UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Philosophical critique of advanced industrial society. Fast, Scott Orman 1970

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A PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY by Scatt 0. Fast B.A., University of Washington, 1968 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1970 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r ee t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a Vancouve r 8, Canada Data _^2iWl^ i . ABSTRACT The thesis i s divided generally i n t o two sections. The f i r s t delineates the v i r t u a l l y i n v i s i b l e and yet dominating ideology (ethos) which d i r e c t s advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y . The second portion presents the meaning of t h i s ideology (ethos) f o r s o c i e t y and i t s members. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the second p o r t i o n asserts that the nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society mediates against the p o s s i b i l i t y of our understanding i t , and further m i l i t a t e s against the a p p l i c a t i o n of any understanding we might have to the r e s o l u t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l p l i g h t of our s o c i e t y . The concept of "ethos" i s introduced, and a number of f a m i l i a r s t r a i n s i n the h i s t o r i c a l development of advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y are described so as to show t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p i n developmentj and as mutual supports f o r one another. These s t r a i n s are shown to combine i n h i s t o r i c a l development to have meaning over and be-yond the sun of t h e i r parts; to d i r e c t the s o c i e t y as the dominant ethos (ideology) — the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. The argument holds that western man, being dominated by the need to conquer s c a r c i t y , sought to organize h i s a c t i v i t y i n the most r a t i o n a l i z e d way to produce more goods. Science became the method by which he could gain c o n t r o l over nature. Bureaucracy was the organizational method by which the p r i n c i p l e s and prerogatives of science i n i t s applied form,technology, could be i n s t i t u t e d i n s o c i e t y . Liberalism i s seen as the formal p h i l o s o p h i c a l explanation and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of these changes i n the organization of s o c i e t y . Taken together, the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s b a s i c a l l y and fundamentally s c i e n t i f i c i i . and economic. And i t i s the adherence to the values and prerogatives of t h i s ethos which above a l l d i r e c t s and determines the a c t i v i t y of advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . The t h i r d chapter further describes the nature of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos and speaks to the meaning i t maintains i n the socie t y . Although i t can be shown to q u a l i f y as a v a l i d ideology, the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s not considered as such because of i t s u t t e r dominance i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society ( i t "trans-cends" a l l contemporary i d e o l o g i c a l disputes because they l a r g e l y accept the d i r e c t i v e s of the dominant ethos as given and thus carry on conventional debates circumscribed within t h i s larger context); or because i t i s considered not to be a p o s i t i v e force i n i t s own r i g h t , but rather a neutral method to apply on behalf of human needs and objectives. This i s shown not to be the case, f o r the prerogatives of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos make transforming demands on .the'whole of that which i t must deal within the contem-porary case, v i r t u a l l y every facet of our l i v e s . L a s t l y , the thesis argues that advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y displays as affi r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r — t h a t i s , i t serves to form i t s members so as to a f f i r m i t s e l f , (The formative character of any society i s granted as the process of developmnnt and s o c i a l i z a t i o n of any member.) On a s o c i o l o g i c a l l e v e l , conformity to the values and procedures of the status quo i s a bureaucratic prerogative. On a ph i l o s o p h i c a l l e v e l , the philosophy of science s t r i p s other epistemological and o n t o l o g i c a l views of t h e i r v a l i d i t y , and thus of t h e i r a b i l i t y to judge the s c i e n t i f i c project of advanced i n -d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . On a p o l i t i c a l l e v e l , the society i s able to absorb a l t e r n a t i v e s i n t o i t s dominant whole and further serves to i i i . transform the content of v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s to that of support f o r the given h i s t o r i c a l p r o j e c t . Pluralism, p h i l o s o p h i c a l and p o l i -t i c a l , seems apparent, but i t i s feigned p l u r a l i s m because no force does e f f e c t i v e l y challenge the larger dominance of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction 1 Chapter Two: A H i s t o r i c a l Description of Advanced I n d u s t r i a l Society 11 A. S c a r c i t y : The H i s t o r i c a l Imperative 11 B. Production and Consumption: The Surrogate Imperatives 16 C. Technology: New Demands on the Society 22 D. The Philosophy of Science: On Human Organization 26 E. The Organizational Setting 31 F. L i b e r a l i s m : The Formal P h i l o s o p h i c a l Response 38 G. Summary: The L i b e r a l Technocratic Ethos 47 Chapter Three: The Affirmative Character of the L i b e r a l Technocratic Ethos 50 A. The Myth of N e u t r a l i t y : Technology and the End of Ideology 53 B. The Formative Nature of the Technology: Bureaucracy and Conformity 72 C. The Affirmative Character of L i b e r a l Technocratic Philosophy: The Demise of Alternatives 84 D. Advanced I n d u s t r i a l Society: The P o l i t i c s of Feigned Pluralism 113 Footnotes 129 Bibliography 138 V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would here l i k e to acknowledge those who were i n t e g r a l to the successful accomplishment of t h i s t h e s i s . F i r s t l y , I would l i k e to thank those who examined and c r i t i c i z e d p a r t i c u l a r portions of the text . Gerry Sattinger aided me i n the formulation of the introduction and repeatedly re-examined d r a f t s of the second chapter. David Mole served to c r i t i c i z e those portions of the text dealing with economics and economic h i s t o r y , and kept me honest i n these matters. A l l a n Robbins helped me to structure my discussion of a r t i n the l a s t chapter. In any paper, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n ojse of such a general and expansive nature, good conversation regarding the argument therein i s indispensable. Such conversation provides many f u n c t i o n s — i t sometimes provides c r i t i c i s m ; i t more -.often allows one simply to argue h i s point f o r the ears of another, and i n doing so, brings one to c l a r i f y and hedge i n a way he would not were he simply arguing to himself. Being somewhat of a ver b a l over-achiever, I engaged i n many such conversations, but those with c e r t a i n i n d i v i -duals were most rewarding. I am deeply indebted to long discussions with Don Wells, Gerry Sattinger, and A l l a n Robbins. But i n par-t i c u l a r I owe most to John Lobsinger, whose i n c i t e f u l cynicism both forced me to r e v i s e my p o s i t i o n and s t i l l r e inforced i n me the need f o r t h i s undertaking. And I am also indebted to conversations with my father who provided f o r me someone to speak not only to, but also on behalf o f . I must also thank my primary t y p i s t , Natasha P l o t n i k o f f , who yas w i l l i n g to undergo a marathon performance i n order that we might v i . appease the gods of bureaucracy, I must l a s t l y thank my wife, Mary E l l e n , who d u t i f u l l y proof read, but more than that was tolerant at a time when tolerance was a necessary but d i f f i c u l t v i r t u e . v i i I nay have conceived t h e o r e t i c a l t r u t h wrongly, but I was not wrong i n thinking that there i s such a thing, and that i t deserves our allegiance* I may have thought the road to a world of free and happy human beings shorter than i t i s proving to be, but I was not wrong i n thinking that such a road i s p o s s i b l e , and that i t i s worth while to l i v e with a view of bringing i t nearer* I have l i v e d i n the pur-s u i t of a v i s i o n , both personal and s o c i a l . Personal: to care f o r what i s noble, f o r what i s b e a u t i f u l , f o r what i s gentle; to allow moments of i n s i g h t to give wisdom at more mundane times. S o c i a l : to see i n imagination the societ y that i s to be created, where i n d i v i d u a l s grow f r e e l y , and where hate and greed and envy die because there i s nothing to nourish them. These things I b e l i e v e , and the world, f o r a l l i t s horrors, has l e f t me unshaken. Bertrand R u s s e l l And he s h a l l judge among many people, and rebuke strong nations afar o f f ; and they s h a l l beat t h e i r swords i n t o plowshares, and t h e i r spears i n t o pruning hooks: nation s h a l l not l i f t up a sword against nation, neither s h a l l they learn war any more. But they s h a l l s i t every man under h i s vine and under h i s f i g tree; and none s h a l l make them a f r a i d : f o r the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken i t . For a l l people w i l l walk every one i n the name of h i s god, and we w i l l walk i n the name of the Lord our God f o r ever and ever. Micah 4:3-5 Lorsque l e f o r t s'oppose au f a i b l e , c'est l a l i b e r t e qui rend esclave, et c'est l a l o i q u i l i b e r e . Lacordaire / CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION I can take some small portion of t h i s very large top i c and t r y to prove something about i t i n some d e t a i l ; or I can take the whole topic and t r y to be merely provocative. Naturally, I choose the second course. For one thing, i t i s more fun; and for another, we ought to t r y to reason together. C. Wright M i l l s E i t h e r go away, or go a l l the way. Grace S l i c k This t h e s i s w i l l be divided generally into two sections. The f i r s t w i l l delineate the v i r t u a l l y i n v i s i b l e and yet dominating ideology (ethos) which d i r e c t s advanced i n d u s t r i a l society c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y . The second w i l l attempt to present the meaning of t h i s ideology (ethos) for society, and i t s members. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the second portion w i l l assert that the nature of our society mediates against the p o s s i b i l i t y of our understanding i t , and further m i l i t a t e s against t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of any understanding we might have to the. r e s o l u t i o n of our p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l p l i g h t . This i s no small task. Nor i s i t an unimportant one. However, the greatest d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s paper w i l l not have resulted from magnitude nor importance of task but rather because of the t a u t o l o g i c a l character of a l l arguments which f i n d i t necessary to transcend conventional systems of understanding and meaning. This t h e s i s , at i t s most fundamental l e v e l , i s about the need for such a transcedence. :-Our c r i t i q u e i s to be pr i m a r i l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l , arid philosophy concerns not only what1 i s true but also the terms (methods) by which brie goes about ascertaining t r u t h . Thus, i n order for t h i s c r i t i q u e to get outside the conventional understanding of r e a l i t y , i t must a l s o , i n t h i s case, get outside the conventional universe of discourse. I t i s , i n f a c t , the c l o s i n g down of t h i s universe of discourse that most concerns us. That i s , we do not argue that the society i s misunderstood only because students, p o l i t i c i a n s , and c i t i z e n s have misapplied or badly developed t h e i r own brands of analysis (although,we believe a good case for t h i s point could also be made), but rather wa propose a more fundamental criticism«-that t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r universe of discourse and inquiry precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of understanding the society, because i t i s at one with that society. Philosophically,we pretend to have discovered nothing new; episteraology i n e v i t a b l y bears on ontology, i n fact i f not i n p r i n c i p l e . However, p o l i t i c a l l y speaking, what we s h a l l propose i s quite foreign to the conventional wisdom. Yet, here, that c i r c u l a r nature of our argument becomes apparent. We argue that the world would appear, and thusly for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes be, d i f f e r e n t i f we looked at i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way. We need- not be 19th century German Theologians to understand and agree that the object perceived i s at the mercy of the subject perceiver for i t s existence i n the mind of the subject. (Whether or not the object does indeed e x i s t independent of the subject i s for p h i l o s -ophers to squabble over, but the psychological (perceptual) r e l a t i o n s h i p seems basic to us.) We w i l l argue that we read p o l i t i c s badly and obstruct the path to solutions of human problems because we look at the world improperly. This crudely resembles saying that the world i s the way we say i t i s because we see i t that way; to which one can reply that the world i s not that way because It was looked at wrongly. E i t h e r way the c i r c l e i s not e a s i l y broken for we further understand the nature of the society to shape the observing subjects and thusly t h e i r perception of the o b j e c t — i n t h i s case, the s o c i e t y i t s e l f . Yet we can attempt to deal with t h i s dilemma on two l e v e l s , separately and i n necessary conjunction--on the subjective l e v e l i n terms of method (epistemology) and on the objective l e v e l i n terms of what we consider to be 3. extant, be i t p a r t i c u l a r , u n i v e r s a l , or metaphysic (ontology). We s h a l l attempt to deal on both of these l e v e l s , indeed, to show the p o l i t i c a l importance of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them. The scope of t h i s study i s consciously over-ambitious. In s o c i a l a n alysis there a r i s e s the trade-off between speaking accurately and exactly of something very p a r t i c u l a r and speaking generally and thus less exactly of the whole. Both kinds of analysis run the r i s k of having said nothing about society at a l l . A whole quite often has meaning which i s other than the mere sum of i t s parts. But gross generalizations are poetry at best and hack journalism at worst. The a l t e r n a t i v e s are not dichotomous, but the dilemma i s nonetheless r e a l . Nor have t r a d i t i o n a l solutions proven adequate. Three volume t r e a t i s e s on "The Nature of the Universe" are a b i t out of s t y l e and tended to suffer from one or both problems anyway. The modern s o l u t i o n i n s i s t s that a growing accumulation of micro-studies w i l l at some* mystical point i n the future (when our 'tools are as perfected as i n the natural sciences, perhaps) be transformed into the '"wisdom of the'ages"; or at : the very l e a s t , the problem of synthesis belongs to some-one e l s e . ">' '•' > ••'• •'•>'••• .<•'..•::•->'•••••. ;' . •. :-::••:.•••' '-" ' I n the case 5 of t h i s 'thesis','we opt for the problems involved i n speaking too broadly. 1 Further, we w i l l propose here and'argue i m p l i c i t l y 1ft the context o f t h i s study that the present trend toward p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c research and an a l y s i s , despite the v a l i d i t y of the c r i t i c i s m s of t r a d i t i o n a l work'which served i n part to in s p i r e t h i s movement, represses bur a b i l i t y to understand society c o r r e c t l y . '"••''•""' i; Evett granting the who l i s t i c claims of this''undertakingi the reader may find'our'assertion that t h i s i s a p h i l o s o p h i c ' c r i t i q u e incbhgruOus with the amount of purely h i s t o r i c a l , economic, and 'sociological analysis found herein. Yet t h i s i s also done consciously for two reasons Ttfhich border upon being truism i n theory but which are seldom acted upon i n p r a c t i c e . The f i r s t i s that we do not wish to draw conceptual boundaries where they are counter-productive to accurate d e s c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s . Too often we f i n d authors more interested i n speaking of p o l i t i c s or economics or philosophy or r e l i g i o n than i n dealing with the world. Secondly, we must deal adequately with the breadth of subject matter with which philosophy deals and i s formed. One need not believe that a l l philosophy i s the mere ex post facto j u s t i f i c a t i o n of e x i s t i n g r e a l i t i e s by i n t e l l e c t u a l s who benefit from them to appreciate the v a l i d i t y of the m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n . Given the primary importance of economic conditions on the e s t a b l i s h -ment of s o c i a l structures, p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and p h i l o s o p h i c a l perspectives, we also appreciate the not'ions: of c u l t u r a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l l a g — t h a t point at which conceptual and i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements for coping with objective conditions have established an i n e r t i a which prevents^ changes corresponding to the changes i n those objective conditions. At t h i s point, i t i s no longer the objective economic conditions which operate on s o c i a l , i d e o l o g i c a l , and philosophical i n s t i t u t i o n s , but rather the reverse i s true. Marx himself was to r e a l i z e t h i s . Within a nation i t s e l f the i n d i v i d u a l s , even apart from t h e i r pecuniary circumstances, have quite d i f f e r e n t developments, and... an e a r l i e r i n t e r e s t , the peculiar form of intercourse of which has already been ousted by that belonging to a l a t e r i n t e r e s t , remains for a long time afterwards i n possession of a t r a d i t i o n a l poxjer i n the i l l u s o r y community (state, law) which has won an existence independent of the i n d i v i d u a l s ; a power which i n the l a s t resort can only be broken by r e v o l u t i o n . * With the a c c e l e r a t i o n of change i n objective conditions through the r i s e of technology on the one hand, and the i n e r t i a inherent i n the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of massive bureaucratic i n s t i t u t i o n s on the other (which w i l l be discussed extensively i n the body of t h i s t h e s i s ) , we have reason to believe that the above: mentioned tendency w i l l become the dominant arrangement. This i s 5. important, for at the recognition of t h i s change i n emphasis from "being" to "idea", we must d i r e c t our attention from the objective conditions to the ideology (ethos) of the dominant i n s t i t u t i o n s i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s ociety. In the same vein, t h i s paper i s very interested i n the meaning of philosophy for the average c i t i z e n . This involves the conversion of pbilosophy to ideology--"the doctrines, opinions, or ways of thinking of 2 an i n d i v i d u a l , c l a s s , e t c . " At t h i s point philosophy and psychology merge even as they had h i s t o r i c a l l y emerged from s i m i l a r concerns. A continuum develops ranging from the more p h i l o s o p h i c a l - - e t h i c s , to the i d e O l o g i c a l — p a r t y preference, to the more p s y c h o l o g i c a l — p a t t e r n s of cognition. Yet the three can never be considered f u l l y as d i s t i n c t . To return now to our j u s t i f i c a t i o n of and argument for w h o l i s t i c a n a l y s i s , actions i n (directions of) a society are often rooted i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l , yet are not transmitted to i n d i v i d u a l s through the study of philosophy as such. They are learned through membership and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the society i t s e l f ; more s p e c i f i c a l l y , through the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure of that society. Here a second c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p analgous to the r e l a t i o n s h i p of epistemology to ontology appears. Simply stated i t posits that that which i s to be perceived ( i n general terms, the environment) plays a major r o l e i n shaping the cognitive maps which w i l l perceive i t . This point becomes c r i t i c a l l y important i n regard to the perceiving of s o c i a l phenomena, for i t i s within the range of s o c i a l phenomena that the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process takes place. That i s , men are conditioned and s o c i a l i z e d by t h e i r society which i s , i n t h i s case, that which they must attempt to comprehend. But t h i s comprehension can only take form within that range of experiences and cogni-tions which the i n d i v i d u a l has already developed as a member of that society. Surely, t h i s c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p i s not absolute. History moves on, new 6. discoveries are made, new i n s t i t u t i o n s a r i s e , old ones wither and fade. Furthermore, there are a number of ways t h i s c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p can be broken or made' less complete. The f i r s t i s that, h i s t o r i c a l l y , the components of a s o c i e t a l environment tend not to be m o n o l i t h i c a l l y integrated but display a p l u r a l i t y of content. That i s , the component parts have content/that i s "other." than one another. The work process may be guided by somewhat d i f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e s than i s l e i s u r e time. Re l i g i o n may be t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t i n perspective than i s the rest of the l i f e process. In any event, the i n d i v i d u a l forms a cognitive map from a p l u r a l i t y of environmental cues.* Secondly, we arrange ways to set ourselves systematically outside of t h i s c i r c l e so that we might view the society more accurately ( o b j e c t i v e l y ) . Whether i t be i n the establishment of abstract systems such as l o g i c i n philosopy and mathematics i n science, or the establishment of method as a means to i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y , or i n the vague i d e a l of c r i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y , a l l are attempts to eliminate conventional blinders, natural arid -socialized, to get out:side' the c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p of :environmehtv r perception, -and conceptualization; !' Y e t - t h i s paper * w i l l "'deal with the process by 'which even these "attemptsi-have :been'!;,;-neutralised, absorbed into the societa 1 tautblogy*arid1 rendered i n e f f e c t i v e ) as ^ 'sources o f analysis and thought independ'erit1 of the on-going 1 society; ; - - S e v e r a l s p e c i f i c -notes regarding •method -are 'in 'order here;'-' •- ' '-V-"-" - • ) t rri1—The"? conceptual "framework we use for such a who l i s t i c arid often disparate e n t e r p r i s e r s :one we %ave -borrowed from 'cultural -ant-hrdpolbgy and -Leslie ^A'i' 1^ 3 White. His -general statement of his 'system of culture i s as succinct as i t could be Kind we present ;'£i 'here vst t ,i.u;:;:. • ':• ••--.,.\v<.-. •*:••>->:..<.: i:::.rv * This discussion i s , of course, one of degree. Undoubtedly c e r t a i n primitive s o c i e t i e s are m o n o l i t h i c a l l y dominated by. t h e i r re l i g i o u s b e l i e f s . And c e r t a i n l y i n any society, some c u l t u r a l world view asserts i t s e l f i n the cognitive, maps of- its;-individuals. r However we hopeito show i n the course of t h i s study that advanced i n d u s t r i a l society exhibits t h i s "one-dimensionality" to, a;Kgreate:r degree than other complex s o c i e t i e s before i t . We here would ask the reader to bear with us i n our argument, and judge our a s s e r t i o n within the t o t a l context o.f'this t h e s i s . :.<<.v,^ - c•••. !v^ 7. Culture is an organized and integrated system. But we may distinguish sub-divisions within, or aspects of this system. For our purpose, we shall distinguish three subsystems of culture, namely, technological, sociological, and ideological systems. The technological system is composed of the material, mechanical, physical, and chemical instruments; together with the techniques of their use, by means of which man, as an animal species,-;;is articulated with his natural habitat. Here we find the tools of production, the means of subsistence, the materials of shelter, the instruments of offense and defense. The sociological system is made up of inter-personal relations expressed in patterns of behavior, collective as welias individual. In this category we find social, kinship, economic, ethical, p o l i t i c a l , military, ecclesiastical, occupational and professional, recreational, etc., systems. The ideological system is composed of ideas, beliefs, knowledge, legend, literature, philosophy, science, folk wisdom and common sense knowledge. These three categories comprise the system of culture as a whole. They are, of course, interrelated; each reacts upon the others and is affected by them in turn. But the influence of this mutual interaction is not equal in a l l directions. The roles played by the several sub-systems in the culture process as a whole are not equal by any means.. The primary role is played by the technological system. This i s , of course, as we would expect i t to be; i t could not be otherwise. Man is an animal species, and consequently culture as a whole is dependent upon the material, mechanical means of adjustment to the natural environment. Man must have food. He must be protected, from the elements. And he must defend himself from his enemies. These three things he must do i f he is to continue to live, and these objectives are obtained only by technological means. The technological system is both primary and basic in importance; a l l human .life and culture rest and depend on i t . ' . Social systems are in a very real sense secondary and subsidiary to technological systems. In fact a social system may be defined r e a l i s t i c a l l y as the organized effort of human beings in the use of the instruments of subsistence, offense and defense, and protection. A social system is a function of a technological system...The technology is the independent variable, and the social system the dependent variable. Social systems are therefore determined by systems of technology; as the latter change, so do the former... Ideological, or philosophical systems are organizations of beliefs, in which human experience finds i t s interpretation. But experience, and interpretations thereof are powerfully conditioned by technologies. There is a type of philosophy proper to every type of technology. We consider this view of the cultural system as three horizontal strata to be generally descriptive of cultural systems up to and through the present time. The technological base stresses the overriding importance of technology on social structures and philosophical leanings, yet does not demand ah absolutely rig i d philosophical materialism. Likewise, social structures may appear or remain which are relatively independent of the technostructure, 8. and may exert some co n t r o l over or support for the technostructure, but the causal linkage i s more generally the opposite. This r e l a t i o n s h i p of the systems of culture i s quite reasonable i n i i g h t of "the condition of s c a r c i t y which has always existed i n human experience. E x i s t i n g m a t e r i a l l y has h i s t o r i c a l l y been the f u l l - t i m e occupation of mankind and i t i s there-fore not s u r p r i s i n g that men have created t h e i r mechanical, s o c i a l , and thought world around t h i s base and that t h i s base has provided the primary force for shaping the other a c t i v i t i e s and thought patterns i n society. In the course of t h i s thesis we w i l l on numerous occasions, employ the term "ethos." Indeed, the v a l i d i t y of the concept of "ethos" and i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and meaning i n our present h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n i s c e n t r a l to t h i s argument. We wish only to apply the common (dictionary) meaning of the term. Webster's college d i c t i o n a r y defines "ethos" as " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a t t i t u d e s , habits, etc. of a r a c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , occupational, or other group.""* The Shorter Oxford E n g l i s h Dictionary defines "ethos" as "the prevalent tone of sentiment of a people or community; " ' 6 the genius of an i n s t i t u t i o n s or system." Webster's unabridged labels "ethos" as a) "The guiding b e l i e f s , standards, or ideals that characterize or pervade a group, a community, a people, or an ideology; the s p i r i t that motivates the ideas, customs, or practices of a people, an epoch, or region." b) "The complex of fundamental values that underlies, permeates, or actuates major patterns of thought and behavior i n any p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , society, or i n s t i t u t i o n . " ^ These three sets of d e f i n i t i o n s are congruous and together elucidate the concept as x*e w i l l use i t . Despite the obvious problems of o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , we think that i t can be agreed that the concept makes some sense. Some might argue that the lumping together of a l l that there i s i n the s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and philosophic universe into one neat term i s doing no more than saying that we must understand " a l l that there i s , " 9. and g i v i n g the " a l l that there i s " a t i t l e . But we consider ourselves to do more than that. We intend to i d e n t i f y an ethos which has mutually dependent ( i n development and i n f a c t ) , s i m i l a r , and i n t e r r e l a t e d s t r a i n s which serve as a coherent bond of u n i f i c a t i o n and thusly give t h i s p a r t i c u l a r ethos a "substance" of i t s own. In any event, the proof i s i n the pudding, and the case for a general and s p e c i f i c concept of ethos w i l l rest with the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of such a phenomenon in advanced i n d u s t r i a l society to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the reader. In the course of t h i s t h e s i s , we w i l l review and incorporate the work of a number of d i s c i p l i n e s and w i l l r e f e r to an array of h i s t o r i c a l phenomena. For the sake of economy and argument we w i l l use only those portions of t h i s subject matter which we f e e l are fundamental to our discussion. For example, In our discussion of l i b e r a l i s m and i t s h i s t o r i c a l development, we w i l l only speak of c e r t a i n aspects of the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l creed, because these seem most s i g n i f i c a n t to the understanding of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. It i s our desire here only to note that we consciously do not pretend to be presenting a d e f i n i t i v e account of the whole of the various subjects which we discuss. We have t r i e d c a r e f u l l y to not d i s t o r t the subject matter xtfhich i s incorporated i n our presentation. Nor have we consciously overlooked portions of a subject which might i n v a l i d a t e our argument, but have t r i e d to be accurately s e l e c t i v e . Also, i n the course of t h i s t h e s i s , we w i l l present a number of h i s t o r i c a l s t r a i n s and developments i n philosophy, ideology, economics, technology, organizational sociology, psychology, and i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y , and w i l l argue that these various s t r a i n s are i n t e r r e l a t e d and a f f e c t one another. We w i l l suggest a number of what we consider t o be persuasive and enlightening causal explanations for these developments. We r e a l i z e that the 10. certainty of our d e s c r i p t i v e argument l i e s not i n causal explanation but rather i n a phenomenological account and c o r r e l a t i o n a l analysis. Since Aristotle i t has been understood that causal explanation i s a part of science and that i t i s most desirable when possi b l e . We agree, and for that reason have interwoven much prospective causal argument i n t o our study and feel i t i s a strength of our study. But we r e a l i z e that as the s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of our methods of inq u i r y i s increased, that such knowledge i s i n c r e a s i n g l y hard to come by i n absolute and not hypothetical terms. This r e a l i z a t i o n of course does not i n v a l i d a t e our work here, for most of modern science and s o c i a l science has e f f e c t i v e l y dispensed with rigorous causal a n a l y s i s , and both f e e l competent to explain and p r e d i c t . A l a s t point l i e s i n the b a s i c a l l y d e s c r i p t i v e nature of t h i s under-taking. C h a p t e r H w i l l attempt to describe the dominant ethos of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. Chapter III w i l l attempt to describe the meaning of t h i s ethos for the s o c i e t i e s involved. Yet to speak of meaning i s to speak of more than pure d e s c r i p t i o n . The philosophical problem involved i n t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n i s a c e n t r a l theme of Chapter IIEand w i l l not be elaborated here. But we must assert again, that the basic mission of t h i s study i s a v a l i d and complete d e s c r i p t i o n of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. We are indeed committed personally to a value p o s i t i o n i n t h i s discussion as we would hope the reader would be upon having read i t . We consider ourselves to be l i k e those residents of a sanitarium who were c a l l e d upon to describe tuberculosis o b j e c t i v e l y . 11. CHAPTER TWO: A HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY It should be reiterated here that this thesis is divided generally into two parts. Chapter two is the beginning of that f i r s t part which w i l l set out those h i s tor ica l and contemporary facets of advanced industrial society which the author deems most important and fundamental for a proper understanding of what that society is about. The length of this thesis demands economy. We w i l l thus be forced to discuss only major factors, and then often re lat ively br ie f ly in comparison to the breadth of subject matter with which we are concerned; yet, we think the reader w i l l find such a concise statement enlightening and well in the sp i r i t of the synthesis of social knowledge. A. Scarcity: The Histor ical Imperative The economist, l ike everyone else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man. Alfred Marshall We must understand scarcity to be the dominating objective h i s tor ica l condition in the collective experience of mankind.* Basic material satisfaction is primal to a l l other forms of human expression. It is fundamental to the materialist position and to the anthropological scheme used in this thesis. To repeat a portion of the White explanation: Man is an animal species, and consequently culture as a whole is dependent upon the material, mechanical means of adjustment to the natural environment. Man must have food. He must be protected from the elements. And he must defend himself from his enemies. These three things he must do i f he is to continue to l ive ( . )^ Given that existing materially has h i s tor ica l ly been the full-time job * The meaning of the term scarcity does not for me depend upon the view of man as an inf ini te consumer. This paper w i l l later deal with this definit ion of the term. Unless otherwise specified, scarcity has a f inite meaning. It refers to some definite level of satisfaction of fundamental human material needs for a specified group(s) of people. 12. for mankind, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that men have b u i l t t h e i r mechanical, s o c i a l , and thought worlds around t h i s base, and that t h i s base has been the primary force i n shaping the rest of society. A l l human a c t i v i t y must i n i t i a l l y be subordinated to t h i s h i s t o r i c a l imperative. The amelioration of t h i s condition of basic material need and the acceptance of such an amelioration has not come e a s i l y . Indeed i t has come l i t t l e , i f at a l l . Lord Keynes remarked that "(f)rom the e a r l i e s t times of which we have records-back, say, to two thousand years before Christ—down to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change i n the standard of l i v i n g of the average man l i v i n g i n the c i v i l i z e d centers of the earth. Ups and downs c e r t a i n l y . V i s i t a t i o n s of plague, famine and war. Golden i n t e r v a l s . But no progressive v i o l e n t change."9 A number of fac t o r s , the advancement of science and the advent of the nation state not i n s i g n i f i c a n t among them, led to the i n d u s t r i a l r evolution. But a fundamental change i n p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and philosophic orientations did not follow those changes that did occur i n objective conditions. There are a number of reasons for t h i s . F i r s t , objective material conditions were slow to change for the •--masses. J.K. Gal b r a i t h observes: (I)n the e a r l y years of the I n d u s t r i a l Revolution, the rewards of increased e f f i c i e n c y were d i s t r i b u t e d very unequally. It was the wealth of the new entrepreneurs, not of t h e i r workman, which was every where celebrated. ...In England i n the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth century both t o t a l production and output per person were r i s i n g r a p i d l y . The number of people of means was increasing. So too, as the mid-century approached, were r e a l wages. But the improvement i n the p o s i t i o n of the masses was far less evident than the increase i n i n d u s t r i a l and mercantile wealth. I f the poor were becoming less poor, t h i s change was s l i g h t ^ as compared with the growing contrast between the r i c h and the poor. Secondly, when material progress on a s o c i e t a l l e v e l did occur, sweeping uncertainties such as war or economic depression invalidated the i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n that man might be f i n a l l y conquering s c a r c i t y . M a t e r i a l w e l l beiag was considered, given the gloomy p a l l of the past and the uncertainties 13. of the present to be at best temporary. The i n e v i t a b i l i t y and even d e s i r a b i l i t y of uncertainty became a part of the notions of competitive c a p i t a l i s m . * Thus l i f e continued on under the shadow of s c a r c i t y ; i t was considered to be the natural state, abundance to be the aberration. A t h i r d reason for the maintenance of the dominance of s c a r c i t y i n the s o c i o l o g i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l l e v e l s of culture i s i t s accepted p o s i t i o n i n the d i s c i p l i n e of economics. The assumption of the existence of s c a r c i t y i s b u i l t into the d e f i n i t i o n of economics i t s e l f . According to Paul A. Samuelson, most economists agree on a d e f i n i t i o n l i k e the following: Economics i s the study of how men and society choose, with or without the use of money, to employ scarce productive resources to produce various commodities over time and d i s t r i b u t e them for consumption, now and i n the future among various people and groups i n society. The o r i g i n s of economic thought were grounded i n even darker terms. At best, the economic p l i g h t of c o l l e c t i v e man was bad. G a l b r a i t h i s c l e a r on t h i s . "Economists would have indeed been i n d i f f e r e n t to both h i s t o r y and environment had they not taken the p r i v a t i o n and economic desolation of the masses for granted. In economics*, mi a fortune; and f a i l u r e were normal....Enduring success was at odds with a l l h i s t o r y and could not be expected. This was the legacy of circumstances to ideas." 12 G a l b r a i t h further elaborates the e f f e c t of objective conditions on the inception of economic thought. As i t was l e f t by Malthus and Ricardo the economic prospect for the ordinary i n d i v i d u a l was remarkably d u l l . His normal 1 expectation was to l i v e on the edge of starvation.. Anything better was abnormal. Progress would enhance the wealth of those who were;generally speaking, already r i c h , but not the masses. Nothing could be done about i t . 1 3 * Whether or not competition i s fundamental to the actual workings of c a p i t a l i s m i s beside the point here. I t was nonetheless and s t i l l i s an important facet of pure c a p i t a l i s t theory. For further discussion, see J.K. Ga l b r a i t h , The A f f l u e n t Society. Chapter IV, Section 3, pg. 41. 