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The revolt against materialism in English psychology, 1875-1910 MacDonald, Donald Alexander 1969

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THE REVOLT AGAINST MATERIALISM IN ENGLISH PSYCHOLOGY, 1875-1910 by - : . DONALD A. MacDONALD B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of History We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July, 1969 - A In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C olumbia, I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and Study. I f u r t h e r a g r e e t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ABSTRACT The accepted view of Late V i c t o r i a n psychology suggests t h a t i t avoided a commitment t o a s c i e n t i f i c framework because of the i n f l u e n c e o f I d e a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s study r e p r e s e n t s an attempt t o show t h a t both moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and the r e c o g n i t i o n of the p o s i t i v e r o l e which the human mind p l a y s i n o r g a n i z i n g sense data favoured the abandonment of c e r t a i n assumptions i n h e r e n t i n P o s i t i v i s m and Naturalism. In essence, the problem f a c e d by Late V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t s was how t o e x p l a i n consciousness as a n a t u r a l phenomenon. The most important sources of i n f o r m a t i o n used i n t h i s study were the t e x t books of James Ward, James S u l l y and G.F. Stout. In a d d i t i o n , t h e i r a r t i c l e s on p s y c h o l o g i c a l t o p i c s , p u b l i s h e d i n academic j o u r n a l s , were of c o n s i d e r a b l e v a l u e ; and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the B r i t i s h j o u r n a l , Mind proved u s e f u l . In an address t o the B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n f o r the Advance-ment of Sc i e n c e , Thomas Henry Huxley presented the " d o c t r i n e of conscious automatism," which d e s c r i b e d human behavior as a r e s u l t s o l e l y of e x t e r n a l s e n s a t i o n s without the i n t e r v e n t i o n of consciousness. The p s y c h o l o g i s t , James Ward, a t t a c k e d the m a t e r i a l i s t i n f l u e n c e upon psychology and N a t u r a l i s m i n g e n e r a l . Ward took the p o s i t i o n t h a t the laws of s c i e n c e were only mathe-m a t i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and thus were not always a p p l i c a b l e t o s i n g l e i n s t a n c e s . E v o l u t i o n , he b e l i e v e d , gave evidence of the workings of a S u p e r n a t u r a l Power. In man, the i n f l u -ence of the Power was shown by a need t o f u l f i l l a moral i d e a l . Another Late V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t , James S u l l y , t r i e d t o adhere more f i r m l y t o the P o s i t i v i s t t r a d i t i o n . F o l l o w i n g a s u g g e s t i o n of Herbert Spencer's, S u l l y t r i e d t o e x p l a i n morals as the end product of mankind's e v o l u t i o n a r y development. The f i n a l p s y c h o l o g i s t t r e a t e d i n t h i s study, George F r e d e r i c k Stout a l s o r e c o g n i z e d the importance of s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s i n a man's p e r c e p t i o n s and judgments. Stout adopted Avenarius' t h e o r y t h a t a l l thought served as a form of b i o l o g i c a l adjustment t o the environment. In t h i s way, Stout showed how consciousness c o u l d be s t u d i e d as a n a t u r a l phenomenon. CONTENTS Chapter Page I . T.H. HUXLEY AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUS AUTOMATISM 1 I I . VICTORIAN PSYCHOLOGY—A DARWINIAN MYSTICISM OR A PRAGMATIC SCIENCE? 22 I I I . JAMES SULLY AND THE STUDY OF ILLUSIONS . . . 48 IV. G.F. STOUT AND THE PROBLEM OF BELIEF . . . . 55 V. CONCLUSION 71 V I . APPENDICES SO V I I . BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 92 I . T. H. HUXLEY AND THE DOCTRINE OF CONSCIOUS AUTOMATISM 2 O f t h e m any a c a d e m i c d e b a t e s w h i c h g a v e r i s e t o m u c h d e e p r e f l e c t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f L a t e V i c t o r i a n a n d E d w a r d i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s , f e w h a d m o r e s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a n t h a t i n p s y c h o l o g y . T h e q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e w a s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n b y p r a c t i t i o n e r s , s o m e t i m e s y e a r s b e f o r e o t h e r t h i n k e r s , t h a t s c i e n c e h a d f a i l e d i n i t s e f f o r t s t o o f f e r a c r e d i b l e , a l l -e m b r a c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d , a t l e a s t a n a c c o u n t w h i c h c o u l d i n c l u d e a s a n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n o n t h e h u m a n m i n d . D e s p i t e i t s i m p r e s s i v e r e c o r d o f a c h i e v e m e n t s , V i c t o r i a n s c i e n c e , a s T h o m a s H e n r y H u x l e y o b s e r v e d i n 1 8 6 8 , w a s a c a u s e f o r a n x i o u s c o n c e r n t o V i c t o r i a n s . B y 1 8 3 9 t h e c e l l t h e o r y o f S c h l e i d e n h a d made p o s s i b l e a p h y s i c o - c h e m i c a l i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n o f e l e m e n t a l l i f e p r o c e s s e s . L a t e r t h e d i s c o v e r i e s o f D a l t o n , F a r a d a y a n d A m p e r e l e d t h e p h y s i c i s t , H e l m h o l t z , t o f o r m u l a t e t h e l a w o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n o f e n e r g y a n d t h e r e b y t o d e s c r i b e t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n o f h e a t a n d m o t i o n . Now o n e c o u l d v i s u a l i z e t h e u n i v e r s e a s a c l o s e d m e c h a n i c a l s y s t e m , f o r H e l m h o l t z ' s t h e o r y h a d r e d u c e d a l l p h y s i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s t o m e r e c h a n g e s i n t h e m o t i o n o f t h e p a r t i c l e s o f m a t t e r . A n d f i n a l l y , i n 1 8 5 9 w h e n D a r w i n made s o b o l d a s t o a r g u e t h a t n a t u r a l i s t i c c a u s e s , t h e m o r e o r l e s s s u c c e s s f u l a d a p t a t i o n o f o r g a n i s m s t o t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , w e r e t h e r e a l s o u r c e o f t h e v a r i a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e s p e c i e s , i t s e e m e d t o t h o u g h t f u l V i c t o r i a n s t h a t t h e d a y w a s n i g h w h e n s c i e n c e w o u l d , a t l a s t , b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o g i v e a w h o l l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c e x p l a n a t i o n t o a c c o u n t f o r e v e r y e v e n t t h a t h a d e v e r t a k e n p l a c e , o r w o u l d b e l i k e l y t o t a k e p l a c e , a n y w h e r e i n t h e c o s m o s . I n 3 t h e g r a p h i c language o f T.H. Hux l e y , The c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h i s g r e a t t r u t h weighs l i k e a n i g h t m a r e , I b e l i e v e , upon many o f t h e b e s t minds o f t h e s e days. They watch what t h e y c o n c e i v e t o be t h e p r o g r e s s o f m a t e r i a l i s m , i n such f e a r and p o w e r l e s s anger as a savage f e e l s , when, d u r i n g an e c l i p s e , t h e g r e a t shadow creeps over t h e f a c e o f t h e sun. The a d v a n c i n g t i d e o f m a t t e r t h r e a t e n s t o drown t h e i r s o u l s ; t h e t i g h t e n i n g g r a s p o f law impedes t h e i r freedom; t h e y a r e alarmed l e s t man's m o r a l n a t u r e be debased by t h e i n c r e a s e o f h i s wisdom.1 Huxley was c o r r e c t i n h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e i m p l i c a -t i o n s o f m a t e r i a l i s m (the word i s v i r t u a l l y synonymous w i t h s c i e n c e u n t i l t h e l a s t decade o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y ) would l e a d a man t o draw c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t were e n t i r e l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h t h e a c c e p t e d t h i n k i n g about human n a t u r e . The bone o f c o n t e n t i o n a r o s e not from t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h e l i k e l i -hood t h a t t h e p h y s i o l o g y o f man f o l l o w e d t h e same c h e m i c a l laws t h a t a p p l i e d t o t h e remainder o f t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d , n or from t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f Darwin's t h e o r y about t h e o r i g i n o f man, but out o f a d i f f e r e n t problem: how t o f i t t h e f a c t o f human c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t o what seemed t h e immutable law o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n o f energy. A knowledge o f t h e law o f t h e c o n s e r -v a t i o n o f energy would appear t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a c o n s c i o u s i d e a o r m e n t a l change, not b e i n g i t s e l f a s o u r c e o f m a t e r i a l energy, c o u l d not t h e r e f o r e a f f e c t , i n any way wh a t s o e v e r , t h e p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s o c c u r r i n g w i t h i n t h e b r a i n . The i m p l i c a t i o n s t o t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g were, as t h e b i o l o g i s t , G.J. Romanes o b s e r v e d , n o t h i n g l e s s t h a n dumbfounding. Nowhere can we suppose t h e p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s t o be i n t e r r u p t e d o r d i v e r t e d by t h e p s y c h i c a l p r o c e s s ; and t h e r e f o r e we must co n c l u d e t h a t thought and  v o l i t i o n r e a l l y p l a y no p a r t whatever i n d e t e r m i n i n g 4 a c t i o n , (my emphasis) Thoughts and f e e l i n g s are but i n d i c e s which show i n the m i r r o r of the mind c e r t a i n changes t h a t are proceeding i n the matter of the b r a i n , and are as i n e f f i c i e n t i n i n f l u e n c i n g those changes as the shadow of a c l o u d i s powerless t o d i r e c t the move-ments of t h a t of which i t i s the shadow.^ There were only two p o s s i b l e deductions: e i t h e r the phenomenon of consciousness evidenced a r e a l i t y t h a t stood apart from the s o - c a l l e d laws of nature and man t h e r e f o r e e x i s t e d o u t s i d e the premises of m a t e r i a l i s m , or c o n v e r s e l y , t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l ' s thoughts and f e e l i n g s p l a y no r o l e what-soever i n determining h i s c o n d u c t — t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s view. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , some V i c t o r i a n s concluded t h a t i f the f i x e d purpose of s c i e n c e was to be a b l e t o put forward one day a completely n a t u r a l i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of man as w e l l as h i s world, i t had a p p a r e n t l y foundered on the rocky s h o a l of human consciousness. Must s c i e n c e , then, r e t r e a t from t h i s attempt at a comprehensive g e n e r a l i z a t i o n and f i n a l l y concede the t r u t h of claims t h a t the s o u l of man gave proof of some g r e a t e r power governing the u n i v e r s e , than the mere t r a n s -mutations of matter. Not a l l s c i e n t i s t s were prepared t o grant the v a l i d i t y of the argument demanding t h a t they p o s t u l a t e the e x i s t e n c e of a s u p e r n a t u r a l i n f l u e n c e i n order t h a t they c o u l d shed l i g h t upon the mystery of human cons c i o u s -ness. Furthermore, some s c i e n t i s t s were aware of the poten-t i a l t h r e a t of a re-emergent obscurantism which might s t i f l e f o r e v e r the growth of s c i e n t i f i c enlightenment should they admit the p o s s i b i l i t y of a non-material source f o r human behavior. 5 With t h i s thought i n mind, Thomas Henry Huxley i n 1874 l e c t u r e d t o the B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n f o r the Advancement of Science, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata and I t s H i s t o r y . " Huxley i n h i s address a t t r a c t e d the widespread a t t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c , f o r he b o l d l y extended the assumptions of s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m even to human conscious-ness and thereby demonstrated that the h i t h e r t o i n e x p l i c a b l e f a c t of consciousness only i n v o l v e d another f a c e t of the mani-f o l d p r o p e r t i e s of matter. Huxley wished to a b o l i s h once and f o r a l l from the realm of s c i e n t i f i c discourse that unknown e n t i t y , consciousness, so beloved by metaphysicians and t h e o l o g i a n s , i n order to e s t a b l i s h a wholly m a t e r i a l i s t science of the mind upon what he presumed were the foundations l a i d by Descartes. In t h i s Huxley's programme came some f o r t y years too e a r l y ; i t remained f o r Watson and the B e h a v i o r i s t s to c l a i m the dubious c r e d i t f o r banishing consciousness from psychology. The f i v e p r i n c i p l e s taken from Descartes which Huxley b e l i e v e d were e n t i r e l y compatible w i t h the then current notions of physiology and which could provide the core f o r a nonmetaphysical psychology were: (1) The b r a i n i s the organ of s e n s a t i o n , thought, and emotion; t h a t i s t o say, some change i n the c o n d i t i o n of the matter of t h i s organ i s the i n v a r i a b l e ante-cedent of the s t a t e of consciousness t o which each of these terms i s a p p l i e d . (2) The movements of animals are due t o the change of form.of muscles, which shorten and become t h i c k e r ; and t h i s change of form i n a muscle a r i s e s from a motion of the substance contained w i t h i n the nerves which go to the muscles. (3) The s e n s a t i o n s o f animals are due t o a motion of the substance of the nerves which connects the sensory organs w i t h the b r a i n . (4) The motion of the matter of a sensory nerve may be t r a n s m i t t e d through the b r a i n . (5) The motion of any g i v e n p o r t i o n of the matter of the b r a i n e x c i t e d by the motion of a sensory nerve, l e a v e s behind a r e a d i n e s s t o be moved i n the same way, i n t h a t p a r t . Anything which r e s u s c i t a t e s the motion g i v e s r i s e t o the a p p r o p r i a t e f e e l i n g . T h i s i s the p h y s i c a l mechanism of memory.3 By the term automatism, Huxley d i d not imply t h a t animals were, as Descartes had supposed, simply b i o l o g i c a l machines without anything e q u i v a l e n t t o man's consciousness, r a t h e r , Huxley meant t o suggest t h a t animal behavior was determined e n t i r e l y by n e u r a l r e a c t i o n s t o e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i . An animal may have some form of consciousness, but i t s r e a c t i o n s are not the consequence of conscious p e r c e p t i o n upon i t s p a r t . Huxley thought the s t i m u l i from the environment r e a c t upon the sense organs and c r e a t e a form of molecular movement which i s t r a n s -m i t t e d along the nerve pathways u n t i l i t reaches the b r a i n where i t produces a change i n b r a i n matter and a concurrent a l t e r a t i o n i n consciousness. Despite t h i s change i n con s c i o u s -ness the animal's muscular e x e r t i o n r e s u l t s e n t i r e l y from these m o d i f i c a t i o n s of b r a i n substance; consciousness i t s e l f has no e f f e c t at a l l upon an animal's r e a c t i o n s . No independ-ent t r a n s m u t a t i o n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s — i f t h i s i s at a l l p o s s i b l e — can cause b r a i n matter t o change i n any way. Huxley b e l i e v e d he had proved h i s h y p o t h e s i s by an experiment i n which he removed the c e r e b r a l hemispheres of a f r o g . To a l l i n t e n t s and purposes, he argued, the behavior 7 of the f r o g has remained the same, r e a c t i n g as before to the same s e n s a t i o n s , although now without any p o s s i b i l i t y of i t having a consciousness of i t s a c t i o n s . Thus, Huxley concluded, animal consciousness i s always an e f f e c t and never a cause. In a phrase d e s t i n e d to e x c i t e a good d e a l of conscious a c t i v i t y among h i s c r i t i c s , he d e s c r i b e d animal consciousness by u s i n g the analogy of a steam w h i s t l e . The consciousness of b r u t e s would appear t o be r e l a t e d t o the mechanism of t h e i r body simply as a c o l l a t e r a l product of i t s working, and t o be as com-p l e t e l y without any power of modifying t h a t working, as the steam w h i s t l e which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine i s without i n f l u e n c e upon i t s machinery. T h e i r v o l i t i o n , i f they have any, i s an emotion i n d i c a t i v e of p h y s i c a l changes, not a cause of such changes.•+ Yet, i t was not Huxley's negation of the consciousness of b r u t e s which provoked the heated response t o h i s paper. Huxley had dared t o apply h i s h y p o t h e s i s t o man. H i s manifest d e s i r e was t o make a f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o s c i e n c e , but Huxley's d i s c u s s i o n on animal automatism a l s o f u l f i l l e d another purpose, f o r h i s paper d e l i v e r e d one more blow i n the cause of i n t e l l e c t u a l a n t i c l e r i c a l i s m . Near the end of h i s l e c t u r e , Huxley ceased f i n a l l y t o pose any l o n g e r as the d i s p a s s i o n a t e b i o l o g i s t , motivated s o l e l y by h i s i n t e r e s t i n animal r e f l e x e s , and took up h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c b u l l d o g stance i n defence of f r e e thought. While a d m i t t i n g t h a t h i s d i s c u s s i o n of brute mentation would o f f e n d n e i t h e r P a p i s t or P r e s b y t y r , Huxley p r o v o c a t i v e l y d e c l a r e d t h a t having " l u x e r a t e d " i n the r a r e freedom p e r m i t t e d s c i e n t i s t , "to go as f a r as reason l e a d s , and stop where evidence comes to an e n d — w i t h o u t s p e e d i l y being deafened by the t a t t o o of the 'drum e c c l e s i s a s t i c , ' " he must now u n w i l l i n g l y prepare, he continued, t o r i s k t h e o l o g i c a l censure by a p p l y i n g h i s e x p l a n a t i o n t o man's 5 c o n s c i o u s n e s s , f o r should he f a i l t o do so, others would. A p o l o g i z i n g tongue-in-cheek, Huxley r e g r e t t e d t h a t the sheer i n c o n t r o v e r t i b i l i t y of the evidence had f o r c e d upon him these unwanted c o n c l u s i o n s : human consciousness i s l i k e t h a t of b r u t e s , and consciousness i s nothing e l s e but molecular changes i n b r a i n substance. As a l o g i c a l c o r o l l a r y t o t h i s t h e s i s , Huxley maintained t h a t the s t a t e of f e e l i n g g e n e r a l l y termed v o l i t i o n i s never a determinant of a c t i o n , but only "the symbol of t h a t s t a t e of b r a i n which i s the immediate cause of t h a t a c t . " ^ One i s f r e e t o do only what one's b r a i n has a l r e a d y decided upon before hand, without any conscious awareness of the d e c i s i o n . T h e r e f o r e a l l human a c t i o n f o l l o w s as the predetermined consequences of n a t u r a l causes; i t i s as simple as t h a t . Such was the substance of Huxley's r e a s o n i n g . S t r a n g e l y enough, c o n s i d e r i n g the tenor of h i s argument, he ended h i s address by r e j e c t i n g any attempt t o l a b e l him a " m a t e r i a l i s t , f a t a l i s t or a t h e i s t . " Nonetheless the i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s statements seemed c l e a r t o h i s l i s t e n e r s and were t o them unquestionably m a t e r i a l i s t i c , f a t a l i s t i c , and a t h e i s t i c . By means of h i s paper on conscious automatism, Huxley had i s s u e d a ch a l l e n g e t o the V i c t o r i a n p u b l i c t o admit the r i g h t of s c i e n c e t o express as f r e e l y i t s views on the nature of man as i t had the r i g h t t o do about the n a t u r a l world. 9 That i s t o say, he had s e i z e d the o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e i t e r a t e the very message of John T y n d a l l ' s p r e s i d e n t i a l address before t h a t same meeting at B e l f a s t of the B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n . Both men a f f i r m e d i n t h e i r own way the " i n h e r e n t " emnity of s c i e n c e towards both metaphysics and theology. T y n d a l l had d i s c u s s e d the h i s t o r y of s c i e n c e at great l e n g t h . He r e f e r r e d t o i t s e a r l y antecedents, p a r t i c u l a r l y the m a t e r i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h i e s of Democritus and E p i c u r u s , the ever present c o n f l i c t of s c i e n c e w i t h p h i l o s o p h i c i d e a l i s m , and the eventual suppres-s i o n of s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m by the medieval church. The c h i e f g l o r y of a n c i e n t s c i e n c e , T y n d a l l h e l d , was i t s un-f l i n c h i n g acceptance of the p r i n c i p l e of the constancy of matter i n the u n i v e r s e : "from nothing comes n o t h i n g , " the i n d e s t r u c t a b i l i t y of matter, and the b e l i e f t h a t a l l change r e s u l t s from a necessary cause: u l t i m a t e l y the combination and s e p a r a t i o n of atoms. T y n d a l l submitted t h a t the g r e a t d i s c o v e r i e s of V i c t o r i a n s c i e n c e had not s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r e d Democritus' p r o p o s i t i o n s . In c o n c l u d i n g h i s address, T y n d a l l f o r t h r i g h t l y proposed t o demarcate the spheres of r e l i g i o n and s c i e n c e , t o r e l e a s e s c i e n c e from any r e s t r a i n t s a g a i n s t f u r t h e r progress. R e l i g i o n , he d e c l a r e d , ought t o concern i t s e l f s o l e l y w i t h the expres-s i o n of sentiment: the f e e l i n g s of "Awe, Reverence and Wonder," thereby adding, " i n the r e g i o n of p o e t r y and emotion, inward 7 completeness and d i g n i t y t o man."' R e l i g i o n , so d e s t r u c t i v e of f r e e i n q u i r y i n the p a s t , cannot add anything t o the r e g i o n of o b j e c t i v e knowledge and thus should not be p e r m i t t e d t o 10 i n t e r f e r e with the proper t a s k of s c i e n c e : the search f o r impersonal t r u t h . By s e p a r a t i n g the r e s p e c t i v e domains of s c i e n c e and r e l i g i o n , T y n d a l l w i t h a l l the p r o v o c a t i v e confidence of a man f e e l i n g assured of the c e r t a i n v i c t o r y of h i s i d e a l s over h i s a d v e r s a r i e s ' unreasoned, f a i t h , claimed the r i g h t t o exclude r e l i g i o n from the p r i v i l e g e of u t t e r i n g any statement whatsoever about the p h y s i c a l u n i v e r s e . T y n d a l l , comparing systems of thought t o competing organisms w i t h i n the Darwinian scheme, demanded freedom from a l l t h e o l o g i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s t o a l l o w t r u t h (by t r u t h T y n d a l l meant h i s n o t i o n of s c i e n c e ) t o evolve f u r t h e r i n t o being: When t h i s t r u t h has been thoroughly taken i n , r i g i d i t y w i l l be r e l a x e d , e x c l u s i v e n e s s d i m i n i s h e d , t h i n g s now deemed e s s e n t i a l w i l l be dropped, and elements now r e j e c t e d w i l l be a s s i m i l a t e d . The l i f t i n g of the l i f e i s the e s s e n t i a l p o i n t , and as l o n g as dogmatism, f a n a t i c i s m , and i n t o l e r a n c e are kept out, v a r i o u s modes of l e v e r a g e may be employed t o r a i s e l i f e t o a h i g h e r l e v e l . 