UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Alliance cohesion : NATO and the Warsaw Pact Terry, John C. 1970

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A L L I A N C E C O H E S I O N : N A T O A N D T H E WARSAW P A C T b y J O H N C H A R L E S T E R R Y B . A . , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , 1969 A T H E S I S S U B M I T T E D I N P A R T I A L F U L F I L L M E N T O F T H E R E Q U I R E M E N T S F O R T H E D E G R E E O F M A S T E R O F A R T S i n t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l S c i e n c e We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A A u g u s t , 1970 I n p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a d v a n c e d d e g r e e a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l m a k e i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e a n d s t u d y . I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e H e a d o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . D e p a r t m e n t o f P o l i t i c a l Science T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a D a t e October 5, 1970 A B S T R A C T T h i s t h e s i s r e p o r t s t h e r e s u l t s o f a n " a t t e m p t t o a s s e s s t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t w o v a r i a b l e s , n a t i o n a l p o w e r b a s e a n d d e g r e e o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , o n t h e c o h e s i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s . Two s p e c i f i c m o d e r n a l l i a n c e s a r e e x a m i n e d : t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t . T h e f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e e x p e c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n p o w e r b a s e a n d a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , a n d b e t w e e n e x t e r n a l t h r e a t a n d a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , h o l d t r u e o n l y f o r c e r t a i n t y p e s o f a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s . TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I INTRODUCTION 1 II DISSENSION IN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT 33 I I I RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES 47 IV FINDINGS 61 V CONCLUSION 90 BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 99 APPENDIX A: NOTE ON DATA SOURCES 114 APPENDIX B: PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO BY MEMBER COUNTRIES 115 APPENDIX C: ANALYSIS OF THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS 116 APPENDIX D: VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT .'.'118 APPENDIX E: TRANSFORMED MEASURES OF TOTAL CONFLICT INTENSITY AND VERBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY ... 120 APPENDIX F: PERCEPTIONS OF OPPOSING BLOC AND OF OPPOSING BLOC LEADER BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERS 121 L I S T O P T A B L E S T A B L E P A G E I SUMMARY O P L I T E R A T U R E ON A L L I A N C E S 30 H a A G G R E G A T E C O R R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N I N D I C A T O R S W I T H T H E D A T A R A N K O R D E R E D B Y Y E A R F O R E A C H N A T I O N : N A T O . . . . 63 l i b A G G R E G A T E C O R R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N I N D I C A T O R S W I T H T H E D A T A R A N K O R D E R E D B Y N A T I O N F O R E A C H Y E A R : N A T O . . . . 6k I I I A G G R E G A T E C O R R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N C O H E S I O N A N D POWER B A S E I N D I C A T O R S W I T H T H E D A T A R A N K O R D E R E D B Y Y E A R F O R E A C H N A T I O N : N A T O 67 I V a A G G R E G A T E C O R R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N C O H E S I O N A N D POWER B A S E I N D I C A T O R S W I T H T H E D A T A R A N K O R D E R E D B Y Y E A R F O R E A C H N A T I O N : N A T O 69 I V b A G G R E G A T E C O R R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N C O H E S I O N A N D POWER B A S E I N D I C A T O R S W I T H T H E D A T A R A N K O R D E R E D B Y N A T I O N F O R E A C H Y E A R : N A T O 70 V N A T O M E M B E R S ' R A N K O R D E R I N G S ON C O H E S I O N I N D I C A T O R S F O R S E L E C T E D Y E A R S 71 V I C O R R E L A T I O N S O F C O H E S I O N I N D I C A T O R S W I T H I N D I C A T O R S O F POWER B A S E A N D E X T E R N A L T H R E A T : F R A N C E 73 V I I C O R R E L A T I O N S O F C O H E S I O N I N D I C A T O R S W I T H I N D I C A T O R S O F POWER B A S E A N D E X T E R N A L T H R E A T : T H E N E T H E R L A N D S 7I+ V I I I C O R R E L A T I O N S O F C O H E S I O N I N D I C A T O R S W I T H I N D I C A T O R S O F POWER B A S E A N D E X T E R N A L T H R E A T : T H E U . S . A 7I1 i i LIST OF TABLES (Continued) TABLE PAGE IX AGGREGATE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN POWER BASE INDICATORS WITH THE DATA RANK ORDERED BY YEAR FOR EACH NATION: WARSAW PACT 8 0 X AGGREGATE COHESION INDICATORS CORRELATED WITH POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT INDICATORS WITH THE DATA RANK ORDERED BY YEAR FOR EACH NATION: WARSAW PACT 8 l XI RANK ORDERS OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS ON COHESION INDICATORS FOR SELECTED YEARS 8 3 XII CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: RUMANIA 8k XIII CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: POLAND 85 XIV CORRELATIONS OF COHESION INDICATORS WITH INDICATORS OF POWER BASE AND EXTERNAL THREAT: U.S.S.R 8 5 i i i A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S I w o u l d l i k e t o a c k n o w l e d g e my g r a t i t u d e t o c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s for t h e i r e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d a d v i c e a t v a r i o u s s t a g e s o f t h i s p r o j e c t : M a r k W . Z a c h e r , J o h n R . W o o d , K e n M c V i c a r , a n d W i l l i a m M o u l , a l l r e a d t h e r e p o r t a t v a r i o u s s t a g e s a n d o f f e r e d a d v i c e w h i c h s h o u l d h a v e b e e n t a k e n m o r e o f t e n t h a n i t w a s . S p e c i a l t h a n k s a r e d u e t o O l e R . H o l s t i w h o g u i d e d t h e p r o j e c t a n d p r o v i d e d me w i t h e n c o u r a g e m e n t , c o n s t r u c t i v e c r i t i c i s m , a n d a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o l e a r n f o r t h e p a s t t w o y e a r s ; a n d t o m y w i f e w h o b o r e m y t e m p e r w i t h g o o d g r a c e a n d g a v e me m u c h - n e e d e d a s s i s t a n c e w i t h t h e d a t a . A n y f a i l u r e s o r s h o r t c o m i n g s , o f c o u r s e , a r e m y o w n . i v C H A P T E R I T H E O R Y A N D R E S E A R C H ON A L L I A N C E S A l l i a n c e s o f n a t i o n - s t a t e s u s u a l l y m e r i t s o m e a t t e n t i o n i n a n y g e n e r a l t e x t b o o k i n t h e f i e l d o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f a l l i a n c e s , h o w e v e r , i s m o r e l i k e l y t o b e b r i e f , a n e c d o t a l , a n d u n s y s t e m a t i c t h a n r i g o r o u s a n d e x h a u s t i v e . W h e n a l l i a n c e s h a v e b e e n e x a m i n e d m o r e t h o r o u g h l y , a s a s p e c i a l t o p i c o f i n t e r e s t , t h e t e n d e n c y h a s b e e n t o b a s e t h e d i s c u s s i o n o n a n u m b e r o f u n s t a t e d a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d i m p o r t a n c e o f a l l i a n c e s , a n d t o e m p h a s i z e t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l a l l i a n c e s i n e x i s t e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f ' w r i t i n g . We a r e o f f e r e d a l m o s t i n n u m e r a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t a l l i a n c e s i n g e n e r a l ; we a r e d e l u g e d w i t h d e t a i l e d o b s e r v a t i o n s o n t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f a f e w s p e c i f i c a l l i a n c e s . M o s t , i f n o t a l l , o f t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s , h o w e v e r , r e m a i n u n t e s t e d . S i m i l a r l y , t h e r e l e v a n c e o f o b s e r v a t i o n s o f s u c h s p e c i f i c a l l i a n c e s a s N A T O , C E N T O , o r t h e T r i p l e E n t e n t e t o O t h e r a l l i a n c e s i s y e t l a r g e l y u n d e t e r m i n e d . T h e p u r p o s e o f t h e a n a l y s i s b e l o w i s t o a t t e m p t t o a s s e s s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o N A T O a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t o f s o m e c o m m o n p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o h e s i o n o f a l l i a n c e s . T w o g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s w i l l b e e x a m i n e d : f i r s t , t h e c o m m o n a s s e r t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n w i l l d i m i n i s h a s e x t e r n a l t h r e a t t o t h e a l l i a n c e o r a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s l e s s e n s ; s e c o n d , t h e n o t i o n t h a t a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s w i l l s h o w e v i d e n c e o f i n c r e a s i n g d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e a l l i a n c e a s t h e i r n a t i o n a l p o w e r g r o w s . A n a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d r e l e v a n c e o f s u c h a n a n a l y s i s c a n , I b e l i e v e , b e f a c i l i t a t e d b y s o m e k n o w l e d g e o f p a s t 2. r e s e a r c h r e l a t e d t o t h e s u b j e c t o f a l l i a n c e s , a n d o f t h e s u c c e s s e s a n d l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h i s r e s e a r c h . T h e r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e f a l l s i n t o t w o b r o a d c a t e g o r i e s : t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e d e a l i n g w i t h a l l i a n c e s i n g e n e r a l o r w i t h s p e c i f i c a l l i a n c e s ; a n d t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s o f s m a l l g r o u p c o a l i t i o n s . ^ " T h e l a t t e r s t u d i e s w i l l b e c o n s i d e r e d f i r s t . S m a l l G r o u p S t u d i e s A g r o w i n g n u m b e r o f e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d i e s o f s m a l l g r o u p s a n d c o a l i t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s h a s a p p e a r e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e , i n t h e p a s t t w o d e c a d e s , o f s o c i o l o g y , g a m e t h e o r y , s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y , a n d o t h e r f i e l d s o f p s y c h o l o g y . T h i s r e s e a r c h h a s b e e n c o n c e n t r a t e d m a i n l y o n t w o t o p i c s : c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n a n d g r o u p c o h e s i o n . T h e s t u d i e s o f c o a l i t i o n s e e m q u i t e g e r m a n e t o a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e f o r m a t i o n o f i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s , b u t t h e y f a l l o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f t h e p r e s e n t e n d e a v o u r a n d , i n a n y e v e n t , r e c e n t w o r k s b y C h e r t k o f f (1970), K e l l e y (1967 a n d 1970), a n d Z i n n e s (1970) p r o v i d e w e l l - r e a s o n e d a s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e p r o g r e s s t o d a t e o f r e s e a r c h o n c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n . T h e o t h e r a s p e c t o f s m a l l g r o u p s w h i c h h a s r e c e i v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t e n t i o n i s t h e c o h e s i o n o f c o a l i t i o n s o r g r o u p s . K e l l e y (1970, p . ^ 83), s u m m a r i z i n g a n u m b e r o f c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s , n o t e s : 1 T h e r e l e v a n c e o f s t u d i e s o f s m a l l g r o u p c o a l i t i o n s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s h a s b e e n l a r g e l y i g n o r e d , w i t h t h e n o t a b l e e x c e p t i o n o f Z i n n e s (1970)- Y e t t h e y o f f e r a n u m b e r o f f a i r l y r i g o r o u s l y t e s t e d p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h s e e m p a r t i c u l a r l y g e r m a n e t o a l l i a n c e s . We t h e n h a v e t h e f o l l o w i n g d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s : 1. s i z e o f c o a l i t i o n 2. w h o a c t u a l l y j o i n i n c o a l i t i o n s 3. w h o a c t u a l l y j o i n i n w i n n i n g c o a l i t i o n s k. w h e n c o a l i t i o n s w i l l b r e a k u p - o r how l o n g t h e y w i l l e x i s t . 5. w h o s e e k s t o b a r g a i n i n i t i a l l y w i t h w h o m 6. w h a t , i f a n y , t h e v a r i o u s r e g u l a r i t i e s a r e i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s e s a t t e n d a n t t o t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c o a l i t i o n s . A l l b u t t h e f o u r t h v a r i a b l e a r e p a r t o f t h e p r o c e s s o f c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n ; t h e f o u r t h v a r i a b l e r e f e r s t o c o a l i t i o n c o h e s i o n . T h e s t u d i e s r e l a t i n g t o c o h e s i o n m a y b e d i v i d e d i n t o t w o g r o u p s : 2 t h o s e e x a m i n i n g c o a l i t i o n o r g r o u p c o h e s i o n a s a d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e ; a n d t h o s e e m p l o y i n g c o h e s i o n a s a n i n d e p e n d e n t o r e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e . E x p e r i m e n t s f a l l i n g i n t o t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r y a r e o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f t h i s p a p e r a n d w i l l n o t b e d i s c u s s e d h e r e . I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d , f i r s t , t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f c o h e s i o n h a s p r o v e d d i f f i c u l t t o d e f i n e o p e r a t i o n a l l y . H a g s t r o m a n d S e l v i n (1965) e m p l o y e d f a c t o r a n a l y s i s o n t h e d a t a f r o m a s m a l l g r o u p e x p e r i m e n t i n a n a t t e m p t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e m a j o r c o m p o n e n t s o f c o h e s i e n . T h e y f o u n d t w o m a j o r d i m e n s i o n s : s o c i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n a n d s o c i o m e t r i c c o h e s i o n . S o c i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n i n c l u d e s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e g r o u p a n d w i t h s o c i a l l i f e . T h e s o c i o m e t r i c c o h e s i o n d i m e n s i o n i s g i v e n t h a t l a b e l b e c a u s e i t i s h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h s u c h s o c i o m e t r i c m e a s u r e s a s " p r o p o r t i o n o f b e s t f r i e n d s i n t h e g r o u p a n d p r o p o r t i o n w h o s e e k p e r s o n a l a d v i c e f r o m o t h e r 2 M a n y o f t h e s e s t u d i e s a r e s m a l l g r o u p e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h n o e x p l i c i t r e f e r e n c e t o c o a l i t i o n s . h. g r o u p m e m b e r s , " ( p p . 35-6), a s w e l l a s s u c h m e a s u r e s a s g r o u p s i z e - T h e y c o n c l u d e , T h e f i r s t f a c t o r , s o c i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n , m a y b e s a i d t o m e a s u r e t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f t h e g r o u p s . . . T h e s e c o n d f a c t o r , s o c i o m e t r i c c o h e s i o n , m a y b e s a i d t o m e a s u r e i n t r i n s i c a t t r a c t i v e n e s s , t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h m e m b e r s a r e a t t r a c t e d b y v a l u e s i n t e r n a l t o t h e g r o u p . We h a v e s h o w n t h a t i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r b o t h f a c t o r s i n s t u d y i n g t h e d y n a m i c s o f s m a l l g r o u p b e h a v i o r . ( p . kl) T h i s , o f c o u r s e , s a y s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e r e l i a b i l i t y w i t h w h i c h H a g s t r o m a n d S e l v i n ' s d i m e n s i o n s a c t u a l l y d o r e p r e s e n t i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d i n t r i n s i c a t t r a c t i v e n e s s . F u r t h e r , we h a v e n o g u a r a n t e e t h a t c o h e s i o n i s , i n f a c t , a t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l ( r a t h e r t h a n 3, k, o r n - d i m e n s i o n a l ) c o n c e p t . S t i l l , H a g s t r o m a n d S e l v i n h a v e i m p r o v e d c o n s i d e r a b l y o n F e s t i n g e r ' s d e f i n i t i o n o f c o h e s i o n a s ' t h e r e s u l t a n t o f a l l f o r c e s i n f l u e n c i n g t h e m e m b e r s t o r e m a i n i n t h e g r o u p . T h e s e f o r c e s m a y d e p e n d o n t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f e i t h e r t h e p r e s t i g e o f t h e g r o u p , m e m b e r s o f t h e g r o u p , o r t h e a c t i v i t i e s i n w h i c h t h e g r o u p e n g a g e s . ' ( Q u o t e d i n A l b e r t , 1953> p . 232). F e s t i n g e r o f f e r s n o s p e c u l a t i o n , e v i d e n c e , o r h y p o t h e s i s a b o u t w h a t , e x a c t l y , t h e s e ' f o r c e s ' a r e . E i s m a n (1959) a l s o a r g u e s t h a t c o h e s i o n i s a n o n - u n i t a r y c o n c e p t . S h e u s e d f i v e d i f f e r e n t m e a s u r e s o f c o h e s i o n - 1 i n a s m a l l 3 " T h e f o l l o w i n g m e a s u r e s o f c o h e s i v e n e s s w e r e u t i l i z e d : ( a ) a s o c i o m e t r i c i n d e x b a s e d o n f r i e n d s h i p ; ( b ) a d i r e c t r a t i n g o f g r o u p a t t r a c t i v e n e s s ; ( c ) a v e r a g e n u m b e r o f r e a s o n s g i v e n b y g r o u p m e m b e r s f o r b e l o n g i n g t o t h e g r o u p ; ( d ) n u m b e r o f s a m e r e a s o n s f o r g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p g i v e n b y a m a j o r i t y o f t h e m e m b e r s ; a n d ( e ) d e g r e e o f s i m i l a r i t y e x i s t i n g a m o n g g r o u p m e m b e r s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r v a l u e s . " ( E i s m a n , 1959> P« 188) 5. g r o u p e x p e r i m e n t a n d c o m p u t e d t h e r a n k o r d e r c o r r e l a t i o n s ( K e n d a l l ' s TAU") b e t w e e n t h e m e a s u r e s . N o m e a s u r e w a s r e l a t e d t o a n y o t h e r a t t h e . 0 5 l e v e l o f s i g n i f i c a n c e o r b e t t e r . S h e o f f e r e d t h e w a r n i n g w h i c h s h o u l d b e b o r n e i n m i n d w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c o m p a r a b i l i t y a n d g e n e r a l i t y o f t h e r e s u l t s o f s t u d i e s e m p l o y i n g c o h e s i o n a s a v a r i a b l e , t h a t : I t i s h a r d l y l e g i t i m a t e f o r u s t o a t t e m p t t o g e n e r a l i z e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n c o h e s i v e n e s s a n d o t h e r v a r i a b l e s , s u c h a s g r o u p p r o d u c t i v i t y , u n i f o r m i t y o f o p i n i o n , e t c . , w h e n c o h e s i v e n e s s , i n t h e v a r i o u s e m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s f r o m w h i c h i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h e s e f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s c o m e , i s " m e a s u r e d d i f f e r e n t l y f r o m o n e s t u d y t o a n o t h e r . ( p . 186) O n e v a r i a b l e c o m m o n l y l i n k e d t o c o h e s i o n i n s t u d i e s o f c o a l i t i o n s a n d s m a l l g r o u p s i s t h r e a t t o t h e g r o u p f r o m a n e x t e r n a l s o u r c e . S h e r i f , e t . a l . , ( l 9 6 l , i n S i n g e r 1965) r e p o r t i n g o n t h e w e l l k n o w n R o b b e r ' s C a v e e x p e r i m e n t , f o u n d a s t r o n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n i n t e r - g r o u p c o m p e t i t i o n o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d i n - g r o u p s o l i d a r i t y a n d c o - o p e r a t i v e n e s s o n t h e o t h e r : T h e h e i g h t e n e d i n - g r o u p s o l i d a r i t y a n d c o - o p e r a t i v e n e s s w e r e o b s e r v e d a t t h e v e r y t i m e w h e n i n t e r - g r o u p h o s t i l i t y w a s a t i t s p e a k , d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d w h e n t h e g r o u p s a s s e r t e d e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t t h e y w o u l d n o t h a v e a n y t h i n g m o r e t o d o w i t h e a c h o t h e r . ( p . ^29) B o u l d i n g o f f e r s a s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n . H e h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t a c o m m o n e n e m y s e r v e s a s a u n i f y i n g f o r c e , a n d o f f e r e d a n e c d o t a l s u p p o r t i n g e v i d e n c e f r o m s u c h d i s p a r a t e g r o u p s a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s , l a b o r u n i o n s , a n d c h u r c h e s (1962, p . 162). H a m b l i n ( i n S i n g e r , 1965) c o n d u c t e d a n e x p e r i m e n t t e s t i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n g r o u p i n t e g r a t i o n a n d c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n s . H a l f t h e s u b j e c t s w e r e p l a c e d i n a c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n a n d h a l f i n a n o n - c r i s i s s i t u a t i o n , a n d t h e e x t e n t o f c o - o p e r a t i v e b e h a v i o r w a s o b s e r v e d , w i t h 6. t h e r e s u l t s t e s t e d f o r s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ( t w o - t a i l e d t - t e s t ) . T h e a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a c o o p e r a t i v e o r c o m p e t i t i v e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c r i s i s w a s f o u n d t o b e a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r v e n i n g v a r i a b l e : G r o u p i n t e g r a t i o n d e c r e a s e s d u r i n g a c r i s i s i f a l i k e l y s o l u t i o n t o t h e c r i s i s p r o b l e m i s u n a v a i l a b l e . G r o u p i n t e g r a t i o n i n c r e a s e s d u r i n g a c r i s i s i f a l i k e l y c o o p e r a t i v e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c r i s i s p r o b l e m i s p r e s e n t . G r o u p s d i s i n t e g r a t e d u r i n g a c r i s i s i f a l i k e l y c o m p e t i t i v e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c r i s i s p r o b l e m i s p r e s e n t . ( p . 230) C a r t w r i g h t a n d Z a n d e r ( i960, p . 82) n o t e d t h a t , " I t a p p e a r s t h a t c o h e s i v e n e s s c a n b e i n c r e a s e d i n s o m e g r o u p s b y a t t a c k s f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . " I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , t h e y c i t e t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f J a p a n e s e - A m e r i c a n s i n W o r l d W a r I I r e l o c a t i o n c a m p s , a n d e x p e r i m e n t s i n b o y s c a m p s c o n d u c t e d b y S h e r i f . k C a r t w r i g h t a n d Z a n d e r a l s o r e f e r t o a s t u d y b y K e l l e y w h o f o u n d a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p , i n a s m a l l g r o u p e x p e r i m e n t , b e t w e e n t h e a m o u n t o f p r e s t i g e a p e r s o n h a s i n a g r o u p a n d t h e e x t e n t o f h i s a t t r a c t i o n t o t h e g r o u p . E x l i n e a n d Z i l l e r (1959) o f f e r s o m e s u p p o r t f o r t h i s f i n d i n g . T h e y c o n d u c t e d a n e x p e r i m e n t w i t h a d i s c u s s i o n g r o u p w i t h g r o u p s p l a c e d i n a s i t u a t i o n o f e i t h e r s t a t u s c o n g r u e n c y o r i n c o n g r u e n c y a c r o s s t w o d i m e n s i o n s o f s t a t u s ( a b i l i t y a n d v o t i n g p o w e r ) . T h e g r o u p s w e r e r e q u i r e d t o p e r f o r m c e r t a i n t a s k s , a n d t h e d e g r e e o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t w a s m e a s u r e d . M e m b e r s o f s t a t u s c o n g r u e n t g r o u p s a r g u e d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r i n d i s c u s s i o n s i g n i f i c a n t l y k H . H . K e l l e y , " C o m m u n i c a t i o n i n E x p e r i m e n t a l l y C r e a t e d H i e r a r c h i e s , " H u m a n R e l a t i o n s , I V (1950, p p . 39-56). 7-m o r e o f t e n t h a n s t a t u s i n c o n g r u e n t g r o u p s ; h o w e v e r , . . . m e m b e r s o f s t a t u s c o n g r u e n t g r o u p s r a t e d t h e i r c o - w o r k e r s n o m o r e f a v o r a b l y a n d n o l e s s c r i t i c a l l y t h a n d i d m e m b e r s o f i n c o n g r u e n t g r o u p s . I t w a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e s e f i n d i n g s p o i n t e d t o t h e d e s i r -a b i l i t y o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g t h e c o n c e p t o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n f l i c t i n t o o b j e c t i v e a n d a f f e c t i v e c o m p o n e n t s , ( p . 160) E x l i n e a n d Z i l l e r c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e h y p o t h e s i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n s t a t u s i n c o n g r u e n c y a n d i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t h e l d t r u e i n c a s e s o f o b j e c t i v e , b u t n o t a f f e c t i v e c o m p o n e n t s o f c o n f l i c t . K e l m a n ( i n S i n g e r , 1965) o f f e r e d f u r t h e r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e h y p o t h e s i s . H e o f f e r e d a s e t o f h y p o t h e s e s r e l a t i n g k i n d s o f p o w e r t o t y p e o f c o n f o r m i t y : 1. T o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e p o w e r o f t h e i n f l u e n c i n g a g e n t i s b a s e d o n m e a n s - c o n t r o l , c o n f o r m i t y w i l l t e n d t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f c o m p l i a n c e . 