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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Freedom and responsibility Baugh, Bruce 1978

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FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY by BRUCE BAUGH A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES i n the Department of Phi l o s o p h y We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF -BRITISH:COLUMBIA August 197 8 (c) Bruce Baugh, 197 8 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the r e q u i r e -ments f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my department or h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Bruce Baugh ABSTRACT Th i s t h e s i s shows the ways i n which the concepts of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are r e l a t e d , and how indeed they i l l u m i n a t e each other. In P a r t One, i t i s shown t h a t both are based on a concept of a c t i o n , and i t i s thus with an a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n t h a t a theory of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must begin. A c t i o n s are f i r s t d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from events, so t h a t c o n d i t i o n s which must o b t a i n from an event to be an a c t i o n are s p e c i f i e d . The concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may then be used to i l l u m i n a t e a c t i o n by showing how excuses i n d i c a t e ways i n which a c t i o n s can f a i l . From t h i s a n a l y s i s , an a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n i n the f u l l sense emerges, namely, t h a t an a c t i o n i n the f u l l or u n q u a l i f i e d sense i s t h a t to which no excuses are a p p l i c a b l e . A c t i o n i n the f u l l sense i s thus l i n k e d to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the f u l l sense. The a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n shows t h a t the breakdown of an a c t i o n i s the l o s s of c o n t r o l over i t s e f f e c t s , and a c t i o n i n the f u l l sense thus o b t a i n s where no breakdown oc c u r s . Conscious c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n i s the c o n t r o l of an a c t i o n ' s e f f e c t s , which i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s , and the c o n t r o l of i n t e n t i o n s , which i s what may be analyzed as r a t i o n a l i t y . Conscious c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , or agency, c o n s t i t u t e s freedom on the plane of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . Thus, from the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y emerges a concept of a c t i o n and of agency which i n d i c a t e s what freedom i s . Yet, i t i s the a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n upon which the a c t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t s . The theory of freedom i s d e f i n e d i n P a r t Two a g a i n s t the i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t p o s i t i o n t h a t i f determinism i s t r u e , n e i t h e r freedom.nor r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e x i s t . I t i s shown that causal determinism does not rule out actions' being free i n the sense required for an i n d i v i d u a l to be responsible; for them as a theory of action.shows that i t i s not an action's being caused but the nature of i t s . causes which makes i t free or. unfr.ee. If the action i s caused so that i t i s i n the conscious control of the agent, i t i s free. The r e s t of Part Two examines moral practices such as praise and blame i n l i g h t of the l i m i t s determinism places on them. It i s necessary to show what .rational or j u s t i f i a b l e grounds there could be for practices such as p r a i s i n g and blaming i n any theory of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Part Three shows that agency, or control over an action, i s extendable over the values upon which actions are.based. Control over values is. achieved by the i n d i v i d u a l consciously choosing values i n awareness of being responsible for those choices and values. What the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s c a l l "Authenticity" i s thus a f u l l e r degree of freedom and of agency. This analysis of authen-t i c i t y does not focus on how authenticity i s a response to a value question posed by n i h i l i s m ; but on how authenticity i s an extension of our regular concepts of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . It i s shown that authenticity, when i t i s accompanied by f u l l agency (as that notion i s developed i n Part One) i s freedom and .responsibility i n the highest degree. i i i FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY I n t r o d u c t i o n P a r t One: A c t i o n and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y I n t r o d u c t i o n C a u s a l i t y and a c t i o n I n t e n t i o n and e f f e c t The s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n R a t i o n a l i t y I n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n s C o n c l u s i o n P a r t Two: Determinism and Freedom I n t r o d u c t i o n D e f i n i n g the problem C a p a c i t i e s and freedom I n c o m p a t i b i l i s t o b j e c t i o n s : Campbell and Hospers P r a i s e and blame and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y C haracter and moral worth P r a i s e and blame as a t t i t u d e s and as a c t i o n s P r a i s e and blame and agency Re a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s P a r t Three: A u t h e n t i c i t y and Freedom I n t r o d u c t i o n Degrees of freedom Value and c h o i c e S a r t r e a n freedom A u t h e n t i c i t y as freedom C o n c l u s i o n C o n c l u s i o n Notes B i b l i o g r a p h y i v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to ' acknowledge the help and i n f l u e n c e of Pr o f . S.C. Cov a l , who in t r o d u c e d me to the approach taken i n t h i s t h e s i s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n P a r t One. The method used i n P a r t One i s borrowed f r e e l y from P r o f e s s o r C o v a l 1 s unpublished paper, "The Concept of A c t i o n . " I would a l s o l i k e to thank my a d v i s o r , E a r l Winkler, f o r h i s guidance, support and h e l p f u l comments and c r i t i c i s m . My thanks a l s o to P a i s l e y Woodward f o r encouragement and f r u i t f u l d i s c u s s i o n . v INTRODUCTION Freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are concepts t h a t are i n t e r c o n -nected i n such a way as to i l l u m i n a t e each other. Both are based on the concept of a c t i o n . Any theory of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y must then begin "with an a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n . In the f i r s t p l a c e , i t i s necessary to d i f f e r e n t i a t e a c t i o n s from other s o r t s of events, and so i t i s necessary to show the c o n d i t i o n s which must o b t a i n f o r . an event to be an a c t i o n . Once these have been e s t a b l i s h e d , the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y may be used to r e v e a l the s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n by p o i n t i n g out how excuses i n d i c a t e ways i n which a c t i o n s f a i l . From t h i s a n a l y s i s a d e s c r i p t i o n of a c t i o n i n the f u l l sense emerges, namely, t h a t a c t i o n i n the f u l l or u n q u a l i f i e d sense i s a c t i o n to which no excuses are a p p l i c a b l e . A c t i o n i n the f u l l sense i s thus l i n k e d to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the - f u l l sense. The n o t i o n of a c t i o n i s l i n k e d to t h a t of agency, and from the a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n a theory of agency emerges which holds t h a t f u l l agency i s the p o s s e s s i o n of conscious c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n . The a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n shows t h a t the breakdown of an a c t i o n i s the l o s s of c o n t r o l over i t s e f f e c t s , and a c t i o n i n the f u l l sense, and hence f u l l agency, thus o b t a i n s where no breakdown occurs. Conscious c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n i s the c o n t r o l of an a c t i o n ' s e f f e c t s , which i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s , and the c o n t r o l of i n t e n t i o n s , which i s what may be analyzed as r a t i o n a l i t y . Conscious c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , or agency, 2 i s what c o n s t i t u e s freedom on the plane of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . Thus, from the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y emerges a concept of a c t i o n and of agency which i n d i c a t e s what freedom i s . Yet, i t i s the a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n upon which the n o t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e r e s t s . The n o t i o n s of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are thus interdependent and have as t h e i r foundation a theory of a c t i o n , which i s i t s e l f i l l u m i n a t e d by the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The theory of freedom developed on the b a s i s of a theory of agency can be defended a g a i n s t the o b j e c t i o n s of d e t e r m i n i s t s or i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t s , who h o l d t h a t n e i t h e r freedom nor respon-s i b i l i t y can e x i s t i f determinism i s t r u e . I t can be shown t h a t , whether or not determinism i s i n f a c t t r u e , the c a u s a l ' d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c t i o n s does not r u l e out those a c t i o n s being f r e e i n the sense r e q u i r e d f o r an i n d i v i d u a l to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them. On the b a s i s of the theory of a c t i o n , one can show t h a t i t i s not an a c t i o n ' s being caused, but the nature o f i t s causes which makes i t f r e e or u n f r e e . I f the a c t i o n i s caused i n such a way as to be w i t h i n the conscious c o n t r o l o f the agent, then i t i s f r e e . Determinism does p l a c e l i m i t s on the concept of freedom, however. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t r u l e s out a n o t i o n o f freedom which i s the b a s i s o f some of our moral p r a c t i c e s , n o t a b l y those of p r a i s i n g and blaming. I t i s necessary to o u t l i n e what r a t i o n a l or j u s t i f i a b l e grounds there c o u l d be f o r p r a c t i c e s such as p r a i s i n g and blaming i f determinism i s t r u e i n any theory o f freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 3 Agency, or c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , i s extendable over the values upon which a c t i o n s are based. C o n t r o l over v a l u e s i s achieved by the i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s l y choosing values and being c o n s c i o u s l y aware of being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r those c h o i c e s and those v a l u e s . What the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s c a l l " a u t h e n t i c i t y " i s thus a f u l l e r degree of freedom and of agency. As such, i t e n t a i l s the h i g h e s t degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a c t i o n s which an i n d i v i d u a l i s capable of assuming. In the context of a theory of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , an a n a l y s i s of a u t h e n t i -c i t y focusses not on how a u t h e n t i c i t y i s a response t o a value q u e s t i o n posed by n i h i l i s m , but on how a u t h e n t i c i t y i s an ext e n s i o n of our r e g u l a r concepts of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and shows t h a t a u t h e n t i c i t y , when i t i s accompanied by f u l l agency, i s freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the h i g h e s t degree. The n o t i o n s of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y developed i n t h i s a n a l y s i s are a p p l i c a b l e to p r i m a r i l y i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s , and so i t i s with a theory o f a c t i o n t h a t we begin and with a theory of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a c t i o n s t h a t we c l o s e . PART ONE ACTION AND RESPONSIBILITY 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y u s u a l l y d i s c u s s e d i n the d e t e r m i n i s t / l i b e r t a r i a n debate i s one which concerns a c t i o n . In order to get c l e a r on what i t i s to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n , one must f i r s t understand what i t i s f o r someone to a c t . Once a b a s i c n o t i o n of a c t i o n i s a r r i v e d a t , one can then develop a concept of agency, which would r e f e r t o the powers and a b i l i t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l s t o a c t i n v a r i o u s circumstances, and where those powers may be d i m i n i s h e d . The a n a l y s i s of the concept of agency w i l l r e f e r to the v a r i o u s ways i n which a c t i o n s can f a i l , or break down, and thus shows how agency can be di m i n i s h e d . T h i s a n a l y s i s i l l u m i n a t e s the c e n t r a l core of the concept of a c t i o n , i n d i c a t i n g the minimum c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r agency. By seeing how a c t i o n s f a i l and how agency may be d i m i n i s h e d , a n o t i o n of what i t i s to have f u l l agency w i l l emerge. P a r t of the n o t i o n of f u l l agency i s the concept of r a t i o n a l i t y , and i t i s t h i s concept t h a t l i e s at the b a s i s of s o c i a l r u l e s and p r a c t i c e s , i n c l u d i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . From the concept of agency, one w i l l then be able to develop the concepts of freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n a c t i o n . 4 5 2. C a u s a l i t y and a c t i o n The f i r s t p o i n t to c o n s i d e r i s how an a c t i o n d i f f e r s from other n a t u r a l events. I f determinism i s t r u e , then a c t i o n s , l i k e events, have causes. The d i f f e r e n c e between a c t i o n s and other n a t u r a l events i s t h a t the system of causes of an a c t i o n must be i n some way i n t e r n a l to the agent i n a way t h a t a system of causes of other events i s not i n t e r n a l t o them. I t w i l l be shown t h a t not a l l b o d i l y movements are a c t i o n s , f o r not a l l b o d i l y movements have the r i g h t s o r t of causes to be c a l l e d a c t i o n s . I t seems t h a t an a c t i o n i s an event caused by the agent. To make i t c l e a r i n what way i t i s caused by the agent, i t w i l l h e lp to c o n s i d e r the view t h a t there are some a c t i o n s ("basic a c t i o n s " ) which the agent does not cause. Danto argues"'" t h a t although there i s a sense of "cause" such t h a t i t may be s a i d t h a t an agent "causes" an a c t i o n , t h i s i s a d i f f e r e n t sense of "cause" than the one used to d e s c r i b e an event being "caused" by the agent. The sense of "cause" i n • which the agent causes an event (which i s not i t s e l f an a c t i o n of t h a t agent) e n t a i l s t h a t the event was caused by an a c t i o n of the agent. For example, to say an agent caused the r o l l i n g of the rock i m p l i e s t h a t the agent performed an a c t i o n (eg. pushing) which caused the rock to r o l l . (This i m p l i c a t i o n seems to h o l d , however, o n l y where an agent may be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an event. Helen of Troy may have been the cause of the T r o j a n War, but we would not hold her r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t event i n t h a t i t was her beauty, and not her a c t i o n s , which 6 caused i t , and so she did nothing to cause i t . ) There are at l e a s t some a c t i o n s which are not caused by the agent i n the way an event may be caused by an agent (which i s through some a c t i o n of t h a t agent). That i s , there are some a c t i o n s f o r which the agent performs no a d d i t i o n a l or separate a c t i o n i n order to b r i n g t h a t a c t i o n about. For example, i n order to move my arm, I need not perform any prev i o u s a c t i o n . I d i d not cause my arm to move by f i r s t t r y i n g to move i t , or by c o n t r a c t i n g muscles or f i r i n g neurons, f o r the f i r i n g of neurons and the c o n t r a c t i n g of muscles i s X " the same event as the arm's being moved by the agent (and so i s the same a c t i o n ) , and " t r y i n g to move an arm" i m p l i e s o n l y t h a t the a c t i o n may not have been s u c c e s s f u l , but i f i t were s u c c e s s f u l the t r y i n g and the a c t u a l movement would be the same a c t i o n under d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n s , and so " t r y i n g to move an arm" i m p l i e s no a c t i o n antecedent to the a c t u a l move-ment of the arm. The movement of an arm would d i f f e r from the agent's t r y i n g to move i t , or the agent f i r i n g c e r t a i n neurons and c o n t r a c t i n g c e r t a i n muscles, on l y i f the source of movement i s e x t e r n a l to the agent ( i t could be a p u l l e y , or someone e l s e moving the arm), i n which case the movement i s not an a c t i o n of the person whose arm moves. So th e r e are some a c t i o n s , a c c o r d i n g to t h i s argument, which are not caused by the agent i n t h a t there are some a c t i o n s f o r which the agent does not do anything i n order to b r i n g i t about, and to say an agent causes something i s to say the agent has done some-t h i n g to cause i t . 7 The p o i n t at which there i s no p r e v i o u s a c t i o n t h a t i s necessary to produce the a c t i o n i s the p o i n t where what takes p l a c e i s not a d e l i b e r a t e e x e r c i s e of power by the agent, but some process i n t e r n a l t o the agent over which the agent has no c o n t r o l . The b e a t i n g of a heart i s not an a c t i o n , but t h e o r e t i c a l l y i t c o u l d be, i f one l e a r n e d how to c o n t r o l i t . S i m i l a r i l y , some b r a i n processes are u s u a l l y simply i n t e r n a l events, not a c t i o n s , but i f one co u l d c o n t r o l them, then one would be a c t i n g when one produced such events. Through b i o -feedback techniques, some people can l e a r n t o produce c e r t a i n b r a i n events, i n which case those events become a c t i o n s , as they become s u b j e c t to the conscious c o n t r o l o f the agent. (Returning to the Helen of Troy example, i t i s c l e a r t h a t Helen's beauty was not an a c t i o n i n t h a t she had no conscious c o n t r o l over i t . Thus though she caused the T r o j a n War through her beauty, she performed no a c t i o n , and so c o u l d not be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the war.) Events not s u b j e c t t o the conscious c o n t r o l of the agent are not a c t i o n s , but mere events (unless they are s u b j e c t t o the conscious c o n t r o l o f another agent, i n which case they are a c t i o n s of that agent). I t seems t h a t there must be some p o i n t where the cause of an a c t i o n i s not s u b j e c t to one's d e l i b e r a t e c o n t r o l , so there i s some p o i n t a t which an a c t i o n i s caused by an event which i s not an a c t i o n . I f the p o i n t a t which an event becomes su b j e c t to the conscious c o n t r o l i s the p o i n t a t which i t becomes an a c t i o n , then an a c t i o n i s an event w i t h i n the conscious c o n t r o l of the agent. A c t i o n s not caused by any 8 p r e v i o u s a c t i o n are what Danto c a l l s " b a s i c a c t i o n s , " and b a s i c a c t i o n s , s i n c e they are caused by events over which the agent has no c o n t r o l , are not caused by the agent. Yet there i s another sense of "cause" such t h a t one c o u l d say t h a t the agent "caused" a b a s i c a c t i o n . B a s i c a c t i o n s are caused j u s t as other p h y s i c a l events are caused, but possess a unique and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . For example, the cause of a b a s i c a c t i o n may be the f i r i n g of c e r t a i n neurons. The f i r i n g o f those neurons does not seem to i n v o l v e any i n t e n t i o n a l i t y or d e l i b e r a t e agency, and i s thus l i k e o ther n a t u r a l events which are not a c t i o n s . In t h a t the agent has no power over the f i r i n g of those neurons, and thus performs no a c t i o n which produces such f i r i n g or the b a s i c a c t i o n which r e s u l t s from i t , the agent cannot "cause" b a s i c a c t i o n s . But i n so f a r as the cause of the a c t i o n i s i n t e r n a l to the agent, then the agent i s the cause of the a c t i o n i n the sense t h a t those causes of the a c t i o n i n t e r n a l to the agent are necessary c o n d i t i o n s of the a c t i o n ' s being performed. Even though the agent has not done anything to produce the a c t i o n , the system of causes w i t h i n the agent which produces the a c t i o n i s ( i n a sense) p a r t of the agent, and t h e r e f o r e one may s t a t e t h a t i f an event i s an a c t i o n , i t must be caused by the agent ( i n the second sense of cause j u s t i n d i c a t e d ) . I f i t were not, then there would be no d i f f e r e n c e between a c t i o n s , b a s i c or otherwise, and other events. I t i s the o r i g i n of the a c t i o n i n a system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent (and thus, the o r i g i n of the a c t i o n i n the agent) which.makes the a c t i o n an 9 a c t i o n of t h a t agent. T h i s i s o n l y to say t h a t f o r an event to be an a c t i o n , the system of causes which produced i t must be a t l e a s t p a r t i a l l y i n t e r n a l to the agent. T h i s i s a necessary, and by no means s u f f i c i e n t , c o n d i t i o n of an event's being an a c t i o n , as there are some events produced by causes i n t e r n a l to the agent which are not a c t i o n s (as w i l l be shown l a t e r ) . Can machines act? Apparently t h e i r movements and o p e r a t i o n s are produced by causes which are to a l a r g e degree i n t e r n a l to themselves. I t seems reasonable to assume t h a t to the degree to which a michine performs o p e r a t i o n s autonomously (that i s , without being d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by someone or something e l s e ) , i t may be s a i d to be a c t i n g . An i n t e r n a l combustion engine does not a c t , but a robot c o u l d . I f a machine operated autonomously, i t would have to be s e l f - m o t i v a t e d , and t h e r e f o r e i t s o p e r a t i o n s would be i n t e n t i o n a l (a d e l i b e r a t e e x e r c i s e of power f o r i t s own reasons or purposes), and t h e r e f o r e a c t i o n s , f o r which i t c o u l d be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e . Thus, a machine c o u l d not a c t u n l e s s i t had some i n t e n t i o n s , and i t c o u l d not have i n t e n t i o n s without some s o r t of concept of s e l f (though the concept need not be the s e l f - c o n s c i o u s awareness of s e l f t h a t humans p o s s e s s ) . Machines co u l d a c t , t h e r e f o r e , and so t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s no o b j e c t i o n to the p o i n t t h a t a c t i o n s are produced by a system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent, whether the agent i s human or mechanical. Of course, there are some a c t i o n s which are s a i d to be caused by other a c t i o n s . (We are not speaking here of cases 10 where the a c t i o n of one agent i s s a i d to be the cause of another a c t i o n of the same, agent.) For example, i n order to move a rock one must f i r s t push i t . There seem to be two a c t i o n s here, the pushing and the moving. But the pushing and the moving of a rock are one movement, one e f f o r t and one a c t i o n . The same p h y s i c a l event (neurons f i r i n g , muscles c o n t r a c t i n g , f o r c e being exerted) takes p l a c e . To t r y to move the rock i s t o push i t , and i f the attempt i s s u c c e s s f u l , no a c t i o n i n a d d i t i o n to the pushing i s needed t o accomplish i t . The apparent d i f f e r e n c e between the two a c t i o n s (the moving and the pushing) i s merely t h a t one i s d e s c r i b e d with r e f e r e n c e to the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n (the movement of the rock) and the other i s not. There i s a c o n f u s i o n i n saying t h a t an a c t i o n can cause another a c t i o n which may be brought out i f one notes cases where an agent performs an a c t i o n t h a t produces another b o d i l y movement t h a t i s not an a c t i o n . I f an e x t e r n a l f o r c e (such as a s l i n g operated by a mechanical p u l l e y ) causes someone's arm to move, t h a t movement i s not an a c t i o n , as the system of causes of the event i s e x t e r n a l t o the agent. But i f someone uses one arm to move the other (as when, f o r example, the other arm i s p a r a l y z e d ) , i s the movement of the arm being moved an a c t i o n ? In one sense, the system of causes of the movement i s i n t e r n a l t o the agent, and so i t would seem t h a t the movement of the arm caused by the movement of the other arm i s an a c t i o n caused by another, p r e v i o u s a c t i o n . However, c l o s e r a n a l y s i s of t h i s example shows t h i s not to be the case. The arm being moved by the other arm i s being moved not simply 11 by a system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent, but by the e x t e r n a l f o r c e generated by the system of causes i n t e r n a l t o the agent which i s the movement of the other arm. In t h i s r e s p e c t , the movement of the p a r a l y z e d or i n a c t i v e arm i s l i k e the movement of a rock t h a t i s pushed; the agent moved the i n a c t i v e arm i n the same way t h a t the agent would move a rock, and not i n the way t h a t the agent would move a normally f u n t i o n i n g arm. The movement of the arm which causes the other ( i n a c t i v e ) arm to move i s caused by nothing except f a c t o r s i n t e r n a l to the agent. That i s , i f one t r a c e s the c a u s a l c h a i n of the movement back to the moment bef o r e the movement took p l a c e , the causes would a l l be i n t e r n a l t o the agent (though one c o u l d , of course, t r a c e the c a u s a l c h a i n back f u r t h e r to a p o i n t at which a t l e a s t some of the causes, as, f o r example, an o b j e c t of p e r c e p t i o n , are e x t e r n a l ) . I t i s not caused by some pre v i o u s movement or a c t i o n . The arm being moved by t h a t f u n c t i o n i n g arm i s an a c t i o n of the agent's onl y i n the way t h a t a stone being moved i s an a c t i o n ; i t i s an a c t i o n i n t h a t i t i s a movement caused by an a c t i o n (and so i s t h a t a c t i o n d e s c r i b e d with r e f e r e n c e to i t s e f f e c t s ) . But the movement of the i n a c t i v e arm i n and of i t s e l f i s not an a c t i o n , i n the same way t h a t a stone r o l l i n g i s not i n and of i t s e l f an a c t i o n . Rather, i t i s the e f f e c t of an a c t i o n , f o r the arm being moved i s merely the o b j e c t and not the instrument of the a c t i o n i n such a case (since one cou l d not i n t e n t i o n a l l y move i t without performing some separate and pr e v i o u s a c t i o n ) . The arm which i s i n a c t i v e or 12 p a r a l y z e d does not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the a c t i o n any more than does a stone t h a t i s r o l l e d . Because of t h i s p a s s i v i t y i n the arm, i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e whether the f o r c e t h a t moved i t was produced by the agent or not, so long as i t i s e x t e r n a l to i t i n the way t h a t has been d e s c r i b e d , i n which case i t i s not an a c t i o n i n and of i t s e l f but the e f f e c t of an a c t i o n . (The movement of an a r t i f i c i a l limb i s not i n and of i t s e l f an a c t i o n ; i t i s onl y an a c t i o n when i t i s an e f f e c t of some pr e v i o u s o r separate a c t i o n , such as the movement of a p a r t i a l limb or of c e r t a i n muscles. The movement of the p a r t i a l limb or of the muscles and of the a r t i f i c i a l limb are one a c t i o n and one movement, as the movement of the a r t i f i c i a l limb i s .an e f f e c t of an a c t i o n , not a second a c t i o n produced by the movement of the p a r t i a l r e a l limb or of c e r t a i n muscles. The movement of a n a t u r a l and f u n c t i o n i n g limb, by c o n t r a s t , r e q u i r e s no pre v i o u s a c t i o n , and can o n l y be an a c t i o n of the person of whom i t i s a p a r t i f no pre v i o u s a c t i o n , such as the a c t i o n of someone e l s e , produced i t , and thus must r e s u l t from the system of causes i n t e r n a l t o the agent i f i t i s to be an a c t i o n of t h a t agent.) J u s t as we can say "the agent r o l l e d the stone," we can say "the agent moved h i s or her p a r a l y z e d arm (by l i f t i n g i t wi t h the other arm)," which i s simply a way of d e s c r i b i n g an a c t i o n of the f u n c t i o n i n g arm doing the l i f t i n g i n terms of i t s e f f e c t s . The p a r a l y z e d arm does not a c t , and i t s movement i s not an a c t i o n . ( I t i s impossible f o r an agent to simply move a p a r a l y z e d arm, f o r a p a r a l y z e d arm i s one t h a t cannot be moved, un l e s s i t i s 13 moved by another arm, a machine, or someone e l s e . ) There are not two a c t i o n s (the movement of the f u n c t i o n i n g arm and t h a t of the i n a c t i v e arm) such t h a t the one i s the cause of the other. I t i s c l e a r from t h i s a n a l y s i s t h a t not only must an event be produced by a system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent i n order to be an a c t i o n , i t i s necessary to d i s t i n g u i s h between a c t i o n s and t h e i r e f f e c t s . 3. I n t e n t i o n and e f f e c t The f i r s t reason f o r making the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t i o n s and t h e i r e f f e c t s i s t h a t i t f o l l o w s from the d e s c r i p t i o n of an a c t i o n being the r e s u l t of a system of causes i n t e r n a l t o the agent. We have j u s t seen t h a t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n shows t h a t no a c t i o n i s the cause of another a c t i o n . T h i s a p p l i e s to the a c t i o n s of d i f f e r e n t persons as w e l l as to a c t i o n s performed by the same agent. I f the a c t i o n of an agent i s genuine, then what the agent does may be caused by someone e l s e ' s a c t i o n o n l y i n an i n d i r e c t way. For the a c t i o n of another can be the "cause" of an a c t i o n o n l y i n the sense t h a t the a c t i o n of the agent i s a response to the a c t i o n of the other ( j u s t as an a c t i o n can be a response to some other f a c t o r beyond the agent). T h i s does not mean the other person caused the a c t i o n (or t h a t other elements of the environment caused the a c t i o n ) , f o r t h a t would mean t h a t the a c t i o n was merely the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n of another, and not the a c t i o n o f . t h e agent a t a l l . (If the a c t i o n was caused by other f a c t o r s i n the environment than the a c t i o n of another i t s t i l l would not be an a c t i o n , f o r 14 i t would be a mere event as i t would not be produced by a system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent.) Hence a c t i o n s cannot have as t h e i r complete cause another a c t i o n (or event); they must r e s u l t from the system of causes i n t e r n a l t o the agent. T h i s system of causes may i t s e l f be a f f e c t e d by f a c t o r s both w i t h i n and without the agent (such as the a c t i o n s of o t h e r s ) , but i f i t i s not o p e r a t i v e , the agent does not perform an a c t i o n . There i s an a d d i t i o n a l , pragmatic reason f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a c t i o n s from t h e i r e f f e c t s , which i s t h a t to say someone has acted i s to a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the e f f e c t s of t h a t 2 a c t i o n to t h a t person. - There may be cases where such a d e s c r i p -t i o n i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e u n l e s s q u a l i f i e d by some adverb of excuse, as there are cases where a person has acted but where we would not want to h o l d the person r e s p o n s i b i l e f o r the e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n . In such cases, something has gone wrong wi t h the a c t i o n , so t h a t the intended e f f e c t i s not achieved. So while the agent has acted, i t i s wrong to d e s c r i b e the a c t i o n i n those cases i n terms of the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n , f o r to do so i s to a s c r i b e (by i m p l i c a t i o n ) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the agent f o r the e f f e c t . In such cases, where the e f f e c t achieved was not t h a t which was intended, any d e s c r i p t i o n of the a c t i o n i n terms of the e f f e c t must be q u a l i f i e d somehow to i n d i c a t e t h a t the e f f e c t was u n i n t e n t i o n a l , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t the agent may have dim i n i s h e d or have no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t . In law, one means of defense i s to admit performing an a c t i o n , but to c l a i m t h a t the d e s c r i p t i o n 15 of the a c t i o n must be q u a l i f i e d (eg. wit h r e f e r e n c e to the circumstances, the agent's s t a t e of mind, e t c . ) , thus dimin-i s h i n g or e l i m i n a t i n g the agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the a c t i o n . Thus, the system o f causes w i t h i n the agent may produce an a c t i o n which goes awry f o r one reason or another, and so while the agent has acted, the o n l y u n q u a l i f i e d d e s c r i p t i o n o f the a c t i o n t h a t w i l l be c o r r e c t w i l l be t h a t which r e f e r s t o the a c t i o n i t s e l f (or what Danto c a l l s the b a s i c a c t i o n ) , and not to the e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n . The o b j e c t i o n may be r a i s e d here t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s dim i n i s h e d or e l i m i n a t e d i n cases other than those where the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n was unforseen or u n i n t e n t i o n a l , as f o r example with i n v o l u n t a r y or coerced behaviour. However, i t w i l l be shown t h a t i n v o l u n t a r y or coerced behaviour i s u s u a l l y behaviour f o r which the agent i s h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e , but of which we would not, c o n s i d e r i n g the circumstances, disapprove. Thus, i t i s not excused, but i s i n a sense j u s t i f i e d or condoned. From t h i s i t w i l l be argued t h a t where the agent i s r a t i o n a l and there i s no breakdown between the i n t e n t i o n and the e f f e c t , then there i s f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For s i m p l i c i t y , mistake of •' f a c t and i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f w i l l be t r e a t e d as a breakdown of agency, as these are cases where the i n t e n t i o n i t s e l f breaks down as i t i s not compatible w i t h the other i n t e n t i o n s of the agent, but t h i s i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y i s hidden from the agent due to a mistaken or i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f . C " I n t e n t i o n " i s here used t o mean the d i r e c t i n g of o n e s e l f toward an end, and so i s c o i n c i d e n t a l with the p o s t u l a t i o n and 16 p u r s u i t o f an end, as d i s t i n c t from a d e s i r e , which i s merely a tendency to p o s t u l a t e and pursue an end. To i n t e n d some-t h i n g i s then not onl y to d e s i r e i t , but to d i r e c t o n e s e l f toward i t as an end, or to p u r s u e - i t , and so i t i s not a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e or a t t i t u d e which precedes a c t i o n but i s a component of ends or of goals.) The l i n k between the a s c r i p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and t h a t of agency i s so str o n g t h a t i t l e d H.L.A. Hart t o c l a i m t h a t the concept of a c t i o n cannot "be e x p l a i n e d by d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e -ments. Rather, he says, the concept must r e f e r to a s c r i p t i v e statements about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . "Our concept of a c t i o n ... i s a s o c i a l concept and l o g i c a l l y dependent on c e r t a i n r u l e s o f 5 conduct." T h i s i s to put the c a r t before the horse. The d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a c t i o n s , or of how an a c t i o n should be p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d , i s not independent of normative c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about under which c o n d i t i o n s and i n what way one should h o l d people r e s p o n s i b l e . So Hart i s r i g h t i n t h a t r e s p e c t , but i s a l s o m i s l e a d i n g . Because of the conceptual connection between the concept of a c t i o n and t h a t of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , we need a concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o i l l u m i n a t e why c e r t a i n a c t i o n s are excused. What i s f i n a l l y e x p l a i n e d , however, i s the concept of a c t i o n i t s e l f ( i n c l u d i n g how a c t i o n s break down), which i s the b a s i s of the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The reason why some a c t i o n s are excused must r e f e r to the concept of a c t i o n . The e v a l u a t i v e or normative aspect of the concept of a c t i o n r e l i e s not so much on r u l e s of conduct but on some concept of 17 agency, which focusses on how agency may be di m i n i s h e d i n c e r t a i n circumstances. The e v a l u a t i v e component of the concept of agency i s some concept of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , which i n d i c a t e s what c r i t e r i a t h ere are f o r a s c r i b i n g agency and hence r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t i s thus a normative concept of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , not r u l e s of conduct, which i n d i c a t e s how and when standard d e v i a t i o n s from standard a c t i o n and agency are excusable. The normative core of the concept of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y i s a concept of r a t i o n a l i t y which p r o v i d e s a r a t i o n a l e or b a s i s f o r r u l e s of conduct and f o r the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , as w i l l be shown l a t e r . The phenomenal b a s i s f o r the concepts of a c t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s thus the a c t u a l s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n , and the normative b a s i s f o r the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s the concept o f r a t i o n a l i t y as i t a p p l i e s t o s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s . To j u s t i f y excusing a c t i o n s on the b a s i s of the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would be to engage i n a p e t i t i o principi. Rules of conduct must be l o g i c a l l y dependent on what we know about how people a c t i n order f o r the r u l e s to be e f f i c a c i o u s . Unless someone knows enough about a c t i o n to be able t o demon-s t r a t e why persons are h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e i n some s i t u a t i o n s and not i n o t h e r s , o r why some people are never h e l d respon-s i b l e , i t w i l l be im p o s s i b l e to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l p r a c t i c e of h o l d i n g persons r e s p o n s i b l e . I f the p r a c t i c e i s to be j u s t i f i e d , i t must make r e f e r e n c e t o the f a c t s of the world which make the p r a c t i c e e f f i c a c i o u s , and s i n c e the p r a c t i c e governs a c t i o n s and r e f e r s to them, i t i s n a t u r a l to suppose t h a t the f a c t s i n q u e s t i o n concern the concept of a c t i o n . To 18 say t h a t someone performed an a c t i o n without q u a l i f y i n g t h a t statement i m p l i e s t h a t the person was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n , but i t i s not the r u l e s o f conduct alone which p r o v i d e the j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r saying whether or not the person i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n , f o r what i s at i s s u e i s whether or not the person acted i n co n f o r m i t y to those r u l e s of conduct, and the answer t o t h a t q u e s t i o n w i l l depend upon an examination of the person's a c t i o n s , and not j u s t the r u l e s of conduct. In order t o a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i -b i l i t y , one must f i r s t be able t o decide whether and i n what manner the person acted. I f whether the person, i s r e s p o n s i b l e depends on the extent t o which the person acted i n the standard ( i . e . u n q u a l i f i e d ) sense of a c t i o n , then i t i s the concept of a c t i o n which determines when a person has acted i n the u n q u a l i f i e d sense of a c t i o n , and which t h e r e f o r e determines what i t i s to be an agent and to be r e s p o n s i b l e . 