180; Weiss, op.cit . , p. 48; Guthrie, op.cit . , pp. 461-462. 30sextus Empiricus, 8, 6, D.A. 59. Cf. 8, 56. 24 It is certainly to be doubted that v o r j T O v was a terra used by Democritus,31 but the reason Sextus Empiricus could group him with Plato (on the grounds that both believed the v o t i x d were the only realities) lies in Democritus' view of the role of yvr\oir) YVU>LIT].32 "Legitimate knowledge" alone (which results from the activity of the mind) can grasp the nature of the ultimate realities, the atoms and the void; the latter are the vOT}TCt,33 the objects of thought, and they, in Democritus1 view, are the only true realities just as Plato's v o i y c d , the "ideas," were in his view the only realities. Again i t is important to note, as further evidence that Democritus believed the mind grasped the nature of the atoms, the three passages of Aetius in which Democritus is said to have called the atoms \6yw •&ea)pr)Td .34 This evidence, however, must be treated with caution, since the phrase may have belonged to Epicurean term-inology and have been incorrectly applied to Democritus.35 It is now clear that Democritus believed there was a true reality lying beneath the conflicting appearances of sensible objects that could be 3!weiss, op. cit., p. 51. 32Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. l 8 l and Guthrie, op. cit., p. 462. 33p. Natorp, Forschungen zu Geschichte des Erkenntnissproblems im  Atterthum (Berlin, 1884), p. 115. Note that the term vOTjxd as applied to Democritus refers to entities that are of an essentially physical nature in contrast to Plato's "ideas" which are non-sensible by nature. There could not be, of course, in Democritus' strictly material system an exact counterpart to Plato's v o r i T C t . 34Aetius, PI., 4, 3, 5, D.A. 102, Pox. Gr., p. 388; Ibid., 1, 15, 11, P.A. 124, Pox. Gr., p. 314; Ibid., 1, 3, IB, Pox. Gr., p. ^ BJT 35zeller, Greek Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 225 n.3. For Epicurus' use of the phrase see Aetius PI., 1, 7, ,34, Pox. Gr., p. 306, Ep. H., 47 b, 62 (twice) and K.P. 1. 25 apprehended by y v n a i r ) YVWLIT). This fact is emphasized by Democritus' opposition to the teachings of Protagoras: •rcaaav LIEV ouv q p a v T a a i a v o i w a v ELTCOI TIC, aA.r)$f) 6ia TTJV TtepITPOTITJV , na^ioc; o -re ATJLIOHP ITOC; n a l o riA.dxu)v OCVTuXeyovTec; xtp n p u r r a y o p a E b i b a c m o v 36 We get a clear idea of the meaning of the statement that every c p a v T a a i a is true from Sextus Empiricus 1 description of Protagoras' teachings: ETIEL <pr)ai [6 n p O T a y o p a c ; ] udaac; x a c ; c p a v T a a i a c ^ H a l Tac, 66£ac; a\rc8-£Lc; O n d g x E i v n a l TWV Tipoc, TL E i v a i , TTJV a X r i ^ E i a v 6ia TO n a v TO cpavbv r\ 6o£av TLVI EU^EOJC; u p b c ; EHEIVOV UTCapXELV .3 ' The acceptance of every sense-impression as true reduces a l l knowledge to 38 sensation and in fact eliminates the possibility of any kind of stable knowledge.39 Plutarch also mentions that Democritus argued against Protagoras: aAAa^TocrouTOv ye ATJLIOHP IT05 OCTIOCSEI TOU VOLILCEIV LIT) LiaXAov E i v a i TOIOV f) TOIOV TWV TtpaYP-dTuiv s n a a T o v IUOTE n p a j T a y o p a T t j i a o 9 i a T " n TOUTO ELUOVTI | i E L i a Y f ) a & a i n a l yeypacpevai u o W a n a l T t i ' d a v a u p b c ; a u T O v . 4 0 Protagoras said that sense-impressions were true for each person; "man is the measure;" whatever appears to one man is true for him, whatever appears to another man is true for him as well. ^ l The result of this assertion i s that an object i s "no more of one description than another;" truth becomes s t i c t l y relative. In relation to the sensible qualities, sweet and bit t e r 36sextus Empiricus, 7, 389, D.A. Ilk. 37lbjd., 7, 60, 3. 3^Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 151 E, 15 2 A, D.B. (Anaxagoras) 1. 39cf. Freeman, op. c i t . , p. 349. 40piutarch, Adv. Col., k, 1108 f, D.B. 156. 4lCf. Aristotle, Metaph.,4, 5, 1009 a 6. See also Guthrie, op. c i t . , P. 455. 26 for example, Democritus stated they existed only vOLUp ; these were in fact relative to each individual and were, therefore, "no more one than the other." Democritus did not, however, believe that sense-impressions were true, as Protagoras did, but taught that truth lay ev pu&ip (being the existence of the atoms and void underlying Ta aLa^nxd themselves) and that this truth could be grasped by a stable form of knowledge, the yvT)o~Cr) yvwiiTi. We have established that Democritus believed the mind could grasp the nature of the atoms and void; the information that the senses receive from TCX ala%r]xd ±s assigned to OHOTLTJ YVU>U.TI. What role then did Democritus assign to the senses? He accused sense-impressions of being purely subjective and of lacking reality; did he then completely reject Ta ata^T]Ta as sources of information? This can hardly be the case. Democritus himself states that genuine knowledge follows upon the results of sense-perception, but i t works by a "finer method." It is important to note that even the anoxCr) yvwu-Ti is s t i l l yvuinT); ^ 2 reports from the senses provide some information but the senses themselves are incapable of analyzing it to any degree; the genuine yvwuiT) carries on the investigation from the point at which the CTHOT CX] yvwur) can go no further. We must always bear in mind that Democritus' system was a strictly physical one. As we have seen, thought and sensation are "changes" caused by el'6u)\a coming from some object outside the body: thought is a physical process brought about through the agency of physical entities. 42Hirzel, op. c i t . , p. 117; Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 50; C. Taylor, "Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus," Phronesis, 12 (1967), p. 21. 27 Democritus does not make clear exactly how thought goes beyond the conflicting characteristics presented by sensible objects, or more precisely, how thought can "see" beyond the mere form of the el'6ioA.a to the atoms and void which compose them, but these sensible objects are of necessity the cause of thought i t s e l f . There is evidence to support the view that Democritus did believe the sensible objects were the starting point for gaining true knowledge. Sextus Empiricus records a statement of Diotimus that Democritus believed T<x (pottyOLievct were the criterion for the apprehension of non-evident things." Atoxttioc; 6e xptoc next' auxbv [Arpoxptxov] e/veyev etvat xptxrjpta, XTJC; LIEV TUJV <X6TJA.U)V xaxaXrJ^eooc; xa tpatvotteva, <oc|>tc; yap. xtov a6rj\u)v xa cpatv6u.Eva cue; cprialv ' Ava£ay6pac;, ov ent xouxio Ar)u,6xptxoc; ETtat ve C43 Sextus Empiricus also states that Democritus in one of his works assigned the senses mastery over be l i e f : ev^6e xotc; Kpaxuvxriptotc;, xatnep Oueax'HriEvoc; xatc; ata$TJaeat xb xpdxoc; TTIC; utaxecoc; ava^stvat, ot>6ev TJXXOV euptaxexat xouxcov xaxa6 txdCtov .44 We cannot know in what context Democritus was speaking in the Kpaxuvxripta nor should we attempt to postulate the specific subject he was discussing.45 43sextus Empiricus, J, 140, D.B. (Anaxagoras) 21 a. Cf. also the statement of Sextus Empricus C8, 327, D.B. 10 b) that Democritus may have denied the possibility of aito6etc;tc; (demonstration by deduction). It appears that Democritus believed that demonstration must be based on the facts of experience. See Guthrie, o p . c i t p . 483. 44ibid., 7, 136, D.B. 9. For work Kpaxuvxrjpta cf. Diogenes Laertius, 9, 45. ^ f i s Hirzel, op.cit., p. I l l , attempts to do. 28 We can only say that in some fashion Democritus did assign the senses "mastery over belief" even though, as Sextus Empiricus points out, he is also found condemning them. Again Sextus Empiricus says that Democritus started from the senses to reach his idea of the atoms and void: Et n a t arco TTIC, avu )|ia\tac; toav cpatVOLIEVWV apxETat^ 0 The following statement of Theophrastus shows Democritus believed certain useful information was provided through the perception of sensible qualities: L6L(JOC, 6E ETC! TunpoO [qpricuv] noupocv EXEtv avviazuc,^ Theophrastus says that Democritus believed our perception of the sensible quality, bitterness, has a "portion of understanding," that i s , i t gives us an insight into the objective re a l i t y lying behind the quality i t s e l f . 4 8 The statement i s a strange one but seems to indicate., that Democritus thought some idea of the type of atoms which cause bitterness could be gained when the quality was perceived, although bitterness i s not in i t s e l f ' 4Q an objective r e a l i t y but exists VOLKO. 7 Finally a statement attributed to Democritus^ and preserved by Galen indicates that the Atomist was well aware of what would be the result of t o t a l l y rejecting the senses: [ A r i L i o H p i T O c ; ] euoCriae x a c ; ataccrete, X e y o u a a q Ttpoc. TTJV 6tdvotav OUTWC/ ' x a X a t v a 9pr)v^ n a p ' TJU-EWV \ a B o u a a x a c T t t a T E t c , rjLiEac; n a t a B a W E t s ; Ttxtopid T o t TO HaTaf3\T ) t ia ' .51 46sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, 1, 214. 4TTheophrastus, De Sens., 71, D.A. 135. 4 8 G . M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (London, 1917), pp. 194-195. ^Sextus Empiricus, 7, 135, D.B. 9. 50There is a possibility that this statement was framed by some later c r i t i c as a corrective of Democritus' "sceptical" sayings. See Kirk and Raven, op.cit., p. 424 n. 1. 5lGalen, De Medicina Empirica, 1259, D.B. 125. 29 If the senses are overthrown, so is the mind since i t receives i t s information from the senses themselves. This statement probably does not indicate an attitude of complete scepticism on Democritus' part, that isy Democritus i s not condemning both the mind and the senses.52 Rather'the saying reveals that the Atomist saw that i f the mind did completely reject the evidence of the senses, i t would have no basis on which i t s ideas could rest; therefore, i f a l l stable knowledge was not "to become an impossibility, some validity would have to be assigned to both the mind and the senses.53 We can now consider in a new light the sayings of Democritus that were termed "sceptical."54 It is clear that Democritus did reject the senses as reliable sources of truth, but he taught that these same senses, however unreliable they were, acted nonetheless as the starting point for gaining yvr\aCr\ yvoJ\xr). It was the objective existence of the sensible qualities that Democritus denied; in his view one's. judgement of these qualities was s t r i c t l y subjective. In this sense Democritus rejected uaaav aia&nTriv ;55 ^ this sense he judges at ala^-qaciq^ to be false. Democritus is quite different from a sceptic: the latter rejects both sensation and thought as means by which one can grasp the truth; Democritus postulated a stable form of knowledge which could grasp 5 2This interpretation i s made by Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 179. 53cf. Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 50 n. 4, Cherniss, op. c i t . , p.82 and S. Sambursky, The Physical World of the Greeks, translated by M. Dagut (London, 1956), p. 150. 54see above pp. 16-17. 55sextus Empiricus, 8, 355. 5^Aetius, PI., 4, 9, 1, D.A. (Anaxagoras) 96, Pox. Gr., p. 396. 30 the truth, the existence of the atoms and void, and though he was sceptical of the validity of the sensible qualities, yet he used xa aLo$r)xa as sources of information. The true position of Democritus in relation to scepticism is stated by Sextus Empiricus: a\'ka x a l f| ATIHOHPLXELOC; cpi\oao<pia \E*YExaL HOtvojvuav e x e t y Ttpbc, XT)V cmecHvj, ETCEI 6OHEL xfi a u x f j u \ r i T ]Uiv HE^pfia'&aL» aub yap x o u XOLC; LIEV Y^UHU < p a L v e a $ a L x b UE\L XOLC, 6E uLHpbv x b v A r i n o H p i x o v £TCLX.oyLC£a-&aL cpacrt x b n r j x E YXUHU a u x b E u v a i n r j x E T u x p o v , n a l 6ta xoGxo ETuqp&EYYEcr'&ai XTJV ' o u |i .a\Xov' g juvr iv OHEUXLHTJV o u a a v . 6uaq)6ptug LIEVXOL Xpwvxai, x f i ' o u naWov' cgwvfi OL XE OHEUXLHOL n a l OL arcb x o u Anu.oxp LXOU • EHELVOL HEV yap e n l x o u Lin&Exspov EL v aL x d x x o u a L XT)V 9WVT)V, TJHELC; 6E ETtl^XOU a y v o E L V TCOXEpOV a|i(p6x£pa^f) OU^EXEpOV XL EGXL XWV (paLV0|i£V0)V . WOXE n a l x a x a xoGxo U.EV 6taq)EpoLiEv, Ttpo6T)\oxdxri^6£ y L v s x a L t) 6LaHpLaLc, o x a v o Ar)u.6xp LXOS XEYT) ' e x e f i ^ 6E axopia n a l HEVOV.' EXETI HEV yap Keyei a v x l x o u aXn ^ E L a * n a x ' aXrv&ELav 6E u c p E a x d v a L \EYWV xdc , XE axonous n a l x b HEVOV OXL 6LEVTIVOXEV TJUOJV, EL n a l arcb x r j g avwp.aA.Lac, x w v (paLvonevwv apxsxaL , TCEPLXXOV.. . .X,EYELV . 5 7 We come now to a discussion of the evidence of Aristotle. This has been treated separately since i t presents some difficulty in interpre-tation. The passages of Aristotle can be divided into two groups, the first being quite straightforward and indicating that Democritus used the senses as sources of information about the atoms and void. ATJLIOHPLXOC. 6E n a l AEUHLTCTCOC, TCOLTiaavxEc. x a a x^naxa x r i v a W o L o o o L v n a l XT)V YEVEOLV EH xouxtuv TCOLOUOL, 6LanpLCTEL IIEV n a l a u y n p t a E L YEVEOLV nal^cp^opdv. x d ^ E t 6E n a l ^EOEL a W o L w a L v . ETCEI 6* tiJOVXO x aXri&ec; EV X<+> opaLVEa^aL, EvavxCa 6E n a l a u s L p a x a r \ f II it C.Q 9atvo|iEva, x a a x i i n a x a a t t E L p a E i i O L T i a a v p o 57sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, 1, 213-214. See also Natorp, op. cit., pp. l8l-lti2. ~ 58Aristotle, De Gen, et Corr., 1, 1, 315 b 7, D.A. (Leucippus) 9. 31 Aristotle states that Democritus used appearances as a guide to explain the characteristics of the a x T l L i a x a , the atoms which made up x a c p a i v O L i e v a. Aristotle says Leucippus and Democritus reasoned that since phenomena were infinite in number, the atoms also must be infinite in number and since phenomena appeared to be of infinite variety, the atoms also must be of an infinite number of shapes. Then, accepting the fact that in the realm of x a 9aiv6u.eva the same object often appears different to different people, Leucippus and Democritus stated that the atoms were able to alter their position within a compound and in this way cause the object they compose to appear different to different people. Similarly Democritus is said to have justified the existence of the void by reference to the evidence given by sensible objects: Xeyovai 6' e v L iev STI HL VT)O*LC; rj xaxa. x o r c o v OIW a v eLT) (auxT) &' e a x l cpopa Hal avE,r)oi<;)' o u yap av & o > t e i v e i v a i HLVTIOLV, EL LIT) e l ' i ) n e v o v * xb yap TtXfjpec; a6uvaxov e t v a i 6e£ a a $ a L x i . . . . a \ \ o v 6' o x i cpaivexaL e v i a a u v L o v x a n a l T t L X o u L i e v a . . . . exL ok n a l rj av^aiq 6OHEL i xaoL yCyvzabai 5ia n e v o G.59 If there were no void, there could be no movement ( l ) , contraction o r thickening (2), o r growth (3); x a c p a L v O L i e v a , however, reveal that these processes do exist; therefore the void must exist. The sensible objects provide information about the ultimate realities which by their very nature cannot be perceived by the senses themselves. In the passages in which he speaks of the relation of the Atomists t o the Eleatics, Aristotle gives further evidence about Democritus' use o f the senses: 59Aristotle, Physica, k, 6, 213 h. Cf. D.A. (Leucippus) 19. 32 o6if) 6e \ia\iaxa n a l u e p l u d v T i o v e v l X o y i p 6L ! jopLxao ' i A e u H L K f i o c ; n a l ATJLIOHP LTOC; , apXTjv iroLTjaaLievoi n a T a c p u t u v Tjuep e a T L v . . . . A e u H i T u t o g 6 ' e x e L v <4)TJ#TJ X o y o u c ; O L T i v e c ; n p b c ; TTJV aila&Tjcuv O L i o X o y o u L i e v a X e y o v T e c ; OUH a v a L p T j a o u a L y o u r e yiveaiv ovxe rpftopav OUTC H i v T j a e v n a l TO •TCXTJ&OC; TUJV OVTCOV . OLioXoyTjaac; 6e T a u T a u.ev TOLC; q p a t v o L i e v o L c ; , TOLC; 6e TO e v H a T a a n e u d C o u a i v toe; OUH a v KLVTJCTLV o u a a v a v e u n e v o u D U The contrast between the Atomists and the Eleatics is clearly shown when Aristotle points out that the Eleatics: e n L iev o u v TOUTCOV Ttov X o y t o v , u n e p -p d v T e c ; TTJV a L a ^ T j a i v n a l uapL6ovTec; auTTjv ibc; TIP Xoyio 6eov a n o u X o u -** 61 $ e i v . The Eleatics passed over sense-perception and followed reason; Leucippus (and Democritus), on the other hand, took sense-perception as their starting point and found "arguments" which would be consistent with sense-perception and explain i t . In another passage Aristotle notes the difference between these philosophers who based their theories on the phenomena of nature and those who used a dialectical method of inquiry: L6OL 6* a v TLC; n a l e n TOUTCUV o a o v 6ia<pepouaLv OL 9UCTLHU)C; n a l XoyLHtoc; aHOuouvTec; • i t e p l y a p TOU aTOLia e L v a L LieyedTj 01 Liev ( p a a L v OTL TO auTOTpLyiuvov T i o X X a e a T a i , ATJLIOHPLTOC; 6' a v cpaveiTj OLHeioic ; n a l cpuaLHOLc; X o y o L c ; Tre"rceia$ai . 6 2 Democritus based his arguments on a study of nature; he found Tflt cpaLVOLieva a trustworthy guide for his theory on the nature of reality. We come now to the second group of Aristotle's statements which 1 b 0Aristotle, De Gen, et Corr., 1, 8, 325 a 1, 325 a 23, D.A. (Leucippus) 7. Concerning the similarity of Leucippus and Democritus, see De Gen. let Corr., 1, 8, 324 b 35. Cf. Natorp, op. cit., p. 170; Kirk and Raven, op. cit., p. 402, and C. Taylor, op. cit., p. 2k. ^Aristotle, De Gen, et Corr., 1, 8, 325 a 12. 6 2Ibid., 1, 2, 316 a 11. 33 pose a problem of interpretation.^3 in the De Anima Aristotle states: exetvoc^ [o ATiu-oxptTOcJ nev yap anXuq xaurbv <PUXT]V x a l vvouv^ TO yap aXT)dec; etvat TO cpatvonevov .. .. ou 6t) x p ^ a t xc«j> vto ic; ouvdnet^Ttvl nepl TTJV a \ r i$etav, aXXa T a u T O Xeyet <PUXT}V x a l vouv.64 Similarly in the Metaphysica, he makes the statement; oXcoc. 6e 6ta^TO UTtoXanBdvetv (ppovpatv u.ev TTJV ata^r/atv, T a u T n v 6 etvat aXXotwatv, TO cpatvonevov _ x a T a xr\v ata^natv e£ avdyxTic, aXTi&ec; etvat c p a a t v ^ The result that follows upon the acceptance of T a cpatvOLieva as true is explained by Aristotle: etTe y^P T a 6oxouvTa TidvTa ecrclv aXTi'&'n n a t t a ^ qpatvouieva, avdyxTi TtdvTa au.a OCXTI$TJ nal c|jeu6f) e t v a t * TioXXol yap T a v a v T t a OuoXataSdvouaty aXXTiXotc;, n a t TOUCJ \J.T) TauTa 6o£dCovTac, eauTOtc; 6te(t»euati,at vop.tCouatv • WOT avdyHTi TO auTO etvat Te nat p.r) e t v a i . nat et TOUT' eaTtv, a v d y x n . xa 6oxouvTa etvat TcdvT' aXTi^-n* TOC a v T t x e t u e v a yap 6o£dCouatv aXXTjXotc; ot 6te(i>eua|ievot x a l aXii'&euovTec;. et o u v exet xa ovxa OUTWS, aXii^euaouat TcdvTec;.66 w a T e^o Xeyujv auavTa xa. matvoneva etvat a X T i & f ] , anavTa Ttotet xa. ovTa upocj x i . ^ ' Aristotle points out that i f TCX cpatvoneva are true, everything w i l l be both true and false since different people receive different sensations 63uhfortunately these passages have not received f u l l treatment by scholars. Some, such as Burnet, Kirk and Raven, and Gomperz, have simply not treated them at a l l . Others, such as Brieger and Zeller, dismiss them as expressions of Aristotle's own opinions rather than as valid state-ments of Democritus' teachings. ^ A r i s t o t l e , De An., 1, 2, kOk a 29, D.A. 101. 65Aristotle, Metaph., 3, 5, 1009 b 12, D.A. 112. 6 6 I b i d . , 3, h, 1009 a, 8. 67lbia., 3, 4, 1011 a 20. Cf. also 1007 h 19-1008 a 2. 34 from the same object; the t r u t h of sense-perception i s s t r i c t l y r e l a t i v e t o the p a r t i c u l a r person and s i t u a t i o n . ^ 8 We can see that A r i s t o t l e i s a t t r i b u t i n g t o Democritus teachings s i m i l a r to those of Protagoras. Philoponus, whose authority probably consisted s o l e l y of the passages of Ar i s t o t l e , ^ 9 d i r e c t l y associates Democritus and Protagoras: avTt,xpt>c; yap euxev [b ArjuoxpiToq j OTL TO aXti^eg nal TO <pai.v6u.evov Tau-rov fecm, nal ou6ev 6iatj>epei.v TTJV aXr^eiav nal TO TTI aia&rjaei cgaiv6u.evov, aWa. TO 9aLv6(ievov exdaTii) nal TO 6OHOUV TOUTO nal etvat aA.T)$ec;, tuanep x a l ITpcoTayopag eXeve 70 In these passages i n the De Anima and the Metaphysica, therefore, we f i n d evidence which c o n f l i c t s with the statements of Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus that Democritus opposed Protagoras.7 1 On what grounds then does A r i s t o t l e a t t r i b u t e t o Democritus teachings s i m i l a r t o those of Protagoras? The answer l i e s i n the A r i s t o t e l i a n concept of the vouc; J 2 A r i s t o t l e says of Democritus: ou 6TI xP^S^t Tip vcp ibc; 6uvdnei> TLV I rcepl TTJV aXr^eiav '3 it In A r i s t o t l e ' s terms, vouc; was a f a c u l t y "concerned with t r u t h ; " i t s function was t o comprehend the vor)Td,75 the apx<xt, which were the 6 8 A r i s t o t l e , Metaph., 3, 4, 1011 a 22. ^ S e l l e r , Greek Philosophy, V o l . 2, p. 273 n. 1; Watorp, op. c i t . , p. 164. 79Philoponus, De Anima, 71, 19 (concerning A r i s t o t l e , De An., 1, 2, 405 a 25), D.A. 113. f^See above p. 25. ^S e e e s p e c i a l l y Weiss, op.citpp.47-56. Cf. A.J. Porteous, "Democritus" i n the Oxford C l a s s i c a l Dictionary (Oxford, 1949), p. 267. 73Aristotle, De An., 1, 2, 404 a 31, D.A. 101. 74Aristotle, De An., 3, 3, 428 a 17, E t h i c a XELcpmadiea, 1139 b 15. See A r i s t o t l e , De Anima, edited by R.D.Hicks (Cambridge, 1907, reprinted Amsterdam, 1965), p.219 n. a 30. 75weiss, op. c i t . , p. 54; Guthrie, op. c i t . , p. 456. 35 ground and foundation of existing things, that i s , the foundation of their being. Aristotle believed rea l i t y was divided into the VOTJTOV (the i n t e l l i g i b l e ) and the aia&T)xov (the sensible); the former was incorporeal, the latter, corporeal. The apxai (vonxd) comprised the unchanging ouaia of existing objects; they existed in what may be called the abstract meaning of the word ov, that i s , the apxai were the essential "beingness" which lay behind the object which was Sv in the concrete sense of the word, that i s , the object which was aLadnxov .77 in Aristotle's philosophy, the aia&rjxd were opposed to the vonxd .7® ^he philosophy of Democritus, however, there was no term to correspond to the Aristotelian vorixd ; the Atomist accepted only the existence of what Aristotle termed xa ataSTixd. Democritus' apxai, the atoms and void, by their very nature belonged to what Aristotle termed axoixeCa : ETOIXE^OV Xevexat e£ ou auvKeixai Ttpulxou evuTcdpxovxoc aoiaipexou x(o eioei etc; exepov e i6oc;'y Since the atoms had by nature the same character as the objects compounded of them, even though they were avaucrdTjTa with respect to the senses themselves, yet being in fact awnaxa, they did belong to the realm of xa a i a $ r i x a . u w The idea of vonxa in the Aristotelian sense was foreign to Democritus' philosophy. This fact becomes clear when Aristotle iss, op. c i t . , p. 53. 77p.A. Wickstead and F.M. Cornford, "Introduction" in Aristotle, The Physica (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, 1929), p. 1. lQCf. Aristotle, De An., 2, 8, 431 b 22. See Weiss, op. c i t . , p. 53 and Guthrie, op. c i t . , p. '453. T9Aristotle, Metaph., 4, 3, 1014 a 26. ^Cf. Metaph., 12, 4, 1070 b 7, where Aristotle points out that a vonxov cannot be a axotx e>» 0v • 80W eiss, op. c i t . , p. 53. 