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Canada's Siberian policy 1918-1919 1969

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CANADA'S SIBERIAN POLICY i918 - 1919 ROBERT NEIL MURBY B.A,, University of British Columbia, 1968 A1 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the DEPARTMENT OF SLAVONIC STUDIES We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1969 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and Study. I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thes,is f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Robert N. Murby Department o f Slavonic Studies The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada D a 1 e April 17th. 1969 - i i - ABSTRACT The aim of t h i s essay was to add to the extremely l i m i t e d fund of knowledge regarding Canada's r e l a t i o n s with S i b e r i a during the c r i t i c a l period of the Intervention, The r e s u l t hopefully i s a co n t r i b u t i o n both to Russian/Soviet and Canadian h i s t o r y . The scope of the subject includes both Canada's m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the i n t e r - a l l i e d i n t e r v e n t i o n and simultaneously the attempt on the part of Canada to economically penetrate S i b e r i a , The p r i n c i p a l research was c a r r i e d out at the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa during September and October, 1968. The vast majority of the documents u t i l i z e d i n t h i s essay have never previously been published e i t h e r i n whole or i n part. The only research d i f f i c u l t y experienced was i n attempting to view the documents r e l a t i n g to the Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a . The documents i n question were under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Department of Trade and Commerce rather than the Pu b l i c Archives. In s p i t e of p e r s i s t e n t negotiations, i t o r i g i n a l l y appeared dubious whether or not the Department would release the documents. The matter was f i n a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r i l y resolved whereby the Department transferred the f i l e s of the Commission to the P u b l i c Archives on a permanent basi s . These documents had never previously been a v a i l a b l e to researchers. =• i i i « Two basic assumptions about Canada's Siberian policy for the period under study predated the actual archival research. The f i r s t was that regardless of Canada's 'colonial status* i n 1918, she had been i n fact largely independent of the United Kingdom and had agreed to j o i n the m i l i t a r y intervention i n Siberia for reasons of s t r i c t national interest. The second was that one of the most important elements of Canada's agreement had been economic interest. The documents reviewed would suggest a substantial factual basis for these assumptions,, Various aspects of Canada's Siberian intervention are new to this essay. The questions of Canada's economic interest i n Siberia; the relationship of the B r i t i s h and Canadian troops i n Siberia; and the problem of disaffection i n the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia) have not previously been discussed,, ACKR0W1EDGEENT I am extremely grateful to Dr„ C y r i l Bryner, my thesis supervisor* He gave freely of his time and encouragement. He provided invaluable assistance at a l l stages of the planning and wri t ing of this essay, Thanks also go to Dr., Michael F u t r e l l who read the manuscript proofs and offered many suggestions for improvement^ He was always w i l l i n g to ass is t me i n various wayse Robert N , Murby TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGMENT INTRODUCTION Chapter I.. CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (SIBERIA) A, Formation of P o l i c y B, « Staging of the C.E.F,(s) G a Post Armistice Government P o l i c y D_, The C.E.F.(S) i n - S i b e r i a E, The B r i t i s h B a t t a l i o n s and the Issue of Command F e Troop D i s a f f e c t i o n i n the C,E.F.(S) I I , CANADIAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION TO SIBERIA. A, Formation of the Commission B, Commission A c t i v i t y i n S i b e r i a 1, Mercantile A c t i v i t y 2. Messrs, Kunst & Albers 3# S i b e r i a n Supply Company . 4» The Braithwaite Mission I I I , THE DISENGAGEMENT - AN APPRAISAL FOOTNOTES BIBLIOGRAPHY UTRODUCTION The A l l i e d Intervention i n Siberia has for a long period excited the c u r i o s i t y and interest of a number of important scholars. Three works on the subject i n the English language, s i g n i f i c a n t both f o r their comprehensiveness and sold research which were found most useful as preparatory background for this essay were: John A. White's The Siberian Intervention;*" George F, Kennan's two volume work Soviet - American 2 Relations. 1917 - 1920 ^ Robert H. Ullman's two volume work Intervention and the War: Anglo - Soviet Relations. 1917 - 1921.^ I t i s however unfortunate that to date v i r t u a l l y no attention has been devoted to the interesting economic, m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l roles played by Canada i n the Siberian Intervention. I t i s noteworthy and inexplicable that the numerically inconsequential Canadian participation i n the Interventions both i n North Russia and Transcaucasia have been so well reported,"* whereas the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Siberia consisting as i t did of nearly f i v e thousand troops and i n addition, an a n c i l l a r y Economic Commission has been almost untouched as an area of h i s t o r i c a l research. The exceptions, however, should be noted, J . A. Swettenham's A l l i e d Intervention i n Russia. 1918 - 1919: and the 5 Fart Played by Canada perhaps presaged the beginning of an interest, at least by Canadian historians, i n this question. Since Swettenham's study covers the whole scope of the Intervention i n Russia, i t goes without saying that the material dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y with the Siberian Intervention is not as comprehensive as a full-scale monograph on the subject might have been. Another useful essay was Gaddis Smith's MCanada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918 - 1919".^ Even in these two isolated studies however there was no discussion of the role played by economics in the Canadian Siberian Intervention, It i s , nevertheless, true that Canada made a serious attempt, through the medium of an Economic Commission sent to Siberia, to penetrate Siberia economically during the period of C i v i l War and Intervention in order to develop markets for Canadian manufactured goods, A study of the role that Canada played i n the Siberian Intervention i s a v i t a l area of concern for a number of reasons, the most important of which i s that i t represents a significant aspect of our nation's history, and as Canadians we should be aware of i t , Canada did not 'officially* gain f u l l independence from Great Britain until 1931 with the passage of the Statute of Westminster ? and as a result a misconception has grown up that until that date Canada was i n every sense of the word a British colony, A study of Canada's participation in the Siberian Intervention demonstrates that this was not the case, Canada was clearly executing a national and independent policy with regard to the Siberian Intervention from the time of the i n i t i a l negotiations until the withdrawal. The role played by Canada during the Siberian Intervention provides an excellent object lesson on Canada's constitutional development. I t could, admittedly, be alleged that i t was the very important role that Canada played i n World War I that demonstrated Canada's transition from colonial to national status. Although this may be true, World War I was, after a l l , a situation of national and world emergency. The Siberian situation, on the other hand, represented no r e a l or immediate threat to Canada, and the Canadian decision to intervene, unlike the situation i n Europe, was based p r i n c i p a l l y upon cold p o l i t i c a l and economic calculation. The fact that i t was Great B r i t a i n who i n i t i a l l y made the request that Canada supply a contingent of troops f o r the Intervention, was not ultimately a consideration of paramount importance as f a r as the components of Canada's eventual decision were concerned. A second misconception i s that the B r i t i s h battalions i n Siberia are popularly presumed to have been under the command of Major-General A l f r e d Knox, the Head of the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission. I t i s also presumed, f a l s e l y , that the B r i t i s h forces i n Siberia were a separate national contingent. In f a c t the B r i t i s h battalions present i n Siberia were only part of an Imperial contingent, the bulk of which was composed of the C.E.F . ( s ) , In theory, at least, a l l the government bodies concerned recognized the fact that the B r i t i s h battalions were an integral part of t h i s Imperial Force, This Imperial Force was under the command of Major-General J , H. Elmsley, the commander of the C.E.F . (s) and a Canadian, I t i s extremely interesting to consider the massive Soviet polemic that has "been mounted over the years against the B r i t i s h intervention i n Siberia. Yet Canada's role i s ignored by Soviet historians, or i f mentioned, i t i s of the most cursory variety. Except for the fact that the Soviet historians are suffering from the general misconception that Canada was, during the period of the Intervention, l i t t l e more than a col o n i a l satrap of Great B r i t a i n , much of this Soviet propaganda should have l o g i c a l l y been directed at Canada, One of the p r i n c i p a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of the study of the Intervention from the point of view of the American, B r i t i s h , French, and Japanese aspects, i s that one cannot do so out of the context of the history of their p o l i t i c a l and economic relations with the Russian State, Taking merely the economic question alone, France and B r i t a i n p a r t i c u l a r l y and the United States to a lesser extent had massive investments i n Russia, both i n the form of loans to the Russian Government and c a p i t a l invest- ment i n the Russian economy. Naturally one of the motivating factors for these states as f a r as the Intervention was concerned was the protection of the investment. Although this economic aspect of the Intervention has largely been overshadowed by the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y aspects, i t i s slowly being realized that i t was a consideration of the utmost importance, J , A, White i n his The Siberian Intervention makes thi s very clear as does Louis Fischer i n The Soviets i n World A f f a i r s . 8 Canada, on the contrary, had v i r t u a l l y no pre-intervention relations of any significance with Russia, Except f o r the unusual conditions created by World War I whereby Canada gained a share of the Russian market, under the more normal pre-war conditions, Canadian trade with Russia was minimal; f o r a l l intents and purposes there was no s i g n i f i c a n t Canadian investment i n Russia; and since Canada's foreign relations were at t h i s time conducted by Great B r i t a i n , one cannot speak of any Russo-Canadian p o l i t i c a l or diplomatic r e l a t i o n s . I t i s precisely because of this » the f a c t that Canada had 'no axe to grind' i n Russia - that one can see the Canadian Intervention i n Siberia as a microcosm of the Intervention generally. The p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic considerations that induced Canada to intervene, and f i n a l l y the factors that caused the Canadian Intervention to founder and eventually led to the withdrawal from Siberia, were by and large not peculiar to Canada but were general to a l l the participating powers. In this essay, the two broad aspects of the Canadian Intervention are considered: the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia) and the Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a , They were the p r i n c i p a l components of Canada's Siberian policy i n the period under discussion. The two topics are considered separately not because that was necessarily the most desirable, but rather because i t was the only method possible. Although Canada's economic and m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s for Siberia derived from one common policy they were technically and administratively separate. The C.E.P.(s) was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the M i l i t i a Department and the Economic Commission was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Department of Trade and Commerce, The documentary basis of this essay was s i m i l a r l y divided. One set of archival f i l e s on the C.E.F . (s) and another on the Economic Commission, That both were the offsprings of one policy can, however, be s u f f i c i e n t l y demonstrated from a review of a number of statements made by top-level cabinet ministers, p r i n c i p a l l y S i r Robert Borden, i n a number of key documents,, Major-General S, C, Mewburn, the Minister of M i l i t i a , i n a l e t t e r dated 12th July 1918 to S i r Robert Borden regarding the formation of the C.E.F.(S) expressed rather c l e a r l y the relationship between the m i l i t a r y and economic aspects of the Canadian intervention i n S i b e r i a , I t has been suggested that the trade conditions i n this territory (Siberia} w i l l be a v i t a l factor,., i t might be advisable to have some Canadian representative accompany this force, (C.E.F .(s)J as f a r as Trade and Commerce goes, 9 In early August, 1918, S i r Robert Borden was i n a veritable panic when he discovered that the despatch of economic commissions to Si b e r i a from Great B r i t a i n and the United States was imminent, United States and Great B r i t a i n are sending economic commissions to Siberia i n connection with m i l i t a r y expedition, I consider i t essential that Canada should take l i k e action, Hope Cabinet w i l l give the subject consideration and reach favourable decision immediately,,,organization of proposed Commission should be made with least delay. 10 - 7 - In a letter to Major-General Mewburn dated August 13, 1918 Borden stated the principal considerations that in his view justified Canada's despatch of a military force to Siberia, It is interesting to note that they have very l i t t l e to do with aiding either the Russians or the Czechoslovaks or indeed the defeat of the Central Powers, Intimate relations with that rapidly developing country [Siberia] will be of great advantage to Canada in the future. Other nations w i l l make very vigorous and determined efforts to obtain a foothold and our inter- position with a small military force would tend to bring Canada into favourable notice by the strongest elements in that great community, [Siberia] ^ The Order-in-Council of 21st October 1918 which established the Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia clearly stated that the economic and military aspects of the Siberian Intervention could not be divorced, and were merely the two expressions of an over-all Siberian policy. Besides assisting in the protection and pacification of the country [Siberia) the purpose of the Allies is to assist the people of Siberia to reestablish their productive industries and reorganize their financial and commercial a c t i v i t i e s , . , . ^ Altruism, however, was not quite what the Cabinet had in mind. After a lengthy preamble the Order-in-Council finally gets to the principal point at issue, namely that Canada's interest in Siberia from a "...trade...point of view, both present and future, i s undoubted." 13 Later, when Borden was encountering cabinet opposition to the continuance of the C.E.F.(S) he advised Sir Thomas White, the Acting Prime Minister, that should the C.E.F.(s) be recalled "...the Economic - 8 - Commission which we have sent over would...he useless and would have to he recalled to our possible detriment i n the future,' 1 Borden i n another document, dated November 20th, again emphasized the economic and m i l i t a r y connection. ...Canadian Forces now i n Sib e r i a should remain u n t i l Spring and i n absence of strong reasons to contrary that the additional forces...should proceed to Siberia for the purposes indicated as well as for economic considerations which are manifest, 15 The cabinet ministers who were, orseventually became, opposed to Canada's further Siberian involvement also c l e a r l y understood the economic considerations which underlay the i n t e r - a l l i e d intervention generally and Canada's s p e c i f i c a l l y . Great B r i t a i n and France are immediately interested f i n intervening] by reason of Russia's large indebtedness to them and the d e s i r a b i l i t y of retaining stable Government i n order that such indebtedness may be met, Canada has no such economic or business interest as w i l l j u s t i f y the employment of a Canadian f o r c e . . . . 1 6 . 9 - I. CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (SIBERIA) A. Formation of Policy The r e l a t i v e l y extensive amount of research which has already heen completed on the general subject of the Siberian Intervention precluded the necessity f o r further detailed background explanation,, I t i s intended, therefore, to analyze the p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y background only i n so f a r as i t had a d i r e c t bearing on the Canadian Government's decision to participate i n the Intervention,, The collapse of the Provisional Government and of the A l l i e d e f f o r t s to convince the Bolshevik Government to continue the struggle against the Central Powers put the A l l i e d Powers, for a time, i n a d i f f i c u l t m i l i t a r y position on the Western Front, In view of the situation i n Russia there existed a number of v a l i d m i l i t a r y arguments for some kind of intervention i n that country: to attempt to reconstitute the Eastern Front; to secure the m i l i t a r y stockpiles at Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel and at the same time protect the Czechoslovak Legion, both of which were presumed to be threatened by armed prisoners of war of the Central Powers; and f i n a l l y to secure v i t a l areas of economic importance such as the Baku o i l region. The B r i t i s h Government f e l t that her troop commitments elsewhere made i t impossible to make anything other than the most minimal troop contribution to any Siberian intervention, The idea of an Imperial - 10 - Force for Siberia with Canadians making up the bulk of the strength had early presented- i t s e l f to B r i t i s h policymakers as a l o g i c a l solution to the problem. During the f i r s t week of July 1918, General Bridges, the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Representative i n Washington, D. C, had met with Ottawa cabinet ministers and o f f i c e r s of the Canadian General Staff regarding the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Canadian contribution to a Siberian force. He was informed at the time that troops were simply not available, but that possibly two battalions of discharged soldiers might be r a i s e d , 1 Major-General de B. Radcliffe (War Office Director of M i l i t a r y Operations) requested of N, W, Rowell (President of the Canadian Privy Council) i n a l e t t e r of July 9th that the matter be brought to the attention of Prime Minister S i r Robert Borden and that his views on the matter be made known to the War Office prior to any o f f i c i a l action being taken,^ Borden apparently did concur with the suggestion that Canada take part i n the Siberian force and a consultation took place i n London between Major-General de B, Radcliffe and Major-General S, C, Mewburn, Minister of M i l i t i a , on July 12th at which time firm agreement by Canada was given and the i n i t i a l organizational d e t a i l s worked out. At that time i t was agreed that the tentative strength of the Canadian contribution would be two infantry battalions (@ 1000 men each) plus supporting units. The B r i t i s h Government at the meeting promised to - 11 - contribute at least one battalion of infantry. The entire force, both the Canadian and British segments, was to be under the command of a Canadian officer, 3 The meeting did not resolve the questions of the objectives of the expedition or of which nation was to have control of the force. These two questions, which later assumed crucial importance, were left in abeyance, to be resolved at a later date, 4 In a secret memorandum from the General Staff of the Department of Overseas Military Forces of Canada to their Minister, Sir Edward Kemp dated July 19th it was stated that although the Japanese would make up the bulk of the proposed inter-allied Siberian force and carry out the bulk of the fighting ",,,it is necessary for each of the Allies to be represented for political reasons,1" The Memorandum went on to assert that: If everything goes well, the Russian front will be re-established on the western side of the Urals, and if possible will link up with the force of Czechs which is operating from the port of Archangel, [sicjl and fighting their way south, 5 At this time, although the plans for Canadian participation in the Siberian intervention had been nearing finalization, the British Colonial Secretary, Long, for some unknown reason, on July 20th in a cable despatch to the Canadian Governor-General, the Duke of Devonshire, requested that the Canadian Government 'speed up' their final agree- ment, ̂  The British Government had sent this message without prior - 12 - consultation with either Major-General Mewburn or S i r Robert Borden both of whom were at the time i n London. Borden was not pleased at this somewhat high-handed action and i n a cable to the Minister of Justice, Charles J , Doherty, Borden stated that: Mewburn and I greatly surprised that B r i t i s h Government recently sent telegram to Governor General...without f i r s t consulting us. ... I desire that no reply s h a l l be sent...except through me, 7 The Canadian Government's decision to participate i n the Siberian intervention was based primarily on three premises. There was certainly a natural and genuine desire to aid, within l i m i t s , Great B r i t a i n and at the same time play a role i n terminating the war. I t cannot be seriously suggested that panic a r i s i n g out of the German offensive of March - July 1918 was an important consideration for the Canadian policymakers. During the i n i t i a l negotiations on the formation of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia) which had taken place during the f i r s t two weeks of July 1918, the German offensive on the Western Front had already ground to a halt and by August 8th the German forces were i n f u l l retreat. There was at this time i n Ottawa an optimistic appraisal of the m i l i t a r y situation i n which the defeat of the Central Powers was looked to with confident expectation. The most that the German offensive had accomplished as f a r as Canadian p o l i t i c a l and military planners were concerned was that the prospect of victory i n 1918 was no longer regarded as f e a s i b l e . The Canadian Government had - 13 - every reason to anticipate ultimate victory. Canadian troops i n Europe had not been attacked during the German offensive and with the exception of the fiasco of Passchendaele the Canadian Corps according to Borden was i n excellent shape. 8 Moreover, by June 21st, Borden had at his disposal information that by August 1st, 1.2 m i l l i o n TJ. S. troops would be i n Prance, 9 The ultimate termination of the war, although a happy enough event i n i t s e l f , would bring with i t certain serious economic, and i n d i r e c t l y p o l i t i c a l problems. During the war, Canada had experienced an economic 'boom* of unprecedented proportions. Many existing manufacturing f a c i l i t i e s had been expanded and numerous new ones had been established. Although of course, as long as the war continued, many of these were producing war materiel under government contract. The end of the war would see them quickly retooled for c i v i l i a n peacetime production. What then would occur when the Canadian manufacturers began vastly overproducing f or a c i v i l i a n market? A depression the severity of which was unforeseen was forecast with massive unemployment - a serious l i a b i l i t y f o r any government. There was also the danger of Bolshevism spreading among the jobless. The manufacturers themselves would be reluctant to see their p r o f i t s decline and would look askance at any government that allowed this to take place, A solution to the problem was the enlargement of the foreign market for Canadian goods by establishing trading links i n previously •unexploited' areas, Siberia was such an area and the consideration - 14- of Si b e r i a as a market for Canadian exports was a factor of great importance i n Canada*s ultimate agreement to take part i n the Siberian i n t e r - a l l i e d intervention. I t was a factor certainly present i n the minds of Canadian policymakers throughout the negotiations for the establishment of the CE.F . ( s ) . 