4. The s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n Since A r i s t o t l e , much has been made of the f a c t t h a t the f u l l concept of agency i s determined n e g a t i v e l y . That i s , the standard concept of a c t i o n i s t h a t a c t i o n where a l l excusing c o n d i t i o n s are absent. But grounds f o r e x c e p t i o n from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ( c o n d i t i o n s of excuse) o n l y d i m i n i s h agency, they do not remove i t , and so a c e n t r a l concept of a c t i o n (the "core concept") remains a f t e r a l l the aspects of agency c a n c e l l a b l e by c o n d i t i o n s of excuse have been so c a n c e l l e d . Adverbs of excuse do not deny agency, but they do deny agency i n the standard sense. Standard agency i s then t h a t core 19 of a c t i o n which remains a f t e r a l l aspects c a n c e l l a b l e by adverbs o f excuse have been c a n c e l l e d , p l u s a l l those can-c e l l a b l e a s p e c t s . (Add to what remains o f the whole what was taken away from the whole and the r e s u l t i s the complete whole, but understood now i n terms of i t s p a r t s and i t s p r i n c i p l e of u n i f i c a t i o n . ) The standard case of a c t i o n i s thus one where no excusing c o n d i t i o n s are a p p l i c a b l e . In th a t standard agency i s the absence of excusing c o n d i t i o n s , i t i s d e f i n e d n e g a t i v e l y , but i n t h a t i t makes r e f e r e n c e to the core of a c t i o n which i s not c a n c e l l a b l e by excusing con-d i t i o n s , i t i s not. The core of a c t i o n i s not c a n c e l l a b l e i n t h a t i t s absence would e n t a i l t h a t the o b j e c t of i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s not an a c t i o n , and i t c o n s t i t u t e s the essence of a c t i o n i n th a t a d e s c r i p t i o n of i t i s a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s necessary f o r something to be an a c t i o n . The way i n which the p a r t s of standard a c t i o n which are c a n c e l l a b l e are r e l a t e d t o standard a c t i o n i n d i c a t e s the s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n . The apparent h e t e r o g e n e i t y of excuses and of the c o n d i t i o n s to which they r e f e r obscures the f a c t t h a t they have i n common the q u a l i t y of p o i n t i n g out how an a c t i o n can go wrong. That i s , they p o i n t out standard d e v i a t i o n s from the standard or paradigm 7 . case of agency. I t can be shown t h a t an a c t i o n goes wrong when the system of causes w i t h i n the agent t h a t produced i t i s d e f e c t i v e or i s made f u l l y or p a r t i a l l y i n o p e r a t i v e by some e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n . When an a c t i o n produces an undesi r e d or u n i n t e n t i o n a l r e s u l t , something of t h a t s o r t can be seen t o occur, i f one i n c l u d e s such t h i n g s as reasons and i n t e n t i o n s 20 w i t h i n the s e t of causes i n t e r n a l t o the agent which produces a c t i o n s . (Though an i n t e n t i o n i s a component of a c t i o n , i t . may be s a i d a l s o t o be a cause of a c t i o n i n t h a t i t i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of an a c t i o n ' s being performed, s i n c e a c t i o n s must have some go a l or o b j e c t , but i t does not f o l l o w from t h i s t h a t an i n t e n t i o n i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e which precedes a c t i o n . I n t e n t i o n s precede the completion of an a c t i o n , but not the commencement of an a c t i o n ' s e x e c u t i o n , as t o embark on an a c t i o n by d i r e c t i n g o n e s e l f toward a g o a l or an o b j e c t and to have an i n t e n t i o n i s the same thing.) There i s l i t t l e disagreement as to what kinds of con-d i t i o n s are taken to be c o n d i t i o n s of excuse. There are words i n our language (adverbs of excuse) which r e f e r to standard ways i n which the system of causes of an a c t i o n i n t e r n a l t o the agent may e i t h e r break down or be made i n o p e r a t i v e . By seeing how an a c t i o n may go wrong, we get a sense of what a standard a c t i o n i s , as w e l l as the minimal concept of a c t i o n t h a t remains i n the presence of excusing c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s i s because the c a n c e l l a t i o n of c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s of a c t i o n by excuses i n d i c a t e the way i n which the d e v i a n t case (the excused a c t i o n ) i s 8 r e l a t e d t o the standard one. A person i s not h e l d f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of an a c t i o n u n l e s s those e f f e c t s were intended. Even where the agent was n e g l i g e n t , the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the neg-l i g e n c e and the e f f e c t of i t , but the agent i s not h e l d respon-s i b l e to the same extent t h a t a person i n t e n d i n g t h a t e f f e c t would be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e . 21 There are v a r i o u s ways i n which the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f the system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent may be o v e r r i d d e n by the presence of some f a c t o r t h a t produces an e f f e c t o ther than the one the agent intended. I t i s not t h a t the system i s completely o v e r r i d e n , f o r i t i t were the a c t i o n would not have been produced by the system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent, i n which case i t would not be an a c t i o n of t h a t agent (although i t c o u l d be the e f f e c t o f the a c t i o n of another agent) and the agent would not be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t a t a l l . What i s o v e r r i d e e n here i s the standard system of causes w i t h i n the agent, and so the reasons f o r a s c r i b i n g standard agency : and f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y are o v e r r i d d e n . I f i n the course of an a c t i o n an unforseen event occurs which a l t e r s the e f f e c t o f the a c t i o n so t h a t i t i s no longer the e f f e c t intended (and i t may happen t h a t the e f f e c t produced i s c o n t r a r y t o t h a t i n t e n d e d ) , t h i s i s an i n s t a n c e o f the system of causes of a c t i o n w i t h i n the agent being p a r t i a l l y o v e r r i d d e n by some other c a u s a l f a c t o r , i n t h a t p a r t o f the system of causes (or, one may say, the whole of the standard system of causes) i s made i n o p e r a t i v e . The i n t e n t i o n s (which are p a r t of the system of causes) are not r e a l i z e d , because they are o v e r r i d d e n by some other, more powerful f a c t o r . T h i s i s not to say t h a t i n t e n t i o n s d i d not operate as a c a u s a l f a c t o r ( f o r i f t h i s were so, there would be no d e l i b e r a t e e x e r c i s e of power and hence no a c t i o n ) , but o n l y t h a t some other c a u s a l f a c t o r caused those i n t e n t i o n s to remain u n r e a l i z e d , or defeated. I f t h a t c a u s a l f a c t o r i s an unforseen event, we are l i a b l e to say t h a t the 22 consequences o f the a c t i o n were a c c i d e n t a l , and we would d i m i n i s h o r e l i m i n a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h a t a c t i o n t o the extent t h a t the f a c t o r a f f e c t i n g the outcome of the a c t i o n ( i n t h i s case, the f a c t o r i s an event) c o u l d not have been reasonably f o r s e e n . Standard agency, and f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , occurs when a person i s able to f o r s e e a l l r e l e v a n t circumstances or causes of the a c t u a l e f f e c t of the a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g events t h a t may occur between the i n i t i a l o p e r a t i o n (eg. a b o d i l y movement) and the e f f e c t . In such cases, the complete c a u s a l mechanism i n t e r n a l t o the agent ( i n c l u d i n g i n t e n t i o n s , which are pre -served due to the presence of f o r e s i g h t ) i s the c h i e f c a u s a l f a c t o r producing the e f f e c t ( i n t h a t the agent i s able to determine t h a t e f f e c t through a c t i o n ) and i s not o v e r r i d d e n by o t h e r c a u s a l f a c t o r s . Adverbs such as " a c c i d e n t a l l y " c a n c e l t h i s aspect o f standard agency, and any d e s c r i p t i o n o f an a c t i o n where t h a t aspect ( i . e . , o f f o r e s i g h t ) i s m i s s i n g t h a t i s not m o d i f i e d by a q u a l i f y i n g adverb such as " a c c i d e n t a l l y " would be i n a c c u r a t e , as the unmodified d e s c r i p t i o n i m p l i e s standard agency and f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . One may note t h a t the f a c t t h a t " a c c i d e n t a l l y " may r e f e r to other i n s t a n c e s of an a c t i o n producing an unintended e f f e c t than the s o r t j u s t o u t l i n e d does not concern us here. What i t i s important to n o t i c e i s the d i f f e r e n t stages of an a c t i o n where t h a t a c t i o n can go wrong. There are many ways f o r i n t e n t i o n s t o be o v e r r i d d e n and made i n o p e r a t i v e . One way i s f o r an unforseen event t o a l t e r the outcome of the a c t i o n , as i n A u s t i n ' s example o f the neighbor's donkey moving i n f r o n t 23 of a t a r g e t and being a c c i d e n t a l l y shot. The movement of the donkey was a c a u s a l f a c t o r more powerful than the agent's i n t e n t i o n s and e f f o r t s to r e a l i z e those i n t e n t i o n s , and so overrode the system of causes of the a c t i o n i n t e r n a l to the agent by causing those i n t e n t i o n s to go u n r e a l i z e d . The i n t e n t i o n s were made i n o p e r a t i v e by the movement of the donkey i n t h a t they no longer determined the e f f e c t or con-sequence of the a c t i o n , whereas the movement of the donkey d i d . The presence of f o r e s i g h t ( i n the system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent) would have allowed the i n t e n t i o n s to r e t a i n t h e i r c a u s a l e f f i c a c y by e l i m i n a t i n g the donkey's movement as a c a u s a l f a c t o r . An a c t i o n can go wrong when i n the normal performance of the a c t an a d d i t i o n a l e f f e c t consequent to the e f f e c t intended or r e s u l t i n g from the a c t i o n as an u n i n t e n t i o n a l s i d e - e f f e c t i s produced. T h i s i s an i n s t a n c e of the system of causes of an a c t i o n i n t e r n a l t o the agent being o v e r r i d d e n by f a c t o r s p resent i n the s i t u a t i o n at the time of the performance of the a c t . Although the system of causes i s e f f e c t i v e i n s o f a r as i t produces the a c t i o n intended, i t i s o v e r r i d d e n i n t h a t i t a l s o produces unde s i r e d or u n i n t e n t i o n a l r e s u l t s (which mean t h a t the i n t e n t i o n s which are p a r t of the system of causes are o v e r r i d d e n i n t h a t there are some e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n which they do not determine). T h i s d i f f e r s from the way an a c t i o n can go wrong a l r e a d y d e s c r i b e d under the r u b r i c of " a c c i d e n t s " i n t h a t no unforseen event causes the u n i n t e n -t i o n a l e f f e c t of the a c t i o n . For t h i s reason, t h i s s o r t of 24 unintentional e f f e c t (due to inadvertance) i s less excusable, for i t r e s u l t s from the agent not paying attention to a l l the factors of the si t u a t i o n i n which the act was committed. The agent was not responsible to the extent that the e f f e c t was unintentional, but i s not excusable to the extent that had proper attention been paid to a l l the circumstances of the act, the unintentional (and perhaps undesired) e f f e c t could have been avoided. What w i l l count as "proper attention" w i l l depend on the a b i l i t y of the agent to have noticed d e t a i l s of the s i t u a t i o n given the agent's epistemic capacities- and the nature of the circumstances. The knowledge the agent has of. that type of circumstance would also be relevant, for i f one could not reasonably have expected the agent to know about the factor that produced the inadvertant consequence of the action, then one could not reasonably hold the agent respon-s i b l e for that consequence. For example, a c h i l d i n a new sit u a t i o n about which he or she has no knowledge (and could not reasonably be expected to have knowledge due to the lack of opportunity to have obtained i t ) would not be held respon-s i b l e for the inadvertant consequences of i t s actions i n that s i t u a t i o n . Situations where the agent's epistemic capacities are diminished or made temporarily inoperative due to circum-stances, or where the agent IsVlacking i n such capacities, w i l l be ones where the agent w i l l not be held responsible for any unintentional side-effects or additional e f f e c t s r e s u l t i n g from inadvertance, insofar as the inadvertant action was due to the absence of dimunition of the agent's capacities. (A 25 further discussion of the capacities of the agent i n r e l a t i o n to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y comes l a t e r i n the paper.) A f u l l y respon-s i b l e agent would be one both able to forsee a l l the consequences of the action and who had i n fact forseen a l l the consequences. (An agent able to forsee the consequences but who did not would either be excusable or negligent, depending on the circumstances and the kind of inadvertance, but i n neither of these cases would the agent be f u l l y responsible for the unintentional and inadvertant e f f e c t s of the action.) The standard case of action would then be one where a l l the con-sequences of the action were forseen, and i t i s t h i s feature of standard action which i s cancellable by adverbs of excuse such as "inadvertantly." From what has been said already, i t i s clear that a case of an action where some eff e c t s were not forseen but resulted anyway as a "matter of inadvertance i n the normal performance of an act that i s described without using qu a l i f y i n g adverbs of excuse i s described i n c o r r e c t l y , for such a description ascribes more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the agent than we would want to i n t h i s case. There are cases where the system of causes i n t e r n a l to the agent may produce an action which i s i t s e l f not intended. This kind of case d i f f e r s from the others i n that i t i s described with reference to something going wrong i n the i n i t i a l or basic action, rather than to the action described in terms of i t s consequences. For example, the adverb "carelessly," refers to inattention on the part of the agent 26 to the manner i n which the a c t i o n i s performed, and not to the unforseen consequence of the a c t i o n (as i n "she moved her arm c a r e l e s s l y " ) . As with other examples mentioned so f a r , i t i s e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t t h a t the adverb of excuse, i n t h i s case, " c a r e l e s s l y , " may have other meanings i n other c o n t e x t s . One can perform a " c a r e l e s s " a c t d e l i b e r a t e l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , i n which case the adverb r e f e r s to the f a c t t h a t the person d i d not care about c e r t a i n values or g o als we g e n e r a l l y f e e l t h a t people should care about. For example, one can t o s s garbage down a r a v i n e " c a r e l e s s l y , " and what i s meant here i s t h a t one does not care about the harmful consequences of one's a c t i o n . But used i n t h a t sense, the adverb i s no longer one of excuse. One can a l s o use " c a r e l e s s l y " to r e f e r to an a c t i o n i n terms of i t s e f f e c t s , as i n "she c a r e l e s s l y knocked over the p i t c h e r , " but what we are concerned w i t h here i s i n showing the d i f f e r e n t ways i n which a c t i o n s can f a i l , and not i n p r o v i d i n g d e f i n i t i o n s f o r words i n the E n g l i s h l a n g i a g e . Thus, i t i s n o t h i n g to the p o i n t t h a t " c a r e l e s s l y " may be used i n other ways t h a t i t i s used here, f o r the use of i t here i s merely as a l a b e l f o r a c e r t a i n way i n which a c t i o n s can f a i l and agency can be d i m i n i s h e d . So to r e t u r n to our example of a c t i n g c a r e l e s s l y , s i n c e the b a s i c or i n i t i a l movement i s f o r s e e n and i n t e n t i o n a l (when d e s c r i b e d without r e f e r e n c e to i t s e f f e c t s ) , the c a r e l e s s n e s s l i e s i n not paying a t t e n t i o n to the performance of the a c t i o n , and not i n i n a t t e n t i o n to the present s i t u a t i o n (as i n inadvertance) or i n the i n a b i l i t y to f o r s e e f u t u r e events which a f f e c t the outcome of the a c t i o n (as i n a c c i d e n t s ) . An agent, 27 through c a r e l e s s n e s s , may then perform an a c t x 1 while performing a c t x by not paying a t t e n t i o n t o the manner of performance of a c t x. Thus, an i n t e n t i o n a l and f o r s e e n i n i t i a l a c t ion, may go awry and become an u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n . Adverbs such as " c a r e l e s s l y " c a n c e l the f e a t u r e of standard a c t i o n which i s the agent's e x e r c i s i n g a c e r t a i n amount of care and a t t e n t i o n i n the performance of the a c t . C a r e l e s s n e s s i s not a very powerful excuse, as i t i s a form of n e g l i g e n c e , r a t h e r than simply ignorance of the f a c t s , and c o u l d have been prevented by the agent. I t i s excusing only i n s o f a r as i t i n d i c a t e s t hat a r e s u l t of the a c t i o n other than t h a t intended may have been produced due t o i n a t t e n t i o n t o the manner of performance of the a c t i o n . The agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the consequence or e f f e c t t h a t r e s u l t e d from n e g l i g e n c e i n s o f a r as i t was hot intended, but i s respon-s i b l e f o r i t i n s o f a r as i t r e s u l t e d from n e g l i g e n c e which c o u l d have been prevented. C a r e l e s s n e s s i s not a powerful excuse because the care one takes i n the performance of an a c t i o n i s something over which one u s u a l l y has complete c o n t r o l , i n c o n t r a s t to aspects of the environment or f u t u r e events (which a f f e c t the outcome of an a c t i o n ) . There may be some cases where c a r e l e s s n e s s i s excusable because the agent d i d not have f u l l power over the manner i n which the a c t i o n was performed, as, f o r example, when an agent i s d i s t r a c t e d and so prevented from paying s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to the manner of performance of the a c t i o n . Some d i s t r a c t i o n s would be more l e g i t i m a t e excuses than o t h e r s , as being d i s t r a c t e d may r e s u l t simply 28 from a l a c k of e f f o r t to pay a t t e n t i o n t o what one i s doing ( i n which case the excuse i s not very p o w e r f u l ) , but i n other cases, t h e r e are some events (such as a person c r y i n g f o r help) which we c o u l d not reasonably expect someone not be d i s t r a c t e d by ( i n which case the excuse i s q u i t e p o w e r f u l ) . F u l l agency thus i n v o l v e s having the o p p o r t u n i t y to pay a t t e n t i o n t o the performance of an a c t i o n and a c t u a l i z i n g t h a t o p p o r t u n i t y . The c a r e l e s s n e s s which r e s u l t s from the l a c k of o p p o r t u n i t y to take s u f f i c i e n t care (due, f o r example, to the presence of a compelling d i s t r a c t i o n ) would be more excusable than t h a t which r e s u l t s from the f a i l u r e to a c t u a l i z e t h a t o p p o r t u n i t y , as the former i n d i c a t e s a breakdown i n the system of causes t h a t produces an a c t i o n over which the agent has l e s s , i f any, c o n t r o l than over the l a t t e r , which excuses o n l y because i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n a t t e n t i o n t o the manner of performance of the a c t o c c u r r e d which may have l e d to e f f e c t s which were not intended ( i . e . the i n t e n t i o n s were not r e a l i z e d ) . The breakdown of a c t i o n i n the l a t t e r case i s due to an event which the agent has the power to c o n t r o l and which t h e r e f o r e c o u l d have been prevented by the agent, and so i s not grounds f o r a very powerful excuse. A breakdown i n a c t i o n can occur when the agent's b e l i e f s about the f a c t s of the s i t u a t i o n i n which the a c t i o n takes p l a c e are mistaken.' The e f f e c t of the a c t i o n i s not t h a t intended because of the e p i s t e m i c s t a t e of the agent. As the 4 excuse "mistakenly" r e f e r s to the agent's e p i s t e m i c s t a t e , i t may be assumed t h a t i n the standard case of a c t i o n the agent's 29 e p i s t e m i c s t a t e i s such t h a t the agent holds no f a l s e b e l i e f s about the f a c t s of the s i t u a t i o n which a f f e c t the outcome of the a c t i o n , and so holds no f a l s e b e l i e f s about the l i k e l y a f f e c t s of the a c t i o n . Standard a c t i o n and f u l l agency may o b t a i n when one holds f a l s e b e l i e f s which c o u l d a f f e c t the outcome of the a c t i o n so long as those b e l i e f s do not i n f a c t a f f e c t the outcome, f o r then, d e s p i t e the presence of f a l s e b e l i e f s (even i f the b e l i e f s are about or r e l e v a n t t o the s i t u a t i o n i n which the a c t i o n takes p l a c e ) , the system of causes of the a c t i o n i n t e r n a l to the agent would have produced the a c t i o n without having been o v e r r i d d e n at any p o i n t , f o r the agent's i n t e n t i o n s would be r e a l i z e d , and so the agent would be i n p o s s e s s i o n of f u l l agency, and consequently would be f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n , a l l other t h i n g s being equal. 5. R a t i o n a l i t y So f a r , we have assumed t h a t the agent a c t s w i t h a view to a c h i e v i n g some end which the agent wants, and t h a t an a c t i o n may go wrong when what i s intended i s not achieved. However, there may be cases where an agent may be mistaken about what he or she wants. T h i s mistake c o u l d r e s u l t from an i n a b i l i t y to see the r e l a t i o n between one goal and another (so t h a t a secondary g o a l i s acted upon at the expense of the primary g o a l , unbeknownst to the agent), or from a mistake as to what means w i l l b est secure the d e s i r e d end (which r e s u l t s i n t h a t end not being a c h i e v e d ) . These mistakes about what the agent r e a l l y wants may r e s u l t i n the agent never a t t a i n i n g those 30 goals which are most important to t h a t agent. Moreover, the mistake may be so deeply rooted t h a t the agent i s unable to apply new and r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n to the problem, and so r e p e a t e d l y makes the same k i n d of mistakes. In such cases, the agent a c t s not simply m i s t a k e n l y , but i r r a t i o n a l l y . The n o t i o n of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n put forward here i s a c r i t i c a l one, f o r i t e n t a i l s t h a t o n l y those a c t i o n s motivated by good reasons ( i . e . , reasons which meet c e r t a i n e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a ) are r a t i o n a l . The concept of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n has a l s o been analyzed as an e m p i r i c a l concept, n o t a b l y by Hempel. The e m p i r i c a l h y p othesis i s t h a t those a c t i o n s which can be e x p l a i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e to the reasons which produce ^them are r a t i o n a l . But as Hempel f e a r s might be the case, such a concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i s o t i o s e . What Hempel's i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the e m p i r i c a l hypothesis of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n r e v e a l s i s t h a t a l l i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n s are motivated. To put i t another way, t h e r e are always reasons f o r a c t i o n s which we are conscious of performing and which have some purpose. As i t i s p r e t t y c l e a r l y not the case t h a t a l l i n t e n t i o n a l or purposive a c t i o n s are r a t i o n a l , something must be wrong wi t h the account of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n proposed by the e m p i r i c a l h y p o t h e s i s . For t h i s reason, o n l y a c r i t i c a l concept of r a t i o n a l i t y may prove u s e f u l . The c r i t i c a l concept judges an a c t i o n as r a t i o n a l by e v a l u a t i n g the agent's reasons f o r the a c t i o n and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to the a c t i o n produced, T h i s e v a l u a t i o n attempts to determine whether or not the reasons f o r the a c t i o n were good, and the c a u s a l e f f i c a c y of those reasons i n producing the d e s i r e d outcome. 31 The reason t h a t Hempel i s i n c l i n e d t o c o n s i d e r an e m p i r i c a l account of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n i s t h a t h i s account of the c r i t i c a l concept i s mistaken. ^According to Hempel, the c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n judges as r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s which, i n the l i g h t Of the agent's o b j e c t i v e s and b e l i e f s , are approp-r i a t e means to a t t a i n i n g the end sought. The r a t i o n a l i t y of an a c t i o n thus depends on (1) the o b j e c t i v e s the a c t i o n i s meant to achieve and (2) the r e l e v a n t e m p i r i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o the agent at the time of the d e c i s i o n . Hempel contends t h a t an a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l i f i t o f f e r s the optimal p rospects o f a c h i e v i n g i t s o b j e c t i v e s . As Hempel p o i n t s out, i n a s s e s s i n g the r a t i o n a l i t y of an a c t i o n one must c o n s i d e r o n l y the f a c t s (concerning which means may bes t achieve the agent's o b j e c t i v e ) which are a v a i l a b l e t o the agent, and not a l l the f a c t s of the s i t u a t i o n which would be r e l e v a n t to the agent's d e c i s i o n t o a c t i n one way or another. The r e l e v a n t f a c t s are those which p r e t a i n to the circumstances i n which the a c t i o n i s to be performed, the d i f f e r e n t means which i n those circumstances are l i k e l y to achieve t h a t end, the s i d e - e f f e c t s (which are those e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n which are a d d i t i o n a l t o the e f f e c t intended but are secondary to some primary goal or i n t e n t i o n ) of the a c t i o n (considered as a means) and (a f a c t o r which Hempel omits) the s t a t e of the agent. I t would be i n c o r r e c t to judge an a c t i o n as i r r a t i o n a l i f i t f a i l e d t o achieve optimal r e s u l t s due to the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y to the agent of some r e l e v a n t f a c t s . In t h i s we can agree w i t h Hempel, 32 Hempel goes on to say t h a t one must assess the r a t i o n a l i t y o f an a c t i o n i n the l i g h t o f the agent's b e l i e f s , but the b a s i s of those b e l i e f s he c l a i m s i s not important f o r the a n a l y s i s . Many ap p a r e n t l y i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s , the argument runs, are r a t i o n a l given the agent's b e l i e f s , as the a c t i o n s proceed from those b e l i e f s . But i f one i s to d e c l a r e w i t h Hempel t h a t an a c t i o n may be r a t i o n a l given the b e l i e f s of the agent, then any i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n w i l l be counted as r a t i o n a l . An i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n i s p u r p o s i v e : i n other words, the agent has reasons f o r a c t i n g (some of which would be b e l i e f s ) . Hempel i s r i g h t i n saying t h a t to show t h a t an agent acted i r r a t i o n a l l y one would not have to show p r e c i s e l y what the grounds t h a t produced t h a t b e l i e f a re, but he f a i l s to see t h a t t h i s i s because one would have to show merely t h a t the grounds of the b e l i e f s are inadequate. I t i s not necessary to know why or on what grounds J i l l b e l i e v e s she w i l l experience bad l u c k i f she walks under a ladde r i n order t o show t h a t such a b e l i e f i s i r r a t i o n a l ; i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o show t h a t t h e r e i s no good evidence which c o u l d support such a b e l i e f . We can see now why Hempel's account of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n i s n e i t h e r f u l l nor a c c u r a t e : he n e g l e c t s t o p o i n t out t h a t f o r an a c t i o n to be r a t i o n a l , the b e l i e f s on which i t i s based must a l s o be r a t i o n a l . In other words, a f u l l c r i t i c a l account of r a t i o n a l a c t i o n must take i n t o account not onl y the b e l i e f s of the agent, but the b a s i s of those b e l i e f s . A r a t i o n a l a c t i o n would then be one produced by good reasons, where good reasons are b e l i e f s based on evidence a v a i l a b l e t o the agent (about both means and ends). There are cases of i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f , 33 t h a t i s , cases where the agent holds a b e l i e f not supportable (or even made probable) by the a v a i l a b l e evidence; and indeed, i n some cases the b e l i e f s run counter to the a v a i l a b l e evidence. I t seems p l a u s i b l e to say t h a t any a c t i o n based on an i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f i s i t s e l f i r r a t i o n a l . Reasons s i m i l a r to those o u t l i n e d above i n d i c a t e t h a t the o b j e c t i v e s of an a c t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g s i d e - e f f e c t s , when these are taken i n t o account) and the norms c o n s t r a i n i n g the c h o i c e of means by which the o b j e c t i v e s may be achieved may a l s o be c l a s s i f i e d as r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . Any o b j e c t i v e i s a product not of the agent's needs, but of what the agent b e l i e v e s those needs to be. There are cases where the agent may a c t c o n t r a r y t o h i s or her own . i n t e r e s t s . T h i s i n i t s e l f may not be i r r a t i o n a l ; i t would be f o o l i s h t o judge a l l mistakes or m i s c a l c u l a t i o n s about what i s i n one's i n t e r e s t s as i n d i c a t i o n s of i r r a t i o n a l i t y . I t i s an i n d i c a t i o n of i r r a t i o n a l i t y o n l y where the b e l i e f s upon which the o b j e c t i v e s and norms of a c t i o n of the agent are based c o n f l i c t with, or are not supported by, the evidence a v a i l a b l e t o the agent (eg., concerning the agent's own i n t e r e s t s ) . In such cases, the o b j e c t i v e s or norms of a c t i o n are i r r a t i o n a l . (Of course, i f the d i s c r e p e n c y i s s l i g h t the f a l s e b e l i e f may be more on the order of a mistake than an i r r a t i o n a l i t y , but the g r e a t e r the s e v e r i t y of the di s c r e p e n c y , the g r e a t e r grounds there are f o r c o n s i d e r i n g the b e l i e f and the a c t i o n s based upon i t i r r a t i o n a l ) . Hence, any a c t i o n d i r e c t e d toward those ( i r r a t i o n a l ) o b j e c t i v e s or r e s u l t i n g from a d e s i r e to f o l l o w those norms w i l l a l s o be i r r a t i o n a l . 34 I f t h i s i s t r u e , a g r e a t d e a l f o l l o w s . Persons a c t i n g l a r g e l y or e n t i r e l y on the b a s i s of emotions or f e e l i n g s are o f t e n s a i d t o be a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y . T h i s f i t s i n wi t h what has j u s t been s a i d about i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , f o r such persons can be seen as a c t i n g on the b a s i s of b e l i e f s about what they want or about the s i t u a t i o n they are i n t h a t are not supported by the evidence a v a i l a b l e to them. Emotions or f e e l i n g s i n and of themselves do not count as good evidence f o r a b e l i e f , and so an a c t i o n based on a b e l i e f which i s supported more by emotion than by the f a c t s w i l l be i r r a t i o n a l . T h i s needs to be q u a l i f i e d , however. Since a l l a c t i o n s aim a t some o b j e c t , and those o b j e c t s most primary and b a s i c ( i n t h a t a l l other o b j e c t i v e s may be ways.- of a c h i e v i n g the primary o b j e c t i v e s ) c o n s i s t i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of some elementary d e s i r e (and so those o b j e c t s are, as i t were, simply a matter of f a c t f o r the agent, and not supported by other b e l i e f s or evidence simply because they are i n need of no such s u p p o r t ) , then there w i l l be a component of f e e l i n g i n a l l a c t i o n s , a t some l e v e l . Or so Hume argues, and he seems to be r i g h t . I t seems t h a t i f one i s aware of what the b a s i c or primary o b j e c t i v e s and v a l u e s one has are so t h a t these then become a matter of ch o i c e r a t h e r than f a c t , one has a t t a i n e d f u l l e r agency and g r e a t e r freedom Cas the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s p o i n t o u t ) 1 1 , but the absense of t h i s awareness i s not i n i t s e l f an aspect of i r r a t i o n a l i t y (although i t c o u l d be i f the o b j e c t i v e were a c t u a l l y counter to the agent's r e a l and deeper i n t e r e s t s and e x i s t e d as a d i s g u i s e d p e r v e r s i o n of those i n t e r e s t s , as may be the case with masochism, f o r 35 example). There may even be cases of a c t i o n s which are m o r a l l y praiseworthy and which have been guided by a f e e l i n g , such as a f f e c t i o n or compassion. (One should note, however, t h a t i n such cases the f e e l i n g i t s e l f i s m o r a l l y praiseworthy o n l y i n s o f a r as i t i s founded on b e l i e f s which do not run counter t o the f a c t s p r e s e n t to the agent.) Yet there are cases where a f e e l i n g or emotion d i s t o r t s or excludes the f a c t s i n such a way t h a t the b e l i e f s of the agent are made i r r a t i o n a l by the presence of those f e e l i n g s . In such cases, a c t i o n s based on b e l i e f s d i s t o r t e d by f e e l i n g s would be i r r a t i o n a l . (Emotions can d i s t o r t b e l i e f e i t h e r over a s h o r t p e r i o d of time, as when one's view of the world i s d i s t o r t e d by anger or sadness or i n f a t u a t i o n , or the d i s t o r t i o n can be c h r o n i c due to the constant presence of the emotion, as i s the case with p r e j u d i c e . The process i s s e l f - r e i n f o r c i n g , as the d i s t o r t e d b e l i e f s p r o v i d e a b a s i s f o r the emotion, which continues t o d i s t o r t b e l i e f s , and so on.) T h i s conforms w i t h the f a c t t h a t i n the absence of str o n g emotions, or a f t e r f e e l i n g s have subsided, the agent i s l i k e l y to see the s i t u a t i o n i n a d i f f e r e n t way and to a c t d i f f e r e n t l y as a r e s u l t . S t i l l , our account i s incomplete.. There are times when an agent may a c t on an emotion t h a t i s not founded on the evidence, but i s not founded on the agent's b e l i e f e i t h e r , and, more-over, does not a f f e c t the agent's b e l i e f s . T h i s occurs w i t h persons s u f f e r i n g from phobias, who know they have no reason to f e a r the o b j e c t which they f e a r . So i r r a t i o n a l i t y i s not simply a matter of a d i s p a r i t y between b e l i e f s and evidence, but a l s o may be a matter of d i s p a r i t y between evidence and 36 emotions, or even between b e l i e f s and emotions. The d i s -cordance between a t t i t u d e and evidence may produce i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s . Indeed, there may even be cases where the absence of c e r t a i n emotions i s i r r a t i o n a l i f c e r t a i n b e l i e f s are present, as may be the case w i t h psychopaths and sociopaths. These cases may be analogous to those where an agent i s l a c k i n g i n a b e l i e f when a l l the evidence necessary to support t h a t b e l i e f i s a v a i l a b l e to the agent. The discordance can thus be e i t h e r the presence or absence of an emotion, i n the former case when the agent's b e l i e f s do not support the emotion and i n the l a t t e r case when the agent l a c k s an emotion h i s or her b e l i e f s support. A c t i o n s based on such discordance w i l l be i r r a t i o n a l (but the matter i s one of degree, w i t h greater discordance p r o v i d i n g b e t t e r grounds f o r regarding the a c t i o n as i r r a t i o n a l and s l i g h t discordance as being perhaps i n s i g -n i f i c a n t ) . C e r t a i n b e l i e f s i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y powers, such as t e l e -k i n e s i s , would not n e c e s s a r i l y be i r r a t i o n a l , even i f the ba s i s f o r such b e l i e f s may be l a r g e l y emotional (as may or may not be the case) i f such b e l i e f s do not run counter to the f a c t s a v a i l a b l e to the agent or d i s t o r t other b e l i e f s . In cases where f e e l i n g and b e l i e f are to a degree inseparable (as i n some forms of magic, r e l i g i o n and other " e c s t a t i c " e xperiences), those f e e l i n g s or b e l i e f s would be i r r a t i o n a l only where t h e i r presence d i s t o r t e d other b e l i e f s or where such f e e l i n g s produced b e l i e f s t h a t are incompatible w i t h the evidence a v a i l a b l e . One must be c a r e f u l not to overextend the concept of r a t i o n a l i t y so tha t any b e l i e f or a c t i o n not 37 i n concord with a dominant world view i s c l a s s i f i e d as i r r a t i o n a l . I r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s are onl y those which, because of t h e i r f a l s i t y and i n t r a c t i b i l i t y , i n some way or another i n c a p a c i t a t e s the agent (to a degree)- i n the agent's attempts to achieve h i s or her goals (by causing the agent to choose u n s u c c e s s f u l means, or to a c t a g a i n s t the agent's own be s t i n t e r e s t s ) . To the degree to which a f e e l i n g or b e l i e f so i n c a p a c i t a t e s an agent, an a c t i o n based on t h a t f e e l i n g or b e l i e f w i l l be i r r a t i o n a l . R a t i o n a l i t y a l s o i n v o l v e s the a b i l i t y to c o n s i d e r the r e l e v a n t evidence. I f an agent a c t s i n such a way t h a t he or she achieves a secondary g o a l a t the expense of a primary one, t h i s a c t i o n c o u l d e i t h e r be i r r a t i o n a l or simply mistaken. I f i t i s p o i n t e d out to the agent how such an a c t i o n d e f e a t s h i s or her