36 says: AITIOV 6e T f k 56Z,T)q [OTI TO c p a i v o n e v b v e a T i v aA.r)$ec;] TOUTOIC; OTI i x e p l TIOV ovxcov piev TTIV aA . T i$e iav eanoitouv, x a 6' o v x a uite/VaBov e i v a i * * r> » ' «1 x a aua^Tjxa i i o v o v 0 1 In relation to Democritus, Aristotle says it was because the Atomist believed that vouc; was the same as <vuxr), the faculty of sense, and that cppovTjaic; 8 2 was the same as a ia$T )a ic ; (a process caused by effluences from sensible objects) that "of necessity" he found x b <paivou.evov to be aA.rj'&eg . In other words, since Democritus denied the existence of the Aristotelian vor j xa and did not assign to the v o u s the independent intellectual activity of discovering what Aristotle himself conceived the apxaC to be, he was forced to take x a (pauv6p.eva as his sphere of truth. We can compare also Aristotle's statement that i f there were only atcT'lVnxd, there would be no vor)xov and no knowledge either unless one said that sense-perception was knowledge: e t u.ev ouv \ir)&£v e a x t n a p a x a n a $ ' e x a a x a , ou'&ev av el'r) VOTJTOV aXXa u d v x a a i a $ r ) T a nal eTI; 1 axnu.r) o u ^ e v o c ; , e t u.ri T I C ; ' e i v a i \ e y e i TTJV a i a $ r ) a i v euiaTriu.r)v .83 In Aristotle's eyes, the rejection of the VOTITCX and the acceptance of the 8 l Aris tot le , Metaph., h, 5, 1010 a 1. Cf. Metaph., 1, 8, 988 b 25. ftp ' u c Aristot le is using c p p o v r j a i c ; to indicate the activity of the v o u c ; ; he is not using the word in its narrower sense (most frequently found in Aristotle) in which c p p o v n a i c ; refers only to reflection in Ttpa£ic;. See H . Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, in Aristotelis Opera, ed. by Academia Regia Borussica, Second Edition (Berlin, ltJ70, reprinted Berlin, 1961), Vol. 5 , p. 831; Cf. Weiss, op.cit . , p. 55 n. 5. Cf. use of 9poveiv in De An., 3, 3, 4-27 a 22. 83Aristotle, Metaph., 3, 3, 999 h 1. 37 existence of those things alone that f a l l into the realm of the aiar$r)xd made i t necessary for one to take xa 90CIv6|ieva, the sensible objects, as the sole source of information. Since, however, sensible objects give conflicting information, Aristotle believed those who accepted xa <paiv6|ieva as the sole source of knowledge and consequently as the only criterion must make truth relative. We now see on what grounds Aristotle could attribute to Democritus teachings similar to those of Protagoras. Aristotle believed that since neither philosopher accepted the existence of the vor)xd, they both must have taken xa cpai.v6p.eva as their sphere of truth. We must note, however, that working within this sphere of truth, Democritus and Protagoras reached different conclusions. The result of accepting xa cpaivoueva as true that Aristotle describes belongs primarily to Protagoras himself;8*1" Democritus treated xa cpaivou.eva in a more subtle fashion, as Aristotle himself indicates. Within the restricted sphere of xa cpat.v6u.eva, Democritus believed there was behind the mere appearances of sensible objects a reality consisting of atoms and void; these two were his apxau which in Aristotle's eyes were s t i l l of a nature to belong to the realm of xa cpai.v6u.eva, the sensible objects, (in strict opposition to xa vorixd) . Aristotle himself makes clear the position of Democritus in a statement in which he explains the consequences of accepting xa cpaiv6u.eva as true: 8^Cf. H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentarius, (Bonn, 1849 reprinted Hildesheim, i960), p. 209. Bonitz specifically cites Protagoras. 38 x b n e v yap a\r}&ec; o u TcX i faet H p t v e a t t a t o t o v T a t TcpoarJHetv ou6e o \ i Y O T T ) T t , TO 6' a u T O TOtc; | iev Y^UHU y e u o i i e v o t c ; 6oxetv e t v a t , TOIC; 6e rctHpov* WOT' e t rcdvTeg e n a t i v o y TI TtdvTeg Ttapecppovouv, 6uo 6' fi T p e t c . u y t a t v o v fi v o u v e t x o v , 6oxetv a v TOUTOUC; n d n v e t v n a l u a p a c p p o v e t v , TOUC; 6' a U o u ^ o u . £ T t 6e T c o W o t g TWV a\\a)v C<jiwv T a y a v T t a [ r c e p t TWV auTwv] < p a t v e a $ a i n a t T | t i t v , w H a t a u T y 6e e x d a r t f ) u p b c ; a u - r b v o u T a u T a HaTCt TT]V atcr8-T)atv a e t 6oxetv. T t o i a o u v TOUTWV aA.T)#fi TI 4>eu6fi, a6T)A.ov • o u $ e v yap t i a X A o v Ta6e fj Ta6e aXr)$r\, aXX' OLiotwc;. b t b ^ A T i n o H p i T O c ; y£jpr)ai\> T^TOt o u $ e v e t v a t a\T)$ec; TJLIIV y' a5r\Xov .85 When different people have different sensations from the same object, Protagoras' solution®^ Was simply to say that a l l sense-impressions were true. Democritus, however, did not accept sense-impressions as true but found truth in the reality underlying them, using, nonetheless, the evidence of the senses as guides for learning the characteristics of the ultimate realities, the atoms and void;®? truth for Democritus was a6r)Xov. Aristotle further clarifies Democritus' position when he states that the Atomist advanced a small way to the conception of the o u a t a e r c l t i i H p b v Y ^ p T t ^ u - e p o c j ' E|m;e6oH\T)c; n a t A T i n o x p t T O c ; TOU et'6ouc; n a t TOU T t T)V e t v a t r\tyavxo a t T t o v 6e TOU^HT) e \ $ e t v xovq TtpoyeveaTepouc; e n l TOV Tp6TCOv^TOUTOV.(the (scientific)method of Aristotle), OTt TO T t rjv e t v a t n a t TO o p t a a a d a t TTIV o u a t a v OUH T)V, a.XX' Ti^ a T o ^ n e v Ari^oxpiToc ; TtpwTogj u>c; OUH a v a y H a t o u oe xx\ cpuainji • f tewpta , aXX' e n q p e p o i i e v o c , UTC' auTOu TOU 7ipdynaTog«^ 85Aristotle, Metaph., 3, 5, 1009 h 2. Cf. D.A. 112. The fact that Aristotle says in the sentence immediately following this statement that Democritus taught xa <patvO | - ieva were true (see above p.33) shows thaj; he saw no contradiction JJI stating that Democritus believed that truth was a6n \ ov and thatTa c p a t v o u e v a were true. 86cf. Sextus Empiricus, 7, 60 f f . ®Tsee passages of Aristotle quoted above pp. 30-32. SSAristotle, Physica, 2, 2, 194 a 20. 89Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 1, 1, 642 a 24; D.A. 36. 39 s It i s c l e a r that Democritus came close t o the conception of "heingness" by s t a t i n g that the atoms were the T t eaTt of e x i s t i n g things; A r i s t o t l e himself terms the atoms a t o u a t a t '. Ta a T O U . a , Tac; o u a t a g n o t e t [6 ArpOHptTOc;] . ^  Democritus, then, within the sphere of t r u t h i n which he worked, xa cpatv6|i£va, attempted t o explain the r e a l i t y which l a y behind the appearance of things and f o r t h i s reason wins A r i s t o t l e ' s praise as the f i r s t t o gain some idea of the concept of o6ata.91 I f we understand A r i s t o t l e ' s statements i n the De Anima and the Metaphysica i n the l i g h t of h i s own philosophy, they do not appear t o be inconsistent with h i s other statements about Democritus. In these two passages A r i s t o t l e indicates that the Atomist took Ta c p a t v o n e v a as h i s sphere of t r u t h ; i n the other passages he shows that within t h i s sphere Democritus b e l i e v e d that there was an objective r e a l i t y (atoms and void) underlying appearances and that sensible objects were guides f o r gaining an understanding of t h i s r e a l i t y . This i s e s s e n t i a l l y the teaching ascribed t o Democritus i n our other sources. The fragment of Democritus quoted i n Sextus Empiricus makes i t c l e a r that Democritus b e l i e v e d the ultimate r e a l i t i e s were grasped by Yvr)-aiT) YVWU .T), but the exact fashion i n which he be l i e v e d t h i s occurred has remained a problem. Burnet92 b e l i e v e s that the soul could come in t o immediate contact with the atoms themselves and i n t h i s way grasp t h e i r nature. Burnet, however, does not state how the soul could grasp the 90Aristotle, Metaph., 6, 13, 1039 a 9, D.A. 42. ^Cf. Guthrie, op. c i t . , p. 454. 92Burnet, op. c i t . , p. 198. ho r e a l i t y of the void, f o r t h i s c l e a r l y could not take place through the soul's contact with the void which cannot, by i t s very nature, come in t o contact with anything. Scoon93 also misses t h i s point when he states that the soul could apprehend the atoms and the void immediately as they were. It i s c l e a r from Democritus' statement about the two types of knowledge that theyvT)aLr| YVWLIT] does carry on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n \ e n T O T e p o v at the point at which the CTKOT CT) yvu)\ir) can go no fur t h e r , but there i s no evidence that the soul at t h i s point can come i n t o d i r e c t contact with the i n d i v i d u a l atoms and the void ( i f t h i s were possible) apart from the things compounded of them.94 Another s o l u t i o n has been put forward by Bailey.95 He suggests that when the senses give information concerning the primary q u a l i t i e s of things, that i s (as B a i l e y states) the q u a l i t i e s of shape, s i z e and weight, they can be considered trustworthy and the perception of these q u a l i t i e s i s the path of yvr\aCr\ YVWLIT) since the q u a l i t i e s of the ultimate r e a l i t i e s can be i n f e r r e d from the primary q u a l i t i e s of compound objects. When, on the other hand, the senses give information about the remaining secondary q u a l i t i e s of things, they are t o be considered deceptive and i n t h i s case they lead only t o CTHOTLT) yvuHXT). In other words sense-impressions can be divi d e d i n t o two groups, some leading t o "legitimate" knowledge, others t o "Dastard cognition." B a i l e y bases h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n on Democritus' teaching 93Robert Scoon, Greek Philosophy Before Plato (Princeton, 1928), p. 219. Robert E n g l i s h ("Democritus' Theory of Sense Perception," TAPA 46 (1915), pp. 224-27) perhaps holds t h i s view as w e l l , since he states that the.mind knows r e a l i t y d i r e c t l y ; he does not explain, however, how t h i s can happen. t e l l e r , Greek Philosophy, V o l . 2, p. 271 n. 2. Cf. Ba i l e y , Greek Atomists, p. 183. 95Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 184-185. in concerning the primary and secondary qualities of compounds. Bailey states that Democritus believed that shape, size and weight were the primary qualities of compound objects just as they were the primary qualities of the atoms themselves. 96 Theophrastus, however, gives evidence that Democritus attributed a certain objective re a l i t y as well to the qualities of hardness, softness, heaviness, and lightness in xa aia$rixd '. ETte i x a ^ B a p e o c , u x v n a l n o u c p o u n a l a n X r i p o G x a l L i a X a n o G . nab' a u x a TCOIELV c p u a E i c ; (LIEYE^OC; LIEV y a p n a l a L U H p o x n c ; n a l x b TIUHVOV n a l x b L i a v b v > \ « f t \ Q 7 OU TipOC; E X E p O V EOX l ) " ' v G v 6E a n X r i p o G LIEV n a l L i a X a n o G n a l B a p E O c n a l HOUCpOU JIOLEL XLV O U a i t t V . " 0 In one passage Theophrastus does appear to contrast Democritus* treatment of these qualities with the way he treats the other sensible qualities: T i s p l LIEV { o u v ) S a p s o c ; n a l HOUCJOU n a l aKA.r)poG n a l ( ia/VanoG EV x o u x o i c ; a c p o p i C E i . x w v 6e a W u o v ata^ r i x i o v O66EVOC; E L v a i c p u a i v 99 H i r z e l 1 ^ 0 and Goedeckemeyer 1^ 1 in the light of these statements of Theophrastus say that the sensations of hardness, softness, heaviness, and lightness are objectively true in contrast to the perception of the other qualities which must he considered purely subjective. Although 96Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 168, l8k, 185. For shape and size being the primary qualities of the atoms, see Aetius, PI., 1, 73, 18, D.A. hf, Pox. Gr., pp. 385, 311. For weight being a primary quality of the atoms, see Aristotle Pe Gen, et Corr., 1, 326 a 9, P.A. 60 and Theophrastus, Pe Sens., 6l, P.A. 135, and a f u l l discussion in Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 120-132 and Guthrie, op. c i t . , pp. koO-koU. " 97Theophrastus, Pe Sens., 68, P.A. 135. Cf. 69 and Guthrie, op. c i t . , p. khO. 9 8 I b i d . , 71, P.A. 135. 99ibid., 63, P.A. 135. 1 0 0 H i r z e l , op. c i t . , pp. 116-117. lOlGoedeckemeyer, op. c i t . , pp. 68-69. 42 neither of these scholars relates this division of sensible qualities to Democritus1 statement on the two types of knowledge, their position is similar to that of Bailey's in relation to the primary properties of xa aicj'vVnxd he mentions (shape, size and weight), namely that certain sensible qualities possess an objective reality and the perception of these qualities can be accepted as true. The view of these scholars, however, must be rejected in" the light of other evidence. With reference to Theophrastus, Hirzel and Goedeckemeyer have not considered his statement: vGv 6e anXrigou LIEV n a l LiaXanoG n a l Bapsoc; n a l HOUCpOU TtOLEL X L V ^ OUO"iaV . SlXEp OL»X ^ X X O V E6 0C;£ Xsysa^aL ixpbc; T)Liac; ' ' 0 2 Theophrastus says that even though Democritus assigned some degree of objective reality to the qualities of hardness, softness, lightness, and heaviness, nevertheless he appears to count these qualities among those that are relative to us. In what way then do these qualities have an objective reality? Br ieger l03 gives what appears to be the best explanation. The qualities perceived by the sense of taste come into existence only during the process of taste; similarly the quality of colour comes into existence only with v i s i o n . H a r d n e s s , softness, heaviness, and lightness, however, need no person perceiving them in order to exist, since they owe their origin to the size and number of the a t o m s , n o t to the interaction 102Theophrastus, De Sens., 71, D.A. 135. Brieger, "Demokrits Leugnung der Sinneswahreit," Hermes, 37 (1902), p. 65. 1 0 kcf. Aristotle, De An., 3, 2, 426 a 21. For the fact that Aristotle is referring to Democritus see Zeller, Greek Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. kk-9 n. 1, Hicks, De Anima, p. 440, Ross De Anima,p. 276 and Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, p. 175 h 50. l°5Theophrastus, De.Sens., 6I-63, D.A. 135. 43 between the atoms of different shapes and the person perceiving those atoms; for this reason these four qualities (as well as the qualities of size, shape and weight) can be said to possess a cpuauc;. These qualities, however, can s t i l l be perceived in different ways by different people, since perception involves an interaction between the atoms of the individual (which may d i f f e r from person to person) and the object, and for this reason these qualities can have different effects on different people. Therefore Democritus s t i l l called these qualities "relative to us." Thus in other passages Theophrastus, speaking of tot aLa&r\ia, says that Democritus made a l l sense qualities relative: AnuoxpiTOc; oe udvxa [xa aia$T)xa] Tid^n Trjg aia^riaeioc; ucatov .106 ex L 6* auxouc; uexaBaAAeiv xfl npr\aei xaxa xa nd^T) x a l xac; T\\iHuac,' f) nal cpavepbv toe; f) 6id#eaic; a i x i a XTJC; tpavxacuac;. auXtoc; u.ev ouv Tiepl xtov aia$t)xtov ouxto 6etv 6ixo\aLi8dvetv . ^  07 The "sceptical" statements of Democritus himself also made clear that he considered a l l sensible qualities "empty affections of the senses."108 Bailey's idea, therefore, that Democritus thought phenomena could give two types of information, one type based on the primary qualities which could lead to yvnaiT) yvtotiTi, the other based on the subjective impressions of the senses which resulted only in axoxir) yvtoLin,is not supported by the evidence. The statement of Democritus on the two types of knowledge indicates simply that axoxir) yvuiLin proceeds to a certain point beyond which i t cannot advance; yvr)aCr) yvi6u,ri then carries on the investigation in a more subtle ^Theophrastus, De Sens., 60, D.A. 135• 1 07ibid., 64, D.A. 135. l o 8Sextus Empiricus, 8, 184. See above page 17. See also Natorp, op.cit., p. 165 n. 1. kk fashion and is able to grasp the truth, that is, the nature of the atoms and void. It is not the sense-impressions which are divided, some leading to "genuine knowledge," some to "bastard knowledge" but a l l t a aCa^nxa form the subject material of axoTiT) YVOJUT) and i t is within the whole realm of the sense-impressions that OKOX Cr\ yvwUT) must investigate XeTCTOTEpov in order to discover the nature of reality. Democritus expressly states that "touch" belongs to OXOT Ct] YVUHITI109 yet by Bailey's interpretation, touch would be valid in some cases but not in others. Burnet, 1 1 0 presumably with the same idea as Bailey, has gone so far as to state that Democritus has two meanings for the word "touch," one for what he terms the qualities of the "special senses" (secondary qualities), and one for the primary qualities. There is, however, no evidence to support this assumption.111 How exactly Democritus imagined that YvncHTi yvwuT) did grasp the ultimate realities must remain unknown, for we simply do not possess evidence to explain the process. It may well be that Democritus himself did not explain the process in detail, his strict materialism perhaps making this impossible. To explain in purely physical terms the method by which, for example, one assumes that the atoms are of infinite shapes because xa cpaivojieva are of infinite variety, J" L that is, to make a comparison and draw a conclusion, would be extremely difficult. Yet this is actually the l°9sextus Empiricus, 7, 138, D.B. 11. Cf. also 7, 139. 1 1 0Burnet, op.cit., pp. 196-197. 1 1 1Burnet is wrong in stating that when Aristotle says that most of the physicists reduced a l l sensation to touch, (De Sens., k, kk2 a 29, D.A. 119) he is using "touch" to indicate the sense that perceives only the primary qualities. 1 1 2Aristotle, De Gen, et Corr., 1, 1, 315 h 6, D.A. (Leucippus) 9j see above page 30. h5 method Democritus used in determining the characteristics of the atoms and void, that is, the process of using the sensible objects as guides for determining the nature of the ultimate realities which the sense themselves could not perceive. YvnatT] YVWLIT) arises 61.0c TTIC; 6 t a v o L a g . 1 1 3 Democritus taught that thinking was a change in the soul-atoms brought about by the touch of ei6u)\a from external objects. It may well be that the:Atomist thought this was a sufficient explanation of thought, since i t explained the process in strictly physical terms. This is as close as we come to a description of reasoning from our evidence on Democritus and i t is actually the only notion, however inadequate it be, that we have of how YVTKUT] yvuJfiTi functioned.^ ^Sextus Empiricus, 7, 138, D.B. 11. n 4 C f . Guthrie, op. cit., pp. h6k-k65. CHAPTER THREE EPICURUS: THE NATURE OF THE SOUL Like Democritus, Epicurus taught that the soul was a corporeal entity composed of very fine particles: •n, tyvxh auiiid iaii X e u T O L i e p e c ; ! The scholiast on Epicurus identifies the shape and quality of the soul atoms: [ 'ETUHOUPOC;] ^Xeyet e v CXWOLC; nal ei; CXTOU-WV [xriv «|»UXTIV] auYneta&ai XeLOXtxT iov nal a T p o Y Y u X i o T a T i o v , uoWcu T t v t 6ta<pepouacov tu)v TOU nupoc;'2 Epicurus taught that the atoms of the soul were extremely smooth and round. Lucretius also states that the soul was composed of very small smooth particles, round in shape: principio esse aio persubtilem atque minutis perquam corporibus factum constare (sc. animum)3 . . . (sc. animum) constare rotundis . perquam seminibus debet perquamque minutis, nunc igitur quoniam <est> animi natura reperta mobilis egregie, perquam constare necessest corporibus parvis et levibus atque rotundis.5 1Ep 1_H_., 63. 2 Z Epicuri, Ep. H . , 66, Usener, 311. 3Lucretius, 3, 177-178. ^Tbid., 3, 186-188. 5Ibid., 3, 203-205. Cf. also 3, 216-217, 228-230, and 425. 47 Lucretius cites as proofs of these statements on the nature of the soul the swiftness of thought^ (3, 182-207) which must depend on the roundness and smoothness of the soul particles, and the absence of a change of weight in the body after the soul has departed (3, 208-227) which must be attributable to the lightness and small size of the soul atoms. Of what nature then are these tiny particles that make up the soul? Epicurus describes three components of the soul: t) (I^ UXTI a u i n a . . . npoaeLupepeaTaTqy 6e T t v e u n a x i •9-epp.ou T L v a n p a a i v EXOVTI n a l ref) n e v TOUTI^ i x p o a e n q j e p e c j , u f i 6e TOUTJO. e c m 6e TO n e p o c ; TIOAATIV T t a p a W a y r i v eL\ncpbs Tfj A - e r c T o n e p e l a nal auTajv TOUTU)V, auLiTca'&ec; 6e TOUT(p uiaWov nal Tip \OLTC(J) a^potaM -aTL* ^ The soul is like wind with an admixture of heat; besides these two components there is a "much subtler element." Lucretius gives a fuller, though less exact, account of the composition of the soul. He is less exact in that he states the components of the soul are particles of breath and heat rather than particles like those of u v e u n a and d e p n o c ; . His account is fuller in that he speaks of the element of the soul, air, which is not mentioned by Epicurus in the Epistula ad Herodotum: Nec tamen haec simplex nobis natura putanda est. tenvis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura mixta vapore, vapor porro trahit- aera secum. nec calor est quisquam, cui non sit mixtus et aer. rara quod eius enim constat natura, necessest aeris inter eum primordia multa moveri. iam triplex animi est igitur natura reperta; nec tamen haec sat sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, n i l horum quoniam recipit mens posse creare sens i f er os motus jquaedamque mente volutatf . quarta. quoque his igitur quaedam natura necessest %ote Epicurus' expression atia VOTILIQCTI ("as quick as thought") in Ep. H., 48, 6l, 83. ?Ep. H., 63. U8 attribuatur. east omnino nominis expers; qua neque raobilius quicquam neque tenvius exstat, nec magis e parvis et levibus ex elementis; sensiferos raotus quae didit prima per artus. 8 Like Lucretius, Plutarch says the Epicureans believed the soul was composed of one substance like heat, one like wind, one like air and a fourth name-less element: 6t [ 'EniHOupeiot] nexpt xiov n e p l adpna xfjc;. <\>VXT)S 6uvd|j,ecov, a t e ; •Q-epu.oxnxa n a l uaXaHoxrixa n a l xovov napexet xiij a w i i a x i , xrjv o u a t a v avtiiiTiYvuvTec; auxf]c; EH xtvog •depLioG n a l KveuLiaxtHoG n a l aepto6ouc; OUH e£tHvoGvxat repbe; xb nupitoxaxov aWa. aTta-yopeuouat • xb yap n p t v e t n a l t ivTi t ioveuet n a l cpiXet n a l L i t a e t , n a l oXioc, TO cppovtLiov n a l Xoyta-ctHov ex xtvoc; cpaatv 1 aHaxovou,daxou' uot6xr)xos eatYt'vea&ai .9 Aetius also supports Lucretius' statements that the soul was composed of four elements: 'EirtHoupoc; [xrjv cbyxriv] n p a u i a en xexxaptov, en 71010G uupui6ouc;, EH notou aepco6ouc;, en TCOIOG TtveuLiaxiHoG, EH xexapxoG x i v b g a n a x o v o L i d a x o u ' ^ ^ Although he does not mention the "nameless element" Macrobius, like Lucretius, Plutarch and Aetius, includes "air" in his description of Epicurus' teaching: ^Lucretius, 3, 231-2^5. Cf. also lines 3, 121-129 in which Lucretius mentions aer, ventus and vapor. Bailey (Commentary, Vol. 2, pp.. 1006, 1009, 102b) is correct in pointing out that aer here is used as a synonym for ventus. That Lucretius mentions only two elements here (wind and heat), although he adds air later on (231-236) is probably due to the fact that he is not being technical in this passage (Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 1009) rather than that he is using two different sources (A. Brieger, Epikurs Lehre von der Seele (Halle, 1893) p. 13) or is being inconsistent. 9piutarch, Adv. Col . , 20, 1118 d, Usener 314. l ° A e t i u s , PI. , k, 3 , 11, Usener 315, Pox. Gr., p. 388. k9 Epicurus (animain dixit) speciem ex igne et aere et spiritu v mixtam.H In the light of these passages i t seems clear that Epicurus taught the soul was composed of four elements. The reason that the element of air was not mentioned hy Epicurus himself is to he found in the nature of the Epistula  ad Herodotum. This epistle was intended for those who were fairly well acquainted with the teachings and terminology of Epicurus and was to serve only as a summary of the main principles of the system.12 The description of the soul in the letter, therefore, can he thought to he simply a rough statement, i t being very l i k e l y 1 3 that Epicurus did give an elaborate account of the soul in another work (the Magna Epitoma?, 1^ ) which may well have been Lucret ius 1 s ource. Lucretius says i t is because air, heat, and wind are seen to leave the dying body that these must be components of the soul. The fourth element, however, must be present to account for sensation;15 UMacrdbius, Commentarius.ex Cicerone in Somnium Scipionis, 1, Ik, 20, Usener 315. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, 1, tf, 127 U, Usener 315. 1 2Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 389 and G. Strodach, The Philosophy  of Epicurus (Northwestern University, 1963), P. 228. De Witt (Epicurus and  His Philosophy (Minneapolis, 195*0, P« 198) suggests that Epicurus does not mention the element of air, since air was the cause of repose (Aetius, PI., h, 3, l l ) and Epicurus at this point in the Epistula ad Herodotum was dwelling upon the question of motion. This statement is not strictly accurate. At 63 Epicurus passed to a new topic (the nature of the soul and its functions) leaving the question of mobility (6l-62); this question is not treated in the description of the soul. l3Note Diogenes Laertius" statement (10, 26) that Epicurus was a prolific writer, exceeding a l l before him in the number of his works. l^See Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 11 n. 1, 229, and"Studi Lucreziani," in Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, edited by C. Giussani (Torino, 1896) Vol. 1, P. 9. ^Giussani (op.cit.,p.l87) and Bailey (Greek Atomists,p.391) point out that i t is likely Epicurus took the idea of the nameless element from Aristotle's "quintessence." (See Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 1, 22, 4U_6l; Academica Posteriora, §6-29, De Finibus, 12). There is, however, an essential difference between Aristotle's "fifth" element and Epicurus' "fourth" nature. The functions of the two are similar but the nameless element of Epicurus was strictly material in nature. 50 (sc. quarta natura) sensiferos motus quae didit prima per artus. prima cietur enim, parvis perfecta figuris;!^ Epicurus also states that the fourth element was more able to feel in harmony with the body than the other soul elements: xb liepoc; ... auuiTtocdeg 6e TOUTIO p.a\\ov xal T(p \oLTttJj oc^ poCaLiaTi.* Aetius states that the functions of a l l four elements were as follows: u>v TO Liev Ttveuna Huvnaiv, TOV 6e ocepa Tjpeiiiav, TO 6e depLibv TTIV tpaivonevriv ^epLiOTTiTd TOG aconaTOc ; , TO O a n a T O v o i a a a T O v ^ T T i v ev riutv enTcoietv ata^rjauv ev ou&evl yap TUJV ovoiiaCou-evoov axoixztwv eivai. a t a ^ n a i v . "18 Epicurus taught that the soul and the body were closely united. The soul grows with the body (Epistula ad Herodotum, 64, 1, Lucretius, 3, 344-49). It lives united with the body (Lucretius, 3, 331-332). It provides the body with sensation (Epistula ad Herodotum, 63, 10; 6k, 7-10). It is not only the soul present in the body that is capable of sensation, but the body itself, through the soul's presence, receives the power of sensation: Quod superest, siquis corpus sentire refutat atque animam credit permixtam corpore toto suscipere hunc motum quem sensum nominitamus, vel manifestas res contra verasque repugnat. quid sit enim corpus sentire quis adferet umquam, si non ipsa palam quod res deditac docuit nos? at dimissa anima corpus caret undique sensu; perdit enim quod non proprium fuit eius in aevo, multaque praeterea perdit cum expellitur aevo3-9 l 6Lucretius, 3, 245-246. ^Ep. H., 63. l^Aetius, PI., 4, 3, 11, Usener 315; Pox. Gr., p. 388. 19Lucretius, 3, 350-358. 51 The soul renders the body capable of sensation only because i t is enclosed within the body itself; body and soul, therefore, are dependent on each as the body (Lucretius, 3> 437-439)• To support this supposition Lucretius gives twenty-two proofs on the mortality of the soul in which he emphasizes again and again the strictly physical and perishable nature of the soul . 2 ! Epicurus taught that the number of soul particles was smaller than the number of body particles. He indicates this when he speaks of "the sum of soul atoms, however small i t be:" TO 6e XOLTCOV a ^ p o u a L i a . . . OUH EXE I tT)v a i a ^ n a u v EHEIVOU aTtnWaynevou, Saov TIOTE EOTI TO OUVTELVOV TUJV aTonwv 7iA,f)$oc; etg TTJV TT)C; (JJUX )^? 9601 V.22 Similarly Lucretius opposes Democritus1 teaching that the soul particles alternated with the body particles on the ground that the particles of the soul were far fewer than those of the body: nam cum multo sunt animae elementa minora quam quibus e corpus nobis et viscera constant, turn numero quoque concedunt et rara per artus dissita sunt dumtaxat;23 other for their existence.^ Finally, the soul perishes at the same time Regarding the soul 1 s position in the body Epicurus says simply that the <\>vxr\ L I E V O V . 24 is a body that is Ttap* o\ov TO a$poiana irapeaTcap-Although in the Epistula ad Herodotum Epicurus speaks 2QEp.H., 64-65. 23Lucretius, 3, 374-377. 2t*-Ep. H . , 63. 52 only of the 4>L>xi1 a s a whole, there is also evidence that he taught that this soul, although of one nature, had two distinct parts, one located in the breast, the other distributed throughout the whole body. The scholiast states: n a l TO LIEV Tt a \ o y o v aOTTiq, o Tip Xo tn ip Txapeaixdp'&at atoLiaTL* TO 6e \ o y t n b v ev^Tcp d t o p a n i , tbc; 6TI\OV EH TE T<JJV <po6wv n a l TTIC; xapac;.25 Lucretius terms TO a X o y o v, anima, TO \ o y t H O V , animus: Nunc animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se, sed caput esse quasi et dominari in corpore toto consilium quod nos animum mentemque vocamus. idque situm media regione in pectoris haeret. hie exsultat enim pavor ac metus, haec loca circum laetitiae mulcent; hie ergo mens animusquest. cetera pars animae per totum dissita corpus paret et ad numen mentis momenque movetur§6 Aetius also gives evidence that Epicurus taught there were two parts of the soul: 'ETCLHOUPOC; 6iu.epf) TTIV cpuxi iv , TO Liev /VoyiHov e x o u a a v ev TCO ^ topan i H a d i 6 g u | i e v o v , TO 6e a/\.oyov n a $ ' 8\nv TT)V a u y n p t a t v TOU acuLiaToq 6iecrrcapLi£vov .27 Again the reason that Epicurus himself does not describe the division of the soul into two parts lies in the nature of the Epistula ad Herodotum. The advanced students for whom the epistle was intended would probably have been well acquainted with Epicurus' teachings on the nature of the soul.28 25 E Epicuri, Ep. H., 66, Usener 3 H -26Lucretius, 3, 136-144. Cf. 3, 94-135. ^Aetius, PL, 4, 46, Usener 312, Pox. Gr., p. 390. Cf. Aetius, PI., 4, 5, 5, Usener 312 and Tertullian,De Anima, 15, Usener, 312. 28cyril Bailey, Epicurus, The Extant Remains (Oxford, 1926), p. 226. : 5 3 From these passages one can conclude that Epicurus taught that the mind (animus) was a concentration of pure soul particles located in the chest and that the soul (anima) was distributed throughout the body and was chiefly responsible for sensation.29 Lucretius makes clear that the animus was the more important part of the soul.3° i t was the seat of emotion, will and thought; the anima was subordinate to the momen of the mind (3, 1 4 4 ) . The animus was also dominantior ad vitam quam vis animai;31 when the mind left the body, the anima followed instantly. We come now to the question of how the four elements of the soul were placed in the body. Scholars have reached different conclusions on this point. Tohte,32 Woltjer,33 Munro, 34 and Taylor35 believe that the animus was composed of the nameless element and the other three cbmponents but that the anima was composed only of the three, wind, heat and air. Brieger,36 De Witt37 and Farrington3® believe the four elements formed the 29Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 1006. 3°See lines 3, 136-144 quoted above on p. 5 2 . 3lLucretius, 3, 397. 32T. Tohte, Epikurs Kriterien der Wahrheit (Clausthal, 1874), p..' 4, f f . 33j. Woltjer, Lucretii Philosophia Cum Fontibus Comparata (Groningen, 1877), pp. 62 ff., 69 f f . 34Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, edited by H.Munro (London, 1900), Fourth Edition, pp. 187-ltitf. 35A.E.Taylor, Epicurus (London,1911), pp. 72-73. Taylor does not make clear whether he believes the animus was composed of a l l four soul elements or only the fourth element": 36Br ieger, Epikurs Lehre von der Seele, p. 11. Brieger says, however, that the fourth element (= the mindj moves among the other three elements which are also present in the breast. 37oe Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, pp. 201-202, 211. De Witt says the atoms of the soul are situated in the body, graded in relation to 54 animus, the other three the anima. In contrast to these scholars, Giussani39, Goedeckemeyer,^0 and Bailey^ 1 believe that both the anima and animus were composed of the four soul elements and that both were identical in composition, although they differed in respect to location and function. This question of the distribution of the soul elements is an important one since the placement of the quarta natura indicates how Epicurus believed sensation took place, whether i t arose in the sense-organs themselves or whether i t also involved the participation of the animus located in the breast.42 Epicurus himself gives us l i t t l e evidence on this point, since he does not speak of the division of the soul into its two parts. He does say of the fourth element, however, that i t was "more capable of feeling in harmony with the rest of the body"^ than the other soul elements; this statement suggests that the nameless element was distributed throughout the body. Similarly he states that the (puXTl, which he subsequently describes as being composed of a substance like wind, one like heat and a much finer their mobility. The particles of the fourth element are located at the centre of the body; the particles of the other three are located nearer to or further from the surface depending upon their mobility. 3%. Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus (London, 196T)> PP. 115-116. 39Giussani, op.cit., pp. 183-217. ^°Goedeckemeyer, op.cit., p. 57 f f . 4lBailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 392, 580-87; Commentary, Vol. 2, pp. 1027 f f . 42we are discussing here only the question of the participation of the animus in the process by which the body becomes aware of objects stimu-lating it (sensation); the interpretation of sensation did take place in the mind. (See Chapters.4 and 5 below; cf. Bailey, Commentary, p. 1052.) 43See above p. 50. 55 substance (the nameless element), was spread throughout the body, 4 this again seems to indicate that Epicurus believed the quarta natura was present in the anima which was distributed throughout the body. Lucretius gives f u l l evidence on this question. He emphasizes that the mind and the soul have the same nature: Nam animum atque animam dico coniuncta teneri inter se atque unam naturam conficere ex se,45 atque animam verbi causa cum dicere pergam, mortalem esse docens, animum quoque dicere credas, quatenus est unum inter se coniunctaque res est.46 He describes the relationship of the four soul elements as follows: inter enim cursant primordia principiorura motibus inter se, n i l ut secernier unum possit nec spatio f i e r i divisa potestas, sed quasi multae vis unius corporis exstant. quod genus in quovis animantum viscere vulgo est odor et quidam calor et sapor, et tamen ex his omnibus est unum perfectum corporis augmen. sic calor atque aer et venti caeca potestas mixta creant unam naturam et mobilis i l i a vis, initum motus ab se quae dividit o l l i s , sensifer unde oritur primum per viscera motus. nam penitus prorsum latet haec natura subestque nec magis hac infra quicquam est in corpore nostro atque anima est animae proporro totius ipsa, quod genus in nostris membris et corpore toto mixta latens animi vis est aminaeque potestas, corporibus quia de parvis paucisque creatast. sic t i b i nominis haec expers vis facta minutis corporibus latet atque animae quasi totius ipsa proporrost anima et dominatur corpore toto. The four elements form a whole; none of them can be separated from the others nor can any one element exert its power independently of any other element. The particles of a l l four elements are constantly moving among 45Lucretius, 3, 136-137. 47ibid., 3, 262-281. ^ 6 l b i d . , 3, 422-424. 56 one another; a l l four make up "one nature." Speaking specifically about the fourth nature, Lucretius states that i t is present within the soul itself in a manner analogous to how the mind and soul are present in the body. By this statement Lucretius does not mean that the atoms of the fourth nature are hidden deep among the particles of the other three elements, that is, Lucretius is not describing a local arrangement of the atoms of the soul, since he plainly states (3, 262-265) that the atoms of a l l four elements move freely among one another.^8 By the terms latet, subest and infra Lucretius is expressing what can be called a scale of perceptibility.49 Because of the nature of the atoms composing them, the particles of the body are such that they are nearer to perception by the senses than the particles of the soul which, owing to the nature of the atoms composing them, are too fine to be able to be perceived by the senses at all.5° Thus in relation to a scale of perceptibility the atoms of the soul are less perceptible than those of the body. In a similar fashion, of the elements of the soul the quarta natura, because of the nature of its atoms, can be said to be less perceptible51 than the other 48ln Greek Atomists (pp. 392, 585) Bailey states that the fourth nature was placed beneath the other three soul elements, that is, he believes that Lucretius was expressing a local relationship of the elements. It is clear, however, from his•Commentary, Vol.2, pp. 1038-1039 that Bailey had come (rightly) to reject this view. Cf. T. Lucretius Carus, De Rerum Natura, edited by W.E.Leonard and S.B.Smith (Madison, 1942), p. 44b. 49see Bailey, Commentary, Vol.2, pp.1033, 1036-39. Woltjer (op.cit., p.69) takes lines 273-274 as a reference to the restricted position of the fourth element in the breast; however the free movement of a l l four elements in the nature of the soul as a whole (262-265) refutes this interpretation, oltjer emends the reading of infra to intra (274) which is unnecessary ailey, Commentary, Vol.2, p.1039)^ infra conveys the same idea as penitus  latet, namely, the distance of the fourth element from perception by the senses, that i s , the position of the element on the scale of perceptibility. 50cf. Lucretius, 4,110 f f . See Bailey, Commentary,Vol.2, p.1039. 5lNote that the fourth element is the least perceptible of the elements of the soul but is the most perceptive of the four. (Lucretius, 3, 246-248.) 57 three components and to be the element furthest from perception by the senses. In relation to the scale of perceptibility, therefore, the atoms of the fourth element are the least perceptible atoms in the body. In this sense there is "nothing below the fourth nature" (274) in the body and the nameless element can be called the anima animae. The passages of Lucretius makes clear that a l l four elements of the soul form one nature, that is, the composition of the anima and animus is identical, both containing the fourth element. In the united nature of the mind and soul, the particles of a l l four elements move freely among one another, although in relation to perceptibility, those of the fourth nature are "below" the other three. The views of those who believe that the fourth element was restricted to the mind (either in union with the other three elements or by itself) are based in part on a statement of Plutarch: TO yap <!p upCvet Hat tivnu-oveuet n a l cptA.et nat u t a e t , n a l oXioq TO qppoviLiov n a l A-oytaTiHOv eK_Tiv6c; qpaaiv ' a n a T o v o L i d a T o u ' TI-OIOTTITOC; e n t y t v e a ^ a t .^ 2 Plutarch is mentioning some of the functions of the quarta natura which are also the functions Lucretius attributes to the mind (3, 139-144). One cannot, however, conclude on the basis of the similarity of these functions that the mind and the fourth element are identical.53 The name-less element is also the cause of sensation,54 a function not mentioned by Plutarch. The statement of Plutarch is an incomplete l i s t of the functions of the fourth element and though i t makes clear that the quarta natura was 52piutarch, Adv. Col., 20, 1118 e, Usener 314. 5 3 A s Brieger, Epikurs Lehre von der Seele, p. 13. 54See above pp. k9-50. 58 certainly a part of the mind, i t does not exclude the possibility that the fourth nature was present in the rest of the soul (anima) as well.55 The misunderstanding concerning the nature of the soul, namely that the fourth element is not present in the anima, results also from a misinterpretation of the following lines of Lucretius: (sc. quarta natura) prima cietur enim, parvis perfecta figuris; inde calor motus et venti caeca potestas accipit, inde aer; inde omnia mobilitantur, concutitur sanguis, turn viscera persentiscunt omnia, postremis datur ossibus atque medullis sive voluptas est sive est contrarius ardor. nec temere hue dolor usque potest penetrare neque acre permanare malum, quin omnia perturbentur usque adeo (ut^ vitae desit locus atque animai diffugiant partes per caulas corporis omnis. sed plerumque f i t in summo quasi corpore finis motibus: hanc ob rem vitam retinere valemus. 56 Zeller,57 Munro, 58 and Woltjer59 take hue (252) as a reference to the fourth nature. In the light of this interpretation Woltjer^O takes these lines very closely with the passage 3, 396-401, in which Lucretius states that i f the mind departs from the body, the anima follows closely upon i t and l i f e comes to an end. Woltjer concludes from these two passages that 55Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 582. In a similar manner Brieger (Epikurs Lehre von der Seele, p. 1 4 ) says that since Lucretius states that both the mind (3, 13^) and the quarta natura (3> 28l) are predominant (dominare) in the body, these two must be identical. Both statements of Lucretius are true but are no reason for identifying the mind and the fourth element (Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 583): Lucretius is simply saying that the mind is predominant as the seat of thought and emotion, the fourth nature, as the cause of sensation in the body. 56Lucretius, 3, 246-257. 57E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen (Leipzig, l88o), Third Edition, Vol. 3, p. 419 n. 2. 58Munro, o p . c i t p . 188. 59woltjer, op.cit., p. 69. Bailey in his Greek Atomists (p. 583) accepted this interpretation but rejected i t in his Commentary (Vol. 2,p . l03l). Woltjer, loc.cit. 59 the mind and the fourth nature must he i d e n t i c a l , since the destruction of e i t h e r of them causes death. Woltjer's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( Z e l l e r ' s and Munro's also) that hue r e f e r s t o the fourth element can he questioned. I t i s f a r more l i k e l y that hue r e f e r s t o the "bones and marrow."^l Hue could hardly mean the quarta natura since the l a t t e r i s the f i r s t element of the soul t o be moved during the process of sensation (3, 246-256). I f a v i o l e n t pain d i d penetrate t o the bones and marrow, a d i s r u p t i o n would occur, causing the soul t o leave the body; usually, however, the blow i s checked at the surface of the body. This passage of Lucretius, therefore, cannot be taken as proof that the fourth element was not present i n the anima. The evidence of Lucretius and Epicurus himself supports the view that Epicurus taught that both the animus and anima were composed of a l l four soul elements. I f , however, Epicurus d i d b e l i e v e that the fourth element was r e s t r i c t e d t o the mind, the process of sensation would have t o involve the animus, since the fourth nature was the cause of sensation. Thus Tohte,^ 2 Woltjer,63 Brieger , 6 4 Munro,^5 Taylor,66 and De Witt^7 state that the atoms of the anima are moved by i d o l s but i t i s not u n t i l the 6lBailey, Commentary, V o l . 2, p. 1031. ^ 2Tohte, o p . c i t . , pp. 5-6. ^•^woltjer, o p . c i t . , p. 68. ^ B r i e g e r , Epikurs Lehre von der Seele, p. 17. ^5Munro, o p . c i t . , p. 191. ^ T a y l o r , o p . c i t . , p. 73. 6?De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. 201. 6o mind-atoms (that i s , the fourth nature) are also struck in some fashion"" and the effect transmitted again to the atoms of the anima which had been f i r s t moved, that sensation arises. A statement of Lucretius, however, does make i t plain that i t is the fourth nature, present in whatever portion of the anima that is found in the sense-organs, that gives rise to sensation: Dicere porro oculos nullam rem cernere posse, sed per eos animum ut foribus spectare reclusis, d i f f i c i l e s t , contra cum sensus ducat eorum; sensus enim trahit atque acies detrudit ad ipsas; fulgida praesertim cum cernere saepe nequimus, lumina luminibus quia nobis praepediuntur. quod foribus non f i t ; neque enim, qua cernimus i p s i , ostia suscipiunt ullum reclusa laborem. 69 In this passage Lucretius denies that the mind participates in the act of vision. The sensation of the eyes themselves makes this clear, since we cannot see blazing lights; i f i t were the mind that was responsible for vision, blazing lights would have no effect on the a b i l i t y to see. Moreover, the feeling in the eyes "draw us to the very pupils (acies)," ^ T a y l o r (op.cit., p. 73) ancL Zeller (Die Philosophie der  Griechen, Vol. 3, p. 421) suggest the idols themselves must pass through the body and strike the mind. (Taylor is not referring to those fine idols which, being too subtle to s t i r the sense-organs, do strike the mind directly (Lucretius, 4, 749-776) but the idols that s t i r the senses). Lines 3, 359-366 of Lucretius refute Taylor's view. In this passage Lucretius rejects the teaching that the eyes themselves do not see but the mind looks through them as though through open portals. If, as Taylor suggests, the idols pass through the sense-organs to the mind i t s e l f , the sense-organs would play no role but merely be passages to the mind. It is just such a view of the mind and the senses that Lucretius opposes. 'Tohte (op.cit., pp. 4-5) suggests that the idols causing sensation come only as far as the sense-organs but a picture of the object travels to the mind "ohne Materie." Bailey (Greek Atomists, p. 4l8), however, points out that in the purely material system of Epicurus, an image of "immaterial form" is an impossibility. 69Lucretius, 3, 359-366. 6 l that i s , i t leads us to believe that the eyes themselves see, not the mind through them.TO Just as the body as a whole possesses sensation because of the presence of the anima (Lucretius, 3, 350-358), so the eyes too in particular have the power of sensation because of the anima present in them; i t is not merely the mind, looking through the eyes, that is able to see. It is clear, moreover, that i f the eyes are able to perceive, the soul particles which the eyes contain must possess atoms of the fourth element. Finally in relation to this question of the involvement of the animus in sensation a passage of Aetius has caused some d i f f i c u l t y : OL ZxtoLHOt xa Liev ud&rj ev TOLC; Ttertovdoai TOTIOIC;, TOCC; 6e aia$r iae ic; ev Tip T)YeLiovixijj. 'ETILXOUPOC; nal TOC Ttd&T) x a l Tac; aia^iiaeic: ev TOLC; ueuov^oai TOTIOIC;, T O 6e TyyeLiovixbv ana^ec;.' 