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aboratory study of the labor-management bargaining relationship. Douglas, Ronald Lew 1970

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A LABORATORY STUDY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP by Ronald Lew Douglas B. A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1964  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  In the Department of Psychology  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OP BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1970  In  presenting  this  thesis  an a d v a n c e d  degree  the L i b r a r y  s h a l l make  I  f u r t h e r agree  for  scholarly  by h i s of  at  tha  the U n i v e r s i t y  permission  written  for  A  P  r i l  >  1 9 7 0  B r i t i s h Columbia,  is understood  Psychology  6 + h  requirements  Columbia  I agree  r e f e r e n c e and this  that copying or  not  for  that  study. thesis  by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t  f i n a n c i a l gain shall  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada  Date  It  permission.  Department o f  of  the  for extensive copying of  p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d  thesis  fulfilment of  it freely available for  representatives.  this  in p a r t i a l  or  publication  be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  ABSTRACT The present study i s intended as an a l t e r n a t i v e to the experimental game approach to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of c o n f l i c t .  I t explores a p a r t i c u l a r  real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i s viewed as a t r a n s i t i o n a l step between laboratory experimentat i o n and research i n n a t u r a l s e t t i n g s . Subjects were 34 male a d u l t s , 19 representing "Management" and 15 representing "Labor", a l l with formal bargaining experience i n labormanagement n e g o t i a t i o n s .  A t o t a l of ten 3-hour sessions were conducted  i n which representatives of both p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 3- and 4-person groups.  The study was designed to provide information concerning ways i n  which representatives of each party (1) perceive the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p , and ( i i )  approachnnegotiations.  Perceptual information was obtained by means of an opinion questionn a i r e which d e a l t w i t h s p e c i f i c aspects of labor r e l a t i o n s , and semantic differential-type scales.  I n a d d i t i o n to the d e s c r i p t i v e information  provided by these t o o l s , i t was found that:  (1) labor representatives  perceived more d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" than d i d management representatives; (2) the personal opinions of management representatives d i f f e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Management" i n general to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives d i f f e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Labor" i n general to hold; (3) the personal opinions of labor representatives d i f f e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Management" i n general to hold:, more frequently than the personal opinions of management representatives d i f f e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Labor" i n general to hold;  (4)  no d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t e d between the labor sample and the management  sample i n terms of homogeneity of perception or i n terms of homogeneity of personal opinion.  The f i r s t f i n d i n g i s considered to r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t  values placed upon tension and c o n f l i c t by "Labor" and "Management", while the second and t h i r d f i n d i n g s suggest a greater tendency f o r "Labor" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party l i n e " .  An  i m p l i c a t i o n of the fourth f i n d i n g i s that i f exogeneous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the'party l i n e " adopted by "Labor" i s no more w e l l defined f o r labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s f o r management representatives. A p o t e n t i a l l y important observation i n v o l v i n g misperceptions was  the  tendency f o r both labor and management representatives to think the other party perceived them i n a l e s s favorable manner than i t a c t u a l l y d i d .  This  i s regarded as one consequence of the r o l e s prescribed f o r two p a r t i e s i n a conflict relationship. Negotiating information was obtained from a formal a n a l y s i s of the v e r b a l content of simulated bargaining sessions.  The bargaining problem  employed i n t h i s study cast management representatives i n the r o l e of business partners and labor representatives as the elected o f f i c i a l s representing employees of the business.  The two p a r t i e s were required to  negotiate a wage settlement f o r the coming year on the b a s i s of a projected wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s adapted from the model of Sawyer's bargaining board.  Findings are o u t l i n e d i n terms of the ways i n which Labor and  Management presented questioned  the p o s i t i o n of t h e i r party on the wage i s s u e ,  the p o s i t i o n taken by the other party, and d e a l t w i t h  questions and arguments from the other party.  Those aspects of v e r b a l  behavior reported Include the r e l a t i v e emphasis given p a r t i c u l a r bargaining positions, the kinds of arguments presented and degree of determination with which supportive statements were expressed, the types of information exchanged, and the nature of threats and attacks made by each party.  In  addition to categorizing verbal statements made during "negotiations", emphasis was placed upon the r e l a t i v e frequency with which a p a r t i c u l a r kind of statement was made by Labor and Management. Implications of the findings of this exploratory study and suggestions for future research are discussed.  i  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1.  Introduction  2.  CHAPTER ONE:  3.  1 HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN NATURAL SETTINGS . . . . .  A.  The Ring-McGuire Debate  3  B.  Approaches t o N a t u r a l i s t i c E x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  5  C.  Summary  8  CHAPTER TWO: A.  THE LABORATORY STUDY ON INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT .  Laboratory  Game I n v e s t i g a t i o n s of C o n f l i c t :  B.  Labor-Management N e g o t i a t i o n s :  C.  Summary  A Research Viewpoint  .  10  . .  16 24  CHAPTER THREE:  METHOD  26  A.  Subjects  26  B.  Procedure  27  Opinion  questionnaire  28  Scales  32  Bargaining C. 5.  10  Some  Problems  4.  3  . . . . .  34  Summary  CHAPTER FOUR: A.  task  43 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  Perceptions  45  of the P a r t i e s i n a B a r g a i n i n g  Relationship  45  P e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n as p o t e n t i a l s o u r c e s of t e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t Perceived  .  51  p a r t y o p i n i o n s , p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s , and  the 'party l i n e "  55  ii Page  B.  Perceptions and misperceptions  58  Authoritarianism  63  "  Approaches to Negotiations Employed by the P a r t i e s i n a Bargaining Relationship Party p o s i t i o n s  65 . . . . .  68  Arguments and degree of determination  70  Exchange of information  73  Threats and attacks  74  S h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  76  Chronology of events Overview 6.  CHAPTER FIVE:  7.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  8.  APPENDICES  .  78 79  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  82 87  . . . . . . .  91  APPENDIX A:  OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE  92  APPENDIX B:  SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL-TYPE SCALES  94  APPENDIX C:  30-ITEM F-SCALE  95  APPENDIX D:  STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE  ON WHICH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WERE MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED APPENDIX E:  97  STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE  ON WHICH MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "MANAGEMENT" IN GENERAL HOLDS . . . APPENDIX F:  STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE  ON WHICH LABOR REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY  99  iii Page INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE 100  OPINION THEY THOUGHT "LABOR" IN GENERAL HOLDS APPENDIX G: 1.  101  _t TEST TABLES  R a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" and "Labor" by . . .  Management R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 2.  R a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" and "Labor" by  Labor R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 3.  101  . . . . . .  ..  101  R a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" by Labor R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and R a t i n g s Management R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s P r e d i c t e d "Management" 101  Would be Given by "Labor" 4.  R a t i n g s g i v e n "Labor" by Management R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and R a t i n g s  Labor  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s P r e d i c t e d "Labor" Would 102  be Given by "Management" APPENDIX H:  CATEGORIES EMPLOYED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS  WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE BARGAINING  SESSIONS  103  iv  LIST OF TABLES  1.  Page  P e r c e p t i o n s by the s u b j e c t s o f the o p i n i o n s of "Management" and "Labor", and the p e r s o n a l  opinions  of the s u b j e c t s 2.  .  Number of q u e s t i o n n a i r e items on which d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of opinions occurred  i n the responses of  the s u b j e c t s 3.  47  52  Comparison of mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" and "Labor" by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s  4.  60  Comparison of mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Labor" and "Management" by l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s . . . . .  5.  60  Comparison of mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Labor" by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and mean r a t i n g s t h a t l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p r e d i c t "Labor" would be g i v e n by "Management" on the Semantic Differential-type scales  6.  62  Comparison o f mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" by l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and mean r a t i n g s t h a t management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p r e d i c t "Management" would be g i v e n by "Labor" on the Semantic Differential-type scales  7.  Summary f e a t u r e s o f the b a r g a i n i n g  62 sessions  66  V  LIST OF FIGURES Page 1.  Wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s t o be used i n t h e b a r g a i n i n g task  2.  Wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s t o be used i n the event  38 of a  " s t r i k e " or " l o c k o u t " 3.  40  Scale f o r i n d i c a t i o n of personal s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome o f the b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n  42  vi  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l i k e to express my gratitude to Dr. Robert Knox for his invaluable assistance and encouragement i n the undertaking and completion of this study.  The h e l p f u l c r i t i c i s m s and suggestions of Dr. Demetrios  Papageorgis are also gratefully  acknowledged.  In addition, I would l i k e to thank a l l those persons who gave graciously of t h e i r time to take part i n the study.  For the  enthusiastic  and sincere manner i n which they participated I am especially  grateful.  P a r t i c u l a r thanks are due to Mr. C . P. Neale of the Vancouver and D i s t r i c t Labor Council, Mr. E. M. Lawson of the Teamsters,  and Mr. R.. Downey and  Mr. D. Reid of the Industrial Relations Management Association for t h e i r cooperation and assistance i n the formative stages of the project. I am indebted as w e l l to Dr. J .  T. Montague and the Industrial  Relations Institute at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia for f i n a n c i a l assistance during this undertaking. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to express my gratitude to Carole Hilstrom for her expert typing of this t h e s i s , and to fellow students Marc Barnes, for his patient and e f f i c i e n t handling of the content analysis, Fred Madryga, for his i n s i g h t f u l help i n editing the f i n a l copy.  and  1  A LABORATORY STUDY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP S o c i a l relationships involving a c o n f l i c t of interests  or goals  between two parties have been the subject of considerable research i n the past decade.  interest  P a r t i c u l a r attention has been given to a paradoxical  kind of s i t u a t i o n i n which the two p a r t i e s ,  each seeming to act i n his own  best i n t e r e s t , achieve an outcome which i s considerably worse than i f each had acted contrary to his i n t e r e s t .  The t r a d i t i o n a l laboratory approach  to investigating c o n f l i c t situations of this nature i s characterized by the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma and s i m i l a r 2-person games.  As an analog to  c o n f l i c t i n the r e a l world, the Dilemma i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y a t t r a c t i v e  since  i t incorporates a number of i n t r i c a t e s t r u c t u r a l elements of r e a l c o n f l i c t relationships  ( e . g . , interdependence, commonality of i n d i v i d u a l  dominance of alternatives)  interests,  i n an ostensibly simple choice behavior s i t u a t i o n .  However, aside from consistently demonstrating the detrimental nature of c o n f l i c t , research employing the Prisoner's Dilemma has provided l i t t l e insight into the kinds of processes and mechanisms underlying the develops ment, sustaining, and resolution of c o n f l i c t .  As an alternative to the  experimental game approach, this study deals with a p a r t i c u l a r real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p .  The  nature of the study reported here i s exploratory rather than manipulative, with p a r t i c u l a r emphasis given to c l a r i f y i n g ways i n which "Labor" and "Management" perceive the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i s o l a t i n g  approaches  to negotiations adopted by each party. This thesis w i l l be organized into f i v e chapters.  The f i r s t  chapter  includes a review of some c l a s s i c a l n a t u r a l i s t i c research as w e l l as  2  conceptual and empirical evidence r e l a t i n g to the current status of nonlaboratory experimentation i n s o c i a l psychology.  In the second chapter,  some limitations of the t r a d i t i o n a l game approach to c o n f l i c t research w i l l be discussed, and a conceptual basis for the present study w i l l be presented.  In Chapters Three and Four the study i t s e l f w i l l be reported  and discussed.  F i n a l l y , i n the f i f t h chapter, the results w i l l be reviewed  and the major conclusions and implications of the study f o r future research outlined.  3  CHAPTER ONE: HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN NATURAL SETTINGS A.  The Ring-McGulre Debate In a recent exchange of a r t i c l e s , Kenneth Ring and W i l l i a m McGuire  assessed some of the values and goals of s o c i a l psychology.  Ring (1967)  examined the extent to which s o c i a l psychologists are c u r r e n t l y guided by a humanistic, a c t i o n - o r i e n t e d view of the f i e l d .  H i s t o r i c a l l y , he  a t t r i b u t e s t h i s view to Lewin, who believed i t p o s s i b l e for a d i s c i p l i n e of s o c i a l psychology not only to further the s c i e n t i f i c understanding of man,  but a l s o to advance the cause of human welfare at the same time.  In  concluding that t h i s i s no longer a dominant conception of s o c i a l psychology, he argues that present values favor a b a s i c , theory-oriented d i s c i p l i n e which i s pervaded by a f r i v o l o u s "fun-and-games" approach to research.  In  Ring's opinion these values are to a large extent responsible f o r a s t a t e of i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s a r r a y i n s o c i a l psychology, and he considers that the long-run effect of a "fun-and-games" research t r a d i t i o n w i l l be d e t r i m e n t a l . Expressing concern f o r the t r a i n i n g of graduate students, Ring c i t e s two general i m p l i c a t i o n s of a s o c i a l psychology which appears to be mainly a matter of s t y l e rather than substance.  On the one hand, he p r e d i c t s that  some students w i l l lose i n t e r e s t i n a d i s c i p l i n e that i s perceived to be e i t h e r too t r i v i a l or t i g h t l y experimental.  On the other hand, those  students who remain should come to share and perpetuate the same f r i v o l o u s values which caused t h e i r colleagues to leave.  According to these values  a considerable number of good students can be expected to pursue d i s c i p l i n e s other than s o c i a l psychology.  For e s s e n t i a l l y pragmatic reasons then, Ring  urges s o c i a l psychologists to take stock of where the f i e l d i s heading and to reconsider the values of an a c t i o n - o r i e n t e d , or applied approach.  4  Commenting on some of the issues raised by Ring, McGuire (1967) indicated that he too recognizes the widening gap between basic and applied research trends.  Although he agrees that these trends have resulted i n an  undesirable overemphasis on basic, theory-oriented research, he considers the "fun-and-games" s i t u a t i o n to be a much less desperate one than does Ring.  Accordingly, McGuire does not deal at length with the fun-and-gamesmen,  preferring instead to comment on what he considers are "some impending reorientations i n s o c i a l psychology." The main point of disagreement between Ring and McGuire stems from the former's apparent expectation that the separation of the two streams of research and overemphasis on basic research show signs of being and even accentuated  continued  i n the foreseeable future i n s o c i a l psychology.  McGuire argues that s o c i a l psychology i s moving towards a "best of both worlds" s o l u t i o n i n which theory-oriented research w i l l be done i n natural settings.  A number of technological factors and s o c i a l trends are con-  sidered responsible for making this kind of research both f e a s i b l e and desirable.  Among these McGuire sees the a v a i l a b i l i t y of sophisticated  computer programs for dealing with the kinds of methodological  and  s t a t i s t i c a l problems that a r i s e i n the " d i r t y " r e a l world, access to "caravan"-type nation wide surveys, the increasing a v a i l a b i l i t y of data archives relevant to the s o c i a l sciences, the current upsurge i n concern about s o c i a l a f f a i r s brought about by the Vietnam war, human r i g h t s issues, etc., and a government interest i n the payoffs associated with sizeable research grants.  In addition he c i t e s a number of negative factors  associated with prevailing problems of laboratory research.  These include  the kind of a r t i f a c t s to which Rosenthal, Orne and others have drawn  5  a t t e n t i o n , and the serious e t h i c a l questions raised by the use of noxious c o n d i t i o n s , deceptive manipulations, invasion of p r i v a c y , e t c . While McGuire concludes that redeployment Into the n a t u r a l environment w i l l be only p a r t i a l , that the bulk of s o c i a l psychological research  will  remain i n the laboratory, he urges the u t i l i z a t i o n and teaching of techniques designed to take advantage of research p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n n a t u r a l s e t t i n g s . B.  Approaches to N a t u r a l i s t i c Experimentation Although i t i s too e a r l y to assess whether or not McGuire's "best of  both worlds" p r e d i c t i o n w i l l be r e a l i z e d , there e x i s t i n the s o c i a l psychological l i t e r a t u r e c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l precedents f o r research i n natural settings.  Such studies appear to have taken one of three d i s t i n c t  approaches to the c o l l e c t i o n of data.  The f i r s t strategy sees the e x p e r i -  menter taking advantage of a more or l e s s n a t u r a l l y o c c u r r i n g 1 event i n order to t e s t p a r t i c u l a r hypotheses or to analyze what i s happening, while the second involves hypothesis-testing situation.  i n a commonly occurring "everyday"  In the f i r s t approach, an event takes place having consequences  which can be considered s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l , and should the experimenter not have h i s tools of i n v e s t i g a t i o n ready, he attempts to prepare them, and i f p o s s i b l e , formulate t e s t a b l e hypotheses, since the event i s j u s t too appealing to leave academically unexploited.  This d i f f e r s from the second  approach i n that i n t h i s instance, w h i l e the experimenter i s armed w i t h p a r t i c u l a r hypotheses, he i s required to seek out or specify from among a number of n a t u r a l l y occurring events the one which i s an appropriate v e h i c l e f o r t e s t i n g of these hypotheses.  In the t h i r d approach, the  *An event which the experimenter was i n no way instrumental i n causing to happen.  6  experimenter manipulates a part of the n a t u r a l environment i n order to determine the effect of the manipulation on the behavior of h i s subjects (those persons who, i n the n a t u r a l course of events, enter the a l t e r e d environment created by the experimenter).  The difference between t h i s  approach and the previous two i s i n terms of the element of environmental c o n t r o l which i s introduced i n t o the n a t u r a l s i t u a t i o n i n which the hypothesis i s  tested.  Two c l a s s i c a l examples of the f i r s t approach are C a n t r i l ' s (1940) survey of mass behavior i n the panic s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from Orson Welles 1 War of the Worlds broadcast,  and a study by Festinger et al.(1956) of  c o g n i t i v e dissonance and s o c i a l support i n a small group a n t i c i p a t i n g the end of the w o r l d .  More recent examples of t h i s kind of research include  studies of b i r t h order e f f e c t s during the 1965 New York C i t y power f a i l u r e (Zucker et a l . , 1968), communication of emotion f o l l o w i n g the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of D r . M a r t i n Luther King (Sawyer, 1968), as w e l l as the a n t i c i p a t e d reports of research conducted during the much p u b l i c i z e d 1969 C a l i f o r n i a earthquake mania. Examples of the second approach 2 can be found i n the dissonance l i t e r a t u r e , among the o r i g i n a l s e r i e s of experiments conducted by Festinger (1957) i n v o l v i n g s e l e c t i v e exposure to newspaper and i n a recent study by Knox and Inkster (1968).  advertisements,  In the l a t t e r experiment  the authors compared confidence estimates made by pre- and post-bet subjects at the $2.00 WIN window of a race t r a c k .  I t i s worth noting that  t e c h n i q u e s of data c o l l e c t i o n which might be considered the ultimate refinement of t h i s approach appear i n a book by Webb et a l . (1966), e n t i t l e d Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research i n the S o c i a l Sciences.  7  i n t h i s instance r e s u l t s , consistent w i t h dissonance theory, were obtained without the use of cumbersome, deceptive, and e t h i c a l l y questionable manipulations that often characterize laboratory-bound dissonance research. Other recent examples of t h i s approach include two studies generated by Schachter's s e r i e s of laboratory demonstrations that eating i s motivated by d i f f e r e n t s t i m u l i i n normal and obese i n d i v i d u a l s .  Here Goldman et a l .  (1968) studied eating behavior i n a v a r i e t y of non-laboratory s i t u a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g r e l i g i o u s f a s t i n g , i n s t i t u t i o n a l food tolerance, and changing time zone e f f e c t s , w h i l e N i s b e t t and Kanouse (1968) observed the  effects  of obesity and hunger on supermarket shopping behavior. One of the e a r l i e s t examples of the t h i r d approach i s La P i e r e ' s (1934) study of a c t u a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and v e r b a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The i n v e s t i g a t o r t r a v e l l e d widely i n the United States w i t h a Chinese couple, stopping at various sleeping and eating places.  He compared the incidence  of refusals of service i n these places with r e p l i e s to questionnaires sent to the p r o p r i e t o r s asking whether they would take "members of the Chinese race as guests i n your establishment."  S i m i l a r n a t u r a l i s t i c studies of  prejudice have been conducted by Kutner et a l . (1952) and Wax (1948);  the  former experiment involved v i s i t s by r a c i a l l y mixed groups to restaurants and taverns i n a fashionable New York suburb, while i n the l a t t e r h o t e l and r e s o r t managers received mailed requests for accommodation signed w i t h names suggesting membership i n p a r t i c u l a r ethnic groups.  Some of the  recent f i e l d experimentation of t h i s type has concentrated on what can be termed " h e l p i n g b e h a v i o r " .  Among these are Feldman's studies  (1968a, b)  of treatment of f o r e i g n and compatriot strangers by members of d i f f e r e n t geographic populations i n a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l contexts, studies by Ryan  8  and Test ( 1 9 6 7 ) and Hornstein et a l . ( 1 9 6 8 ) of the influence of s o c i a l models on helping i n n a t u r a l i s t i c situations,  as w e l l as Milgram's ( 1 9 6 5 )  l o s t l e t t e r technique. This b r i e f survey i s not intended as a review of n a t u r a l i s t i c experimentation i n s o c i a l psychology, a purpose for which i t would certainly be inadequate, but rather as an acknowledgment that this kind of experimentation i s more than just a recent phenomenon. examples cited above affirm this f a c t .  The c l a s s i c  In addition, the recent experiments  included here are examples of research which appears to typify the i n creasing incidence of studies which provide both the basis and potential v a l i d a t i o n for McGuire's arguments. C.  Summary A cursory review of the Psychological Abstracts f o r the past decade  i s s u f f i c i e n t to establish laboratory-based  that s o c i a l psychology i s a theory-oriented and  discipline.  Recently  some s o c i a l psychologists have  questioned the values and goals of such a d i s c i p l i n e with Ring i n p a r t i c u l a r urging h i s colleagues  to devote less attention to basic research and to r e -  consider the kind of humanistic, action-oriented approach to the f i e l d adopted by Lewin. theory-oriented  Commenting on Ring's remarks, McGuire, a proponent of  laboratory research, contends that the emphasis on basic  research i s waning and that the gap between basic and applied trends i s l i k e l y to be narrowed i n the near future.  research  In addition, McGuire  foresees certain reorientations i n s o c i a l psychology which are l i k e l y to f a c i l i t a t e theory-oriented  research i n natural settings.  In this regard  there are a number of h i s t o r i c a l precedents f o r this kind of research as w e l l as an increasing number of recent experiments designed to take  9  advantage of the natural environment for the testing of hypotheses.  The  present chapter included a review of Ring's plea against a s t r i c t l y laboratory-based,  theory-oriented approach to research, McGuire's contention  of impending redeployment into natural settings, and c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l as well as recent examples of hypothesis-testing i n natural settings.  In  one could argue rather strongly that there currently exists i n s o c i a l psychology  a demand and climate of readiness, as well as h i s t o r i c a l  precedence, for n a t u r a l i s t i c experimentation.  sum,  10  CHAPTER TWO:  THE LABORATORY STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT  Some of the experiments c i t e d i n . the previous chapter were conducted i n n a t u r a l s e t t i n g s because t h i s was the obvious p l a c e , i f not the only place, to conduct these experiments.  Others were designed to provide  a d d i t i o n a l , but not c r i t i c a l , evidence relevant to p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which have already received considerable a t t e n t i o n i n the laboratory.  However, very few i n v e s t i g a t i o n s have e x p l o i t e d the n a t u r a l  environment as a necessary a l t e r n a t i v e to laboratory study.  Consequently,  c e r t a i n problems which have h a b i t u a l l y been studied i n the s o c i a l psycholog i c a l laboratory appear destined to remain i n the laboratory even though more meaningful research p o s s i b i l i t i e s could present themselves w i t h r e deployment i n t o the r e a l w o r l d .  One such problem i s the study of s o c i a l  negotiations where there e x i s t s some c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t s or goals between two p a r t i e s , a subject which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been pursued w i t h the use of gaming and modified gaming techniques.  In t h i s chapter i t w i l l be  argued that the experimental game, i n p a r t i c u l a r the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game, has not been a f r u i t f u l t o o l f o r the study of c o n f l i c t i n s o c i a l negotiations.  