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The evolution of railways in the Kootenays Meyer, Ronald Howard 1970

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THE EVOLUTION OF RAILWAYS IN THE KOOTENAYS by '.• BON ALB"; HOWARD MEYER' B.A. , Uhiyersity..of Brit i s h Columbia, 1967 A THESIS .SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS, FOR THE DEGREE OF -MASTER OF ARTS in the Department , " of Geography We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1970 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l , g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8. C a n a d a ABSTRACT « Traditionally, international boundaries have been re-garded as barriers to the evolution of transportation networks. Numerous examples of the disruptive influence of borders on travel routes have been documented in the literature. Does such a pattern always occur? This thesis i s concerned with a railnet which evolved i n close proximity to an international boundary, but which for the most part appeared able to develop with l i t t l e regard for the boundary as a barrier. This railnet i s that of the Kootenay district of south-eastern B r i t i s h Columbia and the adjacent United States. An investigation i s made of the major elements which best explain the nature of this network's evolution. They are discovered to include a rich natural resource endowment, rivalry between r a i l -way companies, and private and government decision makers, but not the international boundary. Comparison i s made with the railnet of another area, similar apart from the absence of such a border. The nature of private and government decision making i s also exam-ined. Each step i n turn provides additional evidence to indicate that the boundary was not a major factor, certainly not a s i g n i f i -cant barrier, i n the evolution of the Kootenay railnet. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Introduction to the Problem The Kootenay Region Methodology Chapter Outline Research Methods 2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE RAILNET 7 The Regional Setting Pre-Railroad Transport Transcontinental Railways The Importance of Water Transport The Development of Railways i n the Study Area The 1 8 9 5 Railway Network The 1 9 0 0 Railway Network The 1 9 1 2 Railway Network The 1 9 6 8 Railway Network Railway Abandonments Projected Railways A Model of Railnet Evolution Based on the Kootenay Pattern 3 RESOURCES, RIVALRY, AND RAILWAYS National Expansion and Transcontinental Strategy Regional Resource Development and the Evolution of Transportation Routes The Importance of Spokane The Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway The Growth of Mining and Railway Rivalry Rivalry to Nelson Rivalry to the Sloean Rivalry to Rossland Rivalry on the Waterways Rivalry to the Crowsnest and Kootenay Lake Rivalry to the Boundary Rivalry to the Lardeau A Counterthrust to Spokane: Canadian Retaliation Later Railway Developments .Renewed Rivalry: Rediscovery df the Crowsnest The Rationale for Railway Abandonments Railway Rivalry in the Kootenays—An Overview An Analogy to Kootenay Railnet Evolution Rich N a t u r a l Resources,, .. Rival Railway Companies PAGE 1 Iv CHAPTER PAGE THE DECISION MAKERS 83 The Identity of the Decision Makers Governments The Dominion Government The Provincial Government Private Railway Interests D.C. Corbin of the Spokane F a l l s and Northern F.A. Heinze of the .Columbia and Western J. J.. H i l l of the Great Northern William'Van Horne and Thomas Shaughnessy of the The Need for Integration: An Overview The Presence of Resources—The Incentive Intercompany Rivalry The Decision Makers The Role of the International Boundary Canadian Pacific 5 CONCLUSION BIBLIOGRAPHY 121 LIST OF MAPS Map Page 1 The Kootenays Place Names . ... .... . . . . ... . . . . . 8 2 T r a i l s and Waterways i n the l 8 6 0 s - l 8 8 0 s . . . . ..... . . 10 3 Transcontinental Railways 1885 12 4 Major Waterways i n the l 8 8 0 s - l 8 9 0 s . . . . . . . . . . .14 5 Railways 1895 . 1 6 6 Railways 1900 . . ....... . . ' 19 7 Railways 1912 23 8 Railways 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . 26 9 'Railway Abandonments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 10 Projected 'Railways with Charters 1870-1930 . . . . . . . 30 11 Spokane and Railways i n the Inland Empire 1888 40 12 South line of the Canadian Pacific and Three Main Lines of the Great Northern i n 1916 60 13 Railway A f f i l i a t i o n s with, the Great Northern and Canadian Pacific 72 14 The Railnet of Arizona-New Mexico 1880-1920 78 15 Railways Projected by the Provincial Government 1890 . . 90 16 Overlapping Networks of the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern Railways Built 1880-1940 . . . . .103 LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1 Schematic Simplification of Railway Development i n the Kootenays . . . . . . . . . . 32 LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 Sequence of Developments i n the Major Mining Areas . . . 74 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would l i k e to thank numerous people for their assistance i n the preparation of this thesis. My adviser, Dr. A.L. Farley, who encouraged me from the start, and Dr. R. North, who also pro-vided essential assistance, were particularly helpful. I would also l i k e to thank Miss I. Mitchell and Mrs. Blakey-Smithof the Provincial Library and Archives i n Victoria, Mrs. A. Yandle of Special Collections, the Library of the University of Br i t i s h Columbia, Miss Walker of the Northwest Room, Vancouver Public Library, as well as the staff of the Glenbow Library and Archives, Calgary, the staff of Cominco, Kimberley, and the staff of the Tra i l Public Library. . Special thanks for their help are also due to Mrs. Mary Daem, Revelstoke; Mrs. Weir of the Valley Echo, Winder-mere; Miss Loretta Mangan, Fernie; Mr. Dave Kay, Cranbrook; Mrs. Mae Slade and Mr. B i l l Leaman, Kimberley; Mrs. Kate Johnson, Nakusp; Mr. Kolfage of the Nelson Miner, Nelson; Mr. Bernie Fetterley and Mr. Ian Turner, Nelson; Mr. Craig Weir, editor of Cominco Magazine, T r a i l ; Mr. Gib Kennedy, T r a i l ; Mr. Jack McDonald of the Rossland Museum, Rossland; Mr. Barrie Sanfo^d of the National Railway Histori-cal Society, Vancouver; and Mr. Harry Attertdn and other staff of CP Rail i n Vancouver. Each of these people went out of his way to give assistance to the author. Last, but not least, I would lik e to thank Miss.Vicki March for providing assistance with typing and proofreading.. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Introduction To The Problem The concern of this thesis i s the evolution of a trans-portation network. It i s a study i n his t o r i c a l geography, an attempt to interpret and explain the growth and decline of a particular railroad network. Specifically, i t i s an investigation into the development of railways from 1880 i n the Kootenay dis-t r i c t of southeastern Briti s h Columbia, an area adjacent to the United States border. The Kootenay Region The Kootenay area was selected for a number of reasons. Not only was the area readily accessible for f i e l d research, i t was rich i n natural resources, i t had witnessed the development of a complex network of railways, and i t was bordered by an inter-national boundary. In addition, there had been l i t t l e geographic investigation of railnet evolution i n the region. Although one case study had been made of the area i n terms of the international boundary (Stephen Jones, 1937) , only superficial treatment was given to transport network evolution. In any attempt to explain railnet evolution i n this area, the presence of the international border would appear to be the most important factor. Elsewhere along i t s length the 49th p a r a l l e l has had a strongly disruptive effect on railway network 2 development, particularly i n the Canadian-American prairies (Losch, 1954; Wolfe, 1962). Its barrier effect i n related f i e l d s of circulation has? also been noted, for example by Mackay (1958), who investigated the impact of the international boundary on telephone c a l l s i n eastern Canada, and by Hinghi (1963, I 9 6 4 ) , who noted the effect on television preference of the same boundary i n the Pacific Coast region. However, the railnet of the Cordil-leran section of the border area appears not to reflect any such barrier effect of the boundary, and i n particular i t contrasts remarkably with the railnet of the prairie border area. Whereas the majority of lines i n the prairies approach, but do not cross the boundary, i n the Kootenays there are few lines which approach the border but do not cross i t . That railways evolved i n the Kootenays with l i t t l e regard for the boundary as a barrier, i.e. that their pattern of evolution can be explained without much reference to.the boundary, i s therefore taken as the major hypo-thesis i n this study. Methodology In order to explain the evolution of the Kootenay railnet, we shall proceed through several stages of analysis. 1) Describe, and present a simplified model of. network  change. Following a description of the evolution of the railnet, a simple stage model w i l l be presented to summarize that evolution. This,approach was stimulated by the attempt of Taaffe, M o r r i l l , and Gould (1963) to develop a four-stage model to summarize the evolu-tion of transportation networks inland from the seacoast i n under-developed countries such as Ghana. 2) Formulate hypotheses concerning the ma.lor elements  affecting evolution, and attempt to explain network evolution i n  terms of these elements. It i s not possible to investigate a l l the elements which might contribute towards explaining the evolution of , the Kootenay railnet. Only certain major elements are hypothesized to have influenced, and thus to explain satisfactorily, the develop-ment of railways. In essence, this provides a simplified model of the real situation. In the Kootenay region, the elements hypothe-sized to have had a dominant influence are (a) rich natural resources, (b) competing interests, particularly r i v a l railway companies, (c) individual decision makers at the head of the railway companies, individuals who were competing on a personal as well as on a corpor-ate l e v e l , and (d) government decision makers, both federal and provincial. The combination of the f i r s t three elements led to a highly competitive situation during the period of railway construc-tion. The resource endowment provided the incentive for cross-border railway construction by the various decision makers, who thus found their companies competing with each other across the boundary. The importance of the government decision makers i s -hypothesized to be that they fa i l e d to render the border effective, or on occasion deliberately rendered i t ineffective, as a b a r r i e r — hence the hypothesis concerning the lack of influence of the bor-der, referred to above. Even i f i t can be shown that the border had very l i t t l e influence as a barrier to railways, however, i t should also be noted whether or not i t had some indirect effect through the presence of nationalistic elements i n intercompany 4 r i v a l r y , elements which would not have existed had there been no p o l i t i c a l division of the area. Other studies of railway evolution have also been concerned with some of these elements. Wolfe (1962) has noted the r i v a l r y along the prairie section of the 49th parallel boundary between Canadian and American railways. Meinig (1962) has documented the complex pattern of network development i n the Columbia Basin which resulted from a similar highly competitive situation between "four major railroad systems and their subsidiaries" (p. 402). In the same study there i s also the c a l l for a "focus of attention upon the actions of those i n control of the processes of development" (p. 413)» namely the decision makers responsible i n large part for the nature and location of railway systems. A number of writers have pointed out that the north-south physiographic grain of the Kootenay region was important i n i n -fluencing the location of 1 transportation routes across rather than parallel to the boundary (e.g. Stephen Jones, 1937, p. 441; Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 228-229). To these writers, topography would seem to be the major factor determining the development of north-south routes by Americans prior to that of east-west routes by Canadians. Although topographic conditions no doubt made American ease of entry somewhat greater, we suggest that other factors, h i s t o r i c a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l , were actually more important i n explaining the chronology of development of transportation routes i n the Kootenays. 3) Attempt further to justify the rejection of "the border as barrier" as an important variable, by using a historical 5 geographical analogy. In order to provide additional support for the major hypothesis, an attempt w i l l be made to show the general similarity of railnet development i n the Kootenay region to that of another region where there i s no international boundary, but where other major elements, particularly natural resources and r i v a l i n -terests, are also present. Chapter Outline The approach outlined above i s reflected i n the chapter organization as follows. In Chapter 2, the chronology and location of railway developments w i l l be documented. It i s here, too, that the simple stage model of network change w i l l be presented to aid i n the understanding of Kootenay railnet evolution. A start at analyzing evolution without reference to the boundary as a major variable w i l l follow i n Chapter 3. There w i l l be an attempt to examine railnet development i n terms of the f i r s t two major elements, resources and r i v a l interests.. Each of the arenas of railway-build-ing activity i n the region w i l l be investigated i n terms of cross-border r i v a l r y for resources. The presence of the rich mineral resources of the area and the strategies of railway companies w i l l be related i n each case. Here there w i l l also be a brief comparison of the Kootenay railnet with that of another region where there i s no international boundary, but which i s similar i n other ways. There w i l l be an analysis of the third and fourth major elements, the private and government decision makers, i n Chapter k- In Chap-ter 5 there w i l l be an integration and summary of the findings of t h i s study. 6 Research Methods Research methods for this thesis involved a number of dif-ferent procedures. Since the subject i s hi s t o r i c a l , there i s a great dependence on library and archival material such as govern-ment and railway company reports, maps, newspapers, and other material which cover the period of major concern. F i e l d work i n the selected area involved the consultation of local repositories such as l i b r a r i e s and museum-archives collections, as well as the interviewing of company o f f i c i a l s and those with a local historical or railway.' background. Altogether, these have contributed a f a i r l y comprehensive collection of information, although i t i s s t i l l not as complete as could be desired. A l l maps, appearing i n this thesis are the original work of the author, based on research data compiled from numerous sources. CHAPTER 2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE RAILNET The Regional Setting The Kootenay d i s t r i c t of southeastern B r i t i s h Columbia and the adjacent areas of the Northwest States—including parts of Washington, Idaho, and Montana—form part of the North American Cordillera (See Map 1). The history of the area i n the period 1860-1920 was characterized by mining booms, the rapid appearance of shortlived mining towns, and the extracting, concentrating, smelting, and export of base metals. There were rich' deposits of gold, copper, silver , lead, and zinc i n numerous locations, as well as thick coal beds i n the Crowsnest Pass area to the east. It was these mineral deposits, impressive i n both quantity and quality, that constituted the major attractiveness of the Kootenays to both Canadian and American interests. A number of these deposits were rich enough to bear the high cost of shipment out of the region by riverboats, wagons, and pack animals almost immediately following discovery. In other words, railways were not essential for a l l mineral resource exploitation i n the Kootenays. Pre-Railroad Transport Long before railways were constructed i n the Kootenays, then, the area was traversed by numerous transport routes. The major rivers and lakes were used by craft ranging from canoes to steam-8 MAP 1 Revelstoke Ar/owhead Nakusp yftosebery \ \ \\,New Denver] SJocon .SandonK Lak 5 ^Slocon City B 0 U A/ D •Deodwood ^ • Phoenix • Gran V ^s-^^.. Robson west Robson •Gastlegar Kaslo K o o elson fouth Sldcan n e n a y ' l ^ t e r Rossland Midway rand Forks 1^A{S~HT~N~G TO. North port 7 \ CANADA—si 1 V. S. A. T H E K O O T E N A Y S P L A C E N A M E S .Natal Kuskonook [Kootenay Landing •Creston . Fernie \Gorbin •Coal Creek r n i . . n i i i .Carbonado folvalh .swinton ^ •Caithness B R I T I S H ° Spokane Yahk VNewgate .^Rykerts £...2..^^^y_^J» G^! e*! aX..-IDAHO I U O NT ANA I Rexford 'Elko S ^ •Waldo rB5nhers Ferry •Sandpoint Jennings / 10 20 30 40 50 Miles 9; boats, and overland t r a i l s were tributary to the waterways. Not surprisingly, these early travel routes, whether by water or by land, often followed a path later adopted by the railways. In striking a balance between that which i s cheapest to build i n terms of cost of engineering and that which i s cheapest to use i n terms of time and distance, a l l modes of land transport normally select a route that i s physiographically easy. In the Kootenays the choice was frequent-l y not very great; hence the tendency for considerable coincidence i n communication routes despite differences i n date and i n mode. By 1880 the Kootenays were served by a number of important t r a i l s and riverboat routes, although t r a f f i c was intermittent and irregular, there being almost no mining activity at a l l i n some years. The majority of these transport routes ran north-south across the border (See Map 2), and kootenay minerals were transported to smelters i n Montana and Idaho, before being shipped to the eastern United States. To counter this trend towards north-south t r a f f i c and interaction across the international boundary, the Dewdney T r a i l was constructed i n 1865 from the Pacific Coast to the Kootenays, north of and parallel to the border (See Map 2). Nevertheless, t r a f f i c continued to cross the international boundary despite Canadian attempts to provide east-west links i n order to change the direction of dominant flows both into and out of the Kootenays. This contrast and competition between north-south and east-west transportation routes into the region gives a spatial dimension to the theme of cross-border ri v a l r y and w i l l be noted frequently throughout this thesis. 11 Transcontinental Railways The Pacific Northwest was traversed by two transcontinental railways within two years of each other, the Northern Pacific-and the Canadian Pacific. Essentially, both .were concerned at the time of construction only with reaching the Pacific coast by the easiest route. Nonetheless, by virtue of their location, they could not help but have a significant effect upon the Kootenays and adjacent United States. Specifically, the Northern Pacific Railway was completed i n 1883 from Minneapolis and St. Paul i n the east, to Portland i n the west, through Helena, Sand Point, and Spokane. The Canadian Pacific Railway was completed i n 1885 from Montreal i n the east to Port Moody i n the west, through Calgary, Golden, and Revelstoke (See Map 3)» Neither railway actually traversed the area of real concern i n this thesis, although both skirted i t , one to the south and one to the north. The immediate result of the completion of these lines was a greatly increased accessibility to the Kootenays, from both the east and west. Both transcontinental railways, l i k e the border to which they were pa r a l l e l , crossed the grain of the topography and a number of navigable waterways. What resulted was a transportation network i n which east-west movement to the area was by r a i l , and north-south movement within the area was by river, lake, or t r a i l , at least u n t i l further railways were constructed. Water transport i n the area was definitely stimulated by the completion of the transcontin-ental railways. 13 The Importance of Water Transport After the completion of the transcontinental railways, r a i l developments consisted largely of short branch lines and "portage" l i n e s between different waterways, further stimulating the use of water transport. The combination of r a i l and water transport gave far easier access into the area than before. In effect, r a i l and water routes must be seen as parts of an integrated network. The railways relied upon water services as the only means by which to reach otherwise disconnected branch lines, often establishing their own steamboat and r a i l ferry services along such routes. The most important of these water transport routes were the following: 1) The Columbia River (a) south from the Canadian Pacific Railway at Revelstoke to points on the Arrow Lakes, and (b) north from the Northern Pacific Railway to the' same points. 2) The lower Kootenay River from the United States across the international boundary to various points on Kootenay Lake. 3) The upper Columbia River south from the Canadian Pacific Railway at Golden. k) The upper Kootenay River from the United States across the international boundary to various points i n the East Kootenays. These four major waterways, along with others which were less significant, are depicted on Map 4.' Regular service was pro-vided by numerous navigation companies from the mid l880*s on the f i r s t three of these routes, and from the early 1890's on the fourth. A l l steamboat services connected with at least one of the transcon-tinental railways, either directly or by means of branch lines, and i n some cases served as links between two or more such lines. 