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Alliance cohesion : NATO and the Warsaw Pact Terry, John C. 1970

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ALLIANCE  NATO  AND  COHESION:  THE  WARSAW  PACT  by  JOHN B.A.,  A  CHARLES  University  THESIS THE  of  SUBMITTED  British  IN  FOR  MASTER  the  Columbia,  PARTIAL  REQUIREMENTS  in  TERRY  OF  1969  F U L F I L L M E N T OF  THE DEGREE  OF  ARTS  Department of  Political  We  accept  required  this  thesis  Science  as  conforming  to  standard  THE UNIVERSITY  OF  August,  BRITISH 1970  COLUMBIA  the  In  presenting  an  advanced  the I  Library  further  for  degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  written  this  thesis  in  at  University  the  make  that  it  purposes  for  may  be  It  financial  for  of  Political  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  October 5,  1970  of  of  Columbia,  British  by  the  understood  gain  shall  Science Columbia  for  extensive  granted  is  fulfilment  available  permission.  Department  D a t e  freely  permission  representatives. thesis  partial  Head  be  requirements  reference copying  that  not  the  of  agree  and  of my  I  this  or  allowed  without  that  study. thesis  Department  copying  for  or  publication my  ABSTRACT  This to  assess  base  and  the  are  examined:  the  Warsaw  only  for  of  of  the  external  certain  results  threat, Two  The  threat types  and of  on  base  Treaty  indicate and  alliance  alliance  an  "attempt  national  the  specific  findings power  of  variables,  North Atlantic  between  external  the  two  alliances.  Pact.  relationships  reports  influence  degree  international  between  thesis  power  cohesion  modern  of  alliances  Organization that  alliance cohesion,  members.  the  and  expected  cohesion, hold  true  and  TABLE OF CONTENTS  CHAPTER  PAGE  I  INTRODUCTION  II  DISSENSION IN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT  33  III  RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES  47  IV  FINDINGS  61  V  CONCLUSION  90  BIBLIOGRAPHY  1  ...  99  APPENDIX A:  NOTE ON DATA SOURCES  114  APPENDIX B:  PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO BY MEMBER COUNTRIES  115  ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS  116  APPENDIX C:  APPENDIX D:  VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT  .'.'118  APPENDIX E:  TRANSFORMED MEASURES OF TOTAL CONFLICT INTENSITY AND VERBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY ... 120  APPENDIX F:  PERCEPTIONS OF OPPOSING BLOC AND OF OPPOSING BLOC LEADER BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERS  121  LIST  OP  TABLES  TABLE  PAGE  I  SUMMARY  H a  AGGREGATE  lib  OP  LITERATURE CORRELATIONS WITH  T H E DATA  RANK  ORDERED  YEAR  FOR  NATION:  BY  AGGREGATE ORDERED  V  ORDERED  FOR  CORRELATIONS  AND  BASE  ORDERED  BY  YEAR  CORRELATIONS BASE  POWER  RANK  ORDERED  NATO  MEMBERS'  OF  INDICATORS  OF  RANK  6k  NATO  67  NATO  69  EACH  NATO  70  COHESION THE  DATA  NATION:  BETWEEN WITH  FOR  DATA  NATION:  COHESION THE  DATA  EACH YEAR:  ORDERINGS  ON  COHESION  SELECTED YEARS  OF  COHESION  POWER  BASE  71  INDICATORS AND  WITH  EXTERNAL  OF  73 COHESION  POWER  BASE  INDICATORS AND  WITH  EXTERNAL  THE NETHERLANDS  CORRELATIONS INDICATORS THREAT:  NATION  ....  FRANCE  CORRELATIONS THREAT:  BY  NATO  THE  BETWEEN  INDICATORS  FOR  CORRELATIONS  EACH  FOR  AND  63  COHESION  WITH  INDICATORS WITH  AGGREGATE  THREAT:  VIII  YEAR  AGGREGATE POWER  BETWEEN  INDICATORS  BY  ....  RANK  EACH YEAR:  CORRELATIONS  INDICATORS  VII  FOR  BASE  POWER  INDICATORS VI  NATION  NATO  BETWEEN  DATA  AND  RANK IVb  BY  THE  AGGREGATE RANK  IVa  EACH  CORRELATIONS  30  BETWEEN  INDICATORS  INDICATORS WITH  III  ON A L L I A N C E S  OF  OF  COHESION  POWER  BASE  7I+ INDICATORS AND  THE U . S . A  WITH  EXTERNAL 7I1  i i  LIST  OF TABLES  (Continued)  TABLE  IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  PAGE  AGGREGATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POWER BASE INDICATORS WITH THE DATA RANK ORDERED BY YEAR FOR EACH NATION: WARSAW PACT  80  AGGREGATE COHESION INDICATORS CORRELATED WITH POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT INDICATORS WITH THE DATA RANK ORDERED BY YEAR FOR EACH NATION: WARSAW PACT  8l  RANK ORDERS OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS ON COHESION INDICATORS FOR SELECTED YEARS  83  CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: RUMANIA  8k  CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: POLAND  85  CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: U.S.S.R  85  iii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  I  would  individuals of  this  William advice  and an who  acknowledge  encouragement  Mark  W.  Moul,  read  the  a l l  should  thanks  are  due  to  are  with  the  my  own.  Zacher,  to  John  report  been  at  taken  Ole  R.  with  for  the  good  data.  gratitude advice  R.  more  at  Wood,  various  Holsti  two  than  guided  and  failures  iv  years;  gave or  me  certain  various  stages  often who  to  stages  Ken M c V i c a r ,  constructive  past  grace  Any  my  and  encouragement,  learn  my t e m p e r  assistance  have  me w i t h  opportunity  course,  to  project:  provided  bore  their  for  which  Special  like  and  offered  i t  was.  the  project  criticism, and  to  and  my  wife  much-needed  shortcomings,  and  of  CHAPTER  I  THEORY AND R E S E A R C H  Alliances general of  textbook  alliances,  than  examined  more  has  to  about  the  powerful almost  l i k e l y  and as  to  be  exhaustive.  a  special  topic  and  importance  of  alliances,  existence  at  the  detailed Most,  i f  Similarly, as  NATO,  observations not  a l l ,  the  of  or  the  of  time  the  these  unstated and  of  to  Entente  to  tendency  the  We a r e  of  a  we  such  Other  most  offered are  few  however, of  been  assumptions  general;  observations  Triple  have  emphasize  functioning  any  and  the  'writing. i n  in  discussion  anecdotal,  propositions,  of  The  interest,  alliances  on  relevance  CENTO,  number  about  politics.  of  nature  propositions  attention  When a l l i a n c e s  a  i n  some  brief,  on  largely  specific remain  specific  alliances  is  undetermined.  The  purpose  applicability  to  the  examined:  f i r s t ,  external  cohesion  threat that  satisfaction An can,  of  the to  the  analysis  the  of  the  Warsaw  believe,  Pact  alliance members  of be  the  as  or  w i l l  is  of  Two  assertion  alliance  assessment  below  alliances.  common  alliance  with  I  the  NATO a n d  concerning  analysis  more  international  discussion  with  notion  of  merit  the  untested.  the  is  thoroughly,  alliances  alliances  f i e l d  usually  base  alliances.  as  the  rigorous  innumerable  deluged  yet  in  nation-states  however,  unsystematic  been  of  ON A L L I A N C E S  that  their  facilitated  by  common  general  assess  of  power  the  propositions  cohesion  members  evidence  to  propositions  alliance  national  implications  attempt  some  alliance show  to  w i l l  w i l l  lessens;  be  diminish  second,  increasing  d i s -  grows.  and  relevance  of  such  some  knowledge  of  past  an  2.  research  related  limitations broad  of  studies  i n  of  two  general  Group  coalitions  of  national  of  of  seem  quite  alliances,  progress  is  summarizing  in  to  The  The  The  of  the  literature  successes  f a l l s  literature  alliances; latter  other the  a  and  the  studies  and  into  two  dealing  with  experimental w i l l  cohesion  of  (1970)-  propositions  of  which  f a l l  of  of  largely they seem  group  groups or  studies,  small  group  ignored, offer  cohesion.  a  of  the  be  by  with  number  particularly  the  groups  in  Chertkoff  past other on  studies  the  of  of inter-  present  (1970),  well-reasoned  and  mainly  formation of  the  and  The  scope  coalition  coalitions  coalition  literature,  concentrated  provide  small  small  been  works  on  of  psychology,  outside  recent  of  the  analysis  (1970)  studies Yet  an  studies  social  has  and  research  aspect  been  to  they  in  theory,  research  event,  of  number  has  game  Zinnes  date  appeared  formation  but  any  experimental  has  germane  and  relevance  p o l i t i c s Zinnes  and  politics  specific  of  This  coalition  1970),  1  number  psychology.  (1967  attention  relevant  coalitions.^"  sociology,  and,  the  group  with  individuals  endeavour and  The  international  or  growing  topics:  coalition  alliances,  Studies  decades,  fields  of  f i r s t .  A  two  subject  research. the  small  considered  the  this  categories:  alliances  Small  to  Kelley  assessments  of  formation.  which  has  received  groups.  Kelley  considerable  (1970,  p.  ^83),  notes:  coalitions the of  to  notable f a i r l y  germane  to  international  exception  rigorously  alliances.  of tested  We  then  have of  the  following  1.  size  2.  who  actually  join  in  3.  who  actually  join  i n  k.  when  dependent  variables:  coalition  coalitions  coalitions winning  w i l l  break  coalitions  up  -  or  how  long  they  w i l l  exist. 5.  who  6.  what,  seeks i f  to  bargain  any,  bargaining  the  i n i t i a l l y  various  processes  with  whom  regularities  attendant  to  the  are  in  the  formation  of  coalitions. A l l  but  the  the  fourth  fourth  variable  variable  refers  The  studies  are to  part  of  the  coalition  relating  to  process  of  coalition  formation;  cohesion.  cohesion  may be  divided  into  two  groups:  2 those  examining  coalition  those  employing  cohesion  Experiments paper  and  f a l l i n g  w i l l It  proved  attempt  factor to  friends  Many  the  of  these to  with  group  independent  studies  that  major  data  a  components  dimension  explanatory outside  with is  variable;  and  variable. the  small  group  of  group  cohesien.  sociometric  the  given  sociometric  concept  small  of  and  p r o p o r t i o n who  are  dependent  Hagstrom and  from  satisfaction  coalitions.  a  are  the  operationally.  such  and  or  category  f i r s t ,  on the  as  scope  of  this  here.  satisfaction  cohesion  in  reference  the  cohesion  latter  noted,  social  correlated  an  the  define  includes  sociometric  as  group  discussed  analysis  dimensions:  highly  2  to  determine  satisfaction The  be  should be  difficult  employed  major  not  into  or  group that  measures seek  and  found  cohesion.  because  advice  with  no  i n  an  two Social  social i t  "proportion  personal  experiments  experiment They  has  (1965)  Selvin  with  label as  cohesion  of  from  l i f e . is best other  explicit  h.  group  members,"  35-6),  (pp.  as well  as  such  measures  as group  size-  They  conclude, The to  f i r s t  factor,  measure  groups  .  may b e  said  the  .  dynamics  and  of course,  Selvin's  fact,  t o which  of  small  says  a two-dimensional S t i l l ,  definition  influencing  t h e members  the  the attractiveness group,  or the activities  1953>  Albert,  hypothesis  p.  about Eisman  concept.  3  232). what,  She used  "The following sociometric  five  attractiveness;  group  members  and  of  to their  improved  cohesion  (b) a  existing  among  forces may depend  members  of  (Quoted  i n or  non-unitary  1  i n a  utilized: direct  ( d ) number  b y a majority  (Eisman,  on  evidence,  of reasons  t o the group;  similarity  i s a  o f cohesion-  number  concept.  are.  were  values."  i s , i n  forces  engages.'  of cohesiveness  given  and intrinsic  of a l l  no speculation,  measures  Hagstrom  considerably  of the group,  'forces'  membership  which  cohesion  These  t h e group  that  (c) average  with  that  on friendship;  f o r belonging  f o r group  (e) degree  respect  argues  the  kl)  'the resultant  offers  i s  instrumental  i n the group.  these  different  based  group  reasons  also  measures  index  have  as  values  i t  or n-dimensional)  the prestige  Festinger  (1959)  k,  3,  i n which  exactly,  (p.  the r e l i a b i l i t y  than  t o remain  by  that  i n studying  no guarantee  of cohesion  of either  shown  do represent  we h a v e  (rather  are attracted factors  Hagstrom and S e l v i n  Festinger's  on  actually  cohesion,  attractiveness,  behavior.  about  said  of the  sociometric  We h a v e  group  nothing  Further,  factor,  both  may b e  attractiveness  intrinsic  members  t o consider  dimensions  attractiveness.  satisfaction,  The second t o measure  t o the group.  necessary  This,  .  degree  internal  social  the instrumental  P«  (a) a  rating given of  of the  group  1959>  of by  same members;  members  188)  small  with  5.  group  experiment  TAU") b e t w e e n the  .05  the  level be  borne  of  results It  of  mind  hardly  hand  a  the  warning  as  a  attempt  as  from and  was more  similar  a  unifying  such  Hamblin  (in  and  placed the  its  peak,  force,  a  extent  each  and  groups p.  Singer,  i n  with  as  well  of  and  known  Sherif,  Robber's  Cave  competition on t h e  other:  co-operativeness  inter-group  the  p e r i o d when  they  would  not  (p.  ^29)  hypothesized  that  offered  coalitions  source.  inter-group  other. He  studies  anecdotal  international  the have  a  common  supporting  alliances,  labor  162). 1965)  conducted  integration c r i s i s of  that  i n  co-operativeness  when  during  conclusion.  (1962,  group  time  emphatically  these differently  external  between  solidarity  very  do  an the  and  other of  various of  cohesion  on  and  186)  from  reporting  the  the  generality  that:  uniformity  is"measured  to  solidarity  disparate  between  were  to  a  churches  relationship  at  asserted  i n  which  generalize  cohesiveness  (p.  group  in-group at  come,  linked  the  to  at  and  variable,  indications  relationship  in-group  observed  offers  to  1965)  heightened  anything  which  another.  commonly  strong  and  groups  serves  to  threat  h o s t i l i t y  situation,  to  cohesiveness,  from  relationships  Singer  found  were  subjects  us  offered  comparability  cohesion  for  group  when  study  is  i n  as  studies  variable  The  unions,  legitimate  etc.,  one  groups  one  evidence  employing  the  other  productivity,  experiment,  enemy  considering  any  such  (l96l,  Boulding  She  (Kendall's  to  variables,  One  the  better.  related  between  from  on  or  was  correlations  relationships  functional  e t . a l . ,  order  functional opinion,  small  rank  No m e a s u r e  when  studies  empirical  and  the  significance i n  is  computed  measures.  of  should the  and  and  situation  co-operative  an  experiment  c r i s i s and  situations.  half  behavior  testing  in was  a  Half  the the  non-crisis  observed,  with  6.  the  results  tested  The  availability  was  found  to  be  for  of an  Group  a  Group  important  solution  present.  i f  a  problem  is  cohesiveness  and  can  In  solution  be  increased  support  of  Japanese-Americans  in  boys  in  conducted  of  this  World by  to  the  c r i s i s  is  during  a  c r i s i s  the  c r i s i s  during to  i f i f  a  problem  a  the  a  unavailable.  c r i s i s  crisis  230)  in  82)  p. some  II  noted  groups  conclusion,  War  c r i s i s  to  solution  (i960,  Zander  a  problem  disintegrate (p.  solution  t - t e s t ) .  variable:  during  increases  competitive  (two-tailed  competitive  c r i s i s  present.  Cartwright  camps  the  Groups  l i k e l y  or  decreases  to  cooperative  is  significance  intervening  integration  l i k e l y  environment."  cooperative  integration  l i k e l y  that  statistical  by  they  relocation  that,  "It  attacks  appears from  the  cite  the  experience  camps,  and  experiments  Sherif.  k Cartwright found  a  statistically  experiment, the  extent  offer a  some  congruency  the  of  degree  H.  his  group  or  H.  of  Zander  the  amount  for with  this  groups  Kelley,  argued  IV  the  group.  placed  across were  with  two  one  (1950,  to  a  i n  i n  a  person Exline  by  Kelley  small has  and  who  group  in  a  group  Z i l l e r  an  experiment  i n  situation  of  either  a  dimensions  was  to  of  perform  measured. i n  with  status  (ability  certain  tasks,  Members  of  discussion  Experimentally  39-56).  status  and  (1959)  conducted  another  pp.  a  study  They  required  conflict  "Communication  Human R e l a t i o n s ,  prestige  finding.  interpersonal  groups  refer  relationship,  of  to  groups  incongruency The  also  significant  attraction  support  power).  congruent  k  between  discussion  voting  and  and and  status  significantly  Created  Hierarchies,"  7-  more  often  than ...  status  members  co-workers than  did  conflict and  status  incongruency but  Kelman hypothesis. type  of  He  (in  To  set  to  the  tend To  3.  of  conflict of  was  the  of  desir-  interpersonal  components,  hypothesized  (p.  relationship  held  true  i n  160) between  cases  of  modification  of  conflict. further  hypotheses  relating  take  kinds  of  the  power  to  take  the  Responses  to  supported  statistically  comparing  these  Exline  questionnaire  attraction  and to  The studies  at  findings  and  slightly  congruency;  form  with  Z i l l e r ,  power;  the  group,  .05 those  enhanced  by  of  a l l  of  must  w i l l  by  be  conflict,  that  influencing (p.  these  significance  of  w i l l  recalled,  hypotheses or  the  they  we're  better. and  that  prestige;  and  tend  23^-5)  Cartwright  non-comparable  fact  w i l l  influencing  the  of  variable:  significance the  the  conformity  reported i t  influencing  conformity  power  that  level  possibly  and  of  internalization.  intra-group  r e l i a b i l i t y are  of  the  identification.  the  independent  and  power  credibility,  however,  different  of  indicated  the  of  conformity  compliance.  the  which  on  power  attractiveness, form  to  based  of  which  on  the  extent  the  means-control, form  to  based  is  which  on  the  extent is  the  to  to  based take  to  agent  a  extent is  agent  group  a  It  to  affective  their  c r i t i c a l l y  groups.  offered  1965)  rated  less  concept  components  Singer,  the  To  2.  a  the  no  pointed  the  and  intra-group  offered  tend  used  findings  that  affective  groups  and  incongruent  objective  and  agent  by  of  however,  conformity: 1.  and  congruent  favorably  these  concluded  not  groups;  differentiating  into  Exline  objective,  status more  that  of  Z i l l e r  of no  members  suggested a b i l i t y  incongruent  Zander,  each  status  dependent  In  study i n -  variables:  conformity. findings  are  of  the  mainly based  small on  8.  rigorous experimental research much of which has been r e p l i c a t e d , and some of which has been found t o be i n need of modification.  On the other  hand, the g e n e r a l i t y of the findings i s hampered by the l i m i t a t i o n that the findings on group cohesion are l a r g e l y based on a single explanatory variable, and, unfortunately, u s u a l l y the same single explanatory variable:  external threat.  We lack information concerning the r e l a t i v e  explanatory power of the independent variables employed i n comparison with other possible independent variables, and about the possible importance of i n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s between d i f f e r e n t explanatory vaiables. We a l s o lack any information concerning the relevance of these findings t o i n t e r national r e l a t i o n s .  Derived, as they are, from experimental studies of  i n d i v i d u a l s , the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of these propositions t o international r e l a t i o n s should be regarded as tenuous and questionable.  Nevertheless,  there i s f a i r l y strong support f o r the relevance of differences i n l e v e l of external threat t o cohesion i n small groups, and an examination of t h i s factor;, i n the context of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s may be a f r u i t f u l l i n e of  inquiry.  The Study of A l l i a n c e s i n International P o l i t i c s The i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s counterpart t o the studies of c o a l i t i o n s and i n t e r a c t i o n i n small groups i s the large body of l i t e r a t u r e on a l l i a n c e s .  A l l i a n c e has some properties i n common with other forms of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation, but, as Fedder notes (1968, p. 6 9 ) , i t i s important t o d i s t i n g u i s h a l l i a n c e from other forms of organized i n t e r national co-operation or alignment, and from c o l l e c t i v e security arrangements.  The f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n was a p t l y made by Friedman.  He noted  9-  certain  factors  Bladen,  and Rosen, a.  common t o eds.,  associations pp.  1970,  among  nation-states  (in Friedman,  4-5):  pairing  or collaboration  limited  duration  with  regarding  a  one another nutually  for  a  perceived  problem; b.  aggregation in  c.  d.  of  of  national  courses  of  action;  probability  ...  What  to  that one  national the  a.  interests  assistance  alliance  cooperation,  community b u i l d i n g  presence  of  such  existence  for  participation  jointly  or by  w i l l  be  from  other  p a r a l l e l  rendered  by  another.  distinguishes  international  capabilities  affairs;  pursuit  members  of  their  international  of  such  as  and economic  pivotal  factors  a n enemy  experiences  integration,  multi-  partnership,  i s  as:  or enemies,  actual  or  anticipated; b.  contemplation risk  c.  mutuality of  the  An  alliance  may be  by  the  that  while  fact  universal  necessary and  by the  of  the  status  or  disruption The  ing  to  the  for  the  a  i t  population,  need  to  a  not be  i n either  and the  the  strategic  preservation i n regard  resources,  collective  security  universal  adherence  to  properly  security  an alliance  status  taken  from  function  collective  literature  approach  engagement  quo o r aggrandizement  or near-universal  quo, while of  interest  distinguished  that  military  to  and  forth.  an alliance  i n order fact  of  status  territory, so  of  of war;  (Fedder,  collective (Claude,  I968,  196*1-,  i s  aimed  aimed  at  either  at  80)  p.  security  system  can be  arrangement  Chap.  i s  12),  maintenance  preservation  quo.  on a l l i a n c e s  can be  by various  authors.  f r u i t f u l l y Just  as  divided the  up  studies  accordon  10.  small groups and c o a l i t i o n s comprised a number of d i f f e r e n t approaches so, too, w i t h the l i t e r a t u r e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s .  We have, f i r s t ,  a large group of studies which might be lumped together under the term 'equilibrium models and analyses,' t h a t i s , those works which examine i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s i n termssof the balance of power, the structure of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, or the search f o r ' s t a b i l i t y ' .  Since such  a large proportion of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e f i t s i n t o t h i s category, i t seems advisable t o f u r t h e r subdivide them t o f a c i l i t a t e analysis.  Accordingly, I s h a l l consider f i r s t , those studies u t i l i z i n g  the 'equilibrium' approach which are of l i m i t e d scope, t h a t i s , those which d e a l only w i t h one a l l i a n c e (or, o c c a s i o n a l l y , two a l l i a n c e s which e x i s t a t the same time i n the same geographical area).  The second  group of studies d e a l w i t h a broader range of a l l i a n c e s (e.g. the a l l i a n c e p o l i c i e s of new s t a t e s ; European a l l i a n c e s since the 19th  century; or  a l l post-World War I I American a l l i a n c e s ) than the f i r s t group, e i t h e r i n terms of geographical area or time span, but s t i l l do not c l a i m u n i v e r s a l relevance.  The t h i r d group of studies apply, or at l e a s t  purport t o apply, t o a l l i a n c e s i n general, though often w i t h the caution t h a t the conclusions are probably not relevant t o a l l i a n c e s which e x i s t e d before some time p e r i o d , such as World War I I . Most of the case studies of a l l i a n c e s deal w i t h NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a r e f l e c t i o n , probably, of the f a c t that most of them were w r i t t e n i n the Post-World War I I p e r i o d , and of the obvious importance and long l i f e - s p a n of these two a l l i a n c e s .  A number of studies of the  Communist system a l s o merit a t t e n t i o n f o r t h e i r i n s i g h t s i n t o the  11.  dynamics system  of  is  relations  not  an  system  establishment out,  led the  image  of  a  the  of  NATO  -  threat  to  then,  that  while  on  anecdotal  Triska  symmetrical  and  Finley  formation  Calvocoressi  was  members  on  make  each  NATO a n d  the  hamper  cohesion  of  strength  of  policies;  neglect  frontations strengths of  of  alliance  nuclear  minor  an  of  between  the the  alliance members,  deterrence,  his and  members;  decline  the  of  a  East  with  number  minor great  others; the  a  i n  the  near  mirror-  rationalized  in  as  (pp.  response  in and,  did Pact.  and  the  38-9)  to  of  the  disparity  c r e d i b i l i t y  of  events  threat; alliance  in  the  that  i n  might growing leader's con-  relative  among  alliance of  alliance  which  members  integration  the alliances,  demands  factors  of  an  of  West  external  and  However,  analysis  alliance  in  Triska  discussion  disapproval  progress  in  the  a  decreased  of  as  Warsaw  to  mainly  suggested  superpowers;  pointed  NATO t h r e a t . "  formed  impressionistic  interests  they  The  alliance  resources the  inter-  another.  "presents  analysis,  themselves  members;  bipolar  one  similar  was  Communist  NATO.  NATO  His  excluding a  Pact  alliance:  alliance  a  Warsaw  instead,  Pact  of  military  organization  other.  