An a l t e r n a t i v e approach, adopted by the present study as a  u s e f u l t r a n s i t i o n a l step between the manipulational laboratory experiment and n a t u r a l s e t t i n g research, w i l l be o u t l i n e d . A.  Laboratory Game Investigations of C o n f l i c t :  Some Problems  Although the l i t e r a t u r e on experimental games has  expanded consider-  ably i n recent years, i t remains plagued by two rather general problems. One of these stems from the influence of the o r i g i n a l theory of games which assumes that a person acts r a t i o n a l l y i n order to maximize gain and minimize loss (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, pp. 8-9).  When t h i s  11  premise i s considered i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand why the levels pf cooperation found i n most P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma studies are as low as they are. The other d i f f i c u l t y involves the fact that ten years of gaming research has provided l i t t l e d e f i n i t i v e i n s i g h t i n t o r e a l - l i f e c o n f l i c t s and t h e i r resolution.  Recently both Vinacke (1969) and G a l l o (1968) have addressed  themselves to these problems. In a survey of experimental game research Vinacke i s o l a t e s types of v a r i a b l e s that have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been manipulated:  three  task v a r i a b l e s  such as matrix e n t r i e s , mode of presentation, and number of t r i a l s ; s i t u a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s such as feedback, opportunity for communication, and strategy of opponent; and p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s such as family background, psychopathology, and a t t i t u d e s .  In a d d i t i o n to c i t i n g a number of methodo-  l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n manipulating these v a r i a b l e s , he discusses what he considers to be the t h e o r e t i c a l shortcomings of approaches based p r i m a r i l y on task and s i t u a t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s as opposed to approaches based on p e r s o n a l i t y v a r i a b l e s .  He contends that n e i t h e r the assumption i m p l i c i t  i n the task and s i t u a t i o n a l approaches,  that persons behave i n a wholly  r a t i o n a l manner, nor the assumption i m p l i c i t i n the p e r s o n a l i t y approach, that persons are wholly guided by antecedent i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t s , i s adequate to account f o r behavior i n experimental gaming s i t u a t i o n s 3 .  As an  a l t e r n a t i v e , Vinacke argues for a Lewinian f i e l d theory approach which w i l l enable researchers  to look at the i n t e r a c t i o n between person and environment  In order to i d e n t i y v a r i a b l e s from both d i r e c t i o n s and determine how they  3  While t h i s contention may appear t r i v i a l , i t i s necessary since the notion that behavior i s a f u n c t i o n of one of these v a r i a b l e s to the e x c l u s i o n of the others i s inherent i n a m a j o r i t y of gaming r e p o r t s .  12  are r e l a t e d i n producing behavior.  I n t h i s regard he s t a t e s ,  I t i s g r o s s l y a r t i f i c i a l to b e l i e v e that subjects can be treated as i f they are a l l a l i k e . I t i s equally a r t i f i c i a l t o eliminate v a r i a t i o n s i n the s i t u a t i o n s where behavior takes place. Thus, emphasis needs to be placed on the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i n t e r a c t i o n s between the forces that can meaningfully be measured i n both person and s i t u a t i o n . . . . P u t t i n g I t another way, suppose that our p r a c t i c a l o b j e c t i v e i s to achieve agreements which the p a r t i e s i n question w i l l both accept. Let us begin with a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the outcome desired and explore the conditions required t o reach i t . This means a process of p u t t i n g together i n meaningful combinations v a r i a b l e s i n a l l three of the classes I have described. The aim i s not to a s c e r t a i n the l e v e l of cooperation a t t a i n e d under a c e r t a i n experimental manipulation nor to compare groups of subjects. Rather the aim i s to decide that cooperation (or some other outcome) i s the intended outcome, and then to f i n d out how i t can be achieved. (Vinacke, 1969, pp. 314-315). G a l l o , on the other hand, contends that much of the current d i f f i c u l t y w i t h gaming research i s due to the f a c t that we have thus f a r not been able to develop a s e t of conceptual tools that allows us to analyze the nature of c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s .  He notes t h a t ,  . . .an a n a l y s i s of the nature of c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s must begin with a r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t that there are at l e a s t two classes of payoffs at stake i n every c o n f l i c t — t h e t a n g i b l e payoffs and the i n t a n g i b l e or symbolic payoffs. The t a n g i b l e outcomes hardly need d e f i n i t i o n — t h e y c o n s i s t of the m a t e r i a l resources under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , whether i t be expressed i n terms of money, f r i n g e b e n e f i t s , c o n t r o l of land, e t c . The symbolic payoffs, on the other hand, are r e l a t e d to the needs of the c o n f l i c t i n g p a r t i e s f o r maintaining face, s e l f respect, p r e s t i g e , honor, status v i s - a - v i s one another and a l s o v i s - a - v i s any t h i r d p a r t i e s that may be observing the c o n f l i c t . ( G a l l o , 1968, p. 2 ) . In the gaming s i t u a t i o n the outcome depends very much upon whether a subject attempts to achieve a t a n g i b l e or an i n t a n g i b l e payoff.  Accordingly,  G a l l o argues that a r e l a t i v e increase i n the value of the t a n g i b l e payoffs should expedite c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , w h i l e a r e l a t i v e increase i n the value  13  of the symbolic payoffs should decrease the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t resolution. While both Vinacke and G a l l o are aware of the kinds of problems that should concern researchers using gaming s i t u a t i o n s as a n a l o g s t o r e a l world c o n f l i c t , the s o l u t i o n that each o f f e r s i s l e s s than comforting. Both s o l u t i o n s are, i n t h e i r present forms a t l e a s t , conceptual rather than operational i n nature, although G a l l o does c i t e c e r t a i n experimental evidence i n support of h i s a n a l y s i s of the e f f e c t s of a v a i l a b l e payoffs.  The kinds  of manipulations and measurements that can be meaningfully imposed by the f i e l d approach which Vinacke advocates remain to be determined as does the method of s c a l i n g the symbolic rewards discussed by G a l l o .  In addition,  should these o p e r a t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s be overcome, the kinds of laboratory s i t u a t i o n s that Vinacke proposes to s t r u c t u r e f o r the study of c o n f l i c t and c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n may have no counterpart i n the r e a l world.  Similarly,  s i t u a t i o n s I n which the r e l a t i v e values of t a n g i b l e and symbolic payoffs are allowed to vary to an extent necessary t o e i t h e r expedite or f o r e s t a l l c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n may be uncommon i n the r e a l world. Other d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s e i f we consider two approaches t o gaming research which these authors have e i t h e r not d e a l t w i t h , or a t best, have dealt w i t h i n a very cursory manner.  I m p l i c i t i n one s e r i e s of I n v e s t i g a t i o n s  i s the idea that behavior i n experimental gaming s i t u a t i o n s i s of i n t e r e s t i n i t s own r i g h t and whether or not the s i t u a t i o n or the behavior i s representative of real-world s i t u a t i o n s or behaviors i s inconsequential. Here a t t e n t i o n i s d i r e c t e d toward i s o l a t i n g motives (Messick and Thorngate, 1967; Messick and McClintock, 1968), determining e f f e c t s of various matrix e n t r i e s (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), e t c .  What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g  14  about this research i s the inherent notion that the game s i t u a t i o n i s i n i t s e l f a unique environment i n which s o c i a l behavior can be p r o f i t a b l y studied.  Thus, rather than asking how a subject's behavior i n the game  approximates his behavior i n the r e a l world, the experimenter asks how does a subject from the r e a l world behave i n the game. research by a second group of investigators relevance of gaming situations  In contrast,  i s aimed at c l a r i f y i n g the  to the r e a l world.  Since interest here  has been focussed on the effects of low motivation and poor understanding by subjects i n game experiments, the two most frequently manipulated variables have been the size of payoffs and extensiveness  of i n s t r u c t i o n s .  A number of researchers have found that as the size of monetary payoffs i s increased, the l e v e l of cooperation also increases  (Gallo, 1963; Radlow,  1965; McClintock and McNeel, 1966a, b, 1967), and this i s the kind of evidence on which Gallo bases his argument concerning the relationship between tangible payoffs,  symbolic payoffs,  However, the fact that other researchers  and cooperative behavior.  find no differences  i n levels  of cooperation between real and imaginary money conditions 1 * ( W i l l i s and Joseph,  1969; Vinacke, 1966; Wrightsman, 1966), and between high and low  money conditions (Knox and Douglas, 1968) suggests that the relationship between tangible and symbolic payoffs i s not as straightforward as Gallo implies.  Similar inconsistencies appear among the findings of  researchers  expressing concern about their subjects' l e v e l of comprehension i n gaming experiments.  Using more e x p l i c i t instructions than those t r a d i t i o n a l l y  employed, both Wrightsman et a l .  4  (1968) and Messe1 and Sawyer (1966)  I n a recent study by Gumpert et a l . (1969), subjects playing for r e a l d o l l a r s were s i g n i f i c a n t l y less cooperative than those playing for imaginary d o l l a r s .  15  report increased levels of cooperation, while Knox and Douglas (1968) observed no such increase.  It i s not c l e a r , then, just what aspect of  the more extensive instructions employed i n the former studies mediates the effect  on cooperation.  Although the evidence c i t e d above i s not the basis of a strong argument that the study of gaming c o n f l i c t i s i r r e l e v a n t to an understanding of c o n f l i c t i n the r e a l world, i t does introduce some uncertainty concerning the g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y of game behavior.  Especially pertinent to  this problem of g e n e r a l i z a b i l i t y are the results of the investigation by Knox and Douglas (1968) i n which both payoffs i n a simple 2 x 2  f a c t o r i a l design.  and instructions were varied  These authors found no change i n the  l e v e l of cooperation i n a Prisoner's Dilemma game when the t r a d i t i o n a l penny rewards were replaced by d o l l a r rewards, or when the customary instructions were replaced by more rigorous i n s t r u c t i o n s , or when both of these conditions were introduced together.  However, they did observe an  ordered increase i n variances from the t r a d i t i o n a l instruction-penny payoff condition to the rigorous i n s t r u c t i o n - d o l l a r payoff condition which was interpreted as true score rather than error variance.  A conservative  statement concerning the problem of generalizing from gaming to r e a l world behavior follows from this f i n d i n g :  irrespective of what is r e a l l y  being assessed when a gaming s i t u a t i o n i s employed, that assessment w i l l be more r e l i a b l e when both motivation and comprehension are at a high level.  Because both motivation and comprehension appear to have been at  a r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l i n a majority of studies, the t r a d i t i o n a l game s i t u a t i o n i s probably a poor analog to most real-world c o n f l i c t  situations.  Consequently, now might be an appropriate time to suspend research which  16  employs games to c l a r i f y behavior  i n real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s , and  to deal seriously with the problem of whether or not games can be p r o f i t a b l y used as analogs to actual c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . Hopefully then, the current status of gaming research w i l l force a reappraisal of the goals and methods of this kind of research, while at the same time providing the impetus f o r studies designed to take advantage of natural settings f o r the study of c o n f l i c t .  The remainder of this chapter w i l l be devoted to  o u t l i n i n g a laboratory study viewed by the author as a desirable and appropriate i n i t i a l step to c l a r i f y i n g the nature of real-world c o n f l i c t and i t s r e s o l u t i o n . B.  Labor-Management Negotiations:  A Research Viewpoint  One s i t u a t i o n which game theorists frequently c i t e as a real-world analog to the dilemma posed i n the basic gaming s i t u a t i o n i s the labormanagement bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . Although the aptness of this analogy i s questionable, this relationship does appear to o f f e r workable research p o s s i b i l i t i e s since most labor disputes gravitate toward tangible resolution within days, weeks, or months.  Hence, because solutions do  appear, and because these can be achieved within a r e l a t i v e l y short time span, the behavioral elements that contribute to solutions should be open to study. In attempting  to i s o l a t e some of the factors which expedite as well  as f o r e s t a l l resblution of labor-management c o n f l i c t , the s i t u a t i o n w i l l be considered from a viewpoint which emphasizes psychological rather than economic f a c t o r s .  In this regard, there appears to be two major contract  terms at issue i n the bargaining process:  these are the wages to be paid  to p a r t i c u l a r employees, and a variety>of additional considerations i n -  17  eluded under the heading of " f r i n g e b e n e f i t s " .  I t i s the author's  contention that i n most contract negotiations the settlement wage and a majority of the f r i n g e benefits are determined by c e r t a i n economic realities.  These include such factors as the n a t i o n a l and r e g i o n a l  economic outlook, market p o s i t i o n of the company i n an i n d u s t r y , wages paid w i t h i n the industry or i n comparable i n d u s t r i e s , changes i n cost of l i v i n g , e t c . , as opposed to psychological factors such as the a t t i t u d e s and opinions of the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  the unique ways i n which they  perceive t h e i r own goals and the goals of the other p a r t y , the kinds of bargaining t a c t i c s each employs,  etc.5  In terms of t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n then, the present viewpoint can be expressed by the following postulate:  tangible or economic terms of the  contract settlement are r e l a t i v e l y i n v a r i a b l e , , while i n t a n g i b l e or psychological factors vary to determine the amount of time required to  5  Although i t i s argued here that the same kind of economic r e a l i t i e s that determine wage rates influence to a considerable extent the types of f r i n g e benefits demanded and conceded, i t should be recognized that c e r t a i n fringe benefits allow a curious mixture of economic and p s y c h o l o g i c a l factors to come i n t o p l a y . Consider the number of labor disputes i n which settlement i s f o r e s t a l l e d by such issues as the p r o v i s i o n of an extra meal f o r loggers on e a r l y morning s h i f t s (Port A l b e r n i , B r i t i s h Columbia, I n t e r n a t i o n a l Woodworkers of America, 1969), p r o v i s i o n of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r mailmen to p o s t a l s t a t i o n s f o r lunch breaks (Letter C a r r i e r s ' Union of Canada, 1968), e t c . In a d d i t i o n to t h e i r economic v a l u e , these kinds of issues appear to have a d e f i n i t e psychological value i n the sense of e x t r a c t i o n or d e n i a l of "moral" v i c t o r i e s . Thus, i t could be argued that on some points the a c t u a l economic terms of the contract are influenced by psychological factors. However, since i t i s f e l t that t h i s p a r t i c u l a r kind of f r i n g e benefit contributes i n a very minor way to the economic terms of the c o n t r a c t , and due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g the r o l e of any f r i n g e benefits i n a formal experiment, the present study w i l l deal both t h e o r e t i c a l l y and e m p i r i c a l l y with the process of wage settlement exclusive of f r i n g e b e n e f i t s .  18  reach the present  settlement  and the climate of the subsequent working and  bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s contended that i n many contract negotiations, both "Labor" and "Management" can estimate f a i r l y 6  accurately j u s t what the settlement wage and most attendant fringe benefits w i l l be p r i o r to the opening round of negotiations.  This estimate i s  determined by economic r e a l i t i e s and i s subject to very l i t t l e r e v i s i o n during the course of the negotiations. not the actual wage, but rather how  What remains to be determined i s  long i t w i l l take the two parties to  agree upon this wage and the costs that w i l l be invoked by the expenditure of this time.  These factors i n turn w i l l influence the l e v e l of s a t i s f a c t i o n  which the parties derive from the negotiations which w i l l i n large part determine the climate of their future r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Thus, while c o n f l i c t  resolution i n e v i t a b l y appears at the contract l e v e l , the extent to which i t i s present on a psychological l e v e l would appear to depend very much upon such factors as attitudes, opinions, need§, and t a c t i c s of the parties concerned.  This i s a strong statement of this p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n and  such i t may  appear that the contribution of economic determinants of  c o n f l i c t resolution has been greatly underestimated. impression  The  to emphasize the important r o l e of psychological factors  i n the resolution of a p a r t i c u l a r kind of c o n f l i c t .  6  This i s not an  that the author has d e l i b e r a t e l y attempted to create.  intent i s simply  as  These factors are  I n order to f a c i l i t a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between general and s p e c i f i c references to these two p a r t i e s , the following convention i s adopted i n this paper: when r e f e r r i n g to labor and management i n general, the referents "Labor" and "Management" are used; when r e f e r r i n g to those p a r t i c u l a r subjects who participated i n the present study, the referents used are Labor and Management (not quotated), or labor representatives and management representatives.  19  considered important because they are free to vary to an extent that economic factors are not, and i n so doing innumerable p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r i n i t i a t i n g , sustaining, and resolving c o n f l i c t are created. Because v i a b l e techniques f o r the laboratory study of the kind of c o n f l i c t referred to here have not yet been developed, research i n the r e a l world becomes a necessary a l t e r n a t i v e to t r a d i t i o n a l laboratory i n v e s t i gation.  However, the present lack of understanding  of c o n f l i c t and i t s  resolution i n general, as w e l l as an u n f a m i l i a r i t y with s o c i a l psychological aspects of the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p i n p a r t i c u l a r , suggest than an i n i t i a l t r a n s i t i o n a l step between the laboratory and natural setting i s appropriate.  The approach taken by the present study i s to observe persons  who are involved i n actual real-world c o n f l i c t s i n a laboratory s e t t i n g . An attempt w i l l be made to acquire information concerning a s p e c i f i c r e a l world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n and the protagonists by requesting the presence of experienced  labor and management negotiators i n a laboratory/'study".  The major purpose i s to obtain information of a descriptive nature  concern-  ing the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p and to generate hypotheses pertinent to c o n f l i c t resolution for subsequent testing i n both the laboratory and natural s e t t i n g .  At the same time c e r t a i n formal hypotheses pertaining  to the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p can be tested.  The study  itself  involves 3-hour sessions i n which both labor and management representatives complete questionnaires and interact In small bargaining u n i t s .  The data  collected are intended to provide answers, or at least p a r t i a l answers, to the following kinds of questions about "Labor" and "Management" as d i s t i n c t parties i n a bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p : (i)  What are the attitudes, opinions, bargaining goals, intentions,  20  and positions that a labor or management representative perceives his own party to hold? ( i i ) What are the attitudes . . . etc., that a labor or management representative perceives the other party to hold? ( i i i ) What are the attitudes . . . etc., that a labor or management representative personally holds? (iv) How accurate are labor and management representatives i n assessing the attitudes . . . etc., held by p a r t i c u l a r other participants i n the bargaining relationship? (v) What are some of the p a r t i c u l a r issues of agreement and disagreement between the parties as perceived by representatives of those parties? (vi) How do labor and management representatives think their own party i s perceived by members of the other  party?  ( v i i ) What kinds of bargaining t a c t i c s are employed by each party? In addition to obtaining this kind of descriptive information, f i v e hypotheses w i l l be tested. be  These hypotheses and attendant  logic w i l l now  presented. In the recent history of labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p s , "Manage-  ment" i n general seems to have shown a greater concern than "Labor" f o r a l l e v i a t i n g states of tension and c o n f l i c t between the two p a r t i e s .  On  the other hand, "Labor" i n general seems to have shown a greater concern for maintaining  7  these states, at least at some l e v e l .  7  These actions are  T h i s observation appears p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l i d with respect to labor r e l a t i o n s  21  not surprising i n that tension and c o n f l i c t are l i k e l y to endanger production, and i n so doing provide a basis of bargaining power f o r "Labor",  whether or not a party i s able to deal with these states i s  unimportant with regard to the hypothesis  presented here.  What i s  important i s the observation that the behavior of "Labor" suggests that they view tension and c o n f l i c t as states which are p o t e n t i a l l y b e n e f i c i a l to the attainment of their goals, whereas the behavior of "Management" suggests that they view tension and c o n f l i c t as states which are p o t e n t i a l l y detrimental to the attainment of their goals.  Because differences, actual  or perceived, between two parties provide a basis f o r tension and c o n f l i c t , i t i s hypothesized that "Labor" w i l l prefer to emphasize areas of d i s agreement between "Labor" and "Management", while "Management" w i l l prefer to emphasize areas of agreement between "Labor" and "Management". More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s hypothesized (1)  that issues on which the two parties  are perceived to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions, attitudes, or positions w i l l be seen more frequently by labor representatives.  Conversely, issues on  i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia. For example, l e g i s l a t i o n , the ultimate goal of which i s to calm troubled labor r e l a t i o n s , i s vehemently opposed by "Labor", post settlement statements of a "we won" nature have become standard comments of union representatives, and formal committees and groups a c t i v e l y opposed to the Vietnam war, poverty, tenant e x p l o i t a t i o n , e t c . — conditions which "Management" can be perceived to play a leading r o l e i n perpetuating—are t r a d i t i o n a l l y sponsored and supported by labor a f f i l i a t e s . On the other hand, labor l e g i s l a t i o n receives either scant or approving comment from "Management". Post settlement "no comments" or statements of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the equitable outcome of negotiations are frequently made by management representatives, and formal associations and clubs whose goals include improvement of employer-employee r e l a t i o n s ( i . e . , i n d u s t r i a l relations associations, s t a f f r e l a t i o n s departments, public r e l a t i o n s departments, etc.) are most commonly formed by "ManagementV.  22  which the two parties are perceived to share a common opinion, a t t i t u d e , or p o s i t i o n w i l l be seen more frequently by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . 8 Three additional predictions follow from the f i r s t hypothesis. extent to which organized "Labor" i s successful  The  i n maintaining at least  some l e v e l of tension and c o n f l i c t w i l l depend upon a capacity  for  perpetuating among i n d i v i d u a l representations perceptions of d i f f e r i n g opinions between "Labor" and "Management".  In this regard one important  t a c t i c often employed by "Labor" involves an attempt to present to "Management" the image of a united labor front which i s i n support of their demands.  This t a c t i c does not appear to have gained the same degree  of prominence on the part of "Management", l i k e l y due both to a lack of necessity for adopting such a t a c t i c as w e l l as to the organizational d i v e r s i t y of managements r e l a t i v e to "Labor".  For both functional and  s t r u c t u r a l reasons then, i t can be argued that the i n c u l c a t i o n and presentation of a "party l i n e " i s a more s a l i e n t t a c t i c for "Labor" than i t i s for "Management".  Consequently, i t i s hypothesized (2)  that the  personal opinions of management representatives w i l l d i f f e r from the opinions they perceive t h e i r own party to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives w i l l d i f f e r from the opinions they perceive their own party to hold. (3)  In addition i t i s hypothesized  that labor representatives w i l l see more issues on which their personal  opinions d i f f e r from the opinions they perceive the other party to hold than w i l l management representatives.  8  This t h i r d hypothesis resembles  For purposes of b r e v i t y , i n subsequent references to the "opinions, a t t i t u d e s , or p o s i t i o n s " of a party, only the term "opinions" w i l l be used.  23  the f i r s t hypothesis except that here perception of the opinion held by one's own party i s replaced by one's own personal opinion. i s hypothesized  (4)  Finally, i t  that labor representatives w i l l be more homogeneous  i n the perception of their own party's opinions, i n the perception of the other party's opinions, and i n their own personal opinions, than management representatives w i l l be. In the course of contract negotiations both "Labor" and "Management" have prescribed roles which they are expected to assume.  Inherent i n these  roles i s the adoption of p a r t i c u l a r attitudes and t a c t i c s with respect to the other party, which include one-sided statements of positions, unr e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands, threats, etc.  One e f f e c t of this i s  to create an impression of h o s t i l i t y which i s sometimes more a matter of show than actual i n c l i n a t i o n .  Consequently, i t i s hypothesized  (5) that  both parties w i l l exhibit a tendency to think that the other party perceives them i n a less favorable manner than i t a c t u a l l y does. While these hypotheses w i l l be defined i n operational terms i n the following chapter, some a d d i t i o n a l comments on the predictions made by the f i r s t four hypotheses appear warranted at this point. by the f i r s t hypothesis,  The prediction made  that issues on which the two parties are perceived  to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions w i l l be seen more frequently by labor representatives than by management representatives, i s based upon a behavioral observation which suggests that "Labor" and "Management" value tension and c o n f l i c t quite d i f f e r e n t l y .  Inherent i n this p r e d i c t i o n i s  the idea that the nature of the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p predisposes the two parties to perceive relevant issues i n somewhat d i f f e r e n t ways. S i m i l a r l y , the nature of the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p should  predispose  24  the two  p a r t i e s to adopt, to some extent at l e a s t , somewhat d i f f e r e n t  t a c t i c s to a t t a i n t h e i r g o a l s .  