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Development, and the effects upon bargaining, of trust and suspicion Kee, Herbert William 1969

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THE  DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EFFECTS  UPON BARGAINING, OF TRUST AND  SUSPICION  by H e r b e r t W i l l i a m Kee  THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  Doctor  in  of Philosophy  t h e Department of  Psychology  We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r m i n g . t o the required standard  THE  UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H J a n u a r y , 1969  COLUMBIA  In p r e s e n t i n g an  this  thesis  in partial  f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r  advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h  the  Library  I further for  shall  make i t f r e e l y  agree that  permission  available  Columbia,  I agree  that  f o r r e f e r e n c e and S t u d y .  f o rextensive  copying of this  thesis  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d b y t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r  by  h i s representatives.  of  this  written  thesis  It i s understood  for financial  gain  shall  that  copying or p u b l i c a t i o n  n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t  permission.  Herbert ¥. Kee.  Department o f  Psychology  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  Date  March 17.  1969  Columbia  my  ABSTRACT This  s t u d y was c o n c e r n e d w i t h  (i)experiential factors  w h i c h a f f e c t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and (ii)  t h e e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g  negotiations. orthogonal group. final  E s s e n t i a l l y / the experiment c o n s i s t e d  2 x 2 x 3  Altogether,  factorial  design  approach  that  the  e m p h a s i s was p l a c e d  could  suspicion.  t o allow  and  i n previous  (on t h e b a s i s  from m a n i f e s t  sequentially-played  i n s o f a r as i t was p o s s i b l e  (1)  M o r e o v e r , t h e game  m a t r i x t h a t was m e a n i n g f u l t o t h e  of their  f o r the subjects  own money a p p a r e n t l y  subjects.  t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  a function o f previous previous  to  as a r e s u l t  t h e u n t r u s t w o r t h y b e h a v i o r o f one o f t h e o t h e r With r e s p e c t  as  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  game.  subjects  of  of  o f responses r e l a t e d t o a  a payoff  losses  of the observation  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ,  involved  incur real  attempts t o  i n f e r e n c e s , a b o u t t r u s t and •  F o r example, s u b j e c t i v e  were m e a s u r e d o n t h e b a s i s  one-trial  an  To t h i s ' e n d , t h e e x p e r i m e n t  responses) v a l i d  were d i s t i n g u i s h e d  upon d e v e l o p i n g  overcome some o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n .  subjects'  control  •-  problems t h a t have been i n h e r e n t  was d e s i g n e d  o f an  112 m a l e u n d e r g r a d u a t e s c o m p r i s e d t h e  sample. Particular  study  with.one  and,  experience,  trustworthiness  i t was  engendered  found-that:  t r u s t whereas  previous was  untrustworthiness  e s t a b l i s h e d more e a s i l y  previously greater  the i n c e n t i v e  temptation  to betray  to betray.  a related finding that  suspicion;  (2) s u s p i c i o n  t h a n t r u s t ; h o w e v e r , (3) where  e s p e c i a l l y i f the other  lucrative was  generated  had been h i g h ,  person  t r u s t was  (0) h a d r e s i s t e d t h e  •. Of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t  the tendency  to manifest  trust or  s u s p i c i o n was c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e u n d e r l y i n g  (subjective)  state  relationship  in  of t r u s t or suspicion.  The n a t u r e o f t h i s  terms o f c e r t a i n t y and u n c e r t a i n t y  was, h o w e v e r , more  c l e a r - c u t . f o r t h o s e who m a n i f e s t e d s u s p i c i o n - t h a n who m a n i f e s t e d  trust.  While  would be u n t r u s t w o r t h y ,  t h e "former were c e r t a i n t h a t  the l a t t e r  0 e v e n t h o u g h t h e y were u n c e r t a i n trustworthy In  i n a number  of bargaining,  the  f o rthis  of respects.  With regard  the t r u s t group r e q u i r e d  f i n d i n g were e v i d e n t .  s u s p i c i o n g r o u p made i n i t i a l  extreme than t h e i n i t i a l trust- group.  less  utilities.  time  Several  subjects i n  o f f e r s made b y t h e s u b j e c t s  Secondly, subjects  each o t h e r ' s  to the  group.  First,  and  o f f e r s t h a t were more  i n the suspicion  a p p e a r e d t o be more c o n c e r n e d w i t h ing  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  i n influencing bargaining  t o r e a c h a g r e e m e n t s t h a n d i d the. s u s p i c i o n reasons  t r u s t toward  as t o w h e t h e r 0 w o u l d be.  o f the study, both  were f o u n d t o be i m p o r t a n t  duration  manifested  0  or not.  the second p a r t  negotiations  f o r those  the o b j e c t i v e  i n the  group of modify-  T h i s was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e  finding  that  t h e communications  (compared w i t h by  lies,  sincere in  attempts  t o exchange i n f o r m a t i o n ;  that  d i d the subjects  t o the nature  and s u s p i c i o n  (regardless  appeared  i n the  t o h a v e no o v e r a l l e f f e c t upon  were made a t e q u a l i t y o r e q u i t y . . .  about t h i s  t h a t was o b t a i n e d  i n a context  easily  operating).  o f s u s p i c i o n was  o f t i m e , vrhereas t h e  t h a t was a g r e e d upon i n t h e c o n t e x t  relatively  o f t r u s t was  a c h i e v e d . • I t was t h e r e f o r e  concluded  e v e n i f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s o l u t i o n were n o t a f f e c t e d  suspicion, bargaining  would be p r e f e r a b l e suspicion;  u n d e r a c e r t a i n amount o f t r u s t  to bargaining  under a h i g h  f o r under extreme s u s p i c i o n ,  b e h a v i o r becomes e a s i l y consuming c o n f l i c t .  disrupted  5  r e s u l t was t h a t t h e  hard-earned over a prolonged p e r i o d equality  There  at equality  o f w h e t h e r t r u s t o r s u s p i c i o n was  interesting feature  equality  by  and •  (location) of the s o l u t i o n ,  however, a p r e v a l e n c e o f s e t t l e m e n t s  that  subjects  g r o u p made more c h e c k s on e a c h o t h e r  whether s e t t l e m e n t s  The  also,  group. In r e l a t i o n  was,  more  t h r e a t s , and ultimatums,, and l e s s b y . g e n u i n e and  made more r e f u s a l s t o b a r g a i n  trust  group  t h e t r u s t g r o u p ) were c h a r a c t e r i z e d  the suspicion  trust  of the suspicion  task-oriented  and reduced *  degree o f  to time-  ,  TABLE OF CONTENTS  1. - I n t r o d u c t i o n  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  CHAPTER ONE: A.  Defining and  B.  3.  Trust'  Suspicion  . .  The M e t h o d T r a d i t i o n a l l y  CHAPTER TWO: A.  3  and C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  Study T r u s t  Employed  and S u s p i c i o n  . . . . . . .  METHODOLOGICAL, CONSIDERATIONS  V a l i d i t y of Inferences  C.  Defining  15  . . .  15  . . . . . . . . . .  17  and  a n d M e a s u r i n g T r u s t and  Suspicion CHAPTER THREE:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  THE DEVELOPMENT  SUSPICION A.  O's T r u s t w o r t h i n e s s -  B.  Magnitude  C.  Number o f E x p o s u r e s  D.  Hypotheses  CHAPTER FOUR: A.  initial  to Betray  Pertaining to the and S u s p i c i o n  Concepts: bargaining  equity  26 30  . . .  35  Development  . . . . . . . . .  38  .40.  minimum range,  offer  Outcome-Related  24  . . . .  BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS  Process-Related  and  -  . . . . . . . . . .  of Incentive  disposition,  B.  OF TRUST AND  21  . . . .... . .  of T r u s t 5.  10  . '.  Meaningfulness of Incentives  B.  3  to  Payoffs  4.  Page 1  . .'" 41 Concepts:  equality - . ". .  .45  ii  Page C.  H y p o t h e s e s and P o s s i b l e Outcomes Pertaining and  to the E f f e c t s of Trust  Suspicion  Negotiations 6.  CHAPTER F I V E : A.  Subjects  Upon B a r g a i n i n g  and  . . . ... . . . . . . . .  49  METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54  and D e s i g n  55  Special  .  . .  considerations  and t h e  Recruitment of the Subjects B.  . . . .  Procedure STAGE I : The  INDUCTION  . . .  57  . . . .. . . . . -V .  58  game, as p r e s e n t e d  to the  subjects  . . .  Rationale The  Preliminary  63  .  64  . . . .  64  . . . . . . .  i n s t r u c t i o n s and t h e  . . . . . . . . . .  .'"66  Subjective  probability:  the task  Summary STAGE I I I : TIONS  61  .  Rationale  and  .60  . ^ -  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  STAGE I I : MEASUREMENT  PDG t a s k  59  ..  Manipulations  Summary  55  BARGAINING  AND  instructions . . . . .  67  . . . .  68  .  NEGOTIA70  Ill  Page Initial payoff  instructions schedule  and t h e  . . . . . .  . . . .  Communication Time  and s t r i k e s  .•. . . . .  • . •  73  . . . .  75  Checking  76  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l Summary o u t l i n e  . . . .  . . .  7.  CHAPTER A.  SUMMARY  SIX:  77  . . . ... . . . . . . .  RESULTS  The D e v e l o p m e n t  Effects  Experience  81  . '.  .82  o f T r u s t a n d S u s p i c i o n Upon t h e and  tions  Negotia: .  Nature of the f i n a l equality Time Effects  . . .  78  o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n as  Outcomes o f B a r g a i n i n g  C.  . . . .  . . . . . ., . . . .  a Function of Previous B.  77  of stage I I I  procedure CHAPTER  72  vs e q u i t y  94  settlement: . . . . . . . .  to solution  .  . . . .  94 96  o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon t h e  Process  of Bargaining  and  Negotia-  tions Extremity Actual  of the i n i t i a l  initial  range  Changes  97  .  97  offer  . . . . . . . . .  Communication Checks  . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . i n the b a r g a i n i n g range  99 .  99  . . . 102 . 104  iv Page Interpersonal  evaluation:  the  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l . . . . . . . D. 8.  Summary  105  CHAPTER SEVEN: A.  Factors  DISCUSSION  Affecting  Trust B.  Effects  . ... . . . .  of Trust  CHAPTER EIGHT:  .  .108  the Development o f  and S u s p i c i o n  Bargaining 9.  . 104  . . . . . . . . . .  and S u s p i c i o n  Upon 1 . . . . . 116  and N e g o t i a t i o n s  SUMMARY AND  108  CONCLUSIONS  . . 129  10.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  .  11.  APPENDICES  . . '. . . . . . . . . 139  APPENDIX A: SHEET APPENDIX B:  EXAMPLE  OF THE PDG  PROCEDURE AND  OF  . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . 142  STANDARD FORMS USED DURING  BARGAINING SEMANTIC  APPENDIX F :  ANOVA TABLES . . .  Subjective of Trust  •  . . . . . . .  APPENDIX E :  1.  .140  BARGAINING  PROBLEMS APPENDIX D:  . 139  RULES OF  . . . . . . .  EXAMPLES  . . . . 135  RESPONSE  . . . . . . . . . . .  BARGAINING APPENDIX C:  . . . .  .  DIFFERENTIAL  Probability  . .  . . . . . . . .  144 .147 148  Measures  and S u s p i c i o n  . . . . . 148  2.  N a t u r e o f t h e F i n a l S e t t l e m e n t " . . 149  3.  Time t o S o l u t i o n  . . . .' . . . . . . 149  v Page 4.  Absolute  5.  Relative Extremity  6.  Mid-Points Ranges  Extremity  . . . . . . . .  of Actual  . . .  150  . . . .  150  Initial  . . .  Initial  .151  7.  Actual  Range  . . .  8.  Amount o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n  . . • • 151  (Total  Number o f M e s s a g e s D i v i d e d Time t o S o l u t i o n )  by  . . . . . . . .  9(a).  Information  Messages  (Rate)  9(b).  Information  Messages  (Pro-  . . 152  portion)  . 153  10(a).  M o d i f i c a t i o n Messages  (Rate)  10(b).  M o d i f i c a t i o n Messages  (Pro-  . . 153  portion)  * 154  11(a).  Lies  (Rate)  11(b) .  Lies  (Proportion)  12(a).  Time-Bonus  Messages  (Rate)  12(b).  Time-Bonus  Messages  (Pro-  portion)  152  .  154  . . . . .  '.- . 155 . "'. . 155;  .  . 156  13.  Checks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14.  Changes  i n the B a r g a i n i n g  15.  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l  Range  156  . . 157  . .. . . . . . 157  vi  L I S T OF TABLES Page I.  1 . ' Programs  u s e d by K o m o r i t a and M e c h l i n g  (1967)  II.  2.  .  "Reformed Harford  III.  3.  Degrees o f t r u s t ,  5.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  (1967)  suspicion,  generated under of previous  .  .  .  .  .  0 i n t h e PDG  Nature of the f i n a l  . . . . . .  36  .  37  o r unvarious  experience  F r e q u e n c i e s o f s u b j e c t s who trust  V.  .  and Solomon  conditions 4.  .  s i n n e r " p r o g r a m u s e d by  certainty  IV.  .  . . .  87  . . . . . . .  90  chose t o  settlement  as a  f u n c t i o n o f O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and the  number o f e x p o s u r e s  . . . . . . ... . ' 9 5  VI.  6.  Summary  VII.  7.  C o n t r o l and t r e a t m e n t means ing  o f a n a l y s e s o f communications  t o s i g n i f i c a n t main  found i n the analyses communications V I I I .  101  correspond-  effects  of the  . . . . . . .  8 ( a ) . Means o f t h e S e m a n t i c  .-. .  ''.].  .  . . .  103  Differential  e v a l u a t i o n s made by t h e c o n t r o l and treatment groups 8(b).  Means c o m p r i s i n g A  IX.  9.  x B interaction  Summary  of results  analyses  . . . . . .  . . . . .  105.  the s i g n i f i c a n t . . .  105  from the p r i n c i p a l . . . . . . . .  106  vii  Page X.  KK  Degrees  of t r u s t ,  uncertainty various  s u s p i c i o n , or  generated  conditions  experience  .  of  under previous 110  VX11  L I S T OF FIGURES Page 1.  Basic  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t r u s t and  suspicion 2.  Payoff  . . . . . . . . . . . .  matrix  of a t y p i c a l  Dilemma Game 3.  Matrices  4.  A general  Prisoner's  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  e m p l o y e d by. S w i n t h matrix  (19 67)  Representation  comprised o f four  (adapted 6.  of a bargaining  parameters  bargaining  of equity problem  Sawyer, 1967) 7.  Matrix  (from  9.  . . . . . . .  • • • . . . . . . . .  schedules  11.  Subjective  trust  .  62  . . . . .  64  suspicion  . . . . . . . . :. . '.  r e c e i v e d by t h e s u b j e c t s  .. ." 69  . . .  .  71  . . . .- .  89  and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n  of  t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s  or  an u n t r u s t w o r t h y  to a  trustworthy  0 . . . . .. . . . .  Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s trusted  . . . . . . . . .  t o measure s u b j e c t i v e  and s u s p i c i o n  Payoff  47  game i n  s e q u e n t i a l - p l a y game  Response s c a l e used  10.  last  t o measure t r u s t . a n d  a one-trial,  trust  12.  used  43  Morgan a n d  representation of the Induction  PDG m a t r i x in  situation  and e q u a l i t y i n a  w h i c h number 4 c h o o s e s 8.  ..v. . . . . . 31  f r o m I k l e a n d L e i t e s , 1962) . . . . . .  Illustration  11 28  W, X, Y, a n d Z. . . . . . . . . . 5.  8  o f s u b j e c t s who'  or d i d not trust  0  . . . . . .  . . .  .92  ix  Page 13.  Comparison subjects  14.  of frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s of who  trusted  Graphic representation t o r e a c h agreement  15.  Nature of the f i n a l of  16.  or d i d not t r u s t 0  . ...  . . . . . . . . . .  s e t t l e m e n t as a  over  .  119  . . . .  122  function  . . '. . . .  d i s t r i b u t i o n o f dyads  range of s o l u t i o n s  .93  of the times -required  t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s  Frequency  .  the 123  X  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  It my  i s d i f f i c u l t to express  a p p r e c i a t i o n and  ment p r o v i d e d of  this  by  gratitude  Dr.  f o r the  He  was  I encountered  humor, I w i l l The  extent  of  and  encourageduration  never r e l u c t a n t to share and  his  c r i t i c i s m s were a l w a y s i n v a l u a b l e . thoughtfulness,.and  help  the  R o b e r t Knox t h r o u g h o u t t h e  undertaking.  problems t h a t  adequately  the  i n s i g h t s , advice,  and  For  his  h i s guidance,  f o r h i s uncommon p a t i e n c e  and  good  a l w a y s be g r a t e f u l .  h e l p f u l comments, s u g g e s t i o n s ,  Dr.  Ole  Holsti,  Dr.  Dr.  Tom  S t o r m , and  R o r y O'Day, D r . Dr.  Rod  and  criticisms  Demetrios  Wong a r e  also  of  Papageorgis,  gratefully  acknowledged. In a d d i t i o n , I would Fraternity ternities  Council  I would  president  of  president  for their  subject pool recruitment  o f U.B.C. and  the  like  the  I . F . C . and  a v a i l a b l e , but of  the  and  remarkably calm i n the typing  only  fra-  past-  current  also, i n f a c i l i t a t i n g  the the  "  Suzanne L e h r was  the  Inter  In  the  i n making  t h a n k s i s a l s o due  my  and  Vivian.  French,  subjects.  s m a l l measure of wife  not  the  cooperation.  John Simson, the  assistance  1967-1968  members o f  t o thank Rick  and  editing  to thank the  that participated for their  particular,  No  like  t o Suzanne  accurate,  competent,  e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t j o b of'-'-  final  c o p y , and  my  wife  Lehr  Vivian  patiently  persevered  handwritten I am at  trying  task of t r a n s l a t i n g  l e g i b l e , typed  i n d e b t e d to the I n s t i t u t e  the U n i v e r s i t y  assistance and  copy i n t o  i n the  of B r i t i s h  copy. .  the  for providing financial conduct  of the r e s e a r c h  t o t h e Canada C o u n c i l f o r t h e award o f a p r e d o c t o r a l  fellowship  d u r i n g the w r i t i n g  of the d i s s e r t a t i o n .  r e s e a r c h would n o t have been p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t of  ' - /•  of I n d u s t r i a l .Relations  Columbia  d u r i n g t h e d e s i g n and  my  support.  these  The sources  1 THE  DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EFFECTS  UPON BARGAINING, OF TRUST AND  Trust  and s u s p i c i o n ,  many s o c i a l  SUSPICION  because they appear t o u n d e r l i e  i n t e r a c t i o n s , o c c u p y a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n many  efforts  to explain  or describe  various  ships.  Knowledge a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e s e  r e m a i n s , however, a t a s p e c u l a t i v e primitive  l e v e l because o f a lack  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l development. variables  been i n a d e q u a t e l y  have o f t e n  been i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y  and  suspicion.  (i)  t o attempt  difficulties obtain  the experimental  It will  h a v e some  involve  relevant  o r even  techniques  applied.  devoted t o a systematic  . • .  o f t h e o r e t i c a l and  investigated  but also  concepts'  and r e l a t i v e l y  Not only  neglected,  therefore  human r e l a t i o n -  This  completely employed  paper i s  examination of t r u s t two r e l a t e d  objectives:  t o overcome some_of t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  i n studying  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ,  some t h e o r e t i c a l l y - i m p o r t a n t  and ( i i ) to '  empirical  evidence  a b o u t b o t h t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h e e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and : suspicion. This chapters.  "•' dissertation will I n the f i r s t  four  / be o r g a n i z e d chapters,  into  eight  the conceptual  framework f o r t h e h y p o t h e s e s a n d t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l for  the experiment t o t e s t these hypotheses w i l l  presented. Six,  Then, i n t h e n e x t t h r e e  chapters  and Seven), t h e e x p e r i m e n t i t s e l f  will  basis,  be  (Chapters be  reported  Five  and  discussed.  conclusions of  Finally,  i n Chapter E i g h t ,  of  the  study  will  a resume o f  the  results.  be  outlined  the  major  i n the  context  CHAPTER ONE:  A.  Defining  are  scarce.  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . often  used  defensiveness,  suspicion  considers  Cooperation,  synonymously w i t h  changeably with  particular  suspicion.  are rather  studies.  faith,  t r u s t , while  inter-tribal  i s understandable  —  notions  i f one t r u s t and  o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  to the i n t e r p e r s o n a l ,  However, t h e p r e c i s e  baby-sitter  and  seem t o  primitive  inter-national  connotations  a r e employed  —  from the  and f r o m  r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o contemporary  instances  next.  competition,  however v a g u e o r u n s p e c i f i e d  terms t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  various  confidence,  Existing definitions of trust  i n t o a gamut o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s r a n g i n g  intra-personal  priest  synonymously  - . "'  more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  the  used  some o f t h e p r o b l e m s i n d e f i n i n g  contexts.  a r e , on  l i m i t e d and a l m o s t p e c u l i a r t o  This  Popular notions  the  Suspicion:  a r e sometimes u s e d i n t e r -  suspicion.  enter  and  On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a  v a r i e t y o f terms i s f r e q u e n t l y  resistance,  and  Trust  d e f i n i t i o n s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  one. h a n d , c o n s p i c u o u s l y  with  INTRODUCTION  and C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  Explicit  diverse  GENERAL  implied  when  i n these  a r e n o t i d e n t i c a l f r o m one i n s t a n c e  to  F o r example, a mother i s s a i d t o " t r u s t " t h e j u s t as a p a r i s h i o n e r  during  confession.  i s said t o " t r u s t " the  S i m i l a r l y , t h e Akka pygmies o f  A f r i c a may be s a i d t o " t r u s t " t h e n e i g h b o r i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l  4 tribes  i n their silent  trade  relationships  may u s u a l l y be s a i d t o " t r u s t " t h e U n i t e d political notion  different.  necessary  I f there  i s some t h r e a d  that  applications,  t h e common d i m e n s i o n s o r e l e m e n t s  and s u s p i c i o n  concerns,  i n those d i v e r s e  running  then i t i s  that  characterize  applications.  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , t h e p r o b l e m o f how t r u s t  and  suspicion  one  dimension involved  represent  are conceptualized.  F o r example, i s o n l y  i n w h i c h t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  t h e extremes o f a continuum?  "opposite"  fact  o f communality  adequate d e f i n i t i o n s attempt t o e x t r a c t o r  Another problem i n d e f i n i n g  the  i n their  i n each o f t h e s e examples i s  through t h e range o f such d i v e r s e  trust  States  and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . , Y e t , t h e e x a c t  of trust involved  specify  j u s t as B r i t a i n  And i s d i s t r u s t  o f t r u s t , o r a r e d i s t r u s t and- s u s p i c i o n i n  t h e same? It  i s tempting  t o regard  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  as p o l a r  opposites;  b u t i n terms o f f u n c t i o n ,  the  O r d i n a r i l y , t r u s t i s r e g a r d e d as h a v i n g p o s i t i v e ,  case.  desirable  consequences, w h i l e s u s p i c i o n  having d i s r u p t i v e , dysfunctional trust  —  what D e u t s c h c a l l s  characterized (Deutsch, as  t h i s i s not so e a s i l y  i s depicted  effects.  "pathological  by s u c h t e r m s a s " g u l l i b l e "  1958, p . 278) — m a y  extreme s u s p i c i o n  also  However,  extreme  t r u s t , " and and  "credulous"  be d y s f u n c t i o n a l  ••— a s o r t o f p a r a n o i d  as  state  just  •— may be  5 dysfunctional.  On  the o t h e r hand, Deutsch  acknowledge the p o s s i b i l i t y suspicion but not It  (however t h a t i s d e t e r m i n e d )  distracting  guardedness "—  is- evident that t r u s t  concepts  that a s l i g h t  which probably  and  not  amount o f  —  may  does  a k i n d of  be  alert  facilitative.  s u s p i c i o n are  complex  r e q u i r e a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f  qualification. In order  to f a c i l i t a t e  suspicion,  those  tions  from  o t h e r s as  first  be  features'which involving  identified.  m o s t common c a s e , that are  In the  a trust  to a c e r t a i n  the p a r t i e s  trusting  (P)  or not  to manifest  option with important risk 0.  their  choice not  trustworthy  or  to manifest  the  P and  with  I f . P's  but not  here  t h a t he  refers  trust  0 are  —  choice i s the  toward 0 no  will  further  situation.  It is  cognizant of  to the p o s s i b i l i t y  necessarily w i l l  one  untrustworthy.  t o which P exposes h i m s e l f i n h i s d e c i s i o n ("Risk"  respect  c h o i c e between  leaving. 0 u s u a l l y with  t h a t both  the. parties  i n t u r n , has  r e s p e c t to the p a r t i c u l a r  to note  perhaps  c h o i c e s , and  (0) .  t h e n 0,  situa-  i n v o l v e s two  joint  and  suspicion "will  s i m p l e s t and  the other  t o w a r d 0,  preclude betrayal,  and  it; c o n f r o n t e d w i t h  choice of being e i t h e r However, P's  trust  some  extent interdependent  trusting  trust  of t r u s t  distinguish  situation  t o t h e outcomes d e f i n e d by of  the d e f i n i t i o n  to. t r u s t  that 0  b e t r a y P's  the  c a n —  trust.)  6 T h a t i s , P knows 0 c a n extended h i s  (P's)  betray  him  and  t r u s t even i n the  0 knows t h a t face  of  that  P  has  risk.  •  Therefore,  e v e n where t h e  gible,  situation s t i l l  the  possibility So  other  o f b e t r a y a l by  states.  studies,  This  only  red, the  i n the  means by  defined,  and  which  t r u s t and  interpretations suspicion. presently  Secondly, utilized  i s not  not  the  i s not  these a s s e r t i o n s w i l l  states w i l l process of  the  now  be  the  have  r a r e l y made f o r two  explicit  reasons,  observed choice (PDG)  has  been  s u s p i c i o n have the  choice  bealmost  been'infer-  behavior  s o l e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to but  i s subject  dichotomous c h o i c e  to  in the  other  trust  and  behavior  s e n s i t i v e to t h e o r e t i c a l l y subjective  state.  While both  d e v e l o p e d more e x t e n s i v e l y  n a t u r e and  the  r o l e of  s p e c i f i e d i n "greater  t r u s t and  as  underlying  necessarily involve  d e f i n i n g t r u s t and  Subjective P's  be  that  t r u s t and  i m p o r t a n t v a r i a t i o n s i n the  next chapter,  fact  suspicion,  t h a t do  long  t o the  important  Dilemma Game  PDG  negli-  suspicion  not  measured.. F i r s t ,  simultaneous-play  concepts of  of  t r u s t , as  distinction,  the  Prisoner's  t o be  Q exists.  i s extremely  both of which r e l a t e to  the  involves  to manifest behaviors but  theoretical  havior  i s perceived  f a r , s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t t r u s t and  referred  in  risk  the  of  i n the .  underlying  detail  in  the  suspicion.  suspicion  c e r t a i n t y or u n c e r t a i n t y  can  be  a b o u t O's  defined  i n terms  trustworthiness.  7 Certainty  m i g h t be  probability given  the  that 0 w i l l  t h a t P has  greater  P's  m e a s u r e d , f o r e x a m p l e , by  already  commit h i m s e l f  not  to the  the  greater  act of be  greater  point  or  be the  the  analysis  t r u s t i n g 0;  the  threshold  threshold  threshold or  varies  i f i t varies  incentive.  i . e . , the  possibility  at which s u b j e c t i v e  an  a c t of  —  factors that  way  i n a c o n s i s t e n t way  sort of  i n which  conceptualized that  experience  information  t r u s t and  to the  trust be  more P choose  can  there  (i.e.,  is  the  influence  the  inter-  the  not  level  the  between i n d i v i d u a l s ,  would o b v i o u s l y underlying  suspicion  i n Figure  1.  as be  constructs.  are b a s i c a l l y It is  to  (a)''of F i g u r e  be  grouped  s t r u c t u r a l and  a,  trustworthy)  I t w o u l d be  factors associated  (corresponding  independent v a r i a b l e s categories:  will  P's  to s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s such  i s depicted  in addition  that  f o r example, whether o r  according  This  trust.  i n a c c e s s i b l e w i t h o u t a measure o f The  greater  l i k e l i h o o d that P w i l l  r a i s e s the  to determine the  this  i.e.,  • - - " • . " '  becomes m a n i f e s t as  of  The  l i k e l i h o o d that P  degree to which P i s c e r t a i n t h a t 0 w i l l  esting  untrustworthy,  trustworthy,  untrustworthy,  t o t r u s t 0. This  or  subjective  made a t r u s t i n g c h o i c e .  the  that 0 w i l l  s u s p e c t s 0,  trustworthy  certainty that 0 w i l l  more P t r u s t s Q,  certainty  be  P's  suggested  with 1)  i n t o two  previous  most o f other  situational factors  the  broad  (corresponding  t  Independent  Variables  Hypothetical  Intervening  States  (b) STRUCTURAL a n d SITUATIONAL FACTORS - incentive - power - communication - characteristics of O (d)  (a)  PERCEPTION OF •+ O's MOTIVES, and/or COMPETENCE  PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE-  :  (c)  DISPOSITIONAL FACTORS - motivational orientation - personality factors - attitudes  Figure  1.  (e)  (f)  BEHAVIORAL SUBJECTIVE » • TRUST o r TRUST o r — SUSPICION SUSPICION ( i . e . , subjective probability or c e r t a i n t y about O's t r u s t w o r t h i ness)  B a s i c c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . (The f a c t o r s above p e r t a i n t o P's t r u s t o r s u s p i c i o n v i s - a - v i s O.)  represented  9 to  (b)  of Figure  sponding that  to  (d)  of  influence  o f O's Figure the  Each of may  and  d i s p o s i t i o n a l factors . (corre-  (c) o f F i g u r e  i n a d d i t i o n to  perception to  1)  1).  acting directly  1), previous  the  three  act directly  to  experience  suspicion)  (or  suspicion).  w h i c h may  o r may  "inputs"  observable  "output" of manifest  P's  m e d i a t e d by  independent perception  perception  not  of  O's  be  hypothetical  In  evident  this  implications.  O's how  P  .  n e x t two  chapters,  conceptualization  c e r t a i n important  of  trust  as.trust  such the  suspicion  states. —  and  a b o u t O's i t will  untrustbecome  t r u s t and  methodological  are  first,  m o t i v e s and/or competence  worthiness.  s u s p i c i o n has  of  manifest  t r u s t or  c e r t a i n t y or u n c e r t a i n t y  that  variables  power upon  s e c o n d l y P's  the  can  subjective  e f f e c t s of  i n c e n t i v e and  two  itself  and/or competence, J ? w i l l  E s s e n t i a l l y , the as  P's  (corresponding  T h e n , d e p e n d i n g on  observable  therefore  of  some c o r r e s p o n d i n g d e g r e e o f  (or  note  dispositional factors.  