Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Labour force participation rates and poverty in Canadian metropolitan areas Kunin, Roslyn 1970

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1970_A1 K85.pdf [ 3.97MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0102153.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0102153-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0102153-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0102153-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0102153-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0102153-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0102153-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0102153-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0102153.ris

Full Text

LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES AND POVERTY IN CANADIAN METROPOLITAN AREAS by R o s l y n K u n i n B.A., S i r George W i l l i a m s U n i v e r s i t y , 1963 M.A., McMaster's U n i v e r s i t y , 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Ph .D . i n the Department of Economics We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA APRIL, 1970 In presenting th i s thes is in pa r t i a l f u l f i lmen t o f the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f r ee l y ava i lab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree tha permission for extensive copying o f th is thes is fo r scho la r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives . It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th i s thes is fo r f inanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion. Department of E c O n O m U C a The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date A p r i l 28. 1970 ABSTRACT A t h e o r e t i c a l model i s developed e x p l a i n i n g p a r t i c i -p a t i o n i n the l a b o u r f o r c e i n terms of the u t i l i t y o b t a i n e d from w o r k i n g , the l i k e l i h o o d of o b t a i n i n g a j o b , and the c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h g e t t i n g a j o b . Both d i s c o u r a g e d and added worker b e h a v i o u r are e x p l a i n e d i n terms of the model and the much g r e a t e r l i k e l i h o o d of f i n d i n g e v i d e n c e of the former i s noted. R e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s i s then a p p l i e d to 1961 census t r a c t d ata f o r the major c i t i e s of Canada i n o r d e r to d i s -cover the d e t e r m i n a n t s of l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s and e s p e c i a l l y the i n f l u e n c e of unemployment ,on these r a t e s . S eparate r e g r e s s i o n s are run f o r h i g h , m i d d l e , and low i n -come t r a c t s . R e g r e s s i o n s are a l s o s e p a r a t e d by sex. For males, i t i s found t h a t unemployment, wage l e v e l s , age, e d u c a t i o n , and m a r r i a g e are i m p o r t a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a r -t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . The i n f l u e n c e of these v a r i a b l e s d i f -f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y among the income groups. A s t r o n g d i s -couraged worker e f f e c t i s found. For women, s i m i l a r r e -s u l t s are found, but c h i l d r e n , h o u s i n g c o n d i t i o n s , e t h n i c v a r i a b l e s and the unemployment and e a r n i n g r a t e s of males a l s o i n f l u e n c e t h e i r l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r . Some s l i g h t e v i d e n c e f o r added worker b e h a v i o u r was found among the h i g h e r income groups. S i m i l a r r e g r e s s i o n s were then run u s i n g 1951 census d a t a . A l t h o u g h t h e r e was evi d e n c e t h a t the i n f l u e n c e of some of the soci o - d e m o g r a p h i c v a r i a b l e s had changed over t i m e , d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r s t i l l predominated over added worker b e h a v i o u r f o r a l l groups w i t h the e x c e p t i o n of h i g h e r income women. The r e s u l t s of t h i s t h e s i s were found to conform w i t h the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d i n e a r l i e r • s t u d i e s i n the U.S. and Canada. TABLE OF CONTENTS, Page LIST OF TABLES i i LIST OF FIGURES i i i Chapter I INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 1 I I A MODEL OF LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION . . . . 27 I I I EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 1961 45 IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 1951 64 V COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS . . ' 80 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 88 APPENDIX 91 LIST OF TABLES Table Page I R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1961 46 Dependent V a r i a b l e =: MPT I I Chow Test R e s u l t s on R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1961 Data . 48 Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT I I I R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1961 54 Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT IV Chow Test R e s u l t s on R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1961 Data ,i 60 Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT V R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1951 66 Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT VI Chow Test R e s u l t s on R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1951 Data . 68 Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT VI I R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1951 71 Dependent' V a r i a b l e = FPT V I I I Chow Test R e s u l t s on R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1951 Data . 79 Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT i i LIST OF FIGURES F i g u r e Page 1 Net Income E f f e c t or A d d i t i o n a l Worker Behaviour 6 Net Wage ( S u b s t i t u t i o n ) E f f e c t or D i s c o u r a g e d Worker Behaviour 6 D i s c o u r a g e d Worker Behaviour 33 Added Worker Beh a v i o u r 36 i i i CHAPTER I I N T R O D U C T I O N AND R E V I E W OF THE L I T E R A T U R E The p u r p o s e of t h i s t h e s i s i s to examine the d e t e r -m i n a n t s of l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n by men and women i n t h e major C a n a d i a n c i t i e s and to d i s c o v e r i f any d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t between the l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s of p e o p l e a t d i f f e r e n t income l e v e l s . Such d i f f e r e n c e s would have im-p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s u c h p r o b l e m s as r e d u c i n g p o v e r t y and m i n i m i z i n g unemployment. i s p r i m a r i l y d e t e r m i n e d by the p r e v a i l i n g l e v e l of wages. However, r e c e n t e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h has r e v e a l e d t h a t the s u p p l y of l a b o u r r e s p o n d s more t o ; t h e l e v e l of unemployment t h a n to the wage l e v e l . . These f i n d i n g s have been r e c o n c i l e d by assuming t h a t movements i n wages and unemployment r a t e s a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . However, g i v e n p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t , t h i s a s s u m p t i o n no l o n g e r a p p e a r s to be j u s t i f i e d . T h e o r y would l e a d us to b e l i e v e t h a t a f a l l i n wages would o c c u r i n r e s p o n s e to r i s i n g l e v e l s of unemploy-ment. In f a c t , no s i g n i f i c a n t t e n d e n c y f o r wages to f a l l . has been o b s e r v e d i n r e c e n t d e c a d e s i n s p i t e of p e r i o d s of h i g h and f a i r l y p r o l o n g e d unemployment. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the s e c o n d c h a p t e r of t h i s t h e s i s p r e s e n t s a model w h i c h e x p l a i n s how the s u p p l y of l a b o u r c o u l d v a r y i n r e s p o n s e to changes i n Economic t h e o r y s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e s u p p l y of l a b o u r 1 2 unemployment l e v e l s r e g a r d l e s s of whether or not wages are r e s p o n s i v e to l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s . The r e m a i n i n g c h a p t e r s w i l l be devoted to t e s t i n g the model e m p i r i c a l l y , u s i n g 1961 and 1951 census d a t a . R e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s w i l l be used to f i n d the i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s and s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s w i l l be made to see i f d i f f e r e n c e s i n the i n f l u e n c e of these d e t e r m i n a n t s e x i s t among income groups. F i n a l l y , the r e s u l t s w i l l be compared to those o b t a i n e d i n e a r l i e r s t u d i e s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between p o v e r t y and the w i l l i n g -ness of i t s v i c t i m s to work i s not a new i d e a i n the f i e l d of economics. As e a r l y as the s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y , mercant-i l i s t w r i t e r s f e l t t h a t p o v e r t y was both n e c e s s a r y and s u f f i -c i e n t to induce the l a b o u r i n g c l a s s e s to undertake u s e f u l and p r o d u c t i v e work.^ Though t h i s view d i d not c o m p l e t e l y d i s a p p e a r w i t h the waning of m e r c a n t i l i s m , an a l t e r n a t i v e view was becoming more p r e v a l e n t by the time of Adam Smith. P o v e r t y , a c c o r d -i n g to Smith, was not an i n c e n t i v e to l a b o u r . On the con-t r a r y , h i g h wages were n e c e s s a r y to induce and enable people to produce e f f e c t i v e l y . Samuel Mencher, Poor Law to Poverty Program^ Economics Security P o l i c y in B r i t a i n and United States ( P i t t s b u r g h : U n i -v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1967), Chap. I . 