I f what we  have termed the " p a r t y  line"  s t r a t e g y i s a more important  t a c t i c f o r "Labor" than f o r "Management"  then the p r e d i c t i o n s made by  the second, t h i r d , and  should  f o l l o w from the f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s .  more i s s u e s on which the two o p i n i o n s , and  If labor representatives  p a r t i e s are perceived  to h o l d  d i f f e r from the o p i n i o n s  (second  tactic  t o a g r e a t e r extent  management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , h o l d p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s p a r t y to h o l d  see  differing  i f the " p a r t y l i n e " s t r a t e g y i s a more important  f o r "Labor", then l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' s h o u l d ,  t h e i r own  f o u r t h hypotheses  l i k e those  than  they  perceive  hypothesis), hold personal opinions  that  that they p e r c e i v e the o t h e r p a r t y to h o l d  (third  h y p o t h e s i s ) , and be a l i k e i n t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n of the o p i n i o n s h e l d by own  p a r t y , the o p i n i o n s h e l d by  opinions C.  the other p a r t y , and  personal  (fourth hypothesis).  Summary In the p r e s e n t  chapter  i t has been argued t h a t r e s e a r c h based upon  the t r a d i t i o n a l l a b o r a t o r y gaming paradigm has s i g h t i n t o r e a l - l i f e c o n f l i c t s and use  in their  their  f o r the continued  frameworks, one  use  sufficient in-  t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n to j u s t i f y  of games as a means to t h i s end.  researchers  not p r o v i d e d  Arguments by  two  of gaming techniques  the  continued  prominent game w i t h i n new  conceptual  f o c u s s i n g on the p o t e n t i a l i n t e r a c t i o n between a broad range  of independent v a r i a b l e s and  the o t h e r on a unique c o n c e p t i o n  s t r u c t u r e i n h e r e n t i n game s i t u a t i o n s , were reviev/ed. t h a t w h i l e both V i n a c k e and plague gaming r e s e a r c h , Consequently, i t was  I t was  of the  payoff  concluded  G a l l o a r e aware of the problems that c u r r e n t l y  the s o l u t i o n t h a t each o f f e r s i s inadequate.  suggested t h a t now  i s an a p p r o p r i a t e  time to suspend  25  that r e s e a r c h which employs games t o c l a r i f y b e h a v i o r c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s , and to d e a l w i t h can be p r o f i t a b l y used as analogs can be so employed, then  t h e problem of whether or n o t games  to a c t u a l c o n f l i c t  observing world  I f they  defined.  remainder o f t h e chapter was devoted t o o u t l i n i n g a l a b o r a t o r y  study which i s c o n s i d e r e d the n a t u r e  situations.  the m o d i f i c a t i o n s t h a t must be made t o the  t r a d i t i o n a l approach w i l l have to be e x p l i c i t l y The  i n real-world  to be an a p p r o p r i a t e i n i t i a l s t e p t o c l a r i f y i n g  of c o n f l i c t and i t s r e s o l u t i o n i n the r e a l w o r l d .  This involves  i n the l a b o r a t o r y persons who a r e a c t i v e i n a p a r t i c u l a r  conflict situation,  the labor-management b a r g a i n i n g  an approach which i s viewed as a necessary  initial  real-  relationship,  s t e p i n b r i d g i n g the  gap between the l a b o r a t o r y and n a t u r a l s e t t i n g as r e s e a r c h environments. The major o b j e c t i v e s i n c l u d e the o b t a i n i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n of a d e s c r i p t i v e nature  concerning  the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p and the g e n e r a t i o n o f  hypotheses p e r t i n e n t t o c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n f o r subsequent t e s t i n g i n both the l a b o r a t o r y and n a t u r a l s e t t i n g .  I n a d d i t i o n , f i v e hypotheses d e a l i n g  w i t h p e r c e p t u a l a s p e c t s of the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p were  presented.  26  CHAPTER THREE: The across  present  study was  c o n d i t i o n s , but  not one  r a t h e r was  i n which v a r i a b l e s were manipulated  intended  d e s c r i p t i v e information concerning labor-management b a r g a i n i n g  METHOD  as a v e h i c l e f o r c o l l e c t i n g  s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l aspects  relationship.  The  of  the  primary o b j e c t i v e was  to  c o l l e c t as much p e r t i n e n t data as p o s s i b l e d u r i n g a s h o r t p e r i o d of time and  f o r t h i s reason  the procedure tends to be somewhat segmented among  t h r e e k i n d s of t a s k s .  These tasks i n c l u d e d q u e s t i o n n a i r e s  and  s c a l e s d e a l i n g w i t h p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s as w e l l as p e r c e p t i o n of o p i n i o n s of o t h e r s , a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma-type game , and 9  b a r g a i n i n g problem.  In t h i s chapter  a  rating the  simulated  the s t r u c t u r e of the groups  and  sequence of events w i l l be o u t l i n e d , and d e s c r i p t i o n s of the t a s k s t h e i r mode of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n g i v e n .  and  In a d d i t i o n , the hypotheses w i l l  be  d e f i n e d i n o p e r a t i o n a l terms. A.  Subjects S u b j e c t s were 34 male a d u l t s w i t h  formal bargaining  experience  in  labor-management n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the g r e a t e r Vancouver b u s i n e s s - i n d u s t r i a l area.  N i n e t e e n of the s u b j e c t s were management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from  personnel  and  l a b o r r e l a t i o n s departments of such i n d u s t r i e s and  services  as Weldwood of Canada, G u l f O i l , B r i t i s h Columbia Hydro and Power  9  A P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma-type game w i t h postage stamp p a y o f f s was employed i n the p r e s e n t study. Due to d i f f i c u l t i e s i n simultaneous s c h e d u l i n g of two l a b o r and two management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n some e x p e r i m e n t a l s e s s i o n s , s u b j e c t s c o u l d not be run i n a l l of the c o n d i t i o n s o r i g i n a l l y planned; i n a d d i t i o n , many s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d o n l y a c u r s o r y understanding of the mechanics of c h o i c e and p a y o f f c o n t i n g e n c i e s . Since these two f a c t o r s p r e c l u d e d any m e a n i n g f u l treatment of the d a t a , t h i s p a r t of the experiment was excluded from subsequent a n a l y s i s and the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game w i l l not be d i s c u s s e d in. t h i s r e p o r t .  27  A u t h o r i t y , and Vancouver C i t y H a l l .  The remaining s u b j e c t s were  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f v a r i o u s u n i o n l o c a l s and c o u n c i l s which i n c l u d e d the Teamsters, Canadian Union o f P u b l i c Employees, L e t t e r C a r r i e r s ' Union o f Canada, Vancouver and D i s t r i c t Labor C o u n c i l , and so on. B.  Procedure I t was i n i t i a l l y proposed t h a t t e n s e s s i o n s be conducted, w i t h  two  management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and two l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n each s e s s i o n .  Due t o d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the simultaneous s c h e d u l i n g  s u b j e c t s who a l s o had n e g o t i a t i o n s  to conduct and o t h e r  of f o u r  commitments i n  the r e a l w o r l d , these t e n s e s s i o n s were comprised o f f o u r s e s s i o n s i n which two l a b o r and two management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p a r t i c i p a t e d , sessions and  i n which one l a b o r and two management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  one s e s s i o n i n which two l a b o r and one management  participated.  I n order  to standardize  five  participated,  representative  c o n d i t i o n s , and as a c o u r t e s y t o  the s u b j e c t s , the f o l l o w i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s were p l a c e d on the s t r u c t u r e of the  groups : 1 0  (i) did  Management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the same company or i n d u s t r y n o t appear together  (ii)  Labor r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the same u n i o n o r i n d u s t r y d i d  not appear t o g e t h e r (iii)  i n any one s e s s i o n .  i n any one s e s s i o n .  Representatives  from s p e c i f i c i n d u s t r y and l a b o r t h a t were  known t o have been i n the p a s t , or were c o n s i d e r e d  1 0  l i k e l y t o be i n  I t was f e l t t h a t s u b j e c t s would be more candid and a t ease knowing t h a t t h e i r b e h a v i o r was not b e i n g observed by immediate s u p e r i o r s , c l o s e colleagues, or p a r t i c u l a r bargaining "adversaries". A t the same time, adherence to these c o n t i n g e n c i e s i n t r o d u c e d a g r e a t e r degree o f homogeneity among the groups.  28  the near f u t u r e , i n v o l v e d i n c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r , d i d not appear t o g e t h e r  i n any  one  session.  At the b e g i n n i n g of each s e s s i o n the s u b j e c t s were s e a t e d c e n t r a l t a b l e i n a 15 by  30 f o o t room and  a b r i e f v e r b a l o u t l i n e of the k i n d s working d u r i n g attached  a s s u r e d t h a t the d a t a would not  Ll_ and  be  be  "Management"  g i v e n a l a p e l tag w i t h h i s name  A session l a s t e d approximately  the sequence of events was  as  M2  three  follows:  1.  f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O p i n i o n  2.  administration  3.  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the  4.  P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game  5.  bargaining  6.  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of a s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h s e t t l e m e n t  7.  second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  Questionnaire  of Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s F-scale  session  Opinion Questionnaire:  of the O p i n i o n The  might agree or d i s a g r e e .  (Appendix  l a b o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h which a  A) subject  Twenty-one of these statements r e f e r r e d to  labor r e l a t i o n s i n general. c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , one over the o t h e r p a r t y . " ;  scale  Questionnaire.  Opinion Questionnaire  c o n s i s t e d o f 25 statements concerning  A few should  examples of these items a r e : seek to a c q u i r e  process.";  "In  every p o s s i b l e advantage  " U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and  e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the b a r g a i n i n g mutual t r u s t can be  given  L_2 f o r l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , Ml_ and  f o r management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . hours and  r a t h e r to "Labor" and  In a d d i t i o n , each s u b j e c t was  a coded d e s i g n a t i o n ,  to each o t h e r ,  of tasks upon which they would  to i n d i v i d u a l s by name, but  as groups. and  the s e s s i o n , and  introduced  around a  "Persons who  demands are  an  t h i n k a s t a t e of  e s t a b l i s h e d between l a b o r and management are  being  29  unrealistic".  The remaining f o u r items were s p e c i f i c t o l a b o r r e l a t i o n s  in  the p r o v i n c e  "I  think that a frank interchange  and  of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a .  Examples o f these items i n c l u d e :  1 1  top management p e r s o n n e l  o f i d e a s between l o c a l l a b o r  leaders  c o u l d a l l e v i a t e much of t h e t e n s i o n t h a t  e x i s t s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today."; "The p r o v i n c i a l l a b o r laws f a v o r management.". Following seated  t h e experimenter's i n t r o d u c t o r y remarks, t h e s u b j e c t s were  a t i n d i v i d u a l t a b l e s i n the room and were g i v e n  t i o n o f the O p i n i o n  Questionnaire.  t h a t each of the q u e s t i o n n a i r e p a r t i c u l a r aspect  administra-  They were informed by the experimenter  items was a statement of o p i n i o n about a  o f l a b o r r e l a t i o n s , and a s u b j e c t was r e q u i r e d t o make  two judgments on each of these items. thought "Labor" ( i n g e n e r a l ) tend  the f i r s t  He was asked t o i n d i c a t e whether he  i n the p r o v i n c e  t o agree or d i s a g r e e w i t h  of B r i t i s h Columbia would  the statement, and whether he thought  "Management" ( i n g e n e r a l )  i n the p r o v i n c e  of B r i t i s h Columbia would  tend  to agree o r d i s a g r e e w i t h  the statement.  I n d i c a t i o n s were made by p l a c i n g  an L_, f o r "Labor", and an M, f o r "Management", i n e i t h e r the column headed AGREE o r i n the column headed DISAGREE. In o p e r a t i o n a l terms the f i r s t h y p o t h e s i s which "Labor" and "Management" a r e p e r c e i v e d  p r e d i c t s t h a t items on  to h o l d d i f f e r i n g  opinions  w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more f r e q u e n t l y i n the responses of l a b o r  ^ D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d i n which data were c o l l e c t e d , two o f f i c e r s o f the U n i t e d Fishermen and A l l i e d Worker's Union were r e l e a s e d from p r i s o n a f t e r ^ s e r v i n g p o r t i o n s o f sentences imposed f o r d e f y i n g an i n j u n c t i o n . As a r e s u l t , q u e s t i o n n a i r e item no. 7, which r e a d , "Those o f f i c i a l s o f the Fishermen and A l l i e d Worker's U n i o n now s e r v i n g p r i s o n terms s h o u l d be r e l e a s e d immediately.", was e l i m i n a t e d from the a n a l y s i s . Subsequent a n a l y s i s o f the q u e s t i o n n a i r e responses was based on the remaining 24 items.  30  representatives perceived  (conversely,  items on which "Labor" and "Management" a r e  t o share the same o p i n i o n w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more  f r e q u e n t l y i n the responses o f management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ) .  In other  words, i t was p r e d i c t e d t h a t l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would i n d i c a t e more statements on which one p a r t y was p e r c e i v e d to d i s a g r e e  t o agr'e and the o t h e r  than would management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  (Conversely,  perceived  management  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s would i n d i c a t e more statements w i t h which the two p a r t i e s were p e r c e i v e d  to e i t h e r b o t h agree o r b o t h d i s a g r e e  representatives.)  Consider  worker a r e overlooked  the item,  by the u n i o n o f f i c i a l s who r e p r e s e n t him."  "Management" as a g r e e i n g w i t h  (or both d i s a g r e e i n g ) w i t h  a management  the statement.  agreeing  While t h i s can be c o n s i d e r e d i s made by the f i r s t  should be noted t h a t p r e d i c t i o n s a r e not made w i t h r e f e r e n c e  as  hypothesis, to p a r t i c u l a r  i t i s p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e r e w i l l e x i s t a tendency f o r l a b o r  and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  to perceive  i n d i f f e r e n t ways over a l l o f the items. should  representa-  "Labor" and "Management" as both  an example of the k i n d o f p r e d i c t i o n t h a t  Instead,  A labor  "Labor" as d i s a g r e e i n g and  t h i s statement, w h i l e  t i v e might be expected to p e r c e i v e  items.  labor  "Sometimes the r e a l needs of the  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e might be expected t o p e r c e i v e  it  than would  the o p i n i o n s Specifically,  of the two p a r t i e s labor  representatives  p e r c e i v e more d i f f e r e n c e s of o p i n i o n between t h e two p a r t i e s than  should management  representatives.  At the end o f the s e s s i o n , f o l l o w i n g the b a r g a i n i n g completed the second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O p i n i o n  task,  Questionnaire.  subjects They  were informed by the experimenter t h a t these were the same items on which they had made judgments a t the b e g i n n i n g  o f the s e s s i o n , b u t t h a t on t h i s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n the procedure would be d i f f e r e n t .  A s u b j e c t was i n s t r u c t e d  31  to make f o u r judgments ( t h r e e judgments i f o n l y t h r e e s u b j e c t s were p r e s e n t in  the group) on each item.  He was asked t o i n d i c a t e whether he  p e r s o n a l l y agreed or d i s a g r e e d w i t h he  each statement, and t o i n d i c a t e how  thought each of the o t h e r s u b j e c t s would respond t o the items.  I n d i c a t i o n s were made by p l a c i n g an  f o r s e l f i n e i t h e r the column headed  AGREE o r i n the column headed DISAGREE.  I n d i c a t i o n s of how a s u b j e c t  thought t h e o t h e r s would respond were made w i t h  an M o r an L f o r one's  c o l l e a g u e , and an Ml_ and M2, o r L_l and L2 f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the other  party. The  second and t h i r d hypotheses r e q u i r e comparisons between the  s u b j e c t s ' responses on the i n i t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and t h i s f i n a l  administra-  t i o n o f the q u e s t i o n n a i r e . In o p e r a t i o n a l terms t h e second h y p o t h e s i s which one's p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n questionnaire) to h o l d  p r e d i c t s t h a t items on  ( i n d i c a t e d on the f i n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the  d i f f e r s from the o p i n i o n t h a t one p e r c e i v e s h i s own p a r t y  ( i n d i c a t e d on the i n i t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the q u e s t i o n n a i r e )  will  appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more f r e q u e n t l y i n the responses o f management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s than i n the responses o f l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  (Conversely,  items on which one's p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n i s the same as the o p i n i o n t h a t one p e r c e i v e s h i s own p a r t y t o h o l d w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more f r e q u e n t l y in  the responses of l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  ment  than i n the responses o f manage-  representatives.) In o p e r a t i o n a l terms the t h i r d h y p o t h e s i s  p r e d i c t s t h a t items on  which one's p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n d i f f e r s from t h e o p i n i o n t h a t one p e r c e i v e s the other p a r t y questionnaire)  to hold  ( i n d i c a t e d on the i n i t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the  w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more f r e q u e n t l y i n the responses  32  of l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s (Conversely,  than i n the responses o f management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  items on which one's p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n i s the same as t h e  o p i n i o n t h a t one p e r c e i v e s  the o t h e r p a r t y t o h o l d w i l l appear  significantly  more f r e q u e n t l y i n the responses of management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s responses of l a b o r The these a r e :  representatives.)  f o u r t h hypothesis  makes t h r e e p r e d i c t i o n s .  (a) over a l l q u e s t i o n n a i r e  items,  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t i n g a common p e r c e p t i o n be s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r  I n o p e r a t i o n a l terms  the percentage o f l a b o r of " L a b o r ' s " o p i n i o n s  than t h e percentage of management  i n d i c a t i n g a common p e r c e p t i o n of "Management's" o p i n i o n s ; questionnaire  than i n the  items,  representatives (b) over a l l  t h e percentage of l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t i n g a  common p e r c e p t i o n of "Management's" o p i n i o n s w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y than the percentage o f management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s perception  the percentage of l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t i n g a common o p i n i o n w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y g r e a t e r  personal  In o t h e r words,  b o t h homogeneity of p e r c e p t i o n and homogeneity o f o p i n i o n by l a b o r  Scales:  One 7-point  than by management  repre-  representatives . 1 2  r a t i n g s c a l e (Appendix B) r e q u i r e d  d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e r a t i n g s on the f o l l o w i n g s i x dimensions: t r u s t i n g - s u s p i c i o u s , strong-weak, h o n e s t - d i s h o n e s t ,  1 2  items,  than the percentage of management  i n d i c a t i n g a common p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n .  s e n t a t i v e s w i l l be g r e a t e r  greater  i n d i c a t i n g a common  of " L a b o r ' s " o p i n i o n s ; and, (c) over a l l q u e s t i o n n a i r e  representatives  will  semantic  good-bad,  trustworthy-  A l t h o u g h 15 l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s took p a r t i n t h e study, one s u b j e c t a r r i v e d t o o l a t e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h a t p a r t of the s e s s i o n which i n v o l v e d the c o l l e c t i o n of p e r c e p t u a l d a t a . F o r t h i s r e a s o n the l a b o r n i s 14 here r a t h e r than 15.  33  untrustworthy, c o o p e r a t i v e - c o m p e t i t i v e . 1 6  T h i s s c a l e was a d m i n i s t e r e d  t h r e e times i n s u c c e s s i o n , and the experimenter r e a d the f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the s u b j e c t s on these a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s : f i r s t administration The two l a b o r people have a s h e e t w i t h "Labor" p r i n t e d a t the top and t h e two management p e o p l e have e x a c t l y the same sheet except t h a t "Management" i s p r i n t e d a t the t o p . You l a b o r p e o p l e a r e t o c o n s i d e r the term "Labor", whatever t h a t means t o you. I s "Labor" bad o r i s i t good? I f i t i s extremely bad put a t i c k mark a t -3 o f the top s c a l e . I f i t i s extremely good, put a t i c k mark a t +3. I f i t i s n e u t r a l , put a t i c k mark a t z e r o . I f "Labor" i s b e t t e r than n e u t r a l , b u t not extremely good, your t i c k mark s h o u l d go somewhere between z e r o and +3 a t a p o i n t t h a t r e f l e c t s j u s t how good you t h i n k "Labor" i s . You management people do t h e same t h i n g f o r the concept o f "Management". Extremely bad, t i c k a t -3, extremely good, t i c k a t +3. Or p l a c e your t i c k somewhere i n between. F o l l o w t h e same procedure f o r each of the s e p a r a t e s c a l e s . Labor people r a t e "Labor" on the " t r u s t i n g - s u s p i c i o u s " s c a l e , "strong-weak" s c a l e and so on. Management p e o p l e r a t e "Management". second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n Now Labor has a form w i t h "Management" at the top and Management has a form w i t h "Labor" a t the t o p . You ( i n d i c a t i n g Labor) r a t e "Management" on a l l of these s c a l e s , and you ( i n d i c a t i n g Management) r a t e "Labor". third administration Now Labor has a "Labor" s h e e t a g a i n and Management has a "Management" s h e e t . T h i s time Labor, you i n d i c a t e how you t h i n k "Labor" would be r a t e d by "Management" and "Management" you i n d i c a t e how you t h i n k "Management" would be r a t e d by "Labor". The f i f t h  h y p o t h e s i s r e q u i r e s comparisons between the s u b j e c t s '  responses on t h e second and t h i r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s o f these s c a l e s .  In  o p e r a t i o n a l terms the f i f t h h y p o t h e s i s p r e d i c t s t h a t on the t h r e e e v a l u a t i v e dimensions, "good-bad", " t r u s t w o r t h y - u n t r u s t w o r t h y " ,  Because a l a r g e number of s u b j e c t s expressed concern t h a t the terms " c o o p e r a t i v e " and " c o m p e t i t i v e " a r e n o t p o l a r o p p o s i t e s , i n the same sense as t h e o t h e r f i v e dimensions, t h i s dimension was e l i m i n a t e d from the a n a l y s i s . Subsequent a n a l y s i s of responses on t h i s s c a l e was based on the remaining f i v e dimensions.  34  "honest-dishonest",  the r a t i n g s i n d i c a t e d by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of a p a r t y  on the t h i r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of these s c a l e s w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  lower  than the r a t i n g s g i v e n by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the o t h e r p a r t y on the second administration. be r a t e d by tives w i l l negative)  In other words, when asked how  t h i n k "Labor" would  "Management" (on the t h i r d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) , l a b o r tend  to i n d i c a t e a lower r a t i n g  than they a r e a c t u a l l y g i v e n by  the p r e s e n t  they  study  ( l e s s p o s i t i v e , or more "Management" as r e p r e s e n t e d  (on the second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) .  representatives w i l l  tend  representa-  in  S i m i l a r l y , management  to expect lower r a t i n g s than they a r e a c t u a l l y  g i v e n by "Labor" as r e p r e s e n t e d  i n the p r e s e n t  study.  A tendency i s  p r e d i c t e d then, f o r each p a r t y to t h i n k t h a t the o t h e r p e r c e i v e s l e s s "good", l e s s " t r u s t w o r t h y " , A second r a t i n g s c a l e was from Adorno e t a l . (1950),  and  them as  l e s s "honest", than i t a c t u a l l y does.  the 30-item F - s c a l e  (Appendix C)  adopted  T h i s s c a l e was  administered  following  of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s .  Standardized  i n s t r u c t i o n s were  provided with  employed i n o r d e r  the s c a l e .  The  F - s c a l e was  to  completion  provide  some a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m and  l e v e l of c o o p e r a t i o n  i n the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma ( u s i n g a s e q u e n t i a l -  p l a y s i t u a t i o n . Deutsch (1960) has r e f l e c t i n g t r u s t and who  shown t h a t s u b j e c t s who  t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s had  low F - s c o r e s , whereas s u b j e c t s  made c h o i c e s r e f l e c t i n g s u s p i c i o n and u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s  scores). excluded  made c h o i c e s  had h i g h  Because the r e s u l t s of the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game had from the p r e s e n t  a n a l y s i s , t h i s s p e c i f i c purpose was  not  F-  to be achieved.  However, the d a t a d e r i v e d from the F - s c a l e are i n c l u d e d i n the r e p o r t . Bargaining  task;  The management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s were seated a t two  separate  labor  t a b l e s and were i n s t r u c t e d  35  by  the experimenter t h a t they would n e g o t i a t e as two-person teams, a  management team and a l a b o r team, to a r r i v e a t a wage s e t t l e m e n t simulated bargaining s i t u a t i o n .  Each team was  in a  given four typewritten  pages of i n f o r m a t i o n d e s c r i b i n g the p r e s e n t and p r o j e c t e d p r o f i t p i c t u r e of a f i c t i t i o u s s m a l l b u s i n e s s home pay  e n t e r p r i s e as w e l l as the wages and  of employees a t v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e wage r a t e s .  b a r g a i n i n g " r u l e s " was  also included.  take-  An o u t l i n e of  Here management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  were d e p i c t e d as p a r t n e r s i n the b u s i n e s s , and  the l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  were d e p i c t e d as the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s r e p r e s e n t i n g t e n employees of business. team was  The  i n f o r m a t i o n a v a i l a b l e to the management team and  i d e n t i c a l but f o r two  the  exceptions:  the  the l a b o r  (1) Management's i n f o r m a t i o n  i n c l u d e d the exact p r o f i t f i g u r e s f o r p a s t y e a r s w h i l e Labor had  estimates  of the range w i t h i n which p r o f i t s f e l l d u r i n g the p r e v i o u s y e a r ,  and  (2) Management r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n s p e c i f y i n g a p r o j e c t e d raw m a t e r i a l c o s t about which Labor had no i n f o r m a t i o n . these The  two  The  a d d i t i o n a l p i e c e s of I n f o r m a t i o n was  f a c t t h a t Management had made known to both  teams.  