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The revolt against materialism in English psychology, 1875-1910 MacDonald, Donald Alexander 1969

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THE  REVOLT AGAINST MATERIALISM IN  ENGLISH PSYCHOLOGY, 1875-1910 by  -: .  DONALD A. MacDONALD B.A., U n i v e r s i t y  of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE  REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  i n t h e Department of History  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming required  THE  standard  UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA J u l y , 1969  -A  t o the  In p r e s e n t i n g an the  thesis  advanced degree at Library  I further for  this  shall  the  his  of  this  agree that  written  University  of  permission  representatives. thesis  f u l f i l m e n t of  make i t f r e e l y  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may  by  in p a r t i a l  be  available  for  for extensive  g r a n t e d by  the  It i s understood  for financial  gain  permission.  Department The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  British  Columbia  shall  requirements  Columbia,  Head o f my  be  I agree  r e f e r e n c e and copying of  that  not  the  that  Study.  this  thesis  Department  copying or  for  or  publication  allowed without  my  ABSTRACT The that  accepted  i t avoided  view o f Late  a commitment  of the i n f l u e n c e o f I d e a l i s t an  attempt  t o show t h a t  recognition in  problem f a c e d  study  as a n a t u r a l  most i m p o r t a n t  i n academic  i n particular,  of Science,  of conscious a result of  represents  plays  In essence,  V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t s was how t o  sources  phenomenon. of information used i n t h i s  articles  James S u l l y  the B r i t i s h  a n d G.F.  on p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o p i c s ,  j o u r n a l s , were o f c o n s i d e r a b l e  value;  j o u r n a l , Mind proved u s e f u l .  In an a d d r e s s t o t h e B r i t i s h ment  T h i s study  i n P o s i t i v i s m and N a t u r a l i s m .  In a d d i t i o n , t h e i r  published  framework b e c a u s e  t h e abandonment o f c e r t a i n  were t h e t e x t b o o k s o f James Ward,  Stout.  and  favoured  by L a t e  consciousness The  philosophy.  suggests  both m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and t h e  sense data  assumptions inherent  explain  to a scientific  o f t h e p o s i t i v e r o l e w h i c h t h e human m i n d  organizing  the  V i c t o r i a n psychology  A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e Advance-  Thomas H e n r y H u x l e y p r e s e n t e d  the "doctrine  a u t o m a t i s m , " w h i c h d e s c r i b e d human b e h a v i o r  solely  of external sensations  without  as  the intervention  consciousness. The  psychologist,  James Ward, a t t a c k e d  i n f l u e n c e upon p s y c h o l o g y and N a t u r a l i s m  the m a t e r i a l i s t  i n general.  t o o k t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e l a w s o f s c i e n c e were o n l y  Ward mathe-  m a t i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and t h u s were n o t a l w a y s a p p l i c a b l e  to  single  instances.  E v o l u t i o n , he b e l i e v e d , g a v e  o f t h e w o r k i n g s o f a S u p e r n a t u r a l Power.  I n man,  ence o f t h e Power was shown by a n e e d t o f u l f i l l  evidence the i n f l u -  a moral  ideal. Another Late V i c t o r i a n tried  p s y c h o l o g i s t , James  t o a d h e r e more f i r m l y t o t h e P o s i t i v i s t  Following  a suggestion of Herbert  e x p l a i n morals  a s t h e end p r o d u c t  Spencer's,  Sully,  tradition. Sully tried to  o f mankind's e v o l u t i o n a r y  development. The Frederick factors  final Stout  psychologist treated i n this a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h e importance  i n a man's p e r c e p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s .  Avenarius'  t h e o r y t h a t a l l thought  biological  adjustment  showed how  consciousness  phenomenon.  study,  George  of subjective Stout  adopted  s e r v e d as a form o f  t o t h e environment.  I n t h i s way,  c o u l d be s t u d i e d a s a n a t u r a l  Stout  CONTENTS Chapter I.  II.  Page T.H. HUXLEY AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUS AUTOMATISM VICTORIAN PSYCHOLOGY—A DARWINIAN MYSTICISM 22  OR A PRAGMATIC SCIENCE? III. IV. V. VI. VII.  1  . . .  48  G.F. STOUT AND THE PROBLEM OF B E L I E F . . . .  55  CONCLUSION  71  APPENDICES  SO  JAMES SULLY AND THE STUDY OF ILLUSIONS  BIBLIOGRAPHY .  .  .  .  .  92  I.  T. H. HUXLEY AND T H E DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUS  AUTOMATISM  2  Of deep  t h e many  reflection  intellectuals, in  psychology.  anxious  of  Schleiden  few h a d more  serious  implications than  l i f e  changes  causes,  of  t o their  organisms  Victorians be  i n a  to  account be  that  f o r every  l i k e l y  of heat as a  t o take  Victorian a  1839 t h e c e l l  of energy  cause  theory  interpreta-  made  so bold  the species,  a wholly that  place,  the real  ever  anywhere  taken  And  that  adaptation source  of  thoughtful  would,  materialistic  had  system,  as t o argue  science  one  of matter.  i t seemed t o  when  Now  transformations  successful  were  thereby  mechanical  a l l physical  or less  nigh  and  and motion.  closed  environment,  event  mind.  i n 1 8 6 8 , was  of the particles  t h e more  position t o give  which  t o  Darwin  t h e day was  a l l -  an account  physico-chemical  had reduced  v a r i a t i o n s between  that  of achievements,  Later  by  l e d the p h y s i c i s t , Helmholtz,  i n the motion  i n 1859 when  that  of  the universe theory  Edwardian  the discoveries  the interrelation  Helmholtz's  would  a  much  credible,  t h e human  By  processes.  and Ampere  naturalistic  the  possible  t o  thinkers,  at least  observed  t o Victorians.  rise  the recognition  t o offer a  record  Huxley  gave  other  phenomenon  i t s impressive Henry  was  before  of the world,  h a d made  visualize  f i n a l l y ,  years  the law of the conservation  describe  mere  at issue  i n i t s efforts  concern  Faraday  formulate  could  question  as a natural  of elemental  Dalton,  to  V i c t o r i a n and  a s Thomas  for  for  of Late  explanation  include  science,  to  on t h e p a r t  sometimes  Despite  tion  which  had f a i l e d  embracing could  debates  The  practitioners, science  academic  at  last,  explanation place,  i n t h e cosmos.  or In  3  the g r a p h i c language  o f T.H.  Huxley,  The c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h i s g r e a t t r u t h w e i g h s l i k e a n i g h t m a r e , I b e l i e v e , u p o n many o f t h e b e s t m i n d s o f t h e s e days. They w a t c h what t h e y c o n c e i v e t o be t h e p r o g r e s s o f m a t e r i a l i s m , i n such f e a r and powerless a n g e r a s a s a v a g e f e e l s , when, d u r i n g an e c l i p s e , t h e g r e a t shadow c r e e p s o v e r t h e f a c e o f t h e s u n . The a d v a n c i n g t i d e o f m a t t e r t h r e a t e n s t o drown t h e i r s o u l s ; t h e t i g h t e n i n g g r a s p o f l a w impedes t h e i r f r e e d o m ; t h e y a r e a l a r m e d l e s t man's m o r a l n a t u r e be d e b a s e d by t h e i n c r e a s e o f h i s w i s d o m . 1 H u x l e y was c o r r e c t i n h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f m a t e r i a l i s m (the word i s v i r t u a l l y science u n t i l the last  synonymous w i t h  decade o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y )  would  l e a d a man t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t w e r e e n t i r e l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e a c c e p t e d t h i n k i n g a b o u t human n a t u r e .  The  bone o f c o n t e n t i o n a r o s e n o t f r o m t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e p h y s i o l o g y o f man f o l l o w e d t h e same c h e m i c a l laws t h a t a p p l i e d t o t h e remainder from t h e acceptance  o f Darwin's  man, b u t o u t o f a d i f f e r e n t  of the natural world, nor  t h e o r y about  problem:  the origin of  how t o f i t  the fact of  human c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t o what seemed t h e i m m u t a b l e l a w o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n o f energy. v a t i o n o f energy would idea or mental energy,  A knowledge o f t h e l a w o f t h e conserappear t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a conscious  change, not b e i n g i t s e l f a source o f m a t e r i a l  c o u l d n o t t h e r e f o r e a f f e c t , i n a n y way w h a t s o e v e r , t h e  p h y s i c a l processes occurring w i t h i n the brain.  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  t o t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g w e r e , a s t h e b i o l o g i s t , G . J . Romanes observed, nothing l e s s than  dumbfounding.  Nowhere c a n we s u p p o s e t h e p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s t o be i n t e r r u p t e d o r d i v e r t e d by t h e p s y c h i c a l p r o c e s s ; a n d t h e r e f o r e we must c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o u g h t a n d v o l i t i o n r e a l l y p l a y no p a r t w h a t e v e r i n d e t e r m i n i n g  4  a c t i o n , (my e m p h a s i s ) T h o u g h t s and f e e l i n g s a r e but i n d i c e s w h i c h show i n t h e m i r r o r o f t h e mind c e r t a i n changes t h a t a r e p r o c e e d i n g i n t h e m a t t e r o f the b r a i n , and a r e a s i n e f f i c i e n t i n i n f l u e n c i n g t h o s e c h a n g e s a s t h e shadow o f a c l o u d i s p o w e r l e s s t o d i r e c t t h e movements o f t h a t o f w h i c h i t i s t h e shadow.^ T h e r e were o n l y two  possible  phenomenon o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s apart  evidenced  o u t s i d e the premises  that  i n d i v i d u a l ' s thoughts  an  soever  that  man  purpose  and  f e e l i n g s p l a y no  role  world,  i t had  attempt  interpretation  apparently foundered  human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  forward  o f man  mutations  o f c l a i m s t h a t t h e s o u l o f man  of matter.  the v a l i d i t y  one  fixed  day  a  a s w e l l as h i s  Must s c i e n c e , t h e n , r e t r e a t  g r e a t e r power g o v e r n i n g  view.  on t h e r o c k y s h o a l o f  a t a c o m p r e h e n s i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and  the t r u t h  what-  concluded t h a t i f the  t o be a b l e t o put  completely n a t u r a l i s t i c  stood  of m a t e r i a l i s m , or conversely,  some V i c t o r i a n s  o f s c i e n c e was  the  therefore  i n determining h i s conduct—the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s  surprisingly,  grant  a reality  f r o m t h e s o - c a l l e d l a w s o f n a t u r e and  existed  Not  deductions: either  from  finally  this concede  gave p r o o f o f some  t h e u n i v e r s e , t h a n t h e mere t r a n s -  Not  a l l s c i e n t i s t s were p r e p a r e d  o f t h e argument demanding t h a t  to  they  p o s t u l a t e the e x i s t e n c e of a s u p e r n a t u r a l i n f l u e n c e i n order that ness. tial  they  c o u l d shed  Furthermore, threat  light  upon t h e m y s t e r y  some s c i e n t i s t s were aware o f t h e  of a re-emergent  o b s c u r a n t i s m which might  f o r e v e r the growth of s c i e n t i f i c admit  the p o s s i b i l i t y  behavior.  o f human c o n s c i o u s -  enlightenment  of a non-material  should  potenstifle they  s o u r c e f o r human  5  W i t h t h i s thought i n mind, Thomas Henry Huxley i n 1874 l e c t u r e d t o t h e B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e Advancement of S c i e n c e , "On t h e H y p o t h e s i s t h a t Animals a r e Automata and I t s History."  Huxley i n h i s address a t t r a c t e d t h e w i d e s p r e a d  a t t e n t i o n o f t h e B r i t i s h p u b l i c , f o r he b o l d l y extended t h e assumptions o f s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m even t o human c o n s c i o u s ness and t h e r e b y demonstrated t h a t t h e h i t h e r t o  inexplicable  f a c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o n l y i n v o l v e d a n o t h e r f a c e t o f t h e manif o l d p r o p e r t i e s of m a t t e r .  Huxley w i s h e d t o a b o l i s h once and  f o r a l l from t h e r e a l m of s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e t h a t unknown e n t i t y , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , so b e l o v e d by m e t a p h y s i c i a n s and theologians, i n order to e s t a b l i s h a wholly m a t e r i a l i s t s c i e n c e o f t h e mind upon what he presumed were t h e f o u n d a t i o n s l a i d by D e s c a r t e s .  I n t h i s H u x l e y ' s programme came some f o r t y  y e a r s t o o e a r l y ; i t remained f o r Watson and t h e B e h a v i o r i s t s t o c l a i m t h e dubious c r e d i t f o r b a n i s h i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s from psychology. The f i v e p r i n c i p l e s t a k e n from D e s c a r t e s which Huxley b e l i e v e d were e n t i r e l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e t h e n c u r r e n t n o t i o n s of p h y s i o l o g y and which c o u l d p r o v i d e t h e core f o r a n o n m e t a p h y s i c a l p s y c h o l o g y were: (1) The b r a i n i s t h e organ o f s e n s a t i o n , t h o u g h t , and emotion; t h a t i s t o s a y , some change i n t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e m a t t e r of t h i s organ i s t h e i n v a r i a b l e a n t e cedent o f t h e s t a t e of c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o which each of t h e s e terms i s a p p l i e d . (2) The movements o f a n i m a l s a r e due t o t h e change of form.of m u s c l e s , which s h o r t e n and become t h i c k e r ; and t h i s change of form i n a muscle a r i s e s from a motion of t h e s u b s t a n c e c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the n e r v e s which go t o the muscles.  (3) The s e n s a t i o n s o f a n i m a l s a r e due t o a m o t i o n o f the substance o f t h e nerves which connects t h e sensory organs w i t h t h e b r a i n . (4) The m o t i o n o f t h e m a t t e r o f a s e n s o r y n e r v e may be t r a n s m i t t e d t h r o u g h t h e b r a i n . (5) The m o t i o n o f any g i v e n p o r t i o n o f t h e m a t t e r o f t h e b r a i n e x c i t e d by t h e m o t i o n o f a s e n s o r y n e r v e , l e a v e s b e h i n d a r e a d i n e s s t o be moved i n t h e same way, in that part. Anything which r e s u s c i t a t e s t h e motion gives r i s e t o the appropriate f e e l i n g . This i s the p h y s i c a l mechanism o f memory.3 By t h e t e r m a u t o m a t i s m ,  Huxley  were, as D e s c a r t e s had supposed, without  anything equivalent  simply b i o l o g i c a l  animals  machines  t o man's c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r a t h e r ,  H u x l e y meant t o s u g g e s t t h a t entirely  d i d not imply that  a n i m a l b e h a v i o r was d e t e r m i n e d  by n e u r a l r e a c t i o n s t o e x t e r n a l  stimuli.  An a n i m a l  may have some f o r m o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t i t s r e a c t i o n s a r e n o t the  consequence  thought  o f c o n s c i o u s p e r c e p t i o n upon i t s p a r t .  the stimuli  from t h e environment  react  upon t h e s e n s e  o r g a n s a n d c r e a t e a f o r m o f m o l e c u l a r movement w h i c h m i t t e d a l o n g t h e n e r v e pathways u n t i l  Huxley  i s trans-  i t reaches the brain  where i t p r o d u c e s a change i n b r a i n m a t t e r a n d a c o n c u r r e n t alteration  i n consciousness.  ness the animal's muscular these modifications h a s no e f f e c t ent  Despite t h i s  change i n c o n s c i o u s -  exertion results  of brain  entirely  from  substance; consciousness i t s e l f  a t a l l upon a n a n i m a l ' s r e a c t i o n s .  transmutation of c o n s c i o u s n e s s — i f t h i s  No i n d e p e n d -  i s at a l l p o s s i b l e —  c a n c a u s e b r a i n m a t t e r t o change i n any way. H u x l e y b e l i e v e d he h a d p r o v e d h i s h y p o t h e s i s by a n experiment frog.  i n w h i c h he removed t h e c e r e b r a l h e m i s p h e r e s  of a  To a l l i n t e n t s and p u r p o s e s , he a r g u e d , t h e b e h a v i o r  7  o f t h e f r o g has  remained  t h e same, r e a c t i n g  same s e n s a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h now  without  any  having a consciousness of i t s actions. animal  c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s always  In a phrase activity  destined to excite  among h i s c r i t i c s ,  by u s i n g t h e a n a l o g y  he  an  as b e f o r e t o the  possibility  Thus, Huxley  effect  and  never  of i t concluded,  a  cause.  a good d e a l o f c o n s c i o u s d e s c r i b e d animal  o f a steam  consciousness  whistle.  The c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f b r u t e s w o u l d a p p e a r t o be r e l a t e d t o t h e mechanism o f t h e i r body s i m p l y as a c o l l a t e r a l p r o d u c t o f i t s w o r k i n g , and t o be a s comp l e t e l y w i t h o u t any power o f m o d i f y i n g t h a t w o r k i n g , as t h e s t e a m w h i s t l e w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s t h e work o f a l o c o m o t i v e e n g i n e i s w i t h o u t i n f l u e n c e upon i t s machinery. T h e i r v o l i t i o n , i f t h e y have any, i s an emotion i n d i c a t i v e o f p h y s i c a l changes, not a cause o f s u c h changes.•+ Y e t , i t was  not  Huxley's  of b r u t e s which provoked Huxley  had  d e s i r e was  t o make a f u r t h e r  discussion  purpose,  f o r h i s paper  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  response  on a n i m a l a u t o m a t i s m a l s o delivered  ceased f i n a l l y  f r e e thought.  one  t o p o s e any solely  While  Near t h e  and  permitted s c i e n t i s t ,  s t o p where e v i d e n c e  fulfilled  end  of h i s  another  cause lecture,  i n animal  reflexes,  b u l l d o g stance i n defence  admitting that  declared that  His manifest  l o n g e r as the d i s p a s s i o n a t e  his discussion  mentation would o f f e n d n e i t h e r P a p i s t provocatively  paper.  more blow i n t h e  by h i s i n t e r e s t  t o o k up h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  freedom  to h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n t o s c i e n c e , but  anticlericalism.  b i o l o g i s t , motivated and  the heated  consciousness  d a r e d t o a p p l y h i s h y p o t h e s i s t o man.  Huxley's  Huxley  n e g a t i o n of the  having " t o go  comes t o an  of  of brute  or P r e s b y t y r , Huxley  " l u x e r a t e d " i n the  rare  as f a r a s r e a s o n  leads,  end—without  speedily  being he  deafened  by t h e t a t t o o o f t h e 'drum  must now u n w i l l i n g l y  theological  censure  ecclesisastic,'"  p r e p a r e , he c o n t i n u e d , t o r i s k  by a p p l y i n g h i s e x p l a n a t i o n t o man's  5 consciousness,  f o r s h o u l d he f a i l  Apologizing sheer  t o do s o , o t h e r s w o u l d .  tongue-in-cheek,  incontrovertibility  Huxley r e g r e t t e d t h a t t h e  of the evidence  h a d f o r c e d upon h i m  t h e s e unwanted c o n c l u s i o n s : human c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f b r u t e s , and c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s nothing  changes i n b r a i n  As a l o g i c a l  thesis,  Huxley maintained  termed v o l i t i o n "the  substance.  i s never  that the state a determinant  symbol o f t h a t s t a t e  cause o f t h a t a c t . " ^  else  i s like  but m o l e c u l a r  corollary to this of feeling generally  of action,  but o n l y  o f b r a i n which i s t h e immediate  One i s f r e e t o do o n l y what  one's  b r a i n h a s a l r e a d y d e c i d e d upon b e f o r e h a n d , w i t h o u t conscious  awareness o f t h e d e c i s i o n .  a c t i o n f o l l o w s as t h e predetermined causes;  i t i s as simple  Huxley's  reasoning.  as t h a t .  consequences of n a t u r a l  Such was t h e s u b s t a n c e  to l a b e l him a " m a t e r i a l i s t ,  or a t h e i s t . "  listeners  fatalist  o f h i s statements  any  Nonetheless  materialistic,  and a t h e i s t i c .  By means o f h i s p a p e r on c o n s c i o u s a u t o m a t i s m , had  issued a challenge t o the V i c t o r i a n public  right  attempt  seemed c l e a r t o h i s  a n d were t o them u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  fatalistic,  of  S t r a n g e l y enough, c o n s i d e r i n g t h e t e n o r by r e j e c t i n g  implications  any  T h e r e f o r e a l l human  o f h i s a r g u m e n t , he ended h i s a d d r e s s  the  that  o f s c i e n c e t o express  o f man a s i t h a d t h e r i g h t  as f r e e l y  Huxley  t o admit t h e  i t s v i e w s on t h e n a t u r e  t o do a b o u t t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d .  9  That  i s to  very  message o f J o h n T y n d a l l ' s p r e s i d e n t i a l a d d r e s s  that  same m e e t i n g a t B e l f a s t o f t h e  men  say,  affirmed  he  had  in their  s e i z e d the  own  way  t o w a r d s b o t h m e t a p h y s i c s and the  h i s t o r y of s c i e n c e  e a r l y antecedents,  science with sion  universe:  indestructability  and  separation  altered  by  the  o f m a t t e r , and  the  eventual  of the  o f V i c t o r i a n s c i e n c e had  of  suppresThe  i t s un-  constancy  comes n o t h i n g , " b e l i e f that  T y n d a l l submitted  concluding  h i s address,  of the  a l l change  combination  that the  great  not s u b s t a n t i a l l y  Tyndall forthrightly  spheres of r e l i g i o n  s c i e n c e f r o m any  restraints  declared,  ought t o  adding,  against  " i n the  f e e l i n g s of region  and  science, to  proposed  release  f u r t h e r progress.  concern i t s e l f  of sentiment: the  thereby  philosophies  conflict  cause: u l t i m a t e l y the  o f atoms.  discussed  medieval church.  principle  t o demarcate the  sion  the  science  Democritus' p r o p o s i t i o n s . In  he  present  "from nothing  from a necessary  discoveries  the m a t e r i a l i s t ever  Both  referred to i t s  s c i e n c e , T y n d a l l h e l d , was  acceptance of the  matter i n the  He  the  before  Association.  T y n d a l l had  length.  the  materialism  to reiterate  " i n h e r e n t " emnity of  p h i l o s o p h i c i d e a l i s m , and  c h i e f g l o r y of ancient  results  British  theology.  at great  Epicurus,  of s c i e n t i f i c  flinching  the  particularly  o f D e m o c r i t u s and  opportunity  s o l e l y with  "Awe,  the  Religion, expres-  R e v e r e n c e and  of poetry  and  emotion,  Wonder," inward  7 c o m p l e t e n e s s and  d i g n i t y t o man."'  of f r e e i n q u i r y i n the  past,  o f o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e and  R e l i g i o n , so  c a n n o t add  thus should  anything not  be  destructive t o the  permitted  region to  10  i n t e r f e r e with impersonal science  the  proper  truth.  and  confidence  By  religion, o f a man  task  of s c i e n c e : the  separating  the  Tyndall with  feeling  for  r e s p e c t i v e domains  a l l the  assured  search  of the  provocative certain victory  o f h i s i d e a l s o v e r h i s a d v e r s a r i e s ' unreasoned, f a i t h , the  right  to  any  statement whatsoever about the  comparing  exclude  religion  from the  systems of thought t o  privilege  claimed  of u t t e r i n g  physical universe.  competing  of  Tyndall,  organisms w i t h i n  the  D a r w i n i a n scheme, demanded f r e e d o m f r o m a l l t h e o l o g i c a l restrictions notion  to allow  of science)  to  truth  (by t r u t h T y n d a l l meant h i s  evolve  further into  being:  When t h i s t r u t h h a s been t h o r o u g h l y t a k e n i n , r i g i d i t y w i l l be r e l a x e d , e x c l u s i v e n e s s diminished, t h i n g s now deemed e s s e n t i a l w i l l be d r o p p e d , and e l e m e n t s now r e j e c t e d w i l l be a s s i m i l a t e d . The l i f t i n g o f t h e l i f e i s t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t , and a s l o n g as dogmatism, f a n a t i c i s m , and i n t o l e r a n c e a r e k e p t o u t , v a r i o u s modes o f l e v e r a g e may be employed to r a i s e l i f e to a higher l e v e l . 