i n f l u e n c e P's  motives  to  influence  experience  classes  m o t i v e s and/or competence. O's  to  m o t i v e s and/or competence  s t r u c t u r a l and  does p e r c e i v e  I t i s important  ,  ;  10 B.  The Method T r a d i t i o n a l l y  Employed  t o S t u d y T r u s t and  Suspicion: Before  reviewing  description  some o f t h e r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e ,  o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g y g e n e r a l l y e m p l o y e d i n most  o f t h e experiments on t r u s t presented. will  and s u s p i c i o n w i l l  A more d e t a i l e d c r i t i q u e  be r e s e r v e d  f o r the next  Most s t u d i e s o f t r u s t ized  a  of this  first  be  methodology  chapter.  and s u s p i c i o n a r e c h a r a c t e r -  by t h e u s e o f a r e p l i c a t e d ,  simultaneously-played,  2 dichotomous c h o i c e and  as the. means by w h i c h  s u s p i c i o n a r e manipulated o r measured.  PDG p a y o f f are  PDG  matrix  i s illustrated  u s u a l l y two p l a y e r s  (p-L o r P2 a n d o^ o r 02) combinations player. being  The c h o i c e s  as b e i n g  combinations)  (P and 0) w i t h  typical  2.  There  two c h o i c e s  and f o u r r e s u l t i n g  each  choice-  t h a t i n d i c a t e t h e p o s s i b l e -payoffs  "cooperative"  labelled  i n Figure  A  trust  f o r each  p-^ and o^ a r e u s u a l l y l a b e l l e d as choices  while  "competitive".  P2 a n d O2 a r e u s u a l l y The outcomes  a r e such t h a t i f both s e l e c t  (choice-  their  second  •'•For t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h i s p a p e r , P and 0 w i l l r e f e r , i n t h e g e n e r a l c a s e t o the. members o f a d y a d . . I n a d d i t i o n , P a n d 0 w i l l a l s o r e f e r t o t h e two p l a y e r s . i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game.. \ I t i s a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t b e c a u s e t h e game i s r e p l i c a t e d , the d e s i g n a t i o n 'Prisoner's"Dilemma no l o n g e r ; t r u l y , applies. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e t e r m s w i l l be u s e d i n t h i s s t u d y more a s a m a t t e r o f c o n v e n t i o n t h a n o f a p p r o p r i ateness. - , 1  11  ?2  3  , 3  0  5  , 0  1  , 5  r  . l  S u b j e c t P c h o o s e s between t h e rows p-^ and P2 and s u b j e c t 0 c h o o s e s b e t w e e n the" " columns o^ and 02The p a y o f f s f o r P a r e i n d i c a t e d by t h e f i r s t number i n each, c e l l w h i l e O's p a y o f f s a r e i n d i c a t e d .by t h e s e c o n d number i n e a c h c e l l . 1  Figure  2.  Payoff matrix of a t y p i c a l Dilemma Game.  Prisoner's  12  alternative only  ( p / o ) / i . e . , i f b o t h compete, b o t h 2  the small  of F i g u r e  2.  alternative receive  2  payoff  i n d i c a t e d i n the lower r i g h t quadrant  On t h e o t h e r  hand, i f b o t h  s e l e c t the f i r s t  ( p ^ , o^) , i . e . , i f b o t h c o o p e r a t e ,  the r e l a t i v e l y  left.quadrant  However, where one competes w h i l e t h e o t h e r one who competes  one  who c o o p e r a t e s  both  l a r g e r , b u t .nevertheless  amount i n d i c a t e d i n t h e u p p e r  the  receive  receives  receives  moderate  of Figure  cooperates,  the l a r g e s t payoff  the smallest,  while the  as i s e v i d e n t i n  either  the upper r i g h t o r t h e lower l e f t quadrants i n  Figure  2.  T h e r e may b e , t h e n , a t e m p t a t i o n  competitively  i n t h e hope t h a t  the other  2.  t o choose  will  choose c o -  operatively. In a o n e - t r i a l simultaneous-play solution players  (vide Luce  erations:  loss.  The dilemma  First,  cooperatively) since  £• R a i f f a , 1957, p . 96) i s f o r b o t h  t o choose c o m p e t i t i v e l y  potential  operatively,  i n a number o f c o n s i d (i.e.,  both  that both players  on a g i v e n  trial.  both players  solution  But, i n choosing co-  Hence, s i n c e  are "forced"  choose  cannot r e c e i v e the  t h e way i s l e f t o p e n f o r t h e o t h e r  self-defeating  i  lies  t o minimize  seems t o b e t h e most r e a s o n a b l e  choose c o m p e t i t i v e l y . trial,  i n order  mutual cooperation  i t i s obvious  maximum p a y o f f  game, t h e p r e s c r i b e d  there  player to  i s o n l y one  into a paradoxically  outcome f o r , w h i c h t h e p a y o f f  i s lower  than  13  if  both  had cooperated.  (1966), an  "reasonable  men must c h o o s e i n a way t h a t  u n r e a s o n a b l e outcome" I n an i t e r a t e d  cooperation, players  being  to.the  (vide Luce & R a i f f a ,  choice last  play,  mutual  i s the solution usually prescribed However, i t i s o f t h e c o m p e t i t i v e ."  ( i n o n e ' s own b e s t  or the last  trial  itself  i n t e r e s t ) on t h e (Luce  p . 1 0 0 ) . Such a c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e n d e r s  cooperative  1).  advantage and b e n e f i t o f both  t o argue t h a t t h e s e l e c t i o n  few t r i a l s  1957,  simultaneous  1957, p . 101) .  i s "rational"  produces  (Messe & Sawyer, 1966, p .  game w i t h  i n the long run,  possible  I n t h e words o f M e s s e a n d Sawyer  state, i f i t occurs,  unstable,  & Raiffa,  the mutually i . e . , subject  t o d e f e c t i o n and a consequent e s c a l a t i o n o f c o n f l i c t , especially trials early  i f t h e p l a y e r s do n o t know t h e e x a c t  i n t h e game o r i f t h e y i n t h e game.  For this  of mutual competition plausible To  "pre-empt" b y c o m p e t i n g t o o reason,  i n an i t e r a t e d  (vide Rapoport,  1959, p .  t h e "Nash  solution"  game i s . a l s o  .  58)..  account f o r the underlying motivation  Deutsch p o s t u l a t e s  number o f •  t o cooperate,  the notion o f t r u s t .  The e s s e n t i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e o f t h e game i s t h a t t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y . f o r " r a t i o n a l " i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o r i n i t u n l e s s t h e "~'x...i:^. c o n d i t i o n s f o r mutual t r u s t e x i s t . " I f each p l a y e r c h o o s e s t o o b t a i n e i t h e r maximum g a i n o r minimum l o s s f o r h i m s e l f , e a c h w i l l l o s e . B u t i t makes no s e n s e t o c h o o s e t h e o t h e r a l t e r n a - . t i v e , w h i c h c o u l d r e s u l t i n maximum l o s s , u n l e s s one c a n t r u s t t h e o t h e r p l a y e r . I f one cannot t r u s t , i t i s , o f c o u r s e , s a f e r t o c h o o s e s o as  14  t o s u f f e r minimum r a t h e r t h a n maximum l o s s , b u t i t i s e v e n b e t t e r n o t t o p l a y t h e game.. I f one c a n n o t a v o i d p l a y i n g t h e game "and i f one c a n n o t t r u s t , t h e r e may be no r e a s o n a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e e x c e p t t o choose " t h e l e s s e r of. two e v i l s " a n d / o r a t t e m p t t o d e v e l o p t h e . c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w i l l permit mutual t r u s t . ( D e u t s c h , 1962, p . 3 0 9 ) . In e f f e c t ,  Deutsch  i s inferring  the observation of cooperation in  t h e PDG.  quite  o f such-an  The r e a s o n s f o r t h i s  i n the next chapter.  and s u s p i c i o n  and c o m p e t i t i o n ,  However, t h e v a l i d i t y  tenuous.  considered  trust  . "; : from  respectively,  approach i s  o b j e c t i o n . w i l l be  15 CHAPTER TWO:  Earlier, trust  and  METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  i t was  noted  t h a t most a t t e m p t s  s u s p i c i o n have employed a r e p l i c a t e d ,  ously-played, a number o f most o t h e r  dichotomous c h o i c e  important  reasons  n o n - z e r o sum  PDG.  why  games, i s n o t  these  sorts  o f i n f e r e n c e s w h i c h m i g h t be  suspicion  of c e r t a i n methodological  warranted.  This examination  o l o g i c a l questions Incentives  A.  and  D e f i n i n g and  ations  of the  of  involving trust  and  incalculable.  most o f the  have p u r p o r t e d l y  Meaningfulness  trust  imaginary  Messe and  of and  Payoffs: of r e a l - l i f e  the. s t a k e s  and  situ-  Sawyer  are  money as and  (1966)  that  s u s p i c i o n have the p a y o f f more  l a r g e amounts o f money m i g h t h a v e y i e l d e d As  method-  laboratory studies  i s p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t r e a l  results.  three  Suspicion.  i n many c a s e s ,  d e a l t with  employed p o i n t s o r  careful  suspicion i s that there i s  and  Yet,  and  of Inferences,  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g aspects  something a t stake,  It  and  the  questions.is highly  (A)  (B) V a l i d i t y  Incentives  a  concern  M e a s u r i n g T r u s t and  Meaningfulness One  will  in particular:  Payoffs,  implications for  game b e h a v i o r ,  or  satisfactory.  made a b o u t t r u s t  examination  are  o f t h e PDG  entirely  o b j e c t i o n s have i m p o r t a n t  from o b s e r v i n g  simultane-  However, t h e r e  such a use  Since  (C)  to i n v e s t i g a t e  units.  meaningfully  different  reason,  16  When r e w a r d s a r e s m a l l e r , and t h e i r motivating a b i l i t y less, other motivations more e a s i l y e n t e r . . . . Small rewards 'do n o t make b e h a v i o r u n l a w f u l , o f c o u r s e ; they s i m p l y m u l t i p l y the p o t e n t i a l causes, m a k i n g i t more d i f f i c u l t t o v e r i f y t h e o r i e s b a s e d upon r e s p o n s e s t o t h e r e w a r d s thems e l v e s (and h e n c e more d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r stand a l t o g e t h e r ) . (Messe & Sawyer, 1966, Evidence  for this  by  (1966),  Gallo  McNeel  (1966),  Perlman  l e a v e many o f trust  p o s i t i o n has Knox and  Messe and  ,  been found  Douglas Sawyer  (1968),  (1966),  i n recent studies McClintock  and  Oskamp  these  s t u d i e s are not  and  and  the e x i s t i n g  c o n c l u s i v e , they  c o n c l u s i o n s about  concern  here  i s not  monetary a s p e c t s  o f the  fact  interested  t h a t we  are  behavior which t r u s t  and  himself notes,  i n behavior  the  strictly  (in this  the case,  s u s p i c i o n u n d e r l i e ) i n which l a r g e or small, are " T h e r e h a v e b e e n few  l a r g e amounts o f money h a v e b e e n u s e d " p.  47).  to  a p r o b l e m o f u t i l i t i e s , and  Essentially,  The  l a r g e r p a y o f f s , but with  s t a k e s , whether m a t e r i a l l y Deutsch  s o much w i t h  do  cooperation  ( e . g . , Deutsch's) open t o c r i t i c i s m .  principal  As  16) .  (1965).  Although  and  p.  t h a t perhaps other  sorts  of u t i l i t y  m i g h t be  studied.  It is difficult,  possible  units.  Nevertheless,  the  meaningful. s t u d i e s where  (Deutsch,  1966,  the problem bf meaningfulness i n this  the  reduces  respect, implies  units,  e.g.,  prestige,  however, t o s c a l e  i t m i g h t be  profitable  other to  17  explore  other  rather gross As used.  Unfortunately,  situations is  the r e s u l t s  1967) h a v e n o t b e e n v e r y  different  i s suggested  by t h e f a c t  were a c t u a l l y  t o take  B.  Validity  losing  then  own money  (and i f such a  t h e s i t u a t i o n w o u l d b e more  a n d more, m e a n i n g f u l  i s one o f t h e most i m p o r t a n t undertaking.  and s u s p i c i o n .  study  o f these  Here, i t d e a l s w i t h the  I f t h e PDG i s a v a l i d  concepts,  then  t o make r e a s o n a b l y  ideally,  t o study  tool  f o r the  i t o u g h t t o be  unambiguous i n f e r e n c e s  a n d s u s p i c i o n on t h e b a s i s o f b e h a v i o r  PDG.  perspective  considerations  o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e PDG c a n be u s e d  trust  trust  their  that  of Inferences:  o f any e x p e r i m e n t a l  possible  on t h e p a r t o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s  on a d i f f e r e n t  Validity  question  amount o f p e r s o n a l  f o r e x a m p l e , be made t o p e r c e i v e  p r o c e d u r e were e t h i c a l ) , apt  Another  and s u s p i c i o n , m e a n i n g f u l n e s s  and involvement  subjects could,  from the  that i n t r u e - l i f e  u s u a l l y d e r i v e d from a c o n s i d e r a b l e  they  the  from the i s o l a t e d  ( B i x e n s t i n e & O ' R e i l l y , 1966,  involving trust  investment If  on a n o r d i n a l s c a l e .  o f s t u d i e s u s i n g monetary p a y o f f s .  alternative  are  t o monetary p a y o f f s , shock m i g h t be  t o employ s h o c k  Douglas,  results  even i f t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s  a n d c a n o n l y be p l a c e d  an a l t e r n a t i v e  attempts and  possibilities,  about  observed i n  F o r a l l i n t e n t s a n d p u r p o s e s , D e u t s c h a n d other's  equate the o b s e r v a t i o n  of cooperation  with  trust  and t h e  18  observation of competition But  as w i l l  be e v i d e n t  a s t r o n g case  with  from the remainder o f t h i s s e c t i o n ,  may be mounted a g a i n s t s u c h a n  T h e r e a r e two r e l a t e d possible First,  represent  real-life  respects  trust  which  equation.  express  problem o f v a l i d i t y .  d o e s t h e PDG f a i l t o  situations?  Secondly,  ( i n a d d i t i o n t o t r u s t a n d s u s p i c i o n ) be  from the o b s e r v a t i o n the  questions  approaches t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r  i n what i m p o r t a n t  factors  the occurence of s u s p i c i o n .  of cooperation  inferred  and c o m p e t i t i o n i n  PDG? A moment's  acts  reflection  involving trust  m a j o r i t y o f those  upon-the temporal aspects o f  and s u s p i c i o n s u g g e s t s  situations  sequence o f events.  that the  a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a  The p a r t y  that manifests  trust or  w a n t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t r u s t makes h i s move f i r s t effect  p l a c e s h i s own f a t e ,  to the extent  squarely  i n t h e hands o f t h e o t h e r .  trusting  0,  usually  leaves  aware o f t h i s  outcome t h a t r e s u l t s so as t o p r e c l u d e  vulnerability.  the  negative  acts  outcome.  involving trust  nature.  t h a t he  trusts,  t o 0 , . and b o t h a r e Where P  suspects  o f an u n d e s i r a b l e  f r o m O's c h o i c e ,  or a t least  and i n  P, i n t h e a c t o f  himself vulnerable  0, i . e . , P h a s a s t r o n g e x p e c t a t i o n  in  can other  then  P moves  first  reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y o f  The c o n t e n t i o n h e r e t h e n  i s that  and s u s p i c i o n a r e u s u a l l y s e q u e n t i a l  19 If then  this  analysis i s accurate  i t w o u l d be n e c e s s a r y  and f a i r l y  t h a t the element o f sequen-  tialness  be r e p r e s e n t e d  i n an e x p e r i m e n t a l  designed  t o study  and s u s p i c i o n .  ever,  another  reason  sequentialness directly  trust  general,  situation  T h e r e i s , how-  f o r a s s e r t i n g that the notion of  i s important,  and t h i s  t o t h e game s i t u a t i o n s  used  reason  relates  t o study  t r u s t and  suspicion. When P makes a c o m p e t i t i v e simultaneous arises  play, i ti s d i f f i c u l t  t o know i f h i s c h o i c e t o guard  t h e w o r s t outcome, o r i f he i s i n f a c t  m a x i m i z e h i s own p a y o f f  cooperatively.  Although  same, t h e u n d e r l y i n g sequential play is  i n a condition of  o u t o f s u s p i c i o n , i . e . , an a t t e m p t  against to  choice  i n the event  the observed  reasons  situation,  t h a t P's c h o i c e  t h a t 0 chooses  choice  are different.  the maximization  r u l e d o u t and i t i s more l i k e l y , c a n be a t t r i b u t e d  trying  i s the In a explanation  but not necessary,  t o the concept  of  choice  discussion  suspicion. With regard  to a cooperative  of  s e q u e n t i a l versus  to  O's s e l e c t i o n when 0 i s e i t h e r  a b o u t P's c h o i c e .  simultaneous  I n simultaneous  play,  i n this the focus  shifts  certain or uncertain p l a y , he i s u n c e r t a i n ,  while  i n s e q u e n t i a l p l a y , he i s c e r t a i n .  play,  there  In sequential  i s no d o u b t t h a t when P i s f i r s t  and chooses  c o o p e r a t i v e l y , 0 may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d a s b e i n g  either  20  trustworthy, P  i f he  a l s o chooses c o o p e r a t i v e l y knowing  i s vulnerable, or untrustworthy,  tively  and  contrast,  takes such  simultaneous This  a d v a n t a g e o f P's  imputations  other person's  equivalent  and  (MJG), i . e . , t h e  total  (Becker  the  ambiguous. anticipated  there  the  gain  outcome, w h i c h  might  choices.  are  at  an  least  gain f o r both  in  regardless less  of  joint  o n e s e l f and  equivalent to a of the  other person's  1967;  McClintock  1967;  and  the  individualistic  2) M a x i m i z a t i o n  equivalent to a competitive  & Messick,  (MOG)  i s more o r  called  3) M a x i m i z a t i o n  & McClintock,  McClintock Rawson,  and  g a i n and  roughly  in  competitive  others,  o t h e r , which i s approximately  is  and  o f o n e ' s own  motivational orientation,  o n e ' s own  In  t o whether o t h e r motives  t o what D e u t s c h has  orientation,  competi-  t h a t i n f l u e n c e a s u b j e c t ' s response  1) M a x i m i z a t i o n the  a r e more  cooperative  to McClintock  three motives  of  behavior  d i s c u s s i o n o f s i m u l t a n e i t y has  underlie manifest  PDG:  chooses  vulnerability.  a b o u t O's  play situation  somewhat t h e q u e s t i o n as  According  i f he  that  gain  the  cooperative  d i f f e r e n c e between  outcome,  (MD)  which  orientation & McNeel,  1966;  M i n a s , S c o d e l , ' Marlowe &  1960).  T h e r e may, a punishment or wherein the  of course,  be  other motives.  " v i n d i c t i v e n e s s " m o t i v e may  s u b j e c t wants  For be  to minimize the o t h e r  example,  operating, person's  21 payoff  a t any  c o s t to h i m s e l f .  motive to outwit involve observed of  the  the  pattern  other of  a s e r i e s of  person.  solely  for a competitive cooperative  Or,  third is  or onlooker,  responses  might  m i g h t be  respect  made on  i s necessary  perceive related  the  Such, a m o t i v e esteem of  a prestigious  a  experimenter,  and  to the  the b a s i s  section that a  validity of  the  of  present  use  be  m o t i v a t e d by  to t r u s t  and  f a c t o r s other  than  cooperation  and  that  PDG  is invalid  but  application  Defining Related  earlier  rather  o f the  and  PDG  competition. f o r the  is  of  may  basis  i s not  trust  to  of say  and qualified  necessary.  question  of  measuring t r u s t  postulated  study  This  PDG.  exercised  the  t h a t a more r e f i n e d and  Measuring Trust  to the  d e f i n i n g and  the  those  s u s p i c i o n , c a u t i o n must be  observed  suspicion,  of  which  to conclude that because subjects  a b o u t t h e s e c o n c e p t s on  the  problem  inferences  i n making i n f e r e n c e s  of  consist  t h a t would s e t  defection.  been argued i n t h i s  exists with  C.  not  valued. I t has  It  a  responses  o r i e n t a t i o n , but  s u c h as  a l s o be  T h i s would  s a l i e n t where, f o r example, t h e  party  may  competitive  stage f o r p e r i o d i c or eventual m i g h t be  there  and  Suspicion:  inferences and  i s the  suspicion.  that i n situations that c a l l  problem  It for  was a  decision  to  there  (1)  is  t r u s t or an  not  (herein  termed  observed behavior  dichotomous nature  —  doesn't —  a hypothetical  state  of  and  (2)  t r u s t or  a continuous  P manifests  suspicion  nature.  that  concomitant  game i s n o t  tion.  P e r h a p s r e p l i c a t e d PDG  do  not  allow  state. P's  of  The  the  steps  f o r an  m a n i f e s t as "feel"  threshold  behavioral  t h a t he  trusting  or  threshold  be  already  or and  subjective  subjective  of  What makes t h e  will  or'  i n t e r e s t to. know  t r u s t becomes  t r u s t , i . e . , t o what e x t e n t he  by  made a t r u s t i n g  P  must  i n f a c t make a  determination  of  such  e v e n more i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h a t u n d o u b t e d l y  will  vary  with  a v a r i e t y of  the  situational,  a n d / o r d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , e.g.,  or  trustworthiness.  own  experi-  trustworthy  structural, P's  situa-  a test situation  i t w o u l d be  t r u s t s 0 before  decision.  threshold  the  (measured, f o r example,  t h a t P has  i s important since  which p o i n t  an  e s t i m a t e o r m e a s u r e o f P's state  of  dichotomous-  provide  subjective p r o b a b i l i t y that 0 w i l l  choice)  a  the  then  replicated test situations  that precede  subjective  untrustworthy, given  at  of  trials  he  assumed t o be  case, by  a  subjective  adequate f o r a p a r t i c u l a r t e s t  mental analogue only possibly  be  i s the  dependent v a r i a b l e measure a f f o r d e d choice  i s u s u a l l y of  t r u s t toward 0 or  t h a t may  If this  "test situations")  incentives  23  I t w o u l d t h e r e f o r e a p p e a r t h a t i f t h e PDG o r some o t h e r n o n - z e r o game i s t o be u s e d and  of trust  s u s p i c i o n , i t o u g h t t o be a s e q u e n t i a l l y - p l a y e d game  for meaningful be  i n t h e study  stakes  supplemented w i t h ,  caveats  and s h o u l d e i t h e r a continuous  measure.  this  study  independent  i s primarily  provide or  With  i n m i n d , i t i s now p o s s i b l e t o p r o c e e d  d i s c u s s i o n o f the s p e c i f i c which  itself  with the  variables  concerned.  these  with  CHAPTER THREE:  The  THE  specific  DEVELOPMENT  r e s e a r c h upon w h i c h  deals with  two q u e s t i o n s  suspicion.  This chapter  the  first  question —  influence second  OF T R U S T AND S U S P I C I O N  this  about the nature i s addressed  paper i s focused o f t r u s t and  to a discussion of  What a r e some o f t h e f a c t o r s  t h e development o f t r u s t  and s u s p i c i o n ?  of trust  considered  a n d s u s p i c i o n a r e upon b e h a v i o r , w i l l  i n the next  chapter.  i t i s proposed  suspicion  i s i n f l u e n c e d n o t o n l y by f a c t o r s  immediate s i t u a t i o n ,  factors,  t h a t t h e development o f t r u s t and  e.g., s t r u c t u r a l  b u t a l s o by r e l e v a n t p r e v i o u s  Previous  experience  i s important  F o r example,  t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l  since i tprovides P  i ti s to a certain  P may o r may n o t t r u s t  one o r more p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s .  simplified to  and d i s p o s i t i o n a l  experience.^  0, d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y on  operating i n  a b a s i s on w h i c h t o make i n f e r e n c e s a b o u t O's  worthiness.  view o f the genesis  be q u a l i f i e d  instance,  considerably.  t o determine  be  In regard to the f i r s t  question,  with  The  q u e s t i o n , a s t o what some o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o r  effects  the  that  i f trust  extent  another or  trustobvious  individual  untrustworthy  However, t h i s somewhat  of trust  and s u s p i c i o n needs  I t w o u l d be i m p o r t a n t , f o r and s u s p i c i o n d e v e l o p a t  ^•A p a r t i c u l a r " p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e " h a s , o f c o u r s e , u s u a l l y b e e n s u b j e c t t o s i t u a t i o n a l and d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s itself.  similar  or d i f f e r e n t  previous  experiences.  reasonable  r a t e s as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e number o f On one h a n d , i t i s i n t u i t i v e l y  t h a t s u s p i c i o n c a n be a r o u s e d  a s i n g l e and u s u a l l y p o w e r f u l  or dramatic  on t h e b a s i s o f betrayal.  on  t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t i s r a r e when " c o m p l e t e  be  e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e b a s i s o f m e r e l y  experience, previous  depending, of course,  experience.  Rather,  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t r u s t  Yet,  t r u s t " can  one p r e v i o u s  upon t h e n a t u r e  of the  i t seems more l i k e l y  involves a process  that  or processes  t h a t a r e t o some e x t e n t more t i m e - d e m a n d i n g t h a n t h e process  or processes  Insofar  by w h i c h s u s p i c i o n i s a r o u s e d .  as i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a l l o f t h e s e  t i o n s m i g h t be q u a l i f i e d by s p e c i f y i n g previous like  experience,  the stakes  to betray be  the nature  i t i s also possible that a  associated with  observa-  the choices  factor  (especially  or not) i s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e importance.  worthwhile,  f o r example, t o d e t e r m i n e  of the  I t would  i fsuspicion  m i g h t be g r e a t e r o r l e s s where p r e v i o u s b e t r a y a l o c c u r r e d under h i g h i n c e n t i v e incentives therefore  to betray.  While  betrayal f o r high  m i g h t be p e r c e i v e d t o be more not r e s u l t  a l s o provoke both  "justifiable"  i n the a r o u s a l of s u s p i c i o n , i t might  r e s e n t m e n t and s u s p i c i o n * .  On t h e o t h e r  h a n d , e v e n g r e a t e r r e s e n t m e n t m i g h t o c c u r when t h e incentives  to betray  and  are r e l a t i v e l y  low o r  trivial..  26 Altogether, for  foregoing  experimentally-testable  ment o f t r u s t factorial (A) to  the  O's  and  design  and  i n v o l v i n g three  (C)  or untrustworthy  the  number o f e x p o s u r e s  acts.  But  before  first  presented.  O's  develop-  framework o f  (B) m a g n i t u d e o f t h e  a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of  A.  the  a basis  a  independent v a r i a b l e s :  explicit, be  provide  p r o p o s i t i o n s about the  suspicion within  trustworthiness,  betray,  observations  incentive  to  trustworthy  making the the  three  hypotheses factors  will  Trustworthiness:  Although  i t may  at f i r s t  seem o b v i o u s  t h a t O's  trust-  worthiness w i l l  promote t r u s t  i n P whereas h i s  untrust-  worthiness w i l l  engender s u s p i c i o n , i t i s l e s s  apparent  as  t o w h e t h e r as  are  sufficient  situation, is  an  as  to give  one rise  or  two  trustworthy  to b e h a v i o r a l  i . e . , i n a s i t u a t i o n where t h e  quite high.  worthiness)  few  The  importance of  therefore  interactive  lies  e f f e c t with  this  trust risk  factor  p r i m a r i l y i n the the  "number o f  responses in a  test  of  betrayal  (O's  trust-  possibility  of  exposures"  factor. The is  experimental  relatively  only  i f the  tially  such  manipulation  s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d ; but  experimental  situation  t h a t P must f i r s t  trust  o f O's i t can  trustworthiness be  effected  is structured 0 before  0  sequen-  can  27  d e m o n s t r a t e i f he i s t r u s t w o r t h y  o r n o t . Y e t , perhaps  because o f the seemingly obvious  sorts of predictions  w h i c h m i g h t b e made, few s t u d i e s h a v e a t t e m p t e d the  exact  trust,  relationship  this 1966)  there  point, only will  Mechling with  b e t w e e n O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  a n d b e t w e e n O's u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  Although  to establish  are three  two ( S w i n t h ,  and P's  and P's s u s p i c i o n .  studies that are relevant a t 1967, a n d Messe & Sawyer,  b e d i s c u s s e d now; t h e o t h e r , by K o m o r i t a a n d  (1967), w i l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  later  i n conjunction  the d i s c u s s i o n of the i n c e n t i v e v a r i a b l e . In an i n t e r e s t i n g  programmed c h o i c e s defined  study,  Swinth  o f "0" t o _ e s t a b l i s h  i n terms o f c o o p e r a t i v e  (see F i g u r e  3).  (1967) u t i l i z e d t h e trust.  choice  Swinth hypothesized  T r u s t was  on a " t e s t "  and found  matrix  that  trust  c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i f 0 communicated a d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h t r u s t by e x p o s i n g  himself  to the r i s k  i.e.,  t r u s t i n g , when c h o o s i n g  gain,  i . e . , being This  explored  first,  trustworthy,  i s an i n t e r e s t i n g  t o note t h a t Swinth's  of  i n which P  it  was i m p o s s i b l e  O's t r u s t  and f o r e g o i n g . p e r s o n a l  when s e c o n d .  f u r t h e r f o r a number o f r e a s o n s .  (the r e a l  program) a l t e r n a t e d w i t h  regard  to assess  reduction,  f i n d i n g w h i c h ought t o be  necessary trials  of payoff  study  First,  i t is  involved a series  subject)  and 0  (a m a t c h i n g  t o who c h o s e f i r s t .  the r e l a t i v e  a n d O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  Thus  contribution of  to the induction of t r u s t  10, 10  8, 11  8  10, 10  ii,  10, 10  6, 12  6  10, 10  12,  10, 10  o, 18  0  10, 10  18,  T  75,  75  100, -100  Figure  3.  -100, 100 50, 50  M a t r i c e s e m p l o y e d b y S w i n t h (1967). NOTE: M a t r i c e s A, B...E a r e t h e s e q u e n t i a l l y - p l a y e d "commitment" m a t r i c e s w h e r e b y O ( t h e program) c a n communicate h i s d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h t r u s t by r i s k i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y g r e a t e r r e d u c t i o n s i n p a y o f f s , i . e . , c h o o s i n g row X when f i r s t , and by h i m s e l f r e s i s t i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y greater temptations t o betray, i . e . , being t r u s t w o r t h y by c h o o s i n g X when s e c o n d p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i n i t i a l l y does t r u s t 0 . Matrix T i s the simultaneously-played " t e s t " m a t r i x on w h i c h t h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s m e a s u r e d . NJ  00  29  in  P.  Perhaps t h e most i m p o r t a n t  no d e m o n s t r a t i o n P's t r u s t  o f the nature  a n d O's  trust  suspicion  conflict. to  this  Paired  confederate) c h o i c e PDG 0 about  the r e s o l u t i o n  i s t h e manner  subjects  (actually  —  study  outcome  c o n f l i c t was  essentially  (payoffs) preceded  generated.  a  continuous  the a c t u a l  Moves were simultaneous"'" a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n  possible  a deliberately  t o c r e a t e c o n f l i c t b y h a v i n g 0 move  as t o a t t e m p t  bargaining.  a  t o betray the s u b j e c t , r a t h e r than  (0) o r i g i n a l l y  indicated  i n reducing the percentage  a b o v e 50% t o a b o u t  ^"For t h e s a k e a c t u a l l y used  i . e . , i n such  Over the span o f t e n t r i a l s ,  were e f f e c t i v e  was  o f s t a n d a r d messages.  