14. A fourth reason is that when objective economic conditions in the western world did improve or showed signs of the poss ib i l i ty of improvement, the concept of scarcity was extended to envelope a new convenient theory of the nature of man who was now to be seen as an inf ini te consumer.* The capital i s t system depended upon scarcity to continue to justify i t se l f - -for scarcity was not only that which capitalism purported to end, * * but also the assumption on which i t was theoretically based. Had scarcity been allowed to disappear, presumably the need for the capita l i s t system (or any system dedicated soley to increased production) would also disappear. But by extending the nature of man to make him an inf ini te consumer, scarcity was made also inf ini te and the existing system was therefore just i f ied * When one speaks of the end of scarcity or even of the poss ibi l i ty of the end of scarcity, he can only r e a l i s t i c a l l y be referring to advanced industrial western society. We surely, even under the most ideal of p o l i t i c a l and economic arrangements, are not on the verge of conquering world scarcity. However, neither western advanced industrial governments nor their citizens consider i t to be their primary task to solve this problem. In absolute terms, foreign aid is sparce, and then is for the most part considered as strategic in terms of national interest and not in terms of international altruism. We can, however, perhaps for the f i r s t time in history, see the end of primary scarcity in western post-industrial nations. Poverty and gross material insecurity w i l l more and more be a problem of distribution and not of production in these nations. * * This statement is not exactly true, as such. No class ical l ibera l thinker proposed that capitalism was the means to the end of anything, for man was an inf inite consumer of goods and capitalism was to be the provider of the good l i f e - - i „ e . , the provider of those goods man so in f in i te ly desired. And we cannot imagine a member of the. established bourgeois believing that his business was the means to anyone's ends but his . But here scarcity is the assumption underlying the h i s tor ica l quest for the maximization of production. Class ical l ibera l theorists simply insured that a change in objective material conditions would not jeopardize the existence of scarc i t y . And i n the s p i r i t of Hegel's master-slave r e l a t i o n -ship, we cannot suppose that the masses of workers who would f a c i l i t a t e the emerging capital i s t system would have subjected themselves to the conditions of that system i f they had not considered i t to be at least a means to the resolution of fundamental material needs. Thus we can consider scarcity to be the fundamental assumption which underlies any system which is able to mobilize an entire culture in an economic enterprise. We here refer back to the anthropological model and the relation of the technological system to the sociological and philosophical systems of culture. 15. i n f i n i t e l y . A tautological relationship is established here in economic thought. Scarcity is objectively observed and theoretically facilitated, and thus becomes an integral part of the theory which w i l l explain how the system w i l l and must work. Description, over time, thusly becomes prescription. We shall return to the evolving meaning of scarcity again in this chapter. The f i f t h and last reason for the importance and lingering effect of scarcity on social thought can be seen in terms of general historical lag. We have illustrated one kind of lag in which theories springing from and accounting for one set of objective conditions adapt themselves to new conditions by altering definitions of basic terms and basic concepts and thus act to disguise change and to alter the reasonable impact df such change. Yet the notion of historical lag can further be substantiated conceptually to have basic psychological and sociological components. Simply stated, the psychological component is the result of the basic psychological fact that new and different perceptual cues are interpreted in terms of cognitive patterns resulting from previous experiences. There is a psychological stake in resolving the cognitive dissonance created by cues which are not immediately interpretable in terms of the subject's existing cognitive map. More than not, new cues, i f they represent a phenomena of sufficient magnitude and importance and therefore cannot be merely dismissed, w i l l be reinterpreted in terms of the existing cognitive orientations. For to enlarge or reformulate those wholistic conceptualiza-tions through which one interprets the world, would force the further reinterpretation of a l l previous experiences in terms of the new system, and this is not a psychologically comfortable operation. This "conservative" tendency is manifested especially in large scale conceptual orientations toward such things as the meaning of l i f e , national identity, p o l i t i c a l and 16. religious beliefs, and the justification of ones position in the production process. The cultural component has to do with the establishment of institutions on the sociological and philosophical levels of culture to meet the needs of the technological base in response to objective material conditions. It w i l l be seen how these means to ends become ends in themselves and thusly lose sight of their original relationship to the objective material conditions which do in fact change. Furthermore, we shall see how the bureaucratic institutions needed to meet the demands of the technological base exert an inherent "conservative" force which tends toward being impervious to change. In many respects, this paper can be seen to be about such historical lag. B. Production and Consumption: The Surrogate Imperatives The importance of production transcends our boundaries. We are regularly told--in the conventional wisdom i t is the most frequent justification of our c i v i l i z a t i o n , even our existence—that the American standard of living " i s the marvel of the world." J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society. Scarcity has now been established to be the prevalent historical condition and an academically accepted reality. Relative material progress was apparent, but the notion of absolute material progress was invalidated by such uncertainties as war and depression up through World War II. Indeed there was much historical evidence to support the notion that the battle against scarcity would be long and uphill even in the twentieth century. The optimistic visions of astute observers would be considerably less than enough to alter attitudes and institutions that had been gathering cognitive and institutional inertia since the dawn of mankind. Scarcity is effectively the problem of not having enough material goods to go around. Obviously the solution is to produce more goods. 17. Even as s c a r c i t y i s h i s t o r i c a l l y the absolute problem (absolute i n the sense of being primal), production becomes the h i s t o r i c a l s o l u t i o n . Thus, given that both i n d i v i d u a l s and governments tend to never abstract t h e i r world view beyond the f i r s t l e v e l of things at hand, production becomes a b s o l u t e — a n end i n i t s e l f . This transformation i s easy for us to under-stand i n l i g h t of the anthropological model of the systems of c u l t u r e . Production—the output of the economic s y s t e m — i s not an i d e a l , but an arrangement of structures i n the technological system of c u l t u r e . But t h i s arrangement of structures i s i n i t i a l l y conceived i n the minds of men. This i s not to reverse the i n i t i a l causal arrow between the technological system and the s o c i o l o g i c a l and p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems; the necessity i s material, not s o c i a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l , or moral at inception. But rather we must argue that the three systems overlap. Arrangements on the technological l e v e l must be accompanied by corresponding adaptations and changes on the other two l e v e l s . Technology, even a most p r i m i t i v e kind, demands f a c i l i -t a t i n g s o c i a l arrangements. New norms must be established to encourage proper responses on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l s i n the society. The whole process w i l l have to be r a t i o n a l i z e d and j u s t i f i e d i n moral, p h i l o s o p h i c a l , and t h e o l o g i c a l terms. Furthermore, producing i s a composite of a vast array of s k i l l s and trades which make up the l i v e s of the masses, whereas s c a r c i t y i s the abstract constant. That i s , farming i s much more e a s i l y conceptualized as a l i f e t i m e i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i e t a l a c t i v i t y than the conquering of s c a r c i t y . According to the model, when production i s inculcated as an absolute value on one l e v e l of society, i t i s l i k e l y to permeate the other two l e v e l s , and these l e v e l s w i l l tend to serve as supports for the technological system. The notion of an ends-means transformation i s f e a s i b l e as we understand the s o c i a l and philosophical adjustments which must be made to normally f a c i l i t a t e the technological 18. system. I t i s easy for the culture to e f f e c t i v e l y lose sight of the reason for i t s present endeavor, e s p e c i a l l y i f i t must devote i t s whole s e l f to t h i s endeavor. Over and above the explanatory power of t h i s argument the f a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l argument for an ends-means transformation seems impeccably c l e a r . That s c a r c i t y was the h i s t o r i c a l problem i s beyond doubt. But that production, over and beyond the s a t i s f a c t i o n of scarcity^ i s dominant and a l s o apparent. We pride ourselves not i n the number of mouths fed, but i n the per cent increase i n GNP. When a government party argues that i t has led the nation through a good year, or a best year, i t i s more often than not r e f e r r i n g not to i t s l e v e l of l i t e r a c y , nor the q u a l i t y of the n a t i o n a l b a l l e t , nor to the number of people who that year found a meaningful r e l a t i o n -ship with God, nor even to the q u a l i t y of t h e i r n a t i o n a l hockey team, but i n e v i t a b l y to the increase i n some suitable measure of economic p r o d u c t i v i t y . Further evidence for the ends-means transformation theory can be seen i n the fact that i n nations where production has f u l f i l l e d i t s purpose—that of eli m i n a t i n g s c a r c i t y , i t continues to be seen as an absolute value. G a l b r a i t h comments on t h i s phenomenon i n the United States: Now goods are abundant. More die i n the United States of too much food than too l i t t l e . Where the population was once thought to press on the food supply, now the food supply presses r e l e n t l e s s l y on the population. No one can s e r i o u s l y suggest that the s t e e l which comprises the extra four or f i v e feet of purely decorative distance on our automobiles i s of prime urgency. For many women and some men c l o t h i n g has become l i k e plumage, almost e x c l u s i v e l y e r o t i c . Yet production remains c e n t r a l to our thoughts. There i s no tendency to take i t , l i k e sun and water, for granted; on the contrary, i t continues to measure the q u a l i t y and progress of our c i v i l i z a t i o n . ^ He further summarizes the r o l e of production i n the value hierarchy of our society: Our preoccupation with production i s , i n f a c t , the culminating consequence of powerful h i s t o r i c a l and psychological forces. Producti-v i t y , has enabled us to avoid or finesse the tensions anciently associated 19. with i n e q u a l i t y and i t s inconvenient remedies. It has become c e n t r a l to our s t r i v i n g s to reduce i n s e c u r i t i e s . And our s t r i v i n g i s buttressed by a highly dubious but equally accepted psychology of want; by an equally dubious and equally accepted i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of nat i o n a l i n t e r e s t ; and by a powerful vested i n t e r e s t . So a l l embracing, indeed, i s our sense of the importance of production as a goal that the f i r s t r e a c t i o n to any questioning of t h i s a t t i t u d e w i l l be, "What else i s there?" So large does production bulk i n our thoughts that we can ; ;only suppose that a vacuum must remain i f i t should be relegated to a smaller role.*5 Such l o g i c i s st r a i g h t forward once one has l o s t sight of the h i s t o r i c a l s i t u a t i o n , a v i s i o n obscured l a r g e l y by the material, t e c h n i c a l and organi-z a t i o n a l energy which i s t y p i c a l l y invested i n the present h i s t o r i c a l p roject. Just as the absolute need to combat s c a r c i t y brought on the d e i f i c a t i o n of the value of production,, organized, mandatory consumption i s the l o g i c a l extension of the need for the absolute maximization of production. I f , as we have demonstrated, production i s e f f e c t i v e l y seen as an end i n i t s e l f , a goal to maximize, then consumption i s i t s i n e v i t a b l e counterpart. The former cannot e x i s t without the l a t t e r . Galbraith's a s s e r t i o n that the American economy depends upon persons buying things they don't need with money they don't have may be an overstatement, but to document the amount of time, money, and e f f o r t put into the synthesis of want would be highly redundant to anyone even s l i g h t l y f a m i l i a r with the media i n North America. Engineers are paid $40,000 a year to design new chrome s t r i p s for Fords so that the car we own w i l l be obsolete next year. The t h i r t y - t h i r d brand of dishwashing l i q u i d undoubtedly gets your dishes cleaner than the former thirty-two brands, and furthermore w i l l maintain your age at twenty-eight,, not pollute the environment, and cement your marriage. Nylon stockings are made to run, and we must shorten our l i v e s with cigar e t t e s i n order to make i t with whomever we want i n our prime. The consumption of goods i s even f a c i l i t a t e d when consumers cannot pay. Credit, bankcards, a l l assure that o the necessary consumption function w i l l not be endangered by a mere lack of funds. v 20. Consumption cannot only be seen as the l o g i c a l compliment to an ethos which honors production, but also as a r e s u l t of the expanding of the notion of s c a r c i t y to an h i s t o r i c a l l y insoluble p o s i t i o n by portraying a nature of man i n which he i s seen as an i n f i n i t e consumer. There may be few better h i s t o r i c a l examples of the response of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l system of culture to the technological base. If s c a r c i t y i s by d e f i n i t i o n unending, then the primacy of economic prerogatives, (and the r e s u l t i n g maintenance of e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s of wealth, p r i v i l e g e , and vested i n t e r e s t ) can be j u s t i f i e d i n f i n i t e l y a l s o . The accepted theory of consumer demand and i t s r e l a t i o n to s c a r c i t y i s c l e a r i n economic te x t -books. A leading u n i v e r s i t y text i n economics i n an opening section concerning d e f i n i t i o n s states, under the heading of " s c a r c i t y " , that "(t)he human wants that can be s a t i s f i e d by consuming goods and s e r v i c e s may be regarded, for a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes i n today's world, as l i m i t l e s s . G a l b r a i t h states that the accepted theory of consumer demand i s based on 17 two broad propositions. The f i r s t i s that the urgency of wants does not diminish appreciably as more of them are s a t i s f i e d . "When man has s a t i s i f e d 13 h i s physical needs, then ps y c h o l o g i c a l l y grounded desires take over." "The second proposition i s that wants ori g i n a t e i n the personality of the consumer, or, i n any case, they are given data for the economist. The l a t t e r * s 19 task i s merely to seek t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n . " These two propositions c l e a r l y e x h i b i t that convenient naivete which abounds i n the conventional wisdom. In proposition one, the sloppy transformation from phy s i c a l needs to psychological needs not only j u s t i f i e s the e x i s t i n g production and consumption mechanisms, but denies any understanding of what "psychological needs" are. This happy and functional ignorance i s further c a r r i e d out i n proposition two. We understand that psychological needs, over and above b i o l o g i c a l needs ( r e a l i z i n g that the two kinds of needs are not independent), are 21. learned needs; or, at the very l e a s t , the material and s o c i a l expressions and manifestations of these needs are learned i n the s o c i a l i z a t i o n process--that i s , the expressions of these needs are c u l t u r a l l y determined. I f , as such, they are learned, then they obviously cannot o r i g i n a t e i n s i d e the consumer. Furthermore, i n that the economic system goes to great expense i n ad v e r t i s i n g , i t seems to accept the falsehood of i t s own concept of human nature. Economic h i s t o r i a n Robert L. Heilbroner states that we are constantly t o l d that the version of man as an i n f i n i t e consumer, motivated only by 20 p r o f i t s i s "as old as man himself." But he r e l a t e s the h i s t o r i c a l r e a l i t i e s : The p r b f i t motive as we know i t i s only as old as "modern man." Even today the notion of gain for gain's sake i s foreign to a large portion of the world's population, and i t has been conspicuous by i t s absence over most of recorded history.^1 Heilbroner remarks further that, ...among the u n i n d u s t r i a l i z e d peoples of the x^orld: a rav^ working force, unused to wage work, uncomfortable i n factory l i f e , unschooled i n the idea of an e v e r - r i s i n g standard of l i v i n g , w i l l not work harder i f wages r i s e ; i t w i l l simply take more time o f f . The idea of gain, the idea that each man not only may but should constantly s t r i v e to better his material l o t , i s an idea which i s quite foreign to the great lower and middle s t r a t a of Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and medieval cultures, only scattered throughout Renaissance and Reformation times, and l a r g e l y absent i n the majority of Eastern c i v i l i z a t i o n s . As a ubiquitous c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of society, i t i s as modern as the invention of printing.22 C. B. Macpherson speaks of t h i s o n t o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n as being l a r g e l y a new formulation and of the necessity of t h i s formulation to the e d i c t s of production. The f i r s t society that postulated man as an i n f i n i t e l y desirous consumer of u t i l i t i e s was the c a p i t a l i s t market society that emerged i n the seventeenth century i n England. I do not mean that moral and p o l i t i c a l philosophers had never before then noticed the a p p e t i t i v e side of man or even postualted the i n f i n a t e l y desirous nature of some men. Many had done so. But they had generally noticed i t only to deplore i t and to urge i t s supression by higher 22. moral values. What I find now, from the seventeenth century on, was the widespread assumption that infinite desire not only was present in man but was also rational and morally allowable. How may this new assumption be said to have been required by the new society? It was, I think, required in order to justify the change to certain new institutions which were required to realize the great increase of individual and national wealth (and of individual freedom) that was seen to be possible.23 Before we turn ourselves to these new institutions, and their meaning for our present society, we must consider the means to these ends. C. Technology: New Demands on the Society To understand the economic situation in advanced industrial societies, one must appreciate the rise of technology to primary importance and the demands that both the apparatus and logic of this technology make on organizational prerogatives. In the economic system, this trend manifests i t s e l f in the rise of large bureaucratically organized corporations and in the larger society i t is manifested in the virtually universal acceptance of bureaucratic principles. It is this linkage that provides the key to the reorganization of the socialogical and philosophical systems by the techno-logical base. And this is in turn the key to the understanding of the nature of society that inspires this p o l i t i c a l and philosophical critique. Galbraith, in speaking of the occurrence and extent of these changes states that (t)he innovations and alterations in economic l i f e in the last seventy years, and more especially since the beginning of World War II, have, by any calculation, been great. The most visible has been the application of increasingly intricate and sophisticated technology to the production of things. Machines have replaced crude manpower. And increasingly, as they are used to instruct other machines, they replace cruder forms of human intelligence. Seventy years ago the corporation was s t i l l confined to those industries—railroading, steamboating, steel-making, petroleum recovery and refining, some mining—where, i t seemed, production had to be on a large scale. Now i t also sells groceries, mills grain, publishes newspapers and provides public entertainment, a l l activities that were once the province of the individual proprietor or the insignificant f i r m . ^ 23. In this paper, technology w i l l be defined as "the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge for practical tasks. if ,25 Galbraith suggests six consequences of technology for organi-zation in the economic sphere. 26 These consequences, in a more generalized form, bear on a l l organizations which adopt the principles of technology to the accomplishing of any task, economic or otherwise.) F i r s t , "(a)n increasing time span separates the beginning from the completion of any task." This is a function of the complexity of the product and of the numbers of experts who must be consulted and integrated both in the planning and production stage. It is also a function of the materials needed and the procurement of those materials. Second, "(t)here is an increase in the capital that is committed to production aside from that occasioned by increased output." Increased time means the increased investment of capital between the planning and the profit stage of the product. Experts cost more than workers and technology implies the use of machinery that may have to be especially created before production can get under way. Third, "(w)ith increasing technology the commitment of time and money tends to be made ever more inflex5.bly to the performance of a particular task. That task must be precisely defined before i t is divided and subdivided into i t s component parts. Knowledge and equipment are then brought to bear on these fractions and they are useful only for the task as i t was i n i t i a l l y defined. If that task is changed, new knowledge and new equipment w i l l have to be brought to bear." Fourth, "(t)echnology requires specialized manpower." This is true on managerial, technical, and general labour levels. Fifth, "(t)he inevitable counterpart of specialization (and of size, I might add) is organization." This w i l l be taken up later on in this chapter. The sixth consequence is that "(f)rom the time and capital that must be committed, the i n f l e x i b i l i t y of this commitment, the needs of the large organization and the problems 24. of market performance under conditions of advanced technology, comes the necessity for planning." These s i x economic consequences of technology i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s manifest themselves i n two general ways. The f i r s t i s that these consequences encourage bigness. The very complexity of modern corporations demands the expansion of bureaucratic structures i n order to co-ordinate the vast array of exports. Furthermore, modern corporate economics demand the elimination of i n s e c u r i t y and the assurance of p r e d i c t a b i l i t y . This need encourages bigness i n a number of ways, but i t a lso leads us to our second kind of m a n i f e s t a t i o n — c o n t r o l . "The large commitment of c a p i t a l and organization well i n advance of r e s u l t requires that there be foresight and also that a l l f e a s i b l e steps be taken to insure 27 that what i s foreseen w i l l t r a n s p i r e . " There are two ways of doing t h i s . One i s to never predict wrong. The other i s to attempt to c o n t r o l those factors you are t r y i n g to pr e d i c t . Naturally the l a t t e r choice i s more p r a c t i c a l . In the economic sphere, t h i s c o n t r o l can be seen to be exerted over three major areas. 1.) Control over i n t e r n a l i n s t a b i l i t y . This can be accomplished by expansion and d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . This involves the development of the so c a l l e d polyglot corporation. G a l b r a i t h argues that " ( i ) t combines great size with highly diverse l i n e s of manufacture. Thus i t can absorb the adverse consequences of uncertainty that cannot otherwise be eliminated. Uncontrolled aversion of customers t o one product, such as a i r c r a f t , i s u n l i k e l y to a f f e c t telephones or bu i l d i n g materials. The e f f e c t s of market uncertainty are thus contained i n what w i l l often be a r e l a t i v e l y small part of the t o t a l planning u n i t . " 28 2.) Control of the prices for and access to raw materials and other supplies necessary for the production of the f i n a l product. The market i s superseded i n t h i s way which i s usually r e f e r r e d to a v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n . G a l b r a i t h states that 25. (t)he planning unit takes over the source of supply or the outlet; a transaction that i s subject to bargaining over prices and amounts is thus replaced with a transfer within the planning unit...As viewed by the firm, elimination of the market converts an external negotia-tion and hence a partially or wholly uncontrollable decision to a matter for purely internal decision. Nothing, better explains modern industrial policy in regard to capital and labour than the desire to make these highly strategic cost factors subject to purely internal decision.29 A second method of this kind of control is found in the power that big corporations can exert by choosing to buy or not to buy materials from smaller suppliers. This technique can exert considerable covert and overt price-setting pressure. 3.) Control of the consumer market. This can also be done in a number of ways. Large corporations are able to set prices for their products and be secure in the knowledge that no individual buyer or group of buyers, who by refusing to purchase, can force a change. The fact that this large corporation is one of the few sellers adds to i t s control. "Each seller shares the common interest in secure and certain prices; i t is to the advantage of none to disrupt this mutual security system."30 Furthermore, corporations can control the market by synthesizing need for those goods they desire to produce. "Control of prices is only a part of market control; i f uncertainty is to be eliminated there must also be control of the amount sold. But size also makes this possible. It allows advertising, a well-nurtured sales organization and careful management of product design which can help to insure the needed customer response."31 Large corporations can also eliminate market uncertainty by making mutual arrangements with one another. "This they do by entering into contracts specifying prices and amounts to be provided or bought for substantial periods of time."32 A fin a l way to control the consumer market - is-to encourage the government to provide one. "When investment in technological development is very high, a wrong technical judgement or a failure in pursuading consumers to buy the product can also be extremely expensive. The cost and associated risk can be greatly reduced i f the state pays for more exhalted technical development or guarantees a market for the technically advanced product. Suitable just ification--national defense, the needs of national prestige, support of indispensable industries such as supersonic travel—can readily be found. Modern technology thus defines a growing function of the modern state."33 But we are getting a bit ahead of our story. We have seen the demands 26. of technology on an economy dedicated to production and consumption above a l l other ends, but we have spoken l i t t l e of the philosophy and logic of technology i t s e l f . We now turn our attention to this task. D. The Philosophy of Science: on Human Organization Scarcity and natural insecurities (pestilence, disease, famine, natural catastrophes, etc.) are due to man's inability to master nature. And mastery of nature requires a true reading of the physical world. Let us return for a moment to the fundamental philosophical dilemma presented in the introductory- chapter, that of the relation of subject to object. Natural science encounters this dilemma head on, for unlike social systems, scien t i f i c systems cannot operate on inculcated half-truths and accepted myths; they must ideally perceive the object as i t really is--that i s , objectively. We w i l l not trouble ourselves to document the role of science in technology and in man's progressive mastering of nature. This under-standing is part of the conventional wisdom. What we w i l l try to do however is to establish those philosophical and sociological demands made upon culture by science. The most important of these appear to be: 1.) categorical self-removal; 2.) the establishment of a fact-value distinction; 3.) empiricism; and 4.) reliance on method. These w i l l each be taken up separately. 1.) The essential problem in any perceiving act is that the subject, whose cognitive composition is largely conditioned by previous experiences and therefore at the mercy of those experiences for his perception and cognition of new objects, can only comprehend the perceived object in his (the subject's) own terms. This truism has precipitated the age old philosophical question, whether or not man can indeed perceive anything other than himself—that i s , is a l l knowledge inevitably subjective. 27. Despite p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , the conceptually l o g i c a l answer to t h i s dilemma i s the removal of s e l f from observation, that i s , to put the matter i n more formal terms, the elimination or at least dininuation of subject i n i t s r e l a t i o n to object. L o g i c a l l y , t h i s i s impossible, but yet as a valued i d e a l , there are many common sense a p p l i c a t i o n s . In observation and d e s c r i p t i o n we are expected to not allow personal bias or emotions to i n t e r f e r e with our acts. However, more formally, we are expected to adhere to p a r t i c u l a r procedures of inquiry, methods which are designed to eliminate or c o n t r o l for observer b i a s . (These methods and the stress on methodology w i l l be taken up i n several places i n the remainder of t h i s chapter and t h i s study.) The notion of c o n t r o l l i n g for observer bias i s the same i n p r i n c i p l e as c o n t r o l l i n g for a v a r i a b l e i n an experimental s i t u a t i o n , and gets quite s u c c e s s f u l l y around the problem of the p o s s i b i l i t y of ultimate o b j e c t i v i t y . Thus science can be defined in terms of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y . According to Arnold Brecht, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , a term which he suggests "alludes to the process of intercommunication", depends on the fundamental presupposition embodied i n the concept of con-s u b j e c t i v i t y which he defines as "the t r u t h of the corDmon-»sense assumption that one and the same thing often causes p a r a l l e l impressions i n d i f f e r e n t human beings." He goes on to state that "(w)ithout co n s u b j e c t i v i t y there can be no i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , and without i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y there could be „34 no science." 2.) A second important ph i l o s o p h i c a l development concurrent with the emergence of science i s the a s s e r t i o n of the a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between judgements of fact and judgements of value. (That t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n takes on an h o n o r i f i c status considerably beyond that of being merely a n a l y t i c a l w i l l be stressed i n the next chapter. However, i n t h i s chapter, we hope to demonstrate how t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n might have become so elevated.) ... • 28. Judgements of fact are seen to deal with the establishment of existence— what i s ; judgements of value deal with evaluations of phenomena—what ought. The importance of this distinction and the necessity for i t , and also the key to the status of judgements of the former kind becomes more clear under point three, empiricism. 3.) Empiricism, generally stated, is the doctrine that only those things which can be observed directly, or directly observable operators of those things, can be classified as fact. The dictionary defines "empirical 1 1 35 as "relying or based solely on experiment and observation." William A. Glaser defines empirical theories as "generalizations about observable 36 reality." Eugene Meehan suggests that empiricism is "(t)he doctrine that man can have no knowledge of the universe that is not a consequence 37 of perception and experience." Although various definitions of empiricism may allow for a whole range of ontological positions, that i s , empiricism may be considered "an" epistemological approach as opposed to "the" epistemological approach, empiricism in i t s e l f , as an epistemology, proposes or elevates a particular ontology. For, i f observations are the prerequisite to knowledge, then we cannot know what we cannot observe, unless we can operationalize the unobservable fact of concept in terms of other observable occurrence. This provides some d i f f i c u l t i e s in the establishment of and dealing with concepts describing relationships, but these can be reasonably overcome, i f not for abstract philosophical purposes, at least for most practical ones. But such an epistemology proves fatal to judgements of value. Weber, when asked what was the f u l l meaning of "value-free" science, responded that " ( i ) t is certainly not that value judgements are to be withdrawn from scientific discussion in general."38 But a l l that could be meant here is that s t r i c t s c i e n t i f i c analysis was not 29. comprehensive of a l l important realms of discussion. However, within the l o g i c of empiricism i t s e l f , judgements of value can have no meaning. For as stated by Richard S. Rudner, "there i s no sort of observable, or e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t a b l e , behavior whose occurrence i s both necessary and s u f f i c i e n t for the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of any v a l u a t i o n a l predicates; and that, accordingly, i t i s impossible to employ the standard v a l u a t i o n a l steps of the s c i e n t i f i c method to test hypotheses about valuations."39 4.) Method i s embodied i n the meaning of science. One can find few d e f i n i t i o n s of science which do not i n some way employ the word "systematic." For example: Science—..2.. systematized knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation c a r r i e d bn in order to determine the nature of p r i n c i p l e s of what i s being studied. 3. a branch of knowledge or study, e s p e c i a l l y one concerned with e s t a b l i s h i n g and systematizing f a c t s , p r i n c i p l e s , and methods, as by experiments and hypotheses....4. a) the sytematized knowledge of nature and the physical world, b) any branch of this.^O "Systematic" i s further defined as: 3. made or arranged according to a system, method, or a plan;, regular, orderly. 4. characterized by the use of method or orderly planning; methodical.41 I think that we can understand the various methods of science to manifest themselves i n three general ways. F i r s t , s c i e n t i f i c experiments and observations must be conducive to r e p l i c a b i l i t y . This becomes cl e a r when we consider science i n terms of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y - - c o n t r o l l i n g for the subject v a r i a b l e . Each observation and the corresponding set of conditions under which the observation was made must be capable of r e p e t i t i o n . This i n turn means that each experiment must be c o n t r o l l e d i n a systematic way i n order that i t might be duplicated at a l a t e r time. Secondly, and i n l i n e with the f i r s t point, s c i e n t i f i c experietnnts and observations must be able to be performed and r e s u l t s obtained by anyone q u a l i f i e d 30. technically to perforin the experiment. That i s , observers must be interchangeable. This is a second way to control for the subjective factor. The third and most general and important manifestation of the scie n t i f i c method is the demand for systematic control over the proceeding. A scientific observation demands control over both the observer and the environment of that which is to be observed. Replicability demands that the mandates of the method or techniques are adhered to rigorously. Exceptions mean the contamination and therefore the invalidation of the observation. Such s l i p ups are not only philosophically unsound, but economically costly. These principles undoubtedly predate the scientific revolution. Common sense organizational logic maintains that to obtain identical ends, a l l must pursue identical means. Yet i f the ends and the means to these ends are not complicated, the demand for conformity lessens. Mistakes are less costly in terms of both efficiency and economics. But as the finished product (be i t for sale or for a scientific journal) becomes more vast and complex, and the means to that end are resultingly more vast and complex, as has been the expodential tendency from the industrial revolution on, then the demands of a rigorous method must rule. Method, in fact, is so fundamental, i t becomes a prerequisite to to the accomplishment of any other end. Thus as the seeds of science from the lever to the atomic bomb have been sown in modern industry and modern society, they have brought with them their own set of methodological mandates for the organization of not only scientists, but of those who would apply this science in their world, their economy, and their lives. We w i l l now turn to those organizational forms which fa c i l i t a t e the institution of scientific principles and prerogatives in advanced industrial society. 31. E. The Organizational Setting Bureaucracy i s that form of s o c i a l organization which dominates our s o c i a l structures because i t i s the e f f i c i e n t form of organization for accomplishing s p e c i f i c goals which require considerable numbers of persons and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of function. Peter M. Blau defines bureaucracy as the "organization that maximizes e f f i c i e n c y i n administration, x^hatever, i t s formal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , or as an i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d method of organizing s o c i a l conduct i n the i n t e r e s t of administrative e f f i c i e n c y . " It i s that organizational form demanded by the imperatives of technology. A summary of the l i t e r a t u r e on bufeaucracy shows t h i s type of organi-zation to manifest at least twelve d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . They are important and we w i l l summarize them here.* Weber provides us with the following major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 1. ) "The regular a c t i v i t i e s required for the purposes of the organi-zation are d i s t r i b u t e d i n a fixed way as o f f i c i a l d u t i e s . " ^ This includes both v e r t i c a l and h o r i z o n t a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . 2. ) "The organization of o f f i c e s follows the p r i n c i p l e of hierarchy; that i s , each lower o f f i c e i s under the c o n t r o l and supervision of a higher one."44 This allows the superior to "merely" give the orders he has been t o l d to give and absolves him of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y other than: that of a u t h o r i t a -t i v e communication. The onus of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y then f a l l s : on the subordinate whose duty i s to obey the d i r e c t i v e s he receives. This allows for the orders or procedures (methods) to be communicated and c a r r i e d out without a l t e r a t i o n , i n an organization where d i r e c t supervision by the top i s impossible. 3. ) Operations are governed "by a consistent system of abstract rules...and consist of the a p p l i c a t i o n of these rules to p a r t i c u l a r 45 cases." This s t r u c t u r i n g aims at uniformity and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y * In a l l cases we w i l l be r e f e r r i n g to bureaucracy i n the " i d e a l - t y p i c a l case." 32. irregardless of the size of the organization. It also serves a "conservative" function, that i s , the rules can only be changed according to other rules, and in most bureaucratic situations, they can be only changed under direct supervision of those at the top. 4. ) "The ideal o f f i c i a l conducts his office...