a  Organization,  organization  of  the  states.  in  mirror  against  limited  concerned,  concerning the  the  of  that  system  about  and  to  Treaty  unified  existence  data  alignment  tend  (1966) b a s e d  Calvocoressi Finley,  of  although  suggested  latter  defense  the  an  establishment  The  concept  by  rather  alliances  the  Pact.  posed  nations,  North Atlantic  European  suggested,  of  (1965)  Finley  the  a  group hut  competing  Warsaw  Societ-East  They  and  eventually  East,  a  alliance  Triska national  in  a  subset  based  on  deterrent  (pp.  358-  12.  360).  He noted a l s o that the m i l i t a r y pressure of the Korean War l e d t o  pressures by the U.S. f o r greater assumption of a l l i a n c e burdens by other members (p. 357)- Eastern Europe's domestic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Warsaw Pact may, Calvocoressi suggested, i n s p i r e more responsive p o l i c i e s on the part of the a l l i a n c e leader (pp. 363-4).  None of these  observations, however, were tested by a p p l i c a t i o n t o other a l l i a n c e s , nor even s y s t e m a t i c a l l y examined i n the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Other a r t i c l e s and books dealing with NATO r e f l e c t the same preoccupation w i t h the cohesion of the a l l i a n c e , as w e l l as a p r o c l i v i t y f o r the use of anecdotal evidence.  I t i s impossible t o do more than  scratch the surface of the NATO l i t e r a t u r e here, but the f o l l o w i n g examples are, I b e l i e v e , representative of the research and a n a l y s i s t o date, excluding the endless discussions of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l structures and nuclear strategy t o be found i n such sources as The A t l a n t i c Community Quarterly, and the studies which f a l l i n t o other categories t o be d i s cussed below, such as t r a n s a c t i o n analyses and more general  studies  employing the e q u i l i b r i u m approach. M a r s h a l l ( i n Wolfers, 1964), and P f a l t z g r a f f (1969) both emphasize the e f f e c t of changes i n e x t e r n a l t h r e a t on a l l i a n c e cohesion. M a r s h a l l hypothesized that the East-West detente of the 1960's may have a d i s i n t e g r a t i v e e f f e c t on NATO (p. 19). P f a l t z g r a f f , i n a sense, t e s t e d t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the e f f e c t of the Czeckoslovak c r i s i s of I968 on the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e . d i s u n i t y i n NATO before the c r i s i s and concluded t h a t :  He noted the  ...  i nthe  presence  NATO members levels  and  took  improve  capabilities. improvements tion Wolfers  danger  enhances  alliance  allies  t o r a l l y  around the  He  also  authors,  based  suggested  alliance  P * 3)  also  his  idiosyncratic  varied  o f members  (pp.  mentioned,  i n somewhat  "The  subjective  limit  soon  as a nation Bowie  fashion,  also  differing before and  1957,  the  that  U.S.  alliance been  reduced of  interests 2^-5).  increased  alliance  a coalition  Morgenthau  writing  i s caused  tension  and  and  i naddition  b yperceived  same  the von  may  (1961,  p . ^22):  a t stake . . . "  events  U.S.  the  i n NATO Britain concluded  tension  proposition, that  members  (pp.  and  Brentano,  22-3).  i n the which  has  reduction o f  may  he suggested  threat  also  impressionistic  cause  cited,  alliance  and  would b e created b y  between  offered  NATO.  t o be reached as  (1957) d i s c u s s e d  already  o f weaker  i s  o f i t s own a r e  members  also  monopoly;  factor  seems  about  discrepancy i n  Brentano  i n the  Wolfers  o f t h ea r t i c l e s  cohesion;  b y von  the  be related t o  o f leaders;  interests  like  might  latter  external  encourages  evidence  which  t o a nalliance  o f alliance  power  The  o nr e l a t i o n s He,  that  as with  American nuclear  terms,  alliance  consulta-  ( p . 220)  Wolfers,  factors  Morgenthau  and France.  and  onanecdotal  l l ) .  52-9),  military t o make  proposition  leader.  qualities  v i t a l  that  concentrating  (pp.  and  pp>  goals.  common t o m a n y  threat  that  suggested  divergent  -  o f loyalty  (1963,  national  h  force  more.specifically,  o f the  different  feels  or,  o f other  t h ee n d  machinery  alliance.  analysis  o f allies;  of their  the  threat,  their  attempted  offered  alliance  capabilities goals  the  cohesion,  a number  cohesion:  they  planning  within  Arnold  previous  t h equality  i n the  external  t o increase  Moreover,  procedures (1959,  o f perceived  steps  lead t o  that  formation  14.  (19&4,  Steel weak  nations  enter  and  alliances  the  weak  pp.  3^-7)'  become It  hypotheses (weak  -  is  strong) that  formation  and  of  influence  d i r e c t l y toward only  the  the  NATO  the  United  with  be  a  factor  (19^3,  to  however, the  conclusions:  external  threat,  diminishes  develop that  nuclear  variable  these  two  of  external  elements  and weapons:  Steel's  characteristics  level  Dallin,  between i n  lead  to  support  to  threat for  the  unity  in  (1963,  might  to  513-4),  also as  an  pp.  of  nations  threat;  he  alliance  of  115-6)  the  and  pp.  and  that  system  Soviet  (1963,  anecdotal  subcoalitions  in  the  was that  relations of  pp.  an  ideology  38, 44-8).  evidence an  varies  attitudes  found  importance  153>  China  hypothesized  in  Schwartz  conclusion  significant  communist  upswing  the  (1963,  Union  522)  P>  presenting  formation  a  perceptions  noted did  example  the  Brzezinski lead  has  Soviet  (1963?  Lowenthal  117 > 129),  that  lend  Sino-Soviet  promoting  (pp.  system  external  Brzezinski  PP-  suggested  de-unifying  restricted  same  threat  they  between  that  conflict  conflict  unifying  views,  i f  note,  cohesion.  West.  as  his  response  external  Communist  States.  Eastern Europe.  Halpern  of  difference  with  And  the  factor  the  Sino-Soviet  a  system  studies  that  significant  conflict  of  alliance  with  to  the  disruption.  concluded  162),  i n  as  interaction  and the  suggested  (especially  combinations  the on  disrupted  interesting an  Studies many  be  alliances  stronger  posit  suggested  in  into  w i l l  21:16)  pp.  to  support  alliance  might  factor.  Hot  a l l  of  the  research  to  the  p o s t - W o r l d War  on II  alliances blocs,  i n  this  however.  category  Hardy  is  (1919,  PP-  260»-5),  15.  discussing the Argentina-Brazil-Chile alliance of 1919 found the same relationships between external threat and alliance cohesion, and between changing international roles and alliance cohesion, which were found in the studies of post-World War II alliances, employing the same anecdotal type of data and impressionistic style of analysis. War I alliances also offer familiar conclusions.  Studies of World  Allen (1920, p. 4^9)  for example, suggested that i t was the "contemplation of war" which led to formation of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente.  Craigi.(l965,  pp. 336-40) discussed the importance of trust and attitudinal similarity among allies for alliance cohesion. The second category of research u t i l i z i n g the "equilibrium" approach comprises a small group of studies each of which focusesson a particular area and particular historical period, though not on a particular alliance.  A l l of these studies considered here rely on  historical anecdotes for evidence rather than any systematically gathered data, and a l l but one (Good, in Martin, 1962) attempt to explain their topics through the perspective of system-level variables, that i s , in terms of such things as number and type of units or actors in the international system, the characteristic relationships among those units, and/or the configuration of the system.  Good's explanation hinges  on the nation-state attribute of recency of independence. A new state, he suggests, w i l l (p. 8) want "to pick up i t s own franchise, speak with i t s own voice, and demonstrate i t s own capacities. Alignment with a bloc means a renewed loss of voice and identity." Domestic factors, such as radical pressure and need to maintain power, are also held to militate  16.  against  alignment.  (1961,  Stevens threat  to  in  p o s t - W o r l d War  the  alliance  Some  cohesion,  Korea,  treaty  small  then,  groups  allies  aid  as  reaches  and  i n  a  the  the  context  under  Nationalist ...  organizations,  military Stevens,  the  directly  and  enthusiastic  in  discussed  importance  of  American  of  external  alliances  period:  II  countries  South  4-5)  p.  the  Others  with  -  West  for to  Germany,  example  he  -  pressed  guarantee  of  are into  lavish  4  U.S.  factor.  often  studies  gun  had  the  decisive  conclusion case  the  China,  mentioned  which  follow  i n  the  the  studies  of  equilibrium  approach.  (1969)  Haas NATO,  discussed  SEATO,  and  the  particularly  the  amount  He  98)  that  noted  (p.  responses alliance  i n or  a  international  (1959)  ...  the  superpower  counterinfluences ones  among  Pact,  but  them." might The  be  last  on  to  improve  is the  be  part  of  its  generalized  those  works  number  alliances.  of  which They  by  by  to  any  cover in  from  the  with  extended  (p.  113).  of  entangling the  web."  a  bipolar  i n  (p.  1^3)  counterforces  p a r t i c u l a r l y the  bipolar  other  tiro k i n d s  inequalities:  mainly with  following  an  environment  relations  a l l i e s ,  dealt  the  strengthening  power  (specifically  conditions,  provoke  confronted  studies  are,  can  intra-bloc  to  from  withdraw  i t  going  analysis  group  to  strained  alliances  international  conditions  that  on  emanating  desire  may be  His  comprises of  threat  "a  found  effect  changing  changed  commitment  system  of  of  alliances:  Herz  "  OAS)  the  NATO a n d  and  stronger  the  Warsaw  system. the time  words,  'equilibrium' period  more  approach  and/or  inclusive  a  than  large the  17-  e q u i l i b r i u m type of analyses discussed above and, consequently, tbe conclusions reached i n these studies are more l i k e l y t o be g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e , though perhaps l e s s accurate i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o s p e c i f i c a l l i a n c e s than the case studies of those a l l i a n c e s . A number of these authors treated a l l i a n c e s quite b r i e f l y . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n older textbooks, a l l i a n c e s i n general were considered t o be a balancing mechanism i n , or an i n t e g r a l part of, a balance of power system, w i t h more or l e s s appropriate examples given (Cf. B e l o f f , 1955,  p. 71; Claude, 1962, p. 89; H i l l , 1963, pp.  254-255;  Morgenthau,  1967, PP* 175-187; Organski, 1968, p. 277; Padelford and L i n c o l n , 1967, p. 309; Palmer and Perkins, 1967* p. 255).  These studies u s u a l l y r e f e r  t o formal m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s i n any system which might be appropriately described as a balance of power system. Other authors have dismissed the e f f e c t on a l l i a n c e s of a change i n the nature of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  Rosecrance (1966, p. 320)  suggested that as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system becomes more m u l t i - p o l a r , s i g n i f i c a n c e of s h i f t s i n a l l i a n c e s lessens, although the a r i s i n g from s h i f t i n g a l l i a n c e patterns increases.  the  uncertainty  D i n e r s t e i n (1965)  argued t h a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system changed t o a b i p o l a r power conf i g u r a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h the development of nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . As a r e s u l t , he contended, a l l i a n c e s now d i f f e r from pre-World War I I a l l i a n c e s i n three ways: (1) (2) (3)  p o l i t i c a l goals have superseded m i l i t a r y ; the r e l a t i v e power and the number of p a r t i c i p a n t states have a l t e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y ; ideology has become a major f a c t o r . (p. 593)  18.  Because of these three factors, Dinerstein suggested, alliances have become more durable and extend over a broader geographic area. He offered no evidence, however, to support the conclusion that the change in the nature of alliances can be best explained by the factors he has suggested rather than by other changes in the system.  (See Fedder, I968,  pp. 72-75). The concern with cohesion of alliances, manifested in the alliance case studies discussed above, i s also evident in these more general studies.  Stoessinger (1969, pp.  IU5-IU6,  156-157) suggested that  the cohesion of post-World War I I alliances is affected by such factors as intra-bloc p o l i t i c a l and military tensions; threat perception; and ideology.  Stoessinger's examples are drawn solely from current American  alliances, with no attempt to generalize his conclusions to other historical periods or to alliances outside of the cold war blocs. Wolfers (1962) also concentrated his attention on the subject of alliance cohesion.  Unlike Stoessinger, however, he referred to war-  time as well as peacetime alliances and to a broader historical period. He, too, noted that alliance cohesion may be undermined by a diminution of external threat, or by suspicions concerning the r e l i a b i l i t y of a l l i e d pledges of future assistance (p. 29), among other factors. A few authors have offered more complete theories of alliances, with consideration given to a number of aspects of alliances rather than just alliance formation or cohesion.  Osgood (1968) emphasized post-  World War I I American alliances, but his examples also include references to eighteenth and nineteenth century alliances and to alliances i n the  19-  two  world  wars.  He  There  are  and  they  suggested four are  accretion of  a l l i e s ,  principle  not  of  that:  power,  and  functions  necessarily internal  international  of  alliances,  mutually  exclusive:  security,  21)  (p. Osgood He  also  considered  concluded  effect  on  these  convergent the  that  a  creation,  number  aspects  interests  "alliance  the  of  of  of  of  economic  strength,  subjective  attitude  of  time  span,  alliances, alliance  including and  to  tend  to  'polar' knit  and  authors  be  systems  temporary  system f a i r l y  or  a  noted  i n  above,  structures the  have  significant  of of  such  Greek  and  military factors  systems,  importance  of  frequent  sources  Thucydides  noted  of  of  threat  alliance  over  2,000  are  tend as  years  ago,  of  particular  types  of  inter-  alliances  while to  be  did  i n  most fear  a  closely-  many  threat  As mutual  wartime  of  perceived  the  the  broad  types  that  system  probably  strategies.  and  very  alliances: Common p e r c e p t i o n s  internal  discussion  a l l  Holsti,  110).  a  paying  and  alliances  as  system,  different i n  power;  22-24).  over  included  appear  and  policy;  (pp.  cohesion, in  alliances.  divergent  city-state  analysis  system  a  foreign  international  (p.  of  alliances  alliances  'diffuse'  decline  alliances  hierarchical  noted  is,  alliances  'diffuse-bloc'  durable  discussed  a  the  structure,  that  except  that  predictable  His  of  might  pattern  examined  alliances.  and  distribution  toward  from  duration,  He  a  has  configuration  systems.  international  (1967)  examples  modern  the  and  governments  Holsti  formation,  attention national  J .  the  the  members,  stability,  K.  "determinants"  members;  capability"  duration,  alliances:  restraint  order.  of for  the  20.  is  the  only  alliance If  a l l  partners  perceive l i k e l y  solid  basis  upon which  to  organize  a  to  of  a  defensive  common e n e m y withstand  incompatibilities personality  or  strains  or  the  caused  distrust  differences  military  threat,  by  arising  between  also  values  may  modern  era,  suggested produce the  consequences  for  that  strains  and  of  alliances  (pp.  such  as  would  of  more and  reflect  alliances and  War  the  from  p o l i t i c a l  to  policies  and  serve: solely  or  Both  one  the  distribution  of  power  centuries, Liska  a l l i e s , of  small  wide  states  in  He  external  have  the  divisive  identified  on  he  on  and  he  suggested,  common  interests,  military of  concluded,  the  complementary,  ideology,  based  three  complementarity,  benefits  among  would be  l i k e l y  alliance.  variety  of  observations  about  alliances  i n  the  particular  attention  to  alliances  such  to  i n  to  varied  attraction  attention  is  in  references  paying  the  disruption.  formation  a  discussed  p o l i t i c a l  that,  may  distribution  alliance,  anecdotal  and  and  identical,  economic  an  on  of  threat  offered  social  I89-I93)  pp.  of  based  II.  based  last.  116)  I l l ,  capability  1959,  duration while  perceived  particular  cohesion, alliance  short  leaders.  117 -119)'  alliances  alliance  major  is  ideological  alliances  nuclear  Wolfers,  which  (1962)  influence paid  (in  Liska  c r e d i b i l i t y  he  An  l i k e l y  the  twentieth  World  the  very  mutually  be  members to  "interests"  be  military  of  ideological.  would  i n  development  Morgenthau types  Incompatible  coalition alliance  (pp. Holsti  an  ...  an the  of  aspects  strong  alliance, subjects  concluded threat,  that with  states  and of  of  alliances for  alliance  alliance  the other  nineteenth since  as  weak  ones,  efficacy,  formation,  primary impetus factors  such  the  as  to  but  21.  national  strength  complementarity cohesion, of  he  members,  be  or  a b i l i t y  of  the  of  be  approach,  but  his  than  w i l l  examined  analysis  of  alliance;  i t  the  "morphology" a l l i e s ;  the  (p.  of  the  run the  or  time  hand,  of  risks  i n  the in  alliance,  an  own  among  other  an  of  the  suggested  reasons  of  the  for  nature  relations,  that  the  i s ,  the  the  and  which  or  of  other  more  analyses  "key  of  cannot  equilibrium  which  issues"  to  the  form  for  an  alliance;  interaction  alliance, the  without  literature  decision form  hierarchy,  factors.  probably  the  and  of  in  the  that  deterioration manner  interests  category  may  domestic  status  systemic  or  and  cohesion  alliance,  alliances  the  change,  alliance's  studies  stability  complementary  alliance  of  Edwards  to  their  this  Alliance  a l l i e s ,  discussion example  economic  domestic  respond  diffusion  coalition  are  alliance  expansion  other  approximates  below.  i f  alliance  of  the  any;  and  w i l l  the  the  terminate,  209). Edwards  On  as  determinants of  determinants  to  the  alliances  On t h e  by  among  to  and  12-14).  enhanced  alliance  nuclear  of  style  does  be  affinity,  (pp.  consultation  the  (1969)  classified  to  role  derangement  interests  closely be  by  a l l i e s  Edwards' properly  of  members,  willingness to  appears  threat.  affected  ideological  secondary  ideology,  external  adversely  regard  a  suggested,  the  i n s t a b i l i t y  weakness,  playing  common  interests, perceived  or  the  three  basis  of  conditions ...  a  examined  anecdotal are  the  evidence  conducive  precipitating  military  f i r s t  situation,  to  issue  on  the  only:  WarsawPact,  alliances  (p.  threatening  change  a  the  desire  by  alliance he  227): in  the  dominant  formation.  hypothesized  that  22.  power the  to  increase  adversary,  influence was He  found  current though (p.  that  these  alliances the  third  of  227)  such  receiving  studies  findings,  while  of  the  rely  the  concerned Third,  the  with  of to  and  equilibrium  varying  and a  the  consequence  studies  the  coalition or  other  alliance,  than  in  of  an  objective"  concerned  extensive  On t h e  a  while with  group's  authors  i n  the  build  Although  explaining  studies theory  this  of  on  the  tendency no  work  of  others.  usually  basis  may  is  are  evidence  more  situation  coalition  there  the  the  are  previous  operate of  a  Fourth,  generally  as  formation,  of  is offer  to  some  comparable the  what  w i l l  more  be  are  given commonly  directly  they  find  there  extent  i t .  is  findings  a and  in  the  conscious  conclusions  applicable  of  their  do  predictions  the  coalition  predicting  cohesion  on  notable  the  support  they  the  aspects  some  F i r s t , to  in  emphasis  other  however,  these  and  grouped  equilibrium analyses  coalitions,  seem more how  are,  an  with  evidence  the  have  studies  literature.  experimental used  I  coalitions  There of  which  equilibrium studies,  studies  to  Sino-Soviet  while  on  these  degrees  hand,  alliances, build  of  other  to  against  its  each  the  bodies  studies  describing  effort  speculations.  effort  form  particularly  conscious  studies  the  circumstances. in  when  "more  alliances  evidence  propositions,  implicit  with  upon  explanatory  certain  may be  two  Second,  w i l l  strength  increase  to  SEATO,  attention.  anecdotal.  coalitions  allies  applied  NATO,  share  less  between  of  to  threatened.  briefly,  cohesion  generally  desire  formation.  category  the  differences  new  as  summarize  and  topic  its or  condition  formation  position  a  conditions  alliance  To equilibrium  over  weakening  its  and  than  of  the  those  of  the of  failure  the a  coalition to  authors  number  variations  of  one  specify  of  of  coalition  studies,  the  their  studies  the  this  may h e  limitations  equilibrium type  possible i n  though  explanatory dependent  tend  explanatory  to  the  variable  on  one  national i s ,  a  large  number  follow  this  by  no  on  means A  suggest  observed of  the  the  influence  variable.  have  a l l  of  second  transactions  communications,  f i f t h ,  *  studies  approach.  emphasizes  patterns,  of  And  authors  *  p o l i t i c s  trade  the  the  attention  dependent  artifact  invariably  explain  while  an  studies.  almost  to  their  degree  former  studies  variable(s),  concentrate  equilibrium category,  literature  of  some  the  variables  * While  of  to  been  the  grouped  international  approach between  student  and  above  common t o  or  among  into  p o l i t i c s inter-  states,  professional  that  exchanges,  etcetera. The  studies  category  since  space  alliances  to  except  a l l i e s  might  affect  a  vulnerable  (1964, leaders  pp.  small  might  supported  his  a  for  form  bargaining with  suggested  as  negotiation, of  which that  noted  positions;  position  are  summit  f a c i l i t a t e  agreement  hypothesis  with  among  anecdotal  might  that  not  alliance references  between members. to  negotiating power  might  a l l i e s  (p.  this  l i t t l e  relative  states  a l l i e d  into  devote  smaller  diplomacy  f a l l  affect  the  powerful  vis-a*-vis  they  which  communication,  alliances  example,  negotiating  states  126-7)  is  insofar  (1966),  l a l l  vis-Et-vis  inter-state  negotiation  procedures.  more  of  be  of i n  than  189).  Ikle  national L a l l  relations  among  24.  Communist s t a t e s .  I k l e " r e f e r r e d t o NATO and the Warsaw P a c t .  While s t u d i e s of f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n s have c o n t r i b u t e d t o our knowledge of a l l i a n c e s , s t u d i e s of other forms of communication have been more r e v e a l i n g . dyadic  a l l i a n c e employing the same type  same c o n c l u s i o n .  0. R.  Holsti  Two  analyses  inter-state  of the  Sino-Soviet  of d a t a r e p o r t r o u g h l y  ( i n T r i s k a , 1969)  little  hypothesized  the "that  i n t r a - b l o c r e l a t i o n s v a r y s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a c c o r d i n g t o the l e v e l of inter-bloc conflict." S o v i e t and  (p. 339)-  He conducted a c o n t e n t  a n a l y s i s of  45 Chinese documents i s s u e d between 1950 and 19&5>  an  39  &  concluded: A l t h o u g h t h e d a t a l e n d s t r o n g support t o the h y p o t h e s i s examined here, i t seems a d v i s a b l e t o i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s with great caution. I t would be p a r t i c u l a r l y hazardous t o conclude t h a t other f a c t o r s - such as those of p e r s o n a l i t y , i d e o l o g y , or domestic p o l i c y - p l a y no s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e ... A more t e n a b l e c o n c l u s i o n might be t h a t East-West t e n s i o n may be- a n e c e s s a r y , but i s not a s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n f o r S i n o - S o v i e t c o h e s i o n . (p. Zaninovich  (1962) conducted a s i m i l a r study w i t h a s i m i l a r  t h a t p e r c e p t u a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n i n a dyadic i n c r i s i s and n o - c r i s i s p e r i o d s  (p. 265).  some support Two S o v i e t dyad.  hypothesis:  r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l be  different  H i s p a t t e r n a n a l y s i s of  S o v i e t and Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c y statements i n a c r i s i s and a n o n - c r i s i s (May,  349)  (January,  i960)  i960) p e r i o d confirmed the h y p o t h e s i s , l e n d i n g  to Holsti's finding. other authors  examined d i f f e r e n t t r a n s a c t i o n s i n the  F r e e b e r n e ' s (1965) a n e c d o t a l a n a l y s i s of  Sino-Soviet  statements suggested t h a t r a c i a l i s s u e s p l a y an important Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t  (pp. 4 l l - 4 l 6 ) .  