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Symbol and kairos, Paul Tillich in encounter with world religions Eggen, William M. G., 1972

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SYMBOL AND KAIROS P a u l T i l l i c h i n E n c o u n t e r w i t h World R e l i g i o n s By WILLIAM M.G. EGGEN A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n t h e Department Of RELIGIOUS STUDIES We a c c e p t t h i s t h e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1972 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t c o p y i n g or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a llowed w ithout my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Religious Studies The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date 14 A p r i l , 1972 i ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s study i s to investigate the elements i n the theology of T i l l i c h which would have enabled him to enter into the intensive encounter with data from the history of Religion, which encounter he thought offered the only acceptable hope for the future of theology and of Religions as such. T i l l i c h conceives r e l i g i o n as man's concern for ultimate meaning f u l f i l l -ment. It forms trie true substance of a l l culture, because a l l c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s are e s s e n t i a l l y responses to the immanence of the Ultimate Ground of r e a l i t y which breaks through the concrete forms as a revelatory demand on man to transcend the concrete meaning structures. Revelation and man's s e l f - t r a n s c -ending responses to i t are u n i v e r s a l l y present, but the l a t t e r are ambiguous as they are embodied i n concrete, l i m i t e d forms, which tend to absolutize themselves. As symbols, however, these forms have the power to mediate man's r e l a t i o n to the Ground of being and as such be l i f e - g i v i n g . Symbolic medi-ation, i n T i l l i c h ' s opinion, must be related to the h i s t o r i c a l setting of a concrete community. I t i s e f f e c t i v e to the extent that i t enables man to l i v e i n the paradox of accepting con-crete forms and moments {Kaivoi) as the representatives of what concerns him ultimately. Our approach to r e l i g i o u s symbols, then, must be that of a double hermeneutics. We must be r a d i c -a l l y c r i t i c a l l e s t any contingent form claims ultimacy and at the same time we must be e n t i r e l y committed to accepting the 1 1 t r a d i t i o n as the source of meaning f u l f i l l m e n t s . . We have related T i l l i c h to the two major hermeneutical approaches of our time and we found that his own p o s i t i o n not only accomodates any s c i e n t i f i c study of Religions but also illustrates'how a d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n can become an i n t e g r a l part of a community's hermeneutical horizon. T i l l i c h pro-posed the i d e a l of a unifying theonomy, as the alt e r n a t i v e to heteronomy and absolutism on the one hand, and autonomous secularism and r e l a t i v i s m on the other. He r e h a b i l i t a t e s myths and symbols as indispensable parts of a l l r e l i g i o n . By t h i s system, we think, T i l l i c h created sound th e o l o g i c a l conditions f o r the required dialogue, even though he did not develop an adequate h e u r i s t i c t o o l for. the ana-lysis of non-Western Religions and f a i l e d to emphasize the need of intensive p r a c t i c a l contacts. i i i TABLE OF CONTENTS - PAGE INTRODUCTION . 1 PART I 1.1 Religion against Religion . . . . . 8 1.2 Identity and Distance . . . . . . . . . 16 1.3 Religion and Culture 25 1.4 Reason and Revelation 3 2 1.5 Correlation and Self-Transcendence .' . 43 1.6 D i a l e c t i c s and Symbolism . . . . . . 56 1.7 Encounter and Typology 6 4 PART II 11.1 Religious Symbols . . . . . . . . . . . 75 11.2 Analogia Imaginis 86 II . 3 Community and History 96 II . 4 Prophetism and Kairos 107 II. 5 Hermeneutics and Encounter 117 II . 6 The Dialogue 130 BIBLIOGRAPHY 150 1 INTRODUCTION Shortly before he died i n the F a l l of 1965, Paul T i l l i c h , then 79, delivered an address e n t i t l e d "The Significance of the History of Religions f o r the Systematic Theologian", i n which he regretted the fac t that his theology had been con-ceived exclusively as an answer to the secular c r i t i c i s m of Christianity."'" His philosophical and th e o l o g i c a l convictions had matured i n a very involved confrontation with the German c u l t u r a l c r i s i s of the early 20th. century, and no substantial change took place after he emigrated to the U.S.A., i n 1933. He had attempted to show that r e l i g i o n as perceived i n the Chris t i a n — Protestant t r a d i t i o n , formed the depth dimension which responded to the e x i s t e n t i a l questions implied i n man's c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . This form of apologetic theology was most appreciative of culture and refused to retreat into the idea of a revelation which i s posited as a monolithic, divine word. He professes that human culture u n i v e r s a l l y embodies divine revelation, which i t s e l f , however, transcends these forms. The concepts of d i a l e c t i c s , c o r r e l a t i o n , boundary and paradox had received s p e c i f i c meanings i n t h i s theology, but regrettably Cf. J . Brauer (ed.), The Future of Religions (abr.: Fut. Re I. ) , 19 6 6 , p. 91. 2 they had never been applied to a serious encounter with non-Western, r e l i g i o u s traditions." 1" We may wonder why T i l l i c h had previously f a i l e d to pay much attention to that encounter, despite his admiration for a man l i k e R.Otto. He obviously detested the neo-Protestant opinion that a l l Religions had become obsolete since C h r i s t i a n -i t y had appeared. On the other hand he rejected Troeltsch's theory of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t cultures with unrelated r e l i g i o u s 2 t r a d i t i o n s . That he s t i l l f a i l e d to advocate an intensive contact between World Religions, can be explained only by one major factor i n his system, namely the conviction that theo-logy should be .apologetic i n the sense of responding to the e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n . The f a c t u a l contact between cultures and the impact of quasi-Religions on the established Religions The attempts which he made i n the Bampton Lectures of 1961 do not o f f e r any new views, but only repeat the concepts about quasi-Religions, universalism, dynamic" typology, dialogue and C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s need of s e l f - c r i t i c i s m . These Lectures appeared i n C h r i s t i a n i t y and the Encounter of World Religions (abr.: Chr. Enc.)r 1963. T i l l i c h indicated the need for encounter with non-Christian Religions b r i e f l y i n his main work System-a t i c Theology (abr. ST.) Vol. I - I I I , 1951-1963. Cf. S T . I l l p. 6. 2 T i l l i c h shares Otto's high regard for mysticism but he fears a detached aestheticism that might r e s u l t from that a t t i t u d e . Troeltsch' view that truth i s i n the depth of every Religion i s also c r i t i c i z e d for too l i t t l e active i n t e r e s t and involvement. True r e l i g i o n , he thinks, i s beyond, not i n , any existent form. Cf. Gesammelten Werke (abr.: Ges. W. ) Vol. XII, 1971, pp. 185f. and 169. This twelveth volume i s the l a s t i n a series started i n 1960. 3 at the present time, demand a theological reflection for the first time in history.This can be done without the prevailing risk of becoming a purely academic excercise, a "Literatenill-usion", because some form of "Blutzusammenhang" has now been created.^  With regard to the actual dialogue, Tillich resents any form of relativism which rejects every criterion, but the guideline which he himself proposes as absolute says only that everything is relative and nothing absolute. We must try to discover why he insists on this absolute criterion. He ,. also proposes a distinct method of approach, called the dynamic typology, and finally he gives directives for the dialogue, which can be summed up in the demands to accept.the equality of the partner, a common ground and a commitment to sincerely represent one's own tradition. The dynamic typology tries to determine in each Religion the fundamental elements that, by their eternal dynamic tension, create the actual cultural 2 expressions of the sacred. His holistic approach and the idea that such basic elements are universals, make Tillich come close to the latest developments, especially of the structur-alist theories in studies of myth and ritual. Consequently, it Understanding other cultures with which there is no such relationship Tillich considers a scholar's illusion Cf. Ges.W. V. p. 21 2Cf. ST. I, pp. 219f. 4 i s l e f t to conjecture to f i n d why he should prove to be d i s -s a t i s f i e d with his own method."'" The most plausible reason for t h i s seems to be that T i l l i c h sensed how strongly his concepts of ultimacy and paradox depended on the Western frame of thought. He must have f e l t that they can hardly function as h e u r i s t i c devices i n determining the t y p o l o g i c a l elements of other Religions. Additional reasons for his d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n can be advanced such as the danger that his method might favour an i n t e l l e c t -ualism that merely concentrates on essentials and r e s t r i c t s the encounter to symposia and i s o l a t e d experiments. Essentialism with i t s stress on abstract eternals m i l i t a t e s against his basic conviction that truth i s . e x i s t e n t i a l i n nature. Most of a l l , the h e u r i s t i c t o o l i t s e l f , the Protestant p r i n c i p l e , i s scarcely convincing as being u n i v e r s a l l y applicable. Does the awareness that ultimacy breaks through r a t i o n a l forms exhaust the fundament-als of everything r e l i g i o u s , from r i t u a l s to mystical ecstasy? Is there perhaps a danger of reducing a l l r e l i g i o n once again 2 to feelings and i r r a t i o n a l i s m ? Could i t be that T i l l i c h ' s "^'My approach i s dynamic-typological. ' '..Teilhard de Chardin ... stresses the development of a universal, divine-centered consciousness which i s b a s i c a l l y C h r i s t i a n . I am d i s s a t i s f i e d with such an attempt. I am also d i s s a t i s f i e d with my own1. (Fut. Rel. p. 86) . 2 •• Norenberg thinks that there i s t h i s danger of T i l l i c h re-lapsing i n the post-Schleiermacher theology of f e e l i n g . Cf. K.D. Norenberg, Analogia Imaginis3 1966, p. 225.' Could t h i s be the reason why K. Barth reproached T i l l i c h for i r r a t i o n a l i s m ? Cf. T. Torrance, Karl Barth, 1962, p. 181. 5 h o l i s t i c approach i s v a l i d but that his h e u r i s t i c tools are formulated i n terms that are too strongly culture-bound? Did T i l l i c h f i n d the 'key for understanding the extremely c h a o t i c . ..history of Religions'?"'" Rather than a key for understanding other Religions, T i l l i c h seems to have formulated a key to the eschatological perspectives of Western t r a d i t i o n s , including C h r i s t i a n i t y and the s e c u l a r i s t movements that sprang from i t , i n which non-Western Religions receive a place to the extent that they con-form to t h i s c r i t e r i o n . This might seem e n t i r e l y uninteresting for any student i n r e l i g i o u s studies, unless the true conditions for a dialogue have been created rather than excluded by t h i s c r i t e r i o n . When T i l l i c h discusses the Religion of the Concrete S p i r i t as the aim of a l l history of Religions he seems to con-sider the encounter, the unifying dialogue as the kernel of a l l r e l i g i o n . Man's separation from the ultimate ground of being i s overcome by symbols that are l i f e - g i v i n g , not because they give abstract knowledge about the divine, but because they create communication within the concrete r e a l i t y , the kairos. The love {evos which becomes agape within the kairos) i s the c r u c i a l factor i n t h i s system because i t r e a l i z e s the e s s e n t i a l -i z a t i o n of man, the conquest of his al i e n a t i n g attachment to p a r t i c u l a r i t y and a transcendence of subject - object structures. XFut. Re I. p.88. ' 6 In t h i s thesis, therefore, we s h a l l not concentrate on the actual method which T i l l i c h proposed for the study of other Religions. We s h a l l try to trace the elements i n T i l l i c h ' s view of r e l i g i o n which enable him not only to acknowledge the value of other Religions, but to consider the dialogue desirable or even indispensible. His actual studies of non-Christian Religions are very sparse and l i t t l e h e l p f u l i n t h i s respect, as we have intimated above, and we s h a l l focus our attention on two central issues i n his system which have a d i r e c t bearing on the evaluation of non-Christian Religions, namely the question of the univers-a l i t y of revelation and the ro l e of concrete r e a l i t y , as symbol and kairosj i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s revelation. These two issues divide the thesis into two major parts. In keeping.with most commentaries no attempt has been made to f i n d developments i n T i l l i c h ' s views. The word ' r e l i g i o n ' i s used i n c a p i t a l i z e d form unless i t indicates the human - divine r e l a t i o n s h i p as such, i n the form T i l l i c h thinks i t should take."1" In the f i r s t part we s h a l l deal with t h i s i d e a l of r e l i g i o n as man's ultimate This form, according to T i l l i c h , i s the 'point where Religion loses i t s importance' as a separate e n t i t y , (Cf. Chr. Eno. p.97) and where the reinforcement of the r e l i g i o u s elements i n a l l Religions results i n an ever greater awareness of what concerns man ultimately and which by d e f i n i t i o n l i e s beyond a l l existent r e l i g i o u s forms. 7 concern and response to the universal revelation. In the second part we s h a l l examine how the theologian Paul T i l l i c h approaches concrete symbols, and which hermeneutic method he i n fact favours. The question to ask i s whether his th e o l o g i c a l framework allows the renewal of his own system which he envis-aged i n the free approach of the history of Religions. PART I 8 1.1 RELIGION AGAINST RELIGION The t h e o l o g i c a l valuation of the World Religions has been widely discussed i n both Protestant and Catholic c i r c l e s ever since Cusanus and Lessing. In the l a s t three decades Catholic theologians, tuning i n more and more on global problems, have shown an increasingly p o s i t i v e appraisal of other Religions, which they view as b a s i c a l l y v a l i d responses of mankind-in-evolution to God's Word. Even terms.like C h r i s t i a n i t y i n pre-paration (Danielou) or anonymous C h r i s t i a n i t y (Rahner) are gradually being discarded as inadequate.^ During t h i s period the Protestant scene was struggling to free i t s e l f from nineteenth century l i b e r a l i s m and h i s t o r i c i s m . Most i n f l u e n t i a l i n t h i s struggle has been the neo-orthodox theo-logy led by Karl Barth. He was sharply c r i t i c a l of Religion as such. He considered human Religion as man's f u t i l e attempt at s e l f - s a l v a t i o n and therefore as opposed or even contray to God's act of s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n and of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n Jesus T i l l i c h shows l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n Catholic theology. In our context he mentions Pierre Teilhard de Chardin whose c h r i s t o -centrism he interprets neither favourably nor very c o r r e c t l y . C £ . : Fut. Rel. p. 86. Among the more i n f l u e n t i a l works by Catholi theologians published on t h i s topic during T i l l i c h ' s American years we mention: J. Danielou: Le Mystere de I'Avent, Paris 1948 J. Danielou: Le Mystere du Salut des Nations, Paris 1948, J. Danielou: Essai sur le Mystere de I ' H i s t o i r e , Paris 1955, K. Rahner: Schriften zur Theologie I-VIII, E i n s i d e l n 1954ff, K. Rahner: Mission and Grace (Eng. T r . ) , New York 1964, J. Ratzinger Die Neue Heiden und Die Kirche , Hochland, 1958, i d . Der Ch r i s t -hiche Glaube und Die Weltreligionen i n H. Vorgrimler: Gott in Welt Vol. 2, 1964, E. Cornells: Valeurs Chretiennes des Religions non Chretiennes j Paris 1965. 9 Christ. Religion has no p o s i t i v e role at a l l p r i o r to or even alongside f a i t h i n God's Word. In t h i s respect Feuerbach Is correct i n c a l l i n g Religions i l l u s i o n s . Barth holds that revelation i n Christ can never be considered 'a p a r t i c u l a r instance of the universal which i s c a l l e d r e l i g i o n . On the contrary t h i s r e v elation should be accepted as the prius of a l l r e l a t i o n s between man and God. Religion then i s only true to the degree that i t i s an expression i n space and time of the community's f a i t h i n t h i s r e v e l a t i o n . Paul T i l l i c h proves to d i f f e r considerably from t h i s view when he c a l l s r e l i g i o n man's ultimate concern, which forms the foundation of his f a i t h i n r e v e l a t i o n . Does t h i s mean that T i l l i c h i s less c r i t i c a l of established Religions and of l i b e r a l views thereof? On the contrary, His c r i t i c i s m seems even more r i g i d and consistent than that of Barth! In f a c t he acknowledges that he had come to the same c r i t i c a l p o s i t i o n as Barth, i n -2 dependently and on the basis of his philosophy. As early as K. Barth: Church Dogmatics 1,2, 1963, p. 281. This par. 17 gives a comprehensive exposition of Barth's views on r e l i g i o n s as unbelief and of what he c a l l s true r e l i g i o n . "No r e l i g i o n i s true... i t can become true ... only from without". Ibid. p. 325. Other important .works by Barth i n t h i s context are K. Barth: The E p i s t l e to the Romans, 1919, Eng. Tr. 1933, i d . : The Humanity of God, 1960. 2 Cf. P. T i l l i c h : What is Religion? 1969. This book contains three early works by T i l l i c h , namely: Religionsphilosophie 1925, Die Uberwindung des R e l i g i o n s b e g r i f f s in der Religionsphilosophie 1922; Religionsphilosophie der Kultur, 1919- (in p a r t ) . They are translated, edited and introduced by James Luther Adams. 10 1912 he wrote: "Der Religi o n s b e g r i f f muss von dem Gottesbegriff abgeleitet werden, nicht umgekehrt". x In 1922 he showed i n an address to the Kant-Gesellschaft that the l i b e r a l concept of Religion takes the place of God and i s worthless because i t i s mere Religion (blosse Religion). But i n that same year T i l l i c h contrasted his views to Barth's concept of the c r i t i c a l paradox and he c a l l e d his approach the p o s i t i v e paradox. The opposition between the two men grew and the f i n a l breach occured i n 1934, the year af t e r T i l l i c h ' s departure from Germany. I t was occasioned by Barth's brochure "Nein" directed against Brunner's natural theology and by the Barmen Declaration i n which T i l l i c h saw c l e a r l y the s o c i a l i s o l a t i o n i s m to which Barth 2 was leading the German Church.-This breach however, did not mean that T i l l i c h stopped preaching that Christ i s the c r i s i s of a l l Religion. As we can see from the sermon on "The Yoke of Religion", which was delivered "The concept of r e l i g i o n should be derived from the concept of God not the inverse" Quoted i n B. Benktson: Christus und die Religion, 1967, p. 96. 2 The Barmen Declaration was drafted by K. Barth personally, soon af t e r H i t l e r had become Chancellor and T i l l i c h had been removed from his chair of sociology at Frankfurt University because of his active i n t e r e s t i n a C h r i s t i a n , s o c i a l i s t move-ment. ( T i l l i c h ' s publications i n t h i s connection are to be found i n the second volume of Gesammelten Werke, 1962). Barth's action was aimed against the Deutsche Christen, who cooperated with H i t l e r ' s party and i t became the foundation paper of the Con-fessing Church. I t declared the world profane and devoid of d i r e c t C h r i s t i a n i n t e r e s t . Cf. B. Martin: PauI T i l l i c h ' s Doctrine of Man, 1963, p..25. ' 11 i n the f o u r t i e s , Jesus i s said to replace the burden of Religions with the easy yoke of New Being and to be the "end of a l l Religions rather than the bringer of a new one.''' And at the end of his l i f e T i l l i c h writes that "a p a r t i c u l a r Religion w i l l l a s t to the degree i n which i t negates i t s e l f 2 as a Religion". Unlike Barth, however, T i l l i c h accepts a 3 r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e i n man which i s valuable and imperishable. True r e l i g i o n as the state of ultimate concern i s , i n f a c t , the foundation of f a i t h , but consequently involves attitudes beyond f a i t h which Barth would r e j e c t as self-righteous aberr-ations. According to T i l l i c h ultimate concern permeates a l l culture, and f a i t h consists i n r e l a t i n g t h i s concern to a concrete symbol as the representation of what concerns us u l t -imately. As T i l l i c h sees i t , i t i s the task of r e l i g i o n to f i g h t within the c u l t u r a l t o t a l i t y of concrete Religions against human r e l i g i o s i t i e s . His view of r e l i g i o n therefore i s d i a l e c t i c and paradoxical i n ways that Barth's i s not. We understand that Bonhoeffer i s somewhat suspicious of T i l l i c h ' s attempt "to i n t e r p r e t the evolution of the world i t s e l f ... i n a r e l i g i o u s 4 sense" . T i l l i c h i n fact makes sure to r e j e c t a Religion of "*"P. T i l l i c h : The Shaking of the Foundations3 1948 , p. 172. 2Chr. Eno. , p. 97 3Ibid.j p. 96. Cf. also Fut. Bel., pp. 88 and 94. ^D. Bonhoeffer: Letters -and Papers from. -Prison. Cf. Letter 8/ 6/1944, Fontana papers, 1965, pp. 108 f. 12 non-religion or a theology of the secular. In his eyes these concepts are contradictions and i t seems to us that Barth 1s contrast between revelation and r e l i g i o n , between God's word and man's word, i s prone to lead to such contradictions. The paradox i n which T i l l i c h t r i e s to combine the p o s i t i v e and negative appraisal of Religions forms the heart of his system and i t can be understood only i n terms of c o r r e l a t i o n as we s h a l l t r y to show below. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to see i n t h i s context that T i l l i c h agrees with Bonhoeffer's view that C h r i s t -i a n i t y should become secular, or i n his own words "an expression 2 of the ultimate meaning i n the actions of our d a i l y l i f e " . The r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and the secular should be given some attention r i g h t from the beginning. It- i s the ever return-ing theme of T i l l i c h ' s thinking and he himself stresses the 3 role i t plays i n the encounter between the Religions. Whereas he considers the profane the absolute opposite of r e l i g i o n , and whereas pure secularism should also be seen as a truncated "... rejected the paradox of r e l i g i o n of non-religion, or a theology without theos also c a l l e d a theology of the secular". Fut. Rel. p.80. 2 "We f i n d contemporary theologians (like Bonhoeffer..) maintain-ing that C h r i s t i a n i t y must become secular.. And that i s what i t should be", Chr. Eno. , p. 94. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the word "secular" had been absent from T i l l i c h ' s works almost u n t i l the f i n a l period of his l i f e . But the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n he gives of i t corresponds to a theme which occupied him during a l l his l i f e , namely the r e l a t i o n between culture and r e l i g i o n . For t h i s theme cf. P. T i l l i c h : On the Boundary,. 1966 , pp. 68-74. 3 C f . Chr. Eno. , p. 95. o r i e n t a t i o n that frustrates grace i n a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t f i n i t u d e , he holds that the secular nonetheless has a r e l i g i o u s function 2 of i t s own. When l i f e i s dominated by "the e c s t a t i c forms of the Holy and the repression of the i n t r i n s i c demands of goodness, of j u s t i c e , of truth and of beauty", T i l l i c h i n s i s t s , secular-3 i z a t i o n i s l i b e r a t i o n . The secular i n t h i s sense contains the r a t i o n a l protest which also urged the prophets and mystics. Rationalism i s i n fac t the daughter of mysticism and consequently only those forms of the i r r a t i o n a l should be excluded by a se c u l a r i z a t i o n process which t r y to preserve the inner power of 4 things against the " r a t i o " . On the other hand the secular shares i n the ambiguities of Religions as i t i s always i n danger of becoming autonomous and demonic i t s e l f . When the forces of law, science and aesthetics cease to point to the ultimate mean-ing of l i f e , s e c u l a r i t y acquires the state of quasi-Religion 5 with i t s own oppressiveness and ambiguity. Thus T i l l i c h refuses to consider r e l i g i o n the sphere of the Cf. James L. Adams: Paul T i l l i c h ' s Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion. 1965, p. 50. 2 C f . Rut. Rel. , p. 89. ^Ibid. p. 90. Also: "The Secular i s the Rational. The Rational must Judge the I r r a t i o n a l i t y of the Holy". Ibid. p. 89. 4 Cf. quotations i n Adams op. c i t . pp. 219f. n. 58, as well as P. T i l l i c h : Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century. Protestant Theology (Abr. Persp.) 1967, p. 19. 5 C f . Rut. Rel. , p.90. 14 i r r a t i o n a l as does Rudolph Otto. When he designs his apolog-e t i c theology with s i m i l a r intentions as Schleiermacher, he 2 attempts f i r s t of a l l to safeguard the rights of the r a t i o n a l . Yet his main i n t e r e s t i s not rationalism but e x i s t e n t i a l i s m for he pri m a r i l y aims at defeating the former. In p a r t i c u l a r , he strongly resents Hegel's r a t i o n a l i s t monism, because i t declares philosophers the highest s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n of the divine and glosses over the seriousness of man's e x i s t e n t i a l predicament. Although he himself retains many i d e a l i s t elements i n his own self-transcending realism, as we s h a l l see below, he makes every e f f o r t not to reason away h i s t o r i c a l existence into a s t a t i c , e s s e n t i a l i s t system as has been done by the main 3 _ stream of Western philosophy. Against Hegel he argues that the ground of being does not shine through existence unequivocally, Cf. quotation i n Adams op. c i t . p. 220 and also What is Religion? p. 61. This does not exclude that T i l l i c h acknowledges great indebtedness to Otto at many instances e.g., ST. I, pp.215f. 2 . . . . His esteem for Schleiermacher i s often combined with c r i t i c i s m of the attempt to make r e l i g i o n a separate province of man's s p i r i t u a l l i f e . Cf. What is Religion? pp. 126,131,160. But T i l l i c h knew about Schleiermacher 1s r e a l intentions cf. ST.I, p. 42 and Persp. p. 96 and passim. 3 Adams op. c i t . pp. 202-13 gives clear outlines of T i l l i c h ' s perception of European philosophy. For his i d e a l i s t sympathies. Cf. On the Boundary pp. 81-91. Many c r i t i c s think that i d e a l i s t elements choke T i l l i c h ' s understanding of existence to some extent Cf. e s p e c i a l l y K. Hamilton: The System and the Gospel. 1963. K. Osborne:, New Being, 1969. For T i l l i c h ' s views on the r e l a t i o n between essentialism and e x i s t e n t i a l i s m cf. Persp., pp. 243 f f . 15 but that t h i s transparency i s i n f a c t the telos , the intended f u l f i l l m e n t of h i s t o r y and that as such i t w i l l always require an i n f i n i t e "jump"."'" In T i l l i c h ' s conception of r e l i g i o n i t i s t h i s intended transparency of everything for the ground of being, which allows him to agree with Bonhoeffer's demand that C h r i s t i a n i t y must become secular. I t also c a l l s for a swinging between "Yes" and "No", a pradoxical balancing on the boundary l i n e , which indeed T i l l i c h thinks c r u c i a l for anyone who desires true 2 knowledge of r e a l i t y . These concepts however can not be under-stood unless we study them within T i l l i c h ' s perception of the history of philosophy and more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t of his doctoral study on S c h e l l i n g . As a matter of f a c t , we f i n d most of his l a t e r insights already i n t h i s work and he himself acknowledges repeatedly that Schelling i n s p i r e d his understanding of existence. I t i s also i n t e r e s t i n g to note that he traces back-"There i s no proportion or gradation between the f i n i t e and the I n f i n i t e . There i s an absolute break, an i n f i n i t e "jump". " (ST. I, p. 237) Yet: "... the i n f i n i t e transcendence of the i n f i n i t e over the f i n i t e , . . . does not contradict but rather con-firms the coincidence of opposites. The i n f i n i t e i s present i n everything f i n i t e " (ST.I, p. 263). The coincidence of opposites and the i n f i n i t e "jump" (concepts derived from Nicolaus Cusanus and Sciren Kierkegaard) form together what T i l l i c h has c a l l e d "the p o s i t i v e paradox of r e l i g i o n " . 2 "The boundary i s the best place to acquire knowledge" (On the Boundary} p.13) T i l l i c h ' s stress on the boundary we see also i n : P. T i l l i c h : The Protestant Era (abr. Prot. Era) 1962, p. 19 5. . , 16 to Schelling some of the other philosophies that have influenced him, such as Nietzsche's Lebensphilosophie and Kierkegaard's e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . And f i n a l l y we should mention that he himself considers t h i s study of Schelling h e l p f u l for the encounter with Asian R e l i g i o n s . 1 1.2 IDENTITY AND DISTANCE In his doctoral study on Sc h e l l i n g T i l l i c h was faced with the problem which was to occupy him f o r the rest of his l i f e : can we accept a philosophy of r e l i g i o n which presupposes the i d e n t i t y between the r e l i g i o u s and the philosophical ultimate and, at the same time, profess the wholly otherliness of God's transcendence. This i s the problem of man's ess e n t i a l union with the divine and the all-permeating and i n f i n i t e distance, 2 which requires that the divine address i t s e l f to mankind. 1 C f . Persp., pp. 75 and 141f.; Ges.W.I p. 9; Ges.W.IV, p. 133. T i l l i c h knows about Kierkegaard's c r i t i c i s m of Schelling but he thinks that the two have more i n common than Hamilton permits.Gf. Persp. , pp. 150f. and 162f. 2 "Das r e l i g i o s e und philosophische Absolute, deus und esse, Konnen nicht unverbunden nebeneinander stehen. Wie konnen sie miteinander verbunden werden, ontologisch und erkenntnistheoretisch?" (Ges.W. V, p. 123). "Philosophy of Religion Loses God the Moment i t forsakes t h i s grounds: impossibile est sine deo discere deum. God i s known only through God." (What is Religion? p. 154). 17 In modern philosophy the extreme positions of thi s p o l a r i t y were represented by Hegel and Kant. The l a t t e r ' s c r i t i c a l philosophy had shown that man's mental categories completely structure his knowledge of an object. Hegel accepted t h i s view but denied the conclusion that t h i s unity between the subject and the object forces us to pos i t an absolute distance between the contingent and the divine source. Spinoza's monism had professed the i d e n t i t y of the universe and the one, divine Substance, and now Hegel l i k e other Romantics, attempted a synthesis of Kant and Spinoza. His theory of divine, cunning ideas, d r i v i n g d i a l e c t i c a l l y toward a c t u a l i z a t i o n i n h i s t o r i c a l mankind, was bound to break down, because i t f a i l e d to recognize that God, universe and human i n t e l l e c t cannot possibly be made interchangeable terms, or, i n other words, because i t ignored the second side of the p o l a r i t y , the distance. The v a c i l l a t i o n between these two poles characterizes a l l the history of Western philosophy according to Tilli c h . " ' ' These themes return passim i n Per>sp. , but we should mention more p a r t i c u l a r l y T i l l i c h ' s a r ticle:"The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion" (abr. Two Types) Union Seminary Quarterly Review 1 (1946)pp. 3-13 and two chapters i n Protestant Era, namely Philosophy and Fate, and Realism and Faith. Osborne devotes an excursus to T i l l i c h ' s view of the two philosophical streams. Cf. op. c i t . pp. 207-15. J.P. Gabus also spends a chapter on thi s issue. Cf. Introduction "a la Theologie de la Culture de Paul T i l l i c h , 1969, pp. 65-86. Comparing these two authors we seem to f i n d a double p o l a r i t y i n T i l l i c h ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , namely that between the ontological and the cosmological approach, and that between the e s s e n t i a l i s t and the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t philosophy. Although the l a t t e r , the post-Renaissance p o l a r i t y runs mainly p a r a l l e l to the former, there are differences which T i l l i c h does not examine thoroughly. 18 One stream of thought stresses the distance between God and man i n an overwhelming manner. Kierkegaard's protest against Hegel i s the most f o r c e f u l expression of thi s awareness that man should never ignore t h i s distance and disguise the g u i l t involved by c a l l i n g a lack of being simply a non-being or a not-yet-being. 1 The anxiety about non-being relates Kier-kegaard to Kant's view of the e t h i c a l imperative, of f i n i t u d e and r a d i c a l e v i l . This view, i n i t s turn, should be valued as an adequate expression of the Protestant r e j e c t i o n of a l l 2 human attempts at s e l f - s a l v a t i o n . The emphasis on man's distance from the divine, therefore, goes back to the Reform-ers, to t h e i r nominalist sources, to Duns Scotus, and i n the f i n a l analysis to the Thomist-Aristotelian protest against the 3 neo-Platonic, Augustinian l i n e of thought. The l a t t e r ' s main contention that 'Deus est esse' had led to an exaggerated view of the fundamental, divine immanence i n both r e a l i t y and human 1 C f . Ges. W. I, p. 21. 2 'We can not break through to God... He must come to us. In th i s way Kant represents to great extent the attitude of Pro-testantism' (Persp. p. 66). T i l l i c h develops t h i s s i m i l a r i t y between Kant, Protestantism and early E x i s t e n t i a l i s m also with reference to the theory of r a d i c a l e v i l . F i n a l l y he shows that the Romantics a l l 'faced the problem: How to unite mysticism and the Protestant p r i n c i p l e ' and that Schleiermacher was the f i r s t one to attempt that synthesis, the synthesis between Spinoza and Kant. (Ibid. pp. 74f). . •^Cf. Two Types pp.6f. An Interesting study on the revolution toward anthropocentrism which Aquinas i n i t i a t e d can be found i n L. Dewart The Foundations of Belief, 1969, The word 'dissolution' which T i l l i c h uses to characterize Aquinas'- attack on the August-ini a n system suggests a disapproval which i s not altogether T i l l i c h ' s r e a l view, for he praises Aquinas at many occasions e s p e c i a l l y for introducing the a n a l y t i c a l detachment. Cf. e.g. ST.I, p. 41. reason. The awareness of God, however, as the immanent power of being, which preceeds the separation between object and subject, and as the source of a l l truth (ipsum verum) i s considered by T i l l i c h as the indispensible basis of a l l philosophy of r e l i g i o n . This emphasis on the union with the divine was defended by Franciscans l i k e Bonaventura and re-appeared i n modified form, aft e r the nominalist episode, i n the rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and e s p e c i a l l y i n Spinoza's concept of the divine Substance. Kant attempted to combine the immanence of eternal ideas i n man's mind with the B r i t i s h empiricism and Hume's skept-icism. In so doing, however, he formulated most c l e a r l y the s t a t i c , e s s e n t i a l i s t approach of r e a l i t y which had become ever more dominant and which enabled Hegel to use Kant's c r i t i q u e s for his own phenomenology of the S p i r i t , i n which the r a d i c a l , e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement from the divine i s completely ignored. Kant himself was s t i l l aware of t h i s distance, when he r e s t r i c t e d the union between God and man to the categorical imperative, but the Romantics who r e p l i e d to him had soon o b l i t e r a t e d the la s t element of the subdominant stream of Western thought, namely the awareness of the e x i s t e n t i a l l y c r i t i c a l struggle between the divine and the demonic.''" ''"This did not prevent him from having a high regard for men l i k e Schleiermacher. Cf.