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The Russian American Company and its trading relations with foreigners in Alaska until 1839 McIntosh, John Duncan Lawrence 1969

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THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY AND ITS TRADING RELATIONS WITH FOREIGNERS IN ALASKA UNTIL 1839 by John Duncan Lawrence Mcintosh B.A., University of British Columbia, 1962 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts In the Department of Slavonic Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard The University of British Columbia January, 1969 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced deg ree a t t he U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g ree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n -t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a Vancouve r 8, Canada ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper i s two-fold - to trace the development of Russian American Company relations with for-eigners in Alaska and to assess the effects of foreign trade there on the competitive position of the company. The closing year for this study, 1839» i s the year i n which the Russian American Company made definite arrangements to receive much of i t s provisions from the Hudson's Bay Company in order to resolve i t s long-standing problem of supply. As to the f i r s t aspect of this theme, this account of Russian American Company foreign relations follows in broad outline the existing works dealing with the history of the company. However, some corrections and new material based on a careful study of unpublished sources in America and the Soviet Union have been added concerning the details of foreign v i s i t s to Alaska. Various subject relevant to the development of foreign trade are considered: i t s beginnings, the evolu-tion of company and government attitudes to relations with foreigners, and the development-'o'f Hudson's Bay Company trade in the area. The financial, prosperity of the Russian American Company i s reassessed and revised downwards on the basis of some relatively unexploited archival material, with the i n -flationary decrease in the value of the paper ruble being taken into account. Particular attention i s paid to the events leading up to the lease of the Alaska panhandle ( l i s i ^ r e ) in 1839 i n order to determine the essential significance of the agreement in terms of the foreign trade and further development of the Russian American Company. The main conclusions of the thesis can be stated brief-l y as follows. Although small i n comparison with the total income and expenditure in the colony, foreign trade was abso-lutely necessary to the survival of the company in Alaska unless and un t i l some reliable alternative source of v i t a l provisions and supplies could be devised. The f i n a l decision to regularize and perpetuate the Russian American Company's dependence on foreign trade signified a f i n a l acceptance of the view that there was no feasible alternative. Whether this view was completely valid cannot be answered definitely on the basis of the available evidence. It seems clear that the decision was not made on the basis of economic f e a s i b i l i t y or p o l i t i c a l considerations alone. In any case the principal result of the lease agreement was that the Russian American Company's prospects for economic progress or even for holding i t s own financially practically disappeared. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author expresses his gratitude to Professor C y r i l Bryner of the Slavonic Studies Department at the University of British Columbia for his patient encouragement and assistance, and to Professor Georgii Andreievich Novitskii of the History Faculty, Moscow State University, for valuable advice on source material. Special apprecia-tion i s due to the University of British Columbia Committee of World University Service for providing the opportunity, through their exchange programme, to carry out study and research in the U.S.S.R. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction i I The Historical Background to Foreign Trade in Novo Arkhangelsk 1 II Foreign Trade in Novo Arkhangelsk and the Russian American Company, 1803 - 1817 17 III Foreign Trade in the Colony in the Light of Russian American Company Income During the F i r s t Charter Period 43 IV Foreign Trade in the Colony 1818 - 1825 and the Tsar's Decree of 1821 53 V The Russian American Company Crisis of the Mid-1820»s: External and Internal Aspects 59 VI The Hudson's Bay Company Undermines American Trade in Sitka, 1821 - 1837 70 VII The Lease of the Lisiere. 1839 100 Conclusion 111 Notes on the Source Material 114 Bibliography 117 INTRODUCTION The following study i s based on an examination of virtually a l l of the published and unpublished sources in English and Russian dealing with the history of the Russian American Company. The exchange programme arranged by the University of British Columbia Committee of World University Service provided the opportunity for me to do study and re-search in Soviet li b r a r i e s and archives. However, unexploited or new material on Russian America turned out to be limited in quantity and value. For a description of the documents and works consulted the readerssis referred to the notes on source material on page 114 of this paper. There may be a few rele-vant documents in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; however access to that archive i s especially d i f f i c u l t for a foreign student to obtain. The purpose of this work i s not to write a general company history, although the choice of subject matter has favoured the inclusion of a considerable amount of background narrative. Instead i t i s my intention to trace the develop-ment of Russian American Company trading relations with Ameri-can and British visitors to Alaska and to assess the s i g n i f i -cance of the trade in relation to the company's potential for prosperous growth. For several reasons this account i s not taken beyond the lease of the Alaska panhandle (or l i s i e r e ) to the Hudson's Bay-Company in February, 1839. Although trade between the i i companies continued until the sale of Alaska in 1867> i t had entered a new phase after the lease - that of a regularized, settled business arrangement. The post-lease period has been covered quite well by D. C. Davidson's a r t i c l e 1 which concen-trates i t s attention on the commercial features of inter-company relations after 1839. The lease served to resolve the supply problem of the Russian American Company by commit-ting the Russian fur enterprise to a reliance on the Hudson's Bay Company for food supplies and land furs. Davidson 1 1 and J. S. G a l b r a i t h 1 1 1 have considered the arrangement to have been to the advantage of both parties. Two facts led me to question this interpretation. F i r s t l y , the total amount of of peltry received declined substantially after 1839.1V. Secondly, there i s some evidence that monetary returns from fur sales also deereased. V Consequently I have reexamined the role of foreign trade in the history of the Russian Ameri-can Company and particularly the lease agreement to find out whether the lease was really in the company's long term 1D. C. Davidson, "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Com-pany with the Russian American Company on the Northwest Coast, 1829-1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No. 1, 1941, PP. 33 - 48. X 10p. c i t . 1 1 1 J . S. Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an  Imperial Factor. l vP. Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe obozrenie ... Rossisko-amerikanskoi kompanii 1, p. 3 2 7 , vol. 2, p. 221. vNational Archives of the U.S.A., Microfilm Publications, o i i i interest. To answer this question, one must consider the cevelopment of each company and of the inter-company rela-tions which led up to the settlement so as to determine the context in which each side had to bargain. Graphs are used where possible to show trends in com-pany income. The effect of the inflationary loss in value of the paper ruble i s illustrated so as to correct the impression of prosperity which uncritical use of some company sta t i s t i c s would suggest. Since this i s both an account of the development of foreign trade in Alaska and an examination of i t s basic sig-nificance, i t was convenient to arrange the paper chrono-log i c a l l y . Records of the Russian American Company. Board of directors to governor, I 8 4 8 , p. 5 9 5 . The table referred to covers only the years 1844 - 1 8 4 7 . CHAPTER I THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO FOREIGN TRADE IN NOVO ARKHANGELSK For a period of over a century, Imperial Russia ruled over the huge territory now known as the State of Alaska. During the latter sixty-eight years of Russian dominion, the Russian American Company exercised monopoly rule over the area in the name of the Tsar. Before examining the trading relations of the company we should r e c a l l briefly the early history of Alaska's dis-covery and exploration in order to understand the conditions under which the Russian American Company developed. By the latter half of the seventeenth century, the Russians had completed their rapid expansion eastward across Siberia and had established settlements on the shores of the Pacific Ocean. When they f i r s t reached the extreme eastern part of Asia, they found the Chukchi, whom Tompkins describes as having "vague ideas about their own neighbour-hood and extremely meager information on what lay beyond i t . " The Soviet historian M. Chernenko puts the situation somewhat more positively, stating that by the beginning of the eigh-teenth century Russians had already obtained "a certain R. Tompkins, Alaska, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1945, p. 19. 2 amount" of evidence as to the position of the North American continent, i t s conditions and tribes owing to the ancient o trading ties of the Chukchi with the inhabitants of Alaska. In any case, sufficiently precise knowledge had not gotten as far as St. Petersburg. Through his contact with Western European scientists and statesmen Peter I had developed a strong enthusiasm for exploration of the far reaches of the immense territories he ruled. But i t would be an oversimplification to suggest that the expeditions he initiated were intended merely to satisfy an academic curiosity. He f u l l y realized that new and probably rich territories were there somewhere for the taking, and Russia should get her share. In 1719 Peter commissioned the surveyors Yevreinov and Luzhin to look for the coast of America in conjunction with their mission of exploration along the Kurile chain. The expedition was almost a complete failure. Much more significant were the expeditions of Vitus Bering, the f i r s t of which received royal instructions from Peter the Great in the year of his death, 1725. One impor-tant point of the instructions obliged Bering to look for European settlements i f the American coast were reached. On the second Bering expedition, he along with Chirikov discovered M^. B. Chernenko, ed. Puteshestviia i issledovaniia . . . Zagoskina . . . . Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Ltd., 1956, p. 6. 3 northwestern America i n July, 1741. The next year, Bering's ship was wrecked off the coast of Kamchatka on the island that was to bear his name. Those members of the crew who lived through the rigours of the terrible winter that followed re-turned to c i v i l i z a t i o n the following spring with news of the discovery of the sea otter, whose rich pelt soon was to become even more avidly hunted than that of the sable. Later during the eighteenth century, many fur hunting expeditions went ever farther after the precious sea otter, opening the way to Alaska. Before long almost a l l of the islands of the Aleutian chain and several mainland points were discovered. By 1763, fur hunters had reached Kodiak Island. In a period of f i f t y - s i x years from the time of Emelian Basov's voyage from Okhotsk via Kamchatka in 1743 u n t i l the founding of the Russian American Company in 1799, a total of eighty-six Russian expeditions sailed to the coast of Alaska.** Eventually, with the accession to the throne of the Empress Catherine, government interest in Far Eastern discov-eries reawakened after the period of inactivity following the f i n a l , and long unappreciated, Bering expedition. Measures were begun to investigate the newly discovered lands and map them accurately, althoughninterrupted from time to time by government preoccupation with the partitions of Poland and °R. V. Makarov, "Ekspeditsii russkikh promyshlennykh l i u d e i v Tikhom Okeane v XVIII veke," Voprosy Geografii, 17, 1950. 4 wars with Turkey. One of the chief backers of these efforts was Mikhail Lomonosov, who was c a l l i n g for the development of Russian shipping in the north and on the Pacific. The expedi-tions of Krenitsyn-Levashev in the Aleutian area in 1768-69 and the geographical and astronomical investigations of the B i l l -ings expedition in the northern Pacific in 1790-92 were among f r u i t f u l efforts i n that direction. Lending urgency to the exertions of the Russian government was the fact that by 1780 both the English and the Spanish had arrived in the North Paci-f i c . Captain James Cook's expedition (1776-80) had resulted in the naming of islands, bays, and inlets a l l the way through Bering Strait, and in a quickening of interest in the wealth to be won by hunting the sea otter, as Cook's men had disposed of £2000 worth of sea otter skins i n Canton. Catherine II was thereupon warned by at least one of her advisors that Russian hunting posts were in imminent danger from extensive and harm-fu l competition on the part of other nations.^ Rumours of Russian advance in the 1760's and 1770*s had aroused the Span-ish to extend their settlements northward eight hundred miles to present-day San Francisco. Perez proceeded in 1774 along the coast as far as the Queen Charlotte Islands, taking posses-sion of the lands in the name of the King of Spain. In 1775 the expedition of Hecate and Quadra discovered the mouth of the Columbia and explored the coast northwards to Norfolk Sound. 4s. B. Okun, The Russian American Company. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951* ( f i r s t Russian edition, 1939): p. 13. Catherine made plans in the 1780fs to dispatch four naval vessels to ward off encroachment by foreign traders i n the hunting and trade of the North Pacific. However, the out-break of war again with Turkey in 1786 forced the cancellation of her plan, which would not l i k e l y have had any positive effect anyway, owing to the growing number of enterprising foreign merchants and traders. It i s indicative i n the light of the later course of events in Russian America that the im-plementation of decisive and forceful government action depend-ed clearly on the European p o l i t i c a l situation, and was judged therefore to be of relatively secondary importance. By the mid-eighties of the XVIII century permanent Russian settlements appeared in Alaska, set up by competing fur companies: that of Grigorii Ivanovich Shelikhov on the island of Kodiak, ("Three Saints"), and that of Lebedev-Lastochkin i n Norfolk Sound. Shelikhov had been Lebedev-Lastochkin's partner on their f i r s t trading voyage to the Aleutians from Okhotsk i n 1776. After organizing several very successful voyages, Shelikhov in 1781 entered into partnership with Ivan Golikov. Then, having f i t t e d out three ships, he had arranged and accompanied a large expedition to establish a settlement on Kodiak Island, which he named after his flagship, the "Three Saints". The primary market for the furs the Russian promvsh-lenniks^ brought back from America was Russia, but a significant ^The name used in Siberia and Russian America for free-lance hunters and fishermen of that time; from the verb "promyshliafc*"- to carry on business. proportion was exported to China. However, during the second half of the 18th Century until 1794* the Chinese government would permit no trade with Russia, with the result that Russian furs had to get into China by sea under the flags of other na-tions. The Chinese were most pleased with the quality of furs brought by the English to Canton, but would not agree to give the English monopoly rights in furs. In 1794 China agreed to reestablish trade with Russia, which would be allowed i n one town only, Kiakhta, on the border of China and Siberia. By that time, however, the supply of furs from Alaska and the Aleutians had begun to diminish as a result of uncon-trolled hunting by the many companies and individuals engaged in the business.. Competition became ruinous for many of the smaller operators and harmful to Russian state interest in the area. In addition the increased incidence of organized resis-tance on the part of the natives made clear the need for strong-l y f o r t i f i e d settlements with a consequent large increase in the number of settlers, yet that was beyond the means of most of the fur companies. Add to these factors the need for l a r -ger, systematically organized supply expeditions, and i t be-comes clear why influential people began to press for the es-tablishment of a fur monopoly with government authority to run the fur business and to govern and defend the region with gov-ernment financial and logis t i c s support. There were numerous examples of such enterprises. The success of the East India Company and the Hudson Bay Company were well known. Previously the Russian government had sanctioned similar efforts with the setting up of the Russian Trading Company in Constantinople (1757)> and the Company for Trade with Persia (1758). Expan-sion of the Russian empire thus could also, in the manner of the English and Dutch, take place by indirect government action through the a c t i v i t i e s of an ostensibly private concern. In such a manner, diplomatic complications could be kept to a minimum in case of clashes with foreign powers. Of course i t was also in the interest of the more power fu l Russian private operators to obtain monopoly privileges so as to put down the opposition, as business conditions were de-teriorating year by year. One of the most successful of these was Grigorii Ivanovich Shelikhov, previously mentioned as the founder of "Three Saints". He had invested in the voyage of the Nikolai in 1777 and had soon risen to the position of stockholder i n the majority of Alaskan expeditions. According to Okun, he had "participated with his capital in the equip-ping of fourteen out of the thirty-six ships returning from the hunting posts in the twenty-one year period from 1777 to 1797."^ As early as 1787 Shelikhov put forward to the governor of Irkutsk a plan for the establishment of a single strong com-pany, including provisions for armed defense personnel and a sufficient supply of Russian labour to supplement the native nucleus, to be made up of people with lapsed passports, bank-rupt debtors, and convicts. Shortly thereafter in his petition to Catherine II, Shelikhov openly requested monopoly privileges Okun, op. cit.« p. 23. 8 in the area. However, beset by wars with Turkey and Sweden, and constrained from antagonizing England which shared her hos-t i l i t y toward the French Revolution, Catherine refrained from granting Shelikhov*s requests. The formation of the monopoly 7 i s described i n convincing detail by Professor Okun. Pending a change i n the situation, preparations were made i n the years that followed so that the Shelikhov-Golikov Company would be ready for the transformation into a monopolistic company. Alexander Andreievich Baranov, Shelikhov*s administrator on the islands and in America, was instructed to choose a suitable location for a colonial center and given detailed specifica-tions as to i t s layout. About 1794 over one hundred more men were sent, some of them artisans who could be used i n carrying out these plans. Parallel with this, Shelikhov was busy en-deavoring to open up new markets for Russian trade. However, he died i n 1795, before his plans could be carried out. Meanwhile, competition in the North Pacific had become very fierce indeed, both from Russian rivals and from the ever more frequent foreign marine expeditions. As Okun points out, "The situation in the Russian colonies in America and on the islands had, by the end of the 1790*s, become a question of 8 their very existence." In 1797 government action was taken which in effect limited the number of companies in the f i e l d . Approval was Okun, op. c i t . . Chapter 2. Okun, op. c i t . . p. 36. 9 given for the formation of a new company, headed by the mer-chant Mylnikov, but Tsar Paul ordered that this approval not harm Shelikhov*s company. This led to an uneasy union of the Shelikhov-Golikov Company and the Mylnikov group in 1797, known as the United American Company. However, this was but a f i r s t step in carrying out the government's intention to bring about a union of a l l the companies working i n the colonies. At this stage only the Shelikhov-Golikov Company, enjoying the pre-eminent position, supported the plan, and much lobbying was done by representatives of the other merchants who f e l t that they would be swallowed up in such an amalgamation. Key sup-port for the Shelikhov family's interests was given by his brother-in-law Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, Head Procurator of the First Department of the Senate. The f i n a l decision to grant exclusive rights to the Company was made on July 8, 1799. It was henceforth to be known as the Russian American Company, with Baranov the new governor of the Russian colonies i n Amer-ica, which at that time consisted of settlements on Komandor-s k i i Islands, a small hunting post on Atka Island of about f i f t y Russians overseeing another three hundred odd Aleuts, on Unalaska of about thirty Russians i n charge of over one thou-sand Aleuts, and one small post on the Prib i l o f Islands.^ Closer to the mainland was the center of operations u n t i l 1804, ^The traditionally accepted spelling of proper names of geographical locations i s used, rather than the modern transliteration. 10 "Three Saints" on Kodiak Island, under whose immediate j u r i s -diction were several posts on Cook Inlet (called Kenai Bay by the Russians). In addition, there were three trading posts in the Chugatsk Gulf. Trade with foreigners had already posed a problem for Baranov soon after his appointment to supervise the Shelikhov interests in Alaska in 1791. He had been warned to be wary about foreign vis i t o r s , both to ward off foreign competition and also i n view of Russia's current war with Sweden. It had even been suggested that Russia's Pacific outposts might be attacked. Nevertheless, his f i r s t encounter turned out to be a pleasant one, when on a v i s i t to Prince William Sound during Baranov's f i r s t North American summer, 1792, Captain Hugh Moore, an English trader working out of Calcutta, appeared on the Phoenix at Nuchek Island to replace one of i t s masts. Although Baranov made i t clear to Moore, a representative of the East India Company, and his mate, Joseph O'Cain, of Boston, that he was not authorized to engage i n trade, he l e t i t be known that he would otherwise have had no objection personally. In fact, his brief presence in the colonies had already shown Baranov quite clearly that Shelikhov's visions had blinded him to the practical problem of v i t a l food and other material sup-plies, and he foresaw possible shortages. While his men help-ed the crew of the Phoenix replace her mast, Baranov learned much from his visitors regarding the way business was done in Canton and who was involved in Northern Pacific shipping. As a reward for this hospitality and the courtesy his men had 11 extended to the British expedition of Captain George Vancouver, Baranov was severely reprimanded by Shelikhov, who accused Baranov of betraying Company and Russian interests; he should instead have tried to capture the vis i t o r . V i s i t s of foreign ships were not to be tolerated. Thus Baranov, very early, came face to face with the fundamental conflict which for many years was to cloud the question of trade with foreign vessels. Good reasons existed for discouraging the presence of foreign ships in the area. Baranov recognized this. But the colonies were regularly lacking in many things necessary for their sustenance and development. Moreover in that lonely and forbidding region, always in some danger from neighbouring Indian tribes and even from his own unruly men, Baranov would have welcomed the occa-sional company of fellow traders with commercial interests akin to his own. This dilemma reappeared in various circumstances and situations to each of the governors of Russian America. During the years before the Russian American Company was formed, no foreign trade was carried out i n Alaska. War in Europe kept Spanish, English and French ships away during the mid-90's. After Vancouver's expedition, only Captain Henry Barber's Unicorn i s recorded as being in the area until 1798, when Americans began to appear in increasing numbers; one i n 1798, three i n 1799, bringing with them liquor and firearms to trade to the Indians for the furs the Russians had been getting. They would load at home with English goods, in Alaska trade for furs, then trade furs in turn for Chinese goods to s e l l to the United States. Unless something could be done to exclude the enterprising Yankees, the loss would be catastrophic. Nor would the United States captains l i s t e n to Baranov1s protests that arms were not suitable goods to s e l l to a primitive people Their avowed aim was profit. Baranov decided that i t was nec-essary to move his headquarters east and south to a location where he could cut off American access to the sea otter-rich inlets and passages of the Alexander Archipelago. In May, 1799, Baranov led a party of men to the island of Sitka^® in three ships and over three hundred baidars. ^ The journey was marred by rough seas and an attack by the Kol-osh that cost several lives. When he had chosen the spot where they would build, an agreement was made with the local Kolosh chiefs for the desired land. However, the natives of the Archi pelago were not the subdued Aleuts of Kodiak and had been trad-ing extensively with foreign ships for firearms. While Baranov was at Sitka, three English and American ships were there; in 1800, two, with three not far away. Extreme watchfulness was an absolute necessity. The situation was greatly aggravated when over a hundred of his Aleuts suddenly died from eating poisoned mussels. In the spring came another disaster - traces of the supply ship Phoenix were found, indicating that she had been wrecked on the way from Okhotsk. Goods were already in short supply. Now food supplies could not be expected in quantity for another year. Temporary respite was afforded by •LUNow known as Baranof Island. •'••'•Large open hide boats, held together with wooden cleats. 