3 The l i b e r a l reward of l a b o u r . . . i n c r e a s e s the i n d u s t r y of the common pe o p l e . The wages of l a b o u r are the encouragement of i n d u s t r y , w h i c h , l i k e every o t h e r human q u a l i t y , improves i n p r o p o r t i o n to the encouragement i t rer-c e i v e s . A p l e n t i f u l s u b s i s t e n c e i n r c r e a s e s the b o d i l y s t r e n g t h of the l a b -o u r e r , and the c o m f o r t a b l e hope of b e t -t e r i n g h i s c o n d i t i o n , and of ending h i s days perhaps i n ease and p l e n t y , a n i -mates him to e x e r t t h a t s t r e n g t h to the utmost. Where wages aire h i g h , a c c o r d i n g -l y , we s h a l l always f i n d the workmen more a c t i v e , d i l i g e n t , and e x p e d i t i o u s , than where they are low. 2 Thus, v e r y e a r l y i n the s c i e n c e of economics, a d i -chotomy arose . On the one hand, t h e r e were those (such as the m e r c a n t i l i s t s ) who f e l t t h a t p o v e r t y encouraged people to work and i n d e e d , was a n e c e s s a r y i n c e n t i v e . On the 3 o t h e r hand, t h e r e were those (e.g. Smith) who b e l i e v e d the • o p p o s i t e J T h i s c o n f l i c t s t i l l e x i s t s i n c u r r e n t l a b o u r market t h e o r y , o n l y now one r e f e r s to the ' a d d i t i o n a l w o r ker' hypo-t h e s i s or the ' d i s c o u r a g e d worker' h y p o t h e s i s . The former h y p o t h e s i s m a i n t a i n s t h a t low wages and/or h i g h unemployment w i l l f o r c e people i n t o the l a b o u r f o r c e who might n o t , o t h e r -Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776) ( e d . ) , Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern L i b r a r y , 1937), p. 81. 3Ibid.i pp. 82-83. 4 w i s e , choose to work.. An example i s the w i f e of the low-income or unemployed man who must c o n t r i b u t e to the f a m i l y income, but who would r e a l l y p r e f e r s t a y i n g home and p r e ^ sumably w i l l do so as soon as c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e r m i t . The ' d i s c o u r a g e d w o r k e r ' . h y p o t h e s i s m a i n t a i n s t h a t poor l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s have the o p p o s i t e e f f e c t . P o t e n t i a l workers now f e e l t h a t t h e i r chances of g e t t i n g a job are much reduced and any job they do get w i l l o f f e r them much l e s s monetary and p s y c h i c income. Much of the work t h a t has been done r e c e n t l y has been s e e k i n g to d e t e r -mine to what e x t e n t each of these hypotheses i s o p e r a t i v e . The remainder of t h i s c h a p t e r w i l l be concerned w i t h the key a r t i c l e s of the c u r r e n t decade. F i r s t , I s h a l l examine s t u d i e s done i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Canada on these h y p o t h e s e s . Second, I w i l l r e v i e w r e l e v a n t U.S. s t u d i e s on p ove r t y . A l t h o u g h Jacob M i n c e r ' s c l a s s i c s t u d y , "Labour Force 4 P a r t i c i p a t i o n of M a r r i e d Women" d e a l s w i t h o n l y one r a t h e r a t y p i c a l p a r t of the l a b o u r f o r c e , t h e r e i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r examining i t . F i r s t , i t has become a c l a s s i c i n the f i e l d . Second, s t u d i e s have shown t h a t l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n Jacob M i n c e r , "Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n of M a r r i e d Women: A Study of Labor S u p p l y , " Aspects of Labor Economics, A Conference of the N a t i o n a l Bureau Committee f o r Economic Research ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962). 5 by a d u l t males i s remarkably s t a b l e r e l a t i v e to o t h e r l a b - , our f o r c e groups and i s not v e r y r e s p o n s i v e to changes i n such v a r i a b l e s as unemployment r a t e s or wage l e v e l s . Hence, much of the v a r i a b i l i t y i n the t o t a l l a b o u r f o r c e can be e x p l a i n e d by the b e h a v i o u r of 'secondary w o r k e r s ' such as m a r r i e d f e m a l e s . A study of M i n c e r ' s t h e o r y r e q u i r e s the i n t r o d u c t i o n of new terms.' Under the a d d i t i o n a l worker h y p o t h e s i s , we saw t h a t a f a l l i n wages would l e a d to a r i s e i n l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . I f we.assume t h a t a person's a l t e r n a t i v e uses of time c o n s i s t o n l y of wage-work or l e i s u r e , a f a l l i n wages would r e s u l t i n an i n c r e a s e i n l e i s u r e . With goods d i v i d e d i n t o wage goods (goods bought w i t h wages) and l e i s u r e , we see t h a t the a d d i t i o n a l worker h y p o t h e s i s be-comes the 'income e f f e c t ' of demand t h e o r y . T h i s e f f e c t i s p o s i t i v e between wages and l e i s u r e s i n c e - l e i s u r e i s a 'normal' good and, t h e r e f o r e n e g a t i v e between wages and work. Under the d i s c o u r a g e d worker h y p o t h e s i s , bad l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s and f a l l i n g wages would cause f a l l i n g l a b -our f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . A g a i n , t r a n s l a t i n g t h i s i n t o a w o r k - l e i s u r e . c h o i c e , a r i s e i n wages w i l l make the p r i c e of l e i s u r e r i s e , thus making l e i s u r e a r e l a t i v e l y more expenr s i v e good. Hence, a c c o r d i n g to the s u b s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t of demand t h e o r y , l e s s l e i s u r e w i l l be consumed and more l a b o u r 6 m a r k e t a c t i v i t y w i l l t a k e p l a c e . T h i s we w i l l c a l l t h e 'wage e f f e c t ' . T h e s e e f f e c t s a r e s h o w n i n F i g u r e s 1 a n d 2. F i g u r e 1 N e t I n c o m e E f f e c t o r A d d i t i o n a l W o r k e r B e h a v i o u r e a r n i n g s p e r u n i t o f t i m e l e i s u r e p e r u n i t o f t i m e F i g u r e 2 N e t Wage ( S u b s t i t u t i o n ) E f f e c t o r D i s c o u r a g e d W o r k e r B e h a v i o u r e a r n i n g s p e r u n i t o f t i m e l e i s u r e p e r u n i t o f t i m e 7 A d d i t i o n a l and d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r are u s u a l l y e x p l a i n e d i n terms of the unemployment r a t e r a t h e r than i n terms of wage l e v e l s . The c o n v e r s i o n from income/ s u b s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t s to added/discouraged.worker e f f e c t s i s made by assuming t h a t wage l e v e l s (annual e a r n i n g s i f not h o u r l y r a t e s ) move i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s to unemployment. However, g i v e n the e x i s t i n g downward s t i c k i n e s s of wages even w i t h v e r y h i g h r a t e s of unemployment, the t h e o r y would be improved i f the l i n k between wages l e v e l s and unemploy-ment were not r e q u i r e d . A t h e o r y which does not r e q u i r e t h i s l i n k i s p r e s e n t e d i n Chapter I I . The c o n c l u s i o n s of M i n c e r ' s study are as f o l l o w s : (1) the wage e f f e c t tends to be c o n s i d e r a b l y s t r o n g e r than the income e f f e c t ; (2) the wage e f f e c t i s weakened by the presence of young c h i l d r e n . " ' These f i n d i n g s are c o n f i r m e d on o t h e r data l a t e r i n the study;*' (3) t r a n s i t o r y changes i n income are much more l i k e l y to induce changes i n w i v e s ' l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a -t i o n than those of permanent income.^ M i n c e r shows t h i s by -M i n c e r , op. c i t . , p. 77. 6Ibid.J p.. 88. ^Ibid.j p. 80 and f o l l o w i n g . 8 n o t i n g t h a t more educated men tend to have h i g h e r l i f e t i m e e a r n i n g s (permanent income) and a s t e e p e r age income p r o -f i l e than those w i t h l e s s e d u c a t i o n . He a l s o notes a h i g h l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e among wives of young men w i t h h i g h e d u c a t i o n l e v e l s and concludes t h a t t h e i r work-i n g i s p r i m a r i l y to f i l l the gap between low p r e s e n t ( t r a n -s i t o r y ) income and the h i g h e r permanent income l e v e l s . T h i s seems l i k e a r e a s o n a b l e h y p o t h e s i s a l t h o u g h more h i g h l y edu-cated men tend to marry b e t t e r educated women and e d u c a t i o n i n women may r e f l e c t a t a s t e f o r market work. I f v a l i d , M i n c e r ' s f i n d i n g s about the e f f e c t s of t r a n s i t o r y v e r s u s permanent income are i m p o r t a n t f o r the study of p o v e r t y problems. His c o n c l u s i o n s i m p l y t h a t i t i s not low income per se3 but o n l y low income r e l a t i v e to permanent or expected income t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t i n i n d u c i n g m a r r i e d women to work. In poor f a m i l i e s , incomes are low; b u t , i n g e n e r a l , they are not expected to r i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y over t i m e . Hence, t h i s inducement to poor wives to r a i s e i n -come by working does not e x i s t . 