primary g o a l and the agent then amends h i s or her a c t i o n s i n order t o a v o i d t h i s u n d e s i r a b l e r e s u l t , we would say t h a t the agent was a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y but m i s t a k e n l y . However, i f the agent f a i l e d to amend the a c t i o n i n the l i g h t of the new evidence, to the degree to which the evidence i s compelling and to which the agent r e s i s t s a d j u s t i n g the a c t i o n we would say t h a t the agent was a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y . T h i s t h e s i s p l a c e s s e l f - d e c e p t i v e b e l i e f s i n the c l a s s of i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s , and so c l a s s e s a c t i o n s based upon s e l f - d e c e p t i o n as i r r a t i o n a l . S e l f - d e c e p t i v e b e l i e f s run counter to the evidence a v a i l a b l e to the agent. One form of s e l f - d e c e p t i o n i s d e c e i v i n g o n e s e l f as to one's reasons f o r a c t i n g . One can be s e l f - d e c e i v e d about one's own motives and i n t e n t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e , i n order f o r an a c t i o n to be r a t i o n a l , 38 i t i s necessary t h a t the agent be aware of the r e a l reasons f o r the a c t i o n , f o r among the b e l i e f s of the agent which must be r a t i o n a l i n order f o r the a c t i o n produced by them to be r a t i o n a l are those which concern the agent's m o t i v a t i o n s . (Again, i t i s a matter of degree, with g r e a t e r self-awareness l e a d i n g i n the d i r e c t i o n of g r e a t e r freedom and f u l l e r agency, and g r e a t e r d i s c o r d a n c e between one's r e a l reasons and one's assumed reasons l e a d i n g i n the d i r e c t i o n of i r r a t i o n a l i t y . ) However, one can imagine cases where the agent i s able to i n c o r p o r a t e new evidence i n t o h i s or her systems of b e l i e f s c o n s i s t e n t l y , where the agent's goals and the o r d e r i n g of those goals are c o n s i s t e n t and where the agent can g i v e a t r u e account of h i s or her reasons f o r a c t i n g which we would s t i l l c a l l i r r a t i o n a l . There c o u l d be a d e l u s i v e paranoid (or a t l e a s t , someone who appears to be one) who b e l i e v e s she i s Joan of Arc r e i n c a r n a t e , and whose system of b e l i e f s i s such t h a t any evidence w i l l serve to r e i n f o r c e t h a t b e l i e f , g i v e n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n she g i v e s the evidence and which i s supported by her system of b e l i e f s . Perhaps we are d r i v e n to some ki n d of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l r e l a t i v i s m here, but t h i s need not be. Perhaps i t i s the f a c t t h a t any evidence w i l l support her b e l i e f t h a t she i s S a i n t Joan t h a t makes such a woman i r r a t i o n a l . That i s , i t i s the r i g i d i t y of such a b e l i e f t h a t makes i t i r r a t i o n a l , and t h a t d i s t o r t s a l l the other b e l i e f s of t h a t person. So i t may be a necessary c o n d i t i o n of r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t a person be at l e a s t capable of a l t e r i n g c e r t a i n b a s i c b e l i e f s i f the evidence would be 39 better handled by such an a l t e r a t i o n . Yet, there remains the problem of what i t i s to handle the evidence better. If a l l that means i s that the best way to handle the evidence i s that way which best achieves one's goals, then Saint Joan, whose goals are consistent, may well be able to achieve her goals best by believing she i s Saint Joan. She may be able to achieve her r e a l needs best that way, and not just her goals, so that she l i v e s a long and happy l i f e . I t may be the case that she i s i n fact Saint Joan, but only she i s i n a position to know that (God talks to her and her alone about her i d e n t i t y ) . It would make no difference to us i f she r e a l l y were Saint Joan i f only she could' know that: we would s t i l l c a l l her i r r a t i o n a l . (Logical p o s i t i v i s t s might want to go so far as to assert that she was speaking nonsense.) But we would not be just i n doing so, for unless we could show how her system of b e l i e f s i s inconsistent, or how she f a i l s to achieve her goals (perhaps due to an inconsistency i n the b e l i e f system), c a l l i n g Saint Joan i r r a t i o n a l i s a form of epistemological tyranny: i t i s the imposition of our world view on another world view that i s i n t e r n a l l y consistent and as able to deal with the facts as our own. Although such a person i s not i r r a t i o n a l (and therefore not excusable on those grounds), such a person i s indeed l i v i n g " i n another world," with another b e l i e f system and hence with another set of rules, (Even i f the values were b a s i c a l l y the same, the rules would be d i f f e r e n t as a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f system would propose d i f f e r e n t means for r e a l i z i n g those 40 values.) To t r y to make such a person conform t o our r u l e s , which are based on a d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f system, would, be f o o l i s h , u s e l e s s and perhaps even u n j u s t . Since r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a p r a c t i c e based on our b e l i e f s and r u l e s concerning human a c t i o n , i t would not be p o s s i b l e to hold a person w i t h a r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t b e l i e f system r e s p o n s i b l e , f o r such a person c o u l d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the p r a c t i c e . In c o n t r a s t , although i r r a t i o n a l agents are not h e l d f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s , such agents are l i a b l e to be t r e a t e d by us to c o r r e c t t h e i r i r r a t i o n a l i t y and thus a l t e r t h e i r behaviour because such agents have i n c o n s i s t e n t b e l i e f systems, or are not able to handle the evidence s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l , or cannot g i v e a t r u e account o f why they acted, or c o n t i n u a l l y f a i l to achieve t h e i r most important goals (and these f a c t o r s are c l e a r l y r e l a t e d ) . By t r e a t i n g such agents so they w i l l a c t more r a t i o n a l l y , and hence w i t h g r e a t e r agency and respon-s i b i l i t y , we enable those agents t o b e t t e r achieve t h e i r g o a l s . A r a t i o n a l agent a c t i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y i n a p a r t i c u l a r circumstance would not be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , as an a c t i o n based on i r r a t i o n a l (and hence mistaken) b e l i e f does not r e f l e c t the agent's t r u e d e s i r e s and i n t e n t i o n s , and would i n a way be s i m i l a r t o a mistaken a c t i o n (and s i m i l a r l y e x c u s a b l e ) . In the case of both the i r r a t i o n a l agent and of the i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , the agent i s s u b j e c t to treatment i n order t h a t the agent may i n f u t u r e be able t o a c t r e s p o n s i b l y , t h a t i s , w i t h standard agency. Such would not be the case w i t h S a i n t Joan; she i s not a p a r t i c i p a n t 41 i n the practice of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and any attempt to make her j o i n the practice by conforming to our world view would be unjust, in that i t would not be treatment, as she i s able to r e a l i z e her goals, but coercion. Rationality i s then another component of standard agency, and hence a precondition for f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the same basic b e l i e f system upon which the practice of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s based i s a necessary precondition of any p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the practice of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y at a l l . 6. Involuntary actions We have looked at ways in which intentional acts may go wrong and at ways in which inetntions themselves can go wrong in such a way as to diminish or eliminate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action. The next question a theory of action must address i s whether persons can act i n t e n t i o n a l l y but "against t h e i r w i l l . " Can a person perform an act that i s both intentional and I n v o l u n t a r y ? The prime example of acting "against one's w i l l " i s coercion. 12 In coercion, i t i s argued , one i s forced to accept a goal or an ordering of goals that would otherwise not be part of the i n t e r r e l a t e d set of needs and desires of the agent. In other words, circumstances make one accept a goal one would not otherwise have held. There i s a t r i v i a l way of construing t h i s formulation, and a t r i v i a l objection. Circumstances always act as a determinant of the goals of the agent, even i n cases where the 42 a c t i o n i s not coerced. I f I knew no one i n Saskatoon, I would not v i s i t t h e r e . However, as I have r e l a t i v e s t h e r e (whom I want t o v i s i t ) , circumstances are such t h a t I adopt a goa l t h a t otherwise I would not h o l d , i . e . , the go a l of v i s i t i n g Saskatoon. C l e a r l y , t h i s i s not a case of c o e r c i o n or i n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n , and so the f a c t o r which marks c o e r c i o n o f f from other determinants must be something other than the one c i t e d i n the f o r m u l a t i o n g i v e n . There i s , however, another way of approaching the problem. I t c o u l d be argued t h a t v o l u n t a r i n e s s i s having standard con-13 d i t i o n s o f c h o i c e . I n v o l u n t a n n e s s i s a d e v i a t i o n from standard c h o i c e and occurs under c o n d i t i o n s t h a t d e v i a t e from the standard. Not being f r e e i s being s u b j e c t to o v e r r i d i n g c o n d i t i o n s which are not normally i n f o r c e . The o v e r r i d i n g c o n d i t i o n s (such as a gun to the head) produce an o v e r r i d i n g c h o i c e ( s u r v i v a l ) which i s a ch o i c e t h a t i t would be i r r a t i o n a l not to choose. Normal c o n d i t i o n s are not f u l l y s p e c i f i a b l e ; they are the absence of abnormal c o n d i t i o n s , which are s p e c i f i a b l e . So v o l u n t a r i n e s s r e f e r s t o c h o i c e , which i s p r e - i n t e n t i o n a l , and thus an i n v o l u n t a r y c h o i c e (and an i n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n produced by such a choice) i s one not determined by normal c o n d i t i o n s i n which the agent's normal goals and the o r d e r i n g of those goals may come forward as determinants of the agent's a c t i o n . An i n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n c o u l d then be produced by c o e r c i o n , by e x t r a o r d i n a r y circum-stances, or by an or g a n i c m a l f u n c t i o n such t h a t the agent's 1^ knowledge and p r e f e r e n c e s do not determine the i n t e n t i o n or 43 the a c t i o n . There i s something strange about t h i s l i n e of argument, though. Take the examples of c o e r c i o n and e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances. (The former seems to be a subset of the l a t t e r . ) In such cases, the agent's goals and g o a l o r d e r i n g , f a r from not determining the a c t i o n s , become c l e a r e r than normal and determine the a c t i o n to a more obvious degree. The agent's lower order p r e f e r e n c e s do not come forward as determinants of the a c t i o n p r e c i s e l y because h i s or her higher order p r e f e r e n c e s do. Take f o r example being t o l d t h a t one must eat pork or have one's b r a i n s blown out (the l a t t e r c e r t a i n t o r e s u l t i n death except f o r those who enter p o l i t i c s , as Mark Twaine p o i n t e d o u t ) , and the s i t u a t i o n i s such t h a t those are the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e s (one cannot overpower the person w i t h the gun, or escape by some r u s e ) . I f one d i s l i k e s pork, and even i f one has a s t r o n g moral p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e a t i n g pork (as would be the case w i t h members of some r e l i g i o u s groups), one i s more l i k e l y t o choose e a t i n g the pork than t o choose death. But the p o i n t i s t h a t , whichever of the two c h o i c e s one makes, one makes a c h o i c e , and so a c t s on the b a s i s of one's p r e f e r e n c e s . C e r t a i n l y the s i t u a t i o n i s such t h a t one a c t s on one value ( s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ) a t the expense of another (abomination of pork e a t i n g , or proper reverence to r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y or some supreme b e i n g ) , but one chooses which value has p r i o r i t y , and so by a c t i n g on a p r i o r i t y of v a l u e s one has not acted " a g a i n s t one's w i l l " a t a l l . I t i s t h e r e f o r e not the case t h a t i n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n i s not due to the system of causes 44 and potential causes (such as preferences and goals) which defines the agent, for i t i s precisely under circumstances of extreme stress (where one i s forced to choose between highly-ranked values) that one may discover just which values one r e a l l y holds highest. There i s no such thing as an i n v o l -untary choice when the notion (of involuntariness) i s used i n t h i s sense, as one never chooses against one's w i l l , and so there i s no such thing as an action which i s both inten-t i o n a l (that i s , the product of the agent's choice) and i n v o l -untary. At best, the notion of an involuntary action can refer to actions produced by extraordinary circumstances where very highly valued goals determine the outcome of the action, but 14 even so, the word "involuntary" i s misleading. In the vern-acular, involuntary emphasizes the presence of extraordinary circumstances, but i t i s a mistake to think a person who acts i n t e n t i o n a l l y and on the basis of choice under such circum-stances as acting "against t h e i r w i l l . " In extraordinary circumstances one s t i l l has a choice, and there may be cases where one very highly valued goal (eg., self-preservation) i s s a c r i f i c e d to another even more highly valued goal (eg., love of another, love of country, strong feelings about murder, e t c . ) . The agent s t i l l chooses, and the choice i s a product of the agent's character (which i s nothing more perhaps than a d i s p o s i t i o n to behave a certain way i n certain circumstances). Any intentional act which i s a matter of r a t i o n a l choice i s then voluntary. There can be no grounds for excuse for an intentional action simply on the basis of the presence of extraordinary . 45 circumstances or a s i t u a t i o n of' c o e r c i o n , f o r nothing has gone wrong wi t h the agent's a c t i o n (assuming the intended r e s u l t was ac h i e v e d ) , nor (we assume) d i d the agent a c t i r r a t i o n a l l y . T h i s i s a s u r p r i s i n g c o n c l u s i o n c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t persons a c t i n g under c o e r c i o n or e x t r a o r d i n a r y circum-stances are very r a r e l y punished. But the s u r p r i s e fades when one sees t h a t the reason they are not punished i s not because such persons are not h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e . Indeed, i n such cases the a c t i o n i s not excused so much as i t i s , i n a way, j u s t i f i e d or condoned, f o r the a c t i o n took p l a c e under circumstances where the agent c o u l d have avoided v i o l a t i n g one value (eg., the p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t pork eating) o n l y by v i o l a t i n g a st r o n g e r or higher one (eg., s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ) , where the stronger value i s one which we c o u l d not reasonably expect the agent to v i o l a t e (simply because to p l a c e such a high demand on human beings would be f r u i t l e s s , as the.demands would not and perhaps c o u l d not be met most of the time, and so a r u l e e n f o r c i n g such demands would be i n e f f i c a c i o u s . ) To perform a coerced a c t i o n then i s t o perform an a c t t h a t the non-performance of t h a t a c t would have caused one to v i o l a t e a g o a l or value which one co u l d not reasonably be expected to v i o l a t e . The v a l u e s i n q u e s t i o n are u s u a l l y very b a s i c and r a t i o n a l d e s i r e s (such as s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n ) . Thus, when a person a c t s under c o e r c i o n , we do not so much excuse the a c t i o n as admit i t was m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e (and i n some cases m o r a l l y r i g h t ) under the circumstances. (There may be cases where the agent's value s t r u c t u r e i t s e l f cannot m o r a l l y j u s t i f y 46 the action as that value system-may not coincide with the value system of morality, but coercive interference mitigates c u l p a b i l i t y as i t presents the person with a choice he or she need not otherwise make. The presence of coercion may make the person perform the morally wrong choice, but the choice cannot be condemned, at least not very strongly, because the consequence of the morally r i g h t choice i s the v i o l a t i o n of a value so high i n the agent's p r i o r i t i e s that we could not reasonably expect the agent to v i o l a t e i t . ) Another sort of case subsumed under the concept of involuntary action i s that of compulsion. It i s clear from our e a r l i e r analysis of r a t i o n a l i t y that t h i s kind of action i s better included i n the category of i r r a t i o n a l actions, for compulsive behaviour (whether induced by organic malfunction, such as a brain tumour, or by a purely psychological d i s -order) i s behaviour produced by a system of causes within the agent that i s malfunctioning. The compulsive r e a l l y has no choice, whereas the person who i s coerced doesl I t i s part of the d e f i n i t i o n of a compulsive that the agent cannot choose to not act on the compulsion. In a sense then, compulsive actions are involuntary, as the agent has no choice. This may be due to an i n a b i l i t y to consider the evidence, or to an overriding emotional factor, or some other cause that produces incoherence i n the agent's b e l i e f system, or i n the r e l a t i o n between the agent's knowledge and the agent's emotions (where the emotion may produce behaviour). The compulsive does not choose against his or her own w i l l , though, for i t 47 i s i n c o r r e c t to say t h a t the compulsive chooses a t a l l . As with other kinds of i r r a t i o n a l i t y , the matter i s one of degree. The s t r o n g e r the compulsion,.the narrower the range of c h o i c e or the l e s s e r the a b i l i t y to choose, but there may be some compulsives f o r whom c h o i c e i s not n o n - e x i s t e n t but i s merely s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d by the s t r e n g t h of the compulsion. There are two types of i n v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n s which remain. The f i r s t i n v o l v e s persons being p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d to do something, as when someone i s pushed. The second i n v o l v e s those movements such as muscular spasms and t w i t c h e s which are s a i d to be i n v o l u n t a r y . While i n both types of cases the movement of the person i s i n a sense i n v o l u n t a r y , i n n e i t h e r does the movement count as an a c t i o n of t h a t person. Take as an example of the f i r s t s o r t of case a person being pushed i n t o a g l a s s door so t h a t the g l a s s breaks. One might ask who broke the g l a s s . On the face of i t , the person pushed i n t o the door broke the g l a s s . Analogously, i f a rock i s thrown through a window, one can say t h a t the rock broke the g l a s s . But the rock d i d not a c t . I t was the a c t i o n (throwing the rock) t h a t caused the g l a s s to break. So i t i s i n the case of the person being pushed i n t o the g l a s s door. That person performed no a c t i o n . While i n a sense t h a t person broke the g l a s s (as i n the sense the rock breaks the gla s s ) t h a t person d i d nothing to break i t and t h e r e f o r e would not be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the breakage. The bre a k i n g of the g l a s s would be an a c t i o n of the person doing the pushing d e s c r i b e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o i t s e f f e c t s . The event of the 48 g l a s s breaking was not produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the person being pushed, but was produced by the a c t i o n of the person who pushed t h a t person. Thus, i t was the person who pushed who broke the g l a s s , by pushing someone e l s e . The person pushed i s not r e s p o n s i b l e because t h a t person does not a c t . A person p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d i n t o movement does not a c t , then, but i s acted upon. The movement i s not produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the person, but i s e i t h e r a simple event (produced by non-human forc e s ) or i s the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n of another (and i s i n t h a t case produced by a system of causes i n t e r n a l to an agent, but.not i n t e r n a l t o the person who i s moved by p h y s i c a l f o r c e ) . The person moved i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s o f the movement, as the movement was not an a c t i o n of t h a t person. A person p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d i n t o movement moves i n v o l u n t a r i l y , but does not, p r o p e r l y speaking,. a c t . One can imagine circumstances where a person p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d i n t o movement might be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of t h a t movement, as when a person should be on the a l e r t f o r p h y s i c a l events and human a c t i o n s t h a t might f o r c e t h a t person to move a g a i n s t t h a t person's w i l l . But the person i n such i n s t a n c e s i s h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r being i n a s i t u a t i o n or f o r not being a l e r t , and not f o r the a c t u a l movement. While the movement produces the e f f e c t f o r which the person i s h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e , i t was the person's presence i n the s i t u a t i o n or the person's l a c k of a l e r t n e s s which allowed the movement to 49 take p l a c e . The person would be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of the movement because the person was n e g l i g e n t i n t h a t the person had c o n t r o l over being i n the s i t u a t i o n or being a l e r t , even i f the person had no c o n t r o l over the a c t u a l movement. In e f f e c t , the person i s h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of ne g l i g e n c e , and not, s t r i c t l y speaking, the move-ment. The movement would hot be an a c t i o n , and so the person would not be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s e f f e c t s i n the way he or she would be f o r an a c t i o n (which i s produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the person). The person would o n l y be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the ne g l i g e n c e . P h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d movements d i f f e r from u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n s i n t h a t the l a t t e r i n v o l v e s i n t e n t i o n s not being r e a l i z e d (and so not being c a u s a l l y e f f e c t i v e ) w h ile i r i ~ the.„ former there are no r e l e v a n t i n t e n t i o n s o p e r a t i v e at a l l . I t i s not the case with f o r c e d movement t h a t an a c t i o n m i s c a r r i e d so t h a t an i n t e n t i o n was not r e a l i z e d (as i s the case w i t h u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n s ) , f o r the movement i t s e l f was not intended and not an a c t i o n . There was no i n t e n t i o n present t o be r e a l i z e d . I t i s not a case of an a c t i o n breaking down, simply because i t i s not a case of a c t i o n . I n v o l u n t a r y movements such as twitc h e s and spasms at f i r s t seem to d i f f e r from p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d movements i n t h a t they are produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the agent. But they are not a c t i o n s because no i n t e n t i o n s are o p e r a t i v e , and so the movement, and not simply i t s e f f e c t , i s u n i n t e n t i o n a l . A movement, we have seen, becomes an a c t i o n when i t becomes s u b j e c t t o or r e s u l t s from the agent's d e l i b e r a t e and conscious 50 c o n t r o l . In other words, there must be an i n t e n t i o n oper-a t i v e f o r an event to be an a c t i o n . While t w i t c h e s and spasms are produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the person moving, the system of causes i s not the s o r t necessary f o r the movement to be an a c t i o n because i t l a c k s i n t e n t i o n s . One i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t w i t c h e s and spasms as they are not a c t i o n s . One may be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t s of such i n v o l u n t a r y movements i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s — but as i s the case w i t h p h y s i c a l l y f o r c e d movements, one i s then o n l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r being i n a s i t u a t i o n and f o r one's awareness, not f o r the movement i t s e l f . One has c o n t r o l over the former, but not the l a t t e r . Twitches and spasms are i n v o l u n t a r y i n t h a t the person e x p e r i e n c i n g them has no c o n t r o l over them, and so they may occur a g a i n s t the person's w i l l , but they are not a c t i o n s . There i s a c o n f u s i o n between i n v o l u n t a r y movements and c o e r c i o n , f o r i n both s o r t s of cases we may say t h a t the person "couldn't help i t , " but t h i s i s i n f a c t o n l y t r u e of i n v o l u n t a r y movements, because they are not a product of the person's c h o i c e s and i n t e n t i o n s , whereas coerced a c t i o n s are. 7. C o n c l u s i o n We are now i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o understand what an a c t i o n i s . I t must be produced by a system of causes with the agent. T h i s system of causes must i n c l u d e some i n t e n t i o n of the agent, as the d i f f e r e n c e between an event t h a t takes p l a c e i n the body or i n v o l v e s the body and an a c t i o n i s t h a t 51 the l a t t e r i s the product of the conscious e x e r c i s e of power. These are minimal c o n d i t i o n s f o r an event's being an a c t i o n . I t i s what remains of a c t i o n a f t e r whatever adverbs of excuse might i n d i c a t e t h a t the i n t e n t i o n s of the agent have not been r e a l i z e d , and thus t h a t the a c t i o n broke down a t some p o i n t . The i n t e n t i o n t h a t produces the a c t i o n i s not r e a l i z e d when g r e a t e r c a u s a l f a c t o r s determine the outcome of the a c t i o n . The r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of s u c c e s s f u l a c t i o n , or a c t i o n i n i t s standard, u n q u a l i f i e d sense. I t i s thus a necessary c o n d i t i o n of standard agency and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But i t i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n , as f u l l agency r e q u i r e s t h a t the agent be r a t i o n a l , i . e . , t h a t the agent's g o a l s , b e l i e f s , and emotions be coherent. F u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y then r e q u i r e s t h a t the i n t e n t i o n s of the agent be r e a l i z e d and t h a t the agent be r a t i o n a l . There i s a pragmatic b a s i s f o r the concept of respon-s i b i l i t y i n the concept of agency. Persons are h e l d respon-s i b l e f o r those t h i n g s over which they have the power t o c o n t r o l . When an a c t i o n breaks down or f a i l s , the agent l a c k s c o n t r o l over i t s r e s u l t s o r e f f e c t s and so i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t . Moreover, the agent i s not hel d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t to the degree t o which the agent had no power t o c o n t r o l i t . The agent may be h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e f o r those t h i n g s t h a t would have ensured the r e a l i z a t i o n o f the agent's i n t e n t i o n s , such as proper f o r e s i g h t , a t t e n t i o n t o the s i t u a t i o n and to the manner of performance of the a c t i o n , when these f a c t o r s are su b j e c t to the agent's c o n t r o l . In p o i n t i n g out how an a c t i o n 52 breaks down, one r e v e a l s to the agent the steps t h a t can be taken (or should have been) to ensure the r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s . In e f f e c t , one makes the agent more f u l l y aware of the areas over which the agent may (and i s expected to) e x e r c i s e c o n t r o l , thus f a c i l i t a t i n g the agent's c o n t r o l over those areas. One thereby i n c r e a s e s the freedom of the agent and enlarges the area f o r which the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e . An i r r a t i o n a l agent i s not h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e because the a c t i o n s and i n t e n t i o n s of t h a t agent are not s u b j e c t to t h a t agent's c o n t r o l . In t r e a t i n g an i r r a t i o n a l person, one seeks to i n c r e a s e the person's agency by d e v e l o p i n g i n t h a t person the c a p a c i t y f o r r a t i o n a l c h o i ce and a c t i o n which b r i n g s the i n t e n t i o n s and a c t i o n s of t h a t person under the person's d e l i b e r a t e c o n t r o l . In doing so, one g i v e s the person a cap-a c i t y f o r agency and hence f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The simple reason t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e s t s on agency i s t h a t i t i s a p r a c t i c e designed to c o n t r o l behaviour. I t does so by p o i n t i n g out to agents t h e i r agency. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y can o n l y c o n t r o l behaviour i f the behaviour i s s u b j e c t to the c o n t r o l of the agent. I t i s o n l y common sense to ask agents to c o n t r o l o n l y t h a t which they can c o n t r o l . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y (as a p r a c t i c e ) i s an attempt to c o n t r o l behaviour as i t asks the agent to r e c o g n i z e not o n l y the good or bad consequences of an a c t i o n , but the agent's power to produce or prevent such consequences. In h o l d i n g someone r e s p o n s i b l e one i s c l a i m i n g or t r e a t i n g the outcome of the a c t i o n s as one over which the agent had c o n t r o l . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s thus a r e c o g n i t i o n of agency and a demand addressed to the person being h e l d 53 r e s p o n s i b l e t h a t the person r e c o g n i z e h i s or her agency. One makes a c t i o n s s u b j e c t t o moral judgments and extends those judgments (and the measures r e f l e c t i n g them) to the agent by p o i n t i n g out to the agent t h a t the moral q u a l i t y of the a c t i o n was a f a c t o r over which the agent had c o n t r o l . One thus demands t h a t a c t i o n s be s u b j e c t t o moral standards and s a n c t i o n s , thus c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour. The more f u l l y agency i s developed i n t h i s way, the g r e a t e r i s the respon-s i b i l i t y of the agent. Hence, the g r e a t e r i s the moral r e g u l a t i o n of the agent's behaviour. The p r a c t i c e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has pragmatic ends other than.the c o n t r o l of behaviour (which c o u l d be accomplished by other means, such as shock therapy or other behaviour m o d i f i c a t i o n t e c h n i q u e s ) . The d i f f e r e n c e between respon-s i b i l i t y and other p r a c t i c e s f o r c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour i s t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i n r e c o g n i z i n g agency, r e c o g n i z e s the c o n t r o l of an agent over the r e s u l t of an a c t i o n , which i s a recog-n i t i o n of the agent's freedom. In d e v e l o p i n g and p o i n t i n g out agency, the p r a c t i c e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n d i c a t e s ways i n which we may a c t with f u l l e r c o n t r o l over our a c t i o n s , t h a t i s , more f r e e l y . To have agency i s to have c o n t r o l , and to have c o n t r o l i s to be f r e e . Our a n a l y s i s of agency has thus g i v e n us not onl y an understanding of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but of the n o t i o n of human freedom as w e l l . That freedom i s a matter of c o n t r o l over one's a c t i o n s and t h a t i t e x i s t s i s something f o r which - we must now argue. PART TWO DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n There i s a view which holds t h a t there i s something fun-damentally wrong with the account of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y g i v e n so f a r . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s view, no one i s ever r e s p o n s i b i l e because no one has the freedom necessary f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The argument runs as f o l l o w s . One i s r e s p o n s i b l e o n l y f o r those a c t i o n s which are f r e e ; i f one c o u l d not h e l p doing as one d i d , one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n . Thus, i f one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n , i t must have been p o s s i b l e f o r one to have acted otherwise than one i n f a c t d i d . I f one c o u l d have acted otherwise than i n f a c t one d i d , then one must have had the power to have r e a l i z e d a d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e or i n t e n t i o n than the one acted upon. Furthermore, one must have been able to have chosen or intended otherwise i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n than one d i d . However, the argument co n t i n u e s , one i s never r e a l l y able to a c t otherwise than one does. One's powers, c a p a c i t i e s and one's p r o c l i v i t i e s f o r c h o i c e are c a u s a l l y determined by one's g e n e t i c make-up, environment and p r e v i o u s experiences, a l l f a c t o r s over which one has no c h o i c e or c o n t r o l . Since how one a c t s i s a product of one's powers and c h o i c e s , and those powers and c h o i c e s are c a u s a l l y 55 determined, how one a c t s i s c a u s a l l y determined. T h e r e f o r e , concludes the argument, one cannot a c t otherwise than one i n f a c t does, and thus one i s not f r e e i n the way t h a t i s r e q u i r e d by r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Hence, i t i s s a i d , no one i s ever r e s p o n s i b l e . While t h i s argument does p l a c e l i m i t s on the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y on the p r a c t i c e s of p r a i s e and blame, i t does not r u l e out the concept o f • r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t has been argued f o r here. Determinism does not r u l e out freedom because the sense i n which i t must have been p o s s i b l e f o r an agent t o have acted otherwise than the agent i n f a c t d i d i n order f o r the agent to be f r e e and r e s p o n s i b l e i s not t h a t given the exact same c a u s a l antecedency the a c t i o n c o u l d have been otherwise, but whether the causes of the a c t i o n were such t h a t the a c t i o n was i n the agent's c o n t r o l , so t h a t i f , the c a u s a l antecedency had been d i f f e r e n t i n some r e s p e c t than d i d not change the f a c t t h a t i t was the same agent a c t i n g i n a r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n , the agent had c e r t a i n powers and a b i l i t i e s t h a t c o u l d have been e x e r c i s e d d i f f e r e n t l y . Given the exact same c a u s a l antecedency, no event c o u l d have been d i f f e r e n t than i t was, and so i f an agent c o u l d have acted d i f f e r e n t l y , something i n the c a u s a l antecedency must have been d i f f e r e n t . T h i s i s a n a l y t i c , and so does not depend on any p r i n c i p l e of u n i v e r s a l c a u s a l i t y , as even i f the a c t i o n was caused by the agent's f r e e w i l l , t h a t f r e e w i l l would have had to have decided t o act i n the same way i f the c a u s a l antecedency of the a c t i o n i s to be e x a c t l y the same. I t w i l l be argued, t h e r e f o r e , 56 t h a t the p o s t u l a t i o n of an uncaused or f r e e w i l l does not e x p l a i n freedom of a c t i o n , and t h a t the concept of freedom must be understood i n terms of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n t r o l over the a c t i o n , which i s a matter of the powers and a b i l i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l , and so of what the causes of an a c t i o n are, and not of whether or not the a c t i o n was caused. 2. D e f i n i n g the problem I t w i l l be u s e f u l to begin by c o n s i d e r i n g some pre v i o u s attempts to d e a l with t h i s argument. While none of them has been very s a t i s f a c t o r y , they do i n d i c a t e what the proper approach to the problem should be. 15 One argument, put forward by P.H. Nowell Smith , claims t h a t to say t h a t an agent c o u l d have acted otherwise i s to express a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i f the agent had been s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t , or i f circumstances had been d i f f e r e n t , then the agent would have performed a d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n . I f t h i s a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t , then c e r t a i n l y the freedom needed f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e x i s t s , as the h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n might o f t e n be t r u e . There would then be no problem about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S i m i l a r arguments have been made t h a t s t a t e t h a t t o say the agent c o u l d have acted otherwise i s to express the h y p o t h e t i c a l t h a t i f the agent had wanted or intended to a c t otherwise, then the agent would have done so. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Nowell Smith's a n a l y s i s i s h o p e l e s s l y flawed, as i s any other attempt to put the requirement t h a t the agent c o u l d have acted otherwise i n t o a h y p o t e h t i c a l form-57 u l a t i o n . C.A. Campbell, i n "Is Freedom a Pseudo-Problem?""""" r i g h t l y notes t h a t such analyses do not meet the p o i n t a t i s s u e . Campbell p o i n t s out t h a t i n a s s e s s i n g whether an agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e , we assess whether the a c t i o n of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r agent, i n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n , was f r e e . We are concerned with a s s e s s i n g the freedom of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r agent, and so are concerned with whether t h a t agent c o u l d have acted otherwise i n the same circumstances. We are not i n t e r e s t e d i n what a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r would have done i n the same s i t u a t i o n , or i n what the same c h a r a c t e r would have 17 done i n a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n . Campbell, however, i s u n c l e a r as to what i s to count as the same c h a r a c t e r or the same s i t u a t i o n . There i s some t r u t h i n the i n t u i t i o n behind the h y p o t h e t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f "could have done otherwise." That i s , when a s s e s s i n g whether an agent c o u l d have done otherwise, one i s a s s e s s i n g the agent's cap-a c i t i e s t o have done otherwise, and an assessment of c a p a c i t i e s may be expressed h y p o t h e t i c a l l y , although i t would be mis-l e a d i n g to formulate the assessment i n t h a t way. To ask i f an agent c o u l d have performed an a c t i o n i s t o ask whether i t would have been t r u e t o have s a i d i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n t h a t "the agent can perform t h a t a c t i o n . " The q u e s t i o n i s then e s s e n t i a l l y whether the agent has (or had) the c a p a c i t y to perform a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . I t i s not to ask whether the agent would have performed the a c t i o n g i v e n e x a c t l y the same con-d i t i o n s , f o r t h a t i s not. to ask whether the agent has a c e r t a i n c a p a c i t y , but whether, gi v e n c e r t a i n circumstances, 58 that c a p a c i t y would be a c t u a l i z e d . Again, compare the question of whether i t would have been true to say i n a given s i t u a t i o n , "the agent w i l l perform t h a t a c t i o n , " w i t h the question concerning the t r u t h of "the agent can perform t h a t a c t i o n . " The questions are d i s t i n c t , even though, as the i n t u i t i o n behind the h y p o t h e t i c a l a n a l y s i s recognizes, a d e f i n i t i o n of c a p a c i t i e s may be to a c e r t a i n extent be expressed by s p e c i f y i n g what a t h i n g or person may do under circumstances. Yet, i t i s misleading to express t h i s i n terms of what a t h i n g or person would do, f o r i t i s not a question of what a t h i n g or person would do, but of what a t h i n g or person i s capable of doing. For example, to say t h a t a car could have gone 50 kph i s to say that i t was capable of doing so, not that i t would have done so given the exact same circum-stances, which may i n c l u d e the f a c t t h a t the a c c e l e r a t o r was f a r enough down tha t the car went twice that f a s t . I t would be i n c o r r e c t to say t h a t the car was incapable of going L50 at' t h a t moment; i n f a c t , i t went f a s t e r , but i t could have gone slower. Which is/mf-simply^to s a y t n a t t n e c a r would have gone • slower i f the a c c e l e r a t o r was not pressed so f a r down, although t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l would u s u a l l y be t r u e . I t does i n d i c a t e the c a p a c i t i e s of the car by c l a i m i n g t h a t the same car i n the same c o n d i t i o n on a road of the same c o n d i t i o n and d i f f i c u l t y could have gone 50. Obviously, a damaged car could not have gone 50, and a bad, treacherous or blocked roadway would have prevented an undamaged car from doing so. Thus, the c a p a c i t y i s d e f i n e d by s p e c i f y i n g the c o n d i t i o n which must be t r u e of a t h i n g or person f o r the c a p a c i t y to be present, and by s p e c i f y i n g the c o n d i t i o n which must be present i n the s i t u a t i o n f o r i t to be p o s s i b l e f o r t h a t cap-a c i t y t o be a c t u a l i z e d , one s p e c i f i e s what c o n s t i t u t e s an op p o r t u n i t y f o r the e x e r c i s e of the c a p a c i t y . To i n d i c a t e what c o u l d t r a n s p i r e when c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s are f u l f i l l e d i s t o i n d i c a t e what the c a p a c i t y i s ; f u l f i l l m e n t of the con-d i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s the t r u t h o f the statement t h a t the t h i n g or person could have done the a c t i o n made p o s s i b l e by the presence of the c a p a c i t y i n q u e s t i o n . To go beyond those necessary c o n d i t i o n s i s to s p e c i f y which c o n d i t i o n s would l e a d to an a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the c a p a c i t y ; and f u l f i l l m e n t of those c o n d i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s the t r u t h of a statement about what a t h i n g or person would have done. Though a c t u a l i z a t i o n s of a c a p a c i t y make the presence of a c a p a c i t y i n d u b i t a b l e , the absence of an a c t u a l i z a t i o n , where the necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r the a c t u a l i z a t i o n of the c a p a c i t y are f u l f i l l e d , does not i n d i c a t e the absence of the c a p a c i t y . Only an absence of a c t u a l i z a t i o n i n the presence of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t should be s u f f i c i e n t f o r i t s a c t u a l i z a t i o n would i n d i c a t e the l a c k of the c a p a c i t y (although i t would take repeated t e s t s t o determine t h a t the c a p a c i t y was i n f a c t l a c k i n g , and t h a t i t s n o n - a c t u a l i z a t i o n was not due to some other f a c t o r , such as a temporary m a l f u n c t i o n or the o v e r r i d i n g of the system of" causes w i t h i n the agent by some g r e a t e r c a u s a l f a c t o r t h a t prevented the agent from e x e r c i s i n g the c a p a c i t y ) . I f the a c c e l e r a t o r was depressed and the car d i d not respond, i t lac k e d a c e r t a i n 60 c a p a c i t y (assuming the engine was on and the car was unimpeded by o b s t a c l e s ) . I f a d e s i r e which i s str o n g enough t o motivate an a c t i o n i s present but e i t h e r cannot be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a c t i o n , or the a c t i o n i s u n s u c c e s s f u l d e s p i t e the presence of c o n d i t i o n s t h a t would make a s u c c e s s f u l a c t i o n p o s s i b l e , then the person who has t h a t d e s i r e e i t h e r l a c k s a c a p a c i t y or t h a t c a p a c i t y i s l i m i t e d (depending on how one wants to d e s c r i b e the c a p a c i t y , s i n c e absence of a c a p a c i t y may some-times be d e s c r i b e d as presence of a s i m i l a r but l e s s e r c a p a c i t y ) . Hence, to say t h a t a person could have done something i s to say the person had the c a p a c i t y to do i t , not t h a t under the same circumstances the person would have done i t . I t i s to say t h a t a person was able to have performed an a c t i o n , given t h a t the circumstances presented the o p p o r t u n i t y f o r 18 the performance of t h a t a c t i o n . 3. C a p a c i t i e s and freedom We can now apply these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to Campbell's o b j e c t i o n t o f o r m u l a t i n g the statement t h a t the agent c o u l d have done something i n terms of what the agent would have done. Although i n a s s e s s i n g the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of an agent one i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n what another agent might have done i n the same s i t u a t i o n , one may be i n t e r e s t e d i n whether, i n a s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t i n g the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r a c t i o n , an agent c o u l d have acted d i f f e r e n t l y i f a c o n d i t i o n t h a t i s u s u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t f o r a d i f f e r e n t a c t i o n which the agent has the c a p a c i t y f o r had been pres e n t . (For example, a str o n g 6 1 d e s i r e would be a u s u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r an a c t i o n i n t h a t i t would produce an a c t i o n i n any agent having the c a p a c i t y f o r the a c t i o n . ) Lack of a c t i o n i n such circum-stances would s t r o n g l y i n d i c a t e the l a c k of a c a p a c i t y , i n which case the agent would not have been f r e e to have per-formed t h a t a c t i o n . Thus, one may be i n t e r e s t e d i n what f a c t o r s f u n c t i o n e d as motives i n producing the a c t i o n and i n whether the agent had the c a p a c i t y t o a c t or to r e f r a i n from a c t i n g on those motives. One i s thus i n t e r e s t e d i n whether the c o n d i t i o n s which must be t r u e of an agent f o r c e r t a i n a c t i o n s to take p l a c e are f u l f i l l e d . One may be i n t e r e s t e d , f o r example, i n what mental f a c t o r s are necessary c o n d i t i o n s of a c t i o n s , and i n whether an agent i s capable of f u l f i l l i n g those c o n d i t i o n s . One might then be i n t e r e s t e d i n how the same agent i n a d i f f e r e n t frame of mind might have acted. I t i s r e l e v a n t to an assessment of the c a p a c i t i e s of an agent to c o n s i d e r whether the agent would have acted d i f f e r e n t l y i f the agent had been more a l e r t (which i s to ask whether the agent had the c a p a c i t y t o be more a l e r t , and thus to ask whether the agent was somehow n e g l i g e n t ) , or i f the agent had been more r e f l e c t i v e and l e s s emotional (which i s to ask whether the agent acted r a t i o n a l l y or was capable of doing so ) . C e r t a i n l y , t h i s i s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the same agent and not another. In a s s e s s i n g whether an agent has c e r t a i n c a p a b i l i t i e s , one c o n s i d e r s not whether the agent would have acted d i f f e r e n t l y given the exact same c a u s a l antecedency of the a c t i o n ( f o r given t h a t antecedency, the agent c o u l d not 62 have acted otherwise and t h e r e f o r e had no c a p a c i t i e s to do s o ) , but whether, i f the c a u s a l antecedency had been d i f f e r e n t i n some r e s p e c t , such as the agent's frame of mind (but not i n those aspects t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d the o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r e s e n t i n the s i t u a t i o n ) , the agent had c e r t a i n powers and a b i l i t i e s t h a t c o u l d have been e x e r c i s e d d i f f e r e n t l y i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . I f someone has the c a p a c i t y to perform an a c t i o n , then t h a t person a l s o has the c a p a c i t y to not perform i t . Other-wise, what occurs i s not the r e s u l t of a c a p a c i t y f o r a c t i o n . (So, f o r example, to the extent to which I am i n c a p a b l e of not b r e a t h i n g , my b r e a t h i n g i s not an a c t i o n , but a r e f l e x . ) A c t i o n s must i n c l u d e i n t h e i r causes an i n t e n t i o n , and a movement a person i s i n c a p a b l e of not making i s t h e r e f o r e not an a c t i o n . An a c t i o n one i s i n c a p a b l e of not i n t e n d i n g i s an a c t i o n , a l b e i t a compulsive one, and an agent who a c t s c o m p u l s i v e l y i s i n c a p a b l e of doing otherwise, i n which case i t i s not t h a t the agent i s capable of the compulsive a c t i o n (though i n the sense t h a t the agent i s capable of r e a l i z i n g the compulsive c h o i c e the agent i s capable of the a c t i o n ) so much as the agent l a c k s the c a p a c i t y to not perform t h a t a c t i o n (as the agent l a c k s the c a p a c i t y to not choose t h a t a c t i o n ) . To ask whether an agent c o u l d have acted otherwise i s to ask whether the agent had a c a p a c i t y f o r doing so, not whether t h a t c a p a c i t y would have been a c t u a l i z e d (as i t c l e a r l y was not) under the exact same circumstances. T h i s a n a l y s i s of what i t i s f o r i t to be t r u e t h a t an agent co u l d have acted otherwise thus i n d i c a t e s t h a t freedom i s 63 a matter of one's c a p a c i t i e s to a c t . In other words, i t i s a matter of agency. There are two s o r t s of c a p a c i t i e s which must be c o n s i d e r e d : the c a p a c i t y f o r a c t i o n and the c a p a c i t y f o r c h o i c e . The c a p a c i t y f o r a c t i o n i s the freedom or a b i l i t y t o t r a n s l a t e c h o i c e i n t o a c t i o n . I t i s necessary f o r respon-s i b i l i t y , f o r without i t one's i n t e n t i o n s c o u l d not be r e a l i z e d . The c a p a c i t y f o r c h o i c e i s the c a p a c i t y to c o n t r o l one's i n t e n t i o n s by making them s u b j e c t to one's i n t e r e s t s on the b a s i s o f one's knowledge. I t i s thus what we have r e f e r r e d to as r a t i o n a l i t y , or the c a p a c i t y to be r a t i o n a l . (One can choose i r r a t i o n a l l y , i n t h a t one can i n t e n d i r r a t -i o n a l a c t i o n s and so a c t i r r a t i o n a l l y , but as such c h o i c e s are not under the c o n t r o l of the agent and so not f r e e they do not r e s u l t from a c a p a c i t y f o r c h o i c e , as to be capable of choosing something i s to be capable of not choosing i t , and one cannot be capable of not choosing an i r r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , s i n c e one i s not capable of not i n t e n d i n g i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s , as those a c t i o n s are not s u b j e c t to one's conscious c o n t r o l . By the c a p a c i t y f o r c h o i c e we thus are r e f e r r i n g t o the c a p a c i t y f o r f r e e c h o i c e , or c h o i c e t h a t i s under the agent's conscious c o n t r o l and thus-- r a t i o n a l . ) One c o u l d have the c a p a c i t y to have r e a l i z e d a d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e even i f one's ch o i c e and hence one's a c t i o n was c a u s a l l y determined. S i m i l a r l y , one c o u l d have the c a p a c i t y f o r c h o i c e , i n the sense t h a t one's c h o i c e s were s u b j e c t to one's r a t i o n a l d i r e c t i o n or c o n t r o l , even i f the c h o i c e one made was c a u s a l l y determined. To be able to have acted otherwise i s to have the c a p a c i t y f o r 64 ch o i c e and a c t i o n , and t h a t i s the o n l y freedom necessary f o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A c t i o n s which are u n i n t e n t i o n a l are not s u b j e c t t o the agent's c o n t r o l , and so the agent i s r e l i e v e d of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r them. I r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s are those produced by i n t e n t i o n s over which the agent has no c o n t r o l (and which may i n f a c t run counter to the agent's be s t i n t e r -ests) and so are not s u b j e c t to the agent's c o n t r o l and thus are not a c t i o n s f o r which the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e . The q u e s t i o n i s then whether an agent i s r e a l l y ever i n c o n t r o l of an a c t i o n , the answer being t h a t the agent i s i n c o n t r o l when the agent has the c a p a c i t y to choose and a c t otherwise. 4. I n c o m p a t i b i l i s t o b j e c t i o n s : Campbell and Hospers But those who argue t h a t determinism and freedom are incompatible are not going to g i v e up y e t . They argue t h a t i f determinism i s t r u e , then u l t i m a t e l y no a c t i o n s are s u b j e c t to the c o n t r o l of the agent, s i n c e u l t i m a t e l y they are caused by f a c t o r s beyond the agent's c o n t r o l . Campbell, f o r one, argues t h a t i f one's c h o i c e s and powers of agency are c a u s a l l y determined, then any a c t i o n r e s u l t i n g from c a u s a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s not r e a l l y i n the agent's c o n t r o l , s i n c e the c a u s a l f a c t o r s which produce the a c t i o n {via the agent) are not w i t h i n the agent's c o n t r o l . Before a s s e s s i n g the m e r i t of t h i s argument, one might look a t the s o l u t i o n Campbell proposes. The way out of what Campbell takes to be a dilemma i s to a s s e r t freedom and deny u n i v e r s a l c a u s a t i o n or determinism. Campbell urges us to suppose we have a s e l f which has a c o n t r a - c a u s a l s o r t of 65 freedom. T h i s k i n d of freedom i s necessary f o r respon-s i b i l i t y i f one accepts Campbell's argument about determined a c t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s account, the Campbellian s e l f i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t " e f f o r t of w i l l " experienced whenever we do what we b e l i e v e t o be moral, r a t h e r than what we d e s i r e . A charming n o t i o n , s u r e l y , but a r e l i c of the dark days of B r i t i s h metaphysics. I t i s , i n the f i r s t p l a c e , e n t i r e l y a r b i t r a r y . Campbell p r o v i d e s no c o n v i n c i n g r a t i o n a l e f o r s e p a r a t i n g the d e s i r e to be moral from other idesires>: but t h i s s e p a r a t i o n i s the b a s i s f o r h i s s e p a r a t i o n o f the uncaused " s e l f " from the c a u s a l l y determined " c h a r a c t e r , " the former opposing i t s " e f f o r t of w i l l " to the l a t t e r ' s d e s i r e . Without such a s e p a r a t i o n t h e r e remains no e f f o r t of w i l l opposed t o d e s i r e s and no " s e l f " d i s t i n c t from " c h a r a c t e r . " The n o t i o n of an uncaused s e l f moreover makes no sense; i t f l i e s i n the face of psychology and common sense. Whether an i n d i v i d u a l makes an e f f o r t or t r i e s to do something i s a r e s u l t of t h a t person's c a u s a l l y determined c h a r a c t e r . For example, the person's sense of duty, d e s i r e to achieve and so on, which produce the " e f f o r t of w i l l " we experience, are products of experience and environment, such as pare n t s , t e a c h e r s and other f i g u r e s of a u t h o r i t y i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . Whatever the " e f f o r t o f w i l l " i s d i r e c t e d toward as a g o a l i s a l s o a r e s u l t of aspects of one's c h a r a c t e r t h a t are c a u s a l l y determined. The " e f f o r t of w i l l " must have an end, and t h a t end i s the r e s u l t of c a u s a l l y determined c h o i c e s and p r e f e r -ences. An " e f f o r t of w i l l " without purpose i s s e n s e l e s s , and 66 a purposive " e f f o r t of w i l l " without causes i s e q u a l l y s e n s e l e s s . Moreover, i f freedom e x i s t s o n l y i n o p p o s i t i o n to d e s i r e s , then one i s most f r e e when one r e s i s t s a l l one's d e s i r e s . Yet s u r e l y such a c o n d i t i o n i s p a t h o l o g i c a l , and would i n d i c a t e the absence of freedom (since i t i n d i c a t e s some s o r t of compulsion), r a t h e r than the presence of freedom. Campbell thus leaves the problem he poses unsolved. The problem i s t h a t i f the c a u s a l f a c t o r s which determine an a c t i o n are beyond the agent's c o n t r o l , then the a c t i o n i s not w i t h i n the agent's c o n t r o l and t h e r e f o r e the agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t . The extent to which the antecedent i s t r u e and whether the consequent f o l l o w s from i t i s something which needs examination. A c l e a r and f o r c e f u l statement of the problem can be 19 found i n Hospers' "What Means T h i s Freedom?" . Hospers begins by p o i n t i n g out t h a t " f r e q u e n t l y persons we t h i n k 20 r e s p o n s i b l e are not p r o p e r l y to be c a l l e d so." Many a c t i o n s may r e s u l t from unconscious d r i v e s over which the person has no c o n t r o l , and while they appear d e l i b e r a t e and i n t e n t i o n a l , they cannot be a f f e c t e d by "reasoning, e x h o r t i n g or t h r e a t e n i n g . " They are not s u b j e c t t o the agent's conscious c o n t r o l . Indeed, the behaviour which Hosper's d e s c r i b e s i s t h a t which we have l a b e l l e d " i r r a t i o n a l , " and i t has been shown t h a t the agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t . But from the f a c t t h a t agents are not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r i r r a t i o n a l behaviour, Hospers f a l s e l y concludes t h a t agents are not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i r r a t i o n a l behaviour because they are not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s i t u a t i o n s 67 of c h i l d h o o d which produced t h a t behaviour. In f a c t , the agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r such behaviour simply because i t i s not s u b j e c t to the agent's conscious c o n t r o l . Why i t i s not s u b j e c t to the agent's conscious c o n t r o l may be r e l e v a n t to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of how to go about making i t s u b j e c t to the agent's conscious c o n t r o l , thereby i n c r e a s i n g the agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and agency, but i t i s not r e l e v a n t to c o n s i d - ' e r a t i o n s of whether or not the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e . (In other words, i t i s a p u r e l y t h e r a p e u t i c concern based on the presumption t h a t the agent was not f r e e and not r e l e v a n t to the q u e s t i o n of whether the agent acted f r e e l y . ) Consider Hospers 1' argument: One i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's c h i l d h o o d s i t u a t i o n s . One's c h i l d h o o d s i t u a t i o n s produce n e u r o t i c or i r r a t i o n a l behaviour. T h e r e f o r e , one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's n e u r o t i c behaviour. Now c o n s i d e r a p a r a l l e l argument: One i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's c h i l d h o o d s i t u a t i o n s . One's childhood* s i t u a t i o n s r e s u l t i n r a t i o n a l behaviour. T h e r e f o r e , one i s not r e s -p o n s i b l e f o r one's r a t i o n a l behaviour. There i s as l i t t l e need t o accept the second argument as the f i r s t , which i s to say none at a l l . One i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i r r a t i o n a l behaviour because i t i s i r r a t i o n a l , not because one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the c h i l d h o o d s i t u a t i o n s t h a t r e s u l t e d in.one behaving i r r a t i o n a l l y . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s a matter of agency, t h a t i s , a matter of c o n t r o l . The r a t i o n a l person's a c t i o n s are s u b j e c t to t h a t person's conscious c o n t r o l , and t h e r e f o r e t h a t person i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them. 68 (The concept of r a t i o n a l i t y i s t h a t o u t l i n e d i n P a r t One, which i s b a s i c a l l y the coherence of g o a l s , b e l i e f s , emotions and the i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the agent.) The i r r a t i o n a l •i person l a c k s such c o n t r o l , and so l a c k s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Even l o o k i n g a t c h i l d h o o d s i t u a t i o n s f o r which we are not r e s p o n s i b l e , we are not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them because we l a c k power and c o n t r o l i n them (and to the degree to which we l a c k such c o n t r o l ) , not because they are caused by f a c t o r s beyond our c o n t r o l . T h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s not a matter of c o n t r o l over the causes of an a c t i o n , but of c o n t r o l over the a c t i o n . I t i s one t h i n g to say t h a t agents have no c o n t r o l over the f a c t o r s t h a t c r e a t e d t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s , and hence determined how they behave, and i t . i s another to say t h a t those agents have no c o n t r o l over t h e i r a c t i o n s . Hospers extends h i s account to exclude a l l . persons from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , and not j u s t those who behave i r r a t i o n a l l y . That such a move i s i l l e g i t i m a t e i s a consequence of Hospers' wrong account of why we excuse i r r a t i o n a l behaviour. From the f a c t t h a t we excuse behaviour when we l e a r n t h a t i t i s produced by p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t s , or t h a t in- on some way i r r a t i o n a l , Hospers reasons t h a t "the more thoroughly and i n d e t a i l we know the c a u s a l f a c t o r s l e a d i n g a person to behave 2 as he does, the more we tend to exempt him from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . " I t i s the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the behaviour, given i t s causes, says Hospers, which causes us to excuse the agent. Such reasoning i s simply f a l s e . We do not excuse an a c t i o n to the extent to which we know i t s causes; i t i s not always the case t h a t " t o u t comprendre, c ' e s t t o u t pardonner," 6 9 and i n f a c t the r e v e r s e may sometimes be t r u e (as when the r e a l , d a s t a r d l y and p r e v i o u s l y hidden reasons f o r an a c t i o n are d i s c o v e r e d ) . Knowing the causes of an agent's behaviour, f a r from excusing the agent, may i n some cases l e a d one to a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to t h a t agent i f one d i s c o v e r s t h a t the a c t i o n was r a t i o n a l ( i n the sense we are us i n g t h a t concept) and i n t e n t i o n a l . I t i s not an a c t i o n ' s being caused t h a t excuses an agent, but the nature of those causes. I f i n examining the causes of an a c t i o n we f i n d the agent acted i r r a t i o n a l l y or u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , then we excuse the agent. D i s c o v e r i n g the causes of an a c t i o n exempts the agent from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n l y i n s o f a r as those causes i n d i c a t e t h a t the a c t i o n was e i t h e r u n i n t e n t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l , and so i n some way not s u b j e c t to the agent's c o n t r o l . In other words, when the system of causes w i t h i n the agent t h a t con-s t i t u t e s standard agency breaks down, i s f a u l t y or i s over-r i d d e n , the agent l a c k s c o n t r o l over the a c t i o n and so i s exempted from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The q u e s t i o n then i s not whether an a c t i o n was caused, but what the causes were. More p r e c i s e l y , the q u e s t i o n i s whether the a c t i o n was produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the agent t h a t i n c l u d e d a r a t i o n a l i n t e n t i o n which was r e a l i z e d (and so c a u s a l l y e f f e c t i v e ) . I f so, then the agent was i n c o n t r o l o f the a c t i o n and i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t . I f not, then the agent, f o r any number of reasons, was not i n c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n , and so i s excusable (to the extent t h a t the a c t i o n was not i n h i s or her c o n t r o l ) . C r i m i n a l s who are excused are excused because of i r r a t i o n a l i t y , not because of determinism. (Those who can 70 be shown to be r a t i o n a l and whose a c t i o n was the r e a l i z a t i o n of an i n t e n t i o n hence are not excused. Whether one can be r a t i o n a l and a l s o a c r i m i n a l , except through a c c i d e n t or m i s f o r t u n e , i s a p s y c h o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n to which t h i s t h e s i s presupposes no answer. C l e a r l y , however, one can be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n which, judged by some norm not n e c e s s a r i l y shared by the agent, may be judged as bad without the agent being i r r a t i o n a l . ) I f an a c t i o n which was d e t e r -mined were r a t i o n a l , we would not take i t s causes f o r excuses. We can now assess the argument t h a t i f a c t i o n s f o l l o w from one's c h a r a c t e r and one's c h a r a c t e r i s determined by c a u s a l f a c t o r s beyond one's c o n t r o l , one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's a c t i o n s . The flaw i n the argument i s the f a i l u r e to see t h a t the presence of o n l y c e r t a i n c a u s a l f a c t o r s , and not c a u s a l f a c t o r s i n g e n e r a l , i s a ground f o r excusing an a c t i o n . Persons who are excused because t h e i r a c t i o n s r e s u l t from t h e i r c h a r a c t e r s are excused not because t h e i r c h a r a c t e r has been c a u s a l l y determined, but because i t has been d e t e r -mined i n such a way as to make the f o r m u l a t i o n and r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s i n a r a t i o n a l ( i . e . , n o n - s e l f - d e f e a t i n g ) manner i m p o s s i b l e . The argument t h a t determinism r u l e s out r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s f a l s e . There i s , throughout Campbell's and Hospers' arguments, some n o t i o n of the agent being f o r c e d i n t o an a c t i o n or being impeded i n a c t i o n by f o r c e s or o b s t a c l e s which somehow stand i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the agent. Our p r e v i o u s account of a c t i o n (Part One) shows t h a t some o u t s i d e f o r c e s or s t a t e s of a f f a i r s 71 may make c e r t a i n a c t i o n s i m p o s s i b l e by p l a c i n g c e r t a i n p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s on what courses of a c t i o n are a v a i l a b l e to the agent, or by t a k i n g away the agent's power to a c t . I f the agent l a c k s agency, the agent i s not f r e e and does not a c t . As long as the agent i s able to a c t , however, the a c t i s a r e s u l t of the c h o i c e s of the agent. Though the s i t u a t i o n p l a c e s l i m i t s on the agent's c h o i c e s , i t does not d i m i n i s h the agent's a b i l i t y to choose or to a c t on a c h o i c e , and so does not make any a c t i o n s which do take p l a c e any l e s s f r e e . The q u a l i t y of the a c t i o n w i l l be assessed c o n s i d e r i n g the c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e to the agent, but the agent i s not excusable simply because the range of c h o i c e s was not i n f i n i t e or even optimum at the time of the a c t i o n . (But c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of the c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e may l e a d to a c t i o n s r e c e i v i n g a d i f f e r e n t v a l u a t i o n than they would r e c e i v e i n a s i t u a t i o n where the range of c h o i c e s was d i f f e r e n t or wider. The more e x t r a o r d i n a r y the circumstances, the l e s s we are e n t i t l e d t o expect or demand the s o r t of a c t i o n s t h a t would take p l a c e i n o r d i n a r y circumstances. Yet one i s accountable f o r a c t i o n s t h a t are performed under e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o n d i t i o n s ; sometimes a c t i o n s are permissable under those circumstances which o t h e r -wise would not be. T h i s g i v e s the appearance of the agent being excused f o r those a c t i o n s , when the a c t i o n i s not r e a l l y excused but simply p e r m i t t e d ( i n t h a t i t i s not condemned) under such circumstances, f o r the simple reason t h a t a pro-h i b i t i o n of i t under such circumstances would p l a c e too g r e a t a demand on agents and so would be i n e f f i c a c i o u s and unreason-abl e , as we saw i n P a r t One, i n the s e c t i o n on i n v o l u n t a r y 72 a c t i o n . ) The i d e a of compulsion o r c o n s t r a i n t due to i n n e r f o r c e s or s t a t e s of a f f a i r s i s s i m i l a r l y confused i n Campbell's and Hospers' accounts. One i s c o n s t r a i n e d or compelled by such f o r c e s when one i s not a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y or when one i s in c a p a b l e of a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y , i n which case one's c h o i c e s are not conscious (as they are produced by some unconscious d r i v e or a l t e r e d by the presence of a f a c t o r such as drugs, str o n g emotion or pain) and one's i n t e n t i o n s are not s u b j e c t to one's c o n t r o l . In such cases agency and freedom are dim-i n i s h e d , as has been shown, as there the range of c h o i c e s i s l i m i t e d or even e l i m i n a t e d ( i n the case of compulsive b e h a v i o u r ) , because the a b i l i t y t o choose i s l i m i t e d . Lack of c o n t r o l of i n t e n t i o n s , which i s evidenced i n i r r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s , may be the r e s u l t of i n n e r f o r c e s , and hence c o n s t i t u t e s a k i n d of inne r compulsion or c o n s t r a i n t due to i n n e r f o r c e s . But a d e s i r e or p r e f e r e n c e does not d i m i n i s h one's range of c h o i c e s or a b i l i t y to choose; i t merely allows a c h o i c e t o be made. I f a d e s i r e or pr e f e r e n c e i s taken t o be an o b s t a c l e , t h a t merely r e f l e c t s the presence of another d e s i r e , or another c h o i c e , r e a l i z a t i o n of which i s incompatible w i t h the d e s i r e or p r e f e r e n c e seen as an o b s t a c l e . How the c o n f l i c t i s r e s o l v e d i s a l s o a matter of c h o i c e , s p e c i f i c a l l y , choosing how t o order and value c e r t a i n g o a l s . ( I f , a t bottom, any o r d e r i n g i s based on a ch o i c e t h a t i s not based on any other c h o i c e , t h i s i s a l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y , and has nothing to do with determinism. T h i s i s s u e w i l l be explored i n P a r t Three.) To say t h a t a c h o i c e of the agent somehow compels or c o n s t r a i n s 73 the agent i s to put the w i l l of the agent i n c o n f l i c t w i t h i t s e l f . A c h o i c e does not i n i t s e l f d i m i n i s h one's a b i l i t y to choose. (If a c h o i c e i s compulsive, t h a t i n d i c a t e s t h a t the a b i l i t y to choose f r e e l y i s impaired, but the c h o i c e i s a r e s u l t and not a cause of the impairment.) To be f o r c e d to do what one wants to do by the f a c t t h a t one wants to do i t i s not to be f o r c e d a t a l l . Hence, to be able to choose, 23 which i s what i t i s to be r a t i o n a l , and to be a b l e to a c t on zone's c h o i c e s are the o n l y necessary c o n d i t i o n s of respon-s i b i l i t y and freedom, f o r i t i s these which c o n s t i t u t e agency. There i s a f i n a l p o i n t which Hospers makes, though, which i s worth c o n s i d e r i n g . Whether one i s r a t i o n a l or not i s a matter o f l u c k . I f one can c o n s c i o u s l y c o n t r o l one's behaviour, so t h a t one may a l t e r i t on the b a s i s of r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , one i s j u s t l u c k y and can take no c r e d i t f o r t h a t happy s t a t e of a f f a i r s . A good e a r l y environment i s a matter of l u c k , but so i s the a b i l i t y t o overcome an adverse e a r l y environment and the a b i l i t y to respond to treatment, as they r e s u l t from one's g e n e t i c makeup and e a r l y e x p e r i e n c e s . Even whether one i s able to t r y harder to self-overcome Is c a u s a l l y determined by f a c t o r s beyond one's c o n t r o l , and thus i s a matter of l u c k . T h i s does not, as Hospers t h i n k s i t does, r u l e out respon-s i b i l i t y , f o r one may be r e s p o n s i b l e as a matter of l u c k and s t i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e . I f one can c o n s c i o u s l y c o n t r o l one's behaviour one i s i n a sense lucky, but one i s a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e . But the p o i n t does have b e a r i n g on the i s s u e of p r a i s e and blame and the a s c r i p t i o n of moral worth to s e l f and to o t h e r s . 7 4 For even i f one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's a c t i o n s , one's p r e f e r e n c e s and v a l u e s are u l t i m a t e l y the r e s u l t of c a u s a l f a c t o r s beyond one's c o n t r o l , and so i t i s a matter of good o and bad lu c k whether those p r e f e r e n c e s and v a l u e s are com-p a t i b l e w i t h moral or wit h the standards of m o r a l i t y of a s o c i e t y o r whether one can choose or l e a r n t o subordinate c e r t a i n preferences and valu e s to the morals of a s o c i e t y i n order t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h a t s o c i e t y . Whether one's behaviour w i l l earn p r a i s e or blame then i s , i n a sense, a matter of lu c k , even when one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r such behaviour. 5. P r a i s e and blame and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y There i s a c l o s e connection, remarked on by many p h i l o s -ophers, between a person's being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n and a person's being s u b j e c t to p r a i s e or blame f o r t h a t a c t i o n . To p r a i s e or blame i s to measure the q u a l i t y of an a c t i o n a g a i n s t a standard of how we expect, d e s i r e or demand persons to behave (depending on the importance of the k i n d of a c t i o n ) . H o l d i n g a person r e s p o n s i b l e i s thus l i n k e d t o an assessment of t h a t person's behaviour, and so to an assessment of t h a t person's c h a r a c t e r . From our e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s of agency, we can p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l e f o r such a co n n e c t i o n . An agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n when the a c t i o n i s a r e a l i z a t i o n of the agent's i n t e n t i o n s (provided t h a t the agent i s r a t i o n a l a t the time of the a c t i o n ) . Any e v a l u a t i o n of an a c t i o n f o r which the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e i s t h e r e f o r e an e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's i n t e n t i o n s , and the agent's i n t e n t i o n s are a 75 r e f l e c t i o n o f the agent's c h a r a c t e r . I f the agent acted i r r a t i o n a l l y , the i n t e n t i o n s would p o i n t e i t h e r to the agent's c h r o n i c i r r a t i o n a l i t y or to a temporary i r r a t i o n a l i t y due to circumstances ( i n which case the agent i s s a i d to have acted "out of c h a r a c t e r " ) . I f the agent acted r a t i o n a l l y , those i n t e n t i o n s would be a r e f l e c t i o n o f the d e s i r e s , b e l i e f s and a t t i t u d e s of the agent. An e v a l u a t i o n of an agent's a c t i o n s i s i n those cases an e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's c h a r a c t e r . An e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's c h a r a c t e r on the b a s i s o f the agent's a c t i o n would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e when the agent a c t s i r r a t i o n a l l y , f o r one of two reasons. E i t h e r the agent's i n t e n t i o n s were not s u b j e c t t o the agent's conscious c o n t r o l due to s p e c i a l circumstances, as when the agent a c t s "out of c h a r a c t e r , " i n which case the a c t i o n would not be t r u l y r e f l e c t i v e of the agent's d e s i r e s and a t t i t u d e s and so a c h a r a c t e r assessment based on t h a t a c t i o n would be f a l s e o r i n a c c u r a t e ; o r the agent c h r o n i c a l l y l a c k s c o n t r o l over i n t e n t i o n s or a c t i o n s , as i s tr u e of c h r o n i c a l l y i r r a t i o n a l agents, i n which case i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to p l a c e the same e x p e c t a t i o n s on t h a t agent as one would p l a c e on a r a t i o n a l agent, and so the standards a g a i n s t which a c t i o n s are measured i n p r a i s i n g and blaming would be i n a p p l i c a b l e . (One might welcome or rue such a c t i o n s , but to h o l d the person r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them would be mistaken, and s i n c e p r a i s e and blame go beyond the a c t i o n t o the i n t e n t i o n they presuppose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ) I t would a l s o be mistaken t o eval u a t e the agent's c h a r a c t e r on the b a s i s of an a c t i o n t h a t i s u n i n t e n t i o n a l , f o r an u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n would notobe 76 a r e f l e c t i o n of the agent's c h a r a c t e r or i n t e n t i o n s ( b a r r i n g n e g l i g e n c e , which r e v e a l s the extent t o which the agent v a l u e s c e r t a i n r e s u l t s by i n d i c a t i n g the l e v e l of care the agent maintains t o achieve them), and any assessment of such a c t i o n would have no b e a r i n g on an assessment or e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's c h a r a c t e r . I f an agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n which i s judged to have good e f f e c t s or which surpasses the e x p e c t a t i o n s p l a c e d on the agent i n some way, the a c t i o n and the agent are p r a i s e d . I f the r e s u l t s are judged to be bad, or f a l l below the standard of behaviour p l a c e d on the agent i n some way, then the a c t i o n i s c r i t i c i z e d and the agent i s blamed. To p r a i s e i s then both t o laud an a c t i o n and to approve, esteem or compliment the agent; to blame i s then t o c r i t i c i z e an a c t i o n and to reprove,: censure, rebuke or c r i t i -c i z e the agent. When the standards a g a i n s t which the a c t i o n i s measured are moral ( i n t h a t they r e f e r t o moral v a l u e s , r a t h e r than, f o r example, a e s t h e t i c ones), assessments of the m o r a l i t y of the a c t i o n become l i n k e d to e v a l u a t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r . The assessment of the moral worth of the a c t i o n then appears to e n t a i l the e v a l u a t i o n of the moral worth of the agent. 