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The argument from illusion Taylor, Wayne Rupert 1961

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THE  ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION by WAYNE R. TAYLOR  B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia,  1961  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the r e q u i r e d  THE  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September,  1969  In  presenting t h i s  thesis  in p a r t i a l  f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h the L i b r a r y s h a l l  make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e  1 f u r t h e r agree tha for scholarly by h i s  permission  of this  thesis  written  permission.  It  for financial  Date  U\  Se^T  r e f e r e n c e and  that  study. thesis  by the Head of my Department  or  i s understood that copying o r p u b l i c a t i o n gain s h a l l  Depa rtment The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  I agree  f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s  purposes may be granted  representatives.  for  Columbia,  for  Columbia  not be allowed without my  THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION Abstract I t has o f t e n been a l l e g e d t h a t the argument from i l l u s i o n demonstrates t h a t p e r c e p t u a l  judgements expressed  i n o r d i n a r y or m a t e r i a l o b j e c t language a r e i n h e r e n t l y v u l nerable and  t o s c e p t i c i s m , a r e imprecise,  imply  ambiguous,  inconvenient,  somewhat more than we l e g i t i m a t e l y ought t o say.  Perceptual  judgements about the same experience  expressed  i n sense data language are, on the other hand, a l l e g e d l y shown t o be i n d u b i t a b l e , p r e c i s e , unambiguous, and, as such, t o be the raw data from which our e m p i r i c a l knowledge i s inferred. I contend there  i s no such e s s e n t i a l asymmetry between  an o b j e c t language judgement (M-judgement) and a sense data language judgement (S-judgement) about the same  perceptual  experience  t o have the  provided  the judgements a r e intended  same f u n c t i o n . Arguments from i l l u s i o n are, by analogy. illusion,  I contend, arguments  They argue t h a t s i n c e we may be s u b j e c t t o  then perhaps we a r e p r e s e n t l y s u b j e c t t o i l l u s i o n .  But arguments by analogy a r e l e s s arguments than hypotheses. We can e a s i l y counter t h a t s i n c e we may not be s u b j e c t t o illusion,  perhaps we a r e not p r e s e n t l y subject t o i l l u s i o n .  ii  The problem i s t o d i s c o v e r whether or n o t we a r e s u b j e c t t o i l l u s i o n and t h i s , i n p r i n c i p l e we can do.  M-judgements,  as c o n t i n g e n t judgements, can only be h e l d t o be c o n t i n g e n t l y d o u b t f u l ; they may i n p r i n c i p l e be v e r i f i e d or f a l s i f i e d . F u r t h e r , i f we a t t e n d c l o s e l y t o the c o n d i t i o n s under which we make M-judgements and t o our pragmatic and purposes  interests  i n making them, we d i s c o v e r t h a t such d u b i t a b i l i t y  to which they a r e prone d e r i v e s e s s e n t i a l l y from the f a c t t h a t they a r e intended t o e f f e c t a maximum d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of our sensory  experience.  S-judgements on the other hand a r e shown t o d e r i v e t h e i r i n d u b i t a b i l i t y p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y t o the extent that they minimize  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of our experience.  Indubitability  i s achieved only by d i m i n i s h i n g the r i s k of contingency ent a i l e d by c l a s s i f y i n g experience.  A completely  S-judgement then, would e f f e c t minimal  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of  sensory experience and c o n s i d e r i n g our pragmatic would be s i n g u l a r l y  inutile.  doubt-free  interests,  Thus i t has been shown t h a t  such advantages as S-judgements have over M-judgements with r e s p e c t t o doubt d e r i v e only from a more r a d i c a l asymmetry of  intention,  f u n c t i o n , and u t i l i t y .  F u r t h e r asymmetries r e g a r d i n g p r e c i s i o n , and convenience  a r e shown e i t h e r  t o be s i m i l a r l y  ambiguity untenable  or t o f a v o r M-language. My c o n c l u s i o n s a r e meant t o undermine the t r a d i t i o n of b a s i n g sense data philosophy upon an i n f e r i o r i t y of o r d i n a r y  iii  (M-statement)  language as a l l e g e d l y shown by a problematic  asymmetry of M-judgements w i t h S-judgements. some asymmetry e x i s t s .  I do recognize  i l l u s i o n e l u c i d a t e the extent r e f l e c t s conditions  No such t r o u b l e -  t h a t arguments  t o which o r d i n a r y  that are purely contingent  from  language and t h a t i t  may w e l l be p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h independently a sense d a t a language which i s l e s s t i e d t o p u r e l y contingent conditions.  empirical  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Chapter  Page  One  INTRODUCTION  Two  DOUBT AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION  10 15 kO k°-  INDUBITABILITY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION  6k  I. II. Four  10  Introduction F a c t u a l Doubt Formal Doubt Some Doubts About Doubting  I. II. III. IV. Three  1  I n t r o d u c t i o n of the I n d u b i t a b l e Element, Sense Data Some Doubts About I n d u b i t a b i l i t y  CONCLUSION I. II.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  The Argument From I l l u s i o n Foundations of E m p i r i c a l Knowledge  6k 87 101 101 107 117  CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION A. J . Ayer concludes the opening chapter of h i s book The Foundations  of E m p i r i c a l Knowledge by s a y i n g , " I may sum  up my l o n g d i s c u s s i o n of the argument from i l l u s i o n by s a y i n g t h a t i t makes i t seem d e s i r a b l e t o use a t e c h n i c a l terminology of some k i n d i n p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about p e r c e p t i o n ; and that of those t h a t are a v a i l a b l e the terminology of the 'sense datum t h e o r y ' appears  t o be the b e s t . "  1  A g r e a t many p h i l o s o p h e r s have shared Ayer's  fas-  c i n a t i o n w i t h the argument from i l l u s i o n and they have f e l t t h a t i t supports programs f o r p e r c e p t u a l philosophy s i m i l a r t o Ayer's. found  I t h i n k le_ mot .juste f o r t h e i r d i s p o s i t i o n may be  i n a passage from Sterne's T r i s t r a m Shandy.  "Away they  go c l u t t e r i n g l i k e hey-go mad; and by t r e a d i n g the same steps over and over a g a i n they p r e s e n t l y make a road of i t , as p l a i n and smooth as a garden walk, which, when they a r e used t o , the D e v i l h i m s e l f sometimes s h a l l not be a b l e t o d r i v e them off  it." I s h a l l attempt  i n t h i s paper what the D e v i l h i m s e l f  sometimes s h a l l not be a b l e t o do.  I hope t o show t h a t Ayer  and most sense d a t a p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e mistaken,  that the argu-  ment from i l l u s i o n does not support h i s c o n c l u s i o n that o r d i n a r y terminology i s l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r p e r c e p t u a l philosophy than  2  a t e c h n i c a l terminology.  F u r t h e r , I hope t o show t h a t the  argument from i l l u s i o n does not demonstrate t h a t the founda t i o n s of e m p i r i c a l knowledge a r e sense d a t a . approach t o philosophy may indeed be a v a l i d  The f o u n d a t i o n a l one.  But, simply,  the argument from i l l u s i o n has no place i n i t . How does the argument from i l l u s i o n support conclusion?  Ayer's  The answer ought t o be e x p l i c i t l y g i v e n i n h i s  f i r s t chapter and we ought t h e r e f o r e t o b e g i n with a c l o s e examination The  of i t . s t r u c t u r e of Ayer's chapter on the argument from  i l l u s i o n i s rather surprising. entitled  He begins with a s e c t i o n  ' E x p o s i t i o n of the Argument.'  He notes  t h a t some  p h i l o s o p h e r s have introduced sense data as the t h i n g s we are d i r e c t l y aware of i n p e r c e p t i o n . necessary  The answer t o why i t i s  t o introduce the term sense datum i n s t e a d of saying  we are d i r e c t l y aware of m a t e r i a l t h i n g s i s , he says, by the argument from i l l u s i o n .  Now i t i s , I t h i n k ,  provided extremely  i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t Ayer does not expound h i s own argument but t e l l s us how others have argued. n e u t r a l or i m p a r t i a l ,  His exposition i s apparently  ( i e . ' I t i s argued',  'Philosophers have  recourse t o . . . ' , ' I t i s pointed out', e t c . ) . e v a l u a t i o n of the argument w i l l d i s t i l l  i t s e f f e c t i v e points  and dispense w i t h any o b j e c t i o n a l or i n v a l i d However, h i s next s e c t i o n , c a l l e d Argument From I l l u s i o n ' ,  Ostensibly h i s  ones.  ' E v a l u a t i o n of the  i s concerned mainly with whether the  argument i n v o l v e s a q u e s t i o n of language or a q u e s t i o n of f a c t s .  3  He concludes i t i s the former. o r i g i n a l question.  T h i s of course a f f e c t s the  I f the argument i n v o l v e s a q u e s t i o n of  language, then i t cannot he necessary t o introduce the term sense datum although i t may be d e s i r a b l e f o r some purposes to use sense d a t a language. In his of  considering  'The I n t r o d u c t i o n of Sense Data',  next s e c t i o n , Ayer expounds on the theme of two p e r c e p t u a l verbs, such t h a t i n one sense  usages  'perceive' implies  t h a t the o b j e c t p e r c e i v e d e x i s t s and i n another i t does not. He f e e l s there i s some ambiguity i n the way we use p e r c e p t u a l verbs.  The sense datum advocates he notes have d e c i d e d t o  obviate ambiguity by d e c i d i n g upon one use f o r p e r c e p t u a l verbs.  They s h a l l , by convention, r e f e r t o sense d a t a . Ayer then asks; "Is t h i s a l l t h a t the argument from 2  i l l u s i o n y i e l d s us; a motive f o r adopting a new terminology?" In  the s e c t i o n headed  'Misuses of the Argument from  Illusion'  he r i g o r o u s l y examines v a r i o u s uses of the argument, f o r example t h a t i t supports such c o n c l u s i o n s as "that the world of  s e n s i b l e phenomena i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; t h a t our ideas  of  secondary q u a l i t i e s are not resemblances  of any r e a l  t i e s of m a t e r i a l t h i n g s ; which means i n t e r a l i a , material thing i s l i t e r a l l y  c o l o r e d , or l i t e r a l l y  quali-  t h a t no character-  i z e d by any s e n s i b l e temperature or weight; t h a t the primary q u a l i t i e s of s o l i d i t y , e x t e n s i o n , number, f i g u r e and are  a l s o "not r e a l " ;  to be r e l i e d  motion  that the testimony of the senses i s not  on, and t h a t i f we have any acquaintance w i t h  4  m a t e r i a l t h i n g s as they r e a l l y are, of sense p e r c e p t i o n but mind."^  He  i l l u s i o n are  claims  i t i s not through any  only through some " i n t u i t i o n of  act  the  t h a t a l l such uses of the argument from  invalid.  In the f i n a l s e c t i o n ,  'Theories  of P e r c e p t i o n  As  A l t e r n a t i v e Languages' Ayer makes i t c l e a r t h a t he does not t h i n k naive  r e a l i s m can be r e f u t e d by the argument from  illu-  s i o n f o r the reason t h a t i t i s not p r o p e r l y a theory and properly refutable.  I t i s r a t h e r "a proposal  in a certain fashion."  What are  often c a l l e d  p e r c e p t i o n ' Ayer c a l l s a l t e r n a t i v e languages. erent ways of d e s c r i b i n g the same phenomena. dence does not favour  one  not  t o use words 'theories They are Empirical  of diffevi-  of the t h e o r i e s over another.  He  accepts or r e j e c t s the a l t e r n a t i v e t h e o r i e s or languages according  as they are s u i t a b l e f o r purposes.  Now  keeping i n mind h i s c o n c l u s i o n that the  from i l l u s i o n . . . m a k e s  First,  must ask  one,  ques-  he shown us the  As he says there  the a l t e r n a t i v e languages being wrong. foundations.  in  i s not a f a c t u a l matter but  i n what sense has  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge'?  have i t s own  some very pointed  i f the matter of which terminology to use  p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about p e r c e p t i o n a linguistic  1  i t seem d e s i r a b l e t o use a t e c h n i c a l  terminology of some k i n d " we tions.  "argument  What we  'foundations  i s no q u e s t i o n  of  Presumably each w i l l  take as the  foundations  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge w i l l depend on which language we  use.  5  Ayer says he regards the a l t e r n a t i v e language of sense d a t a as b e i n g more ' s u i t a b l e f o r h i s purposes.' in this f i r s t The t i t l e  But he hasn't  chapter c l e a r l y s t a t e d what h i s purposes a r e .  of h i s book h i n t s t h a t he i s going a f t e r  something  o n t o l o g i c a l , the f o u n d a t i o n s , a f t e r a l l , of knowledge about the  world. What are h i s purposes such t h a t sense d a t a terminology  are  more s u i t a b l e f o r them?  What can sense d a t a terminology  do t h a t , say, the languages of n a i v e r e a l i s m or of the Theory of  Appearing cannot do?  What e x a c t l y i s i t about the argument  from i l l u s i o n t h a t makes i t d e s i r a b l e t o use sense d a t a terminology? are,  We would expect Ayer t o s t a t e c l e a r l y what h i s purposes t o g i v e h i s own e x p o s i t i o n of the argument from  and t o show e x p l i c i t l y how we  illusion,  i t demonstrates t h a t the language  o r d i n a r i l y use (the language used t o s t a t e the argument  from i l l u s i o n ) cannot serve h i s purposes. Instead Ayer does not s t a t e c l e a r l y what h i s purposes are.  He does not g i v e h i s own e x p o s i t i o n of h i s own argument  from i l l u s i o n ; he stands back as i t were and s t a t e s the argument i n such non-committal terms as out',  ' i t i s s t a t e d ' , or ' i t i s pointed  or 'we are i n v i t e d t o g i v e ' c e r t a i n answers  to questions.  Ayer does not seem h i m s e l f t o be a r g u i n g from i l l u s i o n .  He  does not e x p l i c i t l y say,  It  is d i f f i c u l t  'I argue and I conclude t h u s . '  i n h i s chapter on the argument from i l l u s i o n t o  a s c e r t a i n e x a c t l y what Ayer's purposes are and why d a t a terminology can s a t i s f y them.  only sense  The c l o s e s t he comes t o an  6  e x p l i c i t statement  i s t h i s t h a t sense datum terminology i s  designed "to e l i m i n a t e the problems which a r i s e out of the ambiguous use of words l i k e speech.He any r i v a l .  'touch' and  'see' i n o r d i n a r y  c l a i m s i t can do t h i s more c o n v e n i e n t l y than  He a l s o says i t has the advantage,  "of e n a b l i n g  us t o r e f e r t o the contents of our sense-experiences, without r e f e r r i n g to material t h i n g s . " i s an advantage. argument from  0  He does not t e l l us why  The answer presumably  this  l i e s somewhere i n the  illusion.  We might essay the f o l l o w i n g paraphrase: the argument from i l l u s i o n i l l u s t r a t e s that o r d i n a r y speech about p e r c e p t i o n i s ambiguous and t h a t problems of p e r c e p t u a l p h i l o s o p h y a r i s e out t h i s ambiguity.  The t e c h n i c a l terminology of sense d a t a  i s not ambiguous and hence o b v i a t e s the problems.  We  might  t e n t a t i v e l y add that sense d a t a terminology i s more b a s i c  than  o r d i n a r y speech and t h e r e f o r e i l l u s t r a t i v e of the foundations of  e m p i r i c a l knowledge. Ayer's f a i l u r e t o g i v e h i s own argument from  is,  I .think, the source of some c o n f u s i o n .  how  Ayer t h i n k s the argument e x p l i c i t l y supports h i s c o n c l u s i o n s .  When A u s t i n ,  found i n Ayer's f i r s t  section.  illusion.  the arguments from  sense illusion  But these are not Ayer's argu-  In f a c t i t i s not c l e a r how  argument from  clear  i n Sense and S e n s i b i l i a . c r i t i c i z e s Ayer's  d a t a program, he does so by examining  ments.  It isn't  illusion  Ayer would s t a t e h i s  own  7  I hope t o obviate these d i f f i c u l t i e s by examining two s p e c i f i c examples  of the argument from i l l u s i o n g i v e n a t f i r s t  hand by t h e i r proponents. the  I s h a l l attempt t o d i s c o v e r where  a l l e g e d a m b i g u i t i e s and problems supposedly n e c e s s a r i l y  a r i s e i n o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l judgement of  and how the i n t r o d u c t i o n  sense d a t a terminology i s supposed t o s o l v e them.  It i s  f o o l i s h t o say * I t i s argued' or ' I t i s h e l d ' or 'Philosophers have r e c o r s e t o . . . ' when we can l e t the p h i l o s o p h e r s argue for  themselves.  I have chosen two arguments,  P r i c e and one by B e r t r a n d R u s s e l l . to  sense d a t a p h i l o s o p h y .  Perception.  one by H. H.  Both a r e of s i g n i f i c a n c e  Ayer acknowledges  P r i c e ' s work,  R u s s e l l ' s argument occasioned the f i r s t  ance i n p r i n t of the term  'sense datum.'  appear-  Obviously Ayer must  have had j u s t such p h i l o s o p h e r s as these i n mind when he wrote of the  the argument from i l l u s i o n .  Between the txvo arguments a l l  e s s e n t i a l moves are made; they cover e v e r y t h i n g Ayer covers  in his exposition.  They do so c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y and  there i s no doubt as t o what purpose.' i s b e i n g served by v a r ious p a r t s of the arguments.  They have the advantage  over  Ayer's e x p o s i t i o n i n t h a t they make an argument, they do n o t r e f e r t o one or r e p o r t on one. We can e a s i l y see where and how c o n c l u s i o n s a r e drawn and can determine t h e i r  validity.  I hope t o show t h a t the argument from i l l u s i o n does not  demonstrate any inherent ambiguity about o r d i n a r y speech  nor  that i t i s a t any disadvantage i n r e f e r r i n g t o m a t e r i a l  objects.  I f sense d a t a terminology i s i n f a c t d e s i r a b l e f o r  8  some purposes, t h i s  i s not shown by the arguments from i l l u s i o n .  Put another way,  what I hope t o do i n t h i s paper i s  undermine the whole t r a d i t i o n  of b a s i n g sense datum p h i l o s o p h y  upon an a l l e g e d i n f e r i o r i t y of o r d i n a r y speech as shown by an argument i t s e l f expressed i n o r d i n a r y speech. t h a t such arguments are coherent. insufficient  I cannot  find  I f o r d i n a r y speech i s  f o r some purposes, then t h i s must be shown i n -  dependently; the argument from i l l u s i o n makes out t h a t i t i s insufficient We may  f o r i t s own purposes and the argument f a i l s .  attempt t o analyze o r d i n a r y words i n terms of sense  experience but t h i s procedure i s independent of the argument from i l l u s i o n . the  We may  argue t h a t o r d i n a r y speech i s t i e d t o  c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n that now  o b t a i n and that sense  d a t a terminology i s by nature not t i e d to c o n d i t i o n s . this  too i s independent of the argument from i l l u s i o n .  But  FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER ONE  1 A y e r , A. J . , The F o u n d a t i o n s of E m p i r i c a l Knowledge. M a c M i l l a n , T o r o n t o , 196*1-, p. 57. 2  I b i d . . p. 28.  3  I b i d . , p. 29.  k  I b i d . . p. 48.  5  I b i d . . p.  6  I b i d . . p. 57  56.  CHAPTER TWO DOUBT AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION I.  Introduction Doubt and i n d u b i t a b i l i t y p l a y c e n t r a l r o l e s i n the  argument from i l l u s i o n . argument supports  The sense d a t i s t c l a i m s t h a t the  the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t judgements about  t i o n are inherently doubtful.  percep-  Concommitantly he claims t h a t  the argument demonstrates t h a t s i n c e we do experience  some-  t h i n g when we p e r c e i v e and s i n c e i t i s only the judgemental aspect of p e r c e p t i o n t h a t i s d o u b t f u l , then simple d e s c r i p t i o n s of  our sense experience w i l l y i e l d us an i n d u b i t a b l e account  of  perception.  S i n c e , he c o n t i n u e s , as p h i l o s o p h e r s , we have  an i n t e r e s t i n the foundations  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge, we  ought, as p h i l o s o p h e r s , t o concern  o u r s e l v e s s o l e l y with the  i n d u b i t a b l e aspect of p e r c e p t i o n .  Since what i s i n d u b i t a b l e  i s simply the content of our sensory experience,  or sense  data, and n o t any judgement about them, the sense d a t i s t concludes t h a t the foundations data.  Sense d a t i s t s have d i f f e r e d  draw concerning of  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge a r e sense on what c o n c l u s i o n s t o  the n o t i o n of substance  or of the e x i s t e n c e  t h i n g s other than o u r s e l f and our experience.  Some have  claimed t h a t such n o t i o n s ought t o be dispensed w i t h i n p h i l o sophy as b e i n g e i t h e r n o n s e n s i c a l or u n v e r i f i a b l e .  Others  11  have h e l d simply  t h a t judgements embodying such n o t i o n s a r e  i n h e r e n t l y d o u b t f u l and t h a t language expressing  such judge-  ments i s t h e r e f o r e u n s u i t a b l e f o r p h i l o s o p h i c purposes. The  f i r s t q u e s t i o n t o ask i s how the argument from  i l l u s i o n supports the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t judgements about percept i o n , f o r example the o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l claims we make about objects, are inherently doubtful.  How f o r example does the  argument from i l l u s i o n show t h a t such claims as, 'I see a tomato' or, *I see Smith's c a r coming' a r e de n a t u r a  dubitable  statements and hence u n s u i t a b l e f o r p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about perception? Before  answering t h i s q u e s t i o n we ought f i r s t  the nature of doubt. s o r t s of doubt?  May we make any d i s t i n c t i o n s between  A very common s o r t of doubt occurs when some  f a c t Is i n d i s p u t e .  F o r example there  i s the s o r t of doubt  t h a t I have when I am c o n f i d e n t of what a doubt-free p e r c e i v i n g x i s but where I am not sure it  t o examine  i s an x t h a t I am p e r c e i v i n g .  case of  i n the case i n hand i f  Perhaps, i f I check I w i l l  f i n d evidence t h a t what I took t o be an x i s a c t u a l l y something e l s e , a copy, something t h a t looks l i k e an x.  T h i s s o r t of  doubt we may c a l l f a c t u a l doubt; i t concerns d i s p u t e d f a c t s which we may v e r i f y . In c o n t r a s t t o cases where p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s a r e i n q u e s t i o n with regard  t o p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s i s the occasion  where i t i s suggested t h a t f o r m a l l y speaking a l l the f a c t s are open t o q u e s t i o n w i t h regard  to a l l objects.  Sense d a t i s t s  12  have noted t h a t because of t h e i r formal  s t r u c t u r e or because  of t h e i r place w i t h i n the l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e of language, statements we make about our perceptions  of objects do not  e n t a i l t h a t the objects a r e as we d e s c r i b e  them.  That i s ,  such statements a r e by nature s y n t h e t i c and no c o n t r a d i c t i o n is involved  i n their denial.  empirical v e r i f i c a t i o n , be f a l s e ,  They are always s u b j e c t t o  experience may always prove them t o  or i n c o r r e c t , or i n need of amendment.  to s a y i n g t h a t f o r p u r e l y formal reasons there  T h i s amounts  i s always the  p o s s i b i l i t y of f a c t u a l doubt a r i s i n g w i t h r e f e r e n c e perceptual  claims  I might make about o b j e c t s .  t o any  We may t h e r e -  f o r e t a l k of formal doubt as being d i s t i n g u i s h e d from f a c t u a l doubt.  We may note t h a t formal doubt i s n ' t r e s t r i c t e d t o  what I say about p e r c e i v i n g o b j e c t s .  The sense d a t i s t  claims t h a t i t happens t o be the case t h a t p u r e l y  also  formally  when I t h i n k I am p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t I may be mistaken. Only f u t u r e events w i l l t e l l .  There i s nothing  about the f a c t  t h a t I t h i n k I am p e r c e i v i n g an object t h a t e n t a i l s i s an o b j e c t present  that'there  or t h a t I am t r u l y p e r c e i v i n g the o b j e c t .  Thus although I may t h i n k I .am p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t and would a s s e r t t h a t I am p e r c e i v i n g the object, the sense d a t i s t claims  t h a t f u t u r e experience may show that one of the f o l l o w -  ing s t a t e s of a f f a i r s may have been the case. perceived imitation, the  the object or I may have p e r c e i v e d I may have p e r c e i v e d  o b j e c t and made an i n c o r r e c t  I may have a copy or an  something t h a t looked judgement.  I may have  like  13  hallucinated the object or I may have imagined i t . What I thought was an object may  have been a r e f l e c t i o n .  Although I am perceiving a c e r t a i n object, one of the other p o s s i b i l i t i e s may not make i t so.  obtain.  Thinking, i n this case, does  The truth of perceptual claims must be estab-  lished by verification..  Thus, says the sense d a t i s t , per-  ceiving objects i s a c o r r i g i b l e enterprise and statements about our perception of objects are ex hypothesi c o r r i g i b l e statements.  He further suggests that the c o r r i g i b i l i t y of  our ordinary perceptual claims either damages our common sense theories of perception or that i t renders  ordinary  speech unsuitable f o r philosophizing about perception.  He  therefore introduces what he claims are indubitable elements of perception, sense data.  When these are expressed proposition-  a l l y the r e s u l t i n g perceptual claims w i l l require no further v e r i f i c a t i o n operation.  They w i l l therefore, he argues, com-  prise a body of incorrigible, statements about perception and as such w i l l be most suitable f o r philosophizing about perception. I s h a l l argue that the argument from i l l u s i o n does not show that our ordinary speech i s inherently c o r r i g i b l e , that neither f a c t u a l nor formal doubt i s destructive of the s u i t a b i l i t y of ordinary speech f o r perceptual philosophy.  