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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Public interest in collective bargaining Jelking, Robert Paul 1969

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THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT by ROBERT PAUL JELKING B.Sc., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 19^5  A THESIS SUBMITTED .IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION  i n the Department of COMMERCE AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming required  t o the  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1969  In  presenting  an  advanced  the I  Library  further  for  degree shall  agree  scholarly  by  his  of  this  this  thesis  in  at  University  the  make  that  it  purposes  written  for  may  be  It  financial  f u l f i l m e n t of of  available for  by  the  understood  gain  for  extensive  granted  is  British  shall  reference  Head  be  requirements  Columbia,  copying  that  not  the  of  and  of my  copying  I agree  this  or  of  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  March,' 1969  Columbia  that  thesis or  publication  allowed without  Commerce and Business A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  for  Study.  Department  permission.  Department  Date  freely  permission  representatives. thesis  partial  my  (i)  ABSTRACT Problem T h i s t h e s i s attempts t o determine i f the r a l and  p r o v i n c i a l governments are  of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the The  increasing t h e i r assertion  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  process.  primary concern i s t o determine t o what extent the  ment, through i t s new the  Canadian f e d e -  govern-  l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n w i l l be able t o a f f e c t  q u a l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e agreements.  The  q u a l i t y of c o l l e c t i v e  agreements can be a f f e c t e d d i r e c t l y through a r b i t r a t i o n or be a f f e c t e d i n d i r e c t l y by i n f l u e n c i n g the power p o s i t i o n s the n e g o t i a t i n g Method of  can of  parties.  Investigation  The  first  problem which i s t a c k l e d i s the d e f i n i t i o n of  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  The  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a term now  being  used i n l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n , f o r which a p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n i s not  e a s i l y derived.  A l i t e r a t u r e a n a l y s i s i s undertaken t o  develop a c o n c e p t u a l framework of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . S i n c e t h i s i s an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the  changing r o l e  of  the government, i t i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h the t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e o f the government i n the This  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  i s accomplished by examining l e s s recent  l a t i o n as w e l l as Taft-Hartley The  case s t u d i e s  process.  government  of the a p p l i c a t i o n s o f the  legisU.S.  Act. p u b l i c employees of Canada and  t r e a t e d as a s p e c i a l case.  the U n i t e d S t a t e s  are  Recent l e g i s l a t i v e developments i n  (ii)  both  c o u n t r i e s have r e s u l t e d i n f e d e r a l p u b l i c s e r v a n t s t o be-  come a c t i v e i n c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g .  These r e c e n t  develop-  ments c o n s i s t i n Canada o f the P u b l i c S e r v i c e S t a f f R e l a t i o n s A c t , and i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f the E x e c u t i v e Order 10$99. The  new developments i n p r o v i n c i a l l a b o u r  legislation  consist of B . C ^ s B i l l 3 3 , Saskatchewan^ E s s e n t i a l Services Emergency Act, and O n t a r i o ' s Rand Royal Commission These two Acts and the Royal Commission Report  Report.  are analyzed  c r i t i c a l l y f o r t h e i r p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t upon the c o l l e c t i v e gaining  bar-  process.  Conclusions The  l i t e r a t u r e a n a l y s i s o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t r e v e a l s  t h a t t h e r e i s no u n i v e r s a l l y a c c e p t a b l e d e f i n i t i o n o f the p u b l i c interest.  The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  w i t h i n a s i t u a t i o n a l framework. capable  can o n l y be m e a n i n g f u l l y used I n other words, the concept i s  of d e f i n i t i o n only w i t h i n a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n .  the f a c t t h a t the concept  Despite  i s not l i k e l y ever t o be u n i v e r s a l l y  d e f i n e d , i t will..undoubtedly continue t o be w i d e l y used. The p o l i c y o f the Canadian f e d e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l govern ments r e g a r d i n g c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been t o a s s i s t the p a r t i e s t o come t o an agreement. government has not been one o f i n t e r f e r e n c e .  The r o l e o f the I t has c o n s i s t e d  s o l e l y o f f a c i l i t a t i n g agreements by postponing work stoppages and by p r o v i d i n g mediators.  Although  the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f  these measures can be questioned, the i n t e n t i s q u i t e c l e a r .  (iii)  The the  recent  provincial  proposition that  conflict.  It  l e g i s l a t i o n to  settle  At  the  page  felt  their  part The  of new  i t  the  certain  kinds  are  heavily  endowed  hoc  a c t i v i t y basis  i n  of  collective  i n  these  kinds  the  past,  the  vide  assertion  labour come new  disputes.  to  an  agreement  l e g i s l a t i o n  which  the  tration.  In  w i l l  government  of  some  the  the  to  of  public  cases,  and  of  concept  the  work  stop-  there  relationships  had  Whereas occurred  B.G.'s  B i l l  mechanisms interest where  the  i n  a  provide  an  or  mechanism  dispute  to  on  an and  w i l l  ad the pro-  extraordinary  parties  work  which  govern-  33,  which  to  the  a  that  resorting  submit  that  stoppages.  without  can  social  negotiations  work  interest.  agency  of  process.  the  disputes  established  sense  threat  bargaining  Rand Report,  the  i n  bargaining  public  reinforce form  collective  formalizes  the  to  undesirable  to  that  collective with  an  seems  resorting  recognizes  l e g i s l a t i o n  the  parties  without  Saskatchewan for  is  undesirable  l e g i s l a t i o n  are  ment  be  the  dispute  time,  strike  to  encourages  same  is  is  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  cannot  stoppage,  the  through  compulsory  a r b i -  TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I.  Page  INTRODUCTION  1  A. Purpose  2  B. Data  2  1. The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t as an A b s t r a c t Concept 2. The T r a d i t i o n a l Role o f Government.. 3. The U n i t e d S t a t e s N a t i o n a l EmergencyDisputes 4. F e d e r a l P u b l i c Employment 5. The Rand Report, B i l l 33 and the Saskatchewan E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s A c t I I . DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST  2 3 3 3 4 5  A. General  5  B. The V a l i d i t y o f t h e Concept  7  C. Two Typologies  of the P u b l i c I n t e r e s t  ...  12  1. Niemeyer's Typology  13  2. Schubert's Typology  16  D. F i n d i n g a Common Thread-  1$  E. Summary  21  I I I . THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT  24  A. General  24  B. The F e d e r a l C o n c i l i a t i o n A c t ( 1 9 0 0 )  25  C. The Railway Disputes  26  Act (1903)  D. The I n d u s t r i a l Disputes Act  Investigation  (1907)  27  E. Wartime Labour L e g i s l a t i o n F. I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s & Disputes gation Act (1946) G. Conclusions  2$ Investi29 30  Table of Contents  (continued)  Page  CHAPTER IV. THE  TAFT-HARTLEY ACT:  EMERGENCY PROVISIONS ...  33  A. I n t r o d u c t i o n  33  B. The Truman P e r i o d 1 9 4 7 - 1 9 5 2  36  1. Meatpacker's S t r i k e 1943 2. Coal Miner's Pension Dispute 1943 ..  36 33  3. The  Telephone Dispute 1943  39  C. The Eisenhower P e r i o d 1952-1959  40  1. Atomic Energy D i s p u t e s 1954  40  2. B a s i c S t e e l I n d u s t r y S t r i k e 1959 ...  42  D. The Kennedy-Johnson P e r i o d 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 3 1. Maritime 2. The  44  I n d u s t r y Dispute 1962  45  I.L.A. Dispute 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 5  46  E. Conclusions and Summary V. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE  47  PUBLIC EMPLOYEE  52  A. I n t r o d u c t i o n B. The U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i o n  52 ...  1. B a r g a i n i n g Substance  55  2. Power S t r u c t u r e  57  C. The  Canadian F e d e r a l System  59  1. B a r g a i n i n g Substance 2. Power S t r u c t u r e  60 63  D. Conclusions V I . THE  54  67  SASKATCHEWAN LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEM  71  A. I n t r o d u c t i o n  71  B. The  72  Trade Union Act  C. The E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act D. Summary  ....  74 75  Table o f Contents  (continued)  CHAPTER  Page  V I I . THE BRITISH COLUMBIA APPROACH - BILL 33  77  A. Before B i l l 33  77  B. The M e d i a t i o n Commission Act  79  C. The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t  81  D. The P u b l i c S e r v i c e  82  E. Summary and Conclusions  83  V I I I . AN ONTARIO PROPOSAL: THE RAND COMMISSION REPORT  87  A.  Introduction  87  B.  General Recommendations  89  C. P u b l i c Employment D. E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s  91 and/or I n d u s t r i e s  ...  E. Summary and Conclusions  94  IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS A.  The P u b l i c  B.  The T r a d i t i o n a l Role o f Government  97  Interest  97 101  C. The New Role o f Government D. The Future o f C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g  92  105 ....  1. Banning S t r i k e s 2. The Need f o r an A l t e r n a t i v e 3. P o s s i b l e Changes i n the Nature o f C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining 4. Contents o f C o l l e c t i v e Agreements.. 5. Conclusions BIBLIOGRAPHY Chapter I I - The Problems o f D e f i n i n g P u b l i c Interest Chapter I I I - The T r a d i t i o n a l Role o f Government Chapter IV - T a f t - H a r t l e y Emergency P r o v i sions  109 109 110 I l l 112 112 114 114 117 117  Table o f Contents  (continued)  CHAPTER  Page  BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued) Chapter V - The Case of the P u b l i c Servants Chapter VI -.The Saskatchewan Labour R e l a t i o n s Systems Chapter V I I - The B.C. Approach - B i l l 33 Chapter V I I I - An O n t a r i o P r o p o s a l : The Rand Commission Report Preliminary Bibliography  119 120 121 121 122  -1-  CHAPTER  I  INTRODUCTION  Recent as  well  rest i t  as  and  legislative  controversy  applies  to  terest  is  and  so  did  The  assertion  ing  process  as  Many  a  is  yet  a  proposals  i n  the  r e l a t i v e l y study  i s  unanswered  recent,  made  which  questions determine  2.  How s h o u l d  the  questions of A  eternal  d e f i n i t i o n of  the far  attempt  the  less  Saskatchewan,  have  sparked  public  interest  process.  The  Aristotle  spoke  the  as  public  called  i t  i n  collective  the  inte-  of  i n -  i t ,  "commonweal". bargain-  however. involves  always  the  crop  public  interest answer  interest,  up:  interest?, be  determined?  these  truths  have  public  interest.  value  public  a l l  laden  two  questions;  f a i l e d The  to  produce  answers  because  of  a  to  the  very  themselves.  value  answer  has  to  inevitably  questions  to  "Who  are  he  the  public  attempted  for  the  and  interest  Who s h o u l d  have  Ontario, of  Plato  though  public  Columbia and  bargaining  concept;  the  i n  concept  1.  universal  nature  B r i t i s h  collective  new  of  searching  these  i n  Adam S m i t h e v e n  scholars  those  to  the  not  When two  l e g i s l a t i o n  laden  the  approach  to  the  public  interest  is  question:  asserted  the  public  interest,  and under  what  circumstances?" This  kind  of  judgements terest. a  guide  It for  approach  but  presents  suffers the  does a  not  pragmatic  from the  future  stray  into  the  approach  deficiency  a p p l i c a t i o n of  that  the  area  of'ivalue  to  the  i t  does  public  public not  interest.  i n -  present It  -2-  has  the advantage t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t can thereby  f i n e d i n terms of l e g i s l a t i o n and The be  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining could a l s o In other words, i t r e p r e s e n t s  T  the i n t e r e s t s of the p a r t y not d i r e c t l y r e p r e s e n t e d c o l l e c t i v e bargaining sessions.  self interests.  during  the  C o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s , f o r  the most p a r t , a c o n f r o n t a t i o n and  e v e n t u a l accommodation of  Consequently, the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a s s e r -  t e d by f o r c e s o p e r a t i n g o u t s i d e of the process.  de-  precedents.  c a l l e d the p u b l i c s i n t e r e s t .  two  be  collective  bargaining  These e x t e r n a l f o r c e s c o n s i s t of s o c i a l s a n c t i o n s  l e g a l sanctions.  I t i s upon these l e g a l or more f o r m a l  and  sanc-  t i o n s t h a t t h i s t h e s i s w i l l focus i t s a t t e n t i o n . A. Purpose: The  purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o examine whether r e c e n t  government l e g i s l a t i o n and new  represent  a  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by the government of what c o n s t i t u t e s the  public interest.  F i r s t of a l l ,  mine the t r a d i t i o n a l nature t i v e bargaining. p r o p o s a l f o r new what, i f any blic  l e g i s l a t i v e proposals  interest  i t w i l l be necessary  of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n c o l l e c -  Secondly, by a n a l y z i n g new legislation,  l e g i s l a t i o n and  a  i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o determine^  changes have taken p l a c e i n the nature in collective  to deter-  of the  pu-  bargaining.  B. Data: 1. The  P u b l i c I n t e r e s t as an A b s t r a c t Concept A survey  of the l i t e r a t u r e w i l l be made t o f i n d at  l e a s t a t h e o r e t i c a l l y acceptable I f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  concept of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  cannot be d e f i n e d as a g e n e r a l  concept,  then i t w i l l be related to concepts which can be more e a s i l y and s p e c i f i c a l l y dealt with and which r e l a t e to the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process. 2. The T r a d i t i o n a l Role of the Government The t r a d i t i o n a l role of the government i n the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process can be determined by analyzing past federal and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n .  The p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n by and  large follows the pattern of the federal laws governing t i v e bargaining.  collec-  Emphasis w i l l therefore be placed upon analy-  zing the federal government's a c t i v i t i e s i n the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process. 3 . The United States National Emergency Disputes No analysis of the role of the public interest i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining can be complete without including a b r i e f desc r i p t i o n of the American experience under the Taft Hartley emergency dispute provisions. The Taft-Hartley Act has provided the bulk of the case h i s t o r i e s related to public interest disputes. From h i s t o r i c a l data provided by the only available indexed source, The New York Times, case h i s t o r i e s w i l l be pieced together of several national emergency disputes.  It i s expected  that the American experience w i l l reveal whether the public i n terest i s an economic, a s o c i a l , or a p o l i t i c a l concept or whether the public interest i s a combination of these concepts. 4-. Federal Public Employment Two public service c o l l e c t i v e bargaining systems are b r i e f l y described.  The data f o r the U.S.system was  from the Executive Order 1093S which created i t .  obtained  The data f o r  -4-  the  Canadian system of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g was  the Heeney Report and  o n l y the Heeney Report's recommenda-  t i o n s but a l s o i m p l i c a t i o n s not  covered i n the Report.  p u b l i c employees' c o l l e c t i v e  appears t o deserve separate  bargaining  system  a t t e n t i o n p r i m a r i l y because of the  i n h e r e n t l y s p e c i a l s t a t u s of the government employer. Canadian and  from  from the P u b l i c S e r v i c e S t a f f R e l a t i o n s  Act which encompasses not  The  obtained  Only the  American f e d e r a l approaches w i l l be examined i n  detail. 5. The Rand Report, B i l l 33, S e r v i c e s Act The reasonably  and  the Saskatchewan E s s e n t i a l  a n a l y s i s on these three p i e c e s of l e g i s l a t i o n simple  Saskatchexiran  and  straightforward.  N e i t h e r B i l l 33  l e a s e d i n August of 1963,  and,  The  Rand r e p o r t was  the  only r e -  a l t h o u g h i t does c o n t a i n recom-  mendations f o r l e g i s l a t i o n , the recommendations have not been a c t e d upon. l a t i o n focussed  The  a n a l y s i s f o r these t h r e e items of  upon two  aspects  attempts t o i n f l u e n c e the  of government a c t i v i t y : content- of  collective  agreements (ii)  nor  l e g i s l a t i o n have been o p e r a t i n g long enough t o i n -  clude examples of a p p l i c a t i o n .  (i)  was  attempts t o i n f l u e n c e the power p o s i t i o n s of the disputants.  yet legis-  -5-  CHAPTER I I DEFINING THE PUBLIC INTEREST A. General As f a r back as Adam S m i t h s  use o f the term commonweal,  man has never been a b l e t o p r o p e r l y d e f i n e the nature o f the "public interest".  T h i s t h e s i s attempts  j u s t such a d e f i n i t i o n  d e s p i t e the g e n e r a t i o n s o f r e c o g n i z e d s c h o l a r s who have f a i l e d i n s i m i l a r attempts. interest  The problems o f d e f i n i t i o n o f the p u b l i c  ( o r commonweal) a r i s e when an attempt  i s made t o f i n d  an a l l encompassing, u n i v e r s a l d e f i n i t i o n capable o f w i t h s t a n d i n g the changes i n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e brought about by the passage o f time.  Many s c h o l a r s have devoted c o n s i d e r a b l e energy t o de-  f i n i n g t h i s e l u s i v e term " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " .  Few have  succeeded  i n d e f i n i n g the term i n even the most g e n e r a l terms. The s c h o l a r s can choose between two p o s i t i o n s .  Those i n  s e a r c h o f p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n s and not w i l l i n g t o s e t t l e f o r a n y t h i n g " l e s s " can q u i t i n f r u s t r a t i o n and suggest t h a t s c h o l a r s would b e t t e r spend t h e i r time i n the a n a l y s i s o f concepts t o l e a d t o concrete and u s e f u l r e s u l t s .  likely  Others, d e s p i t e b e i n g  e q u a l l y f r u s t r a t e d , can r e f u s e t o abandon the study o f the concept, merely because  i t has eluded p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n .  They  can chose t o l i v e w i t h the p r e s e n t use o f the term r a t h e r than deny t h a t i t p l a y s any u s e f u l r o l e i n our s o c i e t y .  More  complete  arguments f o r these two p o s i t i o n s w i l l be examined subsequently i n t h i s chapter. I d e a l l y , a p e r f e c t d e f i n i t i o n o f the p u b l i c  interest  would be an a b s t r a c t concept capable o f b e i n g a p p l i e d t o a l l  phases of p r i v a t e - p u b l i c burden o f d e c i s i o n  interaction.  I t would l i g h t e n the  makers i n the f i e l d s o f economic p l a n n i n g ,  l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a r y a c t i v i t y , and s o c i a l p l a n n i n g as w e l l as a s s i s t v a r i o u s r e g u l a t o r y tions.  agencies i n t h e i r p o l i c y formula-  I d e a l l y a s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n would enable us t o "prove"  that: 1. counter c y c l i c a l f i s c a l whenever unemployment 2. zoning r e g u l a t i o n s aesthetic 3.  measures are  required  reaches the 4 percent l e v e l  are necessary t o p r o t e c t  interests  certain regulatory  a g e n c i e s are needed t o  a d m i n i s t e r c e r t a i n government p o l i c i e s 4. c e r t a i n s t r i k e s i n the p r i v a t e economy r e q u i r e No such p r e c i s e occurs however.  government  intervention  interest."  i t necessary t o a t t a c h a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y of  T h i s q u a l i t y has been presented under v a -  r i o u s names a l l more o r l e s s s y n o n i m o u s — i f not then c e r t a i n l y q u a l i t a t i v e l y . Taft-Hartley  concept  Despite t h i s l a c k o f d e f i n i t i o n , both the j u -  t o c e r t a i n o f t h e i r p o l i c i e s and d e c i s i o n s  the  o f the  d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s elusive  d i c i a r y and the l e g i s l a t u r e s have f e l t  "public  sector  quantitatively  I n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , f o r example,  A c t speaks o f "The P u b l i c H e a l t h and S a f e t y , "  w h i l e Saskatchewan*s E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act o f 1966 prescribes  certain actions  t o be taken i n the " p u b l i c  I n B r i t i s h Columbia, as r e c e n t l y were g r a n t e d t o a r e g u l a t o r y terest."  interest".  as 1963, wide sweeping powers  agency t o a c t i n "the p u b l i c i n -  -7-  " P u b l i c i n t e r e s t " p o l i c i e s are not f i e l d of l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s . i n Canada s i n c e 1889 States  exclusive to  A n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n has  / A n t i Combines Act/ and 7  s i n c e 16*90 /the  Sherman Act/.  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by r e g u l a t i n g  i n the  The  existed  United  Both these a c t s .expressed  the r e l a t i o n s h i p between b u s i -  nesses themselves as w e l l as between b u s i n e s s e s and B.  the  V a l i d i t y of the P u b l i c I n t e r e s t  the  public.  Concept  A q u e s t i o n comes t o mind i n r e l a t i o n to the d e f i n i t i o n a l problem of t h i s " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " phrase. f a r d e f i e d p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n why attempts t o d e f i n e  it?  s e l f , of the people who  One use  and  of the people who  The  other group of s c h o l a r s  of the  situation.  not abandon i t s use  There are two  answer t o t h i s q u e s t i o n .  I f t h i s phrase has and  so  related  s c h o o l s of thought i n  group i s s c e p t i c a l of the term i t -  i t to j u s t i f y t h e i r p o l i c y  decisions,  continue i n t h e i r attempts to d e f i n e i t . are  simply r e a c t i n g t o the  reality,  They argue t h a t as long as t h i s n o t o r i o u s  d e s c r i p t i v e phrase " i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " i s being used then scholars  have no  c h o i c e but  to be  concerned w i t h i t s use  and  Frank J . S o r a u f e x p r e s s e s h i s f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h  the  meaning.  f a c t t h a t n e a r l y every p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n has l a b e l l i n g i t " i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " means one situation.  t h i n g one He  day  and  the  He  been j u s t i f i e d  by  complains t h a t i t  complete o p p o s i t e i n another  concludes h i s d i s c u s s i o n w i t h the  t h a t s i n c e the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t has f i n i t i o n " t o argue t h a t what i s not  observation  eluded p r e c i s e s c h o l a r l y good enough f o r the  de-  scholar  should  suit  p o l i t i c a l Sorauf  the  p o l i t i c i a n  dialogue  describes  fashion usage,  his  public  interest  means  segment  i t ;  of  i n  interest  not  s u f f i c i e n t l y  fashion  he  come  to  mean  l i c y  may  the  some  to-set  same  the  measured,-  the  to  "In  a  time  'the  i n  by  public*  that  it."(3)  to  (and, or  some  In  by  which policy  a  identigoal  public  public  a  contemporary-  refers  desideratum  goal  interest  empirically  not  " i n the  effective  presumes."  possessed  i t  or  the  much o f  real,  grasp  phrase  some  public  by)  whether  c r i t e r i o n or  a  i n  is  less  or  loaded  interest"  has  which public ought  is  po-  ideally  to  a t t a i n . "  Essentially of  the  is  further  p o l i t i c s  interest  i t  enlightened that  of  perceived  public,  to  here.  an  sense  And at  finds  be  and  of  dimly  this  interest.  the  lack  perceptions quoting  least  l i t t l e  democratic  deserves  at  pursue  our  which  presumably  fiable  which  does  what  d e f i n i t i o n of these  goals.  Mr. Sorauf  what  goals  He d o e s  not  is  are  sceptical to  seem  be  to  about  pursued  deny  the  is  the  a n d who  is  existence  of  i  a  public  interest  Glendon the of  term  interest efforts t i c a l that  scientific the  a  use  of  study the  i t s made  no  might  of  of  public  a  very  by  capable  of  p o l i t i c a l interest  usefulness.  thorough He  analysis  sums  up  concluding that  operational  better  promise  operational  i n t e r e s t . ^  interest"  makes  greater  has  public  generation  scientists offer  of  "public  concept of  merely  Schubert  philosophies the  but  spend  sense,  becoming  "the  time  useful  a  r  public  because  K  i  that  tools  i t  the  " p o l i -  nurturing  responsibility."(6) concept  opinion  notwithstanding  scholars"(5) their  his  of  concepts  i n  the  ^  c r i t i c i z e s  e  neither  adds  -9to nor s u b t r a c t s from the t h e o r y and methods otherwise p r e s e n t l y a v a i l a b l e f o r analyzing p o l i t i c a l behavior. Schubert does not deny the e x i s t e n c e of a p u b l i c  inte-  r e s t nor the f r e q u e n t use made by p o l i t i c i a n s of the phrase. He simply q u e s t i o n s the wisdom of so many s c h o l a r s c h a s i n g f r u i t l e s s l y a f t e r an a l l encompassing d e f i n i t i o n f o r t h i s p u b l i c i n terest ure.  concept when a l l of these searches have ended up i n f a i l Schubert does, however, admit  t h a t t h e r e have been many  d e f i n i t i o n s of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t put forward, but t h a t a l l of these d e f i n i t i o n s have been o r i e n t e d towards p a r t i c u l a r tances, not toward u n i v e r s a l  circums-  situations.  Sorauf and Schubert have taken the stand t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a vague concept i t should be  because dropped  from the v o c a b u l a r y of p o l i t i c i a n s and t h a t s c h o l a r s too would be b e t t e r t o work on more u s e f u l concepts. J.R.  Pennock, Gerhard Colm, and  C.W.  C a s s i n e l l i have  taken another p o s i t i o n which i s : as l o n g as the term i s b e i n g used, s c h o l a r s should continue to seek t o determine how i s b e i n g used and what meaning(s) i t i s i n t e n d e d t o J.R.  Pennockfeels  convey.  t h a t t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t the  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s a vague concept. i t has some v a l i d i t y .  the term  He n e v e r t h e l e s s f e e l s t h a t  He draws a p a r a l l e l between the term  " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " and the. word beauty, both being almost i m p o s s i b l e t o d e f i n e i n p r e c i s e terms f o r a l l c a s e s .  He makes the p o i n t  t h a t both, a l t h o u g h b e i n g vague i n the a b s t r a c t sense, l o s e a g r e a t d e a l of t h i s vagueness when a p p l i e d t o s p e c i f i c circumstances.  Both words are i n t e n d e d t o convey a c e r t a i n q u a l i t y t o  -10-  whatever i t i s they d e s c r i b e .  He p o i n t s out t h a t students o f  e s t h e t i c s a r e i n n o t o r i o u s disagreement as t o what c o n s t i t u t e s beauty.  Yet much o f t h i s disagreement  are p l a c e d i n a s i t u a t i o n a l  d i s a p p e a r s when the terms  concept.  Pennock maintains the u s e f u l n e s s o f such a term as public interest.  " I t i s a reminder t h a t p r i v a t e r i g h t s a r e not  e x h a u s t i v e o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ( 3 )  j  n  other words, he f e e l s  t h a t t h e r e i s a k i n d o f s y n e r g i s t i c q u a l i t y about the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , o r t h a t i t i s g r e a t e r than s i m p l y the sum of i n d i v i d u a l self interests.  "A term t h a t p l a y s t h i s r o l e even though i t  l a c k s p r e c i s i o n i s as v a l u a b l e as i t i s i n e s c a p a b l e .  Moreover,  i n many p a r t i c u l a r a p p l i c a t i o n s , the context o f the s i t u a t i o n g i v e s t h e phrase g r e a t e r d e f i n i t i o n .  F o r such uses i t has the  s p e c i a l v i r t u e t h a t i t s e r v e s as a r e c e p t a c l e f o r accumulating standards."(9) Gerhard Colm^O) i s even more p o s i t i v e about the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f u s i n g the term " i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . "  He admits  t h a t denying the term any genuine meaning has both methodologic a l a p p e a l t o the t h e o r i s t s i n p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e and i s welcomed by a l l who a r e t i r e d o f h e a r i n g the word bandied about by those who make p r e t e n s e s t o i d e a l i s m w h i l e i n r e a l i t y they a r e advocating particular interests.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , Colm argues " t h a t we  d e a l more adequately w i t h problems  o f economic and s o c i a l  poli-  c i e s , p u b l i c f i n a n c e , and j u d i c i a l procedures i f we f a c e up s q u a r e l y t o the meaning o f the term p u b l i c i n t e r e s t than i f we deny t h i s concept or l e t i t i n o n l y by the back d o o r . " ( H )  -11-  Colm maintains t h a t p o l i t i c i a n s , statemen, judges and those concerned with the f o r m u l a t i o n simply  o f government p o l i c i e s  could not do without t h i s "vague, impalpable but a l l  c o n t r o l l i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " d ) 2  Colm  f u r t h e r argues t h a t the term l o s e s much o f i t s vagueness as a r e s u l t o f p o l i t i c a l debates, j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s and t r a n s l a t i o n s i n t o s p e c i f i c goals o f economic performance and achievement. Cassinelli(13)  C.W.  a l s o looks upon the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  as a n e c e s s a r y t o o l o f the p o l i c y maker.  He s c o f f s a t the  c l a i m t h a t the concept i s u s e l e s s as a t o o l of a n a l y s i s o r an a i d t o s c i e n t i f i c study and t h a t t h e r e f o r e i t should doned from usage.  be aban-  " T h i s statement i s q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t . The  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as an e t h i c a l concept has f u n c t i o n s q u i t e d i f f e r ent from those o f a n a l y t i c models."(14) r e s t i s the h i g h e s t affairs."  e t h i c a l standard  ..."The p u b l i c i n t e -  applicable- to p o l i t i c a l  l^ 1  C a s s i n e l l i claims t h a t the e t h i c a l standard  o f the  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t can be a p p l i e d t o a l l phenomena r e l e v a n t t o p u b l i c p o l i c i e s , d e s p i t e i t s apparent vagueness.  