1 It is the interpretation of this last statement, TO 6e TYYELIOV ixbv ana&ec;, that has posed a problem in interpretation. Goedeckemeyer?2 and Tohte73 say that the statement is wrong since Lucretius (3, ihl) points out that the mind is the seat of emotion, that i s , the mind is the seat of feeling 7°Woltjer (op.cit., p. 68) and Munro (op.cit., p. 193) assume as the object of trahit (3t>2) the word "animum": the feeling in the eyes also brings about some effect upon the mind and after the mind has been stirred in this way, vision results. This interpretation must be rejected since Woltjer and Munro, by saying that the animus must participate in sight, are stating exactly the view which Lucretius is rejecting. Cf. Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 1055. ^Aetius, PI., k, 23, 1-2, Pox. Gr., p. klh. Cf. Usener 317. 72Gcedeckemeyer, op.cit., p. 58. 73Tohte, op.cit., p. 6. 62 and consequently cannot be called aTKX'&ec; . These scholars refer also to the scholium on Epicurus' Epistula ad Herodotum (66) which states that the mind must reside in the breast since the latter is the seat of fear and joy, Usener74 brackets this passage of Aetius following Diels75 who says the statement is clearly false. Diels agrees with Zeller7^ and Munro77 who suggest that in this statement Aetius is attempting to express the ideas found in Lucretius 3, 252-257. 78 Bailey79 and G ± u s s a n i , o u however, take the statement as support of the view that Epicurus believed sensation took place in the sense-organs, not the mind. This certainly appears to be the point Aetius is making. The mind is aTta&ec; in the sense that it is not the place in which sensation takes place. In this passage ana^ec; must be thought to have a very restricted meaning8^ with no reference to the mind as the seat of emotion nor to the mind's ability to perceive idols that are too fine to affect the senses. Taken in this light the passage does support Epicurus' view of sensation as expressed by Lucretius: sensation takes place in the sense-organs themselves after the particles of the fourth element present there in the anima have been stirred. 74usener, op.cit . , #317, p. 220. 75Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 4 l 4 , "Prolegomena," pp. 219-220. 7 6 z e l l e r , Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol .3, P. 419 n.2. 77Munro, op.cit . , p . l 8 8 . 78zel ler and Munro, however, are misled in this interpretation since they believe hue (see above pp.58-59) refers to the fourth nature which they believe was restricted to the mind. 'Thus they believe Lucretius is speaking of the mind in this passage and stating that, i f pain penetrates to the mind, death must follow. The scholars think that Aetius, expressing this idea, stated that the mind must be aita-ftec;. 79Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 586-87. 8 oGiussani, op.cit . ,p. 195-8 l Bai ley , Greek Atomists, p. 586. CHAPTER FOUR THE TWO CRITERIA: SENSATION AND PROLEPSIS Having established Epicurus' teaching on the nature of the soul we can now discuss the question of how the mind was made aware of the - external world and how i t dealt with the data provided by the senses. This will lead to a discussion of the nature of two criteria of truth that Epicurus mentions,1 namely al'o"&T}cus and np6Xr\i\>iq , and of the important role these played in his theory of knowledge. Although sensation occurred in the sense-organs,2 Epicurus believed the interpretation of the nature of the sense-impression was a function of the mind.3 How then did the mind become aware of the objects impinging upon the sense-organs? Epicurus himself gives us no evidence on this point. It is unlikely that the idols causing sensation passed right through the body to the mind.*1' Bailey5 suggests the stimulation of -^-The TEa^T), the feelings of pleasure and pain that Epicurus believed attended each sensation, were also called a criterion of truth (Diogenes Laertius, 10, 31). These play an important role in Epicurus' ethics. See Tohte, op.cit., p. 19, and Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp.248-59, 485 f f . 2See previous chapter. 3HOW this occurs will be discussed below. ^See above footnote 67, p. 59. ^Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 244, 4l7-4l8. 64 the sense-organs caused a movement to take place along a chain of soul-atoms leading directly to the mind. In absence of direct evidence we can only imagine that in some fashion, through a strictly physical process, the mind was stirred with each sense-impression and stimulated to perform the act of interpreting the sensation. According to Epicurus 1 teaching, the mind in addition to being stirred in some way with each impression made upon the senses also acted itself like an organ of sense. It was directly stimulated by idols too fine to affect the sense-organs: quae cum mobiliter summa levitate feruntur, . . . facile uno commovet ictu quaelibet una animum nobis subtilis imago, nunc igitur quoniam docui me forte leonem cernere per simulacra, oculos quaecumque lacessunt, scire licet mentem simile ratione moveri, per simulacra leonem *£et) cetera quae videt aeque nec minus atque oculi, nisi quod mage tenvia cernit.7 One instance of the idols that can affect the mind directly is the avotaaeiq , compound idols formed by ei6u)A.a which have ^Lucretius, 4, 745-747. The mind can be struck by a single idol (uno ictu) unlike the eyes which can only perceive the impression made by a series of idols. See Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 3, pp. 1268, 1270. See also below on qpavTaaioc. ^Lucretius, 4, 752-756. Lucretius is emphasizing here that the process by which the mind is stirred by finer idols is the same as that by which the senses are stirred. He is not saying that the mind is moved by exactly the same idols as the senses; it is only the mage tenvia idols that strike the mind. Cf. R. English, "The Lucretian Theory of Sense Perception," CW 14 (1911), p. 105. 65 joined together in the a i r : x a l avaxdaziq ev Tip n e p u e x o v T i o£euai bia. T O LIT) 6 e i v HaTa Bdftoc; T O auiaTcA.TJpwna yivza&ai^ The visions of Centaurs and Scyllas can he attributed to such combinations of idols; these are too fine to stimulate the eyes but are able to move the mind.9 The idols causing dreams and also the visions of madmen form*' another example of the direct' stimulation of the mind: 'Evuuvia O U H e\a\e cpuaLv •fteiav ou6e u.avTiHT)v 6uvaLuv, aWa y t v e T a i Haxa euuTcjatv e 1 6G5\.U)V . 1 ^ eTtl yovv T O U 'OpeaToG, OTe e66nei 8A.e*Ti;eiv Tag 'Epivua^, T)(|iev <x"a&T)oiq un' ^eL6W\.WV HivouLievri a\ndT)g T)v (uTceneiTO yap xa eibwXa)^ Similarly the el'.dwXa that flow from the bodies of the gods are directly perceived by the mind: nec de corpore quae sancto simulacra feruntur in mentis hominum divinae nuntia formae,12 Epicurus . . . docet earn esse vim et naturam deorum ut primum non sensu sed mente cernantur^ [ ' E T U H O U P O C J q>T)ai T O U ? $eou<; \6yip •ftewpTiTOugl 4 Finally the mind can be stirred by subtle idols that have remained in existence after the people from whom they arose either have died or are absent: Q E P . H., 4 8 . 9Lucretius, 4, 131, 724-33, 738. 1 0Epicurus, Sent. Vat., 2 4 . Cf. Lucretius, 4, 26-4l. 1 : iSextus Empiricus, 8, 63, Usener 253. 1 2Lucretius, 6, 76-77. Cf. 5, 1169-1171. 13cicero, De Mat. Deor., 1, 19, 49, Usener 352. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, 9, 25, Usener 353. ^ E Epicuri, K.D., 1, Usener 355. Cf. also Aetius, PI., 1, 7, 34, Dox.Gr., p. 306, Usener 355. Here the same phrase \6yi4) •9,eidpT]TOuc; is used. 66 nec ratione alia, cum somnus membra profudit, mens animi vigilat, nisi quod simulacra lacessunt haec eadem nostros animos quae cum. vigilamus, usque adeo, certe ut videamur cernere eum quem relicta vita iam mors et terra potitast.15 Not only do idols of people who are no longer present stir the mind but also the el'6u)A.a from events and activities that have taken place in the past: et quicumque dies multos ex ordine ludis assiduas dederunt operas, plerumque videmus, cum iam destiterunt ea sensibus usurpare, reliquas tamera esse vias in mente patentis. qua possint eadem rerum simulacra venire.1° In the case of these past events, "passages" (along which presumably the image was carried to the mind after the simulacra stimulated the senses)^ remained open through which the finer et!6u)A.a could travel. From this statement of Lucretius we can assume that in the case of the other idols which affect the mind directly some "passages" to the mind existed as well.I 8 It is important to note that before the mind can perceive any of these mage tenvia idols, i t must direct its attention to them.19 i t 15Lucretius, h, 757-761. See also Cicero's ironical statement in Epistulae ad Familiares, 15, 16, 1. ^Lucretius, h, 973-977. Cf. k, 26-kl. ^Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 3, p. 1297. l%ote also Plutarch's statement (Quaestiones Convivales, 8, 10, 2, 735 A) that Epicurus accepted Democritus' belief^ that the ic^ols causing dreams eyHaxa8uaaoua$at, xa el'6ioA.a 61a xcov nopiov etg xa atuLtaxa 1 9The technical term for this is e7u6oA,r) XT]C; 6iavoLac;. This will be discussed more fully in the following chapter. 67 is precisely the presence of innumberable images in every place and the ab i l i t y of the mind to direct i t s attention to these images that enable the mind to think of whatever i t wishes: propterea f i t u t i quovis in tempore quaeque praesto sint simulacra locis in quisque parata: et quia tenvia sunt, n i s i quae contendit, acute cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt praeterea pereunt, n i s i { s i ad> quae se ipse paravit. 2^ cum maximis voluptatibus in eas imagines mentem intentam infixamque nostram intellegentiam capere quae s i t et beata natura et aeterna.^l Epicurus gives no evidence on how the mind turns i t s attention to the idols which strike i t . Lucretius does point out, however, that such visions of the mind occur when the senses and the memory are at rest (4, 763 f f ) . When the mind is free from being stirred by the images arising from the stimulation of the sense-organs, i t can turn i t s attention to the type of idol that can strike i t directly. We have now seen in what way Epicurus believed the mind became aware of the external world. How then did he view the information pro-vided by the senses? Did he consider i t trustworthy in presenting a, true picture of sensible objects or did he, lik e Democritus, consider sense-impressions deceptive? There is abundant evidence for Epicurus' views on thi s point. He states in the Epistula ad Herodotum: Mexoc 6e xauxa 6eC auvopav avaopepovxa ent xag a i a ^ r j a e i c ; . . . (OUTW yap T) BeBaLoxdxr) n i a x i c ; eaxa i,)22 2 0Lucretius, 4, 797-798, 802-804. see also k, 777-795. 2 1Cicero, De Mat. Deor., 1, 19, 49-50, Usener 352. 2 2Ep. H., 63. 68 ETC TE naza zaq aia&riat.6EI rcdvTa TTIPECV23 The Epistula ad Pythoclem also states: ou yap xaTa dgiwnaTa XEVCC x a l v o n o ^ e a t a g ^ u a t o X o y n t e o v , aW tig Ta 9aiv6 | i £ v a £xxa\E iTttL* 24 Lucretius strongly asserts the truth of sensation: nam contra sensus ab sensibus ipse (sc. Heraclitus) repugnat et labefactat eos, unde omnia credita pendent,25 quid nobis certius ipsis sensibus esse potest, qui vera ac falsa notemus?26 invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam notitiem veri neque sensus posse r e f e l l i . nam maiore fide debet reperirier i l l u d , sponte sua veris quod possit vincere falsa, quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi debet?27 Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus give similar evidence about Epicurus 1 views: 6EL 6E ala^r\azi u.tv |iT)6enLo; |idxEa$ai* 28 6 6E ' E i u x o u p o c ; EA.EYE p.£v TtdvTa Ta aia$r)Ta EuvaL a\r)&r\29 6 6E ' E i t t H o u p o g ndvTa E\EY£ TO a i a ^ n T a TOuauTa UTCOXE i a$a i orcoia tpatvETat x a l xaT* ai0#r)ai.v upocruCTCTEL, UTIOETIOTE (^ £u6oM.£VT)g TTJ? ata'9-Tia£U)g50 23sp. H., 38. Cf. also 68 and 82. 2W P., 86. This letter is probably not by Epicurus himself but is rather an abridged compilation of some longer work of Epicurus. Nonetheless the letter appears to contain teachings that are s t r i c t l y in accord with Epicurean tradition. See Usener, Epicurea, XXXVII-XXXTX, Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 275-276, Greek Atomists, p. 228. 25Lucretius, 1, 693-694. 2 6]hid_., l , 699-700. 27ibid., 4, 1+78-483; cf. also 1, 422-425. 2 8Plutarch, Adv. Col., 5, 1109 d, Usener 250. 29sextus Empiricus, 8, 63, Usener 253. 3°Ibid., 8, 185, Usener 247. 69 o 6e 'EiciHOUpog xa LIEV aio&r)xa T j a v x a eXeyev aA.n$T) nal OVTCC. ou 6irjv£yH£ y a p aA.ri$Ec; SLVCXL TL XEYELV TI U T t d p x o v 31 Epicurus believed that each sense-impression gave a true picture of the sensible object in the particular conditions in which that object was present. For example, the sense-impression that shows an oar bent in water is true since i t reveals the actual appearance of a straight oar in water.32 Similarly the sense-impression that shows a square tower at a distance as round is true since i t presents a true picture of how a square tower actually appears in these particular circumstances, that is, at some distance away. Epicurus taught that one should accept the evidence of the senses as aA,T)$Ti and OVTO: ; the senses give a true picture of objects which really exist. For this reason Epicurus called the senses a standard of truth: EV TOLVUV T<+) KaVOVL A.EY10V E0TLV 6 ' EllLKOUpOC; KpLTTipia TTIC; aA.r)&£iac; xaq aLa^naELc; 33 In the passages quoted so far, the terms used for "sensation" have been aLO^riaLg, xa aia$T)xa and TO: cpaivoLiEvct. There is also evidence that Epicurus taught that 'every <pavTao"La was true. It seems clear that Epicurus himself used this term to refer to the image ^Sextus Empiricus, 8, 9, Usener 2kk. Other passages in which Epicurus is said to have asserted the truth of sensation are Sextus Empiricus, 7, 3&9> Olympiodorus, In Platonis Phaedo, 80,T, Tertullian, De Anima, 17; Augustine, De Civitate Dei, ii, 7, (all in Usener 2Vf) , Cicero, Academica Priora, 2, 26, 62 (Usener 247), 2, 7, 19 (Usener 252) and Cicero, De Finibus, 1, 9, 30 (Usener 256). 32see Plutarch, Adv. Col., 25, 1121 A, Usener 252. 33Diogenes Laertius, 10, 31. Cf. Cicero,Academica Priora, 2, k6, lh2 where the:senses are called a iudicium and Diogenes Laertius, 9, 106 where the senses are once again called a xpiTT)pLOV. 70 created in the eye as a result of a swift succession of idols; 34 the eye is only able to perceive an image formed by many idols since i t cannot perceive the idols individually. sunt igitur iara formarum vestigia certa quae vulgo volitant s u b t i l i praedita f i l o nec singillatim possunt secreta videri.35 nal f\v av XdBaiLiev 9avTaatav eTupXriTtHuic; xfi 6tavota r\ xoZq a t a $ r | T r i p t o t c ; ^ £ i T £ tiopcpric; el ' x e O"UM.8£6T)H6TU>V, U-OQ9T) e a T L v a u x n T O C a x e p e u i v L O u , Yuvonevn^ H a T a TO ££T}C; TtuHvwna r\ iyKaxd\eiu.u.a T O U zibwXov.J The cpavTacria is "the shape of the solid object" that i s , i t is a true representation of the sensible object. When Aetius, Sextus Empiricus, and Plutarch, however, report that Epicurus taught every ( p a v x a a t a was true, they use the term to signify any sense-impression and cpavxaa ta is used simply .as a synonym for a "annate , ;37 ' ETUHOUPOC; Tcaaav a i a $ n a t v n a l i raaav cpavxaa tav a/\.r|dfp8 XTJV cpavxaa tav . . . 6ta navxbq akr)$T\ cpnatv [ ' EutHoupoc;] Onapxetv.39 'E7UH0upetu) 66viiaTi n e x p i x a t xu> *ndaaq e t v a t xaq 6t' a ta^Tiaewg cpavxaa tag a\r)%eZq . '40 34sailey, Epicurus, p. 196, Greek Atomists, p. 410 n. 3. The evidence on Epicurus 1 views of cpavxaata is slight since the word occurs only twice in his extant works (Ep.H., 50, 80). That the term was an important one in Epicurus' system is shown by the fact that one of his works was called riepl cpavxaatac; (Diogenes Laertius, 10, 28). 35Lucretius, 4, 87-89. Cf. 4, 256-258. 36E P .H., 50. 37Tohte, op.cit., p. 6, Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3, P. 388 n. 3, and W.A. Heidel, "Epicurea," AJP 23 (1902), p. 187, 38Aetius, PI., 4, 95, Usener 248, Dox.Gr., p. 396. 39sextus Empiricus, 7, 203, Usener 247. Cf. also 8, 63. 40piutarch, Adv. Col., 4, 1109 a, Usener 2.50, Cf. 25, 1121 d, Usener 252. 71 Epicurus accepted the truth of aia&r\aiq because it was a\oyos ; the senses neither add to nor detract from the impression made by an external object: Tcaaa yap cpTiaiv, aia%r)aiq a A - o y o g ecrxi n a l u-vrjnns ou6eu.i.ac; denxLHTj ouxe yap 6cp' a6xf)c;^Hiveixat,, ouxe ucp' exepou Hivn ^ e i a a 6uvaxaJ XL n p o a O e t v a t fj <x<pe#\.eLV. ou6e eaxL x b 6uvaM.evov auxag 6ie\£y£,aiA^ XT}V xe a t a ^ T i a L v a v x i A r j n x L H r i v ouaav xwv 0TCOTILTCX6VXU>V ai ' jxf), n a l M.T)xe acpaipouady XL nr)xe Tcpoo"XL$eLaav LiTixe u .exaxL$eLcrav x £ a X o y o v e L v a i , ^ 6 i a Ttavxoc; xe aA.ri'9-eue LV n a l OUXOJ xb o v X a L i B a v e t v wg e iY£ qpuaewc; auxb e n e t v o . Ttavxcov o e xwv a u a ^ r i x a i v aATvduiv o v x w v ^ Furthermore Epicurus supports his belief in the truth of sensation through the following three points:^3 a sensation arising in one sense-organ cannot refute another sensation arising in the same sense-organ since both have equal validity; sensations arising in different sense-organs cannot refute one another (for example, taste cannot refute sight); reason cannot refute sensation since its origin lies in sensation itself . Not only did Epicurus believe that every sensation was true but also that, i f the truth of one sensation was rejected, no standard of truth could exist. eo enim rem demittit Epicurus, s i unus sensus semel in vita mentitus s i t , nul l i umquam esse credendum.44 2, 32, 101. 4lDiogenes Laertius, 10, 32. Cf. Lucretius, 4 , 480 ft. ^Sextus Empiricus, 8 , 9 , Usener 247; cf. Lucretius, 4 , 486-98. ^Diogenes Laertius, 10, 32. Cf. Lucretius, 4 , 480 ff . ^Cicero, Academica Priora, 2, 25, 79, Usener 251. Cf. also 72 t i m u i t E p i c u r u s ne s i unum v i s u m e s s e t f a l s u m n u l l u m e s s e t v e r u m : omnis s e n s u s v e r i n u n t i o s d i x i t e s s e . 4 5 F u r t h e r m o r e n o t o n l y t h e s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s m a d e upon t h e s e n s e - o r g a n s were t r u e b u t a l s o t h e i m p r e s s i o n s made d i r e c t l y upon t h e m i n d b y t h e i d o l s c a u s i n g d r e a m s , t h e d e l u s i o n s o f madmen a n d t h e v i s i o n s o f t h e g o d s : xa x e xiov L iaLvoL ievcov c p a v T a o u i a x a n a l £ f t t > n a x ' o v a p aA,r )$f ) , HLVEL yap* xb oe LIT) 6V 06 H L v e i . 4 6 etc; xb avxb avveveynovxeq e n xiov EVUTCVLIOV n a l x iov TtapaHontov ou6ev £L vaC yaai Ttapopaua x o u x i o v ou6e ipeGdoc; ovbe a a u a x a x o v , aXXa. c p a v x a a L a g aXr\§eLC; a u d a a c ; na l a i o u . a x a n a l uop9ac; EH XOG u e p L E X o v x o c ; acpLHOULiEvac; .47 E p i c u r u s b e l i e v e d a l l a L a $ r ) a £ L c ; w e r e a \ r ) d £ L c ; ; how t h e n d i d h e e x p l a i n t h a t p e o p l e o f t e n h o l d i n c o r r e c t n o t i o n s o f s e n s i b l e o b j e c t s a s a r e s u l t o f s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s ? B e f o r e we c a n d i s c u s s E p i c u r u s ' s o l u t i o n o f t h i s p r o b l e m , t h e n a t u r e o f t h e T ipoXrupic ; must b e made c l e a r . Epicurus taught that the prolepsis, like sensation, was a • I, o criterion of truth. ° Its nature i s described by Diogenes Laertius as follows: Trjv be TtpoXncpLv Xeyovaiv OLOVEI H a x a X r i i p i v f) 6 o £ a v 6p$f)v fl E v v c a a v ^ f ! H a f t o A a n f i v v o r j e u v EVOCTCOHELLIEVTIV, XOOX'^EOXL IjLVTlLlTlV^XoG -rtOWdtHLc; Ec;iO$Ey C|)(XVEVXOc; , OLOV XO T O L o G x O V eoxLv avGpcouoc ; • CCLIOC yap xcp pT j^ f j vaL a v ^ p u m o c ; EO$UC; HaXCX 1ip6\T)Cl;LV H t t l .6 XUTtOg a6xoG V O E L X a t KpOTlYOULlEV'jOV xcov (xta-B-rjaEcov. r t a v x ! o u v OVOLUXXL x b Tipcoxcog i m o x E x a Y -(J.EVOV E v a p Y E ? EQTX L . H a l OUH tXV ECTJXTiaaLlEV x b CTJXOULLEVOV , 45Cicero, De Mat. Deor., 1, 25, 70. ^^Diogenes Laertius, 10, 32. Cf. also Sextus Empiricus, 8, 63 quoted on page 65 concerning the truth of Orestes' visions of the Furies. ^piutarch, Adv., Col., 28, 1123 h-c, Usener 254. 48Diogenes Laertius, 10, 31. Cf. Cicero, Academica Priora, 2, 46, 142 ( n o t i t i i s ) . 73 et LITJ npoxepov e Y v u m e L i i e v auxo* OLOV To noppco eaxtus LTiTtoc; e a x l v f| Bouc;* 6et yap xaxa TipoA-TicpLv eyvuixevai Tioxe tiraou xal Bobc; Liopcprjv. ou6* av ouvoLidaaLiev XL Lin upoxepov auxou xaxa TtpoXncHv xbv xuitov Lia$6vxec;. evapyeic; ouv e t a t v a L 7ipoA.T)(peLc; Epicurus taught that the prolepsis was a general or universal concept of a class of objects; i t was an "universal idea stored in the mind," "a recollection of what has often been presented from without." Our sources give no detailed explanation of how Epicurus believed prolepseis were formed by the mind. We can, however, form some idea of the process by using Diogenes Laertius' description of the prolepsis and keeping in mind Epicurus' belief in the s t r i c t l y physical nature of the mind and i t s a c t i v i t i e s . It appears that the mind stores up both the individual images conveyed to i t each time the senses are stimulated and those images i t perceives directly, placing similar images together. When several similar images have been stored together, in some fashion — we must imagine a st r i c t l y physical process — the mind joins together these similar images, placing aside the individual differences, and forms a "concept" or general picture of what a l l the images represent. Thus, for example, the mind, having received several images of different men, combines these images, selecting out what is common to a l l of them and allowing the individual differences to disappear and in this way forms a prolepsis, a concept of "man." The prolepsis once formed can be used by the mind to classify new sense-impressions. The concepts act as "anticipations" of future sense-impressions of the same nature; thus they can be termed upoXricpeLCJ , "anticipations." Moreover, since the concepts are b u i l t from previous ^^Diogenes Laertius, 10, 33. sensations, they themselves can be called true.5° Because they..represenl; composite pictures of individual sense-impressions, their validity can be thought to be equal to the validity of sensation itself and thus the prolepseis act as criteria of truth. Wot only are prolepseis true but also "clear," ( evapyaq ) ; they present a distinct and well-defined picture of some object to the mind.51 Epicurus believed the prolepsis was a necessary requirement- i f one was to make any inquiry or be able to gain an understanding of the nature of anything. Thus Diogenes Laertius in his description of prolepsis said that "we could not seek the object of our investigation unless we had known i t beforehand." Prolepsis makes investigation possible. Cicero and Clement also emphasize this feature of the concept: sine qua (sc. prolepsis) nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari possit.52 pr) 6uvaa$ai 6e uir)6eva nnxe Q-qx-qaai \xr\xz aTtopriaai. (iT]6e nrjy 6o£daoa, ocW* ou6e eXey^ai 53 50zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3, p. 390, Taylor, op.cit. , 48, 50 and. Flitter and Preller, op.cit., p. 379. .Bailey (Greek Atomists, p. 246) states that the prolepseis are evapyeiq but not a\r|-9-eLg since they do not correspond to "one external existence." It is true that Epicurus used the term aXn&'nc; to indicate what was real (Sextus Empiricus, 8, 9,.Usener 244J hut he certainly did not use the term exclusively in this sense; a\.r)$T]c; also is used by Epicurus to mean "not false" (see Ep.H., 62). With this meaning of a\.T)$Tic; (not false), the prolepseis must have been true since they; were themselves a criterion of truth"! Again taking the second meaning of a\n-^ T)g (real), there is no evidence that Epicurus' idea of "real" was limited to external objects. Prolepseis, although invisible and present within the individuals' mind, were just as real ( aA-Ti^eic; ) as external objects since they were, in Epicurus' eyes, physical in nature. The fact that Epicurus does not specifically call the prolepseis aXn^etg is not conclusive since this term is found only four times in his extant works and in the passages in which npo\r)<\iiq does occur, there is no definition of the term. 5lF. Merbach, De Epicuri Canonica (Weida, 1909), p. 18. 