13 the arrival of the Zakhar i Elizaveta, but the accompanying letters were discouragingly c r i t i c a l of Baranov1s management. As i f a l l this were not sufficient, Baranov found on his return to Kodiak that the priests had been undermining his authority by preaching open revolt to the Aleuts. They had even gone so far as to persuade his own native consort to leave him. Native dissatisfaction was r i f e even without ecclesiastical encourage-ment, owing to the high loss of l i f e and the fact that the com-pany had not been able to pay them for some time. In view of a l l these complications, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand Baranov's desperation, or his joy when in May, 1801, the Ameri-can ship Enterprise arrived with Joseph O'Cain and a plentiful cargo of goods which Baranov's old acquaintance was eager to s e l l . (Joseph O'Cain was the f i r s t mate. The captain, accord-ing to Khlebnikov's table, part of which i s reproduced on page 12 17, and Howay's l i s t , was Ezekiel Hubbel, not Scott as Tomp-k i n s ^ indicates.) Permission or no permission,tBaranov could wait no longer for supplies from Russia from directors who were not satisfied with him anyway. ' This time without hesitation he purchased arms, ammunition, foodstuffs, rum, tobacco, canvas and other necessities. However, his enthusiasm did not prevent him from bargaining shrewdly. Apparently i t was only his sup-erior drinking capacity that kept the price to two thousand red X i iF. W. Howay, "A List of Trading Vessels in the Mari-time Fur Trade, 1 7 9 5 - 1 8 0 4 , " Proceedings and Transactions of  the Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 2 5 : 1 3 7 , 1 9 3 1 . ^Tompkins, p_p_. c i t . , p. 1 1 2 . 14 and silver fox skins. From the visitors Baranov heard for the f i r s t time about the outbreak of war i n Europe in 1799, and of the possible consequent threat to the colonies from Spain. Trading with foreign ships thus began in Russian Amer-ica because of a combination of circumstances which l e f t Bara-nov no other choice. Neither could the directors be blamed at that time, for they had no way of knowing that the Phoenix had not arrived. Lack of swift and reliable communication was a continuing problem of the colony, located as i t was so far from the head office i n St. Petersburg. The windfall good fortune of the Enterprise soon became well known to Pacific mariners, who began to v i s i t Alaska more often than ever. Hopes that Baranov*s deal with the Enterprise would be repeated were not i n vain, as the supply situation did not improve, and bad fortune continued to dog the colony i t s e l f . In June, 1802, the garrison on Sitka was overwhelmed in Bara-nov* s absence by the Tlingits. Only three Russians and twenty Aleuts (and of those only two males) survived the massacre, only to be held for ransom by their rescuer, Captain Henry Bar-ber of the Unicorn. This English freebooter, who may have « played a large part in antagonizing the natives on that occa-sion, demanded payment from Baranov for the Aleuts* release. Baranov paid what he could - ten thousand rubles in pelts of various kinds. Later the same year, Baranov learned for the f i r s t time from dispatches sent on the brig 01ga of the establishment of the new Russian American Company, i t s charter, and his new o f f i c i a l t i t l e , complete with imperial honours from the Tsar. However, the dispatches included neither new instructions re-garding trade nor firm guarantees of more frequent supply-expeditions. To get their captured garrison back from the Tlingits, the Russians needed arms badly, and again, i t was a foreign ship that f i r s t was able to f u l f i l their need. In 1803 Joseph O'Cain returned, now captain of the O'Cain and a partner of the prosperous Winships of Boston. O'Cain had learned in Hawaii that Baranov was planning to recapture Sitka, and had stocked up there on arms and ammunition, along with tools and food-stuffs. O'Cain proposed a longer-term business arrangement whereby the colony would be steadily supplied, not only with goods, but even with ski l l e d workmen, -in return for which O'Cain would s e l l Russian furs at Canton. Although Baranov did not have the authority to permit such an agreement, however advan-tageous, he certainly did need the present cargo. The d i f f i -culty was that he had just sent a l l available furs to Siberia on the Zakhar i Elizaveta. O'Cain was quick i n coming up with a solution to Baranov's in a b i l i t y to pay. The captain would borrow the services of a number of Aleuts with their baidarkas to carry out what amounted to a poaching expedition along the California coast, where the sea otter was most p l e n t i f u l . The Spaniards did not patrol the coast frequently. Moreover, the Aleuts had no potential enemies l i k e the Tlingits i n that re-gion. Baranov would then be in a position to buy the cargo out of his share of the sea otter catch. At length Baranov con-16 sented, providing that the Aleuts be paid $2.50 a pelt and their families $250 i n case of a d e a t h . T h e expedition was successful enough to satisfy the needs of both parties, with the result that Baranov gave verbal assent to the proposed alliance, while reserving the right to trade with others. Evi-dently by this time Baranov had given up in despair a l l hopes of adhering s t r i c t l y to Company policy i n this matter. The enterprising governor was to show his resourcefulness and shrewdness i n carrying on a trade which he had long avoided. 4H. Chevigny, Russian America. New York, Viking, 1965: p. 102. I CHAPTER II FOREIGN TRADE IN NOVO ARKHANGELSK AND THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY, 1803 - 1817 Baranov's arrangement with Joseph O'Cain marked the Russian governor's decision to agree at least tentatively to continue such dealings in Novo Arkhangelsk. Much information on the frequency and magnitude of this trade as i t developed after 1803 i s contained in notes on the colony written by the accountant K i r i l l Khlebnikov, which are now located i n the archives of the State Geographical Society i n Leningrad."^ Reproduced below i s the f i r s t part of Khlebnikov's s t a t i s t i c s covering the Baranov period, l i s t i n g briefly the names of vi s i t i n g ships, their captains, the value of goods purchased, i & and the furs or b i l l s paid out in exchange. The table w i l l be followed by an account of the evolution of this trade. 15K. Khlebnikov, Zapiski o koloniiakh v Amerike  Rossiisko-Amerikanskoi Kompanii.(Notes on the Russian Ameri-can Company Colonies i n America), manuscript i n Archives of the State Geographical Society, Leningrad, section 99* index 1, item 111, pp. 10 (reverse side) to 13 (reverse side). •^Names in parentheses were missing in the manuscript, and have been determined from F. V7. Howay's "A List of Trading Vessels i n the Maritime Fur Trade", published in consecutive issues of Proceedings of the Royal Society of Canada. Series III, vols. 25, 26, and 27, 1931 - 1933. Howay»s l i s t does not include a second visitor to Sitka in 1805, hence the spelling of "Trescott" i s based only on approximate transliteration. 18 NAMES OF CAPTAINS AND SHIPS TRADING AT NOVO ARKHANGELSK, 1805 - 1817 AND AMOUNT SPENT ON CARGOES Year Ship 1805 Juno Captain D*Wolf Amount 12,320.00 " "(sic) Trescott 9 , 0 4 0 . 5 0 Juno & D'Wolf 136,000.00 cargo QUANTITY OF FUR BEARING ANIMALS TRADED OUT AND THEIR PRICE (RUBLES) Mode of Payment Price/pelt 112 sea otters 8 0 . 0 0 rub. 84 yearlings 4 0 . 0 0 113 sea otters 8 0 . 0 0 300 piasters 2 . 0 0 r/p. 472 sea otters 1 0 0 . 0 0 101 yearlings & b i l l s of ex-change on St. Petersburg: 5 4 , 6 3 7 . 5 0 p. 2 . 0 0 r/p. O'Cain Winship 9,767.60 credit: 9,697.25 Vancouver Brown 3,529.60 1,520 fur seals 2.00 6 sea otters 80.00 Peacock Kimball 345.00 5 sea otters 63.00 Eclipse 0'Cain 9,689.80 (Myrtle) Barber , 84,000.00 b i l l : : 40,050 p. 2.00 950.00 p. cash Peacock Kimball 7,921.28 2,296 fur seals 3.00 J. Winship13,746.08 1,315 beaver 3.00 170 red fox 5.00 65 Kodiak fox 3.00 9 sea otters 80.00 1 sea otter 75.00 20 t a i l s 4.50 1,391 fur seals 2.00 Derby Swift 18,036.11 258 sea otters 70.00 Mercury Ayres 4,709.80 general produce Derby Swift 34,516.00 2 ,485 beavers 6.00 1,200 n 5.00 132 tt 4.00 100 tt 2.00 47 otters 7.00 1 , 4 0 7 beaver t a i l s 6.00 377 beaver t a i l s 5.00 1 sea otter 80.00 Mercury Ayres 1,209.67 190 beaver 6.00 O'Cain Winship 40,427.08 1,619 beaver 6.00 19 Year Ship Captain Amount 1810 Mercury Ayres 7*725.60 Mode of Payment Price/Pelt Isabella Davis 1811 Mercury Ayres 3*722 sea otters (total: (Various 36,988 r.) prices) 10,852 fur seals (total: 16,875 r.) 24,750.00 2,363 fur seals 2.00 10,440 » » 1.50 O'Cain Winship 10,889.34 Katherine Blanchard 22,050.45 Enterprise Ebbets 94,843.12 Isabella Davis 25 ,400.17 5*000 fur seals 3 , 6 0 0 " " 5 poods of bone 823 otter 908 beaver t a i l s 7 , 4 7 0 fur seals 4 , 8 4 4 " " for 346 barrels of tar. 3 , 0 0 0 fur seals 7 , 4 5 8 » » 1 , 4 7 7 beavers 41 otters 1 6 , 6 4 6 fur seals 3 4 , 7 6 4 » » 529 beavers 297 " t a i l s 70 sable 7 , 4 7 0 fur seals 19,693.08 1812 Charon Beaver Whittemore 22,617.00 Hunt17 (sic) 124,056.74 1812 -13 Mercury Ayres 12,425.36 1 2 , 5 6 5 fur seals 2 0 , 0 0 0 fur seals 5 3 , 0 4 5 » n 3 , 0 0 0 fur seals 72 sable 2 . 0 0 1 .50 1 8 . 0 0 7 . 0 0 3 . 6 0 1 . 2 0 2 . 0 0 1 . 0 0 6 . 0 0 6 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 1 . 5 0 6 . 0 0 3 . 6 0 2 . 0 0 1 . 2 0 1 . 8 0 2 . 0 0 1 .50 1 . 5 0 2 . 0 0 Charon Whittemore 6,065.00 Atahualpa Suter 27*753.30 3,160 fur seals 3.00 & Cargo 20,000.00 2,175 » » 2.80 (for ship) 6,768 » ti 1.80 Lydia Bennett 55,512.50 28,000 " it 2.00 (brig) 20,000.00 13,000 " n 1.50 & cargo (for ship) 10,000 » n 2.00 •^Wilson Hunt was John Jacob Astor's person repre-sentative on the Beaver. The captain, according to Howay, was Cornelius Sowle. 20 Year Ship 1813 (Pedlar) Isabella Amethyst & cargo 1814 Pedlar 1815 Brutus Captain Clark Davis Meek Pi^ott Meek Amount 22,377.62 2,432.00 25,477.32 for ship: 10,000.00 75,981.81 24,000.00 Mode of Payment Price/pelt 3,996 fur seals 6,216 » " 535 fur seals 713 " " 2,000 fur seals 2,219 " " 5,128 " " 700 t a i l s 5,749 fur seals from Kodiak (paid after Bara-nov f s retirement.) 15,000 fur seals 50,768 » » 2.80 1.80 2.00 1.50 3.00 2.00 1.50 3.60 1.50 1.75 1.50 43,287.84 (paid after Bara-nov* s retirement.) 1817 Lydia Gyzelaar 33,204.00 (schooner) general produce 21 In the years following Baranov*s deal with O'Cain, several other American captains arranged to go shares with Baranov in similar California coastal sea otter expeditions. Khlebnikov summed up the results of the California hunts separately from the preceding table, as follows: Mature One and two Year Captain Sea Otters year olds Cubs Total 1803 0»Cain 1806 Kimball 753 228 250 1,231 1808 Ayres 1809 John Winship 2,251 267 288 2,726 1810 Nathan Winship 389 70 101 560 1811 William Davis 989 (sic) 216 283 2,488 1811 Thomas Meek 655 49 17 721 1811 William Blanchard i 626 93 39 758 1813 Whittemore 798 68 30 896 After the awarding of the Russian American Company char-ter in 1799, there was considerable concern in St. Petersburg on the part of the directors and the government about the state of affairs i n America. Despite the quantities of furs being sent back, there were signs that a l l was not well. The missionaries there were complaining vehemently about Baranov*s rule, and one had succeeded in bringing two Aleuts a l l the way to St. Peters-burg to a i r their grievances personally to Tsar Paul. Moreover, Baranov himself had once already tried to resign. Now with the company o f f i c i a l l y launched, grandiose plans for Russian expan-22 sion and for a flourishing colonial economy were being develop-ed, i n particular by the Company's representative in the Tsar's government, Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, the Head-Procurator of the F i r s t Department of the Senate, and the man most respon-sible for obtaining the Charter for the Russian American Com-pany. Close government cooperation now could be expected^ and was in fact not long in coming. A diplomatic mission was as-signed to v i s i t Peking, with instructions to secure the opening of the Amur to navigation and, most important, to obtain permis-sion for Russian ships to trade in Canton. With that port open, the Russians would no longer have to resort to foreign merchant middlemen to s e l l their furs there. Also i n the wind was a plan to break down trading barriers with the Japanese, who were s t i l l carrying on but a limited trade with Europeans, and at that only with the Dutch. So as to f a c i l i t a t e communication and supply for the colony, investigations were begun as to direct voyages from St. Petersburg, which promised to be more convenient than the long precarious haul across the vast length of Siberia and then the Pacific. At the same time Russia's position i n the north Paci-f i c would be strengthened by the presence of vessels of the Imperial Navy, and an opportunity presented for establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. To f a c i l i t a t e this project, the Russian American Company purchased an English frigate; the government obtained another. These three-masted ships, the Leander and the Thames, were renamed the Nadezhda and the Neva. 1 8 23 Owing to his enthusiasm, knowledge, and position both in government and in the Russian American Company, Rezanov was the natural choice to accompany the expedition to conduct nego-tiations with the Japanese and to inspect the American colony. With the t i t l e of "Correspondent" of the Russian American Com-pany he was authorized to supersede Baranov for the duration of his stay in America; for his diplomatic duties he was given ambassadorial rank. The expedition set out from Kronshtadt on August 7> 1803 on the Neva. under naval officer Y u r i i Lisian-s k i i , and the Nadezhda. under Adam Krusenstern. Not u n t i l the two ships arrived in Hawaii did Lisian-s k i i and Krusenstern receive news of the massacre on Sitka. At that the expedition s p l i t up, the Neva proceeding direct to Kodiak, and the Nadezhda with Rezanov aboard to Petropavlovsk to prepare for his mission to Japan. Meanwhile, Lisianskii, upon his arrival at Kodiak July 13, 1804, had been instructed to proceed to Norfolk Sound off Sitka. Baranov was at the earliest opportunity gathering his forces for recapturing the fort from the Tlingits. Already two company vessels were on the scene. In September Baranov arrived with two more ships and three hundred baidarkas. After an un-successful i n i t i a l attack, the Neva's guns decided the issue, and the garrison was reoccupied by the Russians. The rebuilt fort was named Novo Arkhangelsk. i s evident in this arrangement, as i n many other aspects of Russian American Company activity, the Company was, even at this early stage, virtually an arm of Russian foreign policy and worked in the closest cooperation with the govern-ment. Okun has convincingly confirmed this close association in his Russian American Company already cited. 24 The next summer Rezanov arrived on the Nadezhda after the complete failure of his attempts to open trade with Japan. Just as depressing was the condition of the colony i n 1805. What a contrast with the forecasts of Grigorii Shelikhov! Shelikhov had envisioned a series of centers of culture, con-taining schools, hospitals, numbers of s k i l l e d craftsmen en-gaged i n diversified industry, busy shipyards, and flourishing churches for the conversion and c i v i l i z a t i o n of the natives. Instead, Rezanov found a few miserable outposts in a vast i n -hospitable wilderness. Disease, especially scurvy, was wide-spread, and there was not one doctor in the colony. The prin-cipal reason for poor health was obvious - a scarcity of the basic food requirements. Without doubt Rezanov then began to realize how ignorant of the true state of affairs had been the theoreticians, himself included, back i n St. Petersburg. Things were especially bad that year, of course, owing to the need to rebuild the fort at Sitka. L i t t l e time could be spent on proper organization of the far-flung fledgling empire. No men were available for catching fis h to supplement their meager diet, as those who were not busy rebuilding the garrison were too sick to work. There were far too few even working i n the colony even when they were a l l healthy. As to the prime goal of company activity, the acquisition of furs, Rezanov saw dis-turbing signs that the fur-seal population, especially of the Pri b i l o f Islands, was diminishing rapidly. It i s not surpris-ing that morale was very low. To make matters worse, Baranov was having to take abuse from naval officers i n company service who had no desire to obey a mere trader, a man of a despised class. Rezanov soon became convinced that Baranov could not be blamed for the sad state of the colony. In fact, he came to believe that only Baranov possessed the qualities necessary for bringing the colony to prosperity. In his reports Rezanov urged that Baranov be protected against the insults and i n -subordination of navy men. In addition, in order to persuade Baranov to stay on, Rezanov promised to do a l l he could to pro-vide improvements in medical assistance, pensions, and f a c i l i -t i es for education. Above a l l , Rezanov recognized the absurdity of forbid-ding trade with foreign ships while there was such an unreli-able domestic supply system. He gave Baranov a free hand to decide for himself in future how and when to enter into commer-c i a l relations with foreigners. So that he would not always have to pay in furs, credit was arranged for him by making i t possible for him to issue b i l l s of exchange payable at St. Petersburg banks on the account of the Board of Directors of the Russian American Company. Owing to the desperate lack of provisions, Rezanov himself decided to buy the American ship Juno together with her cargo. The transaction afforded the Russians only temporary material r e l i e f ; however, the acquisition of the large new ship proved to be useful in obtaining more supplies. As the winter of 1805-06 went on, the number of deaths from scurvy increased, and to add to the general depression, the Company ship Zakhar i 26 Elizaveta was lost. To make the food situation even more c r i -t i c a l , hunting and fishing became impossible owing to the renewed belligerency of the Tlingits. The settlement at Yaku-tat was wiped out. Rezanov could f i n a l l y wait no longer, and in late February with some trade goods, the Juno and thirt y -three men, some of them i l l , he set out southwards, hoping to get game or f i s h from the natives in the region of the Columbia's mouth. The attempt to enter the Columbia with a ship manned by sick men was vain and costly. Eight men died, and of the l i v i n g only a few could s t i l l f u l f i l their duties. The only place Rezanov could then v i s i t in the hopes of getting fresh food was the small Spanish mission of San Fran-cisco. He s t i l l had documents confirming his ambassadorial status, and hoped that the European situation had not changed so much in his absence that the local Spaniards could not con-sider relaxing the ban of foreign trade. He may have surmised the fact that California was in a somewhat similar situation to that of Alaska - ill-supplied from Mexico, yet discouraged from trade with anyone else. It turned out that the European situation was not favourable, owing to some diplomatic moves of Napoleon which promised to put Spain and Russia at odds. Nevertheless, Reza-nov was eventually successful, primarily through his rather precipitate haste i n becoming betrothed to the Commander's daughter, in a move which may, or may not, have been merely a strategem. 27 On June 8, 1806, Rezanov arrived in Sitka to find that a good herring catch had somewhat replenished the food supply and that Baranov had already obtained some additional supplies through trade with Captain Joseph 0*Cain who was accompanied on his ship, the 0*Cain. by one of the owner partners, Jonathan Winship, x^ In spite of a l l of the hardships and immediate needs that Rezanov had seen in the colony, he had not forgotten the ambitions and far-reaching plans he had discussed with high government o f f i c i a l s and the Board of Directors in St. Peters-burg. Despite his disillusionment with the colony, the worst seemed to be over, and he had every confidence in Baranov as a leader, although Baranov showed considerable reluctance to continue. The important consideration now was to expand south-wards. The North American coast was unoccupied as far as Spanish California, which i t s e l f was not strong and perhaps could be taken at some future time. Southward expansion was not only a strategic desirability, i t held great hope for im-proving the food supply. In the light of these factors plans were made to establish posts at the mouth of the Columbia and as close as possible to San Francisco, and more tentative plans x vHector Chevigny in his book Russian America errs, ac-cording to Howay and Khlebnikov, in suggesting that in the spring previous to Rezanov*s arrival in 1805, " . . . the Yankees came, among them Captain Oliver Kimball, . . . i n the brig Pea-cock . . . . Jonathan Winship also came . . . in the brig 0*Cain . . . ." Chevigny, Russian America p. 112. These ships actu-ally arrived following the most c r i t i c a l winter of 1805-06, as Khlebnikov records. Partial corroboration of this point was 28 were made to make trading inroads i n Hawaii with a view toward eventual control of the islands. Rezanov himself decided to return to St. Petersburg rather than carry out his original intention of v i s i t i n g Canton and India to explore the possibility of establishing commercial relations with the East India Company. It was desirable to follow up his success in California with diplomatic efforts at home to obtain Spanish consent to Alaska-California trade. A l l of his plans came to naught, however, as Rezanov died en route to St. Petersburg in March, 1807. Baranov was l e f t alone to carry out Russian policy i n North America. Trade with foreign ships became more rather than less necessary owing to the inability of the company to arrange more frequent supply expeditions from Okhotsk, and the unavailability of provisions from other sources. The govern-ment was not able to spare vessels for the purpose, as from 1805 on, Russia was at war; f i r s t with Napoleon until 1807; then beginning in 1809, with Finland. Finally a l l of Europe erupted in 1812 and until 1815 Russia had to suspend sea voyages to the Russian colony i n Alaska. During that time, Baranov1s attitude towards trade with foreign traders was necessarily ambivalent. He now enjoyed more freedom of action i n this matter than he had before Reza-nov1 s v i s i t . But the necessary trade s t i l l contradicted found by Howay (pp. c i t . vol. 26, p. 54) i n the log of the O'Cain, which did v i s i t Sitka in 1806, not 1805. 