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Development, and the effects upon bargaining, of trust and suspicion Kee, Herbert William 1969

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THE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EFFECTS UPON BARGAINING, OF TRUST AND SUSPICION by Herbert W i l l i a m Kee THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor o f Ph i l o s o p h y i n the Department of Psychology We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming . t o the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 1969 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C olumbia, I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and Study. I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Herbert ¥. Kee. Department o f Psychology  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date March 17. 1969 ABSTRACT T h i s study was concerned w i t h ( i ) e x p e r i e n t i a l f a c t o r s which a f f e c t the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and ( i i ) the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g and, n e g o t i a t i o n s . E s s e n t i a l l y / the experiment c o n s i s t e d of an ort h o g o n a l 2 x 2 x 3 f a c t o r i a l d e s i g n with.one c o n t r o l group. A l t o g e t h e r , 112 male undergraduates comprised the f i n a l sample. •-P a r t i c u l a r emphasis was p l a c e d upon d e v e l o p i n g an approach t h a t c o u l d overcome some of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l problems t h a t have been i n h e r e n t i n p r e v i o u s attempts to study t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . To this' end, the experiment was designed t o allow (on the b a s i s of the o b s e r v a t i o n o f the s u b j e c t s ' responses) v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s , about t r u s t and • s u s p i c i o n . For example, s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were d i s t i n g u i s h e d from m a n i f e s t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and were measured on the b a s i s o f responses r e l a t e d t o a o n e - t r i a l s e q u e n t i a l l y - p l a y e d game. Moreover, the game i n v o l v e d a p a y o f f m a t r i x t h a t was meaningful to the s u b j e c t s i n s o f a r as i t was p o s s i b l e f o r the s u b j e c t s to i n c u r r e a l l o s s e s o f t h e i r own money a p p a r e n t l y as a r e s u l t of the untrustworthy behavior o f one of the oth e r s u b j e c t s . With r e s p e c t t o the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , i t was found-that: (1) p r e v i o u s t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s engendered t r u s t whereas p r e v i o u s u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s generated s u s p i c i o n ; (2) s u s p i c i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d more e a s i l y than t r u s t ; however, (3) where p r e v i o u s l y the i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y had been h i g h , t r u s t was g r e a t e r e s p e c i a l l y i f the oth e r person (0) had r e s i s t e d the l u c r a t i v e temptation to b e t r a y . •. Of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t was a r e l a t e d f i n d i n g t h a t the tendency to m a n i f e s t t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n was c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the u n d e r l y i n g ( s u b j e c t i v e ) s t a t e o f t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n . The nature of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i n terms of c e r t a i n t y and u n c e r t a i n t y was, however, more c l e a r - c u t .for those who man i f e s t e d s u s p i c i o n - t h a n f o r those who m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t . While the "former were c e r t a i n t h a t 0 would be untrustworthy, the l a t t e r m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t toward 0 even though they were u n c e r t a i n as to whether 0 would be. trus t w o r t h y or not. In the second p a r t of the study, both t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were found t o be important i n i n f l u e n c i n g b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s i n a number of r e s p e c t s . With r e g a r d to the d u r a t i o n o f b a r g a i n i n g , the t r u s t group r e q u i r e d l e s s time t o reach agreements than d i d the. s u s p i c i o n group. S e v e r a l reasons f o r t h i s f i n d i n g were e v i d e n t . F i r s t , s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group made i n i t i a l o f f e r s t h a t were more extreme than the i n i t i a l o f f e r s made by the s u b j e c t s i n the tru s t - group. Secondly, s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group appeared to be more concerned w i t h the o b j e c t i v e of modify-i n g each o t h e r ' s u t i l i t i e s . T h i s was r e f l e c t e d i n the f i n d i n g t h a t the communications of the s u s p i c i o n group (compared w i t h the t r u s t group) were c h a r a c t e r i z e d more by l i e s , t h r e a t s , and ultimatums,, and l e s s by.genuine and s i n c e r e attempts to exchange i n f o r m a t i o n ; a l s o , s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group made more checks on each ot h e r and • made more r e f u s a l s to b a r g a i n t h a t d i d the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group. In r e l a t i o n t o the nature ( l o c a t i o n ) of the s o l u t i o n , t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n appeared t o have no o v e r a l l e f f e c t upon whether s e t t l e m e n t s were made a t e q u a l i t y o r equity... There 5 was, however, a p r e v a l e n c e of s e t t l e m e n t s a t e q u a l i t y ( r e g a r d l e s s o f whether t r u s t o r s u s p i c i o n was o p e r a t i n g ) . The i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e about t h i s r e s u l t was t h a t the e q u a l i t y t h a t was o b t a i n e d i n a c o n t e x t of s u s p i c i o n was hard-earned over a prolonged p e r i o d of time, vrhereas the , e q u a l i t y t h a t was agreed upon i n the con t e x t of t r u s t was r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y a c h i e v e d . • I t was t h e r e f o r e concluded t h a t even i f the nature of the s o l u t i o n were not a f f e c t e d by s u s p i c i o n , b a r g a i n i n g under a c e r t a i n amount of t r u s t would be p r e f e r a b l e to b a r g a i n i n g under a h i g h degree of s u s p i c i o n ; f o r under extreme s u s p i c i o n , t a s k - o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r becomes e a s i l y d i s r u p t e d and reduced to time-consuming c o n f l i c t . * TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. - I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3 A. D e f i n i n g and C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g T r u s t ' and S u s p i c i o n . . 3 B. The Method T r a d i t i o n a l l y Employed to Study T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . 10 3. CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGICAL, CONSIDERATIONS . '. 15 A. Meaningfulness of I n c e n t i v e s and P a y o f f s . . . 15 B. V a l i d i t y o f Infe r e n c e s . . . . . . . . . . 17 C. D e f i n i n g and Measuring T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4. CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND -SUSPICION . . . . . . . . . 24 A. O's Trustworthiness- . . . . . . . . . . 26 B. Magnitude o f I n c e n t i v e to Betray . . . . 30 C. Number of Exposures . . . 35 D. Hypotheses P e r t a i n i n g to the Development of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . . 38 5. CHAPTER FOUR: BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS . . 4 0 . A. P r o c e s s - R e l a t e d Concepts: minimum d i s p o s i t i o n , b a r g a i n i n g range, i n i t i a l o f f e r . .'" 41 B. Outcome-Related Concepts: e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y - . ". . . 4 5 i i Page C. Hypotheses and P o s s i b l e Outcomes P e r t a i n i n g t o the E f f e c t s o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n s . . . ... . . . . . . . . 49 6. CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 A. Subjec t s and Design . . . 55 S p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and the Recruitment of the S u b j e c t s . . . . 55 B. Procedure . . . 57 STAGE I : INDUCTION . . . .. . . . . -V . 58 The game, as pres e n t e d to the s u b j e c t s . . . 59 R a t i o n a l e .. . 6 0 The M a n i p u l a t i o n s . ^ - 61 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 STAGE I I : MEASUREMENT . . . . . . . . 64 P r e l i m i n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s and the PDG task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 R a t i o n a l e .'"66 S u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y : i n s t r u c t i o n s and the task . . . . . 67 Summary . . . . . 68 STAGE I I I : BARGAINING AND NEGOTIA-TIONS 70 I l l Page I n i t i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s and the p a y o f f schedule . . . . . . . . . . 72 Communication • . • 73 Time and s t r i k e s . • . . . . . . . . . 75 Checking 76 Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l . . . . . . . 77 Summary o u t l i n e of stage I I I procedure 77 CHAPTER SUMMARY . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 78 7. CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS . . . . . ., . . . . . . . 81 A. The Development of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n as a F u n c t i o n of Pr e v i o u s Experience . '. . 8 2 B. E f f e c t s of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon the Outcomes of B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a -t i o n s : . 94 Nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t : e q u a l i t y vs e q u i t y . . . . . . . . . 94 Time t o s o l u t i o n . . . . 96 C. E f f e c t s o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon the Process o f B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a -t i o n s . . 97 Ex t r e m i t y of the i n i t i a l o f f e r . 97 A c t u a l i n i t i a l range . . . . . . . . . 99 Communication . 99 Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Changes i n the b a r g a i n i n g range . 104 i v Page I n t e r p e r s o n a l e v a l u a t i o n : the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l . . . . . . . . 104 D. Summary 105 8. CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION . ... . . . . . .108 A. F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the Development of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . . . . 108 B. E f f e c t s o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n s 1 . . . . . 116 9. CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . 129 10. BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . 135 11. APPENDICES . . '. . . . . . . . . 139 APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF THE PDG RESPONSE SHEET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 APPENDIX B: PROCEDURE AND RULES OF BARGAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140 APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS . . . . . 142 APPENDIX D: STANDARD FORMS USED DURING • BARGAINING . . . . . . . 144 APPENDIX E: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL . . .147 APPENDIX F: ANOVA TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . 148 1. S u b j e c t i v e P r o b a b i l i t y Measures o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . . . . . 148 2. Nature of the F i n a l Settlement " . . 149 3. Time t o S o l u t i o n . . . .' . . . . . . 149 v Page 4. Ab s o l u t e E x t r e m i t y . . . . . . . . 150 5. R e l a t i v e E x t r e m i t y . . . . . . . 150 6. Mid-Points of A c t u a l I n i t i a l Ranges . . . .151 7. A c t u a l I n i t i a l Range . . . . . • • 151 8. Amount of Communication ( T o t a l Number of Messages D i v i d e d by Time to S o l u t i o n ) . . . . . . . . 152 9 ( a ) . I n f o r m a t i o n Messages (Rate) . . 152 9(b). I n f o r m a t i o n Messages (Pro-p o r t i o n ) . 153 10(a). M o d i f i c a t i o n Messages (Rate) . . 153 10(b). M o d i f i c a t i o n Messages (Pro-p o r t i o n ) * 154 11(a). L i e s (Rate) . 154 11(b) . L i e s (Proportion) . . . . . '.- . 155 12(a). Time-Bonus Messages (Rate) . "'. . 155; 12(b). Time-Bonus Messages (Pro-p o r t i o n ) . . 156 13. Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 14. Changes i n the B a r g a i n i n g Range . . 157 15. Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l . .. . . . . . 157 v i LIST OF TABLES Page I . 1.' Programs used by Komorita and Mechling ( 1 9 6 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6 I I . 2 . "Reformed s i n n e r " program used by H a r f o r d and Solomon ( 1 9 6 7 ) . . . . . . 3 7 I I I . 3 . Degrees of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , or un-c e r t a i n t y generated under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . . . 8 7 I V . 4 . Frequencies of s u b j e c t s who chose t o t r u s t 0 i n the PDG . . . . . . . . 9 0 V . 5 . Nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t as a f u n c t i o n o f O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and the number of exposures . . . . . . ... . '95 V I . 6. Summary of analyses o f communications .-. . 1 0 1 V I I . 7 . C o n t r o l and treatment means correspond-i n g t o s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t s found i n the analyses of the communications . . . . . . . ''.]. . . . . 1 0 3 V I I I . 8 ( a ) . Means of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l e v a l u a t i o n s made by the c o n t r o l and treatment groups . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5 . 8 ( b ) . Means comp r i s i n g the s i g n i f i c a n t A x B i n t e r a c t i o n . . . 1 0 5 I X . 9 . Summary o f r e s u l t s from the p r i n c i p a l analyses . . . . . . . . 1 0 6 v i i Page X. K K Degrees of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , or u n c e r t a i n t y generated under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s of pr e v i o u s experience . 110 V X 1 1 LIST OF FIGURES Page 1. B a s i c c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. P a y o f f m a t r i x of a t y p i c a l P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. M a t r i c e s employed by. Swinth (19 67) 28 4. A g e n e r a l m a t r i x comprised of f o u r parameters W, X, Y, and Z. . . . . . . . . . ..v. . . . . . 31 5. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n (adapted from I k l e and L e i t e s , 1962) . . . . . . 43 6. I l l u s t r a t i o n of e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y i n a b a r g a i n i n g problem (from Morgan and Sawyer, 1967) . . . . . . . • • • . . . . . . . . 47 7. M a t r i x r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the I n d u c t i o n game i n which number 4 chooses l a s t . . . . . . . . . . 62 8. PDG ma t r i x used t o measure t r u s t . a n d s u s p i c i o n i n a o n e - t r i a l , s e q u e n t i a l - p l a y game . . . . . 64 9. Response s c a l e used to measure s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . . . . . . . . :. . '. .. ." 69 10. P a y o f f schedules r e c e i v e d by the s u b j e c t s . . . . 71 11. S u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n of the number of exposures t o a tr u s t w o r t h y o r an untrustworthy 0 . . . . .. . . . . . . . .- . 89 12. Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f s u b j e c t s who' t r u s t e d or d i d not t r u s t 0 . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 i x Page 13. Comparison of frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d or d i d not t r u s t 0 . . 9 3 14. Graphic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the times -required to r each agreement . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 119 15. Nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t as a f u n c t i o n of the number of exposures . . '. . . . . . . . 122 16. Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n of dyads over the range of s o l u t i o n s 123 X ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o express adequately the e x t e n t of my a p p r e c i a t i o n and g r a t i t u d e f o r the h e l p and encourage-ment p r o v i d e d by Dr. Robert Knox throughout the d u r a t i o n of t h i s u n d e r t a k i n g . He was never r e l u c t a n t to share the problems t h a t I encountered and h i s i n s i g h t s , a d v i c e , and c r i t i c i s m s were always i n v a l u a b l e . For h i s guidance, h i s t h o u g h t f u l n e s s , . a n d f o r h i s uncommon p a t i e n c e and good humor, I w i l l always be g r a t e f u l . The h e l p f u l comments, s u g g e s t i o n s , and c r i t i c i s m s of Dr. Ole H o l s t i , Dr. Rory O'Day, Dr. Demetrios Papageorgis, Dr. Tom Storm, and Dr. Rod Wong are a l s o g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged. In a d d i t i o n , I would l i k e to thank the 1967-1968 I n t e r F r a t e r n i t y C o u n c i l of U.B.C. and the members of the f r a -t e r n i t i e s t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e d f o r t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n . In p a r t i c u l a r , I would l i k e t o thank Rick French, the p a s t -p r e s i d e n t o f the I.F.C. and John Simson, the c u r r e n t p r e s i d e n t f o r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e not o n l y i n making the s u b j e c t p o o l a v a i l a b l e , but also, i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the r e c r u i t m e n t of the s u b j e c t s . " No s m a l l measure of thanks i s a l s o due to Suzanne Lehr and my w i f e V i v i a n . Suzanne Lehr was a c c u r a t e , competent, and remarkably calm i n the extremely d i f f i c u l t job of'-'-e d i t i n g and t y p i n g the f i n a l copy, and my w i f e V i v i a n p a t i e n t l y p e rsevered i n the t r y i n g task of t r a n s l a t i n g my handwritten copy i n t o l e g i b l e , typed copy. . ' - / • I am i n d e b t e d to the I n s t i t u t e of I n d u s t r i a l .Relations a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia f o r p r o v i d i n g f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e d u r i n g the d e s i g n and the conduct of the r e s e a r c h and to the Canada C o u n c i l f o r the award of a p r e d o c t o r a l f e l l o w s h i p d u r i n g the w r i t i n g of the d i s s e r t a t i o n . The r e s e a r c h would not have been p o s s i b l e w ithout these sources of support. 1 THE DEVELOPMENT, AND THE EFFECTS UPON BARGAINING, OF TRUST AND SUSPICION T r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , because they appear t o u n d e r l i e many s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s , occupy an important r o l e i n many e f f o r t s t o e x p l a i n or d e s c r i b e v a r i o u s human r e l a t i o n -s h i p s . Knowledge about the nature of these concepts' remains, however, a t a s p e c u l a t i v e and r e l a t i v e l y . • . p r i m i t i v e l e v e l because of a l a c k of t h e o r e t i c a l and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l development. Not onl y have some r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s been i n a d e q u a t e l y i n v e s t i g a t e d or even completely n e g l e c t e d , but a l s o the experimental techniques employed have o f t e n been i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y a p p l i e d . T h i s paper i s t h e r e f o r e devoted t o a sy s t e m a t i c examination of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . I t w i l l i n v o l v e two r e l a t e d o b j e c t i v e s : (i) t o attempt t o overcome some_of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n s t u d y i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and ( i i ) to ' o b t a i n some t h e o r e t i c a l l y - i m p o r t a n t e m p i r i c a l evidence about both the development and the e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and : s u s p i c i o n . "•' / Th i s d i s s e r t a t i o n w i l l be o r g a n i z e d i n t o e i g h t c h a p t e r s . I n the f i r s t f o u r c h a p t e r s , the c o n c e p t u a l framework f o r the hypotheses and the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l b a s i s , f o r the experiment t o t e s t these hypotheses w i l l be p r e s e n t e d . Then, i n the next three chapters (Chapters F i v e S i x , and Seven), the experiment i t s e l f w i l l be r e p o r t e d and d i s c u s s e d . F i n a l l y , i n Chapter E i g h t , the major c o n c l u s i o n s o f the study w i l l be o u t l i n e d i n the c o n t e x t of a resume of the r e s u l t s . CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION A. D e f i n i n g and C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n : E x p l i c i t d e f i n i t i o n s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n a r e , on one. hand, c o n s p i c u o u s l y s c a r c e . On the other hand, a d i v e r s e v a r i e t y of terms i s f r e q u e n t l y used synonymously w i t h t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . C o o p e r a t i o n , f a i t h , c o n f i d e n c e , are o f t e n used synonymously w i t h t r u s t , w h i l e c o m p e t i t i o n , r e s i s t a n c e , d e f e n s i v e n e s s , are sometimes used i n t e r -changeably w i t h s u s p i c i o n . E x i s t i n g d e f i n i t i o n s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are r a t h e r l i m i t e d and almost p e c u l i a r t o p a r t i c u l a r s t u d i e s . T h i s i s understandable i f one c o n s i d e r s some of the problems i n d e f i n i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . - . "' Popular n o t i o n s — however vague or u n s p e c i f i e d — and more s o p h i s t i c a t e d n o t i o n s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n seem t o en t e r i n t o a gamut of r e l a t i o n s h i p s r a n g i n g from the i n t r a - p e r s o n a l t o the i n t e r p e r s o n a l , and from p r i m i t i v e i n t e r - t r i b a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o contemporary i n t e r - n a t i o n a l c o n t e x t s . However, the p r e c i s e c o n n o t a t i o n s i m p l i e d when the terms t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are employed i n these v a r i o u s i n s t a n c e s are not i d e n t i c a l from one i n s t a n c e to the next. For example, a mother i s s a i d t o " t r u s t " the b a b y - s i t t e r j u s t as a p a r i s h i o n e r i s s a i d t o " t r u s t " the p r i e s t d u r i n g c o n f e s s i o n . S i m i l a r l y , the Akka pygmies of A f r i c a may be s a i d to " t r u s t " the n e i g h b o r i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l 4 t r i b e s i n t h e i r s i l e n t t r a de r e l a t i o n s h i p s j u s t as B r i t a i n may u s u a l l y be s a i d t o " t r u s t " the U n i t e d S t a t e s i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s h i p s . , Yet, the exact n o t i o n of t r u s t i n v o l v e d i n each of these examples i s d i f f e r e n t . I f the r e i s some thre a d o f communality running through the range o f such d i v e r s e a p p l i c a t i o n s , then i t i s necessary t h a t adequate d e f i n i t i o n s attempt t o e x t r a c t or s p e c i f y the common dimensions o r elements t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i n those d i v e r s e a p p l i c a t i o n s . Another problem i n d e f i n i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n concerns, to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , the problem o f how t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are c o n c e p t u a l i z e d . F o r example, i s o n l y one dimension i n v o l v e d i n which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n r e p r e s e n t the extremes of a continuum? And i s d i s t r u s t the " o p p o s i t e " of t r u s t , or are d i s t r u s t and- s u s p i c i o n i n f a c t the same? I t i s tempting t o r e g a r d t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as p o l a r o p p o s i t e s ; but i n terms of f u n c t i o n , t h i s i s not so e a s i l y the c ase. O r d i n a r i l y , t r u s t i s regarded as having p o s i t i v e , d e s i r a b l e consequences, w h i l e s u s p i c i o n i s d e p i c t e d as having d i s r u p t i v e , d y s f u n c t i o n a l e f f e c t s . However, extreme t r u s t — what Deutsch c a l l s " p a t h o l o g i c a l t r u s t , " and c h a r a c t e r i z e d by such terms as " g u l l i b l e " and "cre d u l o u s " (Deutsch, 1958, p. 278) — m a y a l s o be d y s f u n c t i o n a l j u s t as extreme s u s p i c i o n ••— a s o r t o f p a r a n o i d s t a t e •— may be 5 d y s f u n c t i o n a l . On the o t h e r hand, Deutsch does not acknowledge the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a s l i g h t amount of s u s p i c i o n (however t h a t i s determined) — a k i n d of a l e r t but not d i s t r a c t i n g guardedness "— may be f a c i l i t a t i v e . I t is- e v i d e n t t h a t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are complex concepts which probably r e q u i r e a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of q u a l i f i c a t i o n . In o r d e r to f a c i l i t a t e the d e f i n i t i o n of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , those f e a t u r e s ' w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h some s i t u a -t i o n s from o t h e r s as i n v o l v i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n " w i l l f i r s t be i d e n t i f i e d . In the s i m p l e s t and perhaps the. most common case, a t r u s t s i t u a t i o n i n v o l v e s two p a r t i e s t h a t are to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t i n t e r d e p e n d e n t w i t h r e s p e c t to the outcomes d e f i n e d by t h e i r j o i n t c h o i c e s , and one of the p a r t i e s (P) it; c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the c h o i c e between t r u s t i n g or not t r u s t i n g the other (0) . If. P's c h o i c e i s to m a n i f e s t t r u s t toward 0, then 0, i n t u r n , has the c h o i c e of b e i n g e i t h e r t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy. However, P's c h o i c e not to m a n i f e s t t r u s t toward 0 w i l l p r e c l u d e b e t r a y a l , leaving. 0 u s u a l l y w i t h no f u r t h e r o p t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . I t i s important to note t h a t both P and 0 are c o g n i z a n t of the r i s k t o which P exposes h i m s e l f i n h i s d e c i s i o n to. t r u s t 0. ("Risk" here r e f e r s to the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t 0 c a n — but not t h a t he n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l — b e t r a y P's t r u s t . ) 6 That i s , P knows 0 can b e t r a y him and 0 knows t h a t P has extended h i s (P's) t r u s t even i n the f a c e of t h a t r i s k . • T h e r e f o r e , even where the r i s k i s p e r c e i v e d to be n e g l i -g i b l e , the s i t u a t i o n s t i l l i n v o l v e s t r u s t , as long as the p o s s i b i l i t y of b e t r a y a l by Q e x i s t s . So f a r , statements about t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n have r e f e r r e d t o m a n i f e s t b e h a v i o r s but not to the u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , r a r e l y made e x p l i c i t i n o t h e r s t u d i e s , i s extremely important f o r two reasons, both of which r e l a t e to the f a c t t h a t observed c h o i c e be-h a v i o r i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game (PDG) has been almost the o n l y means by which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n have b e e n ' i n f e r -r e d , d e f i n e d , and measured.. F i r s t , the c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n the s imultaneous-play PDG i s not s o l e l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the concepts of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , but i s s u b j e c t to other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t do not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . Secondly, the dichotomous c h o i c e b e h a v i o r p r e s e n t l y u t i l i z e d i s not s e n s i t i v e to t h e o r e t i c a l l y -important v a r i a t i o n s i n the s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e . While both of these a s s e r t i o n s w i l l be developed more e x t e n s i v e l y i n the . next c h a p t e r , the nature and the r o l e of the u n d e r l y i n g s t a t e s w i l l now be s p e c i f i e d i n "greater d e t a i l i n the p rocess of d e f i n i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . S u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n can be d e f i n e d i n terms of P's c e r t a i n t y or u n c e r t a i n t y about O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . 7 C e r t a i n t y might be measured, f o r example, by P's s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy, g i v e n t h a t P has a l r e a d y made a t r u s t i n g c h o i c e . The g r e a t e r P's c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y , i . e . , the more P t r u s t s Q, the g r e a t e r the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t P w i l l commit h i m s e l f to the a c t of t r u s t i n g 0; the g r e a t e r P's c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be untrustworthy, i . e . , the more P suspects 0, the g r e a t e r the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t P w i l l choose not to t r u s t 0. • - - " • . " ' T h i s a n a l y s i s r a i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e i s a, p o i n t or t h r e s h o l d a t which s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t ( i . e . , the degree t o which P i s c e r t a i n t h a t 0 w i l l be trustworthy) becomes m a n i f e s t as an a c t of t r u s t . I t would be i n t e r -e s t i n g to determine the f a c t o r s t h a t i n f l u e n c e the l e v e l o f t h i s t h r e s h o l d — f o r example, whether or not the t h r e s h o l d v a r i e s i n a c o n s i s t e n t way between i n d i v i d u a l s , o r i f i t v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g to s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s such as i n c e n t i v e . T h i s s o r t o f i n f o r m a t i o n would o b v i o u s l y be i n a c c e s s i b l e w i t h o u t a measure of the u n d e r l y i n g c o n s t r u c t s . The way i n which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are b a s i c a l l y c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i s d e p i c t e d i n F i g u r e 1. I t i s suggested t h a t i n a d d i t i o n to the f a c t o r s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e (corresponding t o (a)''of F i g u r e 1) most of the independent v a r i a b l e s can be grouped i n t o two o t h e r broad c a t e g o r i e s : s t r u c t u r a l and s i t u a t i o n a l f a c t o r s (corresponding Independent V a r i a b l e s H y p o t h e t i c a l I n t e r v e n i n g S t a t e s t (b) STRUCTURAL and SITUATIONAL FACTORS - i n c e n t i v e - power - communication - c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of O (a) (d) (e) (f) PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE-PERCEPTION OF : (c) DISPOSITIONAL FACTORS - m o t i v a t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n - p e r s o n a l i t y f a c t o r s - a t t i t u d e s •+ O's MOTIVES, and/or COMPETENCE SUBJECTIVE TRUST or — SUSPICION ( i . e . , sub-j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y or c e r t a i n t y about O's t r u s t w o r t h i -ness) BEHAVIORAL -»• TRUST or SUSPICION F i g u r e 1. B a s i c c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . (The f a c t o r s r e p r e s e n t e d above p e r t a i n t o P's t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n v i s - a - v i s O.) 9 to (b) of F i g u r e 1) and d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s . ( c o r r e -sponding to (c) of F i g u r e 1 ) . I t i s important to note t h a t i n a d d i t i o n to a c t i n g d i r e c t l y t o i n f l u e n c e P's p e r c e p t i o n of O's motives and/or competence (corresponding to (d) of F i g u r e 1), p r e v i o u s experience i t s e l f can i n f l u e n c e the s t r u c t u r a l and d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s . Each of the t h r e e c l a s s e s of independent v a r i a b l e s may a c t d i r e c t l y t o i n f l u e n c e P's p e r c e p t i o n of O's motives and/or competence. Then, depending on how P . does p e r c e i v e O's motives and/or competence, J? w i l l e x p e r i e n c e some co r r e s p o n d i n g degree of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t (or s u s p i c i o n ) which may or may not be m a n i f e s t a s . t r u s t (or s u s p i c i o n ) . E s s e n t i a l l y , the e f f e c t s of such o b s e r v a b l e " i n p u t s " as i n c e n t i v e and power upon the o b s e r v a b l e "output" of m a n i f e s t t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n are t h e r e f o r e mediated by two h y p o t h e t i c a l s t a t e s . — f i r s t , P's p e r c e p t i o n of O's motives and/or competence and secondly P's c e r t a i n t y or u n c e r t a i n t y about O's u n t r u s t -w o r t h i n e s s . In the next two c h a p t e r s , i t w i l l become e v i d e n t t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of t r u s t and ,; s u s p i c i o n has c e r t a i n important m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . 10 B. The Method T r a d i t i o n a l l y Employed t o Study T r u s t and  S u s p i c i o n : Before r e v i e w i n g some of the r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e , a d e s c r i p t i o n of the methodology g e n e r a l l y employed i n most of the experiments on t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l f i r s t be pr e s e n t e d . A more d e t a i l e d c r i t i q u e o f t h i s methodology w i l l be r e s e r v e d f o r the next c h a p t e r . Most s t u d i e s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are c h a r a c t e r -i z e d by the use of a r e p l i c a t e d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y - p l a y e d , 2 dichotomous c h o i c e PDG as the. means by which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are manipulated or measured. A t y p i c a l PDG p a y o f f m a t r i x i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 2. There are u s u a l l y two p l a y e r s (P and 0) w i t h two ch o i c e s each (p-L o r P2 and o^ or 02) and f o u r r e s u l t i n g c h o i c e -combinations t h a t i n d i c a t e the p o s s i b l e -payoffs f o r each p l a y e r . The ch o i c e s p-^  and o^ are u s u a l l y l a b e l l e d as b e i n g " c o o p e r a t i v e " c h o i c e s w h i l e P2 and O2 are u s u a l l y l a b e l l e d as be i n g " c o m p e t i t i v e " . The outcomes ( c h o i c e -combinations) are such t h a t i f both s e l e c t t h e i r second •'•For the remainder of t h i s paper, P and 0 w i l l r e f e r , i n the g e n e r a l case to the. members of a dyad. . In a d d i t i o n , P and 0 w i l l a l s o r e f e r to the two p l a y e r s . i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game.. \ I t i s acknowledged t h a t because the game i s r e p l i c a t e d , the d e s i g n a t i o n 'Prisoner's"Dilemma 1 no longer; t r u l y , a p p l i e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the terms w i l l be used i n t h i s study more as a matter of convention than of a p p r o p r i -a t e n e s s . - , 11 ?2 3 , 3 0 , 5 5 , 0 1 r . l S u b j e c t P chooses between the rows p-^  and P2 and s u b j e c t 0 chooses between the"1" columns o^ and 02- The p a y o f f s f o r P are i n d i c a t e d by the f i r s t number i n each, c e l l w h i l e O's p a y o f f s are i n d i c a t e d .by the second number i n each c e l l . F i g u r e 2. Payoff m a t r i x of a t y p i c a l P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma Game. 12 a l t e r n a t i v e ( p 2 / o 2 ) / i . e . , i f both compete, both r e c e i v e o n l y the s m a l l p a y o f f i n d i c a t e d i n the lower r i g h t quadrant of F i g u r e 2. On the oth e r hand, i f both s e l e c t the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e (p^, o^) , i . e . , i f both cooperate, both r e c e i v e the r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e r , but .nevertheless moderate amount i n d i c a t e d i n the upper l e f t . q u a d r a n t of F i g u r e 2. However, where one competes w h i l e the o t h e r cooperates, the one who competes r e c e i v e s the l a r g e s t p a y o f f w h i l e the one who cooperates r e c e i v e s the s m a l l e s t , as i s e v i d e n t i n e i t h e r the upper r i g h t o r the lower l e f t quadrants i n F i g u r e 2. There may be, then, a temptation t o choose c o m p e t i t i v e l y i n the hope t h a t the o t h e r w i l l choose co-o p e r a t i v e l y . In a o n e - t r i a l s i m u l t a n e o u s - p l a y game, the p r e s c r i b e d s o l u t i o n (vide Luce £• R a i f f a , 1957, p. 96) i s f o r both p l a y e r s to choose c o m p e t i t i v e l y i n or d e r t o minimize p o t e n t i a l l o s s . The dilemma l i e s i n a number of c o n s i d -e r a t i o n s : F i r s t , mutual c o o p e r a t i o n ( i . e . , both choose c o o p e r a t i v e l y ) seems t o be the most reasonable s o l u t i o n s i n c e i t i s obvious t h a t both p l a y e r s cannot r e c e i v e the maximum p a y o f f on a g i v e n t r i a l . But, i n choosing co-o p e r a t i v e l y , the way i s l e f t open f o r the ot h e r p l a y e r t o choose c o m p e t i t i v e l y . Hence, s i n c e t h e r e i s o n l y one t r i a l , both p l a y e r s are " f o r c e d " i n t o a p a r a d o x i c a l l y s e l f - d e f e a t i n g outcome for, which the p a y o f f i s lower than i 13 i f both had cooperated. In the words of Messe and Sawyer (1966), "reasonable men must choose i n a way t h a t produces an unreasonable outcome" (Messe & Sawyer, 1966, p. 1 ) . In an i t e r a t e d game with simultaneous p l a y , mutual c o o p e r a t i o n , b e i n g t o . t h e advantage and b e n e f i t o f both p l a y e r s i n the long run, i s the s o l u t i o n u s u a l l y p r e s c r i b e d (vide Luce & R a i f f a , 1957, p. 101) . However, i t i s p o s s i b l e t o argue t h a t the s e l e c t i o n o f the c o m p e t i t i v e ." ch o i c e i s " r a t i o n a l " ( i n one's own b e s t i n t e r e s t ) on the l a s t few t r i a l s or the l a s t t r i a l i t s e l f (Luce & R a i f f a , 1957, p. 100). Such a c o n s i d e r a t i o n renders the mutu a l l y c o o p e r a t i v e s t a t e , i f i t o c c u r s , u n s t a b l e , i . e . , s u b j e c t t o d e f e c t i o n and a consequent e s c a l a t i o n o f c o n f l i c t , e s p e c i a l l y i f the p l a y e r s do not know the ex a c t number o f • t r i a l s i n the game or i f they "pre-empt" by competing too e a r l y i n the game. For t h i s reason, the "Nash s o l u t i o n " o f mutual c o m p e t i t i o n i n an i t e r a t e d game i s . a l s o . p l a u s i b l e (vide Rapoport, 1959, p. 58).. To account f o r the u n d e r l y i n g m o t i v a t i o n t o cooperate, Deutsch p o s t u l a t e s the n o t i o n o f t r u s t . The e s s e n t i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l f e a t u r e o f the game i s t h a t t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y . f o r " r a t i o n a l " i n d i v i d u a l b e h a v i o r i n i t u n l e s s the "~'x...i:^. c o n d i t i o n s f o r mutual t r u s t e x i s t . " I f each p l a y e r chooses t o o b t a i n e i t h e r maximum g a i n o r minimum l o s s f o r h i m s e l f , each w i l l l o s e . But i t makes no sense t o choose the o t h e r a l t e r n a - . t i v e , which c o u l d r e s u l t i n maximum l o s s , u n l e s s one can t r u s t the othe r p l a y e r . I f one cannot t r u s t , i t i s , o f course, s a f e r t o choose so as 14 t o s u f f e r minimum r a t h e r than maximum l o s s , but i t i s even b e t t e r not to p l a y the game.. I f one cannot a v o i d p l a y i n g the game "and i f one cannot t r u s t , t here may be no reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e except to choose "the l e s s e r of. two e v i l s " and/or attempt t o develop the . . "; c o n d i t i o n s t h a t w i l l permit mutual t r u s t . : (Deutsch, 1962, p. 309). -In e f f e c t , Deutsch i s i n f e r r i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n from the o b s e r v a t i o n of c o o p e r a t i o n and c o m p e t i t i o n , r e s p e c t i v e l y , i n the PDG. However, the v a l i d i t y o f such-an approach i s q u i t e tenuous. The reasons f o r t h i s o b j e c t i o n . w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n the next c h a p t e r . 15 CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS E a r l i e r , i t was noted t h a t most attempts to i n v e s t i g a t e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n have employed a r e p l i c a t e d , s i m u l t a n e -o u s l y - p l a y e d , dichotomous c h o i c e PDG. However, there are a number of important reasons why such a use of the PDG or most o t h e r non-zero sum games, i s not e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . S i n c e these o b j e c t i o n s have important i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the s o r t s of i n f e r e n c e s which might be made about t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n from o b s e r v i n g game b e h a v i o r , a c a r e f u l examination of c e r t a i n m e t h o d o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s . i s h i g h l y warranted. T h i s examination w i l l concern t h r e e method-o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s i n p a r t i c u l a r : (A) Meaningfulness of I n c e n t i v e s and P a y o f f s , (B) V a l i d i t y of I n f e r e n c e s , and (C) D e f i n i n g and Measuring T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n . A. Meaningfulness of I n c e n t i v e s and P a y o f f s : One of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g aspects of r e a l - l i f e s i t u -a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i s t h a t t h e r e i s something a t s t a k e , and i n many cas e s , the. stakes are i n c a l c u l a b l e . Yet, most of the l a b o r a t o r y s t u d i e s t h a t have p u r p o r t e d l y d e a l t w i t h t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n have employed p o i n t s or imaginary money as the p a y o f f u n i t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e , however, t h a t r e a l and more m e a n i n g f u l l y l a r g e amounts of money might have y i e l d e d d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . As Messe and Sawyer (1966) reason, 16 When rewards are s m a l l e r , and t h e i r m o t i v a t i n g a b i l i t y l e s s , o t h e r m o t i v a t i o n s more e a s i l y e n t e r . . . . Small rewards 'do not make behavior u n l a w f u l , of course; they simply m u l t i p l y the p o t e n t i a l causes, making i t more d i f f i c u l t t o v e r i f y t h e o r i e s based upon responses to the rewards them-s e l v e s (and hence more d i f f i c u l t to under-stand a l t o g e t h e r ) . (Messe & Sawyer, 1966, p. 16) . , Evidence f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n has been found i n r e c e n t s t u d i e s by G a l l o (1966), Knox and Douglas (1968), M c C l i n t o c k and McNeel (1966), Messe and Sawyer (1966), and Oskamp and Perlman (1965). Although these s t u d i e s are not c o n c l u s i v e , they do le a v e many of the e x i s t i n g c o n c l u s i o n s about c o o p e r a t i o n and t r u s t (e.g., Deutsch's) open to c r i t i c i s m . The p r i n c i p a l concern here i s not so much w i t h the s t r i c t l y monetary aspects o f the l a r g e r p a y o f f s , but w i t h the f a c t t h a t we are i n t e r e s t e d i n b e h a v i o r ( i n t h i s case, the b e h a v i o r which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n u n d e r l i e ) i n which the s t a k e s , whether m a t e r i a l l y l a r g e or s m a l l , are m e a n i n g f u l . As Deutsch h i m s e l f notes, "There have been few s t u d i e s where l a r g e amounts of money have been used" (Deutsch, 1966, p. 47). E s s e n t i a l l y , the problem bf meaningfulness reduces t o a problem o f u t i l i t i e s , and i n t h i s r e s p e c t , i m p l i e s t h a t perhaps o t h e r s o r t s of u t i l i t y u n i t s , e.g., p r e s t i g e , might be s t u d i e d . I t i s d i f f i c u l t , however, to s c a l e o t h e r p o s s i b l e u n i t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t might be p r o f i t a b l e t o 1 7 e x p l o r e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s , even i f the man i p u l a t i o n s are r a t h e r gross and can o n l y be p l a c e d on an o r d i n a l s c a l e . As an a l t e r n a t i v e t o monetary p a y o f f s , shock might be used. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the r e s u l t s from the i s o l a t e d attempts t o employ shock ( B i x e n s t i n e & O ' R e i l l y , 1966, and Douglas, 1967) have not been very d i f f e r e n t from the r e s u l t s o f s t u d i e s u s i n g monetary p a y o f f s . Another a l t e r n a t i v e i s suggested by the f a c t t h a t i n t r u e - l i f e s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , meaningfulness i s u s u a l l y d e r i v e d from a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of p e r s o n a l investment and involvement on the p a r t o f the p a r t i c i p a n t s I f s u b j e c t s c o u l d , f o r example, be made to p e r c e i v e t h a t they were a c t u a l l y l o s i n g t h e i r own money (and i f such a procedure were e t h i c a l ) , then the s i t u a t i o n would be more apt to take on a d i f f e r e n t and more, meaningful p e r s p e c t i v e B. V a l i d i t y of I n f e r e n c e s : V a l i d i t y i s one of the most important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of any exp e r i m e n t a l u n d e r t a k i n g . Here, i t d e a l s w i t h the q u e s t i o n o f whether or not the PDG can be used t o study t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . I f the PDG i s a v a l i d t o o l f o r the study o f these concepts, then i d e a l l y , i t ought t o be p o s s i b l e t o make reasonably unambiguous i n f e r e n c e s about t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n on the b a s i s o f b e h a v i o r observed i n the PDG. F o r a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, Deutsch and other's equate the o b s e r v a t i o n o f c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t r u s t and the 1 8 o b s e r v a t i o n o f c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h the occurence of s u s p i c i o n . But as w i l l be e v i d e n t from the remainder o f t h i s s e c t i o n , a s t r o n g case may be mounted a g a i n s t such an e q u a t i o n . There are two r e l a t e d q u e s t i o n s which express p o s s i b l e approaches t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r problem of v a l i d i t y . F i r s t , i n what important r e s p e c t s does the PDG f a i l to r e p r e s e n t r e a l - l i f e t r u s t s i t u a t i o n s ? Secondly, can o t h e r f a c t o r s ( i n a d d i t i o n t o t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ) be i n f e r r e d from the o b s e r v a t i o n o f c o o p e r a t i o n and c o m p e t i t i o n i n the PDG? A moment's r e f l e c t i o n upon-the temporal aspects o f a c t s i n v o l v i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n suggests t h a t the m a j o r i t y o f those s i t u a t i o n s are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a sequence o f events. The p a r t y t h a t m a n i f e s t s t r u s t or wants t o demonstrate t r u s t makes h i s move f i r s t and i n e f f e c t p l a c e s h i s own f a t e , t o the e x t e n t t h a t he t r u s t s , s q u a r e l y i n the hands of the o t h e r . P, i n the a c t of t r u s t i n g 0 , leaves h i m s e l f v u l n e r a b l e t o 0 , . and both are u s u a l l y aware of t h i s v u l n e r a b i l i t y . Where P suspects 0, i . e . , P has a s t r o n g e x p e c t a t i o n of an u n d e s i r a b l e outcome t h a t r e s u l t s from O's c h o i c e , then P moves f i r s t so as t o p r e c l u d e or a t l e a s t reduce the p o s s i b i l i t y of the n e g a t i v e outcome. The c o n t e n t i o n here then i s t h a t a c t s i n v o l v i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are u s u a l l y s e q u e n t i a l i n n a t u r e . 19 I f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s acc u r a t e and f a i r l y g e n e r a l , then i t would be necessary t h a t the element of sequen-t i a l n e s s be r e p r e s e n t e d i n an experimental s i t u a t i o n designed to study t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . There i s , how-ever, another reason f o r a s s e r t i n g t h a t the n o t i o n of s e q u e n t i a l n e s s i s important, and t h i s reason r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y to the game s i t u a t i o n s used to study t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . When P makes a c o m p e t i t i v e c h o i c e i n a c o n d i t i o n of simultaneous p l a y , i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know i f h i s c h o i c e a r i s e s out of s u s p i c i o n , i . e . , an attempt t o guard a g a i n s t the worst outcome, or i f he i s i n f a c t t r y i n g t o maximize h i s own pa y o f f i n the event t h a t 0 chooses c o o p e r a t i v e l y . Although the observed c h o i c e i s the same, the u n d e r l y i n g reasons are d i f f e r e n t . In a s e q u e n t i a l p l a y s i t u a t i o n , the maximization e x p l a n a t i o n i s r u l e d out and i t i s more l i k e l y , but not necessary, t h a t P's c h o i c e can be a t t r i b u t e d t o the concept o f s u s p i c i o n . With r e g a r d to a c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e i n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of s e q u e n t i a l versus simultaneous p l a y , the focus s h i f t s to O's s e l e c t i o n when 0 i s e i t h e r c e r t a i n o r u n c e r t a i n about P's c h o i c e . In simultaneous p l a y , he i s u n c e r t a i n , w h i l e i n s e q u e n t i a l p l a y , he i s c e r t a i n . In s e q u e n t i a l p l a y , t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t when P i s f i r s t and chooses c o o p e r a t i v e l y , 0 may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as be i n g e i t h e r 20 t r u s t w o r t h y , i f he a l s o chooses c o o p e r a t i v e l y knowing t h a t P i s v u l n e r a b l e , or untrustworthy, i f he chooses competi-t i v e l y and takes advantage of P's v u l n e r a b i l i t y . In c o n t r a s t , such imputations about O's b e h a v i o r i n the simultaneous p l a y s i t u a t i o n are more ambiguous. T h i s d i s c u s s i o n of s i m u l t a n e i t y has a n t i c i p a t e d somewhat the q u e s t i o n as t o whether ot h e r motives might u n d e r l i e m a n i f e s t c o o p e r a t i v e and c o m p e t i t i v e c h o i c e s . A c c o r d i n g to M c C l i n t o c k and o t h e r s , t h e r e are a t l e a s t t h r e e motives t h a t i n f l u e n c e a s u b j e c t ' s response i n the PDG: 1) M a x i m i z a t i o n of one's own g a i n (MOG) r e g a r d l e s s of the o t h e r person's outcome, which i s more or l e s s e q u i v a l e n t to what Deutsch has c a l l e d an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c m o t i v a t i o n a l o r i e n t a t i o n , 2) M a x i m i z a t i o n of j o i n t g a i n (MJG), i . e . , the t o t a l g a i n f o r both o n e s e l f and the o t h e r , which i s approximately e q u i v a l e n t to a c o o p e r a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n , and 3) M a x i m i z a t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e between one's own g a i n and the o t h e r person's outcome, (MD) which i s roughly e q u i v a l e n t to a c o m p e t i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n (Becker & M c C l i n t o c k , 1967; M c C l i n t o c k & McNeel, 1966; M c C l i n t o c k & Messick, 1967; and Minas, Scodel,' Marlowe & Rawson, 1960). There may, of course, be o t h e r motives. For example, a punishment or " v i n d i c t i v e n e s s " motive may be o p e r a t i n g , wherein the s u b j e c t wants to minimize the o t h e r person's 21 p a y o f f a t any c o s t to h i m s e l f . Or, t h e r e may a l s o be a motive to o u t w i t the o t h e r person. T h i s would not i n v o l v e the p a t t e r n of s o l e l y c o m p e t i t i v e responses observed f o r a c o m p e t i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n , but might c o n s i s t o f a s e r i e s of c o o p e r a t i v e responses t h a t would s e t the stage f o r p e r i o d i c or e v e n t u a l d e f e c t i o n . Such, a motive might be s a l i e n t where, f o r example, the esteem of a t h i r d p a r t y or onlooker, such as a p r e s t i g i o u s experimenter, i s v a l u e d . I t has been argued i n t h i s s e c t i o n t h a t a problem e x i s t s w i t h r e s p e c t to the v a l i d i t y of i n f e r e n c e s which might be made on the b a s i s of the p r e s e n t use of the PDG. I t i s necessary to conclude t h a t because s u b j e c t s may p e r c e i v e and be motivated by f a c t o r s other than those r e l a t e d t o t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , c a u t i o n must be e x e r c i s e d i n making i n f e r e n c e s about these concepts on the b a s i s of observed c o o p e r a t i o n and c o m p e t i t i o n . T h i s i s not to say t h a t the PDG i s i n v a l i d f o r the study of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , but r a t h e r t h a t a more r e f i n e d and q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a t i o n o f the PDG i s necessary. C. D e f i n i n g and Measuring T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n : R e l a t e d to the q u e s t i o n o f i n f e r e n c e s i s the problem of d e f i n i n g and measuring t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . I t was e a r l i e r p o s t u l a t e d t h a t i n s i t u a t i o n s t h a t c a l l f o r a d e c i s i o n t o t r u s t or not ( h e r e i n termed " t e s t s i t u a t i o n s " ) t h e r e i s (1) an observed b e h a v i o r t h a t i s u s u a l l y of a dichotomous nature — P m a n i f e s t s t r u s t toward 0 or he doesn't — and (2) a h y p o t h e t i c a l concomitant s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n t h a t may be assumed to be of a continuous n a t u r e . I f t h i s i s the case, then the dependent v a r i a b l e measure a f f o r d e d by the dichotomous-c h o i c e game i s not adequate f o r a p a r t i c u l a r t e s t s i t u a -t i o n . Perhaps r e p l i c a t e d PDG t r i a l s p r o v i d e an e x p e r i -mental analogue on l y of r e p l i c a t e d t e s t s i t u a t i o n s or p o s s i b l y of the steps t h a t precede a t e s t s i t u a t i o n and do not a l l o w f o r an estimate or measure of P's s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e . The s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e (measured, f o r example, by P's s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y or' untrustworthy, g i v e n t h a t P has a l r e a d y made a t r u s t i n g choice) i s important s i n c e i t would be of i n t e r e s t to. know a t which p o i n t or t h r e s h o l d s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t becomes m a n i f e s t as b e h a v i o r a l t r u s t , i . e . , to what e x t e n t P must " f e e l " t h a t he t r u s t s 0 b e f o r e he w i l l i n f a c t make a t r u s t i n g d e c i s i o n . What makes the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of such a t h r e s h o l d even more i n t e r e s t i n g i s t h a t undoubtedly the t h r e s h o l d w i l l vary with a v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n a l , s t r u c t u r a l , and/or d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , e.g., i n c e n t i v e s or P's own t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . 23 I t would t h e r e f o r e appear t h a t i f the PDG or some othe r non-zero game i s to be used i n the study o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , i t ought t o be a s e q u e n t i a l l y - p l a y e d game f o r meaningful stakes and should e i t h e r i t s e l f p r o v i d e or be supplemented w i t h , a continuous measure. With these caveats i n mind, i t i s now p o s s i b l e t o proceed w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n o f the s p e c i f i c independent v a r i a b l e s w i t h which t h i s study i s p r i m a r i l y concerned. CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST AND SUSPICION The s p e c i f i c r e s e a r c h upon which t h i s paper i s focused d e a l s w i t h two q u e s t i o n s about the nature of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . T h i s chapter i s addressed to a d i s c u s s i o n of the f i r s t q u e s t i o n — What are some of the f a c t o r s t h a t i n f l u e n c e the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ? The second q u e s t i o n , as to what some of the consequences or e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are upon b e h a v i o r , w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d i n the next c h a p t e r . In r e g a r d t o the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , i t i s proposed t h a t the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i s i n f l u e n c e d not onl y by f a c t o r s o p e r a t i n g i n the immediate s i t u a t i o n , e.g., s t r u c t u r a l and d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s , but a l s o by r e l e v a n t p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . ^ P r e v i o u s experience i s important s i n c e i t p r o v i d e s P w i t h a b a s i s on which t o make i n f e r e n c e s about O's t r u s t -w o r t h i n e s s . For example, i t i s to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t obvious t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l P may or may not t r u s t another i n d i v i d u a l 0, depending on whether 0 was tr u s t w o r t h y o r untrustworthy on one o r more p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s . However, t h i s somewhat s i m p l i f i e d view of the genesis o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n needs to be q u a l i f i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . I t would be important, f o r i n s t a n c e , t o determine i f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n develop a t •^A p a r t i c u l a r "previous experience" has, of course, u s u a l l y been s u b j e c t t o s i t u a t i o n a l and d i s p o s i t i o n a l f a c t o r s i t s e l f . s i m i l a r or d i f f e r e n t r a t e s as a f u n c t i o n of the number of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e s . On one hand, i t i s i n t u i t i v e l y r e asonable t h a t s u s p i c i o n can be aroused on the b a s i s of a s i n g l e and u s u a l l y powerful o r dramatic b e t r a y a l . Yet, on the other hand, i t i s r a r e when "complete t r u s t " can be e s t a b l i s h e d on the b a s i s of merely one p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , depending, of course, upon the nature of the p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . Rather, i t seems more l i k e l y t h a t the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t r u s t i n v o l v e s a process or processes t h a t are to some ext e n t more time-demanding than the process or processes by which s u s p i c i o n i s aroused. I n s o f a r as i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a l l of these observa-t i o n s might be q u a l i f i e d by s p e c i f y i n g the nature of the p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t a f a c t o r l i k e the stakes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the c h o i c e s ( e s p e c i a l l y t o b e t r a y or not) i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e importance. I t would be worthwhile, f o r example, t o determine i f s u s p i c i o n might be g r e a t e r o r l e s s where p r e v i o u s b e t r a y a l o c c u r r e d under h i g h i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y . While b e t r a y a l f o r hi g h i n c e n t i v e s might be p e r c e i v e d t o be more " j u s t i f i a b l e " and t h e r e f o r e not r e s u l t i n the a r o u s a l of s u s p i c i o n , i t might a l s o provoke both resentment and suspicion*. On the o t h e r hand, even g r e a t e r resentment might occur when the i n c e n t i v e s to b e t r a y are r e l a t i v e l y low or t r i v i a l . . 