And  Hoeffding  Sino-  r o l e i n the  (1963) n o t e d t h a t  Sino-Soviet the  two  economic  nations Some  importance  of  increased of  integration, integrative interests p.  1964,  the  a  number  including  among  spillover  Deutsch  Jacob  the  increase  determines conducted would  i n  whether on any  appear  to  variables  rate or  of  the  conflict  (in  between  one  integrative p.  1964,  transactions  w i l l  propositions,  and  (in  to  relevance  the  success  functional  Jacob  and  growth  Toscano,  might  that  promote And  the  of  of  previous  another.  succeed.  and  Toscano,  common  deduced the  the  effectiveness;  sector  to  and  association  102)  with  enhance  Teune of  dealt  Jacob  might  quantities;  frequency  questionable  has  governmental  integration  these  have  which  that  of  not  Teune  15-16; 2 7 - 4 4 ) .  (pp.  and Toscano,  the  and  transaction  from  as  integration  homogeneity;  others  integrative  on  Jacob  of  hypothesized  260)  decreased  intensity.  literature  experience;  (in  in  transactions.  suggested  1964)  interactions  ratio  of  institutions  Wo t e s t  is  in  any  event  these  to  the  study  of  studies  inter-state  alliances.  Other alliances. position enter  authors  Waltz  relative  into  reference  to  English  centuries.  Cross  deductively  the  hypothesizing principle  (±967*  than  (in  pp.  other  alliances. to  have  He  the  nations  i n  of  search  for  this the  a  approach that  declining  and  market  study  whose  of  economic to  anecdotal  twentieth examined  1970)  model to  (p.  the  motivated  with  alliance  price."  be  and  Rosen,  to  nation  might  nineteenth  'best'  lowest  a  contention  economic  for a  suggested  Bladen,  the  search  economic  is  supported  Friedman,  "the  an  67-68)  alignments  relevance  that  taken  is  199)  no  alliances, different He  noted  in that  26.  t h e economic model i m p l i e s t h a t t h e g a i n s t o c o a l i t i o n members a r e determined e n t i r e l y b y t h e environment, p e r s o n group:  and found t h a t i n a t h r e e -  (a) any c o a l i t i o n may form;  (b) one o f t h e p l a y e r s must  r e c e i v e no g a i n s ; and ( c ) t h e r e i s no use f o r t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f which c o a l i t i o n w i l l form f i n d i n g s , C r o s s contended,  (pp. 203-205).  These  s h o u l d a p p l y t o any a l l i a n c e s i t u a t i o n so  l o n g as members a r e m o t i v a t e d t o maximize t h e i r g a i n s , and membership i n any g r o u p i n g p r e c l u d e s membership i n - a n o t h e r . Olson and Zeckhauser  (1966) s t u d i e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between  n a t i o n a l income and e x t e n t o f f u l f i l m e n t o f quotas i n NATO and t h e U l N . They found s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between s i z e o f a member's n a t i o n a l income and p r o p o r t i o n o f t h a t income spent on defense; between G.N.P. and e x t e n t o f f u l f i l m e n t o f quotas i n t h e U.N.; between n a t i o n a l income and percentage o f n a t i o n a l income devoted t o i n f r a s t r u c t u r e expenses i n NATO; and between n a t i o n a l income and t h e r a t i o o f an a l l i a n c e member's share o f t h e c o s t s o f a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t i e s b y s i l l y some members t o h i s share o f t h e c o s t s o f a c t i v i t i e s b y a l l members o f t h e a l l i a n c e .  supported supported  The a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e s e f i n d i n g s t o  a l l i a n c e s o t h e r t h a n NATO, however, remains t o be seen. Kaplan  (1957) o f f e r e d a number o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about a l l i a n c e s ,  deduced p a r t l y from game t h e o r e t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p a r t l y from systems t h e o r y , o c c a s i o n a l l y supported b y a n e c d o t a l r e f e r e n c e s t o post-World War I I alliances.  Kaplan, i n common w i t h many o f t h e o t h e r a u t h o r s  above, noted t h e importance  mentioned  o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t i n c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n and  a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n (pp. 2U-25).  He a l s o suggested t h a t a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n  27-  w i l l be i n c r e a s e d increased be  i f members' p e r c e p t i o n s  (p. 80) and t h a t a c t i o n s d i v e r g e n t  viewed as d e v i a n t  (p. 110).  o f common i n t e r e s t s a r e from t h e group norm w i l l  t h e more t h o s e norms a r e p e r c e i v e d  as l e g i t i m a t e  F i n a l l y , Kaplan suggested t h a t a l l i a n c e memberships  will  t e n d t o f l u c t u a t e more as t h e number o f ' e s s e n t i a l n a t i o n a l a c t o r s ' i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system i n c r e a s e s  ( p . 130).  A number o f s t u d i e s based on a s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l approach a l s o o f f e r r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o our knowledge o f a l l i a n c e s . Koch, and Zinnes  (i960, p. 367) o f f e r e d t h e f a m i l i a r h y p o t h e s i s :  Worth, "the  t h r e a t o f an e x t e r n a l enemy - and t h a t o f an i n t e r n a l enemy, t o o - i s l i k e l y t o i n c r e a s e t h e c o h e s i o n o f t h e 'in-group' o r g a n i z a t i o n . " p r o p o s i t i o n i s supported b y anecdotal explained  c o a l i t i o n formation  evidence.  S i m i l a r l y , Coser  (1956)  and c o h e s i o n m a i n l y i n terms o f c o n f l i c t .  B l a d e n ( i n Friedman, B l a d e n , and Rosen, 1970, p. 121) order  The  suggested t h a t , i n  f o r an a l l i a n c e t o form, i t i s "a p r e r e q u i s i t e t h a t t h e p a r t n e r s  perceive  themselves under a common t h r e a t , f a c i n g a common enemy."  c i t e d anecdotal  He  evidence from a l l i a n c e s d u r i n g and a f t e r World War I I  t o support t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n .  B l a d e n a l s o o f f e r e d a d i s t i n c t i o n between  a l l i a n c e and i n t e g r a t i o n (p. 126): S u c c e s s f u l i n t e g r a t i o n , having a s i g n i f i c a n t b a s i s i n economics, would seem t o i m p l y c o n t i n u i n g and i n c r e a s i n g b e n e f i t s . A l l i a n c e , b y c o n t r a s t , ceases t o impart b e n e f i t s t o t h e f u l l membership once t h e t h r e a t which brought i t i n t o being disappears. The t a s k s and f u n c t i o n s which t h e two p r o c e s s e s p e r f o r m a r e r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Scott  (1967) o f f e r e d a number o f u n t e s t e d p r o p o s i t i o n s about  a l l i a n c e cohesion.  He suggested c o h e s i o n w i l l be a f f e c t e d b y t h e  a l l i a n c e ' s a b i l i t y t o respond t o demands made upon i t ; amount of e x t e r n a l  28.  t h r e a t ; and the e x t e n t t o which the g o a l s of the a l l i a n c e and the g o a l s o f i n d i v i d u a l members c o i n c i d e (pp. 111-117; 227-228).  Guetzkow, ( i n  Rosenau, 1961), on the other hand, c o n c e n t r a t e d h i s a t t e n t i o n on n a t i o n s ' t e n d e n c i e s t o a c t i n i s o l a t i o n or c o l l a b o r a t i o n .  He proposed  of p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s , though he l e f t t h e i r r e l a t i v e unexamined: policies;  a number importance  a) p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e w i t h s e l f - r e l i a n t or c o l l a b o r a t i v e  b) t h e degree of i d e o l o g i c a l emphasis o r i s o l a t i o n ;  c ) the  e x t e n t t o which i s o l a t i o n o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n seems p r a c t i c a l or advantageous; and  d) t h e c u l t u r a l homogeneity of group members (pp. 154-159). F i n a l l y , we  have a few  experimental studies r e l e v a n t t o  a l l i a n c e s which do not f i t n e a t l y i n t o any of the c a t e g o r i e s d i s c u s s e d above.  These i n c l u d e s i m u l a t i o n s t u d i e s and s t u d i e s of a t t i t u d e s . Brody (1963) and Brody and Benham ( i n P r u i t t and Snyder,  I969)  examined the e f f e c t on a l l i a n c e s of t h e spread of n u c l e a r weapons i n s i m u l a t i o n experiments. hypotheses  Brody (1963* PP«  731-74l) r e j e c t e d a number of  s u g g e s t i n g a lower degree of p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t a f t e r the  s p r e a d of n u c l e a r weapons.  Brody and Benham h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t a l l i a n c e  c o h e s i o n would decrease a f t e r t h e s p r e a d of n u c l e a r weapons w i t h i n the bloc.  T h e i r s i m u l a t i o n s t u d y supported t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n : Four key elements of t h e p r e s p r e a d system were d i f f e r e n t a f t e r the spread of n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y : (a) t h r e a t e x t e r n a l t o the b l o c was reduced, (b) t h r e a t i n t e r n a l t o the b l o c was i n c r e a s e d , ( c ) the c o h e s i v e n e s s of the b l o c s was reduced, and (d) the b i p o l a r i t y was fragmented.  (I969, p. 173) Gordon and Lerner  (1965) r e p o r t e d a s t u d y of i n t e r v i e w s of European  e l i t e attitudes.  They found  (pp. 421-426) t h a t the g r e a t e r the e x t e n t t o  which e l i t e s p e r c e i v e the enemy as t h r e a t e n i n g , the g r e a t e r t h e i r  29.  r e l i a n c e on the b l o c leader and the greater t h e i r  f a i t h i n the a l l i a n c e .  Summary The s t u d i e s d i s c u s s e d above approach the t o p i c of a l l i a n c e s i n a v a r i e t y of ways yet reach a number of s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s .  Some  authors i n almost every category have suggested t h a t a l l i a n c e cohesion w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t e d by e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . u t i l i z i n g different  A number of s t u d i e s  approaches have reported a r e l a t i o n s h i p between  a l l i a n c e cohesion and n a t i o n a l power.  Power has quite often been  advanced as a s i g n i f i c a n t determinant of c o a l i t i o n or a l l i a n c e formation. Such f a c t o r s as i d e o l o g y and c u l t u r a l , h i s t o r i c a l , and  attitudinal  homogeneity have been f r e q u e n t l y advanced as having important f o r a l l i a n c e cohesion and e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  implications,  And the nature of the  inter-  n a t i o n a l system has often been l i n k e d i n a more or l e s s c a u s a l manner, the c a u s a t i o n being i m p l i e d r a t h e r than demonstrated, t o a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n , cohesion, and d u r a t i o n . In s h o r t , the s t u d i e s d i s c u s s e d above u t i l i z e methodologies and d a t a , often w i t h d i f f e r e n t d e a l w i t h d i f f e r i n g l e v e l s of a n a l y s i s .  varying  primary concerns, and  N e v e r t h e l e s s , the  findings  of these d i s p a r a t e analyses l a r g e l y converge, p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e cohesion and e x t e r n a l  threat.  30.  TABLE  I  SUMMARY OF LITERATURE  S m a l l Group Studies  Equilibrium: a) Case Studies  OH ALLIANCES  Level of Explanation  Generality  Type of Evidence  T a r g e t of Explanation  s m a l l group  medium-low  experimental  coalition f o r m a t i o n and cohesion.  anecdotal  alliance formation, cohesion, disruption.  anecdotal  alliance formation, cohesion, interaction.  alliance  low  b) Regional  international system  c) General  international system  high  anecdotal  alliance formation, cohesion, disruption, effectiveness, duration.  Transaction Models  alliance; international system  medium-low  aggregate data  alliance cohesion.  Economic Models  national attributes  medium-high  aggregate data  alliance formation, effectiveness •  deductive; anecdotal  alliance formation, cohesion.  StructuralFunctional  system  medium-high  high  31.  A p a r t from the s i m i l a r i t y of a number of the f i n d i n g s t h e r e a r e some i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s and examined h e r e .  reached,  s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the s t u d i e s  T a b l e I summarizes the modal l e v e l of e x p l a n a t i o n ,  g e n e r a l i t y of f i n d i n g s , t y p e of evidence employed, and t a r g e t of e x p l a n a t i o n or dependent v a r i a b l e ( s ) of t h e v a r i o u s approaches t o a n a l y s i s of a l l i a n c e s d i s c u s s e d above. Two alliances:  c o n c l u s i o n s are suggested b y the s t a t e of our knowledge of  f i r s t , we know more about a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n and  alliance  f o r m a t i o n than about such o t h e r a s p e c t s of a l l i a n c e s as t h e i r  effective-  ness i f c a l l e d i n t o f o r c e or t h e d u r a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t types of a l l i a n c e s in different situations. and f o r m a t i o n i s based and  Second, what we  do know about a l l i a n c e  l a r g e l y on a n e c d o t a l , i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  on e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s of s m a l l groups,  cohesion  evidence  t h e r e l e v a n c e of whose  f i n d i n g s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s s h o u l d be e m p i r i c a l l y  determined  r a t h e r t h a n assumed. Two  d i f f e r e n t r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g i e s a r e , i n t u r n , suggested  these conclusions.  F i r s t , we  might c o n c e n t r a t e our. a t t e n t i o n on those  a s p e c t s of a l l i a n c e s about which we we might devote  by  know r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e ;  or,  second,  our r e s o u r c e s t o g a i n i n g more r e l i a b l e , more s p e c i f i c  knowledge about a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n and c o h e s i o n .  In the a n a l y s i s which  f o l l o w s , I have chosen t o pursue b o t h of t h e s e s t r a t e g i e s . c h a p t e r s r e p o r t the r e s u l t s of an attempt  The  t o examine the impact  c o h e s i o n of KATO and t h e Warsaw P a c t of two  independent  remaining on the  variables:  e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , which has been o f t e n d i s c u s s e d i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n ; and n a t i o n a l power, which has r e c e i v e d  comparatively l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n i n discussions of a l l i a n c e cohesion despite the p o s s i b i l i t y that growth i n n a t i o n a l power may be an important f a c t o r i n the d e c l i n i n g cohesion of an a l l i a n c e .  CHAPTER II  DISSENSION IN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT The subject of the cohesion of NATO has received considerable attention, increasingly so since the late  1950s !  when de Gaulle openly  began to express French discontent with the a l l i a n c e .  Similarly, there  have been open r i f t s i n the communist bloc since the 1956  crises i n  Hungary and Poland, though these r i f t s are often discussed i n the context of the entire communist bloc rather than with e x p l i c i t reference to the Warsaw Pact.  To some extent, t h i s i s also true of NATO: many of the  references are to decreasing cohesion i n the "Atlantic a l l i a n c e , " with no direct statement as to whether the author i s referring to NATO or to the informal friendship and alignment of nations i n the Atlantic area, quite apart from their membership i n the NATO a l l i a n c e . Despite this d i f f i c u l t y of differentiating the Communist and Atlantic blocs from their respective m i l i t a r y alliances, i t seems clear that growing disunity i s an important problem i n both opposing alliances. After the withdrawal of France from m i l i t a r y participation i n NATO, Spaak  (1967,  p.  199)  wrote:  People say that there i s a c r i s i s i n the Atlantic A l l i a n c e , and unfortunately they are r i g h t . Those who have l i v e d with the Alliance have heard a good deal of talk about crises but this time, i f I am not very much mistaken, the c r i s i s i s a r e a l one. It i s no minor matter when one of the most important members of the Alliance withdraws from NATO. This discontent with NATO has not been confined to France.  Both Canada  and the United States have recently withdrawn some of their forces from Europe.  The American withdrawals, to be sure, can be partly explained  3k.  by t h e p r e s s u r e  of the war  i n Vietnam and balance  but p a r t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n may among a t l e a s t (1969, pp. suggested  of payment  a l s o l i e i n growing disenchantment  some American p o l i c y - m a k e r s  w i t h the a l l i a n c e .  335-336) and Enthoven and Smith (1969, p. 581)  Harrison  have  a number of f a c t o r s which might promote a decrease  American commitments t o NATO:  difficulties,  in  the h i g h monetary c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g  American m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n Europe; the u n w i l l i n g n e s s or i n a b i l i t y  of  the European KATO members t o meet the m i l i t a r y f o r c e l e v e l s c a l l e d f o r b y KATO c o u n c i l s ; t h e r e d u c t i o n i n the S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h r e a t ; and possibility  t h a t n u c l e a r armaments have r e n d e r e d  Germany has m a i n t a i n e d  alliance  i t s m i l i t a r y involvement  the  superfluous. i n KATO, but'  t h e Germans have i n c r e a s i n g l y v o i c e d d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e i r l a c k of s t a t u s i n the a l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e g a r d t o the i s s u e of n u c l e a r weapons.  K r e s s l e r , f o r example, concluded  (1966, p.  233):  The F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c b e l i e v e s t h a t the U.S. quest f o r a t r e a t y t o p r e v e n t the f u r t h e r d i s s e m i n a t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons d i m i n i s h e s the p r o s p e c t s f o r o b t a i n i n g f o r Bonn an i n c r e a s e d v o i c e i n NATO n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y ... Should the p r i n c i p l e of KATO n u c l e a r s h a r i n g be s u b o r d i n a t e d t o the p r i n c i p l e of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t German d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h KATO w i l l r i s e . Germany has ceased  t o be a yes-man i n KATO as German power and  a t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l The  community have grown.  s m a l l e r KATO members have a l s o begun t o r e a s s e s s  commitments t o t h e a l l i a n c e .  their  In Norway, f o r example, the i s s u e of  c o n t i n u e d membership i n NATO was Korwegian p a r l i a m e n t .  particip-  debated i n the 1967-68 s e s s i o n of the  A motion t o withdraw from the a l l i a n c e  d e f e a t e d , b u t a t l e a s t one author  concluded  t h a t the v i e w p o i n t s  was expressed  35.  i n the debate were f a r more d i v e r s i f i e d than the voting indicated and that "the general tendency of the debate was not at a l l characterized by status quo thinking."  (Hansen, 1969* P« 235)  S i m i l a r l y , i n Denmark  doubts have been expressed concerning the d e s i r a b i l i t y of continued membership i n NATO (Haekkerup, 1969, pp. 348-350). In the case of the Warsaw Pact, strains began to appear only a year a f t e r the formation of the a l l i a n c e i n 1955-  C-omulka demanded  new terms f o r m i l i t a r y collaboration with the Soviet Union when he took power i n Poland i n 1956 and Imre Nagy voiced opposition t o the Warsaw Treaty during the Hungarian c r i s i s of 1956 (ionescu, 1965* pp. 4 9 - 5 0 ) . On October 31* 1956, Nagy "revealed that he was beginning negotiations f o r Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact."  (Brzezinski, I967* p. 2 3 1 ) .  The following day, Hungary formally requested withdrawal of the Soviet army, whose presence i n Hungary had been l e g a l i z e d by the Warsaw Pact, from the country; asked t o be released from the a l l i a n c e ; and o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed n e u t r a l i t y (Wesson, 1969* p. 2 9 8 ; Brzezinski, 1967, The Soviet response was invasion of Hungary.  p. 2 3 1 ) .  The Hungarian demands were  ignored, the Soviet Union took over, and the dissident Hungarian Army was disbanded: ... i t was not u n t i l the mid-1960's that Hungarian d i v i s i o n s were once again able t o j o i n the active ranks of the Warsaw Pact, and even today the Hungarian Army numbers only a l i t t l e over half of the eleven-division strong force which f a i l e d t o support the Soviet cause i n October 1956. (Mackintosh, I969, pp. 3-4) Albania's r e l a t i o n s with the Soviet Union deteriorated throughout the 1950's, as Sino-Albanian r e l a t i o n s became more and more f r i e n d l y .  36.  In 1 9 6 l , diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between the Soviet Union and A l b a n i a were broken o f f ; and by I 9 6 2 , A l b a n i a had ceased t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n Warsaw Pact a c t i v i t i e s , though the Albanians d i d not f o r m a l l y denounce the Warsaw Treaty u n t i l 1968 (Cf. B r z e z i n s k i , 1967, P- ^57; Mackintosh, I969, P.  9).  B u l g a r i a and East Germany have continued t o support the p o l i c i e s of the Soviet Union (Wesson, 1969,  pp. 368-369) but Rumania has  grown i n c r e a s i n g l y independent and Czechoslavakia has been l e s s than enchanted w i t h Soviet f o r e i g n p o l i c y since I 9 6 8 , i f not before.  In the  mid-1960's, Rumania "began t o reserve the r i g h t t o take her own decisions i n f o r e i g n and defence p o l i c y . " (Mackintosh, 1969, P- 9)  The Rumanians  have repeatedly urged the a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y b l o c s , withdrawal of f o r e i g n troops from other c o u n t r i e s , and development of b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the West (Mackintosh, 1969, p. 9; Wesson, I969, p. 367).  The  Rumanian armed forces have been: ... somewhat withdrawn from j o i n t Warsaw Pact a c t i v i t i e s . The I966 f a l l maneuvers i n Czechoslovakia took place without any s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Rumanian u n i t s . Former plans charging the Rumanian People's Army w i t h coordinated offensive tasks as part of Soviet s t r a t e g y against Western Europe have been changed. ( L i e s s , i n C o l l i e r and Glaser, eds., 1967, P> 176) No j o i n t m i l i t a r y exercises of the Pact members were held i n Rumania between 1964 and  1969.  Mackintosh  (1969, P-  10)  noted t h a t Czechoslovakian spokesmen  were expressing some doubts about the u t i l i t y of the Warsaw Pact as e a r l y as 1966.  He o f f e r e d the f o l l o w i n g observation concerning the e f f e c t of  the Soviet i n v a s i o n of Czechoslovakia i n 1968 (p. 15):  37The main legacy of the c r i s i s as f a r as the Warsaw Pact i s concerned i s that Czechoslovakia ... has become deeply a n t i - S o v i e t , imbued w i t h f e e l i n g s of d i s t r u s t and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t which w i l l not be e a s i l y overcome. Wesson, however  (1969,  pp.  390-391)  concluded t h a t the Czechs w i l l be  more l i k e l y t o pursue a f a i r l y submissive f o r e i g n p o l i c y , p a r t l y i n order t o gain more freedom i n domestic a f f a i r s .  Whether Czechoslovakia  w i l l , i n f a c t , now pursue a more independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y remains t o be seen. While the existence of a r i f t i n each of these two a l l i a n c e s i s quite obvious, the causes of these r i f t s are not so obvious.  In some  cases, a t l e a s t the immediate explanatory f a c t o r s are f a i r l y apparent: the Invasion i n the case of Czechoslovakia; the i d e o l o g i c a l dispute between A l b a n i a and the Soviet Union; the demands of the French f o r more i n f l u e n c e i n European a f f a i r s ; and the high cost of maintaining American p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n European defence while the United States i s engaged i n a c o s t l y m i l i t a r y exercise i n Vietnam. In other cases, however, the causes of dissension are not so e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d and even the f a c t o r s commonly mentioned i n connection w i t h France, A l b a n i a , and other nations may not c o n s t i t u t e a s u f f i c i e n t explanation.  The i n v a s i o n of Czechoslovakia and French demands f o r  reorganization of NATO's s t r u c t u r e were c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t and immediate i s s u e s , but we cannot be c e r t a i n t h a t such issues were the underlying causes of dissension i n the a l l i a n c e s . The purpose of t h i s paper i s not, however, t o examine the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the e f f e c t of s p e c i f i c issues on cohesion of NATO and  38.  the Warsaw P a c t .  The purpose i s , r a t h e r , an i n q u i r y i n t o the  applicability  of p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s and h y p o t h e s i s c o n c e r n i n g a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n t o t h e s e two p a r t i c u l a r a l l i a n c e s . i n Chapter  I , two  In the l i t e r a t u r e which i s summarized  e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s commonly l i n k e d t o a l l i a n c e  c o h e s i o n a r e e x t e r n a l t h r e a t and the power of a l l i a n c e members.  We  have,  t h e n , two g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s : P r o p o s i t i o n One:  The  g r e a t e r the e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , t h e h i g h e r the  l e v e l of c o h e s i o n i n an P r o p o s i t i o n Two:  alliance.  