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aboratory study of the labor-management bargaining relationship. 1970

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A LABORATORY STUDY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP by Ronald Lew Douglas B. A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1964 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In the Department of Psychology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OP BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1970 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced deg ree a t t he U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r ee t h a t t he L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Psychology The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a V a n c o u v e r 8, Canada Date A P r i l 6 + h > 1 9 7 0 ABSTRACT The present study i s intended as an alternative to the experimental game approach to the investigation of c o n f l i c t . I t explores a particular real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n - ship, and i s viewed as a t r a n s i t i o n a l step between laboratory experimenta- tion and research i n natural settings. Subjects were 34 male adults, 19 representing "Management" and 15 representing "Labor", a l l with formal bargaining experience i n labor- management negotiations. A t o t a l of ten 3-hour sessions were conducted i n which representatives of both parties participated i n 3- and 4-person groups. The study was designed to provide information concerning ways i n which representatives of each party (1) perceive the labor-management relationship, and ( i i ) approachnnegotiations. Perceptual information was obtained by means of an opinion question- naire which dealt with s p e c i f i c aspects of labor r e l a t i o n s , and semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales. In addition to the descriptive information provided by these to o l s , i t was found that: (1) labor representatives perceived more differences of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" than did management representatives; (2) the personal opinions of management representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" i n general to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives dif f e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Labor" i n general to hold; (3) the personal opinions of labor representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" i n general to hold:, more frequently than the personal opinions of management representatives diff e r e d from the opinions they perceived "Labor" i n general to hold; (4) no differences existed between the labor sample and the management sample i n terms of homogeneity of perception or i n terms of homogeneity of personal opinion. The f i r s t finding i s considered to r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t values placed upon tension and c o n f l i c t by "Labor" and "Management", while the second and t h i r d findings suggest a greater tendency for "Labor" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party l i n e " . An implication of the fourth finding i s that i f exogeneous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the'party l i n e " adopted by "Labor" i s no more w e l l defined for labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s for management representatives. A p o t e n t i a l l y important observation involving misperceptions was the tendency for both labor and management representatives to think the other party perceived them i n a less favorable manner than i t actually did. This i s regarded as one consequence of the roles prescribed for two parties i n a c o n f l i c t relationship. Negotiating information was obtained from a formal analysis of the verbal content of simulated bargaining sessions. The bargaining problem employed i n t h i s study cast management representatives i n the role of business partners and labor representatives as the elected o f f i c i a l s representing employees of the business. The two parties were required to negotiate a wage settlement for the coming year on the basis of a projected wage and p r o f i t analysis adapted from the model of Sawyer's bargaining board. Findings are outlined i n terms of the ways i n which Labor and Management presented the position of their party on the wage issue, questioned the position taken by the other party, and dealt with questions and arguments from the other party. Those aspects of verbal behavior reported Include the relative emphasis given particular bargaining positions, the kinds of arguments presented and degree of determination with which supportive statements were expressed, the types of information exchanged, and the nature of threats and attacks made by each party. In addition to categorizing verbal statements made during "negotiations", emphasis was placed upon the relative frequency with which a particular kind of statement was made by Labor and Management. Implications of the findings of this exploratory study and suggestions for future research are discussed. i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Introduction 1 2. CHAPTER ONE: HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN NATURAL SETTINGS . . . . . 3 A. The Ring-McGuire Debate 3 B. Approaches to N a t u r a l i s t i c Experimentation 5 C. Summary 8 3. CHAPTER TWO: THE LABORATORY STUDY ON INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT . 10 A. Laboratory Game Investigations of C o n f l i c t : Some Problems . 10 B. Labor-Management Negotiations: A Research Viewpoint . . 16 C. Summary 24 4. CHAPTER THREE: METHOD 26 A. Subjects 26 B. Procedure 27 Opinion questionnaire 28 Scales 32 Bargaining task . . . . . 34 C. Summary 43 5. CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 45 A. Perceptions of the Parties i n a Bargaining Relationship 45 Perceived differences of opinion as p o t e n t i a l sources of tension and c o n f l i c t . 51 Perceived party opinions, personal opinions, and the 'party l i n e " 55 i i Page Perceptions and misperceptions 58 Authoritarianism " 63 B. Approaches to Negotiations Employed by the Part ies i n a Bargaining Relationship 65 Party posi t ions . . . . . 68 Arguments and degree of determination 70 Exchange of information 73 Threats and attacks 74 Sh i f t ing of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 76 Chronology of events . 78 Overview 79 6. CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 82 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 87 8. APPENDICES . . . . . . . 91 APPENDIX A: OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE 92 APPENDIX B: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL-TYPE SCALES 94 APPENDIX C: 30-ITEM F-SCALE 95 APPENDIX D: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WERE MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED 97 APPENDIX E: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "MANAGEMENT" IN GENERAL HOLDS . . . 99 APPENDIX F: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH LABOR REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY i i i Page INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "LABOR" IN GENERAL HOLDS 100 APPENDIX G: _t TEST TABLES 101 1. Ratings given "Management" and "Labor" by Management Representatives . . . 101 2. Ratings given "Management" and "Labor" by Labor Representatives . . . . . . . . 101 3. Ratings given "Management" by Labor Representatives and Ratings Management Representatives Predicted "Management" Would be Given by "Labor" 101 4. Ratings given "Labor" by Management Representatives and Ratings Labor Representatives Predicted "Labor" Would be Given by "Management" 102 APPENDIX H: CATEGORIES EMPLOYED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE BARGAINING SESSIONS 103 i v LIST OF TABLES Page 1. Perceptions by the subjects of the opinions of "Management" and "Labor", and the personal opinions of the subjects . 47 2. Number of questionnaire items on which d i f f e r e n t - i a t i o n of opinions occurred i n the responses of the subjects 52 3. Comparison of mean ratings given "Management" and "Labor" by management representatives on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales 60 4. Comparison of mean ratings given "Labor" and "Management" by labor representatives on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales . . . . . 60 5. Comparison of mean ratings given "Labor" by management representatives and mean ratings that labor representatives predict "Labor" would be given by "Management" on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales 62 6. Comparison of mean ratings given "Management" by labor representatives and mean ratings that management representatives predict "Management" would be given by "Labor" on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales 62 7. Summary features of the bargaining sessions 66 V LIST OF FIGURES Page 1. Wage and p r o f i t analysis to be used i n the bargaining task 38 2. Wage and p r o f i t analysis to be used i n the event of a " s t r i k e " or "lock out" 40 3. Scale f o r i n d i c a t i o n of personal s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome of the bargaining session 42 v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would l ike to express my gratitude to Dr. Robert Knox for his invaluable assistance and encouragement i n the undertaking and completion of this study. The helpful criticisms and suggestions of Dr. Demetrios Papageorgis are also gratefully acknowledged. In addition, I would l ike to thank a l l those persons who gave graciously of their time to take part in the study. For the enthusiastic and sincere manner in which they participated I am especially grateful. Particular thanks are due to Mr. C. P. Neale of the Vancouver and Di s t r i c t Labor Council, Mr. E. M. Lawson of the Teamsters, and Mr. R.. Downey and Mr. D. Reid of the Industrial Relations Management Association for their cooperation and assistance in the formative stages of the project. I am indebted as well to Dr. J . T. Montague and the Industrial Relations Institute at the University of Br i t i sh Columbia for f inancial assistance during this undertaking. F ina l ly , I would l ike to express my gratitude to Carole Hilstrom for her expert typing of this thesis, and to fellow students Marc Barnes, for his patient and efficient handling of the content analysis, and Fred Madryga, for his insightful help in editing the f ina l copy. 1 A LABORATORY STUDY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP Social relationships involving a confl ict of interests or goals between two parties have been the subject of considerable research interest in the past decade. Particular attention has been given to a paradoxical kind of situation in which the two parties, each seeming to act in his own best interest, achieve an outcome which is considerably worse than i f each had acted contrary to his interest. The tradit ional laboratory approach to investigating confl ict situations of this nature is characterized by the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma and similar 2-person games. As an analog to confl ict in the real world, the Dilemma is in t r in s i ca l ly attractive since i t incorporates a number of intr icate structural elements of rea l confl ict relationships (e.g. , interdependence, commonality of individual interests, dominance of alternatives) in an ostensibly simple choice behavior situation. However, aside from consistently demonstrating the detrimental nature of conf l ic t , research employing the Prisoner's Dilemma has provided l i t t l e insight into the kinds of processes and mechanisms underlying the develops ment, sustaining, and resolution of conf l ic t . As an alternative to the experimental game approach, this study deals with a particular real-world confl ict s ituation, the labor-management bargaining relationship. The nature of the study reported here is exploratory rather than manipulative, with particular emphasis given to c lar i fying ways in which "Labor" and "Management" perceive the bargaining relationship, and isolating approaches to negotiations adopted by each party. This thesis w i l l be organized into five chapters. The f i r s t chapter includes a review of some c lass ica l natural is t ic research as well as 2 conceptual and empirical evidence relating to the current status of non- laboratory experimentation in social psychology. In the second chapter, some limitations of the traditional game approach to conflict research w i l l be discussed, and a conceptual basis for the present study w i l l be presented. In Chapters Three and Four the study i t s e l f w i l l be reported and discussed. Finally, i n the f i f t h chapter, the results w i l l be reviewed and the major conclusions and implications of the study for future research outlined. 3 CHAPTER ONE: HYPOTHESIS TESTING IN NATURAL SETTINGS A. The Ring-McGulre Debate In a recent exchange of a r t i c l e s , Kenneth Ring and Wil l iam McGuire assessed some of the values and goals of s o c i a l psychology. Ring (1967) examined the extent to which s o c i a l psychologists are current ly guided by a humanistic, act ion-oriented view of the f i e l d . H i s t o r i c a l l y , he a t t r ibutes th i s view to Lewin, who believed i t possible for a d i s c i p l i n e of s o c i a l psychology not only to further the s c i e n t i f i c understanding of man, but also to advance the cause of human welfare at the same time. In concluding that th i s i s no longer a dominant conception of s o c i a l psychology, he argues that present values favor a bas ic , theory-oriented d i s c i p l i n e which i s pervaded by a f r ivo lous "fun-and-games" approach to research. In Ring's opinion these values are to a large extent responsible for a state of i n t e l l e c t u a l disarray i n s o c i a l psychology, and he considers that the long-run effect of a "fun-and-games" research t r a d i t i o n w i l l be detr imental . Expressing concern for the t ra in ing of graduate students, Ring c i t e s two general impl icat ions of a s o c i a l psychology which appears to be mainly a matter of s ty l e rather than substance. On the one hand, he predicts that some students w i l l lose interes t i n a d i s c i p l i n e that i s perceived to be e i ther too t r i v i a l or t i g h t l y experimental. On the other hand, those students who remain should come to share and perpetuate the same fr ivolous values which caused t h e i r colleagues to leave. According to these values a considerable number of good students can be expected to pursue d i s c i p l i n e s other than s o c i a l psychology. For e s sent i a l ly pragmatic reasons then, Ring urges s o c i a l psychologists to take stock of where the f i e l d i s heading and to reconsider the values of an act ion-or iented, or applied approach. 4 Commenting on some of the issues raised by Ring, McGuire (1967) indicated that he too recognizes the widening gap between basic and applied research trends. Although he agrees that these trends have resulted i n an undesirable overemphasis on basic, theory-oriented research, he considers the "fun-and-games" situation to be a much less desperate one than does Ring. Accordingly, McGuire does not deal at length with the fun-and-gamesmen, preferring instead to comment on what he considers are "some impending re- orientations i n social psychology." The main point of disagreement between Ring and McGuire stems from the former's apparent expectation that the separation of the two streams of research and overemphasis on basic research show signs of being continued and even accentuated i n the foreseeable future in social psychology. McGuire argues that social psychology is moving towards a "best of both worlds" solution in which theory-oriented research w i l l be done in natural settings. A number of technological factors and social trends are con- sidered responsible for making this kind of research both feasible and desirable. Among these McGuire sees the availability of sophisticated computer programs for dealing with the kinds of methodological and s t a t i s t i c a l problems that arise in the "dirty" real world, access to "caravan"-type nation wide surveys, the increasing availability of data archives relevant to the social sciences, the current upsurge in concern about social affairs brought about by the Vietnam war, human rights issues, etc., and a government interest in the payoffs associated with sizeable research grants. In addition he cites a number of negative factors associated with prevailing problems of laboratory research. These include the kind of artifacts to which Rosenthal, Orne and others have drawn 5 a t tent ion , and the serious e t h i c a l questions raised by the use of noxious condit ions , deceptive manipulations, invasion of pr ivacy , e tc . While McGuire concludes that redeployment Into the natural environment w i l l be only p a r t i a l , that the bulk of s o c i a l psychological research w i l l remain i n the laboratory, he urges the u t i l i z a t i o n and teaching of techniques designed to take advantage of research p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n natural se t t ings . B. Approaches to N a t u r a l i s t i c Experimentation Although i t i s too early to assess whether or not McGuire's "best of both worlds" pred ic t ion w i l l be r e a l i z e d , there ex i s t i n the s o c i a l psychological l i t e r a t u r e cer ta in h i s t o r i c a l precedents for research i n natura l se t t ings . Such studies appear to have taken one of three d i s t i n c t approaches to the c o l l e c t i o n of data. The f i r s t strategy sees the experi- menter taking advantage of a more or less na tura l ly occurr ing 1 event i n order to tes t pa r t i cu l a r hypotheses or to analyze what i s happening, while the second involves hypothesis-testing i n a commonly occurring "everyday" s i t u a t i o n . In the f i r s t approach, an event takes place having consequences which can be considered s o c i a l psychological , and should the experimenter not have h i s tools of inves t iga t ion ready, he attempts to prepare them, and i f poss ib le , formulate testable hypotheses, since the event i s jus t too appealing to leave academically unexploited. This d i f f e r s from the second approach i n that i n this instance, while the experimenter i s armed with par t i cu la r hypotheses, he i s required to seek out or specify from among a number of na tura l ly occurring events the one which i s an appropriate vehic le for test ing of these hypotheses. In the t h i r d approach, the *An event which the experimenter was i n no way instrumental i n causing to happen. 6 experimenter manipulates a part of the natura l environment i n order to determine the effect of the manipulation on the behavior of h i s subjects (those persons who, i n the natura l course of events, enter the a l tered environment created by the experimenter). The difference between th i s approach and the previous two i s i n terms of the element of environmental contro l which i s introduced into the natura l s i t u a t i o n i n which the hypothesis i s tested. Two c l a s s i c a l examples of the f i r s t approach are C a n t r i l ' s (1940) survey of mass behavior i n the panic s i t u a t i o n re su l t ing from Orson Welles 1 War of the Worlds broadcast, and a study by Festinger et al.(1956) of cognit ive dissonance and s o c i a l support i n a small group ant i c ipa t ing the end of the wor ld . More recent examples of th i s kind of research include studies of b i r t h order effects during the 1965 New York C i t y power f a i l u r e (Zucker et a l . , 1968), communication of emotion fol lowing the assassination of Dr. Mart in Luther King (Sawyer, 1968), as w e l l as the antic ipated reports of research conducted during the much publ ic ized 1969 C a l i f o r n i a earthquake mania. Examples of the second approach 2 can be found i n the dissonance l i t e r a t u r e , among the o r i g i n a l series of experiments conducted by Festinger (1957) involv ing se lec t ive exposure to newspaper advertisements, and i n a recent study by Knox and Inkster (1968). In the l a t t e r experiment the authors compared confidence estimates made by pre- and post-bet subjects at the $2.00 WIN window of a race track. I t i s worth noting that techniques of data c o l l e c t i o n which might be considered the ult imate refinement of th i s approach appear i n a book by Webb et a l . (1966), e n t i t l e d Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research i n the Soc ia l Sciences. 7 i n this instance r e su l t s , consistent with dissonance theory, were obtained without the use of cumbersome, deceptive, and e t h i c a l l y questionable manipulations that often characterize laboratory-bound dissonance research. Other recent examples of th i s approach include two studies generated by Schachter's series of laboratory demonstrations that eating i s motivated by d i f ferent s t i m u l i i n normal and obese i n d i v i d u a l s . Here Goldman et a l . (1968) studied eating behavior i n a var ie ty of non-laboratory s i tuat ions including r e l i g i o u s f a s t ing , i n s t i t u t i o n a l food tolerance, and changing time zone e f fect s , whi le Nisbett and Kanouse (1968) observed the effects of obesity and hunger on supermarket shopping behavior. One of the e a r l i e s t examples of the t h i r d approach i s La P ie re ' s (1934) study of actual d i scr iminat ion and verbal d i s c r imina t ion . The i n - vest igator t rave l led widely i n the United States wi th a Chinese couple, stopping at various sleeping and eating places. He compared the incidence of refusals of service i n these places with rep l ie s to questionnaires sent to the proprietors asking whether they would take "members of the Chinese race as guests i n your establishment." S imilar n a t u r a l i s t i c studies of prejudice have been conducted by Kutner et a l . (1952) and Wax (1948); the former experiment involved v i s i t s by r a c i a l l y mixed groups to restaurants and taverns i n a fashionable New York suburb, while i n the l a t t e r hote l and resort managers received mailed requests for accommodation signed with names suggesting membership i n pa r t i cu l a r ethnic groups. Some of the recent f i e l d experimentation of th i s type has concentrated on what can be termed "helping behavior" . Among these are Feldman's studies (1968a, b) of treatment of foreign and compatriot strangers by members of d i f fe rent geographic populations i n a var ie ty of s o c i a l contexts, studies by Ryan 8 and Test (1967) and Hornstein et a l . (1968) of the influence of social models on helping i n naturalistic situations, as well as Milgram's (1965) lost letter technique. This brief survey is not intended as a review of naturalistic experimentation in social psychology, a purpose for which i t would certainly be inadequate, but rather as an acknowledgment that this kind of experimentation is more than just a recent phenomenon. The classic examples cited above affirm this fact. In addition, the recent experiments included here are examples of research which appears to typify the i n - creasing incidence of studies which provide both the basis and potential validation for McGuire's arguments. C. Summary A cursory review of the Psychological Abstracts for the past decade is sufficient to establish that social psychology i s a theory-oriented and laboratory-based discipline. Recently some social psychologists have questioned the values and goals of such a discipline with Ring i n particular urging his colleagues to devote less attention to basic research and to re- consider the kind of humanistic, action-oriented approach to the f i e l d adopted by Lewin. Commenting on Ring's remarks, McGuire, a proponent of theory-oriented laboratory research, contends that the emphasis on basic research i s waning and that the gap between basic and applied research trends i s l i k e l y to be narrowed in the near future. In addition, McGuire foresees certain reorientations i n social psychology which are likely to f a c i l i t a t e theory-oriented research in natural settings. In this regard there are a number of his t o r i c a l precedents for this kind of research as well as an increasing number of recent experiments designed to take 9 advantage of the natural environment for the testing of hypotheses. The present chapter included a review of Ring's plea against a s t r i c t l y laboratory-based, theory-oriented approach to research, McGuire's contention of impending redeployment into natural settings, and certain h i s t o r i c a l as well as recent examples of hypothesis-testing i n natural settings. In sum, one could argue rather strongly that there currently exists i n social psychology a demand and climate of readiness, as well as h i s t o r i c a l precedence, for naturalistic experimentation. 