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PRI and the Mexican Student Movement of 1968 : a case study of repression. Hernandez, Salvador 1970

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THE PRI AND THE MEXICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT OF 1968 A CASE STUDY OF REPRESSION by SALVADOR HERNANDEZ B.A., U.N.A.M. Mexico 1958 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA June, 1970 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumb i a , I a g ree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s tudy . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d tha t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co lumbia Vancouver 8, Canada i ABSTRACT This report i s a study of the development of strategies of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t surrounding the Mexican Student Movement of 1968. I t analyzes s t r a t e g i e s of the students' organization of the National S t r i k e Committee and the Government Party of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s (P.R.I.), i n order to understand why v i o l e n t repression was applied by the government to suppress the student group. The understanding of repression i s undertaken i n a review of the development of governmental structures and the h i s t o r y of c o n f l i c t i n Mexico beginning i n 1910. In looking through the h i s t o r y of Mexico and examining the student movement, the report weaves together three theories: 1) the c o n f l i c t of d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l groups i n h i s t o r y ; 2) the development of a one-party system of government; and 3) the r o u t i n i z e d use of repression i n p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t since the Mexican Revolution of 1910. In review of the h i s t o r i c a l development of the P.R.I., the study indicates that the early period i n the 1930's contained an oppor- ' tunity f o r a v i a b l e p o l i t i c a l democracy with a c o n t r o l and orderly con-f l i c t between i n t e r e s t group on the l e f t and r i g h t . The push to a c e n t r a l i z e d government came from Cardenas who was sympathetic to the needs of the peasants and workers and whose administration worked on t h e i r behalf. But following the leadership of Cardenas, the p r e s i d e n t i a l successors, A v i l a Camacho and Aleman, used the Central Party, and by strengthening i t s c o n t r o l , suppressed labor and peasant movements. I t i s at this time that the legacy of violence i n p o l i c y matters i s introduced — a strategy of repression i n modern Mexican p o l i t i c s . i i Evidence on the composition of the P.R.I, points to a structure i n which c o n t r o l of the government flows, from the top down i n a uni-d i r e c t i o n a l manner with l i t t l e or no influence from the workers, pea-sants or small businessmen. Representation i n the party does not bring with i t the a b i l i t y to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the decision making, nor does the populist ideology of the party mean that the masses are able to "influence the leadership of the government. This being the case, the problem f o r the government becomes one of persuasion and c o n t r o l . A chronological account of the events of 1968 reveal that the strategy of the student movement, was that of c a l l i n g f o r a p u b l i c debate with the government i n order to provide a means of r e s t o r i n g the influence of the masses of the people upon pu b l i c of-f i c i a l s , and the strategy of the government was to applied p h y s i c a l force through the p o l i c e and the army i n order to avoid a p u b l i c debate and to quickly eliminate the student movement. i i i TABLE Of CONTENTS Ab s t r a c t L i s t of Charts I n t r o d u c t i o n Chapter Ii The Mexican Rev o l u t i o n and the O r i g i n s of the O f f i c i a l P a r t y Chapter I I : The F.R.I. P o l i t i c a l Machine Chapter I I I : The Students' P r i n c i p l e : We Must Have P u b l i c Dialogue Chapter IV: The Government P r i n c i p l e : We Must Preserve the " P r i n c i p l e of Authority 5' Chapter V; Conclusions B i b l i o g r a p h y i v LIST OF CHARTS Page Chart 1 3 1 Chart 2 33-34 Chart 3 4 5 To the students who f e l l i n 1968; Year of T l a t e l o l c o Massacre. 1 INTRODUCTION On October 2nd, 1968 i n the P l a z a of the Three Cultures i n T l a t e l o l c o 15,000 s t u d e n t s s p r o f e s s o r s , workers, r e s i d e n t s , i n c l u d i n g women and c h i l d r e n met f o r a r a l l y c a l l e d by the N a t i o n a l S t r i k e Com-mittee (CNH) of the 1968 student movement. This was the s i x t h p r o t e s t demonstration m o b i l i z e d by students against the Government over a per-i o d of three months. I t was c a l l e d i n support of s i x demands (which I w i l l o u t l i n e i n a l a t e r chapter) that had been presented to the Gov-ernment. Unknown to the p a r t i c i p a n t s 5,000 s o l d i e r s and p o l i c e s u r -rounded the square. Upon orders and without warning or provocation of c i v i l d i s o r d e r they f i r e d i n t o the masses of people, k i l l i n g and wounding, and pursuing those who attempted to f l e e . This i s now known- as the ''Tlatelolco Massacre. ! i The "'Mas-sa c r e " i s but one p o i n t i n the 1968 Mexican student movement and i t i s f o r us a p a i n f u l l y symbolic p o i n t of departure i n l o o k i n g i n t o the movement and the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of the Mexican government. The October 2nd i n c i d e n t was one of the more g l a r i n g and overt acts of p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e c a r r i e d out by the Government and i t rang down the c u r t a i n on a decade of i n c r e a s i n g r e p r e s s i o n of popular movements which began w i t h the peasants and workers and ended w i t h the student movement of 1968. The purpose of t h i s r e p o r t i s to study the development of s t r a -t egies of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t surrounding the student movement from both the sides of the student and the Government, and w i t h respect to the. l a t t e r to concentrate on the major t a c t i c of p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s s i o n . 2 Repression i s a form of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . I t i s not a type of power a c t i v i t y i n which partie s attempt to negotiate, persuade others, or r a t i o n a l l y advance t h e i r i n t e r e s t through dialogue. Rather repression i s an extreme use of power i n which a government or a party i n c o n t r o l of governmental departments exercises p h y s i c a l force to elim-inate opposing groups. This, i n f a c t , i s the reverse of p o l i t i c a l groups who use p h y s i c a l violence to bring down an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d form of government. In the case of v i o l e n t revolution'and i n the case of repression p h y s i c a l power i s used as a device to destroy the opponent. Unlike the revolutionary perspective of removing the govern-ment, repression may be regarded as l e g a l and j u s t i f i e d . There are the cases, such as treason, or s e d i t i o n , where p o l i t i c a l leaders are granted the r i g h t to destroy p o l i t i c a l groups and to remove persons labeled as p o l i t i c a l criminals from the p o l i t i c s of the country through p h y s i c a l force. These circumstances are c a r e f u l l y s p e l l e d out i n the laws of a country, such as a r t i c l e i 8 9 , s e c t i o n 6 of the Mexican c o n s t i t u t i o n which states, t!To make use of the e n t i r e permanent armed forces whether of the Army, the Navy or the A i r Force for the i n t e r n a l security and external defense of the Federation." Now i f there are no attempts to undermine the i n t e r n a l secur-i t y and external defense of a country, and i f a government t r i e s to eliminate an opposing p o l i t i c a l group or mass movement, then we have a case of " i l l e g a l repression." I t i s the purpose of t h i s report to reveal how the Mexican Government, namely Party of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s (PRI) applied i l l e g a l repression i n attempting to suppress the student movement of 1968, and how that party s t r a t e g i c a l l y manouvered to use p h y s i c a l force 3 as a measure to what they c a l l e d a " r e a l t h r e a t " to the s o c i a l order . of Mexico, i n order to persuade the Mexican p o p u l a t i o n that they were j u s t i f i e d i n the massacre of T l a t e l o l c o . But the s o c i o l o g i c a l problem of r e p r e s s i o n goes beyond the question of techniques to the. i s s u e of why a government, e s p e c i a l l y one p r i n c i p l e d on democratic l i n e s s uses p h y s i c a l v i o l e n c e as a recourse to remove i t s o p p o s i t i o n i n a modern c o n f l i c t ? To answer a question concerning why p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s s i o n i s used as a device takes us i n t o the area of the development of governmental s t r u c t u r e s and i n t o the h i s t o r y of c o n f l i c t i n Mexico, For that reason the f i r s t h a l f of t h i s r e p o r t concentrates on the h i s t o r y of the p o l i t i c s and economic condi-t i o n s of Mexico i n order to provide an understanding f o r the d e t a i l e d documentation of the r i s e and supression of the student movement of 1968. In l o o k i n g through the h i s t o r y of Mexico and i n examining the student movement I w i l l attempt to weave together-three themes: 1) the c o n f l i c t of d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l groups i n h i s t o r y ; 2) the development of a one-party system of government; and 3)the r o u t i n i z e d use of repres-s i o n i n p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s i n c e the Mexican R e v o l u t i o n of 1910. The remainder of t h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n w i l l trace the major con-t r i b u t i o n of the Mexican R e v o l u t i o n of 1910 tc the r i s e of the modern government of the country. Chapter I i s a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the founders of the o f f i c i a l one-party system. In Chapter I I we look at the s t r u c t u r e of the PRI and i t s o p e r a t i o n . Chapters I I I and IV deal w i t h the c o n f l i c t surrounding the student movement, w i t h the former con-c e n t r a t i n g on the p e r i o d J u l y 2.2 to August 29 and the s t r a t e g i e s of the students, and the l a t t e r on the p e r i o d September 1 to October and the t a c t i c s of the Government. F i n a l l y i n t h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r t , i t must be emphasized th a t t h i s i s not a study of the p o l i t i c a l ideology of the Mexican s t u -dent movement of 1968, nor of the i d e a l s , the goals and b e l i e f s of that movement; r a t h e r , i t i s a case study of the p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t between the N a t i o n a l S t r i k e Committee (the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the students during the events of 1968) and the Government, and of the r e p r e s s i o n a p p l i e d by the l a t t e r . Since we are emphasizing s t r a t e g i e s of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than the content of i d e o l o g i e s a comparative framework, u t i l i z i n g data from student movements i n other c o u n t r i e s , i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y f r u i t f u l . I d e o l o g i e s appear h i g h l y t r a n s f e r a b l e but the immediate h i s -t o r i c a l contexts of the v a r i o u s movements are so v a r i a b l e as to shed l i t -t l e l i g h t on t h i s case study. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Mexican R e v o l u t i o n of 1910 i n modern p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s may be seen i n the t i t l e of the o f f i c i a l gov-ernment p a r t y , "The P a r t y of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s " (PRI). I n order t o understand the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the use of the word "Rev-o l u t i o n a r y " i n the t i t l e and l a t e r to understand the changes that have taken place i n i t s meaning we begin our a n a l y s i s w i t h an ac-count of the p e r i o d of the 1910 R e v o l u t i o n . T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the Mexican R e v o l u t i o n of 1910 was sup-posed to become the f i r s t " s o c i a l i s t i c " R e v o l u t i o n , of the present century. L a t e r i n 1917 a new C o n s t i t u t i o n was enacted, which was a l s o among the most advanced of i t s time. Examples of i t are the A r t i c l e s 27 and 123, both c l o s e l y r e l a t e d since the former proclaims the expro-p r i a t i o n of p r i v a t e land i n order to be d i s t r i b u t e d among the peasants, 5 and the latter had established a labor code which gave to the Mexican worker the right to s tr ike. So advanced were Articles 27 and 123 of the nCar-ta Magna1', that Mexican commentators proudly pointed out the international ef-fects of the ar t ic les . They claim to have influenced the Treaty of Versail les (1918), and on the Constitution of the Spanish Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania; Poland s Rumania, the Weimar Republic of Germany, and among the Latin American nations of Bol iv ia , Braz i l , Chile , Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Nica-1 ragua, Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Hence, we have been talking about what happened at the theo-re t i ca l level but we may ask: how was that theory carried out in practice? The answer to the question, is a very obvious one: the so-called ' 'Social i s t ic" Revolution, turned out to be a bourgeois Rev-olution, and the Constitution an instrument of the newly born bour-geoisie. Once the f i e ld was clear after the assassination of Emiliano Zapata in 1919, and Pancho V i l l a in 1923, both of them genuine popular leaders, the new Mexican ruling class took f u l l command of the "rev-olution 1 5 , but also at the same time, they foresaw the necessity of creating a p o l i t i c a l party in order to maintain themselves in power, and to use the party as a concrete and immediate tool : to "centralize" a l l dissident groups, and attracting them to "participate' 1 and to 1. See: Howard F. Cl ine, Mexico, Revolution to Evolution; 1940-1960. p. 138. New York, Oxford University Press, 1963. "share'' responsibility in the country's p o l i t i c a l l i f e , a l l this ob-tained simply, but only by becoming members of the " O f f i c i a l Party" and at the same time of the "Revolutionary Family'1. Nowadays, the party is known as P.R.I. — the Party of Revolutionary Institutions — and has become an extremely effective p o l i t i c a l machine in centralizing power, to the extent that no one can seriously deny that Mexico is a society of a One-Party System. In regard to this a Mexican observer writes: f iIt is a fact that in Mexico a predominant one-party sys-tem has existed since 1929. Parties do not alternate in the exercise of power, and there is no special party for the labouring masses."^ Thus, we can clearly see that within the Mexican context, an effective p o l i t i c a l opposition does not exist. Consequently this situation has created through the years.a climate of p o l i t i c a l asphy-xiation 9 since the o f f i c i a l party had been also transformed into an instrument of repression of any relevant and independent mass-movement . Countless times peasant and workers'movements.and their leaders have been repressed. The most striking examples in the last ten years have been the assasination of Ruben M. Jaramillo, a peasant leader from the state of Morelos, and in 1959- the imprison-ment of Demetrio Vallajo, a railroad leader. 2. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova,, Dynamics of the Class Structure, op. c i t . , p. 74. Comparative Perspectives on Stratification: Mexico, Great Britain, Japan, Joseph A. Kahl. L i t t l e , Brown and Company, Boston 1968. 7 Describing Jaramilio's movement aims and h i s eventual as-sassination an observer writes: •'Jaramillo was born with t h i s century i n the h i l l s of the state of Morelos. S t i l l young, he joined Zapata for the T i e r r a y Libertad (Land and Liberty) crusade against oppression. When armed f i g h t i n g stopped, Jara-m i l l o returned to Morelos, where he became a peasant leader, constantly threatening r e b e l l i o n i f agrarian reforms were not c a r r i e d out. Often he l e d his men onto undistributed land, and stayed there u n t i l i t was parceled out or u n t i l f e d e r a l troops forced him o f f .... During Cardenas presidency, Jaramillo had no reason to f i g h t . But a f t e r Cardenas, he became voc a l . As long as some agrarian reforms were enacted, he kept his a c t i v i t i e s peaceful. When Ruiz Cortines halted reforms completely, Jaramillo took h i s men to the h i l l s . He was pursued by tanks, cavalry, a r t i l l e r y , and the a i r force, but, aided by Morelos' peasants and f a m i l i a r with Morelos' t e r r a i n , he was never caught. When Lopez Mateos became President, and offered him an amnesty, Jaramillo went home. He met Lopez Mateos, t o l d him what he had fought f o r , and that he would con-tinue to f i g h t i f land reforms were not renewed. Lopez Mateos promised to bring the revo l u t i o n back to Morelos, and the two men hugged each other i n a L a t i n s t y l e abrazo. The scene, photographed by witnesses, became known throughout Mexico. Jaramillo produly decorated his walls with i t . But Lopez Mateos forgot about Morelos. Jaramillo waited and waited. Then, i n 1961, he decided to wait no longer. With f i v e thousand landless peasants, he occupied a ser-ies of l a t i f u n d i o s and unused plots i n Michapa and E l Guarin, e s p e c i a l l y the vast u n t i l l e d tracts owned by a wealthy landowner named Ramon Espin, the protege and f r i e n d of Morelos PRI Governor Norberto Lopez Avelar. The case went to the Department of Agrarian Matters and 8 Colonization. (DAAC), which found that the land was indeed unused and should be d i s t r i b u t e d . J a r a m i l l o , h i s aims ac-complished , l e f t h i s men on t h e i r new la n d . Then, a few weeks l a t e r , DAAC reversed i t s e l f , and declared J a r a m i l l o an outlaw f o r t r e s p a s s i n g on p r i v a t e property. E a r l y i n 1962, the S e c r e t a r i a t of H y d r o e l e c t r i c Resources announced that the A l t o Amacuzac and San Jeronimo r i v e r s were to be tapped f o r a dam, e l e c t r i c power and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t which would transform Michapa and E l Guarin's 40,000 hectares i n t o the breadbasket of Morelos. DAAC had not known about the p r o j e c t when i t announced i t s f i r s t d e c i s i o n . Said P r o f e s s o r Roberto B a r r i o s , DAAC's boss; ''I d i d not know. We were going to give a gold mine to those people! And great p o l i t i c a l power.'' Thus on February 13, 1962, General Pascual Cornejo Brum, c h i e f of Morelos' m i l i t a r y zone, was ordered to c l e a r the occu-p i e d lands. J a r a m i l l o again sought a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . On March 18th he t r i e d to see Lopez Mateos, but was r e -fused an audience, and returned to h i s home i n T l a q u i l t e n a n -go, Morelos, a modest s i n g l e - f l o o r , poured-concrete house where he l i v e d w i t h h i s pregnant w i f e , E p i f a n i a Zuniga, and h i s three adolescent sons. They were a l l there on May 23, 1962, at 2:30 P.M. when s i x t y s o l d i e r s and c i v i l i a n s suddenly a r r i v e d i n two army trucks and two jeeps, surrounded the house, l e v e l e d sub-, machine guns at i t s two entrances, and ordered J a r a m i l l o to come out. When he d i d , besiegers rushed i n t o the house, brought out E p i f a n i a and the three sons, pushed a l l f i v e i n t o the v e h i c l e s , and drove away. Up to t h i s p o i n t , there are scores of witnesses — the neighbors and passers-by. Two hours l a t e r , near the Xochicalco a r c h a e o l o g i c a l r u i n s , peasants found the whole J a r a m i l l o f a m i l y dead. Each of the f i v e heads had a coup de grfice .45 b u l l e t i n i t ; i n each of the f i v e bodies was a handful of Thompson sub-machine-gun s l u g s . * Witnesses, s l u g s , h i s t o r y , and f a c t s notwithstanding, Mexico's press —- and, n a t u r a l l y . Time magazine — t r i e d to make the murders. sound l i k e "a p r i v a t e a f f a i r ' ' of ''re-venge/'. But there can be no doubt that the J a r a m i l l o s were k i l l e d , on orders from the PRI top, because they represen-ted the Mexican peasants' u n f u l f i l l e d demands from the rev-o l u t i o n . * The c a r t r i d g e s , found a l l around the bodies, were stamped F a b r i c s Nacional de Municiones (1953 and 1954), a s u p p l i e r that d i s t r i b u t e s only to the army. Morelos P o l i c e Chief 9 Captain Gustavo Ortega Rcjas t o l d r e p o r t e r s a few hours a f t e r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n that the Federal J u d i c i a l P o l i c e had c a l l e d him the nig h t before to ask f o r arms and a jeep, but that when the Federales never showed up and he c a l l e d them, he was t o l d ; ! , I t i s no longer necessary; everything has been taken care of. J i The time: 1 hour 30 minutes a f -t e r J a r a m i l l o F s death. (Ortega l a t e r denied t h i s conver-s a t i o n when questioned by o f f i c i a l " i n v e s t i g a t o r s . The case of the la b o r leader Demetrio V a l l e j o and h i s move-ment took place i n 1958 when a powerful movement i n favor of union i n -dependence grew i n the 9th Section of S.N.T'.E. ( P u b l i c School Teacher's Union of Mexico C i t y ) . I t s main l e a d e r , Othon S a l a z a r , was a r r e s t e d and j a i l e d that same year. With the growth of t h i s movement i n favor of independent un-ions and against "charrismo" (the c o r r u p t i o n of establishment unions) the R a i l r o a d Workers Union enforced the m a j o r i t y choice i n favor of the t i c k e t headed by Demetrio V a l l e j o . A l l i n a l l , i n 1958 the outlook f o r the l a b o r and the peasant movement was very promising, because als o by that time Lopez Mateos had taken o f f i c e and as we already pointed out, he o f f e r e d iunnesty to Ruben J a r a m i l l o . But, once again the p r e s i d e n t i a l promises were only promises. The r a i l r o a d s t r i k e of March 1959 and the r e p r e s s i o n of the union headed by V a l l e j o created a cli m a t e of s o c i a l t e n s i o n . An attempt was made to plac e the p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the r a i l r o a d s t r i k e cn the Mexi-can Communist Party which f e l l v i c t i m to a wave of p e r s e c u t i o n . Close to 5,000 persons were a r r e s t e d , the m a j o r i t y of whom were r a i l r o a d workers. The s t r i k e r s were forced to r e t u r n to work and searching w i t h -out a warrant became an everyday occurrence. According to Attorney Gen-e r a l Fernando Lopez A r i a s the r e p r e s s i v e measures employed against the 3. John G e r a s s i . The Great Fear i n L a t i n America, op. c i t . , pp. 105-.107. N.Y.