26 A l t o g e t h e r , the f o r e g o i n g o b s e r v a t i o n s p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r e x p e r i m e n t a l l y - t e s t a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s about the develop-ment of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i t h i n the framework of a f a c t o r i a l d e s i g n i n v o l v i n g three independent v a r i a b l e s : (A) O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , (B) magnitude of the i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y , and (C) the number of exposures to trustworthy or untrustworthy a c t s . But b e f o r e making the hypotheses e x p l i c i t , a d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n of the three f a c t o r s w i l l f i r s t be p r e s e n t e d . A. O's T r u s t w o r t h i n e s s : Although i t may a t f i r s t seem obvious t h a t O's t r u s t -w orthiness w i l l promote t r u s t i n P whereas h i s u n t r u s t -worthiness w i l l engender s u s p i c i o n , i t i s l e s s apparent as to whether as few as one or two trustworthy responses are s u f f i c i e n t t o g i v e r i s e to b e h a v i o r a l t r u s t i n a t e s t s i t u a t i o n , i . e . , i n a s i t u a t i o n where the r i s k of b e t r a y a l i s q u i t e h i g h . The importance of t h i s f a c t o r (O's t r u s t -worthiness) t h e r e f o r e l i e s p r i m a r i l y i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n t e r a c t i v e e f f e c t with the "number of exposures" f a c t o r . The experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n of O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s i s r e l a t i v e l y s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d ; but i t can be e f f e c t e d o n l y i f the experimental s i t u a t i o n i s s t r u c t u r e d sequen-t i a l l y such t h a t P must f i r s t t r u s t 0 b e f o r e 0 can 27 demonstrate i f he i s tru s t w o r t h y or not. Yet, perhaps because of the seemingly obvious s o r t s of p r e d i c t i o n s which might be made, few s t u d i e s have attempted t o e s t a b l i s h the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p between O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and P's t r u s t , and between O's u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and P's s u s p i c i o n . Although there are three s t u d i e s t h a t are r e l e v a n t a t t h i s p o i n t , o n l y two (Swinth, 1967, and Messe & Sawyer, 1966) w i l l be d i s c u s s e d now; the o t h e r , by Komorita and Mechling (1967), w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d l a t e r i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the d i s c u s s i o n o f the i n c e n t i v e v a r i a b l e . In an i n t e r e s t i n g study, Swinth (1967) u t i l i z e d the programmed c h o i c e s of "0" t o _ e s t a b l i s h t r u s t . T r u s t was d e f i n e d i n terms of c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e on a " t e s t " m a t r i x (see F i g u r e 3 ) . Swinth h y p o t h e s i z e d and found t h a t t r u s t c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d i f 0 communicated a d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h t r u s t by exposing h i m s e l f to the r i s k o f p a y o f f r e d u c t i o n , i . e . , t r u s t i n g , when choosing f i r s t , and f o r e g o i n g . p e r s o n a l g a i n , i . e . , b e i n g t r u s t w o r t h y , when second. T h i s i s an i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g which ought t o be e x p l o r e d f u r t h e r f o r a number of reasons. F i r s t , i t i s necessary to note t h a t Swinth's study i n v o l v e d a s e r i e s of t r i a l s i n which P (the r e a l s u b j e c t ) and 0 (a matching program) a l t e r n a t e d w i t h r e g a r d to who chose f i r s t . Thus i t was i m p o s s i b l e to assess the r e l a t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n of O's t r u s t and O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s to the i n d u c t i o n o f t r u s t 10, 10 8, 11 10, 10 6, 12 10, 10 o, 18 i i , 8 10, 10 12, 6 10, 10 18, 0 10, 10 T 75, 75 -100, 100 100, -100 50, 50 F i g u r e 3. M a t r i c e s employed by Swinth (1967). NOTE: M a t r i c e s A, B...E are the s e q u e n t i a l l y - p l a y e d "commitment" ma t r i c e s whereby O (the program) can communicate h i s d e s i r e t o e s t a b l i s h t r u s t by r i s k i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y g r e a t e r r e d u c t i o n s i n p a y o f f s , i . e . , choosing row X when f i r s t , and by h i m s e l f r e s i s t i n g p r o g r e s s i v e l y g r e a t e r temptations t o b e t r a y , i . e . , b e i n g t r u s t -worthy by choosing X when second p r o v i d e d t h a t the s u b j e c t i n i t i a l l y does t r u s t 0 . M a t r i x T i s the s i m u l t a n e o u s l y - p l a y e d " t e s t " m a t r i x on which the dependent v a r i a b l e i s measured. NJ 00 29 i n P. Perhaps the most important reason i s t h a t t h e r e was no demonstration of the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between P's t r u s t and O's t r u s t and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . F i n a l l y , the development of s u s p i c i o n was not s t u d i e d by Swinth. Some i n d i c a t i o n o f the nature of the development of s u s p i c i o n i s rendered i n a study by Messe and Sawyer (1966), which d e a l t w i t h the r e s o l u t i o n o f e x p e r i m e n t a l l y - i n d u c e d c o n f l i c t . What makes t h e i r study i n t e r e s t i n g i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s paper i s the manner i n which c o n f l i c t was generated. P a i r e d s u b j e c t s ( a c t u a l l y a s u b j e c t p a i r e d w i t h 0, a confederate) were g i v e n a task — e s s e n t i a l l y a continuous c h o i c e PDG — i n which b a r g a i n i n g between the s u b j e c t and 0 about the f i n a l outcome (payoffs) preceded the a c t u a l c h o i c e s . Moves were simultaneous"'" and communication was accomplished by means of a number o f standard messages. Thus, i t was p o s s i b l e to c r e a t e c o n f l i c t by having 0 move i n a d e l i b e r a t e l y treacherous manner, i . e . , i n such a d i r e c t i o n as to attempt t o b e t r a y the s u b j e c t , r a t h e r than i n the d i r e c t i o n he (0) o r i g i n a l l y i n d i c a t e d d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g . Over the span of ten t r i a l s , such b e t r a y a l s were e f f e c t i v e i n r e d u c i n g the percentage of c o o p e r a t i o n . from above 50% t o about 25%. However, i t i s noteworthy ^"For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y , a more e l a b o r a t e procedure a c t u a l l y used by Messe and Sawyer i s not d e s c r i b e d here. 30 t h a t even i n the fa c e of such f l a g r a n t " u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , the v a r i o u s modes of r e s o l u t i o n , i . e . , matching, i n i t i a t i n g , o r n a t u r a l s t r a t e g i e s on the p a r t of O, subsequently produced a r e l a t i v e l y r a p i d r e c o v e r y o f c o o p e r a t i o n . B. Magnitude of I n c e n t i v e to Betray: There are two aspects t o t h i s v a r i a b l e . The one w i t h which t h i s study i s concerned i s how P's s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y of being b e t r a y e d i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n i s a f f e c t e d by pr e v i o u s experiences i n which 0, under a h i g h (or a low) i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y , was tr u s t w o r t h y (or u n t r u s t -worthy) . The other a s p e c t — perhaps, the most common — r e l a t e s t o how the i n c e n t i v e (to betray) i n the immediate s i t u a t i o n a f f e c t s the p r o b a b i l i t y of b e t r a y a l i n t h a t same s i t u a t i o n . Although these two aspects are r e l a t e d , i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y and e x p e r i m e n t a l l y p o s s i b l e t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h e i r e f f e c t s . S t u d i e s of the i n c e n t i v e v a r i a b l e have t y p i c a l l y been concerned w i t h the l a t t e r a spect and have sought to determine the e f f e c t s of the m a n i p u l a t i o n of the parameter Y (see F i g u r e 4) upon the l e v e l of c o o p e r a t i o n i n a simultaneous game. The c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t has been t h a t c o o p e r a t i o n decreases w i t h i n c r e a s e s i n Y ( B i x e n s t i n e & B l u n d e l l , 1966; Lave, 1965; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the 31 O cooperate" 'compete" "cooperate Tl U compete" w, w X, Y y, x z, z F i g u r e 4. A general matrix comprised of four para-meters W,'X,'Y, and Z. The matrix i s a PDG when the f o l l o w i n g c o n s t r a i n t s hold: ( i ) Y>W>Z>X ( i i ) 2W>X+Y (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965 , p. 34) 32 r e s u l t s of these s t u d i e s must, of course, be tempered by the arguments advanced e a r l i e r , t h a t i n simultaneous games, the c o m p e t i t i v e or s u s p i c i o u s c h o i c e by e i t h e r s u b j e c t may a c t u a l l y be a f u n c t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n c e between the v a l u e s of the parameters X and Y. Thus, i n c r e a s e d " s u s p i c i o n " ( i . e . , i n c r e a s e d s e l e c t i o n of the c o m p e t i t i v e response) i n simultaneous games may i n e f f e c t be a f u n c t i o n of the i n c r e a s e i n the d i f f e r e n c e between X and Y r a t h e r than a f u n c t i o n of only the i n c r e a s e i n Y. In c o n t r a s t to the f i n d i n g s j u s t c i t e d , i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s might be found where the e f f e c t s of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e are concerned. To r e p e a t the example used e a r l i e r , we might ask what degree of s u s p i c i o n i s generated by b e t r a y a l under low i n c e n t i v e . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the amount of s u s p i c i o n i s g r e a t e r 'than i n the c o n d i t i o n o f b e t r a y a l under h i g h i n c e n t i v e s i n c e b e t r a y a l -may seem to be l e s s j u s t i f i a b l e under c o n d i t i o n s of low i n c e n t i v e . Komorita and Mechling (1967) made p r e c i s e l y t h a t p r e d i c t i o n i n t h e i r study of b e t r a y a l and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . In o r d e r to v a r y e x p e r i e n c e , they manipulated t h r e e f a c t o r s : (i) temptation to d e f e c t ( i . e . , Y=6 or 9 ) , ( i i ) l o s s i n c u r r e d when b e t r a y e d ( i . e . , X=0 or - 5 ) , and ( i i i ) e x p e c t a t i o n of a c o o p e r a t i v e response ( i . e . , e i t h e r 4 or 10 c o o p e r a t i v e t r i a l s from the program b e f o r e b e t r a y a l ) . S u b j e c t s , i n f a c t p l a y i n g 33 a g a i n s t the experimenter, were more or l e s s i n s t r u c t e d to respond c o o p e r a t i v e l y i n the dichotomous c h o i c e PDG. F o l l o w i n g the 4 or 10 t r i a l s of c o o p e r a t i o n by which s u b j e c t s were l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t a s t a t e of mutual co-o p e r a t i o n had been achieved w i t h 0 (the experimenter), 0 made two s u c c e s s i v e c o m p e t i t i v e c h o i c e s . Although the game was p l a y e d w i t h simultaneous c h o i c e s , the two c o m p e t i t i v e responses by O were d e f i n e d as " b e t r a y a l " . (Such a d e f i n i t i o n would have been j u s t i f i e d o n l y i f the i n s t r u c t i o n s and the i n i t i a l t r i a l s o f c o o p e r a t i o n were e f f e c t i v e i n c r e a t i n g the b e l i e f i n s u b j e c t s t h a t a s t a t e of mutual c o o p e r a t i o n had a c t u a l l y been achieved.) The dependent v a r i a b l e measure of the e f f e c t s of the v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s of b e t r a y a l (e.g., b e t r a y a l under h i g h or low temptation, etc.) was the number of t r i a l s to r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . R e c o n c i l i a t i o n was d e f i n e d as f i v e c o n s e c u t i v e c o o p e r a t i v e responses by a s u b j e c t subsequent to b e t r a y a l . I t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t f o r r e c o n c i l i a t i o n to o c c u r , more t r i a l s would be r e q u i r e d i n the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : (1) when temptation was s m a l l r a t h e r than l a r g e , (2) the g r e a t e r the harm experienced when be t r a y e d , and (3) the g r e a t e r a s u b j e c t ' s e x p e c t a t i o n of a c o o p e r a t i v e response from 0. Each of the main e f f e c t s was s i g n i f i c a n t . However, the d i r e c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e f o r both temptation and the e x p e c t a t i o n f a c t o r s was counter to the p r e d i c t i o n . 34 A l t h o u g h t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e f o r t h e t e m p t a t i o n f a c t o r was t h e r e v e r s e o f what ha d b e e n p r e -d i c t e d , i t was n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e r e s u l t s o f some o f t h e s t u d i e s p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d ( B i x e n s t i n e & B l u n d e l l , 1966; L a v e , 1965; R a p o p o r t & Chammah, 1 9 6 5 ) . T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t p e r h a p s K o m o r i t a and M e c h l i n g s u c c e e d e d o n l y i n r e p l i c a t i n g t h e r e s u l t s o f t h o s e o t h e r s t u d i e s and d i d n o t p r o v i d e a r e a l t e s t o f t h e i r own h y p o t h e s i s . . They assumed t h a t i t was s u f f i c i e n t s i m p l y t o v a r y Y and t h a t t h e b e t r a y e d s u b j e c t s w o u l d p e r c e i v e t h e h i g h v a l u e o f Y as a c t u a l l y b e i n g h i g h o r t h e low v a l u e o f Y as b e i n g low. B u t t h e s u b j e c t s w e r e g i v e n no s t a n d a r d by w h i c h t h e y c o u l d a s s e s s o r gauge t h e p a y o f f o f nine- p o i n t s as b e i n g " h i g h " ( o r a t l e a s t h i g h e r t h a n s i x ) o r t h e p a y o f f o f s i x a s ' b e i n g "low" ( o r a t l e a s t l o w e r ' t h a n n i n e ) . I n f a c t , t h e r e was l i t t l e r e a s o n why t h e s u b j e c t s s h o u l d n o t h a v e p e r c e i v e d t h e n i n e p o i n t s as b e i n g low. One way o f c i r c u m v e n t i n g t h i s d i f f i c u l t y w o u l d be t o d e m o n s t r a t e i n d e p e n d e n t l y t h a t t h e s u b j e c t s do p e r c e i v e t h e i n c e n t i v e l e v e l s a p p r o p r i a t e l y . A more s a t i s f a c t o r y method, however, w o u l d be t o employ b o t h t h e h i g h and low Y m a t r i c e s i n o r d e r t o draw t o t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t s t h e r e l a t i v e m e a n i n g o f t h e d i f f e r e n t Y v a l u e s . The p r o c e d u r e t h a t w i l l be a d o p t e d i n t h i s s t u d y f o l l o w s t h e s e c o n d a l t e r n a t i v e . 35 C. Number of Exposures: An important t h e o r e t i c a l problem r e s i d e s i n the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the number of times a person has experien c e d t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s or b e t r a y a l and .the develop-ment of s u b j e c t i v e and b e h a v i o r a l t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n . An e x t e n s i o n of t h i s q u e s t i o n to a comparison of the r a t e s of development o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f the number of exposures i s a l s o o f primary i n t e r e s t . In t h i s r e s p e c t , c e r t a i n o b s e r v a t i o n s suggest a p o s s i b l e p r e d i c t i o n . On one hand, i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t very few experiences of b e t r a y a l — p o s s i b l y o n l y one -- are s u f f i c i e n t t o arouse s u s p i c i o n (and perhaps t h i s might depend upon the magnitude of i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y ) . On the o t h e r hand, th e r e i s a l s o evidence t h a t the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t r u s t i n v o l v e s a more prolonged process (Swinth, 1967). I t would t h e r e f o r e be p r e d i c t e d t h a t the r a t e of i n c r e a s e of t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n of the number of p r e v i o u s exposures i s g r e a t e r f o r s u s p i c i o n than f o r t r u s t . Two s t u d i e s are p e r i p h e r a l l y r e l e v a n t , although as i s g e n e r a l l y the case, no s t u d i e s have a c t u a l l y attempted to i n v e s t i g a t e the v a r i a b l e of.number of exposures. In t h e i r study of b e t r a y a l and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , Komorita and Mechling (1967) u t i l i z e d two programs t h a t d i f f e r e d o n l y i n the number of i n i t i a l c o o p e r a t i v e responses d u r i n g simultaneous p l a y s of a number of PDGs. These programs are o u t l i n e d i n Table 1. The most i n t e r e s t i n g r e s u l t s i n r e l a -Table 1. Programs used by Komorita and Mechling (1967) . INTENDED EFFECT OF MANIPULATION PROGRAM 1 PROGRAM 2 "expectation" "betrayal" (dependent variable measure: t r i a l s to cr i t e r i o n ) -4 cooperative t r i a l s -2 competitive t r i a l s -3 cooperative t r i a l s conditional cooperation 10 cooperative t r i a l s 2 competitive t r i a l s 3 cooperative t r i a l s c onditional cooperation UJ as 37 t i o n t o t h i s p a r t of the d i s c u s s i o n are the mean pro-p o r t i o n s o f c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e s immediately a f t e r the f i r s t of the two c o n s e c u t i v e " b e t r a y a l s " . Although the l e v e l of c o o p e r a t i o n i s s t i l l q u i t e h i g h a f t e r the f i r s t " b e t r a y a l " , i t drops p r e c i p i t o u s l y from .76 to .36 a f t e r the second " b e t r a y a l " . The e f f e c t does not seem to be very d u r a b l e , however, s i n c e r e c o v e r y i s r a p i d and a mean of o n l y ten t r i a l s i s needed t o r e i n s t a t e co-o p e r a t i o n . With the e x c e p t i o n of the i n i t i a l c o o p e r a t i v e t r i a l s , the Komorita and Mechling programs (2 c o m p e t i t i v e then 3 c o o p e r a t i v e responses and f i n a l l y c o n d i t i o n a l cooperation) are much l i k e the "reformed s i n n e r " program used by H a r f o r d and Solomon (1967). (See Table 2.) As i n the Komorita and Tabl e 2. "Reformed s i n n e r " program used by H a r f o r d and Solomon (1967) . INTENDED EFFECT OF MANIPULATION "Sin n e r " "Reform" PROGRAMMED CHOICES ( i n a simultaneous PDG) 3 c o m p e t i t i v e t r i a l s 3 c o o p e r a t i v e t r i a l s (dependent measure: p r o p o r t i o n o f co-o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e s i n a f i x e d number of t r i a l s ) c o n d i t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n f o r the remainder of the t r i a l s . 38 Mechling study, the l e v e l of c o o p e r a t i o n dropped from .4 to 0 w i t h i n the two t r i a l s immediately a f t e r the f i r s t b e t r a y a l . ^ " However, i t i s somewhat p u z z l i n g t o note t h a t on the f o u r t h t r i a l , i . e . , immediately f o l l o w i n g the three c o n s e c u t i v e c o m p e t i t i v e responses, the l e v e l bf c o o p e r a t i o n rose t o almost .20. T h e r e a f t e r , r e c o v e r y was r a p i d and the succeeding l e v e l s o f c o o p e r a t i o n e v e n t u a l l y exceeded the i n i t i a l l e v e l . D. Hypotheses P e r t a i n i n g to the Development of T r u s t and  S u s p i c i o n ; To conclude t h i s c h a p t e r , the e x p l i c i t hypotheses r e l a t e d to the f o r e g o i n g w i l l now be p r e s e n t e d . The b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n u n d e r l y i n g these t h r e e hypotheses i s t h a t the development o f both t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i s a f u n c t i o n of pr e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t : (1) P i s more l i k e l y to t r u s t 0 where O was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y . On the other hand, P w i l l not t r u s t 0, i . e . , w i l l be s u s p i c i o u s o f 0, where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y u n t r u s t -worthy. (2) S u s p i c i o n i s more e a s i l y e s t a b l i s h e d than t r u s t . Here, " e s t a b l i s h e d " w i l l r e f e r to a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e ^"It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t the ext e n t of the d e c l i n e s was s i m i l a r i n both s t u d i e s even though the i n i t i a l l e v e l s were d i f f e r e n t ; the i n i t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l of co- -o p e r a t i o n i s probably accounted f o r by the s e r i e s of c o o p e r a t i v e t r i a l s w i t h which Komorita a n d M e c h l i n g ' s programs began. 39 i n the amount of t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n between a group t h a t i s exposed t o e i t h e r a trus t w o r t h y or an untrustworthy 0 and a group (a c o n t r o l group) t h a t i s not exposed to e i t h e r a " t r u s t w o r t h y o r an untrustworthy 0. R e l a t i v e ease ( i . e . , "more e a s i l y " ) w i l l r e f e r to a comparison of t r u s t - and s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups with r e s p e c t to the number of exposures r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . (3) The development of t r u s t i s i n f l u e n c e d by the . magnitude of the i n c e n t i v e (to betray) under which 0 was n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u s t w o r t h y . A l s o , the development of s u s p i c i o n i s i n f l u e n c e d by the magnitude of i n c e n t i v e under which 0 was untrustworthy. The experimental t e s t o f these hypotheses comprises o n l y the f i r s t h a l f of the r e s e a r c h to be r e p o r t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s . A d i s c u s s i o n o f the remaining hypotheses and the background f o r those hypotheses w i l l be presented i n the next c h a p t e r . 40 CHAPTER FOUR: BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS B a r g a i n i n g a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e means b y w h i c h .con-f l i c t i s o f t e n r e s o l v e d . To a l a r g e e x t e n t , t h e i r i m p o r t a n c e r e s i d e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y o c c u r a l m o s t u n i v e r s a l l y as a s p e c t s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s n o t o n l y b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t a l s o b e t w e e n g r o u p s a n d b e t w e e n n a t i o n s . I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h e n , t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount o f a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n d i r e c t e d t o t h e t o p i c o f b a r g a i n i n g a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n t h e f o r m o f e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n s o f p r o p o s e d m o d e l s a n d r e v i e w s o f r e s e a r c h ( F o u r a k e r & S i e g e l , 1963; M c G r a t h , 1 9 6 6 ; S a w y e r & G u e t z g o w , 19 6 5 ; S i e g e l & F o u r a k e r , 1 9 6 0 ; S t e v e n s , 1 963; a n d W a l t o n & M c K e r s i e , 1 9 6 5 ) . S p e c i f i c s t u d i e s h a v e i n v e s t i g a t e d s u c h r e l e v a n t v a r i a b l e s a s r o l e b e h a v i o r ( B a s s , 1966; D r u c k m a n , 1967; a n d M c G r a t h & V i d m a r , 1966) ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n ( D e u t s c h , 1966; D e u t s c h & K r a u s s , 1 9 6 2 ) , t h r e a t ( D e u t s c h & K r a u s s , 1960 a n d 19 6 2 ; K e l l e y , 1 9 6 5 ) , p r e n e g o t i a t i o n e x p e r i e n c e a n d p e r s o n a l i t y ( D r u c k m a n , 1 9 6 7 ) , v a r i o u s k i n d s o f .;' a t t i t u d e s ( K r a u s s , 1966; M o r g a n & S a w y e r , 1 9 6 7 ) , l e v e l o f a s p i r a t i o n a n d amount o f i n f o r m a t i o n ( F o u r a k e r & S i e g e l , 1 9 6 3 ; S i e g e l & F o u r a k e r , 1 9 6 0 ) , a n d o t h e r a s p e c t s o f b a r g a i n i n g a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s ( K e l l e y , 1966) . Of i n t e r e s t h e r e a r e t h e e f f e c t s o f e x p e r i m e n t a l l y i n d u c e d t r u s t a n d s u s p i c i o n u p o n b a r g a i n i n g a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e i r r e l e v a n c e h a s r e c e n t l y b e e n s p e c u l a t e d u p o n i n a r t i c l e s 41 by K e l l e y (1966), Hoedemaker (1968), and Walton and McKersie (1965); but more commonly, the importance of. t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i n i n f l u e n c i n g b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i -a t i o n s has been emphasized almost d a i l y i n the v a r i o u s mass media by many informed o b s e r v e r s . The v a l i d i t y of t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n s has h a r d l y been i r r e f u t a b l y e s t a b l i s h e d , however, s i n c e t h e i r o b s e r v a t i o n s about the e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n have been made p r i m a r i l y on a c a s u a l b a s i s . P r e c i s e l y what are the e f f e c t s — i f any — of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s ? T h i s chapter i s devoted to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f two. p o s s i b l e types o f e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s . One concerns the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s upon the process of b a r g a i n i n g . Aspects o f the b a r g a i n i n g process would i n c l u d e , f o r example, the degree or the type of communication t h a t occurs d u r i n g - b a r g a i n i n g . The o t h e r concerns the e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon the nature o f the outcome. T h i s would i n v o l v e , f o r example, the q u a l i t a t i v e nature o f the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . In o r d e r to c a s t the hypotheses in,more s p e c i f i c terms, the b a r g a i n i n g concepts t h a t w i l l . b e e x t e n s i v e l y employed w i l l be d i s c u s s e d f i r s t . A. P r o c e s s - R e l a t e d Concepts: Minimum d i s p o s i t i o n , b a r g a i n i n g  range, i n i t i a l o f f e r : Many of the b a s i c f e a t u r e s of b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s have been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the model of p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a -t i o n proposed by I k l e and L e i t e s (1962). In t h e i r a n a l y s i which p r o v i d e s p a r t of the i n i t i a l framework of t h i s s e c t i o n , an i s s u e i s r e p r e s e n t e d by an o r d e r i n g of a l l of the p o s s i b l e outcomes. I t i s assumed t h a t each outcome has a c e r t a i n u t i l i t y f o r each n e g o t i a t o r a t a g i v e n time and t h a t on t h i s b a s i s , an o r d e r i n g of p r e f e r e n c e s f o r each s i d e i s p o s s i b l e . That c o n f l i c t e x i s t s i s r e p r e s e n t e d by the o r d e r i n g of one s i d e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s i n the exact r e v e r s e of the o t h e r s i d e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s (see F i g u r e 5 ) . What i s most p r e f e r r e d by the one s i d e (P) i s l e a s t p r e f e r r e d by 0. . 2 The a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n i s a p o i n t which d i v i d e s the range of p r e f e r e n c e s f o r any one s i d e i n t o two groups of outcomes: (a) those t h a t are a c c e p t a b l e (ranging from b e i n g m i n i m a l l y a c c e p t a b l e to b e i n g h i g h l y p r e f e r r e d ) , and (b) those t h a t are u n a c c e p t a b l e . The r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n i n g of the a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n f o r each s i d e i s important. On one hand, an o v e r l a p p i n g ^ h e analyses of K e l l e y (1966) , Stevens (1963) , Walton and McKersie (1965), and others are a l s o r e l e v a n t f o r t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . However, i n the i n t e r e s t of c o n c i s e n e s s , r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made only to I k l e and L e i t e s (1962) s i n c e a l l o f these analyses u t i l i z e e s s e n t i a l l y the same s o r t s of concepts. 2 For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y , i t w i l l be assumed t h a t the minimum d i s p o s i t i o n i s a p o i n t r a t h e r than an i n t e r v a l . Most p r e f e r r e d outcome f o r 0 + 3 7 6 5 -1 0 1 2 + P's a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n O's a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n 4 3 2 1 0 3 4 5 6 7 i ! '--Actual b a r g a i n i n g range- 3 = o v e r l a p between: P's range of a c c e p t a b l e outcomes -1 -2 -3 - j k ~ 1 8 9 10 O's p r e f e r e n c e s Outcomes P's p r e f e r e n c e s Most p r e f e r r e d outcome f o r P O's range of a c c e p t a b l e outcomes F i g u r e 5. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n (adapted from I k l e and L e i t e s , 1962) . 44 of the ranges of unacceptable outcomes might p r e c l u d e any • p o s s i b i l i t y of s e t t l e m e n t . On,the ot h e r hand, an over-l a p p i n g of the ranges of a c c e p t a b l e outcomes would appear to d e f i n e a r e g i o n of v i a b l e c o n t r a c t s w i t h i n which the f i n a l agreement i s q u i t e l i k e l y to f a l l . I k l e and L e i t e s (1962) c a l l t h i s the a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g range and i t i s r e p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 5 by the i n t e r v a l c - h. Knowledge about O's minimum d i s p o s i t i o n i s important s i n c e i t allows P to " d r i v e a harder b a r g a i n " , p r o v i d i n g , of course, t h a t 0 does not i n r e t u r n know P's minimum d i s p o s i t i o n . However, such p r e c i s e i n f o r m a t i o n , not o n l y about the o t h e r ' s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n , but more g e n e r a l l y about h i s e n t i r e range of u t i l i t i e s , i s r a r e l y possessed by e i t h e r s i d e a t the o u t s e t of n e g o t i a t i o n s . Thus, one of the major f u n c t i o n s of b a r g a i n i n g i s to estimate what the o t h e r s i d e ' s u t i l i t i e s and p r e f e r e n c e s are f o r c e r t a i n outcomes ( e s p e c i a l l y h i s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ) . In a d d i t i o n t o e s t i m a t i o n , b a r g a i n i n g has a t l e a s t two o t h e r r e l a t e d f u n c t i o n s . One i s to i n f o r m 0 about one's own u t i l i t i e s . The o t h e r i s to attempt to modify e i t h e r O's u t i l i t i e s and p r e f e r e n c e s or O's p e r c e p t i o n of one's own u t i l i t i e s and p r e f e r e n c e s ; I k l e and L e i t e s (1962).have d e a l t almost e x c l u s i v e l y w i t h t h i s l a t t e r f u n c t i o n of m o d i f i c a t i o n i n t h e i r a n a l y s i s of p o l i t i c a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . . 45 B a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c s r e f e r t o means by which n e g o t i a t o r s o f t e n attempt t o modify each o t h e r ' s u t i l i t i e s . I n c l u d ed are such d e v i c e s as s t r i k e s , t h r e a t s , c o n c e s s i o n s , extreme demands or o f f e r s , and l i e s . The r o l e of such t a c t i c s i s apparent a t the commencement of n e g o t i a t i o n s , when the i n i t i a l o f f e r o r demand i s made. For example, a n e g o t i a t o r might adopt the g e n e r a l s t r a t e g y or s t y l e o f b e g i n n i n g w i t h a s p u r i o u s l y h i g h demand (or low o f f e r ) i n order t o al l o w a l a t i t u d e f o r what w i l l i n f a c t be f a l s e c o n c e s s i o n s . An i n f l a t e d i n i t i a l demand i s i n f a c t p r e s c r i b e d i n a number of d i s c u s s i o n s of b a r g a i n i n g s t r a t e g y (e.g., K e l l e y , 1966, and Stevens, 1963). However, i f g e n e r a l l y p r a c t i c e d , such a p r e s c r i p t i o n would merely seem to b r i n g the problem around " f u l l c i r c l e " to a c o s t l y and time-consuming s i t u a -t i o n where both n e g o t i a t o r s must b e g i n w i t h extreme and d e c e p t i v e demands, knowing t h a t the o t h e r w i l l do the same. Our i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i n f l u e n c e the use of t a c t i c s . I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g t o determine i f , f o r example, t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n a f f e c t s the ex t r e m i t y o f the i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n , o r i f more l i e s are communicated where s u s p i c i o n i s o p e r a t i n g . B. Outcome-Related Concepts: e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y : In an i n f o r m a l sense, e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y r e f e r to two ways i n which s e t t l e m e n t s can be i n t e r p r e t e d as be i n g " f a i r " . More f o r m a l l y , e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y r e f e r t o two of the p o s s i b l e s e t of s o l u t i o n s t o a b a r g a i n i n g problem i n which the p a y o f f s are asymmetric. Asymmetry can be re p r e s e n t e d v/here the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n (or, assuming t h a t the u t i l i t y of money i s l i n e a r w i t h money, the range of pa y o f f s ) of one of the b a r g a i n e r s i s i n c r e a s e d or decreased i n a l i n e a r t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . Thus, as i n d i c a t e d i n F i g u r e 6, one s i d e ' s p a y o f f p o t e n t i a l , i . e . , the most he can get, i s g r e a t e r than the oth e r s i d e ' s p a y o f f p o t e n t i a l (150 versus 30) . E q u a l i t y ("f" i n F i g u r e 6) occurs when the a l t e r n a t i v e agreed upon by both s i d e s y i e l d s e x a c t l y the same p a y o f f f o r b o t h. On the oth e r hand, e q u i t y ("d" i n F i g u r e 6) . occurs when the unequal p a y o f f p o t e n t i a l i s taken i n t o account. While the s i d e with the h i g h e r p a y o f f p o t e n t i a l r e c e i v e s an amount t h a t i s i n a b s o l u t e terms more than the a b s o l u t e amount r e c e i v e d by the oth e r s i d e , i . e . , 75 versus 15, each s i d e , r e l a t i v e t o i t s own p a y o f f p o t e n t i a l , r e c e i v e s p r o p o r t i o n a l l y the same, i . e . , 75 _ 15^ A t the F F 130" 317 p o i n t o f e q u i t y , the product o f the u t i l i t i e s (75 times 15) i s maximized. Reference t o such n o t i o n s o f f a i r n e s s as e q u a l i t y and e q u i t y i s q u i t e common, even i n t h e . l a r g e r c o n t e x t a p a r t from b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s noteworthy t h a t e q u a l i t y seems to be p r e f e r r e d or demanded i n some cases 150 125 100 75 50 25 0 •«- One Si d e ' s P a y o f f s a b c d e f g -f- S o l u t i o n s or Outcomes 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 -*- The Other Side's P a y o f f s EQUITY EQUALITY F i g u r e 6. I l l u s t r a t i o n o f e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y i n a b a r g a i n i n g problem (from Morgan and Sawyer, 1967). 