15 The Development of Railways i n the Study Area The actual pattern and sequence of railway developments i n the Kootenay area i s detailed and complex. Because of this, i t i s believed that the most meaningful presentation of railway evolution would be by means of a number of stages. The dates selected are each representative of a somewhat different phase i n the evolution of the railnet. Four dates were chosen: 1895, 1900, 1912, and 1968. For each period or stage there w i l l follow a brief description of the railways constructed and abandoned. The 1895 Railway Network By 1895, ten years after the completion of the second of the two transcontinental railways noted above, a number of new railway developments had occurred, as can be seen from Map 5. The f i r s t two railways to be built i n the Kootenays served the mining centre of Nelson, providing the town with connections to two transcontinental railways. In 1892 the Columbia and Kootenay Railway was completed from Robson on the Columbia River along the unnavigable stretch of the Kootenay River to Nelson. This provided a l i n k with the main l i n e of the Canadian Pacific via the water route along the Columbia River-Arrow Lakes from Robson to Revelstoke (See Map 5 ) . In the •t following year, 1893, the Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway reached Nelson, connecting at the United States border with the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway. The l a t t e r line ran from the Northern Pacific .at Spokane, Washington, to the international boundary, having been completed to C o l v i l l e , Washington by 1889, and to Northport, just south of the border, by 1892. The following year i t reached the bor-der where i t connected with the Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway. MAP 5 Golden ( T H E K O O T E N A Y S R A I L W A Y S 1 8 9 5 — EXISTING LINES (1885) — WATERWAYS LINES BUILT SINCE 1885= COLUMBIA a KOOTENAY SPOKANE FALLS S NORTHERN NELSON a FORT SHEPPARD' GREAT NORTHERN NAKUSP a SLOCAN KASLO a SLOCAN 17 Nelson thus acquired two railways ?/ithin a year, an occurrence that was to be repeated elsewherei The year 1893 also saw the completion of a third transcon-tinental railway through the Pacific Northwest, the Great Northern Railway. Built through Jennings, Montana and Bonners Ferry, Idaho, on i t s route from the Great Lakes i n the east to Everett, Washington i n the west, i t was roughly parallel to but more northerly than the Northern Pacific. Due largely to i t s greater proximity to the i n -ternational boundary, i t was to have considerably more effect on the Kootenays than i t s earlier r i v a l , even though i t s transcontinen-t a l main l i n e , l i k e that of the Northern Pacific, did not enter the study area. A repetition of the kind of railway development noted at Nelson occurred somewhat further north i n 1895, when two railway projects reached the mining camp of Sandon i n the heart of the Slo-can country. From the west the Nakusp and Slocan Railway was built i n from Nakusp on Upper Arrow Lake through New Denver on Slocan Lake. Like the Columbia and Kootenay Railway at Nelson, i t was an outlet to Revelstoke and the Canadian Pacific Railway, via water transport along the Columbia River-Arrow Lakes. From the east the Kaslo and Slocan Railway was built into Sandon from Kaslo on Kootenay Lake and served as a link, via Kootenay Lake and River, to the Great Northern Railway at Bonners Ferry i n the United States. Thus both new lines were dependent upon steamboat services operating on the rivers and lakes. By 1895 these operations served a l l the major waterways of the Kootenays. 18 This, then, was the r a i l and water transportation pattern of the Kootenays i n 1895. A number of routes had penetrated hither-to inaccessible areas Access to the region was now possible from either north or south. It was s t i l l impossible, however, to travel through, the area by r a i l alone. Water transport links were essential. The 1900 Railway Network' From even a cursory visual comparison of Maps 5 and 6, i t i s apparent that the railway network became much denser and more com-plex i n the 1895-1900 period. In 1896 a branch lin e was constructed along the Columbia River from Revelstoke on the Canadian Pacific main lin e to Arrowhead on Upper Arrow Lake, thus shortening the water distance between the transcontinental line and such points as Nakusp and Robson (See Map 6 ) . In the same year the occurrence f i r s t noted at Nelson was repeated at Rossland. The Red Mountain Railway from Rossland to the international boundary, and i t s United States counterpart, the Colum-bia and Red Mountain Railway from the border to Northport, linked the Kootenay centre with the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway, and thus with the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railways at Spokane. The narrow (later standard) gauge Columbia and Western Railway provided Rossland with a second outlet to the Columbia River at T r a i l . In the following year, 1897, the Columbia and Western was extended along the Columbia River north to Castlegar and West Robson, directly across the river from the Robson terminus of the Columbia and Kootenay Railway (See Map 6 ) . 19 MAP 6 v. LRevelstoke Arrowhead .Nakusp New Denvi South Slocan^ JJobson WesT Robsonj 'Nelson Kimberley Cranbrookt THE KOOTENAYS RAILWAYS 1900 EXISTING LINES (1895) WATERWAYS LINES BUILT SINCE 1895= CANADIAN PACIFIC ARROWHEAD BRANCH WWWHH- RED MOUNTAIN '•' ' I COLUMBIA S RED MOUNTAIN - » - « — CANADIAN PACIFIC SOUTH SLOCAN BRANCH h •- BRITISH COLUMBIA SOUTHERN ' BEDLINGTON a NELSON « — » — CANADIAN PACIFIC PROCTER BRANCH ===== MORRISSEY, FERNIE, a MICHEL —==-= COLUMBIA a WESTERN Fernies « — , »Coal t Creek i. Kootenay Landing 'veKuskonook hoenix i Grand! Forks STiair ^osslond *Northport jRykerts 20 Another branch line of the Canadian Pacific Railway was bui l t i n 1897» This ran from South Slocan on the Columbia and Kootenay Railway north to Slocan City on Slocan Lake, connecting v i a steamboat service on the lake to New Denver on the Nakusp and Slocan Railway. The years 1898-1899 saw much new railway construction i n the Kootenays. The Columbia and Western Railway was extended west -to Midway through Grand Forks and the Boundary country during this time. To the east the Briti s h Columbia Southern Railway was com-pleted from Lethbridge, Alberta (already linked to the Canadian Pacific main line) through the Crowsnest Pass and the towns of Fernie and Granbrook to the steamboat dock at Kootenay Landing at the south end of Kootenay Lake (See Map 6 ) . In 1900 another railway reached Kootenay Landing. The Bed-lington and Nelson Railway, connecting with the Great Northern, crossed the International boundary at Rykerts and extended north through Kootenay Landing to another steamboat connection on Kootenay Lake at Kuskonook. In the same year the Canadian Pacific constructed two more short branch lines. One extended east from Nelson and the Columbia and Kootenay Railway along the west arm of Kootenay Lake to Procter, thus further shortening the water transport route on the Kootenay River system. The other was a branch of the British Columbia Southern Railway from Cranbrook north to Kimberley. Other short r a i l lines constructed i n 1900 included two Columbia and Western spurs i n the Boundary area to the camps of Deadwood and Phoenix. In the East Kootenays the Canadian Pacific 21 Railway also constructed a short l i n e from Fernie to Coal Creek on behalf of the Morrissey, Fernie, and Michel Railway. In total, then, i t can be seen that the railnet had expanded considerably i n the five years after 1895. Many new areas, inland and distant from navigable waterways, had been penetrated for the f i r s t time. Railways were beginning to replace water transport, particularly where they paralleled rivers. In the West Kootenay a l l water transport routes except for those on the lakes had been rendered superfluous by railway construction. Only i n the East Kootenay were river routes s t i l l an important l i n k i n the now pre-dominantly r a i l oriented network. Access to much of the area had improved markedly. The 1912 Railway Network.' The railway network i n 1912 represented the peak i n railway evolution. Very few railways were to be constructed after this date, and no railway, abandonments had yet taken place. Throughout North America, and elsewhere for that matter, the year 1912 was one of the years of peak importance i n railway transportation. The Kootenays were simply representative i n this respect. In the Kootenays, the twelve year period 1900-1912 saw the construction of numerous small branch lines and the penetration of many areas by new routes, as well as the arrival of additional r a i l links to points already served by r a i l . Within this period, the year 1902 was the f i r s t i n which considerable construction activity occurred. One of the important links to be constructed i n 1902 was a railway bridge across the Columbia River at Robson, joining the 22 Columbia and Western Railway at West Robson with the Columbia and Kootenay Railway at Robson, and replacing the r a i l ferry service. Another new railway b u i l t i n 1902 was the Kootenay and Arrowhead Railway between Lardeau at the north end of Kootenay Lake, and Gerrard on Trout Lake (See Map 7 ) . Lake boats connected with the new railway on both north and south ends. At Grand Forks two additional railway lines were constructed during the same year. The Spokane and British Columbia Railway con-nected Republic, Washington with Grand Forks, A branch of the Van-couver, Victoria, and Eastern Railway (a company with r a i l l i n e s i n the Lower Fraser Valley and elsewhere) followed the Kettle River from Marcus, Washington north to the international boundary at Gas-cade, then extended west to Grand Forks and south to Republic, paraV l e l i n g the Spokane and Briti s h Columbia Railway lin e between the two l a s t named towns. / Another railway connecting with the Great Northern Railway i n the United States, the Crows Nest Southern was built north across the border through Newgate, Elko, and Fernie to Natal and Michel i n the East Kootenays. Reaching Swinton, south of Fernie, i n 1902, i t was not extended to Fernie unt i l 1904. nor to Michel unt i l 1908 (See Map 7 ) . Also i n the Fernie area, the Morrissey, Fernie, and Michel Railway extended operations i n 1904. A second spur was bu i l t , from Swinton to Carbonado. The two lines were connected by Br i t i s h Colum-bia Southern and Crows Nest Southern trackage between Swinton and Fernie, not by the company's own lines (See Map 7 ) . In 1906 a much longer piece of construction, the Spokane International Railway (one of Wallace's examples of "bridge l i n e s " 23 MAP 7 Golden" Gerrard Republic (Marcus Bonners Ferry Spokane, T H E K O O T E N A Y S R A I L W A Y S 1 9 1 2 EXISTING LINES (1900) WATERWAYS LINES BUILT SINCE 1900= -» KOOTENAY 8 ARROWHEAD SPOKANE S BRITISH COLUMBIA " (KETTLE VALLEY) — VANCOUVER, VICTORIA, 8 EASTERN mf CROW'S NEST SOUTHERN = MORRISSEY, FERNIE, a MICHEL -+ SPOKANE INTERNATIONAL EASTERN BRITISH COLUMBIA CANADIAN PACIFIC WALDO BRANCH KOOTENAY CENTRAL (PROJECTED) GREAT NORTHERN (RELOCATED MAIN LINE) \ Micjiel Fernie olvalli CaithRessI bCorbin I .Carbonado 'Yank ^winton rEIko Valdo j . Newgate | Gateway _ i.. Rexford^ "•Jennings N O. 0 10 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 M i l e s I {19653) was completed between Spokane and lahk. Between Spokane and Bonners Ferry i t closely paralleled portions of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern. In ,1909 another short spur l i n e i n the East Kootenays, the Eastern Briti s h Columbia Railway, was built south from the Br i t i s h Columbia Southern Railway at a point east Of Michel to the town of Corbin. In the Boundary-Grand Forks area, a number of short branch l i n e s were built i n the 1 9 O G - I 9 I G period by a l l three railways serving the region (Columbia and Western, Spokane and British Colum-bia, and Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern) as can be seen from Map 7. A l l of the remaining railway construction i n the Kootenay area up to 1912 was undertaken by the Canadian Pacific Railway. Projects included a short branch lin e from Caithness, on the Br i t i s h Columbia Southern south of Granbrook, to the community of Waldo, com-pleted i n 1912. A more ambitious project was the Kootenay Central Railway, between Golden on the transcontinental main lin e and Col-v a l l i on the Br i t i s h Columbia Southern l i n e , an a l l r a i l north-south l i n k through the East Kootenay along the upper reaches of the Colum-bia and Kootenay Rivers. Work began on this project i n 1910 and ±s progress by 1912 can be noted on Map 7. With i t s completion, the l a s t important water transport route i n the Kootenays would be paral-l e l e d by r a i l . Such, then, was the extent of the railnet i n 1912 at the peak of i t s development. More and more river valleys had been followed by railways, further diminishing the scope and importance of water transport. The Kootenays had now become very accessible by r a i l and entry from many directions, with a wide choice of different routes, 25 was now possible. The 1968 Railway Network The Kootenay railway network of today i s l i k e a skeleton of the 1912 network. It i l l u s t r a t e s very l i t t l e i n the way of new construction, but much i n the way of abandonment. New construction included the completion of the Kootenay Central Railway, referred to above, i n 1915. Fifteen years late r , i n 1930, the Canadian Pacific constructed a li n e between Kootenay Landing and Procter along the west side of Kootenay Lake, thereby eliminating the need for a r a i l ferry service which had been i n operation since the early 1890*s (See Map 8 ) . Completion of the Kettle Valley Railway i n 1916 outside of the study area, to the west of Midway, linked the Kooten-ays with Vancouver by a second r a i l l i n e . To the east M• lineilinked "jth.e. ~ Kootenay sa. with Lethbridge and points east as early as 1899. In effect, then, this southern route, comprised of numerous railway fragments l i k e the Columbia and Kootenay and the Columbia and Western Railways, had become equivalent to the other transcontinental lines spanning the area with i t s f i n a l rendering into an a l l r a i l route. The only other new construction i s under way at the time of writing. This i s a li n e from Natal north to the Fording River being undertaken by the Canadian Pacific Railway, or as i t i s now known, CP Rail. Railway Abandonments Despite the construction of these lines, the theme of Kootenay railway evolution since 1912 has been abandonment. During the past fifty-odd years, the importance of the railway as a univer-2 6 MAP 8 27 sal means of transport has been drastically reduced as the motor vehicle and airplane have taken over much of what previously tra-velled by r a i l . Railway abandonment has been the result a l l over the world as railway companies have fought to compete by stream-l i n i n g operations and removing unprofitable branch li n e s . This has also been the case i n the Kootenays. The f i r s t Kootenay railway to be abandoned permanently"*" was the Bedlington and Nelson Railway line between the United States border at Rykerts and Kuskonook on Kootenay Lake i n 1913-1914, only thirteen years after i t s construction. It was followed i n 1921 by the Red Mountain Railway and the Columbia and Red Moun-tain Railway between Northport and Rossland. In 1919 the Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern Railway from Grand Forks to Phoenix was closed down, and so, i n the following years up to 1935, were other branches of that li n e as well as branches of the Columbia and Western and the Spokane and Briti s h Columbia Railway i n i t s entirety. In 1935 the r a i l pattern i n the Boundary d i s t r i c t became as i t i s today. In the East Kootenay, the Waldo branch of the Canadian Paci f i c , south from Caithness, was abandoned i n 1928; the Crows Nest Southern Railway was closed down i n two sections: from Michel to Elko i n 1926; and from Elko to Rexford, Montana, i n 1936. The Eastern Briti s h Columbia Railway ceased to operate i n 1934. Other l i n e s to be abandoned included the Kootenay and Arrowhead Railway from Lardeau to Gerrard, i n 1942; the Kaslo and Slocan Railway ^The Kaslo and Slocan Railway (narrow gauge) had been aban-doned i n 1910 and rebuilt (standard gauge) i n 1914. 1 28 ifrbmv:Kas'lOcCto New. Denver, i n 1955; and the Morrissey, Fernie, and Michel Railway, i n 1958. The earliest line of the Columbia and Western Railway, between Rossiand and T r a i l was closed down i n 1966, and the Revelstoke to Arrowhead branch of the Canadian Pacific was abandoned i n 1968. A l l of these abandonments are indicated on Map 9- As can also be,seen from Map 8^ the importance of water transport for links i n the r a i l network had diminished to the ser-vice on Slocan Lake between Slocan City and New Denver. This, then, describes the railways bu i l t and abandoned between 1912 and the present. The two new lines completed during the per-iod were both links i n major branch lines. Most of the railways abandoned, however, were either branch lines from the United States or short local feeder l i n e s , most of them built i n the 1900-1912 period. Projected Railways It i s possible to portray cartographically, from the l i s t of railways chartered i n Canada (Dorman, 1938), the lines projected but never bu i l t , and to compare these with the much smaller number of lines which actually were constructed. In this way a visual contrast of some sort can be made between the objectives and the results of decision makers collectively. Such a map of projected routes was provided by Meinig (1962,.p. 413) to i l l u s t r a t e the multitude of possible locations and thus location decisions faced by only one railway company, the Northern Pacific, i n a relatively small area, the Columbia Basin. In this study Map 10 depicts the total pattern of projected routes for a l l the railways chartered 3 0 MAP 10 T H E K O O T E N A Y S P R O J E C T E D R A I L W A Y S W I T H C H A R T E R S 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 3 0 NOTE: Detailed information only available for Canada 0 10 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 Miles 31 i n the Kootenays, Since many of these were never surveyed or even accurately mapped, only an approximate location can be shown. How-ever, for the purposes of this thesis, i t i s the general location of routes within the region, rather than their local siting, which i s of interest. A Model of Railnet Evolution Based on the Kootenay Pattern This detailed-description of railway evolution i n the Kootenays can be simplified and summarized i n the form of a stage model. Such a model can provide a better understanding of the process of Kootenay railnet evolution, as well as a more useful basis by which to consider the similarity of Kootenay railway evolution to that elsewhere. In the style of the model of network development i n underdeveloped countries presented by Taaffe, M o r r i l l , and Gould (1963), the model to be presented here i s geometrically descriptive rather than quantitative. In the above description i t was apparent that each railway constructed i n the Kootenays provided improved connections either with other parts of Canada or with the United States. It i s thus possible to classify a l l Kootenay railways as either American or Canadian oriented. Accordingly, Figure 1 presents a schematic simplification of the actual stages of Kootenay railnet evolution, differentiating between Canadian and American lines. Stage I - 1885 - Transcontinental Routeways. As shown in the f i r s t stage of Figure 1, the two p o l i t i c a l units, economically undeveloped, are separated by a straight international boundary. In the interests of national development transcontinental lines 32 FIGURE 1 SCHEMATIC SIMPLIFICATION OF RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN THE KOOTENAYS J2> Mi les RAILWAYS WATERWAYS CANADIAN •< 1 1 1 ' " *-*-+--+-«-*. AMERICAN 1885 i i i i i i I I I I I 1896 1 fa 4-4-• 4-4-> "' T " • ' * i i i r i i i ' i •• o TRAFFIC GENERATING POINTS 1968 1 r i I t 1 33 are constructed parallel to the border. The area between these main lines i s the area o f interest. Both these transcontinental routes are built before there i s detailed knowledge of natural resources or other potential t r a f f i c generating features i n the area of interest which might affect their location. . Stage II - I 8 9 6 - The I n i t i a l Development of Routes i n the Study Area. With the discovery of natural resource sites or the growth of other kinds-of traffic-generating centres i n the study area, r i v a l tributary transportation routes are constructed to them from both the transcontinental lines, despite the presence of the international boundary which must be crossed by a number of these feeder lines. Thus each major t r a f f i c generating centre in the area w i l l be served by two competing transportation routes. Stage III - 1912 - Protection of National Interests. 