- C o l l i e r Books, 1968. ' " 10 r a i l r o a d workers were for the purpose of preventing "ideologies and i n t e r e s t s foreign to those of Mexico from attempting to subvert pub-l i c order." The leaders Demetrio V a l l e j o and Valentin Campa were ac-cused of being " t r a i t o r s to t h e i r country. 1' Two members of the d i p l o -matic corps of the Soviet Union, apparently linked with the r a i l r o a d c o n f l i c t s , were deported. Several of the Mexican newspapers c a l l e d for breaking o f f diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with the U.S.S.R., and ''McCarthy-ism'1 reached i t s heights when Lopez Arias stated that ''in Mexico i t was i n t o l e r a b l e f o r a Communist to hold a union p o s i t i o n . " In the p r e v a i l i n g anti-Communist climate of opinion hundreds of people were accused of a va r i e t y of crimes i n connection with the s t r i k e . The leaders were accused of " s o c i a l d i s s o l u t i o n ' . As a r e s u l t of this repression a Committee to Defend P o l i -t i c a l Prisoners was formed, which i n turn was savagely suppressed. On Agusut 4, 1960, an estimated number of 1,500 uniformed p o l i c e and p l a i n -clothesmen attacked a demonstration i n support of the teachers of Sec-t i o n 9 of the S.N.T.E. Several people were wounded, some of them ser-i o u s l y . On the 9th of August, the well-known painter of murals, David A l f a r o Siqueiros, and newspaperman Filomeno Mata were arrested and j a i l e d . As members and sponsors of the Defense Committee, they v/ere to be accused of " s o c i a l dissolution''. The day before the 50th anniversary of the Mexican Revolu-t i o n , 21 of the 35 p o l i t i c a l prisoners being held i n Mexico City's Lecumberri j a i l went on a hunger s t r i k e . They were protesting against the delay i n the consideration of t h e i r appeals and the hearing of t h e i r cases. The majority of them had been i n j a i l f o r over 18 months. 11 Two of the p o l i t i c a l p r i s o n e r s , David A l f a r o S i q u e i r o s and Filomeno Mata, the l a s t to be a r r e s t e d , were sentenced to 8 years i n p r i s o n on March 10, 1962, more than 20 months a f t e r t r i a l proceedings against them were i n i t i a t e d . On the 10th c f August 1963, sentence was passed on the m a j o r i t y of the r a i l r o a d and p o l i t i c a l leaders who were s t i l l i n j a i l . The sentences v a r i e d from three years to 16 i n the case of Demetrio V a l l e j o . At the present moment only two of the 1959 p r i s o n e r s are s t i l l i n j a i l : Demetrio V a l l e j o and V a l e n t i n Campa, both of whom are e l e g i b l e f o r p a r o l e because they have served more than two-thirds of t h e i r sentences. Both have requested t h e i r r e l e a s e but, up to now, i t has been denied them. In 1964, when the current p r e s i d e n t of Mexico: Gustavo Diaz Ordaz took o f f i c e one of h i s campaign slogans, "Order and Pro-gress" resembled those of the years of General P o r f i r i o Diaz whose d i c t a t o r i a l regime of almost t h i r t y years was overthrown by the Mex-i c a n R evolution of 1910. But w i t h the e l e c t i o n of Diaz Ordaz, hopes t h i s time were not so h i g h , s i n c e the candidate was w e l l known f o r h i s r i g h t i s t p o l -i t i c a l l e a n i n g s . L e f t p o l i t i c a l observers were p e s s i m i s t i c about Diaz Ordaz's e l e c t i o n f o r the p r e s i d e n t i a l term of 1964-1970. Soon, t h e i r pessimism proved to be r i g h t , because i f the p o l i c i e s of the former p r e s i d e n t Lopez Mateos were those of p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s s i o n , w i t h Diaz Ordaz they were expanded and p e r f e c t e d . Repression was no longer ex post f a c t o ; i t was now preventive as w e l l . L e f t r a d i -c a l groups were e s p e c i a l l y v i c t i m i z e d but they were not the only ones. W i t h i n the P.R.I., r e p r e s s i o n took the form'of forced r e s i g -12 nations by those cabinet members vzhc were not partisans of the admin-istration. A clear example of what we have just said, was the case of Carlos A. Madrazo, who was appointed as president of P.R.I, on December 7, 1964 and was forced to resign on November 22, 1965; Madrazo tried during this short period to clear up and democratize the party at a l l levels, but soon his task was interrupted. Mow the PRI operates and how much internal repression is applied leads us to ask about the hi s t o r i c a l origins of the o f f i c i a l party, i t s early formation in 1929, and i t s development up to the administration of 1964. These questions are dealt with i n the next chapter. 13 ' CHAPTER I The Mexican Revolution and the Origins of the " O f f i c i a l Party" In 1910 the Mexican Revolution emerged as a r e a c t i o n to almost t h i r t y years of General Diaz's d i c t a t o r i a l regime. During those years, despite a century of p o l i t i c a l independence, the economy of the country was t y p i c a l l y " c o l o n i a l " . Railroads, t e x t i l e m i l l s , and o i l wells were b u i l t by foreign c a p i t a l and d i r e c t e d by f o r e i g n managers and a l l the p r o f i t s from those i n d u s t r i e s flowed abroad. The r u l e r s of the country were absentee landlords, p o l i t i c i a n s , and m i l i t a r y men, a l l of them i n close c o l l a b o r a t i o n with foreign c a p i t a l i s t s . About 80 per cent of the people were peasants laboring for mere subsistence, and l i v i n g as semi-serfs on large plantations or haciendas. Then Diaz's feudal order collapsed i n r e v o l u t i o n . The years between-1910 to 1920 were a period of turbulence during which the pop-u l a t i o n f e l l by almost h a l f a m i l l i o n from a t o t a l of 15 m i l l i o n , as a r e s u l t of c i v i l war many foreigners were driven out and l o c a l landlords were forced from t h e i r haciendas. A l s o the p o l i t i c a l power of the Church was broken. In regard to t h i s stage of Mexican h i s t o r y , an observer writes: "The Mexican Revolution v/as a product of a l l i a n c e between the bourgeoisie, represented by Madera, and the peasants, led by Emiliano Zapata and Pancho V i l l a . They faced a common enemy, the feudal order and i t s supporting p i l l a r s of Church, army, and foreign c a p i t a l . But t h e i r goals i n -e v i t a b l y d i f f e r e d . Freedom from domestic and f o r e i g n bonds and loosening of the economic structure for the bourgeoisie; land for the peasants. Although Zapata continued to press the i n t e r e s t s of the peasants u n t i l his murder i n 1919, the r e a l leadership of the r e v o l u t i o n was never out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, except i n s o f a r as i t was challenged by 14 Huerta re a c t i o n and American intervention. The elimination of feudal s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s was of course i n the i n t e r e s t of the emerging bourgeoisie as well as of the peasants. Edu-cat i o n became secularized, Church and State more widely separated. But accession to power by the peasantry was ne-ver r e a l l y i n the cards. As a r e s u l t of t h i s revolutionary decade 1910-1920, a newly formed Northern dynasty headed by General Obregon de l a Huerta and C a l l e s , emerged i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. Obregon ruled during the early twenties and Plutarco E l i a s C a l l e s who succeeded him, i n the middle 1920's. In order to r e t a i n the power within the Northern dynasty, Obregon sought p r e s i d e n t i a l r e - e l e c t i o n at the end of C a l l e s 1 adminis-t r a t i o n i n 1928. By an amendment to the Constitution of 1917, which i n p r i n c i -ple says that no president can be re-elected for a second term i n o f f i c e , Obregon was re-elected, but j u s t before taking o f f i c e was assassinated by a r e l i g i o u s f a n a t i c . With Obregon's death, General Plutarco E. C a l l e s was 2 f remaned "Jefe Maximo." But he no longer, as Obregon, sought r e - e l e c t i o n i n order to maintain power; instead he created a p o l i t i c a l party, through which he retained power u n t i l 1934. In regard to Obregdn's death and the creation of the p o l i t i -c a l party, Howard F. Clines writes: "Obregon's death by assassination i n 1928 l e f t a dangerous vacuum which the Oligarchy f i l l e d by an ingenious device, the creation of a single p o l i t i c a l party. Within i t s walls, the revolutionary family feuds and c o n f l i c t s could be recon-1. A. Gunder Frank, Mexico: The Janus Faces of 20th Century Bourgeois Revolution, op. c i t . , p. 76. Whither L a t i n America? M.R. Press, N.Y. 1963. 2, Country's Big Boss. 15 c i l e d and q u i e t l y accommodated without c r e a t i n g p e r i l o u s breaches through which c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y elements could pour i n to capture power and reverse the gains achieved. 1 The above C l i n e q u o t a t i o n , not only confirms Gunder Prank's assumption that r e a l l y , "the Rev o l u t i o n was never out of the hands of the b o u r g e o i s i e . . . / ' , but a l s o shows c l e a r l y w i t h the foundation of the " o f f i c i a l p a r t y " , the beginning of the " i n t e g r a t i o n i s t " e r a . I t i s almost a general b e l i e f , that i t was C a l l e s , who f i r s t had the idea of c r e a t i n g a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , but r a t h e r he was the exe-cutor of Gbregon idea s . General Obregon was about to be r e - e l e c t e d when on J u l y 1, 1928 he had a long conversation about h i s f u t u r e plans f o r Mexico w i t h L u i s L. Leon, M i n i s t e r of A g r i c u l t u r e and Development. In regard to t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n , P r o f e s s o r John W. Du l l e s w r i t e s : "Obregon s a i d w i t h emphasis that i t was necessary to create a p o l i t i c a l or s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h a d e f i n i t e program and permanent a c t i o n , 'to guarantee the s u r v i v a l of the Rev-o l u t i o n a r y p r i n c i p l e s by means of democratic paths.' 'We must, 1 he s a i d , 'take advantage of the s i x years of my government i n order to create t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h i s p o l i -t i c a l p a r t y that should be an expression of our d e s i r e s and sentiments.' "4 The Formation of t h e " G f f i e i a l " Party On December 1, 1928, the n a t i o n learned about the organiza-t i o n of the P.N.R. (N a t i o n a l Revolutionary Party) from a manifesto signed by General C a l l e s and other prominent p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e s of that time. I t mentioned the need f o r the " o r g a n i z a t i o n and foundations of .J permanent p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s of d e f i n i t e p r i n c i p l e s . " But i t was not 3. Howard F. C l i n e : The United States and Mexico, op. c i t . , p. 195. ' Atheneum, N.Y., 1963. 4. John W.F. D u l l e s , Yesterday i n Mexico: A C h r o n i c l e of the Revo-l u t i o n , 1919-1936. op. c i t . , p. 358. Univ. of Texas P r e s s , A u s t i n . 5. I b i d . , p. 410. 16 u n t i l March 3, 1929, i n a N a t i o n a l Convention h e l d i n the c i t y of Queretaro that the p r e s i d i n g o f f i c e r of the Convention,. declared that P a r t i d o Nacional R e v o l u c i o n a r i o was now o f f i c i a l . Consequently, w i t h the foundation of the " O f f i c i a l P a r t y P.N.R.", General C a l l e s r e t a i n e d power through h i s "puppet" p r e s i d e n t s ; E m i l i o Portes G i l , Pascual O r t i z Rubio and Abelardo Rodriguez. An observer w r i t e s ; "So long as C a l l e s remained the J e f e Maximo down to 1935, p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s were made almost e x c l u s i v e l y by the Par-t y , guided by h i s h o l d on i t s key executive committee. Pre-s i d e n t s from 1928 through 1934 had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y without power. C a l l e s had power without r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " 6 Cardenas and the P o s s i b i l i t i e s of a Damocracy and the Development of  the L e f t But an important s h i f t i n Mexican p o l i t i c s took place when on December 1, 1934, General Lazaro Cardenas became p r e s i d e n t , breaking the power of the Northern dynasty — i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that Cardenas was the f i r s t p r e s i d e n t who d i d not come from the n o r t h . L a t e r , on June 19, 1935, Cardenas sent C a l l e s i n t o e x i l e because of s e r i o u s disagreements i n p o l i c y matters. Having d e l i v e r e d a f a t a l blow to the Northern dynasty, Lazaro Cardenas became s o l e head of the Revolutionary Family, i n i t i a t i n g w i t h t h i s blow, the replacement of the "ma'ximato" Obregon and C a l l e s e r a , by a new era which came to known as the era of "Cardenismc". R e f e r r i n g back to the e a r l y days of 1933, i t was c l e a r that the e l e c t i o n of a p r e s i d e n t i n 1934 would be an important event i n Mex-i c o . Consequently p o l i t i c a l a g i t a t i o n , centered on i n t e r f a c t i o n a l raan-oeuvering between, the L e f t wingwho wanted the r e v o l u t i o n to forge ahead i n v i o l e n t f a s h i o n and the Right wing who wanted a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the 6. Howard F. Clines The United States and Mexico, op. c i t . , p. 199. Atheneum, N.Y., 1963. 17 d i r e c t i o n established since 1920 under the Northern dynasty. The issue was further confused by an important speech by C a l l e s , on May 30, 1933, i n which he pointed out that the Mexican Revolution had f a i l e d i n most of i t s important objectives. Through corruption, circumstance, and i g -norance, the men charged with providing a better l i f e for Mexicans had seen th e i r proposals deferred and defeated. Thus i n December 1933 the P.N.R. met to endorse the preordained candidate, Lazaro Cardenas. Cardenas' basic idea was to preserve c e r t a i n d estructive ten-dencies of the Mexican Revolution to c l e a r the way for new i n s t i t u t i o n s . He was eager to r i d the nation of i n d i v i d u a l and corporative e x p l o i t a -t i o n and to replace them by s e l f - r u n groups of farmers and workers. E x p l o i t a t i o n by the state as an employer, or the s u b s t i t u t i o n of f o r -eign c a p i t a l i s m by a native version, f e l l outside his mass-oriented program. New cooperative ventures would replace the h i s t o r i c a l i n s t i -t u t i o n s . The n a t i o n a l state would back organized groups i n the des-t r u c t i v e phase and also would help t h e i r plans for reconstruction. That v/as the message which Lazaro Cardenas c a r r i e d to most of Mexico i n 1934 before he was inaugurated as president. While campaigning i n the name of the party, he was also b u i l d i n g a powerful new personal p o l i t i c a l machine, based on mass support. He v i s i t e d every state, almost every town and v i l l a g e . On e l e c t i o n day, J u l y 1, 1934, o f f i c i a l counting gave him the expected overwhelming majority. Throughout his p o l i t i c a l cam-paign Cardenas repeated again and again the slogan, "Workers of Mexico, u n i t e . " Then, on December 1, 1934, Cardenas became president. Among his f i r s t o f f i c i a l acts, Cardenas gave up the gaudy p r e s i d e n t i a l residence i n Chapultepee Castle. He also began c l o s i n g down the gambling casinos and brothels in which prominent Callistas had invested their profits from bribery and industrial a c t i v i t i e s . Already some tension within p o l i t i c a l circles began to appear, but the tension reached, i t s peak, when in a wave . of strikes early in 1935, President Cardenas supported the workers. It became clear that a test of power between Calles and the new president.was in the making. It was also clear that Cardenas was to be no "puppet" president. Then during the f i r s t days of June 1935, Calles .delivered a national speech attacking Cardenas' ,;marathon of radicalism'. Calles also emphasized that by "going too far on those grounds s president can be forced to resign." After Calles" speech some of the members of the Congress openly supported former President Calles. But Cardenas in a very fast and astute manoeuvre, dismissed the Calles-dorninated cabinet, appointed a new cabinet, began to concen-trate his own army contingents in Mexico City, talked with prominent Church figures, turning Calles' long time, anticleric'alism against him. With the Army, much of the Church, Congress, and new labor organization behind Cardenas, he isolated Calles sending him as has already been stated into exile on June 19, 1935. Centralizing the Party Under the Cardenas Regime With the i n i t i a t i o n of Cardenas Era there began also a real centralization of power, something that Calles through a l l his years as a Jefe Maximo had never really achieved: the complete centralization of the Agrarian and Labor Sector under "the o f f i c i a l " Party. Cardenas created the Confederacidn Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confed-eration) and the Confederacion de Trabaja dores Mexicano (Mexican Workers Confederation). With the creation of CNC and CTM Cardenas not only 19 i n i t i a t