6. Ch a r a c t e r and moral worth The f o r c e of Hospers' argument l i e s i n h i s f i x i n g a l i m i t on p r a i s e and blame by p o i n t i n g out t h a t one i s never j u s t i f i e d . i n a s s e s s i n g the moral worth of the agent or i n p r a i s i n g or blaming agents f o r what they are, r a t h e r than f o r 77 what they do. An a c t i o n may have been w i t h i n the agent's c o n t r o l , and so r e f l e c t the agent's c h a r a c t e r , but u l t i m a t e l y the agent's c h a r a c t e r was produced by f a c t o r s beyond the agent's c o n t r o l (such as h e r e d i t y and environment) and so i s u l t i m a t e l y a matter of good or bad l u c k . (Of course, i n s o f a r as one shapes c h a r a c t e r by encouraging some a c t i o n s through p r i a s e and d i s c o u r a g i n g o t h e r s through blame one d i r e c t s p r a i s e and blame toward the agent's c h a r a c t e r , but t h a t i s not the same t h i n g as p r a i s i n g or blaming the agent f o r being what the agent cannot but be.) The agent who a c t s m o r a l l y cannot take c r e d i t f o r the h e r e d i t y and up b r i n g i n g t h a t made the agent t h a t way; nor i s the immoral agent t o be blamed f o r the f a c t o r s t h a t produced t h a t agent's c h a r a c t e r . Blame-worthiness and p r a i s e w o r t h i n e s s do not f o l l o w from respon-s i b i l i t y i n s o f a r as they are a p p l i e d t o the agent's c h a r a c t e r r a t h e r than to the agent's a c t i o n s , s i n c e i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e to h o l d an agent r e s p o n s i b l e f o r something which i s not s u b j e c t to the agent's c o n t r o l , such as c h a r a c t e r , and i n s o f a r as p r a i s e and blame go beyond the a c t i o n to the agent ( i n the manner i n d i c a t e d ) i t i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c h a r a c t e r t h a t p r a i s e and blame r e q u i r e , r a t h e r than r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the a c t i o n . A moral e v a l u a t i o n o f a c t s f o r which the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e w i l l a llow one to make a moral e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's c h a r a c t e r o n l y i n t h a t one may say of the agent t h a t the agent does or does not a c t m o r a l l y , and one may or may not esteem such behaviour. (Thus, i n saying the agent i s "morally good" one says t h a t the agent a c t s m o r a l l y , but to say t h a t the agent a c t s m o r a l l y because the agent i s 78 m o r a l l y good i s to be i n e r r o r , as to a c t m o r a l l y i s to be m o r a l l y good and does not follow from being m o r a l l y good.) I t does not a l l o w one to p r a i s e or blame the agent f o r having the c h a r a c t e r t h a t i s such t h a t the agent a c t s m o r a l l y or immorally. One can assess the moral worth of an a c t i o n or of behaviour, and so p r a i s e or d i s p r a i s e i t , but one may not assess the moral worth of an agent. To p r a i s e or blame the agent, r a t h e r than merely esteeming or condemning the a c t or p a t t e r n of behaviour, i s to assess the moral worth of the agent as w e l l as to a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o the agent and to m o r a l l y e v a l u a t e the a c t , and so i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . I n s o f a r as p r a i s e and blame r e f e r not simply to the a c t but to the a t t i t u d e or i n t e n t i o n of the agent which produced the a c t , they go beyond the a c t to the agent. Such a move i s i l l e g i t i m a t e because the agent cannot p o s s i b l y be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t agent's c h a r a c t e r i n the way r e q u i r e d by such an assessment (although i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to address p r a i s e and blame to the agent i n order to shape c h a r a c t e r and f u t u r e behaviour, as we s h a l l d i s c u s s , which i s not the same t h i n g as p r a i s i n g or blaming the agent f o r being what the agent i s , which i s a 2 4 matter over which the agent u l t i m a t e l y has no c o n t r o l ) . There are ways i n which p r a i s e and blame may be j u s t i f i a b l e , but before e x p l a i n i n g how an a s c r i p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t ogether w i t h a moral assessment of the a c t are a l l t h a t i s r e q u i r e d (and t h a t an e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's moral worth i s u s e l e s s ) , we might look a t what s o r t of c o n d i t i o n s would make p r a i s e or blame of the agent ( f o r being what the agent i s ) 79 a p p r o p r i a t e . I f a person i s p r a i s e d or blamed f o r an a c t i o n because o f i t s i n t e n t i o n s , then t o deserve p r a i s e or blame t h a t person must be r e s p o n s i b l e not o n l y f o r the a c t but f o r t h a t person's c h a r a c t e r , as i t i s t h a t person's i n t e n t i o n s and thus c h a r a c t e r which are being assessed. I t i s a l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y f o r someone to be completely r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s or her c h a r a c t e r , f o r one cannot be the cause of o n e s e l f , as t h a t would r e q u i r e t h a t one p r e - e x i s t one's own e x i s t e n c e . The i d e a t h a t one can be completely r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's own e x i s t e n c e appears to be a hang-over from the C h r i s t i a n i d e a of autonomy of the s o u l . On t h i s view, the s o u l i s f r e e from c a u s a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n . One i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t simply because i t c o n s t i t u t e s the essence of one's s e l f . Though c r e a t e d by God, the s o u l i s f r e e . Whether i t i s good or bad i s a matter of i t s own c h o i c e , and i t s c h o i c e i s undetermined. I t s c h o i c e has i t s o r i g i n o n l y w i t h i n i t s e l f , and i t chooses f r e e l y and g r a t u i t o u s l y , as d i d Adam and Eve. I t does not choose because of i t s - m o r a l c h a r a c t e r , f o r i n choosing good or e v i l i t chooses i t s moral c h a r a c t e r , and as t h a t c h o i c e emanates o n l y from i t s e l f i t alone i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t , and t o t a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e . I t i s the s o u l t h a t determines how one a c t s , f o r no circumstances compel the s o u l to choose to a c t i n one way r a t h e r than another. As one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's s o u l , as i t i s the essence of one's s e l f and so one i s i n a sense the cause of o n e s e l f as the s o u l i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s e l f , one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's c h a r a c t e r . One i s thus d e s e r v i n g of p r a i s e or blame f o r the moral q u a l i t y of one's 80 actions, as t h e i r goodness or badness depends on the goodness or badness of one's soul. Hence, one can morally evaluate the goodness or badness of a person on the basis of that person's acts, and so praise or blame that person. As persons are ultimately and t o t a l l y responsible for t h e i r own actions, a person i s thus deserving of reward or punishment simply because of that person's moral worth. This view then sees r e t r i b u t i o n as an appropriate response to moral badness and reward as a . f i t t i n g response to goodness. A person can then be seen as simply morally superior or i n f e r i o r , as the person i s respon-s i b l e for his or her own character. Good persons should be then (paradoxically) e n t i t l e d to take pride i n themselves; bad persons should f e e l a sense of g u i l t and s i n . One can judge oneself i n the same way as others can judge one. The view outlined here allows for a whole system of praise and blame and a notion of moral worth and deservingness based on a meta-physics of the soul which makes even less sense than Campbell's metaphysics of the s e l f , embodying as i t does the l o g i c a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y of the s e l f being the cause of i t s e l f (which i s another way of saying that the soul i s responsible for i t s e l f and so one i s responsible for one's soul). Moreover, the only support for t h i s system i s the impossible metaphysics. (Kant's noumenal s e l f and other similar notions simply present the soul i n R a t i o n a l i s t drag, and though Sartre states that conscious-ness cannot be the cause of i t s e l f , i n speaking of freedom to choose oneself through an o r i g i n a l project he seems to forget this.) If t h i s C h r i s t i a n metaphysics of the soul i s impossible 81 (as many C h r i s t i a n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those who hold t h a t s a l v a t i o n i s a matter of d i v i n e grace, t h i n k i t i s ) , then so i s any moral system t h a t assesses the moral worth of the agent, s i n c e any such system must presume t h a t the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s or her own c h a r a c t e r . P r a i s e and blame, i n s o f a r as they i n v o l v e t h i s s o r t o f c h a r a c t e r assessment, are then never l e g i t i m a t e . 7. P r a i s e and blame, as a t t i t u d e s and as a c t i o n s I t should be made c l e a r t h a t i n speaking of p r a i s e and blame, one r e f e r s to an a c t i o n and to an a t t i t u d e . To p r a i s e or blame someone i s to c o n s i d e r t h a t person r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n or a t t i t u d e which f a l l s above or below some standard t h a t members of s o c i e t y are expected to meet. I t may a l s o be to c o n s i d e r t h a t person's c h a r a c t e r as one t h a t i s good or bad i n t h a t i t intends a c t i o n s or e x h i b i t s a t t i t u d e s which are good or bad (according to some sta n d a r d ) . In t h i s r e s p e c t p r a i s e and blame are a t t i t u d e s one holds toward the agent. To c o n s i d e r an agent worthy of p r a i s e or blame i s at l e a s t to c o n s i d e r the agent as the source o f some e f f e c t ' which i s judged as good o r i l l , as when a person i s s a i d t o be "at f a u l t " i n an a c c i d e n t or when one f e e l s g r a t i t u d e toward a c r a z y b e n e f a c t o r , t o take two examples. In those cases, i n f i x i n g praiseworthiness or blameworthiness one i s more i n t e r -e s t e d i n determining the agent's r e l a t i o n t o some e f f e c t than i n whether the e f f e c t was i n t e n t i o n a l l y produced. I f the agent i s to be worthy of p r a i s e and blame at a l l , then the agent must be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t i n some way, such as neg-82 l i g e n c e , even i f the e f f e c t was. u n i n t e n t i o n a l . N a t u r a l l y , the extent to which the agent i s re s p o n s i b l e f o r the e f f e c t i s the extent to which the e f f e c t i s i n t e n t i o n a l and the agent was a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y , and so the degree of strength i n appropriate p r a i s e and blame i s c o r r e l a t i v e w i t h the degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent. The strongest sense of p r a i s e and blame r e f e r s to a t t i t u d e s of the agent as evidenced i n act i o n s which, because of the agent's l e v e l of care i n the performance of the a c t i o n or because of the i n t e n t i o n of the agent, i s seen as meeting, surpassing or f a l l i n g below a standard of human conduct and a t t i t u d e . I t i s t h i s s o r t of p r a i s e and blame t h a t comes i n t o p l a y when we consider an agent "morally r e s p o n s i b l e , " and the a p p l i c a t i o n of such moral standards to a c t i o n s presumes tha t i t was w i t h i n the agent's power to have determined the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n , and t h a t a p p l i c a t i o n of those standards i n tha t s i t u a t i o n would not place unreasonable demands upon the agent. They are based on a p r a c t i c a l concern f o r the c o n t r o l l i n g of c e r t a i n e f f e c t s through the c o n t r o l of t h e i r causes, and t h e i r appropriateness i s contingent upon the degree to which those causes may be c o n t r o l l e d . The v e r b a l expression of those a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame, or t h e i r embodiment i n punishment and reward, con-s t i t u t e the a c t i o n s of p r a i s i n g and blaming, and whi l e the inappropriateness of the expression of the a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e the inappropriateness of those a t t i t u d e s , the appropriateness of such a t t i t u d e s i s contingent on the p o s s i b i l i t y of some expression of them i n 83 word or a c t i o n being e f f i c a c i o u s under at l e a s t some circum-stances. For t h a t reason, t h e i r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s i s c o n t i n -gent on the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent, as the c a u s a l e f f i c a c y of the a c t i o n of p r a i s i n g or blaming r e q u i r e s t h a t the agent have the agency t o a l t e r h i s or her a c t i o n s due to r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , such as the o p i n i o n s of others and rewards and punishment. What we have s a i d about the i l l e g i t i m a c y of some kinds of p r a i s e and blame a p p l i e s not onl y to the a c t i o n s of p r a i s i n g and blaming, but to the a t t i t u d e s which form the b a s i s of those a c t i o n s . Since a person cannot be u l t i m a t e l y and f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r h i s or her c h a r a c t e r , one i s not o n l y wrong i s e x p r e s s i n g a v a l u a t i o n of t h a t person's moral worth, but i n even making t h a t v a l u a t i o n . I t i s as u n j u s t t o presume to judge people as contemptible, e v i l , bad, d e s p i c a b l e , admirable, ho l y , good or e n l i g h t e n e d as i t i s to express t h a t o p i n i o n . As i f people had any say i n t h e i r h e r e d i t y and u p b r i n g i n g ! Of course i t i s l e g i t i m a t e to c o n s i d e r a person's c h a r a c t e r and e v a l u a t e i t when what one i s r e f e r r i n g to i s a person's behaviour, which i s to d e s c r i b e c h a r a c t e r i n an e v a l u a t i v e way without a s c r i b i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i t , but i t i s wrong to go beyond t h a t to p r a i s e or blame t h a t person f o r being the s o r t of person who a c t s t h a t way. That i s , i t i s wrong to admire or d e s p i s e the person, r a t h e r than the person's behaviour, f o r being what t h a t person i s , s i n c e what the person i s r e s u l t s from c a u s a l f a c t o r s beyond t h a t person's c o n t r o l . What t h i s r u l e s out i s not the judgment t h a t so-and-so i s a c r i m i n a l or so-and-so i s a s a i n t , but the a t t i t u d e s of moral 84 condemnation or admiration t h a t go w i t h those judgments, c a r r y i n g w i t h them as they do the G o d - l i k e presumption o f moral s u p e r i o r i t y (or, l e s s l i k e l y , i n f e r i o r i t y ) on the p a r t of the person making the assessment. I t r u l e s out the i d e a t h a t one performs good a c t i o n s because one i s good, or t h a t one performs bad a c t i o n s because one i s e v i l , f o r to perform good a c t i o n s i s what i t i s to be good, and so being good i s not the cause of performing good a c t i o n s , as i t i s the same t h i n g under a d i f f e r e n t d e s c r i p t i o n . What causes one to perform good a c t i o n s , or bad ones, are t h i n g s l i k e h e r e d i t y and up-b r i n g i n g , matters over which one has no c o n t r o l and f o r which one i s not r e s p o n s i b l e . The i d e a of there being e v i l persons i s r u l e d out a l t o g e t h e r , f o r to say someone i s e v i l i s not merely another way of saying t h a t person performs bad a c t i o n s , but i t i s to c l a i m t h a t those bad a c t i o n s r e s u l t from t h a t person's nature or essence, whereas i f determinism i s t r u e , the reason the person performs bad a c t i o n s i s t h a t the person had a h e r e d i t y and u p b r i n g i n g t h a t caused him or her to a c t t h a t way, not because the person i s i n n a t e l y and by nature e v i l . I t i s these a t t i t u d e s of moral judgment t h a t determinism makes i l l e g i t i m a t e . As w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r , those a t t i t u d e s are o f t e n i n v o l v e d i n p r a i s e and blame, but t h a t does not e n t a i l t h a t the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent f o r an a c t i o n j u s t i f i e s t h e i r being h e l d . Our c l a i m i s then not about the meaning of " p r a i s e " and "blame," f o r even i f a t t i t u d e s of moral i n d i g n a t i o n and moral worship are components of a t t i t u d e s r e f e r r e d to as " p r a i s e " and "blame," they should not be. T h i s i s the f o r c e of Hospers' p o i n t . Assessments of moral worth are 85 u n j u s t because they presume a freedom of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t does not e x i s t . In f a c t , i n d i g n a t i o n and worship have more the c h a r a c t e r of sentiments such as a f f e c t i o n and hatr e d than they resemble moral judgments. To p r a i s e or blame a person f o r a c h a r a c t e r f o r which t h a t person i s not r e s p o n s i b l e i s analogous t o p r a i s i n g or blaming a person f o r an a b i l i t y (which i s a product of innate and environmental f a c t o r s , such as t r a i n i n g , over which the person has no c o n t r o l ) or beauty (which, except f o r environmental i n f l u e n c e s on h e a l t h , i s e n t i r e l y an in n a t e t r a i t ) . E s s e n t i a l l y , i n e x p r e s s i n g admiration or contempt f o r the q u a l i t y of the person's t r a i t s i n r e s p e c t t o those c a t e g o r i e s one i s making an a e s t h e t i c , r a t h e r than a moral, judgment. The person i s judged by some standard o f arete, be i t v i r t u e or beauty. But while p o s s e s s i o n of arete may c a l l f o r p r a i s e , l a c k o f i t does not c a l l f o r blame. P r a i s e i s an ambiguous concept i n t h a t i t can be used as an a e s t h e t i c and as a moral judgment; blame i s not. Here the p r a i s e and blame dichotomy breaks down, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t one i s not making a moral assessment when one assesses a t r a i t , as one i s not a s s e s s i n g t h a t f o r which the person i s r e s p o n s i b l e . To p r a i s e beauty seems f i n e , but one does not "blame" u g l i n e s s . To do so would simply be i n a p p r o p r i a t e , as w e l l as c r u e l . The term which corresponds to " p r a i s e " here i s not "blame," but such words as " d i s l i k e , " "abhor," " c r i t i c i z e " and so on, words which i n d i c a t e a l a c k of a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r or a l a c k of a t t r a c t i o n to some o b j e c t . And i t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t the presence of 86 such attitudes indicates that the person i s being evaluated simply as an object for the person making the evaluation, not as a subject with i t s own system of values, l i k e s , d i s l i k e s and needs, i n that the person i s assessed r e l a t i v e to the needs, values and preferences of the person making the judgment. For that reason the judgment i s aesthetic; i t i s , l i k e preferring chocolate to v a n i l l a , a matter of taste. While one may admire a beautiful person, that person can take no c r e d i t for being be a u t i f u l , and an ugly person i s not to blame or at f a u l t for being ugly. The same i s true of admiring or despising someone for that person's character or moral q u a l i t i e s . One may admire a person's character, but the person can take no more cr e d i t for having such a character than one can take for being be a u t i f u l , talented, a t h l e t i c or a male Caucasian over f i v e feet t a l l . S i m i l a r l y , to blame a person for that person's moral character i s wrong, i n that i t i s inappropriate, even i f to disapprove of that person's character or behaviour, and even to passionately d i s l i k e i t , may not be inappropriate. Indig-nation and admiration are passions, rather than judgments, and t h e i r role i n the moral sphere w i l l be discussed more l a t e r . It i s enough to note here that the nature of admiration and indignation indicates that while l i k e and d i s l i k e of character may be appropriate and indeed inevitable, praise (in i t s moral rather than i t s aesthetic, sense) and blame are not. This,.of course, does not rule out the legitimacy of some attitudes of praise and blame. If i n ascribing blame one i s merely considering the agent as the cause of a certain e f f e c t 87 and as being i n some way r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t (through i n t e n t or negligence) w h i l e c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t e f f e c t as u n d e s i r a b l e , bad or lamentable, then t h a t i s j u s t i f i a b l e . Or i f one i s simply saying t h a t a c t i o n s over which the agent had c o n t r o l d i d not meet c e r t a i n (perhaps moral) standards, then t h a t too i s j u s t i f i a b l e (though such an a t t i t u d e would be more p r o p e r l y construed as c r i t i c i s m , r a t h e r than blame). But to move from those d e s c r i p t i v e assessments to a condemnation of the agent i s to condemn the agent f o r what the agent i s , r a t h e r than simply c r i t i c i z e the agent's a c t i o n s or behaviour, and i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , as i t presupposes t h a t the agent was f r e e t o have been otherwise than what, gi v e n determinism, the agent was and must have been, and i t makes no d i f f e r e n c e whether such an assessment i s thought, f e l t , spoken or acted upon. The same goes, mutatis mutandis, f o r p r a i s e . 8. P r a i s e and blame and agency So much f o r a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame. What i s the r e l a t i o n between a person's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an a c t i o n and i t s moral worth as r e f l e c t e d i n the p r a c t i c e of h o l d i n g person's r e s p o n s i b l e ? We have s a i d t h a t the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame i s c o n t i n g e n t upon the p o s s i b i l i t y of the e f f i c a c y of the e x p r e s s i o n of such a t t i t u d e s . We can now p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l e f o r the connection between the appro-p r i a t e n e s s of a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame and the a s c r i p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In so doing, the r e l a t i o n between the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame and the e f f i c a c y of the e x p r e s s i o n of those a t t i t u d e s may be brought out. 88 As has been- p o i n t e d out, to express the b e l i e f t h a t one holds a person r e s p o n s i b l e i s to i n d i c a t e to t h a t person t h a t i t was w i t h i n t h a t person's power to perform or not perform an a c t i n the p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n i n which i t was (or was not) performed. Moreover, i t i s to p o i n t out i n what way the person had c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n (or c o u l d have had c o n t r o l of i t ) and so i s a way of making the person more aware of t h a t person's agency. The person's agency and freedom are thereby i n c r e a s e d , as the person i s made more aware of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s open to him or her, and i s then more able to c o n s c i o u s l y d i r e c t a c t i o n s toward h i s or her purposes. T h i s enables the person to e x e r c i s e g r e a t e r c o n t r o l over a c t i o n s i n the f u t u r e , as awareness of agency and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of c h o i c e allows f o r g r e a t e r use of one's powers toward ends of which one i s aware, and thus allows f o r g r e a t e r freedom. To h o l d someone r e s p o n s i b l e i s d i s t i n c t from p r a i s i n g or blaming t h a t person. I t i s not to make an assessment of the worth of the a c t i o n or of the agent, but i s an e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's freedom. I t i s a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h a t freedom t h a t when expressed allows the agent to a c t more f r e e l y and thus w i t h g r e a t e r c o n t r o l and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the f u t u r e . One can, q u i t e independently, assess the moral worth of an a c t i o n . When one expresses an assessment of an a c t i o n f o r which the agent i s r e s p o n s i b l e as being good or bad, one p o i n t s out to the agent t h a t agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h a t good or bad a c t i o n . But i n so doing one i s merely p o i n t i n g out to the agent the agent's c a p a c i t y f o r a v o i d i n g or r e p e a t i n g 89 t h a t a c t i o n and the f a c t t h a t such a c t i o n s are looked upon with favour or d i s f a v o u r by some group or i n d i v i d u a l . I f the agent i s aware of h i s or her c a p a c i t y f o r performing or not performing the a c t i o n , and was aware of i t at the time of the a c t i o n , then the agent i s f o r c e d to acknowledge t h a t he or she d e s i r e d i t s outcome. I f t h i s i s the case, one i s then i n the p o s i t i o n to assess the c h a r a c t e r of the agent as the s o r t of person who d e s i r e s or intends c e r t a i n t h i n g s , which one might regard as being e i t h e r good or bad. One i s not i n a p o s i t i o n to pass judgment on the agent's moral worth, f o r t h a t i s to go beyond the a s c r i p t i o n of agency and a s s e s s -ment of c h a r a c t e r to an a s c r i p t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's c h a r a c t e r , a move t h a t , g i v e n determinism, i s i l l e g i t i m a t e . I f there i s anything t o the p r a c t i c e of p r a i s i n g and blaming, i t i s i n the e f f i c i a c y of the e x p r e s s i o n of p r a i s e and blame i n c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour. To p r a i s e or blame i s to assess the value of an a c t i o n and to a s c r i b e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to an agent. In a s c r i b i n g a value to the a c t i o n , one i n d i c a t e s whether ot not i t i s ac c e p t a b l e and what steps w i l l be taken to c o n t r o l the frequency of i t s occurence. That i s , one expresses approbation or d i s a p p r o b a t i o n together with an i n d i c a t i o n of what consequences an agent may expect from others as an incentive, to repeat or a b s t a i n from such a c t i o n s . The p r a c t i c e , as S c h l i c k has p o i n t e d out, i s i n t i m a t e l y connected 25 with the ideas of reward and punishment. One does not reward or punish because of the agent's moral worth; one rewards or punishes because of the worth of the a c t and because one wants t o encourage or discourage the performance of such a c t i o n s . 90 (This i s compatible w i t h the idea t h a t punishment should be treatment or r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of the o f f e n d e r , as even i n the form of treatment, punishment c o n t a i n s an element of censure of the a c t i o n and the agent, which the agent may wish to a v o i d , and a l s o i n v o l v e s some i n t e r f e r e n c e with the l i b e r t y of the agent. Punishment need not be p a i n f u l to be a d e t e r r e n t . ) P r a i s e and blame as a c t i o n s are v e r b a l forms of reward and punishment which appeal t o the agent's d e s i r e t o be esteemed or l i k e d by h i s or her f e l l o w s . T h i s esteem may r e l a t e to the agent's motives or the agent's s k i l l s . P r a i s e and blame when a p p l i e d to the agent's i n t e n t i o n s , and hence the agent's c h a r a c t e r , then appeal t o the agent's 'desire to be moral, or to a t l e a s t appear moral to others i n cases where m o r a l i t y i s not i n t e r n a l i z e d . P r a i s e and blame a p p l i e d to the agent's method of a c t i o n or the manner of performance appeal t o the agent's d e s i r e to do w e l l or t o have h i s or her s k i l l s r e c o g n i z e d and a p p r e c i a t e d . T h i s i s a rough sketch: the p s y c h o l o g i c a l mechanisms of the e f f e c t s of p r a i s e and blame on motives and i n t e n t i o n s i s a complex matter. But i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to note here t h a t p r a i s e encourages a c t i o n s and blame discourages a c t i o n s by app e a l i n g to an aspect of the agent's c h a r a c t e r which may stand i n o p p o s i t i o n to those aspects of the agent's c h a r a c t e r which would otherwise l e a d the agent t o perform or not perform a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . By ap p e a l i n g to a sense of duty or d e s i r e f o r esteem one over-comes one agent's ind o l e n c e ; by app e a l i n g to c o n s i d e r a t i o n of others or a d e s i r e to l i v e i n s o c i e t y one r e s t r a i n s an agent from committing an o f f e n c e . In order f o r p r a i s e and blame to 91 be e f f e c t i v e , they must appeal to some desire or motive of the agent that stands in ': opposition to desires and motives that the actions of praising and blaming t r y to counter-balance or overcome. One thus attempts i n praising and blaming to modify the intentions of the agent by pointing out to the agent that the consequence of cert a i n actions i s the approbation of disapprobation of the agent by others. An agent whose actions can be altered by praising and blaming i s thus one who i s concerned with how he or she i s thought of or regarded by others. As praise and blame are incentives, they are not coercive as they require that the agent be able to act on incentives, and thus require that the agent control his or her actions through r a t i o n a l and conscious choice. Incentives are thus a way of appealing to the freedom of the agent, rather than a l i m i t a t i o n on that freedom. They encourage the agent to take control of certain actions i n view of cert a i n con-sequences and thus encourage the agent to recognize freedom and agency, and so to be responsible. Praise and blame thus appeal to the agent's freedom and to the agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . For that reason, praise and blame, l i k e other threats and inducements, are applicable only to responsible persons. Responsible persons are the only ones who may a l t e r t h e i r intentions and actions due to a consideration of the con-sequences, because they are i n conscious control of t h e i r actions. Praise and blame are l i k e any other consequence of an action except that they are applied by other persons in order to encourage or discourage actions by making i t 92 known how those persons regard such a c t i o n s and what steps they w i l l take to prevent or promote them. More g e n e r a l l y , one promotes or d e t e r s behaviour by o f f e r i n g c e r t a i n con-sequences as t h r e a t s and inducements, and such consequences may onl y be a p p l i e d t o r e s p o n s i b l e agents as they are the only agents able to a l t e r t h e i r a c t i o n s by c o n s i d e r i n g the consequences of those a c t i o n s . The reward may be p r a i s e or esteem or something more t a n g i b l e , depending on the value of the a c t i o n ; the punishment may be c r i t i c i s m or something more d r a s t i c , depending on how important i t i s to det e r the a c t i o n and what measures need be taken f o r doing so. The extent of the reward or punishment has noth i n g t o do with the agent's moral worth; i t i s based on the v a l u e of the a c t i o n (and hence on the d e s i r a b i l i t y of t h a t -action being promoted or d e t e r r e d ) . The form of the i n c e n t i v e or d e t e r r e n t w i l l depend on what i s l i k e l y to c o n t r o l behaviour i n the d e s i r e d manner: i f the agent i s one concerned with the o p i n i o n s of o t h e r s , p r a i s e and blame may be s u f f i c i e n t ; i n other cases, more m a t e r i a l measures (such as monetary reward or the d e p r i v a t i o n of l i b e r t y ) may be necessary. But i n any case of i n c e n t i v e s or d e t e r r e n t s , one appeals t o the agent's a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l i n t e n t i o n s and a c t i o n s i n view o f t h e i r consequences, and thus one appeals t o the age'nt's freedom. T h i s i s very u n l i k e p h y s i c a l c o n s t r a i n t , mere imprisonment or f o r c e d a c t i o n s , where no such appeal t o i n t e n t i o n s e x i s t s and no c h o i c e i s allowed the agent. I t i s a l s o d i f f e r e n t from behaviour m o d i f i c a t i o n techniques such as electro-shock therapy, which i n s t e a d o f i n c r e a s i n g agency and app e a l i n g t o the agent's freedom, remove the freedom of the agent 93 by making c e r t a i n c h o i c e s compulsive, and hence i r r a t i o n a l (because they are not w i t h i n the conscious c o n t r o l of the agent) even i f they appear to be i n the agent's b e s t i n t e r e s t s . At best, such p r a c t i c e s merely s u b s t i t u t e one compulsion f o r another. By t a k i n g away freedom, such p r a c t i c e s a l s o remove r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . (A good l i t e r a r y i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s can be found i n Burgess' A Clockwork Orange.) The p r a c t i c e of p r a i s i n g and blaming, l i k e other forms of reward and punishment, i s a unique form of behaviour c o n t r o l i n t h a t i t a c t u a l l y seeks to i n c r e a s e , r a t h e r than l i m i t , the freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent. One judges whether to reward or punish, p r a i s e or blame on the same b a s i s as one judges whether to perform any other a c t i o n : on the b a s i s of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , of i t s l i k l i h o o d of producing a d e s i r e d outcome, namely, the c o n t r o l of the behaviour of the person being p r a i s e d or blamed. I t s e f f i c a c y i s dependent on s e v e r a l necessary c o n d i t i o n s . I t has a l r e a d y been argued t h a t the agent must have been f r e e and r a t i o n a l a t the time o f the a c t i o n . But the agent must a l s o be f r e e and r a t i o n a l at the time of the reward or punishment, p r a i s e or blame i f such measures are to be e f f e c t i v e , f o r even i f the agent was r a t i o n a l at the time of the a c t i o n , the purpose of i n c e n t i v e s and d e t e r r e n t s i s to c o n t r o l f u t u r e a c t i o n s by a p p e a l i n g to the agent's a b i l i t y to c o n t r o l or l a t e r h i s o f her i n t e n t i o n s , and t h a t i s impossible i f the agent i s no longer r a t i o n a l and f r e e . I f a f t e r committing a murder wi t h f u l l agency an agent goes insane, i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o 94 t r e a t the agent as one would t r e a t a sane agent, f o r the simple reason t h a t the agent i s no longer c o n s c i o u s l y c o n t r o l l i n g h i s or her a c t i o n s , and so w i l l not be a f f e c t e d by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the consequences of those a c t i o n s . An agent once i n p o s s e s s i o n of the freedom t o r e a l i z e i n t e n t i o n s but i s now l a c k i n g i t i s s i m i l a r l y not a f f e c t e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of the consequences of a c t i o n s , as such an agent i s e i t h e r simply not able t o a c t or i s r e s t r i c t e d i n doing so i n such a way t h a t the agent i s not capable of the a c t i o n s being encouraged or d e t e r r e d . The robber who i s p a r a l y z e d by an i n j u r y s u s t a i n e d i n the course of committing a crime i s no longer capable of breaking the law, or, f o r t h a t matter, of f o l l o w i n g i t : freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y v a n i s h t o g e ther. I t may be o b j e c t e d t h a t i n c e n t i v e s and d e t e r r e n t s are supposed to promote or de t e r a c t i o n s on the p a r t of other r a t i o n a l or f r e e agents as w e l l , and f a i l u r e t o f o l l o w through on t h r e a t s or promises of consequences w i l l r e s u l t i n those consequences not being taken s e r i o u s l y . T h i s apparent d i f f i c u l t y i s , however, i l l u s o r y . In f a c t , l o s s of r a t i o n a l i t y and freedom are i n themselves d e t e r r e n t s , and so w i l l themselves a f f e c t the behaviour of o t h e r s . L i k e other d e t e r r e n t s , they may not be t o t a l l y e f f e c t i v e , but c e r t a i n l y i t i s a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g t o commit a crime knowing one w i l l not be punished i f one goes insane i n the meantime than t o "get away wi t h murder." One who l o s e s r a t i o n a l i t y or freedom i s not " g e t t i n g away" at a l l . C e r t a i n l y , i f the a l t e r n a t i v e consequences of an a c t i o n are i n s a n i t y , l o s s of freedom . to t r a n s l a t e thought i n t o a c t i o n , or punishment by o t h e r s , such an a c t i o n w i l l not appear very 95 a t t r a c t i v e . The c o n d i t i o n s which would make a p p l i c a t i o n of punishment or blame i n e f f e c t i v e are themselves powerful d e t e r r e n t s , and so the a p p l i c a t i o n of f u r t h e r d e t e r r e n t s would be i n e f f e c t i v e and su p e r f l u o u s (and hence an u n j u s t i f i a b l e i n f l i c t i o n of s u f f e r i n g ) . L i k e other a c t i o n s , p r a i s i n g or blaming may be j u s t or u n j u s t . I t would be u n j u s t t o p r a i s e or blame a person not r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n merely to gi v e an example to others because the s e l e c t i o n o f t h a t person would be a r b i t r a r y . Moreover, no one would want t o l i v e under a system of a r b i t r a r y reward and punishment, f o r under such a system such consequences c o u l d n e i t h e r be achieved nor avoided through i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n , as they c o u l d b e f a l l anyone, and so the purpose of such i n c e n t i v e s and d e t e r r e n t s (the c o n t r o l of behaviour through an appeal t o i n t e n t i o n s ) would then be l o s t . Under such a system, rewards and punishments would not f u n c t i o n as i n c e n t i v e s or d e t e r r e n t s , and so would not r e a l l y be rewards or punishments, but some other p r a c t i c e whereby m a t e r i a l g a i n or s u f f e r i n g or approbation or d i s a p p r o b a t i o n are a l l o c a t e d i n some s o r t of a r b i t r a r y way. Such m a t e r i a l measures without the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent would not be reward or punishment, and such o p i n i o n s would not be p r a i s e o r blame. Not o n l y would such measures be u n j u s t , they would be e n t i r e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e , f o r i n p r a i s i n g and blaming one r e f e r s t o what the agent i n e t e n t i o n a l l y d i d , and i f the a c t d i d not r e f l e c t the agent's i n t e n t i o n s , or i f no a c t was performed and the agent was innocent (so to speak) of any a c t i o n , one would be a s c r i b i n g t o the agent i n t e n t i o n s (or even a c t i o n s ) t h a t d i d 96 not e x i s t . Though praise and blame do not follow from respon-s i b i l i t y , they require i t , since to praise or blame i s to make a claim about the agent's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for an action and hence about the agent's intentions. Praise and blame also require the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the person being praised or blamed for the action because they are addressed to the agent as well as to others, and the agent can only be encouraged to repeat or r e f r a i n from cert a i n actions i f the agent has the agency to perform those actions i n t e n t i o n a l l y . Since praise and blame appeal to the agent's agency, as they are directed at c o n t r o l l i n g or a l t e r i n g the agent's actions by c o n t r o l l i n g or a l t e r i n g the agent's intentions or method of action, one does not praise or blame unintentional acts. To do so would be to encourage such acts, and to encourage or discourage such acts i s pointless, as the agent i s not i n control of those actions, and so such encouragement or discouragement can have no good e f f e c t . One may, however, c r i t i c i z e an unintentional act for i t s negligence, i n which case one blames the agent for the agent's method of action or the manner of performance of the action, matters over which (assuming the agent was negligent) the agent has control and which are therefore subject to control or a l t e r a t i o n from praise and blame. Si m i l a r l y , an act can be praised not only for i t s intentions, but for i t s manner of execution, which encourages that method of action. But to praise or blame the agent for actions or aspects of actions not within the agent's control i s pointless because i t i s i n e f f i c a c i o u s and unjust because i t wrongly ascribes an agency to the agent which the agent lacked. In 97 a s c r i b i n g to the agent agency t h a t the agent l a c k e d , and hence i n t e n t i o n s or a t t i t u d e s the agent d i d not possess, one mis-d e s c r i b e s the agent's behaviour. P r a i s e and blame can o n l y be e f f e c t i v e and j u s t when the agent i s i n c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n or aspect of an a c t i o n being p r a i s e d or blamed. To say then t h a t an.agent""deserves" p r a i s e or.blame,is to i n d i c a t e t h a t p r a i s e or blame would be a p p r o p r i a t e , and p r a i s e and blame are a p p r o p r i a t e when the agent was i n c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n or behaviour being assessed. Desert i s then not a matter of moral worth and hence of what c e r t a i n moral types deserve; i t i s a matter of what person i s the a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of a method of c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour, such as p r a i s e or blame, and of whether t h a t person was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n and t h e r e f o r e an a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of such measures. While, the n o t i o n o f d e s e r t i s backward-looking i n t h a t i t i s r e l a t e d to an assessment of the value and cause of a past a c t i o n and of whether the agent was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h a t a c t i o n , i t i s forward- l o o k i n g i n t h a t i t i s bound up i n the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s ( i . e . , the l i k e l y e f f i c a c y and the n e c e s s i t y ) o f p r a i s i n g or blaming the agent. I t i s backward-looking i n t h a t the q u e s t i o n of whether t o p r a i s e or blame (or not) i s dependent on whether the agent was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n , t h a t i s , on whether the agent was i n c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n . I t i s for w a r d - l o o k i n g i n t h a t an answer t o t h a t q u e s t i o n determines the probable e f f i c a c y of p r a i s e and blame, or of any other form of t h r e a t or inducement, i n c o n t r o l l i n g such a c t i o n s . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s o n l y a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the approp-r a i t e n e s s of p r a i s i n g and blaming, as i t i s necessary f o r the 98 e f f i c a c y of those p r a c t i c e s but not s u f f i c i e n t . To deserve p r a i s e or blame i s hot o n l y to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n , but t o be i n a p o s i t i o n where r e c e i p t of p r a i s e and blame may a f f e c t one's f u t u r e a c t i o n s . One may go so f a r as to say t h a t one i s d e s e r v i n g of p r a i s e or blame when the good e f f e c t s o f being p r a i s e d or blamed are l i k e l y t o outweigh any p o s s i b l e bad e f f e c t s . (One may note t h a t the e f f i c a c y , and thus the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s , of p r a i s e and blame i s an e m p i r i c a l matter. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l show t h a t i n f a c t blame, l i k e g u i l t , i s more d e b i l i t a t i n g than e f f e c t i v e , or t h a t p r a i s e leads to egotism. T h i s t h e s i s allows f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t p r a i s e or blame may be i n e f f i c a c i o u s means of c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour; our o b j e c t here i s merely to show what c o n d i t i o n s must n e c e s s a r i l y o b t a i n f o r e i t h e r p r a i s e or blame to be e f f e c t i v e . ) A person may be the a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of an a t t i t u d e of p r a i s e or blame, and i n t h a t sense be "praiseworthy" or blameworthy," but e x p r e s s i o n of t h a t a t t i t u d e may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e or u n j u s t under some circumstances. I t may be p o i n t l e s s or even harmful to p r a i s e or blame even when a person i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t . V i r t u e i s i t s own reward o f t e n enough, and r e c o g n i t i o n of agency and freedom and of the v a l u e of the a c t may be present to the agent and so need not be brought to the agent's a t t e n t i o n (though to do so would do no harm, and to express one's admiration or g r a t i t u d e may b e n e f i t the agent and so serve as an a d d i t i o n a l , i f unnecessary, way of promoting the a c t i o n p r a i s e d ) . In other cases, where a person achieves a good and p r o f i t s p e r s o n a l l y from such an achievement, p r a i s e i s unnecessary, and, i n cases where p e r s o n a l 99 p r o f i t was the m o t i v a t i o n and where the p r a i s e r e f e r s to the i n t e n t i o n s or a t t i t u d e s of the agent, i t i s misguided i n t h a t i t i n c o r r e c t l y a s c r i b e s worthy i n t e n t i o n s or motives to the agent which the agent d i d not possess. S i m i l a r l y , e v i l can be i t s own punishment, and the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t one has done wrong and had the power to avoid doing so i s o f t e n punishment enough, i n which case f u r t h e r punishment (such as blame) would be a p o i n t l e s s and c r u e l i n f l i c t i o n of s u f f e r i n g . The p o i n t of p r a i s e and blame i s to guide a c t i o n s by p o i n t i n g out to agents the val u e s of c e r t a i n a c t i o n s and t h e i r power to perform or not perform a c t i o n s , t h a t i s , t h e i r own freedom and agency. There may be cases where p r a i s e and blame are not necessary because the agent i s aware of agency and freedom and of the v a l u e of the a c t i o n , and the consequence of the a c t i o n i s i n i t s e l f a s u f f i c i e n t d e t e r r e n t or i n c e n t i v e , making any consequences d e l i b e r a t e l y imposed by others because of the v a l u e of the ac t unnecessary. To p r a i s e one a l r e a d y content w i t h the consequence of the a c t i o n does l i t t l e (though there may be cases where one i s content only i f the consequence of the action i s p r a i s e ) , and to blame someone despondent over an a c t i o n i s p e t t y and c r u e l , as w e l l as u s e l e s s (and i t i s a l s o t o assume a presumptious a t t i t u d e of moral judgment of the agent's worth, and we have seen t h a t such assessments are never l e g i t i m a t e ) . 9. R e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s There i s , however, an element of p r a i s e and blame which needs to be more f u l l y e x p l o r e d . I t i s what has been a l l u d e d to as the a e s t h e t i c judgment of c h a r a c t e r and a c t i o n s c ontained 100 i n some forms of approbation and d i s a p p r o b a t i o n . The b a s i s of such judgments are what P.F. Strawson has termed " r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . " I n s o f a r as p r a i s e and blame are ex p r e s s i o n s of a t t i t u d e s of l i k e or d i s l i k e toward the agent, they are more a f u n c t i o n o f the a t t i t u d e s and e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r -p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s than a consequence of the p r a c t i c e o f h o l d i n g persons r e s p o n s i b l e . They are r e l a t e d to the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o n l y i n s o f a r as the respon-s i b i l i t y o f the agent i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the approp-r i a t e n e s s of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s being d i r e c t e d toward the agent. We respond with l i k e or d i s l i k e , a v e r s i o n or a t t r a c t i o n , to d i f f e r e n t events and s t a t e s of a f f a i r s . Our f e e l i n g s of l i k e and d i s l i k e are d i r e c t e d toward a c t i o n s , among other t h i n g s . But these f e e l i n g s are d i r e c t e d i n some cases not a t the a c t i o n s themselves, but express a l i k e or d i s l i k e of the i n t e n t i o n or a t t i t u d e of the agent the a c t i o n r e v e a l s . The i n t e n t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s toward us and toward humans i n gen e r a l i s a matter of prime importance to us as i n d i v i d u a l s and as s o c i a l beings. I t i s important to us to be able to both r e c o g n i z e and to eva l u a t e those i n t e n t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s as good, fav o u r a b l e or sympathetic on the one hand, or as malevolent, contemptuous or i n d i f f e r e n t on the other. We must know i n some measure what the i n t e n t i o n s or a t t i t u d e s of a person are i n order to know how to i n t e r a c t w i t h t h a t person and whether or not one wishes t o enter i n t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p , be i t p e r s o n a l , s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l or commercial, w i t h t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . Awareness of the a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s of others and concern f o r those a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s thus profoundly a f f e c t s our own a t t i t u d e s , i n t e n t i o n s and ways of l i f e . 101 The reason f o r t h i s i s t h a t c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s between persons or between an i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y r e q u i r e the presence of c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The a t t i t u d e r e q u i r e d and the i n t e n s i t y or degree t o which i t i s h e l d depends on the r e l a t i o n s h i p . Most g e n e r a l l y , s o c i a l l i f e depends on c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s of g o o d w i l l , compassion, c a r i n g or concern among the p a r t i c i p a n t s . M o r a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y a regard f o r the i n t e r e s t s , r i g h t s and f e e l i n g s of other s e n t i e n t beings. One who i s inc a p a b l e of such o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s i s not a moral agent and i s t h e r e f o r e i n c a p a b l e of moral freedom. ( i t i s , of course, one t h i n g to be immoral and another to be incap-able of being moral.) R e l a t i o n s with such a person would then not i n v o l v e t r e a t i n g the person as one capable of moral f r e e -dom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but would r a t h e r i n v o l v e an e f f o r t t o c o n t r o l or a l t e r t h a t person's behaviour by appeal t o other measures than moral sense, or a regard f o r o t h e r s , as t h a t sense i s l a c k i n g i n t h a t i n d i v i d u a l . (The immoral agent may possess the sense, but i t i s not a c t i v a t e d or dominant enough, i n which case the purpose of h o l d i n g t h a t agent m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e would be to develop or a c t i v a t e t h a t sense or t o t i e i t t o some oth e r concern, such as a d e s i r e t o enjoy the freedoms accorded o n l y t o m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l s . ) In d e a l i n g with a person i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s , one, i n a way, would be f o r c e d t o t r e a t t h a t person as being somewhat l e s s than a person, f o r i t would not be p o s s i b l e to appeal to t h a t person's freedom to c o n t r o l the moral q u a l i t i e s of t h a t person's a c t s , as t h a t person l a c k s such freedom. (Sociopaths are i n d i v i d u a l s of t h i s type.) In 102 consequence, any r e l a t i o n with t h a t person r e q u i r i n g moral freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y would be i m p o s s i b l e . Such a person would be s u b j e c t to n e i t h e r p r a i s e or blame, as such a per-son i s i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g the a t t i t u d e s to which p r a i s e and blame (as assessments of a t t i t u d e s ) r e f e r . On the other hand, one p o s s e s s i n g the a b i l i t y to have the a p p r o p r i a t e o t h e r -r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s would be expected, as a c o n d i t i o n of t h a t person's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i e t y , to possess those a t t i t u d e s . When t h a t a b i l i t y i s present i n a person, we take p l e a s u r e i n the f u l f i l l m e n t of our e x p e c t a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the a t t i t u d e s the person should possess, and f e e l d i s t r e s s or h o s t i l i t y when those e x p e c t a t i o n s are not r e a l i z e d . A person who f u l f i l l s our e x p e c t a t i o n s by e x h i b i t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e o t h e r -r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s i s a welcome p a r t i c i p a n t i n s o c i e t y ; a person i s p e r c e i v e d as noxious, and noxious due to c h o i c e (and hence e v i l ) , and so i s abhorred or r e s e n t e d i f such a l a c k of o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and mis-t r u s t e d as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n s o c i e t y en tous cas. S o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are based on t r u s t , and t r u s t t h a t others w i l l regard persons other than themselves f a v o u r a b l y ; b e t r a y a l of t h i s t r u s t i s a t h r e a t to s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and to t h e i r p a r t i c i p a n t s , and the n a t u r a l response to a t h r e a t i s to be wary of i t and to take steps to defend o n e s e l f a g a i n s t i t . In cases where the t h r e a t i s a person, one appeals to t h a t . person's i n t e r e s t s , i f t h a t person i s f r e e , and to t h a t per-son's i n t e r e s t s i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g as a f r e e and r e s p o n s i b l e i n d i v i d u a l i n s o c i e t y , i f t h a t person i s m o r a l l y f r e e i n the sense t h a t the person i s capable of h o l d i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e 103 o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s . I f the person does not e x h i b i t the a p p r o p r i a t e o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s , t h a t person i s excluded from c e r t a i n s o r t s of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s u n t i l such time as those o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s are evidenced, as a person l a c k i n g those a t t i t u d e s cannot f u l f i l l the e x p e c t a t i o n s r e q u i r e d of t h a t person i n those r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The same b a s i c r e a s o n i n g a p p l i e s to oth e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s ; i n commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s , some honesty or r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s r e q u i r e d ; i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , the e x p e c t a t i o n s on the a t t i t u d e s of the p a r t i c i p a n t s are much g r e a t e r , and w i l l i n c l u d e t h i n g s such as c e r t a i n kinds of t r u s t , love and l o y a l t y . The n e c e s s i t y then, of c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s being present i n the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s e n t a i l s t h a t where a r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s , c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l be h e l d o f any i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t , and v i o l a t i o n of those e x p e c t a t i o n s w i l l be :iseeh as a t h r e a t to the r e l a t i o n s h i p and to i t s other p a r t i c i p a n t ( s ) . Because of the e x p e c t a t i o n s we' p l a c e on ot h e r s with regard to the a t t i t u d e s they ho l d toward us, an e v a l u a t i o n of the agent's a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s may be accompanied by an emotional response based p r i m a r i l y on f e e l i n g s of l i k e and d i s -l i k e . As the p o s s i b i l i t y of c e r t a i n p o s i t i v e emotional a t t i t u d e s toward another i s dependent on the presence of c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s i n another, l a c k of those a t t i t u d e s i n another may r u l e out c e r t a i n kinds o f emotional responses, and hence c e r t a i n kinds of r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In cases where a t t i t u d e s of a c e r t a i n s o r t are expected to be h e l d by another (as, f o r example, when the other i s a p a r t i c i p a n t i n some s o c i a l or pe r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with one) and are absent, one's emotional 104 response' may be based on f e e l i n g s of a v e r s i o n and d i s l i k e (based p r i m a r i l y on the p e r c e p t i o n of a h u r t or p o t e n t i a l hurt due to the o t h e r ) . The kinds of emotional responses one can have toward persons thus depends on the p o s s i b i l i t y of persons h o l d i n g c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s necessary f o r the approp-r i a t e n e s s of such emotional responses and on whether, when such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s i n f a c t present, a person does i n f a c t possess those a t t i t u d e s . Any r e l a t i o n s h i p hence r e q u i r e s t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s h o l d e x p e c t a t i o n s of each other, and to ask whether one should s u b j e c t o t hers to e x p e c t a t i o n s i s then to ask whether one should have r e l a t i o n s with o t h e r s . The emotional response to an assessment of an agent's a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s i s o f t e n a component of a t t i t u d e s of p r a i s e and blame and the e x p r e s s i o n of those a t t i t u d e s . F e e l i n g s such as g r a t i t u d e and resentment, which Strawson p l a c e s under the g e n e r a l r u b r i c of " r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s , " are a product of one's assessment of the agent's i n t e n t i o n s , r a t h e r than of the a c t i t s e l f . S p e c i f i c a l l y , r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are a r e f l e c t i o n of what one b e l i e v e s were the a t t i t u d e s of the agent toward o n e s e l f or toward another i n a c t i n g i n a c e r t a i n way. I t i s not so much the r e s u l t of the a c t i o n as the a t t i t u d e which the a c t i o n r e v e a l s or expresses t h a t matters. Reactive a t t i t u d e s are thus a r e a c t i o n to an assessment of the agent's c h a r a c t e r , and are p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d toward the agent, r a t h e r than the a c t i o n . They are d i r e c t e d toward the a c t i o n o n l y i n s o f a r as i t r e v e a l s the c h a r a c t e r of the agent, and hence are u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t e d toward the agent. 105 C e r t a i n forms of a c t i o n are by nature i n a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t s of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . A c t i o n s which are u n i n t e n t i o n a l do not c a l l f o r t h an emotional response toward the agent simply because the a c t i o n d i d not r e f l e c t the agent's i n t e n t i o n s or a t t i t u d e s , and i t i s those i n t e n t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s to. which the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are a response. N e g l i g e n t a c t i o n s may appear to be an e x p e c t a t i o n s i n c e they do c a l l f o r t h a negative response, but are not so as they r e v e a l the a t t i t u d e of the agent toward o n e s e l f or o t hers by i n d i c -a t i n g the pains the agent i s prepared to take to achieve or avo i d c e r t a i n s t a t e s of a f f a i r s t h a t the agent b e l i e v e s (or i s i n a p o s i t i o n to know) w i l l a f f e c t o t h e r s , or by i n d i c a t i n g the agent's l e v e l of concern f o r o t hers simply i n view of the f a c t t h a t the agent has or has not c o n s i d e r e d the e f f e c t such a c t i o n s (or l a c k of care i n t h e i r performance) w i l l have on o t h e r s . In the case of u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n , i t i s the f a c t t h a t the a c t i o n does not r e f l e c t the agent's i n t e n t i o n s which makes the agent an i n a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s based on t h a t a c t i o n , except i n cases of n e g l i g e n c e , where r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s d i r e c t e d toward the agent are based on the s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t the a c t i o n r e f l e c t e d an i n t e n t i o n of the agent would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e , but where r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s d i r e c t e d toward the a t t i t u d e s of the agent evidenced by the agent's negligence would not. Where r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are suspended or are i n a p p r o p r i a t e due to the u n i n t e n -t i o n a l nature of the a c t , the suspension or the w i t h h o l d i n g of the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i n no way i m p l i e s t h a t the agent i s not r a t i o n a l and f r e e i n the manner r e q u i r e d f o r an agent 106 to be responsible. So while the agent i s excused because the action was unintentional, and reactive attitudes are therefore withheld, the agent i s s t i l l regarded as being subject to the expectations and demands that are part of interpersonal and s o c i a l relationships concerning the attitudes of a member of such a relationship toward others. Reactive attitudes are suspended since the fact of the unintentional act i s not incompatible with the possession by the agent of an attitude or intention contrary to or incompatible with the outcome of the act. Where an unintentional act i s b e n e f i c i a l , the act says nothing about the goodwill or v i r t u e of the agent, and so gratitude would be out of place. Or when the action i s harmful, the reason that the reactive attitude of resentment would be inappropriate i s that, as Strawson says, "the fact of the injury was not i n t h i s case incompatible with ... the agent's attitudes and intentions being just what we demand 27 they should be." In other words, not only would i t be reasonable to hold expectations that are part of f u l l i n t e r -personal and s o c i a l relationships with the agent, but the agent has not f a i l e d to f u l f i l l those expectations, since the agent's actions were not a r e f l e c t i o n of the agent's attitudes and thus did not indicate that the agent lacks the attitudes which we would expect the agent to hold. The inapprop-riateness of d i r e c t i n g reactive attitudes toward an agent on the basis of the agent's unintentional act then says nothing about the character of the agent or about whether the agent i s a possible object of reactive attitudes or a possible participant i n social- and interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . 107 There may be cases, however, where reactive attitudes may be inappropriate because the expectations of attitudes and behaviour of the agent involved i n f u l l interpersonal and so c i a l relationships are unreasonable. The expectations of attitudes and behaviour placed on others i n a context of s o c i a l or interpersonal relationships are unreasonable i n two sorts of cases: those i n which responsible agents are placed in extraordinary circumstances, and so th e i r choices r e f l e c t the d r a s t i c or s t r e s s f u l nature of the situ a t i o n , and those in which the agent lacks the r a t i o n a l i t y necessary to be able to possess the attitudes toward others necessary for f u l l interpersonal and s o c i a l relationships. In our discussion of some actions which have been mistakenly 2 8 c a l l e d "involuntary," we noted that under circumstances where the choice with which the agent i s presented involves some choices valued so highly by the agent that we could not reasonably expect the agent to s a c r i f i c e i t or not act on i t , the agent's actions are j u s t i f i a b l e or permissible because of the value choice on which they are based. The agent i s not excusable, because the agent possessed f u l l agency and the action resulted from a r a t i o n a l choice of the agent, and so the agent i s f u l l y responsible for the action. Yet when dr a s t i c choices involving values held very strongly by the agent are presented to the agent due to extraordinary circum-stances, the expectations we would have of the agent under ordinary circumstances (where such high values are not at stake) would not apply, as i t would be unreasonable to expect the agent not to act upon certain important or highly ranked 108 values (and any rule asking that of agent's would be i n e f f e c t i v e for that reason). In e f f e c t , because one cannot reasonably expect agents acting under such extraordinary circumstances to behave as they would under normal circumstances, those agents' obligations would not be the same as they would be under ordinary circumstances, i f any obligations would even exi s t under extraordinary circumstances. If an agent does succeed i n s a c r i f i c i n g a highly valued goal (such as self-preservation), then such acts are indeed estimable, as they far surpass what we may reasonably expect agents to do. It i s not that the expectations we would have of the agent i n normal circumstances are met and then surpassed; by achieving a good we would expect of the agent under ordinary circumstances, the agent achieves a good we would not expect the agent to, and so, far from merely surpassing our expect-ations, the agent achieves a value when no expectations of the agent to do so are present. The value of the act derives from the fact that the agent went beyond the whole network of normal expectations of other-regarding attitudes and behaviour. If the agent does, however, choose some very high value (such as self-preservation), though such an action i s not excusable (since the agent i s i n f u l l control of i t and so f u l l y respon-s i b l e for i t ) , i t i s pardonable, as the expectations one would normally have of an agent do not apply i n that s i t u a t i o n , and so the act does not v i o l a t e the expectations of goodwill that form a basis for f u l l interpersonal and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Where one cannot reasonably expect the agent to do otherwise, one cannot reasonably blame or resent the agent for the action. 109 On the other hand, i f an agent achieves a good because non-performance o f t h a t a c t would r e s u l t i n the s a c r i f i c e o f a very high v a l u e , i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e to p r a i s e or f e e l g r a t i t u d e toward the agent f o r doing what one c o u l d not have reasonably expected the agent f o r doing what one c o u l d not have reasonably expected the agent not to have done. In such cases, i t i s not c o r r e c t to say t h a t the agent has f u l -f i l l e d our e x p e c t a t i o n s , as the m o t i v a t i o n of the a c t i o n was the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f some h i g h l y valued g o a l , r a t h e r than some o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e , and our e x p e c t a t i o n s r e f e r not only to behaviour but to the a t t i t u d e s which produce i t . Because of the b a s i c nature of h i g h l y valued goals such as s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , and because one cannot reasonably expect an agent not to a c t on those v a l u e s , a c t i o n s based on h i g h l y valued g o a l s , while they are r e v e a l i n g i n t h a t they i l l u m i n a t e the value system of the agent, i n a way say l i t t l e about the agent i n t h a t they o n l y i n d i c a t e t h a t the agent i s not u n l i k e most people i n t h a t the agent holds c e r t a i n v a l u e s so h i g h l y t h a t i t would be extremely u n l i k e l y f o r the agent not to a c t on them. Hence, r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s d i r e c t e d toward agents on the b a s i s of a c t i o n s t h a t take p l a c e i n circumstances where the agent a c t s on a value one c o u l d not reasonably expect the agent to s a c r i f i c e are i n a p p r o p r i a t e because the ex p e c t a t i o n s t h a t one. co u l d reasonably h o l d of the agent under o r d i n a r y circumstances cannot be reasonably h e l d i n circum-stances where the ch o i c e s presented are f a r more d r a s t i c . The o n l y e x p e c t a t i o n would be p o s i t i v e r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s toward h e r o i c a c t s or a c t s of g r e a t s e l f - s a c r i f i c e , but those 110 f e e l i n g s would be present p r e c i s e l y because the agent has achieved some good i n the absence o f any e x p e c t a t i o n s of the agent to do so. In s u r p a s s i n g our e x p e c t a t i o n s by a c h i e v i n g i n e x t r a o r d i n a r y circumstances t h a t we can reasonably expect o f agents o n l y i n o r d i n a r y circumstances, the agent earns our g r a t i t u d e . The e x i s t e n c e o f negative r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s f o r a f a i l u r e to go beyond what we can reasonably expect of agents would be unreasonable and hence i n a p p r o p r i a t e , and the e x i s t e n c e of p o s i t i v e r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s toward an agent who d i d good because not doing so would r e s u l t i n d r a s t i c s a c r i f i c e s on the p a r t o f the agent would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e and i n a sense mistaken. Reactive a t t i t u d e s and the e x p e c t a t i o n s on which they are based would be suspended, however, due to the nature o f the circumstances i n these cases, and t h i s suspension would be f u l l y compatible with the agent being r e s p o n s i b l e and so s u b j e c t to the e x p e c t a t i o n s h e l d i n f u l l i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and so to the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s on which they are based. The agent i n such s i t u a t i o n s i s s t i l l r e s p o n s i b l e and f r e e ; i t i s our e x p e c t a t i o n s which d i f f e r o r are absent, as the case may be. Circumstances may make r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r a d i f f e r e n t reason, namely, t h a t the s t r e s s f u l nature of some s i t u a t i o n s causes the agent to behave i r r a t i o n a l l y . Under such circumstances the agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e and t h e r e f o r e not s u b j e c t to the e x p e c t a t i o n s we p l a c e on r e s p o n s i b l e agents or to the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s r e s u l t i n g from those e x p e c t a t i o n s . S t r e s s may, moreover, cause the agent to a c t "out of c h a r a c t e r , " so t h a t the agent's a c t i o n s are not t r u l y r e f l e c t i v e of the I l l agent's r e a l a t t i t u d e s , which would be o p e r a t i v e and d e t e c t a b l e i n circumstances where the agent was r a t i o n a l . When under s t r e s s , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s normally important to the agent may have no e f f e c t , making the agent's a c t i o n a product o f a mom-entar y a b e r r a t i o n i n a t t i t u d e s due to u n u s u a l l y s t r e s s f u l circumstances r a t h e r than to the a t t i t u d e s the agent would e x h i b i t when r a t i o n a l . The e x p e c t a t i o n s one would hol d of the agent when the agent i s r a t i o n a l and the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s t h a t accompany them would thus be i n a p p r o p r i a t e because the agent i s not r e s p o n s i b l e (as the agent i s not r a t i o n a l ) i n those s i t u a t i o n s . Hence, the agent i s not an a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of the e x p e c t a t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s t h a t are p a r t of f u l l i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s because the agent, l a c k i n g c o n t r o l over a c t i o n s , i s t e m p o r a r i l y i n c a p a b l e of engaging i n such r e l a t i o n s h i p s (as the agent l a c k s the a b i l i t y to f u l f i l l the e x p e c t a t i o n s which o b t a i n i n such r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) , due to i r r a t i o n a l i t y brought on by s t r e s s f u l circumstances. The second s o r t of case where the e x p e c t a t i o n s of the agent which form the b a s i s of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are unreasonable or i n a p p r o p r i a t e i s when the agent i s i n c a p a b l e of meeting those e x p e c t a t i o n s due to a handicap such as c h r o n i c i r r a t i o n -a l i t y . E x p e c t a t i o n s are i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n these cases because of a f a c t about the agent, r a t h e r than a f a c t about the circum-stances. I t i s obvious t h a t a p h y s i c a l l y handicapped agent cannot be expected to perform those a c t i o n s t h a t the handicap prevents the agent from performing. I t should a l s o be obvious t h a t i t i s unreasonable t o expect the i r r a t i o n a l agent to have those a t t i t u d e s of g o o d w i l l and prudence t h a t the agent's 112 i r r a t i o n a l i t y prevents the agent from having. Wheras the p h y s i c a l l y handicapped are not s u b j e c t to c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s as to behaviour, they are, however, s u b j e c t to e x p e c t a t i o n s concerning what t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward o t h e r s should be ( b a r r i n g any i r r a t i o n a l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g those t h a t may r e s u l t from the handicap), and so are a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t s of the e x p e c t a t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s t h a t are p a r t of f u l l i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The m e n t a l l y handicapped or i r r a t i o n a l person i s i n a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n . Such a person i s i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g the a t t i t u d e s necessary to such r e l a t i o n s h i p s and which o t h e r s would demand of a person i n such a r e l a t i o n s h i p . Excluded from c e r t a i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (though not from t h e r a p e u t i c ones), m e n t a l l y handicapped and i r r a t i o n a l persons are t h e r e f o r e not s u b j e c t to the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n those r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s are not s u b j e c t to r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s based on those e x p e c t a t i o n s . The a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s o f r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s thus c o i n c i d e s w i t h the agent's being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the a c t i o n i n most cases. As r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are d i r e c t e d toward the a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s of the agent, i t i s necessary t h a t the a c t i o n r e f l e c t the agent's a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s , and thus ( b a r r i n g neg-l i g e n c e ) must be i n t e n t i o n a l . An u n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n r e v e a l s the a t t i t u d e s of the agent only when i t r e v e a l s n e g l i g e n c e , and then the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e i s d i r e c t e d toward the f a c t of n e g l i g e n c e , r a t h e r than the unintended outcome of the a c t . R e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are based on e x p e c t a t i o n s of what a t t i t u d e s agents should have i n c e r t a i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -113 s h i p s . Where the e x p e c t a t i o n s are unreasonable, then so are the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . An agent can be r e s p o n s i b l e and y e t be an i n a p p r o p r i a t e o b j e c t of o r d i n a r y r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i f the demands p l a c e d on the agent are i n o r d i n a t e l y g r e a t , and i n these cases the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s does not correspond w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent. However, an agent not i n conscious c o n t r o l of h i s or her i n t e n t i o n s cannot be expected to make those i n t e n t i o n s con-form to what we expect or demand o f r e s p o n s i b l e agents, and such an agent i s n e i t h e r r e s p o n s i b l e nor a f i t o b j e c t of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s , and so here again r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the appropriateness'- of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s c o i n c i d e . So r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a t most o u t l i n e s where r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s c o u l d be a p p r o p r i a t e . As we have a l r e a d y seen, sometimes the unreasonableness of the e x p e c t a t i o n s on which o r d i n a r y r e a c t i v e . a t t i t u d e s are based can make such a t t i t u d e s i n a p p r o p r i a t e even when d i r e c t e d a t r e s p o n s i b l e agents. In f a c t , r e a c t i v e a t t i t -udes are more a f u n c t i o n of our e x p e c t a t i o n s of other people than of t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent i s a necessary but not s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . The e x i s t e n c e of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i s c o n t i n g e n t upon our concern f o r the a t t i t u d e s of another toward o n e s e l f and o t h e r s , and upon the e x i s t e n c e or a d e s i r e f o r the e x i s t e n c e of some i n t e r p e r s o n a l or s o c i a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p i n which another p a r t i c i p a t e s and i n which the o t h e r ' s a t t i t u d e toward o n e s e l f and others would matter. I f the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n q u e s t i o n i s an i n t e r p e r s o n a l one between the agent and o n e s e l f , then i f one i s i n d i f f e r e n t to 114 how the agent f e e l s toward o n e s e l f , no f e e l i n g of g r a t i t u d e or resentment c o u l d a r i s e as a r e s u l t of the agent's a c t i o n s t h a t would be d i r e c t e d toward the agent. (One may l i k e or d i s l i k e what the agent does, but those f e e l i n g s would not be extended from the a c t i o n to the agent.) Lack of concern f o r how the agent f e e l s about o n e s e l f i n f a c t r u l e s out many o f the deeper kinds of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g w i t h t h a t agent. Perhaps complete i n d i f f e r e n c e toward how any r a t i o n a l being regards one i s u n l i k e l y , but we may say t h a t (roughly) the i n t e n s i t y of the r e a c t i v e f e e l i n g s v a r i e s pro-p o r t i o n a t e l y with the p e r s o n a l , emotional investment one has i n the agent or i n a s p e c i f i c k i n d of r e l a t i o n s h i p with the agent. I t w i l l a l s o vary p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y to one's expect-a t i o n s of the agent. These two areas are r e l a t e d i n t h a t the deeper the r e l a t i o n s h i p , and hence the g r e a t e r the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d , the more s e r i o u s becomes the f u l f i l l m e n t of expect-a t i o n s t h a t would be the sum t o t a l of a l e s s p e r s o n a l or deep r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thus, l a c k of f u l f i l l m e n t of an o r d i n a r y e x p e c t a t i o n , which one would h o l d of any member of s o c i e t y , on the p a r t of an agent w i t h whom one i s c o n s i d e r a b l y more deeply i n v o l v e d i s a much g r e a t e r v i o l a t i o n o f e x p e c t a t i o n s than i t would be i n a l e s s deep r e l a t i o n s h i p . A l t e r n a t i v e l y put, the e x p e c t a t i o n s of a l e s s deep r e l a t i o n s h i p are b a s i c to any f u r t h e r e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t would be p a r t of a deeper r e l a t i o n s h i p , and so, the emotional r e a c t i o n to v i o l a t i o n of-e x p e c t a t i o n s i s bound to be t h a t much s t r o n g e r . To t h i n k of i t g e o m e t r i c a l l y , i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s one i s con-cerned w i t h how the other person f e e l s about one, and the 115 g r e a t e r the concern, the g r e a t e r the r a d i u s of the c i r c l e w i t h i n which a c t i o n s s u b j e c t to r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s w i l l f a l l , and the nearer t o the c e n t r e o f the c i r c l e , the s t r o n g e r w i l l be the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e . (Thus a l i e t o l d by a t r u s t e d f r i e n d i s r e sented more than one t o l d by a s t r a n g e r , and the murder of a parent i s found more loathsome than the k i l l i n g of one to whom one i s not r e l a t e d . ) The e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s extend i n t o s u r p r i s i n g l y many spheres of l i f e . Even i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p between a p a t i e n t and a t h e r a p i s t , i n which c e r t a i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e s are d e l i b e r a t e l y excluded f o r the sake of o b j e c t i v i t y , some a c t i o n s w i l l s t i l l be the approp-r i a t e o b j e c t o f a r e a c t i v e response. C e r t a i n c o - o p e r a t i o n i s expected between p a t i e n t and t h e r a p i s t ; the t h e r a p i s t i s expected to a c t i n the p a t i e n t ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s , and the p a t i e n t i s expected to f o l l o w the t h e r a p i s t ' s guidance. I f , f o r example, the t h e r a p i s t i s never i n a t the time of the appointment, c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s i n h e r e n t t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p are v i o l a t e d , and i f e i t h e r the t h e r a p i s t or the p a t i e n t t r i e s to k i l l the other, e x p e c t a t i o n s of g o o d w i l l b a s i c to any r e l a t i o n s h i p whatsoever are v i o l a t e d . V i o l a t i o n s of the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n h e r e n t to the r e l a t i o n s h i p r e v e a l a t t i t u d e s (eg., of i n d i f f -erence or h o s t i l i t y ) which, given the nature of the r e l a t i o n -s h i p , matter to the p a r t i c i p a n t enough t h a t t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n or r e v e l a t i o n v i o l a t e s the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s . e x p e c t a t i o n s and i n j u r e s h i s or her f e e l i n g s o r person, s i n c e the f e e l i n g s (eg., of a f f e c t i o n or t r u s t ) i n v e s t e d i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p have been betrayed or denied. 