In an a l l i a n c e of s t a t e s of unequal power, the commitment of i n d i v i d u a l members t o the  alliance  w i l l decrease as t h e i r n a t i o n a l power i n c r e a s e s . Osgood  (1968, p. 67) suggested t h a t "Rumania's independent  c o u r s e i s c h i e f l y a p r o d u c t of growing economic s t r e n g t h and a s t a b l e , u n i f i e d p o l i t i c a l regime b a s i n g i t s a p p e a l on r e s u r g e n t n a t i o n a l i s m . " Osgood a l s o c o n c l u d e d t h a t d i m i n i s h e d East-West t e n s i o n f a c i l i t a t e d p u r s u i t o f an independent degrees,  the  c o u r s e , and t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s , t o v a r y i n g  a l s o f a c i l i t a t e d i n c r e a s e d independence of other E a s t European  n a t i o n s (pp.  67-68).  Jamgotch  (1968, p. 63) noted t h a t the n a t i o n a l  armies and m i l i t a r y p l a n n i n g of the Warsaw Pact members are dominated b y t h e S o v i e t Union. domination would be  I t might be r e a s o n a b l e t o expect t h a t t h i s i n c r e a s i n g l y q u e s t i o n e d as the power of the E a s t  European s t a t e s grew. i n Europe.  He  Jamgotch, t o o , mentioned the impact  suggested t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t " v e r y l i t t l e  o r i g i n a l expressed o b j e c t i v e s has been accomplished"  of the  detente  i n support of  (p. 65)  b y the  Warsaw P a c t might be p a r t l y e x p l a i n e d b y the d i m i n i s h e d t h r e a t .  39.  S i m i l a r l y , Aspaturian  c o n c l u d e d t h a t detente was one o f t h e f a c t o r s which  a l l o w e d some o f t h e E a s t European s t a t e s t o " g r a d u a l l y p r y themselves l o o s e " from S o v i e t hegemony.  (1966, p . 33)  Hopmann (1969) compared t h e degree o f a t t i t u d i n a l c o - o r i e n t a t i o n among members o f NATO and o f t h e Communist b l o c , i n c l u d i n g non-Warsaw Pact members, i n p e r i o d s  o f i n t e n s e c o n f l i c t and i n p e r i o d s  of detente.  He found t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p between e x t e r n a l and  conflict  degree o f consensus does appear t o be c o n f i r m e d i n NATO and t h e  Communist b l o c , though w i t h some r e s e r v a t i o n ( p . 199): D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s o f most i n t e n s e c o n f l i c t between members o f t h e two a l l i a n c e systems, t h e degree o f a t t i t u d i n a l consensus g e n e r a l l y tends t o i n c r e a s e ; c o n v e r s e l y , d u r i n g p e r i o d s o f r e l a t i v e detente between t h e two major b l o c s , t h e degree o f c o o r i e n t a t i o n among a l l i e s t e n d s , b u t n o t n e c e s s a r i l y , to decline. Hopmann based t h i s c o n c l u s i o n on a c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y statements by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f e i g h t NATO members and e l e v e n  Communist  b l o c c o u n t r i e s i n t h e y e a r s 1950, 1955, 19^3, and 1965. A number o f o t h e r a u t h o r s have a l s o d i s c u s s e d ..the impact o f decreasing 1964,  e x t e r n a l t h r e a t on NATO c o h e s i o n .  Marshall  p . 19) concluded t h a t growing detente was h a v i n g a d i s i n t e g r a t i v e  e f f e c t on t h e a l l i a n c e .  Gasteyger (1967, p . 319) remarked on t h e d e c l i n e  o f i n t e r e s t i n NATO "as a consequence o f d e t e n t e . "  93),  Orvik  (1966, pp. 92-  H a r r i s o n (1969} p . 335), and K i s s i n g e r ( i n Roach, 1967, pp. 10-22)  have a l l noted t h e d i m i n i s h e d NATO.  ( i n Wolfers,  m i l i t a r y t h r e a t i n Europe and i t s e f f e c t on  In t h e wake o f t h e i n c r e a s e d l e v e l o f t e n s i o n generated by t h e  C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n c r i s i s o f 1968, P f a l t z g r a f f (1969, pp. 218-220) demonstrated,  ko.  NATO members i n c r e a s e d t h e i r f o r c e l e v e l s and improved the p l a n n i n g  machinery and  military capabilities  c o n s u l t a t i o n procedures of  and  the  alliance. Calvocoressi  (1966, p. 361) suggested t h a t one cause of  d i s s e n s i o n i n NATO has been the  l a r g e d i s p a r i t y i n the r e l a t i v e  o f members of the a l l i a n c e , and  t h a t i f the  the a l l i a n c e ,  such as B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , and  p l a y a r o l e i n the a l l i a n c e  stronger  strengths  "minor" members of  Canada, are not a l l o w e d t o  commensurate w i t h t h e i r power  c a p a b i l i t i e s , the c o h e s i o n of the a l l i a n c e w i l l s u f f e r  and  (p.  360).  (1968, pp. 23-24) h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t the d i s t r i b u t i o n  Osgood  o f m i l i t a r y power i n an a l l i a n c e would have an important e f f e c t the  continuation  o f such n a t i o n s  or d e c l i n e of the a l l i a n c e . as F r a n c e , Germany, and  between them and the U n i t e d class  s t a t u s i n NATO.  power d i s c r e p a n c y  between the U n i t e d  relationship  t h e i r concern over t h e i r  S t a t e s and  between e x t e r n a l t h r e a t and  second-  a l s o been mentioned i n s p e c i f i c a n a l y s e s  i s a source  States  belongs.  alliance  studies discussed  though perhaps more o f t e n w i t h r e f e r e n c e Pact.  her a l l i e s  t o which the U n i t e d  encountered q u i t e o f t e n i n the v a r i o u s t h e n , has  disparity  (1962, p. 212) a l s o suggested t h a t the  of t e n s i o n i n the v a r i o u s a l l i a n c e s The  dissatisfaction  I t a l y w i t h the power  S t a t e s , and  Wolfers  He noted the  on  cohesion  i n Chapter I ,  of t h e s e two  alliances,  t o NATO t h a n t o the Warsaw  In some form or o t h e r , the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t growing East-West  d e t e n t e t o some e x t e n t  accounts f o r the d i m i n i s h e d  major post-war a l l i a n c e s  c o h e s i o n of the  has been q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y advanced.  two  It w i l l  be r e c a l l e d t h a t s i m i l a r f i n d i n g s have been encountered i n such d i s p a r a t e  hi.  s t u d i e s as  s m a l l group experiments, a n a l y s e s  t r a n s a c t i o n between n a t i o n - s t a t e dyads, and the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g i o n and  question  of v e r b a l and  behavioral  s t u d i e s a t the l e v e l of  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, among o t h e r s .  o f the c o m p a r a b i l i t y of the a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s  The  employed  i n t h e s e s t u d i e s a s i d e , the convergence of the f i n d i n g s suggests t h a t changes i n e x t e n t alliance  of e s t e r n a l t h r e a t m e r i t a t t e n t i o n i n a s t u d y of  cohesion. While some a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o the impact of d i f f e r e n c e s  i n r e l a t i v e power among members of an a l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o power d i s c r e p a n c i e s between the l e a d e r of the a l l i a n c e and comparatively  l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o the i n f l u e n c e of  a b s o l u t e power of n a t i o n s suggestion  on a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n .  We  economically  and m i l i t a r i l y ,  And  to  i n NATO the growth i n power, e s p e c i a l l y  of Germany and France l e d t o  demands f o r g r e a t e r say b y t h e s e two  increased  c o u n t r i e s i n the a f f a i r s of  the  F r a n c e ' s growing power, h i g h l i g h t e d by the a c q u i s i t i o n of  n u c l e a r weapons, may  not have been a s u f f i c i e n t cause of the F r e n c h  d e c i s i o n t o pursue a course independent of NATO, but  i t could  be  argued t h a t s u f f i c i e n t power t o enable France t o r e l y on her own was  the  do have the  t h a t Rumania's growing independence i s l a r g e l y due  growing economic s t r e n g t h .  alliance.  other members,  a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r F r e n c h w i t h d r a w a l from the  C e r t a i n l y t h i s was  resources  alliance.  a t l e a s t a major p a r t o f , i f not the whole, r a t i o n a l e  f o r F r a n c e ' s development of n u c l e a r weapons: c o n t r o l over American weapons, c o u l d not be  t h a t France had  no  c e r t a i n of American  i n the event of a n u c l e a r a t t a c k on F r a n c e , and  must, t h e r e f o r e ,  support be  42.  p r e p a r e d t o defend  herself.  A s i m i l a r p r o c e s s may w e l l have o p e r a t e d i n t h e Warsaw P a c t . S u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h t o have c o n f i d e n c e i n s u r v i v i n g on h e r own may have sparked t h e d e c l i n e i n commitment o f , f o r example, Rumania t o the Warsaw P a c t . cut  A i d from China t o A l b a n i a enabled t h e A l b a n i a n s t o  t h e i r t i e s w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union, and E a s t e r n Europe, w i t h o u t  f a l l i n g f l a t on t h e i r f a c e s . It  seems p l a u s i b l e , then, t h a t i n c r e a s e s i n n a t i o n a l power may  l e a d t o d i m i n i s h e d commitment t o a l l i a n c e s on t h e p a r t o f those n a t i o n s . Though we cannot be c e r t a i n t h a t i n c r e a s e d power causes  alliance  d i s s e n s i o n , t h e n o t i o n t h a t power i n c r e a s e s a r e a n e c e s s a r y or important c o n d i t i o n f o r p u r s u i t o f an independent worthy o f examination  f o r e i g n p o l i c y would seem t o be  ( C f . Morgenthau, 1957; and S t e e l , 1964, pp. 34-37)-  To some e x t e n t , a d e s c r i p t i o n o f a b s o l u t e n a t i o n a l power a v o i d t a p p i n g , as w e l l , t h e concepts inconsistency.  cannot  o f r e l a t i v e power and s t a t u s  T a k i n g t h e f i f t e e n NATO members, f o r example, i f we  compare t h e r e l a t i v e power base d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e U.S. and each of  t h e o t h e r f o u r t e e n members i n a g i v e n year, what we a r e , i n e f f e c t ,  d o i n g i s s u b t r a c t i n g a c o n s t a n t from t h e power base o f each o f t h e members. U.S.  Looked a t t h i s way, comparing t h e power base r e l a t i v e t o t h e  o f t h e f o u r t e e n NATO n a t i o n s i s t h e same t h i n g as comparing t h e i r  n a t i o n a l power bases.  F o r an i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r y , however, comparing  i t s power base r e l a t i v e t o t h e U.S. f o r d i f f e r e n t years i s n o t t h e same as comparing a n n u a l f i g u r e s f o r t h a t c o u n t r y ' s a b s o l u t e power b a s e , s i n c e t h e f i g u r e s f o r t h e U.S., i n t h i s case, a r e n o t c o n s t a n t .  43-  F i g u r e s measuring a b s o l u t e  n a t i o n a l power a l s o t a p  i n c o n s i s t e n c y , t h a t i s , the d i f f e r e n c e between a n a t i o n ' s status  ( i t s power) and  i t s ''ascribed' s t a t u s  d e f e r e n c e g i v e n t o i t b y other n a t i o n s ) . t h a t i f achieved  consistency. may  be  The  T a n t o l o g i c a l l y , we  the  may  note  constant,  same as measuring s t a t u s i n -  measures of n a t i o n a l power base employed below, t h e n ,  s a i d t o i n d i c a t e s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n the a l l i a n c e s t o  e x t e n t t h a t the mained  s t a t u s i s the  'achieved'  ( i t s p r e s t i g e and  s t a t u s v a r i e s but a s c r i b e d s t a t u s remains  t h e n measuring a c h i e v e d  status  s t a t u s a s c r i b e d t o members of the a l l i a n c e s has  the re-  constant. In the Warsaw P a c t , member c o u n t r i e s have advanced somewhat  i n a s c r i b e d s t a t u s t h r o u g h i n c r e a s e d m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of the a l l i a n c e .  They have, as w e l l , become somewhat l e s s  dependent upon the S o v i e t Union f o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y g u i d e l i n e s . may  i n d i c a t e a feedback problem:  power i n c r e a s e s may  d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , d r i v e s f o r g r e a t e r  This  have produced,  independence which, i n t u r n ,  d e c r e a s e d the amount of s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y which c o u l d have o r i g i n a l l y been the spur t o g r e a t e r independence i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  Nevertheless,  the a l l i a n c e members do remain under the d i r e c t i o n of the S o v i e t Union and  any attempt t o withdraw from t h i s t u t e l a g e may  b y the of  same r e a c t i o n as o c c u r r e d  be  expected t o be  i n the case o f the C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n  met crisis  I968. The S o v i e t Union remains the u n d i s p u t e d l e a d e r of the a l l i a n c e .  S i m i l a r l y , demands by France and,  t o a l e s s e r but  s t i l l noticeable  Germany and B r i t a i n , f o r more say i n NATO a f f a i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n t r o l o f n u c l e a r weapons, have been met  by American  extent,  regarding  intransigence.  kk.  The d i s t i n c t i o n i s less clear-cut than i n the Warsaw Pact since American leadership has not been undisputed, hut the U.S.  remains the most  important member of the a l l i a n c e with a greater measure of c o n t r o l over NATO strategies and p o l i c i e s than the other members.  In one sense, then,  the ascribed statuses of the members of the two a l l i a n c e s have remained roughly the same. A further consideration with regard to the e f f e c t of increases i n national power on a nation's r e l a t i o n s with an a l l i a n c e t o which i t belongs i s the d i f f e r e n t e f f e c t such increases might have i n p l u r a l i s t i c and authoritarian states.  As 0. R. H o l s t i and S u l l i v a n  (1969, p. 158), among others, have noted, ... i n a p l u r a l i s t i c system foreign p o l i c y e l i t e s operate under s i g n i f i c a n t constraints against sudden and complete changes i n p o l i c y . These include multiple i n t e r n a l and external channels of communication, r e l a t i v e freedom f o r divergent interests to make p o l i t i c a l demands and a l i m i t e d a b i l i t y of top leaders to mobilize a l l p o l i t i c a l l y relevant groups and i n s t i t u t i o n s i n support of t h e i r p o l i c i e s . Since there are these constraints on foreign p o l i c y changes i n a pluralistic  society, which are inoperative or at least less important  i n an authoritarian society, we might expect that changes i n a l l i a n c e cohesion, whether as a r e s u l t of increased national power, diminished external threat, or other f a c t o r s , would be more l i k e l y to occur i n authoritarian than i n p l u r a l i s t i c  systems.  This d i s t i n c t i o n suggests, f i r s t , that we might expect power increases of a l l i a n c e members and diminished external threat to have a greater e f f e c t on the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact than on the cohesion  of NAT©, s i n c e the Warsaw Pact has,  c l e a r l y , the more m o n o l i t h i c  s t r u c t u r e and NATO the more p l u r a l i s t i c And  second, we  s t r u c t u r e of the two a l l i a n c e s .  might expect t h a t the more a u t h o r i t a r i a n members of  each a l l i a n c e w i l l show g r e a t e r evidence of d i m i n i s h e d t h e i r a l l i a n c e s under c o n d i t i o n s diminished  of i n c r e a s e d n a t i o n a l power  e x t e r n a l t h r e a t t h a n w i l l the more p l u r a l i s t i c  members of the  same a l l i a n c e s .  and  or democratic  I t i s not an e a s y matter, of c o u r s e ,  t o d i s t i n g u i s h a u t h o r i t a r i a n and p l u r a l i s t i c the two  commitment t o  a l l i a n c e s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n :  n a t i o n s w i t h i n each of  a l l of the Warsaw Pact members  are u s u a l l y r e g a r d e d as a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and most of the NATO members as pluralistic. and  However, i n the Warsaw P a c t Rumania and perhaps Hungary,  more r e c e n t l y C z e c h o s l o v a k i a ,  might be r e g a r d e d as a t l e a s t some-  what l e s s a u t h o r i t a r i a n than such other a l l i a n c e members as Germany, B u l g a r i a , and  Poland.  In NATO, P o r t u g a l and  East  Greece have been  l e s s p l u r a l i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d s o c i e t i e s than Canada, Norway, or N e t h e r l a n d s ; and France under de G a u l l e has terms v a g u e l y r e m i n i s c e n t In s h o r t , t h e r e for  o f t e n been d e s c r i b e d  the in  of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i c t a t o r s h i p . i s considerable  support i n the  literature  the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t d e c l i n i n g e x t e r n a l t h r e a t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y  l i n k e d to diminished  a l l i a n c e cohesion.  i n n a t i o n a l power t o d i m i n i s h e d f r e q u e n t l y i n previous  Discussions  r e l a t i n g growth  a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n are encountered l e s s  s t u d i e s , however, the n o t i o n t h a t  sufficient  n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h i s n e c e s s a r y t o a l l o w f o r some c o n f i d e n c e v i a b i l i t y of a p o l i c y of  'going i t a l o n e '  between n a t i o n a l power growth and  i n the  suggests t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p  a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n may  be worthy of  e m p i r i c a l examination.  In the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r , t h e n , the r e s e a r c h  d e s i g n and s p e c i f i c hypotheses, which g u i d e d the e m p i r i c a l which f o l l o w s , a r e p r e s e n t e d .  analysis  CHAPTER  III  RESEARCH DESIGN AND  HYPOTHESES  Because n a t i o n - s t a t e s a r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l y  reluctant to  a l l o w s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t o conduct experiments w i t h t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , the data on a s u b j e c t such as the c o h e s i o n  of an  alliance  must be e i t h e r drawn from the i n f o r m a t i o n which i s made a v a i l a b l e or c r e a t e d i n an analogous atmosphere, as i n the s i m u l a t i o n s t u d i e s b y Brody and h i s a s s o c i a t e s mentioned i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r . When, as i s the case here, the aim of the r e s e a r c h i s an  examination  of the r e l e v a n c e of a p r o p o s i t i o n or p r o p o s i t i o n s t o two  specific  a l l i a n c e s , the former r e s e a r c h s t r a t e g y i s d i c t a t e d . Temporal Domain In a study of NATO and the Warsaw P a c t , the u s u a l problems o f data c o l l e c t i o n and  d e r i v a t i o n o f v a l i d i n d i c a t o r s of the v a r i a b l e s  employed a r e p r e s e n t , a l o n g w i t h the added d i f f i c u l t y of a t r u n c a t e d t e m p o r a l domain.  NATO was  formed i n 19^9,  but Greece and Turkey d i d  not become members of the a l l i a n c e u n t i l 1952, 1955-  and Germany not  A c c o r d i n g l y , d a t a were c o l l e c t e d from 19^9  t o 1969  until  whenever  p o s s i b l e , though Greece, Turkey, and Germany w i l l not e n t e r i n t o the a n a l y s i s u n t i l t h e dates  of t h e i r e n t r y i n t o the a l l i a n c e .  withdrew from m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n NATO i n  France  I966, but d i d not  f o r m a l l y withdraw from the T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n i t s e l f and  i s , there-  f o r e , i n c l u d e d i n the a n a l y s i s throughout. A l b a n i a ceased t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Warsaw P a c t i n but d i d not f o r m a l l y withdraw from the a l l i a n c e u n t i l 1968.  19^2, Albania  U8.  must, then, be c o n s i d e r e d a member u n t i l the l a t t e r d a t e . P a c t was NATO.  formed i n 1955,  i n response  The Warsaw  t o the e n t r y of West Germany i n t o  As w i t h NATO, however, d a t a were c o l l e c t e d from 19^9  whenever p o s s i b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the independent  onwards  v a r i a b l e s , f o r use  i n c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h a time l a g . Measurement of the V a r i a b l e s The dependent v a r i a b l e , c o h e s i o n of an a l l i a n c e , has been o p e r a t i o n a l l y d e f i n e d f o r purposes  of the a n a l y s i s below as  alliance  members' v e r b a l or b e h a v i o r a l commitment t o the a l l i a n c e or a t t i t u d i n a l c o - o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h each o t h e r .  Three i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n have  been employed f o r the NATO a l l i a n c e :  each member's t r o o p commitments  t o t h e a l l i a n c e ; e x t e n t of v o t i n g agreement i n the U n i t e d Nations G e n e r a l Assembly; and a s u r v e y of the New Warsaw P a c t , o n l y the l a t t e r two  York Times Index.  F o r the  i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n a r e employed  s i n c e Warsaw Pact members do not commit a s p e c i f i c p r o p o r t i o n of t h e i r f o r c e s t o t h e a l l i a n c e as do NATO members, or a t l e a s t i f t h e y do the i n f o r m a t i o n has not been r e l e a s e d . The  f i r s t c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r , t r o o p commitments t o the  a l l i a n c e , i s the weakest i n terms of d a t a a v a i l a b i l i t y .  For the  Warsaw P a c t , the i n d i c a t o r i s i r r e l e v a n t ; f o r NATO t h e s e d a t a are o n l y a v a i l a b l e f o r a l l a l l i a n c e members i n The M i l i t a r y Balance, p u b l i s h e d b y t h e I n s t i t u t e of S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , and  o n l y a few  t h e more r e c e n t i s s u e s of t h i s publication-'- are a v a i l a b l e t o t h e  1  See Appendix A f o r i n f o r m a t i o n on d a t a  sources.  of  49-  present author.  Nevertheless, since troop commitments to the alliance  seem to indicate f a i r l y directly the members' commitments to NATO, these data are employed in the analysis to the limited extent possible. There i s an additional difficulty with the use of troop commitments as an indicator of NATO cohesion.  The most satisfactory  method of transforming the raw data on proportion of forces committed to the alliance into usable form would be to express those commitments as a percentage or fraction of the force goals which are periodically suggested by the alliance as a whole for each member country.  This  procedure, however, could not be followed. Although Britain, the U.S., and West Germany have given some indication of their force goals, other NATO members have not, so there remain three obstacles to assessment of NATO force goals (U.S. Congressional Record, January 19, I967, p. 999): First, i t has been the long-standing policy of the various NATO commands and of the individual NATO members to classify NATO force goals and the extent to which these goals have been met ... Second, to the extent that some NATO ground force goals and the contributions of NATO members are known, they are usually expressed in terms of divisions. But the number of men assigned to a division and the number who contribute support to a division vary widely ... Third, whereas NATO ground force goals for the centred European sector ... have been the subject of many unofficial published reports, force goals for northern Europe ... and for southern Europe ... appear to be largely unreported. For these reasons, an alternative method was employed:  the data on  troop commitments were converted into the percentage of each country's armed forces which are committed to the alliance. are presented in Appendix B.  These percentages  50.  The  second i n d i c a t o r o f c o h e s i o n employed i s a s u r v e y o f  e v e n t s , d e r i v e d from t h e Mew York Times Index. at  two-year  These d a t a were g a t h e r e d  i n t e r v a l s b e g i n n i n g i n 1950 f o r NATO and i n 195-6 f o r t h e  Warsaw P a c t , i n each case one year a f t e r t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e a l l i a n c e . Two-year, r a t h e r t h a n one-year because  i n t e r v a l s were used f o r these data  o f t h e time and d i f f i c u l t y  i n v o l v e d i n g a t h e r i n g them.  t h e l e s s , i t i s f e l t t h a t t h e two-year  i n t e r v a l s should s t i l l  Never-  accurately  r e f l e c t t h e t r e n d i n commitment o f t h e v a r i o u s members t o t h e a l l i a n c e s . L e a v i n g o u t t h e odd-numbered years means t h a t such events as t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e a l l i a n c e s and t h e e n t r y o f West Germany i n t o NATO are  e x c l u d e d from t h e s e d a t a , b u t events such as t h e Suez c r i s i s , t h e  P o l i s h and Hungarian u p r i s i n g s , t h e Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s , w i t h d r a w a l from NATO, and t h e 1968 C z e c h o s l o v a k i a n c r i s i s ,  France's are included.  The procedure f o l l o w e d i n t h i s case was t o code any statement or  a c t i o n b y an a l l i a n c e member which was d i r e c t e d a t t h e a l l i a n c e  or  i t s members as e i t h e r p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e .  