48 whereas e q u i t y i s p r e f e r r e d i n o t h e r s . Such d i f f e r e n t i a l p r e f e r e n c e s b r i n g up the important q u e s t i o n as to what c o n d i t i o n s i n f l u e n c e the c h o i c e o f one over the o t h e r . Our i n t e r e s t s l i e , o f course, i n the v a r i a b l e s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . However, p r e d i c t i o n s as t o what the exact e f f e c t s might be are not immediately apparent. Under the assumptions t h a t b a r g a i n e r s are r a t i o n a l and j t h a t they have complete i n f o r m a t i o n about each o t h e r ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s , many game t h e o r i s t s , e.g., Nash, Zeuthen, and i n some cases, R a i f f a ( a l l c i t e d i n Bishop, 1963) p r e -s c r i b e s e t t l e m e n t a t e q u i t y . But d e s c r i p t i v e l y , the s o l u t i o n of e q u a l i t y might a l s o be expected s i n c e i n many ; c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o t h e r f a c t o r s may operate t o supercede or d e t r a c t from c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of r a t i o n a l i t y . Morgan and Sawyer (1967), f o r example, h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t knowledge of the o t h e r ' s b a r g a i n i n g range ( i . e . , the i n t e r v a l between the most he expected and h i s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n ) would i n f l u e n c e the nature o f the outcome, depending upon whether or not the b a r g a i n e r s were f r i e n d s . F r i e n d s , they reasoned, would "conform l e s s t o the model o f r a t i o n a l b a r g a i n e r s " (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967, p. 140) than non-f r i e n d s . Thus they p r e d i c t e d t h a t w i t h knowledge of the ot h e r ' s b a r g a i n i n g range, n o n f r i e n d s would tend t o reach e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n s (as p r e s c r i b e d f o r r a t i o n a l b a r g a i n e r s i n game theory) whereas f r i e n d s would tend more t o agree t o e q u a l i t y . 49 T r u s t and f r i e n d s h i p are o f t e n h i g h l y r e l a t e d , a t l e a s t i n s o f a r as t r u s t (both m a n i f e s t and s u b j e c t i v e ) i s more l i k e l y t o e x i s t between f r i e n d s than between non-f r i e n d s . To the exte n t t h a t t r u s t g i v e s r i s e t o the same reasons f o r n o n - r a t i o n a l i t y as does f r i e n d s h i p (e.g;, i n the case of extreme t r u s t ) , so i s i t p o s s i b l e t h a t t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p s might a l s o be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a tendency toward s o l u t i o n s of e q u a l i t y . However, i t might a l s o be argued t h a t t r u s t promotes r a t i o n a l i t y (and t h e r e f o r e e q u i t a b l e outcomes), w h i l e s u s p i c i o n r e s u l t s i n departures from r a t i o n a l i t y (and t h e r e f o r e i n n o n - e q u i t a b l e , but not n e c e s s a r i l y e q u a l , outcomes). T h i s l a t t e r c o n t e n t i o n seems i n t u i t i v e l y more p l a u s i b l e . . T h i s d i s c u s s i o n has r a i s e d many p o s s i b i l i t i e s , making i t e v i d e n t t h a t many c o m p l e x i t i e s are i n v o l v e d i n making p r e d i c t i o n s about b a r g a i n i n g outcomes. To a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , t h i s w i l l be r e f l e c t e d i n the remaining s e c t i o n , i n which the s p e c i f i c hypotheses and ot h e r p o s s i b l e e x p e r i m e n t a l outcomes w i l l be p r e s e n t e d . C. Hypotheses and P o s s i b l e Outcomes P e r t a i n i n g t o the E f f e c t s  o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n s : The examination o f the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l be made i n terms of (a) the process and (b) the outcome o f b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s . The i n t e n t i o n w i l l be not 50 o n l y to determine what the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are upon b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s , but a l s o to i n f e r p o s s i b l e reasons as to why the e f f e c t s do o c c u r . For example, i t w i l l be h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t s u s p i c i o n has a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t upon b a r g a i n i n g i n s o f a r as i t w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t , i . e . , more time w i l l be r e q u i r e d , t o a r r i v e a t mutually accepted s o l u t i o n s . But i n a d d i t i o n to time, a number of o t h e r dependent v a r i a b l e s w i l l be measured and r e c o r d e d . Thus, i f s u s p i c i o n is_ found to extend the time to s o l u t i o n , i t w i l l a l s o be p o s s i b l e to i n f e r i f t h i s r e s u l t i s r e l a t e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , to more-extreme i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s , or perhaps to i n c r e a s e d t e n dencies to engage i n f a l s e or t h r e a t e n i n g communication. Be f o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the hypotheses r e l a t e d to b a r g a i n i n g , two p o i n t s r e q u i r e c l a r i f i c a t i o n . F i r s t i t w i l l be assumed t h a t the experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n s w i l l be e f f e c t i v e i n (i) c r e a t i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and ( i i ) i n f l u e n c i n g b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s . E s s e n t i a l l y , t h i s i s expressed i n the p o s t u l a t e t h a t t h e . r e l a t i o n s h i p between the e x p e r i m e n t al manipulations and the dependent v a r i a b l e measures i s mediated by the i n t e r v e n i n g c o n s t r u c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . Thus, i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to r e f e r to "the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n " (as we have been doing) where we w i l l be d e a l i n g , o s t e n s i b l y , w i t h o n l y the e f f e c t s of the experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n s . 51 The second p o i n t of c l a r i f i c a t i o n concerns the a c t u a l statement of the hypotheses. Although a number'of dependent v a r i a b l e measures w i l l be r e c o r d e d , formal hypotheses w i l l be advanced on l y f o r a few of them.- For the other dependent v a r i a b l e measures (which, as p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , w i l l be p o s s i b l e sources o f i n f o r m a t i o n as to why e f f e c t s do o c c u r ) , the nature of the p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l be l a r g e l y e x p l o r a t o r y q u e s t i o n s and w i l l t h e r e f o r e not be c a s t i n formal terms. The Hypotheses and Other P o s s i b l e Outcomes: I t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a t l e a s t t h r e e ways i n which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n can i n f l u e n c e b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a -t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , i t i s h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t : (1) T r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l d i f f e r e n t i a l l y i n f l u e n c e the nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . However, whether t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n promotes e q u a l i t y or e q u i t y i s l a r g e l y an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n . (2) T r u s t f a c i l i t a t e s , whereas s u s p i c i o n impedes b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s i n s o f a r as agreements w i l l be more d i f f i c u l t t o a c h i e v e , i . e . , more time w i l l be r e q u i r e d to reach agreement, when s u s p i c i o n , r a t h e r than t r u s t , i s o p e r a t i n g . (3a) T r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l a f f e c t the amount of  communication. (3b) Furthermore, both t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l a f f e c t the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of communication d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g , 52 e s p e c i a l l y those communications concerned w i t h t a c t i c s . T h i s w i l l be e v i d e n t i n the frequency w i t h which one or more of the f o l l o w i n g types of communication are employed: (i) those communications t h a t are o b v i o u s l y d i r e c t e d toward the f u n c t i o n o f m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g t h r e a t s , r e f u s a l s to b a r g a i n (analogous t o s t r i k e s and l o c k o u t s ) , and t a s k -i r r e l e v a n t , a g g r e s s i o n - p r o v o k i n g statements (e.g., i n s u l t s ) , ( i i ) those communications t h a t are i n t e n d e d p r i m a r i l y to i n f o r m o r t o o b t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n r a t h e r than t o modify, ( i i i ) those communications t h a t g i v e f a l s e i n f o r m a t i o n ( l i e s ) ; a l though l i e s might a l s o be grouped i n the f i r s t c a t e g o r y , they are analyzed s e p a r a t e l y s i n c e they are l e s s - o b v i o u s means by which u t i l i t i e s can be m o d i f i e d . '. Among the oth e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t w i l l be examined (but not f o r m a l l y advanced as hypotheses) are those c o n c e r n i n g the e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon: (a) one's own a c t u a l i n i t i a l range, i . e . , the range between the h i g h e s t one r e a l l y hopes to get and h i s a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n a t the b e g i n n i n g o f b a r g a i n i n g ; (b) the e x t r e m i t y o f the i n i t i a l o f f e r (both i n a b s o l u t e terms and r e l a t i v e t o the mid-point o f the one's own a c t u a l i n i t i a l range); (c) the degree to which b a r g a i n i n g ranges w i l l c o n s t r i c t over the course of b a r g a i n i n g , i . e . , the " d i f f e r e n c e between 53 the a c t u a l i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g range and the f i n a l b a r g a i n -i n g range; and (d) i n t e r p e r s o n a l e v a l u a t i o n (as measured on seven e v a l u a t i v e s c a l e s on the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l ) . 54 CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD To t e s t the hypotheses s e t f o r t h a t the c o n c l u s i o n of Chapters Three and Four, a t h r e e - s t a g e experiment was con-ducted. Although the d e s i g n and each of the t h r e e stages w i l l subsequently be d e s c r i b e d i n complete d e t a i l , an over-view of the e n t i r e experiment w i l l f i r s t be p r e s e n t e d . In the f i r s t stage — the i n d u c t i o n stage d u r i n g which "previous e x p e r i e n c e " was manipulated — the independent v a r i a b l e s d i s c u s s e d i n Chapter Three were combined i n a c o m p l e t e l y - c r o s s e d f a c t o r i a l d e s i g n . Thus, i n the f i r s t s t a ge, s u b j e c t s were exposed 1, 3, or 5 times to e i t h e r a t r u s t w o r t h y or an untrustworthy 0 and the l e v e l of the i n c e n t i v e f o r the 0 t o have been untrustworthy was e i t h e r h i g h or low. In the second or the measurement stage, the e f f e c t s of the m a n i p u l a t i o n s i n the i n d u c t i o n stage upon two measures of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were r e c o r d e d . In the f i n a l s t age, the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon p e r -formance i n a b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n task were a l s o r e c o r d e d . In a d d i t i o n t o the e x p erimental groups, a c o n t r o l group was conducted; t h i s group was g i v e n the i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the i n d u c t i o n stage, but proceeded d i r e c t l y t o the second and t h i r d stages without exposure to any of the experimental m a n i p u l a t i o n s of stage I . In o t h e r words, the o n l y d i f f e r -ence between the c o n t r o l and the treatment groups was t h a t 55 the treatment groups experienced t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s or b e t r a y a l on the p a r t of 0, whereas the c o n t r o l group d i d not have any p r e v i o u s experience w i t h 0 d u r i n g stage I . E s s e n t i a l l y , the c o n t r o l group p r o v i d e d b a s e - l i n e b e h a v i o r w i t h which the b e h a v i o r of the treatment groups c o u l d be compared. In the measurement stage, t h i s c o n s i s t e d of an estimate of the e x i s t i n g or pre-treatment l e v e l of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i n the p o p u l a t i o n from which the sample was drawn. In the b a r g a i n i n g stage, the responses of the c o n t r o l group p r o v i d e d an i n d i c a t i o n of the b a s e - l i n e l e v e l s of both the b a r g a i n i n g process and the outcomes of b a r g a i n i n g . A. S u b j e c t s and Design: A l t o g e t h e r , there were 112 v o l u n t e e r s u b j e c t s , 96 of whom were i n the experimental groups and 16 i n the c o n t r o l group. Except f o r one o r i e n t a l , a l l of the s u b j e c t s were white, and a l l were male u n i v e r s i t y students b e l o n g i n g to or l i v i n g i n one of the campus f r a t e r n i t i e s . The b a s i c d e s i g n of the experiment was a completely c r o s s e d 2 x 2 x 3 f a c t o r i a l w i t h e i g h t s u b j e c t s i n each c e l l . Each s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n o n l y one s e s s i o n . A s e s s i o n u s u a l l y l a s t e d f o r two hours and always i n v o l v e d a group of f o u r s u b j e c t s , each one r e p r e s e n t i n g a d i f f e r e n t f r a t e r n i t y . S p e c i a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s and the Recruitment of the  S u b j e c t s : For the f i r s t two s t a g e s , the experimental t a s k s were designed to make i t p o s s i b l e f o r the s u b j e c t s e i t h e r t o 56 win or to l o s e money, a p p a r e n t l y depending upon whether the other group members were trus t w o r t h y or not. A l l of the p o t e n t i a l s u b j e c t s were t h e r e f o r e requested to v o l u n t e e r under the complete understanding t h a t even though they c o u l d win up to $5.00, there was a l s o a genuine r i s k of l o s i n g up to $2.50 of t h e i r own money. They were, i n f a c t , r e q u i r e d to b r i n g $2.50 i n cash b e f o r e b e i n g allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e . . Any l o s s e s t h a t were i n c u r r e d d u r i n g the experiment were doubly reimbursed a t the c o n c l u s i o n of the s e s s i o n although, of course, no one was informed o f t h i s beforehand. To f a c i l i t a t e r e c r u i t m e n t , an arrangement was made wit h the p r e s i d e n t of the I n t e r - F r a t e r n i t y C o u n c i l (IFC) whereby the experiment c o u l d be conducted through the IFC under the g u i s e of an i n t e r - f r a t e r n i t y c o m p e t i t i o n . At stake was a s u b s t a n t i a l sum of money ($50.00) . The winning f r a t e r n i t y was determined by a formula combining (i) performance by the f r a t e r n i t y as a whole d u r i n g the experiment, and ( i i ) the number ( i n p r o p o r t i o n to the t o t a l membership) of v o l u n t e e r s t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e d . Thus, t h e r e was an i n c e n t i v e f o r each f r a t e r n i t y t o supply v o l u n t e e r s . In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e was, f o r each i n d i v i d u a l , an i n c e n t i v e not o n l y to do w e l l f o r h i m s e l f (or a t l e a s t , not to l o s e h i s own money), but a l s o to do w e l l f o r the sake of e a r n i n g more p o i n t s (or not l o s i n g them) toward the p r i z e f o r the f r a t e r n i t y . 57 B. Procedure: A l l f o u r of the s u b j e c t s were seated a t desks i n f o u r s eparate c u b i c l e s . The c u b i c l e s , w e r e arranged so t h a t d u r i n g the i n d u c t i o n stage and the i n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d s , each s u b j e c t c o u l d see the experimenter, but not the other s u b j e c t s . During the measurement and the b a r g a i n i n g stages however, p o r t a b l e opaque p a r t i t i o n s enabled the experimenter t o c l o s e the c u b i c l e s o f f e n t i r e l y . Thus, even the e x p e r i -menter c o u l d not be seen by the s u b j e c t s . On each desk were: a p e n c i l ; a d i t t o e d o u t l i n e of the i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r the f i r s t stage; two s m a l l s i g n s , one w i t h "COOPERATE" p r i n t e d on both s i d e s , and one w i t h "SELF" p r i n t e d on both s i d e s ; and a cardboard c o n t a i n e r f o r l o o s e change. At the b e g i n n i n g of the s e s s i o n , a l l s u b j e c t s were asked to produce $2.50. While t h i s amount was b e i n g changed f o r q u a r t e r s , the experimenter i d e n t i f i e d a loud each p a r t i c i -pant by name and f r a t e r n i t y . A b r i e f i n t r o d u c t o r y statement was then read i n s t r u c t i n g the s u b j e c t s to be n e i t h e r completely c o o p e r a t i v e nor completely c o m p e t i t i v e . I t a l s o reminded them t h a t the b e t t e r they d i d i n d i v i d u a l l y , the b e t t e r i t would be f o r the f r a t e r n i t y . In an e f f o r t to f a c i l i t a t e the t r a n s i t i o n from stage I to stage I I , and as w e l l , to m a i n t a i n the i n t e r e s t of the s u b j e c t s , task i n s t r u c t i o n s were i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h e i t h e r the tasks themselves or t a s k - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s . Moreover, 5 8 i n the f i r s t two s t a g e s , the tasks were not always immedi-a t e l y preceded by the r e l a t e d i n s t r u c t i o n s . The d e t a i l e d procedure d e s c r i b e d h e r e i n w i l l not f o l l o w the exact c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r of events c a r r i e d out i n the experiment. I n s t e a d , each stage w i l l be d e s c r i b e d as a u n i t , as though the i n s t r u c t i o n s and the r e l a t e d t asks had been co n t i g u o u s . The a c t u a l c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r o f events w i l l be summarized a t the c o n c l u s i o n of the c h a p t e r . STAGE I : INDUCTION: The purpose o f t h i s stage was to manipulate the th r e e f a c t o r s (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y , and number of exposures) d i s c u s s e d p r e v i o u s l y i n Chapter Three. T h i s was accomplished i n the context of a 4-person game i n which each s u b j e c t was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the problem o f whether o r not to m a n i f e s t t r u s t toward one of the oth e r members of the group. A l l of the s u b j e c t s were l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t they were i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h each o t h e r ; but i n f a c t , the responses of the " o t h e r s " were a l l completely c o n t r o l l e d by the experimenter. The game was s t r u c t u r e d i n such a way t h a t each s u b j e c t p e r c e i v e d t h a t he had a c h o i c e , i . e . , t h a t h i s c h o i c e t o t r u s t 0 or not was e n t i r e l y o f h i s own v o l i t i o n ; but a c t u a l l y , the s u b j e c t s were v i r t u a l l y f o r c e d to t r u s t " 0 " — i . e . , t r u s t the experimenter. Thus, i t was p o s s i b l e f o r the experimenter t o manipulate not o n l y "O's" t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , i . e . , programming "0" e i t h e r t o f u l f i l l or b e t r a y the s u b j e c t s ' t r u s t , but a l s o the i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y and the number of times t r u s t was e i t h e r f u l f i l l e d o r b e t r a y e d . I n s t r u c t i o n s and examples f o r t h i s stage were g i v e n e n t i r e l y by means of an e i g h t minute v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g . T h i s technique was employed i n o r d e r to m a i n t a i n the s t r i c t a t t e n t i o n of the s u b j e c t s , to f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r comprehension of the t a s k , and to make the subsequent m a n i p u l a t i o n s h i g h l y c r e d i b l e . A d i t t o e d o u t l i n e supplementing these i n s t r u c -t i o n s Was a v a i l a b l e a t a l l times f o r easy r e f e r e n c e . The game, as p r e s e n t e d to the s u b j e c t s : By means of a draw, the s u b j e c t s were numbered from one to f o u r . Each one knew onl y h i s own number, but not the numbers drawn by the o t h e r t h r e e . Each s u b j e c t was r e q u i r e d to ante 25C and then i n s u c c e s s i o n a c c o r d i n g to the number drawn, each voted e i t h e r " s e l f " or "cooperate" by p o i n t i n g t o one of the s i g n s on the desk. The way i n which each person voted was immediately t a l l i e d on the b l a c k b o a r d so t h a t the e n t i r e group c o u l d keep t r a c k of each vote as i t was b e i n g made. Three outcomes were d e f i n e d , and the s u b j e c t s were completely informed of each outcome and i t s s o c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s : (i) I f a l l v ote "cooperate", then a l l r e c e i v e 50C, i . e . , t h e i r 25C antes r e t u r n e d p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l 25*. ( i i ) I f o n l y one votes " s e l f " , then a l l but t h a t one i n d i v i d u a l l o s e t h e i r 60 antes. The one i n d i v i d u a l who votes " s e l f " r e c e i v e s 50C (the amount he would have r e c e i v e d i f he had voted "co-operate") p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l 5C or 50C (depending on whether he i s i n a h i g h or low i n c e n t i v e group); i n o t h e r words, he was g e t t i n g e i t h e r 5C or 50C more than i f he had voted "cooperate". ( i i i ) L a s t l y , i f two o r more vote " s e l f " , then a l l l o s e t h e i r 25$ antes; i n a d d i t i o n , the f i r s t person to vote " s e l f " l o s e s another 75£ making h i s t o t a l l o s s $1.00. R a t i o n a l e : In the a c t u a l experiment, the draw f o r the p o s i t i o n numbers was rigged^" so t h a t a l l o f the s u b j e c t s were a s s i g n e d p o s i t i o n 3. When the "vote" of each person was a p p a r e n t l y b e i n g t a l l i e d , the experimenter was i n f a c t " f i l l i n g i n " the votes f o r the n o n - e x i s t e n t numbers 1, 2, and 4. In a l l groups, the votes f o r numbers 1 and 2 were always "cooperate". Thus each s u b j e c t ( s i n c e a l l had the number 3) was c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the d e c i s i o n of e i t h e r v o t i n g " s e l f " , and i n v i t i n g outcome ( i i i ) on h i s own, or v o t i n g "cooperate", and i n e f f e c t b e i n g the l a s t t o a l l o w number "'"Elaborate p r e c a u t i o n s were adopted to ensure t h a t s u b j e c t s would not d e t e c t the d e c e p t i o n . These steps were j u s t i f i e d by the a s s e r t i o n t h a t anonymity (at l e a s t i n s o f a r as no one knew who had drawn the o t h e r numbers) would encourage l e s s - , i n h i b i t e d r e s p o n d i n g . For example, when the votes were a p p a r e n t l y b e i n g t a l l i e d , the experimenter scanned a l l f o u r c u b i c l e s 'to prevent the s u b j e c t s from d e t e c t i n g the person upon whom he was f o c u s s i n g . S i m i l a r measures were adopted when p a y o f f s were b e i n g made or when p e n a l t i e s were b e i n g c o l l e c t e d . 61 4 to determine the outcome f o r h i m s e l f and the r e s t of the group. Almost i n v a r i a b l y , the s u b j e c t s voted t o "co-operate" . By v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n , number 4 (the experimenter) had a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of power. I t was h i s vote which u l t i m a t e l y d e c i d e d i f the r e s t o f the group won or l o s t . In essence, t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a " f o r c e d t r u s t " s i t u a t i o n which reduced t o the m a t r i x shown i n F i g u r e 7. The important f e a t u r e o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n was t h a t although number 3 was v i r t u a l l y f o r c e d t o t r u s t number 4 by v o t i n g "cooperate", number 4 c o u l d n e v e r t h e l e s s be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as b e i n g t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy a c c o r d i n g t o how he chose. T h i s was p o s s i b l e because number 4 had a c h o i c e and c o u l d — but d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y have t o -- e x e r c i s e h i s power to e x p l o i t the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the o t h e r s . The m a n i p u l a t i o n s : (a) To induce t r u s t , the e x p e r i -menter simply t a l l i e d number 4's vote as b e i n g the f o u r t h to "cooperate", i . e . , number 4 was t r u s t w o r t h y . To induce s u s p i c i o n , he t a l l i e d number 4's vote as b e i n g the onl y " s e l f " v o t e , i . e . , number 4 was untrustworthy. (b) The ^"Individual s u b j e c t s voted " s e l f " i n on l y a few cases: once i n a group i n which t r u s t was induced and f o u r times i n groups, i n which s u s p i c i o n was induced, always on the l a s t t r i a l of a s e r i e s of three or f i v e t r i a l s . In these cases, the e x p e r i -menter c o u l d not and d i d not t a l l y the vote f o r number 3 on the board. I n s t e a d , he e x p l a i n e d t h a t s i n c e number 4 had had such an advantage, he (the experimenter) would now d e p r i v e number 4 of the i n f o r m a t i o n of how number 3 had v o t e d . The experimenter then a p p a r e n t l y took number 4's v o t e . Group (Numbers 1, 2, and 3) Number 4 T r u s t i n g S u s p i c i o u s Trustworthy 25C 25C -25* -25C* ( 5* Untrustworthy 25£+( -25$ -25* -25*** (50$ *except f o r the onl y one t o vote " s e l f " — he r e c e i v e s 25C p l u s 5C or 50C. **except f o r the f i r s t one t o vote " s e l f " — he l o s e s $1.00 a l t o g e t h e r . FIGURE 7. M a t r i x r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the I n d u c t i o n game i n which number 4 chooses l a s t . Number f o u r ' s p a y o f f i s the f i r s t e n t r y i n each c e l l . The second e n t r y i s the pay o f f f o r any one member of the group. 63 m a n i p u l a t i o n o f the i n c e n t i v e f a c t o r has a l r e a d y been . d e s c r i b e d . In o r d e r to permit the comparison between the i n c e n t i v e l e v e l s and t h e r e f o r e to a l l o w the assumption t h a t the s u b j e c t s p e r c e i v e d the i n c e n t i v e l e v e l s as i n t e n d e d , the s u b j e c t s were t o l d t h a t by means of another draw, the "bonus" to the s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l who voted " s e l f " would be one of two v a l u e s , 5£ or 50C. T h i s draw was bona  f i d e so t h a t assignment to the i n c e n t i v e c o n d i t i o n was random. (c) The number of t r i a l s ( i . e . , the number of times the s u b j e c t s made an ante and voted) c o n s t i t u t e d the number of exposures to e i t h e r a t r u s t w o r t h y or an u n t r u s t -worthy o t h e r (number 4 ) . In t h i s experiment,, the t h r e e l e v e l s of the number of exposures f a c t o r were 1, 3, and 5. However, the s u b j e c t s were never informed of e x a c t l y how many t r i a l s t h e r e would be, although a range of from one to twenty was mentioned i f anyone asked. Summary: In the c o n t e x t of a f o u r - p e r s o n game, a l l s u b j e c t s were c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the c h o i c e of t r u s t i n g 0 or not; t r u s t i n g e n t a i l e d r i s k i n g one's own money. The game was s t r u c t u r e d so t h a t each s u b j e c t was v i r t u a l l y f o r c e d to make the t r u s t i n g c h o i c e . I t was t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e to manipulate not o n l y O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ( F a c t o r A ) , but a l s o the i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 to be untrustworthy (Factor B), and the number of times 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y o r untrustworthy 64 ( F a c t o r C ) . In the t r u s t c o n d i t i o n s ( i n which 0 was t r u s t -worthy) the s u b j e c t s a l l won money; but i n the s u s p i c i o n c o n d i t i o n s ( i n which 0 was u n t r u s t w o r t h y ) , the s u b j e c t s a l l l o s t t h e i r own money. As soon as the mani p u l a t i o n s were complete, the experimenter proceeded d i r e c t l y t o the stage I I t a s k s . These are d e s c r i b e d i n the f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . . STAGE I I : MEASUREMENT: In t h i s s tage, two measurements were taken of the e f f e c t s o f the stage I m a n i p u l a t i o n s . The f i r s t was simply a response on the o n e - t r i a l , s e q u e n t i a l - c h o i c e PDG m a t r i x shown i n F i g u r e 8. The second was a measure of s u b j e c t i v e +$0 .50 +$0.50 -$1.00 +$1.00 +$1.00 -$1.00 0 0 FIGURE 8. PDG m a t r i x used t o measure t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n i n a o n e - t r i a l , s e q u e n t i a l -p l a y game. p r o b a b i l i t y — the e x t e n t t o which a s u b j e c t f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t O would be tr u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy, g i v e n t h a t he (the s u b j e c t ) had a l r e a d y extended h i s t r u s t to 0. P r e l i m i n a r y i n s t r u c t i o n s and the PDG t a s k : P a r t i t i o n s were s e t up to permit the experimenter t o pass and c o l l e c t response sheets a t ease without r e v e a l i n g any of the decep-65 t i o n s t h a t were employed. PDG response sheets designed to f a c i l i t a t e comprehension were then d i s t r i b u t e d , one to each s u b j e c t . An example of one of these sheets i s i n c l u d e d i n Appendix A. Each group was informed t h a t i t would be a r b i t r a r i l y d i v i d e d i n t o p a i r s . While the s u b j e c t s were l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e r e was no s p e c i a l reason f o r the p a r t i c u l a r p a i r i n g s , i t was i n t e n t i o n a l l y arranged t h a t s u b j e c t number 1 would d e f i n i t e l y be p a i r e d w i t h number 2 and number 3 would d e f i n i t e l y be p a i r e d w i t h number 4. ( I t should be empha-s i z e d t h a t t h i s was announced, b e f o r e the s u b j e c t s had even drawn t h e i r numbers.) They were then t o l d t h a t w i t h i n each p a i r , one would be d e s i g n a t e d "Red" and the other "Green", and t h a t these d e s i g n a t i o n s would be determined by c u t t i n g a deck of c a r d s . Red's task was simply to choose f i r s t by drawing a h o r i z o n t a l l i n e a c r o s s e i t h e r the top o r the bottom row of the m a t r i x . The sheet was then to be d e l i v e r e d to Green, who would t h e r e f o r e know what Red had a l r e a d y chosen. Green's task was simply to draw a v e r t i c a l l i n e down e i t h e r the l e f t - o r the r i g h t - h a n d column of the m a t r i x to i n t e r -s e c t w i t h Red's l i n e . P a y o f f s were to be determined by the i n t e r s e c t i o n of the l i n e s drav/n by Red and Green. Red's p a y o f f s were p r i n t e d i n r e d and Green's p a y o f f s were p r i n t e d i n green to 66 f a c i l i t a t e comprehension. Each of the outcomes was c a r e -• f u l l y e x p l a i n e d and as w e l l , the dilemma, e s p e c i a l l y f o r Red, was f u l l y v e r b a l i z e d . . The s u b j e c t s were informed t h a t t h e r e would be on l y one t r i a l , and they were a l s o reminded t h a t the p a y o f f e n t r i e s i n the m a t r i x r e p r e s e n t e d r e a l sums of money t h a t would be won or l o s t . No i n d i c a t i o n was g i v e n t h a t t h e r e would be another t a s k , i . e . , the measure of s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y . R a t i o n a l e ; Once a g a i n , the draw was " f i x e d " , t h i s time so t h a t each s u b j e c t was d e s i g n a t e d Red. In e f f e c t , each s u b j e c t was l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t : (a) he had drawn the number 3 (stage I ) ; (b) he was p a i r e d w i t h number 4 (who was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy, e t c . ) ; (c) he was now d e s i g n a t e d Red and t h e r e f o r e had to choose f i r s t i n the o n e - t r i a l s e q u e n t i a l c h o i c e PDG.