(in) a s p i r i t of formalistic impersonality...without hatred or passion, and hence without 46 affection or enthusiasm." The organization has a rationality of i t s own which dare not be tampered with for personal reasons. Blau states that "(t)he exclusion of personal considerations from o f f i c i a l business is a prerequisite for impartiality as well as for efficiency. 5. ) Bureaucratic employment "constitutes a career. There is a system 48 of 'promotions' according to seniority or to achievement or both.'' The determinism of a career position tends to lead to and is encouraged to lead to a sort of espirit de corps among the members of a given bureaucratic organization. 6. ) The experts seem to agree that bureaucracies are, a l l things considered, from a purely technical point of view," capable of attaining 49 the highest degree of efficiency." Contrary to the conventional wisdom, they do get the job done. Weber suggests that "(t)he fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production.""^ Blau reinforces this position. "Bureaucracy solves the distinctive organizational problem of maximizing organizational efficiency, not merely that of individuals."^''' Robert Presthus serves to compliment the Weberian l i s t of bureaucratic characteristics. 7. ) Organizations in modern societies are large. This can refer to many aspects of organization such as the scale of operations, the volume of work, extent of capital resources, number of clients or customers, 33. and the geographical scope of a c t i v i t i e s . We have seen the advantages of great size which are fostered by technological developments in the economic system. 8. ) A dominant characteristic of modern bureaucracies is specialization which Presthus describes as "one of the main x^eapons of the scientific management movement in its drive for greater productivity in industrial 52 organizations." The technical nature of the tasks on a l l levels and the great size of organizations makes such specialization a necessity for both efficiency and economy. 9. ) Bureaucratic organizations generally exhibit some sort of status system--"the allocation of different amounts of authority, income, deference, 53 rights, and privileges to the various positions in the hierarchy." The status system functions to reinforce the hierarchy by legitimizing the chain of command and therefore the authority structure, to rexvard those who move up in the hierarchy, and to reward persons according to their worth to the organization. 10. ) Bureaucratic organizations are subject to oligarchical leadership. Oligarchy as an "organic necessity" is the result of technical demands for internal direction, unity and consistency, control of market conditions, leadership s k i l l s , public relations, and lobbying. It is rendered necessary, in short, by the need for someone to give coherence and continuity to the vague, often conflicting aspirations of the majority.54 11. ) Co-optation—in this context, is "the process by which those in power designate their successors."^ This prerogative is part of the monopoly of scarce values that hierarchy assigns to the organizational e l i t e . Since the successors are chosen by existing elites, i t can be assumed that they x^i l l personify traditional values. In this way sanctioned behaviors and expectations are transmitted through agents selected after x^ hat tends to, be a lengthy apprenticeship. Meanwhile the impact of co-optation extends to those immediately affected. Each promotion and its rituals provide ah opportunity to dramatize the terms under which rewards are given. The indexes of success are reaffirmed....For various 34. reasons, including the desire to preserve i n t e r n a l unity and d i s c i p l i n e , l o y a l t y seems to have become the main basis for bureaucratic succession. Like s e n i o r i t y , l o y a l t y enjoys the advantage of wide acceptance for i t i s a q u a l i t y almost everyone can aspire t o . - ^ 12.) As a general -Statement, bureaucracies seek and succeed i n r a t i o n a l i z i n g the production process. R a t i o n a l i t y can here be defined as "the capacity for objective, i n t e l l i g e n t a c t i o n . It i s usually characterized by a patent nexus between ends and means....In an i d e a l - t y p i c a l organization r a t i o n a l i t y i s sought by organizing and d i r e c t i n g i t s many parts so that each contributes to the whole product. S p e c i a l i z a t i o n , c a r e f u l recruitment, job a n a l y s i s , and planning are among the obvious means to t h i s end."57 This b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n of bureaucratic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s must now be integrated into the larger context of t h i s study. S p e c i f i c a l l y we need to understand how the needs of the economic system, and r e s u l t i n g l y how the needs of the technology x^hich dominate that economic system are provided by bureaucratic organizational structures. We w i l l do that i n two ways; the f i r s t i s to reassert the kinds of conditions that have given r i s e to bureaucracy, and the second i s to show the analogous r e l a t i o n s h i p of the s c i e n t i f i c method and the bureaucratic proceeduralism. Blau, i n concurrence with the h i s t o r i c a l argument presented herein, argues that the following kinds of conditions have given r i s e to the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of bureaucratic structures. 1. ) A money economy. "(A) money economy permits the payment of regular s a l a r i e s , which i n turn creates the combination of dependence and independence that i s most conducive to the f a i t h f u l performance of bureau-59 c r a t i c d u t i e s . " 2. ) The sheer size of modern organizations of a l l types. Here we must remember the demands of technology on the s i z e of firms i n the economic sector, and of the further r o l e of technology i n the whole develop-ment of the complexity of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. This leads to the 3 5 . t h i r d kind of condition. 3 . ) The h i s t o r i c a l emergence of s p e c i a l administrative problems and of organizations devoted to s p e c i f i c goals. These might range from modern advertising to public r e l a t i o n s work, i n d u s t r i a l psychology, "think tanks" for s c i e n t i f i c personnel, insurance needs, a s e c r e t a r i a l s t a f f , etc. The v i r t u a l l y i n f i n i t e p r o l i f e r a t i o n of these s p e c i a l needs and functions and the need to coordinate these s p e c i a l t i e s i n both the public and private spheres and between the two, are l a r g e l y a r e s u l t of s c i e n t i f i c discovery and the implementation of technological p r i n c i p l e s and methods i n the economic and governmental structures of p o s t - i n d u s t r i a l society. 4. ) The emergence of the c a p i t a l i s t system. A l a Galbraith, Blau sees the economic need for p r e d i c t a b i l i t y as a major factor i n f l u e n c i n g t h i s condition of bureaucracy. Not only i s t h i s p r e d i c t a b i l i t y necessary within the corporate structure, but external p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i s equally i f not more important. The r a t i o n a l estimation of economic r i s k s which i s presupposed, i n capitalism, requires that .the regular processes of the competitive market not be interrupted by external forces i n unpredictable ways. A r b i t r a r y actions of p o l i t i c a l tyrants i n t e r f e r e with the r a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n of gain or loss, and so do banditry, piracy, and s o c i a l upheavals. The i n t e r e s t of c a p i t a l i s m demands, therefore, not only the overthrow of t y r a n i c a l r u l e r s but also the establishment of governments strong enough to maintain order and s t a b i l i t y . ^ 0 Capitalism also leads to the bureaucratization of other spheres. The expansion of business firms and the consequent removal of most employees from a c t i v i t i e s d i r e c t l y governed by the p r o f i t p r i n c i p l e make i t increasingly necessary to introduce bureaucratic methods of administration for the sake of e f f i c i e n c y . These giant corporations, i n turn, constrain workers, who no longer can bargain i n d i v i d u a l l y with an employer they know personally, to organize into large unions with complex administrative machineries.61 Although the r i s e of c a p i t a l i s m i s undoubtedly a factor i n the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of bureaucratic structures, Blau may have overstated h i s case. A look at the Soviet Union where bureaucratic structures are 36. equally i f not more prevalent than i n c a p i t a l i s t nations would tend to indicate that other factors are the more important. Sheer s i z e , the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y needed for the planning of any modern economy, the e f f i c i e n c y of h i e r a r c h i c a l power d i s t r i b u t i o n , and the v e r t i c a l and ho r i z o n t a l d i f f e r e n t i -a t i o n demanded by the nature of s c i e n t i f i c and technological s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , these factors appear to be the most u n i v e r s a l l y important for the encouragement and maintenance of bureaucratization. Bureaucratic organizations f a c i l i t a t e the imperatives of large scale technological endeavors i n a number of ways. The need for the removal of one's s e l f from the work process (intimately r e l a t e d to the d i s t i n c t i o n of facts and values) i s encouraged by the f i x i n g of a l l bureaucratic acts according to fixed r u l e s , c o n t r o l l e d from the top. Each person performs h i s job as r o l e requirements of his p o s i t i o n are designed. He takes orders only from h i s superiors and gives orders only to i n f e r i o r s , according to the p r i n c i p l e s of h i e r a r c h i c a l , o l i g a r c h i c a l r u l e . Any autonomy he i s given i s circumscribed within a larger set of formal r u l e s . This ensures, i n e f f e c t , that the worker does only what he i s t o l d , that he performs his task t e c h n i c a l l y , and not personally. Indeed, such impersonality i s the epitome of the i d e a l bureaucrat. Furthermore, the regulation of acts according to fixed r u l e s , aids the p r i n c i p l e s of r e p l i c a b i l i t y of task and the interc h a n g e a b i l i t y of the performers of tasks. Here of course, the s i t u a t i o n i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t than i n the s c i e n t i f i c case. In the case of the l a t t e r , one controls for the subject ( i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y ) i n order to obtain a true, constant, and predictable observation of the object. In the bureaucratic case, the con t r o l of the subject i s necessary for the accomplishment of i d e n t i c a l ends over time. Nonetheless, whether we are c o n t r o l l i n g the subject i n a creative or observational act, :the lo g i c of the c o n t r o l and the r e l a t i o n of t h i s control to efficiency;accuracy, and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y i s the same. By creating a 37. system conducted by persons performing impersonal r o l e s , the interchange-a b i l i t y of personnel can be f a c i l i t a t e d with l i t t l e loss to e f f i c i e n c y . We have seen the demands for size and complex planning that technology has placed upon units of the advanced i n d u s t r i a l economy. We have already noted that bureaucratization i s considered to be the most e f f i c i e n t way of accomplishing these and other organizational tasks on a large scale. Furthermore, we have seen technology to increase the demand for s p e c i a l i s t s of a l l kinds--not only i n the form of technicians on a l l l e v e l s of endeavor, but also i n terms of a vast array of services and other o f f e r i n g s necessitated and f a c i l i t a t e d by the extremely diverse advanced economies. As does the philosophy of science, the l o g i c of bureaucracy stresses above a l l method, routine, and c o n t r o l over those methods and routines. Indeed, the means i s so fundamental to the e f f i c i e n t accomplishment of ends that the means become as important and dominant, i f not more so, than the ends themselves, which can be considered to surely follow i f the means, once properly set i n order, are s t r i c t l y adhered to. The importance of fixed rules and of s t r i c t h i e r a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l , surely predates the successes of science. It can be seen on some scale i n governmental and m i l i t a r y organizations since the dawn of c i v i l i z a t i o n . Yet science served to re-introduce and r e i n f o r c e t h i s form of organization both by having i t be fundamental to the workings of i t s revolutionary successes and by the extent to which applied science demanded the spread of i t s p r i n c i p l e s throughout the rest of society. L a s t l y , i f not most important, i s the xjay i n which i d e a l science prescribes absolute (or as absolute as possible) c o n t r o l over a l l of the v a r i a b l e s involved i n order to obtain a meaningful and predictable outcome. Bureaucratic organization, i n almost every c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , seeks to gain and 38. maintain such c o n t r o l . The r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the work process i s established through the f i x i n g of rules and techniques, the h i e r a r c h i c a l chain of command, and the o l i g a r c h i c a l c o n t r o l of decisions at a l l l e v e l s . Yet, perhaps even more important, i s the way i n which modern bureaucracies induce conformity i n t h e i r members. The informal and formal i n s t i t u t i o n of status systems, the notion of bureaucratic positions being seen as career p o s i t i o n s , the fact that s p e c i a l i z a t i o n tends to make workers less mobile i n the work force, the assendency up the bureaucratic ladder through co-optation and/or s e n i o r i t y , the attempts of the corporation to provide for a l l of the needs of i t s workers (recreation, insurance, retirement, s o c i a l contact, prestige, e t c . ) , a l l these attempt to induce and r e i n f o r c e l o y a l t y and conformity to the organization. A l l v a r i a b l e s , mechanical or human, must be c o n t r o l l e d for the machine to function e f f i c i e n t l y . F. Liberalism; The Formal P h i l o s o p h i c a l Response. The inner idea of c a p i t a l i s m i s inherently a philosophy of l i f e . Those who accept i t do not need e x t r a - c a p i t a l i s t sources to v a l i d a t e t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . Their search for wealth as i n d i v i d u a l s colours and shapes t h e i r a t t i t u d e to every department of behavior. Unless t h i s had been the case, c a p i t a l i s m could not have achieved the revolution i t e f f e c t e d . Harold Laski, The Rise of Liberalism We have thus far spoken of the dominance of s c a r c i t y , the r e s u l t i n g drive for production, the r o l e of technology i n the accomplishment of t h i s goal, the general i n s t i t u t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s i n society as a whole, and the organizational demands which x^ere the r e s u l t of these powerful h i s t o r i c a l forces. We have yet one more aspect of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society to discuss before xje can speak of the emergent ethos as a whole with meaning beyond the p a r t i c u l a r meanings of i t s parts. What I have i n mind here i s a discussion of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l body of thought which served as the e x p l i c a t i o n s and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l occurrences we have 39. thus far described. The body of thought to which I am r e f e r r i n g i s , of course, l i b e r a l i s m . The term l i b e r a l i s m and i t s derivatives takes on a vast array of connotative and denotative meanings. Whereas i t means freedom to one, i t means license to another. It can r e f e r to the roots of l a i s s e z f a i r e c a pitalism, and also to welfare state socialism. In some academic l i t e r a t u r e , l i b e r a l i s m i s that l i g h t of western man, the culmination of p o l i t i c a l thought, that which i s our only hope and that which must be defended i n the shadow of communist t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m . In other academic l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s viewed as the road to the v u l g a r i t i e s of mass culture, that which mediates against q u a l i t a t i v e judgements and therefore q u a l i t a t i v e existence. Hard l i n e Marxists see l i b e r a l i s m as ex post facto bourgeois d r i v e l ; l i b e r a l democrats may see i t as a p r i o r i natural truths. But i t i s exactly these kinds of discussions that t h i s study wants to avoid. We wish to avoid them not because they are d i f f i c u l t and not because they are unimportant, but rather because they misdirect our attention from a more important meaning of l i b e r a l i s m i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. But t h i s meaning only takes on form when coupled with those other discussions previous in t h i s study. That i s , we want here to speak of those facets of l i b e r a l i s m which are an i n t e g r a l and coherent portion of what we s h a l l i d e n t i f y as the dominant ethos i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. To begin with, we should make some d i s t i n c t i o n between the doctrines of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m and contemporary l i b e r a l i s m . As observed by Harry K. Girvetz, contemporary l i b e r a l i s m i s more of a "frame of mind" than 62 a systematic body of thought. As i n William F. Buckley's statements 63 regarding an adequate d e f i n i t i o n of contemporary conservatism, i t i s probably more easy to say "who" a contemporary l i b e r a l i s , than "what" i s contemporary l i b e r a l i s m * Girvetz comments that " ( i ) t i s not a fixed 40. or systematically elaborated doctrine, nor i s i t a product of the p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l labours of one or two or even several great men...Contemporary l i b e r a l i s m i s e s s e n t i a l l y a f l u i d and frequently elusive , . „ 64 doctrine. Contemporary l i b e r a l i s m i s not d i r e c t l y relevant to t h i s discussion as a force i n i t s own right.- We would be prepared to argue at length some-where else that i t i s more a r e s u l t of the dominant ethos than a cause for i t . But t h i s i s not true i n the case of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m . The p r i n c i p l e s of t h i s doctrine both help to cause and to j u s t i f y the emerging i n d u s t r i a l society; c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m incorporated the p r i n c i p l e s of science into a more or less coherent p h i l o s o p h i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic doctrine. Contemporary l i b e r a l i s m has added to the prerogatives of i t s older form, and has made many patchwork adjustments i n the doctrine according to changes i n times and objective conditions, but i n a c e n t r a l fundamental core (fundamental, at least from the standpoint of t h i s argument), that part which serves to drive the dominant ethos, i t maintains much of i t s c l a s s i c a l form. We s h a l l argue here that c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m was shaped by two major factors; the advent and success of science and applied science (technology) which Ttfould lead to new economic arrangements; and the need for the phi l o s o p h i c a l system of culture to j u s t i f y and explain the emerging economic and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . In t h i s endeavor we are supported by Girvetz who states: Whatever conclusions are reached as to i t s absolute v a l i d i t y , c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m cannot be understood unless one i s aware of two factors which profoundly influenced i t s formulation: the impact of the physical sciences on the thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the aspirations of the new c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s . 41. We w i l l b r i e f l y discuss the second factor f i r s t . We have already spoken generally of the need for the s o c i o l o g i c a l and philosophical systems of culture to respond to the needs of the technological base--that l e v e l which was engaged i n the b a t t l e against s c a r c i t y . We have also already spoken of the expansion of the d e f i n i t i o n of s c a r c i t y and of the development of a human ontology which viewed man as an i n f i n i t e consumer, and we have seen t h i s as an example of the above mentioned c u l t u r a l adaptation. But we have yet to speak s p e c i f i c a l l y of the emerging vested in t e r e s t of the bourgeois class i n t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l exercise. There were, of course, to be a number of arrangements i n which the bourgeois would develop a vested i n t e r e s t ; not i n s i g n i f i c a n t among them was the need, on the one hand, for a government strong enough to preserve order and r e g u l a r i t y within i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n and increasingly between j u r i s d i c t i o n s , and on the other hand, the need of a series of l e g a l and other arrangements which would insure that the government did not i n t e r f e r e with business transactions and the p r o f i t s from those transactions. But more fundamental than these kinds of arguments (which compose a great deal of the l i b e r a l creed) was the need for a coherent philosophy which would both prescribe i n moral and e t h i c a l terms the duties of c i t i z e n s necessary for these new economic arrangements., and j u s t i f y , for both the workers and the bourgeois, the whole enterprise. Girvetz speaks to t h i s point. Merchants and manufacturers of the new era wanted mores which honored t h r i f t , industry, and enterprise, just as they wanted s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s that dispensed with obsolete h i e r a r c h i c a l arrangements i n which honored places were reserved for functionless a r i s t o c r a t s . An exaggeration of the economic motive often leads one to oversimplify the purposes of the entrepreneurial c l a s s . Entrepreneurs were not animated e x c l u s i v e l y by a desire for gain. As much as anything, they needed a philosophy which would demonstrate that the welfare of the community was dependent on t h e i r e f f o r t s ; t h e i r pecuniary z e a l notwithstanding, they wanted to f e e l that they were making an indispensable c o n t r i b u t i o n to soc i e t y . The thinkers which were to propound the philosophies which would come 42. together as c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m , although l a r g e l y members of that class which would benefit from t h e i r conclusions, were ostensibly a f f e c t e d i n t h e i r thoughts by a more profound influence than mere vested i n t e r e s t . Here I am r e f e r r i n g to the great debt of l i b e r a l i s m to the philosophy and assertiveness of science. The r e l a t i o n of science to philosophy" i s c l e a r . We f i n d , i n t h i s c l a s s i c a l period, numerous examples of philosophers attempting to make moral philosophy " s c i e n t i f i c , " attempting to emulate the methods of s c i e n t i f i c i n quiry, and hoping to emulate the successes which the physical sciences had enjoyed i n understanding and mastering the physical world. As i n the physical sciences, method was of prime importance both as a kind of inquiry and as a resultant p r e s c r i p t i v e means to philosophic and other ends. Girvetz relates t h i s point. On i t s t h e o r e t i c a l side the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l philosophy was shaped as to method by the physical sciences, which enjoyed enormous prestige a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of Newton's P r i n c i p i a . The s o c i a l science of the eighteenth, century consciously patterned i t s e l f a f t e r the physical sciences, i n p a r t i c u l a r , the science of mechanics with i t s r e l i a n c e upon unive r s a l and invariant, mathematically formulable laws. Whatever may have been the r e s u l t of t h i s approach i n the physical sciences, where G a l i l e o cautioned that experience i s the "true mistress of astronomy" and Newton emphasized experimental confirmation, i n the s o c i a l sciences the r e s u l t , with few exceptions, was an emphasis upon deductive procedures ....The prestige of the physical sciences led also to an insistence upon extending mechanical p r i n c i p l e s to the science of man and society and, with t h i s , to the f a c i l assumption that wholes are completely understood by analyzing them into t h e i r simplest elements.&7 It appears that the human quest for p h i l o s o p h i c a l and psychological c e r t a i n t y has forever dominated academic and lay philosophy (including theology). This process seems clear here. As philosophy became more sk e p t i c a l and agnostic, not only i n that older r e l i g i o u s interpretations were losing t h e i r v a l i d i t y , but further that the number of things we "could know for sure" was getting smaller, a great psychological and philoso-phyical viod descended. Science, with i t s p r i n c i p l e s , methods, and successes, which had l a r g e l y served as the creator of the void, came to f i l l the needs 43. of t h i s quest for c e r t a i n t y with i t s immutable laws and exacting mathematics. I f we could not have God, we could indeed have deus ex machina. This would serve as the background against which the Eng l i s h philosophers who would found c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m would work. We can see, as does Armand A. Maurer, that "English philosophy was dominated by the two towering figures of Locke and Newton. The former l a i d the groundwork for the empiricism that culminated i n Hume; the l a t t e r inspired the century with the v i s i o n of the universe as a Great Machine designed and set in motion by God, and with a s c i e n t i f i c method whose astounding success i n physics seduced philosophers to apply i t to t h e i r own subject."68 We can see the dominant e f f e c t s of science on both the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l theory of human nature and on i t s j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the dominant p o s i t i o n society that the economic system was to receive. Although the formulation of human nature embodied i n the concept of "egoism"—that man i s by nature self-seeking and only self-seeking, was f i r s t postulated by Thomas Hobbes (whose observations were also based on a pse u d o - s c i e n t i f i c psychology) more than a century before, i t i s reasonable to say that the founder of l i b e r a l -economic thought at i t s most p r i m i t i v e stage was Jeremy Bentham and the 69 U t i l i t a r i a n s . The U t i l i t a r i a n s held as a guiding, unifying p r i n c i p l e "that an a c t i o n i s good insofar as i t contributes to the greatest happiness of the greatest number of p e o p l e . " ^ They were convinced and dedicated to the a s s e r t i o n that "at last the moral sciences could be made t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c - -a goal toward which Locke and Hume had been working. Newton had shown how, through the use of the experimental method, physical laws could be discovered that would render i n t e l l i g i b l e a vast number of natural phenomena. Nov/ i t appeared that a uni v e r s a l p r a c t i c a l science of morality could be established by applying the Newtonian method to the phenomena of man's conduct as an i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l being.72 It was from t h i s perspective that Bentham went to work. In attempting to emulate science, Bentham was immediately faced with the problems of o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n and measurement. The steps of his l o g i c , however tenuous, 44. are w e l l known. Man i s by nature a self-seeker of happiness. The r o l e of society i s to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number. With acknowledged help from Helvetius and Baccaria, Bentham concludes that happiness i s the bringing together of a combination of pleasures, and 73 l o g i c a l l y , the minimization of pain. Thus we are graced with the statement that "(n)ature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 74 masters, pain and pleasure." Following Baccaria again, Bentham i s able to break pleasures down into a s e r i e s of dimensions, a term which suggests measurement. On an abstract l e v e l , t h i s allows the moralist to become a c a l c u l a t o r of r i g h t actions. In the Deontology Bentham states Vice may be defined to be a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n of changes: a mistake i n estimating the value of pleasures and pains. It i s f a l s e moral arithmetic; and there i s the consolation of knowing that, by the a p p l i c a t i o n of a r i g h t standard, there are few moral questions which may not be resolved, with an accuracy and a c e r t a i n t y not far removed from mathematical demonstration.?5 But Bentham must face up to p r a c t i c a l consideration. He has s t i l l not provided any p r a c t i c a l , measurable, operator by which he might " s c i e n t i f i c a l l y " compute the hedonistic c a l c u l u s . Driven by the desire to be s c i e n t i f i c above a l l other considerations, Bentham declares that "(p)leasure i t s e l f not being ponderable or measurable, to form an estimate...take the general source, and thence representative of pleasure, v i z . money. We have a c l e a r example here of the e f f e c t i v e p r e s c r i p t i v e force of the s c i e n t i f i c method on the society. It i s indeed only a way of looking at the world. But i t i s , as any epistemology i s , a p a r t i c u l a r method with p a r t i c u l a r p r i n c i p l e s regarding both how one i s to view the x^orld and what meaning such v i s i o n s might have. As such, i t produces a p a r t i c u l a r understanding of the world, and accordingly men w i l l act with some reference of t h e i r understanding. We had stated i n the introduction that epistemology i n e v i t a b l y bore on ontology, but we can see i n t h i s case that the combination of these two 45. (epistemology and ontology) when applied to social and moral understandings, also embody an ideological component. We w i l l speak at length of this in the following chapter. The application of scientific principles affected classical liberal thought in at least two other ways. Science, as has been discussed before, calls for the distinction of judgements of fact and judgements of value. This distinction is demanded by the pragmatic needs of empiricism and quantification. For i t is on this level that the distinction transcends a mere epistemological categorization and becomes a dogmatic ontology. The former would allow for the equality of the components of the fact-value dualism; the latter demands that that which is is that which is observable under controlled conditions, and preferably can be subjected to some form of quantification. This latter point is especially important when we consider the primary role of mathematics and the certainty and prestige they afforded the Newtonian system. Simply put, statements concerning "what i s " can be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y verified and counted, statements of "what ought" cannot. This is important to classical liberalism. Bentham, feeling compelled to make the study of morality sc i e n t i f i c , was constrained to conclude that "(p)rejudice apart, the game of push pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of 77 music and poetry." This statement, of course, astounded most classical liberals, yet judgements of quality were never again in Western society to be held in the esteem they had enjoyed before science had been thrust upon a l l facets of culture. Furthermore, the ramifications of this doctrine were expl i c i t l y and implicitly built into the p o l i t i c a l philosophies which sprang forth from that day, and which are mainstays of contemporary liberalism. If judgements of value, were not absolute, at least to the extent that they could not be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y verified, then they were of necessity relegated to being mere, and in some formulations virtually arbitrary, opinions. This had two 46. p o l i t i c a l meanings. The f i r s t was that there was now no philosophical grounds on which a society could enforce a series of moral imperatives for they were by definition particularistic and could in no way be substantiated as universalistic. This formulation f i t well the needs of the bourgeois class who desired no interference with their economic prerogatives which 78 at the time were in direct opposition to certain traditional moral codes. The second p o l i t i c a l meaning and a corollary to the f i r s t was that there must be means by which individual values are protected from the state and from other citizens. Now no government or individual could have any true moral claim for the validity of his position and thus the justification for such a position to be enforced upon others. The last point to be made in this context is the effect that the notion of a natural but mechanized Newtonian system had on classical liberal thought. The physical sciences had made great inroads into the "natural" order of nature and further into the precise mathematical relationships that seemed to govern the universe. This had two main effects. The f i r s t was that the absolutness of a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y unfeasible theological order could be replaced with the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y verifiable absoluteness of the order of nature. Thus p o l i t i c a l and philosophical discussions could turn to a demythologized version of an old philosophical game—that of natural law. The second effect, is that the notion of setting a world in scientific order, and having i t continue to function perfectly according to natural laws in a deus ex machina fashion, coupled with the reliance of science on method and systemization for results, increased the fervor for the implementation of constitutions and other legal methods as a way toward the setting in motion of the "good society." Surely constitutions are as old as the Greeks, and Cicero may well be the father of codified law, but nonetheless, the 47. advent of the s c i e n t i f i c revolution had set the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l s a f t e r t h i s task with renewed vigor. G. Summary: The L i b e r a l Technocratic Ethos. Two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s above a l l d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s culture from others that have exist e d . F i r s t , i t i s s c i e n t i f i c ; i t concentrates on the domination of man over nature through knowledge and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n . This dominance of men over nature means that we can s a t i s f y more human needs with less *?ork than ever before i n h i s t o r y . This c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our society i s generally recognized. What i s less often recognized i s that t h i s society, l i k e a l l others, i s more than simply an expression of the r e l a t i o n s h i p of man to nature; i t also exemplifies a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p of man to man; namely some men's dominance over other men. A l l our I n s t i t u t i o n s express the way i n which one l o t of men dedicated to c e r t a i n ends impose dominance over other men. Our society i s above a l l the expression of dominance that the large scale c a p i t a l i s t exerts over a l l other persons. And what makes our society something new i n h i s t o r y i s the new ways that these concentrated economic, p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y e l i t e s have of imposing s o c i a l dominance over the i n d i v i d u a l . The paradox indeed i s t h i s ; so great i s the power that society can exert against the i n d i v i d u a l that i t even subjects to dominance those very e l i t e s who seem to r u l e . Thus at t h i s stage of i n d u s t r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n , r ule becomes ever more impersonal, something outside the g r i p of any i n d i v i d u a l . George Grant, Philosophy i n the Mass Age We have set out in t h i s chapter to indicate a p a r t i c u l a r dominant ethos which d i r e c t s the actions of men, t h e i r governments, and t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. We use the term "ethos" because i t r e f e r s to that whole range of ways of viewing the world that i d e n t i f y a group of people i n t h e i r actions.(See the formal d e f i n i t i o n s of "ethos" i n the introduction.) In t h i s sense, the term "ethos" implies an i d e o l o g i c a l component, that i s a component which determines action on the part of the i n d i v i d u a l . We will i d e n t i f y t h i s "ethos" as the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. We indicate t h i s term as such, c e r t a i n l y not for the mere p r o l i f e r a t i o n of jargon, nor simply for convenience i n t h i s discussion, but because the words " l i b e r a l " and "technocratic" have s i g n i f i c a n t meaning to t h i s argument and because when placed with the term "ethos" they represent our a s s e r t i o n of a coherent and s p e c i f i c meaning for t h i s whole. We propose that the name ''t, _ 48. " l i b e r a l technocratic ethos," although encompassing a number of somewhat disparate parts, should have meaning i n the sense that the name C h r i s t i a n i t y , or l i b e r a l i s m , or e x i s t e n t i a l i s m has meaning, a l l of these also combining disparate portions with some uni f y i n g core. The terms " l i b e r a l " and "technocratic" conceptually embody the unifying core of the ethos described here. The meaning of l i b e r a l i s m was discussed i n the previous section. And the term technocracy implies that state of technology manifested i n i t s organizational form, as i t was al s o dealt with in previous sections. More important i s that both terms imply the two dominant features of the ethos which make i t p a r t i c u l a r i n h i s t o r y - i t i s s c i e n t i f i c and i t i s economic. We have seen the primal r o l e of science i n the development of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l thought; and we have a l s o seen the demands of science through technology on organizational structures. But l i b e r a l i s m i s also an economic creed, a creed which from i t s beginnings placed p o s i t i v e emphasis on economic a c t i v i t y and prescribed a kind of ambivalent tolerance for other forms of a c t i v i t y . The technocracy i s the p r i n c i p l e s of science writ large i n the economic system. We must be prepared to appreciate the dominance of science and of economics i n the meaning of the l i b e r a l techno-c r a t i c ethos. Yet as we look back on h i s t o r y , t h i s i s much as i t had to be. Scarcity was the h i s t o r i c a l imperative and enemy. The economic system was the b a t t l e -f i e l d . Science i n i t s applied form, technology, was the weapon that could win. It i s t h i s predominant economic component which gives the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i t s p a r t i c u l a r a f f i r m a t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l meaning. For unlike other s o c i a l philosophies, ideologies, or r e l i g i o n s , it's economic component engages each i n d i v i d u a l i n i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l prerogatives as a matter of t h e i r d a i l y struggle for existence. It i s not only an abstract i d e a l , not only the desirable l i f e s t y l e , but that l i f e s t y l e i n t o x^hich everyone i s cast by 49. merely being born i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. There are, i n e f f e c t , no laymen i n the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos; we are a l l clergy, p r i e s t s , nuns, ministers, evangelists, and a c t i v i s t s i n i t s teaching by the fact of our mere p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the society. 50. CHAPTER THREE: THE AFFIRMATIVE CHARACTER OF THE LIBERAL TECHNOCRATIC ETHOS We have, thus f a r , spoken concerning ithe nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i n terms of what we have i d e n t i f i e d , defined, and have chosen to c a l l the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. We desire i n t h i s chapter to elaborate t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i n terms of the p r e s c r i p t i v e implications of t h i s ethos for our society. But here we must be more s p e c i f i c . In the remainder of t h i s t h e s i s , we would l i k e to speak of the p a r t i c u l a r " a f f i r m a t i v e " character of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos.* The word " a f f i r m a t i v e " has been chosen c a r e f u l l y . The d i c t i o n a r y defines " a f f i r m a t i v e " i n the following manner. adj. affirming; saying that i t i s true; answering "yes." n. 1. a word or expression i n d i c a t i n g assent or agreement. 