29 general policy, for the traders visited not only the Russians, but the surrounding natives as well. One of the arguments used by the directors i n 1808 to persuade Baranov to stay on had been that he had the closest acquaintance with the foreign traders upon whom the colony would have to depend almost en-20 t i r e l y . Yet 1808 was the year in which Russia f i r s t began to complain o f f i c i a l l y to the United States about the t r a f f i c of the American traders in firearms and liquor among the Indians. Not only did this practice cutainto the amount of furs received by the Russians; i t also undermined Russian prices, thus lead-ing the natives to unrest and violence. Moreover, in the long run the unrestricted presence of American vessels would belie Russian claims to sovereignty in the area., and seriously hinder the fulfilment of company and government plans for further t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. On the other hand, the fact that company trade with foreign ships was profitable has largely been ignored. Indeed, the prices received in North America for Baranov*s furs were often better for the company than those received in Kiakhta, especially when i t i s taken into account that the company had to pay both transportation and duty charges to the Russian government on the furs traded i n Russia. For example, consid-ering the two principal sources of company income, sea otters 21 and fur seals, the following price ranges were in effect: z uChevigny, op. c i t . . p. 127. 21 Tikhmenev, op. c i t . . v. I, p. 254 and Khlebnikov»s table, p. 18-20, of this paper. 30 Price at Novo Arkhangelsk Price at Kiakhta Sea otter 20, 40, 50 piasters (mostly at 50 p.) 55-62 p. ( i f traded for tea.) 30 p. (for silk.) Fur seal 1.00, 1.50, 1.75 p. (Mostly at 1.00 p.) 2.60-3.60 (for tea.) 1.20-1.30 (for silk.) Another positive feature of the presence of the Ameri-can captains was their possible usefulness in times of native h o s t i l i t y . In J.807, for example, Captain Oliver Kimball of the Peacock helped to ransom two captive natives of Kodiak from the Tl i n g i t s . Of course, such assistance was generally given with the expectation that favours would be granted in return. Bar-anov* s friendship with American captains was at best a frontier relationship of necessity, despite the manifestations of hospitality for which he was famous. A case in point i s Joseph 0'Cain, whose longstanding friendship with Baranov i s given considerable attention in Chevigny*s romanticized his-tory, Russian America. However Khlebnikov, who had the oppor-tunity to interview Baranov over a period of several months in 1 8 1 8 , remarks in the notes accompanying his l i s t only that O'Cain had deceived Baranov i n connection with the cooperative 22 sea otter hunt of 1 8 0 3 . In proposing the expedition, O'Cain had referred to an island abounding in sea otter he had dis-covered off the coast of California. Khlebnikov believed this to have been a l i e , indicating that O'Cain was not trusted. Later, at the time of the recapture of Novo Arkhangelsk from 2 2Khlebnikov, op., c i t . . p. 7. 31 the Tlingits, O'Cain's ship i s described as lying at anchor . . . to await the issue of the forthcoming struggle between the Russians and the Kolosh and to do business with the victors.23 Evidently there was a strained relationship between the Russ-ians and even the more reliable of the visitors. Nevertheless the immediate needs of the colony during the period of European warfare dictated that the trade continue. During the period 1808-1812 both Russian and American governments became interested in working out mutually advanta-geous arrangements for supplying Russian America. Up until that period, the Russian government had only very grudgingly acquiesced to occasional foreign trade in the colony as an emergency measure. Too much danger to t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions was f e l t to be involved, as well as danger from Indians equip-ped with guns, ammunition, and liquor supplied by the foreign-ers. In 1808 the f i r s t o f f i c i a l complaint was delivered to the United States government about the misdeeds of American traders; only the absence of diplomatic relations had prevented such a protest before that year. However, the impossibility of pro-viding enough goods from Europe or Siberia in wartime compelled the Russian government to change i t s tune quite radically. In these circumstances the United States embargo on a l l foreign trade, imposed in 1807 as a protest against Napoleon's blockade 23Tompkins, op. c i t . . p. 119. The terms "Tlingit" and "Kolosh" are interchangeable, the latter being used primarily by Russian sources. 32 of Europe and Great Britain's impressment of seamen in the open ocean, caused alarm rather than r e l i e f in St. Petersburg. The embargo threatened to cut off Novo Arkhangelsk's only emergency source of supplies.^ One of Andrei Dashkov's f i r s t tasks upon his appointment as Russian representative i n the United States was to try to obtain an agreement to furnish the colony with foodstuffs, while endeavoring at the same time to put an end to i l l i c i t trade with the natives. One merchant very interested in Dashkov's proposals was John Jacob Astor. After purchasing the ship Enterprise. Astor loaded her with a cargo of goods which he thought the colony would need- and sent her to Baranov in 1810 along with a letter proposing partnership. The proposed agreement between the Russian American Company and Astor*s American Fur Company would exclude a l l ri v a l s i n the northwestern coastal fur trade. Astor also undertook to send larger quantities and better s e l -ections of goods i n future. As Baranov expected to retire shortly, he told Captain Ebbets of the Enterprise that a long term agreement was not within his authority to sign. Baranov did buy the cargo, however, and agreed on terms for one more voyage. No doubt there were reasons in addition to those given for not giving f u l l approval yet to Astor's plan. The prices Astor was charging for his goods exceeded colonial prices by f i f t y percent, and at such prices the governor would not have 2 4 l t can be seen from Khlebnikov's table, on pages 18-20 of this paper that not a l l U. S. vessels observed the "Jefferson embargo," which was soon repealed in 1809. 33 wanted to promise much in advance, in case the war with England should end quickly and the company succeed soon in sending sufficient supplies from Russia. Baranov used the Enterprise to ship furs to Canton, which were sold there successfully. Baranov*s caution seems to have been borne out, as on the second v i s i t of an Astor ship, the Beaver. i n 1812, the Americans insisted on charging higher prices than earlier agreed upon, blaming i t on h o s t i l i t i e s between England and the United States. Part of that cargo remained unsold.^5 Accord-ing to 0kun*s account, an agreement was signed between the Russian American Company and Astor*s firm in 1812, but Astor proved to have no effective influence in discouraging other traders from doing business with the natives.^6 Really Astor was not in a position to guarantee anything in 1812. His es-tablishment at Astoria near the mouth of the Columbia was soon to be lost to the North West Company; he had failed to get presidential approval for monopoly rights in the area, and one of his ships, the Tonquin, had been lost in a fight with natives near Astoria. On the government level attempts to reach agreement were also unsuccessful. Dashkov had attempted to persuade the United States government to ban the trade by American sailors i n fire-arms and ammunition. Discussion foundered basically 25p. Tikhmenev. Istoricheskoe obozrenie . . . Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii . . . , v. I, St. Petersburg, Weimar Typography, 1861: p. 80. 2^0kun, op_. c i t . . p. 78. 34 on the question of t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s . The United States re-fused to act against the Indian trade, arguing that such trade would be i l l i c i t only i f the Indians were subject to Russia, i n which case the responsibility for prevention rested on Russia, not the United States. In 1810 Count Nikolai Rumiantsev, the Russian Commerce Minister, proposed that United States ships receive exclusive rights to carry Russian furs to Canton for sale to the Chinese, in return for an agreement to cease s e l l -ing arms and ammunition to the natives. Again the American government, through i t s minister in St. Petersburg, John Quincy Adams, preferred to postpone any agreement relating to the Indians until the world situation would allow the conclusion of a general treaty between the two countries. Adams became es-pecially wary after Rumiantsev intimated that Russia might make t e r r i t o r i a l claims as far south as the Columbia River. The outbreak of war between France and Russia forced the abandonment for a long time of plans for a general treaty that would settle the t e r r i t o r i a l issue. Meanwhile, Baranov had been getting supplies as best he could. Uncertain ties with Siberia had resulted in a continued reliance on United States vessels. To counteract the American trade with the natives, the Russian government had dispatched the sloop-of-war Diana, under Captain V a s i l i i Golovnin, which arrived i n Novo Arkhangelsk in 1810. However, the presence of one war vessel proved to be an ineffectual gesture. Baranov decided to make a bold move to establish a farming base on the coast of North America to the south of the 35 Columbia, a project which held promise of alleviating the food shortage while at the same time laying the foundation for later t e r r i t o r i a l expansion. Information on the country had come with Ivan Kuskov on his return from a sea otter hunt in 1809-10 that reached almost as far south as San Francisco. Baranov lost no time in assembling the necessary personnel, including again some Siberian convicts, for the new colony. After one false start, which ended when the party was attacked by Haida Indians from the Queen Charlotte Islands, Kuskov set out with his men in the Chirikov late in 1811. He chose land sixty miles north of San Francisco, and in 1812 the Russian settle-ment known as Ross took shape. Great hopes were held that Ross would become an important hunting, agricultural, and industrial center, and indeed, farms, orchards, vineyards, and cattle ranges were soon l a i d out. However, Ross never really lived up to i t s promise, and long continued to experience annual deficits. Its location had several disadvantages as a farming center. The fort was surrounded by h i l l s which became densely wooded a short distance inland. The grain was damaged by the summer fogs near the ocean, and much of the growing crops were ruined by squirrels and gophers. Yields were poor, and i t was not un t i l 1826 that any significant volume of grain was sent to Novo Arkhangelsk. Until a reliable alternative became available, Baranov had to keep on making the best deals he could with the Ameri-cans. But in early 1813, only one trader showed up, as British warships in the Pacific were threatening to seize American 36 ships should they leave the safety of neutral ports. The si t u -ation gave the company an opportunity, in Baranov*s view, to acquire some needed ships. It was certain that American ships were not making money lying at anchor in neutral ports around the Pacific. Baranov told the captain of the v i s i t i n g ship that the company was i n a position to lease or buy ships, whose crews could work safely for the Russians while under the com-pany flag. By the end of the year Baranov had purchased three ships and had leased another, enabling him to send vessels to the Philippines, Indonesia, Hawaii, and C a l i f o r n i a . ^ The years 1813 and 1814 were very profitable for Novo Arkhangelsk, but the Americans with whom Baranov was dealing were not above taking advantage of his position i n ways which harmed the Russ-ian American Company as a whole. Captain Bennett sold goods at Novo Arkhangelsk for furs, and then contrary to instructions sold the same furs back to the company office in Okhotsk at considerably inflated prices. The following year Captain Pig-got tried to repeat Bennett*s trick, s e l l i n g Baranov*s fur seals to the Russian American Company commissioner in Kamchatka at fifteen rubles a pelt for a total of 61,000 rubles in prom-issory notes, when the purchase price in Novo Arkhangelsk had been only two and a half rubles per pelt. However, this time the Board of Directors refused payment on the notes, claiming that colonial regulations were well known to the buyer, and instead began proceedings to recover from Piggott 35,000 rubles 'Chevigny, op. c i t . . p. 151s-152. Neither Chevigny nor other sources consulted identify the lone American visitor in the spring of 1813. 37 to cover freight charges from Kamchatka to Okhotsk. Piggott did very l i t t l e business with the Russians after that. Baranov was told to cut down his trade with foreigners, in order to retain fur seals- for supporting the lucrative Chinese trade at Kiakhta. He in turn demanded to know whether the Board expected to be able to guarantee an adequate food supply, and gave the directors to understand that the trading would continue. He did endeavor whenever possible to pay in notes payable in St. Petersburg rather than i n furs. Fortunately, the supply situation eased considerably with the arrival of the Suvorov i n November, 1814. At the same time the governor's relations with naval officers were aggravated by the attitude of the Suvorov*s commanding officer, Mikhail Lazarev, later to become an admiral, who was not one to take orders from a mere merchant. When in 1815 Baranov had Astor*s brig Pedlar seized for s e l l i n g arms and ammunition openly to the natives, he blamed Lazarev for encouraging dis-obedience to colonial authority. Lazarev refused to sanction the seizure, and f r i c t i o n increased to the point where Lazarev l e f t with his ship under cover of darkness for St. Petersburg. Back in the capital, Lazarev was tried before a naval court of inquiry on charges brought by the company head office. He was charged with immorality, with leaving Novo Arkhangelsk without the company*s supercargo, without the ship*s doctor, without b i l l s of lading, Baranov* s dispatches to headquarters or even his permission. Evidently Lazarev*s colleagues found in his favour, for when the Suvurov was again sent to Novo 38 Arkhangelsk under Leontii Hagemeister, the new commander was authorized to assume control of the colony in place of Baranov, should he find i t necessary. In the spring preceding the arrival of the Suvorov, Alexander Baranov had begun a f i n a l major undertaking for ex-panding Russia's influence in the Pacific. This ambitious goal, which the aging governor had discussed with Rezanov eight years before, was the establishment of trading stations and plantations on the Hawaiian Islands. This enterprise would gain a share for Russia in the lucrative sandalwood trade, another important source of food produce, and a possible base for control of the islands. Back in 1809, Captain Hagemeister had started things off badly by t e l l i n g King Kamehameha, the native ruler of the islands, that Russia might take by force what she could not gain by diplomacy. The king had ruled against the establish-ment of any foreign settlements. In the spring of 1814 a situation arose which gave Baranov an opportunity to try to repair the damage. At that time one of the ships purchased by the company from Captain Bennett, the Bering, ran aground on Kauai, where i t was con-fiscated by King Kaumualii of Kauai. As Kaumualii had pre-viously submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Kamehameha, the Russians could expect cooperation from Kamehameha, hope-f u l l y i n the form of settlement rights within Kaumualii*s domain. 39 When Baranov heard that Kamehameha no longer had a per-sonal physician, i t seemed to him that Doctor Egor Nikolaievich 28 Sheffer, who had been l e f t behind when the Suvorov had fled, would be an ideal ambassador whose interest i n the natural sciences would stand him i n good stead with the king. Shef-fer *s mission began successfully with his appointment as Kame-hameha' s personal physician, but opposition from the Americans hindered his efforts to deal i n sandalwood and establish plan-tations. His decision to work with Kaumaulii resulted in an agreement which was contrary to his orders and disastrous for Russian interests. Not only were land and sandalwood rights made available, but Sheffer also committed the Company to help Kaumualii overthrow Kamehameha, a move which cost the support of Hawaiians of both camps as soon as i t became clear that Russian military aid to the lesser king was not forthcoming. Finally, the Russian and Aleut workers had to flee for their l i v e s . By 1816 the supply problem at Novo Arkhangelsk was much less c r i t i c a l owing to the arrival of five ships from Russia in two years. Khlebnikov records no trading with foreign ships that year, despite the fact that a total of fifteen ships v i s i -ted Novo Arkhangelsk i n 1816. Tikhmenev notes that foreign captains were very reluctant to accept b i l l s payable in St. Petersburg, demanding Spanish piasters instead, at a rate of exchange very different from that operating i n Europe. Accord-Real name: Georg Anton Schaffer. 40 ing to the American captains, one piaster was equivalent to two rubles (paper) while in St. Petersburg, one piaster was valued at five and a half rubles (paper).^ No progress had been made towards the end of Baranov*s governorship in persuading or forcing foreign merchants to refrain from trading with the Indians. The Boston firm of Bryant & Sturgis in instructions to Captain Suter of the Mentor. August 6, 1816, stated that the cargo was of two classes - one intended for trade with the Russians; the other, with the In-dians. 3® Even the virtual cessation of foreign trading by Baranov from 1815 to 1817 did not discourage the visitors, whose trade with the natives was sufficiently profitable to jus t i f y the effort and investment expended. As the end of the Company*s f i r s t twenty year charter approached, the navy began to lobby in St. Petersburg for con-t r o l of the American colonies so as to extend Russian naval power i n the Pacific. Navy captains had often resented mer-chant authority in Alaska and had brought back much informa-tion which could be used against the Russian American Company and Baranov*s management. The poverty of the Russian and native employees of the company was often cited, as was the lack of medical f a c i l i t i e s or even a doctor. In addition, rumour had i t that Baranov had made a personal fortune through the misappropriation of company funds. Whether or not this was 30Howay, OP. c i t . (1933), p. 121. ^Tikhmenev, op. c i t . . v. I, p. 173. 41 true, Baranov*s judgment was suspect over the Suvorov af f a i r -Lazarev had been cleared by a navy tribunal - and i t now looked as i f the governor had chosen the wrong man to superintend the Hawaiian venture. To forestall possible loss of the colony, the Company consented to cooperate with the navy. In 1817 the directors sent the Suvorov. under Captain Leontii Hagemeister, and the Kutuzov. under Captain Ponfidin on a round-the-cape voyage to Novo Arkhangelsk. Hagemeister was authorized to make a thor-ough inspection of the company f a c i l i t i e s and i t s financial records in particular, and was empowered to supersede Baranov. The accountant brought along to examine the books was K i r i l l Khlebnikov. Instead of finding discrepancies, Khlebnikov found the books in perfect order and came to admire Baranov for his honesty and generosityand for the respect he had won even 31 among the Tlingits: He never knew what avarice was, and never hoarded riches. He did not wait until his death to make pro-vision for the l i v i n g , and gave freely to a l l who had any claims on him. Some said he had large deposits in foreign banks, but no proof was to be found when he died . . . . As to the necessity for trade with Yankee captains, Khlebnikov had this to say in his Z a p i s k i : 3 2 3 1H. H. Bancroft, History of Alaska. 1886, pp. 514, 515. 32 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 86 (reverse side). 42 (The Americans) keep coming, and i t i s to be hoped that every year ships w i l l come from Boston, Canton, or Hawaii; from here they turn their atten-tion toward California and s e l l as much as they can a l l the way down the coast to Chile. The inordin-ate activity of the Americans i s a source of wonder; they come straight from Boston to Sitka stopping only at the Hawaiian Islands for three to five days for water, etc. . . . In any case, Hagemeister used the powers conferred on him to remove Baranov quite unceremoniously from office, naming Lieutenant Semen Yanovskii, Baranov*s new son-in-law, to the post of governor. On December 1, 1818, Alexander Baranov l e f t America on the Kutuzov. However, he never reached his native Russia, as he died of a fever shortly after setting s a i l from Batavia in April, 1819. CHAPTER III FOREIGN TRADE IN THE COLONY IN THE LIGHT OF RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY INCOME DURING THE FIRST CHARTER PERIOD In order to assess the significance of the trade in Novo Arkhangelsk to the economy of the Russian American Com-pany operations in America as a whole, i t i s instructive to examine the total returns of the Company from the colony during the same period. Through the Historical Calendar of the Russ-ian American Company. 1741-1817.33 i t i s possible to describe i n much greater detail than in the past the fluctuations in Company income during the period of the f i r s t imperial charter. The information found there i s particularly valuable as i t per-tains to the f i r s t period of operations, for which there i s a large gap from 1802-1818 in the colonial records of the Company. Here, from the Historical Calendar, i s the l i s t of ships transporting Alaskan furs to Russia (including those of the Shelikhov-Golikov partnership before the formation of the Russian American Company), together with the value of the im-ported furs and details of the voyages made by each ship:34 °JIstoricheskii kalendar* Rossiisko-Amerikanskoi Kom-panii. 1741-1817 gg. manuscript, 57 sheets. Central State Archive for Ancient Documents, Moscow. Yudin collection 796, index 1, item 160. Russian scholars discovered this document among the papers of G. V. Yudin in Krasnoyarsk only in 1957. However, i t i s also to be found among the F. Golder collection of photostatic copies of documents in the Russian archives, carried out in St. Petersburg in 1917, thus indicating that the Historical Calendar was known of at that time. 1) . Simeon: made 3 trips, i n 1793 took out from the colony from the wreck of the Ioann  Predtecha a cargo worth 128,000 rubles. In 1794 with Predtechevskii Company furs worth 224,815 rubles. On i t s third voyage in 1799 wrecked near the Seal Islands. 2) . Mikhail: made 2 trips, in 1792 brought a cargo worth 376,000 rubles; i n 1800 a cargo worth 320,000 rubles. Wrecked on Unalaska in 1801. 3) . Trekh S v i a t i t e l e i (Three Saints); made, three trips; i n 1785 worth 56,000 rubles in 1789 worth 300,000 rubles. Wrecked on i t s third voyage on Unalaska. 3). Ioann Predtecha (John the Baptist); set out i n 1790 and was wrecked near the Seal Islands i t s cargo was salvaged by the first-mentioned Simeon. 5) . Predpriiatie Sv. Aleksandr (Enterprise of St. Alexander); made three trips - in 1795 worth 276,550 rubles, in 1798 worth 431,931.50 rubles and i n 1802 worth 228,380 rubles. Wrecked on Unalaska. 6) . Phoenix; (built in America); made three trips; i n 1795 worth 321,138 rubles; in 1798 worth 525,937 rubles. Was sent in 1799 to Kodiak, but never arrived, but by available evidence sank i n the sea. 7) . Severnvi Orel (Northern Eagle); sailed in 1792, brought furs worth 21,912.30 rubles. Then in 1799 was wrecked along the Chugach coast. 8) . Ekaterina (Katherine); this ship never sailes to Okhotsk, but was soon broken up on account of decrepitude. 9) . Dmitrii: made two trips - i n 1803 brought furs worth 583,196.25. Set out for the second time in 1803 and was wrecked in October of that year near Umnak Island. However the cargo and crew were saved. 34i Did.. p. 25 (reverse side) f. 10) . Petr i Pavel (Peter and Paul); made two voyages - in 1809 worth 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 rubles. On account of decrepitude this ship was l e f t i n Okhotsk and turned into a storage depot. 11) . Zakhariia i Elizavetv (Zakhar and Elizabeth) sailed twice -in 1803 brought a cargo worth 1 , 1 6 6 , 3 9 2 . 5 0 rubles. Sailed in 1804 and was wrecked in America in December, 1 8 0 5 . 12) . Aleksandr Nevskii; saied from Okhotsk in 1803 and remained at Kodiak for use i n the colony; wrecked in 1 8 1 3 , but the cargo worth 7 8 4 , 5 4 8 rubles was saved. 13) . Neva; wrecked in 1 8 1 3 . 14) . Nadezhda: capsized in the Baltic. These two ships, which had been sent around the world from Kronshtadt i n 1 8 0 3 , brought furs out i n 1806 worth 5 8 2 , 2 1 4 . 