^ As i n the f i r s t s t age, s u b j e c t s were i n t h i s stage c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the c h o i c e of t r u s t i n g 0 or not. T h i s time, however, each As was mentioned p r e v i o u s l y (see Footnote 1, page 60), a number of p r e c a u t i o n s were taken t o enhance c r e d i b i l i t y . In a d d i t i o n t o the p r e c a u t i o n s o u t l i n e d b e f o r e , the experimenter d i r e c t e d s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s to 'Green' even though none of the s u b j e c t s had i n f a c t been d e s i g n a t e d as Green; f u r t h e r -more, the cards used i n the draws were always s h u f f l e d t h o r o u g h l y w h i l e the s u b j e c t s observed, and the s u b j e c t s were even allowed e i t h e r to c u t or to draw the cards when the numbers and c o l o r s were b e i n g d e s i g n a t e d . At the c o n c l u s i o n of the experiment, the success of these e f f o r t s was assessed i n an i n f o r m a l manner. In the d e b r i e f i n g p e r i o d , the experimenter t o l d the s u b j e c t s t h a t o t h e r s had found the ma n i p u l a t i o n s to be unc o n v i n c i n g and o b v i o u s l y c o n t r i v e d . The i n t e n t i o n was, of course, to encourage the s u b j e c t s to v e r b a l i z e any of t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s about the experiment. Only two s u b j e c t s d i d so, and t h e r e f o r e none of the data from e i t h e r of t h e i r groups was i n c l u d e d i n any p a r t of t h i s r e p o r t . 67 s u b j e c t knew t h a t t h e r e would be onl y one t r i a l . On the ot h e r hand, each s u b j e c t was now t r u l y f r e e t o choose; furthermore, he was a b l e t o base h i s c h o i c e upon p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . Thus, the use of the s u b j e c t s ' responses on the PDG as one o f the measures o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n was j u s t i f i e d . S u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y : i n s t r u c t i o n s and the task: In t h i s p a r t of stage I I , i t was necessary f o r the e x p e r i -menter t o d i s t r i b u t e the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y response sheets and to a d m i n i s t e r the a p p r o p r i a t e i n s t r u c t i o n s , a l l w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g the s u b j e c t s ' i m p r e s s i o n t h a t they were s t i l l i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h each o t h e r . A f t e r c o l l e c t i n g the PDG response s h e e t s , - t h e experimenter announced t h a t the s u b j e c t s who were d e s i g n a t e d Red would r e c e i v e y e t another type o f response s h e e t . These were d i s t r i b u t e d presumably as the two PDG response sheets were b e i n g d e l i v e r e d from the two Red s u b j e c t s to the two Green s u b j e c t s . A b r i e f pause was allowed o s t e n s i b l y to g i v e the two Green s u b j e c t s time t o make t h e i r responses. A c t u a l l y , the pause was g i v e n to p e r m i t the s u b j e c t s t o read the i n s t r u c t i o n s on the new forms. Then, the experimenter proceeded t o e x p l a i n the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y response t a s k . Because the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y response sheets were l a r g e l y s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y , few i n s t r u c t i o n s were r e q u i r e d . 6 8 An example of the response sheet i s pr e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 9. Sub j e c t s d e s i g n a t e d Red, i . e . , a l l of the s u b j e c t s , were asked to suppose t h a t they d i d choose the top row r e g a r d -l e s s of what they a c t u a l l y chose. That i s , s u b j e c t s were t o suppose they had t r u s t e d the oth e r person. T h e i r task was t o i n d i c a t e the e x t e n t to which they f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t the o t h e r person (number 4) would be t r u s t w o r t h y or u n t r u s t -worthy g i v e n t h a t they had a l r e a d y extended t h e i r t r u s t t o him. O p e r a t i o n a l l y , s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y , i . e . , c e r t a i n t y o r u n c e r t a i n t y , was the exte n t to which a s u b j e c t ' s response (a mark on the s c a l e i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 9) d e v i a t e d from the mid-point of the s c a l e . Complete c e r t a i n t y was i n d i c a t e d by a response a t e i t h e r o f the extreme ends whereas maximum u n c e r t a i n t y was i n d i c a t e d by a response a t the mid-point of the s c a l e . As soon as a l l of the s u b j e c t s had made t h e i r responses, the experimenter c o l l e c t e d the s h e e t s . The p a r t i t i o n s were then removed f o r a s h o r t c o f f e e break. Queries r e g a r d i n g the outcomes of stage I I were not, o f course, answered a t t h i s time. Summary: During stage I , t h r e e v a r i a b l e s h y p o t h e s i z e d as b e i n g r e l e v a n t to the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y v a r i e d . In stage I I , the e f f e c t s o f these m a n i p u l a t i o n s upon two measures of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were determined. T h e - f i r s t measure was the response made by 6 9 F i g u r e 9 . Response s c a l e used to measure s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . SP FORM f o r RED. ( I ) R e g a r d l e s s o f what you a c t u a l l y c h o s e on t h e PD Form j u s t p r e v i o u s l y , suppose t h a t you c h o s e t h e upper row; i . e . , l e f t r i g h t suppose you c h o s e . -fr upper lower + $0.50 + $0.50 - $1.00 + $1.00 + $1.00 - $1.00 0 '< 0 ( i i ) Which column do you t h i n k t h e o t h e r p e r s o n would c h o o s e I f you c h o s e t h e upper,row, and how c e r t a i n a r e you t h a t he would make such a c h o i c e ? (ANSWER BY ING ONLY ONE MARK ANYWHERE ON EITHER THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT HALF OF THE LINE BELOW, TO THE EXTENT THAT YOU FEEL HE WOULD MAKE SUCH A CHOICE.) ]00% 1.00? I am a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a t he wouId c h o o s e t h e column oo t h e l e f t . I am u n c e r t a i n a s t o what he would c h o o s e . I am a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n t h a i he would choos-j t h e column on t h e r i g h t . 70 a s u b j e c t on a o n e - t r i a l dichotomous-choice PDG i n which the s u b j e c t chose f i r s t . The second measure was a measure of s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y — the e x t e n t to which a s u b j e c t f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t 0 would be t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy g i v e n t h a t he (the s u b j e c t ) had a l r e a d y made a d e c i s i o n to t r u s t O. STAGE I I I : BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATIONS: Because a l l of the s u b j e c t s thought t h a t they were s t i l l p a i r e d w i t h number 4 i n t h i s p a r t of the e x p e r i -ment, i t was p l a u s i b l e t h a t the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon a b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s task c o u l d be determined i n t h i s s t a g e . There was, however, no f u r t h e r d e c e p t i o n by the experimenter, and a l l b a r g a i n i n g was completely bona f i d e . Some of the p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s of the e x p e r i m e n t a l task adopted f o r t h i s stage w i l l be o u t l i n e d f i r s t . Subsequently, the p r o c e d u r a l d e t a i l s w i l l be e x p l a i n e d more f u l l y . S u b j e c t s were a r b i t r a r i l y p a i r e d f o r the b a r g a i n i n g task and g i v e n only t h e i r own s c a l e s ( i . e . , t h e i r own s i d e of the p a y o f f s c h e d u l e ) . The p a y o f f schedule f o r the b a r g a i n i n g problem employed i s p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 1 0 . I t was emphasized to the s u b j e c t s t h a t the p a y o f f s i n d i c a t e d on the s c a l e s r e p r e s e n t e d r e a l amounts of money t h a t they would r e c e i v e (or have deducted) a t the c o n c l u s i o n of the s e s s i o n . B a r g a i n i n g was conducted by means of w r i t t e n F i g u r e 10. Payoff schedules r e c e i v e d by the s u b j e c t s . 1 > O J U J Oi CD U J vO O O J o o NJ 00 00 m NJ ~ J O J T l M U l 0\ 7> t\J NJ OJ — NJ 3 00 c— NJ - J f~ o> O Z NJ - J o NJ a\ O '.o TO o\ •Cb LT) -Cb 00 — J O J OJ cz ON < o 1 X 1 —1 1 -Cb • .Cb o 00 o m ON ~n NJ O 7> NJ U l NJ 03 — ' OJ NJ c— OJ U l 7v -Cb O 1— -C» •Cb 2 •o z U l N) o U l o> TJ O -Pb JD o\ 00 OJ - j —I - j o» c oo < 00 -c* 00 X 1 72 communications o n l y . Although p r i n t e d s t a n d a r d messages were s u p p l i e d , t h e r e was i n e f f e c t no r e s t r i c t i o n upon e i t h e r the q u a n t i t y or the content o f the communication. P a r t i t i o n s prevented the s u b j e c t s from s e e i n g the person to whom the messages were being d e l i v e r e d . Time was a f a c t o r inasmuch as time bonuses.or p e n a l t i e s were added to or s u b t r a c t e d from the f i n a l p a y o f f . There was, however, no s p e c i f i e d time l i m i t g i v e n to the s u b j e c t s although b a r g a i n i n g was d i s c o n t i n u e d a f t e r t h i r t y minutes. I n i t i a l i n s t r u c t i o n s and the p a y o f f schedule: To f a c i l i t a t e u nderstanding of the t a s k , two handouts were d i s t r i b u t e d . One was a d e t a i l e d o u t l i n e of the procedure and the r u l e s of the b a r g a i n i n g task (see Appendix B ) . The other was an example sheet w i t h p a y o f f schedules f o r two d i f f e r e n t b a r g a i n i n g problems (see Appendix C ) . In o r d e r to g i v e the b a r g a i n i n g task a more f a m i l i a r frame of r e f e r e n c e , a used c a r b u y e r - d e a l e r analogy was employed. By t h i s means, i t was p o s s i b l e to i l l u s t r a t e e f f e c t i v e l y the way i n which p a y o f f schedules would.be"used t o r e p r e s e n t such aspects of b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s as the c o n f l i c t i n g o r d e r i n g of the p r e f e r e n c e s h e l d by each s i d e or the attempts by b a r g a i n e r s to d i s c o v e r and t o modify each o t h e r ' s u t i l i t i e s or p r e f e r e n c e s . In the p a y o f f schedule a c t u a l l y used (see F i g u r e 10) one s i d e ' s s c a l e ranged from - 7£ to $3.36 over twenty-four. 73 a l t e r n a t i v e s and i n c r e a s e d by m u l t i p l e s of 16, whereas the o t h e r s i d e ' s s c a l e ranged from - 4* to 87C and i n c r e a s e d by m u l t i p l e s of 4.^ Except f o r the lowest p a y o f f , no i n f o r m a t i o n was g i v e n about the o t h e r s i d e ' s s c a l e beyond the f a c t t h a t h i s (the o t h e r s i d e ' s ) p a y o f f s were ordered i n the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n . The lowest p a y o f f was g i v e n i n order to p r o v i d e some standard f o r the i n i t i a l o f f e r . In the absence of such a standard, the most extreme i n i t i a l o f f e r would have been somewhat j u s t i f i e d . Communication: W r i t t e n messages c o n s t i t u t e d the o n l y medium of communication between the s u b j e c t s . Copies of a l l the d i f f e r e n t types of note forms used can be found i n Appendix D. D i f f e r e n t c o l o r s made the d i s t i n c t i o n between the v a r i o u s types e a s i e r . There were two types of i n t e r -s u b j e c t messages: f i r s t , there were "standard" messages which were n e i t h e r b i n d i n g nor n e c e s s a r i l y t r u t h f u l . Standard messages c o n s i s t e d of s i x items, any one of which c o u l d be e a s i l y completed by the s u b j e c t . The nature of these items ranged from p u r e l y i n f o r m a t i o n a l s o r t s of communications, e.g., "What do you get a t ?", to ^ " R e g u l a r i t i e s i n the increments were d i s g u i s e d by adding or s u b t r a c t i n g 1 to or from each s i d e ' s p a y o f f s a t some of the a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s was done i n order to reduce prominence of a s o l u t i o n based upon e a r l y d e t e c t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e upon which the s c a l e s were c o n s t r u c t e d . 74 communications i n which one b a r g a i n e r c o u l d t h r e a t e n the ot h e r . A seventh completely open item was a l s o p o s s i b l e i n which the s u b j e c t c o u l d w r i t e any message he wanted. There was t h e r e f o r e v i r t u a l l y no r e s t r i c t i o n upon the cont e n t of the messages. However, f o r the purposes of a n a l y s i s , f o u r content c a t e g o r i e s were d i s t i n g u i s h e d : (1) messages geared s t r i c t l y toward the exchange of i n f o r -mation; (2) messages geared o b v i o u s l y toward the f u n c t i o n of m o d i f i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g , f o r example, t h r e a t s , ultimatums, and s t r i k e s ; (3) messages which, i n conveying f a l s e i n f o r -mation were l e s s o b v i o u s l y geared toward m o d i f i c a t i o n ; and (4) messages which were p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h time and p a y o f f bonuses. The s u b j e c t s were t o l d t h a t the standard messages were more or l e s s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r v o c a l communi-c a t i o n and c o u l d not be used to f i n a l i z e c o n t r a c t s . On the oth e r hand, the second type o f form — the " d e c i s i o n " message — was b i n d i n g , but not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u t h f u l . D e c i s i o n messages were used p r i m a r i l y i n order t o a r r i v e a t f i n a l c o n t r a c t s o r to make d e f i n i t e u n i l a t e r a l commitments. Thus, w h i l e t h r e a t s c o u l d be made and o f f e r s c o u l d be t e n t a t i v e l y proposed on the standard messages, f i n a l a c t i o n s were a c t u a l l y executed o n l y on the d e c i s i o n messages. The d e c i s i o n messages c o u l d a l s o be c a t e g o r i z e d a c c o r d i n g to one of the f o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y o u t l i n e d . 75 There was no r e s t r i c t i o n upon the number or the type of messages sent or upon the d u r a t i o n of the i n t e r v a l between messages. (At times,, however, th e r e was e i t h e r some u n i n t e n t i o n a l delay i n d e l i v e r y because of a sudden i n f l u x , o r an i n t e n t i o n a l delay t o prevent the s u b j e c t s from knowing to whom a message was b e i n g d e l i v e r e d . ) I t was mandatory t h a t each message, whether s t a n d a r d or d e c i s i o n , be accompanied by a "statement". Statements were se p a r a t e p r i n t e d forms on which s u b j e c t s were supposed to have t r u t h f u l l y i n d i c a t e d t h e i r minimum and t h e i r maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s . These forms were, of course,,always r e t a i n e d by the experimenter, and the s u b j e c t s were assured t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n from the statements would never be d i v u l g e d to t h e i r p a r t n e r s . Without a c o r r e s p o n d i n g statement, no message was d e l i v e r e d . Statements p r o v i d e d the means by which the v e r a c i t y of some of the messages ( e s p e c i a l l y the i n f o r m a t i o n a l ones) c o u l d be determined i n the a n a l y s i s . In a d d i t i o n , measures of such i n t e r v a l s as the a c t u a l i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g range and one's own b a r g a i n i n g range were o b t a i n e d from the statements. Time and s t r i k e s : A system of time bonuses and p e n a l t i e s was i n s t i t u t e d t o p l a c e , i n e f f e c t , a k i n d of a time l i m i t upon the d u r a t i o n o f b a r g a i n i n g . A d e t a i l e d d e s c r i p t i o n of t h i s system i s i n c l u d e d i n Appendix B. The p r i n c i p a l i n t e n t i o n of t h i s arrangement was to make time a s a l i e n t 76 c o n s i d e r a t i o n d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g , as o f t e n occurs i n r e a l -l i f e s i t u a t i o n s i n which ultimatums are g i v e n and "end-gaming" i s p r a c t i c e d . Furthermore, i t p r o v i d e d a b a s i s f o r i n s t i t u t i n g the t a c t i c o f r e f u s a l t o b a r g a i n , comparable to a s t r i k e or a l o c k - o u t . P's r e f u s a l to b a r g a i n w i t h 0 was tantamount t o going on s t r i k e a g a i n s t 0 . While both s i d e s were l o s i n g time, 0 , the p a r t y " s t r u c k " , l o s t a t twice the r a t e t h a t P was l o s i n g d u r i n g the s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d . The r e a s o n i n g i n v o l v e d i n u s i n g t h i s t a c t i c i s somewhat s i m i l a r to t h a t i n a r e a l s t r i k e : " I t ' s h u r t i n g me, but i t ' s c o s t i n g you more than i t ' s c o s t i n g me." Checking: Checking was a way by which a b a r g a i n e r c o u l d determine p r e c i s e l y the oth e r person's p a y o f f a t any g i v e n a l t e r n a t i v e . In order t o check, a b a r g a i n e r had o n l y to submit a "check s l i p " to the experimenter. T h i s s l i p i n d i c a t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t the b a r g a i n e r wanted checked and was r e t u r n e d w i t h the requested i n f o r m a t i o n by the experimenter as soon as p o s s i b l e . Although t h e r e was no l i m i t to the number of times one c o u l d check, a charge of 5% of one's maximum p o s s i b l e p a y o f f was l e v i e d f o r each check. T h i s amounted t o about 17-1/2C f o r the person w i t h the h i g h e r s c a l e , and about 3-1/2C f o r the person w i t h the lower s c a l e . Using such h i g h l y d i s p a r a t e s c a l e s f o r the b a r g a i n i n g problem probably made the b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n more i n h e r e n t l y c o n f l i c t f u l . But as w e l l , b a r g a i n i n g might consequently have become l e s s meaningful because of the 77 i n c r e a s e d tendency e i t h e r to l i e to the other person or t o d i s b e l i e v e him. Thus, some means of v e r i f y i n g O's communications had t o be i n t r o d u c e d . Not o n l y c o u l d such a checking d e v i c e e x e r t a s t a b i l i z i n g i n f l u e n c e (so t h a t a t l e a s t , b a r g a i n -i n g would not n e c e s s a r i l y degenerate i n t o a l y i n g c o n t e s t ) , ) but a l s o i t p r o v i d e d an a d d i t i o n a l index of s u s p i c i o n . Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l : A t the c o n c l u s i o n of b a r g a i n -i n g ( i . e . , when both dyads were f i n i s h e d b a r g a i n i n g ) , s u b j e c t s were asked to e v a l u a t e the person w i t h whom they had been b a r g a i n i n g . E v a l u a t i o n s were made on a seven item Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l . (A copy of the response sheet i s i n c l u d e d as Appendix E.) Scores from 1 to 7 c o u l d be o b t a i n e d on each item, w i t h a h i g h e r s c o r e i n d i c a t i n g a more p o s i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n . The t o t a l s c o r e on each e v a l u a t i o n c o u l d t h e r e f o r e range from 7 (completely negative) through 28 (completely n e u t r a l ) to 49 (completely p o s i t i v e ) . E s s e n t i a l l y , the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l p r o v i d e d a g l o b a l i n d i c a t i o n of the e f f e c t of the experiment as a whole. I t was i n f l u e n c e d not o n l y by the stage I m a n i p u l a t i o n s , but a l s o the events and the outcomes of b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a -t i o n s . Summary o u t l i n e of stage I I I procedure: Upon comple-t i o n of the i n s t r u c t i o n s , the s c a l e s f o r the b a r g a i n i n g 78 problem were d i s t r i b u t e d . The s u b j e c t s were then reminded t h a t they were s t i l l p a i r e d , number 1 wit h number 2 and number 3 w i t h number 4. A f t e r a b r i e f pause i n which the s u b j e c t s were g i v e n time to study t h e i r s c a l e s , a l l s u b j e c t s were r e q u i r e d to submit a standard message ( n e i t h e r b i n d -i n g nor n e c e s s a r i l y t r u t h f u l ) s u g g e s t i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e a t which they would s e t t l e . These messages, d e f i n e d as the i n i t i a l o f f e r s , were d e l i v e r e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . From then on, the o n l y r e s t r i c t i o n imposed upon the messages o c c u r r e d where r e f e r e n c e was made t o the number or c o l o r which one or the othe r o f the b a r g a i n e r s had drawn, e.g., "You were number 4 l a s t time . . .". Messages t h a t j e o p a r d i z e d the experimental d e c e p t i o n were never d e l i v e r e d . Agreement was reached when one s i d e made a b i n d i n g o f f e r on a d e c i s i o n message, and the othe r s i d e accepted, a l s o on a b i n d i n g d e c i s i o n message. F i n a l l y , w i t h the b a r g a i n -i n g f i n i s h e d , the s u b j e c t s were asked t o e v a l u a t e the person w i t h whom they had been b a r g a i n i n g on seven b i p o l a r s c a l e s from the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l . CHAPTER SUMMARY; A t h r e e - s t a g e experiment was conducted i n order to t e s t the hypotheses advanced i n Chapters Three and Four. Data were o b t a i n e d d u r i n g two hour s e s s i o n s i n which s u b j e c t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n groups of f o u r . Each s e s s i o n i n v o l v e d b a s i c a l l y the same t h r e e - s t a g e procedure. In the f i r s t 79 stage, the f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s were manipulated i n the c o n t e x t of a f o u r - p e r s o n game: (a) O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , (b) i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 to b e t r a y , (c) number of exposures to e i t h e r a t r u s t w o r t h y or an untrustworthy 0. In the second stage, the e f f e c t s of the. stage I m a n i p u l a t i o n s upon two measures of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were determined. These measures were (i) c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n a o n e - t r i a l , s e q u e n t i a l c h o i c e PDG i n which the s u b j e c t s chose f i r s t ; ( i i ) the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t 0 would be t r u s t -worthy or untrustworthy, g i v e n t h a t t r u s t had a l r e a d y been extended to 0. F i n a l l y , i n the t h i r d s tage, the e f f e c t s o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ( r e s u l t i n g from the stage I manipu-l a t i o n s ) upon a b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s task were determined. < .. To f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s i t i o n between the stages and to m a i n t a i n the i n t e r e s t of the s u b j e c t s , task i n s t r u c t i o n s were i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h the tasks themselves and o t h e r t a s k - r e l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s . The exact c h r o n o l o g i c a l order of events as they o c c u r r e d i n the experiment was as f o l l o w s : (1) i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r stage I on v i d e o t a p e , (2) PDG i n s t r u c t i o n s for. stage I I , (3) draw f o r numbers, (4) stage I t a s k , • • . •. ( 5 ) draw f o r c o l o r s , (6) stage I I t a s k : PDG, 80 (7) i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y task of stage I I / (8) stage I I t a s k : s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y , (9) c o f f e e break, (10) i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r stage I I I , (11) stage I I I t a s k : b a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n s , and (12) e v a l u a t i o n of 0 on semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l . A t the c o n c l u s i o n of the experiment, a complete explana-t i o n of the experiment i t s e l f and of the deceptions employed was r e v e a l e d to the s u b j e c t s . A s t r o n g p l e a was made by the experimenter a s k i n g the s u b j e c t s not to d i v u l g e i n f o r m a t i o n about the experiment to any of t h e i r a c q u aintances. I n f o r m a l q u e r i e s as long as two months a f t e r the experiment had been completed i n d i c a t e d t h a t the p l e a was h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l and t h a t the i n t e g r i t y of the e x p e r i m e n t a l m a n i p u l a t i o n s was i n f a c t never endangered. 81 CHAPTER S I X : R E S U L T S . . In a l l of the analyses, .unless otherwise noted, the same b a s i c s t a t i s t i c a l procedures w i l l be adopted. There-, f o r e , to expedite p r e s e n t a t i o n , a number of conventions w i l l be observed. F i r s t , the terms " a n a l y s i s of v a r i a n c e " (ANOVA) w i l l be used i n s t e a d of a more complete d e s c r i p t i o n , of the b a s i c a n a l y s i s a c t u a l l y employed. l"n most of the cases, t h i s w i l l c o n s i s t of a completely-crossed 2 x 2 x 3 . ANOVA ( f i x e d . e f f e c t s model). Secondly, the usual t a b l e s summarizing these ANOVAs V 7 i l l not be presented i n the t e x t ' of t h i s chapter, but w i l l insteeid be i n c l u d e d i n Appendix F . T h i r d l y , a number of s t a t i s t i c a l measures to remove extrane-ous sources of v a r i a t i o n w i l l be d e s c r i b e d . However, repeated reference to these steps w i l l not be made, even though the v a r i a t i o n due to.these sources w i l l be auto-m a t i c a l l y removed i n as many of the analyses as p o s s i b l e . F i n a l l y , i n many i n s t a n c e s , comparisons between the c o n t r o l group and one or more of. the c e l l s from the f a c t o r i a l design w i l l be made according to a method suggested by Winer (1962, p. 264) . These comparisons' w i l l u s u a l l y be made where a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e or i n t e r a c t i o n i s obtained. However, an e x p l a n a t i o n of the procedures i n v o l v e d w i l l not be presented each time a comparison i s made. In the a n a l y s i s of the data r e l e v a n t to the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n (i.e.,- the data obtained during the measurement 82 s t a g e ) , a l l of the c o n t r o l v s . treatment group comparisons w i l l i n v o l v e o n e - t a i l e d t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e . In the a n a l y s i s of the b a r g a i n i n g data, however, the c o n t r o l v s . treatment group comparisons w i l l i n v o l v e t w o - t a i l e d t e s t s s i n c e d i r e c t i o n a l hypotheses have not been made w i t h r e s p e c t to the c o n t r o l group. A. The Development of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n as a F u n c t i o n o f  Pre v i o u s E x p e r i e n c e : Although analyses were conducted on both the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y and the PDG response measures of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , the p r i n c i p a l t e s t s o f the hypotheses were made on the b a s i s of the analyses of the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure; these were supplemented by the analyses of the PDG response measure. The s e l e c t i o n of the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure f o r major emphasis was governed by two reasons: f i r s t , the s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e , which has d i r e c t consequences f o r the m a n i f e s t b e h a v i o r , i s more s e n s i t i v e to v a r i a t i o n s i n the independent v a r i a b l e s ; secondly, the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure i s amenable t o more powerful p a r a m e t r i c a n a l y s e s whereas the PDG response measure i s not. A c c o r d i n g l y , i n the ensuing p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the r e s u l t s , r e f e r e n c e s t o the hypotheses and the r e l a t i o n o f the r e s u l t s to the hypotheses w i l l p e r t a i n p r i m a r i l y to the s u b j e c t i v e prob-a b i l i t y measure. 83 To r e i t e r a t e , the three f a c t o r s manipulated i n the f i r s t stage were: (A) O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , (B) p r e v i o u s i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 to b e t r a y , and (C) number of exposures. I t was h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t : 1. P i s more l i k e l y to t r u s t 0 where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y . On the other hand, P w i l l not t r u s t 0, i . e . w i l l be s u s p i c i o u s of 0, where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y u ntrustworthy. 2. S u s p i c i o n i s more e a s i l y e s t a b l i s h e d than t r u s t . 