8 T y n d a l l T s l e c t u r e was a d e f i a n t r e f u s a l t o accept e i t h e r a s e l f - e f f a c i n g or secondary r o l e f o r s c i e n c e , or to acknowledge r e l i g i o n as the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of some h i g h e r form of t r u t h . S i m i l a r l y , Huxley had s e i z e d the o p p o r t u n i t y of the B e l f a s t meeting t o i s s u e h i s p e r s o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o the f o r c e s of unreason. Huxley had expected t h a t h i s extreme mec h a n i s t i c a n a l y s i s which he so v i g o r o u s l y put f o r t h would s t i r up s t i f f r e s i s t a n c e . He was c o r r e c t i n t h i s , but was mistaken about the sources of h i s c r i t i c i s m . Not the c l e r g y , but f e l l o w p h y s i o l o g i s t s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s took up Huxley's gage and d i s p u t e d h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t consciousness was nothing e l s e than the p a s s i v e , impotent r e c o r d of p h y s i c a l changes w i t h i n 11 the b r a i n . Yet, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t Huxley d i d not s e r i o u s l y o f f e r h i s ide a s as anything more than a prod t o awaken s c i e n t i s t s t o what he f e l t was t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : the a p p l i c a t i o n of the methodology of the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s t o the mind of man, h i t h e r t o the s o l e domain of p h i l o s o p h e r s and t h e o l o g i a n s . Perhaps Huxley only hoped he might g i v e courage t o some new and t i m i d Darwin who would do f o r the study of the mind something comparable t o the ot h e r ' s a c h i e v e -ments i n b i o l o g y . Whatever Huxley's reason, he needed a generous measure of a u d a c i t y t o make the i n d i r e c t s u g g e s t i o n t h a t the members of h i s V i c t o r i a n audience were automatons, a l b e i t conscious ones, without any t r u l y independent w i l l — t h i s i n a s o c i e t y where the dominant v a l u e s urged a man t o s t r i v e c o n c e r t e d l y and " e a r n e s t l y " f o r h i s f u l l share of m e r i t . As a consequence, Huxley's c l a i m d i d not go undebated. Were men only conscious automata, who m e c h a n i c a l l y adapted to t h e i r environment; or were men r a t i o n a l beings w i t h the c a p a c i t y t o f u l f i l l some h i g h e r moral nature through t h e i r own w i l f u l e f f o r t s ? To argue as Huxley appeared t o be doing t h a t consciousness c o u l d not a l t e r behavior i n any way, t h a t people's a c t i o n s , good or bad, were nothing more than r e f l e x e s stamped upon t h e i r c h a r a c t e r and beyond t h e i r w i l f u l c o n t r o l , no doubt posed a t h r e a t t o the s e l f - e s t e e m and t o the sense of moral e f f i c a c y of more than j u s t a few.^ Thus many of Huxley's opponents were d r i v e n t o v i n d i c a t e as a b i o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y those same moral precepts which formed such an 12 i n t e g r a l element w i t h i n t h e i r own c h a r a c t e r . More d i r e c t l y , t he d i s s e n t a g a i n s t the h y p o t h e s i s o f conscious automatism g e n e r a l l y c e n t r e d on the q u e s t i o n o f whether an i n d i v i d u a l ' s i n t e l l e c t u a l and p h y s i c a l responses were predetermined or the r e s u l t of h i s own v o l i t i o n . The p h y s i o l o g i s t , W i l l i a m B. Carpenter, found t h a t the problem o f conscious automatism had r e s u r r e c t e d t h a t chestnut of metaphysics: f r e e w i l l v e rsus determinism. Carpenter demanded t h a t Huxley r e c o g n i z e t h a t man has a conscience which guides h i s conduct. The supp o r t e r s of automatism, Carpenter thought, drew t h e i r c o n c l u s i o n not from any obser-v a t i o n o f human nat u r e , but from a commitment t o a p h i l o s o p h i c dogma. In r e a l i t y , the i n d i v i d u a l need not behave as a auto-maton; he always has, argued Carpenter, the o p t i o n t o choose what course o f a c t i o n he w i l l f o l l o w . Unless, of course, he has a d e f i n i t e p a t h o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r and i s t h e r e f o r e a "moral i d i o t , 1 * a man must r e c o g n i z e the d i s t i n c t i o n between r i g h t and wrong and must have a sense of duty: the d e s i r e t o act r i g h t l y or a t l e a s t i n conformity t o h i s own moral d i s t i n c t i o n s . Carpenter deduced from h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f the t h r e e f o l d i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p o f W i l l , the a t t e n t i o n p r o c e s s , and behavior the i n f e r e n c e t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l must a t a l l times accept the u l t i m a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r h i s a c t i o n s . He cannot blame h i s f a i l i n g s upon automatic r e f l e x e s o u t s i d e h i s c o n t r o l . The co n c l u d i n g passage of Carpenter's a r t i c l e i n The Contemporary Review communicates the f e e l i n g s o f those 13 concerned V i c t o r i a n t h i n k e r s t o whom Huxley's d o c t r i n e of conscious automatism seemed the i r r e s p o n s i b l e r a v i n g s of godles s man. Carpenter w r i t e s , I t i s then t h a t we sow what w i l l come up e i t h e r as a harve s t of wholesome nourishment t o the s p i r i t u a l - part of our nature, or as a growth of noxious weeds which inf l a m e the ' f l e s h l y l u s t s t h a t war a g a i n s t the s o u l . ' And i t i s then t h a t we l a y up i n our i n n e r chamber those accumulations o f good or e v i l t e n d e n c i e s which shape our f u t u r e course i n l i f e ; h e l p i n g us as with the hand o f an Angel whom we have e n t e r t a i n e d unawares, when we are e a r n e s t l y s t r i v i n g t o 'turn t o the r i g h t and keep s t r a i g h t on'; or dragging us down-ward, as with the grasp of a Nemesis, towards the lowest depths of s e l f i s h n e s s and s e n s u a l i t y , when we have knowingly allowed o u r s e l v e s t o take the f i r s t s t eps i n the f a c i l i s descensus A v e r n i . 1 0 Although not everyone agreed wholeheartedly with Carpenter's judgment t h a t the d o c t r i n e of conscious automatism i n d i c a t e d the Age's h u r r i e d descent i n t o d e p r a v i t y , c l e a r l y the d o c t r i n e had a s e r i o u s moral i m p l i c a t i o n . Huxley d i d not deny the e x i s t e n c e of consciousness, bat he d i d argue t h a t consciousness was only another e x p r e s s i o n of matter, t h a t consciousness c o u l d i n no way e f f e c t a p h y s i c a l response. Furthermore, i f Huxley's view was c o r r e c t , then, a l l of man's b e l i e f s , h i s reasoned knowledge, h i s i d e a l s , were e q u a l l y o f no importance; man was but an i n v o l u n t a r y c r e a t u r e wholly at the whim of b l i n d r e f l e x e s . Huxley's th e o r y of conscious automatism, by removing from a person a l l p o t e n t i a l f o r independent a c t i o n , a l s o removed from him any c a p a c i t y t o make a moral d e c i s i o n . I f a man cou l d not act other than as determined by s e n s a t i o n , how cou l d he-be c a l l e d t o account f o r h i s a c t i o n s ? Besides the d o c t r i n e had a humber of obvious 14 i n t e l l e c t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . For example, i t h a r d l y f i t t e d w i t h the apparent f a c t t h a t men sometimes c a r e f u l l y d e l i b e r a t e about t h e i r a c t i o n s before they attempt t o c a r r y them i n t o e x e c u t i o n . George Henry Lewes, one of Huxley's c r i t i c s , put forward the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t the evidence seemed t o prove t h a t the mind a c t u a l l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h the s e n s a t i o n s which i t was about t o experience. Lewes, who devoted n e a r l y two hundred pages of h i s P h y s i c a l B a s i s of Mind t o a d i s c u s s i o n of automatism, h e l d t h a t consciousness, i t s e l f , was an agent and was not s o l e l y 12 the r e s u l t of the preceding p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e . In h i s view a man does not r e a c t wholly s u b m i s s i v e l y t o h i s surround-i n g s . The environment produces a s e n s a t i o n as w e l l as a conscious experience of i t — w h a t one means by the term f e e l i n g — w h i c h allows him t o a n t i c i p a t e the probable s e n s a t i o n s , d e s i r a b l e or otherwise, about t o f o l l o w . F o r t u n a t e l y , a person may act i n such a manner as t o prevent t h i s l i k e l i h o o d from t a k i n g p l a c e ; but without the f a c t of consciousness the i n i t i a l s e r i e s would n e c e s s a r i l y continue without any m o d i f i c a t i o n . As Lewes put i t , the f e e l i n g which accompanies a muscular c o n t r a c t i o n i s the s t i m u l u s of the c o n t r a c t i o n . Lewes used t o i l l u s t r a t e h i s p o i n t the example of a man with h i s eyes c l o s e d who s l i d e s h i s hand along a t a b l e he d i s c o v e r s a wet patch and then e i t h e r suspends the movement of h i s hand or a l t e r s i t s d i r e c t i o n . From t h i s Lewes drew the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t consciousness i s not j u s t an e f f e c t caused by the e n v i r o n -ment , but an a c t i v e agent as w e l l ; a person does not only 15 r e a c t t o h i s surroundings, he i n t e r a c t s w i t h them by c o n t i n u a l l y making new t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n s as f u r t h e r knowledge of h i s environment warrants them. ^  In fact., Lewes was developing here something a k i n t o the c y b e r n e t i c i s t s ' n o t i o n of "feedback," an approach t o be more f u l l y developed i n the n i n e t e e n t h cen-t u r y by Ri c h a r d Avenarius. N e v e r t h e l e s s , whatever the success of Huxley's attempt t o p r o v i d e a " s c i e n t i f i c " account of human conduct, he d i d draw a t t e n t i o n t o the f a c t t h a t s c i e n c e had f a i l e d t o r e a l i z e the e x p e c t a t i o n s of the ei g h t e e n t h century philosophes and the n i n e t e e n t h century p o s i t i v i s t s , who t r u s t e d t h a t one day s c i e n c e would r e v e a l a u n i v e r s e of n a t u r a l laws t o which men might adapt themselves and thereby l i v e a c c o r d i n g t o the d i c t a t e s of reason. At a l l events, Huxley had a p p a r e n t l y d e r i v e d h i s the o r y from a law of nature, i n t h i s case the law of the c o n s e r v a t i o n of energy, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t i t was im p o s s i b l e f o r him t o conceive of consciousness having any i n f l u e n c e upon p h y s i c a l a c t i v i t y . Thus Huxley's s c i e n t i f i c psychology not only s t a t e d t h a t reason seemingly had no e f f e c t upon behavior; but, i n a d d i t i o n , i m p l i e d t h a t man's understanding of the mechanical processes of nature was i n c a p a b l e of p r o v i d i n g him wit h a s t o r e of u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n from which he co u l d deduce what c o n s t i t u t e d a r a t i o n a l way of a c t i n g . Huxley had cut the ground from under the t r u s t of George Henry Lewes t h a t , When Science has f a i r l y mastered the p r i n c i p l e s of moral r e l a t i o n s , a l l Knowledge w i l l be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n a homogeneous d o c t r i n e r i v a l i n g t h a t of the o l d 16 t h e o l o g i e s i n i t s comprehensiveness, and s u r p a s s i n g i t i n the a u t h o r i t y of i t s c r e d e n t i a l s . ' C h r i s t i a n E t h n i c s ' w i l l then no lon g e r mean E t h i c s founded on the p r i n c i p l e s of C h r i s t i a n Theology, but on the p r i n c i p l e s e x p r e s s i n g the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s and d u t i e s of man i n C h r i s t i a n i z e d s o c i e t y . 13 Lewes' p o s i t i v i s t hope t h a t the o b s e r v a t i o n s and l o g i c o f the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s would e v e n t u a l l y p r o v i d e mankind wi t h a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y bore no f r u i t . More i m p o r t a n t l y , a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of Huxley's paper a Late V i c t o r i a n might a r r i v e a t one of two c o n c l u s i o n s . He might venture the o p i n i o n t h a t mental processes d i d not wholly r e l a t e t o the n a t u r a l world because they r e f l e c t e d the presence of s u p e r n a t u r a l f o r c e . Or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , he might conclude t h a t s c i e n c e had so f a r not succeeded i n d i s c l o s i n g t h a t hidden law of nat u r e , which shed l i g h t upon the a f f i n i t y between the p h y s i c a l world and human consci o u s n e s s , l e t alone b u i l d a r a t i o n a l m o r a l i t y upon i t . S t i l l , t h e r e were a few who p r e f e r r e d t o r e t a i n the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t s c i e n c e must always assume t h a t every event has u l t i m a t e l y a n a t u r a l source. F o l l o w i n g t h i s assumption, the q u e s t i o n t h a t they p r e f e r r e d t o ask of Huxley's d o c t r i n e o f conscious automatism was whether or not i t n e c e s s a r i l y expressed the onl y c r e d i b l e , n a t u r a l i s t i c account o f human mentation and conduct. I n other words, need a t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c psychology be committed i n e v i t a b l y t o the premises and assump-t i o n s o f m a t e r i a l i s m ? Huxley's l o g i c had l e d him t o conclude t h a t consciousness c o u l d not i n f l u e n c e human behavior. He had f o l l o w e d a s t r i c t l y m a t e r i a l i s t l i n e of r e a s o n i n g : t h a t i s t o say, i f energy i s no t h i n g more than moving m a t t e r — H e l m h o l t z ' s 17 view--then the source of human a c t i v i t y must be from a form of m o l e c u l a r movement, t r a n s m i t t e d from the sensory r e c e p t o r s over the pathways of the nerves through the b r a i n , and again along the nerves, u n t i l i t i s f i n a l l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o muscular responses. Furthermore, the d i r e c t cause of the n e u r a l motion i n the f i r s t p l a c e was s e n s a t i o n , a c t u a l l y an i n d i v i d u a l ' s r e c e p t i o n through h i s sense organs of s t i m u l i from the e n v i r o n -ment; t h u s , t o a l l appearances, human behavior f o l l o w e d the p a t t e r n o f a r e f l e x a r c . In t h i s view, i t was d i f f i c u l t t o see how thought, u n l e s s i t was another form of matter, c o u l d a f f e c t the course of a c e r e b r a l r e f l e x . B e s i d e s , even i f consciousness and matter were but two d i f f e r e n t forms of a s i n g l e substance, as the p h i l o s o p h e r W.K. C l i f f o r d argued, i t would s t i l l be i m p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n how a man co u l d f e e l h i m s e l f , at times, p o s s e s s i n g the a b i l i t y t o choose between v a r i o u s courses of a c t i o n , i f h i s thoughts were always a r e f l e c t i o n of a predetermined m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n . How co u l d t h e r e be any k i n d of v o l i t i o n when every n e u r a l response must f o l l o w from some movement of matter t a k i n g p l a c e w i t h i n the b r a i n , a movement which must have a l r e a d y been i n s t i t u t e d by a preceding m a t e r i a l change? C l e a r l y , the d o c t r i n e of conscious automatism presented c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of such a nature t h a t even those who were not i n c l i n e d t o r e j e c t i t on emotional grounds t r e a t e d i t s k e p t i c a l l y . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Huxley's paper had served t o r a i s e important questions about the r e l a t i o n s h i p 18 o f p s y c h o l o g y t o m e t a p h y s i c s . What, a f t e r a l l , was c o n s c i o u s -n ess? Was i t , as some c l a i m e d , t h e m i x t u r e o f p h y s i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and d i v i n e l y i n s p i r e d i n t u i t i o n s , or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , was i t m e r e l y t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n o f immediate, remembered and a n t i c i p a t e d s e n s a t i o n s o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n ? A f t e r Huxley had r e a d h i s paper L a t e V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g y c o u l d no l o n g e r b r u s h a s i d e t h e moot p o i n t o f whether or not man's thought p r o c e s s e s were t h e p r o d u c t o f n a t u r a l or s u p e r n a t u r a l causes. S h o u l d t h e l a t t e r v i e w prove t r u e , t h e n t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f s c i e n c e were c l e a r l y e v i d e n t , but s h o u l d t h e f o r m e r p r e v a i l , one would s t i l l have t o admit t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s account o f man's r e l a t i o n t o t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d s u f f e r e d f r o m o b v i o u s d e f e c t s . Hence, e i t h e r o p i n i o n b e i n g c o r r e c t , one would have t o c o n c l u d e t h a t m a t e r i a l i s m ' s c l a i m s t o d e s c r i b e t h e n a t u r a l w o r l d a c c u r a t e l y and e x h a u s t i v e l y were f r a u d u l e n t . Moreover, one would a l s o have t o q u e s t i o n whether p s y c h o l o g y c o u l d t r u l y c a l l i t s e l f a s c i e n c e , u n l e s s i t w i l l i n g l y committed i t s e l f t o t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n i m p l i c i t i n m a t e r i a l i s m . P e r h a p s , p s y c h o l o g y would have t o admit t h a t t h e f a c t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s s t o o d o u t s i d e t h e l i m i t e d comprehension of t h e n a t u r a l i s t . Thus, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g H u x l e y ' s s c i e n t i f i c r e p u t a -t i o n , a number of t h o u g h t f u l V i c t o r i a n s remained u n c o n v i n c e d t h a t man was an automaton and s u b m i t t e d t h a t h i s r e p u d i a t i o n o f man's s p i r i t u a l b e i n g was b o t h h a s t y and i l l - c o n s i d e r e d . F o r one c r i t i c , t h e p s y c h i c a l r e s e a r c h e r , F.W.H. Myers, t h e d a t a a c c u m u l a t i n g from r e s e a r c h i n t o h y p n o t i c t r a n c e 19 s t a t e s o f f e r e d s t r o n g arguments i n favour of the view t h a t v a r i a t i o n s i n . c o n s c i o u s n e s s d i d , a f t e r a l l , cause l a t e r p h y s i c a l responses. In any case, i t was becoming obvious t o those who, l i k e Myers, were acquainted w i t h h y p n o t i c phenome-na, t h a t a f a r r e a c h i n g r e v i s i o n of c u r r e n t n o t i o n s about consciousness, subconsciousness, automatism and v o l i t i o n would have t o take p l a c e before they would be i n accord with the known f a c t s about hypnotism, f o r hypnotism seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t a "secondary c o n s c i o u s n e s s " e x e r c i s e d unknown powers over 15 the i n d i v i d u a l . C e r t a i n l y , on t h i s b a s i s i t looked as i f p s y c h o l o g i s t s ought t o i n f e r t h a t the mind was something more than a r e f l e c t i o n of "matter i n motion." Besides, they reasoned, i f Huxley and h i s m a t e r i a l i s t c o l l e a g u e s were i n e r r o r , would i t be so wrong f o r a man t o suppose t h a t the moral a s p i r a t i o n s of humanity had, a f t e r a l l , some purpose behind them. F r e d e r i c k W i l l i a m Henry Myers was one man among others who ventured t o r a i s e t h i s q u e s t i o n , and thereby found a way t o r e c o n c i l e s c i e n c e w i t h r e l i g i o n . He b e l i e v e d t h a t c e r t a i n unusual phenomena, among them c l a i r v o y a n c e and t e l e p a t h y , suggested t h a t t h e r e were imma t e r i a l f o r c e s — n o t e n t i r e l y ' d i s s i m i l a r t o some of the n o t i o n s h e l d by m y s t i c s — w h i c h operate upon the nonconscious l e v e l s of the mind. Myers e n t e r t a i n e d the i d e a t h a t i f he observed the canons of the s c i e n t i f i c method and confirmed c e r t a i n p s y c h i c a l experiences w i t h r i g i d t e s t s , then he would have an obvious c h a l l e n g e t o the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s c o nception of the world. But beyond even 20 these f a r reaching a s p i r a t i o n s , Myers wished t o a f f i r m con-c l u s i v e l y the t r u t h of mankind's most a l l u r i n g dream: the promise of e t e r n a l l i f e . On the other hand, another Late V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t disputed the contention that consciousness n e c e s s a r i l y sub-ve r t e d the n a t u r a l i s t ' s point of view. Although he r e a d i l y acknowledged t h a t consciousness played an immense r o l e i n behavior, George F r e d e r i c k Stout b e l i e v e d that i t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e t o construct a t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c psychology. Psychology would, however, f i r s t have t o recognize t h a t a p h y s i o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of mental s t a t e s was, at present, f a r beyond i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s . Although unable t o f i n d f a u l t w i t h the m a t e r i a l -i s t ' s c o r r e l a t i o n of behavior and s e n s a t i o n , and unable t o deny the importance of consciousness, Stout concluded that he must suspend a l l metaphysical judgments, u n t i l a time came when f u r t h e r knowledge would show the exact r e l a t i o n s h i p of mind t o matter. I f psychology must make the choice between the a l t e r n a t i v e s of n a t u r a l i s m and mysticism, he b e l i e v e d i t must declare i t s e l f on the s i d e of science. 21 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I T.H. Huxley. "On the P h y s i c a l Basis ef L i f e , " ( f i r s t p ublished i n 1 8 6 8 ) , Method and R e s u l t s , New York, D. Appleton, 1 3 9 8 , p. 1 6 0 . 2 G.J. Romanes, "The F a l l a c y of M a t e r i a l i s m , " The Nineteenth  Century, v o l . 12 (July-Dec. 1 #82 ) , p. 879. 3 T.H. Huxley, "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata and I t s H i s t o r y , " The F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 16 (July-Dec. 1 * 7 4 ) , PP. 557 -562T fa  ^ I b i d . , p. 575. 5 I b i d . , p. 576. W , p. 577. 7 J . T y n d a l l , "The B e l f a s t Address," Fragments of Science, London, Longmans Green, 1907, v o l . 2, p. 1967 g I b i d . , p. 197. 9 Cf. G.H. Lewes' remark t o the e f f e c t that the "general p u b l i c " was sca n d a l i z e d by Huxley's address. G.H. Lewes, The  P h y s i c a l Basis of Mind, London, Trubner, 1 8 7 7 , p. 3 8 9 . "^ W.B. Carpenter, "On the Doctrine of Human Automatism," The Contemporary Review, v o l . 25 (Dec. 1874-May 1 8 7 5 ) , p. 9 6 1 . "^v. Appendix A. 12 G.H. Lewes, The P h y s i c a l Basis of Mind, London, Trubner, 1877. 1 3G.H. Lewes, "The Dread and D i s l i k e of Science," The  F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 23 (Jan.-June 1 8 7 8 ) , p. 3 1 5 . 1 / f¥.K. C l i f f o r d , "Body and Mind," The F o r t n i g h t l y Review, v o l . 16 (July-Dec. I 8 7 4 ) , pp. 7 1 4 - 7 3 6 . 15 J. Milne Bramwell, "What i s Hypnotism?" Proceedings of the S o c i e t y f o r P s y c h i c a l Research, v o l . 12, 1 8 9 6 - 7, pp. 204-2W. I I . V I C T O R I A N P S Y C H O L O G Y — A D A R W I N I A N M Y S T I C I S M OR A P R A G M A T I C S C I E N C E ? 23 G.M. Young, the author of P o r t r a i t of An Age, has po i n t e d out t h a t the l a s t y e a r s of the n i n e t e e n t h century gave evidence of a widespread search f o r a new f a i t h , one t h a t c o u l d be r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h the a u t h o r i t a t i v e judgments of s c i e n c e . . . . from In Memoriam t o The Woods of Westermain, from the Choruses of The Dynasts, we can f o l l o w the s e c u l a r i n t e l l e c t s eeking i t s way t o such an apprehension of Being as Process as might h e r e a f t e r r e c o n c i l e the s p i r i t u a l demands of humanity with the ra p t and cosmic i n d i f f e r e n c e of E v o l u t i o n . 