e d the complete c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of forces under the party struc-ture but also under the d i r e c t control of the president. And i n March 1938, Cardenas created the P.R.M., the Mexican Revolutionary Party, which took the place of C a l l e s 1 P.N.R. With the creation of P.R.M., Mexican Revolutionary Party, Cardenas divided the power elements of Mexico i n t o four sectors: M i l i t a r y , Labor, Agrarian and Popular (un-organized l i t t l e urban groups). Each e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t i n the Republic contained a l l of them, so the basis of the new party was functional and geographical. An i n d i v i d u a l belonged to a revolutionary organization which i n turn v/as a f f i l i a t e d v/ith one of the three main organizations — the Army, the C.T.M. or the C.N.C. Delegates to party conventions, to choose the platforms and formulate the programs were selected by and represented a geographical unit of the sector. Each sector held i t s own convention before they met as a body and party. When each sector had prepared i t s platform, a run-off primary v/as held; the candidates of each sector campaigned vigorously, then a f t e r the party primary e l e c t i o n , the successful aspirant became the " o f f i c i a l " candidate; then the two other sectors agreed to support him. The "Popular" sector r o l e was vague. In t h i s way Cardenas had t r i e d to create a fun c t i o n a l demo-cracy; also a party theme v/as created: "For a Democracy of Workers". In short, i t seems that during Cardenas' Administration, the c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of the power elements of Mexico, v/as based on the idea of creating a national economic independence c o n t r o l l e d i n part by the State. Cardenas projects on land d i s t r i b u t i o n , on labor, on s o c i a l i s t i c programs of education, and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y on o i l expropriation, give, i f not a complete, a clear idea of Cardenas governmental p o l i c i e s . Professor Brandenburg writes: "He (Cardenas) exercised his 7 power on behalf of and in the name of the worker and the peasant." Another observer writes: 'Abroad, the Cardenas administration (1934-1940) may be best known for i t s expropriation of Mexico's privately owned pe-troleum, a step which was also provided for by the constitu-tion of 1917. But s t i l l more important domestically, the administration of President Cardenas expropriated and redis-tributed more land than a l l other administrations before and since, put together. Pursuant to the Constitution and the laws of Calles 7 administration, these lands were taken from the territories surrounding particular villages and were ceded to them communally as ejidos to be worked in some cases collectively but in most cases individually. An e.jido bank was established to provide the new owners with agricultural credit. Irrigation and other capital investment in agricul-ture was not however, expanded at the same time. In fact, in retrospect i t is clear that although he undoubtedly had his heart in the right place, Cardenas, as a head of a bour-geois government, did not provide Mexican peasant agriculture with nearly enough resources to get i t over the hump into self-sustained development. Although i t is true that some of the Cardenas policies in economic matters did not succeed, it. i s also true that the power of the " o f f i c i a l " party was not used to suppress popular demands; on the contrary, they v/ere backed by the party. Changing the Direction of P o l i t i c a l and Economic Affairs Under Avila Camacho and Aleman Administrations" Cardenas' successors in office, Manuel Avila Camacho and later Miguel Aleman, brought a shift in p o l i t i c a l as well as economic matters. During Manuel Avila Camacho's administration, 1940-1946, two major changes altered the P.5..M. Revolutionary Mexican Party Structure. 7. Frank Brandenburg: The Making of Modern Mexico, op. c i t . , p. 81. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. 8. A. Gunder Frank, Mexico: The Janus Faces of 20th Century Bour-geois Revolution, op. c i t . , p. 77. Whither Latin America? M.R. Press, N.Y., 1963. 21 F i r s t , the m i l i t a r y sector was dropped from the o f f i c i a l party i n order to weld the powers of the Mexican Army to the p r e s i d e n t i a l of-f i c e , without the intermediary of the o f f i c i a l party. This p o l i t i c a l device does not mean,as Professor Scott comments, that the army divorced i t s e l f from p o l i t i c s . On the contrary, having returned to i t s old p o s i t i o n behind the throne, the m i l i t a r y ' s r o l e i n Mexican p o l i t i c s has remained strong and p a r t i s a n . Although i n recent years i t s a c t i v i -t i e s have been somewhat les s obvious than formerly, the m i l i t a r y con-9 tinues to wield a very important influence i n p o l i c y making. The second major change was the replacement of Vicente Lombardo Toledano as the leader of the powerful Mexican Worker Confederation and the repiacement of the workers' administration of the n a t i o n a l i z e d r a i l -ways by a government c o n t r o l l e d bureaucracy, the National Railways Ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n , under a single d i r e c t o r appointed by the president. Con-sequently while Cardenas' administration gave wide support to the labor movement, A v i l a Camacho tempered t h e i r demands. During Miguel Aleman's administration, 1946-1952, the P.R.M. became the P.R.I., Party of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s and i n a j o c u l a r manner Professor Brandenburg comments, "How can r e v o l u t i o n remain rev-10 o l u t i o n i f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ? " A l s o i n regard to Aleman epoch, Professor Brandenburg writes: "Aleman's philosophy of labor contained overtones of Diaz and Carranza, and his philosophy of p o l i t i c s elements of callismo. 9. Robert E. Scott: Mexican Government i n T r a n s i t i o n , p. 134. Univer-s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press, 1964. 10. Frank Brandenburg: The Making of Modern Mexico, op. c i t . , p. 101. Prentice H a l l , Inc., 1964. 22 Governmental defense of s t r i k e s was nonsense: the courts would s e t t l e - l a b o r disputes peacefully and i n accord with the promotion of constructive r e l a t i o n s with management. Company unions were protected, promoted, and given immunity from mandatory membership i n a b i g c e n t r a l ; Rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a -t i o n , an Aleman f e t i s h , required low wages and the s a c r i f i c e of the labor force to c a p i t a l accumulation. Also i t i s important to r e c a l l that Aleman was the f i r s t pre-12 sident who used troops, i n order to break an o i l s t r i k e . In regard to economic p o l i c i e s of A v i l a Camacho and Aleman's administration i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note what Raymond Vernon writes about i t : "The s h i f t from A v i l a Camacho to Aleman was not dramatic, the p o l i c i e s of the two administrations bore more signs of con-t i n u i t y than of change. Aleman had no more h e s i t a t i o n i n using the economic powers of government than d i d his predeces-sor. His a r r i v a l therefore did not bring a reduction of the Mexican government's economic powers and a c t i v i t i e s . Rather, i t brought a somewhat greater willingness to use those powers i n tandem with the r i s i n g business c l a s s . In other words with A v i l a Camacho and mainly with Aleman, a new era of p o l i t i c a l and economical a c t i v i t y s t a r t s with the gradual suppression of labor movements and the growth of a strong Mexican p r i -vate c a p i t a l i s t clan, which i n turn permitted the almost u n r e s t r i c t e d i n f l u x of foreign investment i n t o the country. (Later i n t h i s study we w i l l analyze b r i e f l y some aspects of the l a s t twenty-five years of i n t e r n a l as well as the external s i t u a t i o n of Mexican economy.) B r i e f l y , when Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, took o f f i c e for the pre-s i d e n t i a l term of 1952-1953, he i n h e r i t e d from Aleman's administration, 11. I b i d . , op. c i t . , p. 102. 12. See: Robert E. Scott: Mexican Government i n T r a n s i t i o n , pp. 141-142. U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press, 1954. 13. Raymond Vernon: The Dilemma of Mexico's Development, op. c i t . , p. 99. Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1965. among other problems, those of inflation, corruption, an empty govern-ment treasury, unfinished public works, balance~of-payments problems, and an amorphous family leadership. In short Ruiz Cortines' regime is known as a paying-off cautious administration. Uncertain Era of Lopez Mateos administration and Early Student Unrest Adolfo Lc'pez Mateos'' Administration, 1958-1964, tends to evoke such adjectives as vacillating and compromising. Policy had to be made in a complicated sort of context: after twnety years of being sacrificed to capital accumulation, organized labor and agrarian groups wanted higher real wages and agrarian reforms, i n other words a better share of national increase, but the only answer they got to their demands was repression, a clear- example of which we have already pointed out in the cases of Ruben Jaramillo and Demetrio Vallego. Turning again to Aleman's regime, Professor Brandenburg writes that for the former, "the-sacrifice of a generation of workers and pea-sants was small price for making his nation maternally strong, indus-14 t r i a l i z e d , modernized, advanced."' Therefore why after twenty years of capital accumulation, the demands of those who had paid for i t , can-not be even partially f u l f i l l e d ? To obtain a complete answer to the above question, one perhaps needs a complete analysis of the Mexican economy, -and since this is not the main concern of cur study, nevertheless^in order to clarify partially our doubts >it w i l l be necessary to know what have been in the last twenty-five years the two main goals of Mexico's p o l i t i c a l economy: 1) to increase the standard of living of the population: 2) to achieve national economic independence. 14. Ibid., op. c i t . , p. 103. 24 A Mexican economist, Fernando Carmona, deals with the problen* of Mexico's p o l i t i c a l economy i n a very accurate form when he writes: "The income l e v e l s of the great majority indicate only pover-ty and even d e s t i t u t i o n . According to data from a survey by the Bank of Mexico, f i f t y - f o u r percent of peasant f a m i l i e s had, i n 1963, a monthly income of l e s s than 530 pesos, and f i f t y percent of those occupied i n industry, of le s s than 950 pesos. A s i m i l a r conclusion i s reached when one analyzes the condition of housing, health, c l o t h i n g and food, not f o r -g e t t i n g that i t has been estimated that, on the average, 65 percent of the average expenditure of the urban population and 34 percent of the outlay of the peasants i n 1958 was spent which i s very revealing, on food alone. With regard to the l e v e l of l i t e r a c y , i t i s estimated that s t i l l i n 1964-65, 28.9 percent of the population over s i x years of age had never been to school and that another 44.9 percent had only studied as far as the fourth primary grade. That i s to say, great numbers of peasants with or without land, but poverty-stricken; and the urban population i n the slums and 'misery b e l t s ' of the c i t i e s , have not achieved prosperity i n t h i s quarter of a century, and they are le s s and le s s content to remain i n t h e i r " v i e l l e malaise/' With respect to the other great h i s -t o r i c a l objective of p o l i t i c a l development, national economic independence, can one share t h i s opinion expressed by the Programme P o l i c y of the o f f i c i a l party: ' . . . i n 1910 d i r e c t f o r e i g n investment accounted for 69 percent of the gross na-t i o n a l product at that time, whereas i n 1962 the proportion was only seven percent. With regard to the t o t a l national investment i n t h i s l a s t year, i t can be said that our econo-mic independence was nine times greater, thanks to our nation-a l i s t revolution....' Apart from the c h i l d i s h ploy attempted i n t h i s statement and the obvious f a c t that, with regard to the regime of Diaz, the si z e and extent of economic dependence may perhaps have been less and were c e r t a i n l y d i f f e r e n t , who has not observed the growing depth and spread of foreign — i m p e r i a l i s t --penetration, above a l l from North America, e s p e c i a l l y since 1941? What else, i f not an increase i n our economic depen-dence, and indeed, the dependence of our economic system, can be meant by the f a c t that s t i l l about 70 percent of our t o t a l volume of foreign trade i s c a r r i e d on with the United States, very much more than the proportion previous to 1940: that we continue to be b a s i c a l l y exporters of raw-materials and pro-ducts of low economic density, and importers of f i n i s h e d and h a l f - f i n i s h e d goods: that the d e f i c i t i n the balance of trade i s growing, even without counting the large and growing contraband trade i n imports, b a s i c a l l y coming from the United States, and tlia t we continue to be threatened by the d e t e r i -oration of the exchange rate? 25 What else can be meant by the endless and growing national debt, through which the c a p i t a l balance of Mexico's debts abroad has grown from 101.4 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n 1940 to 1803.3 m i l l i o n by the 30 of June 1966? By the unlimited and con-t i n u a l increase i n d i r e c t investment by the great i n t e r n a t i o n -a l monopolies from a t o t a l of 411.2 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n 1940 to some 1800 to 1900 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n 1965? I t i s for t h i s reason that these monopolies are exercising more and more influence on the economy and the p o l i t i c s of many branches of industry, on trade at home and abroad and on other ser-v i c e s , and that they are besides linked i n a thousand ways with i n d i r e c t investment? We must not f a i l to mention other f a c t s . What can we say of the growing technological dependence? Of the pressures of i n f l a t i o n and the ever greater pressures on our balance of payments? Of the subjection to external (or foreign) econo-my of regions, sectors and whole branches.of the natio n a l economy? We must consider also that the sum of the r e a l trade d e f i c i t , the remittance of dividends, pe r q u s i t i e s and i n t e r e s t by foreign firms who have set up business i n Mexico, the payment of i n t e r e s t on the n a t i o n a l debt abroad and of f r e i g h t charges, i n 1965 went up to some 1,100 m i l l i o n d o l -l a r s , that i s to say, about a t h i r d of the gross national product and almost 55 percent of the t o t a l export i n goods and services i n account current. This great national expen-d i t u r e , to which i t would be necessary to add the figures r e s u l t i n g from the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the rate of exchange which have not been taken i n t o account i n the previous data, the 'leakage' of Mexican c a p i t a l , the payments made by Mexican firms for patents, manufacturing licences and insurance to-gether with other items i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l accounts, i s r e a l l y nothing other than the formidable and ever-greater t r i b u t e to the 'developed' countries -- with the United States at t h e i r head -- that we pay as the p r i c e of our increasing sub-ordination. Far from advancing towards economic independence, i n r e a l i t y the country has regressed i n the l a s t quarter of a century. Returning to our analysis of Lopes liateos' Administration, we observe that student p o l i t i c s became a major problem. Students sup-ported the Cuban Revolution and there were countless anti-American demonstrations, but during those days students were dealing merely with 15. Fernando Carmona: La P o l i t i c a Economica. op. c i t . , pp. 109-111. Mexico: Riqueza Y M i s e r i a . Alonso A g u i l a r M.Y Fernando Carmona. E d i t o r i a l Nuestro Tiempo. Mexico, 1968. 1.0 international issues and severe measures against them were not taken. Then when the current administration of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz came to power (1964-1970), students started to deal with national issues — (that we shall analyze later) and the circle of repression was closed with the student movement of 1968. Finally in this chapter i t is important to note what an ob-server wrote in 1963: "Cardenas' successors Avila Camacho (1940-1946), Miguel Aleman (1940-1952), Adolfo Ruiz Cortinez (1952-1958), and the current President Adolfc Lopez Mateos (1958-1964). The next one, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, nominated and therefore sure of election at the time of this writing, is not expected to change the pattern. These presidents have pushed Mexico to the Right, creating a climate for high-level corruption, and have twisted the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) into a Tammany-like machine. Summary From our account of the p o l i t i c a l history of modern Mexico, we find that the early period in the I930's contained an opportunity for a viable p o l i t i c a l democracy with a controlled and orderly con-f l i c t between interest groups on the l e f t and right. Strangely, the push to a centralized government came from Cardenas, who was sympathe-ti c to the needs of the peasants and workers, and whose administration worked on their behalf. But following the leadership of Cardenas, the Presidential successors, Camacho and Aleman, used the Central Party,and by strengthsing i t s control, suppressed labor and peasant movements. 16. John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, op. c i t . , p. 103. Collier Books, N.Y., 1968. 27 It i s at this time that we begin to see that legacy of vio-lence in policy matters is introduced as strategy of repression in modern Mexican p o l i t i c s . The push toward modernization took on the character of foreign investments and with i t foreign control. And i t i s the latter., the foreign domination of the Mexican economy, that plays an important role in the application of repression. 28 CHAPTER I I The P.R.I. P o l i t i c a l Machine To understand better how the " o f f i c i a l " p o l i t i c a l machine works and controls the whole s o c i a l and economic structure i n Mexico, f i r s t we s h a l l attempt to describe how that s o c i a l and economic struc-ture works. Mexico, l i k e many other countries, i s composed of a s o c i a l and economic pyramid with a p o l i t i c a l pyramid i n s i d e i t . An observer describes the Mexican pyramid i n the following manner: "At the bottom are the indigenous Indians, remaining where they always were. In the next layer are the landless r u r a l people and the unemployed or only occasionally employed ur-ban ones. The l a t t e r arc a v e r i t a b l e lumpen p r o l e t a r i a t dispossessed by the r u r a l and unabsorbed by the urban eco-nomy, l i v i n g on the margin of society, i s o l a t e d and alienated ' from i t , from each other, and often from themselves. Next come the e j i d a t a r i o s and such private small holders as are poor enough to work the i r land by themselves. Although eco-nomically more secure, they stand s o c i a l l y some times even below the marginal urban people, perhaps because the chances for s o c i a l m o b i l i t y are greater for the l a t t e r . Above them are the workers i n the narrower sense of the word, p a r t i c u -l a r l y the unionized ones, who i n Mexico and i n many parts of L a t i n America, A s i a , and A f r i c a today comprise a sort of 'aristocracy of the p r o l e t a r i a t . ' The next layer may be termed the middle cl a s s or petty bourgeoisie. I t comprises a large v a r i e t y of economic walks of l i f e -- small landowner, professional merchant, clergy, government and white-collar worker, small p o l i t i c i a n — but i t affords considerable l a t e r a l m o b i l i t y within i t , from one occupation to another. Their badge i n Mexico i s darkglasses as i t i s a briefcase i n Wes-tern Europe, however dark i t may be outside or however few papers there may be to carry. And that badge i s a counter-weight to the sometimes higher income of the workers below them. The bourgeois upper c l a s s , the p r i n c i p a l manipulators and the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the system, includes the large land-holders, the e f f e c t i v e d i r e c t o r s of the f i n a n c i a l commercial, i n d u s t r i a l , p r o f e s s i o n a l , governmental, and m i l i t a r y appara-tuses and by 'noblesse oblige' some i n t e l l e c t u a l s . The v i a -ble economic base of the more a r i s t o c r a t i c upper class was destroyed by the r e v o l u t i o n . But many of i t s members and 29 t h e i r wealth survived. Their money was invested i n finance, commerce, industry, and l a t e r again a g r i c u l t u r e ; and the ex-a r i s t o c r a t s became the nucleus of the new bourgeoisie. 