10 CHAPTER TWO: THE LABORATORY STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT Some of the experiments c i t e d i n . the previous chapter were conducted i n natural sett ings because th i s was the obvious place , i f not the only place, to conduct these experiments. Others were designed to provide a d d i t i o n a l , but not c r i t i c a l , evidence relevant to pa r t i cu l a r theore t i ca l interpretat ions which have already received considerable a t tent ion i n the laboratory. However, very few invest igat ions have exploited the natura l environment as a necessary a l ternat ive to laboratory study. Consequently, cer ta in problems which have hab i tua l ly been studied i n the s o c i a l psycholo- g i c a l laboratory appear destined to remain i n the laboratory even though more meaningful research p o s s i b i l i t i e s could present themselves wi th re- deployment into the r e a l world . One such problem i s the study of s o c i a l negotiations where there exis t s some c o n f l i c t of interes t s or goals between two pa r t i e s , a subject which has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been pursued with the use of gaming and modified gaming techniques. In th i s chapter i t w i l l be argued that the experimental game, i n par t i cu la r the Pr i soner ' s Dilemma game, has not been a f r u i t f u l t o o l for the study of c o n f l i c t i n s o c i a l negotiat ions . An a l ternat ive approach, adopted by the present study as a useful t r a n s i t i o n a l step between the manipulational laboratory experiment and natura l se t t ing research, w i l l be out l ined . A . Laboratory Game Investigations of C o n f l i c t : Some Problems Although the l i t e r a t u r e on experimental games has expanded consider- ably i n recent years, i t remains plagued by two rather general problems. One of these stems from the influence of the o r i g i n a l theory of games which assumes that a person acts r a t i o n a l l y i n order to maximize gain and minimize loss (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944, pp. 8-9). When th i s 11 premise i s considered i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand why the levels pf cooperation found i n most Pr i soner ' s Dilemma studies are as low as they are. The other d i f f i c u l t y involves the fact that ten years of gaming research has provided l i t t l e d e f i n i t i v e ins ight in to r e a l - l i f e c o n f l i c t s and t h e i r r e so lu t ion . Recently both Vinacke (1969) and Gal lo (1968) have addressed themselves to these problems. In a survey of experimental game research Vinacke i so la tes three types of var iables that have t r a d i t i o n a l l y been manipulated: task variables such as matrix en t r i e s , mode of presentation, and number of t r i a l s ; s i t u a t i o n a l variables such as feedback, opportunity for communication, and strategy of opponent; and personal i ty var iables such as family background, psychopathology, and a t t i tudes . In addit ion to c i t i n g a number of methodo- l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n manipulating these var i ab le s , he discusses what he considers to be the theore t i ca l shortcomings of approaches based pr imar i ly on task and s i t u a t i o n a l variables as opposed to approaches based on personal i ty var i ab le s . He contends that neither the assumption i m p l i c i t i n the task and s i t u a t i o n a l approaches, that persons behave i n a wholly r a t i o n a l manner, nor the assumption i m p l i c i t i n the personal i ty approach, that persons are wholly guided by antecedent i n t r i n s i c in te re s t s , i s adequate to account for behavior i n experimental gaming s i t u a t i o n s 3 . As an a l t e r n a t i v e , Vinacke argues for a Lewinian f i e l d theory approach which w i l l enable researchers to look at the in te rac t ion between person and environment In order to ident iy var iables from both direct ions and determine how they 3 While th i s contention may appear t r i v i a l , i t i s necessary since the notion that behavior i s a function of one of these var iables to the exclusion of the others i s inherent i n a majority of gaming reports . 12 are related i n producing behavior. In this regard he states, I t i s grossly a r t i f i c i a l to believe that subjects can be treated as i f they are a l l a l i k e . I t i s equally a r t i f i c i a l to eliminate variations i n the situations where behavior takes place. Thus, emphasis needs to be placed on the interpretation of interactions between the forces that can meaningfully be measured i n both person and s i t u a t i o n . . . . Putting I t another way, suppose that our p r a c t i c a l objective i s to achieve agreements which the parties i n question w i l l both accept. Let us begin with a s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the outcome desired and explore the conditions required to reach i t . This means a process of putting together i n meaningful combinations variables i n a l l three of the classes I have described. The aim i s not to ascertain the l e v e l of cooperation attained under a certain experimental manipulation nor to compare groups of subjects. Rather the aim i s to decide that cooperation (or some other outcome) i s the intended outcome, and then to find out how i t can be achieved. (Vinacke, 1969, pp. 314-315). Gallo, on the other hand, contends that much of the current d i f f i c u l t y with gaming research i s due to the fact that we have thus far not been able to develop a set of conceptual tools that allows us to analyze the nature of c o n f l i c t situations. He notes that, . . .an analysis of the nature of c o n f l i c t situations must begin with a recognition of the fact that there are at least two classes of payoffs at stake i n every c o n f l i c t — t h e tangible payoffs and the intangible or symbolic payoffs. The tangible outcomes hardly need d e f i n i t i o n — t h e y consist of the material resources under consideration, whether i t be expressed i n terms of money, fringe benefits, control of land, etc. The symbolic payoffs, on the other hand, are related to the needs of the c o n f l i c t i n g parties for maintain- ing face, s e l f respect, prestige, honor, status v i s - a - v i s one another and also v i s - a - v i s any th i r d parties that may be observing the c o n f l i c t . (Gallo, 1968, p. 2). In the gaming s i t u a t i o n the outcome depends very much upon whether a subject attempts to achieve a tangible or an intangible payoff. Accordingly, Gallo argues that a r e l a t i v e increase i n the value of the tangible payoffs should expedite c o n f l i c t resolution, while a r e l a t i v e increase i n the value 13 of the symbolic payoffs should decrease the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t resolution. While both Vinacke and Gallo are aware of the kinds of problems that should concern researchers using gaming situations as analogs to r e a l - world c o n f l i c t , the solution that each offers i s less than comforting. Both solutions are, i n their present forms at lea s t , conceptual rather than operational i n nature, although Gallo does c i t e certain experimental evidence i n support of his analysis of the effects of available payoffs. The kinds of manipulations and measurements that can be meaningfully imposed by the f i e l d approach which Vinacke advocates remain to be determined as does the method of scaling the symbolic rewards discussed by Gallo. In addition, should these operational d i f f i c u l t i e s be overcome, the kinds of laboratory situations that Vinacke proposes to structure for the study of c o n f l i c t and c o n f l i c t resolution may have no counterpart i n the r e a l world. S i m i l a r l y , situations In which the r e l a t i v e values of tangible and symbolic payoffs are allowed to vary to an extent necessary to either expedite or f o r e s t a l l c o n f l i c t resolution may be uncommon i n the r e a l world. Other d i f f i c u l t i e s arise i f we consider two approaches to gaming research which these authors have either not dealt with, or at best, have dealt with i n a very cursory manner. Imp l i c i t i n one series of Investigations i s the idea that behavior i n experimental gaming situations i s of interest i n i t s own right and whether or not the s i t u a t i o n or the behavior i s representative of real-world situations or behaviors i s inconsequential. Here attention i s directed toward i s o l a t i n g motives (Messick and Thorngate, 1967; Messick and McClintock, 1968), determining effects of various matrix entries (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), etc. What i s p a r t i c u l a r l y interesting 14 about this research i s the inherent notion that the game situation is i n i t s e l f a unique environment i n which social behavior can be profitably studied. Thus, rather than asking how a subject's behavior i n the game approximates his behavior i n the real world, the experimenter asks how does a subject from the real world behave i n the game. In contrast, research by a second group of investigators is aimed at c lar i fying the relevance of gaming situations to the real world. Since interest here has been focussed on the effects of low motivation and poor understanding by subjects in game experiments, the two most frequently manipulated variables have been the size of payoffs and extensiveness of instructions. A number of researchers have found that as the size of monetary payoffs i s increased, the level of cooperation also increases (Gallo, 1963; Radlow, 1965; McClintock and McNeel, 1966a, b, 1967), and this i s the kind of evidence on which Gallo bases his argument concerning the relationship between tangible payoffs, symbolic payoffs, and cooperative behavior. However, the fact that other researchers find no differences i n levels of cooperation between real and imaginary money conditions1* (Will is and Joseph, 1969; Vinacke, 1966; Wrightsman, 1966), and between high and low money conditions (Knox and Douglas, 1968) suggests that the relationship between tangible and symbolic payoffs i s not as straightforward as Gallo implies. Similar inconsistencies appear among the findings of researchers expressing concern about their subjects' level of comprehension in gaming experiments. Using more expl ic i t instructions than those tradit ional ly employed, both Wrightsman et a l . (1968) and Messe1 and Sawyer (1966) 4 In a recent study by Gumpert et a l . (1969), subjects playing for real dollars were s ignif icantly less cooperative than those playing for imaginary dollars . 15 report increased levels of cooperation, while Knox and Douglas (1968) observed no such increase. It i s not clear, then, just what aspect of the more extensive instructions employed in the former studies mediates the effect on cooperation. Although the evidence cited above i s not the basis of a strong argument that the study of gaming confl ict i s irrelevant to an understand- ing of confl ict in the real world, i t does introduce some uncertainty concerning the generalizabil ity of game behavior. Especially pertinent to this problem of generalizabil ity are the results of the investigation by Knox and Douglas (1968) in which both payoffs and instructions were varied in a simple 2 x 2 factoria l design. These authors found no change in the level of cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma game when the tradit ional penny rewards were replaced by dollar rewards, or when the customary instructions were replaced by more rigorous instructions, or when both of these conditions were introduced together. However, they did observe an ordered increase in variances from the tradit ional instruction-penny payoff condition to the rigorous instruction-dollar payoff condition which was interpreted as true score rather than error variance. A conservative statement concerning the problem of generalizing from gaming to real world behavior follows from this finding: irrespective of what is real ly being assessed when a gaming situation is employed, that assessment w i l l be more rel iable when both motivation and comprehension are at a high l eve l . Because both motivation and comprehension appear to have been at a re lat ively low level in a majority of studies, the tradit ional game situation is probably a poor analog to most real-world confl ict situations. Consequently, now might be an appropriate time to suspend research which 16 employs games to c l a r i f y behavior i n real-world conflict situations, and to deal seriously with the problem of whether or not games can be profitably used as analogs to actual conflict situations. Hopefully then, the current status of gaming research w i l l force a reappraisal of the goals and methods of this kind of research, while at the same time providing the impetus for studies designed to take advantage of natural settings for the study of conflict. The remainder of this chapter w i l l be devoted to outlining a laboratory study viewed by the author as a desirable and appropriate i n i t i a l step to clarifying the nature of real-world conflict and i t s resolution. B. Labor-Management Negotiations: A Research Viewpoint One situation which game theorists frequently cite as a real-world analog to the dilemma posed in the basic gaming situation i s the labor- management bargaining relationship. Although the aptness of this analogy is questionable, this relationship does appear to offer workable research possibilities since most labor disputes gravitate toward tangible resolution within days, weeks, or months. Hence, because solutions do appear, and because these can be achieved within a relatively short time span, the behavioral elements that contribute to solutions should be open to study. In attempting to isolate some of the factors which expedite as well as forestall resblution of labor-management conflict, the situation w i l l be considered from a viewpoint which emphasizes psychological rather than economic factors. In this regard, there appears to be two major contract terms at issue in the bargaining process: these are the wages to be paid to particular employees, and a variety>of additional considerations i n - 17 eluded under the heading of " f r inge benef i t s " . I t i s the author's contention that i n most contract negotiations the settlement wage and a majority of the fr inge benefits are determined by cer ta in economic r e a l i t i e s . These include such factors as the nat ional and regional economic outlook, market pos i t ion of the company i n an industry, wages paid w i t h i n the industry or i n comparable indus t r i e s , changes i n cost of l i v i n g , e t c . , as opposed to psychological factors such as the att i tudes and opinions of the par t ic ipants i n negotiat ions, the unique ways i n which they perceive the i r own goals and the goals of the other party, the kinds of bargaining t ac t i c s each employs, e t c . 5 In terms of th i s in terpre ta t ion then, the present viewpoint can be expressed by the fol lowing postulate: tangible or economic terms of the contract settlement are r e l a t i v e l y invar iab le , , while intangible or psychological factors vary to determine the amount of time required to 5Although i t i s argued here that the same kind of economic r e a l i t i e s that determine wage rates influence to a considerable extent the types of f r inge benefits demanded and conceded, i t should be recognized that ce r t a in fr inge benefits allow a curious mixture of economic and psychological factors to come in to p lay . Consider the number of labor disputes i n which settlement i s fo re s ta l l ed by such issues as the provis ion of an extra meal for loggers on early morning sh i f t s (Port A l b e r n i , B r i t i s h Columbia, Internat ional Woodworkers of America, 1969), provis ion of transportat ion for mailmen to posta l s tat ions for lunch breaks (Letter C a r r i e r s ' Union of Canada, 1968), e tc . In addit ion to the i r economic value, these kinds of issues appear to have a d e f i n i t e psychological value i n the sense of extract ion or denia l of "moral" v i c t o r i e s . Thus, i t could be argued that on some points the actual economic terms of the contract are influenced by psychological f ac tors . However, since i t i s f e l t that th i s par t i cu la r kind of f r inge benefit contributes i n a very minor way to the economic terms of the contract , and due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s inherent i n operat ional iz ing the ro le of any fr inge benefits i n a formal experiment, the present study w i l l deal both t h e o r e t i c a l l y and empir ica l ly with the process of wage settlement exclusive of f r inge benef i t s . 18 reach the present settlement and the climate of the subsequent working and bargaining relationship. More specifically, i t is contended that i n many contract negotiations, both "Labor" and "Management"6 can estimate f a i r l y accurately just what the settlement wage and most attendant fringe benefits w i l l be prior to the opening round of negotiations. This estimate is determined by economic realities and is subject to very l i t t l e revision during the course of the negotiations. What remains to be determined i s not the actual wage, but rather how long i t w i l l take the two parties to agree upon this wage and the costs that w i l l be invoked by the expenditure of this time. These factors in turn w i l l influence the level of satisfaction which the parties derive from the negotiations which w i l l in large part determine the climate of their future relationship. Thus, while conflict resolution inevitably appears at the contract level, the extent to which i t i s present on a psychological level would appear to depend very much upon such factors as attitudes, opinions, need§, and tactics of the parties concerned. This is a strong statement of this particular position and as such i t may appear that the contribution of economic determinants of conflict resolution has been greatly underestimated. This is not an impression that the author has deliberately attempted to create. The intent i s simply to emphasize the important role of psychological factors in the resolution of a particular kind of conflict. These factors are 6I n order to f a c i l i t a t e the distinction between general and specific references to these two parties, the following convention i s adopted in this paper: when referring to labor and management in general, the referents "Labor" and "Management" are used; when referring to those particular subjects who participated in the present study, the referents used are Labor and Management (not quotated), or labor representatives and management representatives. 19 considered important because they are free to vary to an extent that economic factors are not, and in so doing innumerable possibilities for in i t i a t i n g , sustaining, and resolving conflict are created. Because viable techniques for the laboratory study of the kind of conflict referred to here have not yet been developed, research i n the real world becomes a necessary alternative to traditional laboratory investi- gation. However, the present lack of understanding of conflict and i t s resolution i n general, as well as an unfamiliarity with social psychological aspects of the labor-management relationship in particular, suggest than an i n i t i a l transitional step between the laboratory and natural setting is appropriate. The approach taken by the present study is to observe persons who are involved in actual real-world conflicts in a laboratory setting. An attempt w i l l be made to acquire information concerning a specific real- world conflict situation and the protagonists by requesting the presence of experienced labor and management negotiators in a laboratory/'study". The major purpose is to obtain information of a descriptive nature concern- ing the labor-management relationship and to generate hypotheses pertinent to conflict resolution for subsequent testing in both the laboratory and natural setting. At the same time certain formal hypotheses pertaining to the labor-management relationship can be tested. The study i t s e l f involves 3-hour sessions in which both labor and management representatives complete questionnaires and interact In small bargaining units. The data collected are intended to provide answers, or at least partial answers, to the following kinds of questions about "Labor" and "Management" as distinct parties i n a bargaining relationship: (i) What are the attitudes, opinions, bargaining goals, intentions, 20 and positions that a labor or management representative perceives his own party to hold? ( i i ) What are the attitudes . . . etc., that a labor or management representative perceives the other party to hold? ( i i i ) What are the attitudes . . . etc., that a labor or management representative personally holds? (iv) How accurate are labor and management representatives in assessing the attitudes . . . etc., held by particular other participants in the bargaining relationship? (v) What are some of the particular issues of agreement and disagreement between the parties as perceived by representatives of those parties? (vi) How do labor and management representatives think their own party is perceived by members of the other party? (vii) What kinds of bargaining tactics are employed by each party? In addition to obtaining this kind of descriptive information, five hypotheses w i l l be tested. These hypotheses and attendant logic w i l l now be presented. In the recent history of labor-management relationships, "Manage- ment" i n general seems to have shown a greater concern than "Labor" for alleviating states of tension and conflict between the two parties. On the other hand, "Labor" i n general seems to have shown a greater concern for maintaining these states, at least at some l e v e l . 7 These actions are 7This observation appears particularly valid with respect to labor relations 21 not surprising i n that tension and conflict are lik e l y to endanger production, and in so doing provide a basis of bargaining power for "Labor", whether or not a party i s able to deal with these states i s unimportant with regard to the hypothesis presented here. What is important i s the observation that the behavior of "Labor" suggests that they view tension and conflict as states which are potentially beneficial to the attainment of their goals, whereas the behavior of "Management" suggests that they view tension and conflict as states which are potentially detrimental to the attainment of their goals. Because differences, actual or perceived, between two parties provide a basis for tension and conflict, i t i s hypothesized that "Labor" w i l l prefer to emphasize areas of dis- agreement between "Labor" and "Management", while "Management" w i l l prefer to emphasize areas of agreement between "Labor" and "Management". More specifically, i t is hypothesized (1) that issues on which the two parties are perceived to hold differing opinions, attitudes, or positions w i l l be seen more frequently by labor representatives. Conversely, issues on in the province of British Columbia. For example, legislation, the ultimate goal of which i s to calm troubled labor relations, is vehemently opposed by "Labor", post settlement statements of a "we won" nature have become standard comments of union representatives, and formal committees and groups actively opposed to the Vietnam war, poverty, tenant exploitation, e t c . — conditions which "Management" can be perceived to play a leading role in perpetuating—are traditionally sponsored and supported by labor a f f i l i a t e s . On the other hand, labor legislation receives either scant or approving comment from "Management". Post settlement "no comments" or statements of satisfaction with the equitable outcome of negotiations are frequently made by management representatives, and formal associations and clubs whose goals include improvement of employer-employee relations (i.e., industrial relations associations, staff relations departments, public relations departments, etc.) are most commonly formed by "ManagementV. 22 which the two parties are perceived to share a common opinion, attitude, or position w i l l be seen more frequently by management representatives. 