2. T o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e p o w e r o f t h e i n f l u e n c i n g a g e n t i s b a s e d o n a t t r a c t i v e n e s s , c o n f o r m i t y w i l l t e n d t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . 3. T o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e p o w e r o f t h e i n f l u e n c i n g a g e n t i s b a s e d o n c r e d i b i l i t y , c o n f o r m i t y w i l l t e n d t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n . ( p . 23^-5) R e s p o n s e s t o a q u e s t i o n n a i r e i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l l o f t h e s e h y p o t h e s e s w e ' r e s u p p o r t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y a t t h e . 0 5 l e v e l o f s i g n i f i c a n c e o r b e t t e r . I n c o m p a r i n g t h e s e f i n d i n g s w i t h t h o s e r e p o r t e d b y C a r t w r i g h t a n d Z a n d e r , a n d b y E x l i n e a n d Z i l l e r , h o w e v e r , i t m u s t b e r e c a l l e d , t h a t e a c h s t u d y u s e d a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e : p r e s t i g e ; s t a t u s i n -c o n g r u e n c y ; a n d p o w e r ; a n d p o s s i b l y n o n - c o m p a r a b l e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s : a t t r a c t i o n t o t h e g r o u p , i n t r a - g r o u p c o n f l i c t , a n d c o n f o r m i t y . T h e r e l i a b i l i t y a n d s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e s m a l l g r o u p s t u d i e s a r e e n h a n c e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a r e m a i n l y b a s e d o n 8. rigorous experimental research much of which has been replicated, and some of which has been found to be in need of modification. On the other hand, the generality of the findings i s hampered by the limitation that the findings on group cohesion are largely based on a single explanatory variable, and, unfortunately, usually the same single explanatory variable: external threat. We lack information concerning the relative explanatory power of the independent variables employed in comparison with other possible independent variables, and about the possible importance of interaction effects between different explanatory vaiables. We also lack any information concerning the relevance of these findings to inter-national relations. Derived, as they are, from experimental studies of individuals, the applicability of these propositions to international relations should be regarded as tenuous and questionable. Nevertheless, there i s f a i r l y strong support for the relevance of differences in level of external threat to cohesion in small groups, and an examination of this factor;, in the context of international alliances may be a f r u i t f u l line of inquiry. The Study of Alliances in International Politics The international p o l i t i c s counterpart to the studies of coalitions and interaction in small groups i s the large body of literature on alliances. Alliance has some properties in common with other forms of international co-operation, but, as Fedder notes (1968, p. 6 9 ) , i t is important to distinguish alliance from other forms of organized inter-national co-operation or alignment, and from collective security arrange-ments. The f i r s t distinction was aptly made by Friedman. He noted 9-c e r t a i n f a c t o r s c o m m o n t o a s s o c i a t i o n s a m o n g n a t i o n - s t a t e s ( i n F r i e d m a n , B l a d e n , a n d R o s e n , e d s . , 1970, p p . 4-5): a . p a i r i n g o r c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r f o r a l i m i t e d d u r a t i o n r e g a r d i n g a n u t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d p r o b l e m ; b . a g g r e g a t i o n o f t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s ; c . p u r s u i t o f n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s j o i n t l y o r b y p a r a l l e l c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n ; d . p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t a s s i s t a n c e w i l l b e r e n d e r e d b y m e m b e r s t o o n e a n o t h e r . . . . W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s a l l i a n c e f r o m o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n , s u c h a s i n t e g r a t i o n , m u l t i -n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y b u i l d i n g a n d e c o n o m i c p a r t n e r s h i p , i s t h e p r e s e n c e o f s u c h p i v o t a l f a c t o r s a s : a . e x i s t e n c e o f a n e n e m y o r e n e m i e s , a c t u a l o r a n t i c i p a t e d ; b . c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f m i l i t a r y e n g a g e m e n t a n d t h e r i s k o f w a r ; c . m u t u a l i t y o f i n t e r e s t i n e i t h e r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s q u o o r a g g r a n d i z e m e n t i n r e g a r d t o t e r r i t o r y , p o p u l a t i o n , s t r a t e g i c r e s o u r c e s , a n d s o f o r t h . A n a l l i a n c e m a y b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y a r r a n g e m e n t b y t h e f a c t t h a t a n a l l i a n c e n e e d n o t b e u n i v e r s a l ( F e d d e r , I968, p . 80) w h i l e u n i v e r s a l o r n e a r - u n i v e r s a l a d h e r e n c e t o c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y i s n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r f o r i t t o f u n c t i o n p r o p e r l y ( C l a u d e , 196*1-, C h a p . 12), a n d b y t h e f a c t t h a t a c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y s y s t e m i s a i m e d a t m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s t a t u s q u o , w h i l e a n a l l i a n c e c a n b e a i m e d a t e i t h e r p r e s e r v a t i o n o r d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s q u o . T h e l i t e r a t u r e o n a l l i a n c e s c a n b e f r u i t f u l l y d i v i d e d u p a c c o r d -i n g t o t h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n b y v a r i o u s a u t h o r s . J u s t a s t h e s t u d i e s o n 10. small groups and c o a l i t i o n s comprised a number of different approaches so, too, with the l i t e r a t u r e i n international r e l a t i o n s . We have, f i r s t , a large group of studies which might be lumped together under the term 'equilibrium models and analyses,' that i s , those works which examine international p o l i t i c s i n termssof the balance of power, the structure of the international system, or the search for ' s t a b i l i t y ' . Since such a large proportion of the international p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e f i t s i n to t h i s category, i t seems advisable to further subdivide them to f a c i l i t a t e analysis. Accordingly, I s h a l l consider f i r s t , those studies u t i l i z i n g the 'equilibrium' approach which are of l i m i t e d scope, that i s , those which deal only with one a l l i a n c e (or, occasionally, two alliances which e x i s t at the same time i n the same geographical area). The second group of studies deal with a broader range of alliances (e.g. the all i a n c e p o l i c i e s of new states; European allianc e s since the 19th century; or a l l post-World War I I American all i a n c e s ) than the f i r s t group, either i n terms of geographical area or time span, but s t i l l do not claim universal relevance. The t h i r d group of studies apply, or at least purport to apply, t o allian c e s i n general, though often with the caution that the conclusions are probably not relevant to alliances which existed before some time period, such as World War I I . Most of the case studies of alliances deal with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, a r e f l e c t i o n , probably, of the fact that most of them were written i n the Post-World War I I period, and of the obvious importance and long life-span of these two a l l i a n c e s . A number of studies of the Communist system also merit attention f o r t h e i r insights into the 11. d y n a m i c s o f r e l a t i o n s i n a g r o u p o f n a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h t h e C o m m u n i s t s y s t e m i s n o t a n a l l i a n c e h u t r a t h e r a n a l i g n m e n t o f s t a t e s . T r i s k a a n d F i n l e y (1965) s u g g e s t e d t h a t i n a b i p o l a r i n t e r -n a t i o n a l s y s t e m c o m p e t i n g a l l i a n c e s t e n d t o m i r r o r o n e a n o t h e r . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e N o r t h A t l a n t i c T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e y p o i n t e d o u t , l e d e v e n t u a l l y t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a s i m i l a r a l l i a n c e i n t h e E a s t , t h e W a r s a w P a c t . T h e l a t t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n " p r e s e n t s a n e a r m i r r o r -i m a g e o f N A T O - a c o n c e p t o f u n i f i e d m i l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s r a t i o n a l i z e d a s a S o c i e t - E a s t E u r o p e a n d e f e n s e s y s t e m a g a i n s t t h e N A T O t h r e a t . " ( p p . 38-9) T h e y s u g g e s t e d , t h e n , t h a t t h e W a r s a w P a c t w a s f o r m e d i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e t h r e a t p o s e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f N A T O . C a l v o c o r e s s i (1966) b a s e d h i s a n a l y s i s , a s d i d T r i s k a a n d F i n l e y , o n a n e c d o t a l d a t a a b o u t N A T O a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t . H o w e v e r , w h i l e T r i s k a a n d F i n l e y l i m i t e d t h e m s e l v e s t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e s y m m e t r i c a l f o r m a t i o n a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e E a s t a n d W e s t a l l i a n c e s , C a l v o c o r e s s i w a s c o n c e r n e d , i n s t e a d , m a i n l y w i t h t h e d e m a n d s a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s m a k e o n e a c h o t h e r . H i s i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c a n a l y s i s o f e v e n t s c o n c e r n i n g N A T O a n d t h e P a c t s u g g e s t e d a n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s w h i c h m i g h t h a m p e r t h e c o h e s i o n o f a n a l l i a n c e : d e c r e a s e d e x t e r n a l t h r e a t ; g r o w i n g s t r e n g t h o f m i n o r a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s ; d i s a p p r o v a l o f t h e a l l i a n c e l e a d e r ' s p o l i c i e s ; n e g l e c t o f t h e i n t e r e s t s o f m i n o r a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s i n c o n -f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s u p e r p o w e r s ; g r e a t d i s p a r i t y i n t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h s o f a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s ; p r o g r e s s i n i n t e g r a t i o n a m o n g a s u b s e t o f a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s , e x c l u d i n g o t h e r s ; a n d , i n a n a l l i a n c e b a s e d o n n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n c e , a d e c l i n e i n t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h a t d e t e r r e n t ( p p . 358-12. 360). He noted also that the m i l i t a r y pressure of the Korean War led to pressures by the U.S. for greater assumption of al l i a n c e burdens by other members (p. 357)- Eastern Europe's domestic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the Warsaw Pact may, Calvocoressi suggested, inspire more responsive p o l i c i e s on the part of the a l l i a n c e leader (pp. 363-4). None of these observations, however, were tested by application to other a l l i a n c e s , nor even systematically examined i n the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Other a r t i c l e s and books dealing with NATO r e f l e c t the same preoccupation with the cohesion of the a l l i a n c e , as w e l l as a p r o c l i v i t y for the use of anecdotal evidence. I t i s impossible to do more than scratch the surface of the NATO l i t e r a t u r e here, but the following examples are, I believe, representative of the research and analysis to date, excluding the endless discussions of organizational structures and nuclear strategy to be found i n such sources as The A t l a n t i c Community  Quarterly, and the studies which f a l l into other categories to be d i s -cussed below, such as transaction analyses and more general studies employing the equilibrium approach. Marshall ( i n Wolfers, 1964), and P f a l t z g r a f f (1969) both emphasize the effect of changes i n external threat on allia n c e cohesion. Marshall hypothesized that the East-West detente of the 1960's may have a disintegrative effect on NATO (p. 19). P f a l t z g r a f f , i n a sense, tested t h i s proposition i n his discussion of the effect of the Czeckoslovak c r i s i s of I968 on the A t l a n t i c A l l i a n c e . He noted the dis u n i t y i n NATO before the c r i s i s and concluded that: . . . i n t h e p r e s e n c e o f p e r c e i v e d e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , N A T O m e m b e r s t o o k s t e p s t o i n c r e a s e t h e i r f o r c e l e v e l s a n d i m p r o v e t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e y a t t e m p t e d t o m a k e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n t h e p l a n n i n g m a c h i n e r y a n d c o n s u l t a -t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w i t h i n t h e a l l i a n c e . ( p . 220) A r n o l d W o l f e r s (1959, P * 3) a l s o o f f e r e d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t e x t e r n a l d a n g e r e n h a n c e s a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , o r , m o r e . s p e c i f i c a l l y , e n c o u r a g e s a l l i e s t o r a l l y a r o u n d t h e a l l i a n c e l e a d e r . W o l f e r s , a s w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s a u t h o r s , b a s e d h i s a n a l y s i s o n a n e c d o t a l e v i d e n c e a b o u t N A T O . H e a l s o s u g g e s t e d a n u m b e r o f o t h e r f a c t o r s w h i c h m i g h t b e r e l a t e d t o a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n : i d i o s y n c r a t i c q u a l i t i e s o f l e a d e r s ; d i s c r e p a n c y i n c a p a b i l i t i e s o f a l l i e s ; t h e e n d o f t h e A m e r i c a n n u c l e a r m o n o p o l y ; a n d v a r i e d g o a l s o f m e m b e r s ( p p . h - l l ) . T h e l a t t e r f a c t o r i s a l s o m e n t i o n e d , i n s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t t e r m s , b y v o n B r e n t a n o (1961, p . ^22): " T h e s u b j e c t i v e l i m i t o f l o y a l t y t o a n a l l i a n c e s e e m s t o b e r e a c h e d a s s o o n a s a n a t i o n f e e l s t h a t v i t a l i n t e r e s t s o f i t s own a r e a t s t a k e . . . " B o w i e (1963, pp> 52-9) , w r i t i n g i n t h e s a m e i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c f a s h i o n , a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t a l l i a n c e t e n s i o n w o u l d b e c r e a t e d b y d i f f e r i n g n a t i o n a l g o a l s . M o r g e n t h a u (1957) d i s c u s s e d e v e n t s i n N A T O b e f o r e 1957, c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e U . S . a n d B r i t a i n a n d t h e U . S . a n d F r a n c e . H e , l i k e W o l f e r s a n d v o n B r e n t a n o , c o n c l u d e d t h a t d i v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s o f a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s m a y c a u s e t e n s i o n i n t h e a l l i a n c e ( p p . 2^-5) . M o r g e n t h a u a l s o o f f e r e d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n , w h i c h h a s b e e n c o m m o n t o m a n y o f t h e a r t i c l e s a l r e a d y c i t e d , t h a t r e d u c t i o n o f t h r e a t a n d i n c r e a s e d p o w e r o f w e a k e r a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s m a y l e a d t o r e d u c e d a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n ; a n d i n a d d i t i o n h e s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r m a t i o n o f a c o a l i t i o n i s c a u s e d b y p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t ( p p . 22-3) . 14. S t e e l (19&4, p p . 21:16) s u g g e s t e d t h e s a m e c o n c l u s i o n s : w e a k n a t i o n s e n t e r i n t o a l l i a n c e s i n r e s p o n s e t o e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , a n d a l l i a n c e s w i l l b e d i s r u p t e d a s e x t e r n a l t h r e a t d i m i n i s h e s a n d t h e w e a k b e c o m e s t r o n g e r ( e s p e c i a l l y i f t h e y d e v e l o p n u c l e a r w e a p o n s : p p . 3^-7)' I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e , h o w e v e r , t h a t S t e e l ' s h y p o t h e s e s p o s i t a n i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f n a t i o n s ( w e a k - s t r o n g ) a n d t h e s y s t e m l e v e l v a r i a b l e o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t ; h e s u g g e s t e d t h a t c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t h e s e t w o e l e m e n t s l e a d t o a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n a n d d i s r u p t i o n . S t u d i e s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t s y s t e m l e n d s u p p o r t t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n i n m a n y o f t h e N A T O s t u d i e s t h a t e x t e r n a l t h r e a t h a s a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e o n a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n . D a l l i n , f o r e x a m p l e (1963, p p . 153> 162), c o n c l u d e d t h a t c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d C h i n a v a r i e s d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n S i n o - S o v i e t p e r c e p t i o n s a n d a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . L o w e n t h a l (1963? p p . 115-6) f o u n d t h a t t h e o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r p r o m o t i n g u n i t y i n t h e c o m m u n i s t s y s t e m w a s c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e W e s t . B r z e z i n s k i (1963, P> 522) h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t t h e S i n o - S o v i e t c o n f l i c t m i g h t l e a d t o a n u p s w i n g i n S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s w i t h E a s t e r n E u r o p e . B r z e z i n s k i a l s o n o t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a n i d e o l o g y a s a u n i f y i n g f a c t o r ( p p . 513-4), a s d i d S c h w a r t z (1963, p p . 38, 44-8). A n d H a l p e r n (19^3, P P - 117 > 129), p r e s e n t i n g a n e c d o t a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t h i s v i e w s , s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r m a t i o n o f s u b c o a l i t i o n s i n a n a l l i a n c e m i g h t b e a d e - u n i f y i n g f a c t o r . H o t a l l o f t h e r e s e a r c h o n a l l i a n c e s i n t h i s c a t e g o r y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e p o s t - W o r l d W a r I I b l o c s , h o w e v e r . H a r d y (1919, P P - 260»-5), 15. discussing the Argentina-Brazil-Chile alliance of 1919 found the same relationships between external threat and alliance cohesion, and between changing international roles and alliance cohesion, which were found in the studies of post-World War II alliances, employing the same anecdotal type of data and impressionistic style of analysis. Studies of World War I alliances also offer familiar conclusions. Allen (1920, p. 4^9) for example, suggested that i t was the "contemplation of war" which led to formation of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. Craigi.(l965, pp. 336-40) discussed the importance of trust and attitudinal similarity among allies for alliance cohesion. The second category of research utilizing the "equilibrium" approach comprises a small group of studies each of which focusesson a particular area and particular historical period, though not on a particular alliance. A l l of these studies considered here rely on historical anecdotes for evidence rather than any systematically gathered data, and a l l but one (Good, in Martin, 1962) attempt to explain their topics through the perspective of system-level variables, that is, in terms of such things as number and type of units or actors in the international system, the characteristic relationships among those units, and/or the configuration of the system. Good's explanation hinges on the nation-state attribute of recency of independence. A new state, he suggests, will (p. 8) want "to pick up its own franchise, speak with its own voice, and demonstrate its own capacities. Alignment with a bloc means a renewed loss of voice and identity." Domestic factors, such as radical pressure and need to maintain power, are also held to militate 16. a g a i n s t a l i g n m e n t . S t e v e n s (1961, p . 4-5) d i s c u s s e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t t o a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f A m e r i c a n a l l i a n c e s i n t h e p o s t - W o r l d W a r I I p e r i o d : S o m e c o u n t r i e s d i r e c t l y u n d e r t h e g u n - W e s t G e r m a n y , S o u t h K o r e a , a n d N a t i o n a l i s t C h i n a , f o r e x a m p l e - a r e e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l i e s . . . O t h e r s h a d t o h e p r e s s e d i n t o 4 t r e a t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w i t h t h e g u a r a n t e e o f l a v i s h U . S . m i l i t a r y a i d a s t h e d e c i s i v e f a c t o r . S t e v e n s , t h e n , r e a c h e s a c o n c l u s i o n o f t e n m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s t u d i e s o f s m a l l g r o u p s a n d i n t h e c a s e s t u d i e s w h i c h f o l l o w t h e e q u i l i b r i u m a p p r o a c h . H a a s (1969) d i s c u s s e d t h e e f f e c t o n a l l i a n c e s ( s p e c i f i c a l l y N A T O , S E A T O , a n d t h e O A S ) o f c h a n g i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e a m o u n t o f t h r e a t e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ( p . 113). H e n o t e d ( p . 98) t h a t c h a n g e d c o n d i t i o n s c a n p r o v o k e t i r o k i n d s o f r e s p o n s e s i n a l l i a n c e s : " a d e s i r e t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e e n t a n g l i n g a l l i a n c e o r a c o m m i t m e n t t o i m p r o v e i t b y s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e w e b . " H e r z (1959) f o u n d t h a t i n t r a - b l o c r e l a t i o n s i n a b i p o l a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m m a y b e s t r a i n e d b y p o w e r i n e q u a l i t i e s : ( p . 1^3) " . . . t h e s u p e r p o w e r i s g o i n g t o b e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h c o u n t e r f o r c e s a n d c o u n t e r i n f l u e n c e s o n t h e p a r t o f i t s a l l i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e s t r o n g e r o n e s a m o n g t h e m . " H i s a n a l y s i s d e a l t m a i n l y w i t h N A T O a n d t h e W a r s a w P a c t , b u t m i g h t b e g e n e r a l i z e d t o a n y b i p o l a r s y s t e m . T h e l a s t g r o u p o f s t u d i e s f o l l o w i n g t h e ' e q u i l i b r i u m ' a p p r o a c h c o m p r i s e s t h o s e w o r k s w h i c h c o v e r a n e x t e n d e d t i m e p e r i o d a n d / o r a l a r g e n u m b e r o f a l l i a n c e s . T h e y a r e , i n o t h e r w o r d s , m o r e i n c l u s i v e t h a n t h e 17-equilibrium type of analyses discussed above and, consequently, tbe conclusions reached i n these studies are more l i k e l y to be generally applicable, though perhaps less accurate i n t h e i r application to spe c i f i c alliances than the case studies of those a l l i a n c e s . A number of these authors treated alliances quite b r i e f l y . P a r t i c u l a r l y i n older textbooks, alliances i n general were considered to be a balancing mechanism i n , or an i n t e g r a l part of, a balance of power system, with more or less appropriate examples given (Cf. Beloff, 1955, p. 71; Claude, 1962, p. 89; H i l l , 1963, pp. 254-255; Morgenthau, 1967, PP* 175-187; Organski, 1968, p. 277; Padelford and Lincoln, 1967, p. 309; Palmer and Perkins, 1967* p. 255). These studies usually refer to formal m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s i n any system which might be appropriately described as a balance of power system. Other authors have dismissed the effect on alliances of a change i n the nature of the international system. Rosecrance (1966, p. 320) suggested that as the international system becomes more multi-polar, the significance of s h i f t s i n a l l i a n c e s lessens, although the uncertainty a r i s i n g from s h i f t i n g a l l i a n c e patterns increases. Dinerstein (1965) argued that the international system changed t o a bipolar power con-f i g u r a t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y with the development of nuclear cap a b i l i t y . As a r e s u l t , he contended, allianc e s now d i f f e r from pre-World War I I allian c e s i n three ways: (1) p o l i t i c a l goals have superseded m i l i t a r y ; (2) the r e l a t i v e power and the number of participant states have altered s i g n i f i c a n t l y ; (3) ideology has become a major factor. (p. 593) 18. Because of these three factors, Dinerstein suggested, alliances have become more durable and extend over a broader geographic area. He offered no evidence, however, to support the conclusion that the change in the nature of alliances can be best explained by the factors he has suggested rather than by other changes in the system. (See Fedder, I968, pp. 72-75). The concern with cohesion of alliances, manifested in the alliance case studies discussed above, is also evident in these more general studies. Stoessinger (1969, pp. I U 5 - I U 6 , 156-157) suggested that the cohesion of post-World War I I alliances is affected by such factors as intra-bloc political and military tensions; threat perception; and ideology. Stoessinger's examples are drawn solely from current American alliances, with no attempt to generalize his conclusions to other historical periods or to alliances outside of the cold war blocs. Wolfers (1962) also concentrated his attention on the subject of alliance cohesion. Unlike Stoessinger, however, he referred to war-time as well as peacetime alliances and to a broader historical period. He, too, noted that alliance cohesion may be undermined by a diminution of external threat, or by suspicions concerning the reliability of allied pledges of future assistance (p. 29), among other factors. A few authors have offered more complete theories of alliances, with consideration given to a number of aspects of alliances rather than just alliance formation or cohesion. Osgood (1968) emphasized post-World War I I American alliances, but his examples also include references to eighteenth and nineteenth century alliances and to alliances in the 19-t w o w o r l d w a r s . H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t : T h e r e a r e f o u r p r i n c i p l e f u n c t i o n s o f a l l i a n c e s , a n d t h e y a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e : a c c r e t i o n o f p o w e r , i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , r e s t r a i n t o f a l l i e s , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r . ( p . 