What  is d i f f i c u l t to show, however, i s that what force the sense d a t i s t ' s argument seems to have derives from i t s s h i f t i n g back and forth, seeming now  to be claiming factual doubt,  14  now  f o r m a l doubt.  I t i s as hard i n philosophy as  elsewhere  t o h i t a moving t a r g e t . Let us now  examine some arguments from i l l u s i o n i n  d e t a i l and analyze the r o l e t h a t doubt, f a c t u a l and f o r m a l , p l a y s i n them.  15  II.  Factual H.  Doubt  H.  P r i c e founds h i s theory  argument w h i c h w i l l  serve  from  e x p o s i t i o n of t h e  the  illusion. claim  that  such o r d i n a r y mistaken;  His there  are,  he  o f a f f a i r s w h i c h may states  of a f f a i r s  as  one,  f a c t u a l doubt.  formal  think  of a f f a i r s  I s h a l l begin  argument  suggests,  my  Later  Finally  one  may  Bertrand  even  claims,  be  s i n c e e a c h of and  since  of a f f a i r s  to  these  the  obtain  is a factual considering  I shall  force  enquire  I s h a l l ask  more c a r e f u l l y  whether the  f r o m a more g e n e r a l  of  thesis  w h e t h e r s u c h f o r c e as  in fact,  derive  factual,  now  consideration  i n P r i c e ' s argument  i n a s i m i l a r but  see  a n a l y s i s of h i s argument by  i m m e d i a t e l y upon our  f a c t u a l doubt  Now  a c t u a l l y obtain,  s l i p p e r y enough t o seem now  Following  he  with  several alternative states  state  argument seems t o have d o e s n o t , being  may,  a m a t t e r of f a c t  i s n ' t meant t o d e r i v e  doubt.  We  an  argument  argument b e g i n s  d o u b t when we  a c t u a l l y obtain.  argument t h a t when we another state  can  tomatoes.  is itself  on  a p r i m e example of t h e  i s much we  objects  there  as  of s e n s e d a t a  I shall  the  from i t s  formal.  of t h e  role  argument  of  Russell.  H e r e i s what P r i c e  of  of  examine i t s r o l e  constructed  his  says,  When I see a t o m a t o t h e r e i s much I c a n d o u b t . I c a n d o u b t w h e t h e r i t i s a t o m a t o t h a t I am s e e i n g and n o t a c l e v e r l y p a i n t e d p i e c e o f wax. I can d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e r e i s any m a t e r i a l t h i n g t h e r e at a l l . P e r h a p s what I t o o k f o r a t o m a t o was really  16  a r e f l e c t i o n ; p e r h a p s I am even t h e v i c t i m of some h a l l u c i n a t i o n . ^  Before  I begin  t o make some g e n e r a l  t o examine t h i s  comments on t h e r e l a t i o n  judgement t o l a n g u a g e . cerns  is  expression  the r e l a t i v e  utility  judgements and t h e i r uage  may b e c o n s t r u e d I think  tomato.  i n ordinary  language  (S-statments).  expression  In short  saying.  i n sense d a t a  Thus  'When I s e e a tomato',  as t h e sentence,  i n ordinary  language  indicates, saying  apprehend a patch  some-  of c o l o r of a  giving propositional  l a n g u a g e t o one's p e r c e p t u a l  judge-  i n c o n s i d e r i n g P r i c e ' s arguments I s h a l l  t o t h e judgements t h a t we make and sometimes  sentential construals.  f u s i o n can a r i s e  Judgements  'I s e e a tomato', i s  shape, e t c . ' i s s i m p l y  A t any r a t e ,  to their  As P r i c e l a t e r  'I i n t u i t i v e l y  sometimes r e f e r  lang-  when he j u d g e s t h a t he s e e s a  g i v i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l expression  like,  or object  judgements and t h e i r  H i s judgement may be c o n s t r u e d  r o u n d and b u l g y  ment.  and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a t u s o f o b j e c t  t o occasions  t o one's judgement.  con-  at issue  i n the form of d e c l a r a t i v e sentences.  'I s e e a tomato.* simply  Specifically  i t i s c l e a r t h a t when P r i c e s a y s ,  i s referring  thing  them.  expression  i n sense d a t a  paper  judgements we make and t h e  ( M - s t a t e m e n t s ) , and s e n s e d a t a  expression  he  we g i v e  like  of perceptual  The c e n t r a l i s s u e o f t h i s  the s o r t s of p e r c e p t u a l  linguistic  c l a i m I would  from t h i s  I do n o t b e l i e v e any con-  procedure.  17  To t u r n now t o P r i c e ' s argument, I t h i n k i t i s c l e a r t h a t when he says,  'When I see a tomato there  doubt', he means t h a t on occasions sees a tomato there construed  when he judges t h a t he  i s much he can doubt.  as 'On occasions  a basic  And t h i s can be  when my judgement may be expressed  by the statement, 'I see a tomato', there Construing  i s much I can  i s much I can doubt.*  P r i c e ' s argument i n t h i s manner b r i n g s out  inconsistency  i n i t . When I judge something t o be  the case I don't a t the same time doubt i t t o be the case. Judgements may be mistaken s u r e l y but we don't w i t t i n g l y make mistaken judgements.  I f I make the judgement that I see a  tomato I don't doubt my judgement because i f c o n d i t i o n s were such as t o induce doubt then I wouldn't have made p r e c i s e l y that  judgement i n the f i r s t  place.  I f there was  anything  about which I was d o u b t f u l then I would have made the l e s s e r or hedged judgement t h a t I t h i n k I see a tomato or t h a t what I see looks l i k e a tomato or t h a t I seem t o see a tomato, e t c . When I e i t h e r judge, or a s s e r t t h a t I see a tomato, there i s a c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t I do not doubt t h a t I do.  A phrase  embodying doubt about a judgement i s appendable t o some but not a l l of our p e r c e p t u a l  assertions.  I may say, *I seem t o  see a tomato b u t I doubt that I do.' But I cannot say, 'I see a tomato but I doubt that I do.' 'see'  i m p l i e s the preceding  The use of the word  c o n d i t i o n that we are s a t i s f i e d  t h a t c o n d i t i o n s do not warrant doubt.  18  Ryle has suggested t h a t verb.  'see' Is an 'achievement'  The 'achievement' sense of 'see' would imply some  knowledge of what the c o n d i t i o n s t h a t the use of the word  of achievement a r e .  I argue  'see' i n the sentence,  'I see a  tomato* i m p l i e s a knowledge of what a doubt-free  instance  of seeing a tomato i s .  I t i m p l i e s that we a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h  tomatoes a t l e a s t t o the p o i n t of being able t o recognize one, and  that we a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h the c o n d i t i o n s f o r r e c o g n i z i n g  tomatoes.  I t implies a confidence  t h a t present  s a t i s f y the requirements f o r judging  conditions  that we have  'achieved'  seeing a tomato. I do not suggest f o r a moment t h a t we cannot be mistaken, simply not  t h a t when we judge t h a t we see a tomato we do  t h i n k we a r e mistaken.  between suggesting there  There i s a world of d i f f e r e n c e  (1) t h a t when I judge t h a t I see a tomato  i s much t h a t I can doubt and (2) t h a t when I judge t h a t  I see a tomato I may be mistaken.  The former i m p l i e s  that  we can t h i n k we a r e mistaken, the l a t t e r i m p l i e s t h a t we may be mistaken but t h a t we do not t h i n k we a r e . Prom t h i s a n a l y s i s i t would seem t h a t P r i c e ' s argument might b e t t e r be expressed i n e i t h e r of the f o l l o w i n g forms: 'When I t h i n k I see a tomato there  i s much I can doubt', or  •When I judge t h a t I see a tomato I may be mistaken. '•' In the former the f a c t that he uses the phrase  'think I see*  implies  t h a t he i s not s u f f i c i e n t l y c e r t a i n t o say *I do see* and thus t h a t there  i s something about the case which i s , however s l i g h t l y ,  19  doubtful.  I think  by the l a t t e r  i t i s c l e a r that Price's intent i s r e a l i z e d  expression.  •When I judge t h a t I see a tomato I may be mistaken,' Of course doubt would s t i l l p l a y a c e n t r a l r o l e i n P r i c e ' s argument i n the sense t h a t a judgement t h a t may be mistaken i s a judgement that may be doubted.  P r i c e suggests s e v e r a l  ways i n which our judgement may i n f a c t be mistaken.  What  we see may be a wax r e p l i c a of a tomato or a r e f l e c t i o n of a tomato, or a h a l l u c i n a t e d tomato. t h a t what i s d o u b t f u l  That i s t o say he suggests  i s whether I see a r e a l tomato, or some-  t h i n g which looks l i k e a tomato, or i s an a r t i f i c i a l or i n s h o r t ,  tomato,  i s not a r e a l tomato but i s i n some common way  l i k e a tomato. I t h i n k i t i s necessary t o stop a t t h i s p o i n t t o examine a b a s i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  involved  judgements both c o r r e c t and mistaken. a matching procedure. a standard  i n the making of Judging i s e s s e n t i a l l y  We judge t h a t the case a t hand i s l i k e  case and ought t o be c a l l e d by the same name.  When we f i r s t meet an o b j e c t , when i t i s o s t e n s i v e l y d e f i n e d f o r us we do n o t judge that i t matches the d e f i n i t i o n . l e a r n t h a t the o b j e c t  i s c a l l e d by a c e r t a i n name.  are c h i l d r e n we l e a r n t h a t a c e r t a i n object  We  When we  i s c a l l e d a tomato.  We judge t h a t another o b j e c t i s a l s o a tomato and our judgement may be c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . inherent  i n the n o t i o n of judging  of what b i s 5 b i s a standard  But c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t , t h a t a i s b i s some knowledge  and b a s i c t o judging  t h a t something  20  i s b i s knowledge of what the standard names of o b j e c t s by o s t e n t i o n we we Can  don't l e a r n t h a t we :  you  is.  When we  l e a r n the  l e a r n t h e i r names s i m p l i c i t e r ;  t h i n k they are c a l l e d by t h a t name.  imagine someone o s t e n s i v e l y d e f i n i n g o b j e c t s by  •I t h i n k t h i s i s x', named x and  y.  a l s o x's and  We  or,  'This may  be y'?  The  objects  saying, are  subsequently judge t h a t other o b j e c t s  y's.  Judging t h a t a i s b e n t a i l s knowing what b i s . ing t h a t a i s b e n t a i l s knowing what a doubt-free of b i s .  Judging t h a t a i s b e n t a i l s t h a t we  a i s b, t h a t we essential, what we  or d e f i n i n g , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . We  I must know how  I f I am  to t e s t f o r b.  can v e r i f y  cannot doubt  b.  To doubt t h a t what I see  case of being  case.  P r i c e suggests that  What I see may  i t may  be a h a l l u c i n a t i o n .  be a wax  tomato, i t may  a  i s a tomato i s t o doubt  i s a range of p o s s i b l e cases.  there  be a tomato, He  suggests  always be mistaken i f I judge t h a t i t i s a tomato.  I b e l i e v e I have shown t h a t the l o g i c of the word  e n t a i l s a v e r i f i c a t i o n process. and  the  judge t h a t I see a tomato i s t o judge t h a t what I  t h a t i t matches the standard  But  to  I must know what i t i s t o  see matches what I know t o be the standard  t h a t I may  that  t o doubt that a i s b then  be b and.thus what i t i s not t o be  tomato.  Doubt-  instance  can see t h a t a matches b w i t h r e s p e c t  cannot v e r i f y .  To  are  a s c e r t a i n whether I am  I can v e r i f y my  'judge'  judgement  i n f a c t c o r r e c t or mistaken.  21  L e t us now, In the same v e i n , c o n s i d e r t i v e s P r i c e suggests. i s true;, i t may he.  the a l t e r n a -  What I see may he a wax tomato.  But I can t e s t whether i t i s a wax  That tomato.  I can s a t i s f y myself that i t i s n o t . What I see may he made of p l a s t i c ,  or g l a s s , or s t e e l ,  or even c o a l .  I t may be a  reflection,  or a holograph, or a p i c t u r e , or a p r o j e c t e d  I t may be a h a l l u c i n a t i o n , or a dream, or a mirage. simply  slide.  I argue  t h a t t o know what these t h i n g s a r e i s t o know how t o  t e s t f o r them. For every f a c t u a l doubt there must be a f a c t u a l t e s t . On the matter of f a c t u a l doubt I conclude then,  (1)  t h a t f a c t u a l doubt makes sense only a g a i n s t a case of f a c t u a l c e r t a i n t y , and (2)  that the doubt can be d i s p e l l e d by r e l e v a n t  tests. Now l e t us see how these c o n c l u s i o n s P r i c e ' s argument.  against  I have s a i d that the c e n t r a l i s s u e of t h i s  paper concerns the s o r t s of judgements e n t i a l c o n s t r u a l s we g i v e them.  judgements  we make and the sent-  S p e c i f i c a l l y a t i s s u e i s the  r e l a t i v e u t i l i t y and e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l o b j e c t language  count  s t a t u s of o r d i n a r y or  (which w i l l be expressed as re-  statements) and sense d a t a language  judgements (S-statements).  The argument from i l l u s i o n - which P r i c e i s making - attempts t o show t h a t the two languages a r e of two r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t s o r t s ; t h a t m a t e r i a l object language statements a r e i n h e r e n t l y doubtful, necessarily vulnerable  t o s c e p t i c a l doubt, and a r e  i n short c o r r i g i b l e , and t h a t sense d a t a statements a r e  22  i n d u b i t a b l e , not v u l n e r a b l e  t o s c e p t i c i s m , and  are  incorri-  gible. Has construed  P r i c e shown t h a t the M-statement,  as an e x p r e s s i o n  a tomato, i s i n p r i n c i p l e  of the object d o u b t f u l and  I b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s not of statements may c o r r i g i b l e but may  be  as a r e s u l t  in fact  judgement that I see  corrigible?  paradoxical  Let us  considered  statements w i t h i n that c l a s s incorrigible.  We  shall  t h i s matter f u r t h e r i n the chapter on formal doubt. wish t o argue t h a t i f my  see.  that a c l a s s  of t h e i r form be  that i n d i v i d u a l  e s t a b l i s h e d as  'I see a tomato*  conclusions  (1) and  consider Here I  (2) above are  conceded, as I t h i n k P r i c e would concede them, then i t f o l l o w s t h a t we true.  can e s t a b l i s h t h a t p a r t i c u l a r  M-statement language then i s only c o n t i n g e n t l y  or c o r r i g i b l e . and  M-statements are  Concommitantly i t i s c o n t i n g e n t l y  incorrigible.  statement,  I f (1) and  'I see a tomato' may  doubtful  doubt-free  (2) are conceded then the be v e r i f i e d .  then i t s v e r i f i c a t i o n ex hypothesi bility.  in fact  I t cannot, a f t e r a l l , be  M-  I f i t is, v e r i f i e d  established i t s i n c o r r i g i subject to c o r r e c t i o n i f  i t has been v e r i f i e d . The  upshot of t h i s  doubt M-statements and types one t h a t the  corrigible  i s t h a t compared w i t h r e s p e c t  S-statements are not  and  the other  of two  distinct  i n c o r r i g i b l e , but  i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of M-statements must be  to  rather  established  by v e r i f i c a t i o n w h i l e t h a t of S-statements a l l e g e d l y does not require v e r i f i c a t i o n .  (We  s h a l l examine i n my  chapter,  23  Some Doubts About I n d u b i t a b i l i t y . whether i t i s t r u e t h a t statements do not r e q u i r e v e r i f i c a t i o n . ) argument has t o be  S-  I contend t h a t P r i c e ' s  shown t h a t M-statement language can only be  l e s s convenient (because i t i s contingent  argued  and must be  v e r i f i e d ) than S-statement language which need not be  verified.  I b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s has broken the back of the argument from illusion.  With r e s p e c t t o doubt there  between M-statements and whether there and  i s any  ambiguity.  We  i s no e s s e n t i a l asymmetry  S-statements.  I t remains to be  seen  such asymmetry w i t h r e s p e c t t o convenience  s h a l l consider  these matters i n the r e t r o -  s p e c t i v e s e c t i o n on doubt, Some Doubts About Doubting. Concluding the s e c t i o n on f a c t u a l doubt as i t p e r t a i n s t o P r i c e l e t me  say t h a t I t h i n k he:, has been m i s l e d ,  many. p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  by p r e s e n t i n g  doubted about,, p e r c e p t u a l see a tomato and i s not anything contrary  as have  h i s examplevjof what may  judgement i n vacuo.  be  Judging t h a t  we  not a r e p l i c a or a r e f l e c t i o n or a h a l l u c i n a t i o n l i k e as d o u b t f u l as P r i c e suggests.  to what we  i n t u i t i v e l y b e l i e v e , t h a t f o r any  He  suggests perceptual  judgement of an object s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s t a t e s of a f f a i r s are always ;on an equal f o o t i n g . that conditions  believe  p r e v a i l i n g i n d i c a t e t h a t some of the a l t e r n a t e  s t a t e s of a f f a i r s do not t h a t the only r e l e v a n c e provide  Normally however we  obtain.  I t may  however be  of p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s  f u r t h e r occasions  f o r doubt.  thorough-going s p e c p t i c a l t h e s i s not are d o u b t f u l about p e r c e p t i o n but  objected  i s that they  T h i s leads t o the more just that p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s  t h a t a l l the f a c t s about  any  24  case are e q u a l l y d o u b t f u l .  We  s h a l l examine j u s t how  f u l t h i s argument i s i n the next chapter,  force-  Formal Doubt.  I f P r i c e ' s argument from doubt i s r a t h e r hasty, l e t us examine a longer and d u b i t a b l e and tables.  more c a r e f u l account of what i s a l l e g e d l y  i n d u b i t a b l e about p e r c e i v i n g such t h i n g s  Bertrand  as  R u s s e l l makes the f o l l o w i n g argument from  • i l l u s i o n in: h i s book Problems of P h i l o s o p h y . In the f i r s t  chapter R u s s e l l proposes a d i s t i n c t i o n  between appearance and what we  reality.  U l t i m a t e l y he argues that  commonly take as r e a l i s i n f a c t h i g h l y d o u b t f u l ,  f a r too d o u b t f u l t o serve as the f o u n d a t i o n knowledge.  What w i l l f u l f i l l  t h a t e x a l t e d f u n c t i o n , he  are appearances or sense data, perception.  of e m p i r i c a l  the  argues,  i n d u b i t a b l e elements of  Let us f o l l o w h i s argument as he t r i e s t o con-  v i n c e us of the  i l l u s o r y nature of our o r d i n a r y b e l i e f s about  tables  •. R u s s e l l introduces  and he and  the d i s t i n c t i o n between appearance  r e a l i t y by examining how  we  describe  tables.  says, d e s c r i b e a t a b l e as oblong, brown and c o o l and  tapped.  hard, and  We  might,  shiny,  smooth  such as t o emit a wooden sound when  "Anyone e l s e who  sees and  f e e l s and  hears the  table  w i l l agree w i t h t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , so that i t might seem as i f no d i f f i c u l t y would a r i s e ; but as soon as we 2 more p r e c i s e our t r o u b l e s  begin."  t r y t o be  25  The as  f o l l o w i n g i s a para-phrase of R u s s e l l ' s argument  i t a f f e c t s our n o t i o n s  f e e l of thev-table.  of the c o l o r , t e x t u r e ,  shape, and  F i r s t he suggests t h a t although we b e l i e v e  the t a b l e i s ' r e a l l y ' the same c o l o r a l l over, i n f a c t we do not  see the same c o l o r .  We see some p a r t s b r i g h t e r than  others,  some p a r t s which look b r i g h t and shiny due t o r e f l e c t e d l i g h t . Some p a r t s look dark and shadowed. as I change p o s i t i o n .  These p a r t s change p o s i t i o n  " I t f o l l o w s t h a t i f s e v e r a l people  are l o o k i n g a t the t a b l e a t the same moment, no two of them w i l l see e x a c t l y the same d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o l o u r s , because no two can see i t from e x a c t l y the same p o i n t of view, and any  change i n the p o i n t of view makes some change i n the.may  the l i g h t  i s reflected."-^  He goes on t o suggest t h a t some people, a r t i s t s f o r example, have a s p e c i a l concern w i t h how t h i n g s appear irather than how we t h i n k they a r e .  (An example t h a t R u s s e l l might  have used i s t h a t a r t i s t s o f t e n must l e a r n t h a t shadows a r e not b l a c k but colored.) appearance/reality ficial  And t h i s i s the genesis  distinction.  l i g h t , color blindness,  of the  A f t e r mentioning t h a t  arti-  tinted spectacles etc. w i l l  r e s u l t i n changes i n the way we p e r c e i v e t a b l e , R u s s e l l makes the f o l l o w i n g  the c o l o r of the  claims,  T h i s c o l o r i s not something inherent i n the t a b l e , but something depending upon the t a b l e and the s p e c t a t o r and the way the l i g h t f a l l s on the t a b l e . When i n o r d i n a r y l i f e , we speak of the c o l o u r of the t a b l e , we only mean the s o r t of  26  c o l o u r which i t w i l l seem to have t o a normal s p e c t a t o r from an o r d i n a r y p o i n t of view under u s u a l c o n d i t i o n s of l i g h t . But the other c o l o u r s which appear under other c o n d i t i o n s have j u s t as good a r i g h t t o be considered r e a l ; and t h e r e f o r e t o a v o i d f a v o r i t i s m , we are compelled to deny t h a t , i n i t s e l f , the t a b l e has any one particular colour.^ R u s s e l l a p p l i e s the same s o r t of c r i t i q u e t o the t e x t u r e of the t a b l e , n o t i n g t h a t what looks smooth and t o the naked eye may fying glass, and  look rough and  uneven through a magni-  "Which of these i s the  f u r t h e r concludes,  "Thus again,  senses with which we began d e s e r t s Then he c o n s i d e r s  even  ' r e a l * t a b l e ? " , he the confidence  asks,  i n our  us,"^  the shape of the t a b l e .  We are a l l i n the h a b i t of judging as t o the ' r e a l ' shapes of t h i n g s , and we do t h i s so u n r e f l e c t i n g l y t h a t we come t o t h i n k we a c t u a l l y see the r e a l shapes. But, i n f a c t , as we a l l have t o l e a r n i f we t r y t o draw, a g i v e n t h i n g looks d i f f e r e n t i n shape from every p o i n t of view. I f our t a b l e i s ' r e a l l y * r e c t a n g u l a r , i t w i l l look from almost a l l p o i n t s of view, as i f i t had two acute angles and two obtuse angles. I f opposite s i d e s are p a r a l l e l they w i l l look a s . i f they converged t o a p o i n t away from the s p e c t a t o r . . . . A l l these t h i n g s are not n o t i c e d i n l o o k i n g a t a t a b l e because experience has taught us to c o n s t r u c t the ' r e a l ' shape from the apparent shape..,.But the r e a l shape i s not what we see; i t i s something i n f e r r e d from what we see. And what we see i s c o n s t a n t l y changing i n shape as we move about the room.g  Next he c o n s i d e r s  the sense of touch, n o t i n g  though the t a b l e always f e e l s hard, "the s e n s a t i o n we depends upon how  hard we  p a r t of the body we  press  press the t a b l e and with."?  that obtain  a l s o upon what  2?  The  conclusion that R u s s e l l , l i k e Price,  would have  us draw from a l l t h i s i s t h a t there are many t h i n g s we can doubt when we see such o b j e c t s as tomatoes and t a b l e s . we might b e g i n with some confidence soon d e s e r t us.  We never p e r c e i v e  i n our senses,  Though  i t will  ' r e a l ' o b j e c t s nor t h e i r  q u a l i t i e s but only i n f e r them. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know where t o begin t o c r i t i c i z e an argument such as t h i s . wrong with  I t h i n k there i s something very  i t b u t i t i s by no means easy t o say what.  claim i s clear  enough; we do not p e r c e i v e the r e a l  qualities  of o b j e c t s but c o n s t r u c t or i n f e r them from apparent What i s n ' t c l e a r  Russell's  qualities.  t o me i s whether, and i f so how, t h i s i s  e s t a b l i s h e d as a v a l i d c o n c l u s i o n from h i s examples or whether it  i s something e s s e n t i a l l y  presupposed by R u s s e l l .  In order  to get t o the bottom of t h i s i t might be u s e f u l t o ask what would count as seeing the r e a l shape of an o b j e c t . i n f a c t anything qualities  Is_ there  t h a t would count as p e r c e i v i n g the ' r e a l '  of an o b j e c t or i s t h i s debarred  of what i s meant by ' r e a l * ?  by R u s s e l l ' s n o t i o n  These a r e d i f f i c u l t  questions.  C e r t a i n l y R u s s e l l ' s p o i n t seems t o come as a c o n c l u s i o n f o l l o w ing from a l i n e of r e a s o n i n g .  He has g i v e n us examples of  p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t d i f f e r e n t l y from d i f f e r e n t view and under d i f f e r e n t tual  conditions.  These r e l a t i v e  judgements a r e what seem t o support  we do not p e r c e i v e but i n f e r the r e a l  p o i n t s of percep-  the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t  qualities.  28  Let us, however, attempt to f a l s i f y the c o n c l u s i o n to a s c e r t a i n whether there are, on R u s s e l l ' s view, any t h a t would a l l o w us t o say t h a t we of an o b j e c t .  Suppose there was  conditions  p e r c e i v e the r e a l  qualities  an o b j e c t whose t e x t u r e  looked  the same under a microscope as i t d i d t o the naked eye. would then on R u s s e l l ' s account have no reason our senses and we would not •which i s the  'real' table?'  We  to d i s t r u s t  i n t h i s case ask R u s s e l l ' s q u e s t i o n , Or c o n s i d e r the case of a sphere.  I t looks the same from every p o i n t of view.  There i s nothing  i n the case of spheres to make us conclude t h a t we do not their  ' r e a l ' shape.  various perceptions  I f i t i s the r e l a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s i n our of o b j e c t s under d i f f e r e n t  t h a t ought t o convince their  'real' qualities,  experience different  different  us t o conclude t h a t we  perceptions  c o n d i t i o n s we  position  perceive not  should be able to conclude t h a t  we  This would put us- i n the ' r e a l ' shapes of  but not of others, t a b l e s .  t h i s i s c o n t r a r y to R u s s e l l ' s i n t e n t i o n . c l a i m t h a t we  do not  of the same o b j e c t s under  of b e i n g a b l e to see the  some o b j e c t s , spheres,  conditions  then f o r examples where we do  do p e r c e i v e t h e i r r e a l q u a l i t i e s . strange  see  l o g i c a l l y c o n s t r u c t the  I think  I believe Russell's  'real' qualities  of  o b j e c t s d e r i v e s more from h i s n o t i o n of what ' r e a l ' means than from an argument from examples. However, l e t us, b e f o r e we the word  t u r n t o an examination of  ' r e a l ' , c o n s i d e r more c l o s e l y R u s s e l l ' s argument con-  c e r n i n g s e e i n g the shape of a t a b l e .  Remember t h a t he  says  2  t h a t we l e a r n , i f we t r y t o draw, t h a t "a g i v e n t h i n g different  looks  i n shape from every d i f f e r e n t p o i n t of view."  the e x p r e s s i o n  'looks d i f f e r e n t  9  Now  i n shape' i s ambiguous.  