2. the side upholding the proposition being debated.^9 The l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s not only a f f i r m a t i v e , but also formative i n character. This i s , of course, an academic truism. People are l a r g e l y products of t h e i r environment, they are conditioned by t h e i r surroundings, they are s o c i a l i z e d by t h e i r m i l i e u . We a l l know and accept some version of t h i s argument. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i s that the formative character of our present culture manifests i t s e l f i n an a f f i r m a t i v e way— that i s the culture, dominated as i t i s by the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos, forms i t s c i t i z e n s so as to a f f i r m i t s e l f . Put d i f f e r e n t l y , the nature of * The use of the word "a f f i r m a t i v e " i n conjunction with "ethos" or " c u l t u r e " should not be confused with the concept of culture known as " a f f i r m a t i v e " as developed by Herbert Marcuse i n a 1937 a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d , "The A f f i r m a t i v e Character of Culture." Although I admit the i n s p i r a t i o n provided by that a r t i c l e for my p a r t i c u l a r use of that term, I use the term d i f f e r e n t l y , and mine i s a very d i f f e r e n t though not contrary argument to that of Professor Marcuse. His argument can be found i n a p u b l i c a t i o n of h i s e a r l y German essays e n t i t l e d Negations. 51. the society mediates against i t s own understanding and transcendence.* This i s because of the nature of the c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p of the society to those, i t s c i t i z e n s , who must view i t . For, as we have seen, the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos, i s both a p a r t i c u l a r kind of society and a p a r t i c u l a r way of viewing society; and when these two components are reunited, the e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t i s that v i r t u a l l y a l l judgements and observations regarding the society, i n the largest sense, serve to a f f i r m that society. Advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i s p a r t i c u l a r i n hi s t o r y because the ethos i s manifested i n the economic system i n which everyone, whether through the production process, the consumption process, the media, education, or even the arts and r e l i g i o n , i s engaged. In t h i s way, the p a r t i c u l a r philosophy which permeates the ethos, or at least some version of that philosophy, i s inculcated into each and every i n d i v i d u a l — t h a t i s , v i r t u a l l y no one, who would consider his p l i g h t , can consider i t i n terms and logic other than the terms and l o g i c of that p l i g h t . The precee'ding paragraph demands further e x p l i c a t i o n . The c i r c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p between the formative character of a society and the af f i r m a t i v e response of i t s c i t i z e n s as a r e s u l t of the psychological r e l a t i o n s h i p of perception, experience, and cognition i s not restrained to advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, but rather i s common to a l l s o c i e t i e s . Nor i s i t unusual for the given s o c i e t a l ethos to f i n d i t s roots i n the economic system; t h i s r e l a t i o n -ship i s afforded i n basic Marxist materialism and i s f a c i l i t a t e d i n our anthropological scheme. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t and d i f f e r e n t i n advanced * Following Herbert Marcuse, I c i t e his usage of the term "transcend" and "transcendence" as he defines them i n One-Dimensional Man, pg. x i . "The terms 'transcend' and 'transcendence' are used throughout i n the empirical, c r i t i c a l sense: they designate tendencies i n theory and prac t i c e which, i n a given society, 'overshoot' the established universe of discourse and a c t i o n toward i t s h i s t o r i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s ( r e a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s ) . " 8 0 52. i n d u s t r i a l society i s the extent of these two r e l a t i o n s h i p s . This quantitative increase i n extent makes for a quantitative d i f f e r e n c e . When we re f e r to the economic nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, we mean far more than the h i s t o r i c a l fact that men have organized themselves to f i g h t t h e i r b a t t l e against fundamental s c a r c i t y , and that t h i s technological organization has been primal to the development of the rest of cu l t u r e . What we mean i n the case of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i s that economic considera-t i o n s and prerogatives implicate v i r t u a l l y every facet of the cult u r e . F i r s t , the array of things which are treated as commodities are much greater than i n any other previous society. The media which provide information i n the complex society are under the d i r e c t supervision of economic i n t e r e s t s and must compete and censure i t s e l f for, i t s audiences the same as any commodity. Leisure i s that which i s purchased, whether i t be i n the form of a t e l e v i s i o n , camping equipment, t r a v e l expenses, or paid vacations. Entertainment--radio, t e l e v i s i o n , movies, music, a l l are t a i l o r e d l i k e products to t h e i r sales material on the market. Art i s mass produced and i s also regulated according to aggregate de s i r e s . Movies, books, music, painting, a l l of these which reach any proportion of the public are regulated by economic concerns and are thus adjusted i n form and content to s u i t these needs and are therefore deprived of t h e i r autonomous a r t i s t i c q u a l i t i e s . The economic system i s further extended i n that the having of a l l these i s reward for the d i l i g e n t worker who cooperates with the system unquestion-i n g l y . His status, prestige, and security are measured for himself and others i n terms of these commodities. Furthermore, not only can he get everything he "needs" from the economic system, but the complexity of the system and the demands i t places on h i s time and mind, often prevent him from a t t a i n i n g those few things he once could provide for himself. Those crea t i v e acts he might perform are furthermore, the rewards for the 53. d i l i g e n t worker who can a f f o r d h i s hobby shop. We w i l l discuss and elaborate these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the mass economic society again i n t h i s study. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t here i s the extent of the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of economic l o g i c , a c t i v i t y , and prerogatives i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. If we look to, for example, Medieval society, we would surely fin d the masses engaged i n economic a c t i v i t y to the extent that they attempted to procure material substance from the land. They may have even engaged i n li m i t e d mercantile a c t i v i t y . But much of t h e i r a c t i v i t y , t h e i r s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n , t h e i r world view came from sources e n t i r e l y "other" to economic considerations. Their l e i s u r e , t h e i r communications, t h e i r r e l i g i o u s and su p e r s t i t i o u s b e l i e f s , these a l l set outside of an economic context (except i n the fact that economic conditions might determine t h e i r class p o s i t i o n and therefore those portions of the s o c i e t a l melieu which they experienced). To be sure, t h e i r view of t h e i r society was conditioned by the nature of that society, but t h e i r s o c i e t a l environment was not dominated by a unifying ethos, but rather by a p l u r a l i t y of influences. Only i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society does a disperate but integrated ethos, dominated by two interconnected developments--science and economics, implicate the whole of society and render i t "one-dimensional" i n the sense we have set f o r t h above. We s h a l l now describe further and speak to the meaning of t h i s monolithic nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. We s h a l l look at a number of manifestations of t h i s dominant trend i n society which serves to disguise i t s i d e o l o g i c a l and a f f i r m a t i v e character. A. The Myth of N e u t r a l i t y : Technology and the End of Ideology. (T)he technocracy e a s i l y eludes a l l t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l categories. Indeed i t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the technocracy to render i t s e l f i d e o l o g i c a l l y i n v i s i b l e . Its assumptions about r e a l i t y and i t s values become as unobtrusively pervasive as the a i r we breathe. While d a i l y p o l i t i c a l argument continues within and between the c a p i t a l i s t and c o l l e c t i v i s t s o c i e t i e s of the world, the technocracy increases and consolidates i t s power i n both as a 54. t r a n s p o l i t i c a l phenomenon following the dict a t e s of i n d u s t r i a l e f f i c i e n c y , r a t i o n a l i t y , and necessity...The angry debates of conservative and l i b e r a l , r a d i c a l and reactionary touch everything except the technocracy, because the technocracy i s not generally perceived as a p o l i t i c a l phenomenon i n our advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . It holds the place, rather, of a grand c u l t u r a l imperative which i s beyond question, beyond discussion. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture It has been popular, i n the best of the conventional academic wisdom, to assert that there has been an "end of ideology" i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . I n i t i a l l y , the "end of ideology" p o s i t i o n was formulated i n response to observations regarding the waning impact i n the West of re v o l u t i o n -ary Marxism and Utopian socialism. Supporting observations included the general "disillusionment of the l a s t f o r t y years with mass movements, with 81 revolu t i o n and with the s o c i a l i s t - c l a s s l e s s Utopia projected by Marxism," the general d i s c r e d i t e d p o s i t i o n that Marxism-Leninism has come to have since World War II i n the West, the propensity of o r i g i o n a l l y r a d i c a l p a r t i e s to take on reformist garb as they come into v i a b l e competition i n the p o l i t i c a l system, and the fac t that the r i s i n g western standard of l i v i n g had l a r g e l y ended the material s u f f e r i n g of the lower classes even i f i t had maintained 82 cl a s s and class power r e l a t i o n s h i p s . The p o s i t i o n , of course, came complete with supplementary observations and explanations which we w i l l not go into here, for our quarrel i s not with the p a r t i c u l a r s of the argument, but with the universe of discourse within which these discussions during the F i f t i e s and S i x t i e s took place. The "end of ideology" p o s i t i o n did not, of course, go unchallenged. A main problem was one of d e f i n i t i o n . Chaim I. Waxman, i n his introduction to The End of Ideology Debate, states that " ( t ) o a large extent the end-of-ideology debate i s due more to the lack of a common d e f i n i t i o n of the term "ideology" than to a disagreement over basic issues. Almost no two writers 55. 83 maintain the same d e f i n i t i o n . " Of course t h i s problem of d e f i n i t i o n was a fundamental one. Depending on the d e f i n i t i o n and then i n turn the h i s t o r i c a l evidence, the debate ranged from whether i n fact there had been an "end of ideology" to whether or not there had been a "beginning of ideology", and over most of the distance i n between. ' Yet, i n summarizing of the "end-of-ideology" l i t e r a t u r e , we can seem to abstract some commonality of d e f i n i t i o n from among those offered. There seems to be two common threads running throughout most t r a d i t i o n a l and contemporary d e f i n i t i o n s of "ideology". They are f i r s t embodied i n the notion of Weltanschauung. and the second i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of thought to a c t i o n . We see the notion of w h o l i s t i c world view represented i n v i r t u a l l y a l l d e f i n i t i o n s of the term. Raymond Aaron sees ideology as "a pseudo-84 systematic formulation of a t o t a l v i s i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l world." Edward S h i l l s states that "(i)deologies are characterized by a high degree of e x p l i c i t n e s s of formulation over a very wide range of objects with which 85 they deal." Daniel B e l l sees ideology i n i t s largest meaning as "an a l l -i n c l u s i v e system of comprehensive r e a l i t y ( i t ) seeks to transform the „87 86 whole way of l i f e . " It i s also seen as " a l l - i n c l u s i v e " i n the d i c t i o n a r y "the doctrines, opinions, or way of thinking of an i n d i v i d u a l , c l a s s , etc The pragmatic aspect of the term "ideology" i s also r e f l e c t e d i n most d e f i n i t i o n s . Henry David Aiken sees ideology to address i t s e l f "to the guiding p r i n c i p l e s , practices and aspirations by which p o l i t i c a l l y organized 88 s o c i e t i e s ought to be governed." Daniel B e l l states that "(i)deology i s the conversion of ideas into s o c i a l l e v e r s . . . . I t i s the commitment to the 89 consequence of ideas..." Joseph LaPolambara p r e c i s e l y r e l a t e s the concept of ideology to ideas and actions. "Ideology...tends to specify a set of values that are more or less coherent and that seek to l i n k given patterns of a c t i o n to the achievement or maintenance of a future, or e x i s t i n g , state of 56. 90 a f f a i r s . " We have, then, the two dominant and accepted common denominators of the various notions of the meaning of the term "ideology", and we accept them as they stand. We w i l l return to them s h o r t l y . Waxman suggests that over and above the problem of d e f i n i t i o n , "(t)he end-of-ideology thesis involves two basic premises. The f i r s t , and i n t h i s most agree, i s the statement of actual s i t u a t i o n ; namely, the absence of 91 i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c s i n modern i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . " The debate, when not concerned with d e f i n i t i o n s , was mainly conducted over the second major premise of the end-of-ideology t h e s i s , that of an "at least i m p l i c i t . . . 92 value-judgement about t h i s r e a l i t y . " The argument has ranged over evalua-tions concerning advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s and l i b e r a l democracies, Lipset remarked i n his chapter of P o l i t i c a l Man devoted to the debate to the e f f e c t that "democracy i s not only or even primarily a means through which d i f f e r e n t groups can a t t a i n t h e i r ends or seek a good society; i t i s 93 the good society i t s e l f i n operation", and that "the fundamental p o l i t i c a l 94 problems of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution have been solved." The debate ranged also over evaluations concerning ideology i t s e l f as a s o c i a l f o r c e — 95 "ideology can only serve to hinder the progress we are making." Our thoughts concerning the q u a l i t y of our society should become clear i n the context of t h i s paper, and a discussion of the value of ideology as such i s not within our immediate i n t e r e s t . We have summarized the discussion, however, to substantiate the scope of the conventional academic universe of discourse on such matters and to cl e a r up our usage of the term "ideology". We w i l l return to these matters shortly. What i s of immediate i n t e r e s t to us i s that which the conventional academic universe of discourse has overlooked. No one i n the discussion, which took place during the decade i n which technological and organizational expansion was taking place at an exponential rate, viewed the d r i v i n g l o g i c 57. and organizational prerogative of the technocracy as having i d e o l o g i c a l content. Some, i n re b u t t a l to the assertion that i d e o l o g i c a l p o l i t i c s were on the wane because of the disappearance of clas s based calamities such as general cl a s s e x p l o i t a t i o n or poverty, asserted that the impact of the technology would create new clas s problems such as the displacement of c e r t a i n working cl a s s jobs by automation and thus -?ould provide a base for new p o l i t i c a l ideologies. Yet none saw f i t to see the technology i t s e l f and i t s p r i n c i p l e s as ideology. Edgar Z. Friedenberg remarked that "(w)ith rare and prophetic exception,...most Western wri t e r s , even when unsympathetic to the e f f e c t s of tec h n i c a l progress, have regarded technology i t s e l f as morally 36 n e u t r a l , though seductive i n i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s and subject to dangerous abuse. Let us look at the accepted d e f i n i t i o n a l components of the term "ideology" and see i f the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos might so apply. The f i r s t component of the d e f i n i t i o n was embodied i n the notion of Weltansehauung. Who can deny the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos a coherent and w h o l i s t i c Weltanschauung. It prescribes a theory of human nature ( i n f i n i t e consumerism), a set of personal motivations (economic and orga n i z a t i o n a l ) , a dominant imperative ( s c a r c i t y ) , a set of imperatives which are closer at hand (production, consumption, e f f i c i e n c y ) , a s p e c i f i c epistemology (empiricism) and r e s u l t i n g ontology, and general c r i t e r i a by which one can evaluate his personal l i f e and the project of hi s society (usefulness, economic pr o d u c t i v i t y , e f f i c i e n c y , l e v e l of aff l u e n c e ) . And what of the second d e f i n i t i o n a l component, the conversion of ideas into a c t i v i t y . We find i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society that the d r i v i n g ethos holds e f f e c t i v e l y a most au t h o r i t a r i a n dominance over the actions of men. The primacy of the technocracy and the economy i n v i r t u a l l y a l l a c t i v i t i e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s i s undeniable. A l l a c t i v i t y , from employment i n the production process to the consumption of the systems goods, from one's educational prerogatives to one's external i d e n t i t y , from one's sexuality to the employment of the mass media, 5 8 , a l l are held under the sway of economic and l a r g e l y technocratic prerogatives and p r i n c i p l e s . I f we look at the d e f i n i t i o n s which were provided as a part of the end of ideology debate, we fin d those also to confirm our assertion that we must view the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos as p o l i t i c a l ideology. We have surely seen the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos to manifest i t s e l f as "a pseudo-systematic formulation of a t o t a l v i s i o n of the h i s t o r i c a l world," and i t i s a "formulation over a very wide range of objects with which they d e a l . " Daniel B e l l ' s d e f i n i t i o n of ideology speaks better to the notion of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos than we have been able to thus far s t a t e — " an a l l -i n c l u s i v e system of comprehensive reality...(which) seeks to transform the whole way of l i f e . " As to the d e f i n i t i o n a l component of ideology which stresses the conversion of ideas into a c t i v i t y , we also see our notion of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos to meet the test--"the guiding p r i n c i p l e s , p r a c t i c e s , and aspirations by which p o l i t i c a l l y organized s o c i e t i e s ought to be governed." Or, "a set of values more or less coherent and that seek to l i n k given patterns of action to the achievement or maintenance of a future, or e x i s t i n g , state of a f f a i r s . " Edward S h i l l s states that "(c)omplete i n d i v i d u a l subservience to the ideology i s demanded of those who accept i t , and i t i s regarded as e s s e n t i a l and imperative that t h e i r conduct be completely 97 permeated by i t . " Here again, when we look back to the organizational demands for conformity and compliance (which we w i l l further develop i n the following section of t h i s chapter) and when we consider the structured economic penalties for not p a r t i c i p a t i n g f u l l y i n t h i s economic ideology, we understand t h i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n of ideology to also be met. The l i b e r a l technocratic ethos as ideology i s l a r g e l y i n v i s i b l e because of i t s very predominance i n a l l facets of l i f e . Few can think of a l t e r n a t i v e s (for a number of reasons to be discussed i n the course of t h i s chapter) 59. and therefore the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos appears more "na t u r a l " and ine v i t a b l e than i d e o l o g i c a l . Nowhere i n the l i t e r a t u r e do we f i n d that "ideology" need be a minority p o s i t i o n , however, when i t i s v i r t u a l l y u n i v e r s a l l y accepted i n some form or another i t s i d e o l o g i c a l d e f i n i t i o n merges with the d e f i n i t i o n s of ethos as were provided i n the introduction. This i s why we have chosen the term ethos as opposed to "ideology"; yet t h i s does not mean that ethos does not display an i d e o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r - - i t can be seen i n fact to be ideology writ large i n the society. Herbert Marcuse remarks that ( t ) h i s absorption of ideology into r e a l i t y does not, however, s i g n i f y the "end of ideology." On the contrary, i n a s p e c i f i c sense advanced i n d u s t r i a l culture i s more i d e o l o g i c a l than i t s predecessor, inasmuch as today the ideology i s the process of production i t s e l f . Nor i s t h i s ideology (ethos) any more apparent outside the academic sphere. The following i s an excerpt from the Yale U n i v e r s i t y Commencement Speech, given by President John F. Kennedy i n June of 1962. Today these old sweeping issues have l a r g e l y disappeared. The ce n t r a l domestic problems of our time are more subtle and less simple. They r e l a t e not to basic clashes of philosophy or ideology, but to ways and means of reaching common goals--to research for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate issues... What i s at stake i n our economic decisions today i s not some grand warfare of r i v a l ideologies which w i l l sweep the country with passion, but the p r a c t i c a l management of a modern economy. What we need are not labels and c l i c h e s but more basic discussion of the sophisticated and t e c h n i c a l questions involved i n keeping a great economic machinery moving ahead... I am suggesting that the problems of f i s c a l and monetary p o l i c y i n the S i x t i e s as opposed to the kinds of problems we faced i n the T h i r t i e s demand subtle challenges for which t e c h n i c a l answers--not p o l i t i c a l answers--must be provided.^9 Kenneday here not only displays agreement with the end-of-ideology t h e s i s , but also demonstrates the extent to which the conventional wisdom i s swaddeled i n the r h e t o r i c and r e a l i t i e s of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. Theodore Roszak suggests that the great secret of the. technocracy l i e s i n i t s capacity to convince us of three i n t e r l o c k i n g premises, and the 60. Kennedy address shows h i s acceptance of these premises. 1. That the v i t a l needs of man are...purely t e c h n i c a l i n character. Meaning: the requirements of our humanity y i e l d wholly to some manner of formal analysis which can be c a r r i e d out by s p e c i a l i s t s possessing c e r t a i n impenetrable s k i l l s and which can then be tran s l a t e d by them d i r e c t l y into a congeries of s o c i a l and economic programs, personnel management procedures, merchandise, and mechanical gadgetry. I f the problem does not have a t e c h n i c a l s o l u t i o n , i t must not be a r e a l problem. It i s but an i l l u s i o n . . . a figment born of some regressive c u l t u r a l tendency. 2. That t h i s formal (and highly esoteric) analysis of our needs has nox-j achieved 99 per cent completion. Thus, with minor hitches and anags on the part of i r r a t i o n a l elements i n our midst, the prerequisites of human f u l f i l l m e n t have a l l but been s a t i s f i e d . It i s t h i s assumption which leads to the conclusion that wherever s o c i a l f r i c t i o n appears i n the technocracy, i t must be due to what i s c a l l e d a :,breakdown i n communication." For where human happiness has been so p r e c i s e l y c a l i b r a t e d and where the powers that be are so u t t e r l y w e l l intentioned, controversy could not possibly derive from a substantive issue, but only from misunderstanding. Thus we need only s i t down and reason together and a l l x ^ i l l be w e l l . 3. That the experts who have fathomed our heart's desires and \*ho alone can continue providing for our needs, the experts x7ho r e a l l y know what t h e i r t a l k i n g about, a l l happen to be on the o f f i c i a l p a y r o l l of the state and/or corporate structure. C l e a r l y these premises are accepted both as good and nat u r a l . They are also c l e a r l y the edicts of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. What i s most s t r i k i n g i s the way these premises are considered to be neutral indeed, i f they are not so i n v i s i b l e as to not be considered at a l l . They have no i d e o l o g i c a l content, lie must nox-7 examine why i t might be that the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos xjhich i d e o l o g i c a l l y dominates advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s goes v i r t u a l l y unnoticed and i s t o t a l l y accepted i n the conventional academic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l discourse of our society. A f i r s t reason for the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos and i t s i d e o l o g i c a l e f f e c t i s i t s utter pervasiveness i n the society. In that i t i s both s c i e n t i f i c and economic ( e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r ) i t dominates most of human a c t i v i t y . Furthermore, as we have seen, t h i s state of a f f a i r s has developed gradually and h i s t o r i c a l l y i n response to r e a l u n i v e r s a l needs, as opposed to t r a d i t i o n a l movements which x;e have come to associate with ideology such as communism, i t s revolutionary inception, and i t s working c l a s s 61. cant. Indeed, the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s so all-encompassing, i t incorporates v i r t u a l l y a l l thinkable a l t e r n a t i v e s ; and by the nature of t h i s u n i v e r s a l i t y , i t appears to be more in e v i t a b l e than ideolqgical--the l a t t e r term generally r e f e r r i n g to some p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e to the exclusion of other a l t e r n a t i v e s . The key to the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the i d e o l o g i c a l content of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s that t h i s ethos subsumes a l l t r a d i t i o n a l i n d u s t r i a l ideologies. For i f we look b r i e f l y at the two great advanced i n d u s t r i a l powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, we fin d them to d i f f e r g r e atly i n p o l i t i c a l ideology. Yet in advanced i n d u s t r i a l ideologies they d i f f e r very l i t t l e . They both measure the q u a l i t y of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l -economic systems i n terms of productive output; they both maximize t h i s output through the i n s t i t u t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y i n the i n d u s t r i a l system; they both r e l y extensively on bureaucratic organizational techniques to f a c i l i t a t e these a c t i v i t i e s , and as the American corporate economy continues to stress e f f i c i e n c y rather than p r o f i t as a f i r s t l e v e l of consciousness motivation, both advanced i n d u s t r i a l economies w i l l become more a l i k e . Ue have seen i n the previous chapter, that a technological economy demands p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , c o n t r o l over i t s functions, and security from uncertainty, regardless of the p o l i t i c a l philosophy of i t s government. Galbraith r e f l e c t s upon t h i s point: In the Soviet-type economies, prices are extensively managed by the state. Production i s not i n response to market demand but given by the o v e r a l l plan. In the western economies, markets are dominated by great firms. These e s t a b l i s h prices and seek to insure a demand for what they have to s e l l . . . I t i s not the s o c i a l i s t s . It i s advanced technology and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of men and process that t h i s requires and the r e s u l t i n g commitment of time and c a p i t a l . These make the market work badly when the need i s for greatly enhanced r e l i a b i l i t y - -when planning i s e s s e n t i a l . The modern large corporation and the modern apparatus of s o c i a l i s t planning are variant accommodations of the same need.^02 Given that economic a c t i v i t y i s the dominant a c t i v i t y of the c i t i z e n s and governments of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and given 62. that economic progress i s the device by which i n d i v i d u a l s and these governments measure t h e i r worth,* and given that i t i s to t h i s end that the c i t i z e n s of both nations d a i l y devote t h e i r l i v e s , we can reasonably say that a common ethos, which i s subsumed by a l l advanced i n d u s t r i a l ideologies, i s , i n imporant ways, more fundamental an ideology than those normally discussed i n conventional p o l i t i c a l and academic discourse. Our desire here i s not to gloss over important d i s t i n c t i o n s between the communist and democratic free world. And we are not, i n t h i s study, i n a p o s i t i o n to discuss the r e l a t i o n s h i p of c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m to Marxist thought. The term "technocratic" more c l e a r l y and t r u e l y applies to both the east and the west than does the term " l i b e r a l . " Yet, when we speak of ideology of p o l i t i c s we must transcend the universe of discourse which l i m i t s us to discussions of communism and l i b e r a l democracy, centralism and r e g i o n a l -ism, overt p o l i t i c a l repression and c i v i l r i g h t s . We must concern ourselves with the i d e o l o g i c a l and a u t h o r i t a r i a n nature of the technocracy and i t s accompanying l o g i c and discuss what i t means to the freedom and development of i n d i v i d u a l s . In the same way that we have t r a d i t i o n a l l y considered the r o l e of such things as the rig h t of kings, despotism, and p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy to e f f e c t the q u a l i t y of l i f e , we must now consider the r o l e of the s c i e n t i f i c ' and economic nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s . A second reason for the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos has also to due with the economic nature of i t s i d e o l o g i c a l component. The * The d i s t i n c t i o n between measuring one's worth or the worth of one's nation and what one would r e a l l y consider to be the substance of that worth must be acknowledged. C l e a r l y , i t could be argued that economic progress i s often treated as the pre-condition for the r e a l i z a t i o n of other goals--national influence and prestige, the eradication of poverty, etc., and we would agree. The point to be made here i s , however, that the measurement of these goals is. considered i n terms of economic progress, and therefore r.hese (economic) ends are pursued as such i n the d a i l y l i v e s of i n d i v i d u a l s and nations. 63. things of the economic system which we work to produce and aspire to consume are the material representatives of the ethos i t s e l f . That i s , the buying and s e l l i n g of goods and services--the ordinary, and seemingly n e u t r a l a c t i v i t i e s of every day l i f e , i s the buying and s e l l i n g of the systems—the economic becomes p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l i n t h i s sense. For the economic system must be seen to be inseparable i n a s i g n i f i c a n t sense from the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l systems. Marcuse states that "(t)he productive apparatus and the goods and services which i t produces ' s e l l ' or impose the s o c i a l system as a 103 whole." Furthermore, as the products of the system become more u n i v e r s a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d throughout the society, they also, l i k e the technocracy which produced them, become to appear natural and i n e v i t a b l e rather than p a r t i c u l a r . "(A)s these b e n e f i c i a l products become ava i l a b l e to more in d i v i d u a l s i n more s o c i a l classes, the introduction they carry ceases to be p u b l i c i t y ; i t , , . . , ,,104 becomes a way of l i f e . " The t h i r d and most d i r e c t l y p h i losophical reason for the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos has to do with the "technique" nature of that ethos. Technique i s not introduced here as a new facet of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos but rather as a summarizing concept to r e f e r to that whole of methods and procedures which dominate the philosophy of science, the technology and i t s f a c i l i t a t i n g organizational form, bureaucracy (taken together, the technocracy), and a force which i s r e f l e c t e d i n the procedural-lism of p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m . Jaques E l l u l , uses "technique" to r e f e r not only to the machinery of the technocracy, but also to "any complex means for a t t a i n i n g a predetermined r e s u l t . Thus i t converts spontaneous and u n r e f l e c t -ive behavior that i s deliberate and r a t i o n a l i z e d . " ^ ^ ^ Technique then i s that whole complex of machinery, expertise, organization, and behavior patterns which work i n a d i s c i p l i n e d and e f f i c i e n t way to a t t a i n a, given goal. It i s not synonymous with any p a r t i c u l a r technique, but r e f e r s rather 64. to that whole range of techniques employed. The l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s dominated by technique which i s considered as means to an end, indeed the best means to any end. Therefore the conventional wisdom reads that philosophers and p o l i t i c i a n s and "the people" decide what i t i s we are to do, and technique i s simply that r a t i o n a l i z e d method to these ends. Technique, then, i s considered neutral i n our society. This view of the n e u t r a l i t y of method i s t i e d to the debt of both the technocracy and l i b e r a l i s m to science. Science i t s e l f i s a method; i t i s a way of accomplishing ends, i n i t i a l l y the comprehension of observable r e a l i t y , and i n i t s pragmatic technological form, of any end to which s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s can be r a t i o n a l l y applied. Secondly, the separa-t i o n of ends and means can be seen to be analogous to the s c i e n t i f i c separation of judgements of fact and judgements of value. Technique i s subject to s c i e n t i f i c manipulation, i t i s d i r e c t l y part of the universe of f a c t s . Ends, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the sense of ultimate ends are la r g e l y considered to be i n the universe of values. Science can only speak to the universe of fa c t s , 106 and i n some formulations serves to defame the universe of values. Because society i s so dominated by i t s reverence for science, we can understand the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of technique and the accompanying r e l e g a t i o n of the contempla-t i o n of ends to the a r b i t r a r y . Thus the s i t u a t i o n develops i n which only the neutral a c t i v i t i e s of the society can have meaning, only the means can be meaningful ends. The neutral means can become ends i n a number of other ways, some of which we have discussed i n the previous chapter. The e f f i c i e n t completion of any complex task i s so dependent upon adherence to technique for i t s accomplishment that as a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t p rerequisite to the end, the means becomes the only end one need worry about. Furthermore, Blau states 65. Preoccupied with perfecting e f f i c i e n t means for achieving objectives, we tend to forget why we want to reach these goals. Since we neglect to c l a r i f y the basic values that determine why some objectives are preferable to others, objectives lose t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e , and t h e i r pursuit becomes an end i n i t s e l f . To understand advanced i n d u s t r i a l society we must understand the importance of t h i s myth of n e u t r a l i t y which envelops those structures and i n s t i t u t i o n s which dominate i t and which renders void of i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l content by conceiving t h e i r r o l e as having no p o s i t i v e meaning o t h e r than that of being f u n c t i o n a l to other long forgotten objectives of the society. We best proceed to examples here. Some of us perceive a c r i s i s i n u n i v e r s i t y education. A t y p i c a l comment of the l i b e r a l academic regarding the future of the u n i v e r s i t y i s that what the r a d i c a l students want i s to p o l i t i c i z e the u n i v e r s i t y , to make i t not an arena of open inquiry, but rather to teach students a p a r t i c u l a r i d e o l o g i c a l position--a dogma for a c t i o n . I m p l i c i t i n t h i s statement and statements l i k e them i s that mythical model of the neutral u n i v e r s i t y * - i n the best of the l i b e r a l -technocratic t r a d i t i o n of "neutral" institutions--where the open and free exchange of ideas takes place. It i s not, so the argument goes, an i n s t i t u t i o n of ideologies, but a place where one studies (not an end but a means) ideologies. I t s " n e u t r a l i t y " i s v i o l a t e d by i n d o c t r i n a t i o n of any kind. Neither B i l l y Grahm nor K a r l Marx are to make campus conversions; the u n i v e r s i t y would no longer be n e u t r a l . But l e t us look at the "legitimate", "neutral", "non-ideological" a c t i v i t i e s of the u n i v e r s i t y . The u n i v e r s i t y i n North America i s an i n t e g r a l part of the dominant s o c i e t a l ethos. It i s the t r a i n i n g gound for the l i f e p o sitions within the corporate c a p i t a l i s t , l i b e r a l - t e c h n o c r a t i c ethos. It can be seen i n no other t e r m s . B o t h the underlying motivations to go to u n i v e r s i t y and to succeed there are steeped i n terms of bourgeois success and professionalism. The demands of technology and the economy for t e c h n i c a l 66. expertise i s the leading reason provided to taxpayers by p o l i t i c i a n s for the existence of the u n i v e r s i t y . Colleges and d i s c i p l i n e s within the u n i v e r s i t y are exclusive and p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c ; p a r t l y to f a c i l i t a t e the employment market, and p a r t l y to maintain meritocratic g u i l d norms, which are themselves a product of bureaucratic l o g i c . That academic n e u t r a l i t y which was i d e a l l y maintained i n c l a s s i c a l thought was the n e u t r a l i t y of contemplative r a t i o n a l i t y - - t h e c r i t i c i s m of wise men, not of those trained soley i n instrumentalities and technique. Today the u n i v e r s i t y i s a place 109 where one learns how to "get on" and not where he i s "getting on t o . " And the mesh of the u n i v e r s i t y with the ethos of the larger s o c i e t y i s more than coincidence. To maintain that the very i n s t i t u t i o n which the society holds as necessary preparation for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the business of that society i s neutral or non-ideological i s nonsense, unlass one would maintain that the society i t s e l f i s also p o l i t i c a l l y non-ideological, and we have already spoken at length to that point. However, we w i l l speak to t h i s point from another angle. I f p o l i t i c s i s the "authoritative a l l o c a t i o n of values within a s o c i e t y " and i f by a u t h o r i t a -t i v e we mean some e f f e c t i v e as opposed to procedural d e f i n i t i o n — t h a t i s , we define a u t h o r i t a t i v e as the e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t i n g propensity for a c t i o n on and/or reception of said values, then there i s a l o t of p o l i t i c k i n g going on i n our society. Given that the dominant ethos of a society and i t s r e s u l t i n g a c t i v i t i e s (or draw the causal arrow the other way i f you l i k e ) does not involve the