complete s e t of i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n s u b j e c t s f o r t h i s t a s k i s p r e s e n t e d  below: You are a p a r t n e r i n a s m a l l independent company w i t h a s s e t s of $500,000. You employ 10 g e r b i l makers. Over the p a s t y e a r s your p r o f i t s from the s a l e of g e r b i l s , a f t e r payment of a l l o p e r a t i n g expenses, i n c l u d i n g the s a l a r i e s of both you and your .partner, have been as f o l l o w s : $35,000  -1967  $25,000  - y e a r l y average f o r the p e r i o d 1964-1966  $20,000  - y e a r l y average f o r the p e r i o d 1961-1963  (the o n l y i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t Labor possesses c o n c e r n i n g your p r o f i t s i s an e s t i m a t e t h a t the 1967 p r o f i t was somewhere i n the range of $30,000-$50,000)  36  ( T h i s i s t h e i n i t i a l i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n t o the management team and t h i s i s the o n l y p a r t which d i f f e r s from the i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n the l a b o r team. The c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n g i v e n Labor was as follows: "You a r e t h e c e r t i f i e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f 10 g e r b i l makers employed by a s m a l l independent company. The a s s e t s o f t h i s company amount t o $500,000. A f t e r payment of a l l o p e r a t i n g expenses, i n c l u d i n g management s a l a r i e s , t h e p r o f i t made by t h i s company from the s a l e of g e r b i l s i n 1967 was i n the range of $30,000-$50,000 (the exact f i g u r e and y e a r l y averages f o r the p e r i o d s 1961-1963 and 1964-1966 a r e known o n l y t o Management)." The r e s t o f the i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t e d here was g i v e n t o both the l a b o r team and the management team.) Each employee i s p a i d the same h o u r l y wage which i s r e n e g o t i a t e d a t the end of each y e a r . A l t h o u g h the n e g o t i a t e d wage has tended to r i s e over the y e a r s , wages have n o t i n c r e a s e d each and every y e a r , and on some o c c a s i o n s they have a c t u a l l y d e c r e a s e d . Both you and the l a b o r (management) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have access t o an independent a n a l y s i s which r e v e a l s t h e p r o f i t s t h a t can be expected a t v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e h o u r l y wage r a t e s f o r the coming y e a r ( f o r example, a p r o f i t of $52,500 can be expected i f the r e n e g o t i a t e d h o u r l y wage i s $2.10. The gross e a r n i n g s f o r the coming y e a r a t t h i s wage would be $4,368 f o r each g e r b i l maker.). The c u r r e n t wage i s $3.20 p e r hour and the t a s k f a c i n g b o t h you and the l a b o r (management) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i s t o r e n e g o t i a t e the h o u r l y wage r a t e f o r the coming y e a r . Both Labor and Management w i l l be allowed t o d i s c u s s the problem w i t h t h e i r a s s o c i a t e f o r 10 minutes p r i o r t o n e g o t i a t i o n . Both p a r t i e s w i l l then be c a l l e d t o the b a r g a i n i n g t a b l e and a timer w i l l be s t a r t e d . N e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l c o s t Management $50 p e r minute, t o be s u b t r a c t e d from t h e expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year a t t h e s e t t l e m e n t wage ( f o r example, i f a s e t t l e m e n t o f $3.00 per hour i s reached a f t e r 30 minutes o f n e g o t i a t i n g , 30 x $50 = $1500 w i l l be s u b t r a c t e d from Management's expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year a t t h a t wage. T h i s would l e a v e Management w i t h an expected p r o f i t of $30,000 - $1500 = $28,500. S i m i l a r l y , 30 x $50 = $1500 w i l l be s u b t r a c t e d from an employee's fund which has the e f f e c t of r e d u c i n g each o f the 10 employees' wages by $150 over t h e y e a r and b r i n g i n g e a r n i n g s t o $6090 ($6240 - $150 = $6090). T h i s would amount t o $150 from each of t h e 10 employees' wages, l e a v i n g each employee w i t h a gross e a r n i n g of $6240 - $150 = $6090). Should no s e t t l e m e n t be reached a f t e r 50 minutes, t h e c o s t of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l i n c r e a s e t o $100 per minute. Note: I f Management f i n d s the i n i t i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y they may choose t o l o c k t h e i r employees o u t . S i m i l a r l y , should Labor f i n d the i n i t i a l n e g o t i a t i o n s u n s a t i s f a c t o r y they may choose to s t r i k e . In e i t h e r case, i f a d e c i s i o n i s made t o l o c k out or to s t r i k e , t h e o r i g i n a l a n a l y s i s of expected p r o f i t s a t v a r i o u s p o s s i b l e h o u r l y wage r a t e s w i l l be r e p l a c e d by a new one. Subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be based on t h i s new a n a l y s i s : here,  37  both the y e a r l y earnings and the expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year associated w i t h each p o s s i b l e hourly wage w i l l be l e s s than they were i n the o r i g i n a l a n a l y s i s . Should a s t r i k e or a lockout occur, both Labor and Management w i l l be allowed to adjourn from the bargaining table to discuss the new a n a l y s i s w i t h t h e i r associate. At t h i s point the timer w i l l be stopped and r e s t a r t e d only when both p a r t i e s have returned t o the bargaining t a b l e . The current wage as stated i n the i n s t r u c t i o n s was $3.20 per hour and the task f a c i n g the subjects was to renegotiate the hourly wage f o r the coming year.  Economic considerations i n these negotiations were  based on a wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s which consisted e s s e n t i a l l y of a concrete v e r s i o n of Sawyer's bargaining board (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967). This a n a l y s i s i s shown i n Figure 1. By g i v i n g s p e c i f i c examples subjects were shown how to i n t e r p r e t t h i s wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s . For example, the stated current wage of $3.20 per hour appears i n row L, about h a l f way down the column of f i g u r e s on the l e f t .  By looking across t h i s row  i t can be seen that a worker's gross earnings f o r the coming year a t that wage would be $6656, while Management's expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year at that wage would be $25,000.  In the same manner a worker's  gross earnings and Management's expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year can be derived from each of the p o s s i b l e settlement wage rates which range from $2.10 per hour to $4.60 per hour.  Each ten cent increment i n hourly  wage increases a worker's gross earnings f o r the coming year by $208, while reducing Management's expected p r o f i t by $2500.  Consequently a ten cent  r a i s e i n the e x i s t i n g r a t e of pay from $3.20 per hour to $3.30 per hour would have the e f f e c t of increasing gross earnings from $6656 t o $6864, while reducing expected p r o f i t from $25,000 to $22,500. B r i e f l y reviewing the s t r u c t u r e of t h i s bargaining task, each team was allowed up to 20 minutes to discuss bargaining s t r a t e g i e s and during  38  h o u r l y wage and gross earnings f o r coming year at t h a t wage  F i g u r e 1.  expected p r o f i t f o r coming year  2.10  4368  A  52500  2.20  4576  B  50000  2.30  4784  C  47500  2.40  4992  D  45000  2.50  5200  E  42500  2.60  5408  F  40000  2.70  5616  G  37500  2.80  5824  H  35000  2.90  6032  I  32500  3.00  6240  J  30000  3.10  6448  K  27500  3.20  6656  L  25000  3.30  6864  M  22500  3.40  7072  N  20000  3.50  7280  0  17500  3.60  7488  P  15000  3.70  7696  Q  12500  3.80  7904  R  10000  3.90  8112  S  7500  4.00  8320  T  5000  4.10  8528  U  2500  4.20  8736  V  0  4.30  8944  W  -2500  4.40  9152  X  -5000  4.50  9360  Y  -7500  4.60  9568  Z  -10000  Wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s t o be used i n the b a r g a i n i n g  task.  39  t h i s time one overheard by then c a l l e d  team was  permitted  to a c e n t r a l b a r g a i n i n g on one  room so as not t o  " n e g o t i a t i o n s " began. wage was  t h a t they c o n s i d e r e d  room.  Subjects  t a b l e i n the e x p e r i m e n t a l  s i d e of the  on the o t h e r , a timer which was  a settlement  a separate  the team remaining i n the experimental  the l a b o r team seated  and  to use  t a b l e and  be were  room, w i t h  the management team  v i s i b l e to the p a r t i c i p a n t s was  started,  T h i s p a r t of the s e s s i o n proceeded u n t i l e i t h e r  agreed upon by b o t h teams, or one  team i n d i c a t e d  a s t a l e m a t e to have been reached.  A "time c o n s t r a i n t " was  introduced  n e g o t i a t i o n s i n the r e a l w o r l d and  to s i m u l a t e  the c o s t s of p r o t r a c t e d  as an i n c e n t i v e f o r the s u b j e c t s  t h i s p a r t of the s e s s i o n moving a t a r a p i d pace.  T h i s i n v o l v e d an  to keep imaginary  $50.00 per minute c o s t , to be deducted from Management's p r o f i t and gross  earnings  a t the e v e n t u a l  settlement  wage l e v e l .  informed t h a t t h i s c o s t would be i n c r e a s e d the b a r g a i n i n g  s e s s i o n proceed longer  to withdraw from the b a r g a i n i n g  Subjects  were  to $100.00 per minute  than 50 minutes.  t a b l e a t any  should  A team was  time i n order  allowed  to d i s c u s s  o f f e r s , demands, s t r a t e g i e s , e t c .  They were informed however, t h a t  timer would c o n t i n u e  these  A p r o v i s i o n was  to run d u r i n g  Labor's  the  periods.  a l s o made f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a team f i n d i n g the  negotiations unsatisfactory. " s t r i k e " and Management had  I n t h i s event, Labor had the r i g h t to " l o c k out".  the r i g h t  to  S u b j e c t s were informed  t h a t a d e c i s i o n to e i t h e r " s t r i k e " or " l o c k o u t " would r e s u l t i n r e p l a c e ment of the o r i g i n a l wage and F i g u r e 2. new  p r o f i t a n a l y s i s w i t h a new  one,  shown i n  Subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s would be based on the f i g u r e s i n t h i s  a n a l y s i s , which d i f f e r e d from those i n the o r i g i n a l a n a l y s i s to  extent  t h a t a worker's g r o s s  earning  and Management's expected  the  profit  40  h o u r l y wage and gross earnings f o r coming year at t h a t wage  F i g u r e 2.  expected p r o f i t f o r coming year  2.10  4284  A  47500  2.20  4488  B  45000  2.30  4692  C  42500  2.40  4896  D  40000  2.50  5100  E  37500  2.60  5304  F  35000  2.70  5508  G  32500  2.80  5712  H  30000  2.90  5916  I  27500  3.00  6120  J  25000  3.10  6324  K  22500  3.20  6528  L  20000  3.30  6732  M  17500  3.40  6936  N  15000  3.50  7140  0  12500  3.60  7344  P  10000  3.70  7548  Q  7500  3.80  7752  R  5000  3.90  7956  S  2500  4.00  8160  T  0  4.10  8364  U  -2500  4.20  8568  V  -5000  4.30  8772  w  -7500  4.40  8976  X  -10000  4,50  9180  Y  -12500  4.60  9384  Z  -15000  Wage and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s t o be used i n the event o f a " s t r i k e " or "lock out".  41  a t each h o u r l y wage were lower In the new intended  "lock out"  Subjects  were a l s o informed t h a t should  o c c u r , b o t h the l a b o r team and  a l l o w e d to a d j o u r n from the b a r g a i n i n g t h i s p o i n t the timer was p a r t i e s returned  recorded. session.  T h i s procedure  to be  settlement  wage and  A r a t i n g s c a l e was  table to discuss s t r a t e g y .  administered  session.  the headings EXTREMELY SATISFIED and s e s s i o n was  content a n a l y s i s  period.  4  5  1 5  At  table.  f o l l o w i n g the  T h i s s c a l e c o n s i s t e d of a 7-point l i n e ,  the b a r g a i n i n g  be  r e s t a r t e d o n l y when both  time taken to r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h the outcome of the b a r g a i n i n g  or  the management team would  stopped and  to the b a r g a i n i n g  a "strike"  19 cm.  The  were  bargaining i n length  ( F i g . 3 ) , on which the s u b j e c t s were asked to i n d i c a t e t h e i r  The  was  as a s i m u l a t i o n of the c o s t s invoked by a breakdown i n  negotiations.  The  analysis.  s c a l e was  EXTREMELY UNSATISFIED.  satisfaction  anchored w i t h In a d d i t i o n ,  tape r e c o r d e d * f o r the purpose of a subsequent 11  .  e x p e r i m e n t a l s e s s i o n concluded w i t h a b r i e f i n f o r m a l  discussion  These d i s c u s s i o n s u s u a l l y i n v o l v e d comments on s p e c i f i c  T h e b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n was of the s u b j e c t s .  tape recorded  w i t h the knowledge and  labor-  consent  A1though ten b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s were conducted, d a t a from two of these were e l i m i n a t e d from the a n a l y s i s . In one of these s e s s i o n s the b e h a v i o r of a s u b j e c t suggasted inadequate comprehension of the i n s t r u c t i o n s , w h i l e i n the other s e s s i o n a management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and a l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n d i c a t e d that they had p r e v i o u s l y p a r t i c i p a t e d i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h each o t h e r , and much of t h e i r b e h a v i o r d u r i n g the s e s s i o n was conducted on a p e r s o n a l l e v e l , i n the sense t h a t s p e c i f i c p r i o r b a r g a i n i n g e x p e r i e n c e s appeared to p l a y a major r o l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i r b e h a v i o r d u r i n g the s e s s i o n . (Note t h a t the r e a s o n i n g f o r e l i m i n a t i o n of t h i s s e s s i o n from the a n a l y s i s i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the c r i t e r i a e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the s t r u c t u r i n g of the groups.) Subsequent a n a l y s i s of the b a r g a i n i n g d a t a was based on the remaining e i g h t s e s s i o n s .  I n d i c a t e how s a t i s f i e d you a r e w i t h the outcome by p l a c i n g a mark on the l i n e below  EXTREMELY  EXTREMELY  UNSATISFIED  SATISFIED  F i g u r e 3.  Scale f o r i n d i c a t i o n the b a r g a i n i n g  of p e r s o n a l s a t i s f a c t i o n  session.  with  the outcome o f  43  management r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the g r e a t e r Vancouver b u s i n e s s - i n d u s t r i a l area and  the a p p l i c a t i o n of s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s i n the  relationship.  No  f o r m a l d a t a were c o l l e c t e d d u r i n g  time the experimenter f u l l y e x p l a i n e d any  questions.  C.  Suinnary In the p r e s e n t  formal bargaining  study  d e s c r i p t i v e data concerning relationship.  this  answered  to y i e l d  s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s of the  bargaining  A t o t a l of ten 3-hour s e s s i o n s were conducted i n which  Questionnaire,  Prisoner's Dilenna-type The  At  15 l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s w i t h  p a r t i c i p a t e d i n s e s s i o n s designed  s u b j e c t s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 3- and Opinion  this period.  the purpose of the study and  19 management and  experience  bargaining  Opinion  4-person groups.  The  tasks included  the an  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s , the F - s c a l e , a gaue, and  Questionnaire  a simulated bargaining  was  problem.  comprised of 25 statements  l a b o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h which s u b j e c t s might agree or d i s a g r e e .  concerning A subject  asked to i n d i c a t e f o r each statement the o p i n i o n he p e r c e i v e d h i s own to h o l d , the o p i n i o n he p e r c e i v e d o p i n i o n , and, bargaining  the o t h e r p a r t y to h o l d , h i s own  a f t e r i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h the other group members i n the  s i t u a t i o n , the o p i n i o n he  q u e s t i o n n a i r e responses were  thought each of the o t h e r s  held. the  presented.  Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s c o n s i s t e d of the f o l l o w i n g s i x  dimensions: dishonest", separate  party  personal  O p e r a t i o n a l statements of each of the f o u r hypotheses d e a l i n g w i t h  The  was  "good-bad", " t r u s t i n g - s u s p i c i o u s " , "strong-weak", "honest"trustworthy-untrustworthy",  "cooperative-competitive".  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s of these s c a l e s a s u b j e c t was  i n d i c a t e f o r each of the s i x dimensions how  On  r e q u i r e d to  he would r a t e h i s own  party,  44  how  he would r a t e the other p a r t y , and  be r a t e d by the o t h e r p a r t y . dealing with The  An  how  he  thought h i s own  p a r t y would  o p e r a t i o n a l statement of the  the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e responses was  session also included a bargaining  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the r o l e of b u s i n e s s as the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s r e p r e s e n t i n g  hypothesis  presented.  t a s k which c a s t management  partners  and  labor  representatives  employees of the b u s i n e s s .  r e q u i r e d the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the two  p a r t i e s to n e g o t i a t e  The  analysis.  profit  adapted from the model of Sawyer's b a r g a i n i n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s were tape recorded  and  subjected  to a f o r m a l  In a d d i t i o n , a s c a l e on which the s u b j e c t s  of s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h  the outcome of the b a r g a i n i n g  task  a wage s e t t l e -  ment f o r the coming year on the b a s i s of a p r o j e c t e d wage and a n a l y s i s which was  The  board.  content  indicated their  s e s s i o n was  level  administered.  45  CHAPTER FOUR: The  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  a n a l y s i s and d i s c u s s i o n o f r e s u l t s w i l l be developed  first in  terms of the p e r c e p t i o n s of persons i n v o l v e d i n the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p , and second i n terms of the v a r i o u s approaches t o n e g o t i a t i o n s employed by these persons i n a s i m u l a t e d b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n .  I n the  p r e s e n t c o n t e x t t h e term " p e r c e p t i o n " i s used t o encompass some of t h e ways i n which l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s view "Labor" and "Management" as d i s t i n c t groups o r p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a b a r g a i n i n g relationship.  T h i s p e r c e p t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n was o b t a i n e d u s i n g t h e O p i n i o n  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e and the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s . were o b t a i n e d by f o r m a l a n a l y s i s of the v e r b a l content session.  Bargaining  data  of the n e g o t i a t i n g  I n a d d i t i o n , i n f o r m a t i o n was c o l l e c t e d c o n c e r n i n g  the time  taken  to r e a c h a s e t t l e m e n t , s e t t l e m e n t wage, and degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the settlement. Although presented, groups.  d a t a o f both a d e s c r i p t i v e and a comparative n a t u r e w i l l be  emphasis i n the t e x t i s p l a c e d on comparisons between and w i t h i n  F o r example, homogeneity o f l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' opinions v s  homogeneity of management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ' o p i n i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s a betweengroups comparison, w h i l e p e r c e p t i o n by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the o p i n i o n s h e l d by t h e i r own p a r t y v s the p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s o f management representatives c o n s t i t u t e s a within-groups t a b l e s and f i g u r e s have been o r g a n i z e d  comparison.  Consequently,  to i n c l u d e c e r t a i n summary  s t a t i s t i c s which a r e d e s c r i p t i v e i n n a t u r e  as w e l l as those n e c e s s a r y f o r  making r e l e v a n t comparisons. A.  Perceptions The  of the P a r t i e s i n a B a r g a i n i n g R e l a t i o n s h i p  responses g i v e n by l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o t h e  46  24 q u e s t i o n n a i r e items a r e summarized i n T a b l e  1 i n terms of the percentage  of s u b j e c t s who: (i)  t h i n k t h e i r own p a r t y agrees w i t h each statement;  ( i i ) t h i n k the o t h e r p a r t y agrees w i t h each statement; and  ( i i i ) p e r s o n a l l y agree w i t h each statement.  As an example of the way i n which t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s i n t e r p r e t e d , c o n s i d e r the f i r s t q u e s t i o n n a i r e item, "The need t o l o o k good t o one's c o n s t i t u e n t s plays a very  important  bargaining behavior."  r o l e i n determining  a labor representative's  From t h e top row o f f i g u r e s i n T a b l e  1 i t can be  seen t h a t 95% ( o r 18 of 19) of the management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s thought "Management" i n g e n e r a l would agree w i t h t h i s statement and 64% (or 9 of 14) of t h e l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s thought "Labor" i n g e n e r a l would agree. It  can a l s o be seen t h a t 89% o f the management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s thought  "Labor" i n g e n e r a l would agree w i t h  the statement and 92% o f the l a b o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s thought "Management" i n g e n e r a l would agree.  Finally, i t  can be seen t h a t 89% of the management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p e r s o n a l l y agree w i t h the statement and 64% o f the l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p e r s o n a l l y agree. The looked  information obtained  a t i n another way.  from the O p i n i o n Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  Considering  can be  t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i n terms of the  responses r e q u i r e d on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e , r e c a l l t h a t a s u b j e c t was asked, i n e f f e c t , t o i n d i c a t e f o r each  item:  (a) the o p i n i o n t h a t he t h i n k s h i s own p a r t y  holds;  (b) t h e o p i n i o n t h a t he t h i n k s the o t h e r p a r t y and The  (c) h i s own p e r s o n a l  first  holds;  opinion.  t h r e e hypotheses a r e r e i t e r a t e d below a l o n g w i t h an i n d i c a t i o n  of which two of the t h r e e responses above c o n s t i t u t e s the comparison  Table  1.  P e r c e p t i o n s by the s u b j e c t s of the o p i n i o n s of "Management" and "Labor", and the p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n s of the s u b j e c t s .  MANAGEMENT (n=19)  q u e s t i o n n a i r e item  % % indicating indicating agreement agreement by by "Management" "Labor"  LABOR (n=14)  % % indicating personal agreement  indicating agreement by "Labor"  indicating % agreement indicating by parsouai "Management" agreement  1. The need to l o o k good to one's c o n s t i t u e n t s p l a y s a v e r y important r o l e i n determining a labor repres e n t a t i v e ' s bargaining behavior.  95  89  89  64  92  2. In c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s management i n t e r p r e t s the g o a l s of l a b o r f a i r l y accurately.  74  42  84  39  86  61  3. Government s h o u l d i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labor's r i g h t to strike.  11  84  47  79  14  5? •  4. I n an i n d u s t r y i n the "best of a l l p o s s i b l e w o r l d s " there would be no need f o r u n i o n s .  63  0  16  50  100  29  5  84  0  86  7  71  6. In n e o g i t a t i n g a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the other p a r t y I would l i k e to be c o m p l e t e l y h c n e s t , but I am a f r a i d t h a t my honesty would be taken advantage o f .  74  79  58  64  64  71  8. Management i s g e n u i n e l y concerned w i t h the needs of the worker.  79  11  74  36  86  29 ,.  5. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e management.  Table  1  (continued) MANAGEMENT  %  questionnaire  item  LABOR  %  %  indicating indicating % agreement agreement indicating by by personal "Management" "Labor" agreement  9. In c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , one should seek to a c q u i r e every p o s s i b l e advantage over t h e other p a r t y .  58  84  47  10. In b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s , l a b o r r a r e l y seems t o a p p r e c i a t e the problems f a c i n g management.  84  11  53  .11. The union shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees.  32  0  12. The c l o s e d shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees,  95  13. I t h i n k t h a t a f r a n k i n t e r c h a n g e of i d e a s between l o c a l l a b o r l e a d e r s and top management p e r s o n n e l could a l l e v i a t e much of the t e n s i o n t h a t e x i s t s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today.  indicating agreement by "Labor"  %  indicating % agreement indicating by personal "Management" agreement  86  50  7  79  7  31  0  64  0  0  79  15  100  38  68  74  74  86  64  86  100  100  89  100  93  93  15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands a r e an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f the bargaining process.  32  37  26  50  64  43  16. Labor i s more l i k e l y t o take advantage of c o n t r a c t loopholes than i s management.  61  6  33  0  86  0  14. In g e n e r a l , labor-management r e l a t i o n s c o u l d be iraproved.  71  -  Table  1  (continued) MANAGEMENT  %  questionnaire  indicating agreement by Management  item  LABOR  % indicating % agreement indicating by personal "Labor" agreement  % indicating agreement by "Labor"  %  % indicating indicating agreement personal by "Management" agreement  17. A good l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e can u s u a l l y do what he t h i n k s i s r i g h t i n labor-management b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s and not worry about l o o k i n g good to his constitutents.  11  42  26  74  69  71  18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker a r e overlooked by the u n i o n o f f i c i a l s who r e p r e s e n t him.  95  26  89  29  61  36  19. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e w i t h management's r i g h t t o l o c k o u t .  58  32  68  64  92  71  20. Labor p e o p l e a r e g e n e r a l l y more s e n s i t i v e t o s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than a r e management p e o p l e .  47  89  58  93  15  86  21. The p r o v i n c i a l l a b o r laws f a v o r management.  11  84  11  86  15  79  22. The r i g h t t o s t r i k e i s an i n d i s p e n s i b l e p a r t of the labor-management relationship.  79  89  79  93  15  93  23. Persons who t h i n k a s t a t e of mutual t r u s t can be e s t a b l i s h e d between l a b o r and management a r e b e i n g u n r e a l i s t i c .  17  28  22  36  28  29  24. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d i n f l e x i b l e labor.  47  0  26  0  77  0  53  0  47  0  69  7  25. The p r o v i n c i a l labor.  by  l a b o r laws f a v o r  so  appropriate to each hypothesis: hypothesis 1.  Issues on which the two parties are thought to hold  differing opinions w i l l be indicated more frequently by Labor than by Management. This hypothesis involves (a) and (b) and compares the mean number of statements on which a difference of opinion i s perceived by labor representatives with the mean number of statements on which a difference i s perceived by management representatives. hypothesis 2. The personal opinions of Management w i l l differ from the opinions they think their own party holds more frequently than the personal opinions of Labor w i l l differ from the opinions they think their own party holds.  This hypothesis Involves (a) and  (c) and compares the mean number of statements on which a management representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Management" In general holds with the mean number of statements on which a labor representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Labor" i n general holds. hypothesis 3. Issues on which one's personal opinion differs from the opinion one thinks i s held by the other party w i l l be indicated more frequently by Labor than by Management. This hypothesis involves (c) and (b) and compares the mean number of statements on which a labor representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Management" i n general holds with the mean number of statements on which a management representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Labor" i n general holds.  51  The data used to t e s t each of these hypotheses are shown i n Table 2 i n terms of the number of questionnaire items on which the r e q u i s i t e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of opinions occurred i n the responses of the subjects. As an example of the way i n which t h i s information i s i n t e r p r e t e d , consider the responses of the f i r s t management representative and the f i r s t labor representative.  From the top row of f i g u r e s i n Table 2 i t  can be seen that the management representative i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e of opinion between the two p a r t i e s on 11 of the 24 items and the labor representative i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e on 17 of the 24 items.  I t can a l s o  be seen that the management representative i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e between h i s personal opinion and the opinion he thought h i s own party held on 1 of the 24 items and the labor representative i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e on 4 of the, 24 items.  F i n a l l y , i t can be seen that the management representative  i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e between h i s personal opinion and the opinion he thought the other party held on 10 of: the 24 items and the labor representat i v e i n d i c a t e d a d i f f e r e n c e on 13 of the 24 items.  