1 0 F i n a l l y , the Canadian role i n the war, although an impressive one, caused Borden and certain of his p o l i t i c a l associates to gain an impression of a post-war Canada sketched i n somewhat grandiose terms, N, W« Rowell, the President of the Privy Council, saw Canada coming out of the war i n a pre-eminent economic position, but coupled with i t p o l i t i c a l importance. He c l e a r l y saw the relationship between the two. In his view, both the United States and Canada j o i n t l y and singly would, i n the post-war period be dominant i n the P a c i f i c , ^ This was a time, not the f i r s t or the l a s t when 'Pa c i f i c rimism , was a basic tenet of Canada's economic and foreign p o l i c i e s . ^2 Of the three bases upon which f i n a l agreement had been reached, at least to the Borden clique within the cabinet, the l a s t two, namely Sibe r i a as a market and the P a c i f i c region as a region i n which Canada might wield p o l i t i c a l influence were the most c r i t i c a l to f i n a l agree- ment to go ahead with the C.E.F . ( s ) 9 The agreement, however, was conditional. The B r i t i s h Government from the beginning had been agreeable to a Canadian being appointed commander of the projected Imperial Force, This did not go f a r enough 15 - to s a t i s f y the Canadian Government. They insisted upon Ottawa rather than the B r i t i s h War Office having control of the Force. Although the B r i t i s h Government did not take readily to t h i s , since Canada was supplying the hulk of the Force and since the Canadian position was simply control and troops, or no control no troops, the War Office was forced to capitulate to Canada on this question. A meaningless face-saving formula was subsequently negotiated. Those present at the August 13th War Office Conference regarding the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia) were: Major-General J . H. Elmsley, who was subsequently appointed Commanding Officer of the Force; Major-General S, C, Mewburn, the Canadian Minister of M i l i t i a ; and Major-General de B. Radcliffe, the War Office Director of M i l i t a r y Operations, The results of the Conference l e f t the matter of command* channels f o r further negotiation. The B r i t i s h Government nevertheless i n effect acceded to the Canadian position. Notes of the Conference state that agreement was reached that the Canadian Commanding Officer was: "To have right to appeal to his Government re any order from superior authority which he considers w i l l be disadvantageous to his Force." 1 3 Also on August 13th Borden sent a l e t t e r to Mewburn i n which he stipulated the command-channels and conditions which would be acceptable to the Canadian Government, In essence they were that as to matters of policy and operations there was to be d i r e c t communication between the - 16 - War Office and the Canadian Commanding Officer of the Force. Copies of a l l such communications were to be sent to the Mi l i t i a Department, Ottawa. In a l l administrative matters the Canadian Government would have jurisdiction and would communicate directly with the Force Commanding Officer, copies of a l l such communications being sent to the War Office, London, Again, the question of ultimate appeal was c r i t i c a l , Borden's letter goes on: ...Canadian government has stipulated and Imperial Government agreed no disposition of Forces in Field shall be made nor such Forces committed any military operations without carrying judgment Canadian Commander and therefore latter shall at a l l times have right direct communication Canadian Government, 14 Therefore, although in theory the War Office had jurisdiction over policy and operations, this in fact was only meaningful in so far as Canada permitted i t to be meaningful. Not only did the Commanding Officer have the right of appeal to Ottawa, but more important, although not mentioned, the Commanding Officer was after a l l a Canadian Army officer who owed his ultimate loyalty to Canada rather than to the British Government, and as a Canadian Army officer he was, in a direct sense, ultimately under the control of the Milit i a Department, Ottawa* By August 7th the matter had been completely finalized and on that date Borden sent a cable to Ottawa requesting that the Cabinet pass an Order-in-Council immediately, 15 The originating-Order-in-Council was passed on August 12th. I 6 The Order-in-Council authorized the mobilization and despatch of two - 17 - infantry battalions with supporting units. A l l ranks would constitute a force of approximately four thousand. Two subsequent Order-in-Councils 17 18 passed on August 23rd and September 5th added other supporting units although over-all strength was to remain four:thousand. It is interesting to note that the August 23rd Order-in-Council added one squadron of cavalry of the Royal North West Mounted Police, It had originally been intended that the C.E.P.(s) would be raised by voluntary enlistment since the Military Service Act (1917) had already been the cause of much controversy and unrest. Major-General S. C, Newburn, the Minister of Militia, also pointed out that the detailing of conscripts to the Siberian Force would endanger the despatch of reinforcements to France,-^ Ultimately i t was a combination of conscripts and volunteers that made up the Force. On September 10th Major-General H. H. Elmsley, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., was appointed by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as Commanding Officer of the Imperial Force (Siberia), The order stated that the immediate objective of the expedition was "...to support the Czecho- slovak forces in their present positions," Any other objectives remained undecided. The order advised Elmsley that: "You will be kept informed of any further objective that may be decided upon." Regarding operations, Elmsley was to be under the command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General K. Otani, General Otani was the Commander of the Japanese Force in Siberia which was the largest of the participating national contingents- Elmsley was ordered to "...carry - 18 - out l o y a l l y any i n s t r u c t i o n s issued to you by the Commander-in-Chief of the A l l i e d Forces." Instructions were to be ca r r i e d out except where any order given you appears to imperil,,,your force you w i l l be at l i b e r t y to appeal to the B r i t i s h Government before executing such order,." In Item 6 of the Appointment Order, Elmsley was advised to ",...keep i n touch with Major-General Knox,.,." although t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p was not further defined, Item 7 stated that " , , , i n p o l i t i c a l matters you w i l l keep i n touch with S i r Charles E l l i o t , " 20 S i r Charles E l l i o t was the B r i t i s h High Commissioner i n S i b e r i a , I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that one of the conditions s t i p u l a t e d by Canada during the negotiations regarding the C.E.F.(s) was that the objectives of the i n t e r - a l l i e d i n t e r v e n t i o n should be 1spelled-out' i n s p e c i f i c terms and furthermore unanimously agreed to by the p a r t i c i p a t i n g powers. During the negotiations these were l e f t i n abeyance since agreement at that stage had not been attained and indeed was never effected. Canada placed a great importance up»n t h i s matter f o r two reasons, Canada di d not wish the C.E.F.(s) t« become engaged i n m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y without the support of the other n a t i o n a l contingents, p r i n c i p a l l y Japan and the United States, and hence have the C.E.F.(s) placed i n an untenable s i t u a t i o n by a superior force of opposition. I t i s also possible that Canada, i n view of her post war plans f o r the P a c i f i c , d i d not want to antagonize e i t h e r the United States or Japan by embarking on a course of a c t i o n not having the support of these two poxrersa - 19 - The B r i t i s h - Canadian controversy over the degree of commitment began to assume serious proportions when Major-General Elmsley and Major J. F. Lash sent a j o i n t telegram to Major-General Mewburn on September 10th, the same day as Elmsley's appointment, recommending that: ...some reservation should be made preventing committal of Force to any plan of operation u n t i l whole scheme agreed upon and understood by Canada..having regard to uncertainty of i n t e n t i o n of Japan and United States regarding extent and purpose of operation....21 B. Staging of the C.E.F . (s) The two battalions which were mobilized for the C E . F . ( s ) , both by voluntary enlistment and conscription, were the 259th and 260th Battalions Canadian Infantry. There were, of course, i n addition supporting units. The p r i n c i p a l staging area for the C.E.F.(S) was Willows Camp, just outside V i c t o r i a , B, C. The f i r s t contingents of the Force arrived i n V i c t o r i a i n late September and early October 1918,. An interesting aspect of this early period of the Force's history concerned the so-called 'Russian platoons' which were attached to the C.E.F . ( s ) . The Russian platoons played an important although unfortunate role within the C.E.F.(S). During the course of World War I some four to f i v e thousand Russian nationals had either enlisted or been conscripted into the Canadian Army. 22 rp^e documents do not explain how these Russian nationals came to be i n Canada, but possibly i t can be assumed that they were simply immigrants brought over under the auspices of the Department of Immigration and Colonization or else under the C, P. R. scheme which i s referred to i n Chapter II of this essay 'Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a * Apparently, however, most of the Russian nationals serving i n the Canadian Army had come to Canada alone, leaving their wives and families i n Russia. 2 3 21 - The proposal to organize the C.E.F . (s) had been i n i t i a l l y agreed to by July 12th, however, i t was only sometime l a t e r that the decision was reached to include Russian units within the Force. The proposal was f i r s t made by a Lt. Col, Yourkevitch on July 18, 1918 i n the course of an interview with a Capt, Bray of the M i l i t a r y Intelligence Section of the Canadian Army Headquarters i n London. Lt . Col, Yourkevitch, p r i o r to the outbreak of war acted as the o f f i c i a l representative of the Russian Ministry of Agriculture i n Great B r i t a i n and France. At the outbreak of war he was appointed to the Russian Government Committee i n London, In March 1917, he was given a commission as Captain i n the Canadian Army. I t i s interesting to speculate how an o f f i c i a l representative of the Russian Government and a Russian Army o f f i c e r came to be given a commission i n the Canadian Army. The documents leave this matter unexplained. His a c t i v i t y from March to November 1917, was not with the Canadian Army however, but rather with the Russian M i l i t a r y Mission i n London where he acted as Deputy to General Yermolov, After the Bolshevik Revolution he joined the Canadian Army Headquarters i n London, A suitable completion to his fantastic biography i s to note that he was married to Princess Saliha, the niece of the Sultan of Egypt, who was attached to the Canadian M i l i t a r y Intelligence Section, 24 Yourkevitch suggested the p o s s i b i l i t y of forming a Russo - Canadian unit of d i v i s i o n strength, u t i l i z i n g the four to f i v e thousand Russian nationals then i n service with the Canadian Army, and approximately - 22 - ten thousand Canadians, He advised that Russian speaking o f f i c e r s be attached to the proposed Force, 25 Although the document does not specify whether Yourkevitch was then aware of the decision to send a Canadian force to Siberia, he nevertheless had i t i n mind that his proposed Russo - Canadian force should see service i n some part of Russia, Capt, Bray notes that Yourkevitch "...was special l y desirous of speaking of the p o s s i b i l i t y of forming a special brigade for service i n Russia," 26 The War Office Conference of August 13, 1918 on the subject of the C.E.F . (s) makes note of the fact that there were i n England at that time the numerical equivalent of three to four platoons of Russo - Canadian troops. The Conference concluded that the question of their u t i l i z a t i o n was to be l e f t to the discretion of Major-General Elmsley, 27 Although the purpose of sending the Russian troops to Siberia was not defined, Major-General Elmsley did agree to their inclusion i n the C.E.F . (s) and o f f i c i a l approval on behalf of the Canadian Government was given by Major-General Mewburn, the Minister of M i l i t i a , 2 8 I t was decided to organize only two platoons and by August 29th the process of selection and staging at B e x h i l l , England was taking place, 29 The main bulk of the Russian Force, consisting of one hundred and thirteen other ranks and two o f f i c e r s (leuts. Ragosin and Englehardt) l e f t England on September 30th. 30 By October 3rd a further nineteen other ranks and one o f f i c e r (Lieut, M i l l e r ) had departed for Canada, 31 By October 21st the two contingents had arrived at the C.E.F.(S) staging area at V i c t o r i a , B, C, ^ 2 - 23 - I t had previously been decided that the Russian platoons would be kept intact , and that one platoon would be attached supernumerary to the 259th Battal ion and the other platoon attached to the 260th Bat ta l ion.53 This was la ter modified, and i t was decided to carry both platoons supernumerary to establishment of 259th Bat ta l ion.34 The later history of the Russian platoons was characterized by serious disaffection and the platoons were ultimately disbanded. (See Section F , Chapter I , 'Troop Disaffection i n the C.E.F.(S ' ) ' . ) C, Post Armistice Government Policy I t had been possible to achieve cabinet consensus regarding the formation of the C.E.F.(S) while such an operation remained an aspect of the struggle against the Central Powers; the signing of the Armistice on November 11th however immediately brought about a schism i n the cabinet ranks. Prime Minister S i r Robert Borden, then leader of a c o a l i t i o n government of Lib e r a l and Conservative cabinet ministers, although himself a strong supporter of Siberian intervention eventually found i t necessary to bow to the wishes of the non-interventionists i n order to preserve cabinet peace, A "afar Office cable to Major-General Mewburn sent just after the signing of the Armistice advised him that the War Cabinet was l i k e l y to continue to favour energetic Anglo - French action i n Siberia, The cable went on to state that although "...lack of direction American and Japanese.,.renders i t more d i f f i c u l t f o r French and ourselves, the advantage to B r i t i s h trade and prestige w i l l be correspondingly greater," J J The Ottawa cabinet ministers, however, as d i s t i n c t from those who were i n London, were d e f i n i t e l y opposed to the sending of further troops to Si b e r i a , Acting Prime Minister W. T. White advised S i r Edward Kemp, Minister of Overseas M i l i t a r y Service, on November 14th that i t was the Ipinion of the cabinet that public opinion would not sustain the Government i n continuing with the C E . F . ( s ) and he urged that the troops already i n Siberia should be recalled at the e a r l i e s t opportunity. ^ 25 - Preparatory to a possible withdrawal, on November 15th Ottawa advised the War Office that i t was their wish that Major-General Elmsley be ordered to hold a l l Canadian forces i n Vladivostok. 37 An example of cabinet opposition i s seen i n a l e t t e r dated November 22nd from the Minister of Agriculture, T. A. Crerar to Acting Prime Minister White. He advised White of his absolute opposition to sending any additional troops and asked for the r e c a l l of those already there as soon as possible. He went on to state that: The matter of how Russia s h a l l s e t t l e her internal a f f a i r s i s her concern - not ours. I f Prance or Great B r i t a i n may desire, for what appears to them good and s u f f i c i e n t reasons, to maintain armed Forces i n Russia...this i s their a f f a i r . 38 Crerar was not the only minister so opposed; i n a cable to Borden dated November 22nd White advised him that: "Many members of Council strongly opposed to our sending troops now ready to s a i l to Siberia and continuing expedition." 39 Qn November 24th the M i l i t i a Department advised the War Office that the sailings of the three troopships: S.S. TEESTA, S.S. PROTESLIAUS and S.S. JAPAN which had been designated to carry the bulk of the Force to Siberia, were cancelled pending advise to the contrary from Borden. 40 Borden, however, was very much opposed to the course of action that his Ottawa cabinet ministers had proposed. In a l e t t e r to White dated November 22nd Borden l i s t e d a number of reasons why he f e l t that Canada should proceed with her commitment. He emphasized that no m i l i t a r y action other than the possible curbing of small, l o c a l disturbances was - 26 - contemplated. Although i t was unlikely that m i l i t a r y operations would be necessary, i t was Borden's opinion that the mere presence of the C.E.F.(s) i n Siberia would have a s t a b i l i z i n g e f f ect and would a s s i s t the efforts of the newly organized Russian Government, He stressed the d i s t i n c t i o n that would accrue to Canada by having an Imperial Force under the command of a Canadian o f f i c e r . F i n a l l y he stated that i f the Force were withdrawn "...the Economic Commission which we have sent over would,,.be useless and would have to be recalled to our possible detriment i n the future," 4 1 On November 24th Borden reiterated his position i n a cable to White, He stated that "Canada's present position and prestige would be singularly impaired by deliberate withdrawing from definite arrangement... He advised White that he did not hold with the argument that the sending of draftees to Siberia after the Armistice was inappropriate, "Draftees sent to take part i n t e r r i b l e f i g h t i n g i n France have much more right to complain than draftees sent to Siberia where no fi g h t i n g i s anticipated,,.." White was advised that the London based cabinet ministers: S i r George Foster, the Minister of Trade and Commerce; Arthur L. Sift o n , the Minister of National Revenue; and Charles J , Doherty the Minister of Justice, supported Borden's view of the problem. The resolution of the matter was l e f t , however, to the discretion of White and the rest of the cabinet i n Ottawa. 42 On November 25th White, who had not at this time received Borden's communication, despatched a lengthy cable to Borden d e t a i l i n g the cabinet 1 - 27 reasons against the intervention. Among other items referred to, White detailed the fact that public opinion would not tolerate a continuation of the C.E.F.(s); that Canada had no economic interests in Siberia that would justify the employment of troops there; and that the expense would meet strong criticism both among politicians and public alike. 43 Borden, on November 27th conferred with Major-General de B, Eadcliffe, the War Office Director of Military Operations, regarding the difficulties that had arisen i n Canada regarding the Force, Radcliffe had suggested to Borden that i f i t was found necessary to discontinue the despatch of troops and withdraw the troops in Siberia, perhaps i t would be possible for Major-General Elmsley and a staff of approximately one hundred and f i f t y instructors to be permitted to remain in Siberia for training Russian troops. ^ On the same day Borden advised White of this 'out*. 45 In a second cable sent to White on November 27th Borden reiterated that the whole question of the future of the Force was to be le f t for the cabinet to determine. 46 In spite of the violent opposition of the cabinet to the continuation of the Force i t is strange that they did not determine the question to their complete satisfaction, namely total withdrawal from the arrangement, since Borden had given them this prerogative, or failing that, to have acted to limit the Force to Major-General Elmsley and a small body of instructors, which would in small measure at least, have satisfied the War Office at that time. Neither was to be the case, however, for the cabinet now decided, out of deference to Borden's views, to continue - 28 - with the Expedition in its original conception. On November 27th White advised Borden that the cabinet rt...desire to meet your wishes." 47 only qualifying suggestion was that the time of service be limited until the following summer when, i f continuation of the Force was necessary, i t would be relieved by volunteers, 4 8 ^ u o v e m b e r 29th Borden was definitely advised that the decision had been made to proceed with the Expedition, the time of service had been amended to one year's service after the signing of the Armistice (i.e. November 1919), White advised Borden that he might "...regard the matter as closed." 49 Since a few days earlier the War Office had been faced with the prospect of no Canadian forces in Siberia, they were, of course more than ready to agree to the service limit of one year for those who did not wish to remain longer. Official War Office approval for the one year guarantee was given on December 6th, In spite of the Cabinet's decision to go ahead with the C.E.F.(s) they now proceeded to place various obstacles in the path of i t s useful utilization. In many respects, there was sufficient justification for this course' of action. It w i l l be recalled that one of the guarantees demanded by Canada and offered by the British Government during the preparatory stages of the C.E.F.(s) was that there was to be one Siberian policy to which a l l the allied participating partners were to subscribe. This guarantee had been one of prime importance to the Canadian policy- makers and had been an essential preliminary to final Canadian agreement. At the time of the formation of the C.E.F.(s) inter-allied agreement had not been reached, and hence the non-fulfillment of the B r i t i s h guarantee had, for the time being, been l e f t i n abeyance. This did not, however, lessen the importance to the Canadian Government of the eventual s a t i s f y i n g of this condition, In a December 6 t h communication to the War Office, Major-General Gwatkin, the Chief of the Canadian General Staff stated that: ,,,arrangements i n S i b e r i a lack co-ordination and control, that the railway system i s i n a condition seriously disorganized, that among A l l i e s there i s no general agreement, that Americans are inactive, that Japanese, bent on commercial penetration, are subsidizing insurgent elements, Major-General Gwatkin went on to state that because of this prevailing state of a f f a i r s i n Siberia i t was f e l t that Major-General Elmsley and the Canadian Force might be placed i n a d i f f i c u l t position and that the Canadian Government was loath to see the Canadian Force undertake any course of action which might have disastrous consequences. Although the War Office was advised that the despatch of Canadian troops to Vladivostok would continue, no movement of Canadian troops inland from Vladivostok was to take place and " , . . i t may be necessary to r e c a l l them to Canada unless their mission i s made clear," 51 I t i s apparent that at this time the Cabinet had arrived at the decision, a l b e i t j u s t i f i e d , to use the issue of non-Allied agreement, as the pretext f o r Canada's non-active participation and eventual withdrawal. In a cable to Borden on December 6 t h Acting Prime Minister White - 30 - reminded Borden that the B r i t i s h guarantee had not been met. Neither the B r i t i s h singly, nor the A l l i e s j o i n t l y had come for t h with any def i n i t e policy regarding operations i n S i b e r i a . Furthermore, no likelihood of i n t e r - A l l i e d agreement existed and i n view of this White suggested that the Canadian Government should remain uncommitted, 52 Borden i n two messages to White sent on December 9th v i r t u a l l y •washed his hands' of the whole question. White was advised that the War Office "...thoroughly understands d i f f i c u l t i e s which have arisen i n Canada and you are free to act accordingly." 