8 Tyndall s  l e c t u r e was  T  a d e f i a n t r e f u s a l t o accept  a self-effacing  or secondary r o l e  religion  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f some h i g h e r  as t h e  Similarly,  H u x l e y had  s e i z e d the  meeting t o i s s u e h i s p e r s o n a l unreason.  H u x l e y had  a n a l y s i s w h i c h he resistance. the  sources  He  challenge  so v i g o r o u s l y put  was  and  opportunity  of the B e l f a s t  t o the  Not  but  the  p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o o k up  disputed  his contention  than the  passive,  that  impotent  was  of  mechanistic up  mistaken  c l e r g y , but  was  stiff  about  fellow  H u x l e y ' s gage  consciousness  record  forces  f o r t h would s t i r  correct i n this,  acknowledge  form of t r u t h .  e x p e c t e d t h a t h i s extreme  of h i s c r i t i c i s m .  physiologists  f o r s c i e n c e , or t o  either  nothing  and else  o f p h y s i c a l changes w i t h i n  11  the  brain.  Yet, i t i s possible that  Huxley d i d not  seriously  o f f e r h i s i d e a s a s a n y t h i n g more t h a n a p r o d t o awaken s c i e n t i s t s t o what he f e l t application the  mind  was  of t h e methodology  o f man,  their  of the n a t u r a l  h i t h e r t o the sole  and t h e o l o g i a n s .  responsibility:  and t i m i d  s t u d y o f t h e mind  something  ments i n b i o l o g y .  Whatever  sciences to  domain o f p h i l o s o p h e r s  P e r h a p s H u x l e y o n l y hoped  c o u r a g e t o some new  D a r w i n who  comparable  he m i g h t  would  to the other's  this  a u d i e n c e were  c o n s c i o u s o n e s , w i t h o u t any t r u l y  i n a s o c i e t y where t h e dominant  strive  c o n c e r t e d l y and  achieve-  H u x l e y ' s r e a s o n , he n e e d e d  t h e members o f h i s V i c t o r i a n  albeit  give  do f o r t h e  g e n e r o u s measure o f a u d a c i t y t o make t h e i n d i r e c t that  the  a  suggestion  automatons,  independent  w i l l —  v a l u e s u r g e d a man  "earnestly" f o r his f u l l  to  share of  merit. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , Were men their  o n l y c o n s c i o u s automata,  environment;  o r were men  capacity to f u l f i l l own  wilful  that  efforts?  who  upon t h e i r  no doubt  beings with the  b e h a v i o r i n any way,  o r b a d , were n o t h i n g more t h a n  c h a r a c t e r and b e y o n d  their wilful  that  reflexes control,  t o t h e s e l f - e s t e e m and t o t h e s e n s e  o f more t h a n j u s t  a few.^  H u x l e y ' s o p p o n e n t s were d r i v e n t o v i n d i c a t e necessity  their  To a r g u e as H u x l e y a p p e a r e d t o be d o i n g  posed a t h r e a t  moral e f f i c a c y  mechanically adapted to  rational  c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o u l d not a l t e r  stamped  undebated.  some h i g h e r m o r a l n a t u r e t h r o u g h  p e o p l e ' s a c t i o n s , good  of  H u x l e y ' s c l a i m d i d n o t go  t h o s e same m o r a l p r e c e p t s w h i c h  Thus many o f as a  biological  f o r m e d s u c h an  12  integral  element  the dissent generally  own c h a r a c t e r .  More  directly,  a g a i n s t t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f c o n s c i o u s automatism  c e n t r e d on t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s  intellectual the r e s u l t  a n d p h y s i c a l r e s p o n s e s were p r e d e t e r m i n e d o r  o f h i s own  The problem  within their  volition.  p h y s i o l o g i s t , W i l l i a m B. C a r p e n t e r , f o u n d t h a t t h e  o f c o n s c i o u s automatism had r e s u r r e c t e d t h a t  of metaphysics: demanded t h a t  free w i l l  Huxley  versus determinism.  recognize that  which guides h i s conduct. Carpenter thought,  chestnut  Carpenter  man h a s a c o n s c i e n c e  The s u p p o r t e r s o f a u t o m a t i s m ,  drew t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n not from any o b s e r -  v a t i o n o f human n a t u r e , b u t f r o m a commitment t o a p h i l o s o p h i c dogma.  In r e a l i t y ,  maton; he a l w a y s  t h e i n d i v i d u a l n e e d n o t behave a s a a u t o -  has, argued  Carpenter, the option t o  what c o u r s e o f a c t i o n he w i l l has  a definite  "moral right act  U n l e s s , o f c o u r s e , he  c h a r a c t e r and i s t h e r e f o r e a  i d i o t , * a man must r e c o g n i z e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n  between  1  a n d wrong a n d must h a v e a s e n s e  rightly  or at least  distinctions. threefold and  pathological  follow.  choose  of duty: the d e s i r e t o  i n c o n f o r m i t y t o h i s own  moral  C a r p e n t e r deduced from h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e  interrelationship  of W i l l ,  behavior the inference that  the attention  process,  t h e i n d i v i d u a l must a t a l l  times accept the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s actions. He c a n n o t his  blame h i s f a i l i n g s upon a u t o m a t i c  control.  The c o n c l u d i n g p a s s a g e  reflexes outside  of Carpenter's  i n The C o n t e m p o r a r y R e v i e w communicates t h e f e e l i n g s  article of those  13  c o n c e r n e d V i c t o r i a n t h i n k e r s t o whom H u x l e y ' s d o c t r i n e o f conscious godless  a u t o m a t i s m seemed t h e i r r e s p o n s i b l e r a v i n g s o f  man.  Carpenter  writes,  I t i s t h e n t h a t we sow what w i l l come up e i t h e r a s a h a r v e s t o f wholesome n o u r i s h m e n t t o t h e s p i r i t u a l - p a r t o f o u r n a t u r e , o r a s a g r o w t h o f n o x i o u s weeds w h i c h i n f l a m e t h e ' f l e s h l y l u s t s t h a t war a g a i n s t t h e soul.' And i t i s t h e n t h a t we l a y up i n o u r i n n e r chamber t h o s e a c c u m u l a t i o n s o f g o o d o r e v i l tendencies which shape o u r f u t u r e c o u r s e i n l i f e ; h e l p i n g us a s w i t h t h e h a n d o f a n A n g e l whom we have e n t e r t a i n e d u n a w a r e s , when we a r e e a r n e s t l y s t r i v i n g t o ' t u r n t o t h e r i g h t a n d k e e p s t r a i g h t o n ' ; o r d r a g g i n g u s downward, a s w i t h t h e g r a s p o f a Nemesis, towards t h e l o w e s t d e p t h s o f s e l f i s h n e s s a n d s e n s u a l i t y , when we have k n o w i n g l y a l l o w e d o u r s e l v e s t o t a k e t h e f i r s t steps i n t h e f a c i l i s descensus A v e r n i . 1 0  Although not everyone agreed w h o l e h e a r t e d l y C a r p e n t e r ' s judgment t h a t  the doctrine  i n d i c a t e d t h e Age's h u r r i e d d e s c e n t the  o f conscious  into depravity,  d o c t r i n e had a s e r i o u s moral i m p l i c a t i o n .  deny t h e e x i s t e n c e  o f consciousness,  consciousness  was o n l y a n o t h e r  consciousness  could  automatism clearly  Huxley d i d not  bat he d i d a r g u e  expression  i n no way e f f e c t  with  of matter,  a physical  that that  response.  F u r t h e r m o r e , i f H u x l e y ' s v i e w was c o r r e c t , t h e n , a l l o f man's beliefs, no the  h i s r e a s o n e d k n o w l e d g e , h i s i d e a l s , were e q u a l l y o f  i m p o r t a n c e ; man was b u t a n i n v o l u n t a r y whim o f b l i n d  reflexes.  creature wholly at  Huxley's theory  of conscious  a u t o m a t i s m , by r e m o v i n g f r o m a p e r s o n a l l p o t e n t i a l f o r independent  a c t i o n , a l s o removed f r o m h i m a n y c a p a c i t y t o  make a m o r a l d e c i s i o n .  I f a man c o u l d  d e t e r m i n e d by s e n s a t i o n , for  his actions?  Besides  not a c t other  how c o u l d he-be c a l l e d  than as  t o account  t h e d o c t r i n e h a d a humber o f o b v i o u s  14  intellectual  difficulties.  w i t h the apparent about t h e i r  fact  For  t h a t men  example, i t h a r d l y  sometimes c a r e f u l l y  a c t i o n s before they  attempt  fitted deliberate  t o c a r r y them  into  execution. G e o r g e H e n r y Lewes, one the  suggestion that the  actually  his  evidence  i n t e r f e r e d with the  experience.  of Huxley's  Lewes, who  critics,  seemed t o p r o v e  n e a r l y two  forward  that the  s e n s a t i o n s w h i c h i t was  devoted  put  mind  about  hundred pages  to  of  P h y s i c a l B a s i s o f Mind t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f automatism, h e l d  that  consciousness,  i t s e l f , was  an a g e n t  and  was  not  solely  12 the  result  of the preceding  v i e w a man  does not  ings.  environment  The  conscious  desirable may  of i t — w h a t  or otherwise,  contraction to  i t , the i s the  illustrate  c l o s e d who patch  and  alters that  the f a c t  an  active  term  probable  sensations,  likelihood  of consciousness  the  contraction.  a t a b l e he  Lewes  From t h i s  agent  from initial  just  used  w i t h h i s eyes discovers a  s u s p e n d s t h e movement o f h i s h a n d  i s not  person  any m o d i f i c a t i o n .  example o f a man  s l i d e s h i s hand a l o n g  consciousness  a  which accompanies a muscular  stimulus of the  either  surround-  Fortunately, a  this  continue without  feeling  i t s direction.  ment , but  means by t h e  to a n t i c i p a t e the  h i s point the  then  one  a manner as t o p r e v e n t  p l a c e ; but w i t h o u t  Lewes p u t  In h i s  submissively to his  about t o f o l l o w .  s e r i e s would n e c e s s a r i l y As  state.  p r o d u c e s a s e n s a t i o n as w e l l a s  a l l o w s him  a c t i n such  taking  react wholly  experience  feeling—which  physiological  wet or  Lewes drew t h e c o n c l u s i o n  an  as w e l l ;  effect  caused  a person  by t h e  does n o t  environ-  only  15  react  t o h i s s u r r o u n d i n g s , he i n t e r a c t s w i t h them by c o n t i n u a l l y  making new t a c t i c a l environment something  warrants  them. ^ I n f a c t . , Lewes was d e v e l o p i n g  akin to the cyberneticists' notion of  an a p p r o a c h tury  d e c i s i o n s as f u r t h e r knowledge o f h i s  t o be more f u l l y  by R i c h a r d  developed  "feedback,"  i n the nineteenth  cen-  Avenarius.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , whatever t h e success to provide a " s c i e n t i f i c " draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t the  here  account that  o f Huxley's  o f human c o n d u c t ,  s c i e n c e had f a i l e d  attempt  he d i d to realize  e x p e c t a t i o n s o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y p h i l o s o p h e s and t h e  nineteenth  c e n t u r y p o s i t i v i s t s , who t r u s t e d  s c i e n c e would r e v e a l might  adapt  dictates  and t h e r e b y l i v e  with the result  not only s t a t e d that  understanding  of the mechanical  i t was  reason  seemingly  scientific h a d no  implied that  processes  man's  o f n a t u r e was  o f p r o v i d i n g him w i t h a s t o r e o f u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m w h i c h he c o u l d d e d u c e what acting.  that  Thus H u x l e y ' s  upon b e h a v i o r ; b u t , i n a d d i t i o n ,  incapable  case t h e law  f o r h i m t o c o n c e i v e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s h a v i n g any  i n f l u e n c e upon p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y .  effect  had a p p a r e n t l y  a law o f n a t u r e , i n t h i s  of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n o f energy,  psychology  according t o the  At a l l e v e n t s , H u x l e y  d e r i v e d h i s t h e o r y from  impossible  one day  a u n i v e r s e o f n a t u r a l l a w s t o w h i c h men  themselves  of reason.  that  Huxley  c o n s t i t u t e d a r a t i o n a l way o f  had cut t h e ground from under t h e t r u s t o f  G e o r g e H e n r y Lewes  that,  When S c i e n c e h a s f a i r l y m a s t e r e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f m o r a l r e l a t i o n s , a l l Knowledge w i l l be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a homogeneous d o c t r i n e r i v a l i n g t h a t o f t h e o l d  16  t h e o l o g i e s i n i t s comprehensiveness, and s u r p a s s i n g i t in the authority of i t s credentials. 'Christian Ethnics' w i l l t h e n no l o n g e r mean E t h i c s f o u n d e d on t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f C h r i s t i a n T h e o l o g y , b u t on t h e p r i n c i p l e s e x p r e s s i n g t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a n d d u t i e s o f man i n C h r i s t i a n i z e d s o c i e t y . 13 Lewes' p o s i t i v i s t of the natural  the p u b l i c a t i o n  no f r u i t .  o f Huxley's  one o f two c o n c l u s i o n s .  mental  t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s and l o g i c  s c i e n c e s would e v e n t u a l l y p r o v i d e mankind  a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y bore  at  hope t h a t  paper  More i m p o r t a n t l y , a f t e r a L a t e V i c t o r i a n might  because they r e f l e c t e d t h e presence  conclude that  succeeded  that  upon t h e a f f i n i t y  hidden  Still,  Or  s c i e n c e had so f a r not  law o f n a t u r e , which  between t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d  consciousness, l e t alone b u i l d  world  of supernatural force.  a l t e r n a t i v e l y , he m i g h t  light  arrive  He m i g h t v e n t u r e t h e o p i n i o n t h a t  processes d i d not wholly r e l a t e t o the n a t u r a l  i n disclosing  with  shed  a n d human  a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y upon i t .  t h e r e were a f e w who p r e f e r r e d t o r e t a i n t h e  conviction that  s c i e n c e must a l w a y s assume t h a t  has u l t i m a t e l y a n a t u r a l s o u r c e . the question that  every  Following t h i s  event  assumption,  they p r e f e r r e d t o ask o f Huxley's  doctrine  o f c o n s c i o u s a u t o m a t i s m was w h e t h e r o r n o t i t n e c e s s a r i l y expressed  the only credible, n a t u r a l i s t i c  mentation  and conduct.  psychology tions that  account  I n o t h e r words, need a t r u l y  be c o m m i t t e d i n e v i t a b l y t o t h e p r e m i s e s  of materialism? consciousness  Huxley's  logic  scientific  a n d assump-  had l e d him t o conclude  c o u l d n o t i n f l u e n c e human b e h a v i o r .  followed a s t r i c t l y materialist say, i f energy  o f human  line  of reasoning: that  i s n o t h i n g more t h a n moving  He h a d i s to  matter—Helmholtz's  17  v i e w - - t h e n t h e s o u r c e o f human a c t i v i t y o f m o l e c u l a r movement, t r a n s m i t t e d  must be f r o m a f o r m  from t h e sensory  receptors  o v e r t h e pathways o f t h e n e r v e s t h r o u g h t h e b r a i n , a n d a g a i n along the nerves, u n t i l responses. motion  i t i s finally  Furthermore, the d i r e c t  i n the f i r s t  translated  cause  into  of the neural  p l a c e was s e n s a t i o n , a c t u a l l y  r e c e p t i o n through h i s sense organs  muscular  of stimuli  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  from the environ-  ment; t h u s , t o a l l a p p e a r a n c e s , human b e h a v i o r f o l l o w e d t h e pattern  of a reflex arc.  In t h i s  view,  i t was d i f f i c u l t t o  s e e how t h o u g h t , u n l e s s i t was a n o t h e r f o r m o f m a t t e r , affect  the course of a c e r e b r a l r e f l e x .  B e s i d e s , even i f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d m a t t e r were b u t two d i f f e r e n t single it  still  various  courses of a c t i o n ,  reflection  feel  between  How  a could  o f v o l i t i o n when e v e r y n e u r a l r e s p o n s e must  a movement w h i c h  a preceding material  must have a l r e a d y  certain theoretical  place within the been i n s t i t u t e d by  change?  Clearly, the doctrine  o f c o n s c i o u s automatism  difficulties  t h o s e who were n o t i n c l i n e d i t skeptically.  served t o raise  t o choose  condition.  f o l l o w f r o m some movement o f m a t t e r t a k i n g  treated  argued,  i f h i s t h o u g h t s were a l w a y s  of a predetermined m a t e r i a l  be any k i n d  brain,  of a  be i m p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n how a man c o u l d  himself, at times, possessing the a b i l i t y  there  forms  s u b s t a n c e , a s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r W.K. C l i f f o r d  would  could  presented  o f such a n a t u r e t h a t  to reject  i t on e m o t i o n a l  N e v e r t h e l e s s , Huxley's  i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s about  even grounds  paper had  the relationship  18  of psychology ness?  Was  What, a f t e r a l l , was  i t , a s some c l a i m e d , t h e m i x t u r e  experience was  t o metaphysics.  and  pain?  read h i s paper Late V i c t o r i a n psychology  brush  alternatively,  c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f i m m e d i a t e , remembered  a n t i c i p a t e d s e n s a t i o n s o f p l e a s u r e and had  of p h y s i c a l  d i v i n e l y i n s p i r e d i n t u i t i o n s , or  i t merely the  conscious-  and  A f t e r Huxley c o u l d no  longer  a s i d e t h e moot p o i n t o f w h e t h e r o r n o t man's t h o u g h t  processes Should  were t h e p r o d u c t  of n a t u r a l or s u p e r n a t u r a l  causes.  the l a t t e r view prove t r u e , then the l i m i t a t i o n s  s c i e n c e were c l e a r l y one w o u l d s t i l l  e v i d e n t , but  should the former  prevail,  have t o admit t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s  o f man's r e l a t i o n t o t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d  of  account  s u f f e r e d from  obvious  defects. Hence, e i t h e r o p i n i o n b e i n g conclude  that materialism's  w o r l d a c c u r a t e l y and  c o r r e c t , one  would have t o  claims to describe the n a t u r a l  e x h a u s t i v e l y were f r a u d u l e n t .  one w o u l d a l s o h a v e t o q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r p s y c h o l o g y call to  i t s e l f a science, unless  i t willingly  the p h y s i o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n i m p l i c i t  Perhaps, psychology consciousness naturalist.  Moreover, could  committed  itself  i n materialism.  would have t o admit t h a t t h e f a c t  of  stood o u t s i d e the l i m i t e d comprehension of Thus, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  truly  Huxley's s c i e n t i f i c  the  reputa-  t i o n , a number o f t h o u g h t f u l V i c t o r i a n s r e m a i n e d u n c o n v i n c e d t h a t man  was  an a u t o m a t o n and  o f man's s p i r i t u a l b e i n g was For  one  submitted  that his repudiation  b o t h h a s t y and  ill-considered.  c r i t i c , t h e p s y c h i c a l r e s e a r c h e r , F.W.H. M y e r s ,  the data accumulating  from research i n t o hypnotic  trance  19  states  offered  variations  s t r o n g arguments i n f a v o u r o f the view t h a t  in.consciousness did, after  p h y s i c a l responses. t h o s e who, na,  like  case,  have t o t a k e known f a c t s  i t was  cause  later  becoming o b v i o u s  M y e r s , were a c q u a i n t e d w i t h h y p n o t i c  that a f a r reaching revision  consciousness,  that  I n any  all,  subconsciousness,  of current n o t i o n s a u t o m a t i s m and  p l a c e b e f o r e t h e y w o u l d be  a "secondary  consciousness"  phenomeabout  volition  i n accord with  about h y p n o t i s m , f o r h y p n o t i s m  to  seemed t o  would  the  indicate  e x e r c i s e d unknown powers  over  15 the  individual.  psychologists than  Certainly,  of "matter  i f H u x l e y and  e r r o r , w o u l d i t be moral a s p i r a t i o n s behind  b a s i s i t l o o k e d as i f  ought t o i n f e r t h a t t h e m i n d was  a reflection  reasoned,  on t h i s  i n motion."  his materialist  so wrong f o r a man of humanity had,  Besides,  t o suppose t h a t  after  all,  to reconcile  some p u r p o s e  to raise  this  one  q u e s t i o n , and  science with r e l i g i o n .  He  man  among  others  thereby  found  a  believed that  phenomena, among them c l a i r v o y a n c e and  suggested  upon t h e n o n c o n s c i o u s  e n t e r t a i n e d the  levels  i d e a t h a t i f he  scientific  method and  with r i g i d  tests,  the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s  confirmed  mystics—which  the  obvious  conception of the world.  Myers  canons o f  certain psychical  t h e n he w o u l d h a v e an  certain  entirely  o f t h e mind.  observed  way  telepathy,  t h a t t h e r e were i m m a t e r i a l f o r c e s — n o t  ' d i s s i m i l a r t o some o f t h e n o t i o n s h e l d by operate  the  them.  ventured  unusual  they  c o l l e a g u e s were i n  F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m H e n r y M y e r s was who  s o m e t h i n g more  But  the  experiences  challenge to beyond  even  20  t h e s e f a r r e a c h i n g a s p i r a t i o n s , Myers wished t o a f f i r m  con-  c l u s i v e l y t h e t r u t h o f mankind's most a l l u r i n g dream: t h e promise o f e t e r n a l  life.  On t h e o t h e r hand, a n o t h e r L a t e V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t d i s p u t e d the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s n e c e s s a r i l y v e r t e d t h e n a t u r a l i s t ' s p o i n t of view.  Although he  sub-  readily  acknowledged t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s p l a y e d an immense r o l e i n b e h a v i o r , George F r e d e r i c k S t o u t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was  still  p o s s i b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c psychology.  Psychology  would, however, f i r s t have t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t a p h y s i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s o f mental s t a t e s was, capabilities.  at p r e s e n t , f a r beyond i t s  A l t h o u g h unable t o f i n d f a u l t w i t h t h e m a t e r i a l -  i s t ' s c o r r e l a t i o n o f b e h a v i o r and s e n s a t i o n , and unable t o deny t h e importance o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , S t o u t concluded t h a t he must suspend  a l l m e t a p h y s i c a l judgments, u n t i l a time came  when f u r t h e r knowledge would show t h e exact r e l a t i o n s h i p of mind t o m a t t e r .  I f p s y c h o l o g y must make t h e c h o i c e between  t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s of n a t u r a l i s m and m y s t i c i s m , he b e l i e v e d i t must d e c l a r e i t s e l f on the s i d e o f s c i e n c e .  21  FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I T.H. H u x l e y . "On t h e P h y s i c a l B a s i s e f L i f e , " ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 8 6 8 ) , Method and R e s u l t s , New Y o r k , D. A p p l e t o n , 1 3 9 8 , p. 1 6 0 .  2 G.J. Romanes, "The F a l l a c y o f M a t e r i a l i s m , " The N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y , v o l . 12 ( J u l y - D e c . 1 # 8 2 ) , p. 879. 3  T.H. H u x l e y , "On t h e H y p o t h e s i s t h a t Animals a r e Automata and I t s H i s t o r y , " The F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 1 6 ( J u l y - D e c . 1*74),  PP.  557-562T  fa  ^ I b i d . , p. 575. I b i d . , p. 576.  5  W ,  p.  577.  J . T y n d a l l , "The B e l f a s t A d d r e s s , " Fragments o f S c i e n c e , London, Longmans Green, 1907, v o l . 2, p. 1967 7  g  I b i d . , p. 197.  9  Cf. G.H. Lewes' remark t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e " g e n e r a l p u b l i c " was s c a n d a l i z e d by H u x l e y ' s a d d r e s s . G.H. Lewes, The P h y s i c a l B a s i s o f M i n d , London, T r u b n e r , 1 8 7 7 , p. 3 8 9 . "^W.B. C a r p e n t e r , "On t h e D o c t r i n e o f Human Automatism," The Contemporary Review, v o l . 