8 Cain's study on m a r r i e d female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s 9 tends to c o n f i r m M i n c e r ' s f i n d i n g s . However, C a i n goes f u r -t h e r than M i n c e r i n h i s a n a l y s i s of the non-white l a b o u r mar-Glen G. C a i n , Married Women in the Labour Market: An Economic Analysis ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1966). Ibid., pp. 52-71, 9 k e t . Negro wives p a r t i c i p a t e more i n the l a b o u r f o r c e cet. par., than w h i t e wives a l t h o u g h t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s are not r i s i n g as q u i c k l y over time. While t h e i r r esponse to changes i n wages i s g r e a t e r t h a n . t h a t of w h i t e w i v e s , t h e i r response to f a m i l y income and the presence of c h i l d r e n i s l e s s . C a i n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r the h i g h e r l a b -our market a c t i v i t y of non-white wives show t h a t b l a c k mar-r i a g e s are l e s s s e c u r e , thus i n d u c i n g b l a c k women to remain i n the l a b o u r f o r c e w h i l e m a r r i e d . He a l s o b e l i e v e s t h a t b l a c k females are d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t l e s s than b l a c k males. He a l s o suggests t h a t s m a l l and crowded q u a r t e r s en-courage women to work o u t s i d e the home by r e d u c i n g the amount of housework n e c e s s a r y and by p r o v i d i n g the presence of othe r a d u l t s a b l e to h e l p w i t h housework and the care of c h i l d r e n . The v a r i a b l e he chooses to r e p r e s e n t t h i s f a c t o r (the per cent of husband/wife f a m i l i e s w i t h o u t t h e i r own household) t u r n s out to have a p o s i t i v e - a n d s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t i n h i s r e g r e s s i o n on m a r r i e d female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . ^ We t u r n now to s t u d i e s concerned w i t h the e f f e c t s of changes i n l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , e s p e c i a l l y as these changes r e l a t e d to the problems of unemployment and C a i n , o p . c i t . > p. 81. Ibid, j p. 83. 10 the g o a l of p r o v i d i n g ' f u l l ' employment. In an i n t e r e s t i n g 12 a r t i c l e , A l f r e d T e l i a d i s c u s s e d t h i s problem and was l e d to expect a d i s c o u r a g e d worker r e a c t i o n which h i s e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s l a t e r c o n f i r m e d . The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s d i s -couraged worker phenomenon bode r a t h e r i l l f o r a f u l l em-ployment p o l i c y . For example, d u r i n g a r e c e s s i o n the govern l e n t p r a c t i c e s a program which i n c r e a s e s employment. T h i s , of c o u r s e , absorbs some of the unemployed. However, the im-proved l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s now a t t r a c t more ( j o b l e s s ) workers i n t o the l a b o u r f o r c e so t h a t a c t u a l unemployment r a t e s are not lowered by n e a r l y so much as a n t i c i p a t e d . T e l i a a l s o notes t h a t females t e n d . t o be more r e s p o n s i v e to changes i n employment c o n d i t i o n s than males. Consequent-l y , i n c r e a s i n g j o b s f o r females would have an even s m a l l e r e f f e c t on the unemployment r a t e than would i n c r e a s i n g j o b s ' f o r males. T e l i a c o n c l u d e s "a r e l a t i v e l y f u l l employment g o a l by 1965 presupposes s u s t a i n e d employment g a i n s w e l l beyond the e x p e r i e n c e , not o n l y of r e c e n t y e a r s , but of the p o s t -13 war p e r i o d as a whole." He notes f u r t h e r t h a t growing numbers of teen-agers who have h i g h l a b o u r f o r c e e l a s t i c i t y would i n t e n s i f y the problem. 12 A l f r e d T e l i a , "The R e l a t i o n of Labor Force to Unem ployment," I n d u s t r i a l and Labor Relations Review, X V I I , No. ( A p r i l , 1964), pp. 454-69. 13 T e l i a , op. c%t.3 p. 467. 11 In "Labor Force S e n s i t i v i t y to Employment by Age, 14 Sex," T e l i a d e a l s w i t h the problem of the d i s g u i s e d unem-p l o y e d „ ( i . e . those who would e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e as demand c o n d i t i o n s approached the f u l l employment l e v e l ) . C o n s i d e r -a b l e d i s g u i s e d unemployment i s found i n the 14-24 age group of both sexes. I t was n e g l i g i b l e f o r men i n the c e n t r a l age groups, but h i g h f o r women aged 25-55. The r a t i o of d i s g u i s e d to r e p o r t e d unemployment was h i g h e r i n the female groups than i n the male groups i n a l l c a s e s . The a u t h o r then makes p r o j e c t i o n s of the amounts of d i s g u i s e d employ-ment f o r 1970; but h i s f a i l u r e to take i n t o account such f a c t o r s as the changing p a t t e r n s of s c h o o l a t t e n d a n c e among the younger age groups make h i s p r o j e c t i o n s s u s p e c t . T e l i a c o n cludes t h a t d i s g u i s e d unemployment w i l l make the a t t a i n m e n t of f u l l employment g o a l s more d i f f i c u l t , es-p e c i a l l y f o r younger workers and middle-aged women whose l a b o u r f o r c e e l a s t i c i t i e s are f a i r l y h i g h . However, v e r y l i t t l e s l a c k e x i s t s among men i n the c e n t r a l age groups. Hence j o b s w i l l have to be c r e a t e d f o r young and female workers as opposed to prime aged m a l e s . ^ Such j o b s w i l l have to appear i n v e r y l a r g e numbers i f f u l l employment i s A l f r e d T e l i a , "Labor Force S e n s i t i v i t y to Employ-ment by Age, Sex," I n d u s t r i a l Relations 3 IV,- No. 2 ( F e b r u a r y , 1965) pp . 69-83 . Note t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n c o n t r a d i c t s the p o i n t of view i n T e l i a ' s e a r l i e r a r t i c l e . See W i l l i a m G. Bowen 12 to be m a i n t a i n e d and unemployment (both d i s g u i s e d and re-?* p o r t e d ) kept to a minimum. 16 Bowen and Finegan w i s h to determine the l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s among v a r i o u s age-sex groups to see i f these changed from 1940 to 1960. I t i s expected t h a t l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l be determined by t a s t e s , a f f l u e n c e and i n c e n t i v e s . The measurable v a r i a b l e s which r e p r e s e n t these c a t e g o r i e s w i l l d i f f e r from group to group. D i s c o u r a g e d worker p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o u r were found f o r a l l groups i n c l u d i n g m a r r i e d women whom one would ex-pec t on.a p r i o r i grounds to be most l i k e l y to d i s p l a y added worker b e h a v i o u r . E d u c a t i o n tended to encourage p a r t i c i p a -t i o n , w h i l e unearned income tended to d i s c o u r a g e i t . When Bowen and Fine g a n t u r n to the q u e s t i o n of d i s -g u i s e d unemployment, , t h e i r r e s u l t s are s i m i l a r to those of T e l i a . A l t h o u g h the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t was p r e s e n t f o r a l l groups i n a l l y e a r s , the most s e n s i t i v e groups were o l d e r males and teen-aged boys. M a r r i e d women and teen-aged and T. A. F i n e g a n , "Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Unemploy-ment," in.Employment P o l i c y and the Labor Market ( e d . ) , A r t h u r M. Ross ( B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1965), p. 123, f o r a d e f i n i t i o n of prime aged males. Bowen and F i n e g a n , op. c i t . 13 females were i n an i n t e r m e d i a t e c a t e g o r y . • In 1 9 4 0 , how-e v e r , i t was the m a r r i e d women who were the most s e n s i t i v e to unemployment c o n d i t i o n s . The au t h o r s a l s o noted t h a t s e n s i t i v i t y to market c o n d i t i o n s had i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l y over time. No reasons are o f f e r e d f o r t h i s t r e n d , but i t was suggested t h a t unemployment b e i n g lower i n the 4 0 ' s than i n the 3 0 ' s may have l e s s e n e d the discouragement e f f e c t . I would suggest t h a t the g e n e r a l l e v e l of a f f l u e n c e i n the 5 0 ' s ^ and 60's (as r e f l e c t e d i n such t h i n g s as b e t t e r w e l f a r e . s y s -tems , o l d age s e c u r i t y and l a r g e r c u s h i o n s of s a v i n g s and c r e d i t ) may add to the discouragement e f f e c t . Bowen and Finegan e s t i m a t e t o t a l h i d d e n unemploy-ment f o r urban areas i n 1 9 5 0 and 1960 at over h a l f a m i l l i o n i n b o th y e a r s . M a r r i e d women c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y to t h i s group. The a u t h o r s c o n f i r m T e l i a ' s f i n d i n g t h a t prime aged males were l i t t l e a f f e c t e d by d i s g u i s e d unemployment. M i n c e r ' s l a t e r work, "Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Unemployment,1,' p r o v i d e s a c o n v e n i e n t r e v i e w of the work done i n t h i s f i e l d to 1 9 6 6 . He concludes t h a t secondary workers i n the aggregate d i s p l a y c o n s i d e r a b l e r e s p o n s i v e n e s s to l a b -our market c o n d i t i o n s — a r e a c t i o n which i s l e s s c l e a r when the secondary worker group i s d i s a g g r e g a t e d i n t o i t s component p a r t s . H e r e , . l o n g term i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s p l a y a more d i s t i n c t r o l e . M i n c e r s p e c i f i c a l l y mentions p l a n s which de-cre a s e the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s of older" men and i n c r e a s i n g l y 1 4 l a r g e minimum wage l e v e l s . w h i c h reduce job o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t e e n - a g e r s and encourage employers to h i x e prime age males i n s t e a d . He thus e n f o r c e s the o p i n i o n of many w r i -t e r s who f e e l t h a t unemployment among young people i s of s u f f i c i e n t magnitude to become a major s o c i a l problem, w h i l e v e r y l i t t l e employment s l a c k e x i s t s among prime age males. Mincer a l s o makes a p o i n t of r e l e v a n c e to the d i s -c u s s i o n of p o v e r t y and l a b o u r market a c t i v i t y . N o t i n g t h a t the o n l y group whose l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n p a t t e r n v a r i e s i n v e r s e l y w i t h the b u s i n e s s c y c l e i s non-white a d u l t f e m a l e s , he c o n c l u d e s "the 'additional worker' is more likely to be a low-income person than the 'discouraged worker' . ""^ The i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s statement f o r p o v e r t y problems would be even more i m p o r t a n t i f one c o u l d v a l i d l y i n f e r the c o n v e r s e , namely t h a t a low income person i s more l i k e l y to be an a d d i t i o n a l worker. M i n c e r c o n c l u d e s by n o t i n g t h a t the d i s g u i s e d unemployment as measured by s t u d i e s such as T e l i a ' s - i s not s t r i c t l y a d d i t i v e w i t h r e p o r t e d unemployment s i n c e those who are out of the l a b o u r f o r c e are not w i l l i n g to work at the going r e a l wage, demanding at l e a s t lower c o s t s Jacob M i n c e r , "Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Un-employment," Prosperity and Unemployment3 ( e d . ) , R. A. Gor-don and M. S. Gordon (New York: John W i l e y and Sons, 1966) p. 95. I t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l . 