-ST. I, p. 42. 20 Among the rejoinders of Kant, T i l l i c h had chosen to study Schelling because of his ultimately successful attempt at integrating an i d e a l i s t philosophy of nature and an existent-i a l i s t awareness of the demonic c o n f l i c t between the conscious and unconscious. In so doing Schelling included the subdom-inant of thought with i t s emphasis on the concrete h i s t o r i c a l dimension of man, as against the Cartesian, r a t i o n a l formalism, and, more important yet, he avoided deriving the concept of God from a r a t i o n a l analysis of r e l i g i o n . 1 Mysticism, as the union with the divine, and consciousness of g u i l t , as expression of the i n f i n i t e estrangement, are the poles with which T i l l i c h ' s study on Schelling deals. Schelling' f i r s t period had been a d i r e c t preparation of Hegel's e s s e n t i a l i s t monism. It ignored man's g u i l t and distance from the 2 divine. In attacking Kant's f i r s t two C r i t i q u e s , Schelling combined Fichte's d i a l e c t i c s with the organic teleology found i n Kant's Cri t i q u e of Judgment. This led him to a mysticism Cf. Persp. p. 88. We should note that T i l l i c h i n speaking of dominant and subdominant streams of thought does not intend to c l a s s i f y any philosopher exclusively i n either l i n e . Whereas the most outspoken representatives of the two streams are Kant and Boehme, we see that Plato and Augustine are said to have integrated very successfully the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t awareness. Cf. Persp. p. 244. 2 'Alles was e x i s t i e r t i s t als existierendes mit Gott iden-t i s c h , ein Widerspruch zwischen Gott und Mensch beruht auf Imagination... Schuldbewusstsein i s t Sunde' (Ges.W.I, p.74). T i l l i c h ' s doctoral study was published i n 1912 under the t i t l e : 'Mystik und Sehuldbewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwickelung ' (Ges.W.I. pp. 13-108). 21 i n which nature figured as the free self-development of the Unconditional Ground of being. Nature was not an i r r e l e v a n t matter, he claimed, i n which man was to es t a b l i s h his e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s glory, but rather the embodiment of grace, the divine self-manifestation and s e l f - g i f t . Man's j u s t i f i c a t i o n , then, consisted i n his mystical u n i f i c a t i o n with the creative force underneath nature's history." 1" Schelling's f i r s t period ended i n an aesthetic mysticism i n which he professed creative art to be the divine r e v e l a t i o n , j u s t as Hegel did with regard 2 to philosophy. Schelling entered his second period with a new study of the idea of freedom, a f t e r he had perceived • the d i s t o r t i o n of the moral consciousness i n both his own system and that of Hegel. He s t i l l retained some central views of his i d e a l -ism, such as the idea that nature's h i s t o r y embodies the grace 3 which, unites man to the Unvordenkliche. In history freedom and destiny seem to be each other's opposites and e s s e n t i a l l y they form i n fact a p o l a r i t y (Widersprueh). In God's aseity, 1Indem i c h aber mit der Natur identisch bin, bin i c h eins mit Gott dem Lebendigen der Natur' (Ges.W. I, p. 44). T i l l i c h i s quick to point out that Schelling's p o s i t i o n i s not i d e n t i c a l with Spinoza's pantheism because i t does not equate God and nature but c a l l s God nature's creative power. Cf. Ges.W. I, p.9. 2 'die Kunst i s t die'wahre Religion' (Quoted by T i l l i c h Ges.W. I/ P. 57) . 3 Cf. Ges.W.I, pp. 76ff. The word "Unvordenkliche' means that beyond which thought i s inconceivable. 22 however, t h i s p o l a r i t y i s overcome by an e t e r n a l l y new act of the W i l l . Ideally, therefore, the poles of freedom and destiny include each other because being receives i t s form only through the s p i r i t u a l and free self-determination. 1 At the opposite pole to God i s the created universe of which He i s the underlying (subjectum) power of being. He w i l l s i t s eternal coming into existence and i n so doing He f r e e l y re-nounces immediate union. This f a c t i s i r r a t i o n a l not because 2 i t contradicts, but because i t preceeds r a t i o n a l i t y . The freedom to create t h i s pole as his self-manifestation proves God's transcendence. To the extent that the created universe has being, i t s opposition to the divine i s e s s e n t i a l -l y overcome, and not to be i d e n t i f i e d with the s i n f u l separation. This created pole, however, as can be seen most c l e a r l y i n i t s highest a c t u a l i z a t i o n which i s man, possesses the same s t r u c t -ure of being, that i s the p o l a r i t y between freedom and destiny. This p o l a r i t y r esults i n s i n f u l s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n i f man asserts his selfhood over against the o r i e n t a t i o n toward the eternal and transcendent divine act. Man, of necessity, has a 1 U n i v e r s -a l w i l l e ' , but he can s a c r i f i c e i t to something p a r t i c u l a r and_ 1 , E s i s t ein Ur-und Grundwollen das sich selbst zu etwas macht, und der Grund und der Basis a l l e r Wesenheit ist'. (Quoted by T i l l i c h : Ges. W.I, .p. 7 7 ) . . 2 We see t h i s idea of i r r a t i o n a l i t y return i n connection with T i l l i c h ' s discussion of the purpose of creation. Cf. ST.I, p. 2 6 3 . 23 i n so doing become a truncated s u b j e c t i v i t y . When he submits, however, to the concern about the depth of creation we speak of r e l i g i o n , which Schelling also c a l l s God's love of Himself i n a completed self-realization."'" Even though the opposition whi di resulted from God's free act of creation can assume the t r a i t s of a s i n f u l , autonomous opposition i n man and although i t f a c t u a l l y always does so, we must s t i l l hold that the opposition i s b a s i c a l l y overcome i n an enduring union between creation and the Ground of i t s being. This union appears as a wrathful judgment i f an anthropocentric, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y p r e v a i l s i n man, but i t i s grace i f God's immanence i s accepted, i f man recognizes his g u i l t and l e t s 2 this union overcome .the separation. This i s T i l l i c h ' s reading of S c h e l l i n g , which has become most i n f l u e n t i a l i n his own understanding of r e l i g i o n as the true dimension of h i s t o r y . The imperishable union with the divine and the d i s t o r t i n g , f a c t u a l estrangement form the para-doxi c a l l y united dimensions of our s i t u a t i o n . Man must accept that he i s e s s e n t i a l l y the divine nature i n an eternal incarn-'Religion i s t die Liebe mit der Gott sic h s elbst l i e b t ' (Gee. IV. I, p. 83) . 2 Cf. Ges.W. I, p. 87. Why selfhood has not got the s p i r i t u a l power to overcome the opposition, as has the divine S p i r i t , i s one of those questions to which Sch e l l i n g would answer that i s how things are, and that 'Nur Seinen Wegen nach zu gehen i s t aufgabe der Theologie' {Ges.W. I, p. 86). 24 ation, not as an i d e n t i t y , but as a conquered opposition. This acceptance, which conquers man's estrangement, cannot be a mystical escape from e x i s t e n t i a l , concrete conditions, for i t necessarily takes place i n c u l t u r a l forms. The s p a t i a l and temporal r e a l i t y , the c u l t u r a l forms, however contingent and p a r t i c u l a r they be, are the only mediation of our u n i f i c a t i o n with the Ground of our being, when the s i n f u l 2 ' P a r t i c u l a r w i l l e ' i s submitted to the ' U n i v e r s a l w i l l e '. 'Der Mensch an si c h ... i s t Gott setzend, ... die Vermitt-lung Gottes mit sich selbst' "Uberwundener Widerspruch... Identitat ... behauptet sich im ewigen Prozess der Mensch-werdung Gottes. Dies i s t der Re l i g i o n s b e g r i f f . . . Pas, was Religion zur Religion macht, i s t die s u b s t a n t i e l l e I d e n t i t a t mit Gott" (Ges. W.I, pp. l O l f ) . 2 'Sunde i s t die Selbstheit die sich a l s Selbstheit Au-fri c h t e n w i l l 1 (Ges. W. I, p. 89). The words 1 P a r t i c u l a r w i l l e ' and ' U n i v e r s a l w i l l e ' are close enough to English to be immediat-ely comprehensible. T i l l i c h learned from Schelling that r e l i g i o n should negate a l l attempts at s e l f - s a l v a t i o n without denying the i n t r i n s i c value of the concrete r e a l i t y . The Thomist r e v o l -ution had r i g h t l y emphasized the concrete, r a t i o n a l world of the human, culture creating s p i r i t , but when l a t e r the estrange-ment from the ultimate Ground of meaning was forgotten, as i n Hegel's essentialism which i d e n t i f i e s culture and r e l i g i o n , the valuable subdominant stream had l o s t i t s protesting power. Only the system that keeps the pradox between these poles can hope to have universal relevance. Gabus thinks that Aquinas was better equipped to do so than the Franciscan t r a d i t i o n of Bonaventure, which T i l l i c h has chosen to follow. Cf. Gabus, op. c i t . p. 85. On both sides t h i s discussion smacks s l i g h t l y of unwise confessionalism. 25 1.3 RELIGION AND CULTURE Religion as the ultimate concern i s the prius of a l l events, because i t i s the event i n which creation, through man, returns to i t s o r i g i n . Man surrenders to his essence as divine s e l f -manifestation without losing his selfhood. This r e l i g i o u s surrender i s an i n f i n i t e leap, but i t should not be c a l l e d i r r a t i o n a l except i n the same sense as God's c r e a t i v i t y , which establishes the opposition God - creature, i s i r r a t i o n a l , or rather p r e - r a t i o n a l . Religion, even i f we c a l l i t God's own s e l f - l o v e , i s a f u l l y human and r a t i o n a l r e a l i t y , which, how-ever, cannot be sounded to i t s f u l l depth. I t does not e x i s t separately from r a t i o n a l functions. It does not contradict them, but rather permeates them. By functions T i l l i c h means the s p i r i t u a l processes by which man r e a l i z e s meaning i n h i s t o r i c a l acts of grasping and shaping r e a l i t y . And i t i s his most c r u c i a l view that the r e l i g i o u s r e l a t i o n to the ground of a l l meaning underlies every human function, so that r e l i g i o n i s the prius of culture and that no f i n i t e form of meaning, no concrete c u l t -u r a l act can be understood without the permeating passion of the i n f i n i t e . I t could be observed that there i s a s h i f t i n T i l l i c h ' s d e f i n i t i o n of r e l i g i o n from "the state of being ultimately concerned' to 'the state of being grasped by the ultimate con-cern', which i s his favourite formula i n l a t e r years. 26 To comprehend th i s i n s i g h t f u l l y , however, we must r e l a t e i t to the human tendency to set the search for c u l t u r a l absolutes i n the place of God and thereby to cease being s e l f - c r i t i c a l . " ' ' Because the ultimate concern d i s t o r t s man's self-transcending function when i t clings r e l e n t l e s s l y to a contingent c u l t u r a l r e a l i t y , t h i s function's e s s e n t i a l unity with that of c u l t u r a l s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n and moral s e l f - i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l be broken 2 i n the state of man's existence. Religion, then, appears as a separate and ambiguous function i n mankind. Man's i n c l i n a t i o n to h a l t the eternal process of the divine by s i n f u l s e l f - a s s e r t i o n s turns what i s e s s e n t i a l l y only a l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n into an e x i s t e n t i a l d i s t o r t i o n . The core of thi s process i s that man t r i e s to negate f i n i t u d e by attaching absolute value to auto-/* nomous c u l t u r a l acts. Because T i l l i c h does not deny the i n t r i n s i c value of these acts we can f e e l already that the Lutheran para-dox of 1 simul Justus et pecoator' has an important r o l e to play i n t h i s sytem. This paradox makes T i l l i c h also accept that the history of revelation i s e n t i r e l y interwoven with man's s e l f -3 righteous attempts at overcoming his f i n i t u d e . "'"'Each of these... forms i n which r e l i g i o n i s overcome within r e l i g i o n i s characterized by the same d i a l e c t i c as r e l i g i o n i t -s e l f . They can set themselves i n the place of God' (What is-Religion? p.147. 2 Cf. ST. 111., p. 96. This view q u a l i f i e s T i l l i c h ' s former contention that r e l i g i o n can not be considered as a separate function of the human s p i r i t . 3 'That history...of revelation,...begins the moment man be-comes aware of the ultimate question of his estranged predic-ament and of his destiny to overcome t h i s predicament'. ( S T . I l l , p. 366). 1Demonization of the holy occurs i n a l l Religions day by day' (ST. I l l , p. 1 0 2 ) . Cf. also Ges. W. I, p. 383. 27 T i l l i c h appears close to Barth's c r i t i c i s m of l i b e r a l , anthropocentric theories when i t comes to the r e l a t i o n bet-ween culture and r e l i g i o n . He points out that the L i b e r a l s wrongly i d e n t i f i e d r e l i g i o n with s p i r i t u a l functions such as w i l l i n g , f e e l i n g or thinking and a c t u a l l y defined God by taking f i n i t e r e a l i t i e s as point of departure, such as the s e l f , the universe, culture or the h i s t o r y of R e l i g i o n s . 1 To i d e n t i f y r e l i g i o n with these human functions means to turn i t i n t o the most pertinent expression of d i s t o r t i o n because i t 2 o b l i t e r a t e s the unconditional Ground of a l l meaning. Each function necessarily operates within the subject - object " p o l a r i t y . But God transcends t h i s p o l a r i t y , so that any Religion which ignores- God as the -prius of a l l functions i s 3 necessarily destructive, t r a g i c and demonic. Whereas Barth's c r i t i c i s m presents a strongly m o r a l i s t i c and abstract No to culture, T i l l i c h t r i e s to show that the quest of God and the theological study thereof permeate a l l functions and i n s t i t u t i o n s of man. He claims that God's transcendence does not make r e l i g i o n Cf. What is Religion? p.124. 2 Cf. Ibid., p. 160. This forms one of the central ideas of Barth's c r i t i c i s m of Religion. 3 Churches are the places where f a i t h i s allowed to become Religion i . e . , 'ambiguous, d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , destructive and demonic' but also where these ambiguities are recognized.: Cf. ST. I l l , p. 73. 28 i r r e l e v a n t for culture and vice v e r s a . 1 The t r a d i t i o n of Halle University had given T i l l i c h an awareness that r e l i g i o n can never be divorced from, nor i d e n t i f i e d with s p e c i a l functions of the human s p i r i t . He therefore thinks that Barth's approach i n stead of o f f e r i n g an alte r n a t i v e to Liberalism, presents a disruption of meaning, a negative view of creation and a supranaturalism which does not care to re l a t e revelation to 2 the questions implied i n man's predicaments. T i l l i c h ' s own al t e r n a t i v e can be summed up i n his frequent-ly used formula: r e l i g i o n i s the substance of culture and 3 culture i s the form of r e l i g i o n . We f i n d t h i s view worked out 4 more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n some of. his early writings. In 1922, he set out to show that theology does not deal with a separate being but with the ultimate concern that inspires a l l f i e l d s In T i l l i c h ' s view 'the r a t i o n a l i s t i c moralism and the abstract universalism of Kantian ethics have served to give an abstract, "untimely" character to Barthianism' Adams op. c i t . p. 117. 2 Cf. Persp. XXXI. The uni v e r s i t y of Halle combined a p i e t i s t and i d e a l i s t t r a d i t i o n . Its most i n f l u e n t i a l teacher had been Martin Kahler, to whom T i l l i c h i s indebted for some most fundament-a l i n s i g h t s . His difference with Barth i n these matters i s clear from S T . I l l , 285 and also from Adam's discussion. Cf. op. c i t . p. 120. But thi s should not make us forget that he had a deep respect for Barth. Cf. e.g., Prot. Era, pp 84, 38, 60, 207. 3 Cf. ST. I l l , p. 248 and On the Boundary pp.69f. ^In p a r t i c u l a r : Religionsphilosophie der Kultur. B e r l i n 1919. Die Uberwinding des R e l i g i o n s b e g r i f f s in' der Religions-philosophie. B e r l i n 1922. Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenstanden und Methoden. Gottingen 1923 and Religionsphilosophie B e r l i n 1925. 29 with which other sciences are dealing. He rejects the Liberals who considered r e l i g i o n the i r r a t i o n a l f i e l d of the human s p i r i t which can not come into c o n f l i c t with the r a t i o n a l . He argues that t h i s view i s a form of escapism, which only ' s p a t i a l -i z e s ' God as a being besides other beings and Religion as a 2 function besides others. Against such attempts we should stress that r e l i g i o n i s the ultimate import embodied i n c u l t u r a l forms of meaning as the very concern about meaning, rather than as a separate a c t i v i t y dealing with an object such as a "Highest 3 Being", the "Ultimate" or the "Universal". In order to form-ulate both the difference and the r e l a t i o n between culture and r e l i g i o n , T i l l i c h had to develop a new method which he 4 c a l l e d metal-ogi.es- or critical-phenomenology. This method underlies his whole system of correlations and i t i s determined 5 by his basic i n s i g h t into the paradoxical nature of the r e a l i t y . Cf. Adams p. 181. 2 Cf. What is Religion? p.13.Benkston compares T i l l i c h ' s warning against escapism into the r a t i o n a l (Cf. ST.I, p.. 15) to s i m i l a r protests voiced by Bonhoeffer. Cf. op. c i t . p. 103. 3 Cf. ST.I, p. 12. On the other hand T i l l i c h points out that 'in the cognitive realm everything... be i t God or a stone... i s an object' and that 'Theology makes an object of that which pre-cedes the subject - object structure' (ST.I., p. 172). 4 The term metalogics i s used exclusively i n the e a r l i e r works, and i t refers to the method that goes beyond (meta)' the study of mere l o g i c a l forms. We f i n d a clear description of his ' C r i t i c a l phenomenology' also i n ST.I, p. 106. ^ T i l l i c h declares that 'das System nicht nur z i e l sondern auch Ausgangspunkt a l l e s Erkennens i s t ' (Ges.W.I-, p. 111). For a d i s -cussion of t h i s view i n r e l a t i o n with the place of theology i n the system of sciences, see Schmitz op. c i t . pp. 38ff. 30 As many c r i t i c s attack T i l l i c h ' s system as such we must give some attention to t h i s method. Although i t deals i n f i r s t instance with the philosophy of r e l i g i o n , t h i s method i s of d i r e c t importance for theology because T i l l i c h considers these two d i r e c t l y interdependent. 1 j T i l l i c h thinks that i n determining the essence of r e l i g i o n , we can not r e l y e i t h e r on psychology or h i s t o r y . Even theo-2 logy or metaphysics are inadequate d i s c i p l i n e s i n t h i s respect. Religion's c r i t i c a l power, which points to the transcendent depth of a l l c u l t u r a l meaning, i s l o s t by the r e l a t i v i s m of a l l d i s c i p l i n e s that define r e l i g i o n " i n terms of c u l t u r a l structures. The d i a l e c t i c r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and culture was l o s t also when Schleiermacher, Troeltsch and even Otto adopted the 3 theory of a r e l i g i o u s a p r i o r i . The only hope l e f t seems to be a combination of Kant's c r i t i c i s m and Husserl's phenomen-ology, which emphasize respectively the actual form i n which man structures r e a l i t y and the e s s e n t i a l that breaks through the "*"A11 c u l t u r a l r e a l i t i e s , r e l i g i o n included, can be approached from three angles. Philosophy a r t i c u l a t e s t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r sphere of meaning, c u l t u r a l history studies the empirical forms i n which th i s meaning i s embodied and systematics presents the concrete normative system on the basis of the two forgoing studies. With respect to r e l i g i o n we see three interdependent f i e l d s namely: the philosophy of r e l i g i o n , the hi s t o r y of Religions and system-a t i c theology. 2 C f . What is Religion? pp. 10, 32, 80, 97. 3 Cf. Adams op. c i t . p. 150 and What is Religion? pp.61 and 126. ' , • 31 actual forms. Neither of these methods by i t s e l f reaches a r e a l understanding, and even an i d e a l i s t combination as proposed by Hegel f a l l s short of the mark.'1' Kant takes c u l t u r a l forms and t h e i r interconnections at t h e i r face value without asking 2 about the dynamics that brxng them about and unite them. The Kantian approach, which led to a concentration on emperical, psychological data, c a l l e d for the phenomenology of Husserl as a reaction. He.claims that any. study of emperical forms of meaning i s preceded by an i n t u i t i o n i n t o the eternal truth of 3 essences (Wesensohau). But Husserl, and Hegel to a large extent as w e l l , f a i l e d to explain the distance between essence and concrete a c t u a l i z a t i o n . T i l l i c h stresses that c u l t u r a l l o g i c a l forms as concrete, h i s t o r i c a l structures embody i n f i n i t e ways an import of meaning which i t s e l f i s i n f i n i t e and inexhaustibly dynamic. The p l u r a l i t y of forms i n t h e i r r a t i o n a l concreteness and unity betray a dynamics of being which i s not explained by t h e i r form. In terms of r e l i g i o n and culture one should r e l a t e these two poles df r e a l i t y saying that r e l i g i o n focuses on the dynamic import of meaning and culture on i t s form and that 'culture as ''"'The c r i t i c a l - d i a l e c t i c a l method ... hopes ... to avoid... an exclusive idealism as well as a doctrine of pre-established harmony, ... i t i s best to speak of the s p i r i t u a l process of f u l f i l l i n g being with meaning'. (What is Religion? p.42). Cf. also i b i d . p. 51. 2 C f . Ibid, pp. 43f. 3 C f . Ibid. pp. 45f. 32 culture i s therefore s u b s t a n t i a l l y , but not i n t e n t i o n a l l y , r e l i g i o u s ' . 1 Form and import of meaning are obviously inseparably united and anything but contradictory to each other. Every form actualizes the import but no matter how valuable i t i s , i t may close i t s e l f to the ever demanding depth beyond i t s e l f . I t is at t h i s point that ambiguity enters and that the e s s e n t i a l unity between the s e l f - c r e a t i n g function of culture and the self-transcending function of r e l i g i o n breaks down into two separate functions. 1.4 REASON AND REVELATION Gilkey points out that T i l l i c h i s a true L i b e r a l as he considers r e l i g i o n the creative, ' s p i r i t u a l force within culture rather than the antithesis of culture' yet d i f f e r s 2 -on several points on rev e l a t i o n . This makes us wonder how T i l l i c h r e l a t e s revelation to the sphere of r a t i o n a l i t y . How can we speak of the c o r r e l a t i o n between e x i s t e n t i a l questions and t h e o l o g i c a l answers without turning r e g i i o n into an 3 i r r a t i o n a l function, a f a l s e safety? In the discussion of 1lbid3 p. 59. 2 L. Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind:The Renewal of God - Language. 1969, p. 186. 3 T i l l i c h says that the protest against any absolute claim for a r e l a t i v e r e a l i t y i s the remedy against the temptation i n the many o f f e r s of r e l i g i o u s or non-religious safety. Cf. Prot. Era. pp. 163 and 195. But with T i l l i c h t h i s should not r e s u l t i n a sort of Religion of misery and doubt. 33 reason and revelation we meet a great va r i e t y of influences on T i l l i c h ' s thought. His a f f i n i t y with men l i k e Heidegger and Plotinus i s immediately evident when we look at his concept of reason. Reason i s that which gives form to being so that 'nichts wird erkannt, was nicht denkgeformt ist. 1"*" Reason i t s e l f , however, i s not the same as the s p i r i t which creates culture i n a constant self-determination, i n the dynamic tension of freedom and destiny, of being and reason, of substan-2 ce and form. Only man's s p i r i t u a l existence, only Base%n3 knows the concern for being. Base-in, as Heidegger has shown, i s the key to what transcends the r a t i o n a l forms, namely the 3 power of being. T i l l i c h values highly not only Hexdegger, however, but also the neo-Platonic Zog-os-ontology, e s p e c i a l l y i n the form presented by Plotinus who 'finds the ultimate power of being beyond the nous (the power of reason) i n the abyss 4 of the formless One'. W. Rowe emphasizes t h i s congruence bet-ween T i l l i c h and Plotinus which i s most i n t e r e s t i n g for us, i f we consider that T i l l i c h c a l l e d the synthesis of the mystical Nothing can be known which i s not formed by thought Ges.W.I, p. 138. 2 . . 'Geist i s t selbst-bestimmung des Denkens im Sem... sem dynamische Spannung beruht auf dem unendlichen Widerspruch von Denken und Sein' {Ges.W.. I, p. 210). 3 c f . ST., I, pp. 62-189, and also Prot. Era p. 85. 4 Prot. Era p. 69. 34 and the r a t i o n a l an o r i e n t a l element i n Plotinus. Incidently, t h i s point i s also noted by Gilkey. While T i l l i c h considers himself as standing on the boundary between idealism and marxism, he i n s i s t s on c a l l i n g himself an i d e a l i s t i f that means accepting 'the i d e n t i t y of thought 2 and being as the p r i n c i p l e of truth'. But, at the same time, he refutes the s t a t i c formalism which could r e s u l t from t h i s p r i n c i p l e . By stres s i n g the p o l a r i t y of being and reason he reintroduces a dynamism of which neo-Platonism had been aware already when i t considered the goal of reason to be i d e n t i c a l with the goal of l i f e ' s movement. 3 The great impression Kant made on T i l l i c h , had taught him not to look at reason or 'logos ' i t s e l f as the creative pulse of h i s t o r y . In Kant's view reason consists of the human categories 'Plotinus... i n thi s ... i s o r i e n t a l and not Greek'. (Ibid.) -Cf. Gilkey op. c i t . p. 289. In p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g that T i l l i c h ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f and Plotinus' One agree i n excluding any l i t e r a l , non-symbolic predication. The major difference bet-ween these two, according to Rowe, stems from the fac t that T i l l i c h ' s B e i n g - i t s e l f does not exclude a l l negativity but rather overcomes i t . Cf. W. Rowe, Religious Symbols and God Chicago 1968, pp. 69-71. 2 On the Boundary p. 82. This quotation i s taken from the chapter e n t i t l e d : Between Idealism and Marxism. 3 'Finitude i s e s s e n t i a l f o r reason... The structure of t h i s f i n i t u d e i s described i n the most profound and comprehensive way in Kant's " c r i t i q u e s " . 1 (ST.I, pp. 81f.) Although T i l l i c h acknowledges he i s heavily indebted to Kant's c r i t i c a l p h i l o -sophy at many occasions (Cf. Osborne op. c i t . pp. 51-57), he also considers this l i n e of thought the mighties.t expression of the Cartesian methodological formalism, which he resents because i t s a c r i f i c e s history to eternal ideas and laws. Cf. Adams op. c i t . p. 202. 35 that structure our perception of r e a l i t y . Hegel's d i a l e c t i c idealism does not deny t h i s , but claims that t h i s r a t i o n a l , formative p r i n c i p l e not only agrees with h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y , but even determines i t s very development. S c h e l l i n g , Marx and Nietzsche i n t h e i r turn, pointed out that'these two positions were both s t a t i c and i d e o l o g i c a l formalism, which ignored the fact that the r e a l , h i s t o r i c a l dynamics must break through established r a t i o n a l forms as the power of being. 1 I t appears to T i l l i c h that the Augustinian-Franciscan t r a d i t i o n struck an acceptable balance i n t h i s matter, because i t combined a prophetic appraisal of the h i s t o r i c a l with the view that truth and being coincide i n God as ipsa Veritas and ipsum esse. God, i n t h i s perception, i s the ultimate power that makes a l l beings p a r t i c i p a t e i n Himself and precedes the cleavage between 2 subject and object. What made T i l l i c h adopt th i s seemingly outdated approach: the Zoefos-ontology? I t was a reaction against those, e s p e c i a l l y the Neo-Kantians, who forgot that 'every epistemology has '''Tillich, following Schell i n g , contends that logos i s an empty abstraction unless i t becomes a matter of concrete concern and decision. This abstraction can take the form either of r a t i o n a l , d i s t i n c t ideas or of emperical p r o b a b i l i t i e s . Truth, however, i s e x i s t e n t i a l . The idea must enter h i s t o r y , not i n the Hegelian way, but within the ambiguity of the tension between fate and freedom. Cf. Adams op. c i t . pp. 2 06-213. 2 Cf. Two Types. pp.4ff. The term vpsum esse, although not Augustinian i n the proper sense, has been linked to t h i s t r a d i t i o n by T i l l i c h and r i g h t l y so. 36 o n t o l o g i c a l assumptions'. If we accept Kant's premise that epistemology 'must begin with the point where subject and object meet', we must admit according to T i l l i c h , that any object has 'essential structures with which the cognitive 2 subject i s e s s e n t i a l l y united. This means that there i s an objective as well as a subjective 'logos' . A l l being i s formed by the 1 logos' which i s the universal p r i n c i p l e of the divine self-manifestation. Because he accepts r a t i o n a l structures i n the objects, T i l l i c h considers himself a r e a l i s t , but not i n 3 the t r a d i t i o n a l sense of the word. What he c a l l s s e l f - t r a n s -cending realism points to man's "participation i n the trans-cendent unity between subject and object, as well as i n the e s s e n t i a l union between reason and being. As a free and s p i r i t u a l 4 self-determination man can therefore be c a l l e d a microcosm. In his e n t i r e l y i n d i v i d u a l Dasein man grasps and shapes being r a t i o n a l l y with a concern about the unconditioned and universal being. At f i r s t sight we suspect a deep a f f i n i t y with Hegel, i n Quoted i n Osborne op. c i t . pp. 51f. 2 On the Boundary, p. 82 and ST. I, p. 94. ^He disagrees with Realism which 'questions every transcend-ence of the r e a l ' (Prot. Era, p. 67). 4 . 'Man i s the microcosmos because i n him a l l l e v e l s of r e a l i t y are present 1 {ST., I, p. 260). Later T i l l i c h w i l l change the term level to dimension. Cf. ST. I l l , p. 15. This concept i s i l l u m i n -ating because i t shows how T i l l i c h thinks that r e l i g i o n need not contradict culture any more than the b i o l o g i c a l contradicts the physical. 37 these l i n e s . But T i l l i c h does not hold that the eternal, e s s e n t i a l union appears i n existence as such, through some inherent force. On the contrary, the world process which man's reason grasps and shapes i s not i d e n t i c a l with the eternal logos that puls-ates through a l l our thinking."*" The p o l a r i t y between the free dynamics of being and the determinative, l o g i c a l structures, which i s e s s e n t i a l l y overcome i n the divine, eternal logos, i s experienced as a destructive predicament i n human existence. Reason i t s e l f suffers most from the e x i s t e n t i a l predicament. Not only does man's reason f a i l to grasp and to shape structures of i n t e r -related beings i n f u l l i n t e g r i t y , but i t i s even impossible to say that man's reason i s the divine logos when viewed under the aspect of eternal evolution. H i s t o r i c a l existence, according to T i l l i c h , can not experience openness to the dynamic presence of the Unconditioned, but as an i r r a t i o n a l breakthrough, which however, does not destroy the r a t i o n a l forms against which i t s 2 %Nol i s directed. When the concern about the unconditional meaning grasps man's reason, the l o g i c a l structures i n which Cf. ST.I, p. 95 2 , T i l l i c h takes great pains to point out that 'God does not need to destroy his created world ... i n order to manifest him-s e l f i n i t ' [ST. I l l , p. 114). 3 8 he deals with r e a l i t y are subjected to the e x i s t e n t i a l quest for r e v e l a t i o n . 1 This i s because the e s s e n t i a l union between being and reason (in the sense of t h e i r conquered p o l a r i t y ) i s disrupted i n the fragmented human reason, so that i t becomes impossible to say that e x i s t e n t i a l r a t i o n a l i t y i s the power of things (which can be said of the divine Logos). To understand the e x i s t e n t i a l predicament of reason, from which re v e l a t i o n heals us, we must b r i e f l y look into T i l l i c h ' s . analysis of reason. Further i t w i l l prove to be important i n respect of the dialogue between Religions. As T i l l i c h says, reason i s not j u s t the cognitive function alone. We d i s t i n g u i s h between receiving and shaping r a t i o n a l i t y and i n both cases there i s one side that deals with the form and one that deals with the contents, so that we discover four r a t i o n a l functions: the cognitive, the aesthetic, the organizational and the organic. The subject - object structure i n a l l of these has to be trans-cended i f the depth of reason i s to manifest i t s e l f f u l l y , but r e l a t i v i s m and absolutism either exagerate or ignore that f a c t . Just l i k e other antinomies, these prevent the f u l l manifestation of the logos which occurs only when the unconditioned import of So i f T i l l i c h agrees with Heidegger that man i s the e x i s t e n t i a l question himself, he q u a l i f i e s i t . Another difference between these thinkers we f i n d when T i l l i c h thinks that Heidegger has b a s i c a l l y l o s t the sting of h i s t o r i c i t y by taking the i d e a l i s t element out of Dasein. Cf. Osborne op. c i t . p. 4 3 . 2 -Cf. ST. I. p. 85. These functions correspond to the areas of science, a r t , law and morals, each with i t s i n t r a n s i c demands of the truth, beauty, j u s t i c e and goodness. 39 meaning shines through the concrete forms as God's free s e l f -determination . Although the very being of things does show that the r a t i o n a l form stands i n a r e l a t i o n of conquered opposition to the ground of being, we can only say that e x i s t e n t i a l l y t h i s i s being contradicted to an i n f i n i t e degree. Human reason i s a di s t o r t e d logos i n the state of fragmentation and c o n f l i c t between the four f u n c t i o n s . 