8 Three additional predictions follow from the f i r s t hypothesis. The extent to which organized "Labor" i s successful i n maintaining at least some level of tension and confl ict w i l l depend upon a capacity for perpetuating among individual representations perceptions of differing opinions between "Labor" and "Management". In this regard one important tactic often employed by "Labor" involves an attempt to present to "Management" the image of a united labor front which is i n support of their demands. This tactic does not appear to have gained the same degree of prominence on the part of "Management", l ike ly due both to a lack of necessity for adopting such a tactic as well as to the organizational diversity of managements relative to "Labor". For both functional and structural reasons then, i t can be argued that the inculcation and presentation of a "party l ine " is a more salient tactic for "Labor" than i t i s for "Management". Consequently, i t i s hypothesized (2) that the personal opinions of management representatives w i l l differ from the opinions they perceive their own party to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives w i l l differ from the opinions they perceive their own party to hold. In addition i t i s hypothesized (3) that labor representatives w i l l see more issues on which their personal opinions differ from the opinions they perceive the other party to hold than w i l l management representatives. This third hypothesis resembles 8For purposes of brevity, in subsequent references to the "opinions, attitudes, or positions" of a party, only the term "opinions" w i l l be used. 23 the f i r s t hypothesis except that here perception of the opinion held by one's own party i s replaced by one's own personal opinion. Finally, i t is hypothesized (4) that labor representatives w i l l be more homogeneous in the perception of their own party's opinions, i n the perception of the other party's opinions, and in their own personal opinions, than management representatives w i l l be. In the course of contract negotiations both "Labor" and "Management" have prescribed roles which they are expected to assume. Inherent in these roles i s the adoption of particular attitudes and tactics with respect to the other party, which include one-sided statements of positions, un- re a l i s t i c opening offers and demands, threats, etc. One effect of this i s to create an impression of h o s t i l i t y which i s sometimes more a matter of show than actual inclination. Consequently, i t is hypothesized (5) that both parties w i l l exhibit a tendency to think that the other party perceives them in a less favorable manner than i t actually does. While these hypotheses w i l l be defined in operational terms i n the following chapter, some additional comments on the predictions made by the f i r s t four hypotheses appear warranted at this point. The prediction made by the f i r s t hypothesis, that issues on which the two parties are perceived to hold differing opinions w i l l be seen more frequently by labor representatives than by management representatives, i s based upon a behavioral observation which suggests that "Labor" and "Management" value tension and conflict quite differently. Inherent in this prediction is the idea that the nature of the bargaining relationship predisposes the two parties to perceive relevant issues i n somewhat different ways. Similarly, the nature of the bargaining relationship should predispose 24 the two p a r t i e s to adopt, to some extent at l e a s t , somewhat d i f f e r e n t t a c t i c s to a t t a i n t h e i r goals. If what we have termed the "party l i n e " strategy i s a more important t a c t i c f o r "Labor" than for "Management" then the predictions made by the second, t h i r d , and fourth hypotheses should follow from the f i r s t hypothesis. If labor representatives see more issues on which the two p a r t i e s are perceived to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions, and i f the "party l i n e " strategy i s a more important t a c t i c f o r "Labor", then labor representatives' should, to a greater extent than management representatives, hold personal opinions l i k e those they perceive t h e i r own party to hold (second hypothesis), hold personal opinions that d i f f e r from the opinions that they perceive the other party to hold ( t h i r d hypothesis), and be a l i k e i n t h e i r perception of the opinions held by t h e i r own party, the opinions held by the other party, and i n t h e i r personal opinions (fourth hypothesis). C. Summary In the present chapter i t has been argued that research based upon the t r a d i t i o n a l laboratory gaming paradigm has not provided s u f f i c i e n t i n - sight into r e a l - l i f e c o n f l i c t s and t h e i r r e s o l u t i o n to j u s t i f y the continued use of games as a means to t h i s end. Arguments by two prominent game researchers f o r the continued use of gaming techniques w i t h i n new conceptual frameworks, one focussing on the p o t e n t i a l i n t e r a c t i o n between a broad range of independent variables and the other on a unique conception of the payoff structure inherent i n game s i t u a t i o n s , were reviev/ed. It was concluded that while both Vinacke and Gallo are aware of the problems that currently plague gaming research, the s o l u t i o n that each o f f e r s i s inadequate. Consequently, i t was suggested that now i s an appropriate time to suspend 25 that research which employs games to c l a r i f y behavior i n real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s , and to deal with the problem of whether or not games can be p r o f i t a b l y used as analogs to act u a l c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s . If they can be so employed, then the modifications that must be made to the t r a d i t i o n a l approach w i l l have to be e x p l i c i t l y defined. The remainder of the chapter was devoted to o u t l i n i n g a laboratory study which i s considered to be an appropriate i n i t i a l step to c l a r i f y i n g the nature of c o n f l i c t and i t s r e s o l u t i o n i n the r e a l world. This involves observing i n the laboratory persons who are ac t i v e i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e a l - world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p , an approach which i s viewed as a necessary i n i t i a l step i n bridging the gap between the laboratory and natural s e t t i n g as research environments. The major objectives include the obtaining of information of a d e s c r i p t i v e nature concerning the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p and the generation of hypotheses pertinent to c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n f o r subsequent t e s t i n g i n both the laboratory and natural s e t t i n g . In addition, f i v e hypotheses dealing with perceptual aspects of the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p were presented. 26 CHAPTER THREE: METHOD The present study was not one i n which variables were manipulated across conditions, but rather was intended as a v e h i c l e for c o l l e c t i n g d e s c r i p t i v e information concerning s o c i a l psychological aspects of the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . The primary objective was to c o l l e c t as much pertinent data as possible during a short period of time and f o r t h i s reason the procedure tends to be somewhat segmented among three kinds of tasks. These tasks included questionnaires and r a t i n g scales dealing with personal opinions as w e l l as perception of the opinions of others, a Prisoner's Dilemma-type game9, and a simulated bargaining problem. In this chapter the structure of the groups and sequence of events w i l l be outlined, and descriptions of the tasks and t h e i r mode of administration given. In addition, the hypotheses w i l l be defined i n operational terms. A. Subjects Subjects were 34 male adults with formal bargaining experience i n labor-management negotiations i n the greater Vancouver b u s i n e s s - i n d u s t r i a l area. Nineteen of the subjects were management representatives from personnel and labor r e l a t i o n s departments of such i n d u s t r i e s and services as Weldwood of Canada, Gulf O i l , B r i t i s h Columbia Hydro and Power 9 A Prisoner's Dilemma-type game with postage stamp payoffs was employed i n the present study. Due to d i f f i c u l t i e s i n simultaneous scheduling of two labor and two management representatives i n some experimental sessions, subjects could not be run i n a l l of the conditions o r i g i n a l l y planned; i n addition, many subjects indicated only a cursory understanding of the mechanics of choice and payoff contingencies. Since these two factors precluded any meaningful treatment of the data, t h i s part of the experiment was excluded from subsequent analysis and the Prisoner's Dilemma game w i l l not be discussed in. t h i s report. 27 Authority, and Vancouver C i t y H a l l . The remaining subjects were representatives of various union l o c a l s and councils which included the Teamsters, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Let t e r C a r r i e r s ' Union of Canada, Vancouver and D i s t r i c t Labor Council, and so on. B. Procedure I t was i n i t i a l l y proposed that ten sessions be conducted, with two management representatives and two labor representatives p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n each session. Due to d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the simultaneous scheduling of four subjects who also had negotiations to conduct and other commitments i n the r e a l world, these ten sessions were comprised of four sessions i n which two labor and two management representatives p a r t i c i p a t e d , f i v e sessions i n which one labor and two management representatives p a r t i c i p a t e d , and one session i n which two labor and one management representative p a r t i c i p a t e d . In order to standardize conditions, and as a courtesy to the subjects, the following r e s t r i c t i o n s were placed on the structure of the g r o ups 1 0: (i) Management representatives from the same company or industry did not appear together i n any one session. ( i i ) Labor representatives from the same union or industry did not appear together i n any one session. ( i i i ) Representatives from s p e c i f i c industry and labor that were known to have been i n the past, or were considered l i k e l y to be i n 1 0 I t was f e l t that subjects would be more candid and at ease knowing that t h e i r behavior was not being observed by immediate superiors, close colleagues, or p a r t i c u l a r bargaining "adversaries". At the same time, adherence to these contingencies introduced a greater degree of homogeneity among the groups. 28 the near future, involved i n contract negotiations with each other, did not appear together i n any one session. At the beginning of each session the subjects were seated around a c e n t r a l table i n a 15 by 30 foot room and introduced to each other, given a b r i e f v e r b a l o u t l i n e of the kinds of tasks upon which they would be working during the session, and assured that the data would not be attached to i n d i v i d u a l s by name, but rather to "Labor" and "Management" as groups. In addition, each subject was given a l a p e l tag with h i s name and a coded designation, Ll_ and L_2 f o r labor representatives, Ml_ and M2 f o r management representatives. A session lasted approximately three hours and the sequence of events was as follows: 1. f i r s t administration of the Opinion Questionnaire 2. administration of Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales 3. administration of the F-scale 4. Prisoner's Dilemma game 5. bargaining session 6. administration of a s a t i s f a c t i o n with settlement scale 7. second administration of the Opinion Questionnaire. Opinion Questionnaire: The Opinion Questionnaire (Appendix A) consisted of 25 statements concerning labor r e l a t i o n s with which a subject might agree or disagree. Twenty-one of these statements referred to labor r e l a t i o n s i n general. A few examples of these items are: "In contract negotiations, one should seek to acquire every possible advantage over the other party."; " U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands are an e s s e n t i a l part of the bargaining process."; "Persons who think a state of mutual t r u s t can be established between labor and management are being 29 u n r e a l i s t i c " . The remaining four items were s p e c i f i c to labor r e l a t i o n s i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia 1 1. Examples of these items include: "I think that a frank interchange of ideas between l o c a l labor leaders and top management personnel could a l l e v i a t e much of the tension that exists i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today."; "The p r o v i n c i a l labor laws favor management.". Following the experimenter's introductory remarks, the subjects were seated at i n d i v i d u a l tables i n the room and were given the f i r s t administra- t i o n of the Opinion Questionnaire. They were informed by the experimenter that each of the questionnaire items was a statement of opinion about a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of labor r e l a t i o n s , and a subject was required to make two judgments on each of these items. He was asked to in d i c a t e whether he thought "Labor" ( i n general) i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia would tend to agree or disagree with the statement, and whether he thought "Management" ( i n general) i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia would tend to agree or disagree with the statement. Indications were made by placing an L_, for "Labor", and an M, f o r "Management", i n eit h e r the column headed AGREE or i n the column headed DISAGREE. In operational terms the f i r s t hypothesis predicts that items on which "Labor" and "Management" are perceived to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses of labor ^ D u r i n g the period i n which data were c o l l e c t e d , two o f f i c e r s of the United Fishermen and A l l i e d Worker's Union were released from prison a f t e r ^serving portions of sentences imposed f or defying an i n j u n c t i o n . As a r e s u l t , questionnaire item no. 7, which read, "Those o f f i c i a l s of the Fishermen and A l l i e d Worker's Union now serving prison terms should be released immediately.", was eliminated from the an a l y s i s . Subsequent analysis of the questionnaire responses was based on the remaining 24 items. 30 representatives (conversely, items on which "Labor" and "Management" are perceived to share the same opinion w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses of management representatives). In other words, i t was predicted that labor representatives would i n d i c a t e more statements on which one party was perceived to agr'e and the other perceived to disagree than would management representatives. (Conversely, management representatives would i n d i c a t e more statements with which the two pa r t i e s were perceived to either both agree or both disagree than would labor representatives.) Consider the item, "Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker are overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who represent him." A labor representative might be expected to perceive "Labor" as disagreeing and "Management" as agreeing with t h i s statement, while a management representa- t i v e might be expected to perceive "Labor" and "Management" as both agreeing (or both disagreeing) with the statement. While t h i s can be considered as an example of the kind of p r e d i c t i o n that i s made by the f i r s t hypothesis, i t should be noted that predictions are not made with reference to p a r t i c u l a r items. Instead, i t i s predicted that there w i l l e x i s t a tendency f o r labor and management representatives to perceive the opinions of the two parties i n d i f f e r e n t ways over a l l of the items. S p e c i f i c a l l y , labor representatives should perceive more differences of opinion between the two parties than should management representatives. At the end of the session, following the bargaining task, subjects completed the second administration of the Opinion Questionnaire. They were informed by the experimenter that these were the same items on which they had made judgments at the beginning of the session, but that on t h i s administration the procedure would be d i f f e r e n t . A subject was instructed 31 to make four judgments (three judgments i f only three subjects were present i n the group) on each item. He was asked to i n d i c a t e whether he personally agreed or disagreed with each statement, and to indic a t e how he thought each of the other subjects would respond to the items. Indications were made by placing an f o r s e l f i n either the column headed AGREE or i n the column headed DISAGREE. Indications of how a subject thought the others would respond were made with an M or an L for one's colleague, and an Ml_ and M2, or L_l and L2 for representatives of the other party. The second and t h i r d hypotheses require comparisons between the subjects' responses on the i n i t i a l administration and t h i s f i n a l administra- t i o n of the questionnaire. In operational terms the second hypothesis predicts that items on which one's personal opinion (indicated on the f i n a l administration of the questionnaire) d i f f e r s from the opinion that one perceives h i s own party to hold (indicated on the i n i t i a l administration of the questionnaire) w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses of management representatives than i n the responses of labor representatives. (Conversely, items on which one's personal opinion i s the same as the opinion that one perceives h i s own party to hold w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses of labor representatives than i n the responses of manage- ment representatives.) In operational terms the t h i r d hypothesis predicts that items on which one's personal opinion d i f f e r s from the opinion that one perceives the other party to hold (indicated on the i n i t i a l administration of the questionnaire) w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses 32 of labor representatives than i n the responses of management representatives. (Conversely, items on which one's personal opinion i s the same as the opinion that one perceives the other party to hold w i l l appear s i g n i f i c a n t l y more frequently i n the responses of management representatives than i n the responses of labor representatives.) The fourth hypothesis makes three p r e d i c t i o n s . In operational terms these are: (a) over a l l questionnaire items, the percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of "Labor's" opinions w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than the percentage of management representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of "Management's" opinions; (b) over a l l questionnaire items, the percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of "Management's" opinions w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than the percentage of management representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common perception of "Labor's" opinions; and, (c) over a l l questionnaire items, the percentage of labor representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common personal opinion w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater than the percentage of management representatives i n d i c a t i n g a common personal opinion. In other words, both homogeneity of perception and homogeneity of opinion by labor repre- sentatives w i l l be greater than by management r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s 1 2 . Scales: One 7-point r a t i n g scale (Appendix B) required semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e ratings on the following s i x dimensions: good-bad, trusting-suspicious, strong-weak, honest-dishonest, trustworthy- 1 2Although 15 labor representatives took part i n the study, one subject a r r i v e d too l a t e to p a r t i c i p a t e i n that part of the session which involved the c o l l e c t i o n of perceptual data. For th i s reason the labor n i s 14 here rather than 15. 33 untrustworthy, cooperative-competitive 1 6. This scale was administered three times i n succession, and the experimenter read the following i n s t r u c t i o n s to the subjects on these administrations: f i r s t administration The two labor people have a sheet with "Labor" printed at the top and the two management people have exactly the same sheet except that "Management" i s printed at the top. You labor people are to consider the term "Labor", whatever that means to you. Is "Labor" bad or i s i t good? If i t i s extremely bad put a t i c k mark at -3 of the top scale. If i t i s extremely good, put a t i c k mark at +3. If i t i s neu t r a l , put a t i c k mark at zero. I f "Labor" i s better than n e u t r a l , but not extremely good, your t i c k mark should go somewhere between zero and +3 at a point that r e f l e c t s j u s t how good you think "Labor" i s . You management people do the same thing f o r the concept of "Management". Extremely bad, t i c k at -3, extremely good, t i c k at +3. Or place your t i c k somewhere i n between. Follow the same procedure f o r each of the separate s c a l e s . Labor people rate "Labor" on the "t r u s t i n g - s u s p i c i o u s " scale, "strong-weak" scale and so on. Management people rate "Manage- ment". second administration Now Labor has a form with "Management" at the top and Management has a form with "Labor" at the top. You ( i n d i c a t i n g Labor) rate "Management" on a l l of these scales, and you ( i n d i c a t i n g Management) rate "Labor". t h i r d administration Now Labor has a "Labor" sheet again and Management has a "Management" sheet. This time Labor, you in d i c a t e how you think "Labor" would be rated by "Management" and "Management" you i n d i c a t e how you think "Management" would be rated by "Labor". The f i f t h hypothesis requires comparisons between the subjects' responses on the second and t h i r d administrations of these sc a l e s . In operational terms the f i f t h hypothesis predicts that on the three evaluative dimensions, "good-bad", "trustworthy-untrustworthy", Because a large number of subjects expressed concern that the terms "cooperative" and "competitive" are not polar opposites, i n the same sense as the other f i v e dimensions, t h i s dimension was eliminated from the a n a l y s i s . Subsequent analysis of responses on th i s scale was based on the remaining f i v e dimensions. 