t r e a c h e r o u s manner,  t h e d i r e c t i o n he  from  i n relation  i n w h i c h b a r g a i n i n g b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t and  T h u s , i t was  in  (1966),  a s u b j e c t p a i r e d w i t h 0, a  by means o f a number  direction  Swinth.  interesting  i n which  accomplished  in  F i n a l l y , the  of experimentally-induced  were g i v e n a t a s k —  the f i n a l  choices.  n o t s t u d i e d by  between  i n a s t u d y by Messe and Sawyer  What makes t h e i r  paper  o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p  was  o f the nature o f the development o f  i s rendered  which d e a l t with  i s that there  and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s .  d e v e l o p m e n t o f s u s p i c i o n was Some i n d i c a t i o n  reason  25%.  during  such b e t r a y a l s of cooperation .  However, i t i s  noteworthy  o f s i m p l i c i t y , a more e l a b o r a t e p r o c e d u r e by Messe and Sawyer i s n o t d e s c r i b e d h e r e .  30  t h a t even i n t h e f a c e o f such f l a g r a n t " u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , t h e v a r i o u s modes o f r e s o l u t i o n ,  i . e . , matching,  or n a t u r a l strategies  o n t h e p a r t o f O,  produced a r e l a t i v e l y  rapid  B.  recovery  initiating,  subsequently  of cooperation.  Magnitude o f I n c e n t i v e t o Betray: T h e r e a r e two a s p e c t s  which  this  study  probability affected  to this  i s concerned  of being betrayed  by p r e v i o u s  variable.  The one w i t h  i s how P's s u b j e c t i v e i n a given situation i s  experiences  i n w h i c h 0, u n d e r a h i g h  ( o r a low) i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y , was t r u s t w o r t h y worthy) . relates  The o t h e r a s p e c t  —  perhaps, t h e m o s t common  t o how t h e i n c e n t i v e ( t o b e t r a y )  situation  affects  situation.  the p r o b a b i l i t y  Although  these  (or u n t r u s t —  i n t h e immediate  o f b e t r a y a l i n t h a t same  two a s p e c t s  are related,  i t is  theoretically  and e x p e r i m e n t a l l y p o s s i b l e t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between t h e i r  effects.  S t u d i e s o f t h e i n c e n t i v e v a r i a b l e have t y p i c a l l y concerned the  with  effects  Figure  the l a t t e r  aspect  of the manipulation  4) upon t h e l e v e l  been  and have sought t o d e t e r m i n e o f t h e parameter Y (see  of cooperation  in a  simultaneous  game. The decreases Lave,  c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t has been t h a t with  increases i n Y  1965; R a p o p o r t  cooperation  ( B i x e n s t i n e & B l u n d e l l , 1966;  & Chammah, 1 9 6 5 ) .  Consideration ofthe  31  O  "cooperate  Tl  U  compete"  cooperate"  w, w  X, Y  'compete"  y, x  z, z  F i g u r e 4. A g e n e r a l m a t r i x c o m p r i s e d o f f o u r parameters W,'X,'Y, and Z. The m a t r i x i s a PDG when the f o l l o w i n g c o n s t r a i n t s h o l d : ( i ) Y>W>Z>X ( i i ) 2W>X+Y (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965, p. 34)  32  results  of  these studies  must, o f  the  arguments advanced e a r l i e r ,  the  competitive  actually of  the  (i.e.,  be  or  a function  increased  i n the  function  of  In  Y.  only  the to  the  in  findings  betrayal  amount o f  condition  suspicion  of betrayal  seem t o be  low  less  justifiable  the  rather  than  just cited, i t is f o u n d where t h e To  repeat  incentive.  i s greater  under h i g h  of  in  a  Y.  what d e g r e e o f  under  values  response)  a function Y  may  "suspicion"  competitive  concerned.  m i g h t ask  games,  either subject  Thus, i n c r e a s e d  increase  experience are  u s e d e a r l i e r , we  the  by  by  d i f f e r e n c e between the  i n e f f e c t be  the  tempered  i n simultaneous  choice  d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s m i g h t be  g e n e r a t e d by  that  d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n X and  contrast  previous  may  the  s e l e c t i o n of  games may  increase  that  of  p a r a m e t e r s X and  simultaneous  that  suspicious  c o u r s e , be  effects  the  It is  since  under c o n d i t i o n s  of  example  suspicion  'than i n  incentive  possible  is  possible  the betrayal of  low  incentive. K o m o r i t a and prediction  Mechling  (1967) made p r e c i s e l y  i n t h e i r study of b e t r a y a l  In o r d e r to vary experience, (i)  temptation  when b e t r a y e d cooperative from the  to d e f e c t (i.e.,  response  X=0  or  (i.e.,  and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  they manipulated  (i.e., -5),  Y=6  or  and  either  program b e f o r e b e t r a y a l ) .  that  9),  three  factors:  ( i i ) loss  ( i i i ) expectation  4 or  10  cooperative  Subjects,  in fact  incurred of  a  trials playing  33  against  the  experimenter,  were more o r  less  i n s t r u c t e d to  respond c o o p e r a t i v e l y i n the  dichotomous c h o i c e  Following  of  the  4 or  10  trials  cooperation  by  PDG. which  s u b j e c t s were l e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t a s t a t e o f mutual o p e r a t i o n had  been a c h i e v e d  made two  successive  game was  played with  competitive  with  competitive  0  r e s p o n s e s by  (the e x p e r i m e n t e r ) ,  choices.  simultaneous  Although  c h o i c e s , the  O were d e f i n e d as  effective of  various low  temptation,  more t r i a l s  (2)  (3)  response  f r o m 0.  the  were  that a state  the  effects  trials  d e f i n e d as a subject  r e q u i r e d i n the  of  the high  to  five subsequent  was  small rather  t h e harm e x p e r i e n c e d  a subject's  direction  of  when  expectation of a  counter  than betrayed, cooperative  significant.  the d i f f e r e n c e f o r both  f a c t o r s was  to  following  E a c h o f t h e m a i n e f f e c t s was  expectation  i f the  achieved.)  number o f  r e s p o n s e s by  w o u l d be  greater  only  predicted that for reconciliation  the g r e a t e r  the  two  (e.g., b e t r a y a l under  the  (1) when t e m p t a t i o n  However, t h e and  been  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n was  I t was  the  of cooperation  i n subjects  actually  e t c . ) was  cooperative  conditions: large,  had  c o n d i t i o n s of b e t r a y a l  betrayal.  occur,  trials  dependent v a r i a b l e measure o f  consecutive  and  initial  i n c r e a t i n g the b e l i e f  reconciliation.  to  the  mutual cooperation The  or  and  0  "betrayal".  (Such a d e f i n i t i o n w o u l d h a v e b e e n j u s t i f i e d instructions  co-  temptation  to the p r e d i c t i o n .  34  Although temptation dicted, of  the  factor  i t was  some o f  Blundell,  direction was  the  studies  1966;  Lave,  suggests  only  in replicating not  provide  assumed the as But  that  actually the  subjects  (or  as'being there  or  at  perceived  results test  high  least  of  or  the  the  circumventing  this  difficulty  independently  that  the  to  order  to  draw  meaning be  of  adopted  employ  the in  to  both  the  the  study  Y  Y  and  the  high  value  by  which  the  be  One to  perceive  and the  values.  follows  low  the  In  Y low.  being of  six  fact,  not  way  Y  the  have  of  incentive  method,  the  procedure  second  however,  matrices  subjects  The  of  demonstrate  satisfactory  high  that  they as  should  and  . They  being  payoff  nine).  low.  would do  as  nine- p o i n t s  subjects  a t t e n t i o n of  different this  more  hypothesis.  standard  subjects A  studies  Y  being  succeeded  vary  or  &  1965).  of  the  as  (Bixenstine  to  lower'than  why  pre-  results  value  six)  points  be  low  than  least  appropriately.  simply  of  nine  would  the  other  own  the  been  Mechling  those  payoff  higher  reason  of  and  their  no  the  levels  had  & Chammah,  perceive  given  (or a t  little  Komorita  would  were  what  Rapoport  sufficient  gauge  "low"  was  the  real  being  of  consistent with  1965;  subjects  assess  "high"  a  difference for  p r e v i o u s l y mentioned  perhaps  i t was  betrayed  could  that  the  reverse  nevertheless  This  did  the  of  in relative  that  will  alternative.  35 C.  Number o f E x p o s u r e s : An  of  important  t h e o r e t i c a l problem r e s i d e s  i n the nature  t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e number o f t i m e s a p e r s o n has  experienced  trustworthiness  ment o f s u b j e c t i v e extension  of this  or betrayal  and b e h a v i o r a l question  and .the d e v e l o p -  t r u s t or suspicion.  An  to a comparison of the r a t e s of  development o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s respect,  i s also of primary  c e r t a i n observations  interest.  suggest a p o s s i b l e  On one h a n d , i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t v e r y betrayal  —  suspicion of  possibly only  that  (Swinth,  the r a t e  hand, t h e r e  of t r u s t involves  1967).  f o r suspicion  Two s t u d i e s generally  of increase  Mechling  although  (1967) u t i l i z e d  i n Table  In their  K o m o r i t a and  two p r o g r a m s t h a t d i f f e r e d o n l y cooperative  responses  o f a number o f PDGs. 1.  as i s  have a c t u a l l y a t t e m p t e d t o  and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  t h e number o f i n i t i a l  outlined  exposures i s  t h e v a r i a b l e of.number o f e x p o s u r e s .  simultaneous plays  be  of t r u s t or suspicion  are p e r i p h e r a l l y relevant,  study of b e t r a y a l  a more  than f o r t r u s t .  t h e c a s e , no s t u d i e s  investigate  i s also  I t would t h e r e f o r e  a f u n c t i o n o f t h e number o f p r e v i o u s  greater  in  On t h e o t h e r  the establishment  prolonged process  as  t o arouse  (and p e r h a p s t h i s m i g h t d e p e n d upon t h e m a g n i t u d e  that  predicted  prediction.  few e x p e r i e n c e s o f  one - - a r e s u f f i c i e n t  incentive to betray).  evidence  In this  during  These programs a r e  The most i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t s i n r e l a -  Table 1.  INTENDED EFFECT OF MANIPULATION  Programs used by Komorita and Mechling  PROGRAM 1  (1967) .  PROGRAM 2  "expectation"  -4 c o o p e r a t i v e  trials  10 c o o p e r a t i v e  trials  "betrayal"  -2 c o m p e t i t i v e  trials  2 competitive  trials  -3 c o o p e r a t i v e  trials  3 cooperative  trials  (dependent v a r i a b l e measure: t r i a l s t o criterion)  conditional  cooperation  conditional  cooperation  UJ  as  37 tion  to this  portions  p a r t o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n a r e t h e mean  of cooperative  choices  immediately  a f t e r the  first  o f t h e two c o n s e c u t i v e  level  of cooperation  first  " b e t r a y a l " , i t drops p r e c i p i t o u s l y  from  after  the second  does n o t seem  to  be v e r y  "betrayal".  durable,  a mean o f o n l y  is still  "betrayals".  pro-  quite high  The e f f e c t  Although a f t e r the  however, s i n c e r e c o v e r y  ten t r i a l s  the  .76 t o .36  i s r a p i d and  i s needed t o r e i n s t a t e c o -  operation. With  the exception  of the i n i t i a l  t h e K o m o r i t a and M e c h l i n g cooperative a r e much and  Table  r e s p o n s e s and f i n a l l y  like  Solomon  programs  (2 c o m p e t i t i v e conditional  trials, then  (See T a b l e  2.)  Harford  As i n t h e K o m o r i t a and  "Reformed s i n n e r " p r o g r a m u s e d by and Solomon (1967) .  INTENDED E F F E C T OF MANIPULATION  Harford  PROGRAMMED CHOICES ( i n a simultaneous PDG)  "Sinner"  3 competitive  trials  "Reform"  3 cooperative  trials  (dependent measure: proportion of cooperative choices i n a f i x e d number o f trials)  3  cooperation)  t h e "reformed s i n n e r " program used by  (1967).  2.  cooperative  conditional cooperation for the remainder of the t r i a l s .  38 Mechling study, to  0 within  consecutive  succeeding  D.  trial,  i . e . , immediately  competitive  to almost  initial  immediately  dropped  .20.  responses,  Thereafter,  levels of cooperation  from  a f t e r the  However, i t i s somewhat p u z z l i n g  the fourth  rose  of cooperation  t h e two t r i a l s  betrayal.^" on  the l e v e l  first  t o note  following  the l e v e l  recovery  eventually  the  bf  was  .4  that three  cooperation  r a p i d and t h e  exceeded the  level.  Hypotheses P e r t a i n i n g  t o the Development o f T r u s t  and  Suspicion; To related  conclude  this  to the foregoing  proposition  underlying  development o f both previous  chapter, will  the e x p l i c i t  now be p r e s e n t e d .  these three  hypotheses  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  experience.  hypotheses  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  The  basic  i s that the  i s a function of i t i s hypothesized  that: (1)  P i s more  trustworthy. will  likely  On t h e o t h e r  be s u s p i c i o u s  t o t r u s t 0 where O was hand, P w i l l  o f 0, where 0 was  previously  n o t t r u s t 0, i . e . ,  previously  untrust-  worthy. (2) Here,  Suspicion  i s more e a s i l y  "established" w i l l  established  refer to a s i g n i f i c a n t  than t r u s t . difference  ^"It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t t h e e x t e n t o f t h e d e c l i n e s was s i m i l a r i n both s t u d i e s even though t h e i n i t i a l l e v e l s were d i f f e r e n t ; t h e i n i t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l o f c o - o p e r a t i o n i s p r o b a b l y a c c o u n t e d f o r by t h e s e r i e s o f c o o p e r a t i v e t r i a l s w i t h which Komorita a n d M e c h l i n g ' s programs began.  39  in  t h e amount o f t r u s t  exposed t o e i t h e r group  a trustworthy  (a c o n t r o l g r o u p )  trustworthy  will  suspicion-induced  i s n o t exposed  of the incentive trustworthy.  i s influenced  to either  R e l a t i v e ease  a "  (i.e.,  t o a c o m p a r i s o n o f t r u s t - and respect  to establish  The d e v e l o p m e n t  nevertheless suspicion  refer  groups w i t h  exposures r e q u i r e d  magnitude  that  o r a n u n t r u s t w o r t h y 0 and a  o r an u n t r u s t w o r t h y 0.  "more e a s i l y " )  (3)  o r s u s p i c i o n between a group t h a t i s  trust  of trust  t o t h e number o f and s u s p i c i o n .  i s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e .  ( t o b e t r a y ) u n d e r w h i c h 0 was Also,  the development o f  by t h e m a g n i t u d e  of incentive  u n d e r w h i c h 0 was u n t r u s t w o r t h y . The  experimental test  only  the f i r s t  this  thesis.  and in  half  of the research  t o be r e p o r t e d i n  A d i s c u s s i o n o f the remaining hypotheses  the background the next  o f these hypotheses comprises  f o r those hypotheses w i l l  chapter.  be  presented  40  C H A P T E R FOUR:  Bargaining flict  i soften  importance  resolved.  AND  NEGOTIATIONS  a r e means b y w h i c h .con-  To a l a r g e  i nthe fact that  as a s p e c t s  individuals, It  and negotiations  resides  universally  BARGAINING  extent, they  b u t a l s o between groups that  a  1965;  o f proposed models  & S i e g e l , 1963;  Siegel  McKersie, relevant  & Fouraker,  1965).  and McGrath  1966;  Deutsch  & Krauss,  1960  a n d 1962;  Kelley,  and  personality  aspiration 1963;  Of induced Their  & Vidmar,  1966)  1962),  Morgan  threat  such  (Deutsch,  & Krauss,  experience  kinds  o f .;'  & Sawyer, 1967), (Fouraker  ( K e l l e y , 1966)  &  1966; Druckman,  (Deutsch  aretheeffects of  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  relevance  (Bass,  1960), and other  and negotiations  & Guetzgow,  ; communication  a n d amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n & Fouraker,  research  investigated  1965), p r e n e g o t i a t i o n  1966;  i n t e r e s t here  of  1963;and Walton  (Druckman, 1967), v a r i o u s  (Krauss,  Siegel  bargaining  have  as r o l e behavior  1967;  extensive  1966;Sawyer  Stevens,  Specific studies  variables  attitudes  1960;  nations.  to thetopic of  and reviews  McGrath,  between  considerable  and negotiations, i n t h e form o f  discussions  almost  and between  amount o f a t t e n t i o n h a s been d i r e c t e d  (Fouraker  occur  of relationships not only  i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g then,  bargaining  their  level of  & Siegel,  aspects of . experimentally  upon b a r g a i n i n g  has r e c e n t l y been s p e c u l a t e d  and n e g o t i a t i o n s . upon i n a r t i c l e s  41 by  Kelley  ( 1 9 6 6 ) , Hoedemaker  McKersie trust  (1968), and Walton and  ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; b u t more commonly, t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f .  and s u s p i c i o n i n i n f l u e n c i n g b a r g a i n i n g  and n e g o t i -  a t i o n s has been emphasized  almost d a i l y  i n the various  mass m e d i a by many i n f o r m e d  observers.  The v a l i d i t y of  their  observations  has h a r d l y been i r r e f u t a b l y  however, s i n c e t h e i r trust  P r e c i s e l y what a r e t h e e f f e c t s a n d s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g  This possible  chapter types  bargaining effects  i s devoted  of effects  upon t h e p r o c e s s process  the type  The  other  the  nature  will  A.  that occurs  the e f f e c t s  concepts  Process-Related range, i n i t i a l  a n d s u s p i c i o n upon  One c o n c e r n s  the possible  Aspects of the  of trust  during-bargaining. a n d s u s p i c i o n upon  T h i s would i n v o l v e , f o r  nature  to c a s t the hypotheses  be d i s c u s s e d  of  would i n c l u d e , f o r example, t h e degree  o f t h e outcome.  the b a r g a i n i n g  i f any —  and n e g o t i a t i o n s ?  of bargaining.  example, t h e q u a l i t a t i v e In order  of trust  o f communication  concerns  —  t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f two.  and n e g o t i a t i o n s .  bargaining or  about the e f f e c t s o f  a n d s u s p i c i o n h a v e b e e n made p r i m a r i l y on a c a s u a l  basis. trust  observations  established,  of the f i n a l  settlement.  in,more s p e c i f i c  that will.be extensively  terms, employed  first.  Concepts:  Minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ,  bargaining  offer:  Many o f t h e b a s i c f e a t u r e s have been i n c o r p o r a t e d  of bargaining  and n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n t o t h e model o f p o l i t i c a l  negotia-  t i o n p r o p o s e d by which provides section,  an  I k l e and  part  issue  of  possible  has  a certain u t i l i t y  and  that  each s i d e by  the  outcomes.  the  of  by  an  ordering  of  That c o n f l i c t  side's  What i s most p r e f e r r e d preferred  by  ordering  side's  by  0.  this of  a l l of  outcome  preferences exists i s  preferences one  each  side  analysi  at a given  preferences  the  their  framework o f  f o r each n e g o t i a t o r  one  other  In  I t i s assumed t h a t  is possible.  of  initial  t h i s b a s i s , an  ordering  reverse  the  (1962).  i s represented  the  on  Leites  (P)  for  represented  i n the (see  time  exact  Figure  5).  is least  . 2  The divides  a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n i s a p o i n t the  groups of (ranging  outcomes: from being  preferred), relative for  range of p r e f e r e n c e s  and  (b)  (a)  each s i d e  those that are  minimally  acceptable  those that  p o s i t i o n i n g of  f o r any  the  i s important.  are  one  which  side  into  two  acceptable to being  unacceptable.  highly The  a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n On  one  h a n d , an  overlapping  ^he a n a l y s e s o f K e l l e y (1966) , S t e v e n s (1963) , W a l t o n and M c K e r s i e ( 1 9 6 5 ) , and o t h e r s a r e a l s o r e l e v a n t f o r t h i s discussion. However, i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f conciseness, r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made o n l y t o I k l e and L e i t e s (1962) s i n c e a l l o f t h e s e a n a l y s e s u t i l i z e e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same s o r t s o f concepts. 2 F o r t h e s a k e o f s i m p l i c i t y , i t w i l l be assumed t h a t t h e minimum d i s p o s i t i o n i s a p o i n t r a t h e r t h a n an i n t e r v a l .  O's a c t u a l minimum disposition  Most p r e f e r r e d outcome f o r 0 + 3  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0  -1 - j  -1  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  i!  7  8  -2 k ~ 9  -3 1 10  O's  Outcomes P's  + Most p r e f e r r e d outcome f o r P  P's a c t u a l minimum disposition  '--Actual b a r g a i n i n g range= o v e r l a p between: P's r a n g e o f a c c e p t a b l e outcomes 3  O's r a n g e o f a c c e p t a b l e  Figure  5.  outcomes  Representation of a bargaining s i t u a t i o n I k l e and L e i t e s , 1962) .  (adapted  preferences  from  preferences  44 of  the  ranges of unacceptable  •possibility lapping to  of  define  final  of settlement. the  On,the o t h e r  ranges of a c c e p t a b l e  agreement i s q u i t e this  represented  i n Figure  the  likely  i t allows  of course,  5 by  the  interval  "drive a harder  e i t h e r s i d e a t the  of  the major f u n c t i o n s of b a r g a i n i n g  bargaining  One  but  and  preferences;  o r O's  this  Leites  i t is  important providing,  not  i s rarely  possessed Thus,  i s to estimate  preferences  at least  two  are  one what  for certain In  other  t o m o d i f y e i t h e r O's o f o n e ' s own  only  more g e n e r a l l y  0 a b o u t o n e ' s own  perception  I k l e and  exclusively with  has  the  minimum  of n e g o t i a t i o n s .  i s to inform  i s to attempt  preferences  their  is  ( e s p e c i a l l y h i s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ) .  estimation,  other  outset  side's u t i l i t i e s  functions. The  appear  h.  bargain",  minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ,  by  to  c -  and  i n r e t u r n know P's  about h i s e n t i r e range of u t i l i t i e s ,  outcomes  range  However, s u c h p r e c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n ,  other's  other  I k l e and  minimum d i s p o s i t i o n  t h a t 0 does n o t  disposition. about the  P to  to f a l l .  any  over-  outcomes w o u l d  actual bargaining  Knowledge a b o u t O's  the  h a n d , an  a r e g i o n of v i a b l e c o n t r a c t s w i t h i n which  (1962) c a l l  since  outcomes m i g h t p r e c l u d e  addition  related  utilities.  utilities  utilities  and and  Leites  (1962).have d e a l t  latter  f u n c t i o n of m o d i f i c a t i o n i n  a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l  negotiations..  almost  45  Bargaining often are  attempt  tactics  r e f e r t o means by w h i c h  t o modify each o t h e r ' s  such devices  as s t r i k e s ,  threats,  demands o r o f f e r s , and l i e s .  initial  a  spuriously  a  l a t i t u d e f o r what w i l l  inflated  high  demand  Stevens,  1963).  around  "full  circle"  Our  influence  prescribed  strategy  (e.g.,  Kelley,  the use o f t a c t i c s .  will  that  situa-  do t h e same.  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  I t w o u l d be i n t e r e s t i n g t o a f f e c t s the  o f t h e i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n , o r i f more l i e s a r e  communicated where s u s p i c i o n  B.  such  extreme and  d e t e r m i n e i f , f o r example, t r u s t o r s u s p i c i o n extremity  1966,  the problem  must b e g i n w i t h  i n the p o s s i b i l i t y  An  i n a number  t o a c o s t l y and time-consuming  the other  with  to allow  practiced,  seem t o b r i n g  demands, k n o w i n g t h a t  interest lies  negotiator  concessions.  However, i f g e n e r a l l y  t i o n where b o t h n e g o t i a t o r s deceptive  i n order  i n f a c t be f a l s e  a p r e s c r i p t i o n would merely  when t h e  or s t y l e of beginning  ( o r low o f f e r )  of bargaining  extreme  tactics i s  F o r example, a  i n i t i a l demand i s i n f a c t  of d i s c u s s i o n s and  strategy  Included  concessions,  of negotiations,  o f f e r o r demand i s made.  might adopt the g e n e r a l  utilities.  The r o l e o f s u c h  a p p a r e n t a t t h e commencement  negotiators  Outcome-Related Concepts: I n an i n f o r m a l  i s operating.  e q u a l i t y and  equity:  s e n s e , e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y  ways i n w h i c h s e t t l e m e n t s  r e f e r t o two  c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as b e i n g  "fair".  More f o r m a l l y , possible  e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y  set of solutions  which the payoffs  r e f e r t o two o f t h e  to a bargaining  a r e asymmetric.  problem i n  Asymmetry  represented  v/here t h e u t i l i t y  the  o f money i s l i n e a r w i t h money, t h e r a n g e o f  utility  payoffs)  o f one o f t h e b a r g a i n e r s  in  a linear  one  side's  greater  function  c a n be  transformation. payoff  (or, assuming  i s increased  that  or decreased  Thus, as i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e  p o t e n t i a l , i . e . , t h e most he c a n g e t ,  than the other  side's  payoff  potential  6, is  (150 v e r s u s  30) . Equality  ("f" i n F i g u r e  6) o c c u r s when t h e a l t e r n a t i v e  a g r e e d upon b y b o t h s i d e s y i e l d s e x a c t l y for  both.  On t h e o t h e r  hand, e q u i t y  o c c u r s when t h e u n e q u a l p a y o f f account.  While  the side with  t h e same  payoff  ("d" i n F i g u r e  p o t e n t i a l i s taken the higher  payoff  6) .  into  potential  receives  an amount t h a t  i s i n absolute  t e r m s more t h a n t h e  absolute  amount r e c e i v e d  by t h e o t h e r  s i d e , i . e . , 75 v e r s u s  15,  each s i d e , r e l a t i v e  receives  p r oF p o r t i o n a l l y t h e same, i . e . , F  point of equity, is  t o i t s own p a y o f f  potential, 75 _ 15^ 317  130"  the product o f the u t i l i t i e s  At the  (75 t i m e s 15)  maximized. Reference t o such notions  equity  i s quite  from b a r g a i n i n g equality  o f f a i r n e s s as e q u a l i t y a n d  common, e v e n i n t h e . l a r g e r and n e g o t i a t i o n s .  seems t o be p r e f e r r e d  context  I t i s noteworthy  o r demanded i n some  apart that cases  150  125  100  a  b  c  0  5  10  75  50  25  0  •«-  One S i d e ' s  d  e  f  g  -f-  S o l u t i o n s o r Outcomes  15  20  25  30  -*-  The O t h e r S i d e ' s  EQUITY  Figure  6.  Payoffs  Payoffs  EQUALITY  I l l u s t r a t i o n o f e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y ( f r o m Morgan a n d Sawyer, 1 9 6 7 ) .  i n a bargaining  problem  48  whereas e q u i t y i s p r e f e r r e d i n o t h e r s . p r e f e r e n c e s b r i n g up t h e i m p o r t a n t conditions  interests  l i e ,o f course,  and  suspicion.  ( a l lcited  settlement a t equity. of equality  circumstances, detract  from  other  are rational  i n f o r m a t i o n about each  f u n c t i o n s , many game t h e o r i s t s ,  solution  Sawyer  apparent.  that bargainers  have c o m p l e t e  i n some c a s e s , R a i f f a  scribe  i n Bishop,  Zeuthen,  1963) p r e -  But d e s c r i p t i v e l y , the  m i g h t a l s o be e x p e c t e d f a c t o r s may o p e r a t e  f o r example, h y p o t h e s i z e d  the o t h e r ' s b a r g a i n i n g range  other's  e.g., Nash,  s i n c e i n many ;  t o supercede  considerations of r a t i o n a l i t y .  (1967),  of trust  However, p r e d i c t i o n s a s t o what t h e e x a c t  Under t h e assumptions  and  the other.  i n the variables  e f f e c t s m i g h t be a r e n o t i m m e d i a t e l y  and j t h a t t h e y  differential  q u e s t i o n as t o what  i n f l u e n c e t h e c h o i c e o f one o v e r  Our  utility  Such  (i.e.,  or  Morgan a n d  t h a t knowledge o f  the i n t e r v a l  between  t h e m o s t he e x p e c t e d  a n d h i s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ) w o u l d  influence  o f t h e outcome, d e p e n d i n g upon w h e t h e r  the nature  o r n o t t h e b a r g a i n e r s were f r i e n d s . reasoned,  would  bargainers" friends.  "conform l e s s  in  t o t h e model o f r a t i o n a l  Thus t h e y p r e d i c t e d t h a t w i t h k n o w l e d g e o f t h e  solutions  game t h e o r y )  equality.  they  (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967, p . 140) t h a n n o n -  o t h e r ' s b a r g a i n i n g range, equitable  Friends,  n o n f r i e n d s would tend  (as p r e s c r i b e d f o r r a t i o n a l  whereas  t o reach bargainers  f r i e n d s w o u l d t e n d more t o a g r e e t o  49  Trust least  and f r i e n d s h i p a r e o f t e n h i g h l y  i n s o f a r as t r u s t  more l i k e l y friends.  manifest  and s u b j e c t i v e ) i s  t o e x i s t between f r i e n d s t h a n between non-  To t h e e x t e n t  same r e a s o n s in  (both  that  t r u s t gives  rise  so i s i t p o s s i b l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s m i g h t a l s o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d toward s o l u t i o n s argued t h a t  of equality.  t r u s t promotes r a t i o n a l i t y  from r a t i o n a l i t y  (and t h e r e f o r e  necessarily  equal,  intuitively  more p l a u s i b l e . .  it  outcomes).  about b a r g a i n i n g  this w i l l  Hypotheses and P o s s i b l e of Trust  will  r e s u l t s i n departures  This  latter  but not  contention  are involved  outcomes.  and S u s p i c i o n  seems  making  i n making  To a c e r t a i n  hypotheses and o t h e r  e x p e r i m e n t a l outcomes w i l l  The  (and t h e r e f o r e  be r e f l e c t e d i n t h e r e m a i n i n g  i n which the s p e c i f i c  trust  by a tendency  i n non-equitable,  t h a t many c o m p l e x i t i e s  predictions  C.  that  d i s c u s s i o n h a s r a i s e d many p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  evident  extent,  (e.g;,  However, i t m i g h t a l s o be  outcomes), w h i l e s u s p i c i o n  This  t o the  f o r n o n - r a t i o n a l i t y a s does f r i e n d s h i p  t h e case o f extreme t r u s t ) ,  equitable  related, at  section,  possible  be p r e s e n t e d .  Outcomes P e r t a i n i n g Upon B a r g a i n i n g  to the E f f e c t s  and N e g o t i a t i o n s :  e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  b e made i n t e r m s o f (a) t h e p r o c e s s  of bargaining  and n e g o t i a t i o n s .  a n d (b) t h e outcome  The i n t e n t i o n w i l l  be n o t  50  only are  t o d e t e r m i n e what t h e upon b a r g a i n i n g  possible  and  e f f e c t s of  negotiations,  reasons  as  t o why  example, i t w i l l  be  hypothesized  detrimental  arrive  accepted  t o t i m e , a number o f o t h e r m e a s u r e d and  infer  the  recorded.  will be  be  two  assumed t h a t  effective in  this  i s expressed  the  t r u s t and  to  "the  in  to  suspicion.  e f f e c t s of  d o i n g ) where we the  be  be  the  t o more-  to  First  suspicion"  dealing,  experimental  suspicion,  i t will  and  Essentially,  the.relationship and  the  dependent  intervening  Thus, i t w i l l  to  communication.  