1 In the f i n a l analysis these c o n f l i c t s can be reduced to the opposing r e a l i t i e s of an autonomous reason which l i m i t s i t s e l f to f i n i t e forms and the theonomous reason which accepts as a law (nomos) that everything f i n i t e should be open to the unconditioned (Theos). When theonomy i s considered a surrender to some reason beyond reason and when we speak of law being imposed upon reason rather than reason being united with i t s own depth, then a c o n f l i c t between revelation and reason, 2 between culture and r e l i g i o n appears i n e v i t a b l e . But things are not so. T i l l i c h leaves no doubt that i n his view revelation does not give extraneous information or laws to our r a t i o n a l functions, or 'add anything d i r e c t l y to the t o t a l i t y of our ordinary -'-For a short exposition of T i l l i c h ' s system of the so- c a l l e d Geisteswissenschaften Cf. J.Schmitz, Die a p o l o g e t i s h e Theologie Paul T i l l i c h s . 1966, pp. 26-41. 2 • 'Autonomie fur sich t r e i b t zur leeren, mhaltlosen Form1 (Ges.W.I, p. 272) and actual reason as such ressents the quest of or revelation as well as the unification- with the depth of reason. Cf. ST., I, pp. 83-94. 40 knowledge'. Revelation i s an event, a healing event, and as such i t can be made an object of our cognitive reason. Just what i s t h i s healing event? Its f i r s t aspect, as T i l l i c h points out, consists i n the ontological shock i n which the e x i s t e n t i a l predicament i s exposed. The r i v a l r i e s between the functions and t h e i r i n t e r n a l struggles, as well as the appalling lack of depth and i n t e g r i t y of meaning which they have occasioned a l l through human h i s t o r y , appear experienced as a quest for a 2 word of power, able to overcome t h i s predicament. The impact of the o n t o l o g i c a l shock i s the beginning of a l l genuine p h i -losophical questioning, but the answer, the integration of the functions, can only be received as a gratuitous g i f t . Yes, even the shocking threat of non-being i t s e l f , which leads- to the ontological question, i s inconceivable without the gratuitous, miraculous influence of the mystery of being, and consequently i t would be wrong to suggest a process i n the l i n e of Socrates' m.aieutics. Revelation does not bring out what i s there already but i t brings 'the self-manifestation of the divine... which i s a transforming power '. ST.I. p. 109. 2 And i n t h i s sense "reason does not r e s i s t r e v e l a t i o n . I t asks f o r i t ' {ST.I, p. 94) Cf. ST.II, p. 140 and ST. I, pp. 147-153. Cf. also Schmitz op. c i t . pp. 168f. We f e e l l i k e asking, with. Martin op. c i t . p. 80, i f there could not be ways to over-come these c o n f l i c t s other than by the gratuitous r e v e l a t i o n described by T i l l i c h . 3 ' Persp. p.180. 41 This strong emphasis on the gratuitous r e v e l a t i o n does not mean, however, that T i l l i c h accepts two lev e l s of God's s e l f -manifestation, or accepts any destruction of the r a t i o n a l i t y . With respect to the l a t t e r we should be quite c l e a r . T i l l i c h describes revelation as the miraculous appearance of the mystery of being which man receives i n the state of ecstacy. This sounds l i k e an i r r a t i o n a l enthusiasm about something an t i - n a t u r a l . T i l l i c h , however, states that ecstacy and miracle i n his usage are characterized exactly by the respect for r a t i o n a l i t y . 1 Miracles are the events i n which man i s confronted with the abysmal mystery of his being through the encounter with a con-crete r e a l i t y . Man recognizes t h i s r e a l i t y as representative of the unconditioned Ground of meaning, but only because of his state of form-transcending openness, c a l l e d ecstacy. Although r a t i o n a l structures are respected here, neither miracle nor 2 ecstacy can be c a l l e d 'objective'; they must need transcend established structures, even though revelation w i l l always This respect for r a t i o n a l structures distinguishes ecstacy from demonic possession. Cf. ST.I, p. 116f. I t seems a legitimate question to ask i f therefore r a t i o n a l i t y can be used as a c r i -t e r i o n to d i s t i n g u i s h ecstacy and miracle. T i l l i c h evades t h i s question, but to accept t h i s view would contradict his views. 2 Cf. ST.l, pp. 125f. A miracle must be astonishing and be received as a sign-event i n an e c s t a t i c experience. I t must consequently express the r e l a t i o n of the mystery of being to us i n a s p e c i f i c way, so that we can not hold that i t s contents do not matter, even though i t i s true that everything can become a medium of revelation. Cf. B i b l i c a l Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (abr. Bibl. Rel.), 1955, p. 22. 42 require concrete structures. To the extent that revelation i s the transparency of the Ground of a l l meaning and being i n concrete forms, the opposition betv/een the various functions of reason i s overcome under a growing primacy of love, (agape). The f i n a l and decisive revelation i s consequently that event i n which 'the medium of revelation overcomes i t s f i n i t e con-diti o n s by s a c r i f i c i n g them and i t s e l f with them' through 'the power of negating i t s e l f without losing i t s e l f ' . x This f i n a l r e v e l a t i o n , T i l l i c h t e l l s us, has i n actual f a c t happened i n Jesus as the C h r i s t , the C r u c i f i e d who conquered the demonic powers of s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n and thereby l i b e r a t e d his followers 'from the authority of everything f i n i t e i n him', so that they 2 might have courage and power to be. The absolute of the Christ event which T i l l i c h proposes does not deny r a t i o n a l i t y or impose a new one. I t respects meaning as meaning and brings i t to completion. Reason as reason i s u n i v e r s a l l y both the f r u i t of revelation and the condition for f i n a l r evelation to occur, not ST.I, p. 133. 2 ST.I, p. 134. I t i s the r e a l i t y of the Cross (which i t s e l f i s a symbol) that constitutes the u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d , decisive revelation. I t seems to me that Martin's c r i t i c i s m s (op. c i t . pp. 69-80), miss the point which T i l l i c h wants to make i n several instances. T i l l i c h would i n fact hold that the contents of the b i b l i c a l C h r i s t were v a l i d as f i n a l r e v e lation even i f the h i s t o r i c i t y of Jesus could be disproved. Cf. On the Boundary p.50. And to object that the f i n a l r evelation as complete trans-parency should not require symbols i s either misunderstanding the nature of symbols or changing the focus of attention from the Christ event to the forms i n which we receive i t c o g n i t i v e l y . A l l man can receive the f i n a l r evelation but i t would be wrong to say that c h r i s t i a n s have received i t , received, that i s , i n the f u l l , e x i s t e n t i a l l y v a l i d sense of the word. 43 on a second l e v e l , but as the transparency which i s univers-a l l y relevant and expected. 1.5 CORRELATION AND SELF-TRANSCENDENCE The purpose of T i l l i c h ' s much debated method of c o r r e l a t i o n i s to show the interrelatedness of the questions a r i s i n g from human existence and the answers provided by the Ch r i s t i a n message. We are i l l - a d v i s e d to take these words at face value as i f we are dealing with a s i m p l i s t i c question - answer schema, for T i l l i c h makes i t quite clear that the method i t s e l f must be understood i n terms of 'a p r i o r knowledge of the object to which i t i s a p p l i e d ' . 1 The c r u c i a l i n s i g h t here i s the i n t e r -dependence of God and man i n the revelatory event, which i s never a u n i l a t e r a l act but rather a c o n s t e l l a t i o n . I t i s an encounter i n which man's reason i s grasped by the Unconditioned i n an experience of the mystery of being mediated by a word 2 or a sacrament. Reality as a whole i n a l l i t s aspects i s f i l l e d ^ST.I, p. 60. 'The method of c o r r e l a t i o n explains the contents of the Ch r i s t i a n f a i t h through e x i s t e n t i a l questions and theo-l o g i c a l answers i n mutual interdependence' and i t i s 'derived from a p r i o r knowledge of the system which i s to be b u i l t by the method' (ibid.) Cf. also ST. I I , pp. 13-16. 2 Cf. ST.I, pp. 106ff. Osborne gives a clear summary of the revelatory c o n s t e l l a t i o n op. c i t . pp. 89ff. Note that i n T i l l i c h ' s view the divine - human encounter 'means something r e a l for both sides 1 (ST. I, p. 61) . ' . 44 with the history of the holy. This does not deny that r e v e l -ation i s gratuitous. T i l l i c h ' s emphasis on the leap and on the s e l f - s a c r i f i c e i n the f i n a l r e v e lation makes i t impossible to accuse him of Hegelian naturalism, for he holds that neither the question nor the answer has i t s o r i g i n i n an inner-human word and that reason must necessarily be thrown out of balance."'' Granted t h i s , however, we must observe that T i l l i c h i s very sympathetic to Feuerbach's contention that r e l i g i o n i s an e n t i r e l y human, r a t i o n a l answer to man's predicaments and i n f i n i t e desires. He even agrees with Marx saying that Feuerbach's c r i t i c i s m of Hegel did not go f a r enough because i t only inverted things and did not remove the r e a l danger of the system, which consists i n i t s i n e r t conservatism. Feuerbach's demand for s o c i a l commitment became only e f f e c t i v e when Marx related i t to h i s -t o r i c a l struggles and discrepancies. T i l l i c h agrees that any Religion i s dehumanizing to the extent that i t accepts ideo-l o g i c a l superstructures as revealed truth and i n so doing re-2 fuses to give f u l l y human answers to h i s t o r i c a l predicaments. 1 C f . ST.I, p. 113 and Martin op. c i t . pp.' 61f. 2 ' Cf. Dynamics of F a i t h p.75. A number of authors have pointed to T i l l i c h ' s a f f i n i t y with Feuerbach. E.g. J. Taubes i n S. Hook (ed.) Religious Experience and Truth 1961, pp. 70-75. Cf. also Osborne op. c i t . p. 89. For T i l l i c h ' s own appraisal of Feuerbach and Marx we can r e f e r to many places such as Prot. Era p.19 3; Ges.W. I I , pp. 153; 156; 164 and 321. More extensively he deals with t h i s subject i n P e r p s p e c t i v e s pp. 139-ff. and On the Boundary pp.81-91. \ 45 How can he hold, then, that the revolutionary renewal requested can come:only from the divine answers to e x i s t e n t i a l questions? What i s thi s correlation? How can revelation break through a closed realism and yet be anything but a a l i e n body of information and laws? T i l l i c h says that the unconditional Ground of being i s present as the eternal 'les' and 'No', i n s p i r i n g man's c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t y and p r o h i b i t i n g any i d e o l o g i c a l absolutism. God's S p i r i t f i l l s man with a passion for ultimacy, but i n every d e t a i l , the S p i r i t depends on man's a c t i v i t y for the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of meaning. T i l l i c h thus combines the g r a t u i t -ousness of revelation with a synergism that gives f u l l weight to man's cooperation with God's creative immanence."*" The p o s s i b i l i t y of asserting 'the f u l l y human nature of the answer presupposes a ce r t a i n view of man, for we see that T i l l i c h at the same time emphasizes that even the human quest of God i s T i l l i c h ' s main objective i s to f i n d a t e r t i u m quid for the p o l a r i t y naturalism - supranaturalism. Cf. Osborne op. c i t . p. 102. In simple form he states that God 'gives man the power of trans-forming himself and the world.' (ST.I, p. 256). Revelation does not only remedy the shortcomings of human reason, i t i s the very presupposition of t h i s reason. Although th i s c l e a r l y excludes Pelagian forms of synergism, Schmitz thinks that T i l l i c h abreviates God's revelation by defining i t as an answer to man's e x i s t e n t i a l questions, for t h i s allows man to l i m i t God, as i t were, by the extent of his questioning. Cf. op. c i t . pp. 272f. But did T i l l i c h not say that man is an i n f i n i t e passion, an enduring quest for being?, and also that the f i r s t impact of rev e l a t i o n i s the ontological shock? Schmitz knows that T i l l i c h sees the very desire of salvation as the f r u i t of re v e l a t i o n , but he s t i l l contends that the l a t t e r i s conceived i n terms of the 'aufge-wiesene' c o n f l i c t s . May we ask Schmitz i f T i l l i c h ever excluded that other c o n f l i c t s are ' auf'zuweisen'? 46 a f r u i t of re v e l a t i o n . I t must pressupose that the human s p i r i t has an e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the divine S p i r i t i n which'there i s no c o r r e l a t i o n but rather mutual immanence', and that i t i s yet e x i s t e n t i a l l y i n i n f i n i t e estrangement 2 . from t h i s union. This estrangement i s r a d i c a l and t o t a l i n the sense that no h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y escapes from i t . The anxieties r e s u l t i n g from the l i m i t a t i o n s and d i s t o r t i o n s i n -volved constitute the e x i s t e n t i a l question which man's Dasein i s . T i l l i c h does not say that man's e x i s t e n t i a l predicament i s a steppingstone for revelation, or a premise which r e v e l -3 ation can hook on to, as Bonhoeffer seemed to think. Mean-inglessness and f i n i t u d e can be known only through concern about i n f i n i t e meanings, which can not be the f r u i t of our f i n i t u d e as such.^ This aggres with the Neo-Orthodox p o s i t i o n but has very d i f f e r e n t connotation, which i s the u n i v e r s a l i t y of re v e l a t i o n and not the acceptance of a natural theology as Bonhoeffer thinks. In: Act and Being, 1962, p. 87 n . l . 2 Quotation from ST. I l l , p. 114. 3 'Bonhoeffers Zuruckweisung von T i l l i c h ' s Versuch, die Grenze zum Fundament der r e l i g i o s e Frage und damit zum Ank-nupfungspunkt der Offenbarung zu machen (zeigt) ein frappierende Ahnlichkeit mit Barths Protest gegen Brunner'. Benktson op. c i t . p. 16 6. 1 ^ T i l l i c h refers often to Cusanus' docta i g n o r a t i a and c o i n -c i d e n t i a oppositorum i n t h i s connection Cf. e s p e c i a l l y ST.I, pp. 81ff. y 47 T i l l i c h , therefore, agrees v;ith the neo-orthodox school that the r e a l question can be understood only through r e v e l -ation. Schillebeeckx sees c l e a r l y that T i l l i c h reformulated the question t h e o l o g i c a l l y so as to avoid a c a t e g o r i c a l blunder by giving answers i n a language d i f f e r e n t from that of the questions, but does that necessarily f o r f e i t the purpose of the method of c o r r e l a t i o n , as Schillebeeckcclaims i t does? 1 I t does only i f we f a i l to see that the answers have received a reformulation as w e l l . Translating the answers back we f i n d ourselves d i r e c t l y confronted with the proposition that there i s the revelation of the creative ground of being wherever there i s meaning being formed. A very important i n s i g h t for us indeed! The idea of c o r r e l a t i o n has a very wide a p p l i c a t i o n i n T i l l i c h ' s system, which i s seasoned with p o l a r i t i e s and bound-ary l i n e s . But the'universality which T i l l i c h claims for r e v e l -ation i s not just that of binary or d i a l e c t i c a l thinking. His self-transcendent realism can not do without t h i s schema but i t refuses to r e s t r i c t i t s e l f to a s t a t i c formalism. S e l f - t r a n s -cendence i s an idea which does not contradict the autonomy of man i n his attempts to give answers to his questions. This ' T i l l i c h ... has reformulated the p h i l o s o p h i c a l question t h e o l o g i c a l l y . But t h i s , of course, undermines the purpose of the method of c o r r e l a t i o n 1 (Translation E.) (E. Schillebeeckx: C h r i s t e l i j k antwoord op een menselijke vraag? i n : T i j d s c h v i f t voor Theologie 10, (1970), p. 7. 48 autonomy, i s watertight and does not need any stop-gaps. But, in a l l i t s dimensions, i t l i v e s by an i n f i n i t e i n t e r e s t and a concern f o r ultimacy which explains that human answers, however f i n i t e and ambiguous, are not i n themselves incomp-a t i b l e r i v a l s of the divine but rather i t s manifestations. 1 Hegel again? On the contray, there i s an i n f i n i t e jump, but this does not introduce an a l i e n body of conditions to replace human existence. The concept of existence i n T i l l i c h ' s w r iting has caused much controversy. Existence i s not pure negativity. Even as the p r i n c i p l e of opposition to essence i t can not be con-sidered thus. T i l l i c h i s pointing to a fac t rather than a l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e when he says that 'the state of existence i s 2 . . the state of estrangement'. But xn point of fact existence i s always estrangement and resistence, and i t i s a question only under the impact of rev e l a t i o n . I t would be wrong to conclude from th i s that self-transcendence as the state of man under the influence of reve l a t i o n , should destroy existence. When we study the concept of self-transcendent realism we r e a l i z e 'God does not destroy his created world ... i n order to manifest Himself i n i t ' ( S T . I l l , p. 114). 2 ST. I I , p. 25. Osborne feels that existence as abstract p r i n c i p l e receives only negative connotations i n T i l l i c h ' s descriptions. Cf. op. c i t . pp. 119-123. 49 that Bonhoeffer i s wrong i n supposing that T i l l i c h wants to clear a space for r e l i g i o n against the world. 1 But we also r e a l i z e that for T i l l i c h there i s no such thing as natural revelation or natural theology. Natural theology i s i n fact the misnomer for the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the shock or 'stigma of nonbeing', which i s experienced i n existence. To r e j e c t this as something altogether valueless, as Barth does, i s a 2 self-deception. But we should r e a l i z e that i t i s 'the neg-ative, side of the revelation of mystery' and that 'the universal quest of New Being i s a consequence of universal r e v e l a t i o n ' , 3 of nothing else. When dealing with T i l l i c h ' s realism we should note f i r s t of a l l that t h i s i s not just an epistemological system. Other Cf. Bonhoeffer: Letters and Papers from Prison p.108. T i l l i c h answers: "Believe me, you who are estranged from r e l i g i o n . . . i t i s not our purpose to make you r e l i g i o u s ... when we i n t e r -pret the c a l l of Jesus for our time" {Shaking of the Foundations p.102). 2 Cf. ST. II,p.14. The awareness of being's mystery comes from revelation through natural mediums, but never from a natural r e v e l a t i o n , for that i s a contradiction i n terms. Natural theo-logy interprets the shock brought about by that awareness. I t prepares the question for being. This question i t s e l f i s not asked by natural theology, i t i s the question of reason about i t s own ground and abyss. By t h i s T i l l i c h probably means that i t i s not a formal, academic question, but an e x i s t e n t i a l concern. Cf. ST. I, pp. 119f). 3 Quotation from: ST.II, p. 89. About T i l l i c h ' s view of natural theology see ST.I, p. 119f., and S T . I l l , p. 112. 50 types of realism went wrong exactly because they f a i l e d to relate the cognitive to the rest of human experience. 1 In-volvement i n entire existence i s the condition of true know-ledge. This f a c t i s not honoured by either mystical or tech-nological realism, but only by h i s t o r i c a l realism, which combines a passionate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and transformation of the s e l f and of the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n with s c i e n t i f i c ob-2 . j e c t i v i t y . The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t and Marxist conception of truth as truthfulness i s noticeable here, but T i l l i c h goes further and points out that t h i s realism i s preliminary and u n r e a l i s t i c , unless i t accepts that the r e a l ground of meaning i s beyond man's h i s t o r i c a l autonomy. He who takes hi s t o r y seriously must acknowledge the i n f i n i t e gap between the con-, 3 tingent forms of meaning and t h e i r ultimate depth. This brings us to T i l l i c h ' s conception of the act of f a i t h . S e l f -transcendent or b e l i e f - f u l realism does not negate h i s t o r i c a l existence, but rather accepts i t as representative of what concerns man ultimately and i s beyond the t o t a l i t y of meaning structures i n r e a l i t y . Man i s grasped gratuitously by that concern and through the c o r r e l a t i o n of the 'Yes' and the 1 No' Cf. Trot. Era p.73. 2 C f . Ibid. p. 73. 3 C f . Ibid. p. 76. 51 within concrete r e a l i t y . When f a i t h i s formally defined as the accepted awareness of the Unconditioned, t h i s does not mean that i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a disdain of c u l t u r a l creations of meaning, and even less a conceited t r u s t i n some sort of ' , . 2 vague f e e l i n g . The state of f u l f i l l m e n t i n which revelation i s accepted i n the b e l i e f - f u l openness for the Unconditioned i s c a l l e d 3 New Being or e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n . This state of s e l f - t r a n s -cendence i n i t s f i n a l f u l f i l l m e n t i s the conquest which l i f t s concrete structures of meaning above t h e i r s e l f - l i m i t i n g tend-encies, so that the e s s e n t i a l s e l f shines through the conting-4 encies of the e x i s t e n t i a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n s . In T i l l i c h ' s opinion this i s not a second l e v e l of existence or an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the divine, i n which present existence would be annihilated, 'The unconditional r e a l i t y . . . i s . . . the No and Yes of every-thing' (What is R e l i g i o n ? p. 162), Cf. also i b i d . p. 57. 2 T i l l i c h i s a red u c t i o n i s t i n the sense that he reduces a l l theology to one l e v e l . Cf. Osborne op. c i t . pp. 91-9 3. 3 The term ' e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n ' stems from Schelling but was avoided by T i l l i c h u n t i l the f i n a l section of his Systematic Theology probably because of i t s Platonic connotations, which c a l l f o r a negation of existence. Cf. S T . I l l , p. 400. 4 . Cf. S27. I l l , p. 235. Hamilton f a i l s to see that T i l l i c h d i s -sociates himself from the popular i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Schleiermacher 1s concept of f a i t h as f e e l i n g . Compare Hamilton op. c i t . pp. 226 and 162 n . l with ST.I, pp. 15 and 41f. I t i s hard to see how Hamilton could a r r i v e at his conclusions. 52 but rather the conquest of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement with i t s di s t o r t i o n s and despair. F a i t h , then, i s the act i n which man as a free and centered person transcends himself and surrenders to the demand that he f u l f i l l the ultimate meaning r e a l i t y within a f i n i t e meaning. 1 This i s also what T i l l i c h c a l l s the paradox of Christ's God-manhood which coincides with e s s e n t i a l manhood and which does not remove contingent concreteness. Even the resurrection should not be interpreted as the n u l l i f i c a t i o n of man's non-identity with the divi n e , for that would contradict 2 the act of creation. F a i t h i s a response which takes the r i s k not just of gi v i n g up a l l f a l s e c e r t a i n t y , but of having the courage to accept a f i n i t e meaning as the representative of the Unconditioned, the 'God above God', about which one i s ultimately 3 4 concerned. F a i t h and doubt are therefore inseparable. The Cf. Dynamics of Faith p. 114 and What i s Religion? p.19. 2>phe c h r i s t o l o g i c a l paradox i s explained i n ST.II, pp.l49f. and pp. 90-9 3. T i l l i c h i nterprets the resurrection as a symbol i n t e r r e l a t e d with the symbol of the Cross. Jesus' h i s t o r i c a l c r u c i f i x i o n i s the picture i n which the leap that brings New Being i s recognized by mankind. The resurrection i s the event i n which New Being became d e c i s i v e l y embodied i n the Cross of t h i s concrete person Jesus, as the Christ and center of h i s t o r y . His death was unable to separate the New Being, which had appeared i n him and which conquered the death of e x i s t e n t i a l estrangement, from the picture of his personal l i f e . Cf. ST.II, pp.154-162. I t can not be our task to discuss t h i s r e s t i t u t i o n theory or other c h r i s t o l o g i c a l concepts of T i l l i c h . Many commentaries focus t h e i r c r i t i c i s m on t h i s aspect of T i l l i c h ' s theology. 3This concept of the r i s k taking response, i s therefore d i f f e r -ent from the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t Entscheidung taught by Bultmann. T i l l i c h declares the t h e i s t i c God to be a symbol of the object of our ultimate concern which i s beyond th i s symbol. Cf. Hook op. c i t . p. 315 and ST. p. 12. The expression 'God above God' was used mainly i n his book: The Courage to Be, 1952. ^Cf. Dynamics of F a i t h , pp. 16ff., and 99ff. Cf. Also A. Unhjem Dynamics of Doubt, 1966. 53 leap of f a i t h should never be l e s s , but rather more intensive, when man has actualized more of his p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n t o higher forms of meaning.'*' Let us now return to the question of the d i a l e c t i c s between questions and answers i n r e l a t i o n to synergism and to the gratuitous, yet universal revelation. T i l l i c h resents the theo-logy which sets out to prove that man's endeavours are worthless, only leading to the absurdities of estrangement and that Ch r i s t i a n r e velation has the exclusive, ready-made answers to th i s predicament. A l l human e f f o r t s are attempts at meaning-f u l f i l l m e n t , however misconceived they may be. They a l l aspire toward the ultimate i n being and meaning i n a movement of s e l f -transcendence, which supposes what i s formally defined as f a i t h , namely the sate of being grasped by ultimacy. 'In t h i s formal sense of f a i t h as ultimate concern, every human being has f a i t h ' . Every meaning-fulfillment, therefore, must be seen as the f r u i t of the gratuitously given state of being grasped by ultimate concern. The reception and embodiment of t h i s concern, moreover, are e n t i r e l y dependent on contingent, c u l t u r a l categories. When the question of meaning arises and man submits to the demand of ultimacy, answers, i n whatever r e l i g i o n or culture, are being Cf. What is R e l i g i o n ? p.144. T i l l i c h ' s leap of f a i t h seems more paradoxical than Kierkegaard's, for the l a t t e r urges a t o t a l l y i r r a t i o n a l surrender. 2 ST.III. p. 130. 'Nobody can escape the e s s e n t i a l r e l a t i o n of the conditional s p i r i t to something unconditional, i n the d i r e c t i o n of which i t i s self-transcendent i n unity with a l l l i f e ' . (Ibid.) 54 given both within human structures and i n the dimension of reve l a t i o n . The concept of synergism must be extended into the very heart of revelation,, for the s e n s i t i v i t y for the ultimate i s conditioned by c u l t u r a l patterns. This i n s i g h t agrees with'the conception of theology as the paradox of the 'logos of theos'. Paradoxical means neither i r r a t i o n a l nor d i a l e c t i c a l l y r a t i o n a l , but rather: 'against man's s e l f -understanding and e x p e c t a t i o n s 1 . 1 Neither the r e f l e c t i o n on the question - answer d i a l e c t i c s i t s e l f , nor, on the other hand, the accumulation of paradoxes, leads to the understand-ing of theos. C u l t u r a l expressions of meaning form coherent systems and should be studied as such, but t h i s study should perceive i t s e l f as being the logos of the new and ultimate r e a l i t y which forms the immanent horizon of a l l meaning f u l f i l l m e n t , the genesis of i t s arohe and the esohaton of i t s t e l o s . The reception of the ultimate concern can be, and i s , always, d i s t o r t e d to some degree, so much so that r e l i g i o u s forms often destroy rather than heal man. No form, then, should be considered meaningful, except to the extent to which i t i s 2 sustained by the immanence of the ultimate. 1ST.II, 92. Cf. ST.I, p. 16. 2 This conception of man's immediate awareness of ultimacy we fin d also i n the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and Coreth, where i t i s expressed i n the Heideggerian term Vorgriff, which allegedly corresponds to Aquinas' excessusi.e. an a p r i o r i metaphysical horizon. In his book S p i r i t in the World, New York 1968 (Original German t i t l e : Geist in Welt) K. Rahner resembles T i l l i c h i n that he also intends to combine the Kantian epistemology with Heidegger's 55 In the f i n a l analysis man l i v e s only by t h i s ultimate concern, which i n the temporal process of a growing e s s e n t i a l -i z a t i o n i s e f f e c t i v e as the e t e r n a l memory. T i l l i c h uses the phrase 'from essence, through existence, to e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n ' to indicate that the l a t t e r i s not a single event i n which existence i s n u l l i f i e d and man returns to his e s s e n t i a l s t a t e . x He thinks that C h r i s t i a n i t y rejects the Nirvana doctrine, which f a i l s to value p o s i t i v e l y the meaning f u l f i l l m e n t s i n histo r y . The l a t t e r are enrichments of the essences and p a r t i c i p a t e i n eternal l i f e , but only so i f the negative i s exposed as negative and i f the ambiguities of l i f e are conquered. The memory of the, transcendent and the awareness of fin i t u d e are reinforced rather than attenuated when more p o t e n t i a l i t i e s are being actualized. In any moment i n which estrangement i s conquered the e s s e n t i a l -i z a t i o n i s said to happen, which honours the value of man's attempts at answering his own questions. The t e l o s of the 're-surrection of the body', which involves a l l dimensions of human Footnote 2 continued ontology. It seems, however, that the Thomistic influence has prevented Rahner from recognizing the fac t that meaning should not be conceived merely as a cognitive r e a l i t y but primarily as p r a c t i c a l and that the transcendent appears both as c r i t i c i s m and f u l f i l l m e n t of a l l meaning structures. T i l l i c h i s more sens i t i v e to thi s f a c t . 1 S T . I l l , p. 130. 56 being, i s the symbol i n which the all-embracing c o r r e l a t i o n of t h i s process to the dimension of ultimacy i s expressed. Man's l i f e i t s e l f i s an e x i s t e n t i a l question for ultimacy, fo r revelatory and the o l o g i c a l answers, but not as stop-gaps for d e f i c i e n c i e s within our human d i a l e c t i c a l structures. God i s the name and symbol of.what we are ultimately concerned 2 about, and which i s immanent i n every meaning we e s t a b l i s h . 1.6 DIALECTICS AND SYMBOLISM After we have covered some of the most important aspects of T i l l i c h ' s views on r e l i g i o n , we must now try to locate his concept of symbolism i n t h i s sytem of c o r r e l a t i o n and paradox. He himself said that the center of his 'methodological doctrine 3 of knowledge i s the concept of symbol' . The question that must eventually be asked i s how T i l l i c h r elates p a r t i c u l a r to universal 'If we use " e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n " we can say that man's psycho-l o g i c a l , s p i r i t u a l and s o c i a l being i s implied i n his bodily being-and t h i s i n unity with the essences of everything else that has being' ( S T . I l l , p. 413). This view commands a t o t a l univers-alism and openness to accept t h i s as the t e l o s of man. 2 It seems that T i l l i c h ' s method of c o r r e l a t i o n does meet Schillebeeckx' requirements of ntin - f u n c t i o n a l i s t i c language about God i n which meaning or value ' i s recognized, c a l l e d by name and loved without having secondary thoughts about function-a l u t i l i t y play a r o l e ' (Schillebeeckx art. c i t . p. 19. Transl.E.). In: C. Kegley: The Theology of Paul T i l l i c h . New York 1961, p. 333. 5 7 r e v e l a t i o n . To solve that problem we have f i r s t to prove that symbolism i s to be defined i n terms of the c o r r e l a t i o n we have described, the c o r r e l a t i o n that i s between union and distance i n the God-man r e l a t i o n . Despite the danger of • r e p e t i t i o n we may t r y to summarize T i l l i c h ' s p o s i t i o n and for that purpose re f e r to his highly controversial theory about the transcendent f a l l , which we f i n d i n the chapter e n t i t l e d : 'The T r a n s i t i o n from Essence to Existence and the Symbol of the F a l l ' . 1 When T i l l i c h speaks about man f a l l i n g away from his e s s e n t i a l unity with the ground of being, t h i s should not be understood i n terms of one being departing from another being, as the prodigal son departs from his father, for God i s not an existent 2 being. I t i s good to remember that T i l l i c h never accepted the pre-existence i n an e s s e n t i a l state. Notwithstanding terms l i k e S T . I I , pp. 29-44 Cf. also ST. I, pp. 255f. The a f f i n i t y of t h i s concept with Neo-Platonic theories i s clear. Among the Greek Fathers i t was held p a r t i c u l a r l y by Origen, who l i k e T i l l i c h stressed the u n i v e r s a l i t y and the o n t o l o g i c a l character of the f a l l . Cf. Persp. XXI. We s h a l l not enter the discussions i n d e t a i l , but i t seems that Hamilton's opinion, that T i l l i c h -holds creation and f a l l to be o n t o l o g i c a l l y the same, gravely d i s t o r t s the meaning of T i l l i c h ' s answer to Niebuhr which runs: actualized creation and estranged existence are i d e n t i c a l . This formula only implies that human existence always involves a s e l f -l i m i t i n g particularism. T i l l i c h ' s coincidence i s a temporal category not an ontological . Compare ST.II, p. 44 and Hamilton op . c i t . p. 151 as well as Osborne op. c i t . p. 110 and^Martin op. c i t . p. 134f. 2 For T i l l i c h only one thing e x i s t s , namely, man i n his world. The existence of God i s a contradictory term. Cf. ST,!, p. 65 and 236f. 58 'dreaming innocence' and 'eternal memory' he re j e c t s such Platonic theories. The state of the e s s e n t i a l unity with the ground of being, i n T i l l i c h ' s conception, i s a pure p o t e n t i a l i t y which has existed at no time nor i n any place, so that the t r a n s i t i o n we speak of should not be conceived as temporal or s p a t i a l . We are dealing with the ontological passing from p o t e n t i a l i t y to the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of f i n i t e freedom, which by s t r u c t u r a l necessity i s t r a g i c and s i n f u l . To under-stand T i l l i c h we should be ca r e f u l not to i d e n t i f y t h i s s t r u c t u r a l necessity with Hegelian doctrines. As Osborne has pointed out c o r r e c t l y , T i l l i c h ' s view of the all-embracing estrangement and g u i l t i s designed s p e c i f i c a l l y to o f f s e t the i d e a l i s t concept of a u n i f i e d world-structure."'" Another ob-servation of Osborne could be h e l p f u l , namely when he stresses that T i l l i c h d e l i b e r a t e l y chooses poetic terms to present his myth of the transcendent f a l l . Thus p o t e n t i a l i t y i s c a l l e d 'innocence', which besides g u i l t l e s s n e s s , means absence of 2 responsible involvement. The core of the t r a n s i t i o n consists i n man's anxious desire to actualize his f i n i t e freedom i n a c r e a t u r i l y s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n " ' " T i l l i c h refuses to ontologize away the f a l l l e s t 'sin may become a r a t i o n a l necessity, as i n purely e s s e n t i a l i s t systems' ( S T . I I , pp. 43f.) Cf. also S T . I I , p. 29 and Osborne op. c i t . p. 44. 