53 second message Borden advised White that the Cabinet had at i t s disposal information that he [Borden] did not have and that Ottawa was therefore better able to make a decision on the matter. White was advised to "...dispose of matter without further reference to us," 54 The following date, December 10th White had suggested to Major-General Mewburn, the Minister of M i l i t i a , that no further troopships should be despatched to Vladivostok and that arrangements should be immediately made for the withdrawal of those already i n Siberia, 55 <£hl3 was not acted upon although the documentation i s not clear as to the reason. The War Office, no doubt goaded into action by the stance taken by the Canadian Government regarding i n t e r - A l l i e d agreement, had made recommendations to the Imperial War Cabinet to bring the strongest pressure to bear upon the Japanese "...to secure cessation of their obstructive attitude"; and upon the Americans and Japanese i n order to effect a solution of the Siberian railway c r i s i s , 56 ^ t h e t i m e > although the - 31 - War Office appreciated the reluctance of the Canadian Government to send any troops inland u n t i l such time as United States - Japanese agreement had been obtained, the nevertheless pressed for the personal movement of Major-General Elmsley and some of his staff to Omsk to take over effective control of the B r i t i s h battalions there, ^7 The Canadian Government was unwil l ing to meet even this apparently modest request. In messages both to the War Office and to Major-General Elmsley dated December 22nd the Canadian Government advised that although for the present the despatch of troops would continue they were to return to Canada by the Spring of 1919* Orders were given that the Canadian troops i n Siber ia were neither to move inland nor were they to engage i n any mi l i t a ry operations, Major-General Elmsley was ordered not to personally proceed to Omsk u n t i l such time as his infantry commander, Brigadier-General Bickford should arrive i n Vladivostok, 58 In addition to the p o l i t i c a l grounds stipulated by the Canadian Government for disallowing the movement inland of the C.E.F.(S) there were, according to Major-General Elmsley, jus t i f iab le physical and mi l i t a ry reasons for retaining the Canadian Force at Vladivostok. In a l e t t e r to Major-General Alfred Knox, the Head of the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission at Omsk, dated 21st December, Major-General Elmsley stated that even i n the event of the Canadian Government changing i t s pol icy regarding the movement of the Canadian contingent to Omsk, he, as commander of the Force would not fee l jus t i f i ed i n moving the troops unless his l ines of supply v i a the Trans Siberian Railway could be - 32 .- guaranteed, Elmsley told Knox that i t was his intention prior to any movement to Omsk to seek a joint guarantee from a l l the Allied commanders in Siberia to secure his lines of supply to Omsk, 59 gn0x replied that such an inter-Allied guarantee was an impossibility because: ,,,neither the Americans nor the Japanese wish us to go on, the f i r s t because President Wilson is advised by Jews who sympathise with Bolshevism and the second because they want a weak Russia rather than a strong one, 60 In a further letter of December 27th Knox stated that he hoped that "...they Cbhe Canadian Government] will...go the whole hog. If they only think of playing the American-Japanese sitting game in the Far East, I honestly don't see much use in their coming at a l l , " This apparently was precisely the feeling of the War Office, In a cable dated January 4th Ottawa was advised that in view of the Canadian decision not to allow the movement inland of the C.E.F.(s) the War Office had no recourse but to recommend to the War Cabinet the withdrawal of the two British battalions and a l l Canadian forces, 62 Major-General Elmsley was appalled at the War Office action and requested them on January 8th to ask the Canadian Government to hold the matter in abeyance pending the results of the Paris Peace Conference, He suggested that the withdrawal "...may have disastrous effects on a situation,., already c r i t i c a l : and may neutralize any decisions arrived at by Peace Conference...." ^ i t was finally determined that pending a decision of the Russian question by the Peace Conference the Canadian troops would, for the time being, remain in Siberia, 4̂ - 33 - In a cable to Major-General de B. Radcliffe, the War Office Director of M i l i t a r y Operations, Major-General Elmsley advised on January 19th against the appointment of General Janin as Commander-in-Chief i n Siberia (west of Lake Baikal) "...an American C. i n C. would go f a r to win American support and guarantee to whole world...unselfish and democratic attitude to Russia." Elmsley suggested that Great B r i t a i n should adopt "...a more t a c t f u l and conciliatory attitude towards America, Japan and Canada, Modern nations can be led but cannot be driven,..." 65 Borden advised White by cable on January 28th that the War Office had no objection to the immediate demobilization of those troops designated f o r the C.E.P.(S) who had not yet been despatched to Sib e r i a , 6 6 The following day, January 29th, the War Office advised Major-General Elmsley that pending the results of the Peace Conference i t was preferable that he not go forward to Omsk i n spite of the fact that Brigadier-General Bickford had by this time arrived i n Vladivostok. ^7 In a personal l e t t e r to Major-General Radcliffe dated February 11th, Major-General Elmsley gave a candid analysis of the course that the intervention had taken to date. Elmsley stated that i n i t i a l l y i t had been possible f or the A l l i e d powers to subscribe to one agreed-upon policy regarding Siberia as long as such intervention was part of the struggle against the Central Powers, The signing of the Armistice, however, had caused the United States, Japan, the Czechoslovaks, and Canada to adopt an inactive position. The changed situation necessitated a new policy and though the Bolsheviks may be a threat, they were nevertheless a threat separate and d i s t inc t from that of the Central Powers. Elmsley c r i t i c i z e d Br i t a in and Prance for attempting to subvert the intervention into an anti-Bolshevik crusade without the mandate or consent of the par t ic ipat ing powers. I t was Elmsley's opinion that the pol icy of the B r i t i s h and French became par t icular ly arrogant i n the l i g h t of their minimal troop commitment i n S iber ia , Furthermore, Elmsley made reference to the Kolchak coup d'etat and the extremely unfavourable impression i t had made on most of the part ic ipat ing powers, par t icular ly the Czechoslovaks. Whether jus t i f i ed or not as far as the other powers were concerned, the B r i t i s h were associated with the collapse of the Directorate, and that de facto i f not de .jure the B r i t i s h and French had recognized a regime which not only did not have the support of the other a l l i e d powers, but which to the average Russian had very l i t t l e more, i f any, to offer than the Bolsheviks, Elmsley added that "Canada i s host i le to intervention unless this intervention i s part of a pol icy agreed to and supported by U« S, and Japan," He continued: . . .America, Japan, Canada and the Czechs were i n accord and understood each other's att i tude, and furthermore awaited some reconstructed pol icy which, known and agreed to by a l l , would meet the new si tuat ion created by the signing of the armistice and the recognition by the A l l i e s that Bolshevism was' a menace to the . peace of the world, 68 I t i s worthwhile noting that when Elmsley spoke of United States - Japanese accord he referred only to their joint unwillingness to become parties to the Anglo-French brand of intervention. There were few other examples of such 'accord ' . - 35 - Superficially at least, i t would seem that Major-General Graves, the commander of the U.S.E.F., and Elmsley viewed the Siberian situation in much the same way. This, however, was not quite the case. Although, like Graves, Elmsley may have found the Kolchak regime to be abhorrent, he was not in principle opposed to intervention. He was only opposed to a commitment of his forces as long as inter-allied agreement did not prevail. Graves, on the other hand, both on the basis of personal conviction and on the basis of the Aide Memoire which was his government's instructions regarding the use of his force, was opposed to intervention on behalf of any particular Russian political group, 69 On February 13th Borden advised White that i t was extremely unlikely that the Peace Conference would decide on a Russian policy in favour of intervention and that accordingly orders should be issued withdrawing the C.E.F.(S) in April. In a March 17th letter to Borden, Winston Churchill, the Secretary of State for War, stated that: In view of the very decided attitude taken up by Canada regarding the withdrawal of her troops from Vladivostok, the War Office have no option but to acquiesce, as they have f e l t i t impossible to continue to urge the Dominion Government to share, against i t s w i l l , in a task of much difficulty and anxiety, 71 A final communication on the question of the intervention was a further letter from Churchill to Borden in which Churchill made a strong plea to allow members of the C.E.F.(s) to volunteer for service in Siberia with the British Military Mission. 72 rj^g w a s finally agreed to by the Canadian Government, 73 D. The CEJ.(S) in Siberia The f i r s t body of Canadian troops arrived in Vladivostok on October 26, 1918 via the S.S. EMPRESS OP JAPAN,. 74 On October 30th they requisitioned the Pushinskaya Theatre on Svetlanskaya Street for use as a headquarters building.75 The Theatre was owned by the Commercial r Industrial Society of Vladivostok. The Society carried on numerous cultural, charitable, and educational activities in Vladivostok and they were understandably disturbed to find their centre requisitioned as CE.P . ( s ) Headquarters, A resolution of protest was passed by a meeting of the Society on November 1st, A l l the Allied Forces entering Russia assured a l l the world of their policy of complete non-intervention i n the internal affairs of Russia, In reality, however, we see just the reverse: on every side the interests of Russian citizens are being trampled upon.,,, ,,,in this case the Canadian command have occupied the premises of the society and have thus deprived i t s members and their families,.,of the possibility of continuing their.,.activities., 76 Also on October 30th arrangements were completed regarding the take-over of Gornostai Barracks, about eight miles from the city centre.77 Gornostai Barracks were the principal Canadian infantry encampment. By the time the entire Force had arrived in Vladivostok, the C.E.F.(S) occupied nine military camps of varying sizes in different sectors of the city and the immediately surrounding area, 78 - 37 - For a l l intents and purposes i t can be said that the f u l l contingent of Canadians had arrived i n Vladivostok by February 27th, 1919* Five troopships had been involved beginning with the Advance Party a r r i v i n g on the S.S. EMPRESS OF JAPAN on October 26 with 62 o f f i c e r s and 618 other ranks,79 I t w a s followed by the S.S. MONTEAGLE which reached Vladivostok on December 5 with 30 o f f i c e r s and 395 other ranks,,80 Third was the S.S. TEESTA making Vladivostok on January 12 with 43 o f f i c e r s and 824 other ranks.81 Fourth was the S.S. PROTESLIAUS, a r r i v i n g three days l a t e r on January 15 with 96 o f f i c e r s and 1,669 other ranks.82 F i n a l l y a r r i v i n g on February 27 was the S.S. JAPAN with 18 o f f i c e r s and 298 other ranks , 8 3 The C.E.F.(S) operated six d i f f e r e n t hospitals i n Siberia f or the use of the C.E.F.(s), the B r i t i s h and i n one case the Russians. The t o t a l bed capacity was 5 3 5 . 8 4 Four of the hospitals were i n the Vladivostok v i c i n i t y and had a 410 bed capacity, 85 Qn e hospital of f i f t y bed capacity was situated at Omsk p r i n c i p a l l y f o r the B r i t i s h forces stationed i n that c i t y , 8 6 One seventy-five bed hospital was located on Russian Island f o r the use of the B r i t i s h operated Russian Officers Training School, 8 7 Regarding the operation of the Russian Island Hospital there arose a serious c o n f l i c t between the Canadian medical o f f i c e r s and the Russian medical o f f i c e r s as to who had control of the Hospital, The chief Russian medical o f f i c e r claimed to be i n charge of the Hospital according to orders issued by General K» Sakharov, the School Commandant, 88 A Canadian Medical Officer investigating the conf l ic t recommended that: , ..as i t i s absolutely impossible to run an eff ic ient M i l i t a r y Hospital under dual control , i t i s strongly urged that the Russian Medical Officers be informed that they have absolutely no au thor i ty , . . i n the H o s p i t a l . , , , This was the or ig ina l arrangement., and i f i t i s not found adviseable to have i t enforced, I would recommend that the Canadian Personnel be withdrawn, 89 Shortly thereafter, General Sakharov informed Major-^General Knox of his complete accedence to the Canadian demands, 90 In spite of a number of claims as to the exemplary behavior displayed by the Canadian troops i n Siber ia , 91 there exist a number of documents which would suggest that this assessment was not ent i rely correct.. There were numerous complaints received by the Headquarters of the C.E.F.(S) from the Russian authorities regarding various actions of members of the Force,, Dai ly Routine Order 49 dated 18 December 1918 referred to a complaint from Russian authorities regarding the theft of Russian property from the Russkan barracks occupied by the C . E . F . ( s ) , 92 In a l e t te r to Elmsley dated February 17th, Colonel Butenko, the Vladivostok Commandant referred to the damage to.Russian premises caused by the Canadian troops occupying them, 93 In a l e t t e r to the editor, appearing i n Golos Primorya of. March 7th a group of Russian officers complained regarding the comic impersonation by a Canadian of a Russian officer at a Y.M.C.A. function on February 23rd which they implied was designed to bring dis c r e d i t to the Russian o f f i c e r corp. •..one of them dressed up i n the uniform of a Russian lieutenant, wearing the M i l i t a r y Cross of St, George and f i v e campaign stripes played the f o o l and hooligan. 94 A f i n a l example of these representative complaints i s a l e t t e r to the Canadian Chief of Staff, C.E.F . (s) from the Czech Town Major. The documentation on the C.E.F . (s) i s quite clear on one point « namely, that aside from the small advance party of. Canadians at Omsk consisting of eight l f f i c e r s and forty-seven other ranks, no Canadian troops were employed outside of Vladivostok and i t s environs. A number of cables from Ottawa, both to Elmsley and to the War Office reiterate the order that the Canadian troops were expressly forbidden to move rup country 1. 96 On the basis of this documentary evidence i t could be assumed that certainly no Canadian troops were engaged i n guarding the railway from Vladivostok to Omsk. A War Office cable to Elmsley dated March 20, 1919 only emphasizes t h i s point when i t states that "Canadian troops are of course not available for the defence of the railway...." 97 There exists not a single suggestion i n the documents reviewed that this order was ever abrogated or contravened. I have received a note from the Russian M i l i t i a complaining about Canadian and American soldiers gathered always on the trottoir #..(at...Canadian Y.M.C.A. H a l l These soldiers...hinder the free passage ,qf the public and accost...passing women making them different propositions, 95 - 40 - I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, i n t h i s case that the documents misrepresent the true state of a f f a i r s , since a number of other sources, some of them eye witness reports state that i n f a c t Canadian troops were guarding the railway or were otherwise engaged 'up country 1, C a r l W, Ackerman, the correspondent f o r the New York Times reported that while he was at Manchouli S t a t i o n (at the end of November or f i r s t h a l f of December, 1918) four hundred Canadian troops had already l e f t Vladivostok and t h e i r a r r i v a l at Manchouli S t a t i o n was imminent, 98 The Vladivostok d a i l y Golos Primorya reported i n i t s January 5, 1919 issue that echelons of Canadian troops are passing through Harbin every day," ^9 Captain W, E, Dunham, an o f f i c e r of the C.E.F.(s) i n an a r t i c l e he wrote on the Force f o r Maclean's Magazine stated that small ",,,units /of Canadians^are stationed elsewhere along the l i n e between the base at Vlady and the 'front' at Omsk..,," 1 0 0 O f f i c e r s returning to Canada v i a the S.S., MONTEAGLE (arr i v e d V i c t o r i a , B, C„, May 5, 1919) t o l d reporters of the D a i l y C o l o n i s t : "A few Canadians went as f a r as the Omsk frontier,, where they are engaged i n guard duty, and others were d i s t r i b u t e d along the l i n e of the Trans- S i b e r i a n Railway," - ^ l F i n a l l y , A, D. Braithwaite, a member of the Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a i n describing the t r i p he undertook to Omsk stated that a l l the railway s t a t i o n s between Vladivostok and Omsk "...are guarded by Chinese, Russian, Czechoslovak or Japanese troops. Occasionally E n g l i s h , American and French s o l d i e r s are i n evidence, and now and again a Canadian", 1(^2 « 41 - The one and only incident i n which Canadian Forces nearly became engaged i n armed c o n f l i c t with alleged Bolshevik forces occurred i n A p r i l 1919. On A p r i l 11th an armed g u e r r i l l a force began threatening the region around the v i l l a g e of Shkotova, which was t h i r t y miles north of Vladivostok, The situation was a serious one p r i n c i p a l l y since Vladivostok's source of coal, the Souchan Mines were located i n the same area, Qn A p r i l 12th, General K, Otani, the A l l i e d Forces Commander-in-Chief had despatched two Japanese battalions under the command of Colonel Isobayashi,104 General Otani by Army Order 64 on the 13th A p r i l ordered a l l the A l l i e d Forces, with the notable exception of the U.S.E.F.(S), to supply specified contingents, Canada was ordered to supply one infantry company and eight machine guns. They departed at 1 P.M. on A p r i l 13th from Vladivostok Station, According to Army Order 64 upon their a r r i v a l at Shkotova the entire i n t e r - a l l i e d force would come under the command of Colonel Isobayashi, Major-General Elmsley's action i n carrying out Otani*s order was contrary to at least one previous order from Ottawa which had specified that the Dominion Government cannot permit them to engage i n m i l i t a r y operations,..." 1 0 6 On A p r i l 13th following the despatch of the Shkotova force, Elmsley advised the War Office of his action, l u 7 The Canadian contingent was under the command of Major Hart, and a second Canadian Officer Lt, Col, James acted as Laison Officer between - 42 - the inter-allied commanders and the Japanese commander, Col. Isobayashi, By April 19th, most of the Bolshevik forces had disappeared, though some remnants surrendered without a struggle to a Japanese-Canadian column under the command of Major Hart, l ^ 8 The enemy base camp at Novo- Rossiskaya was reached on April 19th but no enemy forces were encountered. 109 The Canadian troops who had taken part in the inter-allied force returned to Vladivostok during the period April 21 - 24* On April 24th there was a march past and review of the troops by the Allied Commander- in-Chief, General Otani„ HO By April 1st, 1919 a l l of the Advance Party C.E.F.(s) at Omsk had been ordered to turn over their f a c i l i t i e s there to the British Military Mission and return to Vladivostok, H I In accordance with Canada's agreement with the War Office, those officers and men who wished to volunteer for service with the British Military Mission were allowed to do so. Eventually, only ten officers and thirteen other ranks elected to do so„ H2 in addition, eleven officers resigned their commissions in Siberia 113 and i t is possible that some of this number may also have found employment with the British, One Lfficer and eighteen other ranks had died while on duty with the Force and at least four other ranks had deserted., 114 As for the various premises and fa c i l i t i e s occupied by the C.E.F.(s) they were turned over to the various Allied contingents remaining. The Force Headquarters Building, the Pushinskaya Theatre was on June 2nd - 43 - turned over to the French M i l i t a r y Mission, ^ r r , h e B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission received most of the hospitals, ordance and supply f a c i l i t i e s , H6 The three important C.E,F . (s) camps were divided among the I t a l i a n s , the B r i t i s h , the Japanese and the Russians i n the following manner. The Italians received the prize of Gornostai Barracks,, HI The Russians and Japanese shared possession of the barracks at Second River, H 8 r^g j; a s-t; Barracks went to the 1/9 Battalion Hampshire Regiment, The C.E.F.(S) returned to Canada i n four troopships: S.S. MONTEAGLE which departed Vladivostok on A p r i l 21st, S.S. JAPAN departed May 9th, the S.S. EMPRESS GF RUSSIA departed May 19th, 1 2 0 and f i n a l l y the S.S, MONTEAGLE which l e f t Vladivostok on i t s second voyage June 5th and arrived at V i c t o r i a , B, C, June 28th, 121 - 44 - E. The British Battalions and the Issue of Command As soon as Allied agreement had been reached regarding the Siberian intervention, Britain had transferred to Siberia the 25th Bttn, Middlesex 122 Regiment from Hong Kong on August 3rd 1918. They had been immediately moved inland to Omsk, Though most of the Middlesex were in fact medically unfit for service and due for discharge 1 23 they were, at that time, the only British troops available. They were later replaced by the l/9th, Bttn. Hampshire Regiment, According to the founding documents of the C.E.F .(s), the 25th8 Bttn, Middlesex or a battalion to replace i t were to be an integral part of the Imperial contingent, a s s u c h , were to be under the command of Major-General Elmsley, The orders, dated 10th September 1918, appointing Elmsley commander of the Imperial Force, were explicit on the matter of command. Item 3 of the order states: "One British Battalion, which w i l l form part of your force, i s at present in Siberia....This Battalion or another to replace i t , w i l l come under your orders on your arrival." ̂ 25 It i s true that i n i t i a l l y Canada had given tacit agreement to the movement of Elmsley and the bulk of the C.E.F.(s) to Omsk where the 25th Middlesex was stationed. The terms of appointment, however, do not specify Elmsley 1s arrival in Omsk as the point at which he would take over the Battalion, i t merely states "...on your arrival," Elmsley interpreted this as to mean his arrival in Siberia, - 45 - At this point, Major-General Knox, the Head of the B r i t i s h Military- Mission, was not i n any sense the commander of the B r i t i s h troops i n Si b e r i a , On August 26th 1918 he had been appointed by the War Office as Head of the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission, Command of the B r i t i s h Battalions was not one of his duties as enumerated i n his l e t t e r of appointment. The War Office informed Knox, i n the same l e t t e r , i n precise terms that "Major General J , H, Elmsley w i l l command the B r i t i s h Imperial contingent.,,," 126 Elmsley and the Advance Party of six hundred and eighty a l l ranks had arrived i n Vladivostok on October 26th v i a the S.S. EMPRESS OP 127 JAPAN, One of the f i r s t situations with which he was confronted was the coup d'etat i n Omsk on November 18th whereby Admiral Kolchak took over the reins of power and assumed the t i t l e 'Supreme Ruler', This event was of tremendous significance, largely because of the h o s t i l i t y that i t generated i n the Czechoslovak Legion and the U.S.E.P .