116 Generally then, i f one cares about or feels for a person or cares about a relationship with a person, then one w i l l care about the attitude of the person toward oneself. Reactive attitudes are then based on what one would l i k e the person's attitudes toward oneself to be, or what one expects them to be given the nature of the relationship, rather than on what action or attitude one i s e n t i t l e d to receive from the agent. The less personal investment one has i n a re l a t i o n s h i p with the agent, the less important what one expects of the agent or would l i k e the agent to do (or to be) w i l l be. Since the above i s the case, reactive attitudes based on an action that reveals the agent's attitudes toward others, rather than oneself, d i f f e r in degree only, and not i n kind, from reactive attitudes which arise i n a context of i n t e r -personal relations with the agent. When one has a reactive attitude to an agent because of the moral value of an action, one i s reacting to an action which reveals whether or not the agent has cert a i n attitudes which are generally expected to be held by members of society toward other members. Such a "moral" reaction can be experienced simultaneously with more personal feelings directed toward the agent, and the presence of more intense feelings i s contingent on how close the agent or one affected by the agent's actions i s to oneself. In other words, i t i s a matter of how much the agent's attitudes matter to oneself that allows for "moral" as well as personal reactive attitudes. The one form of reaction does not rule out the other. If an agent injures someone close to oneself, one's f e e l i n g may involve moral indignation, but i t may also 117 involve, f e e l i n g s such as resentment and a d e s i r e f o r vengence. Or, f o r example, i f someone i s c r u e l toward one, one's i n d i g -n a t i o n may be moral, but i f the agent i s c l o s e to one and has v i o l a t e d more e x p e c t a t i o n s than the g e n e r a l ones which count as moral, one's f e e l i n g may go beyond moral i n d i g n a t i o n , not because the a c t i s not judged on i t s moral p r i n c i p l e s , but because there i s an a d d i t i o n a l non-moral element due to the f a c t t h a t e x p e c t a t i o n s l e s s b a s i c than those which count as moral but which are i n h e r e n t to the r e l a t i o n s h i p have a l s o been v i o l a t e d . Of course, there are e x p e c t a t i o n s l e s s b a s i c than moral ones, v i o l a t i o n or f u l f i l l m e n t o f which would g i v e r i s e o n l y to non-moral r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s based on expect-a t i o n s which occur o n l y i n deeper i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . And one may experience such r e a c t i o n s i n one's own r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the agent, or when the agent does or does not f u l f i l l e x p e c t a t i o n s i n an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h another, wi t h whom one i d e n t i f i e s or f e e l s f o r i n some way, even i f i t i s j u s t as a f e l l o w human. The i n t e n s i t y of the r e a c t i o n w i l l depend on one's involvement w i t h the agent or those a f f e c t e d by the agent's a c t i o n s . I f an agent i s not c l o s e to one, one may f e e l moral i n d i g n a t i o n where one cared about the agent would f e e l resentment, or approval where another would . have f e l t g r a t i t u d e . Where another c l o s e to one i s a f f e c t e d by an a c t i o n of the agent, one may f e e l resentment r a t h e r than mere i n d i g n a t i o n . Where the agent i s o n e s e l f , the degree to which one f e e l s remorse or p r i d e over an a c t i o n w i l l , d e p e n d on how c l o s e those a f f e c t e d by one's a c t i o n s are to o n e s e l f , and how b a s i c are the e x p e c t a t i o n s one has f u l f i l l e d or v i o l a t e d . 118 In order f o r a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e to be "moral" then, i t must be based on e x p e c t a t i o n s b a s i c to the e x i s t e n c e of i n t e r -p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . A r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e based on b a s i c or moral e x p e c t a t i o n s can be accompanied by a non-moral r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e when the r e l a t i o n s h i p with the agent and the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n i t go beyond b a s i c s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . One can have non-moral r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s when what one r e a c t s to i s the f u l f i l l m e n t or v i o l a t i o n o f expect-a t i o n s not b a s i c to s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s but i n h e r e n t i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p one has with the agent . (or when one i s c l o s e to one a f f e c t e d by the agent's a c t i o n s , or when the person a f f e c t e d by the agent i s i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the agent t h a t i s deeper than a mere s o c i a l one and with whom one i d e n t -i f i e s or sympathizes i n one way or another). One's r e a c t i o n s thus v a r i e s w i t h the k i n d o f e x p e c t a t i o n s one has of the agent and with how much one cares about the agent's a t t i t u d e s (which v a r i e s w i t h how much one cares about the agent and with how much one cares about those, i n c l u d i n g o n e s e l f , who are a f f e c t e d by the agent). To be concerned with how another person regards others and o n e s e l f i s i n a sense to regard t h a t person as an o b j e c t , as one thereby s u b j e c t s the person to one's own v a l u e s and d e s i r e s by concerning o n e s e l f w i t h how t h a t person stands i n r e l a t i o n to those d e s i r e s and v a l u e s ; y e t l a c k of concern w i t h the agent's a t t i t u d e s toward others and toward o n e s e l f i n d i c a t e s t h a t one i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the agent o n l y as an o b j e c t and as more of an o b j e c t , s i n c e one i n t e r e s t e d o n l y i n the agent's behaviour ( and so i n the e f f e c t s the agent produces) 119 i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n the agent's s u b j e c t i v i t y (or e l s e one would be i n t e r e s t e d i n the a t t i t u d e s o f which the behaviour i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n ) . Lack of concern f o r the agent's a t t i t u d e s toward others i s i n f a c t to not c o n s i d e r the agent as a moral or s o c i a l being, and so to not c o n s i d e r the agent as a p o s s i b l e p a r t i c i p a n t i n s o c i a l or i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s (which r e q u i r e not onl y the moral freedom of the agent but the concern on the p a r t of others w i t h the moral q u a l i t y o f the agent's a c t i o n s , and so with the agent's a t t i t u d e s ) . In the vent of such l a c k of concern, one would have no r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e toward the agent. I f one does not care about o t h e r s o n e s e l f , one w i l l a l s o not care about how an agent t r e a t s o t h ers except i n s o f a r as t h a t reveals how an agent i s l i k e l y to t r e a t one-s e l f , and as one has not y e t been a f f e c t e d by the agent, no r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s would f o l l o w from the agent's a c t i o n s , though one may c o n s i d e r how to i n t e r a c t w i t h the agent on the b a s i s of the agent's o t h e r - r e g a r d i n g a t t i t u d e s (or the l a c k of them). Such a t t i t u d e s on one's own p a r t , however, would i n d i c a t e a f a i l u r e to regard o t h e r s as anything save means to one's own ends, i n which case one would o n e s e l f l a c k the a t t i t u d e s necessary f o r c e r t a i n s o c i a l and i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The e x i s t e n c e of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s thus depends on some r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the agent. The occurence of a negative r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e may r u l e out f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but t h a t i s because the e x p e c t a t i o n s of some pr e v i o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p had been v i o l a t e d , and not because r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are forward-l o o k i n g , as they are not. D i f f e r e n t s o r t s of agents w i l l be 120 capable of d i f f e r e n t degrees of r e l a t e d n e s s , and so of meeting d i f f e r e n t s o r t s of e x p e c t a t i o n s , so t h a t not being i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h an agent r u l e s out r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s , . w h i l e the i n c a p a c i t y of an agent to meet the e x p e c t a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s (due to i r r a t i o n a l i t y , f o r example) r u l e s out not o n l y r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s toward the agent, but even the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s ( i n s o f a r as the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the agent i s r u l e d o u t ) . Future r e l a t i o n s h i p s may thus be r u l e d out i n the absence of any r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . R eactive a t t i t u d e s depend on the the a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of a r e l a t i o n s h i p , not on the mere p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p , though an assessment of t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y might f o l l o w from r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . But an assessment of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the agent does not depend on the e x i s t e n c e of a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e , and a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e may e x i s t even when f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h the agent are i m p o s s i b l e (due to the death of the agent, f o r example). Reactive a t t i t u d e s hence do not f o l l o w from the p r a c t i c e of judging and h o l d i n g persons r e s p o n s i b l e , but from the e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n which the a t t i t u d e of the agent matters to one f o r one reason or another. C a r i n g about the a t t i t u d e of the agent i s i n h e r e n t i n any i n t e r p e r s o n a l or s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with the agent (to v a r y i n g degrees). Lack of a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e toward an agent may r e f l e c t a f a i l u r e to take the agent s e r i o u s l y or i n d i c a t e t h a t one i s i n c a p a b l e of c e r t a i n types of r e l a t i o n s h i p s s i n c e one i s i n c a p a b l e of the a p p r o p r i a t e emotional responses i n v o l v e d i n 121 them: f o r example, a f a i l u r e to r e s e n t a t h r e a t to one's l i f e by a t r u s t e d f r i e n d may i n d i c a t e a l a c k of c a r i n g about o n e s e l f , and a f a i l u r e to f e e l g r a t i t u d e f o r being rescued at the agent's p e r i l i n d i c a t e s a l a c k of c a r i n g about the agent. C e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s thus r e q u i r e e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t g i v e r i s e to r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s , as they r e q u i r e one to care about the agent's a t t i t u d e s and i n t e r e s t s , and a l s o r e q u i r e t h a t one care about the a t t i t u d e s and i n t e r e s t s o f those (such as on e s e l f ) a f f e c t e d by the agent's a c t i o n s . For t h i s reason, r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are i n h e r e n t i n c e r t a i n s o r t s o f r e l a t i o n -s h i p s . From t h i s i t does not f o l l o w t h a t the e x p r e s s i o n of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i s a l s o i n h e r e n t i n c e r t a i n s o r t s of r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Whether or not to express a f e e l i n g , however a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t f e e l i n g may be, whether the f e e l i n g i s p o s i t i v e or n e g a t i v e , i s a pragmatic q u e s t i o n , the answer to which depends on the l i k e l y e f f e c t s of the e x p r e s s i o n o f the f e e l i n g i n c e r t a i n circumstances. Anger may be a p p r o p r i a t e when one i s abused, but r e t a l i a t i o n or a rude response may succeed i n only making matters worse, i n which case i t would be f a r b e t t e r to d e a l w i t h one's anger i n some other way than a d i r e c t e x p r e s s i o n of i t aimed a t the person who provoked i t . There may be cases where one can have one's i n t e r e s t s taken s e r i o u s l y only i f one responds d i r e c t l y to the agent. Being a pragmatic matter, i t i s a l s o an e m p i r i c a l matter. The same goes f o r any other r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e ; whether or not one should express the f e e l i n g i s dependent on the s i t u a t i o n , and d i s c r e t i o n i s the b e t t e r p a r t not o n l y of v a l o u r . 122 T h i s being so, i t i s obvious t h a t i t i s p e r f e c t l y p o s s i b l e , contra Strawson, to have a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e w h ile a t the same time o b j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r i n g what one ought to do i n regard to the agent i n order to secure the r e p e t i t i o n or c e s s a t i o n of the a c t i o n which gave r i s e t o the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e , or i n order to maintain or charge an agent's a t t i t u d e , s i n c e i t i s p o s s i b l e to a t the same time have a f e e l i n g and to c o n s i d e r whether or how one should express i t . Strawson i s mistaken i n b e l i e v i n g t h a t o b j e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of how to a f f e c t or c o n t r o l the behaviour of an agent are incom p a t i b l e with r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . Reactive a t t i t u d e s may prevent one from c o n s i d e r i n g the s i t u a t i o n o b j e c t i v e l y i f they are s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r o n g t h a t one's emotions prevent one from being r a t i o n a l , but t h a t i s a f e a t u r e of emotion i n g e n e r a l , and not of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , and i t i s the s t r e n g t h of the f e e l i n g , not the presence of the r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e per se, which r u l e s out o b j e c t i v i t y . And while i t i s tr u e t h a t one may c o n s i d e r how to a f f e c t or c o n t r o l the behaviour of an agent i n cases where r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s are i n a p p r o p r i a t e , as f o r example when the agent i s i n c a p a b l e of i n t e r p e r s o n a l or s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of a c e r t a i n k i n d due to i r r a t i o n a l i t y , one can c o n s i d e r how to a f f e c t an agent's behaviour and e n t e r -t a i n a r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e when the agent i s r a t i o n a l and r e s p o n s i b l e . One can r e a l i z e what caused an agent t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way, and so c o n s i d e r how to prevent or promote s i m i l a r a c t i o n s i n the f u t u r e , w h i l e a t the same time r e a l i z i n g how the a t t i t u d e r e v e a l e d by the a c t i o n r e l a t e s to one's e x p e c t a t i o n s of the agent, and so e x p e r i e n c i n g r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s 123 on t h a t b a s i s . An o b j e c t i v e a t t i t u d e may be ev i d e n t a f t e r a r e a c t i v e one subsides, but t h a t does not mean t h a t i t was not present when the r e a c t i v e one was as w e l l . In f a c t , the re v e r s e may occur: a f t e r one has decided how to i n t e r a c t with an agent to promote or dete r c e r t a i n a c t i o n s or a f f e c t c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s , one may s t i l l have r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s concerning the agent. There i s no conceptual i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y between r e a c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e a t t i t u d e s , and i f Strawson's c l a i m i s the p s y c h o l o g i c a l one t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of how to a f f e c t an agent's behaviour are incompatible with an emotional response to the agent's a t t i t u d e s as r e v e a l e d by a c t i o n , t h i s seems to be e m p i r i c a l l y f a l s e . One may c o n s i d e r the causes of an a c t and s t i l l have f e e l i n g s of g r a t i t u d e , resentment, p r i d e or shame, f o r what i s a t stake i s an e v a l u a t i o n of c h a r a c t e r , and how a person came to have a c h a r a c t e r of a c e r t a i n type i f i r r e l e v a n t to a s s e s s i n g what types of c h a r a c t e r t h a t person has, though c o n s i d e r i n g how a person came to have a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r would not be incompatible with an assessment of c h a r a c t e r and an emotional response to t h a t assessment based on l i k e or d i s l i k e . R eactive a t t i t u d e s are t h e r e f o r e i n h e r e n t i n c e r t a i n types of r e l a t i o n s h i p s , but the e x p r e s s i o n of those a t t i t u d e s i n word or deed i s not. The l a t t e r i s a pragmatic q u e s t i o n , b a s e d o n what l i k e l y e f f e c t s such e x p r e s s i o n w i l l have on the agent, and these pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are not incom-p a t i b l e with the experience of r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s . To a c t toward agents s o l e l y on the b a s i s o f r a t i o n a l and pragmatic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of how best to c o n t r o l or a f f e c t t h e i r behaviour 124 does not, and cou l d not, r u l e out t h a t important element of l i f e which c o n s i s t s o f emotional responses to the a t t i t u d e s of agents, and so i t would be f o o l i s h to a c t on the b a s i s of those responses (what Strawson c a l l s r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s ) when such a c t i o n would be harmful f o r f e a r t h a t not doing so would e l i m i n a t e t h a t important element of the i n n e r l i f e which c o n s i s t s i n s o l e l y having those emotional responses. One can then care about agents and about o n e s e l f and s t i l l behave r a t i o n a l l y and o b j e c t i v e l y toward them. (In some cases, of course, e x p r e s s i o n of one's f e e l i n g s may be both approp-r i a t e and necessary, but the app r o p r i a t e n e s s of the f e e l i n g does not e n t a i l the app r o p r i a t e n e s s of i t s e x p r e s s i o n . I f one does not respond with s u i t a b l e a f f e c t i o n to k i n d a c t s one may e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e s i r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h an agent because one's l a c k of f a v o u r a b l e response may be i n t e r p r e t e d as a l a c k of i n c a p a c i t y f o r f e e l i n g ; i f one does not respond with anger to c e r t a i n s o r t s of h o s t i l i t y , t h a t may r u l e out c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s with others who i n f e r from one's apparent l a c k of i n d i g n a t i o n a f a i l u r e to take others s e r i o u s l y o r a l a c k o f concern about o n e s e l f . ) Whether to express one's f e e l i n g s i n p r a i s e or blame, then, i s a prag-matic q u e s t i o n , f o r such e x p r e s s i o n f o l l o w s n e i t h e r from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the agent (which i s a necessary c o n d i t i o n of the ap p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the f e e l i n g ) , nor from the approp-r i a t e n e s s of the f e e l i n g . While they are elements of p r a i s e and blame, then r e a c t i v e a t t i t u d e s do not i l l u m i n a t e when p r a i s e and blame should be expressed and r e v e a l more about the expect-a t i o n s i n h e r e n t i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s 125 than about r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In this section we have seen how r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s compat-i b l e with determinism, and how i t relates to practices such as praise and blame. Determinism rules out the legitimacy of some attitudes of praise and blame that hold the agent t o t a l l y and ultimately responsible for what the agent i s , but i t does not rule out evaluations of acts coupled with an assess-ment of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Nor does i t rule out praise and blame as means of c o n t r o l l i n g behaviour. Lastly, i t was shown how the emotional component of some attitudes of praise and blame, known as reactive attitudes, do not follow from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but reveal more about the nature of relationships between persons. PART THREE AUTHENTICITY AND FREEDOM 1. I n t r o d u c t i o n The f i r s t p a r t of t h i s essay showed how the concept of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i l l u m i n a t e s the s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n , but t h a t i t i s the s t r u c t u r e of a c t i o n i t s e l f t h a t p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r both the concept and the p r a c t i c e of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t was found t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n c r e a s e s w i t h agency, and agency i s the degree to which the e f f e c t of the a c t i o n i s under the c o n t r o l of the agent. A c t i o n s are then a k i n d of event t y p i -f i e d by the f a c t t h a t they are produced by a system of causes w i t h i n the agent, and are thus events over which an agent has c o n t r o l . In order f o r an agent to have c o n t r o l over an event, the causes o f t h a t event must i n c l u d e some d e l i b e r a t e or purposive e x e r c i s e of power by the agent, and thus f o r an event caused by an agent to be an a c t i o n the system of causes w i t h i n the agent t h a t produces the event must i n c l u d e an i n -t e n t i o n . R e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s constitutes a g r e a t e r degree of agency, as i t e n t a i l s g r e a t e r conscious c o n t r o l over the a c t i o n , and i t was p o i n t e d out how d i f f e r e n t adverbs of excuse p o i n t out d i f f e r e n t ways i n which an agent may f a i l to c o n t r o l an a c t i o n and not r e a l i z e h i s or her i n t e n t i o n . C o n t r o l over one's i n t e n t i o n s , by f o r m u l a t i n g them i n a c c o r d -ance with one's goals and knowledge (and f o r m u l a t i n g the l a t t e r 127 two i n accordance with the evidence a v a i l a b l e to one), i s what constitutes r a t i o n a l i t y , which i s a c o n d i t i o n of f u l l c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , or of f u l l agency. The t h e s i s which emerges from t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t g r e a t e r agency e n t a i l s g r e a t e r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , ' and hence i s what freedom i s i n the sphere of i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n . Freedom of a c t i o n i s then the degree to which the i n d i v i d u a l has c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n and i t s e f f e c t s . T h i s concept of freedom was defended i n the second p a r t of t h i s essay a g a i n s t the d e t e r m i n i s t or i n c o m p a t i b i l i s t p o s i t i o n , which equates freedom with c a u s a l indeterminancy, or " c o n t r a - c a u s a l " freedom. I t was shown t h a t s i n c e freedom i s agency, i t i s not an a c t i o n ' s being caused t h a t makes i t f r e e or unfree, but the nature of those causes. To the degree to which an agent has c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , and so to the degree to which the causes of an a c t i o n are w i t h i n an agent and s u b j e c t to t h a t agent's conscious c o n t r o l , the a c t i o n i s f r e e . How i t came to be t h a t the agent was such t h a t he or she had c o n t r o l over the a c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t t o any c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of whether or not the a c t i o n was f r e e . The f i r s t p o i n t of the second s e c t i o n e x p l o r e d the l i m i t a t i o n s determinism does p l a c e on our concept of freedom and s p e c i f i c a l l y attempted to show how some no t i o n s of p r a i s e and blame are based on a- concept of c o n t r a - c a u s a l freedom which i s untenable. The r e l a t i o n s h i p of standards of behaviour and of p r a i s e and blame to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was then i n v e s t i g a t e d . T h i s f i n a l s e c t i o n d e a l s b r i e f l y w i t h what the e x i s t e n t i a l -i s t s have dubbed " a u t h e n t i c i t y . " The reason f o r i n c l u d i n g a 128 d i s c u s s i o n of a u t h e n t i c i t y here i s t h a t i t i s an e x t e n s i o n of the concept of freedom t h a t has been developed so f a r . By assuming r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's v a l u e s , and hence f o r one's goals and o b j e c t i v e s , one achieves a g r e a t e r degree of c o n t r o l over one's a c t i o n s and l i f e , and hence a g r e a t e r degree of freedom. We w i l l argue t h a t freedom i s a matter of degree (and not, as S a r t r e says, absolute) and t h a t a u t h e t i c i t y i s the h i g h e s t degree of p e r s o n a l freedom. While agreeing with the e x i s t e n t i a l i s t t h a t freedom i s founded on the e x i s t e n c e of a consciousness t h a t can conceive of i t s s i t u a t i o n being other than i t i s , and so act to b r i n g about a d e s i r e d s t a t e of a f f a i r s , t h i s i s o n l y a necessary c o n d i t i o n of f r e e -dom, f o r freedom i n the f u l l sense i s not merely the power to i n t e n d , but the power to c o n t r o l these i n t e n t i o n s and to r e a l i z e them. F u l l freedom i s an agent's c o n t r o l over an a c t i o n , a s i t u a t i o n or a l i f e , and the freedom which i s the nature o f human consciousness (the freedom to intend) i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n of t h a t f u l l freedom. 2. Degrees of freedom The reason t h a t freedom i s a matter of degree should be c l e a r g i v e n an a n a l y s i s of agency. For the degree to which an a c t i o n i s the s u c c e s s f u l r e a l i z a t i o n of the i n t e n t i o n of the agent, the agent has c o n t r o l over i t , and so i s f r e e . On the l e v e l of i n t e n t i o n s , to the degree to which the i n t e n -t i o n i s r a t i o n a l , i t i s s u b j e c t t o the c o n t r o l of the agent, and to t h a t degree i t i s f r e e . Freedom i s then the extent to which a c t i o n s are r e a l i z a t i o n s of i n t e n t i o n s and the extent 129 to which these i n t e n t i o n s are r a t i o n a l , so t h a t an a c t i o n f r e e i n t h a t i t i s r a t i o n a l may f a l l s h o r t of f u l l freedom i f the i n t e n t i o n i s not r e a l i z e d , and an a c t i o n t h a t i s the r e a l i z a t i o n of an i n t e n t i o n may f a l l s h o r t of freedom i f the i n t e n t i o n i s not r a t i o n a l . F u l l freedom thus c o i n c i d e s with f u l l agency. I t i s thus a degree of c o n t r o l and of freedom to r e a l i z e i n t e n t i o n s , and another degree of c o n t r o l and freedom to make these i n t e n t i o n s s u b j e c t t o one's g o a l s and knowledge. To c o n t r o l one's goals and v a l u e s , and hence the i n t e n t i o n s and a c t i o n s on which they are based, i s then to r e a l i z e an even g r e a t e r degree of freedom, a t the same time as i t i s to assume a g r e a t e r degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . A u t h e n t i c i t y together with f u l l agency i s then the h i g h e s t degree of freedom. 3. Value and c h o i c e The e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s argue t h a t v a l u e s are not g i v e n or a p r i o r i as d i s c e r n a b l e f a c t s i n the world, but are c h o i c e s made as a s o l u t i o n t o the problem of what to do, and thus are a b a s i s 29 of a c t i o n and i n s e p a r a b l e from the concept of a c t i o n . As how to a c t i s a q u e s t i o n which faces each i n d i v i d u a l , the v a l u e s chosen through a c t i o n are chosen by the i n d i v i d u a l , and so the i n d i v i d u a l , the v a l u e s chosen through a c t i o n are chosen by the i n d i v i d u a l , and so i t i s the i n d i v i d u a l who i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them. T r a d i t i o n a l world view and value systems have no guarantee of being r i g h t ; they do not have the s t a t u s of mere d e s c r i p t i o n s of p r o p e r t i e s of o b j e c t s or s i t u a t i o n s , as they 130 c o n t a i n an imperative or p r e s c r i p t i v e q u a l i t y : a "Thou s h a l t " 30 or a "Thou s h a l t . n o t . " As they are not f a c t u a l c l a i m s , value systems are u n v e r i f i a b l e , i . e . , they are not l o g i c a l l y d e d u c i b l e from any o b j e c t i v e s t a t e of a f f a i r s or from a v a l u e - f r e e des-31 c r i p t i o n o f a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s . As a va l u e i s not a f a c t , i t i s not d i s c o v e r a b l e by reasoned a n a l y s i s or by o b s e r v a t i o n , and so reason cannot demonstrate to us which val u e s to choose, as values are not i n h e r e n t i n or d e d u c i b l e from t h i n g s . (Even s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n can take second p l a c e t o other v a l u e s , and so u t i l i t a r i a n c a l c u l u s e s based on any n o t i o n of s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h a t i s not c i r c u l a r , i n t h a t i t i s not d e f i n e d simply as the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s v a l u e s , f o r which i t i s supposed to serve as a foundation, are as open to q u e s t i o n as any other v a l u e s , and a l s o r e f l e c t some value c h o i c e not d e d u c i b l e from any f a c t , such as a v a l u a t i o n of one's own l i f e over a l l e l s e . ) V a l u a t i o n i s then an i n d i v i d u a l a c t of c h o i c e , not a d i s c o v e r y of f a c t , and so one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's own v a l u e s . Value systems take on the appearance of a f a c t when they serve as a means o f esca p i n g the n e c e s s i t y t o choose, s i n c e to accept an a l r e a d y formulated value system i s to accept the choice of others without r e a l i z i n g t h a t one has chosen to accept t h a t c h o i c e ; and so i t i s to take those v a l u e s as f a c t s , r a t h e r than c h o i c e s . To accept a value system while denying to one-s e l f t h a t one has chosen to accept i t hi d e s the e v a l u a t i v e a c t contained i n a c c e p t i n g t h a t system (or i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , 3 2 such as s o c i e t y , the Church, the Par t y , etc.) as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . ^  A value i s not worthy of being chosen simply because many, or a whole s o c i e t y , h o l d i t (since 50 m i l l i o n French can be and 131 have been wrong), even i f one c o u l d choose to value s o c i e t y as one's a u t h o r i t y on values (thus choosing to abd i c a t e choosing f o r o n e s e l f . As Kierkegaard p o i n t s out, to do so would be f o o l i s h because one i s i n danger of h i d i n g one's c h o i c e from o n e s e l f and of r e g a r d i n g s o c i e t y ' s value c h o i c e s not onl y as a u t h o r i t a t i v e , but as f a c t u a l , i n which case one would be a b d i c a t i n g one's freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to choose, but u n s u c c e s s f u l l y , as one would have t h a t freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y even i f one hides t h a t f a c t from o n e s e l f ) . For example, to decide t h a t the good i s t h a t which the gods d e s i r e and so to decide t h a t i f something i s d e s i r e d by the gods, i t i s good, i s not to make an e m p i r i c a l d i s c o v e r y , but to choose a s t a n -dard f o r a l l one's v a l u a t i o n s (eg., t h a t which the gods d e s i r e i s good). To v a l u a t e i s then, as Nie t z s c h e put i t , to l e g i s -l a t e f o r o n e s e l f without recourse to basing t h a t d e c i s i o n on a value i n h e r e n t i n an o b j e c t or s t a t e of a f f a i r s , s i n c e ob-j e c t s i n themselves are v a l u e - l e s s , and r e c e i v e v a l u e o n l y through t h e i r v a l u a t i o n by some person. I t i s of no a v a i l to seek to escape the n e c e s s i t y o f choosing v a l u e s by referring to l i n g u i s t i c conventions. "The f a c t t h a t o t h e r human beings have e v a l u a t e d c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s i n c e r t a i n ways, and have succeeded i n b u i l d i n g those e v a l u a t i o n s i n t o the language a v a i l a b l e f o r d e s c r i b i n g those s i t u a t i o n s has no automatic normative i m p l i c a t i o n s , " as O l a f s o n p o i n t s 33 out i n Principles and Persons. - Words used i n moral d i s c o u r s e (eg., "promise," " l i e , " etc.) have a d e s c r i p t i v e element t h a t r e f e r s to behaviour which i s separable from t h e i r e v a l u a t i v e component and hence does not l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l the e v a l u a t i v e 132 or p r e s c r i p t i v e component. Words c o n t a i n i n g both normative and d e s c r i p t i v e elements do r e f e r to p r a c t i c e s , but they do not e s t a b l i s h the j u s t i f i a b i l i t y or value of those p r a c t i c e s . To say t h a t a person i s a necromancer once i m p l i e d t h a t t h a t person should be regarded as e v i l and so destroyed, but i t does so no longer (save f o r those who choose to accept a value system t h a t i n c l u d e s the value t h a t necromancy i s noxious or e v i l , which i s the m i s s i n g premise of the p r a c t i c a l s y l l o g i s m t h a t " i f a person i s a necromancer, d e s t r o y t h a t person"). The i n d i v i d u a l i s then faced w i t h a c h o i c e t h a t has no support i n the nature o f th i n g s or the o p i n i o n s of o t h e r s , and t h a t unfounded c h o i c e i s the foundation of t h a t i n d i v i d u a l ' s v a l u e s . The i n d i v i d u a l must choose i n order to a c t , s i n c e a c t i o n i s i n s e p a r a b l e from the p o s t u l a t i o n of value s ( i n t h a t a l l a c t i o n s must have a g o a l ) . Kierkegaard p o i n t s out t h a t to choose an a c t i o n i s to choose the way of l i f e i m p l i c i t i n t h a t a c t i o n , and to endorse t h a t choice as r i g h t and hence as abso-l u t e (though one c o u l d change one's mind and renounce one's choice l a t e r , which would r e q u i r e a new choice and so a new endorsement of a way of l i f e ) . To a c t i s thus to p o s i t a value which through u n i v e r s a l i z a b i l i t y over s i t u a t i o n s (though not over persons, as one cannot choose f o r another) becomes a standard of a c t i o n . In order to e x i s t , one must a c t , and i n order to a c t , one must make value c h o i c e s . V a l u a t i o n i s then i n s e p a r a b l e from human e x i s t e n c e . The i n d i v i d u a l i s faced with the n e c e s s i t y of choosing values and t o t a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r tha t c h o i c e , i n t h a t i t d e r i v e s from nothing save t h a t i n d i -v i d u a l . 