1 A vastmajority of t h i s new Mexican bourgeoisie forms i n s i d e of P i l l ' s p o l i t i c a l pyramid a h i e r n r c h i c a l family known as the "Revolu-tionary Family" which enjoys p o l i t i c a l prestige and p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i t y . The Party of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s (PRI) i s the p o l i t i -c a l pyramid. The structure of t h i s p o l i t i c a l pyramid i s very complex, we might almost say cumbersome, consequently we should describe i t i n a b r i e f but precise manner-. Today, as Professor Brandenburg writes, the " O f f i c i a l Party" i s composed of three sectors: Agrarian, Labor, and Popular elements — which t h e o r e t i c a l l y nominate candidates to public o f f i c e s through a functional,, proportional-representation, intraparty process structured from l o c a l to national levels. Unions, federations, and associations formally a f f i l i a t e d with the o f f i c i a l party purportedly take over the sectors and appoint party o f f i c i a l d o m . A number of l o c a l "ward" com-mittees are subject to. d i s t r i c t committees, which i n turn f a l l under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of state executive committees that answer to national organs of the o f f i c i a l party. At a l l l e v e l s , p a r t y - a f f i l i a t e d i n t e r e s t groups are to assume control of the party's three sectors. T h e o r e t i c a l l y , the sectors then decide among themselves which e l e c t i v e o f f i c e s are to 1. A. Gunder Frank: Mexico: The Janus Faces of 20th Century Bourgeois Revolution, op. . c i t . , p. 35. Whither L a t i n America? M.R. Press, N.Y., 1963. 30 be apportioned to each s e c t o r , each s e c t o r s e l e c t s the candidates f o r i t s designated o f f i c e s , and a l l three s e c t o r s c o l l e c t i v e l y support the nominations i n the name of the o f f i c i a l p a r t y . N a t i o n a l organs presum-ably take d i r e c t charge of nominating a candidate f o r the o f f i c e of P r e s i d e n t of Mexico, w h i l e s t a t e - l e v e l p a r ty organs s e l e c t governors and senators, d i s t r i c t organs s e l e c t f e d e r a l and s t a t e deputees, and 2 l o c a l organs s e l e c t m u n i c i p a l p r e s i d e n t s and c o u n c i l men. i 2. See, Frank Brandenburg: The Making of Modern Mexico, p. 143. 3.1 The Org a n i z a t i o n of the PRI CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE Pre s i d e n t ( E l e c t e d by Secretary-General ( N a t i o n a l Assembly. S e c r e t a r i e s of: /Designated by A g r a r i a n A c t i v i t i e s Labor A c t i v i t i e s J n a t i o n a l sector Popular A c t i v i t i e s )organ. P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t i e s 1 Senate ('Designated A by caucus. Chamber of Deputies GRAN COMISION f10 members se l e c t e d by 30 members je a c h sector at N a t i o n a l ^Assembly.  NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (As provided i n convocation. Delegates / U s u a l l y about a thousand, I r e p r e s e n t i n g each sector I e q u a l l y . 32 REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES One Committee per s t a t e , t e r r i t o r y , and the Federal D i s t r i c t . P r e s i d e n t Secretary-General S e c r e t a r i e s of: A g r a r i a n A c t i v i t i e s Labor A c t i v i t i e s Popular A c t i v i t i e s P o l i t i c a l A c t i v i t i e s State Deputy (Elected at r e g i o n a l 1 convention. Designated by 4 s t a t e sector ^ o r g a n i z a t i o n . ^Designated I by caucus. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES One Committee f o r each municipio i n s t a t e . IAppointed by C e n t r a l Executive Committee on advice of Regional Executive Committee Repre-s e n t a t i v e of s o c i a l and economic a c t i v i t i e s of area. GENERAL MEMBERSHIP Popular Sector-(CNOP-10 Branches) Farm Sector-(CNC,etc.) Labor Sector-(CTM.etc.) DISTRICT COMMITTEES One Committee f o r each e l e c t i o n d i s -t r i c t i n Fed e r a l D i s t r i c t . [Same as f o r 5 members-)members of •Municipal 'Committees. 3. Source, Robert E. S c o t t : Mexican Government i n T r a n s i t i o n , p. 158 32 The Agrarian, Labor and Popular, which are the three basic sectors upon which f i r s t the Mexican Revolutionary Party P.R.M. and then the Party of Revolutionary I n s t i t u t i o n s — P.R.I. were b u i l t , have remained the major units for " i n t e r e s t representation" i n the revolutionary party since 1940. Consequently i t w i l l be important for our study to know what the group composition of these three basic sectors i s , but since there are very few sources of information about i t , we w i l l use Professor Scott's diagram on the Sectors' Organization. Although i t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y outdated (1958), i t might serve us as a guide to have an idea of the Party's* scope i n .his " c e n t r a l i z a t i o n task." 33 THE SECTOR ORGANIZATION OF THE PRI Farm Sector 1. Confederacion Nacional Campesina A. 2,332,914 ej i d o f a m i l i e s on 18,564 ejidos (1958 a g r i c u l t u r a l census) 2,500,000 B. Sindicatos Campesinos (organization of wage-laborers on private lands, a f f i l i a t e d with the CNC) ^ 150,000 2. Sociedad Agronomica Mexicana 10,000 Tot a l i n Farm Sector 2,660,000 Labor Sector 1. A f f i l i a t e d with BUO A. Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) ^ 1,500,000 B. Confederacion Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) 35,000 C. Confederacion General de Trabajadorcs (CGT) 25,000* D. Railroad Workers Union (STFRM) 102,000* E. Mining and Metal Workers Union (STMMSRil) 90,000 F. Petroleum Workers Union (STPRM) 85,000* G. Telephone Workers Union (STRM) 10,000 H. Motion P i c t u r e Workers Union (STPCRM) 6,000 I. Other independent unions (FNRT, FTDF, FNUT, FAO, ANDA, ATA, etc.) 20,000 1,873,000 2. Anti-BUO A f f i l i a t e s A. Confederacion Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC) 150,000 B. Confederacion Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (CRT) 25,000 C. E l e c t r i c a l Workers Unions (3 unions) 50,000* D. Other independent unions 15,000 E. Sindicato de Trabajadores A g r i c o l a s ( i n formation) 240,000 Tot a l i n Labor Sector 2,113,000 Popular Sector—CNOP 1. C i v i l Servants A. Bureaucrats Unions (FSTSE) 300,000 B. Teachers (SNTE) 55,000* 2. Cooperatives A. National Federation of Cooperatives 275,000 B. National Cooperative League 3,000 Continued . . . 34 0 3. Small Farm Proprietors A. Confederacies Nacional de l a Pequena Propiedad A g r i c o l a 850,000 B. Asociacion Nacional de Cosecheros 15,000 4. Small Merchants \ „, , , n nr,r. _ _ .. _ , . . . >These overlap 40,000 5. Small I n d u s t r i a l i s t s J 6. P r o f e s s i o n a l s — I n t e l l e c t u a l s 55,000 7. Youth Groups A. Confederacion de Jovenes Mexicanos 75,000 8. Artisans (nonsalaried service employees) 70,000 9. Women's Organizations A. Sociedad de Tdcnicas y Profesionales 25,000 B. Others (Mujeres Revolucionarias, Mujeres en Marcha, etc.) 10,000 10. D i v e r s i f i e d Persons (a c a t c h a l l f o r a l l kinds of otherwise u n a f f i l i a t e d Mexicans) 75,000 Tot a l i n Popular Sector 1,848,000 Grand To t a l i n Three PRI Sectors 6,621,000 *The mere f a c t that a union or labor confederation i s l i s t e d as a f f i l i a t e d with the BU0 or against i t does not always mean that i t c o l -l e c t i v e l y or a l l of i t s l o c a l s or i n d i v i d u a l members support the p o s i t i o n irrevocably. The r a i l r o a d workers and the petroleum workers i n the La-bot sector, and the Federal D i s t r i c t ' s primary-school teachers i n the Popular sector, nominally support the BUO, but i n a c t u a l i t y , u n t i l the government's crackdown p r e c i p i t a t e d by the r a i l r o a d s t r i k e of March-A p r i l 1959, they cooperated with the anti-BUO forces. At the same time, the e l e c t r i c a l workers, v/ho belong to the anti-BUO f a c t i o n , broke off the i r cooperation v/ith the l e f t i s t r a i l r o a d leaders a f t e r the same s t r i k e . S i m i l a r l y , although the CGT nominally i s part of the BUO, the Secretary-General of the federation instructed his followers not to support the candidates for congressional - o f f i c e put up by the CTM dur-ing the 1958 p o l i t i c a l campaign. On the other hand, although the bur-eaucrats union (FSTSE) operates out of the Popular sector, i t consi-ders i t s e l f a part of and works v/ith the BUO. 4. Source: Scott, Mexican Government, pp. 166-67. 35 I f we look at these se c t o r s more c l o s e l y , we immediately f i n d that evidence about party membership and that of s e c t o r s i s con-t r a d i c t o r y , incomplete and g e n e r a l l y u n r e l i a b l e - As we have already s a i d , P r o f e s s o r Scott has presented a documented general p i c t u r e f o r about 1958. A l s o Scott warns th a t : "Because of the r a p i d l y changing f a c t o r s of s e c t o r s membership, coupled w i t h the beginnings of o v e r l a p -ping i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t and consequent m u l t i p l e membership i n func-t i o n a l i n t e r e s t a s s o c i a t i o n s belonging to one or more sect o r s of the PRI, i t i s almost impossible to estimate a c c u r a t e l y the r e l a t i v e i n f l u -ence of the s e c t o r s on t h e i r component p a r t s i n the decision-making 5 process." In short what Scott says i s t h a t , " e f f o r t s to measure the r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e of each s e c t o r , are not l i k e l y to be very f r u i t f u l . " We f i n d that Scott's assumptions about the r e l a t i v e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e of PRI s e c t o r s , are accurate when we compare them w i t h Pro-f e s s o r Gonzalez Casanova's observations on government c o n t r o l of l a b o r f o r c e s . The l a t t e r w r i t e s : "Two-thirds of the u n i o n i z e d workers belong to the Mexican Workers' Confederation, which i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d to the of-f i c i a l p a r t y through the o f f i c i a l jobs of i t s l e a d e r s . Other unions, not l i n k e d to the c e n t r a l one, maintain e q u a l l y c l o s e r e l a t i o n s w i t h the o f f i c i a l p a r t y and the government." Gonzalez Casanova adds: "An index of the dependence of the Mexican unions upon the government and i n p a r t i c u l a r upon i t s p r e s i d e n t i a l - t y p e p o l -i c y , i s that of strikes„ I f one observes the s t r i k e s which break out on a l a r g e s c a l e i n v a r y i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l regimes, one can e s t a b l i s h the f a c t that i t i s when the P r e s i d e n t s are known f o r t h e i r p r o p u l i s t and pro-worker p o l i c i e s that the g r e a t e s t number of s t r i k e s occur, as i f the union l e a -ders and the workers f e l t themselves protected or even en-5. I b i d . , op. c i t . , p. 171. 36 couraged by the. p r e s i d e n t i a l power. P r e c i s e l y the opposite e f f e c t i s produced when the P r e s i d e n t s f o l l o w a l e s s r a d i c a l p o l i c y , or a more open a l l i a n c e w i t h the property-owning na-t i o n a l and f o r e i g n s e c t o r s . Then we can see that during Pres-i d e n t Obregon's stay i n power (1920-24), who counted among h i s f o l l o w e r s the 'Red B a t t a l l i o n s ' and the working-class l e a d e r s , the n a t i o n a l average of s t r i k e s rose to 197; during the conservative p e r i o d of C a l l e s and the s o - c a l l e d "Maximato" (1925-34), the average went down to 41; i t rose again to 470 w i t h Lazaro Cardenas' p r o - a g r a r i a n and working-class govern-ment (1934-40). Later^ the average was 387 i n A v i l a Camacho's moderate government; 108 w i t h Aleman (under the regime i n which the trend i n income d i s t r i b u t i o n was unfavorable to the working-class s e c t o r and 240 w i t h Ruiz Cortines whose p o l i c y was above a l l reformist.''6 In s h o r t , we see that the party s e c t o r as a group does not have any p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , that those who ha\Te i t , and who are a l s o i n c o n t r o l of i t , are the leaders of these o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and the s o c i a l r o l e s that these leaders have are ambiguous and not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d , because r a t h e r than represent the s e c t o r i n t e r e s t s , they are mediators between the l a t t e r and the a u t h o r i t i e s . As a r e s u l t of t h i s , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know i f these leaders support the i n t e r e s t of the power s t r u c t u r e rather than those of the s e c t o r members. Thus i n Mexico the party masses^ f a r from having p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , are manipulated, c o n t r o l l e d and m o b i l i z e d by leaders and party p o l i t i c i a n s . In regard to t h i s p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l Gonzalez Casanova w r i t e s : "In the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of Mexico there e x i s t , then, two types of c o n t r o l : the c o n t r o l by the popular o r g a n i z a t i o n s , and the c o n t r o l of the non-organized p o p u l a t i o n by the governmen-t a l and para-governmental organs and o r g a n i z a t i o n s . . . . " Gonzalez Casanova adds: " I t can be s a i d , w i t h no room f o r doubt, that the p a r t i e s are not organized, s u b s i d i z e d or c o n t r o l l e d by the c i t i z e n s . The usual t h i n g i s f o r the groups i n power — w i t h p o l i t i c a n s and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s — to organize, s u b s i d i z e and c o n t r o l the p a r t i e s . 6. P. Gonzalez Casanova: Dynamics of Class S t r u c t u r e , op. c i t . , p. 74. Comparative P e r s p e c t i v e s on S t r a t i f i c a t i o n , Mexico, Great B r i t a i n , Japan. L i t t l e Brown and Co. 1968. •37 and f o r the p a r t i e s t o be t h e i r l e g a l - p o l i t i c a l t o o l , c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l l y sanctioned f o r the c i v i c contest of the e l e c t r o n s . In such a complex context where o r g a n i z a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l come from the top, the few " o p p o s i t i o n " p a r t i e s , i n order to o b t a i n t h e i r " ' o f f i c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n " as p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , must f u l f i l l some ambiguous requirements e s t a b l i s h e d by the M i n i s t r y of the I n t e r i o r . This M i n i s t r y has the l a s t word i n granting r e g i s t r a t i o n on the grounds that those p o l i t i c a l groups must not " i n t e r f e r e " w i t h the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y " l i n e c f the o f f i c i a l p a r t y , otherwise as Robert Scott comments: "Sev-e r a l times s i n c e 1950 the government has refused to grant r e c o g n i t i o n 8 to p o l i t i c a l groups seeking r e g i s t r a t i o n . " In such a context, once these p o l i t i c a l groups o b t a i n the o f -f i c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n as p a r t i e s they s t a r t to play t h e i r " p a r t " i n the p o l i t i c a l arena. One of the l a t e s t examples of t h e i r " e f f e c t i v e " oppo-s i t i o n as a p o l i t i c a l p a r t y , has been the p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n of 1958, where — of the f i v e p a r t i e s r e g i s t e r e d , f o u r , the PRI, P.N.M., PARM, and 9 PPS — supported the P R I ? s , p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate, Adolfo Lopez Mateos. Only the PAN, which has always been known as a conservative p a r t y , rep-r e s e n t i n g the i n t e r e s t of the Church, some big-business as w e l l as some upper- and middle - c l a s s p r o f e s s i o n a l people, nominated an o p p o s i t i o n can-didate f o r the presidency, L u i s H. A l v a r e z . This candidate, being h i m s e l f of the Party which represented extreme r i g h t - w i n g forces of the Mexican s o c i e t y , throughout h i s p r e s i d e n t i a l campaign and being sure that he could not win, had made such demagogic promises that h i s v i c t o r y would have placed ~7~. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova-; La Democracia en Mexico, op. c i t . , pp. 102-104. Ediciones Era. Mexico, 1965. 8. S c o t t : Mexican Government, op. c i t . , p. 151. 9. I b i d . , p. 181. 38 an untenable burden on both the governmental and s o c i a l . s t r u c t u r e s of the country. In return for the c o n t r i b u t i o n of a l l these p a r t i e s to the "staged e l e c t i o n s " , they get t h e i r p e r q u i s i t e s : some seats i n the Congress. Furthermore, these opposition p a r t i e s l a t e l y , have been "en-couraged" by the new e l e c t i o n law of December, 1962, which provides that any p o l i t i c a l party winning 2.5 per cent of the national vote, whether f i v e of i t s candidates a c t u a l l y win or not, w i l l automatically obtain at l e a s t f i v e deputy seats. Any party w i l l acquire another seat for 10 each a d d i t i o n a l one-half of 7 per cent of the t o t a l n a t i o n a l vote. As has already been mentioned before, i n t h i s sort of highly manipulated p o l i t i c a l context, where everything i s c o n t r o l l e d from the top, how does t h i s p o l i t i c a l machine named PRI manipulate and mobilize the population during the e l e c t i o n period? As we have already pointed out i n the introductory part of t h i s study, 1958, the year that the " O f f i c i a l " party became an extremely power-f u l instrument of repression, was also the year when the e l e c t i o n demonstra-ted the further p e r f e c t i n g of the e l e c t i o n control machinery of the PRI. A p o l i t i c a l observer writes: "Beginning i n September, 1957, the party's communications channels were employed for the 'auscultacidn', the canvassing of preferences i n the state and l o c a l party machines and i n the i n t e r e s t group sectors of the party. Gossip about " e l t a -pado" (the v e i l e d one), who ultimately would be the candidate of the PRI, had been going on for well over a year, although i t would be hard to contend t r u t h f u l l y that electioneering (futurismo) i s ever suspended. Ultimately, on November 4th, the PRI's headquarters announced that the majority had shown i t s e l f for Labor Secretary Lopez. Those organizations which contribute to the strength of the PR.I then swung heavily to the indicated 'prc-candidate 1, and the nominating convention of the party, held i n a motion picture theater on November 15 and 16, became a n t i c l i m a t i c and quite perfunctory. 'Tapadismo' served i t s purpose, however; those leaders i n d i s c r e e t enough 10. See: Brandenburg: Making of Modern Mexico, p. 155. 