He admits t h a t  "the phrase i t s e l f i s expendable; even though men of p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s continue  t o use i t , i t  could disappear  from s c h o l a r l y  prose with no e f f e c t whatsoever on the e x i s t e n c e and s i g n i f i c a n c e of the idea t o which i t refers."(16)  He goes on t o argue t h a t  we cannot escape from t h i s k i n d o f e t h i c a l standard.  "The simple  f a c t t h a t men d i s t i n g u i s h between good and bad o b l i g e s us t o t h i n k and w r i t e about problems o f e t h i c s , and the u l t i m a t e  goals  -12-  o f p o l i t i c a l l i f e are u n q u e s t i o n a b l y among the most important of these problems."(^7) D e s p i t e the views of those whom I have chosen t o the s c e p t i c s : those who usage, there  propose dropping the word from  i s agreement on the f o l l o w i n g  1. The  phrase "the  2. The  current  points:  public interest" i s i n  usage as an i n e s c a p a b l e  call  current  f a c t of p o l i t i c a l  phrase does l a c k d e f i n i t i o n i n a  life.  precise  u n i v e r s a l sense. 3. C. Two  I t may  be e a s i e r to>define f o r s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s .  T y p o l o g i e s o f the P u b l i c The  concept of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s h e a v i l y  i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l and  e t h i c a l value systems.  a b e t t e r c o n c e p t i o n of how t e r e s t and  Interest involved  In order t o have  v a l u e systems a f f e c t the p u b l i c i n -  hence p u b l i c p o l i c y , a b r i e f a n a l y s i s w i l l be made  of the d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of r o l e s a s s i g n e d t o p u b l i c p o l i c y . P u b l i c p o l i c y i s i n v a r i a b l y the r e s u l t o f a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e t h i c a l s e t of  values.  A b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of two t e r e s t w i l l be undertaken. by Niemeyer and  The  typologies  first  undertaken  s p l i t s up the v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s i n terms of  second and "somewhat l e s s a p p e a l i n g  by Schubert.  of the p u b l i c i n -  t y p o l o g y i s one  r e l a t i o n s h i p between p r i v a t e u t i l i t y and The  or  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  t y p o l o g y i s proposed  I t i s based on W.A.R. Leys t y p o l o g y and  t e s on-the f u n c t i o n s  of p u b l i c  the  officials.  concentra-  -13-  1. Niemeyer's Typology Niemeyer's Typology(19) compares f o u r concepts o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as e x e m p l i f i e d by the p h i l o s o p h i e s  o f 1) P l a t o  and  A r i s t o t l e , 2) Augustine and Aquinas, 3) Locke, Adam Smith,  and  J.S. M i l l , and 4) Marx and L e n i n . P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e b e l i e v e d t h a t a government  should  be r u n by guardians o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t who would thems e l v e s have no p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s e i t h e r i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f goods o r i n the economic w e l f a r e production,  o f the community.  Material  under t h i s system, i s r e l e g a t e d t o the sphere o f  p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l concerns.  A government " i s not an arrange-  ment f o r the purpose o f communal l a b o u r but r a t h e r f o r the p h i l o s o p h i c a l r u l e o f the community."(20)  -p^g guardians (or the  government) of the community a r e d i v e s t e d o f m a t e r i a l i n order t o d i v e s t them o f m a t e r i a l  possessions  concerns.  P l a t o and A r i s t o t l e f e l t t h a t t h e r e was a r a t i o n a l element i n man's s o u l and t h a t t h i s element was d i v i n e i n character.  The guardians (philosopher-Kings?)  o f the community  would express t h i s d i v i n e element; and, having been r e l i e v e d o f m a t e r i a l concerns, these guardians would t h e r e f o r e express views not r e l a t e d t o p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t s but t o the " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " The  second grouping o f p h i l o s o p h i e s  the w r i t i n g s o f Augustine and Aquinas. f e r r e d t o as the C a t h o l i c e t h i c .  i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by  T h i s i s sometimes r e -  For Augustine and Aquinas  man's d e s t i n y was now p e r c e i v e d as the s a l v a t i o n o f h i s i n d i v i dual s o u l .  Accordingly  the a c t i v i t i e s o f p o l i t i c a l governments  were r e s t r i c t e d t o peace order and a minimal j u s t i c e .  "Function-  -14-  a l l y speaking an e n t i r e realm o f human l i f e was staked o f f i n which governments must not i n t e r f e r e : the realm o f the s a l v a t i o n of s o u l s . " ( 2 1 )  " H i e r a r c h i c a l l y speaking, government was l i m i t e d  by the h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y o f ' n a t u r a l l a w  T  t o which human law  ought t o d e f e r . " A c c o r d i n g t o the l o g i c expressed i n t h i s p h i l o s o p h y , "The to  r i g h t o r d e r i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l l i v e s was the c r i t e r i o n common  t h e sphere o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , the e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  and the p r i v a t e sphere.  The o v e r a l l purpose  sphere,  of salvation  c r e a t e d o r d e r o v e r l a p p i n g the t h r e e spheres: i t i n v e n t e d moral r u l e s f o r p r i v a t e economic a c t i v i t i e s , drove i n d i v i d u a l r u l e r s to  p u b l i c a c t s o f p e r s o n a l p e n i t e n c e and produced such h y b r i d  phenomena as t h e I n q u i s i t i o n w i t h i t s mixture o f concern f o r pub l i c o r d e r and concern f o r i n d i v i d u a l  salvation. u(22)  The t h i r d p h i l o s o p h y o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the w r i t i n g s o f Locke, Smith and M i l l . political  F o r them, the  community was i n t e n d e d t o promote men's i n d i v i d u a l  needs and a s p i r a t i o n s . sake o f p r i v a t e u t i l i t y .  C i v i l s o c i e t y f o r Locke e x i s t e d f o r the Locke f e l t t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f p r o -  p e r t y was the c h i e f reason f o r men u n i t i n g t o form s o c i e t i e s . Adam Smith added t h e concept o f the " I n v i s i b l e Hand." He suggested t h a t i t was the t a s k o f s o c i e t y as a whole t o e s t a b l i s h a framework o f laws such t h a t any i n d i v i d u a l i n p u r s u i n g his  own s e l f i n t e r e s t would be " l e d by an i n v i s i b l e hand t o p r o -  mote an end which was no p a r t o f h i s i n t e n t i o n his  . . .  By p u r s u i n g  s e l f i n t e r e s t man f r e q u e n t l y promotes t h a t o f s o c i e t y more  e f f e c t i v e l y than when he r e a l l y i n t e n d s t o promote i t . " ( 2 3 )  -15-  Government a c t i v i t y was t o be r e s t r i c t e d t o c r e a t i n g a realm o f p r i v a t e i n i t i a t i v e and a s p i r a t i o n . Government's a c t i v i t i e s were l i m i t e d by "the n a t u r a l order of " s o c i e t y ; " t h e s e l f a d j u s t i n g  and s e l f e q u i l i b r a t i n g  system o f p r i v a t e a c t i v i t i e s t o which p u b l i c laws ought t o def e r " (24) the  (the f r e e market f o r c e s ) .  Consumer s a t i s f a c t i o n was  c r i t e r i o n common t o the sphere o f government and the sphere  of the i n v i s i b l e hand and i t p r o v i d e d t h e substance of t h e standards o f judgement: 'good government,' ' e f f i c i e n t  economy.'  T h e o r e t i c a l l y t h i s p h i l o s o p h y suggests t h a t government a c t i v i t y i s supposed t o d e f e r t o t h e ' n a t u r a l o r d e r ' o f s e l f adjusting  private a c t i v i t i e s .  I n p r a c t i c e however, t h i s n a t u r a l  order o f economic p r i v a t e a c t i v i t i e s has l e a d t o 1) breakdowns i n the economic system, 2) u n d e s i r a b l e  r e s u l t s , 3) f a i l u r e t o  p r o v i d e and ensure i n d i v i d u a l s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I n these t h r e e  cases "governments i n t h e name o f p u b l i c u t i l i t y have taken the i n v i s i b l e hand under p u b l i c management."(25) therefore  Public  utility  i s t h e g o a l o f government hence i t i s even p o s s i b l e  to argue t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t (when motivated by P u b l i c utility)  can p o i n t  i n socialistic  Niemeyer p o i n t s  directions.  out r e a s s u r i n g l y  that "retention of p r i -  vate p r o p e r t y r i g h t s i s not w h o l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e with p u b l i c d i r e c t i o n or regulation of large scale i n d u s t r i e s . " ( 2 6 )  j  n a  n  y  case i f we have s o c i a l i s m i n the West today, " i t i s then one o f the v a r i e t i e s o f a l i b e r a l order t h a t a s s i g n s t o the p u b l i c i n terest the task of s a t i s f y i n g private  aspirations."(27)  -16The  last  ed by Marx and  philosophy Lenin.  of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s r e p r e s e n t -  In the pure s e n s e , p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y  no  l o n g e r e x i s t s and m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n i s no l o n g e r e n t r u s t e d to the i n d i v i d u a l s .  "The  s o c i a l order i s thus e s s e n t i a l l y  order of c o l l e c t i v e l a b o u r and  i t s management . . .  the  For the  f u t u r e s o c i e t y , the f i r s t s o c i e t y t h a t w i l l be f u l l y human, Marx d e f i n e s the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as t h a t of l a b o u r management.  ..USL e n i n (29.) has added a refinement  to the i d e a s of Marx,  p r e d i c t i n g a p e r i o d of s t r u g g l e t o b r i n g about t h i s i d e a l  so-  c i e t y ; he speaks of a " p r o t r a c t e d s t r u g g l e " l a s t i n g perhaps several lifetimes.  From Lenin's ideas have "emerged a p e c u l i a r  type of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , the type of i n t e r e s t t h a t i s connected w i t h the i d e a of a combat government"(30)  (  a  government whose  purpose seems t o be the f i g h t a g a i n s t f o r c e s h o l d i n g back the t r a n s i t i o n t o the i d e a l marxian s o c i e t y ) . 2.  Schubert's  Typology  Schubert(3D  developed  h i s t y p o l o g y based upon an i n -  v e s t i g a t i o n of the w r i t i n g s of p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e t h e o r i s t s s i n c e the 1 9 3 0 ' s . 1)  He  c l a s s i f i e s h i s i d e a s i n t o t h r e e broad  R a t i o n a l i s t s ; 2)  I d e a l i s t s ; 3)  Realists.  The r a t i o n a l i s t s a c c o r d i n g to Schubert litical blic  groups  "envisage  a  po-  system i n which the norms are a l l g i v e n i n s o f a r as  o f f i c i a l s are concerned . . .  government and b u r e a u c r a t i c o f f i c i a l s  The  pu-  function therefore  i s t o t r a n s l a t e the  norms i n t o s p e c i f i c r u l e s of government a c t i o n . " ( 3 2 )  of  given  The  r a t i o n a l i s t s a l l agree t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y should promote the common good which r e f l e c t s the presumed e x i s t e n c e of v a r i o u s  -17-  common - f r e q u e n t l y m a j o r i t a r i a n - i n t e r e s t s .  The theory  offers  no guidance i n determining the p r e c i s e nature o f the p u b l i c or common i n t e r e s t s . Schubert's second category i s t h a t o f the i d e a l i s t s . He sums up t h e i r ideas o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t as f o l l o w s : "The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s what the e l i t e t h i n k s i s good f o r the masses."(33)  I d e a l i s t s apparently  conceive o f the d e c i s i o n  making p r o c e s s as " r e q u i r i n g the e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y i n order t o engage i n s o c i a l p l a n n i n g (the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ) .  by c l a r i f y i n g a vague  Complete r e l i a n c e i s p l a c e d upon the  moral and e t h i c a l p r e c o n d i t i o n i n g maker.  criterion"(34)  of the i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n  The problem w i t h t h i s p h i l o s o p h y  i s t h a t there  i s no  guarantee t h a t the t y r a n t s w i l l remain benevolent. R e a l i s t s a r e Schubert's l a s t  classification.  These  t h e o r i s t s s t a t e t h a t "the f u n c t i o n of p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s i s t o engage i n the p o l i t i c a l mediation of d i s p u t e s i n t e r e s t e d groups); the g o a l s in conflict."  (between competing  o f p u b l i c p o l i c y a r e s p e c i f i c but  Hence the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s d e r i v e d from the r e -  s o l u t i o n or compromise of c o n f l i c t i n g  goals.  Whereas Niemeyer makes h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t t h e o r i e s on t h e b a s i s o f d i f f e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i e s o r s o c i a l g o a l s , Schubert, on t h e other hand bases h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n on a more mechanistic the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ?  l e v e l : who i s t o i n t e r p r e t and a p p l y  I t might t h e r e f o r e appear t h a t any d e f i n i -  t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t might have t o be made i n terms o f goals  o r s o c i a l values  same goals  or s o c i a l  and i n terms o f implementation o f these  values.  -Xo-  D. F i n d i n g A Common Thread Despite  the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a  s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a b r i e f survey o f past s c h o l a r l y d e f i n i t i o n s could s t i l l r e v e a l some common ground. Schubert and Niemeyer both concentrated  on t h e d i f f e r e n c e s  between uses, and meanings o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . vey  o f present  could s t i l l  A brief  sur-  o p i n i o n o f the meaning o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  r e v e a l a common thread as t o what c o n s t i t u t e s the  public interest. Wayne A.R. Leys (36)- considered of c r i t e r i a f o r p u t t i n g a value He f e e l s t h a t p u b l i c p o l i c y "1)  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t a s e t  judgement upon p u b l i c p o l i c y .  should:  maximize i n t e r e s t s a t i s f a c t i o n  (utility)  2)  be determined by due process  3)  be motivated by a d e s i r e t o a v o i d  destructive  social conflict"(37) Leys admits t h a t seldom w i l l : ' i t be p o s s i b l e t o f i n d a l t e r n a t i v e s which w i l l s a t i s f y a l l t h r e e  of these  conditions.  John D. Montgomery(33) f i n d s t h e term i t s e l f  impossible  t o d e f i n e a c c u r a t e l y , y e t as a concept, t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s of overwhelming importance.  Montgomery f e e l s t h a t the p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t o f f e r s , t o t h e Western mind a t l e a s t the u l t i m a t e e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r demanding t h e s a c r i f i c e s which t h e i n d i v i d u a l may be c a l l e d upon t o make i n t h e i n t e r e s t s o f the s t a t e , and i t p r e s c r i b e s c e r t a i n o f the u l t i m a t e goals ganized  society. "(39)  of or-  -19Edgar Bodenheimer has  suggested t h a t  the  public  inte-  r e s t r e p r e s e n t s something q u i t e d i s t i n c t from i n d i v i d u a l  self  interest.  to  "The  public  i n t e r e s t approach l o o k s p r i m a r i l y  s o c i a l c o n s t i t u e n t i n man not  . . . aware of the  l i v e alone i n t h i s world but  interests  of o t h e r s and  the  i n the  end  does  must adapt h i s b e h a v i o r to  good of the whole."  c o n n e c t i o n W a l t e r Lipman d e f i n e d the "what men  f a c t t h a t he  public  and  the  this  i n t e r e s t as  would choose i f they saw  r a t i o n a l l y , acted d i s i n t e r e s t e d l y  In  the  being  c l e a r l y , thought  benevolently."^-^  Both  these d e f i n i t i o n s appeal t o man s s o c i a l i n s t i n c t s . T  J.R.  Pennock f e e l s t h a t  i n l e g i s l a t i o n i s necessary. public  interest  r o l e of the  He  f e e l s that  l e g i s l a t u r e can  o f t e n be  t h i s , Pennock claims t h a t  the  based on experience (and)  public  i n t o two  separate and  that  public  second f a c t o r i s an  ment one  or more of the  nity."^)  interest.  public  interest  that by  In  doing  precise  the  policy inte-  conditions. the  The  i n t e r e s t represents.;.the b a s i c  i n the  feels  quite e f f e c t i v e  economic  d i s t i n c t factors.  would be  He  the  will  c o n t i n u i n g contact w i t h s p e c i a l  j s p e c i a l s o c i a l and  The  a d e f i n i t i o n of  increasingly  J u l i u s Cohen, a lawyer, breaks up  or g o a l s .  interest  legislature " i s providing  means f o r a p p l y i n g a dynamic and  the  public  to an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency to  a d m i n i s t e r i n accordance w i t h the  a n €  of the  from p l a c e to p l a c e .  simply delegating i t s authority  rests" (42)  use  i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s i t u a t i o n a l concern and  v a r y from time to time and the  the  public  interest  f i r s t factor  is  community v a l u e s  i n s t r u m e n t a l one  "a  policy  i f i t s consequences would imple-  established  basic  v a l u e s of the  commu-  -20-  David B r a y b r o o k ^ ) speaks of the p u b l i c terms of s o c i a l g o a l s and difficult  i f not  public p o l i c i e s .  finds that i t i s  i m p o s s i b l e to d e a l w i t h a l l problems w i t h  same concept of the  public interest.  "obvious" examples and  finds that  He  f i n i t i o n s of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t are necessarily applicable  i n any  the  d e a l s w i t h more or l e s s  the p u b l i c  d i f f e r s from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n .  not  He  interest in  His  interest  conclusion  really i s that  de-  l a r g e l y s i t u a t i o n a l ones  two,  however s i m i l a r , s e t s  of  circumstances. The  use  of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t concept appeals to  Gerhard C o l m ^ ^ ) p r i n c i p a l l y because i t escapes p r e c i s e description. b e i n g the public  He  conceives the  universal  " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " concept  b r i d g e between p u b l i c p o l i c i e s and  i n t e r e s t s e r v e s t o j u s t i f y both the  as  s o c i a l values.  means and  the  The  ends of  public p o l i c i e s . R.A.  Musgrove has  contributed  a generally  n i t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t g i v i n g the view.  "The  the  Musgrove p o i n t s premise t h a t  the  out  anchors i n the  whereby i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s , by  i n v i s i b l e hand, c o i n c i d e that  r e s u l t s which would be  economists have had  hedo-  c o u r t e s y of  to reconsider  Yet the  i n t e r e s t i s p r o v i d e d by  obtained under p e r f e c t  P a r t l y as a r e s u l t of the  of  interest."(^6)  w i t h the p u b l i c  "standard of p u b l i c  defi-  economist's p o i n t  t r a d i t i o n of economic a n a l y s i s  n i s t i c proposition  accepted  D e p r e s s i o n of the  competition."(47)  30's  and  the  develop-  ment of Keynesian economics, economists have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t public  i n t e r e s t must be broadened to i n c l u d e  implications  of economic p r o c e s s e s .  the  the  the  non-economic  Musgrove maintains, however,  -21-'  that the as  t h i s l a t t e r concept o f the p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t i s not e n t i r e l y  p r o v i n c e o f the economist and d e f i n e s i t more s p e c i f i c a l l y " e f f i c i e n c y i n the c r e a t i o n  and maintenance o f m a t e r i a l wel-  f a r e . "(A-8) Stephen B a i l e y  views t h e p u b l i c  gely s i t u a t i o n a l i n nature. course o r p o l i c i e s d i c t a t e d reconciling out  that  several  interest  concept as l a r -  He p o i n t s out that  determining the  by p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t u s u a l l y means  competing o r c o n f l i c t i n g g o a l s .  t h e phrase "the p u b l i c  He p o i n t s  i n t e r e s t " i s the d e c i s i o n  maker's anchor r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n f o r p o l i c y caused p a i n . " ( ^ ) adds however, t h a t the  l o n g run,  He  t o have t h i s phrase serve i t s purpose over  "public  s e r v a n t s must be a b l e t o g i v e i t a r a t i o n -  a l content anchored i n w i d e l y shared value a s s u m p t i o n s . " ( 4 9 ) H a r o l d L a s w e l l proposes t h a t  public  interest  of-two elements 1) content, 2) procedure.  consists  He d e s c r i b e s a s e r i e s  of broad g o a l s which human beings have i n common.  His d e f i n i -  t i o n o f the p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t i s best summed up i n h i s own words:  "the  of g o a l s i n r e f e r e n c e t o the s o c i a l and h i s t o -  specifrcation  r i c a l p r o c e s s w i t h a view t o the p o s s i b l e gies appropriate to t h e i r  improvement o f s t r a t e -  fulfillment."(50)  E. Summary Whether o r not one f e e l s t h a t  the public  interest  con-  cept has any v a l i d i t y , one must c e r t a i n l y admit i t s e x i s t e n c e . It exists  i n a n t i - t r u s t l e g i s l a t i o n , i n consumer p r o t e c t i o n  g i s l a t i o n and l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n .  le-  S c h o l a r s such as Schubert and  Sorauf may be q u i t e j u s t i f i e d i n s u g g e s t i n g that  the term be  -22-  stricken  from the E n g l i s h  language.  i n g t h e i r o p i n i o n s , the phrase  Nevertheless,  "the p u b l i c  used by l e g i s l a t u r e s and the j u d i c i a r y . will it  continue t o be used.  i n t e r e s t " has been  In a l l l i k e l i h o o d i t  There seems t o be l i t t l e  does serve as a f a v o r a b l e d e s c r i p t i v e  kinds of public  notwithstand-  policies.  In any  doubt  t o t a g onto  that  certain  case, i t w i l l do l i t t l e  good  simply to ignore i t . A s e a r c h of the l i t e r a t u r e on the p u b l i c  interest  r e v e a l e d t h r e e simple f a c t s r e l a t i n g to the use of the interest  has  public  concept. 1. There i s no u n i v e r s a l l y what c o n s t i t u t e s 2.  The p u b l i c public  3.  applicable  the p u b l i c  d e f i n i t i o n of  interest.  i n t e r e s t i s u s u a l l y used t o d e s c r i b e  policies.  I t represents a) the p r i o r i t i e s which have been a s s i g n e d to one  or more s o c i a l g o a l s or v a l u e s  b) the manner i n which these g o a l s w i l l  be  attained. The  element o f the p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t which has  much f r u s t r a t i o n and bewilderment to s c h o l a r s i s t h a t of "the p u b l i c  caused  the g o a l s  i n t e r e s t " p o l i c i e s are f o r e v e r changing.  i n s o c i a l g o a l s occur as a r e s u l t of changing  so  Changes  s o c i a l environment.  As the s o c i a l environment changes then changes occur i n the  prio-  r i t i e s f o r s o c i a l g o a l s or even the s o c i a l or common values themselves. i n public  Thus the changes i n environment are r e f l e c t e d i n changes policy.  -23-  The v a l u e s and  r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and p u b l i c p o l i c y i s not a s t a t i c one  reason i t has to h o l d  one  thus f a r escaped r i g o r o u s  of these t h r e e v a r i a b l e s  d i s t o r t i o n of the r e s t of the One  definition.  Any  attempt  constant only r e s u l t s i n  of the a n a l y s e s which can be done however i s t o  l e g i s l a t u r e s who  examine how  t h i s i s the  system.  examine c e r t a i n p u b l i c p o l i c i e s and the  and  social  t o examine the  proposed these p o l i c i e s and  the p u b l i c p o l i c i e s were a p p l i e d .  intentions  further  to  Using t h i s k i n d  i n d u c t i v e a n a l y s i s i t i s p o s s i b l e t o a r r i v e a t a more g e n e r a l f i n i t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  (such as Labour P o l i c y f o r i n s t a n c e ) .  ceptions examples.  of de-  Normally, however, t h i s w i l l  only be p o s s i b l e f o r a r e l a t i v e l y narrow sphere of  would concentrate on the  of  This kind  l e g i s l a t u r e ' s and  the  of  activities analysis  j u d i c i a r y ' s per-  of what s o c i a l goals were important i n chosen case C a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n would a l s o have to be p a i d to  the  nature of the body chosen t o a d m i n i s t e r the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  -24-  CHAPTER THE A.  III  TRADITIONAL ROLE OF  GOVERNMENT  General Before an  examination i s made of the  r e s p e c t to government i n f l u e n c e on the cess, i t i s necessary to examine the ment i n Canada. existing  The  to 1 9 6 5 .  thinking" with  collective  bargaining pro-  traditional role  word t r a d i t i o n a l  legislation prior  "new  of  i s used here to  govern-  describe  There i s nothing t e r r i b l y  " t r a d i t i o n a l " about l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n s i n c e most  significant  p i e c e s of l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n have o n l y come i n t o being s i n c e t u r n of t h i s The  century.  government's a c t i v i t i e s i n the  b a r g a i n i n g through the  mediation and  p r o v i d e d f o r i n the  existing  been r e f e r r e d to as  intervention.  l e g i s l a t i o n and tion" into the  the  Yet  i t s i n t e n t does not  mechanisms  an  sometimes  examination of  the  r e v e a l any  actual  "interven-  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process.  On the  contrary,  such) through the  i t s principal  conflict  purpose  (or what was  then  f a c i l i t a t i o n of C o l l e c t i v e  i n t e n t of the  such.  l e g i s l a t i o n not  In f a c t  l e g i s l a t i o n was  even s i n c e the  o n l y of Canada but  B r i t a i n seems to have as  not  t u r n of the  a l s o cf the  i t s axioms the  one  the  re-  Bargaining.  examination of Canadian l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y  show t h a t the v e n t i o n as  collective  body of l e g i s l a t i o n has  p r e v e n t i o n of d e s t r u c t i v e s o c i a l  An  f i e l d of  investigation  e a r l y l e g i s l a t i o n seemed to have as  garded as  the  of  will  inter-  century  U.S.A. and  assumptions t h a t  the  Great strong  -25-  t r a d e unions and  e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g are d e s i r a b l e  elements of a h e a l t h y i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . B. The  F e d e r a l C o n c i l i a t i o n Act Although  1900  l e g i s l a t i o n pertinent to labour r e l a t i o n s  had  been passed before t h i s time, the F e d e r a l C o n c i l i a t i o n Act  was  the f i r s t  s i g n t h a t the F e d e r a l government was  the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g process.- -  Under v a r i o u s c r i m i n a l  1  code amendments the Canadian Parliament provided without  interested in  had by t h i s time a l r e a d y  c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w i n g t r a d e unions t o pursue l a w f u l aims f e a r of the c r i m i n a l law.  P r i o r t o 18*92, unions whether,  r e g i s t e r e d or u n r e g i s t e r e d , c o u l d be h a r r a s s e d through the minal  code whenever any p i c k e t i n g a c t i v i t y was  Unions had  cri-  taking place.  even been s u b j e c t t o r e s t r a i n t of t r a d e r e g u l a t i o n s  under our a n t i combines l e g i s l a t i o n . The  new  the settlement  l e g i s l a t i o n was  the f i r s t p r o v i s i o n made f o r  of i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s .  I t appears t o have been  modelled a f t e r the B r i t i s h C o n c i l i a t i o n Act of 1 8 9 6 .  The  p r o v i d e d f o r c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n but contained compulsory p r o v i s i o n s .  The  m i n i s t e r of l a b o u r was  expedient"  i n s t r u c t e d " t o take such s t e p s as seems t o  ar-  depart-  empowered t o  and p u b l i s h f a c t s and s t a t i s t i c s p e r t a i n i n g t o l a b o u r . m i n i s t e r was  no  I n a d d i t i o n t o the c o n c i l i a t i o n and  b i t r a t i o n p r o v i s i o n s i t p r o v i d e d f o r the c r e a t i o n of a ment of l a b o u r .  act  gather The him  i n order t o h e l p the p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e t o s e t t l e  t h e i r disagreement.  To t h i s end,  he c o u l d appoint a  conciliator  or c o n c i l i a t i o n board a t the request of e i t h e r p a r t y o r an t r a t o r a t the request  of both  parties.  arbi-  - 2 6 -  C. The Railway Labour Disputes  Act  1903  T h i s a c t added another t w i s t t o the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s scene i n Canada. CPR  and  The  a c t arose out of a d i s p u t e between the  i t s employees over the  the union r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . t o get through parliament  The  company's r e f u s a l t o d e a l w i t h l e g i s l a t i o n i t s e l f took two  and underwent c o n s i d e r a b l e  b e f o r e f i n a l l y b e i n g passed.  revision  When f i n a l l y passed i t p r o v i d e d  f o r postponements of s t r i k e s and of the a c t had been complied  years  l o c k o u t s u n t i l the  with.  The  "procedures"  procedures of the a c t  i n c l u d e d a c o n c i l i a t i o n committee and an a r b i t r a t i o n board. a c t a l l o w e d a c o n c i l i a t i o n committee t o be s e t up on the t i v e of the m i n i s t e r or upon the request dispute.  I f the  The  initia-  of e i t h e r p a r t y t o a  c o n c i l i a t i o n - p r o c e d u r e f a i l e d to b r i n g about  agreement, then the m i n i s t e r c o u l d appoint an a r b i t r a t i o n board. Although the p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e were f o r c e d t o f a c e each other d u r i n g mediation,  they were not f o r c e d to b a r g a i n  collectively.  N e i t h e r were they  compelled t o accept the a r b i t r a t i o n board's  awards. The a c t a p p l i e d o n l y to the R a i l r o a d i n d u s t r y , y e t i t i s o f s i g n i f i c a n t importance i n t h a t i t a p p l i e d t o what was regarded  as somewhat of an e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r y .  The  then  r a i l r o a d at  t h i s time was  the o n l y l i n k b i n d i n g the country t o g e t h e r and  such was  to be a v i t a l a r t e r y of commerce as w e l l as  felt  o f no s m a l l p o l i t i c a l importance.  as  being  Despite the importance of the  r a i l r o a d , the a c t s t i l l p l a c e d a g r e a t d e a l of emphasis s o l e l y on the i n f l u e n c e of p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  The  act substituted f o r  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n "the p r i n c i p l e of compulsory i n v e s t i g a t i o n  -27-  and  i t s r e c o g n i t i o n of the i n f l u e n c e of our informed p u b l i c o p i -  n i o n upon matters of v i t a l concern t o the p u b l i c i t s e l f . " t h i s stage o f the l e g i s l a t i o n , ho p a r t i e s to bargain  compulsion was  c o l l e c t i v e l y nor was  the r i g h t t o s t r i k e nor was  t h e r e any  At  2  made upon the  t h e r e any withdrawal of  compulsion w i t h r e s p e c t  acceptance of the a r b i t r a t i o n award d e s p i t e the b e l i e f t h a t r a i l r o a d s were a " v i t a l " D.  