52cicero, De Mat. Deor., 1, 16, 43, Usener 255. 53ciement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 2, 4, Usener 255. 75 To recognize an object one must have a prolepsis to which the sensible object can be referred; to carry on an investigation, one must know by means of a concept the object which is sought. The prolepsis is also closely linked with the use of language: each word is a symbol of some concept and the task of the word is to represent the n:p6\T)(i»Lc; So exactly that there is no need of further definition to illustrate the meaning of the concept.5^ The evidence of Clement supports the interpretation of the prolepsis that Diogenes Laertius gives. Clement shows that the term prolepsis was used not only in the passive sense of the general concept existing in the mind but also in the active sense of the actual act of grasping the clear image formed from a "generalization" of several similar sense-impressions:55 •Kp6\r\<\>iv 6e ccnodCb'jiaiv [ o ^ ' E i u H O u p o c ; ] e7iu8oA.T)v knC TL evapyeq n a l e r u TTJV e v a p Y n TOG updyuaTOc; entvoLav*56 Lucretius uses the word notitia (notities) to indicate the npOA.TKlHc; of Epicurus.57 The manner in which he uses the term also lends support to the interpretation of the prolepsis that Diogenes Laertius gives. 5**-See Ep. H., 37-38. For Epicurus' use of words see Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 173, 177. 55]3ailey, Greek Atomists, p. 2k"J. 56ciement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 2, k, Usener 255. Cf. Theodoretus, Graecorum affectionum Curatio, 1, 90. 57Tohte, op.cit., p. 17; Munro, op.cit., p. 182; Leonard and Smith, op.cit., p. 566; Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 823, Vol. 3, p. 13^5; F. Peters, T. Lucretius et M. Cicero Quo Modo Vocabula Graeca Epicuri Disciplinae Propria Latine Verterint (Westfalia, 192b), p. 19. 76 exemplum porro gignundis rebus et ipsa notities divis hominum unde est insita primum, quid vellent facere ut scirent animoque viderent, 58 praeterea si non a l i i quoque vocibus usi inter se fuerant, unde insita notities sat utilitatis et unde data est huic prima potestas, quid vellet facere ut sciret animoque videret?59 In these two passages Lucretius indicates the impossibility of creating anything unless a concept of that object is already present in the mind. Lucretius' meaning is clearly that neither the ggds could have created mankind nor any individual, language without notitiae of these objects and since the possession of these concepts was dependent upon experience with the objects themselves already in existence (whether i t be mankind or language), neither the gods nor some individual could have created them. notitiam veri quae res falsique crearit et dubium certo quae res differre probarit. invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli . 6 0 It is from the information provided by the senses that one gains a concept of what is true and this forms an "anticipation" by which one can judge truth and falsehood. The senses are the source of the prolepsis. i l i a quidem sorsum sunt omnia quae prius ipsa nata dedere suae post notitiam u t i l i t a t i s . quo genere in primis sensus et membra videmus;"1 It was only after the parts of the body had been created (and used) that a concept of their usefulness could have arisen. This passage, like the others, supports Diogenes Laertius' definition of the prolepsis as a "recollection of something which has often been presented before from without." 58Lucretius, 5, l 8 l - l 8 3 . 6 oIbid., 4, 476-479. 5 9 i b i d . , 5, 1046-1049. 6 l l b i d . , 4, 853-855. 77 In two further passages Lucretius indicates that the mind can combine existing prolepseis to form new concepts. These new concepts are s t i l l true since they arise from prolepseis which originated directly from :• sensation. quae procul usque adeo divino a numine distent, inque deum numero quae sint indigna videri, notitiam potius praebere ut posse putentur quid sit v i t a l i motu sensuque remotum.°2 In these lines Lucretius states that the mind, grouping together the concepts i t possesses of the sun, moon and other heavenly phenomena and picking out the elements common to these concepts, can form a new prolepsis of an object that lacks both motion and feeling. scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse verti in notitiam nullo circumlita fuco.°3 The mind is also able to combine the concept of "body" and the concept of the "absence of colour" to form a new notitia of bodies without colour. In Epicurus' extant writings the word ttpOA.'ncjac; occurs only four times and unfortunately the passages in which the term occurs cast l i t t l e light on the nature of the prolepsis. In Kuriai Doxai 37 and 38, Epicurus speaks of the concept of justice; according to Diogenes Laertius' definition this would be the prolepsis formed by the mind after several just acts had been perceived. In relation to the beliefs concerning the gods Epicurus states: ou yap TtpoA.in<i>eic; e i a l y a\\' vnoKri<beiq <\>ev5eZq al TUJV uoWtov uuep $eiov a'rco<pdaeic;64 6 2Lucretius, 5, 122-125. ^3jJbid., 2, 'Jkk-'jk^. Cf. also 2, 124 where Lucretius states that concepts of important principles can be formed from the example of small things. 61tEp.M., 124. 78 Again, according to Diogenes Laertius 1 description of the prolepsis, Epicurus is saying that what the common people believe about the gods are not concepts formed when their minds unified several of the individual images of the gods which had struck their minds directly, but inferences incorrectly drawn, as Lucretius states, ^ 5*from observation of the universe. Finally speaking of "time" Epicurus says: TOV yap 6r) x p o v o v ou CyjTrjTeov wanep n a ! xa Xomd, o a a ev Onone iL iev ip CnxouLiey a v d y o v c e c ; e n ! xac; BXercoLievac; n a p ' TJLUV aO-roic ; npoA.rjtpei.c;65 In the case of a l l objects (except time), concepts of their nature and qualities can exist in the mind, to which new sense-impressions can be referred. According to Diogenes Laertius definition of the concept, these prolepseis would exist as a result of frequent experience with the objects themselves. The interpretation of the evidence which Cicero gives about the nature of the prolepsis of Epicurus poses a serious problem. Cicero states as follows: Ita f i t ut deus i l l e quern mente noscimus atque in animi notione tamquam in vestigio volumus reponere nusquam prorsus appareat.66 Solus (sc. Epicurus) enim v i d i t primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrine anticipationem quandam deorum: quam appellat npOA.T)c|>iv Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo r e i quandam informationem, sine qua nec i n t e l l e g i quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari possit . . . . i n t e l l e g i necesse est esse deos. quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus;°7 65Ep. H., 72. 6_5_a 5, 1183-1193. ^Cic e r o , De Mat. Deor., 1, Ik, 37. 67lbid., 1, 16, k3-kk. 79 fateamur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem ut ante dixi sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim^  rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse npOA.Ti(JHv appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat)68 primum quod ita sit informatum anticipatumque mentibus nostris ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma occurrat humana;"9 "Habemus" inquis "in animo insitam informationem quandam dei."70 The most difficult phrase to deal with is insitas . . . vel potius innatas cognitiones (44). These words seem to indicate that the prolepsis was an innate idea present in the individual at birth and not obtained through sensation. Thus i t would appear that man was provided by nature with ideas necessary for thought just as he was provided with feelings of pleasure and pain which he could use as "moral guides.'^1 This interpretation of Cicero's words has its difficulties. 72 6 8Cicero, De Nat. Deor., 1, 17, 44. 6 9 I b i d . , 1, 27, 76. 70rpia., 1, 36, 100. 7lFor the feelings of pleasure and pain being provided by nature, see Ep.M., 129, 137 and K.D., 7. Strodach (op.cit., p. 225 n. 29) says that if prolepseis are innate ideas provided by nature in order to enable man to classify his sensations, nature would be a "purposeful agent" but Epicurus clearly rejected the idea of purpose in nature (Lucretius, 4, 823 f f ) . This objection is not valid. In the same way as Epicurus taught that man was endowed with feelings of pleasure and pain, these being given by no "purposeful agent" but merely being parts of man's state of being (as much as eyes and ears) so, i f Epicurus believed prolepseis were innate ideas, he could explain their presence by simply calling them parts of man's constitution, given him "by nature." 72Most scholars reject the evidence of Cicero: Ritter and Preller, op.cit.,.p. 379, Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3, P. 39P, Woltjer, op.cit., p. 92 n. 2, Tohte, op.cit., p. 17, Brieger, op.cit., p. 19, Merbach, op.cit., p. 51, and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 557. De Witt ("The God of Epicurus and the Canon,'1 Transactions of the Royal  Society of Canada, Ser. 3, Sect. 2, Vol. 36 (19U2), pp. 33-4-9 and Epicurus  and His Philosophy, pp. 142-150) accepts Cicero's evidence, rejecting Diogenes Laertius' definition. . 8o It is true that the term Tip6\r)(\>iq , "anticipation," seems to support this interpretation, that is, the term appears to indicate that the prolepseis are anticipations of a l l sensation. However we must s t i l l ask: is the prolepsis an anticipation of a l l sensation or only of those sense-impressions that follow after the prolepsis has been formed in the mind as a result of sensation?73 Secondly, the statement of Epicurus that a l l reasoning was derived from the senses74 conflicts with the presence in the mind at birth of innate ideas not derived from sensation.75 Furthermore the non-physical character of the notion of "innate ideas" seems to be at variance with the strictly physical system of Epicurus. 76 In the works of Epicurus himself i t is difficult to confirm or refute Cicero's definition since, the references to prolepsis are so few and especially since three of the passages in which the word does occur77 offer good sense with either meaning given to "prolepsis." However when Epicurus states that the suppositions of the common people concerning the nature of the gods are not npoK-q^eiq but VTioXr\<\>eiq, 78 i t is difficult to see, i f prolepseis are innate ideas, why the people should not - have had the proper concepts of the gods straight from birth. 73Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 245. 7%>iogenes Laertius, 10, 32. Lucretius, 4, 484. 75woltjer, op.cit., p. 92 n .2. 76Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 557. 77wamely K.D., 37 and 38, Ep. H., 72. See above pp. 77-78. 78E P . M . , 124. 81 In the passages of Lucretius in which notitia (notities)79 occurs, difficulties arise when the meaning of "innate idea" is assigned to notitia. In lines 5> I8I-I83 in which Lucretius asks where the gods could have obtained a concept of mankind in order that they could create men, the implication is certainly that the only source of such a concept was actual experience with mankind who were already in existence. Similarly in 5, 1046-49, the meaning is clearly that a man could not have invented speech unless he had received a notitia of speech from hearing those who were already using i t . If notitia was an innate idea not derived from sense-perception, there was certainly no point to Lucretius' questions, since direct experience with mankind and speech would not have been necessary for the presence of notitiae of them. In 4, 476-479 where Lucretius states that the concept of truth is derived from the senses, there is a clear contradiction * of 1 the idea that the notitia was "inborn. Similarly in 4, 853-855 one can ask why the concept of the usefulness of the parts of the body couid only result from actual use of these parts i f this concept was inborn. Also in 5, 124 Lucretius states that the heavenly phenomena can be thought to provide a concept of something that is lacking in sensation and feeling; here again the concept certainly is said to be derived from sensation. Only in lines 2, 744-45, where Lucretius states i t is possible for a concept of bodies without colour to 79De Witt (Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. 100) denies that this term represents the Epicurean prolepsis. In "The Gods of Epicurus and the Canon," however, he identifies the two terms,.pointing out that Cicero (Academica Priora, 2, 10, 30) specifically identifies the two words. 80De Witt's explanation ("The Epicurean Gods and the Canon," pp. 39-40) that the prolepsis of mankind, or speech could not be present unless i t was caused by an actual experience with them is certainly inconsistent with his assertion that the prolepsis is an innate idea. Unfortunately, De Witt only deals with these two passages of Lucretius. 82 exist in the mind, can either meaning of prolepsis be applied to n o t i t i a with equal sense. In the light of the evidence of both Epicurus and Lucretius, doubt can be cast upon Cicero's statement that the prolepseis were innatas cognitiones. Bailey 8 1 in treating the evidence of Cicero says that the term innatas does not necessarily mean "born'in" but that the word is being used by Cicero with the meaning of "be implanted, grow up in." Tohte 8 2 also says that the word innatas indicates merely that concepts were implanted in the mind. Mayor83 notes that the two words insitus and innatus were used together by Cicero to indicate something which was a "natural growth" rather than the result of " a r t i f i c i a l training." He says that Cicero's description of prolepseis as insitas vel potius innatas cognitiones means simply that the prolepseis were not "arbitrarily imposed from without" but were the natural result of experience. He cites as support for this statement the following three passages: (sc. nos) habere etiam insitam quandam vel potius innatam cupiditatem scientiae84 insulam Sicilian] totam esse Cereri et Liberae consecratam . . . ipsis Siculis i t a persuasum est ut in animis eorum insitum atque innatum esse videatur. 85 ut anteponantur . . . innata atque in s i t a assumptis et adventiciis86 SlBailey, Greek Atomists, p. 557. 8 2Tohte, op.cit., p. 17. 83M. Tullius Cicero, De Katura Deorum, edited by ff. H. Mayor (Cambridge, l88o), Vol. 1, pp. 137-138. ^Cicero, De Finibus, h, 2, k. 85cicero, Actio in Verrem, 2, k, 106. 8 6Cicero, Topica, 18, 69. 83 Surely, however, innatus in these passages has the meaning of that which is "inborn," "present from birth" with no reference to a result of exper-ience? Pease®7 suggests it is safest to take innatas cognitiones as ideas "implanted by nature sine doctrina at some time subsequent to birth." He also points out 8 8 that i f a l l people must form prolepseis at an early age, i t is only slightly incorrect (though not strictly accurate) to speak of prolepseis as innatas. The interpretation of innatas as meaning "implanted as a result of experience," appears to gain some support from the fact that Cicero, after saying the existence of the gods was known by a prolepsis (lH_45), states: Nam a natura habemus omnes omnium gentium speciem nullam aliam nis i humanam d'eorum; quae enim forma al ia occurrit umquam aut vigilanti cuiquam aut dormienti?®9 The gods were believed to have human shape since this was the only form in which visions of them came to men whether they were awake or asleep. Cicero is certainly speaking of a knowledge of the gods gained through sensation.90 Nonetheless one cannot ignore the basic meaning of innatas ("inborn") and the possibility that Cicero did intend innatas cognitiones to mean "innate ideas." Because of the scantiness of evidence on the nature of prolepsis in Epicurus' works, i t is impossible to reach a definite con-clusion to this problem, although the description of the prolepsis given by Diogenes Laertius seems most in accord with the material nature of Epicurus' system. ®7M. Tullius Cicero, De Natura Deorum, edited by H. S. Pease (Cambridge, Mass., 1355), PP. 290-299. ®®Quoting Cicero, Academica, edited by J . S. Reid (London, 1885), 2, 30. 89Cicero, De Nat. Deor., 1, 18, 46. 9 ° J . P. Elder, "Review of N. De Witt's Epicurus and His Philosophy," AJP 77 (1956), p. 80. 84 We can now discuss how Epicurus explained the apparent falsity of some sensations. Epicurus' explanation was a simple one: the senses themselves do not deceive but the mind in making inferences about "irrational" ( aA-oyoc; ) sensation can give rise to error, since the opinion ( 6o£a ) i t forms about sensation can be true or false: T O 6e 6LT)u.apTr)Lievov O6H av OTJTJPXEV , ^ei LIT) eXaLiBdvoLiev xa! a\'A.T)v T Lva HLvt)aiv ev TILUV auT0Lc;91 TTJV 6e 6o£av na! 6TC6A.T)(|;LV XeyouaLv, aXn^r) T E 9aa i n a ! cbeu6T)*92 aua^Tjaetoc; 6e i 6 i o v 0,if)pxe TOU napovTOc; LIOVOV n a ! HLVOUVTOC; auTT)v avTiA.au.Bdvea§aL, OLOV xpwuaxoc;, oux! 6e TO 6LaHpiveiv OTI a\\o Liev eaTi TO ev&dde a\\o 6e To^ev^doe UITOHE LLIEVOV . ^ t o i r e p at Liev (pavTaauau 6i.a TauTa^Ttaaat e ioay a/Vn$e LC; , <at 6e 6o£ai ou naaat rjaav a\r)^etc;,> CIAA* E L X O V T Iva 6iacpopdv. TOUTCOV yap at^LiEv rjaav aXri^eic^ at 6e cpeudeug, eneiuep nptaeuc; natteaTaauv TJLXCOV en! Tate; qpavTaaiai.c;, npLvoLiev 6e Ta Liev op&coc; TOC 6e^ p.oX'&Tiptoc; f)TOt Tiapoc TO fipoaTL'8-evai TL na! npoaveneiy Tauc; cpavTaataLc; Jc\ irapa. TO oupaLpsiv T L TOUTCOV na! HOLVCOC; KaTacpeu6ea$ai Trjc; aXoyou ata^riaecoc;. OUHOUV TCOV 6O£COV HaTa TOV 'ET ILHOUPOV at Liev aA.r)&eLc; ELO*!V at 6e (j»eu6eLc;93 As soon as the mind becomes aware of some object stimulating the eyes (for example) i t spontaneously makes some inference ( im6/\.r)cHc;, 6o£a ) about the nature of the object by referring the sense-impression of the object to one of the concepts present in the mind itself: n a ! TO 6oc;aaTbv ocub npoTepou TLVOC; evapyouc; f)pTT)TaL , £<p' o avacpepovTec XeyoLiev * OLOV n6$ev I'aLiev et T O U T O Lax L v avftpcouoc;; 9 4 9 1Ep. H., 51 . 92Diogenes Laertius, 10, 3k. Cf. Aetius, PI., k, 8 , 2, Usener 248; Dox.Gr., p. 396. 93sextus Empiricus, 7, 210, Usener 247. Cf. Lucretius, 4, 386, 462-68 and Tertullian, De Anima, 17, Usener 247. 94oiogenes Laertius, 10, 33. 85 Whatever interpretation the mind gives to the sense-impression is called the "addition of opinion" (upoa6o£aCo| ievov ) . j r o r example, a square tower at a distance appears to be round. If a person concludes the tower is round, his mind has added information (TCpoa6o£aC6u-evov ) to the simple sensation and formed a judgement (bn.6\r\<\> iq ) which in this case is incorrect since the tower is not round. The original sensation, however, was s t i l l true since i t showed how a square tower appears at a distance.95 To determine whether an opinion is true or false, one must examine the object in question at close hand in the medium of air; 96 he must gain a clear well-defined view of the object ( e v a p y r i n a , ivdpyeia) . To ucpeaxTiHog 6 e i izXoq i%\.AoyCC£0$a.i H a l Ttaaav TTIV e v d p y e Lav, £tp' TW xh 6o£aC6|ieva a v d Y O u e v * 9 7 The opinions about those objects that do present a distinct view can be accepted as true. In the case of these 6o£ai, the mind correctly selects the concept to which the object corresponds and a recognition of the object (eTtai*a#r||!a) occurs. Thus concerning the eTcaiattr||ia Diogenes Laertius states: x a l T O xh euaia^rniaxa 6* u c p e a T a v a i T u a T O U T a i TTJV T W V aia$rjaeu>v a \ r i ^ £ t a v . 9 8 95For other common examples of false 6o£ai made by the mind, see Lucretius, k, 379-461. 96Epicurus never raentionsf the necessity of a medium of air but it was perhaps a feature of the e v d p Y T ) u a that he took for granted. An oar in water seen at very close hand will s t i l l look bent; placed in the air the oar will present a clear view of its real nature. 9 7 K . P . , 22, Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 243 f f . , and Merbach, op.cit., p. lb. 9®Diogenes Laertius, 10. 32. 86 That the sense-impression exactly fits an existing concept gives proof that the sense-impression in true." It is not possible, however, to obtain a clear view (Evdpyr)u.a) of every sensible object. The object may be a great distance away or the light too dim to allow one to see i t clearly. The sense-impressions one receives of these objects are true (they give a true picture of what the object appears to be at a certain distance) but they are not clear (svapyTic;; . Stimulation of the senses by these objects does not give rise to an kna.Ca&T)\ia. -1-00- Before one's opinion about these "unclear" objects 99The understanding of the term £uaia$T)u,a (Eixaia&TKHc;) is difficult because the evidence on the Epicurean use of the term is so slight. enaia%r]aic; occurs twice in the works of Epicurus (Ep.H., 52, 53) and appears to indicate the act of comprehension or recognition of the nature of the sensation (in these passages, the understanding of the words of the speaker). For this comprehension to have taken place, the mind clearly must have assigned the sense-impression t'o the correct concept. ^Cf.^De Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, pp. 140, 205.) Besides the use of ETcata'S-nu.a in the passage of Diogenes Laertius^ just quoted (a passage which sheds l i t t l e light on the nature of an ETICX JO"-9,T)LKX ) » there is only one other use of the word in relation to Epicurus (Aetius, PI., 4, 8, 2, Usener 2h9, Dox.Gr., p. 39*0: ' ETUHOUpOC; TO TE LlOpiOV EO*T L V T) a L a&T)01 c; , f) TL? E0TLV T) 6uvaLiic;, nal xb ETXOCIO"6T)U.OC, o itEp EO*T! TO EVEpynLia. Here Enaia&ri\ia. refers to the passive impression received by the senses (See Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 238 n.3.) The word is certainly, in its meaning,equivalent to tpavTaata (sense-impression) and perhaps its use may be accounted for by ascribing i t to a failure on the part of Aetius to keep cpavTaaia end EicaiaftTiLia, passive sensation and cognition, distinct. Bailey's account of £Tiaia-9riLia( kneeCa$r\ai<; )is rather confusing. In Epicurus (p. 415 n.5) and Greek Atomists (pp. 420, 558) he describes i t as the act of cognition, that is, the method by which the mind interprets the sense-impression and. performs an "act of comprehension," by which i t grasps the nature of the object. Nonetheless, he also describes it (Greek  Atomists, p. 240 n.6) as the process by which a series of idols following quickly upon one another forms a sense-Impress ion (cpavTaata) which the eye can grasp. It is difficult to see, however, in this case how £HCtio&T\aic; would differ from a l attr)a l g . 