1 5 of ' s e a r c h ' . A l t h o u g h o t h e r s have p r e s e n t e d t h i s p o i n t . o f view, the g e n e r a l consensus i s t h a t r e d u c i n g the weight g i v e n to the di s g u i s e d . u n e m p l o y e d i n c a l c u l a t i n g the man-power gap does not e l i m i n a t e the problem of unemployment, a l t h o u g h i t may l e s s e n i t . M i n c e r f e e l s the i n c r e a s i n g l a b o u r f l e x i b i l i t y of secondary workers w i l l cause growing and p e r s i s t e n t amounts of unemployment to be observed i n the economy. T h i s w i l l be i n t e n s i f i e d by the f a c t t h a t downward r i g i d wages deny many workers even the o p t i o n between unemployment and low pa y i n g j ob s. 18 In a more r e c e n t s t u d y , C a i n a l s o f i n d s d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t s . However, he p o s t u l a t e s t h a t i n cases of low income, "need" would be of more importance than " p r i c e " i n 19 the d e c i s i o n to e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e . Hence, f o r low income groups the n e g a t i v e e f f e c t of h i g h unemployment r a t e s on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s would not be f e l t or at l e a s t would be weaker than i n the case of secondary w o r k e r s . To t e s t t h i s view he runs a s e p a r a t e r e g r e s s i o n on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s of non-white w i v e s , the m a j o r i t y of whom he assumes 20 to have low incomes.. In these r e g r e s s i o n s the c o e f f i c i e n t 18 G l e n G. C a i n , "Unemployment and L a b o r - F o r c e P a r t i c i -p a t i o n of Secondary Workers," I n d u s t r i a l and Labor Relations Review, XX, No. 2 ( J a n u a r y , 1967), pp. 275-97. 1 9 Ibid.j p. 288. 2 0 Ibid, i p. 289; e q u a t i o n s 1, 2 and 3. 16 of the unemployment v a r i a b l e i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t a t the 5% l e v e l . Thus, he con c l u d e s t h a t f o r t h i s low income group, the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t does not e x i s t ; However, he does note t h a t unemployment, even i f i t does not d i s c o u r a g e l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduces the a v e r -age number of weeks and hours worked by the women most of whom are engaged, v o l u n t a r i l y or o t h e r w i s e , i n p a r t - t i m e work.. Another group on whom the e f f e c t s of low income were t e s t e d were f a m i l i e s headed by fe m a l e s . T h i s i s another group i n which p o v e r t y i s p r e v a l e n t . (Some doubt may a r i s e as to whether f a m i l y heads of e i t h e r sex s h o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d as secondary w o r k e r s , but Ca i n so c l a s s i f i e s them). Here, t o o , none of the c o e f f i c i e n t s on unemployment 21 are s i g n i f i c a n t at 5%. Whether s i m i l a r r e s u l t s would p r e -v a i l i n a more g e n e r a l study of p o v e r t y i s an i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n . However, even though t h e r e i s no s i g n i f i c a n t d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t , no evi d e n c e i s found f o r added worker e f f e c t s . The unemployment v a r i a b l e merely becomes i r r e l e v a n t to the d e c i s i o n to e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e . We t u r n now from American to Canadian s t u d i e s . Very l i t t l e has been done i n t h i s f i e l d to d a t e . One of Ca i n , op. a i t . j p. 291. 17 the f i r s t s t u d i e s was Unemployment and Labor.?.- Force P a r t i c i -22 pation: The Canadian Experience by Robert S w i d i n s k y . In i t , both time s e r i e s and c r o s s - s e c t i o n a l d a t a are used. The time s e r i e s work g i v e s r e s u l t s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from those of the U.S. In the U.S. s t u d i e s , the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t was c o n s i s t e n t l y u p h e l d , w h i l e the a d d i t i o n a l worker e f f e c t was o n l y found i n Cain's r e s u l t s f o r Negro 2 3 w i v e s . S w i d i n s k y ' s s t u d y , however, f i n d s e v i d e n c e of both the added worker and the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t . The added worker e f f e c t dominates f o r males from 19 to 65 y e a r s , a l t h o u g h the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t o p e r a t e s i n the extreme age groups. In the a g g r e g a t e , males show no s e n s i t i v i t y i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n to unemployment c o n d i t i o n s . Females as a whole d i s p l a y a d i s c o u r a g e d worker p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r , a l t h o u g h those 45 y e a r s of age and o l d e r tend to behave l i k e added w o r k e r s . The c r o s s - s e c t i o n study r e v e a l s a c o n s i s t e n t d i s -couraged worker e f f e c t w i t h the c o e f f i c i e n t s on unemploy-ment f o r males b e i n g n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t at the 5% l e v e l , Robert Swidinsky., "Unemployment and Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n : The Canadian E x p e r i e n c e , " ( u n p u b l i s h e d Doc-t o r ' s d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of M i n n e s o t a , 1969). C a i n , Married Women in the Labour Force: An Econo-mic Analysis. 18 f o r a l l age groups except those 35-54. In t h i s age group, t h e r e was no s i g n i f i c a n t r e a c t i o n to changes i n employment c o n d i t i o n s . For women, t h e ' c o e f f i c i e n t s on unemployment are ag a i n n e g a t i v e t h r o u g h o u t , though they are o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t 24 f o r those below 25. T h i s would c o n t r a d i c t U.S. f i n d i n g s which tend to show t h a t secondary workers i n g e n e r a l and women i n p a r t i c u l a r were more r e s p o n s i v e to l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s . Though the d i s c o u r a g e d worker h y p o t h e s i s i s weakly upheld by S w i d i n s k y , no evi d e n c e i s g i v e n i n the c r o s s -s e c t i o n work f o r added worker b e h a v i o u r . An attempt i s made to r e c o n c i l e the d i f f e r e n c e between c r o s s - s e c t i o n and time s e r i e s r e s u l t s by i n t r o d u c i n g m i g r a t i o n . However, 25 as i n Bowen and Finegan's work, the m i g r a t i o n v a r i a b l e proves to have l i t t l e e x p l a n a t o r y power. Concerning d i f f e r e n c e s between the U.S. and Canada, S w i d i n s k y notes t h a t the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t i s l e s s c l e a r l y predominant i n Canada than i n the U.S. The c r o s s -s e c t i o n r e s u l t s which r e p r e s e n t long run i n f l u e n c e , are f a i r l y s i m i l a r . In the time s e r i e s which show c y c l i c a l ment. 2 4 T e l i a , "The R e l a t i o n of Labor Force to Unemploy-2 5 Bowen and F i n e g a n , " D i s c u s s i o n , " i n Gordon and Gordon , op. c i t . 19 changes, the d i f f e r e n c e s are more o b v i o u s . S w i d i n s k y a l s o notes t h a t p a t t e r n s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n , e.g. r i s i n g r a t e s f o r m a r r i e d women and f a l l i n g r a t e s f o r o l d e r men, are changing i n Canada at much f a s t e r r a t e s than i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . He f e e l s t h a t t h i s i m p l i e s t h a t the U.S. i s ap p r o a c h i n g an e q u i l i b r i u m p a t t e r n which Canada w i l l a t t a i n as she matures i n d u s t r i a l l y . When i n d u s t r i a l m a t u r i t y and the h i g h e r i n -come l e v e l s t h a t go w i t h i t are reached i n Canada, we can then expect our l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s to resemble more c l o s e l y those i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 2 6 An a r t i c l e by P i e r r e - P a u l P r o u l x tends t o , c o n f i r m S w i d i n s k y ' s • r e s u l t s . U s i n g time s e r i e s data and r e g r e s s i n g the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s f o r the v a r i o u s age-sex groups on a tr e n d term and on e i t h e r the unemployment r a t e or an excess demand f o r l a b o u r v a r i a b l e , P r o u l x found t h a t added worker b e h a v i o u r was e x h i b i t e d by men i n the aggregate and by those 20-24 ye a r s o l d . A l s o , women over 45 d i s p l a y e d added work-er b e h a v i o u r . The d i s c o u r a g e d worker phenomenon was upheld 2 7 by teen-aged boys and young women (20-24) . In c o n c l u s i o n , 2 6 P i e r r e - P a u l P r o u l x , "La v a r i a b i l i t e c y c l i q u e des taux de p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l a main d 'oeuvire au Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, I I , No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 268-77. 2 7 Ibid., p. 275. No r e g r e s s i o n was g i v e n f o r women of a l l ages t o g e t h e r , women under 20, women aged 25-45, prime age males and men over 65. 