25 (Dec. 1874-May 1 8 7 5 ) , p. 9 6 1 . "^v. Appendix A. 12 G.H. Lewes, The P h y s i c a l B a s i s o f M i n d , London, T r u b n e r , 1877. G.H. Lewes, "The Dread and D i s l i k e o f S c i e n c e , " The F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 23 (Jan.-June 1 8 7 8 ) , p. 3 1 5 . 13  ¥.K. C l i f f o r d , "Body and Mind," The F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 1 6 ( J u l y - D e c . I 8 7 4 ) , pp. 7 1 4 - 7 3 6 . 1/f  15  the  2W.  J . M i l n e B r a m w e l l , "What i s Hypnotism?" P r o c e e d i n g s o f S o c i e t y f o r P s y c h i c a l R e s e a r c h , v o l . 12, 1 8 9 6 - 7 , pp. 204-  II.  VICTORIAN  PSYCHOLOGY—A OR  A  PRAGMATIC  DARWINIAN SCIENCE?  MYSTICISM  23  G.M. out  Young, t h e a u t h o r  that the last  years  of a widespread search  of Portrait  of the nineteenth f o r a new f a i t h ,  reconcilable with the authoritative  o f An Age, h a s p o i n t e d century  one t h a t  gave  evidence  c o u l d be  judgments o f s c i e n c e .  . . . f r o m I n Memoriam t o The Woods o f W e s t e r m a i n , f r o m t h e C h o r u s e s o f The D y n a s t s , we c a n f o l l o w t h e s e c u l a r i n t e l l e c t s e e k i n g i t s way t o s u c h an a p p r e h e n s i o n o f Being as P r o c e s s as might h e r e a f t e r r e c o n c i l e t h e s p i r i t u a l demands o f h u m a n i t y w i t h t h e r a p t a n d c o s m i c indifference of E v o l u t i o n . 1  Similarly,  the h i s t o r i a n ,  the  plight  of the Victorian  the  dogmas o f t h e i r  A.O.J. C o c k s h u t h a s d e s c r i b e d  a g n o s t i c s who r e n o u n c e d many o f  upbringing, yet t r i e d  t o i n c o r p o r a t e some-  2 thing  of their  while these  lost  in  into fresh  of t h e i r  still  "alternative  and  t o h i s utmost nobility  over  of the individual  t o exert  t h e f o r c e s o f d e p r a v i t y and e g o i s m .  universe;  need t o d e s t r o y ;  task  consequence o f a f a i l i n g  the  i t was n o t some  expression  Late  and t h e o t h e r f o i b l e s  Victorian  Most  chance  innate  of moral  t o make a t o t a l  of eradicating a l l tendencies  v a n i t y , greed  him-  i t was n o t e v e n an e x i s t e n t f a c t .  E v i l was i n s t e a d t h e n e g a t i v e the  belief  i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h e supremacy o f v i r t u e  i n a contingent  biological  at the  r e l i g i o n s " l a y the h e a r t f e l t  a g n o s t i c s t r u s t e d t h a t e v i l was n o t a n i n e x p l i c a b l e event  But  theology of  r e t a i n e d much o f i t s s u b s t a n c e ;  the personal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  self  ethical rationales.  skeptics r e j e c t e d the fundamentalist  Puritanism, they core  faith  intellectual,  vacillation,  commitment t o t h e  towards s e l f - i n d u l g e n c e , o f humanity.3  who m a i n t a i n e d  Nevertheless,  a strong  faith  24  i n the moral imperatives had  a concurrent  faith, both to  difficulty  especially  the  ideal  of r i g h t  i n e x p l a i n i n g the  of a s u p e r n a t u r a l L e g i s l a t o r  for this  "earnestness,"  seemed t o h a v e e v a p o r a t e d , still  faced the  impulses  were t r u l y  the  they  fail  stand himself  and  Although years  roughly  leading  connect  this  intellectual teenth  after  and  with  the  views prevalent and  the  Puritans,  generation beliefs.  a variety  of always  always t h a t t h e i r  universe.  Yet,  all,  the  their  1870  i n the  emotional  first  that  reason.  i n the  Britain's  t u r m o i l of  nature  years  of  of the  f o r i n many i n s t a n c e s  conceptions  served  largely  t o r e p l a c e a now  a  to the nine-  decade of t h e t w e n t i e t h .  did exist,  intellectual  last  under-  exercise of  a profusion of  semi-mystical  trusted,  efforts  capacity to  through the  moral  but  they  h i s t o r i a n s h a v e so f a r v e n t u r e d  judgments c o n v e n i e n t l y faith.  out  endeavour, at l e a s t  had,  few  debacle  certain  Darwinian  hoping  w i t h i n the  his universe  such a r e l a t i o n s h i p formed  from the  p h i l o s o p h i c t h e o r i e s , hoping  between 1830  century  the t h e o l o g i c a l  h i s t o r i a n s have l o n g r e c o g n i z e d  crisis,  eliminated  the o b l i g a t i o n  of v i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r  i n t e l l e c t u a l s underwent t h e  religious  this  m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f some o b s c u r e  in this  w o u l d p r o v e t h a t man  and  inherited  post  insecure f a i t h ,  r i g h t e o u s power l a t e n t should  while  were d r i v e n t o s e a r c h  h y p o t h e s e s and  t o b u t t r e s s an  the  awkward t a s k  Consequently, they scientific  But  thought,  b a s i s of  s i n c e e v o l u t i o n appeared t o have  obey h i s d i v i n e o r d i n a n c e s .  rationale  a c t i o n , c o n d u c t and  But men  because  these  questionable  25  One must remember t h a t  f o r many a l o s s  o f f a i t h was n o t  a sudden c a t a c l y s m i c event, a c o n v e r s i o n i n r e v e r s e , but a slow a g o n i z i n g s e r i e s , and t h e n , sooner  first  counter denials  of p o s i t i v e  o f t h e same d o g m a t i c  d i d t h e s e unhappy V i c t o r i a n s  a feeling  of certainty  n a t u r e o f man found t h i s  sense t h a t  i n one judgment a b o u t  or the d i v i n e  attributes  s u r e t y had evaporated  Nevertheless, t h e i r absolute  slow  than from  any p o s i t i v e  repudiation  displaying  r e a l i z a t i o n that  the moral cause  really  vacuity  an a p a t h y  they  doubts.  a state of  o f a new of their  brought  certainty, former  of t h e i r  ignorance; not  towards t h e o l o g i c a l  or triumph;  with i t deep-seated  n o t h i n g more t h a n a w r e t c h e d Victorians  shrank  more t h a n a c a l c u l a t i n g  reasoned,  they  discredited.  God gave  newly d i s c o v e r e d  misgivings.  Was  man  accident of blind  matter?  indiffer-  I f only they could f i n d  something  r e a s s u r a n c e , even t h o u g h  matters.  generation to f e e l  from t h e aweful  behind nature, i f only they  could j u s t i f i a b l y  their  rather  convictions.  o f an e x i s t e n c e i n a w o r l d w i t h o u t  ence o f a c o n t i n g e n t u n i v e r s e .  forever  they had g a i n e d  of Jesus, than,  t h e y were t h e f i r s t  f o r exultation  These i r r e s o l u t e  purpose  No  the s p i r i t u a l  progress from  more f r o m a s u b s t i t u t i o n  a statement  freedom  points.  i n t h e f a c e o f new  A g n o s t i c i s m was t o them an a d m i s s i o n  no  of b e l i e f  d e s p a i r t o a new mood o f c o n f i d e n c e and r e a s s u r a n c e  came a b o u t  The  assertions  c o u l d prove t h a t  man  some was  b r u t e , t h e n , so t h e y show f r e s h g r o u n d s f o r  the f a i t h  of their  childhood  remained  E v e n t u a l l y , a number o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s  .26  replaced their scientific  Christian  doctrine.  advantage o f not statement  about  b e l i e f s with  a new  These new-fashioned  only appearing the world;  c o n v i c t i o n s promised  but  p h i l o s o p h i c or  c r e e d s had  the  a s an  objective,  rational  at the  same t i m e ,  these  to furnish  a modicum o f hope  and  consolation. To g r a s p  fully  the predicament  Victorian  intellectuals,  religious  faith  themselves, Witness  one  this  must r e a l i z e  c o u l d mean t h e l o s s  i n mankind and letter  from  indeed  the  f a c e d by many L a t e that  the  of a l l f a i t h :  loss  of  faith  in  i n the value of l i f e  p s y c h o l o g i s t James Ward,  itself. then  twenty-nine: A l l my d o u b t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , I am s u r e o f t h i s a s a p r a c t i c a l t r u t h — r e a s o n , c o n s c i e n c e , e x p e r i e n c e b a c k me up a s I s a y i t , I s a y i t w i t h my whole s o u l - - I have no doubt o f God's i n f i n i t e f a t h e r l y p a t i e n c e and l o v e : when I d e s p a i r o f m y s e l f I f i n d new hope i n what He i s . . . S e l f i s one's b a n e - - s e l f i t i s w h i c h d e f l e c t s t h e w i l l , t h e n e e d l e o f o u r s p i r i t u a l compass. How a r e we t o know? Were t h e h e a v e n s f o r e v e r d a r k we w o u l d n o t p e r h a p s a t o n c e , but t h e r e a r e s t a r s and l i g h t above e v e n t h e d r e a r i e s t s e a o f d o u b t . Spiritual s h i p w r e c k t o an h o n e s t man o r t o any man u n c o n s c i o u s l y i s doubly i m p o s s i b l e . In a l l t h i s , i n the p r a c t i c a l , what I want i s n o t l i g h t but g r a c e , t o be t a k e n up i n t o a h i g h e r l i f e and d e l i v e r e d f r o m t h e t r e a c h e r o u s self. I t e l l y o u Wolstenhome, I have no d r e a d o f God, no f e a r o f t h e D e v i l , no f e a r o f man, b u t my h e a d swims as I w r i t e i t — I f e a r m y s e l f . Oh God d e l i v e r me o r I p e r i s h I There i t ends. To t h i s I come b a c k : " B e l o v e d , i f o u r h e a r t condemn u s , God i s g r e a t e r t h a n o u r h e a r t and knowth a l l t h i n g s . "AJames Ward e v e n t u a l l y overcame h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s , o n l y a f t e r he was indicating  that  convinced that  some s p i r i t u a l  he had  f o r c e was  discovered promoting  but  evidence the  27  evolutionary of  development  of the m a t e r i a l world.  V i c t o r i a n t h i n k e r s , Ward s p e n t  scientific validity  p r o o f w h i c h he  o f h i s own  his life  c o u l d use  moral  impulses.  in  judgments about  the t h i n k i n g  and  scientific  This close  powering  Ward's l i f e  need, which a f f e c t e d  inward  L i k e the  their  sense their  of r i g h t intuitive  S c i e n c e , t h e y t r u s t e d , would  nod  of b l i n d  by means o f h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t of a f a r s e e i n g Although intelligent  one  public  to  intrinsic  and  academic  that  ethical  was  not  felt  somehow o r  of  law.  Huxley's  a dumb c r e a t u r e w h o l l y a b e i n g who  could  d i m l y make out t h e  might w e l l have doubts  grand  Huxley's  whether or not  views s e r i o u s l y  apprehension  the  Admittedly, Huxley's  psychology  of everyone's  a man's f e e l i n g s and  about  failed  the  enough t o  b e i n g mere a u t o m a t o n s , i t i s c e r t a i n  a materialist  as  disposition.  of n a t u r a l error  over-  and  impulses  wrong must  grasp  reason  of materialism.  deny, i n s p i t e  that  uncommon  of England's  r e f l e x e s , , but  indeed a widespread  implications found  not  Providence.  took  have w o r r i e s about t h e r e was  truly .  illustrates  expose t h e  i t w o u l d r e v e a l t h a t man  t h e b e c k and  design  t o be  eighteenth century philosophes these agnostics  other d e r i v e from  at  took  p e r s o n a l moral  expression of nature's  certain that  views;  objective  a number o f V i c t o r i a n  Edwardian a g n o s t i c s , t o j u s t i f y the  section  for  relationship  t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d was  of a s i g n i f i c a n t community.  i n a quest  to confirm the  between Ward's e m o t i o n a l n e e d s and what he scientific  L i k e a number  that  moral  efforts  b e c a u s e he was  to  forced  experiences t o the contrary,  j u d g m e n t s had  any  effect  on h i s  28  behavior. eventual day  Thoughtful success  of the m a t e r i a l i s t  w o u l d come, t h e y  cated understanding t h o u g h t s and and  thereby  doctrine.  the prospect  Perhaps,  o f p h y s i o l o g y w o u l d show how  achieve  a  sophisti-  of n a t u r a l f o r c e s ,  i n psychology something comparable  accomplished i n biology.  existed.  to  They s h r a n k  They f e a r e d a l i f e  the  person's  of a w o r l d where n e i t h e r a b s o l u t e good,  evil  the  f e a r e d , when someone w i t h a more  a c t i o n s were t r u l y t h e p r o d u c t  what D a r w i n h a d  absolute  Englishmen dreaded, nonetheless,  devoid  before nor  of  the  welcome s o l a c e o f knowing t h a t t h e i r l i v e s were both r i g h t good inasmuch as t h e y  complied  w i t h the d i c t a t e s of a  a u t h o r i t y , a power whose w i l l was a s p i r a t i o n s o f emergent n a t u r e .  r e v e a l e d by t h e  Late  higher  evolutionary  Faced w i t h the a l t e r n a t i v e  t h a t a l l o f man's h o p e s , dreams and t h a n some a b s u r d p e r m u t a t i o n  and  d e s i r e s m i g h t be no  of matter,  not  a few  more  concerned  V i c t o r i a n s w o n d e r e d w h e t h e r s c i e n c e must n e c e s s a r i l y be  committed t o the m a t e r i a l i s t Behind the w a r d by  critique  outlook.  o f s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m put  James W a r d , i t i s p o s s i b l e e a s i l y t o d e t e c t  fundamentally s c i e n c e had  spiritual  erred i n denying the  elements i n e v o l u t i o n . w o u l d mean t h e Since there e v i l , he  concern.  He  s u b j e c t i v e , m o r a l and  human  hoped t h a t u l t i m a t e l y e v o l u t i o n  i n nature  e x p l a i n e d , must be  Ward's  Ward c o n t e n d e d t h a t n a t u r a l  e r a d i c a t i o n of moral e v i l from the  i s nothing  for-  world.  equivalent to o r i g i n a l s i n ,  only a k i n d of d i s o r d e r ,  confusion  of not  Thus e v i l  i s identical with i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  the  k n o w i n g where o n e ' s r e a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t While  an  lies.  29  i n d i v i d u a l may o b s e r v e t h a t definite  physical progression,  tween t h e s p e c i e s ,  "rational  so t h a t ,  Ward b e l i e v e d t h a t  i n h i s words,  this  spawned  lem:  century  dominion o f  by t h e b i o l o g i c a l  egoism o f  had l a t e l y and  ideal  of t h e Heldenmoral.  the experimental psychology of the  ignored  a fundamental e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  prob-  how a p e r s o n l e g i t i m a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between h i s own  subjective objective dualism  c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d what source  separation reality  of sensation,  o f mind a n d body.  psychologists  appears t o him as the  i n other  Generally  most  f r o m one o f two d i s t i n c t  was m i n d , t h e c o n c l u s i o n  phenomena t o t h e a c t i o n s  therefore, t i o n , while  philosophers  measurement  thought  Either a l l  of the i d e a l i s t ,  o r a l l was  I n one r e s p e c t  t h e two  they reduce a l l  of single entity.  equated psychology w i t h t h e a n a l y s i s others  and  Cartesian  positions.  v i e w s a r e s i m i l a r , f o r b o t h a r e monisms; existent  words, t h e C a r t e s i a n  had attempted t o r e s o l v e t h i s  matter, the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s s o l u t i o n .  the  from  d e s i r e gave e v i d e n c e o f s p i r i t u a l  the Nietzschian  Ward a r g u e d t h a t nineteenth  o f g r e a t e r im-  " j u s t i c e may be supreme."  s e l e c t i o n , w h i c h , he r e g r e t t e d ,  unfortunately  that  a man t o s e e t h e g r e a t e r  d e p t h s i n man, u n r e c o g n i z e d natural  from t h e c o n f l i c t be-  By r a t i o n a l s e l e c t i o n , Ward meant t h e  desire within  ethical,  exhibits a  S e l e c t i o n i s man's advancement  selection."  compelling  arising  he may a l s o d i s c o v e r  portance than Natural  the  the natural world  Some,  of introspec-  p s y c h o l o g y t o be synonymous  of physiological reactions.  with  30  Ward d i s a g r e e d w i t h Huxley and t h e m a t e r i a l i s t s , and emphatically  r e j e c t e d t h e i r assumption t h a t m a t t e r must  always be t h e s o l e c a u s a l p a r t n e r body.  i n t h e d u a l i t y of mind and  Ward's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o p s y c h o l o g y was t o a s s e r t  unequivocally  t h a t p h y s i o l o g i c a l changes were not t h e whole  s o u r c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s f o r , i n h i s v i e w , t h e mental a t t i t u d e of t h e organism, i t s e l f , c o u l d e f f e c t p h y s i c a l  reactions.  As e a r l y as 1876, Ward had c r i t i c i z e d t h e f o u n d e r o f p s y c h o p h y s i c s , Gustav Fechner, on t h e same grounds.^ had proposed t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e of a  r e l a t e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y t o t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e  Fechner  sensation  stimulus.  Ward, however, argued t h a t i n the experiment from which Fechner had d e r i v e d h i s c o n c l u s i o n ,  the s u b j e c t  occasionally  m i s j u d g e d t h e t h r e s h o l d - i n t e n s i t y of the s t i m u l u s . ment i n d i c a t e d t o Ward t h a t s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n  The  experi-  had p l a y e d  an a c t i v e r o l e i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e s e n s a t i o n ,  therefore  he c o n c l u d e d t h a t p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n s were not e n t i r e l y independent of c o n s c i o u s n e s s . t h i s subjective  Fechner had compensated f o r  e r r o r by s t a t i s t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t i n g i t . Thus  t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of a s t i m u l u s  to a  sensation  might e x p r e s s o n l y t h e law of a v e r a g e s , and was not n e c e s s a r i l y a d e s c r i p t i o n of a c t u a l  instances.  L a t e r i n Ward's G i f f o r d l e c t u r e s o f l $ 9 6 - 9 8 , t h i s t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between an a c t u a l event and t h e  failure  hypothetical  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of many s i m i l a r events and i n t h i s case compressed i n t o a s c i e n t i f i c  l a w , drove him t o a t t a c k many of t h e  fundamental premises of n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y s c i e n c e , and i n  31  p a r t i c u l a r the t h e o r i e s  of Herbert Spencer.  Ward  treated  w i t h much s u s p i c i o n m a t e r i a l i s m ' s e f f o r t s t o r e d u c e a l l phenomena t o t h e c a u s e - e f f e c t motion. effect we  between m a t t e r  and  As Ward e x p l a i n e d , f o r t h e most p a r t , t h e i d e a o f an resulting  c a n n e v e r be  effect. ships  reciprocity  from a cause a c t u a l l y c e r t a i n which  speak  of causal  when t h e s e r i e s  since  i s the  relation-  between m a s s e s , t h e r e c a n , i n f a c t ,  c a u s e when t h e a c t i o n  definite  us l i t t l e ,  i s t h e c a u s e and w h i c h  Thus w h i l e t h e p h y s i c i s t s  existing  tells  o n l y be  i s d e t e r m i n e d by an e x t e r n a l a g e n t  of r e s u l t i n g  a c t i o n s f o l l o w one  t i m e - o r d e r sequence.  M a t t e r i s n o t mass, Ward  conception with  and  another i n a  Besides, the p h y s i c i s t s  tended to confuse a s t a t i s t i c a l  a  had  reality.  stated:  . . . a 'mass' means m e r e l y a c o n c r e t e number, i . e . the term s t a n d s f o r a s p e c i f i c q u a n t i t y not f o r a c o n c r e t e t h i n g ; mass i s a m a t h e m a t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n d e v i s e d s o l e l y t o f a c i l i t a t e c a l c u l a t i o n and was H n e v e r meant t o a i d r a t i o n a l i n s i g h t o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Ward t h o u g h t t h a t the  great majority  believed  o f n a t u r a l i s t s were m i s l e a d i n g .  t h e i r vaunted  subjective fictions. want t o a v o i d  t h e o p i n i o n s e x p r e s s e d by S p e n c e r  laws The  discussing  only  ships.  They h a d m i s t a k e n t h e p a r t  sary  quantifiable,  s u b s t a n c e s ; t h e s e laws properties  he  the r e a l i t i e s  instead  for  certain  of existent  Ward  o f s c i e n c e t o be l i t t l e  scientists,  emphasized  and t e m p o r a l  of science r e f l e c t e d  upon n a t u r e by t h e human m i n d .  seemed t o  o f m a t t e r , and  f o r the whole,  m a t t e r , but  more t h a n  explained,  spatial  and  relation-  qualities  not t h e  o n l y an o r d e r  neces-  imposed  32  H e r e Ward was Hegelians' notion  repeating,  critique  of the  i n essence, the  of materialism  "concrete  universal."  between a s i n g l e , o b s e r v a b l e f a c t similar  f a c t s or t h i n g s  example w o u l d be at  o 0 C and  The  the  all  bodies of water.  and  the  had  This  scientific  concluded, the  abstractions  assumption that  o f an  eliminated  played  the  tively  by  the  too  i n an  i n some c a s e s be  may,  conception  in fact,  An  recognized  and  the  common t o  important  by  part  Ward i n each  materialism, to  for,  construct  these  of the m a t e r i a l i s t s ' s passive  also  result  questioned  o f a phenomenon, all-inclusive  exempt f r o m t h e  collec-  generalizacomprehensive  argument—ought  with less stringent  not  9  concrete  determinism i n nature which s c i e n t i s t s  have d i s c o v e r e d Our  properties  critics  single instances  laws of s c i e n c e  of  grouped.  i n t o words  always the  N a t u r a l i s t s - - s o went t h e  rigid  since that  an  c o n s c i o u s n e s s was  w h e t h e r o r not  statement.  t o put  falseness  scientists  class  numerous unknown  upon s c i e n t i f i c  Furthermore, these  t i o n , might not  be  d i f f e r e n c e between  of s e n s a t i o n .  treated  general  a c t u a l pond f r e e z i n g .  mind's o b v i o u s a b i l i t y  i n d i c a t e d the  their  u n i v e r s a l of water f r e e z i n g  abstractions,  separate attacks  sprung from  Hegelians d i s t i n g u i s h  the  emphasizing the  English Hegelians,  of t h e i r they  and  and  v a r i a b l e s i n order  t r u t h f o u n d by  realities  reality  statement  nonquantifiable  The  under which i t c o u l d  scientific  concrete  scientific  abstract  the  w h i c h had  English  to  hypotheses, claim  exist.  of space i s not,  Ward n o t e d ,  replac  based  to  33  solely  on t h e s e n s o r y a w a r e n e s s c r e a t e d  observation  made l o n g  g e o m e t e r s were a b l e consisted  ago by K a n t .  of a l l sensory  then a person to abstract  could  Kant h a d b e l i e v e d  t o t a l k o f pure o r a b s t r a c t  o f a system o f a b s t r a c t  independent  by o u r movements, an  conclude that  e x p e r i e n c e becomes t h e b a s i s  space which  r e l a t i o n s h i p s , known  experience.  the p a r t i c u l a r type  that  I f t h i s were  he h a s a l r e a d y  true,  the capacity  o f knowledge, t h u s ,  "Active  o f geometry, not geometry o f  „10 experience." Ward a g r e e d w i t h K a n t ; perception  wholly with  every s p a t i a l both the  one must n o t m i s t a k e n l y  sensory  As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  o r t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p a c t u a l l y depends upon  objective  and s u b j e c t i v e  f a c t o r s which a r e products o f  i n d i v i d u a l ' s ego a n d i t s powers o f o r g a n i z a t i o n  ordination.  Therefore  science—Herbert  t o t h e c o n t r a r y — i s not a t r u e is  experience.  only  future  identify  an e x p l a n a t i o n  Spencer's  and c o -  assertion  description of r e a l i t y ;  science  w h i c h may a l w a y s a t some t i m e i n t h e  be s u p e r c e d e d by a b e t t e r  explanation.  Science  i s not  certainty.' James Ward was f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e work o f t h e A u s t r i a n physicist  and p h i l o s o p h e r  arguments c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l book o f 1883:  The S c i e n c e  of science,  Ernst  Mach, a n d Ward's  a number o f t h o s e f o u n d i n Mach's o f Mechanics; A C r i t i c a l and  Historical  Exposition.  Mach q u e s t i o n e d t h e two p r e m i s e s o f  scientific  materialism:  that  a l l phenomena c o u l d  t o t h e laws o f m e c h a n i c s , and t h a t offer  a complete e x p l a n a t i o n  science  would  be r e d u c e d eventually  f o r every occurrence w i t h i n the  34  universe.  