negotiations. that  to  increased  threatening  postulate  t r u s t and  will  addition  possible  clarification.  and  be  to  is_ f o u n d  a l s o be  experimental manipulations  of  i t will  required, But  a  hypotheses r e l a t e d  v a r i a b l e m e a s u r e s i s m e d i a t e d by  of  be  ( i ) c r e a t i n g t r u s t and  i n the  For  experimental manipulations  influencing bargaining  between the  or  require  the  infer  dependent v a r i a b l e s w i l l  of  (ii)  effects  i n s o f a r as  p o s i t i o n s , or perhaps  points  to  occur.  Thus, i f s u s p i c i o n  Before presentation  suspicion  s u s p i c i o n has  solutions.  t o engage i n f a l s e  bargaining,  also  r e s u l t i s related, for instance,  extreme i n i t i a l tendencies  that  time to s o l u t i o n , i t w i l l  i f this  but  e f f e c t s do  i . e . , more t i m e w i l l  at mutually  extend  the  e f f e c t upon b a r g a i n i n g  more d i f f i c u l t ,  t r u s t and  be  constructs  possible  (as we  to  have been  ostensibly, with only  manipulations.  refer  the  51  The  second p o i n t  statement of  the  of  hypotheses.  v a r i a b l e measures w i l l be  advanced only  the will be  be  cast  and  the  there  suspicion  can  Accordingly,  (1)  Trust  nature of  or s u s p i c i o n empirical (2)  and the  dependent  stated, w i l l  be  e f f e c t s do  and  will  will  occur),  suspicion therefore  not  Other P o s s i b l e will  be  Outcomes:  at l e a s t three  influence bargaining  i t i s hypothesized  suspicion w i l l final  promotes e q u a l i t y or  ways i n w h i c h and  negotia-  that:  differentially  settlement.  It is  influence  However, w h e t h e r t r u s t  equity  is largely  an  question. Trust  bargaining  and  more d i f f i c u l t to reach  other  t r u s t and  questions  dependent  hypotheses  the  t o why  e f f e c t s of  actual  terms.  H y p o t h e s e s and that  For  previously as  the  a number'of  formal  them.-  information  possible  i n formal  anticipated  tions.  of  largely exploratory  The  trust  the  concerns  Although  recorded,  ( w h i c h , as  sources of  nature of  be  f o r a few  v a r i a b l e measures possible  clarification  facilitates,  whereas s u s p i c i o n  negotiations  i n s o f a r as  to achieve,  impedes  agreements w i l l  i . e . , more t i m e w i l l  a g r e e m e n t , when s u s p i c i o n ,  rather  be  be  required  than t r u s t , i s  operating. (3a)  Trust  and  suspicion w i l l  a f f e c t the  amount o f  communication. (3b) the  Furthermore, both  q u a l i t a t i v e nature of  t r u s t and  suspicion w i l l  communication d u r i n g  affect  bargaining,  52  especially This w i l l of  those  communications  be e v i d e n t  concerned with  i n the frequency  the f o l l o w i n g types  w i t h w h i c h one o r more  o f communication  a r e employed:  (i)  those  the  function of modification, including threats, refusals  to  communications  tactics.  bargain  irrelevant, (ii)  those  (analogous  t h a t a r e o b v i o u s l y d i r e c t e d toward  to strikes  and l o c k o u t s ) , a n d t a s k -  aggression-provoking communications  statements  (e.g.,  that are intended  p r i m a r i l y to  i n f o r m o r t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n r a t h e r than (iii)  those  although they  communications  lies  that give  false  s e p a r a t e l y s i n c e they  means by w h i c h u t i l i t i e s Among t h e o t h e r  possibilities  the effects  of trust  b e t w e e n t h e h i g h e s t one r e a l l y minimum d i s p o s i t i o n  that w i l l  absolute  the course  a r e those  hopes t o g e t and h i s a c t u a l of bargaining; offer  to the mid-point  (both i n o f t h e one's  range);  (c) t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h b a r g a i n i n g over  be e x a m i n e d  range, i . e . , the range  of the i n i t i a l  terms and r e l a t i v e  own a c t u a l i n i t i a l  category,  and s u s p i c i o n upon:  a t the beginning  the extremity  (lies);  c a n be m o d i f i e d . '.  (a) o n e ' s own a c t u a l i n i t i a l  (b)  information  are less-obvious  ( b u t n o t f o r m a l l y a d v a n c e d as h y p o t h e s e s ) concerning  t o modify,  m i g h t a l s o be g r o u p e d i n t h e f i r s t  are analyzed  insults),  of bargaining,  ranges w i l l  constrict  i . e . , t h e " d i f f e r e n c e between  53 the  actual  initial  ing  range;  and  bargaining  (d) i n t e r p e r s o n a l evaluative  scales  on  range  evaluation  the semantic  and  the f i n a l  (as m e a s u r e d on differential).  bargain-  seven  54 CHAPTER F I V E :  To  test  the hypotheses  Chapters  T h r e e and  ducted.  Although  will  the  first  be  entire  stage  —  stage,  will  first  manipulated  three  factorial  be  —  the  1,  5 times  0 and  In the  second  and  the e f f e c t s  over-  i n the  the  first  to either  level  of was  either  i n d u c t i o n stage  f o r m a n c e i n a b a r g a i n i n g and  and  the  upon In  s u s p i c i o n upon  n e g o t i a t i o n t a s k were  a  the  s u s p i c i o n were r e c o r d e d . of t r u s t  In  in a  o r t h e measurement s t a g e ,  of the manipulations  measures o f t r u s t  an  independent  Thus, i n the  or  stages  d u r i n g which  design. 3,  con-  presented.  f o r the 0 t o have been u n t r u s t w o r t h y  stage,  was  T h r e e were c o m b i n e d  o r an u n t r u s t w o r t h y  h i g h o r low. effects  each of the  i n d u c t i o n stage  s u b j e c t s were e x p o s e d  incentive  final  and  d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter  trustworthy  two  a three-stage experiment  experiment the  completely-crossed  a t the c o n c l u s i o n of  d e s c r i b e d i n complete d e t a i l ,  " p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e " was variables  set forth  the design  subsequently  view o f the  Four,  METHOD  the  per-  also  recorded. In  addition  t o the e x p e r i m e n t a l  was  conducted;  this  g r o u p was  the  i n d u c t i o n stage, but proceeded  and  third  stages without  manipulations  of stage  ence between the  I.  groups,  given the  instructions  directly  e x p o s u r e t o any  a control  t o the  o f the  the  treatment  for  second  experimental  In o t h e r words, the o n l y  c o n t r o l and  group  g r o u p s was  differthat  55 the on  treatment  t h e p a r t o f 0,  any  previous  the  control  of the  treatment  the  level  S u b j e c t s and Altogether,  and  white, or  and  living The  crossed  of the  t h e r e were 112  g r o u p s and  oriental,  o f t h e campus  f o r two  a l l of  the  of both  the  group  first  the  i n the  two  of  control  s u b j e c t s were belonging  was  a  to  completely  e i g h t s u b j e c t s i n each session.  cell.  A session  always i n v o l v e d a group  representing a different  S p e c i a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s and the  16  students  i n o n l y one  h o u r s and  f o u r s u b j e c t s , e a c h one  were d e s i g n e d  In  fraternities.  2 x 2 x 3 f a c t o r i a l with  For  drawn.  control  b a s i c d e s i g n of the experiment  Subjects:  and s u s p i c i o n  v o l u n t e e r s u b j e c t s , 96  a l l were m a l e u n i v e r s i t y  lasted  of  t h e outcomes o f b a r g a i n i n g .  Each s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t e d usually  sample was  estimate  Design:  f o r one  i n one  trust  which  compared.  of the b a s e - l i n e l e v e l s  whom were i n t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l Except  of  have  Essentially,  c o n s i s t e d o f an  responses  indication  bargaining process  group.  I.  g r o u p s c o u l d be  or pre-treatment  stage,  an  group d i d not  0 during stage  the p o p u l a t i o n from which the  provided  A.  control  t h e measurement s t a g e , t h i s  bargaining  trustworthiness or b e t r a y a l  group p r o v i d e d b a s e - l i n e b e h a v i o r w i t h  the e x i s t i n g in  whereas the  experience with  the behavior In  groups e x p e r i e n c e d  the Recruitment  s t a g e s , the  t o make i t p o s s i b l e f o r t h e  of  fraternity.  of  the  experimental  tasks  subjects either  to  56  win  or  other  t o l o s e money, a p p a r e n t l y  d e p e n d i n g upon w h e t h e r  g r o u p members were t r u s t w o r t h y  or not.  A l l of  potential  s u b j e c t s were t h e r e f o r e r e q u e s t e d  under the  complete understanding  t h a t even though  c o u l d win  up  a l s o a genuine r i s k  losing  t o $2.50 o f t h e i r  up  required  t o $5.00, t h e r e was own  money.  t o b r i n g $2.50 i n c a s h  before  participate.  . Any  although,  reimbursed  of course,  no  they of  They w e r e , i n being  a t the  one  the  volunteer  allowed  l o s s e s t h a t were i n c u r r e d d u r i n g  e x p e r i m e n t were d o u b l y session  to  was  the  fact, to  the  c o n c l u s i o n of informed  of  the  this  beforehand. To  facilitate  recruitment,  the  p r e s i d e n t of the  the  e x p e r i m e n t c o u l d be  guise  o f an  substantial  o f money  conducted through the competition.  ($50.00) .  was  d e t e r m i n e d by  a formula  the  fraternity  a whole d u r i n g  the  number  volunteers for  that participated.  the  to supply  (or a t l e a s t ,  At  IFC  s t a k e was  a  by  e x p e r i m e n t , and ( i i )  an  of incentive  In a d d i t i o n ,  i n c e n t i v e not  only  t o l o s e h i s own  to  a l s o t o do w e l l f o r t h e  s a k e o f e a r n i n g more p o i n t s  not  losing  prize  f o r the  do  money),  but  them) t o w a r d t h e  the  fraternity  (i) performance  volunteers.  not  with  whereby  under  t o t a l membership)  an  made  (IFC)  winning  T h u s , t h e r e was  f o r each i n d i v i d u a l ,  for himself  The  combining  ( i n p r o p o r t i o n to the  each f r a t e r n i t y  t h e r e was, well  as  a r r a n g e m e n t was  Inter-Fraternity Council  inter-fraternity sum  an  fraternity.  (or  57  B.  Procedure: All  four  of  the  separate c u b i c l e s . during  the  The  induction  each s u b j e c t subjects.  could  During  however, p o r t a b l e to close  subjects  the  were s e a t e d  cubicles,were  s t a g e and  see the  the  the  not  measurement and  stage;  two  small  sides,  and  one  At  s e e n by  the  asked for  with  quarters,  name and  then read  cooperative them t h a t w o u l d be In  of  better  effort  t o s t a g e I I , and  other  the  On  stages  experimenter experi-  each desk were:  i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the  "COOPERATE" p r i n t e d on  session, this  experimenter  completely  the  both  sides;  and  first both  a  change.  While  fraternity.  f o r the  a l l subjects  amount was  identified A brief  aloud  each  introductory  subjects  t o be  competitive.  were  being  It also  changed partici-  statement  neither  they d i d i n d i v i d u a l l y , the  completely  reminded better i t  fraternity. to  facilitate  as w e l l ,  subjects,  task  the  themselves or  tasks  the  i n s t r u c t i n g the  nor  the  an  f o r loose  $2.50.  the  with  not  bargaining  subjects. the  four  that  Thus, even the  "SELF" p r i n t e d on  beginning  to produce  p a n t by was  s i g n s , one  container  the  the  opaque p a r t i t i o n s e n a b l e d  be  in  i n s t r u c t i o n periods,  experimenter, but  a p e n c i l ; a d i t t o e d o u t l i n e of  cardboard  a r r a n g e d so  cubicles off entirely.  menter c o u l d  a t desks  the  t r a n s i t i o n from stage  t o m a i n t a i n the  i n t e r e s t of  i n s t r u c t i o n s were i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h task-related activities.  I  the  either Moreover,  58  in  the f i r s t  ately  two s t a g e s , t h e t a s k s were n o t a l w a y s  p r e c e d e d by t h e r e l a t e d The  detailed  procedure  instructions.  described herein w i l l  the exact c h r o n o l o g i c a l order o f events experiment. as  though  I n s t e a d , each  the i n s t r u c t i o n s  contiguous. be  The a c t u a l  stage w i l l  The factors  purpose  (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ,  each  incentive  will  the three  t o b e t r a y , and i n Chapter  Three.  i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a 4 - p e r s o n game i n  toward  one o f t h e o t h e r  A l l o f t h e s u b j e c t s were l e d t o  t h e y were i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h e a c h  the responses  other; buti n  o f t h e " o t h e r s " were a l l c o m p l e t e l y  by t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r .  s u c h a way t h a t e a c h  The game was s t r u c t u r e d i n  s u b j e c t p e r c e i v e d t h a t he h a d a c h o i c e ,  t h a t h i s c h o i c e t o t r u s t 0 o r n o t was e n t i r e l y  own v o l i t i o n ;  it  t a s k s had been  s u b j e c t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f  that  controlled  forced  as a u n i t ,  of the chapter.  discussed previously  members o f t h e g r o u p .  i.e.,  be d e s c r i b e d  s t a g e was t o m a n i p u l a t e  whether o r n o t t o m a n i f e s t t r u s t  fact,  out i n the  c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r o f events  of this  T h i s was a c c o m p l i s h e d  believe  not follow  INDUCTION:  number o f e x p o s u r e s )  which  carried  and t h e r e l a t e d  summarized a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n  STAGE I :  immedi-  but actually,  to trust  was p o s s i b l e  "0" —  t h e s u b j e c t s were  i . e . , trust  virtually  the experimenter.  f o r the experimenter  of h i s  t o manipulate  Thus,  not only  "O's"  t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , i . e . , programming  fulfill  or b e t r a y the s u b j e c t s ' t r u s t ,  incentive either  t o b e t r a y and  fulfilled  or  Instructions entirely This  of  t h e number o f t i m e s  examples  for this  t o make t h e s u b s e q u e n t  A dittoed available  outline  was  comprehension  these  the desk.  immediately  or The  instruc-  f o r easy r e f e r e n c e .  from  one  By means o f a  to four.  r e q u i r e d to ante  " c o o p e r a t e " by way  tallied  on  pointing  i n which each  vote  outcomes were d e f i n e d , and  informed  o f each  all  "cooperate",  vote  outcome and  antes  r e t u r n e d p l u s an  votes  "self",  as  i t was  additional  25*.  t h a t one  the  and  was  the  entire  b e i n g made. completely  implications:  (i) I f  i.e., their  (ii)  individual  then  voted  t h e s u b j e c t s were  i t s social  one  of the signs  person voted  t h e n a l l r e c e i v e 50C,  then a l l but  Each  25C  t o one  the b l a c k b o a r d so t h a t  group c o u l d keep t r a c k o f each Three  highly  n o t t h e numbers drawn by  E a c h s u b j e c t was  "self"  strict  manipulations  to the s u b j e c t s :  number, b u t  the  s u c c e s s i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e number drawn, e a c h  either on  three.  their  supplementing  a t a l l times  game, as p r e s e n t e d  knew o n l y h i s own  in  trust  employed i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n  draw, t h e s u b j e c t s were numbered  other  the  s t a g e were g i v e n  of the s u b j e c t s , to f a c i l i t a t e  credible.  The  also  to  by means o f an e i g h t m i n u t e v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g .  t h e t a s k , and  t i o n s Was  but  either  betrayed.  and  t e c h n i q u e was  attention  "0"  I f only lose  25C  one  their  60  antes. (the  The  one  i n d i v i d u a l who  p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l  w h e t h e r he  he h a d  voted  getting  "cooperate".  "self",  then  the  first  person  his  total  loss  either  to vote  "self"  i n " the votes In a l l groups,  "cooperate".  number 3) was "self",  and  "cooperate",  loses  "coon  in  more t h a n i f  i f two  antes;  50C  o r more  i n addition,  another  75£  making  3.  When t h e  and  "vote" o f each  the experimenter  was  f o r t h e n o n - e x i s t e n t numbers the votes  Thus e a c h  confronted with  inviting  t h e draw f o r t h e  rigged^" so t h a t a l l o f the s u b j e c t s  apparently being t a l l i e d ,  always  o r 50C  ( i i i ) Lastly, 25$  voted  group);  In the a c t u a l experiment,  were a s s i g n e d p o s i t i o n  4.  5C  had  (depending  incentive  a l l lose their  p o s i t i o n numbers was  "filling  o r 50C  receives  $1.00.  Rationale:  and  5C  i s i n a h i g h o r low  o t h e r w o r d s , he was  was  "self"  amount he w o u l d h a v e r e c e i v e d i f he  operate")  vote  votes  outcome  f o r numbers  subject  1,  last  fact 2,  2 were the  of e i t h e r voting  on h i s own,  i n e f f e c t b e i n g the  in  ( s i n c e a l l had  the d e c i s i o n (iii)  1 and  person  or v o t i n g  t o a l l o w number  "'"Elaborate p r e c a u t i o n s were a d o p t e d t o e n s u r e t h a t s u b j e c t s would not d e t e c t the d e c e p t i o n . T h e s e s t e p s were j u s t i f i e d by t h e a s s e r t i o n t h a t a n o n y m i t y ( a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as no one knew who had drawn t h e o t h e r numbers) w o u l d e n c o u r a g e l e s s - , i n h i b i t e d responding. F o r e x a m p l e , when t h e v o t e s were a p p a r e n t l y b e i n g t a l l i e d , the experimenter scanned a l l f o u r c u b i c l e s 'to p r e v e n t t h e s u b j e c t s f r o m d e t e c t i n g t h e p e r s o n upon whom he was f o c u s s i n g . S i m i l a r m e a s u r e s were a d o p t e d when p a y o f f s were b e i n g made o r when p e n a l t i e s were b e i n g collected.  61 4 to determine the  group.  t h e outcome f o r h i m s e l f and t h e r e s t o f  Almost i n v a r i a b l y ,  the subjects voted  t o "co-  operate" . By had  virtue  of h i s p o s i t i o n ,  a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f power.  ultimately  decided  In essence,  this  which reduced important  i f the r e s t  to the matrix  feature of this  "cooperate", as b e i n g chose. could  experimenter)  I t was h i s v o t e  o f t h e g r o u p won  number  shown i n F i g u r e  s i t u a t i o n was  forced to trust  which  or l o s t .  situation  7.  that  The  although  number  4 by v o t i n g  4 c o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s be c h a r a c t e r i z e d  trustworthy  or untrustworthy  according  T h i s was p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e number —  t o how  he  4 h a d a c h o i c e and  b u t d i d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y have t o -- e x e r c i s e h i s  power t o e x p l o i t  The  the v u l n e r a b i l i t y  manipulations:  menter simply  tallied  "cooperate",  vote,  (a)  number  i . e . , number  s u s p i c i o n , he t a l l i e d "self"  4 (the  constituted a "forced trust"  number 3 was v i r t u a l l y  to  number  number  i . e . , number  of the o t h e r s .  To i n d u c e 4's v o t e 4 was  trust,  as b e i n g  trustworthy.  4's v o t e  as b e i n g  4 was u n t r u s t w o r t h y .  the e x p e r i the f o u r t h To  induce  the only (b)  The  ^ " I n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t s v o t e d " s e l f " i n o n l y a few c a s e s : once i n a g r o u p i n w h i c h t r u s t was i n d u c e d a n d f o u r t i m e s i n g r o u p s , i n w h i c h s u s p i c i o n was i n d u c e d , a l w a y s on t h e l a s t t r i a l o f a s e r i e s of three or f i v e t r i a l s . In these cases, the e x p e r i m e n t e r c o u l d n o t and d i d n o t t a l l y t h e v o t e f o r number 3 on the board. I n s t e a d , he e x p l a i n e d t h a t s i n c e number 4 h a d h a d s u c h an a d v a n t a g e , he ( t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r ) w o u l d now d e p r i v e number 4 o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o f how number 3 h a d v o t e d . The e x p e r i m e n t e r t h e n a p p a r e n t l y t o o k number 4's v o t e .  Group  (Numbers 1, 2, a n d 3) Suspicious  Trusting Trustworthy  25C  Untrustworthy  ( 5* 25£+( (50$  25C  -25*  -25C*  -25$  -25*  -25***  Number 4  *except f o r the only p l u s 5C o r 50C. **except f o r the f i r s t altogether.  FIGURE 7.  one t o v o t e  one t o v o t e  "self"  "self"  —  he r e c e i v e s  —  25C  he l o s e s $1.00  M a t r i x r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e I n d u c t i o n game i n w h i c h number 4 c h o o s e s l a s t . Number f o u r ' s p a y o f f i s t h e f i r s t e n t r y i n each c e l l . The s e c o n d e n t r y i s t h e p a y o f f f o r any one member o f t h e g r o u p .  63  manipulation described. incentive t h a t the  of  the  i n c e n t i v e f a c t o r has  In order levels  to permit  and  subjects  perceived  the  draw, t h e  "bonus" t o t h e  fide  so  one  of  two  (c)  the  The  levels  of  the  many t r i a l s  trusting  and  the  this  In the  context with  entailed risking  trusting  only  O's  number o f  t i m e s 0 was  or  an  the  untrustthree 3,  and  of exactly  a range of  from  5.  how one  asked.  choice  game, a l l  of t r u s t i n g  0  money.  game  virtually  The  (Factor A),  untrustworthy trustworthy  or  or  forced  therefore possible  trustworthiness  i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 t o be  of  constituted  f a c t o r w e r e 1,  o n e ' s own  I t was  bona  was  number  of a four-person the  "self"  draw was  the  voted)  t h a t e a c h s u b j e c t was choice.  voted  experiment,, the  although  m e n t i o n e d i f anyone  s t r u c t u r e d so  the  (i.e.,  a n t e and  t h e r e would be,  manipulate not also  This  another  incentive condition  trials  In  s u b j e c t s were c o n f r o n t e d  make t h e  50C.  s u b j e c t s were n e v e r i n f o r m e d  Summary:  was  or  number o f e x p o s u r e s  t w e n t y was  not;  5£  as  means o f  to e i t h e r a trustworthy  (number 4 ) .  However, t h e  to  values,  s u b j e c t s made an  worthy other  t h a t by  the  assumption  s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l who  number o f  number o f e x p o s u r e s  the  incentive levels  s u b j e c t s were t o l d  t h a t assignment to the  random. times  the  been .  comparison between  t h e r e f o r e to allow  intended,  w o u l d be  the  already  (Factor  to  to but B),  untrustworthy  64 (Factor C ) .  In the t r u s t  conditions  ( i n w h i c h 0 was  trust-  w o r t h y ) t h e s u b j e c t s a l l won money; b u t i n t h e s u s p i c i o n conditions all  lost  ( i n w h i c h 0 was u n t r u s t w o r t h y ) ,  their  own money.  As s o o n a s t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s  were c o m p l e t e , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r stage  II tasks.  MEASUREMENT:  In t h i s  stage,  two measurements were t a k e n  o f the stage  a response  probability  I manipulations.  on t h e o n e - t r i a l ,  i n Figure  FIGURE  8.  +$0 .50  +$0.50  +$1.00  -$1.00  8.  —  The f i r s t was  s e q u e n t i a l - c h o i c e PDG  -$1.00  matrix  0  0  PDG m a t r i x u s e d t o m e a s u r e t r u s t a n d suspicion i n a one-trial, sequentialp l a y game.  the extent  Preliminary  t o which a s u b j e c t f e l t or untrustworthy,  instructions  w e r e s e t up t o p e r m i t sheets  simply  +$1.00  and t h e PDG t a s k :  the experimenter  a t ease without  certain  given  (the s u b j e c t ) had a l r e a d y extended h i s t r u s t  response  of the  The s e c o n d was a measure o f s u b j e c t i v e  t h a t O would be t r u s t w o r t h y he  to the  .  STAGE I I :  shown  proceeded d i r e c t l y  These a r e d e s c r i b e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g  section.  effects  the subjects  that  t o 0.  Partitions  t o p a s s and c o l l e c t  r e v e a l i n g any o f t h e d e c e p -  65 tions  t h a t were e m p l o y e d .  facilitate subject.  example o f one  that it  sheets  no  While  special  intentionally  that  reason  arranged  be  p a i r e d w i t h number 4.  sized  t h i s was  that  drawn t h e i r one  that  horizontal  line  the matrix.  The  They were t h e n  designated  "Red"  simply  across either s h e e t was  simply  the other  determined  each  "Green",  by  cutting  by  drawing  a  t h e t o p o r t h e b o t t o m row  then  t o be had  delivered already  t o draw a v e r t i c a l  to  of  Green,  chosen.  line  down to  either inter-  line.  P a y o f f s were t o be  printed  and  even  that within  o r the r i g h t - h a n d column o f t h e m a t r i x  s e c t w i t h Red's  lines  told  t o choose f i r s t  w o u l d t h e r e f o r e know what Red  G r e e n ' s t a s k was  the  empha-  cards.  Red's t a s k was  left-  number 3 w o u l d  ( I t s h o u l d be  t h e s e d e s i g n a t i o n s w o u l d be  a deck o f  pairings,  announced, b e f o r e t h e s u b j e c t s had  numbers.)  w o u l d be  believe  t h a t s u b j e c t number 1 w o u l d  definitely  the  each  arbitrarily  f o r the p a r t i c u l a r  p a i r e d w i t h number 2 and  who  to  t h e s u b j e c t s were l e d t o  be  and  one  to  i s included i n  i t w o u l d be  definitely  pair,  designed  distributed,  of these  informed  into pairs.  t h e r e was  was  sheets  A.  E a c h g r o u p was divided  response  c o m p r e h e n s i o n were t h e n An  Appendix  PDG  drav/n by  i n r e d and  Red  determined and  Green.  by  the  intersection  of  Red's p a y o f f s were  G r e e n ' s p a y o f f s were p r i n t e d  i n green  to  66  facilitate • fully  comprehension.  E a c h o f t h e outcomes was  e x p l a i n e d a n d as w e l l ,  Red, was  fully  t h e dilemma, e s p e c i a l l y f o r  v e r b a l i z e d . . The s u b j e c t s were i n f o r m e d  t h e r e w o u l d b e o n l y one t r i a l , that the payoff of  of  entries  represented  that  reminded real  No i n d i c a t i o n  sums  was  t a s k , i . e . , t h e measure  subjective probability.  time  Once a g a i n ,  s o t h a t e a c h s u b j e c t was  e a c h s u b j e c t was number 3  (who was  t h e draw was designated  l e d to b e l i e v e that:  ( s t a g e I ) ; (b) he was  p r e v i o u s l y trustworthy  (c) he was  now  designated  first  i n the o n e - t r i a l  first  stage,  the  or l o s t .  t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be a n o t h e r  Rationale;  the  a n d t h e y were a l s o  i n the matrix  money t h a t w o u l d be won  given  care-  Red.  this  In e f f e c t ,  (a) he h a d drawn  paired with  number 4  or untrustworthy,  etc.);  Red and t h e r e f o r e h a d t o c h o o s e  s e q u e n t i a l c h o i c e PDG.^  s u b j e c t s were i n t h i s  choice of trusting  "fixed",  0 or not.  stage  As i n t h e  confronted  T h i s time,  with  however, each  As was m e n t i o n e d p r e v i o u s l y ( s e e F o o t n o t e 1, page 6 0 ) , a number o f p r e c a u t i o n s were t a k e n t o e n h a n c e c r e d i b i l i t y . In a d d i t i o n t o the precautions o u t l i n e d before, the experimenter d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s t o 'Green' e v e n t h o u g h none o f t h e s u b j e c t s h a d i n f a c t b e e n d e s i g n a t e d as G r e e n ; f u r t h e r more, t h e c a r d s u s e d i n t h e draws were a l w a y s s h u f f l e d t h o r o u g h l y w h i l e t h e s u b j e c t s o b s e r v e d , and t h e s u b j e c t s were e v e n a l l o w e d e i t h e r t o c u t o r t o draw t h e c a r d s when t h e numbers a n d c o l o r s were b e i n g d e s i g n a t e d . At the c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t , t h e s u c c e s s o f t h e s e e f f o r t s was a s s e s s e d i n an i n f o r m a l manner. In the d e b r i e f i n g p e r i o d , the e x p e r i m e n t e r t o l d t h e s u b j e c t s t h a t o t h e r s had found t h e m a n i p u l a t i o n s t o be u n c o n v i n c i n g and o b v i o u s l y c o n t r i v e d . The i n t e n t i o n was, o f c o u r s e , t o e n c o u r a g e t h e s u b j e c t s t o v e r b a l i z e any o f t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s a b o u t t h e e x p e r i m e n t . Only two s u b j e c t s d i d s o , and t h e r e f o r e none o f t h e d a t a f r o m e i t h e r o f t h e i r g r o u p s was i n c l u d e d i n any p a r t o f t h i s r e p o r t .  67 s u b j e c t knew t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be o n l y one t r i a l . o t h e r h a n d , e a c h s u b j e c t was now t r u l y  free  On t h e  t o choose;  furthermore,  he was a b l e t o b a s e h i s c h o i c e upon  experience.  Thus, t h e use o f t h e s u b j e c t s ' responses  t h e PDG a s o n e o f t h e m e a s u r e s o f t r u s t  previous on  and s u s p i c i o n was  justified.  Subjective probability: In t h i s  p a r t of stage  menter t o d i s t r i b u t e sheets  still  I I , i t was n e c e s s a r y  the appropriate  each o t h e r .  sheets,-the  as  o f response  sheet.  t h e two PDG r e s p o n s e  the  two Red s u b j e c t s  p a u s e was a l l o w e d time  t o make t h e i r  to permit forms.  After  experimenter  s u b j e c t s who were d e s i g n a t e d type  response  t h a t they  were  c o l l e c t i n g the  announced t h a t t h e  Red w o u l d r e c e i v e y e t a n o t h e r  T h e s e were d i s t r i b u t e d sheets  were b e i n g  presumably  d e l i v e r e d from  t o t h e two G r e e n s u b j e c t s .  A  o s t e n s i b l y t o g i v e t h e two G r e e n responses.  the subjects t o read  Then, t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r  subjective probability  response  Actually,  brief subjects  t h e p a u s e was  the i n s t r u c t i o n s  given  on t h e new  proceeded t o e x p l a i n the task.  Because t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y largely  f o r the experi-  instructions, a l l  the subjects' impression  interacting with  PDG r e s p o n s e  and t h e t a s k :  the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y  and t o a d m i n i s t e r  while maintaining  instructions  response  sheets  were  s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y , few i n s t r u c t i o n s were r e q u i r e d .  68  An  example o f t h e r e s p o n s e  Subjects asked less  t o suppose t h a t o f what t h e y  to indicate  i n F i g u r e 9.  t h e y d i d c h o o s e t h e t o p row r e g a r d -  actually  chose.  That  i s , s u b j e c t s were  the other person.  the e x t e n t t o which they  the other person worthy g i v e n t h a t him.  i s presented  d e s i g n a t e d Red, i . e . , a l l o f t h e s u b j e c t s , were  t o suppose they had t r u s t e d was  sheet  Their task  felt  certain  that  (number 4) w o u l d be t r u s t w o r t h y o r u n t r u s t they had a l r e a d y extended  their  Operationally, subjective probability,  trust to  i . e . , certainty  o r u n c e r t a i n t y , was t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h a s u b j e c t ' s response  (a mark on t h e s c a l e  deviated  from  was  the mid-point  i n d i c a t e d by a r e s p o n s e  illustrated  of the scale. at either  i n F i g u r e 9) Complete  certainty  o f t h e extreme  ends  w h e r e a s maximum u n c e r t a i n t y was i n d i c a t e d b y a r e s p o n s e a t the mid-point As  of the scale.  