2 5 r. 15) . Maria; made two trips, the f i r s t i n 1807 bringing furs worth 3 5 7 , 7 0 3 rubles. The second time she set out i n 1810 from Okhotsk; spent the winter i n Kamchatka, and then was sent to America, from which i t set out on i t s return voyage to Okhotsk; however, i t could not enter the harbour, and so that i t would not be wrecked by the wind near the rocky shore, i t was necessary to ground the vessel, which so damaged i t that i t could not be repaired. The furs brought on i t were worth 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 rubles. 16) . Konstantin: two trips; i n 1805 took a cargo of furs to the Nadezhda i n Kamchatka for trade intended for Canton - the cargo i s shown included with that of the Nadezhda. This l i t t l e ship arrived last year ( 1816) with a cargo of 7000 fur seals worth 70 ,000 r. 17) . Yunona (Juno); purchased i n America, l e f t there in 1807 and was used in a special expedition for Sakhalin; f i n a l l y wrecked in 1808 at Kamchatka near the Viliui c h i k R. More than 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 rubles worth of Canton goods were lost. 18) . Tender Avos*; built in America, l e f t in 1807 for Okhotsk and was used i n the special Sakhalin expedition; f i n a l l y in 1808 was wrecked in America at the mouth of Icy Strait. 19) . Rostislav; built in America, l e f t for Okhotsk in 1807 and was also employed in the Sakhalin expedition. On i t s second t r i p from America i t car-ried to Kamchatka along with the Neva furs to t a l l i n g 778,521 rubles in value, which were then taken to Okhotsk on crown ships. The third time i t sailed for Atkha Island. 20) . Sitka; built in America, sailed to Kamchatka in 1807, where i t was wrecked in the mouth of the Kamchatka River. 21) . Finlandiia: built in Okhotsk; sailed for the f i r s t time in 1810 to survey the Kurile Islands. On i t s second voyage i t brought furs to Okhotsk worth 200,000 rubles. In the same year i t sailed to Atkha Island; on i t s return i t wintered in Okhotsk; in 1815 i t carried 200,000 rubles worth of furs from America. The same year i t sailed to Sitka Island. In 1810 the crown vessel Diana took company furs of value 80,627.35 rubles. 22) . The ship Suvorov; sailed from Kronshtadt around the world in 1813; arrived at the island of Sitka in November, 1814, returning to Kron-shtadt in July, 1816 with a fur cargo valued at 900,000 rubles. Then in company with the ship Kutuzov sailed to the colony for a second time with a cargo of Russian and German goods, an i l l u s t r i o u s cargo for these ships, and various provisions. 23) . The ship Otkrvtie (Discovery); built on Sitka; on i t s f i r s t crossing brought furs to Okhotsk worth 515,905 rubles. 2 4 ) . (The ship) Bering, purchased from a Boston skipper; on i t s f i r s t crossing took 581,169.50 rubles worth of furs. Then, having been sent to Sitka, was wrecked on the Hawaiian Islands. 25) . (The ship) Kutuzov; sent last year (1816) along with the Suvorov under the general command of Lieutenant-Commander Hagemeister - called the 4th expedition. 47 The total value of fur goods collected and taken to Russia by the Russian American Company alone from 1783 to the present (1817) i s 10,700,067 rubles. The same data on furs exported to Russia from the colony, expressed graphically, appear as follows, taking into account the years 1798 to 1816: I-Rubles millions) O^im 'too ieoi solid line ~- silver ruble, value. dotted lint —paper ruble value moi nob /so; 1109 mo Year itiv ihi Hi*, ifis t&b Graph 1 VALUE OF FURS SHIPPED BY RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY FROM AMERICA, 1798 r 1816 48 On this graph the solid line together with the dotted line represents the cargo value totals each year from 1798 to 1 8 1 6 , which would seem to indicate that fur output was quite steady over the period, with the exception of the time just prior to Rezanov*s v i s i t and the years of the Napoleonic war. However, i t should be kept in mind that the figures used are in paper rubles, whose real value steadily decreased with respect to the silver ruble during this period. The s i l v e r ruble value of imports i s represented on this graph by the solid portion of the l i n e s . 3 5 3 5 A table of the relative values of silver and paper currency i s to be found in A. Del Mar, Money and Ci v i l i z a t i o n . London, Bell & Sons, 1 8 8 6 , p. 3 0 8 . 49 Graphic representation of Company capital over the same period, using annual inventory data from the Historical  Calendar. t e l l s much the same story. The solid l i n e again represents the value of goods on hand in silver rubles, and the dotted line - the original data in paper currency. Again we can readily see that conversion to the more stable silver currency suggests that the period was not really characterized by r i s i n g profits as the original figures would suggest. In comparison with the size of the quantities shown on Graphs 1 and 2, the annual value of furs traded to foreign ships i n Novo Arkhangelsk would appear quite small, at most just 190,000 rubles (approximately) in 1813, marked on the graphs by an asterisk. More significant i s the company e s t i -mate that the Americans were taking from 10,000 to 15,000 sea otters annually from the north west coast.^ Taking the lower figure, and using the minimum Kiakhta price of 110 rubles per sea otter skin,"5 we may conclude that such a quantity of sea otters would have increased company income by over a million rubles a year, assuming of course that the order of magnitude of the Russian estimate i s not too wildly exaggerated and that the Russians could have caught the others i f the Americans had not. 36(3p. c i t . . pp. 31 (reverse side), 32. J /0kun, OP. cit... pp. 74 - 7 5 . ^Tikhmenev, op. c i t . , v. 1, p. 2 5 4 . See otters traded for cloth received a lower price, but the majority were traded for tea. 50 A study of annual income over the f i r s t charter period thus reveals that the value of furs received, rather than increasing as i t would seem from Company accounts, was at best only holding steady as the value of paper currency declined. The very small proportion of furs sold to foreigners at Sitka had l i t t l e effect on total Russian American Company income. However, the trade had a very significant effect in reducing company expenses, both of freight and duty charges on those furs, and in particular of the cost of sending supply expeditions. As the capital outline which has been illustrated i n Graph 2, discovered in 1957, represents the only existing de-tailed information on Russian American Company income during the f i r s t charter period, i t i s included in f u l l on page 51 of this paper. Taking the Baranov period as a whole, we may conclude that the Russian American Company achieved a limited improve-ment in i t s financial condition. However, the Hawaiian venture had failed; American mariners through their uninterrupted trade with the natives were diverting large quantities of furs into their own hands; and the area was s t i l l very sparsely populated by Russians. Moreover, there were clouds on the economic horizon, and the supply of marine fursfewa's dwindling. The next few years would show whether the company's management and i t s support from the government were sufficiently effec-tive to succeed i n solving the problems which were hindering TABLE I CAPITAL OUTLINE - 1798 to 1817 From taking of Inventories Capital (paper rubles) Year In sea hunting In land hunting 1798 1,671,020.765 917,682.74 1799 1,663,551.4375 1,593,029.3825 1800 2,101,862.5175 1,907,451.07 1801 2,269,017.69 1,685,547.7175 1802 2,420,683.23 1,818,767.3775 1803 2,860.073.045 2,590,625.4125 1804 2,295,480.7725 4,159,225.8425 1805 2,907,927.96 3,713,473.6975 1806 2,964,843.465 3,771,007.07 1807 3,396,048.845 3,182^02.795 1808 2,686,844.6825 3,426,955.7675 1809 2,195,617.37 3,487,920.09 1810 2,326,970.1275 3,091,878.29 1811 2,254,048.14 3,349,173.53 1812 2,244,488.40 3,329,076.60 1813 3,477,065.55 2,583,109.94 1814 3,751,066.91 1,930,019.91 1815 3,421,443.74 2,928,272.52 1816 3,615,167.81 3,221,514.80 Altogether 2 , 5 8 8 , 3 , 2 5 6 , 4,009, 3 , 9 5 4 , 4 , 2 3 9 , 5 , 4 5 0 , 6 , 4 5 4 , 6 , 6 2 1 , 6 , 3 7 5 . 6 , 5 7 8 , 6 , 1 1 3 , 5 , 6 8 3 , 5 , 4 1 8 , 5 , 6 0 3 , 5 , 5 7 3 , 6 , 0 6 0 , 5,681, 6 , 3 4 9 , 6 , 8 3 6 , 7 0 4 . 5 0 5 5 8 0 . 8 2 3 1 3 . 5 8 7 5 5 6 5 . 4 0 7 5 4 5 0 . 6 0 7 5 6 9 4 . 4 5 7 5 7 0 6 . 6 1 5 3 8 7 . 6 5 7 5 920.535 451.6375 8 0 0 . 4 5 5 3 7 . 4 6 8 4 8 . 4 1 7 5 2 2 1 . 6 7 5 6 5 . 0 0 1 7 5 . 4 9 0 8 6 . 8 2 7 1 6 . 2 6 682.61 Credits included in capital 1,290,244.0475 1,280,253.895 1,374,957.01 1,207,506.72 1,399,449.285 1,674,848.5425 2,010,376.985 1,991,583.325 2,574.576.625 2,394,362.3775 2,184,770.505 1,774,911.0925 1,476,344.2425 1,595,975.74 1,304,065.00 1,722,538.26 1,242,676.59 1,628,430.04 1,236,767.30 Remaining Unaccounted for 800,873.80 Credits removed; Capital remaining 1,298, 1,976, 2,634, 2,744, 2,840, 3,775, 4,444, 4,629, 4,161, 4,184, 3,929, 3,908, 3,942, 4,007, 4,269, 4,337, 4,438, 4,316, 4,799, 4 5 9 . 4 5 7 5 3 4 4 . 9 2 5 356.5775 0 0 4 , 6 8 7 5 0 0 1 . 3 1 2 5 8 4 5 . 9 1 5 3 2 9 . 6 3 8 1 4 . 3 3 2 5 3 4 3 . 9 1 0 8 9 . 2 6 029.945 6 2 6 . 3 6 7 5 5 0 4 . 1 7 5 2 4 5 . 9 3 5 0 0 . 0 0 637.23 410.23 0 8 2 . 9 5 0 4 1 . 5 1 52 colonial development and threatening the company's livelihood. The Russian American Company stood to gain both in furs and t e r r i t o r i a l control in the long run i f some alternative to American sources of supply could be found. Initiatives from the government were needed to exclude or resist foreign competition while ensuring alternative means of supply. CHAPTER IV FOREIGN TRADE IN THE COLONY 1818 - 1825 AND THE TSAR'S DECREE OF 1821 A committee had been named upon the expiration of the f i r s t charter to examine Russian American Company activ i t i e s so as to decide whether or not i t s privileges should be con-tinued. It concluded that the company's privileges should be renewed, with a recommendation that t e r r i t o r i a l limits be de-fined as soon as possible, and that, most importantly, foreign-ers should be excluded entirely from the region. Accordingly, a decree was issued by the Tsar on Septem-ber 4 , 1821, which reserved for Russian subjects a l l a c t i v i t i e s within an area extending on the coast of America from Bering Strait south to latitude 51° north. Foreign vessels were for-bidden to approach within less than one hundred Italian miles of this coast at any point. Nine days after the decree was issued, a new charter was f i n a l l y granted, securing for the Company exclusive p r i v i -leges in the hunting of fur-bearing animals and for fishing within the waters reserved for the Russians by the decree. Additionally, governors would be chosen exclusively from the ranks of naval officers, a move which had the effect of making the job a temporary stepping stone to a higher position, rather than an opportunity to fashion a permanent career. 54 The international situation at the time made i t impos-sible for the government to ignore the strong protests which the decree quite predictably evoked from the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Russia wished to placate American and English governments at a time when she was endea-voring to be given responsibility for the restoration of order in the Balkans following the Greek Revolution of 1821, in an effort to attain one of Russia's long sought after goals, control of the Dardanelles. As Okun has pointed out, It was not worthwhile to allow relations with the powers to deteriorate over an acquisition such as the American colonies, while those powers were also opposed to Russian intervention in the Greek affair. 3 9 Within eight months of the decree, when faced with British support of the American position, the Russian Foreign Ministry found i t expedient to issue instructions to vessels in America which for a l l intents and purposes cancelled the September decree of 1821. On June 3 , 1822, the Russian foreign minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, informed Count Dmitrii Guriev, the Mini-ster of Finance, that ships in Russian America had been instruc-ted to confine their patrols to the latitudes within which the Russian American Company "actually enjoyed i t s prerogatives in hunting and fishing . . . 3 9 o k u n , op. c i t . . p. 8 3 . 4°Ibid. 55 In any case, the only effect of hampering the trade of Americans with the Indians was to arouse ho s t i l i t y among the natives. The Russians were paying them only one half to two-thirds the price given by the Americans. As the following table shows, the decline in the main items of the Tl i n g i t trade with the Russian American Company was only partially alleviated in the years immediately following the ban on foreign trade at Novo Arkhangelsk FURS RECEIVED FROM TLINGITS BY RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMPANY 1818 - 1825 (Main Items Only) 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 182,5 Seal 54 54 27 21 20 24 16 22 Mink 1,807 1,302 842 272 137 433 602 165 Beaver 265 147 115 41 39 177 198 74 Trade with foreign ships was carried on in other places so as to adhere to the letter of the 1821 decree, but i t never ceased entirely, as the colony s t i l l depended on the Americans for a sufficient supply of provisions and other supplies. For reasons of higher state interest the government had attempted to deal with foreign competition without enforcing i t s decisions or ensuring effective alternative means of sup-ply. Colonial governor Matvei Muraviev, the Navy captain who succeeded Semen Yanovskii i n 1820, thus carried on a v i r -tually uninterrupted trade with the Americans, as i s shown in Khlebnikov, op. c i t . . p. 61. 56 the continuation of Khlebnikov*s table from the year 1818. It should be noted that the prices in this section of the table are given in Spanish piasters rather than rubles. 42 Year Ship Captain 1818 Eagle Meek l e Bordelais Roquefeuil 1819 Brutus Eagle Clarion Volunteer Clarion Brutus 1820 Clarion Pedlar Thaddeus Nye Meek Gyzelaar Bennett (Gyzelaar) Davis Bennett Piggot Blanchard Amount 2,436.00 5,514.06 4,917.83 1,789.97 2,288.60 380.90 1,863.53 1,285.90 302.80 f Price* Mode of payment /Pelt 1,211 fur seals 1.75 2 , 7 0 0 fur seals 1 .75 5 , 0 0 0 fur seals (small) 605 fur seals 1 .75 remainder on account 1 , 3 0 8 fur seals 1 .75 1821 Arab Meek 12,939.31 5,155 fur seals 1822 Sultan Pedlar Arab Clark Meek J. Meek Pearl Stephens 898.83 7,775.98 21,177.77 680.75 483 fur seals 1.75 4,361 fur seals 1.75 2,400 beaver 4.00 4,739 fur seals 1.75 Remainder—Russ. goods of value -3,274.00 373 fur seals 1.75 Note: the brig Pearl was in port when the Appollon arrived with news of the ban on trade with foreigners in the colonies. After this the scarcity of goods and supplies forced further trade via the Hawaiian Islands and California:-4 2 I b i d . . p. 51 ( reverse side) to 52 (reverse side). 57 Year Ship 1823 Mentor 1824 Mentor Washington 1825 Lapwing Parf ianin(* Captain Amount Newell 13,991.08 Hartnell 6 , 0 4 3 . 0 0 (English trader in California) Price* Mode of payment /Pelt 2,995 fur seals 1.75 credit: 8,749.83 3,276 fur seals 1.75 goods: 310.00 Newell 8 , 8 6 6 . 1 5 5 , 0 0 0 fur seals 1 . 7 5 5 , 0 0 0 •» " (for 1823) 1 . 7 5 3 , 1 5 0 . 0 0 1 , 8 0 0 fur s e a l s l l . 7 5 1 , 1 9 0 . 0 0 700 fur seals 1.70(sic) E l v i l l e 812.25 500 fur seals 1 .75 (from T. 34,203.17 4 , 4 2 8 fur seals 1 .75 Meek). 1 2 , 8 2 5 fur seals 1 .75 500 beaver 4 . 0 0 1 1 , 0 0 0 fur seals 1 .75 Blanchard 4 2 , 6 5 5 . 0 0 (including ship). Wells 1 , 2 1 2 . 3 0 2 4 , 3 2 5 fur seals 1 . 7 5 603 fur seals 1 . 7 5 "Spanish piasters. There was by this time only the occasional exception to the exclusively American presence in the North Pacific. The not-able exception i n this l i s t i s l e Bordelais. which was only the second French trading expedition to the waters adjacent to Alaska, the f i r s t being that of l e Solide in 1 7 9 0 - 9 2 . Le Bor-delais. under Captain Camille Roquefeuil, arrived i n Novo Arkhangelsk in Apr i l , 1 8 1 8 . After the example of the sea otter hunts of Baranov*s time, Roquefeuil obtained a party of Aleut hunters from the Russians. The party was attacked by Tlingits on Prince of Wales Island, and the captain himself barely escaped with his l i f e . At that the remains of the expedition 58 returned to Novo Arkhangelsk to pay the Russian American Com-pany the agreed amount of two hundred piasters for each Aleut lost (perhaps by cancelling the debt for goods bought, shown in the preceding table), and then l e f t for France. TikhmenevTs st a t i s t i c s on the quantities of various kinds of peltry sent from the colony in the periods 1797 -1820 and 1821 - 1841 show that there was a great decrease in the average quantity of marine animals obtained annually from the former period to the latter, especially in the numbers of valuable sea otter processed. At the same time there was a corresponding though more gradual increase in the number of land animals obtained. This shift occurred because of the depletion of fur seals and sea otters and as a result of the energetic a c t i v i t i e s of the Americans. During the period 1818-25 referred to by the above table, a total of 1 , 0 2 8 , 2 6 2 . 5 0 rubles worth of peltry was paid out to foreigners in the colony, compared with 1 , 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 rubles in the longer period 1 8 0 5 - 1 7 . Hence, the rather sur-prising conclusion to be drawn i s that average annual trade with foreign ships actually increased i n value in the years when the greatest efforts were being made to keep i t to a minimum. The following chapter w i l l deal with some of the reasons why Company policy as expressed at the beginning of the second charter period was markedly lacking in success. CHAPTER V THE RUSSIAN AMERICAN COMPANY CRISIS OF THE MID-1820»s: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ASPECTS The United States government was taking an active interest in the t e r r i t o r i a l claims of the Russians, even to the point of in s i s t i n g on being a party to a f i n a l boundary settlement, on the strength of i t s 1818 treaty with Britain at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, by which the English and the Americans enjoyed equal rights i n the territory west of the Rocky Mountains. This treaty had drawn American atten-tion to the resources of that whole territory, including that within Russian influence. Public attention in the United States had been drawn to Russia's North American colony in 1821 by a congressional investigation of an American expedition sent to occupy the land along the Columbia River. A special committee reported to Congress warning of Russian expansionism, noting the development of settlements and trade in Alaska and California, even overstating the case by including one of the Hawaiian Islands, a Russian attempt which had not succeeded. Russian opposition to American shipping near the colony also served to intensify American interest in the north coastal region. There were even fears expressed that Russia might be about to take California from Spain in exchange for assistance in restoring Spanish rule over the newly-declared Spanish-American republics of South America. 60 When notified of the Tsar's decree, the British Prime Minister had immediately sent instructions to the Duke of Well-ington, who was representing England at the European Congress of Verona, to convey to Alexander I Britain's displeasure. The Tsar asked that negotiations be initiated in St. Peters-burg by the British ambassador. However, i t was not u n t i l February of 1824 that Russian plenipotentiaries received treaty negotiating powers. During the preceding year, as i t became clear that the United States would insist on a part in negotiations on Russian t e r r i t o r i a l limits, the Russian government had decided to negotiate simul-taneously with both powers in St. Petersburg. Prior to the commencement of o f f i c i a l negotiations, while unofficial talks were under way, President Monroe of the United States declared in his message to Congress on December 2, 1823 that "the American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any Euro-pean power."43 This unequivocal assertion, to be known as the "Monroe Doctrine," gave the American representative in St. Petersburg a valuable bargaining position from which he could retreat gracefully in order to secure his minimum objectives, which included a complete withdrawal of Russia's exclusion of foreign shipping and a southern limit of around 55° for her southern boundary. Chevigny, Russian America, pp. 184 - 185. 61 Britain contended for a limit set further north than 60°. Unfortunately for her maximum hopes, the Americans came to terms with the Russians f i r s t , achieving a satisfactory ten year convention by April S> 1824, that set 54°40f north l a t i -tude as the southern limit of Russia's territory. Since B r i -tain had admitted the United States to an equal say in deciding sovereignty in lands west of the Rockies, i t was virtually inevitable that the Russian negotiators would succeed in back-ing the English down to conform to the American agreement, for the Russians were anxious to obtain enough of a coastal strip to serve as a protective barrier between the Russian American Company and the approaching operations of the Hudson's Bay Company. It was easy to argue that England's i n i t i a l demands were unreasonable, as the main settlement of the Russian Ameri-can Company was situated at latitude 57°. After several months of hard bargaining, the English and the Russians concluded an agreement on February 16, 1825. Sir^Charles "Bagot, the chief Br i t i s h negotiator, succeeded i n having the boundary north of 59° moved from the one hundred and thirty-ninth meridian to the one hundred and forty f i r s t , and in establishing that the line supposedly to follow the crest of the mountains along the l i s i & r e should never exceed a distance of ten marine leagues from the sea.44 4*The absence of a single crest along the l i s i e r e led to a dispute over the interpretation of this clause between Canada and the United States at the turn of the century. 62 The over-all advantage from these conventions did not go to the Russians, as they both confirmed the annulment of the Tsar*s 1821 decree by o f f i c i a l l y opening a l l parts of the Paci-f i c Ocean i n the area to the subjects of a l l three powers for purposes of trade and fishing,^ 5 ^he only condition being that no citizen of either country would v i s i t places on the coast occupied by citizens of one of the other powers. This meant that the Company was deprived of any perspectives of expanding i t s operations even within the limits of the territory formally belonging to Russia. These conventions were concluded, as we have seen, at a time most favorable for exerting pressure on the Russian government, and resulted in the failure of Russian efforts to eradicate "smuggling" along the coast of the colony. The trea-ties of 1 8 2 4 - 2 5 marked the end also of Russia's hope for t e r r i -t o r i a l expansion in North America; and boded i l l for the colony at Ross, which was not mentioned in either document. Naturally enough, Russian American Company o f f i c i a l s in St. Petersburg tried to prevent the ra t i f i c a t i o n of the United States treaty unti l the very last moment. The poet Kondratii Ryleev, who served as office manager of the Company, tried to persuade the Minister of Finance that i f foreigners were to be given legal rights to compete alongside the Company at the very sources of i t s income, the result would be an intensification 4 5 i h e term "pSche" i n the original referring to aquatic animals as well as f i s h . 63 of hunting of fur-bearing animals and of trade with the natives that would in turn further estrange the natives from the Russ-ians, who could not pay equivalent prices. Ryleev indicated that round-the-world supply expeditions had already proved prohibitively expensive. The treaty with England also came under severe C r i t i c -ism, because of the ar t i c l e allowing foreigners to navigate the rivers in Russian territory freely and for a l l time. Dmitrii Zavalishin, among others, strenuously objected to i t s r a t i f i c a -tion, and when that fight was lost, put forth proposals designed to circumvent i t s provisions. He proposed that trading stations be established in a l l places suitable for commerce, so as to keep foreigners away from those areas, and that the Company at last send out large quantities of merchandise with which to undersell competition, so as to discourage the English and the Americans from exercising their rights. These suggestions were not followed, in part owing to the untimely involvement of several members of the Company exec-utive, including Ryleev and Zavalishin, in the abortive Decemb-r i s t uprising of December, 1825. Russian American Company i n -terests suffered through i t s implication in the af f a i r , for which Ryleev and others outside the Company paid with their l i v e s . 4 5 * In fact i t often happened that proposals were rejected simply because they were put forward by merchants. Okun quotes Zavalishin*s memoirs to show that Alexander I 45a Okun, Russian American Company, pp. 106 - 114. 