1 S i m i l a r l y , the h i s t o r i a n , A.O.J. Cockshut has d e s c r i b e d the p l i g h t of the V i c t o r i a n a g n o s t i c s who renounced many of the dogmas of t h e i r u p b r i n g i n g , yet t r i e d t o i n c o r p o r a t e some-2 t h i n g of t h e i r l o s t f a i t h i n t o f r e s h e t h i c a l r a t i o n a l e s . But w h i l e these s k e p t i c s r e j e c t e d the fun d a m e n t a l i s t t h e o l o g y of P u r i t a n i s m , they s t i l l r e t a i n e d much of i t s substance; at the core of t h e i r " a l t e r n a t i v e r e l i g i o n s " l a y the h e a r t f e l t b e l i e f i n the p e r s o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the i n d i v i d u a l t o exert him-s e l f t o h i s utmost i n order t o ensure the supremacy of v i r t u e and n o b i l i t y over the f o r c e s of d e p r a v i t y and egoism. Most a g n o s t i c s t r u s t e d t h a t e v i l was not an i n e x p l i c a b l e chance event i n a contingent u n i v e r s e ; i t was not some in n a t e b i o l o g i c a l need t o des t r o y ; i t was not even an e x i s t e n t f a c t . E v i l was i n s t e a d the ne g a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n of moral v a c i l l a t i o n , the consequence of a f a i l i n g t o make a t o t a l commitment t o the ta s k of e r a d i c a t i n g a l l t e n d e n c i e s towards s e l f - i n d u l g e n c e , v a n i t y , greed and the other f o i b l e s of humanity.3 N e v e r t h e l e s s , the Late V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l , who maintained a s t r o n g f a i t h 24 i n the moral i m p e r a t i v e s of r i g h t a c t i o n , conduct and thought, had a concurrent d i f f i c u l t y i n e x p l a i n i n g the b a s i s of t h i s f a i t h , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e e v o l u t i o n appeared t o have e l i m i n a t e d both the i d e a l of a s u p e r n a t u r a l L e g i s l a t o r and the o b l i g a t i o n t o obey h i s d i v i n e ordinances. But while the t h e o l o g i c a l r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s " e a r n e s t n e s s , " i n h e r i t e d from the P u r i t a n s , seemed t o have evaporated, the post Darwinian g e n e r a t i o n s t i l l f a c e d the awkward ta s k of v i n d i c a t i n g t h e i r b e l i e f s . Consequently, they were d r i v e n t o search out a v a r i e t y of s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses and p h i l o s o p h i c t h e o r i e s , hoping always t o b u t t r e s s an i n s e c u r e f a i t h , hoping always t h a t t h e i r moral impulses were t r u l y the m a n i f e s t a t i o n of some obscure but r i g h t e o u s power l a t e n t w i t h i n the u n i v e r s e . Yet, they t r u s t e d , should they f a i l i n t h i s endeavour, at l e a s t t h e i r e f f o r t s would prove t h a t man had, a f t e r a l l , the c a p a c i t y t o under-stand h i m s e l f and h i s u n i v e r s e through the e x e r c i s e of reason. Although h i s t o r i a n s have long r e c o g n i z e d t h a t i n the years r o u g h l y between 1830 and 1870 a p r o f u s i o n of B r i t a i n ' s l e a d i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l s underwent the emotional t u r m o i l of a r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s , few h i s t o r i a n s have so f a r ventured t o connect t h i s debacle with the s e m i - m y s t i c a l nature of the i n t e l l e c t u a l views p r e v a l e n t i n the l a s t years of the n i n e -t e e n t h century and the f i r s t decade of the t w e n t i e t h . But such a r e l a t i o n s h i p d i d e x i s t , f o r i n many i n s t a n c e s men formed c e r t a i n i n t e l l e c t u a l conceptions l a r g e l y because these judgments c o n v e n i e n t l y served t o r e p l a c e a now q u e s t i o n a b l e f a i t h . 2 5 One must remember t h a t f o r many a l o s s of f a i t h was not a sudden c a t a c l y s m i c event, a c o n v e r s i o n i n r e v e r s e , but a slow a g o n i z i n g s e r i e s , f i r s t of p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n s of b e l i e f and then, counter d e n i a l s of the same dogmatic p o i n t s . No sooner d i d these unhappy V i c t o r i a n s sense t h a t they had gained a f e e l i n g of c e r t a i n t y i n one judgment about the s p i r i t u a l nature of man or the d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s o f Jesus, than, they found t h i s s u r e t y had evaporated i n the f a c e of new doubts. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r slow progress from a s t a t e of a b s o l u t e d e s p a i r t o a new mood of confidence and reassurance came about more from a s u b s t i t u t i o n of a new c e r t a i n t y , r a t h e r than from any p o s i t i v e r e p u d i a t i o n of t h e i r former c o n v i c t i o n s . A g n o s t i c i s m was t o them an admission of t h e i r ignorance; not a statement d i s p l a y i n g an apathy towards t h e o l o g i c a l matters. The r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t they were the f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n t o f e e l the moral v a c u i t y of an e x i s t e n c e i n a world without God gave no cause f o r e x u l t a t i o n or triumph; t h e i r newly d i s c o v e r e d freedom brought w i t h i t deep-seated m i s g i v i n g s . Was man r e a l l y n o t h i n g more than a wretched a c c i d e n t of b l i n d matter? These i r r e s o l u t e V i c t o r i a n s shrank from the aweful i n d i f f e r -ence of a contingent u n i v e r s e . I f only they c o u l d f i n d some purpose behind nature, i f only they c o u l d prove t h a t man was something more than a c a l c u l a t i n g b r u t e , then, so they reasoned, they c o u l d j u s t i f i a b l y show f r e s h grounds f o r reas s u r a n c e , even though the f a i t h of t h e i r c h i l d h o o d remained f o r e v e r d i s c r e d i t e d . E v e n t u a l l y , a number of i n t e l l e c t u a l s .26 r e p l a c e d t h e i r C h r i s t i a n b e l i e f s with a new p h i l o s o p h i c or s c i e n t i f i c d o c t r i n e . These new-fashioned creeds had the advantage of not only appearing as an o b j e c t i v e , r a t i o n a l statement about the world; but at the same time, these c o n v i c t i o n s promised t o f u r n i s h a modicum of hope and c o n s o l a t i o n . To grasp f u l l y the predicament f a c e d by many Late V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s , one must r e a l i z e t h a t the l o s s of r e l i g i o u s f a i t h c o u l d mean the l o s s of a l l f a i t h : f a i t h i n themselves, i n mankind and indeed i n the value of l i f e i t s e l f . Witness t h i s l e t t e r from the p s y c h o l o g i s t James Ward, then twenty-nine: A l l my doubts p h i l o s o p h i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l notwith-s t a n d i n g , I am sure of t h i s as a p r a c t i c a l t r u t h — reason, c o n s c i e n c e , experience back me up as I say i t , I say i t w i t h my whole s o u l - - I have no doubt of God's i n f i n i t e f a t h e r l y p a t i e n c e and l o v e : when I d e s p a i r of myself I f i n d new hope i n what He i s . . . S e l f i s one's b a n e - - s e l f i t i s which d e f l e c t s the w i l l , the needle of our s p i r i t u a l compass. How are we t o know? Were the heavens f o r e v e r dark we would not perhaps at once, but t h e r e are s t a r s and l i g h t above even the d r e a r i e s t sea of doubt. S p i r i t u a l shipwreck t o an honest man or to any man u n c o n s c i o u s l y i s doubly i m p o s s i b l e . In a l l t h i s , i n the p r a c t i c a l , what I want i s not l i g h t but grace, t o be taken up i n t o a h i g h e r l i f e and d e l i v e r e d from the treacherous s e l f . I t e l l you Wolstenhome, I have no dread of God, no f e a r of the D e v i l , no f e a r of man, but my head swims as I w r i t e i t — I f e a r myself. Oh God d e l i v e r me or I p e r i s h I There i t ends. To t h i s I come back: "Beloved, i f our heart condemn us, God i s g r e a t e r than our heart and knowth a l l t h i n g s . "A-James Ward e v e n t u a l l y overcame h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s , but only a f t e r he was convinced t h a t he had d i s c o v e r e d evidence i n d i c a t i n g t h a t some s p i r i t u a l f o r c e was promoting the 27 e v o l u t i o n a r y development of the m a t e r i a l world. L i k e a number of V i c t o r i a n t h i n k e r s , Ward spent h i s l i f e i n a quest f o r s c i e n t i f i c proof which he c o u l d use t o confirm the o b j e c t i v e v a l i d i t y of h i s own moral impulses. T h i s c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between Ward's emotional needs and what he took t o be t r u l y . s c i e n t i f i c judgments about the n a t u r a l world was not uncommon i n the t h i n k i n g of a s i g n i f i c a n t s e c t i o n of England's academic and s c i e n t i f i c community. Ward's l i f e i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t over-powering need, which a f f e c t e d a number of V i c t o r i a n and Edwardian a g n o s t i c s , t o j u s t i f y p e r s o n a l moral impulses as the inward e x p r e s s i o n of nature's i n t r i n s i c e t h i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n . L i k e the e i g h t e e n t h century philosophes these a g n o s t i c s f e l t c e r t a i n t h a t t h e i r sense of r i g h t and wrong must somehow or other d e r i v e from t h e i r i n t u i t i v e grasp of n a t u r a l law. S c i e n c e , they t r u s t e d , would expose the e r r o r of Huxley's views; i t would r e v e a l t h a t man was not a dumb c r e a t u r e wholly at the beck and nod of b l i n d r e f l e x e s , , but a being who c o u l d by means of h i s transcendent reason dimly make out the grand d e s i g n of a f a r s e e i n g Providence. Although one might w e l l have doubts whether or not the i n t e l l i g e n t p u b l i c took Huxley's views s e r i o u s l y enough t o have w o r r i e s about being mere automatons, i t i s c e r t a i n t h a t t h e r e was indeed a widespread apprehension about the moral i m p l i c a t i o n s of m a t e r i a l i s m . Admittedly, Huxley's e f f o r t s t o found a m a t e r i a l i s t psychology f a i l e d because he was f o r c e d t o deny, i n s p i t e of everyone's experiences t o the c o n t r a r y , t h a t a man's f e e l i n g s and judgments had any e f f e c t on h i s 28 b e h a v i o r . T h o u g h t f u l E n glishmen dreaded, n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e e v e n t u a l s u c c e s s o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n e . P e r h a p s , t h e day would come, t h e y f e a r e d , when someone w i t h a more s o p h i s t i -c a t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p h y s i o l o g y would show how a person's t h o u g h t s and a c t i o n s were t r u l y t h e p r o d u c t o f n a t u r a l f o r c e s , and t h e r e b y a c h i e v e i n p s y c h o l o g y something comparable t o what Darwin had a c c o m p l i s h e d i n b i o l o g y . They shrank b e f o r e t h e p r o s p e c t o f a w o r l d where n e i t h e r a b s o l u t e good, nor a b s o l u t e e v i l e x i s t e d . They f e a r e d a l i f e d e v o i d o f t h e welcome s o l a c e o f knowing t h a t t h e i r l i v e s were both r i g h t and good inasmuch as t h e y c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e d i c t a t e s o f a h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y , a power whose w i l l was r e v e a l e d by t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y a s p i r a t i o n s o f emergent n a t u r e . Faced w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t a l l o f man's hopes, dreams and d e s i r e s might be no more t h a n some a b s u r d p e r m u t a t i o n of m a t t e r , not a few concerned L a t e V i c t o r i a n s wondered whether s c i e n c e must n e c e s s a r i l y be committed t o t h e m a t e r i a l i s t o u t l o o k . B e h i n d t h e c r i t i q u e o f s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m put f o r -ward by James Ward, i t i s p o s s i b l e e a s i l y t o d e t e c t Ward's f u n d a m e n t a l l y s p i r i t u a l c o n c e r n . Ward contended t h a t n a t u r a l s c i e n c e had e r r e d i n d e n y i n g t h e s u b j e c t i v e , m o r a l and human elements i n e v o l u t i o n . He hoped t h a t u l t i m a t e l y e v o l u t i o n would mean the e r a d i c a t i o n of m o r a l e v i l f r o m t h e w o r l d . S i n c e t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n n a t u r e e q u i v a l e n t t o o r i g i n a l s i n , e v i l , he e x p l a i n e d , must be o n l y a k i n d o f d i s o r d e r , t h e c o n f u s i o n o f not knowing where one's r e a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t l i e s . Thus e v i l i s i d e n t i c a l w i t h i r r a t i o n a l i t y . W h i l e an 29 i n d i v i d u a l may observe t h a t the n a t u r a l world e x h i b i t s a d e f i n i t e p h y s i c a l p r o g r e s s i o n , a r i s i n g from the c o n f l i c t be-tween the s p e c i e s , he may a l s o d i s c o v e r t h a t of g r e a t e r im-portance than N a t u r a l S e l e c t i o n i s man's advancement from " r a t i o n a l s e l e c t i o n . " By r a t i o n a l s e l e c t i o n , Ward meant the compelling d e s i r e w i t h i n a man t o see the g r e a t e r dominion of the e t h i c a l , so t h a t , i n h i s words, " j u s t i c e may be supreme." Ward b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s d e s i r e gave evidence of s p i r i t u a l depths i n man, unrecognized by the b i o l o g i c a l egoism of n a t u r a l s e l e c t i o n , which, he r e g r e t t e d , had l a t e l y and u n f o r t u n a t e l y spawned the N i e t z s c h i a n i d e a l of the Heldenmoral. Ward argued t h a t the experimental psychology of the ni n e t e e n t h century i g n o r e d a fundamental e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l prob-lem: how a person l e g i t i m a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s between h i s own s u b j e c t i v e consciousness and what appears t o him as the o b j e c t i v e source of s e n s a t i o n , i n other words, the C a r t e s i a n dualism of mind and body. G e n e r a l l y most p h i l o s o p h e r s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s had attempted t o r e s o l v e t h i s C a r t e s i a n s e p a r a t i o n from one of two d i s t i n c t p o s i t i o n s . E i t h e r a l l r e a l i t y was mind, the c o n c l u s i o n of the i d e a l i s t , or a l l was matter, the m a t e r i a l i s t ' s s o l u t i o n . In one r e s p e c t the two views are s i m i l a r , f o r both are monisms; they reduce a l l e x i s t e n t phenomena t o the a c t i o n s of s i n g l e e n t i t y . Some, t h e r e f o r e , equated psychology w i t h the a n a l y s i s of i n t r o s p e c -t i o n , w h i l e others thought psychology t o be synonymous with the measurement of p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n s . 30 Ward disagreed wi t h Huxley and the m a t e r i a l i s t s , and emphatically r e j e c t e d t h e i r assumption that matter must always be the s o l e causal partner i n the d u a l i t y of mind and body. Ward's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o psychology was t o a s s e r t u n e q u i v o c a l l y that p h y s i o l o g i c a l changes were not the whole source of consciousness f o r , i n h i s view, the mental a t t i t u d e of the organism, i t s e l f , could e f f e c t p h y s i c a l r e a c t i o n s . As e a r l y as 1876, Ward had c r i t i c i z e d the founder of psychophysics, Gustav Fechner, on the same grounds.^ Fechner had proposed that the s u b j e c t i v e experience of a sensation r e l a t e d p r o p o r t i o n a l l y t o the i n t e n s i t y of the stimulus. Ward, however, argued that i n the experiment from which Fechner had deri v e d h i s c o n c l u s i o n , the subject o c c a s i o n a l l y misjudged the t h r e s h o l d - i n t e n s i t y of the stimulus. The e x p e r i -ment i n d i c a t e d t o Ward that s u b j e c t i v e perception had played an a c t i v e r o l e i n the experience of the se n s a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e he concluded th a t p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n s were not e n t i r e l y independent of consciousness. Fechner had compensated f o r t h i s s u b j e c t i v e e r r o r by s t a t i s t i c a l l y e l i m i n a t i n g i t . Thus the mathematical r e l a t i o n s h i p of a stimulus t o a sensation might express only the law of averages, and was not n e c e s s a r i l y a d e s c r i p t i o n of a c t u a l i n s t a n c e s . Later i n Ward's G i f f o r d l e c t u r e s of l$96-98, t h i s f a i l u r e t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between an a c t u a l event and the h y p o t h e t i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n of many s i m i l a r events and i n t h i s case com-pressed i n t o a s c i e n t i f i c law, drove him t o attack many of the fundamental premises of nineteenth century s c i e n c e , and i n 31 p a r t i c u l a r the t h e o r i e s of Herbert Spencer. Ward t r e a t e d w i t h much s u s p i c i o n m a t e r i a l i s m ' s e f f o r t s t o reduce a l l phenomena t o the c a u s e - e f f e c t r e c i p r o c i t y between matter and motion. As Ward e x p l a i n e d , f o r the most p a r t , the i d e a of an e f f e c t r e s u l t i n g from a cause a c t u a l l y t e l l s us l i t t l e , s i n c e we can never be c e r t a i n which i s the cause and which i s the e f f e c t . Thus w h i l e the p h y s i c i s t s speak of c a u s a l r e l a t i o n -s h i p s e x i s t i n g between masses, there can, i n f a c t , only be a cause when the a c t i o n i s determined by an e x t e r n a l agent and when the s e r i e s of r e s u l t i n g a c t i o n s f o l l o w one another i n a d e f i n i t e time-order sequence. B e s i d e s , the p h y s i c i s t s had tended t o confuse a s t a t i s t i c a l c onception w i t h r e a l i t y . Matter i s not mass, Ward s t a t e d : . . . a 'mass' means merely a concrete number, i . e . the term stands f o r a s p e c i f i c q u a n t i t y not f o r a concrete t h i n g ; mass i s a mathematical conception de v i s e d s o l e l y t o f a c i l i t a t e c a l c u l a t i o n and was H never meant t o a i d r a t i o n a l i n s i g h t or understanding. Ward thought t h a t the o p i n i o n s expressed by Spencer and the g r e a t m a j o r i t y of n a t u r a l i s t s were m i s l e a d i n g . Ward b e l i e v e d t h e i r vaunted laws of s c i e n c e t o be l i t t l e more than s u b j e c t i v e f i c t i o n s . The s c i e n t i s t s , he e x p l a i n e d , seemed t o want t o a v o i d d i s c u s s i n g the r e a l i t i e s of matter, and emphasized i n s t e a d only c e r t a i n q u a n t i f i a b l e , s p a t i a l and temporal r e l a t i o n -s h i p s . They had mistaken the part f o r the whole, q u a l i t i e s f o r substances; these laws of s c i e n c e r e f l e c t e d not the neces-sary p r o p e r t i e s of e x i s t e n t matter, but only an order imposed upon nature by the human mind. 32 Here Ward was r e p e a t i n g , i n essence, the E n g l i s h H e g e l i a n s ' c r i t i q u e of m a t e r i a l i s m which had sprung from t h e i r n o t i o n of the "concrete u n i v e r s a l . " The Hegelians d i s t i n g u i s h between a s i n g l e , observable f a c t and the g e n e r a l c l a s s of s i m i l a r f a c t s or t h i n g s under which i t c o u l d be grouped. An example would be the s c i e n t i f i c u n i v e r s a l of water f r e e z i n g o 9 at 0 C and the concrete r e a l i t y of an a c t u a l pond f r e e z i n g . The s c i e n t i f i c statement had e l i m i n a t e d numerous unknown and n o n q u a n t i f i a b l e v a r i a b l e s i n order t o put i n t o words the a b s t r a c t t r u t h found by emphasizing the p r o p e r t i e s common t o a l l bodies of water. T h i s d i f f e r e n c e between concrete r e a l i t i e s and s c i e n t i f i c a b s t r a c t i o n s , r e c o g n i z e d by Ward and the E n g l i s h H e g e l i a n s , p l a y e d an important p a r t i n each of t h e i r separate a t t a c k s upon s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m , f o r , they concluded, the mind's obvious a b i l i t y t o c o n s t r u c t these a b s t r a c t i o n s i n d i c a t e d the f a l s e n e s s of the m a t e r i a l i s t s ' s assumption t h a t consciousness was always the p a s s i v e r e s u l t of s e n s a t i o n . Furthermore, these c r i t i c s a l s o questioned whether or not the s i n g l e i n s t a n c e s of a phenomenon, c o l l e c -t i v e l y t r e a t e d by s c i e n t i s t s i n an a l l - i n c l u s i v e g e n e r a l i z a -t i o n , might not i n some cases be exempt from the comprehensive statement. N a t u r a l i s t s - - s o went the argument—ought t o r e p l a c the too r i g i d laws of s c i e n c e w i t h l e s s s t r i n g e n t hypotheses, s i n c e t h a t determinism i n nature which s c i e n t i s t s c l a i m t o have d i s c o v e r e d may, i n f a c t , not e x i s t . Our conception of space i s not, Ward noted, based 33 s o l e l y on the sensory awareness c r e a t e d by our movements, an o b s e r v a t i o n made long ago by Kant. Kant had b e l i e v e d t h a t geometers were able t o t a l k of pure or a b s t r a c t space which c o n s i s t e d of a system of a b s t r a c t r e l a t i o n s h i p s , known independent of a l l sensory experience. I f t h i s were t r u e , then a person could conclude t h a t he has a l r e a d y the c a p a c i t y t o a b s t r a c t the p a r t i c u l a r type of knowledge, thus, " A c t i v e experience becomes the b a s i s of geometry, not geometry of „10 e x p e r i e n c e . " Ward agreed w i t h Kant; one must not m i s t a k e n l y i d e n t i f y p e r c e p t i o n w h o l l y w i t h sensory experience. As a consequence, every s p a t i a l or temporal r e l a t i o n s h i p a c t u a l l y depends upon both o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s which are products of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s ego and i t s powers of o r g a n i z a t i o n and co-o r d i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e s c i e n c e — H e r b e r t Spencer's a s s e r t i o n t o the c o n t r a r y — i s not a t r u e d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y ; s c i e n c e i s only an e x p l a n a t i o n which may always at some time i n the f u t u r e be superceded by a b e t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n . Science i s not certainty.' James Ward was f a m i l i a r with the work of the A u s t r i a n p h y s i c i s t and p h i l o s o p h e r of s c i e n c e , E r n s t Mach, and Ward's arguments c l o s e l y p a r a l l e l a number of those found i n Mach's book of 1883: The Science of Mechanics; A C r i t i c a l and  H i s t o r i c a l E x p o s i t i o n . Mach questioned the two premises of s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m : t h a t a l l phenomena could be reduced t o the laws of mechanics, and t h a t s c i e n c e would e v e n t u a l l y o f f e r a complete e x p l a n a t i o n f o r every occurrence w i t h i n the 34 u n i v e r s e . S c i e n c e , ' d e c l a r e d Mach, c o u l d g i v e no r e a l e x p l a n a -t i o n f o r n a t u r a l e v e n t s , i t me r e l y d e s c r i b e d phenomena. And th e s o - c a l l e d laws o f s c i e n c e were not f a c t s but s e n s o r y o b s e r v a t i o n s , a b b r e v i a t e d and g e n e r a l i z e d . I n t h e s c i e n t i f i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d , m e n t a l a c t i v i t y , i t s e l f , p l a y e d an eminent r o l e i n s i m p l i f y i n g and c a t e g o r i z i n g t h e o b s e r v a -t i o n s f r om w h i c h s c i e n c e f o r m u l a t e s i t s h y p o t h e s e s . Mach b e l i e v e d i t f r u i t l e s s t o t a l k o f an o b j e c t i v e , e x t e r n a l , m a t e r i a l w o r l d ; i n t r u t h , t h e r e e x i s t e d o n l y one's s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n c o n s i s t e d o f n o t h i n g more t h a n p e r c e p t u a l e x p e r i e n c e . 