S c i e n c e , ' d e c l a r e d M a c h , c o u l d g i v e no r e a l  t i o n f o r n a t u r a l events, the  i t merely described  understanding an  phenomena.  s o - c a l l e d laws o f s c i e n c e were n o t f a c t s but  observations, abbreviated  and g e n e r a l i z e d .  sensory  itself,  eminent r o l e i n s i m p l i f y i n g and c a t e g o r i z i n g t h e  believed i t fruitless to talk material world; perception. of nothing  i t s hypotheses.  played observaMach  o f an o b j e c t i v e , e x t e r n a l ,  i n t r u t h , there  e x i s t e d o n l y one's s u b j e c t i v e  Consequently, s c i e n t i f i c more t h a n p e r c e p t u a l  c r i t i c i s m s , of course,  And  In the s c i e n t i f i c  of the world, mental a c t i v i t y ,  t i o n s from which science formulates  explana-  explanation  experience.  are s t i l l  1 1  consisted  These  b a s i c t o modern phenomeno-  l o g i s t s and l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s .  They w o u l d a g r e e w i t h  t h a t t r u e r e a l i t y must a l w a y s r e m a i n u n k n o w a b l e ; a man  Mach sees  only r e a l i t y ' s manufactured appearance through t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y of h i s p e r c e p t i o n .  Ward t h e r e f o r e saw t h e f u n c t i o n o f  p s y c h o l o g y t o be n o t t h e h o p e l e s s existent and  t a s k o f m e a s u r i n g non-  s e n s a t i o n s , b u t r a t h e r t o d i s c o v e r o u r own f e e l i n g s  awareness, our e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y .  significant the very  To Ward, t h e most  element i n any a c t o f c o g n i t i o n u n d o u b t e d l y i s  i n d i v i d u a l who i s c u r r e n t l y h a v i n g  that  experience.  A c t u a l l y what Ward meant h e r e i s t h a t a n i n d i v i d u a l n o t o n l y has  ordinary consciousness,  the perception  of the world 12  a r o u n d h i m , he a l s o h a d a d i s t i n c t awareness o r consciousness experiences  self-consciousness,  o f h i m s e l f as t h e s u b j e c t  13 w h i c h he i s c u r r e n t l y u n d e r g o i n g . ^  the  of those  35  To  clarify  " E m p i r i c a l Ego" consisted  this  Empirical  Ego  o f a man's a w a r e n e s s o f h i s own  feelings,  such  as  " I am  ( o b j e c t ) of which part  "Pure  sad."  the I  the E m p i r i c a l  organic  the  Ego  Self."  These  statements  was  a product  Ward t h o u g h t  that  p a r t i c u l a r mood o r g r o u p  o f the awareness o f  T h i s form  the source of  and  of domination  and  On tion, is  and  one dominate  the world surrounding  exercised  over the whole  o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , Ward f o u n d p a r t i c u l a r l y of m u l t i p l e  abnormal  physical  as a r e s u l t  o f r e l a t e d moods o c c u p y  t h e Ego's c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f i t s e l f  Me  F o r t h e most  t h e moods c r e a t e d by  s e n s a t i o n s somehow become i m b a l a n c e d  the  describe the  (subject) i s conscious.  s e n s a t i o n s , t h u s i t l i k e l y was  behavior.  it.  into  The  statements  and  p o i n t Ward d i v i d e d t h e s e l f  field  noticeable  i n cases  d e r i v e s from  imagina-  personality.  the o t h e r hand, t h e Pure  one's i d e a l s  and  Self  reasoning a b i l i t y .  The  "Pure  Self"  the: . . . c o n c e p t w h i c h e v e r y i n t e l l i g e n t b e i n g more o r l e s s d i s t i n c t l y f o r m s o f h i m s e l f a s a p e r s o n , M. o r N., h a v i n g s u c h and s u c h as c h a r a c t e r , t a s t e s and c o n v i c t i o n s , s u c h and s u c h a h i s t o r y , and s u c h and s u c h an a i m i n l i f e . The m a i n i n s t r u m e n t i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s c o n c e p t , as o f o t h e r s , i s l a n g u a g e , and e s p e c i a l l y t h e s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e t h a t l a n g u a g e promotes. + lj  The  "Pure  S e l f " r e l a t e s t o i t s environment  through  p r o c e s s known a s " i n t r o j e c t i o n , " a t e r m Ward d e r i v e d Richard Avenarius, the criticism.  By t h e t e r m  a  from  c o - f o u n d e r , a l o n g w i t h Mach, o f E m p i r i o introjection,  p r o c e s s whereby an i n d i v i d u a l a l t e r s  A v e n a r i u s meant  the  the data of sensory  36  experience t o conform t o h i s e x i s t i n g preconceptions.  Aven-  a r i u s b e l i e v e d t h a t the  to  b r a i n has  the  t e n d e n c y t o want  preserve a s t a t e of e q u i l i b r i a t i o n w i t h the order the  to minimize tension  or excitement.  environment appear too t h r e a t e n i n g ,  modifies  i t s c o n c e p t i o n s i n s u c h a way  dangerous s t i m u l u s  i n the  simplest  environment i n  Should, however, the  brain  then  as t o n e u t r a l i z e  the  p o s s i b l e manner w i t h  the  15  l e a s t p o s s i b l e change i n i t s a c c u s t o m e d a t t i t u d e . A v e n a r i u s b e l i e v e d , was  the  u l t i m a t e l y of the  source of the  man  and  are  n a t u r a l l y a n t h r o p o r m o r p h i c and  q u a l i t i e s to nature. a tension-reducing  And  b e l i e f i n God.  like  d u a l i s t i c n a t u r e o f man;  the  " p r e s e n t e d " o r e x p e r i e n t i a l s e l f was  by K a n t .  even  complete  1  the  Men,  F r e u d , A v e n a r i u s saw  ( F e c h n e r ' s " p r i n c i p l e o f c o n s t a n c y " ^ ) as This  animism of p r i m i t i v e  attribute their  energy system w i t h  This,  scientists, own mind  equilibriation  its final  goal.  conscious s e l f previously  Compare Ward's d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h a t  as  and  recognized  o f a modern  student of Kant: I n a s i t u a t i o n w h e r e we a t t e n d t o , o r j u d g e on t h e b a s i s o f , some i t e m i n o u r s e n s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , we n a t u r a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between the a t t e n t i o n or the j u d g m e n t and t h e s e n s i b l e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i t e m . K a n t i n s i s t s t h a t i f we t a l k o f k n o w i n g t h a t we a r e a t t e n d i n g t o , o r j u d g i n g , s o m e t h i n g , t h e n we should a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e j u d g m e n t a b o u t out? a t t e n t i o n and i t s s e n s i b l e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 1 7 A l t h o u g h Ward a c c e p t e d K a n t ' s d i s t i n c t i o n , he that the  dualism  implicit  " t r a n s c e n d e d " by t h e  i n e x p e r i e n c e was  individual.  t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between h i m s e l f  Firstly, and  resolved a person  thought or learns  h i s environment; next  to  37  s e p a r a t e t h e p r e s e n t i d e a s from p a s t memories; t h e n t o his on  control  d e s i r e s through reason, u n t i l f i n a l l y there i s a focusing an, . . . image o f t h e s e l f i n t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l i d e n t i t y o f a s e l f c o n s c i o u s o f i t s e l f a s a p e r s o n , and c a p a b l e o f s a y i n g " I am" . . . a c t i v i t y , a t f i r s t i m p e l l e d by a p p e t i t e , t h e n s o l i c i t e d by d e s i r e , m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f at l e n g t h as f r e e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . B e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d p s y c h o l o g y h a d t r i e d t o i g n o r e t h i s  vital  fact  of l i f e ,  c o n s c i o u s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Ward  was  c o n v i n c e d t h a t much o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e u n h a p p y i g n o r a n c e a b o u t man's s p i r i t u a l b e i n g , e v i d e n c e d by an  age  w h i c h t o o k N i e t z s c h e as i t s p r o p h e t , l a y w i t h  psychology's  faulty tenets.  physiological  In h i s o p i n i o n , n a t u r a l i s t i c ,  p s y c h o l o g y had t r i e d t o i g n o r e s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s i n o r d e r t o b u i l d u p o n t h e more e a s i l y c a l c u l a b l e it  had  to  "scientific),  c o n s e q u e n t l y n e g l e c t e d t h e r e a l n a t u r e o f man.  s h o r t , man, his  (hence  l i k e a l l other l i v i n g  environment  a c c o r d i n g t o how  In  creatures, interacts with he  can e x p l o i t  i t i n order  r e a l i z e h i s e n d s , t h e r e f o r e h i s a t t i t u d e s must o f n e c e s s i t y  r e f l e c t whether or not he, h i m s e l f , f e e l s c e r t a i n a s p e c t s  of  h i s . s u r r o u n d i n g s t o be e i t h e r a h e l p o r a h i n d r a n c e t o h i s p u r s u i t o f s u r v i v a l and  self-betterment.  T h i s l e d Ward t o  c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o s e a p p a r e n t l y o b j e c t i v e l a w s and  causal  r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n n a t u r e were n o t h i n g o f t h e k i n d ; t h e y were, i n h i s view, only the anthropomorphic c o n c e p t u a l schemes o f men. the impotent  As he  shadow o f N a t u r e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s and  e x p l a i n e d i t , "Mind i s not  as t h u s shaped f o r t h but  s h a p i n g i s i t s e l f t h e work o f m i n d . "  19  this  38  Ward f u l l y  acknowledged h i s debt t o A v e n a r i u s f o r  r e s o l v i n g t h e apparent  d u a l i s m between t h e s u b j e c t i v e and  o b j e c t i v e components o f e x p e r i e n c e .  Avenarius's  notion of  " i n t r o j e c t i o n " meant t h a t w h i l e a n i n d i v i d u a l e a s i l y b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s own i d e a s a r e somehow a n o b j e c t i v e c r e a t i o n o f h i s sensory  p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , he a l s o a s s u m e s  e r r o n e o u s l y t h a t t h e ideas o f everyone e l s e a r i s e w h o l l y  from  20  subjective considerations.  Actually, since others are  r e a c t i n g t o t h e same s i t u a t i o n a n d a r e m e e t i n g w i t h  something  which approximates  t h e same a w a r e n e s s t h a t we a r e h a v i n g  s e l v e s , psychology  can t h e r e f o r e study these " t r a n s u b j e c t i v e "  aspects  of experience, thereby  eradicating the false  t h e c o n f u s i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , w h i c h  our-  dualism,  besets  psychology. Furthermore,  Ward a r g u e d , t h e s e u n i v e r s a l o r " t r a n -  s u b j e c t i v e " features which are found-to  be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f  experience, are a direct r e f u t a t i o n of naturalism, f o rthe premises  of n a t u r a l i s m i m p l i e s a system of matter  b e y o n d man's c o n t r o l . if  Ward u n d e r s t o o d  and l a w  the issue i n t h i s  c e r t a i n n a t u r a l laws e n t i r e l y r e g u l a t e d the course  u n i v e r s e , t h e n man's ego o u g h t i t s e l f t o r e f l e c t t h i s of t h i n g s .  As a r e s u l t , t h e ego w o u l d be n o t h i n g more  the passive instrument without to  way:  of the order than  o f s e n s a t i o n , a n d m a n k i n d w o u l d be  t h e c a p a c i t y , t h e independent judgment, o r i m a g i n a t i o n  t a k e an a c t i v e r o l e i n shaping 21  surroundings.  and m a n i p u l a t i n g i t s  39 Thus Ward t o o k f r o m A v e n a r i u s ' l i n e judgment t h a t jective gained stood  every experience  phenomenon. support  as  stimuli.  From t h i s  way  to  believed  resolve  the  separate truths it  was  this  that  apparent  of r e l i g i o n  present,  this  the  knowledge had  science.  yearning  saw  as  Ward r e a c h e d t h e still  the  between He  was  i n man  contingency  conclusion  the  the  c e r t a i n that that  dis-  attainment  constancy  relationships  individuals;  o f an  Hence, t h e  consequences of t h e i r  more f a v o u r a b l e  at  explanation, statisti-  unpredictable o f new  applies  a c t i o n s , t h e y may  forms  in and  consequent  equally  never wholly foresee  ways o f r e a c t i n g w i t h t h e i r  i s progressive  to  the  accident-  also learn  new,  environment;  and  evolution.  Ward j u d g e d t h a t P l u r a l i s t s , who  can  N a t u r e was,  c o m p l e x i t y and  always remained. . T h i s since they  the  r e f l e c t e d the  possibility  even g r e a t e r  in  In h i s  o f l a r g e numbers; N a t u r e was  instances.  improvement  evident  that  evolving—teleologically.  cal  this  aware-  shown him  towards the  seeming d e t e r m i n i s m o f Nature o n l y  al  the  s u b s t a n c e o f Ward's  the  single  under-  environmental  gains  contradictions and  be  Ward  ideal.  From what he universe,  of b l i n d ,  s u b j e c t i v e , v i s i o n a r y element  closed Nature's everpresent of a moral  was  sub-  conclusion  cannot  s u b j e c t i v i t y man  ness of h i s t r u e moral being He  man  the  inherently  all-important  were m e r e l y a p r o d u c t  Through h i s very  argument.  i n d i c a t e d an  f o r his conviction that  i f he  of reasoning  h i s v i e w were i n agreement w i t h  argued that  God  has  l i m i t e d Himself i n  the order  40  to  l e n d man  talents; the  a p o r t i o n of h i s c a u s a t i o n .  His  creatures they  discretion Now  God.  In  identify  essence,  their  own  Although  ideal  c o u l d not  o n l y an  or they  a curious proof  h i s argument was  a self-imposed  men.  was  use  assigns may  the  misuse  them—  i s theirs.  Ward f o u n d  recognize  may  God  t h a t the  moral i d e a l  interest  with  Ward a c c e p t e d a l w a y s be  best  highest  some m i g h t  justified  existence  of  o f men  always  through which they  the  that  f o r the  can  good f o r a l l argue t h a t  on l o g i c a l  this  grounds,  this  appearance f o r ,  E i t h e r t h e w o r l d i s n o t r a t i o n a l o r man does n o t s t a n d a l o n e and t h i s l i f e i s n o t a l l . But i t c a n n o t be r a t i o n a l t o conclude t h a t the w o r l d i s not r a t i o n a l , l e a s t o f a l l when an a l t e r n a t i v e i s open t o us t h a t l e a v e s room f o r i t s r a t i o n a l i t y — t h e a l t e r n a t i v e o f p o s t u l a t i n g God and t h e f u t u r e l i f e . 2 2 And also  provide  ideals free of  as  our  moral i d e a l s  us w i t h  demand t h e  agent has  the  l e a d us  assurance  existence  necessity, exist;  i n God,  of a f u t u r e l i f e .  of a s o u l .  c h o s e n some b e l i e f  to a f a i t h  I f man  as  a  Our rational  f o r a moral i d e a l ,  o r a s Ward i n a b u r s t  of  they  i t must,  inspiration  instructs, H u m a n i t y a l r e a d y has y e a r n i n g s and a s p i r a t i o n s t h a t t h e f l e s h - p o t s o f E g y p t - - m a t e r i a l and t e m p o r a l w e l l b e i n g — c a n n e v e r c o n t e n t ; i s i t , i m p e l l e d by t h e s e l o n g i n g s f o r h i g h e r t h i n g s d e s t i n e d t o wander a i m l e s s l y i n the wilderness f o r e v e r u n s a t i s f i e d ? 2 3 It with  i s important  not  some f o r m o f I d e a l i s m .  manifold  f o r m s and  substance.  d i d not  to  confuse He  Ward's r a t i o n a l  b e l i e v e d the  have t h e  universe  u n i t y o f one  Ward d e s c r i b e d h i s o u t l o o k  as  being  a combination  theology possessed or of  41  b o t h P l u r a l i s m and T h e i s m , d e c l a r i n g t h a t existed  i n two a s p e c t s :  universe  contains  " i t i s One a n d i t i s Many."  a multiplicity  and i n o r g a n i c , o f v a r y i n g  seeking  to realize  o f t h e good.  their  entities,  degrees o f consciousness  ends: t h e i r  These e n t i t i e s  p e r f e c t i o n o f form,  o r monads  exhibit will  and m a t e r i a l i s t s t o t h e p h i l o s o p h y  a definite  reach  progression  its final  o r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h on  harmony i n t h e " p e r f e c t  one  o f t h e t r u e and t h e good.  f o r P l u r a l i s m t o be f u l l y  universe's explained  "living  orbs"  Ward, t h e r e  to resolve  because o f H i s love and It  has allowed i s this  and  rational,  earth  a l l becoming  f o r the  i n the higher  must a l s o be a h i e r a r c h y  ences, a h i e r a r c h y which culminates  of the  commonwealth" o f  c o - o p e r a t e a n d none c o n f l i c t ;  But  their  of Leibniz)  men where a l l w i l l i n the pursuit  a l l  (Ward owed h i s  s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y monisms idealists  actually-  The  of self-determining  organic  idea  the universe  of  synthesis, intellig-  i n a Supreme B e i n g .  God  f o r t h e w o r l d has renounced H i s omnipotence,  t h e "Many" t h e f r e e d o m t o d e t e r m i n e t h e i r  love that  gives  the true unity to Pluralism.  P l u r a l i s m a r e one: t h e s y n t h e s i s  o f r e a s o n and  ends. Theism  faith,  therefore, We c a n n o t l i v e o r move w i t h o u t f a i t h , t h a t i s clear. I s i t not r a t i o n a l t o b e l i e v e i n t h e best, we a s k ; a n d c a n t h e r e be a b e t t e r ? 2 4 I n t h i s way, Ward came t o t h e r e a s s u r i n g faith that still  i s rationality, by r e c o g n i z i n g small  and r e a s o n i s p i e t y .  the fact  voice within,  He was  of s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  a man  could  deduction  that  confident  e s p e c i a l l y the  see not only  a refutation  42  of m a t e r i a l i s m , but c o u l d glimpse the workings of a h i g h e r power.  T h i s s o r t of reasoning was  not uncommon among Late  V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s ; witness F r e d e r i c k Myers' theory t h a t the subconscious response  ("subliminal") mind was  evolving i n  t o t e l e p a t h i c s t i m u l i broadcast by the World  Spirit.  Again, l i k e many other i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the p e r i o d , Ward f e l t a s t r o n g need t o a s s e r t h i s p a r t i c u l a r moral p r i n c i p l e s as the only r a t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e s .  Psychology  became f o r him  a means t o put the stamp of a p p r o v a l on what were e s s e n t i a l l y the r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s of h i s c h i l d h o o d .  Using an amalgam  of E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m , H e g e l i a n d i a l e c t i c s and Sunday School dogma, Ward e x p l a i n e d how  c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y and  rational-  i t y are one and the same. Ward thought i s supposedly  t h a t the key t o s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n , which  a man's awareness of h i s t r u e moral being, l i e s  i n the " t r a n s u b j e c t i v e " nature of experience.  Through  p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n s o c i e t y a person transcends h i s i s o l a t e d s e l f ; h i s t r a n s u b j e c t i v e knowledge allows him t o e s t a b l i s h what i s o b j e c t i v e l y t r u e f o r a l l . t i n g u i s h h i s own  Thus he i s a b l e t o d i s -  p r i v a t e and s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n s from the  g e n e r a l fund of o b j e c t i v e knowledge.  In t h i s way  he  attains  self-consciousness. In Ward's view, most s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s , not e x c l u d i n g Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, had l e d themselves assuming t h a t a man society.  was  a s t r a y by  a r a t i o n a l b e i n g , antecedent  On the other hand, Hegel was  essentially  to  correct  43  t o argue t h a t s o c i e t y was an organism t h r o u g h which s o c i a l man became r a t i o n a l and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ; "the more i n t i m a t e t h e u n i t y of t h e whole t h e more complete t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of „25 i t s members."  I f f o l l o w e d , t h e n , t h e r e c o u l d be no c o n f l i c t  between s o c i e t y and an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  self-interest.  W h i l e many  s t i l l pursue e g o i s t i c g o a l s , t h e r e i s a growing r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t r e a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the s o c i a l good—what Green had c a l l e d t h e " c l a i m s of t h e common humanity."  T.H. 26 Ward  agreed w i t h Green t h a t s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n meant not t h e apparent s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f egoism and g r e e d , but t h e m o r a l i t y of s o c i a l l y constructive behavior.  I n t h i s way t h e " c o n c r e t e " i n d i v i d u a l  t h r o u g h h i s s h a r i n g i n t h e m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s of s o c i e t y a t t a i n s 27 the " u n i v e r s a l " — r a t i o n a l i t y . What w i l l be t h e r a t i o n a l i d e a l g a i n e d t h e r e b y , Ward asked? The answer may be v e r y b r i e f . "Thy Kingdom come, Thy w i l l be done on e a r t h as i t i s i n heaven." To imagine t h i s p e t i t i o n answered i s t o imagine humanity animated by a s i n g l e w i s e and r i g h t e o u s w i l l : every c i t i z e n would work h a r m o n i o u s l y w i t h every o t h e r , each one d o i n g t h e h i g h e s t and t h e b e s t o f which he i s c a p a b l e . The w i l l of the many and t h e w i l l o f t h e One would a c c o r d completely. ... The Kingdom would t a k e t h e p l a c e o f the i d e a l K i n g : t h e r e would be a p e r f e c t commonwealth, but s t r i c t l y no monarch o t h e r t h a n 'the o b j e c t i v e mind' s o v e r e i g n i n every b r e a s t . 2 8 Ward was one of t h o s e post D a r w i n i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s , d e s c r i b e d by C o c k s h u t , who t r i e d t o shed what t h e y b e l i e v e d t o be C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s u n t e n a b l e dogmas, w h i l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e v o l v i n g a new s e t of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h t h e y hoped t o r e t a i n c e r t a i n  through  elements of t h e i r former  44  convictions, particularly ment o f a n i n h e r e n t intellectual  a f a i t h i n the progressive  moral order.  I n t h i s way, a V i c t o r i a n  could l e g i t i m a t e l y renounce t h e uncomfortable  doctrines of h i s childhood ethical ideals.  r e l i g i o n without  betraying i t s  He w o u l d n o t l o n g e r n e e d t o g r o u n d h i s f a i t h  on a s e t o f d u b i o u s t e n e t s  and q u e s t i o n a b l e  f a i t h w o u l d now be c o r r o b o r a t e d of e v o l u t i o n a r y progress. not,  fulfill-  stories, f o r that  by t h e i n c o n t e s t a b l e f a c t s  I t seemed t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e  as-Mr. C a r l y l e f e a r e d , a b l i n d , m e c h a n i s t i c  was  clockwork  29  and n  man a mere c o g i n i t s g r e a t w o r k i n g s .  fact  it  t t  shattered the foundations  '  Thus i f s c i e n t i f i c  of the Puritan world  view,  a l s o seemed c a p a b l e o f r e s c u i n g m o r a l f r e e d o m f r o m t h e d i m  prospects and  of Calvinist  predestination.  Ward was o n e — w e r e c e r t a i n t h a t s c i e n c e w o u l d one d a y  prove t h a t those e t h i c a l imperatives Late  The more o p t i m i s t i c —  felt  s o s t r o n g l y by many  V i c t o r i a n s , were a n a t u r a l and i n t r i n s i c  a s p e c t o f human  evolution. O t h e r s c o u l d n o t s h a r e Ward's c o m f o r t i n g They f o u n d i t d i f f i c u l t of p e r c e p t i o n  t o accept that the s u b j e c t i v e  and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  w i t h what t h e y c o n c e i v e d  convictions.  were e n t i r e l y r e c o n c i l a b l e  of as r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g .  t h e y a g r e e d w i t h Ward t h a t  aspects  Though  consciousness d i d i n f l u e n c e be-  h a v i o r , t h e y w e r e l e s s t h a n c e r t a i n t h a t one c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y assume t h a t m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s a l w a y s c o n f o r m e d t o t h e l a w s o f logic.  