3. The development of t r u s t i s i n f l u e n c e d by the magnitude of the i n c e n t i v e (to betray) under which 0 was n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u s t -worthy. A l s o , the development of s u s p i -c i o n i s i n f l u e n c e d by the magnitude of i n c e n t i v e under which 0 was u n t r u s t -worthy . A c c o r d i n g t o the f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s , a main e f f e c t d i f -f e r e n c e would be p r e d i c t e d f o r F a c t o r A such t h a t a t r u s t -worthy 0 would engender s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t whereas an u n t r u s t -worthy 0 would engender s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n . Subjects i n d i c a t e d the e x t e n t of t h e i r s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n by making a mark across a 30 cm. l i n e t h a t was v e r b a l l y anchored a t the mid-point and a t both of the extremes. (See F i g u r e 9, p. 69). S u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were d e f i n e d i n terms of measured d e v i a t i o n s ( i n centimeters) from the mid-point of the l i n e . For the purposes of a n a l y s i s , the mid-point, r e p r e s e n t i n g complete u n c e r t a i n t y , had a v a l u e of zero. D e v i a t i o n s i n the d i r e c t i o n of extreme t r u s t 84 were r e c o r d e d as p o s i t i v e v a l u e s w h i l e d e v i a t i o n s i n the d i r e c t i o n of extreme s u s p i c i o n were reco r d e d as n e g a t i v e v a l u e s . Thus, the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y s c a l e ranged from complete t r u s t (+15.0 cm.) through complete uncer-t a i n t y (0 cm.) to complete s u s p i c i o n (- 15.0 cm.). Hypothesis Two r e q u i r e s a comparison between the c o n t r o l group and each of the s i x c e l l s c o n s t i t u t i n g the i n t e r a c t i o n between O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and the number of exposures. Here, t r u s t i s d e f i n e d as b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d when the d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n t r o l group and a p a r t i c u l a r t r u s t group (at one of the thr e e l e v e l s of exposure) i s s i g n i f i c a n t , and the mean of the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure f o r the t r u s t group i s a p o s i t i v e number. An a l o g o u s l y , s u s p i c i o n i s d e f i n e d as b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d when the d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n t r o l group and a p a r t i c u l a r s u s p i c i o n group i s s i g n i f i c a n t and the mean of the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure f o r the s u s p i c i o n group i s n e g a t i v e . On the b a s i s of the second h y p o t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s p r e d i c t e d t h a t compared to the e s t a b l i s h -ment of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d a t a s m a l l e r l e v e l o f C (number of exposures). That i s , the e s t a b l i s h -ment o f s u s p i c i o n w i l l r e q u i r e fewer exposures than w i l l the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f t r u s t . A c c o r d i n g to the t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s , t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d by the magnitude of the i n c e n t i v e under 8 5 which 0 was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y or untrustworthy. However, a d i r e c t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n w i l l not be advanced. On the b a s i s of p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s , e.g., those of Komorita and Mechling (196 7) , i t c o u l d be p r e d i c t e d t h a t the g r e a t e r the i n c e n t i v e when 0 was untrustworthy, the g r e a t e r the s u s p i c i o n . However, a more i n t u i t i v e l y s a t i s f y i n g p r e d i c -t i o n (as proposed e a r l i e r ) i s t h a t P w i l l be more s u s p i c i o u s where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y untrustworthy and the i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y was low. Furthermore, P w i l l be more l i k e l y t o t r u s t 0 where 0 was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y even though the i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y was h i g h ; however, P w i l l be much l e s s c e r t a i n about t r u s t i n g 0 where 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y , but the i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y was low. Because the measures may have been a f f e c t e d i n some unique way from s e s s i o n to s e s s i o n , e.g., the p a r t i c u l a r circumstances under which a group was run or the p a r t i c u l a r composition of a c e r t a i n group, the v a r i a t i o n due to " s e s s i o n s " was removed from the treatment v a r i a t i o n . With r e g a r d to O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . (Factor A), the mean of the group t h a t was exposed t o the t r u s t w o r t h y 0 was (on the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n ) 6.13, whereas the mean o f the group exposed to the untrustworthy 0 was -9.43. These means were found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from each other i n the ANOVA (p <.0001); furthermore, i n the i n d i v i d u a l comparisons of 86 the c o n t r o l group w i t h the treatment groups, the c o n t r o l group mean of 0.16 was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the means of both the t r u s t group (p <.01) and the s u s p i c i o n group (p <.0001). S i m i l a r r e s u l t s were ob t a i n e d i n the a n a l y s i s of the PDG response measure. In the t r u s t group, 40 out of 48 s u b j e c t s m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t toward 0 w h i l e o n l y 13 out of 48 s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group manifested t r u s t i n the PDG. In the c o n t r o l group, 10 out of 16 s u b j e c t s m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t toward 0 i n the PDG. Tes t s of the d i f f e r e n c e s between these p r o p o r t i o n s i n d i c a t e d t h a t the t r u s t group was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the s u s p i c i o n group (z = 9.5, p <.0001) and t h a t the c o n t r o l group was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from both the t r u s t group (z = 2.7, p <.01) and the s u s p i c i o n group (z = 6.8, p <.0001) . In T a b l e 3, the column t o t a l s r e p r e s e n t the degrees of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n e l i c i t e d by the hig h and the low l e v e l s of i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y ( F a c t o r B ) . The d i f -f e r e n c e between these means approached s i g n i f i c a n c e (p =.06) su g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e r e was a tendency f o r the h i g h i n c e n t i v e to engender g r e a t e r t r u s t than the low i n c e n t i v e . However, an examination of the f o u r A x B means (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s by i n c e n t i v e to betray) i n Table 3 i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h i s tend-ency was a t t r i b u t a b l e p r i m a r i l y t o the groups where 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y . That i s , s u b j e c t s d i s p l a y e d s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t 87 Table 3. Degrees of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , or u n c e r t a i n t y generated under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . I n c e n t i v e High Low Trustworthy 0 8 .0 4 .3 Untrustworthy 0 -8 .4 -10 .4 Column T o t a l s -0 .4 - 6 .1 (In the above t a b l e , +15 r e p r e s e n t s complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t O w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y ; whereas -15 r e p r e s e n t s complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be untrustworthy; 0 (zero) r e p r e s e n t s complete u n c e r t a i n t y . ) 88 where O had p r e v i o u s l y been t r u s t w o r t h y even though th e r e had been a h i g h i n c e n t i v e f o r 0 t o b e t r a y ; however, they were l e s s c e r t a i n , though s t i l l somewhat t r u s t i n g , where 0 had been p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y , but the i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y had been low. On.the other hand, i t was i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t i n c e n t i v e had l i t t l e e f f e c t upon the degree of s u s p i c i o n t h a t was generated through b e t r a y a l by 0. The i n t e r a c t i o n between O ' s . t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and the number of exposures (A x C) was a l s o s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.02) . However, i n r e l a t i o n to h y p o t h e s i s Two, the importance of the means of the A x G i n t e r a c t i o n l a y i n the comparisons of the means w i t h the c o n t r o l group. In F i g u r e 11, the treatment means t h a t were s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the c o n t r o l group are r e p r e s e n t e d by a s t e r i s k s , w i t h the number of a s t e r i s k s i n d i c a t i n g the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the d i f f e r e n c e . I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t s u s p i c i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h o n l y one exposure to b e t r a y a l whereas t r u s t was not e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l the s u b j e c t s had e x p e r i e n c e d f i v e exposures to the t r u s t w o r t h y 0. Evidence from the PDG response measure p e r t a i n i n g to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n was not as c l e a r -c u t as from the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y measure. Table 4 p r e s e n t s the f r e q u e n c i e s of the s u b j e c t s who chose to t r u s t 0 i n the PDG. I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t n e i t h e r t r u s t nor s u s p i c i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d u n t i l the f i v e exposure l e v e l of C 89 T r u s t +15 10 S u b j e c t i v e T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n -5 -10 Trustworthy 0 * p<.05 *# p<.005 *** p<.001 Untrus tworthy S u s p i c i o n -15 8 ^ ° ^ 0 1 (Control) Number of Exposures F i g u r e 11. S u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n of the number of exposures t o a trustworthy or an untrustworthy 0. 90 Table 4. Frequencies of s u b j e c t s who chose to t r u s t O i n the PDG. Number of Exposures c o n t r o l 1 3 5 Trustworthy 0 10 13 12 15 Untrustworthy 0 6 6 1 (number of ex p o s u r e s ) . At the one exposure l e v e l of C, the d i f f e r e n c e i n f r e q u e n c i e s between the c o n t r o l group and the t r u s t groups was 3, whereas the d i f f e r e n c e between the c o n t r o l group and the s u s p i c i o n group was o n l y 4; moreover, a t the th r e e exposure l e v e l of C, n e i t h e r m a n i f e s t t r u s t nor m a n i f e s t s u s p i c i o n developed any further.^" In a d d i t i o n to the f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s e s , two other aspects of the data were examined.. F i r s t , whether or not th e r e was a r e l a t i o n s h i p between (a) the dichotomous c h o i c e PDG measure, and (b) the continuous measure of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n , was determined by means of a p o i n t -b i s e r i a l c o r r e l a t i o n . I n c l u d i n g the c o n t r o l group, the rp\-, f o r the e n t i r e sample of 112 s u b j e c t s was .88 (p. <.001), i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the two measures were h i g h l y r e l a t e d . That i s , s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d 0 i n the PDG a l s o tended t o ^"Because the dependent measure was dichotomous, i t was d i f f i -c u l t t o apply an a p p r o p r i a t e s t a t i s t i c a l technique t h a t would permit i n f e r e n c e s about the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f m a n i f e s t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . 91 i n d i c a t e s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t , whereas, s u b j e c t s who d i d not t r u s t 0 i n the PDG i n d i c a t e d s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n . R e l a t e d to t h i s f i n d i n g was a second a s p e c t of the d a t a . T h i s concerned the q u e s t i o n of the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two measures. F i g u r e 12 d e p i c t s two frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s over the range of the s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n s c a l e : one d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the 63 (out of 112) s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d 0 i n the PDG and one f o r the o t h e r 49 s u b j e c t s who d i d not m a n i f e s t t h i s t r u s t toward 0. I t i s e v i d e n t from F i g u r e 12 t h a t these two d i s t r i b u t i o n s are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from each ot h e r i n a number of r e s p e c t s For purposes of comparison, the d i s t r i b u t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d i n terms of c e r t a i n t y and u n c e r t a i n t y , i . e . , i n terms of a b s o l u t e d e v i a t i o n s from the mid-point of the s c a l e . T h i s can perhaps be b e t t e r c o n c e p t u a l i z e d by imagining t h a t the s c a l e r e p r e s e n t e d i n F i g u r e 12 i s f o l d e d over a t i t s mid-point, y i e l d i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n s ^ shown i n F i g u r e 13. To t e s t the d i f f e r e n c e between the two d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t to c e n t r a l tendency, the Mann-Whitney U ^"Six s u b j e c t s m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t i n 0 even though -they f e l t t h a t he was to some ex t e n t untrustworthy. However, t h e i r s c o r e s were not a c t u a l l y f o l d e d over. I n s t e a d , t h e i r s c ores were c l a s s i f i e d i n the "completely u n c e r t a i n " category s i n c e we.were i n t e r e s t e d i n the group of s u b j e c t s who e i t h e r (i) chose to' t r u s t 0 even i n the f a c e of un-c e r t a i n t y about O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , or ( i i ) chose to t r u s t 0 even though they expected 0 to be untrustworthy. Frequency 35 30 25 20 15 10 Subjec t s who t r u s t 0 (x= +6.94, SD= 6.17) M^m Subjects who do not t r u s t 0 (x= -12.11, SD= 3.66) C e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be u n t r u s t -worthy U n c e r t a i n t y + C e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t -worthy Sc a l e of S u b j e c t i v e P r o b a b i l i t y « 3 (V) F i g u r e 12. Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d o r d i d not t r u s t 0. 35 Frequency 30 1-25 20 1 5 10 Subjec t s who t r u s t 0 " (x= +6 .94, SD= 6.17) 3 S u b j e c t s who do not t r u s t O (x= -12.11, SD= 3.66) #These are the s i x persons who mani-f e s t e d t r u s t toward O even though they f e l t t h a t he was to some ex t e n t u n t r u s t -worthy . U n c e r t a i n t y C e r t a i n t y t h a t O w i l l be t r u s t -worthy or u n t r u s t -worthy S c a l e of U n c e r t a i n t y F i g u r e 13. Comparison of frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s u b j e c t s who t r u s t e d o r d i d not t r u s t 0. 9 4 s t a t i s t i c was c a l c u l a t e d . The r e s u l t i n g z v a l u e of 5.14 was h i g h l y s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.0001). I n s p e c t i o n o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n s i n d i c a t e s t h a t most of the s u b j e c t s who d i d not t r u s t 0 i n the PDG were q u i t e c e r t a i n t h a t he (0) would be untrustworthy. However, s u b j e c t s who d i d t r u s t 0 i n the PDG o f t e n d i d so i n the face of u n c e r t a i n t y about O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . In f a c t , i n the 6 cases mentioned p r e v i o u s l y (see Footnote 1, page 91), the s u b j e c t s t r u s t e d 0 even though they were to some ex t e n t c e r t a i n t h a t 0 would be untrustworthy. These f i n d i n g s seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t f o r t h i s group of s u b j e c t s a t l e a s t , t h e r e i s an approximate p o i n t (somewhere i n the r e g i o n between -6 to -11.9 on the s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y s c a l e ) a t which s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n i s l i k e l y to become m a n i f e s t as an a c t of s u s p i c i o n (see F i g u r e 12). However, such a p o i n t does not seem to be as e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e f o r those who chose t o t r u s t 0 i n the PDG s i n c e t h e r e does not seem to be any simple and r e g u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the frequency of s u b j e c t s who d i d t r u s t 0 i n the PDG and s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t as i t i n c r e a s e s toward c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y . B. E f f e c t s o f T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon the Outcomes of  B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n s : Nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t : e q u a l i t y vs e q u i t y : For the purposes of a n a l y s i s , numbers (1 to 24) were as s i g n e d 95 t o the ordered s e t of p o s s i b l e outcomes. E q u i t y , where each r e c e i v e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y the same r e l a t i v e to the maximum p a y o f f p o s s i b l e on h i s own s c a l e , was l o c a t e d a t 12. E q u a l i t y , where the p a y o f f s were a b s o l u t e l y e q u a l , was l o c a t e d a t 18. In the e i g h t cases i n which the b a r g a i n e r s f a i l e d to reach an agreement b e f o r e the 30 minute d e a d l i n e , the mid-point of the i n t e r v a l between the minimum d i s p o s i t i o n s of the b a r g a i n e r s a t the 30 minute mark was taken to be the s o l u t i o n . In the ANOVA of the numbers (corresponding t o the s o l u t i o n s ) from the 4 8 b a r g a i n i n g dyads, on l y the i n t e r a c t i o n between O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and number of exposures (A x C) was s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.04) . However, as i s e v i d e n t from Table 5, the nature of t h i s T a b l e 5. Nature o f the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t as a f u n c t i o n of O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and the number of exposures. Number of Exposures c o n t r o l 1 3 5 16.25 17.00 15.00 14.25 Trustworthy 0 15.00 15 .38 17 .00 Untrustworthy 0 (e q u i t y = 12.00; e q u a l i t y = 18.00) i n t e r a c t i o n was extremely complex. With o n l y one exposure to the t r u s t w o r t h y 0, se t t l e m e n t s were made c l o s e to e q u a l i t y . With the i n c r e a s e d number of exposures to the 96 t r u s t w o r t h y 0 ( i . e . , w i t h i n c r e a s i n g t r u s t ) , the s e t t l e -ments became more e q u i t a b l e . On the oth e r hand, the • s u s p i c i o n group a t the l e v e l o f one exposure t o the u n t r u s t -worthy 0 made se t t l e m e n t s t h a t tended toward e q u i t y ; and with i n c r e a s e d exposures to the untrustworthy 0 ( i . e . , w i t h i n c r e a s i n g s u s p i c i o n ) , the s o l u t i o n s approached e q u a l i t y . The complexity o f t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n was even more p r o -nounced when the c o n t r o l group was taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . While the mean of the c o n t r o l group (which f e l l between the two c^ means) was not i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from any o f the s i x A x C means, the c o n t r o l group " e f f e c t " appeared t o be s i m i l a r to the e f f e c t s of both one exposure t o a tr u s t w o r t h y 0 and f i v e exposures to an untrustworthy 0. (In a d d i t i o n , t h r e e exposures t o a tr u s t w o r t h y 0 appeared to have the same e f f e c t as one exposiire t o an untrustworthy 0.) I t was t h e r e f o r e extremely d i f f i c u l t to o f f e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f these p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t s . Time to s o l u t i o n : Times ranged from 4 minutes to 30 minutes, the l a t t e r b e i n g the time a s s i g n e d when the s u b j e c t s f a i l e d t o reach agreement. Of the e i g h t dyads t h a t d i d not reach a s e t t l e m e n t , s i x were i n the s u s p i c i o n c o n d i t i o n , one was i n the t r u s t c o n d i t i o n , and one was i n the c o n t r o l group. T h i s was r e f l e c t e d i n the ANOVA. Here, as h y p o t h e s i z e d , the s u s p i c i o n group, w i t h a mean time of 97 19.5 minutes, r e q u i r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y more time to a r r i v e a t a s o l u t i o n than d i d the t r u s t group, which had a mean time of 14.3 minutes (p <.03). Because the i n c l u s i o n of the c o n t r o l group data i n c r e a s e d the e r r o r v a r i a n c e , the mean of the c o n t r o l group, 20.1 minutes, d i d not d i f f e r s i g n i f i c a n t l y from e i t h e r the t r u s t or the s u s p i c i o n group mean. C. E f f e c t s of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon the Process 1 of  B a r g a i n i n g and N e g o t i a t i o n s : E x t r e m i t y of the i n i t i a l o f f e r : Two types of e x t r e m i t y were a n a l y z e d . A bsolute e x t r e m i t y was taken to be the number of a l t e r n a t i v e s between the a l t e r n a t i v e proposed i n the i n i t i a l o f f e r and the most extreme a l t e r n a t i v e a t the "low" end of one's own p a y o f f s c a l e , i . e . , where one's, lowest p a y o f f was l o c a t e d . . One p o s s i b l e source of v a r i a b i l i t y i n the i n i t i a l o f f e r s was i n the s c a l e s themselves, e.g., the range or the magnitude of the p a y o f f s comprising the s c a l e s . V . T h u s , the v a r i a t i o n due to s c a l e s was removed i n a d d i t i o n to removing the v a r i a t i o n due to s e s s i o n s . Because the i n i t i a l o f f e r s were made si m u l t a n e o u s l y and i n d e p e n d e n t l y , i t was ^"In the. b a r g a i n i n g problem employed, one s i d e r e c e i v e d a s c a l e of p a y o f f s t h a t ranged from -7C to $3.36 w h i l e the o t h e r s i d e r e c e i v e d a s c a l e t h a t ranged on l y from -4C to 87$. 98 p o s s i b l e t o analyze the e x t r e m i t y scores f o r a l l of the 96 s u b j e c t s i n the ANOVA. The mean of the a b s o l u t e e x t r e m i t y scores of the i n i t i a l o f f e r s from the t r u s t group, 16.5, was found t o be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the s u s p i c i o n group mean of 18.4 (p <.01) . (More extreme o f f e r s had h i g h e r scores.) The c o n t r o l group mean (17.6) was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r the t r u s t or the s u s p i c i o n group mean. I t was p o s s i b l e t h a t a s u b j e c t ' s o f f e r would not n e c e s s a r i l y be a b s o l u t e l y extreme, but extreme r e l a t i v e to h i s own a c t u a l i n i t i a l range, i . e . , the range between h i s i n i t i a l minimum and h i s i n i t i a l maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s . In such a case, an o f f e r a t the a l t e r n a t i v e where one hoped t o get the most (maximum d i s p o s i t i o n ) would c o n s t i t u t e an extreme o f f e r . T h e r e f o r e , r e l a t i v e e x t r e m i t y was d e f i n e d as the number of a l t e r n a t i v e s between the i n i t i a l o f f e r and the mid-point of a s u b j e c t ' s a c t u a l i n i t i a l range. As i n the p r e v i o u s a n a l y s i s , i t was found t h a t the mean of the t r u s t group, 3.6, was s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the s u s p i c i o n group mean of 5.2 (p <.03) . The c o n t r o l group group mean of 3.8 was not, however, s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r the t r u s t or the s u s p i c i o n group mean. Con-c e i v a b l y , the d i f f e r e n c e between the t r u s t and the s u s p i c i o n group might have been a t t r i b u t a b l e merely t o e x i s t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s between the mid-points of the a c t u a l 99 i n i t i a l ranges of the s u b j e c t s . However, an ANOVA of the mid-points e l i m i n a t e d t h i s as a p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n . A c t u a l i n i t i a l range: T h i s was d e f i n e d as the number of a l t e r n a t i v e s between the a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n and the a c t u a l maximum d i s p o s i t i o n . These d i s p o s i t i o n s were i n d i c a t e d on the statement t h a t accompanied the i n i t i a l o f f e r . In the ANOVA of the range s c o r e s , o n l y the main e f f e c t f o r the exposures f a c t o r ( F a c t o r C) was s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.05). The means of the a c t u a l i n i t i a l ranges of the c o n t r o l group and of each exposure l e v e l were: c o n t r o l , 7.8; one exposure, 10.9; three exposures, 5.6; and f i v e exposures, 8.1. The i m p l i c a t i o n of t h i s r e s u l t was, how-ever, d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n . Communication: I t was p r e v i o u s l y h y p o t h e s i z e d t h a t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n would a f f e c t (a) the amount of communi-c a t i o n , and (b) the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of communication. With r e g a r d to the amount of communication, the.measure used was the t o t a l number of messages sent per minute w i t h i n a dyad.^" In the ANOVA of t h i s measure however, n e i t h e r main e f f e c t d i f f e r e n c e s nor i n t e r a c t i o n s were found. ^"The t o t a l number of messages alone c o u l d not be used as a measure s i n c e the amount of communication would be con-founded w i t h the time r e q u i r e d to reach an agreement. Furthermore, because the messages sent by one b a r g a i n e r were not independent o f the messages sent by the oth e r b a r g a i n e r , the t o t a l s f o r the dyad had to be used. Hence the measures were the t o t a l s f o r the dyad d i v i d e d by the time taken by the dyad to reach a s e t t l e m e n t . l 100 Concerning the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of communication, each message was c l a s s i f i e d i n t o one of f o u r c a t e g o r i e s : (1) i n f o r m a t i o n messages — geared s t r i c t l y toward the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n ; (2) m o d i f i c a t i o n messages — which i n c l u d e d t h r e a t s , ultimatums, and s t r i k e s ; (3) l i e s -'- d e f i n e d by any d i s c r e p a n c y between what was communicated to the o t h e r b a r g a i n e r and what was i n f a c t the case, e.g., w i t h r e s p e c t to p a y o f f s or minimum d i s p o s i t i o n s ; and (4) time-bonus messages — concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h e i t h e r a v o i d i n g a p e n a l t y or o b t a i n i n g a bonus. The b a s i c measure employed was the t o t a l ( f o r the dyad) of the number of messages i n each c a t e g o r y . However, two v a r i a t i o n s of t h i s measure were an a l y z e d i n the ANOVA. On one hand, each category t o t a l was d i v i d e d by the time r e q u i r e d by the group to reach agreement. On the o t h e r hand, each category t o t a l was taken as a p r o p o r t i o n of the t o t a l number of messages sent d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g , i . e . , each category t o t a l was d i v i d e d by the t o t a l number of messages sent d u r i n g bargaining."'' Table 6 summarizes the e f f e c t s , the a s s o c i a t e d s i g n i f i -cance l e v e l s , and the d i r e c t i o n s of the e f f e c t s o b t a i n e d f o r both v a r i a t i o n s of the measures. (No i n t e r a c t i o n s were * I t i s acknowledged t h a t the analyses of the messages may not be completely independent. However, s i n c e the two v a r i a t i o n s convey a d i f f e r e n t meaning, the analyses were n e v e r t h e l e s s conducted. Table 6. Summary of analyses of communications. Rate: Category Time T o t a l C a te go ry To ta1 P r o p o r t i o n : T o t a l Main E f f e c t s P Main E f f e c t s p D i r e c t i o n I n f o r m a t i o n A <.03 A • .01 T > S* M o d i f i c a t i o n A .09 A < .02 S > T L i e s A .07 S > T Time-Bonus B .04 B <.04 Hi > Lo *T = T r u s t S = S u s p i c i o n Hi = High Lo = Low 102 found to be s i g n i f i c a n t i n any of these analyses.) I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t the e f f e c t s are c o n s i s t e n t r e g a r d l e s s of which v a r i a t i o n i s employed. Groups i n which s u s p i c i o n was engendered tended to send (1) fewer i n f o r m a t i o n messages, (2) more m o d i f i c a t i o n messages, and (3) more l i e s . In a d d i t i o n , s u b j e c t s who were p r e v i o u s l y i n the h i g h i n c e n t i v e groups seemed to be more concerned about p a y o f f s i n s o f a r as they sent more time-bonus messages. Comparisons were a l s o made between c o n t r o l group means and the c o r r e -sponding means of l e v e l s t h a t were found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y or almost s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . A l l of these means are pre s e n t e d i n Table 7; the cases i n which the c o n t r o l group d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y from the treatment are i n d i c a t e d by a l i n e between the means. Checks: In a d d i t i o n to the messages t h a t were sent d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g , s u b j e c t s were a b l e to submit "checks". These enabled the s u b j e c t s to determine e x a c t l y the p a y o f f t h a t the o t h e r person would r e c e i v e a t a p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e . An ANOVA of the number of checks i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e was a tendency f o r the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group to make fewer checks than the s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group (p <.07). The d i f f e r e n c e between the mean of the c o n t r o l group (1.86) and the mean of e i t h e r the t r u s t group (0.92) or the s u s p i c i o n group (1.86) d i d not approach c o n v e n t i o n a l l e v e l s of s i g n i f i c a n c e . T a b l e 7. C o n t r o l and treatment means cor r e s p o n d i n g to s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t s found i n the analyses of the communications. Category T o t a l Category T o t a l Rate: Time P r o p o r t i o n : T o t a l C o n t r o l Treatment C o n t r o l Treatment In f o r m a t i o n T r u s t 1.16 T r u s t 0.73 0 .85 0.77 ^ ^ ^ S u s p i c i o n 0.85 "^""""^  S u s p i c i o n 0.59 ', " M o d i f i c a t i o n T r u s t 0.0 8 0.07 S u s p i c i o n 0.13 T r u s t 0.05 0.06 S u s p i c i o n 0.10 L i e s T r u s t 0.18 0 . 0 7 ^ ^ ^ ^ S u s p i c i o n 0.26 Time Bonus High 0.0 9 0 . 1 0 ^ ^ ^ Low 0.04 High 0.06 0 . 1 0 ^ ^ Low 0.03 O U) 104 Changes i n the b a r g a i n i n g range: One other aspect of the b a r g a i n i n g data was the e x t e n t to which a s u b j e c t ' s minimum d i s p o s i t i o n might change between the i n i t i a l o f f e r and the f i n a l agreement. In t h i s case, the measure was the d i f f e r e n c e between the i n i t i a l b a r g a i n i n g range, i . e . , the o v e r l a p between a c t u a l i n i t i a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n s , and the f i n a l b a r g a i n i n g range. The f i n a l range was d e f i n e d as the range j u s t b e f o r e s e t t l e m e n t s i n c e many s u b j e c t s gave, i n e f f e c t , no range a t the c o n c l u s i o n of b a r g a i n i n g . For example, a s u b j e c t would make a " f i n a l o f f e r " t o s e t t l e a t "Q" and i n d i c a t e t h a t both h i s minimum and h i s maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s were a l s o a t "Q". An ANOVA of the measure of change i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e r e were no d i f f e r e n c e s or i n t e r a c t i o n s due to any of the t h r e e treatment f a c t o r s . I n t e r p e r s o n a l e v a l u a t i o n : the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l : In the ANOVA of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l s c o r e s , two e f f e c t s were s i g n i f i c a n t . F i r s t , t here was a main e f f e c t wherein the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group e v a l u a t e d 0 more f a v o r a b l y than d i d the s u b j e c t s i n both the s u s p i c i o n group (p <.0001) and the c o n t r o l group (p <.05) . (See Table '8(a)'.)" Secondly, t h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r a c t i o n (p <.02) between O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s and i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y (A x B); the means comprising t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n are p r e s e n t e d i n Table 8 ( b ) . 105 Table 8(a) Means of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l e v a l u a t i o n s made by the c o n t r o l and treatment groups. (A completely n e u t r a l e v a l u a t i o n = 28.00.) GROUPS MEANS CONTROL 32.8 TRUST 35.1 SUSPICION 27.9 8 ( b ) . Means comprising the s i g n i f i c a n t A x B i n t e r a c t i o n . T r u s t S u s p i c i o n I n c e n t i v e High Low 32.6 29 .3 37.6 26.4 I t i s e v i d e n t from Table 8(a) t h a t the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group g e n e r a l l y e v a l u a t e d 0 q u i t e p o s i t i v e l y ; however, r e l a t i v e t o the c o n t r o l group, t h i s e f f e c t appears to be p r i m a r i l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the low i n c e n t i v e group (Table 8 ( b ) ) . D. Summary: P r i m a r i l y by means of a 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA w i t h one c o n t r o l group, hypotheses about the development and the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were examined. To summarize the r e s u l t s of the a n a l y s e s , Table 9 i s presented, i n d i c a t i n g ( i ) the dependent v a r i a b l e a n a l y z e d , ( i i ) the s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s T a b l e 9. Summary of r e s u l t s from the p r i n c i p a l a n a l y s e s . (See Appendix F f o r d e t a i l e d ANOVA t a b l e s ) . Dependent V a r i a b l e (Method S i g n i f i c a n t of a n a l y s i s : ANOVA except F a c t o r or where i n d i c a t e d ) S t a t i s t i c p? l . ( a ) s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t A .0001 and s u s p i c i o n B .07 (comparisons w i t h A x C .02 the c o n t r o l group) (b) s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y r D b = * 8 8 .001 and c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n PDG ( p o i n t - b i s e r i a l ) (c) s u b j e c t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y z= 5.14 .0001 and c h o i c e b e h a v i o r i n PDG (Mann-Whitney) D e s c r i p t i o n or I n t e r p r e t a t i o n - a p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y 0 engendered t r u s t ; a p r e v i o u s l y untrustworthy 0 engendered s u s p i c i o n . - g r e a t e r t r u s t where i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y was h i g h , e s p e c i a l l y where 0 was t r u s t w o r t h y . - s u s p i c i o n i s e s t a b l i s h e d more r e a d i l y than t r u s t . - a person's tendency to m a n i f e s t t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n was h i g h l y r e l a t e d t o the r e p o r t e d sub-j e c t i v e s t a t e . - those who d i d not t r u s t 0 i n the PDG were c e r t a i n t h a t he would be untrustworthy. How-ever, those who d i d t r u s t O were u n c e r t a i n t h a t he would be t r u s t w o r t h y . Table 9 c o n t i n u e d . Dependent V a r i a b l e (Method S i g n i f i c a n t of a n a l y s i s : ANOVA except F a c t o r or _ where i n d i c a t e d ) S t a t i s t i c P<" 2.