1 1 These c r i t i c i s m s , o f c o u r s e , a r e s t i l l b a s i c t o modern phenomeno-l o g i s t s and l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t s . They would agree w i t h Mach t h a t t r u e r e a l i t y must always remain unknowable; a man sees o n l y r e a l i t y ' s m anufactured appearance t h r o u g h t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f h i s p e r c e p t i o n . Ward t h e r e f o r e saw t h e f u n c t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g y t o be not t h e h o p e l e s s t a s k o f measuring non-e x i s t e n t s e n s a t i o n s , but r a t h e r t o d i s c o v e r our own f e e l i n g s and awareness, our e x i s t e n t i a l r e a l i t y . To Ward, t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t element i n any a c t o f c o g n i t i o n u n d o u b t e d l y i s t h e v e r y i n d i v i d u a l who i s c u r r e n t l y h a v i n g t h a t e x p e r i e n c e . A c t u a l l y what Ward meant here i s t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l not o n l y has o r d i n a r y c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e p e r c e p t i o n of t h e w o r l d 12 around him, he a l s o had a d i s t i n c t s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e awareness o r c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f h i m s e l f as t h e s u b j e c t o f t h o s e 13 e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h he i s c u r r e n t l y u n d e r g o i n g . ^ 35 To c l a r i f y t h i s p o i n t Ward d i v i d e d the s e l f i n t o the " E m p i r i c a l Ego" and the "Pure S e l f . " The E m p i r i c a l Ego c o n s i s t e d of a man's awareness of h i s own f e e l i n g s , such statements as " I am sad." These statements d e s c r i b e the Me ( o b j e c t ) of which the I ( s u b j e c t ) i s conscious. For the most par t the E m p i r i c a l Ego was a product of the awareness of or g a n i c s e n s a t i o n s , thus i t l i k e l y was the source of abnormal behavior. Ward thought t h a t the moods c r e a t e d by p h y s i c a l s e n s a t i o n s somehow become imbalanced and as a r e s u l t one p a r t i c u l a r mood or group of r e l a t e d moods occupy and dominate the Ego's consciousness of i t s e l f and the world surrounding i t . T h i s form of domination e x e r c i s e d over the whole f i e l d of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , Ward found p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t i c e a b l e i n cases of m u l t i p l e p e r s o n a l i t y . On the other hand, the Pure S e l f d e r i v e s from imagina-t i o n , one's i d e a l s and r e a s o n i n g a b i l i t y . The "Pure S e l f " i s t h e : . . . concept which every i n t e l l i g e n t being more or l e s s d i s t i n c t l y forms of h i m s e l f as a person, M. or N., having such and such as c h a r a c t e r , t a s t e s and c o n v i c t i o n s , such and such a h i s t o r y , and such and such an aim i n l i f e . The main instrument i n the f o r m a t i o n of t h i s concept, as of o t h e r s , i s language, and e s p e c i a l l y the s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e t h a t language promotes. lj+ The "Pure S e l f " r e l a t e s t o i t s environment through a process known as " i n t r o j e c t i o n , " a term Ward d e r i v e d from R i c h a r d Avenarius, the co-founder, along w i t h Mach, of Empirio-c r i t i c i s m . By the term i n t r o j e c t i o n , Avenarius meant the process whereby an i n d i v i d u a l a l t e r s the data of sensory 3 6 e x p e r i e n c e t o conform t o h i s e x i s t i n g p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . Aven-a r i u s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e b r a i n has t h e tendency t o want t o p r e s e r v e a s t a t e o f e q u i l i b r i a t i o n w i t h t h e environment i n o r d e r t o m i n i m i z e t e n s i o n o r e x c i t e m e n t . S h o u l d , however, t h e environment appear t o o t h r e a t e n i n g , t h e b r a i n t h e n m o d i f i e s i t s c o n c e p t i o n s i n such a way as t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e dangerous s t i m u l u s i n t h e s i m p l e s t p o s s i b l e manner w i t h t h e 15 l e a s t p o s s i b l e change i n i t s accustomed a t t i t u d e . T h i s , A v e n a r i u s b e l i e v e d , was the s o u r c e o f t h e animism of p r i m i t i v e man and u l t i m a t e l y o f t h e b e l i e f i n God. Men, even s c i e n t i s t s , a r e n a t u r a l l y a n t h r o p o r m o r p h i c and a t t r i b u t e t h e i r own q u a l i t i e s t o n a t u r e . And l i k e F r e u d , A v e n a r i u s saw mind as a t e n s i o n - r e d u c i n g energy system w i t h complete e q u i l i b r i a t i o n ( F e chner's " p r i n c i p l e o f c o n s t a n c y " 1 ^ ) as i t s f i n a l g o a l . T h i s d u a l i s t i c n a t u r e of man; t h e c o n s c i o u s s e l f and t h e " p r e s e n t e d " or e x p e r i e n t i a l s e l f was p r e v i o u s l y r e c o g n i z e d by Kant. Compare Ward's d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h a t of a modern s t u d e n t of Kant: I n a s i t u a t i o n where we a t t e n d t o , or judge on t h e b a s i s o f , some i t e m i n our s e n s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , we n a t u r a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e a t t e n t i o n or t h e judgment and t h e s e n s i b l e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e i t e m . Kant i n s i s t s t h a t i f we t a l k o f knowing t h a t we a r e a t t e n d i n g t o , or j u d g i n g , something, t h e n we s h o u l d a l s o d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e judgment about out? a t t e n t i o n and i t s s e n s i b l e p r e s e n t a t i o n . 1 7 A l t h o u g h Ward a c c e p t e d Kant's d i s t i n c t i o n , he t hought t h a t t h e d u a l i s m i m p l i c i t i n e x p e r i e n c e was r e s o l v e d or " t r a n s c e n d e d " by t h e i n d i v i d u a l . F i r s t l y , a p e r s o n l e a r n s t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between h i m s e l f and h i s environment; next t o 37 s e p a r a t e t h e p r e s e n t i d e a s from p a s t memories; t h e n t o c o n t r o l h i s d e s i r e s t h r o u g h r e a s o n , u n t i l f i n a l l y t h e r e i s a f o c u s i n g on an, . . . image o f t h e s e l f i n t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l i d e n t i t y of a s e l f c o n s c i o u s o f i t s e l f as a p e r s o n , and c a p a b l e o f s a y i n g " I am" . . . a c t i v i t y , a t f i r s t i m p e l l e d by a p p e t i t e , t h e n s o l i c i t e d by d e s i r e , m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f a t l e n g t h as f r e e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . Because he b e l i e v e d p s y c h o l o g y had t r i e d t o i g n o r e t h i s v i t a l f a c t o f l i f e , c o n s c i o u s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Ward was c o n v i n c e d t h a t much o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e unhappy i g n o r a n c e about man's s p i r i t u a l b e i n g , e v i d e n c e d by an age w h i c h t o o k N i e t z s c h e as i t s p r o p h e t , l a y w i t h p s y c h o l o g y ' s f a u l t y t e n e t s . I n h i s o p i n i o n , n a t u r a l i s t i c , p h y s i o l o g i c a l p s y c h o l o g y had t r i e d t o i g n o r e s u b j e c t i v e f a c t o r s i n o r d e r t o b u i l d upon t h e more e a s i l y c a l c u l a b l e (hence " s c i e n t i f i c ) , i t had c o n s e q u e n t l y n e g l e c t e d t h e r e a l n a t u r e o f man. I n s h o r t , man, l i k e a l l o t h e r l i v i n g c r e a t u r e s , i n t e r a c t s w i t h h i s environment a c c o r d i n g t o how he can e x p l o i t i t i n o r d e r t o r e a l i z e h i s ends, t h e r e f o r e h i s a t t i t u d e s must of n e c e s s i t y r e f l e c t whether or not he, h i m s e l f , f e e l s c e r t a i n a s p e c t s o f h i s . s u r r o u n d i n g s t o be e i t h e r a h e l p or a h i n d r a n c e t o h i s p u r s u i t o f s u r v i v a l and s e l f - b e t t e r m e n t . T h i s l e d Ward t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h o s e a p p a r e n t l y o b j e c t i v e laws and c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n n a t u r e were n o t h i n g o f t h e k i n d ; t h e y were, i n h i s v i e w , o n l y t h e a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s and c o n c e p t u a l schemes of men. As he e x p l a i n e d i t , "Mind i s not t h e impotent shadow of Nature as t h u s shaped f o r t h but t h i s 19 s h a p i n g i s i t s e l f t h e work of mind." 3 8 Ward f u l l y acknowledged h i s debt t o A v e n a r i u s f o r r e s o l v i n g t h e apparent d u a l i s m between t h e s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e components o f e x p e r i e n c e . A v e n a r i u s ' s n o t i o n of " i n t r o j e c t i o n " meant t h a t w h i l e an i n d i v i d u a l e a s i l y b e l i e v e s t h a t h i s own i d e a s a r e somehow an o b j e c t i v e c r e a t i o n of h i s s e n s o r y p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e environment, he a l s o assumes e r r o n e o u s l y t h a t t h e i d e a s o f everyone e l s e a r i s e w h o l l y from 20 s u b j e c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A c t u a l l y , s i n c e o t h e r s a r e r e a c t i n g t o t h e same s i t u a t i o n and a r e meeting w i t h something w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e same awareness t h a t we a r e h a v i n g our-s e l v e s , p s y c h o l o g y can t h e r e f o r e s t u d y t h e s e " t r a n s u b j e c t i v e " a s p e c t s o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e b y e r a d i c a t i n g t h e f a l s e d u a l i s m , t h e c o n f u s i o n between s u b j e c t and o b j e c t , which b e s e t s p s y c h o l o g y . F u r t h e r m o r e , Ward argued, t h e s e u n i v e r s a l o r " t r a n -s u b j e c t i v e " f e a t u r e s w h i c h a r e f o u n d - t o be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f e x p e r i e n c e , a r e a d i r e c t r e f u t a t i o n o f n a t u r a l i s m , f o r t h e pr e m i s e s of n a t u r a l i s m i m p l i e s a system o f m a t t e r and law beyond man's c o n t r o l . Ward u n d e r s t o o d t h e i s s u e i n t h i s way: i f c e r t a i n n a t u r a l laws e n t i r e l y r e g u l a t e d t h e c o u r s e o f t h e u n i v e r s e , t h e n man's ego ought i t s e l f t o r e f l e c t t h i s o r d e r o f t h i n g s . As a r e s u l t , t h e ego would be n o t h i n g more t h a n t h e p a s s i v e i n s t r u m e n t o f s e n s a t i o n , and mankind would be w i t h o u t t h e c a p a c i t y , t h e independent judgment, or i m a g i n a t i o n t o t a k e an a c t i v e r o l e i n s h a p i n g and m a n i p u l a t i n g i t s 21 s u r r o u n d i n g s . 39 Thus Ward took from Avenarius' l i n e of reasoning the judgment t h a t every experience i n d i c a t e d an i n h e r e n t l y sub-j e c t i v e phenomenon. From t h i s a l l - i m p o r t a n t c o n c l u s i o n Ward gained support f o r h i s c o n v i c t i o n t h a t man cannot be under-stood as i f he were merely a product of b l i n d , environmental s t i m u l i . Through h i s very s u b j e c t i v i t y man g a i n s the aware-ness of h i s t r u e moral being was the substance of Ward's argument. He b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s knowledge had shown him the way t o r e s o l v e the apparent c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between the separate t r u t h s of r e l i g i o n and s c i e n c e . He was c e r t a i n t h a t i t was t h i s s u b j e c t i v e , v i s i o n a r y element i n man t h a t d i s -c l o s e d Nature's everpresent y e a r n i n g towards the attainment of a moral i d e a l . From what he saw as the contingency evident i n the u n i v e r s e , Ward reached the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Nature was, at p r e s e n t , s t i l l e v o l v i n g — t e l e o l o g i c a l l y . In h i s e x p l a n a t i o n , the seeming determinism of Nature only r e f l e c t e d the s t a t i s t i -c a l constancy of l a r g e numbers; Nature was u n p r e d i c t a b l e i n s i n g l e i n s t a n c e s . Hence, the p o s s i b i l i t y of new forms and r e l a t i o n s h i p s of an even g r e a t e r complexity and consequent improvement always remained. . T h i s a p p l i e s e q u a l l y t o i n d i v i d u a l s ; s i n c e they can never wholly f o r e s e e the a c c i d e n t -a l consequences of t h e i r a c t i o n s , they may a l s o l e a r n new, more f a v o u r a b l e ways of r e a c t i n g with t h e i r environment; and t h i s i s p r o g r e s s i v e e v o l u t i o n . Ward judged t h a t h i s view were i n agreement with the P l u r a l i s t s , who argued t h a t God has l i m i t e d Himself i n order 40 t o l e n d man a p o r t i o n of h i s c a u s a t i o n . God a s s i g n s the t a l e n t s ; His c r e a t u r e s they may use or they may misuse them— the d i s c r e t i o n i s t h e i r s . Now Ward found a c u r i o u s proof f o r the e x i s t e n c e of God. In essence, h i s argument was t h a t the best of men always r e c o g n i z e a s e l f - i m p o s e d moral i d e a l through which they can i d e n t i f y t h e i r own i n t e r e s t w i t h the h i g h e s t good f o r a l l men. Although Ward accepted t h a t some might argue t h a t t h i s i d e a l c o u l d not always be j u s t i f i e d on l o g i c a l grounds, t h i s was o n l y an appearance f o r , E i t h e r the world i s not r a t i o n a l or man does not stand alone and t h i s l i f e i s not a l l . But i t cannot be r a t i o n a l t o conclude t h a t the world i s not r a t i o n a l , l e a s t of a l l when an a l t e r n a t i v e i s open t o us t h a t l e a v e s room f o r i t s r a t i o n a l i t y — t h e a l t e r n a t i v e of p o s t u l a t i n g God and the f u t u r e l i f e . 2 2 And as our moral i d e a l s l e a d us t o a f a i t h i n God, they a l s o provide us w i t h the assurance of a f u t u r e l i f e . Our i d e a l s demand the e x i s t e n c e of a s o u l . I f man as a r a t i o n a l f r e e agent has chosen some b e l i e f f o r a moral i d e a l , i t must, of n e c e s s i t y , e x i s t ; or as Ward i n a burst of i n s p i r a t i o n i n s t r u c t s , Humanity a l r e a d y has y e a r n i n g s and a s p i r a t i o n s t h a t the f l e s h - p o t s of E g y p t - - m a t e r i a l and temporal w e l l -b e i n g — c a n never content; i s i t , i m p e l l e d by these l o n g i n g s f o r h i g h e r t h i n g s d e s t i n e d t o wander aim-l e s s l y i n the w i l d e r n e s s f o r e v e r u n s a t i s f i e d ? 2 3 I t i s important not to confuse Ward's r a t i o n a l theology w i t h some form of I d e a l i s m . He b e l i e v e d the u n i v e r s e possessed m a n i f o l d forms and d i d not have the u n i t y of one being or substance. Ward d e s c r i b e d h i s outlook as a combination of 41 both P l u r a l i s m and Theism, d e c l a r i n g t h a t the u n i v e r s e actually-e x i s t e d i n two a s p e c t s : " i t i s One and i t i s Many." The u n i v e r s e c o n t a i n s a m u l t i p l i c i t y of s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g e n t i t i e s , o r ganic and i n o r g a n i c , of v a r y i n g degrees of consciousness a l l seeking t o r e a l i z e t h e i r ends: t h e i r p e r f e c t i o n of form, t h e i r i d e a of the good. These e n t i t i e s or monads (Ward owed h i s s o l u t i o n t o the problem of the c o n t r a d i c t o r y monisms of the i d e a l i s t s and m a t e r i a l i s t s t o the philosophy of L e i b n i z ) e x h i b i t a d e f i n i t e p r o g r e s s i o n or e v o l u t i o n which on ea r t h w i l l reach i t s f i n a l harmony i n the " p e r f e c t commonwealth" of men where a l l w i l l co-operate and none c o n f l i c t ; a l l becoming one i n the p u r s u i t of the t r u e and the good. But f o r P l u r a l i s m t o be f u l l y r a t i o n a l , f o r the u n i v e r s e ' s " l i v i n g o r b s " t o r e s o l v e i n the h i g h e r s y n t h e s i s , e x p l a i n e d Ward, th e r e must a l s o be a h i e r a r c h y of i n t e l l i g -ences, a h i e r a r c h y which culminates i n a Supreme Being. God because of His lov e f o r the world has renounced H i s omnipotence, and has allowed the "Many" the freedom t o determine t h e i r ends. I t i s t h i s l o v e t h a t g i v e s the t r u e u n i t y t o P l u r a l i s m . Theism and P l u r a l i s m are one: the s y n t h e s i s of reason and f a i t h , t h e r e f o r e , We cannot l i v e or move without f a i t h , t h a t i s c l e a r . Is i t not r a t i o n a l t o b e l i e v e i n the bes t , we ask; and can th e r e be a bett e r ? 2 4 In t h i s way, Ward came t o the r e a s s u r i n g deduction t h a t f a i t h i s r a t i o n a l i t y , and reason i s p i e t y . He was c o n f i d e n t t h a t by r e c o g n i z i n g the f a c t of s u b j e c t i v i t y , e s p e c i a l l y the s t i l l s m a l l v o i c e w i t h i n , a man c o u l d see not only a r e f u t a t i o n 42 of materialism, but could glimpse the workings of a higher power. This sort of reasoning was not uncommon among Late Vic t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s ; witness Frederick Myers' theory that the subconscious ("subliminal") mind was evolving i n response to telepathic s t i m u l i broadcast by the World S p i r i t . Again, l i k e many other i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n the period, Ward f e l t a strong need to assert his p a r t i c u l a r moral p r i n c i p l e s as the only r a t i o n a l a l t ernatives. Psychology became fo r him a means to put the stamp of approval on what were e s s e n t i a l l y the r e l i g i o u s convictions of his childhood. Using an amalgam of Empirio-criticism, Hegelian d i a l e c t i c s and Sunday School dogma, Ward explained how conventional morality and r a t i o n a l -i t y are one and the same. Ward thought that the key to s e l f - a c t u a l i z a t i o n , which i s supposedly a man's awareness of h i s true moral being, l i e s i n the "transubjective" nature of experience. Through p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n society a person transcends his i s o l a t e d s e l f ; his transubjective knowledge allows him to establish what i s objectively true for a l l . Thus he i s able to d i s -tinguish h i s own private and subjective perceptions from the general fund of objective knowledge. In t h i s way he attains self-consciousness. In Ward's view, most s o c i a l t h e o r i s t s , not excluding Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, had led themselves astray by assuming that a man was a r a t i o n a l being, antecedent to society. On the other hand, Hegel was e s s e n t i a l l y correct 43 t o argue that s o c i e t y was an organism through which s o c i a l -man became r a t i o n a l and s e l f - c o n s c i o u s ; "the more inti m a t e the u n i t y of the whole the more complete the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of „25 i t s members." I f f o l l o w e d , then, there could be no c o n f l i c t between s o c i e t y and an i n d i v i d u a l ' s s e l f - i n t e r e s t . While many s t i l l pursue e g o i s t i c g o a l s , there i s a growing r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t r e a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the s o c i a l good—what T.H. 26 Green had c a l l e d the "claims of the common humanity." Ward agreed w i t h Green that s e l f - r e a l i z a t i o n meant not the apparent s e l f - i n t e r e s t of egoism and greed, but the m o r a l i t y of s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t i v e behavior. In t h i s way the "concrete" i n d i v i d u a l through h i s sharing i n the moral o b l i g a t i o n s of s o c i e t y a t t a i n s 27 the " u n i v e r s a l " — r a t i o n a l i t y . What w i l l be the r a t i o n a l i d e a l gained thereby, Ward asked? The answer may be very b r i e f . "Thy Kingdom come, Thy w i l l be done on earth as i t i s i n heaven." To imagine t h i s p e t i t i o n answered i s t o imagine humanity animated by a s i n g l e wise and righteous w i l l : every c i t i z e n would work harmoniously w i t h every other, each one doing the highest and the best of which he i s capable. The w i l l of the many and the w i l l of the One would accord com-p l e t e l y . . . . The Kingdom would take the place of the i d e a l King: there would be a p e r f e c t commonwealth, but s t r i c t l y no monarch other than 'the objec-t i v e mind' sovereign i n every breast.28 Ward was one of those post Darwinian i n t e l l e c t u a l s , d escribed by Cockshut, who t r i e d t o shed what they b e l i e v e d t o be C h r i s t i a n i t y ' s untenable dogmas, whi l e simultaneously e v o l v i n g a new set of e t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , p r i n c i p l e s through which they hoped to r e t a i n c e r t a i n elements of t h e i r former 44 c o n v i c t i o n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f a i t h i n t h e p r o g r e s s i v e f u l f i l l -ment o f an i n h e r e n t m o r a l o r d e r . I n t h i s way, a V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y renounce t h e u n c o m f o r t a b l e d o c t r i n e s o f h i s c h i l d h o o d r e l i g i o n w i t h o u t b e t r a y i n g i t s e t h i c a l i d e a l s . He would not l o n g e r need t o ground h i s f a i t h on a s e t o f dubious t e n e t s and q u e s t i o n a b l e s t o r i e s , f o r t h a t f a i t h would now be c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e i n c o n t e s t a b l e f a c t s o f e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o g r e s s . I t seemed t h a t t h e u n i v e r s e was n o t , as-Mr. C a r l y l e f e a r e d , a b l i n d , m e c h a n i s t i c c l o c k w o r k 2 9 and man a mere cog i n i t s g r e a t w o r k i n g s . ' Thus i f s c i e n t i f i c n f a c t t t s h a t t e r e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e P u r i t a n w o r l d v i e w , i t a l s o seemed c a p a b l e o f r e s c u i n g m o r a l freedom from t h e dim p r o s p e c t s o f C a l v i n i s t p r e d e s t i n a t i o n . The more o p t i m i s t i c — and Ward was o n e — w e r e c e r t a i n t h a t s c i e n c e would one day prove t h a t t h o s e e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s f e l t so s t r o n g l y by many L a t e V i c t o r i a n s , were a n a t u r a l and i n t r i n s i c a s p e c t o f human e v o l u t i o n . O t h e r s c o u l d not share Ward's c o m f o r t i n g c o n v i c t i o n s . They found i t d i f f i c u l t t o a c c e p t t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i v e a s p e c t s o f p e r c e p t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g were e n t i r e l y r e c o n c i l a b l e w i t h what t h e y c o n c e i v e d of as r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g . Though t h e y agreed w i t h Ward t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s d i d i n f l u e n c e be-h a v i o r , t h e y were l e s s t h a n c e r t a i n t h a t one c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y assume t h a t m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s always conformed t o t h e laws o f l o g i c . 45 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I G.M. Young, P o r t r a i t of An Age, London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , I 9 6 0 , p. 1 1 0 . p A.O.J. Cockshut, The U n b e l i e v e r s , London, C o l l i n s , 1 9 6 4 . 3 v. the d i s c u s s i o n of " e a r n e s t n e s s " i n W.E. Houghton, The V i c t o r i a n Frame of Mind, New Haven, Ya l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 1 , PP. 218-262. ^A l e t t e r quoted by Ward's daughter i n her b i o g r a p h i c a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a c o l l e c t i o n of Ward's essays. O.W. Campbell, "Memoir," Essays i n Philosophy James Ward, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 2 7 , p. 4 6 . 