45  FOOTNOTES TO  Press,  CHAPTER I I  G.M. Young, P o r t r a i t I 9 6 0 , p. 110.  o f An  Age,  London, Oxford  A.O.J. C o c k s h u t , The  Unbelievers,  University  p  London, C o l l i n s ,  1964.  3  v. t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f " e a r n e s t n e s s " i n W.E. Houghton, The V i c t o r i a n Frame o f M i n d , New Haven, Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1951, PP. 218-262. ^A l e t t e r q u o t e d by Ward's d a u g h t e r i n h e r b i o g r a p h i c a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a c o l l e c t i o n o f Ward's e s s a y s . O.W. Campbell, "Memoir," E s s a y s i n P h i l o s o p h y James Ward, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1927, p. 4 6 . 5  •'w.R. S o r l e y , an i n t i m a t e f r i e n d and a u t h o r o f t h e n o t i c e on Ward i n t h e D i c t i o n a r y o f N a t i o n a l B i o g r a p h y , d e s c r i b e d Ward's f a m i l y a s C o n g r e g a t i o n a l i s t s , but C a l v i n i s t s I n t h e i r theology. A c c o r d i n g t o S o r l e y ' s a c c o u n t , Ward c o m p l e t e d a B.A. i n t h e o l o g y a t S p r i n g H i l l C o l l e g e i n B i r m i n g h a m and t h e n t r a v e l l e d t o Germany t o s t u d y p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r R u d o l f L o t z e . I n 1&'71 Ward, a l t h o u g h n o t o f f i c i a l l y o r d a i n e d as a m i n i s t e r , a c c e p t e d a c a l l t o p r e a c h a t t h e Emmanuel C o n g r e g a t i o n c h a p e l at Cambridge. But Ward, d u r i n g h i s s h o r t m i n i s t r y underwent a c r i s i s o f b e l i e f , w h i c h c a u s e d him t o r e j e c t i n s t i t u t i o n a l religion. T h e r e u p o n he e n t e r e d Cambridge t o p u r s u e h i s i n t e r e s t s i n p h i l o s o p h y and p s y c h o l o g y . Nevertheless, Sorley had t h e o p i n i o n t h a t Ward a l w a y s r e t a i n e d much o f h i s e a r l y b e l i e f i n s p i r i t u a l v a l u e s and n e v e r t e n d e d r e a l l y t o w a r d s s e c u l a r i s m or a g n o s t i c i s m . W.R. S o r l e y , "James Ward," D i c t i o n a r y o f N a t i o n a l B i o g r a p h y 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 3 0 , ed. J.R.H. Weaver, London, O x f o r d , r e p r i n t e d 1965, p. 885. James Ward, "An A t t e m p t M i n d , v o l . 1,. I 8 7 6 , p. 459.  To  I n t e r p r e t Fechner's  Law,"  7 I n t h e e i g h t e e n - e i g h t i e s L o r d G i f f o r d f o u n d e d and endowed a l e c t u r e s h i p i n t h e S c o t t i s h U n i v e r s i t i e s . The l e c t u r e s were t o have a s t h e i r s u b j e c t m a t t e r , " N a t u r a l T h e o l o g y " and demanded "an i n q u i r y I n t o t h e u l t i m a t e g r o u n d of being, pursued i n a s p i r i t of s c i e n t i f i c philosophy, and e x p r e s s l y renouncing s u p e r n a t u r a l s o u r c e s o f knowledge: e n q u i r y i n t o e x i s t i n g n a t u r e , and a t t r i b u t e s o f t h e D i v i n e , t h e r e l a t i o n s i n w h i c h man and t h e u n i v e r s e s t a n d t o t h e D e i t y , t h e meaning o f e x i s t e n c e e t c . " R.M. M e t z , A Hundred Y e a r s o f P h i l o s o p h y , London, George A l l e n , 1938, p. 779.  46  8 James Ward, N a t u r a l i s m and A g n o s t i c i s m , London, Adam and C h a r l e s B l a c k , 1906, v o l . 2, p. 86. A.J.M. M i l n e , The S o c i a l P h i l o s o p h y o f E n g l i s h I d e a l i s m , London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1962, p. 21. 9  :  "^Ward, N a t u r a l i s m and A g n o s t i c i s m , v o l . 2, p. 142. " ^ T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f Mach's p h i l o s o p h y , o f t e n termed neop o s i t i v i s m o r e m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m , has been t a k e n from P h i l l i p F r a n k , Modern S c i e n c e and I t s P h i l o s o p h y , Cambridge Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1949* 12  I n Ward's somewhat obscure words: . . . t h e f i r s t and most fundamental f a c t y i e l d e d by t h e a n a l y s i s o f t h i s e x p e r i ence we have found t o be i t s r e f e r e n c e t o a s u b j e c t o r s e l f t h a t has i t . The knowledge o f t h i s f a c t we c a l l s e l f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , meaning t h e r e b y n o t t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o every s e l f but t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; a c o n s c i o u s n e s s t o which o n l y some e x p e r i e n t s a t t a i n , t o w h i c h we o n l y g r a d u a l l y a t t a i n . " James Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1918, p. 361. 13 A l t h o u g h Ward's major work i n psychology was not publ i s h e d u n t i l 1918, many o f i t s i m p o r t a n t c h a p t e r s c o n s i s t e d of papers p u b l i s h e d between 1330 and 1393, i n c l u d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m Ward's "famous" a r t i c l e on psychology f o r t h e ninth e d i t i o n of the Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a . ^ J . Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , p. 368. 15 'N. S m i t h , " A v e n a r i u s ' P h i l o s o p h y o f Pure E x p e r i e n c e , " M i n d , v o l . 15, 1906, p. 27. M  "^S. F r e u d , Beyond t h e P l e a s u r e P r i n c i p l e , New Y o r k , Bantam, 1959, pp. 23-25. 17 'G. B i r d , Kant's Theory- o f Knowledge, London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1962, p. 170. 13 Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , p. 376. 19 'Ward, N a t u r a l i s m and A g n o s t i c i s m , v o l . 2, p. 247. I b i d . , p. 172. I b i d . , p. 169. 22 James Ward, The Realm o f Ends o r P l u r a l i s m and Theism, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1920, p. 1+2T. The Realm o f Ends was Ward's s e q u e l t o N a t u r a l i s m and A g n o s t i c i s m . These 2 0  2 1  47  G i f f o r d l e c t u r e s were d e l i v e r e d Andrews between 1907-1910.  of S t .  W a r d , The Realm of Ends, p. '1+25.  23  2Zt  - I b i d . , p. 453.  2 5  I b i d . , p. 124-  2  at the U n i v e r s i t y  6  Quoted by Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 134-  ^A.J.M. M i l n e , The S o c i a l Philosophy of E n g l i s h London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1962, p. 5 1 . 2  Idealism,  Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 1 3 6 . ^ W.E.Houghton, The V i c t o r i a n Frame of Mind, New Haven, Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957, p. 5 0 . 2  III.  J A M E S S U L L Y AND T H E STUDY  OF  ILLUSIONS  49  I n t h e t h i r t y y e a r s o r so a f t e r T.H. t o the  B e l f a s t meeting, B r i t i s h psychology found i t s e l f  i n g t o cope w i t h a p e c u l i a r l y d i f f i c u l t had  denied  still  the  w i l l i n g t o argue t h a t  not  task.  e f f i c a c y of consciousness,  in a scientific And  Huxley's address try-  Though H u x l e y  p s y c h o l o g i s t s were  c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o u l d be  treated  framework, even i f I d e a l i s t s begged t o  a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s saw  t w e e n Ward's p a l p a b l e  the  mysticism  differ.  i s s u e as a mere c h o i c e  and  Huxley's  be-  atavistic  Behaviorism. For  i n s t a n c e , one  Sully believed that explanation  science  Victorian psychologist,  could o f f e r a f u l l y  Deity.  Lamarekian understanding r a t i o n a l j u d g m e n t s o f one next.  S u l l y accepted Herbert o f e v o l u t i o n , and generation  James  rational  f o r s u b j e c t i v e , moral values, without  to a supernatural  of the  Late  resorting Spencer's  contended t h a t  become t h e m o r a l  the  values  In S u l l y ' s words,  I t i s by t h i s a g e n c y t h a t e a c h g e n e r a t i o n t r a n s m i t s (on t h e a v e r a g e ) a s l i g h t i n c r e m e n t o f b r a i n - p o w e r t o i t s s u c c e s s o r , and t h a t t h e c o n t i n u o u s e x e r c i s e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e , o f m o r a l f e e l i n g , and so f o r t h , through the s u c c e s s i o n of generations leads t o a p e r c e p t i b l e i m p r o v e m e n t o f t h e s e powers.-'H e n c e , S u l l y c o u l d d i s c e r n no and  rationality.  Still,  the  dichotomy between m o r a l s  p r o b l e m of s u b j e c t i v i t y had  w i d e r d i m e n s i o n t h a n one  of simply  another form of reason.  Sully's lifelong  i n g i l l u s i o n s and irrationality  dreams l e d h i m  d e r i v e d from the  j u s t i f y i n g morals  distorting  as  concern with  to conclude that  a  study-  apparent  e f f e c t o f man's  50  expectations  on h i s p e r c e p t i o n  of the external world.  To  i l l u s t r a t e , a man spending t h e n i g h t i n a house which  accord-  i n g t o rumour i s i n h a b i t e d by g h o s t s , might e a s i l y e x p e r i e n c e an i l l u s i o n o f what he i s a n t i c i p a t i n g . e x h i b i t t h e same p r o c e s s ,  excepting  Hallucinations  that the "representation"  p l a y s an even g r e a t e r r o l e , d o m i n a t i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s completely.  S i m i l a r l y , i n dream s t a t e s and cases o f i n s a n i t y a  man's p e r c e p t u a l  a b i l i t y i s a l s o overcome by memories  (repre-  s e n t a t i o n s ) which t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e s e s i t u a t i o n s cannot a l t e r t o conform t o t h e r e a l n a t u r e o f Following  sensory-objects.  i n the t r a d i t i o n of the Enlightenment, S u l l y  a c c e p t e d t h a t t r u t h c o u l d be found i n t h e u n i v e r s a l q u a l i t i e s of a l l men's e x p e r i e n c e .  Thus, S u l l y b e l i e v e d t h e r e  existed  a way by which a man c o u l d overcome t h e b l i n d and hazardous judgments which h i s i l l u s i o n s e n t a i l .  He must check h i s  s u b j e c t i v e tendency t o f a l s e and i n a c c u r a t e statements by t r y i n g t o a s c e r t a i n which a r e t h e f e a t u r e s i n any a c t o f c o g n i t i o n t h a t he s h a r e s w i t h t h e m a j o r i t y . must t h e n attempt t o f o r m u l a t e "accurate  S e c o n d l y , he  t h e s e common p e r c e p t i o n s i n  d e f i n i t i o n s " and " u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s " i n order  t o o b t a i n both t h e f r u i t o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l imagination., and a r e a l i s t i c standard  which would a c t t o curb any p o s s i b l e  t h r e a t from a too b i z a r r e s u b j e c t i v i t y . C u l t u r a l e v o l u t i o n was i n a sense i n e v i t a b l e , S u l l y s u r m i s e d , f o r e r r o r and i l l u s i o n have o n l y n e g a t i v e  utility;  t h e y must o f n e c e s s i t y b r i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n t o some form  51  of  c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s environment.  new s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h itself  Because o f t h i s f a c t  which has t h e advantage o f p r e s e n t i n g  a s a b e t t e r p i c t u r e o f r e a l i t y ( a more a c c u r a t e  t i o n ) , w i l l manage t o s u r v i v e t h e p u b l i c ' s i n i t i a l and  will  every  percep-  antagonism  e v e n t u a l l y become a p a r t o f t h e common u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  Whether t h e y have o r i g i n a t e d from s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r y o r i n the  imaginative intuitions  o f g e n i u s , p r i v a t e b e l i e f s must a t  some t i m e c o n f r o n t t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v e n t i o n s o f This c l a s h i n g of view w i l l  either  foundations of the i n d i v i d u a l pragmatic value from t h e i r efficacy,"  society.  demonstrate t h e i l l u s i o n a r y  judgments o r w i l l  "fitness  to external  show  their  conditions  and  practical  and sooner o r l a t e r w i l l  come t o be  the  new s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h e d u c a t e d men c a n t e s t  their  3 own  convictions. By  providing a biological  a man's r a t i o n a l repetition  support  (Spencer's theory  u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h c o n t i n u a l e x e r c i s e and  becomes a h a b i t u a l a s s u m p t i o n t r a n s f e r a b l e t o h i s  d e s c e n d a n t s ) f o r m o r a l development and s o c i a l Sully  forged Darwinism t o U t i l i t a r i a n i s m  dialectical  conflicts  this  objective truth conflict  date s o c i e t y . the  Social  co-operation,  i n a series  of  i n which organisms s t r u g g l e with, t h e i r  environment, reasoned s e l f - i n t e r e s t and  that  opposes p a s s i o n a t e  overcomes s u b j e c t i v e e r r o r .  egotism,  At t i m e s ,  e v e n o c c u r s b e t w e e n c i v i l i z e d man a n d h i s u p - t o Though h i s p o s i t i o n  seems s i m i l a r  t o that of  Darwinists, i treally reflects h i s U t i l i t a r i a n  heritage of radicalism.  F o r l i k e t h e r a d i c a l , he p l a c e s t h e  52  more h i g h l y e v o l v e d "belief-systems" sensativeness  i n d i v i d u a l i n opposition t o the obsolete  of his society.  The g e n i u s w i t h  o f nerve" and a f i n e r p e r c e p t i o n  must be p r e p a r e d t o r e j e c t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l s o c i e t y a n d r e l y on h i s p e r s o n a l  "prenatural  of r e a l i t y  truths of h i s  experience,  rather  than  accept e i t h e r t h e unreasoned assumptions o f t h e "multitude" o r t h e k n o w l e d g e p a s s e d on b y t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l a g e n c i e s o f instruction."^ Still,  he d i d b e l i e v e i t p o s s i b l e t h a t  the interaction  b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d s o c i e t y was t o t h e m u t u a l a d v a n t a g e of a l l .  To a p p r e h e n d r e a l i t y ,  sense-experiences.  i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o compare  T h r o u g h t h e medium o f a common l a n g u a g e  and  by t h e f o r m u l a t i o n  of experience i n l o g i c a l  and  d e f i n i t i o n s , t h e " t r u e r " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e world can  become common k n o w l e d g e . the  forces of passion  One c a n e l i m i n a t e , by  propositions  subjugating  a n d i m p a t i e n c e a n d by d i r e c t i n g a t t e n -  t i o n and v o l i t i o n t o t h e p u r s u i t contamination of the i n t e l l e c t  of t r u t h , the possible  by s o c i e t y ' s u n r e a s o n e d  creeds.  Here t h e r e i s s t i l l a d e s i r e and a w i l l t o b e l i e v e , o n l y t h a t i t i s a w i l l t o b e l i e v e what i s t r u e , t h a t i s t o say, a v o l i t i o n a l p r o c e s s i n i t i a t e d and s u s t a i n e d by a l o g i c a l f e e l i n g o r a r e g a r d f o r t r u t h as such.5 Thus a p e r s o n r e a l i z e s h i s m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t when h e l e a r n s t o h e s i t a t e before responding t o h i s impulses towards immediate g r a t i f i c a t i o n , and i n s t e a d begins t o pursue t h e e n d u r i n g ends o f h e a l t h , r e p u t a t i o n a n d k n o w l e d g e . b e y o n d even t h i s f o r m o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h e r e  Moreover,  i s t h e common  53  good; e v e n t u a l l y t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i l l  f i n d h i s "motive-idea"  i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f s e l f - c o n t r o l f o r t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e community.  T h i s i s p a r t i a l l y a t t a i n e d a s one a c q u i r e s m o t i v e s  a n s w e r i n g t o t h e common i n t e r e s t — t h e and t h e c r e a t i o n o f a r t .  The  "benevolence," the a l t r u i s t i c  f u r t h e r a n c e of knowledge  p r i n c i p l e s o f " d u t y " and concern f o r humanity, represent  t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s s e l f - c o n t r o l and  moral  development. Thus a man r e s t r a i n i n g a p p e t i t e , o r s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h i n t h e f a c e o f s e r i o u s r i s k s , may be s a i d t o be a p p l y i n g t o h i m s e l f t h e r u l e o r maxim B e t e m p e r a t e , ' 'Be truthful.' I n t h i s way, a s m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t advances, we p a s s f r o m mere o b e d i e n c e t o an e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h e i n w a r d v o i c e o f r e a s o n a n d conscience.° T  A c c o r d i n g l y , James S u l l y , w h i l e f o l l o w i n g a v e r y ent l i n e  o f thought t h a n Ward's, r e a c h e d s i m i l a r  F o r b o t h , t h e m o r a l element quintessence of r a t i o n a l i t y . sented the vanguard  differ-  conclusions.  i n consciousness expressed the For both, moral v a l u e s r e p r e -  of e v o l u t i o n a r y development.  And  both  w e r e n o t ashamed t o s a y t h a t t h e i r v a l u e s w e r e t h e v e r y ones s h a r e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f d e c e n t men.  Morality,  harmony, r a t i o n a l i t y , a l l were m e r e l y d i f f e r e n t same e s s e n t i a l v e r i t y ;  social facets of the  i n t e l l i g e n c e worked hand i n hand w i t h  f e e l i n g t o b r i n g t o mankind a knowledge o f t h i s happy  truth.  T h u s , by a c c e p t i n g H e r b e r t S p e n c e r ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f  evolution,  James S u l l y e s c a p e d t h e d i s c o n c e r t i n g r e a l i z a t i o n : t h a t d i c t a t e s o f c o n s c i e n c e c o u l d n o t be e x p l a i n e d a s t h e responses to objective  conditions.  the  rational  54  FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I I J . S u l l y , The Human Mind, London, Longmans Green, 1892, v o l . 1, p. 139. 2 1  J . S u l l y , I l l u s i o n s , London, Kegan P a u l , 1881,  passim.  I b i d . , p. 339^"J. S u l l y , "Genius and I n s a n i t y , " The N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y , v o l . 17 (Jan.-June 1 8 8 5 ) , p. 968. S u l l y r e s e a r c h e d t h e backgrounds o f a number o f " g e n i u s e s " and found t h a t most o f them gave l i t t l e c r e d i t t o t h e i n f l u e n c e o f f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n upon them. v. J . S u l l y , "The E d u c a t i o n o f G e n i u s , " The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 188 (Jan.-March), pp. 558-565. — 3  5  6  J.  S u l l y , The Human Mind, v o l . 2, p. 277.  I b i d . , p. 268.  IV.  G.F.  STOUT  AND  THE  PROBLEM  OF  BELIEF  56  If virtually  a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s were f u l l y  prepared t o  defend t h e e f f i c a c y of consciousness from t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s a t t a c k and t o d e c l a r e t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e ' s independence from physiology,  not a l l f e l t  conventional  t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y t o e q u a t e  morality with rational thinking.  p s y c h o l o g i s t , George F r e d e r i c k opposite wise,  Stout  came t o v e r y much t h e  conclusion: that s u b j e c t i v e d e s i r e s , moral or other-  had t h e tendency t o i n h i b i t ' r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g . L i k e h i s former professor  Stout  I n f a c t , one  a t C a m b r i d g e , James Ward,  was a t t r a c t e d by t h e w r i t i n g s o f R i c h a r d  Despite  the continued  o p p o s i t i o n o f i d e a l i s t s and m a t e r i a l i s t s  t o t h e independent e x i s t e n c e Richard  Avenarius.  o f p s y c h o l o g y , he d i s c o v e r e d  Avenarius had r e d e f i n e d t h e task  a way t h a t  i t had been g i v e n  subscribed  t o Avenarius'  o f psychology i n such  a new l e a s e on l i f e . " ' "  contention  Stout  axiom o f t h e interdependency o f  p s y c h i c a l and p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s and c o n c u r r e d Avenarius'  that  with  that the ultimate t r u t h of t h i s  t i o n was, i n f a c t , i r r e l e v a n t . must a c c e p t t h e v a l i d i t y  A p s y c h o l o g i s t , Stout  proposiagreed,  o f t h i s p r e m i s e , even i f o n l y f o r i t s o  usefulness  i n procuring  Avenarius, a "scientific  objectively verifiable  himself, believed the task  philosophy"  results.  o f what he t e r m e d  was m e r e l y t o g i v e t h e b e s t  descrip-  t i o n o f a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t , and not attempt e i t h e r t o prove o r t o r e f u t e any m e t a p h y s i c a l  assumptions.  To t h i s e n d ,  A v e n a r i u s l i s t e d h i s two "axioms" o f E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m w h i c h  57  he  used t o j u s t i f y h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s : f i r s t ,  every  i n d i v i d u a l n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r a c t s w i t h a complex, p h y s i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t ; and can  be  second, a l l p h i l o s o p h i c  r e d u c e d t o more s i m p l e  and  or s c i e n t i f i c  general  thought  intellectual  functions. Although these are the  root  p r i n c i p l e s of  p s y c h o l o g y — a n d S t o u t ' s — i t s n u c l e u s was the  n e r v o u s s y s t e m was  creature's  vital  at the with  the  Avenarius h e l d t h a t the  same t i m e ,  the  nervous system again  notion  environment  organism.  environment a l s o f u r n i s h e s the  a substance to r e p l e n i s h i t s reserves  that  the  e n e r g y , s o m e t h i n g a k i n t o t h e modern  e x p e n d i t u r e o f e n e r g y by t h e  r e s u l t that the  conception  a mechanism w h i c h r e g u l a t e d  of a homeostatic device. occasions  the  Avenarius'  However, organism  of energy w i t h  the  r e a c h e s a b a l a n c e between  3  its  e n e r g y i n c o m e and  expenditure.  But,  in truth, a  of r e a l e q u i l i b r i u m i s never a t t a i n e d because the is altering  continuously  tion—Avenarius'  and  therefore  "vital difference."  environment  imbalancing The  state  the  organism  consequently  becomes a c t i v e t r y i n g t o r e s t o r e i t s e q u i l i b r i u m ; t h i s h a v i o r he  termed the  b e l i e v e d t h a t he  had  "vital finally  c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a p o s t u l a t e he  r e a s o n e d , s i n c e no  denied the describe  existence  psychologic  so a m b i g u o u s . in this  Stout  respect.  series."  I n t h i s way,  done away w i t h t h e for. the  equa-  be-  Avenarius  usefulness  psychologistBesides,  s u b s t a n t i a l proof e i t h e r confirmed o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s one  ought t o l e a r n  events without r e s o r t i n g to was  not  of  w i l l i n g t o go  or to  something  as f a r a s  Avenarius  58  On t h e w h o l e h i g h l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o A v e n a r i u s ' Stout  a g r e e d t h a t a t i m e h a d come f o r p s y c h o l o g y t o d i s p e n s e  with metaphysical had  arguments,  preconceptions.  been c o r r e c t t o i n f e r t h a t  In his estimation  judgments and b e l i e f s  u l t i m a t e l y a b i o l o g i c a l , hence s u b j e c t i v e , o r i g i n . individual,  Avenarius have An  i t seemed, s e e k s t o a t t a i n some g o a l w h i c h  will  e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e  of pleasure  of p a i n ; t h e d e s i r e t o g a i n t h i s  end n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s i n  his  belief  i n the reality  arose from desire's  of that  This  course o f events  c a p a c i t y t o r e i n f o r c e a man's c o n v i c t i o n  about a p r e v i o u s l y u n c e r t a i n firmly held belief.  end.  and d i m i n u t i o n  Desire  o p i n i o n , t h u s m a k i n g i t now a had t h e e f f e c t o f d i r e c t i n g  a t t e n t i o n away f r o m a l l c o n t r a r y  evidence.  I n extreme  cases  t h i s r e s u l t e d i n an i m p u l s i v e , u n d i s c e r n i n g  passion,  Stout's  Furthermore, i n  phrase: "overwhelming c o n a t a t i o n . "  or i n  a d d i t i o n t o m o n o p o l i z i n g one's a t t e n t i o n , d e s i r e h e l p e d an opinion resist a man, S t o u t  c o n d i t i o n s which might negate i t .  