(s), and as a result changed the whole complexion of the intervention. Any likelihood of accord and common policy which may have existed e a r l i e r was dissipated by this event. The coup d'etat immediately brought into sharp focus the question of Elmsley's command of the 25th Middlesex since the B r i t i s h troops became involved i n the coup d'etat unknown to their 'commander- i n - c h i e f 1 , General Elmsley, The extent of their involvement remains i n some doubt, what can, however, be said with certainty i s that L t , Col, John Ward, the Battalion Commanding Officer, did provide guards to escort - 46 - the Social Revolutionary members of the overthrown Directory out of the country, 1̂ 8 Sometime later, i n response to a request from Elmsley, 129 Colonel Morrisey, the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Advance Party at Omsk and the 'theoretical* Acting Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces at Omsk investigated the matter, 150 Ward had originally justified his action by saying that the escorting of the prisoners had taken place on orders from Knox and with the approval of Sir Charles E l l i o t , the British High Commissioner. He further stated that Knox had command of the Battalion at that time, 131 Knox, during the course of the Morrisey investigation denied that Ward had been ordered by him to escort the prisoners, Knox stated "...that the guard had actually le f t before he got the telegram advising him of the fact." Knox did admit that:approval of the action had been given post factum by E l l i o t and himself. 132 M o r r i s e y c o n c i u d e d that Ward had acted on his own authority. 133 Even i f Knox had not been entirely candid with Morrisey and had in fact ordered Ward to provide the escort as Ward alleged then Knox was clearly acting outside his prerogatives. Just the day previously, November 17th, the War Office had send a cable (No. 70984) confirming that the 25th Middlesex was under orders of Major-General Elmsley, 134 The replacements for the 25th Middlesex, the l/9th Bttn. Hampshire Regiment arrived in Vladivostok via the S.S. DUNERA on November 27th 1918. - 47 - The force consisted of thirty-two o f f i c e r s and nine hundred and f o r t y - f i v e other ranks, 135 The Advance Party of the C E . F . ( s ) under the command of Lt, Col, Morrisey, eight o f f i c e r s and forty-seven other ranks l e f t Vladivostok for Omsk on December 8th, ^36 On December 10th, the Chief of the Canadian General Staff, Major-General Gwatkin received authorization from the War Office to despatch the l/9th Hampshires to Omsk immediately. They began to entrain f o r Omsk on December 15th and the l a s t of them had departed by December 20th, 1 ^ On December 16th, Major-General Elmsley cabled the War Office for new orders regarding the B r i t i s h Battalions as previous",,,instructions regarding my force have apparently been modified or cancelled by the Armistice, Request fresh instructions,..stating if,..any d i s t i n c t i o n between commitment of English and Canadian troops," -^8 In reply, sent December 18th, v i a Major-General Gwatkin, the War Office stated that: "We consider i t of urgent importance...that Elmsley should move west [ i , e , to Omsk] without delay...to take charge of the Middlesex and Hampshire Regiments," 139 The Canadian Government, however, had i n the meantime decided that Elmsley and his s t a f f were not to leave for Omsk u n t i l the a r r i v a l i n Vladivostok of Brigadier-General Bickford, the C.E.P,(s) infantry commander. - 48 - The Chief of the Canadian General Staff had advised Elmsley of this decision by cable on December 23rd, 140 In a War Office cable dated January 6, 1919, Elmsley was advised that the British Battalions would come under his command at such time as he arrived in Omsk "...but not before", 141 ij^e W a r office further informed Elmsley by cable on January 29th that he should remain in Vladivostok pending clarification of Allied Russian policy at the Peace Conference,142 A War Office cable of February 2nd apparently merely confirmed the issue when i t advised Elmsley that for ",.,the present the 25th Middlesex and l/9th Hampshire Regiments wi l l remain under General Knox." 143 ^ copy of this cable had been sent to the British Military Mission at Omsk, On February 6th, Brigadier-General J. M, Blair, Knox's Chief of Staff, queried the War Office regarding the cable. Your telegram No, 74870 of 2nd February to General Elmsley i s not understood. The Hampshire Regiment has never been under General Knox and the Middlesex Regiment was only under the Mission t i l l the arrival of Canadian staff here. The Mission has no Supplies or Administrative Services for taking over Troops,,,.144 The War Office apparently conceded their error and the correctness of Blair's objections. The British troops were again o f f i c i a l l y recognized by the War Office as being under Major-General Elmsley's command, thus ipso facto nullifying War Office cables of December 18th, January 6th and February 2nd, The War Office sent Knox a cable (No. 75107) dated February 8th confirming Elmsley's command, 145 Kn 0 X turn « 49 - advised Elmsley of the situation by letter on February 21st. "In view of...Telegram 75107 of 8th February I take i t these Battalions remain under your command,..." 146 This was the situation until April 1919. The War Office and the British Military Mission, however, were only willing to accept Elmsley's command as long as i t was convenient to do so. In a War Office cable to Elmsley dated March 20th he had been advised that the Hampshires were not to leave Omsk, 147 j n Aprii^ however, Brigadier-General Blair had requested of Elmsley permission to move the Hampshires to Ekaterinburg due to the fact that Russian Army General Headquarters had moved to that city from Omsk. 148 g e -k e e n advised by Elmsley in reply that "I have no objection provided C.E.F. is not responsible for administration," 149 i n spite of the fact that the War Office had never advised Elmsley that he was no longer responsible for the Hampshires, they did nevertheless make the move to Ekaterinburg, presumably under orders of Major-rGeneral Knox, Upon learning of the movement of the Hampshires, Elmsley in a cable to the War Office dated May 2nd abdicated his command of the Battalion, "As the First Ninth Hampshires are now moving to Ekaterinburg under orders from the British Mission I cannot accept any further responsibility in regard to their command or administration." 15^ The Middlesex were being gradually moved to Vladivostok preparatory to being shipped out of Siberia,. Elmsley continued to command this Battalion until the C.E.F.(s) was withdrawn. On June 19th the command of 151 the remaining Middlesex was passed to the British Military Mission, J - 50 - P, Troop Disaffection i n the C.E.F.(s) I t i s • p a r t i c u l a r l y appropriate to attempt an assessment of the degree of d i s a f f e c t i o n i n the C.E.F.(S), That i t was r e l a t i v e l y wide- spread can be documented. Its prevalence i n the Force was due to a combination of factors. The M i l i t a r y Service Act (1917) which had established conscription i n Canada had been enacted only i n the face of overwelming opposition. Elsewhere i n Canada the resentment had been largely verbal and passive; i n Quebec, however, the opposition had been violent, 152 While people were w i l l i n g to acquiesce i n conscription as a part of the struggle against the Central Powers, they were not w i l l i n g to do so i n order that Canada should interfere i n Russia's internal a f f a i r s . The only acceptable basis for the Siberian intervention was to re-estab- l i s h the Eastern Front and with the signing of the Armistice this j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the CE.F.(S) disappeared. Furthermore, i n the minds of many, the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f or further conscription under the M i l i t a r y Service Act s i m i l a r l y disappeared since, according to S i r Robert Borden, the purpose of the M i l i t a r y Service Act had been sole l y for the purpose of providing reinforcements for the Canadian troops i n Europe, 153 By 1917 - 1918 the general state of the c o l l e c t i v e Canadian psyche was one of intense 'war weariness'. This would apply both within Canada - 51 - i t s e l f and among the Canadian forces overseas. One element of t h i s may have been due to the possible spreading influence of s o c i a l i s t and Bolshevik doctrines. In March, 1919 there had been serious r i o t i n g among the Canadian forces in.England and Prance who were awaiting d e m o b i l i z a t i o n . 1 - ^ Also i n March a mutiny of Canadian troops had taken place at Murmansk i n the North Russian Expeditionary Force,1-'-' These disturbances were not unique to Canada or Cpnaflians; i t i s generally w e l l known that s i m i l a r disturbances were common occurrences i n the l a t t e r part of the war and. the immediate post-Armistice period. The C.E.F(s), e s p e c i a l l y as i t had been organized so l a t e i n the war, had a number of encumbrances against i t from the moment of i t s inception. A s i g n i f i c a n t number of the troops making tip the Force had been conscripted and a large proportion of them had been Quebecois, among whom the M i l i t a r y Service Act was a p a r t i c u l a r l y odious instrument of governmental oppression. The o f f i c i a l and p u b l i c i z e d basis f o r the C.E.F .(s) had been to f i g h t the Central Powers, The signing of the Armistice on November 11th found the vast majority of the approximately f i v e thousand troops making up the Force s t i l l i n V i c t o r i a , B.C. I t was the opinion of the men that since the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the S i b e r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n no longer existed that they would be demobilized. This, of course, d i d not take place. The e f f e c t of t h i s development on the men can perhaps best be ascertained by noting that two of the most serious - 52 - examples of disaffection i n the Force occurred within the one and one-half month period immediately following the signing of the Armistice. On Sunday night, December 9, 1918 a large r a l l y had been held at the Columbia Theatre i n V i c t o r i a . The meeting had been organized under the auspices of the Federated Labour Party. The purpose of the meeting had been to protest Canadian participation i n the Siberian intervention. The Daily Colonist noted i n their report of the meeting that the audience "...held a large proportion of soldiers from the Siberian Forces." 1 5 6 The War Diary of the C.E.F.(s) records that the following day, December 10th, Brigadier-General Bickford addressed a l l ranks on the subject of propaganda against the C.E.F.(s) . 157 c a n D e a s s u m e d that the m i l i t a r y authorities were seriously concerned about the effect of such anti-intervention propaganda upon troop morale otherwise the 'pep talk' by Bickford would have been unnecessary. The two Russian platoons consisting of three o f f i c e r s and one hundred and thirty-two other ranks had o f f i c i a l l y been taken on strength by the 259th Battalion on October 24th 1918. 1 5 8 One of the members of this Russian Force was a Serb passing for a Russian. He related to one of the Canadian o f f i c e r s of the C.E.F.(s) that not only was the reading of Bolshevik propaganda widespread among the Russians but moreover that: ...his comrades are saying that they were not asked i n France or England whether they wished to fi g h t the Bolsheviki but only whether they wished to go to Russia. They w i l l f i g h t Germans but not their own countrymen. If they get a chance...they w i l l j o i n the Bolsheviki Army. 159 - 53 - This intelligence regarding the state of disaffection i n the Russian platoons reached Major-General Gwatkin, the Chief of the Canadian General St a f f , who wrote to Major-General Leckie, the General Officer Commanding M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t 11, on November 4th. I t was understood that the Russians...before being returned to Canada...were carefully selected, but i t i s possible that amongst them there are some of an undesirable type, and I ask you to get r i d of any whom you have good and s u f f i c i e n t reason to suspect, 160 On the same date Major-General Gwatkin sent a l e t t e r to Major-General Elmsley that after their a r r i v a l i n Vladivostok, the Russians i n the C E . F . ( s ) were to be kept under close observation. 161 The actual form the investigation took at V i c t o r i a i s not documented, however, the War Diary of the 259th Battalion states that on November 16th, thirty-nine Russian other ranks were transferred to Work Point Barracks, i n V i c t o r i a , pending disposal, 1^2 On November 20th, forty-eight further Russian other ranks followed them, 163 The reason given i n the War Diary for the transfer was that "...these men not being anxious to proceed to Siberia." 1^4 As a result of this development which decimated the Russian Force by approximately sixty-seven percent i t was decided, i n an e f f o r t to l i m i t the spread of the disaffection among those Russians remaining, to break up the Russian platoons and distribute the members of the force evenly throughout the 259th Battalion and 260th Battalion, 165 It was the opinion of the Chief of Staff, Major-General Gwatkin that the Russian o f f i c e r s should have been discharged also or i n his - 54 - own words "...I.would bow them out." This was not acted upon. The Russians transferred to Work Point Barracks according to the Discharge C e r t i f i c a t e s were discharged on account of 'Demobilization', 167 I t can be assumed that no l e g a l a c t i o n was taken against them. However, on January 29th 1919, the M i n i s t e r of M i l i t i a , Major-General Mewburn ordered, through Major-General Gwatkin: "That those Bolsheviks who were discharged 'on demobilization 1 but f o r misconduct, are not to receive war g r a t u i t i e s , . . . " This would suggest that there was ac t u a l though unspecified misconduct i n ad d i t i o n to t h e i r having Bolshevik sympathies. This i s the only document that s p e c i f i e s 'misconduct 1, the other documents allude only to Bolshevik tendencies among the men or else to t h e i r d i s i n c l i n a t i o n to go to S i b e r i a , I t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to determine, due to the paucity of documentation, what exactly happened to the remained of the erstwhile Russian platoons a f t e r they reached S i b e r i a . I t i s apparent, however, that many of them e i t h e r retained or acquired a sympathy f o r the Bolshevik cause. I t i s not possible to determine the number of Russians who deserted i n S i b e r i a from the C.E.P . ( s ) , There were at l e a s t four, and because of the incompleteness of the Nominal R o l l s , the number could have been greater, L t . C o l . Cartwright, the C.E.P .(s) A s s i s t a n t Provost Marshal stated that " . . . i n every case the men who deserted are Russian subjects." 1 6 9 - 55 - As recorded e a r l i e r the M i l i t a r y Service Act had been most vociferously opposed within the ProvincB of Quebec. Though the actual number i s not known a large proportion of the men composing the 259th Battalion C.E.F.(s) were Prench-Canadiens who had been conscripted for service i n Siberia, The i n i t i a l resentment of the men must have been compounded after the Armistice had been signed, On December 18th, 1918, S i r Lomer Gouin, the Premier of Quebec, had received the following cable from V i c t o r i a ; because of i t s s i g n i - ficance i t i s quoted i n i t s entirety: Over 300 l o y a l French Canadians of the 16th. Brigade, S.E.F., which were w i l l i n g to do their duty to annihilate the Hun menace energetically protest against being sent to-day i n Siberia, contrary to their w i l l , i n an expedition which i s not j u s t i f i e d and useless for our Country. As f i r s t c i t i z e n of our Province and worthy representative of our race, we beg that your influence may be used to prevent such an i n j u s t i c e , (Sgd) 259th. Battalion 170 The cable had been passed on to Major-General Mewburn, the Minister of M i l i t i a , but no action had been taken. Three days l a t e r , on December 21st, the 259th Battalion was due to embark for Vladivostok on the S.S. TEESTA, On the march from Willows Camp to the dock a mutiny had taken place involving French-Canadien troops. The disturbance was quelled and the men taking part were placed under arrest and f o r c i b l y transported to Vladivostok, 171 The actual form the mutiny took i s not known. It can be determined, however, that -56 - as a result of the events of December 21st, a F i e l d General Court Martial held i n Vladivostok on January 28th found f i v e men were gu i l t y of 'joining i n a mutiny i n forces belonging to His Majesty's Auxiliary Forces'. They were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from s i x months to three years. Two men were found g u i l t y of 'disobeying i n such a manner as to show w i l f u l defiance of authority'. They received terms of one year and ninety days, Two men were found g u i l t y of 'disobeying a lawful command' and were sentenced to twenty eight days and thirty- days, ^ 2 The documents do not suggest that the disturbance was any wider than involving the nine individuals noted. I t may, however, be the case that the documents do not t e l l the complete story. On June 25, 1919, Joseph Archambault, Member of Parliament for Chambly and Vercheres, brought up i n the House of Commons the fa c t that he had recently interviewed some of the men of the 259th Battalion who had returned from Si b e r i a , Archambault related that the men stated they had o r i g i n a l l y been forced to board a t r a i n to V i c t o r i a against their w i l l . They were forced to embark on a boat for Siberia at the point of the bayonet, Some of them resisted and were court-martialled," 1^3 One of the factors which led to troop d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and demoral^ i z a t i o n was the f a i l u r e of the Government to develop new policy to j u s t i f y the need for the Force i n the immediate post-Armistice period. - 57 - The unrest was p a r t i c u l a r l y evident among those troops remaing i n V i c t o r i a , who did not know i f they were to be demobilized or despatched to S i b e r i a , On January 21, 1919, Major-General Leckie, the Commanding Officer, M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t 11, sought from Major-General Gwatkin, the Chief of Staff, c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Canada's Siberian policy, "Could some information be forwarded with regard to probable disposal of Siberian Forca....A certain amount of uneasiness exists...but i f some early decision could be given i t would relieve situation." 174 As for the actual extent of disaffection among the troops i n Siberia i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to gauge from the available evidence. However, i t i s possible to determine that the troops were becoming increasingly demoralized. Such words as 'fed-up' and 'homesick* perhaps best describe their condition. In a l e t t e r to a friend i n Vancouver, one member of the C.E.F.(s) wrote on December 29, 1918: "Now that the war i s p r a c t i c a l l y over, we are more or less fed up,...Most of us f e e l we are here now because the p o l i t i c i a n s say so." 175 At the Peace Conference on January 21, 1919 there took place a discussion of the Russian question. Notes of the Conference describe B r i t i s h Prime Minister Lloyd George's expressed sentiments: Now Canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the Canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and f i g h t against the Russians. Similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other A l l i e d troops. And he f e l t certain that, i f the B r i t i s h t r i e d to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny, 176 - 58 - Although no substantiative evidence was found, the Chief of Staff, Major-General Gwatkin on February IJth cabled Elmsley that he /Gwatkir^ had received reports of serious discontent among the Canadian forces 177 i n S iberia. ' Although there had apparently been no overt acts of discontent, Major-General Elmsley undoubtedly was i n error when he replied on February 18th that there was "...no discontent and troops quite happy." 1 7 8 By March 1, 1919 d i s c i p l i n e among the C.E.F .(s) had deteriorated to the extent that Elmsley had been forced to prepare a special Daily Order on the subject. Attention i s again directed to the slackness of Other Ranks...in regard to saluting. I t i s necessary that the reputation for good d i s c i p l i n e which has been achieved by the Canadian Army i n Great B r i t a i n and France be maintained... i n Siberia. 179 Certainly one member of the Force, Rifleman J . Penner (260th Battalion) was not only German.but a self-confessed Bolshevik of long standing who had been conscripted into the C.E.F . ( s ) . His sister-in-law stated proudly to an investigating police o f f i c e r that "...we are sure he w i l l help the Bolsheviks i n Siberia i f he gets the chance,.,," l 8 ^ Rifleman Penner ,s brother, Jacob Penner, l a t e r became one of the most important figures i n the early development of the Communist movement i n Canada. 1 81 The f i r s t shipload of returning soldiers of the C.E.F . (s) was carried on the S.S. MONTEAGLE. I t had l e f t Vladivostok on 21st A p r i l - 5 9 . - and a r r i v e d a t V i c t o r i a on May 5th. During the course of the journey at l e a s t one case of l o o t i n g had occurred and at l e a s t one o f f i c e r ' s l i f e had.been threatened, l 8 2 In the l a s t shipload of C.E.P.(s) troops out of S i b e r i a , there were, according to i n t e l l i g e n c e received by the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission, some mem of the 260th B a t t a l i o n who "...had i n t h e i r possession,,, a large quantity of Bolshevik propaganda, printed i n Eng l i s h , f o r d i s t r i b u t i o n i n Canada and the United States," ^ 8 3 « 60 - I I . CANADIAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION TO SIBERIA A, Formation of the Commission P r i o r to the outbreak of World War I , the f e a s i b i l i t y of Canadian trade w i t h Russia was severely l i m i t e d f o r a number of reasons. One of them was the extremely strong p o s i t i o n occupied by German i n t e r e s t s i n the import-export trade with the major population base of European Russia, 1 This s i t u a t i o n arose not only because of the f o r e s i g h t and business acumen displayed by the German entrepeneurs, although t h i s undoubtedly played a part, but rather more s p e c i f i c a l l y because of Germany's geographic proximity. None of the nations on the P a c i f i c rim: Canada, the United States, or Japan could have hoped to compete with the more favourable f r e i g h t rates enjoyed by German business houses, Although any of these nations, Canada included, could have competed favourably i n S i b e r i a , German i n t e r e s t s there had v i r t u a l l y monopolized the S i b e r i a n market long before the outbreak of World War I , This was true not only i n banking as i n the case of the Russo-Asiatic Bank and the Si b e r i a n Bank of Commerce where German influence was strongly f e l t , but of more importance f o r purposes of t h i s study i n the import-export trade and the wholesaling and r e t a i l i n g of consumer goods, a l l of which were so e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l l e d by the German f i r m of Messrs. Kunst & Albers. - 61 - It was only with the outbreak of war and the resultant decline of German economic influence 2 that Canada saw her opportunity. Canadian manufacturers benefited from war contracts let by the Russian Government both directly to Canada, and the seconding of contracts originally let to British firms. Canada in 1916 appointed two Trade Commissioners to Russia: Mr. C, F. Just to Petrograd in April, and Mr. W. D, Wilgress to Omsk in July. 5 i n 3.918, owing to the political instability of the Russian capital, Just was recalled to Canada; Wilgress however remained at his Omsk post. 4 As early as October 9, 1917, Major J, Mackintosh-Bell, a Canadian attached to the British Intelligence Mission to Russia, and well known to the Borden cabinet, wrote to Loring C, Christie, Borden's Special Executive Assistant, that: ...the Americans continue to make every effort here to obtain the mining concessions and trade interests which the Germans lost, and which in great part Great Britain i s unable to maintain owing to present conditions. It is a wonderful chance for Canada, 5 On December 13, 1917, the British Consul in Vladivostok, R, M. Hodgson, wrote to Mackintosh-Bell stressing the benefits Canada could derive from trade in Siberia and strongly recommended the appointment of a Trade Commissioner to Vladivostok, 6 Thi s letter was passed on to the Prime Minister and several of the more important 62 - cabinet ministers. Arthur Meighen, Minister of the Interior, wrote to the Prime Minister on January 29, 1918 regarding the recommendation and suggested the transfer to Vladivostok from Petrograd of C. P. Just. 7 This suggestion, however, was not acted upon and Just subsequently returned to Canada. Except for the transfer and appointment of Wilgress from Omsk to Vladivostok i n July 1918 8 as an interim measure, the whole subject of Canada's economic relations with Siberia was l e f t temporarily i n abeyance. Important plans to send a Canadian m i l i t a r y force to Siberia were being f i n a l i z e d i n London, Firm agreement between Canada and Great B r i t a i n on Canada's troop commitment probably had been reached • u n o f f i c i a l l y ' by the end of June, and o f f i c i a l agreement was reached on July 12, 1918. 