(a) l o c a t i o n o f the A x C .04 set t l e m e n t (b) time t o agreement A .03 3.(a) (i) a b s o l u t e e x t r e m i t y A .01 ( i i ) r e l a t i v e e x t r e m i t y A .03 (b) a c t u a l i n i t i a l range C .05 i (c) (i) amount of communi-c a t i o n -( i i ) nature o f communi-c a t i o n (See Table 6) (d) number of checks A .07 D e s c r i p t i o n or I n t e r p r e t a t i o n - the g r e a t e r the number of exposures to a trust w o r t h y 0, the g r e a t e r the tendency to a more e q u i t a b l e s o l u -t i o n ; the g r e a t e r the number of exposures to an u n t r u s t -worthy 0, the g r e a t e r the tendency t o e q u a l i t y . - t r u s t groups r e q u i r e d l e s s time than the s u s p i c i o n groups to reach an agreement. - i n i t i a l o f f e r s made by the s u s p i c i o n group were more extreme. - tendency f o r the s u s p i c i o n group H to check more, ° Table 9 c o n t i n u e d . Dependent V a r i a b l e (Method of a n a l y s i s : ANOVA except where i n d i c a t e d ) S i g n i f i c a n t F a c t o r o r S t a t i s t i c (e) c o n s t r i c t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g range (f) e v a l u a t i o n of 0 on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l A x B D e s c r i p t i o n or I n t e r p r e t a t i o n - t r u s t group e v a l u a t e d 0 p o s i t i v e l y whereas s u s p i c i o n group gave a n e u t r a l e v a l u a -t i o n of 0. - the most f a v o r a b l e e v a l u a t i o n s were made where 0 had been tr u s t w o r t h y d e s p i t e a low i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y . The lowest e v a l u a t i o n s were made where 0 betr a y e d P f o r a low i n c e n t i v e . 107 or i n t e r a c t i o n s t h a t were found, ( i i i ) the c o r r e s p o n d i n g l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e , and (iv) a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of the nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n or the d i r e c t i o n of the d i f f e r e n c e . 108 CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION A. F a c t o r s A f f e c t i n g the Development of T r u s t arid S u s p i c i o n : I n t e r p e r s o n a l t r u s t i s i n f l u e n c e d by a v a r i e t y of f a c t o r s . T h i s study was concerned w i t h f a c t o r s t h a t r e l a t e t o p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . In o t h e r words, t h i s study was concerned w i t h the way i n which the nature of a p r e v i o u s encounter a f f e c t s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n i n the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h r e e independent v a r i a b l e s were of i n t e r e s t : (A) O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , (B) i n c e n t i v e t o b e t r a y , and (C) number of exposures. These } v a r i a b l e s were combined i n a f a c t o r i a l d e s i g n to determine t h e i r e f f e c t s upon two measures of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . Both t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were found to be f u n c t i o n s of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . F u l f i l l e d t r u s t (where an i n d i -v i d u a l t r u s t e d another person who, i n t u r n , was t r u s t -worthy) engendered both s u b j e c t i v e and m a n i f e s t t r u s t on subsequent o c c a s i o n s . Betrayed t r u s t (where the o t h e r person was untrustworthy) gave r i s e to both s u b j e c t i v e and m a n i f e s t s u s p i c i o n on subsequent o c c a s i o n s . The i n c e n t i v e c o n d i t i o n s under which an i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e d p r e v i o u s t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s or u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s were a l s o important i n i n f l u e n c i n g the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . In t h i s experiment, g r e a t e r t r u s t was found to occur where, i n the p r e v i o u s s i t u a t i o n , the i n c e n t i v e 109 to be untrustworthy was high ; however, i t was observed t h a t t h i s e f f e c t was p r i m a r i l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to groups i n which t r u s t had been induced, i . e . , where 0 was t r u s t -worthy. In the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups where 0 was un-tr u s t w o r t h y , the e f f e c t of the p r e v i o u s i n c e n t i v e c o n d i -t i o n s was s m a l l . (As a matter of convenience, Table 10 reproduces the f o u r A x B means pre s e n t e d p r e v i o u s l y i n Table 3.) These r e s u l t s , f o r the most p a r t , are c o n s i s t e n t not o n l y w i t h the i n t u i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n advanced e a r l i e r (p. 85), but a l s o w i t h Heider's a n a l y s i s of power r e l a t i o n s t h a t i n v o l v e b e n e f i t and harm (Heider, 1958, pp. 258-263). In a s e q u e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n such as t h a t employed i n both the i n d u c t i o n and the measurement stage, i t can be s a i d t h a t the person who chooses l a s t ( during i n d u c t i o n , t h i s was s u b j e c t number 4) has power i f the person who chooses f i r s t makes a t r u s t i n g c h o i c e . That i s , the person who has extended h i s t r u s t i s v u l n e r a b l e , and the person t o whom t r u s t has been extended i s i n a p o s i t i o n of power i n s o f a r as he can b e n e f i t or harm the t r u s t i n g person by b e i n g t r u s t w o r t h y or u n t r u s t -worthy. A c c o r d i n g t o Heider, . . . the power of 0 i s an important determinant of P's g e n e r a l e v a l u a t i o n and r e a c t i o n to an a c t of harm or b e n e f i t . Not on l y w i l l P's p e r c e p t i o n of who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t be i n f l u e n c e d , but a l s o h i s understanding of the reasons m o t i -v a t i n g the a c t . n o Table 10. Degrees of t r u s t , s u s p i c i o n , or un-c e r t a i n t y generated under v a r i o u s c o n d i t i o n s of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . Trustworthy O Untrustworthy 0 Column t o t a l s I n c e n t i v e High Low 8.0 4.3 -8.4 -10.4 -0.4 -6.1 (In the above t a b l e , +15 r e p r e s e n t s complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be t r u s t w o r t h y ; whereas -15 r e p r e s e n t s complete c e r t a i n t y t h a t 0 w i l l be untrustworthy; 0 (zero) r e p r e s e n t s complete u n c e r t a i n t y . ) I l l . . . Power r e l a t i o n s a l s o p l a y a p a r t i n s t i l l deeper l e v e l s of a t t r i b u t i o n , l e v e l s t h a t answer the q u e s t i o n why 0 wanted to harm or b e n e f i t P. In t h i s way power r e l a t i o n s are an important determinant of P's acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the a c t . (Heider, 1958, pp. 259-260) . Heider's o b s e r v a t i o n s l e a d to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e f f e c t s of i n c e n t i v e s i m i l a r to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n advanced e a r l i e r . E s s e n t i a l l y , the i n t u i t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n proposed e a r l i e r supposes t h a t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n are products of an i n f e r e n t i a l - e v a l u a t i v e process and t h a t the c r i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r the process i s d e r i v e d i n p a r t from p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . I n c e n t i v e i n t h i s scheme i s impor-t a n t i n s o f a r as i t i n f l u e n c e s the degree of t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n t h a t i s generated. For example, whether a h i g h degree or a low degree of t r u s t i s e l i c i t e d by O's p r e v i o u s t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s would seem to depend upon the l e v e l of the i n c e n t i v e t h a t was f o r -gone by 0. Under a c o n d i t i o n of low i n c e n t i v e , t h e r e i s s t i l l room f o r doubt or u n c e r t a i n t y to occur d u r i n g the process i n which P makes i n f e r e n c e s about, and e v a l u a t e s , O's motives. 0 may have been t r u s t w o r t h y not because he was g e n u i n e l y so, but simply because he had l i t t l e to g a i n by b e i n g untrustworthy. In c o n t r a s t , t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s d e s p i t e a h i g h i n c e n t i v e leaves l e s s room f o r doubt, communicating a r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r degree of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , 112 e s p e c i a l l y i f O's d e c i s i o n i s p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g a s t e a d -f a s t r e f u s a l to b e t r a y . C o n c e i v a b l y , the e v a l u a t i o n of p r e v i o u s u n t r u s t -w orthiness i s a l s o d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d by the l e v e l o f i n c e n t i v e . Here, the c o n d i t i o n of low i n c e n t i v e i s l i k e l y to e l i c i t a r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r degree of s u s p i c i o n ( i . e . , l e s s t r u s t ) . T h i s happens because b e t r a y a l f o r a low i n c e n t i v e i s l i k e l y to be p e r c e i v e d as b e i n g l e s s j u s t i f i a b l e (at l e a s t on monetary grounds) than b e t r a y a l f o r a h i g h i n c e n t i v e . .Whereas the h i g h i n c e n t i v e i s i t s e l f a t a n g i b l e reason f o r O's u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s , the low i n c e n t i v e does not p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r r a t i o n a l i z i n g the p r e v i o u s b e t r a y a l . One of the more important f i n d i n g s was t h a t the way i n which s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t developed as a f u n c t i o n of p r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e was d i f f e r e n t from the way i n which s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n developed. Among the groups i n which t r u s t was induced, on l y the group t h a t was exposed f i v e times to a t r u s t w o r t h y 0 i n d i c a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t . In c o n t r a s t , a l l of the groups i n which s u s p i c i o n was induced i n d i c a t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n c r e a s e d s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n , even where th e r e was o n l y one exposure to an untrustworthy 0. I t was t h e r e f o r e apparent t h a t s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t was more d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h than s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e , however, was not 113 c l e a r l y r e f l e c t e d i n the PDG responses. That i s , f o r any one l e v e l of C, the tendency of the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups to m a n i f e s t s u s p i c i o n was not s u b s t a n t i a l l y g r e a t e r than the tendency of the t r u s t - i n d u c e d gro\ips to m a n i f e s t t r u s t . T h i s seemed to i n d i c a t e t h a t m a n i f e s t t r u s t was somewhat, but not much more, d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h than m a n i f e s t s u s p i c i o n . However, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d r e p r e s e n t an overestimate of m a n i f e s t t r u s t . Without such an o v e r e s t i m a t i o n the r e s u l t s would be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h those o b t a i n e d f o r the measures of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , i n d i c a t i n g t h a t both mani-f e s t and s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t are more d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h than m a n i f e s t and s u b j e c t i v e s u s p i c i o n . Two reasons can be presented to support t h i s i n t e r p r e -t a t i o n . The f i r s t i s based upon the f i n d i n g t h a t many s u b j e c t s d e c i d e d to t r u s t 0 i n the PDG d e s p i t e t h e i r own u n c e r t a i n t y and l a c k of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t . S i n c e t h i s out-come was i n t u i t i v e l y unexpected, the q u e s t i o n n a t u r a l l y a r i s e s as to why these s u b j e c t s would make such a c h o i c e . I t can be argued t h a t i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , members of a c o h e s i v e in-group, compared w i t h complete s t r a n g e r s , are more l i k e l y to g i v e each other "the b e n e f i t of the doubt" i n the a n t i c i p a t i o n of p o s t - e x p e r i m e n t a l i n t e r a c t i o n . In o t h e r words, in-group members ( l i k e the members of the h i g h l y s e l e c t e d f r a t e r n i t y p o p u l a t i o n from which the sample 114 was drawn) expect to encounter each o t h e r o u t s i d e the experiment. Thus, they are probably more w i l l i n g t o ac c e p t the r i s k of extending t h e i r t r u s t even i f they do not s u b j e c t i v e l y t r u s t 0, as long as 0 i s a l s o a member of the i n - g r o u p . Complete s t r a n g e r s , on the other hand, wi t h l i t t l e chance t h a t they would have to i n t e r a c t w i t h 0 out-s i d e of the experimental s i t u a t i o n , would probably be q u i t e u n w i l l i n g to undertake such a r i s k , g i v e n the same degree of u n c e r t a i n t y i n the same s i t u a t i o n . What t h i s u l t i m a t e l y i m p l i e s i s t h a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the measures of the m a n i f e s t and the s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f in-group members e x p e c t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n i s d i f f e r e n t from the r e l a t i o n s h i p f o r complete s t r a n g e r s who have l i t t l e reason t o expect e x t r a - e x p e r i m e n t a l i n t e r a c t i o n . Such:a comparison would i n f a c t be a worthwhile focus f o r f u t u r e r e s e a r c h . T h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g would be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h other p r e v i o u s f i n d i n g s . Lieberman (1964), on the b a s i s of r e s u l t s from a n e g o t i a b l e 3-person c o a l i t i o n game, con-c l u d e d t h a t t r u s t and t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s d e r i v e from s e l f -i n t e r e s t — a long term i n t e r e s t based upon the a n t i c i p a t i o n of f u t u r e i n t e r a c t i o n and d i r e c t e d towards the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the s t a b i l i t y o f the c o a l i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , Marlowe, Gergen, and Doob (1966), although not d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the problem of t r u s t , d i d f i n d t h a t g i v e n the e x p e c t a t i o n of f u t u r e s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h the oth e r person, s u b j e c t s made more c o o p e r a t i v e c h o i c e s . 115 There i s a second reason why the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d r e p r e s e n t an o v e r e s t i m a t i o n of m a n i f e s t t r u s t . For each t r i a l i n which 0 (number 4) was t r u s t w o r t h y d u r i n g stage I, the s u b j e c t s r e c e i v e d 25C. That i s , they r e c e i v e d 25C, 15$, or $1.25 depending on the number of exposures to the t r u s t w o r t h y 0. Consequently, d u r i n g measurement, the s u b j e c t s may have reasoned t h a t s i n c e they were a l r e a d y "ahead" (by 25$, 75$, or $1.25), they c o u l d a f f o r d t o take a chance even though s u b j e c t i v e l y , they may not have been very convinced of O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . Under ot h e r circum-s t a n c e s , w i t h o u t the b e n e f i t o f p r e v i o u s p a y o f f s , they may have been more r e l u c t a n t to r i s k a net l o s s of t h e i r own money. To summarize up to t h i s p o i n t , the d i s c u s s i o n has been p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the h y p o t h e s i s t h a t t r u s t i s more d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h than s u s p i c i o n . The measures of s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n f u r n i s h e d s t r o n g support f o r t h i s h y p o t h e s i s . However, the measures of m a n i f e s t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were not as c l e a r - c u t . To account f o r the l a t t e r r e s u l t , i t was argued t h a t the frequency of s u b j e c t s who m a n i f e s t e d t r u s t was i n f l a t e d , the consequence of t h i s b e i n g to decrease the d i f f e r e n c e between the frequency of s u b j e c t s who m a n i f ested t r u s t and the frequency of s u b j e c t s who m a n i f e s t e d s u s p i c i o n . Two reasons were o f f e r e d i n support of t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n . F i r s t , the f a c t t h a t the 116 s u b j e c t s were a l l members w i t h i n a w e l l - d e f i n e d group r a i s e d the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t b e i n g in-group members, they had an e x p e c t a t i o n of p o s t - e x p e r i m e n t a l i n t e r a c t i o n , and a g r e a t e r tendency to g i v e each other "the b e n e f i t of the doubt". Secondly, because o f the p a y o f f s t h a t were r e c e i v e d by the s u b j e c t s d u r i n g the i n d u c t i o n of t r u s t , i t was p o s s i b l e t h a t the degree of m a n i f e s t t r u s t o b t a i n e d was an a r t i f a c t of the methodology. Thus, the tendency of the s u b j e c t s i n t h i s experiment to m a n i f e s t t r u s t even i n the f a c e of un-c e r t a i n t y may not have been t y p i c a l , e s p e c i a l l y under oth e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . B. E f f e c t s of T r u s t and S u s p i c i o n Upon B a r g a i n i n g and  N e g o t i a t i o n s : T h i s p a r t of the study (the b a r g a i n i n g stage) was designed not o n l y to determine the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g outcomes, but a l s o to permit i n f e r e n c e s about why those outcomes o c c u r r e d . For t h i s reason, the f i n d i n g s concerning the processes of b a r g a i n -i n g were as s i g n e d l a r g e l y to the r o l e of q u a l i f y i n g the r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g the outcomes of b a r g a i n i n g . In t h i s r e s p e c t , the emphasis of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i l l l i e i n r e l a t i n g and i n t e g r a t i n g the f i n d i n g s as m e a n i n g f u l l y as p o s s i b l e r a t h e r than a c c o u n t i n g f o r each r e s u l t i n d i v i d u a l l y . Two i n d i c e s of outcome were ana l y z e d . One measure was the time r e q u i r e d to reach s e t t l e m e n t ; the other was the locus 117 or nature of the s e t t l e m e n t , e.g., i f agreements tended to be equal or more e q u i t a b l e . Of the two measures, the former i s g e n e r a l l y regarded as b e i n g l e s s important. That i s , whether the d u r a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g i s p r o t r a c t e d or a b b r e v i a t e d u s u a l l y i s not, i t s e l f , o f c e n t r a l interest"'' ( e s p e c i a l l y i f the s e t t l e m e n t i s o b j e c t i v e l y i n the b e s t long-range i n t e r e s t s of both p a r t i e s ) . Knowledge of dura-t i o n , however, can be u s e f u l i f i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e to determine why and under what c o n d i t i o n s a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d of time has been r e q u i r e d to achieve an agreement. For example, i f a b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n has been prolonged, i t would be worthwhile to determine i f the time has been oc c u p i e d by i r r e l e v a n t b i c k e r i n g or i f some c o n s t r u c t i v e ends have been accomplished. In the a n a l y s i s of the time measure, a s i g n i f i c a n t main e f f e c t was found, w i t h the t r u s t - i n d u c e d groups r e q u i r i n g l e s s time than the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups to reach an agreement. Taking the c o n t r o l group i n t o account made i t d i f f i c u l t , however, to s p e c i f y p r e c i s e l y what the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n were upon the d u r a t i o n of b a r g a i n i n g . The g r a p h i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the means of "'"Exceptions occur, of c o u r s e , i n the extreme cases. Where, b a r g a i n i n g i s , f o r example, concluded q u i c k l y , the agreement might be regarded as b e i n g o v e r l y hasty and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d ; o r , i f b a r g a i n i n g i s proceeding s l o w l y , the c o n s t i t u e n t s might become i m p a t i e n t and d i s g r u n t l e d ; o r , i f a s t r i k e i s i n e f f e c t , the delay i n p r o d u c t i o n might be extremely c o s t l y . 118 the c o n t r o l group, the t r u s t group, and the s u s p i c i o n group (see F i g u r e 14, p. 119), gave the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t r u s t had the e f f e c t of d e c r e a s i n g d u r a t i o n , whereas s u s p i c i o n had no a p p r e c i a b l e e f f e c t . However, comparisons of the c o n t r o l group mean w i t h the means of the t r u s t and the s u s p i c i o n groups d e t r a c t e d from the p l a u s i b i l i t y of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n i n s o f a r as no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s were found. Although the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon d u r a t i o n c o u l d not be u n e q u i v o c a l l y s p e c i f i e d , i t was c l e a r t h a t the t r u s t group d i d r e q u i r e l e s s time than the s u s p i c i o n group to reach a s o l u t i o n . An examination pf the more s p e c i f i c a spects of the b a r g a i n i n g process suggested a number of p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h i s d i f f e r e n c e . For example, i t was found t h a t the s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group made i n i t i a l o f f e r s t h a t were more extreme than the i n i t i a l o f f e r s made by the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group. T h e i r o f f e r s were both a b s o l u t e l y extreme and extreme r e l a t i v e t o t h e i r own a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g ranges,^ (However, t h e i r own a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g ranges were u n a f f e c t e d by t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . ) The d i s c r e p a n c y between the i n i t i a l o f f e r s was t h e r e f o r e g r e a t e r f o r the s u s p i c i o n group than f o r the t r u s t group. In e f f e c t , t h i s meant t h a t the s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group had to b a r g a i n over an i n i t i a l l y g r e a t e r "^A s u b j e c t ' s own a c t u a l b a r g a i n i n g range was d e f i n e d as the range between h i s a c t u a l minimum d i s p o s i t i o n and h i s a c t u a l maximum d i s p o s i t i o n . 119 F i g u r e 14. Graphic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the times r e q u i r e d to reach agreement. 120 range of a l t e r n a t i v e s ; and i n order to reach an agreement, they e v e n t u a l l y had to make a g r e a t e r number of c o n c e s s i o n s . Thus, the u l t i m a t e consequence was probably t h a t the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t group, r e l a t i v e to the s u s p i c i o n group, found b a r g a i n i n g e a s i e r , as was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to a r r i v e a t s e t t l e m e n t s more q u i c k l y . Analyses of the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of the communications a l s o r e f l e c t e d the d i f f e r e n c e s between the t r u s t and the s u s p i c i o n groups. P r o p o r t i o n a l l y more of the messages sent by the s u b j e c t s i n s u s p i c i o n groups were d i r e c t e d toward the m o d i f i c a t i o n of each o t h e r s ' u t i l i t i e s . Not o n l y d i d they send more l i e s , but they a l s o made more checks and sent more t h r e a t s , ultimatums, and r e f u s a l s to b a r g a i n ( s t r i k e s ) than d i d the s u b j e c t s i n the t r u s t groups. On the o t h e r hand, they (the s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n groups) sent p r o p o r t i o n a l l y fewer i n f o r m a t i o n a l messages. Along w i t h the o t h e r r e s u l t s , t h i s seems to i n d i c a t e t h a t the s u b j e c t s i n the s u s p i c i o n group were not so much seeking s o l u t i o n through the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n as attempting to o b t a i n h i g h e r p a y o f f s by means t h a t were h i g h l y c o n f l i c t f u l . T h i s l a t t e r o b s e r v a t i o n r e l a t e s , i n f a c t , t o the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s f o r the o t h e r measure of outcome —- the nature of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . Whether a dyad s e t t l e d a t e q u a l i t y or i n a more e q u i t a b l e d i r e c t i o n appeared to depend upon the degree of t r u s t or 121 s u s p i c i o n t h a t had been induced i n the f i r s t stage of the experiment. T h i s r e s u l t , r e p r e s e n t e d s t a t i s t i c a l l y as an i n t e r a c t i o n , i s d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n because of the nature of the i n t e r a c t i o n (see F i g u r e 15, p. 122). On one hand, the s e t t l e m e n t s of the t r u s t group a t the lowest l e v e l of C, the number of exposures f a c t o r , tended toward e q u a l i t y ; a t h i g h e r l e v e l s of C, i . e . , as t r u s t was presumably i n c r e a s i n g , the tendency was to s e t t l e i n a more e q u i t a b l e d i r e c t i o n . On the other hand, the s u s p i c i o n group at the lowest l e v e l . o f C began w i t h more e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t s and, as s u s p i c i o n i n c r e a s e d , tended toward e q u a l i t y . Of the 56 dyads ( i n c l u d i n g the c o n t r o l group dyads), 18 — almost a t h i r d — s e t t l e d a t e q u a l i t y . T h i s was twice the number of dyads t h a t s e t t l e d a t the next most f r e q u e n t l y o c c u r r i n g a l t e r n a t i v e (which was e x a c t l y midway between e q u i t y and e q u a l i t y ) . F i g u r e 16 p r e s e n t s the frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the e n t i r e range of a l t e r n a t i v e s . C l e a r l y , e q u a l i t y was h i g h l y p r e f e r r e d . T h i s r e s u l t r a i s e s two q u e s t i o n s . F i r s t , how does t h i s r e s u l t r e l a t e to the o b t a i n e d i n t e r a c t i o n ? Secondly, why i s e q u a l i t y so a t t r a c t i v e ? With r e g a r d to the f i r s t q u e s t i o n , a more d e t a i l e d i n s p e c t i o n of the data i n d i c a t e d t h a t out. of the 18 dyads t h a t s e t t l e d a t e q u a l i t y , 7 were i n the t r u s t - i n d u c e d group, 7 were i n the s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d group, and 4 were i n \ A l t e r n a t i v e s F i g u r e 16. Frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n of dyads over the range of s o l u t i o n s . 124 the c o n t r o l group. In other words, the experimental t r e a t -ments had no apparent e f f e c t upon the p r e f e r e n c e f o r e q u a l i t y . However, an examination of the times r e q u i r e d . by these dyads r e v e a l e d an i n t e r e s t i n g f i n d i n g : t h a t the 7 dyads i n the t r u s t c o n d i t i o n s e t t l e d r e l a t i v e l y q u i c k l y , whereas the 7 dyads i n the s u s p i c i o n c o n d i t i o n s e t t l e d r e l a t i v e l y slowly."'" I t appears, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the reasons u n d e r l y i n g the s o l u t i o n of e q u a l i t y were q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . The t r u s t dyads t h a t s e t t l e d a t e q u a l i t y p r e f e r r e d and/or accepted the s o l u t i o n w i t h r e l a t i v e ease, whereas the s u s p i c i o n dyads c a p i t u l a t e d or u n w i l l i n g l y y i e l d e d to e q u a l i t y o n l y a f t e r a c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of c o n f l i c t and hard b a r g a i n i n g . In t h i s c o n t e x t , the i n t e r a c t i o n o b t a i n e d (from the data p e r t a i n i n g to the nature of the s o l u t i o n ) i s more e a s i l y understood. Although i t appears from the i n t e r -a c t i o n t h a t the "low t r u s t " group and the "high s u s p i c i o n " group are s i m i l a r i n s o f a r as they both tend to s e t t l e toward e q u a l i t y , t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suggests t h a t the s e t t l e m e n t s by these groups a t e q u a l i t y have d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s . ^"The means f o r the 7 t r u s t dyads and the 7 s u s p i c i o n dyads were 15.6 minutes and 22.9 minutes r e s p e c t i v e l y , the d i f -f e r e n c e b e i n g 7.3 minutes. A t e s t of t h i s d i f f e r e n c e was s i g n i f i c a n t (p <.05), but, of course, was not independent o f the o v e r - a l l F t e s t t h a t had p r e v i o u s l y been found to be s i g n i f i c a n t . 125 The q u e s t i o n remains as to why so many set t l e m e n t s were l o c a t e d a t e q u a l i t y . Morgan and Sawyer (1967) compared f r i e n d s w i t h n o n - f r i e n d s and a l s o found e q u a l i t y to be e q u a l l y h i g h l y a t t r a c t i v e i n both groups.^" T h i s o c c u r r e d even though asymmetry (where one person r e c e i v e d a more generous s c a l e of p a y o f f s ) was l e g i t i m a t e d between non-f r i e n d s , i . e . , why one person r e c e i v e d the h i g h e r s c a l e was p l a u s i b l y j u s t i f i e d w i t h i n the exp e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n . To account f o r t h e i r f i n d i n g s , Morgan and Sawyer argued t h a t i n e f f e c t , asymmetry was v i r t u a l l y d i s r e g a r d e d by the s u b j e c t s and t h a t a number of f a c t o r s promoted symmetry. Thus, w i t h e s s e n t i a l l y symmetrical outcomes, e q u a l i t y became h i g h l y prominent. In the pr e s e n t experiment, asymmetry was not l e g i t i m a t e d i n any way. I t i s t h e r e f o r e p o s s i b l e t h a t the s u b j e c t s , l i k e the s u b j e c t s i n the Morgan and Sawyer study, a l s o imposed symmetry over asymmetry. However, i t was i n f o r m a l l y observed i n many cases t h a t once asymmetry became e v i d e n t , i t was accepted and o f t e n taken i n t o account d u r i n g b a r g a i n i n g . E q u a l i t y may have been prominent f o r other reasons. To a l i m i t e d e x t e n t , the p a y o f f schedules were d i s g u i s e d ; ^Morgan and Sawyer a l s o compared the e f f e c t s of having i n f o r m a t i o n about O's e x p e c t a t i o n s w i t h not having i n f o r -mation. The r e s u l t d i s c u s s e d here p e r t a i n s o n l y to the "have i n f o r m a t i o n " c o n d i t i o n s i n c e t h i s c o n d i t i o n resembles more c l o s e l y the way i n which the p r e s e n t study was conducted. 