only v i a b l e h i s t o r i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n an age when the grand h i s t o r i c a l imperative, s c a r c i t y , i s a l l but removed from western man), then the content of that c u l t u r e , that ethos, i s i d e o l o g i c a l . A u n i v e r s i t y which serves the function of preparation and support for that ethos i s i n e v i t a b l y i d e o l o g i c a l . To suggest the n e u t r a l i t y of the status quo and imply that the Subversive i s of necessity i d e o l o g i c a l i s to reverse 67, and abort the h i s t o r i c a l meaning of those concepts and t h e i r i n t e r -r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Such an abortion i s both incorrect and repressive. There are of course many more and perhaps better examples of the myth of i d e o l o g i c a l n e u t r a l i t y i n our society. (The u n i v e r s i t y discussions are the ones we are the closest to.) V i r t u a l l y none of the leading i n s t i t u t i o n s i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society lay claims to making e f f e c t i v e judgements and decisions which e f f e c t people's l i v e s i n a formative way, acts which might contain one or both d e f i n i t i o n a l components of ideology. A l l of them claim to be simply playing out t h e i r roles i n the s o c i e t a l game, acting according to the procedures of the society, simply providing means, simply doing t h e i r job. The ad v e r t i s i n g industry does not provide and reinfo r c e values, i t merely serves an informational function, provides options, and protects consumer sovereignty. Parliaments and congresses do not make moral and e t h i c a l (value) decisions, they merely provide the s e t t i n g for the game c a l l e d the "market place of ideas," and a f f o r d the r e s o l u t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s . The police do not engage i n p o l i t i c a l acts, they merely enforce law and order. Supreme court judges merely interpret the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Physical s c i e n t i s t s do not sanction the arms race, they merely engage i n the academic study of nerve gas. The s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t did not invade the privacy of h i s subject, he was merely engaging i n value free s o c i a l science. The r e a l estate" developer did not e x p l o i t the people by d i v i d i n g a l l of h i s land up into ninety foot l o t s , he was merely employing the method by which he increases h i s p r o f i t s , which i s merely the method by which we are a l l motivated to produce to our c a p a b i l i t i e s , which i s merely the method by which our economic system w i l l produce the most things for a l l of us, including ninety foot l o t s on which to r a i s e four c h i l d r e n . The c i t i z e n r y d i s p l a y t h e i r allegiance to t h i s myth i n t h e i r reaction to a whole range of issues. We weekly read of parents groups outraged that t h e i r c h i l d r e n are 68. being taught anything at a l l substantive beyond technique i n the public schools. Sophomore students of public law are disturbed to find that Supreme Court decisions are i n e v i t a b l y l e g i s l a t i v e . In times of p o l i t i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n the public on r i g h t and l e f t and center i s agitated by media who "suddenly" appear to be taking sides when every journalism student knows that the media are only to present the f a c t s . It i s l i t t l e wonder that we can be t o l d that, "We are only here to celebrate Honor America Day, i t i s not a p o l i t i c a l a c t . " We have discussed the philosophy of science and have seen i t to be a basic epistemological dogma which precludes the meaningfulness of c e r t a i n o n t o l o g i c a l positions—statements of value, judgements of q u a l i t y , and thus the contemplation of ends. We s h a l l speak extensively of t h i s problem i n the remainder of t h i s t h e s i s but we must f i r s t understand the analogous s o c i o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s before we return to the fundamental p h i l o s o p h i c a l ones. We must deal with the r e l a t i o n s h i p of technique to the work process, and of the r e s u l t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p of means to ends. In a simple work s i t u a t i o n , the technique and tools involved are simply that--technique and t o o l s . They merely f a c i l i t a t e a more or less e f f i c i e n t accomplishment of some objective. A shovel i s i n e v i t a b l y relegated to the means for digging a hole. It w i l l not become more important than the desired hole. The worker could a f t e r a l l , probably d i g the hole with a s t i c k or even his hands i f he had to. But l e t us look at a s l i g h t l y more t e c h n i c a l and advanced version of the same task. This time the objective i s to d i g t h e hole where the ground i s too d i f f i c u l t to penetrate with a s t i c k or bare hands. Technology, the shovel, i s not merely an aid here, but a necessity. The shovel now i s at least as important to the worker as i s his task. The procurement of the means i s as necessary and important as the end i t s e l f . Furthermore, i n that the procurement of the shovel i s both necessary 69. and s u f f i c i e n t to,the performance of the task, the i n i t i a l end must be to procure the means. As objectives demand tec h n i c a l apparatus and expertise, t h i s tendency i s magnified many times. Furthermore as the tasks become more complex and demand the int e g r a t i o n of many factions into the production process, organizational technique becomes also a prerequisite for the completion of an end. We have dealt with t h i s i n the previous chapter, but i t must be stressed here i n conjunction with the myth of n e u t r a l i t y and the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the i d e o l o g i c a l content of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. For i t i s the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of technology and technocratic p r i n c i p l e s throughout the society which makes our society p a r t i c u l a r i n h i s t o r y . Our governments and economies d a i l y complete vast and complex tasks which demand technique on every l e v e l of planning and o r g a n i z a t i o n ; ^ Technique i s the prerequisite for the accomplishment of these ends, but also must become and end i n i t s e l f because of the demands i t makes over a l l which i t must c o n t r o l . Because of the complexity of the process for the accomplishment of most advanced i n d u s t r i a l objectives, most i n d i v i d u a l s do not experience that portion of the work process which deals with ends, they are involved only with means. This allows i n d i v i d u a l s to adapt t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n the means process to that of a personal end. But i t also allows them to not be responsible or need"to think about that larger whole of which they are a p a r t — t h e y are simply doing t h e i r job. What i s most s i g n i f i c a n t i s the way i n which technique must form both the outlooks and the action patterns (both c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of ideology) of those whom i t must integrate into i t s process. For even as there i s "one best way" to integrate factions for the accomplishment of any task, there i s "one best way" to integrate the i n d i v i d u a l s who happen to be involved i n those f a c t i o n s . E l l u l states: Technique requires p r e d i c t a b i l i t y and, no l e s s , exactness of 70. p r e d i c t i o n . It i s necessary, then, that technique p r e v a i l over the human being. For technique, t h i s i s a matter of l i f e and death. Technique must reduce man to a t e c h n i c a l animal, the king of the slaves of technique. Human caprice crumbles before t h i s necessity; there can be no human autonomy i n the face of t e c h n i c a l autonomy. The i n d i v i d u a l must be fashioned by techniques, e i t h e r negatively (by the techniques of understanding man) or p o s i t v e l y (by the adaption of man to the t e c h n i c a l framework), i n order to wipe out the blo t s hi s personal determination introduces into the perfect design of the organization.110 We see ourselves then, i n t h i s i n c r e d i b l e s i t u a t i o n i n which the means we have h i s t o r i c a l l y developed to f a c i l i t a t e our ends now shapes us and our world to s u i t i t s ends. Yet because i t s ends are those of t e c h n i q u e — method, procedures, means, i t goes about i t s work s i l e n t l y and almost i n v i s i b l y . At best i t i s a s o c i a l problem, but even here i t w i l l subject i t s e l f to i t s own devices, i t w i l l f i n d t e c h n i c a l solutions to i t s technical and la r g e l y t e c h n i c a l l y created problems. Nor does t h i s s i t u a t i o n maintain i t s e l f within the confines of the economic system; i t permeates and envelopes the p o l i t i c s , leisure,education, and the l i f e patterns of all--technique i s not that which i s i n d u s t r i a l i n our society, it- i s our society. Technique i s the u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o n of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society; yet i t does not manifest i t s e l f as such because i t i s held to have neither i d e o l o g i c a l nor formative implications, i t merely f a c i l i t a t e s our ends, helps to provide o p t i o n s i In excerpts from a book by Robert S. HcNamara, former i n d u s t r i a l leader and Secretary of Defense of the United States, we f i n d him to display utter b e l i e f that the technique of t e c h n i c a l management i s that end which advanced i n d u s t r i a l society must aspire to. Yet sees i t s only f i n a l manifestation to be that of providing options. Some c r i t i c s today worry that our democratic, free s o c i e t i e s are becoming overmanaged. I would argue that just the opposite i s true. As paradoxical as i t may sound, the r e a l threat to democracy comes, not from overmangement, but from undermanagement. To undermanage r e a l i t y i s not to keep free. It i s simply to l e t some force other than reason shape r e a l i t y . That force may be unbrideled emotion; i t may be greed; i t may be agressiveness; i t may be hatred; i t may be ignorance; i t may be i n e r t i a ; i t may be anything other than reason. 71. But whatever i t i s , i f i t i s not reason that rules man, then man f a l l s short of h i s p o t e n t i a l . V i t a l decision making, p a r t i c u l a r l y on p o l i c y matters, must remain at the top. This i s p a r t l y , though not completely, what the top i s f o r . But r a t i o n a l decision-making depends on having a f u l l range of r a t i o n a l options from which to choose, and successful management organizes the enterprise so that process can best take place. It i s the mechanism whereby free men can most e f f i c i e n t l y exercise t h e i r reason, i n i t i a t i v e , c r e a t i v i t y and personal responsi-b i l i t y . The adventurous and immensely s a t i s f y i n g task of an * m e f f i c i e n t organization i s to formulate and organize these options. As i n the Kennedy excerpts, McNamara does not f i n d the technocracy i d e o l o g i c a l or, i f he does, he shows unalarmed acceptance of the f a c t . He c l e a r l y sees technique as that which the good p o l i t i c a l system must employ, but he does not see technique i t s e l f as p o l i t i c a l . And l i k e Kennedy, he shows not only h i s r h e t o r i c but i t s underlying l o g i c to be steeped i n the terms of the dominant s o c i e t a l ethos. (If the ethos i s n e u t r a l — o n l y method " a n d not substance, then why has i t shaped h i s thinking-to the extent that i t obviously has?) McNamara c l e a r l y only f e e l s that he i s applying technique i n order to reduce i r r a t i o n a l i t y and uncertainties i n the p o l i t i c a l and economic system that they might be able to provide a wider range of a l t e r n a -t i v e s from which to choose. The mechanism provides the options and allows "the top" i n the case of " v i t a l " decisions and presumably "the people" i n the case of goods and services to choose among them. This seems a l l fin e and good, even despite his somewhat e l i t i s t , non-democratic cant. (Which provides an excellent example of the i n f u s i o n of technocratic l o g i c into p o l i t i c a l theory--the surplanting of democratic p r i n c i p l e s for the sake of the e f f i c i e n t r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of the f r a c t i o n s of the society.) What * Roszak's comments concerning men such as McNamara are i n t e r e s t i n g and very much to the point: "Ia the present generation, i t i s second and t h i r d - l e v e l figures l i k e McNamara who are apt to be the technocrats par excellence: the men who stand behind the o f f i c i a l facade of leadership and who continue t h e i r work despite a l l super-f i c i a l changes of government. McNamara's career i s almost a paradigm of our new e l i t i s t managerialism: from the head of Ford head of the Defense Depart-ment to head of the World Bank. The f i n a l step w i l l surely be the presidency of one of our larger u n i v e r s i t i e s or foundations. C l e a r l y i t no longer matters what a manager manages; i t i s a l l a matter of juggling vast magnitudes of things: money, m i s s i l e s , students...."112 72 . Mr. McNamara c l e a r l y f a i l s to r e a l i z e i s that the same p r o l i f e r a t i o n of technique for the legitimate maximization of v i a b l e options i n the so c i e t y , by the nature of technique, m i l i t a t e s against the a v a i l a b i l i t y of c e r t a i n other kinds of options--options perhaps more fundamental and t r a d i t i o n a l than those now provided i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. At t h i s point we must turn our discussion to a more concise and cogent analysis of how the technocracy shapes i t s c i t i z e n s to i t s own ends, and how i t mediates against the c r i t i c a l contemplation of what i t i s about. B. The Formative Nature of the Technocracy: Bureaucracy and Conformity We assume that society tends to produce i n d i v i d u a l s who possess i t s dominant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The r a t i o n a l i t y of the b i g organization i s s i m i l a r l y i n s t i l l e d i n i t s members. Not only are i t s structures and procedures designed to enhance p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , but i n d i v i d u a l s too become, insofar as possible, animated instruments. Individual d i s c r e t i o n i s l i m i t e d by regulations and precedents that cover a l l anticipated events, and such regulations tend to become ends i n themselves. As a r e s u l t , i n d i v i d u a l s t r y to f i n d written authority for every action and to avoid ac t i o n when such cannot be fouhd. The very i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of rules and the search for authority to act (or not to act) become valued s k i l l s . Knowledge of the rules and how they can be bent gives the i n d i v i d u a l s e c u r i t y and a share of organized power. He thus develops a vested i n t e r e s t i n preserving the rules against change, Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society We have summarized the major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of bureaucratic organiza-t i o n a l structures and traced the h i s t o r i c a l response of these struct ires to the needs of a growing technology i n the previous chapter. We have seen how these structures have sought to i n s t i t u t e s c i e n t i f i c r a t i o n a l i t y i n t o any and a l l processes which set out to accomplish complex objectives the one most e f f i c i e n t and best way. In t h i s section we must consider the extent of these types of organizations i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, and then speak of the meaning of these organizations for t h e i r members. We have i m p l i c i t l y and e x p l i c i t y spoken to the f i r s t point throughout t h i s study. Simply reviewed, we have seen the demands of technology for large powerful organizational structures i n a society which i s dominated i n 73. fact and i n i d e a l by the economic prerogatives. We have seen how the economic sphere touches v i r t u a l l y every portion of i n d i v i d u a l existence i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y - t h r o u g h the work process, through the consumption of goods, through the advertisement of those goods, through the demands of a d v e r t i s i n g on the media, through the establishment of economic values, norms, and status referents, through the demands of economic prerogatives on the governmental structures, and through the demands which s a l a b i l i t y makes on a l l goods and services, private and p u b l i c . A l l of these aspects of l i f e , because they are economic or economically derived, come under the sway of bureaucratic p r i n c i p l e s , Blau speaks of the reasons for t h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n of bureaucratic p r i n c i p l e s . A large and increasing proportion of the American people spend t h e i r working l i v e s as small cogs in. the complex mechanisms of bureaucratic organizations. And t h i s i s not a l l , for bureaucracies also a f f e c t much of the .rest of our l i v e s . The employment agency we approach to get a job, the union we j o i n to protect i t ; the supermarket and the chain store where we shop: the school our c h i l d r e n attend, and the p o l i t i c a l parties for whose candidates we vote; the f r a t e r n a l organization where we play, and the church where we w o r s h i p — a l l these more often than not are large organizations of the kind that tends to be b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y organized.1*3 But more importantly, we must speak to the second p o i n t - - s p e c i f i c a l l y , what are the psychological and p h i l o s o p h i c a l ( i d e o l o g i c a l ) manifestations for persons employed by and involved iri bureaucratic organizations. We must concern ourselves with what kinds of persons and what kinds of thought patterns are developed and encouraged i n these i n d i v i d u a l s . This i s of q u a l i t a t i v e importance to the p o l i t i c a l society and to the f u l f i l l m e n t of the i n d i v i d u a l s themselves. The remainder of t h i s section w i l l turn i t s e l f to t h i s task. I f the reader w i l l forbear a rather lengthy quote, we w i l l allow Robert Presthus to introduce us to t h i s discussion. (S)uch organizations are more than mere devices for producing goods and services. They have become c r i t i c a l normative consequences. They provide the environment i n which most of us spend our l i v e s . In 74. t h e i r e f f o r t s to r a t i o n a l i z e human energy they become s e n s i t i v e and v e r s a t i l e agencies for the con t r o l of man's behavior, employing subtle psychological sanctions that evoke desired responses and inculcate consistent patterns of a c t i o n . In t h i s sense, b i g organizations are a major d i s c i p l i n a r y force i n our society. Their influence s p i l l s over it-he boundaries of economic i n t e r e s t or a c t i v i t y into s p i r i t and i n t e l l e c t u a l sectors; the accepted values of the organization shape the in d i v i d u a l ' s personality and influence his behavior i n extravocational a f f a i r s . Because such values are supported by organized power, they become reinforced not only for those immediately concerned but for society generally. They provide the c r i t e r i a of personal worth, success, and power...Many i n d i v i d u a l s accept such demands, and some become as d i s c i p l i n e d as the organization i t s e l f . Most of t h e i r interpersonal r e l a t i o n s and t h e i r s o c i a l l i f e are bent toward career ends. Big organizations therefore become instruments of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , providing p h y s i c a l and moral sustenance for t h e i r members and shaping t h e i r thought and behaviour i n countless ways. These human consequences are the r e s u l t of the groxvth of science, technology, and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n our society i n the past seventy-five years. S t r u c t u r a l changes i n the economy during that period and the growing si z e and power of organizations had s t r i k i n g implications for the t r a d i t i o n a l i deals of i n d i v i d u a l autonomy that had characterized a simpler s o c i a l system. While new conditions brought many new opportunities based mainly upon the expanding s p e c i a l i z a t i o n of labour/ such opportunities existed i n a d i f f e r e n t context which demanded new personal s k i l l s and d i s c i p l i n e . I r o n i c a l l y , instead of bringing contentment, new opportunities often encourage i n s e c u r i t y . A vague d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n persisted as men became a f r a i d that the job they had was not as good as the one a v a i l a b l e . With one eye focused on the main chance, the i n d i v i d u a l tended to lose the i n t r i n s i c s a t i s f a c t i o n as work tended to become a mere means to other ends. The s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and impersonality of bureaucratic tasks were further causes i n the a l i e n a t i o n of men from t h e i r work, which i n c r e a s i n g l y became a means of buying escape i n the form of organized recreation and entertainment.H9 Man i s further alienated from h i s work as he r e a l i z e s that his work i s - u l t i m a t e l y unimportant. In an age of s c a r c i t y , the work of most men was at least i n d i r e c t l y necessary for t h e i r personal s u r v i v a l and the s u r v i v a l of t h e i r f a m i l i e s . The provision of basic material sustenance and the r e s u l t i n g psychological security was the f u l l - t i m e job of v i r t u a l l y every human being, c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y . To the extent that meaningfulness can be found i n s i m i l a r important work, most of today's workers are out of luck. The postman d e l i v e r i n g junk mail, the engineer designing a new fender or chrome s t r i p so that we w i l l a l l need a new car next season, the ad man who must s e l l us that thirty*second brand of dish washing l i q u i d , a l l of these are not 75. l i k e l y to be able to f i n d fundamental meaning and s a t i s f a c t i o n i n t h e i r vocations. Slogans such as "Mail moves the country," "Ford has a better idea," and "Progress i s our most important product," w i l l p a c i f y those who must believe, but a l i e n a t i o n * i s i n e v i t a b l e . But even the a l i e n a t i o n of meaningless work and of the i s o l a t i o n of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n can be functional to the organization and to the larger economic system. F i r s t , as a worker i s less and less able to f i n d s a t i s f a c -t i o n i n his occupation i t s e l f , the more l i k e l y he i s to seek s a t i s f a c t i o n outside of his work. But as long as the options for l e i s u r e are also provided by and for the economic system, and to the extent that the i n d i v i d -ual has come to define his needs i n terms of what the system has to o f f e r — something that a d v e r t i s i n g and r e s u l t i n g status norms s t r i v e to nourish and maintain, he also i s contributing to the economic system. The system does not need s a t i s f i e d workers, i t only needs i n d i v i d u a l s who believe that they need what the system has to o f f e r enough to t o l e r a t e work that would other-wise be i n t o l e r a b l e . This too has h i s t o r i c a l roots i n the age of s c a r c i t y where i n fact one did, according to any hierarchy of values, need the things of the system, and would have to do most anything to a t t a i n them. Secondly, a l i e n a t i o n from the work process may even promote l o y a l t y to the larger organization. Blau suggests that "(d)enied an understanding of the larger scheme, he magnifies the l i m i t e d i n s i g h t s and s a t i s f a c t i o n s that are within his grasp. He i s , as i t were, driven to t h i s end. Objective, impersonal standards become a l l the more a c q u i s i t i v e because he i s often unaware of t h e i r implications. He thinks everyone l i v e s that way." 1 1^ Furthermore, not being able to i d e n t i f y with the work process or the importance of that procees, he can aspire to i d e n t i f y with the corporation * We use the term " a l i e n a t e " here i n the sense of estrangement—to remove, keep apart or away; to turn away, d i v e r t ; to turn a person from an a f f e c t i o n a t e or f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e to an i n d i f f e r e n t , unfriendly, or h o s t i l e o n e . " 1 1 6 76. i t s e l f and with i t s importance. We can thus replace craftsmen, with company men. Hierarchy, the universal characteristic of bureaucratic organizational forms must be seen as more than simply an effective and efficient way to communicate directives. Indeed, i t s i n i t i a l function is to assure that each fraction of a complex task can be unswervingly coordinated by the top, a demand placed on organization by the complexity of tasks and of the need to institute the prerogatives of science into the production mechanism. Because information is at a premium in complicated technocratic situations, hierarchy insures that complete information is available only at the top. Because information is a prerequisite for action, hierarchy insures that no one w i l l act unt i l he is told what to do. But this access to information gives the top control over more than the work process. Presthus states that (s)ince information is obviously prerequisite for participation this control enables the e l i t e to manipulate both the issues and those who help resolve them. Hierarchy permits elites to determine what kind of issues w i l l be raised for organizational consideration. Potential solutions can be delimited by hierarchical control of meetings. By proposing only one or two alternatives and by indicating his preference among them, the formal leader can exercise disproportion-ate inf luence...H7 But a second function of heirarchy is to create a situation in which desired values become scarce, as a means of maintaining loyalty and control over the individual. We again c a l l upon Robert Presthus who states that positions in the hierarchy are ranked not only in terms of authority but also in status, deference, income and other perquisites of o f f i c e . . . such perquisites are allocated disproportionately. They tend to cluster near the top and decrease rapidly as one descends the hierarchy. This inequitable distribution of scarce values i s characteristic of a l l organizations; i t provides a b u i l t - i n condition of inequality and individual differentiation. Hierarchical monopoly of the distribution system augments the power of those at the top since rewards can be allocated to reinforce e l i t e definitions of " loya l ty" , ^.competence", and so on. A related objective of this inequality i s to reinforce the organization's status system, which in turn reinforces the authority and legitimacy of i t s leaders.**^ It is interesting that we continue to find the l ibera l technocratic ethos to employ the proli feration of types of scarcity in order to effectively maintain control over individuals through the creation of a kind of h i s tor ica l continuity that otherwise might not have appeared to exist . The combination of scarce values within the bureaucracy; the needs of individuals to attain those values for status needs and self-evaluation purposes in a society that legitimizes and provides no alternate outlets for the satisfaction of such needs; and the fact of hierarchy which places the access to those values in the hands of your immediate superior: these work together to encourage, indeed enforce conformity of the individual to bureaucratic norms, values, procedures, etc. In some instances individuals take on the basic world view of the organization and inculcate in themselves the technique of the organization. For many, this acceptance is a more satisfactory psychological accommodation than offered in the alternative approach—that of simply playing the game though the individual i s to ta l ly alienated by i t . In any case, conformity is demanded from the individual . Since there are few other games in town, to reject the system is often to opt but of the entire advanced industrial l i f e style. This meaning of hierarchy is generally referred to as a "status system." Presthus feels that the bureacratic status system serves as a substitute for "conspicuous consumption" which served, that function in a less affluent age. Here again we find an effective though probably not conscious synthesization of h i s tor ica l continuity. The inevitable counterpart of a world which honors the economic l i f e as the "good" l i f e i s that individuals w i l l f u l f i l l their status needs externally. Yet status implies differentia-tion along a ver t ica l scale; and as the general level of affluence rose, mere consumption was enjoyed to such an extent by a l l , that i t was no longer good status referent m a t e r i a l . But now positions within the bureaucratic structure of society can f u l f i l l those old status needs. But conspicuous consumption i s d i f f i c u l t today for the reason that mass production has made the symbols of material success a v a i l a b l e on so large a scale...the decline of t h i s psychic income means that the status aspirations w i l l be s h i f t e d to other areas, and that subtle, nonmaterial d i s t i n c t i o n s w i l l become more highly valued since they are more d i f f i c u l t to e s t a b l i s h . The importance of power and personal influence i n our society seems i n fact to nourish a neurotic drive for any symbol that w i l l enhance one's status. The status system i s a two-sided coin. On the one side, i t provides a substitute for values no longer a t t a i n a b l e . On the other side, i t i s used by the organization to co-opt or "buy o f f " persons seeking status. Available status (which can be manufactured by the organization; i t i s , from the organization's standpoint, considerably less than a scarce value) can induce conformity i n persons who might otherwise pursue values i n less abundance, e s p e c i a l l y when these values are not i n the i n t e r e s t of the organization. The e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t of organized r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , fixed r u l e s , and channeled h i e r a r c h i c a l authority i s that "every one" ( i . e . , no one) i s responsible for the t o t a l i t y of the work process (or whatever process the p a r t i c u l a r organization may p a r t i c i p a t e i n ) . The organization as a whole becomes responsible, and organizations can perform tasks and deal with persons i n a t o t a l l y impersonal and at times immoral way; a way i n which perhaps ho single member or group of members could perform. Here again we see an instance i n which the whole of technique becomes greater and "other" than the sum of i t s parts. Bureaucratic organizations seek to c o n t r o l the i n d i v i d u a l both i n and out of the organization's formal structures. F i r s t , i t seeks to order and c o n t r o l i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r work environment. Second, i t seeks to order and c o n t r o l the minds and actions of persons i n t h e i r public and private l i v e s . 79. But these two kinds of attempts at control reinforce each other. The orientations toward social norms and values which are learned and reinforced in the organizational situation carry over into private l i f e . personal orientations toward society, p o l i t i c s , the business establishment, religion, etc., become prerequisites for success on the job. "In many sectors, personal and ideological conventionality have become prerequisite for jobs that once 120 required only technical s k i l l and adequate performance." Presthus goes on to speak of covert ways in which conformity is encouraged and enforced. A major objective is to avoid prejudicing any future career opportunity, since even undesired opportunities can pay status dividends within one's own organization by judicious and casual mention. To avoid controversial matters, to create ah aura of unlimited friendship, and to borrow status by discreet name dropping may appear rather negative, but these are significant c r i t e r i a in the bureaucratic areana where "personality" and "working with the team" are vital."121 But the reinforcement to conform is considerably more complex and effective than simply those things one must do and be to get ahead. It is not as i f one participates in one universe (work) in order that he might participate in another (leisure, private l i f e , etc.). For in advanced industrial society, l i f e in and out of the work process, (as we have noted before) is dominated by the values of economic-technological progress; that i s , is under the sway of the liberal technocratic ethos. His social worth, his status, his income, his prestige, his identification, his side of the tracks, what he is for himself and for others is largely determined by his .occupation and the perquisites of that occupation. We assume people are human beings. We ask them i f they are plumbers, or professors, or doctors, or welders. This is only logical in a society dominated by scientific philosophy and economic prerogatives. We direct our attention, from important subjective qualitative questions to unimportant objective material considerations. In any event, conformity is enforced, for one's very 30. existence depends upon the attainment of a niche i n the technological system. Nor i s t h i s entrapment easy to escape because the "one-dimensionality" of the s o c i e t y attacks from a l l sides. Our personal status i s based on, among other things, the objects and positions we possess and d i s p l a y . The media pounds us with things we must have to be a man, or a woman, to get ahead, to be l i k e d , to be " i n , " and to be a l i v e . The choice i s yours. The l i s t to choose from i s someone e l s e s . You then receive a chargex card i n the mail (perhaps a status object i t s e l f ) so that you can have a l l of these things which you need for f r e e — w e l l , a c t u a l l y , for twenty-five d o l l a r s a month, a great deal of which i s in t e r e s t and o f f i c e charges. So you buy, and you get ahead, and you become a man, and you become a l i v e , and you also owe. And then you go to work, and you conform, because you cannot now a f f o r d to loose your job, or not be promoted, or appointed, or whatever, because you owe and besides you want more so you can be even more of a man, and get ahead even further. And i n a l l t h i s your organization helps you by making the p o s i t i o n just above you i n the hierarchy one of those things you need to have and d i s p l a y . In the meantime your firm i s a d v e r t i s i n g t h e i r product because people "need" i t , and the c i r c l e never ends. And what does t h i s whole process mean for the i n d i v i d u a l . At what point i s he encouraged, indeed allowed to consider h i s p l i g h t , and that of his society? C e r t a i n l y not within the covert and overt confines of the organization i s the i n d i v i d u a l to s e r i o u s l y consider the meaning and legitimacy of that organization. And c e r t a i n l y not within the confines of the educational process, which i s l a r g e l y no more than another set of organizational hurdles i n preparation for a p o s i t i o n i n the economic society and i n the organizations thereof. Why should a state, or corporation, or public supported school prepare students i n a way that would be dysfunctional 81. to the machinery of the technocracy? I f the i n d i v i d u a l should ask, " i s t h i s a l l there i s to l i f e " , he i s answered, "of course not, now get back to work." Or he may be escorted o f f to one-dimensional churches because i t i s the thing "good c i t i z e n s " do, where he i s t o l d that what i s q u a l i t a t i v e l y better i s o f f i n some vague future i n f i n i t y , and to get back to work. I f h i s questionings take him too f a r astray he w i l l be analyzed and readjusted as a t o o l i s rehoned. By x^hat c r i t e r i a i s he to judge his l i f e project and that of his society? His income? His occupation? His prestige? But these are not independent c r i t e r i a but rather a fundamental part of that x^hich he might consider. It i s a s i g n i f i c a n t feature of the technological society that i t provides for i t s members only such c r i t e r i a for judgement as i t can measure up to. The comfort of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society makes i t s techniques for c o n t r o l ever more e f f e c t i v e i n two ways. The f i r s t has to do with our physical comfort, the second with the scope of our i n t e l l e c t u a l ambitions, yet the two are inseparably linked. In an age x?hen the objective material conditions were very poor, the prospective r e b e l could well be guided by the adage, "when you a i n ' t got nothin', you got nothin' to lose." Yet i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, no one can deny the a b i l i t y of the system to " d e l i v e r the goods"; to supply for v i r t u a l l y a l l freedom from the s u f f e r i n g and i n s e c u r i t y of fundamental material deprivation. The problem a r i s e s i n the way i n x/hich material progress i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i s m o n o l i t h i c a l l y offered. To opt for the transcendence of mere material progress i s not an option, and the serious challenging of the system may w e l l mean being cut o f f from the true benefits x^hich i t can and does provide. Secondly, given the h i s t o r i c a l background of s c a r c i t y , the material marvels of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society may w e l l seem magically wonderful, as opposed to being a reasonable c o r o l l o r y o f s c i e n t i f i c discovery and technological progress. George Grant 82. states that "(e)very moment of our existence i s so surrounded by the benefits of technology that to t r y to understand the l i m i t s to i t s conquests, and also i t s r e l a t i o n to human excellence, may seem the work of a neurotic 122 seeking to escape from l i f e i nto dreams." In such a vast economic and s c i e n t i f i c monolith, i t i s l i t t l e wonder that people can be set at awe by the "wealth" of t h e i r nation, the wonderfulness of t h e i r "freedom", and the glory's of " e q u a l i t y . " Furthermore, there i s "opportunity." But what do these words mean i n the advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. "Opportunity" i s the opportunity to become more " f r e e " and "equal" than others. And what does t h i s freedom amount to? It does not mean the freedom to breathe clean a i r . It does not mean the freedom to choose not to k i l l one's fellow man. These options are not offered. "Freedom" means the opportunity to buy and s e l l stocks and bonds i f one i s so i n c l i n e d and so f i n a n c i a l l y endowed. It means the freedom to choose between a colour t e l e v i s i o n and a new Camaro. The system provides the boxes, you are free to check those you desire. Yet t h i s i s only as i t should be i n the organizational, economic, and technological ethos of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. The very notion of the term organization suggests the i n t e g r a t i o n of a number of working parts with a minimum of c o n f l i c t . Organizations are goal oriented, and the purpose of the organization i s to pursue those goals, not to question them. C o n f l i c t i s by d e f i n i t i o n dysfunctional to the organizational machinery, and the questioning of e i t h e r the goals or the workings of any part of the technique process w i l l encourage c o n f l i c t - - c o n f l i c t with the established practices and c o d i f i e d procedures i f nothing e l s e . Coser states that "(t)he decision makers are engaged i n maintaining and, i f possible, i n strengthening the organizational structures through which they exercise power and influence. Whatever c o n f l i c t s occur within these structures w i l l appear to them to be 83. dysfunctional." We can observe t h i s tendency for organizations to attempt to repress a l l c o n f l i c t , however natural, reasonable, and honest, and to view c o n f l i c t as dysfunctional to the good of a l l , to be manifested i n the p o l i t i c a l , s ociety. This i s as we might have expected, given that we have seen both p o l i t i c a l prerogatives ( l i b e r a l i s m ) and organizational prerogatives (technocracy) to have sprung from the same roots, primal economics and s c i e n t i f i c progress. Indeed we even f i n d s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s themselves accepting t h i s v i e w — t o "regard c o n f l i c t as anathema because they define society as an organic system i n which by d e f i n i t i o n a l l values and groups 122 operate smoothly as v i t a l parts of the whole system." Presthus states further that, i n t h i s view, " ( c ) o n f l i c t or disagreement about basic values or the roles assigned to each group thus tends to be regarded as destruct-125 i v e . " In any event, we can c l e a r l y see t h i s organizational l o g i c to carry over into the p o l i t i c a l arena and i t i s t i e d c l o s e l y to the notion of the "end-of-ideology" dealt with previously. Presthus remarks that ...the l i b e r a l i d e a l of a co-operative society i n which everyone works together for the public i n t e r e s t has gone v i r t u a l l y unchallenged. This romantic pluralism holds that there are r e a l l y no basic (or at least i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ) c o n f l i c t s between classes, between labour and management, between b i g businesses and small businesses, etc. Adjustment, not c o n f l i c t i s the theme. In the everyday world, organizational leaders share t h i s (conservative) bias; and much of t h e i r time i s consequently spent showing that we must a l l hang together or we w i l l hang separately. *26 84. C. The Affirmative Character of L i b e r a l Technocratic Philosophy: The Demise of A l t e r n a t i v e s . * Western t e c h n i c a l achievement has shaped a d i f f e r e n t c i v i l i z a t i o n from any previous, and we North Americans are the most advanced i n that achievement. This achievement i s not something simply external to us, as so many people envision i t . It i s not merely ah external environment which we make and choose to use as we want--a playground i n which we are to do more and more, an orchard where we can always pick variegated f r u i t . It moulds us i n what we are, not only at the heart of our animality i n the propogation and continuance of our species, but i n our actions and thoughts and imaginings. George Grant, Technology and Empire We have thus far i d e n t i f i e d the h i s t o r i c a l development and nature of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos and have suggested a number of ways i n which i t might have been inculcated into both advanced i n d u s t r i a l society and the i n d i v i d u a l members of that society. Among these ways have been the dominance of the h i s t o r i c a l imperative with which the ethos had so s u c c e s s f u l l y dealt; the economic nature of the ethos, coupled with the dominance df economics i n *What we must do i n t h i s section i s to elaborate the f u l l e s t p h i l osophical meaning of empiricism as i t has evolved into predominance i n recent B r i t i s h philosophy and emanated from there throughout the West. And we then must examine the shortcomings of t h i s philosophy, for our thesis has postulated that the nature of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos renders advanced i n d u s t r i a l society incapable of judging i t s e l f , the very society i n which the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos plays a dominant and formative r o l e . But i n order to do t h i s properly, we must c a l l upon an a l t e r n a t i v e and competing ph i l o s o p h i c a l approach, that of idealism, that vie might better understand some p o t e n t i a l l i m i t a t i o n s of the empirical approach. It i s reasonable that we do t h i s for we have already suggested that a reason for the i n v i s i b i l i t y of the ethos i s that i t provides i t s c i t i z e n s terms by which to judge society which can only serve to a f f i r m i t . This i s because of the t a u t o l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of perception,conceptualization, and s o c i a l i z a t i o n which i s that which has been shown to have been accelerated according to the nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. Thus, i n order to suggest a lack of transcendence on the part of one universe of discourse, we must ourselves transcend that universe of discourse, an a c t i v i t y which t h i s author r e a l i z e s tends toward tautology i t s e l f . Nonetheless we must attempt t h i s feat. It must be made cl e a r to the reader that our task i s not to attempt to argue for idealism over some other p h i l o s o p h i c a l system, but only to provide i t , with i t s philosophical strengths and weaknesses, as a tentative means to the opening up of the universe of discourse. We are confident that when i t comes time to p u l l our analysis together again that the following exercise w i l l have been a u s e f u l and a necessary step i n our dealing with the nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. 