39 to commit themselves to others than Lopez were brought out into the open. Their p o l i t i c a l futures may well hang on t h i s . " 1 1 I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe how a Mexican weekly magazine, "Revista de Revistas", i n August, 1957, referred i r o n i c a l l y to the men who could make the choice among the various "pre-candidates". The magazine's cover bore photographs of outgoing President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, the l a t e former President Manuel A v i l a Camacho, former Pres-ident Miguel Aleman, and Cardenas. I t s comment was, "One plus one plus one plus one equal one, f o r these are the four great e l e c t o r s . What 12 of the other 30,000,000 faces? What point i n i d e n t i f y i n g them?" To sum up, i f the vast majority of the population cannot r e l y on t h e i r organizations as e f f e c t i v e channels through which they can ex-press themselves p o l i t i c a l l y , they cannot have e f f e c t i v e e l e c t o r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . However, the " p o l i t i c a l apparatus" has created several devices i n order to make them believe that t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s e f f e c -t i v e . A clear example of these was the enormous display of propaganda made before the e l e c t i o n s with the slogan: "Every Mexican of age has the moral o b l i g a t i o n to r e g i s t e r f or vote." With t h i s and some other p o l i t i c a l devices the "Party" keeps the "Myth of s o l i d a r i t y " , and i s able to mobilize the population i n those huge demonstrations of "popu-l a r support" of the " o f f i c i a l " candidate. In regard to these party p o l i t i c a l devices Frantz Fanon writes: TH P h i l i p B. Taylor J r . : The Mexican E l e c t i o n s of 1958i A f f i r m a t i o n of Authoritarianism? op. c i t . , p. 724. The Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, V o l . XIII, Ho. 3, September, 1960. 12. Revista de Revistas (Mexico C i t y ) , August 18, 1957, cover, pp. 1 and 3. "The mass 'party 1, becomes either simply a n o s t a l g i c purveyor of mythical s o l i d a r i t y and purely symbolic glory, in c r e a s i n g l y focused on the heroic past ( i n the case of Mexico, the Revolu-t i o n of 1910), i t s only r e l a t i o n s h i p to the people that of turning them out on mass 'spontaneous' st r e e t demonstrations and r a l l i e s and of ensuring that they toe the party l i n e , w h i l s t the 'state' becomes an instrument of repressiong and for the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of o f f i c e s , p r i v i l e g e s , and p e l f f or the e l i t e . The c r i t i c a l , democratic, p a r t i c i p a t o r y l i f e of the party branch ceases: the t r a f f i c i s novi one-way-from the top downward."^ Another device that the Party has created i n order to sustain i t s p o l i t i c a l pyramids, i s that of s o c i a l m o b i l i t y , but only for i n d i -v i d u a l s on an i n d i v i d u a l basis, and for those to whom i t i s permitted; t h i s i n d i v i d u a l s o c i a l m o b i l i t y has to be within the system. As a r e s u l t of t h i s , the s o c i a l structure and i t s mythology have given to the lower middle c l a s s and even to some people i n the lower c l a s s , the f e e l i n g that i t i s p o s s i b l e for them to better themselves but within the system and according to i t s r u l e s . The f a c t remains that, although i n d i v i d u a l m o b i l i t y by i n d i -v i d u a l s i s permitted, mobility as a group i s not, because such m o b i l i t y i n Mexico would r a d i c a l l y a l t e r the shape of the p o l i t i c a l pyramid. Consequently, i f any group pressure begins to b u i l d up any-where i n the politico-economic system, sharp measures are taken i n or-der to counteract those trends. The f i r s t measure w i l l be to co-opt the group leadership, The second one may be to grant small concessions i n order to lessen the pressure of the movement. I f these measures arc not successful, the government f i n a l l y r e s o r t s to open repression. The i n t e n s i t y of t h i s 13. Frantz Fanon: Revolutionary Theories by Peter Worsley, op. c i t . , p. 38. Monthly Review, V o l . 21, No. 1, May, 1969. 41 repression w i l l depend on the scope of the movement demands. About the reasons for these repressive measures against mass movements Pro-fessor Rodolfo Stavenhagen writes: "When massive movements for the r e s t i t u t i o n of the i r r i g h t s by the trades unions or syndicates a r i s e ( l i k e the railway-men's s t r i k e i n 1959, the recent movements of school teachers, doctors, students, etc.) which through t h e i r own dynamism exceed the narrow l i m i t s of an organization controlled l i k e those we are considering, then the f i r s t concern of the cor-responding a u t h o r i t i e s i s to break the movement as such, i n the name of the ' p r i n c i p l e of authority', even i f l a t e r they concede i n a large measure the demands formulated by the movement. In these cases, appearances are the most im-. portant thing: the f a c t that i t should not be apparent that a spontaneous mass movement can succeed outside of the system. The bargaining should bo neither open nor p u b l i c . " ^ Summary In the pages of th i s chapter we have t r i e d to describe the p o l i t i c a l structure of the PRI, as well as the representative nature of the government. Our documentation has led us to conclude that the sectors and leadership of the party i s one i n which control of the government flows from the top down i n a u n i d i r e c t i o n a l manner, with l i t t l e or no influence from the workers, peasants or small businessmen. Representation i n the party does not bring with i t the a b i l i t y to par-t i c i p a t e i n the decision making, nor does the populist ideology of the party mean that the masses are able to influence the leadership of the government. This being the case, the problem f o r the government becomes one of persuasion and con t r o l , The nature of that control i s varied 14. Rodolfo Stavenhagen: Un Mode l o para e l estudio de l a s Organiza.-*,, ciones P o l i t i c a s en Mexico, op. c i t . , p. 333. Revista Mexicana de Sociologia. V o l . XXIX, No. 2, A b r i l - J u n i o , 1967. 42 depending on the immediate problems. For example i t may simply be that the government prohibits strikes. At other times the demands for control may be much more extreme. We have already pointed out in Chapter I how the element of violence is embedded in the origins of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and how i t was carried into the origins of the modern Mexican govern-ment. Thus the structural character of the government presented in this chapter, and the historical legacy noted earlier, are two condi-tions that set the stage for the use of violence. But i t is specific conditions in the history of the country that ha^jebrought about the application of repression. We have briefly mentioned a few examples of p o l i t i c a l repression in the Introduction and in these two chapters. In the remaining part of our report we shall describe in detail the case of the student movement of 1968, noting how the structure of the government and the tradition of violence was brought to bear in i t s suppression. 43 CHAPTER I I I The Students' P r i n c i p l e : We Must Have Public Dialogue As we have emphasized i n the introductory part of t h i s thesis our study w i l l focus not on the analysis of the d i f f e r e n t groups or forces that had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the Mexican C o n f l i c t of 1968, but as we have al s o already s a i d ; on repression as a case study. Therefore, we w i l l attempt to concentrate our analysis i n t h i s chapter and the following one on the grounds of p r i n c i p l e s and the methods employed, f i r s t of a l l by the students to expose them through a Public Dialogue, and secondly by the government to repress them i n order to preserve the so-called " p r i n c i p l e of authority". A l s o , i t i s important to emphasize that 1968 was not the f i r s t time that the Mexican Army was used against the students. For instance between 1966-1968 and this i s the most recent example, there has been army intervention i n student c o n f l i c t s i n the state c i t i e s of Morelia, 1 Hermosillo and Villahermosa, but as a Mexican observer writes: "Be-fore 1968, national problems were not among the main motivations of the 2 students* protest." As has also been mentioned i n the introductory part of the present study, t h i s chapter w i l l be devoted to the f i r s t stage of the 1968 Mexican student Movement — J u l y 22 to August 29, and the next and f i n a l chapter the second one, September 1 to October. 1. See: Fernando Carmona, Genealogia de l a Represifin, pp. 191-193. Tres Culturas en Agonia. E d i t o r i a l Nuestro Tiempo. Mexico, 1969. 2. Daniel Cazes, D e s p o l i t i z a c i o n y P o l i t i e a c i o n . op. c i t . , p. 94. ,z Tres Culturas en Agonia. E d i t o r i a l Nuestro Tiempo. Mexico, 1969. 44 Thus, i n order to have an idea of the development of the two stages above mentioned, a b r i e f but precise chronology of the J u l y -October events, w i l l serve us as an introductory guide: Chronology J u l y 22 - October 12 J u l y 22 (Monday) S t r e e t f i g h t between Vocational Schools Nos. 2 and 5 (Vocas Nos. 2 and 5) and t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s , Preparatory School Isaac Ochoterena. J u l y 23 (Tuesday) Renewed street f i g h t i n g between Voca No. 5 and Prepa Ochoterena students. "Granaderos" (Anti-Riot squad p o l i c e ) , invade Voca No. 5 s t r i k i n g students and teachers i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y . One student presumed dead. J u l y 23 (Friday) FNET (Federacion Nacional de Estudiantes Tecnicos), the of-f i c i a l student organization for IPN ( I n s t i t u t e P o l i t e c n i c o Nacional) organizes demonstration protesting against granaderos invasion of Voca No. 5 on the 23rd. L e f t organizations, organize separate r a l l y to celebrate an-niversary of Castro's 1953 attack on Moncada Barracks. M i l i t a n t s from both r a l l i e s are ambushed and beaten by riot p o l i c e on route to National Palace at the Zocalo. Students disperse and regroup, they barricade themselves ins i d e UNAM prepa schools. Stu-dents subsequently repel p o l i c e by commandering and s e t t i n g f i r e to buses. Three day siege of student-controlled prepas commences. By the end of the 3rd day some students dead, several injured and'arrested. I } fOOTTeeKNlfc tNVUTUTE XOftWAl SCHOOL ' T U T t L O U O /'I r PLAZA Of 1W£ I ct>, e e r o R f i v A <8 OVYMfie YTAMUf* CITY The Plaza of Three Cultures: The name comes from the Aztec (pyramid ruins). Colonial (Church of Apostol Santiago) and modern (Tlatelolco housing project) cultures bordering the plaza. Also ncarhy arc the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Vocational School Nu. 7. The plaza was the scene of several major student-ted demonstrations and clashes with police and army units, ft "was also the site of the October 2nd Massacre. The Z6calo (also called the Plaza of the Constitution): The capital's central plaza, site of the National Cathedral, the Presidential Palace and other government buildings, the Zocalo has been the traditional focal point for pro-government rallies. Since July it has been the site of several of the largest studenl-led demonstrations against the government. Source: Mexico 1968, A Study of Domination and Repression. Published by the North American Congress on L a t i n America. N.Y. November, 1968. 46 In separate acti o n , p o l i c e invade and sack Communist Party o f f i c e i n Mexico C i t y ; a r r e s t 76, charging that they i n s t i g a t e d r i o t s . J u l y 27 (Saturday) - J u l y 28 (Sunday) The Communist Party denies charges of i n s t i g a t i n g of the r i o t s , and denounce the i l l e g a l invasion by the p o l i c e of the party headquar-t e r s . IPN and UNAM students unite forces for the f i r s t time and pre-sent i n i t i a l demands. They demand amnesty, indemnity, di s m i s s a l of the chief and a s s i s t a n t chief of p o l i c e , and a b o l i t i o n of r i o t squad p o l i c e . J u l y 29 (Monday) - J u l y 30 (Tuesday) P o l i c e claim that students are getting arms out of gun shops behind the barricades. Late Monday and early Tuesday the army moves i n . L i g h t tanks and armored cars surround the prepas and v.ocas. Without resistance i n f a n t r y , paratroopers, riflemen, and m i l i t a r y p o l i c e secure the streets and seize the schools. To open Preparatory 1, where the l a s t students are hiding, paratroopers use a bazooka to b l a s t down the 200-year-old door and the guards behind i t . The p o l i c e haul away the prisoners. Other troops occupy four more schools and take up positions around the U n i v e r s i t y and the Polytechnic I n s t i t u t e . E i g h t b a t a l l i o n s are i n a c t i o n . Later on Tuesday, the Mexico C i t y Mayor agrees to release arrested students, cancel t h e i r p o l i c e records, and evacuate federal^ forces from the schools. This, he implies, w i l l close the case. But i n f a c t i t has j u s t opened. Ar r e s t s are continued. Students i n s i s t that over 30 of t h e i r comrades are missing without trace, and demand that o f f i c i a l s reveal t h e i r fate. Students-and-teacher s t r i k e s engulf schools i n Mexico C i t y and spread to important c i t i e s i n various states. 47 August 1 (Thursday) UNAM Rector Barros S i e r r a declares that the school's c o n s t i -t u t i o n a l autonomy, i t s academic independence and freedom established almost 40 years ago, i s i n grave danger. In the afternoon UNAM Rector Barros S i e r r a leads 50,000 stu-dents and professors, the f i r s t great protest. The demonstration pro-ceeds solemnly out of the U n i v e r s i t y , s i l e n t l y up the main southern boulevard of Mexico C i t y , and peacefully back onto campus. August 5 (Monday) IPN students organize demonstration (with p a r t i c i p a t i o n of UNAM, Chapirgo and Normales students) numbering approximately 125,000. Government-backed FNET t r i e s but f a i l s to take over student movement. August 8 (Thursday) Students form National St r i k e Council, Consejo Nacional de Huelga (C.N.H.), and professors a Teachers' C o a l i t i o n for Democratic L i b e r t i e s . In a composed manner they i n s i s t e d on the four o r i g i n a l demands: amnesty, indemnity, dismissal of the po l i c e c h i e f s , and the a b o l i t i o n of the r i o t squads. And they presented as well two other p o l i t i c a l demands: freedom for p o l i t i c a l prisoners serving time for i n f r a c t i o n s of Penal Code A r t i c l e s 145 and 145A (Mexico's A l i e n and Se-d i t i o n Laws), and the repeal of those a r t i c l e s . August 13 (Tuesday) The Teachers' C o a l i t i o n for Democratic L i b e r t i e s lead the t h i r d great protest — 150,000 students chanting c a u s t i c slogans against the " h i r e l i n g " press, the po l i c e and ( u n t i l then a taboo i n Mexico) the President himself, but marching i n good order up the southern boulevard, 48 along the downtown avenues and into the ZoCalo (the Central Square). There they r a t i f i e d the six demands and denounced o f f i c i a l attempts at a " f a l s e " settlement. August 17 (Saturday) CNH Press Conference at the Voca No. 5 Auditorium. CNH take the d e c i s i o n to continue with the s t r i k e , u n t i l a u t h o r i t i e s f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the six demands. Als o CNH declares that i n order to negotiate with the auth-o r i t i e s , one condition has to be f u l f i l l e d ; that a l l negotiations need to be p u b l i c . No p r i v a t e dialogue. No mediators commission. August 22 (Thursday) The M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r declares that the Federal Gov-ernment i s to have a "frank and calm dialogue" i n order to reach a " d e f i n i t i v e " s o l u t i o n of " t h i s lamentable problem". But the CNH and the Teachers' C o a l i t i o n i n s i s t that a l l negotiations be p u b l i c , so that no i n t i m i d a t i o n or co-option can occur. And o f f i c i a l s make no d i r e c t answer. Meanwhile, students p o l i t i c a l - b r i g a d e s s t a r t spontaneous meetings i n the st r e e t s throughout Mexico Ci t y and i n some states, ex-pounding the s i x demands, arguing that the cause i s not simply academic, but popular and democratic, announcing plans, and c o l l e c t i n g money. Other brigades d i s t r i b u t e l e a f l e t s around f a c t o r i e s . August 27 (Tuesday) CNH led the fourth great demonstration -- 300,000 students and teachers, and now parents, workers, st r e e t peddlers and c l e r k s , marching loudly but again i n good order to the z6calo (Central Square). Once i n the Central Square,, CNH leaders and professors address the crowd. By the end of the r a l l y a CNH leader Socrates Campos JLemus 49 (we s h a l l return l a t e r i n t h i s chapter to analyze t h i s incident) pro-pose that the public dialogue with the government a u t h o r i t i e s , w i l l take place i n the Zocalo, September 1 at 10:00 a.m. (September 1, at 10:00 a.m. i s p r e c i s e l y the day and the time when the President d e l i v e r s h i s annual report to the nation). Also i n the same r a l l y at the Zocalo some "students" paint i n s u l t s to the government a u t h o r i t i e s on the walls of the National Palace and "others" f l y a red-and-black s t r i k e f l a g on the National flagpole i n the very center of the square. Late Monday night a group of students s t a t i o n themselves i n front of the National Palace i n ssi around-the-clock p i c k e t . August 28 (Wednesday) At one i n the morning, armored cars and f i r e trucks d r i v e the student pickets out of the square. A paratroop b a t a l l i o n , two i n -fantry b a t t a l l i o n s , and some 500 p o l i c e chase them back through the downtown avenues. The troops and p o l i c e then occupy the square. At midday, o f f i c i a l s assemble a crowd of bureaucrats i n the square, to burn the s t r i k e f l a g and to i !pay homage to the National flag".' Groups of students a r r i v e at the square, but the troops and p o l i c e d r i v e them out. August 29 (Thursday) In a Press Conference, the CNH declares i n regard to the acts which have taken place on August 27 at the square; that f i r s t of a l l CNH has not planned ot authorized the pai n t i n g of the walls of the Na-t i o n a l Palace: secondly that the red-and-black s t r i k e f l a g was run up .against CNH w i l l : t h i r d l y that CNH and Teachers' C o a l i t i o n wish to ex-50 press again t h e i r w illingness to i n i t i a t e the dialogue with the author-i t i e s . August 30 (Friday) Protected by 22 truckloads of troops, President Diaz Ordaz addresses CTM (Mexican Workers Confederation). CTM leader Arturo Gutierrez assures Diaz of workers "support". CNH d e l i v e r s the following agreements: a) On September 1, day of the P r e s i d e n t i a l annual report to the nation, there w i l l be no demonstrations i n the cen t r a l square. b) CNH i s very disposed to i n i t i a t e the dialogue with the auth-o r i t i e s , under the conditions that the dialogue be public and that there be no p o l i c e nor army repression. c) That the students commissions that w i l l negotiate with the a u t h o r i t i e s have been already established. d) There w i l l be an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of student p o l i t i c a l ac-t i o n among popular sectors, but any confrontation with the repressive forces w i l l be avoided. a) The Student movement has no desire to obstruct the Olympic games. August 31 (Saturday) Right-wing t e r r o r i s t attacks on Vocational Schools No. 7 and 4. Several students wounded. Once again, CNH r e i t e r a t e s i t s desire to i n i t i a t e a dialogue with the a u t h o r i t i e s . CNH has also declared: we accept an immediate , technical discussion to e s t a b l i s h hew the dialogue w i l l be accomplished i n order to put an end to the c o n f l i c t ; the dialogue w i l l be set up i n a way that w i l l guarantee the i n t e g r i t y of the leaders as well as that of the movement. CNH also asked for an end to the v i r t u a l c i t y 8tat dc siege. 