5 •'w.R. S o r l e y , an i n t i m a t e f r i e n d and author of the n o t i c e on Ward i n the D i c t i o n a r y of N a t i o n a l Biography, d e s c r i b e d Ward's f a m i l y as C o n g r e g a t i o n a l i s t s , but C a l v i n i s t s In t h e i r t h e o l o g y . According t o S o r l e y ' s account, Ward completed a B.A. i n t h e o l o g y at Spring H i l l C o l l e g e i n Birmingham and then t r a v e l l e d t o Germany t o study p h i l o s o p h y under Rudolf L o t z e . In 1&'71 Ward, although not o f f i c i a l l y ordained as a m i n i s t e r , accepted a c a l l t o preach at the Emmanuel Congregation chapel at Cambridge. But Ward, durin g h i s short m i n i s t r y underwent a c r i s i s of b e l i e f , which caused him t o r e j e c t i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l i g i o n . Thereupon he entered Cambridge t o pursue h i s i n t e r e s t s i n philosophy and psychology. N e v e r t h e l e s s , S o r l e y had the o p i n i o n t h a t Ward always r e t a i n e d much of h i s e a r l y b e l i e f i n s p i r i t u a l v a l u e s and never tended r e a l l y towards s e c u l a r i s m or a g n o s t i c i s m . W.R. S o r l e y , "James Ward," D i c t i o n a r y of N a t i o n a l Biography 1 9 2 2 - 1 9 3 0 , ed. J.R.H. Weaver, London, Oxford, r e p r i n t e d 1 9 6 5 , p. 8 8 5 . James Ward, "An Attempt To I n t e r p r e t Fechner's Law," Mind, v o l . 1,. I 8 7 6 , p. 4 5 9 . 7 In the e i g h t e e n - e i g h t i e s Lord G i f f o r d founded and endowed a l e c t u r e s h i p i n the S c o t t i s h U n i v e r s i t i e s . The l e c t u r e s were t o have as t h e i r s u b j e c t matter, " N a t u r a l Theology" and demanded "an i n q u i r y Into the u l t i m a t e ground of being, pursued i n a s p i r i t of s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y , and e x p r e s s l y renouncing s u p e r n a t u r a l sources of knowledge: enquiry i n t o e x i s t i n g n ature, and a t t r i b u t e s of the D i v i n e , the r e l a t i o n s i n which man and the u n i v e r s e stand t o the D e i t y , the meaning of e x i s t e n c e e t c . " R.M. Metz, A Hundred  Years of Philosophy, London, George A l l e n , 1 9 3 8 , p. 7 7 9 . 4 6 8 James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, London, Adam and Charles Black, 1906, v o l . 2, p. 86. 9A.J.M. M i l n e , The S o c i a l Philosophy of E n g l i s h Idealism, London, George A l l e n and Unwin, 1962, p. 21. : "^Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, v o l . 2, p. 142. "^This explanation of Mach's philosophy, o f t e n termed neo-p o s i t i v i s m or e m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m , has been taken from P h i l l i p Frank, Modern Science and I t s Philosophy, Cambridge Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1949* 12 In Ward's somewhat obscure words: M. . . the f i r s t and most fundamental f a c t y i e l d e d by the a n a l y s i s of t h i s e x p e r i -ence we have found t o be i t s reference t o a subject or s e l f t hat has i t . The knowledge of t h i s f a c t we c a l l s e l f -consciousness, meaning thereby not the consciousness that we a t t r i b u t e t o every s e l f but the consciousness of t h i s consciousness; a consciousness to which only some experients a t t a i n , t o which we only g r a d u a l l y a t t a i n . " James Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1918, p. 361. 13 Although Ward's major work i n psychology was not pub-l i s h e d u n t i l 1918, many of i t s important chapters c o n s i s t e d of papers published between 1330 and 1393, i n c l u d i n g i n f o r -mation from Ward's "famous" a r t i c l e on psychology f o r the n i n t h e d i t i o n of the Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a . ^ J . Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , p. 368. 15 'N. Smith, "Avenarius' Philosophy of Pure Experience," Mind, v o l . 15, 1906, p. 27. "^S. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure P r i n c i p l e , New York, Bantam, 1959, pp. 23-25. 17 'G. B i r d , Kant's Theory- of Knowledge, London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1962, p. 170. 13 Ward, P s y c h o l o g i c a l P r i n c i p l e s , p. 376. 19 'Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, v o l . 2, p. 247. 2 0 I b i d . , p. 172. 2 1 I b i d . , p. 169. 22 James Ward, The Realm of Ends or P l u r a l i s m and Theism, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1920, p. 1+2T. The Realm of Ends was Ward's sequel t o Naturalism and Agnosticism. These 47 G i f f o r d lectures were delivered at the University of St. Andrews between 1907-1910. 2 3Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. '1+25. 2 Z t-Ibid. , p. 453. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 124-2 6 Quoted by Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 134-2^A.J.M. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1962, p. 51 . Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 1 3 6 . 2 ^ W.E.Houghton, The Vi c t o r i a n Frame of Mind, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957, p. 5 0 . I I I . JAMES S U L L Y AND THE STUDY OF I L L U S I O N S 49 I n t h e t h i r t y y e a r s or so a f t e r T.H. H u x l e y ' s a d d r e s s t o t h e B e l f a s t m e e t i n g , B r i t i s h p s y c h o l o g y found i t s e l f t r y -i n g t o cope w i t h a p e c u l i a r l y d i f f i c u l t t a s k . Though Huxley had d e n i e d t h e e f f i c a c y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s were s t i l l w i l l i n g t o argue t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o u l d be t r e a t e d i n a s c i e n t i f i c framework, even i f I d e a l i s t s begged t o d i f f e r . And not a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s saw t h e i s s u e as a mere c h o i c e be-tween Ward's p a l p a b l e m y s t i c i s m and H u x l e y ' s a t a v i s t i c B e h a v i o r i s m . F o r i n s t a n c e , one L a t e V i c t o r i a n p s y c h o l o g i s t , James S u l l y b e l i e v e d t h a t s c i e n c e c o u l d o f f e r a f u l l y r a t i o n a l e x p l a n a t i o n f o r s u b j e c t i v e , m o r a l v a l u e s , w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o a s u p e r n a t u r a l D e i t y . S u l l y a c c e p t e d H e r b e r t Spencer's Lamarekian u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e v o l u t i o n , and contended t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l judgments of one g e n e r a t i o n become the m o r a l v a l u e s o f t h e n e x t . I n S u l l y ' s words, I t i s by t h i s agency t h a t each g e n e r a t i o n t r a n s m i t s (on t h e average) a s l i g h t i n crement of b r a i n - p o w e r t o i t s s u c c e s s o r , and t h a t t h e c o n t i n u o u s e x e r c i s e o f i n t e l l i g e n c e , o f m o r a l f e e l i n g , and so f o r t h , t h r o u g h t h e s u c c e s s i o n o f g e n e r a t i o n s l e a d s t o a p e r c e p t i b l e improvement of t h e s e powers.-'-Hence, S u l l y c o u l d d i s c e r n no dichotomy between m o r a l s and r a t i o n a l i t y . S t i l l , t h e problem of s u b j e c t i v i t y had a w i d e r d i m e n s i o n t h a n one o f s i m p l y j u s t i f y i n g m o r a l s as a n o t h e r form o f r e a s o n . S u l l y ' s l i f e l o n g c o n c e r n w i t h s t u d y -i n g i l l u s i o n s and dreams l e d him t o c o n c l u d e t h a t apparent i r r a t i o n a l i t y d e r i v e d from t h e d i s t o r t i n g e f f e c t o f man's 50 expectations on h i s perception of the e x t e r n a l world. To i l l u s t r a t e , a man spending the night i n a house which accord-ing t o rumour i s i n h a b i t e d by ghosts, might e a s i l y experience an i l l u s i o n of what he i s a n t i c i p a t i n g . H a l l u c i n a t i o n s e x h i b i t the same process, excepting that the " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " plays an even greater r o l e , dominating consciousness com-p l e t e l y . S i m i l a r l y , i n dream s t a t e s and cases of i n s a n i t y a man's perceptual a b i l i t y i s a l s o overcome by memories (repre-s e n t a t i o n s ) which the i n d i v i d u a l i n these s i t u a t i o n s cannot a l t e r t o conform t o the r e a l nature of sensory-objects. Following i n the t r a d i t i o n of the Enlightenment, S u l l y accepted that t r u t h could be found i n the u n i v e r s a l q u a l i t i e s of a l l men's experience. Thus, S u l l y b e l i e v e d there e x i s t e d a way by which a man could overcome the b l i n d and hazardous judgments which h i s i l l u s i o n s e n t a i l . He must check h i s s u b j e c t i v e tendency t o f a l s e and inaccurate statements by t r y i n g t o a s c e r t a i n which are the fe a t u r e s i n any act of c o g n i t i o n that he shares with the m a j o r i t y . Secondly, he must then attempt t o formulate these common perceptions i n "accurate d e f i n i t i o n s " and " u n i v e r s a l p r o p o s i t i o n s " i n order t o obtain both the f r u i t of the i n d i v i d u a l imagination., and a r e a l i s t i c standard which would act t o curb any p o s s i b l e t h r e a t from a too b i z a r r e s u b j e c t i v i t y . C u l t u r a l e v o l u t i o n was i n a sense i n e v i t a b l e , S u l l y surmised, f o r e r r o r and i l l u s i o n have only negative u t i l i t y ; they must of n e c e s s i t y b r i n g the i n d i v i d u a l i n t o some form 51 o f c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s environment. Because o f t h i s f a c t every new s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h w hich has t h e advantage o f p r e s e n t i n g i t s e l f as a b e t t e r p i c t u r e o f r e a l i t y (a more a c c u r a t e p e r c e p -t i o n ) , w i l l manage t o s u r v i v e t h e p u b l i c ' s i n i t i a l a ntagonism and w i l l e v e n t u a l l y become a p a r t o f t h e common u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Whether t h e y have o r i g i n a t e d f r om s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r y o r i n t h e i m a g i n a t i v e i n t u i t i o n s of g e n i u s , p r i v a t e b e l i e f s must a t some t i m e c o n f r o n t t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n v e n t i o n s o f s o c i e t y . T h i s c l a s h i n g o f view w i l l e i t h e r demonstrate t h e i l l u s i o n a r y f o u n d a t i o n s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l judgments o r w i l l show t h e i r p r a g m a t i c v a l u e f rom t h e i r " f i t n e s s t o e x t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s and p r a c t i c a l e f f i c a c y , " and sooner o r l a t e r w i l l come t o be t h e new s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h educated men can t e s t t h e i r 3 own c o n v i c t i o n s . By p r o v i d i n g a b i o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t (Spencer's t h e o r y t h a t a man's r a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h r o u g h c o n t i n u a l e x e r c i s e and r e p e t i t i o n becomes a h a b i t u a l a s s u m p t i o n t r a n s f e r a b l e t o h i s descen d a n t s ) f o r m o r a l development and s o c i a l c o - o p e r a t i o n , S u l l y f o r g e d Darwinism t o U t i l i t a r i a n i s m i n a s e r i e s o f d i a l e c t i c a l c o n f l i c t s i n w h i c h organisms s t r u g g l e w i t h , t h e i r e n vironment, r e a s o n e d s e l f - i n t e r e s t opposes p a s s i o n a t e e g o t i s m , and o b j e c t i v e t r u t h overcomes s u b j e c t i v e e r r o r . At t i m e s , t h i s c o n f l i c t even o c c u r s between c i v i l i z e d man and h i s u p - t o -date s o c i e t y . Though h i s p o s i t i o n seems s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e S o c i a l D a r w i n i s t s , i t r e a l l y r e f l e c t s h i s U t i l i t a r i a n h e r i t a g e o f r a d i c a l i s m . For l i k e t h e r a d i c a l , he p l a c e s t h e 52 more h i g h l y e v o l v e d i n d i v i d u a l i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e o b s o l e t e " b e l i e f - s y s t e m s " o f h i s s o c i e t y . The g e n i u s w i t h " p r e n a t u r a l s e n s a t i v e n e s s o f n e r v e " and a f i n e r p e r c e p t i o n o f r e a l i t y must be p r e p a r e d t o r e j e c t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l t r u t h s o f h i s s o c i e t y and r e l y on h i s p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e , r a t h e r t h a n a c c e p t e i t h e r t h e unreasoned assumptions o f t h e " m u l t i t u d e " or t h e knowledge passed on by t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l a g e n c i e s o f i n s t r u c t i o n . " ^ S t i l l , he d i d b e l i e v e i t p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t y was t o t h e mutual advantage of a l l . To apprehend r e a l i t y , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o compare s e n s e - e x p e r i e n c e s . Through t h e medium of a common language and by t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of e x p e r i e n c e i n l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s and d e f i n i t i o n s , t h e " t r u e r " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d can become common knowledge. One can e l i m i n a t e , by s u b j u g a t i n g t h e f o r c e s o f p a s s i o n and i m p a t i e n c e and by d i r e c t i n g a t t e n -t i o n and v o l i t i o n t o t h e p u r s u i t of t r u t h , t h e p o s s i b l e c o n t a m i n a t i o n o f t h e i n t e l l e c t by s o c i e t y ' s unreasoned c r e e d s . Here t h e r e i s s t i l l a d e s i r e and a w i l l t o b e l i e v e , o n l y t h a t i t i s a w i l l t o b e l i e v e what i s t r u e , t h a t i s t o s a y , a v o l i t i o n a l p r o c e s s i n i t i a t e d and s u s t a i n e d by a l o g i c a l f e e l i n g o r a r e g a r d f o r t r u t h as such.5 Thus a p e r s o n r e a l i z e s h i s m o r a l development when he l e a r n s t o h e s i t a t e b e f o r e r e s p o n d i n g t o h i s i m p u l s e s towards immediate g r a t i f i c a t i o n , and i n s t e a d b e g i n s t o pursue t h e e n d u r i n g ends o f h e a l t h , r e p u t a t i o n and knowledge. Moreover, beyond even t h i s form o f s e l f - i n t e r e s t t h e r e i s t h e common 53 good; e v e n t u a l l y t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i l l f i n d h i s " m o t i v e - i d e a " i n t h e e x e r c i s e o f s e l f - c o n t r o l f o r t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e com-munity . T h i s i s p a r t i a l l y a t t a i n e d as one a c q u i r e s m o t i v e s a n s w e r i n g t o t h e common i n t e r e s t — t h e f u r t h e r a n c e o f knowledge and t h e c r e a t i o n o f a r t . The p r i n c i p l e s of " d u t y " and " b e n e v o l e n c e , " t h e a l t r u i s t i c c o ncern f o r humanity, r e p r e s e n t t h e h i g h e s t s t a t e o f c o n s c i o u s s e l f - c o n t r o l and m o r a l development. Thus a man r e s t r a i n i n g a p p e t i t e , o r s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h i n t h e f a c e o f s e r i o u s r i s k s , may be s a i d t o be a p p l y -i n g t o h i m s e l f t h e r u l e o r maxim TBe t e m p e r a t e , ' 'Be t r u t h f u l . ' I n t h i s way, as m o r a l development advances, we pass from mere obedience t o an e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y t o t h e i n w a r d v o i c e o f r e a s o n and conscience.° A c c o r d i n g l y , James S u l l y , w h i l e f o l l o w i n g a v e r y d i f f e r -ent l i n e o f thought t h a n Ward's, r e a c h e d s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s . F o r b o t h , t h e m o r a l element i n c o n s c i o u s n e s s e x p r e s s e d t h e q u i n t e s s e n c e o f r a t i o n a l i t y . For b o t h , m o r a l v a l u e s r e p r e -s e n t e d t h e vanguard o f e v o l u t i o n a r y development. And both were not ashamed t o say t h a t t h e i r v a l u e s were t h e v e r y ones s h a r e d by t h e m a j o r i t y o f decent men. M o r a l i t y , s o c i a l harmony, r a t i o n a l i t y , a l l were m e r e l y d i f f e r e n t f a c e t s o f t h e same e s s e n t i a l v e r i t y ; i n t e l l i g e n c e worked hand i n hand w i t h f e e l i n g t o b r i n g t o mankind a knowledge of t h i s happy t r u t h . Thus, by a c c e p t i n g H e r b e r t Spencer's u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f e v o l u t i o n , James S u l l y escaped t h e d i s c o n c e r t i n g r e a l i z a t i o n : t h a t t h e d i c t a t e s o f c o n s c i e n c e c o u l d not be e x p l a i n e d as t h e r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e s t o o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s . 54 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I I I 1 J . S u l l y , The Human Mind, London, Longmans Green, 1892, v o l . 1, p. 139. 2 J. S u l l y , I l l u s i o n s , London, Kegan P a u l , 1881, passim. 3 I b i d . , p. 339-^"J. S u l l y , "Genius and I n s a n i t y , " The Nineteenth Century, v o l . 17 (Jan.-June 1885) , p. 968. S u l l y researched the back-grounds of a number of "geniuses" and found that most of them gave l i t t l e c r e d i t t o the i n f l u e n c e of formal education upon them. v. J . S u l l y , "The Education of Genius," The L i v i n g Age, v o l . 188 (Jan.-March), pp. 558-565. — 5 J . S u l l y , The Human Mind, v o l . 2, p. 277. 6 I b i d . , p. 268. I V . G . F . S T O U T A N D T H E P R O B L E M O F B E L I E F 56 I f v i r t u a l l y a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s were f u l l y p r e p a r e d t o defend t h e e f f i c a c y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s from t h e m a t e r i a l i s t ' s a t t a c k and t o d e c l a r e t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e ' s independence from p h y s i o l o g y , not a l l f e l t t h a t i t was n e c e s s a r y t o equate c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y w i t h r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g . I n f a c t , one p s y c h o l o g i s t , George F r e d e r i c k S t o u t came t o v e r y much t h e o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n : t h a t s u b j e c t i v e d e s i r e s , m o r a l o r o t h e r -w i s e , had t h e tendency t o i n h i b i t ' r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g . L i k e h i s former p r o f e s s o r a t Cambridge, James Ward, S t o u t was a t t r a c t e d by t h e w r i t i n g s o f R i c h a r d A v e n a r i u s . D e s p i t e t h e c o n t i n u e d o p p o s i t i o n o f i d e a l i s t s and m a t e r i a l i s t s t o t h e independent e x i s t e n c e of p s y c h o l o g y , he d i s c o v e r e d t h a t R i c h a r d A v e n a r i u s had r e d e f i n e d t h e t a s k o f p s y c h o l o g y i n such a way t h a t i t had been g i v e n a new l e a s e on l i f e . " ' " S t o u t s u b s c r i b e d t o A v e n a r i u s ' axiom o f t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y o f p s y c h i c a l and p h y s i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s and c o n c u r r e d w i t h A v e n a r i u s ' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e t r u t h o f t h i s p r o p o s i -t i o n was, i n f a c t , i r r e l e v a n t . A p s y c h o l o g i s t , S t o u t a g r e e d , must a c c e p t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h i s p r e m i s e , even i f o n l y f o r i t s o u s e f u l n e s s i n p r o c u r i n g o b j e c t i v e l y v e r i f i a b l e r e s u l t s . A v e n a r i u s , h i m s e l f , b e l i e v e d t h e t a s k o f what he termed a " s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y " was mer e l y t o g i v e t h e be s t d e s c r i p -t i o n o f a p s y c h o l o g i c a l e v e n t , and not attempt e i t h e r t o prove o r t o r e f u t e any m e t a p h y s i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . To t h i s end, A v e n a r i u s l i s t e d h i s two "axioms" of E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m which 57 he used t o j u s t i f y h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s : f i r s t , e v ery i n d i v i d u a l n e c e s s a r i l y i n t e r a c t s w i t h a complex, p h y s i c a l environment; and second, a l l p h i l o s o p h i c o r s c i e n t i f i c thought can be r e d u c e d t o more s i m p l e and g e n e r a l i n t e l l e c t u a l f u n c t i o n s . A l t h o u g h t h e s e a r e t h e r o o t p r i n c i p l e s o f A v e n a r i u s ' p s y c h o l o g y — a n d S t o u t ' s — i t s n u c l e u s was t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t t h e nervous system was a mechanism which r e g u l a t e d the c r e a t u r e ' s v i t a l energy, something a k i n t o t h e modern n o t i o n o f a h o m e o s t a t i c d e v i c e . A v e n a r i u s h e l d t h a t t h e environment o c c a s i o n s t h e e x p e n d i t u r e o f energy by t h e organism. However, a t t h e same t i m e , t h e environment a l s o f u r n i s h e s t h e organism w i t h a s u b s t a n c e t o r e p l e n i s h i t s r e s e r v e s o f energy w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e nervous system a g a i n r e a c h e s a b a l a n c e between 3 i t s energy income and e x p e n d i t u r e . But, i n t r u t h , a s t a t e o f r e a l e q u i l i b r i u m i s n ever a t t a i n e d because t h e environment i s a l t e r i n g c o n t i n u o u s l y and t h e r e f o r e i m b a l a n c i n g t h e equa-t i o n — A v e n a r i u s ' " v i t a l d i f f e r e n c e . " The organism c o n s e q u e n t l y becomes a c t i v e t r y i n g t o r e s t o r e i t s e q u i l i b r i u m ; t h i s be-h a v i o r he termed t h e " v i t a l s e r i e s . " I n t h i s way, A v e n a r i u s b e l i e v e d t h a t he had f i n a l l y done away w i t h t h e u s e f u l n e s s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a p o s t u l a t e f o r . t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t B e s i d e s , he r e a s o n e d , s i n c e no s u b s t a n t i a l p r o o f e i t h e r c o n f i r m e d or d e n i e d th e e x i s t e n c e o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s one ought t o l e a r n t o d e s c r i b e p s y c h o l o g i c e v e nts w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o something so ambiguous. S t o u t was not w i l l i n g t o go as f a r as A v e n a r i u s i n t h i s r e s p e c t . 58 On t h e whole h i g h l y s y m p a t h e t i c t o A v e n a r i u s ' arguments, S t o u t a g r e e d t h a t a t i m e had come f o r p s y c h o l o g y t o d i s p e n s e w i t h m e t a p h y s i c a l p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . I n h i s e s t i m a t i o n A v e n a r i u s had been c o r r e c t t o i n f e r t h a t judgments and b e l i e f s have u l t i m a t e l y a b i o l o g i c a l , hence s u b j e c t i v e , o r i g i n . An i n d i v i d u a l , i t seemed, seeks t o a t t a i n some g o a l w h i c h w i l l e v e n t u a l l y r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e o f p l e a s u r e and d i m i n u t i o n o f p a i n ; t h e d e s i r e t o g a i n t h i s end n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s i n h i s b e l i e f i n t h e r e a l i t y o f t h a t end. T h i s course o f events a r o s e f r o m d e s i r e ' s c a p a c i t y t o r e i n f o r c e a man's c o n v i c t i o n about a p r e v i o u s l y u n c e r t a i n o p i n i o n , t h u s making i t now a f i r m l y h e l d b e l i e f . D e s i r e had t h e e f f e c t o f d i r e c t i n g a t t e n t i o n away from a l l c o n t r a r y e v i d e n c e . I n extreme cases t h i s r e s u l t e d i n an i m p u l s i v e , u n d i s c e r n i n g p a s s i o n , o r i n S t o u t ' s p h r a s e : "overwhelming c o n a t a t i o n . " F u r t h e r m o r e , i n a d d i t i o n t o m o n o p o l i z i n g one's a t t e n t i o n , d e s i r e h e l p e d an o p i n i o n r e s i s t c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h might negate i t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , a man, S t o u t t h o u g h t , w i l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o r i d h i m s e l f o f a q u e s t i o n a b l e p r e j u d i c e , s i n c e t o a c q u i r e a f r e s h b e l i e f would mean t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h o s e hopes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h h i s i n i t i a l b e l i e f , and t h i s would f r u s t r a t e h i s d e s i r e and p r o -duce an imbalance o f p a i n over p l e a s u r e . A man's c o n v i c t i o n s were a l s o t o some e x t e n t dependent upon t h e v i g o u r and a c t i v i t y — t h e p o t e n t i a l " c o n a t i v e s t r e n g t h " — o f h i s mind. T h i s l e d S t o u t t o co n c l u d e t h a t t h e t r u e b e l i e v e r s and l i k e l y c o n v e r t s were t o be found among t h e r i s i n g g e n e r a t i o n : "Youth i s s a n g u i n e ; age i s s c e p t i c a l and h e s i t a t e s t o adopt new views." 