2 Cf. ST.II, p. 33 and Osborne op. c i t . p. 110. Many problems would disappear i f we r e a l i z e d that T i l l i c h wants to give an analysis of Dasein (existence) rather than a doctrine of man's o r i g i n . 59 which separates him e x i s t e n t i a l l y from the divine. This view i s obviously not Hegelian. But we should not i d e n t i f y i t with Indian Religions or with the philosophies of Plato, Kant or Origen e i t h e r , even though a l l of them profess the transcendent f a l l i n one form or the other."1" T i l l i c h does hold that e x i s t -ence as the way from essence to e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n i s always t r a g i c a l l y estranged and morally s i n f u l , but as we have seen before he rejects the idea that e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n , as the state of f u l f i l m e n t , requires the negation of existence and a return 2 . to essence or pure p o t e n t i a l i t y . I t i s our destiny to e x i s t , i . e . , to actualize our e s s e n t i a l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n l i m i t e d forms. Sinfulness stems from the desire to l i m i t the s e l f to forms which, being f i n i t e , are not i d e n t i c a l with and therefore separated from the divine Ground. Does that compell us to i d e n t i f y g u i l t and finitude? No more than that i t denies the f a c t that meaning i s being actualized i n existence and that t h i s happens through the dynamics of the e s s e n t i a l unity with the divine, even when man i n t e n t i o n a l l y 'stops with the a c t u a l i t i e s ... i n t h e i r 3 conditioned form'. Thus T i l l i c h accepts immanence of the divine 1 C f . ST.II, p. 37. 2 • ' . . . s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , estrangement and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . . . i s the way from essence through existence to e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n ' (ST. I l l , p. 422). Martin, op. c i t . p. 136 shows l i t t l e knowledge of recent trends'in theology as also of T i l l i c h ' s r e a l intentions i n t h i s matter when he quotes approvingly Loomer's opinion that T i l l i c h advocates a return to p o t e n t i a l i t y s i m i l a r to alleged Hindu id e a l s . 3 What i s Religion? p. 177. ( 60 i n existence. Objecting that existence i s given no c r e d i t i n th i s set up p r e c i s e l y i l l u s t r a t e s the point which T i l l i c h wants to make: existence should not claim c r e d i t . The divine immanence however i s a 'No1 only i n so far as i t conquers the d i s t o r t i n g s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n s i n which f i n i t e man, the micro-cosm with his accumulated load of evolution's sinfulness, -i s i n c l i n e d to indulge by losing sight of the dynamic appeal of the Unconditioned. T i l l i c h ' s d i a l e c t i c s t e l l us that every aspect of existence i s valuable as actualized meaning, but that every aspect i s also t o t a l l y affected by the transcendent f a l l . That i s why we can consider Luther's adage ' s i m u l Justus, simul peceatov' the key to T i l l i c h ' s thoughts even though he himself refers to t h i s very seldom. 1 From t h i s we conclude that e s s e n t i a l i z a t i o n i s to be con-sidered as reconciled existence i n which the s e l f - l i m i t i n g tendencies of man are conquered. But because T i l l i c h does not consider those tendencies accidentals i n the way Pelagius viewed 2 them, we should not think of f u l f i l m e n t i n terms of complete a c t u a l i z a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i f that means a s t a t i c p e r f e r c t i o n . We are rather to think of e t e r n a l l y dynamic d i a l e c t i c s and be aware that the leap of s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , the surrender of a l l Cf. e.g. ST.II, p. 178 and S T . I l l , p. 1 3 . This Lutheran idea can be seen turning up constantly, however, as T i l l i c h ' s famous 'Protestant p r i n c i p l e 1 . 2 C f . 52". I I , p. 41. 61 meaning-fulfilment, w i l l never make i t s e l f superfluous. There i s the eternal ontological fact of the c o r r e l a t i o n betv/een the dynamic substance and the s t r u c t u r a l form. Religion deals with the f i r s t , culture with the second, so that they are never to - 2 be i d e n t i f i e d , but even less to be separated. Within t h i s context the concept of symbol should be understood. Tbe complexity of T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of symbolism appears as soon as we attempt to define symbols i n terms of mediation of revelation. Brunner c a l l s T i l l i c h ' s conception of symbolism ambiguous because i t does not c l e a r l y r e l a t e r evelation to one 3 unique event with i t s p a r t i c u l a r mediation. At f i r s t view t h i s seems to be born out by T i l l i c h ' s statement that 'the "New Being i s not dependent on the s p e c i a l symbols i n which i t 4 i s expressed'. The subject of symbolism therefore raises a number of questions which w i l l be dealt with i n the second part As we have seen t h i s forms the core of the f i n a l r e v e l a t i o n , of the New Being i n Christ. Even resurrection does not mean the removal of that jump, but a d e f i n i t e overcoming of particularism. As such New Being affects a l l structures of l i f e , even sexual d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . Cf. S T . I I , p. 156ff. and ST. I l l , pp. 412 and 294. T i l l i c h agrees with the philosophy of becoming that the state of blessedness i s not an immovable perfection, but 'the eternal conquest of the negative' {ST. I l l , pp. 403ff). 2 There i s an 'essential belongingness of r e l i g i o n and culture to each other' so that 'the secular i s driven toward union with the holy' (ST. I l l , p. 24 8) 'in the common directedness toward the unity of meaning'. (What is Religion? p. 60). 3 Cf. E. Brunner: The Philosophy of Religion, 1937, p. 42. 4 S T . I I . , p. 165. How much T i l l i c h d i f f e r s from Brunner appears when he declares i t necessary to defend the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l dogma even i f the non-existence of the h i s t o r i c a l Jesus were proved probable. Cf. On the Boundary, p. 50. 62 of our study, such as: what makes symbols stand out as a medium of revelation and what i s t h e i r function within Religions and within the encounter between d i f f e r e n t Religions? At t h i s point we should try to define symbols p r o v i s i o n a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to the theme of t h i s f i r s t part of our study. In T i l l i c h ' s perception a symbol i s the concrete object of a t h e o r e t i c a l .and p r a c t i c a l act i n which f a i t h apprehends the Unconditional. 1 I t i s important to d i s t i n g u i s h symbols so conceived from other e n t i t i e s l i k e : concepts , which are abstractions used i n c l a s s i f i c a t o r y thinking; ~ . " . s i g n s , which point to the s i g n i f i e d , without representing i t ; h i s t o r i c a l , types which embody ideals but have no mediating power; metaphors, which are hermeneutic devices used to compare beings; images , which for t h e i r representing and mediating power r e l y on t h e i r perceptible form rather than on pure su b s t i t u t i o n . The conception of symbols i s most clo s e l y related to that of myths. In f a c t myths can be understood as the exegesis of symbols as they connect the l a t t e r with other symbols usually i n a kind What i s Religion? -p. 79. 6 3 of h i s t o r i c a l setting . T i l l i c h ' s ideas about the p o s i t i v e paradox are c l e a r l y recognizable when we f i n d that symbols are able to represent the meaning and power of being although 2 t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the transcendent i s alv/ays ambiguous. To say t h i s , however, he has to adopt a s p e c i f i c type of analogical thinking which we s h a l l examine l a t e r . He warns us never to use the phrase 'only a symbol' because 'that i s 3 to confuse symbol with sign'. The importance he attaches to symbols i s apparent when he c a l l s i t i r r e l i g i o u s to attempt speaking about the Unconditional i n anything but symbols and 4 myths. Symbols are the proper language of r e l i g i o n and for that reason he rejects Bultmann's project of demythologization saying that every act of f a i t h needs symbols and myths. His view of co r r e l a t i o n and his ontological i n t e r e s t explain why he resented the e t h i c a l bias of e x i s t e n t i a l i s t theology because 5 they excluded cosmological, sacramental mediation. Symbols mediate the revelatory event. They are f u l l y r a t i o n a l but not the f r u i t of reason. They are to be understood within the co r r e l a t i o n as the f i n i t e r e a l i t y i n which the God-man encounter i s h i s t o r i c a l l y actualized. Within the revelatory c o n s t e l l a t i o n , ^Gadamer's influence i s noticeable i n these l i n e s that summarize: Norenberg, op. c i t . pp. 1 4 - 2 5 . 2 Cf. Hook: op. c i t . p. 5 . 3ST.II, p. 9 . 4 Cf. Dynamics of Faith, p. 5 3 . 5 c f . Ibid p. 49 as well as What is Religion?p. 7 9 , and P e r s p . pp. 2 2 8 and XXXIf. 64 therefore, symbols can be said to be representative of the transcendent referent.""'" I t i s important to note that r e v e l -atory constellations can not be i d e n t i f i e d with recognized r e l i g i o u s settings. Unlike the l a t t e r , the former i s always required i f a symbol i s to represent the depth of reason and to be a genuine r a t i o n a l creation. The paradox of 'Yes' and 'No* , then, i s r e f l e c t e d i n the two main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of re l i g i o u s symbols: t h e i r representative, yet only f i g u r a t i v e power. Both these and aspects l i k e the function, the o r i g i n , ; the l i f e - s p a n and the ambiguity of symbols w i l l demand much of 2 our attention i n the second part of our study. 1.7 ENCOUNTER AND TYPOLOGY It should be clear from the foregoing that T i l l i c h ' s f i r s t concern has been not only to defend C h r i s t i a n symbols against 3 c u l t u r a l despisers. We should never lose sight of the radicalism 'The realms i n which representative symbols appear are language and h i s t o r y , the arts and r e l i g i o n ' (Hook op. c i t . p. 3). T i l l i c h distinguishes these symbols from mathematical symbols which he c a l l s discursive (cf. Ibid.) ^These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of symbols we f i n d summarized by T i l l i c h i n Hook op. c i t . pp. 4-5. ^The converse i s equally close to the truth. T i l l i c h t e l l s the Christians to understand that the confrontation between secularism and established Religions i s the most important h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t y . Cf. ST. I l l , p . 6. His involvement i n socialism leaves no doubt about his seriousness i n this respect. For a comparison with Schleiermacher's p o s i t i o n see W. Paul: What can r e l i g i o n say to i t s cultured despisers Reformed Review 23 (1970), pp. 208-216. 65 i n his method of c o r r e l a t i o n . Even though i t seems sound Barthianism to c a l l Church t r a d i t i o n s the 'receptacles of revelation' and r e l i g i o n 'the name for the reception of re-v e l a t i o n ' 1 , we can not f a i l to see the difference when we compare Barth's concept of revelation with the u n i v e r s a l i s t i c view of T i l l i c h . T i l l i c h applies the concept to every f u l -filment of reason whether i t i s i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e l i g i o u s or not. Obviously, he does not pretend that creations of meaning can be known as receptions of revelation without previous knowledge of revelation. He i n s i s t s that every meaning i s created by man as a r e s u l t of his search for the ultimate r e a l i t y and con- / sequently as the f r u i t of r e v e l a t i o n . The word encounter has been rel a t e d by T i l l i c h to t h i s univers-a l i s t i c concept of the revelatory c o n s t e l l a t i o n . Man encounters f i n i t e beings, the past, the l i v i n g substance i n which we p a r t i c i p a t e etc. Just as when the Church encounters the b i b l i c a l -message, there i s a challenge at the heart of any s i t u a t i o n of 2 encounter. A universal feature re l a t e d to t h i s i s the personalism i n every experience of the holy, which T i l l i c h a t t r i b u t e s to the 3 fact that we are touched i n the center of our personality. But ^Bibl. Eel. pp. 4 and 3. 2 C f . ST. I, pp. 48, 51, 61 and Bibl. Eel. pp. 13f and 22-34. 3 C f . Bibl. Rel. p. 24. 66 even i f we can speak of the projection of personal aspects onto the symbols of the Unconditioned, we should yet be aware that b i b l i c a l theism, according to T i l l i c h , inverts the p o s i t i o n . The encounter with the b i b l i c a l God i s more than c a l l i n g the holy a person, for i t i s the very o r i g i n of our understanding of what a person is."'' This inversion which makes God the chief anaZogon of personal categories reminds us of the Barthian approach to analogical speech about God. Unlike Barth, however, T i l l i c h claims that we should transcend personal theism before we can accept the b i b l i c a l personalist symbols. The th e o l o g i c a l type of theim, which declares God a person i n the philosophical sense of the word, has flourished only since Kant and must be abandoned i f God's true transcendence i s to be salvaged. But b i b l i c a l theism i s also one-sided, i n that i t s I-Thou encounter tends to ignore God's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n everything that i s . The i n s i g h t that God i s immanent as the Ground of being not only i n everybody 3 but i n everything as w e l l , should q u a l i f y the symbol 'personal God', even though t h i s symbol remains 'fundamental because ... man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that i s less than 'It i s not that we f i r s t know what person i s and then apply the concept of God to t h i s . But, i n the encounter with God, we f i r s t experience what person should mean.' (Ibid p. 27.) T i l l i c h takes the a n t i o n t o l o g i c a l character of b i b l i c a l person-alism very seriously here. -67 personal. 1 T i l l i c h ' s c r i t i c i s m of t h e i s t i c categories opens opportunities for the dialogue between the Religion which he never thoroughly explored. The radicalism of T i l l i c h , however, does not consist i n a r e l a t i v i s t i c attitude to concrete symbols, but rather i n his respect for these r a t i o n a l structures as valuable represent-ations of ultimacy. We see t h i s c l e a r l y when we study the dyn-amic typology, which i s the method he proposes for the encounter between Religions. We should be aware that he i s not primarily concerned with a method for c l a s s i f y i n g Religions, but with the t h e o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of the dialogue. Me t e l l s us f i r s t of a l l not to consider any t r a d i t i o n as a s t a t i c combination of symbols which at a cer t a i n moment may become obsolete. Such a view i s Hegelian and based on an inacceptable view of progress. 1ST.I, p. 244. Cf. Schmitz op. c i t . pp. 217f. T i l l i c h c a l l God both B e i n g - i t s e l f and P e r s o n a l - i t s e l f . C f . Bibl. Rel. p.83. Norenberg op. c i t . pp. 186f. contends that T i l l i c h should have paid more attention to Heidegger's warning that there i s no easy passage from the Dasein's analysis to the personality of the Chr i s t i a n God. O'Meara, however, points out that T i l l i c h never pretended there was. Cf. T. O'Meara, T i l l i c h and Heidegger; a s t r u c t u r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Harvard Theological Review 61 (1968) pp. 258f. T i l l i c h emphasizes that the esse ipsum i s a transpersonal category i n C h r i s t i a n i t y which f a c i l i t a t e s understanding of Buddhist nothingness. Cf. Chr. Enc. , p. 67. He claims such elements make i t possible to empathize with Asian mysticism. But i n 19 29, he had warned that 'Es i s t nicht moglich eine g e i s t l i c h e Wirk-l i c h k e i t zu verstehen mit der nicht ein Blutzusammenhang geschaffen i s t ' . (Ges. W.V. p. 21). The Asian studies of those days he c a l l s a ' L i t e r a t e n i l l u s i o n die den Ernst der asiatische Religion... nicht gerecht wird', but he f a i l s to indicate that they could be the means of creating that 'blutmassigen Zusammenhang' (Ibid.) 2 ' T i l l i c h l i m i t s the v a l i d i t y of the concept of progress es-p e c i a l l y i n the f i e l d of Religions. Cf. ST.I, p. 219 and Fut. Rel. p.64-79. Gilkey (op. c i t . pp. 80 and 343) considers the loss of b e l i e f i n progress the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c mark of modern Western man, 6 8 A l l r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s , according to T i l l i c h consist of enduring elements which are forever part of the experience of the holy and which create and sustain a community. I t i s the community that l i v e s and believes transcending the p e r s o n a l i t i e s with a power of i t s own.1 T i l l i c h hesitates to describe these creative elements i n concrete t r a d i t i o n s , but he thinks that . 2 a typology can be useful for guiding our dialogue . There i s an i d e a l structure behind the d i r e c t appearance of every Religion. This should be brought out and be confronted with an other t r a d i t i o n and with the challenging c r i t e r i o n of f i n a l r e v e l a t i o n . It can not go unobserved that T i l l i c h himself has arrived only at a rudimentary application of his approach. He has been pre-occupied mainly with the r e l a t i o n between Protestant C h r i s t -i a n i t y and q u a s i - r e l i g i o u s tendencies such as Fascism, Communism, Humanism and Nationalism. His li m i t e d remarks about other Religions are mainly s u p e r f i c i a l or highly polemic as i n the case of Footnote 2 continued to. which T i l l i c h may have r e p l i e d more constructively than neo-orthodoxy. Cf. also the conclusion i n J.P. Gabus: op. c i t . pp.236f. x C f . Prot. Era, p. 125 as well as B i b l . Bel. pp. 10 and 47f. Cf. also S T . I l l , pp. 172-182. 2 C f . Chr. Enc., p. 54 and ST.I, p. 219. 3 C f . ST.I, pp. 220f. 69 Catholicism.' 1' This arrangement of Religions according to three t y p i f y i n g elements, namely the sacramental, the mystical and the prophetical, already appears i n his study on S c h e l l i n g . It i s c l e a r l y determined by his views of d i a l e c t i c s , of the 2 p o s i t i v e paradox and of the Protestant p r i n c i p l e . We are not primarily interested, however, i n the actual c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the types, given by T i l l i c h . We should rather concentrate on the t h e o l o g i c a l analysis of the encounter as such, r e a l i z i n g that t h i s word i t s e l f often refers to the revelatory s i t u a t i o n as an event. We should consider therefore, why T i l l i c h c a l l s his approach dynamic typology. He envisages the dynamics of a challenging encounter which evokes the a c t i v a t i o n of the e t e r n a l l y v a l i d elements i n each Religion. These elements such as the sacramental and the mystical are contrasting poles. They are interdependent, forming the actual, creative forces that determine Religions i n a t y p i f y i n g manner 3 and at the same time d r i v i n g the type beyond i t s e l f . In t h i s sense we can speak of a universal preparation of f i n a l r e v e l -"'"Behind most of his statements about Catholicism we sense his opinion that i t i s 'the most potent form of demonry' (Quoted by Adams op. c i t . p. 51). However,especially i n his l a s t p u b l i c -ations, T i l l i c h c a l l s the Catholic substance indispensible i f the Protestant p r i n c i p l e i s to make sense. Cf. ST. I l l , pp. 6; 122; 245. 2 C f . Ges.W.. I, pp. 102-108 and Fut.Rel. p. 86. 3 C f . Chr. Enc. pp.56ff. 70 ation. Revelation breaks through universally- by the i n t e r n a l growth which i s to be activated by the encounter with other t r a d i t i o n s . T i l l i c h does not say that revelation i s a general 2 s t r u c t u r a l f a c t that occurs naturally everywhere and always. But he accepts a concept of f i n a l r e v e lation which presupposes the universal p o s s i b i l i t y of r e v e l a t i o n and he outlines the preparatory, dynamic process, pointing to the three functions of conservation, c r i t i c i s m and anticipatory transcendence of 3 what has been received. In the evaluation of Religions T i l l i c h seems to be very near to opinions voiced by theologians such as Rahner and Danielou. Osborne i s eager to point out t h i s a f f i n i t y r e f e r -r i n g e s p e c i a l l y to related questions such as immanence of the divine, s o-called Anknupfungspunkte and the reduction of theo-4 logy to one l e v e l , one order of grace. As we saw before, Cf. ST.I, p. 221. In the t h i r d volume of Systematic Theo-logy we f i n d ample use of both the word preparatory or p r e l i m i n a r and the word l a t e n t . Cf. S T . I l l , pp. 153-156 and 246. I t i s sur p r i s i n g that Osborne f a i l s to point out t h i s s i m i l a r i t y with Rahner's concept of anonymity (Note that Rahner has of late dropped his term anonymous C h r i s t i a n i t y i n favour of the anonym-ous redeemed). On the concept of the latent Church c f . Gabus op. c i t . pp. 60-62. 2 C f . ST.I, pp. 138f. 3 C f . ST. I., pp. 139-144. 4 Besides K. Rahner, Osborne refers e s p e c i a l l y to H. de Lubac and E. Schillebeeckx as well as to Orthodox theology. Cf. op. c i t pp. 201f. Cf. also Benktson op. c i t . p. 202. 71 T i l l i c h does not accept a natural theology i n the sense that Bonhoeffer thinks he does. But there seems another point of difference between Bonhoeffer and T i l l i c h , which places the l a t t e r closer to Catholic thinking and which forms the core of Hamilton's c r i t i c i s m . Benktson i s mistaken i n thinking that Bonhoeffer's l e t t e r of 8/6/1944 simply misunderstands T i l l i c h ' s intentions of uniting culture and r e l i g i o n when i t accuses him of t r y i n g to clear 'a space f o r r e l i g i o n i n the world'. Unlike T i l l i c h , Bonhoeffer i s apparently unable to think of r e l i g i o n other than i n terms of individualism. ""So he st a r t s his programme of r e l i g i o n l e s s C h r i s t i a n i t y i n the l e t t e r of 30/4/1944,, writing; ' r e l i g i o n as i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c concern for personal salvation has ... l e f t us a l l 1 . The conceptions of Bonhoeffer and Hamilton are determined by the ideals of r e l i g i o u s person-alism, which has been revived by Kierkegaard's e x i s t e n t i a l i s m . T i l l i c h i s strongly opposed to the serious d i s t o r t i o n which considers r e l i g i o n as the i n d i v i d u a l ' s search for j u s t i f i c a t i o n and as a useful factor i n man's self-development. This i s the Protestant version of the humanist i d e a l of personality, which, as T i l l i c h thinks, could only r e s u l t i n a drive toward a new t r i b a l existence i n the form of Fascism.''" With good reason, "*"Cf. P r a t . Era p. 131. Parts two and three of t h i s a r t i c l e on personality i d . p. 125-135 are extremely i n s t r u c t i v e . See also Courage to Be, p. 113. T i l l i c h does not want to return to a Catholic concept of a sanctioned structure of an encompassing hierarchy, but he also ressents the i s o l a t i o n i s t p o s i t i o n of •the Confessing Church which could only favour fascism. Cf. Ges.W. I I , pp. 217 and 255. 72 therefore, he drops the word personal when he applies Kierke-gaard's formulation of the i n f i n i t e passion to his own concept of r e l i g i o n . 1 This does not mean that he drops the element of personal involvement and decision. He points out, however, that i t i s the community that gives meaning to the i n d i v i d u a l and that mediates grace by b e l i e v i n g i n the promise i t has received. Thereby he t r i e s to counterbalance the Protestant 2 stress on the heroic, e t h i c a l Entsoheidung. When th i s view i s combined with the u n i v e r s a l i s t i c conception of revelation i t opens up an e n t i r e l y new approach to Religions, for i t makes us acknowledge that the various t r a d i t i o n s them-selves are valuable embodiments of r e v e l a t i o n despite t h e i r ambiguity. T i l l i c h agrees whole-heartedly with the logos doctrine of the Greek Fathers and i t i s t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the universal with the incarnated Logos that enables him to f i g h t the absolutism of any Religion without y i e l d i n g to the 3 temptation of r e l a t i v i s m . The paradoxical c o r r e l a t i o n of 'Yes' Cf. Hamilton op. c i t . p. 43. Kierkegaard describes C h r i s t i a n i t y as 'an i n f i n i t e , personal, passionate i n t e r e s t i n one's eternal happiness'. Hamilton does not see why T i l l i c h attempts to change the one-sided, e t h i c a l bias involved i n t h i s type of e x i s t e n t i a l -ism. 2 T i l l i c h should not be accused of ignoring the e t h i c a l for he refers time and again to the demands of ultimacy to which man should surrender, but he also emphasizes the cosmical and s o c i a l aspects of man who as an i n d i v i d u a l i s an end only as part of a whole (Cf. Prot. Era, p. 125). -^ He has always rejected the r e l a t i v i s m of Troeltsch and he has restated his p o s i t i o n shortly before his death i n a reply to MacQuarrie. Cf. Union Seminary Quaterly Review,20 (1965) pp. 177-178 . 73 and 'No' of divine immanence of transcendence forms the basis of his theology of culture which sees r e l i g i o n even where the r e l i g i o u s import i s not c o g n i t i v e l y acknowledged. The e f f e c t of his d i a l e c t i c a l thinking bewilders many c r i t i c s who t ry to e s t a b l i s h whether the gratuity of revelation i n the b i b l i c a l sense i s respected i n t h i s u n i v e r s a l i s t view of revelation. We can agree with Gabus that T i l l i c h does move i n congruence with b i b l i c a l universalism but that he applies his conception of ultimate concern and c o r r e l a t i o n too e a s i l y to iron away tensions which the Bible takes much more seri o u s l y , in order to a r r i v e at the dialogue.''" This seems due mainly to his u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of Heidegger's concentration on 2 c u e : u u i . u i u y i u a i J . C I L . I I C ; J . i _ i i a . i i L-IIC; O I l L l C . A question which should be asked i n f a c t i s whether the ultimate concern can become a c r i t e r i o n to diagnose and remedy the demonic pathologies of man's shaping and grasping c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . We wonder i f T i l l i c h has not l o s t contact with the Cf. Gabus op. c i t . p. 62ff. T i l l i c h himself does not o f f e r much exegetical material. A c r u c i a l sermon i n connection with universalism i s the one on Gal. 6:15 c a l l e d 'The New Being' (The New Being, New York 1955, pp. 15-24). Barth has also come to recognise the u n i v e r s a l i t y of revelation e s p e c i a l l y i n "The Humanity of God", but there seems to be s t i l l a difference which can be understood i n terms of the difference between Mk. 9:40 ( T i l l i c h ) and Mt. 12:30 (Barth), i n my opinion. This i s Gilkey's c r i t i c i s m of T i l l i c h , op. c i t . , p. 307n. 74 concrete, the o n t i c , when he finds himself j u s t i f i e d i n saying both of f a i t h and of s i n that they are necessarily u n i v e r s a l . 1 We s h a l l have to return to t h i s i n the second part of our study. At t h i s moment we can only conclude that T i l l i c h has shown a b r i l l i a n t consistency, working out his conception of the p o s i t i v e 2 paradox. Churchmen w i l l f i n d f a u l t with hxs excessive emphasis on continuity, whereas others are d i s s a t i s f i e d with his great emphasis on g r a t u i t y , the divine 1 No', and the Protestant p r i n c i p l e . His view of c o r r e l a t i o n c a l l s for both. I t i s a challenge which can be faced only i n the actual dialogue for which he has given a s o l i d basis. But however much we need outside influence to solve the age-old problem of synergism which continues to plague Western theology, only the commitment to> the-'humanum provides us with a ' 3 t r u l y meaningful motive to embark on the dialogue. Cf. Dynamics of f a i t h , p. 126 and ST. II.,p. 44. But we note that he makes a d i s t i n c t i o n between s t r u c t u r a l or e s s e n t i a l necessity and t r a g i c , f a c t u a l or e x i s t e n t i a l necessity, which brings out once again the tension of the p o s i t i v e paradox. Osborne argues that T i l l i c h succeeded i n maintaining the tension between the conditioned being and the Unconditioned, within the d e f i n i t i o n s he himself gave of t h i s paradox, but that these d e f i n -i t i o n s hinge on questionable, ontdlogical conceptions of essence and existence. Cf. Osborne, op. c i t . p. 205. 3 T i l l i c h r e j e c t s vigorously the studies of Asian Religions for the sake of c u r i o s i t y or greater s e l f - f u l f i l m e n t . Cf. Ges. W.J.V, p. 21. He also i n s i s t s that commitment to the own t r a d i t i o n i s a prerequisite for a f r u i t f u l dialogue. Cf. Chr. Enc. , p. 62. But the humanum has c l e a r l y his prime i n t e r e s t and t h i s joins hims with the objectives of Bonhoeffer and i t seems to make his method of c o r r e l a t i o n more valuable than Schillebeeckxis w i l l i n g to admit. Benktson, op. c i t . p. 203 suggests that Western theology does i n f a c t need the importation of ideas 'from elsewhere as theology of the s e c u l a r i z i n g process arrives at an impass. PART I I 7 5 II.1 RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM As indicated i n the introduction, t h i s second part must try to r e l a t e the u n i v e r s a l i t y of revelation to the effectiveness of symbolic mediation within concrete Religions. After having examined the nature of revelation as i t applies to a l l Religions, we may have the f e e l i n g that T i l l i c h never transcended what might be c a l l e d a negative type of hermeneutics. I t i s worth noting that T i l l i c h ' s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with his dynamic typology resembles the discontent which Freud expressed at the end of his l i f e concerning the system of reductive hermeneutics which he had developed.'*' Ricoeur sets out to show that Freud's system i n f a c t presupposes an a c t u a l i z i n g hermeneutics. 2 I t would appear that T i l l i c h ' s method even surpasses Ricoeur's but at the same time f a i l s to accentuate c e r t a i n aspects, the examin-ation of which could well have resolved the d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n mentioned. With respect to Ricoeur we notice that he ends his book on Freud by s t a t i n g that symbolism can be understood only 11 am f a r from s a t i s f i e d with these remarks on... the i n s t a l l -ation of the superego ... as a successful instance of i d e n t i f i c -ation with the parental agency 1 (Quoted by P. Ricoeur inzFreud and Philosophy, 1970, p. 481). 2 . . -This word i s used by E. Schillebeeckx O.P. i n two a r t i c l e s on t h e o l o g i c a l hermeneutics and c r i t i c i s m published i n : T i j d s c h r i f t voor Theologie 11 (1971) pp. 30-51 and 113-140. Ricoeur uses the terms remythicizing, progressive and r e s t o r a t i v e as opposed to demystifying, regressive and reductive hermeneutics. The former approach as reappropriation by r e f l e c t i o n , .has been worked out most eloquently by H. Gadamer. 7 6 i f the d i a l e c t i c between the No and the Yes, that i s between Kierkegaard's and Spinoza's approach, i s honoured. To integrate these two approaches, as we know, has been T i l l i c h ' s objective from the very beginning of his carreer, p a r t i c u l a r -l y with reference to symbolism, the subject to which we now return, which i s a f o c a l point i n a l l contemporary r e l i g i o u s studies and which has undoubtedly played a central r o l e i n 2 T i l l i c h ' s association with Mircea Eliade. The various theories of symbolism can be c l a s s i f i e d into two groups which T i l l i c h c a l l s the negative and the p o s i t i v e Cf. Ricoeur, op. c i t . p. 549. Ricoeur does not seem to know T i l l i c h , even though he has exactly the same i n t e r e s t s , namely to amalgamate phenomenology and neo-orthodox e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i n view of the Freudian and Marxian c r i t i c i s m s . 2 . T i l l i c h was i n close contact with M. Eliade during the f i n a l years of his l i f e . Cf. Fut. Rel. pp. 91 and 31ff. Of the vast l i t e r a t u r e on symbolism we mention the following p e r i o d i c a l s and books: Cahiers Internationaux de Symbolisme, Havre-le-Mons, Belgium; Symbolon, Jahrbuch for Symbolforschung, Basel; Antaios (yearly), Stuttgart; E. Cassirer: The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, New Haven, 1957; G. Durand: Les Structures Anthropologiques de I'Imaginaire, P a r i s , 1963; i d . : l ' I m a g i n a t i o n Symbolique, P a r i s , 1964; M. Eliade: Images and Symbols, New York, 1952; H. Gadamer: Wahrheit und Methode, Tubingen 1960; C. Levi-Strauss: La Pensee Sauvage, P a r i s , 1962; P. Ricoeur: The Symbolism of E v i l , New York, 1967;- A survey of previous theories of symbolism i s given i n : H. Looff: Der Symbolbegriff in neueren Religionsphilosophie und Theologie, Cologne 1955; The most e x p l i c i t study of symbolism i n T i l l i c h ' s thought i s : K. Norenberg: Analogia Imaginis, Gutersloh, 1966. ) 77 approach. Negative theories l i k e those of Freud, Marx, Nietzsche, and we may add Levi-Strauss, a l l reduce symbols to mere signs, claiming that they are no more than repressing subterfuges by which man covers up his inadequate mastership 2 of r e a l i t y . As such symbols are considered detrimental to man. T i l l i c h himself c e r t a i n l y rejects t h i s view, but paradoxically so, for his eschatology pleads for a Religion of the Concrete S p i r i t i n which the 'contrast between r e l a i t y and symbol' i s suspended and 'the non-symbolic r e a l i t y i t s e l f becomes a symbol'. This view c l e a r l y d i f f e r s from that of Levi-Strauss . who envisages the eventual n u l l i f i c a t i o n of any transcendence 3 as the symbolized referent. Unlike the negative theories , T i l l i c h distinguishes symbols from metaphors ,- signs, images-and types, not because he considers these dimensions i r r e l e v a n t , but because a symbol as such refers to a s p e c i f i c dimension. With Anricht he could say that a symbol i s r e a l i t y i n i t s e f f e c t -4 i v i t y . Symbols are not a world apart, but they point to the "*Xf. Hook, op. c i t . pp. 303ff. 2 Cf. Ibid. p. 304 and Ricoeur, op. c i t . , pp. 16ff. 3 Cf. H. Fortmann: Als ziende de O n z i e n l i j k e , 1965, Vol. 3a Geloof en Ervaring, p. 186. For the quotations from T i l l i c h cf. Hook op. c i t . p. 320 and: Fut. Rel.p. 90. ^'Das Symbol i s t die Sache i n ihre Wirkung' (Quoted i n : Fortmann op. c i t . p. 172). 78 transcendent meaning of the one world of our experience. They cease to be symbols once they lose t h i s s i g n i f y i n g power. 