51 September 1 (Sunday) President Diaz Ordaz defends the government's p o s i t i o n i n his fourth annual report to the nation. In regard to the student c o n f l i c t he says: " D i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . . . i n s i d e and outside the country..of d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l tendencies and ideologies, had planned to take ad-vantage of a t r i v i a l i n cident to create major trouble. The aim was to d i s r u p t the Olympics and to d i s c r e d i t the country". The President said that he could not and would not allow i t . President Diaz Ordaz, jus -t i f i e d the use of the army i n the streets as a suitable measure to maintain " i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y " . He promised due protection of the Uni-v e r s i t y ' s autonomy, which he denied had been v i o l a t e d . In regard to the Students s i x demands he discussed the two " b a s i c a l l y p o l i t i c a l " de-mands: L i b e r t y to p o l i t i c a l p risoners; A b o l i t i o n of A r t i c l e s 145 and 145A. President Diaz Ordaz denied that there were p o l i t i c a l prisoners. With respect to A r t i c l e s 145 and 145A he said that he had no authority to change them, but he asked Congress"to hold public hearings to decide whether i t should repeal or reform the laws';" He ignored the other four demands (we s h a l l return to the discussion .of the President's fourth annual report i n the next chapter). September 2 (Monday) In a Press Conference CNH states that the President's Annual Report has not propped the p o l i t i c a l solutions that the student movement has been seeking. CNH adds: We have been i n s i s t i n g that our movement does not intend to act i n any form against the Olympic Games. I f our movement 52 i n t e r f e r e s with the Olympic Games, i t w i l l be the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Federal Government, whose o b l i g a t i o n i t i s to f i n d proper solutions to the deep s o c i a l problems that are a f f e c t i n g our country. September 4 (Wednesday) < CNH states that i t w i l l propose to Federal Government to i n i -t i a t e negotiations on Monday, September 9. CNH conditions for the i n i -t i a t i o n of negotiations: -- to h a l t repression; — to have a p u b l i c dialogue. CNH suggest the National Medical Center as a place to i n i t i a t e the pub-l i c dialogue. September 6 (Friday) The M i n i s t r y of the I n t e r i o r , the C i t y Mayor, the Attorney-General of the Republic and C i t y Attorney, a f t e r passing from one to the other the CNH p e t i t i o n , and using extremely ambiguous l e g a l termin-ology, f i n a l l y answer that "In accordance with A r t i c l e 8 of the Con-s t i t u t i o n a l l p e t i t i o n s need to be presented i n a written form." September 9 (Monday) CNH states that a demonstration w i l l take place on September 13, and that ceremonies to celebrate the Mexican Independence of 1810 w i l l be held on September 15 at UNAM and IPN on campus. September 10 (Tuesday) The Congress gives " f u l l support" to the President to use the Army, the Navy and the A i r Force, i n order "to maintain the i n t e r n a l and external security of Mexico." 53 September 13 (Friday) CNH stages the f i f t h massive, orderly and s i l e n t demonstra-t i o n of approximately 100,000 people i n the square. September 15 (Sunday) Celebrations i n commemoration of the 1310 Mexican Indepen-dence take place i n UNAM and IPN. September 17 (Tuesday) In a Press Conference, CNH leaders make public t h e i r Septem-ber 15, declarations: a) with the celebration of 1810 Mexican Indepen-dence, the student movement takes on a national character; b) The CNH w i l l accept the dialogue i n a written form with the condition that a l l the documents must be widely published. September 18 (Wednesday) UNAM autonomy v i o l a t e d for the f i r s t time i n f o r t y years, 10,000 army troops invade and seal o f f campus, taking several hundred prisoners including s t a f f and parents of the students, a l l of them ta-ken away from u n i v e r s i t y campus i n 15 army trucks. In a public statement the M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r emphasizes that the UNAM occupation by the Army was a necessary measure i n order to stop "openly a n t i - s o c i a l and possibly criminal a c t s . " He added: the government has "the o b l i g a t i o n to maintain order i n the t e r r i t o r y of the nation, of which the U n i v e r s i t y also forms a part." September 19 (Thursday) Protests i n regard to the Army occupation on U n i v e r s i t y Campus. UNAM Rector Barros S i e r r a i n a public statement, says: The UNAM m i l i t a r y occupation has been an act of excessive force, that our un i v e r s i t y does not deserve.... 54 We must remember that the student c o n f l i c t was not executed by the u n i v e r s i t y . . . . The examination and solutions of the youth problems, require comprehension rather than violence. Surely, some other measures could be taken....Mexican i n s t i t u t i o n s , our laws and t r a d i t i o n s provide more suit a b l e instruments than the use of public force.... We w i l l hopa that the deplorable acts we are confronting w i l l not a f f e c t i n an irreparable way, democracy i n t h i s country. But, to the government^ithe Rector's objections were f u t i l e . September 20 (Friday) The PRI three sectors express th e i r " s o l i d a r i t y " with and con-fidence i n the President. At night, t e r r o r i s t s machine-gun the Colegio de Mexico, a small private u n i v e r s i t y near the centre of the c i t y . The Colegio de Mexico asked the p o l i c e for protection, but the p o l i c e refused. From o f f i c i a l sources, there are i n Mexico C i t y j a i l , 334 per-sons arrested. September 21 (Saturday) Students hold meetings i n Plaza de las Tres Culturas i n T l a t e l o l c o ; granaderos attack with bayonets. T l a t e l o l c o residents give students refuge and medical a i d . In a debate on the Student Movement at the Congress' Chamber of Deputies, Octavio A. Hernandez, makes some charges against U n i v e r s i t y a u t h o r i t i e s , claiming that the l a t t e r are responsible for the student c o n f l i c t . In a press conference, deputy Lu i s t i . F a r i a s attacks i n a very i n s u l t i n g way the UNAM Rector Barros S i e r r a . September 22 (Sunday) According to mass media information^ severaL^ persons arrested during the UNAM army occupation, have been already released. But, many others have been arrested^ among them, the well-known u n i v e r s i t y profes-sor E l i de Gortaristhe painter Rina Lazo^and the former d i r e c t o r of the weekly magazine P o l i t i c a , Manuel Marcue. In the e d i t o r i a l pages of some Mexican d a i l y newspapers, se-vere c r i t i c i s m s are made against the verbal attacks of Deputies Hernandez and F a r i a s against the UNAM Rector. An increase of Army-Student confrontations, takes place. September 23 (Monday) Rector Barros S i e r r a presents his resignation to UNAM Board of Governors. September 24 (Tuesday) The Array invades IPN campus. Several hours of v i o l e n t clashes; students f i g h t the p o l i c e and the Army. Students capture busses and blocakde adjacent s t r e e t s . September 26 (Thursday) UNAM Board of Governors do not accept Barros S i e r r a ' s r e s i g -nation and ask him to remain as Un i v e r s i t y Rector. September 27 (Friday) Barros S i e r r a agress to remain at h i s post as UNAM Rector. A r r e s t s increase. September 28 (Saturday) CNH leaders promise to UNAM Rector, that they w i l l not promote viol e n c e . 36 The Minister of I n t e r i o r emphasizes that the Army troops oc-cupying the U n i v e r s i t y campus, w i l l be withdrawn as soon as UNAM auth-o r i t i e s require them to do so. September 29 (Sunday) In a Press Conference, CNH declares that: a) they w i l l look f o r p a c i f i c s olutions; b) there can be no compromises with UNAM author-i t i e s . September 30 (Monday) The Army leaves U n i v e r s i t y campus. October 1 (Tuesday) Thousands of UNAM s t a f f return to u n i v e r s i t y campus. Student* committees i n i t i a t e meetings i n order to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of resuming cl a s s e s . In two r a l l i e s held at UNAM campus, one at midday and the other at 5:30 p.m. the CNH refuses to resume c l a s s e s . CNH convokes a mass r a l l y at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas i n T l a t e l o l Q o on Wednesday, October 2, at 5:00 p.m. October 2 (Wednesday) CNH r a l l y i s i n i t i a t e d at 5:00 p.m. at the Plaza de l a s Tres  Culturas, approximately 15,000 persons were gathered at the Plaza. Around 5:30 p.m. C M spokesmen address the crowd composed of students, workers, Tlateloleo residents, men, women, and ch i l d r e n , camera-men and foreign reporters. Suddenly a f t e r four flares^ presumably used as a signal at 6:10 p.m., so l d i e r s coordinated by plainclothesmen open f i r e without provocation and charge peaceful student r a l l y at the Plaze. Students 57 and bystanders f l e e to T l a t e l o l e o buildings but they are pursued, shot at, beaten and arrested. From 6:10 to 8:30 p.m. the f i r i n g i s continuous. Presumably 5,000 s o l d i e r s had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n what in the an-nals of Mexican History would be known as T l a t e l o l c o Massacre. October 12 ' Olympics open, scheduled to close on October 27. Henceforth, a f t e r describing the composition of the National S t r i k e Committee and the s i x p o l i t i c a l demands presented by them, our study w i l l be concerned with the analysis of the several attempts made by the National S t r i k e Committee during the d i f f e r e n t stages of devel-opment of the student c o n f l i c t , to negotiate with the Mexican Govern-ment. The Committee i n s i s t e d on one basic condition: that a l l negotia-tions be public or what we have c a l l e d the students' p r i n c i p l e : We must have Pub l i c Dialogue. Composition of the National S t r i k e Committee The following scheme explains the CHH composition from the top to the bottom. At the top CHH i s composed of 150 members, who i n t h e i r turn are supported by the C.C. (Central Committee) composed of 600 members. The Central Committee includes several i n s t i t u t i o n s of higher education i n Mexico: the National U n i v e r s i t y , the National Polytechnic I n s t i t u t e , the National School of A g r i c u l t u r e , the National Normal Schools, the National Conservatory of Music, the National I n s t i t u t e of Fine A r t s , the National School of Anthropology and History, a f f i l i a t e d secondary schools and some private u n i v e r s i t i e s , each of these i n s t i t u t i o n s having 53 a delegate i n the CNH, who at the same time leads the movement i n h i s own school. At the bottom comes the "Comites de Lucha" (Struggle Commit-tees) of each i n s t i t u t i o n that compose the Coaite Central (Central Com-mittee) . We have to emphasize that the capacity for organization that the National S t r i k e Committee had demonstrated during the development of the student movement, was highly sophisticated, i f we take into con-s i d e r a t i o n the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l apathy of the vast majority of the student population. As a concrete example of the National S t r i k e Committee organ-i z a t i o n a l capacity, we have the e f f e c t i v e m o b i l i z a t i o n of people during the great mass demonstrations, and t h e i r c l a r i t y i n expressing i n a very a r t i c u l a t e form t h e i r s i x p o l i t i c a l demands. The Six Demands 1. Repeal of A r t i c l e s 145 and 145A of the Penal Code. These a r t i c l e s were passed during World War I I to provide a means of dealing v/ith the r i s e of f i f t h column i n Mexico, and they de-f i n e the crime of " s o c i a l d i s s o l u t i o n " . A r t i c l e s 145 and 145A (Mexico's A l i e n and Sedition Laws) , provide sentences of tv/o to twelve years for any Mexican or foreigner who disseminates ideas or programs of any f o r -eign government that d i s t u r b public order or a f f e c t Mexico's sovereignty. These a r t i c l e s a lso provide sentences of ten to twenty years for any Mexican or foreigner v/ho c a r r i e s out acts "which prepare m a t e r i a l l y or morally for the invasion of n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r y or the submission of the country to any foreign government." 59 2. Freedom for p o l i t i c a l prisecers.• This demand i s concerned not only with the persons arrested during the July-October 1968 events, but also with those arrested be-fore those events, who are also considered as p o l i t i c a l prisoners. An 3 example of the l a t t e r would be the case of Demetrio V a l l e j o . 3. Dismissal of the p o l i c e c h i e f s , Generals L u i s Cueto Ram-i r e z and Raul Mendiolea. The aim of t h i s demand was to oblige the Government to accept i t s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the development of the student movement. 4. To e s t a b l i s h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the a u t h o r i t i e s for the acts of repression due to the actions of the granaderos ( r i o t squad) and the Army. 5. The a b o l i t i o n of the granaderos and dismissal of th e i r c hief General F r i a s . The Mexican Co n s t i t u t i o n allows only the existence of the Po-l i c e under the J u s t i c e Department's j u r i s d i c t i o n ; consequently the ex i s -tence of the granaderos corps i s unc o n s t i t u t i o n a l . This r i o t squad was created i n 1944 and since then they have hden notorious f o r th e i r repressive t a c t i c s . 6. Indemnity for wounded students and fa m i l i e s of students who were k i l l e d . There were several students k i l l e d and hundreds wounded. I t i s important to emphasize as Professor Womack does, that "when the students did adopt p o l i t i c a l demands, they acted not to over-4 throw the government but only to i n s i s t on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees." 3. See Introduction, pp. 5-7. 4. John Womach, J r . : Unfreedom i n Mexico, Government Crackdown on the U n i v e r s i t i e s , op. c i t . , p. 30. The New Republic, October 12, 1968. 60 The government regression started with an invasion by the 5 p o l i c e r i o t squad against Vocational School No. 5 on J u l y 23, 1968. Later, as student c o n f l i c t developed the repression increased with 7 the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Army. The students, once they succeeded i n organizing themselves, f i r s t with the creation as we have already mentioned, of t h e i r repre-sentative body, the National S t r i k e Committee, and with the presen-t a t i o n of t h e i r s i x demands, for the f i r s t time i n the h i s t o r y of mass-movements, adopted the very a n t i t h e s i s of the t r a d i t i o n a l mass-movement p o l i c y — that of having one leader -- which the government had t r a d i t i o n a l l y dealt with by co-opting, buying o f f or imprisoning the said leader, thus e f f e c t i v e l y breaking the movement. To t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l government p o l i c y of dialogue "behind the scenes", which 7 Professor Stavenhagen has described, the students opposed t h e i r own p r i n c i p l e — that of public dialogue. Thus, a basic question a r i s e s i n our study; had the National S t r i k e Committee a concrete aim, when over and over again they empha-sized the need to hold a public dialogue with the government? The answer to our question i s given by one of the National S t r i k e Committee leaders, when interviewed by a weekly Mexican magazine, he sa i d : "We uphold the p r i n c i p l e that any exchange of opinions must be p u b l i c . A l l sectors concerned ,in the dialogue should be 5. See Chronology. 6. See Chronology. 7. See p. 41. 61 informed about the d i s c u s s i o n s . This i s a matter of p r i n -c i p l e and i t i s the reason f o r the Movement. We want to f i n i s h w i t h the corrupt p r a c t i c e of "dialogues behind c l o s e d doors", or of s m a l l committees, where the p r a c t i c e of blow-i n g hot and c o l d keeps the o r d i n a r y people from any p a r t i -c i p a t i o n at a l l . From the beginning of the Mexican Revolu-t i o n , and even during i t , the leaders of any movement have been imprisoned or k i l l e d or bought o f f . We r e a l i z e that our demands w i l l not mean a b a s i c change i n . s o c i e t y . But the Movement that makes them has an honest and popular aim: to give hack to the people confidence i n t h e i r own s t r e n g t h . We do not want so much to convince people that things are i n a bad way, as that t h e i r c o r r e c t i o n depends on the p a r t i c i -p a t i o n of the people. We want to convince them that there are leaders who cannot be bought. We are not going to l e t the government s h i f t the s t r u g g l e to t h e i r own t e r r a i n by p r o p i t i a t i n g the movement w i t h p e t t y concessions."^ Thus we see from t h i s statement that the major i s s u e f o r the CNH's demand f o r a p u b l i c dialogue i s the attempt to remove the e l i t i s m that i n s u l a t e d the masses from the government and f u r t h e r the attempt to renew confidence i n the p u b l i c ' s a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the d e c i s i o n s of p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s . To accomplish t h i s would mean the undoing of the u n i d i r e c t i o n a l flow of power,inherent i n the s t r u c t u r e of the PRI that we o u t l i n e d i n Chapter I I . I f we analyze the s e v e r a l attempts made by the N a t i o n a l S t r i k e Committee to i n i t i a t e p u b l i c t a l k s w i t h the government,we see that through the July-October 1968 events, the f i r s t time that CNH had e s t a b l i s h e d the c o n d i t i o n of p u b l i c dialogue was on August 17, but from the beginning of the student c o n f l i c t u n t i l August 17, 1968, f o u r acts of p o l i c e and army r e p r e s s i o n against students, had taken p l a c e a l r e a d y , on the 23rd, 26th, 29th and 30th of J u l y . Then came the f i r s t mass demonstrations on the 1 s t , 5th and 13th of August. During these three demonstrations no d i r e c t police-army-students c o n f r o n t a t i o n occurred. 8. Hablaa Siempre! E l Consejo Nacional de Huelga. op. c i t . , p. 10, Siempre 18-9-68. 62 Between the 5th and 13th of August, on the 8th, students formed the National Strike Committee, and professors the Teacher's C o a l i t i o n for Democratic L i b e r t i e s . Both formulate the s i x demands, which were r a t i f i e d at the Zocalo on August 13th. Consequently when on August 17th the CNH, i n s i s t e d on public talks i n order to negotiate with the government, the l a t t e r was f u l l y aware of the students'demands and of the scope of t h e i r movement, which had emerged as a response to the July repression applied to the students by the p o l i c e and the Army. Then on August 22, through ,;he Minist e r of the Interior^,Uhe gov-ernment made a move with the following statement: "The a u t h o r i t i e s are very w i l l i n g to i n i t i a t e negotiations i n order to come to a ' d e f i n i t i v e ' 9 s o l u t i o n of th i s 'lamentable problem'." No doubt the Mexican Government f e l t that the need to make such a move was imperative since "the lamentable problem1' was i t s own creation. Consequently, the government's "wi l l i n g n e s s " to i n i t i a t e negotia-tions was mother p o l i t i c a l device i n order to regain what Professor Sta-10 venhagen c a l l s the'"appoarences", and by doing so to e s t a b l i s h what we might c a l l delaying t a c t i c s , whereby l a t e r , with "popular" support the government could " l e g a l l y " increase repression. The day a f t e r , August 23rd, the government went further with i t s plans to carry on repression, when i n a display of "good w i l l " , i t desig-11 nated four representative ( a l l cabinet members) to i n i t i a t e negotiations. The CNH and the Teacher's C o a l i t i o n accepted the government pro-p o s i t i o n , but the former i n s i t e d that the dialogue must be transmitted sim-ultaneously by t e l e v i s i o n and radio networks and published i n a l l Mexican newspapers. 9. See: Revista de l a Universidad-de-Mexico, Septiembre 1968, p. 11. 10. See p. 41. 11. See: Revista de l a Universidad-de-Mexico, Sept. 1968, p. 18. 