The  to  the  industry.  I n d u s t r i a l D i s p u t e s I n v e s t i g a t i o n Act  1907  T h i s f e d e r a l a c t i s l a r g e l y of a c o n s o l i d a t i v e nature i n c o r p o r a t i n g f e a t u r e s from both the F e d e r a l (1900) and  C o n c i l i a t i o n Act  the R a i l r o a d Disputes I n v e s t i g a t i o n Act  i n t e n t of the a c t was  (1903).  d i r e c t e d p r i n c i p a l l y towards i n d u s t r i e s  coming under f e d e r a l j u r i s d i c t i o n : mining, r a i l r o a d s , and utilities. before  The  act generally provided  f o r compulsory mediation  an i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e e f f e c t of almost f o r c i n g  the p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e t o engage i n c o l l e c t i v e McKenzie King was  time and  the deputy m i n i s t e r of Labour at  "The  this  jure  He  Act by i t s v e r y nature o f t e n l e d to what  tantamount t o c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  not a de  bargaining.  i s g e n e r a l l y c r e d i t e d w i t h the d r a f t i n g of the a c t .  comments on i t : was  public  a s t r i k e could take p l a c e . T h i s a c t had  W.L.  The  but  i t was  a de  facto  process."^  A s i d e from wartime l e g i s l a t i o n , t h i s a c t remained i n f o r c e f o r some f o r t y y e a r s .  The  a c t was  i n 1925 by v i r t u e of the f a c t t h a t l a b o u r B.N.A. Act was  declared u l t r a v i r e s l e g i s l a t i o n under the  p r o v i n c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Soon a f t e r 1925 a l l  -28-  the provinces except a g r i c u l t u r a l P.E.I, passed "enabling l e g i s l a t i o n " making the Federal l e g i s l a t i o n applicable within the provinces.  Major changes i n labour l e g i s l a t i o n were not to be  seen u n t i l a f t e r the passage of the United States' Wagner Act of  1935.  E. Wartime Labour  Legislation  The influence of the Wagner Act was through a s e r i e s of executive orders.  f e l t i n Canada  PC 7307 i n 1941,  for  instance, prohibited the c a l l i n g of a s t r i k e u n t i l the dispute had been investigated and a s t r i k e vote had been taken. most famous of these executive orders was PC 1003 PC 1003  The  i n Feb.  1944.  had as i t s objective "the maintenance of indus-  t r i a l peace and the promotion of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining s a t i s f a c tory both to employers and employees."  PC 1003  expressed  the  i  d e s i r a b i l i t y that 1) "employers and employees should f r e e l y discuss matters of mutual interest with each other" 2) "differences a r i s i n g out of i n d u s t r i a l disputes be s e t t l e d by peaceful means" (no s t r i k e or lockout) 3) "both employers and employees should be free to organize f o r the conduct of negotiations between them and that a procedure should be established f o r such negotiations." The orders applied f o r the duration of the war and  co-  vered v i r t u a l l y every industry whether under federal or provincial jurisdiction.  -29-  More s p e c i f i c a l l y the executive orders provided f o r the peaceful settlement of grievance disputes through arbitration.  compulsory  I t also made c o l l e c t i v e bargaining compulsory be-  fore a s t r i k e could take place. F. Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act Following World War  1948  II the I. R. & D. I. Act was  by parliament to replace PC 1003 and the I.D.I. Act.  passed  Various  forms of i t appear as part of p r o v i n c i a l labour l e g i s l a t i o n . The act has remained v i r t u a l l y unchanged during the past 20 years and, i n f a c t , f a i r l y represents the state of labour l e g i s l a t i o n across Canada, except, of course, f o r the r e l a t i v e l y recent developments i n B.C. and Saskatchewan. S p e c i f i c a l l y the act provides f o r : 1. A guarantee that employers and employees have the r i g h t to belong to c o l l e c t i v e bargaining organizations. 2. E i t h e r party to serve notice to the other to begin c o l l e c t i v e bargaining " i n good f a i t h " . 3. The settlement of grievance disputes without a work stoppage - by compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n i f necessary. 4. No s t r i k e or lockout u n t i l a f t e r the  conciliation  process. In addition to these points, the act created the Labour Relations Board to administer the l e g i s l a t i o n , as well as defining such terms as employee, and trade union.  Section four describes what  constitutes u n f a i r labour practices and i s designed to protect  -30-  the  employees and t h e i r t r a d e u n i o n from any steps which the  employer might take i n an attempt t o h i n d e r or i n t i m i d a t e any employee  i n the e x e r c i s e of h i s " r i g h t s " .  Our own B.C. Labour R e l a t i o n s Act c o n t a i n s v e r y much the  same p r o v i s i o n s even though the I n d u s t r i a l C o n c i l i a t i o n and  A r b i t r a t i o n A c t from which i t i s d e r i v e d preceded the f e d e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n by over t e n y e a r s .  Compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n was made  p a r t of the a c t i n 1943 through an amendment o f the I n d u s t r i a l C o n c i l i a t i o n and A r b i t r a t i o n A c t .  A f t e r World War I I the whole  a c t was r e v i s e d and t o i t was added the concept o f a r e g u l a t o r y agency - the Labour R e l a t i o n s Board - t o a d m i n i s t e r the new l e g i s l a t i o n : The Labour R e l a t i o n s A c t . G. C o n c l u s i o n s Thus nowhere i n any government been any evidence o f government c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g process experience).  l e g i s l a t i o n has t h e r e  i n t e n t i o n t o " i n t e r f e r e " i n the  ( e x c e p t i n g o f course the wartime  On the c o n t r a r y most o f the e a r l y l e g i s l a t i o n i n  Canada was intended t o promote t h e growth of Trade Unions and the  use o f C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g .  Unions were f i r s t  exempted from our anti-combines laws.  of a l l  Secondly, p i c k e t i n g as a  r e s u l t o f an i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e was made l e g a l where p r e v i o u s l y such a c t i v i t i e s would have come under the "watching and b e s e t t i n g " s e c t i o n s of t h e c r i m i n a l code. Two b a s i c concepts which dominate l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n today a r e l ) the r i g h t t o c o n t r a c t , 2) the r i g h t t o p r o p e r t y .  In  f a c t n e a r l y a l l o f the p r o v i s i o n s of l a b o u r l e g i s l a t i o n can be rationalized  i n terms o f these concepts.  The B.C. Labour Rela'-  -31-  t i o n s Act, f o r example, expresses the view t h a t every employee has the r i g h t to organize ing.  T h i s i s nothing  f o r the purpose of c o l l e c t i v e  bargain-  more than a restatement of a b a s i c human  r i g h t under B r i t i s h c i v i l law - the r i g h t t o c o n t r a c t or not c o n t r a c t and  the r i g h t t o delegate  to  t o someone e l s e one's r i g h t  t o c o n t r a c t i . e . t o enter i n t o a p r i n c i p a l - a g e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p . The  employer too has  the r i g h t t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n an  "employer's  organization." It  c o u l d be s a i d t h a t S e c t i o n 16 of the B.C.  Labour  R e l a t i o n s Act, f o r example, i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the employer's r i g h t not t o c o n t r a c t .  T h i s i s i n f a c t not the  case,  the s e c t i o n does  not  compel the employer t o c o n t r a c t , but merely to b a r g a i n  his  employees or t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  of employers r e f u s i n g t o b a r g a i n w i t h , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of h i s employees.  There i s a long h i s t o r y or even t o r e c o g n i z e ,  the  T h i s s e c t i o n merely f o r c e s  the  employer t o d e a l w i t h h i s employees c o l l e c t i v e l y j u s t as would n o r m a l l y The  have t o d e a l with each one  act a l s o provides  collective  S e c t i o n 22 of the B.C.L.R. Act  expresses the o p i n i o n t h a t there should d u r i n g the l i f e  he  individually.  f o r enforcement of the  agreement as a l e g a l c o n t r a c t .  with  of the agreement.  be no stoppage of work  Grievances a r i s i n g out  of  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a c u r r e n t c o n t r a c t must be s e t t l e d by barg a i n i n g or by a r b i t r a t i o n . s e t t l e any  grievances  The  p a r t i e s have complete freedom t o  by any means they should  choose except a  work stoppage. By f a r the:, most c o n t e n t i o u s l e g i s l a t i o n i s the  i s s u e i n the present  labour  concept t h a t t h e r e should be no s t r i k e  the p a r t i e s have submitted t o compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n .  until  This  -32-  provision actually I f one  raises  the  q u e s t i o n as to whether the  i n t e r f e r i n g i n the  i s to a c c e p t the  government i s  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g process  i d e a t h a t a great d e a l of the  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s carried  out  i n an  itself.  effective  " e l e v e n t h hour"  crisis  atmosphere ( i . e . j u s t p r i o r to a s t r i k e d e a d l i n e ) , then t h e r e can  be  on the  little  doubt t h a t compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n has  bargaining process.  directed  at the  The  t i m i n g of the  government withdrawal of the lockout.  some e f f e c t  p r i n c i p a l e f f e c t , however, i s  process.  There i s no  question  r i g h t to s t r i k e or the  right  Compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , does not  te "intervention"  i n the  of  to  constitu-  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process.  Before t h e r e could be  "intervention"  i n the  collective  b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s t h e r e would have to be a t h i r d p o i n t of view p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g the f a c t t h e r e i s no  actual  c o n c i l i a t i o n process.  room f o r the  Both the  federal  and  established  provincial  conciliation  The  federal  act  very out-  f u n c t i o n of a c o n c i l i a t i o n board to "endeavour to  b r i n g about agreement between the matters r e f e r r e d  parties  to i t " ( S 3 2 ( l ) ) .  The  t i o n Board.  Nowhere i s there any  to h e l p the  are  parties  s e t t l e m e n t are  of no  v e r y c l e a r : the  f u n c t i o n of a  quality  Act  Concilia-  conciliation  of an  agreement.  purpose of c o n c i l i a t i o n i s  to s e t t l e t h e i r d i s p u t e ; the concern t o the  the  Labour R e l a t i o n s  mention t h a t the  p r o c e s s should C o n c e r n i t s e l f w i t h the instructions  i n r e l a t i o n to  B.C.  c o n t a i n s i d e n t i c a l wording r e g a r d i n g the  The  pre-  l e g i s l a t i o n s are  s p e c i f i c i n t h e i r wording on t h i s i s s u e . l i n e s the  actual  government or anyone e l s e to  sent a t h i r d p o i n t of view under the process.  In  terms of  c o n c i l i a t i o n board.  the  -33-  CHAPTER IV THE A.  TAFT-HARTLEY ACT:  EMERGENCY PROVISIONS  Introduction I t i s not the purpose of t h i s chapter t o e n t e r i n t o  l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n s of the T a f t - H a r t l e y Act Labour Management R e l a t i o n s A c t ) . d e a l of d i s c u s s i o n and  the  There has a l r e a d y been a g r e a t  c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g such q u e s t i o n s  i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , i t s m e r i t s and tion.  (properly called  as  especially i t s interpreta-  There has been enough d i s c u s s i o n i n f a c t t o f i l l a g r e a t  many volumes. I t i s the purpose of t h i s chapter t o d e s c r i b e some of the a p p l i c a t i o n s of the T a f t - H a r t l e y Act's emergency p r o v i s i o n s as case s t u d i e s i n order t o demonstrate the i n t e r - r e l a t e d n e s s of s o c i a l economic and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s r e l e v a n t to the a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c t .  There are few arguments t h a t p r o v i s i o n s should  not e x i s t t o d e a l w i t h c e r t a i n kinds of unusual yet  t h e r e has been v i g o r o u s  labour disputes,  c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g the  specific  a p p l i c a t i o n of the T a f t - H a r t l e y emergency p r o v i s i o n s . ing  The  word-  of the Act a l l o w s f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f l e x i b i l i t y ; hence, the  Act has been a p p l i e d i n a v a r i e t y of "emergency"  circumstances,  i n c l u d i n g some where the q u e s t i o n of emergency could be challenged.  The  emphasis of t h i s chapter w i l l be p l a c e d  seriously on  b r i n g i n g out those elements of the U n i t e d S t a t e s f e d e r a l government domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c y which were d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y promoted through the a p p l i c a t i o n of the emergency p r o v i s i o n s of the T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t .  -34-  I t w i l l be necessary t o b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e  those  sections  o f t h e T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t which w i l l be p e r t i n e n t t o the subsequent d i s c u s s i o n .  The d i s c u s s i o n w i l l c e n t e r upon those  which have been used t o d e a l w i t h d i s p u t e s as N a t i o n a l Emergency  generally  sections  classified  disputes.  S e c t i o n 2 0 6 o f the T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t permits the P r e s i d e n t t o appoint and  a board o f i n q u i r y t o i n q u i r e i n t o a labour  make a r e p o r t t o him t h e r e o n .  The d i s p u t e  dispute  must a f f e c t "an  e n t i r e i n d u s t r y o r a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t t h e r e o f " which i s engaged i n i n t e r s t a t e o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l commerce.  The P r e s i d e n t  must  f u r t h e r be o f the o p i n i o n t h a t a s t r i k e i n such i n d u s t r y "would, i f permitted  t o occur o r t o continue,  h e a l t h and s a f e t y . "  i m p e r i l the n a t i o n a l  The r e p o r t i s not t o c o n t a i n any recommend-  a t i o n s and i s t o be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e p u b l i c . S e c t i o n 208 p r o v i d e s report, a D i s t r i c t The  t h a t : upon r e c e i v i n g the board's  Court may be p e t i t i o n e d t o e n j o i n the s t r i k e .  c o u r t s a r e empowered t o e n j o i n such s t r i k e s o r l o c k o u t s i f  t h e y f i n d t h a t such s t r i k e s would indeed ( i ) a f f e c t an e n t i r e i n d u s t r y o r s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t thereof,  engaged i n commerce...  ( i i ) i f permitted  t o occur o r t o continue w i l l i m p e r i l  the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and s a f e t y . From 1 9 4 7 t o 1 9 6 5 , t h e a c t has been used 24 times by a t o t a l of four P r e s i d e n t i a l administrations  i n a l i m i t e d number o f  i n d u s t r i e s but under a great v a r i e t y o f s o c i a l , economic and political  conditions.  I t i s the i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s chapter t o  determine whether t h e Act was g i v e n a c o n s i s t e n t d e f i n i t i o n i n  -35-  its application. answered as:  I t i s hoped t h a t such q u e s t i o n s w i l l  "Is the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and  b i o l o g i c a l h e a l t h and  be  s a f e t y synonymous w i t h  n a t i o n a l defense?"  "Is t h e r e .an element  of economic h e a l t h i n the a p p l i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a l  health?"  "Does n a t i o n a l s a f e t y a l s o imply an element of p u b l i c  order?"  In o t h e r words: i s there a s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or o f the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and I t has  already  safety?  been shown i n Chapter I I t h a t the  have f a i r l y unanimously f a i l e d t o d e s c r i b e i n p r e c i s e q u a s i mechanical terms. determine whether or not  there  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  T h i s chapter w i l l attempt t o  i s at l e a s t an o p e r a t i o n a l  n i t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t or the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and The  b u l k of the i n f o r m a t i o n  been gathered from the New which can be was  York Times.  s u r r o u n d i n g the d e c i s i o n s to invoke the  of time.-  p e r i o d and  i n t o three a r b i t r a -  These.subdivisions and  l a b e l l e d as the Truman p e r i o d ,  the Kennedy-Johnson p e r i o d .  f a c e d w i t h i t s own  information  T a f t - H a r t l e y emergency  pond t o t h r e e P r e s i d e n t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t h a t they can be  York Times  interrelated factors  p r o v i s i o n s , the a n a l y s i s w i l l be s u b - d i v i d e d chosen p e r i o d s  has  of w r i t i n g .  For the purposes o f t y i n g i n a l l the  rily  welfare.  D e s p i t e the c r i t i c i s m s  the most o b j e c t i v e form o f indexed f i r s t hand place  defi-  presented i n t h i s chapter  l e v e l e d a t newspaper r e p o r t i n g the New  a v a i l a b l e a t the time and  scholars  roughly  corres-  hence i t f o l l o w s the  Eisenhower  Each a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  was  p a r t i c u l a r problems; some i n v o l v i n g i n t e r n a -  t i o n a l p o l i t i c s ; some i n v o l v i n g domestic problems; w h i l e some are simply problems of p u b l i c  order.  -36-  I t must be remembered here, by the reader, that the problems faced by the United States e s p e c i a l l y on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l front, are of a f a r greater magnitude than those which we i n Canada face, under normal circumstances. time since World War  For quite some  I I , f o r example, the United States  has  adopted the role of major guardian of the Western s o c i a l system. Consequently, there i s a very strong i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p not only between domestic a f f a i r s i n the U.S.A. and i t s foreign p o l i c i e s , but also between domestic a f f a i r s i n the U.S.A. and the global p o l i t i c a l situation. B. The Truman Period: 1947-1952 President Truman during whose administration the Act  was  f i n a l l y brought into force used the emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act a t o t a l of 1G times during his administration. In fact i t was used a t o t a l of seven times i n 1948  alone, i n a  v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s . 1) Meat packers s t r i k e  1948  On March 15, 1948,  President Truman ordered a board of  inquiry to look into a meat packers dispute between the United Packinghouse Workers C.I.O. and f i v e major meat packing companies.!  The actual s t r i k e involved 83,000 workers and was directed  against the f i v e biggest meat packing States.  The dispute was  companies i n the United  f i n a l l y s e t t l e d at four of these plants  about 10 weeks a f t e r the beginning of the s t r i k e with the union's acceptance of the company o f f e r . The report of the Inquiry Board found that the company's" o f f e r was  fair.  Both companies and labour submitted t h e i r  -37d i s p u t e t o the F e d e r a l M e d i a t i o n S e r v i c e , thereby a v o i d i n g  a  Taft-Hartley injunction. The  background t o t h i s s t r i k e o f f e r s a g r e a t d e a l more  i n s i g h t i n t o why was  the d i s p u t e was  the year of the R u s s i a n t a k e o v e r i n Czechoslovakia  as being  a year when B e r l i n was  Communist powers.  I t was  194-8  of such s i g n i f i c a n c e .  still  considered  as  well  threatened  by  suggested i n e d i t o r i a l s that t h i s  was  no time t o have such a s t r i k e " j u s t as the r e s t of the n a t i o n r a l l y i n g to face a f a t e f u l c r i s i s  i n Europe."  Thus  was  suggesting  t h a t the e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s upon the s e c u r i t y of the western world demanded a s t a b l e domestic s i t u a t i o n . When the s t r i k e ended, i t was s t r i k e funds were d e p l e t e d ,  and  discovered  t h a t t h e r e had  r i o u s meat shortage i n the U n i t e d  the r i v a l r y between two  industry.  never been a  se-  States.  P o s s i b l y a c r u c i a l f a c t o r i n the was  t h a t union  c a l l i n g of the  strike  unions employed i n the meat packing  At the time t h a t the  C.I.O. was  going on s t r i k e  to  back up t h e i r demands, the A.F.L. unions decided  to remain a t  work and  The u n r e s t  not t o honour the  C.I.O. p i c k e t l i n e s .  not r e s t r i c t e d t o r i v a l r y between the two c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p u b l i c d i s o r d e r and killing  unions, the s t r i k e  i n Minnesota and  ample t h a t p u b l i c order was o f a l o c a l of the  Iowa to r e s t o r e order. being  was  v i o l e n c e i n c l u d i n g the  of a p i c k e t e r , r e s u l t i n g i n the N a t i o n a l Guard  c a l l e d out  was  jeopardized  was  C.I.O. f o r r e f u s i n g t o b a r g a i n  being  Another the  ex-  conviction  (the f i r s t  such  c o n v i c t i o n under the T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t ) . I t appears t h e r e f o r e t h a t c r u c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n the invoking  of the T a f t - H a r t l e y emergency p r o v i s i o n s were:  -38-  1 ) a d e s i r e t o m a i n t a i n s t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s on the domestic scene i n order t o b e t t e r cope w i t h the country's i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems; 2) warnings t h a t the p u b l i c o r d e r was going t o be t h r e a t e n e d - as indeed i t was.  (The u n i o n no-  t i f i e d the F e d e r a l M e d i a t i o n S e r v i c e 9 0 days b e f o r e t h e s t r i k e t h a t "there might be t r o u b l e a r i s i n g out o f the packinghouse n e g o t i a t i o n s " . ) 2)  Coal M i n e r s ' Pension Dispute 1 9 4 8 ^ T h i s i s the w e l l known s t r i k e i n which John L. Lewis was  c o n v i c t e d o f Contempt o f Court, i n t h a t he was found t o have i n s t i g a t e d c o a l miners t o walk o f f t h e i r jobs i n d e f i a n c e o f a Court  order. P r e s i d e n t Truman, i n attempting t o m a i n t a i n  stability  economic  on the home f r o n t was f o r c e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g '  f a c t s p r e s e n t e d t o him by h i s S e c r e t a r y o f Labour.  The S e c r e t a r y  e s t i m a t e d t h a t a 3 0 day s t r i k e i n t h e c o a l i n d u s t r y would ( i ) shut down o r c u r t a i l 36% o f the n a t i o n ' s power output ( i i ) cut down 56% o f the n a t i o n ' s p r o d u c t i o n o f coke byproduct (iii)  cut down 56% o f the n a t i o n ' s s t e e l and r o l l i n g m i l l s production  ( i v ) a f f e c t 69% o f the C l a s s I R a i l r o a d s (v) a f f e c t 36% o f t h e cement m i l l s ( v i ) a f f e c t 43% o f a l l o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s  -39-  The  s t r i k e had begun on March 1 5 ;  9 had become c r i t i c a l . off  the s i t u a t i o n on  Four hundred thousand miners had  the job, and an estimated  idled, including 70,000  1 6 4 , 0 0 0 other workers had  r a i l r o a d workers.  I t was  50$,  by A p r i l 1 6 .  t h e r e f o r e , on A p r i l 9 ,  further e s t i -  The  191+8  strike.  O)  T h i s d i s p u t e i s very d i f f i c u l t  to i n t e r p r e t i n terms of  p r e s i d e n t i a l i n t e n t i n a p p o i n t i n g a Board of I n q u i r y . t i o n s between company and  hearings  facts,  P r e s i d e n t Truman pledged the f u l l f o r c e  Telephone Dispute  time, and,  cut  P a r t l y on the b a s i s of these  of the law t o b r i n g about an end t o the 3)  walked been  mated t h a t c o a l - u s i n g t r a i n s would have t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s back by  April  Negotia-  employees had not broken down a t the  i n f a c t , the Board of I n q u i r y agreed t o postpone i t s  t o a l l o w n e g o t i a t i o n s t o proceed unimpeded.  As a r e -  s u l t of t h i s a c t i o n by the Board of I n q u i r y , the i n q u i r y never took p l a c e , and the company and union  concluded  a contract  by  themselves. The  d i s p u t e i n v o l v e d o n l y the l o n g d i s t a n c e operators  or  l e s s than 5% of the t o t a l communication i n d u s t r y work f o r c e . Neither  company nor union seemed t o understand how  their  dispute  c o u l d c r e a t e a n a t i o n a l emergency a f f e c t i n g the '.'national h e a l t h and w e l f a r e . "  One  can only s p e c u l a t e t h a t the d i s p u t e  have a f f e c t e d the e f f i c i e n c y of the government of the  could United  S t a t e s a t a time when i t depended upon a l l of i t s r e s o u r c e s .  -40-  C. The Eisenhower Era 1952-1959 1) Atomic Energy Disputes 1 9 5 4 ^ Generally speaking, these kinds of disputes are much more e a s i l y connected with national emergencies and national defense than most others.  The employees involved were a c t u a l l y  employed by private contractors working d i r e c t l y f o r the Atomic Energy Commission (a government agency).  I t was the government's  contention that these employees d i d not possess the right to s t r i k e as they were working f o r private contractors who were i n i  e f f e c t government agents.  The two plants involved at Oakville  and Peducah were producing the f i s s i o n a b l e material used i n making Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs  (Uranium-235)•  At the time of t h i s dispute the Cold War was s t i l l i n high gear, and the United States was attempting to maintain i t s Atomic arms lead over Russia.  Clearly, therefore, the opera-  tions of the Atomic Energy Commission were of d i r e c t concern to the President i n that they affected the defense programs of the U.S.A. It was claimed by the Atomic Energy Commission, that a work stoppage by the employees involved i n the dispute, would cause irreparable damage to equipment and processes.  In r e t r o -  spect, however, i t was pointed out that such a s t r i k e would have cut down a u x i l i a r y operations of the plant but would not have affected the continuous process of making U-235 which was the process of d i r e c t concern to the defense of the United States.  -42-  2) Basic Steel Industry S t r i k e 1 9 5 9 ( 5 ) This p a r t i c u l a r s t r i k e i s worth devoting some attention to i n t h i s paper, primarily because there i s a large amount of data available on i t .  A great deal of emphasis was placed by  the government upon the defense e f f e c t s of a s t r i k e i n t h i s i n dustry, yet President Eisenhower was  nevertheless very reluctant  to use the emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act.  Some  background information to t h i s dispute i s e s s e n t i a l at t h i s point. It must be pointed out that the year p r i o r to t h i s d i s pute was  1958 and was  of economic recession.  generally recognized to have been a year One  of the concerns of the nation as r e -  f l e c t e d i n the e d i t o r i a l s of the New inflation.  York Times, appeared to be  One of these e d i t o r i a l s explained the attitude of  President Eisenhower as believing that " i n the s t e e l industry, both prices and wages are administered  i . e . subject to change  (normally increase) without any r e l a t i o n s h i p to either supply or demand."  A -March 15 e d i t o r i a l suggested that the outcome of the  negotiations "... w i l l determine the national l e v e l of wages and prices.  The course of the Cold War  may  be shaped by the a b i l i t y  of the negotiators to evolve a pattern that w i l l strengthen the competitive p o s i t i o n of the West i n the production duel, which Krushchev had proclaimed as the decisive battleground between East and West."  The perceived importance of these negotiations  i s thus well established, and i t i s therefore not s u r p r i s i n g that the President f e l t obligated to remind the parties of the public interest i n t h i s dispute.  -42-  The was  not  i n t e r v e n t i o n of P r e s i d e n t  c l e a r cut and  Eisenhower i n t h i s  d i r e c t a t f i r s t however.  g o t i a t i o n s , the P r e s i d e n t  made p e r s o n a l  t o continue t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s , and  had  board, but the P r e s i d e n t "...by p a s s i n g the mited the use  On  F i n a l l y on June  On t h i s same day  the  27,  union  to e s t a b l i s h a f a c t - f i n d i n g  refused,  g i v i n g as reasons t h a t  T a f t - H a r t l e y Act,  Congress, s p e c i f i c a l l y  On  July 15,  18 days a f t e r the union p l e a ,  li-  the  s t r i k e f i n a l l y began. October 9 ,  the P r e s i d e n t  finally felt  i n v o k i n g the emergency p r o v i s i o n s of the sumably an 84 day h e a l t h and  pu-  of such p r e s i d e n t i a l Boards of I n q u i r y t o n a t i o n a l  emergencies..." threatened  ne-  impressed upon them the  reached a deadlock.  l e a d e r s r e q u e s t e d the P r e s i d e n t  During the  p l e a s t o both p a r t i e s  b l i c i n t e r e s t i n " p r i c e and wage s t a b i l i t y . " negotiations  dispute  s t e e l s t r i k e now  safety."  The  l a t e r on October 1 9 ,  T a f t - H a r t l e y Act.  i m p e r i l e d the  t e n days  t h a t : "There i s a growing n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t has  to preserve."  economic growth;  put an unusual s t r a i n on c o l l e c t i v e b a r -  of which the n a t i o n , n e v e r t h e l e s s  a l s o seeks  T h i s suggested t h a t perhaps i n t h i s case,  t i v e bargaining  Pre-  "national  Board of I n q u i r y r e p o r t e d  i n ways of a c h i e v i n g both p r i c e s t a b i l i t y and  g a i n i n g , the v a l u e s  justified in  by i t s e l f was  not  capable of coping w i t h  collecthe  "public interest". On October 2 0 , the A t t o r n e y  the day a f t e r the  I n q u i r y Board's r e p o r t ,  General a p p l i e d t o e n j o i n the s t r i k e r s .  Most of  the evidence presented i n court i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the fense programs of the n a t i o n , yet an impressive  amount of  dethe  -43-  evidence i s p u r e l y economic i n n a t u r e .  The f o l l o w i n g i s a  summary o f t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d : ( i ) The Board o f I n q u i r y concluded t h a t i t c o u l d see no prospect a t a l l f o r an e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t of t h e s t r i k e ; ( i i ) S t r i k e has r e s u l t e d i n the d e p l e t i o n of s t e e l i n v e n t o r i e s t o 2/5 o f t h e i r o r i g i n a l  level;  ( i i i ) There a r e 765,000 employees i d l e d as a r e s u l t o f the s t r i k e , s u p p o r t i n g an a d d i t i o n a l 2,000,000 persons; ( i v ) The planned program o f space a c t i v i t i e s under N.A.S.A. ( p r o j e c t Mercury - which had a t t h i s time the h i g h e s t n a t i o n a l p r i o r i t y ) i s being delayed; (v) A l s o delayed i s the p r o d u c t i o n o f s t e e l components needed i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m i l i t a r y and weapons systems,  missiles  e s s e n t i a l t o the n a t i o n a l  defense p l a n s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s ; ( v i ) The n u c l e a r submarine and n a v a l s h i p b u i l d i n g programs a r e b e i n g delayed which c o u l d i r r e p a r a b l y i n j u r e the n a t i o n a l defense and i m p e r i l the n a t i o n a l s a f e t y ; ( v i i ) There has been a cutback o f exported s t e e l p r o d u c t s , v i t a l t o the support o f U.S. bases seas  ( i . e . , NATO).  