20 P r o u l x notes t h a t the major d i f f e r e n c e between h i s r e s u l t s and the U.S. r e s u l t s i s the predominance of a d d i t i o n a l work-er b e h a v i o u r i n Canada 1 "He - e x p l a i n s i t s e x i s t e n c e as due to lower income l e v e l s i n Canada, which means t h a t f a m i l i e s are more l i k e l y to encourage a d d i t i o n a l l a b o u r market a c t i v -i t y i n s t e a d of d i s s a v i n g or going i n t o debt. The r e s u l t s of t h i s b e h a v i o u r would be to c r e a t e b u s i n e s s c y c l e s t h a t appear to be more pronounced than i n the U.S. In r e c e s s i o n s , the added worker as opposed to d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r cau-ses a h i g h e r r e p o r t e d unemployment r a t e . As c o n d i t i o n s im-pr o v e , workers tend to l e a v e the l a b o u r f o r c e , making i t d i f f i c u l t to generate i n c r e a s i n g r e a l p r o d u c t i o n and en-c o u r a g i n g i n f l a t i o n . However, as income l e v e l s r i s e i n Canada, P r o u l x , t o o , f e e l s t h a t our l a b o u r market b e h a v i o u r w i l l approach t h a t of the U.S. However, i f Canadians measure t h e i r income, not by i t s a b s o l u t e l e v e l , but r e l a t i v e to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the problem may be of much l o n g e r d u r a t i o n . A second Canadian a r t i c l e p u b l i s h e d at the same time 2 8 as P r o u l x ' s l e a d s to d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t s . Because they are i n t e r e s t e d i n the lon g term as w e l l as s h o r t term r e a c t i o n to unemployment, O f f i c e r and Andersen i n c l u d e v a r i a b l e s r e -Lawrence H. O f f i c e r and P e t e r R. Andersen, "Labour-Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, I I , No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 278-87. 21 p r e s e n t i n g not o n l y the u s u a l unemployment r a t e s , but a l s o r a t e s f o r those unemployed more than one month, more than t h r e e months and more than s i x months. These are s i g n i f i c a n t f o r many'age-sex groups, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the r e a c t i o n to un-employment may take a lo n g t i m e . However, the r e s u l t s ob-t a i n e d are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the c o n c l u s i o n s of e i t h e r P r o u l x or S w i d i n s k y . O f f i c e r and Andersen f i n d a d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t p r e d o m i n a t i n g f o r a l l the male groups and f o r the youngest female group. However, net a d d i t i o n a l worker b e h a v i o u r i s d i s p l a y e d by t h e . r e m a i n i n g female groups. They a l s o f i n d t h a t men behave' l i k e a d d i t i o n a l workers i n response to s h o r t term c y c l i c a l v a r i a t i o n s i n the unemployment r a t e , but become d i s c o u r a g e d as a r e s u l t of l o n g term unemployment. A l t h o u g h the c o e f f i c i e n t on the v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t i n g the c u r r e n t unemployment r a t e i s p o s i t i v e f o r many male groups, i t s p o s i t i v e e f f e c t i s outweighed by the n e g a t i v e c o e f f i -c i e n t s on the v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g unemployment of one, t h r e e or s i x months d u r a t i o n . Thus, we conclude t h a t i n Canada the s h o r t term c y c l i c a l b e h a v i o u r tends to be as i n d i c a t e d by S w i d i n s k y and P r o u l x , w h i l e i n the lo n g term a d i f f e r e n t p a t t e r n i s observed which more c l o s e l y approximates the U.S. p a t t e r n . In the a g g r e g a t e , O f f i c e r and Andersen do f i n d out t h a t f o r Canada'in 1950 to 1967, the a d d i t i o n a l worker e f f e c t 29 d i d tend to outweigh the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t . They O f f i c e r and Andersen, op. c i t . , p. 286. 22 a l s o f i n d t h a t the income e f f e c t on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s was p o s i t i v e , a c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h would c o n t r a d i c t the i d e a s of e a r l i e r a u t h o r s . We now t u r n to s t u d i e s d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h the q u e s t i o n of p o v e r t y . S i n c e no work on t h i s q u e s t i o n has been done w i t h Canadian d a t a , the a r t i c l e s we w i l l examine d e a l w i t h c o n d i t i o n s i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . In "Urban P o v e r t y 30 and Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " Joseph D. Mooney examines the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the unemployment r a t e and l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n poor urban areas — namely those cen-sus t r a c t r e g i o n s of median f a m i l y incomes l e s s than 2/3 of the median f a m i l y income f o r the Standard M e t r o p o l i t a n Area as a whole. Only the l a r g e s t m e t r o p o l i t a n areas ( p o p u l a t i o n 500,000+) were used. The p o v e r t y t r a c t s were then c l a s s i f i e d as N, W or N*, where N i n d i c a t e s a t r a c t w h i c h . i s p r e -d o m i n a n t l y non-white, W i n d i c a t e s a t r a c t which i s predom-i n a n t l y w h i t e , and N* i n d i c a t e s a t r a c t i n which w h i t e s and non-whites were mixed i n f a i r l y e q u a l numbers. Mooney f i r s t n o t i c e s t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s f o r the N areas are. h i g h e r f o r both sexes than i s the case i n the W a r e a s . He a t t r i b u t e s t h i s at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y to 30 Joseph D. Mooney, "Urban P o v e r t y and Labors-Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " .American Economic Review, LVII, No. 1 (March, 1967), pp. 104-119. 23 h i g h e r average age i n the W a r e a s . Re then r e g r e s s e s the unemployment r a t e of the Standard M e t r o p o l i t a n Area on the l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s of a l l males over 14 and f i n d s t h a t f o r the N t r a c t s and f o r the p o v e r t y t r a c t s taken as a whole the c o e f f i c i e n t i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a t i v e . However, the c o e f f i c i e n t , though n e g a t i v e , i s not s i g n i f i -c a n t ' a t • 5 % f o r e i t h e r the W or N* t r a c t s . R e s u l t s .are s i m i l a r f o r a l l females and m a r r i e d women (husband p r e s e n t ) , except t h a t N* t r a c t s now a l s o have s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s . These r e s u l t s p r o v i d e c l e a r e v i d e n c e of a d i s c o u r a g e d worker p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r . To f u r t h e r t e s t s h i s r e s u l t s , Mooney runs r e g r e s s i o n s f o r a l l females 14+ ( i . e . not j u s t those i n p o v e r t y a r e a s ) and a l l m a r r i e d women (husband p r e s e n t ) . He then r e p e a t s the p r o c e s s f o r the two c a t e g o r i e s , but s e p a r a t e s them as to c o l o u r . J u d g i n g by the s i z e of the c o e f f i c i e n t s , and i n a l l but one case by the l e v e l of s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , the Negroes were more r e s p o n s i v e to demand c o n d i t i o n s , and d i s p l a y e d a s t r o n g e r d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t . Mooney c o n c l u d e s , " i t seems c l e a r t h a t the low income worker i s more l i k e l y to be a d i s c o u r a g e d worker than an a d d i t i o n a l worker e s p e c i a l l y i f 'she' i s a non-white m a r r i e d woman w i t h 31 husband p r e s e n t . " Mooney ends by s a y i n g t h a t the poor 31 Mooney, op. c i t . , p. 115 2 4 attempt to l i f t themselves, out of p o v e r t y by e n t e r i n g the l a b o u r market i n g r e a t e r numbers as economic c o n d i t i o n s improve. H is s o l u t i o n to p o v e r t y problems would then be a lo n g p e r i o d of 'good t i m e s ' which would encourage m u l t i p l e e a r n e r s i n poor f a m i l i e s . The m u l t i p l e e a r n e r s , i n turn,-would h e l p the f a m i l y to r i s e from p o v e r t y . The f i n a l i t e m to be examined here i s "Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n W i t h i n M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a s " by John E. P a r k e r 32 and L o i s B. Shaw. The a u t h o r s are concerned w i t h measur-i n g the i n f l u e n c e of the a d d i t i o n a l worker versus the d i s -couraged worker e f f e c t . They use census t r a c t d a t a as opposed to aggregate m e t r o p o l i t a n data so t h a t they are a b l e to l o o k at many f a c t o r s i n f i n e r d e t a i l than would o t h e r w i s e be p o s s i b l e and so t h a t they can t e s t f o r d i f f e r -ences among low, medium and h i g h income a r e a s . In t h e i r r e g r e s s i o n s on male p a r t i c i p a t i o n , P a r k e r and Shaw f i n d a g e n e r a l d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t t h a t was v e r y s t r o n g i n the low income a r e a s , weaker i n the middle income group -and i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n the h i g h income group. E d u c a t i o n was p o s i t i v e , but s i g n i f i c a n t (by a ' t ' v a l u e g r e a t e r than 2) o n l y f o r the lowe s t income group. The per John E. P a r k e r and L o i s B. Shaw, "Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n W i t h i n M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a s , " Southern Economic Journal, XXXIV, No. 4 ( A p r i l , 1968), pp. 538-47-25 cent of non-whites tended to reduce p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s at a l l income l e v e l s f o r men, w h i l e the p r o p o r t i o n of men i n the prime age