21) O s g o o d a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t h e c r e a t i o n , d u r a t i o n , a n d d e c l i n e o f a l l i a n c e s . H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t a n u m b e r o f " d e t e r m i n a n t s " m i g h t h a v e a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t o n t h e s e a s p e c t s o f a l l i a n c e s : t h e p a t t e r n o f d i v e r g e n t a n d c o n v e r g e n t i n t e r e s t s o f m e m b e r s ; t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m i l i t a r y p o w e r ; t h e " a l l i a n c e c a p a b i l i t y " o f m e m b e r s , t h a t i s , s u c h f a c t o r s a s i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y , e c o n o m i c s t r e n g t h , a n d a p r e d i c t a b l e f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e a t t i t u d e o f g o v e r n m e n t s t o w a r d a l l i a n c e s ( p p . 2 2 - 2 4 ) . K . J . H o l s t i (1967) h a s e x a m i n e d a l l i a n c e s o v e r a v e r y b r o a d t i m e s p a n , i n c l u d i n g e x a m p l e s f r o m t h e G r e e k c i t y - s t a t e s y s t e m , w a r t i m e a l l i a n c e s , a n d m o d e r n a l l i a n c e s . H i s a n a l y s i s i n c l u d e d d i s c u s s i o n o f a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n , d u r a t i o n , s t r u c t u r e , a n d c o h e s i o n , p a y i n g p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f a l l i a n c e s i n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f i n t e r -n a t i o n a l s y s t e m s . H e n o t e d t h a t a l l i a n c e s a p p e a r i n a l l t y p e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m s e x c e p t h i e r a r c h i c a l s y s t e m s , a n d t h a t a l l i a n c e s t e n d t o b e t e m p o r a r y i n a ' d i f f u s e ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m w h i l e i n a ' p o l a r ' s y s t e m o r a ' d i f f u s e - b l o c ' s y s t e m a l l i a n c e s t e n d t o b e c l o s e l y -k n i t a n d f a i r l y d u r a b l e s t r u c t u r e s ( p . 110). H o l s t i , a s d i d m a n y o f t h e a u t h o r s d i s c u s s e d a b o v e , n o t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t f o r a l l i a n c e s : C o m m o n p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h r e a t a r e p r o b a b l y t h e m o s t f r e q u e n t s o u r c e s o f a l l i a n c e s t r a t e g i e s . A s T h u c y d i d e s n o t e d o v e r 2,000 y e a r s a g o , m u t u a l f e a r 20. i s t h e o n l y s o l i d b a s i s u p o n w h i c h t o o r g a n i z e a n a l l i a n c e . . . I f a l l p a r t n e r s o f a d e f e n s i v e m i l i t a r y c o a l i t i o n p e r c e i v e a c o m m o n e n e m y o r t h r e a t , t h e a l l i a n c e i s l i k e l y t o w i t h s t a n d s t r a i n s c a u s e d b y i d e o l o g i c a l i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s o r d i s t r u s t a r i s i n g f r o m p e r s o n a l i t y d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s . ( p p . I l l , 116) H o l s t i a l s o s u g g e s t e d t h a t I n c o m p a t i b l e m a j o r s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s m a y p r o d u c e s t r a i n s i n m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s a n d t h a t , i n t h e m o d e r n e r a , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y m a y h a v e d i v i s i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a l l i a n c e s ( p p . 117 -119)' M o r g e n t h a u ( i n W o l f e r s , 1959, p p . I89-I93) i d e n t i f i e d t h r e e t y p e s o f " i n t e r e s t s " w h i c h a l l i a n c e s s e r v e : i d e n t i c a l , c o m p l e m e n t a r y , a n d i d e o l o g i c a l . A n a l l i a n c e b a s e d s o l e l y o n i d e o l o g y , h e s u g g e s t e d , w o u l d b e o f v e r y s h o r t d u r a t i o n w h i l e o n e b a s e d o n c o m m o n i n t e r e s t s , s u c h a s m u t u a l l y p e r c e i v e d t h r e a t o r e c o n o m i c a n d m i l i t a r y c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y , w o u l d b e m o r e l i k e l y t o l a s t . B o t h t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f b e n e f i t s a m o n g m e m b e r s a n d t h e p o l i c i e s o f a n a l l i a n c e , h e c o n c l u d e d , w o u l d b e l i k e l y t o r e f l e c t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r i n t h e a l l i a n c e . L i s k a (1962) o f f e r e d a w i d e v a r i e t y o f o b s e r v a t i o n s a b o u t a l l i a n c e s b a s e d o n a n e c d o t a l r e f e r e n c e s t o a l l i a n c e s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , p a y i n g p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o a l l i a n c e s s i n c e W o r l d W a r I I . L i s k a d i s c u s s e d s u c h v a r i e d a s p e c t s o f a l l i a n c e s a s t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f a l l i e s , t h e a t t r a c t i o n o f s t r o n g s t a t e s f o r w e a k o n e s , t h e i n f l u e n c e o f s m a l l s t a t e s i n a n a l l i a n c e , a n d a l l i a n c e e f f i c a c y , b u t h e p a i d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e s u b j e c t s o f a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n , c o h e s i o n , a n d d i s r u p t i o n . H e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e p r i m a r y i m p e t u s t o a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n i s e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , w i t h o t h e r f a c t o r s s u c h a s 21. n a t i o n a l s t r e n g t h o r w e a k n e s s , i d e o l o g i c a l a f f i n i t y , a n d e c o n o m i c c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y p l a y i n g a s e c o n d a r y r o l e ( p p . 12-14). A l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n , h e s u g g e s t e d , a p p e a r s t o b e e n h a n c e d b y d o m e s t i c s t a b i l i t y o f m e m b e r s , c o m m o n i d e o l o g y , c o n s u l t a t i o n a m o n g a l l i e s , c o m p l e m e n t a r y i n t e r e s t s , t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e a l l i a n c e t o r e s p o n d t o c h a n g e , a n d p e r c e i v e d e x t e r n a l t h r e a t . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l i a n c e c o h e s i o n m a y b e a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d b y n u c l e a r d i f f u s i o n i n a n a l l i a n c e , d o m e s t i c i n s t a b i l i t y o f m e m b e r s , d e r a n g e m e n t o f t h e a l l i a n c e ' s s t a t u s h i e r a r c h y , o r w i l l i n g n e s s o f a l l i e s t o r u n r i s k s i n t h e i r o w n i n t e r e s t s w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e a l l i a n c e , a m o n g o t h e r f a c t o r s . E d w a r d s ' (1969) d i s c u s s i o n o f a l l i a n c e s p r o b a b l y c a n n o t p r o p e r l y b e c l a s s i f i e d a s a n e x a m p l e o f t h e s y s t e m i c o r e q u i l i b r i u m a p p r o a c h , b u t h i s s t y l e a p p r o x i m a t e s t h i s c a t e g o r y o f l i t e r a t u r e m o r e c l o s e l y t h a n i t d o e s t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s o r t h e o t h e r a n a l y s e s w h i c h w i l l b e e x a m i n e d b e l o w . E d w a r d s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e " k e y i s s u e s " f o r a n a l y s i s o f a l l i a n c e s a r e t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e c i s i o n t o f o r m a n a l l i a n c e ; t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f t h e n a t u r e a n d f o r m o f t h e a l l i a n c e ; t h e " m o r p h o l o g y " o f a l l i a n c e r e l a t i o n s , t h a t i s , t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f t h e a l l i e s ; t h e e x p a n s i o n o r d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f t h e a l l i a n c e , i f a n y ; a n d t h e d e t e r m i n a n t s o f t h e t i m e a n d m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e a l l i a n c e w i l l t e r m i n a t e , ( p . 209). E d w a r d s e x a m i n e d t h e f i r s t i s s u e o n l y : a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . O n t h e b a s i s o f a n e c d o t a l e v i d e n c e o n t h e W a r s a w P a c t , h e h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s a r e c o n d u c i v e t o a l l i a n c e s ( p . 227): . . . a p r e c i p i t a t i n g t h r e a t e n i n g c h a n g e i n t h e m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , a d e s i r e b y t h e d o m i n a n t 22. p o w e r t o i n c r e a s e i t s p o s i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h a g a i n s t t h e a d v e r s a r y , a n d a d e s i r e t o i n c r e a s e i t s i n f l u e n c e o v e r i t s n e w a l l i e s w h e n e a c h o f t h e s e w a s w e a k e n i n g o r t h r e a t e n e d . H e f o u n d t h a t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a p p l i e d t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s t o o t h e r c u r r e n t a l l i a n c e s s u c h a s N A T O , S E A T O , a n d t h e S i n o - S o v i e t a l l i a n c e , t h o u g h t h e t h i r d c o n d i t i o n m a y b e " m o r e a c o n s e q u e n c e t h a n a n o b j e c t i v e " ( p . 227) o f a l l i a n c e f o r m a t i o n . T o s u m m a r i z e b r i e f l y , t h e s t u d i e s w h i c h I h a v e g r o u p e d i n t h e e q u i l i b r i u m c a t e g o r y s h a r e w i t h t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s a n e m p h a s i s o n t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d c o h e s i o n o f a l l i a n c e s o r c o a l i t i o n s w i t h o t h e r a s p e c t s o f t h e t o p i c r e c e i v i n g l e s s a t t e n t i o n . T h e r e a r e , h o w e v e r , s o m e n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e t w o b o d i e s o f l i t e r a t u r e . F i r s t , t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s g e n e r a l l y r e l y u p o n e x p e r i m e n t a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e i r f i n d i n g s , w h i l e t h e e v i d e n c e u s e d i n t h e e q u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s e s i s a n e c d o t a l . S e c o n d , t h e s t u d i e s o f c o a l i t i o n s , w h i l e t h e y d o o f f e r e x p l a n a t o r y p r o p o s i t i o n s , s e e m m o r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r e d i c t i n g w h a t c o a l i t i o n s w i l l f o r m a n d h o w e x t e n s i v e a g r o u p ' s c o h e s i o n w i l l b e g i v e n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h i l e p r e d i c t i o n s a r e c o m m o n l y i m p l i c i t i n t h e e q u i l i b r i u m s t u d i e s , t h e s e a u t h o r s a r e m o r e d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e s c r i b i n g a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e s i t u a t i o n a s t h e y f i n d i t . T h i r d , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e s t u d i e s o f c o a l i t i o n f o r m a t i o n , t h e r e i s a c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t t o b u i l d t h e o r y o n t h e b a s i s o f p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s a n d s p e c u l a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h t h i s t e n d e n c y m a y o p e r a t e t o s o m e e x t e n t i n t h e s t u d i e s o f a l l i a n c e s , t h e r e i s n o e v i d e n c e o f a c o m p a r a b l e c o n s c i o u s e f f o r t t o b u i l d o n t h e w o r k o f o t h e r s . F o u r t h , t h e c o n c l u s i o n s o f t h e e q u i l i b r i u m s t u d i e s a r e u s u a l l y m o r e g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t h a n t h o s e o f t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s , t h o u g h t h i s m a y h e t o s o m e d e g r e e a n a r t i f a c t o f f a i l u r e t o s p e c i f y t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e f o r m e r s t u d i e s . A n d f i f t h , t h e a u t h o r s o f t h e e q u i l i b r i u m t y p e o f s t u d i e s a l m o s t i n v a r i a b l y s u g g e s t a n u m b e r o f p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e s t o e x p l a i n t h e o b s e r v e d v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e i r d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e ( s ) , w h i l e t h e a u t h o r s o f t h e c o a l i t i o n s t u d i e s t e n d t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i r a t t e n t i o n o n t h e i n f l u e n c e o f o n e e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e o n o n e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e . * * * W h i l e a l a r g e n u m b e r o f s t u d i e s h a v e b e e n g r o u p e d a b o v e i n t o t h e e q u i l i b r i u m c a t e g o r y , b y n o m e a n s a l l o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s l i t e r a t u r e f o l l o w t h i s a p p r o a c h . A s e c o n d a p p r o a c h c o m m o n t o i n t e r -n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s e m p h a s i z e s t r a n s a c t i o n s b e t w e e n o r a m o n g s t a t e s , t h a t i s , t r a d e p a t t e r n s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , s t u d e n t a n d p r o f e s s i o n a l e x c h a n g e s , e t c e t e r a . T h e s t u d i e s o f i n t e r - s t a t e n e g o t i a t i o n , w h i c h f a l l i n t o t h i s c a t e g o r y s i n c e n e g o t i a t i o n i s a f o r m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , d e v o t e l i t t l e s p a c e t o a l l i a n c e s e x c e p t i n s o f a r a s a l l i a n c e s m i g h t a f f e c t n e g o t i a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s . l a l l (1966), f o r e x a m p l e , n o t e d t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e p o w e r o f a l l i e s m i g h t a f f e c t n e g o t i a t i n g p o s i t i o n s ; p o w e r f u l s t a t e s m i g h t b e i n a m o r e v u l n e r a b l e b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n v i s - a * - v i s s m a l l e r a l l i e s t h a n v i s - E t - v i s s m a l l s t a t e s w i t h w h i c h t h e y a r e n o t a l l i e d ( p . 189). I k l e (1964, p p . 126-7) s u g g e s t e d t h a t s u m m i t d i p l o m a c y b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s m i g h t f a c i l i t a t e a g r e e m e n t a m o n g a l l i a n c e m e m b e r s . L a l l s u p p o r t e d h i s h y p o t h e s i s w i t h a n e c d o t a l r e f e r e n c e s t o r e l a t i o n s a m o n g 24. Communist states. Ikle" r e f e r r e d to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. While studies of formal negotiations have contributed l i t t l e t o our knowledge of a l l i a n c e s , studies of other forms of i n t e r - s t a t e communication have been more revealing. Two analyses of the Sino-Soviet dyadic a l l i a n c e employing the same type of data report roughly the same conclusion. 0. R. H o l s t i ( i n T r i s k a , 1969) hypothesized "that i n t r a - b l o c r e l a t i o n s vary systematically according t o the l e v e l of i n t e r - b l o c c o n f l i c t . " (p. 339)- He conducted a content analysis of 39 Soviet and 45 Chinese documents issued between 1950 and 19&5> a n& concluded: Although the data lend strong support t o the hypothesis examined here, i t seems advisable to i n t e r p r e t the r e s u l t s with great caution. I t would be p a r t i c u l a r l y hazardous t o conclude that other factors - such as those of p e r s o n a l i t y , ideology, or domestic p o l i c y - play no s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e ... A more tenable conclusion might be that East-West tension may be- a necessary, but i s not a s u f f i c i e n t , condition f o r Sino-Soviet cohesion. (p. 349) Zaninovich (1962) conducted a s i m i l a r study with a s i m i l a r hypothesis: that perceptual configuration i n a dyadic r e l a t i o n s h i p w i l l be d i f f e r e n t i n c r i s i s and n o - c r i s i s periods (p. 265). His pattern analysis of Soviet and Chinese f o r e i g n p o l i c y statements i n a c r i s i s (January, i960) and a n o n - c r i s i s (May, i960) period confirmed the hypothesis, lending some support t o H o l s t i ' s f i n d i n g . Two other authors examined d i f f e r e n t transactions i n the Sino-Soviet dyad. Freeberne's (1965) anecdotal analysis of Sino-Soviet statements suggested that r a c i a l issues p l a y an important r o l e i n the Sino-Soviet c o n f l i c t (pp. 4 l l - 4 l 6 ) . And Hoeffding (1963) noted that S i n o - S o v i e t e c o n o m i c i n t e r a c t i o n s d e c r e a s e d a s t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e t w o n a t i o n s i n c r e a s e d i n i n t e n s i t y . Some o f t h e l i t e r a t u r e o n i n t e g r a t i o n h a s d e a l t w i t h t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t r a n s a c t i o n s . J a c o b a n d T e u n e ( i n J a c o b a n d T o s c a n o , 1964) s u g g e s t e d a n u m b e r o f v a r i a b l e s w h i c h m i g h t e n h a n c e t h e s u c c e s s o f i n t e g r a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g h o m o g e n e i t y ; g o v e r n m e n t a l e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; p r e v i o u s i n t e g r a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e ; t r a n s a c t i o n q u a n t i t i e s ; a n d c o m m o n f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a m o n g o t h e r s ( p p . 15-16; 27-44). T e u n e ( i n J a c o b a n d T o s c a n o , 1964, p . 260) h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t f r e q u e n c y o f a s s o c i a t i o n m i g h t p r o m o t e i n t e g r a t i v e s p i l l o v e r f r o m o n e i n t e g r a t i v e s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r . A n d D e u t s c h ( i n J a c o b a n d T o s c a n o , 1964, p . 102) d e d u c e d t h a t t h e r a t i o o f t h e i n c r e a s e i n t h e r a t e o f t r a n s a c t i o n s t o t h e g r o w t h o f i n s t i t u t i o n s d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r o r n o t i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l s u c c e e d . Wo t e s t i s c o n d u c t e d o n a n y o f t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s , a n d i n a n y e v e n t t h e s e s t u d i e s w o u l d a p p e a r t o h a v e q u e s t i o n a b l e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e s t u d y o f i n t e r - s t a t e a l l i a n c e s . O t h e r a u t h o r s h a v e t a k e n a n e c o n o m i c a p p r o a c h t o t h e s t u d y o f a l l i a n c e s . W a l t z (±967* p p . 67-68) s u g g e s t e d t h a t a n a t i o n w h o s e e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n r e l a t i v e t o o t h e r n a t i o n s i s d e c l i n i n g m i g h t b e m o t i v a t e d t o e n t e r i n t o a l l i a n c e s . H e s u p p o r t e d t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w i t h a n e c d o t a l r e f e r e n c e t o E n g l i s h a l i g n m e n t s i n t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . C r o s s ( i n F r i e d m a n , B l a d e n , a n d R o s e n , 1970) e x a m i n e d d e d u c t i v e l y t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e e c o n o m i c m a r k e t m o d e l t o a l l i a n c e s , h y p o t h e s i z i n g t h a t " t h e s e a r c h f o r a ' b e s t ' a l l i a n c e i s n o d i f f e r e n t i n p r i n c i p l e t h a n t h e s e a r c h f o r a l o w e s t p r i c e . " ( p . 199) H e n o t e d t h a t 26. the economic model implies that the gains to c o a l i t i o n members are determined e n t i r e l y by the environment, and found that i n a three-person group: (a) any c o a l i t i o n may form; (b) one of the players must receive no gains; and (c) there i s no use f o r the bargaining process i n the determination of which c o a l i t i o n w i l l form (pp. 203-205). These f i n d i n g s , Cross contended, should apply t o any a l l i a n c e s i t u a t i o n so long as members are motivated t o maximize t h e i r gains, and membership i n any grouping precludes membership in-another. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) studied the r e l a t i o n s h i p between n a t i o n a l income and extent of f u l f i l m e n t of quotas i n NATO and the UlN. They found s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s between siz e of a member's n a t i o n a l income and proportion of that income spent on defense; between G.N.P. and extent of f u l f i l m e n t of quotas i n the U.N.; between n a t i o n a l income and percentage of n a t i o n a l income devoted t o i n f r a s t r u c t u r e expenses i n NATO; and between na t i o n a l income and the r a t i o of an a l l i a n c e member's share of the costs of a l l i a n c e a c t i v i t i e s supported by s i l l y some members t o his share of the costs of a c t i v i t i e s supported by a l l members of the a l l i a n c e . The a p p l i c a b i l i t y of these findings t o a l l i a n c e s other than NATO, however, remains t o be seen. Kaplan (1957) offered a number of propositions about a l l i a n c e s , deduced p a r t l y from game theor e t i c considerations and p a r t l y from systems theory, o c c a s i o n a l l y supported by anecdotal references to post-World War I I a l l i a n c e s . Kaplan, i n common with many of the other authors mentioned above, noted the importance of external threat i n c o a l i t i o n formation and a l l i a n c e cohesion (pp. 2U-25). He a l s o suggested that a l l i a n c e cohesion 27-w i l l be increased i f members' perceptions of common i n t e r e s t s are increased (p. 80) and that actions divergent from the group norm w i l l be viewed as deviant the more those norms are perceived as legitimate (p. 110). F i n a l l y , Kaplan suggested that a l l i a n c e memberships w i l l tend t o f l u c t u a t e more as the number of 'es s e n t i a l n a t i o n a l actors' i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system increases (p. 130). A number of studies based on a s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l approach a l s o o f f e r relevant contributions t o our knowledge of a l l i a n c e s . Worth, Koch, and Zinnes ( i960, p. 367) offered the f a m i l i a r hypothesis: "the threat of an external enemy - and that of an i n t e r n a l enemy, too - i s l i k e l y t o increase the cohesion of the 'in-group' organization." The prop o s i t i o n i s supported by anecdotal evidence. S i m i l a r l y , Coser (1956) explained c o a l i t i o n formation and cohesion mainly i n terms of c o n f l i c t . Bladen ( i n Friedman, Bladen, and Rosen, 1970, p. 121) suggested that, i n order f o r an a l l i a n c e t o form, i t i s "a pre r e q u i s i t e that the partners perceive themselves under a common threat, f a c i n g a common enemy." He c i t e d anecdotal evidence from a l l i a n c e s during and a f t e r World War I I t o support t h i s proposition. Bladen a l s o offered a d i s t i n c t i o n between a l l i a n c e and i n t e g r a t i o n (p. 126): Successful i n t e g r a t i o n , having a s i g n i f i c a n t basis i n economics, would seem t o imply continuing and increasing b e n e f i t s . A l l i a n c e , by contrast, ceases to impart ben e f i t s t o the f u l l membership once the threat which brought i t i n t o being disappears. The tasks and functions which the two processes perform are r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . Scott (1967) offered a number of untested propositions about a l l i a n c e cohesion. He suggested cohesion w i l l be affe c t e d by the a l l i a n c e ' s a b i l i t y t o respond t o demands made upon i t ; amount of external 28. threat; and the extent t o which the goals of the a l l i a n c e and the goals of i n d i v i d u a l members coincide (pp. 111-117; 227-228). Guetzkow, ( i n Rosenau, 1961), on the other hand, concentrated h i s attention on nations' tendencies t o act i n i s o l a t i o n or c o l l a b o r a t i o n . He proposed a number of p o t e n t i a l l y relevant f a c t o r s , though he l e f t t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance unexamined: a) previous experience with s e l f - r e l i a n t or c o l l a b o r a t i v e p o l i c i e s ; b) the degree of i d e o l o g i c a l emphasis or i s o l a t i o n ; c) the extent to which i s o l a t i o n or c o l l a b o r a t i o n seems p r a c t i c a l or advantageous; and d) the c u l t u r a l homogeneity of group members (pp. 154-159). F i n a l l y , we have a few experimental studies relevant t o a l l i a n c e s which do not f i t neatly i n t o any of the categories discussed above. These include simulation studies and studies of a t t i t u d e s . Brody (1963) and Brody and Benham ( i n P r u i t t and Snyder, I 9 6 9 ) examined the e f f e c t on a l l i a n c e s of the spread of nuclear weapons i n simulation experiments. Brody (1963* PP« 731-74l) rejected a number of hypotheses suggesting a lower degree of perceived threat a f t e r the spread of nuclear weapons. Brody and Benham hypothesized that a l l i a n c e cohesion would decrease a f t e r the spread of nuclear weapons within the b l o c . Their simulation study supported the following conclusion: Four key elements of the prespread system were d i f f e r e n t a f t e r the spread of nuclear c a p a b i l i t y : (a) threat external t o the bloc was reduced, (b) threat i n t e r n a l t o the bloc was increased, (c) the cohesiveness of the blocs was reduced, and (d) the b i p o l a r i t y was fragmented. (I969, p. 173) Gordon and Lerner (1965) reported a study of interviews of European e l i t e a t t i t u d e s . They found (pp. 421-426) that the greater the extent t o which e l i t e s perceive the enemy as threatening, the greater t h e i r 2 9 . re l iance on the bloc leader and the greater t he i r f a i t h i n the a l l i a n c e . Summary The studies discussed above approach the topic of a l l i ances i n a va r ie ty of ways yet reach a number of s im i la r conclusions. Some authors i n almost every category have suggested that a l l i ance cohesion w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y af fected by external threat . A number of studies u t i l i z i n g d i f fe ren t approaches have reported a re la t ionsh ip between a l l i ance cohesion and nat iona l power. Power has quite often been advanced as a s i gn i f i can t determinant of c o a l i t i o n or a l l i ance formation. Such factors as ideology and c u l t u r a l , h i s t o r i c a l , and a t t i t u d i n a l homogeneity have been f requent ly advanced as having important impl ica t ions, fo r a l l i ance cohesion and ef fect iveness. And the nature of the i n t e r -na t iona l system has often been l inked i n a more or less causal manner, the causation being impl ied rather than demonstrated, to a l l i ance formation, cohesion, and durat ion. In short , the studies discussed above u t i l i z e varying methodologies and data, often wi th d i f fe ren t primary concerns, and deal wi th d i f f e r i n g l eve l s of ana l ys i s . Nevertheless, the f indings of these disparate analyses l a rge ly converge, p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards the re la t ionsh ip between a l l i ance cohesion and external th reat . 30. TABLE I SUMMARY OF LITERATURE OH ALLIANCES Level of Type of Explanation Generality Evidence Target of Explanation Small Group Studies small group medium-low experimental c o a l i t i o n formation and cohesion. Equilibrium: a) Case Studies a l l i a n c e low anecdotal b) Regional i n t e r n a t i o n a l medium-high anecdotal system c) General i n t e r n a t i o n a l system high anecdotal a l l i a n c e formation, cohesion, dis r u p t i o n . a l l i a n c e formation, cohesion, i n t e r a c t i o n . a l l i a n c e formation, cohesion, dis r u p t i o n , effectiveness, duration. Transaction Models Economic Models a l l i a n c e ; i n t e r n a t i o n a l system n a t i o n a l a t t r i b u t e s medium-low medium-high aggregate data aggregate data a l l i a n c e cohesion. a l l i a n c e formation, effectiveness • S t r u c t u r a l -Functional system high deductive; a l l i a n c e anecdotal formation, cohesion. 31. Apart from the s i m i l a r i t y of a number of the findings reached, there are some i n t e r e s t i n g differences and s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the studies examined here. Table I summarizes the modal l e v e l of explanation, g e n e r a l i t y of f i n d i n g s , type of evidence employed, and target of explanation or dependent v a r i a b l e ( s ) of the various approaches t o analysis of a l l i a n c e s discussed above. Two conclusions are suggested by the state of our knowledge of a l l i a n c e s : f i r s t , we know more about a l l i a n c e cohesion and a l l i a n c e formation than about such other aspects of a l l i a n c e s as t h e i r e f f e c t i v e -ness i f c a l l e d i n t o force or the d u r a b i l i t y of d i f f e r e n t types of a l l i a n c e s i n d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s . Second, what we do know about a l l i a n c e cohesion and formation i s based l a r g e l y on anecdotal, impressionistic evidence and on experimental studies of small groups, the relevance of whose fin d i n g s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s should be e m p i r i c a l l y determined rather than assumed. Two d i f f e r e n t research strategies are, i n turn, suggested by these conclusions. F i r s t , we might concentrate our. attention on those aspects of a l l i a n c e s about which we know r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e ; or, second, we might devote our resources t o gaining more r e l i a b l e , more s p e c i f i c knowledge about a l l i a n c e formation and cohesion. In the analysis which follows, I have chosen t o pursue both of these s t r a t e g i e s . The remaining chapters report the r e s u l t s of an attempt t o examine the impact on the cohesion of KATO and the Warsaw Pact of two independent v a r i a b l e s : e x t e r n a l threat, which has been often discussed i n the l i t e r a t u r e i n connection with a l l i a n c e cohesion; and n a t i o n a l power, which has received comparatively l i t t l e attention i n discussions of a l l i a n c e cohesion despite the p o s s i b i l i t y that growth i n national power may be an important factor i n the declining cohesion of an a l l i a n c e . CHAPTER II DISSENSION IN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT The subject of the cohesion of NATO has received considerable attention, increasingly so since the late 1950!s when de Gaulle openly began to express French discontent with the al l iance. Similarly, there have been open r i f t s i n the communist bloc since the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland, though these r i f t s are often discussed in the context of the entire communist bloc rather than with expl ic i t reference to the Warsaw Pact. To some extent, this i s also true of NATO: many of the references are to decreasing cohesion in the "Atlantic a l l iance , " with no direct statement as to whether the author i s referring to NATO or to the informal friendship and alignment of nations i n the Atlantic area, quite apart from their membership i n the NATO al l iance. Despite this d i f f i c u l t y of differentiating the Communist and Atlantic blocs from their respective mil i tary all iances, i t seems clear that growing disunity i s an important problem i n both opposing al l iances. After the withdrawal of France from mi l i tary participation in NATO, Spaak (1967, p. 199) wrote: People say that there i s a c r i s i s in the Atlantic Al l iance , and unfortunately they are r ight . Those who have l ived with the Alliance have heard a good deal of talk about crises but this time, i f I am not very much mistaken, the c r i s i s i s a real one. It i s no minor matter when one of the most important members of the Alliance withdraws from NATO. This discontent with NATO has not been confined to France. Both Canada and the United States have recently withdrawn some of their forces from Europe. The American withdrawals, to be sure, can be partly explained 3k. by the pressure of the war i n Vietnam and balance of payment d i f f i c u l t i e s , but part of the explanation may a l s o l i e i n growing disenchantment among at l e a s t some American policy-makers with the a l l i a n c e . Harrison (1969, pp. 335-336) and Enthoven and Smith (1969, p. 581) have suggested a number of f a c t o r s which might promote a decrease i n American commitments to NATO: the high monetary cost of maintaining American m i l i t a r y forces i n Europe; the unwillingness or i n a b i l i t y of the European KATO members t o meet the m i l i t a r y force l e v e l s c a l l e d f o r by KATO coun c i l s ; the reduction i n the Soviet m i l i t a r y threat; and the p o s s i b i l i t y that nuclear armaments have rendered a l l i a n c e superfluous. Germany has maintained i t s m i l i t a r y involvement i n KATO, but' the Germans have i n c r e a s i n g l y voiced d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with t h e i r lack of status i n the a l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y with regard to the issue of nuclear weapons. Kressl e r , f o r example, concluded (1966, p. 233): The Federal Republic believes that the U.S. quest f o r a t r e a t y t o prevent the f u r t h e r dissemination of nuclear weapons diminishes the prospects f o r obtaining f o r Bonn an increased voice i n NATO nuclear strategy ... Should the p r i n c i p l e of KATO nuclear sharing be subordinated t o the p r i n c i p l e of n o n p r o l i f e r a t i o n , i t i s l i k e l y that German d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with KATO w i l l r i s e . Germany has ceased t o be a yes-man i n KATO as German power and p a r t i c i p -a t i o n i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community have grown. The smaller KATO members have also begun to reassess t h e i r commitments t o the a l l i a n c e . In Norway, f o r example, the issue of continued membership i n NATO was debated i n the 1967-68 session of the Korwegian parliament. A motion t o withdraw from the a l l i a n c e was defeated, but at l e a s t one author concluded that the viewpoints expressed 35. in the debate were far more diversified than the voting indicated and that "the general tendency of the debate was not at a l l characterized by status quo thinking." (Hansen, 1969* P« 235) Similarly, in Denmark doubts have been expressed concerning the desirability of continued membership in NATO (Haekkerup, 1969, pp. 348-350). In the case of the Warsaw Pact, strains began to appear only a year after the formation of the alliance in 1955- C-omulka demanded new terms for military collaboration with the Soviet Union when he took power in Poland in 1956 and Imre Nagy voiced opposition to the Warsaw Treaty during the Hungarian c r i s i s of 1956 (ionescu, 1965* pp. 4 9 - 5 0 ) . On October 31* 1956, Nagy "revealed that he was beginning negotiations for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact." (Brzezinski, I967* p. 2 3 1 ) . The following day, Hungary formally requested withdrawal of the Soviet army, whose presence in Hungary had been legalized by the Warsaw Pact, from the country; asked to be released from the alliance; and o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed neutrality (Wesson, 1969* p. 298; Brzezinski, 1967, p. 2 3 1 ) . The Soviet response was invasion of Hungary. The Hungarian demands were ignored, the Soviet Union took over, and the dissident Hungarian Army was disbanded: ... i t was not u n t i l the mid-1960's that Hungarian divisions were once again able to join the active ranks of the Warsaw Pact, and even today the Hungarian Army numbers only a l i t t l e over half of the eleven-division strong force which fa i l e d to support the Soviet cause in October 1956. (Mackintosh, I969, pp. 3-4) Albania's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated through-out the 1950's, as Sino-Albanian relations became more and more friendly. 36. In 196l, diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Albania were broken o f f ; and by I962, Albania had ceased to participate i n Warsaw Pact a c t i v i t i e s , though the Albanians did not formally denounce the Warsaw Treaty u n t i l 1968 (Cf. Brzezinski, 1967, P- ^57; Mackintosh, I969, P. 9). Bulgaria and East Germany have continued to support the p o l i c i e s of the Soviet Union (Wesson, 1969, pp. 368-369) but Rumania has grown increasingly independent and Czechoslavakia has been less than enchanted with Soviet foreign p o l i c y since I 9 6 8 , i f not before. In the mid-1960's, Rumania "began to reserve the r i g h t to take her own decisions i n foreign and defence p o l i c y . " (Mackintosh, 1969, P- 9) The Rumanians have repeatedly urged the a b o l i t i o n of m i l i t a r y blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops from other countries, and development of better relations with the West (Mackintosh, 1969, p. 9; Wesson, I969, p. 367). The Rumanian armed forces have been: ... somewhat withdrawn from j o i n t Warsaw Pact a c t i v i t i e s . The I966 f a l l maneuvers i n Czechoslovakia took place without any s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Rumanian uni t s . Former plans charging the Rumanian People's Army with coordinated offensive tasks as part of Soviet strategy against Western Europe have been changed. (Liess, i n C o l l i e r and Glaser, eds., 1967, P> 176) No j o i n t m i l i t a r y exercises of the Pact members were held i n Rumania between 1964 and 1969. Mackintosh (1969, P- 10) noted that Czechoslovakian spokesmen were expressing some doubts about the u t i l i t y of the Warsaw Pact as early as 1966. He offered the following observation concerning the effect of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia i n 1968 (p. 15): 37-The main legacy of the c r i s i s as far as the Warsaw Pact i s concerned i s that Czechoslovakia ... has become deeply anti-Soviet, imbued with feelings of di s t r u s t and disillusionment which w i l l not be e a s i l y overcome. Wesson, however (1969, pp. 390-391) concluded that the Czechs w i l l be more l i k e l y to pursue a f a i r l y submissive foreign po l i c y , p a r t l y i n order to gain more freedom i n domestic a f f a i r s . Whether Czechoslovakia w i l l , i n f a c t , now pursue a more independent foreign p o l i c y remains to be seen. While the existence of a r i f t i n each of these two alliances i s quite obvious, the causes of these r i f t s are not so obvious. In some cases, at least the immediate explanatory factors are f a i r l y apparent: the Invasion i n the case of Czechoslovakia; the ide o l o g i c a l dispute between Albania and the Soviet Union; the demands of the French for more influence i n European a f f a i r s ; and the high cost of maintaining American p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n European defence while the United States i s engaged i n a c o s t l y m i l i t a r y exercise i n Vietnam. In other cases, however, the causes of dissension are not so e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d and even the factors commonly mentioned i n connection with France, Albania, and other nations may not constitute a s u f f i c i e n t explanation. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and French demands for reorganization of NATO's structure were c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t and immediate issues, but we cannot be certain that such issues were the underlying causes of dissension i n the al l i a n c e s . The purpose of t h i s paper i s not, however, to examine the significance of the effect of spec i f i c issues on cohesion of NATO and 38. the Warsaw Pact. The purpose i s , rather, an i n q u i r y i n t o the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of previous findings and hypothesis concerning a l l i a n c e cohesion t o these two p a r t i c u l a r a l l i a n c e s . In the l i t e r a t u r e which i s summarized i n Chapter I, two explanatory variables commonly li n k e d t o a l l i a n c e cohesion are external threat and the power of a l l i a n c e members. We have, then, two general propositions: Proposition One: The greater the external threat, the higher the l e v e l of cohesion i n an a l l i a n c e . Proposition Two: In an a l l i a n c e of states of unequal power, the commitment of i n d i v i d u a l members t o the a l l i a n c e w i l l decrease as t h e i r n a t i o n a l power increases. Osgood (1968, p. 67) suggested that "Rumania's independent course i s c h i e f l y a product of growing economic strength and a stable, u n i f i e d p o l i t i c a l regime basing i t s appeal on resurgent nationalism." Osgood a l s o concluded that diminished East-West tension f a c i l i t a t e d the p u r s u i t of an independent course, and that these f a c t o r s , to varying degrees, also f a c i l i t a t e d increased independence of other East European nations (pp. 67-68). Jamgotch (1968, p. 63) noted that the n a t i o n a l armies and m i l i t a r y planning of the Warsaw Pact members are dominated by the Soviet Union. I t might be reasonable t o expect that t h i s domination would be i n c r e a s i n g l y questioned as the power of the East European states grew. Jamgotch, too, mentioned the impact of the detente i n Europe. He suggested that the f a c t that "very l i t t l e i n support of o r i g i n a l expressed objectives has been accomplished" (p. 65) by the Warsaw Pact might be p a r t l y explained by the diminished threat. 39. S i m i l a r l y , Aspaturian concluded that detente was one of the factors which allowed some of the East European states to "gradually pry themselves l o o s e " from Soviet hegemony. (1966, p. 33) Hopmann (1969) compared the degree of a t t i t u d i n a l c o - o r i e n t a t i o n among members of NATO and of the Communist bloc, i n c l u d i n g non-Warsaw Pact members, i n periods of intense c o n f l i c t and i n periods of detente. He found that the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p between external c o n f l i c t and degree of consensus does appear to be confirmed i n NATO and the Communist bloc, though with some reservation (p. 199): During the periods of most intense c o n f l i c t between members of the two a l l i a n c e systems, the degree of a t t i t u d i n a l consensus generally tends to increase; conversely, during periods of r e l a t i v e detente between the two major blocs, the degree of co-o r i e n t a t i o n among a l l i e s tends, but not neces s a r i l y , t o d e c l i n e . Hopmann based t h i s conclusion on a content a n a l y s i s of for e i g n p o l i c y statements by representatives of eight NATO members and eleven Communist bloc countries i n the years 1950, 1955, 19^3, and 1965. A number of other authors have a l s o discussed ..the impact of decreasing external threat on NATO cohesion. Marshall ( i n Wolfers, 1964, p. 19) concluded that growing detente was having a d i s i n t e g r a t i v e e f f e c t on the a l l i a n c e . Gasteyger (1967, p. 319) remarked on the decline of i n t e r e s t i n NATO "as a consequence of detente." Orvik (1966, pp. 92-93), Harrison (1969} p. 335), and Kissinger ( i n Roach, 1967, pp. 10-22) have a l l noted the diminished m i l i t a r y threat i n Europe and i t s e f f e c t on NATO. In the wake of the increased l e v e l of tension generated by the Czechoslovakian c r i s i s of 1968, P f a l t z g r a f f (1969, pp. 218-220) demonstrated, ko. NATO members increased t h e i r force l e v e l s and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and improved the planning machinery and consultation procedures of the a l l i a n c e . Calvocoressi (1966, p. 361) suggested that one cause of dissension i n NATO has been the large d i s p a r i t y i n the r e l a t i v e strengths of members of the a l l i a n c e , and that i f the stronger "minor" members of the a l l i a n c e , such as B r i t a i n , France, and Canada, are not allowed t o p l a y a r o l e i n the a l l i a n c e commensurate with t h e i r power and c a p a b i l i t i e s , the cohesion of the a l l i a n c e w i l l s u f f e r (p. 360). Osgood (1968, pp. 23-24) hypothesized that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of m i l i t a r y power i n an a l l i a n c e would have an important e f f e c t on the continuation or decline of the a l l i a n c e . He noted the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n of such nations as France, Germany, and I t a l y with the power d i s p a r i t y between them and the United States, and t h e i r concern over t h e i r second-c l a s s status i n NATO. Wolfers (1962, p. 212) a l s o suggested that the power discrepancy between the United States and her a l l i e s i s a source of tension i n the various a l l i a n c e s t o which the United States belongs. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between external threat and a l l i a n c e cohesion encountered quite often i n the various studies discussed i n Chapter I, then, has a l s o been mentioned i n s p e c i f i c analyses of these two a l l i a n c e s , though perhaps more often with reference t o NATO than t o the Warsaw Pact. In some form or other, the proposition that growing East-West detente t o some extent accounts f o r the diminished cohesion of the two major post-war a l l i a n c e s has been quite frequently advanced. I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d that s i m i l a r findings have been encountered i n such disparate hi. studies as small group experiments, analyses of verbal and behavioral t r a n s a c t i o n between nation-state dyads, and studies at the l e v e l of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l region and i n t e r n a t i o n a l system, among others. The question of the comparability of the a n a l y t i c a l techniques employed i n these studies aside, the convergence of the findings suggests that changes i n extent of e s t e r n a l threat merit attention i n a study of a l l i a n c e cohesion. While some att e n t i o n has been paid t o the impact of differences i n r e l a t i v e power among members of an a l l i a n c e , p a r t i c u l a r l y t o power discrepancies between the leader of the a l l i a n c e and other members, comparatively l i t t l e a t tention has been paid t o the influence of the absolute power of nations on a l l i a n c e cohesion. We do have the suggestion that Rumania's growing independence i s l a r g e l y due to growing economic strength. And i n NATO the growth i n power, e s p e c i a l l y economically and m i l i t a r i l y , of Germany and France led t o increased demands f o r greater say by these two countries i n the a f f a i r s of the a l l i a n c e . France's growing power, highlighted by the a c q u i s i t i o n of nuclear weapons, may not have been a s u f f i c i e n t cause of the French de c i s i o n t o pursue a course independent of NATO, but i t could be argued that s u f f i c i e n t power t o enable France t o r e l y on her own resources was a necessary condition f o r French withdrawal from the a l l i a n c e . C e r t a i n l y t h i s was at l e a s t a major part of, i f not the whole, r a t i o n a l e f o r France's development of nuclear weapons: that France had no c o n t r o l over American weapons, could not be c e r t a i n of American support i n the event of a nuclear attack on France, and must, therefore, be 42. prepared t o defend h e r s e l f . A s i m i l a r process may w e l l have operated i n the Warsaw Pact. S u f f i c i e n t strength t o have confidence i n surviving on her own may have sparked the decline i n commitment of, f o r example, Rumania t o the Warsaw Pact. A i d from China t o Albania enabled the Albanians to cut t h e i r t i e s with the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe, without f a l l i n g f l a t on t h e i r faces. I t seems p l a u s i b l e , then, that increases i n national power may lead t o diminished commitment t o a l l i a n c e s on the part of those nations. Though we cannot be c e r t a i n that increased power causes a l l i a n c e dissension, the notion that power increases are a necessary or important condition f o r pursuit of an independent f o r e i g n p o l i c y would seem t o be worthy of examination (Cf. Morgenthau, 1957; and S t e e l , 1964, pp. 34-37)-To some extent, a d e s c r i p t i o n of absolute n a t i o n a l power cannot avoid tapping, as w e l l , the concepts of r e l a t i v e power and status inconsistency. Taking the f i f t e e n NATO members, f o r example, i f we compare the r e l a t i v e power base differences between the U.S. and each of the other fourteen members i n a given year, what we are, i n e f f e c t , doing i s subtracting a constant from the power base of each of the members. Looked at t h i s way, comparing the power base r e l a t i v e t o the U.S. of the fourteen NATO nations i s the same thing as comparing t h e i r n a t i o n a l power bases. For an i n d i v i d u a l country, however, comparing i t s power base r e l a t i v e t o the U.S. f o r d i f f e r e n t years i s not the same as comparing annual f i g u r e s f o r that country's absolute power base, since the fig u r e s f o r the U.S., i n t h i s case, are not constant. 