1 0 0De Witt ("Epicurus: A l l Sensations Are True," TAPA 74 (1943), p. 20) is wrong^  in supposing that Diogenes Laertius' statement that the occurrence of ZTiaia%r\iiaxa confirms the truth of sensation also implies a negative that the non-occurrence of ETraicr&TiiJ.aTa reveals the falsity 87 c a n b e a c c e p t e d a s t r u e , i t must b e c o n f i r m e d b y f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e , t h a t i s , a c l o s e v i e w o f t h e s e n s i b l e o b j e c t must b e o b t a i n e d . A s e n s i b l e o b j e c t whose e x a c t n a t u r e h a s n o t b e e n a s c e r t a i n e d b y a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c l o s e v i e w must b e r e g a r d e d a s an " o b j e c t a w a i t i n g c o n f i r m a t i o n " (npoonevov) . 1 0 1 I f t h e c l o s e v i e w o f t h e o b j e c t d o e s n o t c o n f i r m t h e o p i n i o n one h e l d a b o u t i t s n a t u r e , t h e ooe,a i s f a l s e : xaTa 6e T a u T T j v ^ t x i v n a L v ] , e a v nev ur) euinapTupriOfi f| avTiuapTuoTi$fi TO c|>eC6og YtveToa* eav 6e eTtLLiapTupTi^TI f) LIT) a v T L L i a p T u p T ) $ f ) , TO a/\.T)$ec; . 102 av uiev yap e T U L i a p T u p T ) T a i r\ LIT) a v T L L i a p T u p T y r a L , [TT)V 6 o £ a v ] a\T)^T) e L v a L * e a v 6e UT) e7ii | i a p T u p T ) T a L r) a v T L L i a p T u p p T a L , (1>ZV6T\ T u y x ^ v e L V . o$ev <TO> upoauevov eLaiix^T)* 103 E L T L V ' ex8a \ e L g auAxog a i l a ^ r i a i v x a l u r i O L a L p i^oeL g TO 6otlaC6|j.evov x a T a TO Tcpoatievov x a l TO n a p b v T)6T) x a T a TTJV a L a ^ r j a i v x a l TOC na%r) x a l T taaav c p a v T a a T LXT)V £TCL6OX.T)V TT)^ o i a v o i a g , a u v T a p a £ e i g x a l T a g Xontag a L a & T J a e i g TT) LiaTaLto o o £ n , toaTe TO XPLTTJPLOV aTcav e x 8 a \ e i g . CL 6e 8e6aLu )aeLg x a l TO 7ipoap,evov aTtav ev of the sensations. If an eTcaLO'&nLia does not take place i t shows simply that the object was not seen clearly enough for recognition to occur or that a concept of that particular sensible object had not yet been formed. The sense-impressions are s t i l l true. 101Ep.H., 38 and K.D.,^24. Diogenes Laertius (10,34) is misled in interpreting the term u p o a i i e v o v as the individual's act of waiting to confirm his sense-impression. See Tohte, op.cit., p. 14 n.1, Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3> p. 430 n.2, and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 254 n. 3 . IQgEp.H., 5 1 . Cf. also 5 0 . 103Diogenes Laertius, 10, 34. See also the description of a v T L — n a p T U p T i a i g and eTCLtuxpTupTiaLg in Sextus Empiricus, 7, 212-216, Usener 247. Note especially the prominence of evdpyeia. 88 TOCCC; 6 o £ a o " T i H a C c ; evvoiaLc; n a l TO LIT) TTJV euLLiapTupT)aLv, oun £HA.eCi\icic; TO 6ue(i»eucj|ievov> TETTjpnHtoc; e a e i ^ n a a a y a L u p i a -8T)TT)0"lV HOtTOC TlCtaav X p L O L V ToG 6p$WCj f) LIT) Op'&tOc; . 1 ^4 In the act of confirming or contradicting the u p o a L i e v o v , one purposely directs the attention of the senses to the e v a p y T j L i a ; the technical term for this action is EUL6OA,T) TCOV aia-&T)TT)p LIOV . 105 In some cases one can perceive objects with the senses but cannot receive a clear view (evdpyT)u,a) of them (for example, the heavenly phenomena). Since i t is impossible to confirm one's 6o£a about these objects, Epicurus introduced the principle of non-contradiction (OI>H, OCVT L L i d p T u p n o L c j j *. any explanation that is not contradicted by the evidence of the senses can be accepted as true. In the case of heavenly phenomena several explanations can be given but one explanation must not be preferred over another since definite confirmation of one view is not possible: na l ndvTa T a ToiaGi;a 6T) oaa LiovaxT)y exei ToCg c p a L v o L i e v o L c ; a u L u p t o v i a v * o n e p e n ! TWV LieTetogtov ovx OudpxeL, a \ \ a T a u T a ye n\eovaxT)v exe i n a ! TT)C; y e v e a e i o c ; a i T i a v n a ! TTJC; o u p - t a c ; T a i c ; a ia^Tiaeai auLicpiovov H a T T j y o p i a v . 106 1U4K.D., 2k; K.D., 23 must be taken closely with 2k: EL Lidxn^'tdcraLc; Taic; a i a ^ T J a e a i v , o6x e£eic; 066' ac; av cpTlc; a u T a l v 6 leipeGaSai npbg TL u o i o u L i e v o c ; TTJV avaytuyT)v xpivric;. Epicurus is speaking of the consequences of two different positions: i f a l l sensations are rejected, no standard by which to judge any sensation can exist; i f one sensation is rejected, again no standard of judgement can exist. De Witt (Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. ikl) is incorrect in assuming that Kuria Doxa 23 indicates Epicurus did not affirm the truth of a l l sensations. 1Q5Ep.H., 38, 50, 51, and 62. This expression will be discussed at greater length in the following chapter. 106E P .P . , 86. For other statements about Epicurus' belief in several explanations to account for heavenly phenomena, see Ep.P., 9k, 95, 98 and 173, Lucretius 5, 526-33 and Seneca, Katurales Quaestiones, 6, 20. For examples of explanations by non-contradiction see Ep.P., tits, 92, 93 and Lucretius, Bks. 5 and 6. ~ 89 Epicurus also used the principle of non-contradietlon to support his views about the ultimate realities of the universe which were by nature imperceptible:1°7 OUH ttVT L(i(XpTUpT)0"LS 6e E O T t V <XHO/\.OU$ta TOU U H 0 0 " T a $ £ V T 0 C ; n a l 6o£aa$EVToq a6T]\ou TV <patvou£vu) , o t o v 6^'ErctHoupog \.EYU)V E t v a t H E V O V , O'rtEp E OT IV a6T)X.0V , T t t O T O U T a t 6t' e v a p y o u g T t p a y n a T o g TOUTO, xr)q HtvTiaEOJS* ' w ° In the case of objects of which an E v a p y n n a could not be gained and also in the case of those realities which could not be perceived at a l l , the evidence of the senses was s t i l l in Epicurus' view a l l important; i t did not give definite confirmation of one's 6o£a but s t i l l i t ruled out error by contradicting what was definitely false. In addition to explaining error by means of the false 6o£at formed by the mind, Epicurus 1 09 appears to have held the view (although there is no mention of i t in his extant works) that the idols coming from an object at a distance could be altered in some way during their flight through the a i r . 1 1 0 The sense-impression is true in that i t records the shape of the £t6u>A.a but opinion errs in assuming that the idols are the same shape as the object from which they came. The supposition that the 107The reason Epicurus was able to assert the truth of the theory of atoms and void even though these were not perceptible to the senses will be discussed in the following chapter. l o 8Sextus Empiricus, 7, 213, Usener 247. See also Ep.H., 47-48 in reference to the existence of Ei6u)A.a. 10°Bailey (Greek Atomists, pp. 256-257) suggests that this teaching did not originate with Epicurus himself but only with the later Epicureans. Even though there is no mention of the teaching in the extant works of Epicurus, i t is s t i l l not possible to state the origin of the doctrine since we have no evidence on this point. 1 1 0Sextus Empiricus, 7, 209, Usener 247. Lucretius, 4, 353-363. 90 idols can be altered gives rise to a serious problem: how can one distinguish £i6u>\a that d o correspond to the object from those that do not? Epicurus1 probable answer would be that idols coming from a n object close at hand d o correspond exactly to the sensible object and one should, therefore, always try to gain a clear view (evctpYT]ua) o f each object. 1 1 1 Nonetheless the teaching that the idols could be altered strikes at the very root o f Epicurus' system, since the assertion that a l l sensation is true would hold n o weight i f the idols did not correspond exactly to the concrete objects from which they a r i s e . 1 1 2 The importance Epicurus attached to e v a p y e t a , the clear view o f a n object obtained by turning the attention o f the senses to i t , 1 1 ^ cannot be overemphasized. Again and again Epicurus points out that i t is the clear evidence presented by objects which one must consider in carrying on an investigation o f the phenomena o f nature: o6$ev yap x o u x w v a v x i L i a p x u p E i x a i x a i c ; a t a & r i a e a i v , a v B/Venti x i g x t v a x p o i c o v x a g kvapyzCa^, x t v a n a t x a c a U L i T c a ^ e L a c onto x w v E£U>$EV Ttpbc r j u a c a v o u a e i . . ^ ^ as a U L m a ^ E L a g ano xuiv E EV Ttpog r jLias x l x a u x n v o u v O9o6pa y e 6EI XTJV 6o£av n a x E X E L V , " v a n x e x a n p t x r i p t a a v a i p n x a t x a n a x a x a c EvapYEiac.115 „ -l-^See Ep.H., £0 wh^ ere he states^, that every image obtained ETII-SX-nxLHtog x n 6iavota rj x o i g a i a ^ n x r i p C o n ; is the shape of the object. As noted above, E T u 8 o \ n xuiv aia&TiXT]piu>v is used in the process of confirming an opinion by means of a close view ( e v d p Y T ) u . a ) • ^ C f . Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3, pp. 393-394 and Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 256-257. £TU6O\TI XU>V a t a $ T i x T ) p iu>v . ^Ep.H., 48. i : L5ibid., , 52. 91 O $ E V . . . TcpoaeHxeov . . . u d a n TT) T t a p o u a n K a $ ' e n a a x o v T(JJV K p i T - n p t G J v E v a p y E i a . ^ x a l rcav 6E e t c ; T O U T O TO n s p o c ; evaTT)na pa6tu)c; 6ta-A . u $ T ) a e T a i , E a v TIC; TOLC ; E v a p y r i n a a i Ttpoaexn^? . u a v T a yap T a T O i a u T a n a l Ta TOUTOLC ; a u y Y e v T i O6$EVI TUJV EvapynndTuiv 6ia<pu)VEp ^ T O ucpeaTTiHOc 6EI TEXOC; EniA.OYCCsa&at n a l Ttaaav TTJV E v a p Y e t a v , E9 TJV T a 6o£aCo|iEva a v a y o u - E V 1 i y Scholars have failed to make clear the importance of E v d p y E i a because they have identified aZa^T)aiq and Evdpye t a . 1 2 0 This identi-fication can be questioned. Nowhere in the extant work of Epicurus is al'a&Tiaic ; declared to be identical to E v d p y E l a ; nowhere is a l l a i a t t T i a i c ; termed evapyr)q. Epicurus' teaching seems rather that a l l sensations were true but not a l l were E v a p y T i ?, that is, they did not a l l present a distinct view of the real nature of the sensible object. 1 2 1 Those who have identified aio&T)aiq and E v d p y E L a have done so on the basis of two passages, one in Sextus Empiricus, the other in Plutarch. 'ETCLHOUPO? 6E 6uouv OVTWV TWV auCuYOuvTiov 4\A.T)\OLS TtpaynaTuiv, c g a v T a a i a c ; n a l TT}C; 66£TJS, TOUTCOV TT)V c p a v T a a t a v , TJV n a l E v a p y E u a v n a \ E t , 6ia TtavTog aX-Tidf) cpTjalv UTtdpxe LV . ^ 22 ll6Ep.H., 82 1 17Ep 1P 1, 91 l l 8 I b i d . , 93. Cf. also 96 119K.D., 22. Cf. also Ep.H., 71 1 2 0 Z e l l e r , Die Philosophie der Griechen, Vol. 3, p. 388. For this identification see Ritter and Preller, opTcirT., p. 378, Taylor, op.cit., p. 44, Wallace, op.cit., p. 4l6. 1 2 1 F o r Epicurus' use of E v a p y r ) ? see Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 19k, 256; Greek Atomists, p. 243 f f . and Merbach, op.cit., p. 15. ^Sextus Empiricus, 7, 203, Usener 247. 92 One objection that can be made to Sextus Empiricus' identification of cpavxaata (sense-perception) and evdpyeia is that the whole principle of confirmation or contradiction of a 7ipoo*u.evov would be unnecessary i f a l l sense-impressions were evapyng and thus equally valuable in relation to giving a distinct view of the nature of a sensible object without the circumstances in which the object was placed (distance, light) playing a significant role. De WittI 2 3 accepts this statement of Sextus Empiricus, but on the basis of the identification of evdpyeia and 9avxaaia, he gives a special interpretation to the term cpavxaaua. He defines this word as a clear image coming from an object close at hand] the cpavxaata , he says, is true. He states that cpavxaata was used by Epicurus in opposition to qpdvxaau-a, the term he used, to indicate dreams, the visions of madmen and the heavenly phenomena. De Witt also says that (pavxaatiaxa are a l l false. This last statement is certainly incorrect since Diogenes Laertius explicitly states that Epicurus believed a l l 9avEdo*|J.aTa (referring to the visions of madmen and dreams) were true.12*1' De Witt is incorrect also in restricting Epicurus' use of 9dvTaau.a to dreams, hallucinations and heavenly phenomena (although the word is used most often in this sense-^) since the term is found in the Epistula ad Herodotum12^ referring simply to sense-Witt, Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. 137; "Epicurus, nepl Savxaaiac," TAPA 70 11939J, PP. 414-417. 12%)iogenes' Laertius, 10, 32. (See quote on page 72.) 125wamely in Ep.H., 51; Ep.P., 88, 102 and 110. 126Ep.H., 75. 93 impressions in general. Again De Witt's view that cpavTaata can come only from an object.-near at hand is not supported by any direct evidence. It is true that Epicurus 1 2? speaks of a 9avTaaia which is "the exact shape of the sensible object" but he defines this cpavxaoca as one obtained by an ETCt.6oA.ri of the d i d v o i t x or the a£a$T ) i : r jp ia ; the ETti8oA.Ti of the a i a d r)TT ) p i a has been shown to be connected:' with the confirmation of one's opinion of the nature of an object by a close view. Furthermore Epicurus does use the term c p a v x a a t a in relation to objects which can only be seen at a distance. 1 2 8 De Witt, on the basis of Sextus Empiricus' identification of (pavxaaCa. and i t t E v a p y e i a , has attempted to show that 9avTaaia was in fact a term used only to indicate objects observed close at hand; the evidence does not support his view and i t seems better to question the statement of Sextus Empiricus rather than to assign this restricted meaning to 9avxacria, a term which Sextus Empiricus clearly uses simply as a synonym for ctia&r)aiq , 1 2 9 Plutarch's statement is as follows: E L 6E y i v E t a i , diaxpopct TOU Ttddouc; anoaxaai HOC I T tpog-EX'&oGau, cpEudoc; iaxi xb LirJTE 9avxaaiav LITITE a"a$T)oiv E T E p a c ; E x s p a v E v a p y E a x E p a v O T t d p x E i v ^ O Plutarch states that i f one affirms that an object seen at close hand is 127Ep.H., 50. 128Ep.H., 80. I have followed the text of Bailey (see Epicurus pp. 50 and 254) and Arrighetti (Epicurus, Opere (Torino, i960), p. 71) in this difficult passage. 1 2 9see above page 70. 130piutarch, Adv.Col., 25, 121 d -e, Usener 252. 9h of the nature i t appears to he hut'says that an object seen at a distance appears to be of such and such a nature but does not state that i t is of such a nature, i t is false for this person to say one sensation is not evapyeaxepav than another. How is Plutarch using the term Lvapyr\q ? The context of the passage immediately preceding the words just quoted makes i t clear that Plutarch is using e v a p y n s as a synonym for a/\.T)§Tis (true); he is not preserving the distinction Epicurus drew between what is true (not false, real) and what is clear (distinct, seen at close hand).131 Einarson and De Lacyl32 translate the passage containing e v a p Y e o x e p a v as "no impression and no sensation has . . . a better warrant of truth than another." Plutarch is arguing that i f a person accepts some sense-impressions as trustworthy in showing the nature of an object, that is, accepts them as true (objects close at hand) but not others (objects at a distance), he should not say that a l l sensations are equally true. Epicurus' answer to this objection would be that a l l sensations are equally true since they show the nature of an object as it exists in certain conditions; the clear view, however, is more valuable for ascertaining the objective nature of the object. Despite the passages in Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch, i t appears i; .. i f likely that Epicurus believed that aiavT)ai<; was not identical to evapyeict but evapyei.a referred only to the evidence of objects perceived distinctly at close range. It was not every sensation which Epicurus believed ^ C f . Merbach's definition of evcxpyrk and a\.r)$rjc; , op.cit., p. 20. 1 3 2piutarch, "Reply to Colotes" in Moralia, Vol. 14, edited by B. Einarson and P. De Lacy (Loeb Classical Library, London and Cambridge, Mass., 1 9 6 7 ) , P. 2 7 7 . 95 to be of equal value 1^ for obtaining scientific accuracy and knowledge but only the i\fapyn\xa%a In his attitude to sensation we see that Epicurus differed greatly from Democritus. -^35 Democritus believed that sensible qualities did not exist in themselves but were merely subjective nd^r) of the senses. Epicurus maintained that a l l sensible qualities were real and the perception of them true. It is possible to suppose that Epicurus' teaching that a l l sensations were true would place him in the same position as Protagoras, that is, i f a l l sensations are true, even contradictory sense-impressions from the same object, truth becomes strictly relative and the real nature of any object cannot be known. Epicurus believed sensation gave a true picture of the effect of an object in certain cir-cumstances. If the same object appeared different to different people, this was the result of the interreaction of the ei6coA.a from the object and the particular state of the person. Epicurus emphasizes, however, that one should pay attention to the clear view (evapynuia) of an object; such a view was more valuable, though no more true, than another view for discovering the real nature of an object. Also in the ^De Witt (Epicurus and His Philosophy, p. I38 ff.) is right in pointing out that Epicurus did not ascribe the same value (for ascertaining the real nature of an object) to a l l sensations; he is wrong to conclude that Epicurus did not treat a l l sensation as true. ^^Merbach, op.cit., p. 18; Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 2k3, 252 and Farrington, op.cit., p. 108. Note also the frequent use by Lucretius of the expression manifesta res as clear proof of some assertion: 1, 803, 893, 2, 565j 3, 353, bob; b, 139, 249. That manifestus is the equivalent of evapyng s m Peters, op.cit., p . ,13. 135Natprp< op.cit., p. 220. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, 7, 369: ^ TOJV ^qpUOLKLOV CH Ll£V 7ldvTCt^CtVT)pT)HClO*L T(X CpCtLVOLieVOCj cbg OL TtepI ATJLIOHP ITov, OL 6e TtdvTa e^eaav, cog OL nep! tbv EiuHOupog.... 96 cases in which people received different sense-impressions from the same object; he urged them to pay attention not only to their individual sensations but also to the experiences of others in order, presumably, that they could determine how much the nature of their personal sensations was dependent upon their own individual condition. 1^ This emphasis Epicurus lays upon both e v a p y c - a and common experience shows he believed that some sense-impressions could be relied upon to present a view of an object that was clearer than the view given by other objects and that consequently these impressions could be thought to give a picture of the real nature of the object itself. ^^Ep.H., 82. See Bailey, Epicurus, p. 256 n. 5. CHAPTER FIVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPERCEPTIBLE In the previous chapter four instances of the functioning of the mind were mentioned. First of a l l the mind treats the very subtle idols which strike i t directly. Secondly the mind with each sense-impression made upon the sense-organs receives in some manner a related stimulus. Closely allied with reception of a stimulus from the sense-organs is the subsequent classification of the sense-impression by the mind (the action of 6o£a ) through reference to the prolepseis. Finally the mind, after storing up individual impressions, can form a general picture or concept (prolepsis) of some object by selecting out the essential features from the images it has stored upcof that object. We have no information concerning exactly how the atoms of the mind can, for example, assign an image to the correct prolepsis or form a general concept. It is possible to suppose-*- that the stimulation of the mind involved the rearrangement of the atoms into new patterns and that these patterns could be stored in the mind (as material for the formation of prolepseis). The difficulty connected with this supposition, however, is that the atoms of a l l four elements of the mind are in constant motion, intermingling among themselves2 and the storage of patterns would certainly involve a permanent arrangement of atoms. The lack of evidence makes i t impossible for us to understand how -4). J. Furley, Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton, 1967), p. 200. " 2Lucretius, 3, 263-264. 98 Epicurus, i f he did give a detailed explanation of this difficult question, believed the mind as a strictly physical structure performed its operations. Two points, however, do become clear from these four activities of the mind. First, in a l l cases thought is caused by idols;3 the mind is either directly stimulated by these or receives images that result from the impression of idols made upon the senses. Second,in a l l cases thought takes place by means of images. It can, therefore, be described as a process of visualization.4 In addition to these four types of thought, a l l caused by sensation, Epicurus believed the mind was capable of independent thought, that is, logical activity or reasoning. Even here the material the mind used was provided only by idols striking the mind or the senses. Reasoning was wholly dependent upon sensation: ou6e cori xb 6uvdu.evoy au-cac; [aia$TJo"£ic;]^ . 6L£A.£y£ai . . . OUTE Liriv Xoyoc;, nac; yap \6yoc; cmb TCOV aia&f)a£iov f)pTT)TCCL* ^  In the process of reasoning the mind simply manipulates and rearranges images already present within i t ; this is why Epicurus believed there could be no thought or inquiry without the p r o l e p s e i s A l l independent thought must begin with the concepts the mind has already formed and by arranging 3cf. Cicero, De Finibus, 1, 6, 21, and Aetius, PI., 4 , 8, 10, Usener 317, Pox.Or., p. 395. ^Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 424-425% Note also Ep.H., 38 where Epicurus states that the mind must "look (fiXinza&ai) aF~the TtpCOTOV EVVOT)L ia . 5Diogenes Laertius, 10, 32. Cf. Lucretius, 4 , 483-485. c "Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 2 , 4 (Usener 255) and Cicero, De Nat. Deor., 1, l6, 43. 99 and rearranging these give rise to new ideas.7 The process of reasoning played a chief role in the problem we must now discuss. How did Epicurus believe one could gain a knowledge of the a6r)\a, things not immediately perceptible? These included both the exact nature of heavenly phenomena and the ultimate realities underlying a l l sensible objects (the atoms and void). It was stated above8 that in the case of heavenly phenomena Epicurus accepted as true any explanation that was not contradicted by the senses. How then were such explanations formed and, in particular, how did Epicurus teach that a knowledge of the atoms and void could be obtained? Epicurus states: atoLicxTa Liev ya.f) toc; e a T L v , auxr) TJ aia^ n a L c ; e n ! TtavTiov nagxupeC, na^' f]v avaynaLOv TO a6rj\ov xtp XoyLCTLitp T e H L i a L p e a $ a i 9 On the basis of sensation one can make inferences about the abr\Xov with the help of reasoning. \oy LO*|i6c;10 (and its compounds11) appears to be the term Epicurus employed to indicate the process of reasoning based on the material provided by sensation. 1 2 i t is difficult to define exactly the meaning of the terms related to thought that occur in Epicurus' 7Cf. pp. 76-77 above for the evidence of Lucretius concerning the combination of prolepseis to form new ideas, 5, 123-125 and 2, "Jkk-Jk5. 8See pp. 88-89. -?EP.H., 39. 1 0This term is found also in Ep.H., 75, 76; Ep.M., 132; K.D., 16, 19 and Fr. 7^  with the general meaning, of "reason."'' ^Namely 6La\6yLaLia (Ep.H., 68; Ep.P., 85), . 6 i a \ o Y i a L i o c ; (Ep.P., Qk, Sent. Vat., 10, Fr., 30, 49J and enLAoy lauoc; (Ep.H., 73, K.D., 20, Fr., (,29.1bJ 7, 10,H[il.l6) 8, and (31.32) 9 (ArrighettTJT^ 1 2Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. U23 n.3, R. Philippson, "Zur Epikureischen Gotterlehre," Hermes 51 (1916), p. 572, Merbach, op.cit., p. 22. 