133 One cannot base one's c h o i c e s on one's pas t or on a con-cept of human nature, s i n c e i n choosing v a l u e s one chooses how to l i v e , and i n choosing how to l i v e one chooses what to become. As Heidegger and S a r t r e p o i n t out, human e x i s t e n c e has no f i x e d nature ( i n the sense t h a t i t has no pre-determined telos, even i f i t i s d e f i n a b l e b i o l o g i c a l l y as a s p e c i e s ) , and so e n t a i l s no n a t u r a l v a l u e s . Rather, each i n d i v i d u a l chooses h i s or her nature i n choosing how to l i v e . 4. S a r t r e a n freedom T h i s d o c t r i n e of s e l f - c r e a t i o n r e l i e s on a theory of the freedom of human consciousness which has i n i t s most famous e x p l i -c a t i o n i n S a r t r e ' s chapter on "Being and Doing" i n Being and 34 Nothingness. S a r t r e p o i n t s out t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v e consciousness separates i t s e l f from t h a t which i t takes as o b j e c t s f o r consciousness: f o r any o b j e c t of which c o n s c i o u s -ness i s aware, consciousness i s aware t h a t i t i s not t h a t o b j e c t , as i t i s the t h i n g aware of t h a t o b j e c t . In other words, f o r any t h i n g p e r c e i v e d there must be a t h i n g p e r c e i v i n g (con-sciousness) which i s not t h a t t h i n g p e r c e i v e d . Consciousness i s thus a pure a c t i v i t y d i s c o v e r a b l e i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n s to the o b j e c t s towards which i t d i r e c t s i t s e l f and which i t sees i t i s not. Consciousness i s then not to be confused w i t h the ego or the s e l f , which i s a c o n s t r u c t i o n by consciousness of i t s past a c t i o n s and s t a t e s and which consciousness transcends or separates i t s e l f from by i t s p o s i t i n g of the ego as an ob-j e c t f o r consciousness. Consciousness cannot then take i t s 134 past as a reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of any course of a c t i o n , which i s d i r e c t e d toward the f u t u r e , i n t h a t consciousness i s not d e f i n e d by i t s past s i n c e i t transcends i t . Moreover, the ego can onl y be d e f i n e d by consciousness i n terms of the ends toward which consciousness p r o j e c t s i t s e l f . Thus, i t i s the values one chooses which determine how one regards o n e s e l f , and not the other way around, i n the sense t h a t one's view of o n e s e l f cannot be determined un l e s s one i s u s i n g some c r i t e r i a , such as a val u e or i d e a l , so t h a t one sees o n e s e l f i n terms of t h a t v a l u e or i d e a l which one seeks to r e a l i z e . I t does not f o l l o w , as S a r t r e seems to imply, t h a t c a u s a l f a c t o r s do not determine how one regards o n e s e l f , and hence how one chooses v a l u e s , nor does i t f o l l o w t h a t the ego which i s consciousness' c o n s t r u c t i o n of i t s p a s t a c t i o n s and s t a t e s i s the same as the ego which i s the a c t u a l t o t a l i t y of the s e l f (rather than the p e r c e i v e d t o t a l i t y of the s e l f ) . The p o i n t i s t h a t , s i n c e consciousness i s separate from the ego (by which we mean the ego consciousness p o s t u l a t e s as an ob-j e c t f o r i t s e l f ) , i t cannot take the ego as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n or reason f o r choosing a c e r t a i n v a l u e , f o r i t i s i n choosing a value t h a t consciousness d e f i n e s or c o n f e r s meaning upon the ego. Thus, as Kierkegaard says, one does not a c t m o r a l l y because one i s moral, but one i s moral because one a c t s m o r a l l y ; i n a c t i n g m o r a l l y , one chooses o n e s e l f as a moral being. Or, as S a r t r e says of Genet, one does not s t e a l b e c a u s e one i s a t h i e f ; one i s a t h i e f i n v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t one s t e a l s , and so to attempt to j u s t i f y one's behaviour on the b a s i s of one's being a t h i e f i s simply to say t h a t one s t e a l s because one 135 s t e a l s , which of course i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n of one's behaviour at a l l . To say one s t e a l s because one i s a t h i e f masks one's ch o i c e to continue to remain a t h i e f by c o n t i n u i n g to s t e a l , and t h a t c h o i c e cannot be j u s t i f i e d by the mere f a c t t h a t one has s t o l e n i n the past. One i s then l e f t w i t h the n e c e s s i t y of d e f i n i n g o n e s e l f through a c t i o n , and so w i t h choosing values which may serve as a b a s i s f o r an answer to the q u e s t i o n of how to a c t . Consciousness i s thus not the s e l f which i t takes as an o b j e c t f o r i t s e l f , and i t cannot take i t s e l f as an o b j e c t f o r i t s e l f , because as soon as consciousness p o s i t s i t s e l f as an o b j e c t , i t i s separated from i t s e l f as an o b j e c t f o r c o n s c i o u s -ness i n the same way as i t i s separated from any other o b j e c t f o r consciousness, and so consciousness as s u b j e c t i v i t y t r a n -scends i t s e l f as o b j e c t . Despite t h i s , consciousness s t r i v e s to d e f i n e i t s e l f ( i . e . , t u r n i t s e l f i n t o an o b j e c t f o r i t s e l f ) by p r o j e c t i n g i t s e l f toward the r e a l i z a t i o n of i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s (and d e f i n e what i t has been i n terms of those p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) . The f u t u r e toward which consciousness d i r e c t s i t s e l f i s g i v e n shape by the way consciousness views i t s p a s t and thus c o n f e r s upon i t s p a s t a meaning. (Past stages are seen as stages toward the stage toward which one i s p r o j e c t i n g o n e s e l f and which one has chosen, and so are valued as means or o b s t a c l e s to t h a t p r o j e c t . ) The f u t u r e toward which consciousness d i r e c t s i t s e l f i s c o n d i t i o n e d by i t s present i n t h a t i t s f u t u r e g o a l i s seen to be l a c k i n g i n the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n . One i s t h e r e f o r e c o n t i n u a l l y s u r p a s s i n g one's s i t u a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the s e l f t h a t one has been. This i s what i s meant 136 by the dictum t h a t " e x i s t e n c e preceded essence." One f i r s t of a l l e x i s t s and then d e f i n e s o n e s e l f . One i s not a l r e a d y d e f i n e d by some p r e - e x i s t e n t human nature, f o r though th e r e are e l e -ments of one's s i t u a t i o n t h a t are due to one's being human, one i s not d e f i n e d by one's s i t u a t i o n , but i s f r e e to t r a n -scend i t by endowing i t w i t h meaning (by p r o j e c t i n g o n e s e l f toward f u t u r e g o a l s ) . S i t u a t i o n s i n themselves do not motivate a c t i o n , but our a p p r e c i a t i o n of them ( i . e . , the way we i n t e r -35 p r e t them) does. A g o a l i s a s t a t e of a f f a i r s not y e t ex-i s t i n g , and so i t i s not an e x i s t i n g s t a t e of a f f a i r s but t h a t which i s seen as l a c k i n g i n i t t h a t produces an i n t e n t i o n to a c t . The s i t u a t i o n cannot determine consciousness to p e r c e i v e a l a c k o f i t , but the l a c k i s seen when a p r o j e c t or value i s chosen to be r e a l i z e d . I n t e n t i o n s are produced by an appre-hension of something t h a t i s d e s i r e d , and what i s d e s i r e d i s a n o n - e x i s t e n t s t a t e of a f f a i r s , as even a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the status quo i s a f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t y not e x i s t e n t i n the pre s e n t , and so seen as l a c k i n g . Thus, i n s o f a r as a c t i o n s r e q u i r e i n -t e n t i o n s , and i n t e n t i o n s r e q u i r e t h a t something not y e t achieved be achieved or s t r i v e n f o r , we can agree with S a r t r e t h a t a c t i o n a r i s e s from a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of a s i t u a t i o n as a l a c k of a d e s i r e d p o s s i b l e . In t h a t a c t i o n s r e q u i r e i n t e n t i o n s , they r e s u l t from c h o i c e . (Although those i n t e n t i o n s need not be r e a l i z e d i n order f o r an event to be an a c t i o n , as f a i l u r e of an a c t i o n i s not simply the n o n - r e a l i z a t i o n of an i n t e n t i o n , but i t can be the e f f e c t i n g o f unchosen or unthought of s t a t e s of a f f a i r s , as our a n a l y s i s of a c t i o n r e v e a l e d . Thus, f o r example, S a r t r e says a man who drops a c i g a r e t t e and causes a 137 f i r e does not a c t , whereas we c o u l d say he acted, as he meant to drop the c i g a r e t t e or he meant to smoke, but the r e s u l t of h i s a c t i o n (the f i r e ) was i n a d v e r t a n t and so unintended. Yet, there was an i n t e n t i o n (to smoke, to drop the c i g a r e t t e ) and so there was a c t i o n . ) Even though to p e r c e i v e an e x i s t i n g s i t -u a t i o n as l a c k i n g i s to p e r c e i v e the e x i s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t y o f a d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n , and t h a t p o s s i b i l i t y i s grounded i n the pre s e n t s i t u a t i o n , the s i t u a t i o n i s seen as r e v e a l i n g a p o s s i b i l i t y , r a t h e r than a mere f a c t , o n l y by the negation of the presen t s i t u a t i o n by the p o s i t i n g of a f u t u r e , as y e t no n - e x i s t e n t s t a t e of a f f a i r s as a g o a l , t h a t i s , by a c h o i c e . The way i n which one's s i t u a t i o n i s viewed i s thus determined by the ends toward which consciousness p r o j e c t s i t s e l f . A c t i o n i s d i r e c t e d toward a f u t u r e which does not y e t e x i s t and which i s p o s i t e d by consciousness i n the form of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , which are products of consciousness i n r e l a t i o n to i t s p a s t and to i t s s i t u a t i o n , and not of the past or s i t u a t i o n i t s e l f . One's s i t u a t i o n only l i m i t s the c h o i c e of one's ends, i t does not determine t h a t c h o i c e ( i n t h a t no imperative i s d e d u c i b l e from any s i t u a t i o n ) . What one takes f o r a "cause" of an a c t i o n , by which S a r t r e means a reason f o r a c t i n g , i s not a r e s u l t of the s i t u a t i o n i t s e l f but of the end one has chosen, and thus a "cause" i s an o b j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n p e r c e i v e d i n view of a presupposed end. S i m i l a r l y , a "motive" i s a s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of a f f a i r s ( p a r t i c u l a r l y , one's emotions and d e s i r e s ) i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t of a chosen g o a l . Thus, what S a r t r e c a l l s "causes" and "motives," by which he means f a c t s about o n e s e l f i n the l a t t e r case and f a c t s about one's s i t u a t i o n i n the form-138 er t h a t are taken as reasons f o r a c t i n g , are determined ( i n the sense of being defined) by the ends one chooses, and so do not determine those ends. Thus, motives, causes and ends are p o s i t e d a t once, and each i s d e f i n e d i n r e l a t i o n to the 37 o t h e r s . Hence, f a c t s about the s i t u a t i o n or o n e s e l f do not cause an i n t e n t i o n i n t h a t i t i s o n l y i n the presence of an i n t e n t i o n t h a t those f a c t s become reasons f o r a c t i n g . Any f a c t taken as a reason f o r a c t i o n at one time l o s e s i t s f o r c e i n the absence of an i n t e n t i o n t h a t c o n f e r s upon i t i t s c h a r a c t e r as "cause" or "motive," and so a f a c t taken as a reason f o r a c t i n g a t one time need not be taken as a reason a t another, and w i l l o n l y be taken as a reason i f one again p o s i t s the i n t e n t i o n which makes i t so. The f a c t s of one's s i t u a t i o n thus do not determine one's i n t e n t i o n s , f o r they are seen as d e t e r -minants or reasons f o r a c t i o n o n l y i n l i g h t of an i n t e n t i o n . There i s a g r e a t d e a l of c o n f u s i o n over S a r t r e ' s theory of freedom, as i t can be i n t e r p r e t e d i n two ways. Taken as a theory concerning the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n s i t seems to be most c o r r e c t , and t h i s i s the way i n which we have taken i t . The e x p l a n a t i o n of a c t i o n w i t h which S a r t r e i s d e a l i n g r e f e r s to the agent's reasons f o r a c t i n g and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n on the b a s i s of those reasons. One's s i t u a t i o n i s g i v e n , but how one views i t (eg., what aspects of i t are taken as r e a s -3 8 ons f o r a c t i n g ) i s a r e s u l t of a c h o i c e , which i s not d e t e r -mined i n the sense t h a t a s i t u a t i o n cannot produce j u s t i f i c a t i o n s or reasons f o r one course of a c t i o n r a t h e r than another, even i f the c h o i c e i s c a u s a l l y determined (by p h y s i c a l or psycho-l o g i c a l f a c t o r s ) . Reasons f o r a c t i o n are due to one's g o a l s , 139 and f o r them one i s always r e s p o n s i b l e , as g o a l s are the r e s u l t of a c h o i c e of value which i s not determined by o b j e c t i v e f a c t s i n t h a t no v a l u e s e x i s t a p r i o r i or i n the nature of t h i n g s . Determinism i s t h e r e f o r e simply i r r e l e v a n t . Even i f my a c t i o n i s caused, my i n t e n t i o n i s the product of my own choice and not of any o b j e c t i v e f a c t about myself or.my s i t u a t i o n . Objec-t i v e f a c t s a c q u i r e value as causes or motives on l y i n view of an end which has a l r e a d y been p o s i t e d , and which i s grounded i n a v a l u e chosen without j u s t i f i c a t i o n , as a t bottom the value on which other v a l u e s r e s t cannot be j u s t i f i e d i n terms of any other v a l u e , but must simply be chosen. In t h i s S a r t r e seems c o r r e c t . Yet i f one takes S a r t r e as defending an i n d e t e r m i n i s t theory o f freedom, h i s p o s i t i o n i s u t t e r l y confused. The con-f u s i o n i s between the reason or j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an a c t i o n and i t s a c t u a l cause. What S a r t r e means i n saying t h a t con-sciousness cannot be determined i n i t s c h o i c e s i s t h a t no ob-j e c t i v e f a c t s can persuade or compel i t to embark on a c e r -t a i n course of a c t i o n , as f a c t s i n themselves are v a l u e - l e s s and a c t i o n r e q u i r e s the p o s i t i n g of v a l u e . But i t does not f o l l o w t h a t c h o i c e s of v a l u e a r i s e ex n i h i l o i n the sense t h a t they are uncaused. To argue t h a t i s to n e g l e c t the f a c t t h a t consciousness i s caused ( p h y s i c a l l y and p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ) by t h i n g s other than i t s e l f , even i f i t transcends those t h i n g s i n the sense t h a t i t can take them as o b j e c t s f o r i t s e l f . T h i s i s b i o l o g y : no i n t e r p r e t i v e metaphysics can save S a r t r e here. There i s a l s o the problem t h a t although I am f r e e to g i v e meaning to my s i t u a t i o n i n view of my goals or p r o j e c t s , the 140 s i t u a t i o n s t i l l has an e f f e c t on ray c h o i c e , not as a reason 3 9 but as an a c t u a l (rather than as a perceived) cause of a c t i o n . For example, i f a past i s being f l e d as unwanted, does the person who f l e e s t h a t past enjoy the same freedom as one who does not have to escape i t ? C e r t a i n l y there are a l t e r n a t i v e ways of f l e e i n g the past, but one's c h o i c e s w i l l have to be made wit h r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p a s t , and so are c i r -cumscribed. To be sure, one can deny one's past by dying, but t h a t i n no way m i t i g a t e s the c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e of the past upon one's present c h o i c e . The same can be s a i d about other aspects of my s i t u a t i o n , which S a r t r e groups together under the concept of " f a c t i c i t y . " S a r t r e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t f a c t i c i t y l i m i t s c h o i c e (as i t l i m i t s a l t e r n a t i v e course of a c t i o n ) , but i n denying t h a t i t does not c a u s a l l y determine c h o i c e he confuses l o g i c a l freedom wi t h p s y c h o l o g i c a l freedom, and f a l s e l y deduces from the f a c t t h a t no s i t u a t i o n j u s t i f i e s an a c t i o n the much st r o n g e r c l a i m t h a t no s i t u a t i o n causes an a c t i o n . ^ 5. A u t h e n t i c i t y as freedom I t i s S a r t r e ' s theory of freedom as a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a c t i o n s which forms a b a s i s f o r authen-t i c i t y as a va l u e , and so h i s f a i l u r e t o r e f u t e determinism i s of no consequence. By r e c o g n i z i n g one's power to choose ends and v a l u e s , one achieves a degree of freedom and auton-omy l a c k i n g i n most, even i f u l t i m a t e l y one's'ends are d e t e r -mined by p h y s i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l causes ( s i n c e the way one views one's s i t u a t i o n may be c a u s a l l y determined by psycho-l o g i c a l and s o c i a l f a c t o r s beyond one's c o n t r o l ) , f o r one i s 141 simply more aware of what one i s doing and why, i n which case one i s a t l i b e r t y to r e a s s e s s one's goals and v a l u e s . To step o u t s i d e o f the val u e system one has been presented with and r e a l i z e t h a t v a l u e s are a matter of one's own choosing i s to r e a l i z e a g r e a t e r degree of freedom as i t i s to e x e r c i s e a g r e a t e r degree of c o n t r o l over one's i n t e n t i o n s . To be aware of one's freedom to choose v a l u e s i s to be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to r e a l i z e t h a t freedom, and to be aware of the n e c e s s i t y of ch o i c e and of one's own r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r choosing i s to be made aware of t h a t freedom. In t h a t way, one can make sense of a passage i n S a r t r e ' s situations: We were never more f r e e than dur i n g the German occup a t i o n ... the ch o i c e t h a t each of us made was face to face w i t h death, because i t c o u l d always have been expressed i n these terms: "Rather death than . . - "^ To a c t i n a f u l l y f r e e manner one must a c t a u t h e n t i c a l l y , t h a t i s , w ith the r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t one has chosen and i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the va l u e upon which one has act e d , as i t has no b a s i s or source o u t s i d e of one's f r e e c h o i c e . In doing so, one chooses a way of l i f e and a world ( i n the sense t h a t one c o n t r i b u t e s to the c r e a t i o n o f o n e s e l f and the world through a c t i o n and i n endorsing the value upon which the a c t i o n i s based one chooses o n e s e l f and one's world, and not i n the sense t h a t one's c h o i c e i s s u b j e c t to a Kantian c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , as so many have wrongly taken S a r t r e to be s a y i n g ) , By r e a l i z i n g t h a t one c r e a t e s one's l i f e and world through choosing v a l u e s and a c t i n g upon them, one endows one's l i f e and world w i t h meaning. To f l e e from t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n i s not onl y cowardice, but an a b d i -142 cation of freedom. To decide to not consciously decide i s to renounce control over one's intentions, and so narrows one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s by making them a matter of chance, such as s o c i a l circumstance, p r e v a i l i n g mores or other causal factors. On the other hand, to choose i n awareness of one's freedom and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for that choice to leave open the permanent p o s s i b i l i t y of choosing anew, of revaluing or renouncing old 42 values, and thus one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s are widened. Since authenticity i s the recognition of one's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for one's values, i t i s also the recognition of one's respon-s i b i l i t y for oneself. One i s responsible for oneself only inso-far as what one i s i s the sum of what one does, and what one does i s the r e s u l t of values for which one i s responsible. One i s not responsible for oneself i n the sense that one i s an en causa sui, for one cannot pre-exist one's own existence. But one can choose how to be by choosing how to act. Even though one i s always making oneself and i s never made or complete as long as one exists (as one continually transcends one's past), one can be aware of choosing what to become, and so exercise control over what one w i l l become. One i s able to, as Nietzsche put i t , fashion one's l i f e as a work of art, i n conformity with a value or ide a l one has chosen as admirable. To r e a l i z e one's freedom to choose one's values and hence one's s e l f and thus to choose on the basis of that r e a l i z a t i o n i s authenticity, and t h i s being so, authenticity i s a re a l i z e d i d e a l even i f complete s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n i s not (due to consciousness' con-43 t i n u a l transcendence of i t s e l f ) . 143 To be i n c o n t r o l of one's v a l u e s i s to be i n a b e t t e r p o s i t i o n to r e a l i z e v a l u e s , f o r i n choosing v a l u e s i n aware-ness of the f a c t t h a t I have chosen them I am aware of what my va l u e s are and of the f a c t t h a t they are w i t h i n my c o n t r o l s i n c e they r e s u l t from my c h o i c e . A u t h e n t i c i t y , which i s the conscious e x e r c i s e of c o n t r o l , o v e r one's i n t e n t i o n s by being aware of choosing the v a l u e s upon which those i n t e n t i o n s are based, thus g i v e s one a measure of c o n t r o l over one's l i f e i n t h a t one i s able to c o n s c i o u s l y choose how to l i v e , and so allows f o r s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n , which i s not j u s t the i n e v i t a b l e f u l f i l l -ment of one's p o s s i b i l i t i e s , but the f u l f i l l m e n t of those p o s s i -44 b i l i t i e s one has chosen to f u l f i l l . To not be aware of one's v a l u e s i s to be unable to i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e a l i z e them (though one c o u l d r e a l i z e them by a c c i d e n t ) , and to not be aware of choosing one's val u e s i s to s a c r i f i c e one's c o n t r o l over the l i f e one l i v e s and the person one becomes. Freedom i s a b a s i c value because i t i s necessary i n order to i n t e n t i o n a l l y r e a l -i z e any other v a l u e , and a u t h e n t i c i t y as a form of freedom i s a b a s i c v a l u e i n t h a t i t i s necessary i n order f o r the i n d i -v i d u a l to be i n c o n t r o l of h i s or her v a l u e s , r a t h e r than sub-j e c t to them. A u t h e n t i c i t y has been questionned as an i d e a l . Grene says t h a t S a r t r e sees a u t h e n t i c i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t e n c e as an end i n i t s e l f , whereas, she c l a i m s , a u t h e n t i c i t y i s a by-product of a c t s , not an end or purpose. But we have seen t h a t freedom i s a b a s i c value i n t h a t i t i s necessary to the r e a l i z a t i o n of any other v a l u e , and as a u t h e n t i c i t y i s a form of freedom i s a b a s i c , not secondary. Moreover, the d i s t i n c t i o n Grene 144 makes between what i s chosen and how i t i s chosen needs to be argued f o r : the whole corpus of Kierkegaard's work i s an argument to the e f f e c t that what matters i n order for l i f e to have value or meaning i s not that values are chosen, but how they are chosen, and choosing them i n awareness of one's act of choosing (and with complete concern for one's choice) allows 45 one to place a meaning or sxgnxficance on one's existence. For E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s , the qual i t y of l i f e i s i t s most important aspect and therefore most to be sought, so i t i s the r e a l end of l i f e ; the ends by which i t i s reached (the values chosen authentically) by authentically d i r e c t i n g action toward those goals are secondary. Granted, i f one i s to be authentic, one must have values which one choose authentically. But surely no one w i l l deny t h i s , and so thi s cannot stand as a c r i t i c i s m 46 of authenticity as an i d e a l . If i t i s a value to be i n con-t r o l of one's l i f e , then authenticity, which i s to be i n con- . scious control of one's values (upon which one's l i f e i s based) must be a value. The popular misapprehension of authenticity as an ide a l that c a l l s for capricious behaviour i s dis p e l l e d when one rea l i z e s that actions are based on chosen values and p r i n -c i p l e s , and so are governed by them. Acts are a r b i t r a r y only insofar as value choices are arb i t r a r y , but the fact i s that a l l value choices must rest on some basic choice that i s not j u s t i f i a b l e by reference to any other choice or by any 10bjective fact, and so are arb i t r a r y , but to be aware of choosing one's values i n fact makes them less a r b i t r a r y , as they are placed under one's control, rather than r e s u l t i n g from the chance workings of determinism alone. To be authentic i s then the 145 opposite of a c t i n g c a p r i c i o u s l y , and freedom i s thus the con-t r o l of one's values and hence of one's a c t i o n s , not a l l o w i n g one's l i f e and a c t i o n s to run out of c o n t r o l . Since freedom i s c o n t r o l over one's l i f e and a c t i o n s , i t i s impossible to be f r e e and not be r e s p o n s i b l e , and i n r e a l i z i n g one's r e s -p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's values one places g r e a t e r , not l e s s , c o n t r o l over one's l i f e and a c t i o n s . The idea that values are chosen has a l s o come under c r i t i -cism, but as Olafson p o i n t s out, t h i s too i s due to a mis-perception of the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s ' p o s i t i o n . To say an a c t i o n i s founded on a choice i s not to say that a mental event occured which one may or may not remember, but t h a t there i s no p o s s i b l e 4" d e s c r i p t i o n of an i n t e n t i o n a l act which does not r e f e r to choice. Choice can r e f e r to a mental event r a t h e r than to an a c t i o n , as fo r example w i t h "She chose a theatre career, but changed her mind and took up law," but i t can a l s o r e f e r to a c t i o n w i t h no i m p l i c a t i o n of a mental event, as w i t h f o r example "Cato chose death over dishoner." I t i s c l e a r t h a t the E x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have the l a t t e r s o r t of choice i n mind, not the former, and as a c t i o n s cannot occur without i n t e n t i o n s , choice i s a necessary element of a c t i o n . 6. Conclusion As we have seen, however, as a theory of what freedom i s , a u t h e n t i c i t y i s incomplete. C o n t r o l over one's values i s but an element of freedom, an element which, to be sure, i s e s s e n t i a l to freedom i n i t s f u l l e s t form. But a theory of freedom which does not take i n t o account the freedom which c o n s t i t u t e s r e a l i z i n g 146 one's c h o i c e s , as w e l l the freedom which c o n s i s t s i n c o n s c i o u s l y 49 making those c h o i c e s , i s f a u l t y . Moreover, S a r t r e seems to t h i n k t h a t i t i s mere l a b i l i t y to make c h o i c e s t h a t i s freedom, and w h i l e we can agree t h a t such an a b i l i t y i s the b a s i s of freedom, i t i s the a c t u a l t a k i n g of c o n t r o l , the a c t u a l a u t h e n t i c making of c h o i c e s which c o n s t i t u e s freedom, f o r the mere f a c t o f choosing and being able to choose i s not the same as c o n s c i o u s l y choosing, and thus being i n c o n t r o l o f what one chooses. Choosing v a l u e s while s u p r e s s i n g the know-ledge t h a t one i s choosing i s h a r d l y freedom i n the way t h a t 50 awareness of choice i s freedom, as i n the former case c h o i c e i s l e f t to chance, even i f i t does o r i g i n a t e from the i n d i v i d u a l , w h i l e i n the l a t t e r i t i s under the c o n t r o l of the i n d i v i d u a l i n the o n l y r e a l sense of c o n t r o l , and t h a t i s under conscious c o n t r o l . Thus, awareness of choosing i s freedom, choosing i s not, and c h o i c e i s on l y an element of freedom, s i n c e f u l l f r e e -dom a l s o r e q u i r e s the r e a l i z a t i o n of c h o i c e . A u t h e n t i c i t y i s thus the conscious c o n t r o l of one's v a l u e s through the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t one chooses one's v a l u e s and i s t h e r e f o r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them. As such, a u t h e n t i c i t y i s f r e e -dom, as i t i s c o n t r o l over one's a c t i o n s , as a c t i o n s are based on v a l u e s , and hence of one's l i f e . Freedom i s a value as i t i s e s s e n t i a l to the t r u e r e a l i z a t i o n of any other v a l u e , f o r unl e s s one i s i n c o n t r o l of whether or not a value i s r e a l i z e d -one cannot r e a l i z e i t i n t e n t i o n a l l y , and a u t h e n t i c i t y as f r e e -dom i s a v a l u e i n t h a t i t allows f o r s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n by p l a c i n g the i n d i v i d u a l ' s v a l u e s , and hence the i n d i v i d u a l ' s l i f e and a c t i o n s , w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s own conscious c o n t r o l . Never-theless, control over one's actions through control over the values on which they are based i s only p a r t i a l control and p a r t i a l freedom; f u l l control and f u l l freedom require that the values over which one exercises control by consciously choosing them be r a t i o n a l l y r e a l i z e d . 148 CONCLUSION We have seen then a c o i n c i d e n c e between r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and freedom. For an agent to be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r an a c t i o n , the a c t i o n must have been under the c o n t r o l of the agent. C o n t r o l over the a c t i o n c o n s i s t s i n the r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s , which i s c o n t r o l over the e f f e c t s of the a c t i o n , and the r a t -i o n a l i t y of those i n t e n t i o n s , which i s c o n t r o l over the i n -t e n t i o n s . F u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y thus r e q u i r e s f u l l c o n t r o l of the a c t i o n . Yet there i s another, f u l l e r sense of c o n t r o l over a c t i o n s t h a t i s achieved when the agent c o n s c i o u s l y chooses val u e s w i t h the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t they e x i s t as valu e s f o r the agent due to the agent's c h o i c e and hence the agent i s f u l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r them. T h i s g r e a t e r degree of c o n t r o l i s a g r e a t e r degree of freedom, but i t i s a l s o a g r e a t e r degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , as i t i s the assumption of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y not o n l y f o r one's i n t e n t i o n s and t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n , but of the val u e s on which the i n t e n t i o n s are based, and so i s the maximum degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y an agent can have f o r an a c t i o n . I t i s , i n f a c t , the assumption of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's l i f e p l a n , as i t i s t a k i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r one's g o a l s . Thus, i t i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y not o n l y f o r each a c t i o n i n d i v i d u a l l y , but f o r one's p a t t e r n o f a c t i o n s . I t i s then, when i t i s com-bined w i t h the r a t i o n a l r e a l i z a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n s , the h i g h -e s t degree o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and freedom. 149 NOTES 1. Danto, Ar t h u r C. "Basic A c t i o n s , " American P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Q u a r t e r l y , a (1965), pp. 141-148; "What We Can Do," J o u r n a l  of Philosophy, 60 (1963), pp. 435-445. 2. Hart, H.L.A. " A s c r i p t i o n of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and R i g h t s , " i n Freedom and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ed. Herbert M o r r i s , ( S t a n f o r d , C a l i f o r n i a : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), pp. 143-148. 3. I b i d . 4. c f . P a r t Three, pp.133-140 5. Op. C i t . , Hart., p. 146.. 6. Op. C i t . , Hart; Melden, A.I., " A c t i o n , " i n Freedom and Respon-s i b i l i t y ed. Herbert M o r r i s , (Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a : Stan-f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1961), pp. 149-157. 7. C o v a l , S.C. and J . Smith., "The Concept of A c t i o n , " unpubl-i s h e d . The approach taken i n t h a t paper i s borrowed i n P a r t One, p a r t i c u l a r i l y page 18. 8. I b i d ; Sam Cohoe and D.D. Todd, "Adjuster and Sense Data," American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 9 (1972) pp. 107-112. 9. A u s t i n , J.L., "A P l e a f o r Excuses," A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y  Proceedings, LVII (1956-57), London, pp. 1-30. •10. Hempel, C , " R a t i o n a l A c t i o n , " Proceedings and Addresses of  the American P h i l o s o p h i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 35 (1961-62), pp. 5-23. 11. c f . P a r t Three, p. 140 f f . e s p e c i a l l y . 12. Coval and Smith, "The Concept of A c t i o n . " 13. I b i d . b 14. A r i s t o t l e agrees, c f . The Nicomachean E t h i c s , 1110 - 17. 15. P.H. Nowell Smith, "Free W i l l and Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y , " Mind, January, 1948. 16. Campbell, C A . , "Is F r e e w i l l a Pseudo-Problem? 1, i n Free  W i l l and Determinism ed. Bernard Berofsky, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 112-135. 150 17. I b i d , pp. 118-121. 18. c f . Ayers, Michael, The R e f u t a t i o n of Determinism (London: Methuen, 1968) 19. Hospers, John, "What Means This Freedom?" , i n Berofsky, pp. 26-45. 20. I b i d , p. 27. 21. I b i d , p. 30. 22. I b i d , p. 35. 23. c f . p. 6 4 above. 24. The degree to which one i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r one's character i s discussed i n Pa r t Three, p a r t i c u l a r l y on pages 25. S c h l i c k , M o r i t z , "When i s a Man Responsible?" i n Problems of  E t h i c s , Trans. David Rynin (New York: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1939), pp. 143-156. 26. Strawson, P.F., "Freedom and Resentment," i n Proceedings of  the B r i t i s h Academy, 48 (1962), pp. 187-211. -27. I b i d , p. 193. 28. See Pa r t One, pp. 29. Olafson, P r i n c i p l e s and Persons, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 115; pp. 117-118. 30. Hare, R.M., The Language of Morals, (London: Oxford Univ-e r s i t y Press, 1952) 31. Olafson, p. 123. 32. I b i d , pp. 111-114. 33. I b i d , p. 132. 34. S a r t r e , J.P., Being and Nothingness, t r a n s . Hazel E. Barnes, (London: Methuen, 1957) 35. Olsen, Robert G., E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , (New York: Dover P u b l i -c a t i o n s , 1962), p. 118. 36. Sanborn, P a r t i c i a , ExIsten11a1ism, (New York: Pegasus, 1968), p. 101; Warnock, Mary, E x i s t e n t i a l i s m , (New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1970), pp. 118-119. 37. Grimsley, Ronald, E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Thought, ( C a r d i f f , Wales: U n i v e r s i t y of Wales Press, 1955), pp. 129-130. 151 38. Sanborn, p. 112. 39. Desan, W i l f r i d , The T r a g i c F i n a l e , (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 113. 40. I b i d , p. 170. 41. S a r t r e , J.P., S i t u a t i o n s , V o l . I l l , ( P a r i s : Gallimand, 1949), pp. 11-13; Olson, p. 109. 42. Grimsley, pp. 102-103. 43. B i n k l e y , Luther J . , C o n f l i c t of I d e a l s , (London: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969), pp. 190-191. 44. Barnes, Hazel E., E x i s t e n t i a l i s t E t h i c s , (New York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1967), p. 16. 45. c f . Concluding U n s c i e n t i f i c P o s t s c r i p t , t r a n s . David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, ( P r i n c e t o n , 1974). 46. Grene, M a r j o r i e , P hilosophy i n and out of Europe, (New York: 1976), pp. 51-58. 47. O l a f s o n , p. 165. 48. S a r t r e , Being and Nothingness, pp. 543-545, p. 527. 49. Olson, p. 108. 50. O l a f s o n ^ pp. 158-160. 152 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. A u s t i n , J.L. "A Please f o r Excuses". Proceedings of The  A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , 57 (1956-57), 1-30. 2. Ayers, Michael. The Re f u t a t i o n of Determinism. London: Methuen, 1968. 3. Barnes, Hazel E. E x i s t e n t i a l i s t E t h i c s . New York: A l f r e d Knopfi 1967. 4. Berofsky, Bernard, ed. Free W i l l and Determinism. New York: Harpers and Row, 1966. 5. B i n k l e y , Luther J . C o n f l i c t of I d e a l s . London: VanNostrand Reinhold, 1969. 6. Campbell, C A . "Is Free W i l l a Pseudo-Problem?", Mind, 60 (1951), 441-465. 7. Coval, S.C. and J . Smith. "The Concept of A c t i o n " , unpublished. 8. Coval, S.C. and D.D. Todd. "Adjusters and Sense-Data", American P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 9 (1972), 107-112. 9. Danto, Arthur. "What We Can Do", Journal of Philosophy, 60 (1963), 435-445. 10. . "Basic A c t i o n s " , American, P h i l o s o p h i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , 2 (1965), 141-148. 11. Desan, W i l f r e d . The Tragic F i n a l e . New York: Harper and Row, 1960. 12. Grene, M a r j o r i e . Philosophy i n and Out of Europe. New York, 1976. 13. Grimsley, Ronald. E x i s t e n t i a l i s t Thought. C a r d i f f , Wales: U n i v e r s i t y of Wales Press, 1955. 14. Hare, R.M. The Language of Morals. London: Oxford Univer-s i t y Press, 1952. 15. Hart, H.L.A. "The A s c r i p t i o n of R e s p o n s i b i l i t y and Rig h t s " , Proceedings of the A r i s t e l i a n S o c i e t y , 49 (1948-49), 171-194. 16. Hempel, C a r l . G. " R a t i o n a l A c t i o n " , Proceedings and Addresses  of the American P h i l o s o p h i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n , 35 (1961-62), 5-23. 17. Hospers, John. "What Means This Freedom?", i n Free W i l l and  Determin ism, ed. Bernard Berofsky, New York: Harpers and Row, 1966, 26-45. 153 18. Kierkegaard, Soren. Concluding U n s c i e n t i f i c P o s t s c r i p t , t r a n s . David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1974. 19. Melden, A.I. " A c t i o n " , P h i l o s o p h i c a l Review, 65 (1956), 523-541. 20. M o r r i s , Herbert. Freedom and R e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1961. 21. Nowell-Smith, P.H. "Free W i l l and Moral R e s p o n s i b i l i t y " , Mind, 57 (1948), 45-61. 22. O l a f s o n , F. P r i n c i p l e s and Persons. B a l t i m o r e : John Hopkins Press, 1967. 23. Olson, Robert G. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m . New York: Dover P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1962. 24. Sanborn, P a r t i c i a . E x i s t e n t i a l i s m . New York: Pegasus, 1968. 25. S a r t r e , Jean Paul. Being and Nothingness, t r a n s . Hazel E. Barnes, London: Methuen, 19 57. 26. . S i t u a t i o n s , V o l . I I I . P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1949, 11-13. 27. S c h l i c k , M a r i t z . "When Is a Man Responsible?" i n Problems of  E t h i c s , t r a n s . David Rynin, New York: P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1939, 143-156. 28. Strawson, P.F. "Freedom and Resentment", Proceedings of the  B r i t i s h Academy, 48 (1962), 187-211. 29. Warnock, Mary. E x i s t e n t i a l i s m . New York: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1970. 

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