43-Figures measuring absolute n a t i o n a l power a l s o tap status inconsistency, that i s , the difference between a nation's 'achieved' status ( i t s power) and i t s ''ascribed' status ( i t s prestige and the deference given t o i t by other nations). T a n t o l o g i c a l l y , we may note that i f achieved status varies but ascribed status remains constant, then measuring achieved status i s the same as measuring status i n -consistency. The measures of n a t i o n a l power base employed below, then, may be said t o i n d i c a t e status inconsistency i n the a l l i a n c e s to the extent that the status ascribed t o members of the a l l i a n c e s has r e -mained constant. In the Warsaw Pact, member countries have advanced somewhat i n ascribed status through increased m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a f f a i r s of the a l l i a n c e . They have, as w e l l , become somewhat les s dependent upon the Soviet Union f o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y guidelines. This may i n d i c a t e a feedback problem: power increases may have produced, d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y , drives f o r greater independence which, i n turn, decreased the amount of status inconsistency which could have o r i g i n a l l y been the spur to greater independence i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Nevertheless, the a l l i a n c e members do remain under the d i r e c t i o n of the Soviet Union and any attempt t o withdraw from t h i s tutelage may be expected to be met by the same rea c t i o n as occurred i n the case of the Czechoslovakian c r i s i s of I968. The Soviet Union remains the undisputed leader of the a l l i a n c e . S i m i l a r l y , demands by France and, t o a l e s s e r but s t i l l noticeable extent, Germany and B r i t a i n , f o r more say i n NATO a f f a i r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y regarding c o n t r o l of nuclear weapons, have been met by American intransigence. kk. The distinction is less clear-cut than in the Warsaw Pact since American leadership has not been undisputed, hut the U.S. remains the most important member of the alliance with a greater measure of control over NATO strategies and policies than the other members. In one sense, then, the ascribed statuses of the members of the two alliances have remained roughly the same. A further consideration with regard to the effect of increases in national power on a nation's relations with an alliance to which i t belongs is the different effect such increases might have in p l u r a l i s t i c and authoritarian states. As 0. R. Holsti and Sullivan (1969, p. 158), among others, have noted, ... i n a p l u r a l i s t i c system foreign policy elites operate under significant constraints against sudden and complete changes in policy. These include multiple internal and external channels of communication, relative freedom for divergent interests to make p o l i t i c a l demands and a limited a b i l i t y of top leaders to mobilize a l l p o l i t i c a l l y relevant groups and institutions in support of their policies. Since there are these constraints on foreign policy changes in a p l u r a l i s t i c society, which are inoperative or at least less important in an authoritarian society, we might expect that changes in alliance cohesion, whether as a result of increased national power, diminished external threat, or other factors, would be more l i k e l y to occur in authoritarian than in p l u r a l i s t i c systems. This distinction suggests, f i r s t , that we might expect power increases of alliance members and diminished external threat to have a greater effect on the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact than on the cohesion of NAT©, since the Warsaw Pact has, c l e a r l y , the more monolithic structure and NATO the more p l u r a l i s t i c structure of the two a l l i a n c e s . And second, we might expect that the more au t h o r i t a r i a n members of each a l l i a n c e w i l l show greater evidence of diminished commitment to t h e i r a l l i a n c e s under conditions of increased n a t i o n a l power and diminished external threat than w i l l the more p l u r a l i s t i c or democratic members of the same a l l i a n c e s . I t i s not an easy matter, of course, t o d i s t i n g u i s h a u t h o r i t a r i a n and p l u r a l i s t i c nations within each of the two a l l i a n c e s under consideration: a l l of the Warsaw Pact members are u s u a l l y regarded as a u t h o r i t a r i a n , and most of the NATO members as p l u r a l i s t i c . However, i n the Warsaw Pact Rumania and perhaps Hungary, and more r e c e n t l y Czechoslovakia, might be regarded as at l e a s t some-what l e s s a u t h o r i t a r i a n than such other a l l i a n c e members as East Germany, Bulgaria, and Poland. In NATO, Portugal and Greece have been le s s p l u r a l i s t i c a l l y structured s o c i e t i e s than Canada, Norway, or the Netherlands; and France under de Gaulle has often been described i n terms vaguely reminiscent of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d i c t a t o r s h i p . In short, there i s considerable support i n the l i t e r a t u r e f o r the proposition that d e c l i n i n g external threat i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y l i n k e d to diminished a l l i a n c e cohesion. Discussions r e l a t i n g growth i n n a t i o n a l power t o diminished a l l i a n c e cohesion are encountered le s s frequently i n previous studies, however, the notion that s u f f i c i e n t n a t i o n a l strength i s necessary t o allow f o r some confidence i n the v i a b i l i t y of a p o l i c y of 'going i t alone' suggests that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between na t i o n a l power growth and a l l i a n c e cohesion may be worthy of em pi ri ca l examination. In the following chapter, then, the research design and s p e c i f i c hypotheses, which guided the empirical analysis which follows, are presented. CHAPTER I I I RESEARCH DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES Because nation-states are understandably reluctant t o allow s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t o conduct experiments with t h e i r foreign p o l i c i e s , the data on a subject such as the cohesion of an a l l i a n c e must be e i t h e r drawn from the information which i s made ava i l a b l e or created i n an analogous atmosphere, as i n the simulation studies by Brody and h i s associates mentioned i n the introductory chapter. When, as i s the case here, the aim of the research i s an examination of the relevance of a proposition or propositions t o two s p e c i f i c a l l i a n c e s , the former research strategy i s d i c t a t e d . Temporal Domain In a study of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the usual problems of data c o l l e c t i o n and d e r i v a t i o n of v a l i d i n d i c a t o r s of the variables employed are present, along with the added d i f f i c u l t y of a truncated temporal domain. NATO was formed i n 19^9, but Greece and Turkey d i d not become members of the a l l i a n c e u n t i l 1952, and Germany not u n t i l 1955- Accordingly, data were c o l l e c t e d from 19^ 9 to 1969 whenever possibl e , though Greece, Turkey, and Germany w i l l not enter i n t o the a n a l y s i s u n t i l the dates of t h e i r entry i n t o the a l l i a n c e . France withdrew from m i l i t a r y p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n NATO i n I966, but d i d not f o r m a l l y withdraw from the Treaty Organization i t s e l f and i s , there-f o r e , included i n the analysis throughout. Albania ceased t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Warsaw Pact i n 19^2, but d i d not formally withdraw from the a l l i a n c e u n t i l 1968. Albania U8. must, then, be considered a member u n t i l the l a t t e r date. The Warsaw Pact was formed i n 1955, i n response t o the entry of West Germany i n t o NATO. As with NATO, however, data were c o l l e c t e d from 19^9 onwards whenever possib l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the independent v a r i a b l e s , f o r use i n c o r r e l a t i o n s with a time l a g . Measurement of the Variables The dependent v a r i a b l e , cohesion of an a l l i a n c e , has been o p e r a t i o n a l l y defined f o r purposes of the analysis below as a l l i a n c e members' verbal or behavioral commitment t o the a l l i a n c e or a t t i t u d i n a l c o - o r i e n t a t i o n with each other. Three ind i c a t o r s of cohesion have been employed f o r the NATO a l l i a n c e : each member's troop commitments to the a l l i a n c e ; extent of voting agreement i n the United Nations General Assembly; and a survey of the New York Times Index. For the Warsaw Pact, only the l a t t e r two i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion are employed since Warsaw Pact members do not commit a s p e c i f i c proportion of t h e i r forces t o the a l l i a n c e as do NATO members, or at l e a s t i f they do the information has not been released. The f i r s t cohesion i n d i c a t o r , troop commitments t o the a l l i a n c e , i s the weakest i n terms of data a v a i l a b i l i t y . For the Warsaw Pact, the i n d i c a t o r i s i r r e l e v a n t ; f o r NATO these data are only a v a i l a b l e f o r a l l a l l i a n c e members i n The M i l i t a r y Balance, published by the I n s t i t u t e of Strategic Studies, and only a few of the more recent issues of t h i s publication-'- are a v a i l a b l e t o the 1 See Appendix A f o r information on data sources. 49-present author. Nevertheless, since troop commitments to the alliance seem to indicate fairly directly the members' commitments to NATO, these data are employed in the analysis to the limited extent possible. There is an additional difficulty with the use of troop commitments as an indicator of NATO cohesion. The most satisfactory method of transforming the raw data on proportion of forces committed to the alliance into usable form would be to express those commitments as a percentage or fraction of the force goals which are periodically suggested by the alliance as a whole for each member country. This procedure, however, could not be followed. Although Britain, the U.S., and West Germany have given some indication of their force goals, other NATO members have not, so there remain three obstacles to assessment of NATO force goals (U.S. Congressional Record, January 19, I967, p. 999): First, i t has been the long-standing policy of the various NATO commands and of the individual NATO members to classify NATO force goals and the extent to which these goals have been met ... Second, to the extent that some NATO ground force goals and the contributions of NATO members are known, they are usually expressed in terms of divisions. But the number of men assigned to a division and the number who contribute support to a division vary widely ... Third, whereas NATO ground force goals for the centred European sector ... have been the subject of many unofficial published reports, force goals for northern Europe ... and for southern Europe ... appear to be largely unreported. For these reasons, an alternative method was employed: the data on troop commitments were converted into the percentage of each country's armed forces which are committed to the alliance. These percentages are presented in Appendix B. 50. The second i n d i c a t o r of cohesion employed i s a survey of events, derived from the Mew York Times Index. These data were gathered at two-year i n t e r v a l s beginning i n 1950 f o r NATO and i n 195-6 f o r the Warsaw Pact, i n each case one year a f t e r the formation of the a l l i a n c e . Two-year, rather than one-year i n t e r v a l s were used f o r these data because of the time and d i f f i c u l t y involved i n gathering them. Never-t h e l e s s , i t i s f e l t that the two-year i n t e r v a l s should s t i l l accurately r e f l e c t the trend i n commitment of the various members t o the a l l i a n c e s . Leaving out the odd-numbered years means that such events as the formation of the a l l i a n c e s and the entry of West Germany i n t o NATO are excluded from these data, but events such as the Suez c r i s i s , the P o l i s h and Hungarian uprisings, the Cuban m i s s i l e c r i s i s , France's withdrawal from NATO, and the 1968 Czechoslovakian c r i s i s , are included. The procedure followed i n t h i s case was to code any statement or a c t i o n by an a l l i a n c e member which was direc t e d at the a l l i a n c e or i t s members as eit h e r p o s i t i v e or negative. For example a statement such as: U.S.S.R. and Poland hold stronger Warsaw Pact needed ... would be coded as p o s i t i v e f o r both the U.S.S.R. and Poland. On the other hand, the following statement would be coded as negative f o r France: France announces withdrawal from NATO m i l i t a r y organization ... In t h i s way, adequate data could be gathered f o r the NATO members simply by coding statements and actions of the member countries which appeared under the heading "North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization" i n the Index f o r 51. each year. For many of the Warsaw Pact members, however, no statements or actions were mentioned i n some years under the heading'''"Warsaw Pact." For t h i s a l l i a n c e , therefore, the entries under the names of each member country were surveyed as w e l l as entries under the "Warsaw Pact" heading. The data generated by t h i s procedure are reported i n Appendix C. In those cases where the number of relevant statements and actions by a given country i n a given year was l e s s than three, no percentage was c a l c u l a t e d and that country was coded as having missing data on t h i s v a r i a b l e f o r the year(s) involved. The t h i r d i n d i c a t o r of a l l i a n c e cohesion employed i n the an a l y s i s i s extent of voting agreement i n the United Nations General Assembly. For each a l l i a n c e member, a dyadic index of agreement with each other member of the a l l i a n c e was computed, f o r each session of the General Assembly, i n the following manner: I.A. = f + ?g X 100. t Where I.A. = index of agreement, f = number of times the partners i n the dyad were i n f u l l agreement, that i s , both voted the same way, g = number of times the dyadic partners were i n p a r t i a l agreement, that i s , one of them ab-stained while the other voted e i t h e r yes or no, t = t o t a l number of votes i n which both dyadic partners p a r t i c i p a t e d . This procedure yielded an index of agreement f o r each dyad i n each a l l i a n c e f o r each session of the Assembly. Each country's set of dyadic indice s was then averaged f o r each session, g i v i n g an index of agreement 52. ranging from 0.0 to 100.0 between the member and the r e s t of the a l l i a n c e f o r each session. These f i n a l average indices are reported i n Appendix D. The u t i l i t y of votes i n the U.N. as an i n d i c a t o r of f o r e i g n p o l i c y behavior should not, of course, be overestimated. Alker ( i n Mueller, I969) and Russett ( i n Rosenbaum, 1970) have pointed out some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n discovering and analyzing voting groups i n the U.N. In t h i s case, however, each a l l i a n c e has been assumed t o be an i d e n t i f i a b l e group, and our i n t e r e s t has focused on the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of agreement expressed by members of each group. For t h i s purpose, U.N. votes seem t o be a u s e f u l i n d i c a t o r of basic p o l i c y since "U.N. voting ... forces a country t o take a p u b l i c , recorded p o s i t i o n on many kinds of issues ..." (Russett, 19&5, P* 87)• I t i s worth noting that an assessment of possible i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion by Teune and Synnestvedt ( i n Friedman, Bladen, and Rosen, 1970, pp. 328-330) showed that voting alignments i n the U.N. often co r r e l a t e h i g h l y with other ind i c a t o r s of cohesion employed i n t h e i r study. They concluded (p. 328) that "the voting patterns recorded and published by the United Nations are a r e l i a b l e vindication of alignment behavior." One independent variable whose influence on a l l i a n c e cohesion we wish to t e s t i s n a t i o n a l power. As K. J . H o l s t i (1969, pp. l 4 l - l 4 2 ) and P r u i t t (19^7, PP- 165-168) have pointed out, i t i s e s s e n t i a l to d i s t i n g u i s h between power i n the abstract - u s u a l l y stated i n terms such as 'the a b i l i t y of A t o influence B t o do something he would not otherwise do 1 - and power base, described by Deutsch (1968, p. 23) as the "aggregate power resources of a nation" in c l u d i n g such items as population, 53-GNP, area, and m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l . I t i s the l a t t e r conceptualization of power which i s employed i n the empirical analysis i n Chapter IV, and we should be wary of drawing any inferences about the relationship between al l i a n c e cohesion and power i n the sense of influence from these data. Five d i f f e r e n t measures of power base are employed i n the analysis: size of m i l i t a r y expenditures; population; crude s t e e l production; GNP per capita growth rate; and GNP per capita. These indicators tap such d i s t i n c t aspects of power base as m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y , size of nation, i n d u s t r i a l resource base, economic growth, and national wealth. The f i r s t three indicators are measured annually from 19^9 to I969 with some missing data, p a r t i c u l a r l y among the Communist countries i n e a r l i e r years. GNP per capita growth rate i s measured annually from 1959 to I966, with the remaining years excluded because the index numbers compiled by the United Nations from which these data are drawn are not available i n a complete, homogeneous set for the entire time period. GNP per capita figures have been compiled for four years during the time span studied, at five-year i n t e r v a l s , for the NATO countries, but r e l i a b l e figures f o r the Warsaw Pact members are available for only two years: 1957 ancL 19&5• This l a t t e r indicator, then, can be u t i l i z e d only to a l i m i t e d extent. These indicators of power base have been frequently suggested or employed as measures of power base (Cf. P r u i t t , 19^ 7> P« 166; Russett, 1965, pp. 2-3; Deutsch, 1968, pp. 29, 31) with the exception of economic growth rate. This component of national power i s seldom used i n studies 54. employing -power base as a v a r i a b l e , however i n a time series analysis the rate of economic growth seems i n t u i t i v e l y t o be as important as such n a t i o n a l wealth measures as GWP, net material product, or GNP per c a p i t a . Unlike the data on the i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion and of external threat, data on the power base i n d i c a t o r s are r e a d i l y a v a i l a b l e i n published form. For t h i s reason, these data are not included i n the appendices.. A l i s t of the sources used i s included i n Appendix A. Four measures of external threat were employed i n the an a l y s i s , two of them derived by Corson (unpublished) and two by Hopmann (1969). Corson has scaled the i n t e n s i t y of East-West c o n f l i c t f o r the years from 1945 t o I965 i n two ways: the f i r s t i s a measure of verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y as found i n statements by Soviet and American leaders; the second scale measures t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (behavioral and verbal) by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. f o r the same years. The i n t e n s i t y scales themselves, on the basis of which c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y was measured, were established on the basis of judges.;1 ratings of the importance of near l y a hundred categories of c o n f l i c t and co-operation. This procedure y i e l d e d a scale ranging from 0 t o 2500 f o r East-West i n t e r a c t i o n during t h i s time period. A c t u a l Soviet and American statements and actions were then coded f o r i n t e n s i t y and the r e s u l t s were aggregated at four-month i n t e r v a l s . Since the u n i t of analysis employed below i s the year, Corson's data were transformed by t h i s researcher i n t o annual verbal and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y scores; these transformed data are reported i n Appendix E. There i s one important l i m i t a t i o n of these data on c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . Since only the scores f o r Soviet and American c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y are a v a i l a b l e , and not other a l l i a n c e members' perceptions of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i t was necessary t o assume that the perceived i n t e n s i t y of threat was the same f o r each year from 19^9 t o I9652 and was the same f o r each a l l i a n c e member. The c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y scores were therefore a constant f o r each a l l i a n c e member and the data could be used only by comparing the scores f o r each member from year t o year with the various cohesion i n d i c a t o r s . This d e f i c i e n c y was p a r t i a l l y compensated f o r by the i n c l u s i o n of the second set of threat v a r i a b l e s , those compiled by Hopmann. Hopmann (I969) content analyzed the perceptions of the opposing bloc and of the opposing bloc leader held by a l l Warsaw Pact members and seven KATO members: the U.S., B r i t a i n , France, Canada, Norway, Denmark and Germany, as these perceptions appeared i n the f i r s t o f f i c i a l document released by each country i n r e a c t i o n t o four events. The events considered were the outbreak of the Korean War i n 1950; the opening of the Geneva Summit Conference i n 1955; the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty i n 19^3; and the f i r s t day of regular American bombing missions over North Vietnam, i n 1965. Two measures from Hopmann's data were employed i n the analysis below: the percentage of each country's perceptions of the opposing bloc which were p o s i t i v e ; and the percentage of each country's perceptions of the opposing bloc 2 The f i r s t four years are excluded since the time span of t h i s study begins with 19^9. leader which were p o s i t i v e . A low percentage of p o s i t i v e perceptions was interpreted as i n d i c a t i n g high threat perception. These figures may be found i n Appendix F. C l e a r l y , Hopmann's data to some extent compensates f o r the main d e f i c i e n c y of Corson's measures i n that they provide a measure of perceptions by i n d i v i d u a l a l l i a n c e members. However, these data include only four years i n our time span, though the four years included are spread over a f i f t e e n year period, and they include only h a l f the NATO members. Correlations using these data must, therefore, be interpreted very cautiously. A second, though perhaps le s s t e l l i n g , l i m i t a t i o n i s that these data are measures of evaluative perceptions of the opposing bloc and bloc leader, rather than d i r e c t measures of threat perception. We do not know to what extent nations' evaluative perceptions coincide with threat perceptions, so further cautionc. :. must be exercised i n l i g h t of the assumption which must be made with these data: that evaluative perceptions are an accurate i n d i c a t o r of threat perceptions. In short, each of the i n d i c a t o r s employed i n the analysis s u f f e r s from i t s own i d i o s y n c r a t i c d e f i c i e n c i e s , and the number of cases t o be considered i s small. On the other hand, these d e f i c i e n c i e s are mainly i d i o s y n c r a t i c ones and a v a r i e t y of indicators have been employed i n an attempt to compensate f o r the l i m i t a t i o n s of the data: three i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion (two f o r the Warsaw Pact); f i v e indicators of power base; and four measures of external threat. A second saving f a c t o r i s that the only major systematic bias evident i n the a v a i l a b i l i t y 57. of the data i s the f a i r l y large amount of missing data f o r Comrminist countries i n the e a r l i e r years. However, the Warsaw Pact was not formed u n t i l 1955 and the missing data problem i s l e s s serious a f t e r the mid-1950's. S t i l l , the truncated temporal domain and the l i m i t a t i o n s noted i n t h i s b r i e f discussion of the various i n d i c a t o r s d i c t a t e that the c o r r e l a t i o n s reported i n the next chapter should be interpreted cautiously. Before turning to the analysis of the observed r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the v a r i a b l e s , however, i t may be f r u i t f u l to restate the general propositions posited i n Chapter II i n more operational terms based on the i n d i c a t o r s employed t o measure the three v a r i a b l e s . In the next chapter, then, the following s p e c i f i c hypotheses w i l l be considered i n discussing the two more general propositions: Proposition One: The greater the external threat, the higher the l e v e l of cohesion i n an a l l i a n c e . Hypothesis 1: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and percentage of armed forces committed t o NATO. Hypothesis 2 : There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and voting agreement i n the U.N. Hypothesis 3: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. Hypothesis h: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and percentage of armed forces committed to NATO. Hypothesis 5: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and voting agreement i n the U.N. 58. Hypothesis 6: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. Hypothesis 7" Hypothesis 8: Hypothesis 9' There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc and percentage of armed forces committed t o NATO. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc and voting agreement i n the U.N. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. Hypothesis 10: Hypothesis 11: Hypothesis 12: Proposition Two: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc leader and percentage of armed forces committed to NATO. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc leader and voting agreement i n the U.N. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between perception of the opposing bloc leader and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. In an a l l i a n c e of states of unequal power, the commitment of i n d i v i d u a l members t o the a l l i a n c e w i l l decrease as t h e i r n a t i o n a l power increases. Hypothesis 13: Hypothesis lh; Hypothesis 15: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between rate of growth of GNP per capita and percentage of armed forces committed to NATO. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between rate of growth of GNP per capita and voting agreement i n the U.N. There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between rate of growth of GNP per capita and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. 59-Hypothesis l 6 : There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP per capita and percentage of armed forces committed to NATO. Hypothesis 17: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP per capita and voting agreement i n the U.N. Hypothesis l 8 : There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between GNP per capita and support f o r the a l l i a n c e indicated by an analysis of events. Hypothesis 19: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y expenditures and percentage of armed forces committed t o NATO. Hypothesis 20: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y expenditures and voting agree-ment i n the U.N. Hypothesis 21: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between m i l i t a r y expenditures and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d by an analysis of events. Hypothesis 22: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between population and percentage of armed forces committed t o NATO. Hypothesis 23: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between population and voting agreement i n the U.N. Hypothesis 2k: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o m . between population and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d by an analysis of events. Hypothesis 25: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l production and percentage of armed forces committed to NATO. Hypothesis 26: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l production and voting agree-ment i n the U.N. Hypothesis 27: There w i l l be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l production and support f o r the a l l i a n c e i n d i c a t e d by an analysis of events. Go. These s p e c i f i c hypotheses, which r e l a t e the operational measures of the two independent variables t o the operational measures of the dependent v a r i a b l e , a l l i a n c e cohesion, w i l l guide the analysis i n the following chapter. The empirical analysis i s conceived as a t e s t of these s p e c i f i c propositions as they apply t o NATO and the Warsaw Pact and only i n d i r e c t l y as a t e s t of the two general propositions which are posited above. Strong support f o r a l l or almost a l l of the s p e c i f i c hypotheses r e l a t i n g cohesion i n d i c a t o r s t o the in d i c a t o r s of one of the independent variables might, however, be interpreted as strong evidence i n support of the more general proposition l i n k i n g those two v a r i a b l e s . Conversely, of course, a well-established pattern i n d i c a t i n g lack of support f o r , or evidence contrary t o the battery of hypotheses l i n k i n g the in d i c a t o r s of cohesion to the in d i c a t o r s of one of the two independent variables might be regarding as evidence supporting the r e j e c t i o n of the relevant general proposition. CHAPTER IV FINDINGS A number of a l t e r n a t i v e methods of analysis might be employed to assess the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the data on power base and external threat and the data on cohesion of the two a l l i a n c e s . The small numbers with which we s h a l l be dealing i n an analysis of i n d i v i d u a l countries, however, precludes the use of many s t a t i s t i c a l t o o l s , such as the chi-square. Given the small N, presentation of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n graph form would be appealing; however the large number of i n d i c a t o r s employed here would require a correspondingly large, unwieldy number of graphs to i l l u s t r a t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and the small number of cases would often y e i l d a graph j u s t as misleading as other s t a t i s t i c s . C o r r e lations between in d i c a t o r s can be misleading as w e l l , when the number of cases i s quite small. However, co r r e l a t i o n s do provide a means of summarizing the findings i n a reasonably small space and the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t employed below, Goodman and Kruskal's gamma c o e f f i c i e n t , can be v a l i d with an N as small as eleven cases. Since we are dealing with the e n t i r e "population" of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with occasional exceptions because of missing data, no s t a t i s t i c a l inference can be made from s i g n i f i c a n c e tests performed on the c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s . However, the s i g n i f i c a n c e t e s t s may provide some i n d i c a t i o n of whether the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the i n d i c a t o r s are " r e a l " , that i s , not due t o chance, and f o r t h i s purpose the p r o b a b i l i t i e s associated with the c o r r e l a t i o n s are reported whenever they reach the l e v e l of .10 or bet t e r . For each a l l i a n c e , the f i r s t procedure i n the analysis was t o run co r r e l a t i o n s between each i n d i c a t o r and a l l other indicators of every va r i a b l e , f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole aggregated over the ent i r e twenty-two year time span. No v a l i d inference may be drawn from these c o r r e l a t i o n s , of course, since the re l a t i o n s h i p s i n the aggregate are a r t i f i c i a l l y i n f l a t e d . Nevertheless, these aggregate r e l a t i o n s h i p s do provide a f i r s t approximation of the d i r e c t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the data, f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole, despite the f a c t that the magnitude of those r e l a t i o n s h i p s i s i n f l a t e d and u n r e l i a b l e . In add i t i o n , these aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s provide an opportunity t o make some assessment, however rough, of the r e l i a b i l i t y of the in d i c a t o r s f o r each variable i n the an a l y s i s . Following t h i s preliminary assessment of the re l a t i o n s h i p s between the variables and of the r e l i a b i l i t y of the in d i c a t o r s employed, we turn t o a discussion of some i n d i v i d u a l members of each a l l i a n c e . Data were c o l l e c t e d , of course, on each member of each a l l i a n c e and c o r r e l a t i o n s were computed f o r each i n d i v i d u a l a l l i a n c e member. However, an i n d i v i d u a l discussion of each country would require i n c l u d i n g w e l l over one 'thousand c o r r e l a t i o n s , i n some t h i r t y -f i v e t o f o r t y t a b l e s , f o r NATO alone. There i s , though, a more appealing a l t e r n a t i v e . Tufte (1969) has suggested that the most e f f e c t i v e method of data analysis i s the f i t t i n g of l i n e s t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s between va r i a b l e s and then examining deviations from the l i n e s with the a i d of 63. graphs and s c a t t e r p l o t s . Tufte's theme has been taken as the approach to a n a l y s i s of i n d i v i d u a l countries below, though c o r r e l a t i o n s rather than graphs and s c a t t e r p l o t s have been used an a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s . That i s , those countries most l o y a l to the a l l i a n c e s , the a l l i a n c e leaders and camp-followers; and those which deviated most from the a l l i a n c e s , the mavericks, were sing l e d out f o r i n d i v i d u a l a t t e n t i o n . NATO TABLE H a Aggregate Correlations Between Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered by Year f o r Each Nation: NATO Cohesion: Troop Commitments U.N. Votes Power Base: GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population External Threat: T o t a l C o n f l i c t Intensity Verbal C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y Perceptions of Opposing Bloc GNP/Capita U.N. Votes -.13 (32) M i l i t a r y Expenditures .16 (56) • 39**(6l) Analysis of Events -15 (29) .10 (62) Population .29** (6l) .25* (66) •56**(222) Verbal C o n f l i c t I ntensity .32** (270) Perceptions of Opposing Bloc .32+ (28) -.06 (28) Crude Steel Production •29** (59) .19+ (63) .26**(212) .kk**(219) Perceptions of Opposing Bloc Leader -.10 (19) .10 (19) .21 (19) 64 Looking f i r s t at Table I I , we find, reasonably good i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s among the i n d i c a t o r s of power and of external threat, but some doubt i s cast on the r e l i a b i l i t y of the three i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion. Table I l a shows the i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s among the i n d i c a t o r s with the data rank ordered from year t o year; Table l i b shows the same i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s with the data rank ordered from country to country f o r each year. TABLE l i b Aggregate Correlations Between Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered by Nation f o r Each Year: NATO Cohesion: Troop Commitments U.N. Votes Power Base: GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population + U.N. Votes •32 (10) M i l i t a r y GNP/Capita Expenditures Analysis of Events .03 (14) .19+ (50) Crude S t e e l Population Production 0.0 (1) -.04 (35) .28 (16) .04 (36) .13 (16) .8l**(247) .09 (34) •33 (16) .42**(233) •38**(226) FX. 10 EC. 05 P<-. 01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. In Table I l a , the various i n d i c a t o r s of power base are a l l p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d , with the sole exception of the c o r r e l a t i o n 6 5 . b e t w e e n G N P p e r c a p i t a a n d G N P p e r c a p i t a g r o w t h , w h i c h i s s l i g h t l y -n e g a t i v e . On t h e s e t w o i n d i c a t o r s , h o w e v e r , t h e d a t a a r e f a i r l y s k i m p y a n d t h i s m a y p a r t l y a c c o u n t f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n . T h e o t h e r i n d i c a t o r s a r e a l l q u i t e h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h e a c h a n d w i t h B N P p e r c a p i t a a n d G N P p e r c a p i t a g r o w t h r a t e . T h e t h r e e i n d i c a t o r s o n w h i c h t h e d a t a a r e a l m o s t e n t i r e l y c o m p l e t e , m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s , p o p u l a t i o n , a n d c r u d e s t e e l p r o d u c t i o n , a r e a l l c o r r e l a t e d w i t h e a c h o t h e r a t t h e .01 l e v e l o f s i g n i f i c a n c e o r b e t t e r , a s t h e y a r e i n T a b l e l i b a s w e l l . W h i l e we m u s t b e e x t r e m e l y w a r y o f a t t a c h i n g a n y s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t o t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , f o r t h e r e a s o n s n o t e d a b o v e , i t d o e s s e e m c l e a r t h a t v e r y l i t t l e d o u b t i s c a s t o n t h e r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e p o w e r b a s e i n d i c a t o r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e l a t t e r t h r e e , f o r w h i c h t h e d a t a a r e m o s t c o m p l e t e . T h e i n d i c a t o r s o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t a r e m o s t l y p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h e a c h o t h e r , t h o u g h t h e c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y a n d p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e o p p o s i n g b l o c , a n d b e t w e e n t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y a n d p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e o p p o s i n g b l o c l e a d e r , a r e s l i g h t l y n e g a t i v e , a s s h o w n i n T a b l e I l a . T o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i s q u i t e h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y a n d w i t h p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e o p p o s i n g b l o c l e a d e r a n d p o s i t i v e l y , t h o u g h n o t v e r y h i g h l y , c o r r e l a t e d w i t h v e r b a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y a n d w i t h p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e o p p o s i n g b l o c . We c a n , t h e n , h a v e s o m e c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i n d i c a t o r s o f e x t e r n a l t h r e a t , t h o u g h p e r h a p s n o t t o t h e s a m e d e g r e e a s w i t h t h e p o w e r b a s e i n d i c a t o r s . T h e i n d i c a t o r s o f c o h e s i o n , h o w e v e r , a r e a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r . 66. In Table Ila, we see a slight positive correlation between voting in the U.N. and the measure of cohesion drawn from an analysis of events in the New York Times Index (for purposes of brevity, the latter measure w i l l be simply referred to below as the analysis of events), but slight negative correlations between troop commitments to NATO and the other two measures of cohesion. In Table l i b , the correlations are a l l positive, but only the U.N. votes - NYT indicator correlation i s significant, and that only with a probability of .90 that the relationship i s real . This dilemma may be partly explained by the lack of data on troop commitments for earlier years. While U.N. voting data are available for each year up to 1967 an<3- "the analysis of events has been measured for every even-numbered year up to 1968, data on troop commitments are available only for five years in the 1962 to 19^9 period. There i s , then, relatively l i t t l e overlap between this latter indicator of cohesion and the other two. A second factor which might explain the discrepancies i s that while power base and external threat have been measured f a i r l y directly, the cohesion indicators are comparatively indirect. That i s , troop commitments, voting in the U.N., and the analysis of events can only tentatively be regarded as measures of alliance cohesion and i f they are, i n fact, valid indicators of cohesion, they may be measuring different aspects of alliance cohesion. For these reasons, the relationships between these indicators and the indicators of the power base and external threat variables cannot be regarded as a rigorous test of the two general propositions advanced in Chapter II. We can, of course, be more confident of the implications of the findings for the specific 67 operational hypotheses l i s t e d i n Chapter III. TABLE I I I Aggregate Correlations Between Cohesion and Power Base Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered by Year f o r Each Nation: NATO Troop Cohesion: Commitments U.N. Votes Analysis of Events Total C o n f l i c t Intensity .69* (22) .22** (232) -.07 (60) Verbal Co n f l i c t Intensity .69* .09+ (232) -.05 (60) Perceptions of Opposing Bloc -.46* (23) Perceptions of Opposing Bloc -.04 (15) Leader + = P<.10 * = FX. 05 ** = EC. 01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. The aggregate correlations between the indicators of NATO cohesion and the external threat indicators f o r the NATO members are presented i n Table I I I . Because of the l i m i t e d number of years fo r which the data on perceptions of the opposing bloc and perceptions of the opposing bloc leader are available, there are enough cases to compute correlations only between U.N. votes and these two indicators. I t may be recalled that a negative correlation was predicted between U.N. votes and perceptions of the opposing bloc and bloc leader (supra, p. 55)• In Table I I I , we f i n d a correlation of -.46, s i g n i f i c a n t at the ,0$ l e v e l , 68. between U.N. votes and perceptions of the opposing bloc, but only a s l i g h t negative r e l a t i o n s h i p , -.Oh, between U.N. votes and perceptions of the opposing bloc leader. In the aggregate, then, the hypothesized negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between U.N. voting agreement and perceptions of the opposing bloc appears to be upheld, though there i s no evidence to support the hypothesized negative r e l a t i o n s h i p between U.N. voting and perceptions of the leader of the opposing b l o c . This may be a r e f l e c t i o n of the much-discussed detente beginning i n the middle or l a t e 1950's between the Soviet Union and the West, though once again we should be wary of drawing inferences from the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s . The predicted p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and each of the ind i c a t o r s of cohesion (pp. 5^-55, supra, hypotheses 1 to 6) are upheld by the c o r r e l a t i o n s with two of the three i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion. Troop commitments t o NATO are h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d with both t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.69 i n each case) and the c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. voting and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.22) and U.N. voting and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y (.09), while smaller, are s t i l l s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t because of the large number of observations. Both measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , however, are s l i g h t l y negatively c o r r e l a t e d with the analysis of events. The data, then, o f f e r some evidence i n support of hypotheses 1, 2, ^l-, and 5, which r e l a t e the two measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y to troop commitments and U.N. voting agreement, but not f o r hypotheses 3 and 6, which r e l a t e c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y t o the analysis of events. Since the two measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y 69. vary from year to year but are constant f o r each a l l i a n c e member, no correlations can be computed with these two indicators with the al l i a n c e members rank ordered i n a p a r t i c u l a r year. r e l a t i n g the power base indicators to the indicators of cohesion predicted a negative co r r e l a t i o n . A l l of the seven aggregate correlations between troop commitments to NATO, reported i n Table TV, and the power base indicators are negative and only one of them i s too small (-.09, between troop commitments and crude st e e l production i n Table IVb) to be con-sidered as evidence i n support of the hypothesis. The correlations between the analysis of events and the power base indicators, however, are a l l quite small, ranging from -.15 to .16 except f o r the -.38 correlation between the analysis of events and GNP per capita growth TABLE IVa Each of the hypotheses (pp. 55-56, hypotheses 13 to 27) Aggregate Correlations Between Cohesion and Power Base Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered by Year f o r Each Nation: NATO Troop Commitments U.N. Votes Analysis of Events GNP/Capita Growth Rate -.20 (22) ,2k* (58) •05 (20) GNP/Capita .03 (6k) M i l i t a r y Expenditures -.32* (k2) . O k (208) -.01 (72) Population -.62**(31) .09*(228) -15 (63) Crude Steel Production -•39* (35) .09+(215) -.01 (67) 70. TABLE IVb Aggregate Correlations Between Cohesion and Power Base Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered by Nation f o r Each Year: NATO Troop Commitments -.31).+ (20) 0.1*3+ (15) U.N. Votes -.18 (30) -.05 (13) .12* (208) .09 (218) Analysis of Events -.38 (11) •03 (71) .16 (6k) -.10 (15) .17**(192) -.Ok (61) P:<.10 P C 05 F-C.01 GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population Crude Steel Production + * Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. rate i n Table IVb, and almost h a l f of them, three out of eight, aire • ~o positive while they should be negative i f the hypotheses are correct. S i m i l a r l y , eight of the ten correlations l i n k i n g the power base indicators to voting agreement i n the U.N. are opposite to the predicted negative d i r e c t i o n , some of them s i g n i f i c a n t l y so. Moreover, the correlations i n Table IVa, with the data rank ordered from year to year, are contaminated by the fact that the power base data for each country tend to slope steadily upwards over time. In Table IVb, where t h i s contaminating factor i s con-t r o l l e d by rank ordering the data from country to country f o r each year, almost a l l of the negative correlations between the power base indicators and the cohesion indicators have decreased i n magnitude i n comparison with Table IVa. The correlation between the analysis of events and population, 71-changes from -.15 i n Table IVa t o * . l 6 i n Table TVb. In short, with the possible exception of the co r r e l a t i o n s between troop commitments t o NATO and the m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production i n d i c a t o r s , these aggregate data do not support the hypothesized linkages between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the power base i n d i c a t o r s . TABLE V NATO Members' Rank Orderings on Cohesion Indicators f o r Selected Years. A. Troop Commitments 1948 1952 1956 1962 1966 1968 Belgium 3 4 4 Canada 11 9 10 Denmark 3 2 2 France 13 14 13 Germany 8 5 5 Greece 7 8 6 Iceland I t a l y 10 6 8 Luxembourg 3 10 9 Netherlands •3-J .: 2 2 Norway 3 2 2 Portugal 9 12 12 Turkey 6 7 7 United Kingdom 12 11 11 U.S.A. 14 13 B. U.N. Votes 1948 1952 1956 1962 1966 1968 Belgium 10 11 2 12 4 Canada 4.5 2 3 7 3 Denmark 6 4 11 9 10 France 12 8 12 14 13 Germany Greece 9 12 14 11 11 Iceland 1 5 1 8 6 I t a l y 6 4 5 5 Luxembourg 2 7 1 2 Netherlands 4.5 1 9 2 1 Norway 7 7 13 10 8 Portugal 8 13 14 Turkey 11 10 6 3 12 United Kingdom 3 9 5 6 9 U.S.A. 8 3 10 4 7 72. C. Analysis of Events I 9 U 8 1952 I Q 5 6 I962 I966 1968 Belgium 8.5 11 5-5 Canada 8.5 2 6.5 8 Denmark 1.5 ^.5 1.5 France 10 6 6 14 9 Germany 7 1 9 k Greece 6 h 4.5 Iceland 9 2 I t a l y l 2 8 Luxembourg Netherlands 6 10 2 Norway 1.5 8 2 1-5 Portugal • 5 13 Turkey 3 6.5 5 . 5 United Kingdom 6 5 k 12 3 U.S.A. k 3 3 10 7 The ag£ ^regate data, then, suggest that the linkage between external threat and the i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion may be a s i g n i f i c a n t one or, at l e a s t , there i s no evidence i n the aggregate data which would lead us t o r e j e c t the hypothesized linkages between perceptions of the opposing bloc and U.N. voting or between c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and the three ind i c a t o r s of cohesion employed. On the other hand, the expected r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the power base in d i c a t o r s did not appear. A look at some i n d i v i d u a l NATO members may suggest some refinements to the hypotheses. The rank orderings of each of the NATO members on each of the three i n d i c a t o r s of cohesion are shown i n Table V. The higher a nation's rank, the higher i t s l e v e l of cohesion. Thus France, f o r example, ranked lowest on both the troop commitment i n d i c a t o r and the analysis of events i n 1968, meaning France was the nation l e a s t committed to the a l l i a n c e . A quick glance at France's ranks over the years i n comparison with 73-other NATO members reveals that France has been the "maverick" i n NATO. The Netherlands, on the other hand, has ranked most consistently high on the cohesion indicators and might be termed NATO's most l o y a l "camp follower". These two nations, then, along with the U.S. as 'leader" of the a l l i a n c e , merit i n d i v i d u a l attention. I t must be noted, however, that the number of cases summarized i n the correlations f o r only one country i s extremely small and inferences from them should be drawn very c a r e f u l l y . In some cases, the correlations are not s t a t i s t i c a l l y v a l i d , that i s , when the number of observations i s l e s s than 11. As long as the N i s 5 or greater, these correlations are reported anyway but no probabil-i t i e s may be attached to them. The troop commitment indicator does not give an N of more than 4 i n any of these cases and i s , therefore, ex-cluded from the analysis. S i m i l a r l y , the data on perceptions of the opposing bloc leader cover only four p a r t i c u l a r years; they, too, are therefore excluded from the analysis. TABLE VI Correlations of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: France U.N. Votes Analysis of Events 1-year 5-year 1-year 5-year lags lags lags lags M i l i t a r y Expenditures -.33+(l5) -.49*(l3) -.07 (8) -.64(8) -.43(8) -.47(6) Population -.35*0-8) -.35+0-6) -.38+CLl) -.57(8) -.56(9) -.81(7) Crude Steel -.34+0-7) -.12 (15) -.11 (9) -.50(8) -.28(9) -.80(5) Total Co n f l i c t Intensity .18 (16) -.04 (15) .16 (10) .10(7) .07(8) .24(7) Verbal Conflict Intensity .08 (l6) -.05 (15) -.02 (10) .43(7) .07(8) -.60(6) + = EC. 10 ** = K.01 * = P<.05 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. 