group was p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h l a b o u r market,* a c t i v i t y . For women, two r e g r e s s i o n s were r u n , one f o r a l l •females 14+ and one f o r m a r r i e d women w i t h husband p r e s e n t . We w i l l l o o k at both of these t o g e t h e r . A n e g a t i v e . c o e f f i -c i e n t f o r the female unemployment r a t e f o r the m e t r o p o l i t a n area i n d i c a t e s a d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t , but u n l i k e the case f o r males, t h i s e f f e c t - i s s t r o n g e s t i n the h i g h e s t i n -come group, and becomes i n s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the l o w e s t . How-ever,- added worker b e h a v i o u r i n response to the male unem-ployment r a t e i n the t r a c t i s p r e s e n t i n the h i g h income groups. E d u c a t i o n shows i n c o n s i s t e n t r e s u l t s s i n c e the v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t s average e d u c a t i o n i n the t r a c t not d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by sex. Hence, two i n f l u e n c e s w i l l e x i s t h e r e . Higher e d u c a t i o n of women w i l l tend to encourage p a r t i c i p a t i o n s i n c e i t may i n d i c a t e a t a s t e f o r market work and s i n c e i t i s the key to b e t t e r p a y i n g and more p l e a s a n t j o b s . On the ot h e r hand, h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n f o r males, though i t may be i n d i c a t i v e of a more f a v o u r a b l e a t t i t u d e to women w o r k i n g , i s u s u a l l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h h i g h e r income on t h e i r p a r t and thus p r o v i d e s l e s s "need" f o r a w i f e to work. Female e a r n i n g s have a s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t i n the low income groups perhaps be-26 cause many women workers i n t h i s group work on a p a r t - y e a r or s p o r a d i c b a s i s and h i g h e r e a r n i n g s would have caused more of them to have t e m p o r a r i l y dropped out of the l a b o u r f o r c e d u r i n g the census week. T h i s would r e p r e s e n t a backward s l o p i n g s u p p l y curve of l a b o u r . However, the c o e f f i c i e n t becomes s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e f o r the h i g h income group. Such b e h a v i o u r would tend to widen the- gap between r i c h and poor. R e a c t i o n s to male e a r n i n g s and the presence of c h i l d -ren tend to be n e g a t i v e , as do r e a c t i o n s to the s u p p l y of female l a b o u r . A demand f o r l a b o u r v a r i a b l e does not p e r -form w e l l . C o n c l u s i o n s from t h i s study are not v e r y o p t i m i s t i c . The s t r o n g d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r e x h i b i t e d by males i n the low income areas i n d i c a t e s t h a t 'boom' c o n d i t i o n s are needed to p u l l them i n t o the l a b o u r f o r c e . T h i s con-c l u s i o n i s s i m i l a r to t h a t of Mooney. The l a c k of a d d i t i o n -a l - w o r k e r b e h a v i o u r on the p a r t of low income women tends to r e - e n f o r c e . t h i s c o n c l u s i o n . In f a c t , we must conclude t h a t , c o n t r a r y to the o p i n i o n s of Mincer and C a i n , the a d d i t i o n a l worker i s more l i k e l y to be a h i g h e r income worker than any-one e l s e . I f one had to make a p o l i c y p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r the s o l u t i o n of the p o v e r t y problem based on the r e s u l t s of P a r k e r , Shaw, one c o u l d p r o b a b l y do no b e t t e r than suggest the K e y n e s i a n remedy of a h i g h g e n e r a l l e v e l of aggregate demand. CHAPTER I I A MODEL OF LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION There has been much c o n t r o v e r s y as to what f a c t o r s i n duce people to e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e . As noted i n Chap-t e r I , much of the c o n t r o v e r s y has c e n t e r e d around whether p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y poor p e o p l e , work more i n response to the n e g a t i v e i n c e n t i v e s of need and f e a r of want or to the p o s i -t i v e i n c e n t i v e s of the p r o s p e c t of good working c o n d i t i o n s and more generous wage l e v e l s . In d e a l i n g w i t h the l a b o u r s u p p l y we are concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h changes at the ma r g i n , i . e . w i t h the m a r g i n a l worker. Who i s the m a r g i n a l worker? I t i s most u s e f u l i n t h i s c o n t e x t to d e f i n e a m a r g i n a l worker i n terms of h i s or her l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r r a t h e r than by age, sex or o t h e r socio-demographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the mar-g i n a l worker w i l l be d e f i n e d by the p r o c e s s of e l i m i n a t i o n . The two groups to be e l i m i n a t e d a r e : (1) those who are i n d i s p u t a b l y i n the l a b o u r f o r c e , i . e . those who are h o l d i n g down a job at the p o i n t of time i n q u e s t i o n ; and (2) those who are d e f i n i t e l y not i n the l a b o u r f o r c e , i . e . those who are i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g down any job by reason of age ( e i t h e r extreme) or o t h e r d i s a b i l i t y . 27 28 We are l e f t w i t h a body of m a r g i n a l workers who are poten-t i a l l y e m ployable, but not at work and who may or may not be a c t i v e l y s e a r c h i n g f o r work. I f - t h e y are a c t i v e l y s e a r c h -i n g f o r work, they are c o n s i d e r e d as b e i n g i n the l a b o u r 1 f o r c e , o t h e r w i s e n o t . Whether or not a m a r g i n a l worker w i l l be s e a r c h i n g f o r work and, t h e r e f o r e , i n the l a b o u r f o r c e at any p o i n t i n time depends upon t h r e e f a c t o r s : the u t i l i t y of a j o b , the p r o b a b i l i t y of g e t t i n g t h a t j o b , and the c o s t s a s s o c i a -ted w i t h g e t t i n g i t . I n i t i a l l y , we w i l l assume t h a t a p e r -son l o o k s f o r work i n o n l y one p a r t i c u l a r job c a t e g o r y at a time and i s i n d i f f e r e n t between a l l j o b s i n t h a t c a t e g o r y . T h i s assumption w i l l be dropped l a t e r . Every job c a t e g o r y (e.g. the j - t h ) has a c e r t a i n u t i l i t y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t [ u ( j ) ] . T h i s u t i l i t y w i l l depend upon income earned on the j o b , the n o n - p e c u n i a r y advantages and d i s a d v a n t a g e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h i t and the number of hours i t r e q u i r e s . The l a t t e r moves i n the o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n to u t i l i t y by r e d u c i n g the amount of time a v a i l a b l e f o r l e i -s ure or o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s . For f u r t h e r e x t e n s i o n of the concept of a m a r g i n a l worker,.see "A Theory of Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n , " by R u s s e l l S. U h l e r and R o s l y n K u n i n , Discussion Paper No. 35, Department of Economics, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia (March, 1970). I t i s d o u b t f u l whether a worker c o l l e c t i n g unemployment i n s u r a n c e can be c o n s i d e r e d a m a r g i n a l worker s i n c e a c o n d i t i o n of h i s r e c e i v i n g b e n e f i t s i s t h a t he i s l o o k i n g f o r work. Hence, he i s , i n e f f e c t , h i r e d by the Unemployment Ins u r a n c e Commission to l o o k f o r work. 29 The p r o b a b i l i t y of f i n d i n g a job i n a g i v e n c a t e g o r y , j , i s P_. . S e v e r a l f a c t o r s c o n t r i b u t e to t h i s p r o b a b i l i t y . One of the most i m p o r t a n t i s the amount of time spent s e a r c h -i n g f o r a j o b , t , i n any p e r i o d of t i m e , T, e.g. 24-hours. We may r e f e r to t as the i n t e n s i t y of s e a r c h . The prob-^ a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g a job w i t h o u t spending any time l o o k i n g f o r i t , though u s u a l l y s m a l l , i s not n e c e s s a r i l y z e r o . There i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y of r e c e i v i n g a spontaneous o f f e r of employment. However, the p r o b a b i l i t y does i n c r e a s e w i t h the i n t e n s i t y of s e a r c h . 3 P . ^ > 0 (1) but we assume 3 2P. ^ < 0 (2) 3t s i n c e d i m i n i s h i n g r e t u r n s w i l l p r e v a i l . Another obvious f a c t o r i n f l u e n c i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g a job i s the g e n e r a l l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y i n the r e l e v a n t f i e l d , or -- more s p e c i f i c a l l y -- the g e n e r a l r a t e of unemployment, N. A more s p e c i f i c unemployment r a t e c o u l d be used, but i t w i l l be n e c e s s a r y to use a g e n e r a l r a t e l a t e r and so f o r the sake of c o n s i s t e n c y i t w i l l a l s o be used here . 30 When the unemployment r a t e i s h i g h , the p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g work i s low and viae versa. 