64 was infuriated at the idea of the merchants trying to teach the diplomats, and ordered that the manager be reprimanded, saying that the merchants did not understand anything . . . . ° The reputation of the Company and the conduct of i t s policies were damaged in. the mid-twenties of the nineteenth century by another set of serious problems concerned with internal mismanagement of the Company's affairs . At the time of the treaties with the United States and Britain, discontent among the shareholders had been growing for several years, as a result of several factors. The Company practice of delaying the publishing of balance figures was i t s e l f a source of dis-trust. When reports were made available to the shareholders, they were misleading, for depreciation of equipment was often ignored, and income figures would be padded with nonexistent returns from expected sales. A principal grievance of the shareholders was that they had reason to believe that the directors worked more diligently for their own short term enrichment than for the general wel-fare of the Company. During the period 1808 to 1820 the Russ-ian American Company spent 2,317,318 rubles on supplying and maintaining the colonies, while spending 4,696,364 rubles during the same period on the running of the main office i n St. Petersburg.47 Each of the directors received a salary of 15,000 rubles; the senior director, Mikhailo Buldakov, received Okun, Russian American Company, p. 113. Ibid., p. 67. an additional 10,000 rubles. It was alleged by one of the shareholders, Lobanov, in repeated complaints to the tsar, that at the most c r i t i c a l time for the Company's finances, each one of the directors received a bonus of 100,000 rubles. From 1822-1826 no dividends were paid out to the shareholders and no one would buy those shares which were offered for sale The situation deteriorated to the point where at the general meeting of the Company in March, 1825> the director Benedict Kramer would not appear to sign the balance sheet for 1822-23 and subsequently was forced to resign. One of Kramer's exploits as a Company director i s described by Okun:49 When i t was decided in 1821 to send out the usual round-the-world expedition, the purchase of the ship was entrusted to the firm of the Kramer brothers, at the head of which was the director of the Company V. Kramer. Upon procuring the "Yelena" for the Company in the United States, Kramer was, f i r s t of a l l , paid a commission amounting to 6 per cent of the cost of the vessel. Not only that, but, when i t had already become known that the "Yelena" was on i t s way and would arrive in Kronstadt in the near future, Kramer purchased another boat for the Company, the "Yelizaveta", a vessel that was known to be completely unseaworthy. The "Yelizaveta" had belonged to an insolvent debtor of Kramer's. The director acquired the half-rotted ship for the Company at a cost of 30,000 rubles. Then he put the amount of the debt i n his pocket, and the Company was forced to spend 70,000 rubles addi-tional in repairs on that "acquisition" . . . . 4 8 I b i d . , p. 71. 49ibid. 66 Only one of these two ships ever set out, and i t made i t s way only as far as the Cape of Good Hope, where the cargo was sold at a loss. Indications of some of the complaints against the dir-ectors are also to be found in the hitherto unpublished letter of January, 1820 from Fedor Startsov, nephew of the former Director of Siberian and American Affairs, to Count Nikolai Mordvinov, the head of the Department of C i v i l Affairs of the State Council, Member of the Finance Committee, and former Navy Minister. This letter was among the documents found in 1957 in Krasnoiarsk with part of the Gennadii Yudin archive, which has since been transferred to the Central State Archives for Ancient Documents in Moscow.$® When I was in St. Petersburg i n 1816 I had the pleasure to be with Your Excellency i n the. head offices of the Russian American Company at the general meeting of the shareholders, where the subjects under discussion were the capital balance for that year and the proposal to return to our family 18 shares, which however, the Board of Directors decided to keep within the control of the company. Our family had already for many years dedicated ourselves solely to the good of the company, both with financial sacrifices and with personal services, particularly by my late uncle i n the course of his seven year absence as Director of Siberian and American Affairs. In this, Your Excellency, the following can bear witness: His Grace Count Nikolai Petrovich Reza-nov (!) and His Excellency Ivan Andreievich Veide-meier, and to a greater degree one of the f i r s t directors of the Company, Mikhail Buldakov, who 50startsov, F. P., Letter to N. S. Mordvinov . . . , January, 1820, Central State Historical Archives, Leningrad, Mordvinov Archive 994, index 2, item 835. i s aware of a l l our participation from the very beginning of the establishment of this company. Thus I, also being in equal measure motivated by the same feelings, have already with indefatigable efforts obtained profits from the company approach-ing 200,000 rubles, for which in 1809 I received personal recognition from the directors. And i f you yourself deign to hark back to the time when American and Siberian affairs directly depended on my late uncle's management, you w i l l clearly see that from the time of his death even the profits from reliable and detailed capital inven-tories have ceased, and we have been l e f t for almost ten years completely without profit, and the expectation of sure benefits and those so great privileges which our August Monarch saw f i t to bestow have cost many families their last possessions. (Especially I refer to) the lowering of the Company's credit by those managing i t , which has resulted in the f a l l in value of a share to 200 rubles. As securities they are accepted for no more than 150 rubles, while the crown treasury refuses to accept them at a l l . In this I dare to ci t e myself as an example, Your Excellency; for having had more than 300 shares, for which I had personally sacrificed myself and a l l my wel-fare, yet with a l l our sources of income and expenses we have not been able to retain more than 40. A l l this, according to my twenty-year long observation, can be attributed to the elections of directors, because of the previous ones there re-mains only one, Mr. Buldakov, who was chosen by the class of original shareholders who had found appreciable advantage in joining with the original Shelikhov mass of shareholders. But now they are chosen only by their personal merit, and even from the ranks of foreigners, as i f there were not enough merchant families in Russia . . . when Germans and Greeks began to have a say in manage-ment after 1805, the company began to wither. • • • • • • • • • • I do not wish to burden you with a history of our family's long company service - I shall turn to the Kiakhta trade as my main theme. From long observation and experience I can say that in this trade we lose considerable profits every year from the fact that a l l Chinese goods from the time of the restoration of the trade have changed in an unbelievable manner in weight, measure, and qual-it y , and we pay not only with our best goods, but in greater quantity than ever before. As an 68 example - the foreign cloth manufactures known by the name "oilcloths", received mainly for si l v e r and gold, were at f i r s t eagerly bought by the Chinese at the rate of a chest of tea for 16 arshins^l of cloth. Now we have to pay 30 arshins of cloth for one chest of tea; besides this there are many other losses, so that i t may be said that in general i t i s a rare trader in Kiakhta that i s not losing at least 30$ on the ruble. . . . F. P. Startsov Moscow, January 5> 1820. Irkutsk Meshchanin. While this letter shows by the reference to the long-deceased Rezanov that the writer was not very acquainted with some aspects of Russian American Company activities, his letter does testify to the lack of confidence prevalent i n a company which had not distributed dividends for several years. It i s very lik e l y in view of the laxity of the directors in issuing finan-c i a l reports that Startsov's criticisms of trading practice in Kiakhta had considerable validity. Beset by financial d i f f i c u l t i e s , discontent amongst the shareholders, and government disfavour for i t s involvement in the Decembrist uprising, the Russian American Company was in no position to offer any effective opposition to the damaging treaties with Britain and the United States or to provide any alternative to continued dependence on v i s i t i n g traders for supplying the colony i n Alaska. Only a company with a very healthy economy or strong government support could have afforded to invest the necessary capital in large supply expeditions, 5lQne arshin equals 2.33 feet. 69 either by land and sea across Siberia and the Pacific, or by sea via the Cape of Good Hope. Although the treaties marked the end of Russian expan-sion on the North American continent, the area used by the Russian American Company did now enjoy undisputed legal status, and was s t i l l a land rich in furs and other undeveloped re-sources. There was yet hope that the Company, through sounder business practices and a more plentiful supply?of quality trad-ing goods could consolidate i t s hold on the territory and be able to compete effectively with foreign traders. With more settlers, a more diversified economy could be developed to put the company on a firmer base. Without basic changes, the Russian American Company could not hope for long to keep the territory under i t s jurisdiction under Russian control. The effect of the international situation would again be crucial, as the company could not afford to be used again as a pawn to gain Russian government objectives elsewhere. New dangers and new opportunities were presented by the approach by land of the traders of the Hudson's Bay Company. We shall now turn our attention to the trading relations of the Russian American Company with the Hudson's Bay Company, and the effect of the latter's activities on Russian trade with foreign ships in Novo Arkhangelsk. CHAPTER VI THE HUDSON'S BAY COMPANY UNDERMINES AMERICAN TRADE IN SITKA, 1821 - 1837 By the mid-twenties of the nineteenth century a second major fur-trading enterprise had extended i t s acti v i t i e s almost to the point of contact with the commerce of Sitka, hitherto enjoyed solely by the Russians and the Americans. The English, through the Hudson's Bay Company, which had amalgamated in 1821 with the r i v a l North West Company, were extending their trade northwards and westwards in an effort to hold off Russian expansion. As early as 1814 the North West Company had attempted to enter the Canton market with i t s furs. In the years 1814> 1815, and 1816 that company sent out the Isaac Todd, the Columbia. and the Colonel Allen with trading goods to the Columbia River. After discharging the goods for Fort Van-couver the vessels loaded North West Company furs to be sold i n China. However each of these attempts resulted in financial loss, owing to the refusal of the East India Company to permit the vessels to s e l l their furs for Chinese goods to be taken back to England. Later, in the period 1817-21, the North West Company sold some of i t s furs in Canton through the Perkins firm of Boston. Thus even before any direct mutual dealings with the Russians, the British had begun to compete for a share in the sale of North American furs in Canton. 71 As to the Hudson's Bay Company i t s e l f , only one party of i t s traders, that of Joseph Howse in 1810-11, had crossed the Rocky Mountains before 1821. However, the amalgamation of the Hudson's Bay Company in that year with the enterprising North West Company brought under i t s management several posts which had already been established west of the mountains: Fort McLeod on McLeod Lake ("Babine Fort") founded by Simon Fraser i n 18053 Fort St. James on Stuart Lake and a fort on Fraser Lake, both built in 1806, Fort George, at the junction of the Fraser and the Nechako, built in 1807; Fort Alexandria near the junction of the Fraser and the Thompson Rivers, and several posts in the vicinity of the Kootenay and Columbia Rivers. The enlarged company now turned i t s attention with renewed vigour to the territory west of the Rockies, particularly as that territory, by the agreement of 1818, had been given the status of joint occupancy between the Americans and the British. It was urgent to head off the Americans in order for the English to control as large a part as possible of the land certain soon to be in dispute. At the same time, however, the Russians were advancing bold claims to vastly increased maritime jurisdiction along with coastal territory down to latitude 51°. Instructions issued by the Governor and Committee in February, 1822, assumed that eventual settlement of the t e r r i t o r i a l question would favour the side with the most actual settlement rather than the most ambitious formal claims. The returns from the north-ward expansion were not expected to be great, but ". . . the Russians are endeavoring to set up claims . . . as low as 72 Latitude 5 1 , and we thank i t desirable to extend our trading posts as far to the West and North from Frazer fs River i n 52 Caledonia, as may be practicable." In September, 1822, the Chief Factors of the Hudson's Bay Company west of the Rockfes, John Haldane and John Dugald Cameron, were further instructed by the Governor and Committee "to ascertain the number and tonnage of the Russian Vessells that have appeared on the North West coast in the neighbourhood of the Columbia; and whether 53 the Russians have made any fixed establishments . . . ."-^ Expansion of the fur trade would, i t was hoped, divert furs away from the Russians: ". . .we depend on your strenuous exertions to secure the Fur Trade to Great Britain by your l i b e r a l i t y to and kind treatment of the natives."-* 4 Hudson's Bay Company o f f i c i a l s in London recognized that Russia's " . . . vast plans of aggrandisement & extension of Country . . , may be within range of pos s i b i l i t y . " ^ ^ The rivalry between the companies was at this stage principally t e r r i t o r i a l in nature. Although both companies were sel l i n g beaver i n Russia, the amount sold there by the 5 2 E . E . Rich, ed., Minutes of Council Northern Depart-ment of Rupert Land. 1821-31. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1940, p. 303. 5 3 I b i d . . p. 3 3 5 . 5 4 I b i d . . p. 336. ^^Unknown person to John Lock, 1823, London, in E. E. Rich, ed., Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947, p. 129. 73 Hudson's Bay Company was small, and the most important furs obtained along the coast of the Alaska panhandle were s t i l l seal and sea otter pelts. Moreover the Hudson's Bay Company had only just begun to hunt beaver in the area west of the Rockies, a region that was s t i l l separated from the coast by mountain ranges and hostile Indians. The Hudson's Bay Company was interested in the coast primarily to obtain an access route to the sea for interior furs. Hudson's Bay Company plans for closing the gap between i t s own posts and the Russians were not implemented at once, primarily because at that time the main competitor for t e r r i -tory west of the Rockies was not the Russians, but the Ameri-cans. The Americans presented a continent-wide challenge which now focussed on the land west of the Great Divide. The t e r r i -tory west of the Rockies had only just come under the control of the Hudson's Bay Company. Consequently, the Governor of the Northern Department, George Simpson, considered i t essential for him to survey company act i v i t i e s and establishments in the Columbia region personally before i n i t i a t i n g new policies for consolidating presently controlled territory i n the face of American expansion, or for setting up more trading posts in the direction of the Russian American Company. After his v i s i t of l824-25> Simpson found that there were serious shortcomings in the organization inherited from the North West Company, and instituted reforms which he believed could result in doubling profits for the region. An indication of the severity of his criticism and the ruthlessness of his reforms i s given by the 74 fact that forty-nine of the one hundred and thirty-six staff personnel in the Columbia Di s t r i c t were dismissed and their jobs eliminated at the very time when expansion was urgently contemplated. Simpson also concluded from his v i s i t to the Columbia Department that the Russian trade was "highly vulnerable." Much more urgent was the need for the Hudson's Bay Company to act quickly and effectively to retain i t s control of the Colum-bia basin. Alternatively, on the chance that American claims were to be acknowledged by the British Government, the company had to prepare a second line of defense by establishing a major trading and goods depot to the north, on the lower Fraser River. Fur hunting was now to be concentrated in the Snake River area, so as to undermine American opposition there and at the same time to exhaust the supply of fur-bearing animals to the extent that the Americans would not find the area profitable should they obtain i t through negotiations. Despite this concentration of company activity in the south, Simpson hoped to obtain a share of the coastal trade by means of the ship William and Ann which arrived in the Columbia in April, 1825. However, Captain Hanwell proved to be unco-operative, and the ship had d i f f i c u l t passage and did not man-age to get any further north than the mouth of the Fraser. More might have been done at an earlier date to expand company activity northwards i f Governor Simpson had carried out his plan to return to the Columbia i n 1826. He was obliged to postpone his second journey owing to his appointment as Governor of the Southern Department. 5° For some time Simpson was busily-occupied with putting the business of the Southern Department in order and was further held up by floods on the Red River. Simpson did not return to the west coast until the autumn of 1 8 2 8 . During his absence he had been influential in leading the B r i t i s h government to break negotiations with the United States in 1826 over partition of the Oregon territory. The stalemate had resulted i n an indefinite renewal of the 1818 joint occupancy arrangement. In anticipation of possible negotiations on the Colum-bia, Simpson was instructed in 1828 to secure as ample an occupation of the country as possible - to the south, as well as the north of the river - for bargaining purposes. Not until 1 8 2 8 - 2 9 did George Simpson focus his attention and that of the Hudson's Bay Company on New Caledonia, the coastal trade, and 17 the Fraser River. ' Nevertheless, John McLoughlin, the Chief Factor of the Columbia Distr i c t , had maintained a l i v e l y interest i n the coastal trade after the f i r s t v i s i t of Captain Kelly of the American brig Owhvhee to the northwest coast in 1 8 2 5 . McLaugh-l i n learned from Kelly that the mouth of the Nass River was a 3 The Southern Department included a l l territory east of a l i n e roughly joining Rainy Lake in the south west corner of present-day Ontario with the center of the Hudson's Bay coastline of that province. Territories west of that li n e formed the Northern Department. 57 New Caledonia was the name given by the Hudson's Bay Company to the Department roughly encompassing the area west of the Rockies between latitudes 50 and 59 degrees. 76 very busy trading place, which very l i k e l y was located near the outlet to an inland water route. Poor quality ships and insub-ordinate captains caused the delay of plans for investigating the Nass until the arrival of Lieutenant Aemilius Simpson, a relative of the governor, in 1 8 2 6 . He had been selected to take charge of a ship ordered from England for the coastal trade. Lieutenant Simpson proved to be much more cooperative, being a clerk in the company and thus having a direct interest in the fur trade. His ship, the Cadboro. did not arrive until mid-1827, however. The f i r s t step McLoughlin's programme took for gaining control of the coastal trade was to establish a post at the mouth of the Fraser. On his f i r s t coastal voyage Aemilius Simpson helped establish Fort Langley on the lower Fraser River, after charting part of the Columbia. However, a shortage of goods in 1827 prevented the Cadboro from being outfitted for a trading voyage. The next year Lieutenant Simpson led a trading expedi-tion northward along the coast. Its main accomplishment was to obtain knowledge of the coast and i t s commerce, as the American traders had got there ahead of him that year. Although Lieutenant Simpson's report on the coastal trade has not been found, the Governor's letters indicate that the report made clear the desirability of making some arrange-ment with the Russians. Simpson reported that the coastal trade was less i n volume than had been supposed: the Americans obtained only about six hundred sea otters annually and about 77 six thousand beaver and land otters, the land furs being for the most part brought from the northern inland regions of New Caledonia to Nass, at the mouth of the Nass River. There the Indians, well supplied with s p i r i t s , guns, and ammunition, were numerous and h o s t i l e . ^ Having discovered by his own experience i n 1828 that the Fraser River was not suitable for inland transport, Gover-nor George Simpson decided, in view of his cousin's report, that the Hudson's Bay Company should set up a strong post at Nass in order to cut off the Americans from their source of furs and enjoy, hopefully, a good inland communication route by way of the Nass River. Such a post, in conjunction with well-organized shipping, was expected to drive the Americans from the coastal trade within two or three years. George Simpson stated in his report on his journey of 1828-29 that the country up to latitude 54° was undoubtedly valuable. More-over, the British had a right to i t by the 1825 convention, as well as access from the coast to the northern part of New Caledonia by rivers flowing through Russian territory.^ 9 Simpson was already making plans for Hudson's Bay Company to take over the Americans* business with the Russians at Novo Arkhangelsk. The company would s e l l the Russians manufactured E . Rich, The Hudson's Bav Company. 1670 - 1870 . vol. II: 1763 - 1870 , London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1959 , p. 615 . 5 9 E . E . Rich, Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, p. 8 1 . 78 goods from England, and grain and meat produced at Fort Vancouver. Simpson intended to send the Cadboro and the William  and Ann, which was expected shortly from England, to the north; the Cadboro would supply the Fraser River post, and the other would v i s i t the Russians at Novo Arkhangelsk, after which they would investigate the Nass River together in order to choose a site for a post. During the winter they would load lumber in Fort Vancouver and transport i t south for sale in Hawaii and along the coast as far as Chile. These plans were to be put into effect during 1829 and 1 8 3 0 . However, in March 1829 a pair of American trading ships sailed to the Columbia and began cutting into Hudson's Bay Com-pany trade by charging very low prices for manufactured goods. Shortly afterwards came the news that the William and Ann had been lost together with her whole crew. Plans were further postponed i n the next year, 1 8 3 0 , when the special additional ship the Committee had purchased, the Isabella, was also lost, although the men and cargo were saved. The same year, an out-break of malaria in the Columbia region slowed work down considerably. Meanwhile Governor Simpson had taken another step to-wards depriving the Americans of the benefits of trade with the Russians. In March, 1 8 2 9 , Simpson sent a letter to the governor of the Russian colony in Novo Arkhangelsk by way of Aemilius Simpson, who sailed north in the Cadboro in August of that year. The letter began by expressing the desire of the Hudson's Bay 79 Company to enter into mutually beneficial relations with the Russian American Company so as to prevent any "unfair rivalry and competition." Then Simpson presented his specific pro-posals: . . . we receive our supplies from the manufactur-ers direct on the most advantageous conditions. It having come to our knowledge that you have no regular and direct communication, and thinking that perhaps at times you may want some English goods, we are ready to furnish you annually with from 50 to 100 tons or as much more as may be necessary, upon receiving a moderate guarantee deposit for the f i r s t expenses and we w i l l be satisfied with a small p r o f i t . We, on our side, are willing to take furs at saving price, paying for them either i n b i l l s of exchange drawn on St. Petersburg or London, or in cash, as may be the most convenient to you . . . We also agree to furnish annually from 8000 to 10,000 hams and salt meats for a certain number of years at a f a i r price. Lieutenant Simpson w i l l give you the des-cription of goods which we order and, should they prove not suitable for your use, you have only to send us samples and exact descriptions of a l l the goods you desire, mentioning the price and the mode of payment you offer. We, for our part, w i l l not leave you in ignorance as to next year, i f we agree to your offers . . . .