We  don't c l a i m t h a t o b j e c t s look as though they a r e d i f f e r e n t i n shape seen from d i f f e r e n t i f we draw an o b j e c t  positions.  What i s t r u e i s t h a t  (excepting spheres) from d i f f e r e n t  of view our drawings w i l l not be congruent.  R u s s e l l ' s case  would be e a s i l y made i f we r e s t r i c t e d ourselves about two-dimensional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s v i s u a l experience.  points  to talking  of the content  of our  T h i s p o i n t can be seen when we.consider  h i s c l a i m t h a t , " I f our t a b l e i s ' r e a l l y ' r e c t a n g u l a r , i t will  look from almost a l l p o i n t s of view, as i f i t had two  acute angles  and two obtuse angles."  It i s certainly  true  t h a t two-dimensional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the t a b l e from most p o i n t s of view w i l l have two acute and two obtuse  angles.  But when we look a t the t a b l e we might simply deny t h a t i t looks as though i t - h a d two acute and two obtuse S i m i l a r l y w i t h the c l a i m , "If. opposite  angles.  sides are p a r a l l e l ,  they w i l l look as i f they converged t o a p o i n t away from the spectator."  We might w e l l deny t h a t opposite  look as though they r e a l l y w i l l converge. dimensionally,  s i d e s of a t a b l e  But considered two-  l i n e s extended from the s i d e s of the t a b l e  would converge.  F i n a l l y l e t me c o n s i d e r R u s s e l l ' s c l a i m  "what we see i s c o n s t a n t l y changing i n shape as we move about the room." emphatically  I f what we see i s the t a b l e then we would deny t h a t the t a b l e i s changing shape.  certainly What would  30  be changing shape are r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , as f o r example drawings, of the t a b l e . What these p o i n t s show I t h i n k i s t h a t R u s s e l l ' s argument r e l i e s on a c e r t a i n ambiguous r e f e r e n c e of such p r e s s i o n s as,  ' i t looks as i f i t had* and  'what we  see.'  I s h a l l be c o n s i d e r i n g ambiguity i n a l a t e r chapter. here p o i n t out t h a t the ambiguity may We  or t h a t i t changed shape.  Let  be q u i c k l y c l e a r e d  would q u i c k l y deny t h a t the t a b l e had acute and  angles  data.  But  i f we  up.  C l e a r i n g up the ambiguous  toward the view t h a t what we  Russell  see are sense  c l e a r up any ambiguous r e f e r e n c e then the  judgement t h a t what we credited.  me  obtuse  r e f e r e n c e s would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t R u s s e l l ' s argument. seems predisposed  ex-  see  i s an o b j e c t i s by no means d i s -  There do seem t o be a l t e r n a t e ways of d e s c r i b i n g  our p e r c e p t u a l experience, t i o n are o b j e c t s constant  one  such t h a t the o b j e c t s of percep-  i n shape, e t c . and  the other such  t h a t the o b j e c t s of p e r c e p t i o n are sense data and are cons t a n t l y changing.  R u s s e l l shows a p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r the  a l t e r n a t i v e but he has not destroyed former e i t h e r as theory or language. of  latter  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the But we  are g e t t i n g ahead  ourselves. Let us examine the word  argument.  I t i s always a f a i r q u e s t i o n where the word  i s used t o ask what 'not r e a l *  ' r e a l * , the core of R u s s e l l ' s  'real*  to r e f e r to?  Now  i s being c o n t r a s t e d t o .  'real*  What i s  i n R u s s e l l ' s argument the c l u e  i s g i v e n I t h i n k i n h i s t i t l e f o r the chapter, Appearance  and  31  Reality. or  'Real' o b j e c t s or q u a l i t i e s a r e not apparent o b j e c t s  qualities. Here we have a l r e a d y the beginning of one of the d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t cause most t r o u b l e i n philosophy the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'appearance' and ' r e a l i t y * , between what t h i n g s seem t o be and what they a r e . The p a i n t e r wants t o know what t h i n g s seem t o be, the p r a c t i c a l man and the p h i l o s o p h e r want t o know what they are; but the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s wish t o know t h i s i s s t r o n g e r than the p r a c t i c a l man's and i s more t r o u b l e d by knowledge as t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s of answering the question.g But  somehow i t appears t h a t the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s  question  d i f f e r s from t h a t of the p r a c t i c a l man n o t only by reason of i t s more intense m o t i v a t i o n . different  s o r t of q u e s t i o n .  R u s s e l l a c t s as though i t i s a The p r a c t i c a l man wants t o know  the shape or c o l o r , e t c . of the t a b l e and he i s prepared t o accept  (or t o demand or t o give) answers of v a r y i n g degrees  of completeness.  The p h i l o s o p h e r , a t l e a s t  i n Russell's  account,  wants t o know the ' r e a l ' shape of the t a b l e and seems t o t h i n k t h a t i f the t a b l e has a r e a l shape there w i l l be only one p o s s i b l e complete answer t o h i s q u e s t i o n .  The p r a c t i c a l man  can never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y answer the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s  question  because of the p h i l o s o p h e r ' s s t r i c t u r e concerning  the use of  the word  'real.' R u s s e l l uses the word  ' r e a l ' i n h i s argument i n a wholly  a r t i f i c i a l and m i s l e a d i n g way. of  i t s r e l e v a n t uses.  L e t us examine  We may t a l k of,  A r e a l table A r e a l tomato A r e a l improvement.  ' r e a l ' i n some  3 2  The  p o i n t i s t h a t i n each of these cases the use  • r e a l * excludes from c o n s i d e r a t i o n common ways of being r e a l , common ways of d e v i a t i n g from a standard of a r e a l t a b l e i s not t o suggest t h a t there of being a t a b l e .  But what i t does do  case.  of not  To t a l k  i s only one  way  i s to exclude a l l s o r t s  of common ways of being not a r e a l t a b l e .  I t excludes from  c o n s i d e r a t i o n toy t a b l e s , photographs of t a b l e s , makeshift t a b l e s , and .in short a whole range of t h i n g s we some c o n d i t i o n s mistake f o r t a b l e s . may  be  The  ways i n which t h i n g s  l i k e an x but not be an x are protean.  n o t i o n of a r e a l x i s j u s t as protean.  might under  However the  When I t a l k of a r e a l  t a b l e I l e t you know t h a t I am not r e f e r r i n g t o a makeshift t a b l e or a h a l l u c i n a t e d t a b l e or a photograph of a t a b l e . But  I don't t e l l you anything  mind.  My  t a b l e may  about the t a b l e t h a t I have i n  be a dining-room t a b l e or a k i t c h e n  or a card t a b l e ( a l l of which are, Calling i t a  of course, r e a l t a b l e s ) .  ' r e a l ' t a b l e says nothing  table i t i s .  J u s t as  table  about what s o r t of a  ' r e a l * excludes a whole range of ways  of being n o t - a - r e a l t a b l e , i t a p p l i e s t o a whole range of ways of being a r e a l t a b l e .  I f I speak of a real.tomato I don't  g i v e you any d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n of the tomato but you know t h a t I am tomatoes, e t c . t o l d you  e x c l u d i n g wax  tomatoes, or r e f l e c t i o n s of  I f I t a l k of a r e a l improvement, I haven't  e x a c t l y what the  improvement i n v o l v e s .  I have l e t you know t h a t the isn't  I do l e t  But a t l e a s t  improvement i s n ' t i l l u s o r y or i t  j u s t an„alleged improvement.  33  As A u s t i n has  s a i d , "the f u n c t i o n of  ' r e a l ' i s not  c o n t r i b u t e p o s i t i v e l y to the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of anything t o exclude p o s s i b l e ways of being not r e a l . " ^ t h i n k s the f u n c t i o n of  apparently  but  Russell surely  ' r e a l ' does p o s i t i v e l y c o n t r i b u t e  the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of the t a b l e and  to  to  of i t s q u a l i t i e s .  t h i n k s t h a t i f the t a b l e i s to have a  He  ' r e a l ' shape  or c o l o r then the r e a l shape must admit of only one  (complete)  d e s c r i p t i o n r e g a r d l e s s of the p o i n t of view from which i t i s perceived.  T h i s might be expressed by saying that he  the n o t i o n of a r e a l x i s l o g i c a l l y m o n o l i t h i c . Austin's analysis i s correct that word, a f l e x i b i l i t y d e v i c e , are a d j u s t e d  I f however  ' r e a l ' i s an  "by the use  'adjuster'  of which other words  t o meet the innumerable and unforeseeable  of the world upon language"10 then ' r e a l ' i s not but protean.  A u s t i n has  mechanism by which we as b e i n g a d j u s t e d , As we  it  take: some cases as standard  or compared, t o the  demands  monolithic  i l l u m i n a t e d i t s r o l e i n the  have seen, what we  protean? there may account of  thinks  linguistic  and  others  standard. "'' 1  take as standard  may  be  be many ways of being a r e a l t a b l e .  Russell's  ' r e a l * seems t o be t h a t as used i n o r d i n a r y language  i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d t o a questionable  of substance.  and metaphysical n o t i o n  I f i t i s not too p a r a d o x i c a l we might say  R u s s e l l t h i n k s that i n o r d i n a r y language  ' r e a l * has an  sense t h a t i t ought not l e g i t i m a t e l y t o have. shown that i t does not implication.  i n f a c t have t h i s  Austin  that  'ideal' has  ' i d e a l ' or metaphysical  34  There remains one matter to be c l e a r e d up w i t h to  'real.'  You w i l l have n o t i c e d t h a t a l l my  been concerned w i t h s u b s t a n t i v e s questioning  i s the  of o b j e c t s .  ' r e a l ' nature of q u a l i t i e s we  the  predicate  Does ' r e a l * work any d i f f e r e n t l y r e g a r d i n g  a t a b l e (and not a toy, e t c . ) ? of  examples have  whereas what R u s s e l l i s  shape of the t a b l e than r e g a r d i n g ,  question  regard  say,  the  the f a c t t h a t i t is_  Austin directs  himself  ' r e a l ' c o l o r and notes t h a t one might say  t o the that  'real'- c o l o r of a t h i n g i s the c o l o r i t looks t o a normal  observer under normal or standard counters t h i s suggestion  conditions.  He  immediately  however w i t h a s e r i e s of examples 12  i n which we He  are not  sure what normal c o n d i t i o n s would  concludes t h a t , " I t i s p r e t t y obvious that there  answer t o these questions no r u l e s a c c o r d i n g  be.  i s no  [ i e . as t o r e a l shape, r e a l c o l o r ] -  t o which, no procedure by which, answers  are t o be determined. "•'-3 I t would seem then t h a t we tion,  can e i t h e r answer the ques-  'What i s the r e a l c o l o r of the t a b l e ? • w i t h  t o standard  conditions,  conditions i s disputed, ;  t o the q u e s t i o n .  reference  or, i f what i s t o c o n s t i t u t e we  Divorced  can p r o t e s t that there from standard  standard  i s no answer  c o n d i t i o n s the ques-  t i o n i s unanswerable. We between a  can agree w i t h A u s t i n that "we ' r e a l ' x and  make a  distinction  'not a r e a l x' only i f there  is a  way  of t e l l i n g the d i f f e r e n c e between what i s a r e a l x and what is not."  124-  35  R u s s e l l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between the the apparent  ' r e a l ' shape,  etc.)  of the t a b l e and  etc.)  i s j u s t such a d i s t i n c t i o n because he denies t h a t  dard c o n d i t i o n s are r e l e v a n t .  ( i e . not r e a l ) shape  t h a t we  of o b j e c t s . expression,  do not  see but c o n s t r u c t  t a b l e i s r e a l l y blue  has not  shown t h a t p e r c e p t u a l  pressed  as M-statements are  stan-  admitting,  the r e a l  There seems t o be a p e r f e c t l y good use 'The  (color,  To conclude our d i s c u s s i o n of  ' r e a l ' I contend t h a t R u s s e l l has not d r i v e n us to nor can he,  (color,  qualities  f o r the  (round, e t c . ) . '  Russell  judgements about the t a b l e  inescapably  doubtful.  ex-  Perhaps  what has been shown by our examination of R u s s e l l ' s argument i s t h a t o r d i n a r y language has and  presuppositions.  I f we  i t s own  (and m e t a p h y s i c a l l y )  or t h a t what we then we  i t s own  approach i t w i t h other  t i o n s , f o r instance t h a t the use tively  logic,  of  rules presupposi-  'real' contributes  to the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of  p e r c e i v e are not  o b j e c t s but  posianything  appearances,  might prima f a c i e make a coherent argument.  But  c l o s e l y examined the argument w i l l not hold as the a n a l y s i s of the f u n c t i o n of Let us now  ' r e a l ' i n o r d i n a r y language shows. t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n  senses, the confidence soon d e s e r t s us. the naked eye ing g l a s s .  i t may  i n our  R u s s e l l says we b e g i n w i t h but which  While the t a b l e looks smooth and  According  our confidence  of confidence  look rough and  even to  uneven through a magnify-  to R u s s e l l t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t to  i n our senses to r o u t .  put  36  A g a i n the argument r e v o l v e s around the q u e s t i o n the  ' r e a l ' t a b l e or the  For otherwise how and  'real* texture  We  (shape, c o l o r , e t c . ) .  c o u l d l o o k i n g a t a t a b l e w i t h the naked  then w i t h a microscope d e s t r o y  senses?  of  our confidence  eye  i n our  would expect the t e x t u r e t o look d i f f e r e n t seen  through a magnifying g l a s s . What does he mean by would seem, from the tenor assumption t h a t any be d e f i n i t i v e .  "confidence  i n our senses."  of h i s d i s c u s s i o n , t o be the  single perception  Or perhaps we  naive  of an object ought t o  might put  t i o n of an o b j e c t must be d e f i n i t i v e ;  It  i t t h a t any  descrip-  i f i t c o n f l i c t s with  (or j u s t d i f f e r s from) another d e s c r i p t i o n of the same object then t h i s counts a g a i n s t the  'reality*  t h i s assumption i s s u r e l y e c l e c t i c on R u s s e l l ' s  of the o b j e c t .  But  i f not t o say e c c e n t r i c  part.  On the c o n t r a r y most of us assume that, objects  ought  t o look d i f f e r e n t when seen under d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view and  and  t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n s  we  might make of the object seen under these c o n d i t i o n s or from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view ought to d i f f e r from one What would d e s t r o y o b j e c t looked dence i n my  our confidence  i n our senses i s i f the  the same under a l l c o n d i t i o n s .  Thus my  'confi-  senses' i s not shaken because the t a b l e that  smooth to the naked eye I t would be  another.  looks  looks rough under a magnifying g l a s s .  shaken i f I n o t i c e d no d i f f e r e n c e i n the  as seen under the d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s .  S i m i l a r l y my  table confidence  3?  i n what I take t o he  the  ' r e a l ' shape of the t a b l e would be  shaken i f the t a b l e looked the same from a l l p o i n t s The  c o n d i t i o n s which convince R u s s e l l t h a t we  • r e a l ' shape are do.  .lust the c o n d i t i o n s  t o be  see  of view; t h i s i s a patent Let us  look a g a i n a t how  says, remember, t h a t we  brown and  f e e l s and  shiny,  ' r e a l ' shape i t appears  The  c o o l and  paramount q u e s t i o n  hard, and  oblong,  such as  "Anyone e l s e who  to  sees  and  then i s whether we  can.  And  conventionally  the reason we  can  way.  "troubles."  can be p r e c i s e i s  eg. seen under a magnifying g l a s s . wish, and We  as p r e c i s e as  do not,  i s necessary,  as R u s s e l l does,  s i n g l e d e s c r i p t i o n of a t a b l e must be  Being p r e c i s e  be  s i g n a l that our d e s c r i p t i o n i s made  i n our d e s c r i p t i o n of t a b l e s . assume t h a t any  but  begin."  i n d e s c r i b i n g the t a b l e without running i n t o  can be as p r e c i s e as we  one  a t a b l e as  i f no d i f f i c u l t y would a r i s e ;  under s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s ,  tive.  or under d i f f e r e n t  t r y t o be more p r e c i s e our t r o u b l e s  of course we  t h a t we  of  hears the t a b l e w i l l agree w i t h t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n ,  as soon as we  precise  we  absurdity.  might d e s c r i b e  smooth and  so t h a t i t might seem as  any  the  R u s s e l l begins h i s argument.  emit a wooden sound when tapped.  We  see  t h a t there be no discurepancy between d e s c r i p t i o n s  points  But  a  i s never made e x p l i c i t by him but  o b j e c t s as seen under d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s  He  do not  that convince us t h a t  What would s a t i s f y R u s s e l l t h a t i t has  which we  of view.  i s not b e i n g any  one  defini-  t h i n g or a c t i n g i n  At the same time n o t i c e t h a t there are no  criteria  38  in general upon t h e  f o r being  precise.  p a r t i c u l a r c a s e and  How  we  are  upon our  t o be  precise  purposes w i t h  depends  respect  to i t . As word  w i t h h i s use  'precise*  precise  and  work f o r  being not  'real'  standards are  not  precise.  the  give  a  precise  judging  'troubles' being  the  is  telling  shape of  standards f o r  have  word us  'real*,  the  is.  for  objects real  judging  real  shape  (color, etc.)  the  i t may,  J u s t as  where i t i s n o t r e a l are,  we  of  have of  the  c l e a r what s o we  cannot  c l e a r what  f r o m what  table?",  table?", the  in principle,  are  table  not cannot  questions Russell r a i s e s ,  d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e  W h a t e v e r f a c t u a l d o u b t s we of  'real.'  what i s p r e c i s e  i s that  the  argument w i l l  ' p r e c i s e ' where i t i s n o t  point  description  the  from not  The  precise  R u s s e l l uses  d i f f e r e n c e between b e i n g  And  ' p r e c i s e ' anymore t h a n f o r  doubt the the  without  of the  "How  is  "What  can  we  harmless.  or  of  anyone's  be . d i s p e l l e d by  relevant  investigation, A further f a c t u a l d o u b t s we  objection may  t o the  entertain  opposed t o f o r m a l doubt, the this a  that  causal  explanation argument causal  i n the  o f any  discussion  e a c h example R u s s e l l explanation.  claim  that  For  seems t o  example  i n the  uses a  example,  i s supposed t o r e s u l t i n a d e n i a l  story.  always (as  of w h i c h f o l l o w s )  introduces  of the  are  p a r t i c u l a r object  However, a l t h o u g h he  construction  there  presuppose causal  somehow  of p a r t  is  of  the  the  s e c t i o n q u o t e d above he  says,  39  " t h i s c o l o u r i s n o t something i n h e r e n t i n t h e t a b l e , b u t somet h i n g depending upon t h e t a b l e and t h e s p e c t a t o r and t h e way the l i g h t f a l l s on t h e t a b l e . " l i n e of a r g u i n g  B u t t h e end r e s u l t of h i s  i s t o deny t h a t t h e t a b l e and t h e l i g h t and  the way i t f a l l s on t h e t a b l e e x i s t i n t h e way i n which a l l t h r e e c a n be c a u s a l l y c o n n e c t e d .  He wishes t o c o l l a p s e t h e  t r i p a r t i t e c a u s a l s t o r y i n f a v o r of j u s t t h e s p e c t a t o r . the c a u s a l s t o r y by i t s e l f makes c o n s i d e r a b l e  But  sense and i s  not a f f e c t e d by R u s s e l l ' s c l a i m s t h a t we can n e i t h e r know t h e ' r e a l ' shape of t h e t a b l e n o r d e s c r i b e  i t precisely.  On t h e  c o n t r a r y such n o t i o n s as we have of ' r e a l ' and ' p r e c i s e ' a r e c l o s e l y connected t o c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . say  That i s , we c a n  'That i s n o t t h e r e a l c o l o r of t h e t a b l e ' p r e c i s e l y because  we know t h a t i t i s b e i n g viewed under s p e c i a l (abnormal) conditions.  Wejcan say t h a t our d e s c r i p t i o n of the t a b l e i s  p r e c i s e because we have t a k e n p a i n s t o a s c e r t a i n what  'pre-  c i s e ' means i n t h i s case and t o ensure t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d s have been met ( e g . t h a t s p e c i a l l i g h t i n g has been used, a s p e c t r o g r a p h and/or a m a g n i f y i n g g l a s s has been used e t c . , e t c . ) . ..To c o n c l u d e t h i s s e c t i o n of f a c t u a l doubt l e t me r e i t e r a t e t h a t i t i s no good s u g g e s t i n g  that perceiving  objects  i s d o u b t f u l w i t h o u t i n d i c a t i n g what e x a c t l y i t i s t h a t we can doubt.  I f what i s d o u b t f u l i s s i m p l y some f a c t about t h e  o b j e c t , t h e n t h i s doubt c a n e a s i l y be a l l a y e d .  I f what i s  d o u b t f u l i s something e l s e , some f o r m a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , t h e n we must c o n s i d e r t h i s f o r m a l doubt s e p a r a t e l y and a t l e n g t h .  ko  I I I . Formal Doubt Let us c o n s i d e r whether P r i c e and R u s s e l l are i n g something more than simply doubtful with respect  t h a t any  to t h e i r examples.  suggest-  particular fact is Let us  consider  whether they mean t o argue the more thorough-going s c e p t i c a l t h e s i s t h a t f o r m a l l y speaking a l l the f a c t s are  i n doubt.  Perhaps they mean t o argue that I can never be c e r t a i n t h a t an a s s e r t i o n about a p e r c e p t u a l Let us c o n s i d e r 'The  such a s s e r t i o n s as,  t a b l e i s oblong i n shape.'  I b e l i e v e them to be mistaken.  judgement i s a true a s s e r t i o n .  true.  But  'I see a tomato' or,  When I a s s e r t these  I r e a l i z e that I could  Experience c o u l d prove me  ions are  things  wrong.  be  Perhaps my  assert-  false. Now  I s h a l l argue t h a t t o suggest t h a t experience  demonstrate t h a t my  a s s e r t i o n s are f a l s e  i m p l i e s that  could  experi-  ence c o u l d a l s o , under a l t e r e d c o n d i t i o n s , demonstrate i t t o be  true.  We  cannot, u n l e s s we  are speaking of a n a l y t i c a s s e r -  t i o n s , suggest t h a t something i s f a l s e without knowing that i t c o u l d be t r u e . tomato may  be  For example, my  a s s e r t i o n t h a t I see  true or f a l s e .  I f you  because no tomato i s present  then we  b e i n g a l l t h a t i s objected i n f a c t present  a  suggest that i t i s f a l s e both know t h a t ,  this  t o , i f a tomato were shown t o be  you would not the  say the a s s e r t i o n i s f a l s e .  T h i s may  sound t r i v i a l but  i m p l i c a t i o n s are  ficant.  For what the n o t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s of  I think  signi-  demonstrabiiity  of e i t h e r the t r u t h or f a l s i t y of an a s s e r t i o n means i s t h a t  kl  we  have a d e c i s i o n process by which we  the a s s e r t i o n ' s t r u t h or f a l s i t y . tomato' may  be  true or i t may  The  decide  (demonstrate)  assertion,  be f a l s e .  'I see  a  To say that i t i s  t r u e i s t o imply that necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s t r u t h have been s a t i s f i e d .  To say t h a t i t i s f a l s e i m p l i e s that  necessary c o n d i t i o n s have not been s a t i s f i e d . conditions it  notion  of  of s a t i s f a c t i o n i s b a s i c t o the c l a i m e i t h e r t h a t  i s true or t h a t i t i s f a l s e .  s a t i s f a c t i o n i m p l i e s t h a t we the r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n ) the other.  I f we  can apply  The n o t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s  have a d e c i s i o n process  t h a t allows  thus a l l a y doubt.  are not  or held  are put back to f a c t u a l doubt.  our d e c i s i o n process,  judgements and  of  (checking  us to decide one way  do have a d e c i s i o n process we  i n the g r i p of formal doubt; we We  The  the  that i s we We  can  verify  can a s c e r t a i n whether  the a s s e r t i o n i s true or f a l s e . I t h i n k that b u i l t process we  i n t o the argument from d e c i s i o n  ( i e . the argument that i f we  are not  i n the g r i p of formal doubt) i s the n o t i o n  statements of f a c t s i n the world and f a c t u a l s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , fiable.  have a d e c i s i o n process  The  of my  of  t o be meaningful, must be  a s s e r t i o n t h a t the u n i v e r s e  seems to be  the s o r t of statement t h a t we  false.  i n f a c t we  But  perception  that  veri-  i s expanding  uniformly  c o u l d c a l l true  have no d e c i s i o n process to v e r i f y  statement.  Nothing I can do w i l l demonstrate i t s f a l s i t y .  The most we  c o u l d say  false.  To say  i s that the statement i s e i t h e r true  j u s t t h i s much i s t o leave us w i t h a  or this  or  tautology.  42  Thus i n the end we have s a i d  nothing.  I wish t o argue t h a t formal doubt or systematic s c e p t i c i s m takes whatever f o r c e i t has from denying us a d e c i s i o n process. t h a t there The  i s a tomato before  sceptic w i l l  not P.  L e t me give an example.  I agree.  me.  Suppose I a s s e r t  Me s h a l l c a l l t h i s P.  suggest t h a t perhaps i t i s the case that So the q u e s t i o n  i s Pv-P and I wish t o f i n d  out what i s the case.  Suppose I adduce some evidence f o r P.  I argue i f Q then P.  The s c e p t i c can a t t h i s p o i n t do e i t h e r  of two t h i n g s . not P.  He can argue that even i f Q then p o s s i b l y  I f he does t h i s he w i l l be q u e s t i o n i n g  Q as evidence f o r P.  the worth of  There may be good evidence or bad e v i -  dence and, he w i l l argue, even good evidence may be compatible w i t h the f a l s i t y  of the c o n c l u s i o n .  On the other hand he may  admit t h a t Q would e n t a i l P i f we c o u l d e s t a b l i s h Q, he w i l l q u e s t i o n if  Q i n the same way that he questions  But P.  Thus  I a s s e r t Q the s c e p t i c suggests t h a t perhaps i t i s the case  t h a t not Q. not R.  I f I adduce R t o e n t a i l Q he argues t h a t perhaps  I wish t o decide between P and -P and so I adduce  evidence and c o n s t r u c t an argument. t h a t there  The s c e p t i c claims  either  i s no evidence that would e n t a i l P, or t h a t even  i n the s p e c i a l case i n which Q e n t a i l s P we may s u b j e c t the evidence, Q, t o the same s o r t of doubt as the o r i g i n a l t i o n , P.  asser-  ( I might note t h a t we need not jump t o the c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t t h i s e n t a i l s t h a t there must be an i n f i n i t e  series.  The  s t r e n g t h of the s c e p t i c ' s p o s i t i o n l i e s i n h i s s u b j e c t i n g each  43  piece  of evidence t h a t  We do n o t know a p r i o r i L e t us address it P  i s the case t h a t just  I do a d d u c e t o t h e same s o r t how much e v i d e n c e  conjunction  present.)  