9 Borden, i n London at this time, immediately realized that the positioning of a large Canadian mi l i t a r y force i n Siberia could be of s i g n i f i c a n t economic usefulness. I t was his view that Canada should not be caught 'napping' and upon learning of the pending departures of Economic Commissions to Siberia from Great B r i t a i n and the United States, he advised Acting Prime Minister ¥. T, White and the cabinet i n Ottawa by cable on August 8th that Canada should take l i k e action without delay, ^ Five days l a t e r , Borden was advised of the cabinet's approval by cable, on August 13th. 11 -63- For reasons not yet ascertainable, two individuals: Col. J . S. Dennis and Mr, R. Martens, seem to have had predominant influence regarding the composition of the proposed Commission. Col. J . S. Dennis, on leave from the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway and engaged i n 1918 at the Headquarters of the B r i t i s h and Canadian Recruiting Mission i n New York, was requested by the Hon, J . A, Calder, the Minister of Immigration and Colonization, to provide suggestions regarding the Commission, Dennis, l i k e Mackintosh- B e l l and the Prime Minister, recognized the disadvantages to Canada of United States a c t i v i t y i n Siberia. In his reply dated August 17th he stated: As you are aware, the United States i s organizing a very strong Trade and Propaganda Commission to accompany or follow t h e i r m i l i t a r y expedition, and I f e e l that unless Canada follows s u i t , we w i l l be l e f t i n the cold, 12 B r i e f l y , Dennis* proposal was that the Commission should consist of representatives of four or f i v e special interest groups. The most important of these were to be: the Canadian Bankers Association, the Canadian Manufacturers Association, transportation interests ( i n view of his antecedents he undoubtedly had the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway i n mind). Prior to the war the C. P. R. agents i n Russia had conducted a campaign for immigrants u n t i l the Russian Government had terminated th i s a c t i v i t y , 15 i n the b r i e f , Dennis suggested that this movement of Russian immigrants to Canada could now be reactivated and for that reason suggested that the Department of Immigration and Colonization - 64 - should appoint a representative to the Commission. Moreover, Dennis emphasized the importance of having two or three Russians attached to the Commission. One of the persons he"recommended was Count L. L. T o l s t o i , the son of the famous novelist, then i n the United States on a lecture tour. 14 The Minister, however, did not act upon this particular suggestion. In addition to Colonel Dennis, a gentlemen apparently having considerable influence with the cabinet was Mr, R, Martens, of the firm Messrs, R, Martens & Co, Ltd, of London, a large Anglo-Russian trading company having numerous outlets i n Russia, Martens or his representatives on numerous occasions throughout the summer of 1918 conferred both with the Prime Minister S i r Robert Borden and the Minister of Trade and Commerce S i r George Poster. 15 Martens put forward his proposals to Poster i n the form of a l e t t e r dated October 8th and as i s mentioned i n the l e t t e r did so at the request of Colonel Dennis, I t i s not surprising, then, to f i n d his suggestions i n the main mirroring those of the e a r l i e r Dennis b r i e f of August17th, The Martens 1 proposals called f o r a commission composed of: (a) a transportation man (b) an a g r i c u l t u r a l expert (c) a mining s p e c i a l i s t (d) a f i n a n c i a l expert, and (e) direct government representation for whom he recommended W, D, Wilgress, the Trade Commissioner at Vladivostok, and C, P, Just, the former Trade Commissioner at Petrograd. 1^ - 65 - Although cabinet approval for the creation of the Commission had been reached on or before August 13th, 1 7 the 'Canadian Economic Commission to S ibe r i a ' as i t was o f f i c i a l l y designated, was not formally created by Order-in-Council u n t i l October 21st, 1 8 i t i s interest ing to compare the s imi l a r i t i e s between the Order-in-Council and the proposals submitted by Dennis and Martens previously noted. The Order-in-Council named to the Commission: C, P . Just, W, D. Wilgress, Colonel J , S. Dennis, who at this time was i n Vladivostok as Laison Officer for the C . E . P . ( s ) , and Ross Owen, also i n Vladivostok as C. P . R. representative. X9 T h e Order-in-Council further recommended the future enlargement of the Commission by the addition of representatives of Banking, Mining, Agriculture and Manufacturing, 2 <^ The Order-in--Council stated: . . . s i m i l a r i t y of natural conditions between Siberia and Western Canada, as wel l as the problems connected with agriculture and transportation, mining and fisheries are factors which enable Canada to cooperate,. . in the supply of the commodities urgently required and also from experience and adaptability to afford pract ica l assistance by advise and instruction along the l ines par t icular ly v i t a l to Siberian reconstruction, whilst her ( i . e . Canada's] interest i n the trade and economic -point of view, both present and future i s undoubted. 21 (.Emphasis added) ~~ The terms of reference of the Commission as set forth i n the Order-in-Council were par t icular ly broad, and the divergent interpretations of the Commission's functions later became a source of serious con f l i c t . - 66 - Basically,' the r o l e of the Commission was to be an i n v e s t i g a t i v e one. Studies were to be undertaken i n t o various facets of the S i b e r i a n economy with emphasis on the a g r i c u l t u r a l , mining, f o r e s t and f i s h i n g i n d u s t r i e s to determine the commodity needs that could be supplied by Canadian industry. In view of the i n s t a b i l i t y of the rouble and i t s lack of easy exchangeability, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r barter arrangements with S i b e r i a n cooperatives, m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and trading corporations were to be investigated, The f i n a n c i a l system was to be studied i n order to determine the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r c r e d i t arrangements. F i n a l l y information was to be gathered, and recommendations made, on the commodities to be supplied and arrangements formulated f o r t h e i r s h i p - op ment and s a l e . " The f i n a l item, r e f e r r i n g as i t does to the supply, transport and sale of Canadian imports, was the c r u c i a l one, and the desired end r e s u l t of ' a l l those proceeding. I t was the abrogation by Ottawa of t h i s Commission funct i o n that was l a r g e l y responsible f o r the disagree- ment between Ottawa and the Commission that was to r e s u l t i n the Commission terminating i t s a c t i v i t y . The Commissioners believed that i n order f o r sales and transportation to be arranged i n the most e f f i c a c i o u s manner, the Commission must be something more than a purely i n v e s t i g a t i v e body. They argued that i n a d d i t i o n the Commission must take upon i t s e l f the a t t r i b u t e s of a trading corporation. 2 3 The - 67 - Order-in-Council i t s e l f sets f o r t h this view i n f a i r l y concise terms. Two of the named Commissioners: W, D, Wilgress and Ross Owen were already i n Vladivostok; C. F, Just and the Commission secretary, Mr, Kohn arrived on January 12th. 2 4 Dennis arrived on February 2nd. 2 5 During this period, i n accordance with the Order-in-Council, or more s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n direct accordance with the proposals of Dennis 1 b r i e f of August 17th, the Department of Trade and Commerce contacted the Canadian Bankers Association and asked them to recommend the appointment of a representative. On November 1st, Mr. Pease, the Association President, recommended Mr, A. D. Braithwaite, formerly Assistant General Manager of the Bank of Montreal. 2 6 The Acting Minister of Trade and Commerce recommended to the cabinet on December 19th the appointments of A. D, Braithwaite and a C, J , Curtin of Vancouver (representing B r i t i s h Columbia mining i n t e r e s t s ) . 2 7 The Council approved Braithwaite's appointment, but for some unspecified reason l e f t Curtin's appointment pending, Braithwaite arrived i n Vladivostok v i a the S.S. JAPAN on February 27, 1919. 2 8 The Department of Trade and Commerce also contacted (presumably i n November 1918) Mr. Murray of the Canadian Manufacturers Association for a recommended appointee of that body. The Department, however, was advised that no member of that Association was w i l l i n g to accept 29 the post, J - .68 - This apparent lack of i n t e r e s t on the part of the Canadian Manufacturers Association at t h i s c r i t i c a l point was i n d i r e c t contra- d i c t i o n to the affirmed p o l i c y of the Association since 1915. The opportunities i n S i b e r i a f o r Canadian manufacturing i n t e r e s t s were a constant e d i t o r i a l theme i n the Association's organ ' I n d u s t r i a l 30 Canada'. i n a d d i t i o n , the Ass o c i a t i o n maintained through 1919 a sub-committee s p e c i f i c a l l y delegated to study the S i b e r i a n s i t u a t i o n , Unfortunately, t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n must remain unexplained. B. Commission A c t i v i t y i n Siberia 1. Mercantile A c t i v i t y Prior to the a r r i v a l i n Vladivostok of the f u l l commission, Wilgress and Owen had leased o f f i c e premises at 57, Svetlanskaya Street, formerly occupied by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. 31 The o f f i c e was i n convenient proximity both to the Canadian Expeditionary Force Headquarters and the Canadian Red Cross. U n t i l the a r r i v a l of the other commissioners, Owen and Wilgress occupied themselves with the co l l e c t i o n of background data for the consideration of the Commission. Dennis, who arrived on February 2nd, was elected by his fellow Commissioners to the position of Chairman, thus replacing Just who had previously been acting as interim 32 Chairman. To those unfamiliar with bureaucratic models, this Commission of f i v e members, then performed a seemingly fantastic maneuver - they established four sub-committees "...for the purpose of prompt and e f f i c i e n t consideration of some of the more important questions...." ^3 A better example of r i g i d and extreme compartmentalization would be d i f f i c u l t to f i n d , A look at the sub-committees nevertheless allows us to determine the types of problems with which the Commission was - 7 0 - concerned. The sub-committees were: (a) Transportation, (b) Markets . and Supplies, (c) Business Register, and (d) F i n a n c i a l Conditions and Cr e d i t s , 4̂ The Commission was, at l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , s u f f e r i n g from a number of delusions regarding the state of conditions i n S i b e r i a i n the sense that without basis of f a c t they presumed the existence of the e s s e n t i a l pr e r e q u i s i t e s such as an operative transportation system. They d i d , i n s p i t e of inadequate information, immediately concern themselves with those matters which were, i n essence, t h e i r r a i s o n d'etre - the development of Siberian-Canadian trading r e l a t i o n s , Dennis i n h i s report of February 20th informed the M i n i s t e r of Trade and Commerce that numerous i n q u i r i e s had been received r e l a t i v e to Canadian a b i l i t y to supply farm machinery i n large quantity to meet the needs of S i b e r i a n a g r i c u l t u r e , 35 D e f i n i t e orders had been received by the Commission and these had been d i r e c t l y communicated to the appropriate Canadian manufacturers. I t was only subsequently that the Commission a r r i v e d at the belated conclusion that two fact o r s prevented t h i s venture from being brought to f r u i t i o n - the congested condition of the Vladivostok port f a c i l i t i e s and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of arranging d i s t r i b u t i o n to the i n t e r i o r due to the chaotic condition of the railway system, Three projects were, however, viewed as f e a s i b l e . Recommendations were made to the Department of Trade and Commerce to ship a few thousand - 71 - pounds of vegetable seeds to Siberia, to be sold by the Commission to Zemstvos and other cooperative organizations. I t was the view of the Commission that not only would this have met a basic need i n Siberia for high quality seed, but would have served as an i n i t i a l step i n Siberian-Canadian trade, 57 The v i a b i l i t y of the proposed trade l i n k depended upon i t s development on a b i l a t e r a l basis. This being so, the Commission did what i t could to develop b i l a t e r a l trade. For example, the Commission determined the a v a i l a b i l i t y for export of a quantity of f l a x stored i n Vladivostok (75,000 poods). The Commission considered the question of i t s purchase and shipment to Canada for use by Canada's t e x t i l e industry, 58 The Commission received information from o f f i c i a l Omsk sources about the urgent need for 7.5 m i l l i o n pounds of binder twine to meet the requirements of the following season's crop. They were advised that a Canadian manufacturer of this commodity had a large supply on hand. The Commission, therefore, i n i t i a t e d negotiations for Canada to supply one m i l l i o n pounds to be sold and distributed through the medium of the Commission, 59 These are merely a few examples of the actual commodity problems with which the Commissioners were occupied. In addition to the purely economic considerations discussed above, the Commission saw an aspect of their function to be i n public relations i n order that the Siberian populace might become more aware of Canada. Prior to the a r r i v a l of the f u l l Commission, Wilgress had recommended to the Minister of Trade and Commerce the absolute necessity of informing the Siberian population about Canada. He had already commenced a series of a r t i c l e s on Canada which were being published throughout Sibe r i a i n the newspaper media. He suggested that these be reprinted i n pamphlet form. He also suggested the widespread use of movies, 40 Dennis, i n his February 20th report to the Minister reiterated both of these proposals. 41 As part of i t s promotional a c t i v i t y , the Commission considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of arranging a series of fact-finding tours of Canada by various Siberian economic and professional groups. These were to be financed by the Canadian government and aimed at enabling the Russian v i s i t o r s to study Canada and Canadian methods. This proposal was met with great enthusiasm from the Siberian groups with whom the proposal was broached, ^ One of the concrete proposals put forth along this l i n e was to have been a tour of Canada by a group of Siberian dairymen to study Canadian methods of cheese making, butter preparation and stock 43 care. Due to the short-lived existence of the Commission, i t i s safe to assume that none of these worthwhile proposals were seriously considered by Ottawa, - 73 - 2, Messrs. Kunst & Albers Among the most interesting and important aspects of the Commission's a c t i v i t y were those directed toward ef f e c t i n g the expropriation and acquisition by Anglo-Canadian interests of the Siberian based, German controlled firm of Messrs, Kunst & Albers, Long before the Commission had even been considered, both the B r i t i s h Consular Service i n Russia and the Canadian Trade Commissioners quickly focused their attention on this firm as an excellent means for economic penetration. In May 1917 the Russian Government passed an Order-in-Council ordering the sale of the firm, because of i t s German a f f i l i a t i o n s . The Order-in-Council stated that Russian, A l l i e d , or Neutral nationals would be acceptable purchasers, with the one proviso that regardless of the purchaser, the firm must be kept i n a state of continuous operation both during the negotiations for the sale and a f t e r the sale had been effected, 44 This i s clear evidence of the extreme state of dependency of the Siberian population on the services provided by the company. The company, extremely large by any standards, possessed an extensive organization. I t can perhaps best be compared to the Hudson's Bay Company both as to i t s scope of a c t i v i t i e s and i t s importance. The firm operated twenty-five branches and agencies throughout AC Eastern Siberia, ̂  Operations included multifarious a c t i v i t i e s , the p r i n c i p a l base of which was the retail-wholesale trade. The goods carried by their outlets were exclusively of German origin, the purchase and shipment of which was handled by what was, i n essence, their parent house i n Hamburg. In addition they operated a number of sawmills and also a coal mine on Sakhalin. Prior to the war the firm carried on a lucrative business as a government contractor and was the p r i n c i p a l bunkering outlet for Vladivostok, 46 j u g 1 - grates i n his report to Poster that the firm "...has been for years the greatest stronghold of German commercial influence i n the Russian Par East and along the Eastern A s i a t i c Coast." 47 The firm's r e t a i l turnover i n 1913 was 150,000,000 roubles and i n spite of the chaos of war and c i v i l war the turnover i n 1918 remained a substantial 40,000,000 roubles, 48 An appraisal of the firm's assets by a Mr, Lipovsky on behalf of the interested B r i t i s h - Canadian parties, placed the value as of March 1919 at 200,000,000 roubles or 3,900,000 h ( l i = 50 roubles). 49 Mr, Sandford who had been negotiating on behalf of his firm of Messrs, Denny, Mott & Dickson for the acquisition of the Kunst & Albers property, related to Just that a tentative figure of between 3>000,000 £ and 4,000,000 £ had been suggested. 5 0 Sandford speculated that had the purchase been effected i n 1917 shortly after the promulgation of the Order-in-Council, the terms would have been substantially better, 51 - 75 - I t cannot be said to be the f a u l t of either the B r i t i s h or Canadian representatives that an e a r l i e r purchase had not transpired. In the above noted report dated August 29th to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, S i r George Foster, Just states that overtures had early been made both to the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway Company and to the Hudson's Bay Company to purchase and take over the operation of the firm. Interest had also been e l i c i t e d from the B r i t i s h Board of Trade which had sent out a Commissioner to investigate the prospects for B r i t i s h business interests, 52 The B r i t i s h and Canadian o f f i c i a l s acted for a l l intents and purposes as a team i n their efforts to acquire the firm. I t was obviously intended to be a joi n t venture of B r i t i s h and Canadian c a p i t a l . Just i n his August 29th report to the Minister suggested that: . . . i t might be possible to interest an organization with English and Canadian c a p i t a l i n acquiring the concern,,.so that the purchasing requirements of the company, which are enormous might be directed to Canada and England, 53 Mr, R, M, Hodgson, the B r i t i s h Consul i n Vladivostok was very active i n the Kunst & Albers negotiations. He regarded a j o i n t B r i t i s h - Canadian combination as an i d e a l solution to the question. His thinking on the subject was that "...the adjustment of English and Canadian interests i n such a proposition could take place naturally and with fewer points of difference." 54 The B r i t i s h firm of Messrs. Denny, Mott & Dickson (Vladivostok) had, i n 1916, even before the promulgation of the May 1917 Order-in-Council, - 76 - opened negotiations with representatives of Kunst & Albers, They had maintained their keen interest and had been endeavouring to organize a consortium to handle the purchase. This proposed consortium, as they envisaged i t , was to be a purely B r i t i s h one. 55 However, Messrs. Denny, Mott & Dickson had, early i n February 1919, received a cipher message from the B r i t i s h Foreign Office i n which they were advised that ''His Majesty's Government* was extremely interested i n the matter being brought to a satisfactory solution, but that the desired solution was to be one based upon a combination of B r i t i s h and Canadian c a p i t a l with Russian part i c i p a t i o n to "...anticipate any unfavourable l o c a l c r i t i c i s m of foreign exploitation." 56 The negotiations foundered for a number of reasons. The stock of the firm was controlled by a Mr, Albers and a Mr, Dalton, 57 D aiton, a Vladivostok resident, was w i l l i n g to s e l l , however, he was the junior partner i n the firm. 58 r^g whereabouts of Mr, Albers who had effective control had not be ascertainable since July 1918. 59 Technically the purchase would have been d i f f i c u l t without his concurrence. In spite of the fa c t that the firm was under theoretical control of a Comptroller appointed by the Provisional Government, the Order-in-Council had l o s t much of i t s relevance with the collapse of the issuing authority. I t i s possible that i n the e a r l i e r stages of the negotiations certain Petrograd o f f i c i a l s were reluctant to cooperate and did not press for the execution of the Order-in-Council. Just alleges that this was, i n fact, the case when he states that "Messrs. Kunst and Albers succeeded, at a time when pro-German influences were gaining ground...in bringing about a postponement of the liquidation order." 60 F i n a l l y , with the exception of the B r i t i s h firm of Messrs, Denny, Mott & Dickson, there was no documentation available on the response of private B r i t i s h and Canadian business interests. I t may well have been the case that the response was something less than enthusiastic. Certainly, Braithwaite, the f i n a n c i a l expert on the Economic Commission on March 10th advised against such a commitment of Anglo-Canadian c a p i t a l . I do not think i t would be possible to interest, nor could I advise endeavoring to interest c a p i t a l i s t s to consider the purchase of this business,..involving as i t would such a large t i e up of capit a l i n Vladivostok Real Estate. 61 - 78 - 3« Siberian Supply Company The area of disagreement between the Commission and Ottawa alluded to e a r l i e r centered i n Ottawa's relations with an Anglo-Siberian trading corporation designated the 'Siberian Supply Company'. The fact that the Department of Trade and Commerce entered into an agreement with this company i n direct opposition to the advise proferred by the Commissioners, and that this agreement severely limited the scope of the Commission's a c t i v i t y was perhaps the pri n c i p a l reason for the Commissioners terminating their a c t i v i t y and returning to Canada i n a f i t of pique. In view of the importance of the Siberian Supply Company's role i n any discussion of the Commission i t i s necessary to say something about the background of this firm,. In the l i s t of dramatis personae. the name of Leslie Urquhart i s of key importance, An Englishman of considerable experience i n Russia, by 1917 he found himself i n effective control of a syndicate consisting of three Anglo-Russian mining companies and one Russo-Canadian mining concern: Kyshtim Corporation Limited, Tanalyk Corporation Limited, Irtysh Corporation Limited and the Russor-Canadian Development Corporation Limited, Together they comprised the single largest mining syndicate - 79 - i n Russia possessing concessions to the extent of 2,500,000 acres i n the Urals and Western Siberia. 