59 I n e s s e n c e , however, b e l i e f i s a s i m p l e m a t t e r o f n e u r a l e c o n o m i c s — t h e u t i l i t y o f p l e a s u r e and p a i n . A man b e l i e v e s what w i l l a l l o w him t o i n c r e a s e h i s p l e a s u r e and m i n i m i z e h i s p a i n . He b e l i e v e s what he r a t i o n a l l y , o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r i r r a t i o n a l l y , presumes t o be h i s s e l f - i n t e r e s t — one might almost say h i s Hf£ii:clficc.cad!cul,us?/' I n t h i s r e s p e c t , " c o u n t e r e x p e r i e n c e s " t e n d t o oppose t h e i n e r t i a o f o b s o l e t e b e l i e f s , s i n c e " c o u n t e r e x p e r i e n c e s " can f o r c e a man t o r e v i s e h i s e x i s t i n g b e l i e f s i n o r d e r t h a t he might i n c l u d e them i n h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g and t h e r e b y f i n d a more e f f i c i e n t way o f f u l f i l l i n g h i s r a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . The o t h e r c h i e f f a c t o r , i n S t o u t ' s v i e w , l i m i t i n g t h e v a r i e t y and c o n t e n t of b e l i e f , i s t h e p r e c i s e n a t u r e o f t h e environment, f o r the.environment imposed t h e i n e v i t a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s upon a person's a c t i v i t y and thus,, i n e f f e c t , d e t e r m i n e s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e o f any b e l i e f . What had S t o u t a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h h i s . a d o p t i o n of A v e n a r i u s ' " b i o - p s y c h o l o g y " ? I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , S t o u t used i t t o cut t h r o u g h t h e g o r d i a n knot caused by t h e apparent d u a l i s m between mind and body. Though, i t was i m p o s s i b l e f o r St o u t t o demonstrate e x a c t l y how c o n s c i o u s n e s s was r e l a t e d t o p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s , he agreed w i t h A v e n a r i u s t h a t p s y c h o l o g y must assume i n any event t h a t j u s t such a r e l a t i o n s h i p between tho u g h t and a c t i o n t o o k p l a c e . ^ U n l e s s t h i s assumption was made, a g a i n s t a l l o b j e c t i o n s from p h i l o s o p h y and p h y s i o l o g y , th e f u r t h e r development o f a n a t u r a l i s t i c p s y c h o l o g y would, 60 S t o u t b e l i e v e d , be almost c o m p l e t e l y t h w a r t e d . Of immediate im p o r t a n c e t o S t o u t f o r i t s u s e f u l n e s s i n v i n d i c a t i n g t h e r i g h t o f p s y c h o l o g y t o be independent from m e t a p h y s i c s and p h y s i o l o g y , t h e v i e w p o i n t o f A v e n a r i u s a l s o s u g g e s t e d an i m p o r t a n t r e v i s i o n o f t h e D a r w i n i a n h y p o t h e s i s . No l o n g e r was i t n e c e s s a r y t o l i n k a n i m a l b e h a v i o r t o a p r i m i t i v e s e n s a t i o n a l i s m , whereby ev e r y a c t i o n , l i k e a r e f l e x , proceeded a u t o m a t i c a l l y w i t h o u t t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h o u g h t . A v e n a r i u s e x p l a i n e d away t h e a b s u r d i t i e s o f H u x l e y ' s d o c t r i n e , and a t t h e same t i m e showed how an a n i m a l ' s adjustment t o i t s environment was both a p s y c h o l o g i c a l and b i o l o g i c a l event. An a n i m a l o r man e x p e r i e n c e s a form o f t e n s i o n ( p a i n ) which i s t h e s u b j e c t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f a p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t ( the e x p e n d i t u r e o f energy) t h e a n i m a l t h e n makes t h e a p p r o p r i a t e a d j u s t m e n t , g e n e r a l l y t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f a s u c c e s s f u l p a s t r e s p o n s e . I t would, however, be a m i s t a k e t o assume t h a t t h i s r e v i s i o n o f Darwinism met w i t h a w h o l l y f a v o u r a b l e r e a c t i o n . There were i t appears some l e s s t h a n p l e a s a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s t o t h e new o u t l o o k o f t h e E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s t s . I n A v e n a r i u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n a l l thought s e r v e d t h e purpose o f h e l p i n g t h e organism t o con s e r v e energy. Hence i t would seem a man had no co n c e r n w i t h r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g as an end i n i t s e l f , but o n l y w i t h d e v e l o p i n g an i d e a l e a d i n g t o a c o u r s e o f a c t i o n , w h i c h would remove a s t a t e o f t e n s i o n . From t h i s , S t o u t drew t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e o r i g i n o f a man's b e l i e f s l a y w i t h 61 h i s d e s i r e s . Almost as w i t h a s l e i g h t of hand, S t o u t b l u r r e d and t h e n o b l i t e r a t e d t h e timeworn d i s t i n c t i o n between " r a t i o n a l , " " o b j e c t i v e " judgments and i m p e r a t i v e , " s u b j e c t i v e " b e l i e f s . On t h e o t h e r hand, James Ward i g n o r e d t h e l o g i c o f A v e n a r i u s ' b i o - m e c h a n i c a l p r i n c i p l e , and o d d l y enough, found i n i t a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s own mor a l i n t u i t i o n . Ward thought i t f u t i l e t o hope t h a t s c i e n c e c o u l d ever a p p l y i t s methods s a t i s f a c t o r i t y t o human c o n s c i o u s n e s s . He b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was i m p o s s i b l e t o d i s c u s s c o n s c i o u s n e s s w i t h o u t r e c o g n i z i n g t h e a l l - i m p o r t a n t p a r t m o r a l judgments p l a y e d i n a man's s u b j e c t i v e c o n c e r n s , and here Ward was p r e p a r e d t o see t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a Supreme B e i n g , though I t was not e x a c t l y t h e same God o f t h e o r t h o d o x t h e o l o g i a n s . A c c o r d i n g l y , he f e l t t h a t he was o n l y b e i n g c o n s i s t e n t t o suggest t h a t S c i e n c e p u b l i c l y acknowledge i t s d e f e a t and t h e r e a f t e r bow b e f o r e t h e t r u t h of t h i s g r e a t m y s t e r y w h i c h wedded t h e s u b j e c t i v e mind t o t h e u n i v e r s e ' s immutable m o r a l l a w s . Y e t , i f b o t h S t o u t and Ward a p p e a l e d t o t h e axioms o f E m p i r i o - c r i t i c i s m t o v i n d i c a t e t h e independent e x i s t e n c e o f p s y c h o l o g y , t h e i n f e r e n c e s t h e y drew were c o m p l e t e l y a t odds. S u b j e c t i v i t y was not f o r S t o u t t h e c o m f o r t i n g p a t h t o i n t i m a t i o n o f t r u t h , but a p e r s i s t e n t t h r e a t t o r a t i o n a l t h o u g h t . I n o t h e r words, i f a person's b e l i e f s a r e , as S t o u t c l a i m e d , d e t e r m i n e d i n v a r i a b l y by h i s s u b j e c t i v e d e s i r e s , i s i t t h e n p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n a n y t h i n g which c o u l d l e g i t i -m a t e l y be d e s c r i b e d as o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ? S t o u t ' s apparent 62 w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c c e p t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f A v e n a r i u s ' r e s t a t e -ment o f t h e D a r w i n i a n o u t l o o k and t o a c q u i e s c e i n t h e d i v o r c e o f what he c o n c e i v e d o f as r a t i o n a l thought from any n o t i o n o f an a b s o l u t e m o r a l s t a n d a r d w a r r a n t s f u r t h e r t r e a t m e n t a t t h i s p o i n t . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o remember t h a t w h i l e S t o u t ' s p s y c h o l o g i c a l o p i n i o n s l e d him t o c o n c l u d e t h a t s u b j e c t i v i t y and r a t i o n a l i t y were almost always i n o p p o s i t i o n , most o t h e r p s y c h o l o g i s t s s t i l l f ound i t d i s c o n c e r t i n g t o t h i n k t h a t t h e i r f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s of a l i f e t i m e might be no more t h a n a p l e a s u r e - g i v i n g i l l u s i o n . How i s i t p o s s i b l e t o a s c e r t a i n what i s t h e r e a l w o r l d ? S t o u t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e t o make a l e g i t i m a t e d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a l i t y and mere appearance, a t l e a s t i n t h e case o f e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s , though t h i s i s d i f f i c u l t . . . . when we a r e i n e r r o r what i s u n r e a l appears t o be p r e s e n t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h e same manner as what i s r e a l i s p r e s e n t e d when we t r u l y know. W h i l e t h e e rroneous b e l i e f i s a c t u a l l y h e l d , t h e i l l u s o r y o b j e c t seems i n no way t o d i f f e r f o r t h e c o n s c i o u s s u b j e c t from a r e a l o b j e c t . ' C o n s e q u e n t l y , b e f o r e an i n d i v i d u a l can d i s t i n g u i s h mere appearance from r e a l i t y he must f i r s t l e a r n t o suspend h i s w i l l t o b e l i e v e , and t h u s a l l o w t h e q u a l i t i e s o f t h e r e l e v a n t o b j e c t t o m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s f r e e l y . One must t r y t o know an o b j e c t as a " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " ; such i s t h e case i n e x p e r i -m e n t a l s c i e n c e where t h e chemist a c h i e v e s h i s r e s u l t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f h i s v o l i t i o n . The chemist f i r s t becomes a c t i v e so t h a t he w i l l be p a s s i v e . I n more p r e c i s e l a n g u a g e , 63 the chemist a p p l i e s a t e s t t o a s u b s t a n c e — h e r e one can d e s c r i b e him as being a c t i v e . He i s thus p e r m i t t i n g the independent nature of the substance i n q u e s t i o n t o decide the r e s u l t s of h i s t e s t ; t h e r e f o r e i n a r e a l sense the chemist has now become p a s s i v e . E s s e n t i a l l y , the chemist's a c t i v i t y c o n s i s t s of shaping a q u e s t i o n i n such a way as t o f o r c e an answer from the object being s t u d i e d . In t h i s c ontext, Stout f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between what he d e s c r i b e d as a f a l s e "appearance" and a t r u e " e r r o r . " An appearance was simply a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of an a c t u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n — f o r example, an o p t i c a l i l l u s i o n . On the other hand, an e r r o r o c c u r r e d when a person t r i e d t o make the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an o b j e c t conform t o some pre-determined system of b e l i e f . Hence i f a statement i s t o be meaningful, an i n d i v i d u a l must decide i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y independently of h i s d e s i r e t o e i t h e r a f f i r m or deny i t . Stout r e j e c t e d the two u s u a l s o l u t i o n s of e i t h e r i n d e f i n a t e l y suspending b e l i e f u n t i l more i n f o r m a t i o n was a v a i l a b l e , or as an a l t e r n a t i v e , r e l y i n g on the probable t r u t h of the p r o p o s i t i o n r e l a t i n g t o the o b j e c t . The f i r s t s o l u t i o n had the e f f e c t , Stout b e l i e v e d , of making any a c t i v i t y i m p o s s i b l e ; t h e r e f o r e a man must presume on the l i m i t e d knowledge a v a i l a b l e , otherwise he must continue v a c i l l a t i n g i n t e r m i n a b l y . Furthermore, p r o b a b i l i t y i t s e l f i s dependent upon the t r u t h or f a l s e n e s s of c e r t a i n other b e l i e f s , f o r i n s t a n c e whether or not a person has been c o r r e c t 64 i n h i s judgment about t h e m e r i t s o f t h e competing i n t e r p r e t a -t i o n s , t h u s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r a g a i n emerges. Our r e s u l t , t h e n , i s : (1) That a b s o l u t e suspense o f judgment e x c l u d i n g even t h e judgment o f p r o b a b i l i t y i s e q u i v a l e n t t o suspense o f a c t i o n . (2) That t h e r e l a t i v e suspense o f judgment which c o n s i s t s i n a f f i r m i n g even chances does not s u f f i c e t o determine a c t i o n u n l e s s i t i s supplemented by o t h e r b e l i e f s i n whi c h one a l t e r n a t i v e i s p r e f e r r e d t o o t h e r s . Hence i t appears t h a t p r a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n i n v o l v e s t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n , and t h a t we must c o n s t a n t l y r i s k e r r o r by presuming on p a r t i a l knowledge, i f we a r e t o l i v e a t a l l . 9 S t i l l , t h i s apparent impasse can be a v o i d e d , S t o u t e x p l a i n e d , r e t u r n i n g t o h i s c e n t r a l theme, by a s k i n g t h e k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s w h i c h a l l o w t h e o b j e c t t o r e v e a l i t s e l f g r a t u i t o u s l y . I n p a r t i c u l a r , S t o u t was a t t a c k i n g t h e argument o f t h e I d e a l i s t , F.H. B r a d l e y , who su g g e s t e d t h a t e v e r y p r o p o s i t i o n must be c o n d i t i o n e d ; t h e r e cannot be a n y t h i n g o a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n u n l e s s t h e r e i s a l s o a t o t a l knowledge of t h e u n i v e r s e , t h e c o n d i t i o n s l i m i t i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , B r a d l e y argued, t h i s i n e s c a p a b l e i g n o r a n c e makes t h e t r u t h of any p r o p o s i t i o n h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . S t o u t begged t o d i f f e r : The t r u t h o f judgments c o n c e r n i n g what i s r e a l i s not l o g i c a l l y dependent upon t h e t r u t h of judgments con-c e r n i n g ' R e a l i t y ' w i t h a c a p i t a l R . l o What i m p r e s s e s one about S t o u t ' s o u t l o o k i s i t s s t r o n g p r a g m a t i c temper. Absent i s t h e s e a r c h f o r some a u t h o r i t a t i v e t r u t h w h i c h c l a i m e d t o e x p r e s s t h e m o r a l laws o f t h e u n i v e r s e , f o r i n S t o u t ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g t r u t h cannot be seen as a n y t h i n g l i k e a m o r a l commandment. T r u t h i s r e l a t i v e , a p a r t l y s u b j e c t i v e assumption, an i n t e l l e c t u a l t o o l used by a man t o r e a l i z e h i s ends. And man i s a problem-solver whose u l t i m a t e concern i s g a i n i n g p l e a s u r e while a v o i d i n g p a i n . Stout h e l d t h a t h i s views were e s s e n t i a l l y those expressed by the E n g l i s h Pragmatist, F.C.S. S c h i l l e r , at l e a s t t he, . . . view t h a t a l l adequate v e r i f i c a t i o n s i n v o l v e s the s u c c e s s f u l use of p r o p o s i t i o n s as p o s t u l a t e s f o r the guidance of our a c t i v i t y . T ruth must t h e r e f o r e be, i n some sense, r e l a t i v e t o our emotions, d e s i r e s , purposes e t c . 1 1 T h i s concern with the p r a c t i c a l ways of v e r i f y i n g s t a t e ments, what the l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s t , K a r l Popper has c a l l e d " deductive t e s t i n g , " i s an aspect of Stout's t h i n k i n g t h a t 12 g i v e s i t a p e c u l i a r l y modern f l a v o u r . In the modern e m p i r i c a l outlook, s u b j e c t i v i t y , r a t h e r than being a w e l l -s p r i n g of mystic t r u t h , i s the constant source of e r r o r i n ac c u r a t e o b s e r v a t i o n . James S u l l y a l s o r e c o g n i z e d t h i s f a c t , t h a t a man's s u b j e c t i v e needs co u l d o b s t r u c t h i s conscious e f f o r t s t o under stand h i s world. S u l l y , however, had shared the •commonly h e l d view t h a t e v o l u t i o n must proceed i n such a way as t o demonstrate a u t o m a t i c a l l y , unavoidably, c e r t a i n i n f a l l i b l e t r u t h s . To S u l l y , i t was i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t the e t h i c a l conventions of h i s s o c i e t y d i d not n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t an a b s o l u t e standard set by a provident Nature. Furthermore, the a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , Edward B. T y l o r , whose work S u l l y was f a m i l i a r w i t h , o f f e r e d c o n v i n c i n g proof t h a t i t was p r e c i s e l y those moral conventions, obeyed by the Late V i c t o r i a n g e n t l e -man, which were c o n s p i c u o u s l y l a c k i n g i n those e v o l u t i o n a r y , 13 immature t r i b a l s o c i e t i e s . 66 S t o u t , on t h e o t h e r hand, would h a r d l y have suggested t h a t t h e d i c t a t e s o f c o n s c i e n c e and t h e p o l i t e r u l e s o f s o c i e t y were n e c e s s a r i l y t h e end p r o d u c t s o f e v o l u t i o n and de s e r v e d a man's e x p l i c i t observance l e s t he become an unhappy p r e y t o dangerous i l l u s i o n s . I n h i s v i e w e v e r y m e n t a l p r o c e s s s e r v e d as a f l e x i b l e response t o t h e e v e r -changing r e l a t i o n s h i p between a man and h i s s u r r o u n d i n g s . As t h e p h y s i c a l needs o f an organism change so must i t s c o n c e p t i o n s , e x c e p t i n g o n l y t h a t t h e mental energy r e q u i r e d t o r e p e a t a p r e v i o u s o p e r a t i o n i s l e s s t h a n t h a t needed t o i n i t i a t e a new a c t i o n . S t o u t ' s p s y c h o l o g y was almost t h e o n l y m o r a l l y n e u t r a l t r e a t m e n t i n L a t e V i c t o r i a n E n g l a n d o f t h e D a r w i n i a n o u t l o o k i n p s y c h o l o g y . As a r e s u l t , S t o u t ' s work sought t o p r e s e n t no case f o r any s e t o f m o r a l judgments, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r o t h e r w i s e . U n l i k e o t h e r L a t e V i c t o r i a n s who hoped t h a t s c i e n c e would c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y determine a b s o l u t e t r u t h ( n a t u r a l law) w h i c h would s e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f r a t i o n a l conduct f o r men, S t o u t r e c o g n i z e d t h e f u t i l i t y o f t h i s endeavour. W h i l e he was v i t a l l y c oncerned, l i k e so many o t h e r i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n t h i s p e r i o d , w i t h t r y i n g t o g r a s p t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a m o r a l l y r e l a t i v i s t i c u n i v e r s e , S t o u t a c c e p t e d w i t h o u t any t r a c e o f f e a r l i f e i n a w o r l d where man need acknowledge no t r u e master except h i s own s e l f - i n t e r e s t . D e s p i t e t h e e f f o r t s o f p s y c h o l o g i s t s l i k e James Ward and James S u l l y , S t o u t argued t h a t a c e r t a i n degree o f r e l a t i v i s m must i n e v i t a b l y pervade t h e whole domain o f 67 thought and b e l i e v e d t h a t e t h i c s c o u l d never hope t o ex p r e s s a n y t h i n g t h a t c o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d an a b s o l u t e s t a n d a r d . S t o u t ' s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t a l l thought s e r v e d as a b r i d g e be-tween o b j e c t i v e s t i m u l i and s u b j e c t i v e f e e l i n g and u n i t e d a man's p h y s i o l o g i c a l needs t o t h e s e n s o r y q u a l i t i e s o f o b j e c t s around him had d i s t u r b i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s . For w h i l e t h e V i c t o r i a n a g n o s t i c may have w i l l i n g l y o r u n w i l l i n g l y renounced many o f h i s p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s , he had not b a r g a i n e d on c o n t e n d i n g w i t h a l i f e d e v o i d o f a l l a u t h o r i t y . Yet t h i s was p r e c i s e l y where S t o u t ' s argument seemed t o be l e a d i n g . By i n c l u d i n g s u b j e c t i v i t y as a n a t u r a l though o b t r u s i v e element i n a l l t h i n k i n g , S t o u t had, perhaps u n w i t t i n g l y , h e l p e d t o h e r a l d t h e death o f p o s i t i v i s m and a new age o f u n c e r t a i n t y . H. S t u a r t Hughes has d e s c r i b e d t h e dilemma f a c i n g c o n t i n e n t a l i n t e l l e c t u a l s a t t h e t u r n o f t h e c e n t u r y as a s t r u g g l e t o r e t a i n something o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s b e l i e f i n r a t i o n a l man, w h i l e coming t o terms w i t h t h e ev i d e n c e o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y o f human conduct. They were, Hughes be-l i e v e s , almost obsessed by t h i s problem o f t h e n o n l o g i c a l , i r r a t i o n a l elements i n human b e h a v i o r , y e t f e a r f u l o f abandoning t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e e r r o r s o f e m o t i o n a l i s m and m y s t i c i s m . 1 ^ S i m u l t a n e o u s l y , w h i l e a t t e m p t i n g t o r e a f f i r m t h e i r f a i t h i n t h e a n a l y t i c a l powers o f man t o u n d e r s t a n d h i m s e l f and h i s s o c i e t y , t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f t h e n i n e t i e s were i n c o n s c i o u s r e v o l t a g a i n s t the crude n a t u r a l i s m and s h a l l o w p s y c h o l o g y o f s c i e n t i f i c m a t e r i a l i s m and p o s i t i v i s m . 1 6 8 A man of h i s g e n e r a t i o n , Stout p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s g e n e r a l t r e n d (which a c c o r d i n g t o Hughes d i s t i n g u i s h e d the C o n t i n e n t a l outlook at t h i s t i m e ) , but then, so d i d James Ward. I t was not, t h e r e f o r e , the r e j e c t i o n of m a t e r i a l i s m t h a t made Stout's work a t u r n i n g p o i n t i n E n g l i s h thought. I t was, i n s t e a d , h i s i m p l i c i t r e p u d i a t i o n of the n o t i o n t h a t s c i e n c e ought t o c o n f i r m the r a t i o n a l v a l i d i t y e i t h e r of c o n v e n t i o n a l m o r a l i t y or the m o r a l i t y expressed i n a more 15 r e f i n e d metaphyical creed. ' There was, however, one aspect of Stout's comprehension t h a t r e f l e c t s t h a t happy i f unwarranted confidence with which most modern i n t e l l e c t u a l s are u n b l e s t , t h a t i s to say, the r e a s s u r i n g c o n v i c t i o n of man's in n a t e goodness. The economist, John Maynard Keynes, looked back n o s t a l g i c a l l y t o the optimism shared, perhaps n a i v e l y , by h i s and Stout's g e n e r a t i o n . We were, Keynes w r i t e s , . . . amongsttthe f i r s t t o escape from Benthamism. But of another e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y heresy we were the unrepentant h e i r s and l a s t upholders. We were among the l a s t of the Utopians, or m e l i o r i s t s as they are sometimes c a l l e d , who b e l i e v e i n c o n t i n u i n g moral progress by v i r t u e of which the human race a l r e a d y c o n s i s t s of r e l i a b l e , r a t i o n a l , decent people, i n -f l u e n c e d by t r u t h and o b j e c t i v e standards, who can be s a f e l y r e l e a s e d from outward r e s t r a i n t s of con-v e n t i o n and t r a d i t i o n a l standards and i n f l e x i b l e r u l e s of conduct, and l e f t , from now onwards, t o t h e i r own s e n s i b l e d e v i c e s , pure motives and r e l i a b l e i n -t u i t i o n s of the good.l {- > 69 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV v. Appendix B. 2 W. D r a b o v i t i c h , n L a bio-psychologie de R. Avenarius et l e problem de '1'homme t o t a l ' , " Revue Philosophique, v o l . 115, 1933, P. 409. • • 3 I b i d . , p. 414. v. Appendix C. 4 I b i d . , p. 416. 5 G.F. Stout, A n a l y t i c Psychology, London, Swann Sonneschein, 1909,. v o l . 