100 extant works since each occurs so infrequently and often then in a context that does not help to define the meaning of the term. In addition to Xoyi.au.6q and its compounds, 6Lav6r)0i.g13 seems also to refer to the process of reasoning. Xoyoq is used in a wide sense by Epicurus with these meanings: account or discourse,^ reason itself, and reasonings.l6 Philippson1? says Epicurus used the term only to refer to the faculty of mind that dealt with the abr)Xa. One statement of Epicurus certainly supports this interpretation: e x i xe xa eXdx^oxa HOC! acLuyn nepaxa 6el VOLHCEIV . . . xfi 6LOC Xoyov $eu>pCa ETC! XWV aopdxcov.1® However, i t is best not to define Xoyoq so strictly, since other passages in which Xoyoq appears show that Epicurus did not use the term in one restricted sense. Bailey's contention 1 9 that Epicurus is making no reference to the process of reasoning when he uses the expression •$eu)pT}xbs Xoyo) 2 0 is again too precise. Epicurus uses this expression to indicate ideas that are formed ("seen") by the mind and that are of such a nature to indicate they result from the manipulation of concepts by the mind itself, that is, that they result from what Epicurus conceived the process of reasoning to be.2-*-^Ep.H., 63, 1^,(31.23) 4 (Arrighetti). J-^p.H., 83, Sent. Vat., 26. ^Ep.H., 47 b, 59, 62 (twice), 1^,(29.15) 3 (Arrighetti). l^Epg;.., 86, K.D., 25. ^Philippson, "Zur Epikureischen Gotterlehre," pp. 571-72. l8Ep.H., 59 b a i l e y , Greek Atomists, pp. 423 n. 3, 591. 20See Ep.H., 47 b, 62 (twice), 59= ($£U>plac) . 2 1The Latin equivalent of A.OYLan6c; i S ratio: Cicero, De Finibus, 1, 9, 30, and Lucretius passim especially 4, 483 ff• and 796. Cf. Philippson, "Zur Epikureischen Gotterlehre," p. 574, Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 423 n. 3 and Commentary, Vol. 2, 605. 101 Further evidence of how Epicurus believed knowledge of imperceptible things was established is given in the Epistula ad jfythoclem: edv xic; xaXtoc; T ° L £ 90avoutvote, axoA.ou$iov Ttep! xtov acpavtov ariLie itoxai .22 armeta 6^ en ! xtov ev xoCg liexetopoic, auvxEA.ouuevtov cpepeiv xtov Ttap* T)LUV x t v a cpaivo|ievtov23 xa 9aiv6uieva a 6e i aTiiieia an;o6exea$ai24 n a ! nax' aWoug 6e TrAeiovag xpououc, xouxo Suvaxbv auvxeXetcrtku , edv x i g 6uvr)xai xb auucpwv.ov xo ig cpatvoLievoLg auXXoytCea^ai .25 The phenomena of earth provide "signs" on the basis of which explanations of the heavenly phenomena can be formed (ouMoYiCea'&ai) . That i t is sensation that must act as the source of material for the understanding of both heavenly phenomena and the atoms and void is made clear also by Epicurus1 statement: ext xe xaxot xac, ata$T)aeis 6e i Ttdvxa xripetv . . . outog dv n a ! xb upoauevov n a ! xb a6r)Xov extonev oiq anne itoaone&a .26 This same fact is stated explicitly by Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius: . . . 6 ta (paivonevou y^P cxpeiXei xb a6T)\ov arco-6eLHvua&ai . 2' o&ev x a ! Ttep! xtov aS^Xtov (bib xtov cpatvoneviov XP*) anpie Loua^at .28 2 2 E p.P., 1 0 4 . 23ibid., 87. 2l+Ibid., 97 g5ibid., 112. 2 6 E P .H., 38. The sentence immediately following indicates that Epicurus has in mind in particular at this point the atoms and void. 27sextus Empiricus, 8, 64, Usener 253. 2®Diogenes Laertius, 10, 32. 102 . . . enim per se communis dedicat esse sensusj cui nisi prima fides fundata valebit, haud erit occultis de rebus quo referentes confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus.29 The a6r)Xa are explained by reasoning from the perceptible to the imperceptible, that is, by analogy. There is a clear example of this process in the Epistula ad Herodotum in which Epicurus makes inferences about the structure of the atoms from the nature of sensible bodies. TQCUTT) xj\ cxvocXoyio: voLutrreov XOCL TO ev TT/1 OCTOLICO eXaxt-oTOv xexpTjaSaL* LUXP6TT )T I y a p e n e u v o 6f)Xov IUC, 6uacpepeu T O U xaTa TTJV a i a^Tiaiv ftewpouuievou, avocXoyLo: 6e T p auTp x e x p T T t a L . e n e i ^ T t e p x a l OTU Lieye^oc , e x e t rj CXTOLIOC;, XGCTOC TTJV <TCOV"> evTocuda a v a X o y L a v xaTrryopTiaaLiev, L i i x p o v TU LIOVOV Liaxpav exBdXXovTec ; . 3 0 This analogy, we must believe, is followed by the minimum in the atom; for in its smallness, clearly, i t differs from that which is perceptible, but i t follows the same .analogy. For we have already stated that the atom has magnitude, in virtue of its analogy with the things of this world, just projecting something small on a large scale.31 From this example we can see how Epicurus used what he terms in another passage TTIV a v a X o y i a v TTJV HOCTOC TOC 9 0 C L v 6 n e v [ a e ] v TOLC ; a o p a T O i c ; o[uaoc]v 32 TTJV auLi<pu)vLOCV TT)V T « L C ; aLa$rjaeaiv i m e p x o u a a v 2 9Lucretius, 1, U22-425. 3°Ep.H., 58-59. 31i have given here the translation of Furley (op.cit., p. 22) because of the difficulty in interpretation of the final .phrase. Bailey's translation of this ("only we placed i t far below them- (sensible bodies) in smallness") is forced.and does not make clear the point Epicurus is making, namely that in comparing atoms to a sensible object one is in effect magni-fying the atoms themselves (Furley, op.cit., p. 23). Bailey's insistence also on the strict meaning of the term a v o c X o y i a , namely "proportion" "relation" (Epicurus, pp> 210-211) is perhaps unnecessary. Aristotle used, the term in both senses (LSJ s.v.) and Epicurus clearly uses it with the meaning of "analogy" in Fragment i+9 (LSJ s.v.). 32Fr., kg. 103 Ttpbc; xh aopdxa.33 Lucretius Tby his abundant use of analogy makes quite plain that Epicurus believed the nature of the a6r)A.a was to be discovered through information given by the senses. Two clear examples of analogy found in the De Rerum Natura are the proofs given for the existence of the atoms34 and for the nature of the movement of the atoms in the void. 35 There is evidence that the conclusions the mind reaches after i t has combined and rearranged concepts on the basis of the "signs" provided by nature were termed by Epicurus ETUVOiai. 3& Diogenes Laertius gives specific information concerning the nature of these "ideas." It is important to note that Diogenes Laertius' description of E T i i v o i a t follows immediately upon his statement that we must make inferences about the cxonAa from phenamena37 and acts as an explanation of this statement (as the Y^P makes clear): nal yap nal enivoiai. naaau arcb XUJV dta-&Tia£wv y e y o v a a L naxd X E rcep iTtxaiaiv nal avaXoytav nal onouoxnxa nal auv&EOLV, aunBaWonEvou T I nal xou A.oyiauoG.38 EUivoiat a l l find their source in sensation and arise in four ways. An observation made quite by chance of the signs provided by sensation 33LQC. ci t . 3^1^ 265-328. Lucretius uses the analogy of wind, scents, garments losing their moisture, and objects being invisibly worn away. 352, 112-24. He uses the analogy of the motes in the sunbeam. 36opperman, op.cit., p. 197, Merbach, op.cit., p. 22, Tohte, op.cit., p. 11. 37see page 101 above. 3®Diogenes Laertius, 10, 32. 104 (uep LTCTtoo"i c,) can result in the formation of an eTtLVOia.39 The mind can form ETCLVOLai by (purposely) comparing one experience with another and becoming aware of the similarity between them (avaXoyCa. and O L I O L O T T I S). Finally the mind can form ETC L V O LOCI by combining several of the ar\u,zla provided by experience ( a u v d e a i c ; ) . The logical activity of the mind (X-Oyicruoc.) a l s o has a part to play in the formation of ideas but its role is only secondary. Sensation furnishes a l l the material for eTCivoLQCi; A.oyia|i6c; simply aids the mind in making use of this material. In a statement on the nature of thought, Epicurus gives a . description of the way in which he believed ideas ( e T C L V O i o c i) were formed. ou$ev ou6' euivoTj&fivcu 6uvacTai ouxe rcepIXTITCTLHCOC; ouxe avaXoywc; TOLC. uepL\r)TCTOLg40 "Nothing can be thought of either by mental apprehension or by analogy with what has been apprehended by the mind." TcepL/\.r|TCTiHU>g indicates the process by which the mind grasps (nep iA.aLi.8dve i v ) the images that result from the stimulation of the sense-organs, the direct striking of the 39Tohte, op.cit., p. 12; Bailey, Epicurus, p. 413. 40Ep.H., hO.. Cf. Lucretius, 1, 4 4 5 - 4 4 8 . eruvoeu) (for example, Ep.H., 56, 68), 6uavoeto (for example, Ep.H., 49,60), evvoeui (for example, Ep.H., 73), LniXoyLCOLICXI (for example, Ep.H., 73) and voeu) (for example, Ep.H., 60, 66, 67) were a l l used by Epicurus with the meanings of "think,"•"consider," and refer to the (material) process of thinking he postulated. The term en L VOL a occurs also in Ep.H., 45, Fr., 13 and 169 (Usener). In these last two passages the term means simply "thought." In 45 i t is likely the word is used simply with the meaning.of "understanding," not in the technical sense as a^resultt'of reasoning on basis of sensation (as Bailey, Epicurus, p. 187, supposes). 105 mind by subtle idols and the formation by the mind of prolepseis. avocXoyioc; tote; nep LXTJUTOLS indicates the process by which the mind forms new ideas by combining the images it has already apprehended.^ Thus i t seems clear that Epicurus taught that ideas formed as a result of logical activity basing its conclusions on the experience of the senses were called ETUvoiai .4-2 The notion, therefore, of the existence of atoms and a l l other scientific principles that l i e at the basis of Epicurus' system are e T U V O i a i . How then can one know that these euivoiai are true? Epicurus taught that eiuvoiai just like 66£ai43 must be checked by sensation since error could arise in their formation and they must therefore either be confirmed or not contradicted by the evidence of the senses before they are accepted as true. Thus Epicurus states concerning the sizes existing among the atoms: JAAAQC u.T)y ou6e deU^voLuCeiy Ttav u.ey£$oc; ev TOCCC; a x o L i c a c ; imdpxeiv, Eva UIT) TOC 9aiv6pieva avTLu,apxupf) * uapa\\ayac; 6e xtvag Lxeye^tov voLuaxeov euvocL.44 4-lBailey, Epicurus, p. 182. t t k2j)e Witt (Epicurus and His Philosophy, pp. 113, 136) interprets e n i v o i o c L as ideas logically derived, not built up from sensation with the aid of reasoning. This view, however, is clearly refuted by Diogenes Laertius' description of the nature of ETUVOuai (32)f. De Witt (ibid., pp. 135-136) also says Epicurus used the term e v v o i o c (evv6r)Lioc) to refer to the basic scientific concepts of his system. evvOLOC , however, is not found with this meaning in the passages in which i t occurs in the works of Epicurus (namely Ep.H., 57, 69, 77, K.D. 2k) where i t means simply "thought" or "mental comprehension." 43ihe distinction between 6o£oc and eiiLvoiQC seems to be that the former is an opinion formed by the mind in the classification of sense-impressions, the latter, an idea formed by the mind as i t reasons about the nature of the a6r)\a (Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 259 n.2). There is, however, some overlapping in usage of the terms (see below on Ep. H., 62). Tohte (op.cit., p. 12 n.l) and Zeller (pie Philosophie.der Griechen, Vol. 3, p. 390), are incorrect in identifying 6o£a and e n u v o i a , since Diogenes Laertius (10,32) makes clear the terms had distinct meanings. E^pVH";., 55. Cf. 63 and especially 68 where Epicurus mentions the referral of 6ta\oyLa|iaTa about the soul to the criteria of the perception. 106 Similarly Epicurus' assertion that the idols exist is made on the grounds that nothing in nature contradicts a belief in their existence: Ei$' o x i tot et6u)\a xcciq \E7Cx6xnatv avuTtEpBXr ixo ic ; HexpTjxat, OU&EV a v x i n a p x u p e i . xuiv 9aivOM.Evu>v ^ In the same fashion Lucretius asserts that nothing in nature contradicts the existence of the swerve of the atoms (2, 249-250) nor the principle that bodies possessing sensation are formed of atoms lacking feeling: neque id manifesta refutant nec contra pugnant, in promptu cognita quae sunt, sed magis ipsa manu ducunt et credere cjogunt ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.46 It appears that Epicurus believed that ETCIVOLCXI , especially scientific concepts, just like prolepseis, could be stored in the mind and used in the process of reasoning about other problems (see Epistula ad Herodotum 62).^ Presumably, however, i t would only be "proven" E r u v o i a i that were stored in the intellect, that is, those not contradicted by the senses. From the evidence we possess i t seems clear that Epicurus believed the nature of the adr]\a was discovered by the mind drawing conclusions from information provided by sensation and checking that these conclusions were not contradicted by the evidence of the senses. The results of Epicurus' investigations of the two types of a6r| \ a , namely the nature of the heavenly phenomena and the imperceptible realities underlying sensible objects (atoms and void), show one distinct difference:^® he offered 45Ep.H., 47a. ^Lucretius, 2, 867-870. ^TlThis passage will be discussed in f u l l below. 4®Cf. F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 26-27. 107 several explanations of the same heavenly phenomenon hut only one explanation of the nature of the imperceptible realities underlying sensible objects. HT)TE x b a6uvaTOv na! napaBidCecrtkia U.T)TE o n o i a v x a T a ^ T t d v T a TTIV ^ s i o p i a v E X E I V r\ xoZq Tcep ! B t tov X o y o i c . f\ T O t g H a T a TT)V TUJV a M w v cpuatHcov TcpoSXrmaTUJV n d ^ a p o t v , 6 L O V O T i T O Tcav a u i n a T a na! avacpTi? c p u a i g £0"T!V fj O T t a T o t i a (TC\) a T O t x e t a , na! ndvTa t a TOLauTa 6f) oaa Liovax^v E X E L T O L C ; 9aiyon£ v o i c ; a u u u g u i v i ' a v orcep ETC! TWV ( icTecopaiv oi>x O T t d p x e t , a W a ^ T a u T a yz Tc \ e o v a x r ) v e x e c na! Trig Y£vea£u>g aiTiav na! TT )? obaCaq xaZq aia$r\azoi auLicptovov HaTTyvop i a v .49 Bailey^ 0 lays great emphasis upon this difference in results and believes that Epicurus could dogmatically affirm the truth of a single solution to the problem of the ultimate constituents of the universe (a problem to which,perhaps, since the realities were wholly imperceptible, one would expect Epicurus to give only a tentative solution or several possible answers) because this solution was formed by an ETuBo/Vr) xriq 6t,avoCac; It is clear that this ETCLBOXTI T ^ C ; 6iavoCac, did have an important role in Epicurean thought, for Diogenes Laertius records that the later Epicureans added i t as the fourth criterion of truth.52 its significance, however, in establishing the one true explanation of nature can be questioned. To understand what Epicurus meant by the phrase £TUt ,Bo\ r ) xr)q d i a v o i a g , we must first determine the meaning of ETCiBoXr] since i t ^9E P . P . , 86. 50Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 264-265. 51See Ibid., Appendix 3, pp. 559-570. 52Epicurus' three criteria were the sensations, feelings and prolepseis. Diogenes Laertius, 10, 31. 108 was an aim of Epicurus, even i f he was not entirely successful,53 that each word be employed in its most obvious meaning.5^ The term zmfioXr) does not appear in the works of Homer,55 Pindar,5^ Bacchylides,57 Aeschylus,58 Sophocles,59 Euripides,^° Herodotus,61 Plato,°2 or Aristotle.63 The word is not listed in the Wort index to Diels-'.: Die Fragmente der  Vorsokratiker.64 eniBOA.r) occurs in the work of Thucydides, both in the active meaning of iniectio, "a casting upon7^5 and in the passive meaning of "that which is cast upon."66 xn Aristophanes,67 Xenophon,^8 Lysias,69 Andocides7° and Aeschines71 the word is found with the meaning of "penalty" or "fine;" thus the word again has a passive sense of "that which has been laid upon." The verb knifiaWu), which is of more frequent occurrence in the authors who proceeded Epicurus than the noun, has the basic meaning of "throw upon," "cast upon" or "impose."72 This meaning of 53cf. Bailey, Epicurus, p. 117. ^ p . E m f 38. 55R.J.Cunliffe, A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect (London, 1924). 56j .Rumpel, Lexicon Pindaricum (Leipzig, 1883). 57R.c.Jebb, Bacchylides, The Poems and Fragments(Cambridge, 1905). 58G. Italie, Index Aeschylus (Leiden, 1955). 59B.W.Beatson, Index Graecitatis Sophocleae (London, 1830). 6°C.D.Beckio, Index Graecitatis Euripideae (London, 1829). 6lH.Cary, Lexicon to Herodotus (Oxford, 1843). 62o.Astius, Lexicon Platonicum (Leipzig, 1835). 63Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus. 6 V .Kranz, Wortindex in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Vol. 3. 652, I4.9 (clothes) and 7, 62, 65 (grappling irons). 663, 20 (layers of bricks). 6 7 V e s p a e ^ 68por example Historia Graeca, 1.7-2. 69orationes, 20, 14; 6, 21. 70Qrationes, 1, 73. 7lQrationes, 2, 93. 72See, for example, Homer, Iliad, 23, 135, Pindar, Pythian Ode, 11, 14 (tmesis),Aeschylus, Choephori, 395 (tmesis),Herodotus,7, 109 ETuSdAAoo appears in the statement of Aetius about Epicurus: ' E T U H O U P O C; xr)v a t a $ T)aiv n a l xrjv vonaiv yCvcabai £L6COA,U)V eciw'&ev Ttgoaiovxiov* u.r)6ev! yap EITL8CXA.A.ELV u.r)6£XEpav X w p L g xoG •rcpoani'nxovxoc; ei6wA ,ou.^3 "Neither thought nor sensation can grasp anything apart from the idol that falls upon i t . " Therefore i t is possible for us to expect that Epicurus, i f he did actually follow his principle of using each term in its most lite r a l sense, used the term E T HSOX T I with the meaning of "throwing upon" or "projection towards." In fact the passages in which Epicurus refers to the ETtuBoXr) xtov aio§T)Tr\pCwv 7 k indicate he employed eni^oXr] in its most obvious meaning. By this "projection of the senses" toward some object, one purposely examines closely the nature of that object; i t is clear that this £Tu8oA,r) by its very nature plays an important role in Epicurus1 process of £7it.u.apTUpT)atcj . 75 Two other instances of £TU6OA.TI in Epicurus' works also appear to have an active meaning of "projection" or "apprehension." In Epistula ad Herodotum Epicurus speaks of properties as having ETiL-BoXac; ... i6iac;76 and accidents being perceived nax' E7H.6oX.ag . . . xtvagJ7 in both instances Epicurus appears to be referring to the process by which the senses can project themselves upon these qualities.78 107, Thucydides, 2, 52, Plato, Theaetetus, 173 A and Aristotle, Metaph., 1053 a 35. " . 73Aetius, PI., k, 8, 10, Usener 317, Dox.Gr., p. 395. 74-Ep.H., 38, 50 and 51. 75see above page. 88. 76EP.H., 69. 77rbid., TO. 78cf. Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 238, 2%0 and A. Brieger, Epikurs Brief an Herodot,68-83 (Halle, 1882), p. 69. 110 Again taking ETCUBOXTI in its literal sense, we can translate ETUSOA-T) TT)C; biavoCaq as "a casting of the mind onto" or "an appre-hension by the mind of" some object. That Epicurus did indicate by the phrase ETCLBOXT) ir\q 6iavouac; an active projection of the mind onto some object is shown by certain expressions in the works of Lucretius and Cicero that appear to translate the activity of £7tLBoA.r) %r\q 6iavoiac; or this phrase itself.79 s i inmensam et interminatam in omnis partis magnitudinem regionum videretis, in quam se iniciens animus et intendens ita late longeque peregrinatur ut nullam tamen oram ultimi videat in qua possit insistere.80 Epicurus . . . docet . . . in eas imagines mentem intentam  infixamque nostram^intellegentiam capere quae sit et beata natura et aeterna.&l et quia tenvia sunt (sc. simulacra), nisi quae contendit, acute cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt praeterea pereunt, nisi <si ad) quae se ipse paravit.^ 2 et tamen in rebus quoque apertis noscere possis, si non advertas animum, proinde esse quasi omni tempore semotum fuerit longeque remotum.83 quaerit enim rationem animus, cum summa loci sit infinita foris haec extra moenia mundi, quid sit i b i porro quo prospicere usque velit mens atque animi iactus liber quo pervolet ipse.84 79peters, op.cit., p. 4l; Munro, op.cit., p. 156; Leonard and Smith, op.cit.,^ pp. 4-7, 8^0'« Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 920. De Witt ("Epicurus, iiEpl <£avzaaCac; A" pp. 426-427) agrees that Cicero and Lucretius are translating EICLBOXTJ TT)C; 6iavoLo:c; but states that their interpreta-tion of the phrase is incorrect because Epicurus never had the notion of the "free flight of the soul." De Witt is taking the meaning of iactus animi far too literally. When,.for example, Lucretius speaks of the mind travelling beyond the moenia mundi ( l , 72-74), he is simply referring to the activity of the mind in turning its attention to the subject of the whole universe. 8 oCicero, De Nat. Deor., 1, 20, 54. 8lIbid.,l,19,49. Cf.also 1,37,105 8 2Lucretius, 4, 802-804. 83ibid., 4, 8II-813. 84rbid., 2, 1044-1047. I l l in quae corpora s i nullus t i b i forte videtur posse animi iniectus f i e r i , procul avius erras. scire licet nostrae quoque menti corpora posse verti in notitiam nullo circumlita fuco.85 Clement's statement that Epicurus taught the prolepsis vas an £TCi8oA.r)v knC T I kvapyeq nal ETII TTJV kvapyr\ TOU TipaYM-aTog eiuvoiav 8^ also supports the interpretation of ETUSOXT) Tpg 6t , a v o i a g a s an active process. 87 There is evidence that Epicurus also used the term £Tu8oA,rj in a passive sense to indicate the result of some projection or apprehension. In the following passages of Epicurus' works in which the simple term E7iiBoA.r) is used, the word clearly hears the passive meaning of "grasp," "view" or "comprehension." TT}C; yap a & p o a g E7iLhoA.f)g KUHVOV 6£Ou.£$a, T r ig 6E xaxa HEpog o6x 6u.catog.8o 8a6lCJTEOV Li£V OUV ETI' E H E L V a H a l CTUVEXWg EV TP M-VT1LIT) TO TO0OUTOV T lOLT lTeOV, a tp ' OU T) T E HUpUOTaTT) £TEl80A.T) ETII T a T tpdyu -aTa EOTOCL . . . EIXEI n a l TOU T E T e X s a t o u p Y n u E v o u T0UT0. HUP LlOTttTOV TOU TtaVTO? OCKp LgtOLittTOC Y L V E T a i , TO T a i g ETiLBoXaTg 6c;£tog 6uvaa$ai xpr\a&ai&9 E t g T a g T O i a u T a g a v a X u o v T a g £Tu8o/\ .ag^Tag n : \ E L a T a g TIOV TtEp 106E (,10V UTCEP TTig OA.T)g 9UOEU)g TtO L £ t a d a L' 90 85Lucretius, 2, 739-7^0, 7kk_7L5. 86ciement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 2, h, Usener 255. 8Tsee also Farrington, op.cit., p. 108, Opperman, op.cit., p. 195, and Merhach, op.cit., p. 31. 88Ep.H., 35. 89lbid., 36. 90rbid., 83. 112 The expression £TtiBoA.T) xr\q 6LGCVOLOCC; with ETUBOXTI having a passive meaning would mean the comprehension or grasp by the mind of some subject as a result of the mind projecting itself upon i t . Tohte^l believes Epicurus uses the phrase ETCLBOA.T) x f j g 6LOCVOLOCC; strictly in this passive sense but he also states that Lucretius and Cicero, who clearly refer to an active meaning of the phrase, translate the expression but use i t in a different sense. Giussani^2 seems correct in pointing out, however, that Lucretius and Cicero are certainly attempting to reproduce precisely both the wording and meaning of Epicurus' expression. It is the active sense of ETUBOXTI that occurs in the phrase ETUBOXT) TT}C; biavoiaq. The expression E i t t po\Ti -TT)5 .o LavDiotg occurs in six passages of the extant works of Epicurus. One meaning of the phrase is made clear by the following passages in the Epistula ad Herodotum: T) TE y t tp OLIOLOTTIS TlOV <p 0C V TOCO LIU) V OLOV E t EV ELHOVL X a n B a v o u i E V C o v fj HOC$' UTtvouc; YLVOU-EVCOV TI HOCT' aXAocc; TLvot^ ETCLBoXag^TTig 6 i a v 0 L a c ; fj TU>V \OITCWV HpiTrjpiwv OUH (XV TtOTE UTCT1PXE TO L£ OUCH TE Hal a.\T)&£ai TtpOO-a y o p E u o L i E v o u g , EL LIT) rjv TLvet n a l TO LOCUTOC T c p o a B o c M o i i E v o c . 9 3 Epicurus speaks of the images that arise either "in sleep or in any other apprehensions of the mind or the rest of the Hp LTi^p LOC ." He is using the phrase ETUBOXT) TT)C; 6LOCVOLOCC, to refer to the perception by the mind of idols too fine to strike the senses. Some of these idols cause dreams; others bring the visions of the gods, cause the hallucinations of madmen or help form the compound images that arise in the air (such as, for example, ^Tohte, op.cit., p. 24. 