1 In T i l l i c h ' s own words, a symbol 'radiates the power of being ( S e i n s m a c h t i g k e i t ) and meaning (Sinn) of that for which i t 2 stands'. We recognize here Heidegger's view that the world, as the c o r r e l a t i v e pole of man's Dasein, mediates man's caring about an understanding of being. However, we should note that from the beginning T i l l i c h ' s idea of symbolism was conceived as related to the s o c i a l s e t t i n g , the community, which determ-ines the symbolic content and i t s mediating power. Moreover, he does not see symbols as cognitive devices by which being i s understood, but primarily as revelatory events i n which 3 being i s radiated. With respect to symbolism we face three basic questions. What i s the referent of r e l i g i o u s symbolism? What i s the hermeneutic context of the word meaning? Which factors give symbolic powers to a r e a l i t y ? If we s t a r t with the t h i r d question we must f i r s t ask whether T i l l i c h believes there i s an inner a f f i n i t y between a concrete being and that 'was ohne es ganzlich verborgen bliebe'. "'"Cf. Ges-. W. I l l , p. 126. Tebus seems r i g h t i n pointing out that T i l l i c h too e a s i l y r e j e c t s symbols which he considers to have lo s t t h e i r s i g n i f y i n g value. Cf. op. c i t . p. 130. 2 Hook, op. c i t . p. 4. 3R. Jaspers e s p e c i a l l y emphasizes that a symbol i s an 'Ereignis Cf. Fortmann op. c i t . p. 167. For the congruence of T i l l i c h and Heidegger cf. O'Meara art. c i t . Harvard Theological Review, 61, (1968) pp. 249-261. 4 Phrase quoted from Jaspers i n : Ibid, p. 166. Fortmann, op. c i t p. 166. 79 Although we s h a l l deal with t h i s question s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the next chapter, we should note at t h i s juncture the extent to which T i l l i c h stresses the dependence of symbols i n t h e i r r i s e and decline on the t o t a l i t y of s o c i a l surroundings. 1 In order to receive revelatory s i g n i f i c a n c e the symbolic material must have a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n within a meaning structure. This p o s i t i o n cannot be assigned by an i n d i v i d u a l at random 2 but depends on the acceptance by a group. Symbols have the power to open up hidden dimensions and they have an integrating e f f e c t on human l i f e . They are ambiguous, however, and can be demonically devastating, which i s a l l the more serious as they d i s t o r t that which i n t e n t i o n a l l y deals with the meaning and substance of a l l human culture. On the other hand we must say that revelatory symbols must both upset and restore the 3 transmitted order of meaning. The question of meaning contents of symbolic material confronts us with the problem of the hermeneutic 'theological c i r c l e ' , "'"Cf. Fut. of. Rel. p. 93 and Hook op. c i t . p. 4 . 2 The concept of ' r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n ' i s used i n the anthropo-l o g i c a l structuralism of P. Maranda, E. Leach, J. Pouwer a.o. i n r e f u t a t i o n of functionalism which concentrates on i n d i v i d u a l symbolic meanings rather than on the semantic structures with t h e i r transformational rules. T i l l i c h had no knowledge of structur-alism, but the concept of Gestalt i n his system indicates that he was predisposed to i t s h o l i s t i c approach. ^This twofold hermeneutics w i l l occupy us l a t e r , but one quotations seems most valuable at t h i s point: 'Religious symbols... have t h e i r roots i n the t o t a l i t y of human experience including l o c a l surroundings ... and... can be understood p a r t l y as i n revolt against them' (Fut. of Rel. p. 9 3 . ) 80 within which T i l l i c h acknowledges himself to be operating. This c i r c l e determines his conception of r e l i g i o n . We have seen that T i l l i c h proposes to base the universal v a l i d i t y of the l a t t e r on the central r o l e played by the conception of the logos i h which the absolute universal coincides with the absolutely concrete. To explain the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the Ch r i s t i a n message apologetic theology must show that the 'theological c i r c l e ' i s a l l i n c l u s i v e thanks to i t s twofold formal c r i t e r i o n of a l l theology. 1 Man's ultimate concern about being and not-being i s the context i n which one should understand T i l l i c h ' s universal paradox of meaning. The concept 2 of meaning i t s e l f , he thinks beyond d e f i n i t i o n . However, we could resort i n t h i s matter to the early Heidegger, who conceives meaning as the f u l f i l l m e n t of man's being-in-the-world which i s a concerned openness to a given condition. It i s the understand-a b i l i t y of r e a l i t y i n terms of an answer to the question of being. x C f . ST. I, pp. 11-18. T i l l i c h i s aware of the d i f f i c u l t y i n completing t h i s apologetic task, but he i n s i s t s that we can not escape the question. C r i t i c s agree that he has given a most energetic and thought-provoking answer to i t . Cf. C. Armbruster: The Vision of Paul T i l l i c h , 1967, p. 40 and also Schmitz op. c i t . pp. l l O f . 2 'One can not trace back the concept of meaning to a higher concept', i t i s 'the ultimate unity of the t h e o r e t i c a l and the p r a c t i c a l sphere of s p i r i t ' . {What is R e l i g i o n ? pp. 56f). 3 'Sinn i s t das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und V o r g r i f f struck-t u r i e r t e Woraufhin des Entwurfs aus dem her etwas als verstandlich wird' (M. Heidegger: Sein und Z e i t , p. 151, Eng. t r . , 1962, p. 193). Heidegger points out that understanding of meaning i s necessarily c i r c u l a r and t h i s w i l l bring him more and more into the f i e l d of language and hermeneutics. But from the beginning he stresses that the hermeneutic c i r c l e i s not a vicious c i r c l e (Cf. i b i d . pp. 152f. Eng. t r . p. 194). Ricoeur agrees with t h i s . (Cf. op. c i t . p. 432). 81 If a symbol radiates the meaning of that for which i t stands, i t does so only because i t activates the ultimate concern for being. Although Heidegger, l i k e Freud, considered the quest of being i n s a t i a b l e because death and meaninglessness i s inherent i n a l l f i n i t e things, he does stress the u n i v e r s a l i t y of t h i s quest. This brings us to the question concerning the referent of a l l r e l i g i o u s symbols. I f anything can become a symbol so that nothing can be considered symbolic by i t s very nature, and i f the symbolic dimension of a r e a l i t y depends on t r a d i t i o n , we must ask i f anything non-symbolic can be said about the referent of r e l i g i o u s symbols, which C h r i s t i a n theology c a l l s God. When T i l l i c h refuses to make the symbolic t r a d i t i o n subject to delibe ate human decisions or some sort of a Platonic memory,''" he wants to point out that the human synergetic involvement i s guided by the d i r e c t i n g c r e a t i v i t y of the divine referent himself, who transcends f i n i t e meaning structures. On the other hand he agrees that a non-symbolic statement about God i s not only possible but i n fact necessary. Such a statement must f i r s t of a l l see to i t that the referent of ultimate concern i s not made 2 into a being which i s available as an object. The only accept-able statement therefore seems to be that God i s B e i n g - i t s e l f 1 C f . 52*. I, pp. 94f. and 125f and also Gabus, op. c i t . p. 115 2 C f . ST. I, p. 238; ST.I, pp. 9f; Kegley op. c i t . p. 341. 82 beyond the subject-object structures. When t h i s statement created a controversy, T i l l i c h made the issue more enigmatic not only by o f f e r i n g other formulations, but also by declaring that'the statement i t s e l f i s metaphorical and designates the boundary l i n e at which symbolic and non-symbolic c o i n c i d e ' . 1 Much of the controversy seems to spring from a misunderstanding of T i l l i c h ' s basic i n s i g h t expressed i n his warning never to use the phrase 'only symbolic', which warning he attaches to his view that the only non-symbolic statement about God i s r e a l l y that everything said about him 2 i s symbolic. Speech about God always deals with the r e l a t i o n -ship between God and man and the language used i n a r e l i g i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p can only be symbolic." To t r y and define God out-side t h i s s p e c i a l dimension of r e a l i t y by ignoring t h i s r e l a t i o n -ship should be considered an absurdity. T i l l i c h wants to avoid by a l l means the L i b e r a l danger of s p a t i a l i z i n g God as an object ST.II, p. 10. Cf. Kegley op. c i t . 334 and Hook op. c i t . pp.7f. 2 Cf. ST. XI, p. 9 and Kegley op. c i t . p. 334. I t i s amazing to see that Schmitz uses the phrase 1nur symbolisch' on the very same page where he refers to Kegley op.- c i t . p. 334 , although T i l l i c h i n that location as i n numerous other occasions warns against the usage of that phrase. Cf. Schmitz op. c i t . p. 102. 3 Here the word only does not give an evaluation of the word symbolic but expresses that symbolic language alone expresses 'eine Wahrheit die i n keiner andere Sprache ausgedriickt und m i t g e t e i l t werden kann'. (Ges. 17. ,V, p. 231). T i l l i c h points out that ' r e f l e c t i v e l y r e l i g i o n can also express i t s e l f i n theolo-g i c a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l and a r t i s t i c terms. But i t s d i r e c t s e l f -expression i s the symbol'., (Hook op. c i t . p. 3). 83 alongside others about which something objective can be said. A second consideration i s that symbolism i s the language of r e l i g i o n and not the language of theology. Single symbols should be understood within the entir e t y of symbolism as language of r e l i g i o n . This e n t i r e t y , however, can be analyzed i n theontologica1, x metalinguistic terms i n which symbols are understood as a category of the language of c o r r e l a t i o n . They represent God as the answer or horizon (Ricoeur and Schillebeeckx) of the e x i s t e n t i a l question, which man i s . Theon-t o l o g i c a l speech i s the boundary l i n e at which symbolic and non-symbolic coincide. We speak non-symbolically only i n terms of man's onto l o g i c a l shock and the r a t i o n a l e x p l i c i t a t i o n of the quest that issues from i t . This quest, although evoked by the actual encounter with the holy, remains man's question and as such non-symbolic. The actual encounter with the holy, however, ceases to be an encounter i f i t ignores the symbolic dimension of i t s lan-guage. The term ' B e i n g - i t s e l f , therefore, i s used non-symbol-i c a l l y to the extent that i t expresses the p a i n f u l l y absent dimension which characterizes the predicament of man's f i n i t u d e , but i t i s used symbolically to define the experienced answer to t h i s predicament. Consequently, another variant of the non-T i l l i c h accepts this term coined by R. Scharlemann i n : The Journal of R e l i g i o n XLVI, (1966) no. 1 Part I I , p. 184. 84 symbolic statement could be that God i s the answer to the question Which man is."*" God i s the B e i n g - i t s e l f about which we are ultimately concerned. This statement i s the most comprehensive possible, and consequently nothing else can be predicated l i t e r a l l y as i t would say less rather than more. The structures of being apply to God because they concern us. In T i l l i c h ' s view the truth of symbols consists i n t h e i r mediation of the New Being, that i s , the power to be. Being i s the object of that single 2 faculty of desiring about which Kant has spoken. This object can not receive a l o g i c a l , e s s e n t i a l i s t i c d e f i n i t i o n . I t i s neither a being nor the t o t a l i t y of a l l beings i n the unity of a l l meaning f u l f i l l m e n t s . This t o t a l i t y i t s e l f must be made It i s Norenberg's main purpose to show that symbolism should be understood i n the context of c o r r e l a t i o n . Cf. Armbruster op. c i t . , p. 162, note 90. 2 Ricoeur relates t h i s expression of Kant to Freud's l i b i d o . Cf. op. c i t . p. 512. The ambiguous i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of man's predicament appears when 'Freud adds a pathology of duty to what -Kant c a l l e d the pathology of desire'. (Ibid. 448). Is man alienated by subjection to law or to desire, to culture or to nature? Is i t not rather man's i m p o s s i b i l i t y of overcoming t h i s contradiction which i s exposed by the revelation of unambiguous l i f e ? L e v i -Strauss relates a s i m i l a r idea to the purpose of myth-making when he says that myth i s 'to provide a l o g i c a l model capable of over-coming a contradiction (an impossible achievement i f , as i t happens, the contradiction i s real) ... i t s (the myth's) growth i s a continuous process whereas i t s structure remains the same' (C. Levi-Strauss, The St r u c t u r a l Study of Myth i n : T. Sebeok (ed.) Myth, a Symposium, London, Midland Books, 1968 p. 105).We seem to be l i n e with Ricoeur and T i l l i c h when we contend that the problem of e v i l and f i n i t u d e i s the kernel of myth-making. The structures of the myth remain the same because man has to recuper-ate the power of.being i n the depth of those c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s forms, which have o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y and alienated man from a union with being, beyond the subject - object structure. 85 i n t o the symbol of God's free self-manifestation. Before we examine the factors that determine the symbolic material, we must ask whether T i l l i c h ' s object of ultimate concern d i f f e r s i n any respect from the claim that God i s only the projection of our desire. T i l l i c h ' s answer i s much i n l i n e with the neo-orthodox inversion of analogy. God i s the o r i g i n rather than the aim of our concern. This inversion i s related to the non-symbolic statement. Referring to the various form-ulations of the l a t t e r , Ford, i n reply to Rowe, pointed out that there i s one constant, basic idea, namely, the absolute 2 imperative not to attempt any objective predication about God. T i l l i c h goes further, however, and stresses that the dimension of ultimate concern i s not only beyond s a t i s f a c t o r y predication but also beyond being ignored as i r r e l e v a n t . The universal experience of f i n i t u d e presupposes the knowledge of.the i n f i n i t e which i s the prius of the f i n i t e , exposing the l a t t e r i n e v i t a b l y ; as a question. F i n i t e being presupposes B e i n g - i t s e l f which Schelling c a l l e d the " U n v o r d e n k l i c h e " and Anselm "id quod maius c o g i t a r i nequit". This does not force us to accept the ontolog-The perfect symbol of the Unconditioned can be only 'die vollendete Sinneinheit, die hochste Form der Kultur ... Sie konnte es sein, i s t es aber nicht mit Notwendigkeit. Unmittelbar ... i s t diese Sinneinheit nur die Einheit des Bedingten und als solchen Welt' (Schmitz op. c i t . p. 66). 2 Cf. L. Ford: T i l l i c h ' s one non-symbolic statement i n : Journal of American Academy of R e l i g i o n (1970) pp. ,176-182. 86 i c a l proof of God as a human p o s s i b i l i t y but i t does hold that the quest of God, be i t ever so human, originates beyond man. Barth i s r i g h t to adopt Anselm's axiom 'credo ut i n t e l l i g a m ' , but T i l l i c h claims that the credo should not concern a defined and l i m i t e d set of predications. "*" II.2 ANALOGIA IMAGINIS Although everything that exists can become a symbol of the divine Ground of Being because i t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n being, not everything i s a c t u a l l y a symbol, for o n t o l o g i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s not the only ingredient of symbolism.. One of the most, s t r i k -ing ideas of T i l l i c h i s that symbols are means of speaking about 2 God rather than means of knowing Him. These observations force us to examine his view of the symbolic material and more part-i c u l a r l y his conception of analogy. He often uses analogy and The v a l i d aspect of the t r a d i t i o n a l proofs of God i s that they show the p o s s i b i l i t y and i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the question of God. Cf. ST.I, 204-210. The roots of what has been c a l l e d the neo-orthodox inversion of analogy can c l e a r l y be found even i n R i t s c h l and i n Aquinas himself. On a comparison between T i l l i c h and Aquinas c f . G. McLean; Symbol and Analogy; T i l l i c h and Thomas. This i s an a r t i c l e published i n T.O'Meara and C. Weiser; Paul T i l l i c h in Catholic Thought, 1964. This book returns time and again to the comparison between T i l l i c h and Aquinas. Cf. ST.I, p. 131; ST. i l , p. 115; Armbruster op. c i t . pp. 142f; McLean art. c i t . p. 169. 87 symbolism as synonyms even though he combines a penchant f o r the negative side of analogy with a p o s i t i v e view of the re-presentative power of symbols. 1 The questions to face now are what i t means that the b i r t h of symbols does not depend on an ar b i t r a r y , i n t e n t i o n a l creation, but on man's experience of the r e l i g i o u s encounter with r e a l i t y ; secondly, what i s t h i s decisive experience of the holy which allows concrete beings to open up the dimension of ultimacy i n r e a l i t y ? Any on t o l o g i c a l statement, as we have seen, has a twofold nature, f o r any observation about the structure of being implies both 'the l o g i c a l analysis and the conscious concern 2 about the matter analyzed'. The l a t t e r aspect i s the subject of theology i n which the persistent p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n being i s shown as the o r i g i n of man's self-transcending quest for being due to his shocking confrontation with the absurdity of his fi n i t u d e . The answer to the challenging f i n i t u d e , however, i s the creative presence of transcendent being within symbols. The c r e a t i v e l y healing word enters through a concept, or law, or image, to allow 'the Unconditioned import of meaning (Sinn-gehalt) breaking through the form of meaning (Sinnform) as a Cf. O'Meara op. c i t . p. 24 and Kegley op. c i t . p. 334. In the l a s t reference we see that T i l l i c h rejects the v i a eminentiae which Hartshorne proposes and replaces i t with the via. symbolica. R. Aldwinckle also resents T i l l i c h ' s negative penchant i n : Canadian Journal of Theology, 10, (1964) pp. 110-117. 2 Kegley op. c i t . p. 335. 88 r e v e l a t i o n ' , dependent on 'the reaction of a group through which i t becomes a symbol'."'" We are presented here with a very unusual form of analogy which Gabus seems to miss e n t i r e l y when he states that T i l l i c h ' s doctrine of symbolism reduces everything to an univocal con-ception of being without taking h i s t o r y and t r a d i t i o n into 2 account. The fac t that being appears as the object of man's single f a c u l t y of desire does not j u s t i f y Gabus' judgment, because T i l l i c h rejects that any being i s received other than i n t o t a l dependence on the h i s t o r i c a l l y conditioned, mystical 3 experience. Gabus' c r i t i c i s m does not stand up even i n view of T i l l i c h ' s statement that analogy exists only between the meaning of God's ultimacy which i s immediately and non-symbol-i c a l l y experienced, and the meaning of something f i n i t e , for the l a t t e r i s e n t i r e l y conditioned by a group's meaning s t r u c t -ures . What is R e l i g i o n ? p. 105 and Hook op. c i t . p. 4. Cf. also Norenberg op. c i t . p. 76. 2 Cf. Cabus op. c i t . p. 131. T i l l i c h d e f i n i t e l y related the experience of e x i s t e n t i a l l y v a l i d answers to the h i s t o r i c a l l y given r e a l i t y . Cf. ST,I, p. 42. 3 . The mystical experience, or experience by p a r t i c i p a t i o n , underlies and exceeds the onto l o g i c a l and technological exper-ience. I t happens i n f a i t h within the c i r c l e of r e l i g i o u s un-derstanding. In i t s e l f i t i s ambiguous and, should be rejected as a source of theology. Under the d i r e c t i o n of the c r i t i c a l norm of New Being however, i t must be accepted as the p r a c t i c a l knowledge by which man receives the u n i f i c a t i o n with the divine S p i r i t within the concrete, e x i s t e n t i a l s e t t i n g . Cf. ST.I, pp. 40-45. 89 T i l l i c h ' s way of escaping pansymbolism i s another issue i n which a r i g h t understanding of his view of analogy i s important. Es c h a t o l o g i c a l l y speaking the unity of a l l r e a l i t y represents pansymbolically the dimension beyond i t s l i t e r a l meaning. But Benktson i s wrong i f he thinks that T i l l i c h avoids actual pansymbolism by a form of actualism which re-sembles Barth's p o s i t i v i s m . 1 I t i s not through God's choice that one form rather than another becomes the symbol of re-v e l a t i o n . I t i s rather that most r e a l i t i e s are prevented from functioning as a symbol by the ambiguities of existence, despite t h e i r i n t r i n s i c and natural power1 {Selbstmdchtigkeit und Naturmachtigkeit). Once again we are faced with the problem of immanence and transcendence, which formed the central subject i n the medi-eval theories of analogy. They t r i e d to determine the sense i n which a f i n i t e concept could be applied to God. Whereas the analogy of p r o p o r t i o n a l i t y was proposed by Thomas Aquinas, the Franciscan school headed by Bonaventure kept to the more August-ini a n i n s p i r e d analogy of a t t r i b u t i o n . T i l l i c h opts for the l a t t e r while underscoring very heavily the a n a l y t i c , protestant 2 detachment proper to Aquinas' approach. Knowledge of God can be x C f . Benktson op. c i t . pp. 136-138. Benktson i s r i g h t i n contending that the creative, gratuitous i n i t i a t i v e of God (actual-ism) i s the center of T i l l i c h ' s understanding of revelation and that a l l analogy must be understood within a c e r t a i n form of dialogue between God and man, but with regard to symbols T i l l i c h holds that they are much more bound to the contingency of t r a d i t i o n s than Barth seems to admit. Cf. Norenberg op. c i t . p. 161. 2 C f . ST.I, p. 41, and Two Types., p. 6. 9 0 imparted only by God's revelation and natural theology i s impossible. T i l l i c h finds t h i s neo-orthodox axiom presented i n Aquinas' r e j e c t i o n of Augustinian mystical claims that man has an immediate awareness of being i t s e l f ."^  Yet i f Bonaventure did not preserve the divine transcendence, neither i n T i l l i c h ' s opinion did Aquinas himself. In f a c t , to c a l l created r e a l i t y the derived analogon does not s u f f i c e to j u s t i f y the v i a eminentiae , as a v a l i d method of applying predicates to the ,. . 2 divine. As Norenberg suggest, i t i s important to examine the idea of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n thi s context. Thomas Aquinas proposes the p a r t i c i p a t i o c a u s a l i s , i n order to lend emphasis to the con-cept of creation. In creation, r e a l i t y has received a certa i n r e l a t i o n or proportion to being and to the structures of being, such as l i f e and knowledge. The Creator also has a certa i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s being through cau s a l i t y and so i t i s the pro-portion of proportions that constitutes the analogy. Against this view Bonaventure draws on the old p r i n c i p l e that know-ledge presupposes a certa i n formal i d e n t i t y between subject Cf. ST.I, p. 4 1 and Norenberg op. c i t . p. 1 6 0 . Bonaventure stresses the dynamic, anagogical e f f e c t of man's reading of the book of creation i n addition to the s c r i p t u r e s : ' A l i t e r enim nobis innotescere non potuit i n v i s i b i l i s Dei Sapientia n i s i se his quae novimus v i s i b i l i u m rerum formis ad similitudinem con-formaret et per eas nobis sua i n v i s i b i l i a quae non novimus significando exprimeret' (Tract, de pl a n t a t i o p a r a d i s i n. 1 quoted i n : J . Bougerol: Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, 1 9 6 4 . 2 Cf. Kegley op. c i t . p. 3 3 4 . 91 and object which exceeds the causal r e l a t i o n s h i p and he opts for the p a r t i c i p a t i o o b g e c t i v a . Aquinas rejected t h i s approach mainly to avoid the hermeneutical problems of the a l l e g o r i c a l exegesis, which makes him a forerunner of the Reformation and of the c r i t i c a l hermeneutics of Spinoza. 1, If analogy o s c i l l a t e s between univocity and equivocity we must say that both T i l l i c h and Aquinas keep closer to the l a t t e r so as to stress the divine transcendence. T i l l i c h i s uncom-promising i n t h i s respect, yet he neither excludes the r e a l mediating power of myths and symbols the way Bultmann does, nor reduces symbolic e f f i c a c i t y to ah amorphous univocity of being 2 (via n e g a t i o n i s ) . Although he considers some aspects of pantheism necessary elements of C h r i s t i a n thought, he speaks of B e i n g - i t s e l f only as the depth dimension of r e a l i t y , which i s immanent only as a theophanic, creative c r i s i s . The analogical proportion of man's and God's dimension of being i s marked by the fact that God i s the answer to man's ultimate concern about Cf. G. Weigel: Myth Symbol and Analogy i n : W. Leibrecht (ed.): Religion and Culture, 1959, pp. 129f. 2 . T i l l i c h stresses the necessity of breaking the myth, that i s of challenging every l i t e r a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t . This does not lead to the denial of r e a l i t y ' s power to speak meaningfully about God. Cf. O'Meara op. c i t . p. 23. Norenberg 1s accusation concerning the univ o c a l i t y of T i l l i c h . ' s conception of being i s uncomprehensible to me and seems also s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y i f we compare op. c i t . pp. 120; 171f. and 222. If T i l l i c h emphasizes that we can not say that God e x i s t s , does th i s not show that God's r e l a t i o n to being i s t o t a l i t y d i f f e r e n t from man's? Does th i s not r e f l e c t d i r e c t l y Aquinas' concept of the analogy of pro-p o r t i o n a l i t y by which transcendence i s stressed? 92 being, which answer i s known only i n the mystical experience of ecstacy. God's modus essendi i s i n f i n i t e l y d i f f e r e n t from man's, so much so that analogy can never be 'a method of d i s -covering truth about God' i n an o b j e c t i f y i n g process of reason-ing.''" Barth and Aquinas argue that, given the f a i t h i n God's revelatory and creative self-manifestation, we can discover knowledge about God by s t a r t i n g either from his words or from his creation. T i l l i c h , on the other hand, continues to stress the Lutheran paradox that God's immanence can never permit us to make any l i t e r a l predication i n an absolute sense, because our f a c u l t y of knowledge i s e x i s t e n t i a l l y conditioned to apply the subject-object structure to God. This does not make predic-ation e n t i r e l y impossible, however. Despite his negative-protesting understanding of analogy T i l l i c h professes that f i n i t e r e a l i t y can give contents to the cognitive function of r e v e l a t i o n . His h e s i t a t i o n i n t h i s res-pect, as well as his emphasis on the.concept of being, makes commentators r a i s e the question of why we cannot define con-cepts l i k e love s i m i l a r l y as objects of our unconditional con-2 cern. T i l l i c h ' s a n a l o g i a i m a g i n i s gives an answer to t h i s but only after warning us again never to pretend to push behind the LST.I, p. 131. With regards to T i l l i c h ' s alleged view on God as the essence of a l l things, cf. ST.l, pp. 234f. and O'Meara op. c i t . p. 30 8. ^Cf. Aldwinckle a r t . c i t . p. 116 and Gabus op. c i t . p. 121. T i l l i c h points out that his o n t o l o g i c a l statement i s the f i r s t and c e r t a i n l y not the l a s t assertion about God. Cf. Kegley op. c i t . p. 339. 93 analogy. This sol u t i o n presupposes Aquinas' a n a l o g i a e n t i s i n the sense that any object of our concern must have a rel a t i o n s h i p to the quest for being."*" Predication about God without reference to concern about being i s impossible. With t h i s i n t e n s i f i e d Thomistic premise, T i l l i c h feels at l i b e r t y to adopt f r e e l y the Franciscan t r a d i t i o n , which considers the world as the anagogical, divine self-manifest-ation. He never drops the neo-orthodox c r i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n . He stresses that no r e a l i t y can be a medium of knowledge about the divine by i t s e l f unambiguously and that i t i s not man's decision that determines th i s matter. He seems very close to Barth's p o s i t i v i s t and c h r i s t o c e n t r i c a n a l o g i a f i d e i , e s p e c i a l l y when he holds that any r e a l i t y that functions as God's s e l f -manifestation must be understood within the c o - r e l a t i o n of the divine answer to man's quest for New Being. But i t i s important to note that the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l New Being i s not an empty abstraction nor i s i t determined by any absolute form. The objective contents of the symbolic material are the concrete expressions of the regenerating divine grace. I t . i s true that the acceptance by the subject i n a s i t u a t i o n of encounter and ecstacy i s indispensible and that t h i s acceptance i s s o c i a l l y conditioned, but t h i s can be c a l l e d a r e l a t i v i s t i c subjectivism "*"The term a n a l o g i a i m a g i n i s seems to occur only once i n T i l l i c h ' s oeuvre, namely i n ST.IT, p. 115. The key-concept of Aquinas' a n a l o g i a e n t i s i s the.famous p r i n c i p l e : 'Omne agens agit s i b i simile quia agit secundum quod actu est' (Thomas Aquinas: Sent. ^ II I , d 33 q l a2. Quoted i n Norenberg op. c i t . p. 174). 94 only i f the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t conception of truth i s abandoned i n favour of p o s i t i v i s t essentialism. Analogia imaginis does accept the i n t r i n s i c power of symbolic r e a l i t i e s to speak t r u t h f u l l y about God. The picture of Jesus does reveal the divine i n a l l i t s dimensions, but these dimensions are to be subjected to the c r i t e r i o n of being, New Being. 1 The regenerating experience of the holy within the meaning structures of a h i s t o r i c a l community i s the aspect of God's anagogical immanence, about which the Franciscan t r a d i t i o n has spoken. T i l l i c h accepts t h i s but, at the same time, he i s too much aware of demonic d i s t o r t i o n s of r e l i g i o u s symbols to forget the warning contained i n Aquinas analogia entis. A symbol i s a v a l i d predication of God to the extent that i t u n i f i e s man with the God who overcomes his e x i s t e n t i a l estrange-ment. New Being i s the e v e r - c r i t i c a l horizon which affirms 2 concrete r e a l i t i e s that lead man to self-transcendence. T i l l i c h With regards to the symbol of Jesus as the Christ analogia imaginis 'says that the personal l i f e of Jesus 'when encountered by the d i s c i p l e s ... created the picture ... which mediates the transforming power of New Being' ( S T .II, p. 1 1 5 ) . Although 'New Being i s not dependent on the s p e c i a l symbols i n which i t i s expresse'd' we must s t i l l hold to the universal s i g n i f i c a n c e of Jesus as the Christ (ST.II, p. 1 6 5 ) . This i s a contradiction only i f the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l paradox i s ignored. 2 T i l l i c h r i g h t l y claims that he has anchored analogy beyond r e l a t i v i s m and subjectivism. But when he continues and rejects the demand for 'objective information' about God (Cf.O'Meara op. c i t . pp. 304f.) he f a i l s to explain how one r e a l i t y e.g. wisdom i s more appropriate as a predication of God than an other e.g. deceit. It i s T i l l i c h ' s view that, although such concepts change with time and place, there i s one i n v a r i a b l e dimension i n our r e l a t i o n to both God and e.g. wisdom, namely our concern about being. But, i f t h i s i s the basis of our analogous predic-95 does not opt for a timeless ontology, rather through a n a l o g i a i m a g i n i s he refers being back to h i s t o r y , even though his exegesis often seems too careless to support the claim of h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t . 1 Aquinas had pointed out that there i s no applying of f i n i t e concepts to God simply by expanding t h e i r contents, but only by r e l a t i n g them to the c r u c i a l f a c t of contingency and creation. Because T i l l i c h ' s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m i s indebted to Heidegger's destruction of t r a d i t i o n a l ontology, i t draws the conclusion that a n a l o g i a e n t i s i s v a l i d only as an ever c r i t i c a l basis. The quest for being and the answer to t h i s quest form the dimension within which the effectiveness of contingent symbolic r e a l i t i e s must be judged. with Barth we must confirm that symbolic representations of the divine are true only within the Footnote 2 continued ations, we must-ask i f t h i s being i s the f u l l e s t or the emptiest of a l l concepts. Norenberg argues that T i l l i c h s e t t l e s for the l a t t e r . Cf. op. c i t . p. 226. Schmitz.also finds f a u l t with T i l l i c h ' s idea that the perfect a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the structures of being i n God means that they are negated as d i s t i n c t categories. Cf. op. c i t . p. 102 n. 97. But when T i l l i c h argues that symbols should be understood within the 'configuration i n which the mystery of the ground appears to us' (quoted Ibid. p. 98 n. 75), he seems to. have only one objective, namely to destroy the idea that the eternal logos can be grasped by an i n d i v i d u a l as a Cartesian type of d i s t i n c t idea apart from the s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l k a i r o s . Truth of being i s e x i s t e n t i a l and consequently we must say that symbols do not radiate the power of being as means of knowing God, but as means of communicative dialogue i n speaking about Him. "''Gabus' c r i t i c i s m that T i l l i c h ' s view of history refers us back to symbolism and this i n i t s turn to the concept of being i s v a l i d only i f being i s conceived as a s t a t i c category, rather than i n the dynamic sense of the Lebensphilosophie. Cf. Gabus op. c i t . p. 131. 96 r e l i g i o u s group. In f a c t , there i s no revelation of New Being without s o c i a l , h i s t o r i c a l conditions. Unlike Barth, however, T i l l i c h holds to an analogy which i s c h r i s t o l o g i c a l rather than c h r i s t o c e n t r i c . Any r e a l i t y which resembles the Christ event i n leading man to recognize the quest for God or rather the concern of ultimacy, ca r r i e s the analogy of divine being. This i s a form of revelatory actualism but not l i k e Barth's analogia f i d e i . There i s no ensuring, supernatural r a t i f i c -ation, nor i s there any r a t i o n a l i s t c ertainty. Analogia Imaginis does not give a v e r i f i a b l e s i m i l i t u d e between f i n i t e and i n f i n i t e being, but rather i t enables the revelatory power of being to be a h i s t o r i c experience."'" The hermeneutical richness of Bonaventure 1s (and Anselm's) anagogical approach should be combined with Aquinas' c r i t i c a l i n s i g h t s . Barth seems to f a l l short of t h i s mark. II . 3 COMMUNITY AND HISTORY We ended Part One by observing that T i l l i c h vigorously re-sented the individualism of bourgeoisie r e l i g i o s i t y . Protestant-ism, he claims, has favoured a profanized mass culture within a l i b e r a l economy, p o l i t i c a l imperialism and p o s i t i v i s t i c technocracy and neo-orthodoxy i s powerless to o f f s e t t h i s for i t s prophetic x C f . Norenberg, op. c i t . pp. 1 0 2 f . 