over-  This s t e e l s t r i k e , i f per-  m i t t e d t o continue w i l l s e r i o u s l y i m p e r i l the national safety.  -44-  ( v i i i ) The  s t r i k e has a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d m i l l i o n s of  s m a l l businesses  without the r e s o u r c e s  large inventories.  no evidence presented  h e a l t h of the n a t i o n was f i n d and  accept  n a t i o n was  stock  Thus the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h  w i l l be i m p e r i l l e d i f p e r m i t t e d Thus there was  to  to  continue.  t h a t the  biological  ever i m p e r i l l e d a l t h o u g h the Court d i d  evidence t o show t h a t the economic h e a l t h of the  s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by the s t r i k e or the  continuation  thereof. It  i s s u r p r i s i n g t o f i n d an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n so r e l u c t a n t  t o get i n v o l v e d i n p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s , i n t e r p r e t i n g the " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h or s a f e t y " to i n c l u d e the economic h e a l t h of the D.  nation. The  Kennedy-Johnson p e r i o d 1961-1968 Two  c o u r t d e c i s i o n s w i l l be used here t o determine the  grounds on which the f e d e r a l government sought t o e n j o i n . first  of these s t r i k e s o c c u r r e d  maritime i n d u s t r y , and f l e e t on March 16,  on the West Coast, i n v o l v e d  began to immobilize  1962.  The  The  the American  second s t r i k e was  the  Shipping  c a l l e d by  the  I.L.A. ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l Longshoreman's A s s o c i a t i o n ) and a f f e c t e d the A t l a n t i c and  G u l f c o a s t s ; the work stoppage began on October  1, 1964. The  arguments used by the U n i t e d S t a t e s government i n i t s  p e t i t i o n t o the D i s t r i c t valuable  c l u e s as t o how,  Courts t o e n j o i n the s t r i k e r s w i l l i n the view of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  s t r i k e i m p e r i l l e d the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h or s a f e t y .  Both these  yield the stri-  -45-  kes i n v o l v e d a v i r t u a l shutdown of normal s h i p p i n g a c t i v i t i e s . 1)  Maritime I n d u s t r y Dispute 1962  (West Coast)  The Court found t h a t the n a t i o n a l defense o f the U.S. was t h r e a t e n e d by v i r t u e o f the f a c t  that  ( i ) a s t r i k e would s e r i o u s l y d i s r u p t the f o r e i g n a i d program designed t o p r o v i d e m i l i t a r y , economic and t e c h n i c a l assistance to f r i e n d l y foreign nations under the Mutual S e c u r i t y Act o f 1 9 5 4 ; ( i i ) a s t r i k e would have s e r i o u s adverse e f f e c t  upon  the n a t i o n ' s Food f o r Peace programs under the A g r i c u l t u r a l Trade Development and A s s i s t a n c e Act of 1 9 5 4 designed t o f u r n i s h emergency a s s i s t a n c e t o f r i e n d l y n a t i o n s t o meet famine and urgent  relief  requirements; ( i i i ) a s t r i k e would have an adverse e f f e c t upon the s t a t e of Hawaii (whose governor had a l r e a d y d e c l a r e d a s t a t e o f emergency) which occupies an e s s e n t i a l p o s i t i o n i n the defense o f the n a t i o n ; ( i v ) a s t r i k e would immobilize the American merchant marine which i s r e q u i r e d t o be a v a i l a b l e as a m i l i t a r y a u x i l i a r y i n time of war o r n a t i o n a l emergency; (v) a s t r i k e would have "an adverse impact upon the n a t i o n ' s economy and thereby s e r i o u s l y impair the n a t i o n ' s o v e r a l l defense p o s i t i o n , s i n c e the defense e f f o r t o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s i s dependent upon the s t r e n g t h of the economy o f the U n i t e d States".($)  -46-  The  Court a l s o found t h a t the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and  of the U n i t e d S t a t e s was  safety  i m p e r i l l e d i n view of the f a c t t h a t a  s t r i k e would have an adverse e f f e c t upon the maintenance i n the U.S.A. of an "adequate supply  of petroleum products which.is  e s s e n t i a l t o t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , both m i l i t a r y and f o r the and  operation  of i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s , and  civilian,  electric  and  utilities  f o r heating".(9) Thus i t can be seen t h a t the arguments presented t o  Court were p r i m a r i l y of an economic n a t u r e . f e n s e of the n a t i o n was  The  national  t o q u i c k l y r e a c t to a defense The  I.L.A.* Dispute 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 The  de-  a f f e c t e d o n l y i n s o f a r as the d i s r u p t i o n  i n the economy might g e n e r a l l y weaken the a b i l i t y of the  2)  the  nation  crisis. (East  Court d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g  Coast) the government's p e t i t i o n  f o r a s t r i k e i n j u n c t i o n r e v e a l s t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of t e s t i m o n y was contained  almost p u r e l y economic i n n a t u r e .  roughly  sented r e g a r d i n g  the West Coast shutdown t o show t h a t the  Court i n g i v i n g the  coast.  testimony of the Maritime A d m i n i s t r a t o r  mostly v i t a l s t a t i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g Shipping  na-  the i n j u n c t i o n emphasizes the economic as-  of the shutdoxvn on the East ( i ) The  pre-  involved.  f u l l t e x t of the o p i n i o n of the  reasons f o r g r a n t i n g pects  testimony  the same s u b j e c t matter as t h a t which was  t i o n a l s e c u r i t y of the n a t i o n was The  The  the  the e f f e c t o f an East  shutdown "thereby a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t i n g the  ^ I n t e r n a t i o n a l Longshoreman's A s s o c i a t i o n  contained Coast  national  -47-  economy, w i t h attendant p e r i l t o the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and s a f n(11) ety  The testimony o f the A c t i n g Maritime  A d m i n i s t r a t o r James  W. G u l i c k s t r e s s e d t h a t the people o f Puerto R i c o would be s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by even a s h o r t s t r i k e as a r e s u l t o f d e p l e t i o n of f o o d s t o c k s . The  r e p o r t o f the board of i n q u i r y was a l s o entered as  testimony i n the h e a r i n g and r e p o r t e d t h a t "with r e s p e c t t o the same p o r t s and as between the same p a r t i e s , t h e r e e x i s t s a h i s t o r y i n the l a s t decade of f a i l i n g t o reach agreement i n ne(12) gotiations".  x  '  The Board f u r t h e r concluded,  "The r i g i d i t y o f  p o s i t i o n s on many o f the main i s s u e s p l u s the complexity o f items concerned  w i t h r e l a t e d c r a f t s , makes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f an  e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t most remote."(13) The P r e s i d e n t o f the I.L.A. (A.F.L.-C.I.G.), Gleason,  Thomas  t e s t i f i e d t h a t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the s t r i k e , the I.L.O.  had agreed t o handle such cargoes as would be e s s e n t i a l " t o our n a t i o n a l needs f o r defense and government f u n c t i o n s . " ( 1 3 ) In view o f the testimony presented t o the Courts, by the government, i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n p l a c e d a g r e a t d e a l o f emphasis upon the economic e f f e c t s t o the remainder o f the n a t i o n o f a s t r i k e i n the maritime  o r , i n t h i s case, i n the  longshore i n d u s t r y . E. C o n c l u s i o n s and Summary There a r e some obvious d i f f e r e n c e s i n the way i n which each of the t h r e e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s chose t o use the A c t .  To  Truman, i t appeared  labour  t o be a way of keeping the domestic  -43-  s i t u a t i o n under control i n order to cope with national and i n ternational problems.  President Truman was faced with several  problems which required a stable labour s i t u a t i o n such as Marshal a i d plan, the B e r l i n C r i s i s , the Russian takeover i n Czechoslovakia  (1948), as well as the return to the labour  force of several m i l l i o n veterans. The meat packers* s t r i k e was  characterized by violence  and clashes with law enforcement o f f i c e r s and was therefore a threat to the public order.  The t e c h n i c a l argument was,  however,  that i f the s t r i k e went on long enough there would not be any meat to eat.  The telephone s t r i k e on the other hand i s somewhat  puzzling, there appeared to be no r e a l emergency; the only effect would have been an inconveniencing and slowdown i n government communications.  The use of the Taft-Hartley injunction, i n the  case of the coal miners* pension dispute, w i l l meet with less controversy than the previous two uses. was  Nevertheless the s t r i k e  enjoined not merely because Americans were going to suffer  p h y s i c a l l y but because the s t r i k e was a f f e c t i n g the economy of the nation, as well as because the s t r i k e was a f f e c t i n g the nation's foreign commitments. President Eisenhower's administration was characterized by a greater reluctance to use the Taft-Hartley provisions. Nevertheless when he did use i t , his reasons f o r using i t were very s i m i l a r to those used by Truman.  The s t r i k e of the atomic  energy plants used as one of the examples i s reasonably s t r a i g h t forward.  Clearly the national defense of the United States  was  f a r too involved f o r the government to allow a c r i p p l i n g shut-  -49-  down of e i t h e r p l a n t a t a time when the U n i t e d S t a t e s was  stock-  p i l i n g atomic bombs a n d v t r y i n g t o r e t a i n i t s atomic l e a d over the U.S.S.R. The  s t e e l s t r i k e c r e a t e d somewhat of a c r i s i s .  President  Eisenhower and h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were t r y i n g t o get the economy r o l l i n g a g a i n f o l l o w i n g the 1958  recession.  I t was  felt  the s t e e l n e g o t i a t i o n s were going t o s e t the standard sequent wages, i n other areas  of the economy.  that  f o r sub-  A f t e r an  already  lengthy s t r i k e , i t became c l e a r t h a t s t e e l s t o c k s were almost d e p l e t e d and t h a t , u n l e s s the government a s s e r t e d the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , the government's economic g o a l s were going to be s e r i o u s l y and a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d .  Add  there was  of an e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t ,  s t i l l no prospect  t o these reasons,  f a c t t h a t defense c o n s t r u c t i o n was thus t h e r e was pute any  no way  beginning  the f a c t t h a t and  the  t o " f e e l the  pinch";  f o r the government t o s t a y out of t h i s  dis-  longer.  Whereas Eisenhower was d i s p u t e u n t i l i t was  r e l u c t a n t t o step i n t o a  labour  a c l e a r cut case of emergency, the Kennedy-  Johnson a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s r e c o r d shows t h a t i t would step i n t o l a b o u r d i s p u t e s i f i t was emergency d e v e l o p i n g tance,  s a t i s f i e d t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of an  existed.  I t issued injunctions, f o r i n s -  i n a d i s p u t e i n v o l v i n g the S t e l l i t e d i v i s i o n of Union  Carbide.  S t e l l i t e was  producing  an a l l o y used i n manufacturing  engine p a r t s of c e r t a i n a i r c r a f t and h e l i c o p t e r s . never even allowed  A strike  was  to begin, because of the "Vietnam b u i l d u p " at  t h i s time. Both i n j u n c t i o n s i s s u e d r e s p e c t i n g the West Coast m a r i t i me  d i s p u t e and the East  Coast longshoremen's d i s p u t e were i s s u e d  -50-  not so much because of the p o s s i b l e s u f f e r i n g of the  American  people but because of these s t r i k e ' s widespread e f f e c t s upon the economy g e n e r a l l y and the widespread e f f e c t s upon American commitments abroad, both economic and The  reader w i l l r e c a l l  t o answer some q u e s t i o n s ; 1.  military.  t h a t t h i s chapter would attempt  here are some of the answers:  Are the terms " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and  w i t h b i o l o g i c a l h e a l t h and shown t h a t the U.S.  s a f e t y " synonymous  n a t i o n a l defense?  I t has  c l e a r l y been  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s have a l l agreed that . when the r  defense o f the n a t i o n i s a f f e c t e d , the T a f t - H a r t l e y p r o v i s i o n s should be a p p l i e d . r e l i e f was fense  In n e a r l y every s i t u a t i o n where i n j u n c t i v e  sought, testimony was  of the n a t i o n could or was  presented  t o show t h a t the  being a f f e c t e d .  No  de-  conclusions  can be reached as t o whether or not the term n a t i o n a l h e a l t h welfare  i n c l u d e s the b i o l o g i c a l h e a l t h of the people.  case where t h i s aspect  could have been t e s t e d i s i n the  the meatpackers' d i s p u t e . t h a t t h e r e was 2.  The  There was  even a s e r i o u s meat  never any  and  only  case of  r e a l case to prove  shortage.  Is there an element of economic h e a l t h i n c l u d e d i n the  a p p l i c a t i o n of the " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h " c r i t e r i o n ? There has  existed  i n many "emergency d i s p u t e s " s u b s t a n t i a l and adverse i m p l i c a t i o n s t o the economic h e a l t h of the U.S.A. were present c a t i o n s and  The  economic i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n conjunction with equally serious m i l i t a r y  impli-  i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o determine which of these  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s the Courts f e l t were more important. important to c o n s i d e r the economic and  two  I t would be  defense a s p e c t s  of a  pute s e p a r a t e l y were i t not f o r the f a c t t h a t , i n more than d i s p u t e , the government argued t h a t a h e a l t h y economy  was  disone  -51-  e s s e n t i a l t o the e f f e c t i v e defense o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s overseas i n t e r e s t s .  Thus i t i s s a f e t o conclude t h a t the econo-  mic  stability  nal  h e a l t h and s a f e t y " , a t l e a s t as i t has been i n t e r p r e t e d by  federal 3.  administrations. I s t h e r e a s i n g l e d e f i n i t i o n of the " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and  safety? not!  o f the U.S. i s covered by the g e n e r a l term " n a t i o -  The answer to t h i s q u e s t i o n  i s of course:  no there i s  Sometimes, by c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y , i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o  i s o l a t e one f a c t o r as being  o f g r e a t e r concern than the other  f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t i n g t o an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s d e c i s i o n t o invoke the emergency p r o v i s i o n s o f the T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t .  Generally  speaking, however, one i s f a c e d with a web of interwoven r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n c l u d i n g m i l i t a r y and defense c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  domestic,  and  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l i c a t i o n s and economic and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s ,  and  combinations t h e r e o f .  -52-  CHAPTER V THE V  SPECIAL CASES OF  .  A.  THE .  PUBLIC EMPLOYEES .  .  Introduction It  i s the i n t e n t of t h i s chapter t o examine the  Canadian i  and  United States  public servants.  systems of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g This  from o t h e r c h a p t e r s .  with federal  chapter w i l l d i f f e r somewhat i n emphasis Whereas other chapters were d e a l i n g  prima-  r i l y w i t h l a b o u r management r e l a t i o n s i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r ,  this  chapter w i l l examine the attempts a t e s t a b l i s h i n g c o l l e c t i v e bargaining it  i n the  federal public service.  In the p r i v a t e  i s p o s s i b l e t o speak of government i n f l u e n c e  point, of view i n the  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  sector,  or a t h i r d  party  p r o c e s s , i t becomes  meaningless t o do t h i s type of a n a l y s i s when the government i t s e l f i s the  employer.  An examination can be made however, of  k i n d of concessions which the government has  made i n terms of  l e t t i n g p u b l i c employees determine t h e i r own  working  The gaining  a n a l y s i s w i l l examine two  i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e .  which has  been p l a c e d  upon the  The  first  aspect i s the  gaining.  The  constraint  employee groups w i t h r e s p e c t Both the U.S.  and  systems of f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e systems of b a r g a i n i n g areas which are not  conditions.  a s p e c t s of c o l l e c t i v e bar-  the a c t u a l substance of b a r g a i n i n g .  off  the  to become the  subject  to  Canadian have fenced  of c o l l e c t i v e bar-  second a s p e c t o f p u b l i c s e r v i c e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n -  i n g c r u c i a l to an understanding o f the between the management and of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  system i s the power balance  employee groups.  S i n c e the  i s often strongly influenced  functioning by the  abi-  -53-  l i t y of one other, is  p a r t y t o impose a cost of disagreement upon the  the power p o s i t i o n of both management and  of s i g n i f i c a n t  employee groups  importance.  There can be l i t t l e s e c t o r w i l l present  doubt "that b a r g a i n i n g  i n the  public  the government w i t h some r a t h e r unique p r o -  blems; unique i n t h a t these problems w i l l be more pronounced than they would be i n normal c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g private sector. inherent  The  s i t u a t i o n s i n the  p r i n c i p a l source of these d i f f e r e n c e s i s  i n the s p e c i a l s t a t u s of the s t a t e as an employer.  s t a t e i s o f t e n looked  The  upon as an a r b i t e r of l a b o u r management  r e l a t i o n s , not n e c e s s a r i l y i n the sense t h a t i t w i l l d i c t a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " terms and  c o n d i t i o n s of employment, but  t h a t i t attempts t o create  c o n d i t i o n s l e a d i n g to the  c o n c l u s i o n of n e g o t i a t i o n s between d i s p u t a n t s . must perform i n the  case of p u b l i c employees.  t h i s , however, the s t a t e must s i t a c r o s s employees' r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , and the p u b l i c .  i n the  successful  This function i t In a d d i t i o n t o  the " t a b l e " from i t s  b a r g a i n w i t h them on b e h a l f  Although i t i s sometimes suggested t h a t one  d i f f e r e n c e s between p r i v a t e and employees are p r o f i t seeking,  of  the  i t would be i n a c c u r a t e  to suggest by  I t could be suggested i n f a c t t h a t the government  too i s under pressure at  of  p u b l i c employment i s t h a t p r i v a t e  t h a t governments are f r e e from the f i n a n c i a l squeeze created r i s i n g costs.  sense  t o produce more ( i n t h i s case more s e r v i c e s )  a lower c o s t t o the taxpayer.  government, on the one  Thus we  see the d u a l r o l e of  hand t o f a c i l i t a t e agreement, on the  hand t o d r i v e as hard a b a r g a i n as p o s s i b l e .  other  -54B. The U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i o n The  public i n t e r e s t i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  between f e -  d e r a l employees and the s t a t e f i n d s o f f i c i a l e x p r e s s i o n t i v e Order 10988 dated February 1962.(!)  Despite  as Execu  the f a c t  that  permanent a s s o c i a t i o n s o f manual employees had e x i s t e d i n the U.S.  f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e s i n c e t h e t u r n o f t h e century,  t o 1962, t h e government had not expressed any o p i n i o n s such a s s o c i a t i o n s although,  prior  concernin  l e g a l l y , such a s s o c i a t i o n s were e n t i  t i e d t o e x i s t and p e t i t i o n the government. (2) I t was not u n t i l P r e s i d e n t  Kennedy s i g n e d E x e c u t i v e  Order  10988 t h a t any k i n d o f formal mechanism was e s t a b l i s h e d t o d e a l with  c o l l e c t i v e employee a c t i o n f o r the purpose o f c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining.  Machinery and procedures were e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e  c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f b a r g a i n i n g agents and t h e g r a n t i n g o f o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o the employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . ing  Although the word-  o f the order seems t o shy away from the use o f terms common  t o t h e l a b o u r management f i e l d i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r  (union-  employee a s s o c i a t i o n , b a r g a i n i n g u n i t — a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t , relations—employee  management c o o p e r a t i o n ) ,  nevertheless  labour there  i s an unmistakable i n t e n t t o u n i o n i z e the f e d e r a l p u b l i c s e r v i c e The  preamble t o the E x e c u t i v e  of the order.  Order o u t l i n e s the purpose  I t suggests t h a t t h e " p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f employees  i n t h e f o r m u l a t i o n and implementation of p e r s o n n e l  policies  a f f e c t i n g them c o n t r i b u t e s t o e f f e c t i v e conduct o f p u b l i c b u s i ness" and t h a t "... the e f f i c i e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the Government . . . r e q u i r e s t h a t o r d e r l y and c o n s t r u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s be maintained between employee o r g a n i z a t i o n s and management  -55-  officials;  ..."  These statements precede the a c t u a l r e g u l a -  t i o n s and statement o f r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s o f employees and  managers and a r e presumably intended  the  regulations. I. Bargaining First  not  Substance  of a l l ,  i t must be made c l e a r t h a t E.O.* 109^8 does  speak s p e c i f i c a l l y about b a r g a i n i n g  word.  Bargaining  bargaining gains  t o denote the s p i r i t o f  i n t h e pure sense o f the  as i t sometimes takes p l a c e i n p r i v a t e  industry,  i n the sense t h a t both p a r t i e s w i l l attempt t o maximize  and minimize l o s s e s , does not appear t o be p a r t o f t h e i n -  t e n t o f E.O. 10988.  The f e d e r a l employer has r e s e r v e d  certain  r i g h t s which a r e not t o become s u b j e c t s f o r b a r g a i n i n g .  Never-  t h e l e s s a g r e a t many areas o f l a b o u r management r e l a t i o n s w i l l apparently The  be t h e s u b j e c t first  of bargaining  suggestion  sessions.  o f what t h e employees of the f e d e r a l  p u b l i c s e r v i c e a r e t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n , i s contained 5(b).  i n Section  This s e c t i o n i n s t r u c t s the agencies t o c o n s u l t w i t h i t s  employees on the (i) formulation  and implementation o f p e r s o n n e l  p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s ; ( i i ) matters a f f e c t i n g g e n e r a l working but  conditions;  i t a l s o adds t h a t the agency must not c o n s u l t i t s employees  on matters which would not n o r m a l l y be p a r t o f the c o l l e c t i v e negotiations.  ^Executive  Order  -56A f u r t h e r s e c t i o n (S. 6(b)) adds t h a t employee A s s o c i a t i o n s s h a l l be g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o be r e p r e s e n t e d c u s s i o n s between management and employees (i)  at dis-  concerning:  grievances,  ( i i ) personnel  p o l i c i e s and p r a c t i c e s ,  ( i i i ) other matters r e l a t e d t o g e n e r a l working c o n d i t i o n s . As broad and a l l encompassing as these areas  f o r bargaining  appear t o be, they a r e l i m i t e d i n scope. S e c t i o n seven l i s t s  c e r t a i n "management p r e r o g a t i v e s ,  which t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e managers have more o r l e s s r e s e r v e d as t h e i r own area o f d e c i s i o n making.  They r e t a i n f o r themselves  the r i g h t t o h i r e , promote, t r a n s f e r , demote and discharge employees w i t h i n any government agency.  Presumably, t h i s p r o v i -  s i o n might have the r e s u l t o f dampening d i s c u s s i o n i n these during bargaining sessions. for  vigorous  employment.  Normally, these p o i n t s would  Another area g i v e n s p e c i a l s t a t u s d u r i n g  sonnel by which o p e r a t i o n s  bargaining  the methods, means and per-  o f the government" are t o be conducted.  T h i s i s r a t h e r c u r i o u s wording i n view o f the f a c t t h a t  many p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s e s initiated  provide  discussions during bargaining sessions i n p r i v a t e  s e s s i o n s i s the area o f "determining  /J3.7(l)_7  areas  have p r o f i t e d from a good number o f union  changes.  One e x p l a n a t i o n o f the r e s e r v i n g o f c e r t a i n management p r e r o g a t i v e s has been proposed by Hart. (3) government might have f e l t  j|e suggests t h a t the  t h a t c l o s e d shops simply  t o l e r a t e d i n the P u b l i c S e r v i c e .  could not be  The government would  certainly  want t o r e t a i n the merit system o f h i r i n g p o l i c y and may have f e a r e d t h a t l e t t i n g a union  c o n t r o l i t s manpower supply would  -57-  have had  detrimental e f f e c t s .  Whatever the e x p l a n a t i o n ,  the  r e g u l a t i o n s c e r t a i n l y r e s t r i c t somewhat the scope of b a r g a i n i n g discussions. A f u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n upon the agreement i s contained  content  i n S e c t i o n 7(1).  of any  collective  This section  the d e s i r a b i l i t y t h a t a l l employees be governed by the  expresses policies  of v a r i o u s agency r e g u l a t i o n s as w e l l as p o l i c i e s s e t f o r t h i n the F e d e r a l Personnel to  Manual, none of which are matters s u b j e c t  collective negotiations. II.  Power S t r u c t u r e No  without  examination of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g can be  complete  a d e s c r i p t i o n of the r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o n of the  parties.  T h i s examination w i l l be r e s t r i c t e d to d e s c r i b i n g  those p a r t s of the e x e c u t i v e  order which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s  parties' bargaining p o s i t i o n . e x t r a c t from t h i s E x e c u t i v e  The  the  I t w i l l be most u s e f u l i f one  can  Order, the q u a l i t y of the government's  a t t i t u d e towards the employee o r g a n i z a t i o n and gaining.  two  r e g u l a t i o n s of the e x e c u t i v e  collective  order  bar-  c o n t a i n a number  of r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the employee o r g a n i z a t i o n s . The is  first  contained  r e s t r i c t i o n , and perhaps the most c r i t i c a l  i n Section 2 .  The  order s p e c i f i e s any  g a n i z a t i o n w i l l not r e c e i v e r e c o g n i t i o n i f i t ".  employee o r -  . . a s s e r t s the  r i g h t t o s t r i k e a g a i n s t the Government of the U n i t e d S t a t e s any agency t h e r e o f , or t o a s s i s t or p a r t i c i p a t e i n any strike  ..."  In any  or  such  I t remains t o be seen whether t h i s no s t r i k e  can or w i l l be e n f o r c e d .  one,  order  case i t cannot but i n f l u e n c e  -58-  the b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n of the employee o r g a n i z a t i o n , i n view of  the f a c t t h a t i t has  removed the t h r e a t of  Another r e s t r i c t i o n i s one  strike.  which r e s t r i c t s the type of  a s s o c i a t i o n which w i l l r e c e i v e r e c o g n i t i o n by the E x c l u d e d are o r g a n i z a t i o n s of the  "...  which advocate the  overthrow  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l form of government i n the U n i t e d  "(S.2)  States.  Presumably t h i s would t h e r e b y exclude c e r t a i n types o f .  politically  i n c l i n e d organizations  r i g h t wing o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  - such as f a r l e f t and  c o l o r , creed  S e c t i o n t h r e e d e s c r i b e s another k i n d of  employee o r g a n i z a t i o n as one corrupt  far  A l s o excluded are o r g a n i z a t i o n s  d i s c r i m i n a t e on the b a s i s of r a c e , gin.  government.  which  or n a t i o n a l o r i -  "objectionable"  w h o s e U e a d e r i s ".  . . subject  to  i n f l u e n c e s or i n f l u e n c e s opposed to b a s i c democratic  principles." These r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the type of a s s o c i a t i o n which w i l l be a c c e p t e d as r e p r e s e n t i n g cant  the employees are e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i -  i n view of the f a c t t h a t i t i s the agency i n q u e s t i o n  must determine which u n i t w i l l be a p p r o p r i a t e gaining.  which  for collective  S e c t i o n e l e v e n as w e l l as S e c t i o n f i v e of E.O.  bar-  10988  make i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t whenever an employee o r g a n i z a t i o n a p p l i e s for  o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n on b e h a l f of a l l or p a r t of the  employees  of a government agency i t i s the agency i t s e l f which must mine whether the gaining unit i n  organization i s q u a l i f i e d to represent  the  bar-  question.  Although not p r o c e s s but  deter-  d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g the  collective  c e r t a i n l y a s i g n i f i c a n t i n d i c a t o r of the  a t t i t u d e towards' the unions i s S e c t i o n 8 d e a l i n g w i t h  bargaining government's grievance  -59-  procedures.  "Procedures f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f grievances  . . . s h a l l conform t o standards i s s u e d by the C i v i l S e r v i c e Commission."  _3".8(a)(l_7  This i n d i c a t e s i n f a c t t h a t the f e d e -  r a l government has r e t a i n e d some degree o f c o n t r o l over g r i e vance p r o c e d u r e s .  T h i s same s e c t i o n goes on t o say t h a t  collec-  t i v e agreements may i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n s f o r the a r b i t r a t i o n o f grievances  but t h a t "Such a r b i t r a t i o n . . . s h a l l be a d v i s o r y  i n nature,  w i t h any d e c i s i o n s o r recommendations s u b j e c t t o the  approval  o f t h e agency head." _S.8(b_7  Another i n t e r e s t i n g p r o v i s i o n i s contained a l t h o u g h i t does not d e a l d i r e c t l y with it  i n S e c t i o n 13;  collective  bargaining,  c e r t a i n l y w i l l a f f e c t the p o s i t i o n and.behavior o f the par-  ties.  S e c t i o n 13 p r o v i d e s  f o r the d r a f t i n g o f (1) proposed  standards o f conduct f o r employee o r g a n i z a t i o n s code o f f a i r l a b o u r p r a c t i c e s . provides  (2) a proposed  The c r u c i a l p a r t o f t h i s s e c t i o n  t h a t these standards o f behavior  Department o f Labour and the C i v i l S e r v i c e  w i l l be s e t by the Commission.  