85. advanced i n d u s t r i a l society; the general s o c i o l o g i c a l , psychological, and phi l o s o p h i c a l conditions of h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l lag; the general phenomenon of ends-means transformations, and the p a r t i c u l a r propensity of t h i s tendency i n a technocratic society; the philosophy of science and i t s demands on the technocracy, and the r e s u l t i n g organizational demands upon a l l f r a c t i o n s (including human beings) i n any complex and extensive goal oriented process (technique); the understanding of large organizations which r e s u l t i n g l y dominate a l l facets of advanced i n d u s t r i a l l i f e as agents of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , and the p a r t i c u l a r "extra" ways i n which the c a p i t a l i s t e thic encourages the overt p r o l i f e r a t i o n of t h i s technique; and the inherent conservative nature of large scale bureaucratic organizations, and t h e i r demands for conformity on the i n d i v i d u a l s i n them i n the name of technique. These things and t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s we have discussed to a greater or lesser extent. Some might f e e l that the task of t h i s thesis might w e l l be f i n i s h e d here. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we have asserted that there has not been an end of ideology i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, but that rather i t i s dominated by an ideology so fundamental to our l i f e s t y l e and so a l l pervasive i n influence that i t transcends a l l conventional discussions of the matter. We have further shown the existence of t h i s ideology on both a t h e o r e t i c a l and pragmatic l e v e l , to d i r e c t l y dominate both the society c o l l e c t i v e l y and the i n d i v i d u a l s i n i t , and that i t s u n i v e r s a l acceptance does not deny i t s domination.* But we f e e l obligated to speak more d i r e c t l y concerning the ph i l o s o p h i c a l nature of t h i s a l l -pervasive ethos. For what i s most s i g n i f i c a n t i n our society i s the way i n which the epistemological tenets of t h i s philosophy m i l i t a t e against i t s own self-transcendence; the e f f e c t i v e way i n which i t provides i t s observers with *Domination i s not necessar i l y a p e j o r i t i v e term. For example, i f we were to f i n d a person dominated by the p r i n c i p l e s of freedom, we would not consider such domination to preclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of his being free. 86. words and concepts which can only serve to hide i t s meaning or a f f i r m i t s p o s i t i o n i n the society. Such an undertaking i s , of course, no small task, for our discussion w i l l engage us i n some fundamental p h i l o s o p h i c a l questions. Yet even r i s k i n g the presupposition of, a f t e r a l l i s said and done, o n t o l o g i c a l agnosticism, we w i l l f i n d t h i s discussion both i n t e r e s t i n g and important to the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . The d i f f i c u l t y of discussion begins with the o r i g i n of the philosophy i m p l i c i t to the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. Because i t happened and developed n a t u r a l l y , that i s h i s t o r i c a l l y , as opposed to being set down systematically by a given philosopher or philosophical school, i t i s a c o l l e c -t i o n of d i f f e r e n t but highly re l a t e d (both i n fact and i n development) concepts. We have already experienced t h i s problem i n the de s c r i p t i v e stage of t h i s study. Some of i t s tenets are overt, others covert-having r e s u l t i n g implications other than or beyond t h e i r o r i g i o n a l intentions. This point must be stressed. We are, i n t h i s study, i n search of the e f f e c t i v e implications of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. I f the tenets of t h i s ethos, i n combination and a f t e r h i s t o r i c a l m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of implication, are negative, i t i s not nec e s s a r i l y the r e s u l t of e v i l men who proposed and i n s t i t u t e d an untrue and repressive scheme. We would hope that t h i s i s a study i n p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y and not i n paranoia. In any event, as a t o t a l philosophy, many of the implications are i m p l i c i t and must be abstracted from the whole. For t h i s reason the discussion must simply begin, organiza-t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t . It i s generally conceded that the epistemology of empiricism i s basic to the philosophy of science. As we have stated before, empiricism i s the doctrine that we can only know those things which we are able to observe. Although i t can be considered to be eit h e r "an" epistemology or "the" 37. epistemology, the l o g i c a l conclusions of the doctrine opt for the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e . This l o g i c a l progression to the exclusive epistemological approach* was explicated by Rudner i n the previous chapter of t h i s study. We w i l l return to the problems of the exclusive e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n s h o r t l y but for now we w i l l accept Meehan's statement that empiricism i s "the doctrine that man can have no knowledge of the universe that i s not a conse-127 quence of perception and experience." Empiricism then, bases a l l knowledge i n the presence of objects and events. Objects and events can ex i s t i n themselves and a l l conceptual phenomena must e i t h e r represent r e l a t i o n s h i p s between or among objects and events, or must be capable of being represented by observable operators. However, there are c e r t a i n kinds of knowledge which empiricism tends to exclude. K.W. Kim speaks of non-events. Here I have i n mind not actual occurrences but rather the opposite, namely what did not happen. Such non-events concern us i n three ways. In the f i r s t place, we have examples of successful attempts to explain actual occurrences by making reference to what did not occur. Secondly, we may wish to account for the f a i l u r e of c e r t a i n conceivable events a c t u a l l y to take place. F i n a l l y , at the r i s k df sounding a b i t Hegelian, I s h a l l argue that there i s a sense i n which our understanding of something can be said to be more complete only when coupled with our imagination of something e l s e . 1 2 8 Kim's f i r s t two uses of the importance of non-events can be c l e a r l y exemplified i n a look at the study of p o l i t i c a l decision-making. In order for the study to be " s c i e n t i f i c " — i n t h i s case empirical, only observed •events can be counted as data when one i s considering a question such as who makes the decisions in a community. This means that only overt decisions *The phrase, "exclusive empirical approach" ref e r s to those who hold empiricism as the only method by which we can come to understand that a proposition i s true and thus hold a l l other forms of knowledge as speculation at best and more probably meaningless. The l o g i c of t h i s approach w i l l be developed further i n t h i s section. 83. which can be observed can be counted as s i g n i f i c a n t . A number of obvious problems come to mind. F i r s t , what of the decisions that are made "under the t a b l e " so to speak; events to be sure, but unobservable ones? Further-more, what of considerations that are c l e a r l y non-events? What of the covert organizational influences such as the desire of the decision-maker on one l e v e l of bureaucratic hierarchy to please h i s superior? In the p o l i t i c a l arena, what of the power over career opportunities that can be wielded by a single man or i n t e r e s t ? What of the climate of public opinion? What of bribes and threats? Most important, what of the climate of thinking which surrounds the decision-maker, that way of looking at the world which he has acquired from his work s i t u a t i o n , or has had to conform to because of his work situation? What of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos? A l l of these questions must be considered before one can understand the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r decision-making process, before one can judge the p l u r a l i s t or e l i t i s t nature of the decision-making process, and before one can consider the f u l l meaning of that process. And a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of and devotion to empirical p r i n c i p l e s cannot lead us to these larger kinds of understandings. Surely, such empirical data i s fundamental to attempt to portray an accurate picture of any phenomenon which hopes to go beyond mere speculation and educated guessing, but i t cannot provide us with a l l that i s important to our understanding of such a matter. Not wishing to get ahead of ourselves i n our discussion, we nonetheless cannot r e f r a i n from pointing out a f i r s t example of the way i n which the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos purports a universe of discourse which i s incapable of judging the nature and extent of that,- ethos. Weltanschauungs do not lend themselves w e l l to empirical analysis, even Weltanschauungs which demand empirical v e r i f i c a t i o n for the establishment of t h e i r existence. Kim's t h i r d point, the need for imagination and v i s i o n to enhance our 89. empirical view of things w i l l be shor t l y dealt with at length. But we must f i r s t deal with a second kind of i n i t i a l problem with empirical epistemology. For empiricism not only l i m i t s the way we look at things but also the things we look at. The f i r s t of these l i m i t a t i o n s has to do with the o n t o l o g i c a l prerogatives of empiricism and the second has to do with the demands of operational l o g i c . The r e l a t i o n s h i p of empiricism to the fact-Value d i s t i n c t i o n , the development of philosophy i n the la s t century, and to operational l o g i c i s not .easily reduced to concise statements. For t h i s reason we w i l l b r i e f l y review some general trends i n ph i l o s o p h i c a l thought which seem most d i r e c t l y a h i s t o r i c a l r e s u l t of the evolving domination of science. Empiricism as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , other than i n the philosophy of science i t s e l f , can be traced i n some form back as far as Hume and Berkely and can be traced through the B r i t i s h philosophers to present day p o s i t i v i s t s , and l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s t s . I n i t i a l l y , the phi l o s o p h i c a l problem i s the need to answer i n some general philosophical way the question, what i s the nature of x; or more s p e c i f i c a l l y , as put i n pr e p o s i t i o n a l form, how do we know (how can we v e r i f y ) that the propositions, "x e x i s t s , " and "x i s y," are true? Science through empiricism demonstrated a method which proved successful for propositions regarding f a c t s . This epistemology was adopted by philoso-phers who attempted to apply empiricism to statements of values and to moral questions through the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e t h i c a l values into observable phenomena. (For a leading example of t h i s r e f e r to the discussion of Bentham and the hedonistic calculus i n the second chapter of t h i s study.) What i s s i g n i f i c a n t at t h i s point i n h i s t o r y i s that despite the attempt at the adaptation of s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s to a l l types of inquiry, i n terras of subject matter, there remained some differ e n c e between the moral sciences and the physical sciences. Both sought t r u t h , both employed the same general . .. . 90. (principles, but to d i f f e r e n t kinds of phenomena, both of which held legitintat o n t o l o g i c a l positions i n the world of things and ideas. That i s , there i s a universe of f a c t s , and there i s also a universe of values. To the extent that we demand the empirical epistemology as the method of v e r i f i c a t i o n of t r u t h , we sought to study values s c i e n t i f i c a l l y through o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i d n . Nonetheless, both the world of facts and the world of values existed and had meaning, whether the world of values be t h e o l o g i c a l and metaphysical, r e l a t i v e , or re l a t e d reasonably to objective material conditions. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t i s the change that would occur i n philosophy's a t t i t u d e toward the meaningfulness and importance of the second category of phenomena, values For while arguments raged, both then and i n contemporary times, over whether or not the a p p l i c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c epistemology did indeed influence (bias) the study of values, and while we discussed the bearing of empirical epistemology on the ontology of values, we f i n d the whole realm of values being removed from legitimate philosophic discussion. This came about for two reasons. The f i r s t has to do with the o r i g i n a l notion Of v e r i f i a b i l i t y , the problem of "what we can know for c e r t a i n . " Empiricism - io the simplest and most widely accepted epistemological approach to t h i s problem. Empiricism as a method of v e r i f i c a t i o n for a c e r t a i n range of phenomena--statements of fact and statements regarding r e l a t i o n s h i p s between facts (emperical 129 statements and a n a l y t i c a l statements as Ayer would r e f e r to them ), has become somewhat of an accepted truism,, I n i t i a l l y , the fact that empiricism was not e a s i l y applied to non-material phenomena, was viexjed as a problem to be dealt with, but not, i n i t s e l f , a challenge to the meaningfulhess of non-material phenomena; although, as we have seen i n the statement by Rudner in the previous chapter, xvdthin the confines of s t r i c t empiricism, non-observable phenomena could have no meaning. Yet as empiricism came to 91. be the dominating l o g i c of ph i l o s o p h i c a l inquiry, i t was only reasonable that the f u l l implications of t h i s l a t t e r statement should also come to dominate. Secondly, more important, was the l i n e of phi l o s o p h i c a l inquiry which followed t h i s notion of the v e r i f i c a t i o n of empirical statements. For i n i t s most fundamental form, the question of v e r i f i c a t i o n revolved around the establishment of the t r u t h content of propositions which are of course arrangements i n language. That i s , we must analyze the structure of our language to see what i t i s we mean when xve say for instance, "x e x i s t s , " or "x i s y." This involves also the r e l a t i o n of subjects and objects, or i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, the r e l a t i o n of a subject to i t s predicate•. In an empirical statement, such as "rocks e x i s t , " or "the door i s red," we can v e r i f y these propositions through empirical method. It i s cl e a r what we mean when we state such propositions and i t i s equally c l e a r how we might see i f they are true or not. But what i s i t we mean when we say that "the painting i s b e a u t i f u l " and that "God ex i s t s " ? How can we v e r i f y these statements? The former i s a judgement of value and the l a t t e r i s by d e f i n i t i o n a non-empirical f a c t . What i s or can be the meaning of these statements? These questions, plus the vague, imprecise, and e m p i r i c a l l y n o n - v e r i f i a b l e use of language by philoso-phers of the past and the B r i t i s h i d e a l i s t s i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n s p i r e d Moore, R u s s e l l , Whitehead, and the following B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n of p o s i t i v i s t s and l i n g u i s t i c analysts to pursue t h e i r new found ph i l o s o p h i c a l task, the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of language. Rus s e l l sought a p u r i f i e d language which would provide c e r t a i n t y and eliminate ambiguity as a prerequisite to the v e r i f i c a t i o n of things we could "know for sure." In h i s autobiography he r e f l e c t s back on h i s motivations to t h i s task. 92. I wanted...to f i n d out whether anything could be known...I was troubled by scepticism and u n w i l l i n g l y forced to the conclusion that most of what passes for knowledge i s open to reasonable doubt. I wanted c e r t a i n t y i n the kind of way i n which people want r e l i g i o u s f a i t h . 1 3 0 Such a search led him to mathematics, and s t i l l d i s s a t i s f i e d , to an attempt at a p u r i f i e d mathematical l o g i c . He f e l t that philosophy i t s e l f could be reduced to such l o g i c . "(E)very p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem when i t i s subjected to the necessary analysis and p u r i f i c a t i o n , i s found e i t h e r to be not r e a l l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l at a l l , or else to be, i n the sense i n which we are using the 131 word, l o g i c a l . " Maurer states that "Russell c a l l s l o g i c the essence of philosophy i n the sense that i t enables the philosopher to analyze complex 132 p a r t i c u l a r s and to reach t h e i r l o g i c a l form." What i s s i g n i f i c a n t here, however, i n l i g h t of what was to follow i n B r i t i s h philosophy, i s that R u s s e l l pursued t h i s t a c t i c i n philosophy as a part of what he had considered to be the h i s t o r i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l attempt to answer the question "what i s there i n the world and what i s i t l i k e . " llaurer remarks that Ru s s e l l himself wants to take h i s place i n the long l i n e of Western philosophers, from Thales onward, who dedicated themselves to "that grave and important task" of understanding the world. True, he i s not as o p t i m i s t i c as most of them as regards the p o s s i b i l i t y of success i n t h i s undertaking, but he considers even the f a i l u r e s of philosophers as so much material for t h e i r successors and an incentive to new e f f o r t . Russell's views set him i n opposition to the l a t e r phase of his p u p i l Wittgenstein and his f o l l o w e r s — h e remarks that t h e i r t o t a l relegation of philosophy to the study of language would make philosophy "at best, a s l i g h t 134 help to lexicographers, and at worst, an i d l e tea-table amusement." He thus places himself i n a t r a n s i t o r y stage between an o n t o l o g i c a l agnosticism—"we cannot be sure of non-empirical propositions", and the f i n a l abdication of a l l philosophy which i s not scientific-r'-non-empirical statements can have no meaning whatsoever." 93. With Wittgenstein's Tractatus, the f i n a l blow i s dealt to judgements of value, for he draws a "sharp d i s t i n c t i o n between the natural sciences and 135 philosophy." Before, both philosophy and the natural sciences had been d i s c i p l i n e s which sought t r u t h concerning the nature of things; the former had dealt, with both facts and with values, the l a t t e r , through empiricism with the world of observable f a c t s . We have also seen that philosophy t r i e d to incorporate the p r i n c i p l e s of empiricism into i t s work. But with Wittgenstein, philosophy i s no longer to attempt to adapt science to i t s purposes, but i s rather to understand that science serves those purposes— that of v e r i f i a b l e inquiry, already. Philosophy as such becomes eit h e r redundant i n that i t duplicates science, or meaningless i n that i t formulates questions which are not v e r i f i a b l e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . The s i g n i f i c a n t break i n t r a d i t i o n here i s not that some questions cannot be answered s c i e n t i f i c a l l y and that therefore, according to our degree of b e l i e f i n empiricism as the f i n a l word i n epistemology, we must l i m i t the number of things we "can know for sure" or can " f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes," know at a l l ; but rather i n h i s notion that a l l questions which do not lend themselves to empirical enquiry are nonsensical and therefore t r i i e l y nonrquestions. He states that most of the questions of philosophers of the past are neither true nor f a l s e but meaningless. Most of the propositions and questions to be found i n philosophical works are not f a l s e but nonsensical. Consequently, we cannot give any answer to questions of t h i s kind, but can only e s t a b l i s h that they are nonsensical.. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers a r i s e from our f a i l u r e to understand the logic of our language.136 Science, not philosophy i s to discover the facts (truths); philosophy i s to a i d science i n t h i s endeavor by analyzing the language and propositions of the world, to unmuddle our thinking, and to l o g i c a l l y make our ideas more precise. Philosophy i s not to discover new f a c t s , i t i s unsuited for t h i s . In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states that "(t)he problems 94. are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we always 137 have known(;)" and that philosophy "may not advance any kind of theory, There must not be anything hypothetical i n our considerations. We must do 138 away with a l l explanation, and d e s c r i p t i o n alone must take i t s place." Philosophy, then, has no bearing on the t r u t h content of statements. Only science can deal with t h i s . Maurer states that, according to Wittgenstein, "(p)hilosophy can show c l e a r l y what can be said and what cannot be said; that i s , i t can set l i m i t s to language and consequently to thought. I t can a l s o s e t t l e controversies about the l i m i t s of natural science. A l l of t h i s comes within the competence of philosophy i n i t s r o l e as a c r i t i q u e of 139 language." What i s most s i g n i f i c a n t for our purposes i s the accepted o n t o l o g i c a l manifestations of an exclusive empirical epistemology. Wittgenstein states that "(t)he t o t a l i t y of true propositions i s the whole of natural 140 science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)." Though Wittgenstein comes to h i s conclusions as a r e s u l t of the analysis of language, his c r i t e r i a for the meaningfulness of a statement appears to be a p r i o r i t i e d to the mandatesof empiricism. He seems c l e a r on t h i s . The correct method of philosophy i s "to say nothing except what can be said, 141 i . e . , propositions of natural science." Furthermore, the empirical c r i t e r i o n i s absolute, a question which i s not answerable by science--a question not of fact, i s not a question at a l l , i n fact i t s l o g i c a l examina-t i o n answers i t s e l f , i t i s non-sensical, non-important, non-existent, a meaningless question formulated by those who did not understand the l o g i c of language. The age old questions of the meaning of l i f e and of existence are answered, then, by the mere r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r non-sensical, i . e . , non-empirical content. We f e e l that even when a l l possible s c i e n t i f i c questions have been answered, the problems of l i f e remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions l e f t , and t h i s i t s e l f i s the answer. The 95. s o l u t i o n of the problem i s seen i n the vanishing of the problem. For Wittgenstein, then, ontology i s t i e d to the l o g i c a l l i m i t a t i o n s of language which appear to be, i n his terms, t i e d to empiricism. The key to t h i s linkage i s found i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p which Wittgenstein finds between thought, language, and r e a l i t y , which we w i l l mention here but not examine. He assumes, or understands ( i t i s not clear to us which), that there i s no r e a l i t y which transcends our. c o l l e c t i v e thinking as a r e s u l t of experience (empiricism), and furthermore that there are no thought processes which are separate or d i f f e r e n t from language processes. "Thinking," he says, " i s not an incorporal process which lends l i f e and sense to speaking, and which i t would 143 be possible to detach from speaking..." With t h i s i d e n t i t y of speaking with thinking, and thinking with experience, and experience with the t o t a l i t y of that which i s true, he can l o g i c a l l y conclude that the reasonable l i m i t s of language circumscribe the reasonable l i m i t s of that t o t a l i t y of true statements i n the world. A second point, to be mentioned only b r i e f l y , and i n conjunction with the previous discussion, i s that empiricism demands the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a l l concepts which are not d i r e c t l y observable. . A l l concepts which cannot be adequately b p e r a t i o n a l i z e d cannot be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y examined, and according to one's phi l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y as meaningful concepts may be questioned. He who seeks to do research must therefore l i m i t himself to those concepts which lend themselves to o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , to the exclusion of those which do not. Again, depending upon one's phi l o s o p h i c a l understanding of what i s a meaningful question, one may believe, as Wittgenstein might have, that what cannot be operationalized i s not a v i a b l e question. P.W. Bridgeman sees these implications for society. To adopt the operational point of view involves much more than a mere r e s t r i c t i o n of the sense i n which we understand "concept," but means a far reaching change i n a l l our habits of thought, i n that we 96. shall no longer permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we cannot give an adequate account in terms of operations. The purpose of this brief review of a segment of intellectual history, has been two fold. The f i r s t purpose has been to show the effect of the domination of science and specifically empiricism in recent western philosophy, and in particular, what this development has meant to the status of judgements of value. We have chosen to stress Russell and Wittgenstein because of their dominant positions in the development of contemporary philosophy, and because of the contrast between the two which was of particular significance for our discussion. We have entered upon this undertaking well advised of the d i f f i c u l t y and fluctuations of Wittgenstein's thought and of his personal desire to have been disconnected from various of the groups which he influenced. Whether the logical positivists and linguistic analysts have read him rightly or wrongly, his influence nonetheless remains, and we have attempted to relate br i e f l y that which is both central to his thoughts and significant to our discussion here. Anatol Rapoport summarizes the meaning of this movement. Philosophy should abandon, so say the logical positivists, any attempts to say something factual, for that is the business of science. Philosophy should also jettison its metaphysical baggage (inherited from theology), which has been cluttering up i t s conceptual frameworks. Ethics and esthetics, formerly considered to be integral parts of philosophy, should also be left alone. Empirical or descriptive ethics and esthetics (which are l i t t l e more than records of what various people in various societies hold good and beautiful) are said to be properly the business of psychology and social science, while metaphysical ethics and esthetics (which presumably deal x^ith the : ;real" nature of good and beauty) are declared to be meaningless. In short, logical positivists advise philosophers to stick s t r i c t l y to linguistic analysis.145 The second purpose of this exercise has been to elaborate the philoso-phical manifestations of empiricism in recent philosophy, in order that we might c r i t i c i z e their philosophical limitations, and then speak of the meaning of a l l this to politics in advanced industrial societies. We now turn our attention to this task. 97. We are here i n the process of arguing that the philosophy which dominates the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos e f f e c t i v e l y renders the meaning of that ethos incomprehensible i n the sense of being i n v i s i b l e , except to the extent that i t t a u t o l o g i c a l l y affirms 1 1 i t s own existence. The shortcomings of t h i s approach can only be f u l l y appreciated i f we propose an alternate and competing, as i t were, p h i l o s o p h i c a l approach.. For t h i s purpose, we w i l l r eleate the common thread which we can abstract from what we w i l l r e f e r to and has h i s t o r i c a l l y been referred to as idealism. It i s neither our purpose nor our desire to argue for the absolute v a l i d i t y of t h i s or any other p a r t i c u l a r p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n . In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case, we are well aware of the fundamental problems of i d e a l i s t philosophy as they have been argued throughout i n t e l l e c t u a l h i s t o r y . Yet, i n that same way that an object may be viewed more accurately from two d i f f e r e n t vantage points, neither of which i n i t s e l f i s t o t a l l y accurate, i t w i l l do xjell for us to view the world from the i d e a l i s t standpoint i n order that we might better consider some persuasive objections to exclusive empirical epistemology. Idealism can be understood i n many contexts and stresses vary, of course, • from one philosopher to the next. Generally, i t can be seen to be rooted i n the i n i t i a l perceptual r e l a t i o n s h i p of the subject to the object. On the l e v e l of almost mere truism, idealism states the interdependence of subject arid object as we discussed i n the introduction. H i s t o r i c a l l y , the meaning of t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p has ranged from the psychologically obvious r e l a t i o n s h i p s of object, perception, and conceptualization, to the conceiving of t h i s i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p as the "unity" of the "whole" necessary to support £ p r i o r i t h e o l o g i c a l " t r u t h s " and various metaphysical variants on t h i s theme. As the terminology implies, idealism places emphasis on "idea" as opposed to "being" and can be defined as "any of various theories 98. which hold that the objects of perception are a c t u a l l y ideas of the perceiving m i n d . " 1 4 6 What we are most interested i n for our purposes here i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between f a c t u a i i t y and r e a l i t y , which i s found i n idealism. This framework allows philosophers to incorporate both h i s t o r i c a l processes and judgements of value into t h e i r f a c t u a l scheme. This d i s t i n c t i o n of t r u t h and fact has often lead i d e a l i s t s into h i s t o r i c a l and d i a l e c t i c a l philosophies. The manner i n which t h i s i s done we hope s h a l l become clear s h o r t l y . We begin with a subject. The f a c t u a i i t y of any subject i s i t s objective c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s at any point i n time, t . The r e a l i t y of the subject transcends i t s mere f a c t u a i i t y because the r e a l i t y of the subject i s embodied i n the subject's essence. The essence of the subject i s that understanding of that t o t a l range of f a c t u a l states which i t might have and that nature of the subject by which i t might move from one f a c t u a l stage to another. We can view the subject to be on a v e r t i c a l continuum which i s topped by the absolutely "true" f a c t u a l state. This "true" state represents that r e a l i z e d state of p o t e n t i a l i t y to which the subject, according to i t s essence can aspire. The jargon reads that there i s a d i a l e c t i c a l struggle between the subject i n a c t u a l i t y and i t s true state of p o t e n t i a l i t y . The subject i n i t s temporal state i s alienated from i t s true s e l f , and the l i f e of the subject i s seen as a struggle to overcome (negate) t h i s a l i e n a t i o n . For the i d e a l i s t s , freedom and t r u t h are perfect and one when the subject negates the a l i e n a t i o n between a c t u a l i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y . But the actual state i s that of unfreedom, and untruth. Marcuse states that ( d ) i a l e c t i c a l thought s t a r t s with the experience that the world i s unfree; that i s to say, man and nature e x i s t i n conditions of a l i e n a t i o n , e x i s t as "other than they are." Any mode of thought which excludes t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n from i t s l o g i c i s a f a u l t y l o g i c . Thought corresponds to r e a l i t y only as i t transforms r e a l i t y by comprehending i t s contradictory structure. Here the p r i n c i p l e of d i a l e c t i c drives thought beyond the l i m i t s of philosophy. For to comprehend r e a l i t y means to comprehend what things r e a l l y are, and t h i s i n turn means r e j e c t i n g t h e i r mere f a c t u a l i t y . Rejection i s the process of thought as w e l l as of a c t i o n . While the s c i e n t i f i c method leads from the immediate experience of things to t h e i r mathematical structure, p h i l o s o p h i c a l thought leads from the immediate experience of existence to i t s h i s t o r i c a l structure: the p r i n c i p l e of freedom. The h i s t o r i c a l occurrences of idealism can be seen i n more common contexts and i n less obtuse language. The Greeks e x h i b i t e d l i t t l e awareness of h i s t o r y , but Plato's "Forms" i s c l e a r l y the beginning of the distance between a c t u a l i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y ; and with Plato came the notion of the u n i f i c a t i o n of t r u t h , beauty, and freedom which a r i s e s when the subject has overcome i t s a l i e n a t i o n and transformed i t s a c t u a l i t y into i t s ultimate p o t e n t i a l i t y represented i n the Forms. B i b l i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y also r e f l e c t s the i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n , i n which man as a sinner i s alienated or cut o f f from God, who, through the T r i n i t y i n the person of C h r i s t , he i s to emulate as an i d e a l . The C h r i s t i a n l i f e i s seen as a struggle to become "one with the Father" which i s accomplished p a r t l y through the casting away of the things of the world and the a s p i r a t i o n to be that which i s "other" than he is, With B i b l i c a l C h r i s t i a n i t y , we f i n d i n both the Old and New Testaments the theme of h i s t o r i c a l development which would become so prevalent i n l a t e r i d e a l i s t formulations. Here we f i n d a number of references to the h i s t o r i c a l manifestation of "God i n man" through the ages according to God's eternal plan. In I John 1:2 we f i n d , "For the l i f e was manifested, and we have seen i t , and bear witness, and shew unto you that eternal l i f e , which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us." And i n Mark 4:22 we f i n d what appears to be the precussor pf the i d e a l i s t v i s i o n of Reason h i s t o r i c a l l y manifesting i t s e l f to man which i s so fundamental to both Kant and H e g e l — "For there i s nothing hid, which s h a l l not be manifested; neither was any-thing kept secret, but that i t should come abroad." The other major examples of i d e a l i s t thought are better known, the Reason of Kant, the 100. s t r i c t h i s t o r i c a l d i a l e c t i c of Hegel, and the neo-Hegelian i d e a l i s t s of the recent B r i t i s h period, which, coupled with the inroads of s c i e n t i f i c thought, served, through reaction, to bring on the r e a l i s t s , p o s i t i v i s t s , and l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s t s we have previously d i s c u s s e d — t h a t i s , the idealism of Coleridge, Bradley, and Bosanquet. A major problem i n idealism has always been the metaphysical nature of the u n i f y i n g i d e a l and the c r i t e r i o n by which that i d e a l (the upper l i m i t of p o t e n t i a l i t y , as i t were, according to the nature of the subjects essence) was established. The philosophical base of t h i s problem occurs when we allow a s t r i c t extension of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of subject and object to be taken to i t s l o g i c a l extreme. In the introductory chapter we established the common sense perceptual r e l a t i o n s h i p between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. When placed i n p r o p o s i t i o n a l form and l o g i c a l l y analyzed, we see the meaning of a proposition to depend not upon the subject or the object, but upon the two joined i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e l a t i o n s h i p , each needing each other for i t s meaning i n the proposition (in i d e a l i s t terms, subjects do i n themselves exhibit autonomous essences, but are joined with a predicate i n any language proposition regarding the r e a l world); and thusly we come to what R u s s e l l was to r e f e r to as "the axiom of i n t e r n a l relations"143 which i s that r e a l i t y i s one and p l u r a l i t y i s merely appearance. This view of a l l r e a l i t y as a part of a single "whole", when taken i n more than a symbolic sense, i s more than most can e a s i l y accept. We do not wish to here debate t h i s issue i n these terms, but rather to remark concerning the v i r t u a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y of t h i s understanding i n previous i d e a l i s t thought. The s o c i o l o g i c a l base for t h i s tendency appears to be i n the t h e o l o g i c a l nature of the i d e a l i s t undertakings. The unity of the universe i s a p r i o r i i n r e l i g i o u s thinking. God as the creator of a l l , i s by d e f i n i t i o n the one of which a l l else i s only a part. We only need to think of C h r i s t i a n 101. expressions for the de i t y to r e a l i z e t h i s — " t h e alpha and omega," "omniscient one," "omnipresent one," "the a l l i n a l l , " "we s h a l l become one with Him." The closeness of the major i d e a l i s t thinkers from Plato, through Hegel and Kant to the r e l i g i o u s currents of t h e i r day has to be appreciated. Recent i d e a l i s t s from Hegel to the present were c l e a r l y a c t i v e l y engaged i n the salvaging of the truths of C h r i s t i a n theology from the dregs of ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o n . Nonetheless, the symbolic truths of the i d e a l i s t distance between fact and t r u t h , a c t u a l i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y s t i l l makes for i n t e r e s t i n g and rewarding p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion. For we need not be able to set absolute l i m i t s , be they empirical or metaphysical, on the concept of p o t e n t i a l i t y to appreciate that the concept of a c t u a l i t y d i f f e r s from the concept of p o t e n t i a l i t y , and that there i s something i n the empirical nature of a phenomenon that sets reasonable l i m i t s on the range of things (in e f f e c t , a kind of essence) that a phenomenon can e x h i b i t . Nor can we f a i l to appreciate the e t h i c a l (value) implications that can be b u i l t into a theory which holds p o t e n t i a l i t y up as an i d e a l , (even i f an unrealizable one) for the subject i n a c t u a l i t y to aspire to. A f l e x i b l e i d e a l i s t would argue that these conceptualizations of ideals and potentials are not invalidated i f they are not absolute, immutable, or metaphysical. They can indeed be simply the r e s u l t of constructions of men's minds according to t h e i r understanding, empirical or otherwise, of what i s a better p o t e n t i a l state., These "reasonable" systems can be b u i l t according to needs h i e r a r c h i e s , or admitted value assumptions. The l o g i c of the i d e a l i s t p o s i t i o n i s revealing even when separated from i t s metaphysical content. "Marcuse i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s point with the notion of the essence of man. Analyzing the condition i n which he finds himself i n his universe, man seems to be i n possession of c e r t a i n f a c u l t i e s and powers which T f o u l d enable him to lead a "good l i f e " , i . e . , a l i f e which i s as much 102. as possible free from t o i l , dependence, and ugliness. To a t t a i n such a l i f e i s to a t t a i n the "best l i f e " : to l i v e i n accordance with the essence of the nature of man.1^9 Some may react against Plato's d e s c r i p t i o n of r e a l i t y i n terms of the "Forms" and other a r t i f a c t s of ancient Greek mythology, but t h i s reaction i s s u p e r f i c i a l and f a i l s to grasp the s p i r i t of the phi l o s o p h i c a l truths which the i d e a l i s t s present. Marcuse states that the dictum of the philosopher i s s t i l l that i t i s he who analyzes the human s i t u a t i o n . He subjects experience to his^ c r i t i c a l judgement, and t h i s contains a value judgement— namely, that freedom from t o i l i s preferable to t o i l , and that an i n t e l l i g e n t l i f e i s preferable to a stupid l i f e . I t so happened that philosophy was born of these values. S c i e n t i f i c thought had to break t h i s union of value judgement and ana l y s i s , for i t became incr e a s i n g l y clear that the philosophic values did not guide the organization of society nor the transformation of nature...but t h i s development does not yet inv a l i d a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between e s s e n t i a l and contingent-nature, between true and fa l s e modes of experience...provided that the d i s t i n c t i o n derives from a l o g i c a l analysis of the empirical s i t u a t i o n , and understands i t s p o t e n t i a l as w e l l as i t s contingency.150 Having now l a i d out these two major modes of phi l o s o p h i c a l inquiry which have existed i n western h i s t o r y , we must now turn our attention to s p e c i f i c l i m i t a t i o n s i n empirical epistemology and the meaning of these l i m i t a t i o n s for advanced i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y . * The f i r s t general l i m i t a t i o n and c r i t i c i s m of empirical inquiry i s that i t i s a - h i s t o r i c a l . Empiricism demands de s c r i p t i o n of that which can be observed, which i s , that which e x i s t s i n the p r e s e n t — i n i d e a l i s t terms *Man has also, of course, suffered from the l i m i t a t i o n s and misapplications of i d e a l i s t philosophy. Over and above i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l tendency to produce theories of highly dubious c e r t a i n t i e s , which cannot be reconstructed i n the p r a c t i c a l worid, i d e a l i s t philosophy has surely implicated i t s e l f i n various t o t a l i t a r i a n regimes i n our century. Nonetheless, the l i m i t a t i o n s of i d e a l i s t thought do not e s t a b l i s h the v a l i d i t y necessary, of any other school of inquiry, nor do i t s l i m i t a t i o n s devalue n e c e s s a r i l y i t s strengths. Perhaps, i n the largest sense, we do no more than to comment upon the e n t i r e inadequacy of the whole of human e f f o r t to understand the nature of h i s , the human condition. 103. empiricism must observe subjects i n a state of a c t u a l i t y . Empiricism i s not suited to consider potentials i n that i t must concentrate on the present state of the subject. Although s c i e n t i f i c analysis can consider development i n that i t can record empirical data at any point i n time T, and then again at time t plus x, etc.> the emphasis i s not on t h i s . Development and p o t e n t i a l are c e r t a i n l y to be rooted i n our f a c t u a l understanding of the subject, but our f u l l appreciation of these a t t r i b u t e s of the subject must be nurtured with some reasonable speculation and imagination of that which i s not yet, which i s by d e f i n i t i o n , non-observable. This problem of a - h i s t o r i c i s m i s less important i n the study of c e r t a i n natural phenomenon which change very slowly or not at a l l . In t h i s case, the d i s t i n c t i o n between a c t u a l i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y i s less c r u c i a l . But i n the study of s o c i e t a l and p o l i t i c a l matters, t h i s problem takes on i d e o l o g i c a l content because i t opts for the f a c t u a i i t y of the status quo as opposed to the p o t e n t i a l i t y of change. This s h a l l become more clear as we proceed. In s o c i a l science we find the construc-t i o n of the dichotomous concepts of d e s c r i p t i o n and p r e s c r i p t i o n to be seen to correspond to the d i s t i n c t i o n between judgements of fact and judgements of value. We have seen that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n has resulted not simply i n a useful a n a l y t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n , but rather resulted eventually i n the d i s -credidation of judgements of value. Whether or not one accepts t h i s d i s c r e d i -dation, the conventional s c i e n t i f i c wisdom holds that s c i e n t i f i c statements at least i n i t i a l l y deal with statements of fact and not of value. Thus the l o g i c of t h i s understanding reads that the only legitimate ( i . e . , s c i e n t i f i c ) a c t i v i t y of s o c i a l science can be that of d e s c r i p t i o n , and pure d e s c r i p t i o n i s by d e f i n i t i o n steeped i n the empirical r e a l i t i e s of the present. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g ( i n a c o - r e l a t i o n a l but not n e c e s s a r i l y causal sense) that the needs of the technology for conformity, c o n t r o l , p r e d i c t a b i l i t y , etc., are g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d by the maintenance of the status quo, and i n 104. the b e l i e f of the people that t h e i r ' s i s the only a l t e r n a t i v e . The economic and technological apparatus i s further f a c i l i t a t e d by the t e c h n i c a l view of reason (philosophy) not as a source of c r i t i c a l contemplation of ends, but rather as an instrument (means) for man to employ for " h i s " ends. In Technology and Empire. George Grant speaks to t h i s point, What must be stressed i n t h i s connection i s that reason i t s e l f i s thought of simply as an instrument. It i s to be used for the c o n t r o l of nature and the adjustment of the masses to what i s required of them by the commercial society. This instrumentalist view of reason i s i t s e l f one of the chief influences i n making our society what i t i s ; but, equally, our society increasingly forces on i t s members t h i s view of reason. It i s impossible to say which comes f i r s t , t h i s idea of reason or the mass society. They are i n t e r -dependent. Thought which does not serve the i n t e r e s t of the economic apparatus or some established group i n society i s sneered at as "academic." The old idea that "the t r u t h s h a l l set you free", that i s , the view of reason as the way i n which we discover the meaning of our l i v e s and make that meaning our own, has almost e n t i r e l y disappeared. In place of i t we have substituted the idea of reason as a subjective t o o l , helping us i n production, i n the guidance of the masses, and i n the maintenance of our power against r i v a l empires. People educate themselves to get dominance over nature and over other men. Thus, s c i e n t i f i c reason i s what we mean by reason.151 If the notion of reason being that means of the economic society to maintain domination over i t s c i t i z e n s seems to be a b i t strong, we need only remember the dominance of science through technology i n the economy, and the p o s i t i v i s t formulation of philosophy being the "handmaid of science". Here we have the e f f e c t i v e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a f f i r m a t i o n of t h i s statement. Reason as an instrumentality i s stressed by Wittgenstein, iiaurer states that "Philosophical Investigations and Tractatus fundamentally agree that philosophy i s not a doctrine or theory but an e l u c i d a t i n g and theraputic 152 a c t i v i t y . " G.E. Moore had commented regarding Wittgenstein that, "(a)s regards his own work, he said i t did not matter whether his r e s u l t s 153 were true or not: what mattered was that 'a method had been found!"' A philosophy which i n h i b i t s the contemplation of a l t e r n a t i v e s under the guise of a method at the disposal to man for " h i s " purposes serves to s e t t l e 105. the c i t i z e n r y , to make them more predictable, to make them more content with t h e i r p l i g h t i n that i t retards t h e i r serious contemplation of another. We s h a l l return to t h i s matter s h o r t l y . This l i m i t a t i o n of the contemplation of v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s i s a r e s u l t , then of the non-empirical and non-descriptive nature of speculation. The comprehension of essence over and above appearance i s not however, some grand metaphysical judgement. It i s empirical i n the sense that i t i s rooted i n a l i b e r a t e d sense of p o t e n t i a l i t y . We do not expect a rock to p o t e n t i a l l y be a b i r d . This i s utter mysticism and that which empiricism r i g h t f u l l y did away with. It i s not our empirical understanding of a rock that i t has i n i t s essence (that whole range of things that are e s s e n t i a l to the empirical understanding of the term "rock") the p o t e n t i a l i t y of becoming something which i t i s not absolutely. But i t i s , or ought to be within our understanding of society that we could have a better society i n some sense. We can see i n the essence of the h i s t o r i c a l phenomenon we have chosen to c a l l " s o c i e t i e s " that they are p o t e n t i a l l y "other" than what they are, that they change and evolve, that they are better or worse according to a whole range of standards we may choose to apply. We can reasonably see i n ourselves that we as human beings could be other and better. Better than what? Better than what we are. It i s not that knowledge of the empirical sort i s inaccurate. It i s rather that the procurement and use of t h i s knowledge ought to take place within a proper p h i l o s o p h i c a l framework. The conventional s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c l o g i c would f i n d these two statements incongruous for i t seeks to observe r e a l i t y within a framework which in t e r p r e t s r e a l i t y . This circumscription would aurely bias the data and would hot be value-free. But the necessary point here i s that to do otherwise i s to e f f e c t i v e l y circumscribe o b j e c t i v i t y as w e l l . To understand r e a l i t y i n the empirical present i s no less a bias 106. than to understand r e a l i t y i n i t s empirical h i s t o r i c a l context. (We have re l a t e d the p h i l o s o p h i c a l truism i n the introduction that epistemology i n e v i t a b l y bears upon ontology.) But the e f f e c t i v e implication of these two biases are very d i f f e r e n t . Marcuse speaks to t h i s point But the r a t i o n a l i t y of t h i s kind of s o c i a l science appears i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t i f the given society, while remaining the frame of -reference, becomes the object of a c r i t i c a l theory which aims at the very structure of t h i s society, present i n a l l p a r t i c u l a r facts and conditions and determining t h e i r place and t h e i r function. Then t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l character becomes apparent, and the elabora-t i o n of adequately cognitive concepts demands going beyond the f a l l a c i o u s concreteness of p o s i t i v i s t empiricism. The theraputic and operational concept becomes f a l s e to the extent to which i t insulates and atomizes the f a c t s , s t a b i l i z e s them within the repressive whole, and accepts the terms of t h i s whole as the .terms of the a n a l y s i s . The methodological t r a n s l a t i o n of the u n i v e r s a l into the operational concept then becomes repressive reduction of thought. l->4 The l i m i t a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s i m p l i c i t i n exclusive empirical l o g i c militates not only against the r e a l i z a t i o n of those a l t e r n a t i v e s , but also against the making of judgements regarding the on-going society, by the removal of hypothetical c r i t e r i a by which we can make comparisons. But philosophy i s not to propose anything hypothetical, i t i s simply to a i d science i n i t s search for empirical f a c t s . As i t i s now considered the " s c i e n t i f i c " duty of s o c i a l science to remain value-free, which means to describe and not prescribe, who i s l e f t to perform the necessary task of hypothetical contemplation? I f not the philosopher, and not the s c i e n t i s t then who? Do we r e a l l y understand hypothetical speculation to be nurtured i n the technocratic i n s t i t u t i o n s of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. We think not, t and our evidence i s supportive. Perhaps tihen lay ministers, hack, journalist, and p o l i t i c a l bosses. Again we think not, and i f they did t h e i r e f f o r t s would be considered meaningless for they would not be s c i e n t i f i c , Marcuse suggests Jhat what i s at stake i s not merely "the d e f i n i t i o n and d i g n i t y of philosophy" but rather "the spread of a new ideology which undertakes 107. to describe what i s happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what i s happening (and meant).,'1-'^ The very conceptual format demanded by exacting empirical analysis m i l i t a t e s against those kinds of academic and ph i l o s o p h i c a l undertakings which are needed to comprehend the nature of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. H i s t o r i c a l l y t h i s may be traced back to the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l notion which i t borrowed from Newton that wholes can be t o t a l l y understood by the compre-156 hension of t h e i r many separate parts. But; more important, i t i s a part of organizational technique demanded i n order that complex methods can perform complex tasks, the pursuit of understanding c e r t a i n l y being the l a t t e r . Nonetheless, i n a way analogous to s p e c i a l i s t s i n a complex organization remaining alienated and uninformedof the t o t a l work process, academic inquiry seems also somewhat alienated and uninformed about the whole of society. Like good s c i e n t i s t s , a l l pursue t h e i r s p e c i a l t i e s i n the i n i t i a l l y nobel name of the accummulation of exact knowledge, yet no one asks or i s to ask "where the h e l l i s i t a l l going." It i s argued that no one can have the knowledge necessary to make that judgement with " s c i e n t i f i c " c e r t a i n t y . That argument may be v a l i d , yet the e f f e c t i v e r e s u l t i s s t i l l that no one considers the whole. A good example of t h i s i s the organization of d i s c i p l i n e s within a u n i v e r s i t y and the i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y nature of t h i s study. We have thus far dealt i n terms of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, h i s t o r y , economics, theology, and sociology, a l l i n order that we might speak concerning what we consider to be most s i g n i f i c a n t and most overlooked i n the study of p o l i t i c a l phenomena. In c e r t a i n important contexts, the search for knowledge of the parts ,can i n t e r f e r e with the pursuit of knowledge of the whole„ Yet the problem pf w h o l i s t i c analysis i s a re s u l t of more than organi-1 0 3 . z a t i o n a l prerogatives and paradigm r i g i d i t y . For empirical analysis demands clear and c e r t a i n observation, and that i s simply not an option when viewing complex wholes. Nor do complex wholes lend themselves well to o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . To the extent that the whole manifests c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s over and above the sum of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i t s component parts, exclusive empirical analysis i s inadequate. The notion of the o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of variables so as to render them susceptible to empirical analysis leads us to a discussion of a second and more fundamental way i n which the i m p l i c i t philosophy of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos retards meaningful judgements by removing a l l conceptual c r i t e r i a by which judgements can be made. Stanley Gerr states that the feature of operationalism i s "to consider the names of things as being i n d i c a t i v e at the same time of t h e i r manner of functioning, and the names of properties and processes as symbolical of the apparatus used to detect 157 or produce them.'' Put shortly, t h i s i s technological reasoning which 158 tends "to i d e n t i f y things and t h e i r functions." ° The purpose of o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n i s to convert non-observable concepts into observable ones that they might be dealt with e m p i r i c a l l y . The e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l r a mifications of t h i s tendency, regardless of the p u r i t y and purpose of i t s i n i t i a l conception i s to define a l l concepts in terms of that which already e x i s t s and i s observable. Exclusive empirical l o g i c i n s i s t s that concepts which are not so treated can have no meaning other .than that which i s commonly accepted and thus i s subject to change and f l u c t u a t i o n as i s mere s t y l e and opinion. But again we must r e a l i z e that t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l i -zation destroys independent judgements because i t i d e n t i f i e s a l l concepts which might "negate" the existent society with that which i t must deal--109. the society i t s e l f . * These concepts can no longer be used to set themselves o f f against the present a c t u a l i t y , for they are only provided with meaning which they have received from that a c t u a l i t y . They cannot measure the society, for they have received t h e i r units of measurement from that which they would measure. Herbert Marcuse speaks at length to t h i s point. As a habit of thought outside the s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l language, such reasoning shapes the expression of a s p e c i f i c s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l behaviorism. In t h i s behavioral universe, words and concepts tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be absorbed by the word. The former has no other content than that designated by the word i n the pu b l i c i z e d and standard usage, and the word i s expected to have no other response than than the p u b l i c i z e d and standardized behavior (reaction). The word becomes c l i c h e and, as c l i c h e , governs the speech or the w r i t i n g . To be sure, any language contains innumerable terms which do not require development of t h e i r meaning, such as the terms designate the objects and impliments of d a i l y l i f e , v i s a b l e nature, v i t a l needs and want s... The s i t u a t i o n i s very d i f f i c u l t with respect to terms which denote things or occurrences beyond t h i s non-controversial context. Here, the functionalism of language expresses an abridgement of meaning which had a p o l i t i c a l connotation. The names of things are not only " i n d i c a t i v e of t h e i r manner of functioning," but t h e i r (actual) manner of functioning also defines and "Closes" the meaning of the thing, excluding other manners of functioning.159 In i d e a l i s t philosophy, the subject i s interdependent with i t s object for i t s f u l l meaning in a proposition, but as a subject i t also has an independent and autonomous essence--that which i s e s s e n t i a l to the nature of the concept. Thus when t h i s subject engages with a p a r t i c u l a r object i n the predicate, i t brings i t s own i n d i v i d u a l and autonomous meaning into play *The term "negate" i s one developed i n i d e a l i s t and d i a l e c t i c a l philosophy, and has to do with the distance between a c t u a l i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y . This distance i s often referred to as " n e g a t i v i t y . " To "negate" a statement or to perform a "negative" act i s to expose t h i s distance between f a c t u a i i t y and p o t e n t i a l i t y , an act necessary for the e l i c i d a t i o n of the subject involved. In Reason and Revolution, Marcuse remarks regarding the philosophy of Hegel that i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a negative philosophy. " I t i s o r i g i n a l l y motivated by the conviction that the given facts that appear to common sense as the p o s i t i v e index of t r u t h are i n r e a l i t y the negation of t r u t h , so that t r u t h can only be established by t h e i r destruction."(pg. 26-27) 110. with that of the object. Depending upon the nature of the object i t may i d e n t i f y with i t , i n the case of subject and;object being the same, ( i . e . , "x i s x") in which case the proposition i s simple tautology. Or the subject may set i t s e l f o f f against the object, and negate i t according to the contradictory nature of the essence of the subject to that of the object. But i f a l l subjects (concepts) are defined i n terms of t h e i r objects, the p o s s i b i l i t y of t h i s n e g a t i v i t y to occur i s precluded by the new nature of the subject which has been assimilated into tautology. In the same way that the mandates of empiricism removed a l l viable v i s i o n s of a l t e r n a t i v e r e a l i t y , and thus ideals by which to measure society, now we find ourselves being stripped of independent concepts which may hint at a l t e r n a t i v e s to the e m p i r i c a l l y present r e a l i t i e s . By o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g a l l judgemental concepts i n terms of the observable status quo, such judgments can only serve to a f f i r m the present state of a f f a i r s . Even as a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s to the present society come to be dismissed as "utopian" which in t h i s context means to have no meaning because i t i s e m p i r i c a l l y n o n - v e r i f i a b l e , so are a l l concepts which would negate our present a c t u a l i t y viewed as meaningless. They are merely judgements of value, they have no empirical content. The word "utopian" serves as a good example of what we are t r y i n g to argue. "Utopia's" were once i d e a l s , not existent to be sure, perhaps not even hy p o t h e t i c a l l y r e a l i z a b l e ; yet they were that x^hich could be set o f f against the present society as a model for emulation, as a measuring s t i c k to judge the present society, and a conceptualization x;hich negated the present a c u t a l i t y , and moved thought and action tox^ard p o t e n t i a l i t y . But within the context of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, the x*ord "utopia" has been defamed both i n connotation and i n denotation. In denotation i t lacks empirical content and thus i s meaningless. In connotation, i t i s a xvorld 111. of lunatics and dreamers, of those mystics who cannot face up to the reali t i e s of the status quo. Utopia's are no longer the products of strong minds, but the idle dreams of weak men. And so i t goes with a l l of the words we need to judge our individual and collective plight, and those objects of our existence which serve to further or hinder that plight. Marcuse states that (S)uch nouns as "freedom," "equality," "democracy," and "peace" imply, analytically, a specific set of attributes which occur invariably when the noun is spoken or written. In the West, the analytic prediction is in such terms as free enterprise, i n i t i a t i v e , elections, individual; in the East in terms of workers, and peasants, building communism and socialism, abolition of hostile classes. On either side, transgression of the discourse beyond the closed analytical structure is incorrect or propaganda, although the means of enforcement of truth and the degree of punishment are very different. In the universe of public discourse, speech moves tov/ards synonyms and tautologies; actually, i t never moves toward the qualitative difference. The analytic structure insulates the governing noun from those of i t s contents which would invalidate or at least disturb the accepted use of the noun in statements of policy and public opinion. The ritualized concept is made immune against contradiction.160 We must come to understand the effective authoritarian nature of a language dominated by operational logic. Grant has argued that what is different in our society is the need for and means of control over a l l fractions within i t , and Marcuse shows this control to begin at a basic philosophic level—control over the language. This control by the status quo over the concepts which would judge the society is accomplished in two ways. First, as we have mentioned, i t absorbs alternatives and potentially negative concepts into the terms of the extant society by demanding the operationalization of these concepts in terms of some actual (not potential) objects and events. The subject, by definition of the operational principle, can have no real meaning of i t s own, nor does i t take any autonomous meaning with i t when joined with the object in the proposition. The predicate, then, determines i t s subject totally, and the predicate in an operational statement 112. serves only to affirm the established present reality and universe of discourse. But secondly, the operationalization of concepts is essentially arbitrary, as long as the operational meaning is given. The subject can be defined in terms of any predicate, for i t theoretically can have no meaning unto i t s e l f . Arbitrary assignments of meaning can be regulated by no transcending principles, for the operational logic denies the existence and meaning of such principles. Such arbitrary assignment w i l l always favour the common or the powerful, and in advanced industrial society, these two reinforce each other. The common can become a l l powerful in that i t is invisible, and the acceptance of commonplace always favours those who benefit by i t . We are not here to overlook the problems of arriving at the definitive meaning of such terms as "good", "beautiful", "freedom", etc., nor are we going to suggest philosophical ways to give essential meaning to these terms. We are here rather to describe the effective p o l i t i c a l results for advanced industrial society in which these terms are considered to have no real meaning whatsoever. The statement that they have no meaning is interest-ing in i t s e l f , and also misleading. These terms are said to have no meaning in the sense that unless operationalized, they are not empirical propositions; and secondly, because they refer to judgements of value, which have no meaning according to this same non-empirical criterion. What is misleading is that they are inevitably transformed into statements of value and judge-ment anyway. The empirical c r i t e r i a only strips them of their negative content, and by doing so gives them an ideological affirmative content. Indeed, the irony of the technological society is that i t denies value distinctions on the one hand but prescribes them in terms of i t s own project on the other. The society r e i f i e s these once potentially negative concepts in a new, repressive, affirmative manner. "Progress" is the measure and 113. justification of our society. Bureaucratic organizations are more "efficient." The established universe of discourse wins no matter how the terms are applied to i t . "Progress is our most important product", but to say that progress is not everything, is to be making meaningless metaphysical judgements. Marcuse remarks that "progress is not a neutral term; i t moves toward specific ends and is defined by the possibilities of ameliorating X 6 X the human conditon." We live, in the name of progress and efficiency, but we cannot make judgements concerning the direction and meaning of such progress and efficiency. Clearly, to talk to progress in value free terms is not only to delude oneself but also to distort that which is essential to the concept of progress. We must realize that the proposition "the world is as i t i s " is a judgement of fact, but the valuational and ideological implications of that proposition are immense. George Grant speaks to this fundamental philosophical realization necessary to the understanding of advanced industrial society. Indeed, the distinction between judgements of fact and judgements of value has been thought to be favorable to a pluralist society. The common or objective world would be the facts known sc i e n t i f i c a l l y , leaving men free to choose their values for themselves. However, this distinction has worked in exactly the opposite direction towards the monism of technological values. From the assumption that the scientific method is not concerned with judgements of value, i t is but a short step to asserting that reason cannot t e l l us anything about good and bad, and that, therefore, judgements of value are subjective preferences based on our particular emotional makeup. But the very idea that good and bad are subjective preferences removes one possible break from the triumphant chariot of technology. The rhetoric of pluralism simply legitimizes the monistic fact.162 We must now turn our attention to the more directly p o l i t i c a l manifesta-tions of these trends in advanced industrial society. D. Advanced Industrial Society: The Politics of Feigned Pluralism. For those who stay within the central stream of our society and are therefore dominant in i t s institutions, and effect of nihilism is the narrowing to an unmitigated reliance on technique. Nietzche's equivocation 114. about the r e l a t i o n between the highest w i l l to power and the w i l l to technology has never been a part of the English speaking t r a d i t i o n . With us the i d e n t i t y was securely thought from the very beginning of our modernity. Therefore as our l i b e r a l horizons fade into the winter of n i h i l i s m , and as the dominating amongst us see themselves within no horizon except t h e i r own creating of the world, the pure w i l l to: technology (whether personal or public) more and more gives sole content to that creating. In the o f f i c i a l i n t e l l e c t u a l community t h i s process has been c a l l e d "the end of ideology." What that phrase f l a t t e r i n g l y covers i s the cl o s i n g down of w i l l i n g to a l l content except the desire to make the future by mastery, and the cl o s i n g down of a l l thinking which transcends calculation...We now move towards the pos i t i o n where technolo-g i c a l progress becomes i t s e l f the sole context within which a l l that i s other to i t must attempt to be present. George Grant, Technology and Empire The magnitude of the t a u t o l o g i c a l character of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos acts upon advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i n a most autho r i t a r i a n manner. For a philosophy which e f f e c t i v e l y denies judgements of valuation according to i t s precepts, denys further any valuation of i t s e l f . As the dominant ethos, i t i s both absolute and i n v i s i b l e because of t h i s f a c t . It i s i n v i s i b l e , too, because i t i s seen as a method that would and has aided man to solve many of the basic material problems of his existence. It i s absolute because i t has removed a l l from i t s path which could hinder i t s dominance—that i s , judgements regarding i t and i t s h i s t o r i c a l project. In a l l fairness to the past, George Grant suggests that "(w)hen modern l i b e r a l s , p o s i t i v i s t s , and e x i s t e n t i a l i s t s have c r i t i c i z e d the idea of human excellence, they may have thought that they were c l e a r i n g the ground of r e l i g i o u s and metaphysical 163 s u p e r s t i t i o n s which stood i n the way of the i n d i v i d u a l . " But Grant remarks that they were rather "serving the s o c i a l purpose of l e g i t i m i z i n g the t o t a l l y technological society by destroying anything from before the age of progress 164 which might i n h i b i t i t s v i c t o r y . " It must be clear that when we speak of the monolithic nature of the ethos, and of i t s a b i l i t y to repress a l t e r n a t i v e s and thus c r i t i c a l judgements, and of i t s philosophic tendency to steep a l l true (in i t s own terms) propositions i n the r h e t o r i c and r e a l i t i e s of the present and actual world, that we do not 115. deny that there i s a progress of a sort within the context and confines of the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i t s e l f . Surely, there has been tremendous s c i e n t i f i c and technological progress i n the l a s t century which i s exhibited i n advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. And surely t h i s progress has made l i f e for mankind generally better than i t was i n the past. The point i s that the progress we have witnessed i n the name of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i s technological and s c i e n t i f i c progress, and that t h i s i s a p a r t i c u l a r kind of progress, and that t h i s kind of progress coupled with the complexity of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society m i l i t a t e s against other kinds of progress we might imagine, desire, and need. Although various h i s t o r i c a l versions of p o s i t i -vism and empiricism have been fundamentally theories of p r o g r e s s — t h a t i s , that the r e a l conditions at time t plus x are i n some sense better than at time t, t h i s progress i s circumscribed within the kind of r e a l i t i e s which we find at time t; that i s , no e m p i r i c i s t theory of progress ever progresses to something "other" than the given h i s t o r i c a l p r o j e c t . * Thus, such progress i s e f f e c t i v e l y only quantitative and never t r u e l y q u a l i t a t i v e . * Some might take exception to t h i s statement, and i t does, perhaps, demand c l a r i f i c a t i o n . There have been vague evolutionary theories such as that of Spencer which were c e r t a i n l y i n the s p i r i t of e a r l y s c i e n t i f i c inquiry. There are also the h i s t o r i c a l theories of progress such as Marx. But Marx was able to integrate h i s science x^ith the i d e a l i s t d i a l e c t i c of Hegel, and as such i s an exceptional case. And there have also been p o l i t i c a l science-f i c t i o n Utopia's such as Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward. A l l of these have i n common the viex? of a technological progress x^hich Xi?ould culminate i n a non-technological utopia, a world x^hich x;ould discard or take i t s h i s t o r y for granted once i t had provided that x i/orld with the t e c h n i c a l and material means to transcend i t s e l f . In t h i s way, we see the progress x/hich they x-jould describe to be technological and s c i e n t i f i c progress, and not to be other* However, they did see a point i n time, a point usually which they considered so natural as to not need elaboration, at which t h i s q uantitative p r o l i f e r a -t i o n of technology would bring about a q u a l i t a t i v e change tox^ard something other than the technological x-jorld. In t h i s respect, they understood the nature of the modern technology and the technological socie t y which was to develop very inadequately. They f a i l e d to grasp the xjay i n x-rhich the technology could and x^ould transform the d i r e c t i o n of society, how i t x^ould deny q u a l i t a t i v e change toward an "other" and how i t x«>uld transform the l i v e s of i t s c i t i z e n s and tend to render them both incapable and non-desirous of contemplating t h e i r p l i g h t . 116. We have seen the liberal technocratic ethos to mediate against judgements by the absorption of a l l concepts into the terms and logic of the existing society. This has been, as V7e have described i t , a philosophical absorption. But as throughout this thesis, we have seen societal arrange-ments and dilemmas to parallel philosophical arrangements and dilemmas, (we have seen these two kinds of parallel relationships to be more than coincidental according to the mutual relationship of "idea" and "being."), and here we must now look to the p o l i t i c a l (societal) level for the absorption of alternatives. By alternatives we mean standards, proposals, and Choices which are other than those of the logic and mechanisms of advanced industrial society. We do not challenge that there is a plurality of alternatives of a technological kind in our society. What we do challenge is the availability of viable non-technological alternatives. We would assert that advanced industrial society is able to absorb these non-technological alternatives and to render them as supports for the status quo. The authoritarian nature of this rendering is disguised because there is l i t t l e or no overt repression of alternatives; there is rather an effective transformation of their content. Non-technological alternatives would serve to negate the technological actuality in at least the sense that they are "other" than actual existence. But the absorption process serves to alter the content of alternatives and to transform their negative function into an affirmative one. We have seen in the previous section the transformation of the contents of concepts which could serve both the function of judgement and the provision of conceptual alternatives, through the absorption of subjects by their objects and the resulting desublimation* of their conceptual essence. We have yet to *We here use the term "desublimate" in the sense Marcuse uses the term. We can understand this concept by looking at i t s meaning in the dictionary. "Sublimate is defined as "to express (socially unacceptable impulses or biological drives) in constructive, socially acceptable forms."165 "Desublimate" means then to be made unable to express that which is unac-ceptable to the society in any constructive and meaningful manner. 