97 protest remains an abstract No . I t was i n connection with the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n and with his appeal for a r e l i g i o u s socialism, that T i l l i c h f i r s t formulated his idea of symbols. In 1922 he published 'Masse und G e i s t ' , i n which he pleaded for respect for the holiness of the masses and he declared that C h r i s t i a n symbols cannot hope to be redemptive i f they f a i l to deal with the masses' 2 sufferings. In his search f o r e f f e c t i v e r e l i g i o u s symbols that respect s o c i a l r e a l i t y , he considered j o i n i n g the Catholic Church, but was deterred by the l a t t e r ' s claim that i t s con-tingent community should be i d e n t i f i e d with the esehatological 3 S p i r i t u a l Community. The paradoxical conception of r e l i g i o u s symbolism which T i l l i c h developed i n these years stresses simultaneously the autonomy of c u l t u r a l forms and t h e i r transparency for the 4 unconditioned substance. The truth of such symbols consists Cf. Ges. F/.VT, pp. 29-41. This analysis of the mass culture could have been influenced by T i l l i c h ' s contact with Heidegger to a substantial degree, although there i s no e x p l i c i t i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s i n the text. 2'Die Masse ... i s t Offenbahrung der Schopflichen Unendlichkeit des Unbedingt Wirklichen' ( i b i d . p. 72). T i l l i c h characterizes the present type of masses, by r e f e r r i n g to an 'immanente Mystik' that i s , by an awareness of worldwide s u f f e r i n g . Cf. i d . p. 40. .3cf. Armbruster op. c i t . p. 230. 4'Die Erfassung dieser Doppelheit von Gewissheit und Uberzeugung gegenuber der r e l i g i o s e Symbol i s t die voraussetzung fur ein auf die Menschheit gerichtetes r e l i g i o s e s Einheitsbewusstsein das fern i s t von k r i t i s c h e r Entleerung des Konfessionellen und seiner i n -d i v i d u e l l schopf erische Symbole' . (Ges.W.11,, p. 97). 'Je mehr Negativitat gegen sich se.lbst vom Unbedingten her... desto l e i c h t e r fur r e l i g i o s e Socialismus i n die Symbole einer solchen Kirche einzugehen ... (Ibid). 98 i n t h e i r power as h i s t o r i c a l events within an1 i n t e r n a l l y v i t a l community. True symbols must be creative and dynamic within a s o c i a l s e t t i n g l e s t r e l i g i o n become ideology. 1 T i l l i c h had become aware of the s o c i a l e f f e c t of r e l i g i o u s and q u a s i - r e l -igious symbols when he observed the Nazi myths of o r i g i n . He r e a l i z e d that socialism i t s e l f could employ symbols for a demonic, i d e o l o g i c a l s e l f - l i m i t a t i o n i n a reactionary s e l f -2 assertion. Truly e f f e c t i v e symbols that recreate power and j u s t i c e i n a community can be hoped for only i f t h e i r sacrament-a l l y conceived holiness i s d i a l e c t i c a l l y oriented to the ultim-acy which transcends a l l structures. Unlike medieval society, our own tends to show l i t t l e respect for the charismatic person who, knowing that he l i v e s by the substance of the community of which he remains a part, transcends the given t o t a l i t y i n a prophetic way so as to combine his prophetism with a construct-3 l v e , p r i e s t l y leadership. P r i e s t l y sacramentalism i s the basis of a l l symbols, but i t tends to endow l o g i c a l dogmas and aesthetic as well as l e g a l "'"'Wahrheit (ist) die eigentliche Macht; aber nicht als abstracte Norm ... sondern ... nur als konkrete Wahrheit ... der i n n e r l i c h machtigen Gruppe i n i h r * . {Ges. W. I I , p.201). Cf. Ibid. pp. 104-118. 2 C f . Ges.W.XI, pp. 235f and 324f. 3 C f . Ges. W. I I , p. 288' and 37 as well as Ges. W. VI, p.37. We can-not help wondering why T i l i c h does not think i t worthwhile to examine the implications of these roles i n the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l explanation of the figure of Jesus. Cf. ST.II, 168. T i l l i c h often mentions the Middle Ages as an example of theonomous culture. Cf. Adams op. c i t . p. 83. 99 formulas with a metaphysical i n v i o l a b i l i t y , which prevents an autonomous development of these forms.. Unless the community i s guided by a committed, prophetic c r i t i c i s m , i t i s prone to conceal or even destroy c e r t a i n areas of r e a l i t y . 1 As Otto and Scheler have pointed out, ideas and forms, which are power-less by themselves, receive power because man perceives the dimension of transcendence and value through them. T i l l i c h , however, q u a l i f i e s his acceptance of t h i s view and stresses that ideas can also demonically d i s t o r t transcendence. Any l i v i n g community must therefore perform the double operation of creating and c r i t i c i z i n g symbols and Religious Socialism must f i r s t of 2 a l l 'um Symbole einer theonome Gemeinschaft ringen'. Gabus thinks that t h i s socialism i s abstract because i t lacks the depth of Buber's personalism, and that i t c l a s s i f i e s other philosophies inaccurately. This comment seems u n j u s t i f i e d part-i c u l a r l y when i t c a l l s T i l l i c h ' s attempt to defend the person 3 against technocratic powers a sort of afterthought. To be a person, T i l l i c h contends,is by d e f i n i t i o n to be a s o c i a l being so that i t i s an i n e v i t a b l e conclusion that the community gives 4 ful l n e s s and depth to an i n d i v i d u a l . Symbols that mediate r e v e l -1 C f . Ges.W.XX, p . 102. 2 C f . Ges. W.II, p. 104. Cf. also Ibid. pp. 92f. 3 c f . Gabus op. c i t . p. 205. 4 c f . Prot. Era p.125. "But the i n d i v i d u a l i s not a limb of a body; he i s ... a s o c i a l being, but the society does not create the i n d i v i d u a l ' . {Love, Power and J u s t i c e , p. 92f.) T i l l i c h re-sents speaking about so-called s o c i a l organisms because of i t s reactionary tendency which rejects any prophetic innovation. 100 ation and salvation to a person are not only derived from the c u l t u r a l environment but are e f f e c t i v e only to the extent that they support and recreate the community. This view draws attention to dimensions and categories which Buber's I - Thou personalism i s l i k e l y to underestimate. The revealing capacity of symbols i s d i r e c t l y related to t h e i r community creating power. The r e l i g i o u s , dynamic import of culture may never be conceived as an i s o l a t i n g , i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p to the divine, for 'God c a l l s i n d i v i d u a l s ... as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n his kingdom, i n the unity of a l l beings under God.' 1 • The holy as the ultimate referent of r e l i g i o u s symbols i s therefore to be c a l l e d B e i n g - i t s e l f and P e r s o n a l - i t s e l f in-' equally fundamental sense. Religious symbols by t h e i r very same essence radiate both the power of being and of being personal i . e . s o c i a l . Symbolic language must be understood i n r e l a t i o n to the history-bearing group, to which i t gives actual i d e n t i t y . History, symbolism and r e l i g i o u s reception of r e v e l a t i o n are intimately r e l a t e d r e a l i t i e s . With t h i s i n s i g h t of S c h e l l i n g T i l l i c h stays closer to Hegelian ideas than did men l i k e Marx, Nietzsche and Heidegger, who had influenced him to a s i g n i f i c a n t 1 B i b l . Rel. p.47. Cf. S T . I l l , p. 40. T i l l i c h continues to praise the Reformers for defending the unique value of each i n d i dual person. 2 C f . S T . I l l , p. 346. 101 degree. His conception of f i n i t u d e and estrangement forbade him, i t i s true, to uphold Hegel's i d e a l i s t i c d i a l e c t i c s as they accept a t o t a l l y inner-worldly s y n t h e s i s . 1 On the other hand, he thinks that history i s inexplicable unless we accept the enduring union of the f i n i t e with the unconditioned, which union Schleiermacher has shown to be the presupposition of 2 a l l r a t i o n a l functions of man. In many publications T i l l i c h opts for the early Hegelian p o l a r i t y between space and time. Nazi romanticism which attempts to revive the space-oriented myth of o r i g i n , ' Blut und. Boden.' , t r i e s to reintroduce the u n c r i t -i c a l dominance of sacramental forms of the holy. This s p a t i a l o r i e n t a t i o n had been broken through by the protest of Jewish prophetism, s t a r t i n g with Abraham's act of migration. Nazism, therefore, contradicts i t s e l f by including both Utopian expect-3 ations and r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m i n t o i t s creed. T i l l i c h does not deny that space and time are inseparable despite t h e i r polar opposition, but he holds that there are two d i s t i n c t types of Religions corresponding to t h i s p o l a r i t y . There i s the p r i e s t l y or c y c l i c a l type and the prophetic or l i n e a r type. The l a t t e r he i d e n t i f i e s with the monotheistic, theocratic X C f . Prot. Era pp. 12f. T i l l i c h accepts the fact that there i s an extremely valuable i n s i g h t i n Hegel's d i a l e c t i c a l approach. Cf. S T . I l l , p. 329. 2 Cf. Adams op. c i t . pp. 205ff. and ST, I, pp. 41f. 3 C f . Ges.W.II, pp. 34-47; Ges.W.VI, pp. 140-148; S T . I l l , pp. 313-320. 102 Religions. Space determined Religions, which deny that anything r e a l l y new can a r i s e , are found mainly i n polytheism, the t r a g i c 2 or mystic views of l i f e , and movements l i k e modern Nationalism. The God of Jewish prophetism on the other hand, gives up nation, dynasty and sanctuary to e s t a b l i s h the t e l o s of the S p i r i t which transcends any l i m i t a t i o n of nation or Church. This Rel-igion challenges any u n c r i t i c a l attachment to forms, and points out the demonic within every experience of the holy. This prophetic element i s never absent i n any Religion, however r i g i d the s p a t i a l i z a t i o n might be even i n mythological reports the concept of time i s active as a h i s t o r i c a l consciousness 3 which transforms facts into symbolically s i g n i f i c a n t events. A l l historiography, including the modern type, depends on i m p l i c i t symbols of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n so that the process of s e l e c t i o n and transformation of events into paradigms of an o r i g i n a l onto-1 C f . Ges.W. VI, p. 141 and What is Religion?pp.88£. The space-time p o l a r i t y has been introduced into Western thought most e x p l i c i t l y by Kant, but the connotation which T i l l i c h gives to i t comes mainly from Hegel and Sch e l l i n g . It has also been i n -f l u e n t i a l i n the thinking of Troeltsch, Bergson, a.o. 2 It i s Eliade's opinion that the eternal return i s the kernel of a l l mythology and that the 'sacred time' i s e s s e n t i a l l y the fundamental time, that i s the past. Cf. M. Eliade: Cosmos and H i s t o r y , 1959, pp. 20f. For the r e l a t i o n between space, polytheism and nationalism Cf. Ges.W.VI, p. 142. 3 'In the depth of every l i v i n g Religion there i s a point at which ... that to which i t points breaks through i t s p a r t i c u l a r -i t y ' (Chr. Enc. p. 97). 103 logy need not be c a l l e d a n h i s t o r i c a l , as Eliade thinks. There or two types of symbolic transformations however, namely, the 2 n o n - h i s t o r i c a l and the h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of h i s t o r y . We must be aware that time can be made a dimension of space as i s done by modern progressivism. Such an.approach i s , l i k e mystical pantheism and even Bergson's v i t a l i s m and Heidegger's e x i s t e n t i a l i s m , 'gerade die Negation jeder Realbeziehung zur 3 Geschichte.' Unlike the l i n e a r , goal-oriented view of h i s t o r y , they a l l envisage some sort of an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c deliverance from existence. Starting with Zoroaster's dualism down through Jewish prophetic and apocalyptic thought to C h r i s t i a n eschatology, there i s a h i s t o r i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n which i s endangered constantly by conserv-ati v e , Utopian or super-naturalist eschatologies. Its paradox Cf. S T . I l l , p. 301 and Eliade op. c i t . p. 46. Although T i l l i c h points out that he who interprets history actually contributes to I t s creation, he never states e x p l i c i t l y that h i s t o r i c a l conscious-ness precedes both the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of facts and the actual form i n which facts take place. Paradigms of o r i g i n a l ontology not only determine our historiography but also our very h i s t o r i c existence. With regard to b i b l i c a l exegesis t h i s means that not only the early Church interpreted Jesus mythologically, that i s according to the e x i s t i n g patterns of thought, but also that Jesus himself acted mythologically within those very patterns. 2 C f . Prot. Era pp.. 16-31 and S T . I l l , pp. 350ff. 3 Ges. W.VI, p. 178. Cf. Prot. Era pp.20f. and Osborne op. c i t . p. 43. It i s hard to see why Gabus objects to the i n c l u s i o n of Bergson i n t h i s l i n e and not to that of Nietzsche. He seems correct i n thinking that T i l l i c h ' s c r i t i c i s m of Heidegger d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s Bultmann. Cf. Gabus op. c i t . pp. 9 5f. 104 i s not opposed to sacramental forms as such, but points to the depth of meaning i n the center of these forms. The awareness of this dimension gives a sense of c a l l i n g , not p r i m a r i l y to the i n d i v i d u a l , but to groups and nations who aim at concrete values i n concrete periods."*" This value mediates power to be, as the e f f e c t i v e center of h i s t o r y , often e x p l i c i t l y represented i n symbols. The u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d center of hi s t o r y i s t h e ' c a l l i n g New Being. I t i s symbolized i n Jesus as the Christ i n whom the eschatological telos i s r e a l i z e d . I t i s the center of u n i f i c -ation of man's fragmentated r a t i o n a l functions. The universal v a l i d i t y of t h i s c a l l i n g i s a matter of f a i t h , not only because the u n i f i c a t i o n has not yet penetrated a l l the world, but because of i t s very nature. By analogia imaginis Jesus Christ expresses the divine as the power of being both transcendent and immanent in h i s t o r y . 2 This i s the center of history because i t integrates the pro-phetic and the sacramental o r i e n t a t i o n . As the perfect, para-Cf. 5 T . I l l pp. 308ff. and 330 as well as Fut.. Rel. pp. 58f. 2 'The appearance of Jesus as the Christ i s the h x s t o r i c a l event i n which history becomes aware of i t s e l f and i t s meaning' ...' the actual assertion i s and remains a matter of daring f a i t h ' (S3 7. I l l , pp. 368f.) Does th i s not also place an exceedingly heavy emphasis on the consciousness of Jesus? I t remains unclear how T i l l i c h solves the problem of the present understanding of the Christ event i n i t s r e l a t i o n to the self-understanding of Jesus. This i s su r p r i s i n g i f we r e a l i z e that the conception of the C h r i s t -o l o g i c a l center of history appeared e x p l i c i t l y as early as 1929. Cf. Armbruster op. c i t . p. 256. 105 doxical symbol i t radiates God's kingdom as the u n i f i c a t i o n of functions under the sign of agape. To say that God conquers the e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i v i t i e s by p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the h i s t o r i c a l estrangement i s not necessarily patripassionism i n T i l l i c h ' s o p i nion. 1 The term 'Kingdom of God' i s equivalent to 'theonomy' the word used i n r e l i g i o u s socialism. The Kingdom cannot be r e s t r i c t e d to the C h r i s t i a n Churches, who, however, should be considered i t s representatives. They are to expose the dynamics of history as questions for the divine answer. They are to present the balanced integration of sacramental forms of the holy and the prophetic, c r i t i c a l transcendence, banning both 2 a b s o l u t i s t demonizations and r e l a t i v i s t i c scepticism. We may ask whether T i l l i c h ' s t e l e o l o g i c a l thinking does not overemphasize the s u p e r i o r i t y of progress and innovation over established forms and what t h i s would mean i n r e l a t i o n to non-Christian Religions. He holds, i n f a c t , that man's p o t e n t i a l i t i e cannot be actualized unless a person or a centered group adopts 3 . . . some sort of progressive thinking. History i s always aiming for the better even though we cannot exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y Although he rejects the doctrine, T i l l i c h sees a v a l i d point in patripassionism. Cf. ST. I l l , pp. 404 f. and ST. I I , p. 175. 2 Every Utopian movement must become s e l f - c r i t i c a l . This need not c r i p p l e i t s courage. I t i s only the s p i r i t u a l power of f a i t h that can save a movement from ideocracy. Cf. Ges. W.II, pp. 208f. and Ges.W. VI, p. 139. 3 C f . ST. I l l , pp. 333 and Fut. Rel pp. 44'f. 106 that man relapses more than he advances. This can be true not only i n e t h i c s , as was the case with the German rebarbar-i z a t i o n , but even i n technological matters. F i e l d s such as moral i n t e g r i t y , art or r e l i g i o n i n p a r t i c u l a r know of no v a l i d concept of progress. Forgetfulness of t h i s fact leads Utopian movements time and again into cynicism, because they look for 'the f u l f i l l m e n t around the corner' Religion and Utopia, however, always go together. Man univers-a l l y faces the challenge of his p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . He i s anxious neither to destroy the given forms nor to forego the opportunities. Most Religions, therefore, translate opportunities i n terms of an i d e a l which i s projected i n t o the mythological past. Even though space-oriented thinking absorbs man i n these mythological as well as i n the mystical Religions, the Utopian element w i l l 2 always be present even i f i n inverted form. Moreover, we observe that t h i s element does tend to adopt a symbolic center. Most important of a l l , we f i n d that the heart of time consciousness i s not progress, but the prophetic negation of the negative. Although T i l l i c h seems overly eager to stress God's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n history as i t s c r i t i c a l dimension, he i s not exclusively time oriented. God i s the depth dimension of the temporal process of 'Das Resultat der optimistische Erwartung war ein t i e f e Ent-tauschung, die s c h l i e s s l i c h zu G l e i c h g u l t i g k e i t und dem Zynismus oder auch Fanatismus bei den Masse f iihrte' (Ges. W. VI, p. 139). Cf. Fut. Rel. p.177. 2 C f . Ges. W. VI, p. 175. 107 a c t u a l i z a t i o n of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . A s t a t i c mystical symbol l i k e Ground of being can be used because God i s beyond space and time."*" Negation of f i n i t u d e appears once again as the p i v o t a l point. i i • II.4 PROPHETISM AND KAIROS To summarize T i l l i c h ' s views on symbols we could choose the protestant p r i n c i p l e as a guideline. This p r i n c i p l e i s not the abstract No which T i l l i c h detested i n neo-orthodoxy. It i s not merely a protest against claims made for a r e l a t i v e r e a l i t y , i t i s the continuous paradox of both the c r i t i c a l preparation and the creative affirmation of God's Kingdom, which becomes manifest 2 i n the Cross as the center of h i s t o r y . The prophetxc, c r i t i c a l preparation i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r but not temporarily separated from the p o s i t i v e forms of God's immanence. T i l l i c h pays de-f i n i t e attention to the p o s i t i v e embodiment of r e v e l a t i o n within 1 C f . Ges.W. VI, pp. 174 and 209f. as well as S T . I l l , pp. 320ff. 2 'The Protestant p r i n c i p l e demands a method of i n t e r p r e t i n g history i n which the c r i t i c a l transcendence of the divine... i s strongly expressed and i n which, at the same time, the creative omnipresence of the divine i n the course of history i s concretely indicated'. ( P r o t . Era p. XV f.) "The idea of "the k a i r o s " unites c r i t i c i s m and creation" ( i d . ) . . . " i n the power of the New Being that i s manifest i n Jesus as the C h r i s t , Here the Protestant protest comes to an end." (id. p. x v i i i ) . Cf. S T . I l l , p. 371 and Armbruster op. c i t . p. 259 . " . -. 108 the S p i r i t u a l Community. We have learned about his cosmological and d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r e s t s which stem from Sc h e l l i n g and Hegel. Hegel had proposed the theory of cunning ideas that use the v i t a l forces of persons and of groups to a c t u a l i z e themselves. Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and also Scheler had pointed out that those forces molded ideas as impotent products of economical or l i b i d i n a l drives. The clear and d i s t i n c t ideas of Cartesian philosophy are exposed by the absolute dominance of i r r a t i o n a l fate over p h i l o s o p h i c a l truth. T i l l i c h admits t h i s h i s t o r i c a l l y contingent growth of thought, for 'fate obtrudes even in t o the"sacred enclosures of philosophy, into truth i t s e l f . ' X On the other hand he holds Hegel's view that ideas are dynamic forces whose essence aims at appearance i n existent r e a l i t y . The dependence of ideas on less than r a t i o n a l l y conscious forces, however, seems to be his predominant conviction. He even rejects Scheler's thought that the i n t u i t i o n of moral values eventually guides our thinking process. There i s only one certainty for which fate steps, only one absolute truth we have, namely, that fate 1 i s m e a n i n g - f u l f i l l i n g and not 2 meaning-destroying'. In t h i s p o s i t i o n T i l l i c h i s able to accept the most r a d i c a l psychological or s o c i o l o g i c a l c r i t i c i s m of the r e l i g i o u s symbols and yet hold that logos p r e v a i l s over fate. The Prot. Eva, p. 14. 109 eternal logos pulsates through a l l our thinking but i s not at man's disposal. Rather i t c r i t i c a l l y challenges every r e a l i z -ation. Prophetism l i v e s by the b e l i e f i n an unconditioned truth and by the courage to stand within the c i r c l e of fate. Unable to leave that c r i c l e i t contributes to the unconsciously produced growth of the th e o l o g i c a l norm by acts that are unquestionably conscious but not i n control of that development."'" Prophetism objects to the Cartesian or Kantian logos, which alienates the subject from the object, for i f time i s pure duration within a mathematical space, r e a l i t y has ceased to be the h i s t o r i c a l matte of free decision. Only i f the d i s t i n c t ideas of the logos are related to the h i s t o r i c a l condition do we know what i t i s to f u l f i l l meaning as a free person standing under the divine 2 judgment of ultimacy. The prophetic s p i r i t proclaims the new and e t e r n a l l y important which manifests i t s e l f i n temporal forms 3 but which the Cartesian Logos i s unable to perceive. "*"'The growth of these norms i s a h i s t o r i c a l process which, i n spite of many conscious decisions, i s on the whole unconscious ( S T .I p. 48) . 2 This c r i t i c i s m by T i l l i c h i s best explained i n Adams, op. c i t pp. 202-205. The al i e n a t i n g e f f e c t of Cartesian methodology i s the main theme of Gadamer's book: Wahrheit und Methode. 3 . 'It i s the power of the prophetic s p i r i t i n a l l periods of history to pronounce the coming of such a k a i r o s . . i n which something new, e t e r n a l l y important manifests i t s e l f i n temporal forms.' (Prot. Era p. 155). 110 The prophet announces the k a i r o s , that i s , the h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of a certain time i n view of the r e a l i z a t i o n of God's Kingdom. S t r i c t l y speaking, we should hold that the appearance of New Being i n Jesus as the Christ i s the only such k a i r o s , but T i l l i c h i n s i s t s that t h i s unique k a i r o s , while • remaining the center and the c r i t e r i o n of history occurs i n preparatory or derived forms i n lesser centers of h i s t o r y . x Accepting the revelatory element i n every creation of meaning, T i l l i c h e a s i l y combines the universal claim of the central k a i r o s with the p o s i t i v e evaluation of p a r t i c u l a r symbolic events. If the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l paradox of New Being i s the focus of 2 we-consciousness within the C h r i s t i a n group, T i l l i c h i s r i g h t i n claiming t h i s openness as the true prophetic message,,but only i n i t s constant d i a l e c t i c r e l a t i o n to the center. The prophetism that perpetuates t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the kernel of the community and of the h i s t o r y of New Being. Prophetism i s d i a l e c t i c s that creates community and h i s t o r y i n a sense of which Hegel and Marx were unaware, because they f a i l e d to see that man's a l i e n a t i o n cannot be overcome by a synthesis within time. Prophetism does not primarily profess the b e l i e f i n a Utopian synthesis, but "*"'The fact that ... the appearance of the center of h i s t o r y i s again and again re-experienced through r e l a t i v e k a i r o i . . . i s decisive for our consideration' (ST. I l l , p. 370). Cf. Kegley op. c i t . p. 300. 2 Cf. Kegley, op. c i c . p. 296. I l l rather i t mediates the art of d i a l e c t i c s . This art can be defined as the praxis of l i v i n g on the boundary. I t i s not enough to discover relationships between r e a l i t i e s , we must yet conceive them i n constant reference to the beyond. Every r e a l i t y must be defined by i t s l i m i t s and at the same time by i t s ecstacy beyond that f i n i t u d e . K a i r o s and logos determine each other, the l i m i t s of actualized essences are challenged by a transcendental stratum of knowledge. The d i a l e c t i c s of t h i s prophetic s p i r i t i s by no means the p r i v i l e g e of the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n , f or any true concern about j u s t i c e , goodness, truth and beauty r e f l e c t s t h i s crossing of f r o n t i e r s , while they 2 are brought to f r u i t i o n . At t h i s juncture we should not be surprised that the doctrine of God's d i r e c t i n g c r e a t i v i t y i s c r u c i a l i n T i l l i c h ' s thought. The Protestant P r i n c i p l e expresses primarily the doctrine" of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by grace through f a i t h . I t t e l l s us that any human act i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l and p r a c t i c a l f i e l d receives i t s value only from the dynamic, transcendent dimension breaking through 'An absolute stage at the end of the d i a l e c t i c a l process i s a contradiction of the d i a l e c t i c a l p r i n c i p l e ' . (Prot. Era p. 42). Cf. The Interpretation of History, p. 165 and Kegley op. c i t . p. 300. 2 'But f r o n t i e r i s not only something to be crossed: i t i s also something which must be brought to f r u i t i o n . ' (Fut. Rel. p.57). 112 t h i s p a r t i c u l a r form. I t can be asked i f the prophetic p r i n -c i p l e does not oblige us to foster an a p r i o r i doubt against 2 any established form of the holy. I f we aim at the conquest of Religion by the S p i r i t u a l Presence we seem to exclude not only absolutisms but also any i n t e r e s t i n the formative power of the s p i r i t or the so-called Catholic Substance. T i l l i c h has seen t h i s objection from the beginning and he has proposed the idea of 'Gestalt of grace'. He does not advocate another Hegelian phenomenology of the S p i r i t . Absolute knowledge i n theoria or praxis i s inconceivable i f we take f i n i t u d e serious-l y . , When Ricoeur professes the same opinion and declares that f i n i t u d e i s the motor of a l l symbolic language, he f a i l s to emphasize h i s t o r i c i t y and the dynamic element, which according to T i l l i c h i s the true dimension. Ricoeur t r i e s to combine Eliade's phenomenology and Bultmann's hermeneutics, but both these approaches underestimate the value of the present actual-Cf. Kegley op. c i t . pp. 231; 244 and 252f. The constant negative penchant of T i l l i c h has time and again made c r i t i c s wonder i f a p o s i t i v e theory of symbolism i s possible. Cf. Nor-enberg op. c i t . p. 225 and Gabus op. c i t . p. 120. In defence of T i l l i c h i t can be said that symbols have the onus of proving t h e i r value for the forum of reason, not vice versa. 2 'The p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n by grace through f a i t h ... i s the f i r s t and basic expression of the Protestant p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f . ' (52*.Ill, p.223). 'It i s the p r i n c i p l e which permeates every single assertion of the theological system ... no realm of l i f e can be understood or formed without a r e l a t i o n to the Protestant p r i n c i p l e ' . [Prot. Era, p. VIII)'. 113 i t y . They also adhere to an epistemology of timeless logos-thinking which gives r i s e to an academic world of asce t i c 2 s c i e n t i s t s t r y i n g to perceive eternal objective essences. A mystical or technocratic realism may r e s u l t from t h i s , where-as T i l l i c h pleads for a h i s t o r i c a l realism i n which knowledge i s viewed as the act of r e l a t i n g logos and k a i r o s . The meta-physical arrogance of t r a d i t i o n a l epistemology must bow to the divine ultimacy and acknowledge that man has i n s i g h t despite 3 his separation from the source of meaning. This surrender however, t h i s awareness of transcendence i s not formless, how-ever; i t i s impossible without a_concrete embodiment i n which i t s protest can resound and be heard. The depth dimension of the logos can not be perceived either i n t h e o r i a o r i n p r a x i s without 4 the mediation of the Gestalt of grace. 'We must once more come to grips with Freud, we must con-front his hermeneutics with the hermeneutics of Van der Leeuw, Eliade, Barth and Bultmann, i n order to construct what we can say p o s i t i v e l y and negatively about the psychoanalysis of r e l i g i o n ' . (Ricoeur, op. c i t . p. 5 3 1 ) . Cf. also i d . pp. 526. 2 T i l l i c h considers Max Weber a t y p i c a l example of such a s c i e n t i s t . Cf. Prot. Era p.74. 3 Cf. The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of History, p. 141 and Adams op. c i t . p. 204. 4 . 'Negation, i f i t l i v e s , i s involved i n affirmation... This i s also true of Protestantism. Its protest i s dependent on i t s Gestalt, i t s form-negating on i t s form-creating power' ( P r o t . Era, p. 2 0 6 ) . This basic insight of T i l l i c h i s most revealing even though his actual elaboration of t h i s point i s l e f t very vague mainly because Gestalt refers 'to the t o t a l structure of a l i v i n g r e a l i t y ' , and only to a derived degree to s p e c i f i c expressions of the t o t a l structure. (Cf. Ibid. Note 1 ) . 114 Theological reformulations and l i t u r g i c a l renewals as well as organizational measures should restore the forms which Protestantism has removed, according to Jung's accusation, i n an Iconoclastic destruction of r e l i g i o u s symbols, which was understandable but u n j u s t i f i e d . 1 Grace can never become tan-gible , yet i t i s wrong to replace a demonic sacramentalism with i n t e l l e c t u a l , emotional or e t h i c a l individualism, or worse, with empty secularism. We should create new mythological and c u l t u r a l symbols of the ultimate meaning of r e a l i t y , but at the same time submit them to a r e l e n t l e s s secular scrutiny. 'In every Protestant form the r e l i g i o u s element must be related 2 to, and questioned by, a secular element.' In f a c t we must acknowledge that the s e c u l a r i z a t i o n process i t s e l f i s a k a i v o s , i n which the t r u l y prophetic s p i r i t breaks down e c c l e s i a s t i c a l arrogance so as to make a true encounter with r e a l i t y possible. Only a daring confrontation with the present s i t u a t i o n can hope to r e a l i z e the S p i r i t u a l Community. Besides the most d i s t i n c t i v e mark of T i l l i c h ' s ecclesiology, namely the u n i v e r s a l i t y of the S p i r i t u a l Community, we must note his i n t e r e s t i n combining the sacramental and prophetic elements. It i s clear that T i l l i c h refuses to triumph over f a c t u a l e c c l e s i -Cf. Ibid. p. XIX. 2 I b i d . p. 214. 115 a s t i c a l achievements i n r e c o n c i l i n g and s o c i a l i z i n g mankind. x What, i s important however, i s not only to note the ambiguities i n actual Churches but to develop the theology of the S p i r i t u a l Community i n which 'the encountered r e a l i t y i s i n t o t a l i t y 2 . symbolic of the S p i r i t u a l Presence 1. The growth of unambiguous l i f e i n manifest form i s an ob l i g a t i o n which neo-orthodox doctrinism seems to forget. Grace i s received i n the hearing of trie word, but the word can not be heard unless i t becomes 3 'immanent, creating a divine structure of r e a l i t y ' . T i l l i c h does not hold that the sacramental element has been absent from Protestantism, but that i t was unwisely ignored and played down as something to be ashamed of. We must be ready to acknowledge that secular thought which i s driven to seek the ultimate meaning 4 needs a concrete embodiment of the S p i r i t u a l Presence. When we ask about the concrete forms which the Gestalt of grace should take i n the S p i r i t u a l Community, we seem to f i n d few d i r e c t i v e s . .. But there i s one overriding i n s i g h t , namely, the uncompromizing involvement i n the secular struggle for meaning. Instead of pre-venting secular culture from protesting against established forms, "*"M. Schepers takes t h i s seriously amiss i n his a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d : Paul T i l l i c h on the Church. O'Meara, op. c i t . p. 251. 2 S T . I l l , p. 158 3'Prot. Era, p. 210. 4 In T i l l i c h ' s view t h i s marks 'The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism' (Armbruster op. c i t . p. 231) . 116 the Churches should lead t h i s protest and help create ever new forms. This commitment covers s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l as well as s c i e n t i f i c and a r t i s t i c endeavours. In view of our understanding of T i l l i c h ' s i n t e r e s t s i t comes as no surprise that Przywara should consider the concept of k a i r o s the central i n s i g h t of the system. 