thought, w i l l  of a questionable  find  i t difficult  prejudice, since t o acquire  Specifically,  t o r i d himself a fresh  belief  w o u l d mean t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h o s e h o p e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s initial  b e l i e f , and t h i s would f r u s t r a t e h i s d e s i r e and pro-  duce an i m b a l a n c e o f p a i n o v e r p l e a s u r e . w e r e a l s o t o some e x t e n t activity—the This l e d Stout converts is  A man's  convictions  dependent upon t h e v i g o u r and  p o t e n t i a l "conative  strength"—of  h i s mind.  t o conclude t h a t t h e t r u e b e l i e v e r s and  w e r e t o be f o u n d among t h e r i s i n g  generation:  likely "Youth  s a n g u i n e ; a g e i s s c e p t i c a l a n d h e s i t a t e s t o a d o p t new  views."  59  In  essence, however, b e l i e f i s a s i m p l e matter o f  neural economics—the b e l i e v e s what w i l l  utility  o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n .  A man  a l l o w h i m t o i n c r e a s e h i s p l e a s u r e and  minimize h i s pain.  He b e l i e v e s what he r a t i o n a l l y ,  or f o r  t h a t m a t t e r i r r a t i o n a l l y , p r e s u m e s t o be h i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t — one m i g h t  a l m o s t s a y h i s f£ii:clficc.cad!cul,us /' I n t h i s H  respect,  ?  " c o u n t e r e x p e r i e n c e s " t e n d t o oppose t h e i n e r t i a o f o b s o l e t e beliefs,  s i n c e " c o u n t e r e x p e r i e n c e s " c a n f o r c e a man t o r e v i s e  his  e x i s t i n g b e l i e f s i n o r d e r t h a t he m i g h t  his  u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e r e b y f i n d a more e f f i c i e n t way o f  fulfilling in  hisrational self-interest.  i n c l u d e them i n  The o t h e r c h i e f  factor,  S t o u t ' s v i e w , l i m i t i n g t h e v a r i e t y and content o f b e l i e f ,  i s the p r e c i s e nature o f the environment, f o r the.environment imposed t h e i n e v i t a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s upon a p e r s o n ' s  activity  and t h u s , , i n e f f e c t , d e t e r m i n e s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e o f a n y belief. What h a d S t o u t a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h h i s . a d o p t i o n o f Avenarius' "bio-psychology"? it  In the f i r s t  p l a c e , Stout used  t o c u t t h r o u g h t h e g o r d i a n k n o t c a u s e d by t h e a p p a r e n t  d u a l i s m between mind and body. Stout t o demonstrate  T h o u g h , i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r  e x a c t l y how c o n s c i o u s n e s s was r e l a t e d t o  p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s , he a g r e e d w i t h A v e n a r i u s t h a t must assume i n a n y e v e n t t h a t  just  t h o u g h t and a c t i o n t o o k p l a c e . ^  psychology  such a r e l a t i o n s h i p  Unless t h i s assumption  between was  made, a g a i n s t a l l o b j e c t i o n s f r o m p h i l o s o p h y a n d p h y s i o l o g y , the  f u r t h e r development o f a n a t u r a l i s t i c  psychology  would,  60  S t o u t b e l i e v e d , be a l m o s t  completely thwarted.  Of i m m e d i a t e  importance t o Stout f o r i t s u s e f u l n e s s i n v i n d i c a t i n g the right  o f p s y c h o l o g y t o be i n d e p e n d e n t  from metaphysics  physiology, the viewpoint of Avenarius a l s o suggested important r e v i s i o n of the Darwinian hypothesis.  and an  No l o n g e r  was i t n e c e s s a r y t o l i n k a n i m a l b e h a v i o r t o a p r i m i t i v e s e n s a t i o n a l i s m , whereby every a c t i o n , l i k e a r e f l e x , a u t o m a t i c a l l y without the i n t e r v e n t i o n of thought.  proceeded Avenarius  e x p l a i n e d away t h e a b s u r d i t i e s o f H u x l e y ' s d o c t r i n e , a n d a t t h e same t i m e showed how a n a n i m a l ' s a d j u s t m e n t environment  to i t s  was b o t h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d b i o l o g i c a l  An a n i m a l o r man  event.  experiences a form o f t e n s i o n (pain) which  i s the subjective expression of a p h y s i o l o g i c a l fact (the e x p e n d i t u r e o f e n e r g y ) t h e a n i m a l t h e n makes t h e a p p r o p r i a t e adjustment, generally the r e p e t i t i o n of a successful  past  response. I t w o u l d , h o w e v e r , be a m i s t a k e t o assume t h a t  this  r e v i s i o n o f D a r w i n i s m met w i t h a w h o l l y f a v o u r a b l e r e a c t i o n . There were i t appears  some l e s s t h a n p l e a s a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s  t o t h e new o u t l o o k o f t h e E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s t s . e x p l a n a t i o n a l l thought  s e r v e d t h e purpose  organism t o conserve energy.  In Avenarius'  of helping the  Hence i t w o u l d seem a man h a d  no c o n c e r n w i t h r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g a s a n end i n i t s e l f , b u t o n l y w i t h d e v e l o p i n g an i d e a l e a d i n g t o a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d remove a s t a t e o f t e n s i o n .  From t h i s , S t o u t drew  t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e o r i g i n o f a man's b e l i e f s l a y w i t h  61  his  desires.  and  then  Almost as w i t h a s l e i g h t  of hand, Stout b l u r r e d  o b l i t e r a t e d t h e timeworn d i s t i n c t i o n  between  " r a t i o n a l , " " o b j e c t i v e " judgments and i m p e r a t i v e , " s u b j e c t i v e " beliefs. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , James Ward i g n o r e d t h e l o g i c o f Avenarius'  bio-mechanical  p r i n c i p l e , and o d d l y enough,  found  in  i t a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s own m o r a l i n t u i t i o n .  Ward  thought  it  f u t i l e t o hope t h a t s c i e n c e c o u l d e v e r a p p l y i t s m e t h o d s  s a t i s f a c t o r i t y t o human c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  He b e l i e v e d t h a t i t  was  without recognizing  impossible t o discuss consciousness  t h e a l l - i m p o r t a n t p a r t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s p l a y e d i n a man's s u b j e c t i v e concerns,  a n d h e r e Ward was p r e p a r e d  t o see t h e  i n f l u e n c e o f a Supreme B e i n g , t h o u g h I t was n o t e x a c t l y t h e same God o f t h e o r t h o d o x t h a t he was o n l y b e i n g  theologians.  A c c o r d i n g l y , he f e l t  c o n s i s t e n t t o suggest  that  Science  p u b l i c l y a c k n o w l e d g e i t s d e f e a t a n d t h e r e a f t e r bow b e f o r e t h e t r u t h o f t h i s g r e a t m y s t e r y w h i c h wedded t h e s u b j e c t i v e mind t o t h e u n i v e r s e ' s immutable moral Yet, i f both  laws.  S t o u t a n d Ward a p p e a l e d  t o t h e axioms o f  E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m t o v i n d i c a t e t h e independent e x i s t e n c e o f psychology,  t h e i n f e r e n c e s t h e y drew w e r e c o m p l e t e l y  a t odds.  S u b j e c t i v i t y was n o t f o r S t o u t t h e c o m f o r t i n g p a t h t o i n t i m a t i o n o f t r u t h , but a p e r s i s t e n t t h r e a t t o r a t i o n a l thought. Stout is  I n other words, i f a person's  claimed, determined  b e l i e f s a r e , as  i n v a r i a b l y by h i s s u b j e c t i v e d e s i r e s ,  i t then p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n anything which could  mately  be d e s c r i b e d a s o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ?  Stout's  legiti-  apparent  62  w i l l i n g n e s s t o accept the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Avenarius' ment o f t h e D a r w i n i a n o u t l o o k  restate-  and t o a c q u i e s c e i n t h e d i v o r c e  o f what he c o n c e i v e d o f a s r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t f r o m a n y o f an a b s o l u t e this point.  warrants f u r t h e r treatment at  I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember t h a t w h i l e  psychological and  moral standard  opinions  notion  l e d him t o conclude that  Stout's  subjectivity  r a t i o n a l i t y w e r e a l m o s t a l w a y s i n o p p o s i t i o n , most  psychologists  still  found i t d i s c o n c e r t i n g t o t h i n k  other  that  t h e i r f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s o f a l i f e t i m e m i g h t be no more t h a n a pleasure-giving How Stout  illusion.  i s i t p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n what i s t h e r e a l  believed that  i t was p o s s i b l e t o make a l e g i t i m a t e  d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a l i t y the  world?  a n d mere a p p e a r a n c e , a t l e a s t i n  case of e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , though t h i s  i s difficult.  . . . when we a r e i n e r r o r what i s u n r e a l a p p e a r s t o be p r e s e n t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h e same manner a s what i s r e a l i s p r e s e n t e d when we t r u l y know. While the erroneous b e l i e f i s a c t u a l l y h e l d , the i l l u s o r y o b j e c t seems i n no way t o d i f f e r f o r t h e c o n s c i o u s subject from a r e a l object.' Consequently, before  an i n d i v i d u a l can d i s t i n g u i s h  a p p e a r a n c e f r o m r e a l i t y he must f i r s t will  l e a r n t o suspend h i s  t o b e l i e v e , and t h u s a l l o w t h e q u a l i t i e s o f t h e r e l e v a n t  object an  mere  t o manifest themselves f r e e l y .  object  as a " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " ;  One must t r y t o know  such i s t h e case i n e x p e r i -  m e n t a l s c i e n c e where t h e chemist a c h i e v e s h i s r e s u l t s independently of h i s v o l i t i o n . a c t i v e s o t h a t he w i l l  The c h e m i s t f i r s t  be p a s s i v e .  becomes  I n more p r e c i s e  language,  63  the  chemist  applies  d e s c r i b e him independent  a test  as b e i n g a c t i v e . nature  of h i s t e s t ;  has  become p a s s i v e .  consists  felt  justified  a p p e a r a n c e was  error  of b e l i e f .  Stout indefinately available,  decide i t s t r u t h affirm  r e j e c t e d t h e two suspending  until  the  effect,  interminably.  d e p e n d e n t upon t h e t r u t h  an  context, he  a true "error." o f an  An  actual  illusion.  On t h e  other  t o make t h e  t o some  pre-determined  i s t o be  or f a l s i t y  meaningful,  independently  of  either  more i n f o r m a t i o n was on t h e  probable  t o the o b j e c t .  Stout b e l i e v e d ,  knowledge a v a i l a b l e ,  activity  as t o f o r c e  between what  relying  i m p o s s i b l e ; t h e r e f o r e a man  vacillating  beliefs,  chemist's  usual solutions  belief  chemist  o r deny i t .  of the p r o p o s i t i o n r e l a t i n g  limited  is  optical  o r as an a l t e r n a t i v e ,  s o l u t i o n had  and  the  In t h i s  Hence i f a s t a t e m e n t  of h i s d e s i r e t o e i t h e r  activity  the  i n distinguishing  o f an o b j e c t c o n f o r m  i n d i v i d u a l must  truth  sense  o c c u r r e d when a p e r s o n t r i e d  characteristics  an  Essentially,  example, an  can  p e r m i t t i n g the  simply a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  presentation—for  system  therefore i n a real  "appearance"  one  i n question t o decide the  object being studied.  d e s c r i b e d as a f a l s e  h a n d , an  i s thus  o f s h a p i n g a q u e s t i o n i n s u c h a way  answer f r o m t h e Stout  He  of the substance  results now  to a substance—here  o f making  Furthermore, or f a l s e n e s s  first  any  must presume on  o t h e r w i s e he must  f o r i n s t a n c e whether or not  The  the  continue  probability of c e r t a i n  a p e r s o n has  itself other  been  correct  64  i n h i s judgment about t h e m e r i t s o f t h e competing t i o n s , thus the p o s s i b i l i t y  of error again  interpreta-  emerges.  Our r e s u l t , t h e n , i s : (1) T h a t a b s o l u t e s u s p e n s e o f judgment e x c l u d i n g even t h e judgment o f p r o b a b i l i t y i s e q u i v a l e n t t o suspense o f a c t i o n . (2) T h a t t h e r e l a t i v e suspense o f judgment w h i c h c o n s i s t s i n a f f i r m i n g even chances does n o t s u f f i c e t o d e t e r m i n e a c t i o n u n l e s s i t i s s u p p l e m e n t e d by o t h e r b e l i e f s i n w h i c h one a l t e r n a t i v e i s p r e f e r r e d t o o t h e r s . Hence i t appears that p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n i n v o l v e s t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n , a n d t h a t we must c o n s t a n t l y r i s k e r r o r by p r e s u m i n g on p a r t i a l k n o w l e d g e , i f we a r e t o l i v e a t all. 9 Still,  t h i s apparent  i m p a s s e c a n be a v o i d e d ,  Stout  e x p l a i n e d , r e t u r n i n g t o h i s c e n t r a l t h e m e , by a s k i n g t h e kinds of questions which a l l o w the object t o r e v e a l gratuitously.  In particular,  itself  S t o u t was a t t a c k i n g t h e argument  o f t h e I d e a l i s t , F.H. B r a d l e y , who s u g g e s t e d  that  every  p r o p o s i t i o n must be c o n d i t i o n e d ; t h e r e c a n n o t be a n y t h i n g o a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l s o a t o t a l knowledge o f the u n i v e r s e , the c o n d i t i o n s l i m i t i n g thep r o p o s i t i o n . Consequently, the t r u t h to  Bradley argued, t h i s inescapable ignorance  o f any p r o p o s i t i o n h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e .  Stout  makes begged  differ: The t r u t h o f j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g what i s r e a l i s n o t l o g i c a l l y dependent upon t h e t r u t h o f judgments concerning 'Reality' with a c a p i t a l R.lo What i m p r e s s e s  pragmatic  temper.  one a b o u t S t o u t ' s o u t l o o k i s i t s s t r o n g  A b s e n t i s t h e s e a r c h f o r some a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t r u t h which claimed t o express f o r i n Stout's understanding like  a m o r a l commandment.  t h e moral laws o f t h e u n i v e r s e ,  truth  c a n n o t be s e e n a s a n y t h i n g  Truth i s r e l a t i v e , a p a r t l y  subjective realize  assumption, an i n t e l l e c t u a l t o o l  h i s ends.  And man  concern i s gaining that  i s a problem-solver  pleasure  while  avoiding  h i s v i e w s were e s s e n t i a l l y t h o s e  Pragmatist,  u s e d by a man t o  F.C.S. S c h i l l e r ,  whose  pain.  expressed  ultimate  Stout  held  by t h e E n g l i s h  at least the,  . . . view t h a t a l l adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e s t h e s u c c e s s f u l use o f p r o p o s i t i o n s as p o s t u l a t e s f o r t h e guidance o f our a c t i v i t y . T r u t h must t h e r e f o r e be, i n some s e n s e , r e l a t i v e t o o u r e m o t i o n s , d e s i r e s , p u r p o s e s etc. 1 1  This  concern with  m e n t s , what t h e l o g i c a l "deductive  testing,"  t h e p r a c t i c a l ways positivist,  i s an a s p e c t  of v e r i f y i n g  K a r l Popper has  of Stout's  state  called  thinking that  12 gives  i t a p e c u l i a r l y modern f l a v o u r .  empirical spring  outlook,  of mystic  accurate  subjectivity,  r a t h e r than being  t r u t h , i s the constant  also recognized  s u b j e c t i v e needs c o u l d h i s world.  h e l d view that  this  S u l l y , however, had s h a r e d  e v o l u t i o n must  To S u l l y ,  conventions absolute the  proceed  i t was  a man's  e f f o r t s t o under t h e •commonly  i n s u c h a way  as t o  certain infallible  inconceivable that  the e t h i c a l  of h i s s o c i e t y d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t  standard  s e t by a p r o v i d e n t  Nature.  those  offered convincing  moral conventions,  that  o b e y e d by t h e L a t e  w h i c h were c o n s p i c u o u s l y  13 immature t r i b a l  proof  societies.  an  Furthermore,  a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , Edward B. T y l o r , whose work S u l l y  f a m i l i a r with,  man,  of error i n  f a c t , that  obstruct h i s conscious  demonstrate a u t o m a t i c a l l y , unavoidably, truths.  source  a well-  observation.  James S u l l y  stand  I n t h e modern  was  i t was p r e c i s e l y Victorian gentle-  l a c k i n g i n those  evolutionary,  66  S t o u t , on t h e o t h e r hand, w o u l d  h a r d l y have  suggested  t h a t t h e d i c t a t e s o f c o n s c i e n c e and t h e p o l i t e r u l e s o f s o c i e t y were n e c e s s a r i l y t h e end p r o d u c t s o f e v o l u t i o n and d e s e r v e d a man's e x p l i c i t  observance  l e s t he become a n  unhappy p r e y t o dangerous i l l u s i o n s . mental process served as a f l e x i b l e  I n h i s view response  every  t o the ever-  c h a n g i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a man a n d h i s s u r r o u n d i n g s . As t h e p h y s i c a l n e e d s o f a n o r g a n i s m  c h a n g e s o must i t s  conceptions, excepting only that t h e mental  energy  required  t o r e p e a t a p r e v i o u s o p e r a t i o n i s l e s s t h a n t h a t needed t o initiate  a new a c t i o n .  S t o u t ' s p s y c h o l o g y was a l m o s t t h e  only m o r a l l y n e u t r a l treatment i n Late V i c t o r i a n England of the Darwinian outlook i n psychology.  As a r e s u l t ,  Stout's  w o r k s o u g h t t o p r e s e n t no c a s e f o r a n y s e t o f m o r a l transcendental or otherwise. who h o p e d t h a t s c i e n c e w o u l d absolute truth  Unlike other Late conscientiously  ( n a t u r a l law) which would  judgments,  Victorians  determine  set the standard of  r a t i o n a l conduct  f o r men, S t o u t r e c o g n i z e d t h e f u t i l i t y o f  this  W h i l e he was v i t a l l y  endeavour.  other i n t e l l e c t u a l s intellectual  concerned, l i k e  s o many  i n t h i s p e r i o d , w i t h t r y i n g t o grasp the  implications of a morally r e l a t i v i s t i c universe,  S t o u t a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t any t r a c e o f f e a r l i f e w h e r e man n e e d a c k n o w l e d g e no t r u e m a s t e r self-interest.  i n a world  e x c e p t h i s own  Despite the e f f o r t s of psychologists l i k e  James Ward a n d James S u l l y , S t o u t a r g u e d t h a t a c e r t a i n o f r e l a t i v i s m must i n e v i t a b l y p e r v a d e  degree  t h e whole domain o f  67  thought  a n d b e l i e v e d t h a t e t h i c s c o u l d n e v e r hope t o e x p r e s s  a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d a n a b s o l u t e Stout's conception t h a t a l l thought  standard.  served as a b r i d g e be-  tween o b j e c t i v e s t i m u l i and s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g and u n i t e d a man's p h y s i o l o g i c a l n e e d s t o t h e s e n s o r y  qualities of objects  around him had d i s t u r b i n g  For while the  implications.  V i c t o r i a n a g n o s t i c may h a v e w i l l i n g l y  or unwillingly  renounced  many o f h i s p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s , he h a d n o t b a r g a i n e d contending  with a l i f e  devoid of a l l a u t h o r i t y .  on  Y e t t h i s was  p r e c i s e l y w h e r e S t o u t ' s a r g u m e n t seemed t o be l e a d i n g . including  By  s u b j e c t i v i t y as a n a t u r a l though o b t r u s i v e element  i n a l l t h i n k i n g , Stout had, perhaps u n w i t t i n g l y , helped t o h e r a l d t h e death  o f p o s i t i v i s m a n d a new age o f u n c e r t a i n t y .  H. S t u a r t Hughes h a s d e s c r i b e d t h e d i l e m m a f a c i n g c o n t i n e n t a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s a t t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y as a s t r u g g l e t o r e t a i n something o f t h e Enlightenment's  belief  i n r a t i o n a l man, w h i l e c o m i n g t o t e r m s w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e o f the i r r a t i o n a l i t y l i e v e s , almost  o f human c o n d u c t .  obsessed  They w e r e , Hughes b e -  by t h i s p r o b l e m o f t h e n o n l o g i c a l ,  i r r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t s i n human b e h a v i o r , y e t f e a r f u l o f abandoning themselves mysticism. ^ 1  their faith  t o t h e e r r o r s o f e m o t i o n a l i s m and  Simultaneously, while attempting t o r e a f f i r m i n t h e a n a l y t i c a l p o w e r s o f man t o u n d e r s t a n d  h i m s e l f and h i s s o c i e t y , t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f t h e n i n e t i e s were in  conscious r e v o l t a g a i n s t t h e crude  psychology  n a t u r a l i s m and s h a l l o w  o f s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m and p o s i t i v i s m .  1  68  A man  of h i s generation,  general trend Continental Ward. that It  (which  outlook  I t was  Stout  participated  a c c o r d i n g t o Hughes d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e at t h i s  t i m e ) , but  not, t h e r e f o r e , the  then,  rejection  so d i d James of m a t e r i a l i s m  made S t o u t ' s work a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n E n g l i s h  was,  science  instead, his implicit ought t o  in this  confirm the  thought.  r e p u d i a t i o n of the n o t i o n t h a t rational  validity  either  c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y or the m o r a l i t y expressed  of  i n a more  15 r e f i n e d metaphyical T h e r e was, that  reflects  creed.  however, one  of Stout's  comprehension  confidence  with  are u n b l e s t , t h a t i s t o say,  c o n v i c t i o n o f man's i n n a t e g o o d n e s s .  John Maynard Keynes, l o o k e d shared,  aspect  t h a t happy i f u n w a r r a n t e d  most modern i n t e l l e c t u a l s reassuring  '  back n o s t a l g i c a l l y  p e r h a p s n a i v e l y , by h i s and  which the  The  economist,  to the  optimism  Stout's generation.  We  were, Keynes w r i t e s , . . . a m o n g s t t t h e f i r s t t o e s c a p e f r o m Benthamism. But o f a n o t h e r e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y h e r e s y we were t h e u n r e p e n t a n t h e i r s and l a s t u p h o l d e r s . We were among t h e l a s t o f t h e U t o p i a n s , o r m e l i o r i s t s as t h e y a r e sometimes c a l l e d , who b e l i e v e i n c o n t i n u i n g m o r a l p r o g r e s s by v i r t u e o f w h i c h t h e human r a c e a l r e a d y c o n s i s t s of r e l i a b l e , r a t i o n a l , decent people, i n f l u e n c e d by t r u t h and o b j e c t i v e s t a n d a r d s , who can be s a f e l y r e l e a s e d f r o m o u t w a r d r e s t r a i n t s o f c o n v e n t i o n and t r a d i t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s and i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s o f c o n d u c t , and l e f t , f r o m now onwards, t o t h e i r own s e n s i b l e d e v i c e s , p u r e m o t i v e s and r e l i a b l e i n t u i t i o n s o f t h e good.l {  >  69  FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV  2  v. Appendix B.  W. D r a b o v i t i c h , L a b i o - p s y c h o l o g i e de R. A v e n a r i u s et l e problem de '1'homme t o t a l ' , " Revue P h i l o s o p h i q u e , v o l . 115, 1933, P. 409. • • n  3  I b i d . , p. 414. 4  v . Appendix C.  I b i d . , p. 416.  5  G.F. S t o u t , A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , London, Swann  1909,. v o l . 2, p. 255.  