'With the continued invasion of each p o l i t i c a l area by tributary routes of a foreign transportation system, there i s a move not only to protect the interests of each political.area, but. also to provide a better front from v/hich to invade the other country. Such a move i s the provision of routes parallel with the international boundary and closer to i t than the f i r s t transcontinental lines. They are constructed through both existing and potential t r a f f i c centres on their own side of the border unlike the earlier transcontinental lines v/hich were built without regard for local t r a f f i c potential. In particular, they are constructed through t r a f f i c centres already raided by foreign lines i n an attempt to divert, t r a f f i c which had been crossing the international boundary. They also permit more effective invasion across the boundary into the other country since 3k their feeder lines would be shorter. In each case, of course, this advantage i s counteracted by the presence of a similar, parallel route on the opposite side of the border. Accordingly, new invasion routes tend to be shorter than earlier ones. Stage IV - 1968 - Consolidation and Abandonment. With the completion of the two parallel routes close to the border, invasion of foreign .territory beyond these routes has become less economi-call y attractive. The point has been reached where each half of the border area has become much more closely integrated with the rest of i t s national territory than with the area across the boundary. Each railway network expands and consolidates i t s position on i t s own side of the border. Short feeder lines are b u i l t , and both the area and i t s transport network become more closely knit together with the construction of new links and development lines. Although a few lines may s t i l l cross the boundary, most foreign lines i n both countries w i l l be abandoned as soon as they lose their economic v i a b i l i t y . This process may be hastened by a steadily increasing importance of the boundary as a p o l i t i c a l , economic, and social divide. The above attempt to identify the essential features of Kootenay railnet evolution, although greatly simplified, may help to demonstrate how d i f f i c u l t i t would be to make conclusions of general applicability from the Kootenay experience. If the model represents a reasonable interpretation, similar network development could be expected i n other areas only when certain basic conditions are f u l f i l l e d . In particular, there are, a number of variables which 35 should be approximately equivalent on both sides of the border, as appears to have been the case i n the Kootenays. For example, both sides of the border would have to be similarly attractive to exploitation and development through the provision of transportation routes. The d i f f i c u l t y of route construction would have-to be about equal on both sides of the border, and the barrier effect (or lack of i t ) of the boundary should be the same for movement i n both directions. Both sides of the border should be approximately equidistant from major trading centres and the ocean (for overseas trade) i n their respective nations. There should also be equivalent perception and reaction by the decision making ri v a l s on both sides of the boundary; there should be no delay by interests in one nation i n keeping pace with the other for lack of any kind of resources, whether perceptive, economic, or entrepreneurial. From the start, both areas should be at an equivalent stage of development. Such a balancing of conditions on two sides of a border i s rarely found i n real world situations, and the transferability of our model of Kootenay railnet evolution in i t s to t a l i t y i s probably very limited, therefore. CHAPTER 3 RESOURCES, RIVALRY, AND RAILWAYS The purpose of this chapter i s to demonstrate that railway evolution i n the Kootenays can be explained with a minimum of reference to the international boundary as a barrier. In fact, i t i s intended to show that railnet development can be largely explained i n terms of two major elements, natural resources and r i v a l railway interests. National Expansion and Transcontinental Strategy In many national and sub-national p o l i t i c a l units, the provision of a transportation system spanning great distances within the p o l i t i c a l entity has been of great importance i n helping to unify that area. Railways, h i s t o r i c a l l y , were often the transport mode most significant i n this regard. In North America this has been particularly true. Numerous writers, i n -cluding Innis (1923), Riegel (1926), Glazebrook (1938), and Ho1-brook (1947)> have noted the role of the f i r s t transcontinental railways i n contributing towards national consolidation i n both the United States and Canada. The f i r s t transcontinental railways i n both nations (Union Pacific i n the United States, 1869; Canadian Pacific i n Canada, 1885) were an explicit part of the national policy of westward expansion. Railway networks had developed extensively i n the 37 eastern United States by i860, and i n eastern Canada by 1880, and with interest directed westward, railways were perceived as the obvious means of linking the western and eastern parts of the continent together. In both nations there was a parallel interest In westward expansion and p o l i t i c a l consolidation, the major d i f -ference being a time lag on the part of Canada. Because of the intensive study of the Canadian Pacific Railway by authors such as Innis (1923)» i t i s sufficient here to point out briefly that this f i r s t Canadian transcontinental railway was constructed largely i n competition with American interests i n order to maintain Canadian (or British) sovereignty north of the 49th parallel from the Great Lakes to the Pacific Coast. Constructed over a decade later than the f i r s t American transcontinental, the Canadian Pacific was built concurrently with a r i v a l American transcontinental, the Northern Pacific Railway. As Irwin (1939) has demonstrated, there was significant p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r y between the backers of the Canadian Pacific and Northern Pacific Railways. It i s important to realize at this point that this f i r s t expression of railway ri v a l r y was manifested on a continental scale. The study area of concern i n this thesis was only indirectly affect-ed by this rivalry. The Kootenays were not traversed by these early transcontinentals, and at the time of construction the region had l i t t l e significance or effect on their location. Vance (1961) has called attention to the early lack of concern with local t r a f f i c generating p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n location decisions at the time of construction of the Union Pacific Railway. Later transcontinen-t a l railways were often bu i l t i n a similar fashion. Much of the 38 Nqrth. American west and i n particular the Cordillera, was simply perceived as an empty and d i f f i c u l t area which had to be crossed to reach the Pacific Coast. This i s borne out, for example, i n Fleming* s early surveys of Western Canada on behalf of the Cana-dian Pacific Railway ( 1 8 7 7 ) . Regional Resource Development and the Evolution of Transportation  Routes The completion of the transcontinental railways made entry into the interior of the Pacific Northwest much easier. The "In-land Empire", a term coined i n 1862 when the area had become famous for a series of gold rushes (Lavender, 1 9 5 8 , p. 3 4 7 ) , comprised eastern Washington, northern Idaho, northeastern Oregon, western Montana, and southeastern Br i t i s h Columbia. I t became the scene of "the mining frontier which spread from California eastward and northward" (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1 9 4 2 , p. 264). The area had f i r s t become known i n the 1860's after a series of gold discoveries on both sides of the international boundary resulted in a rapid influx of American miners from the south and east. Entry into the British Columbia Kootenays to such discoveries as the Big Bend and Wild Horse Creek i n 1863 -1864 was made via the Columbia and Kootenay River valleys. The Dewdney T r a i l , constructed i n 1 8 6 5 , was the f i r s t attempt to provide an a l l Canadian means of access to the Kootenays and to divert the trade and t r a f f i c away from the United States (Rossland Miner, May 23, 1 8 9 6 ) . As an attempt to compete with the American t r a i l s i t fa i l e d , largely because the rushes -were nearly over by the time the t r a i l was completed. The north-39 south river,and t r a i l transportation routes used by the Americans had succeeded i n almost completely monopolizing the area's trade. Nevertheless this early attempt to connect the Kootenays with other parts of Canada by a route parallel to the border i n com-petition with American routes which crossed i t i s significant as a preview of what was to follow during the period of railway con-struction i n the, region. v The Importance of Spokane With the construction of the Northern Pacific Railway, the entry of a resident population, and the discovery of more and more mineral deposits the ci t y of Spokane grew rapidly (population 1 8 8 0 , 3 5 0 ; 1 8 8 8 , 7 0 0 0 ; 1 8 9 0 , 2 0 , 0 0 0 ) . Soon after the completion of the Northern Pac i f i c , a number of branch l i n e railways began to radiate outwards from Spokane to the west, east, and south to such areas as the Palouse, the Big Bend, and. the Coeur d'Alene. Resource exploitation and regional development i n these areas depended on the provision of dependable transportation f a c i l i t i e s . By 1 8 8 8 many of these particularly resource rich areas had.been linked to Spokane by independent r a i l l i n e s (the Spokane and Palouse, the Washington Central, the Seattle, Lake Shore and Eastern, the Spokane F a l l s and Idaho, and the Coeur d'Alene Railway and Navigation—see Map 1 1 ) . The net effect was one i n which t r a f f i c into and out of a great part of the Inland Empire was channeled through Spokane. Why Spokane i n particular? The site seems to have been nothing out of the ordin-ary, and one writer suggests that " i t enjoyed less natural attraction than several of i t s neighbours" (Fahey, 1 9 6 5 , p. 4 ) . More important appear to be situational factors ( i t s location on the transcontinen-41 t a l railway linking i t directly with the east and i t s general centrality within the area) and the decisions, or results of decisions, of various railway promoters together with the aggres-sive efforts of the city i t s e l f . Once the city of Spokane recog-nized i t s debt to the railways i n existence by 1888 and experienced the tangible benefits of the increased t r a f f i c they brought, i t "burned with railroading fever" (Fahey, 1965, p. 63). The Spokane F a l l s Review noted how the development of the Coeur d'Alene area.had. contributed to the city's growth and went on to point out that during 1887 and 1888, not only had the. different lines origina-ted and terminated more than 20,000 tons of freight monthly, but also that " f u l l y 5000 people reached Spokane F a l l s by the various l i n e s every month" (Jan. 1, 1889)• The Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway With the city's success i n generating t r a f f i c east, west, and south by 1888, i t was not surprising that Spokane promoters looked to the north as another area i n the Inland Empire which could supply t r a f f i c and profit to the city and i t s entrepreneurs. The proposed railway was called the Spokane F a l l s and Northern. It was intended to extend to the Columbia River i n order to con-nect with the Canadian Pacific Railway via a fleet of steamboats (Durham, 1912, p. 425; Fahey, 1965, p. 63). The rationale behind this railway to the north does not seem unusual when seen i n context. It was the last of railroads depicted on Map 11 to develop and obtain the trade of a sector of the potential, hinterland of Spokane not yet effectively linked to 42 the city. Although even from the start i t had been projected to tap the Kootenays, the Colville area of northern Washington was also seen as potentially significant i n increasing the prosperity of Spokane after completion of the railroad (Spokane F a l l s Review, April 1 8 , 1 8 8 8 ) . Such a railway would, indeed, approach four of the seven mining areas i n the Inland Empire tributary to Spokane: the Kootenay, the Metaline, the C o l v i l l e , and the Okanogan d i s t r i c t s . The Growth of Mining and Railway Rivalry Many railways i n the Kootenays were built almost entirely to tap the mineral resources of the region. Mining was the key-word i n the economic development of the area. While the mines, ore bodies, and mining camps were the raison d'etre for interest and competition i n the Kootenays, access to the various centres of mining activity was essential. Thus there was both a competition for the rich ores between mining companies over mineral claims and smelters, and a rivalry for the remunerative t r a f f i c i n pres and supplies between transportation companies over charters and route location. At f i r s t , before the railway network had begun to take shape, this transportation rivalry between companies and routes applied mainly to the steamboat operations on the lakes and rivers which were tributary to the major transcontinental railways. As railways became more and more important, they i n turn became the chief r i v a l s for transportation serving the mining industry. Rivalry to Nelson * The f i r s t example of railway rivalry i n the Kootenays came 43 right at the outset—with the construction of the f i r s t railways to enter the region. These, the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and the Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway, were both constructed to the town of Nelson. The discovery of rich s i l v e r and copper deposits five miles from Nelson on Toad Mountain i n 1886 was, i n the words of some of British Columbia's most famous historians, "the 'find' that re a l l y made Kootenay" (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 270). A rush to the Kootenays followed i n which most of the prospectors were American and many of the promoters were Spokane businessmen. A l -though transportation i n the area was d i f f i c u l t at f i r s t , some ore was.shipped out i n relatively small quantities by pack horse and riverboat to smelters i n Montana. In the context of this real need for'improved, transportation f a c i l i t i e s i n the area (Fahey,-1965, p. 96-97)» i t i s understandable that railway lines were soon con-structed. Both of the railways built to Nelson, then, must be ex-plained i n terms of supplying a demand for transport by the mining industry. Even at the outset of railway construction i n the Kootenay region, cross-border rivalry was strong. The f i r s t promoters of the Columbia and Kootenay Railway were American (British Columbia Statutes, 1888), and although a provincial charter was obtained as early as 1883, the project was disallowed by the federal government because i t "would i n a l l probability become a feeder to the Northern Pacific Railway" (British Columbia Sessional Papers. 1884, p. 175). As Roy has pointed out (1963, p. 68-69), " i f this l i n e secured busi-ness during the Canadian Pacific's construction period, the federal' cabinet contended, American traders would establish themselves i n the area and would be d i f f i c u l t to dislodge." I t was not u n t i l the project's promoters became Canadians and included a superin-tendent of the Canadian Pacific Railway that the charter was grant-ed. At the time of the original application by American steamboat operators for the charter for such a railway between the Columbia and Kootenay river systems, such an operation was seen as only a simple "portage" l i n e i n a predominantly water transportation network oriented southwards to the United States. In fact, the original name of the project i n f u l l was the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and Transportation Company, and this became the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and Navigation Company (Dorman, 1938, P« 169-170). By the time Canadian interests and the Canadian Pacific Railway had become involved i n the project i n 1887-1890, however, two important new developments had occurred. One was the discovery of ore on Toad Mountain i n 1886 as already noted, the other was the attempt of the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway to extend into the area from Spokane (Fahey, 1965, p. 9 3 ) . These develop-ments meant that the Canadian backed,Columbia and Kootenay Railway would be considerably more than a "portage" l i n e . I t would now be a branch lin e of the Canadian Pacific from Revelstoke. The Annual Report of that company for 1889 clearly states that the Columbia and Kootenay charter was secured "to prevent the i n -vasion by foreign lines of the Kootenay D i s t r i c t , i n Br i t i s h Columbia—a d i s t r i c t rich i n precious metals and other natural resources" (p. 1 8 ) . 45 The American railway competing with the Canadian Pacific's Columbia and Kootenay Railway was the Nelson and Fort Sheppard, a subsidiary of the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, with which i t con-nected at the border. The Spokane F a l l s and Northern's attempt to enter the Kootenays was not made easy for Canadians were well aware of what the proposed railway meant—the diverting to the south of wealth that should remain i n Canada. The f i r s t application for a charter to Nelson was unsuccessful, but the Spokane F a l l s and Nor-thern was extended north from Colville towards the border i n any case, and steamboat connections with the Canadian Pacific at Revel-stoke, via the Columbia River-Arrow Lakes, were made as planned. Largely due to the great demand for improved transportation i n the Kootenays the proposed railway received the support of various groups i n the province, and despite opposition a charter was ob-tained on i t s behalf by a group of Britis h Columbians (Fahey, 1965» p. 1 2 3 f ) . After further delays from Ottawa a charter from the federal government was also granted. Thus the f i r s t American r a i l -way into the Kootenays, the Nelson and Fort Sheppard, was completed i n 1893. Despite i t s i n i t i a l charter by Canadians, i t owed i t s construction to American interests i n Spokane. For both of the railways built" to Nelson mining t r a f f i c had provided the main incentive, but cross-border intercompany rivalry had brought about the evolution of two railways both at the same time. Since these lines were the f i r s t to be built and because l a t e r railways often followed a similar pattern, they have been examined i n greater detail than subsequent developments w i l l be. 46 By 1 8 9 3 when both these railways had been constructed to Nelson, considerable mining activity had shifted to other areas i n the Kootenays such as the Slocan and Rossland. Rivalry to the Slocan It was a significant testimony to the richness of the ores of the Slocan d i s t r i c t that, within four years of the f i r s t dis-covery of minerals, mines were i n production and the area was served by two railways, the Nakusp and Slocan and the Kaslo and Slocan. Both railways were r i v a l s for the ore t r a f f i c of the mines i n the area centred at Sandon, and both were constructed during the year 1 8 9 4 . The Nakusp and Slocan was promoted by Canadians who wanted to retain the t r a f f i c i n Canada; the Kaslo and Slocan, on the other hand, was constructed and financed by the Great Northern Railway i n the United States. The Canadian l i n e was supported by the provincial government which realized that without i t , the Kootenay trade "otherwise would be diverted to the south, and lo s t to British Columbia" (Davie, 1 8 9 4 , p. 3 ) . The provincial Attorney-General was able to persuade the Canadian Pac i f i c , with provincial backing, to construct and operate the l i n e . Rivalry between the two companies was fierce; i t even came to the point of open hos-t i l i t y when at one point employees of the Kaslo and Slocan tore down a station of the Nakusp and Slocan (Affleck, 1 9 5 8 , p. 2 9 ) . It i s quite clear that the rationale for both these railways was essentially the considerable mineral t r a f f i c of the Slocan (Corley, 1 9 6 7 , p. 1 ; Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1 8 9 | » p. 1 3 - - 1 4 ) . Both railways were short feeders to the transcontinental main lines 47 of the parent railroads, the Canadian Pacific and the Great Nor-thern. They were both "portage" lines insofar as they were iso-lated from a l l other r a i l trackage i n the region and relied on connections via the steamboat services on Arrow and Kootenay Lakes. The rationale for the construction of two other l i n e s by the Canadian Pacific can also be seen i n the mining importance of the Slocan. Both of these other railways were constructed to shorten the distance and problems of water transport along rivers or-varying navigability... The f i r s t of these was the branch l i n e south from Revelstoke^to the head of Upper Arrow Lake which, by making transportation along that route much easier and dependable on a year round basis, was intended to stimulate and divert the trade of the Kootenays via Revelstoke and the Canadian Pacific main l i n e (Roy, 1963, p. 31; Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1892, p. 1 1 ) . It did, of course, shorten transport by water from Robson and other points on the Columbia River system as well as from Nakusp and the Slocan, an important factor i n the ri v a l r y with American lines i n the Kootenays. The second of the new lines was the Slocan branch built north from the Canadian Pacific's Columbia and Kootenay Railway to Slocan Lake. Once again the Slocan mining t r a f f i c was the main reason for construction (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1897, p. 8 ) . This meant that i n i t s attempt to r i v a l the Great Northern and American interests i n the Slocan the Canadian Pacific had, along with the Nakusp and Slocan Railway, "another entrance to the Slocan" (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 254). 