1 The k a i r o s i s the moment i n which a concrete form within the r a t i o n a l , c u l t -u r a l t r a d i t i o n becomes the r e c i p i e n t of a revelation and, by i t s imparted power to carry man beyond the li m i t e d structures, t h i s form mediates the courage to believe and to grasp or shape r e a l i t y i n perspective of the unconditioned meaning. In the k a i r o s the logos meets the deepest dimension of r e a l i t y , namely, f i n i t u d e ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to the i n f i n i t e . Although the eternal import of r e a l i t y i s the constant horizon of any moment in time, and although every moment can therefore become a k a i r o s , we must repeat what has been said with respect to symbols, namely that the p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the eternal ultimate dimension alone does not give to a moment or to a r e a l i t y i t s capacity to radiate the power of the i n f i n i t e . These two concepts of k a i r o s and symbol, therefore, belong together and require an i d e n t i c a l herm-eneutic technique, for we should avoid any attempt to define them i n a b s t r a c t o without r e l a t i n g them to the s o c i o - h i s t o r i c a l s e t t i n Cf. Leibrecht, op. c i t . p. 113 117 II.5 HERMENEUTICS AND ENCOUNTER The open experience of new material from inside or outside the C h r i s t i a n c i r c l e i s considered indispensible by T i l l i c h , but at the same time i t i s rejected as a source of theology. The e x p e r i e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n receives the theological sources as an e x i s t e n t i a l truth only through a hermeneutic process. X These sources also include data from the hi s t o r y of Religions. Studying T i l l i c h ' s d i r e c t i v e s for the encounter between World Religions, we seem to be presented with a clear form of the so-called a c t u a l i z i n g hermeneutics, which beginning with men l i k e Schleiermacher and Dilthey, now p r e v a i l s i n the p h i l o -sophical school of Heidegger and Gadamer, and i n the t h e o l o g i c a l approach of both Bultmann and Barth. Against the a l i e n a t i n g methods of Cartesian type science, i n which a detached, academic comparison of r e l i g i o u s data i s advanced, T i l l i c h points out that a true hermeneutical encounter should be centered on an e x i s t -e n t i a l understanding. This agrees with Gadamer's plea for a 'If experience i s c a l l e d the medium through which the object-ive sources are received, t h i s excludes the r e l i a n c e of the theo-logian on a possible post-Christian experience. But i t also denies ... that experience i s a th e o l o g i c a l source... experience receives and does not produce. Its productive power i s r e s t r i c t e d to the transformation of what i s given to i t . But t h i s transform-ation i s not intended'. (ST.I, p. 46). This view agrees with the evidence provided by the hermeneutic sciences. '...Philosophy does not begin anything, since the f u l l n e s s of.language precedes i t ' . (Ricoeur op. c i t . p. 38). T i l l i c h ' s r e j e c t i o n of subjectivism and of experience as a source of r e v e l a t i o n i s not new i n Pro-testant theology, but i t must be seen i n the l i g h t of his dealings with the d i s t o r t i n g q uasi-religious developments i n National Socialism. 118 universal hermeneutic r e f l e c t i o n on the p r i n c i p l e of the 'Wirk-ungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein 1, which method acknowledges that the person himself i s engaged i n contributing to the growth of the t r a d i t i o n on which he r e f l e c t s , so that i t can be said that hermeneutic 'Verstehen i s t selber Geschehen'. 1 On the other hand, T i l l i c h seems equally close to the second contemporary l i n e of thought, the so-called emancipative, c r i t i c -a l hermeneutics. They point out that the t r a d i t i o n does not consist s o l e l y of r a t i o n a l , meaningful factors and that d i s -tortions are more than accidental, temporal alienations. Trad-i t i o n , i t s e l f , then, stands under accusation. Rooted i n Spinoza and the Enlightenment, but silenced during Romanticism, t h i s approach returned i n Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and more recently 2 i n the Frankfurter Schule of s o c i a l philosophers. Habermas1 c a l l for an emancipative praxis, seems to s u i t T i l l i c h better than Bultmann's preoccupation with the semantic gap between the 3 t r a d i t i o n a l language and modern thought. T i l l i c h ' s prime con H. Gadamer, The scope and function of hermeneutic r e f l e c t i o n Continuum 8 (1970) pp. 85f. As early as 1930 T i l l i c h wrote: 'Betrachtung der Geschichte i s t immer ein Mitschaffen des Sinnes der Geschichte.' (Ges.W. V, p. 193). T i l l i c h ' s views on the tech-nocratic realism as opposed to self-transcendent realism agree with the struggle against the o b j e c t i f y i n g methods of p o s i t i v i s t i c sciences, which we fi n d i n Heidegger and those influenced by him (in p a r t i c u l a r Gadamer and Marcuse). 2 Cf. Schillebeeckx a r t . c i t . pp. 31f. 3 ' T i l l i c h ne nous parle pas de comprehension et de concept-ualite*, mais de p a r t i c i p a t i o n . .. i l est ... convaincu que le Message Chretien ne touche pas seulement . . l e niveau de l a comprehension, mais egalement toute l a dimension inconsciente et .collective, de l a vie humaine. Et i c i son approche se distingue profondement de 1'approche bultmannienne 1. (Gabus op. c i t . pp. 209f.) 119 cern i s not the attempt to f i n d alleged essentials by a process of demythologization, but rather the creative p a r t i c i p a t i o n which re-envigorates and emancipates. This requires however, a twofold hermeneutics namely a combination of a c t u a l i z i n g and c r i t i c a l approaches, of both the theological t r a d i t i o n and the contemporary situation.''" As mentioned before Ricoeur has shown convincingly that the c r i t i c a l approach of Freud presupposes a 'hermeneutic c i r c l e ' . Schillebeeckx says the same about Habermas, whose method resembles Freud's because he attempts a type of s o c i o l o g i c a l psychoanalysis of the i r r a t i o n a l i n h i s t o r y , to which 2 T i l l i c h also seems i n c l i n e d . 'Theology i s the methodological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the contents of C h r i s t i a n f a i t h ' (ST.I, p. 15). Besides t h i s process of capt-uring the o r i g i n a l meaning of desintegrated symbols, he emphasizes that secular c r i t i c i s m should be taken f u l l y seriously•and that i s why Gabus speaks of a double p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Cf. op. c i t . p. 210. 2 'New motifs began t o . a t t r a c t attention: the ambiguous character of existence ... the c o n f l i c t of the unconscious and the conscious' (Prot. Era pp. lOf.) I t seems u n j u s t i f i e d to r e l a t e . T i l l i c h ' s agreement with Habermas to t h e i r common dealings with the Univers-i t y of Frankfurt. We should rather point to the influence of both the early Marxian philosophy and Fichte's system of sciences, which they both adopt with minor modifications. T i l l i c h speaks of sciences of Denken, Sein and Geist. Habermas refers to herm-eneutic sciences dealing with the praxis of communication, analytic-emperical sciences dealing with t e c h n i c a l u t i l i t y and s o c i a l sciences which concern the emancipatory praxis. Although T i l l i c h ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n d i f f e r s considerably, we should be aware that i n his view too, the t h i r d group i s characterized by the s p i r i t , which i s the creative tension between thought and being. Cf. Ges.W.1, pp. 217f. and Schmitz exposition op. c i t . pp. 23-34 For Habermas' views cf. Schillebeeckx a r t . c i t . p. 35 and J. Habermas: Technik und Wissenschaft a l s " I d e o l o g i e " , . 1968 pp. 148-159. 1 2 0 The twofold hermeneutical l i n e has been T i l l i c h ' s concern from the moment he f i r s t conceived of the metalogical method and formulated i t as the c r i t i c a l phenomenology with i t s two formal c r i t e r i a of a l l theology."'" Where phenomenology observes the forms of the holy as matters of ultimate concern, i t needs the e x p l i c i t a t i o n of that ultimate dimension as a c r i t i c a l check on demonic developments of these forms. This c r i t i c a l dimension i s Dasein's o n t o l o g i c a l question which functions as a Gestalt-forming force. By integrating t h i s center of the Greek t r a d i t i o n once again with Jewish theism, we do what the early Apologists did, namely, create a new t h e o l o g i c a l language 2 i n the encounter between two r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t methods. Meaning i s the aim of a l l hermeneutic r e f l e c t i o n , but i t cannot be understood by phenomenology of the forms alone. Meaning i s the realm of the s p i r i t , that i s , of the c r i t i c a l p o l a r i t y bet-ween thought and being i n which the boundary of the immediately given i s transcended, not only i n the d i a l e c t i c s with other beings, but p r i m a r i l y i n the surrender to the demand of ultimacy. "'"Cf. ST.I, pp. 11-15 and 106-108. The c r i t i c a l phenomenology t r i e s to avoid the method of abstraction by i n t u i t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n under the guidance of a central c r i t e r i o n of a l l re v e l a t i o n . These two c r i t e r i a also helped us to define the ultimate referent of a l l r e l i g i o u s symbolism. Cf. Hook op. c i t . p. 4. 2 ' T i l l i c h ' s apologetic writing demonstrates how he shared the conviction of the Apologists that Christians by no means have a monopoly on the truth, and that the truth wherever i t may be found belongs to us Christians' (Braaten i n his preface to Persp. p. xx). Cf. Adams op. c i t . pp. 1-16. 121 No r e a l i t y , therefore, i s meaningful unless i t i s c r i t i c a l of i t s e l f . The c h r i s t o l o g i c a l paradox and the in s i g h t that the Gestalt of grace has always the demonic i n i t s back, express t h i s t r u t h . 1 The c r i t i c a l hermeneutics of Freud, Marx and th e i r recent revivers lack t h i s s e l f - c r i t i c a l power apparently 2 because they ignore t h e i r own hermeneutical conditions. T i l l i c h accuses both orthodox and l i b e r a l Protestantism of inconsistent c r i t i c i s m . They avoid a r e a l encounter and prevent theology from becoming t r u l y apolegetic, that i s , the formulation of the 3 divine answer to human history. T i l l i c h ' s twofold approach can also be seen i n his d e f i n i t i o n of God as the abyss and the ground of meaning. This i s not a gnostic amalgamation, but an uncompromizing recognition of e x i s t e n t i a l f i n i t u d e . Hermeneutics must include the r a d i c a l c r i t i c i s m which r e s u l t s from the d i s -possessing experience of meaninglessness before i t can even hope The demonic depth of the divine nature i t s e l f t e l l s us that 'Religion i s the creation and the d i s t o r t i o n of rev e l a t i o n ' and that even i n claiming' that i n the Cross of Christ the f i n a l v i c t o r y i n t h i s struggle has been reached ... the form of the claim i t s e l f shows demonic t r a i t s ' ( S T . I l l , p. 104). The analysis - of the demonic returns often i n T i l l i c h ' s writings, and he con-siders i t decisive for his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of history and Religions. Cf. Prot. Era p x v i ; ST.I, pp. 222-227; Adams op. c i t . pp. 56f. 2 Habermas t r i e s to avoid t h i s s i t u a t i o n by what he c a l l s the 'controlled a l i e n a t i o n ' , r e a l i z i n g that a l l cognitive and p r a c t i c a l dealing with r e a l i t y i s o b j e c t i f y i n g , a l i e n a t i n g . It seems worth noting that the c r i t i c a l hermeneutics have often been advanced by Jewish thinkers l i k e Spinoza, Marx, Freud, Marcuse,Adorno a.o. 3 Cf. Ges.W.VII, pp. 256f. and Schmitz op. c i t . p. 115. The theme o f Christ as f u l f i l l m e n t (Cf. Mt. 5,17) seems to be central also to the thinking of the early Apologists. 122 to reappropriate concrete forms of meaning. Meaning, then i s neither the Hegelian synthesis of d i a l e c t i c ideas nor the outcome of a s k e p t i c a l r e l a t i v i s m (epoche). Mean-ing l i e s i n the power to enter a concrete s i t u a t i o n without the need to avenge excluded opportunities. Meaning appears i n the f i n a l r evelation of the agape which integrates the r e l e n t l e s s c r i t i c i s m of absolutes and a complete commitment to the con-crete as representative of ultimacy."'" The concept of meaning i n t h i s theology, therefore, accomodates the two forms of herme-neutics i n t h e i r most pronounced forms. As mentioned before the study of Religions, according to T i l l i c h , should courageously apply the s k i l l s of psychoanalysis, of s o c i a l c r i t i q u e , of anthropology and the l i k e . The confrontation between the World Religions and the secular c r i t i c i s m of quasi-Religions should be considered a challenge which we should not avoid by s u b t l e t i e s 2 of purely a c t u a l i z i n g hermeneutics. 'The l o v e o f J e s u s , w h i c h i s t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e d i v i n e l o v e ' c o n f r o n t s the a b s o l u t e s o f t h e f o u r r e a l m s o f r a t i o n a l c r e a t i v i t y and i t 'conquers them w i t h o u t p r o d u c i n g c o g n i t i v e s k e p t i c i s m o r a e s t h e t i c chaos o r l a w l e s s n e s s o r estrangement'. (ST.I, p. 152). Cf. Love, Power and J u s t i c e p a s s i m . Love and f a i t h a r e one i n t h e dynamics o f an e x i s t e n t i a l l i f e - g i v i n g power. Cf. A r m b r u s t e r op. c i t . p. 77. 2 I n view o f 'the u n c e a s i n g r e f e r e n c e t o t h e q u a s i - r e l i g i o n s and t h e i r s e c u l a r background ... t h e d i a l o g u e l o s e s t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a d i s c u s s i o n o f dogmatic s u b t l e t i e s and becomes a common i n q u i r y i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e w o r l d s i t u a t i o n ' . (Chr. Enc.p. 6 3 ) . 123 On the other hand we can not ignore that our c r i t i c i s m l i v e s by the actualized t r a d i t i o n . We must therefore consider b r i e f l y T i l l i c h ' s hermeneutical insights concerning the encounter bet-ween the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n and the ontological search of ultimate r e a l i t y . These two t r a d i t i o n s have interacted for twenty centuries and they have survived i n r e l a t i v e independence. More-over, T i l l i c h p a r t l y agrees with Barth that a synthesis between C h r i s t i a n i t y and Humanism should be r e j e c t e d . 1 Despite t h e i r insurmountable differences, however, these t r a d i t i o n s have one fundamental point of contact. This i s the state of ultimate con-cern, to be formulated either as ultimate quest for being or as the need of salvation. This i s not an attempt to define God i n terms of differences from other forms of the divine, as i f T i l l i c h intended to leave further i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a s s i m i l a t i o n to the 2 l i s t e n e r . In the encounter between the B i b l i c a l Religion and This agreement should be greatly q u a l i f i e d , but T i l l i c h does riot o u t r i g h t l y negate the objections of the Barthians raised against his conception of an ultimate unity between B i b l i c a l Religion and ontology. Cf. B i b l . Rel. p . l . 2 'er versucht die Lehre nicht i n ihrem eigenen Verstandnis durch eine Abgrenzung gegen andere Gottesvorstellungen genau zu bestimmen, sondern er versucht eine Deutung der zentralen bib l i s c h e n Aussagen iiber Gott' (Schmitz op. c i t . p. 218). This means that T i l l i c h i s not i n favour of the usual form of comparative r e l i g i o u s studies. The s i m i l a r i t i e s or d i s s i m i l -a r i t i e s between Religions do not consist i n empirical forms. Each t r a d i t i o n must be considered f i r s t of a l l as a meaning Gestalt i n i t s e l f with i t s own i n t e r n a l structure. His herme-neutical p r i n c i p l e of explaining a t r a d i t i o n by i t s own s e l f -understanding could open his approach for a promising cooperation with s t r u c t u r a l i s t techniques of anthropological research. 124 the o n t o l o g i c a l search, we r e a l i z e that the method of c o r r e l -ation consists i n making the ultimate question of the other t r a d i t i o n part of one's own horizon. This question i t s e l f i s always asked with changing connotations so that the true en-counter between the b e l i e v i n g Community and the C h r i s t i a n message varies i n each generation."*" Apologetic theology i s exactly the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of C h r i s t i a n f a i t h as a response to the questions of d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , rather than a defense of the contents of f a i t h . Now we have to ask: what are the sources of t h i s response, how are the sources accessible and by which norm should we i n t e r p r e t them? T i l l i c h accepts a m u l t i p l i c i t y of sources, namely a l l c u l t -u r a l forms i n which revelation has been received i n h i s t o r y . Not only the Bible and i t s exegesis, or the Church's h i s t o r y , but also the h i s t o r y of Religions and a l l cultures contain forms to 2 which our experience can be indebted for understanding. As Gadamer and Ricoeur have also pointed out, there i s a basic a l i e n a t i o n from these sources, which man must appropriate i n an 1 C f . ST.I, p. 48. ' 2 'A broader source of systematic theology than a l l those mentioned so far i s the material presented by the history of r e l i g i o n and culture' (ST.I, p. 3 8 ) . T i l l i c h l i s t s t h i s source after the more obvious ones l i k e Scriptures and Church hi s t o r y , and he points out that a theologian uses this source i n two ways. He i s i n unavoidable contact because his s p i r i t u a l l i f e and even his language i s conditioned by his c u l t u r a l environment, but he also deals more d i r e c t l y with these data either as a help, as a challenge or as an object of his theological r e f l e c -t i o n . (Cf. Ibid.) 125 ever-new hermeneutic experience. T i l l i c h would agree with Ricoeur that t h i s e x p e r i e n t i a l reappropriation can never lead to absolute knowledge, but i n addition he would emphasize with Habermas the importance of the hermeneutical, emancipative praxis. With respect to the norm of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e pro-cess, T i l l i c h observes that there i s a growth which i s unconsc-ious and cannot be produced i n t e n t i o n a l l y . 1 He distinguishes four elements i n the norm, namely that i t should be p o s i t i v e l y concrete, constructive, derived from the sources and created by the c o l l e c t i v e experience of the r e l i g i o u s group. The v a r i a t i o n i n the norm obviously i s a matter of emphasis and the present focus of attention i s on estrangement and despair which makes the aspect of New Being within the symbol of the 2 Cross the material norm of systematic theology today. In t h i s l i g h t we must understand T i l l i c h ' s hermeneutical encounter (apologetics) between B i b l i c a l Religion and contemp-orary ontology. Hamilton and others claim that T i l l i c h has never come near to r e l a t i n g the factual l i f e of Jesus to the 1 C f . ST.I, p. 48. 2 C f . ST.I, pp. 49f. 1 2 6 ontological concept of New Being. T i l l i c h however, does not claim that ontology exhausts B i b l i c a l theism, but only that the concrete symbol of Jesus as the Christ i n fact relates to the e x i s t e n t i a l quest for being i n a l l i t s forms of r a t i o n a l , s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l dimensions. B i b l i c a l personalism does not con-2 t r a d i c t ontology, despite i t s differences i n emphasis. On the other hand we should r e a l i z e that we are speaking symbolic-a l l y i f we c a l l God a person. B i b l i c a l symbols are r i c h e r than can be expressed i n ont o l o g i c a l structures, but as a minimum i t x T h i s i s the:main contention of Hamilton. Cf. e s p e c i a l l y op. c i t . pp. 158-173. Armbruster l i s t s the main complaints tabled i n t h i s respect. Cf. op. c i t . . p. 195. Osborne points out that the main contribution of T i l l i c h consists i n having shown i n which hermeneutical approach the. questions should be asked, namely i n the most courageous confrontation with contemporary thought. Cf. op. c i t . pp. 2 05. Although Schmitz knows that i n T i l l i c h ' s system the ontological question i t s e l f i s formulated i n view of the C h r i s t i a n message, he constantly points out that the ontological categories abbreviate the th e o l o g i c a l answers. He even objects to an ontological understanding of love as a u n i f i c a t i o n of being. His comments become incomprehensible unless." he either accepts a complete dichotomy between a r e l i g i o u s and an ontological concern or r e s t r i c t s his disagreement to the fact that T i l l i c h did not explain a l l possible implications. However,, to say that the concept of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n being holds prevalence over creation and redemption i s simply misunderstanding T i l l i c h ' s apologetic intentions, (op. c i t . pp. 218-22 and 250f.) 2 'Ontology can receive the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l question ... Every philosophy shows the t r a i t s of i t s birthplace ... To say that Jesus as the Christ i s the concrete place where the Logos be-comes v i s i b l e i s an assertion of f a i t h ... But i s not an assertion which contradicts ... the search for ultimate r e a l i t y . 1 (Bibl. Rel. pp. 75f.) T i l l i c h i s not aiming at a summa of answers to a l l possible questions, but at a central o r i e n t a t i o n 'in view of the chaos of our s p i r i t u a l l i f e ' . (ST.I, p. 59). 127 should be required that they f u l l y answer the c r i t i c a l quest for being. x These hermeneutical presuppositions are c r u c i a l and they seem to be ignored too e a s i l y . Another instance of th i s i s the a l l e g a t i o n that T i l l i c h ' s ontology p r e v a i l s to the extent of reducing the h i s t o r i c a l Christ event to marginal 2 proportions. Can t h i s event be ignored as the center of the hermeneutic c i r c l e a f t e r i t has generated the quest of New Being? Can the reappropriating experience be comprehensible within t h i s c i r c l e but without the central k a i r o s of Jesus as the Christ? - 3 With respect to the hermeneutic problem i t i s f i n a l l y most i n s t r u c t i v e to examine T i l l i c h ' s view of myth i n r e l a t i o n to Es p e c i a l l y the r e l a t i o n between ..ontology and personalism .. i s raised constantly e.g. i n : Norenberg op. c i t . 215f. Where T i l l i c h objects to the o b j e c t i f y i n g tendencies i n theism Norenberg i n s i s t s that we should c a l l God a Person. T i l l i c h with his concept of the transcendent Personal-Itself ( B i b l . Bel. p. 83). seems much closer to Aquinas' approach for he says 'God who makes us ... personal ... i s completely personal i n our encounter with him. I t i s not that we f i r s t know what person i s and then apply the concept of God to t h i s . But i n the en-counter with God we f i r s t experience what person should mean.' (Ibid. p. 27). Aquinas says: 'creatura infantum eum repraesentat ... inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet: non tamen i t a quod repraesentet eum, s i c u t a l i q u i d eiusdem specei v e l generis, sed s i c u t principium excellens'. (S.Th.I, q. 13, a 2 resp.) 2 . Cf. Norenberg op. c i t . pp. 218f. The c r i t i c s often forget that T i l l i c h chose ontology as the frame of reference i n order to break through the t r a d i t i o n which made r e l i g i o n an i s o l a t e d function, mainly i n the e t h i c a l sense of following Jesus' examples or rules of behaviour. 3 I t cannot be denied that T i l l i c h ' s considerations about history deal more e x p l i c i t l y with the b e l i e f i n something new than with the r e l a t i o n s h i p to the o r i g i n , but he d e f i n i t e l y holds that his approach i s c h r i s t o l o g i c a l and incomprehensible without the figure of Jesus as the C h r i s t . 128 r e l i g i o n and science. Like Ricoeur, he excludes existence without myth because by d e f i n i t i o n t h i s i s the category i n which we speak about the estrangement from, and the quest of, the Unconditioned. Even a t o t a l integration of a l l meaning structures could not f a i l to speak i n myths and symbols."*" Finitude forbids us to usurpate the sacred and postulate ab-solute knowledge. The nature of myth as the reappropriation of the mythological t r a d i t i o n consequently requires that the myth should be prop h e t i c a l l y broken i n name of the Unconditioned meaning. Because e v i l , or the estrangement from the Unconditioned due to o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , forms the center of myth, as Ricoeur holds, we must conclude that myth both requires to be and resents being broken. The actual sacred forms are i n fac t alienated r e a l i t i e s , which should be both exposed and reappropriated i n creative acts of 2 c u l t , myth-telling and piety. The school of Heidegger tends to blame Cartesian sciences for man's a l i e n a t i o n , but i n fac t i t i s rather the o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n process that forms the kernel of our predicament. Moreover, we should r e a l i z e that science and metaphysics themselves are not a-mythical, but rather 'exhibit a mythological consciousness', by using symbols 'that "*"Cf. Ricoeur op. c i t . p. 526 and. Ges. W. V, p. 195. 2'Kein Mythos i s t r e l i g o s der nicht i n Kultus und Frommigkeit lebendig i s t ... Die im Mythos enthalten Vergegenstandlichung des Gottlichen ... wird von der prophetische Frommigkeit bekampft, von der mystischen iiberboten, von der phildsophischen als unwiirdig und widersinnig dargetan ... Die Mythos i s t uberwunden aber die mythische Substanz i s t geblieben.' {Ges. W.V, p. 189). 129 pulsate with the depth of r e a l i t y ' . Breaking the myth i s our f i r s t hermeneutical and r e l i g i o u s task and atheism has 2 the r e l i g i o u s function of reminding us of thi s task. This i s possible, however, s o l e l y because myth i s never t o t a l a l i e n a t i o n . Myths and t h e i r r e l i g i o u s symbols are structured forms of. man's union with the transcendent meaning (Gestalt of grace). The divine i s both a shattering abyss and a creative ground exactly because i t confronts the subject - object process of a l i e n a t i o n , which i s most p a i n f u l l y experienced i n the demonic o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of the sacred within the r a t i o n a l functions. Somewhat presumptuously T i l l i c h holds that his onto l o g i c a l analysis expresses accurately the mythological understanding of the human s i t u a t i o n . " Considering what has been said re-garding the coincidence of symbolic and non-symbolic statements as well as the r e l a t i o n between myth and metaphysics, we may contend that i t i s the f i r s t task of any hermeneutics of encounter (or method of correlation) to make reappropriation of one's own t r a d i t i o n possible by ever more extending and c l a r i f y i n g the 4 horizon of our understanding. The hermeneutic encounter i s a re l i g i o u s praxis which 'takes i t s object into the transcendent XAdams p. 246 Cf. Ges. W.V. pp. 190-192. 2 Cf. Adams p. 246f. 3 'Sie l e h r t jene Symbole und Mythen verstehn' {Ges. w.V,p.231). 4 Cf. Ricoeur op. c i t . p. 526. 130 unity of unambiguous l i f e ' and p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the agape that 'characterizes the divine l i f e i t s e l f symbolically and e s s e n t i a l -l y . ' 1 As hermeneutic r e f l e c t i o n i n which the myth i s both broken and recaptured, the encounter appears as kairos and as symbol at the same time. II.6 THE DIALOGUE With regard to the dialogue i n a p l u r a l i s t society we have the word of Rahner that 'er muss umfasst bleiben von der schweigende Ehrfurcht dariiber dass das, woruber geredet wird, 2 iiber a l l e s was gesagt wird unaussprechlich erhaben i s t ' . T i l l i c h ' s view of symbolism can leave no doubt that he i s ready to agree with t h i s . His c r i t i c s , however, attack him for stressing transcendence while at the same time reducing the divine revelation to a purely on t o l o g i c a l analysis. Concentr-ating on the underlying hermeneutic p r i n c i p l e s , we notice that T i l l i c h surpasses other methods l i k e Ricoeur's by pointing out that symbols should be understood within the community's con-frontation with the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , the kairos, so that they are seen primarily as a c t i v e l y mediating the f u l l n e s s of 1ST. I l l , p. 138. 2 K. Rahner, Der Dialog i n der p l u r a l i s t i s c h e n Gesellschaft i n : J.B. Metz: Weltverstandnis im Glauben, 1965, pp. 297f. 131 unambiguous l i f e . On the other hand, he knows that there i s no unambiguous re l a t i o n s h i p between symbols and ultimate mean-ing f u l f i l l m e n t , so that he should agree with Freud's and Marx' findings, formulated i n Ricoeur's words: 'to seek mean-ing i s no longer to s p e l l out the consciousness of meaning, but 2 to decipher i t s expression'. This raises doubts about the v a l i d i t y of T i l l i c h ' s c r i t e r i o n of ultimate concern and about his c r i t i c a l phenomenology i f not i n application to his own t r a d i t i o n , c e r t a i n l y i n that to others. Is i t not a deceptive tool? T i l l i c h ' s f i r s t reply would be that we judge other structures by t h i s t o o l only i f we want to evaluate t h e i r forms for our own r e l i g i o u s needs or i f we want to o f f e r them our quest of ultimacy, that i s , only within a dialogue that presumes a universal revelation. Universal r e v e l a t i o n , i n T i l l i c h ' s view, i s a matter not only of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e l a t i o n to the divine, but, demonic dis t o r t i o n s apart, of c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s as such. As early as 1931 he recognized humanist groups as latent forms of what he would later, c a l l the S p i r i t u a l Community. As such the concrete relations between people that l i v e by the new power to be are "'"Ricoeur would probably not deny t h i s , but he a c t u a l l y pays l i t t l e attention to the fact that symbols aris e from mankind's p r a c t i c a l dealings with l i f e , i t seems. 2 • 1 Ricoeur op. c i t . p. 33. 132 forms r e f l e c t i n g the S p i r i t u a l Presence. These forms are not always e x p l i c i t l y r e l i g i o u s symbols but they are v i s i b l e and e f f e c t i v e mediators; consequently t h i s view d i f f e r s d i s t i n c t l y from the doctrine of the i n v i s i b l e Church. Often we f i n d a v i s i b l e i ntegration of the three functions of l i f e , howbeit fragmentary, which must be a t t r i b u t e d to the impact of r e v e l -ation from which r e s u l t s f a i t h and love. Latency means that the manifest r e l i g i o u s self-expression i s missing because the utlimate c r i t e r i o n of Christ's Cross has not yet.been re-ceived. The reception of that c r i t e r i o n makes Churches manifest representatives of that same S p i r i t u a l Community. Both i n the state of preparation, however, and i n the state of reception of t h i s f i n a l r e v e l a t i o n , t h i s Community must be considered 2 created by the divine S p i r i t and marked by f a i t h and love. The latent Community i s 'not simply an infant awaiting baptism; i t i s already a mature adult member ... and under the drive of the 3 S p i r i t i t voices c r i t i c i s m of the manifest Church.' From T i l l i c h ' s c h r i s t i a n point of view t h i s sets the stage and assigns ''"'The problem of the Church and society prompted me to d i s t i n -guish ... between the "manifest" and the "latent" Church ... The existence of a C h r i s t i a n Humanism outside the C h r i s t i a n Church seems to make such a d i s t i n c t i o n necessary'. ( I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of H i s t o r y p. 48 quoted i n Armbruster op. c i t . p. 2 1 6 ) . 2 'Latent or manifest the S p i r i t u a l Community i s created by the divine S p i r i t as manifest i n the New Being i n Jesus as the C h r i s t ... the community of f a i t h and love'. ( S T . I l l , p. 1 5 5 ) . 3 Armbruster op. c i t . p. 234. The absence of the ultimate c r i t e r i o n however, leaves,.the latent Community without a ' p r i n c i p l e of resistance against profanization and demonization' (Ibid. p. 215.) 133 the roles for the dialogue. T i l l i c h does not claim that non-Christians should accept t h i s view and neither does he remove the Church's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Witnessing to mankind's dynamic powers and being a guardian against i t s d i s t o r t i o n s remains a task even i f we recognize that other structures are a Gestalt of grace, a creation of the S p i r i t , i n which man does show concern about the ' L e b e n s s i n n \ i . e . about the ultimate meaning. 1 Universalism, therefore, i s not based on the experimental d i s -covery of C h r i s t i a n forms, but on the time-honoured view, that no search for r e a l meaning i s possible without the l o g i c a l l y preceding encounter and acceptance of the ultimate meaning. At the same time t h i s r e s u l t s i n a u n i v e r s a l , material f a i t h , how-b e i t d i s t o r t e d or underdeveloped. 'Every Religion i s the recept-2 ive answer to revelatory experiences.' Moreover, accepting the v a l i d i t y of these symbols we must say that 'without the symbols created by universal revelation the f i n a l r evelation would 3 not be understandable'. T i l l i c h would not agree with Tavard "'"Tillich has never drawn the conclusion that the phrase 'Gestalt of grace' should be applied to these groups and s t r u c t -ures, even though he acknowledged the authenticity of t h e i r revelatory o r i g i n . A f i r s t e x p l i c i t study on them we f i n d i n 1929: N i c h t k i r c h l i c h e Religionen Cf. Ges.W.V, pp. 13-31. 2 S T . I l l , p. 99. T i l l i c h i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s t r a d i t i o n of univers-alism i n Chr. Enc. pp. 27-51. 3 ST.I, p. 139. However: 'the universal revelation as such could not have prepared the f i n a l r e v e lation. Since the l a t t e r i s concrete, only one concrete development could have been i t s immediate preparation' (Ibid. p. 142). 1 3 4 that the Church should be s e l e c t i v e and that the separation between believers and non-believers must preceed the kerugma. Even more strongly would he r e j e c t any missionary a c t i v i t y that imposes r e l i g i o u s forms with claims of ultimacy.''' The Church's double task i s the commitment to both the f i n a l revelation 2 and humanity i n a l l i t s dimensions. His i n t e r e s t i n dialogue and i n the r e l i g i o u s question of mankind i s of a strongly p r a c t i c a l and e t h i c a l nature, i n which he i s comparable to 3 Barth and Brunner. ., -Among the partners of the dialogue, the s e c u l a r i s t , quasi-r e l i g i o u s movements such as Nationalism and Communism take a peculiar p o s i t i o n , because they seem to have a s i m i l a r l y •••Cf. Prot. Era p. 5 7 and S T . I l l , p. 1 9 3 . T i l l i c h blames post-reformation developments for a loss of universalism and for an u n j u s t i f i e d subjection of foreign cultures Cf. S T . I l l , p. 1 7 1 . It could be advanced that a bent towards individualism i n both Catholic and Protestant approaches made missionary a c t i v i t y less prone to embark on an intensive dialogue than the early J e s u i t endeavours proved to be. Tavard, l i k e Bonhoeffer, objects that T i l l i c h declares people members of the holy community even though they are unaware of being so. Cf. Armbruster op. c i t . p. 2 9 9 . I t i s undeniable that T i l l i c h ' s approach has possible dangers of ending the dialogue before the other has been heard, but as a theological presupposition i t can hardly be considered objection-able. 2 'The purpose of missions ... i s not to save i n d i v i d u a l s ... nor c o r s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n of Religions and cultures ... rather the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the S p i r i t u a l Community within concrete churches a l l over the world.' ( S T . I l l , p. 1 9 3 ) . 3 'What he i s seeking i s ... a fundamental d e f i n i t i o n of the e t h i c a l task of r e l i g i o n ' . (H. Niebuhr, Preface to P. T i l l i c h : The Religious Situation, 1 9 6 4 , p. 2 2 ) . ( 135 devastating e f f e c t on a l l Religions. T i l l i c h ' s evaluation of these movements i s very ambivalent. Protestantism i s both blamed fo r favouring t h e i r development and praised for f u l -f i l l i n g a r e l i g i o u s o b l i g a t i o n thereby. 