Sonneschein,  By v i e w i n g c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a form o f s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , S t o u t thought t h a t he c o u l d g i v e a t e n t a t i v e account o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between mind and body. Conscious s t a t e s a r e d i r e c t l y a f f i l i a t e d w i t h b r a i n p r o c e s s e s ; c o n s c i o u s n e s s has the a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e the b r a i n ' s p h y s i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n g i n o r d e r t o s u s t a i n t h e f l o w o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s needed t o d i r e c t a c t i v i t y toward t h e achievement o f t h e d e s i r e d g o a l . The f a c t that the a v a i l a b l e p h y s i o l o g i c a l data i n d i c a t e s that the b r a i n i s capable o f r e g u l a t i n g i t s own b l o o d s u p p l y appeared t o Stout a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s t h e o r y . I t seemed t h a t t h e whole o f mental l i f e a c t u a l l y c o n s i s t s of a p e r p e t u a l c y c l e i n v o l v i n g f i r s t a m e n t a l change, next t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f nerve i m p u l s e s , t h e n a muscle r e s p o n s e , and f i n a l l y another mental change, t h e l a s t i n t h i s s e r i e s o f events but t h e f i r s t i n a b e g i n n i n g series. S t o u t suggested t h a t t h e " r e v i v a l " o f i d e a s t h r o u g h a s s o c i a t i o n g i v e s s t r o n g support t o h i s b e l i e f t h a t c o n s c i o u s ness s t r i v e s f o r i t s own r e a l i z a t i o n . The r e - e x c i t a t i o n o f p r e v i o u s l y l i n k e d memory t r a c e s , themselves t h e r e s u l t o f t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f b r a i n substance by an e a r l i e r p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s , b r i n g s many more p r i o r but r e l a t e d i m p r e s s i o n s t o bear upon t h e s u b j e c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Indeed, because o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e a t t e n t i o n p r o c e s s a t r a i n o f i d e a s may be s a i d t o propagate i t s e l f as a flame spreads among c o m b u s t i b l e m a t e r i a l . Here c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g , s i n c e i t has i n i t i a t e d t h e changes which o c c a s i o n s t h e r e v i v a l o f memories; f u r t h e r m o r e , i t i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s which caused t h e m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e b r a i n substance i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o note t h a t f o r a l l h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m and h i s f o r e w a r n i n g a g a i n s t a t t r i b u t i n g a m a t e r i a l o r i g i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , Stout c l a i m e d t o accept t h e d u a l i s m i n h e r e n t i n t h e t h e o r y o n l y on t h e grounds o f i t s u t i l i t y ; p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m i s a n e c e s s i t y imposed by t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f man's knowledge. I n t r u t h , however, Stout d i s s e n t e d from t h e m o n i s t i c o u t l o o k o f  70  b o t h I d e a l i s m and M a t e r i a l i s m . T h e r e a r e , i t seemed, two s e p a r a t e but i n t e r d e p e n d e n t e n t i t e s , m a t t e r and m i n d , f o r , . . . t h e s t r e a m o f i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s no s u c h s e l f contained u n i t . I t i s the merest fragment of a u n i v e r s a l r e a l i t y , as i t s c o r r e l a t e d b r a i n - p r o c e s s i s t h e m e r e s t f r a g ment o f t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d . A l l change w i t h i n i t i s d e t e r m i n e d by f a c t o r s e x t r a n e o u s t o i t . At t h e same t i m e , i t i s e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t no change w i t h i n i s e n t i r e l y d e t e r m i n e d f r o m w i t h o u t . " S t o u t , A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , v o l . 1, p. 156. n  7 'G.F. S t o u t , " E r r o r , " S t u d i e s i n P h i l o s o p h y and Psychology, L o n d o n , M a c M i l l a n , 1930, p. 262 ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1902).  1 0  g  I b i d . , p.  269.  9  Ibid.,  p.  286.  Ibid.,  p.  301.  G . F . S t o u t , " C r i t i c a l N o t i c e s : F.C.S. S c h i l l e r , i n Humanism," M i n d , N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 583.  Studies  1:L  12 K. P o p p e r , The L o g i c o f S c i e n t i f i c D i s c o v e r y , New Y o r k , H a r p e r and Row, 1965, p. 3 3 • 13 ^E.B. T y l o r , P r i m i t i v e C u l t u r e , L o n d o n , J o h n M u r r a y , 1903, 2 v o l s , ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1871). "^H. Vintage,  S t u a r t Hughes, C o n s c i o u s n e s s 1958, p. 35.  and  S o c i e t y , New  York,  15 It i s d i f f i c u l t t o estimate the reasons f o r Stout's unusual l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n moral i s s u e s . P r o b a b l y , h i s want o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s u p b r i n g i n g and h e n c e h i s e s c a p e f r o m t h e e m o t i o n a l d o l d r u m s o f a r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s made i t e a s i e r f o r him t o t r u s t h i s n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n s w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o a p h i l o s o p h i c d o c t r i n e t o j u s t i f y them. "*"^J.M. K e y n e s , Two  p.  98.  Memoirs, London, H a r t - D a v i s ,  1949,  V.  CONCLUSION  72  For gathering  some f o r t y y e a r s ,  o f s c i e n t i s t s a t B e l f a s t up  G r e a t War,  British  p s y c h o l o g y had  s e l f t o defending the organizing  and  r e s u l t , one marked t h e evident t o be  say  t r a d i t i o n from Locke t o the beneath the  energetic  longer  I t was  consider  the  clearly  the  mind  feelings.  U t i l i t a r i a n s had  Hearnshaw, i s c o r r e c t i n h i s  finally  determined English  appreciation  unsympathetically  to the  i s nevertheless  later  mistaken After  1  consistent been t h e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s was level-headed  theme i n E n g l i s h p s y c h o l o g y f o r f o r t y e f f o r t t o r e f u t e any  suggestion  that  w i t h o u t i n f l u e n c e upon h i s b e h a v i o r . George F r e d e r i c k  Stout  "transcendentalists," t h i s antipathy  notion that  p s y c h o l o g y had  no  n e s s t o be a l e g i t i m a t e f i e l d  man's And  shared, every b i t  much as t h e  w h e t h e r i t was  a  sensations  Thus, i f the h i s t o r i a n of  B e h a v i o r i s t s , he  As  b l a m e s t h e m y s t i c a l e l e m e n t i n Ward's thought." "  y e a r s had  the  in  in effect,  onslaught of the  English psychology reacted  programme o f t h e  all,  consciousness played  no  the  committed i t -  c o m b i n e d t o f o r m c o m p l e x t h o u g h t s and  p s y c h o l o g y , L.S.  when he  forthrightly  more t h a n a p l a c e w h e r e s i m p l e  opponents of automatism.  that  years before  t h a t H u x l e y ' s paper had,  t h a t p s y c h o l o g y c o u l d now  long  the  i n t e r p r e t i n g man's p h y s i c a l s e n s a t i o n s .  can  nothing  expired  a c t i v e part  to the  demise of c l a s s i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n i s m .  mechanically The  from Huxley's address t o  to  as  the  business considering  conscious-  of s c i e n t i f i c  Any  study.  h e l d by A s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , A u t o m a t i s t s  B e h a v i o r i s t s , t h a t t h e m i n d d i d no more t h a n r e c o r d  view,  or external  73  sensation, without positive, of  vital  any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t  share  i n determining the q u a l i t a t i v e  e x p e r i e n c e , was d i s t i n c t l y  psychologists.  R e s u l t s from  s t r e n g t h e n e d t h i s view  experiments  involving  e v e n f u r t h e r when t h e y  elements  nature  out o f f a v o u r w i t h almost a l l  the  subjective  far  g r e a t e r magnitude over a person's  most r i g o r o u s d e f e n d e r  c o n s c i o u s n e s s had a  indicated  w i t h i n t h e mind e x e r c i s e d conduct  of t h e independence  hypnosis that  a power o f  than  even t h e  of consciousness 2  from  s e n s a t i o n w o u l d h a v e once e v e r Furthermore,  of  the subjective  undertaking  psychology,  by r e c o g n i z i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e  component  i n apprehension,  found  a re-definition  o f t h e Darwinian  account  r e l a t i o n s h i p with h i s surroundings. adequate  to talk  now t h o u g h t response  o f adjustment  itself  was one d i f f i c u l t y a legitimate  solely  most  of active  c h a r a c t e r o f t h e environment.  with t h i s  line  of reasoning.  There  Obstensibly,  from t h i s  proposition  o f t h e demands o f h i s c o n s c i e n c e were  irrational,  a s i t was c l e a r l y  them on t h e u s u a l g r o u n d s t h a t actions t o environmental obvious b i o l o g i c a l  o f man's  i n p h y s i c a l terms, f o r  d e d u c t i o n f o r a man t o i n f e r  w o u l d be t h a t  itself  No l o n g e r d i d i t a p p e a r  began t o be s e e n a s a k i n d  t o the changing  inherently  supposed.  impossible t o j u s t i f y  t h e y were t h e n e c e s s a r y r e -  conditions.  needs, morals  Unless, they  served  and e t h i c a l v a l u e s h a d ,  i t  seemed, no c l a i m t o be c o n s i d e r e d p r o d u c t s o f r a t i o n a l induction. L.S.  Hearnshaw h a s b r i e f l y  d e s c r i b e d the course  taken  74 by B r i t i s h p s y c h o l o g y under the i n f l u e n c e of  Continental  Idealism: . . . B r i t i s h p s y c h o l o g y had been f o r t o o l o n g c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d with a p a r t i c u l a r philosophic t r a d i t i o n , a n t i - r e l i g i o u s i n g e n e r a l t o n e , and t h i s t r a d i t i o n was about t o s u f f e r an e c l i p s e . No s c i e n c e i s so s e l f s u f f i c i e n t as t o be w h o l l y immune t o changes i n philosophic climate. Nineteenth-century psychology, b a r e l y emerged from i n f a n c y , was e q u a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o them. When i n t h e t h i r d q u a r t e r of t h e n i n e t e e n t h century B r i t i s h philosophers, renouncing t h e i r n a t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c t r a d i t i o n , f l o c k e d t o the i d e a l i s t i c banner, t h e development of p s y c h o l o g y was n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t e d . I n German and American u n i v e r s i t i e s a r a p i d growth of p s y c h o l o g i c a l departments took p l a c e i n the l a s t two decades of the c e n t u r y . British u n i v e r s i t i e s a n t a g o n i s t i c a l l y h e l d a l o o f , and f o r at l e a s t two g e n e r a t i o n s the academic development of p s y c h o l o g y was r e t a r d e d , u n t i l a n o t h e r change of p h i l o s o p h i c c l i m a t e and a second w o r l d war p r o v i d e d more f a v o u r a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 3 W h i l e Hearnshaw's argument has a c o n v i n c i n g  r i n g to i t ,  i t i s a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n t h a t cannot s t a n d w i t h o u t the of s e v e r a l i m p o r t a n t q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  addition  I t i s t r u e , of c o u r s e ,  t h a t many L a t e V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s , James Ward, f o r example, f o u n d ' t o t h e i r d e l i g h t t h a t C o n t i n e n t a l  philosophy  c o u l d o f f e r a m o r a l "frame of r e f e r e n c e , " t h a t seemed t o withstand  c r i t i c a l examination b e t t e r than the  B r i t i s h , e t h i c a l systems.  equivalent,  There i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between  the r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s i n Ward's e a r l y manhood, Huxley's d e n i a l of t h e e f f i c a c y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h e sometimes l e s s t h a n s u b t l e m o r a l o v e r t o n e s which c h a r a c t e r i z e d Ward's defence of subjectivism. Stout  Yet, i t i s c l e a r l y impossible  i n t o t h i s narrow mold.  t o f i t G.F.  To equate h i s brand of  Pragmatism w i t h I d e a l i s m , i s s t r e t c h i n g t h e use of t h e s e terms  75  beyond a c c e p t a b l e l i m i t s . those moral concerns i n Stout's  And, moreover, i t i s p r e c i s e l y  o f Ward t h a t a r e c o n s p i c u o u s l y  lacking  outlook.  On t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t e v e r t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l every p s y c h o l o g i s t , -Pragmatist, I d e a l i s t , Spencerian  Spiritualist,  o r P l u r a l i s t , s h a r e d a common i n t e r e s t  t h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f human s u b j e c t i v i t y . p h i l o s o p h i c defence  In this  i n exploring context, the  o f m o r a l v a l u e s was b u t one a s p e c t  l a r g e r i s s u e o f coming t o t e r m s w i t h t h e i m p o r t a n c e subjective  viewpoint,  ( i r r a t i o n a l ? ) aspect  o f human t h o u g h t .  of this  of the This  problem,  t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e a c t i v e r o l e t h e mind performed i n p e r c e i v i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g s e n s a t i o n was t h e o u t s t a n d i n g d e f i c i e n c y of orthodox  Associationism.  Therefore, despite t h e i r  divergent  p h i l o s o p h i e s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s i n L a t e V i c t o r i a n and Edwardian England  faced the recognition of the inherent d i f f i c u l t y of  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r u t h from e r r o r , r e a l i t y from i l l u s i o n , and rational  judgments from i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s .  The q u e s t i o n s  t h e y w e r e a s k i n g o f t h e i r s c i e n c e was t o e x p l a i n how one man could form c e r t a i n c o n v i c t i o n s e n t i r e l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h another's. different  Was i t ,  they asked,  environmental  i n t h e mental processes their  surroundings  p u r e l y a s i t u a t i o n o f two  b a c k g r o u n d s , o r was i t a d i f f e r e n c e o f t h e t w o men; w e r e t h e y p e r c e i v i n g  i n d i f f e r e n t ways?  creasingly d i f f i c u l t  I t was b e c o m i n g i n -  t o s a y e x a c t l y what b e i n g  considered  " r a t i o n a l " a c t u a l l y meant. Furthermore,  i t w o u l d a l s o be a m i s t a k e  t o overemphasize  76  the  impact  had  upon B r i t i s h  in  fact,  the  t h a t the  intellectual  described the  t u r n of the  trends  i n German  attitudes.  One  philosophic outlook  century  as  one  of seeking  philosophy  commentator  has,  i n Cambridge a t to replace,  . . . t h e ' s p e c u l a t i v e ' and ' m e t a p h y s i c a l ' temper B r i t i s h H e g e l i a n i s m by an a t m o s p h e r e o f l i t e r a l m i n d e d ' a n a l y s i s ' and c a u t i o u s 'empiricism'.4  of  To  Stout's  be  s u r e , i t i s not  approach t o the  relationship  much i n common w i t h tivists;  at l e a s t  thinking, tific  semi-mystical  the  both  excluded  difficult  to recognize that  o f s c i e n c e and  metaphysics  emerging g e n e r a t i o n recognized the  of l o g i c a l  evidenced  an  posi-  importance of s u b j e c t i v e  moral i s s u e s from metaphysical  s p e c u l a t i o n , and  had  interest  in  and  scien-  linguistical  5 analysis. logical  positivism  concerns then  T h i s i s not  were but  i n England, one  aspect  S t o u t was  one  contestable beings  had  of a profound  men  w o u l d be  l a w s o f N a t u r e and finally  uncertainty. bility  day  life.  thereby  become w h o l l y  positivist  p h y s i c s t o new  rational  of s u b j e c t i v i t y of the  aware o f c e r t a i n  strange  new  and  inapplica-  developments i n the  began t o h a v e i n c r e a s i n g d o u b t s t h a t a n y t h i n g as  The  a b l e t o l e a r n from those i n -  e x p i r e d amid an age  e l e c t r o m a g n e t i s r n and  of  re-orientation  Even n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , c o g n i z a n t  of c l a s s i c a l  a founder  only that h i s psychological  taking place i n English i n t e l l e c t u a l  dream t h a t  of  t o say t h a t  theory  phenomena  c o u l d be  described  a hard, s c i e n t i f i c f a c t . S c i e n c e had t o c o n f e s s t h a t , What t h e u n i v e r s e i s r e a l l y l i k e we do n o t know, and i t i s meaningless to i n q u i r e . We can but f o r m p i c t u r e s o f n a t u r e t o o u r s e l v e s , w h i c h change r a d i c a l l y f r o m t i m e t o t i m e and a r e f o r e v e r i n c o m p l e t e .  77  With t h i s transformation, criticists, thinking  a n t i c i p a t e d and  Mach and  actions  replaced  by  eighteenth  nineteenth man  from the  h i s t h o u g h t s and  speculation  Ward and  Stout.  G.F.  t o what he existing  saw  and  by  the  ethical an  no  to  context  system.  i t s surprise the  motive  anthropormorphic  generalizations  and  images o f h i s own physical world.  his psychological  who  mind the Stout's  but  human t h o u g h t was  Stout  not  developed from s u b j e c t i v e  r e c o g n i t i o n he  needs.  James antipathy  with  contrast,  constructions any  inherent  legacy,  a response to  the  moral  or  man  was  sees i n the r e f l e c t e d  order,  intellectual  In  accepted that  unwittingly  manifest  s o m e t h i n g much more t h a n t h e that  that  non-  l a y a h e a r t f e l t concern  Avenarius,  being  to  forces  t h e o r i z i n g of  p r e c o n c e p t i o n s s u g g e s t e d by  Like  Now  of  James Ward's p r o f e s s i o n a l  deceiving  need t o l i m i t  questionable  found  d i f f e r e n c e s between  scientific  c a u s a l i t y of science,  felt  whose  burden of t r y i n g  demonstrating moral freedom l a t e n t i n humanity. Stout  the  actions.  Behind  as t h e  creature  sensations  himself  T h e r e w e r e , however, i m p o r t a n t psychological  Empirio-  r e v i s i o n of  i n t o the  Darwinism, d i s c o v e r e d within  a  instrumentalist.  impossible  Associationism  sciences,  the  L'Homme M a c h i n e , t h e  did, a f t e r a l l , contain  effecting  by  came a r a d i c a l  a c u n n i n g , scheming  century  century  natural  flowed from impinging  psychology, released fit  i n the  elucidated  Avenarius,  on human n a t u r e .  t h o u g h t s and himself  change o f o u t l o o k  in  the  therefore,  was  s h a r e d w i t h Ward  objective  Instead,  stimuli  Stout  must  be  78  credited with of  the  brave,  being  one  o f t h e r a r e few,  century, w i l l i n g l y new  world  and  where a t r u l y  the moral preoccupations  fearlessly  who,  ventured  secular spirit  of former  before the  was  generations.  into  turn  a  replacing  79  FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V 'L.S. Hearnshaw, A S h o r t H i s t o r y o f B r i t i s h P s y c h o l o g y 1840-1940, New Y o r k , Barnes and N o b l e , 1964, p. 13b. o  F,W,H. Myers, Human P e r s o n a l i t y and I t s S u r v i v a l o f B o d i l y Death, London, Longmans Green, 1 9 0 3 , 2 v o l s . , passim. 3  ^Hearnshaw, op. c i t . , p. 120. ^G. Bergmann, The M e t a p h y s i c s o f L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m , Longmans Green, 1 9 5 4 , p. 3» /V.  Appendix D.  A.R. H a l l and M.B. H a l l , A B r i e f H i s t o r y o f S c i e n c e , T o r o n t o , New American L i b r a r y o f Canada, 1964, p. 311. 6  VI.  APPENDICES  81  APPENDIX A W i l l i a m James a n d t h e D o c t r i n e o f C o n s c i o u s  Automatism'  As W i l l i a m James u n d e r s t o o d t h e i s s u e , t h e d o c t r i n e o f conscious-automatism i n c l u d e d s e v e r a l erroneous assumptions. I f t h i s w e r e t r u e , James a r g u e d , t h a t f e e l i n g was m e r e l y a c o l l a t e r a l o f t h e n e r v e p r o c e s s e s a n d was u n a b l e i t s e l f t o r e a c t upon them, f e e l i n g would t h e n be, i n e r t , u n i n f l u e n t i a l , a simple passenger i n t h e v o y a g e o f l i f e , i t i s a l l o w e d t o r e m a i n on b o a r d , but not a l l o w e d t o t o u c h t h e helm o r handle t h e rigging. 2  James h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d t h e t h e o r y o f c o n s c i o u s a u t o m a t i s m a c t u a l l y stemmed f r o m a w i s h among s c i e n t i s t s t o a b o l i s h t h e h o a r y t h e o r y o f a d u a l i s m between mind and m a t t e r and t o propose a s i n g l e , a l l i n c l u s i v e f o r m u l a w h i c h w o u l d e x p l a i n human n a t u r e i n t h e same t e r m s a s i t e x p l a i n e d man's p h y s i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t . S c i e n t i s t s , he s u g g e s t e d a r e u n c o m f o r t a b l e when f a c e d w i t h t h e " y a w n i n g chasm b e t w e e n p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s a n d m e n t a l e v e n t s ; " t h e y deny c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d t h u s p u r i f y t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n s from such i n t a n g i b l e s as f e e l i n g s , t o t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h a s i n g l e harmonious and e s t h e t i c a l l y p l e a s i n g concept i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s e , a u n i v e r s e which a l s o conformed t o t h e laws o f cause and e f f e c t . D e s p i t e t h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s , James s t i l l a c c e p t e d t h e g e n e r a l D a r w i n i a n framework f o r p s y c h o l o g y : s c i e n t i s t s ought t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r s t u d y o f how o r g a n i s m s a c t i v e l y r e s p o n d a n d a d j u s t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e i r environment. But i n h i s view, an automaton 'Huxley's d e c a p i t a t e d f r o g ) c o u l d e x h i b i t o n l y a l i m i t e d r a n g e o f r e s p o n s e s a n d h e n c e must r e m a i n l a r g e l y a t t h e m e r c y o f e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f an o r g a n i s m ' s r e a c t i o n s w e r e n o t e n t i r e l y a m a t t e r o f r e f l e x , a p r e d i c t a b l e r e s p o n s e o c c a s i o n e d by f a c t o r s b e y o n d i t s own c o n t r o l , t h e o r g a n i s m was i n s t e a d a c r e a t u r e a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e i t s own r e s p o n s e , i t w o u l d h a v e , a s a c o n s e q u e n c e , a n i n f i n i t e l y greater survival potential. The s u p p o r t e r s o f a u t o m a t i s m h a v e m i s u n d e r s t o o d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , James s u r m i s e d . Consciousness i s n o t some n o n - s e n s a t i o n a l q u a l i t y o r t h i n g c r e a t e d by t h e m i n d , but an element o f t h e p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s : t h e mind's s e l e c t i v e emphasis o f c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s and i t s i n h i b i t i o n o f l e s s r e l e v a n t ones. C o n s c i o u s n e s s , he d e c l a r e d , c a n p r o d u c e n o t h i n g i f can o n l y a l t e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n s o f s e n s a t i o n ; however, through t h i s p r o c e s s o f s e l e c t i o n one e x p e r i e n c e s t h i n g s s u b j e c t i v e l y and t e r m s i t f e e l i n g .  g2  FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A  "'"Source W i l l i a m 1879.  2 Ibid.,  p. 1.  James,  " A r e We  A u t o m a t a ? " M i n d , v o l . I+,  S3  APPENDIX B The p h i l o s o p h e r , H.A. P r i c h a r d , i n an a r t i c l e f o r t h e 1907 e d i t i o n of Mind, c h a l l e n g e d Stout about the v a l i d i t y of p s y c h o l o g y ' s c l a i m t o be s c i e n t i f i c , and demanded t h a t S t o u t e x p l a i n the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l stand of psychology.^ For, i f t h e a i m o f p s y c h o l o g y i s t o s t u d y c o n s c i o u s n e s s : t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e m i n d a p p r e h e n d s t h e w o r l d , t h e n , how d o e s t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , c o n s i d e r e d a s a p r e s e n t a t i o n , and t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' , s a c t i o n o f p e r c e i v i n g this presentation?