92Giussani, op.cit., p. 171. Cf. Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 576. 93Ep. H., 51. 113 Centaurs^). The phrase xtov \OITCU>V Hp ixnp uov 95 i s significant since it indicates that Epicurus is referring to the mind as an organ of sense, that is , as one of the "means of judgement." It was in the perception of fine idols that the mind acted as a sense-organ. HOC! TJV ^ V /\.cx6u>M.ev 9avxaaiav ETUB\TJXIHU)C; xfj 6 i a v o i a r\ xotg aLa$nxT )pLotc^e"xe LiopcpTig elxe auu-BEBriHOxuiv, (iogcpr) eaxiv auxr) xou axepenvtou, YIVOHEVTI naxoc xb e^rjg uuHvu)(j.a n EyHaxaA-Einuxc xou EL6U>\OU. 96 9 \ ^ f The image obtained by an ETCLBO/VT] xng 6 i a v o i a g i s "the shape of the solid object." Again Epicurus is using this expression to refer to the apprehension by'the., mind of subtle idols, since only these idols can strike the mind directly and give rise to a cpavxaata within i t . There is the problem that one class of these fine idols, namely the auaxdaELg , the compound images that arise from idols uniting in the air, cannot be said to correspond to the shape of the solid object. We can only suppose that Epicurus when making this statement was not referring to this particular class of the finer idols.97 Lucretius' statement that the mind could only perceive those idols that it strained itself to perceive9® shows that Epicurus used the expression E7u8oA.T) xf)g 6tavotag to indicate the apprehension by the mind of subtle idols. 94 S e e beginning of Chapter h. 95 n p t x r i p t a is here used in the sense of the'means of judgement" and refers to the individual senses (See Bailey, .Epicurus, pp. 178, 198). The word certainly does not mean "standards of judgements" that is , the sensations, feelings and prolepseits, .for we have no reference to, i f such a reference is even possible, an ETUBOA.TI of the Tcddn or the upo\TicJ;£ic.. 9 6 E p . H . , 50. 97Tohte, op.cit. , p. 23 and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 566' . 9 8 4 , 802-804. Cf. k, 811-813 and Cicero, De Mat. Deor., 1, 19, 49. See quoted on page 110. 114 In fact Lucretius shows that i t was only by an ETCLBOXT) TTjg 6iavoiag that"the mind could perceive such idols. The passage in Epistula ad Herodotum 38 that contains a reference to ETCIBOXTI fnc, 6iavoiag also supports this interpretation of the phrase. E T t . T E x a T a T a g a i c r f r n a E i g 6E L n d v T a TTJPEIV n a l anAiog < x a T c t ) T a g n a p o u o a g £TCL8o\ag E I 'TE 6 i a v o i a g E L $ ' OTOU 6TITIOT£ TWV xpLTnpCtuv , O L i o i w g 6E x a T a ia u u d p x o v T a Tcd$r], OTcwg a v x a l TO 7ipoau,Evov x a l TO aorj/vov £XU>U.EV o i g a"nu.£uaiaou.E'&a.99 It is especially important to note the expression "of the mind or of any of the x p t T r i p i a . " As in Epistula ad Herodotum 51, x p i T r j p i a refers to the individual senses 1 0 0 and here the mind appears to be identified with one of these "means of judgement," that is, Epicurus is referring to the mind as an organ of sense. In this case Epicurus clearly is making reference to the perception of fine idols by the intellect. In addition to this meaning of ETCIBOXT) Trjg 6iavotag, we h a v e in Clement, Cicero, and Lucretius evidence for another interpretation of the expression. When Clement describes a prolepsis as an ETC 18 OA. n "of something clear or the clear notion of the thing," 1 0 1 the term ETtiBoA.fi is being u s e d to express the grasp made by the mind of some concept that exists in the mind i t s e l f . 1 0 2 Cicero is clearly using EU180A.T} TT)g 99E P . H . , 38. 1 0 0 x p t T r i p i a d o e s not refer to Epicurus' "standards o f judgement," that is, his criteria o f truth since b o t h . a i a & T)0ig and Tta&n are mentioned separately. 101Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, 2, k, Usener 255. See quoted above on page 111. 1 0 2Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 568. 115 6iavcaac; in this same sense when he speaks of the mind projecting itself onto the measureless region of space;1^3 the mind casts itself onto, that is, grasps the concept of space \ETiivOLa; existing in itself. This meaning of ETTIBOA.T] XTJC; 6iavOLac; is also found twicel°4 in Lucretius when he speaks of the "projection of the mind" into space and the "casting of the mind" onto bodies without colour. 1^ The mind is turning its attention to, that is, selecting out the notions of space and colourless bodies stored within itself. We come now to deal with the very difficult passage in the Epistula ad Herodotum 62 and the important statement of Epicurus in 51 on the basis of which Bailey assigns a special role to E7u60A.r) ir\q d i a v o i a c , in the formation of the scientific concepts of Epicurus' system: ak\a LIT)V nal naxa x a c ; auynpIOEIC; $dxxtoy E x s p a EXEpac. pp$rjo*£xai xcov axoLiujv laoxax^v ouawv, xi*j E i p ' Eva xonov cp£p£a$ai x a g EV xoi£ aftpoiaLiacuv axonouc. nal naxa xbv EA.dxi.axov auvEXP XP°vov, E L u.rj ecp * eva xaxa xouc; koyty •dEcoptixouc; xpovouc;, dWa TCUHVOV a v x i n o T c x o u a i v , ELOC; av imb xrjv a i a d T j a i v xb auv£X£c; XTIC. cpopac. Y ^ v T j x a i . xb yap upoadoctaCoLiEvov nepl xoG aopdxou, ujc; apa^nal OL 6ia \6you $£wprjxol xpovoi X O J J U V S X E S xf)g (jpopac; " E E O U C U V , Ol)H d\T)^£c; £0*X L V ETtl XIOV XOLOUXWV* EIXEI XO Y£ ^EtopouLievov Tcav f) nax' EUL6O\T)V \ a L i 8 a v o L i E v o v xfi oiavoLa aA.T)$£c. £axLv.1°6 l°3cicero, De Wat. Deor., 1, 20, 54. See quoted on page 110. 104if the reading of Lipsius be adopted (as i t has by Giussani, Bailey and Rouse) in 2, 1080 (in primia animalibus inice mentem), we find another reference to the mind projecting itself upon a concept (namely of animals). See Bailey, Commentary, Vol. 2, p. 970. 105Lucretius, 2, 1044-1047, 739-744. See quoted on pages 110 and 111. lO^Ep.H., 62. 116 xb 6e 6fnu.apTriu.evov OUH av imripxev, ei UTI e\au,-SdvoLiev nal dMnv Tuva Hivrjaiy ev riM-ty auxoig auvriunevriv ney <xfl cpavTaaT i n n eTt1B0A.fi ^ , 6iaA.T)iHv 6e exouaavJO' In 62, Epicurus states that some people may think that one compound body moves more quickly than another because the atoms of the one compound are moving more quickly in one direction than those in the other body. They come to this conclusion because they see that even in the smallest periods of "continuous time" compounds have movement in one direction. Therefore they conclude that in the periods of time conceived only by thought the atoms of a compound also move in one direction only. This is a false inference made by 6o£a (Ttpoa6o£aC6u,evov) . The true concept of the movement of atoms in a compound is that they are a l l travelling at equal speed, constantly colliding and moving in tiny trajects in a l l directions. The speed and direction in which a compound body moves will be an expression of the number of atoms that happen to be moving in the same direction over a continuous period of time. The last clause in 62 is especially difficult to interpret. Epicurus states that the analogy drawn by 6o£a that the nature of the movement of atoms in a compound is the same as the movement of the compound itself, that i s , that the atoms move only i n one direction, is false. Why? because T O yz $eu)poun£vov nav r\ M.a.%' eiuBoXTjv Xau-Bavouevov Tfl 6i.av0la i s true. Hicks translates this clause "Our canon i s that direct observation by sense and direct apprehension by the mind are alone invariably IQTEp.H., 51. The missing dative was supplied by Usener from a gloss on 50. "JSee Usener, op.cit., p. 11 and Bailey, Epicurus, pp. 28, 198.) The HLvnaLS i s the movement of 6o£a (see above chapter, h). l(%urley, pp.cit., pp. 123-125. 117 true. " 1 0 9 Strcxlach.110 translates the clause "since 'true1 means either that which is empirically observed or that which is mentally apprehended." Gigon 1 1 1 renders the clause by "Denn wahr ist das wirklich Geschaute Oder auf Grund der Beobachtung mit dem Denken begriffene." Finally Philippson 1 1 2 translates the clause "denn das Geschaute und das nach einer eTtlBOA.'n durch die &id\,oia Erfasste ist wahr." A l l these scholars take to ye $eu)pouu,evov uav as a reference to that which is perceived by the senses. They a l l appear to take the whole clause as a statement by Epicurus of his belief in the complete trustworthiness of sensation, whether of the sense-organs themselves ( T O ye •ftetopouLievov Ttav) of of the mind functioning as an organ of sense (in the case of the fine i d o l s ) . 1 1 3 This interpretation of the first half of the clause is open to question. Epicurus has just stated that the ixpoa6oc;aC6uievov based on an analogy drawn from sensation is false, for T O ye -fretopouLievov uav f) HOCT' 8OA.T)V \ au.6avoLievov TT/1 6i .avoia is true. If T O ye decopouLievov Ttav refers to sensation, the last clause hardly makes sense as an explanation of why the analogy drawn from sensation itself is false. Bailey11**' translates the last clause of 62 "for we must remember that i t is what we observe with the senses or grasp with the mind by an l°9Diogenes Laertius, Book 10, translated by R.D.Hicks (Loeb Classical Library, London and New York, 1925), p. 593. 1 1 0Strodach, op.cit., pp. 125-126. ^Epikur translated by 0. Gigon (Zurich, 1 9 k 9 ) , p. 21. 1 1 2R. Philippson, "Review of C. Bailey, The Greek Atomists and Epicurus," Gnomon 6 (1930), p. kjl. 1 1 3Tbid., Pp. k70_k7i. l l i (Bailey, Epicurus, p. 39. 118 apprehension that is true." He takes TO yz $eu>pOUU.£VOV Ttav as a reference to "that which is grasped by the senses when 'looking' at the close view, i.e. by an £TCL8oA.r) ^ "115 This interpretation, however, can be questioned. The passages in which •&£U)p£U> occurs 1 1^ indicate that Epicurus used the word simply as a synonym for opociu. Epicurus' use of the term in reference to heavenly phenomena (Epistula ad Herodotum 78, Epistula ad Pythoclem 112, 113 and 114) and objects on earth seen at a distance (Epistula ad Pythoclem 91j 103) make questionable Bailey''s inter-pretation of TO yz $EU )pouu.£vov as a reference to the process of £Tu80/\.r) TiDv aia&r)xr)pCwv , that is, the purposeful examination of an object at close view. Again we must ask: why should Epicurus be saying in this causal clause that sense-perceptions are true (whether per-ceived by close attention of the senses or not) when he has just stated the analogy drawn from sensation is false? Bailey's interpretation of EiuSoXr) ir\q 6uavotac in the passages in 62 is as follows. He takes the first half of the final clause V£7i£L . . . E O T i v ; as a general statement by Epicurus of the truth of sensation; he lays upon the last half of the clause (fi HCXT' £HL8O\T)V . . . 6 i a v o i a ) the weight of the ETCEC r 1 1? the conclusion of 6o£a i s f a i s e ^ f o r the conclusion reached by an £Tu8o/\.r) ir\q 6locvoiac; i S true. Bailey, bearing in mind Epicurus' other statement ^ B a i l e y , Greek Atomists, p. 569. Cf. also pp. 429 and Epicurus, p. 223. ll6Ep.H., 41, 56, 58, 59, 11, 73, 74, 78; Ep.P., 87, 91, 94 (twice), 95, 9b, 9« (twice), 103, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114 and 116. H^Bailey, Greek Atomists, pp. 568-572. 119 in the Epistula ad Herodotum 51 that 6o£a is different from the ETUBO\T) TTJC; 6uavOLag 1 1 8 believes the Atomist in 62 is con-trasting 6o£a with ETu6oA.r) xr\c, 6 iavo iac ; . He takes the clause (ercet . . . E O T I V ) as the statement of two parallel cases: just as the nature of sense-perception is confirmed by the close view ( T O ye ©•ecopoutievov) , so the characteristics of the imperceptible realities of the universe, the atoms and void, are established by an ETU80A.T) TTJC; 6i<xvoiac;. Bailey says that 6o£a forming the theory that the atoms in compound bodies move only in one direction refers this theory to what is grasped by an ETILBOXT) TTJC, diotvoiac;, namely the image of atoms in compound bodies moving in tiny trajects. Bailey says the ETCIBOAJ) TT|C; 6tavoiac; grasped this vision by the juxtaposition of previously conceived clear scientific concepts of the movement of atoms, these concepts themselves having been grasped by an ETttBoA.T) of the mind. Such a juxtaposition results in only one clear vision, that is, in a scientific truth. Thus Bailey states that an ETUBOXT) TTJCJ 6iavouac; is "the immediate, or 'intuitive 1 apprehension of concepts, and in particular of the 'clear,' i.e. self-evident concepts of scientific thought." 1 1 9 First of a l l Bailey's assertion that i t is the second half of the final clause that contains the force of the ETIEI , that is, that the npoa6o£aC6|i£vov is false because the ETUBOXTI of the mind is true, is open to question. Would i t not be more natural to take both TO ye d£topouu.evov nav and H<XT' ETUBO/VTIV /Vau.6av6u.£vov H % a i l e y , Greek Atomists, p. 569. 1 1 9 r b i d . , p. 56I. 120 with TTJ 6 i a v O L a ? The translation would then be: "everything that is examined by the mind or received as a result of an apprehension by the mind is true." This meaning of $eu>peu) , "to study" or "examine" (with the mind) is found both in Plato^O Aristotle.121 y e n o w have a new problem: what does Epicurus mean by this statement? We must examine the passage in its strict context in order to discover the answer. The reasoning in 62 i f explained strictly in Epicurean terms will proceed as follows. The mind is faced with the problem of the move-ment of atoms in a compound body. 6 o £ a working from the signs given by sensation assigns this problem of atomic movement to the concept (prolepsis) the mind possesses of the movement of compound bodies. 6 o £ a forms the 7ipoa6o£aC6|J£vov that the atoms move only in one direction in times conceived by thought just as compound bodies even in the smallest periods of continuous time have movement in one direction. However, the mind performs an act of memory, that is, it chooses out the ideas (ETUVOCOCI) of the motion of the atoms that i t possesses and in light of these rejects the conclusion of 6 o £ a . 1 2 2 Where did the mind obtain these inCvoiai of the motion of atoms? Epicurus believed that the atoms, since they possessed weight,123 moved downward, for sensible objects were seen always to have a downward movement because of their weight.124 Similarly Epicurus believed the atoms swerved because the very existence of 12QA.stius, op.cit., s.v. §eu>peu) . 1 2 1Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v. ^ e t o p e u ) . 122we have here an overlapping in usage of 6o£oc and Xoy LOLtoq . l 23This is clear since objects composed of atoms possess weight. Lucretius, 1, 358-67. l ^ l b i d . , 2, 184-215. 121 created objects showed the atoms must have swerved as they f e l l downward at equal speed through the void and also because nothing in nature con-tradicted this supposition . 1 2 5 Both these e T i L V O i a i , therefore, can be said to be derived from sensation itself. 6o£a made a hasty (in the sense that i t did not pay attention to principles already established on the basis of sensation) and incorrect comparison of the motion of compound bodies and the atoms of those bodies; the careful attention of the mind to the proper en i VOL a t resulted in the correct conclusion. In the last clause of 62 Epicurus appears to be stating the two activities of the mind that are true as opposed to the incorrect (in this particular case) action of 6o£a . It is the careful attention of the mind to principles already established (in this case the principles of the motion of atoms) that is true and also "what is grasped by an eiri8oA.Ti of the mind," that i s , images perceived directly by the mind acting as an organ of sense. This is probably the sense in which Epicurus is using eTti8o/\.T) rfjc; 6iavoiac; in 62, although he may be referring to the second meaning of the phrase, namely the grasping or selecting out by the mind of some concept or image already existing within i t . This action can be called true since the objects of the action are true, namely the prolepseis and "proven" e n i v o i a i (those not contradicted by sensation). Besides Bailey's questionable interpretation of TO ye $eiopouLievov uSv and his overemphasis on the phrase H<XT' eiu6oA.r)v \aLi6avOLievov TT) O L a v o i a , there are difficulties involved in his 1 2 5 L u c r e t i u s , 2, 216-250. 122 interpretation of E T C I 8 O A . T ) Trig 6iavcaac,. The most important problem is that Bailey's notion of the E T C 18 O A . o f the mind is inconsistent with the emphasis Epicurus laid upon sensation as the criterion of truth. Bailey states that the results of an E T U 8 O A . T ) xfj? biavoiaq \ are true simply because they arise from an E T C I B O X T ) of the mind, not because they are confirmed or not contradicted by the evidence of the senses; Bailey is in fact asserting the validity of thought that is independent of sensation.126 The result of what Bailey conceives an "apprehension of the mind" to be is simply a new idea and i f this is true simply because of the way i t was "grasped," the validity of independent thought is being asserted. Another problem of Bailey's interpretation of E T C 18 O A . r) XT)? biavoCaq is that there is no evidence to support it (except Bailey's questionable understanding of Epistula ad Herodotum 62). Although the phrase E T C I 8 O A . T ) TT)C; 6 i a v o i a g was used to indicate the selection or apprehension of a concept or idea, nowhere is the term used in reference to the process of reasoning, that is, the actual manipulation of concepts. Perhaps i t would not be incorrect to say that the E T C 1 8 O A . o f the mind formed a part of the process of reasoning in as much as i t performed the function of selecting out concepts for consideration, but i t did not involve the arranging and rearranging of these notions. Furthermore apart from 62 and 38 (where the use of E T C L 8 O \ T ) xfjc. 6tavotag almost certainly refers to apprehension of fine idols by the mind), there is no ^ojjaiiey seems to be aware of the difficulty here for in Epicurus (pp. 177, 223) he states that the results of the"apprehension of the mind" are verified by reference to sensation, although in his Appendix he clearly states (pp. 570,-571) that the results are true simply because they are grasped by an E T C 18 O A . T) of the mind. 123 mention.of the E T U B O A . T ) of the mind in reference to the problem of the <x6r)A.a (in particular the nature of the atoms and void). If Bailey's interpretation of E T H . B O A . T ) X T J C ; 6iavouac; were correct, we would expect perhaps some mention of the term when Diogenes Laertius describes the method by which one can gain knowledge of the nature of the aor)\a (32), especially since he has just mentioned (31) that the Epicureans added the "apprehension of the mind" as a criterion of truth. Bailey supports his interpretation of 62 that Epicurus is contrasting inifioXr) T T } C ; btavoCaq with 6o£a (= X o y i a i i o c ; ) by reference to the statement in the Epistula ad Herodotum 51 that 6o£a is a movement within us "closely connected with the ETuBoXri of the mind but differing from it."-'-2? Since the discussion in 50 and 51 concerns the errors that occur in vision, i t is more than likely that the reference to 6o£a in 51 is to the term's more usual function of classifying sense-impressions, by selecting the concepts to which they correspond. Similarly the E I U 6 O \ T ) of the mind may refer to the apprehension of subtle idols. This passage makes clear sense with the terms given these meanings: ET t tBoXr ) T T J C ; 6t , a v o i a c ; is the passive reception of idols, 6o£a is connected with this E7 I IBOA,T} in that i t is also a movement concerned with idols, but differs in that i t is not the process that perceives idols but classifies them.^S Qr again with the terms used in this same sense, Epicurus may not have in mind, the difference in the actual processes of 66£a and ETt iBoA,r j so 127see quote on page 115. 128Merbach, op.cit., p. 22 and Furley, op.cit., p. 125. 124 much as the nature of the processes themselves: ETtiBoA.T) xf|c; 6 t a v o t a g is true because i t is a form of sensation, 6o£a on the other hand, can be true or false since it can apply the sense-impression to the correct or incorrect concept.129 The reference to 6o£a in 51 is not to a faculty that solves problems about the unknown (a6rjA.a) by use of concepts existing in the mind itself (Xoytap-Og). Bailey's state-ment, 130 therefore, that the difference mentioned in 51 lies in the way 6o£a (= \oyiau.6q) and £Ttt8o\T) TT}C; 6 tavotac ; u s e concepts is highly questionable. Bailey 131 also feels that the reference to the EIU80A.T) of the mind in 38 supports the wider interpretation he gives the phrase. It is more likely that the term here refers simply to the apprehension of fine idols by the mind.132 Epicurus is mentioning the criterion one must use in investigating problems; the £Ttt8oA.T) of the mind is a part of the most important criterion, sensation itself . Similarly Bailey says the extended meaning of the expression is found in Kuria Doxa 24, the sixth passage in which the phrase occurs: Et T I V ' EH6a \ £ t g aTC/Wc; atadnatv nal p.r) 6iapr ia£ic; T O 6o£aConEvov Haxa T O upoau,Evov nal T O Ttapbv fjorj HCXTa TT)V atadrjatv nat T a Tcat&T) nat Ttaaav cpavTaaTtXTiv E T USOXT I V TTig 6 t a v o t a c ; , auvTapd^Eic; nat Tag XotTtag ata'&TiaEtg TTI u.aTatw oo£Tl, UKJTE T O xptTrjpiov aitav Ex6a \Eig .133 129De Witt, "Epicurus, Ilept $avTaatag," p . kl6. 13°Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 571. 1 3 1 l b i d . , pp. 567, 571. 132see above page 114. 133K.P . , 2k. 125 Here again, however, Epicurus is simply making reference to the criteria that must be used. The passage itself does not shed light on .the nature of the ciuBO/Vr) TTJC; diavotac; but Epicurus appears to be referring again to the apprehension of idols by the mind. It seems best in the light of the evidence we possess to limit the meaning of £1x160X11 TTJC; 6 tavo iag to the perception by the mind of subtle idols and the apprehension of concepts already existing within the mind itself Two- problems s t i l l remain with the phrase etti8o\r) Trie; 6 i avo iac ; . In Kuria Doxa 2k and the Epistula ad Herodotum 51, eiXLBoA.ii is modified by the epithet cpavTaoT ixoc;; the equivalent of this term seems to occur in 38 in the form of Tiapouaac; . Giussani-L35 and Bailey 1 3^ deny that the word has a special significance since a l l thought was cpocvTacrTLHOC; , that is, i t was caused by mental images. De Witt 1 3? (who takes eniBoXr) TTJC; 6iav0Lcxc; simply as the operations of the mind) states that i f an eTtiBoXr) was true, i t was termed 9avT<xaTlK'n. This distinction, however, is refuted by the fact that in 62 the eiTLBoXii of the mind (without cpocvTOCOTLHTI ) is specifically called true. Since the epithet occurs only once (Kuria Doxa 2k) where the text is sure, 1 3 8 i t is really impossible 134in this sense CTILBOXTI of the mind is equivalent, as Clement says (see above page Ilk ), to a prolepsis in its active sense. Cf. Brieger, Epikurs Lehre von der.Seele, p. 19, Heidel, op.cit., p. 188, and Bailey, Greek Atomists, p. 572. 1 3 5 G i u s s a n i , op.cit., p. 176. 1 3 6 j 3 a i l e y , Greek Atomists, pp. 572-573. 13?De Witt "Epicurus: A l l Sensations Are True," p. 21. 1 3 8The reference to e7USoA.il in 51 is an addition of Usenerv See above page 116. 126 to determine the real significance of the word. Finally we can ask why the later Epicureans added the ETuBoXr) TT)C. diavoiaq as the fourth criterion.of truth. Epicurus clearly used the expression and since he appears to have indicated by the term principally the apprehension by the mind of subtle idols, i t is likely he considered the ETCLBOXT) TT)C; 6iavoi"ac. simply a part of sensation itself. 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