48 Rivalry to Rossland "One of the richest mines the world has ever seen" (Whit-taker, 1949» p. 2) was discovered on Red Mountain at Rossland i n 1890. With the discovery of other mines and the commencement of gold and copper shipments i n the following years, the area had come into real prominence by 1893. Mules, wagons, and riverboats were a l l used to ship ore to the nearest point on the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway, but costs of this kind of transportation were prohibitive (Whittaker, 1949, p. 7 ) . Once again railways were re-quired, and two companies began construction. Competition was intense, each lin e attempting to block the other from reaching the town (Fahey, 1965, p. 155). Despite the fact that both companies were promoted by Americans, they had opposite orientations, one Canadian and the other American. Of the two lines, the Columbia and Western Railway was provided to transport ore to a newly con-structed smelter at T r a i l ; the Red Mountain Railway, on the other hand, was built to move ore to smelters i n the United States. The Columbia and Western not only retained the mining t r a f f i c i n Canada but also i n 1897. the year following i t s f i r s t construction, was extended north to West Robson to connect with the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and thus with the Canadian Pacific system. It would seem, i n fact, that the Canadian Pacific was at least partly behind (morally i f not financially) the Columbia and .Western from the outset (Fahey, 1965, p. 172-173). Even at the time the Colum-bia and Western was seen as an important factor i n maintaining Canadian connections with Rossland and i n preventing the town from being "at the complete mercy" of the American interests behind 49 the Red Mountain Railway (Rossland Miner, Sept. 2 3 , 1 8 9 7 ) . In 1898 the Columbia and Western was purchased outright by the Canadian Pacific Railway and thus further competition between the two r a i l -ways at Rossland was truly Canadian versus American. The Canadian Pacific explained the rationale for this move as follows: "Rossland having become the principal mining centre i n British Columbia, i t was necessary either to build an independent, line to that place or acquire the Columbia and Western Railway, and the la t t e r was clearly the wiser choice" (Annual Report, 1 8 9 7 , P. 8 ) . . The. Red Mountain Railway, chartered i n 1 8 9 3 , followed the most direct route between Rossland and the Spokane F a l l s and Nor-thern Railway, of which i t was another subsidiary, and thus to Spokane. As the Nelson and Fort Sheppard had done earlier at Nelson, the Red Mountain lin e (and i t s United States counterpart the Columbia and Red Mountain Railway) tied the Kootenay mines at Rossland with the entire American railroad system, eliminating transhipment prob-lems which were s t i l l present on the r i v a l Canadian lines i n the Kootenays. A link with Spokane also appears logical since many of the companies responsible for mining development at Rossland were American owned and originated i n Spokane (Church, 19.61.,. p. 8 6 ) . In fact "at the beginning of 1 8 9 6 , a l l the major claims of Rossland were owned by Americans, most of whom were from Spokane" (Fahey, 1 9 6 5 , p. 158). As i n the case of the Nelson and Fort Sheppard, the presence of a Canadian oriented line stimulated American compe-t i t i o n and helped to explain the rapid construction of the Red Mountain l i n e . \ 50 Rivalry on the Waterways As noted i n Chapter 2, the water transport routes of the Kootenays must be considered as part of the railnet of the region. Originally the major water routes along the Columbia and Kootenay river systems were served by both Canadian and American navigation, companies unaffiliated with any railway companies. A l l railways were served equally. The largest of these companies, the Canadian owned Columbia and Kootenay Steam Navigation Company, operated on almost a l l the waterways^in the Kootenays by I896. As Affleck put i t (1958, p. 27), this company was "in a highly desirable position." I t served the Canadian Pa c i f i c , Columbia and Kootenay, and Nakusp and Slocan connections on the Columbia River and Arrow Lakes. At T r a i l i t also served the Columbia and Western Railway with connec-tions to the Canadian Pacific. It also connected with the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway at Northport and with i t s subsidiary, the Nelson and Fort Sheppard, at Nelson (Affleck, 1958, p. 27). It brought t r a f f i c to the Great Northern Railway at Bonners Ferry on the Kootenay River i n Idaho from the Kaslo and Slocan at Kaslo and from other points. As the mining t r a f f i c increased, however, the capacity of these navigation companies came to be considered inadequate (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1896, p. 9 ) . What followed, therefore, was predictable; the two giant international r i v a l transcontinental^ the Canadian Pacific and the Great Northern, carried their rivalry i n r a i l transport over to the arena of water transport. The Canadian Pacific acted f i r s t by acquiring the Columbia and Kootenay Steam Navigation Company. As the Canadian 51 Pacific stated at the time, "The Company has been at a great disad-vantage i n reaching the t r a f f i c of the mining d i s t r i c t s of Southern British Columbia i n having to depend upon steamboat connections con-tro l l e d by other parties. The rapid growth of the t r a f f i c , the high rates exacted, aid the inadequate service performed" thus led to the purchase of the steamboat company and the putting under construction of three additional steamers (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1896, p. 9 ) . The immediate result was the curtailing of steamboat ser-vice by the Canadian Pacific to the Great Northern at Bonners Ferry and the Nelson and Fort Sheppard at Nelson. Kuskonook became the terminus for water transport service on Kootenay Lake. This led to the construction of new railways by the Great Northern and the acquisition by that company of a somewhat smaller steamboat operation, the International Navigation and Trading Company, on Kootenay Lake. For over a decade intercompany rivalry between the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern Railways was also expressed i n energetic competi-tion between their water transport services i n the area. Rivalry to the Crowsnest and Kootenay Lake Despite the moves of the Canadian Pacific to compete with American oriented railways, Canadian attempts to retain the Kootenay mining trade for Canada were relatively unsuccessful. Access from United States centres to the south was relatively easy; access to the Kootenays from Canadian centres to both the east and west was relatively more d i f f i c u l t due to the topographic grain of the region; and access from the north, via the Canadian Pacific main l i n e , was 52 long, circuitous, and involved a number of transhipments between r a i l and water. At the same time, no Canadian centres comparable to Spokane were as near the region as the American town. The mile-age by r a i l to most points i n the Kootenays from Spokane was of the order of 200-250 miles. The mileage to the same points from Van-couver was 500-600 miles, from Calgary was 350-450 miles, and for both necessitated changing from r a i l to water, and to some points, back to r a i l again (McCulloch, 1938, p. 2 - 3 ) . In terms of time, Vancouver was seven times as far away from the Kootenays as Spokane i n the 1890's, Calgary about four or five times as far (Roy/1963, p. 3 7 ) . The result was, as has been noted, a tendency for the region to be tributary to Spokane. This tendency was perpetuated by the fact that, at this time, most entrepreneurs and individuals ex-plo i t i n g the region had entered via Spokane and thought, for the most part, only i n terms of interchange with and through that cen-tre. The net of American railways which served the Kootenays areally portrays this fact i n the sense that they a l l led to Spo-kane, almost as spokes to the hub of a wheel, and this pattern was to continue with further construction of American l i n e s into the area. Canadian interests were well aware of the problem of Kootenay trade being diverted southwards. As early as the 1860's the Dewdney T r a i l was built i n an attempt to alter the direction of trade flows. Some such as Sproat, who visi t e d the area on behalf of the provincial government i n 1884, thought that the construction of the transcontinental main lin e of the Canadian 53 Pacific Railway would be sufficient to change the orientation of the area (British Columbia Sessional Papers, 1884, p. 310,323). That this did not happen has already been made clear. The Kootenay region was, i n fact, after the completion of the Canadian Pacific main l i n e , "the l a s t important area i n Canada which was cut off from the rest of the national economy" (McDougall, 1968, p. 73). The subsequent construction and acquisition of short branches and "portage" lines by the Canadian Pac i f i c , namely the Columbia and Kootenay, Nakusp and Spokane, and Columbia and Western, were rela-t i v e l y unsuccessful i n comparison with the direct a l l r a i l routes constructed north from the United States. In order to keep the Kootenay trade i n Canada, another attempt similar to the Dewdney T r a i l was necessary. From surveys conducted i t had been established that a l i n e from Alberta to the east, through the Crowsnest Pass, was more feasible than a direct l i n k with the Pacific Coast. It was well known that the Hope Mountains would be d i f f i c u l t to penetrate with a railway (Roy, 1963, p. 4 0 ) . A railway through the Crowsnest Pass, on the other hand, had been proposed and chartered as early as 1888 (Dorman, 1938, p. 5 7 ) , and the Canadian Pacific had hoped to construct such a lin e as early as 1891 "to protect the Company's interests i n southern British Columbia, including the Kootenay d i s t r i c t which i s now assuming great importance owing to i t s remarkable mineral developments" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1891, p. 1 2 ) . Finally i n 1897 the Canadian Pacific reasserted i t s interest i n such a l i n e , emphasizing that any further delay would be "extremely dangerous", and stated that steps had been 54 taken towards "commencement of the work" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, I896, p. 10)• Concern was expressed at the same time "that unless your Company occupies the ground, others w i l l , the de-mand for shipping and travelling f a c i l i t i e s being most urgent" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1896, p. 1 0 ) . The Canadian Pacific was aware, for instance, that the Great Northern was intend-ing to construct a branch north across the border to Kuskonook, near the projected terminus of the Crowsnest l i n e (Affleck, 1958, p. 32). Without such a line through the Crowsnest, the Canadian Pacific "would continue at a disadvantage i n competing with the American lines (which have already reached Nelson, Rossland, and other important centres i n these districts) u n t i l i t shall have direct railway con-nections of i t s own. Until then the greater part of the mining traf-f i c w i l l be beyond i t s reach, and w i l l continue to be, as at present, carried by the American lines southward" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, I896, p. 1 0 ) . And, as the report went on to conclude, "the interest of the country at large i s so much concerned i n this question that your Directors confidently expect reasonable assistance at the hands of the Dominion Government." Nevertheless construction of the line was delayed. With the financial depression of the mid 1890*8 the Canadian Pacific was unable to obtain government assist-ance for several years, despite the confident expectations voiced above (McDougall, 1968, p. 78-79). Although the need to compete for the mining t r a f f i c of the Kootenays appears to have been the most significant aspect of the rationale for the Crowsnest Pass Railway, there were other reasons as well. The federal government wanted to link the area with the 55 rest of the Canadian economy (Macpherson, 1959, III, p. 373)• Such a lin e could also be used by the Canadian Pacific on a broader, con-tinental scale along with the Soo Line Railway, an American subsidi-ary of the Canadian Pacific i n the United States midwest, as part of a through route to Chicago from the Pacific Coast i n competition with such American lines as the Great Northern and Northern Pacific. It could also serve as an alternative to the main l i n e to the north, and as a means of tapping the t r a f f i c of Spokane (Vaughan, 1920, p. 222), a development that was to occur later. The federal sub-sidy and provincial land grants were an additional incentive. The major attractions of course were the rich metal ores of the Kootenays and the rich, untouched coal f i e l d s of the Crowsnest Pass area. With the construction of the railway, development of the coal began im-mediately and a branch line to the rich lead-silver-zinc ores of the Kimberley area was also constructed. With the completion of the Crowsnest Pass Railway (under the charter of the Britis h Columbia Southern Railway) i n 1898, i t might appear that the Canadian Pacific had f i n a l l y captured the Kootenay mining trade for Canada. Not only was the location of this line strategic, there had also been the almost simultaneous acquisition of the Columbia and Western Railway and the Columbia and Kootenay Steam Navigation Company. Such a victory did not occur i n fact, and there followed a concentrated effort by the Great Northern to improve s t i l l further i t s means of access to the Kootenays through acquisition and construction of new railway routes. It acquired the International Trading and Navigation Company i n 1898 (see p. 5 1 ) , and i n the same year purchased the 56 controlling interest i n the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, with i t s subsidiaries into the Kootenays, the Nelson and Fort Sheppard and the Red Mountain Railways. The Bedlington and Nelson Railway was constructed north to Kuskonook to compete with the newly completed Crowsnest Pass l i n e . The threat of this railway, chartered i n 1897, was i n fact another stimulant to the construction of the Canadian l i n e (Affleck, 1958, p. 32). With the termini of both these railways i n close proximity to each other near the south end of Kootenay Lake at Kootenay Landing-Kuskonook, the site became an important transhipment centre for ores from the Nelson, Slocan, and Kootenay Lake mining camps transported south along the lake by steamboat. The Canadian Pacific's attempt to intercept water t r a f f i c bound for Bonners Ferry and the Great Northern main lin e was thus countered by the Great Northern shortening the water route, and extending a branch lin e i n i t s stead to the new Canadian tran-shipment site. Intercompany rivalry was leading not only to the evolution of new transportation routes, but also to the replace-ment of the slower and less satisfactory water transport system by r a i l lines. Further evidence of this i n the same area was provided i n the construction, under the Br i t i s h Columbia Southern charter, by the Canadian Pacific i n 1900 of a r a i l extension from Nelson east to Proctor. This shortened the water distance between Nelson and Kootenay Landing as well as (and more importantly) by-passing the often frozen and thus impassable western arm of Kootenay Lake (Affleck, 1958, p. 1 3 ) . Another counterthrust by the Great Northern into Canadian Pacific territory was the Crows Nest Southern Railway built into 57 the East Kootenays. The rationale for this l i n e was rivalry over the coal f i e l d s already reached by the Canadian Pacific. The Crows Nest Pass Coal Company, the major coal mining company i n the area, was a Great Northern Railway subsidiary and the Morrissey, Fernie, and Michel Railway with i t s branch lines to-the coal mines, was . owned by the coal company and hence also a part of the Great Nor-thern system (Corley, 1967, p. 3). With this investment i n the area, i t was only to be expected that the American railway would construct a lin e connecting i t with i t s main l i n e , at the same time competing with the Crowsnest branch of the Canadian Pacific. Despite the action taken by Canadian interests to provide a direct a l l r a i l line into the area, the Great Northern was thus able to tap the t r a f f i c potential of the line i n two places, link-ing the Kootenays even more closely and effectively with the ad-jacent United States. This was done simply by constructing two new short feeder lines north across the border from the Great Nor-thern main l i n e . As i n the cases of earlier American r a i l invasions of the Kootenays,-the boundary did not prevent the southwards flow of the valuable heavy tonnages of ore and concentrates to the United States. Rivalry to the Boundary The next scene of mining activity i n the Kootenay d i s t r i c t was the Boundary country i n the west. Rich copper ores had been discovered here as early as 1891> with development beginning two or three years later, shipments being made in "trains" of pack animals (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 284). 58 The f i r s t railway to obtain a charter to enter the Boundary area was the Columbia and Western i n 1896, and this was an additional reason for which the Canadian Pacific found i t desirable to acquire that company. Extension of this railway to Midway by early 1 9 0 0 was achieved not only to tap the mining t r a f f i c of the Boundary (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, I 8 9 8 , p. 6), but also as with the Crowsnest branch, to provide a'further link in the Canadian Pacific's "south l i n e " through Briti s h Columbia (McCulloch, 1938, p. 4; Roy, 1963, p. 42). At the same time as the Columbia and Western reached Midway, two spurs were built to mines at DeadWood and Phoenix. Although the f i r s t to supply r a i l service to the Boundary mining area, the Canadian Pacific was not to remain unchallenged for long. Two competing railways were also serving the Boundary by 1902. The f i r s t of these, the Spokane and British Columbia Railway, was an independent Canadian enterprise "to bring ores from the mines at Republic (Washington) to the Granby smelter at Grand Forks" (Corley, 1967, p. 5). For the f i r s t time a Canadian railway had crossed the international boundary i n order to tap resources i n the United States. While this mine t r a f f i c operation south from Grand Forks was the primary raison d'etre for the railway, i t s charter also permitted i t to extend north along the Kettle River and west to Midway and Hope. The third railway into the Boundary d i s t r i c t , the Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern, was another attempt of the Great Northern to compete with Canadian interests generally and the Canadian Pa-c i f i c specifically. Originally a Canadian enterprise to build a railway from Vancouver through southern Briti s h Columbia to Ross-59 land (Roy, 1963, p. 47-48), the Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern was subsequently taken over by the Great Northern and i t s charter was used to construct future Great Northern extensions into southern British Columbia between the Boundary d i s t r i c t and the Lower Fraser Valley. By linking the Boundary area with the east and providing a second outlet for Republic ores, the Great Northern had, i n one move, provided effective competition for both the Columbia and Wes-tern and the independent Spokane and British Columbia. Both Canadian l i n e s attempted to prevent the Great Northern's subsidiary from crossing their lines where necessary but such actions only delayed the American railway a short time. In the following years the Great Northern pushed further westward, reaching Midway by 1906 i n i t s construction of a "third main l i n e " (third after the f i r s t l i n e to Everett, the second to Portland—see Map 12) to the Pacific Coast at Vancouver. Such a through east-west route was i n direct r i v a l r y with the Canadian Pacific's proposed "south l i n e " through British Columbia. Although they extend beyond the region of study i n this thesis, both of these lines were to extend, pa r a l l e l , to Vancouver through the Okanagan, the Similkameen, and the Lower Fraser Valley. As can be seen from Map 12, the Canadian Pacific l i n e evolved entirely i n Canada, whereas the Great Northern pro-ceeded westward with l i t t l e concern for the international border, crossing i t and re-crossing i t wherever the easiest route or some t r a f f i c generating point dictated. It i s of interest to note that where the Hope Mountains rendered i t impossible to the two railways to run parallel to each other, they were forced to co-operate and operate jointly one stretch of railway (See Map 12). Once again VANCOUVER c ox HOPE,/ "^o^RINCETON -Z- PENTICTON W A S H I N 6 / T O N {EVERETT fSEATTLE 0 23 50 ' >• I.I i • 75 100 Miles PORTLAND M O N T A N A SPOKANE \ ) \ CANADIAN PACIFIC5 • • CONSTRUCTED " — PROJECTED (COMPLETED 1930) GREAT NORTHERN « — • JOINT G.N.-C.P M M JOINT G.N.-CANADIAN NORTHERN S O U T H L I N E OF T H E C A N A D I A N P A C I F I C AND T H R E E M A I N L I N E S OF THE G R E A T N O R T H E R N IN 1916 61 intercompany rivalry had influence railway evolution i n southern Britis h Columbia. With further developments i n the Boundary area the Spokane and British Columbia Railway, or the Kettle Valley Railway as i t became known, was f i r s t backed and later leased by the Canadian Pacific for more effective service i n competition with the Great Northern. By 1931 i t lost i t s separate identity and was completely absorbed into the Canadian Pacific Railway system (Corley, 1967, p. 5 ) . Once again a small independent lin e had disappeared in the face of rivalry between the two giant transcontinentals. Rivalry to the Lardeau Another scene of intercompany railway rivalry i n the Kootenays was the Lardeau district to the north of Kootenay Lake. In 1898 the Great Northern announced that an extension would be built north from i t s terminus at Kuskonook along the east side of Kootenay Lake to the Trout Lake area i n the Lardeau. The Canadian Pacific countered with a proposed railway extension from Arrowhead to Kootenay Lake through the Lardeau (Affleck, 1938, p. 34). In-deed, a l l Canadian Pacific Railway maps of the period show such a proposed extension. The Great Northern obtained a charter for the Kaslo and Lardo-Duncan Railway and i n 1901 both companies began constructing parallel lines north from the upper end of Kootenay Lake. The Canadian Pacific was able to delay Great Northern con-struction over a legal"matter for a time, and since the area's mining boom turned out to be relatively small and short-lived, the American railway abandoned the project before r a i l s were ever l a i d . 62 Only the Canadian Pacific's Arrowhead and Kootenay Railway was bu i l t , and only to Gerrard; the extension to Arrowhead was never constructed. Intercompany rivalry over potential mining t r a f f i c had again led to'new railway construction. Like other lines built i n the Kootenays, the Arrowhead and Kootenay Railway was entirely dependent on steamboat connections. A Counterthrust to Spokane: Canadian Retaliation The rationale for the Spokane International Railway i s more complex than that for many of the railways i n the Kootenays. It was, essentially, constructed as a li n k between Spokane and the Canadian Pacific Railway, but at whose instigation i s not completely certain. Some authorities (e.g. Moir, 1940, p. 6) suggest that the Canadian Pacific was responsible; others (e.g. Graham, 1963, p. 117), that Spokane interests promoted the railway. It would appear that both parties were involved and wanted the link for different reasons (See Chapter k). As i t was, the Spokane International proper only ran from Spokane to the border. The Canadian Pacific constructed the l i n k between the boundary and i t s Crowsnest branch. For both parties competition with the American transcontinentals, the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific, was of central importance. Spo-kane interests desired lower freight rates on eastbound shipments than either of the two American railways would give (Fahey, 1965, p. 210-211). By linking the city with the Canadian Pac i f i c , Spokane would, i n effect, be situated on a third transcontinental railway and one that, by virtue of the Crows Nest Pass Agreement alone, would provide lower rates. 