F o r example a statement  such a s : U.S.S.R. and Poland h o l d s t r o n g e r Warsaw P a c t needed ... would be coded as p o s i t i v e f o r b o t h t h e U.S.S.R. and Poland.  On t h e  o t h e r hand, t h e f o l l o w i n g statement would be coded as n e g a t i v e f o r France: F r a n c e announces w i t h d r a w a l from NATO m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n ... In  t h i s way, adequate  d a t a c o u l d be g a t h e r e d f o r t h e NATO members s i m p l y  b y c o d i n g statements and a c t i o n s o f t h e member c o u n t r i e s which  appeared  under t h e heading "North A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n " i n t h e Index f o r  51.  each year.  F o r many of t h e Warsaw Pact members, however, no  statements  or a c t i o n s were mentioned i n some years under the heading'''"Warsaw P a c t . " F o r t h i s a l l i a n c e , t h e r e f o r e , the e n t r i e s under the names of each member c o u n t r y were surveyed as w e l l as e n t r i e s under the "Warsaw P a c t " heading. The  d a t a generated b y t h i s procedure a r e r e p o r t e d i n Appendix C.  t h o s e cases where the number o f r e l e v a n t statements g i v e n c o u n t r y i n a g i v e n year was c a l c u l a t e d and t h a t c o u n t r y was  In  and a c t i o n s b y a  l e s s than t h r e e , no percentage  was  coded as h a v i n g m i s s i n g d a t a on t h i s  v a r i a b l e f o r the y e a r ( s ) i n v o l v e d . The t h i r d i n d i c a t o r of a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n employed i n the a n a l y s i s i s e x t e n t o f v o t i n g agreement i n the U n i t e d Nations Assembly.  General  F o r each a l l i a n c e member, a d y a d i c index o f agreement w i t h  each o t h e r member o f the a l l i a n c e was  computed, f o r each s e s s i o n o f the  G e n e r a l Assembly, i n t h e f o l l o w i n g manner: =  Where I.A.  =  index of agreement,  f  =  number o f times the p a r t n e r s i n the dyad were i n f u l l agreement, t h a t i s , b o t h v o t e d the same way,  g  =  number of times the dyadic p a r t n e r s were i n p a r t i a l agreement, t h a t i s , one o f them abs t a i n e d w h i l e t h e o t h e r v o t e d e i t h e r yes or no,  t  =  t o t a l number of votes i n which b o t h d y a d i c partners participated.  T h i s procedure  f  + ?g t  X  100.  I.A.  y i e l d e d an index of agreement f o r each dyad i n each  a l l i a n c e f o r each s e s s i o n o f the Assembly. i n d i c e s was  Each c o u n t r y ' s s e t of d y a d i c  t h e n averaged f o r each s e s s i o n , g i v i n g an index of agreement  52.  r a n g i n g from 0.0  t o 100.0  between the member and the r e s t of the  for  each s e s s i o n .  These f i n a l average  D.  The u t i l i t y of votes i n the U.N.  alliance  i n d i c e s a r e r e p o r t e d i n Appendix  as an i n d i c a t o r of f o r e i g n p o l i c y  b e h a v i o r s h o u l d not, of c o u r s e , be o v e r e s t i m a t e d .  Alker ( i n Mueller,  I969) and R u s s e t t ( i n Rosenbaum, 1970) have p o i n t e d out some of the difficulties the U.N.  i n v o l v e d i n d i s c o v e r i n g and a n a l y z i n g v o t i n g groups i n  I n t h i s c a s e , however, each a l l i a n c e has been assumed t o be  an i d e n t i f i a b l e group, and our i n t e r e s t has f o c u s e d on the d i f f e r e n t of agreement e x p r e s s e d b y members of each group. U.N.  For t h i s  purpose,  v o t e s seem t o be a u s e f u l i n d i c a t o r of b a s i c p o l i c y s i n c e  voting  ... f o r c e s a c o u n t r y t o take a p u b l i c , r e c o r d e d p o s i t i o n  many k i n d s of i s s u e s ..."  ( R u s s e t t , 19&5,  P*  87)•  "U.N. on  I t i s worth n o t i n g  t h a t an assessment of p o s s i b l e i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n b y Teune and ( i n Friedman, B l a d e n , and Rosen, alignments  i n the U.N.  levels  Synnestvedt  1970, pp. 328-330) showed t h a t v o t i n g  o f t e n c o r r e l a t e h i g h l y w i t h other i n d i c a t o r s of  c o h e s i o n employed i n t h e i r study.  They concluded  (p. 328)  t h a t "the  v o t i n g p a t t e r n s r e c o r d e d and p u b l i s h e d b y t h e U n i t e d Nations are a r e l i a b l e v i n d i c a t i o n of alignment One  independent  behavior."  v a r i a b l e whose i n f l u e n c e on a l l i a n c e  we wish t o t e s t i s n a t i o n a l power. and P r u i t t  As K. J . H o l s t i  cohesion  (1969, pp. l 4 l - l 4 2 )  (19^7, PP- 165-168) have p o i n t e d out, i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o  d i s t i n g u i s h between power i n the a b s t r a c t - u s u a l l y s t a t e d i n terms such as  'the a b i l i t y of A t o i n f l u e n c e B t o do something he would not  otherwise do "aggregate  1  - and power base, d e s c r i b e d b y Deutsch  (1968, p. 23) as the  power r e s o u r c e s of a n a t i o n " i n c l u d i n g such items as p o p u l a t i o n ,  53-  GNP, area, and m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l .  I t i s the l a t t e r c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  of power which i s employed i n the e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s i n Chapter IV, and we should be wary of drawing any inferences about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a l l i a n c e cohesion and power i n the sense of influence from these data. Five d i f f e r e n t measures of power base are employed i n the analysis:  s i z e of m i l i t a r y expenditures; population; crude s t e e l  production; GNP per c a p i t a growth r a t e ; and GNP per c a p i t a .  These  i n d i c a t o r s tap such d i s t i n c t aspects of power base as m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , s i z e of n a t i o n , i n d u s t r i a l resource base, economic growth, and n a t i o n a l wealth.  The f i r s t three i n d i c a t o r s are measured annually from 19^9 t o  I969 w i t h some missing data, p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Communist countries i n e a r l i e r years.  GNP per c a p i t a growth r a t e i s measured annually  from 1959 t o I966, w i t h the remaining years excluded because the index numbers compiled by the United Nations from which these data are drawn are not a v a i l a b l e i n a complete, homogeneous set f o r the e n t i r e time period.  GNP per c a p i t a f i g u r e s have been compiled f o r four years during  the time span studied, a t f i v e - y e a r i n t e r v a l s , f o r the NATO c o u n t r i e s , but r e l i a b l e f i g u r e s f o r the Warsaw Pact members are a v a i l a b l e f o r only two years:  1957 ncL 19&5• This l a t t e r i n d i c a t o r , then, can be u t i l i z e d only a  t o a l i m i t e d extent. These i n d i c a t o r s of power base have been f r e q u e n t l y suggested or employed as measures of power base (Cf. P r u i t t , 19^7>  P« 166; Russett,  1965, pp. 2-3; Deutsch, 1968, pp. 29, 31) w i t h the exception of economic growth r a t e .  This component of n a t i o n a l power i s seldom used i n studies  54.  employing -power base as a v a r i a b l e , however i n a time s e r i e s a n a l y s i s the r a t e o f economic growth seems i n t u i t i v e l y t o be as important as such n a t i o n a l w e a l t h measures as GWP, n e t m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t , or GNP per  capita.  U n l i k e t h e d a t a on t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n and o f  e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , d a t a on t h e power base i n d i c a t o r s a r e r e a d i l y available i n published  form.  F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e s e d a t a a r e not  i n c l u d e d i n t h e appendices.. A l i s t  o f t h e sources used i s i n c l u d e d i n  Appendix A. Four measures o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t were employed i n t h e a n a l y s i s , two  of them d e r i v e d b y Corson ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) and two b y Hopmann (1969).  C o r s o n has s c a l e d t h e i n t e n s i t y o f East-West c o n f l i c t f o r t h e years from  1945 t o I965 i n two ways:  t h e f i r s t i s a measure o f v e r b a l  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y as found i n statements b y S o v i e t and American the  leaders;  second s c a l e measures t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y ( b e h a v i o r a l and  v e r b a l ) b y t h e U.S. and t h e U.S.S.R. f o r t h e same y e a r s .  The i n t e n s i t y  s c a l e s themselves, on t h e b a s i s o f which c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y was measured, were e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e b a s i s o f judges.; r a t i n g s o f t h e importance o f 1  n e a r l y a hundred c a t e g o r i e s y i e l d e d a scale ranging t h i s time p e r i o d .  from  o f c o n f l i c t and c o - o p e r a t i o n .  T h i s procedure  0 t o 2500 f o r East-West i n t e r a c t i o n d u r i n g  A c t u a l S o v i e t and American statements and a c t i o n s were  t h e n coded f o r i n t e n s i t y and t h e r e s u l t s were aggregated a t four-month intervals.  Since  t h e u n i t o f a n a l y s i s employed below i s t h e year, Corson's  d a t a were t r a n s f o r m e d b y t h i s r e s e a r c h e r  i n t o a n n u a l v e r b a l and t o t a l  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y s c o r e s ; these t r a n s f o r m e d d a t a a r e r e p o r t e d E.  i n Appendix  There intensity.  i s one important l i m i t a t i o n of t h e s e d a t a on  S i n c e o n l y the s c o r e s f o r S o v i e t and American  conflict  conflict  i n t e n s i t y a r e a v a i l a b l e , and not o t h e r a l l i a n c e members' p e r c e p t i o n s of  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i t was  i n t e n s i t y o f t h r e a t was was  n e c e s s a r y t o assume t h a t the p e r c e i v e d  19^9 t o I965 and 2  the same f o r each year from  t h e same f o r each a l l i a n c e member.  The c o n f l i c t  i n t e n s i t y scores  were t h e r e f o r e a c o n s t a n t f o r each a l l i a n c e member and the d a t a c o u l d be used o n l y b y comparing the s c o r e s f o r each member from year t o year w i t h the v a r i o u s c o h e s i o n  indicators.  T h i s d e f i c i e n c y was of  t h e second  Hopmann  p a r t i a l l y compensated f o r b y the  inclusion  s e t o f t h r e a t v a r i a b l e s , t h o s e compiled b y Hopmann.  (I969) c o n t e n t a n a l y z e d t h e p e r c e p t i o n s of the opposing b l o c  and o f the opposing b l o c l e a d e r h e l d b y a l l Warsaw Pact members and seven KATO members:  the U.S.,  B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , Canada, Norway, Denmark  and Germany, as t h e s e p e r c e p t i o n s appeared  i n the f i r s t  official  document r e l e a s e d b y each c o u n t r y i n r e a c t i o n t o f o u r e v e n t s .  The  e v e n t s c o n s i d e r e d were the outbreak o f the Korean War  the  opening  of the Geneva Summit Conference  N u c l e a r T e s t Ban T r e a t y i n 19^3;  i n 1955;  and the f i r s t  bombing m i s s i o n s over N o r t h Vietnam, i n 1965.  i n 1950;  the s i g n i n g o f the  day o f r e g u l a r American Two  Hopmann's d a t a were employed i n the a n a l y s i s below:  measures from the percentage  of  each c o u n t r y ' s p e r c e p t i o n s o f the opposing b l o c which were p o s i t i v e ; and the percentage  2  o f each c o u n t r y ' s p e r c e p t i o n s o f the opposing b l o c  The f i r s t f o u r years are e x c l u d e d s i n c e the time span of t h i s b e g i n s w i t h 19^9.  study  l e a d e r which were p o s i t i v e .  A low percentage of p o s i t i v e  was  i n t e r p r e t e d as i n d i c a t i n g h i g h t h r e a t p e r c e p t i o n .  may  be  found i n Appendix  These f i g u r e s  F.  C l e a r l y , Hopmann's d a t a t o some extent  compensates f o r the  main d e f i c i e n c y of Corson's measures i n t h a t t h e y p r o v i d e of p e r c e p t i o n s  b y i n d i v i d u a l a l l i a n c e members.  years  spread over a f i f t e e n year p e r i o d , and t h e y i n c l u d e  h a l f the NATO members. be  a measure  However, t h e s e d a t a  i n c l u d e o n l y f o u r years i n our time span, though the f o u r i n c l u d e d are  perceptions  only  C o r r e l a t i o n s u s i n g t h e s e d a t a must, t h e r e f o r e ,  interpreted very cautiously.  A second, though perhaps l e s s t e l l i n g ,  l i m i t a t i o n i s t h a t t h e s e d a t a are measures of e v a l u a t i v e p e r c e p t i o n s the  opposing b l o c and b l o c l e a d e r , r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t measures of  threat perception. perceptions be  of  We  do not know t o what e x t e n t  coincide with threat perceptions,  nations'  evaluative  so f u r t h e r cautionc. . must :  e x e r c i s e d i n l i g h t of the assumption which must be made w i t h these  data:  that evaluative perceptions  are an a c c u r a t e  i n d i c a t o r of t h r e a t  perceptions. In s h o r t , each of the i n d i c a t o r s employed i n the s u f f e r s from i t s own cases t o be  i d i o s y n c r a t i c d e f i c i e n c i e s , and the number of  considered  i s small.  are m a i n l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c ones and  On the  other hand, these d e f i c i e n c i e s  a v a r i e t y of i n d i c a t o r s have been  employed i n an attempt t o compensate f o r the three  analysis  i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n (two  l i m i t a t i o n s of the  data:  f o r the Warsaw P a c t ) ; f i v e i n d i c a t o r s  o f power b a s e ; and  f o u r measures of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t .  A second  f a c t o r i s t h a t the  o n l y major s y s t e m a t i c  i n the  bias evident  saving  availability  57.  of the  d a t a i s the f a i r l y l a r g e amount of m i s s i n g  countries  i n the e a r l i e r y e a r s .  u n t i l 1955 1950's.  and  the m i s s i n g  Still,  However, the Warsaw Pact was  not  d a t a problem i s l e s s s e r i o u s a f t e r the  the t r u n c a t e d  t e m p o r a l domain and the  i n t h i s b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of the v a r i o u s c o r r e l a t i o n s reported  data f o r Comrminist  mid-  l i m i t a t i o n s noted  indicators dictate that  i n the next c h a p t e r should be  formed  the  interpreted  cautiously. B e f o r e t u r n i n g t o the a n a l y s i s of the observed r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the v a r i a b l e s , however, i t may  be f r u i t f u l t o r e s t a t e  the  g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s p o s i t e d i n Chapter I I i n more o p e r a t i o n a l terms b a s e d on the the  i n d i c a t o r s employed t o measure the t h r e e v a r i a b l e s .  next c h a p t e r ,  considered  t h e n , the f o l l o w i n g s p e c i f i c hypotheses w i l l  i n d i s c u s s i n g the two  P r o p o s i t i o n One:  The  more g e n e r a l  be  propositions:  g r e a t e r the e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , the h i g h e r  l e v e l of c o h e s i o n i n an  In  the  alliance.  Hypothesis  1:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and percentage of armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  2:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and v o t i n g agreement i n the U.N.  Hypothesis  3:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d by an a n a l y s i s of e v e n t s .  Hypothesis  h:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and percentage of armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  5:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and v o t i n g agreement i n the U.N.  58.  Hypothesis  6:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s o f events.  Hypothesis  7"  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e opposing b l o c and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  8:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e opposing b l o c and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  9'  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e opposing b l o c and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s of e v e n t s .  Hypothesis  10:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n of t h e opposing b l o c l e a d e r and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  11:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e opposing b l o c l e a d e r and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  12:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e opposing b l o c l e a d e r and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s of events.  P r o p o s i t i o n Two:  I n an a l l i a n c e o f s t a t e s  o f unequal power, the  commitment o f i n d i v i d u a l members t o t h e a l l i a n c e w i l l decrease as t h e i r n a t i o n a l power  increases.  Hypothesis  13:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between r a t e o f growth o f GNP p e r c a p i t a and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  lh;  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between r a t e o f growth o f GNP p e r c a p i t a and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  15:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between r a t e o f growth o f GNP p e r c a p i t a and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s of events.  59-  Hypothesis  l6:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP p e r c a p i t a and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  17:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP p e r c a p i t a and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  l8:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP p e r c a p i t a and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s o f e v e n t s .  Hypothesis  19:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  20:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  21:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s o f events.  Hypothesis 22:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p o p u l a t i o n and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between p o p u l a t i o n and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  23:  Hypothesis 2k:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o m . between p o p u l a t i o n and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s of e v e n t s .  Hypothesis 25:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n and percentage o f armed f o r c e s committed t o NATO.  Hypothesis 26:  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n and v o t i n g agreement i n t h e U.N.  Hypothesis  There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n and support f o r t h e a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d b y an a n a l y s i s of events.  27:  Go.  These s p e c i f i c hypotheses, which r e l a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l measures o f t h e two independent v a r i a b l e s t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l measures of t h e dependent v a r i a b l e , a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , w i l l guide t h e a n a l y s i s i n the following chapter.  The e m p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s i s c o n c e i v e d as a t e s t  of t h e s e s p e c i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s  as t h e y a p p l y t o NATO and t h e Warsaw  P a c t and o n l y i n d i r e c t l y as a t e s t o f t h e two g e n e r a l w h i c h a r e p o s i t e d above.  propositions  S t r o n g support f o r a l l o r almost a l l o f t h e  s p e c i f i c hypotheses r e l a t i n g c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s t o t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f one  o f t h e independent v a r i a b l e s might, however, be i n t e r p r e t e d as  strong two  evidence i n support o f t h e more g e n e r a l  variables.  p r o p o s i t i o n l i n k i n g those  Conversely, of course, a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  pattern  i n d i c a t i n g l a c k o f support f o r , or evidence c o n t r a r y t o t h e b a t t e r y o f hypotheses l i n k i n g t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n t o the i n d i c a t o r s o f one of t h e two independent v a r i a b l e s might be r e g a r d i n g supporting  the r e j e c t i o n of the relevant  general  as evidence  proposition.  CHAPTER IV  FINDINGS  A number of a l t e r n a t i v e methods of a n a l y s i s might  be  employed t o a s s e s s the  s i g n i f i c a n c e of the  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between  d a t a on power base and  external  the  the  two  alliances.  The  threat  and  s m a l l numbers w i t h which we  dealing  i n an a n a l y s i s  the use  of many s t a t i s t i c a l t o o l s , such as the  the be  of i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s ,  s m a l l N, p r e s e n t a t i o n  of the  a p p e a l i n g ; however the  would r e q u i r e illustrate often  chi-square.  l a r g e number of i n d i c a t o r s employed here  the  s m a l l number of cases would  between i n d i c a t o r s can be  when the number of cases i s q u i t e  small.  m i s l e a d i n g as  S i n c e we  be  are d e a l i n g  v a l i d w i t h an N as w i t h the  NATO and  the Warsaw P a c t , w i t h o c c a s i o n a l  d a t a , no  s t a t i s t i c a l inference  performed on the  can be  purpose the p r o b a b i l i t i e s a s s o c i a t e d  s m a l l as  made from s i g n i f i c a n c e  i s , not  and  entire "population"  However, the  p r o v i d e some i n d i c a t i o n of whether the " r e a l " , that  do  of  e x c e p t i o n s because of m i s s i n g  correlation coefficients.  i n d i c a t o r s are  well,  i n a reasonably small  c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t employed below, Goodman  K r u s k a l ' s gamma c o e f f i c i e n t , can  t e s t s may  statistics.  However, c o r r e l a t i o n s  p r o v i d e a means of summarizing the f i n d i n g s  eleven cases.  Given  r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n graph form would  the r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and  the  be  however, p r e c l u d e s  y e i l d a graph j u s t as m i s l e a d i n g as o t h e r  space and  shall  of  a c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y l a r g e , u n w i e l d y number of graphs t o  Correlations  the  data on c o h e s i o n  the  due  significance  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between  t o chance, and  w i t h the  tests  for this  c o r r e l a t i o n s are  reported  whenever t h e y r e a c h t h e l e v e l o f .10 For  or b e t t e r .  each a l l i a n c e , t h e f i r s t procedure i n t h e a n a l y s i s was  t o r u n c o r r e l a t i o n s between each i n d i c a t o r and a l l o t h e r i n d i c a t o r s of e v e r y v a r i a b l e , f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole aggregated over t h e e n t i r e twenty-two year time span.  No v a l i d i n f e r e n c e  may be drawn  from t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s , o f c o u r s e , s i n c e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s aggregate a r e a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t e d .  i n the  N e v e r t h e l e s s , these aggregate  r e l a t i o n s h i p s do p r o v i d e a f i r s t a p p r o x i m a t i o n o f t h e d i r e c t i o n o f the  relationships  the  f a c t t h a t t h e magnitude o f those r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s i n f l a t e d and  unreliable.  i n t h e d a t a , f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole,  I n a d d i t i o n , t h e s e aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s p r o v i d e an  o p p o r t u n i t y t o make some assessment, o f t h e i n d i c a t o r s f o r each v a r i a b l e Following t h i s preliminary between t h e v a r i a b l e s  however rough, o f t h e r e l i a b i l i t y i n the a n a l y s i s . assessment  and o f t h e r e l i a b i l i t y  employed, we t u r n t o a d i s c u s s i o n alliance.  despite  of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f the i n d i c a t o r s  o f some i n d i v i d u a l members o f each  Data were c o l l e c t e d , o f c o u r s e , on each member o f each  a l l i a n c e and c o r r e l a t i o n s were computed f o r each i n d i v i d u a l a l l i a n c e member. require  However, an i n d i v i d u a l d i s c u s s i o n  o f each c o u n t r y would  i n c l u d i n g w e l l over one 'thousand c o r r e l a t i o n s , i n some t h i r t y -  f i v e t o f o r t y t a b l e s , f o r NATO a l o n e .  There i s , though, a more  appealing a l t e r n a t i v e . Tufte of d a t a a n a l y s i s variables  (1969)  has suggested t h a t t h e most e f f e c t i v e method  i s the f i t t i n g  o f l i n e s t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s between  and then examining d e v i a t i o n s  from t h e l i n e s w i t h t h e a i d o f  63.  graphs and s c a t t e r p l o t s .  