6 2 Moreover, not only did Urquhart have friends i n the right places i n the B r i t i s h Government, but also had even better connections i n the Kolchak regime. His connections within the Siberian Government ranged from Kolchak himself who was a 63 personal friend, J to A. L. Fedoseev who was at the same time the Managing Director of Urquhart*s minjng syndicate and Chairman of the Extraordinary State Economic Conference, 6 4 A t l e a s t o n e historian sees i n Fedoseev an 'eminence grise* behind the Supreme Ruler, ^5 S i r Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade and acting for the B r i t i s h Government, entered into an agreement with Urquhart on 25th September 1918. 6 6 The basis of the Agreement was that Urquhart was to perform the functions of an import-export agent i n Siberia on behalf of the B r i t i s h Government on a cost-plus basis, Urquhart's p r o f i t was to be one half of one percent of the gross value of the transactions, ^7 gr̂ g terms of reference were such that the geographical area i n which the Agreement was operative included Siberia proper plus the Governments of Perm and Orenburg west of the Urals, ^8 The Agreement further specified that the agent CUrquhartJwas to act: '( l ) i n the acquisition, handling, d i s t r i b u t i o n and sale of goods and other commodities i n stock at Vladivostok or elsewhere i n Siberia and Russia; - 80 - (2) i n the procuring and f u l f i l l i n g of orders for goods and other commodities to be supplied from the United Kingdom; (3) i n procuring and importing goods and other commodities from Canada, Australia, India or other sources; (4) i n obtaining and exporting goods and other commodities which may be available i n Siberia and Russia. 1 6 9 In order to carry out the terms of the Agreement, Urquhart and his associates organized and incorporated the 'Siberian Supply Company.1 The f i r s t intimation that the B r i t i s h Government was "considering entering into an agreement of this sort was received by the Canadian Government i n a confidential despatch dated September 6th, 1918, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor-General of Canada, 7 0 The news of the Agreement was received with misgivings i n Siberia, The e a r l i e s t mention of the scheme i n the Siberian f i l e s appears i n a l e t t e r of complaint from the B r i t i s h Commercial Association of Siberia to Wilgress dated 5th October 1918. Among other matters dealt with, F, I, Gade on behalf of the Association stated: We consider that the Agreement,,,constitutes a menace to B r i t i s h interests, and view with apprehension the grave results which may follow i f i t i s allowed to go into operation without effective control from this side, 7 1 - 81 - The main complaint of these B r i t i s h firms was not so much that they were ignored hy the terms of the Agreement, but rather that Urquhart would establish his own machinery, precluding any opportunity for the B r i t i s h firms to take part i n the trade, 7 2 Wilgress i n a l e t t e r to the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce dated October 10th passed along the complaints of the B r i t i s h firms but did not support them, on the contrary he admitted that the l o c a l B r i t i s h firms did not possess an organization adequate to handle the projected 7 3 scale of supplies, Wilgress favoured at this time that Canada should take an independent position and he urged that a Canadian commission be sent to Siberia to function somewhat along the l i n e s adopted by the United States, 74 Wilgress was not aware at the time that the Economic Commission had already been approved, a l b e i t ' u n o f f i c i a l l y * by the Government, In his report to the Department of Trade and Commerce of October 29th, Wilgress reiterated and added to the l i s t of complaints of the l o c a l B r i t i s h firms against the Urquhart scheme. The new charges were that Urquhart would buil d up his own d i s t r i b u t i n g organization rather than use the organization of the existing firms not because of their size but from motives of pure greed since he would f i n d i t to be ",..to his personal interest,,.." They also alleged that he would favour "...a small 82 - group of manufacturers and suppliers to the detriment of others...." '•3 Wilgress, f o r some reason, was at this time supremely confident that Canada would not become a party to the Siberian Supply Company Agreement. The terms of the contract specifies Canada among the B r i t i s h Dominions over which Mr. Urquhart i s to act as exclusive agent for the B r i t i s h Government, but I do not think that our Government w i l l bind i t s e l f to such an agreement, 76 Although Wilgress had o r i g i n a l l y recognized that the l o c a l B r i t i s h firms were not i n a position to duplicate Urquhart's proposed a c t i v i t y , his position was undergoing a rapid transformation. By November 7th he was more sympathetic to the l o c a l B r i t i s h firms and was hardening his stand against Urquhart, A major matter of concern to the Siberian based B r i t i s h firms was the fear that the Urquhart - Stanley Agreement would preclude them from importing goods from B r i t a i n because of the exclusiveness of the Agreement and they were, as a result, looking to Canada as an alternative source. They were anxious that Canada should not associate herself with the Siberian Supply Company or any similar undertaking and thereby cut off that avenue of supply. 7 7 Again i n his l e t t e r of November 7th Wilgress confidently related that he believed Canada would not become a party to any such agreement, 7 8 - 83 - The Department of Trade and Commerce at this time seemingly had made a commitment to act only through the Commission, hut again i t was merely a matter of the proverbial rig h t hand not knowing what the l e f t was doing, In a cable to Wilgress (sent between November 7 - 19) the Department advised him that export permits would be granted to individual firms upon the recommendation of the Commission, 79 i n the l i g h t of this cable a meeting subsequently took place between S i r Charles E l l i o t , the B r i t i s h High Commissioner, Mr, Porter, the B r i t i s h Commercial Commissioner, and Mr, Wilgress, Wilgress reports on this meeting the following: ,,,we have come to the conclusion on the basis of the cable that the Canadian Government i s going to leave economic r e l i e f i n Siberia i n the hands of private traders, the Government only a s s i s t i n g through the medium of the Commission i n the granting of licenses and i n the securing of tonnage ? 80 Unknown to them, however, this was not to be the policy of the Canadian Government f o r throughout this period, S i r George Foster, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, was i n London, and throughout November had a series of interviews with B r i t i s h .^officials regarding the Siberian Supply Company, On November 25th he addressed a l e t t e r to Alexander MacLean (the Acting Minister) i n which he raised the question of Canada's association with the Siberian Supply Company and expressed his support for the proposal. He requested MacLean to bring the matter up before the cabinet, 8 ^ - 8 4 - Basically his proposal was that the Canadian Government would f i n a n c i a l l y stand behind Canadian exports to Siberia as the B r i t i s h Government did for B r i t i s h exports and that Canada would have a representative on the board of directors of the Siberian Supply Company, 8 2 As a result of the Poster interviews i n London, the Hon, B, E, Hubbard, who had been appointed by the B r i t i s h Government as Comptroller of the company, and Mr, D. P. Mitchell, a Director of the company, had a series of interviews with Ottawa based cabinet ministers. The two o f f i c i a l s of the company were i n Canada and the United States most of January and part of February awaiting transport to Vladivostok, 8 3 Hubbard offered four tentative proposals should Canada adhere to the plan: that Canada should appoint a Commissioner to Vladivostok to supervise the Canadian aspects of the company; that Canada should appoint one or more directors to the board of the company; that the Canadian Government would f i n a n c i a l l y stand behind the Canadian aspects of the company's operations; and f i n a l l y he suggested that should Canada adhere to the Agreement the B r i t i s h Government would accept a l l roubles that Canada acquired as a r e s u l t of her Siberian transactions, ^4 Upon receiving the f i r s t intimation of Canada's pending adherence to the Urquhart agreement, the Commission on February 12th despatched a strongly worded cable to Ottawa, There were three premises upon which - 85 ~ the protest was based. They were that the Agreement was p r e j u d i c i a l to the development of independent trade and shipping between Canada and Siberia; that established B r i t i s h and Russian firms i n Siberia opposed the Agreement and that Russian public opinion opposed the formation of a foreign trading monopoly. 85 ^ Commission threatened that i f Canada became a party to the -Agreement the continuance of the 86 Commission a c t i v i t i e s would be seriously hampered. The reply from Ottawa dated February 17th advised the Commission that Canada's association with the Siberian Supply Company was 87 " . . . p r a c t i c a l l y decided uponj! Apparently Ottawa saw the pr i n c i p a l advantage to be that goods could be sold i n Siberia f o r roubles and that the B r i t i s h Government would exchange these for pounds, 8 8 The Government o f f i c i a l l y committed i t s e l f to the Agreement by Order-in-Council on February 20, 1919» The plan was that the Canadian Trade Commission i n Ottawa would purchase and arrange shipping fo r the goods to be exported to Siberia and to this end the Order-in- Council established a credit of $1,000,000. The disposal of the goods i n Siberia would be through the aegis of the Siberian Supply Company, W, D, Wilgress was appointed to supervise the Canadian aspects of the company, P r o f i t s over the one half of one percent gross due to the company, would accrue to the Canadian Government, 8 9 - 8 6 - The Commission was goaded into action and i n a despatch to the Department of Trade and Commerce dated February 24th not only were the previously presented misgivings reiterated but the opinion was expressed that the contract would have the most disastrous effect upon B r i t i s h and Canadian business interests i n Siberia, The cable went on to state that the Commission: ,,.are strongly of the opinion that the necessity of t h e i r continued a c t i v i t y i n S i b e r i a . , . i s entirely n u l l i f i e d by the contract entered into with the Siberian Supply Company, and that the need for their continued a c t i v i t y w i l l have p r a c t i c a l l y ceased as soon as the terms of the contract,,.become operative. 90 4. The Braithwaite Mission The Commissioners f e l t that prior to their f i n a l departure from Siberia i t would he desirable for an analysis to be made of the situation i n the i n t e r i o r of Siberia generally and i n Omsk s p e c i f i c a l l y , A. D, Braithwaite was chosen by the Commission to carry »ut this investigation. He subsequently l e f t Vladivostok on March 16th and reached Omsk nine days l a t e r . While i n Omsk, Braithwaite interviewed a large number of Russian o f f i c i a l s including Kolchak himself, P, P, Gudkov, the Minister of Trade and Commerce and most important, I. A, Mikhailov, the Minister of Finance, of whom Braithwaite relates: "I cannot say that I was very much impressed with Mr, Michayloff's knowledge of f i n a n c i a l 91 matters.,.," 7 Braithwaite was not alone i n his assessment of Mikhailov ts 92 competence, 3 In addition to the purely governmental o f f i c i a l s , he dealt and conferred with many of the prominent figures among the Omsk banking and commercial community. After spending approximately f i v e days i n Omsk Braithwaite returned to Vladivostok and during his return journey very narrowly escaped an alleged Bolshevik b u l l e t , 93 « 88 - The results of his investigation were pessimistic. The currency situation r e f l e c t i n g the deteriorated economy was p a r t i c u l a r l y chaotic. I n f l a t i o n was out of control. Currency of every description including those of the Romanov, Kerensky, Siberian and Bolshevik regimes was i n c i r c u l a t i o n i n Siberia, The t o t a l value of outstanding notes of a l l v a r i e t i e s was estimated by the Ministry of Finance to be 126,5 b i l l i o n roubles. At the same time, the reserves of the State Bank amounted to a mere 200 m i l l i o n roubles, 94 Due to the v i r t u a l l y complete stoppage of exports as a result of the impossibility of obtaining transport the Government had no means of obtaining foreign exchange. Furthermore, most states, including Canada, had passed laws forbidding the importation of roubles,, 95 Braithwaite found no bank, foreign or Siberian, w i l l i n g to s e l l b i l l s of exchange for roubles, 96 r^g Omsk Government thus had no means at i t s disposal to finance an import program and the only alternative, a system of barter arrangements was precluded by the state of the transportation system, Complicating the issue s t i l l further, Omsk had inadequate l o c a l revenue sources to meet i t s needs. As an expedient the printing presses were kept busy churning out paper of ever decreasing value. In order to stop the s p i r a l l i n g i n f l a t i o n and put the Siberian currency on a firm footing, Braithwaite proposed a six point formula s - 89 - He recommended the organization of Siberia as a separate geographical and p o l i t i c a l entity completely separate from the rest of the Russian Empire. This was to be followed by A l l i e d recognition of the Kolchak regime, a step basic to the regularization of A l l i e d - Siberian f i n a n c i a l relations. He proposed the establishment of an i n t e r - a l l i e d f i n a n c i a l committee to have complete control of Siberian finances, Braithwaite suggested that together with this committee be established a Siberian State Bank, d i s t i n c t from the Russian State Bank, This bank would be the sole currency issuing authority. The bank would receive a l l government revenues and would hold a l l state reserves. The bank's c a p i t a l i z a t i o n , which Braithwaite suggested should be approximately 510,000,000, was to be subscribed partly from within Siberia and partly from within the participating A l l i e d nations. The various currencies i n c i r c u l a t i o n would be redeemed by the bank with twenty year bonds. F i n a l l y , Braithwaite suggested that the a l l i e d nations should make loans to the Omsk Government after the foregoing had been accomplished i n order that badly needed commodities might be imported. 97 A draft memorandum on the Siberian currency situation dated A p r i l 1919 and prepared f o r the B r i t i s h Government by i t s Vladivostok Trade Commissioner, ¥, J. Hinton, drew heavily upon the Braithwaite report, 98 However, there i s no evidence that either the Braithwaite or Hinton report had any impact on their respective governments. - 90 - By the time Braithwaite returned to Vladivostok, the other Commissioners with the exception of Wilgress who was now associated with the Siberian Supply Company, had already departed and toward the middle of April 1919 Braithwaite departed also, 99 I I I . THE DISENGAGEMENT - AN APPRAISAL The Canadian Government's Siberian policy, as i t was o f f i c i a l l y formulated i n the period July - August, 1918, was an extremely ambitious one. The policy encompassed both mi l i t a r y intervention i n Siberia and the establishment of Canadian - Siberian economic links through a government-appointed Economic Commission. The issue of consequence at this juncture i s to delineate the reasons for the government's volte face v i s - a - v i s S i b e r i a within the short space of a few months. I t must be emphasized that at the time the Canadian Government agreed to take part i n the m i l i t a r y intervention i n Siberia, the struggle against the Central Powers had not been concluded. During the course of the war approximately one-half m i l l i o n Canadians had been mobilized. Against the large numbers of Canadian troops i n Europe, the proposed f i v e thousand man Siberian force appeared i n perspective extremely i n s i g n i f i c a n t . At the same time, the Government was able to j u s t i f y such a force on the grounds of m i l i t a r y exigency. However, what had,, prior to the Armistice, been m i l i t a r i l y and numerically inconsequential, a f t e r the Armistice and the end of f i g h t i n g became an issue of great importance to the Canadian public. - 92 - The C.E.F.(s) became the focal point of c r i t i c a l attention by a signi f i c a n t number of Canadians, The best organized and vociferous were the labour unions. The wholesale demobilization of the Canadian forces following the Armistice together with the cessation of war contracts for Canadian industry had resulted i n a general recession of which a depressed labour market had been an important facet, 1 The massive unemployment coupled with the unstable economic conditions led to a ra d i c a l i z a t i o n of the labouring class, Soviet Russia with i t s government fby the pro l e t a r i a t ' or a Canadian model of i t was seen as a panacea for a l l Canada's economic and s o c i a l i l l s , 2 was l o g i c a l , therefore, that labour should have been opposed to the C.E.F.(s) which they regarded, i n spite of Government protestations, as being directed against the Bolshevik Government^ Labour's agitation against the Siberian intervention made i t s e l f most e f f e c t i v e l y f e l t i n Canada's western provinces. Protest meetings were common, A t y p i c a l resolution of protest was that passed by a meeting which was held i n the Rex Theatre i n Vancouver on December 22, 1918 under the auspices of the Federated Labour Party: THEREFORE, be i t resolved that this meeting,,.does protest against the Canadian Government sending forces to oppose the workers and soldiers of Russia, i n the interests of the exploiting classes, 3 - 93 - The Convention of the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress held at Quebec City (September 16 21, 1918) passed a r e l a t i v e l y mild resolution of protest against intervention i n Russia: Resolution Ho. 32 - RESOLVED that this Congress goes on record as being opposed to any intervention on the part of the A l l i e s i n the internal conditions i n Russia, i n the b e l i e f that i n the best interests of democracy every nation should have the right to determine i t s own destiny. 4 The moderateness of the resolution brought into sharp focus the estrangement of r a d i c a l labour i n Western Canada from their more temperate eastern counterparts. The western delegates decided to hold their own s p l i n t e r convention. Designated the Western Labour Conference, i t was held i n Calgary, Alberta, March 10 - 13, 1919. They did not suffer from the restr a i n t exhibited i n Quebec. They went much farther than token opposition to intervention. The Conference declared " , . . i t s f u l l acceptance of the principle of 'proletarian dictatorship'". The Conference placed " , . , i t s e l f on record as being i n f u l l accord and sympathy with the aims and purposes of the Russian Bolshevik and German Spartacan revolutions," 5 By the Spring of 1919, the spread of radicalism, p a r t i c u l a r l y among labour ranks i n Western Canada, had reached such serious proportions that the Acting Prime Minister , T, W, White made h i s , by now, famous request for a B r i t i s h cruiser to Borden i n a cable dated 16 A p r i l 1919* - 94 - Bolshevism has made great progress among workers and soldiers here T We cannot get troops absolutely dependable i n emergency,..,Plans are being l a i d f o r revolutionary movement,,.would immediately bring about serious disturbances i n Calgary and Winnepeg where socialism rampant. We think most desirable B r i t i s h Government should bring over cruiser from China Station to V i c t o r i a or Vancouver, 6 Borden quickly squelched what was an ineffectual i f not ludicrous solution. Instead he suggested u t i l i z a t i o n of "...Royal North West Mounted Police who, I presume, would be e n t i r e l y reliable...,increase their forces by judicious enlistment, M 7 The labour unrest reached i t s zenith during the Winnepeg General Strike which lasted for forty-two days, from May 6th to June 25th, 1919, 8 William Rodney i n his History of the Communist Party of CanadaT 1919 - 1929 makes the assertion that: The chief achievement resul t i n g from the general unrest and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n echoed by radicals and labour groups, was that i t pressured the Borden government into i n s i s t i n g upon Canada's withdrawal from the Russian expedition., 9 The statement i s p a r t i a l l y i f not wholly inaccurate. There i s no documentation i n the archives studied that would suggest the with- drawal of the C.E.P.(S) was solely as a result of r a d i c a l pressure, nor does Rodney provide any documentation for the statement. In spite of i t s importance, the spread of radicalism was but one of a multitude of reasons, the most important of which w i l l be discussed. I t i s possible - 95 - to go even further - on the basis of radicalism alone i t i s extremely- doubtful that the Canadian forces i n Siberia would have been withdrawn. One of the most c r i t i c a l reasons, alluded to e a r l i e r , was the fact that the Canadian Government at this time was a c o a l i t i o n government* The c o a l i t i o n of the majority Conservative Party and a portion of the L i b e r a l Party had been proposed i n 1917 by S i r Robert Borden i n an e f f o r t to effect some sort of p o l i t i c a l consensus over the issue of conscription and at the same time strengthen his personal position. Coalition, or as i t was termed 'Union Government1, came into effect i n October, 1917# The Unionists were successful i n the General Election of December, 1917,, In the interests^-of national unity a Conservative - L i b e r a l c o a l i t i o n had been feasible as long as the war continued. Following the Armistice, however, centrifugal p o l i t i c a l forces again became operative, Borden found himself forced to deal very gingerly with cabinet dissidence, Out of a cabinet of seventeen members at least f i v e ministers were outspoken i n their opposition to the C.K,F.(S) 10 and only four, including Borden, were s o l i d l y i n favour of i t , 1 1 Borden could have undoubtedly forced the issue, however, being an astute p o l i t i c i a n and i n view of the other anti-intervention influences present, he was reluctant to do so. In addition to the purely Canadian p o l i t i c a l , economic and s o c i a l forces operating against continued Siberian intervention, there were equally important extraneous factors which forced on the government the same non-interventionist decision. 96 - The p r i n c i p a l of these factors was the lack of agreement and decisive policy by the other p a r t i c i p a t i n g powers regarding the intervention i n Siberia, Not only was there lacking concurrence as to Siberian policy but also firm national p o l i c i e s by the intervening powers were largely absent, The subject i s outside the scope of this essay but i t can reasonably be suggested that the other nations were experiencing the same s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l anti-interventionist forces as was Canada, As early as December 30, 1918 the Imperial War Cabinet agreed to a 'PrinkLpo Island 1 proposal for a meeting of the various p o l i t i c a l elements i n Russia, the end result of which would have provided an honourable basis for withdrawal, 1 2 The policy of withdrawal was affirmed by the Imperial Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference on January 20, 1919. 