C. The Canadian F e d e r a l System In August 1963 the f e d e r a l government appointed a committee c a l l e d "The P r e p a r a t o r y Public S e r v i c e . " ^ )  Committee on C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g  i n the  T h i s committee was composed p r i m a r i l y o f  s e n i o r government o f f i c i a l s and was t o make p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o the P u b l i c S e r v i c e o f a p p r o p r i a t e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g and a r b i t r a t i o n . published  i n J u l y 1965 and contained  forms o f  The o f f i c i a l r e p o r t was  recommendations f o r sub-  sequent l e g i s l a t i o n t o be named the P u b l i c S e r v i c e S t a f f R e l a tions Act.  -60-  In February 1 9 6 7 , Parliament i s t o govern the government and  approved the new  a c t which  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  the f e d e r a l p u b l i c employees.  The  a c t makes pro-  v i s i o n s f o r c e r t i f i c a t i o n o f employee o r g a n i z a t i o n s as w e l l as s e t t i n g up a form of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ployees.  em-  In a d d i t i o n , the a c t s e t s up the P u b l i c S e r v i c e S t a f f  R e l a t i o n s Board t o a d m i n i s t e r The  f o r the p u b l i c  the v a r i o u s p r o v i s i o n s of the  Act.  a c t u a l l e g i s l a t i o n f o l l o w s the recommendations of the Heeney  Report* reasonably I. Bargaining  closely. Substance  There do not appear t o be too many r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the p a r t i e s t o c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o r e s t r i c t the areas f o r '~ bargaining.  Nevertheless  the government has  t i o n 56 of the P.S.S.R.** Act t h a t no  c o l l e c t i v e agreement  c o n t a i n p r o v i s i o n s which "would r e q u i r e amendment of any  s p e c i f i e d i n Secshall  . . . the enactment or  l e g i s l a t i o n by Parliament,  except f o r the  pur-  pose o f a p p r o p r i a t i n g moneys r e q u i r e d f o r i t s implementation." T h i s same s e c t i o n s p e c i f i e s the p i e c e s of l e g i s l a t i o n which, desp i t e the f a c t t h a t they are p e r t i n e n t to the s t a t u s of the ployees,  are not t o be a l t e r e d through the process  bargaining.  of  em-  collective  These i n c l u d e : l ) T h e Government Employees Compensa-  t i o n Act, 2) Government V e s s e l s  Compensation Act, 3)  Public  S e r v i c e Employment Act, 4) P u b l i c S e r v i c e Superannuation A c t . E s s e n t i a l l y what the government i s s a y i n g i s t h a t they are *The r e p o r t of the P r e p a r a t o r y B a r g a i n i n g / i n the P u b l i c S e r v i c e .  pre-  Committee on C o l l e c t i v e  **Public Service S t a f f Relations  Act.  -61pared t o d i s c u s s such "bread and b u t t e r " i s s u e s such as r a t e s o f pay,  hours o f work, leave and d i s c i p l i n e but a r e not prepared t o  amend the present tem)  system o f h i r i n g and promotion (the merit  sys-  nor i s i t .prepared t o d i s c u s s the g e n e r a l f i n a n c i a l admin-  i s t r a t i o n o f the government, nor w i l l i t d i s c u s s the present scheme o f superannuation. I t w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g t o watch the development of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  i n the f e d e r a l c i v i l s e r v i c e .  Especially inte-  r e s t i n g w i l l be t h e developments concerning  the i s s u e o f the  s p e c i f i e d l i m i t s of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.  Pension schemes, f o r  i n s t a n c e , have o f t e n been t h e s u b j e c t o f f a i r l y vigorous ing sessions, e s p e c i a l l y i n the p r i v a t e sector.  bargain-  Nevertheless  the government's d e c i s i o n not t o i n v o l v e these " f r i n g e i s s u e s " i n the a c t u a l c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  s e s s i o n s does not preclude  the employees from making r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o the government through other The  channels.  government has taken a r a t h e r i n t e r e s t i n g stand  with  r e s p e c t t o boards of a r b i t r a t i o n , not a r b i t r a t i o n of grievance d i s p u t e s , but a r b i t r a t i o n a r i s i n g out o f a s i t u a t i o n where the p a r t i e s t o c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e not a b l e t o conclude an agreement.  S e c t i o n 70 o u t l i n e s t h e s u b j e c t s with which a r b i t r a l  awards may d e a l : " r a t e s o f pay,  hours o f work, l e a v e  entitlements,  standards of d i s c i p l i n e , and other terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t h e r e t o . "  _S.70(lT7  T h i s same  s e c t i o n goes on t o o u t l i n e those s u b j e c t s which a r e not t o be incorporated  i n a r b i t r a l awards such as: "standards,  procedures  or processes  governing the appointment, a p p r a i s a l , promotion,  demotion, t r a n s f e r , l a y - o f f or r e l e a s e of employees." _^S.70(3_7  -62-  T h i s l a t t e r p a r t o f S e c t i o n 70 i s an apparent attempt t o p r o t e c t the "merit  system" of h i r i n g and  promotion, i t remains to  be  seen whether the merit system can be kept o u t s i d e the arena of collective  bargaining.  As an a d d i t i o n a l guide to boards of a r b i t r a t i o n there i s S e c t i o n 68 which p r e s c r i b e s those c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which the government f e e l s are important i n making awards.  The  f u l l text  of t h i s s e c t i o n f o l l o w s : 68. In the conduct of proceedings before i t and i n r e n d e r i n g an a r b i t r a l award i n r e s p e c t o f a matter i n d i s p u t e the A r b i t r a t i o n T r i b u n a l s h a l l c o n s i d e r (a) the needs of the P u b l i c S e r v i c e f o r q u a l i f i e d - employees; (b) the c o n d i t i o n s of employment i n s i m i l a r occup a t i o n s o u t s i d e the P u b l i c S e r v i c e , i n c l u d i n g such geographic, i n d u s t r i a l or other v a r i a t i o n s as the A r b i t r a t i o n T r i b u n a l may c o n s i d e r r e l e vant ; (c) the need t o maintain a p p r o p r i a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the c o n d i t i o n s of employment as between d i f f e r e n t grade l e v e l s w i t h i n an occupation and as between occupations i n the P u b l i c Service ; (d) the need t o e s t a b l i s h terms and c o n d i t i o n s of . employment t h a t are f a i r and reasonable i n r e l a t i o n t o the q u a l i f i c a t i o n s r e q u i r e d , the work performed, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y assumed and the nature of the s e r v i c e s rendered; and (e) any other f a c t o r t h a t t o i t appears t o be r e , l e v a n t t o the matter i n d i s p u t e . Despite  the s p e c i f i c suggestions  made as t o what the government  f e e l s are important c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h e r e does not appear t o be any  i n making a r b i t r a l awards,  l a c k of f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h i s  p o r t i o n o f the l e g i s l a t i o n i n view of S.68(e) which allows a r b i t r a t o r s t o c o n s i d e r any levant.  the  other f a c t o r s which they deem r e -  -63I I . The Power S t r u c t u r e Under the P.S.S.R. Act t h e r e has been a somewhat d i f f e r ent d e l e g a t i o n . :of power than o c c u r r e d i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s under E x e c u t i v e Order 10988.  Whereas i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s the r e s -  p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a d m i n i s t e r i n g the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s system has been p l a c e d i n the hands of the i n d i v i d u a l agencies, the Canad i a n system i s t o be a d m i n i s t e r e d by an e s p e c i a l l y c r e a t e d board named the P.S.S.R. Board. the new  T h i s Board i s i n e f f e c t the key to  system of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g as f a r as f e d e r a l p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s are  concerned.  The Board's chairman as w e l l as the other members are appointed by the Governor General i n C o u n c i l . vice-chairman groups.  The  are not to be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of any  Chairman and interested  The remainder of the members are to be chosen as being  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n equal numbers of the i n t e r e s t s of employees and the i n t e r e s t s - of the employer r e s p e c t i v e l y . The Board w i l l a d m i n i s t e r the process of _S.2_7«  certification  I t w i l l determine what u n i t s are a p p r o p r i a t e f o r  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g as w e l l as determine those employees w i l l be d e s i g n a t e d as being excluded act  (managerial p e r s o n n e l e t c . ) .  who  from the p r o v i s i o n s of the  The  Board i s a l s o empowered  t o deny c e r t i f i c a t i o n from any o r g a n i z a t i o n which i s a f f i l i a t e d or donates funds t o any p o l i t i c a l p a r t y f u r t h e r empowered under S e c t i o n 20 and  _S.3_7«  T  n e  Board i s  19 to make r e g u l a t i o n s of  a g e n e r a l nature as w e l l as make i n q u i r i e s i n t o suspected t i o n s of the A c t . practices,  etc.)  viola-  ( U n f a i r l a b o u r p r a c t i c e s , u n f a i r employer  -64-  The.Board's putes  a r i s i n g  of  law  be  questions  related  arbitration empowered but  also  matters the  tion  of  of  act  lution  legal  by  of  of  of  conciliation process  The  grievance referred  i t s  Board  Any  by  the  not  board  the  be  of  the  applying must  specify  resolved  the  chairman  Governor  i n  under  a  key  to of  Sections  37  by  bargaining  not  a r b i t r a t i o n .  methods:  conflicts  that  bargaining  choice  made  by  of  and  the  Section 78  38,  which  method  is  change  members  upon  is  method  the  second  this  to  operation  on  the  Board  is  a r b i t r a -  under  the  while  the  the  Council  the  two  to  of  fact  the  Section  of  application  i n  simply  of  appointed  choice  the  may  procedures,  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  should  of  Board and  they  result  appoints  the  resolution  questions or  a  d i s -  Board.  to  for  as  The  rules  selection  According  i t  Board  u n d o u b t e d l y -become  question  to  restricted  appointed  of  be  disputes  The  conciliator  for  upon  own  may  of  t r i b u n a l .  are  while  settlement  These  has  of  c e r t i f i c a t i o n  imposed  the  chairman  employees  He  be  setting  appointed  when  w i l l  of  law.  the  adjudication.  tribunal  disputes.  agent  of  intrepretation.  the  the  or  include  arbitration  Board.  w i l l  agreement.  upon  with  conciliation  conflicts  the  is  the  is  gaining  t h a t , may  the  powers  any  questions  conciliation  What  group  law  those  of  also  a r b i t r a t i o n  only  appointed  the  of  tribunal  or  to  a r b i t r a t i o n  advice 52  of  not  The  of  out  functions  then  the  behalf  becomes  a  subsequent about  f i r s t  This  bar-  of  bring  the  reso-  an  being  selection part  of  of the  agent.  bargaining but  of  of  there  process  for  agent are  may  some  be  altered  time  resolution  of  constraints a  dispute.  -65-  The to  intention stick  bargain been be  to  tive  keeps  As there  is  tion  far  reports bring  to  at  the  is  to  been  signed,  bargain  has  been  given  the  actual  by  that  the  a  a  to at  recommendations  tion  89  further  upon  the  The P.S.S.R. of  the  Act  is  the  and  second  the  chan-  next  collec-  section  effect-  conflicts  i n  force  enforced  be  concerned,  the  brought  The  c o n c i l i a t i o n of  a  either  success  or  officer  party  party  or  of  the  matters  i n  parties can  so be  and  failure  c o n c i l i a t i o n board  facts  both  into  c o n c i l i a -  to step  alternately,  c o n c i l i a t i o n board's  the  process  steps:  either  the  i f  Once  can  request  The  of  to  that,  of  the  may  be  two  c o n c i l i a t i o n board  process  process  cannot  i t .  i t  Board his  The  as  Arbitration.  Arbitration  of  the  regarding  provides  parties  at  Board.  as  of  about  consists  request  findings  to  have  c o n c i l i a t i o n is  agent,  agreement.  the  well  recommendations  of  an  the  i t s  unusual  dispute  chairman  of  is  of  c o n c i l i a t i o n board.  into  notice  negotiations. process  It  the  This of  agent  question  but  resolution  bargaining  party.  i n  u n t i l  the  of  given  that  for  activated  contain  appears  process  and  request  negotiations  has  series  bargaining  has  renegotiation.  the; p a r t i e s  be  he  contract  l i t t l e  the  the  once  for  as  brought  process  the  up  either  officer  compel  It  one  chosen  by  be  can  any  of  to  terminated.  to  the  is  38  u n t i l  comes  very  been  action  a  notice  throughout  y  once  agreement  ively  can  choice  successfully  once  has  the  Section  collectively  changed  ged  of  report  dispute dispute. agree, made  as Secthe  binding  accordingly. resolution In  Tribunal are  this  specified  case  the  binding upon  by  the  recommendations  both  parties  to  -66-  the dispute /_S.7_,7 with no resort to s t r i k e action permitted, /_T01(l)p_7  Once notice to bargain has been given by the  bargain-  ing agent, and the negotiations have subsequently broken down, then either party to the dispute can make a request to go to arbitration.  Although,the findings and recommendations of the  A r b i t r a t i o n Tribunal are binding, Section 67(2) provides that i f the parties can agree with respect to one or more of the matters i n dispute then the Tribunal i s not to make an award with respect to these matters.  The A r b i t r a t i o n Tribunal i s  guided i n making i t s awards by Sections 68 and 70.  Section 70  makes clear those matters which are to be subject to becoming part of a r b i t r a l awards as well as those matters which may be dealt with.  not  This section allows the" a r b i t r a l awards to con-  t a i n recommendations about wages and hours of work, etc., but not about matters covered i n the Public Service Employment Act related to the "merit system" of h i r i n g and promotion.  and  Section  68, which has already been reproduced (p. 62) suggests considerations which the t r i b u n a l must make i n making i t s awards.  Of  s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i s the absence of a consideration which, i t has often been suggested, should be of concern to an a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l - the economic condition of the  country.  The government of Canada has, through the P.S.S.R. Act, placed i t s e l f i n much the same p o s i t i o n that employers i n the private sectors have been accustomed to f o r some time.  The  Treasury Board w i l l be responsible f o r the bargaining as well as a host of other management functions as described i n the Financial Administration Act.  new  The administration of the federal  -67-  l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s system i s d e l e g a t e d t o the quasi-autonomous the to (the  P.S.S.R. Board.  body,  The P a r l i a m e n t o f Canada r e t a i n s the r i g h t  v e t o any f i n a n c i a l commitment made by the government-employer T r e a s u r y Board).  D. C o n c l u s i o n s It  should be obvious from the f o r e g o i n g d i s c u s s i o n t h a t  t h e r e a r e some v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the system under which the  United States f e d e r a l c i v i l  s e r v a n t s w i l l b a r g a i n and the new  Canadian system i n t r o d u c e d i n February 1967.  The d i f f e r e n c e s  between the two systems do not occur i n the area o f b a r g a i n i n g substance.  Both the Canadian and U.S. systems s p e c i f i c a l l y ex-  clude from the b a r g a i n i n g process any matters e s s e n t i a l t o the f u n c t i o n i n g o f the "merit system" o f appointment and promotion. In  speaking on the House o f Commons b i l l E-1&1, which was  l a t e r t o become the P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employment A c t , the M i n i s t e r of  N a t i o n a l Revenue, the R t . Hon. E . J . Benson s a i d : " . . .  This  measure w i l l not o n l y r e t a i n the m e r i t system o f appointment and promotion, and the type o f job s e c u r i t y l o n g enjoyed by c i v i l s e r v a n t s , but w i l l extend them t o thousands o f a d d i t i o n a l (5)  employees."  w /  The Report o f the P r e p a r a t o r y Committee a l s o i n -  s i s t e d t h a t c e r t a i n matters be g i v e n s p e c i a l s t a t u s i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.They  suggested t h a t no s u b j e c t a c t u a l l y be e x c l u -  ded from b a r g a i n i n g a l t h o u g h the matters r e l a t e d t o superannuat i o n , appointment, promotion and d i s c i p l i n e should under no c i r cumstance form p a r t o f an a r b i t r a l award.  I t should be remembered,  however, t h a t the Committee was making recommendations knowing  without  t h a t t h e r e was t o be a new d i v i s i o n o f power as a r e s u l t  -68-  of the new  P u b l i c S e r v i c e Employment Act and  Administration It  Financial  Act.  i s the new  d i v i s i o n of power which g i v e s the  f e d e r a l system such a d i f f e r e n t outlook system.  the new  Under the U.S.  E.O.  Canadian  compared t o the  American  10988, most of the power d u r i n g  bar-  g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s w i l l be i n the.'hands of the Agency r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t i t i s the agency which i s r e s p o n s i b l e for  a g r e a t d e a l of the a c t u a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the  Order, e x c l u s i v e of grievance  procedures.  Not  Executive  o n l y must the  agency assume the r o l e of employer and management d u r i n g t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s , but i t must a l s o a d m i n i s t e r l e a v e s unanswered the q u e s t i o n  collec-  the system.  This  of what happens i n case there i s  a c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t between the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f u n c t i o n the b a r g a i n i n g The ble  function.  Canadian system makes an attempt to a v o i d t h i s p o s s i -  c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t .  bills  simultaneously,  of powers.  and  Through the i n t r o d u c t i o n of  t h e r e has  Parliament  has  three  been a s u b s t a n t i a l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  r e t a i n e d the r i g h t of veto over  any  f i n a n c i a l arrangements; i t i s a f t e r a l l the u l t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y of the l a n d .  Under the F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Act, the  Board assumes the r o l e o f management. other t h i n g s , " f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n work, l e a v e and  I t i s r e s p o n s i b l e , among of r a t e s of pay,  hours of  other c o n d i t i o n s of employment; f o r the  c a t i o n of p o s i t i o n s and  able working c o n d i t i o n s . "(7) w i l l be the Treasury  classifi-  employees, f o r the establishment  standards of d i s c i p l i n e ; and  w i l l be  Treasury  of  f o r the promotion of s a f e and In other words, the r e a l  Board, and  employer  i n t h i s r o l e the Treasury  i n much the same p o s i t i o n as any  suit-  Board  l a r g e employer i n the  -69-  private sector. and  The problems o f a d m i n i s t e r i n g  g e n e r a l l y running  the r e g u l a t i o n s  the system has been delegated  t o the  P.S.S.R. Board, a quasi-independent body. Despite  the d i f f e r e n c e s i n r e g u l a t i o n s both the U.S. and  Canadian governments have some common p h i l o s o p h i e s towards ral  c i v i l servants.  fede-  They both a s s e r t t h e i d e a t h a t the l e g i s l a -  t i v e b o d i e s cannot r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r a u t h o r i t y as n a t i o n a l sovereigns.  I n n e i t h e r system.is  t h e r e any way f o r t h e employee  a s s o c i a t i o n s t o f o r c e upon the country a n y t h i n g In Canada, the Treasury  i t does not wish.  Board i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o l l e c t i v e bar-  g a i n i n g ; i n t h e U.S.A., t h e agencies perform t h i s f u n c t i o n ; i n both cases any agreements a r e s u b j e c t t o the o v e r r i d i n g a u t h o r i t y of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e s . approval in  I n both c o u n t r i e s t h e r e i s u n e q u i v o c a l  f o r the f u n c t i o n i n g o f a form o f c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining  the c i v i l s e r v i c e . There a r e some d i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i c i e s between t h e U n i t e d  S t a t e s and Canada.  Perhaps the most obvious o f these i s the  case when c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g by i t s e l f i s not capable of r e s u l t i n g i n a c o l l e c t i v e agreement.  In the United States,  there  i s an o u t r i g h t ban on s t r i k e s and an i n s i s t e n c e t h a t any form o f a r b i t r a t i o n must be a d v i s o r y i n nature. ment has r e c o g n i z e d  I n Canada, the govern-  t h a t there a r e many government s e r v i c e s which  c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y be i n t e r r u p t e d without causing anything worse than a p u b l i c nuisance.  much  Consequently there has been no  o u t r i g h t ban on s t r i k e s other than s t r i k e s o f the armed f o r c e s and  the R.C.M.P.  I t may w e l l be t h a t the absence o f a s t r i k e  -70-  ban i s l i t t l e difficult  more than a r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t a ban on s t r i k e s i s  i f not i m p o s s i b l e to enforce  effectively.  -71-  CHAPTER VI THE A.  SASKATCHEWAN LABOUR RELATIONS SYSTEM  Introduction T h i s chapter w i l l examine the E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency-  Act which was The  r e c e n t l y passed by the Saskatchewan l e g i s l a t u r e .  Act i s only a p o r t i o n of the whole l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s system  presently operating i n that province.  I t w i l l be looked a t i n  c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Trade Unions Act because i t too c o n t a i n s emphasis of t h i s chapter w i l l be  un-  usual features.  The  upon d e t e r m i n i n g  the k i n d of a t t i t u d e which the Saskatchewan l e -  g i s l a t u r e has taken towards the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  placed  process.  I t can be s a f e l y s a i d t h a t compared t o many p r o v i n c e s katchewan has adopted a k i n d of l a i s s e z - f a i r e approach t o relations.  The new  legislation s t i l l  Sas-  labour  i s very moderate i n outlook  y e t i t n e v e r t h e l e s s e f f e c t s a s t e p towards i n c r e a s e d government i n t e r e s t i n the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  process.  Both the changes i n the Trade Union Act and the E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act were suggested i n a r e p o r t made t o the government by a s p e c i a l I n q u i r y Commission. recommendations were implemented. suggested s t r o n g l y t h a t ".  Most of the  report's  Among o t h e r - t h i n g s , the r e p o r t  . . l a b o u r n e g o t i a t i o n s should be  to management and the t r a d e u n i o n w i t h a minimum of o u t s i d e ference."^)  I t f u r t h e r expressed  left inter-  the hope t h a t l a b o u r and mana-  gement approach the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e w i t h good, w i l l and attempt t o r e s o l v e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s without  r e s o r t t o the s t r i k e or l o c k o u t .  i I t added, however, t h a t there were cases where the p u b l i c could  - 7 2 -  f e e l j u s t i f i e d i n not l e t t i n g the p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e completely  on t h e i r own but t h a t ,  settle  nevertheless,  " o n l y i n those areas where the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t p l a c e s a duty upon the Government t h a t any i n t e r f e r e n c e with t h i s could be j u s t i f i e d . " F i n a l l y  process  t h i s r e p o r t summed up i t s  f e e l i n g s t h a t any l e g a l amendment t o the e x i s t i n g body of laws ought t o g i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o g i v i n g maximum p r o t e c t i o n and freedom t o the i n d i v i d u a l worker. any  Nowhere i n the r e p o r t i s there  recommendation t h a t the government ought t o i n t e r f e r e i n t h e  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g process  except under e x c e p t i o n a l  circums-  tances . B. The Trade Unions Act The  Trade Union A c t c o n t a i n s an unusual f e a t u r e  the settlement  o f grievance  disputes.  regarding  Other p r o v i n c e s and the  f e d e r a l government have l e g i s l a t i o n r e q u i r i n g t h a t a l l c o l l e c t i ve agreements p r o v i d e f o r t h e compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n of grievance disputes. the l i f e  T h i s p r o v i s i o n i s intended  t o outlaw s t r i k e s  of a v a l i d c o l l e c t i v e agreement.  during  When a c o l l e c t i v e  agreement c o n t a i n s no p r o v i s i o n t o submit grievance p r i v a t e a r b i t r a t i o n then t h e l e g i s l a t i o n normally  disputes to  requires that  the p a r t i e s submit t h e i r d i s p u t e t o a Labour R e l a t i o n s Board f o r a r b i t r a t i o n whose award then becomes b i n d i n g upon both p a r t i e s . The  Trade Union Act c o n t a i n s no such p r o v i s i o n .  Saskatchewan  never has banned and s t i l l does not ban s t r i k e s d u r i n g the l i f e of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. A r e c e n t amendment t o the Trade Union Act p r o v i d e s f o r the enforcement o f a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e s v o l u n t a r i l y i n c l u d e d i n  -73-  any  c o l l e c t i v e agreement /S.23A/.  Under t h i s s e c t i o n a r b i t r a -  t i o n awards s h a l l be e n f o r c e a b l e as orders o f the Labour R e l a t i o n s Board, and no stoppage o f work w i l l be allowed d u r i n g the l i f e o f an agreement whenever such agreement p r o v i d e s t h a t g r i e v ance d i s p u t e s a r e t o be s e t t l e d by a r b i t r a t i o n . In a d d i t i o n , i n cases where a c o l l e c t i v e agreement prov i d e s f o r t h e s e t t l e m e n t o f g r i e v a n c e d i s p u t e s by a r b i t r a t i o n , but t h e p a r t i e s have not agreed upon an a r b i t r a t i o n then S e c t i o n 2 3 B a p p l i e s .  procedure,  T h i s p r o v i d e s f o r an a r b i t r a t i o n pro-  cedure t o be f o l l o w e d whenever t h e p a r t i e s cannot agree upon a procedure  o f t h e i r own.  When one p a r t y f a i l s t o nominate i t s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e then the other p a r t y may apply t o the c o u r t s t o appoint a member i n b e h a l f o f t h e f i r s t p a r t y .  The two nominees  choose a chairman with both p a r t i e s paying h a l f o f the chairman's expenses. The A c t contains no requirements t i o n process i s t o be conducted.  as t o how the a r b i t r a -  Once the p a r t i e s agree b e f o r e -  hand t h a t t h i s should be the process f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f g r i e v ance d i s p u t e s , then the p a r t i e s must, honour t h e i r agreement, instead of r e s o r t i n g to s t r i k e a c t i o n .  Despite the government's  u n w i l l i n g n e s s to get i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c t u a l a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e s s , the message of t h e government t o l a b o u r and management i s c l e a r : "We would p r e f e r you s e t t l e your d i s p u t e s through  arbitration  r a t h e r than by a s t r i k e , but above a l l we would r a t h e r you s e t t l e d your own d i s p u t e s . "  -74-  C. The  E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act The  E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act was  passed d u r i n g a  s p e c i a l s e s s i o n of the Saskatchewan L e g i s l a t u r e on September 1966.  The  s e s s i o n was  c a l l e d t o " d e a l w i t h an emergency the  Government f e a r e d would develop i f a s t r i k e of gas of the Saskatchewan Power Commission . . . tinue."^)  The  s t r i k e had  these workers The  supply  were allowed  begun on September 2; the  r e c e i v e d R o y a l Assent on September 8 and was on September 12,  7,  thereby making any  workers to con-  legislation  proclaimed  i n force  f u r t h e r s t r i k e a c t i o n by  illegal.  Act r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t t h e r e should  not be any  strike  under c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c circumstances of "emergencies." t i c a l s e c t i o n of the Act i s S e c t i o n  The  cri-  3.  3. Where a t any time i n the o p i n i o n of the Lieutenant Governor i n C o u n c i l a s t a t e of emergency e x i s t s i n the p r o v i n c e or i n any area of the p r o v i n c e i n such c i r cumstances t h a t l i f e , h e a l t h or p r o p e r t y could be i n ser i o u s jeopardy by reason of a l a b o u r d i s p u t e i n v o l v i n g : (a) employees engaged i n the o p e r a t i o n of any system, p l a n t or equipment f o r f u r n i s h i n g or s u p p l y i n g water, heat, e l e c t r i c i t y or gas s e r v i c e t o the p u b l i c or any p a r t of the p u b l i c ; or (b) employees engaged i n the p r o v i s i o n of h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s anywhere i n the p r o v i n c e ; the Lieutenant Governor i n C o u n c i l may by proclamation d e c l a r e t h a t from and a f t e r a date f i x e d i n the p r o c l a ' mation a l l f u r t h e r a c t i o n and procedures i n the d i s p u t e are t o be r e p l a c e d by the emergency procedures p r o v i d e d i n t h i s Act. T h i s means t h a t government a c t i o n s under t h i s Act are l i mited t o c o n d i t i o n s o f "emergency" where the circumstances are such t h a t " l i f e , The  h e a l t h or p r o p e r t y "  could be i n s e r i o u s  jeopardy.  Act i s not v e r y s p e c i f i c as t o what i t means by these terms.  -75-  I t c e r t a i n l y does not answer the i n e v i t a b l e q u e s t i o n of whether these emergencies a l s o i n c l u d e such t h i n g s as the economic h e a l t h of the P r o v i n c e .  ( I t i s t h i s v e r y q u e s t i o n which has plagued  the  U n i t e d S t a t e s i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n of the T a f t - H a r t l e y emergency provisions.)  D e s p i t e the l a c k o f s p e c i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s , i t i s  c l e a r t h a t the Act was  intended t o p r o v i d e procedures  w i t h l a b o u r d i s p u t e s surrounded  by unusual  The a c t u a l emergency procedures  circumstances.  c o n s i s t of banning  present or impending s t r i k e and subsequently pute through  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n .  for dealing  One  to s e t t l e the  any dis-  wonders from the word-  i n g o f the Act whether the a r b i t r a t i o n procedures  once s t a r t e d  are i n t e n d e d to r e p l a c e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g or are intended t o supplement i t .  There i s no p r o v i s i o n i n t h i s p i e c e of l e g i s l a t i o n  f o r the p a r t i e s to s u b s t i t u t e t h e i r own or more of the matters  settlement regarding  i n d i s p u t e , f o r p a r t of the  one  arbitration  award (as i s sometimes p r o v i d e d i n s i m i l a r l e g i s l a t i o n  elsewhere).  