3P . The t o t a l amount of time a pe r s o n has been l o o k i n g f o r work w i l l a l s o i n f l u e n c e the p r o b a b i l i t y of h i s g e t t i n g a j o b . I f t h i s f a c t o r i s c a l l e d A f o r the accumulated t o t a l time of job s e a r c h , we would expect P to f a l l as A r i s e s because a r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l would e x p l o r e the most p r o m i s i n g avenues to employment at the b e g i n n i n g of any p e r -i o d of job h u n t i n g and'leave the l e s s f r u i t f u l p r o s p e c t s f o r l a t e r . Other i n f l u e n c e s on the chances of a per s o n g e t t i n g work are i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r s , such as the age, sex, s k i l l l e v e l , e d u c a t i o n , work h i s t o r y and p e r s o n a l i t y of the p e r -son i n v o l v e d . We w i l l r e f e r to these f a c t o r s c o l l e c t i v e l y as I . The p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g a job i n the j - t h c a t e -gory P ( t , N, A, I) depends upon the i n t e n s i t y of s e a r c h , the accumulated t o t a l time s p e n t , l o o k i n g f o r work, the un-employment r a t e and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the i n d i v i d u a l who i s s e e k i n g employment. The expected u t i l i t y of a job s e a r c h i s t h u s : E [ u ( j ) J = u ( j ) J? ( t , N, A, I) (4) 3 1 and we can deduce r m 1 3P ( t,N,A,I) 8 E 3 t Q ) ] • " C 3 ) 1 8 t > P ( 5 ) 3 2E [ u ( . 1 )1 - u(.1) 3 ? P 1 C t , N t A , I ) 2 2 3 t 3 t < 0 (6) 3E[u(,i)] • u(.j) 5 P j (t,N,A,I) < Q ( 7 ) 3N "3N and 3E[u(,j)] = u ( j ) 8 P . j (t,N,A,I) 3A 3A u (8) The c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h g e t t i n g a job w i l l be ex-p r e s s e d i n terms of d i s u t i l i t y to i n s u r e c o m p a r a b i l i t y w i t h the b e n e f i t s which are d e s c r i b e d i n terms of u t i l i t y . I t w i l l be assumed t h a t the c o s t s of s e a r c h i n c r e a s e w i t h the amount of time spent s e a r c h i n g , and t h a t they do so at an i n c r e a s i n g r a t e . > o, > o (9) 9 t 3 t 2 The l a t t e r i n e q u a l i t y can be e x p l a i n e d by the r i s i n g m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y of l e i s u r e as the t o t a l amount.of l e i s u r e time a v a i l a b l e f a l l s . T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t every ex-t r a hour of s e a r c h s a c r i f i c e s an i n c r e a s i n g l y v a l u a b l e hour of l e i s u r e . R e i n f o r c i n g t h i s tendency i s the f a c t that' a 32 person w i l l f i r s t engage i n s e a r c h where the c o s t s . o t h e r than time (e.g. t r a v e l expenses, e t c . ) are l o w e s t , and o n l y l a t e r u ndertake the more e x p e n s i v e s e a r c h e s . I t i s p r o b a b l e t h a t the c o s t s of s e a r c h v a r y w i t h f a c t o r s o t h e r than time -- f o r example, w i t h the unemploy-ment r a t e or w i t h the accumulated amount of time spent s e a r c h i n g f o r a j o b . For the sake of s i m p l i c i t y , we s h a l l now i g n o r e these p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; a l t h o u g h t h e i r consequences w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d l a t e r i n t h i s c h a p t e r . We are now a b l e to determine whether the m a r g i n a l worker w i l l be i n the l a b o u r f o r c e . I f t h e r e i s some p o s i -t i v e t such t h a t E [ u ( j ) ] > C ( t ) , he w i l l be i n the l a b o u r • 2 f o r c e , o t h e r w i s e n o t . 2 We note i n p a s s i n g t h a t the o p t i m a l time to spend s e a r c h i n g f o r a job i s t h a t t which maximizes E [ u ( j ) ] - C ( t ) s u b j e c t to the c o n s t r a i n t t <. T. These c o n d i t i o n s are 3 E [ u ( j ) ] _ 3 C ( t ) = 3t '3-t T - X - t = 0 -A = 0 f o r X > 0 (10) where A i s a Lagrange m u l t i p l i e r and X i s a s l a c k v a r i a b l e . When the c o n s t r a i n t i s not b i n d i n g (X > 0) the problem i s e q u i v a l e n t to the one i n which the i n e q u a l i t y c o n s t r a i n t i s i g n o r e d . For example, the m a r g i n a l worker whose b e n e f i t -c o s t s i t u a t i o n i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n F i g u r e 3 by C ( t ) and E [ u ( j ) J w i l l be i n the l a b o u r f o r c e spending t * out of each b a s i c time p e r i o d . T s e a r c h i n g . 33 F i g u r e 3 D i s c o u r a g e d Worker Beh a v i o u r t o t a l u t i l i t y and d i s -u t i l i t y t t = time of. s e a r c h I t i s now r e l a t i v e l y easy to d e s c r i b e d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r i n terms of the model. In t h i s c a s e , a r i s e i n the unemployment r a t e N causes a f a l l i n E [ u ( j ) ] to E [ u ( j ) ] ' i n F i g u r e 3. S i n c e E [ u ( j ) ] ' i s now everywhere below C ( t ) , the optimum time of s e a r c h becomes zero and the m a r g i n a l worker w i l l drop out of the l a b o u r f o r c e . The a n a l y s i s may e a s i l y be extended to cover the s i t u a t i o n where a person searches f o r work i n m job c a t e -g o r i e s r a t h e r than j u s t one at a time. I n t h i s case m E(u) = I u ( j ) P ( t , N, A, I) (11) j = l J J 34 where the symbols are as d e f i n e d e a r l i e r and the j ' s . r e f e r to the d i f f e r e n t job c a t e g o r i e s . The c o s t . f u n c t i o n now be-comes m C = E C. (t . ) (12) j - l 3 3 w i t h the s u b s c r i p t s a g a i n r e f e r r i n g to the job c a t e g o r i e s . The c o n d i t i o n f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l a b o u r f o r c e now becomes E(u) = E [ u ( j ) ] P.. (t_., N, A, I) > C = E C.. (t..) 3 f o r some t > 0 where t now becomes E t . . J A g a i n the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t r e s u l t s from the upward s h i f t of the unemployment r a t e i n g e n e r a l and a l l or most of the N 's i n p a r t i c u l a r . T h i s lowers E(u) to some p o s i t i o n below C where the optimum time of s e a r c h becomes zero and r e s u l t s . i n a d i s c o u r a g e d worker l e a v i n g the l a b o u r force." E x t e n d i n g the model to i n c l u d e an e x p l a n a t i o n of added worker b e h a v i o u r i s somewhat more d i f f i c u l t . We w i l l b e g i n by a n a l y z i n g the f i r s t case where t h e r e i s o n l y one job c a t e g o r y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n and then extend the a n a l y -s i s to the m u l t i - j o b case. 3 -The m a r g i n a l worker now a l l o c a t e s h i s time i n or d e r . to maximize E(u) - C s u b j e c t to t 4 T. These c o n d i t i o n s a r e : u ( f ) a p . a c . — 1 - - J - = x a t . a t j T = X = t = 0 J J j = 1,2,. . . , m -X = 0 f o r X > 0 (13) 35 Added worker b e h a v i o u r e x i s t s when an i n c r e a s e i n unemployment l e a d s to i n c r e a s e d l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n or on the l e s s aggregated l e v e l ^- when i t causes a p e r -son to e n t e r the l a b o u r force;'. Such b e h a v i o u r c o u l d o b v i o u s -l y o n l y a p p l y t o . a m a r g i n a l worker who was not i n the l a b o u r f o r c e b e f o r e the r i s e i n the unemployment r a t e . As we have j u s t seen, a r i s e i n N eet'. par. l o w e r s E [ u ( j ) ] r e l a t i v e to C ( t ) and thus reduces the l i k e l i h o o d of a person e n t e r i n g the l a b o u r f o r c e . However, a r i s e i n N may a l s o have the e f f e c t of r e d u c i n g income i n a f a m i l y through workers b e i n g l a i d o f f or through the number of hours of work b e i n g reduced. I f we assume t h a t each f a m i l y has a l e v e l of income which i t c o n f i d e n t l y e x p e c t s to be a b l e to m a i n t a i n -- i . e . permanent income -- c u r r e n t income may a c t u a l l y f a l l below t h i s l e v e l as economic c o n d i t i o n s worsen and as N i n c r e a s e s . T h i s r e s u l t s i n n e g a t i v e , t r a n -s i t o r y income, the l a t t e r b e i n g d e f i n e d as the d i f f e r e n c e between a c t u a l c u r r e n t and permanent income. Making the u s u a l assumption of f a l l i n g m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y of income, a r e d u c t i o n i n f a m i l y income w i l l make the u t i l i t y of an ex-t r a d o l l a r of income r i s e . S i n c e , as was shown above, the u t i l i t y of a job u ( j ) c o n s i s t s to a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t of the u t i l i t y of the income d e r i v e d . f r o m i t , u ( j ) would r i s e as f a m i l y income (Y ) f e l l . Thus r u ( j ) = f ( Y p ) , f f ^ L l < 0, jJ- < 0 (14) 36 where f denotes a f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and t h e r e f o r e 5 u ( j ) 3N 3u ( j ) 3Y„ 3Y j 3N' > 0 (15) Thus the t o t a l change i n E [ u ( j ) ] as a r e s u l t of a change i n N becomes 3 E [ u ( j ) ] 9N . u ( j ) 3P.. ( t . , N , A , I ) 3N + 3 u ( j ) 3N (16) the f i r s t term on the r i g h t hand s i d e b e i n g the n e g a t i v e , discouragement e f f e c t and the second term b e i n g the p o s i t i v e added worker e f f e c t . I n or d e r f o r the added.worker e f f e c t to be observed., e q u a t i o n (16) must be p o s i t i v e by an amount s u f f i c i e n t to r a i s e E [ u ( j ) ] to a p o s i t i o n E [ u ( j ) ] ' where t * > 0. Such a s i t u a t i o n i s d e p i c t e d . i n F i g u r e 4. t o t a l u t i l i t y and d i s -u t i l i t y F i g u r e 4 Added Worker Behaviour t = time of s e a r c h 37 A g a i n , i t i s not too d i f f i c u l t to d e s c r i b e added worker b e h a v i o u r i n terms of a j o b s e a r c h i n many job c a t e -g o r i e s . F i g u r e 4 would be r e p r e s e n t e d i n terms of E(u) and C r a t h e r than E [ u ( j ) ] and C ( t ) as i n (10) and ( 1 1 ) . C o n d i -t i o n (16) would become 9P . - . f W + . = P j ( 1 7 ) 3=1 J = l 3N J In o r d e r t o - g e t added worker b e h a v i o u r , e q u a t i o n (17) must be p o s i t i v e and the change must be l a r g e enough so t h a t f o r some t > 0, E(u) > C. In summary, i f we d e s i g n a t e the f i r s t term on the • r i g h t hand s i d e of e q u a t i o n (16) or (17) as d f o r the d i s -couragement e f f e c t ; and the second term as a f o r the added worker e f f e c t , we can r e a c h the f o l l o w i n g c o n c l u s i o n s . G i v e n a r i s e i n N and a m a r g i n a l worker i n the l a b o u r force,. |d| must exceed |a| by an amount s u f f i c i e n t to reduce t to zero i f d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r i s to be observed. For added worker b e h a v i o u r to be o b s e r v e d , |a| must exceed.