2, p. 255. By viewing consciousness as a form of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Stout thought that he could g i v e a t e n t a t i v e account of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between mind and body. Conscious s t a t e s are d i r e c t l y a f f i l i a t e d w i t h b r a i n processes; consciousness has the a b i l i t y to i n f l u e n c e the br a i n ' s p h y s i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n g i n order t o s u s t a i n the flow of consciousness needed t o d i r e c t a c t i v i t y toward the achievement of the d e s i r e d g o a l . The f a c t t h a t the a v a i l a b l e p h y s i o l o g i c a l data i n d i c a t e s that the b r a i n i s capable of r e g u l a t i n g i t s own blood supply appeared t o Stout a c o n f i r m a t i o n of h i s theory. I t seemed that the whole of mental l i f e a c t u a l l y c o n s i s t s of a perpetual c y c l e i n v o l v i n g f i r s t a mental change, next the tra n s m i s s i o n of nerve impulses, then a muscle response, and f i n a l l y another mental change, the l a s t i n t h i s s e r i e s of events but the f i r s t i n a beginning s e r i e s . Stout suggested that the " r e v i v a l " of ideas through a s s o c i a t i o n g i v e s strong support t o h i s b e l i e f that conscious-ness s t r i v e s f o r i t s own r e a l i z a t i o n . The r e - e x c i t a t i o n of p r e v i o u s l y l i n k e d memory t r a c e s , themselves the r e s u l t of the m o d i f i c a t i o n of b r a i n substance by an e a r l i e r psycho-physical process, brings many more p r i o r but r e l a t e d impressions to bear upon the subject of consciousness. Indeed, because of the nature of the a t t e n t i o n process a t r a i n of ideas may be s a i d t o propagate i t s e l f as a flame spreads among combustible m a t e r i a l . Here consciousness i s s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g , since i t has i n i t i a t e d the changes which occasions the r e v i v a l of memories; furthermore, i t i s consciousness which caused the m o d i f i c a t i o n of the b r a i n substance i n the f i r s t place. I t i s important t o note that f o r a l l h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the theory of psycho-physical p a r a l l e l i s m and h i s forewarning against a t t r i b u t i n g a m a t e r i a l o r i g i n t o consciousness, Stout claimed to accept the dualism inherent i n the theory only on the grounds of i t s u t i l i t y ; psycho-physical p a r a l l e l i s m i s a n e c e s s i t y imposed by the l i m i t a t i o n s of man's knowledge. In t r u t h , however, Stout dissented from the monistic outlook of 70 both I d e a l i s m and M a t e r i a l i s m . There a r e , i t seemed, two separate but interdependent e n t i t e s , matter and mind, f o r , n . . . the stream of i n d i v i d u a l consciousness i s no such s e l f -c o n t ained u n i t . I t i s the merest fragment of a u n i v e r s a l r e a l i t y , as i t s c o r r e l a t e d b r a i n - p r o c e s s i s the merest f r a g -ment of the m a t e r i a l world. A l l change w i t h i n i t i s determined by f a c t o r s extraneous t o i t . At the same time, i t i s e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t no change w i t h i n i s e n t i r e l y determined from without." Stout, A n a l y t i c Psychology, v o l . 1 , p. 1 5 6 . 7 'G.F. Stout, " E r r o r , " S t u d i e s i n Philosophy and Psychology, London, MacMillan, 1930, p. 262 ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1902). g I b i d . , p. 269. 9 I b i d . , p. 286. 1 0 I b i d . , p. 3 0 1 . 1 : LG.F. Stout, " C r i t i c a l N o t i c e s : F.C.S. S c h i l l e r , S t u d i e s  i n Humanism," Mind, N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 583. 12 K. Popper, The L o g i c of S c i e n t i f i c D i s c o v e r y , New York, Harper and Row, 1965, p. 3 3 • 13 ^E.B. T y l o r , P r i m i t i v e C u l t u r e , London, John Murray, 1903, 2 v o l s , ( f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1871). "^H. S t u a r t Hughes, Consciousness and S o c i e t y , New York, V i n t a g e , 1958, p. 35. 15 I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o estimate the reasons f o r Stout's unusual l a c k of i n t e r e s t i n moral i s s u e s . Probably, h i s want of a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e l i g i o u s u p b r i n g i n g and hence h i s escape from the emotional doldrums of a r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s made i t e a s i e r f o r him t o t r u s t h i s n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n s without recourse t o a p h i l o s o p h i c d o c t r i n e t o j u s t i f y them. "*"^ J.M. Keynes, Two Memoirs, London, Hart-Davis, 1949, p. 98. V. CONCLUSION 72 For some f o r t y y e a r s , from H u x l e y ' s a d d r e s s t o t h e g a t h e r i n g o f s c i e n t i s t s a t B e l f a s t up t o t h e y e a r s b e f o r e t h e G reat War, B r i t i s h p s y c h o l o g y had f o r t h r i g h t l y committed i t -s e l f t o d e f e n d i n g t h e a c t i v e p a r t c o n s c i o u s n e s s p l a y e d i n o r g a n i z i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g man's p h y s i c a l s e n s a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t , one can say t h a t H u x l e y ' s paper had, i n e f f e c t , marked t h e demise of c l a s s i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n i s m . I t was c l e a r l y e v i d e n t t h a t p s y c h o l o g y c o u l d now no l o n g e r c o n s i d e r t h e mind t o be n o t h i n g more t h a n a p l a c e where s i m p l e s e n s a t i o n s m e c h a n i c a l l y combined t o form complex t h o u g h t s and f e e l i n g s . The l o n g t r a d i t i o n f r o m Locke t o t h e U t i l i t a r i a n s had f i n a l l y e x p i r e d beneath t h e e n e r g e t i c o n s l a u g h t o f t h e d e t e r m i n e d opponents of automatism. Thus, i f t h e h i s t o r i a n o f E n g l i s h p s y c h o l o g y , L.S. Hearnshaw, i s c o r r e c t i n h i s a p p r e c i a t i o n t h a t E n g l i s h p s y c h o l o g y r e a c t e d u n s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y t o t h e l a t e r programme of t h e B e h a v i o r i s t s , he i s n e v e r t h e l e s s m i s t a k e n when he blames t h e m y s t i c a l element i n Ward's thought." 1" A f t e r a l l , t h e c o n s i s t e n t theme i n E n g l i s h p s y c h o l o g y f o r f o r t y y e a r s had been t h e e f f o r t t o r e f u t e any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t man's c o n s c i o u s n e s s was w i t h o u t i n f l u e n c e upon h i s b e h a v i o r . And t h e l e v e l - h e a d e d George F r e d e r i c k S t o u t s h a r e d , e v e r y b i t as much as t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t s , " t h i s a n t i p a t h y t o t h e n o t i o n t h a t p s y c h o l o g y had no b u s i n e s s c o n s i d e r i n g c o n s c i o u s -ness t o be a l e g i t i m a t e f i e l d o f s c i e n t i f i c s t u d y . Any v i e w , whether i t was h e l d by A s s o c i a t i o n i s t s , A u t o m a t i s t s or B e h a v i o r i s t s , t h a t t h e mind d i d no more t h a n r e c o r d e x t e r n a l 73 s e n s a t i o n , without any s u g g e s t i o n t h a t consciousness had a p o s i t i v e , v i t a l share i n determining the q u a l i t a t i v e nature of experience, was d i s t i n c t l y out of favour w i t h almost a l l p s y c h o l o g i s t s . R e s u l t s from experiments i n v o l v i n g hypnosis strengthened t h i s view even f u r t h e r when they i n d i c a t e d t h a t the s u b j e c t i v e elements w i t h i n the mind e x e r c i s e d a power of f a r g r e a t e r magnitude over a person's conduct than even the most r i g o r o u s defender of the independence of consciousness 2 from s e n s a t i o n would have once ever supposed. Furthermore, psychology, by r e c o g n i z i n g the importance of the s u b j e c t i v e component i n apprehension, found i t s e l f u n dertaking a r e - d e f i n i t i o n o f the Darwinian account of man's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s surroundings. No l o n g e r d i d i t appear adequate t o t a l k of adjustment s o l e l y i n p h y s i c a l terms, f o r now thought i t s e l f began t o be seen as a k i n d of a c t i v e response t o the changing c h a r a c t e r of the environment. There was one d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s l i n e of reas o n i n g . O b s t e n s i b l y , a l e g i t i m a t e deduction f o r a man t o i n f e r from t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n would be t h a t most of the demands of h i s conscience were i n h e r e n t l y i r r a t i o n a l , as i t was c l e a r l y i m p o s s i b l e t o j u s t i f y them on the u s u a l grounds t h a t they were the necessary r e -a c t i o n s t o environmental c o n d i t i o n s . Unless, they served obvious b i o l o g i c a l needs, morals and e t h i c a l v a l u e s had, i t seemed, no c l a i m t o be con s i d e r e d products of r a t i o n a l i n d u c t i o n . L.S. Hearnshaw has b r i e f l y d e s c r i b e d the course taken 74 by B r i t i s h psychology under the i n f l u e n c e of C o n t i n e n t a l Idealism: . . . B r i t i s h psychology had been f o r too long c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c t r a d i t i o n , a n t i - r e l i g i o u s i n general tone, and t h i s t r a d i t i o n was about t o s u f f e r an e c l i p s e . No science i s so s e l f -s u f f i c i e n t as t o be wholly immune t o changes i n p h i l o s o p h i c c l i m a t e . Nineteenth-century psychology, ba r e l y emerged from i n f a n c y , was e q u a l l y s u s c e p t i b l e t o them. When i n the t h i r d quarter of the nineteenth century B r i t i s h p h i l o s o p h e r s , renouncing t h e i r n a t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c t r a d i t i o n , f l o c k e d t o the i d e a l i s t i c banner, the development of psychology was n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t e d . In German and American u n i v e r s i t i e s a r a p i d growth of p s y c h o l o g i c a l departments took place i n the l a s t two decades of the century. B r i t i s h u n i v e r s i t i e s a n t a g o n i s t i c a l l y h e l d a l o o f , and f o r at l e a s t two generations the academic development of psychology was r e t a r d e d , u n t i l another change of p h i l o s o p h i c climate and a second world war provided more favourable circumstances.3 While Hearnshaw's argument has a convincing r i n g t o i t , i t i s a g e n e r a l i z a t i o n that cannot stand without the a d d i t i o n of s e v e r a l important q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . I t i s t r u e , of course, that many Late V i c t o r i a n i n t e l l e c t u a l s , James Ward, f o r example, found'to t h e i r d e l i g h t that C o n t i n e n t a l philosophy could o f f e r a moral "frame of r e f e r e n c e , " that seemed t o withstand c r i t i c a l examination b e t t e r than the e q u i v a l e n t , B r i t i s h , e t h i c a l systems. There i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the r e l i g i o u s c r i s i s i n Ward's e a r l y manhood, Huxley's d e n i a l of the e f f i c a c y of consciousness and the sometimes l e s s than s u b t l e moral overtones which c h a r a c t e r i z e d Ward's defence of s u b j e c t i v i s m . Yet, i t i s c l e a r l y impossible to f i t G.F. Stout i n t o t h i s narrow mold. To equate h i s brand of Pragmatism w i t h I d e a l i s m , i s s t r e t c h i n g the use of these terms 75 beyond a c c e p t a b l e l i m i t s . And, moreover, i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h o s e m o r a l concerns o f Ward t h a t a r e c o n s p i c u o u s l y l a c k i n g i n S t o u t ' s o u t l o o k . On t h e o t h e r hand, whatever t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l v i e w p o i n t , e v e r y p s y c h o l o g i s t , - P r a g m a t i s t , I d e a l i s t , S p i r i t u a l i s t , S p e n c e r i a n o r P l u r a l i s t , s h a r e d a common i n t e r e s t i n e x p l o r i n g t h e r a m i f i c a t i o n s o f human s u b j e c t i v i t y . I n t h i s c o n t e x t , t h e p h i l o s o p h i c defence o f m o r a l v a l u e s was but one a s p e c t o f t h i s l a r g e r i s s u e o f coming t o terms w i t h t h e importance o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e ( i r r a t i o n a l ? ) a s p e c t o f human t h o u g h t . T h i s problem, t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e a c t i v e r o l e t h e mind performed i n p e r c e i v -i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g s e n s a t i o n was t h e o u t s t a n d i n g d e f i c i e n c y o f o r t h o d o x A s s o c i a t i o n i s m . T h e r e f o r e , d e s p i t e t h e i r d i v e r g e n t p h i l o s o p h i e s , p s y c h o l o g i s t s i n L a t e V i c t o r i a n and Edwardian En g l a n d f a c e d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i n h e r e n t d i f f i c u l t y o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t r u t h from e r r o r , r e a l i t y from i l l u s i o n , and r a t i o n a l judgments from i r r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s . The q u e s t i o n s t h e y were a s k i n g o f t h e i r s c i e n c e was t o e x p l a i n how one man c o u l d form c e r t a i n c o n v i c t i o n s e n t i r e l y a t v a r i a n c e w i t h a n o t h e r ' s . Was i t , t h e y a s k e d , p u r e l y a s i t u a t i o n o f two d i f f e r e n t e n v i r o n m e n t a l backgrounds, o r was i t a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e me n t a l p r o c e s s e s of t h e two men; were t h e y p e r c e i v i n g t h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g s i n d i f f e r e n t ways? I t was becoming i n -c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o say e x a c t l y what b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d " r a t i o n a l " a c t u a l l y meant. Fu r t h e r m o r e , i t would a l s o be a m i s t a k e t o overemphasize 7 6 the impact t h a t the s e m i - m y s t i c a l t r e n d s i n German philosophy had upon B r i t i s h i n t e l l e c t u a l a t t i t u d e s . One commentator has, i n f a c t , d e s c r i b e d the p h i l o s o p h i c outlook i n Cambridge at the t u r n of the century as one of seeking t o r e p l a c e , . . . the ' s p e c u l a t i v e ' and 'metaphysical' temper of B r i t i s h Hegelianism by an atmosphere of l i t e r a l minded ' a n a l y s i s ' and c a u t i o u s 'empiricism'.4 To be sure, i t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t Stout's approach t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p of s c i e n c e and metaphysics had much i n common wit h the emerging g e n e r a t i o n of l o g i c a l p o s i -t i v i s t s ; at l e a s t both r e c o g n i z e d the importance of s u b j e c t i v e t h i n k i n g , excluded moral i s s u e s from metaphysical and s c i e n -t i f i c s p e c u l a t i o n , and evidenced an i n t e r e s t i n l i n g u i s t i c a l 5 a n a l y s i s . T h i s i s not t o say t h a t Stout was a founder of l o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m i n England, only t h a t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l concerns were but one aspect of a profound r e - o r i e n t a t i o n then t a k i n g p l a c e i n E n g l i s h i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e . The p o s i t i v i s t dream t h a t one day men would be able t o l e a r n from those i n -c o n t e s t a b l e laws of Nature and thereby become wholly r a t i o n a l beings had f i n a l l y e x p i r e d amid an age of s u b j e c t i v i t y and u n c e r t a i n t y . Even n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , cognizant of the i n a p p l i c a -b i l i t y of c l a s s i c a l p h y s i c s t o new developments i n the theory of electromagnetisrn and aware of c e r t a i n strange new phenomena began t o have i n c r e a s i n g doubts t h a t anything c o u l d be d e s c r i b e d as a hard, s c i e n t i f i c f a c t . Science had to confess t h a t , What the u n i v e r s e i s r e a l l y l i k e we do not know, and i t i s meaningless t o i n q u i r e . We can but form p i c t u r e s of nature t o o u r s e l v e s , which change r a d i c a l l y from time t o time and are f o r e v e r incomplete. 77 With t h i s change of outlook i n the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s , a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , a n t i c i p a t e d and e l u c i d a t e d by the Empirio-c r i t i c i s t s , Mach and Avenarius, came a r a d i c a l r e v i s i o n of the t h i n k i n g on human nature. L'Homme Machine, the c r e a t u r e whose thoughts and a c t i o n s flowed from impinging s e n s a t i o n s found h i m s e l f r e p l a c e d by a cunning, scheming i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t . Now psychology, r e l e a s e d from the i m p o s s i b l e burden of t r y i n g t o f i t e i g h t e e n t h century A s s o c i a t i o n i s m i n t o the context of n i n e t e e n t h century Darwinism, d i s c o v e r e d t o i t s s u r p r i s e t h a t man d i d , a f t e r a l l , c o n t a i n w i t h i n h i m s e l f the motive f o r c e s e f f e c t i n g h i s thoughts and a c t i o n s . There were, however, important d i f f e r e n c e s between the p s y c h o l o g i c a l s p e c u l a t i o n and s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i z i n g of James Ward and G.F. Stout. Behind James Ward's p r o f e s s i o n a l a n t i p a t h y t o what he saw as the d e c e i v i n g g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s and non-e x i s t i n g c a u s a l i t y of s c i e n c e , l a y a h e a r t f e l t concern with demonstrating moral freedom l a t e n t i n humanity. In c o n t r a s t , Stout f e l t no need t o l i m i t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n s by the q u e s t i o n a b l e preconceptions suggested by any moral or e t h i c a l system. L i k e Avenarius, Stout accepted t h a t man was an anthropormorphic being who u n w i t t i n g l y sees i n the r e f l e c t e d images of h i s own mind the manifest order, inherent i n the p h y s i c a l world. Stout's i n t e l l e c t u a l l e g a c y , t h e r e f o r e , was something much more than the r e c o g n i t i o n he shared with Ward t h a t human thought was not a response to o b j e c t i v e s t i m u l i but developed from s u b j e c t i v e needs. Inst e a d , Stout must be 7 8 c r e d i t e d w i t h being one of the r a r e few, who, before the t u r n of the century, w i l l i n g l y and f e a r l e s s l y ventured i n t o a brave, new world where a t r u l y s e c u l a r s p i r i t was r e p l a c i n g the moral preoccupations of former g e n e r a t i o n s . 79 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V 'L.S. Hearnshaw, A Short H i s t o r y of B r i t i s h Psychology  1840-1940, New York, Barnes and Noble, 1964, p. 13b. o F,W,H. Myers, Human P e r s o n a l i t y and I t s S u r v i v a l of  B o d i l y Death, London, Longmans Green, 1 9 0 3 , 2 v o l s . , passim. 3 ^Hearnshaw, op. c i t . , p. 120. ^G. Bergmann, The Metaphysics of L o g i c a l P o s i t i v i s m , Longmans Green, 1 9 5 4 , p. 3» / V . Appendix D. 6A.R. H a l l and M.B. H a l l , A B r i e f H i s t o r y of Science, Toronto, New American L i b r a r y of Canada, 1964, p. 311. V I . APPENDICES 81 APPENDIX A W i l l i a m James and t h e D o c t r i n e o f C o n s c i o u s Automatism' As W i l l i a m James u n d e r s t o o d t h e i s s u e , t h e d o c t r i n e o f c o n s c i o u s - a u t o m a t i s m i n c l u d e d s e v e r a l erroneous a s s u m p t i o n s . I f t h i s were t r u e , James arg u e d , t h a t f e e l i n g was m e r e l y a c o l l a t e r a l o f t h e nerve p r o c e s s e s and was u n a b l e i t s e l f t o r e a c t upon them, f e e l i n g would t h e n be, i n e r t , u n i n f l u e n t i a l , a s i m p l e passenger i n t h e voyage o f l i f e , i t i s a l l o w e d t o remain on bo a r d , but not a l l o w e d t o t o u c h t h e helm or ha n d l e t h e r i g g i n g . 2 James h i m s e l f b e l i e v e d t h e t h e o r y o f c o n s c i o u s automatism a c t u a l l y stemmed from a w i s h among s c i e n t i s t s t o a b o l i s h t h e hoa r y t h e o r y o f a d u a l i s m between mind and m a t t e r and t o propose a s i n g l e , a l l i n c l u s i v e f o r m u l a which would e x p l a i n human n a t u r e i n t h e same terms as i t e x p l a i n e d man's p h y s i c a l environment. S c i e n t i s t s , he s u g g e s t e d a r e u n c o m f o r t a b l e when f a c e d w i t h t h e "yawning chasm between p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e s and m e n t a l e v e n t s ; " t h e y deny c o n s c i o u s n e s s and t h u s p u r i f y t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c d e s c r i p t i o n s from such i n t a n g i b l e s as f e e l i n g s , t o t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h a s i n g l e harmonious and e s t h e t i c a l l y p l e a s i n g concep-t i o n o f t h e u n i v e r s e , a u n i v e r s e w h i c h a l s o conformed t o t h e laws o f cause and e f f e c t . D e s p i t e t h e s e r e s e r v a t i o n s , James s t i l l a c c e p t e d t h e g e n e r a l D a r w i n i a n framework f o r p s y c h o l o g y : s c i e n t i s t s ought t o c o n t i n u e t h e i r s t u d y o f how organisms a c t i v e l y respond and a d j u s t t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n t h e i r environment. But i n h i s v i e w , an automaton 'Huxley's d e c a p i t a t e d f r o g ) c o u l d e x h i b i t o n l y a l i m i t e d range o f r e s p o n s e s and hence must remain l a r g e l y a t t h e mercy o f e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . On t h e o t h e r hand, i f an organism's r e a c t i o n s were not e n t i r e l y a m a t t e r of r e f l e x , a p r e d i c t a b l e r e sponse o c c a s i o n e d by f a c t o r s beyond i t s own con-t r o l , t h e organism was i n s t e a d a c r e a t u r e a b l e t o determine i t s own r e s p o n s e , i t would have, as a consequence, an i n f i n i t e l y g r e a t e r s u r v i v a l p o t e n t i a l . The s u p p o r t e r s o f automatism have m i s u n d e r s t o o d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , James s u r m i s e d . C o n s c i o u s n e s s i s not some n o n - s e n s a t i o n a l q u a l i t y o r t h i n g c r e a t e d by t h e mind, but an element o f t h e p e r c e p t u a l p r o c e s s : t h e mind's s e l e c t i v e emphasis of c e r t a i n s e n s a t i o n s and i t s i n h i b i t i o n of l e s s r e l e v a n t ones. C o n s c i o u s n e s s , he d e c l a r e d , can produce n o t h i n g i f can o n l y a l t e r t h e p r o p o r t i o n s o f s e n s a t i o n ; however, t h r o u g h t h i s p r o c e s s o f s e l e c t i o n one e x p e r i e n c e s t h i n g s s u b j e c t i v e l y and terms i t f e e l i n g . g 2 FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A "'"Source W i l l i a m James, "Are We Automata?" Mind, v o l . I+, 1879. 