^ How c a n a p s y c h o l o g i s t a l l e g e t h a t he c a n d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n t h e s t a r , S i r i u s , t r e a t e d as an a b s t r a c t i o n ( f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e way an a s t r o n o m e r w o u l d c o n c e i v e o f i t ) , and t h e s t a r , S i r i u s , e x p e r i e n c e d as an i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n ? The q u e s t i o n i n P r i c h a r d ' s m i n d was t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e a s o n i n g u s e d by p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o c l a i m t h a t t h e y c o u l d demarcate the conscious mind which apprehends the p r e s e n t a t i o n from the p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f . Stout's reply to t h i s r u n - o f - t h e - m i l l i d e a l i s t c r i t i c i s m was, i n e f f e c t , an a d m i s s i o n t h a t a p s y c h o l o g i s t c o u l d a c t u a l l y be a s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s t , one who b e l i e v e s t h a t n o t h i n g e x i s t s independent of the mind's knowledge of i t . Nevertheless, Stout f e l t he c o u l d n o t c o n c e d e t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s w e r e n o t j u s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g o b j e c t s i n terms other than of t h e i r immediate presentation: What i s i n d i s p e n s i b l e t o p s y c h o l o g y i s n o t any s p e c i a l t h e o r y o f knowledge, good o r bad, but o n l y t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h i n g s a r e known, come t o be known, and c e a s e t o be known t o i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s , and t h a t i n t h i s r e l a t i o n t o i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s p r o p o s i t i o n s h o l d good o f t h e m w h i c h a r e n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o them i n a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m this relation.3 In h i s work, A n a l y t i c Psychology, Stout's forthright:  e x p l a n a t i o n was  more  No c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l a n t e c e d e n t s a s s u c h n e e d s t o be i n c l u d e d i n any s t r i c t l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l proposition. We t a k e a c c o u n t o f them o n l y i n so f a r as t h e y are i n d i s p e n s i b l e h e l p s i n d e t e r m i n i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e n a t u r e and o r d e r o f c h a n g e s p r o d u c e d i n t h e mind from w i t h o u t . 4 But i f S t o u t t o o k s t e p s t o r e f u t e P r i c h a r d ' s e a s e a g a i n s t p s y c h o l o g y , t o r e p u d i a t e h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the study of cons c i o u s n e s s was more p r o p e r l y t h e c o n c e r n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , who, at l e a s t , recognized the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i t s  84  study, Stout a l s o r e j e c t e d the counterclaims of the p h y s i o l o g ists. I n S t o u t ' s j u d g m e n t , any e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h a t o t a l l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of mental behavior f a c e d a predicament i n showing t h e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between a p h y s i o l o g i c a l event and i t s p s y c h i c c o u n t e r p a r t . A p s y c h o l o g i s t c o u l d , at best, o n l y i n f e r t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p and e v e n t h e n he must p r e s u p p o s e t h a t he h a s an i n d e p e n d e n t k n o w l e d g e somehow o f b o t h p h y s i o l o g i c a l and m e n t a l phenomena; c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e s t i l l r e m a i n e d a need f o r a w h o l l y i n t r o s p e c t i v e psychology. Besides, Stout contended, should the p h y s i o l o g i c a l account of mental processes p r o v e c o r r e c t , a f t e r a l l , i t w o u l d s t i l l h a v e t o show t h a t i t was m a t t e r and n o t m i n d t h a t was t h e s o l e a g e n t . As S t o u t commented, because M a t e r i a l i s m assumed t h a t m e n t a l e v e n t s cannot o c c u r w i t h o u t m a t e r i a l c a u s e s , i t was u s i n g t h e v e r y same a n t h r o p o r m o r p h i c r e a s o n i n g a s t h e u n t u t o r e d s a v a g e who s e e s a l l n a t u r a l events r e s u l t i n g from the i n t e r v e n t i o n of s p i r i t s , I f t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e m e c h a n i c a l p r o c e s s d e b a r s us f r o m r e g a r d i n g a movement a s due t o v o l i t i o n , i t must i n l i k e manner d e b a r u s f r o m r e g a r d i n g a v o l i t i o n a s due t o a movement, e v e n o f b r a i n p a r t i c l e s . So f a r a s we h a v e come t o b e l i e v e i n m a t t e r a s t h e o n l y r e a l a g e n t i n m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s , we seem t o owe t h i s bel i e f t o our growing i n s i g h t i n t o t h e c o n t i n u i t y of t h e s e a s p a r t s o f a s i n g l e s y s t e m ; b u t when we come t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p h y s i o l o g i c a l and ment a l e v e n t s , we f i n d a m a r k e d b r e a c h o f c o n t i n u i t y . No a n a l y s i s c a n d i s c o v e r i n t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t any t r a c e s of i t s supposed p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s . 5 Thus f o r S t o u t , any hope o f l i n k i n g m e n t a l phenomena t o p h y s i o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s was b u t a n o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e M a t e r i a l i s t ' s i l l u s i o n a r y , mechanistic vision. Every separate s c i e n c e i n t h e i r view r e p r e s e n t e d but a p a r t o f a s i n g l e , continuous, mechanical system. I n t h e same way t h a t s c i e n t i s t s h a v e l e a r n e d t o r e d u c e b i o l o g y t o t h e more e l e m e n t a r y p r i n c i p l e s o f c h e m i s t r y and p h y s i c s , s i m i l a r l y , i n a m a t t e r o f t i m e , s c i e n t i s t s would a l s o reduce p s y c h i c a l a c t i v i t y i n t o i t s p h y s i o l o g i c a l components. Stout c o u l d not accept t h i s l i n e of r e a s o n i n g . The M a t e r i a l i s t ' s f a l l a c y , he b e l i e v e d , was t o assume t h a t m e n t a l phenomena c o u l d o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d a s a d e v e l o p m e n t o f n o n m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s ; but t h e r e a l c r u x o f t h e i s s u e , l e f t une x p l a i n e d by t h e M a t e r i a l i s t , was t h e e x a c t c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m a t t e r and t h o u g h t . More p a r t i c u l a r l y , S t o u t was c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e f u t i n g t h e views of the p r e s i d e n t of the A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Shadworth H. H o d g s o n . A l t h o u g h H o d g s o n had a g r e e d w i t h S t o u t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t any e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h p s y c h o l o g y e n t i r e l y u p o n a p h y s i o l o g i c a l b a s e must show t h e a f f i n i t y b e t w e e n m a t t e r and c o n s c i o u s n e s s , " w h e r e b y t h e one becomes t h e r e a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e o c c u r r e n c e o r coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e of t h e o t h e r . " Hodgson, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  85  t h i s admission, thought t h a t the everyday d i s t i n c t i o n which saw c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s s o m e t h i n g e n t i r e l y a p a r t f r o m t h e n e r v o u s system, a c t u a l l y d e r i v e d from a l i n g u i s t i c a l confusion. Norm a l l y , H o d g s o n e x p l a i n e d , we d e s c r i b e someone a s f e e l i n g , t h i n k i n g a n d a c t i n g , y e t we t h i n k i t i m p o s s i b l e t o s a y t h e same f o r a p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e , t o a d m i t t h a t n e r v e and b r a i n t i s s u e t h i n k s , f e e l s or a c t s . Language w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s our " p r e a n a l y t i c " (common s e n s e ) t h i n k i n g t e n d s t o d e s c r i b e t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a u n i t y . Y e t , p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s had a c c e p t e d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between t h e agent o r n e r v o u s s y s t e m a n d t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h seems t o be dependent upon i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , . . . t h e whole agency i n c o n s c i o u s a c t i o n , f e e l i n g a n d t h o u g h t l i e s s o l e l y i n t h e n e r v e and b r a i n o f the c o n c r e t e c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ; or i n o t h e r words, t h e w h o l e c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s a s much t h e i r s , when we c o n s i d e r i t a n a l y t i c a l l y a s i t i s h i s when we c o n s i d e r i t preanalytically.° T h e r e f o r e , argued Hodgson, t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s s i m p l e f a c t v i n d i c a t e s the treatment of psychology from a completely p h y s i o l o g i c a l v i e w p o i n t . I t i s t r u e , he a d m i t t e d , t h a t e v e n now t h e p h y s i o l o g i s t i s n o t a b l e t o d e s c r i b e e x a c t l y how m a t t e r " c o n d i t i o n s " c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t t h e n , H o d g s o n , somewhat i l l o g i c a l l y , r e p l i e d , n e i t h e r can t h e p h y s i c i s t e x p l a i n g r a v i t y . Moreo v e r , f o r p s y c h o l o g y t o be t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c i t i s o n l y n e c e s s a r y t o s h o w f i r s t w h i c h n e u r a l r e s p o n s e s were "always and a l o n e a c c o m p a n i e d by t h e a r i s i n g and t h e c o n t i n u i n g o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , " a n d s e c o n d l y , t o i n d i c a t e what was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y u n i q u e a b o u t t h e n e u r a l r e s p o n s e s so t h a t t h e y i n v a r i a b l y c r e a t e t h e same d e p e n d e n t p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e . To t h e t i m e w o r n a r g u m e n t t h e e x i s t e n c e o f f r e e w i l l - the p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s n o t i o n o f " v o l i t i o n " - - p r o v e s t h e independence of mind f r o m m a t t e r , Hodgson r e p l i e d t h a t our a p p a r e n t sense o f c h o i c e merely r e s u l t e d from our i n a b i l i t y t o p e r c e i v e the nerve p r o c e s s e s w h i c h a r e a c t u a l l y making t h e c h o i c e . Hence, a p e r s o n f e e l s f r e e b e c a u s e he i s a w a r e o n l y o f h i s c o n s c i o u s s t a t e o f m i n d when, i n r e a l i t y , i t h a s b e e n h i s s u b c o n s c i o u s n e u r a l p r o c e s s e s w h i c h have g i v e n him t h a t p a r t i c u l a r judgment. The act o f c h o o s i n g not t o w a l k i n t o a w h e l l b a r r o w — t o use Hodgson's e x a m p l e — c o n s i s t e d o f a sequence of events i n which a n e u r a l r e f l e x f o l l o w s a u t o m a t i c a l l y from the i n i t i a l perception of the w h e e l b a r r o w , a n d s t i m u l a t e s i n t u r n t h e l i m b s so t h a t t h e w h e e l b a r r o w i s a v o i d e d . C o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t h i n g more t h a n t h e " n e r v e m o t i o n s " a c h i e v i n g such a degree of i n t e n s i t y t h a t t h e y c r o s s the t h r e s h o l d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e r e f o r e , Hodgson s u r m i s e d , i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s r e a l l y an i n d e p e n d e n t , c a u s a l f a c t o r i n t h e s e r i e s of events from the f i r s t s i g h t of the wheelbarrow t o the f i n a l muscle r e s p o n s e i n s t e p p i n g around i t , as t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l l y i n c l i n e d p s y c h o l o g i s t b e l i e v e s , c o n s c i o u s n e s s must e i t h e r change  86  f r o m a " c o n d i t i o n a t e " t o an a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n i t s e l f . The onlyo t h e r p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n was t h a t some i m m a t e r i a l a g e n t p r e v i o u s l y dormant h a s now become a c t i v e , but n e i t h e r t h e o r y c a n g a i n s u p p o r t f r o m any o f t h e o b s e r v a b l e f a c t s : The o n l y c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e w a r r a n t s i s t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n a l l i t s f o r m s , and w h e n e v e r i t o c c u r s i s not o n l y the c o n c o m i t a n t or c o n d i t i o n a t e , of n e u r a l p r o c e s s e s and t h a t t h i s o r d e r o f d e p e n d e n c e i s never i n v e r t e d . ' S t o u t l a c k e d Hodgson's c o n v i c t i o n s about the l i k e l i h o o d of p s y c h o l o g y e v e r d e m o n s t r a t i n g ai i n c o n t e s t a b l e p r o o f f o r a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m i n d ( c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) and m a t t e r (brain processes). S t o u t b e l i e v e d t h a t i n a l l h o n e s t y he c o u l d do no o t h e r t h a n . r e t a i n a C a r t e s i a n b i f u r c a t e d p s y c h o l o g y , and must t h e r e f o r e recommend t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f psycho-physical p a r a l l e l i s m as t h e one o f f e r i n g t h e b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Still, t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m was a t b e s t o n l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l e x p e d i e n t . By means o f t h i s h y p o t h e s i s psychology c o u l d a d v a n t a g e o u s l y i n c o r p o r a t e t h e e v i d e n c e f r o m p h y s i o l o g y i n t o i t s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w i t h o u t being f o r c e d t o admit the t r u t h o f t h e M a t e r i a l i s t ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s was nothing more t h a n m a t t e r i n m o t i o n — a n e x c e s s i v e n e r v e s e n s a t i o n . He b e l i e v e d t h a t p s y c h o l o g y ought t o a c c e p t t h e l i m i t e d aim of t r y i n g t o demonstrate t h a t c e r t a i n s t a t e s of consciousness are a t t e n d e d " by c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e c e r e b r a l p r o c e s s e s . A c o r r e l a t i o n s u c h as t h i s , S t o u t a r g u e d , m i g h t e x p l a i n what h a p p e n s , f o r i n s t a n c e , when a man b u r n s h i s f i n g e r . The c o n t a c t w i t h t h e f l a m e has c a u s e d a p a i n f u l e x c i t a t i o n w h i c h i n t u r n h a s b e e n t r a n s m i t t e d by t h e a f f e r e n t n e r v e s and finally reaches the c e r e b r a l cortex. There i t has p r o d u c e d a m o l e c u l a r d i s t u r b a n c e and c o - i n c i d e n t a l l y w i t h t h i s h a d o c c u r r e d a p s y c h i c a l s t a t e - - t h e p a i n of being burned. Stout recognized t h a t t h i s d i d not of c o u r s e prove t h a t c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s were always the product of p h y s i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s ; f o r that matter, t h e c o n v e r s e m i g h t w e l l be t r u e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he t h o u g h t , the data of physiology could only prove v a l u a b l e f o r the p s y c h o l o g i s t i f he f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d a c o r r e l a t i o n and a. s e q u e n c e o f e v e n t s w h e r e b y p s y c h i c a l s t a t e a was c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e A, w h i c h r e l a t e d t o a n o t h e r p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e B, i t s e l f h a v i n g a m e n t a l c o r r e s p o n d e n t : t h e p s y c h i c a l stateb. I n t h i s way, by r e l a t i n g t h e two m e n t a l s t a t e s , a and b, one c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y f i n d s u p p o r t f o r t h e t h e o r y o f p s y c h o p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m , a l t h o u g h s c i e n c e had n o t y e t s u b s t a n t i a t e d i t , and i t was t h u s , a t p r e s e n t , no more t h a n a g o o d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l h y p o t h e s i s , a convenient f o r m u l a t i o n of the f a c t s . Stout c o u l d not accept P r i c h a r d ' s o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t p s y c h o l o g y ' s r i g h t t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between the o b j e c t p e r c e i v e d and t h e m i n d p e r c e i v i n g i t ; but t h e n , n e i t h e r c o u l d S t o u t a g r e e  67  w i t h t h e c o n t r a r y v i e w o f H o d g s o n t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s was n o t h i n g more t h a n a n e x t e n s i o n o f m a t t e r . I t follows that Stout's acceptance o f t h e t h e o r y o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m put h i m i n t h e awkward p o s i t i o n o f h a v i n g t o e x p l a i n what e x a c t l y c o n s c i o u s n e s s was. He a d m i t t e d a c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p h y s i o l o g i c a l events and mental s t a t e s , but d e n i e d t h a t t h e y were necess a r i l y t w o a s p e c t s o f t h e same s u b s t a n c e , o r t h a t one i n v a r i a b l y brought i n t o being t h e o t h e r . S t i l l , i n S t o u t ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n i t was n o t p s y c h o l o g y ' s f u n c t i o n t o s o l v e t h e conundrums o f metaphysics. Psychology should confine i t s e l f t o the descript i o n o f t h e m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s o f man i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h h i s e n v i r o n m e n t a n d n o t t r y t o . d e t e r m i n e what w e r e t h e u l t i m a t e entities.  &8  FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX B H.A. P r i c h a r d , " A C r i t i c i s m of the P s y c h o l o g i s t ' s T r e a t ment of Knowledge," Mind, N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 29. 2 " P r e s e n t a t i o n : any immediate content of e x p e r i e n c e , s e n s o r y or i d e a t i o n a l though sometimes r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e f o r m e r . " James D r e v e r , A D i c t i o n a r y of P s y c h o l o g y , Harmondsw o r t h , P e n g u i n , 1952, p. 217. G.F. S t o u t , "Mr. P r i c h a r d s C r i t i c i s m of P s y c h o l o g y , " Mind, N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 240. T  ^G.F. S t o u t , A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , London, Swann S o n n e s c h e i n , 1909, v o l . 1, p. 27. 5  I b i d . , p. 6  5.  S.H. Hodgson, The Metaphysic of E x p e r i e n c e , London, Longmans Green, 1898, v o l . 2, p. 285. I b i d . . p. 319. 7  89 APPENDIX C A MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BIO-MECHANIC  Exterior stimulation  =  R  Work  =  F(R)  Food  =  S  Nutrition  =  F(S)  1.  F(R)  =  SF(R)  =  1  -F(S),  t h e stage o f u n s t a b l e imbalance income and e x p e n d i t u r e .  2.  PRINCIPLE  between t h e energy  -IF(S)  t h e s t a g e o f p e r f e c t e q u i l i b r i u m ; p r o b a b l y nonexistent i n l i f e .  "^"Source: W. D r a b o v i t c h , "La b i o - p s y c h o l o g i e de R. A v e n a r i u s et l e problem de 'l'homme t o t a l ' , " Revue P h i l o s o p h i q u e , v o l . 115, 1933, p. 414.  90  APPENDIX D THE  RELATIONSHIP OF THOUGHT AND  LANGUAGE  A t r a i n o f t h o u g h t , i n so f a r a s t h o u g h t d e p e n d s on language, c o n s i s t s i n a s e r i e s of s u c c e s s i v e l y o b j e c t i f i e d m e n t a l s y s t e m s , e a c h o f w h i c h a p p e r c e i v e s and i s a p p e r c e i v e d by i t s p r e d e c e s s o r . An i l l u s t r a t i o n may be drawn f r o m any g r o u p o f w o r d s c o m b i n e d so a s t o y i e l d an i n t e l l i g i b l e meaning. I n t h e sentence--"John e a t s .apples," t h e word "John" s t a n d s f o r a concept which combines i n s y s t e m a t i c u n i t y a l l t h a t t h e s p e a k e r knows o f t h e p e r s o n r e f e r r e d t o . I t d o e s not s t a n d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t a t i o n , but f o r a system o f p r e s e n t a t i o n s , o f w h i c h o n l y t h e u l t i m a t e components a r e particular. I t f i x e s the a t t e n t i o n of the speaker or of the s i l e n t t h i n k e r on a t o t a l i t y o f d i v e r s e s t a t e s , a c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s , s i m u l t a n e o u s and s u c c e s s i v e , p o s s i b l e and a c t u a l . " J o h n " i s n o t a d e t e r m i n a t e image b u t a U n i v e r s a l , w h i c h , a s such,-Includes w i t h i n i t a m u l t i p l i c i t y of determinations i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g u n i t e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r i m a g e . The w o r d , " e a t s , " a l s o stands f o r a U n i v e r s a l — t h e g e n e r a l concept of an a c t i o n w h i c h may be p e r f o r m e d by d i f f e r e n t a g e n t s o r by t h e same a g e n t a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s a n d w h i c h may v a r y i n m a n i f o l d c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e w o r d " J o h n " i s f o l l o w e d by t h e w o r d " e a t s , " the c o r r e s p o n d i n g mental systems are e x c i t e d t o a c t i v i t y and t h e y a p p e r c e i v e each o t h e r . The p r o d u c t o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n i s a new s y s t e m , w h i c h f o r m s an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f b o t h o f t h e m , and w h i c h may be e x p r e s s e d by t h e compound w o r d , " J o h n - e a t i n g . " T h i s new s y s t e m i s f o r m e d (1) by s i n g l i n g o u t f r o m among a l l t h e s t a t e s , a c t s , and r e l a t i o n s w h i c h e n t e r i n t o t h e c o n c e p t , e x p r e s s e d by t h e w o r d , " J o h n , " t h a t s p e c i f i c a c t i o n e x p r e s s e d by t h e w o r d , " e a t i n g , " t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f incompatible alternatives. T h i s i s the a p p e r c e p t i o n of the c o n c e p t , " J o h n , " by t h e c o n c e p t , " e a t i n g . " (2) By s i n g l i n g o u t f r o m among t h e p o s s i b l e a g e n t s who a r e c a p a b l e o f t h e a c t i o n i n d i c a t e d , t h e s p e c i a l agent John t o t h e e x c l u s i o n of others. A c c o r d i n g a s J o h n i s known t o be a v e g e t a r i a n , a g l u t t o n , an i n v a l i d , e t c . , t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t , " e a t i n g , " w i l l receive a varying kind of s p e c i f i c a t i o n . This i s the a p p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t " e a t i n g , " by t h e c o n c e p t , " J o h n . " J o h n i s r e p r e s e n t e d a s e a t i n g and t h e a c t o f e a t i n g i s r e p r e s e n t e d a s J o h n ' s a c t . The c o n c e p t s e x p r e s s e d by t h e w o r d s " e a t i n g " and " a p p l e s " u n i t e i n a s i m i l a r way t o f o r m a s i n g l e system i n which e a c h - r e c e i v e s s p e c i f i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n from the other. The a p p l e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d a s b e i n g e a t e n and t h e e a t i n g i s r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e e a t i n g o f a p p l e s .  91  FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX D  vol.  S o u r c e : G.F. S t o u t , "Thought a n d HsiBg.uagea," 16, 1891, pp. 189-190.  Mind,  O.S.  VII.  B I B L I O G R A P H Y  '"  93  I.'  GENERAL WORKS 1.  Books a.  Contemporary  Hodgson, Shadworth H. The M e t a p h y s i c o f E x p e r i e n c e . Longmans Green, 1898, 2 v o l s . . 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