T u f t e ' s theme has been t a k e n as t h e approach  t o a n a l y s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s below, though c o r r e l a t i o n s  rather  than graphs and s c a t t e r p l o t s have been used an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s . i s , t h o s e c o u n t r i e s most l o y a l t o t h e a l l i a n c e s , t h e a l l i a n c e  That  leaders  and camp-followers; and t h o s e which d e v i a t e d most from t h e a l l i a n c e s , the m a v e r i c k s , were s i n g l e d out f o r i n d i v i d u a l a t t e n t i o n . NATO TABLE  Ha  Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between I n d i c a t o r s w i t h t h e Data Rank Ordered by Y e a r f o r Each N a t i o n : NATO Cohesion:  U.N. Votes  A n a l y s i s o f Events  -.13 (32)  Troop Commitments  -15 (29) .10 (62)  U.N. Votes  Power Base:  GNP/Capita  Military Expenditures  Population  Crude S t e e l Production  GNP/Capita Growth Rate  .16 (56)  .29** (6l)  •29** (59)  GNP/Capita  • 39**(6l)  .25* (66)  .19+ (63)  •56**(222)  .26**(212)  Military Expenditures  .kk**(219)  Population  External Threat: Total Conflict Intensity Verbal Conflict Intensity Perceptions o f Opposing B l o c  Verbal Conflict Intensity  .32** (270)  Perceptions o f Opposing B l o c  Perceptions o f Opposing B l o c Leader  .32+ (28)  -.10 (19)  -.06 (28)  .10 (19) .21 (19)  64  Looking f i r s t a t Table I I , we find, r e a s o n a b l y good i n t e r r e l a t i o n s among t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f power and o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , but some doubt i s c a s t on t h e r e l i a b i l i t y cohesion.  of the three indicators of  T a b l e I l a shows t h e i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among t h e i n d i c a t o r s  w i t h t h e d a t a rank o r d e r e d from y e a r t o y e a r ; T a b l e l i b shows t h e same i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e d a t a rank o r d e r e d from c o u n t r y t o c o u n t r y for  each y e a r . TABLE l i b Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between I n d i c a t o r s w i t h t h e Data Rank Ordered by N a t i o n f o r Each Year: NATO  Cohesion: Troop U.N.  U.N.  Analysis  Votes  •32 (10)  Commitments  o f Events  .03 (14) .19+ (50)  Votes  Power Base: GNP/Capita Growth Rate  GNP/Capita  0.0 (1)  Military Expenditures  -.04 (35) .28 (16)  GNP/Capita Military Expenditures  Population  Crude S t e e l Production  .04  (36)  .09  (34)  .13  (16)  •33  (16)  .8l**(247)  .42**(233) •38**(226)  Population  +  FX. 10 EC. 05 P<-. 01  Numbers i n parentheses a r e t h e number o f cases.  In Table I l a , t h e v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s o f power base a r e a l l p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d , with the sole exception o f the c o r r e l a t i o n  65.  between  GNP p e r  negative. and  this  are  a l l  almost steel of  On t h e s e may  significance  must  be  these that  extremely  l i t t l e  indicators,  conflict t o t a l  conflict  quite  highly, the  each  intensity  slightly  they  the  on  The  and with  indicators  with  are  f a i r l y  capita the  population,  l i b  at as  the  and  data  and  well.  are  crude level  .01  While  significance  i t  does  of  the  power  which  the  data  r e l i a b i l i t y  skimpy  indicators  on which  above,  for  are  slightly-  BNP p e r  s t a t i s t i c a l  three,  is  other  other  Table  noted  the  latter  each  i n  any  reasons  cast  data  expenditures,  attaching  is  of  correlated opposing  the  and  power The  and  as  with  external base  in  with  the of  can,  the  threat,  the  Ila.  seem  we  to clear  base are  conflict  bloc,  some  perhaps  the  intensity  and  with  though  and with  to  leader,  conflict  confidence not  between  bloc  intensity  intensity  verbal  and  opposing  and p o s i t i v e l y ,  have  positively  between  Total  conflict  leader  though  mostly  opposing of  Table  then,  are  correlations  verbal  bloc  verbal We  threat  perceptions  shown  opposing  bloc.  though  perceptions  correlated the  external  other,  negative,  of  of  intensity  highly  indicators with  as  the  indicators  with  perceptions  of  doubt  three  correlated  of  for  each  which  complete.  correlated  is  wary  particularly  The  are  a l l  the  exception.  with  The  growth,  however,  the  military  better,  relationships, very  most  are  or  for  rate.  complete,  production,  capita  indicators,  correlated  growth  entirely  GNP p e r  account  highly  capita  and  two  partly  quite  GNP p e r  capita  not  very  perceptions in  same  the degree  as  indicators.  indicators  of  cohesion,  however,  are  a  different  matter.  66.  In Table I l a , we see a s l i g h t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between voting i n the U.N.  and the measure of cohesion drawn from an analysis of events i n the  New  York Times Index (for purposes of brevity, the l a t t e r measure w i l l be  simply referred to below as the analysis of events), but s l i g h t negative correlations between troop commitments t o NATO and the other two measures of cohesion. the U.N.  In Table l i b , the correlations are a l l p o s i t i v e , but only  votes - NYT indicator c o r r e l a t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t , and that only  with a p r o b a b i l i t y of .90 that the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r e a l . This dilemma may be p a r t l y explained by the lack of data on troop commitments f o r e a r l i e r years. for each year up to 1967  an<  While U.N.  voting data are available  3- "the analysis of events has been measured  f o r every even-numbered year up t o 1968, data on troop commitments are available only f o r f i v e years i n the 1962 to 19^9 period.  There i s ,  then, r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e overlap between t h i s l a t t e r indicator of cohesion and the other two.  A second factor which might explain the discrepancies  i s that while power base and external threat have been measured f a i r l y d i r e c t l y , the cohesion indicators are comparatively i n d i r e c t . troop commitments, voting i n the U.N.,  That i s ,  and the analysis of events can  only t e n t a t i v e l y be regarded as measures of a l l i a n c e cohesion and i f they are, i n f a c t , v a l i d indicators of cohesion, they may be measuring d i f f e r e n t aspects of a l l i a n c e cohesion.  For these reasons, the relationships  between these indicators and the indicators of the power base and external threat variables cannot be regarded as a rigorous t e s t of the two general propositions advanced i n Chapter I I . We can, of course, be more confident of the implications of the findings f o r the s p e c i f i c  67  operational hypotheses l i s t e d i n Chapter III. TABLE I I I Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between Cohesion and Power Base I n d i c a t o r s w i t h the Data Rank Ordered by Year f o r Each Nation: NATO Troop Cohesion:  Commitments  U.N. Votes  A n a l y s i s o f Events  Total Conflict Intensity  .69* (22)  .22** (232)  -.07 (60)  .69*  .09+  -.05 (60)  Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity  (232)  Perceptions o f Opposing Bloc  -.46* (23)  Perceptions o f Opposing Bloc -.04 (15) Leader + = P<.10 * = FX. 05 ** = EC. 01 The aggregate c o r r e l a t iare o n s the between the of i n dcases. i c a t o r s of NATO Numbers i n parentheses number cohesion and the e x t e r n a l threat i n d i c a t o r s f o r the NATO members are presented i n Table I I I .  Because of the l i m i t e d number of years f o r  which the data on perceptions of the opposing bloc and perceptions o f the opposing bloc leader are a v a i l a b l e , there are enough cases t o compute c o r r e l a t i o n s only between U.N. votes and these two i n d i c a t o r s .  I t may  be r e c a l l e d that a negative c o r r e l a t i o n was predicted between U.N. votes and perceptions o f the opposing bloc and bloc leader (supra, p. 55)• In Table I I I , we f i n d a c o r r e l a t i o n o f -.46, s i g n i f i c a n t a t the ,0$ l e v e l ,  68.  between U.N.  v o t e s and p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e opposing b l o c , but o n l y a  s l i g h t negative r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  -.Oh,  of t h e opposing b l o c l e a d e r .  In the aggregate,  n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between U.N. the opposing b l o c appears  between U.N.  v o t e s and p e r c e p t i o n s then, the  hypothesized  v o t i n g agreement and p e r c e p t i o n s of  t o be u p h e l d , though t h e r e i s no evidence  support the h y p o t h e s i z e d n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between U.N. p e r c e p t i o n s of the l e a d e r of the opposing b l o c .  T h i s may  o f the much-discussed detente b e g i n n i n g i n the middle  v o t i n g and  be a r e f l e c t i o n  or l a t e 1950's  between the S o v i e t Union and the West, though once a g a i n we wary of drawing i n f e r e n c e s from the aggregate  to  should be  correlations.  The p r e d i c t e d p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t o t a l  conflict  i n t e n s i t y and v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and each of the i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n (pp. 5^-55, supra, hypotheses c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h two  1 t o 6)  are u p h e l d b y the  of the t h r e e i n d i c a t o r s of c o h e s i o n .  commitments t o NATO are h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h b o t h t o t a l i n t e n s i t y and v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.69 c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. U.N. still  Troop conflict  i n each case) and  the  v o t i n g and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.22)  and  v o t i n g and v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.09), w h i l e s m a l l e r , are s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t because of the l a r g e number of o b s e r v a t i o n s .  Both measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , however, are s l i g h t l y n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the a n a l y s i s of e v e n t s . evidence i n support of hypotheses  1,  2,  The  d a t a , then, o f f e r some  ^l-, and 5, which r e l a t e the  measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y t o t r o o p commitments and U.N. agreement, but not f o r hypotheses t o the a n a l y s i s of e v e n t s .  3 and 6,  two  voting  which r e l a t e c o n f l i c t  S i n c e the two measures of c o n f l i c t  intensity  intensity  69.  vary from year t o year but are constant f o r each a l l i a n c e member, no c o r r e l a t i o n s can be computed w i t h these two i n d i c a t o r s with the a l l i a n c e members rank ordered i n a p a r t i c u l a r year. Each o f the hypotheses (pp. 55-56, hypotheses 13 t o 27) r e l a t i n g the power base i n d i c a t o r s t o the i n d i c a t o r s o f cohesion predicted a negative c o r r e l a t i o n .  A l l o f the seven aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s between  troop commitments t o NATO, reported i n Table TV, and the power base i n d i c a t o r s are negative and only one o f them i s t o o small (-.09, between troop commitments and crude s t e e l production i n Table IVb) t o be considered as evidence i n support o f the hypothesis.  The c o r r e l a t i o n s  between the a n a l y s i s o f events and the power base i n d i c a t o r s , however, are a l l quite small, ranging from -.15 t o .16 except f o r the -.38 c o r r e l a t i o n between the a n a l y s i s o f events and GNP per c a p i t a growth TABLE IVa Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between Cohesion and Power Base Indicators w i t h the Data Rank Ordered by Year f o r Each Nation: NATO  GNP/Capita Growth Rate  Troop Commitments  U.N. Votes  -.20 (22)  ,2k* (58)  GNP/Capita  .03  Military Expenditures  -.32* (k2)  Population Crude S t e e l Production  Analysis of Events •05 (20)  (6k) (208)  -.01 (72)  -.62**(31)  .09*(228)  -15 (63)  -•39* (35)  .09+(215)  -.01 (67)  . O k  70.  TABLE IVb Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between Cohesion and Power Base I n d i c a t o r s w i t h the Data Rank Ordered by Nation f o r Each Year: NATO Troop Commitments  U.N. Votes  GNP/Capita Growth Rate  -.18  (30)  GNP/Capita  -.05  (13)  A n a l y s i s of Events -.38 (11)  Military Expenditures  -.31).+ (20)  .12* (208)  •03 (71)  Population  0.1*3+ (15)  .09 (218)  .16  -.10 (15)  .17**(192)  Crude S t e e l Production  (6k)  -.Ok (61)  P:<.10 P C 05 F-C.01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number o f cases.  + *  rate i n Table IVb, and almost h a l f o f them, three out o f e i g h t , aire • ~o  p o s i t i v e while they should be negative i f the hypotheses are c o r r e c t . S i m i l a r l y , eight o f the t e n c o r r e l a t i o n s l i n k i n g the power base i n d i c a t o r s t o v o t i n g agreement i n the U.N. are opposite t o the p r e d i c t e d negative d i r e c t i o n , some o f them s i g n i f i c a n t l y so.  Moreover, the c o r r e l a t i o n s i n  Table IVa, w i t h the data rank ordered from year t o year, are contaminated by the f a c t t h a t the power base data f o r each country tend t o slope s t e a d i l y upwards over time.  In Table IVb, where t h i s contaminating f a c t o r i s con-  t r o l l e d by rank ordering the data from country t o country f o r each year, almost a l l of the negative c o r r e l a t i o n s between the power base i n d i c a t o r s and the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s have decreased i n magnitude i n comparison w i t h Table IVa. The c o r r e l a t i o n between the a n a l y s i s o f events and population,  71-  changes from -.15 i n T a b l e IVa t o * . l 6 i n T a b l e TVb.  In short, with the  p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s between t r o o p commitments t o NATO and t h e m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , p o p u l a t i o n , and crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n i n d i c a t o r s , these aggregate  d a t a do n o t support t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d l i n k a g e s  between t h e c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s and t h e power base i n d i c a t o r s . TABLE  V  NATO Members' Rank O r d e r i n g s on Cohesion I n d i c a t o r s f o r S e l e c t e d Years. A.  Troop  Commitments 1948  1952  1956  Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Turkey U n i t e d Kingdom U.S.A. B.  1962  1966  1968  3 11 3 13 8 7  4  4 10 2 13 5 6  10 3  9 2 14 5 8  3 9 6 12 14  6 10 2 2 12 7 11 13  •3-  J .:  8 9 2 2 12 7 11  U.N. Votes  Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Turkey U n i t e d Kingdom U.S.A.  1948  1952  1956  1962  1966  10 4.5 6 12  11 2 4 8  2 3 11 12  12 7 9 14  4  9 1  12 5  14 1 4  2 4.5 7  6 1  11 8 5 1 2 10  11 3 8  10 9 3  7  7 9 13 8 6 5 10  13 3 6 4  3 10 13 11 6 5 2 1 8 14 12 9 7  1968  72.  C.  A n a l y s i s of Events I9U8  Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal • Turkey U n i t e d Kingdom U.S.A.  1952  IQ56  I962  I966  1968  6 1  11 6.5 ^.5 14 9 4.5 2 8  5-5 8 1.5 9  8.5  8.5 1.5 10  2  6  h  6 7 9 l  6 1.5 3 6 k  2  10 8 5 5 3  k  3  k  2 2 13 6.5 12 10  1-5  5.5  3 7  The ag£^regate d a t a , then, suggest t h a t t h e l i n k a g e between e x t e r n a l t h r e a t and t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n may be a s i g n i f i c a n t one o r , a t l e a s t , t h e r e i s no evidence i n t h e aggregate  d a t a which would  l e a d us t o r e j e c t t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d l i n k a g e s between p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e opposing b l o c and U.N. v o t i n g o r between c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and t h e t h r e e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n employed.  On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e expected  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s and t h e power base i n d i c a t o r s d i d n o t appear.  A l o o k a t some i n d i v i d u a l NATO members may  suggest some r e f i n e m e n t s t o t h e hypotheses. The rank o r d e r i n g s o f each o f t h e NATO members on each o f t h e t h r e e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n a r e shown i n T a b l e V. rank, the h i g h e r i t s l e v e l o f c o h e s i o n .  The higher a n a t i o n ' s  Thus F r a n c e , f o r example, ranked  l o w e s t on b o t h t h e t r o o p commitment i n d i c a t o r and t h e a n a l y s i s o f events i n 1968, meaning F r a n c e was t h e n a t i o n l e a s t committed t o t h e a l l i a n c e . A q u i c k glance a t F r a n c e ' s ranks over t h e y e a r s i n comparison  with  73-  other NATO members reveals that France has been the "maverick" i n NATO. The Netherlands, on the other hand, has ranked most c o n s i s t e n t l y high on the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and might be termed NATO's most l o y a l "camp follower".  These two nations, then, along with the U.S. as 'leader"  of the a l l i a n c e , merit i n d i v i d u a l a t t e n t i o n . I t must be noted, however, that the number of cases summarized i n the c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r only one country i s extremely small and inferences from them should be drawn very carefully.  I n some cases, the c o r r e l a t i o n s are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y v a l i d ,  that i s , when the number of observations i s l e s s than 11. As long as the N i s 5 or greater, these c o r r e l a t i o n s are reported anyway but no p r o b a b i l i t i e s may be attached t o them.  The troop commitment i n d i c a t o r does not  give an N o f more than 4 i n any o f these cases and i s , t h e r e f o r e , excluded from the a n a l y s i s . S i m i l a r l y , the data on perceptions of the opposing bloc leader cover only four p a r t i c u l a r years; they, too, are therefore excluded from the a n a l y s i s . TABLE V I C o r r e l a t i o n s of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and E x t e r n a l Threat: France U.N. Votes 1-year lags  Military  A n a l y s i s of Events 1-year 5-year lags lags  5-year lags  Expenditures  -.33+(l5) -.49*(l3)  -.07 (8) -.64(8) -.43(8) -.47(6)  Population  -.35*0-8) -.35+0-6)  -.38+CLl)  Crude S t e e l Total Conflict  -.34+0-7) -.12 (15)  -.11 (9) -.50(8) -.28(9) -.80(5)  Intensity  .18 (16) -.04 (15)  -.57(8) -.56(9) -.81(7)  .16 (10)  .10(7)  .07(8)  .24(7)  -.02 (10)  .43(7)  .07(8) -.60(6)  Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity  .08 (l6) +  *  EC. 10 = P<.05  =  -.05 (15)  ** = K.01 of Numbers cases.i n parentheses are the number  74.  TABLE  VII  C o r r e l a t i o n s o f Cohesion Indicators with I n d i c a t o r s o f Power Base and E x t e r n a l T h r e a t : The N e t h e r l a n d s U.N. Votes 1-year lags  A n a l y s i s of Events 1-year 5-year lags lags  5-year lags  MilitaryExpenditures  •36*(l8)  •32+(l7)  .20  Population  .22  (20)  .40*(l8)  .42+(ii)  Crude S t e e l Production  .16 (19)  •38*(17)  •29 (10)  Total Conflict Intensity  .12  (18)  •13 (17)  .24 (10)  Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity  .03 (18)  .09 (17)  -.20  (10)  (11)  .20(5)  .60(5) .60(5)  .60(5)  •60($)  .60(5)  -78(5)  -.80(5)  .40(5)  -.20(5)  TABLE V I I I C o r r e l a t i o n s o f Cohesion I n d i c a t o r s w i t h I n d i c a t o r s o f Power Base and E x t e r n a l T h r e a t : The U.S.A. U.N. Votes 1-year l a  Military Expenditures  -.25  (17)  gs  .10(15)  A n a l y s i s o f Events 1-year 5-year gs lags  5-year lags  l a  -.24(10)  -.21(8)  -50(8)  .14(7)  Population  .15 (20)  .16(18)  .20(11)  -.21(8)  -•33(9)  -.43(7)  Crude S t e e l Production  .09 (19)  .00(17)  .36(10)  .14(8)  .22(9)  -.47(6)  Total Conflict Intensity  .29+0-8)  .29(17)  .14(10)  -.30(7)  Verbal Conflict Intensity  .19 (18)  .16(17)  -.13(11)  + *  =  .14(8) -.14(7)  -.14(7) -.14(8)  P<.10 F<.05  Numbers i n parentheses a r e t h e number o f c a s e s .  .20(6)  75-  The  c o r r e l a t i o n s between t h e r e m a i n i n g i n d i c a t o r s f o r F r a n c e ,  the N e t h e r l a n d s , and the U.S. a r e shown i n T a b l e s V I , V I I , and V I I I . There a r e some i n t e r e s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between.the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i x f o r F r a n c e , on t h e one hand, and the c o r r e l a t i o n m a t r i c e s f o r the N e t h e r l a n d s and the U.S. on t h e o t h e r hand. First,  c o n t r a r y t o the f i n d i n g s suggested b y t h e aggregate  c o r r e l a t i o n s , t h e r e do appear t o be some n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as o r i g i n a l l y p r e d i c t e d , between the power base i n d i c a t o r s and t h e c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s f o r France.  In Table VI, m i l i t a r y expenditures  (-.33)',  (-.35), and crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n (-.34) a r e a l l n e g a t i v e l y  population  c o r r e l a t e d w i t h U.N. v o t i n g a t the .10 l e v e l o f s i g n i f i c a n c e o r b e t t e r . When the d a t a a r e l a g g e d , t h a t i s , t h e power base i n d i c a t o r s a r e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h measures o f the c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s one year and f i v e y e a r s l a t e r , t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s remain n e g a t i v e .  With the one-year l a g ,  the c o r r e l a t i o n s o f m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and p o p u l a t i o n w i t h U.N. v o t i n g i n c r e a s e i n magnitude and remain  s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative.  between crude s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n and U.N. v o t i n g remains no l o n g e r s i g n i f i c a n t .  The c o r r e l a t i o n  negative, but i s  With a f i v e - y e a r l a g , these t h r e e c o r r e l a t i o n s  s t i l l remain n e g a t i v e , though o n l y the U.N. v o t i n g - p o p u l a t i o n correlation  (-.38) i s s i g n i f i c a n t .  S i m i l a r l y , the c o r r e l a t i o n s o f the  a n a l y s i s o f events w i t h m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , p o p u l a t i o n , and crude p r o d u c t i o n a r e a l l n e g a t i v e and q u i t e l a r g e , and t h e y remain n e g a t i v e w i t h t h e one-year  steel  l a r g e and  and f i v e - y e a r time l a g s , though because o f t h e  S H & I I N's t h e s e c o r r e l a t i o n s cannot be s a i d t o be s i g n i f i c a n t . T u r n i n g t o the N e t h e r l a n d s , however, we see i n T a b l e V I I t h a t  76.  the c o r r e l a t i o n s of both i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion, U.N. v o t i n g and the a n a l y s i s of events, with the three power base i n d i c a t o r s f o r which there are s u f f i c i e n t data (once again, m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production) are a l l p o s i t i v e and remain p o s i t i v e w i t h the one-year and f i v e - y e a r time l a g s .  The c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N.  votes and these three power base i n d i c a t o r s , i n f a c t , are a l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e a t the .10 l e v e l or b e t t e r with a one-year time l a g * . While the contrast between France and the U.S. i s not as g l a r i n g as that between France and the Netherlands, the d i f f e r e n c e i s s t i l l worth noting.  Two-thirds of the c o r r e l a t i o n s between the  a n a l y s i s of events and the power base i n d i c a t o r s of m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production i n Table VIII are negative, as hypothesized, but not h i g h l y negative considering the small N's. M i l i t a r y expenditures are n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d with U.N. v o t i n g f o r the U.S. on the s t r a i g h t c o r r e l a t i o n and with a f i v e - y e a r l a g , but not s i g n i f i c a n t l y so and t h i s c o r r e l a t i o n i s p o s i t i v e with the one-year time lag.  A l l of the U.N. v o t i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h population and with crude  s t e e l production are p o s i t i v e . The second noteworthy item i s t h a t , whereas the d i f f e r e n c e between France and the other two NATO members i s quite s t r i k i n g when we consider the r e l a t i o n s h i p between power base i n d i c a t o r s and the i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion, there i s not - any appreciable d i f f e r e n c e among these three nations when we look a t the linkage between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the two i n d i c a t o r s of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y .  For France, the  c o r r e l a t i o n s between both cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and both c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y  77.  i n d i c a t o r s , w i t h o u t time l a g s , a r e a l l p o s i t i v e as p r e d i c t e d hypotheses  a t the end o f Chapter I I I .  i n the  With a one-year l a g , as  be seen i n T a b l e V I , t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N.  v o t e s and t h e  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures a r e s l i g h t l y n e g a t i v e , and w i t h a y e a r l a g the c o r r e l a t i o n s between v e r b a l two  may two  five-  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and  the  cohesion i n d i c a t o r s are negative. The p a t t e r n  i s s i m i l a r f o r the Netherlands.  f i n d n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s  In T a b l e V I I ,  o f events and b o t h  we  conflict  i n t e n s i t y i n d i c a t o r s w i t h o u t time l a g s ; a n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between the a n a l y s i s  o f events and v e r b a l  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y w i t h a one-year l a g ;  and a n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N. intensity with a five-year l a g .  v o t e s and t o t a l  conflict  None o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s i s s i g n i f i c a n t .  