63 At the same time, the CNH a l s o announced that another de-monstration would take place on Tuesday, August 27th. Then on Saturday, August 24th, i n two p u b l i c manifestoes d i r e c t e d at p u b l i c o p i n i o n and a t the people of Mexico, the CNH and the Teacher's C o a l i t i o n declared: That l a t e r on August 23rd, they r e c e i v e d a telephone c a l l from the M i n i s t r y of the I n t e r i o r , saying 12 that the government would accept the p u b l i c dialogue. The day a f t e r on Sunday, August 25, i n a Press Conference, the CNH declared that on Monday, August 26th, i t would e s t a b l i s h through a telephone c a l l , contact w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s i n order to set up w i t h the l a t t e r a d e f i n i t i v e place and date f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . CNH a l s o i declared that from ten to twenty students, a s s i s t e d by s e v e r a l p r o f e s -s o r s , would attend the p u b l i c dialogue. On Monday, August 26, a very important d e c l a r a t i o n was made by the Mexico C i t y a u t h o r i t i e s , a d e c l a r a t i o n that l a t e r i n t h i s chap-t e r w i l l throw l i g h t on our assumption about the "d e l a y i n g t a c t i c s " employed by the Mexican government to in c r e a s e r e p r e s s i o n " l e g a l l y " . The Mexico C i t y a u t h o r i t i e s d e c l a r a t i o n : (Monday 26th) "The D.D.F. announced that although the r e q u i s i t e permit had not been a p p l i e d f o r , i t w i l l a l l o w the demonstration an-nounced f o r tomorrow to take p l a c e , s e t t i n g o f f from the N a t i o n a l Museum of Anthropology towards the Zoealo (square). The s a i d d e c i s i o n has been made i n accordance w i t h the i n -t e n t i o n of the a u t h o r i t i e s not to impede any m a n i f e s t a t i o n of i d e a s , even when the l a t t e r are d i r e c t e d against them themselves and i n s p i t e of great inconvenience to a l l the i n h a b i t a n t s of the c i t y , but keeping i n mind that a r t i c l e 9 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s that no assembly or reunion can be considered i l l e g a l or d i s s o l v e d i f i t has as i t s aim to present a p e t i t i o n or to make a p r o t e s t some act by an auth-12. I b i d , p. 19. 64 o r i t y , unless the l a t t e r i s i n s u l t e d of unless use i s made of v i o l e n c e or threats to i n t i m i d a t e the a u t h o r i t y or to o b l i g e i t to cede to the demands made.1 Then on August 27, the f o u r t h great demonstration, which we consider to be the key date of the July-October 1968 events, (the manifestants which we have already mentioned i n the chronology), march-i n g l o u d l y , but i n good order reached the Zocalo. Once i n the C e n t r a l square, CNH leaders and profes s o r s spoke at the r a l l y . At the end, a CNH le a d e r , Socrates Campos Lemus took the microphone and proposed that p u b l i c dialogue w i t h the a u t h o r i t i e s , would take p l a c e at the Zocalo on September 1st at 10:00 a.m. A group of "students" painted the w a l l s of the p r e s i d e n t i a l p a l a c e , w i t h i n s u l t s to the P r e s i d e n t . Other groups of "students" flew a red-and-black s t r i k e f l a g on the n a t i o n a l f l a g p o l e i n the very center of the square. Other students set up a round-the-clock p i c k e t i n f r o n t of. the N a t i o n a l Palace, u n t i l the s i x demands could be granted by the auth-o r i t i e s , but at one i n the morning, August 28, Army troops drove the students p i c k e t s out of the square. At midday, the government assembled a crowd of bureaucrats at the Zocalo, to burn the s t r i k e f l a g and "pay homage to the n a t i o n a l f l a g . " In a Press Conference, August 29, CNH declares t h a t : when the demonstration of August 27 was planned, the CNH never discussed, s t i l l l e s s approved the p a i n t i n g of the w a l l s of the palace or the f l y -i n g of the s t r i k e f l a g . On August 30, the CNH agreed hot to h o l d any k i n d of demon-s t r a t i o n at the Zocalo on September 1, and r e i t e r a t e d i t s w i l l i n g n e s s 13. See: R e v i s t a de l a Universidad-de-Mexico, p. 20, Septiembre 1968. 65 to h o l d d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h the government, i n order to f i n d a s o l u t i o n to the c o n f l i c t . Returning to the key events which took place i n the evening of August 27 at the Zocalo we w i l l analyze f i r s t of a l l : the proposal of one of the CNH l e a d e r s , Socrates Campos Lemus, to h o l d a p u b l i c dialogue w i t h the government on September 1, 10:00 a.m. at the Zocalo, . e x a c t l y on the day and hour when the P r e s i d e n t d e l i v e r s h i s annual report to the n a t i o n , i n the Congress, at which a l l cabinet members have to be present. Consequently, Socrates Campos Lemus' proposal sounds r a t h e r than a proposal of one of the CNH spokesmen, l i k e a d e l i b e r a t i v e propo-s i t i o n made by an agent provocateur. Then, l e t us consider the painted w a l l s of the N a t i o n a l P a l -ace w i t h i n s u l t s to the P r e s i d e n t , and the f l y i n g of a red-and-black s t r i k e f l a g on the n a t i o n a l f l a g p o l e i n the center of the square, both acts committed by a group of "students". These acts l a t e r on i n a Press Conference, the CNH denied as being planned or a u t h o r i z e d by the l a t t e r f o r the August 27 demonstration. Thus the s o - c a l l e d group of "students" seems more l i k e a group of agents provocateurs. F i n a l l y , the v i g i l i of some students i n a round-the-clock p i c k e t i n f r o n t of the N a t i o n a l Palace, seems a l s o an act encouraged by the group above mentioned, i n order to produce c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h 14. The s a i d CNH leader Socrates Campos Lemus, once he was a r r e s t e d on October 2nd 1968, turned s t a t e ' s evidence and gave the p o l i c e a l i s t of names of l e f t i s t p o l i t i c i a n s and students. The group of students who committed the c r i t i c i z e d acts were d i r e c t l y under Lemus' c o n t r o l . F o l l o w i n g h i s statement to the p o l i c e , the other CNH leaders and s t u -dents denounced him as a CIA agent. See: Texto d e l acta en que consta l a d e c l a r c i o n de S. Campos Lemus. S o l de Mexico. 68.10.06, pp. 1,2. See a l s o : R e v i s t a de l a Universidad-de-Mexico. pp. 30-32, Septiembre, 1968. te the Army, g i v i n g the government the opportunity to " j u s t i f y the Army l e g a l i n t e r v e n t i o n " , s i n c e the students' v i g i l square was v i o l a t i n g one s e c t i o n of A r t i c l e 9 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n which says t h a t : "No assembly or reunion w i l l be considered i l l e g a l nor d i s s o l v e d i f i t has as i t s aim to present a p e t i t i o n or to p r o t e s t against some act to an a u t h o r i t y , as long as no  i n s u l t s are o f f e r e d to the l a t t e r and no use i s made of  v i o l e n c e or threat s to i n t i m i d a t e the a u t h o r i t y or to ob- l i g e i t to cede to the demands made."15 I t was based on t h i s A r t i c l e 9 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n that a t 0.55 hours of August 28, a warning through loudspeakers i n s t a l l e d a t the top of Mexico C i t y H a l l b u i l d i n g , was d e l i v e r e d to the group of students remaining at the square, g i v i n g the l a t t e r f i v e minutes to c l e a r out the Zocalo. A f t e r e x a c t l y f i v e minutes army troops drove 16 the students p i c k e t s out of the square. I f we compare the government d i s p l a y of f o r c e i n the e a r l y hours of August 23, c l a i m i n g a v i o l a t i o n of A r t i c l e 9 of the C o n s t i -t u t i o n , w i t h the d e c l a r a t i o n made on August 26, by the Mexico C i t y 17 a u t h o r i t i e s , both events have a common denominator; A r t i c l e 9 of the Mexican C o n s t i t u t i o n . On one hand the government "approved" the August 27 s t u -dent demonstration, s i n c e the A r t i c l e 9 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n allows i t , but at the same time i t announced the " p o s s i b l e " consequences " i n case" the requirements of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l A r t i c l e were not observed. On the other hand 48 hours l a t e r the government s t a t e d that 18 there was " l e g a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n " f o r the Army i n t e r v e n t i o n , s i n c e the A r t i c l e requirements were v i o l a t e d by the "students". 15. S e: C o n s t i t u t i o n P o l i t i c a de l o s Estados Unidos Mexicanos. p. 10. Ed. Porrua, Mexico. 16. See: Chronology. CIDOC Dossier I I , Mexico, C o n f l i c t o E s t u d i a n t i l 1968, p. 47. Documentos y Reacciones de Prensa. CIDOC, Cuernavaca, Mexico. 17. See: Chronology. 18. See: R e v i s t a de l a Universidad-de-Mexico. p. 22, Septiembre, 1968. 67 A f t e r we have analyzed the development of the events that took place between August 22 and the evening of August 27 at the Zocalo, and t h e i r f i n a l outcome, i t seems evident that the p o l i t i c a l devices we have c a l l e d the Government's "delaying t a c t i c s " , were well planned and executed by a powerful f a c t i o n — we might c a l l extreme r i g h t wing — within the government, i n order to " l e g a l l y " increase repres-sion. (We s h a l l return to t h i s point i n the next chapter). This f a c t i o n i n order to carry out those p o l i t i c a l devices, used agents  provocateurs; disguised the l a t t e r under the banner of "extreme l e f t " elements. Because we have to emphasize aga n that on August 29, i n a Press Conference, the National S t r i k e Committee, denied having planned or c a r r i e d out the August 27th late-evening events at the Zocalo. This points to another basic question i n our study. I f the Mexican Government had accepted public dialogue and had given a s o l u t i o n to the CNH s i x demands, what large transformations might have caused i n 19 the Mexican p o l i t i c a l structure? In regard to our question, Professor Pablo Gonzalez Casanova wrote i n one of his essays on the student c o n f l i c t : 19. I t should be noted that current Republic-type of governments which are founded upon P o p u l i s t p o l i c i e s , as i n the case of Mexico, usually present, when encountering a mass movement, p o l i t i c a l devices which include a face'dc of legalism that enables the government to a t t r a c t _ s u f f i c i e n t general support so as to suppress the movement. /See: Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Aritmetica Contra-Revolucionaria, pp. 2-4. La Cultura en Mexico. SiempreJ 21.3.68.7 "If i t accepts the dialogue the government w i l l have to inagurate a new p o l i t i c a l s t y l e , and change the forms of government that have ruled the country since the time of C a l l e s . A l l t h i s supposes for the government i t s e l f a seri e s of r i s k s with regard to the co n t r o l of the govern-mental organizations and of the power structure: The PRI, CTM, CNC etc. The power structure w i l l have to re-adjust very s e r i o u s l y f or a p o l i t i c a l struggle i n which other p a r t i e s and organizations, both popular and union-ized,would play an increasingly important part. On the other hand, accepting the dialogue and ceding the demands of the p e t i t i o n would imply encouragement of other movements and popular demands, not only for democratic progress but for s o c i a l j u s t i c e , which would be opposed by the more conservative sectors i n s i d e and outside the government, and a l l those forces who plan on a South-Americanization of Mexico, that i s to say, by those for whom the number one objective i s the immediate concentration and accumulation of c a p i t a l , and who regard as a very secondary objective the growth of nation a l commerce of the supply and the de-mand of goods and ser v i c e s , of employment and eventually a much more stable development and a c e r t a i n accumulation of c a p i t a l over a r e l a t i v e l y long period of time."^0 20. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, E l C o n f l i c t o E s t u d i a n t i l ; decisiones riesgos. op. c i t . , p. 7. E x c e l s i o r 68.09.13. CHAPTER IV The Government Principle: We Must Preserve the "Principle of Authority' Due to the events of lat?;. August, the Mexican people, were anxiously awaiting the Presidential annual report, about those events. Professor Womack writes; 'Military helicopters buzzed constantly over the city....Mexico seemed just another Latin American republic. Every-1 one was waiting for the President's words on September 1=.." On Semptember 1, the President delivered his annual Report to the Nation. From this report we w i l l extract some key paragraphs, which w i l l help us to analyze the Government's " o f f i c i a l 1 , position vis-a-vis the student conflict. The President started his report with the following statement "The Olympics Games w i l l take place for the f i r s t time in a Latin American nation.... During the recent conflicts that have been taking place in Mexico City, different interests inside and outside the country...of different p o l i t i c a l tendencies and ideologies, had planned to take advantage, of a t r i v i a l incident in or-der to create major trouble the aim of which was to dis-rupt the Olympics and to discredit the country.... We are confident that they w i l l net disrupt the sport events as they have planned...."3 1. See: John Womack, Jr.: Unfreedom in Mexico, Government Crackdown on the Universities, op. c i t . , p. 28. The New Republic, October 12, 1968. 2. See: Texto integro del IV Informe Presidencial, pp. 1-2. El Na-cional. Septiembre 2, 1968. 3. I consider i t important to emphasize the fact^as Professor Womack didjthat: ''Students did not picket Olympic installations, much less try to sabotage them. Before the President's report, the Strike Committee even promised that once negotiations began, stu-dents would help beautify the city and would volunteer services to visitors during the Games." Ibid., op. c i t . , p. 29. 70 In regard to the v i o l a t i o n of the University's autonomy at the Preparatory School No. 1, by the Army., on July 30th, the President denied i t had been v i o l a t e d , and he promised ''due protection of the University's autonomy", when he sa i d : "We not only respect University l i b e r t y and autonomy, but we even defend i t . " In regard to the students' s i x demands, he said; " I believe i t i s my duty to make clear the Government po s i -t i o n i n regard to some p o l i t i c a l demands. So far we have not received any "written p e t i t i o n " from any u n i v e r s i t y authority or any ether group organization of professors or students 'presenting concrete p e t i t i o n s ' . " V/ith the above statement, we c l e a r l y see the d e c e i t f u l and ambiguous p o s i t i o n taken by the President i n h i s annual report, i n regard to the CNH s i x demands. As we have already said i n previous chapters, the Govern-ment was f u l l y aware of the s i x p o l i t i c a l demands and of the scope of the student movement, and i t was p r e c i s e l y f o r this reason, that the Government made a move on August 22nd, i n order to halt the f i r s t stage of Army repression c a r r i e d out on the 23rd, 26th, 29th and 30th of July, and the mass-demonstrations of August 1st, 5th and 13th, events because of which.as we have already pointed out,the Mexican Government decided to "approach" the National Strike Committee, i n order to get a " d e f i n i t i v e " s o l u t i o n of the lamentable problem. Conse-quently, the President's statement: "So far we have not received any written p e t i t i o n " , was j u s t an extension of the "delaying t a c t i c s " taken by the government on August 22nd. 4. See; Chronology. But the ambiguous position of the President in regard to the six demands, led him to contradict his own statement, when a few lines later in his annual report the President said: ''I do not admit the existence of p o l i t i c a l prisoners 1'. But he asked the General and the Federal District Attorney's to review pending cases to ''make sure" their charges were for "'crimes net for ideas". He added; "In regard to Articles 145 and I45A of the Penal Code... I have to emphasize that the abolition of them does not f a l l under my Executive jurisdiction." The President's contradiction about the six demands is evi-dent; while on the one hand, he claims he is not aware of those demands since "no written petition has been received", on the other hand he speaks about two of the. six demands even i f he denies the f i r s t one and declares he has no authority to change the second one. The President j u s t i f i e d the Army intervention in the student conflict as "adequate measure to maintain internal security." And he added: "The entire Mexican population knows that when Army intervention takes place, i t is in order to protect peace^ not to oppress the population." Then.the government principle: the "Principle of Authority" came to the surface when the President said; "The j u d i c i a l system i s not simply a theory, nor is i t ar-bitrary- i t is v i t a l collective necessity; without i t no organized society can exist.... In the same context, when those means, which are dictated by good judgment and experience, f a i l , I w i l l invoice, only when i t is s t r i c t l y necessary, the power referred in Ar-ticles 89, Section VI of the General Constitution of the Republic which states, and I quote: "Article 89, the powers and responsibilities of the President are the following: VI To make use of the entire permanent arm forces whether of 72 the Army, the Navy or the Air Force for the internal security and external defence of the Federation." Consequently, after the CNH had analyzed the presidential annual report, for them, the President's words as Professor Womack 5 points out — sounded both short and threatening. Nevertheless. in a Press Conference that took place in the university campus, the National Strike Committee declared: "We took the decision to carry on the struggle, using a l l the legal means.-necessary to achieve a solution to our demands.... We deplore the fact that the presidential report does not offer the p o l i t i c a l solutions that we have been looking for, rather i t denotes a hardening of repressive measures against the student movement..,. We also have been insisting that our movement does not in-tend to disrupt the Olympic Games,..."6 Therefore, with the Presidential annual report on September 1st, the government initiates a second stage of Repression against the Student Movement. The difference between the f i r s t stage of repression — July 22nd -August 27th — and the new one, was that in the latter, the gov-ernment this time, in order to use i t s repressive force, took care of the "legal appearances". Henceforth, our analysis w i l l focus on those : |legal appear-ances", taken by the Mexican Government in order to increase repression. On September 5th, there appeared in "Excelsior", a national daily newspaper,a manifesto, signed by the National Strike Committee and addressed to the people of Mexico. 5. John Womack, Jr.: Unfreedoin in Mexico, p. 29. 6. See: Chronology. 73 In this manifesto, the CNH, besides explaining the different occasions, on which the latter had attempted unsuccessfully to i n i t i a t e negotiations with the government, also explained what they understood by public dialogue, and proposed to the government, the National Medi-cal Center as a place to i n i t i a t e negotiations on Monday, September 9, at 5:00 p.m. . The: CNH manifesto reads; "In case, this proposal, may be considered by the govern-ment as inconvenient, the CNH is very willing to discuss other proposals for the negotiations, with the only con-dition that these negotiations be public and that repres-sion be halted in advance." At the bottom of the manifesto a note reads; "This declaration has been also o f f i c i a l l y addressed to the President, the Ministry cf the Interior, the Attor-ney General and of Federal Di s t r i c t , the Congress and the Federal District Department. September 4, 1968 7 National Strike Committee" The answer from the authorities to the CNH manifesto, came on September 6th. The Government's reply was far from an answer to the concrete CNH demands. The different Government Departments to whom the CNH mani-festo was addressed-, were "handing on" the petition, most of them a l -leging that the six demands were "out of their legal jurisdiction", and that in accordance with the Article 8 of the Constitution, ''all 8 petitions must be presented in a written form". 