63 From the beginning the Canadian Pacific also displayed an interest i n the project. Not only did i t find i t necessary to finance the project i n part from the outset, i t also obtained an option for control, brought about an agreement by which no other transcontinental would be permitted to obtain control for a period of f i f t y years (Durham, 1912, p. 528), and i n 1916 f i n a l l y purchased a controlling interest i n the company. The Canadian railway's interest i n such a line appears to have been primarily motivated by competition with the Great Northern. In retaliation for the most recent Great Northern thrusts into Canadian, and thus Canadian y Pacific, territory i n the Boundary d i s t r i c t , the Canadian company invaded the American railway's hinterland. As Fahey (1965, p. 210) has noted, i t "could have entered Spokane anytime i n the past ten years but stayed out of H i l l ' s (the Great Northern's president) territory u n t i l he invaded theirs." Again intercompany riv a l r y was stimulating railway construction, for without the Canadian Paci-f i c ' s interest i n the Spokane International i t i s doubtful that i t would ever have been constructed (Wallace, 1965, p. 1 2 ) . Later Railway Developments In the years following 1906 the only railways affected by active rivalry were spur lines constructed in the Boundary d i s t r i c t and lines built between that area and Hope, outside the study area. Both cases, again involving the Canadian Pacific and the Great Northern, have been referred to earlier (See p. 59)• . Other railway construction i n the area was not extensive but f a l l s into two general categories; short spur lines, and consolidation 64 l i n e s of the Canadian Pacific. The short spurs constructed were not numerous. American interests from Spokane built the Eastern British Columbia Railway i n order to ship out coal from property they owned. The Canadian Pacific constructed a short line from Caithness on the Crowsnest branch to Waldo, already served by the Great Northern's Crows Nest Southern, i n order to compete for local forest and agricultural t r a f f i c . Neither of these lines was very long-lived, and both were built to exploit local resources. More significant i n terms of mileage and the degree of per-manency were the two lines constructed by the Canadian Pacific i n a move to strengthen and consolidate i t s position i n the Kootenays. The f i r s t of these railways was the Kootenay Central, a lin e intend-ed to l i n k the Crowsnest branch with the transcontinental main l i n e , just as the earlier acquired steamboat company had linked the various scattered lines of the Canadian Pacific with the main lin e over the Columbia River system. A long term project begun i n 1910 and com-pleted i n 1915, the Kootenay Central was not regarded as urgent (in the manner which lines built to compete with American railways had been). At the same time i t was looked on as a means of encouraging long term settlement and development i n the East Kootenays, and this i n turn would generate t r a f f i c (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual  Report, 1910, p. 8 ) . The second consolidation li n e of the Canadian Pacific was the railway along the west side of Kootenay Lake completed i n 1930. The rationale for this project was the elimination of the tranship-ment problems, inconvenience,' and delay which resulted previously with the continuous loading and unloading of railway cars, freight, 65 and passengers on barges and ferries. With i t s completion, the Canadian Pacific had f i n a l l y made i t s "south l i n e " across Briti s h Columbia an a l l r a i l route from the Pacific Coast to the Crowsnest. From this investigation of later railway developments i t can be seen that intercompany riv a l r y was no longer as s i g n i f i -cant i n the Kootenays. The Great Northern was beginning to retreat from the area and the Canadian Pacific was strengthening i t s network and i t s position there. Renewed Rivalry: Rediscovery of the Crowsnest Surprisingly enough considering the numerous abandonments of railways and the relative decline i n the importance of r a i l trans-port generally, cross-border intercompany railway ri v a l r y between the same two companies was renewed i n the area during 1968. The development of large new coal reserves i n the Natal-Michel area by Kaiser Steel for Japanese interests was the occasion. Both railway companies were anxious to obtain a share of the t r a f f i c . While the Canadian Pacific's Crowsnest branch s t i l l traversed the area, the Great Northern's old Crows Nest Southern li n e had long been abandon-ed and i t s right of way occupied by roads and other obstacles to rebuilding. A new charter had to be obtained to permit the Great Northern to re-enter the area and accordingly,- the Kootenay and Elk Railway was incorporated jointly by the Great Northern and Crows Nest Industries, the American owned company which held the rights to the coal reserves. The 70 mile route ; between the coal f i e l d s and the Great Northern was surveyed, and the American railway announced that i t s coal rates would be lower than those published 66 by the Canadian Pacific. There followed considerable verbal r i v a l -ry between the two railways and their supporters (Vancouver Sun, Jan.-March, 1968). The Canadian Pacific was forced to match the lower rates and convince the federal government that to charter a link with the Great Northern would be against Canadian interests. It would appear that this was successful insofar as the Great Nor-thern has, to date, not been permitted to enter the Kootenays again. The Canadian Pacific, on the other hand, obtained a charter for a 34 mile branch line to coal reserves of i t s own near the Fording Eiver north of Michel. Once again, this time i n the present day, riv a l r y over mineral resources i n the Kootenays has led to new r a i l -way developments. In view of the hypothesis central to this thesis, i t would appear that the boundary has gradually become more effective as a barrier to American railways. The Rationale for Railway Abandonments The pattern and nature of railway abandonments in the Kooten-ays i s closely related to their development. Just as rivalry i n -fluenced their growth, so the aftermath of that ri v a l r y was reflected i n their decline. The obvious reason for most railway abandonments or for that matter, the discontinuance of any mode of transport i s the loss of i t s economic v i a b i l i t y . This, as Patmore discusses (1965, p. 73-76), may occur for three different reasons: a) compe-t i t i o n by road or other transport mode, b) loss or modification of original t r a f f i c flows, or c) overduplication as a result of compe-t i t i o n during construction. It i s interesting to relate this to the pattern of abandonments i n the Kootenays. 67 For the most part Kootenay railway abandonment occurred early, most of i t before 1920, almost a l l of i t before 1930, when intermodal competition was relatively insignificant. Patmorels second factor i s much more relevant. Railways were built into the Kootenays essentially to serve the mining t r a f f i c ; when the mines were depleted or became uneconomic the rationale for many railways was also gone, and l i k e the mines they began to disappear. This was the case im the Boundary mining area by 1920, when much of the railnet there had been abandoned. It was also true to a greater or lesser extent at the other mining centres at different times:-at Rossland, i n the Crowsnest, and in the Slocan. In a number of cases, such as the Canadian P a c i f i c 1 s Columbia and Western at Ross-land, removed i n 1966, the trackage had remained long after the mine t r a f f i c had disappeared and served as a means to transport general freight un t i l i t f i n a l l y succumbed to road competition i n the i960«s (McDonald, n.d., p. 5 ) . In both the Slocan and the Lardeau Canadian Pacific abandonments resulted from a similar dimin-ishing i n the volume of general t r a f f i c shipped by r a i l (Currie, 1959, p. 388-389). Abandonment of the Arrowhead branch was hasten-ed i n 1968 by the ri s i n g waters resulting from the construction of new hydro-electric dams on the Columbia River system. It i s the third factor noted by Patmore that i s most rele-vant to the themes of this thesis and the spatial pattern of aban-doned railways i n the Kootenays. Overduplication of railways undoubtedly occurred during the development of the railnet when both Canadian and American companies attempted to serve every mining area i n the region. In most areas one railway could probably have 68 provided adequate service ( i t would be d i f f i c u l t to verify this), but with the arrival of two there resulted a more competitive situ-ation with lower rates and better service. There was even over-duplication of lines constructed by the same company. The^Canadian Pacific, for example, constructed lines into the Slocan from both the west and the south. Another example i s the Great Northern's Bedlington and Nelson Railway to Kuskonook which "drew t r a f f i c from the GNR's Nelson-Northport-Spokane route", the earlier Nelson and Fort Sheppard-Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railways (Affleck, 1958, p. 4 1 ) . The two r a i l routes were generally parallel and one of them was clearly unnecessary insofar as they both tapped the Nelson, Slo-can, and Kootenay Lake mining areas on behalf of the Great Northern. The newer and more direct of the two lines, the Bedlington and Nelson, bypassed the city of Nelson i n favour of Kaslo. In the face of Nelson's opposition however, the Great Northern was unable to have the Nelson and Fort Sheppard Railway "rubbed off the map" (Affleck, 1958, p. 41) > and so the Bedlington and Nelson lin e was abandoned instead. Not only was i t the f i r s t l i n e to be completely abandoned i n the Kootenays, i t was also the shortest lived, being i n existence a period of only 13 years. It provides the best ex-ample of Kootenay r a i l abandonment as a result of overduplication. The spatial pattern of abandoned railways i n the Kootenays i s particularly distinctive (See Map 9)» A l l but three abandoned l i n e s are located i n close proximity to the international boundary, and on closer examination of these lines near the border, i t should be noted that a l l but three were "foreign", constructed to tap resources across the border (seven American lines i n Canada, one 69 Canadian line i n the United States). With the general decline i n t r a f f i c volume i n the area, i t became uneconomic to have two r a i l -ways serving each centre. As the areas on each side of the boundary became more closely consolidated and the east-west r a i l lines close to and parallel with the border became more effective i n integrating the border areas with their respective national economies, the "foreign" north-south feeder lines tapping resources i n both coun-t r i e s were abandoned. The decline i n t r a f f i c alone does not ex-plain this pattern of abandonment since i n most areas there was s t i l l enough t r a f f i c to support one railway. The lines to be aban-doned i n each case where bverduplication existed were the foreign feeder lines and this occurred consistently and comprehensively, leaving very few foreign owned li n e s on either side of the border i n the study area. This i s another interesting consequence, with spatial expression, of the particular nature of overduplication resulting from cross-border railway r i v a l r y during the period of evolution. In most cases, lines pushed across the boundary by foreign interests were simply regarded as short term feeders use-f u l i n tapping a lucrative t r a f f i c . Long term regional develop-ment and the consolidation of transportation interests by the railways was only carried out on their own respective sides of the border. Directly or indirectly, then, the boundary was gradu-a l l y becoming more meaningful as a barrier i n the period following the era of greatest railway construction. Railway Rivalry i n the Kootenays—An Overview Such, then, i s the detailed examination of the rationale for the evolution of railways i n the Kootenays. A number of 7 0 interesting generalizations can be made about this rationale. F i r s t and most important, i t appears that intercompany cross-border ri v a l r y between American and Canadian interests i n the area was indeed significant. In almost a l l of the various scenes of railway construction i n the Kootenays, both American and Canadian transportation services were competing for t r a f f i c within a short period of time. The fact that this same development occurred repeatedly i n different areas at different times serves to empha^ size the importance of rivalry i n bringing about the spatial pattern of the railnet. The same type of development occurred at Nelson, i n the Slocan, at Rossland, on the lakes and rivers, i n the Boundary, i n the Crowsnest, and even at Spokane. Another interesting general aspect of railway evolution i n the Kootenays i s the fact that almost a l l r a i l l i n e s i n the area were either constructed or taken over by one of two major railway companies, either the Canadian transcontinental (Canadian P a c i f i c ) , or the American transcontinental (Great Northern). No railway of any significance i n the Kootenays was to evolve that was not direct-l y owned by or closely a f f i l i a t e d with either of these two operations. Each of the two railway systems was, i n fact, an independent opera-tion with a minimum of interchange t r a f f i c between them. Function-a l l y , therefore, the railnet of the Kootenays should not be considered a single network, but rather two separate treelike networks each with i t s own system of flows. In other words, i t can be extremely misleading to make inferences about a network from i t s appearance on a map. Although i t may appear to be a single graph, functionally i t may actually be two separate graphs, each with i t s own flows. 71 As Map 13 i l l u s t r a t e s , there was a minimum of overlap, i n routes between the two Kootenay systems. Rather, the two subgraphs,-botfc very treelike, interlaced each other usually meeting only at point of t r a f f i c generation. A further generalization that can be made about the rationale for railway construction i n the Kootenays i s that the t r a f f i c generating centres which stimulated cross-border rivalry and attracted the development of transportation routes by interest from both sides of the border were mineral resource sites. A l -though figures on t r a f f i c flows are not available, there i s l i t t l e doubt that mining t r a f f i c outweighed a l l other t r a f f i c i n the early period of the region's development. Most of the branch l i n e s and feeders were built to f a c i l i t a t e mineral resource ex-ploitation, to profit from the transportation of ore from mines and concentrators to smelters, and of supplies and passengers into the area from outside. In this context i t i s necessary to compare railways to other existing forms of transport. Transportation posed a problem even i n permitting access to the Kootenays by miners and prospectors i n the early period. Riverboats and t r a i l s were built and complemented each other. Mining discoveries were made despite the d i f f i c u l t i e s of access even before the Northern Pacific and Canadian Pacific main lines were completed. Water transport developed to aid Canadian Pacific construction, and with the completion of both railroads mining camp settlement developed. Some form of transportation was essential for mining development and early mines depended on shipments by riverboat, pack horse, and wagon. The evidence 73 clearly indicates that railways were not prerequisites for develop-ment, but that their construction stimulated i t i n several ways. Although lower transport costs were the most apparent advantage, concentrators and smelters were also means by which transport costs could be lowered (by reducing the volume of shipments), and r a i l -ways were usually the only practicable way by which the heavy machinery, limestone, and coal required by such plants could be transported. More important for numerous mine promoters, the a r r i v a l of railways meant that larger quantities and lower grades of ore could be shipped. In some cases water transport was unable to ship Kootenay ores as fast as they were mined-(Fahey, 1965, p. 148). Railways also meant that those mines furthest from water routes and previously at the greatest disadvantage could be served equally well. In the Boundary area, for example, "until the advent of railroads, ...vast bodies of ore lay undeveloped, or at any rate, remained non shippers" (Howay, 1914, p. 479)• Until the lower costs of railway transportation had been provided many areas were handicapped (Innis, 1937, p. 2 7 7 f ) . Although water transport accounted for most of the trans-portation in the Kootenays before the advent of railways and con-tinued to be important afterwards, i t s greatest disadvantage was the number of transhipments required between water, r a i l , and t r a i l . This problem continued to some extent even after the introduction of railways for some lines were "portages" between water bodies or depended on water transport for connections with other railways. As more and more railways were constructed, however, the number of intermodal transhipments required tended to decrease. Gradually 74 railways replaced water transport entirely along many routes i n the area, as has already been noted, and the heavy volume of mine traf-f i c was able to flow more smoothly and more cheaply as transhipments disappeared. Additional evidence indicating that mining was the major motive behind cross-border railway rivalry and construction may be provided by the correlation of the sequences of dates i n Table 1. TABLE 1 SEQUENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MAJOR MINING CENTRES DATE OF DATE OF DATE OF DATE OF MINING ORE INITIAL MINE RAILWAY RAILWAY CENTRE DISCOVERY PRODUCTION CHARTER COMPLETION CANADIAN,'AMERICAN CANADIAN AMERICAN Nel son 1886 1888 1889 V 4 1891 1892 1893 Slocan 1891 1892 1893 1892 1895 1895 Rossland 1890 1891 1896 1893 1896 1896 Crowsnest 1887 I898 1888 1901 1898 1902 Boundary 1891 1893 I896 1897 1899 1902 The sequence i n which railways were chartered and completed to the various mining camps correlates quite closely with both the dates of ore discovery and the dates of i n i t i a l production i n the five major mining areas of the Kootenays. The greatest discrepancy i n the pattern, the delay between mineral discovery and development i n the Crowsnest, i s probably best explained by the different na-ture of the mineral found there—coal. A l l the other mining camps produced lode metals and concentrates—lead, silver, zinc, copper, and gold—whose greater value per unit weight or volume than coal 75 would result i n development relatively sooner after i n i t i a l dis-covery. The Crowsnest coal f i e l d s were not exploited until demand increased, particularly from the Kootenays1 smelters and the r a i l -ways. In total, there i s l i t t l e doubt that mineral resources stimulated most cross-border railway rivalry i n the Kootenay region. Innis has examined this subject i n detail. (For a more specific examination of the interrelationships between mining and railways i n the study area than can be given here, together with a number of conclusions about such interrelationships i n general, reference should be made to Innis, Settlement and the Mining Frontier, 1937, Chapters V and VI.) He notes that large scale mining development was dependent on railways (p. 316) which i n turn deliberately en-courage mining i n order to increase t r a f f i c "in relatively non-remunerative, high cost of construction, operation, and maintenance territory" and to obtain "important long haul westbound transcon-tinental t r a f f i c i n the form of machinery and passengers from the industrial east" (p. 313). As noted i n Chapter 2, the transcontin-ental lines had been located with l i t t l e regard for local resources and t r a f f i c . Hence i t was necessary i n the 1890-1920 period to encourage resource development i n general and the mining industry, the major t r a f f i c generating activity, i n particular i n order to p r o f i t on otherwise expensive and non-remunerative sections of the main l i n e . Both Canadian and American transcontinentaisfollowed such a procedure and i n so doing became r i v a l s i n providing compe-t i t i v e service and routes to the same mineral t r a f f i c generating centres. Also of significance i s the fact that a l l four of the 7 6 major railway interests i n the region, namely the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, the Columbia and Western, the Great Northern, and the Canadian Pacific, also became actively involved with invest-ment i n the mining industry. Although most of the railway projects built i n the study area were constructed to serve the mining industry, this i s not true of a l l . Some lines, such as the Waldo branch of the Canadian Pacific, were built to exploit other resources; others, such as the Kootenay Central, were built to promote settlement and to consolidate the railway network i n the area; while s t i l l others, such as the Spokane International, were retaliatory attempts to compete jfor general t r a f f i c . In retrospect then, i t appears that Kootenay railnet evolu-tion can be explained with very l i t t l e reference to the interna-tional boundary. Essentially i t seems that railways evolved as a result of intercompany cross-border ri v a l r y for mineral resources, almost as a network might have evolved i f there had been rivalry between two railway interests i n an area with no international bor-der, as w i l l be investigated below. Only with the abandonment of r a i l l i n e s did the border's presence appear to be significant as a barrier. Although the border did not function as a barrier to railways, there did appear to have been nationalistic elements i n the intercompany rivalry examined on the part of Canadian inter-ests. For instance, competition with American interests seeking to tap the area was provided by the Canadian Pacific which was able i n so doing to acquire special aid from both provincial and federal governments. This was particularly evident i n the Crows 77 Nest Agreement. Such nationalistic elements would not have existed had there been no international boundary, had the area been one p o l i t i c a l entity. The border's presence seems to have been acknow-ledged i n other ways as well. It would appear, for example, particu-l a r l y to Canadian interests, that the boundary was important i n defining the area which was being "invaded". With the passage of time this awareness of the border may have increased, although not to the point where American li n e s were greatly hindered from crossing i t . In a number of ways, therefore, the boundary did appear to have had an indirect effect on railway evolution even i f i t did not func-tion as a significant barrier to lines attempting to cross i t . An Analogy to Kootenay Railnet Evolution In this section i t i s hoped to show the similarity of railnet evolution i n a region not spanned by an international boundary to that of the Kootenays. In this way i t should be possible to demon-strate further the lack of importance of the 49th parallel border as a barrier to Kootenay railnet evolution. For purposes of comparison the region selected should be as similar to the Kootenays as possible i n terms of the elements influencing railway evolution, the major exception being of course the absence of an international boundary. Accordingly i t was decided to select the