T a b l e V I I I shows t h a t the p a t t e r n  f o r t h e U.S.  w i t h o u t time l a g s  w i t h a one-year l a g i s e x a c t l y the same as f o r t h e N e t h e r l a n d s . f i v e - y e a r l a g , two  o f the f o u r c o r r e l a t i o n s between c o h e s i o n  and With a  indicators  and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures a r e n e g a t i v e . In s h o r t ,  the pattern  f o r a l l t h r e e n a t i o n s i s mixed and  r e l a t i o n s h i p s between c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s and the c o n f l i c t  intensity  i n d i c a t o r s a r e almost a l l not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , i n w i t h the f a i r l y s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e s e two c o h e s i o n and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i n the aggregate above.  the  contrast  variables,  correlations discussed  The c o r r e l a t i o n s between the power base i n d i c a t o r s and  are quite  strongly  aggregate  c o r r e l a t i o n s , but p o s i t i v e f o r the Netherlands and mixed f o r  the  U.S.  n e g a t i v e f o r France, a g a i n i n c o n t r a s t  cohesion  with the  78. I t appears  t h a t the h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h e  c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s and the power base i n d i c a t o r s might be pursued  fruitfully  i n t h e f u t u r e i f t h e y a r e r e f o r m u l a t e d t o suggest a r e l a t i o n s h i p  between power base i n d i c a t o r s and c o h e s i o n f o r maverick  or deviant  members o f an a l l i a n c e , though not f o r l o y a l a l l i a n c e members o r f o r the l e a d e r o f an a l l i a n c e .  On t h e o t h e r hand, a d e c l i n e i n e x t e r n a l  t h r e a t , o r a t l e a s t i n c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , does not appear t o be s t r o n g l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e d e c l i n e i n French commitment t o NATO, but o t h e r a l l i a n c e : mavericks  s h o u l d be examined b e f o r e r e j e c t i n g the h y p o t h e s i z e d l i n k a g e s  between a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s and  indicators of c o n f l i c t  intensity.  I t s h o u l d be emphasized t h a t t h e s e s u g g e s t i o n s a r e t e n t a t i v e , based  as  t h e y a r e on o n l y t h r e e n a t i o n s , and t h a t n o t h i n g can be s a i d here about the v a r i o u s i n d i c a t o r s not c o n s i d e r e d i n the a n a l y s i s o f F r a n c e , N e t h e r l a n d s , and the U.S. r e f l e c t on the two  the  F u r t h e r , t h e s e f i n d i n g s can be s a i d t o  general propositions l i n k i n g cohesion to e x t e r n a l  t h r e a t and power o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e i n d i c a t o r s employed a r e a c c u r a t e measures o f t h e s e v a r i a b l e s , and i n the case o f the  cohesion  and e x t e r n a l t h r e a t v a r i a b l e s t h i s i s q u e s t i o n a b l e . The Warsaw Pact A n a l y s i s o f the Warsaw Pact i s even more d i f f i c u l t than NATO because o f t h e s m a l l number o f n a t i o n s i n the a l l i a n c e .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e d a t a l i m i t a t i o n s a r e more severe w i t h the Warsaw Pact members. Because t h e r e were o n l y e i g h t members i n t h i s a l l i a n c e t h e withdrawal  (seven  after  o f A l b a n i a ) no v a l i d c o r r e l a t i o n s c o u l d be computed by  rank o r d e r i n g t h e c o u n t r i e s f o r each y e a r .  T h e r e f o r e o n l y the  time  79.  s e r i e s rankings, that i s , rank ordering the data from year t o year f o r each a l l i a n c e member, were done.  This meant that the data on perceptions  of the other bloc and perceptions o f the other bloc leader were excluded from the a n a l y s i s . In a d d i t i o n , there are no data on troop commitments t o the Warsaw Pact, l e a v i n g only U.N. votes and the a n a l y s i s of events as i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion.  A l l of the power base i n d i c a t o r s are s t i l l  included, but two o f them, GNP per c a p i t a growth r a t e and GNP per c a p i t a , are q u i t e u n r e l i a b l e f o r Communist countries as T r i s k a (1969), f o r example, has noted. The u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f the two GNP i n d i c a t o r s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s reported i n Table IX. Both of the GNP i n d i c a t o r s of power base are very s l i g h t l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the other three power base i n d i c a t o r s , more often than not i n a negative d i r e c t i o n . M i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production, however, are a l l s t r o n g l y p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h each other.  The l a t t e r  three i n d i c a t o r s taken alone appear t o provide an adequate i n d i c a t i o n of the power base of the members of the Warsaw Pact. The two i n d i c a t o r s of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t which we are able t o use f o r the Warsaw Pact, t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y emanating from the West, are n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h each other i n the aggregate  (-.15), though t h i s may be more an i n d i c a t i o n of  i n c o n s i s t e n t statements and behavior by the West than o f the r e l i a b i l i t y of these two i n d i c a t o r s .  The two measures of cohesion, v o t i n g i n the U.N.  General Assembly and the a n a l y s i s o f events, are p o s i t i v e l y , but not  80.  TABLE IX Aggregate C o r r e l a t i o n s Between Power Base Indicators With the Data Rank Ordered By Year f o r Each Nation: Warsaw Pact  GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita  Crude S t e e l Production  GNP/Capita  Military Expenditures  .60 (7)  -.16 (42)  .06  (42)  .06  (38)  -.10 (15)  -.06  (16)  -.05  (14)  Military Expenditures  Population  •32**(96)  .32** (91)  .43**(124)  Population FK.10 P<.05 F<.01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases, +  s t r o n g l y c o r r e l a t e d (.13). As was suggested i n the d i s c u s s i o n o f the r e l i a b i l i t y the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s f o r NATO, the l a c k of a strong r e l a t i o n s h i p between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s may mean t h a t we are tapping d i f f e r e n t aspects o f a l l i a n c e cohesion, though i t i s not c e r t a i n that we are, i n f a c t , measuring cohesion. Given these d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h the i n d i c a t o r s , we should, as with the a n a l y s i s o f NATO, be q u i t e wary o f drawing unsupported inferences from the c o r r e l a t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s .  Even  without t h i s warning s i g n , however, the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s reported i n Table X do not suggest that.the general propositions r e l a t i n g the cohesion v a r i a b l e s should be e i t h e r accepted or r e j e c t e d .  We may,  however, speak w i t h somewhat more confidence about some of the s p e c i f i c hypotheses offered i n Chapter I I I .  81  TABLE  X  Aggregate Cohesion Indicators Correlated With Power Base and E x t e r n a l Threat Indicators w i t h the Data Rank Ordered By Year f o r Each Nation: Warsaw Pact U.N.  Votes  GNP/Capita Growth Rate  .11  (34)  GNP/Capita  .10  (14)  A n a l y s i s of Events -.03  (18)  Military Expenditures  -.25**(77)  -.02  (41)  Population  -.27**(77)  -.03  (42)  Crude S t e e l Production  -.02  (72)  .18  (37)  Total C o n f l i c t Intensity  -.11  (49)  .09  (16)  (49)  •09  (16)  Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity  •30*  + = HC.10 * = P<.05 ** = PX.01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the hypotheses r e l a t i n g the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s t o the power base i n d i c a t o r s p r e d i c t e d , i n each case, a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n . The c o r r e l a t i o n s between the two GNP i n d i c a t o r s and U.N.  v o t i n g are both p o s i t i v e , suggesting  that hypotheses 14 and 17 do not hold true f o r the Warsaw Pact, though as mentioned above very l i t t l e confidence  can be placed i n these two  power base i n d i c a t o r s . GNP per c a p i t a growth, m i l i t a r y expenditures, and  population  are a l l negatively c o r r e l a t e d with the a n a l y s i s of events, but these  82  c o r r e l a t i o n s are so close t o zero that i t i s probably c l o s e r t o the t r u t h t o say t h a t there i s no r e l a t i o n s h i p , e i t h e r negative or p o s i t i v e , between the a n a l y s i s of events and these three power base i n d i c a t o r s . Crude s t e e l production i s p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the a n a l y s i s of events, while a negative c o r r e l a t i o n was expected.  For a l l f o u r of the  linkages between power base i n d i c a t o r s and the a n a l y s i s of events, then, the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s provide no evidence i n support of the hypotheses. There a r e , however, quite strong negative c o r r e l a t i o n s between m i l i t a r y expenditures and U.N. v o t i n g and between population and U.N. v o t i n g , although there i s only a very s l i g h t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N. v o t i n g agreement and crude s t e e l production.  Hypotheses 26,  l i n k i n g the l a t t e r two v a r i a b l e s , i s not supported by the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n , then, but hypotheses 20 and 23, p r e d i c t i n g negative c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. v o t i n g and the m i l i t a r y expenditures and population i n d i c a t o r s are not r e j e c t e d on the basis of the aggregate Warsaw Pact c o r r e l a t i o n s . Turning t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures and the two cohesion i n d i c a t o r s , i n Table X we f i n d p o s i t i v e , but not s i g n i f i c a n t l y h i g h , c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s o f events and both measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , and between U.N. v o t i n g and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y there i s a small negative c o r r e l a t i o n .  There  i s no support, then, f o r hypotheses 2, 3, and 6, but a l s o i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o r e j e c t these hypotheses w i t h any confidence.  Hypothesis 5,  suggesting a strong p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N. v o t i n g and v e r b a l  83-  c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i s supported by the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n of .30, s i g n i f i c a n t a t the .05 l e v e l , though no t r u l y v a l i d inference can be drawn since the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n i s an i n f l a t e d one. TABLE XI Rank Orders of Warsaw Bact Members on Cohesion Indicators For Selected Years Albania  Bulgaria  Czechoslovakia  East Germany  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  1956  2  6  2  k  k  2.5  1  i960  7  8  5.5  7  1  1  k  1964  3.5  7  3.5  2  3-5  6  2  1966  1  8  k  6  h  2  2  6  3  1968  8  1  Hungary  U.N. Votes  Rumania  Poland  Analysis of Events  U.S.S.R.  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  U.N. Votes  Analysis of Events  1956  7  8  6  7  5  2.5  2  5  i960  3  6  3  k  3  k  5S2  2  196U  3.5  h  3.5  2  7  8  3.5  5  1966  k  5  k  2  7  7  k  k  1968  k  2  7  Proceeding i n the same fashion as i n the a n a l y s i s of NATO, we must look next a t the i n d i v i d u a l Warsaw Pact members most c l o s e l y and l e a s t c l o s e l y a l i g n e d w i t h the a l l i a n c e , and a t the Warsaw Pact  5  84.  'leader", the U.S.S.R. In Table XI, the rank orderings of the various members of the Warsaw Pact on the two indicators of cohesion are reported for various years.  Even-numbered years are selected because data  on the analysis of events were only compiled for even-numbered years. Rumania and Albania are almost equally deviant from the alliance. Rumania, however, w i l l be analysed as the alliance 'maverick" because our data for Rumania are more complete on the power base indicators than the data for Albania.  East Germany i s clearly a loyal member of  the alliance, but since East Germany i s not a member of the U.K. we TABLE XII Correlations of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: Rumania U.N. Votes 1-year lags  Military Expenditures  -.56 (10)  -.32 ( l l )  Population  -,38*(ll)  -.38+(ll)  Crude Steel Production -.38+(ll) Total Conflict Intensity  .22  5-year lags  Analysis of Events * 1-year 5-year lags lags  .48 (8) -.40(5) -.41 (10)  -.47*0-3) -.41 (10)  -.40 (5)  -.60(5) -.47(6)  -.40(5)  -.60(5) -.47 (6) -.40 (5)  (9)  .09 (12)  .00 (10)  -.20 (5)  .20 (5)  Verbal Conflict Intensity .67 (9)  .16 (12)  -.23 (10)  .80 (5)  -.40 (5)  +  =  HC-.10  *.  = P<.05  **  =  K.01  Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases, could do only half an analysis. Poland, however, i s a U.N. member and, at least in terms of our two measures of cohesion and i n comparison with  85-  other Warsaw Pact members. camp f o l l o w e r , "  Poland, t h e n , w i l l be t r e a t e d as the  Rumania as the  'loyal  ' m a v e r i c k , " and the Soviet Union as the  " l e a d e r " of the Warsaw P a c t . TABLE X I I I C o r r e l a t i o n s of Cohesion I n d i c a t o r s of Power Base and E x t e r n a l Threat: U.N.  With I n d i c a t o r s Poland A n a l y s i s of Events  Votes  5-year  1-year lags  lags  1-year  5-year  g  lags  l  Military  a  g  Expenditures  -.29 (10)  -.11(10)  -.14(7)  .17(6) -.33(7)  .00(6)  Population  -.03 (12)  -.13(ll)  -.22(9)  .83(6)  .44(7)  .17(6)  .24 (12)  -.13(ll)  -.22(9)  .83(6)  .67(7)  .17(6)  Total Conflict Intensity .20 (10)  .16(10)  .06(9)  .11(5)  .17(6) -.33(6)  Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity .38 (10)  .07(10)  -.22(9)  Crude S t e e l Production  TABLE  A n a l y s i s of Events  5-year  lags  Population  lags  1-year  5-year  lags  lags  .05 (l4)  .05(11)  •43(9)  .33(6) -.62(7)  -.33 (12)  -.l8(l0)  .08(8)  -.20(5) -.47(6)  .01 (l4)  .13(12)  -«5M9)  -.33(9) -.05(7)  .20(5)  .09 (12)  -.14(12)  -.20(9)  -.20(5) -.07(6)  .40(5)  «36+(l2)  .23(12)  -.31(9)  -.20(5) -.33(6)  .60(5)  Crude S t e e l Production Total  with Indicators U.S.S.R.  Votes  1-year Military Expenditures  .50(6)  XIV  C o r r e l a t i o n s of Cohesion I n d i c a t o r s of Power Base and E x t e r n a l Threat: U.N.  .11(5) -.17(6)  .40(5)  Conflict  Intensity Verbal Conflict  Intensity *  *  =  FS.10  = K.05  **  = . P<.01  Numbers i n parentheses are the number of c a s e s .  86  Comparing these three Warsaw Pact members, the same d i f f e r e n c e i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between power base and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s appears as w i t h France, the Netherlands, and the U.S., and the d i f f e r e n c e i s almost as s t r i k i n g as w i t h NATO members.  For Rumania, the a l l i a n c e  "maverick, " a l l but one of the c o r r e l a t i o n s between cohesion and power base i n d i c a t o r s i n Table X I I are negative, both w i t h and without time l a g s .  The sole exception i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N.  voting  and m i l i t a r y expenditures w i t h a f i v e - y e a r l a g . A l l the c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. v o t i n g and population and between U.N. v o t i n g and crude s t e e l production w i t h no time l a g and w i t h a one-year l a g are s i g n i f i c a n t a t the .10 l e v e l of p r o b a b i l i t y or b e t t e r .  And, w i t h the  exception of the one p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n , a l l of the c o r r e l a t i o n s between the power base and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s are a t l e a s t as negative as -.38.  The data f o r Rumania, then, appear t o o f f e r quite  consistent  evidence i n support of the hypotheses l i n k i n g U.N. votes and the a n a l y s i s of events t o the power base I n d i c a t o r s . The c o r r e l a t i o n s between power base and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s f o r Poland and the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, are f a r from uniformly negative.  I n Table X I I I , we f i n d a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N.  v o t i n g and crude s t e e l production f o r Poland.  A l l of the remaining  U.N. voting - power base i n d i c a t o r s c o r r e l a t i o n s , w i t h and without time l a g s , are negative, but none of them are s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative. The l a r g e s t c o r r e l a t i o n f o r Poland i n the negative d i r e c t i o n i s while f o r Rumania the smallest negative c o r r e l a t i o n i s -.38.  -.29,  Moreover,  a l l o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s of events f o r Poland and  87.  the power base indicators are positive, some of them (the correlations with population and steel production) quite high.  Though the N's  here are very small, a l l of the correlations i n the Rumania matrix between power base indicators and the analysis of events are negative. There i s a similar contrast between Rumania and the Soviet Union.  Only three of the nine correlations i n Table XIV between U.K.  votes and power base indicators are negative, none of them significant. Five of the eight correlations for the Soviet Union between the analysis of events and the power base indicators are negative, but most of them are quite small considering the N's and, to repeat, a l l of the Rumania correlations with the analysis of events are negative. To summarize, for the U.S.S.R. there i s weak support for the hypothesized negative relationships between population and both cohesion indicators, but no support for the hypothesized negative linkages between the cohesion indicators and military expenditures or crude steel production. For Poland, there i s some weak support for the hypotheses linking U.N. votes to each of these three power base indicators, but no support for the hypotheses relating the analysis of events and the three indicators of power base.  For Rumania, there i s  consistent, though not highly significant i n terms of probabilities, support for a l l of the hypothesized negative relationships between cohesion indicators and power base indicators.  There i s the same  contrast, then, between the alliance 'Vnaverick" on the one hand, and the alliance 'leader" and "camp follower" on the other hand, as in NATO. This lends further support for the reformulation of the hypotheses  88.  l i n k i n g cohesion i n d i c a t o r s with power base i n d i c a t o r s suggested above i n the discussion o f France, the Netherlands, and the U.S.:  there may-  be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and power base i n d i c a t o r s when a l l i a n c e 'Vnavericks" are considered, but not with l o y a l a l l i a n c e members o f a l l i a n c e  'leaders".  As was the case with the i n d i v i d u a l NATO members, there i s no r e a l l y s t r i k i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p apparent i n Tables X I I , X I I I , and XIV between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the two i n d i c a t o r s o f c o n f l i c t intensity.  I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n s between these  two sets o f i n d i c a t o r s were predicted i n the hypotheses i n Chapter I I I . For Rumania, however, only two of the four c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s o f events and the two c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are p o s i t i v e (the N f o r the c o r r e l a t i o n s without time lags i s l e s s than 5 i n t h i s case, so these c o r r e l a t i o n s are not reported).  A l l but one of the  c o r r e l a t i o n s between the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures and U.N. votes are p o s i t i v e , but only one of these i s higher than . 2 2 and the r e l a t i o n ships are not s i g n i f i c a n t . In Table X I I I , we f i n d that the pattern i s much the same f o r Poland.  One of the c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. v o t i n g and the c o n f l i c t  i n t e n s i t y measures i s negative.  The r e s t are p o s i t i v e , as predicted i n  the hypotheses, but the only c o r r e l a t i o n greater than . 2 0 i s that between the a n a l y s i s o f events and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , but with an N of only 6.  The remaining c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s of  events and the c o n f l i c t measures are uniformly low and two o f them are negative.  89-  Looking a t Table XIV, i n the data on the Soviet Union the c o r r e l a t i o n between verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and U.N. votes i s .36 which i s s i g n i f i c a n t but only at the .10 l e v e l , and three of the remaining f i v e correlations between U.N. votes and the two c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are negative.  S i m i l a r l y , four of the s i x  correlations between the analysis of events f o r the Soviet Union and the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are negative. As was the case with the NATO members, then, the r e l a t i o n ships between cohesion indicators and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are mixed f o r a l l three countries.  However, the negative correlations  are a l l f a i r l y low and the N's are small, so while there i s no r e a l support f o r the hypotheses l i n k i n g cohesion indicators and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y indicators f o r any of these three nations, neither i s there any conclusive evidence that the hypotheses should be rejected. The findings f o r both a l l i a n c e s , then, are s i m i l a r when i n d i v i d u a l members of the a l l i a n c e s are analyzed.  In the concluding  chapter, I s h a l l elaborate on the t h e o r e t i c a l implications of these findings.  CHAPTER  V  CONCLUSION  To summarize b r i e f l y , the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r the two a l l i a n c e s do not suggest any s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the cohesion v a r i a b l e and the power base v a r i a b l e , though there i s some evidence i n the aggregate i n support of a few of the more s p e c i f i c hypothesized linkages between some of the i n d i c a t o r s , o f power base and c e r t a i n i n d i c a t o r s o f cohesion such as, f o r example, the r e l a t i o n ships between troop commitments t o NATO, on the one hand, and m i l i t a r y expenditures, population,  and s t e e l production on the other hand. Yet  there seems t o be quite a strong negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between the i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion and power base i n d i c a t o r s f o r the mavericks i n each a l l i a n c e , France and Rumania, while there i s not f o r the more l o y a l members of these two a l l i a n c e s .  There i s somesevidence t o  support the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p s between a l l i a n c e cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and i n d i c a t o r s o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , i n the aggregate correlations.  However, these r e l a t i o n s h i p s do not hold up when  i n d i v i d u a l a l l i a n c e members are considered. These f i n d i n g s suggest a number of questions which merit consideration.  I s there any explanation f o r the discrepancies  between the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s and those f o r i n d i v i d u a l members of the a l l i a n c e s ? reported here?  How much confidence can we place i n the f i n d i n g s  How do these f i n d i n g s r e f l e c t on the previous studies  of a l l i a n c e s discussed i n the introductory chapter? t h e o r e t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the a n a l y s i s ?  What are the  I t should be noted that there i s no g l a r i n g discrepancy between the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g power base i n d i c a t o r s to cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the corresponding c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r the Netherlands and the U.S.  i n NATO; only the deviant NATO member, France,  demonstrates strong r e l a t i o n s h i p s between power base i n d i c a t o r s cohesion i n d i c a t o r s .  and  In the Warsaw Pact, the aggregate r e l a t i o n s h i p s  are negative between cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and power base i n d i c a t o r s , as are the corresponding c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r Rumania, though f o r the l o y a l a l l i a n c e member, Poland, and the a l l i a n c e leader, the U.S.S.R., these r e l a t i o n s h i p s do not appear to hold.  Two  l e a s t i n p a r t , f o r these discrepancies.  f a c t o r s might account, at F i r s t , f o r the more  committed members of the a l l i a n c e there i s l i t t l e , i f any, change over time i n t h e i r commitment t o the a l l i a n c e .  The smaller the range of  commitment f o r a nation, the smaller the possible range of r e l a t i o n ships between commitment and explanatory v a r i a b l e s .  For the mavericks,  however, there i s a more or l e s s steady decline i n cohesion and a more or l e s s steady r i s e i n power base i n f l a t e d by the f a c t that the power base v a r i a b l e s are prone t o r i s e i n value with the passage of time. Second, the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s are somewhat i n f l a t e d , both i n magnitude and i n l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e by v i r t u e of the f a c t that they are aggregates, while the s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s of the c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r i n d i v i d u a l nations are d e f l a t e d by the small N's on which those c o r r e l a t i o n s are based.  