7. See: Excelsior, Septiembre 5, 1968. 8. See: El Dia, p. 3, Septiembre 7, 1968. 74 In other words, to a concrete and written petition presented by the CNH, the Government objected with a "facade of legalism". Then on September 10th, there appeared in "El Dia'', another national daily newspaper, a manifesto addressed to the people of Mexico, and signed by the National Strike Committee. In the manifesto the CNH states that: "Since in answer to the CNH manifesto of September 4th, ad-dressed to different Departments of Government, the latter had replied in a very vague form claiming that in accor-dance with Article 8 of the Constitution a l l "petitions must be presented in a written form, and on the other hand they completely ignored our request for public dialogue. The CNH is sending to the President of the Republic, another o f f i c i a l note, in which we (CNH) reiterate cur petition for public dialogue. Consequently, we expect an explicit answer to our proposal.... We (CNH) affirm that our proposal to carry out public ne-gotiations, is not due to an exhibitionist desire for pub-l i c i t y , and on the other hand our proposal does not contra-dict the terms of Article 8 of the Constitution, since the exposition of those terms can be done in oral and written form.... We reiterate that our popular movement w i l l continue until the achievement of the p o l i t i c a l solutions, we have been demanding.... We c a l l the people of Mexico to the silent demonstration that w i l l take place on Friday, September 13th. This s i -lent demonstration w i l l leave at 4;00 p.m., from the National Museum of Anthropology to the Zocalo.... In this demonstration we w i l l show our general repudiation of injustice and of the lack of democratic liberties....''-'^ Meanwhile on September 10th, the Congress gave " f u l l sup-port" to the President, in order to dispose of the Army, the Air Force and the Navy, "to protect the internal and external security of Mexico". 9. See: El Dia, p. 10, Septiembre 10, 1968. 75 The announced CNH silent demonstration took place on Septem-ber 13th, During the course cf the demonstrations from the National Museum of Anthropology to the Zocalo. different groups of the population 10 joined the silent demonstration, in which no incident took place. The CNH declared on Tuesday, September 17th, that they might the dialogue in a written form provided a l l documents would be 11 published. So far, as we have seen, since the Presidential annual re-port on September 1st, the Mexican Government took care of the ''legal appearances" in order to increase his repressive force. Consequently, the government attitude toward a positive solution of the student con-f l i c t , had been rather evasive, presenting a "facade of legalism'' to each CNH effort to negotiate. Therefore, i t w i l l be important to ask, what viable prospect from the government side, did the CNH foresee for the settlement of the conflict? In a press interview a CNH spokesman declared; "The solution of, or the failure to solve the conflict is at this moment determent by the correlation of internal forces in the Government, To us i t is obvious at this time that there is a sector of the government which claims to be able to solve the student conflict, and at the same time to promote certain politicians with a view to a possible future presidential campaign; i t is also clear that on the other hand there : exist a faction in the government, which is opposed to sol-ving the conflict, because at this time a satisfactory solution is not in their interest. The struggle between these two governmental groups is what w i l l in the fi n a l analysis determine the solution by means of the supremacy of one group or the other. That is what w i l l determine 10. See; Revista de la Universidad de Mexico, p. 25, Septiembre, 1968. 11. See: Chronology. accept widely whether t h i s movement w i l l continue for a r e l a t i v e l y long time, or whether i t i s already solved.""^ The above press interview with the CNH, took place on Sep-tember 13th, around midday at the u n i v e r s i t y campus. A few hours l a t e r i n the evening, Army troops occupied the u n i v e r s i t y . At the same time, the Army arrested 500 persons, among them, un i v e r s i t y s t a f f , students and some of t h e i r parents who were present, at the u n i v e r s i t y campus, attending mainly t h e i r sorts' graduations. A l l arrested people were taken away from the u n i v e r s i t y campus i n army trucks. I t i s important to note that during the whole Army "clear out'' operation, no students or arrested persons offered any kind of r e s i s -tance. To j u s t i f y such an act, the government declared that: •UNAM occupation by the Army was a necessary measure i n order to stop "openly a n t i - s o c i a l and-possibly criminal acts". And added; 'The Government has "the moral o b l i g a t i o n to maintain order i n the t e r r i t o r y of the nation of which the uni v e r s i t y 13 also forms part." In regard to the u n i v e r s i t y take-over by the army, the w e l l -known l i b e r a l h i s t o r i a n Daniel Cosio V i l l e g a s , wrote: "The m i l i t a r y occupation of the u n i v e r s i t y takes place when ...the students had abandoned the vandalism, and display the d i s c i p l i n e i n two orderly demonstrations; that i s to say when they had announced and repeated that they w i l l not try to s p o i l the Olympic games." 12. Habla e l Consejo Nacional de Huelga. op. c i t . , p. 13. Revista Gente, Octubre, 1968. 13. See: Chronology. 14. See: Daniel Cosio V i l l e g a s , Los siete actos deuna Tragedia. op. c i t . E d i t o r i a l . E x c e l s i o r , Septiembre 27, 1968.. 77 With the university occupation by the army, the last steps to complete the cycle of repression had already been taken by the gov-ernment . Besides, the defamatory campaign undertaken by the government against the university Rector in order to get his resignation. Another sequence of "well prepared'' repressive measures having also specific targets, was underway; the attack committed against El Colegic de Mexico, by a group of armed terrorists, the refusal of the city police, when the former asked for protection, on September 20 (see chronology), the increase of police arrests, the violent Army-Students confrontations on September 21st and 22nd, the UNAM Rector's resignation and finally on September 24th the National Polytechnic Institute campus occupation by the Army, a l l those events were the penultimate step of the Govern-ment "legal" increase of repression. Then, on September 27th, due to the UNAM Board of Governors 15 refusal to accept Rector's resignation, the latter agreed to remain at his post as UNAM Rector. Therefore, the government was forced to give a momentum to its escalation of repression. The Minister of the Interior declared that the withdrawal of army troops from university campus would take place as soon as UNAM authorities would require them to do so. The army l e f t the university campus, and on October 1st, UNAM staff returned to campus. The National Strike Committee refused to resume classes, and convoked a mass-rally at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in Tlatelolco on Wednesday, 15. See: Chronology. 78 October 2nd. And', as i t has been already mentioned i n the Chronology,on Wednesday, October 2nd, the National S t r i k e Committee r a l l y was i n i -t i a t e d at 5:00 p.m. at the Plaza de l a s Tres Culturas i n T l a t e l o c o . Around 5:30 p.m. approximately 15,000 persons were gathered at the Plaza, CNH spokesmen addressed the crowd composed of students, workers, T l a t e l o l c o residents: men, women and c h i l d r e n ; cameramen and foreign reporters. Suddenly a f t e r four f l a r e s presumably used as a s i g n a l , at 6:00 p.m., s o l d i e r s coordinated by plainclothesmen opened f i r e without provocation and charged the peaceful student r a l l y at the Plaza. Stu-dents and bystanders f l e d to T l a t e l o l c o buildings, but they were pur-sued, shot, beaten and arrested. From 6:00 to 8:30 p.m., the f i r i n g was continuous. Presumably, 5,000 s o l d i e r s had p a r t i c i p a t e d i n what i a the 16 annals of Mexican History would be known as T l a t e l o l c o Massacre. Therefore, another important question a r i s e s i n the present study. What w i l l be the possible repercussions of the government's repression ap-p l i e d to the student movement of 1968 i n the Mexican p o l i t i c a l l i f e ? The exact answer to our question i s found i n one of Profes-sor Gonzalez Casanova s essays on the student c o n f l i c t , when he wrote: "...To opt for the a l t e r n a t i v e of employing public force by means of massive f a i l i n g s , m i l i t a r y control of academic i n -s t i t u t i o n s , etc., i s something which we are a l l conscious of as a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , which has been repeated inexorably i n the d i c t a t o r s h i p s of L a t i n America. The implications of t h i s 16. See: Chronology, also P^evista de l a Universidad de Mexico. Sept-iembre 1968, and CIDOC Dossier No. 23, Mexico, C o n f l i c t o Es-t u d i a n t i I-II-1968. pp. 55-56. Cuernavaca, Mexico. 73 d e c i s i o n are obvious. Given the magnitude of the popular student movement and the f a i r l y large support that i t has i n wide sectors of the middle and upper classes — i t i s neces-sary to r e c a l l that the students, did not appear suddenly i n the Mexican context -- such a repression would have to go lengths unprecedented i n the contemporary h i s t o r y of Mexico The measures would have to be taken during the national f e s -t i v i t i e s ^ or i n the Olympics, since i t i s obvious that i f the demands were not granted, there would be no agreement between the government and the students and the restlessness would continue i n a manner inadmissable to the government. Under such conditions i t would have recourse to a p o l i c y i n which the army and the p o l i c e would ne c e s s a r i l y exert more and more power.1° Then, on October 3rd, during a press interview with the Min-i s t e r of Defence, the reporter asked the former: Reporter: "Who i s the Commander responsible for the army intervention i n T l a t e l o l c o ? " The M i n i s t e r of Defence: "The Commander responsible i s me." Reporter: W i l l an etat de siege be decreed?" The Minister of Defence: "No Qtat de siege w i l l be decreed, Mexico i s a country where l i b e r t y e x i s t s and w i l l continue to e x i s t . " 1 9 17. In Mexico, the 15th and 16th of September are dates of national f e s t i v i t i e s which commemorate the 1810 Mexican Independence. 18. Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, E l C o n f l i c t o E s t u d i a n t i l ; decisiones y riesgos. op. c i t . , p. 9. E x c e l s i o r 68.09.13. 19. See: E x c e l s i o r , pp. 7, 12. Octubre 3, 1968. Conclusions In this report we have attempted to look at the consequences of the formation of the one-party system i n modern Mexico i n 1929, and how the violence of i t s o r i g i n s i n the Revolution of 1910 have i n f l u -enced the way i n which p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t was resolved i n the student movement of 1968. The problem i s one of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a democracy fo r Mexico and we can only conclude from our analysis that the one-party system, as the p o l i t i c a l structure of Mexican society, precluded the p o s s i b i l i t y of a working democracy. As an idea, the democratic form of government requires the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r i g h t from opposition groups who have d i f f e r e n t interests and who can influence the course of public p o l i c i e s . Such . divergent i n t e r e s t s are not present i n the Party and i n f a c t the nature of the government, of influence and power, i n the c o n t r o l of the masses through leaders i n intermediate structures. Given the lack of a v i a b l e democracy the problem of the PRI i s one of persuasion and c o n t r o l . This we faced i n the governments of A v i l a Camacho, Aleman, Ruiz Cortines, Lope? Mateos and most cl o s e l y i n the p r e s i d e n t i a l period of Diaz Ordaz, where the problem of a large and vocal opposition of students led to the use of p h y s i c a l violence by the Government. We have t r i e d to show that this violence was neither acciden-t a l nor unique, but i n the h i s t o r y of the PRI a t r a d i t i o n a l strategy i n dealing with c o n f l i c t when the government perceived the opposition to be a threat to i t s power. We have pointed to the use of repression i n the cases of Jaramillo's peasant movement i n 1962, and the r a i l r o a d s t r i k e headed 81 by Demetrio V a l l e j o i n 1959. And we have used the student movement of 1968 as a case study of how the government used repression, namely the t a c t i c s of o f f i c i a l p h y s i c a l violence i n p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t . I t i s t e l l i n g indeed that the government resorted to repres-sion when i t s control was threatened by a demand for a p u b l i c d i a -logue with members of the movement. For, the nature of pu b l i c dialogue opens the channels of influence from the u n o f f i c i a l quarters of the government., and i n oo doing a c t u a l l y restructures the nature of the one-party system. The PRI, unwilling to make such a change resorted to the use of p o l i c e and armed forces. No doubt, the Mexican Student Movement of 1968, has been the most important event i n the l a s t t h i r t y years of Mexican p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The h i s t o r i c a l consequences of the government's repression of students, have been already pointed out. The immediate ones are also already present within the Mexican context, from the very beginning of the student movement; these are: 1) The government's increasing dependency on i t s repressive force when dealing with i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l problems. 2) Due to the scope of the student movement of 1968, government repressive force has been f u l l y exposed for the f i r s t time not only i n t e r n a l l y but abroad as w e l l . 3) When government's repressive forces are exposed i n that way, two main consequences are l i k e l y to r e s u l t : a) Although the govern-ment's enormous display of force, had l e f t a frightened population, b) on the other hand a vast majority of that population became more p o l i t i c a l l y aware, more s e n s i t i v e ; i n other words this sudden p o l i t i c a l awareness of 82 the Mexican population, has removed once and for a l l , the whole myth of "Democracy i n Mexico". In regard to the government repressive methods used against the student movement and their p o l i t i c a l consequences, Professor Tulio Halperin Donghi writes; " I t has thus been possible to put down the movement success-f u l l y , but i t has l e f t Mexico very different from the way i t found i t . A presentiment of possible, i f not certain, doom has been f e l t by the p o l i t i c a l machine that governs the coun-t r y , even more serious since the whole a f f a i r has shown up i t s i n e r t i a and at the same time i t s internal s t r i f e . " ^ And Professor Halperin adds: " I f the regime cannot be modernised, l i b e r a l i s e d and made more advanced i n technology through peaceful, means, or i f the l a t -ter are rejected i n favour of solutions implying a greater em-phasis "on authoritarian measures, then i t seems inevitable that there w i l l arise i n the p o l i t i c a l drama of Mexico a protagonist who u n t i l now has remained s i l e n t although not t o t a l l y absent; the army.1:2 If we compare Professor Halperin's assumption about, the increa-sing p o s s i b i l i t y of an active role of the Mexican army i n t h e • p o l i t i c a l l i f e of. the country, with that of Professor Gonzalez Casanova, we find that these assumptions overlap each ether, when the l a t t e r writes; 11 The police and the army solve the problems of education, of railways, of doctors and of peasants. But the solution i s not that claimed by the p u b l i c i t y men of 'Civic Action', who de~. p i c t soldiers carrying l i t t l e children, building schools or roads, helping young people, peasants and workers. The police and the army solve public problems by occupying schools, hospi-t a l s , railways, that i s to say, by f u l f i l l i n g the m i l i t a r y func-tion for which they are trained i n a war which i s 'domestic'. The cycle of mutual recrimination goes on: the oligarchy permit themselves the luxury of c r i t i c i s i n g the p o l i t i c a l administra-tors for their inept government, their weakness, their corrup-tion and their use of violence. And with good cause the middle 1. Tulio Halperin Donghi. H i s t o r i a Contemporanea-de-America Latina,op. c i t . , p. 532. Alianza E d i t o r i a l . Madrid, 1969. 2 . I b i d . , op. c i t . , pp. 534-535. c l a s s s e c t o r s , the l i b e r a l and r e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o g r e s s i v e f o r c e s a l s o i n d i c t the p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , although they s t r e s s the c r i s i s i n the p o l i t i c a l system i t s e l f . The p o l i t i c a l ad-m i n i s t r a t o r f e e l s p a r t i c u l a r l y f r u s t r a t e d , and hopes th a t the world w i l l not change, t h a t s t a b i l i t y w i l l be maintained and that the o l i g a r c h y , the i m p e r i a l i s t s and the people w i l l l e s s e n t h e i r demands arid be understanding about h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s and shortcomings: to some he wishes to prove that he i s f o r c e f u l and knows how to exert — which he confuses w i t h using the po-l i c e and the army: to others that he i s open-minded and t o l e r -ant, that he makes those concessions to f o r e i g n c a p i t a l which arc h i s to concede:' and to the people and to the progressive groups that he i s the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the s p i r i t of the Repub-l i c , of the lav; and of a regime where i t i s d i f f i c u l t to recon-c i l e c i v i l l i b e r t i e s w i t h n a t i o n a l defense. But when faced w i t h the r e a l dilemma, between r e v o l u t i o n a r y reforms and the use of r e p r e s s i v e f o r c e s , he u n w i l l i n g l y chooses the l a t t e r to an ever greater extent; u n t i l the army solves i n p r a c t i c e almost a l l the problems of government without governing. The problem thus pre-sented to the m i l i t a r y i s u n i v e r s a l and simple: why not r e s o l v e a l l these problems of government by t a k i n g over the government? The foundations f o r a coup d'e'tat, l e g a l or i l l e g a l , arc e s t a - . b l i s h e d a l r e a d y , and can be ' j u s t i f i e d ' to the p u b l i c : the i n -surgents can count on the o l i g a r c h i e s , on the support of the i m p e r i a l i s t s , and even on the d i s c o n t e n t of the people, who to some degree subscribe to F a s c i s t and a u t h o r i t a r i a n i d e o l o g i e s . 1 3. 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(Mexico) pp. 329-336. 23. Taylor , J r . P h i l i p B. "The Mexican Elect ions of 1958: Aff i rmat ion of Authori tar ianism?" The Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, V o l . X I I I , No. 3, September, 1960, pp. 722-744. 24. _______________ The Economist, Edic ion Quincenal para America La-t ina (1968). 25. Unzueta Gerardo, "Sobre e l Problema E s t u d i a n t i l Popular (Cartas-desde-la-prispn)" Huevos Prob1ernas, No. 2. (ed.) Fondo de Cultura Popular (Mexico, 1969). 26. Womaelc, J r . , John "Unfreedom i n Mexico, Government Crackdown on the U n i v e r s i t i e s " , The Ilew Republic , October 12, 1968, pp. 2.7-31. 27. Worsley, Peter . "Frantz Fanon: Revolutionary Theories" , Monthly  Review, V o l . 21, No, 1, May,; 1968, pp. 30-49. 8& Newspapers I. Corrco d e l Sur (Cuernavaca, Mexico). 2» E 1 D i a (Mexico C i t y ) . 3. E x c e l s i o r , (Mexico C i t y ) . 4. E x c e l s i o r Ultimas Moticias de E x c e l s i o r 1 Ed. 2 Ed. (Mexico C i t y ) . 5. 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