o u r s e l v e s t o the q u e s t i o n of whether  t h e r e i s always  s u p p o s i n g we c o u l d e s t a b l i s h  we c a n show t h a t  I will  of doubt.  i f P i s meaningful  evidence  t h a t would  the evidence.  entail  I think  then the presence  of a  of the f a c t o r s which c o n s t i t u t e a d e f i n i t i o n of  P would e n t a i l  P.  P o r example where P s t a n d s f o r b e i n g a  b a c h e l o r and a b a c h e l o r i s d e f i n e d as an unmarried being unmarried  a n d a man w o u l d e n t a i l b e i n g P.  man  then  Where P i s  s e e i n g a t o m a t o a n d s e e i n g a t o m a t o i s d e f i n e d as t h e o c c u r r ence o f c e r t a i n e v e n t s under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , ing that  those  would e n t a i l that is  events d i d occur under t h e s p e c i f i e d c o n d i t i o n s  that  P d i d obtain.  Thus a l t h o u g h we r e c o g n i z e  t h e r e i s good and b a d e v i d e n c e we must a l l o w t h a t  always  some e v i d e n c e w h i c h e n t a i l s  t o t h e s c e p t i c ' s argument t h a t an a s s e r t i o n  i s always  the a s s e r t i o n The I wish  t h a t would  s u b j e c t t o t h e same s o r t  then entail  of doubt  as  o f my argument c a n be shown a s f o l l o w s .  R""»Q .  We may move  the evidence  t o know w h e t h e r P i s t h e c a s e  .  P.  there  itself.  form  I argue  But  t h e n show-  R . P  t h e s c e p t i c ' s argument Rv-R Qv-Q Pv-P  i s simply  or not P i s the case.  44  I t i s obvious t h a t my argument pre-supposes a d e c i s i o n process;  I adduce evidence i n support of P (or, of course,  evidence t h a t - P ) .  The s c e p t i c a l argument i n v o l v e s a system-  a t i c d e n i a l of a d e c i s i o n process. the whole n o t i o n  I t e f f e c t i v e l y denies  of 'evidence f o r P.'  I f E, f o r example,  i s i t s e l f prone t o the same s o r t of doubt as P then i t cannot be used as evidence f o r P. The n e t r e s u l t of the s c e p t i c a l argument i s t o deny us a l l but tautologous a s s e r t i o n s . meaningful d i s c o u r s e ,  And t h i s  i s t o deny us  t o reduce a l l our a s s e r t i o n s t o the  same form as t h a t the u n i v e r s e  i s uniformly  expanding.  Now t h i s program i s p a t e n t l y absurd. and  We do a s s e r t ,  p r o p e r l y , a great many t h i n g s about p e r c e p t i o n and about  objects.  We do decide between P and -P and we do i t on the  b a s i s of an e v i d e n t i a l d e c i s i o n process.  We ought t o attempt  t o i l l u m i n a t e what makes the d e c i s i o n process work.  First  we ought t o note t h a t speech i s i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n of a conventionalized sort. some purpose. vey  We don't u s u a l l y make a s s e r t i o n s without  I a s s e r t t h a t I see a tomato i f I want t o con-  t o you some i n f o r m a t i o n .  When I make the a s s e r t i o n you  u s u a l l y suppose t h a t my i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e normal (that I am not h a l l u c i n a t i n g , t h a t my eyes or my v i s u a l c o r t e x a r e n ' t abnormal) and a l s o t h a t e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s a r e normal or standard  ( i e . t h a t there  i s a tomato there, t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s a r e u s u a l , t h a t what you see i s n ' t etc.).  light  just a r e f l e c t i o n ,  45  Speech as i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n presupposes that we a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y s i m i l a r t o experience the same s o r t s of t h i n g s and t h a t we have s i m i l a r purposes.  I t presupposes that we  know what the conventions a r e and t h a t agree on c o n d i t i o n s of a p p l i c a t i o n , t h a t we know what normal c o n d i t i o n s a r e f o r most s o r t s of p e r c e p t u a l judgement.  B a s i c a l l y i t presupposes  t h a t we do have d e c i s i o n processes that enable us t o decide such t h i n g s as P or -P.  Thus f o r m a l doubt attempts system-  a t i c a l l y t o deny a d e c i s i o n process t h a t i s presupposed as a f o u n d a t i o n of language.  Our language i s founded upon d i s -  t i n c t i o n s between P and not P.  S i n c e the terms i n our language  are d e f i n e d we must i n p r i n c i p l e be a b l e t o c a l l upon;that which c o n s t i t u t e s the d e f i n i t i o n s t o serve as evidence e n t a i l ing the term.  The f a c t that we can do so i n p r i n c i p l e i s  t e l l i n g a g a i n s t the s c e p t i c .  I t means t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e we  can p r o v i d e an argument of the form i f Q then P f o r a n y t h i n g which the s c e p t i c q u e s t i o n s .  Now s i n c e we cannot doubt what  we cannot v e r i f y , the s c e p t i c cannot argue t h a t any p a r t i c u l a r evidence i s d o u b t f u l .  (To do so would be f o r him t o admit  t h a t there i s a standard by which we measure and doubt.  To  admit t h i s would be t o admit a d e c i s i o n procedure which h i s argument i s a t pains t o d i s a l l o w . )  We cannot,base doubt on  another doubt; we must base i t on knowledge of a doubt-free case. Thus the s c e p t i c cannot convince us t o doubt our evidence.  What he can do, and a l l he can do, i s ask us f o r  46  a demonstration of the evidence which would e n t a i l any s t a t e ment.  And t h i s evidence we can i n p r i n c i p l e supply.  i l l u s t r a t e the point.  Suppose I c l a i m t h a t Smith  We may q u e s t i o n t h i s .  Is he r e a l l y a husband?  i s married and a man..  Is Smith r e a l l y married?  entered i n t o a c o n t r a c t w i t h h i s f i a n c e . tract?  L e t me  i s a husband.  So I say Smith Yes, Smith  Was i t a l e g a l  con-  Yes, i t was signed i n the presence of a j u s t i c e of  the peace.  Was he r e a l l y a j u s t i c e of the peace?  Now i t  can be seen t h a t i n a s k i n g a l l these q u e s t i o n s the s c e p t i c i s not a c t i v e l y c a s t i n g doubt  on a n y t h i n g .  He i s not a s k i n g ,  nor can he, any q u e s t i o n s t h a t we cannot i n p r i n c i p l e answer. There  i s t h e r e f o r e no reason t h i s process need be c o n s i d e r e d  destructive.  On the c o n t r a r y , i n many s i t u a t i o n s we c o u l d  c o n s i d e r i t as c o n s t r u c t i v e , each s t e p adding t o the amount of evidence I have t o support the c l a i m t h a t Smith i s a husband. T h i s process may d i s t i n g u i s h e d from denying t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r p i e c e of evidence i s a c t u a l l y the case.  I t i s one t h i n g t o  ask f o r evidence f o r a s s e r t i o n s , and t o ask f o r evidence f o r the evidence, and another t o d i s p u t e the evidence. case only i s doubting.  The l a t t e r  I t c o n s i s t s of c a l l i n g f a c t s  q u e s t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o some standard. a l r e a d y the matter of f a c t u a l  into  We have c o n s i d e r e d  doubt.  In s h o r t the s c e p t i c cannot c a s t doubt but he can ask f o r a demonstration which we can i n p r i n c i p l e supply. There i s I t h i n k an argument t o be made concerning the form of statements about p e r c e p t u a l judgements.  Whereas  47  no conduction  of sense data statements ever e n t a i l s the e x i s t -  ence of a m a t e r i a l o b j e c t , m a t e r i a l o b j e c t statements as a category  of course do.  e n t a i l s the e x i s t e n c e object e x i s t s .  However no p a r t i c u l a r M-statement  of an o b j e c t .  I t i m p l i e s t h a t such an  But M-statements may be f a l s e .  t h e t i c and t h e r e f o r e c o r r i g i b l e .  They a r e syn-  Experience i n the form of  new evidence c o u l d always show them t o be f a l s e . are c o r r i g i b l e by v i r t u e any  particular  Thus they  of t h e i r form and n o t by v i r t u e of  f a c t that i s disputed.  I suggest f i r s t  t h a t the sense i n which such a s s e r -  t i o n s a r e c o r r i g i b l e p u r e l y as a matter of form i s , i n the absence of how i n p a r t i c u l a r they might be c o r r i g i b l e , an, empty one.  To be r e l e v a n t doubt must be f i l l e d  f a c t u a l hypothesis  i n with some  ( i e . t h a t c o n d i t i o n s a r e not standard,  t h a t the tomato i s made of wax, t h a t I am dreaming,  etc.).  What, f o r example would we say t o anyone who suggested t h a t one  (or some) of our p e r c e p t u a l  judgements was d u b i t a b l e but  d i d n ' t suggest any p a r t i c u l a r reason we ought t o f e e l u n c e r t a i n about the judgement. around. let  I f there  I t h i n k we would t e l l him t o stop p l a y i n g  i s anything  d o u b t f u l about the judgement  him t e l l us what i t i s . Finally,  l e t us take the f a c t t h a t p e r c e p t u a l  ments about o b j e c t s a r e s y n t h e t i c . this?  Some p h i l o s o p h e r s  state-  What a r e we t o make of  have argued t h a t the foundations of  e m p i r i c a l knowledge cannot be contingent  statements.  have concluded t h a t what demarcates our s c i e n t i f i c  Others  theories  48  about the world from metaphysical t h e o r i e s or from a n a l y t i c t h e o r i e s i s p r e c i s e l y t h a t they r e s t upon statements which are not a n a l y t i c but t e s t a b l e ; the f a c t that we can t e s t our b a s i c statements i s what makes them the f o u n d a t i o n s of e m p i r i c a l knowledge. I t h i n k t h a t the most we can conclude from the argument from f o r m a l doubt i s t h a t we may be mistaken i n our perceptual  judgements.  We may a l s o be c e r t a i n . v e r i f y our statements.  But t h i s much was never i n doubt. And we know how t o d e c i d e , how t o  49  IV.  Some D o u b t s A b o u t The  illusion  Doubting  r o l e of doubt  i s c e n t r a l t o t h e argument  a s expounded b y b o t h P r i c e and R u s s e l l .  sceptical  tradition  they allow  his  element  objects the  may  be d o u b t e d .  that  reflected a b o u t my cable (ie.  by  about  the  of  R u s s e l l argues t h a t  judgements  about  are doubtful.  They  or q u a l i t i e s  perceptual  conditions  i s a tomato w i l l  I use  ordinary and  ( i e . 'the t a b l e  'It looks  t o express the  judgements  this  language  because of  looks  a s t h a t we table  of  that  we  the  naked  rough' as seen through a m i c r o s c o p e ) .  we  their properties.  i n essence because  square.  They w i l l  i s that  ordin-  i t i s judgemental,  make a b o u t  the  existence  I t expresses such  s e e a t o m a t o and n o t s o m e t h i n g  is really  case  qualities  smooth' a s s e e n b y  i s inherently doubtful  and  In R u s s e l l ' s about  appli-  o f t h e same q u a l i t y u n d e r d i f f e r e n t  i t e x p r e s s e s judgements  objects  be  doubt  judgement  i s shown i n t h e f a c t  What P r i c e and R u s s e l l a r g u e ary  In P r i c e ' s case  'I s e e a t o m a t o ' ) .  different descriptions  eye and,  judgement r e f l e c t s and i s  language.  t o an M-statement t h a t  table are doubtful  give  P r i c e f o r example, b e g i n s  judgement t h a t what I see  i s suggested that  of the  judgements  our p e r c e p t u a l  t o the statment,  critical  to  our p e r c e p t u a l  ' r e a l ' n a t u r e of o b j e c t s  imply t h a t doubt  it  of p e r c e p t i o n .  a r g u m e n t by c l a i m i n g  In the  no component o f knowledge  go u n q u e s t i o n e d and t h e y a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y judgemental  from  judgements  e l s e , or that  the  suggest the a d o p t i o n of a  50  p e r c e p t u a l language t h a t does not r e f e r t o m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s but i s p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e of sense c o n t e n t .  Thus the language  they propose i s more d e s c r i p t i v e than judgemental.  It is a l l -  eged t h a t i t does not express judgements t h a t can be shown t o be d o u b t f u l . Now ful  as we have seen, t o say t h a t judgements are doubt-  i s t o say e i t h e r t h a t some f a c t s are a c t u a l l y i n doubt or  t h a t f o r m a l l y the judgement  i s s y n t h e t i c , t h a t the content of  the judgement may be denied without s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n , or t h a t experience may  prove the .judgement t o be c o r r e c t or  incorrect. The concept of a f a c t u a l doubt i s ex h y p o t h e s i a l i m i t e d concept.  A f a c t u a l doubt s i g n a l s what f a c t s about  the case are i n q u e s t i o n and i n so doing i t g i v e s us the c l u e how  t o v e r i f y e i t h e r the c l a i m or the doubt.  I t oper-  a t e s on the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t there i s a standard or doubtf r e e case a g a i n s t which we can measure or t e s t or otherwise compare the q u e s t i o n a b l e case.  Almost a l l the doubts t h a t  we come a c r o s s i n our o r d i n a r y experience are i n s t a n c e s of f a c t u a l doubt. Is that Smith's car? any tomatoes ripe?  Is Smith's c a r brown?  i n the market t h i s week?  Are they red?  Is t h i s the same desk t h a t was here l a s t week?  are a l l common examples t e s t the cases and how  of f a c t u a l doubt.  Are there Are they These  We know how t o  t o answer them c o r r e c t l y because b e f o r e  we s t a r t vie know what the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c o r r e c t answer would  51  Formal or systematic  doubt doesn't s p e c i f y any p a r t -  i c u l a r f a c t or f a c t s which a r e t o be h e l d as q u e s t i o n a b l e . It  simply makes a b l a n k e t  statement about a l l the p r o p o s i t i o n s  of a c e r t a i n form; f o r formal purposes we must t r e a t them i n a c e r t a i n way.  What t h i s comes down t o i s the judgement t h a t  M-statements a r e s y n t h e t i c . t i v e of M-statements.  Finally,  destruc-  On the c o n t r a r y i t i m p l i e s t h a t M-  statements may be v e r i f i e d . correct.  But t h i s c e r t a i n l y i s n ' t  Experience  may show them t o be  i f a l l our p e r c e p t u a l M-statements a r e  s y n t h e t i c then what i s important  i s not j u s t n o t i n g  this  f a c t with r e s p e c t t o any p a r t i c u l a r M-statement but r a t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between M-statements t h a t a r e true and those that are f a l s e . conventions  And t h i s we can only do i n v i r t u e of our  of having  some cases a c t as standard  cases of  what i s t o c o n s t i t u t e b e i n g an x or what i t i s t o be a doubtf r e e case of x. What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r i c k y i s t o g e t whatever i t i s t h a t i s a l l e g e d l y d o u b t f u l i n p e r c e p t i o n i s o l a t e d e i t h e r as to  f a c t u a l or f o r m a l .  I see a tomato there  Take P r i c e ' s remark f o r example, 'When i s much I can doubt.'  he doesn't g i v e us very much t o doubt.  Now we note t h a t  He f i r s t  t h a t i t may be a c l e v e r l y p a i n t e d piece of wax.  says  simply  T h i s doesn't  sound l i k e much of a doubt; i f we know what a tomato i s and what a wax r e p l i c a i s we ought t o be able t o t e l l which happens t o be the case.  i n a minute  But then P r i c e says,  whether there i s any m a t e r i a l t h i n g there a t a l l . '  'I can doubt This  starts  52  t o look as though a d i f f e r e n t s o r t of t h i n g i s doubted. immediately  he suggests  t h a t i t might be a r e f l e c t i o n or a  h a l l u c i n a t i o n both of which are e a s i l y v e r i f i a b l e of f a c t .  But  questions  The p o i n t i s t h a t P r i c e has claimed t h a t there i s  much we can doubt while suggesting only three a c t u a l doubts about the tomato.  He seems t o be suggesting t h a t there i s  something more than a few f a c t s i n q u e s t i o n .  But i t i s not  c l e a r what. S i m i l a r l y R u s s e l l seems t o move from suggesting t h a t there may be some d i s p u t e about how t o d e s c r i b e the t a b l e p r e c i s e l y , t o suggesting t h a t f o r a l l the q u a l i t i e s of a l l objects, t h e i r  ' r e a l ' nature  i s doubtful.  And here he too  seems t o be moving from f a c t u a l t o formal doubt. • Both arguments trade on the c o n f u s i o n of seeming t o suggest a g r e a t many t h i n g s a r e q u e s t i o n a b l e while i n d i c a t i n g only a v e r y few. Let us c o n s i d e r other occasions In which someone suggests  t h a t something i s d o u b t f u l about o b j e c t s and we  are not sure what he means, what e x a c t l y i s i n q u e s t i o n . Suppose someone were t o ask the f o l l o w i n g questions of us, •What c o l o r i s t h i s  fabric?'  •What c o l o r i s i t r e a l l y ? ' We would o b v i o u s l y conclude  t h a t there was some doubt i n h i s  mind as t o the c o l o r of the f a b r i c . f i r s t q u e s t i o n t h a t the f a b r i c it  We might r e p l y t o h i s  i s p u r p l e , t o the second t h a t  i s made of r e d and b l u e threads but looks purple from a  53  distance. Suppose he then asked, 'What i s the r e a l c o l o r of the  fabric?'  Perhaps we would a g a i n answer t h a t i t i s r e d and b l u e but purple under some c o n d i t i o n s .  looks  But he might t e l l us he under-  stood t h a t i t looked d i f f e r e n t l y under d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s ; what he wanted was  the r e a l  color.  A t . t h i s p o i n t we become aware t h a t h i s t h i r d i s n ' t l i k e the other two.  We  can't s a t i s f y him by g i v i n g  any more f a c t s about the case. isn't factual at a l l .  what s o r t - o f a q u e s t i o n i t i s .  has heard us g i v e two color  r i g h t away j u s t  There seems to be  something  Most probably i t i s t h i s t h a t he  or more d e s c r i p t i o n s of the f a b r i c ' s  (eg. i t looks purple a t a d i s t a n c e and r e d and  c l o s e up)  him  I t appears t h a t h i s q u e s t i o n  I t i s not apparent  t h a t p u z z l e s the person.  question  blue  and he somehow t h i n k s these d e s c r i p t i o n s c o n f l i c t .  His n o t i o n of  ' r e a l ' seems to be t h a t there can be only  ' r e a l * x and  t h a t t h i s must always be p e r c e i v e d the same  one  T h i s , f o r example, i s the course R u s s e l l ' s argument takes  way. and  I have a l r e a d y spoken s u f f i c i e n t l y c r i t i c a l l y of i t . The examination  c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t I wish to draw from the are as f o l l o w s .  P r i c e and R u s s e l l have  the f a c t t h a t doubt I t s e l f must be reasons any  f o r doubt; we must know how  judgement.  justified. and why  we  preceding overlooked  There must be should doubt  I have o b j e c t e d of systematic doubt t h a t i t  denies the whole n o t i o n of 'reason f o r doubt'; i t maintains  5k  t h a t no p i e c e s  of evidence, no c l a i m adduced as evidence f o r  another c l a i m ,  i s any l e s s d o u b t f u l than the o r i g i n a l .  (Should  the s c e p t i c g i v e any reason a c e r t a i n piece of evidence i s d o u b t f u l then he has i m p l i e d a d e c i s i o n process such t h a t we c o u l d t e s t the evidence and u l t i m a t e l y . v e r i f y or f a l s i f y the c l a i m and e l i m i n a t e doubt).  Doubt t h a t a r i s e s because of the  form of a statement a r i s e s because v e r i f i c a t i o n i m p l i e s a process t h a t must take place  i n the f u t u r e and we can never  exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t w h o l l y b i z a r r e s i t u a t i o n s may arise. The  f a c t remains t h a t t o be s u c c e s s f u l doubt must be  j u s t i f i e d with reference a standard  t o some standard.  Vie must know what  case i s b e f o r e we can doubt t h a t what we have a t  hand matches the standard  case i n the e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s .  To  doubt x i s l o g i c a l l y subsequent t o knowing how t o v e r i f y x. Now what t h i s shows i s t h a t o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l  judgements  expressed i n o r d i n a r y language a r e n o t inescapably Doubtful ments.  doubtful.  judgements a r e l o g i c a l l y subsequent t o c e r t a i n judgeJudgements may be proven c o r r e c t .  What the argument  from doubt has shown i s t h a t under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s we can be mistaken i n our judgements b u t concomitantly ;  under  other  c o n d i t i o n s we can be c o r r e c t i n our judgements and we can know we a r e c o r r e c t by a v e r i f i c a t i o n The  process.  r e l a t i o n between f a c t u a l and formal doubt may be  presented by the f o l l o w i n g argument.  From the f a c t t h a t we  sometimes do make mistakes we may conclude t h a t we always  55  may be making a mistake.  But we may counter t h i s argument by  s a y i n g t h a t from the f a c t t h a t we sometimes a r e not mistaken we may conclude t h a t we always may not be making a mistake. The  t h i n g t o do i s t o see i f we a r e i n f a c t making a mistake.  And  no argument has been given t o show t h a t we cannot do t h i s .  But  I contend t h a t what makes P r i c e and R u s s e l l ' s arguments  seem s t r o n g e r  than they a r e i s that they do not e x p l i c i t l y  make the above argument but they suggest i t . They seem t o s h i f t between suggesting  t h a t p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s a r e i n doubt  ( i e . t h a t doubt i s j u s t i f i e d by c o n d i t i o n s t o other f a c t s ) and suggesting  or with  reference  that a l l f a c t s a r e i n doubt  ( i e . t h a t the form of the statement makes i t d u b i t a b l e ) . The  shift  i s misleading.  The s t r o n g e s t  arguments support i s simply  t o show t h a t we may be mistaken  judgements does not, i n i t s e l f , do anything  l i k e the job P r i c e and R u s s e l l want done. do  their  t h a t our judgements may be mistaken.  Now I argue that simply i n our p e r c e p t u a l  conclusion  i s t o d i s c r e d i t our object  What they want t o  judgements and the language  we use t o express them and t o demonstrate t h a t they cannot do the job t h a t they a l l e g e sense data judgements and terminology  can do.  E s s e n t i a l l y t h i s job c o n s i s t s of p r o v i d i n g  i n c o r r i g i b l e judgements about  perception.  F i r s t I argue t h a t t o show that o r d i n a r y or object perception  judgements a r e as a c l a s s c o r r i g i b l e does not  d i s c r e d i t them f o r the reason t h a t p a r t i c u l a r judgements (members of the c l a s s ) may be v e r i f i e d .  They may i n e f f e c t  56  "be e s t a b l i s h e d t o be we  need.  before and  I may  me.  since  i n c o r r i g i b l e a t l e a s t t o any  e s t a b l i s h t h a t there  I may  e s t a b l i s h the  i s a pen  on the  The  correct  'subject t o c o r r e c t i o n *  judgement to be c o r r e c t and  c o r r e c t i o n a t the same time.  that  table  judgement as true and  ' c o r r i g i b l e ' i s d e f i n e d as  I cannot c l a i m the  extent  subject  f a c t that our  to  judgements  can be v e r i f i e d makes them i d e a l p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r s c i e n t i f i c purposes. I f u r t h e r argue w i t h r e f e r e n c e  t o the r i s k of e r r o r  t h a t I am not r e s t r i c t e d t o c a t e g o r i c a l judgements. temper my  judgements a c c o r d i n g  judgements w i l l be less risk. Let me  to conditions.  suppose a knowledge of tomatoes and  Conditions  may  Now  not be  ing, t r i c k e d , i n bad v e r i f y conditions Instead  we: .may  'I see a tomato*  be mistaken about c o n d i t i o n s .  standard; we  may  l i g h t , etc., etc.  or we  a f t e r a l l be h a l l u c i n a t We  can take pains  can hedge our p e r c e p t u a l  express our u n c e r t a i n t y about  s a y i n g t e n t a t i v e l y t h a t i t 'looks l i k e x',  be x',  ' i t resembles x*,  hedged claims when we I f you are  i n my  'What do you  or  see?'  'I t h i n k i t i s x.'  are not  k i t c h e n and You  may  pre-  a l s o of c o n d i t i o n s f o r  standard  conditions i t 'seems to We  r e s o r t to  sure i f c o n d i t i o n s are  standard.  I p o i n t to the counter and reply,  to  judgements.  of s a y i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t something i s a  case of x we: may by  tempered  i s l e s s room f o r c o r r e c t i o n .  Judgements such as,  seeing tomatoes.  may  c l o s e t o i n c o r r i g i b l e because they take  Commesurately there  explain,  My  I  'I see a tomato.*  say,  But i f  57  I say,  'Are you sure?', you may  c o n d i t i o n s are not normal.  We  take t h i s as a h i n t t h a t don't u s u a l l y ask i f people  are sure under normal circumstances. t r i c k on you. fruit.  I may  I may  be p l a y i n g a  have a c q u i r e d some very l i f e - l i k e  So you might r e p l y ,  wax  'Well i t looks l i k e a tomato.*  You guard a g a i n s t b e i n g mistaken by hedging  your c l a i m , by  not s t a t i n g c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t i t i s a standard case of 'tomato' but by comparing what you see t o the standard In  the n o t i o n of r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s we  case.  can f i n d a source of  l e s s r i s k y and t h e r e f o r e l e s s d o u b t f u l forms of o r d i n a r y speech. Let venience  us now  c o n s i d e r another matter,  or inconvenience  see an o b j e c t . doubtful.  the r e l a t i v e  con-  of v e r i f y i n g such judgements t h a t I  P r i c e has claimed such judgements are always  I have argued  t h a t such judgements may  and e s t a b l i s h e d as d o u b t - f r e e .  be  verified  Therefore w i t h r e s p e c t t o doubt  an M-statement i s not n e c e s s a r i l y i n f e r i o r t o an S-statment. But  i t may  be h e l d t o be  i n f e r i o r i n that i t requires v e r i -  f i c a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e M-statements are l e s s convenient S-statements.  than  Thus Ayer says, "At b e s t i t [sense data term-  i n o l o g y ] enables us only t o r e f e r t o f a m i l i a r f a c t s i n a c l e a r e r and more convenient way."15 Take f o r example the pen t h a t i s i n my hand r i g h t or  the paper t h a t i s on the t a b l e b e f o r e me.  How  now  inconvenient  i s i t t o v e r i f y t h a t an M-statement about them i s true? C e r t a i n l y one might suggest  t h a t I am dreaming or h a l l u c i n a t i n g  58  or t h a t the paper may be a r e f l e c t i o n or the pen may be made of wax.  But how long does i t take t o v e r i f y t h a t these a r e  not the case and t h a t I have a pen i n my hand and some paper before me?  In such cases  I b e l i e v e we u s u a l l y say we can  t e l l a t a glance t h a t there i s nothing d o u b t f u l about our judgement.  