D. Summary D e s p i t e a g e n e r a l attempt to m a i n t a i n a " l a i s s e z - f a i r e " approach to l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , Saskatchewan too has  chosen to i n -  crease p u b l i c involvement: i n the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . 1  As f a r as the average c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s are concerned,  there  i s l i t t l e government i n t e r e s t o t h e r than r e q u i r i n g the enforcement of a r b i t r a t i o n c l a u s e s a l r e a d y forming p a r t of the agreement.  collective  The E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Emergency Act i s d i r e c t e d t o -  wards l a b o u r d i s p u t e s i n c e r t a i n s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r i e s .  The under-  l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y i s simply t h a t t h e r e are c e r t a i n kinds of l a b o u r  -76-  d i s p u t e s the r e s o l u t i o n t h e r e o f simply up t o the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d .  The  cannot be l e f t  completely  l e g i s l a t i o n recognizes that  government must be a b l e to prevent  the  or stop s t r i k e s i n o r g a n i z a -  t i o n s p r o v i d i n g e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s , as w e l l as p r o v i d e a t r i b u n a l to p r e s c r i b e the terms o f employment, should the p a r t i e s not a b l e t o conclude t h e i r own  c o l l e c t i v e agreement.  be  -77-  CHAPTER VII THE A.  BRITISH COLUMBIA APPROACH—BILL 33  Before B i l l  33  On December 2, 1968,  a brand new  s h i n y framework f o r the  p r o c e s s i n g o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s went i n t o in  B r i t i s h Columbia.  In the s p r i n g of t h i s same year the  L e g i s l a t u r e passed a b i l l commonly known as B i l l 33, ly  c a l l e d the M e d i a t i o n  Commission A c t .  The  but  B.C. official-  p a s s i n g of the a c t  r e s u l t e d i n the r e p e a l of many s e c t i o n s of the B.C. t i o n s Act which had  operation  Labour R e l a -  p r e v i o u s l y been the r e g u l a t o r of the  labour  r e l a t i o n s system i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The  B.C.  Labour R e l a t i o n s Act w i l l s t i l l govern the  cesses of c e r t i f i c a t i o n and g r i e v a n c e  arbitration.  pro-  The new  Bill  33 has r e a s s e r t e d the requirement t h a t a l l c o l l e c t i v e agreements p r o v i d e f o r the compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n  of d i s p u t e s a r i s i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of v a l i d c o l l e c t i v e agreements _S.2_7. l e g i s l a t i o n i s d i r e c t e d p r i m a r i l y a t s t r e a m l i n i n g the  The  bargaining process.  Nevertheless  be necessary very b r i e f l y .  and  one  can examine the "new  t o backtrack  b i l l w i l l create.  c l i m a t e , " however, i t w i l l  somewhat and d e s c r i b e the o l d  Under the r e g u l a t i o n s of the B.C.  A c t , a s t r i k e was  collective  i t i s p o s s i b l e to d e t e c t some  changes i n the c l i m a t e which the new Before  new  At t h i s p o i n t of time, i t i s not y e t p o s s i b l e t o  gauge the e f f e c t which the B i l l w i l l have upon the  drastic  of  collective  b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s , a s t e p l o n g advocated by both l a b o u r management.  out  prevented  process  Labour R e l a t i o n s  from o c c u r r i n g not o n l y u n t i l a  strike  -78-  vote had been taken,  but a l s o u n t i l a complex c o n c i l i a t i o n  pro-  cess had been complied  with.  s t e p one each normally  r e q u i r i n g c e r t a i n p e r i o d s o f time s t a t u t o -  rily  T h i s c o n c i l i a t i o n process was a two  defined. The  first  s t e p i n t h i s e l a b o r a t e c o n c i l i a t i o n process was  the appointment o f a c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r who would r e p o r t t o t h e M i n i s t e r o f Labour  subsequently  either:  1) t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had r e a d i e d an agreement or  2) t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had not reached agreement, i n which case he would make "recommendations as t o the matters i n d i s p u t e . " The  second step i n t h e c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o c e s s  i n v o l v e d the  appointment o f a c o n c i l i a t i o n board c o n s i s t i n g o f one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from each o f the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s and one chairman nominated  by t h e f i r s t  two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The d u t i e s o f t h e board  were simply t o a s s i s t the p a r t i e s t o conclude  an agreement, and,  f a i l i n g t h i s , t o "make recommendations r e g a r d i n g the matters i n dispute." The blem.  system as i t was being used r e s u l t e d i n a major p r o -  D e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e "machinery was p r o v i d e d  to f a c i l i t a t e agreement,"(1) effective  t h e machinery i n f a c t  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.  merely  delayed  The t i m i n g and r e g u l a t i o n s go-  v e r n i n g t h e two s t e p c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures were such t h a t u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n , by e i t h e r union  o r management (such as s t r i k e s  or l o c k o u t s ) , was not allowed u n t i l u s u a l l y l o n g a f t e r t h e a c t u a l e x p i r y date o f the c o l l e c t i v e agreement. to a p p l y economic s a n c t i o n s u n t i l these had  been complied  with.  N e i t h e r p a r t y was a b l e c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures  -79-  S i n c e the f u n c t i o n o f both c o n c i l i a t i o n board and c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was t o f i n d "terms and c o n d i t i o n s t h a t the p a r t i e s (2)  can agree t o "  v  ' this usually  meant f i n d i n g  some s o r t  o f a com-  promise between the company's o f f e r and t h e union's demands.(3) The  bargaining usually  started  prior to conciliation; at this  p o i n t the f l o o r f o r b a r g a i n i n g was t h e company's o f f e r .  The con-  c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r ' s and the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommendations both had a tendency t o r a i s e the e f f e c t i v e  floor for collective  bargaining. When c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g f i r s t  got under way,  management  was f a c e d w i t h a l e n g t h y and cumbersome c o n c i l i a t i o n p r o c e s s . Each o f these steps u s u a l l y  raised  the e f f e c t i v e l e v e l o f b a r g a i n -  i n g somewhat; consequently ^management was o f t e n u n w i l l i n g  to l a y  a l l o f i t s cards on the t a b l e u n t i l a f t e r the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommendations were r e l e a s e d .  And, i n f a c t , i t was o f t e n sub-  sequent t o t h i s p o i n t arid f r e q u e n t l y j u s t b e f o r e a s t r i k e deadl i n e t h a t a good d e a l o f the e f f e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g took p l a c e . ( 4 ) The  new legislation.'does  away w i t h the o l d two step  conci-  l i a t i o n process. B. The M e d i a t i o n Commission Act ( B i l l The parties  main t h r u s t  o f the B i l l i s d i r e c t e d  a t p r o v i d i n g the  t o a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e w i t h new machinery t o  d e a l w i t h these d i s p u t e s . is  33)  the c r e a t i o n  The c e n t r a l  core o f the new l e g i s l a t i o n  o f the M e d i a t i o n Commission t o a d m i n i s t e r the  p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act (Mediation Commission A c t ) ;  e s p e c i a l l y im-  p o r t a n t , a r e the terms o f r e f e r e n c e o f the Commission.  A brief  -80-  d e s c r i p t i o n of the Act w i l l s u f f i c e t o p o i n t out the c r u c i a l e l e ments o f the new  legislation.  There a r e e s s e n t i a l l y two ways i n which the Commission can become i n v o l v e d i n a l a b o u r d i s p u t e .  Mediation The  first  way i s a s s o c i a t e d with unusual circumstance where the M i n i s t e r of Labour " c o n s i d e r s t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s or may be a f f e c t ed by the d i s p u t e " _S.11(2_7 or a l t e r n a t i v e l y when the  Lieutenant  Governor i n C o u n c i l f e e l s t h a t the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and  welfare  are s u f f i c i e n t l y i n v o l v e d i n a labour d i s p u t e . for  The second  way  the Commission t o become i n v o l v e d i n a l a b o u r d i s p u t e i s by  request  of e i t h e r p a r t y . S e c t i o n 11(b) p r o v i d e s  t h a t , a t the request  of e i t h e r  p a r t y t o a c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n , the Commission may appoint Mediation  Officer.  There i s no compulsion on the p a r t of the  Commission t o f o l l o w t h i s course of a c t i o n . has appointed a M e d i a t i o n t h a t , should  a  Once the Commission  O f f i c e r , t h e r e e x i s t s the p o s s i b i l i t y  the M e d i a t i o n  O f f i c e r not be s u c c e s s f u l i n g e t t i n g  the p a r t i e s t o conclude an agreement, the f u l l  Commission w i l l be  brought i n t o the d i s p u t e . The Commission may h o l d f u l l hearings which a M e d i a t i o n  O f f i c e r has been a p p o i n t e d .  i n t o any d i s p u t e f o r The d e c i s i o n of  whether or not the f u l l Commission i s t o get i n v o l v e d i n a d i s p u t e i s normally l e f t Mediation  up t o the Commission i t s e l f . *  labour  While the  O f f i c e r ' s r e p o r t does not c o n t a i n any recommendations  r e g a r d i n g any of the matters i n d i s p u t e , the r e p o r t o f the Media-  the  *Except where the L t . Gov. i n C o u n c i l r e f e r s a d i s p u t e t o Commission under S e c t i o n s 18, 19.  -81-  t i o n Commission i s t o c o n t a i n recommendations of j u s t such a nature.  The Act s p e c i f i e s t h a t :  "The D e c i s i o n s h a l l s t a t e the  terms and c o n d i t i o n s which i n the o p i n i o n of the Commission would be a f a i r and reasonable c o l l e c t i v e agreement between the p a r t i e s , together sion."  w i t h reasons s u p p o r t i n g _S".15(1_7«  I  n  the o p i n i o n h e l d by the Commis-  other words the recommendations w i l l not  be a r r i v e d a t on the same b a s i s used by the o l d C o n c i l i a t i o n Boards.  Whereas C o n c i l i a t i o n Boards were i n s t r u c t e d t o b r i n g the  p a r t i e s t o an agreement, t h e r e was no d i r e c t i o n as t o the q u a l i t y of such agreements.  The Commission has no such d i s c r e t i o n i n  view of the wording of S e c t i o n 15; i t must recommend terms and c o n d i t i o n s which would c o n s t i t u t e a " f a i r and r e a s o n a b l e  collec-  t i v e agreement." C. The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t The new B i l l 33 i n t r o d u c e s best is  the concept t h a t what i s i n the  i n t e r e s t s of two d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s t o c o l l e c t i v e  negotiations'  not n e c e s s a r i l y i n the i n t e r e s t of the p u b l i c a t l a r g e .  government f e l t i t n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e  The  a mechanism through which  p a r t i e s t o a d i s p u t e would have a c o n t r a c t p r o v i d i n g f o r the terms and  c o n d i t i o n s of employment  whenever the p a r t i e s could not agree  among themselves on such matters. The emphasis of the B i l l appears t o be on p r e v e n t i n g  a  s t r i k e , presumably when a s t r i k e would have e x c e s s i v e l y harmful e f f e c t s upon t h i r d p a r t i e s , i . e . , the community of the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s . t h a t the L i e u t e n a n t  at large  The c o n t r o v e r s i a l S e c t i o n 1&  V  exclusive provides  Governor i n C o u n c i l may r e f e r any l a b o u r  dis-  pute t o the Commission whenever i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t the  -82" p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and w e l f a r e . "  The Commission then takes  the d i s p u t e and handles i t on the "adversary  over  system" s i m i l a r t o  t h a t which i s p r a c t i c e d i n a court room (not n e c e s s a r i l y u s i n g the same r u l e s and p r o c e d u r e s ) . The  Commission handles l a b o u r d i s p u t e s i n much the same  manner as l e g a l d i s p u t e s would be handled i n a court room.  The  Commission determines those matters which a r e i n d i s p u t e w i t h the h e l p o f the p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d .  The Commission then a s s i g n s the  burden o f p r o o f t o e i t h e r p a r t y r e g a r d i n g each o f the matters i n dispute.  Presumably, the Commission hands down an award (or  recommendation) based upon the merit o f the r a t i o n a l arguments presented it  t o i t by the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s .  Once an award i s made,  i s f i n a l and b i n d i n g upon both p a r t i e s "except t o the extent  t h a t t h e p a r t i e s agree t o vary the same".  /_S.18(1) (b) ( i i _ 7  D. The P u b l i c S e r v i c e P u b l i c S e r v i c e employees a r e t r e a t e d i n much the same way t h a t employees would be i f they were working i n i n d u s t r i e s h e a v i l y endowed with the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  There i s one d i f f e r -  ence, however, i n t h a t S e c t i o n 50 p r o v i d e s t h a t any person emp l o y e d i n the P u b l i c S e r v i c e "who takes p a r t i n a s t r i k e g u i l t y o f an o f f e n c e under t h i s The  Executive  . . . is  Act."  C o u n c i l (the Cabinet) has been s e t up as  the employer f o r the purposes o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g .  A l l the  p r o v i s i o n s o f the Act, p e r t i n e n t t o employers a l s o apply t o the "government-employer" (the E x e c u t i v e  Council).  The awards o f the  Commission, when handed down, a r e b i n d i n g upon the government and  -83-  its  employees.  to a bargaining  Even i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e , however, the p a r t i e s dispute  may s t i l l modify the d e c i s i o n o f the  Commission as they wish. E. Summary and C o n c l u s i o n P r i o r t o the i n t r o d u c t i o n i n the B.C. L e g i s l a t u r e o f 3 3 , i t was f e l t t h a t any changes i n the current  Bill  legislation  would embody some o f the recommendations o f the Nemetz R e p o r t .  w /  When the l e g i s l a t i o n was f i n a l l y presented t o the House, i t cont a i n e d very l i t t l e system.  reference  t o the Swedish l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s  I n f a c t t h e r e appeared t o have been s u b s t a n t i a l borrow-  i n g s from the workings o f the A u s t r a l i a n A r b i t r a t i o n Commission.(6) N e v e r t h e l e s s , some o f the recommendations o f t h e Nemetz r e p o r t were implemented. Nemetz seemed t o have r e c o g n i z e d t h a t the C o n c i l i a t i o n Board system had i t s problems i n view o f t h e f a c t t h a t "the d e c i sions  o f these c o n c i l i a t i o n boards have a s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e  upon t h e t r e n d  o f s e t t l e m e n t s throughout our economy."(?)  showed concern t h a t the terms o f r e f e r e n c e  He  o f C o n c i l i a t i o n Boards  were inadequate, t h a t f i n d i n g "terms and c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t the  p a r t i e s can agree t o " was simply not enough. Nemetz f u r t h e r p o i n t e d established  out t h a t a permanent body should be  t o a d m i n i s t e r m e d i a t i o n procedures and thereby  some s t a b i l i t y and c o n t i n u i t y t o the m e d i a t i o n f u n c t i o n . its  give Through  l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e government has i n d i c a t e d t h a t the people  would be w e l l s e r v e d through the implementation o f these two r e commendations .  1  -84-  The M e d i a t i o n Commission was formed t o p r o v i d e a permanent f o r c e o f h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d men t o d e a l w i t h l a b o u r d i s p u t e s . The  Commission i s o f a semi-independent n a t u r e .  The government  can o r d e r t h e Commission when and where t o a c t i n u n u s u a l  cir-  cumstances , b u t i t cannot d i r e c t l y tamper w i t h t h e q u a l i t y o f i t s judgements o r awards. The new system o f l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s has s e v e r a l a s s e t s . The f i r s t a s s e t i s t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f t h e o l d two-step  concilia-  t i o n process w i t h the r e s u l t a n t "step f u n c t i o n " ( r a i s i n g the f l o o r f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ) every time a c o n c i l i a t i o n r e p o r t was made.  The second a s s e t i s t h a t t h e government i s now f r e e d  from a d m i n i s t e r i n g the mediation procedures,  and, i n f a c t , o f  g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n l a b o u r d i s p u t e s a t a l l , except i n u n u s u a l circumstances. The t h i r d a s s e t o f t h e new system i s t h e a c t u a l terms o f r e f e r e n c e o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n — t h e concept  o f making recommenda-  t i o n s on t h e b a s i s o f what c o n s t i t u t e s "a f a i r c o l l e c t i v e agreement."  and r e a s o n a b l e  T h i s i s t h e concept which has g r e a t po-  t e n t i a l t o i n f l u e n c e t h e l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s c l i m a t e i n B.C. " C o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g as i t i s c u r r e n t l y p r a c t i c e d i n Canada i s n o t , by and l a r g e r e s p o n s i v e t o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l ment . . .  argu-  i n f a r t o o many c a s e s , wage i n c r e a s e s r e f l e c t t h e raw  economic power o f e i t h e r l a b o u r o r management."^)  T h i s i s how  t h e p r e s e n t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g system has been d e s c r i b e d by Dr. N o e l H a l l .  He f u r t h e r went on t o e x p l a i n t h a t " c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g i s v e r y much a v e h i c l e f o r a c t i v a t i n g l a t e n t power: power s p r i n g i n g f r o m a monopoly p o s i t i o n ; power d e r i v e d f r o m  -85-  c o n t r o l over access  t o p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l s ; power a r i s i n g from  h o l d i n g a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n i n the economy; power based on (Q)  widespread p u b l i c support  . . ."  V 7 /  The Commission's recommendations a r e intended t o r e s u l t i n much the same t h i n g which would normally  have been a r r i v e d a t  through c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , i . e . , "a c o l l e c t i v e contract."  employment  (One can h a r d l y c a l l the Commission's recommendations  a c o l l e c t i v e agreement.)  The process  through which the Commis-  s i o n w i l l a r r i v e a t i t s c o n c l u s i o n s w i l l , i n some cases, s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t p r o v i s i o n s than those which would have been contained  normally  i n a c o l l e c t i v e agreement had c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g been allowed  t o f o l l o w i t s course t o c o n c l u s i o n .  then i s the most i n t e r e s t i n g aspect prospect  contain  This  of the new l e g i s l a t i o n : the  t h a t c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g w i l l be i n f l u e n c e d by another  process w i t h a g r e a t e r r a t i o n a l content.  I t may w e l l be t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g , i n g e n e r a l , w i l l undergo a s u b t l e change i n emphasis.  I t may be t h a t r e s u l t s d u r i n g c o l l e c t i v e  negotia-  t i o n s w i l l be obtained l e s s through the use or the t h r e a t o f economic s a n c t i o n s and more through the use o f r a t i o n a l argument and persuasion. Whether t h i s change of emphasis a c t u a l l y occurs or not i s at  the moment pure s p e c u l a t i o n .  aspect to  o f the l e g i s l a t i o n .  Nevertheless  i t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g  N e i t h e r i s i t p o s s i b l e , a t t h i s time,  know whether the government, i n . . d r a f t i n g the l e g i s l a t i o n , i n -  tended t o i n f l u e n c e the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g process as  as w i d e l y  this. A f i n a l comment should be made here r e g a r d i n g the compul-  s o r y f e a t u r e o f the A c t — t h e  feature contained  i n S e c t i o n 18  -86-  which has been the t a r g e t o f so much c o n t r o v e r s y .  Despite the  c o n t r o v e r s y about t h i s s e c t i o n , i t g i v e s the p r o v i n c i a l  legisla-  t u r e no power which i t d i d not have before the passage of the Act.  T h i s s e c t i o n simply d e l e g a t e s power from the l e g i s l a t u r e  t o the Cabinet.  Whether i t was a necessary  step or not can be  debated, but i t i s c e r t a i n l y not an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t the government i n t e n d s t o put an end t o a l l s t r i k e s . I n commenting on the B i l l  i n g e n e r a l , the B.C. M i n i s t e r  of Labour and now A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l ,  the Hon. L e s l i e R.  Peterson,  s a i d t h a t the l e g i s l a t i o n was aimed a t p r e v e n t i n g a " p o s s i b l e d i s l o c a t i o n o f s e r v i c e s e s s e n t i a l t o the p u b l i c (at which time) a s t r i k e or l o c k o u t i s v i r t u a l l y not a c c e p t a b l e t o the p u b l i c . n(10) "Nor does i t have any i n t e n t i o n of t a k i n g away or i n h i b i t i n g the r i g h t of l a b o u r t o s t r i k e i n cases t h a t do not have widespread i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p r o v i n c e as a whole." (-^ The government  o b v i o u s l y has no i n t e n t i o n of a p p l y i n g the  a r b i t r a t i o n provisions i n l i e u of f r e e l y negotiated agreements.  collective  The Act c l e a r l y p r o v i d e s t h a t the p a r t i e s may  sub-  s t i t u t e t h e i r own terms and c o n d i t i o n s of employment, a t any f o r those suggested  by the Commission  time,  i n i t s recommendations.  The M i n i s t e r of Labour h i m s e l f a s s e r t e d t h a t : "a f r e e l y n e g o t i a t e d c o l l e c t i v e agreement i s p r e f e r a b l e to any other. "(12)  -87-  CHAPTER V I I I AN ONTARIO PROPOSAL:  THE RAND COMMISSION  REPORT  A. I n t r o d u c t i o n In August 1966, the government o f O n t a r i o appointed the Honourable I.C. Rand t o head a R o y a l Commission I n q u i r y t o " i n q u i r e i n t o the means o f enforcement o f t h e r i g h t s , d u t i e s and o b l i g a t i o n s and l i a b i l i t i e s o f employees and employers, . . . and of t r a d e unions and t h e i r members, . . . w i t h r e l a t i o n t o each o t h e r and t o the g e n e r a l p u b l i c . . ., and the use o f s t r i k e s . . ., and t o r e p o r t thereon and t o make such recommendations as he may deem f i t . . . " ( D  The Royal Commission I n q u i r y termina-  t e d w i t h the r e l e a s e o f i t s r e p o r t which w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o simply as the Rand  Report.  The Rand Report  c o n t a i n s recommendations on v i r t u a l l y  every aspect o f l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s , y e t i t i s the i n t e n t of t h i s chapter t o r e s t r i c t  i t s e l f t o d i s c u s s i o n o f those  recommendations  which d i r e c t l y concern the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ^process  itself.  As i n p r i o r chapters, t h i s d i s c u s s i o n has a r b i t r a r i l y chosen two p o i n t s o f f o c u s : 1) the e f f e c t upon the b a r g a i n i n g substance, and 2) the e f f e c t upon the power p o s i t i o n s o f the d i s p u t a n t s .  The  r e p o r t i t s e l f makes recommendations f o r t h r e e d i s t i n c t types o f employment: 1) g e n e r a l i n d u s t r i a l employment; 2) p u b l i c s e r v i c e employment; 3) e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s o r s e r v i c e s employment. chapter w i l l d e a l w i t h each o f these types o f employment tions i n turn.  This  situa-  -88-  The  k i n d of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  Report seems t o be most c o n c e r n e d l i s  w i t h which the Rand  the s i t u a t i o n where an  agreement i s f i n a l l y concluded through an i n t e r p l a y of economic c o e r c i o n or, u l t i m a t e l y , economic power.  The  f o c a l p o i n t of h i s  concern i s the r e g r e t a b l e s i t u a t i o n which almost always r e s u l t s when two dispute  p a r t i e s cannot r e a c h agreement, the t h i r d p a r t y i n the - the p u b l i c - bears a s i z e a b l e p o r t i o n of the c o s t s  disagreement.  He  c r i t i c i z e s the  of  commonly a s s e r t e d d e s i r e t o  maintain "free c o l l e c t i v e bargaining."  The Rand Report says t h a t  t r u l y free c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  may  "...  be assumed to  imply  t h a t the p a r t i e s , l e f t to themselves come t o an agreement of t h e i r own  v o l i t i o n without other  compulsion other than r a t i o n a l  persuasion  . . ."(2)  l a b o u r and  management t h a t economic c o e r c i o n generated by them  it At  t  n  e  s  i s the d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n the sistence  ...  a  m  e  time i t i s admitted by  'agreement' . . .  both  What the i n -  (on f r e e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g ) . . .  means i s  t h a t they demand t o be l e t alone t o f i g h t i t out w i t h t h e i r weapons, r e g a r d l e s s terest;  of the e f f e c t on the p u b l i c or any  ' f r e e ' means from the r u l e s of s o c i e t y . " ( 3 )  appear, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the Rand Report i s not toward those who  In f a c t , the Rand Report has s t r i k e s i n general, trailing  . . .  i t would  management  on t h e i r own  taken p a r t i c u l a r l y dead aim  wastage and  turmoil.  at  I t f u r t h e r adds t h a t form of  should terms.  d e s c r i b i n g them as economic s t r u g g l e s ,  s t r i k e w i l l soon be regarded as a " b a r b a r i a n " struggle.  other i n -  o v e r l y sympathetic  would advocate t h a t l a b o u r and  be a l l o w e d t o s e t t l e t h e i r c o n t r a c t d i s p u t e s  own  . . . the  social  -89-  B. G e n e r a l Recommendations The Rand Report would c r e a t e an A r b i t r a t i o n T r i b u n a l to oversee the Ontario c r e a t e i t s own  l a b o u r - r e l a t i o n s scene.  r u l e s of p r a c t i c e and  T h i s T r i b u n a l would  procedure s u b j e c t to  the  approval  by the Governor General i n C o u n c i l .  t h a t the  T r i b u n a l not be bound by l e g a l r u l e s of evidence,  t h a t the proceedings be  The Report proposes but  c a r r i e d out under an atmosphere of i n -  formality, i f possible. T h i s same T r i b u n a l would have wide sweeping- powers w i t h respect  t o handing down a r b i t r a t i o n awards, ending s t r i k e s  l a s t i n g l o n g e r than 6 months, and  suspending or making  t i o n s of the p r o v i s i o n s of the Labour R e l a t i o n s A c t . nal  may  modificaThe  Tribu-  a l s o d e c l a r e i t s award b i n d i n g upon the p a r t i e s as a  c o l l e c t i v e agreement.  Since these powers of the T r i b u n a l are  so  wide sweeping i t w i l l be necessary t o examine these c a r e f u l l y i n order t o determine the p o t e n t i a l e f f e c t of the r e p o r t upon the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  process.  S e c t i o n 25 empowers the T r i b u n a l t o d e c l a r e a s t r i k e ended.  Under t h i s p r o v i s i o n , the temporary replacements which  the employer may  have h i r e d d u r i n g  employees a t the d i s c r e t i o n of the ther provides ment.  The  the s t r i k e , become permanent employer.  t h a t s t r i k i n g employees may  reader should  This s e c t i o n f u r -  r e t u r n to t h e i r employ-  be reminded here t h a t i t i s not  purpose of t h i s paper t o q u e s t i o n the wisdom and pose of such a p r o v i s i o n .  The  c l e a r , h o w e v e r — i f i n only one  the  c l a r i t y of pur-  i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s s e c t i o n are sense—that  employees remaining  -90on s t r i k e f o r a p e r i o d i n excess of 6 months could wind up very awkward s i t u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g  their  jobs.  S e c t i o n 21+ of the recommendations of the Report another o c c a s i o n f o r the T r i b u n a l to go i n t o a c t i o n . strike  (or l o c k o u t )  p a r t y may  request  tration.  The  has been i n progress  When a  f o r 90 days, then e i t h e r  compelled to accept  I f the second p a r t y does not accept  c a t i o n s and  provides  t h a t the d i s p u t e be s e t t l e d by compulsory a r b i -  second p a r t y i s not  f i r s t p a r t y may  in a  a l s o request  the award.  the award, however, then the  t h a t the T r i b u n a l make "such m o d i f i -  suspensions of the Act r e l a t i n g to p i c k e t i n g , the  s t a t u s - o f s t r i k e r s , the employment of replacements or the r e employment of s t r i k e r s which may be j u s t and  appear to i t (the T r i b u n a l )  to be conducive t o the c o n c l u s i o n of an agreed  t i v e agreement." ^_S.24(b_7  This same s e c t i o n allows the  to  collecTri-  bunal t o d e c l a r e the a r b i t r a l award b i n d i n g upon both the p a r t i e s t o the d i s p u t e i f i t i s s a t i s f i e d t h a t the p a r t y r e j e c t i n g the award " . . .  has  f a i l e d to bargain  c l e a r l y unreasonably . . . " The  i n good f a i t h , or has  acted  /S. 24(c__7'.  other i n t e r e s t i n g p r o v i s i o n suggested by the Rand  Report i s t h a t contained an employer /.may  i n Section 21.  S e c t i o n 21 p r o v i d e s  attempt to convince the T r i b u n a l , beyond a reason-  a b l e doubt, t h a t economic terms proposed by the union are t h a t the most probable r e s u l t would be the bankruptcy o f employer. bunal,  that  Should the employer succeed i n so c o n v i n c i n g  then the T r i b u n a l may  use  such the  the  Tri-  i t s d i s c r e t i o n a r y powers to  change or suspend any p r o v i s i o n s of the Act r e l a t i n g t o p i c k e t i n g and  the s t a t u s of s t r i k i n g employees . . . "as may  appear j u s t . "  -91-  A u n i o n may a l s o make s i m i l a r a p p l i c a t i o n t o the T r i b u n a l i t be t h r e a t e n e d w i t h  should  destruction.  Clearly, therefore,  the T r i b u n a l would be used whenever,  a t i t s d i s c r e t i o n , the power p o s i t i o n s  of employer and unions  showed a g l a r i n g d i s c r e p a n c y , and one o f t h e p a r t i e s was attempti n g t o take advantage o f the i n e q u i t y o f power.  The powers o f  the  T r i b u n a l would be exerted i n cases when c o l l e c t i v e  had  c l e a r l y broken down o r when t h e p a r t i e s have contravened r e -  gulations  bargaining  o f the Act or when e i t h e r p a r t y has f a i l e d t o a c t i n  good f a i t h . C. P u b l i c  Employment  The are  b u l k o f the recommendations r e g a r d i n g  contained i n Section  54 of t h e Rand Report.  