Arizona-New Mexico region of the United States lying between the main lines of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe (henceforth to be referred to simply as the Santa Fe) and the Southern Pacific Railways (See Map 14). This re-gion would appear .to be l i k e the Kootenays i n terms of the two major elements hypothesized to have had an important influence on railway evolution i n the Kootenays, namely (a) rich natural resources, and El Paso T E X A S 79 (b) the presence of two highly competitive railway companies. The Arizona-New Mexico region w i l l be considered i n terms of both of these elements. Rich Natural Resources Like the Kootenays, the Arizona-New Mexico area i s rich i n natural resources. Not only are these mineral resources, they are vi r t u a l l y the same minerals that are of importance in the Kootenays— gold, copper, silver, lead, and zinc. While scattered throughout the area, these minerals tend to be concentrated i n a belt across the southern half of both states. This zone generally coincides with the area between the Southern Pacific and Santa Fe Railways, just as the mineralized area of the Kootenays lay between the main lines of the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern Railways. Like the northern transcontinentals, the main lines of the southern transcontinentals were located before mineral discoveries and with l i t t l e concern for loc a l t r a f f i c potential; their main goal was the Pacific Coast. Rival Railway Companies As was the case i n the Kootenays, railway evolution i n the Arizona-New Mexico area was dominated by rivalry between two major transcontinental railway companies. Although a number of small i n -dependent lines existed they tended to be functionally related to either of. the transcontinentals as branch lin e feeders, or else soon became subsidiaries of one or the other major company. The Southern Pacific Railway (under the early name Central Pacific) joined with the Union Pacific to form the f i r s t American transcontinental railway, through California, Nevada, Utah, and 80 Wyoming i n 1869. Holding a monopoly on California railway con-nections with the rest of the United States, the Southern Pacific b u i l t eastward through key passes i n the continental divide i n order to prevent other would-be transcontinental railways from using them to reach California and the Pacific.,Coast. ,0ne : such. Southern Pacific line was completed from California through Yuma and Tucson, Arizona to El Paso, Texas by 1881 (See Map Ik). During this same period the Santa Fe Railway, having constructed a network i n Kansas and Colorado, began building a li n e to the southwest i n an attempt to reach the Pacific Coast. It met the Southern Pacific at Deming, New Mexico i n 1881. Through manipulation of rates and flows, however, the Southern Pacific was able to route almost a l l through t r a f f i c away from the Santa Fe, rendering the connection useless. Only with i t s own connections directly to the coast would the Santa Fe be able to obtain a share of the transcontinental t r a f f i c . In another attempt to reach the coast, then, the Santa Fe constructed a l i n e from Albuquerque west across New Mexico and Arizona. The Southern Pacific again countered the move, constructing east across California to meet the Santa Fe at Needles, California i n 1883 (See Map 1 4 ) . "Once again linking lines with the Southern Pacific meant substantially nothing. The Southern Pacific con-sistently routed t r a f f i c over other l i n e s " (Waters, 1950, p. 130). In desperation the Santa Fe began constructing a lin e parallel with the Southern Pacific's east through California. If com-pleted to Needles this would render the Southern Pacific l i n e valueless, so the two companies came to terms and the line west 81 from Needles was sold to the Santa Fe, f i n a l l y permitting that company to become a transcontinental i n 1885. As i n the Kootenays two parallel transcontinental lines spanned the Arizonai-New Mexico region, competing for through t r a f f i c between the Pacific Coast and eastern points. Subsequent railway developments i n the area between the two main lines was similar to railnet evolution i n the Kootenays. The cit y of Phoenix, Arizona was the centre of an important copper min-ing region. The Southern Pacific had reached the town f i r s t through construction of a subsidiary, the Maricopa and Phoenix Railway, i n 1887. The Santa Fe attempted to reach the same area from the north but was blocked by Southern Pacific interests at every turn (Waters, 1950, p. 349). From 1886 unti l 1895 the Santa Fe, Prescott, and Phoenix Railway, as the line south from the Santa Fe was called, was under construction facing many delays and setbacks. Although originally an independent company the project had Santa Fe backing and was purchased outright by that company i n 1901. Further intercompany rivalry i n the region occurred to the east of Phoenix. In 1901 the Santa Fe organized the Phoenix and Eastern Railway to extend from Phoenix south and east into an im-portant mining area. In order to block this project the Southern Pacific incorporated the Arizona Eastern Railway i n 1904 to extend into the same area. Fierce physical and legal battles ensued as backers of each project tried to hinder the other. Fina l l y the Santa Fe sold out to the Southern Pacific the portion of the l i n e which had been completed. 82 As a glance at Map lif w i l l reveal, there was further con-struction by both railway companies i n the region between their main lines. The Southern Pacific acquired more direct routes to the 'Phoenix and the Globe-Miami mining areas of Arizona. The Santa Fe built a li n e to the Silver City mining region of New Mexico i n close proximity to the.Southern Pacific main l i n e . Other less important branch lines were added by both companies. . Although the frequency and duration of intercompany rivalry between the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific railways i n Arizona-New Mexico may not have been the same as that between the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern railways i n the Kootenays, there were important basic similarities. The general structure of both r a i l -nets i s similar; branch lines were sent out into the region between two parallel main lines. The scale of the networks i s also similar; i n both regions the parallel main lines were approximately 150-200 miles apart. The intensity of ri v a l r y was also similar; legal battles and physical violence resulted from the competition of the r i v a l companies over natural resources. From this analogy, then, appears further evidence that Kootenay railnet evolution might well have proceeded much as i t did even i f there had been no inter-national boundary. CHAPTER if THE DECISION MAKERS In the previous chapter Kootenay railway evolution was examined i n terms of resources and r i v a l interests, the two major elements influencing that development. In this chapter i t i s i n -tended to probe more deeply into the decision making which lay be-hind much of the railway rivalry. The remaining two elements noted i n Chapter 1, the private and government decision makers, w i l l thus be examined next. At the decision making le v e l , i t i s also hoped to show that the border was not a significant barrier affecting railway evolution i n the Kootenays. The Identity of the Decision Makers Although i t may be true that a number of individuals not directly a f f i l i a t e d with either governments or railway companies had a slight influence i n the making of decisions whether to con-struct or where to locate railways, this i s rarely documented and they were hardly significant. A l l major decisions were taken by those i n position i n either governments or railway companies, and particularly the l a t t e r . It was the age when important economic decisions were usually made by individuals—the "copper kings", the "manufacturing giants", and others. It was no exception i n the ease of the "railroad barons", as they were called. Decisions which might have considerable impact on large numbers of people, 84 on whole regions of the country, for many years to come, could be and were made by a handful of influential individuals while govern-ments often stood by. For this reason i t i s necessary to investi-gate the identity and relative significance of the various govern-ments and railway promoters responsible for the nature of transport evolution in the Kootenay region. Governments Both the federal government i n Ottawa and the provincial government i n Victoria were interested i n and became involved with railway developments i n the Kootenays of Britis h Columbia. American governments, on the other hand, were not i n any way out of the ordinary concerned with railway projects i n the particular area under study. The Dominion Government Volumes can be written about the railway policies and decision making of. the federal government of Canada from the point of view of geographic significance. Volumes have already been written about federal railway policy ,by historians (e.g. Hedge, 1934). L i t t l e has been done with regard to the effect of federal railway policy on the Kootenays even though both general and specific elements of that policy were of direct relevance to the area. At the turn of the cen-tury, railways were considered desirable for their own sake alone almost everywhere. The general belief, as Glazebrook has pointed out (1964, II, p. 92) was that "Canada could progress only i f an adequate transportation system was built up." And transportation "to most men of the day meant railways" (Glazebrook, 1964, II, p. 26). The result of this v/as a benevolent attitude and generous assistance 85 to any and a l l railways by government decision makers at a l l levels. The federal government of Canada was particularly lavish with encouragement to railways for many years. Its aid to the "nation building" Intercolonial and Canadian Pacific Railways was only the beginning. In 1882, for example, i t introduced a subsidy policy of granting §3200 a mile for which most railways were able to qualify (Skelton, 1916, p. 170). Apart from this, land grants, special subsidies, and other forms of aid were available to numerous railways i n the Dominion. Such a policy could, and often did, lead "to the construction of lines for which there was no economic j u s t i -fication whatever" (Skelton, 1916, p. 170). A number of railways i n the Kootenays, both Canadian and American, were able to qualify for, and received the federal subsidy of $3200 for every mile constructed.. It i s apparent that the theore-t i c a l national objective of projecting and encouraging only Canadian li n e s to foster Canadian patterns of development i n the nation, particularly i n peripheral areas such as the Kootenays, was not con-sistently maintained. The working philosophy of most federal decision makers at the time was often that any railway i s better than no r a i l -way, and that two railways are better than one, regardless of their nationality or spatial orientation. This occurred despite an early earnest dedication to an "all-Canadian" transcontinental from the east to the Pacific Coast which resulted i n the construction of the Canadian Pacific main l i n e . In 1884, before any. railways had been constructed i n the Kootenays, an American project with a British Columbia charter, the Columbia and Kootenay Railway and Transporta-tion Company, had planned to link the Columbia and Kootenay Rivers 86 by r a i l and serve the rivers with steamboats from the United States. The "federal government disallowed the act of incorporation, the Minister of Railways stressing that the company consisted almost entirely of American capitalists, and that 'the road...would i n a l l probability become a feeder to the Northern Pacific Railway'" (Roy, 1963, p. 68, quoting British Columbia, Sessional Papers, 1884, p. 175). As Roy adds (1963, p. 68-69), " i f this line se-cured business during the Canadian Pacific's construction period, the federal government contended, American traders would establish themselves i n the area and be d i f f i c u l t to dislodge." By taking such action federal decision makers had demon-strated the a b i l i t y to influence directly the nature and orienta-tion of transportation routes. Theoretically this was straight-forward and simple, for every railway that crossed the international boundary required a federal charter. Yet opposition to American li n e s appears to have occurred again,on only one or two occasions and even at these times i t only served to delay, rather than to prohibit, railway projects oriented towards the United States. In 1890, for example, the federal government disallowed the incorpora-tion of the Spokane F a l l s and Northern from the border to Nelson and the Brit i s h Columbia Southern which would connect with i t , because they "would transfer the whole t r a f f i c from the rich Kootenay d i s t r i c t to the United States" (Fahey, 1965, p. 104). Somewhat surprisingly, the former of these two projects was char-tered by the same government, under the name Nelson and Fort Shep-pard, three years later. Federal decision makers, at f i r s t i n opposition to American lines entering the area, soon seemed to 87 have altered their attitude. The situation became so detrimental that i n 1898 the provincial government took steps to urge the federal government not to charter lines that would divert t r a f f i c to the United States (British Columbia, Legislature, Journals, Mar. 23, 1898, p. 7 6 ) . As a result, the federal government disallowed the American backed proposed Kettle River Valley Railway i n the same year, but-a similar project was chartered three years later. The provincial action seems to have had no further effect upon the federal attitude towards American backed lines, for the Crows Nest Southern, the Bedlington and Nelson, and the Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern, a l l subsidiaries of the Great Northern, were able to expand operations i n the 1900-1915 period with almost no regard for the international boundary. By allowing American lines to enter Canada, Dominion govern-ment decision makers permitted the development of a transportation network i n the Kootenays which had a distinctive spatial arrangement and orientation. Social and economic ties i n the Kootenays were to the south across the border and Canadian p o l i t i c a l control and ties were weak. Apart from i t s general attitude of benevolence to almost a l l railway schemes, the federal government took a special interest i n the construction of certain railway projects. This was evidenced earlier by the p o l i t i c a l l y oriented Intercolonial and Canadian Pacific Railways, both important as "nation-builders" (Wolfe, 1962, p. 183). Federal decision makers took a direct interest i n only one railway project i n the Kootenay area, although this was probably the single most important lin e built into the region. This railway, the Crows-88 nest branch of the Canadian Pacific, provided the f i r s t "direct access to the Kootenays" by r a i l from the rest of Canada (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 256). An agreement was made with the Canadian Pacific Railway by which the company, for building the l i n e , would receive a special subsidy of 811.000 a mile from the federal govern-ment "which was most anxious to preserve the Kootenay for Canada" (Roy, 1963, P» 42). In return for this aid, the railway company had also to lower freight rates. Among the most important reasons for federal government participation i n the Crowsnest Agreement were the integration and development of the Kootenays with the rest of Canada (Macpherson, III, 1959. p. 373)« By thus taking an active role i n influencing selected railway development i n the area, federal government decision makers were able to influence directly the orientation of the transportation network. It would appear that this was an attempt to compensate somewhat for the earlier decisions which had permitted American railway invasion i n the f i r s t place. Both directly and indirectly, then, federal government decision makers influenced and affected the nature of Kootenay r a i l -net evolution. In particular, i t was they who were largely respon-sible for f a i l i n g to enforce the border as a barrier i n the f i r s t place. The Provincial Government Decision making by governments varies over time with changing administrations and the arrival of new policy makers. Despite numerous changes i n federal administration, however, Dominion r a i l -way policy, insofar as i t was relevant to the Kootenays, was i n no way as prone to change as was Britis h Columbia provincial railway 89 policy. In an unstable p o l i t i c a l situation, provincial policy as well as administrations changed frequently. Nonetheless, in the period 1883-1896 provincial railway policy, l i k e that of the Dominion government, was generally benevolent towards a l l railway projects. In 1883 the provincial government began to encourage railway con-struction by granting large tracts of public land. (Land was far more plentiful than money at the time.) At f i r s t this policy was applied indiscriminately and land was potentially available to a l l those who asked for i t (Cail, 1956, p. 261-262). An example of a railway which qualified and was promised such aid with construction was the American backed Columbia and Kootenay Railway and Transporta-tion Company which was disallowed by the federal government. With a change i n government leadership i n 1889 the generosity of provincial railway policy became more discriminating. A land subsidy bonus of up to 20,000 acres a mile for a number of Canadian oriented railway projects was made available "in an attempt to fore-s t a l l American interests" (Cail, 1956, p. 263). As can be seen from Map 15, most of these projected lines were in the Kootenays, but none of them were constructed for a number of years, nor were any b u i l t as a result of provincial policy. Nevertheless, this does indicate the extent to which provincial decision makers attempted to influence the nature of Kootenay railnet evolution. However opposed to American railways provincial decision makers would appear from this scheme, the same government showed a surprising reversal when i t received "favourably" proposals by the Spokane F a l l s and Northern Railway to construct a line north to Nelson and an east-west lin e across southern Briti s h Columbia 9 1 between the Kettle River and Vancouver (British Columbia, Sessional  Papers, 1890, P« 397). "The construction of these lines would form one continuous lin e of railway from the south end of Kootenay Lake to the Coast, with a short detour i n American territory, rendered necessary by the d i f f i c u l t y of penetrating the chain of mountains on the west bank of the Columbia River" (British Columbia, Sessional  Papers, 1890, p. 395). A later change resulted i n an expansion of the proposed project to include a line from Crowsnest Pass to Koote-nay Lake as .well. Although such a line would provide a direct Coast-Kootenay connection, i t would obviously be American oriented. Thus, as noted on page 86, i t was opposed and rejected by the federal government of the time. In the same year, 1890, the provincial government provided 200,000 acres as an incentive to the Canadian Pacific's Columbia and Kootenay project to link the Columbia and Kootenay river systems to each other and to the rest of Canada via the Canadian Pacific, main l i n e . According to McDougall (1968, p. 7 7 ) , the transcontinental railway company was under pressure from both Dominion and provincial governments to build the line. "The Briti s h Columbia government had promised that i f (it) did so, the charters asked for i n the interest of American lines would not be granted. But before i t was completed they went back on their word and chartered the Nelson and Fort Shep-pard" (McDougall, 1968, p. 7 7 ) . In following years provincial government decision makers tended to be indiscriminately benevolent to any and a l l railway projects. American backed lines, such as the Nelson and Fort Shep-pard, Kaslo and Slocan, Red Mountain, and the Columbia and Western, 92 a l l obtained provincial charters. Of a l l these, only the Red Moun-tain was exceptional i n not receiving government aid of any kind (Fahey, 1965, p. 147). The other three railways received the then standard provincial land subsidy of 10,240 acres a mile, and when completed, added to the diversion of trade and resources south to the United States. In an attempt to counteract this trend, which was largely assisted by the nature of i t s own policy, the provincial government actively promoted the Nakusp and Slocan Railway. In 1893 ores were "carried to Kaslo and shipped over the Nelson and Fort Sheppard" from the Slocan to the United States (Davie, 1894, p. 3 ) . As a result, the provincial government made an agreement with the Canadian Pacific whereby the province would finance the construction of the li n e at $17,500 a mile i f the Canadian railway would construct, lease, and operate the line on behalf of the province (Davie, 1894, p. 5 ) . (Subsequently the line was considered as part of the Canadian Pacific system and was, in fact, acquired by the company at a later date.) In this case provincial government decision makers directly influenced the evolution of the r a i l network by sponsoring a li n e to promote a Canadian orientation of development and t r a f f i c patterns, i n competi-tion to the American orientation i n this part of the province. Although such measures were needed i n order to counter the generous railway policy which permitted American lines to penetrate the region, they occurred infrequently. In fact, during the period after 1893, James J. H i l l of the Great Northern Railway was able to obtain some influence with the provincial governments i n order "to divert the wealth of the Kootenay and Boundary towards Tacoma" 93 (Ormsby, 1958, p. 314,316). This, together with the federal willing-ness to give additional charters to the various Canadian subsidiaries of the Great Northern already noted, permitted other American r a i l -ways to extend across the border into the Kootenays. At times provincial government policy appeared to favour and discourage American backed lines almost simultaneously. For example, during the same period that the lines of the Great Northern were granted charters, the provincial charter of the Columbia and Western Railway forbade the railway to locate any line within 100 yards of the international boundary, to prevent the line from taking away Kootenay business by crossing the border (Roy, 1963, p. 45). Yet i n the following year, the Great Northern's Bedlington and Nelson was freely able to obtain a provincial