34 "honest-dishonest", the ratings indicated by representatives of a party on the t h i r d administration of these scales w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower than the ratings given by representatives of the other party on the second administration. In other words, when asked how they think "Labor" would be rated by "Management" (on the t h i r d administration), labor representa- tives w i l l tend to i n d i c a t e a lower r a t i n g (less p o s i t i v e , or more negative) than they are a c t u a l l y given by "Management" as represented i n the present study (on the second administration). S i m i l a r l y , management representatives w i l l tend to expect lower ratings than they are a c t u a l l y given by "Labor" as represented i n the present study. A tendency i s predicted then, for each party to think that the other perceives them as les s "good", les s "trustworthy", and l e s s "honest", than i t a c t u a l l y does. A second r a t i n g scale was the 30-item F-scale (Appendix C) adopted from Adorno et a l . (1950), This scale was administered following completion of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales. Standardized i n s t r u c t i o n s were provided with the s c a l e . The F-scale was employed i n order to provide some a d d i t i o n a l information about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between authoritarianism and l e v e l of cooperation i n the Prisoner's Dilemma (using a sequential- play s i t u a t i o n . Deutsch (1960) has shown that subjects who made choices r e f l e c t i n g t r u s t and trustworthiness had low F-scores, whereas subjects who made choices r e f l e c t i n g suspicion and untrustworthiness had high F- scores). Because the r e s u l t s of the Prisoner's Dilemma game had to be excluded from the present a n a l y s i s , t h i s s p e c i f i c purpose was not achieved. However, the data derived from the F-scale are included i n the report. Bargaining task; The management representatives and labor representatives were seated at two separate tables and were instructed 35 by the experimenter that they would negotiate as two-person teams, a management team and a labor team, to a r r i v e at a wage settlement i n a simulated bargaining s i t u a t i o n . Each team was given four typewritten pages of information describing the present and projected p r o f i t p i c t ure of a f i c t i t i o u s small business enterprise as w e l l as the wages and take- home pay of employees at various possible wage rates. An o u t l i n e of the bargaining " r u l e s " was also included. Here management representatives were depicted as partners i n the business, and the labor representatives were depicted as the elected o f f i c i a l s representing ten employees of the business. The information a v a i l a b l e to the management team and the labor team was i d e n t i c a l but f o r two exceptions: (1) Management's information included the exact p r o f i t figures f o r past years while Labor had estimates of the range within which p r o f i t s f e l l during the previous year, and (2) Management received information specifying a projected raw material cost about which Labor had no information. The f a c t that Management had these two a d d i t i o n a l pieces of Information was made known to both teams. The complete set of information given subjects for t h i s task i s presented below: You are a partner i n a small independent company with assets of $500,000. You employ 10 g e r b i l makers. Over the past years your p r o f i t s from the sale of g e r b i l s , a f t e r payment of a l l operating expenses, including the s a l a r i e s of both you and your .partner, have been as follows: $35,000 -1967 $25,000 -yearly average for the period 1964-1966 $20,000 -yearly average f o r the period 1961-1963 (the only information that Labor possesses concerning your p r o f i t s i s an estimate that the 1967 p r o f i t was somewhere i n the range of $30,000-$50,000) 36 (This i s the i n i t i a l information given to the management team and thi s i s the only part which d i f f e r s from the information given the labor team. The corresponding information given Labor was as follows: "You are the c e r t i f i e d representatives of 10 g e r b i l makers employed by a small independent company. The assets of t h i s company amount to $500,000. A f t e r payment of a l l operating expenses, including management s a l a r i e s , the p r o f i t made by t h i s company from the sale of g e r b i l s i n 1967 was i n the range of $30,000-$50,000 (the exact f i g u r e and yearly averages f or the periods 1961-1963 and 1964-1966 are known only to Management)." The r e s t of the information presented here was given to both the labor team and the management team.) Each employee i s paid the same hourly wage which i s renegotiated at the end of each year. Although the negotiated wage has tended to r i s e over the years, wages have not increased each and every year, and on some occasions they have a c t u a l l y decreased. Both you and the labor (management) representatives have access to an independent analysis which reveals the p r o f i t s that can be expected at various possible hourly wage rates f o r the coming year (for example, a p r o f i t of $52,500 can be expected i f the renegotiated hourly wage i s $2.10. The gross earnings f o r the coming year at t h i s wage would be $4,368 f o r each g e r b i l maker.). The current wage i s $3.20 per hour and the task facing both you and the labor (management) representatives i s to renegotiate the hourly wage rate f o r the coming year. Both Labor and Management w i l l be allowed to discuss the problem with t h e i r associate f o r 10 minutes p r i o r to negotiation. Both p a r t i e s w i l l then be c a l l e d to the bargaining table and a timer w i l l be s t a r t e d . Negotiations w i l l cost Management $50 per minute, to be subtracted from the expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year at the settlement wage (for example, i f a settlement of $3.00 per hour i s reached a f t e r 30 minutes of negotiating, 30 x $50 = $1500 w i l l be subtracted from Management's expected p r o f i t f o r the coming year at that wage. This would leave Management with an expected p r o f i t of $30,000 - $1500 = $28,500. S i m i l a r l y , 30 x $50 = $1500 w i l l be subtracted from an employee's fund which has the e f f e c t of reducing each of the 10 employees' wages by $150 over the year and bringing earnings to $6090 ($6240 - $150 = $6090). This would amount to $150 from each of the 10 employees' wages, leaving each employee with a gross earning of $6240 - $150 = $6090). Should no settlement be reached a f t e r 50 minutes, the cost of negotiations w i l l increase to $100 per minute. Note: If Management finds the i n i t i a l negotiations unsatisfactory they may choose to lock t h e i r employees out. S i m i l a r l y , should Labor f i n d the i n i t i a l negotiations unsatisfactory they may choose to s t r i k e . In ei t h e r case, i f a de c i s i o n i s made to lock out or to s t r i k e , the o r i g i n a l analysis of expected p r o f i t s at various possible hourly wage rates w i l l be replaced by a new one. Sub- sequent negotiations w i l l be based on th i s new a n a l y s i s : here, 37 both the yearly earnings and the expected p r o f i t for the coming year associated with each possible hourly wage w i l l be less than they were i n the o r i g i n a l analysis. Should a s t r i k e or a lockout occur, both Labor and Management w i l l be allowed to adjourn from the bargaining table to discuss the new analysis with their associate. At th i s point the timer w i l l be stopped and restarted only when both parties have returned to the bargaining table. The current wage as stated i n the instructions was $3.20 per hour and the task facing the subjects was to renegotiate the hourly wage for the coming year. Economic considerations i n these negotiations were based on a wage and p r o f i t analysis which consisted e s s e n t i a l l y of a concrete version of Sawyer's bargaining board (Morgan and Sawyer, 1967). This analysis i s shown i n Figure 1. By giving s p e c i f i c examples subjects were shown how to interpret this wage and p r o f i t analysis. For example, the stated current wage of $3.20 per hour appears i n row L, about half way down the column of figures on the l e f t . By looking across this row i t can be seen that a worker's gross earnings for the coming year at that wage would be $6656, while Management's expected p r o f i t for the coming year at that wage would be $25,000. In the same manner a worker's gross earnings and Management's expected p r o f i t for the coming year can be derived from each of the possible settlement wage rates which range from $2.10 per hour to $4.60 per hour. Each ten cent increment i n hourly wage increases a worker's gross earnings for the coming year by $208, while reducing Management's expected p r o f i t by $2500. Consequently a ten cent raise i n the existing rate of pay from $3.20 per hour to $3.30 per hour would have the effect of increasing gross earnings from $6656 to $6864, while reducing expected p r o f i t from $25,000 to $22,500. B r i e f l y reviewing the structure of this bargaining task, each team was allowed up to 20 minutes to discuss bargaining strategies and during 38 hourly wage and gross earnings for coming year expected p r o f i t at that wage f o r coming year 2.10 4368 A 52500 2.20 4576 B 50000 2.30 4784 C 47500 2.40 4992 D 45000 2.50 5200 E 42500 2.60 5408 F 40000 2.70 5616 G 37500 2.80 5824 H 35000 2.90 6032 I 32500 3.00 6240 J 30000 3.10 6448 K 27500 3.20 6656 L 25000 3.30 6864 M 22500 3.40 7072 N 20000 3.50 7280 0 17500 3.60 7488 P 15000 3.70 7696 Q 12500 3.80 7904 R 10000 3.90 8112 S 7500 4.00 8320 T 5000 4.10 8528 U 2500 4.20 8736 V 0 4.30 8944 W -2500 4.40 9152 X -5000 4.50 9360 Y -7500 4.60 9568 Z -10000 Figure 1. Wage and p r o f i t a n alysis to be used i n the bargaining task. 39 t h i s time one team was permitted to use a separate room so as not to be overheard by the team remaining i n the experimental room. Subjects were then c a l l e d to a c e n t r a l bargaining table i n the experimental room, with the labor team seated on one side of the table and the management team on the other, a timer which was v i s i b l e to the p a r t i c i p a n t s was started, and "negotiations" began. This part of the session proceeded u n t i l either a settlement wage was agreed upon by both teams, or one team indicated that they considered a stalemate to have been reached. A "time c o n s t r a i n t " was introduced to simulate the costs of protracted negotiations i n the r e a l world and as an incentive f o r the subjects to keep t h i s part of the session moving at a r a p i d pace. This involved an imaginary $50.00 per minute cost, to be deducted from Management's p r o f i t and Labor's gross earnings at the eventual settlement wage l e v e l . Subjects were informed that t h i s cost would be increased to $100.00 per minute should the bargaining session proceed longer than 50 minutes. A team was allowed to withdraw from the bargaining table at any time i n order to discuss o f f e r s , demands, s t r a t e g i e s , etc. They were informed however, that the timer would continue to run during these periods. A p r o v i s i o n was also made for the p o s s i b i l i t y of a team f i n d i n g the negotiations u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . In t h i s event, Labor had the r i g h t to " s t r i k e " and Management had the r i g h t to "lock out". Subjects were informed that a d e c i s i o n to either " s t r i k e " or "lock out" would r e s u l t i n replace- ment of the o r i g i n a l wage and p r o f i t analysis with a new one, shown i n Figure 2. Subsequent negotiations would be based on the figures i n t h i s new a n a l y s i s , which d i f f e r e d from those i n the o r i g i n a l analysis to the extent that a worker's gross earning and Management's expected p r o f i t 40 hourly wage and gross earnings for coming year expected p r o f i t at that wage f o r coming year 2.10 4284 A 47500 2.20 4488 B 45000 2.30 4692 C 42500 2.40 4896 D 40000 2.50 5100 E 37500 2.60 5304 F 35000 2.70 5508 G 32500 2.80 5712 H 30000 2.90 5916 I 27500 3.00 6120 J 25000 3.10 6324 K 22500 3.20 6528 L 20000 3.30 6732 M 17500 3.40 6936 N 15000 3.50 7140 0 12500 3.60 7344 P 10000 3.70 7548 Q 7500 3.80 7752 R 5000 3.90 7956 S 2500 4.00 8160 T 0 4.10 8364 U -2500 4.20 8568 V -5000 4.30 8772 w -7500 4.40 8976 X -10000 4,50 9180 Y -12500 4.60 9384 Z -15000 Figure 2. Wage and p r o f i t analysis to be used i n the event of a " s t r i k e " or "lock out". 41 at each hourly wage were lower In the new a n a l y s i s . This procedure was intended as a simulation of the costs invoked by a breakdown i n negotiations. Subjects were also informed that should a " s t r i k e " or "lock out" occur, both the labor team and the management team would be allowed to adjourn from the bargaining table to discuss strategy. At t h i s point the timer was to be stopped and r e s t a r t e d only when both parties returned to the bargaining t a b l e . The settlement wage and time taken to reach a settlement were recorded. A r a t i n g scale was administered following the bargaining session. This scale consisted of a 7-point l i n e , 19 cm. i n length ( F i g . 3), on which the subjects were asked to i n d i c a t e t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome of the bargaining session. The scale was anchored with the headings EXTREMELY SATISFIED and EXTREMELY UNSATISFIED. In addition, the bargaining session was tape recorded 1 1* for the purpose of a subsequent content a n a l y s i s 1 5 . The experimental session concluded with a b r i e f informal discussion period. These discussions usually involved comments on s p e c i f i c labor- 4The bargaining session was tape recorded with the knowledge and consent of the subjects. 5A1though ten bargaining sessions were conducted, data from two of these were eliminated from the a n a l y s i s . In one of these sessions the behavior of a subject suggasted inadequate comprehension of the i n s t r u c t i o n s , while i n the other session a management representative and a labor representative indicated that they had previously p a r t i c i p a t e d i n negotiations with each other, and much of t h e i r behavior during the session was conducted on a personal l e v e l , i n the sense that s p e c i f i c p r i o r bargaining experiences appeared to play a major r o l e i n determining t h e i r behavior during the session. (Note that the reasoning f o r elimination of t h i s session from the analysis i s consistent with the c r i t e r i a established for the s t r u c t u r i n g of the groups.) Subsequent analysis of the bargaining data was based on the remaining eight sessions. Indicate how s a t i s f i e d you are with the outcome by placing a mark on the l i n e below EXTREMELY EXTREMELY UNSATISFIED SATISFIED Figure 3. Scale f o r i n d i c a t i o n of personal s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome of the bargaining session. 43 management r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the greater Vancouver b u s i n e s s - i n d u s t r i a l area and the a p p l i c a t i o n of s o c i a l psychological p r i n c i p l e s i n the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . No formal data were c o l l e c t e d during t h i s period. At t h i s time the experimenter f u l l y explained the purpose of the study and answered any questions. C. Suinnary In the present study 19 management and 15 labor representatives with formal bargaining experience p a r t i c i p a t e d i n sessions designed to y i e l d d e s c r i p t i v e data concerning s o c i a l psychological aspects of the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . A t o t a l of ten 3-hour sessions were conducted i n which the subjects p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 3- and 4-person groups. The tasks included an Opinion Questionnaire, Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales, the F-scale, a Prisoner's Dilenna-type gaue, and a simulated bargaining problem. The Opinion Questionnaire was comprised of 25 statements concerning labor r e l a t i o n s with which subjects might agree or disagree. A subject was asked to i n d i c a t e for each statement the opinion he perceived h i s own party to hold, the opinion he perceived the other party to hold, h i s own personal opinion, and, a f t e r i n t e r a c t i n g with the other group members i n the bargaining s i t u a t i o n , the opinion he thought each of the others held. Operational statements of each of the four hypotheses dealing with the questionnaire responses were presented. The Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales consisted of the following s i x dimensions: "good-bad", "trusting-suspicious", "strong-weak", "honest- dishonest", "trustworthy-untrustworthy", "cooperative-competitive". On separate administrations of these scales a subject was required to i n d i c a t e f o r each of the s i x dimensions how he would rate h i s own party, 44 how he would rate the other party, and how he thought h i s own party would be rated by the other party. An operational statement of the hypothesis dealing with the semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e responses was presented. The session also included a bargaining task which cast management representatives i n the r o l e of business partners and labor representatives as the elected o f f i c i a l s representing employees of the business. The task required the representatives of the two p a r t i e s to negotiate a wage s e t t l e - ment for the coming year on the basis of a projected wage and p r o f i t analysis which was adapted from the model of Sawyer's bargaining board. The negotiations were tape recorded and subjected to a formal content a n a l y s i s . In addition, a scale on which the subjects indicated t h e i r l e v e l of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome of the bargaining session was administered. 45 CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION The analysis and discussion of r e s u l t s w i l l be developed f i r s t i n terms of the perceptions of persons involved i n the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p , and second i n terms of the various approaches to negotiations employed by these persons i n a simulated bargaining s i t u a t i o n . In the present context the term "perception" i s used to encompass some of the ways i n which labor and management representatives view "Labor" and "Management" as d i s t i n c t groups or pa r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . This perceptual information was obtained using the Opinion Questionnaire and the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s . Bargaining data were obtained by formal analysis of the verbal content of the negotiating session. In addition, information was c o l l e c t e d concerning the time taken to reach a settlement, settlement wage, and degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the settlement. Although data of both a d e s c r i p t i v e and a comparative nature w i l l be presented, emphasis i n the text i s placed on comparisons between and within groups. For example, homogeneity of labor representatives' opinions vs homogeneity of management representatives' opinions constitutes a between- groups comparison, while perception by management representatives of the opinions held by t h e i r own party vs the personal opinions of management representatives constitutes a within-groups comparison. Consequently, tables and figures have been organized to include c e r t a i n summary s t a t i s t i c s which are d e s c r i p t i v e i n nature as w e l l as those necessary f o r making relevant comparisons. A. Perceptions of the Pa r t i e s i n a Bargaining Relationship The responses given by labor and management representatives to the 46 24 questionnaire items are summarized i n Table 1 i n terms of the percentage of subjects who: (i ) think t h e i r own party agrees with each statement; ( i i ) think the other party agrees with each statement; and ( i i i ) personally agree with each statement. As an example of the way i n which t h i s information i s interpreted, consider the f i r s t questionnaire item, "The need to look good to one's constituents plays a very important r o l e i n determining a labor representative's bargaining behavior." From the top row of figures i n Table 1 i t can be seen that 95% (or 18 of 19) of the management representatives thought "Management" i n general would agree with t h i s statement and 64% (or 9 of 14) of the labor representatives thought "Labor" i n general would agree. It can also be seen that 89% of the management representatives thought "Labor" i n general would agree with the statement and 92% of the labor representatives thought "Management" i n general would agree. F i n a l l y , i t can be seen that 89% of the management representatives personally agree with the statement and 64% of the labor representatives personally agree. The information obtained from the Opinion Questionnaire can be looked at i n another way. Considering t h i s information i n terms of the responses required on the questionnaire, r e c a l l that a subject was asked, i n e f f e c t , to indic a t e f o r each item: (a) the opinion that he thinks h i s own party holds; (b) the opinion that he thinks the other party holds; and (c) h i s own personal opinion. The f i r s t three hypotheses are r e i t e r a t e d below along with an i n d i c a t i o n of which two of the three responses above constitutes the comparison Table 1. Perceptions by the subjects of the opinions of "Management" and "Labor", and the personal opinions of the subjects. MANAGEMENT (n=19) % % i n d i c a t i n g i n d i c a t i n g % agreement agreement i n d i c a t i n g by by personal questionnaire item "Management" "Labor" agreement 1. The need to look good to one's constituents plays a very important r o l e i n determining a labor repre- sentative's bargaining behavior. 95 89 89 2. In contract negotiations manage- ment i n t e r p r e t s the goals of labor f a i r l y accurately. 74 42 84 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labor's r i g h t to s t r i k e . 11 84 47 4. In an industry i n the "best of a l l p o ssible worlds" there would be no need f o r unions. 63 0 16 5. Most s t r i k e s are precipitated by i n f l e x i b l e management. 5 84 0 6. In neogitating a settlement with the other party I would l i k e to be completely hcnest, but I am a f r a i d that my honesty would be taken advantage of. 74 79 58 8. Management i s genuinely concerned with the needs of the worker. 79 11 74 LABOR (n=14) % i n d i c a t i n g agreement by "Labor" i n d i c a t i n g agreement by "Management" % i n d i c a t i n g parsouai agreement 64 92 39 86 61 79 14 5? • 50 100 29 86 7 71 64 64 71 36 86 29 ,. Table 1 (continued) questionnaire item 9. In contract negotiations, one should seek to acquire every possible advantage over the other party. 10. In bargaining disputes, labor r a r e l y seems to appreciate the problems facing management. .11. The union shop places undesirable b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees. 14. In general, labor-management r e l a t i o n s could be iraproved. 15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening of f e r s and demands are an e s s e n t i a l part of the bargaining process. 16. Labor i s more l i k e l y to take advantage of contract loopholes than i s management. MANAGEMENT % % i n d i c a t i n g i n d i c a t i n g % agreement agreement i n d i c a t i n g by by personal "Management" "Labor" agreement 58 84 47 84 11 53 32 0 31 95 0 79 68 74 74 100 100 89 32 37 26 61 6 33 LABOR % - % i n d i c a t i n g i n d i c a t i n g % agreement agreement i n d i c a t i n g by "Labor" by "Management" personal agreement 71 86 50 7 79 7 0 64 0 15 100 38 86 64 86 100 93 93 50 64 43 0 86 0 12. The closed shop places undesirable b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees, 13. I think that a frank interchange of ideas between l o c a l labor leaders and top management personnel could a l l e v i a t e much of the tension that exists i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today. Table 1 (continued) MANAGEMENT LABOR % % % % i n d i c a t i n g i n d i c a t i n g % i n d i c a t i n g i n d i c a t i n g % agreement agreement i n d i c a t i n g agreement agreement i n d i c a t i n g by by personal by by personal questionnaire item Management "Labor" agreement "Labor" "Management" agreement 17. A good labor representative can usually do what he thinks i s r i g h t i n labor-management bargaining sit u a t i o n s and not worry about looking good to his constitutents. 11 42 26 74 69 71 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker are overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who represent him. 95 26 89 29 61 36 19. Government should i n no way i n t e r - fere with management's right to lock out. 58 32 68 64 92 71 20. Labor people are generally more s e n s i t i v e to s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than are management people. 47 89 58 93 15 86 21. The p r o v i n c i a l labor laws favor management. 11 84 11 86 15 79 22. The r i g h t to s t r i k e i s an i n d i s - pensible part of the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p . 79 89 79 93 15 93 23. Persons who think a state of mutual trust can be established between labor and management are being u n r e a l i s t i c . 17 28 22 36 28 29 24. Most s t r i k e s are preci p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e labor. 47 0 26 0 77 0 25. The p r o v i n c i a l labor laws favor labor. 53 0 47 0 69 7 so appropriate to each hypothesis: hypothesis 1. Issues on which the two parties are thought to hold differing opinions will be indicated more frequently by Labor than by Management. This hypothesis involves (a) and (b) and compares the mean number of statements on which a difference of opinion is perceived by labor representatives with the mean number of state- ments on which a difference is perceived by management representa- tives. hypothesis 2. The personal opinions of Management will differ from the opinions they think their own party holds more frequently than the personal opinions of Labor will differ from the opinions they think their own party holds. This hypothesis Involves (a) and (c) and compares the mean number of statements on which a manage- ment representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Management" In general holds with the mean number of statements on which a labor representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Labor" in general holds. hypothesis 3. Issues on which one's personal opinion differs from the opinion one thinks is held by the other party will be indicated more frequently by Labor than by Management. This hypothesis involves (c) and (b) and compares the mean number of statements on which a labor representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Management" in general holds with the mean number of statements on which a management representative's personal opinion differs from the opinion he thinks "Labor" in general holds. 