I f I doubt anything  i t i s t h a t the .pen i n my hand  i s made of wax or t h a t the paper before me i s r e a l l y only a reflection. one.  I know something about r e f l e c t i o n s ; t h i s  isn't  I am sure I am n o t the v i c t i m of a h a l l u c i n a t i o n .  If I am not sure now then I never w i l l be sure.  And i f I  never can be sure then the word ' h a l l u c i n a t i o n ' has n e i t h e r sense nor f u n c t i o n . The  p o i n t i s t h a t most of our p e r c e p t i o n  judgements  are n e i t h e r d o u b t f u l nor d i f f i c u l t t o v e r i f y supposing are questioned.  they  There seem t o be two s o r t s of p e r c e p t u a l  judgements which may reasonably only with some d i f f i c u l t y .  be claimed  The f i r s t  t o be v e r i f i e d  i s where we a r e a t some  d i s t a n c e from the o b j e c t or where we cannot move around i t . The  second i s where c o n d i t i o n s , f o r example of i l l u m i n a t i o n ,  make v e r i f i c a t i o n d i f f i c u l t .  However as I have remarked  above, i n the l a t t e r case we a r e l i k e l y t o temper our judgement as c o n d i t i o n s demand.  Under c o n d i t i o n s where v e r i f i c a t i o n  i s d i f f i c u l t we a r e l i k e l y t o c o n s i d e r t h a t c a t e g o r i c a l judgement i s r i s k y and a r e very l i k e l y t o hedge our judgement. Even w i t h regard t o the former case we ought t o c o n s i d e r the ways i n which our judgement c o u l d go wrong.  How c o u l d a  59  judgement t h a t I see an o b j e c t a t a d i s t a n c e go wrong? there i s always ating.  the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t I am dreaming  First  or h a l l u c i n -  But t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s no s t r o n g e r w i t h r e g a r d t o  o b j e c t s a t a d i s t a n c e than i t i s w i t h r e g a r d t o o b j e c t s c l o s e a t hand.  Second they may be, as P r i c e has suggested w i t h  r e s p e c t t o the tomato, r e f l e c t i o n s .  But t h i s  i s somewhat d i m i n i s h e d as b e i n g u n r e a l i s t i c . I see a c r o s s the s t r e e t be a r e f l e c t i o n ? t o suggest t h a t i t can.  possibility Could the c a r  I t seems u n r e a l i s t i c  A t any r a t e we do r e c o g n i z e t h a t  d i s t a n c e i t s e l f has a tempering  i n f l u e n c e on our judgements.  The extent t o which we make our judgements c a t e g o r i c a l matches the extent t o which we t h i n k they can be v e r i f i e d . i s o f t e n a f a c t o r i n c a u s i n g us t o say,  Distance  'That looks l i k e x*,  i n s t e a d of *I see x.' I conclude t h a t f o r most of our v e r i f i a b l e p e r c e p t u a l judgements i t i s nowhere near as d i f f i c u l t a c t u a l l y t o v e r i f y them as many sense d a t i s t s suggest.  Compared t o sense data  language w i t h r e s p e c t t o convenience  of v e r i f i c a t i o n , o b j e c t  language cannot be s a i d t o be b a d l y i n f e r i o r .  Indeed there  are other convenience c r i t e r i a than ease of v e r i f i c a t i o n and these may t i p the balance i n f a v o r of o b j e c t language. s h a l l c o n s i d e r these i n a l a t e r  We  section.  F i n a l l y l e t us c o n s i d e r the q u e s t i o n of ambiguity. Many sense d a t i s t s , such as Ayer, have suggested that words like  'see' and 'touch' a r e o f t e n ambiguous.  And t h i s  i s a l l e g e d t o a r i s e out of two uses of 'see', one t h a t  ambiguity entails  60  t h a t what i s seen e x i s t s and one which does not so e n t a i l . Let  us c o n s i d e r the matter w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o P r i c e ' s argument.  I f I say, 'I see a tomato' where what I see i s a c t u a l l y a wax  r e p l i c a of a tomato,  i s my  statement ambiguous?  l e t us assume we mean t h a t we see a r e a l tomato). i s no i t i s not ambiguous, i t i s f a l s e . where I h a l l u c i n a t e a tomato. my statment ambiguous?  Now  (First The answer  c o n s i d e r a case  I say 'I see a tomato.'  Or i s i t f a l s e ?  Is  There i s a g r e a t  temptation t o say i t i s f a l s e on the ground's t h a t one cannot see a tomato i f there i s no tomato p r e s e n t .  On the other  hand there i s a g r e a t temptation t o say t h a t i t i s ambiguous because  I b e l i e v e t h a t I d i d see Let  us t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r the l o g i c of the word  The statement  'I see a tomato'  a q u i t e unambiguous one. that c e r t a i n  something. 'see.'  i s , under normal circumstances,  The use of such statements presupposes  (and normal) c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n .  d i t i o n s i s that there i s a tomato p r e s e n t .  One  of the con-  This presupposition  i s what g i v e s such statements t h e i r u t i l i t y , what makes them p u b l i c statements. act  I t i s what makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r Smith t o  on Jones' remarks t h a t he saw tomatoes  he sees the bus coming,  i n the market,  t h a t he w i l l see the s i g n a l , e t c .  I t i s the knowledge t h a t such statements as, are  that  *I see a  tomato'  e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e and are g e n e r a l l y true and the assump-  t i o n t h a t Jones' statement,  'I see a tomato'  in particular i s  t r u e , t h a t a l l o w s Smith t o a c t , t o ask f o r the tomato, f o r a d e s c r i p t i o n of i t , f o r a b i t e of i t , e t c .  It justifies his  61  annoyance when he f i n d s out Jones d i d n ' t see a tomato but mistaken or f o o l i n g or dreaming. t o mislead  people, t o l i e ,  was  What i n f a c t makes i t p o s s i b l e  deceive,  e t c . i s j u s t the f a c t  under normal c o n d i t i o n s such statements are unambiguous  that  and  are e i t h e r true or f a l s e . Now  whenever 'see'  i s used where c o n d i t i o n s are  normal, where f o r example we  are h a l l u c i n a t i n g or r e f e r r i n g  t o the content of dreams or h a l l u c i n a t i o n s or where we by  i n t e n t i o n s o l e l y t o how  of how  they are, then we  t h i n g s seem v i s u a l l y  are bound to mislead  d i c a t e that c o n d i t i o n s are not normal. convention, p r o s c r i b e d from u s i n g aberrent,  say  We  Once we  'see.'  word but  regardless  unless we  are, by  linguistic  indicate that conditions  have i n d i c a t e d that we  What t h i s r e v e a l s  i s not  that although i t s use  that  may  'see'  presupposes t h a t  i s an ambiguous conditions  p r o v i d i n g that we  s i g n a l that c o n d i t i o n s are s p e c i a l .  'I see a tomato*,  'I see two  us  i f we  spoken r e s p e c t i v e l y by a man  express my  my  to other  conditions  father last  The  night*  l i g h t s ' are not ambiguous statements yet they  would s u r e l y mislead  and by a man  'I saw  are  properly  be used w i t h r e f e r e n c e  and  are  are speaking about  are normal i t may  statements,  in-  'see* where c o n d i t i o n s  such s p e c i a l cases as h a l l u c i n a t i o n s then we use  refer  i n r e f e r r i n g t o dreams or seeing ghosts or  h a l l u c i n a t e d o b j e c t s , unless we not normal.  not  being  d i d not know t h a t they were having a h a l l u c i n a t i o n , by Hamlet,  examined by an o c u l i s t .  conclusion  i n the f o l l o w i n g form.  In short I would There i s no  onus  62  on us t o assume c o n d i t i o n s a r e normal; the use of the word 'see'  i m p l i e s they are so.  I t would he m i s l e a d i n g  we make or should make any such assumption. q u i r e d t o assume.  But there  to claim  We are not r e -  i s , on the other hand, an onus  on us t o i n d i c a t e t h a t c o n d i t i o n s are o f f - s t a n d a r d where there  i s any p o s s i b i l i t y of ambiguity.  Ambiguity l i e s s o l e l y  i n the f a i l u r e t o s i g n a l the presence of non-standard  conditions.  At any r a t e , should anyone i n s i s t , unreasonably I t h i n k , that the above c o n s t i t u t e s ambiguity of p e r c e p t i o n  verbs,  we c o u l d counter t h a t such words as 'see' a r e not inescapably ambiguous.  We can, w i t h r e f e r e n c e  what i s meant.  to conditions,  The case f o r s a y i n g  uous i s , i f anything,  discover  •I see a tomato" i s ambig-  l e s s strong than P r i c e ' s case t h a t I  may doubt my judgement t h a t I see a tomato because of the p o s s i b i l i t y of dreams.  In each case the judgement may be  v e r i f i e d ; doubt and ambiguity may i n p r i n c i p l e be d i s p e l l e d with reference  to conditions.  A g a i n the comparison w i t h sense data language w i l l c e n t e r not on any inescapable but  on the q u e s t i o n  d e f e c t of o r d i n a r y  of convenience.  P r i c e has not shown  t h a t o r d i n a r y language cannot be p r e c i s e or t h a t cannot be v e r i f i e d .  With r e s p e c t  language  it-statements  t o f a c t u a l doubt he has  j u s t brought out some of the f a c t o r s t h a t we take i n t o cons i d e r a t i o n i n v e r i f y i n g them.  63  FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER  1  Price,  H.  H.,  Perception.  TWO  London, Methuen, 1950,  2 R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d , P r o b l e m s of P h i l o s o p h y . O x f o r d U. P., 1952, p. 8.  3  Ibid.,  pp.  4  Ibid.,  P.  10.  5  Ibid.,  P.  10.  6  Ibid.,  P.  10.  7  I b i d . , P.  11.  8  Ibid.,  9.  Austin, 9 Univ. Press, 10  Ibid..  P.  p.  3.  Toronto,  8-9.  J . L., 1962, p. p.  70.  73.  11 I t h i n k however t h a t A u s t i n was m i s t a k e n c a l l i n g ' r e a l s i m p l y an a d j u s t e r . As F o r r e s t and C o v a i have shown (Which Word Wears t h e T r o u s e r s . M i n d , V o l . LXXXVI, no. 301, 1967) ' r e a l ' i s b e t t e r d e s c r i b e d as a r e - a d j u s t e r . I t p u t s us back to s t a n d a r d . 12  Austin,  op.,  c i t . , pp.  13  Ibid..  p.  67.  14  Ibid..  p.  77.  65-67.  15 A y e r , A. J . , The F o u n d a t i o n s M a c M i l l a n , T o r o n t o , 1964, p. 26.  of E m p i r i c a l  Knowledge,  CHAPTER THREE ON INDUBITABILITY AND THE ARGUMENT PROM ILLUSION I.  The I n t r o d u c t i o n of the I n d u b i t a b l e Element, Sense Data Whereas P r i c e and R u s s e l l suggest there a r e many t h i n g s  we may i n f a c t doubt when we see tomatoes and t a b l e s and other such o b j e c t s , and many t h i n g s we must a l l o w a r e f o r m a l l y d u b i t a b l e , they do c l a i m there are some elements of our p e r c e p t u a l experience which a r e n o t d u b i t a b l e . As P r i c e says, One t h i n g however I cannot doubt; t h a t there e x i s t s a r e a l patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, s t a n d i n g out from a background of other c o l o u r - p a t c h e s , and having a c e r t a i n v i s u a l depth, and t h a t t h i s whole f i e l d of c o l o u r i s d i r e c t l y present t o my c o n s c i o u s ness. What the r e d patch i s , whether a substance, or a s t a t e of a substance, or an event, whether i t i s p h y s i c a l or p s y c h i c a l or n e i t h e r a r e questions t h a t we may doubt about. But t h a t something i s r e d and round, then and there I cannot doubt...that which . i s thus present i s c a l l e d a datum. The corresponding mental a t t i t u d e i s c a l l e d acquaintance, i n t u i t i v e apprehension, or sometimes having. Data of t h i s s p e c i a l s o r t a r e c a l l e d sense data.-, What t h i s means I t h i n k i s t h a t P r i c e b e l i e v e s t h a t an e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n of s e e i n g tomatoes i s t h a t c e r t a i n c o l o r e d shapes be present t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s . difficult to  indeed t o deny t h i s .  I t would be  But l e t us pause f o r a moment  examine some i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s argument.  65  O r d i n a r i l y when we  say we  see tomatoes the use  of the  word 'see' presupposes t h a t s e v e r a l c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n . of the c o n d i t i o n s , to be sure, be present  t o consciousness.  t h a t t h i s i s only one  i s t h a t c e r t a i n v i s u a l shapes But  We  i l l u m i n a t i o n , we  and  There i s of course  ness of the r e q u i s i t e shapes. of a tomato.  i t i s important  of a number of c o n d i t i o n s .  c o n s i d e r what are the necessary seeing tomatoes.  One  to  recognize  Let us here  s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s of the presence t o  conscious-  There i s a l s o the presence  must be l o o k i n g a t the tomato under s u f f i c i e n t must not be h a l l u c i n a t i n g , and  i n short  the  tomato must p l a y a (or the) c a u s a l r o l e i n our awareness. ( I t i s very tempting simply t o say t h a t we must i n f a c t see  a  tomato.) S i m i l a r l y the necessary seeing a wax  and  s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s of  r e p l i c a must i n v o l v e not only the presence t o  consciousness  of the same s o r t of v i s u a l shapes as above but  a l s o the presence of a wax  tomato under s u f f i c i e n t i l l u m i n a t i o n .  To see a r e f l e c t i o n of a tomato there must not only be c e r t a i n shapes present  to consciousness  but the c o n d i t i o n t h a t  our  awareness of these shapes must come not from l o o k i n g d i r e c t l y a t a tomato but from l o o k i n g a t a medium which i s r e f l e c t i n g l i g h t from the tomato. On the other hand the c o n d i t i o n s of h a l l u c i n a t i n g a tomato may  j u s t be t h a t we  t o consciousness role.  are aware of c e r t a i n shapes present  where a r e a l tomato does not p l a y a c a u s a l  66  What P r i c e has done then i s t o introduce a f a c t o r common t o a l l f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  as i n d u b i t a b l e  What he has done,  i n e f f e c t , has been t o analyse each p o s s i b i l i t y i n t o i t s components.  That component which i s common t o a l l p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i s the i n d u b i t a b l e sense datum. Now the p o i n t i s t h a t the sense datum P r i c e i s only a p a r t i a l a n a l y s i s .  describes  We can r e a d i l y admit that the  presence t o consciousness of c e r t a i n shapes Is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of seeing tomatoes, seeing r e p l i c a s , seeing ions of tomatoes and of h a l l u c i n a t i n g tomatoes.  reflect-  But i t i s a  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n perhaps of only one of them, h a l l u c i n a t i n g tomatoes.  ( A c t u a l l y I t h i n k i t cannot  be a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n even of t h i s because we must s t i p u l a t e w i t h regard i s n ' t causing  the shapes.  t o h a l l u c i n a t i n g t h a t a tomato  I may be h a l l u c i n a t i n g a tomato  i n the presence of a r e a l tomato.) There a r e two p o i n t s The  first  I would l i k e t o r a i s e about t h i s .  i s t h a t P r i c e ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n of sense data doesn't  accomplish anything  t h a t cannot be done by o r d i n a r y  language.  I f c o n d i t i o n s a r e such as t o make me doubt that what I see i s a.tomato then I o r d i n a r i l y hedge my c l a i m by s a y i n g one of the f o l l o w i n g , 'I t h i n k I see a tomato* •I t h i n k t h a t i s a tomato' 'That looks l i k e a tomato' •Unless I'm wrong t h a t ' s a tomato'  67  •If I'm not seeing t h i n g s t h a t ' s a tomato.' N o t i c e t h a t i m p l i e d by a l l these claims i s knowledge of what seeing a tomato a c t u a l l y i s . standard.  Seeing a tomato i s the  These c l a i m s s e t us i n r e l a t i o n t o the standard;  they compare our present experience w i t h the standard. suggest  t h a t our experience  v i s u a l appearance —  They  i s i n a t l e a s t one way — the  l i k e the standard.  They suggest t h a t  what we a r e n ' t sure about i s whether present experience i s l i k e the standard i n other ways.  So what we a r e s a y i n g i s ,  i n e f f e c t , t h a t r e g a r d l e s s of what our experience  i s of,  we cannot doubt t h a t i t i s l i k e seeing a tomato.  In u t i l i z -  ing  the n o t i o n of a standard case we o r d i n a r i l y have r e f e r -  ence t o a common denominator. The ing  second  p o i n t I would l i k e t o make i s t h a t suppos-  there i s any doubt about.what our experience i s of ( i s  i t of a tomato, a r e p l i c a , a r e f l e c t i o n , a h a l l u c i n a t i o n ? ) the i n t r o d u c t i o n of sense data doesn't h e l p t o d i s p e l the doubt one b i t .  I f i t i s a p r a c t i c a l problem t o d i s t i n g u i s h  s e e i n g a tomato from dreaming t h a t we see a tomato then  just  g i v i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of our v i s u a l content c e r t a i n l y won't d i s p e l any doubts we have.  I f i t i s a p r a c t i c a l problem  to d i s t i n g u i s h between s e e i n g a tomato and seeing a wax copy then i t w i l l be no e a s i e r t o s o l v e t h i s problem by c o n s i d e r ing  only the v i s u a l sense datum than i t w i l l by judging t h a t  what we see looks l i k e a tomato.  In each case we a v o i d the  problem r a t h e r than s o l v e i t . I concede t h a t j u s t by l o o k i n g  68  a t the o b j e c t I may n o t be a b l e t o t e l l whether i t i s r e a l or wax.  I f I cannot make other t e s t s then a d m i t t e d l y I cannot  be doubt f r e e when I say, .'That i s a tomato', wax tomato.' touch i t ,  or 'That i s a  Under those c o n d i t i o n s , where I cannot move or  my M-statement,  i f c a t e g o r i c a l , w i l l be d u b i t a b l e .  (I have argued that under such circumstances I wouldn't make a c a t e g o r i c a l judgement.) if  Thus i f I have a p r a c t i c a l  problem,  I must d i s t i n g u i s h between them, and I am not allowed a  d e c i s i o n process, then my M-judgement w i l l be d o u b t f u l . What has n o t been n o t i c e d however i s t h a t the sense datist  i s i n no p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n t o s o l v e the p r a c t i c a l  problem.  The f a m i l y of sense d a t a i d e n t i f i e d w i t h  tomatoes  d i f f e r s from the f a m i l y of sense d a t a i d e n t i f i e d w i t h wax tomatoes.  Without a d e c i s i o n process the sense d a t i s t i s  not going t o be a b l e t o i d e n t i f y the sense datum he has as to i t s family.  In g i v i n g a d e s c r i p t i o n of h i s sense datum  he may g i v e an S-statement  that i s indubitable.  p r i c e of i t s i n d u b i t a b i l i t y i s i t s u t i l i t y . i s i n d u b i t a b l e because  i t takes no r i s k .  H i s sense datum  I t d e s c r i b e s a sense  datum but does not i d e n t i f y i t as t o f a m i l y cause, or m a t e r i a l o b j e c t c o u n t e r p a r t ) .  But the  (or p a t t e r n , or  A simple continuous  d e s c r i p t i o n of sense content, without i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n the form of an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of f a m i l i e s , would be s i n g u l a r l y inutile.  But i d e n t i f y i n g sense d a t a as t o f a m i l i e s  a d e c i s i o n process.  involves  I t i s , by the way, the same s o r t of  d e c i s i o n process as r e q u i r e d f o r M-judgements.  I t I want t o  69  know whether the tomato I see i s r e a l or wax I touch i t . If I want t o i d e n t i f y the sense datum as t o i t s f a m i l y I c o r r e l a t e v i s u a l data w i t h t a c t i l e d a t a ( i e . I touch  it).  T h i s i s why we cannot a l l o w the sense d a t i s t t o use a d e c i s i o n procedure which has been d i s a l l o w e d t o h i s M-language counterpart.  And i f we do a l l o w i t t o M-judgements then the  M-judgements may be v e r i f i e d , e s t a b l i s h e d as doubt-free, and we have no reason t o f o l l o w P r i c e ' s p r o p o s a l t o i n t r o d u c e sense d a t a . What P r i c e has suggested  i s t h a t w i t h r e s p e c t t o the  same p e r c e p t u a l experience there i s an asymmetry between the M-statement,  'I see a tomato' and the S-statement,  sense datum of a round, b u l g y shape, e t c . " admit  this.  There  'I have a  We can c e r t a i n l y  i s an obvious asymmetry between the judge-  ment that we have i d e n t i f i e d the cause of our experience from a range  of f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s  (always d u b i t a b l e ) and the judge-  ment t h a t we have experienced a sense datum common t o a l l f o u r p o s s i b i l i t i e s b u t which we have't (always i n d u b i t a b l e ) .  i d e n t i f i e d w i t h any of them  The judgements a r e asymmetrical because  although they r e f e r t o the same experience, they don't mean the same t h i n g .  The M-statement i d e n t i f i e d the experience.  The S-statement  .describes sense content but i s non-committal  as t o i d e n t i f y i n g the f a m i l y t o which i t belongs  (or the  p h y s i c a l cause, or p h y s i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t , of the datum). Thus i t i s obvious t h a t the S-statement i n d u b i t a b i l i t y by not t a k i n g any r i s k .  achieves i t s  We c o u l d formulate  70  an M-statement along the same l i n e s .  We c o u l d formulate a  r i s k - f r e e M-statement "by g i v i n g a d i s j u n c t i o n of a l l the possibilities. a replica, etc.'  F o r example we c o u l d say 'I see a tomato, or  or a r e f l e c t i o n ,  or I'm h a l l u c i n a t i n g a tomato,  But we ought t o ask what use a r i s k - f r e e  c o u l d have. risk-free  M-statement  And we ought as w e l l t o ask what use P r i c e ' s  S-statement c o u l d have.  Now c e r t a i n l y  P r i c e does not intend t o stop h i s sense  d a t a program w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of sense d a t a .  But h i s  next step must s u r e l y be t o i d e n t i f y sense data a c c o r d i n g to the f a m i l y t o which they belong.  This w i l l  involve d i s -  t i n g u i s h i n g between, or i d e n t i f y i n g ,  the sense data a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h s e e i n g tomatoes, and those w i t h seeing r e p l i c a s ,  seeing  reflections,  datist  and h a l l u c i n a t e d tomatoes.  Even a sense  must f a c e the problem of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the sense d a t a i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a tomato and those i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a wax copy.  Even a sense d a t i s t must a l l o w f o r the f a c t t h a t  people dream.  N  He must t h e r e f o r e have some way of i d e n t i f y i n g  dreams. There can be no asymmetry between the o b j e c t language judgement t h a t we i d e n t i f y our experience as one of f o u r possibilities etc.)  ( i e , as t h a t we see a tomato and not a r e p l i c a ,  and the sense data language judgement t h a t we  identify  our sense data as b e l o n g i n g t o one f a m i l y or p a t t e r n and not another  ( i e . t h a t my sense data a r e p a r t of the f a m i l y t h a t  has a tomato as i t s p h y s i c a l c o u n t e r p a r t and not a wax r e p l i c a ) .  71  Therefore the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t P r i c e has a l l e g e d t o beset the f i r s t  s o r t of judgement must beset the second.  theory escapes One  them only by b e i n g  non-committal.  might put the p o i n t t h i s way.  a greater interest  whelming pragmatic  We  have i n most cases  i n the d i f f e r e n c e s than i n the  of our p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e s .  Sense d a t a  similarities  I argue t h a t we have an  i n t e r e s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between p e r c e p t u a l  experiences, i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g seeing tomatoes from ing tomatoes or from seeing wax d i s t i n g u i s h them.  over-  We  tomatoes.  We  hallucinat-  must attempt  to  must make m i n i m a l l y hedged c l a i m s .  Ordinary language r e f l e c t s our i n t e r e s t i n r e a l tomatoes by t a k i n g as a standard the case of seeing a r e a l tomato and hedgi n g d o u b t f u l cases by comparing them t o the standard case, (ie.  'This looks l i k e a tomato' compares our present  experience  t o t h a t of a standard case of s e e i n g a tomato.) Any u s e f u l sense d a t a program must r e f l e c t our i n t e r e s t i n a s i m i l a r way. argues  The argument P r i c e has  our o r d i n a r y judgement to be d u b i t a b l e .  practical  presented  But such i n -  d u b i t a b i l i t y as has been achieved by h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n of d a t a d e r i v e s from i g n o r i n g our p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t and t o take any r i s k .  refusing  P r i c e c e r t a i n l y plans t o complete a  sense  data program t h a t w i l l r e f l e c t our p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t . want t o cash our p h y s i c a l o b j e c t concepts of sense d a t a .  T h i s i s the source of a l l e g e d  He  will  i n terms of f a m i l i e s  But the argument which I have quoted  s e v e r a l p h y s i c a l o b j e c t concepts  sense  cashes  i n terms of one sense datum.  i n d u b i t a b i l i t y but i t i s a  72  c u i de sac from which he cannot escape without encountering the o r i g i n a l problem of d u b i t a b i l i t y .  Identifying  families  of sense d a t a w i l l be as r i s k y as i d e n t i f y i n g o b j e c t s .  To  say t h a t o b j e c t s a r e l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s out of sense d a t a doesn't achieve i n d u b i t a b i l i t y ; we can i n c o r r e c t l y c o n s t r u c t . The p o i n t i s , e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t sense d a t a language i s conf r o n t e d by the same s o r t s of doubts as o b j e c t language.  And  t h i s i s because we want i t t o do the same s o r t s of t h i n g s . As I have s a i d b e f o r e , speech i s i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n of a conventionalized sort.  Sense d a t a language w i l l have t o take  our i n t e n t i o n s i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  I t must r e f l e c t  such  i n t e n t i o n s as t h a t I inform you t h a t , say, a t r a i n i s coming. M-language r e f l e c t s t h i s in.the statement, *I see a t r a i n . * Sense d a t a language i f i t i s t o r e f l e c t such i n t e n t i o n s must say something l i k e ,  'I have a sense datum of the f o l l o w i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n which I i d e n t i f y w i t h the f o l l o w i n g p a t t e r n ' , or something of the l i k e . i s t o be i n f o r m a t i v e .  