charter. In 1898 the provincial legislature passed a resolution urging the federal government to, deny, any future charter "having for i t s object the diversion of t r a f f i c from the Province to the United States of America" (British Columbia, Legislature, Journals, Mar. 23, 1898, p. 76). This forestalled an American railway attempt, the Kettle River Valley Railway, backed by the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, to link the Boundary d i s t r i c t with Spokane. As a result the federal charter was not granted and once again provincial decision makers had affected the sequence and pattern of railway evolution i n the area. Nevertheless, i n 1900, the Grand Forks and Kettle River Rail-way received a provincial charter even though i t was "the Kettle River Valley Railway under another name" (Roy, 1963, p. 52). The provincial government, i n granting a charter to a line which i t had taken steps to prevent from receiving a charter two years earlier, 9k was "apparently forgetting i t s fear of American lines tapping the area" (Roy, 1963, p. 5 2 ) . And i n the following year, yet another Great Northern subsidiary, the Vancouver, Victoria, and Eastern, was able to obtain a provincial charter, although this time i t was well camouflaged by a front of Canadian interests. After the turn of the century provincial interest i n and encouragement to railways in the Kootenays declined. Canadian r a i l -ways competing with the American lines were given no special sub-sidies or encouragement by the provincial government. During the period i n which provincial government decision makers had influenced the growth of railways i n the Kootenays, however, they had both negative and positive effects. At times American lines were directly disallowed and Canadian lines were actively encouraged; and at other times, almost simultaneously i n some cases, American", li n e s were permitted entry and even subsidized as well. Throughout the period 1880-190Q,: provincial decision makers had a significant effect on the spatial orientation of the railnet. As a deterrent, they did l i t t l e more than delay the entry of most of the American l i n e s which attempted to tap the region's resources. Like the federal government, they failed to enforce the border as a barrier with any consistency. Private Railway Interests The individuals directly involved with the construction and expansion of railway systems were the decision makers who had the greatest influence on the development of the Kootenay network. While governments may have either permitted or prevented charters, 95 either provided aid or no aid to railways, theirs was essentially a passive role. It was those men who stood to lose or to gain most at the failure or success of their projects, who were most active i n making location decisions which significantly influenced, i f not determined, much of the nature of the sequence, the pattern, and the orientation of the railnet i n the Kootenays. Typical of many areas i n the period, the era of rapid railway expansion i n numerous parts of the world, a small number of entrepreneurs could make de-cisions which affected large areas and populations. In the case of the Kootenays, the responsibility for entrepreneurial railway de-cision making can be clearly assigned to four major interests and a handful of individuals associated with them. For. much of the period of greatest railway building activity, only:;two, of these interests were involved and decision making was the responsibility of only two individuals. Those responsible for decision making and the four major railway interest with which they were associated are as follows: 1) Daniel C. Corbin of the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, 2) Frederick A. Heinze of the Columbia and Western, 3) James J. H i l l of the Great Northern, and k) William Van Home and Thomas G. Shaughnessy of the Canadian Pacific. The role of decision making of each of these must be considered i n turn. D.C. Corbin of the. Spokane F a l l s and Northern Daniel C. Corbin was responsible for the f i r s t successful 96 American railway invasion of the Kootenays, the Nelson and Fort Shep-pard. A New York .entrepreneur who moved to Spokane, Corbin was par-t i c u l a r l y significant as the decision maker f i r s t able to give the study area's transport network a distinctive north-south bias, an orientation that was to last u n t i l well after the peak of the r a i l -way building era. Almost from the outset of his career as a railway builder i n the Pacific Northwest, he began constructing lines direct-ed towards the resources of the Kootenays. His f i r s t project, the Spokane F a l l s and Idaho-.-Coeur d'Alene Railway and Navigation Company system, linked Spokane with the Coeur d'Alene mining area by 188? (See Map 11 ) . His next project, the Spokane F a l l s and Northern, had been proposed as early as 1884 but was unable to get underway un t i l i t s Spokane promoters approached Corbin and he took i t over. Corbin realized not only the potential value of i t s proposed con-nection with the Canadian Pacific, but also that such a railway could develop the north just as the earlier lines (including his) had developed the east, .south, and west. To add an element of ur-gency to decision making, at least three other groups were also showing an interest in extending r a i l lines to the same area—the cit y of Goldendale, the Northern Pacific, and the Canadian Pacific (Fahey, 1 9 6 5 , p. 6 7 - 6 8 ) . Although the Spokane F a l l s and Northern was unable to enter Canada, Corbin made his f i r s t attempt to invade the Kootenays i n 1889. Not until later, with Canadian backing, were his subsidiary companies, the Nelson and Fort Sheppard i n 1 8 9 3 and the Red Mountain i n I 8 9 6 ,able to tap the Kootenays. A later project of Corbin's, the Kettle River Valley Railway, a proposed third Canadian feeder for 97 the Spokane F a l l s and Northern into the Boundary d i s t r i c t , was de-layed and he lost interest. Corbin's decision making i n the projection of a l l his r a i l -ways which attempted to enter the Kootenays, whether successful or not, follows a similar pattern. Although the personal profit motive was uppermost, he.was also regarded as an agent working on behalf of Spokane's economic growth since the effect of each of his railways was the increase of trade and prosperity of that city. In the v/ords of i t s editor, the Spokane Spokesman-Review noted i n September 1893, "I desire to say that Spokane owes.to Mr. D.C. Cor-bin an enduring obligation...He i s doing more today to develop the wilderness and strengthen Spokane than any other man..." In a similar vein, the Spokane F a l l s Board of Trade Annual Report for 1889 was able to state: Next spring communication by steamboat w i l l be opened between the S.F. & N. and the Canadian Pacific and Mr. Corbin has already .taken steps to make an extension of his system which, w i l l ultimately end i n giving to Spokane F a l l s direct railroad connection with the Canadian Pacific and i n opening up the immense mining regions which l i e to the east, north, and west of this important artery of our growth. This road has long been the hope and aspiration of our citizens. Corbin himself made magnanimous statements to the effect that. what he did was largely to benefit Spokane and may have actually considered this an important factor i n his decision making. As early as 1893 he stated that he intended to extend his railways "into a l l the region north that should be tributary to Spokane" (Fahey, 1965, p. 131). At a later date Corbin became interested i n one f i n a l r a i l -way project between the Kootenays and Spokane, the Spokane Inter-national Railway. 'Although i t was to become a Canadian Pacific 98 s u b s i d i a r y , Corbin was p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r s u c c e s s f u l l y o r g a n i z i n g the p r o j e c t and i n a t t r a c t i n g the i n t e r e s t of both Spokane and the Canadian P a c i f i c . In respect to t h i s p r o j e c t , Corbin again emphasized h i s i n t e r e s t i n s e r v i n g the c i t y of Spokane: " I had no thought :&t t h a t time of engaging i n f u r t h e r r a i l r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n , but i n 1904 I was s t r o n g l y impressed w i t h the b e l i e f t h a t connection w i t h the Canadian P a c i f i c r a i l r o a d system would be of very great b e n e f i t to Spokane, and proceeded w i t h a few f r i e n d s to finance the e n t e r p r i s e " ( C o r b i n , 1907, P. 46). As a d e c i s i o n maker, then, Corbin had goals which were e s s e n t i a l l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y economic. Apart from h i s own motive of personal p r o f i t , h i s p o l i c y i s of i n t e r e s t f o r h i s s p e c i a l d e s i r e to develop the h i n t e r l a n d of Spokane. H i s d e c i s i o n s to b u i l d to the Nelson, Rossland, and Boundary mining c e n t r e s as. each, was developing i n d i c a t e h i s goal of tapping Kootenay resources. To C o r b i n , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary was h a r d l y a r e a l b a r r i e r ; i t o n ly f u n c t i o n e d as a source of delay, p r e v e n t i n g him from reaching h i s planned des-t i n a t i o n s as r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e . As a r i v a l to the Columbia and Western and the Canadian P a c i f i c i n the Kootenays, Corbin was a s i g n i f i c a n t f i g u r e . At a l -most every attempt to enter the r e g i o n he was made w e l l aware of Canadian o p p o s i t i o n . From h i s f i r s t a p p l i c a t i o n f o r a c h a r t e r to e n t e r Canada i n 1889 to h i s attempt to c h a r t e r the K e t t l e R i v e r V a l l e y Railway i n 1898, the Canadian P a c i f i c worked to prevent Corbin from i n v a d i n g the r e g i o n (Fahey, 1965, p. 104f, l87f)• T h i s ranged from "running s p e c i a l t r a i n s to c a r r y members (of Parliament) from t h e i r E a s t e r v a c a t i o n s to the s e s s i o n i f they 99 promised to vote against C o r b i n " (Fahey, 1965, p. 1 0 8 ), to l e g a l l y p r e v e n t i n g the Nelson and F o r t Sheppard from e n t e r i n g the town of Nelson proper, f o r c i n g i t to terminate at a p o i n t f i v e m i l e s from town. At one time Corbin reputedly s t a t e d t h a t the Canadian P a c i f i c "used a l l i t s resources to defeat me" (Spokane Spokesman-Review, A p r i l 21 , 1 8 9 8 ) . Despite t h i s . o p p o s i t i o n , however, Corbin was the d e c i s i o n maker who i n i t i a t e d the north-south s p a t i a l o r i e n t a t i o n by r a i l across the i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary w i t h the United S t a t e s . With-out h i s p e r s i s t e n c e and endurance i n the face of setbacks, the development of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p a t t e r n s i n the area might have been--q u i t e different........... F.A. Heinze of the Columbia and Western Although F r e d e r i c k A. Heinze was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o n l y one r a i l w a y p r o j e c t i n the Kootenays, both i t s l o c a t i o n and the time a t which i t was constructed had s t r a t e g i c importance i n r e l a t i o n t o the other three major r a i l w a y i n t e r e s t s i n the area. H e i n z e 1 s d e c i s i o m making was d i r e c t and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ; he was out f o r maximum p r o f i t from the mining i n d u s t r y . A s u c c e s s f u l mining en-trepreneur from Montana, Heinze saw the p o t e n t i a l gain to be had from r a i l w a y s and smelters i n the Kootenay d i s t r i c t of B r i t i s h Columbia. By I896 Heinze had b u i l t both a smelter at T r a i l and a narrow gauge r a i l w a y , the Columbia and Western, from the mines a t Rossland to h i s smelter.at T r a i l . T h i s l i n e was b u i l t i n d i r e c t c o m p e t i t i o n and o p p o s i t i o n to C o r b i n 1 s Red Mountain Railway which had been b u i l t to t r a n s p o r t Rossland ores to smelters i n the Un i t e d S t a t e s . I n f a c t , as Fahey s t a t e s (1965, p.. 148) , from 100 1895 "Heinze was to compete w i t h D.C.Corbin over command of the Kootenay f o r the next three y e a r s . " Heinze not o n l y sought to r i v a l Corbin by d e c i d i n g to attempt to monopolize the mining trade of Rossland, he openly challenged him. Corbin r e t a l i a t e d by l e g a l l y b a r r i n g Heinze's r i g h t of way, a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y . Even so, Heinze's Canadian o r i e n t e d , esst-west r a i l w a y reached Rossland s i x months before Corbin' s American o r i e n t e d , north-south l i n e . With the promising mining d i s c o v e r i e s i n the Boundary d i s t r i c t beginning to a t t r a c t a t t e n t i o n , Heinze made the d e c i s i o n to extend h i s r a i l w a y i n t o t h a t r e g i o n . He had foreseen t h i s area's p o t e n t i a l from the s t a r t and had a c c o r d i n g l y a p p l i e d to co n s t r u c t r the Columbia and Western as f a r west as p e n t i c t o n i n h i s o r i g i n a l c h a r t e r . Heinze himself s t a t e d , i n f a c t , t h a t the Columbia and Western p r o j e c t was based p r i n c i p a l l y "upon the opening up of the n a t u r a l resources of Boundary Creek" ( V i c t o r i a C o l o n i s t , Mar. Ik, I 8 9 6 ) . As a r e s u l t of Corbin's success i n o b t a i n i n g most, of the Rossland ore t r a f f i c , Heinze decided the time had come to b u i l d west to the Boundary i n search of other sources of mineral t r a f f i c (Fahey, 1965, p. l ? 2 f ) . Such a ro u t e , which could be extended to the coast as w e l l , was a l s o a r i v a l to Corbin's proposed l i n e s to the Boundary d i s t r i c t and the coast. Besides t h i s , the p r o j e c t wa? s t r a t e g i c a l l y l o c a t e d and the time c o i n c i d e d w i t h p l a n s of both tie Canadian P a c i f i c and the Great Northern to con s t r u c t l i n e s c l o s e to the border through to the Boundary and the coast. Heinze r e a l i z e d the s t r a t e g i c value of h i s c h a r t e r e d l i n e i n the pla n s of these, the two major r a i l w a y r i v a l s (Whittaker, 1 9 4 9 . p. 50-51; McDonald, 101 n.d., p. 3)> especially " i f he could get the Great Northern and Canadian Pacific bidding...until one or the other would buy" (McDougall, 1968, p. 7 7 ) . Rivalry between Heinze and Corbin over railways, resources, and mining t r a f f i c was evident i n their decision making and i n the results of those decisions, the railways which they constructed. Heinze took advantage of the competitive situation by posing as the champion of Canadian interests. He stated, for example, that B r i t i s h Columbia trade could vir t u a l l y be independent " i f trans-portation f a c i l i t i e s equal to those from the United States are afforded" (Victoria Colonist, March li+, I 8 9 6 ) . Heinze continued to take advantage of Canadian sentiment i n getting support for his projects. As the Rossland Miner noted on Sept. 23, l897» "During I t s short existence the Columbia and Western has manifested remark-able enterprise. Without i t Rossland would have been at the com-plete mercy of...Mr. D.C. Corbin." At a later date Heinze stated "I have done more for this part of the country than a l l the others put together. I have never been sparing of money when development demanded" (Turnbull, 1964, p. 31). Corbin, with his regional interest lying i n Spokane, could make no such statements. As a decision maker Heinze was nevertheless motivated to making personal profit. Significantly, he provided an early r a i l -way project that was spatially oriented to preserving Canadian i n -terest i n areas threatened and tapped by American oriented lines. Aware of the situation i n which he found himself, he took advantage of i t by enlisting Canadian moral and financial support i n his very real rivalry with Corbin and other American interests. 102 J.J. H i l l of the Great Northern 4 In any examination of Canadian railway development, particu-l a r l y that along the international boundary, there must be some con-sideration of the decision making which resulted from the personal r i v a l r y between James J. H i l l , the Canadian i n charge of the Great Northern Railway i n the United States, and William Van Home and Thomas G. Shaughnessy, the Americans i n charge of the Canadian Paci-f i c Railway i n Canada. The r i v a l r y which existed between these two large transcontinental railway companies during the period of their development was very closely related to the personal rivalry between their presidents. The resulting pattern of these two competitive railway systems was an overlapping of networks between the. Pacific Coast and the Great Lakes, as'Map 16 i l l u s t r a t e s . Both companies operated subsidiaries i n the other's country with l i t t l e - r e g a r d for the location of the international boundary. It was a "battle for the economic fealty of the border country" between the Canadian Pa-c i f i c and the Great Northern (Wolfe, 1962, p. 183). It should be realized, therefore, that the Kootenays was only one of several regions on the continent which experienced their active competition. The rivalry between H i l l and Van Home was made a l l the more intense since H i l l had been one of the original partners of the Canadian Pacific i n the period 1880-1883 and had actually recommend-ed Van Horne as general manager for the Canadian syndicate in 1881. Upon leaving the Canadian Pacific, H i l l began building up his own transcontinental l i n e , the Great Northern, and from the 1890's to the F i r s t World War, there was an almost continuous and enduring r i v a l r y , both personal and financial, between the two presidents. O V E R L A P P I N G N E T W O R K S OF THE C A N A D I A N P A C I F I C AND G R E A T N O R T H E R N R A I L W A Y S 1 0 4 This rivalry influenced their decision making and thus the location and orientation of the r a i l l i n e s for which they were responsible. When the Kootenay d i s t r i c t became their "battleground" i t i s not surprising that a l l smaller_railway interests i n the area disappeared. Heinze was bought out by the Canadian Pacific and Corbin was bought out by the Great Northern, both i n I898. From then on, almost a l l railway construction i n the Kootenays was undertaken or backed by one of these two systems, so that v i r t u a l l y every mile of track i n the region was financially controlled by, as well as spatially orient-ed to, either the Canadian Pacific, or the Great Northern. As a railway decision maker with significant influence on the nature of railway evolution i n the Kootenays (and elsewhere), H i l l was primarily motivated by personal profit, the. desire to build "his" transcontinental railway into a viable system, and his enduring r i v a l r y with the Canadian Pacific and Van Home. His major railway policy, once the transcontinental li n e had been completed, was to extend branch line feeders anywhere which would develop additional t r a f f i c and be profitable. His o f f i c i a l biographer accords H i l l with stating "I think our policy should be to build only such.branches or new lines as we are sure w i l l prove good" (Pyle, 1916, II, p. 390). Similarly, he openly declared that his main objective was to secure profitable feeders for his Great Northern main lin e and would con-tinue to build such lines into B r i t i s h Columbia across the border (Vancouver Province, Jan. 8, 1903). Pyle has noted that his r a i l -way "built up the country as i t grew, occupied ^ strategically the whole region through which i t passed and which i t expected to serve, following i t s supreme purpose as a prime factor i n the industrial 105 development of the American Northwest" (Pyle, 1916, I, p. 326). Significantly, and unlike the other railway interests i n the area, H i l l did not seek government aid for railway construction and, i n fact, denounced such "spoon-feeding" (Skelton, 1916, p. 230). As a r i v a l to the Canadian Pacific, H i l l had been bitter ever since Van Home had refused to incorporate H i l l ' s l i n e south of Lake Superior into the Canadian transcontinental, and instead had preferred to locate to the north i n order to remain i n Canada. " I ' l l get even with him even i f I have to go to hell for i t and shovel .coal" H i l l i s quoted as saying of Van Home, and as i t turned out, he chose Briti s h Columbia and the Kootenays i n particular as the arena for retaliation (Vaughan, 1920, p. 2 2 0 f ) . He had already decided to locate his main lin e between the international boundary and the Northern Pac i f i c , the hitherto northernmost American trans-continental 1, i n order to cut that railway off from Canada (Graham, 1963, p. 165), and to result i n shorter branch lines to the border for his own line's rivalry with the Canadian Pacific. Such lines had already been constructed i n the prairies where H i l l had tapped parts of Manitoba, and to the west where numerous branches ran north to terminate at the border (See Map 16 ) . Other actions taken i n r i v a l r y with the Canadian Pacific i n the prairies included policies regarding t r a f f i c arrangements and direct opposition to the Soo Line, an American subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific. It was i n the Kootenays, however, that H i l l chose to concen-trate his efforts against Van Home and the Canadian Pacific. Large-l y because of the region's valuable mineral deposits, H i l l , decided to construct or purchase (as i n the case of Corbin's railways) lines 106 into every mining camp as well as organizing his own steamboat ser-vice on Kootenay Lake and acquiring interest i n Crowsnest Pass coal mines and Boundary copper smelters i n order to ensure t r a f f i c routings over his lines (Howay, Sage, Angus, 1942, p. 257-258). Subsidiary l i n e s of the Great Northern ran to the Slocan, the Crows-nest, Nelson, Kuskonook, Rossland, and to the Boundary. One of these new lines, the Bedlington and Nelson to Kuskonook, largely duplicated the Nelson and Fort Sheppard acquired from Corbin, H i l l considered this l a t t e r l i n e to be "jerry-built" and his new li n e was intended to replace i t (Affleck, 1958, p. 41), regardless of the interests of the town of Nelson which would then be by-passed by the Great Northern. H i l l ' s decision making obviously ignored such considerations for the area he served. After several months of unrest, however, H i l l was forced to return the service. As a result of H i l l ' s decision making, vi r t u a l l y every attempt, by the Canadian Pacific and other Canadian interests, i n -cluding governments, to preserve the Kootenay trade for Canada by providing routes spatially oriented to Canadian trading patterns was rendered of less value by Great Northern counterthrusts. Even the joint Dominion government-Canadian Pacific decision to build a "south l i n e " across Briti s h Columbia from the Crowsnest Pass, through the southern Kootenays, the Boundary, and the south Okana-gan to the coast, i n order to counteract American railways oriented towards the south, was i n turn countered by H i l l . This began i n 1905 when H i l l decided to construct his "third main l i n e " from Spokane west to the coast. This l i n e , i n combination with the other two "main l i n e s " to the coast at Portland and Everett, 1 0 7 ••would then enable the Great Northern to gather t r a f f i c from a l l parts of the Pacific Northwest" (Corley, 1 9 6 7 , p. 1 ) . It would also counter future Canadian invasions of Great Northern territory. Just as H i l l had decided to invade the Kootenays in search of profit as a r i v a l to the Canadian Pacific, he decided to abandon his lines there as soon as they became unprofitable. From 1910 on-wards each Great Northern lin e was abandoned until in 1936 only two line s remained, both of which are s t i l l i n existence.. Interestingly enough, one of these i s the old Corbin l i n e , the Nelson and Fort Sheppard, which H i l l had thought inadequate. The f i r s t American railway ever to tap the Kootenays i s one of the last ones remaining. Largely as a result of H i l l ' s decision making, then, the Kootenays were tapped by American railway lines providing,a compre-hensive south?