°® On Simpson's advice, the Hudson's Bay Company head office in London followed up this conciliatory proposal with a similar letter to the Board of Directors of the Russian American Com-pany in December of 1829. In l i n e with the Hudson's Bay Company's overall plan, Aemilius Simpson sailed north from the Columbia again in 1830, now bearing the t i t l e "Superintendent of the Marine Department." 60Alaska Boundary Tribunal: The Case of the United  States. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903, p. 260. 80 He looked for a suitable site for a post on the Nass while trading with the local Indians. After leaving Nass, Simpson met vigorous competition i n the presence of several American ships, which he managed to challenge successfully only through the use of sp i r i t s i n his trade. It would seem at f i r s t glance that the Russians could have been expected to seize the opportunity presented by the Hudson's Bay Company proposal to r i d themselves of the Ameri-cans upon whom they had depended for such a long time, and whose use of liquor and fire-arms in their trade with the "Russian" Indians had so long been aggravating Indian-Russian American Company relations. It was in the interests of both companies to cut off the supply of arms, ammunition, and sp i r i t s to the natives, as both companies had t e r r i t o r i a l claims and land posts, whereas the American freebooters did not. Moreover, the proposals promised to f u l f i l the longstanding needs of the Russian American Company. However, the Russian company was not to be hurried by the English reference to "next year." There are several rea-sons for the delays which followed the Hudson's Bay Company proposals. Governor Chistiakov did not have the authority to make such a decision on his own, and in any case, he was just about to leave the colony as his period of service was coming to an end. More important was the desire of the directors not to have to depend for v i t a l supplies on a company with whom relations could be broken owing to p o l i t i c a l strain between Russia and Britain. American captains had shown their willing-81 ness to come to Sitka regardless of the current attitudes of the United States government. Surprisingly, the directors of the Russian American Company were s t i l l not willing to admit, or had s t i l l not grasped the fact that the Company could not assure a reliable supply of food staples from Russia by land and sea. In their dispatch of March 21, 1830 to the newly-appointed governor, Ferdinand Wrangel1, announcing the British company's proposals, the directors begin by b e l i t t l i n g i n gen-eral terms the savings which might be achieved by accepting the proposal, and then go on in a curiously indecisive manner: . . . Nevertheless, the company, though not fore-seeing very interesting consequences from taking up the Hudson's Bay Company proposal, w i l l not completely reject i t . We shall propose to the Hudson's Bay Company that they supply the manu-factured goods that we need. If the Hudson's Bay Company agrees, and we agree to her terms and prices, then we may as an experiment send via that company next year a years proportion, and depend-ing on the circumstances, w i l l obtain more needed manufactured goods. Further increases w i l l depend on the situation and on the success of our f i r s t t r i a l attempt. We repeat that manufactured goods can be supplied profitably by the dry land route through Okhotsk. However, we have nothing to lose in establishing limited contact with the Hudson's Bay Company.61 Not until the spring of 1831, a year later, did the directors send any further instructions regarding the Hudson's 0 lBoard of Directors to Wrangell, Dispatch #240, March 21, 1830, p. 20, National Archives of the U.S.A., Microfilm Publications, Records of the Russian-American Company. 1802-1867, r o l l s 1 - 77.(Referred to from now on as "Records".) Letters cited from the Records are translated by the author. 82 Bay Company offer. Correspondence with their head office in London had confirmed that the Hudson's Bay Company would accept payment only i n furs according to current local prices. In answer to a lett e r from St. Petersburg inquiring about grain, the Hudson's Bay Company ignored the subject, while proposing that the Novo Arkhangelsk office take part of a shipment of goods recently sent from England to Fort Vancouver. Clearly the blame for s t a l l i n g should not rest on the Russian American Company alone, and i t i s understandable that this dispatch concluded pessimistically: . . . there i s no use to be made of their i n i t i a l proposals, and we should not count on receiving grain through the Hudson's Bay Company. 62 Nevertheless, the same lett e r gives Wrangell permission to make a deal with representatives of the Hudson's Bay Company, should a satisfactory offer be made, provided that payment for English goods be made in b i l l s payable i n St. Petersburg. Shortly after receiving this dispatch, Governor Wrangell was analyzing Simpson's intentions quite accurately i n a letter to the directors: the Hudson's Bay Company . . . wishes to do no more nor less than grasp into her own hands our trade as well, while demanding payment in furs.63 6 2 R u s s i a n American Company Board of Directors to Wran-ge l l , March 3 1 , 1 8 3 1 , #360, Records. 6 3Wrangell to Board of Directors, May 6 , 1 8 3 2 , #132, Records. 83 However, Wrangell warns that he w i l l have to depend on the Hudson's Bay Company i f relations with Americans are dis-continued, a distinct possibility in view of English competi-tion i n the straits near Sitka and the expiry of American rights i n 1834. At the same time, Wrangell already knew that the English company had f i n a l l y succeeded in establishing a post at Nass in Observatory Inlet: . . . That company has taken a firm step into the aforementioned i n l e t , at the place called Naze (s i c ) , their establishment being located in a well defended condition and their stores overflowing with necessary goods. They have gained the favour of the natives through generous gif t s to the chiefs and by treating them a l l flatteringly. This spring their company ship called i n at Kaigany (Puerto Cordova) for trade with the natives, where two Americans were already situated. Having goods of better quality than the Americans had to offer, their paying the same number of blankets as the latter ( i . e . 1 blanket per beaver) completely ruined their rivals* trade, and by their own testimony within a short time w i l l drive them out of competition. Mr. Simpson, who was in charge of the coast establishments made a survey of the northern inlets, f u l l y intending last year to found i n the southern outlet of Prince Frederick Sound (where the Stikine Indians are) a settlement far enough up the river flowing into the Sound so as hot to violate the provi-sions of the last Convention between Russia and England that refer to our boundaries. Although this enterprise has been put off for a time owing to the sudden death of Mr. Simpson, i t i s probably not for long, and within a year or two the English w i l l start up a post here as well, causing un- , doubted harm to our trading ties with the Kolosh. 4 °4lbid., #133 84 At this point Wrangell expresses very frank dissatisfaction with the supplies arranged by the Russian American Company directors. For the superiority in both quality and quantity of the English goods i s a magnet for the Kolosh, against which we have no means to compete,and there i s no doubt that i f the Board does not take measures to supply the colony with goods of suf-fi c i e n t quality and in sufficient quantity to counteract the Hudson's Bay Company, that company w i l l soon see i t s e l f in f u l l control of the fur trade of northwestern America from Cross Sound or even further north a l l the way to the coast of California. Here are the principal goods offered by the English: good blankets, Virginia tobacco, cinnabar, sewn dresses and shirts. In return they receive mainly beaver at the rate of up to 10,000 pelts a year; i.e. aside from other minor expense, the Hudson's Bay Company provides about 10,000 blankets a year, which i s the only large expense! I w i l l leave this for the Board to determine, ask-ing that you decide the question: should we and can we enter into competition with the Hudson's Bay Company? If I may be permitted to express my own opinion,it i s that i t seems to me that the Russian American Company should not have to stand by as a suffering witness to the ac t i v i t i e s of the English, but should take measures to resist them, which can be achieved only by supplying the colony with the requisite goods and plenty of them. Then we w i l l be able to v i s i t a l l the channels our-selves: but there i s no sense going with empty hands and being made a laughing stock when they discover our poverty. I hope that I have relieved the Board of the responsibility for sending grain from Okhotsk by supplying the colony with a two year supply myself, (I cannot f u l l y expect to repeat this in future); for this reason I think the Board can turn i t s resources and attention toward sending a large supply of goods. I repeat, that a l l the efforts of the Governor here to ex-tend our fur production through trade can enjoy no measure of success at a l l under the present short-age of goods, and, i f I may express i t this way, of our extreme stinginess in payment, for beads and rattles w i l l never attract the savages to trading, but their labour should be rewarded with something of material use: i.e. clothing. Of 85 course our percentage profit w i l l drop a l i t t l e , but afterwards the quantity of traded goods w i l l increase and instead of 5000 beavers we w i l l i n time be able to send twice as many. 65 The dispatches from the Board of Directors for 1832 report that no letters had been exchanged with the Hudson's Bay Company during the past year. However, Chief Factor Peter Ogden visited Sitka along with Aemilius Simpson that spring. Governor Wrangell and the Hudson's Bay Company representatives found that they had much in common against the Americans. They agreed on the need to refrain from trading dangerous items to the natives> and Ogden promised not to use liquor in his trade as long as others did likewise. Wrangell proposed that they set up a joint enterprise to oppose the Americans. He offered to buy a l l the wheat that was available from the Columbia De-partment, and to buy his supplies of manufactured goods from the Hudson's Bay Company. Payment for these goods and food-stuffs was to be made, according to the directors' instructions, in b i l l s payable at St. Petersburg, at prime cost only. Prob-ably Ogden knew that his company would never agree to these terms; in fact, Governor George Simpson would refer to the Russian counterproposal as "preposterous.?1 Ogden merely intimated to Wrangell that the Hudson's Bay Company would not l i k e l y i n s i s t on payment in furs. 6 5 l b i d . ^Rich, The Hudson's Bay Company, p. 625. 86 The Russian American Company directors soon found out from the Hudson's Bay Company in London that . . . the Hudson's Bay Company does not agree with Mr. Ogden and remains adamant not to l e t us have i t s goods except for payment in furs. We do not think i t necessary to repeat that this i s unacceptable. 67 Wrangell i s instructed to make purchases from the Hudson's Bay Company "only i f absolutely necessary" and only for b i l l s on St. Petersburg. As to the use of liquor in the fur trade, even where necessary i f unscrupulous American competition were to be effectively met, the directors in this letter are uncompromis-ing: Although the Americans and the English have violated the agreements about the sale of liquor, we need not follow their example. Such sale must not be permitted.68 Wrangell showed exasperation in his reply to this message, as his instructions on this matter had not been consistent: I consider i t my duty to beg the Board of Directors to c l a r i f y an important contradiction in dispatch #267, referring to the sale of arms and strong drink to the Kolosh, where i n one place i t says "we may not violate the convention by selling arms and s p i r i t s to the savages," but i n another place: "You are granted f u l l rights to s e l l the Kolosh not only strong drink, but also firearms and amunition." Likewise I was told in #258 not "'Russian American Company Board of Directors to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #258, Records. 6 8 I b i d . 87 to follow the example of the Americans and the English. Nevertheless, in dispatch #301 of 1832 I was given permission to s e l l liquor to the Kolosh. How am I to understand a l l this?69 A certain lack of coordination could be expected be-tween the colonial governor and his superiors, who were at least six months away by mail. However, an excessive lack of harmony i s evident in Wrangell*s relations with St. Petersburg. Not only on the liquor question was there unsatisfactory under-standing. The directors* reply to Wrangell*s request for men and goods in 1832 in order to compete with the English must have fallen far short of the Governor*s hopes. The urgent need for more Russian settlers was treated in a particularly casual manner: You asked for more men for new settlements, but you did not say how many men you need and for what purpose. We cannot say anything definite at this time. 70 The request for high-quality trading goods was turned down, the reason given being that even i f the Russian American Company had a greater supply to offer, the transportation cost would be double that for the goods brought to the northwest coast by the English. Financially the company was not in a position to i n -vest on a large enough scale to compete with the English. To convince Wrangell of this, the directors reminded him that the Novo Arkhangelsk office had ended the year 1831 with a loss of 69wrangell to Board of Directors, April 10, 1834, #79, Records. 7°Board to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #267, Records. 88 391,097 rubles, compared with a clear profit of 75,429 rubles in 1 8 2 5 . 7 1 One of the ways in which Governor Wrangell was instruc-ted to cut costs was by keeping his purchases from American ships to an absolute minimum. However, by this time Wrangell saw more danger to his company from the Hudson*s Bay Company than from the Americans, and until a sufficient alternative source of supplies was found by the directors, he was very reluctant to discourage his American vis i t o r s . Moreover, he was not convinced that the directors would carry out alterna-tive supply arrangements effectively: . . . So as to counteract the disadvantages here which prevent the Russian American Company from competing with the Hudson English, the Board of Directors intends to hire a ship in England to supply the colony with goods for the Kolosh . . . such a proposal pleases me greatly, but I shall be even more pleased when i t i s really implemented. It would be an oversimplification to consider the Russian American Company and the Hudson*s Bay Company to be equivalent examples of government-controlled monopolies pro-moting the t e r r i t o r i a l ambitions of the empires to which they belonged. The two companies differed both in their relations with their respective governments and i n the personalities of the men who governed and directed them. Wrangell*s relations 71lbid.. #268. 7 2Wrangell to Board, April 10, 1834, #79, Records. 89 with his company superiors i l l u s t r a t e some of these d i f f e r -ences. According to his correspondence with the directors, Wrangell always awaited approval for new projects and carried out instructions faithfully even while expressing serious doubts about the wisdom and even the consistency of the directors* policy decisions. Colonial leaders of the Hudson*s Bay Company, i n contrast, took more authority into their own hands. George Simpson took personal charge of company expan-sion northwards around 1829; only when his plans were already being carried out did he refer matters to London. In terms of i t s procedures, the Russian firm was more tightly bound to government management; after 1819 i t s governors were chosen exclusively from the ranks of Imperial Navy captains and i t s affairs were directly subordinated to the finance ministry, which exercised thorough control- of a l l i t s activit i e s . ' ° British companies exhibited more freedom from .government con-t r o l in the degree to which they were allowed to compete one against another, sometimes even to the detriment of the inter-ests of empire expansion, as in the refusal of the East India Company to allow the North West Company to s e l l i t s furs in Canton.74 As Wrangell was writing his letters to the directors in early 1834, he knew that a new and dangerous challenge to ' ^ J . S. Galbraith, The Hudson*s Bay Company as an Im-perial Factor. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957, P. 115. ?4Howay, OP. c i t . . (1933), pp. 119 - 120. 90 Russian trade was soon to come from the direction of the Hud-son's Bay Company. He had learned that the previous autumn Peter Ogden had sailed up the Stikine River in Russian t e r r i -tory in order to find a suitable site for a post to be located just inside the English frontier. In 1832 Ogden had denied rumours of such a plan knowing well that Wrangell would oppose the establishment of a post so close to the Russian boundary that many furs would be diverted away from the Russians. It was a d i f f i c u l t position indeed for Wrangell, as he had been denied a sufficient supply of trading goods from home or even the opportunity to buy in quantity from the Americans. More-over, according to the treaty of 1825, Britain had the right for a l l time to s a i l in the rivers and streams which passed through the l i s i e r e . 7 ^ Lacking any sure means of resistance, Wrangell decided that somehow he would have to prevent the Hudson's Bay Company from setting up a post on the Stikine. In his letter to the directors, he expresses the hope that any new treaty replacing the 1825 convention upon i t s expiry in 1835 would limit free s a i l i n g to the downstream direction - an unrealistic hope in view of the fact that the original clause guaranteed free s a i l -ing "for a l l time." In the meantime Wrangell vowed to "stop the English by force" i f they attempted to s a i l up the Stikine. 75xhe l i s i e r e . or coastal strip, comprised the territory running northwestward from latitude 54°40IN. to the line drawn between Cape Spencer at Cross Sound and Mount Fairweather. 'Wrangell to Board, April 28, 1834, #190, Records. 91 Instead of applying force directly, which would have been a clear violation of the 1825 treaty, Wrangell chose to create a situation which would either cause the Hudsonfs Bay Company men to turn around without setting up a post or would put the onus on them to force their way up the river. His method: to establish a small fort near the mouth of the S t i -kine. By one a r t i c l e of the treaty, neither side could land at a place occupied by the other without the permission of the resident commander. As visitors would be trading with the local Indians whether or not their vessel had actually put to shore, Governor Wrangell intended to take the broadest possible interpretation of the term "to land" in order to deny the Brit-ish permission to enter the river. He would attempt to stretch one a r t i c l e of the treaty far enough to circumvent the art i c l e guaranteeing free access to the interior. The Hudson1s Bay Company schooner Dryad arrived with Ogden and his men on June 18, 1834. While s t i l l several miles away from the newly established fort, Ogden was shown a procla-mation from Governor Wrangell notifying him that the provisions of the conventions had elapsed (which was not yet in fact the case), and that henceforth they would be barred from these waters. While the British had the right to navigate any rivers that crossed the l i s i e r e , they could not pass a post without the permission of the commander. After several days of strained discussions, made more d i f f i c u l t by the lack of competent interpreters, Ogden and his 92 men f i n a l l y departed. It i s highly probable that Ogden would not risk disobeying the Russian order primarily because of the manifest host i l i t y of the Stikine Indians.^ Although an armed Russian brig was present, correspondence between i t s captain and Novo Arkhangelsk indicates clearly that the use of force was not contemplated.78 Nevertheless, i t i s quite pos-sible, as Ogden was to charge, that Lieutenant Zarembo saw f i t to threaten to prevent the Dryad from anchoring in the river, by force i f necessary. There would seem to be l i t t l e basis for ChevignyTs contention that Wrangell wanted the British to force their way up the river, thereby giving the Russians an excuse to scrap the treaty entirely.79 This tactic would have been to Wran-gel l *s advantage only i f he had had a supply of provisions, trading goods and other needed equipment sufficient to enable the Russians to enter into open trading competition with the English. However, a dispatch from the directors not long be-fore had requested that Wrangell refrain from such open competition. o u 77Tompkins, Alaska, p. 153. 7 8Etolin to Lieutenant Zarembo, June 13, 1834, in Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Proceedings. Vol. II, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904, p. 270. 79chevigny, Russian America, p. 190. 8 oBoard to Wrangell, March 31, 1833, #267, Records. 93 The Hudson's Bay Company's claim for damages arising out of the "Dryad a f f a i r , " which amounted to 250,000 rubles, led to extended negotiations which served to delay action on proposals for cooperation in fur trading and the supply of pro-visions to Novo Arkhangelsk. The year 1834 might otherwise have been appropriate for the two companies to reach an agree-ment regarding supply, as the Russian treaty with the Americans terminated at that time. The Russians lost no time in barring American ships from shoreline waters in an attempt to reduce the liquor and arms t r a f f i c , but this ban was ineffective with-out adequate means of enforcement. As for arriving at an agreement with the Hudson's Bay Company, the Russians were understandably very cautious in the face of the vigorous ef-forts of the English to intercept the furs passing to the coast by way of the Stikine, a policy considered unfair i n view of the abundance of land controlled by the Br i t i s h further to the south. In his reply to the Hudson's Bay Company claim, the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Karl Nesselrode, made a damag-ing admission. He acknowledged that the authorities in the Russian settlements in Alaska had ". . . acted in a manner far from the intentions of the Imperial government . . . . It appears . . . the latter were mistaken in the interpretation and application of some of the stipulations of the treaty of 1825 . . . Nesselrode denied that threats had been made, 0J-Nesselrode to Durham, Dec. 21, 1835, Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Proceedings. Vol. 2, pp. 287 - 288. 94 maintaining that the British demand for indemnity was i n -applicable, Ogden having been prevented from ascending the Stikine through "an excess of prudence" rather than by threats of physical restraint. Meanwhile the colony lost one of i t s most vigorous governors with the departure of Ferdinand Wrangell at the end of his term in 1835. His successor, Captain Ivan Kuprianov, took over at a time when uninterrupted colonial leadership would have been desirable in safeguarding and promoting the Russian fur trade at a time when the British were approaching. On the other hand, a man with Wrangell fs intimate knowledge of colonial affairs could be of great benefit to the company in St. Petersburg, especially when negotiations were expected concerning the "Dryad Aff a i r . " Wrangell returned to Russia by way of Mexico, where he did his best to obtain the secession of a f e r t i l e valley adja-cent to the Ross settlement. The Mexican authorities expressed willingness to agree to the proposal, in return for o f f i c i a l recognition of the new Mexican regime. When in his verbal re-port to the tsar, Wrangell referred to the example of Prussia, which while o f f i c i a l l y refusing to recognize the new republic, had nevertheless concluded profitable trading agreements indir-ectly, Nicholas was quick to interrupt: "For Prussia, profits come before honour, but for me i t i s the other way round." °^Entsiklopedicheskii slovar 1, Vol. VII, St. Peters burg, Efron, 1892, p. 338. 