public  employees  The essence o f  t h i s s e c t i o n i s simply t h a t p u b l i c s e r v a n t s have not been g i v e n the r i g h t t o s t r i k e p r i o r t o t h i s and t h a t a t the present time t h e r e appears t o be no reason why they s h o u l d expect t o be able to s t r i k e . bargaining  The Rand Report r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a form of c o l l e c t i v e can be p r a c t i c e d i n t h e p u b l i c s e r v i c e , but t h a t  s t r i k e s o f p u b l i c employees cannot be t o l e r a t e d .  The r e a s o n i n g  o f f e r e d by t h e Rand Report i s somewhat i n s u l a r i n nature as i f little  consideration  had been g i v e n t o the advantages o f a l l o w i n g  c i v i l servants t o s t r i k e . Some q u o t a t i o n s from the r e p o r t w i l l serve t o i l l u s t r a t e the k i n d  of a t t i t u d e which t h e authors of the Rand Report  towards p u b l i c employment. be p o i n t e d  hold  Before t h i s i s done however, i t must  out t h a t i n no way does the r e p o r t  suggest a mechanism  through which p u b l i c employees would be a b l e t o b a r g a i n  effecti-  -92-  vely.  There i s a p a s s i n g r e f e r e n c e  . . .  i n p u b l i c employment, a r b i t r a t i o n has proved r e a s o n a b l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y , and the f a c t t h a t r y does not d e t r a c t The  that  "Generally  speaking,  i n c e r t a i n cases i t i s compulso-  from the q u a l i t y o f the r e s u l t s . " ^ )  Rand Report suggests t h a t perhaps c i v i l s e r v a n t s have  c e r t a i n advantages over employees i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . manence of economic s e c u r i t y i n p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e  "Per-  i s today being  sought by workers as never b e f o r e ; annual incomes, pensions, i n surance, and other b e n e f i t s demonstrate the l i f e supplanted the day t o day concern.  This desideratum i n employ-  ment i s most f u l l y s a t i s f i e d i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r is  outlook t h a t has  . . . ; .-.there  no reason why t h a t permanency s h o u l d be excluded as a  a t i o n t o be taken i n t o account i n p u b l i c Rand goes on: "When i n d i v i d u a l s . . .  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . " (5)  v o l u n t a r i l y undertake  these r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s (of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e ) of v i r t u a l monopoly."(6)  consider-  they e n t e r a f i e l d  Because the p u b l i c develops r i g h t s of  e x p e c t a t i o n s and because a s o c i e t y i s based on a " s t r u c t u r e o f interwoven t r u s t , c r e d i t and o b l i g a t i o n , good f a i t h and r e l i a b i l i t y a r e e s s e n t i a l t o i t s mode of o p e r a t i o n . "  I t i s f o r these  reasons t h a t the authors of the Rand Report have suggested t h e r e should not be any s t r i k e s t o l e r a t e d i n the p u b l i c The  that  service.  Report would ban s t r i k e s i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e while o f f e r i n g  a system of a r b i t r a t i o n as the only p r e s e n t l y  viable alternative  to t h e s t r i k e whenever the p a r t i e s cannot reach an agreement. D. E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s The  and/or  Industries  Rand Report a l s o g i v e s  s p e c i a l consideration  ment s i t u a t i o n i n what i t c a l l s e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s .  t o employ/S.567.  -93No s t r i k e would be allowed a f t e r an i n d u s t r y i s d e c l a r e d t i a l , and  essen-  the T r i b u n a l would step i n t o the d i s p u t e ; determine  the matters which were i n d i s p u t e and award which would normally  e v e n t u a l l y hand down an  c o n s t i t u t e a c o l l e c t i v e agreement as  f a r as the Act i s concerned. D e s p i t e the f a c t t h a t the Rand Report recommends t h a t t h e r e should be no s t r i k e subsequent t o an i n d u s t r y being  de-  c l a r e d e s s e n t i a l , there:Ms no other compulsion p l a c e d upon the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s other than f o r c i n g them t o f i n d areas ment.  The  p a r t i e s may  agreement without  e l e c t t o a r r i v e a t t h e i r own  any h e l p , or they may  Should the gears of  the T r i b u n a l have been put i n motion the p a r t i e s may settlement  f o r any  still  sub-  or a l l of the T r i b u n a l ' s r e -  commendations on the matters i n d i s p u t e . T r i b u n a l may  collective  e l e c t t o submit t h e i r  dispute to a p r i v a t e a r b i t r a t i o n process.  s t i t u t e t h e i r own  of agree-  During  i t s hearings  the  even hear arguments from the government as w e l l as  from both d i s p u t a n t s . There i s an obvious l a c k of d e f i n i t i o n i n S e c t i o n  56.  F i r s t of a l l there are no c r i t e r i a s e t f o r the T r i b u n a l ' s awards. Secondly t h e r e i s o n l y a l o o s e d e s c r i p t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e s an " e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r y , business to may  i t s p u b l i c involvement, and  or s e r v i c e " which i s such as owing the e f f e c t upon i t o f a s t r i k e  be d e c l a r e d so by the L t . G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i l .  The  declara-  t i o n s h a l l depend upon the " e x i s t i n g a c t u a l or imminent degree o f danger t o the h e a l t h , s a f e t y , convenience or v i t a l i n t e r e s t the p u b l i c . " _3.5_Z-  of  -94Another d i s c r e t i o n a r y power which the T r i b u n a l possesses d e a l s w i t h stoppages of work i n e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s .  Although  the recommendations of the r e p o r t are t h a t there should s t r i k e s i n i n d u s t r i e s d e c l a r e d t o be " i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n may  " e s s e n t i a l , " the  be  no  Tribunal  permit the temporary c e s s a t i o n of such  p a r t o f the work or s e r v i c e i n v o l v e d as i t may  specify . . .  as not being t o the maintenance of s u b s t a n t i a l s e r v i c e f o r the h e a l t h , s a f e t y , convenience or v i t a l i n t e r e s t of the p u b l i c . " _S\  56._7  E. Summary and  Conclusions  The Rand Report's recommendations are an unashamed attempt t o i n f l u e n c e the outcome of the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  process.  An attempt i s made not so much t o i n f l u e n c e the q u a l i t y of  the  agreements but r a t h e r t o encourage the s i g n i n g of agreements. N e v e r t h e l e s s there are p r o v i s i o n s i n the recommendations which c o u l d a f f e c t the q u a l i t y of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The  Rand Report shows concern over i n d u s t r i a l d i s p u t e s  the k i n d which have r e s u l t e d i n the the union's demands were simply ty  ( w i l l i n g n e s s ) t o pay.  recent  case of the New  The  c l o s i n g of a business because  g r e a t e r ..than the company's a b i l i -  case d e s c r i b e d  i n the Report i s the  York H e r a l d - T r i b u n e which was  forced into  bankruptcy p a r t i a l l y as a r e s u l t of the demands made by employees.  of  striking  In order t o d e a l w i t h t h i s p a r t i c u l a r type of s i t u a -  t i o n , the recommended l e g i s l a t i o n would a l l o w the T r i b u n a l t o make a r b i t r a r y changes i n p i c k e t i n g r e g u l a t i o n s , and of s t r i k i n g and  the  status  replacement e m p l o y e e s — a n obvious mechanism ,to_  -95-  weaken the p o s i t i o n of the u n i o n .  T h i s same r e g u l a t i o n would  a p p l y t o an employer attempting t o break a u n i o n . The T r i b u n a l i s allowed t o make or suspend  existing  regu-  l a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o p i c k e t i n g e t c . . . .; the aim of the T r i b u n a l b e i n g t o take s t e p s which i n i t s o p i n i o n seem " j u s t "  and  w i l l be conducive t o the c o n c l u s i o n of a c o l l e c t i v e agreement. The Rand Report has assumed t h a t the essence of a s t r i k e i s t h a t employees f i n d the terms of employment u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and hence stop working w h i l e they i n s i s t upon r e t a i n i n g t h e i r s t a t u s as employees.  Being v e r y concerned w i t h s t r i k e s and t h e i r  effect  upon t h i r d p a r t i e s , Rand has aimed most of the r e p o r t ' s f i r e power a t the t o o l s of c o e r c i o n o f both l a b o u r and management. The fundamental  concern i s t h a t c o l l e c t i v e agreements be  The Report e x p l a i n s t h a t : p i c k e t i n g , replacement  "The  concluded.  o r d i n a r y i n c i d e n t s of s t r i k e s :  and reemployment of s t r i k e r s as supplement-  a r y f e a t u r e s of c o e r c i o n may  be made e f f e c t i v e t o t h a t end  by  j u s t and f a i r m o d i f i c a t i o n s (of the r e g u l a t i o n s ) t o meet the part i c u l a r circumstances of any case,  . . .  For t h a t , a f l e x i b l e  j u r i s d i c t i o n of the T r i b u n a l i s c a l l e d f o r .  E i t h e r the employer  or the u n i o n s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be p e r m i t t e d . . . such m o d i f i c a t i o n s (of the r e g u l a t i o n s ) as may and a p p r o p r i a t e . "  t o apply f o r be found t o be  The powers of the T r i b u n a l would be  just  "designed  t o meet s i t u a t i o n s where s p e c i a l circumstances are present such as l a c k o f good f a i t h , i n e q u a l i t y of power or i n terms The  unreasonableness  proposed."(7) o b j e c t i v e s of the recommendations a r e , i n the words  of the Report:  -96-  1)  "To confine  l e g i t i m a t e economic p r e s s u r e s ,  so f a r as  i s r e a s o n a b l y p o s s i b l e , t o the employer and h i s employees . . . i n v o l v e d i n a d i s p u t e , t o the e x c l u s i o n o f t h i r d persons. n(8) 2)  "To induce, the p a r t i e s towards an agreement w i t h the  minimum o f d i s r u p t i o n o f t h e i r normal working a c t i v i t i e s and relations," 3)  ( i . e . strikes)(9) " W i t h i n the l i m i t s o f f a i r n e s s t o both p a r t i e s , t o  i n c r e a s e the pressures external  toward agreement w i t h the minimum o f  intervention"^)  As f a r as e s s e n t i a l s e r v i c e s and p u b l i c s e r v i c e employment i s concerned, the Report's o p i n i o n i s t h a t the p u b l i c i s too s t r o n g l y a f f e c t e d f o r employees i n these c a t e g o r i e s t o be allowed t o s t r i k e .  -97-  CHAPTER IX SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS  Summarizing a paper such as t h i s i s , o f course, more d i f f i c u l t  rather  than summarizing a q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s .  This  paper was a f t e r a l l a q u a l i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s o f the new wave o f o p i n i o n which tends t o support  o r argue the p h i l o s o p h y  that  there  i s a need f o r i n c r e a s e d government i n t e r e s t i n the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  process.  i n t e r e s t should  The o p i n i o n i n q u e s t i o n  i s t h a t the p u b l i c  i n some f a s h i o n be a s s e r t e d i n c e r t a i n o r a l l  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Before  the c o n c l u s i o n s  r e s p e c t i n g t h i s new wave o f o p i n i o n  can be made, however, i t may be wise t o review our f i n d i n g s with r e s p e c t t o two t o p i c s : 1) t h i s problem o f what c o n s t i t u t e s the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t ; 2) what i s the t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e o f government. A. The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t B i l l 33 speaks o f the " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " , the T a f t - H a r t l e y Act speaks o f the " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and s a f e t y " , the Rand Report a l s o speaks o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t so t h a t avoidance o f the term i s not p r a c t i c a l i n a study o f t h i s s o r t .  Some s c h o l a r s have  attempted t o convince us t o s t a y away from t h i s vague and undefinable  ( a t any r a t e not i n any p r e c i s e mathematical sense) con-  cept o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  There i s no doubt t h a t , on the  b a s i s of the o p i n i o n s reviewed i n t h i s stud}', one simply  cannot  a s s i g n any s i n g l e meaning o r d e f i n i t i o n t o the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The  i n e v i t a b l e q u e s t i o n a r i s e s , o f what use, then, i s t h i s con-  -98cept o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i f i t cannot be d e f i n e d . To say, unequivocably,  t h a t the concept  i s incapable of  being d e f i n e d and t h a t i t s use s h o u l d be abandoned i s t o be f a r too h a r s h .  A s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t may  never be found,  but t h e r e i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t i t w i l l  t o be used by p o l i t i c i a n and l e g i s l a t o r .  The p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i s  capable o f being a p p l i e d i n s p e c i f i c circumstances; words, i t possesses convenient  continue  a s i t u a t i o n a l meaning.  i n other  Furthermore, i t i s a  d e s c r i p t i v e t o be a t t a c h e d t o c e r t a i n k i n d s o f p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s - o f t e n those kinds o f p o l i c i e s a p p l i e d by governments which r e s u l t i n p e r s o n a l c o s t s t o some p o r t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i n our s o c i e t y but which, i t i s a l l e g e d , w i l l e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t i n g r e a t e r b e n e f i t s t o the whole o f s o c i e t y .  Public interest  p o l i c i e s imply a k i n d o f s y n e r g i s t i c approach t o the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s o c i a l b e n e f i t s i . e . the sum o f the p e r s o n a l c o s t s o f a p o l i c y a r e l e s s than the t o t a l s o c i a l b e n e f i t . Once a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t p o l i c y has been formulated i t u s u a l l y i n v o l v e s an e v a l u a t i o n o f the extent t o which c e r t a i n  socially  a c c e p t a b l e s o c i a l g o a l s o r v a l u e s a r e o r would be a f f e c t e d . I t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n v o l v e s choosing between these g o a l s o r v a l u e s — choosing which i s morer important priority.  o r which s h o u l d be g i v e n h i g h e r  Sometimes these g o a l s o r v a l u e s w i l l appear t o be  pulling i n different  directions.  What a r e these g o a l s and v a l u e s which we have been throwing  about so f r e e l y ?  I n the f i e l d o f l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s t h e r e  are some g o a l s o r fundamental concepts  t o which we c l i n g d e s p i t e  the f a c t t h a t we must sometimes compromise these t r e a s u r e d v a l u e s .  -99We c l i n g f o r i n s t a n c e t o t h e r i g h t o f i n d i v i d u a l s o r groups o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o c o n t r a c t o r not t o c o n t r a c t .  We uphold the r i g h t  of i n d i v i d u a l s o r groups o f i n d i v i d u a l s t o use p r o p e r t y f o r p r o f i t w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s o f c i v i l i z e d law. We a s s e r t the d e s i r a b i l i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s being a b l e t o pursue wealth of v a r i o u s k i n d s be i t m a t e r i a l , s p i r i t u a l o r otherwise;  i n other words,  t h e r e s h o u l d be some i n c e n t i v e f o r i n d i v i d u a l s t o " b e t t e r " themselves.  These a r e v a l u e s v e r y dear t o our c a p i t a l i s t i c way o f  l i f e and r e p r e s e n t a l a i s s e z - f a i r e k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h y . There a r e other v a l u e s , however, which a l s o form p a r t o f our s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e .  Most o f these v a l u e s a r e designed t o main-  t a i n t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f t h e s o c i e t y and a r e contained i n our s y s tem  o f laws and u n w r i t t e n codes o f b e h a v i o r .  Individuals, f o r  i n s t a n c e , a r e p r o t e c t e d from the d e s t r u c t i v e a c t s o f other viduals.  indi-  We uphold t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y o f having a competitive  business atmosphere and i n s t i t u t e anti-combines i n f a c t , r e s t r i c t i o n s upon t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s  laws which a r e  (counting c o r p o r a t i o n s  as i n d i v i d u a l s ) a b i l i t y t o s t r i v e f o r g r e a t e r p r o f i t .  There  e x i s t s an i n t a n g i b l e sense o f f a i r p l a y i n our system o f v a l u e s and laws.  When companies were powerful and employee a s s o c i a t i o n s  weak, we made laws t o weaken-the power p o s i t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s r e l a t i v e t o t h e i r employees. laws a r e another  The  anti-combines  example o f t h i s i n t a n g i b l e sense o f f a i r p l a y ,  these laws p l a c e l i m i t s upon the extent t o which i n d i v i d u a l s may increase t h e i r u t i l i t y  (to use an economic term) a t the expense  of other i n d i v i d u a l s e s p e c i a l l y when t h e g a i n s i n p r i v a t e u t i l i t y are obtained a t the expense o f t h e r e s t o f s o c i e t y . many such p r o t e c t i v e d e v i c e s .  S o c i e t y has  -100-  P a r t of the protecting of the  the  public  existing public  r i g h t s of the  maximize the  toward  h o l d dear;  toward r e g u l a t i n g  the  part  activi-  (or somehow r e s t r i c t i n g these a c t i v i t i e s ) to  benefits  T h e r e i n l i e s the public  i n d i v i d u a l which we  interest i s directed  t i e s of i n d i v i d u a l s  interest i s directed  of our  c i v i l i z a t i o n f o r the whole community.  e s s e n t i a l problems of d e t e r m i n i n g what i s i n  the  interest: ( i ) I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o measure the a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c i e s and which g o a l s are ( i i ) These g o a l s and  benefits  of  thereby determine  t o be g i v e n p r i o r i t y , v a l u e s have changing p r i o r i t i e s  over time. (iii)  Once i t i s agreed t h a t a c e r t a i n g o a l i s i n public  i n t e r e s t , we  must s t i l l  of how  t h i s w i l l be  implemented.  Since i t i s c l e a r l y d i f f i c u l t the p u b l i c fore that the  problem  to speak s p e c i f i c a l l y about  i n t e r e s t i n labour disputes, i t i s e s s e n t i a l one  public  only way  f a c e the  the  r e a l i z e s that  t h e r e are  i n t e r e s t about which one  one  can  there-  things d i r e c t l y related  can  speak s p e c i f i c a l l y .  speak s p e c i f i c a l l y upon the  s u b j e c t of the  to The  public  i n t e r e s t i s to r e l a t e i t to s p e c i f i c p u b l i c p o l i c i e s , s o c i a l goals or fundamental v a l u e s . t e r e s t , one  When one  i s speaking about the p u b l i c  i s i n v a r i a b l y r e f e r r i n g to p u b l i c p o l i c i e s or a  consensus or the p u b l i c  good.  in-  public  Government i n s t i t u t e d p o l i c i e s  ( i n c l u d i n g the  absence of them) d i r e c t l y a f f e c t and  our v a l u e s and  community g o a l s .  r e s u l t from  I t i s important t h e r e f o r e when  a n a l y z i n g l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s l e g i s l a t i o n t o r e c o g n i z e that  there  -101-  are e s s e n t i a l s o c i a l v a l u e s ant t o c o n s i d e r t h a t new  i n v o l v e d ; and  i t i s equally  import-  l e g i s l a t i o n or p u b l i c p o l i c y o f t e n r e -  f l e c t s a change i n s o c i a l v a l u e s  or a change i n the  of the  community's g o a l s .  B. The  T r a d i t i o n a l Role of Government  priorities  G e n e r a l l y speaking, governments concerned themselves very l i t t l e w i t h the c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  process.  Nevertheless,  the  l e g i s l a t i o n a l r e a d y on the books d i d imply t h a t c o l l e c t i v e barg a i n i n g i t s e l f was  a desirable process.  Laws were made t o  en-  courage the o r g a n i z a t i o n of employees t o enable them to take c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n d u r i n g wage n e g o t i a t i o n s .  C e r t i f i c a t i o n proce-  dures were s e t up to g i v e o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n to the  employees'  chosen r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  employers  to bargain provided  Laws were passed t o f o r c e the  c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h t h e i r employees, and  p e n a l t i e s were  f o r anyone found g u i l t y of u n f a i r l a b o u r p r a c t i c e s .  Although we  upheld the employer's r i g h t not t o c o n t r a c t w i t h h i s  newly organized  employees, the employer was  good f a i t h w i t h h i s employees. purpose of b a r g a i n i n g  or g o a l s .  contract.  n o t i c e s the f i r s t apparent c o n f l i c t On the one  hand we  h o l d the d e s i r a b i l i t y of e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g . see v a l u e s which are g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e  upHence  when taken i n the  a b s t r a c t , coming i n t o c o n f l i c t when they are a p p l i e d . countless  of  do not want t o f o r c e  the employer to e n t e r i n t o a c o n t r a c t ; on the other hand we  we  in  might w e l l ask: what i s the  other than t o conclude a  T h i s i s where one s o c i a l values  One  forced to bargain  There are  case h i s t o r i e s d a t i n g as f a r back as the t u r n of  the  -102present  century, of employees and employers l o c k e d i n v i r t u a l  combat over whether the employer s h o u l d have to b a r g a i n w i t h the employee r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . attempting  One group f e l t t h a t they were merely  t o a s s e r t t h e i r r i g h t s , while the other group f e l t i t s  r i g h t s were being i n f r i n g e d upon.  Management f e l t  t h a t i t was  being f o r c e d to c o n t r a c t i n a new and d i f f e r e n t way - i n a c o l l e c tive contract.  T h i s i s , i n e f f e c t , e x a c t l y what the r e s u l t o f  the government's p o l i c y on b a r g a i n i n g " i n good f a i t h " r e s u l t e d i n . The p o s i t i o n of the employees was v e r y simple.  Employees,  each f a c i n g a l a r g e corporate management on an i n d i v i d u a l b a s i s , had no b a r g a i n i n g power; hence e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g was not p o s s i b l e . l a t o r s , was  The c h o i c e , which was made then by the l e g i s -  c l e a r l y t o ensure e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g a t  the cost t o management of having one o f i t s r i g h t s  (that of not  c o n t r a c t i n g ) somewhat c u r t a i l e d . I t appears t h a t s t r i k e s are accepted by f e d e r a l and a l l p r o v i n c i a l governments* as an unavoidable  p a r t o f the c o l l e c t i v e  b a r g a i n i n g process because no government has y e t banned s t r i k e s outright.  There does e x i s t , however, the u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r y which  seems t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a l l e f f o r t s should be made t o a v o i d s t r i k e s whenever p o s s i b l e .  As l o n g as c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i s t o remain  the a c c e p t a b l e process f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n between employee and employer of terms and c o n d i t i o n s o f employment, be unavoidable  i n some cases.  Nevertheless  the s t r i k e s  every e f f o r t  may  i s made  by the government t o a v o i d the a c t u a l s t r i k e by a s s i s t i n g the p a r t i e s t o conclude a c o l l e c t i v e agreement.  The f e d e r a l and most  ^ A p p l i e s t o a l l p r o v i n c e s except Saskatchewan  -103provincial  governments* have s e t up  dures which must be The  t h e o r y was  step c o n c i l i a t i o n proce-  f o l l o w e d b e f o r e a work stoppage can  t h a t i t would g i v e both p a r t i e s  g a i n as w e l l as r e s o l v e the  two  give s k i l l e d c o n c i l i a t o r s  differences  t i o n * r e g a r d i n g the  between the  s t r i k e was  the  occur.  more time to  bar-  a chance t o attempt  parties.  Another r e s t r i c -  enforcement of  collective  agreements as b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t s once they were agreed upon. other words, p a r t i e s to r e s e r v e any  cutting  differences  a r i s i n g out  of the  to the  between employee and  c o l l e c t i v e agreement. putes which do  The  interpretation  been e f f e c t i v e  employer d u r i n g the  become f u l l s c a l e  life  Labour R e l a t i o n s Boards.  success of t h i s p r o v i s i o n  the  of  the  g r i e v a n c e s e v e n t u a l l y are  arbitration  denced by  rela-  been t h a t most of the  by a r b i t r a t i o n e i t h e r p r i v a t e The  in  g e n e r a l l y s t a b i l i z i n g the  r e s u l t has  of  strike.  of these s t r i k e r e s t r i c t i o n s has  down w i l d c a t s t r i k e s and  tionship  In  to a v a l i d c o l l e c t i v e agreement were expected  t h a t agreement without r e s o r t i n g One  to  or a r b i t r a t i o n  dissettled  of  the  is evi-  f a c t t h a t , i n Saskatchewan, where t h e r e i s no  legal  requirement to s e t t l e g r i e v a n c e d i s p u t e s without work stoppages, most c o l l e c t i v e agreements v o l u n t a r i l y s e t t l e g r i e v a n c e s through The  include provisions  to  arbitration.  o t h e r s t r i k e r e s t r i c t i o n i s g e n e r a l l y conceded to have  been w e l l i n t e n t i o n e d but d e l a y i n g the  completely i n e f f e c t i v e .  s t r i k e u n t i l the  have been complied w i t h has more time to  The  effect  of  s t a t u t o r y c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures  not  been such as to g i v e the  complete t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s .  The  parties  overall effect  * A p p l i e s t o a l l p r o v i n c e s except Saskatchewan  has  •104-  been to delay e f f e c t i v e negotiations u n t i l the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures have been complied with.  I t i s widely acknowledged by  both labour and management thatimany  of the r e a l l y substantial  issues are often s e t t l e d at the "eleventh hour" of bargaining. The net e f f e c t of the two step compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n  procedures  has simply been to delay t h i s eleventh hour c r i s i s from the expiry date of the contract to a point i n time usually long past t h i s natural eleventh hour - to the time when the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures have been complied with. There have been four other instances where a government has asserted the public i n t e r e s t , i n t h i s case, i n s p e c i f i c d i s putes.  I t was decided that s p e c i f i c s t r i k e s simply would no  longer be tolerated by the public.  They were dealt with through  extra l e g a l steps requiring the passage of s p e c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n ; the disputes were: (i) 1950 ( i i ) 1958 ( i i i ) 1961 (iv) 1959  - National Railroad s t r i k e (CNR & CPR) - B.C. coast steamships s t r i k e - a threatened s t r i k e of the railroads - Newfoundland I.W.A. dispute  The r o l e of government toward public employees was t r a d i t i o n a l l y very simple.  With the exception of Saskatchewan's pro-  v i n c i a l government, governments generally denied t h e i r public employees, both e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and the r i g h t to strike.  Saskatchewan, on the other hand, has been successfully  bargaining with i t s public employees without ever having had to deny them the right to s t r i k e .  -105-  In c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y the government has attempted t o s t a y out of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s .  The  only k i n d s of involvement, which can be d e t e c t e d stems from a  de-  s i r e or p o l i c y t o encourage employees t o b a r g a i n c o l l e c t i v e l y  and  a p o l i c y t o encourage the settlement  dis-  putes without  work stoppage.  of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  Governments have g e n e r a l l y passed  l e g i s l a t i o n , i . e . , u n f a i r l a b o u r p r a c t i c e laws, which have gener a l l y r e s u l t e d i n the c u r t a i l i n g of the economic power which c o u l d have been e x e r t e d , by the employer, a g a i n s t attempting remaining  t o organize  employees  f o r the purposes of b a r g a i n i n g .  involvement by the p r o v i n c i a l and  The  only  the f e d e r a l govern-  ments has r e s u l t e d from the enforcement of those  laws which r e -  quire that grievance  work stoppages.  d i s p u t e s be s e t t l e d without  These laws i n e f f e c t t r e a t the c o l l e c t i v e agreement as a l e g a l and b i n d i n g c o n t r a c t between the employees and C. The New 1.  the  employer.  Role of the Government The  new  r o l e o f the government has been g e n e r a l l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d by the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t there are c e r t a i n k i n d s l a b o u r d i s p u t e s , the settlement l y t o the two  of which cannot be l e f t  disputing parties.  of  complete-  In a l l cases where new  legisla-  t i o n has been passed there has been no attempt t o s u b s t i t u t e any form of compulsion f o r c o l l e c t i v e n e g o t i a t i o n s . p a r t i e s s i g n an agreement of t h e i r own has  expressed'jthe  Whenever  a c c o r d , then p u b l i c p o l i c y  o p i n i o n t h a t t h i s i s i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  There i s no attempt to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the contents negotiated  two  of a  freely  c o l l e c t i v e agreement, UNLESS, t h e r e e x i s t s a t h r e a t  -106-  t h a t a work stoppage w i l l occur or a work stoppage has actuallyoccurred. The T a f t - H a r t l e y Act r e s t r i c t s government a c t i o n t o p r e s i d e n t i a l a c t i o n and court a c t i o n i n those areas where a n a t i o n a l emergency e x i s t s and where the n a t i o n a l h e a l t h and s a f e t y are imperilled.  C l e a r l y these p r o v i s i o n s r e s t r i c t government a c t i o n  t o h i g h l y unusual circumstances g e n e r a l l y c l a s s i f i e d as emerg e n c i e s , and o n l y where a s t r i k e i s t h r e a t e n e d . Whereas the T a f t - H a r t l e y ' s p r o v i s i o n s a l l o w f o r administ r a t i v e f l e x i b i l i t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g emergencies,  Saskatchewan's  E s s e n t i a l S e r v i c e s Act l e a v e s no such a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  flexibility.  The l e g i s l a t i o n prejudges those s i t u a t i o n s which w i l l be regarded as emergencies;  emergencies  i n t h i s case are those d i s p u t e s  a f f e c t i n g p u b l i c u t i l i t i e s and h o s p i t a l s e r v i c e s .  These emergen-  c i e s are f a r more s p e c i f i c and l e s s ambiguous than those emergenc i e s r e f e r r e d t o i n the T a f t - H a r t l e y A c t . The B.C.  B i l l 33 and the Rand Report's  recommendations  p r o v i d e mechanisms f o r the s t a t u t o r y involvement of p u b l i c bodies or a g e n c i e s i n d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  These  d i s p u t e s need not n e c e s s a r i l y be c l a s s i f i e d as emergencies.  