s o o n a s a l l o f t h e s u b j e c t s h a d made t h e i r  the experimenter then  collected  removed f o r a s h o r t c o f f e e b r e a k .  t h e outcomes o f s t a g e this  the sheets.  responses,  The p a r t i t i o n s Queries  were  regarding  I I were n o t , o f c o u r s e , a n s w e r e d a t  time.  Summary:  During  stage I , three v a r i a b l e s  as b e i n g r e l e v a n t t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t r u s t were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r i e d . these manipulations were d e t e r m i n e d .  In stage  hypothesized and s u s p i c i o n  I I , the e f f e c t s of  upon two m e a s u r e s o f t r u s t  and s u s p i c i o n  T h e - f i r s t m e a s u r e was t h e r e s p o n s e  made by  69  Figure  9.  R e s p o n s e s c a l e u s e d t o measure and s u s p i c i o n .  subjective  trust  SP FORM f o r RED.  ( I ) R e g a r d l e s s o f w h a t y o u a c t u a l l y c h o s e o n t h e PD  Form j u s t p r e v i o u s l y , s u p p o s e t h a t y o u c h o s e t h e u p p e r r o w ; i . e . ,  right  left  suppose you c h o s e .  (ii)  -fr  upper  + $0.50  + $0.50  lower  + $1.00  - $1.00  - $1.00  0  + $1.00  '< 0  W h i c h c o l u m n do y o u t h i n k t h e o t h e r p e r s o n w o u l d c h o o s e I f y o u c h o s e t h e u p p e r , r o w , a n d how c e r t a i n a r e y o u t h a t he w o u l d make such a c h o i c e ? (ANSWER BY ING ONLY ONE MARK ANYWHERE ON EITHER THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT HALF OF THE L I N E BELOW, TO THE EXTENT THAT YOU FEEL HE WOULD MAKE SUCH A CHOICE.)  1.00?  ]00%  I am a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t he wouId c h o o s e t h e column oo t h e l e f t .  I am u n c e r t a i n a s t o w h a t he would choose.  I am a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a i he would choos-j t h e column on t h e r i g h t .  70  a s u b j e c t on the of  subject  a one-trial  d i c h o t o m o u s - c h o i c e PDG  chose f i r s t .  The  subjective probability  felt  certain t h a t he  trust  O.  (the s u b j e c t )  BARGAINING AND  Because a l l of still  paired with  ment, i t was  the  further deception was of  completely the  subjects  first.  explained  task of  and  the  given  payoff  bargaining  task  the  of  Some o f adopted  task  could no  a l l bargaining  principal  for this  the  and  however, and  the  experi-  trust  negotiations  were  stage  procedural  features will  be  details  will  fully.  were a r b i t r a r i l y only  their  schedule).  It  was  emphasized  on  the  scales represented  session.  p a r t of  experimenter,  to the  p a i r e d f o r the  own  scales  (i.e.,  The  payoff  schedule  p r o b l e m employed  would r e c e i v e  thought t h a t they  T h e r e was,  Subsequently,  more  Subjects  the  untrustworthy  made a d e c i s i o n t o  effects  and  stage.  bona f i d e .  experimental  outlined be  by  or  subject  NEGOTIATIONS:  number 4 i n t h i s  in this  a measure  to which a  already  p l a u s i b l e t h a t the  determined  extent  trustworthy had  s u s p i c i o n upon a b a r g a i n i n g be  s e c o n d m e a s u r e was the  t h a t 0 w o u l d be  given  STAGE I I I :  —  i n which  i s presented  subjects real  was  their for  own  10.  i n Figure  t h a t the  payoffs  a t the  c o n d u c t e d by  side  the  indicated  amounts o f money t h a t  (or have deducted)  Bargaining  bargaining  they  c o n c l u s i o n of  means o f  written  the  Figure  10.  Payoff  schedules received  by  the  subjects.  1  >  CD  O  o  m  Tl  OJ UJ  Oi  UJ vO  OJ  o NJ  00 00  M  Ul  0\  t\J  NJ  NJ  3 00  NJ  -J  f~  Z  o  00  o> O  NJ  -J  a\  o  ON  ~n  NJ O  7>  NJ Ul  NJ  03 ' OJ NJ  OJ  — c—  Ul  7v  -Cb O  1—  -C» •Cb  2  •o  z  Ul  NJ  o  m  ~J OJ  OJ  c—  • .Cb  NJ  7>  —  1  -Cb  N)  Ul  o>  o  TJ  O  '.o  TO  •Cb  -Pb  JD  LT)  00  -Cb  o\ 00  OJ  —J  OJ OJ  -j  cz  ON  o»  <  o  X  o\  O  -j  oo  1  00  1  00  —1  —I  c  <  -c*  X  1  72  communications  only.  Although  w e r e s u p p l i e d , t h e r e was either  in effect  the q u a n t i t y or the  Partitions  prevented  p r i n t e d standard  the  content  i n a s m u c h as  time  or s u b t r a c t e d from the no  specified  time  b a r g a i n i n g was  Initial facilitate  o f the  final  payoff.  discontinued after  understanding  and  of the  task,  and  the  of the b a r g a i n i n g task  The  o t h e r was  a detailed  two  d i f f e r e n t b a r g a i n i n g problems  By  effectively to represent conflicting or the  t h e way such  two  of the  payoff  each o t h e r ' s  or  familiar  analogy  p o s s i b l e to schedules  was  illustrate would.be"used  h e l d by  t o d i s c o v e r and  for  to  as  each  the side  modify  preferences.  schedule  s i d e ' s s c a l e ranged  B).  C).  of b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s  bargainers  utilities  In the p a y o f f one  aspects  procedure  schedules  (see A p p e n d i x  i n which p a y o f f  To  h a n d o u t s were  (see A p p e n d i x  o r d e r i n g of the p r e f e r e n c e s  a t t e m p t s by  although  t h e b a r g a i n i n g t a s k a more  t h i s means, i t was  to  however,  schedule:  frame o f r e f e r e n c e , a used c a r b u y e r - d e a l e r employed.  a  minutes.  outline  example s h e e t w i t h  to give  Time was  subjects  the p a y o f f  One  In order  person  T h e r e was,  thirty  distributed.  an  communication.  delivered.  given to the  instructions  rules  upon  b o n u s e s . o r p e n a l t i e s were a d d e d  limit  was  restriction  s u b j e c t s from s e e i n g the  t o whom t h e messages were b e i n g factor  no  messages  actually  f r o m - 7£  used  (see F i g u r e  t o $3.36 o v e r  10)  twenty-four.  73  alternatives  and  other  s c a l e ranged  by  side's  multiples Except  about the other  increased  of  side's)  f r o m - 4*  lowest payoff,  side's  payoffs  to  were o r d e r e d  was  no  of  16,  87C  and  whereas  the  increased  information  s c a l e beyond the  The  lowest payoff  for  the  the  most e x t r e m e i n i t i a l  initial  multiples  4.^  f o r the  other  by  given  offer.  i n the  i n order  In the  fact  given  that his  opposite  to provide  absence of  was  direction.  some  such a  (the  standard  standard,  o f f e r w o u l d h a v e b e e n somewhat  justified.  Communication: medium o f the  different  various  D i f f e r e n t c o l o r s made t h e types e a s i e r . first,  t h e r e were nor  S t a n d a r d messages c o n s i s t e d easily  c o m p l e t e d by  of  be  subject.  get  at  in between  types of  inter-  messages  truthful. any  one  The  informational  "What do y o u  found  "standard"  s i x items,  only  Copies of a l l  distinction  necessarily  the  items ranged from p u r e l y  communications, e.g.,  can  T h e r e were two  w h i c h were n e i t h e r b i n d i n g  these  subjects.  t y p e s of note forms used  s u b j e c t messages:  c o u l d be  messages c o n s t i t u t e d t h e  communication between the  A p p e n d i x D. the  Written  of  which  nature  sorts ?",  of  of to  ^ " R e g u l a r i t i e s i n t h e i n c r e m e n t s were d i s g u i s e d by a d d i n g o r s u b t r a c t i n g 1 t o o r f r o m e a c h s i d e ' s p a y o f f s a t some o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s was done i n o r d e r t o r e d u c e p r o m i n e n c e o f a s o l u t i o n b a s e d upon e a r l y d e t e c t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e upon w h i c h t h e s c a l e s were c o n s t r u c t e d .  74 communications other.  i n w h i c h one b a r g a i n e r  A seventh  completely  i n which t h e s u b j e c t  content  o f t h e messages.  analysis, (1)  four  content  messages g e a r e d  mation;  open i t e m  could write  T h e r e was t h e r e f o r e v i r t u a l l y  could  threaten the  was a l s o  possible  any message he w a n t e d .  no r e s t r i c t i o n  upon t h e  However, f o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f  categories  strictly  were d i s t i n g u i s h e d :  toward t h e exchange o f i n f o r -  (2) m e s s a g e s g e a r e d o b v i o u s l y  toward t h e f u n c t i o n  o f m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g , f o r example, t h r e a t s , and  strikes;  (3) m e s s a g e s w h i c h , i n c o n v e y i n g  m a t i o n were l e s s o b v i o u s l y (4)  false  bonuses.  infor-  g e a r e d toward m o d i f i c a t i o n ; and  m e s s a g e s w h i c h were p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h  payoff  ultimatums,  The s u b j e c t s  were t o l d  time and  that the standard  m e s s a g e s were more o r l e s s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r v o c a l cation  and c o u l d  On  n o t be used  the other  contracts.  hand, t h e second type o f form —  " d e c i s i o n " message — truthful.  to f i n a l i z e  was b i n d i n g ,  commitments.  but not necessarily  contracts  Thus, w h i l e  o r t o make d e f i n i t e  threats  could  be t e n t a t i v e l y p r o p o s e d on t h e s t a n d a r d  final  a c t i o n s were a c t u a l l y e x e c u t e d o n l y  outlined.  The d e c i s i o n messages c o u l d  unilateral  be made a n d o f f e r s  could  according  the  D e c i s i o n m e s s a g e s were u s e d p r i m a r i l y i n o r d e r  to a r r i v e a t f i n a l  messages.  communi-  messages,  on t h e d e c i s i o n  a l s o be  t o one o f t h e f o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  categorized  previously  75 T h e r e was  no r e s t r i c t i o n  upon t h e number o r t h e t y p e  o f m e s s a g e s s e n t o r upon t h e d u r a t i o n  of the  interval  between messages.  ( A t times,, h o w e v e r , t h e r e was  some u n i n t e n t i o n a l  delay  influx,  o r an i n t e n t i o n a l  from knowing I t was  mandatory  t o have t r u t h f u l l y  forms  which  to prevent the being  on w h i c h  standard  Statements  s u b j e c t s were  supposed  their  forms were, o f c o u r s e , , a l w a y s  from the statements would  partners.  Without  delivered.  the v e r a c i t y  Statements  provided  c o u l d be  divulged  r a n g e and one's  own  no  t h e means by (especially  determined i n the  In a d d i t i o n , measures o f such i n t e r v a l s bargaining  n e v e r be  a corresponding statement,  o f some o f t h e messages  i n f o r m a t i o n a l ones)  initial  subjects  delivered.)  t h e i r minimum and  These  sudden  t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r , and t h e s u b j e c t s were a s s u r e d  information  message was  of a  by a " s t a t e m e n t " .  indicated  maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s .  to t h e i r  because  t h a t each message, whether  accompanied  were s e p a r a t e p r i n t e d  r e t a i n e d by  delay  t o whom a message was  o r d e c i s i o n , be  that  i n delivery  either  as t h e  the  analysis. actual  bargaining  range  were o b t a i n e d f r o m t h e s t a t e m e n t s .  Time and was  instituted  strikes: to place,  A system o f time bonuses in effect,  upon t h e d u r a t i o n o f b a r g a i n i n g . this  system  intention  i s included  of this  arrangement  was  a k i n d o f a time  A detailed  i n Appendix  and  B.  The  penalties limit  description principal  t o make t i m e a  salient  of  76 consideration life  during bargaining,  situations  i n which ultimatums  gaming" i s p r a c t i c e d . for  instituting  to a s t r i k e  as o f t e n o c c u r s are given  of refusal  or a lock-out.  s i d e s were l o s i n g  0, the party  The  similar  involved i n using this  to that i n a real  c o s t i n g y o u more t h a n  Checking:  determine p r e c i s e l y  given  alternative.  indicated  the alternative  was r e t u r n e d w i t h  the other  i s somewhat  " I t ' s h u r t i n g me, b u t  bargainer  person's payoff  t o check, a b a r g a i n e r  to the experimenter. that the bargainer  the requested  e x p e r i m e n t e r a s s o o n as p o s s i b l e . limit  tactic  t o t h e number o f t i m e s  This  the h i g h e r  Using  wanted  slip checked  i n f o r m a t i o n by t h e Although  t h e r e was no  one c o u l d c h e c k , a c h a r g e o f f o r each  3-1/2C f o r t h e p e r s o n  with  with the  such h i g h l y d i s p a r a t e s c a l e s f o r t h e  b a r g a i n i n g problem probably more i n h e r e n t l y c o n f l i c t f u l . consequently  had only  amounted t o a b o u t 17-1/2C f o r t h e p e r s o n  s c a l e , and about  lower s c a l e .  a t any  This  5% o f o n e ' s maximum p o s s i b l e p a y o f f was l e v i e d check.  period.  i t ' s c o s t i n g me."  In order  t o s u b m i t a "check s l i p "  both  the specified  C h e c k i n g was a way by w h i c h a  could  and  strike:  While  "struck", lost a t  t h e r a t e t h a t P was l o s i n g d u r i n g  reasoning  it's  time,  comparable  to bargain with 0  against 0.  on s t r i k e  a basis  to bargain,  P's r e f u s a l  was t a n t a m o u n t t o g o i n g  twice  and "end-  Furthermore, i t provided  the t a c t i c  i n real-  made t h e b a r g a i n i n g  situation  B u t as w e l l , b a r g a i n i n g  might  h a v e become l e s s m e a n i n g f u l b e c a u s e o f t h e  77  increased  tendency  to disbelieve  either  to l i e to the  introduced.  Not  exert a s t a b i l i z i n g i n g would not but  only  c o u l d such  when b o t h  s u b j e c t s were asked had  an a d d i t i o n a l  as A p p e n d i x E.)  obtained  on  more p o s i t i v e  indication was also  item, with  The  total  1 to score  the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l  of  the  effect  events  of the  o n l y by  and  the  they  a seven sheet  7 could  item is  be  indicating  a  each e v a l u a t i o n  negative)  through  positive).  provided  e x p e r i m e n t as stage  bargain-  w i t h whom  s c o r e on  (completely  contest),  bargaining),  response  (completely  n e u t r a l ) t o 49  i n f l u e n c e d not the  c o n c l u s i o n of  from  a higher  bargain-  of s u s p i c i o n .  the person  Scores  t h e r e f o r e range from 7  Essentially,  the  (A c o p y o f t h e  evaluation.  (completely  index  had  device  a lying  E v a l u a t i o n s were made on  included  each  At  to evaluate  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l .  28  a checking  d y a d s were f i n i s h e d  been b a r g a i n i n g .  could  communications  n e c e s s a r i l y degenerate i n t o  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l : (i.e.,  O's  i n f l u e n c e (so t h a t a t l e a s t ,  also i t provided  ing  or  him.  T h u s , some means o f v e r i f y i n g t o be  other person  a global  a whole.  I manipulations,  t h e outcomes o f b a r g a i n i n g and  It but  negotia-  tions .  Summary o u t l i n e tion  of the  of stage  instructions,  the  I I I procedure: s c a l e s f o r the  Upon  comple-  bargaining  )  78  p r o b l e m were d i s t r i b u t e d . that  t h e y were s t i l l  number  3 with  p a i r e d , number  number  s u b j e c t s were g i v e n  The s u b j e c t s were t h e n  4. time  After  a brief  t o study  nor n e c e s s a r i l y truthful)  which  they would s e t t l e .  initial on,  number  scales,  message  suggesting  restriction  an a l t e r n a t i v e a t  T h e s e m e s s a g e s , d e f i n e d as t h e From  "You were number jeopardized  o f the bargainers  4 last  time  the experimental  A g r e e m e n t was r e a c h e d  . . .".  h a d drawn, e . g . ,  Messages t h a t  when one s i d e made a b i n d i n g  a d e c i s i o n message, and t h e o t h e r  on  a b i n d i n g d e c i s i o n message. finished,  or color  d e c e p t i o n were n e v e r d e l i v e r e d .  on  ing  then  i m p o s e d upon t h e messages  o c c u r r e d where r e f e r e n c e was made t o t h e number w h i c h one o r t h e o t h e r  a l l subjects  (neither bind-  o f f e r s , were d e l i v e r e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y .  the only  2 and  pause i n which t h e  their  were r e q u i r e d t o s u b m i t a s t a n d a r d ing  1 with  reminded  offer  side accepted,  Finally,  t h e s u b j e c t s were a s k e d  with  also  the bargain-  t o evaluate the  person  w i t h whom t h e y h a d b e e n b a r g a i n i n g o n s e v e n  scales  from t h e semantic  bipolar  differential.  CHAPTER SUMMARY; A three-stage the hypotheses were o b t a i n e d participated basically  e x p e r i m e n t was c o n d u c t e d  advanced during  i n Chapters  i n order  Three and Four.  two h o u r s e s s i o n s i n w h i c h  i n groups o f f o u r .  t h e same t h r e e - s t a g e  to test Data  subjects  Each s e s s i o n i n v o l v e d procedure.  In the f i r s t  79  stage,  the  context (b)  f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s were m a n i p u l a t e d  of a four-person  game:  (a) O's  i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 to betray,  either  a trustworthy  stage,  the  effects  measures o f t r u s t m e a s u r e s were sequential (ii)  the  o r an  i n which  extended  t o 0.  i n the  of  and  Finally,  maintain  the  the  activities.  of events  they  from the  first;  trust-  already the  stage  The  been  effects I manipu-  exact  instructions  (2)  PDG  (3)  draw f o r numbers,  (4)  stage  (5)  draw f o r  (6)  stage  f o r stage  instructions  for. stage  I task,  PDG,  other  as  follows:  videotape, II,  •  colors,  to  chronological order  e x p e r i m e n t was  I on  and  instructions  t h e m s e l v e s and  i n the  (1)  stages  subjects, task  tasks  occurred  II task:  These  ..  of the  task-related as  stage,  t r a n s i t i o n between the  were i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h  two  n e g o t i a t i o n s t a s k were  <  interest  second  upon  chose  t h a t t r u s t had  upon a b a r g a i n i n g and  facilitate  subjects  third  to  one-trial,  t h a t 0 w o u l d be  suspicion (resulting  determined.  in a  the  given  To  In the  s u s p i c i o n were d e t e r m i n e d .  worthy or untrustworthy,  lations)  0.  I manipulations  subjective probability  trust  trustworthiness,  untrustworthy  (i) choice behavior  c h o i c e PDG  the  (c) number o f e x p o s u r e s  o f the. s t a g e and  in  • .  •.  80  (7)  instructions for subjective probability of stage  tion was  (8)  stage  (9)  coffee  task  II/  II task:  subjective  probability,  break,  (10)  i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r stage  (11)  stage  (12)  e v a l u a t i o n o f 0 on  I I I task:  III,  bargaining  and  semantic  negotiations,  differential.  At  the  c o n c l u s i o n of the  experiment, a complete  of  the  experiment i t s e l f  and  revealed  to the  subjects.  experimenter  asking  the  about the queries  subjects  e x p e r i m e n t t o any  as  completed  long  as  two  the  integrity  fact  never  of  endangered.  the  the  deceptions  s t r o n g p l e a was not  to divulge  of t h e i r  months a f t e r  i n d i c a t e d t h a t the  that  A  of  and  explanaemployed  made by  information  acquaintances. the  p l e a was  experimental  the  Informal  e x p e r i m e n t had  been  highly successful manipulations  was  and in  81  CHAPTER  S I X :  R E S U L T S  . . I n a l l of the a n a l y s e s , .unless o t h e r w i s e n o t e d , same b a s i c s t a t i s t i c a l procedures  w i l l be adopted.  f o r e , t o e x p e d i t e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a number o f w i l l be o b s e r v e d .  the There-,  conventions  F i r s t , the terms " a n a l y s i s o f v a r i a n c e "  (ANOVA) w i l l be used i n s t e a d of a more complete d e s c r i p t i o n , o f the b a s i c a n a l y s i s a c t u a l l y employed.  l"n most o f the  cases, t h i s w i l l c o n s i s t of a c o m p l e t e l y - c r o s s e d  2 x 2 x 3 .  ANOVA ( f i x e d . e f f e c t s m o d e l ) .  Secondly,  summarizing t h e s e ANOVAs  not be p r e s e n t e d i n the t e x t '  of t h i s chapter, but w i l l  V7ill  the u s u a l t a b l e s  insteeid be i n c l u d e d i n Appendix F .  T h i r d l y , a number o f s t a t i s t i c a l measures t o remove e x t r a n e ous s o u r c e s of v a r i a t i o n w i l l be d e s c r i b e d .  However,  r e p e a t e d r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s e s t e p s w i l l not be made, even though the v a r i a t i o n due  t o . t h e s e s o u r c e s w i l l be  auto-  m a t i c a l l y removed i n as many of the a n a l y s e s as p o s s i b l e . F i n a l l y , i n many i n s t a n c e s , comparisons between the  control  group and one o r more of. the c e l l s from the f a c t o r i a l  design  w i l l be made a c c o r d i n g t o a method suggested  (1962,  p . 264) .  by Winer  These comparisons' w i l l u s u a l l y be made where a  s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e or i n t e r a c t i o n i s o b t a i n e d . an e x p l a n a t i o n o f the procedures  i n v o l v e d w i l l not  p r e s e n t e d each time a comparison i s made. of  be  I n the a n a l y s i s  the d a t a r e l e v a n t t o the development of t r u s t  suspicion  However,  and  (i.e.,- the d a t a o b t a i n e d d u r i n g the measurement  82  stage), will  a l l o f t h e c o n t r o l v s . treatment group  involve  analysis  one-tailed  tests  of the bargaining  of significance.  to the control  two-tailed  tests  group.  The D e v e l o p m e n t o f T r u s t Previous  probability suspicion,  and S u s p i c i o n  as a F u n c t i o n o f  Experience:  Although  on  involve  d i r e c t i o n a l h y p o t h e s e s have n o t b e e n made w i t h  respect  A.  In the  d a t a , however, t h e c o n t r o l v s .  treatment group comparisons w i l l since  comparisons  a n a l y s e s were c o n d u c t e d on b o t h  the subjective  a n d t h e PDG r e s p o n s e m e a s u r e s o f t r u s t a n d the p r i n c i p a l tests  the basis  of the analyses  o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s were made  of the subjective  probability  m e a s u r e ; t h e s e were s u p p l e m e n t e d by t h e a n a l y s e s response measure.  o f t h e PDG  The s e l e c t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e  probability  m e a s u r e f o r m a j o r e m p h a s i s was g o v e r n e d by two r e a s o n s : first, for in  the subjective  s t a t e , which has d i r e c t  the manifest behavior,  i s more s e n s i t i v e t o v a r i a t i o n s  the independent v a r i a b l e s ;  probability  consequences  secondly,  the subjective  m e a s u r e i s amenable t o more p o w e r f u l  parametric  a n a l y s e s w h e r e a s t h e PDG r e s p o n s e m e a s u r e i s n o t . in the  the ensuing presentation hypotheses  of the r e s u l t s , references  to  and t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h e r e s u l t s t o t h e  hypotheses w i l l ability  Accordingly,  measure.  pertain  primarily  to the subjective  prob-  83  To r e i t e r a t e , t h e t h r e e first  s t a g e were:  incentive I t was  (A) O's  f o r 0 to betray,  hypothesized  factors manipulated  trustworthiness, and  (B)  previous  (C) number o f e x p o s u r e s .  that:  1.  P i s more l i k e l y t o t r u s t 0 where 0 was previously trustworthy. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , P w i l l n o t t r u s t 0, i . e . w i l l be s u s p i c i o u s o f 0, where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y untrustworthy.  2.  Suspicion trust.  3.  The d e v e l o p m e n t o f t r u s t i s i n f l u e n c e d by the magnitude o f the i n c e n t i v e (to betray) u n d e r w h i c h 0 was n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u s t worthy. A l s o , the development of s u s p i c i o n i s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e m a g n i t u d e o f i n c e n t i v e u n d e r w h i c h 0 was u n t r u s t worthy .  According ference  i s more e a s i l y  to the f i r s t  w o u l d be p r e d i c t e d  established  hypothesis, f o r Factor  a main  than  effect  A such t h a t  worthy  0 would  engender  subjective  t r u s t whereas  worthy  0 would  engender  subjective  suspicion.  indicated  the extent  by m a k i n g  a mark a c r o s s  anchored Figure  of their  subjective  a 30 cm.  Subjective  untrust-  Subjects  t r u s t or  t h a t was  a trustan  suspicion  verbally  i n terms o f measured  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n deviations  from the m i d - p o i n t o f the l i n e . mid-point, representing  value  line  dif-  a t t h e m i d - p o i n t and a t b o t h o f t h e e x t r e m e s .  9, p . 6 9 ) .  defined  the  i n the  of zero.  Deviations  (See  were  ( i n centimeters)  For the purposes of a n a l y s i s ,  complete u n c e r t a i n t y ,  had a  i n the d i r e c t i o n o f extreme  trust  84  were r e c o r d e d a s p o s i t i v e v a l u e s w h i l e d e v i a t i o n s direction values.  o f e x t r e m e s u s p i c i o n were r e c o r d e d Thus, t h e s u b j e c t i v e  from complete t r u s t tainty  Hypothesis  as n e g a t i v e  probability scale  ranged  (+15.0 cm.) t h r o u g h c o m p l e t e  (0 cm.) t o c o m p l e t e  suspicion  Two r e q u i r e s  i nthe  uncer-  (- 15.0 cm.).  a comparison between t h e  c o n t r o l g r o u p and e a c h o f t h e s i x c e l l s  c o n s t i t u t i n g the  i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  a n d t h e number o f  exposures.  Here, t r u s t i s d e f i n e d  as b e i n g  when t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e c o n t r o l particular exposure)  t r u s t group  of  ( a t one o f t h e t h r e e  the subjective  group i s negative. therefore,  On t h e b a s i s  i t i s predicted  that  of the second compared  require  That  hypothesis,  to the e s t a b l i s h -  be e s t a b l i s h e d  (number o f e x p o s u r e s ) .  at a  smaller  i s , the e s t a b l i s h -  fewer exposures  than  will  establishment of t r u s t . According  will  group  p r o b a b i l i t y measure f o r t h e s u s p i c i o n  ment o f s u s p i c i o n w i l l the  as b e i n g  g r o u p i s s i g n i f i c a n t a n d t h e mean  ment o f t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n w i l l of C  i s defined  when t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e c o n t r o l  a particular suspicion  level  levels of  measure f o r t h e t r u s t group i s a p o s i t i v e  Analogously, suspicion  established and  group and a  i s s i g n i f i c a n t , a n d t h e mean o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e  probability number.  established  to the t h i r d  be i n f l u e n c e d  hypothesis,  t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  by t h e magnitude o f t h e i n c e n t i v e  under  85  w h i c h 0 was  previously trustworthy  However, a d i r e c t i o n a l On and  Mechling  the  i n c e n t i v e when 0 was  tion  b e t r a y was  low.  previously trustworthy  0 where 0 was  composition  be  the  t o O's  the untrustworthy significantly  0 was  i n c e n t i v e to to  trust  the  be much  trustworthy,  the  run  or  treatment  less  but  the  i n some  particular the due  particular to  variation.  exposed t o the  t h e mean o f t h e -9.43.  different  (p <.0001); f u r t h e r m o r e ,  predic-  more s u s p i c i o u s  even though  trust  0  and  group exposed  to  T h e s e means were f o u n d  to  from each o t h e r  i n the  the  trustworthy  s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure o f whereas  the  trustworthiness . (Factor A),  mean o f t h e g r o u p t h a t was  6.13,  greater  more l i k e l y  group, the v a r i a t i o n  removed f r o m t h e  With regard  be  and  be  have been a f f e c t e d  u n d e r w h i c h a g r o u p was  " s e s s i o n s " was  (on t h e  satisfying  f r o m s e s s i o n t o s e s s i o n , e.g.,  of a c e r t a i n  Komorita  low.  B e c a u s e t h e m e a s u r e s may  circumstances  of  the g r e a t e r  h i g h ; however, P w i l l  t o b e t r a y was  u n i q u e way  those  i s that P w i l l  Furthermore, P w i l l  t o b e t r a y was  advanced.  p r e d i c t e d t h a t the  untrustworthy,  earlier)  c e r t a i n about t r u s t i n g  suspicion)  e.g.,  p r e v i o u s l y untrustworthy  0 where 0 was  was  n o t be  However, a more i n t u i t i v e l y  where 0 was  incentive  findings,  (196 7) , i t c o u l d be  (as p r o p o s e d  incentive  untrustworthy.  prediction w i l l  the b a s i s of p r e v i o u s  suspicion.  or  individual  i n the  ANOVA  comparisons  of  86  the  c o n t r o l group w i t h  the treatment groups, the c o n t r o l  g r o u p mean o f 0.16 was s i g n i f i c a n t l y means o f b o t h group  the t r u s t group  d i f f e r e n t from the  (p <.01) and t h e s u s p i c i o n  (p <.0001). Similar  r e s u l t s were o b t a i n e d  PDG r e s p o n s e m e a s u r e .  i n the a n a l y s i s of the  I n the t r u s t group,  subjects  manifested  subjects  i n the s u s p i c i o n group m a n i f e s t e d  40 o u t o f 48  t r u s t toward 0 w h i l e o n l y  13 o u t o f 48  t r u s t i n the  PDG.  I n t h e c o n t r o l g r o u p , 10 o u t o f 16 s u b j e c t s  trust  t o w a r d 0 i n t h e PDG.  between t h e s e p r o p o r t i o n s was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  the  the  indicated that  suspicion  subjective  group  3, t h e c o l u m n t o t a l s r e p r e s e n t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n  that  there  to engender g r e a t e r  (z =  significantly  (z = 2.7, p <.01) a n d  elicited  to betray  was a t e n d e n c y  the degrees  by t h e h i g h and  (Factor  b e t w e e n t h e s e means a p p r o a c h e d  suggesting  group  (z = 6.8, p <.0001) .  low l e v e l s o f i n c e n t i v e  ference  the t r u s t group  t h e c o n t r o l g r o u p was  from both the t r u s t group  In Table of  of the differences  d i f f e r e n t from the s u s p i c i o n  9.5, p <.0001) a n d t h a t different  Tests  manifested  B).  The d i f -  s i g n i f i c a n c e (p =.06)  f o r the high  incentive  t r u s t t h a n t h e low i n c e n t i v e .  However,  an  e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e f o u r A x B means  by  i n c e n t i v e to betray)  i n Table  (O's  trustworthiness  3 indicated that  this  tend-  e n c y was a t t r i b u t a b l e p r i m a r i l y t o t h e g r o u p s where 0 was trustworthy.  That i s , subjects  displayed  subjective  trust  87  Table  3.  Degrees of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , or u n c e r t a i n t y g e n e r a t e d under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s o f previous experience.  Incentive  Trustworthy  0  Untrustworthy  0  Column T o t a l s  High  Low  8 .0  4 .3  -8 .4  -10 .4  -0 .4  -  6 .1  (In t h e a b o v e t a b l e , +15 r e p r e s e n t s c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y t h a t O w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y ; w h e r e a s -15 r e p r e s e n t s c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be u n t r u s t w o r t h y ; 0 (zero) r e p r e s e n t s complete uncertainty.)  