95 Thus i t turned out that Wrangell had really nothing to offer to the Mexicans. Upon Wrangell*s arrival i n St. Petersburg, he was appointed to head the department which managed the supply of timber for naval ship-building. While this post was related to the problem of supplying the Russian colony in Alaska, i t was rather far removed from actual involvement in the manage-ment of the Russian American Company, where Wrangell's know-ledge of company problems could have been applied most effectively. The directors of the Russian American Company f e l t un-derstandably betrayed by Nesselrode's admission that they had been guilty of violating the 1825 treaty, continuing however to resist the almost certain outcome, free British navigation, by pressing for a counterclaim against the Hudson's Bay Company based on Ogden's admitted use of liquor in meeting American competition during the summer of 1832. The Hudson's Bay Company continued to press i t s advan-tage through diplomatic correspondence, while in 1836 the Coun-c i l of i t s Northern Department passed a resolution to proceed with plans for establishing a post on the Stikine from the 81 east. One way or another, the Hudson's Bay Company was de-termined to capture the fur trade of the Stikine area. Thus, when Chief Factor Duncan Finlayson came to Sitka in September, "'As early as 1834, J. McLeod had reached the head-waters of the Stikine River by an overland route. 96 1836 with attractive offers of grain and a request that free access to British territory be granted—proposals that would solve the Russian American Company supply problem while forcing the Americans out of the coastal trade—Governor Kuprianov was hard put to oppose him. Kuprianov knew well that the Americans could s e l l goods to the Indians at under cost prices only when they knew that they could cover themselves from sales in Novo Arkhangelsk. Kuprianov could not act unilaterally to accept the proposal, however, as any long term agreement would have to be made between London and St. Petersburg. Dependence on a single foreign company would be more risky than having the choice of several independently competing shipping firms. In any case, recent trade with American ships had furnished the colony with a two year supply of everything except tobacco, so there was for once no urgent need for provisions. Finlayson found out in Sitka that the Russian American Company had con-tracted for supplies with the single Boston firm that showed the least interest in engaging in the fur trade. This agree-ment inadvertently helped the British, as i t further undermined the profits to be made by other American visitors to the coastal s t r a i t s . The end of American trade in Novo Arkhangelsk was near. Finlayson and the Nereide were very effective in competing with the LaGrange and the Joseph Peabodv during the summer of 1836. Russian relations with the Americans were becoming more and more strained because of the continued violation of the ban on 97 the trade of liquor and arms to the Indians. The American sailors were trading as much of the latter on the sly as they could, restrained only by their need to ensure that the b i l l s issued to them for supplies be honoured in St. Petersburg. In 1836 the Russians began to take firm action by seizing the American ship Loriot. which was then ordered away under threats of force. This incident gave rise to l i v e l y protests within the United States. A diplomatic note from Count Nesselrode f i n a l l y disposed of the argument on March 21, 1838. The United States could not avoid a diplomatic rebuff at that time, and lost the right to s a i l in Russian waters. There was l i t t l e that could be done in any case, as the Hudson's Bay Company had already effectively undermined American trade with the natives along the northwest coast by reducing the price of goods for the natives when American ships were present, a tactic causing financial set backs which the relatively small shipping com-panies could not survive for long, dependent as they were on trade i n that one area. By the latter part of 1837, United States vessels no longer found i t profitable to v i s i t Russian America. The course of American trade in Novo Arkhangelsk during the f i n a l years i s shown i n the last section of Khleb-nikov' s table, which ill u s t r a t e s the frequency and extent ot Russian trade with American ships from 1826 to 1830.84 Less detailed data for the remaining years, 1831 - 1837, are taken principally from the correspondence of the Russian governors i n the Records and may not be comprehensive. 97a Year Ship Captain Price (piasters) 1826 Sultan Hammet Chinchilla Meek Tally Ho McGill 1827 Tally Ho McGill 17,550.55 19,092.40 2,873.30 Courier 7,462.61 14,875.00 for ship Cunningham 9,400.9 2 Active Cumming Treyton Bryant Chinchilla Meek 8,253.65 4,191.89 23,227.39 Diana Blanchard 28,108.68 1828 Sultan Allen 9,461.25 Washington Carter 5,650.87 1,345.87 Chinchilla Meek 15,514.60 1829 Herald Hammett 2,272.17 Volunteer Taylor 296.60 Plant Steele 7,031.50 Alabama Debrot 905.30 Mode of payment Price /pelt 10,000 seals & goods 10,778 seals 1,603 seals 4,264 seals 8,500 seals 5,000 seals & goods worth 4,716 seals 2,395 seals 10), 000 seals 9 materials worth 13,625 seals 4,000 seals 1,100 seals 400 seals & 80 poods copper 7,354 seals & goods 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.625 1,275.92 1.75 1.75 4,545.90 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 16.00 1.75 1,298 seals 1.75 materials 4,018 seals 1.75 410 f i r spars 84 Khlebnikov, op. c i t . , p. 100. 98 Year Ship Captain Price (piasters) Mode of payment 1830 Sultan Genseman 10,949.75 6,257 seals 1.75 Convoy Thompson 27.00 materials For the years 1831 to 1837, payment was made almost exclu-sively i n b i l l s of exchange payable in St. Petersburg rather than furs: 1831 Wm L i t t l e Diana Crusader Smirna Lama Bolivar-Liberator Crusader Diana 1832 Hamilton 1834 Diana LaGrange Peabody Bolivar-Liberator 1836 Peabody LaGrange Europa Diana LaGrange 1837 Hamilton Upon receiving Finlayson Ts report on his voyage of 1836, John McLoughlin, the Chief Factor of the Hudson's Bay Company in Fort Vancouver, became convinced that the trade of the whole northwest coast would soon f a l l into British hands. Kuprianov's guardedly encouraging response of Finlay-son's proposals and the likelihood that the Americans would soon decide to quit the fur trade lent weight to McLoughlin's conviction. In order to preserve Russian good w i l l in the Carter 907.69 (English) Jones 12,618.00 J. Meek 2,123.00 Barker 14,657.41 McNeill 4,090.15 Underwood 5,583.48 Isaacs 12,888.13 L i t t l e - 14,000.00 Barker 41,314.41 Snow Moore ) 14,932.19 Moore 6,768.81 Snow 8,646.99 Benton) R , (both ships owned by Carter) 504.43 M r # F r e n c h of Boston) Snow 2,367.89 Barker 40,408.69 99 meantime, he ordered his officers to respect Russian t e r r i -t o r i a l rights. At the same time, however, he requested per-mission from London to renew the Stikine venture. McLoughlin's optimism was well founded. While the Americans step by step were dropping out of the coastal trade in 1837, British returns were good, despite t r i b a l wars and a serious outbreak of smallpox among the natives. By this time there was no point in continuing to bar Brit i s h passage into the lower Stikine, as the men of the Hudson's Bay Company were penetrating the region from another direction. In 1838 Robert Campbell was sent from the east side of the coastal mountains to renew the Hudson's Bay Com-pany's attempt to set up a post on the Stikine. Consequently, Governor Kuprianov informed John McLeod, a Hudson's Bay Com-pany representative whom he encountered on a voyage to Ca l i -fornia during the summer of that year that the British might in future use the river without hindrance. The Hudson's Bay Company continued to press i t s claim over the Dryad incident, however, as the Russian American Company maintained i t s efforts to solve i t s basic problem of supply. Both of these outstanding issues were fi n a l l y resolved by a general agreement arrived at in February, 1839, which i n -cluded the lease of the Alaskan l i s i e r e . The lease agreement and i t s significance are discussed in the following chapter. CHAPTER VII THE LEASE OF THE LISIERE. 1839 On February 6, 1839* an agreement was signed in Hamburg by George Simpson and Ferdinand Wrangell which f i n a l l y settled the Dryad affair while guaranteeing the colony a steadier supply of goods to replace that which until 1837 had been furnished by the Americans. By the terms of the agree-ment, the Russians ceded the l i s i e r e for a period of ten years from June 1, 1840. The British were to take over the Russian post at the mouth of the Stikine and could build their own posts, which would be turned over to the Russians on the ex-piration of the ten year term. The Hudson1s Bay Company would pay an annual rental of two thousand land-otter skins, and would s e l l the Russians a quantity of up to two thousand addi-tional land-otters from the west side of the Rockies at 23 shillings a skin and up to three thousand land-otters a year from east of the mountains at 32 shillings a skin. Further, the British agreed not to trade furs on the islands off the coastal strip or on the Russian territory to the north. The Hudson's Bay Company undertook to supply two thousand fanegas of wheat (one fanega equals one hundred and twenty six pounds) in 1840 , and four thousand fanegas annually thereafter. Flour, beans, barley, ham, salt beef and butter were to be supplied at fixed prices. Payment for goods was to be made in b i l l s of exchange drawn on St. Petersburg. Finally, the Hudson's Bay Company renounced i t s claim over the Stikine incident. 101 The lease has been described as a triumph for Wrangell personally and as a windfall for the Russian American Company. Tikhmenev writes: The results of the negotiations f u l f i l l e d the expectations of Baron Wrangell that Mr. Simpson would be prepared to back down in many areas so that friendly relations between the companies could be maintained. Having personally governed the domain of the Hudson's Bay Company for many years, he (Simpson) knew what an advantage the Russian American Company enjoyed over the English-men in areas of contact, and consequently could not help but be afraid of giving the Russian a pretext to act in their turn to the detriment of his countrymen. -> Some Western historians have also chosen to emphasize the advantages of the lease for the Russian American Company. Davidson, for example, states that The Russian American Company considered i t advan-tageous, because i t allowed them to forget the threat of American competition, avoided occasions for hostile collisions with the Hudson's Bay Com-pany and solved some of i t s major problems of provisioning, supplies, and marketing.®6 As to the primary motivation for the lease, North American scholars have generally held to the view that com-mercial considerations were foremost. John S. Galbraith "^Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe obozrenie, vol. 1, p. 267. 86 Davidson, D. C. "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Com-pany with the Russian American Company on the Northwest Coast 1829-1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly. 5, No.l P. 49. 102 maintains that "there i s no reason to suspect that the agree-ment was dictated by p o l i t i c a l considerations." 87 A close examination of the available documents suggests that each of the foregoing conclusions i s misleading. Let us now return to I838 to trace the development of the lease agreement. The seemingly endless diplomatic correspondence over the Dryad af f a i r had continued to drag on into I838. Count Nesselrode had succeeded in drawing out the argument over the incident, f i r s t by contending that Peter Skene Ogden had de-cided against entering the Stikine on account of native h o s t i l -i t y rather than the Russian prohibition, and later by c i t i n g alleged earlier British violations of the 1825 treaty. Meanwhile the Hudson's Bay Company was renewing i t s efforts to conciliate the Russians and woo them with offers of quality goods. The general features of Simpson's proposals had been well known ever since his letter of 1829, in which he had offered to provide goods of high quality for the express purpose of putting down unfair rivalry from the Americans, but for reasons already outlined i n this paper, action had been long delayed. Suspicion of British motives, indecisiveness on the part of the directors, and, most of a l l , the hope of find-ing a reliable alternative to dependence on any foreign source had postponed ultimate decision on the problem. The Hudson's 0 /Galbraith, The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial  Factor, p. 154. 103 Bay Company's continued optimism was encouraged by Finlayson's v i s i t to Novo Arkhangelsk in 1836. In March, I838, George Simpson described the prospect of arriving at a trading agree-00 ment as "more than probable." Later that year George Simpson together with John Pelly, the Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company in London, having grown impatient of further delay, decided to try to hasten the conclusion of an agreement by travelling to St. Petersburg themselves to enter into direct talks with the directors of the Russian American Company. They arrived i n St. Petersburg on August 27, but i t was not until August 31 that they were able to arrange an interview with the board of directors. The directors showed much inter-est, but seemed evasive, informing Pelly and Simpson that they could not make any f i n a l decision until the arrival of Ferdi-nand Wrangell, who according to Galbraith had "apparently 8Q become the most powerful member of the board." y Similarly, E. E. Rich writes that "questions of trade were closely con-trolled by Baron Wrangell." i n fact Wrangell was only just returning to Russian American Company activity in September, I838, as i s shown by a letter which he wrote to the directors of the company after the talks with Simpson and Pelly had already commenced. That the directors were unwilling to act Simpson to Gentlemen Chief Factors and Chief Traders of Columbia and New Caledonia, March 7, 1838, Doc.4/23, Hud-son's Bay Company archives as cited in Galbraith, oj>. ext., p. 151. 89 Galbraith, op_. ext., p. 151. Rich, History of the Hudson's Bay Company, p. 650. 104 without him even before he had actually joined the board t e s t i f i e s to a markedly low level of morale and a b i l i t y in the leadership of the Russian American Company. Wrangell's low opinion of the directors i s evident from his reaction upon being invited to become a member of the board. This letter, which i s to be found among the recently discovered part of the Yudin collection, i s evidently a reply to his appointment by the general meeting of shareholder's held on September 2 4 , 1 8 3 8 : . . . Now I should l i k e to suggest what the word "consultation" means to me. 1. I ask that affairs concerning the colonies be decided in absolutely no other manner than by by consultation with me. 2 . So that I w i l l be in a position to survey affairs in a l l their aspects, I would ask that a l l incoming colonial dispatches be brought to me for my examination, and that my signature be affixed to a l l outgoing documents in that sector. and 3 . With the same end i n view, that a l l papers of past years be made available to me as well.91 Wrangell's talks with the representatives of the Hudson's Bay Company were limited to the question of trade, as i t turned out that the issue of damages could not even be discussed without the participation of Count Nesselrode, the foreign minister, who was not in St. Petersburg at the time. Pelly proposed that the Russians agree for a term to purchase y*Wrangell to board, September 2 7 , 1 8 3 8 , Central State Historical Archive, Leningrad, Mordvinov collection ( 9 9 4 ) , index 2 , item 8 6 5 . from the Hudson's Bay Company the goods i t had been customar-i l y buying from the Americans, that the sale of arms, ammuni-tion, and liquor be forbidden, and that the two companies should confine their trade to their respective territ o r i e s . The American competitors would thus be deprived of their income and the two companies could operate profitably without f r i c t i o n . While not objecting i n principle, Wrangell strove hard to lower the wheat prices offered, maintaining that he could buy wheat on better terms from California. However, he was unsuccessful in this attempt, as Pelly had discovered that the Russians had refused to renew permission for the Americans to engage in the coastal tradea and had decided not to buy supplies from them in future. Nevertheless, Wrangell also held firm, and the talks had almost broken off before Pelly came up with a very attractive new proposal; to supply land-otter skins which the Russians needed for their domestic markets and for their trade with China. Normally the Russian American Company would have had to pay competitive prices and import duties on them. So attractive did this proposal appear at this stage to V/rangell that he brought up the idea of a lease, suggest-ing that the Hudson's Bay Company might lease the southern coastal area of the Russian colony i n return for a supply of land-otters. After Simpson had returned to London, he and Wrangell began an exchange of correspondence regarding the 106 possible details of such a pact. Virtual agreement was Q 9 reached by the beginning of December. In answer to the latte r message, Simpson suggested that remaining d i f f i c u l t i e s could quickly be overcome at a personal meeting between the two men before SimpsonTs return to Canada. On the government level, exchanges concerning the Dryad incident had continued, but the British government was becoming impatient. When Milbanke, the British rep-resentative in St. Petersburg, refusing to be led into further side issues, insisted on treating the Stikine affair on i t s own merits, 93 Count Nesselrode could not deny in the f i n a l analysis that the Russian authorities had indeed re-fused passage to the British into the Stikine, instead of issuing a protest after the fact, as they would have had every right to do under the provisions of the treaty. Close attention to the chronology of Russian government corres-pondence during 1838 indicates that Nesselrode had not merely run out of arguments, but was acting in accordance with direct orders from the tsar. In his letter 9 2Simpson to Wrangell, November 27, 1838, Doc. 4/25, HudsonTs Bay Company Archives, as cited in Galbraith, op. c i t . . p. 154; and Wrangell to Simpson, December 14, 1838, referred to in Alaska Boundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the  United States. Papers relating to the lease . . . , p. 4. 93 Mi lbanke to Nesselrode, October 6, 1838, Alaska Boundary Tribunal, Appendix to the Case of the United States, P. 304. 107 to the Minister of Finance, Count Egor Kankrin, on December 9, I838, Nesselrode reveals that as early as March of that year Nicholas had decided not to support the Russian American Com-i pany further in i t s dispute, and that the Minister of Finance, under whose control the company operated, had been so informed: . . . I consider i t my duty to refer to my report of March 19th in which I had the honour of inform-ing you, that His Imperial Majesty, after having duly considered the matter, was pleased to admit that i t would be more in accord with the rules of s t r i c t justice to admit the principles on which the claim i s based and to enter into negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company i n regard to the amount of the indemnification claimed by the Com-pany, rather than to continue a dispute, which we shall be obliged utlimately to give in to because the clear provisions of the treaty are not calcu-lated to strengthen the side we have defended until now.94c Count Kankrin would not have been l i k e l y to support the Russian American Company and may have influenced the tsar in this matter. Recent historians in America and the Soviet Union emphasize the conservative economic policies of Nicholas' Finance Minister h W. L. Blaekwell describes Kankrin's career as typifying ". . . the inconsistency, paralysis of w i l l , and lack of motivation in the industrial policy of the Russian state during this period" by his " . . . consistent refusal to divert any significant funds to industrial development."^ ^Nesselrode to Kankrin, December 9> 1838, Alaska Blundary Tribunal: Appendix to the Case of the United States. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1903, p. 307. *^A discussion of this revised view of Kankrin's 108 Nesselrode*s above-mentioned letter to Kankrin goes on to suggest that the Russian American Company should " . . . enter into friendly negotiations with the Hudson's Bay Company 96 for a settlement of the damage claims." John S. Galbraith concludes from this: "these were not the words of a man i n t i -mately acquainted with the progress already made by the com-panies themselves toward settlement of the dispute," and hence that the agreement was motivated solely by commercial consid-erations. 97 In this passage Galbraith i s endeavoring to refute Okun's contention that the agreement was primarily the result of the tsar's desire not to risk a diplomatic clash with Eng-land at a time when Russia was considering armed intervention 08 i n Turkey. Quite correctly Okun i s c r i t i c i z e d for his faulty chronology in stating that "precisely" at the time of the Simpson-Wrangell negotiations, "between August 1839 and July 1840," the Russian ambassador in London was trying to promote an understanding on the Straits question when i n fact the com-99 panies had reached substantial agreement long before this. Nevertheless until Nesselrode's le t t e r the issue of damages policies can be found in W. L. Blackwell, The Beginnings of  Russian Industrialization 1800-1860. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 140 - 144. 96AI aska Boundary Tribunal, loc. c i t . 97 Galbraith, op. c i t . . pp. 154 - 155. 980kun, pjDj. c i t . . pp. 218 - 219. 99oalbraith, op. c i t . . p. 450, n. 58. 109 had been avoided. This i s one indication that government intervention played a role in the negotiations. The argument that the lease was not primarily the result of commercial considerations can be supported by a more indirect line of reasoning. While the main features of the lease agreement had been worked out before the res-pective governments were o f f i c i a l l y consulted, i t i s important to bear in mind that agreements negotiated between rivals generally reflect the bargaining strength enjoyed by each side. Although both Wrangell and Simpson earned reputations as shrewd negotiators, the inferior bargaining power of the Russian American Company was largely determined by the tsarist government's decision not to give whole-hearted support to the company over the Stikine af f a i r . In contrast to the Russian company, the Hudson's Bay Company was in a very favorable situation in the late 1830s. Under confident, imaginative leadership and with reliable supply lines, the latter enterprise was continuing i t s advance to the north and west. As we have seen, the British company was planning to gain control of the coastal trade with the natives by an inland route to the Stikine region without waiting for formal permission should negotiations with the Russians prove f r u i t l e s s . Instead of the Russian American Company enjoying an advantage over the Hudson's Bay Company, as Tikhmenev, the company's o f f i c i a l historian optimistically described the situation, u u the real advantage was entirely on the other side. The advantages which the Russian American Company obtained from the lease—peace with the Hudson's Bay Company and a more reliable source of supplies—were more than over-shadowed by the fact that the Russians were now prevented from increasing their fur harvest from the l i s i ^ r e . Only through an increase in land furs could the Russians have off-set the steady depletion in fur seals, which were the most valuable fur resource in the marine areas s t i l l under Russian American Company control.1^"*" The lease of the panhandle was neither to the company's long term advantage nor were i t s causes s t r i c t l y commercial in character. 1 G 0Tikhmenev, op. c i t . . vol. 1, p. 267. 