To be i n t e n t i o n a l , f o r language,  To be i n f o r m a t i v e sense d a t a language  must i d e n t i f y sense d a t a a c c o r d i n g t o f a m i l i e s . R u s s e l l produces a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t argument which he f e e l s i s c o n c l u s i v e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t having c e r t a i n sense data i s a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n of p e r c e i v i n g an o b j e c t , i n h i s case a t a b l e .  H i s argument i s e s s e n t i a l l y  that t o u c h i n g t a b l e s j u s t i s e x p e r i e n c i n g sense d a t a . L e t us examine h i s argument.  As we have seen he has c o n s i d e r e d  s e v e r a l a s p e c t s of the t a b l e  ( i t s shape, c o l o r ,  texture)  73  and w i t h r e s p e c t t o each he claimed  t o f i n d t h a t "our c o n f i -  dence i n our senses d e s e r t s us." Then he considered of touch and noted t h a t although  the sense  the t a b l e "always g i v e s us  s e n s a t i o n of hardness, and we f e e l t h a t i t r e s i s t s  pressure...  the s e n s a t i o n we o b t a i n depends upon how hard we press and a l s o upon what p a r t of the body we press  with."  T h i s , he t h i n k s , f o r c e s us t o the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n , the v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s due t o v a r i o u s pressures of v a r i o u s p a r t s of the body cannot be supposed t o r e v e a l d i r e c t l y any d e f i n i t e property of the t a b l e , but a t most t o be signs of some property which causes a l l the sensations but i s n o t a c t u a l l y apparent i n any of them. And the same a p p l i e s s t i l l more o b v i o u s l y t o the sounds which can be e l i c i t e d by rapping on the table. Thus i t becomes evident t h a t the r e a l t a b l e , i f there i s one, i s not the same as what we immediately experience by s i g h t or touch or h e a r i n g . The r e a l t a b l e , i f there i s one, i s n o t immediately known. Hence two very d i f f e r e n t questions a t one a r i s e ; namely (1) i s there a r e a l t a b l e a t a l l ? (2) I f so what s o r t of an o b j e c t i s i t ? ?  He goes on t o d e f i n e and c l a r i f y some  terminology.  L e t us g i v e the name of 'sense-data' t o the t h i n g s t h a t , a r e immediately known i n s e n s a t i o n ; such t h i n g s as c o l o u r s , sounds, s m e l l s , hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We s h a l l g i v e the name 'sensations' t o the experience of b e i n g immediately aware of these t h i n g s . . . i t i s p l a i n t h a t i f we a r e t o know anything about the t a b l e i t must be by means of the sense-data brown c o l o u r , oblong shape, smoothness, e t c . ; but f o r reasons which have a l r e a d y been g i v e n we cannot say the t a b l e is_ the sense-data, or even t h a t the sense-data a r e d i r e c t l y p r o p e r t i e s of the t a b l e . Thus a problem a r i s e s as t o the r e l a t i o n of the sensedata t o the r e a l t a b l e , supposing there i s such a thing.^ .  74  Now c l e a r l y R u s s e l l f e e l s t h a t h i s examination of the v a r i o u s aspects  of the t a b l e has s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s c r e d i t e d our  naive common sense n o t i o n s about the t a b l e t o introduce mediate elements i n our p e r c e p t i o n .  We ought, he t h i n k s , t o conclude  t h a t we do n o t d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e o b j e c t s .  We d i r e c t l y  per-  c e i v e sense data and we know o b j e c t s only by means of sense data. Our  In f a c t , claims R u s s e l l , we i n f e r them from sense d a t a .  i n f e r e n c e s can go awry, can be doubted, but the p r i m i t i v e  data are, he c l a i m s , chapter  As he says l a t e r i n h i s  on knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by des-  cription, to  indubitable.  "We have seen t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e , without  absurdity,  doubt whether there i s a t a b l e a t a l l , whereas i t i s not 4  p o s s i b l e t o doubt the sense data." I t h i n k the f i r s t c a u t i o u s step i n a c r i t i c a l exami n a t i o n of R u s s e l l ' s argument i s t o note what seems t o be an asymmetry i n h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n of i t . By t h i s I mean h i s t u r n from t a l k i n g of the shape, c o l o r , and t e x t u r e of the table  ( t h i n g s we t h i n k of as p r o p e r t i e s of the t a b l e ) t o  t a l k i n g of our 'sense of touch'  (which we g e n e r a l l y t h i n k of  as being a f a c u l t y by which we became aware of some p r o p e r t i e s of the t a b l e ) .  Since R u s s e l l u l t i m a t e l y c o n s i d e r s the proper-  t i e s of the t a b l e t o be simply  o b j e c t s of our sensory  faculties  and g i v e s a l l such o b j e c t s the same s t a t u s , sense data, we can't suppose t h a t he t h i n k s h i s move i s of much import.  But  he has t o show by independent argument t h a t p r o p e r t i e s of tables are sensations  or sense .data or c o n s t r u c t s from them.  75  He  seems t o be begging the q u e s t i o n .  We  ought not to l e t  him b u i l d h i s case on u n - a r t i c u l a t e d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , i s the overhasty  It  i g n o r i n g of such s u b t l e s h i f t s of focus  t h a t o f t e n i n c u l c a t e s the p s e u d o - s i m p l i c i t y of many p h i l o s o p h i c a l programs. What, I t h i n k , t h i s l i t t l e R u s s e l l to introduce  'sensations',  s h i f t does i s to a l l o w (or as he l a t e r amends,  •sense data') i n t o h i s examination of seeing the t a b l e . He has not mentioned  'sensations' i n h i s examination of the  c o l o r , shape or t e x t u r e of the t a b l e but they are c a s u a l l y i n t r u d e d i n t o the account of the sense of touch. at f i r s t  i n c l i n e d to object, being  by the word  'sense.'  We  not  I t h i n k somewhat l u l l e d  That the'sense of touch' g i v e s  'sensations' doesn't p a r t i c u l a r l y  are  us  j a r us.  The account of the sense of touch  i s meant t o be  d e c i s i v e , t o be the account i n which R u s s e l l ' s c o n c l u s i o n s are e x p l i c i t l y drawn.  Let us examine h i s argument a g a i n .  (1)  "The  t a b l e always g i v e s us a s e n s a t i o n of hardness."  (2)  "The s e n s a t i o n we o b t a i n depends on how hard we press...and what p a r t of the body we press with."  (3)  "Thus the v a r i o u s s e n s a t i o n s due t o v a r i o u s p r e s s ures on v a r i o u s p a r t s of the body cannot be supposed to r e v e a l d i r e c t l y any d e f i n i t e property of the t a b l e but a t most to be s i g n s of some property which causes them."  (4)  "The r e a l t a b l e i f there i s one, i s not the same as what we immediately experience by s i g h t or touch or h e a r i n g . The r e a l t a b l e . . . i s not immedi a t e l y known to us a l l . "  76  A q u e s t i o n of paramount importance i s how the c o n c l u s i o n i s i m p l i e d by the f i r s t premise? going  much of I f we  are  to c o n s i d e r p e r c e i v i n g the t a b l e only i n such terms as  t h a t "the t a b l e always g i v e s us s e n s a t i o n s , " then we I t h i n k , g i v e n the case away.  have,  For  'sensations' j u s t are i n  R u s s e l l ' s view d i r e c t l y p e r c e i v e d ,  immediately known t o us,  and  the t a b l e .  intermediate  as between us and  i n p r i n c i p l e , t o the person who  They  senses them.  belong,  They never c o u l d  be p r o p e r t i e s of t a b l e s ; a t b e s t they c o u l d be caused by t a b l e s . We  ought as w e l l t o examine the term t h a t forms the  crux of the c o n c l u s i o n , the term ience by s i g h t , or touch i a t e l y experience' only to having to  'what we  or h e a r i n g . '  Now  then ex hypothesi  immediately experience*  o b v i o u s l y i f 'immedi f i t refers  the only answer  i s ' s e n s a t i o n s ' and  immediately known to us a t a l l . "  as w e l l t o the e x p r e s s i o n s e n s a t i o n s can  immediately exper-  means awareness of s e n s a t i o n s ,  sensations  r e a l t a b l e i s not  'to r e v e a l d i r e c t l y , '  ' r e v e a l d i r e c t l y ' then we  aware of the t a b l e . s o l e l y to  'what we  But  'sensations', but are compatible  then R u s s e l l ' s c o n c l u s i o n i s i n v a l i d and  This applies I f only  cannot be  i f these expressions  directly  need not  refer  with M-judgements,  probably  His argument seems doubly c i r c u l a r .  "the  false.  Obviously  i f we  can only l e g i t i m a t e l y t a l k about p e r c e i v i n g the t a b l e i n terms of e x p e r i e n c i n g s e n s a t i o n s , then i t f o l l o w s t h a t what we  immediately experience  i f we  are s e n s a t i o n s .  can only l e g i t i m a t e l y t a l k about  And  conversely  'immediately  experiencing'  77  i n terms of sensations  then i t f o l l o w s t h a t what we  i a t e l y experience when we Now can  first  the t a b l e are  we  only l e g i t i m a t e l y t a l k about p e r c e i v i n g the t a b l e s o l e l y  there  i s any  The  tenor  seeing the shape and argument, had  would be  sensations.  He  overwhelming d i f f i c u l t y  f e e l s hard.*  has not  i n saying,  erent;  shown t h a t 'The  table  of h i s arguments, as they p e r t a i n to  c o l o r and  t e x t u r e , would i n d i c a t e t h a t  he not turned  to a  'sensations'  account,  something l i k e as f o l l o w s : under some c o n d i t i o n s  the t a b l e f e e l s hard, under other c o n d i t i o n s  (or  sensations.  of a l l R u s s e l l hasn't e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t  i n terms of e x p e r i e n c i n g  his  perceive  immed-  t h e r e f o r e we  do not f e e l  i t s 'real* hardness).  i s mistaken.  As  i t feels d i f f -  (but i n f e r ) the  'real*  I have shown h i s use  His argument to the c o n t r a r y , we  of  Let us see what happens i f we without u s i n g  'sensations.'  He has  'real'  expect a r e a l  t a b l e t o f e e l d i f f e r e n t l y under d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s h a l l u c i n a t e d t a b l e perhaps to f e e l the  table  (and  a  same). r e - c a s t R u s s e l l ' s argument  g i v e n an S-statement  account of p e r c e i v i n g the t a b l e ; l e t us g i v e an M-statement account. let  Instead  us t a l k of  of choosing t o t a l k of  ' f e e l i n g the t a b l e . '  (1) can e a s i l y be t r a n s l a t e d as,  'The  'obtaining  Russell's f i r s t  sensations' premise  t a b l e always f e e l s  hard.' T r a n s l a t i n g the second premise (2) b r i n g s difficulties.  The  expression,  out some  'the t a b l e f e e l s hard' seems  t o do a double duty, to r e f e r to our  i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the t a b l e .  78  I t may But  be construed  i t may  as r e p o r t i n g on a property  be used t o make a l e s s e r c l a i m about the  than t h a t i t i s hard; i t may s u b j e c t we  of the  experience  of the t a b l e nor any  be construed  table.  table  as r e p o r t i n g on  (while not n e c e s s a r i l y denying the r o l e property  i t may  have).  The  first  con-  s t r u a l w i l l be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h an M-statement account. we  s h a l l say f o r premise two,  'Our  what p a r t of the body we  (3) by,  now,  i f we  press  press  with.'  cannot be  d e f i n i t e property  conclusion  then the c o n c l u s i o n  Of course, we i t s texture  which causes us to f e e l  d i s c o v e r how  rough, how  smooth, e t c .  were to o f f e r us a p i e c e of f r u i t  hard i t i s , what Suppose someone  of a type with which  are u n f a m i l i a r , l e t us say a persimmon or a pomolo. wish t o say t h a t we  as  i s obviously c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e .  wish to say, we  i s , how  supposed to r e v e a l  of the t a b l e but a t most to be  g i v i n g us signs of some property  we  and  ' F e e l i n g the t a b l e w i t h d i f f e r e n t p a r t s of the body  d i r e c t l y any  do',  hard we  attempt to t r a n s l a t e the  or w i t h d i f f e r e n t pressures  we  Thus  assessment of the hardness  of the t a b l e w i l l come i n p a r t from how  But  our  discover  we  Surely  i t s p r o p e r t i e s by f e e l i n g i t ,  p e e l i n g i t , e a t i n g i t . Shouldn't we  a l s o wish to say that  we  d i r e c t l y d i s c o v e r them? Let us now In b r i e f  consider  the use  I s h a l l argue t h a t l i k e  of the word  ' r e a l ' i t i s an  'directly.' adjuster.  ' D i r e c t l y ' serves mainly to exclude ways of i n d i r e c t l y doing something.  There i s no  one way  of doing something d i r e c t l y .  79  We don't u s u a l l y see any need of u s i n g  ' d i r e c t l y ' i n statements  about d i s c o v e r i n g p r o p e r t i e s except t o d i s t i n g u i s h from some way of i n d i r e c t l y d i s c o v e r i n g them.  Seeing Smith, who l i k e s  sweet t h i n g s and d i s l i k e s t a r t f r u i t s , r e l i s h a p i e c e of f r u i t may be i n d i r e c t l y d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t i t i s sweet. then, t a s t i n g i t ourselves  But,  w i l l be d i r e c t l y d i s c o v e r i n g i t .  We don't u s u a l l y f e e l c a l l e d upon t o say we  'directly  discover'  unless  i t i s t o d i s t i n g u i s h our procedure from some a d j u s t e d  case.  There i s a s t r o n g and m i s l e a d i n g  argument t h a t supportive  suggestion  i n Russell's  ' d i r e c t l y ' has a p o s i t i v e f u n c t i o n that i s  only of e x p e r i e n c i n g  sensations.  F i n a l l y l e t us r e - c a s t the r e s t of the c o n c l u s i o n (4) as, 'The r e a l t a b l e i s not the same as what we f e e l . r e a l t a b l e i s not f e l t a t a l l . ' intuitive.  Again the r e s u l t  The  i s counter-  What s o r t of a -table do I f e e l i f I don't f e e l  the r e a l one?  I t seems t o make p e r f e c t l y good sense t o say  I f e e l the r e a l t a b l e but I admit that the context  i n which  i t makes sense i s , by the account I have g i v e n of ' r e a l ' , the context  i n which we want t o d i s t i n g u i s h some p o s s i b l e  way of being not r e a l .  R u s s e l l ' s account, as I have argued  e a r l i e r , r e s t s on a misconception about  ' r e a l ' such that i t  has an almost P l a t o n i c sense, i e . We can't  f e e l the r e a l  t a b l e because the r e a l t a b l e i s n ' t the s o r t of t h i n g that i t i s p o s s i b l e t o f e e l (or f o r t h a t matter, s e e ) . again  And t h i s  i s i n v i r t u e of h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n of 'sensations' as  what we ( r e a l l y ) d i s c o v e r ,  perceive  or immediately experience.  80  Now I am  I would l i k e to make i t c l e a r a t t h i s p o i n t that  i n sympathy with a great d e a l of what i s p o s i t i v e i n  R u s s e l l ' s account. and we  We  look a t t a b l e s , we  a l s o have v a r i o u s sensory  f e e l them, e t c .  experiences  with these e x p l o r a t o r y a c t i v i t i e s ,  which are connected  I b e l i e v e i t may  be  of  c o n s i d e r a b l e p h i l o s o p h i c v i r t u e i f not to say i n t e r e s t t o i n t r o d u c e the concept of sense data t o analyze experiences,  these  personal  f o r example which we d e s c r i b e by s a y i n g  'from  here i t looks s i l v e r y and diamond shaped.* What I o b j e c t to i s the negative aspect  of R u s s e l l ' s  account.  H i s argument as I have quoted i t above i s q u i t e  negative;  i t s c o n c l u s i o n s are n e g a t i v e l y expressed.  e x i s t e n c e of the  ' r e a l ' t a b l e i s questioned.  . . . i s not immediately known t o us a t a l l . '  'The  Thus the r e a l table  The main t h r u s t  of h i s argument seems t o be a g a i n s t our o r d i n a r y account t h a t we  see  ( r e a l ) t a b l e s , d i s c o v e r t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s , and  p r e c i s e l y d e s c r i b e them.  can  I t h i n k h i s program i s t o e s t a b l i s h  h i s sense data a n a l y s i s and  then c l a i m t h a t o b j e c t s ( ' r e a l '  o b j e c t s ) are l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t s out of sense data.  This i s  i n l i n e with the R u s s e l l i a n maxim t h a t wherever p o s s i b l e l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s ought to r e p l a c e i n f e r r e d  entities.  I o b j e c t here only t h a t h i s argument hasn't supported negative  conclusions.  The  'ordinary' account of o b j e c t s  t h e i r p r o p e r t i e s hasn't been demolished. been e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t these t h i n g s are need of replacement.  his and  I t c e r t a i n l y hasn't  just inferences i n  I s h a l l t a l k about i n f e r e n c e s s h o r t l y .  81  I argue w i t h r e s p e c t t o R u s s e l l ' s argument, quoted above, t h a t i f the premises a r e S-statements (which I t h i n k they a r e ) , then i t simply anything  does not f o l l o w t h a t we can conclude  d e s t r u c t i v e of an M-statement account of p e r c e i v i n g  the t a b l e j  n o t , any any r a t e , without the f u r t h e r premise t h a t  S-statements a r e a l l we a r e ever j u s t i f i e d t o our p e r c e p t u a l last  experience of the t a b l e .  i n using with And s i n c e  i s what we are t r y i n g t o demonstrate, we can't  i t as a premise.  respect  this  include  I have demonstrated my c o n t e n t i o n by sub-  s t i t u t i n g M-statements f o r S-statements i n the premises and thus showing the c o n c l u s i o n t o be not only i n v a l i d but f a l s e . What i s a t i s s u e i s the r e l a t i v e s t a t u s and u t i l i t y of M-statement and S-statement accounts of a g i v e n experience. perceive  perceptual  I f one begs the q u e s t i o n and assumes that we  (or 'immediately experience' or 'immediately know')  only s e n s a t i o n s ,  then, sensations  that the e x i s t e n c e  being  subjective, i t follows  of an o b j e c t i v e t a b l e would be i n q u e s t i o n  and we c o u l d r i g h t l y say t h a t the p r o p e r t i e s of the ' r e a l ' t a b l e a r e not d i r e c t l y r e v e a l e d  t o us.  On t h i s account,  which I t h i n k i s the course R u s s e l l has taken, one simply ignores  p e r c e p t i o n verbs t h a t f i g u r e i n the M-statement account,  u n t i l a secure beachhead has been e s t a b l i s h e d f o r sense  data.  Then one r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y i n t e r p r e t s such verbs a c c o r d i n g t o the sense data model. M-statement,  That i s one would simply  ignore the  *I f e e l a t a b l e ' u n t i l he f e l t he had e s t a b l i s h e d  a sense data account such that  'what we immediately experience  82  by touch' are sense data.  Then one would argue t h a t  'feeling  a t a b l e ' must be  i n t e r p r e t e d as i n v o l v i n g something c o n s t r u c t e d  from sense data,  i e . ' f e e l i n g a t a b l e ' becomes simply  c e r t a i n sense data  having  i n a c e r t a i n context.  I t h i n k t h a t a b a s i c flaw i n sense data programs and p a r t i c u l a r l y R u s s e l l ' s , i s t o attempt t o subsume a l l the ways we all  are aware of the e x t e r n a l world the t h i n g s of which we  g e n e r i c term.  Thus 'we  immediately experience  under one  g e n e r i c term and  are aware under a  corresponding  p e r c e i v e only sense data', only sense data.•  But  or  t h i s argument  from g e n e r i c terms can not be e s t a b l i s h e d by r e f e r e n c e facts;  'we  i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a programmatic matter.  to  'Perceive'  i s a g e n e r i c term f o r a l l s o r t s of verbs connected with  sensing  or w i t h becoming aware by means of the senses.  these  Some of  verbs r e f e r t o o b j e c t s , some r e f e r to o b j e c t s or We  'touch' o b j e c t s but not s e n s a t i o n s .  we  ' f e e l ' sensations.  i s no one way  t h i n g we  ' f e e l ' objects  one  t o immediately experience  immediately experience.  t h i n g we  perceive.  t h i n g s nor  The d i f f e r e n t verbs  s o r t s of judgements we make about the world w i t h them may w e l l have d i f f e r e n t and  separate  and  i s to note t h a t there  t o p e r c e i v e anything nor any  There i s no one way one  Most important  We  sensations.  only and very  s o r t s of l o g i c a l s t a t u s .  Statements r e f l e c t i n g some of these  judgements, say M-judgements,  need not be e q u i v a l e n t t o the t r u t h - f u n c t i o n s of other//sorts of statements, say S-statements.  Indeed, s i n c e no  conjunction  of S-statements e n t a i l s the e x i s t e n c e or non-existence  of a  83  m a t e r i a l o b j e c t , then I cannot see how S-statements and Mstatements c o u l d be e q u i v a l e n t .  A t any r a t e the attempt t o  lump them together under g e n e r i c terms i s q u i t e  specious.  Even though we were t o grant t h a t whenever we p e r c e i v e we a r e s e n s o r i l y aware and what we a r e s e n s o r i l y aware of a r e sensat i o n s , t h i s would only imply t h a t there i s a correspondence between M-judgements and S-judgements.  I t i s the case t h a t  when we p e r c e i v e o b j e c t s we a l s o p e r c e i v e s e n s a t i o n s .  But  t h i s statement i s t r u e only because we have used the g e n e r i c term  'perceive.'  I t i s not t r u e i f we s u b s t i t u t e j u s t any  p e r c e p t i o n verb or combination of verbs f o r 'perceive.' eg. I t i s true -if we s u b s t i t u t e 'touch' and ' f e e l ' , or ' f e e l ' and ' f e e l ' , as i n , 'When we touch or  o b j e c t s we f e e l  'When we f e e l o b j e c t s we f e e l s e n s a t i o n s . *  t r u e i f we s u b s t i t u t e 'touch' and 'touch.' we touch  o b j e c t s we touch sensations..'  t h i n g we p e r c e i v e because  sensations', .But i t i s not  eg. as i n , 'When  There can be no one  'perceive' i s by d e f i n i t i o n a generic  term s t a n d i n g f o r many verbs which take many s o r t s of nouns as t h e i r o b j e c t s .  Sense data theory has been motivated  search f o r simples  i n our language and i n our judgements,  a search f o r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s .  by a  Arguments l i k e  R u s s e l l ' s which depend upon the use of g e n e r i c terms beg the question.  They make too f r e e use of the terms 'perceive' and  •immediately experience.' the subspecies  A piecemeal a n a l y s i s shows t h a t  of the g e n e r i c f a m i l i e s show a t l e a s t two s o r t s  of judgements each with separate  l o g i c a l status.  84  L e t us now c o n s i d e r the matter of i n f e r e n c e .  Russell  says we i n f e r the r e a l t a b l e and i t s q u a l i t i e s from glimpses of i t . And of course,  i n accordance with h i s maxim, 'Wherever  p o s s i b l e l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s a r e t o be s u b s t i t u t e d f o r inferred  e n t i t i e s ' , he wants us t o analyze  our M-language  o b j e c t names i n terms of l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s from sense data.  But do we i n f e r o b j e c t s and t h e i r q u a l i t i e s ?  go over R u s s e l l ' s argument y e t another time. as i f i t had f o u r 90° angles  L e t us  The t a b l e l o o k s ,  i f seen from d i r e c t l y above or  below; i t looks as i f i t had two acute and two obtuse from a l l b u t other p o i n t s of view.  angles  Therefore we i n f e r i t s  ( r e a l ) shape. F i r s t as I have suggested before we must deny t h a t we should say the t a b l e looks as i f the t a b l e had two acute and two  obtuse a n g l e s .  A two-dimensional r e p r e s e n t a t i o n does.  Perhaps a sense datum, i f considered as a two-dimensional mapping, does.  But the t a b l e does not.  not y e t even been introduced  And sense data have  i n R u s s e l l ' s argument!  Furthermore there i s c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r a i n on the word 'infer*  i f every case of. p e r c e i v i n g o b j e c t s or t h e i r  i s t o be c a l l e d  inferring.  as being p a r t i c u l a r ,  qualities  We u s u a l l y t h i n k of i n f e r e n c e s  eg. From the f a c t t h a t the t a b l e i s  ten f e e t long I i n f e r t h a t i t won't f i t i n the room.  We  u s u a l l y say we l e a r n the shapes of o b j e c t s and i n f e r t h i n g s from our knowledge.  I t h i n k i t i s a t l e a s t as p l a u s i b l e t o  say t h a t i m p l i c i t i n the n o t i o n of being an o b j e c t i s the  85  f a c t t h a t i t has other  s i d e s , a three dimensional shape, a  c o l o r , e t c . as t o say t h a t i m p l i c i t  i n the n o t i o n of an object  i s the i n f e r e n c e t h a t i t has other s i d e s , e t c . it  I f o r one take  t h a t the f a c t that something is_ a t a b l e and not a r e f l e c t i o n  or a h a l l u c i n a t i o n , or a p i c t u r e or a dream, i m p l i e s t h a t i t i s three dimensional s o l i d , e t c . Yet f u r t h e r i f t o i n f e r i s t o d e r i v e by  reasoning,  then I am c e r t a i n l y not aware of i n f e r r i n g when I see o b j e c t s . I cannot t h i n k of what c h a i n of reasoning I recognize  o b j e c t s and t h i s implies that I must know something  about o b j e c t s . dimensional, But  I a c t u a l l y go through.  One of the things  I know i s t h a t they a r e three  s o l i d , colored, e t c . finally,  i t i s not necessary even on R u s s e l l ' s  account t h a t we i n f e r the q u a l i t i e s of the t a b l e .  I f the  t a b l e looks smooth now and looks rough under a magnifying g l a s s , I may j u s t choose t o c a l l relevant to c a l l  i t rough or t o say i t looks rough.  need not make any i n f e r e n c e . argument i s done by ' r e a l . ' t h i s question  i t smooth u n t i l i t becomes But I  A g a i n much of the work i n R u s s e l l ' s He wants t o know the ' r e a l '  texture;  i s obviated by the a d j u s t e r a n a l y s i s of ' r e a l . '  S i m i l a r l y w i t h shape.  I c a l l the t a b l e r e c t a n g u l a r .  If i t  seems r e l e v a n t I w i l l say i t looks diamond-shaped; i f i t doesn't I won't.  I choose t o say the t a b l e i s brown; I may  choose t o c a l l i t shiny inferring.  or another c o l o r .  But choosing  isn't  There i s no one way of being a r e a l q u a l i t y of an  o b j e c t nor one way of being  p r e c i s e i n our d e s c r i p t i o n of an  86  object's  (real) quality.  take q u a l i t i e s as data and s e l v e s as d a t a .  I t seems t o me  t h a t sometimes we  sometimes we  take o b j e c t s them-  I see no reason t o say t h a t objects are always  I n f e r r e d from more p r i m i t i v e d a t a . primitive, as we  i n t h a t we  'Object' may  itself  be  l e a r n about o b j e c t s a t the same time  l e a r n about q u a l i t i e s . The  question  of which s o r t of data to take as b a s i c  makes i t appear as though there are two of p e r c e p t i o n .  