88 where O had had  previously  been a h i g h  been t r u s t w o r t h y  incentive  for 0 to betray;  were l e s s c e r t a i n , though s t i l l 0 had  been p r e v i o u s l y  betray that  had  i n c e n t i v e had  suspicion The number o f  the  e f f e c t upon t h e  generated  (A x C)  was  also  of  means o f the  the  A  means w i t h  x G the  the  interaction lay  c o n t r o l group are of  asterisks  It  i s evident  until  the  c o n t r o l group.  0.  r e p r e s e n t e d by  i n d i c a t i n g the that  subjects  from the  the  establishment of  cut  as  from the the  0  PDG.  s u s p i c i o n was  the  established not  five  .  of  the  d i f f e r e n t from  s i g n i f i c a n c e of  experienced  the  the  the  number  difference.  with only  one  established  exposures  to  the  0.  Evidence  presents  11,  asterisks, with  s u s p i c i o n was  had  and  comparisons  In F i g u r e  t o b e t r a y a l w h e r e a s t r u s t was  trustworthy  i n the  by  importance  i n the  t r e a t m e n t means t h a t were s i g n i f i c a n t l y  exposure  of  s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.02)  However, i n r e l a t i o n t o h y p o t h e s i s Two, the  degree  through b e t r a y a l  to  interesting  i n t e r a c t i o n between O ' s . t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s exposures  they  incentive  On.the o t h e r h a n d , i t was  little  t h a t was  however,  there  somewhat t r u s t i n g , where  trustworthy, but  b e e n low.  even though  PDG  r e s p o n s e measure p e r t a i n i n g  t r u s t and  subjective  frequencies  not  p r o b a b i l i t y measure.  of  I t i s evident established  s u s p i c i o n was  the  subjects  that  until  neither  the  five  who  as  clear-  Table  chose to  trust  to  4 trust  nor  exposure l e v e l  of  C  89  Trust  +15 Trustworthy  10  Subjective Trust and S u s p i c i o n  0  * p<.05 *# p<.005 *** p<.001  -5 -10  Untrus tworthy Suspicion  -15 8 ^ ° ^ 0 (Control)  1  Number o f E x p o s u r e s  Figure  11.  S u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s t o a t r u s t w o r t h y o r an u n t r u s t w o r t h y 0.  90  Table  4.  F r e q u e n c i e s o f s u b j e c t s who t o t r u s t O i n t h e PDG.  chose  Number o f E x p o s u r e s 3 control 1 Trustworthy  0  5  13  12  15  6  6  1  10 Untrustworthy  0  (number o f e x p o s u r e s ) . the d i f f e r e n c e and  the t r u s t  the c o n t r o l  A t t h e one e x p o s u r e  level  o f C,  i n f r e q u e n c i e s between t h e c o n t r o l  group  g r o u p s was 3, w h e r e a s  the d i f f e r e n c e  g r o u p and t h e s u s p i c i o n g r o u p was o n l y  moreover, a t the t h r e e exposure l e v e l trust  nor manifest In  of  addition  s u s p i c i o n developed  a r e l a t i o n s h i p between  First,  for  correlation.  indicating is,  any f u r t h e r . ^ " aspects  w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e was  measure o f s u b j e c t i v e  o r s u s p i c i o n , was d e t e r m i n e d  the e n t i r e  o f C, n e i t h e r m a n i f e s t  (a) t h e d i c h o t o m o u s c h o i c e PDG  m e a s u r e , a n d (b) t h e c o n t i n u o u s  biserial  4;  t o t h e f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s e s , two o t h e r  t h e d a t a were examined..  trust  between  b y means o f a p o i n t -  I n c l u d i n g t h e c o n t r o l g r o u p , t h e p\-, r  s a m p l e o f 112 s u b j e c t s was  .88 (p. <.001),  t h a t t h e two m e a s u r e s were h i g h l y r e l a t e d .  s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d  0 i n t h e PDG a l s o  That  tended t o  ^"Because t h e d e p e n d e n t m e a s u r e was d i c h o t o m o u s , i t was d i f f i c u l t t o a p p l y an a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c a l t e c h n i q u e t h a t would p e r m i t i n f e r e n c e s about the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f m a n i f e s t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n .  91  indicate trust  s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t , w h e r e a s , s u b j e c t s who  0 i n the Related  data.  This  PDG  to t h i s  f i n d i n g was  concerned  frequency  trust  and  (out of  the  the  other  49  t o w a r d 0.  number o f For  the  nature  Figure  range of  distribution  d i d not  i n the  from F i g u r e  12  the  of  the  12 the  depicts subjective  f o r the  PDG  manifest  quite different  purposes of  this  and  63  one  for  trust  that these  from each o t h e r  comparison,  the  i n t e r m s o f c e r t a i n t y and deviations  p e r h a p s be  mid-point,  with  one  the  s u b j e c t s who  yielding  test  respect  the  distributions uncertainty,  from the mid-point of  better conceptualized  scale represented  To  over  trusted 0  are  the  measures.  s u b j e c t s who  terms of a b s o l u t e can  of  of  two in a  respects  considered  This  two  distributions  I t i s evident  distributions  a second aspect  question  suspicion scale:  112)  not  indicated subjective suspicion.  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two  did  i n Figure  the  12  by  were i.e., in the  imagining  scale. that  i s f o l d e d over a t i t s  distributions^  d i f f e r e n c e between the  shown i n F i g u r e two  13.  distributions  t o c e n t r a l t e n d e n c y , t h e Mann-Whitney  U  ^"Six s u b j e c t s m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t i n 0 e v e n t h o u g h -they f e l t t h a t he was t o some e x t e n t u n t r u s t w o r t h y . However, t h e i r s c o r e s were n o t a c t u a l l y f o l d e d o v e r . Instead, t h e i r s c o r e s were c l a s s i f i e d i n t h e " c o m p l e t e l y uncertain" c a t e g o r y s i n c e we.were i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e g r o u p o f s u b j e c t s who e i t h e r ( i ) c h o s e to' t r u s t 0 e v e n i n t h e f a c e o f u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , o r ( i i ) c h o s e t o t r u s t 0 e v e n t h o u g h t h e y e x p e c t e d 0 t o be untrustworthy.  35 Subjects  who  trust 0  (x= +6.94, SD=  Subjects  who  do n o t t r u s t  6.17)  30 M^m  25  0  (x= -12.11, SD=  3.66)  20 Frequency 15 10  Uncertainty  +  Certainty that 0 w i l l be t r u s t worthy  Certainty that 0 w i l l be u n t r u s t worthy Scale Figure  12.  of Subjective  Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s  « 3 (V)  Probability  o f s u b j e c t s who  trusted  or d i d not t r u s t  0.  35  30  " 1-  S u b j e c t s who t r u s t 0 (x= +6 .94, SD= 6.17)  3 S u b j e c t s who do n o t t r u s t O (x= -12.11, SD= 3.66)  25  20 Frequency #These a r e t h e s i x p e r s o n s who m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t toward O even though they f e l t t h a t he was t o some e x t e n t u n t r u s t worthy .  15  10  Certainty that O w i l l be t r u s t worthy o r u n t r u s t worthy  Uncertainty  Scale Figure  13.  Comparison of frequency d i d n o t t r u s t 0.  of  Uncertainty  distributions  o f s u b j e c t s who  trusted or  94  statistic was  was  highly  significant  distributions not  calculated.  The r e s u l t i n g  (p <.0001).  z value  Inspection  of  5.14  o f the  i n d i c a t e s t h a t most o f t h e s u b j e c t s who d i d  t r u s t 0 i n t h e PDG were q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t he (0)  w o u l d be u n t r u s t w o r t h y .  However, s u b j e c t s who  did trust  0 i n t h e PDG o f t e n d i d s o i n t h e f a c e o f u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t O's  trustworthiness.  mentioned p r e v i o u s l y subjects certain  In f a c t ,  (see F o o t n o t e  were t o some  t h a t 0 w o u l d be u n t r u s t w o r t h y .  i s an a p p r o x i m a t e p o i n t  cases  1, page 9 1 ) , t h e  t r u s t e d 0 even though they  seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t f o r t h i s there  i n the 6  extent  These f i n d i n g s  group of s u b j e c t s  at least,  (somewhere i n t h e r e g i o n  b e t w e e n -6 t o -11.9 on t h e s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y  scale)  at  which s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n i s l i k e l y  manifest  as  an a c t o f s u s p i c i o n  point who to  be any s i m p l e  frequency  be  0 i n t h e PDG  trust  identifiable  since there  f o r those  d o e s n o t seem  did trust  as i t i n c r e a s e s  0 i n t h e PDG a n d  toward c e r t a i n t y t h a t  0  trustworthy.  E f f e c t s o f T r u s t a n d S u s p i c i o n Upon t h e Outcomes o f Bargaining  and  Negotiations:  Nature of the f i n a l For  However, s u c h a  and r e g u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e  o f s u b j e c t s who  subjective  B.  12).  does n o t seem t o b e as e a s i l y  chose t o t r u s t  will  (see F i g u r e  t o become  settlement:  t h e p u r p o s e s o f a n a l y s i s , numbers  e q u a l i t y vs  equity:  (1 t o 24) were  assigned  95  to the ordered  s e t o f p o s s i b l e outcomes.  Equity,  e a c h r e c e i v e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y t h e same r e l a t i v e maximum p a y o f f 12. was  p o s s i b l e on h i s own  E q u a l i t y , where t h e p a y o f f s l o c a t e d a t 18.  bargainers deadline,  failed  (corresponding dyads, only  t h e 30 m i n u t e  a t t h e 30 m i n u t e mark  t h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n O's of exposures  5.  was  I n t h e ANOVA o f t h e numbers  t o the s o l u t i o n s ) from the 4 8  However, as i s e v i d e n t  Table  equal,  i n which the  an a g r e e m e n t b e f o r e  of the bargainers  t a k e n t o be t h e s o l u t i o n .  number  located at  were a b s o l u t e l y  In the e i g h t cases to reach  t o the  t h e m i d - p o i n t o f t h e i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n t h e minimum  dispositions  and  s c a l e , was  where  (A x C) was from T a b l e  bargaining  trustworthiness  significant  5, t h e n a t u r e  (p <.04) . of this  N a t u r e o f t h e f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t as a f u n c t i o n o f O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s a n d t h e number o f exposures.  Number o f E x p o s u r e s 1 5 3  control  17.00  15.00  14.25  Trustworthy  0  15.00  15 .38  17 .00  Untrustworthy  16.25  (equity  = 12.00; e q u a l i t y =  i n t e r a c t i o n was to  equality.  18.00)  e x t r e m e l y complex.  the trustworthy  0, s e t t l e m e n t s  With the increased  0  With only  one  exposure  were made c l o s e t o  number  of exposures  to the  96 trustworthy 0  ( i . e . , with  increasing  ments became more e q u i t a b l e .  trust),  the s e t t l e -  On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e  •  suspicion  group a t the l e v e l  w o r t h y 0 made s e t t l e m e n t s with  i n c r e a s e d exposures  increasing The  suspicion),  complexity  o f one e x p o s u r e t o t h e u n t r u s t -  t h a t tended  t o w a r d e q u i t y ; and  to the untrustworthy  the s o l u t i o n s  of this  approached  t h e mean o f t h e c o n t r o l g r o u p  c ^ means) was n o t i t s e l f  any  o f t h e s i x A x C means, t h e c o n t r o l t o be s i m i l a r  to a trustworthy 0.  0 and f i v e  (In a d d i t i o n ,  appeared  to o f f e r  t h r e e exposures  0.)  Time t o s o l u t i o n : 30 m i n u t e s , subjects  the l a t t e r  failed  group  t o an  from  "effect" one e x p o s u r e  0  as one e x p o s i i r e t o an  particular  Times r a n g e d  t o reach  between t h e  to a trustworthy  o f these  being  pro-  untrustworthy  I t was t h e r e f o r e e x t r e m e l y  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  equality.  different  of both  exposures  t o h a v e t h e same e f f e c t  untrustworthy  fell  significantly  to the e f f e c t s  with  into consideration.  (which  two  appeared  (i.e.,  i n t e r a c t i o n was e v e n more  n o u n c e d when t h e c o n t r o l g r o u p was t a k e n While  0  from  t h e time  agreement.  difficult results.  4 minutes t o  a s s i g n e d when t h e Of t h e e i g h t dyads  that d i d not reach  a s e t t l e m e n t , s i x were i n t h e s u s p i c i o n  condition,  i n the t r u s t  the  control  one was group.  as h y p o t h e s i z e d ,  c o n d i t i o n , and one was i n  T h i s was r e f l e c t e d  i n t h e ANOVA.  the s u s p i c i o n group, w i t h  Here,  a mean t i m e o f  97  19.5 at  minutes, required  a s o l u t i o n than d i d the  time of the  significantly  14.3  minutes  the  arrive  t r u s t g r o u p , w h i c h had  a mean  (p <.03).  c o n t r o l group data  mean o f  more t i m e t o  increased  c o n t r o l group,  significantly  Because the  20.1  from e i t h e r the  the  i n c l u s i o n of  error variance,  minutes, d i d not  t r u s t or  the  the  differ  suspicion  g r o u p mean.  C.  E f f e c t s of  Trust  Bargaining  and  Extremity  of  were a n a l y z e d . number o f the  end  of  initial  offer:  extremity  i n the  the magnitude of v a r i a t i o n due  removing the  the  o n e ' s own  possible  o f f e r s was  the  the  Absolute  was  Upon t h e  Process  of  1  Negotiations:  o f f e r and  lowest payoff One  Suspicion  a l t e r n a t i v e s between the  initial  "low"  and  Two  was  types of  t a k e n t o be  extremity the  a l t e r n a t i v e proposed  most e x t r e m e a l t e r n a t i v e a t  payoff  in  the  s c a l e , i . e . , where one's,  located. . source of v a r i a b i l i t y scales the  i n the  t h e m s e l v e s , e.g.,  payoffs  comprising  t o s c a l e s was  v a r i a t i o n due  range  and  or  scales.V.Thus,  removed i n a d d i t i o n  to s e s s i o n s .  o f f e r s were made s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  the  the  initial  to  Because the  independently,  i t  initial was  ^"In the. b a r g a i n i n g p r o b l e m e m p l o y e d , one s i d e r e c e i v e d a s c a l e o f p a y o f f s t h a t r a n g e d f r o m -7C t o $3.36 w h i l e t h e o t h e r s i d e r e c e i v e d a s c a l e t h a t r a n g e d o n l y f r o m -4C to 87$.  98  possible  to analyze the extremity  96 s u b j e c t s extremity group, the  i n t h e ANOVA.  scores  o f f e r s from the t r u s t  g r o u p mean o f 18.4  had h i g h e r  suspicion It  scores.)  (More  The c o n t r o l g r o u p mean  extreme (17.6)  d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r the t r u s t o r  that  be a b s o l u t e l y  own a c t u a l  initial  (p <.01) .  d i f f e r e n t from  g r o u p mean.  was p o s s i b l e  necessarily his  The mean o f t h e a b s o l u t e  of the i n i t i a l  was n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y the  f o r a l l of the  16.5, was f o u n d t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  suspicion  offers  scores  initial  a subject's extreme,  o f f e r would n o t  b u t extreme  r e l a t i v e to  r a n g e , i . e . , t h e range between h i s  minimum and h i s i n i t i a l  maximum  dispositions.  In  s u c h a c a s e , an o f f e r a t t h e a l t e r n a t i v e where one h o p e d to  g e t t h e most  extreme  offer.  (maximum d i s p o s i t i o n ) w o u l d  c o n s t i t u t e an  T h e r e f o r e , r e l a t i v e e x t r e m i t y was  as t h e number o f a l t e r n a t i v e s b e t w e e n t h e i n i t i a l and in the  the mid-point of a subject's the previous t r u s t group,  suspicion  actual  initial  a n a l y s i s , i t was f o u n d t h a t 3.6, was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  g r o u p mean o f 5.2  (p <.03) .  defined offer  range.  As  t h e mean o f  d i f f e r e n t from the The c o n t r o l  group  g r o u p mean o f 3.8 was n o t , however, s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r the t r u s t o r the s u s p i c i o n  g r o u p mean.  ceivably,  t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e t r u s t and t h e  suspicion  group m i g h t have been  existing  differences  Con-  a t t r i b u t a b l e merely t o  between t h e m i d - p o i n t s o f t h e a c t u a l  99 initial  ranges  mid-points  eliminated  Actual of  initial  alternatives  the  this  However, an ANOVA o f t h e  as a p o s s i b l e  range:  offer.  on t h e statement  f o r the exposures  <.05).  7.8;  and o f each  one e x p o s u r e ,  exposures,  8.1.  ever, d i f f i c u l t  With  dispositions  accompanied scores,  ( F a c t o r C) was  exposure  initial  of the  control,  r e s u l t was, how-  to explain.  I t was p r e v i o u s l y affect  a n d (b) t h e q u a l i t a t i v e  u s e d was t h e t o t a l a dyad.^"  significant  5.6; a n d f i v e  hypothesized that  (a) t h e amount o f communinature of  r e g a r d t o t h e amount o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,  within  t h e main  ranges  l e v e l were:  of this  were  the i n i t i a l  only  10.9; t h r e e e x p o s u r e s ,  and s u s p i c i o n would  cation,  factor  The i m p l i c a t i o n  Communication: trust  that  These  The means o f t h e a c t u a l  c o n t r o l group  as t h e number  b e t w e e n t h e a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n a n d  I n t h e ANOVA o f t h e r a n g e  effect  explanation.  T h i s was d e f i n e d  a c t u a l maximum d i s p o s i t i o n .  indicated  (p  of the subjects.  the.measure  number o f m e s s a g e s s e n t p e r m i n u t e  I n t h e ANOVA o f t h i s  n e i t h e r main e f f e c t  communication.  differences  measure however,  n o r i n t e r a c t i o n s were  found.  ^"The t o t a l number o f messages a l o n e c o u l d n o t b e u s e d as a m e a s u r e s i n c e t h e amount o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d be c o n f o u n d e d w i t h t h e t i m e r e q u i r e d t o r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , b e c a u s e t h e messages s e n t b y one b a r g a i n e r w e r e n o t i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e messages s e n t b y t h e o t h e r b a r g a i n e r , t h e t o t a l s f o r t h e dyad h a d t o be u s e d . Hence the m e a s u r e s were t h e t o t a l s f o r t h e dyad d i v i d e d by t h e t i m e t a k e n by t h e d y a d t o r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t .  l  100  Concerning  the  e a c h message was (1)  classified  i n f o r m a t i o n messages —  exchange of which lies  information;  the  -'- d e f i n e d by  case,  e.g.,  i n t o one geared  of  of four c a t e g o r i e s :  strictly  The  dyad) o f  either  discrepancy bargainer  and  hand, each total  avoiding a penalty  —  or obtaining a  the  total  sent  Table cance both  the  group to reach  category  t o t a l was  during  ( f o r the  number o f messages i n e a c h c a t e g o r y .  t o t a l was  t o t a l was  as  On  d i v i d e d by  the  However,  i n the  d i v i d e d by  agreement. taken  fact  concerned  the  the  ANOVA. time  other  a proportion of  number o f m e s s a g e s s e n t d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g ,  category  in  o r minimum  t i m e - b o n u s messages  hand, each c a t e g o r y  r e q u i r e d by  —  was  what was  v a r i a t i o n s o f t h i s m e a s u r e were a n a l y z e d one  the  (3)  b e t w e e n what  b a s i c m e a s u r e e m p l o y e d was  the  toward  strikes;  respect to payoffs  (4)  communication,  (2) m o d i f i c a t i o n messages  other  with  and  p r i m a r i l y with bonus.  any  to the  dispositions;  two  nature  i n c l u d e d t h r e a t s , u l t i m a t u m s , and  communicated  On  qualitative  total  the  i . e . , each  number o f messages  bargaining."'' 6 summarizes  levels,  and  v a r i a t i o n s of  the  the  effects,  d i r e c t i o n s of  the measures.  the the  (No  associated effects  signifi-  obtained  i n t e r a c t i o n s were  * I t i s a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e a n a l y s e s o f t h e messages may n o t be c o m p l e t e l y i n d e p e n d e n t . However, s i n c e t h e two v a r i a t i o n s c o n v e y a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g , t h e a n a l y s e s were nevertheless conducted.  for  Table  Rate:  6.  Summary o f a n a l y s e s  Category T o t a l Time  of  communications.  Proportion:  C a t e go r y To t a 1 Total Direction  Main E f f e c t s Information  A  Main  P <.03  Effects  p T > S*  A  .01  A  < .02  S > T  A  .07  S > T  B  <.04  •  Modification  A  .09  Lies Time-Bonus  *T = T r u s t S = Suspicion Hi = High Lo = Low  B  .04  Hi  > Lo  102  found  t o be  evident  that  significant the e f f e c t s  which v a r i a t i o n was  engendered  messages,  insofar  are consistent  i s employed. tended to send  s u b j e c t s who  presented  i n Table  7;  significantly  a l i n e between  Checks:  information and  were p r e v i o u s l y  different.  messages.  corre-  significantly  the c o n t r o l  t o t h e messages t h a t were  s u b j e c t s were a b l e  group by  to determine exactly receive  at a  a tendency f o r the s u b j e c t s  (p <.07).  the c o n t r o l group (0.92)  (1.86)  i n the  trust  i n the  levels  t h e mean  and t h e mean o f e i t h e r  of  group  payoff  indicated  The d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n  or the s u s p i c i o n  conventional  the  particular  g r o u p t o make f e w e r c h e c k s t h a n t h e s u b j e c t s s u s p i c i o n group  sent  to submit "checks".  An ANOVA o f t h e number o f c h e c k s  t h e r e was  approach  Comparisons  from the treatment a r e i n d i c a t e d  the o t h e r p e r s o n would  group  payoffs  A l l o f t h e s e means a r e  the cases i n which  In a d d i t i o n  alternative.  lies.  i n the high  t h a t were f o u n d t o be  These enabled the s u b j e c t s  trust  (3) more  t h e means.  during bargaining,  of  suspicion  c o n t r o l g r o u p means and t h e  or almost s i g n i f i c a n t l y  that  (1) f e w e r  as t h e y s e n t more t i m e - b o n u s  s p o n d i n g means o f l e v e l s  that  i n which  of  g r o u p s seemed t o be more c o n c e r n e d a b o u t  were a l s o made b e t w e e n  differs  Groups  It is  regardless  (2) more m o d i f i c a t i o n m e s s a g e s ,  In a d d i t i o n , incentive  i n any o f t h e s e a n a l y s e s . )  (1.86)  significance.  the  d i d not  Table  7.  C o n t r o l and t r e a t m e n t means c o r r e s p o n d i n g to s i g n i f i c a n t main found i n the analyses of the communications.  Rate:  Category T o t a l Time  Control  Treatment Trust  Information  Proportion:  1.16 0.77  Suspicion  0.85 ',  Trust Modification  Category T o t a l Total  Control  0 .85 "  Treatment  Trust ^ ^ ^ ^"""""^ S u s p i c i o n  0.59  Trust  0.05  Suspicion  0.10  Trust  0.18  0.0 8  0.07  0.73  0.06 Suspicion  0.13 0.07^^^  Lies  ^Suspicion High Time Bonus  effects  0.0 9  0 .10^^^  0.26  High  0.06  Low  0.03  0.10^^ Low  0.04  O U)  104  Changes i n t h e the  bargaining  bargaining  data  was  the  range:  extent  One  other  to which a  minimum d i s p o s i t i o n m i g h t c h a n g e b e t w e e n t h e and  the  final  the  d i f f e r e n c e between the  the  overlap  and  the  as  subjects  In t h i s  bargaining  the  initial  range.  For  to s e t t l e  no  initial  the measure  "Q"  and  final  range  settlement  range a t the  was  s i n c e many  conclusion  i n d i c a t e that both  his  An  the measure o f change i n d i c a t e d t h a t  three  d i f f e r e n c e s or  t h e ANOVA o f  evaluation:  the  wherein the favorably  subjects  Secondly,  i n the  than d i d the  (p <.0001) and  the  t h e r e was  trustworthiness  means c o m p r i s i n g  the  Semantic  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l  e f f e c t s were s i g n i f i c a n t .  O's  t o any  "Q". there  of  the  treatment f a c t o r s .  Interpersonal In  i n t e r a c t i o n s due  of  "final  h i s maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s were a l s o a t  w e r e no  was  minimum d i s p o s i t i o n s ,  minimum and ANOVA o f  offer  range, i . e . ,  e x a m p l e , a s u b j e c t w o u l d make a at  of  subject's  bargaining  The  range j u s t b e f o r e  gave, i n e f f e c t ,  bargaining.  case,  between a c t u a l i n i t i a l  final  defined  offer"  agreement.  aspect  First, trust  subjects  a significant and  this  scores,  t h e r e was  (p <.05)  the .  interaction  effect 0 more  s u s p i c i o n group (See  interaction  i n c e n t i v e to betray  two  a main  group e v a l u a t e d  i n both  c o n t r o l group  Differential:  T a b l e '8(a)'.)"  (p <.02)  (A x B ) ;  are presented  between the  i n Table  8(b).  105  Table  Means o f t h e S e m a n t i c D i f f e r e n t i a l e v a l u a t i o n s made by t h e c o n t r o l and treatment groups. (A c o m p l e t e l y n e u t r a l e v a l u a t i o n = 28.00.)  8(a)  GROUPS  CONTROL  MEANS  32.8  8(b).  SUSPICION  TRUST 35.1  27.9  Means c o m p r i s i n g t h e A x B interaction.  significant  Incentive  It  High  Low  Trust  32.6  37.6  Suspicion  29 .3  26.4  i s evident  from T a b l e  group g e n e r a l l y relative primarily (Table  D.  evaluated  8(a)  that  0 quite  t o the c o n t r o l group,  the subjects  p o s i t i v e l y ; however,  this  a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e low  i n the t r u s t  e f f e c t appears  incentive  t o be  group  8(b)).  Summary: P r i m a r i l y by means o f a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA w i t h one  group, hypotheses trust of  about the development  and s u s p i c i o n were e x a m i n e d .  the analyses,  dependent  Table  To  9 i s presented,  variable analyzed,  and  control  the e f f e c t s of  summarize t h e r e s u l t s i n d i c a t i n g ( i ) the  ( i i ) the s i g n i f i c a n t  differences  Table  9.  Summary o f r e s u l t s f r o m t h e p r i n c i p a l a n a l y s e s . d e t a i l e d ANOVA t a b l e s ) .  D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e (Method of a n a l y s i s : ANOVA e x c e p t where i n d i c a t e d ) l.(a)  Significant Factor or Statistic  subjective trust and suspicion  (comparisons w i t h the c o n t r o l group) (b)  subjective probability and c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n PDG ( p o i n t - b i s e r i a l )  (c)  subjective probability and c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n PDG (Mann-Whitney)  r D  Description  or  Interpretation  A  .0001  -  B  .07  - g r e a t e r t r u s t where i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y was h i g h , e s p e c i a l l y where 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y .  .02  -  suspicion i s established r e a d i l y than t r u s t .  .001  -  a person's tendency t o m a n i f e s t t r u s t o r s u s p i c i o n was h i g h l y r e l a t e d t o the r e p o r t e d subjective state.  -  t h o s e who d i d n o t t r u s t 0 i n t h e PDG were c e r t a i n t h a t he would be u n t r u s t w o r t h y . Howe v e r , t h o s e who d i d t r u s t O were u n c e r t a i n t h a t he w o u l d be t r u s t w o r t h y .  A x  C  b  *  =  p?  (See A p p e n d i x F f o r  8 8  z= 5.14  .0001  a previously trustworthy 0 engendered t r u s t ; a p r e v i o u s l y untrustworthy 0 engendered suspicion.  more  Table  9  continued.  D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e (Method o f a n a l y s i s : ANOVA e x c e p t where i n d i c a t e d ) 2.(a)  (b)  3.(a)  (b)  l o c a t i o n of the settlement  time t o agreement  (i)absolute (ii) relative  extremity extremity  actual i n i t i a l  range  Significant Factor or Statistic  _ P<"  Description  or Interpretation  A x C  .04  - t h e g r e a t e r t h e number o f exposures t o a trustworthy 0, t h e g r e a t e r t h e t e n d e n c y t o a more e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n ; t h e g r e a t e r t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s t o an u n t r u s t w o r t h y 0, t h e g r e a t e r t h e tendency t o e q u a l i t y .  A  .03  - t r u s t groups r e q u i r e d l e s s time than t h e s u s p i c i o n g r o u p s t o r e a c h an a g r e e m e n t .  A A  .01 .03  -  i n i t i a l o f f e r s made b y t h e s u s p i c i o n g r o u p were more e x t r e m e .  C  .05  -  tendency f o r t h e s u s p i c i o n group t o c h e c k more, °  i  (c)  (d)  ( i ) amount o f communication ( i i ) n a t u r e o f communication number o f c h e c k s  (See T a b l e A  .07  6) H  Table  9  continued.  D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e (Method o f a n a l y s i s : ANOVA e x c e p t where i n d i c a t e d ) (e)  constriction of b a r g a i n i n g range  (f)  e v a l u a t i o n o f 0 on t h e Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l  Significant Factor or Statistic  Description  or Interpretation  - t r u s t group e v a l u a t e d 0 p o s i t i v e l y whereas s u s p i c i o n g r o u p gave a n e u t r a l e v a l u a t i o n o f 0. A x B  -  t h e most f a v o r a b l e e v a l u a t i o n s were made where 0 h a d b e e n t r u s t w o r t h y d e s p i t e a low incentive to betray. The l o w e s t e v a l u a t i o n s were made where 0 b e t r a y e d P f o r a low incentive.  107  or  interactions  level  t h a t were f o u n d ,  of s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  the nature difference.  and  ( i i i ) the  corresponding  (iv) a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n  of the i n t e r a c t i o n or the d i r e c t i o n of  of  the  108  CHAPTER SEVEN:  A.  Factors Affecting Interpersonal  factors.  t h e D e v e l o p m e n t o f T r u s t arid S u s p i c i o n :  trust  i s i n f l u e n c e d by  T h i s s t u d y was  to previous  with  encounter  affects  the p r e s e n t  concerned  experience.  concerned  t h e way an  DISCUSSION  with  a variety  factors  In o t h e r words, t h i s i n which  the  individual's  situation.  nature  trust  Specifically,  that  study  of a  was  or s u s p i c i o n i n  three  independent  (A)  incentive  number o f e x p o s u r e s .  (C)  relate  previous  v a r i a b l e s were o f i n t e r e s t : t o b e t r a y , and  O's  of  trustworthiness,  (B)  These  } v a r i a b l e s were c o m b i n e d their  effects  upon two  Both t r u s t of previous vidual  and  s u s p i c i o n were f o u n d  experience.  trusted  another  manifest The  s u s p i c i o n on incentive  and  Betrayed  suspicion.  t o be  trust  (where an  on  other  s u b j e c t i v e and  occasions.  in influencing experiment,  t o o c c u r where, i n the p r e v i o u s  trust  (where t h e  to both  indi-  trust-  manifest  t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s or  In t h i s  determine  functions  i n t u r n , was  gave r i s e  subsequent  to  and s u s p i c i o n .  c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h an  previous  important  trust  s u b j e c t i v e and  untrustworthy)  experienced were a l s o  Fulfilled p e r s o n who,  subsequent o c c a s i o n s . was  design  measures o f t r u s t  worthy) engendered both  person  in a factorial  individual  untrustworthiness  the development of  trust  g r e a t e r t r u s t was  found  situation,  the  incentive  109  t o be u n t r u s t w o r t h y was that which  this  e f f e c t was  primarily  t r u s t had been induced,  worthy.  attributable  t i o n s was  the e f f e c t  small.  