1 0 1Tikhmenev, op. c i t . . vol. 1, p. 239, 327; vol. 2, pp. 221. CONCLUSION Foreign trade, though small by comparison with the total turnover of capital, played an important part in the history of Russian American Company activ i t i e s in North America. Having started as a stop-gap emergency measure, i t continued while the company tried to find alternative means of supplying the colony from Russia or California. It was recognized from the f i r s t that commercial dealings with foreign visitors could cut costs tremendously. However, the directors of the company were continually suspicious of the dangers inherent in trading with prime rivals for the riches of northwestern America. There were two reasons for their apprehension. They considered that self-sufficiency would be desirable in case of strains in Russian-American or Russian-British relations. Secondly, they were aware that American ships, through their trade of arms, ammunition and liquor, were making inroads into Russian sources of furs while endan-gering Russian relations with the natives. Later the tactics of the Hudson's Bay Company, while eliminating the American abuses, gave rise to another danger—that the English would be able to divert furs from Russian coastal areas by means of trading goods of superior quality. It was the misfortune of the Russian American Company never to succeed in finding an alternative to foreign sources of supply. Various influences contributed to this result: the conservatism of government and company o f f i c i a l s , the stagnation of the Russian economy 112 as a whole, the serious mismanagement of the company's finan-c i a l affairs and Russia's position in international p o l i t i c s . In view of the foregoing circumstances, Baron Wran-gell 's bargaining position in the negotiations leading to the lease of the panhandle was weak. There would seem to be no other explanation for the fact that this energetic former governor of the Alaskan colony, who had been willing to risk violationsof the Russian-English treaty of 1835 by preventing the Bri t i s h from entering the Stikine, was by 1838, four years later, prepared to cede the whole panhandle. Without a doubt he was one man who with government support might have altered the fortunes of the company. But government support was lack-ing. If in addition we recall his frustration with the d i r -ectors while he was governor, his failure to persuade the tsar to consider dealing with the Mexican republican govern-ment to save California, and perhaps even his recent experi-ence running a government department, i t i s not surprising that he settled for immediate commercial benefits rather than continuing to pursue the dream of an independently prosperous Russian enterprise in North America. It may be objected that too much attention has been paid in this study to the internal problems of the Russian American Company, when in the end i t was Nicholas' decision to conciliate England that determined the outcome of the negotiations which regularized foreign trade. Whether supply from Russia to the colony was economically feasible cannot be 113 decided definitely on the basis of the limited data at our disposal. However, the answer does depend on the extent to which the government was willing to support the Russian Ameri-can Company. If the company had been efficiently managed and had avoided the taint of involvement in the Decembrist a f f a i r , i t s interests might well have received higher priority in the allocation of government resources. While this conclusion i s at best tentative, the relevance of internal aspects of the company's history should not be disregarded. The f i n a l decision to regularize trade with the Hudson's Bay Company signified that the Russians had given up hope of solving the supply problem. Foreign trade in Alaska took a new turn with the 1839 lease of the panhandle to the company's chief competitor. It was to be only a matter of time before other world powers would draw appropriate con-clusions from the evident Russian willingness to trade away control of territory in return for short-term benefits in the colony and favour with other governments. APPENDIX NOTES ON THE SOURCE MATERIAL The only primary source i n North America for this paper i s the Records of the Russian American Company. 1802- 1867 * which are kept in the National Archives of the United States of America, and are to be found in microfilm copy at several North American universities. These Records include the correspondence of the Russian American Company governors in Novo Arkhangelsk with the main office of the company in St. Petersburg and communications received from the Hudson's Bay Company. Several documents in Moscow and Leningrad State Archives proved to be useful, and considerable information has been obtained from the few valuable research works on the subject, especially that of P. Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoe  obozrenie . . . Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii (Historical Survey . . . of the Russian American Company), which contains much economic information not elsewhere available, as the author had access to the archives of the main office of the company, which disappeared later in the nineteenth century. As the Records have a gap lasting from 1802 to 1816, there has been a decided lack of knowledge about company acti v i t i e s during the period of the f i r s t company charter (1799-1819). Consequently, the discovery of the Istoricheskii  kalendar 1 Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii. 1747-1817 gg.. (Historical Calendar of the Russian American Company, 1747-1817) i s of great interest, as i t considerably c l a r i f i e s the economic position of the company during the f i r s t period. The existence of this document was known before i t s supposed discovery in 1957 (see page 43n.); however, i t has only re-cently received attention from Soviet scholars. Also important for i t s detailed first-hand informa-tion on foreign maritime trade in Alaska i s K. Khlebnikov's Zapiski o koloniakh v Amerike Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii. (Notes on the Russian American Company's American Colony), part of which was published in a supplement to Morskoi Sbornik (Marine Journal) in St. Petersburg in 1861-1862. The greater part of these notes i s presently located in manuscript form in the archives of the State Geographical Society in Leningrad. A concise general survey of significant archival and secondary sources in the Soviet Union i s given i n the preface to Professor S. B. Okun's Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia (The Russian American Company), the only f a i r l y comprehensive modern Russian work on the company, which deals with i t s role as an instrument of tsarist foreign policy. However, several of Okun's source references are out of date owing to the fact that Soviet archives have undergone reorganization in recent years, with some documents being transferred to different archives. For example, the documents cited by Okun in ANKh (Archive of the People's Economy) in Moscow and AVPK i B (Archive of Internal Politics, Culture, and Way of Life) in 116 Leningrad now form part of TsGADA (Central State Archive for Ancient Documents) i n Moscow, the former institutions having been superseded in the course of general reorganization. One addition which should be made to Okun's survey i s the small collection of papers dealing with economic aspects of company activity, discovered in Krasnoyarsk in 1957 among the papers of G. V. Yudin and since transferred to TsGADA. As to English language references on Alaskan history, particular mention should be made of the general works of H. H. Bancroft, H. Chevigny, and S. R. Tompkins given in the bibliography. Much information on Hudson's Bay Company history and relations between British and Russian fur companies i s to be found in the works of E. E. Rich, and the documents published in connection with the Alaska Boundary Tribunal of 1901 and the Fur Seal Arbitration of 1895. The latter government pub-lications are the only English language works which pay ade-quate attention to Russian sources. One of the main short-comings of modern scholarship in this f i e l d , both in the West and in the Soviet Union, i s failure to consult foreign language sources, resulting in the perpetuation of certain misconceptions, and ignorance as to recent discoveries. BIBLIOGRAPHY The following l i s t includes those works which have proven useful in the preparation of this paper, and i s not exhaustive. Section I: Government Publications Alaska Boundary Tribunal: The Case of the United States. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. Appendix to the Case of the United States. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1903. : Protocols. Oral Arguments. Award of the Tribunal. and Opinions of i t s Members. London, Harrison and Sons, 1903. Fur-Seal Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1895. Section II: Books Adamov, A. G. Po neizvedannvm putjam. Moscow, Gos. Uch.- ped, izd., 1950. . Perwe russkie issledovateli Aliaski. Moscow, Gos. Uch.- ped. izd., 1950. Afanasiev, D. Rossiisko-amerikanskaia vladeniia. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, 1864. Anderson, A. C. History of the Northwest Coast. Typewritten copy i n the University of British Columbia Library. (The original i s located in the Academy of Pacific Coast History, University of California.) 1878. Andreev, A. I., ed. Russkie otkrvtiia v Tikhom okeane i  severnoi Amerike v XVIII veke. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. L i t . , 1943. Andrews, C. L. The Story of Alaska. Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1938. 118 Bancroft, H. H. The History of Alaska. San Francisco, The History Company, 1886. . The History of British Columbia. San Francisco, The History Company, 1890. Barbeau, Marius. Pathfinders in the North Pacific. Toronto, Ryerson, 1958. Bellingsgauzen, F. F. Dvukratnoe izvskanie. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, 1831. Berkh, V. N. Khronologicheskaia i s t o r i i a otkrvtiia Aleutskikh  ostrov. St. Petersburg, Akad. Nauk, 1823. Caughey, J. History of the Pacific Coast. Los Angeles, Published privately by the author, 1933. Chernenkov, M. B. et a l . Puteshestviia i issledovaniia leitenanta Lavrentiia Zagoskina v Russkoi Amerike v  1842-1844 godakh. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. L i t . , 1956. Chevigny, H. Lord of Alaska. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1951. . Lost Empire. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1958. . Russian America. New York, Viking, 1965. Corney, P. Voyages in the Northern Pacific. Honolulu, Thrum, 1896. Del Mar, A. Money and C i v i l i z a t i o n . London, Bell & Sons, 1886. Efimov, A. V., ed. Atlas geograficheskikh o t k r v t i i v S i b i r i  i severo-zapadnoi Amerike s XVII po XVIII v. Moscow, Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1945. . Iz i s t o r i i velikikh russkikh geograficheskikh o t k r v t i i . Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. Ltd., 1950. Essig, E. 0. The Russians in California. San Francisco, California Historical Society, 1933. Galbraith, J. S. The Hudson's Bay Company as an Imperial Factor. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1957. Golder, F. A. A Guide to Materials for American History in  Russian Archives. Volumes 1, 2. Washington, Carnegie Institute, 1917, 1937. 119 Golovnin, V. M. Puteshestvie vokrug sveta . . . na voennom  shliupe "Kamchatke" v 1817. 1818. i 1819 godakh. Parts 1, 2. St. Petersburg, Morsk. Tipograf., 1822. Hulley, C. C. Alaska. 1741-19 53. Portland, Binfords & Mort, 1953. Innis, H. A. The Fur Trade i n Canada. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1962. Ivashintsova, N. Russkie krugosvetnve puteshestviia s 1803  DO 1849 g. St. Petersburg, Morsk. Tipograf., 1872. Khlebnikov, K. T. Zhizneopisanie A. A. Baranova. St. Peters-burg, Naval P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1835. Langsdorff, G. H. Voyages and Travels i n Various Parts of the World. (English translation.) C a r l i s l e , P h i l i p s , 1817. L i s i a n s k i i , Yu. A Voyage around the World i n the Years 1803. 4. 5. and 6 . ( E n g l i s h translation.) London, Booth, 1814. Lupach, V. S., ed. Russkie moreplavateli. Moscow, Ministerstvo Oborony, 1953. Lutke, F. P. Puteshestvie vokrug sveta na voennom shliupe  "Seniavin." 1826-29. Moscow, Gos. Izd. Geog. L i t . , 1948. Manning, C. A. Russian Influence on Early America. New York, Library Publishers, 1953. Markov, A. Russkie na Vostochnom Okeane. St. Petersburg. Dimitrieva, 1856. Markov, S. Letopis* A l i a s k i . Moscow-Leningrad, 1948. Materialv d l i a i s t o r i i russkikh z a s e l e n i i po beregam Vostoch-nogo Okeana. St. Petersburg, v Morskoi T i p o g r a f i i , 1861. Merk, F., ed. Fur Trade and Empire. George Simpson's Journal . . . 1824-25. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1931. Mordvinov, N. S. Arkhiv Grafov Mordvinowkh. v o l . 6. . Izbrannve proizvedeniia. Moscow, OGIZ, 1945. (introductory a r t i c l e by F. M. Morozov.) 120 Okun1, S. B. Russian American Company, trans. C.Ginsburg, Harvard, 1951. 0kunT, S. B. Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia. Moscow-Leningrad, Gos. Sots.- ekon. Izd., 1939. Ormsby, M. A. British Columbia; a History. Toronto, Macmillan, 1958. Pavlov, P. N., ed. K i s t o r i i Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii. Krasnoiarsk, Krasnoiarsk State Archive, 1957. Philips, C. H. The East India Company. 1784-18.14. Manchester, University Press, 1940. Pierce, R. A. Russia's Hawaiian Adventure. 1815-1817. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1965. Rich, E. E. The History of the Hudson's Bay Company. 1670- 1870. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1958. , ed. The Letters of John McLoughlin from Fort Van-couver to the Governor and Committee. First Series, 1825-38. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1941. . Simpson's 1828 Journey to the Columbia. London, Hudson's Bay Record Society, 1947. Shashkov, S. S. "Rossiisko-amerikanskaia kompaniia" in Sobranie sochinenii S. S. Shashkova. Book 4: Istoricheskie etiudi. St. Petersburg, 1898. Shemelin, F. Zhurnal pervogo puteshestviia rossiian vokrug  zemnogo shara. St. Petersburg, 1816, 1818. Slodkevich, V. S. Iz i s t o r i i otkrvtiia i osvoeniia russkimi  Severozapadnoi Ameriki. Petrozavodsk, Gos. Izd. KFSSR, 1956. Tikhmenev, P. Istoricheskoe obozrenie obrazovaniia Rossiisko- amerikanskoi kompanii . . . vol. I, II. St. Peters-burg, Weimar, 1861, 1863. Tompkins, S. R. Alaska. Promvshlennik and Sourdough. Norman, Oklahoma, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1945. Veselago, F. Kratkaia i s t o r i i a russkogo fl o t a . Moscow-Leningrad, 1939. Williams, W. A. American Russian Relations. 1781-1947. New York, Rinehart, 1952. Zagoskin, L. Peshekhodnaia opis'. St. Petersburg, 1847. 121 Section III: Periodicals Andrews, C. L. "Russian Plans for American Dominion," Washington Historical Quarterly. 18:83 - 92, 1927. Basanoff, V. "Archives of the Russian Church i n Alaska in the Library of Congress," Pacific Historical Review. 2:72 - 84, 1933. Baskakov, E. F. et a l . "Documents of the Russian American Company in the National Archive of the U.S.A." Isto r i i a SSSR. 5:212 - 216, 1963. Berg, L. S. "Otkrytiia," T i k h i i Okean. Collection of Articles, Lengrad, Izd. Akad, Nauk SSSR, 1926. Briukhanov, A. F. "K sud'be arkhiva Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR. 9-"37 - 38, 1934. Davidson, D. C. "Relations of the Hudson's Bay Company with the Russian American Company of the Northwest Coast, 1829 - 1867," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No.1:33 - 58, 1941. Howay, F. W. "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1795-1804," Proceedings and Transactions of the  Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 25:117 - 149, 1931 . "A List of Trading Vessels i n the Maritime Fur Trade, 1805-14," Proceedings and Transactions of the  Roval Society of Canada, Series III, 26:43 - 86, 1932. . "A List of Trading Vessels in the Maritime Fur Trade, 1815-18," Proceedings and Transactions of the  Roval Society of Canada. Series III, 27:119 - 147, 1933 . "International Aspects of the Maritime Fur Trade," Proceedings and Transactions of the Roval Society of  Canada. Series III, 36:59 - 78, 1942. Inkersley, Arthur. "Alexander Baranof and the Russian Colonies of America," Overland Monthly. 7:9 - 22, 1897. Ireland, W. E. "James Douglas and the Russian American Com-pany, 1840," The British Columbia Historical Quarterly 5, No. 1:53 - 66, 1941. Kashevarov, A. F. "Otvet g. Yanovskomu na ego zametku o materialakh d l i a i s t o r i i Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Morskoi Sbornik. 54:19 - 20, 1861. 122 Kerner, R. J. "Russian Expansion to America," Bibliographical  Society of America. Papers. 25:111 - 129, 1931. Laut, Agnes C. "Alexander Baranof, Czar of Russian America," America Illustrated Magazine. 11:60 - 69, 1905. Makarov, R. V. "Ekspeditsii russkikh promyshlennykh liudei v Tikhom Okeane<v XVIII veke," Voorosv Geografii. 17, 1950. Mamyshev, V. "Amerikanskaia vladeniia Rossii," Biblioteka  dl i a chteniia. 130 otdel IH-IV, 4:205 - 292* 1855. Markov, S. N. "Kolumby rossiiskie," Sovetskoe kraevedenie. 6:48 - 58, 1936. Preobrazhenskii, A. A. "Dokumenty po i s t o r i i Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Istoricheskii Arkhiv. 2:232 -245, 1959. . "0 sostave aktsionerov Rossiisko-amerikanskoi Kompanii v nachale XIX v.," Istoricheskie Zapiski. 67:286 - 298, I960. Ryleev, K. F. "Zapiska o nedopushchenii inostrannykh kuptsov k zaniatiiu promyslami na t e r r i t o r i i upravliaiushchei-sia Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompaniei," Literaturnoe  Nasledstvo I, 59:165 - 168, 1954. Sergeev, M. A. "Russkaia Amerika, 1732-1867," Sovetskoe  Primor'e. 13:292 - 330, 1952. Shirokii, B. F. "Iz i s t o r i i khoziaistvennoi deiatel Tnosti Rossiisko-amerikanskoi kompanii," Istoricheskie  Zapiski. 13:207 - 221, 1942. Shternberg, L. Ya. "Etnografiia," T i k h i i Okean. Collection of articles, Leningrad, Izd, Akad. Nauk SSSR, 1926. Vavilov, M. I. "Poslednie dni v Russkoi Amerike," Russkaia  Starina. 49, 50, 51, 1886. Vishniakov, N. "Rossiia, Kaliforniia, i Sandvicheskie ostrova," Russkaia Starina. 124:249 - 289, 1905. (cites Materialv dl i a i s t o r i i russkikh zaselenii po  beregam Vostochnogo okeana. I-IV, St. Petersburg, Morskoe Ministerstvo, 1861.) Wrangell, F. F. "Ferdinand Petrovich Wrangell," Entsiklo-pedicheskii slovar*. St. Petersburg, Efron, 1892. Yarmolinsky, A. "Studies in Russian Americana," Bulletin of  the New York Public Library. 4:376 - 377, 1942. 123 Section IV: Unpublished Theses Dahlstrom, Lawrence. The Attitude of the Russian-American  Company under Baranov towards subordinate groups in Alaska. Seattle, University of Washington M.A. Thesis, 1962. Strausz, David A. The Russian-American Company to 1825. Seattle, University of Washington M.A. Thesis, 1962. Section V: Archive Sources A. Materials in Russian archives. Each document i s identified by the collection (fond) number, the index (opis') number, and the item (edinitsa  khraneniia) number as used in Soviet archives. The cover descriptions for each document have been rendered here in word for word translation. Baranov, A. A. Report to an unknown person'" addressed as "Ivan Alexandrovich" of the working out of a plan for an expedition to the coast of America, October, 1808, copy, 7 pages. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 364. Buldakov, M. M. Notes on the w i l l f u l trade of the English and Americans in Kamchatka and in Siberia, 1820, written copy, 5 pages. GPB, M. M. Speranskii archive (731), item 547. Golovnin, V. M. Report on the Russian-American colony Ross. Oct., 1825, original, 11 pages. TsGADA, Division XXIV, item 68. Hagemeister, L. A. Report by the commander of the ship "Kutuzov" to the Board of Directors of the Russian xFrom the report i t i s quite clear that the addressee was Ivan Alexandrovich Kuskov, Baranov's assistant, who was to take charge of the expedition along the west coast. 124 American Company regarding unsuccessful trade talks with o f f i c i a l s of the city of Lima, April, 1817, copy, 8 pages. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 172. Kankrin, Ye. F. Letter from Kankrin, the Minister of Finance, to N. S. Mordvinov concerning the shortage of goods in the colonies of the Russian American Company and the supply of provisions to Kamchatka, November, 1823, original, 1 page. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 845. . Report of the State Council of the Department of the Economy on the new charter of the RAC, December, 1842, original, 17 sheets, TsGIAL, collection (1152), index 3, item 185. Khlebnikov, K. Notes concernhg the colonies of the RAC in America, January-February,2 rough duplicate specimen, 132 sheets, ARGO, Section 99, index 1, item 111. Kozodavlev, G. Papers concerning the RAC in various questions relating to i t . January, 1819, copies, 2 pages. TsGIAL, Imperial Chancery archive (1409), index 1, item 2911. Krusenstern, A. Notes on the ports of Ross and San Francisco. October, 1821, copy, 2 pages. Division XXIV, item 68. (pages 12 and 12 reverse side of Golovnin fs report; see under Golovnin.) Rezanov, N. P. Outline of the formation, activity, and measures for the strengthening of the RAC. Beginning of the 19th century, copy, 16 sheets. GPB, Olenin archive, item 799. Rumiantsev, N. P. Notification of the Board of Directors of the RAC by the Minister of Commerce concerning the presentation of a loan of 25,000 rubles to the company; notification regarding consideration by the State Council of the Barber a f f a i r . August, 1802; May, 1813, unfinished copy, 2 sheets. TsGADA, collection 786, ( s i c ) 3 index 1, item 168. Undated. Probably written circa 1832. ^Judging from the t i t l e and the item number, the • collection number should undoubtedly be 796, which refers to the Yudin collection elsewhere cited. 125 Startsov, F. P. Letter to N. S. Mordvinov from a shareholder concerning the f a l l in the value of shares in recent years. January, 1820, original, 4 sheets, TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 835. Vorontsov, A. R. Notes of the State Chancellor to Tsar Alexander I regarding government and trade and of measures towards their regularization. November, 1801, 12 sheets. TsGADA, Vorontsov archive (1261), item 803. . Notes for a report of State Chancellor Vorontsov to Tsar Alexander I concerning privileges for RAC ships in foreign ports and of the necessity of con-sidering the issuance of instructions to the company, so as to avoid abuses in the advantage of private interests, capable of leading Russia into unpleasant •explanations 1 to marine powers possessing colonies. February, 1803, 4 sheets, copy, TsGADA, Vorontsov archive (1261), item 808. Wrangell, F. Notification of the RAC Board of Directors in regard to his participation in the colonial affairs of the direction of the company. September, 1838, copy, 1 page. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 865. In addition to the foregoing l i s t i n g by author, the following are RAC documents and records for which individual authors are not given. Historical calendar of the RAC, 1741-1817. 1817, manuscript, 57 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 160. Report of the RAC Board of Directors to Tsar Alexander I concerning the acti v i t i e s of A. A. Baranov towards expanding the trade of the company. September, 1810, copy, 13 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 161.. Representation by the RAC Council to Tsar Alexander I con-cerning the conclusion of a trading agreement with Spanish California for supplying the company's colonies. December, 1813, copy, 10 sheets. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 163. 126 Notes on the bestowal of privileges to RAC ships of war by the East India Company, on the prohibition of the Negro trade and other points of international agree-ment. 1827, 4 sheets in French. TsGADA, Yudin collection (796), index 1, item 178. Financial balance of the RAC as of January 1, 1804, and Jan. 1, 1812. Printed, 1 sheet. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 827. Information regarding the trading expenditures of the RAC in Siberia and America for 1820-22: excerpts from the general balance as of January 1, 1820, and January 1, 1822. Original, 3 sheets, TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 836. Estimate of the circulation of RAC capital for 1824. Original, 5 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 847. Capital balance (brief) of the RAC as of January 1, 1836. Original with attached remarks, 8 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 861. Account by the RAC Board of Directors of trade and capital turnover in Russia for 1836 and 1837 and in the colonies, for 1835 and 1836. Printed, 6 sheets. TsGIAL, Mordvinov archive (994), index 2, item 862. B. Archival sources outside the Soviet Union. National Archives of the U.S.A. Microfilm publications. Records of the Russian-American Company. 1802-1867, Rolls 1-77, (Microcopy No. 11 i s located in the Library of the University of British Columbia). 127 Key to abbreviations used above: TsGADA - Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnykh Aktov, (Central State Archive of Ancient Documents), Moscow. TsGIAL - Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii ArkhivvLeningrade, (Central State Historical Archive in Leningrad). RAC GPB ARGO Russian American Company. Gosudarstvennaia Publichnaia Biblioteka imeni M. E. Saltykova-Shchedrina v Leningrade. (State Public Library named after M. E. Saltykov-Shchedrin.) Otdel rukopisei, (Manuscript department). Arkhiv Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva, (Archive of the Russian Geographical Society), Leningrad. 

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