2 I b i d . , p. 1. S3 APPENDIX B The p h i l o s o p h e r , H.A. P r i c h a r d , i n an a r t i c l e f o r t h e 1907 e d i t i o n o f Mind, c h a l l e n g e d S t o u t about t h e v a l i d i t y of p s y c h o l o g y ' s c l a i m t o be s c i e n t i f i c , and demanded t h a t S t o u t e x p l a i n t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t a n d o f p s y c h o l o g y . ^ F o r , i f t h e aim o f p s y c h o l o g y i s t o s t u d y c o n s c i o u s n e s s : t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e mind apprehends t h e w o r l d , t h e n , how does t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t d i s t i n g u i s h between t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , c o n s i d e r e d as a p r e s e n t a t i o n , and t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' , s a c t i o n o f p e r c e i v i n g t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n ? ^ How can a p s y c h o l o g i s t a l l e g e t h a t he can d i f f e r e n t i a t e between t h e s t a r , S i r i u s , t r e a t e d as an a b s t r a c -t i o n ( f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e way an astronomer would c o n c e i v e o f i t ) , and t h e s t a r , S i r i u s , e x p e r i e n c e d as an immediate p r e s e n t a t i o n ? The q u e s t i o n i n P r i c h a r d ' s mind was t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e a s o n i n g used by p s y c h o l o g i s t s t o c l a i m t h a t t h e y c o u l d demarcate t h e c o n s c i o u s mind which apprehends t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r om t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n i t s e l f . S t o u t ' s r e p l y t o t h i s r u n - o f - t h e - m i l l i d e a l i s t c r i t i c i s m was, i n e f f e c t , an a d m i s s i o n t h a t a p s y c h o l o g i s t c o u l d a c t u a l l y be a s u b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s t , one who b e l i e v e s t h a t n o t h i n g e x i s t s independent of t h e mind's knowledge of i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , S t o u t f e l t he c o u l d not concede t h a t p s y c h o l o g i s t s were not j u s t i f i e d i n c o n s i d e r i n g o b j e c t s i n terms o t h e r t h a n of t h e i r immediate p r e s e n t a t i o n : What i s i n d i s p e n s i b l e t o p s y c h o l o g y i s not any s p e c i a l t h e o r y o f knowledge, good o r bad, but o n l y t h e r e c o g n i -t i o n t h a t t h i n g s a r e known, come t o be known, and cease t o be known t o i n d i v i d u a l minds, and t h a t i n t h i s r e l a -t i o n t o i n d i v i d u a l minds p r o p o s i t i o n s h o l d good o f them w h i c h a r e not a p p l i c a b l e t o them i n a b s t r a c t i o n f rom t h i s r e l a t i o n . 3 I n h i s work, A n a l y t i c P s y c h o l o g y , S t o u t ' s e x p l a n a t i o n was more f o r t h r i g h t : No c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i c a l a n t e c e d e n t s as such needs t o be i n c l u d e d i n any s t r i c t l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n . We t a k e account of them o n l y i n so f a r as t h e y a r e i n d i s p e n s i b l e h e l p s i n d e t e r m i n i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e n a t u r e and o r d e r o f changes produced i n t h e mind from w i t h o u t . 4 But i f S t o u t t o o k s t e p s t o r e f u t e P r i c h a r d ' s ease a g a i n s t p s y c h o l o g y , t o r e p u d i a t e h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e s t u d y o f con-s c i o u s n e s s was more p r o p e r l y t h e c o n c e r n of the p h i l o s o p h e r , who, a t l e a s t , r e c o g n i z e d t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i t s 8 4 s t u d y , S t o u t a l s o r e j e c t e d t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m s o f t h e p h y s i o l o g -i s t s . I n S t o u t ' s judgment, any e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h a t o t a l l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e n t a l b e h a v i o r f a c e d a predicament i n showing t h e d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between a p h y s i o l o g i c a l event and i t s p s y c h i c c o u n t e r p a r t . A p s y c h o l o g i s t c o u l d , a t b e s t , o n l y i n f e r t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p and even t h e n he must presuppose t h a t he has an independent knowledge somehow of both p h y s i o l o g -i c a l and m e n t a l phenomena; c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e s t i l l remained a need f o r a w h o l l y i n t r o s p e c t i v e p s y c h o l o g y . B e s i d e s , S t o u t contended, s h o u l d t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l account o f m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s prove c o r r e c t , a f t e r a l l , i t would s t i l l have t o show t h a t i t was m a t t e r and not mind t h a t was t h e s o l e agent. As S t o u t com-mented, because M a t e r i a l i s m assumed t h a t mental events cannot o c c u r w i t h o u t m a t e r i a l c a u s e s , i t was u s i n g t h e v e r y same an t h r o p o r m o r p h i c r e a s o n i n g as t h e u n t u t o r e d savage who sees a l l n a t u r a l e v e n t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n o f s p i r i t s , I f t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e m e c h a n i c a l p r o c e s s debars us from r e g a r d i n g a movement as due t o v o l i t i o n , i t must i n l i k e manner debar us from r e g a r d i n g a v o l i t i o n as due t o a movement, even of b r a i n p a r t i c l e s . So f a r as we have come t o b e l i e v e i n m a t t e r as t h e o n l y r e a l agent i n m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s , we seem t o owe t h i s be-l i e f t o our growing i n s i g h t i n t o t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e s e as p a r t s o f a s i n g l e system; but when we come t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n n e c t i o n between p h y s i o l o g i c a l and men-t a l e v e n t s , we f i n d a marked breach o f c o n t i n u i t y . No a n a l y s i s can d i s c o v e r i n t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l f a c t any t r a c e s of i t s supposed p h y s i c a l f a c t o r s . 5 Thus f o r S t o u t , any hope of l i n k i n g m e n t a l phenomena t o p h y s i o l o g i c a l changes was but a n o t h e r e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e M a t e r i a l i s t ' s i l l u s i o n a r y , m e c h a n i s t i c v i s i o n . E v e r y s e p a r a t e s c i e n c e i n t h e i r v iew r e p r e s e n t e d but a p a r t o f a s i n g l e , c o n t i n u o u s , m e c h a n i c a l system. I n t h e same way t h a t s c i e n t i s t s have l e a r n e d t o reduce b i o l o g y t o t h e more elementary p r i n c i p l e s o f c h e m i s t r y and p h y s i c s , s i m i l a r l y , i n a m a t t e r o f t i m e , s c i e n -t i s t s would a l s o reduce p s y c h i c a l a c t i v i t y i n t o i t s p h y s i o l o g -i c a l components. S t o u t c o u l d not accept t h i s l i n e o f r e a s o n i n g . The M a t e r i a l i s t ' s f a l l a c y , he b e l i e v e d , was t o assume t h a t m e n t a l phenomena c o u l d o n l y be u n d e r s t o o d as a development of nonmental p r o c e s s e s ; but t h e r e a l c r u x o f t h e i s s u e , l e f t un-e x p l a i n e d by t h e M a t e r i a l i s t , was t h e exact c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between m a t t e r and t h o u g h t . More p a r t i c u l a r l y , S t o u t was concerned w i t h r e f u t i n g t h e v i e w s o f t h e p r e s i d e n t o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y , Shadworth H. Hodgson. A l t h o u g h Hodgson had agreed w i t h S t o u t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t any e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h p s y c h o l o g y e n t i r e l y upon a p h y s i o -l o g i c a l base must show t h e a f f i n i t y between m a t t e r and c o n s c i o u s -n e s s , "whereby t h e one becomes t h e r e a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e o c c u r r e n c e o r coming i n t o e x i s t e n c e o f t h e o t h e r . " Hodgson, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g 85 t h i s a d m i s s i o n , thought t h a t t h e everyday d i s t i n c t i o n w hich saw c o n s c i o u s n e s s as something e n t i r e l y a p a r t from t h e nervous system, a c t u a l l y d e r i v e d from a l i n g u i s t i c a l c o n f u s i o n . Nor-m a l l y , Hodgson e x p l a i n e d , we d e s c r i b e someone as f e e l i n g , t h i n k i n g and a c t i n g , y e t we t h i n k i t i m p o s s i b l e t o say t h e same f o r a p h y s i c a l s u b s t a n c e , t o admit t h a t n erve and b r a i n t i s s u e t h i n k s , f e e l s o r a c t s . Language w h i c h r e p r e s e n t s our " p r e a n a l y t i c " (common sense) t h i n k i n g t e n d s t o d e s c r i b e t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a u n i t y . Y e t , p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s had a c c e p t e d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between t h e agent or n ervous system and t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h seems t o be dependent upon i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , . . . t h e whole agency i n c o n s c i o u s a c t i o n , f e e l i n g and thought l i e s s o l e l y i n t h e nerve and b r a i n o f t h e c o n c r e t e c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ; or i n o t h e r words, t h e whole c o n s c i o u s b e i n g ' s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s as much t h e i r s , when we c o n s i d e r i t a n a l y t i c a l l y as i t i s h i s when we c o n s i d e r i t preanalytically.° T h e r e f o r e , argued Hodgson, t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h i s s i m p l e f a c t v i n d i c a t e s t h e t r e a t m e n t o f p s y c h o l o g y from a c o m p l e t e l y p h y s i o l o g i c a l v i e w p o i n t . I t i s t r u e , he a d m i t t e d , t h a t even now t h e p h y s i o l o g i s t i s not a b l e t o d e s c r i b e e x a c t l y how m a t t e r " c o n d i t i o n s " c o n s c i o u s n e s s , but t h e n , Hodgson, somewhat i l l o g i c -a l l y , r e p l i e d , n e i t h e r can t h e p h y s i c i s t e x p l a i n g r a v i t y . More-o v e r , f o r p s y c h o l o g y t o be t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c i t i s o n l y n e c e s s a r y t o s h o w f i r s t w h i c h n e u r a l r e s p o n s e s were "always and a l o n e accompanied by t h e a r i s i n g and t h e c o n t i n u i n g o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , " and s e c o n d l y , t o i n d i c a t e what was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y unique about t h e n e u r a l r e s p o n s e s so t h a t t h e y i n v a r i a b l y c r e a t e t h e same dependent p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e . To t h e timeworn argument t h e e x i s t e n c e o f f r e e w i l l - -t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t ' s n o t i o n o f " v o l i t i o n " - - p r o v e s t h e independence of mind from m a t t e r , Hodgson r e p l i e d t h a t our apparent sense o f c h o i c e m e r e l y r e s u l t e d from our i n a b i l i t y t o p e r c e i v e t h e nerve p r o c e s s e s which a r e a c t u a l l y making t h e c h o i c e . Hence, a p e r s o n f e e l s f r e e because he i s aware o n l y o f h i s c o n s c i o u s s t a t e o f mind when, i n r e a l i t y , i t has been h i s s u b c o n s c i o u s n e u r a l p r o c e s s e s w h i c h have g i v e n him t h a t p a r t i c u l a r judgment. The a c t o f c h o o s i n g not t o walk i n t o a w h e l l b a r r o w — t o use Hodgson's e x a m p l e — c o n s i s t e d o f a sequence o f events i n which a n e u r a l r e f l e x f o l l o w s a u t o m a t i c a l l y from t h e i n i t i a l p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e wheelbarrow, and s t i m u l a t e s i n t u r n t h e l i m b s so t h a t t h e wheel-barrow i s a v o i d e d . C o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t h i n g more t h a n t h e "nerve m o t i o n s " a c h i e v i n g such a degree o f i n t e n s i t y t h a t t h e y c r o s s t h e t h r e s h o l d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e r e f o r e , Hodgson s u r m i s e d , i f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s r e a l l y an i n d e p e n d e n t , c a u s a l f a c t o r i n t h e s e r i e s o f e vents from t h e f i r s t s i g h t o f t h e wheelbarrow t o t h e f i n a l muscle response i n s t e p p i n g around i t , as t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l l y i n c l i n e d p s y c h o l o g i s t b e l i e v e s , c o n s c i o u s n e s s must e i t h e r change 86 f r o m a " c o n d i t i o n a t e " t o an a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n i t s e l f . The only-o t h e r p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n was t h a t some i m m a t e r i a l agent p r e v i o u s l y dormant has now become a c t i v e , but n e i t h e r t h e o r y can g a i n s u p p o r t from any of t h e o b s e r v a b l e f a c t s : The o n l y c o n c l u s i o n , t h e r e f o r e w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e w a r r a n t s i s t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n a l l i t s f o r m s , and whenever i t o c c u r s i s not o n l y t h e c oncomitant or c o n d i t i o n a t e , o f n e u r a l p r o c e s s e s and t h a t t h i s o r d e r o f dependence i s n e ver i n v e r t e d . ' S t o u t l a c k e d Hodgson's c o n v i c t i o n s about th e l i k e l i h o o d o f p s y c h o l o g y e v e r d e m o n s t r a t i n g ai i n c o n t e s t a b l e p r o o f f o r a c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between mind ( c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) and m a t t e r ( b r a i n p r o c e s s e s ) . S t o u t b e l i e v e d t h a t i n a l l h o n e s t y he c o u l d do no o t h e r t h a n . r e t a i n a C a r t e s i a n b i f u r c a t e d p s y c h o l o g y , and must t h e r e f o r e recommend t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m as t h e one o f f e r i n g t h e b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S t i l l , t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m was a t b e s t o n l y an i n t e l l e c t u a l e x p e d i e n t . By means o f t h i s h y p o t h e s i s p s y c h o l -ogy c o u l d a d v a n t a g e o u s l y i n c o r p o r a t e t h e e v i d e n c e from p h y s i o l o g y i n t o i t s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w i t h o u t b e i n g f o r c e d t o admit th e t r u t h o f t h e M a t e r i a l i s t ' s argument t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s was n o t h i n g more t h a n m a t t e r i n m o t i o n — a n e x c e s s i v e nerve s e n s a t i o n . He b e l i e v e d t h a t p s y c h o l o g y ought t o a c c e p t t h e l i m i t e d aim of t r y i n g t o demonstrate t h a t c e r t a i n s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s are attended" by c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e c e r e b r a l p r o c e s s e s . A c o r r e l a t i o n such as t h i s , S t o u t a r g u e d , might e x p l a i n what happens, f o r i n s t a n c e , when a man burns h i s f i n g e r . The con-t a c t w i t h t h e flame has caused a p a i n f u l e x c i t a t i o n which i n t u r n has been t r a n s m i t t e d by t h e a f f e r e n t n e r v e s and f i n a l l y r e a c h e s t h e c e r e b r a l c o r t e x . There i t has produced a m o l e c u l a r d i s t u r b a n c e and c o - i n c i d e n t a l l y w i t h t h i s had o c c u r r e d a p s y c h i c a l s t a t e - - t h e p a i n o f b e i n g burned. S t o u t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h i s d i d not o f c o u r s e prove t h a t c o n s c i o u s s t a t e s were always t h e p r o d u c t o f p h y s i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n s ; f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h e c o n v e r s e might w e l l be t r u e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , he t h o u g h t , t h e d a t a o f p h y s i o l o g y c o u l d o n l y prove v a l u a b l e f o r t h e p s y c h o l o g i s t i f he f i r s t e s t a b l i s h e d a c o r r e l a t i o n and a. sequence of e v e nts whereby p s y c h i c a l s t a t e a was c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e A, w h i c h r e l a t e d t o a n o t h e r p h y s i o l o g i c a l s t a t e B, i t s e l f h a v i n g a m e n t a l c o r r e s p o n d e n t : t h e p s y c h i c a l s t a t e b . I n t h i s way, by r e l a t i n g t h e two m e n t a l s t a t e s , a and b, one c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y f i n d s u p p o r t f o r t h e t h e o r y o f psycho-p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m , a l t h o u g h s c i e n c e had not y e t s u b s t a n t i a t e d i t , and i t was t h u s , a t p r e s e n t , no more t h a n a good methodolog-i c a l h y p o t h e s i s , a c o n v e n i e n t f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e f a c t s . S t o u t c o u l d not a c c e p t P r i c h a r d ' s o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t p s y c h o l o g y ' s r i g h t t o d i s c r i m i n a t e between t h e o b j e c t p e r c e i v e d and t h e mind p e r c e i v i n g i t ; but t h e n , n e i t h e r c o u l d S t o u t agree 67 w i t h t h e c o n t r a r y v i e w o f Hodgson t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s was n o t h i n g more t h a n an e x t e n s i o n of m a t t e r . I t f o l l o w s t h a t S t o u t ' s a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e t h e o r y o f p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l p a r a l l e l i s m put him i n t h e awkward p o s i t i o n o f h a v i n g t o e x p l a i n what e x a c t l y c o n s c i o u s n e s s was. He a d m i t t e d a c o r r e l a t i o n between p h y s i o l o g i -c a l e v e n t s and m e n t a l s t a t e s , but d e n i e d t h a t t h e y were neces-s a r i l y two a s p e c t s o f t h e same s u b s t a n c e , or t h a t one i n v a r i a b l y brought i n t o b e i n g t h e o t h e r . S t i l l , i n S t o u t ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n i t was not p s y c h o l o g y ' s f u n c t i o n t o s o l v e t h e conundrums o f m e t a p h y s i c s . P s y c h o l o g y s h o u l d c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o t h e d e s c r i p -t i o n o f t h e me n t a l p r o c e s s e s o f man i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h h i s environment and not t r y to . determine what were t h e u l t i m a t e e n t i t i e s . &8 FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX B H.A. P r i c h a r d , " A C r i t i c i s m of the P s y c h o l o g i s t ' s Treat-ment of Knowledge," Mind, N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 29. 2 " P r e s e n t a t i o n : any immediate content of experience, sensory or i d e a t i o n a l though sometimes r e s t r i c t e d t o the former." James Drever, A D i c t i o n a r y of Psychology, Harmonds-worth, Penguin, 1952, p. 217. G.F. Stout, "Mr. P r i c h a r d T s C r i t i c i s m of Psychology," Mind, N.S. v o l . 16, 1907, p. 240. ^G.F. Stout, A n a l y t i c Psychology, London, Swann Sonneschein, 1909, v o l . 1, p. 27. 5 I b i d . , p. 5. 6 S.H. Hodgson, The Metaphysic of Experience, London, Longmans Green, 1898, v o l . 2, p. 285. 7 I b i d . . p. 319. 89 APPENDIX C A MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BIO-MECHANIC PRINCIPLE 1 E x t e r i o r s t i m u l a t i o n = R Work = F(R) Food = S N u t r i t i o n = F(S) 1. F(R) = - F ( S ) , the stage of unstable imbalance between the energy income and expenditure. 2. S F ( R ) = - I F ( S ) the stage of pe r f e c t e q u i l i b r i u m ; probably non-e x i s t e n t i n l i f e . "^"Source: W. Drabovitch, "La bio-psychologie de R. Avenarius et l e problem de 'l'homme t o t a l ' , " Revue Philosophique, v o l . 115, 1933, p. 414. 9 0 APPENDIX D THE RELATIONSHIP OF THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE A t r a i n o f t h o u g h t , i n so f a r as thought depends on l a n g u a g e , c o n s i s t s i n a s e r i e s o f s u c c e s s i v e l y o b j e c t i f i e d m e n t a l systems, each o f which a p p e r c e i v e s and i s a p p e r c e i v e d by i t s p r e d e c e s s o r . An i l l u s t r a t i o n may be drawn from any group o f words combined so as t o y i e l d an i n t e l l i g i b l e mean-i n g . I n t h e s e n t e n c e - - " J o h n e a t s . a p p l e s , " t h e word "John" s t a n d s f o r a concept w h i c h combines i n s y s t e m a t i c u n i t y a l l t h a t t h e s p e a k e r knows of t h e p e r s o n r e f e r r e d t o . I t does not s t a n d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r e s e n t a t i o n , but f o r a system o f p r e s e n t a t i o n s , o f which o n l y t h e u l t i m a t e components a r e p a r t i c u l a r . I t f i x e s t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e speaker or o f t h e s i l e n t t h i n k e r on a t o t a l i t y o f d i v e r s e s t a t e s , a c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s , s i m u l t a n e o u s and s u c c e s s i v e , p o s s i b l e and a c t u a l . "John" i s not a d e t e r m i n a t e image but a U n i v e r s a l , w h i c h , as s u c h , - I n c l u d e s w i t h i n i t a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g u n i t e d i n any p a r t i c u l a r image. The word, " e a t s , " a l s o s t a n d s f o r a U n i v e r s a l — t h e g e n e r a l concept o f an a c t i o n which may be performed by d i f f e r e n t a g ents or by t h e same agent a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s and w h i c h may v a r y i n mani-f o l d c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e word "John" i s f o l l o w e d by t h e word " e a t s , " t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g mental systems a r e e x c i t e d t o a c t i v i t y and t h e y a p p e r c e i v e each o t h e r . The p r o d u c t o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n i s a new system, which forms an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f b o t h o f them, and which may be e x p r e s s e d by t h e compound word, " J o h n - e a t i n g . " T h i s new system i s formed (1) by s i n g l i n g out f r o m among a l l t h e s t a t e s , a c t s , and r e l a t i o n s w h i c h e n t e r i n t o t h e c o n c e p t , e x p r e s s e d by t h e word, "John," t h a t s p e c i f i c a c t i o n e x p r e s s e d by t h e word, " e a t i n g , " t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f i n c o m p a t i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s i s t h e a p p e r c e p t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t , "John," by t h e c o n c e p t , " e a t i n g . " (2) By s i n g l i n g out from among t h e p o s s i b l e a gents who a r e c a p a b l e of t h e a c t i o n i n d i c a t e d , t h e s p e c i a l agent John t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s . A c c o r d i n g as John i s known t o be a v e g e t a r i a n , a g l u t t o n , an i n v a l i d , e t c . , t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t , " e a t i n g , " w i l l r e c e i v e a v a r y i n g k i n d o f s p e c i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i s t h e a p p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e concept " e a t i n g , " by t h e c o n c e p t , "John." John i s r e p r e s e n t e d as e a t i n g and t h e a c t o f e a t i n g i s r e p r e -s e n t e d as John's a c t . The c o n c e p t s e x p r e s s e d by t h e words " e a t i n g " and " a p p l e s " u n i t e i n a s i m i l a r way t o form a s i n g l e system i n which e a c h - r e c e i v e s s p e c i f i c d e t e r m i n a t i o n from t h e o t h e r . The a p p l e s a r e r e p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g eaten and t h e e a t i n g i s r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e e a t i n g o f a p p l e s . 91 FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX D Source: G.F. Stout, "Thought and HsiBg.uagea," Mind, O.S. v o l . 16, 1891, pp. 189-190. V I I . B I B L I O G R A P H Y ' " 93 I.' GENERAL WORKS 1. Books a. Contemporary Hodgson, Shadworth H. The Metaphysic of Experience. London, Longmans Green, 1898, 2 v o l s . . Theory of P r a c t i c e . 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Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a , 9th ed., 1877, v o l . 7, pp. 452-457. . "Dreaming and Po e t i c I n v e n t i o n . " Addresses and Proceedings of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Conveners of Education, New York, N a t i o n a l Educational A s s o c i a t i o n , lB§ 4 , pp. 730-736. . Essay On Laughter. London, Longmans Green, 1902. . " E v o l u t i o n . " Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a , 9th ed., 1873, v o l . S, pp.-751-772. 94 . The Human Mind. London, Longmans Green, 1892, 2 v o l s . . I l l u s i o n s . London, Kegan P a u l , 1881. . My L i f e and Friends . London, J . F i s h e r Unwin, 1918. . Pessimism. London, Henry S. King, 1877. . Studies of Childhood. London, Longmans Green, 1895. T y l o r , Edward B. P r i m i t i v e C u l t u r e . London, John Murray, 1903, 2 v o l s , ( f i r s t published 1871). T y n d a l l , John. Fragments of Science. London, Longmans Green, 1907, v o l . 2. Ward, James. Essays i n Philosophy. 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