That i s , t h a t there  i t t h a t sense d a t a are b a s i c and  c o n f l i c t i n g accounts  i s one  account which  t h a t our n o t i o n of  are e i t h e r i n f e r r e d or c o n s t r u c t e d  has  objects  from them ( i e . we  perceive  redness, roundness, s o f t n e s s , smoothness, j u c i n e s s , e t c . , we  i d e n t i f y these sense data as belonging  we  c a l l t h i s s e r i e s of sense data tomato),  t o one And  account which holds that our n o t i o n of o b j e c t s holds a f o u n d a t i o n a l we  place  there  etc.  We  teach what red If we  i s not  and  i s another  i s basic  and  i n o r d i n a r y language such t h a t  a s c r i b e sense data or q u a l i t i e s t o them (or as  caused by them), i e . The  we  pattern  and  something  tomato i s red, round, s o f t ,  etc.,  i s by o s t e n t i o n , by p o i n t i n g t o tomatoes.  conclude t h a t what P r i c e and  R u s s e l l have done  to have e s t a b l i s h e d a f a c t about the world, t h a t what  perceive  i s one  s o r t of t h i n g , sense data, but  t o have  o u t l i n e d an account of p e r c e p t i o n a l t e r n a t e t o the one o r d i n a r i l y use,  then the q u e s t i o n  i s can t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e  account do something o r d i n a r y language cannot do? a v o i d mistakes.  To answer t h i s we  a l l e g e d i n d u b i t a b i l i t y of sense  we  Can i t  must examine c l o s e l y the  data.  87  II.  Some Doubts About I n d u b i t a b i l i t y Sense data,  f o r example the v i s u a l experience t h a t I  i n d i s p u t a b l y have when I e i t h e r see or t h i n k I see a tomato or when I look a t a t a b l e from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view, were introduced perception,  by P r i c e and R u s s e l l as i n d u b i t a b l e elements of (eg. P r i c e : "One t h i n g however I cannot doubt;  t h a t there e x i s t s a r e a l [ s i c ] patch, e t c . , e t c . " ) .  I f we  wish, f o r c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c reasons, t o make i n c o r r i g i b l e statements about our p e r c e p t u a l  experience of the world, we  must, they argue, r e s t r i c t our d i s c o u r s e  t o statements about  the  I have c r i t i c i z e d  i n d u b i t a b l e elements of p e r c e p t i o n .  t h e i r claim that ordinary, doubtful.  1  judgements a r e i n h e r e n t l y  L e t me here c r i t i c i z e the a l l e g e d  of sense d a t a . itself .'  or o b j e c t ,  F i r s t there  i s the q u e s t i o n  indubitability of the datum  Is a d e s c r i p t i o n of the datum i n f a c t  indubitable?  May I doubt t h a t P r i c e i n t u i t s a round, r e d , patch? contrary  t o h i s c l a i m , doubt i t ?  I t h i n k these;  May he,  questions  concern a v i t a l matter, namely whether d e s c r i p t i o n s of sense data a r e simple,  unhedgeable statements or whether they must  be hedged w i t h r e f e r e n c e  t o some standard.  This point  will  be brought out by c o n s i d e r i n g whether, and i f so how, desc r i p t i o n s of sense d a t a a r e ever s u b j e c t t o v e r i f i c a t i o n . The  second major q u e s t i o n w i t h regard  cerns the f u n c t i o n of the d a t a .  t o i n d u b i t a b i l i t y con-  Supposing the d a t a themselves  t o be i n d u b i t a b l e , what s o r t s of t h i n g s a r e we going t o do w i t h the data?  How a r e we going t o organize  or i n t e r p r e t  88  the data; what a r e we going  t o c o n s t r u c t with the data?  must ask i f any of these t h i n g s are open t o doubt. there  i s the q u e s t i o n of p r e c i s i o n .  We  And f i n a l l y  R u s s e l l has s a i d t h a t  w i t h r e s p e c t t o d e s c r i b i n g o b j e c t s , "as soon as we t r y t o be . . . p r e c i s e our t r o u b l e s begin."  H i s examples, and P r i c e ' s ,  of sense data seem r a t h e r s i m p l i s t i c . regarding criptions?  p r e c i s i o n t o be met w i t h  Are there any t r o u b l e s  i n g i v i n g sense data des-  L e t us t u r n t o these matters and see i f and how  these questions First  can be answered.  I s h a l l note t h a t i f we a r e t o take as hard a  l i n e on doubt as the sense d a t i s t seems t o want us t o take, then we would have t o conclude t h a t s t r i c t l y speaking what i s i n d u b i t a b l e about p e r c e p t i o n perceived.  i s only t h a t which i s p r e s e n t l y  Since memory i s n o t o r i o u s l y f a l l i b l e ,  the f a c t  t h a t I t h i n k t h a t I p e r c e i v e d a t a b l e a minute ago does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean e i t h e r t h a t I d i d p e r c e i v e a t a b l e or even t h a t I h a l l u c i n a t e d or dreamed, e t c . a t a b l e .  I t i s I admit,  somewhat d i f f i c u l t t o see how t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , i e . how I c o u l d t h i n k t h a t I sensed some sense data without sensed them.  having  But u n l e s s we e x p r e s s l y r u l e out (and I don't  t h i n k we can) the p o s s i b i l i t y of present  h a l l u c i n a t i o n s or  misjudgements t h a t a t a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n past time I sensed a t a b l e sense datum, then we must a l l o w t h a t statements about past sensory p e r c e p t i o n a r e s u b j e c t t o doubt.  We may even  argue t h a t they a r e s u b j e c t t o an e s s e n t i a l l y s t r o n g e r doubt than anything  the sense d a t i s t has suggested about statements  89  about o b j e c t p e r c e p t i o n .  The reason i s as f o l l o w s .  I f I say,  'I saw a tomato on the t a b l e ' , someone might be a b l e t o show me  t h a t what I thought was  reflection.  a tomato was  a wax  r e p l i c a or a  On the other hand, perhaps he might v a l i d a t e  c l a i m by showing me  t h a t there was  my  indeed a tomato t h e r e .  But i f I say *I saw a round, bulgy shape, e t c . ' , then the only way  someone e l s e c o u l d v e r i f y t h i s statement i s w i t h r e f e r e n c e  to an o b j e c t  ( i e . by s a y i n g t h a t I must have had t h i s  datum because  there was  a tomato t h e r e ) .  sense  He could not f a l s i f y  the  statement.  The statement i s n ' t s e l f - v e r i f y i n g and g i v e n  the  fallibility  of memory I cannot myself v e r i f y  r e f e r e n c e t o p u b l i c or o b j e c t  i t without  judgements.  This point, i s i l l u s t r a t i v e of a g e n e r a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h sense d a t a unforeseen by t h e i r proponents. about o b j e c t s are p u b l i c l y them are p u b l i c l y  Disputes  d e c i d a b l e because c l a i m s about  v e r i f i a b l e or f a l s i f i a b l e .  Claims about  sense d a t a are only v e r i f i a b l e or f a l s i f i a b l e with r e f e r e n c e to p u b l i c o b j e c t s . bility  Let me  put the case i n terms of c o r r i g i -  or i n c o r r i g i b i l i t y of statements.  tomato* my  I f I say  'I see a  statement i s h e l d t o be c o r r i g i b l e because  c o u l d be adduced  to show t h a t I am mistaken.  Now  evidence  I have  argued e a r l i e r that t o show a judgement can be mistaken i s to e n t a i l t h a t we know how  i t can be c o r r e c t .  doubt-free or standard case.  We must have a  The standard case i s where  statements are no l o n g e r hedged but are c a t e g o r i c a l .  I may  hedge t h i s or t h a t p e r c e p t u a l judgement t h a t what I see i s a  90  tomato b u t t o do so I must know what a tomato i s . To know t h i s I s t o know the c o n d i t i o n s under which 'This i s a tomato' i s t r u e and t h e r e f o r e ex h y p o t h e s i  unhedged.  I f I say ' I sense a r e d , b u l g y shape', t h e n my  state-  ment seems i n c o r r i g i b l e because t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e anyone can p r e s e n t t h a t would c o u n t e r my c l a i m .  But on the o t h e r  hand the o n l y r e a s o n I can g i v e t o j u s t i f y my d e s c r i b i n g my sense datum as 'red', (and the o n l y way I can e x p l a i n what •red' means s u p p o s i n g you a r e i g n o r a n t of the term) i s t o r e f e r t o a s t a n d a r d ease, t o p o i n t t o something r e d and say t h a t what I saw resembles i t .  What I must do i s say t h a t  my sense datum was or i s l i k e a s t a n d a r d case of r e d i n the essential respect.  I j u s t i f y d e s c r i b i n g my sense datum as  r e d by comparing i t t o a s t a n d a r d .  And t h i s i s tantamount  t o s a y i n g t h a t I hedge my sense datum d e s c r i p t i o n w i t h r e f erence t o a statement t h a t i s i t s e l f unhedged,  i e . ' I say  my sense datum i s r e d because i t i s l i k e t h i s and t h i s i s red.'  We can, t h e r e f o r e , i n p r i n c i p l e , doubt t h a t someone  i s u s i n g language c o r r e c t l y when he d e s c r i b e s h i s sense datum as'red,' is red.  We must a f t e r a l l judge t h a t a g i v e n sense datum Therefore  o b v i o u s l y the sense d a t a program has n o t  escaped the judgemental a s p e c t of p e r c e p t i o n .  We  justify  judgements o n l y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a s t a n d a r d .  Sense  data  judgements a r e n o t i n d u b i t a b l e . The sense d a t i s t assumes the c o n d i t i o n t h a t we always a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e our sense d a t a .  But he can g i v e no c r i t e r i a  91  f o r determining what accuracy i s u n l e s s i t i s with r e f e r e n c e to something p u b l i c , d o u b t - f r e e , standard.  I may  mis-describe  a tomato by s a y i n g t h a t i s red when i t i s pink or green. In t h i s case you can show me  t h a t I have m i s - d e s c r i b e d i t .  But I can a l s o m i s - d e s c r i b e my which l o g i c a l l y prevents me  sense datum.  There i s nothing  from e r r i n g by s a y i n g t h a t the  sense datum I have i s red when i t i s pink or green.  But i n  t h i s l a t t e r case one c o u l d only show I had made a mistake i f he a s c e r t a i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a standard t h a t I commonly misused the word 'red.' Furthermore  we  ought not t o suppose t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n s  of sense data i n v o l v e any b u i l t - i n p r e c i s i o n t h a t d e s c r i p t i o n s of o b j e c t s do not have. we  F o r one t h i n g i n the l a t t e r  have ways of t e s t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s ,  cases  i n the former we do not.  Often, f o r example, we are not sure t h a t our d e s c r i p t i o n s of o b j e c t s are p r e c i s e enough f o r our purposes. tomatoes?  red are  Often they seem more orangey or pinky than r e d .  Sometimes we  speak of  i s pre-supposed  'tomato' as the name of a c o l o r .  t h a t we  l i g h t of p u b l i c examination. c a r p e t as  It  can a l l look a t tomatoes t o see f o r  o u r s e l v e s what c o l o r they a r e .  my  How  We  amend our claims i n the  Suppose I d e s c r i b e the nap of  'rough' or ' l o o k i n g rough.*  T h i s i s n ' t a very  p r e c i s e d e s c r i p t i o n of the s u r f a c e of the c a r p e t because we don't have p r e c i s e standards of what i s smooth or rough f o r carpets.  But the d e s c r i p t i o n might be u s e f u l under some  circumstances.  (eg. 'This c a r p e t i s no good f o r p r a c t i c i n g  92  p u t t i n g ; the nap i s too rough.')  The p o i n t i s t h a t i t i s no  e a s i e r t o he p r e c i s e i n d e s c r i b i n g sense d a t a than o b j e c t s . I may always d e s c r i b e my sense datum as r e d when i t i s more orange or pink than r e d . sense datum as rough. the  r i g h t word.  wrong word.  I may d e s c r i b e the nap of my c a r p e t  But I may not be convinced 'rough' i s  On the other hand I may not t h i n k i t i s the  I argue t h a t i t i s a mistake t o c o n s i d e r des-  c r i p t i o n s of sense d a t a i n vacuo f o r there a r e many t h i n g s t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n d e s c r i b i n g .  Purpose and context, f o r example,  p l a y a l a r g e p a r t i n d e c i d i n g whether  such words as 'rough'  apply t o c a r p e t s . Let sounds.  us c o n s i d e r some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  Suppose t h a t I hear a v i o l i n sound t h a t i s very much  l i k e a c e l l o sound. sound.  i n describing  I may doubts that what I hear i s a v i o l i n  I t may be i n d i s p u t a b l e that I experience something.  But how can I g i v e an i n d u b i t a b l e d e s c r i p t i o n of my sense datum?  I may, as P r i c e would be quick t o p o i n t out, be mistaken  about the source of the sound and about the p i t c h and timbre of  the sound.  But how would I d e s c r i b e my sense datum such  that i t i s indubitable?  My o r d i n a r y judgement,  v i o l i n sound, may c e r t a i n l y be doubted.  t h a t I hear a  But what i s the  i n d u b i t a b l e sense datum judgement which I would c o n t r a s t t o it?  With r e s p e c t t o the v i s u a l case, P r i c e says, "When I  see a tomato there i s much I can doubt....One t h i n g however I cannot doubt; t h a t there e x i s t s a r e a l patch of a round and bulgy shape...That something i s r e d and round, then and there  93  I cannot doubt."  L e t us compare the a u d i a l case.  hear a v i o l i n there i s much I can doubt. doubt; t h a t something i s . . . . ' cription?  How  One  'When I  t h i n g I cannot  shall I f i l l  i n this  I can say t h a t a sound i s present t o my  ness perhaps. ' But how  des-  conscious-  s h a l l I d e s c r i b e the sound?  And  be  precise? I conclude t h a t the only way  the sense data program  c o u l d work w i t h r e s p e c t t o sounds would be with r e f e r e n c e t o a standard.  T h i s amounts t o hedging  i s l i k e the standard case.  our c l a i m by s a y i n g i t  Thus the p o i n t I have argued  c e r n i n g v i s u a l sense datum statement  con-  i s more s t r o n g l y exemp-  l i f i e d w i t h r e g a r d t o a u d i a l sense data, i e . Even the s o r t of exchange as f o l l o w s , • I sense r e d . ' 'How  do you know i t ' s red?*  'Because i t matches t h a t . ' ( p o i n t i n g to tomato, sunset, etc.)  i s impossible w i t h regard t o sound because we  i n what we  sense:  i e . 'I sense...what?  instrument?, the note P#*? datum d e s c r i p t i o n . Now  fill  a violin?, a string  None of these i s p r o p e r l y a  sense  C e r t a i n l y none i s i n d u b i t a b l e .  even i f we  o s t e n s i v e l y d e f i n e f o r o u r s e l v e s the  f e a t u r e s of a u d i a l events and so e s t a b l i s h a p r i v a t e we  cannot  standard,  c o u l d always doubt whether we were a c c u r a t e l y matching  present experiences t o the standard. There are s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s with r e f e r e n c e t o shapes. Most of the examples of v i s u a l sense data t h a t we  usually  94  encounter  i n arguments from i l l u s i o n are roughly  i n shape, eg.  'looks e l l i p t i c a l ' , 'round, red, bulgy*,  as i f i t has two acute and two  obtuse angles', e t c .  i n mind Ayer's remarks p r e v i o u s l y quoted terminology  geometric  t h a t sense  'looks  Now  bearing  data  'enables us t o r e f e r t o f a m i l i a r f a c t s i n a  c l e a r e r and more convenient way*, i s intended  'to e l i m i n a t e  problems which a r i s e out of the ambiguous use of words l i k e •touch* and  *see'  f  and has the advantage of 'enabling us t o  r e f e r t o the contents of our sense-experiences, without r e f e r r i n g t o m a t e r i a l t h i n g s ' , we must contend c l a r i t y and convenience  that this alleged  e t c . does not apply t o i r r e g u l a r shapes.  I t would be most d i f f i c u l t to d e s c r i b e c l e a r l y , c o n v e n i e n t l y , and p r e c i s e l y , the v i s u a l sense data a s s o c i a t e d with f o r example a c a t . The d i f f i c u l t y a p p l i e s to P r i c e ' s argument as w e l l . Let  me  s u b s t i t u t e a b l a c k c a t f o r a tomato i n h i s argument.  'When I see a b l a c k c a t there i s much I can doubt....One t h i n g however .I cannot doubt; there i s a b l a c k shape present to consciousness....'  But how  would we  fill  in a description  of t h i s shape (without of course s a y i n g i t 'looks l i k e a c a t ' ) ? How  c o u l d we  communicate the content of our v i s u a l  experience?  I t would seem i n d u b i t a b l e t h a t we, have sense data of c a t s but it  seems impossible t o g i v e p r e c i s e , convenient d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  t h i s indubitable data.  T h i s seems t o go a g a i n s t the g r a i n :  what i s i n d u b i t a b l e ought t o be c l e a r l y d e s c r i b a b l e .  I t does  not h e l p t o say t h a t sense data are t h a t which i s e x p e r i e n t i a l l y  95  encountered.  T h i s begs the q u e s t i o n f o r we can always say t h a t  what i s e x p e r i e n t i a l l y encountered i s a c a t , or a h a l l u c i n a t i o n of a c a t . N o t i c e t h a t some of the p o i n t s R u s s e l l makes i n h i s argument about the t a b l e cannot be made about the c a t .  We  cannot say that the f a c t t h a t the c a t looks l o n g e r seen from the s i d e than from the f r o n t ought t o convince us that  we  i n f e r i t s shape.  Cats  Cats are l o n g e r than they are wide.  do move and change shape.  How  can we d e s c r i b e , and furthermore  p r e c i s e l y d e s c r i b e , our sense d a t a i n t h i s case?  R u s s e l l has  s a i d we run i n t o t r o u b l e s b e i n g p r e c i s e about the r e a l of o b j e c t s .  I t turns out we have the same s o r t of t r o u b l e  b e i n g p r e c i s e about the apparent shape as w e l l . it  that we  R u s s e l l has  ' c o n s t r u c t ' the r e a l from the apparent, the o b j e c t  from the sense d a t a . p r e c i s e way  shapes  But i n the absence of any c l e a r or  of c h a r a c t e r i z i n g the sense data, i t seems a t  l e a s t as p l a u s i b l e t o say t h a t we g i v e sense t o the n o t i o n of sense d a t a only by r e f e r r i n g t o a p u b l i c o b j e c t or p h y s i c a l cause. data.  Sense d a t a are meant t o be b a s i c , unhedged, f o u n d a t i o n a l But i f we are unable t o d e s c r i b e them p r e c i s e l y (except  of course w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t s which we see from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view) then i t becomes moot whether they can be foundational,  R u s s e l l ' s account does seem s t r i k i n g l y  r i a t e to the phenomenon of the animated f i l m .  approp-  The animator  makes a s e r i e s of c a r e f u l l y drawn two-dimensional f i g u r e s , b e g i n n i n g , say, w i t h a square and going through a s e r i e s of  96  f i g u r e s having two acute and two obtuse a n g l e s . graphs these drawings The  He photo-  i n s e r i e s and p r o j e c t s them on a s c r e e n .  ' r e a l i t y ' i s a p r o j e c t e d s e r i e s of two-dimensional draw-  ings.  But we a r e l i k e l y t o i n f e r t h a t what we a r e seeing i s  a t a b l e t o p or a f i l m of a t a b l e top.  S i m i l a r l y we i n f e r the  r e a l shapes of Donald Duck and Mickey Mouse from the s e r i e s of two-dimensional drawings made a t the Disney S t u d i o s . the French f i l m d i r e c t o r , Jean Luc Godard twenty f o u r frames per second.' reality  i n the cinema.  said,  As  'Reality i s  But Godard was r e f e r r i n g t o  R u s s e l l wants t o make the same p o i n t  about the e x t e r n a l world. My r e b u t t a l i s t h a t the case of the f i l m i s p a r a s i t i c upon our n o t i o n of o b j e c t s , not v i c e v e r s a .  Thus seeing objects  i n animated f i l m s may v a l i d l y be c a l l e d cases of i n f e r r i n g : Donald Duck's shape  i s t o a r e a l o b j e c t ' s shape as the s t i l l  drawings a r e t o glimpses of an o b j e c t . not two d i m e n s i o n a l drawings.  Reality  twenty-four sense d a t a per second.  But sense data a r e (or o b j e c t i v i t y ) i s not  Objects a r e the paradigm.  We l e a r n the shapes of o b j e c t s and i n f e r the shapes of f i l m e d objects.  To l i k e n sense d a t a t o drawings begs the q u e s t i o n .  We may say they a r e r e a l glimpses of r e a l o b j e c t s (or dreams or h a l l u c i n a t i o n s of r e a l o b j e c t s ) .  And our tendency t o do  so hasn't a t a l l been weakened by R u s s e l l ' s argument. I f there are d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n d e s c r i b i n g sense d a t a  there i s a c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l r i s k i d e n t i f y i n g the f a m i l y t o which they belong.  L e t me quote R u s s e l l from The Philosophy  97  of  L o g i c a l Atomism w r i t t e n only s i x years a f t e r Problems of  Philosophy. Phantoms and h a l l u c i n a t i o n s , c o n s i d e r e d i n thems e l v e s , are...on e x a c t l y the same l e v e l as o r d i n a r y sense d a t a . They d i f f e r from o r d i n a r y sense-data only i n the f a c t t h a t they do not have the u s u a l c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h other t h i n g s . . . . The t h i n g s t h a t we c a l l r e a l , l i k e t a b l e s . . . a r e systems, s e r i e s of c l a s s e s of p a r t i c u l a r s and the p a r t i c u l a r s a r e the r e a l t h i n g s , the p a r t i c u l a r s b e i n g sense data...A t a b l e . , . w i l l be a s e r i e s of c l a s s e s of p a r t i c u l a r s and t h e r e f o r e a l o g i c a l fiction... A c h a i r presents a t each moment a number of. d i f f e r e n t appearances. A l l the appearances t h a t i t i s p r e s e n t ing a t a g i v e n moment make up a c e r t a i n c l a s s . A l l those s e t s . . . v a r y from time t o time... And so when you go and buy a c h a i r , you buy not only the appearance which i t presents t o you a t t h a t moment but a l s o a l l those other appearances t h a t i t i s going to present when i t gets home. I f i t were a phantom c h a i r , i t would n o t present any appearances when i t got home, and would not be the s o r t of t h i n g you would want t o buy. The s o r t one c a l l s r e a l i s one of a whole c o r r e l a t e d system, whereas the s o r t you c a l l h a l l u c i n ations are not. Now o b v i o u s l y there may occur times when we wrongly i d e n t i f y the 'systems or s e r i e s of c l a s s e s of p a r t i c u l a r s ' j u s t as we may be mistaken see i s a tomato.  i n our judgements t h a t what we  We may buy phantom c h a i r s .  I t i s then a  strange and' q u i x o t i c s o r t of i n d u b i t a b i l i t y t h a t sense  data  have. If R u s s e l l r e c o g n i z e s t h i s , what v i r t u e does he t h i n k sense data have?  As he says,  98  One t h i n g our t e c h n i q u e does i s t o g i v e us a means of c o n s t r u c t i n g a g i v e n body of s y m b o l i c p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h the minimum of a p p a r a t u s , and e v e r y d i m i n u t i o n i n a p p a r a t u s d i m i n i s h e s the r i s k of error...When I spoke about the desk and s a i d I was not g o i n g t o assume the e x i s t e n c e of a p e r s i s t e n t substance u n d e r l y i n g i t s appearances, i t i s an example of the case i n p o i n t . You have anyhow the s u c c e s s i v e appearances, and i f you can get on w i t h o u t assuming the m e t a p h y s i c a l and cons t a n t desk, you have a s m a l l e r r i s k of e r r o r than you had b e f o r e . You would not n e c e s s a r i l y have a s m a l l e r r i s k of e r r o r i f you were t i e d down t o d e n y i n g the m e t a p h y s i c a l desk.^ Now this.  I t h i n k t h e r e are s e v e r a l t h i n g s p r o b l e m a t i c  in  F i r s t I am not c o n v i n c e d t h a t b u i l t i n t o o r d i n a r y  or  o b j e c t language i s a m e t a p h y s i c a l assumption about substance a t l e a s t i n the way  Russell thinks.  My r e s e r v a t i o n s stem  p a r t l y from the a n a l y s i s of the word ' r e a l ' which R u s s e l l seems t o t h i n k has p o s i t i v e and which A u s t i n has or a d j u s t e r .  shown t o be  s u b s t a n t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s and  i n f a c t negative  and an  excluder  But what i s perhaps more t o the p o i n t i s whether  such m e t a p h y s i c a l assumptions as t h e r e a r e i n o r d i n a r y language a r e r e a l l y any more r i s k y or c o n t e n t i o u s systems of sense d a t a and  t h e i r c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h other  Perhaps most o r d i n a r y men i s t h i s a necessary adjunct Do  t h a n assumptions about  b e l i e v e i n substance.  I am  But  t o s p e a k i n g o r d i n a r y language?  o b j e c t terms n e c e s s a r i l y imply substance?  c o n v i n c e d they do.  systems.  I am not a t a l l  sure t h e r e a r e a g r e a t many p r e -  s u p p o s i t i o n s b u i l t i n t o o r d i n a r y language but  I s u s p e c t they  m a i n l y c o n c e r n the n o t i o n of paradigms, of the s o r t s of  situ-  a t i o n s i n which terms are t o be used, of what c o n s t i t u t e s  99  standard c o n d i t i o n s f o r the use of terms. terms by o s t e n t i o n .  We teach o b j e c t  Our d e f i n i t i o n s never mention  substance  but r e f e r t o s i t u a t i o n s and c o r r e l a t i o n s with other o b j e c t s . Objects a r e not d e f i n e d with r e f e r e n c e t o substance but v i c e versa.  C o n t r a r y t o what might be expected o b j e c t terms a r e  l o g i c a l l y p r i o r t o the term substance. that substance  T h i s would  indicate  j u s t i s wherever we choose t o stop d e f i n i n g one  o b j e c t or p r o p e r t y i n terms of another. a thing but a l o g i c a l stopping point.  Thus substance  isn't  A t any: r a t e the assump-  t i o n t h a t the c h a i r I bought yesterday w i l l go on p r e s e n t i n g me w i t h the same appearances  i s no l e s s m e t a p h y s i c a l than t h a t  the o b j e c t I bought yesterday w i l l p e r s i s t i n i t s same s t a t e u n t i l a c t e d upon.  And f i n a l l y we may argue that  'substance'  i s i t s e l f a q u i t e u n - o r d i n a r y term r a r e l y found i n everyday language. R u s s e l l s e t h i m s e l f the task of a n a l y z i n g  statements  about o b j e c t s i n the e x t e r n a l world i n t o i n d u b i t a b l e  statements  about sense d a t a and thereby g i v i n g an account of what we l e g i t i m a t e l y mean by the o b j e c t statements minus any l o g i c a l l y speaking i l l i c i t verify.  or d u b i t a b l e elements that we i n f e r but cannot  I argue t h a t a f a t a l o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s program i s t h a t  o r d i n a r y language has a l o g i c of i t s own and i t i s f a r from e v i d e n t t h a t t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y i m p l i e s the i l l e g i t i m a t e n o t i o n s Russell claims. from Problems  C e r t a i n l y i n h i s argument from i l l u s i o n  In P h i l o s o p h y he has not demonstrated  quoted  the case.  100  FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER THREE  1 o  P r i c e , H, H,, P e r c e p t i o n , London, Methuen, 1950, p. 3 .  