74. TABLE VII Correlations of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: The Netherlands Military-Expenditures Population Crude Steel Production T o t a l C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y Verbal C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y •36*(l8) .22 (20) .16 (19) .12 (18) .03 (18) U.N. Votes 1-year lags •32+(l7) .40*(l8) •38*(17) •13 (17) .09 (17) 5-year lags .20 (10) .42+(ii) •29 (10) .24 (10) -.20 (11) .20(5) .60(5) .60(5) -78(5) -.20(5) Analysis of Events 1-year 5-year lags lags .60(5) .60(5) •60($) -.80(5) .40(5) TABLE VIII Correlations of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: The U.S.A. M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population Crude Steel Production T o t a l C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y Verbal C o n f l i c t I n t e n s i t y + * = -.25 (17) .15 (20) .09 (19) .29+0-8) .19 (18) P<.10 F<.05 U.N. Votes 1-year l a g s .10(15) .16(18) .00(17) .29(17) .16(17) 5-year lags -.24(10) -.21(8) .20(11) -.21(8) .36(10) .14(8) .14(10) -.30(7) Analysis of Events 1-year 5-year l a g s -50(8) -•33(9) lags .14(7) -.43(7) .22(9) -.47(6) .14(8) -.14(7) -.13(11) -.14(7) -.14(8) .20(6) Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. 75-The c o r r e l a t i o n s between the remaining indicators f o r France, the Netherlands, and the U.S. are shown i n Tables VI, VII, and VIII. There are some i n t e r e s t i n g differences between.the c o r r e l a t i o n matrix f o r France, on the one hand, and the c o r r e l a t i o n matrices f o r the Netherlands and the U.S. on the other hand. F i r s t , contrary to the findings suggested by the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s , there do appear to be some negative r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as o r i g i n a l l y predicted, between the power base indi c a t o r s and the cohesion in d i c a t o r s f o r France. In Table VI, m i l i t a r y expenditures (-.33)', population (-.35), and crude s t e e l production (-.34) are a l l negatively c o r r e l a t e d with U.N. voting at the .10 l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e or better. When the data are lagged, that i s , the power base indi c a t o r s are cor r e l a t e d with measures of the cohesion ind i c a t o r s one year and f i v e years l a t e r , these c o r r e l a t i o n s remain negative. With the one-year lag, the c o r r e l a t i o n s of m i l i t a r y expenditures and population with U.N. voting increase i n magnitude and remain s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative. The c o r r e l a t i o n between crude s t e e l production and U.N. voting remains negative, but i s no longer s i g n i f i c a n t . With a five-year l a g , these three c o r r e l a t i o n s s t i l l remain negative, though only the U.N. voting - population c o r r e l a t i o n (-.38) i s s i g n i f i c a n t . S i m i l a r l y , the co r r e l a t i o n s of the analysis of events with m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production are a l l negative and quite large, and they remain large and negative with the one-year and five-year time lags, though because of the S H & I I N's these c o r r e l a t i o n s cannot be sa i d to be s i g n i f i c a n t . Turning to the Netherlands, however, we see i n Table VII that 76. the correlations of both indicators of cohesion, U.N. voting and the analysis of events, with the three power base indicators for which there are s u f f i c i e n t data (once again, m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production) are a l l positive and remain positive with the one-year and five-year time lags. The correlations between U.N. votes and these three power base indicators, i n f a c t , are a l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y positive at the .10 l e v e l or better with a one-year time lag*. While the contrast between France and the U.S. i s not as glaring as that between France and the Netherlands, the difference i s s t i l l worth noting. Two-thirds of the correlations between the analysis of events and the power base indicators of m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production i n Table VIII are negative, as hypothesized, but not highly negative considering the small N's. M i l i t a r y expenditures are negatively correlated with U.N. voting f o r the U.S. on the straight correlation and with a five-year lag, but not s i g n i f i c a n t l y so and t h i s correlation i s positive with the one-year time lag. A l l of the U.N. voting correlations with population and with crude s t e e l production are po s i t i v e . The second noteworthy item i s that, whereas the difference between France and the other two NATO members i s quite s t r i k i n g when we consider the relationship between power base indicators and the indicators of cohesion, there i s not - any appreciable difference among these three nations when we look at the linkage between the cohesion indicators and the two indicators of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . For France, the correlations between both cohesion indicators and both c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y 77. i n d i c a t o r s , without time lags, are a l l p o s i t i v e as predicted i n the hypotheses at the end of Chapter I I I . With a one-year l a g , as may be seen i n Table VI, the c o r r e l a t i o n s between U.N. votes and the two c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are s l i g h t l y negative, and with a f i v e -year l a g the c o r r e l a t i o n s between verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and the two cohesion i n d i c a t o r s are negative. The pattern i s s i m i l a r f o r the Netherlands. In Table VII, we f i n d negative c o r r e l a t i o n s between the a n a l y s i s of events and both c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i n d i c a t o r s without time lags; a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between the analysis of events and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y with a one-year l a g ; and a negative c o r r e l a t i o n between U.N. votes and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y with a f i v e - y e a r l a g . None of the c o r r e l a t i o n s i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Table VIII shows that the pattern f o r the U.S. without time lags and with a one-year l a g i s exactly the same as f o r the Netherlands. With a f i v e - y e a r l a g , two of the four c o r r e l a t i o n s between cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are negative. In short, the pattern f o r a l l three nations i s mixed and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y i n d i c a t o r s are almost a l l not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , i n contrast with the f a i r l y strong r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these two v a r i a b l e s , cohesion and c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i n the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s discussed above. The c o r r e l a t i o n s between the power base i n d i c a t o r s and cohesion are quite strongly negative f o r France, again i n contrast with the aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s , but p o s i t i v e f o r the Netherlands and mixed f o r the U.S. 78. I t appears that the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and the power base i n d i c a t o r s might be f r u i t f u l l y pursued i n the future i f they are reformulated t o suggest a r e l a t i o n s h i p between power base i n d i c a t o r s and cohesion f o r maverick or deviant members of an a l l i a n c e , though not f o r l o y a l a l l i a n c e members or f o r the leader of an a l l i a n c e . On the other hand, a decline i n external threat, or at l e a s t i n c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , does not appear to be strongly l i n k e d with the decline i n French commitment to NATO, but other a l l i a n c e : mavericks should be examined before r e j e c t i n g the hypothesized linkages between a l l i a n c e cohesion i n d i c a t o r s and i n d i c a t o r s of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . I t should be emphasized that these suggestions are t e n t a t i v e , based as they are on only three nations, and that nothing can be s a i d here about the various i n d i c a t o r s not considered i n the a n a l y s i s of France, the Netherlands, and the U.S. Further, these findings can be s a i d to r e f l e c t on the two general propositions l i n k i n g cohesion to external threat and power only to the extent that the i n d i c a t o r s employed are accurate measures of these v a r i a b l e s , and i n the case of the cohesion and external threat v a r i a b l e s t h i s i s questionable. The Warsaw Pact Analysis of the Warsaw Pact i s even more d i f f i c u l t than NATO because of the small number of nations i n the a l l i a n c e . In a d d i t i o n , the data l i m i t a t i o n s are more severe with the Warsaw Pact members. Because there were only eight members i n t h i s a l l i a n c e (seven a f t e r the withdrawal of Albania) no v a l i d c o r r e l a t i o n s could be computed by rank ordering the countries f o r each year. Therefore only the time 79. series rankings, that i s , rank ordering the data from year to year f o r each a l l i a n c e member, were done. This meant that the data on perceptions of the other bloc and perceptions of the other bloc leader were excluded from the analysis. In addition, there are no data on troop commitments to the Warsaw Pact, leaving only U.N. votes and the analysis of events as indicators of cohesion. A l l of the power base indicators are s t i l l included, but two of them, GNP per capita growth rate and GNP per capita, are quite unreliable f o r Communist countries as Triska (1969), f o r example, has noted. The u n r e l i a b i l i t y of the two GNP indicators i s reflected i n the aggregate correlations reported i n Table IX. Both of the GNP indicators of power base are very s l i g h t l y correlated with the other three power base indicators, more often than not i n a negative d i r e c t i o n . M i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and crude s t e e l production, however, are a l l strongly p o s i t i v e l y correlated with each other. The l a t t e r three indicators taken alone appear to provide an adequate indication of the power base of the members of the Warsaw Pact. The two indicators of external threat which we are able to use f o r the Warsaw Pact, t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y emanating from the West, are negatively correlated with each other i n the aggregate (-.15), though t h i s may be more an indication of inconsistent statements and behavior by the West than of the r e l i a b i l i t y of these two indicators. The two measures of cohesion, voting i n the U.N. General Assembly and the analysis of events, are p o s i t i v e l y , but not 80. TABLE IX Aggregate Correlations Between Power Base Indicators With the Data Rank Ordered By Year fo r Each Nation: Warsaw Pact GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population + GNP/Capita .60 (7) M i l i t a r y Expenditures -.16 (42) -.10 (15) Population .06 (42) -.06 (16) •32**(96) Crude Steel Production .06 (38) -.05 (14) .32** (91) .43**(124) FK.10 P<.05 F<.01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases, strongly correlated (.13). As was suggested i n the discussion of the r e l i a b i l i t y the cohesion indicators f o r NATO, the lack of a strong relationship between the cohesion indicators may mean that we are tapping di f f e r e n t aspects of a l l i a n c e cohesion, though i t i s not certain that we are, i n f a c t , measuring cohesion. Given these d i f f i c u l t i e s with the indicators, we should, as with the analysis of NATO, be quite wary of drawing unsupported inferences from the correlations, p a r t i c u l a r l y the aggregate correlations. Even without t h i s warning sign, however, the aggregate correlations reported i n Table X do not suggest that.the general propositions r e l a t i n g the cohesion variables should be either accepted or rejected. We may, however, speak with somewhat more confidence about some of the sp e c i f i c hypotheses offered i n Chapter I I I . 81 TABLE X Aggregate Cohesion Indicators Correlated With Power Base and External Threat Indicators with the Data Rank Ordered By Year for Each Nation: Warsaw Pact GNP/Capita Growth Rate GNP/Capita M i l i t a r y Expenditures Population Crude Steel Production Total C o n f l i c t Intensity Verbal C o n f l i c t Intensity U.N. Votes .11 (34) .10 (14) -.25**(77) -.27**(77) - .02 (72) -.11 (49) •30* (49) Analysis of Events - .03 (18) - .02 (41) - .03 (42) .18 (37) .09 (16) •09 (16) + = HC.10 * = P<.05 ** = PX.01 Numbers i n parentheses are the number of cases. I t w i l l be recalled that the hypotheses r e l a t i n g the cohesion indicators to the power base indicators predicted, i n each case, a s i g n i f i c a n t negative c o r r e l a t i o n . The correlations between the two GNP indicators and U.N. voting are both p o s i t i v e , suggesting that hypotheses 14 and 17 do not hold true f o r the Warsaw Pact, though as mentioned above very l i t t l e confidence can be placed i n these two power base indicators. GNP per capita growth, m i l i t a r y expenditures, and population are a l l negatively correlated with the analysis of events, but these 82 correlations are so close to zero that i t i s probably closer to the tru t h to say that there i s no relationship, either negative or po s i t i v e , between the analysis of events and these three power base indicators. Crude s t e e l production i s p o s i t i v e l y correlated with the analysis of events, while a negative correlation was expected. For a l l four of the linkages between power base indicators and the analysis of events, then, the aggregate correlations provide no evidence i n support of the hypotheses. There are, however, quite strong negative correlations between m i l i t a r y expenditures and U.N. voting and between population and U.N. voting, although there i s only a very s l i g h t negative correlation between U.N. voting agreement and crude st e e l production. Hypotheses 26, l i n k i n g the l a t t e r two variables, i s not supported by the aggregate cor r e l a t i o n , then, but hypotheses 20 and 23, predicting negative correlations between U.N. voting and the m i l i t a r y expenditures and population indicators are not rejected on the basis of the aggregate Warsaw Pact correlations. Turning to the relationship between the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures and the two cohesion indicators, i n Table X we f i n d p o s i t i v e , but not s i g n i f i c a n t l y high, correlations between the analysis of events and both measures of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , and between U.N. voting and t o t a l c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y there i s a small negative co r r e l a t i o n . There i s no support, then, f o r hypotheses 2, 3, and 6, but also i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to reject these hypotheses with any confidence. Hypothesis 5, suggesting a strong positive correlation between U.N. voting and verbal 83-c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , i s supported by the aggregate correlation of .30, s i g n i f i c a n t at the .05 l e v e l , though no t r u l y v a l i d inference can be drawn since the aggregate correlation i s an i n f l a t e d one. TABLE XI Rank Orders of Warsaw Bact Members on Cohesion Indicators For Selected Years Albania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia East Germany U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events 1956 2 6 2 k k 2.5 1 i960 7 8 5.5 7 1 1 k 1964 3.5 7 3.5 2 3-5 6 2 1966 1 8 k 6 h 2 2 1968 8 1 6 3 Hungary Poland Rumania U.S.S.R. U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events U.N. Votes Analysis of Events 1956 7 8 6 7 5 2.5 2 5 i960 3 6 3 k 3 k 5S2 2 196U 3.5 h 3.5 2 7 8 3.5 5 1966 k 5 k 2 7 7 k k 1968 k 2 7 5 Proceeding i n the same fashion as i n the analysis of NATO, we must look next at the i n d i v i d u a l Warsaw Pact members most closely and l e a s t closely aligned with the a l l i a n c e , and at the Warsaw Pact 84. 'leader", the U.S.S.R. In Table XI, the rank orderings of the various members of the Warsaw Pact on the two indicators of cohesion are re-ported for various years. Even-numbered years are selected because data on the analysis of events were only compiled for even-numbered years. Rumania and Albania are almost equally deviant from the alliance. Rumania, however, will be analysed as the alliance 'maverick" because our data for Rumania are more complete on the power base indicators than the data for Albania. East Germany is clearly a loyal member of the alliance, but since East Germany is not a member of the U.K. we TABLE XII Correlations of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: Rumania U.N. Votes Analysis of Events 1-year 5-year * 1-year 5-year lags lags lags lags Military Expenditures -.56 (10) -.32 (ll) .48 (8) -.40(5) -.40 (5) Population -,38*(ll) -.38+(ll) -.41 (10) -.60(5) -.47(6) -.40(5) Crude Steel Production -.38+(ll) -.47*0-3) -.41 (10) -.60(5) -.47 (6) -.40 (5) Total Conflict Intensity .22 (9) .09 (12) .00 (10) -.20 (5) .20 (5) Verbal Conflict Intensity .67 (9) .16 (12) -.23 (10) .80 (5) -.40 (5) + = HC-.10 *. = P<.05 * * = K.01 Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases, could do only half an analysis. Poland, however, is a U.N. member and, at least in terms of our two measures of cohesion and in comparison with 85-other Warsaw Pact members. Poland, then, w i l l be treated as the ' l o y a l camp fo l lower , " Rumania as the 'maverick," and the Soviet Union as the " leader" of the Warsaw Pact. TABLE XI I I Corre lat ions of Cohesion Indicators With Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: Poland U.N. Votes 1-year lags M i l i t a r y Expenditures -.29 (10) -.11(10) 5-year lags Analys is of Events 1-year 5-year l a g g lags -.14(7) Population -.03 (12) -.13(ll) -.22(9) Crude Stee l Production .24 (12) -.13(ll) -.22(9) Tota l Con f l i c t In tens i ty .20 (10) Verbal Con f l i c t In tens i ty .38 (10) .16(10) .06(9) .17(6) -.33(7) .00(6) .83(6) .44(7) .17(6) .83(6) .67(7) .17(6) .11(5) .17(6) -.33(6) .07(10) -.22(9) .11(5) -.17(6) .50(6) TABLE XIV Corre lat ions of Cohesion Indicators with Indicators of Power Base and External Threat: U.S.S.R. M i l i t a r y Expenditures .05 (l4) U.N. Votes 1-year lags .05(11) Population -.33 (12) -.l8(l0) 5-year lags •43(9) .08(8) Analys is of Events 1-year 5-year lags lags .33(6) -.62(7) .40(5) -.20(5) -.47(6) Crude Steel Production .01 (l4) .13(12) -«5M9) -.33(9) -.05(7) .20(5) Tota l Con f l i c t In tens i ty .09 (12) -.14(12) Verbal Con f l i c t In tens i ty «36+(l2) .23(12) * = FS.10 * = K.05 -.20(9) -.20(5) -.07(6) .40(5) -.31(9) -.20(5) -.33(6) .60(5) * * = . P<.01 Numbers in parentheses are the number of cases. 86 Comparing these three Warsaw Pact members, the same difference i n the relationship between power base and cohesion indicators appears as with France, the Netherlands, and the U.S., and the difference i s almost as s t r i k i n g as with NATO members. For Rumania, the a l l i a n c e "maverick, " a l l but one of the correlations between cohesion and power base indicators i n Table XII are negative, both with and without time lags. The sole exception i s the correlation between U.N. voting and m i l i t a r y expenditures with a five-year l a g . A l l the correlations between U.N. voting and population and between U.N. voting and crude s t e e l production with no time l a g and with a one-year l a g are s i g n i f i c a n t at the .10 l e v e l of probability or better. And, with the exception of the one positive correlation, a l l of the correlations between the power base and cohesion indicators are at least as negative as -.38. The data f o r Rumania, then, appear to offer quite consistent evidence i n support of the hypotheses l i n k i n g U.N. votes and the analysis of events to the power base Indicators. The correlations between power base and cohesion indicators for Poland and the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, are f a r from uniformly negative. In Table X I I I , we f i n d a positive correlation between U.N. voting and crude s t e e l production for Poland. A l l of the remaining U.N. voting - power base indicators correlations, with and without time lags, are negative, but none of them are s i g n i f i c a n t l y negative. The largest correlation f o r Poland i n the negative d i r e c t i o n i s -.29, while f o r Rumania the smallest negative correlation i s -.38. Moreover, a l l of the correlations between the analysis of events f o r Poland and 8 7 . the power base indicators are positive, some of them (the correlations with population and steel production) quite high. Though the N's here are very small, a l l of the correlations in the Rumania matrix between power base indicators and the analysis of events are negative. There is a similar contrast between Rumania and the Soviet Union. Only three of the nine correlations in Table XIV between U.K. votes and power base indicators are negative, none of them significant. Five of the eight correlations for the Soviet Union between the analysis of events and the power base indicators are negative, but most of them are quite small considering the N's and, to repeat, a l l of the Rumania correlations with the analysis of events are negative. To summarize, for the U.S.S.R. there is weak support for the hypothesized negative relationships between population and both cohesion indicators, but no support for the hypothesized negative linkages between the cohesion indicators and military expenditures or crude steel production. For Poland, there is some weak support for the hypotheses linking U.N. votes to each of these three power base indicators, but no support for the hypotheses relating the analysis of events and the three indicators of power base. For Rumania, there is consistent, though not highly significant in terms of probabilities, support for a l l of the hypothesized negative relationships between cohesion indicators and power base indicators. There is the same contrast, then, between the alliance 'Vnaverick" on the one hand, and the alliance 'leader" and "camp follower" on the other hand, as in NATO. This lends further support for the reformulation of the hypotheses 88. l i n k i n g cohesion indicators with power base indicators suggested above i n the discussion of France, the Netherlands, and the U.S.: there may-be a s i g n i f i c a n t negative correlation between cohesion indicators and power base indicators when a l l i a n c e 'Vnavericks" are considered, but not with l o y a l a l l i a n c e members of a l l i a n c e 'leaders". As was the case with the in d i v i d u a l NATO members, there i s no r e a l l y s t r i k i n g relationship apparent i n Tables X I I , X I I I , and XIV between the cohesion indicators and the two indicators of c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y . I t w i l l be recalled that positive correlations between these two sets of indicators were predicted i n the hypotheses i n Chapter I I I . For Rumania, however, only two of the four correlations between the analysis of events and the two c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures are positive (the N f o r the correlations without time lags i s less than 5 i n t h i s case, so these correlations are not reported). A l l but one of the correlations between the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures and U.N. votes are p o s i t i v e , but only one of these i s higher than .22 and the r e l a t i o n -ships are not s i g n i f i c a n t . In Table X I I I , we f i n d that the pattern i s much the same for Poland. One of the correlations between U.N. voting and the c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures i s negative. The rest are po s i t i v e , as predicted i n the hypotheses, but the only correlation greater than .20 i s that between the analysis of events and verbal c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y , but with an N of only 6. The remaining correlations between the analysis of events and the c o n f l i c t measures are uniformly low and two of them are negative. 