51 The data used to test each of these hypotheses are shown i n Table 2 i n terms of the number of questionnaire items on which the requisite d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of opinions occurred i n the responses of the subjects. As an example of the way i n which t h i s information i s interpreted, consider the responses of the f i r s t management representative and the f i r s t labor representative. From the top row of figures i n Table 2 i t can be seen that the management representative indicated a difference of opinion between the two parties on 11 of the 24 items and the labor representative indicated a difference on 17 of the 24 items. I t can also be seen that the management representative indicated a difference between his personal opinion and the opinion he thought h i s own party held on 1 of the 24 items and the labor representative indicated a difference on 4 of the, 24 items. F i n a l l y , i t can be seen that the management representative indicated a difference between his personal opinion and the opinion he thought the other party held on 10 of: the 24 items and the labor representa- tiv e indicated a difference on 13 of the 24 items. Note that the data i n this table refer to the number of questionnaire statements on which a difference was indicated by each subject and should not be confused with the percentage of subjects perceiving agreement with each of these questionnaire statements shown i n Table 1. Perceived differences of opinion as potential sources of tension and c o n f l i c t : I t was argued e a r l i e r that the behavior of "Labor" suggests that they view tension and c o n f l i c t as states which can be b e n e f i c i a l to the attainment of th e i r goals, whereas the behavior of "Management" suggests that %hey view tension and c o n f l i c t as states which can be detrimental to the attainment of th e i r goals. I t was also noted that Table 2. Number of questionnaire items on which di f f e r e n t a t i o n of opinions occurred i n the responses of the subjects. MANAGEMENT number of items on which- own party- self-own self-other other party party party subject d i f f e r e n t different different SI 11 1 10 S2 11 6 7 S3 7 4 9 SA 10 11 9 S5 9 5 10 S6 9 4 7 S7 15 9 9 S8 13 5 12 S9 12 3 11 S10 11 7 12 S l l 9 7 8 S12 15 8 9 LABOR number of items on which- own party- self-own self-other other party party party subject d i f f e r e n t d i f f e r e n t d i f f e r e n t SI 17 4 13 S2 14 4 14 S3 17 3 16 S4 9 2 9 S5 9 2 11 S6 14 3 17 S7 9 6 9 S8 19 5 14 S9 11 2 9 S10 24 5 20 S l l 13 3 14 S12 11 9 12 ro Table 2 (continued) MANAGEMENT LABOR number of items on which- number of items on which- subject awn party- ather party d i f f e r e n t self-own party d i f f e r e n t self-other party d i f f e r e n t own party- other party subject d i f f e r e n t self-own party d i f f e r e n t s e l f - o t h e r party d i f f e r e n t S13 11 5 8 S13 r 17 5 1.4 S14 12 2 12 S14 14 2 12 S15 6 5 7 S16 13 8 11 S17 12 3 13 S18 15 11 S19 12 3 11 Means 11.21 5.56 9.79 14.14 3.86 13.14 54 differences, actual or perceived, between two parties provide a basis for tension and c o n f l i c t . In keeping with this rationale, th-j f i r s t hypothesis predicted that issues on which the two parties are thought to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions w i l l be indicated more frequently by labor than by management representatives. Consistent with t h i s hypothesis, the mean number of statements on which these differences were indicated by labor representatives was 14.14 (59% of the statements) and the mean number on which differences were indicated by management representatives was 11.21 (47% of the statements). This difference produced a t of 2.45 (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .05 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) . Those statements on which differences of opinion between the two parties were most frequently indicated are l i s t e d i n Appendix D. These results suggest that, to the extent to which perceived differences of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" serve as a basis for tension and c o n f l i c t , the potential sources of such tension and c o n f l i c t are more l i k e l y to appear i n the perceptions of "Labor" than i n the perceptions of "Management". (One cautious reservation must be considered i n interpreting these r e s u l t s . I t i s possible that i n the context i n which data were collected (both labor and management representatives present, sequential administration of questionnaires, etc.) differences between Labor and Management appeared, whereas, i n a r e a l - l i f e s i t u a t i o n they might not have. In other words, the observed differences might be unique to the laboratory s i t u a t i o n i n which an experimenter a c t i v e l y investigates perceived opinions rather than r e f l e c t i n g differences which are perceived i n the everyday context of the labor-management bargaining relationship. This c r i t i c i s m , implying a demand-induced or context- 55 derived e f f e c t , also applies to subsequent observations r e l a t i n g to the other four hypotheses.) Perceived party opinions, personal opinions, and the "party l i n e " : Inherent i n the secord, t h i r d , and fourth hypotheses i s the prediction that the personal opinions of labor representatives w i l l be very much l i k e the opinions which they think t h e i r own party, i n general, holds; the personal opinions of management representatives, on the other hand, w i l l show greater independence from the opinions that they think t h e i r own party, i n general, holds. Of part i c u l a r interest here i s the extent to which the perceived "party l i n e " appears i n the personal opinions of party representatives, and the extent to which differences of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" are perceived at the level of personal opinion. Also of interest i s the number of subjects who perceive party opinions i n the same way as their fellow representatives, as w e l l as the number of subjects who hold personal opinions l i k e those of th e i r fellow representatives. Previously i t was noted that the t a c t i c of presenting the party position on issues as one that i s supported by a united membership appears to have gained some degree of prominence on the part of "Labor", but not on the part of "Management". For th i s reason i t was hypothesized that the personal opinions of indiv i d u a l management representatives would d i f f e r from the opinions they think "Management" i n general hold more frequently than the personal opinions of in d i v i d u a l labor representatives would d i f f e r from the opinions they think "Labor" i n general hold. Consistent with this second hypothesis, the mean number of statements on which these differences occurred for management representatives was 56 5.56 (23% of the statements) and the mean number for labor representatives was 3.86 (16% of the statements). This difference produced a £ of 1.86 (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t aeyond the .05 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) . Those statements on which differences most frequently occurred between the personal opinion of a party representative and the opinion which he thought h i s own party held are l i s t e d i n Appendices E and F. To b r i e f l y r e i t e r a t e the previous two hypotheses, i t was predicted that issues on which the two parties are thought to hold d i f f e r i n g opinions would be indicated more frequently by Labor than by Management ( f i r s t hypothesis), and that there would be more s i m i l a r i t y between the personal and perceived party opinions of Labor than between the personal and perceived party opinions of Management (converse of the second hypothesis). In keeping with these predictions i t was also hypothesized that labor representatives w i l l indicate more issues on which t h e i r personal opinion d i f f e r s from the opinion they think the other party holds than w i l l manage- ment representatives. Consistent with this t h i r d hypothesis, the mean number of statements on which these differences occurred for labor represent- atives was 13.14 (55% of the statements) and the mean number for management representatives was 9.79 (41% of the statements). This difference produced a t of 3.77 (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .001 l e v e l ( o n e - t a i l ) . If the t a c t i c of presenting a united front i n support of one's position i s indeed a more salient one for "Labor" than for "Management", i t would be expected that the position to be taken by "Labor" on par t i c u l a r issues w i l l be made clear to i t s membership. In keeping with t h i s "party l i n e " rationale, the fourth hypothesis predicted that Labor w i l l be more homogeneous than Management i n (a) the perception of th e i r own party's 57 opinions, (b) the perception of the other party's opinions, and i n (c) t h e i r own personal opinions. The results f a i l e d to confirm any of these predictions. Over a l l questionnaire items: (a) the mean percentage of labor representatives indicating a common perception of the i r own party's opinions was 79.29, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the mean of 75.96% for management representatives. 1 6 (b) the mean percentage of labor representatives indicating a common perception of the other party's opinions was 80.67, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d ifferent from the mean of 84.21% for management representatives. (c) the mean percentage of labor representatives indicating a common personal opinion was 76.42, not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from the mean of 73.83% for management representatives. At t h i s point some comments on interpretation are i n order. The predictions made by the second and t h i r d hypotheses were confirmed, suggesting that there i s a greater tendency for "Labor" than for "Management" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party l i n e " , when thi s "party l i n e " i s defined for each j> as the opinions which he perceives his party i n general to hold. Unfortunately, the data do not bear upon the v a l i d i t y of the assumption underlying the hypotheses, i . e . , that a 1 6The mean percentage for a party was calculated by taking the largest number of subjects i n the party who perceived the same opinion on the f i r s t questionnaire item. This number was then converted to a percentage of the t o t a l number of subjects i n the party. Since there were only two possible responses, "agree" and "disagree", t h i s number always equalled half or more of the subjects i n the party ( i . e . , t his percentage could be no lower than 50% for Labor, representing 7 of the 14 labor subjects, and no lower than 53% for Management, representing 10 of the 19 management subjects). This procedure was repeated for the remaining 23 items on the Opinion Questionnaire, giving 24 percentages. The mean of these 24 percentages was then taken as an o v e r a l l measure of homogeneity for the party. 58 causal relationship exists between perceived party opinions and the personal opinions of party members. Although Labor tended, to a greater extent than Management, to hold personal opinions resembling a perceived "party l i n e " , the question remains as to whether a labor representative forms his opinions on the basis of what he perceives "Labor" i n general to be thinking, or simply assumes that i n forming opinions "Labor" i n general thinks the same way he does. In l i g h t of the "party l i n e " reasoning, the finding of no differences between Labor and Management i n terms of homogeneity of perception or i n terms of homogeneity of personal opinion was unexpected. The most parsimonious interpretation i s that i f exogenous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the "party l i n e " adopted by "Labor" i s no more w e l l defined for labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s for management representa- t i v e s . Perceptions and misperceptions; In addition to the Opinion Question- naire, f i v e Semantic Differential-type scales were employed to obtain perceptual data. A l l data from these scales were analyzed using .t t e s t s 1 7 , and the s t a t i s t i c a l information corresponding to comparisons made i n the text appear i n Appendix G. The mean ratings given by management representatives to "Management" and to "Labor" on each of the f i v e scales are presented i n Table 3. To 1 Altogether, a t o t a l of 20 s t a t i s t i c a l comparisons were made on the basis of the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l data. Although differences proved s i g n i f i c a n t i n 11 of the 20 cases, the l i k e l i h o o d of making type 1 errors i s increased by making multiple comparisons i n this fashion. Thus, the p o s s i b i l i t y that any one of these differences i s spurious, cannot be overlooked. 59 summarize these r e s u l t s , management representatives saw "Management", (a) as good as, (b) not as suspicious as, (c) not as strong as, (d) more honest than, and (e) more trustworthy than "Labor". The mean ratings given by labor representatives to "Labor" and to "Management" on each of the f i v e scales are presented i n Table 4. To summarize these r e s u l t s , labor representatives saw "Labor" as, (a) better than, (b) as suspicious as, (c) as strong as, (d) more honest than, and (e) more trustworthy than "Management". These results indicate a tendency for both Labor and Management to rate their own party i n a more positive (or less negative) manner than the other party (an exception i s the management representatives' tendency to rate "Management" as not as strong as "Labor"). I t was argued e a r l i e r that inherent i n the roles prescribed for labor and management representatives are part i c u l a r attitudes and t a c t i c s which may create an impression of h o s t i l i t y towards the other party which i s more a matter of show than actual i n c l i n a t i o n . For th i s reason i t was hypothesized that representatives of both parties w i l l tend to think that the other party perceives them i n a less favorable manner than i t 60 Table 3 Comparison of mean ratings given "Management" and "Labor" by management representatives bh the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s . scale "Management" "Labor" good-bad +1.39 +1.18 trusting-suspicious -0.12 -1.25 p<.002 strong-weak +0.94 +1.62 p<.05 honest-dishonest +1.65 +0.96 p<.05 trus twor thy-untrus twor thy +1.69 +0.85 p<.002 (In Tables 3-6, +3 represents a maximally p o s i t i v e r a t i n g (e.g., extremely "good"); whereas -3 represents a maximally negative r a t i n g (e.g., extremely "bad*'); 0 (zero) represents a neutral rating.) Table 4 Comparison of mean ratings given "Labor" and "Management" by labor representatives on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales. scale "Labor" "Management" good-bad +2.05 +0.78 p<.02 trusting-suspicious -0.24 -0.83 strong-weak +0.97 +1.51 hone s t-dishones t +1.95 +0.74 p<.01 trustworthy-untrustworthy +1.88 +0.34 p<.01 61 actually does. S p e c i f i c a l l y , when asked how they think "Labor" would be rated by "Management", labor representatives were expected to indicate a lower rating on the three evaluative dimensions ("good-bad", "honest- dishonest", "trustworthy-untrustworthy") than they were actually given by the management representatives. S i m i l a r l y , when asked how they think "Management" would be rated by "Labor", management representatives were expected to indicate a lower rating on these dimensions than they were actually given by the labor representatives. E n t i r e l y consistent with this f i f t h hypothesis, the actual mean rating given "Labor" by management representatives was s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than the mean rating predicted by the labor representatives on each of the evaluative dimensions. The actual mean rating given "Management" by labor representatives was s i g n i f i c a n t l y higher than the mean rating predicted by the management representatives on the "good-bad" dimension only. Although differences between actual and predicted ratings on the "honest-dishonest" and "trustworthy-untrustworthy" dimensions are i n the di r e c t i o n predicted by the hypothesis, they f a i l to reach conventional levels of significance. Consequently, the findings here are considered as p a r t i a l confirmation of the hypothesis. These results are presented i n Tables5 and 6. To summarize, labor representatives expected "Labor" to be rated, (a) not as good as, (b) not as honest as, and (c) not as trustworthy as "Labor" was actually rated by Management i n the present study. Management representatives expected "Management" to be rated, (a) not as good as, 62 Table 5. scale Comparison of mean ratings given "Labor" by management representatives and mean ratings that labor representatives predict "Labor" would be given by "Management" on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e s c a l e s . good-bad trus ting-suspicious strong-weak hone s t - d i shone s t trus twor thy-untrus tworthy actual r a t i n g by Management +1.18 -1.25 +1.62 +0.96 +0.85 ra t i n g predicted by Labor -0.43 p<.01 -1.12 +1.73 -0.01 p<.01 -0.53 p<.02 Table 6. Comparison of mean ratings given "Management" by labor representatives and mean ratings that manage- ment representatives predict "Management" would be given by "Labor" on the Semantic D i f f e r e n t i a l - t y p e scales. scale good-bad trus ting-suspicious strong-weak hones t-dishones t trustworthy-untrustworthy act u a l r a t i n g by Labor +0.78 -0.83 +1.51 +0.74 +0.34 ra t i n g predicted by Management -0.51 -1.34 +1.78 -0.02 -0.13 p<.05 63 "Management" was actually rated by Labor i n the present study. To the extent that the expected ratings and the actual ratings do not coincide, i t appears that both "Labor" and "Management" are l i k e l y to misperceive the way i n which they are viewed, evaluatively at lea s t , by members of the other party. The tendency towards misperception seems to be more pronounced on the part of "Labor" than "Management", an observation which i s consistent with the finding that management representatives were s l i g h t l y more accurate i n t h e i r perceptions of the personal opinions held by i n d i v i d u a l members of the other party than were labor representatives (on the Opinion Questionnaire, the mean number of items on which manage- ment representatives correctly assessed the personal opinion of a pa r t i c u l a r labor representative was 15.94 (66% of the statements) and the mean number of items on which labor representatives correctly assessed the personal opinion of a part i c u l a r management representative was 13.43 (56% of the statements). This difference produced a t of 4.30 (df=30), s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .002 l e v e l ( t w o - t a i l ) 1 8 . ) . Authoritarianism; In a recent evaluation of some of the existing l i t e r a t u r e on authoritarianism, one conclusion reached by Kirscht and Dillehay (1967) was that the most useful way to define authoritarianism 1 8 I t might be argued that the Opinion Questionnaire involved more items on which i t was 'easier" to assess a labor representative's personal opinion than i t was to assess a management representative's personal opinion. If this was the case, we would expect more agreement (homogeneity) among a l l subjects when assessing the personal opinions of labor representatives than when assessing the personal opinions of management representatives. The results do not support this argument. Over a l l questionnaire items, the mean percentage of subjects indicating a common perception of Manage- ment personal opinions was 78.31 and the mean percentage indicating a common perception of Labor personal opinions was 81.75. This difference was not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . 64 i s i n terns of a cognitive s t y l e characterized by closed-minded thinking. In t h i s regard, they state, The genuine authoritarian lacks a b i l i t y to deal with novel cognitive material, seeks rapid closure when exposed to new s i t u a t i o n s , and ultimately depends heavily on external authority for support of his b e l i e f system. To be sure, the s t y l e i s mediated and maintained through a set of b e l i e f s and through s o c i a l r e a l i t y . The particular b e l i e f s and behaviors vary from person to person, but the s t y l e of cognition i s r e l a t i v e l y permanent. (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967, pp. 132-133). In the present study, labor representatives scored higher on the F-scale, that i s , more authoritarian, than did management representatives. The mean scores were 104.85 for labor representatives and 76.78 for management representatives. This difference produced a £ of 3.25 (df=31), s i g n i f i c a n t beyond the .01 l e v e l ( t w o - t a i l ) . Although a l i v e l y controversy has taken place concerning the r e l a t i o n of authoritarianism to a liberal-conservative continuum (Janowitz and Marvick, 1953; C h r i s t i e , 19 54; S h i l s , 1954; Levinson, 1957), i t has been generally conceded that authoritarianism i s more highly correlated with l e f t i s t ideologies than with r i g h t i s t ideologies (Rokeach, 1960; Barker, 1963; Leventhal et a l . , 1964). I f , however, authoritarians do tend to prefer conservative ideologies, the finding of a s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n the d i r e c t i o n reported here i s inconsistent with the t r a d i t i o n a l images of "Labor" and "Management". T r a d i t i o n a l l y , "Labor" has been viewed as leaning to the l e f t and "Management" as leaning to the right on socio- economic and p o l i t i c a l issues. However, the higher F-scores of labor representatives and the related implications concerning preference for a conservative ideology are not inconsistent with certain recent observations on the voting behavior of labor constituents. In the 1968 65 U. S. p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t ion,.. ..not only did George Wallace receive s u b s t a n t i a l support from the "blue c o l l a r " workers, but several prominent labor organizations a c t i v e l y endorsed the candidacy of Richard Nixon. S i m i l a r l y , i n the 1969 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , i t was apparent that a s i g n i f i c a n t p ortion of the labor force voted f o r candidates representing the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t i n B r i t i s h Columbia. These general behavioral observations i n conjunction with the present f i n d i n g s , which can be interpreted as r e f l e c t i n g tendencies towards a p a r t i c u l a r cognitive s t y l e , suggest that the t r a d i t i o n a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between "Labor" and "Management" on a unitary l e f t - r i g h t dimension may be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . 1 9 B. Approaches to Negotiations Employed by the Par t i e s i n a Bargaining Relationship In a d d i t i o n to formal analysis of the verbal content of each bargaining session some s t a t i s t i c a l features were extracted from the sessions and these are presented i n Table 7. To summarize, Labor's opening wage demands ranged from hourly increases of 14.5c to 50c, with a mean of 3 0 . 6 c » while Management's open wage o f f e r s ranged from an hourly wage cut of 40c to an hourly increase of 20c, with a mean of -5.1c. The eventual hourly wage increases negotiated ranged from 12c to 21c with a mean of 17.9C 2 0 . In order to reach these settlements Labor was required to lower t h e i r o r i g i n a l demands by from 0c to 32c, with a mean s h i f t of 1 9A1though an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the F-scale r e s u l t s i n terms of l i b e r a l and conservative ideologies was considered appropriate i n the present context, other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s having to do with the r e l a t i v e educational l e v e l , socio-economic status, etc., of labor and management representatives might j u s t as e a s i l y be invoked. f 2 0Some of the opening proposals and eventual settlements involved wage i n - creases spread over a two-year contract term. In Order to obtain a f i g u r e f o r the one-year period the average yearly wage increase was ca l c u l a t e d . Table 7. Summary features of the bargaining sessions eventual movement from mean number of opening wage negotiated opening wage l e v e l of representatives proposal (C/hr) yearly wage proposal (C/hr) time to s a t i s f a c t i o n increase settlement group MGT LBR MGT LBR (c/hr) MGT LBR (min) MGT LBR 1 2 2 10 38 20 +10 -18 c 9.6 5.5 2 2 2 -40 27 12 +52 -15 38 d d 3 2 2 0 25 21 +21 - 4 63 8.1 8.0 5 2 1 -20 30 NO SETTLEMENT (+16) (0) 78 9.2 6.4 7 2 1 14.5 14.5 14.5 0 0 18 11.2 9.6 8 2 2 0 50 18 +18 -32 56 12.7 12.6 9 2 2 20 a 30 20 b 0 -10 30 17.4 16.8 10 2 1 -20 30 20 +40 -10 31 9.2 7.6 means -5.1 30.6 17.9 +20.1 -12.7 39.3 e 10.9 10.1 opening proposal included the s t i p u l a t i o n of a s t a f f reduction from ten to nine employees settlement tentative, requiring a further meeting at which time Management would "open the books" to Labor time to settlement not recorded because no time constraint was present i n the f i r s t session ^ s a t i s f a c t i o n scales not administered i n this session edoes not include the 78 minutes taken by group 5, since no settlement was reached i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r session 67 -12.7C, while Management had to r a i s e t h e i r o r i g i n a l o f f e r s by from Oo to 52c, with a mean s h i f t of +20.lc. The time required to reach these s e t t l e - ments ranged from 18 to 63 minutes, with a mean of 39.3 minutes. One of the eight groups was deadlocked a f t e r 78 minutes of negotiating and no settlement was reached i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r session. Indications of l e v e l of s a t i s f a c t i o n with the outcome were made by placing a mark on a 19 cm. l i n e with "extreme d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n " at the low end and "extreme s a t i s f a c t i o n " at the high end of t h i s s c ale. The means were 10.9 f o r Management and 10.1 f o r Labor, the di f f e r e n c e being i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The bargaining sessions were highly animated and "negotiations" appeared to be taken extremely s e r i o u s l y by a l l of the subjects. However, the rigorous q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o r i g i n a l l y intended for the verbal content of these sessions was not attained due to the small number of groups studied. For t h i s reason the bargaining behavior w i l l be discussed i n both quantitative and q u a l i t a t i v e terms. The quantitative data i s comprised of the r e s u l t s of the formal content analysis while the q u a l i t a t i v e data consists of summaries of the chronological sequence of events which took place i n each of the eight bargaining sessions. The data derived from the content analysis were dealt with i n a manner s i m i l a r to the perceptual data: comparisons were made both between and within p a r t i e s . When comparing the incidence of a p a r t i c u l a r content Item between Labor and Management, for example, the incidence of threatening statements, a sign test was employed and a co r r e c t i o n procedure was adopted. This procedure involved converting the number of -times the p a r t i c u l a r content item appeared i n the text of a party's statements to a percentage of the t o t a l number of content items coded f o r that party. The r e s u l t i n g 68 comparison between percentages was intended as a means of minimizing e f f e c t s of the unequal number of labor and management representatives i n some of the groups. 