1 These movements resulted from prophetic, r a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m and now 'these outgrowths of the Ch r i s t i a n c i v i l i z a t i o n ' constitute the common horizon or forum before which the World Religions are 2 meeting. The ambivalence i s even greater when T i l l i c h deals with technology as the f i r s t and most powerful disrupting i n -fluence on non-Western cultures. He considers i t s detrimental effects s h o r t - l i v e d and he i s less p essimistic than others who have been influenced by Heidegger's thought i n t h i s respect. After he has described the worldwide dialogue as an encounter 'The inner dilemma of Protestantism l i e s i n t h i s that i t must protest against every, r e l i g i o u s or c u l t u r a l r e a l i z a t i o n which seeks to be i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l i d , but that i t needs such r e a l -i z a t i o n s i f i t i s to be able to make i t s protest i n any mean-i n g f u l way1 (Ibid. p. 192) . 2 Quotation from S T . I l l , p. 379. We must ask 'the question of the future of a l l Religions i n the face of the v i c t o r y of secul-arism a l l over the world'.(Chr. Enc.p. 27. Cf. also i b i d . p. 63 and 77). T i l l i c h moves too e a s i l y i n c l a s s i f y i n g movements with the help of his three categories of sacramental, prophetic and mystical o r i e n t a t i o n . 3 'In the depth of technical c r e a t i v i t y as well as i n the s t r u c t -ure of the secular mind there are r e l i g i o u s elements which have ... offered an a l t e r n a t i v e to the old t r a d i t i o n s as well as to mere i n d i f f e r e n c e ' . (Ibid. p. 14 ) . His c r i t i c i s m of c a p i t a l i s t mentalities however, i s very severe, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n his book ' 1 The R e l i g i o u s S i t u a t i o n ' . 'Soweit i h r Gegenstand die autonome Wirtschaft und ihre Gipfelung im Kapitalismus i s t , wird Sachlich-k e i t zum Damonendienst' . (Ges. W. V, p. 30 ) ., 136 between the established Religions and the quasi-Religions he develops the theological p r i n c i p l e s by which Christians are to judge others and themselves i n such a dialogue. Against the r e l a t i v i s t i c syncretism of Troeltsch and Toynbee, and against the Barthian r e j e c t i o n of a universal logos, he holds that i t i s possible to adhere to the time-honoured u n i v e r s a l i s t approach without giving up every c r i t e r i o n . C h r i s t i a n i t y should judge i t s e l f as the Gestalt, the embodiment of the mean-ing v i s i b l e i n that personal l i f e which ' c r u c i f i e d the p a r t i c u l a r i n himself for the sake of the universal'.'*' From th i s follows an absolute respect for any form i n which Religion u n i v e r s a l l y negates i t s e l f as a separate function. The evaluation of s e l f and others, therefore, should be i n view of a dialogue rather than of a conversion, and i t should be ins p i r e d by a cosmos-embracing love . There can be l i t t l e doubt that t h i s approach of the dialogue contains substantial t h e o l o g i c a l foundations for an open en-counter, but at the same time i t encourages useless t y p o l o g i c a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and an overemphasis on the need of a constant reformation of r e l i g i o u s forms. Before we attempt to evaluate T i l l i c h ' s method, however, l e t us consider the the o l o g i c a l aim XChr. Eno.p. 81. I t does not seem improper to note that Christ did not c r u c i f y Himself, but was c r u c i f i e d . With regard to dialogue t h i s means self-negation should not be i c o n o c l a s t i c , but accepted for the sake of a well-defined greater good. Paradox, cannot be a value i n i t s e l f . 137 and motivation of the dialogue between the Religions. Already i n the 1920's T i l l i c h had indicated the need for a l l mankind to become conscious of i t s basic r e l i g i o u s u n i t y . 1 When he speaks of the latent and manifest S p i r i t u a l Community, he c l e a r l y intends to present the C h r i s t i a n ecclesiology with i t s notions of unity and u n i v e r s a l i t y . As we have seen, he conceives of symbols and t h e i r importance p r e c i s e l y i n terms of t h e i r community-creating power. They radiate the power of being owing to the fact that an i n t e r n a l l y v i t a l and centered group i s conscious of i t s h i s t o r i c a l vocation. T i l l i c h undoubt-edly aims at the u n i f i c a t i o n of mankind i n r e l i g i o u s respect and he professes that the Church, as the representative of the Kingdom should embark on t h i s l i b e r a t i n g and unifying task, with a view to esta b l i s h i n g an increasingly manifest S p i r i t u a l Community. This should not be interpreted, however, i n terms p r o s e l y t i z i n g , missionary a c t i v i t i e s , as should be clear from the hermeneutical s e l f - c r i t i c i s m of C h r i s t i a n i t y which T i l l i c h proposes and by which he urges C h r i s t i a n i t y to become ever more s e l f - c r i t i c a l and less imposing. T i l l i c h ' s objectives seem much i n l i n e with J.B. Metz' p o l i t i c -a l theology and J . Moltmann's eschatological o r i e n t a t i o n , which argue that apologetic theology, i f i t wants to s p e l l out the 'ein auf die Menschheit gerichtetes r e l i g i o s e s Einheitsbe-wusstsein 1 (Ges.W.II, p. 97). 138, divine answer to man's e x i s t e n t i a l quest i n a l l dimensions, ought to take the h i s t o r i c a l , p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n seriously and consider i t as a k a i r o s i n v/hich our p r a c t i c a l response i s demanded."*" The t h i r d volume of Systematic Theology gives a c a r e f u l analysis of the r e l a t i o n between r e l i g i o n and the s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l dimensions of man. Many authors consider th i s volume the core of T i l l i c h ' s theology. It conceives the Religions as communities which o f f e r man the symbols by which he can grasp the h i s t o r i c a l moment as a k a i r o s i . e . as the immanence of the ultimate ground of meaning which urges him to actualize new community-creating forms of meaning. In.the introduction to t h i s t h i r d volume T i l l i c h points out that the present day contact between Religions, and t h e i r common experience of being attacked by the quasi-Religions, creates a challenge for theology to see t h i s as a k a i r o s and to turn 2 the f a c t u a l contact into a unifying dialogue. This does not mean that we should nurture Utopian, p r o g r e s s i v i s t i c ideas, 3 for 'there i s no united mankind i n h i s t o r y ' . We should not t r y , "*"' P o l i t i s c h e Theologie' does not mean the theology of p o l i t i c s . I t i s the conquest of an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c , anthropocentric theo-logy which compromised the Ch r i s t i a n message by est a b l i s h i n g i t s u n i v e r s a l i s t i c claims on other-worldliness. In the p o l i t i c a l theology 'wird die Welt primar als ... Geschichtswelt ... Theo-logie primar als eschatologisch, g e s e l l s c h a f f t - k r i t i s c h e Theologie sichtbar'. (J.B. Metz: Zum V e r h a l t n i s vom Kirche und Welt, 1967, p. 12). 2 C f . ST.Ill, p. 6. 3 S T . I l l , p. 311. 139 as Teilhard de Chardin i s tempted to do, to design a u n i f i e d Religion within the l i m i t s of h i s t o r y , even though we should try to formulate the inner aim of the history of Religions and believe that t h i s can be approached i n fragmentary manifest-ations."'" The r e a l task i s missionary, therefore, but only i n a very li m i t e d sense of the word. T i l l i c h strongly emphasizes the world-unifying impact that s e c u l a r i s t movements have, which movements he c a l l s quasi-Religions, because they carry a consciousness of ultimate concern embodied i n concrete forms 2 and symbols. In view of t h i s f a c t Religions should concentrate on t h e i r transmitted forms, not "in order to perform a rescue operation for defunct c u l t u r a l objects, but because they r e a l i z e that t h i s unifying experience, l i k e any other experience, i s co-determined by a r e l i g i o u s frame of reference which should not be allowed to operate i n the obscurity of the unconscious. There i s no such thing as a pure experience and we must r e a l i z e that the symbols of our r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s are involved i n the present encounter between the cultures, whether we want i t or not. I t i s of the utmost importance that t h i s dimension of underlying conceptions and symbols i s analyzed i n a dialogue, i n which the greatest capacity and willingness to present one's 1'Theonomy appears i n what I c a l l e d "the Religion of the Con-crete S p i r i t " i n fragments ... i t s end i s expectation which goes beyond time to e t e r n i t y ' (Fut. Rel. pp.90f.) Neither Barth nor T i l l i c h r e a l i z e s how close they are i n t h i s matter, as Gabus points out. Cf. op. c i t . pp. 230-234. 2 C f . Chr. Enc. p.94. 140 own t r a d i t i o n i s combined with the acceptance of a common ground and of the v a l i d i t y of the other t r a d i t i o n . The question should be asked whether the o b l i g a t i o n to activate the u n i f i e d S p i r i t u a l Community i s compatible with such an open encounter. Should we choose mission or dialogue, both or neither? I t i s no surprise that T i l l i c h does not think these alternatives mutually exclusive. As i n so many other cases he chooses to stand on the boundary between a dialogue which refuses to absolutize any contingent r e a l i t y , and an uncomprom-i z i n g commitment to the decisive c r i t e r i o n of New Being, which he as a C h r i s t i a n relates to the symbol of Jesus as the Chris t . How does t h i s commitment to a f i n a l c r i t e r i o n operate within a meaningful dialogue? What does T i l l i c h r e j e c t i n the approache of Troeltsch, Toynbee and MacQuarrie? What does i t add to the discussion when he says that we should keep to one absolute statement, namely, that nothing should be absolutized? We wonder why T i l l i c h c r i t i c i z e s Troeltsch's opinion that the truth exists i n the depth of every Religion and that a dialogue should be r e s t r i c t e d to an unintentional process of c r o s s - f e r t i l i z a t i o n , for T i l l i c h himself says that the actual dialogue should reach out to the depth of every R e l i g i o n . x This depth of every Religion, however, i n T i l l i c h ' s view, i s the Compare Ges. W.XII, p. 169 and Fut. Eel. p.97. 141 point where the new, the ultimate, breaks through the concrete forms. This dimension cannot be e n t i r e l y new, for man can receive only within the forms that are already predisposed to so receiving. Consequently, i f there i s to be a f r u i t f u l contact of any sort, i t presupposes basic elements i n a l l t r a d i t i o n s that can be f e r t i l i z e d i n a dialogue. There must be a common ground between the partners. Ignoring t h i s dimension i s tantamount to pleading for two unrelated monologues. This common ground, says T i l l i c h , can only be the awareness that ultimacy must break through p a r t i c u l a r i t y . Renouncing absolutism i s not enough. One should be committed to the ultim-ate meaning f u l f i l l m e n t , one should not leave t h i s to some random, unconscious process. With regard to the history-determ-ining logos and to the growth of theo l o g i c a l norms,he had argued that they are beyond man's conscious controls, but he refused to conclude from th i s that man should cease to be concerned with these r e a l i t i e s . The s o c i a l i s t background had taught him that c r i t i c a l action of highly motivated prophets i s indispens-i b l e to prevent i r r a t i o n a l and i d e o l o g i c a l d i s t o r t i o n s . To l e t things develop at random i s i t s e l f a decision. Consequently the commitment to a f i n a l c r i t e r i o n which T i l l i c h demands i s a stand against i n d i f f e r e n c e , rather than the material b e l i e f i n one creed or another. To draw on other t r a d i t i o n s for private i n t e l l e c t u a l , aesthetic or s p i r i t u a l b enefit, rather than to embark on a dialogue which creates a 'Blutzusammenhang', that seems to be the attitude to which T i l l i c h takes exception. 142 Mission and dialogue for the sake of mankind presuppose rather than exclude each other i n T i l l i c h ' s perception, because the symbols of the unambiguous l i f e mediate salvation or New Being only to the extent that they create a dialogue, a communication. Although we must concede that, t h e o l o g i c a l l y speaking, T i l l i c h ' s combination of mission and dialogue i s well founded and supported by the concepts of universal r e v e l a t i o n , c o r r e l -ation, symbol and k a i r o s , there i s s t i l l s ubstantial reason to be d i s s a t i s f i e d with the d i r e c t i v e s which he gives for the actual dialogue. He speaks of a 'seemingly incomprehensible jungle which the h i s t o r y of Religions represents'. 1 He c a l l s the dynamic typology the most f r u i t f u l means to understand t h i s jungle, but we cannot f a i l to see that t h i s method i s conceived from one central conviction, namely, that there should be a development from a space-oriented, s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t sacrament-alism to a time-oriented, self-transcendent, Protestant a t t i t u d e . Our main objection to t h i s does not concern the predominance of the idea of f i n i t u d e and the paradox involved i n i t , but rather the presupposition that the o n t o l o g i c a l categories i n which t h i s c r u c i a l idea i s conceived should be applicable to the analysis of other t r a d i t i o n s . Determining the t y p o l o g i c a l elements i n other t r a d i t i o n s with such culture-bound and even polemic conceptions appears to be a f u t i l e exercise. I t i s c e r t a i n l y ^Chr. Eno. p. 54. 143 true that he refuses to draw up a typology s t a r t i n g from ar-b i t r a r i l y interpreted phenomena and i t should also be remarked that he expects the main r e s u l t s of the dialogue to spring from the f a c t that i t ' i s accompanied by a s i l e n t dialogue w i t h i n the representatives of each of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g Religions'." 1" We cannot f a i l to see, however, that the c r i t i c a l phenomenology, which was conceived within the c r u c i b l e of Germany's c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s , i s applied to the worldwide dialogue not only rashly, but with the loss of some of i t s most valuable elements. We f e e l that the hermeneutics of c r i t i c a l praxis, which was very much a l i v e i n T i l l i c h ' s early contacts with s o c i a l i s t and other c r i t i c a l , s e c u l a r i s t movements, ceases to be operative i n his l a t e r works, although he never f a i l e d to stress i t s importance. His l a t e r works, including Systematic Theology, appear to depend almost excl u s i v e l y on the a c t u a l i z i n g herm-eneutics and on the anthropocentric tendency of European theo-logy. 2 'Under the method of the dynamic typology every dialogue bet-ween Religions i s accompanied by a s i l e n t d i a l o g u e w i t h i n the representatives of each of the p a r t i c i p a t i n g Religions'. (Chr. Enc. p . 5 7 . 2 The anthropocentric approach has become prevalent not only in the hermeneutic theology of Bultmann's school, but also, on the Catholic side, i n the so-called transcendental Thomism of . K. Rahner, B. Lonergan and to some degree E. Schillebeeckx. Rahner speaks of theology as transcendental anthropology and advances an e x p l i c a t i o n of the meaning of revelation 'auf der Grundlage eines z u t i e f s t "anthropozentrischen" Verstandnis-horizontes' (C. Geffre, Von Apologetik zur " p o l i t i s c h e Theologie" i n : H. Peukert, Diskussion zur " p o l i t i s c h e Theologie".1969 , p. 1 0 9 ) . 144 It i s s u r p r i s i n g that he should i n s i s t on applying t h i s approach to other t r a d i t i o n s , even though he i s aware that the consciousness of estrangement, c o n f l i c t and s e l f - d e s t r u c t i o n i s t y p i c a l for the present s i t u a t i o n i n Western culture and that the norm of New Being has been conceived i n answer to that s i t u a t i o n . 1 What has become of his conviction concerning the role of the unconscious, when he thinks that he can decipher typological elements from outside with no other t o o l than phe-nomenological i n t u i t i o n ? Can the dialogue be f r u i t f u l i f concentrated s o l e l y alleged essentials or should i t rather be 2 a t o t a l , c u l t u r a l experience? And, most of a l l , we should ask why he has retreated almost e n t i r e l y i n the cognitive, i n t e l l e c t -u a l i s t domain, whereas he started out his encounter with European Footnote 2 continued T i l l i c h ' s strong i n c l i n a t i o n to idealism and the phenomenological ontology of Heidegger have earned him the c r i t i c i s m of Gabus (op. c i t . pp. 224f.) and Gilkey (op. c i t . p. 307n.) to the e f f e c t that he pays too l i t t l e attention to the ontic r e a l i t y . 1 C f . ST.I, p. 49. 2 In a very i n s t r u c t i v e a r t i c l e on 'Hindu - C h r i s t i a n Dialogue: Its Religious and C u l t u r a l Implications' (Studies in Religion Sciences Religieuses 1 (1971) pp. .83-97). K. Klostermaier points out very convincingly that any dialogue should be aware that the r e a l issues far transcend what we usually consider as the f i e l d of r e l i g i o n . The dialogue cannot f a i l to be a t o t a l experience i n which a l l c u l t u r a l dimensions should be considered i n t e r r e l a t e d . Concentration on essentials may be d i v i d i n g rather than uniting mankind, whereas personal r e l a t i o n s of friendship may be more constructive, and can shed l i g h t often on the most fundamental issues, which then c a l l for a deeper dialogue. 145 movements with an emphasis on the p r a c t i c a l search for new, l i f e - g i v i n g symbols. We should point to two reasons that could be given i n favour of T i l l i c h ' s method. To the extent that t h i s method i s valuable i n explaining the r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n underneath secularism and technology, i t can be h e l p f u l i n the creation and e x p l i c a t i o n of the growing c u l t u r a l bond between the c u l t -ures . T i l l i c h r i g h t l y argues that these movements embody a prophetic element of C h r i s t i a n i t y and that they are based on science and metaphysics i n which the mythological t r a d i t i o n pulsates, as can be seen i n the symbolic self-expressions these quasi-Religions have adopted. To ignore t h i s would be unwise and T i l l i c h ' s method, therefore, i s valuable as a contribution to the encounter, to the extent that i t illuminates the r e l a t i o n between C h r i s t i a n i t y and the movements which now attack non-Christian- Religions. However, t h i s method could be h e l p f u l not only as an i n t e r -pretative t o o l , but also as a new element within the c r i t i c a l horizon of the other Religions' i n t e r n a l dialogue. If we agree with Ricoeur and T i l l i c h that the problem of e v i l and f i n i t u d e , or the problem of the al i e n a t i n g o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n , forms the kernel of myths and r e l i g i o u s symbolism, we must accept that there i s i n every t r a d i t i o n what J.B. Metz has c a l l e d a 1 dan-146 gerous,memory' i . e . a constant awareness which endangers or rather challenges the present state of man. The structure and operation of t h i s 'dangerous memory' cannot be determined from outside with concepts derived from another t r a d i t i o n - and here T i l l i c h ' s method i s bound to f a i l - but as the center of a l i v i n g Religion i t can and must integrate a l l the questions that appear at i t s horizon. The categories i n which this^ happens are determined e n t i r e l y by the e x i s t i n g structures of that t r a d i t i o n , which should be analyzed by other than pheno-menological methods. T i l l i c h ' s ideas seem to hold elements 2 that make the use of such other methods appropriate. In conclusion we must say that T i l l i c h ' s theology has pre-sented an exceptionally strong case for both the p o s s i b i l i t y and the need for C h r i s t i a n i t y to enter into a t r u l y open dialogue. In p a r t i c u l a r his p o s i t i v e evaluation of the c u l t u r a l and r a -t i o n a l forms i n c o r r e l a t i o n with the universal revelation has cleared away many obstacles on the side of C h r i s t i a n i t y . A l -though many c r i t i c s advance objections concerning the i n t e r -pretation of certa i n dogmas, i t seems that on the whole T i l l i c h x ' Jene gefa.hr l i c h e Erinnerung, die unsere Gegenwart bedrangt und i n Frage s t e l l t weil wir uns i n i h r an unausgestandene Zukunft erinnern'. (J. B. Metz, " P o l i t i s c h e Theologie" i n der Diskussion. i n : H. Peukert op. c i t . p. 287). 2 His conception of Gestalt combined with the^ i n s i g h t of the un i v e r s a l i t y of p o l a r i t y between ty p o l o g i c a l elements should make him p a r t i c u l a r l y prepared for the s t r u c t u r a l i s t methods of analysis. 147 can be said to present a s o l i d and acceptable presentation of the Western r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n . When i t comes to the concepts of symbol and k a i r o s , i n r e l a t i o n to the s o c i a l and h i s t o r i c a l dimensions of man, we even f e e l that his thought i s almost directed to making such a dialogue come about. But we cannot help being disappointed when he a c t u a l l y o f f e r s his d i r e c t i v e s for such a dialogue. These d i r e c t i v e s are e n t i r e l y concerned with an i n t e l l e c t u a l discussion about essentials and they cannot f a i l to lapse into academic c u r i o s i t y and r e l a t i v i s t i c i n d i f f e r e n c e , i n which the universalism of r e v e l a t i o n i s reduced to a private f e e l i n g of ultimate concern fed by an e c l e c t i c amalgam of symbols."'" One cannot hold that T i l l i c h himself e x p l i c i t l y favours t h i s , but he f a i l s to place the dialogue i n the framework of the actual creation of the 'Blutzusammenhang' and the t o t a l involvement i n the search for new l i f e - g i v i n g symbols. He remains i n the p o s i t i o n What we have said about T i l l i c h ' s aversion from individualism i n r e l i g i o u s matters, does not prevent him from emphasizing the enduring value of C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s i n t e r e s t i n the concrete person. 'The Kingdom of God i s . a ... p e r s o n a l i s t i c symbol ... Nirvana i s an o n t o l o g i c a l symbol'. (Chr. Enc. p.64). H.R. Schlette points out that speaking about the ' p o l i t i c a l theology' and the socio-c r i t i c a l involvement does not contradict the f a c t that r e l i g i o n w i l l always be a 'Privatsache'. We have seen that T i l l i c h ' s main objection against the present mass-culture concentrates on the fact that i t robs man of his i d e n t i t y . 'Diese Freisetzung und Vermittlung der P r i v a t h e i t i s t sehr wohl eine Errungenschaft des Christentums, die ... gegeniiber a s i a t i s c h e r R e l i g i o s i t a t , , a f r i k -anische Tribalismus und auch modernen Kollektivismen ... eine Befreiung bedeudet' (R.R. Schlette, Religion i s t Privatsache H. Peukert op. c i t . p. 76). 148 of a spectator, although he had reproached Troeltsch for seeking the meaning of Religions i n t h e i r depth rather than i n the beyond. Having emphasized so strongly the agape dimen-sion of the S p i r i t u a l Community,x he now f a i l s to apply t h i s to the present dialogue. We need new symbols not for another systematic theology, but for mankind, symbols that are born, rather than created, i n the actual struggle for meaning, symbols that are revealing, unifying and r a t i o n a l , symbols overcoming 2 estrangement by true communication. T i l l i c h spends many pages on t h i s concept of agape and he compares i t to the Platonic conception of eros, which 'drives the soul through a l l l e v e l s of r e a l i t y to ultimate r e a l i t y , to t r uth i t s e l f 1 . This_eros i s the cognitive desire, which forms part of the agape. {Bibl. Rel.p. 72).. Agape concerns the concrete person and i t i s the accepting and reuniting a f f i r m -ation of the other s e l f by p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n his personal center i n terms of the eternal meaning of his being. Cf. ST. I l l , p. 45 and 178. This agape makes r e l a t i v i s m impossible because i t 'cuts into the detached safety of a merely aesthetic eros ... makes the c u l t u r a l eros responsible and the mystical eros personal'. (Love, Power and J u s t i c e , p. 118). Agape however 'is f i r s t of a l l the love God has toward the creature and.through the creature to himself ... and then the agape of creature toward creature'. ( S T . I l l , p. 138). It i s God who accepts creature, holds f a s t to i t despite the demonic estrangement and re-establishes i t s holiness and d i g n i t y . Of man the same cannot be said i n his r e l -ation to God, but s t i l l his f a i t h f u l adherence to the ultimacy that grasps him, i s the p a r t i c i p a t i o n which gives being beyond the subject - object structure, i n a l l r a t i o n a l functions. Cf. ST.I, p. 152. Agape must be judgment before i t can be u n i f i c a t i o n , i t must be c r i t i c a l but not abstract. 'Agape loves i n everybody and through everybody love i t s e l f . (Love, Power and J u s t i c e , p.119) . 2 . Perhaps we should invex"t Rahner' s saying: ' Darum aber i s t jeder wahre Dialog nur das unendliche Bemiihen, dass im Glanze der ausgesagten, gemeinsarn besessenen Wahrheit auch e r s c h e i n e , ,. . . die Liebe, die a l l e i n glaubhaft i s t ' (Art. c i t . p. 297). The p r a c t i c a l encounter i n the present world should be the most e f f e c t i v e symbol at t h i s time, a time which T i l l i c h r i g h t l y con-siders a k a i r o s . 149 T i l l i c h r e h a b i l i t a t e d myths and symbols as universals of a l l authentic r e l i g i o n ; he stressed that the l a t t e r cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with one absolutized form; he denied that the r e l i g i o u s p r i n c i p l e can ever come to an end; he resented pure r e l a t i v i s m which explains away the r e a l import of d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s ; he rejected any attempt to view r e l i g i o n as an i n s i g n i f i c a n t by-product of c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s ; and most of a l l , he i l l u s t r a t e d concretely how a theologian should stand on the boundary between d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s . "Theology on the boundary", then, i s a most adequate summation of T i l l i c h ' s system."*" When i t comes to standing on the boundary between World Religions, however, T i l l i c h should be aware that the dialogue requires a more involved approach. Whereas the p h i l o -sophy of one t r a d i t i o n shares the bulk of i t s ins i g h t s with the Religion of that same t r a d i t i o n , so that standing on the boundary between them i s r e l a t i v e l y easy, the same cannot be said of the encounter between d i f f e r e n t r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s . Theology on the boundary, i n that case, not only needs h e u r i s t i c tools other than those that T i l l i c h proposes, but f i r s t of a l l a p r a c t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . However, we f e e l that T i l l i c h ' s work, centered on the concepts of symbol and k a i r o s , creates a very promising framework and a valuable impetus for such a dialogue. Under t h i s t i t l e W« N i c h o l l s discusses T i l l i c h ' s theology i n : W. N i c h o l l s , Systematic and Philosophical Theology, 1969. 150 BIBLIOGRAPHY A. WORKS BY PAUL TILLICH B i b l i c a l Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Chicago-The University of Chicago Press, 1955. C h r i s t i a n i t y and the Encounter of the World Religions New York, Columbia University Press, 1963. The Courage to Be, New Haven, Yale University Press, 19 52. Dynamics of F a i t h , London, A l l e n & Unwin, 1957. The E t e r n a l Now, London, S.C.M. Press, 1963. Gesammelten Werke , Vol. I-XII, Stuttgart, Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1960-1971. • -A History of C h r i s t i a n Thought, New York, Harper & Row, 1968. The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of History, New York, Scribner Publishers, 1936. Love, Rower and J u s t i c e , New York, Oxford University Press, 1954. M o r a l i t y and Beyond, New York, Harper & Row, 1963. My Search f o r Absolutes, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1967. The New Being, New York, Scribner Publishers, 1955. On the Boundary, New York, Scribner Publishers, 1966. Perspectives on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Protestant Theology, London, S.C.M. Press, 1967. The P r o t e s t a n t Era, (Abridged E d i t i o n ) , Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957. The Recovery of the Prophetic Tradition in the Reformation, Washington, Cathedral Library, 19 50. The R e l i g i o u s S i t u a t i o n , Cleveland, (Meridian Books) The World Publishing Company, 1956. .The Shaking of the Foundations, New York, Scribner's Sons, 1948. 151 Symbol und W i r k l i c h k e i t , Gottingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962. Systematic Theology, Vol. I - I I I , Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963. Theology of C u l t u r e , New.York, Oxford University Press, 1959. U l t i m a t e Concern, New York, Harper & Rowr 1965. What is R e l i g i o n ? New York, Harper & Row, 1969. The World S i t u a t i o n , Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1965. B. COLLECTIONS WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY P. TILLICH Brauer J. (ed.) The Future of R e l i g i o n s , New York, Harper & Row, 1966. Hook S. (ed.) Religious Experience and Truth, New York, New York University Press, 1961. Kegley C. (ed.) The Theology of Paul T i l l i c h , New York, The MacMillan Company, 1952. O'Meara T. and Weisser C. (eds.) Paul T i l l i c h in Catholic Thought Dubuque, Iowa, The Priory Press, 1962. C. SEPARATE EDITION OF AN ARTICLE BY P. TILLICH The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion, Union Seminary Q u a r t e r l y Review (New York) 1 (1946) n.4. 152 D. BOOKS REFERRED TO IN THIS THESIS Adams, J. Paul T i l l i c h ' s Philosophy of Culture, Science and Religion, New York, Harper & Row, 1965. Armbruster, C. The Vision of Paul T i l l i c h , New York, Sheed & Ward, 1967. Barth, K. Church Dogmatics, Vol. 1,2, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1956. Benktson, B. Christus und die Religion, Stuttgart, Calver, 1967. Bonhoeffer D., Act and Being, London, C o l l i n s , 1962. , Letters and Papers from Prison, London, (Fontana Books) S.C.M. Press, 1953. .Bougerol, J. Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure, New York, Desclee Co., 1964. Brunner, E. , The Philosophy of Religion, New. York, Scribner' s Sons, 1937. Dewart, L. , The Foundations of Belief, New York, Herder & Herder, 19 69. Eliade, M. , Cosmos qnd History, New York, (Harper Torchbooks) Harper & Row, 1959. Fortmann, H. Als Ziende de Onzienlijke , Vol. 3a, Geloof en Ervaring, Hilversum,Paul Brand, 1965. Gabus, J . , Introduction a la Theologie de la Culture de Paul T i l l i c h , P a r i s , Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1969. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tubingen, 1960. Gilkey, L. , Naming the Whirlwind; The Renewal of God-Langu-age, New York , The Bobbs M e r r i l l Co., 1969. Habermas, J . Technik und Wissenschaft als 'Ideologic' Frankfurt am Mainz, ed. Suhrkamp, 196 8. Hamilton, K., The System and the Gospel, .London, S.C.M. Press, 1963. Heidegger, M. Being and Time , New York, Harper & Row, 1962. 153 Leibrecht, W., R e l i g i o n and C u l t u r e , New York, Harper & Row, 1959 . Martin, B. Raul T i l l i c h ' s D o c t r i n e of Man, London, J . Nisbet & Co., 19 6 3. Metz, J . Zum V e r h d l t n i s von K i r c h e und Welt, Munchen, 1'967. ., Weltverstdndnis im Glaube, Mainz, Matthias Grunewald Verlag, 1965. N i c h o l l s , W. Systematic and Philosophical Theology, Harmond-sworth, (Penguin Books), 1969. Norenberg, K. Analogia Imaginis; Der Symbolbegriff i n der Theologie Paul T i l l i c h s , Gutersloh, Gutersloher Verlaghaus Gerd Mohn, 1966. Osborne, K., New Being, The Hague, Martinus N i j h o f f , 1969. Peukert, H., Diskussion zur " p o l i t i s c h e n Theologie", Mainz, Matthias Grunewald Verlag, 1969. Rahner, K., S c h r i f t e n zur Theologie I-VIII,'Einsideln, 1954-l o r n A ? O V . Ricoeur, P., Freud and Philosophy; An Essay on Interpretation, New Haven, Yale University Press, 19 70. Rowe, W. , R e l i g i o u s Symbols and God, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968. Schmitz, J . , Die Apologetische Theologie Paul T i l l i c h s , Mainz, Matthias Grunewald Verlag, 1966. Sebeok, T. (ed.) Myth; A Symposium, London, (Midland Books), Indiana University Press, 1968. Tavard, G., Paul T i l l i c h and the C h r i s t i a n Message, New York, Scriiners Publishers, 1962. Unhjem, A., Dynamics of Doubt, Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1966. 154 E. ARTICLES REFERRED TO IN THIS THESIS Aldwinckle, R. T i l l i c h ' s theory of Religious Symbolism, Canadian Journal of Theology, 10, (1964), pp. 110-117. Ford, L., T i l l i c h ' s one nonsymbolic statement, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, (1970), pp. 176-182. Gadamer, G., On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection Continuum, (Chicago), 8, (1970), pp. 77-95. Klostermaier, K., Hindu - Ch r i s t i a n Dialogue: Its Religious and C u l t u r a l Implications, Studies in Religion', Sciences Religieuses, 1, (1971) pp. 83-97. O'Meara, T., T i l l i c h and Heidegger; A Str u c t u r a l Relationship Harvard Theological Review, 61 (1968) , pp. 249-261. Schillebeeckx, E. C h r i s t e l i j k antwoord op een menselijke vraag? Engl: (The E x p e r i e n t i a l Context of the quest f o r God), T i j d s c h r i f t voor Theologie 10, (1970), pp. 1-22. , Naar verruiming van de hermeneutiek, (Engl. Toward a C r i t i c a l Expansion of Theological Hermeneutics). . , K r i t i s c h e Theorie and Theologische Hermeneutiek (Engl.: Theological Hermeneutics and Soc i a l C r i t i c a l Theory T i j d s c h r i f t voor Theologie 11 (1971) pp. 30-51; 113-140. T i l l i c h , P. C h r i s t i a n i t y and Other Faiths (Rejoinder MacQuarrie) . Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 20 (1965) , pp. 177-178. F. SOME UNUTILIZED WORKS ON P. TILLICH Ferre, N. (ed.) Paul T i l l i c h ; Retrospect and Future, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1967. Hammond, G., Man in Estrangement, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press,1965. . , The Power of Self-Transcendence, St.Louis, Bethany Press, 1966. 155 Henning K. (ed.) Der Spannungsbogen, Stuttgart, 1961. Johnson R. (ed.) R e l i g i o u s Symbolism, New York, 1955. Kelsey, D. The Fabric of Paul T i l l i c h ' s Theology, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967. K i l l e n , R., The Ontological Theology of Paul T i l l i c h , Kampen, Kok, 19 56. Lindner, R. Grundlegung einer Theologie der Gesellschaft d a r g e s t e l l t an der Theologie Paul T i l l i c h s , B e r l i n , Furche Verlag, 1960. McKelway, A., The Systematic Theology of Paul T i l l i c h , V i r g i n i a , John Knox Press, Richmond, 1964. Rhein C., Paul T i l l i c h ; Philosophe und Theologe, Stuttgart, Evangelisches Verslagswerk, 1957. Scharlemann, R., Reflection and Doubt in the Thought of Paul T i l l i c h , New Haven, Yale University Press, 19 69. Thomas J . , Paul T i l l i c h ; An- Appraisal, London,. S.C.M. Press, 1963. Wernsdorfer, T., Die entfremdete Welt, Zurich, Zwingli Verlag, 1968. West, C., Communism and the Theologians, New York, 1963. Zahrnt H., Die Sache mit Gott, Munchen, Piper & Co., 1966. 

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