Note that the data i n  t h i s table r e f e r to the number of questionnaire statements on which a d i f f e r e n c e was i n d i c a t e d by each subject and should not be confused w i t h the percentage of subjects perceiving agreement w i t h each of these questionnaire statements shown i n Table 1. Perceived d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion as p o t e n t i a l sources of tension and conflict:  I t was argued e a r l i e r that the behavior of "Labor" suggests  that they view tension and c o n f l i c t as states which can be b e n e f i c i a l t o the attainment of t h e i r goals, whereas the behavior of "Management" suggests that %hey view tension and c o n f l i c t as s t a t e s which can be detrimental t o the attainment of t h e i r goals.  I t was a l s o noted that  Table 2. Number of questionnaire items on which d i f f e r e n t a t i o n of opinions occurred i n the responses of the subjects. LABOR  MANAGEMENT  number of items on which-  number of items on which-  subject  own partyother party different  self-own party different  10  SI  17  4  13  6  7  S2  14  4  14  7  4  9  S3  17  3  16  SA  10  11  9  S4  9  2  9  S5  9  5  10  S5  9  2  11  S6  9  4  7  S6  14  3  17  S7  15  9  9  S7  9  6  9  S8  13  5  12  S8  19  5  14  S9  12  3  11  S9  11  2  9  S10  11  7  12  S10  24  5  20  Sll  9  7  8  Sll  13  3  14  S12  15  8  9  S12  11  9  12  subject  own partyother party different  self-own party different  SI  11  1  S2  11  S3  self-other party different  self-other party different  ro  Table 2  (continued)  MANAGEMENT  LABOR  number of items on which-  subject  awn p a r t y ather p a r t y different  number of items on which-  self-own party different  self-other party different  subject  S13  11  5  8  S13  S14  12  2  12  S14  S15  6  5  7  S16  13  8  11  S17  12  3  13  S18  15  S19  12  3  11.21  5.56  Means  own p a r t y other party different  r  self-own party different  self-other party different  17 14  5  1.4  2  12  14.14  3.86  13.14  11 11  9.79  54  d i f f e r e n c e s , a c t u a l or perceived, between two p a r t i e s provide a b a s i s f o r tension and c o n f l i c t .  I n keeping w i t h t h i s r a t i o n a l e , th-j f i r s t  hypothesis predicted that issues on which the two p a r t i e s are thought to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions w i l l be i n d i c a t e d more frequently by labor than by management representatives.  Consistent w i t h t h i s hypothesis, the mean  number of statements on which these d i f f e r e n c e s were i n d i c a t e d by labor representatives was 14.14 (59% of the statements) and the mean number on which d i f f e r e n c e s were i n d i c a t e d by management representatives was 11.21 (47% of the statements).  This d i f f e r e n c e produced a t of 2.45 (df=31),  s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .05 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) .  Those statements on which  d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between the two p a r t i e s were most frequently i n d i c a t e d are l i s t e d i n Appendix D. These r e s u l t s suggest that, t o the extent t o which perceived d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" serve as a basis f o r tension and c o n f l i c t , the p o t e n t i a l sources of such tension and c o n f l i c t are more l i k e l y t o appear i n the perceptions of "Labor" than i n the perceptions of "Management". (One cautious r e s e r v a t i o n must be considered i n i n t e r p r e t i n g these r e s u l t s .  I t i s p o s s i b l e that i n the context i n  which data were c o l l e c t e d (both labor and management representatives present, sequential a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of questionnaires, etc.) d i f f e r e n c e s between Labor and Management appeared, whereas, i n a r e a l - l i f e s i t u a t i o n they might not have.  I n other words, the observed d i f f e r e n c e s might be  unique to the laboratory s i t u a t i o n i n which an experimenter a c t i v e l y i n v e s t i g a t e s perceived opinions rather than r e f l e c t i n g d i f f e r e n c e s which are perceived i n the everyday context of the labor-management bargaining relationship.  This c r i t i c i s m , implying a demand-induced or context-  55  derived e f f e c t , a l s o applies to subsequent observations r e l a t i n g to the other four hypotheses.) Perceived party opinions, personal opinions, and the "party l i n e " : Inherent i n the secord, t h i r d , and f o u r t h hypotheses i s the p r e d i c t i o n that the personal opinions of labor representatives w i l l be very much l i k e the opinions which they think t h e i r own party, i n general, holds; the personal opinions of management representatives, on the other hand, w i l l show greater independence from the opinions that they think t h e i r own party, i n general, holds.  Of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t here i s the extent t o  which the perceived "party l i n e " appears i n the personal opinions of party representatives, and the extent to which d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" are perceived a t the level of personal opinion.  A l s o of i n t e r e s t i s the number of subjects who perceive party  opinions i n the same way as t h e i r f e l l o w representatives, as w e l l as the number of subjects who hold personal opinions l i k e those of t h e i r f e l l o w representatives. Previously i t was noted that the t a c t i c of presenting the party p o s i t i o n on issues as one that i s supported by a united membership appears to have gained some degree of prominence on the part of "Labor", but not on the part of "Management".  For t h i s reason i t was hypothesized  that  the personal opinions of i n d i v i d u a l management representatives would d i f f e r from the opinions they think "Management" i n general hold more frequently than the personal opinions of i n d i v i d u a l labor representatives would d i f f e r from the opinions they think "Labor" i n general hold. Consistent with t h i s second hypothesis, the mean number of statements on which these d i f f e r e n c e s occurred f o r management representatives was  56  5.56 (23% of the statements) and the mean number f o r labor representatives was 3.86 (16% of the statements).  This d i f f e r e n c e produced a £ of 1.86  (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t aeyond the .05 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) .  Those statements  on which d i f f e r e n c e s most frequently occurred between the personal opinion of a party representative and the opinion which he thought h i s own party held are l i s t e d i n Appendices E and F. To b r i e f l y r e i t e r a t e the previous two hypotheses, i t was predicted that issues on which the two p a r t i e s are thought to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions would be i n d i c a t e d more frequently by Labor than by Management ( f i r s t hypothesis), and that there would be more s i m i l a r i t y between the personal and perceived party opinions of Labor than between the personal and perceived party opinions of Management (converse of the second hypothesis). In keeping with these p r e d i c t i o n s i t was a l s o hypothesized  that labor  representatives w i l l i n d i c a t e more issues on which t h e i r personal opinion d i f f e r s from the opinion they think the other party holds than w i l l management representatives.  Consistent w i t h t h i s t h i r d hypothesis, the mean  number of statements on which these d i f f e r e n c e s occurred f o r labor representa t i v e s was 13.14 (55% of the statements) and the mean number f o r management representatives was 9.79 (41% of the statements).  This d i f f e r e n c e produced  a t of 3.77 (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .001 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) . If the t a c t i c of presenting a united f r o n t i n support of one's p o s i t i o n i s indeed a more s a l i e n t one f o r "Labor" than f o r "Management", i t would be expected that the p o s i t i o n to be taken by "Labor" on p a r t i c u l a r issues w i l l be made c l e a r t o i t s membership.  In keeping w i t h t h i s "party  l i n e " r a t i o n a l e , the fourth hypothesis predicted that Labor w i l l be more homogeneous than Management i n (a) the perception of t h e i r own party's  57  opinions, (b) the perception of the other party's opinions, and i n (c) t h e i r own personal opinions. predictions.  The r e s u l t s f a i l e d to confirm any of these  Over a l l questionnaire items:  (a) the mean percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of t h e i r own party's opinions was 79.29, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the mean of 75.96% f o r management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  16  (b) the mean percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of the other party's opinions was 80.67, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the mean of 84.21% f o r management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . (c) the mean percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common personal opinion was 76.42, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the mean of 73.83% f o r management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . At t h i s point some comments on i n t e r p r e t a t i o n are i n order.  The  p r e d i c t i o n s made by the second and t h i r d hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting that there i s a greater tendency f o r "Labor" than f o r "Management" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party l i n e " , when t h i s "party l i n e " i s defined f o r each j> as the opinions which he perceives h i s party i n general to hold.  Unfortunately, the data do not bear upon  the v a l i d i t y of the assumption underlying the hypotheses, i . e . , that a  16  T h e mean percentage f o r a party was c a l c u l a t e d by taking the l a r g e s t number of subjects i n the party who perceived the same opinion on the f i r s t questionnaire item. This number was then converted to a percentage of the t o t a l number of subjects i n the party. Since there were only two p o s s i b l e responses, "agree" and "disagree", t h i s number always equalled h a l f or more of the subjects i n the party ( i . e . , t h i s percentage could be no lower than 50% f o r Labor, representing 7 of the 14 labor subjects, and no lower than 53% f o r Management, representing 10 of the 19 management s u b j e c t s ) . This procedure was repeated f o r the remaining 23 items on the Opinion Questionnaire, g i v i n g 24 percentages. The mean of these 24 percentages was then taken as an o v e r a l l measure of homogeneity f o r the party.  58  causal r e l a t i o n s h i p e x i s t s between perceived party opinions and the personal opinions of party members. Although Labor tended, to a greater extent than Management, t o hold personal opinions resembling a perceived "party l i n e " , the question remains as to whether a labor representative forms h i s opinions on the b a s i s of what he perceives "Labor" i n general to be t h i n k i n g , or simply assumes that i n forming opinions "Labor" i n general thinks the same way he does. In l i g h t of the "party l i n e " reasoning, the f i n d i n g of no d i f f e r e n c e s between Labor and Management i n terms of homogeneity of perception or i n terms of homogeneity of personal opinion was unexpected.  The most  parsimonious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s that i f exogenous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the "party l i n e " adopted by "Labor" i s no more w e l l defined f o r labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s f o r management representatives. Perceptions and misperceptions;  I n a d d i t i o n to the Opinion  Question-  n a i r e , f i v e Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales were employed t o obtain perceptual data.  A l l data from these scales were analyzed using .t t e s t s ,  and the s t a t i s t i c a l information corresponding  1 7  t o comparisons made i n the  text appear i n Appendix G. The mean r a t i n g s given by management representatives t o "Management" and to "Labor" on each of the f i v e scales are presented i n Table 3. To  1  Altogether, a t o t a l of 20 s t a t i s t i c a l comparisons were made on the b a s i s of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l data. Although d i f f e r e n c e s proved s i g n i f i c a n t i n 11 of the 20 cases, the l i k e l i h o o d of making type 1 errors i s increased by making m u l t i p l e comparisons i n t h i s fashion. Thus, the p o s s i b i l i t y that any one of these d i f f e r e n c e s i s spurious, cannot be overlooked.  59  summarize these r e s u l t s , management representatives saw "Management", (a) as good as, (b) not as suspicious as, (c) not as strong as, (d) more honest than, and (e) more trustworthy than "Labor". The mean r a t i n g s given by labor representatives to "Labor" and to "Management" on each of the f i v e scales are presented  i n Table 4.  To  summarize these r e s u l t s , labor representatives saw "Labor" as, (a) b e t t e r than, (b) as suspicious as, (c) as strong as, (d) more honest than, and (e) more trustworthy than "Management". These r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e a tendency f o r both Labor and Management to rate t h e i r own party i n a more p o s i t i v e (or l e s s negative) manner than the other party (an exception i s the management representatives' tendency to rate "Management" as not as strong as "Labor"). I t was argued e a r l i e r that inherent i n the r o l e s prescribed f o r labor and management representatives are p a r t i c u l a r a t t i t u d e s and t a c t i c s which may create an impression of h o s t i l i t y towards the other party which i s more a matter of show than a c t u a l i n c l i n a t i o n . was hypothesized  For t h i s reason i t  that representatives of both p a r t i e s w i l l tend to think  that the other party perceives them i n a l e s s favorable manner than i t  60  Table 3  Comparison o f mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" and "Labor" by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s bh the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s .  "Management"  scale  "Labor"  good-bad  +1.39  +1.18  trusting-suspicious  -0.12  -1.25  p<.002  strong-weak  +0.94  +1.62  p<.05  honest-dishonest  +1.65  +0.96  p<.05  t r u s twor t h y - u n t r u s twor thy  +1.69  +0.85  p<.002  (In T a b l e s 3-6, +3 r e p r e s e n t s a maximally p o s i t i v e r a t i n g "good"); whereas -3 r e p r e s e n t s a maximally n e g a t i v e r a t i n g "bad*'); 0 ( z e r o ) r e p r e s e n t s a n e u t r a l r a t i n g . )  Table 4  (e.g., (e.g.,  Comparison o f mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Labor" and "Management" by l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s .  scale  "Labor"  "Management" p<.02  good-bad  +2.05  +0.78  trusting-suspicious  -0.24  -0.83  strong-weak  +0.97  +1.51  hone s t - d i s h o n e s t  +1.95  +0.74  p<.01  trustworthy-untrustworthy  +1.88  +0.34  p<.01  extremely extremely  61  a c t u a l l y does.  S p e c i f i c a l l y , when asked how they think "Labor" would  be rated by "Management", labor representatives were expected to i n d i c a t e a lower r a t i n g on the three evaluative dimensions ("good-bad", "honestdishonest", "trustworthy-untrustworthy") the management representatives.  than they were a c t u a l l y given by  S i m i l a r l y , when asked how they think  "Management" would be rated by "Labor", management representatives were expected to i n d i c a t e a lower r a t i n g on these dimensions than they were a c t u a l l y given by the labor representatives.  E n t i r e l y consistent w i t h  t h i s f i f t h hypothesis, the a c t u a l mean r a t i n g given "Labor" by management representatives was s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than the mean r a t i n g predicted by the labor representatives on each of the evaluative dimensions.  The  a c t u a l mean r a t i n g given "Management" by labor representatives was s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than the mean r a t i n g predicted by the management representatives on the "good-bad" dimension only.  Although d i f f e r e n c e s  between a c t u a l and predicted r a t i n g s on the "honest-dishonest" "trustworthy-untrustworthy"  and  dimensions are i n the d i r e c t i o n predicted by  the hypothesis, they f a i l to reach conventional l e v e l s of s i g n i f i c a n c e . Consequently, the f i n d i n g s here are considered as p a r t i a l confirmation of the hypothesis.  These r e s u l t s are presented i n Tables5 and 6.  To  summarize, labor representatives expected "Labor" to be r a t e d , (a) not as good as, (b) not as honest as, and  (c) not as trustworthy as  "Labor" was a c t u a l l y rated by Management i n the present study. representatives expected "Management" to be r a t e d , (a) not as good as,  Management  62  T a b l e 5.  Comparison of mean r a t i n g s g i v e n " L a b o r " by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and mean r a t i n g s t h a t l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p r e d i c t "Labor" would be g i v e n by "Management" on t h e Semantic Differential-type scales. actual rating by Management  scale  rating predicted by Labor  good-bad  +1.18  -0.43  trus ting-suspicious  -1.25  -1.12  strong-weak  +1.62  +1.73  hone s t - d i shone s t  +0.96  -0.01  p<.01  t r u s twor t h y - u n t r u s tworthy  +0.85  -0.53  p<.02  T a b l e 6.  p<.01  Comparison of mean r a t i n g s g i v e n "Management" by l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and mean r a t i n g s t h a t management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s p r e d i c t "Management" would be g i v e n by "Labor" on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales.  scale  actual rating by Labor  rating predicted by Management  good-bad  +0.78  -0.51  trus ting-suspicious  -0.83  -1.34  strong-weak  +1.51  +1.78  hones t-dishones t  +0.74  -0.02  trustworthy-untrustworthy  +0.34  -0.13  p<.05  63  "Management" was a c t u a l l y rated by Labor i n the present  study.  To the extent that the expected r a t i n g s and the a c t u a l r a t i n g s do not c o i n c i d e , i t appears that both "Labor" and "Management" are l i k e l y to misperceive the way i n which they are viewed, e v a l u a t i v e l y a t l e a s t , by members of the other party.  The tendency towards misperception seems to  be more pronounced on the part of "Labor" than "Management", an observation which i s consistent with the f i n d i n g that management representatives were s l i g h t l y more accurate i n t h e i r perceptions of the personal opinions held by i n d i v i d u a l members of the other party than were labor representatives (on the Opinion Questionnaire, the mean number of items on which management representatives c o r r e c t l y assessed  the personal opinion of a p a r t i c u l a r  labor representative was 15.94 (66% of the statements) and the mean number of items on which labor representatives c o r r e c t l y assessed the personal opinion of a p a r t i c u l a r management representative was 13.43 (56% of the statements).  This d i f f e r e n c e produced a t of 4.30 (df=30), s i g n i f i c a n t  beyond the .002 l e v e l  (two-tail) .).  Authoritarianism;  1 8  In a recent evaluation of some of the e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e on a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m , one conclusion reached by K i r s c h t and D i l l e h a y (1967) was that the most u s e f u l way to define a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m  1 8  I t might be argued that the Opinion Questionnaire involved more items on which i t was 'easier" to assess a labor representative's personal opinion than i t was to assess a management representative's personal opinion. I f t h i s was the case, we would expect more agreement (homogeneity) among a l l subjects when assessing the personal opinions of labor representatives than when assessing the personal opinions of management representatives. The r e s u l t s do not support t h i s argument. Over a l l questionnaire items, the mean percentage of subjects i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of Management personal opinions was 78.31 and the mean percentage i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of Labor personal opinions was 81.75. This d i f f e r e n c e was not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t .  64  i s i n terns of a c o g n i t i v e s t y l e characterized by closed-minded t h i n k i n g . In t h i s regard, they s t a t e , The genuine a u t h o r i t a r i a n lacks a b i l i t y to deal w i t h novel c o g n i t i v e m a t e r i a l , seeks rapid closure when exposed to new s i t u a t i o n s , and u l t i m a t e l y depends h e a v i l y on e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y f o r support of h i s b e l i e f system. To be sure, the s t y l e i s mediated and maintained through a set of b e l i e f s and through s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The p a r t i c u l a r b e l i e f s and behaviors vary from person to person, but the s t y l e of c o g n i t i o n i s r e l a t i v e l y permanent. ( K i r s c h t and D i l l e h a y , 1967,  pp. 132-133).  In the present study, labor representatives scored higher on the F-scale, that i s , more a u t h o r i t a r i a n , than d i d management representatives.  The mean  scores were 104.85 f o r labor representatives and 76.78 f o r management representatives.  This d i f f e r e n c e produced a £ of 3.25  (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t  beyond the .01 l e v e l ( t w o - t a i l ) . Although a l i v e l y controversy has taken place concerning the r e l a t i o n of a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m to a l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e continuum (Janowitz and Marvick, 1953;  C h r i s t i e , 19 54; S h i l s , 1954;  Levinson, 1957), i t has been  generally conceded that authoritarianism i s more h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h l e f t i s t ideologies than with r i g h t i s t ideologies (Rokeach, 1960; 1963; Leventhal et a l . , 1964).  Barker,  I f , however, a u t h o r i t a r i a n s do tend to  prefer conservative i d e o l o g i e s , the f i n d i n g of a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n the d i r e c t i o n reported here i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l images of "Labor" and "Management".  T r a d i t i o n a l l y , "Labor" has been viewed as  leaning to the l e f t and "Management" as leaning to the r i g h t on s o c i o economic and p o l i t i c a l i s s u e s .  However, the higher F-scores of labor  representatives and the r e l a t e d i m p l i c a t i o n s concerning preference f o r a conservative ideology are not i n c o n s i s t e n t with c e r t a i n recent observations  on the v o t i n g behavior of labor c o n s t i t u e n t s .  In the  1968  65  U. S. p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t ion,.. ..not o n l y d i d George W a l l a c e r e c e i v e s u b s t a n t i a l support  from the "blue c o l l a r " workers, b u t s e v e r a l prominent l a b o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n s a c t i v e l y endorsed the candidacy i n the 1969  o f R i c h a r d Nixon.  Similarly,  p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , i t was apparent t h a t a s i g n i f i c a n t p o r t i o n  of the l a b o r f o r c e v o t e d f o r c a n d i d a t e s i n B r i t i s h Columbia. w i t h the p r e s e n t  r e p r e s e n t i n g the p o l i t i c a l  These g e n e r a l b e h a v i o r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s  right  i n conjunction  f i n d i n g s , which can be i n t e r p r e t e d as r e f l e c t i n g  tendencies  towards a p a r t i c u l a r c o g n i t i v e s t y l e , suggest t h a t the t r a d i t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between "Labor" and "Management" on a u n i t a r y l e f t - r i g h t dimension may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . B.  1 9  Approaches t o N e g o t i a t i o n s Employed by the P a r t i e s i n a B a r g a i n i n g Relationship In a d d i t i o n to f o r m a l a n a l y s i s o f the v e r b a l content  o f each  b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n some s t a t i s t i c a l f e a t u r e s were e x t r a c t e d from t h e s e s s i o n s and these a r e presented  i n T a b l e 7.  To summarize, Labor's  opening wage demands ranged from h o u r l y i n c r e a s e s o f 14.5c  t o 50c,  with  a mean o f 3 0 . 6 c » w h i l e Management's open wage o f f e r s ranged from an h o u r l y wage c u t o f 40c  t o an h o u r l y i n c r e a s e o f 20c,  w i t h a mean of -5.1c.  e v e n t u a l h o u r l y wage i n c r e a s e s n e g o t i a t e d ranged from 12c mean o f 1 7 . 9 C 2 0 .  In order to reach  these s e t t l e m e n t s  to lower t h e i r o r i g i n a l demands by from 0c t o 32c,  19  20  The  t o 21c w i t h a  Labor was r e q u i r e d  w i t h a mean s h i f t o f  A1though an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the F - s c a l e r e s u l t s i n terms o f l i b e r a l and c o n s e r v a t i v e i d e o l o g i e s was c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s having t o do w i t h the r e l a t i v e e d u c a t i o n a l l e v e l , socio-economic s t a t u s , e t c . , o f l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s might j u s t as e a s i l y be invoked. f Some o f the opening p r o p o s a l s and e v e n t u a l s e t t l e m e n t s i n v o l v e d wage i n c r e a s e s spread over a two-year c o n t r a c t term. I n Order t o o b t a i n a f i g u r e f o r the one-year p e r i o d the average y e a r l y wage i n c r e a s e was c a l c u l a t e d .  T a b l e 7.  number of representatives group  MGT  LBR  1  2  2  Summary f e a t u r e s o f the b a r g a i n i n g  opening wage p r o p o s a l (C/hr) MGT  LBR  2  10  38  2  2  -40  3  2  2  5  2  1  7  2  1  14.5  8  2  2  0  9  2  2  20  10  2  1  -20  means  0 -20  -5.1  mean l e v e l of time t o settlement (min)  +10  -18  27  12  +52  -15  38  25  21  +21  - 4  63  8.1  8.0  (0)  78  9.2  6.4  0  18  11.2  9.6  NO SETTLEMENT  14.5  14.5  50  18  30  20  30 30.6  (+16) 0  c  LBR  9.6  5.5 d  d  +18  -32  56  12.7  12.6  0  -10  30  17.4  16.8  20  +40  -10  31  9.2  17.9  +20.1  -12.7  39.3  b  e  of a s t a f f r e d u c t i o n from t e n t o n i n e  10.9  7.6 10.1  employees  t e n t a t i v e , r e q u i r i n g a f u r t h e r meeting a t which time Management would "open t h e books"  ^satisfaction  s c a l e s not a d m i n i s t e r e d  d o e s n o t i n c l u d e the 78 minutes particular  MGT  20  time t o s e t t l e m e n t n o t r e c o r d e d because no time c o n s t r a i n t was p r e s e n t  e  satisfaction  LBR  opening p r o p o s a l i n c l u d e d the s t i p u l a t i o n settlement to Labor  movement from opening wage p r o p o s a l (C/hr) MGT  30  a  eventual negotiated y e a r l y wage increase (c/hr)  sessions  session  i n the f i r s t  session  i n this session  taken by group 5, s i n c e no s e t t l e m e n t was reached i n t h i s  67  -12.7C, w h i l e Management had t o r a i s e t h e i r o r i g i n a l o f f e r s by from Oo t o 52c, w i t h a mean s h i f t o f +20.lc. ments ranged  from  The time r e q u i r e d t o r e a c h these  18 t o 63 minutes,  the e i g h t groups was deadlocked s e t t l e m e n t was reached  w i t h a mean o f 39.3 minutes.  settle-  One of  a f t e r 78 minutes o f n e g o t i a t i n g and no  i n this particular session.  I n d i c a t i o n s of l e v e l  of s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the outcome were made by p l a c i n g a mark on a 19 cm. l i n e w i t h "extreme d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n " a t t h e low end and "extreme s a t i s f a c t i o n " a t the h i g h end of t h i s s c a l e .  The means were 10.9 f o r Management and 10.1  f o r Labor,  insignificant.  the d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g  The b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s were h i g h l y animated and " n e g o t i a t i o n s " appeared  t o be taken extremely  s e r i o u s l y by a l l o f the s u b j e c t s .  However,  the r i g o r o u s q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d f o r the v e r b a l c o n t e n t o f these s e s s i o n s was n o t a t t a i n e d due t o t h e s m a l l number o f groups s t u d i e d . For t h i s reason the b a r g a i n i n g b e h a v i o r w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n b o t h q u a n t i t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e terms.  The q u a n t i t a t i v e d a t a i s comprised  of the r e s u l t s o f the f o r m a l c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s w h i l e the q u a l i t a t i v e  data  c o n s i s t s o f summaries o f the c h r o n o l o g i c a l sequence of events which  took  p l a c e i n each o f the e i g h t b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s . The  d a t a d e r i v e d from the c o n t e n t a n a l y s i s were d e a l t w i t h i n a  manner s i m i l a r t o the p e r c e p t u a l d a t a : and w i t h i n p a r t i e s . Item between Labor statements,  comparisons were made both between  When comparing the i n c i d e n c e o f a p a r t i c u l a r  content  and Management, f o r example, the i n c i d e n c e o f t h r e a t e n i n g  a s i g n t e s t was employed and a c o r r e c t i o n procedure was  T h i s procedure  adopted.  i n v o l v e d c o n v e r t i n g the number o f -times the p a r t i c u l a r  content item appeared  i n the t e x t o f a p a r t y ' s statements  of the t o t a l number o f c o n t e n t items coded f o r t h a t p a r t y .  