2 R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d , Problems of Philosophy, Toronto, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952, p. 1 1 . 3  I b i d . . p. 1 2 ,  4  I b i d . , p. 47.  5 R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d , "The Philosophy of L o g i c a l Atomism," Logic and Knowledge. London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1956, p. 274-5. 6  I b i d . . p. 280.  CHAPTER FOUR CONCLUSION I.  The Argument From I l l u s i o n Ayer, P r i c e , and R u s s e l l have claimed t h a t the argu-  ment from i l l u s i o n demonstrates  t h a t judgements about  t i o n expressed i n o r d i n a r y language are ambiguous, ient, doubtful,  imprecise, or embody i l l e g i t i m a t e  They concommitantly  percep-  inconveninferences.  c l a i m that sense data terminology or  sense d a t a a n a l y s i s o b v i a t e s a l l these  difficulties.  I contend t h a t they have not s u c c e s s f u l l y made t h e i r case.  And  t h i s i s because  the argument from i l l u s i o n i s  p r e d i c a t e d on a howler; namely t h a t while the argument c l a i m s to show o r d i n a r y language p h i l o s o p h i c a l requirements  i s inadequate t o some l o g i c a l or ( o f t e n l e f t vague as i n Ayer's  case where he says " I r e g a r d the a l t e r n a t i v e language  of  sense-data as b e i n g more s u i t a b l e f o r my  purpose,"  making i t c l e a r e x a c t l y what h i s purpose  i s ) , i n a r g u i n g from  illusion it  or doubt  ments .  without  or ambiguity i t only shows occasions where  i s c o n t i n g e n t l y inadequate t o i t s own  where i t might  1  requirements  and  c o n t i n g e n t l y be amended t o meet those r e q u i r e -  102  L e t u s examine t h e c a s e s alleged that The  ambiguity  there  of verbs  non-standard  mirrors,  after  ambiguity  a r i s e s when i t i s u s e d  conditions,  are not s p e c i f i e d .  use  o f t h e word  'see' i m p l i e s t h a t  pains t o avoid)  The  case  i s even l e s s  verified  something  optical  illusions,  a r i s e s because the  (something  i s t h e r e any p o s s i b i l i t y strong f o r an a l l e g e d  with reference to position.  o r he i s n o t .  There  ambiguity of verb.  Either  i s no a m b i g u i t y  the dagger.  we may  of ambiguity.  ' p u b l i c ' and ' s p a t i a l '  may s a y he s e e s a n d t o u c h e s  I t may  one i s t o u c h i n g here.  Macbeth  We may f o r a moment,  n o t know what t o make o f ' s e e s ' b e c a u s e we t o o must around,  halluc-  c o n d i t i o n s a r e normal.  presupposition i s subverted  'touch' f o r 'touch'is a be  'see.'  I f we a t t e n d t o c o n d i t i o n s we may e l i m i n a t e  The q u e s t i o n o f a m b i g u i t y  take  about  eye damage, e t c , where t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s  ambiguity.  i f this  note  s a y w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o dreams,  any  Only  as t o the  under a b e r r e n t o r  images, eye e x a m i n a t i o n s ,  hypnotism,  First  ' s e e ' a n d ' t o u c h ' , we  i s no i n h e r e n t o r i n t r i n s i c  only ambiguity  inations,  like  one b y one.  look i n the distance, look behind  look  u s , l o o k where he i s  l o o k i n g b e f o r e we d e c i d e t h a t he must be h a l l u c i n a t i n g . we c a n t e l l H i s hand here.  a t a g l a n c e t h a t Macbeth i s n ' t  i s nowhere n e a r  a dagger.  His claim i s false;  There  But  touching a dagger. i s no  ambiguity  o b v i o u s l y t h e p o o r man i s h a l l u c -  inating. L e t us c o n s i d e r doubt. be  doubted.  But again t h i s  Our p e r c e p t u a l judgements may  i s b e c a u s e we s u s p e c t c o n d i t i o n s  103  are awry,  We may hedge our judgement  d i t i o n s and a l l a y doubt. standard  or we may v e r i f y con-  Doubt makes sense only a g a i n s t a  or d o u b t - f r e e case. There i s the c l a i m that we w i l l r u n i n t o t r o u b l e  p r e c i s e i n our d e s c r i p t i o n of, say, a t a b l e . i s an a d j u s t e r ;  there  i s no one way of b e i n g  be as p r e c i s e as we need. culties  But ' p r e c i s e ' precise.  We r u n i n t o no p r a c t i c a l  We can  diffi-  i n d e s c r i b i n g o b j e c t s and q u a l i t i e s because we t a i l o r  our d e s c r i p t i o n s and our judgement it  being  i s a tomato,•  to conditions.  ' I t looks smooth and shiny from here.'  There i s the c l a i m t h a t o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l w i l l not t e l l  'I think  judgements  us what the ' r e a l ' q u a l i t i e s of the t a b l e a r e .  But t h i s i s because the word  ' r e a l ' i s misused i n such ques-  t i o n s as 'what i s the r e a l shape, e t c . ' re-adjusts according  *Real' a d j u s t s or  t o some s t a n d a r d .  I t has been suggested t h a t we i n f e r the shapes of objects.  T h i s s t r a i n s the word ' i n f e r . '  have shapes. objects.  We l e a r n t h a t  objects  We make p a r t i c u l a r i n f e r e n c e s about p a r t i c u l a r  What i s implied by saying  something i s an object  and not a dream, h a l l u c i n a t i o n , p i c t u r e , or r e f l e c t i o n , i s t h a t i t has a r e g u l a r three-dimensional  shape.  A t any r a t e  we c o u l d as e a s i l y c l a i m that we do not i n f e r when we say 'The object  i s round' but make a t e s t a b l e  claim.  The problem i s that what the argument from shows t o be ambiguous, d o u b t f u l , ordinary  imprecise,  illusion  i n f e r r e n t i a l about  language, a c a r e f u l examination of the ' i l l u s i o n '  104  i n q u e s t i o n can c l e a r up.  The argument from i l l u s i o n must  l o g i c a l l y c o n t a i n the seeds of i t s own r e f u t a t i o n . c u l t y may be l i k e n e d t o a d i f f i c u l t y  The d i f f i -  i n t e a c h i n g languages.  If I am b i l i n g u a l and you a r e monolingual I can teach you my second language  i n two ways.  g i v i n g you examples.  I can do so by o s t e n t i o n , by  Or I can teach you by g i v i n g you t r a n s -  l a t i o n s from our common language.  I f I"choose, or am f o r c e d ,  t o take the l a t t e r course then no matter how r i c h i n vocabulary the second language i s or how much f i n e r i t s d i s t i n c t i o n s are, I w i l l not be a b l e t o teach you a n y t h i n g t h a t cannot be said  i n our common language.  We would be f o r e v e r bound by  the l i m i t a t i o n s of our common language. argument from i l l u s i o n . tations.  So i t i s w i t h the  I t i s f o r e v e r bound by i t s own l i m i -  There cannot be doubt without d o u b t - f r e e cases,  there cannot be i l l u s i o n without v e r i d i c a l i t y , be ambiguity without c l a r i t y ,  there cannot  i l l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r e n c e s without  legitimate inferences, etc., e t c . The argument from i l l u s i o n i s dependent  upon the  c o n s t r u c t i o n of a c a u s a l c h a i n i n v o l v i n g the presence of replicas, reflections, hallucinations,  i s o l a t e d glimpses,  and upon keeping us i n the dark about p a r t of the c h a i n ( i e . dependent  upon keeping us ignorant of the f a c t that we a r e  l o o k i n g i n a m i r r o r , a t a wax r e p l i c a ,  that we have been  hypnotized, a r e h a l l u c i n a t i n g , e t c . ) .  The argument i s para-  s i t i c upon the n o t i o n of a v e r i d i c a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s which we may be mistaken.  about  Therefore the most the argument  105  can show i s t h a t under some c o n d i t i o n s we may be mistaken. But i t must argue e s s e n t i a l l y from analogy that j u s t as we know what i t i s t o be mistaken under some c o n d i t i o n s , we might be mistaken under present  conditions.  perhaps  As an argument  from analogy i t i s i n v a l i d without independent evidence. Let us c o n s i d e r a g a i n R u s s e l l ' s argument about the supposedly d e l u s i v e scientific  ' r e a l ' shape of the t a b l e .  explanation,  i n terms of g e o m e t r i c a l  We have a optics,  t h a t accounts, i n p a r t , f o r the phenomenon of seeing a t a b l e . G e o m e t r i c a l o p t i c s as a theory u l a t e questions  of p h y s i c s allows  us t o form-  and hypotheses about o p t i c a l phenomena.  I t g i v e s an e x p l a n a t i o n ,  under the u s u a l s c i e n t i f i c r u b r i c  of p r i n c i p l e s , o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  hypotheses, p r e d i c t i o n s , e t c . ,  e t c . , of how and why we do not r e c e i v e the same v i s u a l appearance when we look a t a t a b l e from d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s of view. Assuming  the t a b l e has a shape and that l i g h t t r a v e l s i n a  s t r a i g h t l i n e we can e x p l a i n why the t a b l e does not present us w i t h the same v i s u a l appearance no matter where we  stand  when we look a t i t . We can p r e d i c t what the s e n s a b i l i a caused by the t a b l e w i l l be l i k e .  We can, then, h a r d l y argue from  the f a c t t h a t i t does present  us w i t h d i f f e r e n t appearances  i s d e s t r u c t i v e of the assumption t h a t i t has a ' r e a l ' R u s s e l l I t h i n k would be quick  shape.  t o argue t h a t the assumption  t h a t the t a b l e has a ' r e a l ' shape i s l e g i t i m a t e only when considered receive.  as a l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the appearances we But t h i s doesn't n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w .  I t i s no more  106  l i k e l y than t h a t the appearances of the t a b l e l o g i c a l l y  result  only from the shape of the t a b l e and the p r i n c i p l e s of geometrical optics.  C e r t a i n l y the argument from i l l u s i o n  does  nothing to support R u s s e l l ' s c o n c l u s i o n because the argument i s wholly c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the p h y s i c a l theory of an and g e o m e t r i c a l get  optics.  'outside' p h y s i c s  object  The argument from i l l u s i o n cannot  t o damage p h y s i c a l  explanations.  Suppose f o r example I take a s e r i e s of photographs of my t a b l e from d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s about the room.  The  pictures  when I develop them w i l l be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the theory of geometrical surface gruently  optics.  I f I s c i s s o r around the o u t l i n e of the  of the t a b l e I w i l l be l e f t with a number of t r a p e z o i d a l shapes.  incon-  But I cannot from t h i s f a c t  argue t h a t we do not see the r e a l shape of the t a b l e . The argument from i l l u s i o n c r e a t e s no problems f o r ordinary  language t h a t o r d i n a r y  language, i f f u l l  attention  i s paid t o a l l i t s conventions and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , solve.  cannot  The mere f a c t t h a t we may be mistaken i n our  expression  of p e r c e p t u a l  judgements  does not r u l e out  language as u s e f u l f o r ' p h i l o s o p h i z i n g about I t does i l l u s t r a t e  ordinary ordinary  perception.'  t h a t , s i n c e we may be mistaken, we  ought  to take s p e c i a l care e i t h e r t o ensure we are not, i n the case a t hand, mistaken, or i f we cannot h a n d i l y our  claim.  ensure i t t o hedge  107  II.  The Foundations of E m p i r i c a l Knowledge This concluding  turned  gamekeeper,  data programs  s e c t i o n may  seem a case of the poacher  I have been very c r i t i c a l  t h a t I have considered  of the sense  but only because I do  not f e e l the argument from i l l u s i o n supports these or even provides  good m o t i v a t i o n  programs  f o r them.  I have argued t h a t the argument from i l l u s i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y an argument from doubt and from c o r r i g i b i l i t y . I t attempts t o show t h a t p e r c e p t u a l  judgements  can be doubted  and hence t h a t statements embodying judgements about percept i o n are c o r r i g i b l e .  However, i t a l s o holds that there i s  something which i s i n d u b i t a b l e about p e r c e p t u a l  judgements.  I t attempts t o move us from d o u b t f u l ground t o s a f e ,  indubi-  t a b l e ground, from r i s k y , c o r r i g i b l e statements t o safe, i n corrigible  ones.  I have been c r i t i c a l  of t h i s argument l a r g e l y on the  grounds t h a t i t r e q u i r e s some f i x e d p o i n t on which t o base i t s e s s e n t i a l doubt.  I have argued t h a t o r d i n a r y  i n presupposing standard  cases and standard  conditions,  the f i x e d p o i n t n e c e s s a r y f o r the argument from My c o n c l u s i o n necessary step illogical  language, supplies  illusion.  i s t h a t s i n c e o r d i n a r y language embodies a i n the argument, then i t would be  crudely  t o m a i n t a i n t h a t the argument demonstrates t h a t  o r d i n a r y language i s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l purposes. The n o t i o n of standard argument.  conditions  i s c e n t r a l t o my  But I do not b e l i e v e t h a t i t i s e s s e n t i a l  that  108  any  p a r t i c u l a r conditions  I have a r g u e d t h a t entails not  form the standard  the l o g i c a l  that conditions  of t h e e x t e r n a l perception, conditions  conditions  we p r e s e n t l y  change?  which a c t as c a u s a l  ordinary apparatus,  factors  B u t what,  i f any of these f a c t o r s  the world  judgements a n d o u r l a n g -  themselves t o the world  there  judgements a n d l a n g u a g e p r e s e n t l y  changed?  i s no that  make t o t h e  i t m i g h t make i f c o n d i t i o n s  What w o u l d be f o u n d a t i o n a l  knowledge under b o t h c o n d i t i o n s ? case f o r t a k i n g  I now  suffered  B u t what w o u l d be common t o t h e a c c o m m o d a t i o n  perceptual  i n our  i n the choice of  take as standard.  w o r l d and t o t h e accommodation of  Our  of our p e r c e p t u a l  Our p e r c e p t u a l  uage w o u l d accommodate  B u t i t does  take.  and our i n t e r e s t s and needs,  significant  our  we s h a l l  the conditions  w i s h t o ask, would o c c u r  doubt.  of the language  he t a k e n a s s t a n d a r d .  s t i p u l a t e which c o n d i t i o n s  language r e f l e c t s  structure  conditions.  I argue t h a t  sense d a t a a s / f o u n d a t i o n a l .  to empirical  there  i s a good  L e t me make t h e  case. What d o we u n d e r s t a n d b y t h e t e r m ledge'? that  ' e m p i r i c a l know-  I t h i n k we u s u a l l y u n d e r s t a n d b y i t t h e a w a r e n e s s  c e r t a i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l expressions  world a r e true.  of f a c t s about the  T o p u t i t a n o t h e r way we a r e i n p o s s e s s i o n  of e m p i r i c a l knowledge when we know t h a t statements, by nature c o n t i n g e n t , statements a r e contingent may b e p a r t i c u l a r ,  certain empirical  are i n fact  true.  statements about the world.  'The w a t e r i s b o i l i n g , '  Empirical They  or u n i v e r s a l ,  109  •Water b e i l s a t 212° p, t sea l e v e l . '  Put c o n c i s e l y  a  empirical  knowledge c o n s i s t s of b e l i e v i n g e m p i r i c a l statements t o be t r u e when they.are t r u e and we have evidence of t h e i r Our knowledge about, f o r example, knowledge. origin.  tomatoes  truth.  i s empirical  We know t h a t they a r e a f r u i t of South American  We know t h e i r s i z e , c o l o r , t e x t u r e , t a s t e ; we know  they a r e e d i b l e , how t o cook them, how t o preserve them; we know t h e i r growing c o n d i t i o n s , what s o i l , , temperature, amounts of water they r e q u i r e ; we know what adverse c o n d i t i o n s a f f e c t them and how; we know t h a t there a r e d i f f e r e n t s p e c i e s and we know t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  We a r e i n p o s s e s s i o n of a g r e a t  d e a l of knowledge about tomatoes and i t i s f o r the most p a r t empirical  knowledge.  Now what a r e we t o understand by the term 'foundations of e m p i r i c a l knowledge'?  I t might be thought t h a t t h i s i s a  q u e s t i o n e a s i l y answered;  there a r e o b j e c t s , there i s behavior,  there a r e hypotheses t o be formed and t e s t e d about the two. There a r e tomatoes, and there a r e the hypotheses b o t a n i s t s and gardeners and cooks have formed and t e s t e d about them. But i n a g e n e r a l way a l l  these f a c t o r s a r e the matter of con-  siderable philosophic dispute. Probably the most b a s i c d i s p u t e concerns the language of p e r c e p t i o n .  B o t a n i s t s and gardeners and cooks have named  tomatoes and r e f e r t o them by name.  They have observed them  growing or cooking and they have formulated some hypotheses and a r r i v e d a t c o n c l u s i o n s about them.  They express f a c t s  110  about tomatoes i n sentences and they use sentences i n our language t o convey i n f o r m a t i o n about tomatoes.  Now  consider-  i n g the l a r g e body of i n f o r m a t i o n we have about tomatoes we n a t u r a l l y suppose our language t o be adequate t o our needs. And, we may note, b o t a n i s t s , gardeners, and cooks a r e g e n e r a l l y unconcerned about the a n a l y s i s of o b j e c t words, of p e r c e p t u a l claims,  of the r e l a t i o n of p r e d i c a t e s Philosophers  to objects, etc., e t c .  however have been concerned t o give an  a n a l y s i s of o b j e c t terms such as 'tomato' p r i m a r i l y because they have n o t i c e d that c e r t a i n p r e d i c a t e s normally a s c r i b e d t o tomatoes,  'red',  'round', 'sweet', e t c . , seem t o be dependent  upon the c o n d i t i o n s under which the tomato i s p e r c e i v e d or upon c o n d i t i o n s  of the sensory apparatus of the p e r c e i v e r .  Thus, although we d e s c r i b e a l t e r l i g h t conditions  or sensory c o n d i t i o n s we would  them as something e l s e . but  tomatoes as red, i f we were t o  We d e s c r i b e  describe  them as t a s t y or e d i b l e  i f our t a s t e buds were a l t e r e d i n a c e r t a i n way so that  tomatoes nauseated us or made us gag, we would d e s c r i b e as v i l e or i n e d i b l e . all  them  T h i s s o r t of argument can be a p p l i e d t o  the p r e d i c a t e s normally a s c r i b e d t o tomatoes. Now the c o n c l u s i o n some p h i l o s o p h e r s  have drawn i s  t h i s t h a t although we c l a i m t o have e m p i r i c a l knowledge about tomatoes under our present  conditions  ( i e . t h a t they a r e r e d ,  sweet, e t c . ) and we would c l a i m t o have e m p i r i c a l about them i f c o n d i t i o n s  knowledge  of p e r c e p t i o n were changed i n some  uniform way (eg. t h a t r e d l i g h t rays a r e f i l t e r e d out or our  Ill  t a s t e buds are a l t e r e d so t h a t we would d e s c r i b e tomatoes as, say, blue and  sour) we  cannot take as f o u n d a t i o n a l to e i t h e r  i n s t a n c e of knowledge anything but the d e s c r i p t i o n of our sense content.  That i s , the f o u n d a t i o n of our present e m p i r i c a l  knowledge about tomatoes i s simply the c a l c u l u s of our sense content when and  i f we  p e r c e i v e tomatoes.  However i f c o n d i t i o n s  of p e r c e p t i o n were t o change i n some uniform way  t h a t would  a l l o w us t o make a s i g n i f i c a n t number of true p r o p o s i t i o n a l statements about tomatoes, then the foundations  of our a l t e r e d  e m p i r i c a l knowledge about tomatoes would be the c a l c u l u s of our sense content when and  i f we  p e r c e i v e tomatoes under the  altered conditions. At present  I know tomatoes are r e d .  t h i s means t h a t the statement statement.  'tomatoes are red* i s a true  I t i s t r u e because the word 'red' i s the name  g i v e n to one aspect of my tomatoes.  In p a r t a t l e a s t  sense content when and  i f I perceive  Indeed, the word 'red' i s taught by p o i n t i n g a t  such t h i n g s as tomatoes and  saying  'red' making sure our  understands t h a t we mean the c o l o r , not the shape or the t u r e , or t h a t he understands we  pupil tex-  a r e n ' t naming the o b j e c t .  Under a l t e r e d c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n , say i f red l i g h t waves disappeared  from the spectrum, tomatoes might look b l u e .  might, f o r a s h o r t w h i l e , say blue now.'  But  'Tomatoes are r e d but they  We look  i t would only be f o r a very s h o r t w h i l e .  (We would probably use the e x p r e s s i o n only as a hedge a g a i n s t c o n d i t i o n s changing again, r e d l i g h t waves r e - a p p e a r i n g ) .  112  We would, i f c o n d i t i o n s d i d not undergo any- f u r t h e r change, soon say t h a t tomatoes were b l u e .  The statement  are b l u e ' would be true i f the word  "Tomatoes  'blue' was the name g i v e n  to the c o l o r aspect of our sense content i f and when we perc e i v e d tomatoes.  I t would take a very s h o r t while f o r us t o  d i s c o v e r , by o s t e n t i o n , t h a t our c o l l e c t i v e sense content was the same.  Thus the foundations of e m p i r i c a l knowledge a r e the  content of our sensory experience and the names we have g i v e n to d i f f e r e n t aspects of t h a t content etc.)  (shape, c o l o r ,  taste,  under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s taken as standard. Now i t w i l l be noted t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n has been  reached without r e f e r e n c e t o any supposed i l l u s i o n i n h e r e n t in perception.  I t has been reached without  c o n d i t i o n s as standard. of  I t does not suggest  o b j e c t s or o b j e c t s themselves  taking p a r t i c u l a r ' that q u a l i t i e s  are 'unreal.'  I t does not  r e l y on q u a l i t a t i v e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b i l i t y of v e r i d i c a l and d e l u s i v e cases.  The argument i s more a k i n t o a  r e d u c t i o n than the argument from i l l u s i o n .  phenomenological  I t simply attends  to the names we give t o our sensory content when we p e r c e i v e t h i n g s i n the world. or e x t e r n a l ) d i f f e r will differ. as w e l l .  As c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n ( i n t e r n a l the names we g i v e t o our sensory  Consequently  our e m p i r i c a l knowledge w i l l  differ  We w i l l be a b l e t o make true e m p i r i c a l statements  about t h i n g s i n the world. statements  content  But they a r e not the same true  as vrould be made under other c o n d i t i o n s of p e r c e p t i o n .  113  One of the consequences of this notion that the foundations of empirical knowledge are intimately connected  with  the conditions of perception i s that none of the d i s t i n c t i o n s we make within our language necessarily disappears. Tomatoes presently are red but may look blue under some condition. However i f there should be some change i n the way l i g h t rays a f f e c t us we might well come to c a l l tomatoes blue.  We might well f i n d ourselves i n a condition whereby  we should say that tomatoes are blue but they look red under some conditions. The use of locutions such as 'looks', 'seems',  'appears',  implies that we have a standard by which we judge other cases. We know what a standard case of red i s , we say something looks red  when i t resembles the standard case but we aren't sure  i f i t i s a standard case,: when something has led us to hedge our claim. The question of which case to take as standard i s , on my account, a contingent one. The upshot of my argument i s that there i s a v a l i d foundational sense data program. i t has l i t t l e u t i l i t y .  The point, however, i s that  Ordinary language i s intimately linked  to conditions that now obtain, to our actual interests. I t does i t s job admirably well.  A sense data program cannot be  made at the expense of ordinary language. l o g i c a l examination  But a phenomeno-  of perceptual judgement may indicate that  we need not necessarily maintain that our ordinary perceptual  114  judgements g i v e Me  are  the  last  word i n p e r c e p t u a l  of c o u r s e p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n t e r e s t e d  structure i n the  us  of  our  language.  perceptual  And  conditions  judgements t h a t we  cern  t o admit  ought t o be  that  But  of  and  adjusted  c a s e , and  the  mechanism, any  or the  w i t h any  structure  of  leaves  the  t o do. But  i n an  Our  problems of  ordinary  is  somewhat a k i n  we  could,  to saying  if historical  speaking French. significance,  While  f o r i f we  one  language or the  the  s y n t a x of  the  this  The  had  i s true  and  l a n g u a g e we  our  sense d a t a  use.  this work  knowledge. with  program  speak E n g l i s h ,  b e e n d i f f e r e n t , be  enough,  real  And  expressed  now  of  perceptual  of e m p i r i c a l  a c t u a l l y want t o say  other  in-  T h e y have no  t h a t a l t h o u g h we  conditions  of  structure  language.  foundations  to p a r t i c u l a r conditions.  prestandard  empirical  logical  p a r t i c u l a r e m p i r i c a l knowledge w i l l be  respect  the  mechanism o f  anomalous p o s i t i o n .  They c o n s t i t u t e the  con-  w o r l d a s we' p e r c e i v e i t .  I conclude t h a t a l l the  sense d a t a  of  p a r t i c u l a r instance  world.  h a n d l e d by  data  virtue  mechanisms, s u c h a s  the  be  the  sense  philosophic  p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t i s w i t h the  can  o b t a i n and  foundational  Our  philosophy  empirically interested  particular condition.  i s w i t h the  logical  overriding philosophical  conditions  not  i n the  presently  have t h e  our  standard  are  the  with l i n g u i s t i c  suppositions  terest  that  do make.  p r o g r a m I have o u t l i n e d may f o r c i n g us  we  philosophy.  i t i s of anything  c o n c e r n w i l l be  little we  use  with  115  U l t i m a t e l y then I conclude t h a t a sense d a t a program however v a l i d  i s unnecessary f o r the purpose  have suggested.  i t s proponents  FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER FOUR  1 A y e r , A. J . , The F o u n d a t i o n s M a c M i l l a n , T o r o n t o , 1964, p . 56  of E m p i r i c a l  Knowledge.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  A u s t i n , J . L. Sense and S e n s i b i l i a . e r s i t y Press, 1962.  Oxford, Oxford  Univ-  Ayer, A, J . The Foundations of E m p i r i c a l Knowledge. MacMillan, Toronto, 1964. P r i c e , H. H.  P e r c e p t i o n . London, Methuen, 1950.  R u s s e l l , B e r t r a n d . Problems of P h i l o s o p h y . Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952.  Toronto,  Russell, Bertrand. "The Philosophy of L o g i c a l Atomism," L o g i c and Knowledge. London, A l l e n and Unwin, 1956.  

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