13 Although the Prinkipo Conference set for February 15th did not take place, the non-intervention policy of the Peace Conference did not undergo, alter a t i o n , I t has already been amply demonstrated that one of the most important reasons f o r Canada's agreement to m i l i t a r i l y intervene i n Sib e r i a was economic consideration. The government had proclaimed loudly that i t s intention i n sending troops both to Murmansk and to Siberia, was solely to help the Russian people. Its r e a l aims were revealed, however, by the "economic missions" that went along with the troops. 14 - 97 - Major-General Alfred Knox stated the issue even more succinctly i n a November 4th, 1918 telegram to the War Office, "I.,.want as many B r i t i s h or Canadian troops sent here,..as we can spare. Every B r i t i s h soldier here i s as much a factor of trade and empire as d i v e ' s men were," 15 The Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia had been born under the most auspicious p o l i t i c a l circumstances. I t had been blessed with enthusiastic support from Borden, senior cabinet ministers and the upper echelon of the Department of Trade and Commerce, I t should be noted that the Commission, unlike the C.E.F.(s) was not o f f i c i a l l y withdrawn from Siberia, The Commissioners dissolved the Commission of their own v o l i t i o n . What i s obvious from a study of the Commission documents i s that i n spite of the Government's i n i t i a l enthusiasm, i t quickly l o s t a l l interest i n the Commission, Commission communications were ignored by the Government. I t would be d i f f i c u l t to produce a Commission request or recommendation that was acted upon by the Government, In addition, the Government f a i l e d to keep the Commission advised regarding govern- mental action af f e c t i n g the Commission except on a post factum basis. This was evident not only i n the negotiations with the Siberian Supply Company, but also i n the decision to withdraw the Canadian forces i n Siberia, There are two possible explanations f or the Government's changed attitude toward the Commission, - 98 - The explanation favoured i s that the Government l o g i c a l l y l o s t interest simultaneously both i n the Commission and Siberia as a *land of economic opportunity 1 when i t became apprised that the conditions i n Siberia, p r i n c i p a l l y the chaotic transportation system and unstable f i n a n c i a l structure, precluded any development of Siberian - Canadian trade except i n the most distant future. Since economic considerations had been an important basis for Canada's decision to intervene, i t can be presumed that the lack of opportunity i n Siberia was an equally powerful reason for withdrawal from Siberia. Since Borden had o r i g i n a l l y pressed for intervention on economic grounds, his l a t e r * coolness* to the Siberian intervention may thereby be explained. The second explanation i s related to the p o s s i b i l i t y that factors other than economic caused the Government to withdraw from Siberia, I t i s possible that i n the minds of the top government o f f i c i a l s , including Borden, the success of Canada's attempts to gain an economic foothold i n Siber i a depended upon the presence of a Canadian mi l i t a r y force i n Sib e r i a . Consequently, when the Government began to have second thoughts about the continued stationing of Canadian troops i n Siberia, and began planning for their eventual r e c a l l , a reappraisal of the Government's economic p o l i c i e s for Siberia was a l o g i c a l corollary. The members of the Government possibly believed that without the leverage of mil i t a r y presence, economic endeavours i n Siberia would prove f u t i l e . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to conclude d e f i n i t i v e l y whether the decision to m i l i t a r i l y withdraw preceded the change i n Canada's economic policy for - 99 - Sibe r i a or whether the knowledge of the unpromising economic conditions i n Siberia preceded and were an aspect of Canada's decision to withdraw. The inactive stance adopted by the C.E.F,(s) has resulted i n the Force being regarded as a largely inconsequential element i n the Siberian kaleidoscope. Although this i s not t o t a l l y accurate, i t nevertheless seems incongruous that the withdrawal of the C.E.F .(s) was, i n the f i n a l analysis, an event of possibly greater significance to the concluding history of the Intervention, than the t o t a l i t y of C.E.F . (s) a c t i v i t y i n Siberia, The B r i t i s h had been enabled to assume and maintain their leader- ship position i n Western Siberia largely because of the potential of Canadian m i l i t a r y support,, The Canadian Government was well aware of the potential, i f not actual, support the B r i t i s h garnered by the presence of the C.E.F.(s) i n Siberia, , , , i f the Canadian troops, which form the major portion of the B r i t i s h Force i n Siberia, are with- drawn, the B r i t i s h Government have no course l e f t open but to recommend the withdrawal of the two B r i t i s h battalions, which would otherwise be isolated, 16 The withdrawal of the C.E.F.(s) i n a very r e a l sense set into operation a process which was the 'death k n e l l ' of anti-Bolshevik intervention i n Si b e r i a , The B r i t i s h forces were withdrawn i n September, 1919 a mere four months after the f i n a l Canadian departure. « 100 FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION 1 John A, White, The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950,, 2 George F, Kennan, Soviet - American Relations. 1917 *»' 1920f 2-WVols,, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956, 3 Robert H. Ullman, Intervention and the War; Anglo-Soviet Relations. 1917 - 1921. 2-Vols., Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961. 4 Two excellent studies dealing with Canadian participation i n the intervention i n Transcaucasia are: Capt, W, W. Murray, "Canadians i n Dunsterforce", appearing i n f i v e sections i n Canadian Defence Quarterly: Vol. VIII, No. 2 (Jan. 193l), pp. 209 - 218; Vol, VIII, No. 3 (Apr. 1931), pp. 377 - 386; Vol, VIII, No. 4 ( J u l . 193l), pp. 487 - 497; Vol. IX, No, 1 (Oct. 193l), pp. 92 - 100; and Vol. IX, . No. 2 (Jan, 1932), pp, 233 - 243. Lieut, H, Kingsley, R.C.N., "The Baku Episode", Canadian Defence Quarterly f Vol, VII, No, 1 (Oct, 1929), pp. 36 - 44. There also exist two excellent studies on the Canadian North Russian Expeditionary Force: Capt, E, Altham, "The Dvina Campaign", Canadian Defence Quarterly,, Vol, 1, No, 1, (Oct, 1923), pp. 17 - 41;' Leonid I, Strakhovsky, "The Canadian A r t i l l e r y Brigade i n North Russia, 1918 - 1919", Canadian H i s t o r i c a l Review. Vol, XXXIX, No, 2 (June 1958). 5 J , A, Swettenham, A l l i e d Intervention i n Russia, 1918 - 1919: and the Part Played by CanadaT Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1967, 6 Gaddis Smith, "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918 - 1919"t American H i s t o r i c a l ReviewT Vol, LXIV, No. 4 (July 1959) pp. 866 = 877, 7 The Statute of Westminster, passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom on December 11th, 1931# 8 See for example: White, Siberian Intervention, p, 112 and Louis Fischer, The Soviets i n World A f f a i r s f 2-Vols,, Princeton,, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. 107, 217, 223, - 101 - 9 Letter, Mewburn to Borden, d/l2 July 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Ixpeditionary Force to Siberia', Public Archives of Canada (hereafter cited as P.A.C.) .10 Telegram. Borden to White, d/Aug, 8, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a 1 , P.A.C. 11 Letter, Borden to Mewburn, d/Aug, 13, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 12 Order-in-Council No. P,C, 2595 dated 21 October 1918, p. .1* 13 Ibid.. p. 2, 14 Letter, Borden to White, d/Nov, 20, 1918, as cited i n : S i r Robert Laird Borden, Memoirs. Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1938, Vol, I I , p. 869, 15 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Nov, 20, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 16 Letter, White to Borden, d/Nov, 25, 1918, Borden Papers f F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. CHAPTER ONE 1 Letter, Radcliffe to Rowell, d / j u l . 9, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 2 Ibid. 3 Memorandum Re. Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia), d / j u l . 28, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No., 3, P.A.C. 4 Ibid, 5 Letter, Brig, Gen, «H, F, McD.' to Kemp, d/ j u l , 19, 1918, Attmt, 3 entit l e d 'Vladivostok Force'."Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No. 1, P.A.C. 6 Canada, Department of External A f f a i r s , Documents on Canadian External Relatitns, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1967, pp, 206 - 207* ~ 102 - 7 Telegram, Borden to White, d / j u l . 25, 1918. Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 8 S i r Robert Laird Borden, Memoirs. Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1938, Vol. I I , p, 810, 9 Ibid., p. 817, 10 See: Letter,' Mewburn to Borden, d / j u l . 12, 1918; Letter, Borden to Mewburn, d/Aug. 13, 1918; Telegram, Borden to White, d/Nov, 20, 1918, ( a l l ) Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. (Refer to: Introduction, pp. 6 - 8 for direct quotations). 11 The Daily Colonist. V i c t o r i a , B. C., Sept. 28, 1918, p. 5« 12 'Pacific Rimism* was a basic tenet of the foreign and economic platform of the Progressive Conservative Party during the 1968 General E l e c t i o n . 13 Notes on Conference Re, Siberian Expeditionary Force (Canadian), d/Aug. 13, 1918, p. 1, Siberian Records. Parcel 10, F i l e 27 'Mobilization - General', P.A.C. 14 Letter, Gow to Mewburn, d/Sept, 4, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) *Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 15 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Aug. 7, 1918, 'Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) ^Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 16 Order-in-Council No. P,C. 1983 d/Aug, 12, 1918, 17 Order-in-Council No. P,C. 2073 d/Aug. 23, 1918, 18 Order-in-Council No. P,C, 2151 d/Sept, 5, 1918, ;' 19 Memorandum Re. Canadian Expeditionary/Force (Siberia), d / j u l , 28, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 3, P.A.C. (also) Letter, Mewburn to Kemp, d/Aug. 13, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a 1 , P.A.C. 20 Order, War Office to Elmsley, d/Sept. 10, 1918, Siberian Records, Folder 17, Segret F i l e No, 1, P.A.C, 21 Letter, Gow to Mewburn, d/Sept, 10, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C, - 103 - 22 Report of Interview, Lt» Col. Yourkevitch and Capt, Bray, d/ Jul, 18, 1918, p, 2, Siberian Records. Folder 5, File 41 'Russian Political Parties', P.A.C. It is interesting to speculate why the number of Russians who either enlisted voluntarily or were conscripted into the Canadian Army during World'War I was so small. There are three possible explanations, The Military Service Act which made conscription law in Canada was not brought into effect until 1917. In 1911 there were 89,984 Russian citizens resident in Canada, however, of this number only 46,018 were over 21 years of age, and of this group a proportion would have fallen outside the upper age limit set by the M.S.A. /TCanada, Department of Trade and Commerce, The Canada Yearbook. 1916 - 1917. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1917,1 A final explanation is that following the Bolshevik Revolution the Russians in Canada may have been regarded by the authorities as being politically suspect. An Intelligence Officer for the Department of M i l i t i a and Defence, investigating the political r e l i a b i l i t y of Russian nationals in the Winnipeg area with the aim of enforcing the Military Service Act among them stated in his report dated August 7th, 1918 that "..,1 am not in a position at the present time to give you the name of any person of Russian Nationality whom I would c a l l thoroughly reliable in this Military District,,..my experiences in this connection have been such that I am inclined to look upon a l l Russian Subjects as being untrustworthy for any position of trust," {ietter, Lieut, D. A, Campbell, Acting District Intelligence Officer, M, D, 10 to A.J.A.G., M. D, 10, (Winnepeg, Man,), d/Aug, 7, 1918, Siberian Records. H.,Q, File 762,10 'Situation of Russian Subjects,. M, D, 10', P.A.C J 23 Yourkevitch - Bray Interview, Ibid,, p. 2, 24 Ibid, T pp. 1^2, 25 Ibid., p. 1, 26 Ibid.. p. 1, 27 Notes on Conference Re, Siberian Expeditionary Force (Canadian), . d/Aug, 13, 1918, p, 2, Siberian Records. Parcel 10, File 27, 'Mobilization « General', P.A.C, 28 Telegram, Kemp to Mewburn d/Aug, 28, 1918, Siberian Records. H,Q. File No, 762-11-1, P.A.C. 29 Letter, Adj. Gen, (O.M.F.C.) to H,Q,, C.E.F .(s), London, d/Aug. 29, 1918, Siberian Records. Parcel 10, File 27 'Mobilization - General', P.A.C, - 104 - 30 Telegram, H.Q,, C.E.F. (London) to Mi l i t i a Dept., Ottawa, d/Sept. 30, 1918, Siberian Records. H,Q. Pile No. 762-12-5 (Vol. l ) , 'Mobilization of.Infantry Battalions', P.A.C. 31 Telegram,. Kemp to Mewburn, d/Oct. 3, 1918, Siberian Records. H.Q. Pile 762-12-5 (Vol. l) 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C, (and) Telegram, Adj.-Gen, (Ottawa) to Officer Commanding (Quebec, P.Q.), d/Oct. 9, 1918, Siberian Records. H.Q. Pile 762-12-5 Vol, 1, 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C, 32 Telegram, G.O.C., M.D, 11 (Victoria, B, C.) to Adj.-Gen, (Ottawa) d/Oct, 21, 1918. Siberian Records. H.Q. Pile 762-12-5 (Vol, l ) , 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C. 33 Adj-Gen. (Ottawa) toG.O.C, M.D. 11 (Victoria, B, C.) d/Oct. 11, 1918, Siberian Records. H.Q. Pile 762-12-5 (Vol, l ) , 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C. 34 Telegram, Gen, Ashtoh to General Gwynne, d/Oct. 14, 1918, Siberian Records. H.Q. Pile 762-12-5 (Vol. 2) 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C, 35 Telegram, Mewburn to Kemp, d/Nov, 13, 1918, Siberian RecordsT Polder 19, 'Cables-Out, C.E.P.(s)1', P.A.C, 36 Telegram,'White to Kemp, d/Nov. 14, 1918, Borden Papers. Pile OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C, It should be noted that the.first contingent of C.E.F.(s) had arrived in Vladivostok on October 26, 1918 via the S.S. EMPRESS OF JAPAN, The Advance Party had consisted of 62 officers and 618 other ranks, 37 Telegram, Ottawa to War Office, d/Nov, 15, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 9 'Cables Received - General Staff Branch, C.E.F.(S)', P.A.C, 38 Letter, Crerar to White, d/Nov, 22, 1918, Borden Papersr Pile OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 39 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Nov, 22, 1918, Borden Papers, File OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C, 40 Telegram, C.G.S. to War Office, d/Nov. 24, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 19, "Ciphers and Cables - Out', P.A.C. It should be noted that the-cancelled troopships did eventually s a i l , S.S. TEESTA sailed 21 Dec, 1918, S.S. PROTESLIAUS sailed 26 Dec. 1918. S.S. JAPAN sailed 12 Feb. 1919* - 105 - 41 Letter, Borden to White, d/Nov, 22, 1918, as cited i n : S i r Robert Laird Borden, Memoirs, Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1938, Vol. I I , p. 869. 42 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Nov, 24, 1918, Borden Papers T P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 43 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Nov, 25, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(l), 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C, 44 Telegram, Borden lio White, d/Nov. 27, 1918, Borden Papers, P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 45 Ibid. 46 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Nov. 27, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 47 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Nov, 27,. 1918, Borden Papers, P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. « - - 48 Ibid. 49 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Nov, 29, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 50 Telegram, C.G.S, (Ottawa) to War Office, d/Dec* 4, 1918; (Reply) Telegram, War Office to C.G.S,, d/Dec, 6, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 51 Telegram, C.G.S. to War Office, d/Dec, 6, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 19 'Ciphers and Telegrams - Out', P.A.C, 52 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Dec, 6, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 53 Telegram, Borden to White, No, 56303, d/Dec, 9, 1918, Borden Papers, F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 54 Telegram, Borden to White, No, 56304, d/Dec, 9, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Plrce to Siberia', P.A.C, - 106 - 5 5 L e t t e r , White to Mewburn, d/Dec, 10, 1918. Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary.Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. 56 Telegram, War Of f i c e to C.G.S., d/Dec, 18, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to .Siberia*, P.A.C. 57 I b i d . 58 Telegram, C.G.S. to War O f f i c e , d/Dec, 22, 1918 (and).Telegram, C.G.S. to Elmsley, d/Dec, 22, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. 5 9 L e t t e r , Elmsley to Knox, d/Dec, 21, 1918, S i b e r i a n Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 5 , P.A.C. 60 L e t t e r , Knox to Elmsley, d/Dec, 26, 1918, Sibe r i a n Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No. 3, P.A.C. 61 L e t t e r , Knox'to Elmsley, d/Dec, 27, 1918, Sibe r i a n Records r Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 3, P.A.C. 62 Telegram, War Of f i c e to C.G.S., d/Jan, 4, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. 63 > Telegram, Elmsley to War O f f i c e , d/Jan, 8, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. 6 4 L e t t e r , Gwatkin to Dennis, d/jan, 9 , 1919, S i b e r i a n Records, Folder 19 'Cables and Telegrams - Out. 1, P.A.C, 65 Telegram, Elmsley to R a d c l i f f e , d/Jan, 19, 1919, S i b e r i a n Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 1, P.A.C. 66 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Jan, 28, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. I t should be noted that on Jan, 8th approximately 1,100 troops remained staged [Telegram, C.G.S. to War"Office, d/Jan, 8, 1919, Si b e r i a n Records.. Folder 19,. 'Cables and. Telegrams - In', P.A.CTf however, of t h i s number a 'further 378 were despatched to S i b e r i a , p r i n c i p a l l y on the S.S. JAPAN which departed on Feb, 12th, There- fore approximately 722 were demobilized, 67 Telegram, War Of f i c e to Elmsley d/Jan. 29, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to S i b e r i a ' , P.A.C. B r i g . Gen. Bickford had a r r i v e d at Vladivostok on Jan, 15th v i a the S.S. PROTESLIAUS, - 107 - 68 Letter, Elmsley to Radcliffe, d/Feb, 11, 1919 as cited i n : Appendix VIII of J , H, Elmsley, "Report. Russian M i l i t a r y and P o l i t i c a l Situation", dated June 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 18, P.A.C. 69 See: Major. General W, S, Graves, America's Siberian Adventure. 1918 - 1920. New York, Peter Smith, 1941. 70 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Feb. 13, 1919, Bjrden Papers f F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 71 Letter, Churchill to Borden, d/Mar, 17, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Pores to Siberia', P.A.C. 72 Letter, Churchill to Borden, d/May 1, 1919, Bprden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 73 Returns of. Strength for C.E.F.(s).. Siberian Records. H.Q, F i l e 762-11-25, P.A.C. 74 War Diary Base H.Q. (Sib.)., 1-10-18 to 5^6-19. R.G. 9, Vol. 477, F i l e 961,' 75 Ibid. ' " :' . 76 Golos Primorya. Vladivostok, Nov, 3, 1918, p, 4, 77 War Diary Force H.Q. (Sib,), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18. R.G. 9, Vol. 476, F i l e 957. 78 (a) Second River (b) Gornostai Bay (c) Egerscheldt, (Canadian Ordinance Depot) (d) East Barracks (e) West Barracks (f) No. 11 Stationary Hospital. Russian Island (g) H.Q, - Pushinskaya Theatre (h) Fortress Annex ( i ) Monte Carlo Barracks, 79 War Diary Force H.Q. (Sib.), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G. 9, Vol. 475, F i l e 957, 80 Ibid, " . . 81 War Diary A.A. & Q.M.G. (Sib,), 1-12-18. to 29-5-19, R.G, 9, Vol. 477, F i l e 961, 82 Ibid, 83 Ibid. 84 Letter, A.D.M.S.' to Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross, d/Feb. 12, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 14, F i l e 3-0, 'Administration - General', P.A.C. --108 - 85 Letter^ A.D.M.S. to Commissioner, Canadian Red Cross, d/Feb, 12, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 14, P i l e 3<~Ot 'Administration - General*, P .A.C• •» . • 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid. 88 Letter, A.D.M.S:. to A.A. & Q.M.G., C.E.F.(s), d/Feb,. 18, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 14, F i l e 3-0, 'Administration - General', P.A.C., ' . 89 Ibid. 90 Letter, Sakharov to Knox (no date), Siberian Records. Parcel 14, F i l e 3-0, rAdministration - General', P.A.C. 91 See: The Daily Colonist. V i c t o r i a , B, C,, Jun, 21, 1919, p. 2 (and) Capt,- the Rev, Norman Rawson, "The Syren or North Russian Expeditionary Force to Murmansk", Selected Papers. The Canadian M i l i t a r y Institute, Toronto,.No. 26 (1929), p. 60, 92 Daily Routine Order No. 49, d/Dec. 18, 1918, Siberian Records, Daily Routine Orders, G.O.C., C.E.F.(s) No. 12 d/2-12^18 to No, 84 d/31-12-18. P.A.C 93 Letter, Butenko to Elmsley,,d/Feb, 17, 1919. Siberian Records, Parcel 6, P i l e BH 36-1 'Complaints, Misc, Correspondence', P.A.C,. 94 Golos Primorya f Vladivostok, March 7, 1919, p. 7, 95 Letter, Town Major to Chief of Staff, C.E.F.(s), d/Mar, 8, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 6,. F i l e BH 36-1, 'Complaints. Misc, Correspondence 1, P.A.C, 96 Telegram,, C.G.S. to War Office, d/Nov, 15, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 9, P.A.C, (and) Telegram, C.G.S. to Elmsley, d/Dec, 22, 1918, Borden Papers, F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia* (and) Telegram, C.G.S. to War Office, d/Dec, 24, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. . 97 Telegram 'War Office to Elmsley, d/Mar. 20, 1919, War Diary G.S., C.E.F.(S), 1-3-19 to 31-3-19, R.G, 9, Vol. 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C. 98 Carl W. Ackerman, T r a i l i n g the Bolsheviki, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919, p, 222, 99 Golos Primorya. Vladivostok, Jan. 5, 1919, p, 5 9 . - 109 - 100 Capt. W. E, Dunham, "The Canadians i n Siberia", Maclean"s Magazine. Vol, XXXII, No. 5 '(May 191?), p. 93. , ' . ., 101 The Daily Colonist. V i c t o r i a , B. C,, May 6, 1919, p. 5. 102 A. D. Braithwaite, Re-port of V i s i t to Siberia, (undated, typescript) p. 13, Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 103 Letter, H.Q., A l l i e d Forces to Elmsley, d/Apr, 26,.1919, War Diary G.S., C.E.F.(S), 1-4-19 to 19-6-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C.. 104 Order No,'64 d/Apr. 13, 1919, Otani to Elmsley, War Diary, G.S., C.E.P.(S), 1-4-19 to 19-6-19, R, G, 9, Vol, 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C. 105 Ibid. 106 Telegram, C.G.S.ito War Office, d/Dec, 22, 1918, Borden.Papers. F i l e OC 518(l), 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C, 107 Telegram. Elmsley to War Office, d/Apr. 13, 1919, War Diary, G.S., C.E.F.(S), 1-4-19 to 19-6-19, R.G. 9, Vol, 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C. 108 Letter, Isobayashi to Elmsley, d/Apr, 26, 1919, War Diary, G.S., C.E.F .(s), 1-4T19 to 19-6-19, R.G. 9, Vol, 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C. 109 Ibid. 110 War Diary, Base H.Q, (Sib.), 1-10-18 to 5-6^19, R.G. 9, Vol. 477, F i l e 961, P.A.C, . 111 War Diary, A.A. & Q.M.G. (Sib,), 1-12-18 to 29-5-19, R*G. 9, Vol, 477, F i l e 961, P.A.C, 112 Returns of Strength, CE.F . ( s ) , Siberian Records. H.Q, F i l e 762-11-25, P.A.C. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Letter, French M i l i t a r y Mission to C.E,F.(s) d/jun, 2, 1919,. Siberian.Records, Parcel 5, .File,BH.25-16,, P.A.C. - 110 - 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 Letter, B.M.M. to C.E.F.(s) d/jun, 2, 1919 re,.'No, 11 Stationary Hospital and Fortress Annex Hospital. Letter, B.M.M. to C.E.F.(s), d/jun, 2, 1919 re, ordinance f a c i l i t i e s . Letter, B.M.M. to C.E.F.