to a  percentage  The r e s u l t i n g  68  comparison between percentages was i n t e n d e d  as a means o f m i n i m i z i n g  e f f e c t s o f the unequal number o f l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n some o f the g r o u p s . types o f c o n t e n t  When comparing the i n c i d e n c e o f p a r t i c u l a r  2 1  items w i t h i n a p a r t y , f o r example, the i n c i d e n c e o f  b l a t a n t t h r e a t s r e l a t i v e t o s u b t l e t h r e a t s by Management, the WilcoxOn matched-pairs signed-rank t e s t was employed. w i l l be reviewed now. ( A complete l i s t content category  The r e s u l t s o f t h i s a n a l y s i s  o f the c a t e g o r i e s employed i n t h e  a n a l y s i s w i t h examples from the s e s s i o n s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f each appears i n Appendix H.  Examples c i t e d i n the t e x t were taken  from the s e s s i o n s . ) Party p o s i t i o n s ; concentrated  I n the b a r g a i n i n g  on p r e s e n t i n g  s e s s i o n s b o t h Labor and Management  the p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i r own " p a r t y " on the wage  i s s u e , q u e s t i o n i n g the p o s i t i o n taken by t h e other " p a r t y " , and d e a l i n g with questions  and arguments from the o t h e r " p a r t y " .  I n the course o f  " n e g o t i a t i o n s " Management tended t o make more r e f e r e n c e s  t o t h e i r own  p a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n than d i d Labor, w h i l e Labor tended t o make more r e f e r e n c e s to  t h e o t h e r p a r t y ' s p o s i t i o n than d i d Management.  to  the p o s i t i o n taken by one's own p a r t y , 68% o f these were made by  Management and 32% were made by Labor  (p<.07).  Of a l l the r e f e r e n c e s  Of a l l the r e f e r e n c e s t o  the p o s i t i o n taken by the o t h e r p a r t y , 69% o f these were made by Labor and 31% were made by Management (p<.07).  R e f e r r i n g t o t h e i r own p o s i t i o n ,  Management emphasized i t as one o f weakness (e.g., " . . . we have had an i n c r e a s e i n our d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t o f 30% and t h i s has k i c k e d us r i g h t i n  2 1  T h i s c o r r e c t i o n procedure was i n t r o d u c e d p r i o r t o an}' s t a t i s t i c a l comparison between the two p a r t i e s . I i i a d d i t i o n , wherever an e x p l i c i t comparison i s made i n the t e x t i n terms o f the magnitude o f d i f f e r e n c e s between the two p a r t i e s , the f i g u r e s c i t e d (percentages) a r e based on the c o r r e c t e d d a t a .  69  the rear end . . . we kind of thought we had things going on the road here . . . but . . . t h i s has turned i n t o a r e v o l t i n g development.") as opposed to one of strength (e.g., "We've only had one gerbil-maker leave us i n the past year . . . we c e r t a i n l y had no trouble r e p l a c i n g him."). Labor, on the other hand, r e f e r r e d to Management's p o s i t i o n of strength (e.g., " . . . a small increase i n the p r i c e of g e r b i l s wouldn't do any harm anywhere . . . there's other manufacturers that want to increase (the p r i c e o f ) t h e i r g e r b i l s , and they're only w a i t i n g f o r a l e a d e r — a n d you are a leader i n t h i s industry.") as often as to t h e i r p o s i t i o n of weakness (e.g., " R e a l l y , based on your investment, your p r o f i t s a r e n l t up to 6% on c a p i t a l investment here and t h i s i s n ' t the best s i t u a t i o n possible.").  In c l a s s i f y i n g the references to Management's p o s i t i o n , 93%  of the references made by Management were judged as emphasizing weakness and 7% were judged as emphasizing strength (p<.C2); 50% of the references made by Labor emphasized weakness and 50% emphasized strength.  In addition,  Labor made reference t o t h e i r own p o s i t i o n of strength as often as to t h e i r own p o s i t i o n of weakness.  I n c l a s s i f y i n g these references, 45% were judged  as emphasizing strength and 55% were judged as emphasizing weakness. In the present study then, Management's p o s i t i o n tended to be the subject upon which both p a r t i e s focussed t h e i r a t t e n t i o n .  Since Management  emphasized the d i f f i c u l t i e s of weaknesses inherent i n the bargaining •p o s i t i o n i n which they found themselves, an approach which frequently included d i r e c t appeals f o r sympathetic understanding on the part of Labor, Labor's approach to the "negotiations" was p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g . Rather than emphasizing t h e i r own p o s i t i o n of strength r e l a t i v e to the weak p o s i t i o n of Management, a powerful but p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous t a c t i c ,  70  Labor attempted to upgrade or b o l s t e r Management's p o s i t i o n .  This  b o l s t e r i n g frequently involved suggestions as to the ease w i t h which Management's p o s i t i o n could be strengthened v i a small p r i c e increases, plant e f f i c i e n c y programs, increased labor-management cooperation, e t c . In the context of real-world n e g o t i a t i o n s , i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to determine whether or not emphasis on the weakness of t h e i r own p o s i t i o n i s a bargaining strategy commonly employed by "Management", as w e l l as the extent to which b o l s t e r i n g of the other party's weak p o s i t i o n takes place. A l s o , i t would be i n s t r u c t i v e to explore the extent to which "Management's" p o s i t i o n , as opposed to the p o s i t i o n taken by "Labor", i s a dominant theme of r e a l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Arguments and degree of determination;  One approach to understanding  the way i n vrhich "Labor" and "Management" perceive t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s or r o l e s i n a bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p i s to consider the kinds of arguments each presents and the degree of determination w i t h which supportive statements are made. Arguments were separated i n t o those based on f a c t s which can be v e r i f i e d (e.g., "There has been a d e f i n i t e increase i n the costs of d i s t r i b u t i o n of our product . . . ") and those based on the way a person thinks things should be, or w i l l be, i n the future (e.g., "We'd  l i k e to b e t t e r our p o s i t i o n i n l i f e so that our c h i l d r e n and  our f a m i l i e s can enjoy the things we-are working f o r . " ) . f a c t u a l arguments and purposive arguments r e s p e c t i v e l y .  These were termed The degree of  determination w i t h which a statement was made was coded as f o l l o w s : those statements which implied no other outcome than the one proposed were considered to r e f l e c t high determination and were termed d e f i n i t e statements  (e.g., "We  can t e l l you r i g h t at the outset that 12% would be  71  r i g h t out of the question."), while those which acknowledged the p o s s i b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t i v e outcomes were considered to r e f l e c t low determination and were termed t e n t a t i v e statements (e.g., "We'll back o f f a l i t t l e . . . we're f l e x i b l e . " ) .  Labor was observed to employ more  purposive than f a c t u a l arguments, w h i l e Management made equal use of both types of argument. In c l a s s i f y i n g the arguments made by Labor, 69% of these were considered purposive and 31% were considered f a c t u a l (p<.02); 47% of Management's arguments were considered purposive and 53% were considered f a c t u a l .  I n a d d i t i o n , both Labor and Management made more  d e f i n i t e than t e n t a t i v e statements i n support of t h e i r arguments. I n c l a s s i f y i n g these statements f o r Labor, 58% were considered d e f i n i t e and 42% were considered t e n t a t i v e (p<.05); 64% of Management's statements were considered d e f i n i t e and 36% were considered t e n t a t i v e (p<.02). Examining the verbatim protocols of real-world labor n e g o t i a t i o n s , Haire (1955) observed that "Management's" p o s i t i o n was characterized by f a c t u a l arguments and d e f i n i t e statements while "Labor's" p o s i t i o n was characterized by purposive arguments and t e n t a t i v e statements (underlined f i n d i n g s were observed i n the present study). He i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s as evidence f o r coherent r o l e perceptions by the p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p , suggesting a perception of r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e power and autonomy by "Labor" and one of greater power and autonomy by "Management". Although the present r e s u l t s are s i m i l a r to Haire's, the f i n d i n g s of the two studies are not e n t i r e l y consistent.  I t i s c e r t a i n l y not apparent  from the present r e s u l t s that perceptions of the balance of power and autonomy are h e a v i l y weighted i n favor of "Management". Unfortunately, there are obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s i n g e n e r a l i z i n g r o l e perceptions from  72  e i t h e r of these studies to the s p e c i f i c bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p of concern here, that of "Labor" and "Management" i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia. In the present bargaining task, the p o s i t i o n i n which Management found themselves was a d i f f i c u l t one i n that they were faced w i t h the problem of n e g o t i a t i n g a wage settlement i n l i g h t of a very r e s t r i c t i v e " p r o f i t p i c t u r e " (by merely maintaining the e x i s t i n g wage f o r the coming year, an u n l i k e l y p o s s i b i l i t y , Management would s u f f e r a d e c l i n e i n t h e i r r e t u r n on invested c a p i t a l from 7% to 5%).  As a r e s u l t , Management may have been  forced to r e s o r t to a more purposive presentation of t h e i r proposals than would normally be the case i n the r e a l world, emphasizing the kind of p r o f i t s they would l i k e to r e a l i z e , or even need to r e a l i z e , i n order to meet wage demands.  S i m i l a r l y , recognizing the d i f f i c u l t bargaining  p o s i t i o n i n which Management was placed, Labor may have perceived t h e i r own p o s i t i o n as one of r e l a t i v e strength, enabling them to express  their  arguments i n a more determined manner than would normally be the case i n the r e a l world.  For t h i s reason then, i t i s p o s s i b l e that Haire's r e s u l t s  obtained from real-world bargaining protocols allow a more accurate assessment of r o l e perceptions i n labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n general, than do the present r e s u l t s obtained from simulated bargaining protocols based on what may be an a t y p i c a l bargaining s i t u a t i o n .  On the other hand,  bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s observed by Haire i n the San Francisco Bay area i n the e a r l y 1950's may have l i t t l e i n common w i t h bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s e x i s t i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n the l a t e 1960's.  Consequently, a n a l y s i s  of the protocols of r e a l negotiations i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s regarded an appropriate step towards c l a r i f y i n g the way i n which "Labor" and "Management" perceive t h e i r respective r o l e s i n t h i s l a t t e r bargaining  as  73  relationship.  At t h e same time t h i s would p r o v i d e some i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o  the v a l i d i t y o f i n f e r e n c e s drawn from the l a b o r a t o r y b a r g a i n i n g observed i n the p r e s e n t  behavior  study.  Exchange o f i n f o r m a t i o n :  During  the b a r g a i n i n g  a b l e amount o f time was devoted t o r e q u e s t s  sessions, a consider-  f o r and o f f e r s o f i n f o r m a t i o n .  I t was observed t h a t Management o f f e r e d i n f o r m a t i o n more f r e q u e n t l y than requested  i t , w h i l e Labor made as many r e q u e s t s  as o f f e r s .  2 2  they  In c l a s s i f y i n g  the i n f o r m a t i o n a l statements d i r e c t e d t o Labor by Management, 61% o f these were o f f e r s o f i n f o r m a t i o n and 39% were r e q u e s t s  f o r information  (p<.05);  of t h e statements d i r e c t e d t o Management by Labor, 57% were o f f e r s o f i n f o r m a t i o n and 43% were r e q u e s t s  f o r information.  Informational  statements  were coded as r e f l e c t i n g e i t h e r f a c t s o r how a p a r t y f e l t about something. These statements were termed d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n statements and a t t i t e d e i n f o r m a t i o n statements r e s p e c t i v e l y . L a b o r , Management requested  I n r e q u e s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n from  attitude information  (e.g., "Would i t change  your t h i n k i n g v e r y much i f you knew what our p r o f i t r e a l l y was l a s t more f r e q u e n t l y than d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n have i n t h i s r e p o r t  year?")  (e.g., "What i n f o r m a t i o n do you  ( c o n c e r n i n g Management's p r o f i t s ) ? " ) .  hand, Management o f f e r e d d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n  On t h e o t h e r  (e.g., " . . . our a c t u a l  p r o f i t s l a s t year were i n the o r d e r o f 7%.") more f r e q u e n t l y than a t t i t u d e information  (e.g., " . . . we a r e n o t too impressed w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e r e a l i s m o f your o f f e r . " ) .  I n c l a s s i f y i n g t h e r e q u e s t s made by  " O f f e r s " of information included both that s p o n t a n e o u s l y p r e s e n t e d t o the other p a r t y i n response t o r e q u e s t s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n by o f i n f o r m a t i o n o f f e r e d was spontaneous i n  i n f o r m a t i o n which was as w e l l as i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d the o t h e r p a r t y . The m a j o r i t y nature.  74  Management, 66% of these were judged to be requests f o r a t t i t u d e information and 34% were judged to be requests f o r data information (p<.05); of the o f f e r s made by Management, 30% were o f f e r s of a t t i t u d e information and 70% were o f f e r s of data information (p<.02).  Labor requested both kinds  of information from Management w i t h equal frequency as w e l l as o f f e r i n g both w i t h equal frequency.  I n c l a s s i f y i n g the requests made by Labor, 42%  of these were judged t o be requests f o r a t t i t u d e information and 58% were judged to be requests f o r data information; of the o f f e r s made by Labor, 60% were o f f e r s of a t t i t u d e information and 40% were o f f e r s of data information. The f i n d i n g s concerning the exchange of information may r e f l e c t a b a s i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of real-world bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as opposed t o p a r t i c u l a r n e g o t i a t i n g t a c t i c s which the p a r t i c i p a n t s adopt by choice. Possession by "Management" of most of the information of a f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l nature i s l i k e l y to be an i n v a r i a n t feature i n most n e g o t i a t i o n s . The present f i n d i n g s suggest that "Management's" approach i s one of communicating t h i s kind of information t o "Labor", and requesting feedback from them about a t t i t u d e s and a t t i t u d e changes stimulated by the information.  ( I t should a l s o be noted that the a c t i v e probing of Labor's  a t t i t u d e s by Management during " n e g o t i a t i o n s " may p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n the s l i g h t l y greater accuracy demonstrated by management representatives i n assessing the personal opinions of i n d i v i d u a l members of the other party. R e c a l l that the f i n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Opinion Questionnaire on which these assessments were made followed the bargaining sessions.) Threats arid a t t a c k s ;  Statements of a threatening nature were made  i n f r e q u e n t l y during "negotiations", w i t h n e i t h e r party employing t h i s kind  75  of statement more frequently than the other.  Of a l l the threatening  statements, 54% of these were made by Labor and 46% were made by Management.  When they did occur, Labor tended to employ threats of a less  subtle nature than those made by Management (e.g., " I f we (Labor) go out on the bricks then you're l i k e l y to lose . . . we wouldn't go back f o r less than 30c and we'd increase i t back to the o r i g i n a l figure of 12% (38c) before we went back.  Don't forget that."; "We (Management) have  been i n business f o r a long time . . . we're both getting on into middle age and we could quite e a s i l y — b e quite happy t o — l i q u i d a t e the company and take our p r o f i t s and l i v e i n reasonably luxurious conditions.").  In  c l a s s i f y i n g the threats made by Management, 86% of these were considered subtle and 14% were considered to be of a more blatant nature (p<.02); 54% of Labor's threats were considered subtle and 46% were considered blatant. The term "attack" usually implies some action which involves h o s t i l e intent towards another person or group. here.  This i s not the meaning intended  In the present context the term refers to a response to arguments  made by the other party ||e^which some scepticism or lack of c r e d i b i l i t y i s implied.  Labor was observed to attack Management more frequently than jf'  Management attacked Labor.  Of aljL the attacking statements, 66% of these  were made by Labor and 34% were made by Management (p<.02).  Attacks were  coded according to whether they were directed towards the actual position taken by a party (e.g., " I am just wondering where you get this fantastic p r o f i t figure of $20,000 based on a 12% increase.") or towards the good f a i t h , s i n c e r i t y , or i n t e g r i t y of the party (e.g., " I think you're beating the drum, you're asking f o r the moon, and I think you're being  76  q u i t e u n r e a l i s t i c i n terms o f the economy o f the company."). statements o f t h i s n a t u r e o c c u r r e d  frequently during  Although  "negotiations",  they  were d i r e c t e d towards the p o s i t i o n taken by the o t h e r p a r t y more f r e q u e n t l y than towards the good f a i t h o f the o t h e r p a r t y by b o t h Management and Labor.  In c l a s s i f y i n g  the a t t a c k s made by Management, 81% o f these were  judged t o be d i r e c t e d towards Labor's p o s i t i o n and 19% were judged t o be d i r e c t e d towards Labor's good f a i t h  (p<.05); 76% o f L a b o r ' s a t t a c k were  d i r e c t e d towards Management's p o s i t i o n and 24% were d i r e c t e d towards Management's good f a i t h  (p<.01).  While these r e s u l t s show t h a t Labor  does most o f the a t t a c k i n g - they a r e n o t e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t  Haire's  f i n d i n g t h a t "Management" tends t o a t t a c k " L a b o r ' s " p o s i t i o n w h i l e "Labor" attacks  "Management's" good f a i t h .  d i f f i c u l t bargaining present  (The p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s t h a t the  p o s i t i o n t h a t Management was f o r c e d t o take i n the  study was more s u s c e p t i b l e t o a t t a c k by Labor than were t h e  p o s i t i o n s taken by "Management" i n the r e a l - w o r l d n e g o t i a t i o n s by H a i r e .  observed  As a consequence, there may have been l i t t l e need o r i n c e n t i v e  f o r Labor t o c o n c e n t r a t e  an a t t a c k on Management's good f a i t h . )  The  r e s u l t s do i n d i c a t e t h a t " n e g o t i a t i o n s " tended t o be conducted i n an atmosphere of c o r d i a l i t y , w i t h t h e lower i n c i d e n c e o f b l a t a n t and  a t t a c k i n g statements by Management s u g g e s t i n g  somewhat more concerned w i t h m a i n t a i n i n g prove i n t e r e s t i n g t o determine the e x t e n t  threats  t h a t t h i s p a r t y was  such an atmosphere.  I t might  t o which t h e l a b o r a t o r y s e t t i n g  was a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r h e r e . S h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y :  Labor was observed t o employ more  statements than d i d Management which i n v o l v e d the s h i f t i n g o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for decisions  (e.g., "The men w i l l not agree t o h o l d  the s t a t u s quo and I  77  v e r y much doubt t h a t they w i l l accept problem."). for  anything  below $3.40.  Of a l l the statements which i m p l i e d a s h i f t of  d e c i s i o n s , 86% of these were made by Labor and  Management (p<.01).  T h i s i s our responsibility  14% were made by  This f i n d i n g i s consistent with Haire's  that labor negotiators perceive  t h e i r r o l e as one  of r e l a t i v e l y  little  power and  autonomy.  presented  e a r l i e r , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f i n d i n g i n the  context  of r o l e p e r c e p t i o n s  t h a t one  i n the l i g h t of arguments  seems i n a p p r o p r i a t e .  important t a c t i c o f t e n employed by  to p r e s e n t support  However, when c o n s i d e r e d  contention  R e c a l l the  "Labor" i n v o l v e s an  which p r o v i d e s  Presumably, "Labor" regards  some l e v e r a g e  the e x i s t e n c e of a group which t h r e a t e n s ment" should  t h i s t a c t i c as  to be enhanced by  to d i s c o n t i n u e  s e r v i c e t o "Manage-  the e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h i s group f a i l  Consistent with  one  or power i n the b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p .  C e r t a i n l y the b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n of "Labor" i s l i k e l y  for  attempt  to "Management" the image of a u n i t e d l a b o r f r o n t which i s i n  of t h e i r demands.  demands.  contention  t h i s reasoning,  to a c h i e v e i t s  the a c t o f s h i f t i n g  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g to the u n i o n membership i s one way  responsibility  i n which a l a b o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e can a s s e r t t h i s power, or d i r e c t "Management's" a t t e n t i o n to it,  during negotiations.  Although t h i s behavior  i n v o l v e s a d e n i a l of  autonomy, i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e might w e l l be of a t a c t i c a l n a t u r e r a t h e r than as an i n d i c a t o r of the way  i n which an  perceives h i s r o l e .  s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s upon the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s  Finally,  must be  recognized.  Once f o r m a l n e g o t i a t i o n s have begun, the d e c i s i o n s of a u n i o n membership appear to p l a y a more prominent r o l e i n the n e g o t i a t i o n of than do d e c i s i o n s of company d i r e c t o r s and  shareholders  t h r e e agents onto which r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e c i s i o n s was  settlements  (these were  the  most f r e q u e n t l y  78  shifted).  F o r example, n e g o t i a t e d c o n t r a c t s a r e r a t i f i e d by u n i o n members  but n o t by company d i r e c t o r s and s h a r e h o l d e r s . Consequently, the s h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g by Labor i n t h e p r e s e n t study i s regarded as a b a r g a i n i n g t a c t i c which was c o n v e n i e n t f o r Labor t o adopt due t o the s t r u c t u r a l o r f o r m a l n a t u r e o f the b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s . Chronology o f e v e n t s :  U s i n g t h e t r a n s c r i b e d r e c o r d s of t h e  b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s , an attempt was made t o summarize t h e sequence o f v e r b a l events which o c c u r r e d d u r i n g " n e g o t i a t i o n s " i n each o f t h e e i g h t sessions.  These summaries appear i n t h e f o l l o w i n g pages.  As an example  of the way i n which a summary i s i n t e n d e d t o be r e a d , c o n s i d e r the sequence of events which took p l a c e i n t h e f i r s t  s e s s i o n (group 1 ) :  Labor opened  the n e g o t i a t i o n s by p r o p o s i n g an h o u r l y i n c r e a s e of 38c; i n r e p l y , Management contended t h a t pending p l a n t expansion made such a demand " o u t o f the q u e s t i o n " .  Labor, i n t u r n , noted t h a t Management would make a  r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t a t the proposed wage.  When Management then suggested  t h a t the demand was a r b i t r a r y , t h e i s s u e of a s t r i k e and i t s e f f e c t s on p r o f i t was r a i s e d by Labor . . . b a r g a i n i n g proceeded i n t h i s f a s h i o n  until  Management made what was termed an " a b s o l u t e f i n a l o f f e r " o f a 20c h o u r l y increase.  T h i s o f f e r was then a c c e p t e d by Labor, b r i n g i n g f o r m a l  "negotiations" to a close.  F o r purposes o f c l a r i t y wage demands by Labor  and o f f e r s by Management a r e u n d e r l i n e d i n each  summary.  78(a)  SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; LABOR (n=2) -proposes an h o u r l y  GROUP 1 MANAGEMENT (n=2)  i n c r e a s e of 38c.  -notes t h a t Management w i l l make a r e a s o n a b l e p r o f i t a t t h i s wage.  -contends t h a t p l a n t expansion i s pendi n g and 38c i s out o f t h e q u e s t i o n . -suggests t h a t L a b o r ' s demand i s arbitrary.  -observes t h a t , a l t h o u g h Labor does not want t o c l o s e the p l a n t , a s t r i k e would have immediate and s e v e r e e f f e c t s on p r o f i t s .  - s t a t e s t h a t Management i s w i l l i n g t o i n c r e a s e wages, b u t n o t by 38c.  -asks what Management c o n s i d e r s t o be a r e a s o n a b l e i n c r e a s e . -requests -observes t h a t Labor's demand i s flexible.  -contends t h a t t h e men won't a c c e p t IOC. -lowers demand t o 30c. o b s e r v i n g t h a t a s l i g h t p r i c e increase w i l l cover the c o s t t o Management. •notes t h a t a s t r i k e would "break" t h e company b u t Labor doesn't want t h a t .  -reiterates the p r i c e increase s o l u t i o n and n o t e s t h a t i n t h e event o f a s t r i k e Labor would r e t u r n t o the o r i g i n a l 38c demand. -argues t h a t t h i s company i s a l e a d e r i n the i n d u s t r y , a l l o w i n g i t more freedom t o r a i s e wages and p r i c e s . -comments t h a t a s t r i k e would put t h e company out o f b u s i n e s s q u i c k l y .  -accepts, n o t i n g t h a t t h i s p r o p o s a l w i l l require a l o t of s e l l i n g to the membership.  recess  to discuss.  -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -comments on s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h workers t o d a t e , p r e s e n t wage t r e n d s , a l t e r n a t i v e employment p o s s i b i l i t i e s , and o f f e r s a IPC i n c r e a s e .  -asks i f Labor r e a l i z e s what t h i s wage i n c r e a s e would do t o t h e economy of the company. S t a t e s t h a t Management must have a p r o f i t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h what they have r e a l i z e d i n t h e p a s t .  -suggests t h a t Labor i s b e i n g unr e a l i s t i c , and n o t t a k i n g t h e economy of t h e company i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -contends t h a t t h e board o f d i r e c t o r s w i l l n o t a c c e p t 30c» and Management wants t h e i r poor p r o f i t p i c t u r e and pending expansion investment communicated t o t h e u n i o n membership. - o f f e r s 20c as an " a b s o l u t e f i n a l o f f e r " , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h i s means o p e r a t i n g a t a reduced p r o f i t ; l e v e l next y e a r .  78(b) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=2) -proposes an h o u r l y I n c r e a s e o f 27c, r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h i s w i l l decrease Management's p r o f i t s l i g h t l y .  -states that the r i s i n g cost o f l i v i n g makes m a i n t a i n i n g the s t a t u s quo u n f e a s i b l e .  - l o w e r s demand t o 20c.  GROUP 2 MANAGEMENT (n=2)  -observes t h a t an a d d i t i o n a l c o s t o f $10,000 e n t e r s i n t o t h e p i c t u r e t h i s y e a r and i n o r d e r t o r e c o v e r t h i s a wage c u t o f 40c i s i n o r d e r . -notes t h a t m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r e s e n t wage r a t e s w i l l lower p r o f i t s by $10,000 f o r the coming y e a r . Suggests t h a t an i n c r e a s e o f 27c w i l l a l l o w Management t o r e a l i z e o n l y 4% on i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l and that t h i s i s too l i t t l e . -contends t h a t i f Labor a p p r e c i a t e s t h e d i f f i c u l t f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n o f Management, then t h i s i s a good s t a r t i n g p o i n t -notes t h a t t h e time-cost f a c t o r i s a r e a l i n c e n t i v e t o r e a c h agreement. -suggests t h a t Management views a 5% r e t u r n on c a p i t a l a s r e a s o n a b l e . -argues t h a t m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r e s e n t cont r a c t w i l l a l l o w Management t o r e a l i z e the n e c e s s a r y 5% r e t u r n on i n v e s t e d capital.  -observes t h a t Labor i s n o t about t o " s u b s i d i z e " any o p e r a t i o n .  - r e i t e r a t e s the t i m e - c o s t i n c e n t i v e t o r e a c h agreement, -notes t h a t the 20c demand would p u t t h e company back almost e i g h t y e a r s , -suggests t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e approach i s c a l l e d f o r so t h a t everyone's s e c u r i t y of employment I s m a i n t a i n e d . -argues t h a t the men won't c o n t i n u e t o work f o r t h e p r e s e n t wage, and t h a t i f the company cannot r e a l i z e more p r o f i t they (the workers) w i l l go elsewhere. -observes t h a t j u s t as Labor doesn't want to go backward i n wages, so Management doesn't want t o go backward i n p r o f i t s . - r e i t e r a t e s the time-cost i n c e n t i v e t o r e a c h agreement. -suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y o f an i n d e f i n i t e s t r i k e i f Management p e r s i s t s In m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r e s e n t wage r a t e . -contents t h e Labor should t h i n k o f t h e company, n o t j u s t t h e wage they c a n s e l l to the members, because Labor's p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n could "close the business". - s t a t e s t h a t t h e o f f e r w i l l be -proposes 20c over 2 y e a r s . considered, - n o t e s t h a t Labor will cooperate t o d e v i s e means o f improving pror> -proposes 12c i n a 1-year agreement duction. based on c o s t o f l i v i n g i n c r e a s e . -accepts.  78(c) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=2)  GROUP 3 MANAGEMENT (n=2)  -proposes an h o u r l y i n c r e a s e o f 25c based on (1) t h e " f i n a n c i a l p i c t u r e of t h e u n i o n " and (2) wage r a t e s i n comparable i n d u s t r i e s . Notes t h a t the c o s t o f l i v i n g i s r i s i n g and a b e t t e r l i f e f o r t h e worker's f a m i l y i s important.  -states that p r o d u c t i v i t y i s a problem f o r Management, n o t L a b o r .  -notes t h a t Management f e e l s t h e same way about a " b e t t e r l i f e " and t h i s r e q u i r e s a r e a s o n a b l e r e t u r n on c a p i t a l . S t a t e s t h a t 25c would be t o o "heavy" t h i s y e a r due t o i n c r e a s e d d i s t r i b u t i o n and raw m a t e r i a l costs. -observes t h a t l a y o f f s would r e s u l t i f t h e p r e s e n t p r o f i t p i c t u r e cannot be m a i n t a i n e d . -notes t h a t p r e s e n t p r o f i t s a r e l e s s than can be r e a l i z e d by standard investment procedures, -contends t h a t money must be p u t back i n t o the b u s i n e s s t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i v i t y . -proposes m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r e s e n t wage r a t e , n o t i n g t h a t Management i s w i l l i n g t o h o l d the l i n e on p r o f i t s i f Labor w i l l h o l d t h e l i n e on wages. Suggests t h a t a s m a l l wage i n c r e a s e might be g r a n t e d .  - r a i s e s the issue o f the r i s i n g of l i v i n g .  cost - o f f e r s a 10c i n c r e a s e .  - i m p l i e s t h a t i f t h i s company can't keep up w i t h the buoyant economy i t should shut down. Argues t h a t Labor s h o u l d n ' t be expected t o pay f o r mismanagement. - r e i t e r a t e s t h a t i t i s up t o Management t o s o l v e t h e p r e s e n t problems. - s t a t e s t h a t Labor e s t i m a t e s l a s t y e a r ' s p r o f i t s t o be $50,000.  - s t a t e s t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s must cooperate o r t h e r e w i l l be no j o b s f o r e i t h e r p a r t y . - s t a t e s t h a t Management r e g a r d s a p r o f i t o f $25,000 as a f a i r r e t u r n , n o t i n g t h a t they are b e i n g v e r y candid w i t h Labor h e r e .  - r e p l i e s t h a t the $50,000 f i g u r e i s i n c o r r e c t . - r e i t e r a t e s p r e v i o u s arguments about need f o r " b e t t e r l i f e " and Managements r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s o l v i n g i t s problem.--WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS - o f f e r s 15c based on c o s t o f l i v i n g i n c r e a s e . - r e f u s e s t h i s o f f e r and proposes 22c. -observes t h a t agreement seems n e a r . Proposes 20c as " c e n t r e ground" between the 15c o f f e r and the o r i g i n a l 25c demand. - r e p l i e s t h a t t h e men won't a c c e p t l e s s than 22c. -observes t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s a r e c l o s e t o b r e a k i n g down. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -proposes 21c. -accepts.  78(d) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=l)  GROUP 5 MANAGEMENT  (n=2)  -proposes an h o u r l y wage decrease o f 20c - c r i t i c i z e s Management's " n e g a t i v e " i n view of Management's poor p r o f i t position. approach and q u e s t i o n s the a c c u r a c y of t h e i r s t a t e d p r o f i t p o s i t i o n . P r o poses a 30c i n c r e a s e , i n l i n e w i t h r e g i o n a l and n a t i o n a l s e t t l e m e n t s . -notes precedent f o r wage d e c r e a s e s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p and r e i t e r a t e s poor p r o f i t position. -notes t h a t the workers have upgraded t h e i r s k i l l s and cooperated i n the p a s t and t h a t 30c i s the i n c e n t i v e f o r t h i s behavior to continue. States that Labor i s n o t i n f a v o r o f "horse t r a d i n g " and as a consequence i s f i r m on •argues t h a t a wage c u t now w i l l render t h e the 30<? p r o p o s a l . long-term p o s i t i o n o f both company and employees more s e c u r e . - s t a t e s t h a t the men won't a c c e p t a wage c u t and argues t h a t a 300 i n c r e a s e can be met by t e c h n o l o g i c a l •refutes the t e c h n o l o g i c a l i n n o v a t i o n s innovations. argument and proposes m a i n t a i n i n g the p r e s e n t wage r a t e . -refuses. - r a i s e s the i s s u e of r i s i n g c o s t o f l i v i n g and need f o r the workers' f a m i l i e s t o keep up w i t h the r e s t o f the community, e s p e c i a l l y i n education, -notes t h a t Management has n o t i n c r e a s e d the r e n t on employees' houses. -argues t h a t the workers can't even a f f o r d t o purchase the product they produce. - c h i d e s Management f o r a d o p t i n g a "neg•WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS a t i v e a t t i t u d e " t o the n e g o t i a t i o n s . •notes i n c r e a s e d c o s t o f raw m a t e r i a l s and r a i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i q u i d a t i n g the company. -suggests t h a t I n the l i g h t o f t h e i r p a s t r e s o u r c e f u l n e s s , Management's pessimism i s unfounded. S t a t e s t h a t c o s t s a r e a problem f o r Management -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS, a s k i n g Labor t o r e not Labor. c o n s i d e r i t s p o s i t i o n i n the i n t e r i m -expresses concern t h a t Labor d i d n ' t know about Management's c o s t problem, i m p l y i n g t h a t Labor has n o t done i t s "homework". - r e i t e r a t e s the precedent f o r a wage c u t . -contends t h a t i n the l i g h t o f the buoyant economy the men won't a c c e p t - o f f e r s 10$ p l u s a c o s t o f l i v i n g bonus, a wage c u t . both based on i n c r e a s e i n consumer p r i c e index.  78(a) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=l)  GROUP 5 (continued) MANAGEMENT (n=2)  - d i s a g r e e s w i t h t h i s bonus p r i n c i p l e and demands " f i r m and committed h o u r l y rate". -comments on t h e e n t e r p r i s i n g and r e s o u r c e f u l manner i n which Management has met c o s t problems i n t h e p a s t and expresses c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to do so now. - c r i t i c i z e s Labor's u n f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e u n s t a b l e n a t u r e of t h e i n d u s t r y , r e i t e r a t i n g t h e argument o f i n c r e a s e d c o s t o f -suggests t h a t Management should have raw m a t e r i a l s , f o r e s e e n t h i s problem and done somet h i n g about i t e a r l i e r . - s t a t e s t h a t t h e r e was no way o f p r e d i c t i n g t h i s c o s t problem, - c r i t i c i z e s Labor's l a c k of i n f o r m a t i o n again. Suggests a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings a r e a p p r o p r i a t e and s t a t e s t h a t Management w i l l abide by any d e c i s i o n made thereby,  - r e f u s e s t o commit the workers t o a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. -notes t h a t t h e union's p r o p o s a l i s n o t a "padded" one. -contends t h a t Labor i s n o t w i l l i n g t o bargain. -chides Management f o r " b e r a t i n g " L a b o r ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o " h o r s e t r a d e " . - s t a t e s t h a t Labor appears t o have a " c l o s e d mind". - r e f u s e s t h i s o f f e r , commenting, "Well,-makes " f i n a l o f f e r " of 16c. w e ' l l s e e you a t c o n c i l i a t i o n . " Notes t h a t the " f r e s h n e s s " of Labor's approach t o b a r g a i n i n g seems t o have escaped Management. -one management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l e a v e s , s t a t i n g t h a t he i s l a t e f o r an appointment.  78(f) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=l)  GROUP 7 MANAGEMENT (n=2)  - r e c o g n i z e s t h a t Management's p r o f i t p i c t u r e i s n o t a good one; a t t h e same time contends t h a t the workers must have a wage i n c r e a s e , -proposes an h o u r l y i n c r e a s e o f 14*sC i n each y e a r of a 2-year agreement, based on t h e c o s t o f l i v i n g i n c r e a s e . Notes t h a t t h i s l e a v e s no room f o r b a r g a i n i n g downwards and t h a t shaving of t h i s f i g u r e w i l l l e a d t o r e j e c t i o n and p o s s i b l e s t r i k e . -agrees w i t h Labor's assessment o f Management's u n f o r t u n a t e p r o f i t p i c t u r e , -contends t h a t Labor i s n o t f i r m on -shows i n t e r e s t i n a 2-year agreement, the 2-year c o n t r a c t p r o p o s a l , b u t f e l t t h i s would g i v e Management a better opportunity to project t h e i r costs. - r e c o g n i z e s t h a t the workers need an i n c r e a s e t o keep up w i t h the r e s t o f t h e community. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -notes t h a t Labor's p r o p o s a l cannot be a c c e p t e d o u t r i g h t ; i n s t e a d , o f f e r s increases on a 6-month i n t e r v a l b a s i s t o p r o v i d e a " b r e a t h i n g space" f o r Management a t the p r e s e n t t i m e — 1 0 c i n t h e 1 s t 6 months, kht i n t h e 2nd 6 months, IOC i n t h e 3 r d -agrees t h a t t h i s i s r e a s o n a b l e s i n c e 6 months, and 4%c i n t h e 4 t h 6 months. the l a r g e s t amount comes i n t h e f i r s t h a l f o f each y e a r . S t a t e s t h a t the o f f e r w i l l be recommended t o t h e membership.  78(g) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; LABOR (n=l)  GROUP 8 MANAGEMENT (h«=2)  -proposes h o u r l y i n c r e a s e o f 90$ (based on a m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p r o j e c t e d p r o f i t a n a l y s i s which was subs e q u e n t l y c o r r e c t e d by E ) . comments on Management's poor p r o f i t p i c t u r e due t o i n c r e a s e d o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . -suggests Management i n e f f i c i e n c y as p o s s i b l e cause and observes t h a t Labor has never agreed t o s u b s i d i z e inefficiency. - r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n , "Should we p u t t h i s operation out of business p a i n lessly?" -contends t h a t t h e i n e f f i c i e n c y argument does n o t a p p l y t o t h i s company. - s t a t e s t h a t Management wants a y e a r of " b r e a t h i n g space", hoping f o r an upswing i n market c o n d i t i o n s next y e a r . Proposes " h o l d i n g the l i n e " on wages and n o t e s a -proposes 50c i n c r e a s e as an i n c e n t i v e precedent f o r t h i s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . to i n c r e a s e output t o overcome t h e p r e s e n t d i f f i c u l t y . Notes t h a t t h i s i s a drop o f 40c from the o r i g i n a l demand. •argues t h a t Management must have a r e a s o n a b l e r e t u r n (4%) on i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l , and - r e f u s e s t o e n t e r t a i n t h i s p o l i c y and t h i s r e q u i r e s h o l d i n g t h e l i n e on wages. r a i s e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f a 2-year agreement, t e n t a t i v e l y s u g g e s t i n g 32c i n 1st y e a r and 27c i n t h e 2nd y e a r . •shows i n t e r e s t i n a 2-year agreement, obs e r v i n g t h a t 2 y e a r s o f l a b o r peace would be d e s i r a b l e (WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS), •proposes 10c i n t h e 1st year and 12c i n t h e -observes t h a t t h i s o f f e r i s a s t e p i n 2nd y e a r . the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , b u t u n a c c e p t a b l e . -comments t h a t I f t h e two p a r t i e s cannot move c l o s e r an impasse i s n e a r . •contends t h a t the 50C demand must be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced o r t h e i r w i l l be l i t t l e - r e c o g n i z e s Management's d i f f i c u l t basis for further discussion. p o s i t i o n and o f f e r s a formula o f 22c i n t h e 1st y e a r and 27$ i n t h e 2nd y -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -observes t h a t t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s w i l l n o t accept t h i s demand, and as a " f i n a l o f f e r " proposes 16c i n t h e 1st year and 20c i n t h e - s t a t e s t h a t i n t h e " s p i r i t o f com2nd y e a r , based on an i n d u s t r y p r e c e d e n t . promise" Labor w i l l a c c e p t 18c i n the 1st y e a r and 18c i n t h e 2nd y e a r . -accepts, remarking t h a t Management w i l l be f o r t u n a t e t o s t a y i n b u s i n e s s next y e a r . e a r  78(h)  SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; LABOR (n=2)  GROUP 9 MANAGEMENT (n=2)  -proposes h o u r l y i n c r e a s e of 30c based on (1) p a t t e r n o f s e t t l e m e n t s i n B.C. and (2) p a s t p r o f i t s , e s t i m a t e d a t 10% o f company a s s e t s by L a b o r . - s u g g e s t s t h a t Management w i l l have t o open i t s books and show Labor t h a t p r o f i t s were l e s s than 10% o f a s s e t s , - s t a t e s t h a t a t e s t s a l e s s i t u a t i o n showed a p r i c e i n c r e a s e would n o t i n c r e a s e p r o f i t s , -observes t h a t s e l l i n g the b u s i n e s s i s a real possibility, - s u g g e s t s two a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r r e a l i z i n g adequate r e t u r n (6%) on i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l : (1) lower wages by 200/hour, o r (2) i n c r e a s e wages by 20c w h i l e r e d u c i n g s t a f f from 10 t o 9 employees, -notes t h a t Management does n o t expect Labor t o s u b s i d i z e the b u s i n e s s , b u t t h a t t h e i r h e l p i s needed i n terms o f i d e a s f o r - s u g g e s t s a product m o d i f i c a t i o n t h a t i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y a t t h e p r e s e n t time, might make the company more competitive. -contends t h a t c o s t s of r e t o o l i n g would be - s t a t e s t h a t more s p e c i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n prohibitive* on p a s t p r o f i t s i s r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o judge whether o r n o t t h e p r e s e n t problem i s temporary. S t a t e s t h a t Labor wants t o h e l p r e s t o r e the company's c o m p e t i t i v e market p o s i t i o n . - s t a t e s t h a t Management doesn't i n t e n d t o "horse t r a d e " as i n t h e p a s t , b u t r a t h e r w i l l open t h e books t o Labor, -observes t h a t t h e s t a f f r e d u c t i o n would be through r e t i r e m e n t r a t h e r than a l a y o f f , - r e i t e r a t e s Labor's d e s i r e t o l o o k a t - s t r e s s e s need f o r i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i v i t y , the books e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t o f "high" p r o f i t s i n previous years. -asks whether o r n o t Labor agrees t h a t Management should expect t o r e a l i z e 6% on i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l , and t h a t the 20c o f f e r -contends t h a t no commitment can be i s fair, made b e f o r e s e e i n g the books. Observes t h a t Labor i s w i l l i n g t o c o o p e r a t e , - s u g g e s t s t h a t something more than 20c might be t h e inducement n e c e s s a r y f o r increased p r o d u c t i v i t y . - s u g g e s t s adjournment and s e t s meeting f o r next day t o open t h e books. S t a t e s t h a t Management i s concerned w i t h t h e worker's a t t i t u d e s and f o r t h i s r e a s o n Management doesn't want t o h o l d a n y t h i n g back.  78(i) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: LABOR (n=l) -proposes h o u r l y  MANAGEMENT  (n=2)  I n c r e a s e o f 30c  -observes t h a t Management's problems a r e a p p r e c i a t e d , b u t the r i s i n g c o s t of l i v i n g makes a wage c u t u n a c c e p t able. - s t a t e s t h a t the " l i b e r a l " f i g u r e o f 30c i s n e g o t i a b l e .  -comments, "When s h a l l we take a s t r i k e vote?"  -refers  GROUP 10  - s t a t e s t h a t i n c r e a s e s i n raw m a t e r i a l and d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s f o r c e Management t o r e q u e s t a 20c r e d u c t i o n i n p r e s e n t r a t e s .  -contends t h a t Management needs " b r e a t h i n g space" and a p p e a l s t o Labor t o make the employees aware of Management's d i f f i c u l t i e s , -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -states desire to avoid a s t r i k e -contends t h a t j u s t m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s e n t wage r a t e s w i l l cause t h e company t o go backwards, b u t Management i s w i l l i n g t o " h o l d the l i n e on wages" f o r the coming y e a r .  to r i s i n g l i v i n g costs.  -suggests m a i n t a i n i n g p r e s e n t c o n t r a c t w i t h a "wage reopener" i n 6 months s u b j e c t t o c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n i n t h e hope t h a t the company's market p o s i t i o n w i l l -questions soundness o f t h i s p r o p o s a l , improve i n t h e next 6 months. s t a t i n g disagreement w i t h t h i s principle. -agrees t h a t i t i s b e s t t o s e t t l e now. -contends t h a t the problem i s one of convinc i n g t h e workers o f Management's problems, which i n i t i a l l y i n v o l v e s c o n v i n c i n g t h e i r - s t a t e s t h a t Labor i s w i l l i n g t o conrepresentative. s i d e r a 2-year agreement. Asks what - r e p l i e s $35,000 ( t h e c o r r e c t f i g u r e ) , and Management's p r o f i t was l a s t y e a r . n o t e s t h a t Management c o u l d make more by s e l l i n g the b u s i n e s s and p u t t i n g the money - o b s e r v e s t h a t Management has made no i n the bank. " d i r e c t o f f e r " so f a r , and a l l Labor can do i s r e t u r n t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n t o the membership. -proposes a 10c i n c r e a s e as the most Management can o f f e r . -contends t h a t t h i s i s " n o t h i n g more than a s l a p i n the face" i n l i g h t o f s e t t l e m e n t s i n comparable i n d u s t r i e s . S t a t e s t h a t Labor w i l l shave some o f f the 30c demand, b u t n o t h i n g l i k e t h a t . -asks what Labor's p o s i t i o n i s . - s u g g e s t s 40c over 2 y e a r s . -asks i f 10c i n 1 s t year and 30c i n 2nd year i s acceptable. - r e p l i e s that L a b o r ' s " f i n a l suggestion" i s 10c i n the 1 s t 6 months, 10c i n t h e 2nd 6 months and 20c i n the 2nd year. -accepts.  79  Overview;  Reviewing the sequence of events which took p l a c e i n each  of the e i g h t b a r g a i n i n g  s e s s i o n s , i t i s apparent t h a t  considerable  s i m i l a r i t y e x i s t s i n the approaches taken by members of a p a r t y from s e s s i o n to the next*  In view of t h i s c o n s i s t e n c y , c o n s t r u c t i o n of a  g e n e r a l p i c t u r e of the b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n s , based upon both the of the content  a n a l y s i s and  i s appropriate.  determining  the i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d  A l t h o u g h we  to each s e s s i o n , and  recognize  and  results  summaries,  t h a t c e r t a i n b e h a v i o r s were unique  t h a t these b e h a v i o r s  the p r o g r e s s  i n the  p l a y e d an important  role i n  e v e n t u a l outcome of p a r t i c u l a r s e s s i o n s ,  f o l l o w i n g overview of the " n e g o t i a t i o n s " i s c o n s i d e r e d to the  one  to do no  the  injustice  data. The  dominant theme of the " n e g o t i a t i o n s " , as i n d i c a t e d by  a t t e n t i o n i t was  the  g i v e n by b o t h l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  the p o s i t i o n taken by Management on the wage i s s u e .  Included  was  i n this  p o s i t i o n were i n i t i a l p r o p o s a l s of a wage r e d u c t i o n , renewal of  the  e x i s t i n g wage r a t e , or the g r a n t i n g o f a s l i g h t wage i n c r e a s e .  Management  attempted to j u s t i f y these p r o p o s a l s by a r g u i n g  increases  i n raw m a t e r i a l and  t h a t unforeseen  d i s t r i b u t i o n c o s t s would make i t e s p e c i a l l y  difficult  to meet t r a d i t i o n a l wage demands i n the coming y e a r .  I t was  t h a t r e a l i z a t i o n of a " r e a s o n a b l e  c a p i t a l was  and  r e t u r n " on I n v e s t e d  t h i s r e q u i r e d t h a t Management be allowed  year ahead.  contended  a " b r e a t h i n g space" i n the  T h i s argument f r e q u e n t l y i n v o l v e d a d i r e c t a p p e a l  sympathetic understanding  and  critical,  c o o p e r a t i o n of Labor  (the author  f o r the regarded  t h i s approach as b a r g a i n i n g from a p o s i t i o n of weakness r a t h e r than from a p o s i t i o n of s t r e n g t h ) . the " n e g o t i a t i o n s " was  The  i n f o r m a t i o n which Management imparted  m a i n l y of a f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l  nature,  during  80  emphasizing past p r o f i t s , p r e s e n t  c o s t s , and p r o j e c t e d p r o f i l e s .  In return  they r e q u e s t e d feedback from Labor p r i m a r i l y i n terms o f the a t t i t u d e s which t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n  engendered c o n c e r n i n g  the p r e s e n t  difficulties  f a c i n g Management. In response t o t h e p r o p o s a l s ,  Labor expressed some s c e p t i c i s m about  the company's f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s as p r e s e n t e d by Management.  I t was  suggested t h a t t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s were n o t as s e r i o u s as had been  envisioned  by Management and f r e q u e n t l y Labor proposed s p e c i f i c methods f o r overcoming the problems.  These p r o p o s a l s  i n v o l v e d s u g g e s t i o n s as t o the ease w i t h  which Management's problems c o u l d be overcome v i a such measures as s m a l l price  increases, plant efficiency  cooperation.  programs, and i n c r e a s e d  labor-management  In a d d i t i o n , a f i r m stand was taken a g a i n s t Management's p l e a  f o r t h e n e c e s s a r y " r e a s o n a b l e r e t u r n " on i n v e s t e d c a p i t a l , based on the argument t h a t Labor c o u l d n o t be expected t o s u b s i d i z e Management "inefficiency".  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h e i r own p o s i t i o n ,  Labor emphasized how  they would l i k e t h i n g s t o be, o r how they thought t h i n g s ought t o b e . I n i t i a l demands tended t o be i n the area o f a 10% y e a r l y wage i n c r e a s e , w i t h r i s i n g c o s t s o f l i v i n g and the workers' r i g h t life"  c i t e d as grounds f o r these demands.  t o share i n the "good  In terms o f a p o s s i b l e  settle-  ment, Labor f r e q u e n t l y observed t h a t t h e i r demands r e p r e s e n t e d  a wage which  the workers themselves were r e q u e s t i n g  f o r accepting  any  offer  and t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  from Management was t h e p r e r o g a t i v e  their elected  than  representatives.  Few statements of a t h r e a t e n i n g "negotiations"; the l i k e l i h o o d  o f these workers r a t h e r  n a t u r e were made d u r i n g t h e  those by Labor c o n s i s t e d o f s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  references to  of a s t r i k e , whereas Management tended t o make more s u b t l e  81  remarks about the p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l l i n g  the b u s i n e s s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  a t t a c k s o r q u e s t i o n s which i m p l i e d a l a c k o f c r e d i b i l i t y i n the arguments p r e s e n t e d by the o t h e r p a r t y were d i r e c t e d m a i n l y  towards a c t u a l b a r g a i n -  i n g p o s i t i o n s taken, r a t h e r than towards t h e i n t e g r i t y Such q u e s t i o n s were expressed more f r e q u e n t l y by Labor. b o t h Labor and Management expressed suggested  o f the o t h e r p a r t y . Finally,  although  t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n a manner which  a h i g h degree o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n or f i n a l i t y , the p r o c e s s o f  mutual compromise on the wage i s s u e was apparent, w i t h e v e n t u a l s e t t l e m e n t s f a l l i n g i n the a r e a o f a 6% y e a r l y i n c r e a s e .  82  SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS  As an a l t e r n a t i v e t o f o r m a l game r e s e a r c h , the p r e s e n t  study  explored  a p a r t i c u l a r r e a l - w o r l d c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management b a r g a i n i n g relationship.  The study was designed  to provide information  concerning  ( i ) ways i n which "Labor" and "Management" p e r c e i v e the b a r g a i n i n g  relation-  s h i p , as w e l l as ( i i ) approaches t o n e g o t i a t i o n s adopted by each p a r t y . S u b j e c t s were 19 management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and 15 l a b o r t i v e s , a l l with formal bargaining experience negotiations.  Representatives  representa-  i n labor-management  of both p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 3- and 4-  p e r s o n groups i n s e s s i o n s which l a s t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y  3 hours.  Most o f t h e  p e r c e p t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n was c o l l e c t e d u s i n g an o p i n i o n q u e s t i o n n a i r e which d e a l t w i t h s p e c i f i c a s p e c t s o f l a b o r r e l a t i o n s , and semantic type s c a l e s .  differential-  On the q u e s t i o n n a i r e , s u b j e c t s i n d i c a t e d t h e o p i n i o n s which  they thought t h e i r own p a r t y , i n g e n e r a l , h e l d , as w e l l as the o p i n i o n s they  thought t h e other p a r t y , i n g e n e r a l , h e l d .  On t h e s c a l e s , s u b j e c t s  r a t e d t h e i r own p a r t y , t h e o t h e r p a r t y , and i n d i c a t e d how they t h e i r own p a r t y would be r a t e d by the o t h e r p a r t y .  thought  Negotiating  information  was o b t a i n e d u s i n g a s i m u l a t e d b a r g a i n i n g problem which c a s t management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n the r o l e o f b u s i n e s s  p a r t n e r s and l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  as the e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s r e p r e s e n t i n g employees o f t h e b u s i n e s s . p a r t i e s " n e g o t i a t e d " a wage s e t t l e m e n t  The two  on the b a s i s o f a p r o j e c t e d wage  and p r o f i t a n a l y s i s adapted from Sawyer's b a r g a i n i n g board  technique.  C e r t a i n summary s t a t i s t i c a l f e a t u r e s of the b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n were recorded;  a l s o , a f o r m a l content  transcripts.  a n a l y s i s was conducted, based on a u d i o  F i n a l l y , a t the c o n c l u s i o n o f each b a r g a i n i n g s e s s i o n , the  q u e s t i o n n a i r e was r e a d m i n i s t e r e d  f o r the purposes of a s s e s s i n g  personal  83  o p i n i o n s and p e r c e p t u a l a c c u r a c y .  On t h i s second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , l a b o r  and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n d i c a t e d t h e i r own o p i n i o n s as w e l l as the o p i n i o n s they thought each o f the o t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s h e l d . In a d d i t i o n t o p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n o f a p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e n a t u r e , the t a s k s employed allowed  c e r t a i n comparisons t o be made w i t h i n each  sample and between the two samples ( i . e . , the l a b o r sample and the management sample).  I n the remainder o f t h i s c h a p t e r ,  the major r e s u l t s and  i m p l i c a t i o n s of these comparisons w i l l be reviewed. Some i n d i r e c t support  f o r t h e n o t i o n t h a t "Labor" and "Management"  v a l u e t e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t d i f f e r e n t l y i s p r o v i d e d by the f i n d i n g Labor was more l i k e l y t o p e r c e i v e the two p a r t i e s as h o l d i n g o p i n i o n s on m u t a l l y r e l e v a n t i s s u e s . consistent with  that  opposite  Specifically, this finding i s  the argument t h a t "Labor" should p r e f e r c o n f l i c t  t o be  s u s t a i n e d , a t l e a s t a t some l e v e l , whereas "Management" should p r e f e r the absence o f such c o n f l i c t .  One i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s f i n d i n g i s t h a t the  symmetric o r m i r r o r - l i k e s t r u c t u r e and assumptions o f the P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game do n o t a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t  t h e labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p .  