89-Looking at Table XIV, i n the data on the Soviet Union the correlation between verbal conflict intensity and U.N. votes i s .36 which is significant but only at the .10 level, and three of the remaining five correlations between U.N. votes and the two conflict intensity measures are negative. Similarly, four of the six correlations between the analysis of events for the Soviet Union and the conflict intensity measures are negative. As was the case with the NATO members, then, the relation-ships between cohesion indicators and conflict intensity measures are mixed for a l l three countries. However, the negative correlations are a l l f a i r l y low and the N's are small, so while there i s no real support for the hypotheses linking cohesion indicators and conflict intensity indicators for any of these three nations, neither i s there any conclusive evidence that the hypotheses should be rejected. The findings for both alliances, then, are similar when individual members of the alliances are analyzed. In the concluding chapter, I shall elaborate on the theoretical implications of these findings. CHAPTER V CONCLUSION To summarize b r i e f l y , the aggregate correlations f o r the two a l l i a n c e s do not suggest any s i g n i f i c a n t relationships between the cohesion variable and the power base variable, though there i s some evidence i n the aggregate i n support of a few of the more s p e c i f i c hypothesized linkages between some of the indicators,of power base and certain indicators of cohesion such as, for example, the r e l a t i o n -ships between troop commitments to NATO, on the one hand, and m i l i t a r y expenditures, population, and s t e e l production on the other hand. Yet there seems to be quite a strong negative relationship between the indicators of cohesion and power base indicators f o r the mavericks i n each a l l i a n c e , France and Rumania, while there i s not f o r the more l o y a l members of these two a l l i a n c e s . There i s somesevidence to support the hypothesized relationships between a l l i a n c e cohesion indicators and indicators of external threat, i n the aggregate correlations. However, these relationships do not hold up when indi v i d u a l a l l i a n c e members are considered. These findings suggest a number of questions which merit consideration. Is there any explanation f o r the discrepancies between the aggregate correlations and those for i n d i v i d u a l members of the allia n c e s ? How much confidence can we place i n the findings reported here? How do these findings r e f l e c t on the previous studies of a l l i a n c e s discussed i n the introductory chapter? What are the theo r e t i c a l implications of the analysis? I t should be noted that there i s no glaring discrepancy between the aggregate correlations r e l a t i n g power base indicators to cohesion indicators and the corresponding correlations f o r the Netherlands and the U.S. i n NATO; only the deviant NATO member, France, demonstrates strong relationships between power base indicators and cohesion indicators. In the Warsaw Pact, the aggregate relationships are negative between cohesion indicators and power base indicators, as are the corresponding correlations f o r Rumania, though for the l o y a l a l l i a n c e member, Poland, and the a l l i a n c e leader, the U.S.S.R., these relationships do not appear to hold. Two factors might account, at l e a s t i n part, f o r these discrepancies. F i r s t , f o r the more committed members of the a l l i a n c e there i s l i t t l e , i f any, change over time i n t h e i r commitment to the a l l i a n c e . The smaller the range of commitment for a nation, the smaller the possible range of r e l a t i o n -ships between commitment and explanatory variables. For the mavericks, however, there i s a more or less steady decline i n cohesion and a more or less steady r i s e i n power base i n f l a t e d by the fact that the power base variables are prone to r i s e i n value with the passage of time. Second, the aggregate correlations are somewhat i n f l a t e d , both i n magnitude and i n l e v e l of significance by virtue of the fact that they are aggregates, while the significance l e v e l s of the correlations f o r i n d i v i d u a l nations are deflated by the small N's on which those correlations are based. These same two factors may also account, at l e a s t i n part, f o r the discrepancy between the confirmation of many of the hypothesized linkages between cohesion indicators and indicators of external threat i n the aggregate correlations, and the comparative absence of evidence to support those linkages i n the data f o r i n d i v i d u a l countries. The i n f l a t e d nature of the aggregate relationships, the small N's on which the correlations f o r i n d i v i d u a l nations are based, and the fact that only three s p e c i f i c cases i n each a l l i a n c e were singled out f o r i n d i v i d u a l attention, must, of course, be regarded as l i m i t i n g factors on our confidence i n the results reported. With these l i m i t a t i o n s i n mind, the s t a t i s t i c a l results have been interpreted warily, and regarded only as descriptive evidence. S t a t i s t i c a l tests however, while they do provide us with one c r i t e r i o n f o r deciding whether a relationship i s r e a l , cannot be the only c r i t e r i o n . S t a t i s t i c a l significance, as Gold puts i t (1969> P» 46) " i s only the minimal c r i t e r i o n , necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t " f o r establishing the substantive significance of a relationship. Campbell and his associates^ have suggested a number of factors which may threaten the v a l i d i t y of an empirical relationship. The factors most relevant to the present research are i n s t a b i l i t y of the relationship, which i s the threat to v a l i d i t y which i s appropriately countered by s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s ; maturation, that i s , changes occurring as a function of the passage of time; and f a i l u r e to include variables which might better, or more v a l i d l y , explain the dependent variable. 1 Cf. Campbell and Stanley, 1964; Winch and Campbell, 1969; and Webb, Campbell, et. a l . , 1966. The possible effect of maturation on the power base indicators has been mentioned above. I t i s , c l e a r l y , a contaminat-ing factor f o r these indicators. However, t h i s i s a serious d i f f i c u l t y only i n the aggregate correlations. Passage of time i s a contaminating factor i n the power base data f o r the Netherlands, the U.S., Poland, and the Soviet Union, just as i t i s f o r France and Rumania. I t should be safe to assume that maturation has approx-imately the same effect on a l l s i x of these nations; the observed differences between the 'mavericks " and the other a l l i a n c e members examined may, then, s t i l l be regarded as " r e a l " . The c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y measures of external threat are constant f o r each nation within each a l l i a n c e and they fluctuate considerably; there are also fluctuations up and down over time i n the perceptual measures of threat. These four measures do not appear to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y affected by maturation, though we cannot be sure that the fluctuations would be the same i f time were somehow held constant. Alliance cohesion indicators may be affected by maturation; hist o r y suggests that allian c e s die more or less gracefully as they grow old . But t h i s does not imply that passage of time causes allian c e s to whither - other factors intervene. As with the power base indicators, we may say that time has passed f o r a l l members of the a l l i a n c e s , and the comparisons of i n d i v i d u a l members should hold. Other explanatory factors may, of course, intervene between a l l i a n c e cohesion and power base or external threat. Many of these are mentioned i n the l i t e r a t u r e discussed i n the introductory chapter. 9k. Geographical factors, c u l t u r a l homogeneity, and h i s t o r i c a l experience with i s o l a t i o n or collaboration may be s i g n i f i c a n t . Ideology and dependence on the U.S.S.R. have frequently been assessed as having a s i g n i f i c a n t effect on the unity of the Communist bloc or the Warsaw Pact. Idiosyncracies of leaders such as de Gaulle, and obligations to other international co-operative structures or organizations are often mentioned i n connection with the decline i n the cohesion of NATO. Certainly, these and other factors should merit consideration i n future studies, as they have i n the past. The analysis presented here d i f f e r s from previous studies of a l l i a n c e s , even those dealing s p e c i f i c a l l y with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, i n that the data employed, the methods of aggregating those data, and the manipulations performed on the data, are di f f e r e n t . These q u a l i f i c a t i o n s aside, however, some int e r e s t i n g conclusions are suggested by the data. In the aggregate correlations between power base indicators and cohesion indicators, we f i n d i n Table IV that the only consistently high negative correlations are with ticoop commitments to NATO. This might be explained by the fact that national armed forces were f a i r l y small i n the early post-World War I I period. As the size of the armed forces of various countries i n Europe (and the U.S.) increased, the percentage of those forces committed to NATO could be decreased while s t i l l maintaining the same absolute number of armed forces committed to NATO. Comparing country with country i n NATO, the smaller members of the a l l i a n c e , with small armed forces, have some incentive to commit a large proportion of t h e i r forces to the a l l i a n c e , perhaps reasoning that they can receive greater security by maintaining a high commitment to NATO than by relying more heavily on t h e i r own resources f o r defence. The stronger members of the a l l i a n c e , however, can more safely r e l y on t h e i r own large armies f o r defence and, i n the case of the U.S., B r i t a i n , and France, on nuclear weapons. French ac q u i s i t i o n of nuclear weapons may, i n fa c t , be a very potent explanatory factor i n the decline of French commitment to NATO. In the aggregate correlations between power base indicators and cohesion indicators f o r the Warsaw Pact, reported i n Table X, only the correlations of U.N. votes with m i l i t a r y expenditures and population are strongly negative. The general picture remains the same as f o r NATO: no consistent, strong relationship between cohesion and power base f o r the a l l i a n c e as a whole. This i s quite possibly due to the f a i r l y steady allegiance of the smaller members of both a l l i a n c e s ; i t may be that while the power of smaller states has grown since the formation of the a l l i a n c e s , i t has not grown enough for them to f e e l secure i n a less dependent r o l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , however, t h i s pattern might be interpreted as support f o r the contention advanced i n Chapter I I above, that growth i n national power i s a necessary, though not a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r a decline i n commitment to an a l l i a n c e . The smaller nations i n the two a l l i a n c e s , although they have increased t h e i r power, have not increased that power to a l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t to allow them to f e e l secure i n pursuing 96. a more independent p o l i c y . Other nations, notably France and Germany, have done so. A s i m i l a r argument can be advanced i n terms of status inconsistency: while the power of the smaller a l l i a n c e members has increased, i t has not increased t o the extent that they perceive t h e i r ascribed status within the a l l i a n c e t o be inconsistent with t h e i r a c t u a l power. For the l a r g e r members of the a l l i a n c e s , however, the status a§cribed to them within t h e i r blocs has not kept pace with the growth of t h e i r power. The aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s between external threat i n d i c a t o r s and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s f o r NATO are mainly strong and i n the expected d i r e c t i o n , with the exception of the c o r r e l a t i o n s with the a n a l y s i s of events, as can be seen i n Table I I I . However, only one of the four aggregate c o r r e l a t i o n s between c o n f l i c t i n t e n s i t y and cohesion i n d i c a t o r s f o r the Warsaw Pact, i n Table X, i s both strong and i n the expected d i r e c t i o n . For NATO, t h i s might be regarded as evidence i n support of the general proposition that a l l i a n c e cohesion declines as external threat diminishes. For the Warsaw Pact, i t may be that the dogmatic view of the i m p e r i a l i s t menace overrides any a c t u a l diminution of threat emanating from the West; or that the myth i f not the r e a l i t y of external c o n f l i c t must be kept up i n order t o maintain i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y and s o l i d a r i t y ; or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , that the Warsaw Pact functions not only as an a l l i a n c e but a l s o , and perhaps even more so, as an i n t e r n a l r e g u l a t i n g mechanism f o r the body of Communist states i n Europe. The l a t t e r explanation i s of f e r e d some support by the course of events i n Czechoslovakia i n I968. The findings from the a n a l y s i s of i n d i v i d u a l countries suggest that a p o t e n t i a l l y f r u i t f u l l l i n e of i n q u i r y might be to devote more a t t e n t i o n t o nonconforming a l l i a n c e members as, f o r example, Ole R. H o l s t i and John S u l l i v a n (1969) have done. While the hypothesized r e l a t i o n s h i p s between power base and a l l i a n c e cohesion i n d i c a t o r s are confirmed f o r the deviant a l l i a n c e members, they are not confirmed by the data on conforming a l l i a n c e members. Once again, these data suggest that a growth i n nati o n a l power, though to what l e v e l must remain unspecified, may be a necessary condition f o r a decline i n commitment to an a l l i a n c e , but i s not a s u f f i c i e n t condition since increases i n n a t i o n a l power were a l s o recorded i n t h i s period by the nations who maintained t h e i r conformity with the a l l i a n c e . I f growth i n power i s not a s u f f i c i e n t condition f o r d e c l i n i n g commitment to the a l l i a n c e s , then we might speculate on some other factors which may have combined with the increase i n power to produce the decreased commitment of France and Rumania t o t h e i r respective a l l i a n c e s . The data do not i n d i c a t e a strong r e l a t i o n s h i p between the measures of external threat and the measures of cohesion f o r the i n d i v i d u a l countries; t h i s f a c t o r may explain part of the variance i n a l l i a n c e cohesion, but, at l e a s t i n the cases discussed here, not the major part. I t was suggested i n Chapter I I that the d i s t i n c t i o n between p l u r a l i s t i c and a u t h o r i t a r i a n systems might help t o explain differences i n l e v e l s of commitment to an a l l i a n c e . In NATO, France has u s u a l l y been regarded as more a u t h o r i t a r i a n than 98. either the Netherlands or the U.S. and i t was France whose commitment to the alliance declined most as her power increased. In the Warsaw Pact, however, Rumania has shown less evidence of authoritarian policies than Poland or the U.S.S.R., though a l l three nations could be more aptly described as authoritarian than as p l u r a l i s t i c . It appears, then, that the distinction between p l u r a l i s t i c and authoritarian pol i t i c s may be more germane to an analysis of an alliance with a p l u r a l i s t i c structure, such as NATO, than of a more monolithic alliance such as the Warsaw Pact. In NATO, the fact that France i s less p l u r a l i s t i c than other members of the alliance allows greater scope for the influence of the idiosyncracies of the head of govern-ment, and greater scope for response to changed conditions. In the Warsaw Pact, i t could be the case that growing pluralism in Rumania was necessary in order for the government to have greater freedom of action in foreign policy. It could be f r u i t f u l , i n future analyses, to consider a reformulated version of the pluralist-authoritarian argument discussed here: deviation from the ideological and structural norms of the system affords members of the system greater freedom of action in foreign relations. 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Leiserson, eds., The Study of Coali t i o n Behavior: Theoretical  Perspectives and Cases from Four Continents, New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1970, pp. 351-368. 114 APPENDIX A NOTE ON DATA SOURCES The data employed i n the ana l y s i s were drawn from a number of disparate sources. The troop commitment i n d i c a t o r of cohesion f o r NATO i s based on data a v a i l a b l e i n The M i l i t a r y Balance, London, I n s t i t u t e of Strategic Studies, f o r the years 1962-3, 1964-5, I966-7, I968-9, and 1969-7O. The U.N. voting indices of agreement were compiled by A v r i l Campbell from the raw data which were obtained from The Uni v e r s i t y of Michigan. I am indebted t o her both f o r her generosity i n making these data a v a i l a b l e and f o r saving me the considerable time and e f f o r t involved i n computing the indices of agreement. The data created from an analysis of the New York Times Index are my own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The data on external threa t are taken from the studies by Walter H. Corson and P h i l i p T. Hopmann l i s t e d i n the Bibliography. The data on GNP per capita growth rate and crude s t e e l production are taken from The United Nations S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook, and the figures on population are from The United Nations Demographic  Yearbook. William Moul k i n d l y supplied the data on GNP per cap i t a , which w i l l be published i n Charles L. Taylor, e t . a l . , World Handbook  of P o l i t i c a l and S o c i a l Indicators, second e d i t i o n , forthcoming from Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press. F i n a l l y , the data on m i l i t a r y expenditures are taken from the excellent compilation i n the Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968-69, published i n 1970 by The Humanities Press f o r the Stockholm International Peace Research I n s t i t u t e . APPENDIX B PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL ARMED FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO BY MEMBER COUNTRIES Belgium Canada Denmark France Germany Greece Iceland I t a l y Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Turkey U.K. U.S. 1962 100.0 O69A 100.0 029.8 093. T O 9 8 . 6 088 .5 100.0 100.0 100.0 093.4 099-5 038.9 018.1 1964 100.0 066.2 100.0 039.5 092.9 070.6 084.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 034.0 078.9 036.1 014.3 1966 096.2 061.1 100.0 093.6 066.7 088.9 050.0 100.0 100.0 014.7 079.5 032.5 1968 098.5 045.4 100.0 095.6 094.5 075.4 050.0 100.0 100.0 012.8 079-8 027.3 1969 098.5 045.3 100.0 092.5 094.5 076.2 050.0 098.5 100.0 012.6 079-9 023.2 Source: The M i l i t a r y Balance, London, Ins t i t u t e of Strategic Studies APPENDIX C 116. ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK TIMES INDEX PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS NATO 1?52 1954 1956 1958 i960 1962 1964 1966 1968 Belgium 050.0 073.3 066.7 025.0 042.9 061.5 075.0 Canada 050.0 083.3 090.9 100.0 060.0 080.0 075.0 053.8 Denmark 100.0 075.0 075.0 080.0 080.0 100.0 France 032.1 056.0 068.1 052.9 036.7 033.3 014.8 010.6 029.4 Germany 065.1 065.2 072.0 080.0 073.5 063.6 080.0 Greece 066.7 060.0 080.0 016.7 066.7 075-0 080.0 Iceland 050.0 050.0 100.0 I t a l y o4o.o 094.1 100.0 094.1 077.8 091.8 066.7 Luxembourg 071.4 Netherlands 066.7 069.2 033.3 071.4 100.0 085.7 100.0 Norway 100.0 057.2 080.0 033.3 071.4 100.0 100.0 Portugal 075.0 060.0 Turkey 075.0 062.5 025.0 050.0 075.0 075.0 U.K. 066.7 076.9 071.4 057.9 053.1 062.5 054.5 060.7 084.6 U.S. 067.5 079.5 082.1 073.3 046.2 072.9 074.4 062.0 061.0 117. APPENDIX C PERCENTAGE POSITIVE OF ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS WARSAW PACT 1956 1958 i960 1962 1964 1966 1968 io POS. # Pos. lo POS. io Pos. io Pos. io Pos. i> Pos Albania 050.0 033.3 012.5 025.0 Bulgaria 062.5 100.0 o4o.o 083.3 100.0 033.3 077.8 Czechoslovakia 072.7 066.7 100.0 100.0 060.0 100.0 033.3 E. Germany 092.2 066.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 069.2 Hungary 015.0 080.0 060.0 075.0 085.9 066.7 060.0 Poland 015.8 080.0 066.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 075-0 Rumania 072.7 066.7 100.0 015.8 015.4 020.0 U.S.S.R. 053.1 100.0 087.5 052.0 081.8 088.9 044.8 APPENDIX D VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT WARSAW PACT Session Poland Hungary Czechosl. Albania Bulgaria Rumania U.S.S.R 3 97-9 98.20 98-7 4 100 100 100 5 100 100 100 6 99.0 98.0 99.0 7 99-0 99-5 99.5 8 100 I 100 100 9 100 100 100 10 100 100 100 100 l l 97-57 96.82 98.58 98.63 98.63 98.17 98.63 12 99-77 99-77 98.60 99-77 99.77 99-77 99.77 13 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 l 4 99-10 99.85 99.85 99.85 99.85 99.85 99.85 15 99.42 99.42 99.50 99.08 99.25 99.42 99.25 16 99-88 99.88 99.88 99-30 99-88 99.88 99.88 17 99-63 99.63 99-73 99.60 99.60 99.63 99.63 18 98.43 98.43 98.43 92.30 98.43 97-30 98.43 19 91.67 91.67 91.67 91-67 91.67 50.0 91.67 20 98.57 98.57 98.57 93-45 98.57 97-60 98.57 21 99-83 99.83 99.83 100.0 99.83 99.17 99.83 22 96.97 97.83 97.38 91.67 97-38 95-07 97.38 119. APPENDIX D VOTING IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY INDICES OF AGREEMENT NATO Sessions U.S.A. Can. U.K. Neth. Belg. Lux. France Port. I t a l y Gre. Nor. Den. Ice. Turkey 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 86.60 82.28 80.41 81.34 87.90 82.82 70.89 78.18 86.87 85.05 83.44 79-37 86.54 90.06 90.40 83.05 92.31 82.07 86.06 81.45 88.20 79.56 82.93 86.34 88.93 74.38 78.96 85.41 88.85 87.82 83.17 75.03 83.33 88.16 88.43 75.89 92.31 87.36 86.86 83.85 89.01 77.73 78.73 78.85 85.82 73.93 76.75 71.15 88.25 88.43 79.28 76.86 84.72 88.12 89.51 80.59 92.31 83.65 83.45 79.92 88.20 78.37 82.52 95.15 89.47 74.35 79.13 80.88 86.98 88.89 84.15 80.52 86.05 90.24 91.08 89.55 92.31 87.92 88.05 83.55 85.93 73.21 76.92 78.85 82.33 68.45 77.29 78.14 88.93 87.53 78.36 76.74 80.21 86.23 83.23 89.05 92.31 85.99 86.63 85.OI 89.02 74.34 78.51 86.64 87.09 71.13 79.55 85.97 87.56 88.91 82.53 77.82 85.68 90.35 91.15 75.89 92.31 87.55 87.82 85.25 77.70 72.08 80.24 85.61 87.03 77.39 78.28 80.02 83.03 86.85 78.01 71.47 80.02 78.86 77.33 74.75 53.85 72.25 75.89 72.30 87.02 83.30 74.58 75.37 75.76 77.85 78.40 59.08 53.85 71.89 59.07 64.29 88.36 89.79 83.41 79.83 85.15 88.23 90.25 81.71 92.31 87.45 86.62 82.47 85.95 72.34 76.83 75.94 81.52 65.08 52.64 66.18 75.30 64.85 72.07 76.-59 82.25 87.46 85.04 81.46 92.31 71.16 81.32 70.86 86.86 81*54 80.75 80.26 87.04 66.32 72.36 71.40 81.81 73-41 66.40 70.88 73.85 83.44 85.83 83.87 92.31 85.45 84.38 79.25 87.27 76.15 82.45 82.92 87.70 67.05 74.49 71.40 84.97 73.36 66.40 69.24 73.85 84.35 86.10 82.75 92.31 84.11 82.10 79.89 89.14 81.92 80.68 84.20 87.34 60.42 65.03 75.34 89.72 85.45 77.57 69.49 82.80 84.41 87.97 85.80 92.31 87.13 86.42 86.73 83.34 78.31 78.79 82.92 83.85 70.30 79.68 82.39 87.67 85.82 82.92 77.94 82.08 85.91 90.60 90.38 92.31 74.20 75.93 63.OO 120. APPENDIX E TRANSFORMED MEASURES OF TOTAL CONFLICT INTENSITY AND VERBAL CONFLICT INTENSITY Tot a l C o n f l i c t Verbal C o n f l i c t T o t a l C o n f l i c t Verbal C o n f l i c t I ntensity by Int e n s i t y by Intensity by Int e n s i t y by East East West West 1948 1767 292 1942 237 1949 683 100 1283 43 1950 367 75 1150 53 1951 467 30 1817 30 1952 450 50 1908 15 1953 383 35 1092 47 1954 283 70 683 110 1955 517 65 817 107 1956 500 125 453 75 1957 400 292 608 108 1958 450 150 583 100 1959 258 110 250 112 i960 700 275 680 147 1961 783 142 717 200 1962 1100 113 967 175 1963 300 90 275 52 1964 117 23 233 42 1965 450 80 1617 08 121. APPENDIX F PERCEPTIONS OF OPPOSING BLOC AND OF OPPOSING BLOG LEADER BY NATO AND WARSAW PACT MEMBERS NATO MEMBERS Perceptions of the Communist System Perceptions of the Soviet Union 1950 1955 1963 1965 1950 1955 1963 1965 68(65) 33 (58) 60(20) 68 (38) 100 (2) 48(31) 22 (76) 29 (7) 42(87) 100 (13) 0 (17) 56 (9) 100 (3) 50 (6) 100 (6) 45(20) 39 (14) United States 4 (85) 63(76) 28 (72) 7(242) Great B r i t a i n 18 (17) 60 (20) 17 (41) 16 (32) France 16 (32) 53 (34) 32(116) 38 (13) Canada 0 (28) 34(161) 100 (13) 17 (58) Norway 6 (35) 56 (9) 45 (11) 14 (14) Denmark 0 (3) 60 (10) 100 (6) 47 (16) West Germany 24 (99) 45 (20) 25 (8) 30 (60) WARSAW PACT MEMBERS Perceptions of the West Perceptions of the United States Soviet Union Albania East Germany Poland Hungary Rumania Bulgaria Czechoslovakia 1950 1955 1963 1965 1950 1955 1963 17 (59) 13 (55) 13(105) 23 (94) 9 (91) 16(306) 14 (56) 22 (98) 47 (19) 34 (41) 42 (60) 63 (86) 55 (33) 32 (31) 58 (24) 44 (34) 48 (83) 16(231) 55 (93) 52 (21) 9 (33) 57 (58 35 (17) 41 (66) 9(115) 4(145) 13(218) 10(179) 25 (92) 12(217) 11(109) 5(104) 17 (59) 13 (55) 8(105) 23 (94) 6 (88) 17(219) 61 (49) 26 (54) 56 (9) 12(17) 42(50) 63(86) 55(11) 30(30) 56(16) 42(33) 43 (44) 11(217) 32 (34) 27 (11) 6 (16) 20 (10) 21 (14) 28 (18) 1965 9(115) 4(145) 6(182) 10(179) 25 (92) 12(215) 22 (51) 5(104) Source: Hopmann (1969), pp. 126-127, 164-165. The number given i s the percentage of perceptions which are po s i t i v e ; the numbers of perceptions are given i n parentheses. 

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