(s), d/jun, 2, 1919 re. Base Supply Depot, Letter, B.M.M. E6 CE.F . ( s ) , d/jun, 2, 1919 re. Egerscheldt Supply Depot, ( a l l ) Siberian Records, Parcel 5, F i l e 25-16, P.A.C. Letter of Receipt (Italian) d/jun, 4, 1919, Siberian Records. P a r c e l ^ , F i l e BH 25-16, P.A.C. Letter of Receipt (Japanese) d/jun. 4, 1919 and Letter of Receipt (Russian) d/Jun, 4, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 5, F i l e BH 25-16, P.A.C. ••* Letter of Receipt, d/jun. 2, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 5, F i l e BH 25-16, P.A.C. War Diary, A.A. & ft.M.G, (Sib,), 1-12-18 to 29-5-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 477, F i l e 961, P.A.C. War Diary Force H,Q, (Sib,), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G, 9, Vol, 475, F i l e 957, P.A.C, John Svrettenham, A l l i e d Intervention•in Russia, 1918 - 1919: and the Part Played by Canada. Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1967, p. '126. A medical board determined on January 25, 1919 that 255 of 329 other ranks to be medically u n f i t f o r service, War Diary A.A. & Q.M.G. (Sib,), 1-12-18 to 29-5-19,-R.G, 9, Vol, 477, F i l e 961, P.A.C. Order, War Office to Elmsley, d/Sept, 10, 1918, p, 1, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 1, P.A.C. Telegram, War Office to Knox, d/Aug. 26, 1918, p. 1, Siberian Records, Folder 17, Secret F i l e No,.1, P.A.C. War Diary, Force H,Q. (Sib.), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G. 9, Vol. 475, F i l e 957, P.A.C. N f D, Avksentiev, V, M, Zenzinov, A, A„ Argunov and E, F, Rogovsky had been arrested on the night of Nov, 17/l8 /Elena Varneck and H, H, Fisher (Editors), The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1935, p. 2547 They had been escorted out of the country Nov, 20 under a guard escort of the 25th Bttn, Middlesex Regt, Letter, Ward to G.O.C., China Command, Hong Kong, d/Nov, 21, 1918, p. 3, War Diary, 25th Bttn, ~ 111 - 129 Telegram..Morrisey to Elmsley, d/jan, 14, 1919, War Diary, G.S., C.E.F .(s), 1-1-19 to 31-1-19, R.G, 9, Vol. 476, Pile,959, P.A.C. 130 Ibid, . 131 Ibid. • • . . 132 Ibid. . 133 Ibid. 134 War Diary, Porce H,Q. (Sib.), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G, 9, Vol, 475, P i l e 957, P.A.C, .' ' . _ 135 Ibid. 136 War Diary, Advance Party, C.E.P.(s), 8-12-18 to 12-4-19, R.G. 9, Vol, 477, P i l e 963, P.A.C. . . . 137 War Diary, A;A. & Q.M.G. (Sib.), 1-12-18 to 29-5-19, R.G, 9, Vol. 477, P i l e 961, P.A.C. ,One platoon of 2nd coy, Hampshires remained i n Vladivostok.to serve, as instructors at the Russian Officers School, 138 Telegram, Elmsley to War Office, d/Dec, 16, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(2),"'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 139 Telegram, War Office, to C.G.S., d/Dec. 18, 1918, Borden Papers f P i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 140 Telegram, C.G.S. to War Office, d/Dec. 23, 1918, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 141 Telegram, War Office to Elmsley, d/jan, 6, 1919, Siberian Records. Polder 17, Secret F i l e No, 1, P.A.C. 142 Telegram^, War Office to Elmsley, d/jan, 29, 1919, Borden Papers, F i l e GC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', P.A.C. 143 Telegram, War Office to Elmsley, d/Feb. 2, 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 1,. P.A.C. 144 Telegram, B l a i r to War, Office, d/Feb. 6, 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 1, P.A.C. 145 Letter, Knox to Elmsley, d/Peb, 21, 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret P i l e No. 1, P.A.C. - 112 - 146 Letter, Knox to Elmsley,, d/Feb, 21, 1919, Siberian Records, Folder 17, Secret F i l e No.- 1, P.A.C., - . 147 Telegram 'War Office to Elmsley, d/Mar. 20, 1919, War Diary, G.S., C.E.F«(S), 1-3-19 to 31-3-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C. 148 Letter, B l a i r to Elmsley, d/Apr. 25, 1919, Siberian Records, Parcel 10, F i l e 27-9 *l/9th Hampshire Regt.', P.A.C. - 149 Letter, Elmsley to B l a i r , d/Apr. 25, 1919 (Handwritten reply cited on: Letter, B l a i r to Elmsley, d/Apr. 25, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 10, F i l e 27r9. fl/9th Hampshire Regt.'), P.A.C. 150 Telegram, Elmsley to War Office, d/May 2, 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 10 'Cables - Outgoing, G.S., C.E.F.(s)*, P.A.C. 151 Telegram,.Elmsley to War .Office, d/May 26, 1919, Siberian Records f Folder 10 'Cables - Outgoing, G.S., C.E.F.(s)', P.A.C. 152 Riots had.taken place i n Quebec City between the period March 29 to A p r i l 1,.1918 over federal e f f o r t s to.enforce the M i l i t a r y Service Act. S i r Robert Laird Borden, Memoirs. Vol, I I , pp, 786-788, 153 Ibid., p, 698, , . 154 Ibid.. p,. 919, 155 Colonel G. W. L, Nicholson, (Army H i s t o r i c a l Section)..Canadian Expeditionary Force. 1914 - 1919. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, ,.. (Published with authority of the Minister of National Defence) t 1962, p. 516,' • . . , 156 The Daily Colonist. V i c t o r i a , B. C,, Dec.,10, 1918, p, 4, 157 War Diary, 16th Infantry Brigade, C.E.F .(s), 23-10-18 to 30-4-19, R,G, 9, Vol, 477, F i l e 961, P.A.C, , 158 War Diary, 259th Bttn, CE.F . ( s ) , 19-9-18 to 30-4-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 477,, P i l e 962, P.A.C. 159 Letter, Gwatkin to G.O.C., M.D. .11, d/Nov, 4, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e 2, P.A.C, 160 Ibid. • ~ 113 - 161 Letter, Gwatkin to Elmsley, d/Nov, 4, 1918. Siberian Records. Polder 17, Secret P i l e No,. 2, P.A.C, 162 War Diary, 259th Bttn, C.E.P.(s), 19-9-18 to 30-4-19, R.G. 9, Vol, 477,.Pile 962,P.A.C. 163 Ibid, , . . . 164 Ibid, 165 Telegram, Adj.-Gen, to G.O.C., M.D. 11, D/Nov, 23, 1918, Siberian Records. H.Q, P i l e 762-12-5 (vol. 2) 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C. (and) Memorandum, Gwatkin to Adj,-Gen,, d/Nov, 20, 1918, Siberian Records. H,Q, P i l e 762-12-5 (vol, 2), 'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C.' 166 Memorandum, Gwatkin to Adj,-Gen,, d/Nov, 20, 1918, Siberian Records f H.Q, P i l e 762-12-5 (vol. 2),.'Mobilization of Infantry Battalions', P.A.C. 167 Letter, G.O.C., M.D. 11 to G.O.C., M.D. 2 (Toronto), d/Dec. 21, 1918, Siberian Records. P i l e C-2051 (vol. 2) 'Russian S o c i a l i s t s ' , P.A.C. ..' 168 Letter, Gwatkin to Adj,-Gen,, d/jan, 29, 1919, Siberian Records. H.Q. P i l e 762-12-7 (vol. 2) 'Mobilization - General', P.A.C. 169 Letter, A.P.M. to A.A. & Q.M.G., d/May 21, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 12, Pile,102 'Deserters', P.A.C. 170 Letter, Gouin to Mewburn, d/Dec. 19, 1918, Siberian Records, H.Q..Pile 762-11-24, 'Queries r e l a t i n g to C.E.P.(S)', P.A.C. 171 War Diary, 16th Infantry Brigade, C.E.P.(S),.23-10-18 to 30-4-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 477, P i l e 961, P.A.C. 172 War,Diary, Force H.Q. (Sib,), 1-?2~19 to 28-2-19, R.G. 9, Vol, 475,, F i l e 958, P.A.C. 173 Debates of the House of Commons.2nd Session, 13th Parliament (1919), Vol, CXXXVIII (Vol. V), p. 4001, 174 Telegram, G.6.C., M.D. 11 to Gwatkin, d/jan, 21, 1919, Siberian Records. H.Q, F i l e 762-12-7 (vol, 3) 'Mobilization - General', P.A.C. 175 Vancouver Daily Sun, Vancouver, B, C., Jan. 27, 1919, p, 4, - 114 - 176 David Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, 2-Vols,, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938, Vol. I, p. 360, 177 Telegram, Gwatkin to Elmsley, d/Peh. 13, 1919, War Diary, Eorce H.Q. (Sib,,), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G. 9, Vol, 475, P i l e 957, P.A.C. 178 Telegram, Elmsley to Gwatkin, d/Feb, 18, 1919, War Diary, Force H,Q, (Sib,,), 11-10-18 to 31-12-18, R.G. 9, Vol. 475, F i l e 957, P.A.C. 179 Daily Routine Order No, 313, d/Mar. 1, 1919, Siberian Records. Folder 14 'Routine Orders - Base Commandant, C.E.P.(S)', P.A.C. 180 Letter, Asst, Commissioner, R.N.W.M.P. to Maj, G, S, Worsley, R.N.W.M.P., CE.F.(S), d/Mar, 17, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 12, F i l e 90 'Secret', P.A.C. (and) Letter, A.A. & Q.M.G. to H.Q,, 16th Inf. Brigade, d/Apr, 16, 1919, Siberian Records. Parcel 12, F i l e 90 'Secret', P.A.C. 181 William Rodney, A History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1919-1929. (unpublished M.A, Thesis), London, University of London, 1961, p, 53* 182 The Daily Colonist, V i c t o r i a , B, C,, May 6, 1919, p, 5, 183 Deposition of Sgt, E, Osoll, B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Mission, Vladivostok, d/May 26, 1919, War Diary, G.S., C^.P .(s), 1-4-19 to 19-6-19, R.G. 9, Vol. 476, F i l e 959, P.A.C, CHAPTER TV?0 1 In 1911 Russia's t o t a l exports amounted to 1,513,737,000 roubles, t o t a l imports, 1,022,699,000 roubles. In the. same year Russian exports to the United Kingdom were valued at 336,740,000 roubles and to Germany 490,139,000; imports from the United Kingdom 153,875,000 roubles and from Germany 476,839,000 roubles. Source: Howard P. Kennard (Editor), The Russian Yearbook. 1915. London, Eyre and Spottiswoode Ltd., 1913, p, 294, 2 An excellent discussion of the measures adopted by the Russian Government against German economic interests during World War I can be found i n : Baron Boris E, Nolde, Russia i n the. Economic WarT New Haven, Yale University Press, 1928. (Part of the Russian Series of the Economic and Social History of the World War prepared by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,), - 115 * 3 Order-in-Council No, P.O. 2595 d/Oet. 21, 1918, p, 2, 4 Ibid.. p. 2, 5 Letter, Mackintosh-Bell to Chr i s t i e , d/Oct, 9, 1917, Borden Papers. F i l e RLB 2003 'Russian Trade', P.A.C. 6 Letter, Hodgson to Mackintosh-Bell, d/Dec, 13, 1917, Borden Papers. F i l e RLB 2141 'Vladivostok - Cdn, Trade Commissioner', P.A.C. 7 Letter, Meigheh to Borden, d/jan, 29, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e RLB 2141 'Vladivostok - Cdn. Trade Commissioner', P.A.C. 8 Order-in-Council No, P.C. 2595, d/Oct, 21, 1918, p, 2, 9 Memorandum Re, Canadian Expeditionary Force (Siberia), d/Jul, 28, 1918, Siberian Records. Folder 17, Secret F i l e No, 3, P.A.C. 10 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Aug. 8, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 11 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Aug. 13, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 12 Letter, Dennis to Calder, d/Aug, 17, 1918, p, 1, Dept, of Trade and Commerce (hereafter cited as D.T.C.), F i l e 21916, Vol, I 'Canadian Economic Commission to Sib e r i a ' (hereafter cited as 'C.E.C.S.'), P.A.C. 13 Ibid., p. 2. 14 Ibid., p. 4, 15 Memorandum - Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, d/Mar, 19, 1919, D.T.C., F i l e 22804, Vol. I 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 16 Letter, Martens to Foster d/Oct, 8, 1918, Foster Papers. M,G> 27, F i l e 73, pp. 1 - 2, 'Aid to Siberia, 1918', P.A.C. 17 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Aug, 13, 1918, Borden Papers, F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 18 Order-in-Council P.C, 2595 d/Oct, 21, 1918, - 116 - 19 Order-in-Council P,C. 2595 d/Oct, 21, 1918, p. 3, 20 IbidI, p. 4* 21 Ibid.. p. 2, 22 Ibid. T p, 3, 23 See: Letter, Wilgress to Poster, d/Oct, 29, 1918, pp. 4 ^ 5 , D.T.C,, P i l e 21916, Vol, I •C.E.C.S,'.; Letter, Wilgress to O'Hara (Deputy Minister), d/Nov." 19, 1918, p, 3, D.T.C, P i l e 21916, Vol. I, 'CE.C.S.*; Letter, Dennis to Poster, d/Feb, 24, 1919, p. 4, D.T.C, P i l e 22804,. Vol. I, 'C.E.C.S.', a l l P.A.C, 24 Letter, Dennis to Foster, d/Feb, 20, 1919, p. 1, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol..I 'C.E.CS.', P.A.C, 25 Ibid., p, 1., 26 Memorandum Re, Canadian Commercial Commission to Siberia, d/Dec, 4, 1918, p, 3, D.T.C, P i l e 21916, Vol, I 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C 27 Recommendation of F, C, O'Hara to Cabinet d/Dec, 19, 1918, D.T.C, F i l e 21916, Vol. I 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C 28 A, D, Braithwaite, Report of V i s i t to Siberia, (undated,, typescript), p. 3, Braithwaite Papers. Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 29 Memorandum Re, Canadian Commercial Commission to Siberia, d/Dec, 4, 1918, p, 4, D.T.C, F i l e 21916, Vol, I, 'CE.C.S.*, P.A.C 30 See examples i n the e d i t o r i a l s of Industrial Canada for Jan,, Apr,, Aug., Sept., and Dec, 1915, 31 Letter, Wilgress to Deputy Minister, d/Dec, 3, 1918, p, 1, D.T.C, F i l e 21916, Vol. I 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C, 32 Letter, Dennis to Minister, d/Feb, 20, 1919, p. 1, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol. I 'CE.C.S.', P.A.C 33 Ibid,, p. 2, 34 Ibid., p, 2, 35 Ibid.. p. 3, - 117 - 36 Letter, Dennis to Minister, d/Feb, 20, 1919, p, 4, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol, I, •C.E.C.S,'', P.A.C. 37 Ibid.. p, 4, 38 Ibid.. p, 4. 39 Ibid., pp. 4 » 5, 40 Letter, Wilgress to Foster,' d/Oct. 29, 1918, .p„ 6, D.T.C, F i l e 21916, Vol. I, •C.E.C.S.*, P.A.C." 41 Letter, Dennis to Minister, d/Feb, 20, 1919, Op.Cit.. p, 8, 42 W. E,, P l a y f a i r (Official-Correspondent of the Canadian Press i n Siberia ) , Despatch d/Mar, 1, 1919, p, 3, Siberian Records., Folder 5, F i l e 49, P.A.C 43 Letter, Dennis to Minister, d/Feb, 20, 1919, Op, C i t . , p. 9, 44 Report, C, F, Just to Foster, d/Aug, 29> 1918, p, 1, e n t i t l e d : "The Case of Kunst & Albers", Foster Papers, Vol, 44, F i l e 75 'Aid to Siberia', P.A.C, 45 Report of Interview, Just and Sandford, d/Feb. 17, 1919, p. 1, Braithwaite Papers. Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 46 Report, Just to Foster, d/Aug, 29, 1918, Op. C i t . . p. 1, 47 Ibid.. p, 1, 48 Report of Meeting at B r i t i s h Mission, Vladivostok, d/Mar, 10, 1919, (Present: Lipovsky, Hodgson, Sandford and Braithwaite), pp. 1 - 2 , Braithwaite Papers. Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 49 Ibid.. p. 1, 50 Report of Interview, Just and Sandford, d/Feb. 17, 1919, Op. C i t , . p. 1,. 51 Ibid., p, 1, 52 Report, Just to Foster, d/Aug, 29, 1918, Qp-..i C i t . . p, 2, - 118 - 53 Report, Just to Foster, d/Aug. 29, 1918, p. 2, entitled "The Case of Kunst & Albers", Foster Papers. Vol. 44, F i l e 75 'Aid to Siberia', P.A.C. 54 Report of Interview, Braithwaite and Hodgson, d/Feb, 12, 1919, Braithwaite Papers, Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 55 Report of Interview, Just and Sandford, d/Feb, 17, 1919, p. 1, Braithwaite Papers, Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, 56 Ibid,. p. 1, " 57 Although the name 'Dalton' does not appear to be German, Hodgson refers to Dalton as an ",,.untrustworthy and an objectionable man with strong pro-German feelings," Cited i n : Report of Interview, •Braithwaite and Hodgson, d/Feb, 12, 1919, Op. C i t . 58 Report of Interview, Just and Sandford, d/Feb, 17, 1919, p, 1, Op. Cit,, L. " ... 59 Report of Meeting at B r i t i s h Mission, Vladivostok, d/Mar, 10, 1919, p, 2, Braithwaite Papers, Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P.Q, 60 Report, Just to Foster, d/Aug. 29, 1918, p, 3, Op. C i t . 61 Report of Meeting at B r i t i s h Mission, d/Mar, 10, 1919, p, 2, Op. C i t . 62 The Stock Exchange Yearbook - 1923. London, Thomas Skinner & Co,, 1923, p. 2019, 63 Information taken from The Daily Mail, London, Sept, 12, 1917 but cited i n : J , A. White, The Siberian Intervention, p, 112, 64 J, A, White, The Siberian Intervention, p, 112 (also) Varneck and Fisher, The Testimony of Kolchak, pp. 256 - 257, 65 J . A, White, The Siberian Intervention, p. 112, 66 Memorandum of Agreement, Stanley - Urquhart, d/Sept, 25, 1918, p. 1, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol. I, 'CE.C.S.', P.A.C 67 I b i d , / p . 3, 68 Ibid., pp, 1-3.. 69 Ibid., p. 2. -119 - 70 Memorandum, Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia, d/Mar, 3, 1919, p. 1, D.T.C., F i l e 22804, Vol, I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 71 Letter, Cade to Wilgress, d/Oct, 5, 1918, p. 1, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol. I, 'C.E.C.S.1, P.A.C, 72 Ibid., p. 1. 73 Letter, Wilgress to Deputy Minister, d/0ct s 10, 1918, p, 1, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol. I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 74 Ibid.. pp. 4 - 5 , 75 Letter, Wilgress to Foster, d/Oct. 29, 1918, p. 3, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol..I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 76 Ibid.. p. 3. 77 Letter, Wilgress to Deputy Minister, d/Nov. 7, 1918, p. 2, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol, I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C,. 78 . Ibid., p, 2, 79 Letter, Wilgress to Deputy Minister, d/Nov, 19, 1918, p. 1, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol, I 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 80 Ibid., p. 1, 81 Letter, Foster to MacLean, d/Nov, 25, 1918, pp, 1 - 2, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol. I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 82 Ibid., p. 1. • 83 Letter, Hubbard to MacLean, d/jan. 20, 1919, pp. 1 - 3, D.T.C., F i l e 21916, Vol, I, 'C.E.C.S.', P.A.C. 84 Ibid., pp, 1 - 2, 85 Memorandum Re, Siberian Supply Company, d/Feb, 20, 1919, p. 1, D.T.C./ F i l e 22804, Vol. I, 'C.E.C.S. *', P.A.C. 86 Ibid,, p. 1. 87 Ibid.., p. 1, 88 Ibid., p, 1, - 120 - 89 Order-in-Council No,. P.C. 344 d/Feb. 20, 1919, p. 3, 90 Memorandum.Re. Siberian Supply Company, d/Feb, 20, 1919, p. 3, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol, I 'CE.C.S.', P.A.C, 91 A, D, Braithwaite, Report of V i s i t to Siberia, (undated, typescript) p, 17, Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P.Q, 92 See also assessment of Mikhailov i n : Vameck and Fisher. Testimony of Kolchak, p. 246, 93 A, D, Braithwaite, Report of V i s i t to Siberia, p, 20, 94 A, D, Braithwaite, Report on Financial Conditions i n Siberia. d/Apr,'12, 1919, PP, 2 - 3, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol, I, 'C.E.C.S.1, P.A.C 95 Order-in-Council No, P.C, 113 d/Jan, 17, 1919, 96 A, D, Braithwaite, Report of V i s i t to Siberia, pp. 17, 22, 97 A. D, Braithwaite, Report on Financial Conditions i n Siberia, pp. 3 ~ 5, 98 A,, D, Braithwaite, Report on- Financial Conditions i n Siberia. Appendix D, Memorandum on the Questions of Currency and a Loan t f the Kolchak Government, d/Apr. 12. 1919. P. 3, D.T.C, F i l e 22804, Vol. I, 'CE.CS.', P.A.C 99 A, D. Braithwaite, Report of V i s i t to Siberia, p. 23, CHAPTER THREE 1 The Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s did not provide figures for levels of unemployment for the years under discussion, I t i s , however, possible to gauge the extent of economic recession by analyzing Canada's export trade for 1918 and 1919, The t o t a l value of Canadian exports for 1918 was: Si,540,027,788, By 19I9 this had f a l l e n to: $1,216,433,806, -» a decrease of 21 percent. Source: Canada,, Dept, of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , The Canada Yearbook, 1919f Ottawa, The King's Printer, 1920, p, 299, - 121 - 2 Rodney, History of the.Communist Party of Canadaf Op. C i t . , p.. 36. 3 Resolution submitted by Federated Labour Party d/Dec, 22, 1918, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 4 Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual Convention. Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, Quebec, P..Q,, September 16 - 21, 1918, p, 113. 5 J , Castell-Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public A f f a i r s . 1919« Toronto, Canadian Annual Review Limited, 1920, p, 459* 6 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Apr, 16, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 559 'Bolshevik Propaganda', P.A.C. 7 Telegram, Borden to White, d/Apr, 18, 1919, Borden Papers. F i l e OC 559 ''Bolshevik Propaganda', P.A.C. 8 An excellent, concise chronology of events i n the Winnepeg General Strike can be found i n ; A, Balawyder, The Winnepeg General Strike. Toronto, Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1967* v. 9 Rodney,. History of the Communist Party of Canada, Op. C i t . f p. 46, 10 Telegram, White to Borden, d/Nov, 25, 1918, Borden Papers, F i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 11 Telegram, Borden,to White, d/Nov, 24, 1918, Borden Papers, P i l e OC 518(l) 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. 12 Borden, Memoirs. Vol, I I , p. 890, 13 Ibid., p, 904, 14 Tim Buck, 1917 - 1957, Forty Years of Great Change - Canada and the Great Russian Revolution. Toronto, Progress Books, 1957, p» 16, 15 Telegram, Knox to War Office, d/Nov. 4, 1918, Siberian Records,: Folder 17, Secret F i l e No. 2, P.A.C, 16 Letter, Major B r i s t o l (O.M.F.C.) to Loring Christie (Special Asst, to Borden) d/jan, 7, 1919, p, 2, Borden Papers. P i l e OC 518(2), 'Expeditionary Force to Siberia', P.A.C. - 123 - BIBLIOGRAPHY I ARCHIVAL MATERIAL " A, O f f i c i a l Public Archives of Canada Borden Papers, Papers consist of the complete c o l l e c t i o n of Prime Minister S i r Robert Borden's personal and o f f i c i a l papers. The f i l e s u t i l i z e d were: OC $18(l) and OC 518(2) 'Expeditionary Porce to Siberia', OC 559 'Bolshevik Propaganda1'. RLB 2003 'Russian Trade', RLB 2141 'Vladivostok - Canadian Trade Commissioner'. During research at the Archives, a t o t a l of 112 document pages were extracted from the f i l e s and photocopied. Canadian Economic Commission to Siberia. The documents consist of two Department of Trade and Commerce f i l e s numbered 21916 and 22804, The f i l e s were transferred by the Department of Trade and Commerce to the Public Archives of Canada on October 14, 1968. The f i l e s are a nearly complete co l l e c t i o n of documents r e l a t i n g to the Commission's a c t i v i t y i n Siberia for the period 1918 - 1919* A t o t a l of 139 document pages were photocopied and u t i l i z e d i n this essay, Foster Papers. (Manuscript Group 27) Papers consist of the complete co l l e c t i o n of personal and o f f i c i a l documents of S i r . George Foster, the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The only f i l e u t i l i z e d was No, 75 e n t i t l e d 'Aid to Siberia, 1918''. 22 documents were photocopied. Siberian Records (Record Group 9). This co l l e c t i o n consists of a l l the records, both from the Department of Overseas M i l i t a r y Service of Canada and the Department of M i l i t i a and Defence r e l a t i v e to the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Siberia, except for the War Diaries (see below). Several hundred f i l e s are involved encompassing the complete history of the C.E.P.(s) from the time of organization to withdrawal and demobilization. The documents cover a l l phases of the Force's operation. Some of the documents re l a t i n g to policy matters are copies of documents found i n the Borden Papers, A t o t a l of 185 document pages were photocopied and used i n the preparation of this essay. - 124 - War D i a r i e s . World War I (Siberian S e r i e s ) . Record Group 9- I n d i v i d u a l War D i a r i e s f o r each of the u n i t s comprising the C.E.F.(s), D i a r i e s consist of a chronological, day by day, c a p i t u l a t i o n of matters concerning the s p e c i f i c units,,. The Series i s not complete, B, U n o f f i c i a l Braithwaite Papers. Archives, Bank of Montreal, Montreal, P,Q, Miscellaneous documents r e l a t i v e to the career of Mr, A, D, Braithwaite, The papers of relevance to t h i s essay were those concerning Mr, B r a i t h w a i t e f s membership on the Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a . Among the papers there are some important o f f i c i a l documents hot found i n the P u b l i c Archives, I I PRINTED MATERIAL A, O f f i c i a l Canada, Department of External A f f a i r s , Documents on Canadian External Relations. Ottawa, Queen's P r i n t e r , 1967, . Order-in-Councils r e l a t i n g to the Canadian Expeditionary Porce to S i b e r i a . Nos. P.C. 1983 dated August 12,. 1918; P,C, 2073 dated August 23, 1918; and P,C. 2151 dated September 5, 1918. Order-in-Councils r e l a t i n g to the Canadian Economic Commission to S i b e r i a , Nos, P.C, 2595 dated October 21, 1918 and P.C. 344 dated February 20, 1919. B, U n o f f i c i a l Borden, S i r Robert L a i r d , Memoirs. Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1938, 2-Vols, Dunham, Capt, W. E, "The Canadians i n S i b e r i a " , Maclean's Magazine, V o l . XXXII, No. 5 (May 1919), pp. 11 - 12, 92' - 95* Rodney, William, A History of the Communist Party of Canada, 1919 - 1929. (unpublished M, A, Thesis) London, U n i v e r s i t y of London, 1961, « 125 - Smith, G-addis, "Canada and the Siberian Intervention, 1918-1919", American H i s t o r i c a l Review, Vol, LXIV, No., 4 (July 1959), pp. 866 ~ 877, Swettenham, J , A, A l l i e d Intervention i n Russia, 1918-1919: and the Fart Played by Canada, Toronto, Ryerson.Press, 1967,

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