117. discuss the resulting desublimation of extant alternatives, and we w i l l turn ourselves to this task here. We can understand this absorption process i f we review the extent of the economic nature of advanced industrial society. (See the introduction to Chapter Two.) On the one hand, a l l goods and services are considered as commodities in the mass economic society. On the other, the economic demands for control institute themselves in the society and seek the proliferation of those things which would soothe and bring quietude. Alternatives are subject to distribution as commodities throughout the society. As such, they must be compromised to f i t the needs of "average" citizens, they must not be offensive to any group in society, and more fundamentally they must not challenge the logic and mechanism's of the production and distribution process i t s e l f . We must speak in terms of examples here, and art serves our purpose well. Ideally, art (music, poetry, painting, motion, novels, pictures, drama, etc.) speaks to truth and beauty. (In the idealist formula-tion, these are one in the same.) In either case, art can generally be seen to serve a negative function in the society.-- As art speaks to truth, i t may display factuaiity in a more clear way than we normally can view i t , and thus negate our conventional understanding of the world. It may show factu-a i i t y clearly in order that this factuaiity i t s e l f is set against the rest of our world. Or i t may show factuaiity as "other" than i t is that we might perceive the essence of the subject involved and better comprehend that * Some would feel uneasy about the assigning of a definition or set of functions to art. We do not hope here, to define art or include a i l of what is art into a neat conceptual statement. We wish rather to discuss the interrelationship of art and advanced industrial society, and we feel that this is both a legitimate and important task. For an example of an art historian who shares with us this attitude, see Arnold Hauser, The  Social History of Art. New Yorks Vintage Books, Vols. I-IV, 1951. 118. transcendent character potentiality. As art speaks to beauty, i t negates the ugliness of the actual world by showing us the beauty that is potential in i t . When an artist provides "his truth," he does not mirror the on-going society for i t is less than true in the sense that i t is less than i t could be potentially. When an artist provides a glimpse of beauty, he does i t not because the society is beautiful, but because there is beauty which exists as a fuller alternative for our lives. Furthermore, art is an autonomous effort, the act of an independent individual or group of individuals to comment on truth and beauty and its meaning. But what is art in advanced industrial society? It can be that mass produced commodity which like, cigarettes and dish-washing liquid, is created, advertised, and distributed for profit. Or i t can be true art which has it s content transformed by being rendered other than i t i s . In the affluent society, more and more people are exposed to the classics. But this exposure is of a different kind than was the origional intention of their creators. Having read the classics becomes a commodity in i t s e l f , a part of status and prestige, like having a big car, or a fine stereo, or a "good" woman. Classic's become the status objects of the "cultured", not necessarily part of the contemplative understanding of one's l i f e and society. Art becomes a collector's item, party conversation, background music, a good buy, a benefit of being rich, a diversion or hobby. It is something the diligent can afford; i t is something to occupy one's leisure time. It is less often a meaningful vision of a better and transcendent world. As a commodity and prestige symbol, i t functions as a support to the economic and status needs of the populace and thus the economic system, and less often as a challenge to those needs. Marcuse speaks to those who view this assimilation as the democratization of the "good l i f e . " 119. The neo-conservative c r i t i c s of l e f t i s t c r i t i c s of mass culture rid:'cule the protest against Bach as background music in the kitchen, dgainst Plato and Hegel, Shelly and Baudelaire, Marx and Freud in the drugstore. Instead, they insist on recognition of the fact that the classics have left the mausoleum and come to l i f e again, and that people are just so much more educated. True, but coming to l i f e as classics, they come to l i f e as other than themselves; they are deprived of the antagonistic force, of the estrangement which was the very dimension of their truth. The intent and function of these works has thus been fundamentally changed. If they once stood for contradiction of the status quo, this contradiction is now flattened out...The fact that (in the past) the transcending truths of the fine arts and the aesthetics of l i f e and thought were only accessible to a few is not corrected by paperbacks, general education, long-playing records, and the abolition of formal dress in the theatre and concert hall...It is good that almost everyone can now have the fine arts at his fingertips, by just turning the knob of his set, or by just stepping into his drugstore. In this diffusion, however, they became cogs in the culture machine which remakes their content. But this process of the desublimation of art cannot be fu l l y understood without considering the corresponding desublimation of language and the concepts thereof. Art, as such, according to operational logic, can have no possible meaning other than that given i t by the art salesman, or collector, or connoisseur. Nor can the concepts of truth or beauty—those things that art is about. The function and meaning of art, other than the arbitrary soothing effect i t s admirers have been taught to appreciate, is rendered philosophically s t e r i l e . Therefore, the use of art as a commodity is perfectly feasible according to the dual logic of advanced industrial society— the logic of economics and of science; Art, can have no autonomous and alternative meaning of i t s own. Its meaning is controlled by i t s environ-ment, and used for control by those who can establish and maintain i t . Thus the subject (alternatives), can only have meaning as provided by its object (in this case the rea l i t i e s logic of advanced industrial economic l i f e ) and as such the subject receives i t s whole definition when i t is placed into a proposition with i t s object. We must understand how these two parallel forces, the logic of economic prerogatives and the philosophy of science work 120. inseparably together in the desublimation of alternatives. Each serves to compliment and justify the activity of the other. Virtually nothing can escape this desublimation process. Literature which was intended to subvert the existing society, becomes popular and makes the best seller l i s t . Art becomes not a negation of the conventional social and p o l i t i c a l universe, but rather an " i n " hobby for the rich. The caustic laments of folksingers are packaged and sold at four dollars a shot and played on six hundred dollar stereos. The local underground newspaper is stacked with the New Left Review and The Wall Street Journal and Time Magazine. Long hair becomes "mod" and.the identity of certain of those who would seek to negate the ongoing culture is lost. In the very process of absorption, the negative and liberating essence of these forms of alternate expression is lost. In the process of becoming a salable commodity, that which would subvert the society serves only to be absorbed by its dominant economic system, and is thus rendered as a support for i t . Furthermore, advanced industrial society has managed to effectively incorporate other traditional institutions which might have served to offer resistance into its logic and prerogatives. The case of education is easy to understand. The technological society needed men trained in the logic and instrumentalities of scientific and organizational technique. Furthermore, such training became prerequisite for advancement in the economic heirarchy of society. Education was paid for by the taxpayers or those rich who benefited by the system. Inevitably, especially in North America, x^here there had been virtually no tradition even in ideal of the " c r i t i a l university," education came to mean training for positions in the economic structure. Training in the arts was either an anachronism left over from earlier European society, or served to round out and provide a l i t t l e "culture" for 121. the scientific and corporate technicians."^ We have seen the place of Reason in advanced industrial society to be not that of " c r i t i c a l rationality" but rather of technique and control. George Grant speaks to this point. Reason to a North American is generally thought of as scientific reason. For scie n t i f i c reason is concerned with the external and i t s control for human purposes. It is not concerned with what human purposes are good. This again can be so clearly seen in our educational system. Education is concerned with teaching young people techniques by which they can do things in the world. There is almost no concern in our educational system with seeing that our young people think deeply about the purpose for which these techniques should be used. But we must return to the philosophical side of this desublimation process. It facilitates this ideological unification of a l l dissonant parts with the central theme of the ethos by allowing us the free and arbitrary assignment of names (nomena) to the activity of the society. In some cases these names serve to disguise the content of their new (desublimated) meaning. In other cases, old words with familiar, comforting, and noble connotations are applied where they can best be used by those in control. Meaning is nothing in i t s e l f but is used for an effect. Speech writers, PR men, merchandisers, a l l these dominate a society in which words do not represent larger essential meanings by which the society can be judged but are rather tools of social and p o l i t i c a l control. This is not control in the terms of force and power as we conventionally understand i t , but rather effective control in the terms of alternatives which are not offered in the name of freedom, liberation, comfort, and even permissiveness. Such words can be used to integrate us willingly into the prevailing universe of discourse, and serve to render us incapable of judging our particular historical project. Theodore Roszak provides us with some examples of this use of language. We c a l l i t "education," the " l i f e of the mind," the "pursuit of truth." But i t is a matter of machine-tooling the young to the needs of the various baroque bureaucracies: corporate, governmental, military, 122. trade union, educational. We c a l l i t "free enterprise." But i t is a vastly restrictive system of oligopolistic market manipulation... We c a l l i t "creative leisure:"...But i t is like our sexual longings, an expensive adjunct of careerist high-achievement; the price that goes to the dependable hireling. We c a l l i t "pluralism." But i t is a matter of the public authorities solemnly affirming everybody's right to his own opinion as an excuse for ignoring anybody's troubling challenge. We c a l l i t "democracy." But i t is a matter of public opinion polling in which a "random sample" is asked to nod and wag the head in response to prefabricated alternatives, usually related to the faits accompli of decision makers, who can always construe the polls to their own ends.*69 Foreign policy statements, are packed with this arbitrary and repressive use of language. A "privileged sanctuary" for the enemy is an "a l l y " for our side. The dispatch of troops to a trouble zone by the enemy is a "provocation;" when performed by our side i t is an "action for peace." When the enemy invades a c r i t i c a l nation i t is termed a "violation of neutrality." Commenting on the 1970 Cambodian invasion, by the United States, the governor of California commented that, "surely no freedom loving American would dare speak out against the president's decision." We must understand the repressive effect that this use of language can have in advanced industrial, democratic societies, where politics greatly involve the use of such language on the people through the media. And we must understand that such use of language greatly facilitates the incorporation of alternatives into the social whole, by assigning them new and foreign content; a content which is incapable of challenging and judging the whole or i t s many parts, because i t has content only in terms of that society. The historical evolution of liberalism serves as an excellent example of the a b i l i t y of advanced industrial society to absorb what might have been alternative into i t s project. The evolution of liberalism further shows the general influence of scie n t i f i c and technological prerogatives on its development. We have discussed earlier that some philosophic problems of 123. c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m were due to the e f f o r t s of i t s authors to emulate science. But at that point i n h i s t o r y science was a new and negative influence on the society. Science set i t s e l f o f f against the ignorance and s u p e r s t i t i o n of the past, and against the general incompetence of man i n h i s b a t t l e with nature .to overcome s c a r c i t y and i n s e c u r i t y . Furthermore, c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m set i t s e l f against the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l structures of the t i m e — a g a i n s t the despotism of tyrants, the c o n t r o l and influence of the church i n p o l i t i c s , and against the vested i n t e r e s t s of the landed a r i s t o c r a c y . C l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l i s m has received much praise i n our society for i t s moral cant but t h i s i s somewhat misleading. Liberalism was fundamentally an economic and not moral doctrine. Nonetheless, t h i s economic proposal served to negate and spurn the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l , economic, and p o l i t i c a l arrangements extant at t h i s inception. The difference between the time and work of Locke and H i l l i l l u s t r a t e s the h i s t o r i c a l inversion of the content of l i b e r a l democratic theory. Richard Lichtman states that: Locke wrote during a period i n which landed, feudal power was being undermined by mercantilism and the flowerings of a growing i n d u s t r i a l system. The fundamental a l t e r a t i o n of t h i s time was the destruction of the status of landed wealth and the c r e a t i o n of the i n s t i t u t i o n of private property. Locke's system was both the expression of that transformation and an encouragement to i t s continued development. By the time M i l l appeared, i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l i s m had triumphed, and the requirement of the moment was a defense of that system against the threatening incursions of the i n d u s t r i a l masses. M i l l responded with a theory which shaped democracy to the pattern of i n d u s t r i a l property and power--a theory of c o u n t e r v a i l i n g c a p i t a l i s m within the c a p i t a l i s t parameter.170 Lichtman finds a " s i g n i f i c a n t distance which separates the contemporary, 171 r e v i s i o n i s t i d e a l from that of i t s c l a s s i c a l predecessors. 1' He finds three tendencies i n contemporary l i b e r i a l i s m to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s divergence. F i r s t , the new theory i s a n t i - c r i t i c a l for the basic reason that i t derives i t s d e f i n i t i o n of democracy from the nature of e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . Second, the new theory i s e l i t i s t , not merely in the simple sense that i t notes the existence of e l i t e s , but i n a more fundamental sense that i t redefines the democratic process so that co n t r o l by e l i t e s i s commended and made e s s e n t i a l to the w e l l being m. of democracy: "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to r u l e them." And f i n a l l y , the theory i s s t r i k i n g l y formal, for i t defines democracy as "a p o l i t i c a l method, that i s to say, a c e r t a i n type of i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangement for a r r i v i n g at p o l i t i c a l - l e g i s l a t i v e and administrative decisions--and hence incapable of being an end i n i t s e l f . . . " 1 7 3 - 174 Let us b r i e f l y examine each point. The f i r s t tendency i l l u s t r a t e s the influence of empiricism i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l t h e o r i z i n g . L i b e r a l democratic theory i s now " a n t i - c r i t i c a l " because i t can only speak i n the terms of that which i t would c r i t i c i z e . Furthermore, i t s p r e s c r i p t i v e capacity i s rendered t a u t o l o g i c a l because i t s base i s t o t a l l y d e s c r i p t i v e . It can only prescribe within the range of actual states and cannot consider p o t e n t i a l i t y . Licthman b e a u t i f u l l y r e l a t e s the s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophecy involved i n d e s c r i p t i v e s o c i a l t h e o r i z i n g , and of the r e s u l t i n g absorption of theory into the context of the status quo. The reduction of the moral imperative i n contemporary p o l i t i c a l l i f e leads the t h e o r e t i c a l apologist to reduce his appraisal of that contracting existence to the point at which the two become indi s t i n g u i s h a b l e . P r a c t i t i o n e r s of t h i s technique congratulate themselves upon t h e i r neutral realism, apparently obvious to the fact that t h e i r theories support the very perversion of the democratic process they o s t e n t i a l l y intend to merely describe. In t h i s way, thought and action feed upon each other, each reduction in s o c i a l existence f o r e c l o s i n g another dimension of c r i t i c a l thought, while each d i s o l u t i o n of the exercise of r a t i o n a l dissent leaves existent power so much less vulnerable to p r i n c i p l e d assault. 175 Lichtman's second tendency r e f l e c t s the incorporation of bureaucratic organizational prerogatives into the p o l i t i c a l society. This trend was fostered (some would say necessitated) by the complexity of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. Organizational p r i n c i p l e s were i n s t i t u t e d to r a t i o n a l i z e the a c t i v i t y of the society. This i s e a s i l y seen i n the McNamara excerpt i n which he suggests that democratic s o c i e t i e s run the r i s k of being "undermanaged" and that p o l i c y decisions must "remain at the top." Lichtman's t h i r d tendency i n contemporary l i b e r a l democratic theory i l l u s t r a t e s what we have stressed throughout t h i s thesis--the reduction of a l l forms of 125. l i f e to technique and the r e s u l t i n g i n v i s i b l e and neutral appearance which these forms then take on. A l l mechanisms become only methods for man to apply to h i s world. They are considered i n themselves to have no normative consequences. What i s never considered i s the ends which are prerequisite to these means. Liberalism has been e s s e n t i a l l y an economic doctrine since i t s inception. What we must appreciate i s the h i s t o r i c a l changes which have occurred and which a l t e r the l i b e r a l meaning. We have stated that economic l i b e r a l i s m took on a subversive and l i b e r a t i n g character with Locke. What may be more s i g n i f i c a n t about the Lockean economic creed was that i t took place i n a society of considerably less complexity. Technique was not then an end i n i t s e l f . It could only become so when the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of technology and r e s u l t i n g bureaucratization reached a high degree of development according to the demands of the complex tasks which i t must perform. For Locke freedom was economic freedom and t h i s was to dominate a l l future versions of the l i b e r a l creed. In Locke's time t h i s was perhaps as i t should be. In an age of primal s c a r c i t y , the freedom to p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n economic l i f e was surely a fundamental freedom. But l i b e r a l t h e o r i s t s have f a i l e d to take into account two factors which have changed i n objective material conditions. The f i r s t i s simply that s c a r c i t y i s less of a problem now—perhaps, we w i l l soon be able to see i t as not a problem at a l l . What i s far more s i g n i f i c a n t , however, i s that the l i b e r a l notion of economic freedom would take on important incongruencies as i t encountered the technological economy. For i t was w e l l within the l i b e r a l view of, freedom to be free to pursue economic ends according to the most e f f i c i e n t , productive and p r o f i t a b l e means. Indeed, we have seen these values to be deeply ingrained i n our society. But i n doing so, l i b e r a l i s m f a i l e d to account for the meaning to other kinds of human freedom and development 126. that these new technological means to economic ends would have. In advanced i n d u s t r i a l society, the l i b e r a l ideology would only serve to circumscribe the technocratic ideology, and through t h i s circumscription serve to disguise i t . The l i b e r a l r h e t o r i c s t i l l speaks of freedom and autonomy, i n d i v i d u a l development, and p a r t i c i p a t o r y democracy, yet i t s technological core renders l i b e r a l i s m empty of a l l but i t s drive for economic gain. Lichtman states that present "(l)iberal-democratic theory i s free to display a very large number of l o c a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s , so long as none of the instances transcends the parameter of c a p i t a l i s t economic power."*^ In l i g h t of t h i s discovery we must examine yet another t e n e t of l i b e r a l -democratic theory, the notion of pluralism. We l i v e i n a so-called p l u r a l i s t society where various e l i t e s compete for t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and cancel each other out according to a system of "countervailing powers." There i s no r e a l r u l i n g c l a s s , ideology, or set of r u l i n g i n t e r e s t . Competition seems apparent. Freedom of expression appears to f l o u r i s h . Conservatives b a t t l e L i b e r a l s ; Republicans struggle with Democrats; s o c i a l i s t s counter c a p i t a l i s t s ; labour engages with management; bluenoses censor l i b e r t i n e s . Yet no one challenges the assumptions and prerogatives of the t e c h n o c r a c y — i t s goals, values, or mechanisms. The great p l u r a l i s t myth, in conjunction with the "end-of-ideology.," contends that i n a democratic society, r u l i n g e l i t e s make decisions within the l i m i t s set upon them by public opinion and representative government. We would r e v e r s e t h i s - - p u b l i c opinion and representative government make decisions within rather narrow l i m i t s set by the nature of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society and the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos. Marcuse summarizes our understanding of t h i s feigned pluralism which cannot transcend i t s e l f . Advanced i n d u s t r i a l society i s indeed a system of countervailing powers. But these forces cancel each other out i n a higher u n i f i c a t i o n — i n the common i n t e r e s t to defend and extend the established p o s i t i o n , and to combat the h i s t o r i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s , to contain q u a l i t a t i v e 127. change. The countervailing powers do not include those which counter the whole. 1 " In the introduction to this study we suggested that there is a circular and tautologous relationship between the nature of any society and the means by which an individual can judge that society. This is because the conceptual maps of individuals are largely determined by their environment (society). That i s , an individual can judge his society only with the terms i t has provided him. Also, in the introduction, we postualted three kinds of ways that this circular relationship could be broken. F i r s t , the societal environment could be non-integrated to a degree that would allow for a plurality of conceptual perspectives. That i s , various sectors of the social mileiu could be different from one another in some fundamental perspective, and thus serve to negate one another--i.e., the church could offer values which countered those of the state, leisure pursuits could be "other" than one's daily economic involvement, etc. Secondly, we saw that the cir c l e could be broken by the establishment of man-made abstract systems such as logic in philosophy and mathematics in science. Because these systems were removed from any actual phenomena, they could serve to sit outside the circ l e and to act as objective c r i t e r i a for judgement and evaluation. A third way in which the circ l e might be broken was seen to be an ideal state of mind such as c r i t i c a l rationality, in which exposure to a body of contemplative considerations would enable one to purify human subjectivity. But what has become of these transcendent c r i t e r i a in advanced industrial society? F i r s t , we have seen the societal environment to be tightly integrated on a fundamental ideological level under the auspices of the liberal technocratic ethos. We have seen this ethos to direct individual activity on both a philosophical and pragmatic level. We have witnessed 123.. i t s a b i l i t y to absorb a l t e r n a t i v e s . Also, the dominating economic nature of the t o t a l society has been established. We have come to understand that the pluralism which might e x i s t , (be i t p o l i t i c a l or conceptual), i s subsumed under the larger whole of the d r i v i n g ethos of advanced i n d u s t r i a l society. Secondly, whatever atonomy of c r i t e r i a abstract systems of logic and mathematics might have afforded i n the past, t h i s autonomy has now been incorporated into the s o c i e t a l whole; for at i t s most fundamental l e v e l , the l i b e r a l technocratic ethos i s s c i e n t i f i c . Regardless of the v a l i d i t y of s c i e n t i f i c p r i n c i p l e s and method, such p r i n c i p l e s and method are no longer true a l t e r n a t i v e s which would negate the l o g i c and prerogatives of society. And t h i r d l y , i n a society which has come to e f f e c t i v e l y defame the serious contemplation of values; which has suggested that the proper r o l e of philosophy i s "the handmaiden of science;" and which, through operational l o g i c has deprived a l l concepts of t h e i r autonomous and c r i t i c a l c a p a c i t i e s ; surely i n t h i s society, c r i t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y and contemplative wisdom must, l i k e poetry, be no better or rewarding than push pin. To summarize beyond t h i s point would be ei t h e r redundant or counter-productive. In many respects, t h i s e n t i r e thesis has been a summary of what we consider to be the nature of our p l i g h t . We are f u l l y aware that the outlook presented here i s grim. In the s p i r i t of an ancient western t r a d i t i o n , we have simply borne x^itness to the f a c t . In c l o s i n g , we agree x?ith George Grant i n his observation that (w)e l i v e then i n the most r e a l i z e d technological soc i e t y xvhich has yet been; one which i s , moreover, the chief empirical centre from which technique i s spread around the world. It might seem then that because x?e are destined so to be, x-je might also be the people best able to comprehend what i t i s to be so. Because we are f i r s t and most f u l l y there, the need might seem to press upon us to t r y to know where we are i n t h i s new found "terre incognita." Yet the very substance of our e x i s t i n g x^hich has made us the leaders i n technique, stands as a b a r r i e r to any thinking which might be able to comprehend technique from beyond i t s own dynamism.178 129. FOOTNOTES 1. Karl Marx and Frederick Engles, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 9, f f . 2. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1964), p. 721. 3. L e s l i e A. White, "Energy and the Evolution of C u l t u r e , " The  Science of Culture ( L e s l i e A. White, Farrar Struss and Cudahy Company, 1949) pp. 364-366. 4. I b i d . , pp. 364-366. 5. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. c i t . , p. 499. 6. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (London, England: Oxford University Press, Third E d i t i o n , 1933). 7. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English  Language Unabridged ( S p r i n g f i e l d , Mass.: C. and C. Meriam Comp-any, 1963). 8* White, 0 £ . c i t . , p. 366. 9. Cit e d i n J . K. G a l b r a i t h , The Affl u e n t Society (New York: The New American L i b r a r y , 1958), pv 27, from J . M. Keynes, Essays  i n Persuasion: Economic P o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r Our Grandchildren (London: McMillian, 1931), p. 360. 10. I b i d . , pp. 28-29. 11. Paul A. Samuelson, Economics—An Introductory Analysis (New York: McGraw-Hill, Sixth E d i t i o n , 1948), p. 5, Emphagis i s Bine. 12. G a l b r a i t h , The Affl u e n t Society, op. c i t . , p. 29. 13. I b i d . . p. 37.. 14. I b i d . , p. 103. 15. I b i d . , p. 103. 16. Richard G. Lipsey and Peter 0. Steiner, Economics (New York: Harper and Row, Second E d i t i o n , 1966), p. 3. 17. G a l b r a i t h , The Affluent Society, op. c i t . , p. 117. 18. I b i d . , p. 117. 19. I b i d . , p. 117. 20. Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 11. 130 21. I b i d . , p. 11, 12. 22. I b i d . , p. 12. 23. C. B. Macpherson, "Democratic Theory: Ontology and Technology," i n D. Sp i t z (ed.), P o l i t i c a l Theory and S o c i a l Change (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), Chapter Nine, pp. 206-207. 24. J . K. G a l b r a i t h , The New I n d u s t r i a l State (New York: The New American L i b r a r y , 1967), pp. 13-14. 25. I b i d . . P. 24. 26. I b i d . , PP . 25-29. 27. I b i d . . P« 16.. 28. I b i d . . P. 38. 29. I b i d . , P« 39. 30. I b i d . , P« 41. 31. I b i d . . P« 41. 32. I b i d . , P- 41. 33. I b i d . , P« 17. 34. Arnold Brecht. P o l i t i c a l Theory (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton Un i v e r s i t y Press, 1959), p. 33. 35. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. c i t . , p. 476. 36. William A. Glaser, "The Types and Uses of P o l i t i c a l Theory," i n James A. Gould and Vincent V. Thursby (eds.), Contemporary  P o l i t i c a l Thought (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 70. 37. Eugene Meehan, The Theory and Method of P o l i t i c a l Analysis (Homewood, I l l i n o i s : The Dorsey Press, 1965), p. 171^ 38. Cited i n Brecht,, op_, c i t . , p, 223. 39. Richard S. Rudner, The Philosophy of S o c i a l Science (Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Inc., 1966), p. 80. 40. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. c i t . , p. 1305. 41. I b i d . , p. 1481. 42i Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy i n Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 60. 131. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. From Max Weber: Essays i n Sociology. Translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright M i l l s , (New York: Oxford u n i v e r s i t y Press, 1946), p, 196. Max Weber, The Theory of S o c i a l and Economic Organization, Translated by A. M. Henderson and T a l c o t t Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 331. I b i d . . p. 330. I b i d . , p. 340. Blau, op. c i t . , p. 30. Weber, op_. c i t . , p. 334. I b i d . . p. 337. Gerth and M i l l s , on. c i t . , p. 214. Blau, op_. c i t . , p. 31. Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 38. I b i d . . p. 36. I b i d . , p. 50. I b i d . . p. 49. I b i d . , p. 49. I b i d . , p. 52. Blau, op_. c i t . . pp** 36-39. I b i d . , p. 36. I b i d . . p. 38. I b i d . , p. 38. Harry K. G i r v e t z , The Evolution of Li b e r a l i s m (London, England: Collier-MacmiHan Ltd., 1963), p. 154. William F. Buckley J r . , The Jeweler's Eye (New York: G. E. Put-nam's Sons, 1968), pp. 15-17. G i r v e t z , OP. c i t . , pp» 153-154. I b i d . , p. 23. I b i d . , pp. 25-26. 132. 67. I b i d . , pp. 23-24. 68. Etienne G i l s o n , Thomas Langan, and Armand A. Maurer, Recent  Philosophy: Hegel To The Present (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 411. 69. See G i r v e t z , op_. c i t . , pp. 27-28. 70. G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, op_. c i t . , p. 412. 71. I b i d . , p. 412. 72. I b i d . . p. 412. 73. I b i d . , pp. 415-416. 74. Cite d i n I b i d P T p. 416, from Jeremy Bentham, P r i n c i p l e s of Morals  and L e g i s l a t i o n . I., 1; edited by J . Browning. In a footnote, Maurer shows Bentham's passage to be taken almost l i t e r a l l y from Helvetius, De l ' e s p i r i t . I I I . , 9; Oeuvres Completes ( P a r i s : 1818), V o l . 1, p. 293, f f . 75. Cite d i n I b i d . , p. 418, from Jeremy Bentham, Deontology; ed., J . Browning (London: 1834), I., pp. 130-131. 76. C i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 815, from Jeremy Bentham, C o d i f i c a t i o n Pro- p o s a l , 3; ed., J . Browning, VI., p. 540. 77. C i t e d i n I b i d . . p. 417, from Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of  Reward. I I I . , I; ed. J . Browning, I I . , p. 253* 78. See G i r v e t z , op_. c i t . , Notes on Chapter 1, note # 2, p. 389. 79. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. c i t . , p. 25. 80. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1964), p. x i . 81. Robert A. Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology," i n Chaim I. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology Debate (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 182. 82. A f u l l discussion of the "end-of-ideology" debate can be found i n summary form i n Chaim I. Waxman (ed.), The End of Ideology  Debate (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968). Waxman includes a r t i c l e s containing portions of the o r i g i n a l l i t e r a t u r e debate which took place from 1955 through 1968. 83. I b i d . , p. 3. 84. Raymond Aaron, The I n d u s t r i a l Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 144. 133. 85. Cit e d i n Waxman, op_. c i t . , p. 4. 86. Daniel B e l l , "The End of Ideology i n the West," i n Waxman, op. c i t . , p. 96. 87. Webster's Hew World Dictionary, op. c i t . . p. 721. 88. Henery David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology," i n Waxman, op. c i t . , p. 251. 89. Daniel B e l l , The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 370-371. 90. Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Inte r p r e t a t i o n , " i n The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review. (Vol. LX, No. 1), 1966. 91. Waxman, op. c i t . , p. 5. 92. I b i d . , p. 5. 93. Seymor Martin L i p s e t , P o l i t i c a l Man (Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), p. 439. 94. I b i d . , p. 442. 95. Waxman, op_. c i t . . p. 5. 96. Edgar Z. Friedenberg, i n a review of George Grant's, Technology  and Empire, and S l a t e r ' s , The Pursuit of Loneliness, i n the New York Review of Books. June 4, 1970 (Vol. XIV, No. 11). 97. Waxman, op. c i t . , p. 4. 98. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. c i t . , p. 11. 99. C i t e d i n Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and I t s Youthful  Opposition. (Garden C i t y , New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 11, from John F. Kennedy, ! ,Yale u n i v e r s i t y Commencement Speech," New York Times. June 12, 1962, p. 20. 100. Roszak, op_. c i t . , pp. 10-11. 101. In the context of the argument i n the New I n d u s t r i a l State, G a l b r a i t h alludes to t h i s point, (e.g., see p. 44.). 102. G a l b r a i t h , The New I n d u s t r i a l State, op. c i t . , p. 44. 103. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. c i t . , pp. 11-12. 104. I b i d . , p. 12. 105. Jacques E l l u i , The Technological Society (New York: Random House, 1964), p. v i . 134. 106. The strongest o n t o l o g i c a l statement of t h i s l o g i c a l extension of empiricism as the method f o r v e r i f i c a t i o n i s made by A. J . Ayer. One of the Vienna C i r c l e , Ayer f e e l s that judgments of r i g h t or wrong, good or bad, b e a u t i f u l or ugly, e t c . , can have no f a c t u a l base; they are merely sentiments or f e e l i n g s . For a synopsis of Ayer's work and viewpoints, see G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, Recent Philosophy, op. c i t . , pp. 538-542. 107. Blau, 0£. c i t . , p. 15. 108. This argument i s held by a number of scholars. One such ex-c e l l e n t commentary can be found i n George Grant, "The Univers-i t y Curriculum," i n George Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969). 109. See I b i d . 110. E l l u l , op_. c i t . , p. 138. 111. C i t e d i n Roszak, op_. c i t . , pp. 11-12, from Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 109-110. 112. Roszak, op_. c i t . , footnote on p. 12. 113. Blau, op_. c i t . . p. 21. 114. Presthus, op. c i t . , pp. 15-17. 115. Blau, op_. c i t . , p. 53. 116. Webster's New World Dictionary, bp. c i t . . p. 498. 117. Presthus, og,. ext., p. 33. 118. I b i d . , p. 33. 119. I b i d . , p. 37. 120. I b i d . , p. 165. 121. I b i d . , p. 188. 122. George Grant, Philosophy i n the Mass Age (Vancouver: The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1959), p. v i . 123. Ci t e d i n Presthus, op. c i t . , p. 290, from L. A. Coser, The  Functions of S o c i a l C o n f l i c t (Glencoe, I I I . ; The Free Press, 1956), p. 22. 124. Presthus, op_. c i t . , p. 290. 125. I b i d . , p. 290. 135 126. I b i d . , pp. 290-291. 127. Meehan, op. c i t . , p. 171. 128. K. W. Kim, "The Limits of Behavioral Explanation i n P o l i t i c s , " i n McCoy and Playford (ed.), A p o l i t i c a l P o l i t i c s (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1967), pp. 47-48. 129. See G i l s o n , Langan, Maurer, op_. c i t . , p. 539. 130. Cit e d i n Uni v e r s i t y of Washington Da i l y , February 4, 1970, p. 7, from the t h i r d volume of Bertrand Russell's autobiography. 131. Cit e d i n G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, op. c i t . , p. 498, from Bertrand R u s s e l l , Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 42. 132. G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, op_. c i t . , note # 3 6 p . 830. 133. I b i d . , p. 497. 134. C i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 497, from Bertrand R u s s e l l . My P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Development, p. 217. 135. G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, op_. c i t . , p. 522. 136. C i t e d i n I b i d . . p. 523, from Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus, .4.003. 137. C i t e d i n Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. c i t . , p, 178, from Ludwig W i t t g e n s t e i n - P h i l o s o p h i c a l Investigations, p. 47. 138. I b i d . , p. 47. 139. G i l s o n , Langan, and Maurer, op_. c i t . , p. 524. 140. C i t e d i n I b i d . , p. 524, from Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.11. 141. Cit e d i n I b i d . , p. 525, from Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, 6.53. 142. Cit e d i n I b i d . , p. 525, from Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , 6.52, 5.521. 143. Cit e d i n I b i d . , p. 528, from Wittgenstein, P h i l o s o p h i c a l  Investigations, p. 339. 144. C i t e d i n Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, pp. c i t . , p. 13, from P. W. Bridgeman, The Logic of Modern Physics. (New York: McMillian, 1928), p.' 31. 145. Anatol Rapmrttrtt, Operational Philosophy (New York: John Wiley and Son, Inc., 1965), pp. 215-216. 136. 146. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 720. 147. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of  Social Theory (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1960), p. ix. 148o See Gilson, Langan, and Maurer, op. c i t . . p. 499. 149. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. c i t . . p. 126. 150. Ibid., p. 127. 151. George Grant, Technology and Empire (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), p. 9. 152. Gilson, Langan, and Maurer, OP. ci t . , p. 529. 153. Cited in Ibid., p. 530, from G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33," Mind 1954, p* 26. 154. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. ci t . , pp. 107-108. 155. Ibid., p. 178. 156. See Girvetz, .2P.. cit. T pp. 23-24*. 157. Cited in Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. ci t . , p. 86, from Stanley Gerr, "Language and Science, " in Philosophy of Science, April 1942, p. 156. 158. Ibid., p. 87. 159. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. cit., p. 87. 160. Ibid., p. 88. 161. Ibid., p. 16. 162. Grant, Technology and Empire, op. cit., p. 119. 163. Ibid., p. 129. 164. Ibid., p. 129. 165. Webster's New World Dictionary, op. cit., p. 1452. 166. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. ci t . , pp. 64-65. 167. For a more complete discussion of the role of education in North America and in the technological society, see George Grant, "In Defense of North America," and "The university Curriculum," in Technology and Empire, op. cit.. 168. Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age, op. cit., p. 38. 137 169. Roszak. op. c i t . , pp. 10-11. 170. Richard Lichtman, "The Facade of Eqality in Liberal Democratic Theory" in Inquiry. Summer 1969 (Vol. 12, No. 12), p. 203. 171. Ibid., pp. 205-206. 172. Cited in Lichtman, or>. ci t . , p. 203. 173. Cited in Lichtman. op. cit.. p. 203. 174. Lichtman, op., c i t . . p. 203. 175. Ibid.. p. 205. 176. Ibid., p. 204. 177. 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