/ards spatial orientation for the whole region. Aware of the attractiveness of the area, H i l l tapped i t wherever profitable i n the short run, i n active competition with the Canadian Pacific. His enduring personal rivalry with Van Home and Shaughnessy, to-gether with his policy of developing only profitable branch lines led, as the Vancouver Province complained (Dec. 2 8 , 1901), to his rendering "the Kootenay country, industrially and commercially, tributary to the c i t i e s and states immediately south of the boundary, i n which his great interests are centred." William Van Home and Thomas Shaughnessy of the Canadian Pacific As can be seen from Map 1 3 , the Canadian Pacific was res-ponsible for by far the greatest mileage of railways i n the Kootenays. Of a l l the four railway interests with trackage i n the area, i t 108 operated on the largest scale and provided the most comprehensive network to serve the area, a network which for the most part remains to the present day. The point of view of Canadian Pacific decision makers was also different insofar as they tended to perceive the area as "theirs". Mosfe of the area between the Canadian Pacific main l i n e and the international boundary west of the Great Lakes had been reserved by federal agreement for the railway, but the Kootenays i n particular i t "considered i t s own domain" (Stephen Jones, 1937. p. 442; Vaughan, 1920, p. 221). It was also the area i n which, as a result of the Great Northern's incursions, the Cana-dian Pacific "decided to challenge H i l l " (Roy, 1963* p. 3 9 ) . As presidents of the Canadian Pacific Railway, Van Home (in the period 1888-1899) and Shaughnessy (in the period 1899-1918) were each i n turn almost completely responsible for the. f i n a l de-cisions to construct new lin e s . Both became r i v a l s of H i l l and the Great Northern, and both were motivated by similSr^goal Si P r o f i t -able expansion of the railway system came^first, of course. This was combined with (and obviously related to) a goal of national and regional economic development which would result i n increased traf-f i c and income. (See Innis, 1923 and McDougall, I968 for detailed discussions of this.) In attempting to carry out these goals, the Canadian Pacific tended to become somewhat monopolistic i n i t s at-titudes, and this was particularly so i n the Kootenay region. As a result of Great Northern invasions of the area, Van Home and Shaughnessy became bitter r i v a l s of H i l l . This rivalry affected and influenced the evolution of nearly a l l Canadian Pacific develop-ments i n the region. 109 At the same time, Canadian Pacific interests were also forced to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the international boundary as a barrier to American railways. In order to maintain Canadian interest and participation i n the area i n the face of federal and provincial willingness to charter American railways, Van Home and Shaughnessy realized the need to construct lines into the region to counter and to forestall these United States interests, particularly the Great Northern. This was combined with a reluctance on the part of the Canadian Pacific to take action too soon or on too large a scale. This seems, to be due, at least a t * % i r s t , to a general cautiousness and to a lack df financial resources (McDougall, 3L968r,: p i 75-76).. These generali-zations are i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following examples of Van Home's early policy i n the Kootenays. As a decision maker, Van Home was determined to r i v a l H i l l and the Great Northern as vigorously as possible. Upon, noting the series of Great Northern branches approaching Canada, he i s quoted as exclaiming "Look at these...like hungry hounds ready to jump ini." (Gibbon, 1 9 3 5 , p. 3 3 9 ) . Hearing that H i l l actually intended to invade Canada, the "domain of the Canadian Pacific", he i s also credited with vowing, "Well, i f he does, I ' l l tear the guts out of his road" (Vaughan, 1 9 2 0 , p. 2 2 9 ) . Van Home's railway policy was accordingly one of consis-tent attempts to maintain the trading patterns of the Kootenays along east-west lines within Canada. As early as 1 8 8 9 , when the Canadian Pacific backed the f i r s t railway project i n the area, Van Home stated that his policy was "to prevent the invasion 110 by foreign lines of the Kootenay D i s t r i c t , i n B r i t i s h Columbia— a d i s t r i c t rich i n precious metals and other natural resources" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1889, p. 18 ) . He also informed the Board of Directors that i t s "construction w i l l doubt-less result i n great activity i n the development of that part of the country, and i n a large addition to the t r a f f i c of your r a i l -way" (Canadian Pacific Railway, Annual Report, 1889, p. 1 9 ) . Even so, Van Home apparently had doubts about this f i r s t project of his i n the Kootenays, for on v i s i t i n g the area at the time he i s reputed to have said something to the effect that "the Kootenays are the last place for profitable railway construction" (Smyth, 1942, p. 66 -67 ) . Another source states that he frankly regarded this f i r s t line as "a railroad from nowhere to nowhere" (Kamloops Inland Sentinel, April 5, 1890). Despite this early uncertainty, Van Home continued to build l i n e s to improve Canadian Pacific access to the area, often managing to obtain both federal and provincial land and cash sub-sidies at the same time. Lines were built to bypass navigation hazards and the. largest navigation company i n the area was acquired. There followed a deliberate policy of refusing service to Corbin* s and H i l l ' s railways. The acquisition of Heinze's interests and the construction of other lines followed i n further attempts to fore s t a l l the Great Northern. Regarding the Crowsnest branch, Shaughnessy, as Vice-President, wrote to the federal government i n 1896 thatifj.it was intended "to preserve for Canada the business incident to the mining of the precious metals, copper and coal i n that section of Canada by building up smelting enterprises and I l l smelting towns, i t i s essential that the railway be an integral part of the Canadian system without any interest South of the inter-national Boundary" (Roy, 1963, p. 39, c i t i n g the Laurier and B r i t i s h Columbia Papers). Decision making by both Van Home and Shaughnessy was oriented to obtaining Canadian support by stressing the need for Canadian transportation spatially oriented to Canada. At the same time they wanted to reach the area, and i t s rich t r a f f i c potential, by the easiest route possible (Roy, I963, p. 42), and be subsidized for doing i t (Dafoe, 1931, p. 146). At a later date, i n a similar vein, Van Home wrote, "Some say that the question I have raised concerning Mr. H i l l ' s plans i s merely one between the railways...I say that i t does matter very much to you whether your t r a f f i c i s carried within or without, your own country. (Vaughan, 1920, p. 323). Accordingly Van Home and Shaughnessy made decisions to construct routes to every mining area, big or small, i n the Kootenays i n order to preserve the area for Canada and the Canadian Pacific. As early as 1891 Van Home foresaw the need for planning a through route, the "south l i n e " from the Crowsnest to the coast (Roy, 1963, p. 39). By acquiring the Britis h Columbia Southern and the Columbia and Western charters, Van Home had pushed the li n e through from Macleod, Alberta, to Midway by 1899 with only one interruption, the water gap of Kootenay Lake. Following this lead when he became president, Shaughnessy decided to continue the "south l i n e " through to the coast i n order to forestall H i l l i n the south Okanagan and Similkameen regions, and thus acquired the Kettle Valley Railway (McCulloch, 1938, p. 4 f ) . Cross-border rivalry between the Great 112 Northern and Canadian Pacific thus also influenced the evolution of railways to the west of the study area, although i n a much less complex fashion. Like H i l l , Van Home and Shaughnessy believed that the best form of defence was offence (Glazebrook, 1964, II, p. 117). Accord-ingly, upon.hearing of further Great Northern plans for invasion of the Boundary d i s t r i c t i n 1902, Shaughnessy decided to invade the United States, f i r s t by helping to finance, and later by taking over complete operation of, the Spokane International. 'Competition motivated the CPR...(for) the Canadian road could have entered Spokane anytime i n the past ten years but stayed out of H i l l ' s territory u n t i l he invaded theirs" (Fahey, 1965, p. 210). A similar, smaller scale invasion was that of the Kettle Valley-Spokane and British Columbia Railway (to become also, backed by Canadian Pacific interests) running south into the mining area of Republic, Washington. In general, then, Canadian Pacific decision makers were dedicated to promoting a Canadian orientation i n transportation development, and extremely active i n attempting to r i v a l and op-pose American advances into the area, apart from being concerned with the basic economic profit motive. The result of this was the development of a comprehensive network of routes serving the entire area with a characteristic east-west spatial orientation towards Canada, i n contrast to the characteristic north-south spatial orientation of American lines extending across the border, with which they were in competition i n a struggle ,for the trade and resources of the region. 1 1 3 Just as the situation of cross-border rivalry for resources influenced the evolution of the railnet, as examined i n Chapter 3» so then did those making the decisions. Whereas the net effect of government decision makers was to ensure that the border re-mained a relatively insignificant barrier to railway evolution, private decision makers refused to consider the border a barrier and made decisions to cross i t as i f i t did not exist even though, i n some cases, they may have perceived such action as "invasion". Had the border been reinforced as a barrier, had personal r i v a l r y between the decision making individuals not existed, cross-border railway rivalry and construction may never have occurred to the same extent, and Kootenay railnet evolution might have been quite different. CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION The Need for Integration: An Overview Each chapter of this thesis has provided a different focus on the problem of "the border as barrier" to railway evolution i n the Kootenays. Chapter 1 provided a brief introduction to the prob-lem, setting i t i n the context* of both the region and the literature of the discipline. In Chapter 2 the actual location and chronology of railway evolution was described, together with a schematic simpli-fication (or "model") of that evolution. Chapter 3 comprised a dis-cussion and explanation of the rationale for Kootenay railways, speci-f i c a l l y i n terms of intercompany riv a l r y over mineral resources. Here i t was discovered that l i t t l e reference to the border was re-quired, and a comparison was made of the area with one lacking an i n -ternational boundary, but which was similar i n other respects. Final-l y , Chapter k investigated the role of decision makers as related to the border's lack of a barrier effect on railways. It becomes neces-sary, at this stage, to summarize and integrate the findings of the previous chapters i n order to come to some general conclusions re-garding the validi t y of the central hypothesis. Each of the major elements influencing railway development w i l l be considered in.turn. The Presence of Resources—The Incentive The stimulus to growth of any transportation network can be the presence of any t r a f f i c generating feature, either developed or 115 potential. It might take the form of an active industry or be simp-l y the presence of rich natural resources. In this study, i t has been demonstrated that the Kootenay region was particularly rich i n a variety of mineral resources, resources which were essentially undeveloped before the arrival of railways. Mining was the obvious attraction for railway construction i n the Kootenays, as has been discussed i n detail. V/ithout such a strong incentive to attract intercompany railway rivalry, i t i s unlikely that the same sort of railnet would have developed, or that the same number of border crossings would have occurred. Intercompany Rivalry i Throughout Chapter 3 i t was demonstrated that intercompany riva l r y largely explained the distinctive areal pattern of railway development i n the Kootenay region, and a comparison was made with the Arizona-New Mexico region where a similar situation of inter-company railway rivalry existed. If either of the two railway com-pany r i v a l s had been considerably handicapped or lagging behind the other, the development of such a network would most l i k e l y not have occurred. Instead, there would have been the development of a net-work by only one company's efforts. In the Kootenay region, i t would also appear that, as far as Canadian interests were concerned, a strong element in the r i v a l -ry was that transport routes (i.e. railways) were required to com-pensate for the ineffectiveness of the international boundary as a barrier to American railway invasion, by protecting a national i n -terest i n natural, resources. Since by far the greatest concentration of rich mineral resources was located on the Canadian side of the 116 border, Canadian railway interests (particularly the Canadian Pacific Railway) were forced to take some action towards providing r a i l ser-vice i n competition with American railways (particularly the .Great Northern Railway), apart from the fact that they wanted a share of the profit to be realized from serving the mining industry. Due to the p o l i t i c a l nature of the situation, the Canadian Pacific i n par-ticular was frequently able to obtain additional government assist-ance for building lines i n competition with American lines. Intercompany rivalry was significant on the local scale, i n the development of individual projects to the various mining camps. It was also important on the regional scale through the study area, v/here there occurred a showdown of railway interests providing ser-vice to key points from both sides of the border. And i t was equal-l y important on the national scale, with the development of trans-continentals and the later provision by these systems of lines i n -vading each other's national territory. The great majority of r a i l -way projects constructed and by far the greatest percentage of miles of track l a i d , were stimulated by intercompany riv a l r y over resources and t r a f f i c . The Decision Makers Throughout Chapter 4 i t was noted that a handful of decision makers were directly responsible for policy which affected the na-ture of railnet evolution. Governments i n Canada either wittingly or unwittingly continually made decisions which lessened the effect-iveness of the international boundary as a barrier and permitted American railways to enter the Kootenays. This alone was very sig-117 nificant i n fostering a situation favorable for the expression of r i v a l r y between Canadian and American railway interests. The nature of decision making by different railway entrepre-neurs was also found to be significant. American railway interests were aggressive and, motivated by the desire to tap the resources of southeastern Briti s h Columbia as part of the hinterland of the sys-tem of lines and centres of their railnets i n the United States, per-sisted i n making attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the border. Canadian railway decision makers, particularly those of the Canadian Paci f i c , tended to be more cautious and continually attempted to ob-tain government aid and widespread support for the cause of preserv-ing Canadian resources for Canada before constructing lines to com-pete with American railways. Another important aspect of decision making i n the study area was the deep-seated personal and corporaterivalry between the presidents of the Canadian Pacific and Great Northern Railways dur-ing the period of most r a i l construction. The result of this was collective decision making which did not permit one of these to serve a centre or obtain t r a f f i c from any point i n the region with-out the other offering opposition, competition, and duplicate ser-vice with a different spatial orientation. The Role of the International Boundary To repeat the central hypothesis of this study, i t suggests that railways evolved i n the Kootenays with l i t t l e regard for the international boundary as a barrier. Throughout this thesis, evi-dence has been provided to indicate that i n the study area this situation held true. If the border were an almost complete barrier, 118 or even provided a partial barrier effect, as i n the case of the banking hinterland of E l Paso across an international boundary (Losch, 1954, p. 4 4 8 ) , the hypothesis would have to be rejected as i t stands. In a number of ways, however, i t has been shown that the border was not a significant barrier. It was noted i n Chapter 3 that lines radiated as far from Spokane to the north, across the boundary, as they did to the west, south, and east. "Foreign" lines were able to proceed to a l l t r a f f i c generating centres which promis-ed potential profit and v/ere never more than temporarily delayed from reaching such points by the border. In fact, i t was shown" that railway evolution i n the region could be explained with very l i t t l e reference to the border. It was also demonstrated that Kootenay railnet evolution was very similar to the pattern which developed i n an area where there was no international boundary. In conclusion, then, i t would appear that the central hypo-thesis can be accepted. The 49th parallel boundary did not function as a barrier to the development of railways. Nevertheless, the bor-der did become increasingly important with the passage of time. This was reflected particulary by the nature of railway abandonments, in which cross-border lines were greatly reduced i n number. In the present day i t appears unlikely that the recently projected American l i n e to the Crowsnest w i l l be realized. There were also the nation-a l i s t i c elements which were added to intercompany rivalry i n Canada, elements which would not have existed had there been no boundary, particularly where expressed i n the form of special government as-sistance to Canadian railway projects. The boundary also tended to become an increasingly perceptible feature of the area, for i t was 119 quite apparent that decision makers whose policy i t was to cross the boundary became more and more aware that they were "invading'* another country, even though this did not appear to re s t r i c t their efforts. It would also appear that the major elements which were hy-pothesized to be the major influences on railway evolution, namely the resource endowment, the r i v a l railway companies, and the govern-ment and individual decision makers were, i n fact, the essential elements which i t i s necessary to understand i n order to explain Kootenay railnet evolution. Had the international boundary been a significant barrier to railnet development, a pattern l i k e that noted by Losch (1954, p. 447) and Wolfe (1962, p. 183-184), where the Canada-United States border i n the prairies clearly disrupts the railway network, would probably have evolved. With this i n mind, we can suggest that there are three situations possible where a railnet i s evolving: 1) Where there i s no international boundary, railways would evolve freely, according to the principles of economic demand, com-plementarity, intervening opportunity, and transferability (Ullman, 1956, p. 867-868). 2) Where there i s an international boundary with a strong barrier effect on cross-border movement i n either direction, nation-al transportation systems would evolve independently, and with a restricted number of border crossings (Wolfe, 1962, p. 183-184)• 3) Where there i s an international boundary with a weak barrier effect, as i n the case examined-in this study, the result w i l l be a combination of situations 1 and 2 above. There may be the evolution of national transportation systems, but this w i l l not 120 occur completely independently; a situation of cross-border rivalry may develop i n which each stimulates and competes with the other, as outlined i n the model presented i n Chapter 2. Again i t should be noted that a considerable number of variables must be nearly equivalent on both sides of the boundary i f a pattern l i k e that of the Kootenays i s to develop. This type of situation occurs i n -frequently; i n most parts of the world, international boundaries have tended to be strong barriers to this kind of foreign invasion. The period of major railnet evolution has tended to be the period i n which massive economic development occurs, when national govern-ments are focussed inwards and are hostile to the idea of such obvious economic invasion of transport routes carrying away natural resources, trade, and commerce. 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