reproduces  trust-  where 0 was  of convenience,  un-  condi-  Table  10  t h e f o u r A x B means p r e s e n t e d p r e v i o u s l y i n  3.)  only with  f o r t h e most p a r t ,  the i n t u i t i v e  interpretation  are consistent not advanced  (p. 8 5 ) , b u t a l s o w i t h H e i d e r ' s a n a l y s i s involve benefit  In a s e q u e n t i a l induction  a n d harm  situation  such  as t h a t  chooses  last  choice.  That  first  makes a  has extended h i s  t o whom t r u s t  o f power i n s o f a r  t h a t the  t h i s was s u b j e c t  chooses  i s , t h e p e r s o n who  i s i n a position  o r harm t h e t r u s t i n g worthy.  relations  employed i n b o t h t h e  (during induction,  i s v u l n e r a b l e , and t h e p e r s o n  extended  o f power  ( H e i d e r , 1958, p p . 2 5 8 - 2 6 3 ) .  number 4) has power i f t h e p e r s o n who trusting  earlier  and t h e measurement s t a g e , i t c a n be s a i d  p e r s o n who  trust  t o groups i n  of the previous i n c e n t i v e  (As a m a t t e r  These r e s u l t s ,  that  observed  i . e . , where 0 was  I n the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups  trustworthy,  Table  h i g h ; h o w e v e r , i t was  has b e e n  as he c a n b e n e f i t  p e r s o n by b e i n g t r u s t w o r t h y o r u n t r u s t -  According to Heider,  . . . t h e power o f 0 i s an i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t o f P's g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i o n and r e a c t i o n t o an a c t o f harm o r b e n e f i t . N o t o n l y w i l l P's p e r c e p t i o n o f who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e a c t be i n f l u e n c e d , but a l s o h i s understanding of the reasons motiv a t i n g the a c t .  no  Table  10.  D e g r e e s o f t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , o r unc e r t a i n t y generated under v a r i o u s conditions of previous experience.  Incentive  Trustworthy Untrustworthy Column  O 0 totals  High  Low  8.0  4.3  -8.4  -10.4  -0.4  -6.1  (In t h e a b o v e t a b l e , +15 r e p r e s e n t s c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y ; w h e r e a s -15 r e p r e s e n t s c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be u n t r u s t w o r t h y ; 0 ( z e r o ) r e p r e s e n t s c o m p l e t e uncertainty.)  Ill . . . Power r e l a t i o n s a l s o p l a y a p a r t i n s t i l l d e e p e r l e v e l s o f a t t r i b u t i o n , l e v e l s t h a t answer t h e q u e s t i o n why 0 w a n t e d t o harm o r b e n e f i t P. I n t h i s way power r e l a t i o n s a r e an important d e t e r m i n a n t o f P's a c c e p t a n c e o r r e j e c t i o n o f t h e act. (Heider, Heider's effects  1958,  pp.  observations of  259-260) .  l e a d t o an  incentive similar  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  to the  the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n advanced  earlier. Essentially, earlier an  supposes  the  intuitive  that trust  inferential-evaluative  information previous tant  i n s o f a r as  For trust  of  critical  i s derived  i n part  scheme i s  degree of  trust  degree or a  low  from  imporor  that i s generated. example, whether a h i g h by  O's  0.  previous level  degree  trustworthiness the  i n c e n t i v e t h a t was  Under a c o n d i t i o n o f  low  i n c e n t i v e , there to occur  i n w h i c h P makes i n f e r e n c e s  motives.  0 may  was  genuinely  so, but  have been t r u s t w o r t h y  untrustworthy.  despite a high communicating  simply  b e c a u s e he  In c o n t r a s t ,  i n c e n t i v e leaves a relatively  less  greater  during  a b o u t , and not  had  of  would  of  O's  being  products  t h a t the  in this  room f o r d o u b t o r u n c e r t a i n t y  process  by  process  Incentive  seem t o d e p e n d upon t h e  still  and  i t i n f l u e n c e s the  is elicited  gone by  s u s p i c i o n are  process  r e q u i r e d f o r the  experience.  suspicion  and  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n proposed  for-  is  the  evaluates, because  little  to  he gain  trustworthiness room f o r d o u b t ,  degree of  trustworthiness,  112  especially fast  i f O's  r e f u s a l to  decision  of  the  i s also  incentive.  Here, the  to e l i c i t  (i.e.,  less trust).  incentive  justifiable for a  a high  the  One  This  is likely  reason  t r u s t was  the  subjective t o an  low  level  incentive  degree of  perceived  as  high  sufficient  for  a  less betrayal  incentive  basis  is  suspicion  being  untrustworthiness,  induced,  findings  t r u s t developed  suspicion  as  was  is  the  itself  low  for rationalizing  the  Among t h e  g r o u p t h a t was  0 indicated  that  way  exposed  contrast,  a l l of  induced  indicated  significantly  e v e n where t h e r e  u n t r u s t w o r t h y 0.  subjective  t r u s t was  subjective  suspicion.  I t was  therefore  more d i f f i c u l t This  was  of  i n which  significantly the  way  groups i n which  In  suspicion,  the  a function  d i f f e r e n t from the  developed.  only  trust.  s u s p i c i o n was  greater  more i m p o r t a n t  times to a trustworthy subjective  of  the  betrayal.  e x p e r i e n c e was  subjective  a f f e c t e d by  .Whereas t h e  provide  i n which s u b j e c t i v e previous  stead-  untrust-  monetary grounds) than  f o r O's  does n o t  of  a  happens b e c a u s e b e t r a y a l  t o be  ( a t l e a s t on  previous  being  of p r e v i o u s  condition  a relatively  incentive.  tangible  incentive  evaluation  differentially  likely  low  as  betray.  Conceivably, worthiness  i s perceived  five  increased  groups i n which increased  only  one  apparent  to e s t a b l i s h  exposure that  than  d i f f e r e n c e , however, was  not  113  clearly one  reflected  level  o f C,  i n t h e PDG  the  groups to m a n i f e s t than  the  trust.  tendency  responses.  tendency  the  manifest  not  substantially  t r u s t - i n d u c e d gro\ips t o  T h i s seemed t o i n d i c a t e  somewhat, b u t  that manifest  n o t much more, d i f f i c u l t  suspicion.  o b t a i n e d r e p r e s e n t an o v e r e s t i m a t e  trust.  Without such  consistent with  subjective fest  and  trust  Two  reasons  tation.  The  subjects  decided  uncertainty come was arises It  obtained  of  the  manifest  f o r the measures  suspicion, indicating  than  would of  that both  a r e more d i f f i c u l t  to  mani-  establish  subjective suspicion. c a n be  first  and  was  presented  i s based  to t r u s t  to support  upon t h e  finding  0 i n t h e PDG  unexpected, the  interpre-  t h a t many  despite their  lack of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t .  intuitively  this  own  Since this  question  out-  naturally  as  t o why  these  c a n be  argued  t h a t i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , members o f  cohesive  in-group,  more l i k e l y in  those  and  and  trust  o v e r e s t i m a t i o n the r e s u l t s  subjective trust  than manifest  manifest  However, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t  an  any  greater  to e s t a b l i s h  results  be  i s , for  of the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d  s u s p i c i o n was of  That  compared w i t h  to g i v e each other  the a n t i c i p a t i o n  selected  complete  members  fraternity  (like  a choice. a  s t r a n g e r s , are  "the b e n e f i t  of post-experimental  o t h e r words, i n - g r o u p highly  s u b j e c t s w o u l d make s u c h  of the  doubt"  interaction.  t h e members o f  p o p u l a t i o n from which  In  the  the  sample  114  was drawn) e x p e c t experiment. accept  Thus, they  the r i s k  subjectively  the  in-group.  trust  Complete  t o undertake  expecting  s i t u a t i o n , would p r o b a b l y  such  a risk,  0 out-  g i v e n t h e same d e g r e e  i s different  What t h i s  interaction.  f a c t be a w o r t h w h i l e This  previous results  line  ultimately  —  the r e l a t i o n s h i p reason  t o expect  Such:a comparison  would  f o r future research.  Lieberman  (1964),  of  future interaction  of  the s t a b i l i t y  G e r g e n , and Doob  i n t e r e s t based  and d i r e c t e d  (1966),  although  made more c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e s .  self-  upon t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n  Similarly, not d i r e c t l y  did find  i n t e r a c t i o n with  con-  towards t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f the c o a l i t i o n .  the problem o f t r u s t ,  future social  game,  and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s d e r i v e from  a l o n g term  other  on t h e b a s i s o f  a n e g o t i a b l e 3-person c o a l i t i o n  that trust  interest  focus  members  o f r e a s o n i n g w o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  findings. from  from  s t r a n g e r s who h a v e l i t t l e  extra-experimental  with  with  be q u i t e  and t h e s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f i n - g r o u p  interaction  complete  cluded  do  i s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e measures o f  the m a n i f e s t  for  even i f they  s t r a n g e r s , on t h e o t h e r hand,  u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n .  implies  of  trust  chance t h a t they would have t o i n t e r a c t w i t h  unwilling  in  their  more w i l l i n g t o  0, a s l o n g a s 0 i s a l s o a member o f  side of the experimental  of  each o t h e r o u t s i d e t h e  are probably  of extending  not  little  t o encounter  that given  Marlowe, concerned the expectation  the other person,  subjects  115 There  i s a second  r e a s o n why  the r e s u l t s  r e p r e s e n t an o v e r e s t i m a t i o n o f m a n i f e s t trial  i n which 0  (number 4) was  t h e s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d 25C. 15$,  or  $1.25  trustworthy  0.  s u b j e c t s may "ahead"  depending  (by  on  25$,  75$,  i s , they  stances, without  each  received  d u r i n g measurement,  25C, to  the  the  could afford  t h e y may  trustworthiness.  to  take  n o t have been  Under o t h e r  circum-  the b e n e f i t o f p r e v i o u s p a y o f f s , they  h a v e b e e n more r e l u c t a n t  I,  t h a t s i n c e t h e y were a l r e a d y  or $1.25), they  o f O's  For  t h e number o f e x p o s u r e s  a chance even though s u b j e c t i v e l y , very convinced  trust.  trustworthy during stage  That  Consequently,  have reasoned  obtained  to r i s k  a net  loss  of  their  may  own  money. To  summarize up  to t h i s  primarily  concerned  difficult  to e s t a b l i s h  subjective  trust  with  and  the h y p o t h e s i s  than  suspicion.  suspicion  this  and  s u s p i c i o n were n o t as c l e a r - c u t .  who  result,  manifested  being  support of  argued  this  i s more  measures  that  inflated,  To a c c o u n t  the  frequency  of  support  trust  suspicion.  Two  explanation.  and  of subjects  frequency  the frequency  reasons First,  this of  of subjects  were o f f e r e d  the f a c t  trust  f o r the  the consequence of  the d i f f e r e n c e between the  manifested  manifested  The  trust  been  However, t h e m e a s u r e s o f m a n i f e s t  t r u s t was  to decrease  s u b j e c t s who who  i t was  that  furnished strong  for  latter  hypothesis.  p o i n t , t h e d i s c u s s i o n has  that  in the  116  s u b j e c t s were a l l members w i t h i n a w e l l - d e f i n e d the  possibility  expectation tendency  that being  in-group  of post-experimental  to give  each other  Secondly, because of during  that  degree of manifest  of  experiment to manifest  c e r t a i n t y may other  B.  not  a  an  greater  doubt".  t h a t were r e c e i v e d by  trust  Thus, the  had  and  "the b e n e f i t o f the  i n d u c t i o n of t r u s t ,  the methodology.  this  members, t h e y  interaction,  payoffs  subjects the  the  the  group r a i s e d  i t was  obtained  tendency of  trust  possible  was  an  the  subjects  even i n the  have been t y p i c a l ,  the  artifact  face  especially  of  in  un-  under  circumstances.  E f f e c t s o f T r u s t and  S u s p i c i o n Upon B a r g a i n i n g  and  Negotiations: This designed  p a r t of not  only  the  study  to determine the  s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g inferences reason,  a b o u t why  the  concerning  those  largely the  to the  emphasis o f  relating  and  i n t e g r a t i n g the  possible  rather  this  the  processes  role  and  permit For  of  this  bargain-  of q u a l i f y i n g In  the this  l i e in  f i n d i n g s as m e a n i n g f u l l y f o r each r e s u l t  i n d i c e s o f outcome were a n a l y z e d . to reach  was  trust  also to  discussion w i l l  than accounting  time r e q u i r e d  of  outcomes o f b a r g a i n i n g .  the  the  stage)  outcomes o c c u r r e d .  respect,  Two  effects  outcomes, b u t  findings concerning  i n g were a s s i g n e d results  (the b a r g a i n i n g  settlement;  the  One other  as  individually. measure was  the  was locus  117  or  nature  to  be  equal  former That or  o f the s e t t l e m e n t , e.g.,  i s g e n e r a l l y regarded  abbreviated usually  long-range tion,  Of  the  as b e i n g  time  interests  why  has  i s not,  i f the settlement of both  however, c a n be  determine  less  and  useful  itself,  measures,  the  important.  parties).  In  irrelevant bickering  less  time  of t r u s t The  with  than  agreement.  bargaining.  Knowledge o f  an  agreement.  dura-  period For  been p r o l o n g e d , i t  i f the  t i m e has  been  o r i f some c o n s t r u c t i v e  o f the time measure, a  found,  made i t d i f f i c u l t , effects  best  accomplished.  m a i n e f f e c t was  an  to determine  the a n a l y s i s  requiring  i n the  i f i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to  been r e q u i r e d to a c h i e v e  ends h a v e b e e n  interest"''  u n d e r what c o n d i t i o n s a p a r t i c u l a r  w o u l d be w o r t h w h i l e o c c u p i e d by  of c e n t r a l  is objectively  e x a m p l e , i f a b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n has  reach  two  tended  i s , whether the d u r a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g i s p r o t r a c t e d  (especially  of  o r more e q u i t a b l e .  i f agreements  the  t r u s t - i n d u c e d groups  the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups  Taking  the  c o n t r o l group i n t o  however, t o s p e c i f y  and  significant  to  account  p r e c i s e l y what  the  s u s p i c i o n were upon t h e d u r a t i o n o f  g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e means o f  "'"Exceptions o c c u r , o f c o u r s e , i n t h e e x t r e m e c a s e s . Where, b a r g a i n i n g i s , f o r example, c o n c l u d e d q u i c k l y , the agreement m i g h t be r e g a r d e d as b e i n g o v e r l y h a s t y and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d ; or, i f b a r g a i n i n g i s proceeding s l o w l y , the c o n s t i t u e n t s m i g h t become i m p a t i e n t and d i s g r u n t l e d ; o r , i f a s t r i k e i s i n e f f e c t , t h e d e l a y i n p r o d u c t i o n m i g h t be e x t r e m e l y c o s t l y .  118  the  c o n t r o l group, the  (see F i g u r e the  effect  14, of  appreciable  p.  effect.  i n s o f a r as Although  no  the  that  trust  However, c o m p a r i s o n s the  trust  of  trust  group d i d r e q u i r e  aspects  of  e x a m p l e , i t was  g r o u p made i n i t i a l initial Their  own  to t h e i r  own  suspicion.)  was  therefore greater  trust  group.  The  this interpreta-  s u s p i c i o n g r o u p had  found.  i t was  time than An  clear  the  examination pf process  subjects  suggested  subjects  i n the  i n the  trust  suspicion  extreme  ranges,^  f o r the this  to bargain  between the  the  group.  (However,  r a n g e s were u n a f f e c t e d  discrepancy  the  for this difference.  actual bargaining  In e f f e c t ,  control  t h a t were more e x t r e m e t h a n  the  no  suspicion  specified,  less  t h a t the  actual bargaining  and  had  s u s p i c i o n upon  the b a r g a i n i n g  offers  the  o f f e r s were b o t h a b s o l u t e l y e x t r e m e and  relative their  and  a solution.  found  o f f e r s made by  of  the  d i f f e r e n c e s were  unequivocally  group to reach  that trust  of  and  plausibility  significant  be  s u s p i c i o n group  impression  a number o f p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s For  the  d u r a t i o n , w h e r e a s s u s p i c i o n had  effects  c o u l d not  more s p e c i f i c  gave the  from the  duration  suspicion  g r o u p , and  t h e means o f  groups d e t r a c t e d  the  119),  decreasing  g r o u p mean w i t h  tion  trust  by  initial  trust offers  s u s p i c i o n group than f o r meant t h a t t h e over  an  subjects  initially  ^"A s u b j e c t ' s own a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g r a n g e was r a n g e b e t w e e n h i s a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n maximum d i s p o s i t i o n .  the in  the  greater  d e f i n e d as t h e and h i s a c t u a l  119  Figure  14.  Graphic representation to r e a c h agreement.  of the  times  required  120  r a n g e o f a l t e r n a t i v e s ; and they  e v e n t u a l l y had  Thus, the subjects  ultimate i n the  c o n s e q u e n c e was  trust  to a r r i v e  Analyses also  of  reflected  the  the  subjects  modification  the in  other the  they  subjects  results,  this  exchange of  latter  observation  of  results of  the  by  their  the  communications  trust  and  the  t h e messages  Not  only  did  sent  trust  i n the  groups.  On  so much s e e k i n g as  (strikes) other sent  Along  seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e  information  sent  the  s u s p i c i o n groups)  relates,  f o r the final  other  in fact,  the  they  with subjects  solution  attempting  to  obtain  means t h a t were h i g h l y c o n f l i c t f u l .  Whether a d y a d direction  of  r e f u s a l s to b a r g a i n  s u s p i c i o n g r o u p were n o t  payoffs  nature  nature  fewer i n f o r m a t i o n a l messages.  higher  the  in  a l s o made more c h e c k s and  i n the  (the s u b j e c t s  through the  suspicion  more q u i c k l y .  utilities.  more t h r e a t s , u l t i m a t u m s , and  proportionally  the  i n s u s p i c i o n g r o u p s were d i r e c t e d t o w a r d  s e n d more l i e s , b u t  hand, they  concessions.  reflected  P r o p o r t i o n a l l y more o f  of each o t h e r s '  than d i d the  agreement,  that  to the  d i f f e r e n c e s between the  s u s p i c i o n groups. by  probably  e a s i e r , as was  qualitative  an  number o f  group, r e l a t i v e  at settlements  the  to reach  t o make a g r e a t e r  group, found b a r g a i n i n g ability  i n order  This  t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  m e a s u r e o f outcome —-  the  settlement. settled  at e q u a l i t y or  a p p e a r e d t o depend upon t h e  i n a more  degree of  trust  equitable or  121  suspicion  that  had  been induced  experiment.  This  interaction,  is difficult  of  the  the C,  (see  settlements of number o f  at higher  the  direction.  On  lowest and,  the  the  the  56  number o f  p.  122).  On  dyads  alternative  and  equality  highly  was  This  equality  so  of  hand,  to  t r u s t was  presumably  s e t t l e i n a more suspicion  tended the  toward  Figure  16  group a t  the  equality. group  dyads),  This  was  n e x t most  exactly  twice  frequently  midway b e t w e e n  presents  e n t i r e range of  equitable  settlements  control  s e t t l e d at the  of  the  frequency  alternatives.  Clearly,  preferred. two  questions.  obtained  First,  interaction?  how  does  Secondly,  this why  attractive?  With regard inspection  the  one  equality;  (which was  result raises  r e l a t e to  nature  toward  s e t t l e d at e q u a l i t y .  equality).  the  f a c t o r , tended  (including  dyads t h a t  an  level  i . e . , as  —  as  lowest  increased,  f o r the  the  to  the  first  question,  data indicated  s e t t l e d at equality,  group,  because of  the  the  o t h e r hand, the  distribution  that  15,  stage of  statistically  t r u s t group a t  C,  almost a t h i r d  occurring  is  Figure  first  l e v e l . o f C b e g a n w i t h more e q u i t a b l e  Of  result  explain  t e n d e n c y was  suspicion  equity  to  exposures  as  —  the  l e v e l s of  increasing,  18  r e s u l t , represented  interaction  the  i n the  7 were i n t h e  that  out. o f  7 were i n t h e  suspicion-induced  a more  detailed  the  18  dyads  trust-induced g r o u p , and  4 were  in  \  Alternatives Figure  16.  Frequency  distribution  o f dyads  over the range o f  solutions.  124  the  control  ments had  no  equality. by  group.  In o t h e r words, the  a p p a r e n t e f f e c t upon t h e  However, an  7 dyads  i n the  whereas  the  underlying  the  the  suspicion equality hard  required  s o l u t i o n of  that  settled relatively  suspicion  equality  condition  or  that  the  preferred  amount o f  reasons  different. and/or the  unwillingly yielded  after a considerable  the  quickly,  r e l a t i v e ease, whereas  dyads c a p i t u l a t e d  .  settled  were q u i t e  s e t t l e d at equality  solution with  only  times  I t appears, therefore,  t r u s t dyads t h a t  accepted  the  treat-  for  interesting finding:  7 dyads i n t h e slowly."'"  The  an  trust condition  relatively  preference  examination of  t h e s e dyads r e v e a l e d  experimental  to  conflict  and  bargaining. In  t h i s context,  data p e r t a i n i n g  to  easily  understood.  action  that  group are  the  the  the  "low  nature of  Although  s e t t l e m e n t s by  the  as  (from  solution)  i t appears  t r u s t " g r o u p and  similar insofar  toward e q u a l i t y ,  i n t e r a c t i o n obtained  they both  "high  tend  to  t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggests  t h e s e groups a t e q u a l i t y  i s more  from the  the  the  intersuspicion"  settle that  the  have d i f f e r e n t  implications.  ^"The means f o r t h e 7 t r u s t d y a d s and t h e 7 s u s p i c i o n d y a d s were 15.6 m i n u t e s and 22.9 m i n u t e s r e s p e c t i v e l y , t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g 7.3 m i n u t e s . A t e s t of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e was s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.05), b u t , o f c o u r s e , was n o t i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e o v e r - a l l F t e s t t h a t had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n f o u n d t o be s i g n i f i c a n t .  125 The  question  were l o c a t e d  r e m a i n s as t o why s o many  at equality.  friends with non-friends equally  highly  Morgan a n d Sawyer and a l s o  a t t r a c t i v e i n both  e v e n t h o u g h asymmetry  account f o r t h e i r  in  effect,  not  legitimated  the  subjects,  study, a l s o  In the present  disregarded  scale  symmetry.  o u t c o m e s , e q u a l i t y became e x p e r i m e n t , asymmetry was possible  that  i n t h e Morgan and Sawyer  i n many c a s e s  i t was a c c e p t e d  that  by t h e  that  and o f t e n  However, i t  once  asymmetry  taken i n t o  account  bargaining.  E q u a l i t y may h a v e b e e n p r o m i n e n t f o r o t h e r To  a more  the higher  i m p o s e d symmetry o v e r asymmetry.  became e v i d e n t ,  occurred  between non-  I t i s therefore  the subjects  was i n f o r m a l l y o b s e r v e d  during  This  a number o f f a c t o r s p r o m o t e d  i n any way.  like  t o be  f i n d i n g s , Morgan and Sawyer a r g u e d  e s s e n t i a l l y symmetrical  prominent.  compared  the experimental s i t u a t i o n .  asymmetry was v i r t u a l l y  and t h a t  Thus, w i t h highly  groups.^"  was l e g i t i m a t e d  was p l a u s i b l y j u s t i f i e d w i t h i n  subjects  found e q u a l i t y  i . e . , why one p e r s o n r e c e i v e d  To  (1967)  (where one p e r s o n r e c e i v e d  generous s c a l e o f p a y o f f s ) friends,  settlements  a l i m i t e d extent,  the payoff  s c h e d u l e s were  reasons. disguised;  ^Morgan and Sawyer a l s o compared t h e e f f e c t s o f h a v i n g i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t O's e x p e c t a t i o n s w i t h n o t h a v i n g i n f o r mation. The r e s u l t d i s c u s s e d h e r e p e r t a i n s o n l y t o t h e "have i n f o r m a t i o n " c o n d i t i o n s i n c e t h i s c o n d i t i o n r e s e m b l e s more c l o s e l y t h e way i n w h i c h t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y was conducted.  126  however, t h e those  a t the  t h a t were n o t  through often  the  p o i n t o f e q u a l i t y were among  altered.  exchange of  Thus, d i s c o v e r y  information  o r by  r e s u l t e d i n e q u a l i t y becoming the  subsequent  obvious  e q u i t y , on  as  the  other  hand, c o u l d  revealed  to both s i d e s .  Bargaining  B o a r d , f o r example, t h r e e  with  quarters  three  a t the  p o i n t p r o m i n e n t i f f o r no number o f  c o i n s was  Reference not equitable the  study.  knowledge of  the  scale  outset  of  the  the  notion of they  equity  an  point  check, of  For  the  juxtaposed  e q u i t y , making than  the  quite  the  as  the  fact  the  that 1967).  t o a more  justified  subjects  magnitude of  subjects  schedules  Sawyer's  p o i n t of equity  of the  made  (Morgan & Sawyer,  of bargaining,  (but n o t  payoff In  reason  although  be  n i c k e l s were  nevertheless  r a n g e and  not  had  in  no  other  person's  a l m o s t a l l became aware  scales during  the  course  of  f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d t o some specific  point of equity)  when  i n f a v o r o f more e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n s .  In t h i s present  was  In f a c t ,  argued  other  identical  disparate nature  bargaining.  p o i n t of  so much t o t h e  settlement  present  at  means o f a  focal  i n some e x p e r i m e n t s where t h e  completely  the  either  bargaining.  Exact  are  values  p a r t of  the  d i s c u s s i o n , an  i n t e g r a t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  the  bargaining  stage.  and  then q u a l i f i e d  Two  a t t e m p t was  made t o  the  from  results  m e a s u r e s o f outcome were  discussed  i n terms of s e v e r a l p r o c e s s - r e l a t e d  127  findings. it  was  the of  With r e s p e c t  found  that  t o t h e measure o f time t o agreement,  the t r u s t group r e q u i r e d  s u s p i c i o n group t o reach several  why  aspects  the suspicion  a settlement.  of the bargaining group r e q u i r e d  sent  t i o n m e s s a g e s , more l i e s , to  This  of  final  greater  conflictful  tenor  settlement.  t r u s t , there  E s s e n t i a l l y , i t was was  a greater  toward e q u a l i t y .  t h e same f r e q u e n c y  trust  with  more  there  I t was o b s e r v e d  was  that  i t accounted f o r  Furthermore, e q u a l i t y  that  compared w i t h  groups, t h e t r u s t groups r e q u i r e d  equality  that  occurred  i n b o t h t h e t r u s t and t h e s u s p i c i o n  I t was d i s c o v e r e d  at equality.  explanation  toward  suspicion,  a modal s o l u t i o n ; i n f a c t ,  1/3 o f t h e s o l u t i o n s .  the  found  tendency  tendency  settlement  informa-  to the nature or l o c a t i o n of  a greater  groups.  d i d the s u s p i c i o n  group f a c i l i t a t e d  solutions; but with greater  with  t o come  which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the  equitable  almost  longer  a n d more t h r e a t s , u l t i m a t u m s , and  i n the s u s p i c i o n  e q u a l i t y was  the reasons  p r o p o r t i o n a l l y fewer  the r e s u l t s that pertained  the  Not only  context  bargain.  highly  bargaining  process,  than  o f f e r s t h a t were more e x t r e m e , b u t t h e y  a l s o made more c h e c k s ,  refusals  In the  relatively  t o an a g r e e m e n t became e v i d e n t . g r o u p make i n i t i a l  l e s s time  the suspicion  l e s s time t o reach  Thus, a r r i v i n g  a t the s o l u t i o n o f  h a d d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r  o r s u s p i c i o n was  apparently  operating.  For the t r u s t  128  groups,  equality  was  a solution  a g r e e d upon; h o w e v e r , settlement reluctantly conflict.  that  was  f o r the s u s p i c i o n arrived  relatively groups,  amicably  i t was  a  a t through a great deal of  129  CHAPTER  The  EIGHT:  SUMMARY  p r i n c i p a l purpose  AND  CONCLUSIONS  of t h i s chapter  some o f t h e more g e n e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s so d o i n g ,  were:  were s e t f o r t h .  (i) to attempt  difficulties obtain about  first  suspicion.  To  fore, the  i n s t u d y i n g t r u s t and  t h e d e v e l o p m e n t and Obviously,  (empirical)  briefly  was  was  selected.' which in  evidence  prerequisite  to  suspicion, An  ostensibly  t r u s t and  a manner t h a t  suspicion permitted  the  i t s h o u l d be  to the  s i t u a t i o n was be  (perhaps to  of the  laboratory  toward  more) assess study.  study  induction  then developed  generated  (1) v a l i d  There-  emphasized  i t w o u l d be w o r t h w h i l e  could  of  directed  t h e method o f e x p e r i m e n t a l  experimental  and  objectives.  some o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s  and  ( i i ) . to  accomplishment  a s p e c t s were e q u a l l y  Among t h e v a r i o u s a p p r o a c h e s trust  and  the e f f e c t s of t r u s t  objectives,  For t h i s reason  related  methodological  empirical  the s u c c e s s f u l  the experiment  the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  important.  and.in  objectives  suspicion,  achievement of the e m p i r i c a l  although  latter  that  r e i t e r a t e , the  t o overcome some o f t h e  the methodological o b j e c t i v e s successful  of t h i s study  c h a p t e r , two  some t h e o r e t i c a l l y - i m p o r t a n t both  suggest  t o p r e s e n t a summary o f t h e m a j o r r e s u l t s .  At the b e g i n n i n g of the objectives  i s to  and  inferences  of was in  measured about  trust  ^ A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h w o u l d b e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o compare s a m p l e s drawn f r o m p o p u l a t i o n s t h a t a r e f o r some r e a s o n c o n s i d e r e d t o be d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n .  130  and  s u s p i c i o n , and  (2)  dependent v a r i a b l e s . as  being  necessary  extensively and  as  and  of  and  be  possible.  or  suspicion  trust  For  the  events  t h a t were e a s i l y  s u s p i c i o n on  these steps  number o f r e a s o n s valid  and  the  of  the  other  effective.  For  of  (i.e.,  second  approximately strongest  stage 85%  of  the  e f f e c t i n the  effects  that occurred  usually  consistent with  general  and  However,  m e t h o d o l o g y was  A,  bargaining the  in  which accounted  also  bargaining  s t a g e were  i n c l u s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  of the  for  Furthermore,  this  a  e f f e c t measured  stage.  