In  both these l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s systems, p r o v i s i o n s are made f o r pub l i c involvement i n d i s p u t e s o t h e r than emergency d i s p u t e s .  In  n e i t h e r system i s t h e r e any i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h the c o l l e c t i v e barg a i n i n g p r o c e s s u n l e s s i t appears t h a t the process has  faltered  s u f f i c i e n t l y t h a t a s t r i k e has o c c u r r e d or i s t h r e a t e n i n g t o occur.  I n both systems agreement between the p a r t i e s takes p r e -  cedence  over any e x t e r n a l l y imposed terms and c o n d i t i o n s of  em-  -107-  ployment 33 and  ( s u b j e c t of course t o the law of the l a n d ) .  the Rand Report p r o v i d e  unusual l a b o u r d i s p u t e s  Bill  f o r government involvement i n  only, and  do not p r o v i d e  the government agency i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y  a system where  i n v o l v e d w i t h making r e -  commendations i n every l a b o u r d i s p u t e . and  Both  33  In other words, B i l l  the Rand Report p r e s c r i b e p u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labour  dis-  putes o n l y when: (i) AND  the p a r t i e s cannot agree amongst themselves  ( i i ) the d i s p u t e thereof 2.  i s of such.a nature t h a t the  settlement  cannot be l e f t to the d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s .  Another stand which the government has  be t h a t the s t r i k e i s an u n d e s i r a b l e  taken seems t o  form of s o c i a l  conflict.  T a f t - H a r t l e y ' s p r o v i s i o n s would d e l a y s t r i k e s i n order t o the p a r t i e s a c o o l i n g - o f f p e r i o d and  perhaps g i v e p u b l i c  a chance t o f o r c e the p a r t i e s t o a s e t t l e m e n t . l e g i s l a t i o n p r e s c r i b e s t h a t t h e r e should tial  industries."  The  The  give opinion  Saskatchewan  be no s t r i k e s i n "essen-  Rand recommendations p r e s c r i b e much the  same t h i n g except t h a t e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s w i l l be d e f i n e d  by  the L t . G o v e r n o r - i n - C o u n c i l  case  in  the Saskatchewan system.  dispute  i n s t e a d of by s t a t u t e as i s the  B i l l 33 p r o h i b i t s s t r i k e s when the  i n v o l v e s the " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " . The  i n e v i t a b l e problem a r i s e s when one  which d i s p u t e s  are " s p e c i a l " enough t o warrant a s s e r t i n g  public interest.  In one  case, the problem has  c a r e f u l d e f i n i t i o n of an e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r y . contains  comes t o decide the  been made easy by The  Rand Report  s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n s of c o n d i t i o n s under which  s t r i k e s may  be ended through t h i r d p a r t y i n t e r v e n t i o n .  In most  -108-  cases, t h e r e w i l l have t o be a p e r i o d when t h e " t h i r d p a r t y " t o a d i s p u t e i s groping f o r an answer t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f when t h i s t h i r d p a r t y must a s s e r t the P u b l i c I n t e r e s t i n l a b o u r  disputes.  Because o f t h e l a c k o f d e f i n i t i o n i n t h i s area, the best one can hope f o r , i s c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f the v a r i o u s  legislations.  3. The p u b l i c employees o f both Canada and the U n i t e d S t a t e s a r e i n a s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i a l ; p o s i t i o n t o deserve consideration.  separate  The American p r o p o s a l i n E.O. 10988, c l e a r l y i n -  d i c a t e s t h a t , a t t h i s p o i n t , p u b l i c employees w i l l not be granted t r u l y e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.  The f e d e r a l agencies  r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the b a r g a i n i n g have been i n s t r u c t e d t o e n t e r d i s c u s s i o n s with t h e i r employees, but they have not r e l i n q u i s h e d enough power t o the employee a s s o c i a t i o n s t o make e f f e c t i v e gaining possible.  bar-  The employees have no r i g h t t o s t r i k e and a r -  b i t r a t i o n i s provided  on an a d v i s o r y b a s i s o n l y .  I f an agreement  between agency and employees cannot be reached through c o n s u l t a t i o n and d i s c u s s i o n then,  the employees have no recourse t o  s a n c t i o n s o f any s o r t (except the i n c r e a s i n g l y popular or "work t o r u l e " ) a g a i n s t the agency-employer.  "slowdown"  The Canadian  P u b l i c S e r v i c e S t a f f R e l a t i o n s A c t a t l e a s t promises e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining.  The d i v i s i o n o f powers brought about  through t h e passage o f t h e F i n a n c i a l A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t makes e f f e c t i v e c o l l e c t i v e bargaining p o s s i b l e .  The P u b l i c S e r v i c e  S t a f f R e l a t i o n s Board, an independent body, w i l l a d m i n i s t e r the system, while t h e  Treasury  Board w i l l be able t o b a r g a i n  t i v e l y on b e h a l f o f t h e government. without  effec-  A l l t h i s has been p r o v i d e d  c h a l l e n g i n g the a u t h o r i t y o f P a r l i a m e n t .  -109-  A word of warning about the Canadian f e d e r a l system should  be i n c l u d e d here.  t e s t of f i r e .  The system has not y e t s u r v i v e d a r e a l  I t remains t o be seen whether the government can  continue t o g i v e p u b l i c employees  the o p t i o n of e i t h e r s t r i k i n g  or going t o compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n . instance  I t i s quite possible f o r  t o v i s u a l i z e a s i t u a t i o n where employees  have chosen t o  e x e r c i s e t h e i r r i g h t t o s t r i k e , and t h a t the p u b l i c f e e l s t h a t the s t r i k e can no l o n g e r be t o l e r a t e d . weaknesses,  eventually Despite i t s  t h i s Canadian system shows great promise of being  capable o f d e l i v e r i n g the p u b l i c employees, c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  the same b e n e f i t s o f  which p r i v a t e employees  already  possess.  D. The Future of C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g I t i s c l e a r t h a t e x i s t i n g p u b l i c p o l i c y wishes t o r e t a i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  as the b a s i s f o r the d e t e r m i n a t i o n  and c o n d i t i o n s of employment.  of terms  I t i s a l s o c l e a r that s t r i k e s are  regarded as somewhat of a "necessary e v i l " and t h a t there are .. i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t s t r i k e s w i l l not always be t o l e r a t e d by the public.  The q u e s t i o n  t h e r e f o r e remains t o be answered:  to become o f c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g the s t r i k e ?  Since  What i s  i f i t i s t o be s t r i p p e d o f  c o l l e c t i v e bargaining  i s responsive  by and  l a r g e t o the t h r e a t o r use o f raw economic power, can c o l l e c t i v e bargaining 1.  continue t o be an e f f e c t i v e process?  Banning S t r i k e s First  of a l l , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n that s t r i k e s w i l l  ever be completely outlawed or banned.  The l e g i s l a t i o n  presently  -110-  being t r i e d out only p r o v i d e s a mechanism f o r t h e a s s e r t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n c e r t a i n kinds o f s p e c i a l d i s p u t e s .  There  i s not as y e t any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t s t r i k e s should be banned simply as a matter o f p r i n c i p l e  (although t h i s i s n e i t h e r a strange nor  new theory t o those f a m i l i a r w i t h the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s  literature).  I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t any such g e n e r a l s t r i k e ban w i l l ever be implemented i n t h e near f u t u r e i n Canada - i f f o r no other than t h a t i t would be almost The  reason  impossible to enforce.  i n d i c a t i o n s a r e t h a t a s t r i k e should be an a c t i o n o f  last resort.  The i m p l i c a t i o n i s t h a t t h e s t r i k e i s an u n d e s i r a b l e  form o f s o c i a l c o n f l i c t .  There a r e , however, p r e c i o u s few a l t e r -  n a t i v e s t o s t r i k e a c t i o n , once i t has been f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t n e i t h e r p a r t y w i l l s o f t e n h i s stand d u r i n g c o l l e c t i v e negotiations.  N e v e r t h e l e s s i t would seem reasonable t h a t a l t e r n a -  t i v e s t o the s t r i k e be sought f o r and t h a t a t t e n p t s be made t o make them work, as long as we m a i n t a i n t h a t the s t r i k e i s an "unavoidable 2.  evil".  The Need f o r an A l t e r n a t i v e The need f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r i k e a c t i o n w i l l grow  g r e a t e r and g r e a t e r as our t o l e r a n c e o f t h e t h i r d p a r t y e f f e c t s of a s t r i k e decreases.  At the.moment, machinery has been  c r e a t e d t o prevent s t r i k e s i n i n d u s t r i e s o f an e s s e n t i a l ter.  charac-  How much l o n g e r w i l l i t be b e f o r e we t r y t o ban s t r i k e s  causing merely g e n e r a l p u b l i c inconvenience?  (the Rand  Report's  recommendations l e f t the door open f o r such a c t i o n t o be t a k e n ) . The  o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e t o the s t r i k e a t the moment appears t o be  compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n .  Compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n may be a s a t i s -  -Ill-  f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t i v e whenever b o t h ' p a r t i e s agree t o be bound by the d e c i s i o n of the a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l .  S u r e l y , however, when  d i s p u t a n t s cannot agree upon compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n as an a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n , some e f f o r t w i l l have t o be expended, by both s c h o l a r s and p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n the l a b o u r r e l a t i o n s f i e l d , more i m a g i n a t i v e  s o l u t i o n s t o the problem.  b a r g a i n i n g remains r e s p o n s i v e  As l o n g as  t o the t h r e a t or use  to f i n d  collective  of c o e r c i o n ,  then ways must be found t o a l l o w the p a r t i e s t o impose upon each other a cost of disagreement, other than the 3.  strike.  P o s s i b l e Changes i n the Nature of C o l l e c t i v e There i s some hope t h a t through the use  Bargaining  of compulsory a r -  b i t r a t i o n i n c r i t i c a l i n d u s t r i e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia, we evolve a. new  k i n d of d i s p u t e s e t t l e m e n t  process.  In B r i t i s h  Columbia, t h e r e w i l l e x i s t the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a l a b o u r may  be exposed t o c r i t i c a l and r a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s .  may  The  dispute  Mediation  Commission, once i t holds h e a r i n g s , bases i t s d e c i s i o n s upon what c o n s t i t u t e s a f a i r and reasonable upon the a b i l i t y of one upon the o t h e r .  c o l l e c t i v e agreement and  not  p a r t y to impose a cost of disagreement  The awards of the Commission w i l l not be  s i v e t o c o e r c i o n but to r a t i o n a l argument. s i b i l i t y t h a t the M e d i a t i o n  respon-  There e x i s t s the pos-  Commission w i l l i n d i r e c t l y change the  c h a r a c t e r of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g i f o n l y i n those s e n s i t i v e i n d u s t r i e s which are l i k e l y to be a f f e c t e d by the " p u b l i c i n t e r est" aspects The  of the  Act.  c h a r a c t e r of c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g may  f l u e n c e d not only by B.C.'s M e d i a t i o n  w e l l be i n -  Commission, but a l s o by  -112-  Rand's a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l and the f e d e r a l c i v i l tration tribunal.  One  should not expect  t o see immediate  r a d i c a l changes i n the c h a r a c t e r of the c o l l e c t i v e process.  The  changes, i f any,  service arbiand  bargaining  a r e more l i k e l y t o be s u b t l e  changes i n emphasis from a c o e r c i v e atmosphere t o a more r a t i o n a l one. 4.  Contents of C o l l e c t i v e Agreements There i s no evidence  support  i n any  of the r e c e n t l e g i s l a t i o n to  the view t h a t Canadian governments are at a l l concerned  with the contents of c o l l e c t i v e agreements signed i n the p r i v a t e sector.  I t seems s u r p r i s i n g t h a t an o r g a n i z a t i o n e n t r u s t e d w i t h  the economic helmsmanship of a n a t i o n would f a i l t o express  some  i n t e r e s t i n the contents  One  of the a c t u a l agreements s i g n e d .  need o n l y remember the r e p e r c u s s i o n s a c r o s s the n a t i o n of the 1966  S t . Lawrence Seaway workers' 30%  (over two  years) wage i n -  crease, to r e a l i z e the importance of even one" such s i g n i f i c a n t wage agreement. 5.  Conclusion In c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e , i t may  be s a i d t h a t governments  are showing i n c r e a s i n g concern w i t h the t h i r d p a r t y e f f e c t s of s t r i k e s i n e s s e n t i a l i n d u s t r i e s and.those i n d u s t r i e s which are h e a v i l y endowed w i t h the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t .  Governments have  ne-  v e r t h e l e s s a s s e r t e d t h a t f r e e l y n e g o t i a t e d c o l l e c t i v e agreements a r e t o be p r e f e r r e d to any and  other method of determining  c o n d i t i o n s of employment.  terms  In the f u t u r e , however, changing  -113-  s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s may w e l l b r i n g about i n c r e a s i n g government a s s e r t i o n of the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n the q u a l i t y of a c t u a l c o l l e c t i v e agreements.  -114-  BIBLIOGRAPHY  CHAPTER I I THE PROBLEMS OF DEFINING PUBLIC INTEREST 1.  Sorauf, F.J., "The Conceptual Muddle" i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., Nomos V: The Public Interest, Atherton Press, N.Y., 1962, pp..183-190.  2.  Ibid., p. 190.  3.  Ibid., p. 186.  4.  Schubert, Glendon, The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a P o l i t i c a l Concept, 1961.  5.  Schubert, Glendon, "Is there a Theory of the Public Interest?"  i n . F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 176.  6.  Ibid., p. 176.  7.  Pennock, J.R., "The One and the Many: A Note on the Concept" i n . F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , pp. 177-182.  8. 9. 10. 11.  Ibid., p. 182. Ibid., p. 182. Colm, Gerhard, "The Public Interest: E s s e n t i a l Key to Public P o l i c y , " i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , pp. 115-128. Ibid., p. 117.  12.  Frankfurter, F e l i x , F e l i x Frankfurter Reminisces, ed. Harlan B. P h i l i p s , p . 7 2 , quoted i n Colm, i b i d . , p. 128.  13.  C a s s i n e l l i , C.W.,  "The Public Interest  in Political  E t h i c s " i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 44. 14.  Ibid., p. 45.  15.  Ibid., p. 4 6 .  16.  Ibid., p. 47.  17. 18.  Ibid., p. 47. Leys, W.A.R., "Ethics i n Administrative Discretion", Public Administration Review, Vol. 3, 1943, p. 18.  -115-  Chapter I I (cont'd) 19.  Niemeyer, Gerhart, "Public Interest and Private  Utility"  i n F r i e d r i c h , C/J., op. c i t . , p. 1. 20.  Ibid., p. 3.  21. 22.  Ibid., p. 4. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.  23.  Smith, Adam, Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV, Chapter 2, cited i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 6.  24.  Niemeyer, G., op. c i t . , p. 7 .  25.  Ibid., p. 8.  26.  Ibid., p. 9.  27.  Ibid., p. 10.  28.  Ibid., p. 10.  29.  Ibid., p. 11.  30.  Ibid., p. 11.  31.  Schubert, Glendon, i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 162.  32.  Ibid., p. I 6 4 .  33.  Ibid., p. 167.  34.  Ibid., p. I 6 4 .  35. 36.  Ibid., p. I64. Leys, W.A.R., "The Relevance and Generality of 'The Public Interest'" i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , pp. 2 3 7 - 2 5 6 .  37.  Ibid., p. 256.  38.  Montgomery, J.D., "Public Interest i n the Ideologies of National Development," i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 218.  39.  Ibid., p. 218.  40.  Bodenheimer,  41.  Lipman, W.  i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 217. i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , p. 217.  -116Chapter I I ( c o n t ' d ) . op. c i t . , p. 182.  42.  Pennock, J.R., i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J.,  43.  Cohen, J u l i u s , "A Lawman's View o f the P u b l i c i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J.,  Interest,"  op. c i t . , pp. 155-161.  44.  Braybrook, David, "The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t : The Present and the Future of.the Concept," i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J. pp. 1 2 9 - 1 5 4 .  45.  Colm, Gerhard, i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J.,  46.  Musgrave, R.A., i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J.,  47.  I b i d . , p. 108.  48.  I b i d . , p. 114.  49.  B a i l e y , Stephen, "The P u b l i c  op. c i t . , pp. 115-128. op. c i t . , p. 107.  I n t e r e s t : Some  Operational  Dilemmas" i n . F r i e d r i c h , C.J., op. c i t . , pp. 96-106. 50.  I b i d . , p. 97.  51. 52.  I b i d . , p. 97. L a s w e l l , H.D., "The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t : Proposing P r i n c i p l e s of Content-and Procedure" i n F r i e d r i c h , C.J.,  op. c i t . , pp. 54-79.  53.  I b i d . , p. 57.  Additional  Bibliography  1.  Ball,  2.  B e r l e , A.A., Economic Power and t h e Free S o c i e t y , The Fund f o r t h e R e p u b l i c Pamphlet, 1957.  3.  B e r l e , A.A., The American Economic R e p u b l i c , Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1963.  4.  B e r l e , A.A., and Means, G . C , The Modern C o r p o r a t i o n and P r i v a t e P r o p e r t y , M c M i l l a n Co,, New York, 1944.  5.  Flatham, R.E., The P u b l i c I n t e r e s t ,  J.A., Canadian A n t i - T r u s t L e g i s l a t i o n , W i l l i a m s and W i l k i n s Co., B a l t i m o r e , 1934.  J . W i l e y & Sons,  1966. 6.  Kaplan, A.D.H. B i g E n t e r p r i s e in Competitive System The Brookings I n s t i t u t e , Washington, D.C., 1954.  -117-  Chapter II (cont'd). 7.  Means, G.C., P r i c i n g Power and the Public Interest Harper and Brothers, New York,. 1962. '. " CHAPTER I I I The T r a d i t i o n a l Role of Government  1.  Anton, F.R., Role of Government i n Settlement of I n d u s t r i a l Disputes. C.C.H. Canadian Limited, Don M i l l s , Ontario, 1962, p. 65.  2.  Deputy Minister of Labour. Annual Report. Department of Labour f o r f i s c a l year 1902-1903, p. 59.  3.  McKenzie King, W.L. Industry and Humanity. Toronto, 1947, p. xxvi.  4. . Logan, H.A.  McMillan Co.,  State Intervention and Assistance i n C o l l e c t i v e  Bargaining.  University of Toronto Press: 1956.  Additional Bibliography 1. 2. 3. 4.  Anton, F.R. Government Supervised Strike Votes. C.C.H. Canadian Limited, Montreal, 1961. Bernstein, Enarson and Fleming. Emergency Disputes and National Policy, Harper and Brothers, 1955. Carrothers, A.W.R. Labour A r b i t r a t i o n i n Canada. Butterworths, Toronto, 1961. Northrup and Bloom. Government and Labour. R.D. Irwin Inc., Homewood, I l l s . , 1963, pp. 455-478. CHAPTER IV Taft-Hartley Emergency Provisions  1.  Meatpacking Dispute, 1948 - United Packinghouse Workers (CIO) v. f i v e major meatpacking firms, New York Times Jan. 27, Feb. 20, 21, Mar. 4, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 21, 24, A p r i l 9, 10, 11, May 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 1948,  -118-  Chapter IV  (cont'd). Coal Miners' Pension D i s p u t e , 1948 - U n i t e d Workers of America (Ind.) v. bituminous c o a l o p e r a t o r s , New York Times:2 4 , A p r i l 4, 8, 9, 10, 1948.  2.  Bituminus Mine mine Mar.  3.  Telephone D i s p u t e . 1948 - American Union of Telephone Workers (CIO) v. -American Telephone & Telegraph Co. New York Times: - May 19, 20, 27, June.5, 1943.  4.  Atomic Energy D i s p u t e , 1954 - Carbide and Carbon Chemicals Co., a D i v i s i o n of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. U n i t e d Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers (CIO) and v. Atomic Trades and Labour C o u n c i l (AFL). New York Times:- J u l y 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, August 5, 6,.12, 10, 18, October 31, November 7, 8, 11.  5.  B a s i c S t e e l I n d u s t r y D i s p u t e , 1959 - United S t e e l Workers of America (AFL-CIO) v. b a s i c s t e e l i n d u s t r y New York Times:- Feb. 26, 27, March 15, 20, 27, May 6, June 26, 27, 28, J u l y 12, 15, 16, 19, August 20, 29, Oct. 10, 11, 20, 21, Nov. 4, 8, 9, 1959; :  Jan. 3, 4, 5, I960.  6.  Labour R e l a t i o n s Reference Manual, V o l . 48, pp.  3018,  3019. 7.  "Maritime I n d u s t r y D i s p u t e , West Coast & Hawaii, 1962S e a f a r e r s I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of North America v. Shipowners and operators r e p r e s e n t e d by the P a c i f i c Maritime A s s o c i a t i o n , " i n N a t i o n a l Emergency Disputes Under Labour Management R e l a t i o n s ( T a f t - H a r t l e y ) Act 1947-1965, U n i t e d S t a t e s Department of Labour,  March 1966, pp. 41-44.  8.  Labour R e l a t i o n s Reference Manual, V o l . 48, pp. 2638-9  9.  Ibid.  10.  Longshoring Dispute on the A t l a n t i c and G u l f Coasts, 1964^-05, - I n t e r n a t i o n a l Longshoremen's A s s o c i a t i o n (AFL-CIO) v. S h i p p i n g and s t e v e d o r i n g companies, New York Times:- Oct. 1, 2, Nov. 7, 27, Dec. 1, 17.  11.  Labour R e l a t i o n s Reference Manual, V o l . 57, p. 2600-2603.  12.  I b i d . , p. 2601.  13.  I b i d . , p.  14.  I b i d . , p. 2603.  2601  -119-  Chapter IV (cont'd). Additional Bibliography 1. Bernstein, I., et a l . , Emergency Disputes and National P o l i c y , Harper & Brothers, New York, 1955. 2. Northrup, H.R., and Bloom, G.F., Government and Labour, R.D. Irwin Inc.., Homewood, I l l s . , 1963. 3. National Emergency Disputes under Labour Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act. 1947-6"5~" U.S. Department of Labour, March, 1966. CHAPTER V The Case of the Public Servants 1. President J.F. Kennedy. "Executive Order 10988, Jan. 7, 1962," f u l l text i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, July, 1962, pp. 548-553. 2. Schneider, B.V.H. " C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and the Federal C i v i l Service, -' i n I n d u s t r i a l Relations: A Journal o f Economy and Society, Vol. 3, No. 3, May, 1964, PP. 97120. 5  3. Hart, W.R. "The U.S. C i v i l Service learns to l i v e with Executive Order 10988: An Interim Appraisal," i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol..17, No. 2, Jan., 1964, pp. 203-220. 4. Report of the Preparatory Committee on C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining i n the Public Service (Heeney Report), Queen's P r i n t e r , Ottawa, July, 1965. 5 . Benson, E.J., Rt. Hon., cited i n : "New L e g i s l a t i o n and the Federal Government Service," i n The Labour Gazette, May , 1967, p. 291, 319. 6. Report of the Preparatory Committee on C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining i n the Public Service, op. c i t . , p. 34. 7  Benson, E.J., Rt. Hon. Minister of National Revenue, op_. c i t . , p. 291.  -120-  Chapter V (cont'd). Additional Bibliography 1.  Cunningham, W.B. "Public Employment, C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and the C o l l e c t i v e Wisdom U.S.A. and Canada," i n Relations I n d u s t r i e l l e s , Vol. 21, 1966, pp. 406-433.  2.  Cunningham, W.R. " C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining i n the Public Service," i n Labour Gazette, October, 1967, p. 6 2 6 .  3.  "The F i r s t Public Service C o l l e c t i v e Agreements," i n Labour Gazette. July, 1968.  4.  Government of Canada. The Public Service S t a f f Relations Act. Queen's P r i n t e r , February, 1967.  5.  Hart, Wilson, R. "The Impasse i n Labour Relations i n the Federal C i v i l - S e r v i c e , " i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review. Vol. 14, No. 2, January, 1966, p. 175.  6. Independent Study Group. The Public Interest i n National Labour P o l i c y . Committee f o r Economic Development, December, 1961, pp. 75-79. 7.  Taylor, George W. "Public Employment: Strikes or Procedures," i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, July, 1967.  8.  "The Case of the Public Employees" i n Canadian News Facts, February, 1968, p. 28. CHAPTER VI The Saskatchewan Labour Relations Systems  1.  "Labour L e g i s l a t i o n i n 1966", Labour Gazette, Feb. 1966, p. 101.  2.  Ibid., p. 101.  3.  Ibid., p. 103.  4-  The E s s e n t i a l Services Emergency Act, 1966. Queen's P r i n t e r , Regina, Saskatchewan, 1966.  5.  The Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, 1966. Queen's P r i n t e r , Regina, Saskatchewan, 1966.  -121-  CHAPTER VII The B.C. Approach - B i l l 33 1.  H a l l , Noel A. Contemporary Public P o l i c y Issues i n I n d u s t r i a l Relations. I n d u s t r i a l Administration D i v i s i o n , Faculty of Commerce, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1968, p. 6.  2.  Ibid., p. 6.  3.  Ibid., p. 6.  4.  H a l l , Noel A. Lecture s e r i e s , Jan., Feb., 1968, University of B r i t i s h Columbia.  5.  Nemetz, N.T. The Honourable Justice. Report of Swedish Labour Laws and Practices. Department of Labour, V i c t o r i a , B.C., 1968. ,  6.  Kirby, S i r Richard. "Some Comparisons between Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n and C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining," Journal of I n d u s t r i a l Relations. V o l . 7, No. 1, March, 1967.  7.  Kleinsorge, Paul L. "The Public Interest as a C r i t e r i o n i n S e t t l i n g Labour Disputes: The Australian Experience," Journal of I n d u s t r i a l Relations. Vol. 6, No. 2 , . July, _____  8.  Nemetz, N.T.  9.  H a l l , Noel A.  10.  Ibid., p. 5.  11.  Peterson, Hon. L e s l i e R.  The Honourable Justice, o_p_. c i t . , p. 10. op_. c i t . , p. 5.  B.C. • Minister of Labour, i n  Labour Gazette, July, 1968, p. 3 9 2 . 12.  Ibid., p. 3 9 2 .  13.  Ibid., p. 3 9 2 . CHAPTER VIII An Ontario Proposal:  1.  The Rand Commission Report  Order i n Council, Province of Ontario,  l&th August, 1966.  -122-  Chapter VIII (cont'd). 2.  Rand, the Hon. Ivan C , Commissioner. Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes. Queen's Printer, Ontario, August, 1968, p. 41.  3.  Rand, I. C ,  ibid.  J  4.  Rand, I. C., i b i d .  >  5.  Rand, I. c . , i b i d .  J  P- 111.  6.  Rand, I. c . , i b i d .  »  P. 106.  7.  Rand, I. c . , i b i d .  J  P. 38.  8.  Rand, I. c ,  ibid.  >  9.  Rand, I. c ,  ibid.  >  10. Rand, I. c . , i b i d .  >  P- 41. P- 112.  P. 75. P. 75. P. 68.  PRELIMINARY BIBLIOGRAPHY A recommended reading l i s t of a r t i c l e s and books c o n t r i buting to the understanding of the Government's role i n Collective Bargaining: 1.  Bakke, E.W., "Labour Management and the Public Interest," I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, July 1963, p. 573. :  2.  Bakke, E.W., .1966.  Mutual Survival, Archon Books, Hamden Connecticut,  3.  Brown, Emily Clark, Soviet Trade Unions and Labour Relations Harvard University Press, Boston, Mass. 1966, pp. 48-71.  4.  Brown, Emily Clark, "Interests and Rights of Soviet I n d u s t r i a l Workers and the-Resolution of C o n f l i c t . " I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, Jan. 1963.  5.  Chamberlain, N.W., The Labour Sector: An Introduction to Labour i n the American Economy, McGraw-Hill, 1965.  6.  Chamberlain, N e i l W. and S h i l l i n g , Jane M., The Impact of S t r i k e s : Their S o c i a l and Economic Cost, Harper Brothers, New York, 1954.  i  -123-  Preliminary Bibliography  (cont'd).  7. Chamberlain, N.W., S o c i a l R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and Strikes Harper and Row, New Tork, 1953. 8. Cox, Archibald, Emergency Disputes and National P o l i c y , Bernstein, Irving, Enarson, H.L., Fleming, R.W., (Eds.), Harper and Row, New York, 1955. 9. Congressional Record, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 2442. 10. -Drucker, Peter, The New Society: The Anatomy of I n d u s t r i a l Order, Harper and Row, New York, 1962, pp. 332-333. 11. Felner, William et a l . , The Problem of Rising Prices, Organization f o r European Economic Corporation, 1961, pp. 51-55. 12. Goble, George, "The Non-Stoppage S t r i k e , " Current Economic Comment, Vol. 20, Aug. 1950, pp. 3-12. 13. Habeler, G o t t f r i e d , "Wage P o l i c y , Employment and Economic S t a b i l i t y , " D. McC. Wright, ed., i n The Impact of the Union,-Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., New York, 1951, P. 39-. 14. Jensen, Vernon H., "The Process of C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and the Question of Obsolescence," I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 16,..No. 4, July 1963. 15. Kirby, S i r Richard, "Some Comparisons between Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n and-Collective Bargaining," Journal of I n d u s t r i a l Relations, Vol. 7, No. 1, March, 1965. 16. Kleinsorge, Paul L., "The Public Interest as a C r i t e r i o n i n S e t t l i n g Labour Disputes: The Australian Experience," Journal of I n d u s t r i a l Relations Vol. 6, No. 2, July 1964. 17". Kleinsorge, Paul L., "Singapore's I n d u s t r i a l A r b i t r a t i o n Court: C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining with Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n , " I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 17, No. 4, July 1964. 18. McCalmont, D.B., "The Semi S t r i k e , " The I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. . 15~, Jan., 1962. 19. Mabry, Bevars Dupre, "The Pure-Theory of Bargaining," I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 17,No. 4, July, 1964.  -124-  Preliminary Bibliography (cont'd). 20.  Marceau, LeRoy, Musgrave, R.A., "Strikes i n E s s e n t i a l Industries: A Way Out," i n Harvard Business Review, Vol. 27, May, 1949; p.-287.  21.  Morton, Walter.A., "Trade Unionism, F u l l Employment and I n f l a t i o n , " American Economic Review, v o l . 740, pp. 13-19.-  22.  Northrup, H., and Bloom,-G., Government and Labour, Irwin Inc., 1963, pp. 273-478.  23.  Oberer, Walter E., "Freedom and Public P o l i c y : The Rule of Law and a 'Court of Economies' f o r Price-Wage Problems," i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, July, 1963.  24.  Phelps, Orme W., "Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n : Some Perpectives" i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 1$, No... 1, Oct., 1964.  25.  P h i l l i p s , A.W., "The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of-Change of Money Wage Rates i n the U.K. ' 1861-1957," Economica, Nov. 1958, pp. 283-299.  26.  Samuelson, Paul and Solow, Robert, "Problems of Achieving and Maintaining a Stable Price Level," American Economic Review, Vol. 70, May i 9 6 0 , pp. 192-193.  27.  Sosnick, Stephen H., "Non-Stoppage S t r i k e s : A New Approach," i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review Vol. IS, No. 1, Oct. 1964.  28.  Steiber, Jack, "The President's Committee on Labour Management P o l i c y , " I n d u s t r i a l Relations, Berkeley University, Vol. 5, No. 2, Feb. 1966, pp. 1-19.  29.  Stern, James L., "Declining U t i l i t y of the S t r i k e , " i n I n d u s t r i a l and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, Oct. 1964.  30.  Stevens, Carl M., "Is Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n Compatible with C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining," I n d u s t r i a l Relations,- Berkeley University, Vol. 5, No. 2, Feb. 1966, p. 5 0 .  1  

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