These same two f a c t o r s may a l s o account, at  l e a s t i n p a r t , f o r the discrepancy between the confirmation the hypothesized linkages between cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and  of many of indicators  of external threat i n the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s , and the comparative absence of evidence t o support those linkages i n the data f o r individual  countries. The  i n f l a t e d nature of the aggregate r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the  small N's on which the c o r r e l a t i o n s f o r i n d i v i d u a l nations are based, and the f a c t that only three s p e c i f i c cases i n each a l l i a n c e were s i n g l e d out f o r i n d i v i d u a l a t t e n t i o n , must, of course, be regarded as l i m i t i n g f a c t o r s on our confidence i n the r e s u l t s reported.  With these  l i m i t a t i o n s i n mind, the s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s have been interpreted w a r i l y , and regarded only as d e s c r i p t i v e evidence.  S t a t i s t i c a l tests  however, while they do provide us with one c r i t e r i o n f o r deciding whether a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r e a l , cannot be the only c r i t e r i o n . S t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , as Gold puts i t (1969> P» 46) " i s only the minimal c r i t e r i o n , necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t " f o r e s t a b l i s h i n g the substantive s i g n i f i c a n c e of a r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Campbell and h i s  associates^  have suggested a number of f a c t o r s which may threaten the v a l i d i t y of an empirical relationship.  The f a c t o r s most relevant t o the present  research are i n s t a b i l i t y o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p , which i s the threat t o v a l i d i t y which i s appropriately  countered by s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s ;  maturation, that i s , changes occurring as a function of the passage of time; and f a i l u r e t o include v a r i a b l e s which might b e t t e r , or more v a l i d l y , explain the dependent v a r i a b l e .  1  Cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1964; Winch and Campbell, 1969; and Webb, Campbell, e t . a l . , 1966.  The p o s s i b l e e f f e c t of maturation on the power base i n d i c a t o r s has been mentioned above. ing f a c t o r f o r these i n d i c a t o r s .  I t i s , c l e a r l y , a contaminat-  However, t h i s i s a serious  d i f f i c u l t y only i n the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s .  Passage of time i s a  contaminating f a c t o r i n the power base data f o r the Netherlands, the U.S., Poland, and the Soviet Union, j u s t as i t i s f o r France and Rumania.  I t should be safe t o assume t h a t maturation has approx-  imately the same e f f e c t on a l l s i x of these nations; the observed d i f f e r e n c e s between the 'mavericks " and the other a l l i a n c e members examined may, then, s t i l l be regarded as " r e a l " .  The c o n f l i c t  i n t e n s i t y measures of e x t e r n a l t h r e a t are constant f o r each nation w i t h i n each a l l i a n c e and they f l u c t u a t e considerably; there are a l s o f l u c t u a t i o n s up and down over time i n the perceptual measures of threat.  These f o u r measures do not appear t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a f f e c t e d by maturation, though we cannot be sure that the f l u c t u a t i o n s would be the same i f time were somehow held constant.  Alliance  cohesion i n d i c a t o r s may be a f f e c t e d by maturation; h i s t o r y suggests that a l l i a n c e s d i e more o r l e s s g r a c e f u l l y as they grow o l d . But t h i s does not imply t h a t passage of time causes a l l i a n c e s t o whither - other f a c t o r s intervene. As w i t h the power base i n d i c a t o r s , we may say t h a t time has passed f o r a l l members of the a l l i a n c e s , and the comparisons of i n d i v i d u a l members should h o l d . Other explanatory f a c t o r s may, of course, intervene between a l l i a n c e cohesion and power base or e x t e r n a l t h r e a t .  Many of these  are mentioned i n the l i t e r a t u r e discussed i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter.  9k.  Geographical f a c t o r s , c u l t u r a l homogeneity, and h i s t o r i c a l experience w i t h i s o l a t i o n or c o l l a b o r a t i o n may be s i g n i f i c a n t . Ideology and dependence on the U.S.S.R. have frequently been assessed as having a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the u n i t y o f the Communist bloc o r the Warsaw Pact.  Idiosyncracies o f leaders such as de Gaulle, and  o b l i g a t i o n s t o other i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operative structures or organizations are often mentioned i n connection w i t h the d e c l i n e i n the cohesion o f NATO.  C e r t a i n l y , these and other f a c t o r s should  merit consideration i n future s t u d i e s , as they have i n the past. The a n a l y s i s presented here d i f f e r s from previous studies of a l l i a n c e s , even those d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h NATO and the Warsaw Pact, i n that the data employed, the methods of aggregating those data, and the manipulations performed on the data, are different.  These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a s i d e , however, some i n t e r e s t i n g  conclusions are suggested by the data. In the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s between power base i n d i c a t o r s and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s , we f i n d i n Table IV that the only c o n s i s t e n t l y high negative c o r r e l a t i o n s are w i t h ticoop commitments t o NATO.  This  might be explained by the f a c t that n a t i o n a l armed forces were f a i r l y small i n the e a r l y post-World War I I p e r i o d .  As the s i z e o f the  armed forces o f various countries i n Europe (and the U.S.) increased, the percentage o f those forces committed t o NATO could be decreased while s t i l l maintaining the same absolute number o f armed forces committed t o NATO.  Comparing country w i t h country i n NATO, the smaller  members of the a l l i a n c e , w i t h small armed f o r c e s , have some i n c e n t i v e  t o commit a l a r g e proportion o f t h e i r forces t o the a l l i a n c e , perhaps reasoning that they can receive greater s e c u r i t y by maintaining a high commitment t o NATO than by r e l y i n g more h e a v i l y on t h e i r own resources f o r defence.  The stronger members of the a l l i a n c e ,  however, can more s a f e l y r e l y on t h e i r own l a r g e armies f o r defence and, i n the case o f the U.S., B r i t a i n , and France, on nuclear weapons.  French a c q u i s i t i o n o f nuclear weapons may, i n  f a c t , be a very potent explanatory f a c t o r i n the d e c l i n e o f French commitment t o NATO. In the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s between power base i n d i c a t o r s and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s f o r the Warsaw Pact, reported i n Table X, only the c o r r e l a t i o n s o f U.N. votes w i t h m i l i t a r y expenditures and population are s t r o n g l y negative. same as f o r NATO:  The general p i c t u r e remains the  no c o n s i s t e n t , strong r e l a t i o n s h i p between cohesion  and power base f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole. This i s quite p o s s i b l y due t o the f a i r l y steady a l l e g i a n c e o f the smaller members o f both a l l i a n c e s ; i t may be t h a t while the power o f smaller states has grown since the formation of the a l l i a n c e s , i t has not grown enough f o r them t o f e e l secure i n a l e s s dependent r o l e .  Alternatively,  however, t h i s pattern might be i n t e r p r e t e d as support f o r the contention advanced i n Chapter I I above, that growth i n n a t i o n a l power i s a necessary, though not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a decline i n commitment t o an a l l i a n c e .  The smaller nations i n the two a l l i a n c e s ,  although they have increased t h e i r power, have not increased that power t o a l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w them t o f e e l secure i n pursuing  96.  a more independent  policy.  Germany, have done s o .  Other n a t i o n s , n o t a b l y France  A s i m i l a r argument can be advanced i n  terms o f s t a t u s i n c o n s i s t e n c y : a l l i a n c e members has  and  w h i l e the power o f t h e s m a l l e r  i n c r e a s e d , i t has not i n c r e a s e d t o t h e e x t e n t  t h a t t h e y p e r c e i v e t h e i r a s c r i b e d s t a t u s w i t h i n t h e a l l i a n c e t o be i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r a c t u a l power.  F o r t h e l a r g e r members o f  t h e a l l i a n c e s , however, t h e s t a t u s a§cribed t o them w i t h i n t h e i r b l o c s has not kept pace w i t h t h e growth o f t h e i r power. The aggregate  c o r r e l a t i o n s between e x t e r n a l t h r e a t i n d i c a t o r s  and c o h e s i o n i n d i c a t o r s f o r NATO a r e m a i n l y s t r o n g and i n the  expected  d i r e c t i o n , w i t h the e x c e p t i o n o f the c o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h the a n a l y s i s o f e v e n t s , as can be seen i n T a b l e I I I . f o u r aggregate  However, o n l y one o f t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n s between c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and  cohesion  i n d i c a t o r s f o r the Warsaw Pact, i n T a b l e X, i s b o t h s t r o n g and expected d i r e c t i o n .  F o r NATO, t h i s might be r e g a r d e d as  i n the  evidence  i n support o f the g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n d e c l i n e s as e x t e r n a l t h r e a t d i m i n i s h e s .  F o r the Warsaw Pact, i t may  the dogmatic view o f t h e i m p e r i a l i s t menace o v e r r i d e s any  be t h a t  actual  d i m i n u t i o n o f t h r e a t emanating from t h e West; o r t h a t t h e myth i f not t h e r e a l i t y o f e x t e r n a l c o n f l i c t must be kept up i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y and  s o l i d a r i t y ; o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , t h a t t h e Warsaw  Pact f u n c t i o n s not o n l y as an a l l i a n c e but a l s o , and perhaps even more s o , as an i n t e r n a l r e g u l a t i n g mechanism f o r the body o f Communist s t a t e s i n Europe.  The l a t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n i s o f f e r e d some support  t h e c o u r s e o f events i n C z e c h o s l o v a k i a i n  I968.  by  The  f i n d i n g s from the a n a l y s i s o f i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s  suggest t h a t a p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l l l i n e o f i n q u i r y might be devote more a t t e n t i o n t o nonconforming a l l i a n c e members a s , example, Ole R.  H o l s t i and  John S u l l i v a n  to  for  (1969) have done.  While  the h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s between power base and a l l i a n c e cohesion i n d i c a t o r s are t h e y are not Once a g a i n ,  c o n f i r m e d f o r the d e v i a n t  a l l i a n c e members,  c o n f i r m e d by the d a t a on conforming a l l i a n c e members. t h e s e d a t a suggest t h a t a growth i n n a t i o n a l power,  though t o what l e v e l must remain u n s p e c i f i e d , may  be a n e c e s s a r y  c o n d i t i o n f o r a d e c l i n e i n commitment t o an a l l i a n c e , but s u f f i c i e n t condition since increases  i s not  a  i n n a t i o n a l power were a l s o  r e c o r d e d i n t h i s p e r i o d by the n a t i o n s  who  maintained t h e i r conformity  w i t h the a l l i a n c e . I f growth i n power i s not a s u f f i c i e n t d e c l i n i n g commitment t o the a l l i a n c e s , t h e n we some o t h e r f a c t o r s which may  The  have combined w i t h the  d a t a do not  for  might s p e c u l a t e  t o produce the d e c r e a s e d commitment o f France and respective a l l i a n c e s .  condition  increase  on  i n power  Rumania t o t h e i r  indicate a strong r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the measures o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t and t h e measures o f c o h e s i o n f o r the variance  i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s ; t h i s f a c t o r may i n a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , but,  h e r e , not the major p a r t .  I t was  explain part of  a t l e a s t i n the  cases  the  discussed  suggested i n Chapter I I t h a t  d i s t i n c t i o n between p l u r a l i s t i c and  a u t h o r i t a r i a n systems might  t o e x p l a i n d i f f e r e n c e s i n l e v e l s o f commitment t o an a l l i a n c e . NATO, France has  the help In  u s u a l l y been r e g a r d e d as more a u t h o r i t a r i a n t h a n  98.  e i t h e r the Netherlands or the U.S.  and i t was  France whose commitment  to the a l l i a n c e declined most as her power increased.  In the Warsaw  Pact, however, Rumania has shown l e s s evidence of authoritarian p o l i c i e s than Poland or the U.S.S.R., though a l l three nations  could  be more a p t l y described as authoritarian than as p l u r a l i s t i c .  It  appears, then, that the d i s t i n c t i o n between p l u r a l i s t i c and authoritarian p o l i t i c s may  be more germane to an analysis of an a l l i a n c e with a  p l u r a l i s t i c structure, such as NATO, than of a more monolithic a l l i a n c e such as the Warsaw Pact.  In NATO, the f a c t that France i s  l e s s p l u r a l i s t i c than other members of the a l l i a n c e allows  greater  scope f o r the influence of the idiosyncracies of the head of government, and greater scope f o r response to changed conditions.  In the  Warsaw Pact, i t could be the case that growing pluralism i n Rumania was  necessary i n order f o r the government to have greater freedom of  action i n foreign p o l i c y . consider a reformulated discussed here:  I t could be f r u i t f u l , i n future analyses,  to  version of the p l u r a l i s t - a u t h o r i t a r i a n argument  deviation from the i d e o l o g i c a l and s t r u c t u r a l norms  of the system affords members of the system greater freedom of action i n foreign r e l a t i o n s . The u t i l i t y of such a reformulation, of course, remains to be seen; however, the data reported above do provide some evidence that t h i s may  be a relevant l i n e of i n q u i r y .  In conclusion, the findings of t h i s study indicate that the contrast between conforming and nonconforming a l l i a n c e members i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one.  I t should be of i n t e r e s t , i n future research, to  examine a l l i a n c e members who  deviate from the norms of t h e i r a l l i a n c e , i n  either d i r e c t i o n , i n a number of current and h i s t o r i c a l a l l i a n c e s .  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Abbreviations Used A.C.Q. . J »C »R • • Annals . A.P.S.R. J.P.R. •  A t l a n t i c Community Quarterly Journal o f C o n f l i c t Resolution . Annals o f the American Academy o f P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Science American P o l i t i c a l Science Review Journal o f Peace Research  "NA^O Force Goals, the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f NATO members, c o n s c r i p t i o n p o l i c i e s of NATO members," U.S. Congressional Record, Jan. 19, 1967, PP- 999-1005. 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Leiserson, eds., The Study o f C o a l i t i o n Behavior: T h e o r e t i c a l Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents, New York, H o l t , Rinehart, and Winston, I n c . , 1970, pp. 351-368.  114  APPENDIX A  NOTE ON DATA SOURCES  The d a t a employed i n t h e a n a l y s i s were drawn from a number of disparate sources.  The t r o o p commitment i n d i c a t o r o f c o h e s i o n f o r  NATO i s based on d a t a a v a i l a b l e i n The M i l i t a r y Balance, London, I n s t i t u t e o f S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s , f o r t h e y e a r s 1962-3, 1964-5, I966-7,  I968-9, and 1969-7O. The U.N. v o t i n g i n d i c e s o f agreement were compiled by A v r i l Campbell  from t h e raw data which were o b t a i n e d from The  U n i v e r s i t y o f Michigan.  I am i n d e b t e d t o h e r b o t h f o r h e r g e n e r o s i t y  i n making t h e s e d a t a a v a i l a b l e and f o r s a v i n g me t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e time and e f f o r t i n v o l v e d i n computing t h e i n d i c e s o f agreement.  The d a t a  c r e a t e d from an a n a l y s i s o f t h e New York Times Index a r e my own responsibility. The d a t a on e x t e r n a l t h r e a t a r e taken from t h e s t u d i e s b y Walter H. Corson and P h i l i p T. Hopmann l i s t e d i n t h e B i b l i o g r a p h y . The d a t a on GNP p e r c a p i t a growth r a t e and crude  steel  p r o d u c t i o n a r e t a k e n from The U n i t e d N a t i o n s S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook, and t h e f i g u r e s on p o p u l a t i o n a r e from The U n i t e d N a t i o n s Demographic Yearbook.  W i l l i a m Moul k i n d l y s u p p l i e d t h e d a t a on GNP p e r c a p i t a ,  which w i l l be p u b l i s h e d i n C h a r l e s L. T a y l o r , e t . a l . , World Handbook o f P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l I n d i c a t o r s , second e d i t i o n , f o r t h c o m i n g Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press.  from  F i n a l l y , t h e d a t a on m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s a r e  taken from t h e e x c e l l e n t c o m p i l a t i o n i n t h e Yearbook o f World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968-69, p u b l i s h e d i n 1970 by The Humanities f o r t h e Stockholm  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace Research  Institute.  Press  APPENDIX B PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO BY MEMBER COUNTRIES  1962  1964  1966  1968  1969  Belgium  100.0  100.0  096.2  098.5  098.5  Canada  O69A  066.2  061.1  045.4  045.3  Denmark  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  France  029.8  039.5  Germany  093. T  092.9  093.6  095.6  092.5  Greece  O98.6  070.6  066.7  094.5  094.5  Italy  088.5  084.4  088.9  075.4  076.2  Luxembourg  100.0  100.0  050.0  050.0  050.0  Netherlands  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  098.5  Norway  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  Portugal  093.4  034.0  014.7  012.8  012.6  Turkey  099-5  078.9  079.5  079-8  U.K.  038.9  036.1  032.5  027.3  079-9 023.2  U.S.  018.1  014.3  Iceland  Source:  The M i l i t a r y Balance, London, I n s t i t u t e of S t r a t e g i c Studies  APPENDIX C  116.  ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK TIMES INDEX PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS NATO 1?52  1954  Belgium  050.0  073.3  Canada  050.0  083.3  Denmark  100.0  France  032.1  066.7  056.0  060.0  Iceland Italy  o4o.o  Luxembourg  090.9  094.1  1964  1966  1968  025.0  042.9  061.5  075.0  060.0  080.0  075.0  053.8  075.0  080.0  080.0  100.0  1958  i960  066.7 100.0  075.0  Germany Greece  1956  1962  068.1  052.9  036.7  033.3  014.8  010.6  029.4  065.1  065.2  072.0  080.0  073.5  063.6  080.0  080.0  016.7  066.7  075-0  080.0  050.0  050.0  100.0  094.1  033.3  071.4  100.0  057.2  080.0  033.3  100.0 077.8  091.8  085.7  100.0  066.7  071.4  Netherlands  066.7  Norway  100.0  Portugal  069.2  071.4  100.0  100.0  060.0  075.0  Turkey  075.0  062.5  U.K.  066.7  076.9  071.4  057.9  053.1  U.S.  067.5  079.5  082.1  073.3  046.2  050.0  075.0  075.0  062.5  054.5  060.7  084.6  072.9  074.4  062.0  061.0  025.0  117.  APPENDIX C  PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS WARSAW PACT  1956  1958  i960  1962  1964  1966  1968  io P O S .  # Pos. lo POS. io Pos. io Pos. io Pos. i> Pos  Albania  050.0  033.3  012.5  Bulgaria  062.5  100.0  o4o.o  083.3  100.0  033.3  077.8  Czechoslovakia  072.7  066.7  100.0  100.0  060.0  100.0  033.3  E. Germany  092.2  066.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  069.2  Hungary  015.0  080.0  060.0  075.0  085.9  066.7  060.0  Poland  015.8  080.0  066.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  075-0  Rumania  072.7  066.7  100.0  015.8  015.4  020.0  U.S.S.R.  053.1  087.5  052.0  081.8  088.9  044.8  100.0  025.0  APPENDIX D  VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT WARSAW PACT Session  Poland  3 4  97-9 100 100 99.0 99-0 100 100 100  5 6 7 8 9 10  ll 12 13 l4  15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22  97-57 99-77 100 99-10 99.42 99-88 99-63 98.43 91.67 98.57 99-83 96.97  Hungary  Czechosl.  Albania  Bulgaria  Rumania  98.20 100 100 98.0 I  100 96.82 99-77 100 99.85 99.42 99.88 99.63 98.43 91.67 98.57 99.83 97.83  99-5 100 100 100 98.58 98.60 100 99.85 99.50 99.88 99-73 98.43 91.67 98.57 99.83 97.38  98.63 99-77 100 99.85 99.08 99-30 99.60 92.30 91-67 93-45 100.0 91.67  98.63 99.77 100 99.85 99.25 99-88 99.60 98.43 91.67 98.57 99.83 97-38  98.17 99-77 100 99.85  99.42  99.88 99.63 97-30 50.0 97-60 99.17 95-07  U.S.S.R 98-7 100 100 99.0 99.5 100 100 100 98.63 99.77 100 99.85 99.25 99.88 99.63 98.43 91.67 98.57 99.83 97.38  119. APPENDIX D  VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT  NATO  Sessions  U.S.A.  Can.  U.K.  Neth.  Belg.  Lux.  3  86.60 82.28 80.41 81.34 87.90 82.82 70.89 78.18 86.87 85.05 83.44 79-37 86.54 90.06  88.20 79.56 82.93 86.34 88.93 74.38 78.96  89.01 77.73 78.73 78.85 85.82 73.93 76.75 71.15 88.25 88.43 79.28 76.86  88.20 78.37 82.52 95.15 89.47 74.35 79.13 80.88 86.98 88.89  85.93 73.21 76.92 78.85 82.33 68.45 77.29  89.51 80.59 92.31 83.65 83.45 79.92  91.08 89.55 92.31 87.92 88.05 83.55 85.OI  89.02 77.70 74.34 72.08 78.51 80.24 86.64 85.61 87.09 87.03 71.13 77.39 79.55 78.28 85.97 80.02 87.56 83.03 88.91 86.85 82.53 78.01 77.82 71.47 85.68 80.02 90.35 78.86 91.15 77.33 75.89 74.75 92.31 53.85 87.55 72.25 87.82 75.89 85.25 72.30  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13  14 15  16 17 18 19 20 21 22  90.40  83.05 92.31 82.07 86.06 81.45  85.41  88.85 87.82 83.17 75.03 83.33 88.16 88.43 75.89 92.31 87.36 86.86 83.85  84.15 80.52  84.72 86.05 88.12 90.24  78.14  88.93 87.53 78.36 76.74 80.21 86.23 83.23 89.05 92.31 85.99 86.63  France  Port.  Italy  Gre.  Nor.  Den.  Ice.  85.95 72.34 76.83 75.94 81.52 65.08  86.86  87.27 76.15 82.45 82.92 87.70 67.05 74.49  89.14 83.34 81.92 78.31 80.68 78.79 84.20 82.92 87.34 83.85 60.42 70.30 65.03 79.68 75.34 82.39 89.72 87.67 85.45 85.82 77.57 82.92 69.49 77.94 82.80 82.08 84.41 85.91 87.97 90.60 85.80 90.38 92.31 92.31 87.13 74.20 86.42 75.93 86.73 63.OO  81*54  80.75 80.26  87.04  66.32  52.64 72.36  66.18 87.02 88.36 75.30 83.30 89.79 64.85 74.58 83.41 72.07 75.37 79.83 76.-59 75.76 85.15 82.25 77.85 88.23 87.46 78.40 90.25 85.04 59.08 81.71 81.46 53.85 92.31 92.31 71.89 87.45 71.16 59.07 86.62 81.32 64.29 82.47 70.86  71.40 71.40 81.81 84.97 73-41 73.36 66.40 66.40 70.88 69.24 73.85 73.85 83.44 84.35 85.83 86.10 83.87 82.75 92.31 92.31 85.45 84.11 84.38 82.10 79.25 79.89  Turkey  120.  APPENDIX E  TRANSFORMED MEASURES OF TOTAL CONFLICT INTENSITY AND VERBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY  Total Conflict I n t e n s i t y by East  Verbal Conflict I n t e n s i t y by East  Total Conflict I n t e n s i t y by West  Verbal Conflict I n t e n s i t y by West  1948  1767  292  1942  237  1949  683  100  1283  43  1950  367  75  1150  53  1951  467  30  1817  30  1952  450  50  1908  15  1953  383  35  1092  47  1954  283  70  683  110  1955  517  65  817  107  1956  500  125  453  75  1957  400  292  608  108  1958  450  150  583  100  1959  258  110  250  112  i960  700  275  680  147  1961  783  142  717  200  1962  1100  113  967  175  1963  300  90  275  52  1964  117  23  233  42  1965  450  80  1617  08  121.  APPENDIX F PERCEPTIONS OF OPPOSING BLOC AND OF OPPOSING BLOG LEADER BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERS NATO MEMBERS Perceptions o f the Communist System 1950 United States Great B r i t a i n France Canada Norway Denmark West Germany  4 18 16 0 6 0 24  (85) (17) (32) (28) (35) (3) (99)  1955  1963  63(76) 28 (72) 60 (20) 17 (41) 53 (34) 32(116) 34(161) 100 (13) 56 (9) 45 (11) 60 (10) 100 (6) 45 (20) 25 (8)  1965  Perceptions o f the Soviet Union 1950  7(242) 16 (32) 38 (13) 17 (58) 14 (14) 47 (16) 30 (60)  1955  1963  68(65) 33 60(20) 68 48(31) 22 42(87) 100 56 (9) 100 50 (6) 100 45(20)  1965  (58) (38) 100 (2) (76) 29 (7) (13) 0 (17) (3) (6) 39 (14)  WARSAW PACT MEMBERS Perceptions o f the West 1950 Soviet Union Albania East Germany Poland Hungary Rumania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia  1955  17 (59) 47 (19) 13 (55) 34 (41) 13(105) 42 (60) 23 (94) 63 (86) 9 (91) 55 (33) 16(306) 32 (31) 14 (56) 58 (24) 22 (98) 44 (34) Source:  1963  1965  Perceptions o f the United States 1950  1955  48 (83) 9(115) 17 (59) 56 (9) 16(231) 4(145) 13 (55) 12(17) 55 (93) 13(218) 8(105) 42(50) 52 (21) 10(179) 23 (94) 63(86) 9 (33) 25 (92) 6 (88) 55(11) 57 (58 12(217) 17(219) 30(30) 35 (17) 11(109) 61 (49) 56(16) 41 (66) 5(104) 26 (54) 42(33)  1963  1965  43 (44) 9(115) 11(217) 4(145) 32 (34) 6(182) 27 (11) 10(179) 6 (16) 25 (92) 20 (10) 12(215) 21 (14) 22 (51) 5(104) 28 (18)  Hopmann (1969), pp. 126-127, 164-165. The number given i s the percentage o f perceptions which are p o s i t i v e ; the numbers o f perceptions are given i n parentheses.  

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