2 1 When comparing the incidence of p a r t i c u l a r types of content items within a party, f o r example, the incidence of blatant threats r e l a t i v e to subtle threats by Management, the WilcoxOn matched-pairs signed-rank t e s t was employed. The r e s u l t s of t h i s a n alysis w i l l be reviewed now. ( A complete l i s t of the categories employed i n the content analysis with examples from the sessions representative of each category appears i n Appendix H. Examples c i t e d i n the text were taken from the sessions.) Party p o s i t i o n s ; In the bargaining sessions both Labor and Management concentrated on presenting the posit i o n s of t h e i r own "party" on the wage issue, questioning the p o s i t i o n taken by the other "party", and dealing with questions and arguments from the other "party". In the course of "negotiations" Management tended to make more references to t h e i r own party's p o s i t i o n than d i d Labor, while Labor tended to make more references to the other party's p o s i t i o n than d i d Management. Of a l l the references to the p o s i t i o n taken by one's own party, 68% of these were made by Management and 32% were made by Labor (p<.07). Of a l l the references to the p o s i t i o n taken by the other party, 69% of these were made by Labor and 31% were made by Management (p<.07). Referring to t h e i r own p o s i t i o n , Management emphasized i t as one of weakness (e.g., " . . . we have had an increase i n our d i s t r i b u t i o n cost of 30% and t h i s has kicked us r i g h t i n 2 1 T h i s c o r r e c t i o n procedure was introduced p r i o r to an}' s t a t i s t i c a l comparison between the two p a r t i e s . Iii addition, wherever an e x p l i c i t comparison i s made i n the text i n terms of the magnitude of differences between the two p a r t i e s , the figures c i t e d (percentages) are based on the corrected data. 69 the rear end . . . we kind of thought we had things going on the road here . . . but . . . t h i s has turned into a revolting development.") as opposed to one of strength (e.g., "We've only had one gerbil-maker leave us i n the past year . . . we certa i n l y had no trouble replacing him."). Labor, on the other hand, referred to Management's position of strength (e.g., " . . . a small increase i n the price of gerbils wouldn't do any harm anywhere . . . there's other manufacturers that want to increase (the price of) their g e r b i l s , and they're only waiting for a leader—and you are a leader i n t h i s industry.") as often as to t h e i r position of weakness (e.g., "Really, based on your investment, your p r o f i t s arenlt up to 6% on c a p i t a l investment here and this i s n ' t the best s i t u a t i o n possible."). In c l a s s i f y i n g the references to Management's position, 93% of the references made by Management were judged as emphasizing weakness and 7% were judged as emphasizing strength (p<.C2); 50% of the references made by Labor emphasized weakness and 50% emphasized strength. In addition, Labor made reference to their own position of strength as often as to their own position of weakness. In c l a s s i f y i n g these references, 45% were judged as emphasizing strength and 55% were judged as emphasizing weakness. In the present study then, Management's position tended to be the subject upon which both parties focussed the i r attention. Since Management emphasized the d i f f i c u l t i e s of weaknesses inherent i n the bargaining •- position i n which they found themselves, an approach which frequently included direct appeals for sympathetic understanding on the part of Labor, Labor's approach to the "negotiations" was p a r t i c u l a r l y interesting. Rather than emphasizing t h e i r own position of strength r e l a t i v e to the weak position of Management, a powerful but p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous t a c t i c , 70 Labor attempted to upgrade or bolster Management's position. This bolstering frequently involved suggestions as to the ease with which Management's position could be strengthened v i a small price increases, plant e f f i c i e n c y programs, increased labor-management cooperation, etc. In the context of real-world negotiations, i t would be interesting to determine whether or not emphasis on the weakness of t h e i r own position i s a bargaining strategy commonly employed by "Management", as w e l l as the extent to which bolstering of the other party's weak position takes place. Also, i t would be in s t r u c t i v e to explore the extent to which "Management's" position, as opposed to the position taken by "Labor", i s a dominant theme of r e a l negotiations. Arguments and degree of determination; One approach to understanding the way i n vrhich "Labor" and "Management" perceive their respective positions or roles i n a bargaining relationship i s to consider the kinds of arguments each presents and the degree of determination with which supportive statements are made. Arguments were separated into those based on facts which can be v e r i f i e d (e.g., "There has been a d e f i n i t e increase i n the costs of d i s t r i b u t i o n of our product . . . ") and those based on the way a person thinks things should be, or w i l l be, i n the future (e.g., "We'd l i k e to better our position i n l i f e so that our children and our families can enjoy the things we-are working f o r . " ) . These were termed fact u a l arguments and purposive arguments respectively. The degree of determination with which a statement was made was coded as follows: those statements which implied no other outcome than the one proposed were considered to r e f l e c t high determination and were termed d e f i n i t e statements (e.g., "We can t e l l you right at the outset that 12% would be 71 right out of the question."), while those which acknowledged the p o s s i b i l i t y of alternative outcomes were considered to r e f l e c t low determination and were termed tentative statements (e.g., "We'll back off a l i t t l e . . . we're f l e x i b l e . " ) . Labor was observed to employ more purposive than factual arguments, while Management made equal use of both types of argument. In c l a s s i f y i n g the arguments made by Labor, 69% of these were considered purposive and 31% were considered fac t u a l (p<.02); 47% of Management's arguments were considered purposive and 53% were considered f a c t u a l . In addition, both Labor and Management made more de f i n i t e than tentative statements i n support of their arguments. In c l a s s i f y i n g these statements for Labor, 58% were considered d e f i n i t e and 42% were considered tentative (p<.05); 64% of Management's statements were considered d e f i n i t e and 36% were considered tentative (p<.02). Examining the verbatim protocols of real-world labor negotiations, Haire (1955) observed that "Management's" position was characterized by factual arguments and d e f i n i t e statements while "Labor's" position was characterized by purposive arguments and tentative statements (underlined findings were observed i n the present study). He interpreted t h i s as evidence for coherent role perceptions by the participants i n a bargaining relationship, suggesting a perception of r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e power and autonomy by "Labor" and one of greater power and autonomy by "Management". Although the present results are si m i l a r to Haire's, the findings of the two studies are not en t i r e l y consistent. I t i s ce r t a i n l y not apparent from the present results that perceptions of the balance of power and autonomy are heavily weighted i n favor of "Management". Unfortunately, there are obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s i n generalizing role perceptions from 72 either of these studies to the s p e c i f i c bargaining relationship of concern here, that of "Labor" and "Management" i n the province of B r i t i s h Columbia. In the present bargaining task, the position i n which Management found themselves was a d i f f i c u l t one i n that they were faced with the problem of negotiating a wage settlement i n l i g h t of a very r e s t r i c t i v e " p r o f i t picture" (by merely maintaining the existing wage for the coming year, an u n l i k e l y p o s s i b i l i t y , Management would suffer a decline i n the i r return on invested c a p i t a l from 7% to 5%). As a r e s u l t , Management may have been forced to resort to a more purposive presentation of t h e i r proposals than would normally be the case i n the r e a l world, emphasizing the kind of p r o f i t s they would l i k e to r e a l i z e , or even need to r e a l i z e , i n order to meet wage demands. S i m i l a r l y , recognizing the d i f f i c u l t bargaining position i n which Management was placed, Labor may have perceived the i r own position as one of r e l a t i v e strength, enabling them to express t h e i r arguments i n a more determined manner than would normally be the case i n the r e a l world. For this reason then, i t i s possible that Haire's results obtained from real-world bargaining protocols allow a more accurate assess- ment of role perceptions i n labor-management relationships i n general, than do the present results obtained from simulated bargaining protocols based on what may be an a t y p i c a l bargaining s i t u a t i o n . On the other hand, bargaining relationships observed by Haire i n the San Francisco Bay area i n the early 1950's may have l i t t l e i n common with bargaining relationships existing i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n the l a t e 1960's. Consequently, analysis of the protocols of r e a l negotiations i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s regarded as an appropriate step towards c l a r i f y i n g the way i n which "Labor" and "Management" perceive t h e i r respective roles i n this l a t t e r bargaining 73 r e l a t i o n s h i p . At the same time t h i s would provide some information as to the v a l i d i t y of inferences drawn from the laboratory bargaining behavior observed i n the present study. Exchange of information: During the bargaining sessions, a consider- able amount of time was devoted to requests for and o f f e r s of i n f o r m a t i o n . 2 2 I t was observed that Management offered information more frequently than they requested i t , while Labor made as many requests as o f f e r s . In c l a s s i f y i n g the informational statements directed to Labor by Management, 61% of these were o f f e r s of information and 39% were requests f o r information (p<.05); of the statements dir e c t e d to Management by Labor, 57% were o f f e r s of information and 43% were requests f o r information. Informational statements were coded as r e f l e c t i n g e i t h e r f a c t s or how a party f e l t about something. These statements were termed data information statements and a t t i t e d e information statements r e s p e c t i v e l y . In requesting information from Labor, Management requested a t t i t u d e information (e.g., "Would i t change your thinking very much i f you knew what our p r o f i t r e a l l y was l a s t year?") more frequently than data information (e.g., "What information do you have i n t h i s report (concerning Management's p r o f i t s ) ? " ) . On the other hand, Management offered data information (e.g., " . . . our actual p r o f i t s l a s t year were i n the order of 7%.") more frequently than a t t i t u d e information (e.g., " . . . we are not too impressed with the d e s c r i p t i o n of the realism of your o f f e r . " ) . In c l a s s i f y i n g the requests made by "Offer s " of information included both that information which was spontaneously presented to the other party as w e l l as information provided i n response to requests f o r information by the other party. The majority of information offered was spontaneous i n nature. 74 Management, 66% of these were judged to be requests for attitude information and 34% were judged to be requests f o r data information (p<.05); of the offers made by Management, 30% were offers of attitude information and 70% were offers of data information (p<.02). Labor requested both kinds of information from Management with equal frequency as w e l l as offering both with equal frequency. In c l a s s i f y i n g the requests made by Labor, 42% of these were judged to be requests for attitude information and 58% were judged to be requests for data information; of the offers made by Labor, 60% were offers of attitude information and 40% were offers of data information. The findings concerning the exchange of information may r e f l e c t a basic characteristics of real-world bargaining relationships, as opposed to part i c u l a r negotiating t a c t i c s which the participants adopt by choice. Possession by "Management" of most of the information of a factual or s t a t i s t i c a l nature i s l i k e l y to be an invariant feature i n most negotiations. The present findings suggest that "Management's" approach i s one of communicating t h i s kind of information to "Labor", and requesting feedback from them about attitudes and attitude changes stimulated by the information. ( I t should also be noted that the active probing of Labor's attitudes by Management during "negotiations" may p a r t i a l l y explain the s l i g h t l y greater accuracy demonstrated by management representatives i n assessing the personal opinions of ind i v i d u a l members of the other party. Recall that the f i n a l administration of the Opinion Questionnaire on which these assessments were made followed the bargaining sessions.) Threats arid attacks; Statements of a threatening nature were made infrequently during "negotiations", with neither party employing t h i s kind 75 of statement more frequently than the other. Of a l l the threatening statements, 54% of these were made by Labor and 46% were made by Manage- ment. When they did occur, Labor tended to employ threats of a less subtle nature than those made by Management (e.g., "If we (Labor) go out on the bricks then you're likely to lose . . . we wouldn't go back for less than 30c and we'd increase i t back to the original figure of 12% (38c) before we went back. Don't forget that."; "We (Management) have been in business for a long time . . . we're both getting on into middle age and we could quite easily—be quite happy to—liquidate the company and take our profits and liv e i n reasonably luxurious conditions."). In classifying the threats made by Management, 86% of these were considered subtle and 14% were considered to be of a more blatant nature (p<.02); 54% of Labor's threats were considered subtle and 46% were considered blatant. The term "attack" usually implies some action which involves hostile intent towards another person or group. This i s not the meaning intended here. In the present context the term refers to a response to arguments made by the other party ||e^which some scepticism or lack of credi b i l i t y i s implied. Labor was observed to attack Management more frequently than jf' Management attacked Labor. Of aljL the attacking statements, 66% of these were made by Labor and 34% were made by Management (p<.02). Attacks were coded according to whether they were directed towards the actual position taken by a party (e.g., "I am just wondering where you get this fantastic profit figure of $20,000 based on a 12% increase.") or towards the good faith, sincerity, or integrity of the party (e.g., "I think you're beating the drum, you're asking for the moon, and I think you're being 76 quite u n r e a l i s t i c i n terms of the economy of the company."). Although statements of t h i s nature occurred frequently during "negotiations", they were dire c t e d towards the p o s i t i o n taken by the other party more frequently than towards the good f a i t h of the other party by both Management and Labor. In c l a s s i f y i n g the attacks made by Management, 81% of these were judged to be dire c t e d towards Labor's p o s i t i o n and 19% were judged to be directed towards Labor's good f a i t h (p<.05); 76% of Labor's attack were directed towards Management's p o s i t i o n and 24% were dire c t e d towards Management's good f a i t h (p<.01). While these r e s u l t s show that Labor does most of the attacking -t they are not e n t i r e l y consistent with Haire's f i n d i n g that "Management" tends to attack "Labor's" p o s i t i o n while "Labor" attacks "Management's" good f a i t h . (The p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s that the d i f f i c u l t bargaining p o s i t i o n that Management was forced to take i n the present study was more susceptible to attack by Labor than were the positions taken by "Management" i n the real-world negotiations observed by Haire. As a consequence, there may have been l i t t l e need or incentive f o r Labor to concentrate an attack on Management's good f a i t h . ) The r e s u l t s do i n d i c a t e that "negotiations" tended to be conducted i n an atmosphere of c o r d i a l i t y , with the lower incidence of blatant threats and attacking statements by Management suggesting that t h i s party was somewhat more concerned with maintaining such an atmosphere. I t might prove i n t e r e s t i n g to determine the extent to which the laboratory s e t t i n g was a contributing f a c t o r here. S h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y : Labor was observed to employ more statements than d i d Management which involved the s h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decisions (e.g., "The men w i l l not agree to hold the status quo and I 77 very much doubt that they w i l l accept anything below $3.40. This i s our problem."). Of a l l the statements which implied a s h i f t of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e cisions, 86% of these were made by Labor and 14% were made by Management (p<.01). This f i n d i n g i s consistent with Haire's contention that labor negotiators perceive t h e i r r o l e as one of r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e power and autonomy. However, when considered i n the l i g h t of arguments presented e a r l i e r , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f i n d i n g i n the context of r o l e perceptions seems inappropriate. R e c a l l the contention that one important t a c t i c often employed by "Labor" involves an attempt to present to "Management" the image of a united labor front which i s i n support of t h e i r demands. Presumably, "Labor" regards t h i s t a c t i c as one which provides some leverage or power i n the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . C e r t a i n l y the bargaining p o s i t i o n of "Labor" i s l i k e l y to be enhanced by the existence of a group which threatens to discontinue service to "Manage- ment" should the elected representatives of t h i s group f a i l to achieve i t s demands. Consistent with t h i s reasoning, the act of s h i f t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decision-making to the union membership i s one way i n which a labor representative can assert t h i s power, or d i r e c t "Management's" att e n t i o n to i t , during negotiations. Although t h i s behavior involves a d e n i a l of autonomy, i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e might w e l l be of a t a c t i c a l nature rather than as an i n d i c a t o r of the way i n which an perceives h i s r o l e . F i n a l l y , s t r u c t u r a l constraints upon the decision-making process must be recognized. Once formal negotiations have begun, the decisions of a union membership appear to play a more prominent r o l e i n the negotiation of settlements than do decisions of company d i r e c t o r s and shareholders (these were the three agents onto which r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decisions was most frequently 78 s h i f t e d ) . For example, negotiated contracts are r a t i f i e d by union members but not by company d i r e c t o r s and shareholders. Consequently, the s h i f t i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decision-making by Labor i n the present study i s regarded as a bargaining t a c t i c which was convenient f o r Labor to adopt due to the s t r u c t u r a l or formal nature of the bargaining process. Chronology of events: Using the transcribed records of the bargaining sessions, an attempt was made to summarize the sequence of verbal events which occurred during "negotiations" i n each of the eight sessions. These summaries appear i n the following pages. As an example of the way i n which a summary i s intended to be read, consider the sequence of events which took place i n the f i r s t session (group 1): Labor opened the negotiations by proposing an hourly increase of 38c; i n reply, Manage- ment contended that pending plant expansion made such a demand "out of the question". Labor, i n turn, noted that Management would make a reasonable p r o f i t at the proposed wage. When Management then suggested that the demand was a r b i t r a r y , the issue of a s t r i k e and i t s e f f e c t s on p r o f i t was raised by Labor . . . bargaining proceeded i n t h i s fashion u n t i l Management made what was termed an "absolute f i n a l o f f e r " of a 20c hourly increase. This o f f e r was then accepted by Labor, bringing formal "negotiations" to a close. For purposes of c l a r i t y wage demands by Labor and o f f e r s by Management are underlined i n each summary. 78(a) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; GROUP 1 LABOR (n=2) MANAGEMENT (n=2) -proposes an hourly increase of 38c. -notes that Management w i l l make a reasonable p r o f i t at t h i s wage. -observes that, although Labor does not want to close the plant, a s t r i k e would have immediate and severe e f f e c t s on p r o f i t s . -asks what Management considers to be a reasonable increase. -observes that Labor's demand i s f l e x i b l e . -contends that the men won't accept IOC. -lowers demand to 30c. observing that a s l i g h t p r i c e increase w i l l cover the cost to Management. •notes that a s t r i k e would "break" the company but Labor doesn't want that. -reiterates the p r i c e increase s o l u t i o n and notes that i n the event of a s t r i k e Labor would return to the o r i g i n a l 38c demand. -argues that t h i s company i s a leader i n the industry, allowing i t more freedom to r a i s e wages and p r i c e s . -comments that a s t r i k e would put the company out of business quickly. -contends that plant expansion i s pend- ing and 38c i s out of the question. -suggests that Labor's demand i s a r b i t r a r y . -states that Management i s w i l l i n g to increase wages, but not by 38c. -requests recess to discuss. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -comments on s a t i s f a c t o r y r e l a t i o n s h i p with workers to date, present wage trends, a l t e r n a t i v e employment poss- i b i l i t i e s , and o f f e r s a IPC increase. -accepts, noting that t h i s proposal w i l l require a l o t of s e l l i n g to the membership. -asks i f Labor r e a l i z e s what t h i s wage increase would do to the economy of the company. States that Management must have a p r o f i t consistent with what they have r e a l i z e d i n the past. -suggests that Labor i s being un- r e a l i s t i c , and not taking the economy of the company i n t o consideration. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -contends that the board of d i r e c t o r s w i l l not accept 30c» and Management wants t h e i r poor p r o f i t p i c t u r e and pending expansion investment communicated to the union membership. -offers 20c as an "absolute f i n a l o f f e r " , recognizing that t h i s means operating at a reduced profit; l e v e l next year. 78(b) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 2 LABOR (n=2) -proposes an hourly Increase of 27c, recognizing that t h i s w i l l decrease Management's p r o f i t s l i g h t l y . -states that the r i s i n g cost of l i v i n g makes maintaining the status quo unfeasible. -lowers demand to 20c. -observes that Labor i s not about to "subsidize" any operation. -argues that the men won't continue to work f o r the present wage, and that i f the company cannot r e a l i z e more p r o f i t they (the workers) w i l l go elsewhere. -suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n - d e f i n i t e s t r i k e i f Management p e r s i s t s In maintaining the present wage rate. -states that the o f f e r w i l l be considered, -notes that Labor w i l l cooperate to devise means of improving pror- > duction. -accepts. MANAGEMENT (n=2) -observes that an a d d i t i o n a l cost of $10,000 enters i n t o the pic t u r e t h i s year and i n order to recover t h i s a wage cut of 40c i s i n order. -notes that maintaining the present wage rates w i l l lower p r o f i t s by $10,000 f o r the coming year. Suggests that an i n - crease of 27c w i l l allow Management to r e a l i z e only 4% on invested c a p i t a l and that t h i s i s too l i t t l e . -contends that i f Labor appreciates the d i f f i c u l t f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n of Manage- ment, then t h i s i s a good s t a r t i n g p o i n t -notes that the time-cost f a c t o r i s a r e a l incentive to reach agreement. -suggests that Management views a 5% return on c a p i t a l as reasonable. -argues that maintaining the present con- t r a c t w i l l allow Management to r e a l i z e the necessary 5% return on invested c a p i t a l . - r e i t e r a t e s the time-cost incentive to reach agreement, -notes that the 20c demand would put the company back almost eight years, -suggests that a reasonable approach i s c a l l e d f o r so that everyone's s e c u r i t y of employment Is maintained. -observes that j u s t as Labor doesn't want to go backward i n wages, so Management doesn't want to go backward i n p r o f i t s . - r e i t e r a t e s the time-cost incentive to reach agreement. -contents the Labor should think of the company, not j u s t the wage they can s e l l to the members, because Labor's present p o s i t i o n could "close the business". -proposes 20c over 2 years. -proposes 12c i n a 1-year agreement based on cost of l i v i n g increase. 78(c) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 3 LABOR (n=2) -proposes an hourly increase of 25c based on (1) the " f i n a n c i a l p i c ture of the union" and (2) wage rates i n comparable i n d u s t r i e s . Notes that the cost of l i v i n g i s r i s i n g and a better l i f e f o r the worker's family i s important. MANAGEMENT (n=2) -states that p r o d u c t i v i t y i s a pro- blem f o r Management, not Labor. - r a i s e s the issue of the r i s i n g cost of l i v i n g . -implies that i f t h i s company can't keep up with the buoyant economy i t should shut down. Argues that Labor shouldn't be expected to pay f o r mismanagement. - r e i t e r a t e s that i t i s up to Manage- ment to solve the present problems. -states that Labor estimates l a s t year's p r o f i t s to be $50,000. - r e i t e r a t e s previous arguments about need f o r "better l i f e " and Managements r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r solving i t s problem.- -refuses t h i s o f f e r and proposes 22c. -replies that the men won't accept les s than 22c. -notes that Management f e e l s the same way about a "better l i f e " and t h i s requires a reasonable return on c a p i t a l . States that 25c would be too "heavy" t h i s year due to increased d i s t r i b u t i o n and raw material costs. -observes that l a y o f f s would r e s u l t i f the present p r o f i t p i c t u r e cannot be maintained. -notes that present p r o f i t s are less than can be r e a l i z e d by standard investment procedures, -contends that money must be put back i n t o the business to increase p r o d u c t i v i t y . -proposes maintaining the present wage rate, noting that Management i s w i l l i n g to hold the l i n e on p r o f i t s i f Labor w i l l hold the l i n e on wages. Suggests that a small wage increase might be granted. - o f f e r s a 10c increase. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -proposes 21c. -states that both p a r t i e s must cooperate or there w i l l be no jobs f o r e i t h e r party. -states that Management regards a p r o f i t of $25,000 as a f a i r return, noting that they are being very candid with Labor here. - r e p l i e s that the $50,000 f i g u r e i s incorrect. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -offers 15c based on cost of l i v i n g increase. -observes that agreement seems near. Pro- poses 20c as "centre ground" between the 15c o f f e r and the o r i g i n a l 25c demand. -observes that negotiations are close to breaking down. -accepts. 78(d) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 5 LABOR (n=l) - c r i t i c i z e s Management's "negative" approach and questions the accuracy of t h e i r stated p r o f i t p o s i t i o n . Pro- poses a 30c increase, i n l i n e with regional and national settlements. -notes that the workers have upgraded t h e i r s k i l l s and cooperated i n the past and that 30c i s the incentive for t h i s behavior to continue. States that Labor i s not i n favor of "horse t r a d - i n g " and as a consequence i s fir m on the 30<? proposal. -states that the men won't accept a wage cut and argues that a 300 i n - crease can be met by technological innovations. -refuses. -raises the issue of r i s i n g cost of l i v i n g and need f or the workers' f a m i l i e s to keep up with the re s t of the community, e s p e c i a l l y i n education, -argues that the workers can't even a f f o r d to purchase the product they produce. -chides Management f o r adopting a "neg- at i v e a t t i t u d e " to the negotiations. -suggests that In the l i g h t of t h e i r past resourcefulness, Management's pessimism i s unfounded. States that costs are a problem f o r Management not Labor. MANAGEMENT (n=2) -proposes an hourly wage decrease of 20c i n view of Management's poor p r o f i t position. -notes precedent f o r wage decreases i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p and r e i t e r a t e s poor p r o f i t p o s i t i o n . •argues that a wage cut now w i l l render the long-term p o s i t i o n of both company and employees more secure. •refutes the technological innovations argument and proposes maintaining the present wage rate. -notes that Management has not increased the rent on employees' houses. -contends that i n the l i g h t of the buoyant economy the men won't accept a wage cut. •WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS •notes increased cost of raw materials and ra i s e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i q u i d a t i n g the company. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS, asking Labor to r e - consider i t s p o s i t i o n i n the interim -expresses concern that Labor didn't know about Management's cost problem, implying that Labor has not done i t s "homework". -re i t e r a t e s the precedent f o r a wage cut. -offers 10$ plus a cost of l i v i n g bonus, both based on increase i n consumer p r i c e index. 78(a) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 5 (continued) LABOR (n=l) MANAGEMENT (n=2) -disagrees with t h i s bonus p r i n c i p l e and demands " f i r m and committed hourly ra t e " . -comments on the enterprising and r e - sourceful manner i n which Management has met cost problems i n the past and expresses confidence i n t h e i r a b i l i t y to do so now. - c r i t i c i z e s Labor's u n f a m i l i a r i t y with the unstable nature of the industry, r e i t e r - ating the argument of increased cost of -suggests that Management should have raw materials, foreseen t h i s problem and done some- thing about i t e a r l i e r . -states that there was no way of p r e d i c t i n g t h i s cost problem, - c r i t i c i z e s Labor's lack of information again. Suggests a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings are appropriate and states that Management -refuses to commit the workers to w i l l abide by any decision made thereby, a r b i t r a t i o n proceedings. -notes that the union's proposal i s not a "padded" one. -contends that Labor i s not w i l l i n g to bargain. -chides Management for "berating" Labor's unwillingness to "horsetrade".-states that Labor appears to have a "closed mind". -refuses t h i s o f f e r , commenting, "Well,-makes " f i n a l o f f e r " of 16c. we ' l l see you at c o n c i l i a t i o n . " Notes that the "freshness" of Labor's approach to bargaining seems to have escaped Management. -one management representative leaves, s t a t i n g that he i s l a t e f o r an appointment. 78(f) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 7 LABOR (n=l) MANAGEMENT (n=2) -recognizes that Management's p r o f i t p i c t u r e i s not a good one; at the same time contends that the workers must have a wage increase, -proposes an hourly increase of 14*sC i n each year of a 2-year agreement, based on the cost of l i v i n g increase. Notes that t h i s leaves no room f o r bargaining downwards and that shaving of t h i s f i g u r e w i l l lead to r e j e c t i o n and possible s t r i k e . -agrees with Labor's assessment of Manage- ment's unfortunate p r o f i t p i c t u r e , -contends that Labor i s not fir m on -shows i n t e r e s t i n a 2-year agreement, the 2-year contract proposal, but f e l t t h i s would give Management a better opportunity to project t h e i r costs. -recognizes that the workers need an i n - crease to keep up with the re s t of the community. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -notes that Labor's proposal cannot be accepted outright; instead, o f f e r s increases on a 6-month i n t e r v a l basis to provide a "breathing space" for Management at the present time—10c i n the 1st 6 months, kht i n the 2nd 6 months, IOC i n the 3rd -agrees that t h i s i s reasonable since 6 months, and 4%c i n the 4th 6 months. the l a r g e s t amount comes i n the f i r s t h a l f of each year. States that the of f e r w i l l be recommended to the membership. 78(g) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; GROUP 8 LABOR (n=l) -proposes hourly increase of 90$ (based on a mis i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the pro- jected p r o f i t a n alysis which was sub- sequently corrected by E). -suggests Management i n e f f i c i e n c y as possible cause and observes that Labor has never agreed to subsidize i n e f f i c i e n c y . -raises the question, "Should we put t h i s operation out of business pain- l e s s l y ? " MANAGEMENT (h«=2) comments on Management's poor p r o f i t p i c t u r e due to increased operating costs. -proposes 50c increase as an incentive to increase output to overcome the present d i f f i c u l t y . Notes that t h i s i s a drop of 40c from the o r i g i n a l demand. -refuses to entertain t h i s p o l i c y and rai s e s the question of a 2-year agree- ment, t e n t a t i v e l y suggesting 32c i n 1st year and 27c i n the 2nd year. -observes that t h i s o f f e r i s a step i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , but unacceptable. -comments that I f the two par t i e s can- not move c l o s e r an impasse i s near. -recognizes Management's d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n and o f f e r s a formula of 22c i n the 1st year and 27$ i n the 2nd y e a r - -states that i n the " s p i r i t of com- promise" Labor w i l l accept 18c i n the 1st year and 18c i n the 2nd year. -contends that the i n e f f i c i e n c y argument does not apply to t h i s company. -states that Management wants a year of "breathing space", hoping for an upswing i n market conditions next year. Proposes "holding the l i n e " on wages and notes a precedent for t h i s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p . •argues that Management must have a reason- able return (4%) on invested c a p i t a l , and th i s requires holding the l i n e on wages. •shows i n t e r e s t i n a 2-year agreement, ob- serving that 2 years of labor peace would be desirable (WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS), •proposes 10c i n the 1st year and 12c i n the 2nd year. •contends that the 50C demand must be d r a s t i c a l l y reduced or t h e i r w i l l be l i t t l e basis for further discussion. -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -observes that the shareholders w i l l not accept t h i s demand, and as a " f i n a l o f f e r " proposes 16c i n the 1st year and 20c i n the 2nd year, based on an industry precedent. -accepts, remarking that Management w i l l be fortunate to stay i n business next year. 78(h) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS; GROUP 9 LABOR (n=2) MANAGEMENT (n=2) -proposes hourly increase of 30c based on (1) pattern of settlements i n B.C. and (2) past p r o f i t s , estimated at 10% of company assets by Labor. -suggests that Management w i l l have to open i t s books and show Labor that p r o f i t s were le s s than 10% of assets, -states that a t e s t sales s i t u a t i o n showed a p r i c e increase would not increase p r o f i t s , -observes that s e l l i n g the business i s a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y , -suggests two a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r r e a l i z i n g adequate return (6%) on invested c a p i t a l : (1) lower wages by 200/hour, or (2) i n - crease wages by 20c while reducing s t a f f from 10 to 9 employees, -notes that Management does not expect Labor to subsidize the business, but that t h e i r help i s needed i n terms of ideas f o r -suggests a product modification that increased p r o d u c t i v i t y at the present time, might make the company more competi- t i v e . -contends that costs of r e t o o l i n g would be -states that more s p e c i f i c information p r o h i b i t i v e * on past p r o f i t s i s required i n order to judge whether or not the present problem i s temporary. States that Labor wants to help restore the company's competitive market p o s i t i o n . - s t a t e s that Management doesn't intend to "horse trade" as i n the past, but rather w i l l open the books to Labor, -observes that the s t a f f reduction would be through retirement rather than a l a y o f f , - r e i t e r a t e s Labor's desire to look at -stresses need f o r increased p r o d u c t i v i t y , the books e s p e c i a l l y i n l i g h t of "high" p r o f i t s i n previous years. -asks whether or not Labor agrees that Management should expect to r e a l i z e 6% on invested c a p i t a l , and that the 20c o f f e r -contends that no commitment can be i s f a i r , made before seeing the books. Observes that Labor i s w i l l i n g to cooperate, -suggests that something more than 20c might be the inducement necessary f o r increased p r o d u c t i v i t y . -suggests adjournment and sets meeting f o r next day to open the books. States that Management i s concerned with the worker's atti t u d e s and f o r t h i s reason Management doesn't want to hold anything back. 78(i) SEQUENCE OF EVENTS: GROUP 10 LABOR (n=l) -proposes hourly Increase of 30c -observes that Management's problems are appreciated, but the r i s i n g cost of l i v i n g makes a wage cut unaccept- able. -states that the " l i b e r a l " f i g u r e of 30c i s negotiable. -comments, "When s h a l l we take a s t r i k e vote?" - r e f e r s to r i s i n g l i v i n g costs. -questions soundness of t h i s proposal, s t a t i n g disagreement with t h i s p r i n c i p l e . -states that Labor i s w i l l i n g to con- si d e r a 2-year agreement. Asks what Management's p r o f i t was l a s t year. MANAGEMENT (n=2) -states that increases i n raw material and d i s t r i b u t i o n costs force Management to request a 20c reduction i n present rates. -contends that Management needs "breathing space" and appeals to Labor to make the employees aware of Management's d i f f i c u l t i e s , -WITHDRAWS TO DISCUSS -states d e s i r e to avoid a s t r i k e -contends that j u s t maintaining present wage rates w i l l cause the company to go back- wards, but Management i s w i l l i n g to "hold the l i n e on wages" f o r the coming year. -observes that Management has made no " d i r e c t o f f e r " so f a r , and a l l Labor can do i s return t h i s information to the membership. -contends that t h i s i s "nothing more than a slap i n the face" i n l i g h t of settlements i n comparable i n d u s t r i e s . States that Labor w i l l shave some o f f the 30c demand, but nothing l i k e that. -suggests 40c over 2 years. - r e p l i e s that L a b o r ' s " f i n a l suggestion" i s 10c i n the 1st 6 months, 10c i n the 2nd 6 months and 20c i n the 2nd year. -suggests maintaining present contract with a "wage reopener" i n 6 months subject to c o n c i l i a t i o n and a r b i t r a t i o n i n the hope that the company's market p o s i t i o n w i l l improve i n the next 6 months. -agrees that i t i s best to s e t t l e now. -contends that the problem i s one of convin- cing the workers of Management's problems, which i n i t i a l l y involves convincing t h e i r representative. - r e p l i e s $35,000 (the correct f i g u r e ) , and notes that Management could make more by s e l l i n g the business and putting the money i n the bank. -proposes a 10c increase as the most Manage- ment can o f f e r . -asks what Labor's p o s i t i o n i s . -asks i f 10c i n 1st year and 30c i n 2nd year i s acceptable. -accepts. 79 Overview; Reviewing the sequence of events which took place i n each of the eight bargaining sessions, i t i s apparent that considerable s i m i l a r i t y e x i s t s i n the approaches taken by members of a party from one session to the next* In view of t h i s consistency, construction of a general p i c t u r e of the bargaining sessions, based upon both the r e s u l t s of the content analysis and the information contained i n the summaries, i s appropriate. Although we recognize that c e r t a i n behaviors were unique to each session, and that these behaviors played an important r o l e i n determining the progress and eventual outcome of p a r t i c u l a r sessions, the following overview of the "negotiations" i s considered to do no i n j u s t i c e to the data. The dominant theme of the "negotiations", as indicated by the attention i t was given by both labor and management representatives, was the p o s i t i o n taken by Management on the wage issue. Included i n t h i s p o s i t i o n were i n i t i a l proposals of a wage reduction, renewal of the e x i s t i n g wage rate, or the granting of a s l i g h t wage increase. Management attempted to j u s t i f y these proposals by arguing that unforeseen increases i n raw material and d i s t r i b u t i o n costs would make i t e s p e c i a l l y d i f f i c u l t to meet t r a d i t i o n a l wage demands i n the coming year. I t was contended that r e a l i z a t i o n of a "reasonable return" on Invested c a p i t a l was c r i t i c a l , and t h i s required that Management be allowed a "breathing space" i n the year ahead. This argument frequently involved a d i r e c t appeal f o r the sympathetic understanding and cooperation of Labor (the author regarded t h i s approach as bargaining from a p o s i t i o n of weakness rather than from a p o s i t i o n of strength). The information which Management imparted during the "negotiations" was mainly of a f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l nature, 80 emphasizing past p r o f i t s , present costs, and projected p r o f i l e s . In return they requested feedback from Labor p r i m a r i l y i n terms of the at t i t u d e s which t h i s information engendered concerning the present d i f f i c u l t i e s f acing Management. In response to the proposals, Labor expressed some scepticism about the company's f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s as presented by Management. I t was suggested that these d i f f i c u l t i e s were not as serious as had been envisioned by Management and frequently Labor proposed s p e c i f i c methods f o r overcoming the problems. These proposals involved suggestions as to the ease with which Management's problems could be overcome v i a such measures as small p r i c e increases, plant e f f i c i e n c y programs, and increased labor-management cooperation. In addition, a f i r m stand was taken against Management's plea f o r the necessary "reasonable return" on invested c a p i t a l , based on the argument that Labor could not be expected to subsidize Management " i n e f f i c i e n c y " . In presenting t h e i r own p o s i t i o n , Labor emphasized how they would l i k e things to be, or how they thought things ought to be. I n i t i a l demands tended to be i n the area of a 10% yearly wage increase, with r i s i n g costs of l i v i n g and the workers' r i g h t to share i n the "good l i f e " c i t e d as grounds f o r these demands. In terms of a possible s e t t l e - ment, Labor frequently observed that t h e i r demands represented a wage which the workers themselves were requesting and that r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r accepting any o f f e r from Management was the prerogative of these workers rather than t h e i r elected representatives. Few statements of a threatening nature were made during the "negotiations"; those by Labor consisted of straightforward references to the l i k e l i h o o d of a s t r i k e , whereas Management tended to make more subtle 81 remarks about the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e l l i n g the business. In addition, attacks or questions which implied a lack of c r e d i b i l i t y i n the arguments presented by the other party were dire c t e d mainly towards act u a l bargain- ing p o s i t i o n s taken, rather than towards the i n t e g r i t y of the other party. Such questions were expressed more frequently by Labor. F i n a l l y , although both Labor and Management expressed t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n a manner which suggested a high degree of determination or f i n a l i t y , the process of mutual compromise on the wage issue was apparent, with eventual settlements f a l l i n g i n the area of a 6% yearly increase. 82 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS As an a l t e r n a t i v e to formal game research, the present study explored a p a r t i c u l a r real-world c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n , the labor-management bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . The study was designed to provide information concerning ( i ) ways i n which "Labor" and "Management" perceive the bargaining r e l a t i o n - ship, as w e l l as ( i i ) approaches to negotiations adopted by each party. Subjects were 19 management representatives and 15 labor representa- t i v e s , a l l with formal bargaining experience i n labor-management negotiations. Representatives of both p a r t i e s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n 3- and 4- person groups i n sessions which lasted approximately 3 hours. Most of the perceptual information was c o l l e c t e d using an opinion questionnaire which dealt with s p e c i f i c aspects of labor r e l a t i o n s , and semantic d i f f e r e n t i a l - type scales. On the questionnaire, subjects indicated the opinions which they thought t h e i r own party, i n general, held, as w e l l as the opinions they thought the other party, i n general, held. On the scales, subjects rated t h e i r own party, the other party, and indicated how they thought t h e i r own party would be rated by the other party. Negotiating information was obtained using a simulated bargaining problem which cast management representatives i n the r o l e of business partners and labor representatives as the elected o f f i c i a l s representing employees of the business. The two par t i e s "negotiated" a wage settlement on the basi s of a projected wage and p r o f i t analysis adapted from Sawyer's bargaining board technique. C e r t a i n summary s t a t i s t i c a l features of the bargaining session were recorded; a l s o , a formal content analysis was conducted, based on audio t r a n s c r i p t s . F i n a l l y , at the conclusion of each bargaining session, the questionnaire was readministered f o r the purposes of assessing personal 83 opinions and perceptual accuracy. On th i s second administration, labor and management representatives indicated t h e i r own opinions as w e l l as the opinions they thought each of the other representatives held. In a d d i t i o n to providing information of a purely d e s c r i p t i v e nature, the tasks employed allowed c e r t a i n comparisons to be made with i n each sample and between the two samples ( i . e . , the labor sample and the manage- ment sample). In the remainder of t h i s chapter, the major r e s u l t s and implications of these comparisons w i l l be reviewed. Some i n d i r e c t support f o r the notion that "Labor" and "Management" value tension and c o n f l i c t d i f f e r e n t l y i s provided by the f i n d i n g that Labor was more l i k e l y to perceive the two pa r t i e s as holding opposite opinions on mutally relevant issues. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s f i n d i n g i s consistent with the argument that "Labor" should prefer c o n f l i c t to be sustained, at l e a s t at some l e v e l , whereas "Management" should prefer the absence of such c o n f l i c t . One im p l i c a t i o n of t h i s f i n d i n g i s that the symmetric or m i r r o r - l i k e structure and assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma game do not accurately represent the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p . In p a r t i c u l a r , the t r a d i t i o n a l assumption that both p a r t i e s value highly that outcome which resolves the c o n f l i c t , i s not e n t i r e l y appropriate i n t h i s context. The observation that Labor and Management responded d i f f e r e n t l y when asked to make the same kinds of perceptual judgements suggests that the procedure adopted i n t h i s study may have some p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s . For example, i t might be u s e f u l to administer the present or s i m i l a r questionnaires to labor and management representatives involved i n d i f f e r e n t bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and at d i f f e r e n t times during the 84 tenure of contracts. Comparisons of the kind made i n the present study may have some p r e d i c t i v e value i n terms of a crude index of the l e v e l of tension, or as a means of i s o l a t i n g p o t e n t i a l sources of c o n f l i c t and i t s r e s o l u t i o n . When the p r a c t i c a l problem of d i s p l a c i n g misperceptions with more accurate perceptions i s considered, the tendency to underestimate the favorable manner (or to overestimate the i n i m i c a l manner) i n which one's party i s evaluated by the other, i s p o t e n t i a l l y important. In p a r t i c u l a r , the introduction of cr e d i b l e information concerning the existence of r e l a t i v e l y favorable d i s p o s i t i o n s might be expected to have a mitigating e f f e c t upon the climate of an extended bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . However, d i f f i c u l t i e s can be anticipated should e i t h e r party attempt to convey such information. Since both view the other as the l e s s honest and les s t r u s t - worthy party i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p , attempts to communicate actual d i s - positions may be viewed as acts of deception ( t h i s communication problem would be s i n g u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t f o r "Management" to overcome since "Labor's" misperceptions may serve a function i n sustaining tension and c o n f l i c t ) . Other perceptual findings indicated that a labor representative i s l i k e l y to see other members of h i s own reference group ("Labor" i n general) as holding opinions s i m i l a r to h i s , while a management representative i s le s s l i k e l y to see other members of h i s reference group ("Management" i n general) as sharing h i s opinions. Evidence from the present samples of "Labor" and "Management" did not support a d i s t i n c t i o n between the two par t i e s on t h i s b a s i s . There was no greater consensus among the personal opinions of labor representatives than there was among the personal opinions of management representatives; nor was there any more marked agreement among labor representatives than among management representatives as to 85 just what opinions are held by the majority of thei r own colleagues. I t was tentatively concluded that i f exogenous "party l i n e s " do e x i s t , the "Labor party l i n e " i s no more w e l l defined for labor representatives than any "Management party l i n e " i s for management representatives. The major findings concerning verbal interaction during "negotiations" are reiterated below: (1) Both parties tended to focus attention upon Management's position. (2) Management presented their position primarily as one of d i f f i c u l t y or weakness rather than one of strength, whereas Labor gave equal emphasis to both aspects of their position. (3) Labor's position was characterized by purposive rather than factual arguments, whereas Management made equal use of both types of argument. (4) Both parties expressed statements with a high degree of determination or f i n a l i t y as opposed to f l e x i b i l i t y . (5) Labor was more l i k e l y to express doubt concerning c r e d i b i l i t y of the other party. (6) Both parties were more l i k e l y to express scepticism concerning the other party's bargaining position than the i r i n t e g r i t y . (7) Management imparted primarily factual or s t a t i s t i c a l information as opposed to a t t i t u d i n a l information, "whereas Labor imparled both kinds of information to the same extent. (8) Management requested primarily a t t i t u d i n a l information as opposed to factual or s t a t i s t i c a l information, whereas Labor requested both kinds of information to the same extent, (9) Labor was more l i k e l y to s h i f t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for decisions 86 (to the membership). In general, these findings are viewed as r e f l e c t i n g constraints unique to the labor-management r e l a t i o n s h i p . For example, possession of extensive f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l information i s a necessary r e q u i s i t e to, and consequence of, managing a business. For t h i s reason "Management" i s l i k e l y predisposed to a r e l a t i v e l y f a c t u a l or s t a t i s t i c a l presentation of t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n negotiations. S i m i l a r l y , the desire to change an e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , the desire to obtain greater compensation f o r one's e f f o r t ) , might be expected to predispose "Labor" to a r e l a t i v e l y purposive presentation of t h e i r p o s i t i o n . The kind of information that i s exchanged during negotiations then, i s somewhat l i m i t e d by various constraints of t h i s nature. While the element of constraint i s apparent i n most of the f i n d i n g s , c e r t a i n negotiating behaviors appear to have an e x p l i c i t s t r a t e g i c component. More p r e c i s e l y , even though s t r u c t u r a l features of the labor- management r e l a t i o n s h i p make i t more l i k e l y f o r one party to engage i n a p a r t i c u l a r kind of negotiating behavior, that behavior could conceivably be adopted by e i t h e r party. In t h i s regard, i t would be important to confirm the existence i n r e a l negotiations of such behaviors as emphasizing the weakness of one's p o s i t i o n ("crying poor"), manipulating negotiations so that the p o s i t i o n of one party i s the dominant theme, and s h i f t i n g r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r decisions. Future research might then be directed towards exploring the t a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of these behaviors i n r e a l negotiations, as w e l l as i n the laboratory context, possibly with the aid of various bargaining boards and communication r e s t r a i n t s . 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson^ D. J . , and Sanford, R. 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The need to look good to one's constituents plays a very important r o l e i n determining a labour representative's bargaining behavior. 2. In contract negotiations management i n t e r - prets the goals of labour f a i r l y accurately. 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labour's r i g h t to s t r i k e . 4. In an industry i n "the best of a l l possible worlds" there would be no need f o r unions. 5. Most s t r i k e s are p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e management. 6. In negotiating a settlement with the other party I would l i k e to be completely honest, but I am a f r a i d that my honesty would be taken advantage of. 7. Those o f f i c i a l s of the Fisherman and A l l i e d Workers Union now serving prison terms should be released immediately. 8. Management i s genuinely concerned with the needs of the worker. 9. In contract negotiations, one should seek to acquire every possible advantage over the other party. 93 10. In bargaining disputes, labour r a r e l y seems to appreciate the problems facing management. 11. The union shop places undesirable barriers i n the way of communication between manage- ment and employees. 12. The closed shop places undesirable b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees. 13. I think that a frank interchange of idea§ between l o c a l labour leaders and top manage- ment personnel could a l l e v i a t e much of the tension that e x i s t s i n i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s today. 14. In general, labour-management r e l a t i o n s could be improved. 15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands are an e s s e n t i a l part of the bargaining process. 16. Labour i s more l i k e l y to take advantage of contract loopholes than i s management. 17. A good labour representative can usually do what he thinks i s r i g h t i n labour-manage- ment bargaining s i t u a t i o n s and not worry about looking good to h i s constituents. 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker are overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who represent him. 19. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with management's r i g h t to lock out. 20. Labour people are more s e n s i t i v e to s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than are management people. 21. The p r o v i n c i a l labour laws favor manage- ment . 22. The r i g h t to s t r i k e i s an indispe n s i b l e part of the labour-management r e l a t i o n s h i p . 23. Persons who think a state of mutual t r u s t can be established between labour and manage- ment are being u n r e a l i s t i c . 24. Most s t r i k e s are p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n - f l e x i b l e labour. 25. The p r o v i n c i a l labour laws favor labour. 94 APPENDIX B: SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL-TYPE SCALES Heading: e i t h e r LABOUR or MANAGEMENT -3 -2 - 1 0 +1 +2 +3 H 1 1 1 1 1 h bad good suspicious t r u s t i n g weak strong competitive cooperative dishonest honest untrustworthy trustworthy 95 APPENDIX C: 30-ITEM F-SCALE The following i s a questionnaire concerning what people think and f e e l about a number of important s o c i a l and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below i s your "personal opinion". We have t r i e d to cover many d i f f e r e n t and opposing points of view; you may f i n d yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing j u s t as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people f e e l the same as you do. Mark each statement on the answer sheet according to how much you agree or disagree with i t . Please mark every one. +1 : I agree a l i t t l e -1 : I disagree a l i t t l e +2 : I agree on the whole -2 : I disagree on the whole +3 : I agree very much -3 : I disagree very much Go r i g h t ahead now on the questionnaire. 1. Obedience and respect f o r authority are the most important v i r t u e s c h i l d r e n should le a r n . 2. No weakness or d i f f i c u l t y can hold us back i f we have enough w i l l power. 3. Science has i t s place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind. 4. Human nature being what i t i s , there w i l l always be war and c o n f l i c t . 5. Every person should have complete f a i t h i n some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question. 6. When a person has a problem or x^orry, i t Is best f o r him not to think about i t , but to keep busy with more cheerful things. 7. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people. 8. What the youth needs most i s s t r i c t d i s c i p l i n e , rugged determination, and the w i l l to work and f i g h t f o r family and country. 9. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places. 10. Nowadays when so many d i f f e r e n t kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself e s p e c i a l l y c a r e f u l l y against catching an i n f e c t i o n or disease from them. 11. An Insult to our honor should always be punished. 12. Young people sometimes get r e b e l l i o u s ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and s e t t l e down. 96 13. I t i s best to use some prewar a u t h o r i t i e s i n Germany to keep order and prevent chaos. 14. What th i s country needs most, more than laws and p o l i t i c a l programs, i s a few courageous, t i r e l e s s , devoted leaders i n whom the people can put t h e i r f a i t h . 15. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on c h i l d r e n , deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be p u b l i c l y whipped, or worse. 16. People can be divided into two d i s t i n c t classes: the weak and the strong. 17. There i s hardly anything lower than a person who does not f e e l a great love, gratitude, and respect f o r h i s parents. 18. Some day i t w i l l probably be shown that astrology can explain a l o t of things. 19. The true American way of l i f e i s disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve i t . 20. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and p r i v a t e . 21. Wars and s o c i a l troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or floo d that w i l l destroy the whole world. 22. Most of our s o c i a l problems would be solved i f we could somehow get r i d of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people. 23. The wild sex l i f e of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on i n th i s country, even i n places where people might l e a s t expect i t . 24. I f people would ta l k less and work more, everybody would be better o f f . 25. Most people don't r e a l i z e how much our l i v e s are con t r o l l e d by plo t s hatched i n secret places. 26. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished. 27. The businessman and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the a r t i s t and the professor. 28. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close f r i e n d or r e l a t i v e . 29. F a m i l i a r i t y breeds contempt. 30. Nobody ever learned anything r e a l l y important except through s u f f e r i n g . 97 APPENDIX D: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WERE MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED percentage of subjects who perceive a di f f e r e n c e of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" MANAGEMENT LABOR Items on which a differ e n c e was perceived by both labor and management representatives 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labor's r i g h t to s t r i k e . 5. Most s t r i k e s are p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e management. 8. Management i s genuinely concerned with the needs of the worker. 10. In bargaining disputes, labor r a r e l y seems to appreciate the problems facing management. 12. The closed shop places undesirable b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees. 16. Labor i s more l i k e l y to take advantage of contract loopholes than i s management. 21. The p r o v i n c i a l labor laws favor management. 95 93 79 79 69 79 74 86 95 86 58 86 84 79 98 percentage of subjects who perceive a di f f e r e n c e of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" MANAGEMENT LABOR Items on which a differ e n c e was perceived p r i m a r i l y by labor representatives 11. The union shop places undesirable b a r r i e r s i n the way of communication between management and employees. 20. Labor people are generally more se n s i t i v e to s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e s than are management people. 22. The r i g h t to s t r i k e i s an indispen s i b l e part of the labor- management r e l a t i o n s h i p . 24. Most s t r i k e s are p r e c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e labor. 32 64 53 79 21 71 42 71 Item on which a difference was perceived p r i m a r i l y by management representatives 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker are overlooked by the union o f f i c i a l s who represent him. 68 43 99 APPENDIX E: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "MANAGEMENT" IN GENERAL HOLDS number and correspond- number of number of ing percentage of sub- these sub- these sub- j e c t s who indicated jeate who j e c t s who d i f f e r e n t personal and agree with disagree perceived party the sta t e - with the opinions ment statement 3. Government should i n no way i n t e r f e r e with labor's r i g h t to s t r i k e . 9 47% 8 1 4. In an industry i n the "best of a l l possible worlds" there would be no need f or unions. 9 47% 0 9 6. In negotiating a s e t t l e - ment with the other party I would l i k e to be completely honest, but I am a f r a i d that my honesty would be taken advantage of. 7 37% 2 5 15. U n r e a l i s t i c opening o f f e r s and demands are an es s e n t i a l part of the bargaining process. 8 42% 4 4 24. Most s t r i k e s are pre c i p i t a t e d by i n f l e x i b l e labor. 8 42% 2 6 100 APPENDIX F: STATEMENTS FROM THE OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE ON WHICH LABOR REPRESENTATIVES MOST FREQUENTLY INDICATED A PERSONAL OPINION WHICH DIFFERED FROM THE OPINION THEY THOUGHT "LABOR" IN GENERAL HOLDS number and correspond- number of number of ing percentage of sub- these sub- these sub- j e c t s who indicated j e c t s who j e c t s who d i f f e r e n t personal and agree with disagree perceived party the s t a t e - with the opinions ment statement 2. In contract negotiations management i n t e r p r e t s the 7 62%* 5 2 goals of labor f a i r l y accurately. 6. In negotiating a s e t t l e - ment with the other party I would l i k e to be completely 5 36% 3 2 honest, but I am a f r a i d that my honesty would be taken advantage of. 9. In contract negotiations, one should seek to acquire 5 36% 1 4 every possible advantage over the other party. 18. Sometimes the r e a l needs of the worker are overlooked 5 36% 3 2 by the union o f f i c i a l s who represent him. *Only 13 of the 14 labor representatives responded to t h i s questionnaire item. 101 AiPENDIX G: t TEST TABLES 1. RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" AND "LABOR" BY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES (page 57): scale df_ jt £ good-bad 18 1.75 trusting-suspicious 18 4.35 <.002 strong-weak 18 2.52 <.05 honest-dishonest 18 2.18 <.05 trustworthy-untrustworthy 18 3.11 <.01 2. RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" AND "LABOR" BY LABOR REPRESENTATIVES (page 57): scale df _t _p_ good-bad 14 2.69 <.02 trusting-suspicious 14 1.31 strong-weak 14 1.14 honest-dishonest 14 3.16 <.01 trustworthy-untrustworthy 14 3.48 <.01 3. RATINGS GIVEN "MANAGEMENT" BY LABOR REPRESENTATIVES AND RATINGS MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES PREDICTED "MANAGEMENT" WOULD BE GIVEN BY "LABOR" (page 59): scale df _t £ good-bad 32 2.38 <.05 trusting-suspicious 32 1.55 strong-weak 32 <1.00 honest-dishonest 32 1.59 trustworthy-untrustworthy 32 1.88 102 4. RATINGS GIVEN "LAP^R" BY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND RATINGS LABOR REPRESENTATIVES PREDICTED "LABOR" WOULD BE GIVEN BY "MANAGEMENT" (page 59): scale good-bad trus ting-suspicious strong-weak honest-dishonest trus twor thy-unt rus twor thy M t £ 32 3.39 <.01 32 <1.00 32 <1.00 32 2.73 <.01 32 2.44 <.02 103 APPENDIX H: CATEGORIES EMPLOYED IN THE CONTENT ANALYSIS WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE BARGAINING SESSIONS factual arguments There has been a definite increase in the costs of distr ibution pf our product. purposive arguments We'd l ike to better our position in l i f e so that our children and our families can enjoy the things we are working for. reference to own position of strength We've only had one gerbil-maker leave us in the past year . . . we certainly had no trouble replacing him. 4. reference to own position of weakness . . . we have had an increase in our distribution cost of 30% and this has kicked us right in the rear end . . . we kind of thought we had things going on the road here . . . but . . . this has turned into a revolting development. 5. reference to other's position of strength . . . a small increase in the price of gerbils wouldn't do any harm anywhere . . . there's other manufacturers that want to increase (the price of) their gerbils , and they're only waiting for a leader — and you are a leader in this industry. 6. reference to other's position of weakness Really, based on your investment, your profits aren't up to 6% on capital investment here and this i sn ' t the best situation possible. 7. reference to pleasant mutual fate Let's sort of take i t easy and be reasonable about the thing so that we can get a proper profi t picture which in the f ina l analysis means everybody's security of employment is preserved. 8. reference to unpleasant mutual fate If we did close down . . . in that week you would lose somewhere around $7,000. We'd certainly lose money too over that week. 104 9. definite statements We can t e l l you right at the outset that 12% would be right out of the question. 10. tentative statements We' l l back off a l i t t l e . . . we're f lexible . 11. demands . . . right now we feel that we want a 12% increase across the board. 12. offers Well, I think we would be prepared to make an offer which would be reasonable under the circumstances of $3.30 an hour. 13. reference to time cost We've spent half an hour . . . the time i t ' s taking us, i t ' s costing us a lot of money. 14. refusals A 10c increase is nothing more than a slap in the face that this point. 15. blatant threat If we go out on the bricks then you're l ike ly to lose . . . we wouldn't go back for less than 30c and we'd increase i t back to the original figure of 12% (38c) before we went back. Don't forget that. 16. subtle threats We have been in business for a long time. . .we ' re both getting on into middle age and we could quite easily — be quite happy to — liquidate the company and take our profits and l ive in reasonable luxurious conditions. 17. attacks on the other party's position I am just wondering where you get this fantastic profit figure of $20,000 based on a 12% increase. 18. attacks on the other party's good faith I think you're beating the drum, you're asking for the moon^ and I think you're being quite unrealist ic in terms of the economy of the company. 105 19. .eference to own party's good f a i t h Now t-re'rc pretty reasonable people. 20. aference to other party's good f a i t h You've been reasonable with us throughout the term of t h i s agreement. 21. u n i f y i n g pronouns We've had one good labor r e l a t i o n s i n t h i s g e r b i l industry of ours. 22. other pronouns ( d i v i s i v e ) You haven't moved one inch out of your 10c. We've already gone down 3%. 23. reference to precedents Last year we came i n on the basis of horse-trading •— we've come i n and offered low and you've asked high . . . but t h i s year . . . 24. o f f e r s help or suggestion to ease settlement A s l i g h t increase i n the p r i c e of them (the company's product) would more than make up the p r o f i t . 25. requests data information from the other party What was the p r o f i t of the company l a s t year? 26. requests attit u d e information from the other party Would i t change your thinking very much i f you knew what our p r o f i t r e a l l y was l a s t year? 27. o f f e r s data information to the other party Maybe i t ' s going to be necessary to open the books to you because . . . our actual p r o f i t s l a s t year were i n the order of 7%. 28. o f f e r s attitude information to the other party Well . . . i t ' s my firm conviction, and I have always maintained t h i s , that any increase that the men get they have to earn. 106 29. shifts responsibil ity for decision The men w i l l not agree to hold the status quo and I very much doubt that they w i l l accept anything below $3.40. This is our problem. 30. seeks agreement . . . i f you agree that starting at exactly the same place where we are today without increasing the rates w i l l result in a profit of $25,000 to the company, then I think we've got a good starting point in our discussions.

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