In p a r t i c u l a r , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l assumption t h a t both p a r t i e s v a l u e h i g h l y t h a t outcome which r e s o l v e s the c o n f l i c t , i s n o t e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e i n this  context. The  o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t Labor and Management responded  differently  when asked t o make t h e same k i n d s o f p e r c e p t u a l judgements suggests t h a t the procedure adopted i n t h i s study may have some p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s . F o r example, i t might be u s e f u l t o a d m i n i s t e r  the p r e s e n t  or s i m i l a r  q u e s t i o n n a i r e s t o l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n v o l v e d i n d i f f e r e n t b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and a t d i f f e r e n t times d u r i n g the  84  tenure o f c o n t r a c t s .  Comparisons of the k i n d made i n t h e p r e s e n t  study  may  have some p r e d i c t i v e v a l u e i n terms o f a crude index o f the l e v e l o f t e n s i o n , or as a means o f i s o l a t i n g p o t e n t i a l sources  o f c o n f l i c t and i t s r e s o l u t i o n .  When the p r a c t i c a l problem o f d i s p l a c i n g m i s p e r c e p t i o n s accurate  perceptions  i s considered,  w i t h more  the tendency t o u n d e r e s t i m a t e the  f a v o r a b l e manner (or t o o v e r e s t i m a t e  the i n i m i c a l manner) i n which one's  p a r t y i s e v a l u a t e d by the o t h e r , i s p o t e n t i a l l y i m p o r t a n t . the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f c r e d i b l e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  the e x i s t e n c e o f  r e l a t i v e l y f a v o r a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n s might be expected t o have a m i t i g a t i n g e f f e c t upon the c l i m a t e o f an extended b a r g a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p . However, d i f f i c u l t i e s can be a n t i c i p a t e d should information.  e i t h e r p a r t y attempt t o convey such  Since b o t h view t h e o t h e r as the l e s s honest and l e s s  trust-  worthy p a r t y i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p , attempts t o communicate a c t u a l d i s p o s i t i o n s may be viewed as a c t s o f d e c e p t i o n  ( t h i s communication problem  would be s i n g u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t f o r "Management" t o overcome s i n c e misperceptions  "Labor's"  may s e r v e a f u n c t i o n i n s u s t a i n i n g t e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t ) .  Other p e r c e p t u a l f i n d i n g s i n d i c a t e d t h a t a l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s l i k e l y t o see o t h e r members o f h i s own r e f e r e n c e group ("Labor" i n g e n e r a l ) as h o l d i n g o p i n i o n s s i m i l a r t o h i s , w h i l e a management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i s l e s s l i k e l y t o see o t h e r members o f h i s r e f e r e n c e group general)  as s h a r i n g h i s o p i n i o n s .  Evidence from the p r e s e n t  "Labor" and "Management" d i d n o t support p a r t i e s on t h i s b a s i s .  ("Management" i n samples o f  a d i s t i n c t i o n between the two  There was no g r e a t e r consensus among t h e p e r s o n a l  o p i n i o n s o f l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s than t h e r e was among the p e r s o n a l  opinions  of management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ; nor was t h e r e any more marked agreement among l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s than among management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s as t o  85  j u s t what opinions are held by the majority of t h e i r own colleagues.  It  was t e n t a t i v e l y concluded that i f exogenous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the "Labor party l i n e " i s no more w e l l defined f o r labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s f o r management representatives. The major f i n d i n g s concerning v e r b a l i n t e r a c t i o n during "negotiations" are r e i t e r a t e d below: (1) Both p a r t i e s tended to focus a t t e n t i o n upon Management's p o s i t i o n . (2) Management presented  t h e i r p o s i t i o n p r i m a r i l y as one of d i f f i c u l t y  or weakness rather than one of strength, whereas Labor gave equal emphasis to both aspects of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . (3) Labor's p o s i t i o n was characterized by purposive rather than f a c t u a l arguments, whereas Management made equal use of both types of argument. (4) Both p a r t i e s expressed statements w i t h a high degree of determination or f i n a l i t y as opposed to f l e x i b i l i t y . (5) Labor was more l i k e l y to express doubt concerning c r e d i b i l i t y of the other party. (6) Both p a r t i e s were more l i k e l y to express scepticism concerning the other party's bargaining p o s i t i o n than t h e i r i n t e g r i t y . (7) Management imparted p r i m a r i l y f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l information as opposed to a t t i t u d i n a l information, "whereas Labor imparled both kinds of information to the same extent. (8) Management requested p r i m a r i l y a t t i t u d i n a l information as opposed to f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l information, whereas Labor requested both kinds of information to the same extent, (9) Labor was more l i k e l y to s h i f t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decisions  86  (to the membership). In g e n e r a l , these  f i n d i n g s a r e viewed as r e f l e c t i n g c o n s t r a i n t s  unique to the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p .  For example, p o s s e s s i o n  e x t e n s i v e f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n i s a n e c e s s a r y and consequence o f , managing a b u s i n e s s . l i k e l y predisposed  requisite to,  "Management" i s  to a r e l a t i v e l y f a c t u a l o r s t a t i s t i c a l p r e s e n t a t i o n of  their position i n negotiations. existing situation  F o r t h i s reason  of  S i m i l a r l y , the d e s i r e to change an  ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , the d e s i r e to o b t a i n g r e a t e r  compensation f o r one's e f f o r t ) , might be expected to p r e d i s p o s e to a r e l a t i v e l y p u r p o s i v e  p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e i r p o s i t i o n .  The  "Labor" k i n d of  i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t i s exchanged d u r i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s then, i s somewhat l i m i t e d by v a r i o u s c o n s t r a i n t s of t h i s  nature.  While the element of c o n s t r a i n t i s apparent i n most of the f i n d i n g s , c e r t a i n negotiating behaviors component.  appear to have an e x p l i c i t  strategic  More p r e c i s e l y , even though s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s of the  management r e l a t i o n s h i p make i t more l i k e l y f o r one p a r t i c u l a r k i n d of n e g o t i a t i n g b e h a v i o r , be adopted by e i t h e r p a r t y .  p a r t y to engage i n a  that behavior  could  conceivably  In t h i s r e g a r d , i t would be important  c o n f i r m the e x i s t e n c e i n r e a l n e g o t i a t i o n s of such b e h a v i o r s emphasizing the weakness of one's p o s i t i o n ( " c r y i n g p o o r " ) , n e g o t i a t i o n s so t h a t the p o s i t i o n of one shifting responsibility for decisions.  labor-  to  as manipulating  p a r t y i s the dominant theme, and Future  r e s e a r c h might then be  d i r e c t e d towards e x p l o r i n g the t a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of these  behaviors  i n r e a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , as w e l l as i n the l a b o r a t o r y c o n t e x t , p o s s i b l y the a i d of v a r i o u s b a r g a i n i n g boards and  communication  restraints.  with  87  BIBLIOGRAPHY Adorno, T. 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"Prominence" as J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t  Wrightsman, L. S. P e r s o n a l i t y and a t t i t u d i n a l c o r r e l a t e s o f t r u s t i n g and t r u s t w o r t h y b e h a v i o r s i n a two-person game. J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology, 1966, 4_, 328-332. Wrightsman, L. S., B r u i n i n k s , R. H., L u c k e r , W. G., and O'Connor, J . E f f e c t s of e x t e n s i v e n e s s of i n s t r u c t i o n s upon c o o p e r a t i o n i n a P r i s o n e r ' s Dilemma game. Paper p r e s e n t e d a t the Western P s y c h o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n meetings, San Diego, 1968. Zucker, R. A., M a n o s e v i t z , M., and Lanyon, R. I . B i r t h o r d e r , a n x i e t y , and a f f i l i a t i o n during a c r i s i s . J o u r n a l o f P e r s o n a l i t y and S o c i a l Psychology. 1968, 8, 354-359.  (  APPENDICES  92 APPENDIX At AGREE  OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE  DISAGREE Examples g i v e n on f i r s t  M  _1_. M u t u a l c o o p e r a t i o n between management and organized labor i s a d e s i r a b l e state of affairs.  L  M  L  2. Much o f t h e c o n f l i c t between l a b o r and management i s a v o i d a b l e . Examples g i v e n on second  S M  L  L  2  administration:  administration:  JL M u t u a l c o o p e r a t i o n between management and organized labor i s a d e s i r a b l e s t a t e of affairs.  2  S M Lj  2. Much o f the c o n f l i c t between l a b o r and management i s a v o i d a b l e . 1. The need t o l o o k good t o one's c o n s t i t u e n t s p l a y s a v e r y important r o l e i n determining a labour representative's bargaining behavior. 2. In c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s management i n t e r p r e t s the g o a l s o f labour f a i r l y a c c u r a t e l y . 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e labour's r i g h t to s t r i k e .  with  4. In an i n d u s t r y i n " t h e b e s t o f a l l p o s s i b l e w o r l d s " t h e r e would be no need f o r u n i o n s . 5. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e management. 6. In party but I taken  n e g o t i a t i n g a s e t t l e m e n t w i t h the o t h e r I would l i k e t o be completely honest, am a f r a i d t h a t my honesty would be advantage o f .  7. Those o f f i c i a l s o f the Fisherman and A l l i e d Workers U n i o n now s e r v i n g p r i s o n terms should be r e l e a s e d immediately. 8. Management i s g e n u i n e l y the needs of the worker.  concerned  with  9. In c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , one s h o u l d seek t o a c q u i r e every p o s s i b l e advantage over the other p a r t y .  93 10. In b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s , l a b o u r r a r e l y seems t o a p p r e c i a t e the problems f a c i n g management. 11. The u n i o n shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way o f communication between management and employees. 12. The c l o s e d shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way o f communication between management and employees. 13. I t h i n k t h a t a f r a n k i n t e r c h a n g e of idea§ between l o c a l l a b o u r l e a d e r s and top management p e r s o n n e l c o u l d a l l e v i a t e much o f t h e tension that e x i s t s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today. 14. I n g e n e r a l , labour-management c o u l d be improved.  relations  15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands a r e an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f the b a r g a i n i n g process. 16. Labour i s more l i k e l y t o take advantage of c o n t r a c t l o o p h o l e s than i s management. 17. A good l a b o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e can u s u a l l y do what he t h i n k s i s r i g h t i n labour-management b a r g a i n i n g s i t u a t i o n s and n o t worry about l o o k i n g good t o h i s c o n s t i t u e n t s . 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs o f the worker a r e o v e r l o o k e d by the u n i o n o f f i c i a l s who r e p r e s e n t him. 19. Government s h o u l d i n no way i n t e r f e r e w i t h management's r i g h t t o l o c k o u t . 20. Labour people a r e more s e n s i t i v e t o s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than a r e management p e o p l e . 21. The p r o v i n c i a l l a b o u r laws f a v o r management . 22. The r i g h t t o s t r i k e i s an i n d i s p e n s i b l e p a r t o f the labour-management r e l a t i o n s h i p . 23. Persons who t h i n k a s t a t e o f mutual t r u s t can be e s t a b l i s h e d between l a b o u r and management a r e b e i n g u n r e a l i s t i c . 24. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e labour. 25. The p r o v i n c i a l l a b o u r laws f a v o r  labour.  94 APPENDIX B: Heading: -3  H  bad  -2  1  suspicious  weak  competitive  dishonest  untrustworthy  SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL-TYPE  SCALES  e i t h e r LABOUR o r MANAGEMENT -  1  1  0  +1  1  1  +2  1  +3  h  good  trusting  strong  cooperative  honest  trustworthy  95 APPENDIX C: The  f o l l o w i n g i s a q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n c e r n i n g what p e o p l e t h i n k and  about a number of important to  30-ITEM F-SCALE  each statement  s o c i a l and p e r s o n a l q u e s t i o n s .  below i s your " p e r s o n a l o p i n i o n " .  many d i f f e r e n t and opposing p o i n t s of view; you may s t r o n g l y w i t h some of the statements,  We  feel  The b e s t answer  have t r i e d t o cover  f i n d y o u r s e l f agreeing  d i s a g r e e i n g j u s t as s t r o n g l y w i t h  o t h e r s , and perhaps u n c e r t a i n about o t h e r s ; whether you agree or d i s a g r e e w i t h any statement,  you can be sure t h a t many people f e e l the same as you  Mark each statement  on the answer sheet a c c o r d i n g t o how  agree o r d i s a g r e e w i t h i t .  P l e a s e mark every  much you  one.  +1  : I agree a l i t t l e  -1  : I disagree a  +2  : I agree on the whole  -2  : I d i s a g r e e on the whole  +3  : I agree v e r y much  -3  : I d i s a g r e e v e r y much  Go r i g h t ahead now  do.  little  on the q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  1.  Obedience and r e s p e c t f o r a u t h o r i t y a r e the most important c h i l d r e n should l e a r n .  virtues  2.  No weakness o r d i f f i c u l t y can h o l d us back i f we  3.  S c i e n c e has i t s p l a c e , but t h e r e a r e many important never p o s s i b l y be understood by the human mind.  4.  Human n a t u r e b e i n g what i t i s , t h e r e w i l l always be war  5.  Every person s h o u l d have complete f a i t h i n some s u p e r n a t u r a l power whose d e c i s i o n s he obeys w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n .  6.  When a p e r s o n has a problem o r x^orry, i t I s b e s t f o r him not t o t h i n k about i t , but t o keep busy w i t h more c h e e r f u l t h i n g s .  7.  A person who has bad manners, h a b i t s , and b r e e d i n g can h a r d l y expect get a l o n g w i t h decent p e o p l e .  8.  What the youth needs most i s s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n e , rugged d e t e r m i n a t i o n , the w i l l t o work and f i g h t f o r f a m i l y and c o u n t r y .  9.  Some p e o p l e a r e b o r n w i t h an urge to jump from h i g h p l a c e s .  have enough w i l l power. t h i n g s t h a t can  and  conflict.  to  10.  Nowadays when so many d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of people move around and mix t o g e t h e r so much, a p e r s o n has to p r o t e c t h i m s e l f e s p e c i a l l y c a r e f u l l y a g a i n s t c a t c h i n g an i n f e c t i o n o r d i s e a s e from them.  11.  An I n s u l t t o our honor s h o u l d always be  12.  Young p e o p l e sometimes g e t r e b e l l i o u s i d e a s , but as they grow up ought t o get over them and s e t t l e down.  punished. they  and  96  13.  I t i s b e s t t o use some prewar a u t h o r i t i e s i n Germany t o keep o r d e r and p r e v e n t chaos.  14.  What t h i s c o u n t r y needs most, more than laws and p o l i t i c a l programs, i s a few courageous, t i r e l e s s , devoted l e a d e r s i n whom the people can put their faith.  15.  Sex c r i m e s , such as rape and a t t a c k s on c h i l d r e n , deserve more than mere imprisonment; such c r i m i n a l s ought to be p u b l i c l y whipped, o r worse.  16.  People can be d i v i d e d i n t o two d i s t i n c t c l a s s e s :  17.  There i s h a r d l y a n y t h i n g lower than a p e r s o n who does n o t f e e l a g r e a t l o v e , g r a t i t u d e , and r e s p e c t f o r h i s p a r e n t s .  18.  Some day i t w i l l p r o b a b l y be shown t h a t a s t r o l o g y can e x p l a i n a l o t of things.  19.  The t r u e American way o f l i f e necessary to preserve i t .  20.  Nowadays more and more p e o p l e a r e p r y i n g i n t o m a t t e r s t h a t s h o u l d remain p e r s o n a l and p r i v a t e .  21.  Wars and s o c i a l t r o u b l e s may someday be ended by an earthquake o r f l o o d t h a t w i l l d e s t r o y the whole w o r l d .  22.  Most of our s o c i a l problems would be s o l v e d i f we c o u l d somehow g e t r i d of t h e immoral, crooked, and feebleminded p e o p l e .  23.  The w i l d sex l i f e o f the o l d Greeks and Romans was tame compared t o some of the goings-on i n t h i s c o u n t r y , even i n p l a c e s where people might l e a s t expect i t .  24.  I f p e o p l e would t a l k l e s s and work more, everybody would be b e t t e r o f f .  25.  Most p e o p l e don't r e a l i z e how much our l i v e s a r e c o n t r o l l e d by p l o t s hatched i n s e c r e t p l a c e s .  26.  Homosexuals a r e h a r d l y b e t t e r than c r i m i n a l s and ought punished.  27.  The businessman and the manufacturer a r e much more important to s o c i e t y than the a r t i s t and the p r o f e s s o r .  28.  No sane, normal, decent person c o u l d ever t h i n k of h u r t i n g a c l o s e f r i e n d or r e l a t i v e .  29.  F a m i l i a r i t y breeds  30.  Nobody ever l e a r n e d a n y t h i n g r e a l l y important except through  the weak and the s t r o n g .  i s d i s a p p e a r i n g so f a s t t h a t f o r c e may be  t o be s e v e r e l y  contempt. suffering.  97  APPENDIX D: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WERE MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED  percentage of s u b j e c t s who p e r c e i v e a d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n between "Labor" and "Management"  MANAGEMENT  LABOR  Items on which a d i f f e r e n c e was p e r c e i v e d by both l a b o r and management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labor's r i g h t to s t r i k e .  95  93  5. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e management.  79  79  8. Management i s g e n u i n e l y concerned w i t h t h e needs of the worker.  69  79  10. In b a r g a i n i n g d i s p u t e s , l a b o r r a r e l y seems to a p p r e c i a t e the problems f a c i n g management.  74  86  12. The c l o s e d shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way o f communication between management and employees.  95  86  16. Labor i s more l i k e l y to take advantage o f c o n t r a c t l o o p h o l e s than i s management.  58  86  21. The p r o v i n c i a l l a b o r laws f a v o r management.  84  79  98  percentage o f s u b j e c t s who p e r c e i v e a d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n between "Labor" and "Management"  MANAGEMENT  LABOR  11. The union shop p l a c e s u n d e s i r a b l e b a r r i e r s i n the way o f communication between management and employees.  32  64  20. Labor people a r e g e n e r a l l y more s e n s i t i v e to s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than are management people.  53  79  22. The r i g h t t o s t r i k e i s an i n d i s p e n s i b l e p a r t of the l a b o r management r e l a t i o n s h i p .  21  71  24. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e l a b o r .  42  71  68  43  Items on which a d i f f e r e n c e was p e r c e i v e d p r i m a r i l y by l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  Item on which a d i f f e r e n c e was p e r c e i v e d p r i m a r i l y by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker a r e overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who r e p r e s e n t him.  99  APPENDIX E: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "MANAGEMENT" IN GENERAL HOLDS  number and c o r r e s p o n d i n g percentage of subj e c t s who i n d i c a t e d d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n a l and perceived party opinions  3. Government s h o u l d i n no way i n t e r f e r e w i t h l a b o r ' s r i g h t to s t r i k e . 4. In an i n d u s t r y i n t h e "best o f a l l p o s s i b l e worlds" t h e r e would be no need f o r unions. 6. I n n e g o t i a t i n g a s e t t l e ment w i t h t h e o t h e r p a r t y I would l i k e t o be c o m p l e t e l y honest, b u t I am a f r a i d t h a t my honesty would be taken advantage o f . 15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands a r e an e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f the bargaining process. 24. Most s t r i k e s a r e p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e labor.  number o f these subj e a t e who agree w i t h the s t a t e ment  number of these subj e c t s who disagree with the statement  9  47%  8  1  9  47%  0  9  7  37%  2  5  8  42%  4  4  8  42%  2  6  100  APPENDIX F: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH LABOR REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "LABOR" IN GENERAL HOLDS  number and c o r r e s p o n d i n g percentage of subj e c t s who i n d i c a t e d d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n a l and perceived party opinions  2. In c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s management i n t e r p r e t s the goals of labor f a i r l y accurately. 6. I n n e g o t i a t i n g a s e t t l e ment w i t h the other p a r t y I would l i k e t o be completely honest, b u t I am a f r a i d t h a t my honesty would be taken advantage o f . 9. I n c o n t r a c t n e g o t i a t i o n s , one should seek t o a c q u i r e every p o s s i b l e advantage over the o t h e r p a r t y . 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker a r e overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who r e p r e s e n t him.  number of these subj e c t s who agree w i t h the s t a t e ment  number of these subj e c t s who disagree w i t h the statement  7  62%*  5  2  5  36%  3  2  5  36%  1  4  5  36%  3  2  *Only 13 of t h e 14 l a b o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s responded t o t h i s q u e s t i o n n a i r e  item.  101  AiPENDIX G:  1.  t TEST TABLES  RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" AND "LABOR" BY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES  (page 57):  scale  df_  jt  good-bad  18  1.75  trusting-suspicious  18  4.35  strong-weak honest-dishonest trustworthy-untrustworthy  18 18 18  2.52 2.18 3.11  2.  £  <.002  <.05 <.05 <.01  RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" AND "LABOR" BY LABOR REPRESENTATIVES  (page 5 7 ) : scale good-bad trusting-suspicious strong-weak honest-dishonest trustworthy-untrustworthy  3.  df  _t  14 14 14 14 14  2.69 1.31 1.14 3.16 3.48  _p_ <.02 <.01 <.01  RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" BY LABOR REPRESENTATIVES AND RATINGS MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES PREDICTED "MANAGEMENT" WOULD BE GIVEN BY "LABOR"  (page 5 9 ) : scale good-bad trusting-suspicious strong-weak honest-dishonest trustworthy-untrustworthy  df  _t  £  32 32 32 32 32  2.38 1.55 <1.00 1.59 1.88  <.05  102  4.  RATINGS GIVEN "LAP^R" BY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND RATINGS LABOR REPRESENTATIVES PREDICTED "LABOR" WOULD BE GIVEN BY "MANAGEMENT" (page 5 9 ) :  scale good-bad trus ting-suspicious strong-weak honest-dishonest t r u s twor thy-unt rus twor thy  M 32 32 32 32 32  t 3.39 <1.00 <1.00 2.73 2.44  £ <.01  <.01 <.02  103  APPENDIX H: CATEGORIES EMPLOYED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE BARGAINING SESSIONS factual arguments There has been a definite increase i n the costs of d i s t r i b u t i o n pf our product. purposive arguments We'd l i k e to better our p o s i t i o n i n l i f e so that our children and our families can enjoy the things we are working f o r . reference to own p o s i t i o n of strength We've only had one gerbil-maker leave us i n the past year . . . we c e r t a i n l y had no trouble replacing him. 4.  reference to own position of weakness . . . we have had an increase i n our d i s t r i b u t i o n cost of 30% and this has kicked us right i n the rear end . . . we kind of thought we had things going on the road here . . . but . . . this has turned into a revolting development.  5.  reference to other's p o s i t i o n of strength . . . a small increase i n the price of gerbils wouldn't do any harm anywhere . . . there's other manufacturers that want to increase (the price of) their g e r b i l s , and they're only waiting for a leader — and you are a leader i n this industry.  6.  reference to other's position of weakness Really, based on your investment, your p r o f i t s aren't up to 6% on c a p i t a l investment here and this i s n ' t the best s i t u a t i o n possible.  7.  reference to pleasant mutual fate L e t ' s sort of take i t easy and be reasonable about the thing so that we can get a proper p r o f i t picture which i n the f i n a l analysis means everybody's security of employment i s preserved.  8.  reference to unpleasant mutual fate If we did close down . . . i n that week you would lose somewhere around $7,000. We'd c e r t a i n l y lose money too over that week.  104  9.  definite statements We can t e l l you right at the outset that 12% would be right out of the question.  10.  tentative statements W e ' l l back off a l i t t l e . . . we're f l e x i b l e .  11.  demands . . . right now we f e e l that we want a 12% increase across the board.  12.  offers Well, I think we would be prepared to make an offer which would be reasonable under the circumstances of $3.30 an hour.  13.  reference to time cost We've spent half an hour . . . the time i t ' s costing us a l o t of money.  14.  taking us,  it's  refusals A 10c increase i s nothing more than a slap i n the face that point.  15.  blatant  this  threat  If we go out on the bricks then you're l i k e l y to lose . . . we wouldn't go back for less than 30c and we'd increase i t back to the o r i g i n a l figure of 12% (38c) before we went back. Don't forget that. 16.  subtle threats We have been i n business for a getting on into middle age and be quite happy to — liquidate p r o f i t s and l i v e i n reasonable  17.  attacks on the other party's  long time. . . w e ' r e both we could quite easily — the company and take our luxurious conditions.  position  I am just wondering where you get this fantastic p r o f i t figure of $20,000 based on a 12% increase. 18.  attacks on the other party's  good f a i t h  I think you're beating the drum, you're asking for the moon^ and I think you're being quite u n r e a l i s t i c i n terms of the economy of the company.  105  19.  .eference to own Now  20.  p a r t y ' s good  faith  t-re'rc p r e t t y r e a s o n a b l e  aference to o t h e r p a r t y ' s good  people.  faith  You've been r e a s o n a b l e w i t h us throughout agreement. 21.  other pronouns  one  good l a b o r r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s g e r b i l i n d u s t r y  (divisive)  You haven't moved one gone down 3%. 23.  this  u n i f y i n g pronouns We've had of o u r s .  22.  the term of  r e f e r e n c e to  i n c h out of your 10c.  We've a l r e a d y  precedents  L a s t year we came i n on the b a s i s of h o r s e - t r a d i n g •— we've come i n and o f f e r e d low and you've asked h i g h . . . but t h i s year . . . 24.  o f f e r s h e l p or s u g g e s t i o n to ease s e t t l e m e n t A s l i g h t i n c r e a s e i n the p r i c e of them (the company's would more than make up the p r o f i t .  25.  r e q u e s t s d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n from the o t h e r p a r t y What was  26.  product)  the p r o f i t of the company l a s t  year?  r e q u e s t s a t t i t u d e i n f o r m a t i o n from the o t h e r p a r t y Would i t change your t h i n k i n g v e r y much i f you knew what our p r o f i t r e a l l y was l a s t year?  27.  o f f e r s d a t a i n f o r m a t i o n to the o t h e r p a r t y Maybe i t ' s going to be n e c e s s a r y to open the books to you because . . . our a c t u a l p r o f i t s l a s t year were i n the order of 7%.  28.  o f f e r s a t t i t u d e i n f o r m a t i o n to the other p a r t y W e l l . . . i t ' s my f i r m c o n v i c t i o n , and I have always m a i n t a i n e d t h i s , t h a t any i n c r e a s e t h a t the men get they have to earn.  106  29.  shifts  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for decision The men w i l l not agree to hold the status quo and I very much doubt that they w i l l accept anything below $3.40. This i s our problem.  30.  seeks agreement . . . i f you agree that starting at exactly the same place where we are today without increasing the rates w i l l result i n a p r o f i t of $25,000 to the company, then I think we've got a good starting point i n our discussions.  

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