126 however, the v a l u e s a t the p o i n t of e q u a l i t y were among those t h a t were not a l t e r e d . Thus, d i s c o v e r y e i t h e r through the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n or by means of a check, o f t e n r e s u l t e d i n e q u a l i t y becoming the f o c a l p o i n t of subsequent b a r g a i n i n g . Exact e q u i t y , on the other hand, c o u l d not be made obvious as i n some experiments where the p a y o f f schedules are completely r e v e a l e d to both s i d e s . In Sawyer's B a r g a i n i n g Board, f o r example, three n i c k e l s were juxtaposed w i t h three q u a r t e r s a t the p o i n t of e q u i t y , making the p o i n t prominent i f f o r no o t h e r reason than the f a c t t h a t the number of c o i n s was i d e n t i c a l (Morgan & Sawyer, 1967). Reference not so much to the p o i n t of e q u i t y as to a more e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t was n e v e r t h e l e s s q u i t e j u s t i f i e d i n the p r e s e n t study. For although the s u b j e c t s had no knowledge of the range and magnitude of the other person's s c a l e a t the o u t s e t of b a r g a i n i n g , almost a l l became aware of the d i s p a r a t e nature of the s c a l e s d u r i n g the course of b a r g a i n i n g . In f a c t , s u b j e c t s f r e q u e n t l y r e f e r r e d to some n o t i o n of e q u i t y (but not the s p e c i f i c p o i n t of equity) when they argued i n f a v o r of more e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n s . In t h i s p a r t of the d i s c u s s i o n , an attempt was made to p r e s e n t an i n t e g r a t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s from the b a r g a i n i n g s t a g e . Two measures of outcome were d i s c u s s e d and then q u a l i f i e d i n terms of s e v e r a l p r o c e s s - r e l a t e d 127 f i n d i n g s . With r e s p e c t to the measure of time to agreement, i t was found t h a t the t r u s t group r e q u i r e d l e s s time than the s u s p i c i o n group to reach a s e t t l e m e n t . In the con t e x t of s e v e r a l aspects of the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , the reasons why the s u s p i c i o n group r e q u i r e d r e l a t i v e l y longer to come to an agreement became e v i d e n t . Not onl y d i d the s u s p i c i o n group make i n i t i a l o f f e r s t h a t were more extreme, but they a l s o made more checks, sent p r o p o r t i o n a l l y fewer info r m a -t i o n messages, more l i e s , and more t h r e a t s , ultimatums, and r e f u s a l s t o b a r g a i n . T h i s h i g h l y c o n f l i c t f u l tenor which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the b a r g a i n i n g i n the s u s p i c i o n group f a c i l i t a t e d the e x p l a n a t i o n of the r e s u l t s t h a t p e r t a i n e d t o the nature or l o c a t i o n of the f i n a l s e t t l e m e n t . E s s e n t i a l l y , i t was found t h a t w i t h g r e a t e r t r u s t , there was a g r e a t e r tendency toward more e q u i t a b l e s o l u t i o n s ; but wi t h g r e a t e r s u s p i c i o n , t h e r e was a g r e a t e r tendency toward e q u a l i t y . I t was observed t h a t e q u a l i t y was a modal s o l u t i o n ; i n f a c t , i t accounted f o r almost 1/3 of the s o l u t i o n s . Furthermore, e q u a l i t y o c c u r r e d w i t h the same frequency i n both the t r u s t and the s u s p i c i o n groups. I t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t compared wi t h the s u s p i c i o n groups, the t r u s t groups r e q u i r e d l e s s time to reach s e t t l e m e n t a t e q u a l i t y . Thus, a r r i v i n g a t the s o l u t i o n o f e q u a l i t y had d i f f e r e n t i m p l i c a t i o n s , depending on whether t r u s t or s u s p i c i o n was a p p a r e n t l y o p e r a t i n g . For the t r u s t 128 groups, e q u a l i t y was a s o l u t i o n t h a t was r e l a t i v e l y amicably agreed upon; however, f o r the s u s p i c i o n groups, i t was a s e t t l e m e n t r e l u c t a n t l y a r r i v e d a t through a g r e a t d e a l of c o n f l i c t . 129 CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The p r i n c i p a l purpose of t h i s chapter i s to suggest some of the more g e n e r a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s study and.in so doing, t o p r e s e n t a summary of the major r e s u l t s . At the b e g i n n i n g of the f i r s t c h apter, two r e l a t e d o b j e c t i v e s were s e t f o r t h . To r e i t e r a t e , the o b j e c t i v e s were: (i) to attempt to overcome some of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n s t u d y i n g t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , and ( i i ) . t o o b t a i n some t h e o r e t i c a l l y - i m p o r t a n t e m p i r i c a l evidence about both the development and the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . O b v i o u s l y , the s u c c e s s f u l accomplishment of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s was p r e r e q u i s i t e to the s u c c e s s f u l achievement of the e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . There-f o r e , although the experiment was o s t e n s i b l y d i r e c t e d toward the l a t t e r ( e m p i r i c a l ) o b j e c t i v e s , i t s h o u l d be emphasized t h a t the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l aspects were e q u a l l y (perhaps more) important. For t h i s reason i t would be worthwhile to assess b r i e f l y some of the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s of the study. Among the v a r i o u s approaches to the l a b o r a t o r y study of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n , the method o f experimental i n d u c t i o n was s e l e c t e d . ' An experimental s i t u a t i o n was then developed i n which t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n c o u l d be generated and measured i n a manner t h a t p e r m i t t e d (1) v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s about t r u s t ^Another approach would be, f o r example, to compare samples drawn from p o p u l a t i o n s t h a t are f o r some reason c o n s i d e r e d to be d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n . 130 and s u s p i c i o n , and (2) o b s e r v a t i o n of the e f f e c t s upon some dependent v a r i a b l e s . The c o n d i t i o n s o u t l i n e d i n Chapter Two as being necessary f o r v a l i d i n f e r e n c e s were i n c o r p o r a t e d as e x t e n s i v e l y as p o s s i b l e . For example, i n both the i n d u c t i o n and the measurement sta g e s , the e x p e r i m e n t a l s i t u a t i o n s c o n s i s t e d of s e q u e n t i a l events t h a t were e a s i l y comprehended, and i n v o l v e d moderately s i z a b l e amounts of r e a l money t h a t c o u l d be won or l o s t . Furthermore, the measurement of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n took i n t o account the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between m a n i f e s t t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n on one hand and s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n on the o t h e r hand. Adop t i n g these steps d i d not, of course, guarantee t h a t e f f e c t s would n e c e s s a r i l y be observed. However, the r e s u l t s t h a t have been r e p o r t e d do f u r n i s h some evidence of the e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the procedures. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , a number o f reasons suggest t h a t the methodology was both v a l i d and e f f e c t i v e . For example, the observed e f f e c t s of the stage I m a n i p u l a t i o n s were g e n e r a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n the subsequent s t a g e s . That i s , the s t r o n g e s t e f f e c t measured i n the second stage ( i . e . , F a c t o r A, which accounted f o r approximately 85% of the treatment v a r i a t i o n ) , was a l s o the s t r o n g e s t e f f e c t i n the b a r g a i n i n g s t a g e . Furthermore, the e f f e c t s t h a t o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the b a r g a i n i n g stage were u s u a l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h each othe r ; t h i s p e r m i t t e d a more g e n e r a l and i n c l u s i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the r e s u l t s . 131 F i n a l l y , d e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l was a d m i n i s t e r e d a t the very c o n c l u s i o n of the experiment, i t n e v e r t h e l e s s r e f l e c t e d e f f e c t s i n i t i a t e d i n the f i r s t s t a g e . On the b a s i s of the f o r e g o i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t seems reasonable to conclude t h a t the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e s e t f o r t h a t the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s t h e s i s was accomplished. The remainder o f t h i s chapter w i l l now be devoted to r e v i e w i n g the e m p i r i c a l f i n d i n g s . The r e s u l t s c o n c e r n i n g the development of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n as a f u n c t i o n o f p r e v i o u s experience have a t l e a s t t h r e e important i m p l i c a t i o n s . F i r s t , the conceptu-a l i z a t i o n o f t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n does not c o n s i s t o f simply s t a t i n g one s e t of r e l a t i o n s f o r . t r u s t and merely s t a t i n g the o p p o s i t e s e t of r e l a t i o n s f o r s u s p i c i o n . T h i s i s apparent i n s o f a r as t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n develop a t d i f f e r e n t r a t e s , w i t h t r u s t b e i n g more d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h than s u s p i c i o n . The degree of t r u s t moreover, i s a p p r e c i a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by the i n c e n t i v e c o n d i t i o n s under which 0 was p r e v i o u s l y t r u s t w o r t h y ; i n c o n t r a s t , the degree of s u s p i c i o n i s not i n f l u e n c e d t o the same e x t e n t by the i n c e n t i v e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t were o p e r a t i n g when 0 was p r e v i o u s l y u n t r u s t -worthy. Apart from t h i s c o n c e p t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n , the aforementioned r e s u l t s are important f o r an a d d i t i o n a l reason. T h i s reason r e l a t e s to the long-range i n t e r e s t o f -determining means of 132 j f o s t e r i n g t r u s t where s u s p i c i o n i s u n j u s t i f i e d and/or has c o s t l y and d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t s upon e f f o r t s t o a r r i v e a t s o l u t i o n s to problems. That t r u s t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h i s not, of course, an e n t i r e l y n o v e l f i n d i n g s i n c e o thers (e.g., Osgood, 1962; P i l i s u k , S k o l n i c k , Thomas, & Chapman, 1967; and S c h e l l i n g , 1960) have made s i m i l a r o b s e r v a t i o n s . But i t i s important to r e c o g n i z e t h a t a r e l a t i v e l y g r e a t e r degree of t r u s t can be engendered by an i n d i v i d u a l who has been t r u s t w o r t h y d e s p i t e the temptation of a h i g h i n c e n t i v e to b e t r a y . T r u s t w o r t h i n e s s w h i l e f o r e -going a low i n c e n t i v e does not appear to be as e f f e c t i v e i n encouraging t r u s t . Another i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t i t i s important to d i s t i n -g u i s h between the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n and the u n d e r l y i n g s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s . The importance of making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n l i e s i n d e t e r m i n i n g the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s u b j e c t i v e and the m a n i f e s t s t a t e s and thereby b e i n g a b l e to a s c e r t a i n the t h r e s h o l d s a t which s u b j e c t i v e t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n become expressed as o v e r t b e h a v i o r . From the r e s u l t s of t h i s study, i t appears t h a t the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the m a n i f e s t and the s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s may vary, depending, f o r example, upon such f a c t o r s as the p o p u l a t i o n from which the sample has been drawn. A c c o r d i n g l y , a t h r e s h o l d , i f i d e n t i f i a b l e , may a l s o v a r y . I t i s i n t h i s r e s p e c t t h a t f u t u r e r e s e a r c h can 133 be d i r e c t e d s i n c e a knowledge of t h r e s h o l d s would be . v a l u a b l e i n attempting to generate more b e h a v i o r a l t r u s t . ' W i t h ' r e g a r d to the data from the b a r g a i n i n g stage, i t i s necessary to acknowledge t h a t the g e n e r a l i t y of the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s may be somewhat l i m i t e d . For i n a s s e s s i n g and combining the data i n a post-hoc a n a l y s i s such as t h i s , a c e r t a i n number of a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were s a c r i f i c e d i n the i n t e r e s t of i n t e g r a t i o n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a l i m i t e d number of i m p l i c a t i o n s can t e n t a t i v e l y be proposed. Perhaps the most important i m p l i c a t i o n of the e f f e c t s of t r u s t and s u s p i c i o n upon b a r g a i n i n g i s t h a t t r u s t tends to f a c i l i t a t e , whereas s u s p i c i o n tends to impede and i n some cases d i s r u p t the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . Not o n l y d i d s u s p i c i o n have the e f f e c t of making the i n i t i a l o f f e r s more extreme, but i t a l s o l e d to a p e r i o d of b a r g a i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i z e d by c o n f l i c t . S u b j e c t s i n s u s p i c i o n - i n d u c e d groups sent p r o p o r t i o n a l l y fewer i n f o r m a t i o n a l messages, more l i e s , and made more o u t r i g h t attempts to modify the other persons' u t i l i t i e s by making more t h r e a t s , ultimatums and r e f u s a l s t o b a r g a i n . I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t t r u s t groups were found to r e q u i r e l e s s time to reach a s e t t l e m e n t . I t would t h e r e f o r e appear t h a t even i f the nature of the s o l u t i o n were not a f f e c t e d by s u s p i c i o n , b a r g a i n i n g under a c e r t a i n amount of t r u s t would be p r e f e r a b l e to b a r g a i n i n g under a h i g h degree of s u s p i c i o n . For where 134 extreme s u s p i c i o n i s o p e r a t i n g , t h e r e appears to be a g r e a t e r tendency to become d i s t r a c t e d from t a s k - o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r and i n s t e a d to engage i n b e h a v i o r t h a t i s not o n l y i r r e l e v a n t to the s o l u t i o n o f the problem, but o f t e n conducive o n l y to the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of c o n f l i c t . 135 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bass, B. M. E f f e c t s on the subsequent performance of ' n e g o t i a t o r s of s t u d y i n g i s s u e s or p l a n n i n g s t r a t e g i e s alone or i n groups. Psycholog'lcal Monographs, 1966, 80 (#6), Whole No. 614. Becker, G. M., and M c C l i n t o c k , C. 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Bowers (Ed.), S t u d i e s  on b e h a v i o r i n o r g a n i z a t i o n s : a r e s e a r c h symposium. Athens, Georgia: U n i v e r s i t y of Georgia P r e s s , 1966. McGrath, J . E., and Vidmar, N. J . Role assignment, and c o n f l i c t i n d e c i s i o n making groups: p a r t i a l t e s t of a model of n e g o t i a t i o n . Paper presented a t the Mid-western P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n meeting, Chicago, May, 1966. Messe, L. A., and Sawyer, J . Unexpected c o o p e r a t i o n : the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma r e s o l v e d ? Unpublished mimeo, U n i v e r s i t y of, Chicago, 1966. Minas, J . S., S c o d e l , A., Marlowe, D., and Rawson, H. Some d e s c r i p t i v e aspects of two-person non-zero-sum games. I I . J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1960, 4_, 193-197. Morgan, W. R., and Sawyer, J . B a r g a i n i n g , e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the p r e f e r e n c e f o r e q u a l i t y over e q u i t y . 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B a r g a i n i n g and n e g o t i a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . In H. C. Kelman (Ed.), I n t e r n a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r : a s o c i a l - p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . New York: H o l t , R i n e h a r t and Winston, 1965. S c h e l l i n g , T. C. The s t r a t e g y of c o n f l i c t . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1960. S i e g e l , S., and Fouraker, L. E. B a r g a i n i n g and group d e c i s i o n  making. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. Stevens, C. M. S t r a t e g y and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g n e g o t i a -t i o n . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. Swinth, R. L. The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the t r u s t r e l a t i o n s h i p . J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n , 1967,; 11, 335-344. Walton, R. E., and McKersie, R. B. A b e h a v i o r a l theory of  l a b o r n e g o t i a t i o n s . New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Winer, B. J . S t a t i s t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n experimental d e s i g n . New York: McGraw-Hill, 196 2. APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF THE PDG RESPONSE SHEET PD FORM Instructions: RED • ( T O (i) Carefully examine the table below., (i) Carefully ezawino the table below. [ii) Rensmber that this form goes*) to the other parson who, knowing what jm have already chosen, w i l l then make his choice. ' ( i i ) Note the choice that has already been made by the other person. Lil) Ifow choose either the upper row OP the lower row by drawing a horizon-tal line through the entire row chosen. ] ( i i i ) Now mke your own choice between the column on the left or the column on the right by drawing a vertical line through the chosen column, IMPORTANT: THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU RECEIVE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE INTERSECTION OF THE LINES DRAWN BT YOU AND THE OTHER PERSON. Green chooses either l i f t • $0n$0 • |O,$0 - Si,oo + ti.oo Red cheeses oither • $1.00 - lloOO PD FORM Instructions: RED GREEN (i) Carefully ©gamine the tabl*a below „ i (i) Carefully exasdne the table below, (il) ResBBhsr that this form goes to the other person who, knowing what you haw already chosen, w i l l then make his choice 01 (ii) Bote the choice that has already been aade by the other person. i i i ) Now choose either the upper row or the lower row by drawing a horizon-tal lino through the entire row chosen ( i i i ) Now sake your own choice between 1 the colon on the left or the coluwn on the right by drawing a vertical line through the chosen ooluan, IMPORTANT: THE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU RECEIVE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE INTERSECTION OF THE LINES DRAWN BY YOU AND THE OTHER PERSON. Green chooses either left right Red chooses either • So.5o • $o,5to - $l o00 • $1.00 • $ l o 0 0 - $1,00 0 0 140 APPENDIX B: PROCEDURE AND RULES OF BARGAINING PART I I I : BARGAINING Ob j e c t i v e : Agreement by both sides upon one of the a l t e r n a t i v e s . Procedural D e t a i l s : 1. A statement (on yellow s l i p s ) must accompany each message. 2. Agreement occurs when one s i d e sends a d e c i s i o n message (pink s l i p s ) i n d i c a t i n g commitment, and the other s i d e decides to accept. Rules and Other Factors to Consider: 1. Time: The q u i c k e r you reach an agreement, the more money you w i l l r e c e i v e . HOWEVER, too hasty an agree-ment may not be wise s i n c e the other s i d e may be d e c e i v i n g you, l e a v i n g you w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y low payoff. Determination of the time bonus or penalty: Time Bonus 1 2 3 25% Maximum bonus f o r settlement i n 1st 3 minutes. 4 5 24 n 23 ! Bonus decreases by 1% every minute. 11 12 13 17 | 16 ! 15 J 14 15 16 17 18 12-t 9! 6! 3! oJ Bonus decreases by 3% every minute. Penalty 19 20 _1 a -2% Penalty of 1% every minute. 141 2. Deception; This might y i e l d a b e t t e r outcome, .BUT, i f detected, i . e . , checked, i t might e i t h e r delay or e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of agreement. Checking the t r u t h of the other person's claims c o s t s approximately 5% of your maximum payoff. 3. R e f u s a l to bargain: Here, no messages are allowed f o r the time s p e c i f i e d . Bonus decrements and p e n a l t i e s are s t i l l i n e f f e c t , only the other person's decrements and p e n a l t i e s are doubled. 1 4 2 APPENDIX C: EXAMPLES OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS The problems on the f o l l o w i n g page were intended to c o n t r a s t w i t h each other so tha t the subjects would not be as l i k e l y to have set s about the s i m i l a r i t i e s or d i f f e r e n c e s between one side's s c a l e and the other s i d e ' s s c a l e w i t h r e s p e c t to the range of the payoffs and the payoff increments. In p i l o t s t u d i e s , i t had been found t h a t subjects f r e q u e n t l y assumed e i t h e r t h a t the other person's payoff schedule was s i m i l a r to t h e i r own, or when only one example problem was given, t h a t the experimental problem was i n some s p e c i f i c way s i m i l a r to the example problem. OBJECTIVE OF BARGAINING: MUTUAL AGREEMENT UPON ONE OF THE ALTERNATIVES. Example 1 One s i d e gets 50 31 25 19 17 17 16 16 16 15 14 13 9 6 2 A l t e r n a t i v e s A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 Other s i d e gets -3 -3 -2 -1 0 1 1 3 4 7 15 29 30 31 30 Example 2 One s i d e gets 1 4 6 7 10 13 14 15 22 26 27 29 34 35 39 A l t e r n a t i v e s A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O Other s i d e gets 138 121 109 87 73 51 45 44 21 2 -10 -31 -36 -58 -92 CO 144 APPENDIX D: STANDARD FORMS USED DURING BARGAINING The three forms t h a t were used by the subjects are presented i n the f o l l o w i n g pages. Colors were used to f a c i l i t a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n s among the forms. The f i r s t two (the blue standard message and the pink d e c i s i o n message) were the means by which the subjects communicated. The t h i r d form, which had to be submitted along w i t h each message, was not a communication, but a statement of the subj e c t ' s a c t u a l minimum and maximum d i s p o s i t i o n s a t the time of sending. STANDARD MESSAGE # (NOT BINDING and NOT NECESSARILY TRUTHFUL) Complete o n l y one o f t h e f o l l o w i n q : ( i ) A t a l t e r n a t i v e , I g e t . ( i i ) What do you g e t a t ? ( i i i ) I c a n n o t p o s s i b l y go any lower t h a n . ( i v ) If you a r e n ' t g o i n g t o budge, I w i l l s u b m i t a d e c i s i o n t o r e f u s e b a r g a i n i n g f o r t h e ne x t m i n u t e ( s ) . (v) My n e x t o f f e r wiI I be f i n a I ; I w i l l go t o _ but no lower. ( v i ) I s u g g e s t t h a t we s e t t l e a t around . ( v i i ) O t h e r : Time r e m a i n i n g 146 DECISION MESSAGE* (ALL DECISIONS COMMUNICATED BY THIS MESSAGE ARE BINDING.) - I o f f e > "to,-xommft m y s e l f t o s e t t l e a t , where I w i l l g e t . ( B i n d i n g , but not n e c e s s a r i l y t r u t h f u l ) - I a c c e p t y o u r o f f e r t o s e t t l e a t . - I r e j e c t y o u r o f f e r . - I r e f u s e t o b a r g a i n f o r t h e n e x t m i n u t e ( s ) . T i me rema i n i ng STATEMENT C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o : The i n i t i a l o f f e r . : S t a n d a r d message # . ! : D e c i s i o n message # . (THIS STATEMENT DOES NOT GO TO THE OTHER PERSON, BUT IS RETAINED BY THE MONITOR. { BOTH ENTRIES HERE MUST BE TRUTHFUL.) | i i Complete both o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : j i (1) The l o w e s t a l t e r n a t i v e t o which I w i l l go i s . | i (2) The h i g h e s t I t h i n k I can g e t i s . ; 147 APPENDIX E: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL Name: Assigned #: 1 2 3 4 ( c i r c l e one) ON EACH OF THE SCALES BELOW, INDICATE AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE, YOUR FEELING TOWARD THE PERSON WITH WHOM YOU HAVE BEEN BARGAINING. (Remember tha t #1 has been bargain-ing w i t h #2 and #3 has been b a r g a i n i n g w i t h #4.) DO THIS BY MARKING AN *X' IN ONE OF THE 7 SPACES BETWEEN THE WORDS THAT LIE AT THE ENDS OF EACH SCALE. good : : : : : : bad c r u e l : : : : : : k i n d dishonest : : : : : : honest c l e a n : : : : : : d i r t y unpleasant : : : : : :"' pleasant n i c e : : : : : : awful u n f a i r : : : : : : f a i r 1 4 8 APPENDIX F: ANOVA TABLES In the p r e s e n t a t i o n of these t a b l e s , the f o l l o w i n g conventions have been adopted: (a) The dependent measures, analyzed have been i n d i c a t e d by means of the numbered sub-headings which precede each summary t a b l e . (b) Page numbers have been placed i n the square brackets next to each subheading to r e f e r to the l o c a t i o n i n the t e x t where the par-t i c u l a r r e s u l t has been presented. (c) Where p o s s i b l e , extraneous sources of v a r i a t i o n have been removed from the t r e a t -ment v a r i a t i o n . The v a r i a t i o n due to a p a r t i c u l a r s e s s i o n i n which a group was run has been i n d i c a t e d i n the Source column by the word 'Sessions'. The v a r i a t i o n due to e i t h e r of the d i f f e r e n t s c a l e s r e c e i v e d by the bargainers.has been i n d i c a t e d by the word 'Scales'. 1 . SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY MEASURES OF TRUST AND SUSPICION [pages 8 5 - 8 8 ] : Mean Source df Squares F E . A (O's tr u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 5 8 0 9 . 5 0 1 0 4 . 0 4 < . 0 0 0 1 B (Incentive) 1 1 9 5 . 5 1 3 . 5 0 . 0 6 C (Exposures) 2 2 6 . 9 8 < 1 A B 1 1 7 . 1 7 < 1 A C 2 2 6 9 . 6 7 4 . 8 3 < . 0 2 B C 2 5 1 . 0 8 < 1 A B C 2 8 6 . 0 7 1 . 5 4 Sessions 1 2 3 9 . 4 0 E r r o r 7 2 5 5 . 8 4 T o t a l 9 5 149 2. NATURE OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT [pages 94-96]: Mean Source df Squares A (O's tru s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 1.69 <1 B (Incentive) 1 1.69 <1 C (Exposures) 2 2.65 <1 A B 1 .19 <1 A C 2 22.56 4 B C 2 .06 <1 A B C 2 .81 <1 Sessions . 12 5.60 E r r o r 24 5.60 T o t a l 47 3. TIME TO SOLUTION [pages 96-97]: < .04 Mean Source df Squares F R A (O's tru s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 331.28 5.30 <.03 B (Incentive) 1 80.34 1.29 C (Exposures) 2 22.83 <1 A B 1 13.76 <1 A C 2 149.99 2.40 .11 B C 2 4.84 <1 A B C 2 1.66 <1 Sessions 12 83.25 E r r o r 24 62.46 T o t a l 47 150 4. ABSOLUTE EXTREMITY [pages 9 7 - 9 8 ] : Source A (O's tru s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Scales E r r o r T o t a l 5. RELATIVE EXTREMITY [page 9 8 ] : Source A (O's tr u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) B (Incentive) C (Exposures) A B A C B C A B C Sessions Scales E r r o r T o t a l Mean df Squares F E 1 9 2 . 0 4 7 . 8 5 < .01 1 8 . 1 7 <1 2 2 3 . 9 5 2 . 0 4 <.14. 1 3 . 3 7 <1 2 1 5 . 8 2 1 . 3 5 2 1 4 . 8 9 1 . 2 7 2 .59 <1 12 1 9 . 6 0 12 1 4 . 4 4 60 1 1 . 7 2 95 Mean df Squares F E 1 60 .96 5 . 3 4 < .03 1 9 . 0 7 <1 2 3 . 5 4 <1 1 6 . 7 7 <1 2 1 9 . 6 0 . 1 . 72 <.19 2 .80 <1 2 2 4 . 0 7 2 . 1 1 < .13 12 1 4 . 1 0 12 1 4 . 2 9 60 1 1 . 4 2 95 151 6. MID-POINTS OF ACTUAL INITIAL RANGES [pages 98-99]: Mean Source e l f Squares , A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 8.34 <1 B (Inc e n t i v e ) 1 .75 <1 C (Exposures) 2 5.51 <1 A B 1 .19 <1 A C 2 .22 <1 B C 2 5.45 <1 A B C 2 7.61 <1 Sessi o n s 12 2.51 E r r o r 24 9 .64 T o t a l 47 7. ACTUAL INITIAL RANGE [page 99]: Mean Source d f Squares F E A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 1.33 <1 B (Inc e n t i v e ) 1 40.33 1.26 C (Exposures) 2 115.65 3.62 < .05 A B 1 4.08 <1 A C 2 14.77 <1 B C 2 56 .02 1.75 .19 A B C 2 6.40 <1 Sessions 12 18.79 E r r o r 24 31.96 T o t a l 47 152 8. AMOUNT OF COMMUNICATION.(TOTAL NUMBER OF MESSAGES  DIVIDED BY TIME TO SOLUTION) [page 99]: Mean Source df Squares F A (O's tru s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .3271 1.13 B (Incentive) 1 .0361 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .6083 2.09 A B 1 .5015 1.73 A C 2 .4082 1.40 B C 2 .2550 <1 A B C 2 .3889 1.34 Sessions 12 .2752 E r r o r 24 .2904 T o t a l 47 9(a). INFORMATION MESSAGES (RATE) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares F A (O's tr u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 1.1794 5.36 B (Incentive) 1 .0251 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .5206 2.37 A B 1 .0000 <1 A C 2 .0034 <1 B C 2 .0085 <1 A B C 2 .0717 <1 Sessions 12 .2206 E r r o r 24 .2200 T o t a l 47 153 9(b). INFORMATION MESSAGES (PROPORTION) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .2377 7 B (Inc e n t i v e ) 1 .0002 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .0105 <1 A B 1 .0108 <1 A C 2 .0221 <1 B C 2 .0042 <1 A B C 2 .0010 <1 Se s s i o n s 12 .0273 E r r o r 24 .0318 T o t a l 47 1 0 ( a ) . MODIFICATION MESSAGES (RATE) [pages 100-103] : Mean Source df Squares F A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0410 3.03 B (Incentive) 1 .0022 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .0065 <1 A B 1 .0004 <1 A C 2 .0078 <1 B C 2 .0081 <1 A B C 2 .0149 1.10 Sess i o n s 12 .0207 E r r o r 24 .0136 T o t a l 47 154 1 0 ( b ) . MODIFICATION MESSAGES (PROPORTION) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0263 6 B (Incentive) 1 .0000 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .0025 <1 A B 1 .0000 <1 A C 2 .0041 <1 B C 2 .0008 <1 A B C 2 .0034 <1 Sess i o n s 12 .0096 E r r o r 24 .0041 T o t a l 47 1 1 ( a ) . L I E S (RATE) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares F A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0673 <1 B (Incentive) 1 .0642 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .1897 2.33 A B 1 .0037 <1 A C 2 .1172 1.44 B C 2 .0316 <1 A B C 2 .0015 <1 Se s s i o n s 12 .0767 E r r o r 24 .0816 T o t a l 47 155 11(b). LIES (PROPORTION) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares F A (O's trus t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0834 3 .49 B (Incentive) 1 .0126 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .0243 1.02 A B 1 .0009 <1 A C 2 .0227 <1 B C 2 .0070 <1 A B C 2 .0010 <1 Sessions 12 .0155 E r r o r 24 .0239 T o t a l 47 12(a). TIME-BONUS MESSAGES (RATE) Ipages 100-I03J: Mean Source df Squares F A (O's tru s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0027 <1 B (Incentive) 1 .0304 4.59 C (Exposures) 2 .0048 <1 A B 1 .0158 2.38 A C 2 .0049 <1 B C 2 .0005 <1 A B C 2 .0057 <1 Sessions 12 .0026 E r r o r 24 .0066 T o t a l 47 156 12(b). TIME-BONUS MESSAGES (PROPORTION) [pages 100-103]: Mean Source df Squares F E A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 .0013 <1 B (Incentive) 1 .0145 4.95 <.04 C (Exposures) 2 .0020 <1 A B 1 .0061 2.10 <.16 A C 2 .0027 <1 B C 2 .0011 <1 A B C 2 .0037 1.27 Ses s i o n s 12 .0014 E r r o r 24 .0029 T o t a l 47 13. CHECKS [page 102]: Mean Source df Squares F E A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 11.02 3.75 <.07 B (Inc e n t i v e ) 1 .52 <1 C (Exposures) 2 .02 <1 A B 1 6.02 2.05 .16 A C 2 3.52 1.20 B C 2 .65 <1 A B C 2 5.15 1.75 .19 Se s s i o n s 12 1.73 E r r o r 24 2.94 T o t a l 47 157 14. CHANGES IN THE BARGAINING RANGE [page 104]: Mean Source df Squares F E A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 42.19 1.49 B (Incentive) 1 17.52 <1 C (Exposures) 2 58.15 2.05 < .15 A B 1 15.19 <1 A C 2 23.69 <1 B C 2 51.40 1.81 .18 A B C 2 27.44 <1 Sess i o n s 12 32.02 E r r o r 24 28.40 T o t a l 47 15. SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL Ipages 104-1057: Source df A (O's t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s ) 1 B (Incentive) 1 C (Exposures) 2 A B 1 A C 2 B C 2 A B C 2 Sess i o n s 12 S c a l e s 12 E r r o r 60 T o t a l 95 Mean Squares F E 1254.30 19.10 .0001 25.01 <1 39 .78 <1 380 .01 5.79 <.02 41.70 <1 83.95 1.28 1.32 <1 58.16 56.28 65.67 

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