each o t h e r ;  of  both  consistent  t r e a t m e n t v a r i a t i o n ) , was  within  the  observed e f f e c t s  strongest  Factor  guarantee  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  s t a g e I m a n i p u l a t i o n s were g e n e r a l l y  the  between  subjective  course,  example, t h e  in  trust  f u r n i s h some e v i d e n c e  the  That i s , the  that  measurement o f  observed.  do  subsequent stages.  r e a l money  hand and  procedures. that  comprehended,  hand.  d i d not,  suggest  induction  differentiation  one  t h a t have been r e p o r t e d  effectiveness  as  experimental s i t u a t i o n s  took i n t o account the  the  Two  were i n c o r p o r a t e d  example, i n b o t h the  e f f e c t s w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y be  results  e f f e c t s upon some  o u t l i n e d i n Chapter  inferences  Furthermore,  s u s p i c i o n on  Adopting that  lost.  t r u s t and  and  the  m o d e r a t e l y s i z a b l e amounts o f  won  manifest  of  conditions  for valid  sequential  involved  could  the  The  t h e measurement s t a g e s ,  consisted  the  observation  permitted  the the  a more  the r e s u l t s .  131  Finally,  despite the f a c t  was a d m i n i s t e r e d it  a t the very  nevertheless reflected  stage.  t h a t the Semantic  c o n c l u s i o n of the  effects  initiated  experiment,  i n the f i r s t  On t h e b a s i s o f t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  seems r e a s o n a b l e objective  devoted  to conclude  set forth  accomplished.  The r e m a i n d e r  results  of this  stating  of trust  implications.  one s e t o f r e l a t i o n s  insofar  chapter w i l l  was  now b e  experience First,  have a t  the conceptu-  a n d s u s p i c i o n does n o t c o n s i s t o f s i m p l y f o r . t r u s t and m e r e l y  the o p p o s i t e s e t o f r e l a t i o n s apparent  thesis  t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t r u s t and  s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f p r e v i o u s  alization  of this  the e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s .  concerning  three important  i t  that the methodological  a t the beginning  to reviewing  The  least  Differential  as t r u s t  for suspicion.  stating  This i s  and s u s p i c i o n d e v e l o p  at different  rates, with  t r u s t b e i n g more d i f f i c u l t  suspicion.  The d e g r e e o f t r u s t m o r e o v e r , i s a p p r e c i a b l y  i n f l u e n c e d by t h e i n c e n t i v e previously is  trustworthy;  to establish  than  c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h 0 was  i n c o n t r a s t , the degree o f s u s p i c i o n  n o t i n f l u e n c e d t o t h e same e x t e n t by t h e i n c e n t i v e  conditions  t h a t were o p e r a t i n g when 0 was p r e v i o u s l y u n t r u s t -  worthy. Apart  from  this  conceptual  results  are important  relates  to the long-range  implication,  f o r an a d d i t i o n a l interest  the  reason.  o f -determining  aforementioned This  reason  means o f  132 j  fostering costly  t r u s t where s u s p i c i o n i s u n j u s t i f i e d  and  disruptive  effects  solutions  to problems.  establish  i s not,  since others  observations.  a high  going  and  But  an  Schelling,  entirely  to b e t r a y .  incentive  encouraging  does n o t  1960)  S k o l n i c k , Thomas,  h a v e made  similar  to recognize that a c a n be  e n g e n d e r e d by  appear  t o be  as  an  temptation  Trustworthiness while  implication  fore-  effective  i s that i t i s important  g u i s h between the m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t r u s t the u n d e r l y i n g s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s . distinction  lies  thereby  being  and  the  to  distin-  importance  of making  of  the  the m a n i f e s t  states  thresholds a t which  subjective  trust  behavior.  From t h e r e s u l t s  the nature  o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the m a n i f e s t  and  subjective  s t a t e s may  upon  such  factors  b e e n drawn. also vary.  in  s u s p i c i o n and  the nature  s u b j e c t i v e and  able to a s c e r t a i n  as  and  The  i n determining  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the and  to  trust.  Another  this  at  finding  been t r u s t w o r t h y d e s p i t e the  incentive  a low  novel  Pilisuk,  i t i s important  has  to arrive  has  i s often d i f f i c u l t  g r e a t e r degree of t r u s t  i n d i v i d u a l who of  of course,  trust  ( e . g . , Osgood, 1962;  & Chapman, 1967;  relatively  That  upon e f f o r t s  and/or  s u s p i c i o n become e x p r e s s e d  vary,  of t h i s  study,  depending,  as  overt  i t appears  f o r example,  the p o p u l a t i o n from w h i c h  t h e sample  that  has  Accordingly, a threshold, i f identifiable, It i s i n this  the  respect that future research  may can  133  be  directed since  valuable  i n attempting  'With'regard is  a knowledge o f  necessary  to  and a  combining  i n the  trust  and  but  implications  upon b a r g a i n i n g  bargaining  l e d to a p e r i o d Subjects  proportionally  by  to bargain. were f o u n d It the  assessing this,  process. initial  I t i s not to r e q u i r e  s o l u t i o n were n o t  the  Not  t r u s t tends  only  under a h i g h  groups  the  other  suspicion  by  sent  suspicion,  t r u s t w o u l d be  refusals  t r u s t groups  settlement. nature  bargaining  preferable  suspicion.  and  persons'  u l t i m a t u m s and  t h a t even i f the  degree of  did  characterized  l e s s time to reach a  u n d e r a c e r t a i n amount o f  i n some  o f f e r s more e x t r e m e ,  s u r p r i s i n g , then, that  a f f e c t e d by  to  m e s s a g e s , more l i e s ,  to modify  appear  proposed.  e f f e c t s of  impede and  of bargaining  m a k i n g more t h r e a t s ,  Nevertheless,  i s that  tends to  fewer i n f o r m a t i o n a l  would t h e r e f o r e  bargaining  in  i t  the  t e n t a t i v e l y be  i n suspicion-induced  made more o u t r i g h t a t t e m p t s utilities  can  i m p l i c a t i o n of  e f f e c t of making the  conflict.  stage,  a n a l y s i s s u c h as  integration.  whereas s u s p i c i o n  i t also  trust.  g e n e r a l i t y of For  .  a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were  i n t e r e s t of  suspicion  cases d i s r u p t the  the  bargaining  somewhat l i m i t e d .  most i m p o r t a n t  facilitate,  have the  d a t a from the  data i n a post-hoc  l i m i t e d number o f  Perhaps the  the  be  c e r t a i n number o f  sacrificed a  the  w o u l d be  t o g e n e r a t e more b e h a v i o r a l  to acknowledge t h a t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s may  thresholds  For  to  where  of  134  extreme s u s p i c i o n greater behavior only  tendency and  i s operating,  conducive only  appears  t o become d i s t r a c t e d f r o m  instead  irrelevant  there  to to  t o engage i n b e h a v i o r  the the  s o l u t i o n of  the  intensification  t o be  task-oriented that  is  problem, but of  a  conflict.  not often  135  BIBLIOGRAPHY  B a s s , B. M. E f f e c t s on t h e s u b s e q u e n t p e r f o r m a n c e o f ' n e g o t i a t o r s of studying i s s u e s or planning s t r a t e g i e s alone or i n groups. P s y c h o l o g ' l c a l Monographs, 1966, 80 (#6), Whole No. 614. B e c k e r , G. M., and M c C l i n t o c k , C. G. Value: behavioral decision theory. A n n u a l Review o f P s y c h o l o g y , 19 67, 18^, 239-286 . B i s h o p , R. L . Quarterly  Game-theoretic a n a l y s e s of J o u r n a l o f E c o n o m i c s , 1963,  bargaining. 7_7, 559-602.  B i x e n s t i n e , V. E . , and B l u n d e l l , H. C o n t r o l e x e r t e d by s t r u c t u r a l f a c t o r s i n two-person, non-zero-sum games. J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 19 66, 10, 478-487. B i x e n s t i n e , V. E . , and O ' R e i l l y , E . F. Money v e r s u s e l e c t r i c s h o c k as p a y o f f i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. P s y c h o l o g i c a l R e c o r d , 1966, 16_, 251-264. D e u t s c h , M. T r u s t and R e s o l u t i o n , 1958,  suspicion. Journal 2, 265-279.  of  Conflict  D e u t s c h , M. C o o p e r a t i o n and t r u s t : some n o t e s . In M. R. J o n e s ( E d . ) , N e b r a s k a symposium on m o t i v a t i o n , 1962. Lincoln: U n i v e r s i t y of Nebraska P r e s s , 1962. D e u t s c h , M. B a r g a i n i n g , t h r e a t , and c o m m u n i c a t i o n : some experimental s t u d i e s . In Kathleen A r c h i b a l d (Ed.), S t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n and c o n f l i c t . Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s , 1966. Pp. 19-41. D e u t s c h , M., and K r a u s s , R. M. The e f f e c t o f t h r e a t upon interpersonal bargaining. J o u r n a l o f A b n o r m a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , I960) 61, "181-189. D e u t s c h , M., and bargaining. 6, 52-76. D o u g l a s , R. D. Dilemma.  K r a u s s , R. M. Studies of i n t e r p e r s o n a l J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 196 2,  The use o f s h o c k as p a y o f f s Unpublished paper, 1967.  i n the  Prisoner's  136 Druckman, D. Dogmatism, p r e n e g o t i a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e , and s i m u l a t e d group r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as d e t e r m i n a n t s o f dyadic behavior i n a bargaining s i t u a t i o n . Journal o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1967, 6_,  279-290.  F o u r a k e r , L . E . , and S i e g e l , S. B a r g a i n i n g New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1963.  behavior.  G a l l o , P. S. E f f e c t s o f i n c r e a s e d i n c e n t i v e upon t h e u s e of t h r e a t i n b a r g a i n i n g . J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1966, 4_, 14-20. H a r f o r d , T., and S o l o m o n , L . "Reformed s i n n e r " and " l a p s e d s a i n t " s t r a t e g i e s i n t h e P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1967, 11, 104-109. H e i d e r , F . The p s y c h o l o g y o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . New Y o r k : W i l e y , 1958. Hoedemaker, E . D. D i s t r u s t and a g r e s s i o n : an i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l analogy. Journal of C o n f l i c t Resolution,  1968, JL2, 69-81.  Ikle,  F . C , a n d L e i t e s , N. P o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n as a process of modifying u t i l i t i e s . Journal of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1962, 6, 19-28.  K e l l e y , H. H. Experimental personal negotiations.  studies of threats i n i n t e r Journal of Conflict  R e s o l u t i o n , 1965, 9_, 79-105.  K e l l e y , H. H. A c l a s s r o o m s t u d y o f t h e dilemmas i n i n t e r personal negotiations. In Kathleen Archibald (Ed.), S t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n and c o n f l i c t . Berkeley, University of C a l i f o r n i a , I n s t i t u t e of International S t u d i e s , 1966, P p . 49-73. Knox, R. E . , a n d D o u g l a s , R. D. Low p a y o f f s and m a r g i n a l comprehension: p o s s i b l e c o n s t r a i n t s upon b e h a v i o r i n t h e P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma. Paper p r e s e n t e d a t the Western P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n m e e t i n g , San D i e g o ,  1968.  K o m o r i t a , S. S., a n d M e c h l i n g , J . B e t r a y a l a n d r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n a t w o - p e r s o n game. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l  P s y c h o l o g y , 1967 , 6_, 349-353.  137 K r a u s s , R. M. S t r u c t u r a l and a t t i t u d i n a l f a c t o r s i n i n t e r personal bargaining. Journal of Experimental Social  P s y c h o l o g y , 1966,  2,  42-55.  L a v e , L . B. F a c t o r s a f f e c t i n g c o o p e r a t i o n i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma. B e h a v i o r a l S c i e n c e , 1965, 10./ 26-38. L i e b e r m a n , B. i-Trust: a n o t i o n of t r u s t i n three-person games and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Journal of Conflict R e s o l u t i o n , 1964, 8l, 271-280. L u c e , R. D., and d u c t i o n and  R a i f f a , H. Games and c r i t i c a l survey. New  decisions: introYork: Wiley, 1957.  M a r l o w e , D., G e r g e n , K. J . , and Doob, A. N. Opponent's p e r s o n a l i t y , e x p e c t a t i o n o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n , and interpersonal bargaining. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1966, 3_, 206-213. M c C l i n t o c k , C. G., and playing behavior.  10, 98-102.  M c N e e l , S. P. Reward l e v e l and game J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1966,  M c C l i n t o c k , C. G., and M e s s i c k , D. M. The d e v e l o p m e n t c o o p e r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e m o t i v e s i n c h i l d r e n . research proposal. 1967.  of A  McGrath, J . E. A s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l appraoch to the study of n e g o t i a t i o n . I n Raymond V. Bowers ( E d . ) , S t u d i e s on b e h a v i o r i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s : a r e s e a r c h symposium. Athens, Georgia: U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia Press, 1966. M c G r a t h , J . E . , and V i d m a r , N. J . R o l e a s s i g n m e n t , and c o n f l i c t i n d e c i s i o n making groups: p a r t i a l t e s t of a model of n e g o t i a t i o n . Paper p r e s e n t e d a t the M i d western P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n meeting, Chicago, May, 1966. M e s s e , L . A., and Sawyer, J . Unexpected c o o p e r a t i o n : P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma r e s o l v e d ? U n p u b l i s h e d mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of, C h i c a g o , 1966.  the  M i n a s , J . S., S c o d e l , A., M a r l o w e , D., and Rawson, H. Some d e s c r i p t i v e a s p e c t s o f t w o - p e r s o n n o n - z e r o - s u m games. II. J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1960, 4_, 193-197. M o r g a n , W. R., and Sawyer, J . B a r g a i n i n g , e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the p r e f e r e n c e f o r e q u a l i t y over e q u i t y . Journal of P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y , 1967, 6, 139-149.  138  O s g o o d , C. E . An a l t e r n a t i v e t o war o r s u r r e n d e r . U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s Press, 1962. Oskamp, S,, and P e r l m a n , D. Factors affecting i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. J o u r n a l o f R e s o l u t i o n , 1965, 9, 359-374.  Urbana:  cooperation Conflict  P i l i s u k , M., S k o l n i c k , P., Thomas, K., and Chapman, R. Boredom v s . c o g n i t i v e r e a p p r a i s a l i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of c o o p e r a t i v e s t r a t e g y . J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1967, 11., 110-116 . R a p o p o r t , A. Critiques 1959, 4_, 49-66 .  o f game t h e o r y .  Behavior a l  Science,  R a p o p o r t , A., and Chammah, A. M. P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma. Ann A r b o r , M i c h i g a n : U n i v e r s i t y of Michigan Press,  1965.  Sawyer, J . , and Guetzgow, H. B a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n i n international relations. I n H. C. Kelman ( E d . ) , International behavior: a social-psychological analysis. New Y o r k : H o l t , R i n e h a r t and W i n s t o n , 1965. S c h e l l i n g , T. C. The s t r a t e g y o f c o n f l i c t . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1960. S i e g e l , S., and F o u r a k e r , L . E . B a r g a i n i n g and making. New Y o r k : McGraw-Hill, 1960. S t e v e n s , C. M. tion. New  group d e c i s i o n  S t r a t e g y and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.  negotia-  S w i n t h , R. L . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t h e t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p . J o u r n a l o f C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1967,; 11, 335-344. W a l t o n , R. E . , and M c K e r s i e , R. B. A b e h a v i o r a l theory of l a b o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . New Y o r k : McGraw-Hill, 1965. W i n e r , B. J . Statistical principles New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 196 2.  i n experimental  design.  APPENDIX  A:  EXAMPLE  OF  THE PDG  RESPONSE  SHEET  PD FORM  Instructions: •  RED  (TO  (i) Carefully examine the table below.,  (i) Carefully ezawino the table below.  [ii) Rensmber that this form goes*) to the other parson who, knowing what jm have already chosen, w i l l then make his choice.  '  Lil) Ifow choose either the upper row O P the lower row by drawing a horizont a l line through the entire row chosen.  ]  ( i i ) Note the choice that has already been made by the other person.  ( i iNow i ) mke your the column on column on the vertical line column,  own choice between the l e f t or the right by drawing a through the chosen  IMPORTANT: THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU RECEIVE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE INTERSECTION OF THE LINES DRAWN BT YOU AND THE OTHER PERSON.  Green chooses either  lift  • $0 $0 • |O,$0 n  Red cheeses oither • $1.00 - lloOO  - Si,oo  + ti.oo  PD FORM  Instructions:  GREEN  RED i  (i) Carefully ©gamine the tabl*a below „ ( i l ) ResBBhsr that this form goes to the other person who, knowing what you haw already chosen, w i l l then make his choice  (i) Carefully exasdne the table below, ( i i ) Bote the choice that has already been aade by the other person.  1  0  i i i ) Now choose either the upper row or the lower row by drawing a horizont a l lino through the entire row chosen  ( i i i ) Now sake your own choice between the c o l o n on the l e f t or the coluwn on the right by drawing a vertical line through the chosen ooluan,  1  IMPORTANT: THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU RECEIVE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE INTERSECTION OF THE LINES DRAWN BY YOU AND THE OTHER PERSON.  Green chooses either right  left  • So.5o  • $o,5to  •  - $1,00  - $l 00 o  • $1.00  Red chooses either $l 00 o  0  0  140  APPENDIX B:  PROCEDURE AND RULES OF BARGAINING PART I I I :  BARGAINING  Objective: Agreement by b o t h s i d e s upon one o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s . Procedural Details: 1. A s t a t e m e n t (on y e l l o w s l i p s ) must accompany each message. 2.  Agreement o c c u r s when one s i d e sends a d e c i s i o n message ( p i n k s l i p s ) i n d i c a t i n g commitment, and t h e other side decides to accept.  R u l e s and Other F a c t o r s t o C o n s i d e r : 1. Time: The q u i c k e r you r e a c h an agreement, t h e more money you w i l l r e c e i v e . HOWEVER, t o o h a s t y an agreement may n o t be w i s e s i n c e t h e o t h e r s i d e may be d e c e i v i n g y o u , l e a v i n g you w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y low p a y o f f . D e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e time bonus o r p e n a l t y : Time 1 2 3 4 5  Bonus 25%  Maximum bonus f o r s e t t l e m e n t i n 1st 3 minutes.  24 23 ! n  Bonus d e c r e a s e s by 1% e v e r y m i n u t e . 11 12 13  17 | 16 ! 15  14 15 16 17 18  12-t 9! 6! 3! o Penalty  19 20  J  Bonus d e c r e a s e s by 3% e v e r y m i n u t e .  J  _1 a -2%  P e n a l t y o f 1% e v e r y m i n u t e .  141 2. D e c e p t i o n ; T h i s m i g h t y i e l d a b e t t e r outcome, .BUT, i f d e t e c t e d , i . e . , checked, i t m i g h t e i t h e r d e l a y o r e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of agreement. Checking the t r u t h of the o t h e r person's c l a i m s c o s t s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5% o f y o u r maximum p a y o f f . 3.  R e f u s a l t o b a r g a i n : Here, no messages a r e a l l o w e d f o r the time s p e c i f i e d . Bonus decrements and p e n a l t i e s a r e s t i l l i n e f f e c t , o n l y the o t h e r p e r s o n ' s decrements and p e n a l t i e s a r e d o u b l e d .  142  APPENDIX C:  EXAMPLES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS  The problems on t h e f o l l o w i n g page were i n t e n d e d t o c o n t r a s t w i t h each o t h e r so t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s would n o t be as l i k e l y t o have s e t s about t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s o r d i f f e r e n c e s between one s i d e ' s s c a l e and t h e o t h e r s i d e ' s s c a l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e range o f t h e p a y o f f s and t h e payoff increments. I n p i l o t s t u d i e s , i t had been found t h a t s u b j e c t s f r e q u e n t l y assumed e i t h e r t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ' s p a y o f f s c h e d u l e was s i m i l a r t o t h e i r own, o r when o n l y one example problem was g i v e n , t h a t t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l problem was i n some s p e c i f i c way s i m i l a r t o t h e example problem.  OBJECTIVE OF BARGAINING:  MUTUAL AGREEMENT UPON ONE OF THE ALTERNATIVES.  Example 1  One s i d e  gets  Alternatives Other s i d e  gets  50  31  25  19  17  17  16  16  16  15  14  13  9  6  2  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  0  -3  -3  -2  -1  0  1  1  3  4  7  15  29  30  31  30  Example 2  One s i d e  gets  Alternatives Other s i d e  gets  1  4  6  7  10  13  14  15  22  26  27  29  34  35  39  A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I  J  K  L  M  N  O  138  121  109  87  73  51  45  44  21  -10  -31  -36  -58  -92  2  CO  144 APPENDIX D:  STANDARD FORMS USED DURING BARGAINING  The t h r e e forms t h a t were used by t h e s u b j e c t s a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e f o l l o w i n g pages.  C o l o r s were used t o  f a c i l i t a t e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s among t h e forms.  The f i r s t  two (the b l u e s t a n d a r d message and t h e p i n k d e c i s i o n message) were t h e means by which t h e s u b j e c t s communicated. The t h i r d form, w h i c h had t o be s u b m i t t e d a l o n g w i t h each message, was n o t a communication, b u t a s t a t e m e n t o f t h e s u b j e c t ' s a c t u a l minimum and maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s a t t h e time of sending.  STANDARD MESSAGE #  (NOT BINDING a n d NOT NECESSARILY TRUTHFUL)  Complete o n l y one o f t h e f o l l o w i n q : (i)  At a l t e r n a t i v e  ( i i ) What do y o u g e t a t (iii) (iv)  (v)  (vi) (vii)  I cannot  , I get  .  ?  p o s s i b l y go a n y l o w e r t h a n  .  I f you a r e n ' t g o i n g t o budge, I w i l l submit a decision t o refuse bargaining f o r the next minute(s). My n e x t o f f e r w i I I be f i n a I ; b u t no l o w e r .  I will  I s u g g e s t t h a t we s e t t l e a t a r o u n d Other:  Time  remaining  go t o _  .  146  D E C I S I O N MESSAGE*  ( A L L DECISIONS COMMUNICATED BY T H I S MESSAGE ARE BINDING.)  -  I o f f e > "to,-xommft m y s e l f t o s e t t l e a t where I w i l l g e t .(Binding, but not necessarily truthful)  -  I accept your o f f e r t o s e t t l e a t  -  I r e j e c t your o f f e r  -  I r e f u s e t o bargain f o rt h e next  ,  .  . minute(s).  T i me rema i n i ng  STATEMENT  C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o : The i n i t i a l o f f e r : S t a n d a r d message # : D e c i s i o n message #  . . .  !  ( T H I S STATEMENT DOES NOT GO TO THE OTHER PERSON, BUT IS RETAINED BY THE MONITOR. BOTH ENTRIES HERE MUST BE TRUTHFUL.)  { |  i i Complete both o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : ( 1 ) The l o w e s t a l t e r n a t i v e (2)  The h i g h e s t I t h i n k  t o which  I will  I can get i s  go i s .  .  j i | i  ;  147  APPENDIX E: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL Name: A s s i g n e d #:  1 2 3 4 ( c i r c l e one)  ON EACH OF THE SCALES BELOW, INDICATE AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE, YOUR FEELING TOWARD THE PERSON WITH WHOM YOU HAVE BEEN BARGAINING. (Remember t h a t #1 has been b a r g a i n i n g w i t h #2 and #3 has been b a r g a i n i n g w i t h #4.) DO THIS BY MARKING AN *X' IN ONE OF THE 7 SPACES BETWEEN THE WORDS THAT L I E AT THE ENDS OF EACH SCALE.  good  : : : : : :  cruel  : : : : : :  dishonest  clean  unpleasant  :  :  :  :  :  : : : : : :  :  :  :  :  :  bad  kind  :  honest  dirty  :"' p l e a s a n t  nice  : : : : : :  awful  unfair  : : : : : :  fair  148  APPENDIX F:  ANOVA TABLES  In the p r e s e n t a t i o n of these t a b l e s , the f o l l o w i n g c o n v e n t i o n s have been adopted:  1.  (a)  The dependent measures, a n a l y z e d have been i n d i c a t e d by means o f the numbered subheadings w h i c h precede each summary t a b l e .  (b)  Page numbers have been p l a c e d i n t h e square b r a c k e t s n e x t t o each subheading t o r e f e r t o the l o c a t i o n i n t h e t e x t where the p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t has been p r e s e n t e d .  (c)  Where p o s s i b l e , e x t r a n e o u s s o u r c e s o f v a r i a t i o n have been removed from the t r e a t ment v a r i a t i o n . The v a r i a t i o n due t o a p a r t i c u l a r s e s s i o n i n which a group was r u n has been i n d i c a t e d i n t h e Source column by the word ' S e s s i o n s ' . The v a r i a t i o n due t o e i t h e r o f t h e d i f f e r e n t s c a l e s r e c e i v e d by the b a r g a i n e r s . h a s been i n d i c a t e d by t h e word ' S c a l e s ' .  SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY MEASURES OF TRUST AND [pages 8 5 - 8 8 ] : Source  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures)  df  Mean Squares  1  5809.50 195.51  3  26.98 17.17  <1 <1  269  A  B  1 2 1  A  C  2  B C A B C  Sessions Error Total  F  .67  2 2  51.08 86.07  12  39.40  72 95  55.84  SUSPICION  E  104.04 .50  4.83 <1 1.54  .  <.0001 .06  <.02  149  2.  NATURE OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT [pages 9 4 - 9 6 ] :  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  3.  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 . 12 24 47  Mean Squares 1.69 1.69 2.65 .19 22.56 .06 .81 5.60 5.60  <1 <1 <1 <1 4 <1 <1  < .04  TIME TO SOLUTION [pages 9 6 - 9 7 ] :  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares 331.28 80.34 22.83 13.76 149.99 4.84 1.66 83.25 62.46  F 5.30 1.29 <1 <1 2.40 <1 <1  R <.03  .11  150  4.  ABSOLUTE EXTREMITY [pages 9 7 - 9 8 ] : Source  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C BC  Sessions Scales Error Total  5.  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) B C C BC  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 12 60 95  Mean Squares 92.04 8.17 23.95 3.37 15.82 14.89 .59 19.60 14.44 11.72  F 7.85 <1 2.04 <1 1.35 1.27 <1  E <.01 <.14.  RELATIVE EXTREMITY [page 9 8 ] : Source  A A B A  df  Sessions Scales Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 12 60 95  Mean Squares 60 . 9 6 9.07 3.54 6.77 19.60 .80 24.07 14.10 14.29 11.42  F 5.34 <1 <1 <1 . 1.72 <1 2.11  E <.03  <.19 <.13  151  6.  MID-POINTS OF ACTUAL I N I T I A L [pages 9 8 - 9 9 ] : elf  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  7.  ACTUAL I N I T I A L [page 9 9 ] :  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  RANGES  Mean Squares , 8.34 .75 5.51 .19 .22 5.45 7.61 2.51 9 .64  <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1  RANGE  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  d f 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares 1.33 40.33 115.65 4.08 14.77 56 .02 6.40 18.79 31.96  F <1 1.26 3.62 <1  E  < .05  <1 1.75 <1  .19  152  8.  AMOUNT OF COMMUNICATION.(TOTAL NUMBER OF MESSAGES DIVIDED BY TIME TO SOLUTION) [page 9 9 ] : Source  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  9(a).  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .3271 .0361 .6083 .5015 .4082 .2550 .3889 .2752 .2904  F 1.13 <1 2.09 1.73 1.40 <1 1.34  INFORMATION MESSAGES (RATE)  [pages 100-103]:  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares 1.1794 .0251 .5206 .0000 .0034 .0085 .0717 .2206 .2200  F 5.36 <1 2.37 <1 <1 <1 <1  153  9(b).  INFORMATION MESSAGES [pages  df  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  10(a).  (PROPORTION)  100-103]:  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .2377 .0002 .0105 .0108 .0221 .0042 .0010 .0273 .0318  7 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1  MODIFICATION MESSAGES (RATE) [pages  100-103] :  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .0410 .0022 .0065 .0004 .0078 .0081 .0149 .0207 .0136  F 3.03 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 1.10  154  10(b).  M O D I F I C A T I O N MESSAGES  [pages  100-103]:  df  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  11(a).  LIES  (PROPORTION)  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .0263 .0000 .0025 .0000 .0041 .0008 .0034 .0096 .0041  6 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1  (RATE)  [pages  100-103]:  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .0673 .0642 .1897 .0037 .1172 .0316 .0015 .0767 .0816  F <1 <1 2.33 <1 1.44 <1 <1  155  11(b).  LIES  (PROPORTION)  [pages 100-103]:  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A A B A  B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  12(a).  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) B C C B C  Sessions Error Total  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  TIME-BONUS MESSAGES Ipages 1 0 0 - I 0 3 J :  Source  A A B A  df  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .0834 .0126 .0243 .0009 .0227 .0070 .0010 .0155 .0239  F 3 .49 <1 1.02 <1 <1 <1 <1  (RATE)  Mean Squares .0027 .0304 .0048 .0158 .0049 .0005 .0057 .0026 .0066  F <1 4.59 <1 2.38 <1 <1 <1  156  12(b).  TIME-BONUS MESSAGES [pages  100-103]:  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  13.  (PROPORTION)  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares .0013 .0145 .0020 .0061 .0027 .0011 .0037 .0014 .0029  F <1 4.95 <1 2.10 <1 <1 1.27  E <.04 <.16  CHECKS [page 1 0 2 ] : Source  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  df 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares 11.02 .52 .02 6.02 3.52 .65 5.15 1.73 2.94  F 3.75 <1 <1 2.05 1.20 <1 1.75  E <.07 .16  .19  157  14.  CHANGES IN THE BARGAINING RANGE [page 1 0 4 ] : df  Source A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Error Total  15.  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 24 47  Mean Squares 42.19 17.52 58.15 15.19 23.69 51.40 27.44 32.02 28.40  F 1.49 <1 2.05 <1 <1 1.81 <1  E  < .15 .18  SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL Ipages  104-1057:  Source  df  A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B AC B C A B C Sessions Scales Error Total  1 1 2 1 2 2 2 12 12 60 95  Mean Squares 1254.30 25.01 39 .78 380 .01 41.70 83.95 1.32 58.16 56.28 65.67  F 19.10 <1 <1 5.79 <1 1.28 <1  E .0001  <.02  

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