|d| by an amount s u f f i c i e n t so t h a t a worker who was not p r e v i o u s l y i n the l a b o u r f o r c e would now f i n d i t w o r t h w h i l e to b e g i n to l o o k f o r work. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of a f a l l i n N can be deduced i n a s i m i l a r manner. The above c o n d i t i o n s i m p l y t h a t added worker be-h a v i o u r , would not be v e r y w i d e s p r e a d . However, the l i k e l i -hood of f i n d i n g e v i d e n c e of added worker b e h a v i o u r i s de-38 c r e a s e d s t i l l f u r t h e r by the c o s t s . o f job s e a r c h , which may i n c r e a s e as economic c o n d i t i o n s worsen and unemploy-ment r i s e s . D uring times of boom and l a b o u r s h o r t a g e s , employers w i l l bear much of the c o s t s of s e a r c h ( a p a r t , of c o u r s e , from the p o t e n t i a l employees' t i m e ) . "Help wanted" a d v e r t i s i n g w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l e , t r a v e l c o s t s w i l l o f t e n be p a i d by those hoping to h i r e w o r k e r s , and so on. When unemployment i n c r e a s e s and the s u p p l y of p o t e n t i a l employees b e g i n s to exceed the openings a v a i l -a b l e f o r them, c o n d i t i o n s w i l l change. "Work wanted" ad-v e r t i s e m e n t s w i l l i n c r e a s e r e l a t i v e to the "help wanted" columns. T r a v e l and o t h e r i n c i d e n t a l c o s t s of job h u n t i n g w i l l a l s o be passed on i n c r e a s i n g l y to the job s e e k e r . The accumulated time of job s e a r c h A. over a l l 3 p e r i o d s w i l l a l s o tend to i n c r e a s e the c o s t s of s e a r c h as 4 A. r i s e s . 3 In summary , 3 C . (t . ) 9 C . (t . ) JL > 0, •' J > 0, j - 1, 2 , . . . , m (18) 3N ' 3A. 3 F u r t h e r , as N i n c r e a s e s , and/or as the l e n g t h of time a p e r s o n has been out of work i n c r e a s e s , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the u t i l i t y of l e i s u r e . w i l l d e c r e a s e . S i n c e l e i s u r e 4 U h l e r and K u n i n , op. ovt. 39 foregone i s a major component of C,. t h i s may cause a f a l l i n C. T h i s would r e s u l t i n a decrease of the d i s c o u r a g e -ment e f f e c t and an i n c r e a s e i n the l i k e l i h o o d of added worker b e h a v i o u r . As a r e s u l t , the changes d e s c r i b e d i n (18) s h o u l d be taken as net of these e f f e c t s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t those i n d i v i d u a l f a c t o r s which we have lumped.together and l a b e l l e d I may i n f l u e n c e not o n l y the p r o b a b i l i t y of o b t a i n i n g a j o b , but a l s o the u t i -l i t y d e r i v e d from the j o b . For example, the u t i l i t y of a job (both p e c u n i a r y and no n - p e c u n i a r y r e t u r n s ) , w i l l p rob-a b l y be g r e a t e r f o r a person w i t h h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n than f o r a person w i t h lower s k i l l s . I t i s hoped to take as many of these I f a c t o r s as p o s s i b l e i n t o account when we b u i l d the e m p i r i c a l model. A l t h o u g h the model was developed throughout to apply to the m a r g i n a l worker, i t can e a s i l y be extended to non-marginal w o r k e r s , i . e . to those who are h o l d i n g down a job at the r e l e v a n t p o i n t i n time and to those i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g down a j o b . For the former, we s i m p l y make the p r o b a b i l i t y of g e t t i n g h i s p r e s e n t job e q u a l to u n i t y at a p o i n t i n time and the c o s t s of o b t a i n i n g i t z e r o . I f he i s not c o n s i d e r i n g a l t e r n a t e j o b s (analogous to the one-job case d e s c r i b e d above), t h i s means t h a t he w i l l s t a y at h i s p r e s e n t job as long as u ( j ) > 0. The v a r i a b l e , u ( j ) i s measured net of any d i s u t i l i t i e s of l a b o u r , e t c . , which 40 may be a s s o c i a t e d w i t h j . I f the worker i s c o n s i d e r i n g changing j o b s , the f u l l model a p p l i e s , but w i t h the s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s of C. = 0 and P. = 1 s t i l l r e l e v a n t f o r the job 3 J he i s h o l d i n g . The r a t i o n a l worker w i l l c o n s i d e r changing j o b s when job c a t e g o r i e s o u t s i d e h i s p r e s e n t job e x i s t where the expected u t i l i t i e s i n these c a t e g o r i e s exceed the c o s t s of s e a r c h by an amount g r e a t e r than the u t i l i t y of h i s p r e s e n t j o b , s i n c e i f j r e f e r s to the job he h o l d s , E [ u ( j ) ] - C_. = u ( j ) g i v e n t h a t P.. = 1 and = 0. (See f o o t n o t e 3, t h i s c h a p t e r ) . For the person who i s i n c a p a b l e of h o l d i n g a j o b , we may say t h a t P.. = 0 by d e f i n i t i o n f o r a l l j ; hence, C > E(u) everywhere and the person w i l l never e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e . One o b v i o u s advantage of the t h e o r e t i c a l model j u s t d e s c r i b e d i s t h a t u n l i k e the more u s u a l i n c o m e - l e i s u r e model, i t does not r e l y on the e m p i r i c a l l y weak l i n k between wage l e v e l s and unemployment r a t e s i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n the s u p p l y of l a b o u r i n terms of d i s c o u r a g e d and added worker e f f e c t s . (See Chapter I ) . We now c o n v e r t the t h e o r e t i c a l model i n t o a s t a t i s -t i c a l model which i s c a p a b l e . o f b e i n g e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t e d . The t h e o r e t i c a l model was developed i n terms of ah i n d i v i -d u a l worker. S i n c e d i s a g g r e g a t e d d a t a were not r e a d i l y 41 a v a i l a b l e , we.must f i r s t e x p r e s s the r e l a t i o n s h i p s on a more aggregated l e v e l , measuring l a b o r s u p p l y i n terms of l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . • T h e • i n f l u e n c e of sex, one of the I f a c t o r s , w i l l be taken i n t o account by e s t i -mating s e p a r a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s f o r men and women. As men-t i o n e d a t the b e g i n n i n g of t h i s t h e s i s , the i n f l u e n c e of income l e v e l s w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d by e s t i m a t i n g s e p a r a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p s f o r the d i f f e r e n t income groups. These r e -l a t i o n s h i p s can then be compared. The t h e o r e t i c a l model t e l l s us t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s w i l l depend on N, u ( j ) , t , A, and I . A s t a t i s t i c a l measure of N i s e a s i l y found: the g e n e r a l unemployment r a t e p r e v a i l i n g i n the r e l e v a n t l a b o u r market. I f the d i s -couraged worker e f f e c t predominates (and i t i s suggested above t h a t i t w i l l ) , we would expect N to have a n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . I f added worker e f f e c t p r e d o m i n a t e s , t h e r e would be a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e . " ' In e q u a t i o n s on female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , the male unemploy-ment r a t e i n the t r a c t w i l l a l s o be i n c l u d e d i n an attempt to d i s c o v e r i f added worker b e h a v i o u r e x i s t s . I t has been suggested (see J . T. Montague and John Vanderkamp, British Columbia Labour Foree.: A Study in .Lab-our Market Adjustment, I n s t i t u t e of I n d u s t r i a l R e l a t i o n s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966, Chapter 3) t h a t u s i n g an employment v a r i a b l e , as independent v a r i a b l e where p a r t i -c i p a t i o n r a t e s are the dependent v a r i a b l e , l e a d s to d i f f i -c u l t i e s s i n c e , i f the unemployment r a t e i s d e f i n e d as U/L where U i s the number of unemployed and L i s the l a b o u r f o r c e , t h e r e w i l l a r i s e a s p u r i o u s of n e g a t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n 42 The v a r i a b l e u ( j ) i s v e r y d i f f i c u l t to measure. The c l o s e s t we can come i s to s u b s t i t u t e an e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e s i n c e e a r n i n g s a r e e x p e c t e d to be.a major component of t h e u t i l i t y of a j o b . S i n c e the u t i l i t y of a j o b , e s p e c i a l l y f o r s e c o n d a r y w o r k e r s , o f t e n depends upon the e x p e c t e d i n -come of o t h e r f a m i l y members, male e a r n i n g s were i n c l u d e d i n the e q u a t i o n s f o r f e m a l e s . They would be e x p e c t e d , from the model, to have a n e g a t i v e , i n f l u e n c e on f e m a l e p a r t i c i p a -t i o n r a t e s . I t i s one of the weaknesses of t h i s s t u d y t h a t t h e r e i s no measure a v a i l a b l e f o r the n o n - p e c u n i a r y b e n e f i t s of a job..' However, at l e a s t some of the i n f l u e n c e ' of t h e s e n o n - p e c u n i a r y . f a c t o r s w i l l be c a p t u r e d i n the v a r i a b l e s sub-sumed under I . A t the c e n s u s t r a c t l e v e l ( a t w h i c h the d a t a were c o l l e c t e d ) , t h e r e i s no measure a v a i l a b l e f o r e i t h e r t or A, the i n t e n s i t y or a c c u m u l a t e d t i m e of s e a r c h . T h e r e f o r e , t h e y a r e not i n c l u d e d i n the e m p i r i c a l work, a l t h o u g h o t h e r w i t h p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s w h i c h a r e d e f i n e d as L/P where P i s the p o p u l a t i o n . A p r o b l e m s t i l l e x i s t s i f we r e d e f i n e unemployment r a t e s as U/P s i n c e , by d e f i n i t i o n , L/P = U/P + E/P, where E a r e the employed. However, we w i l l a v o i d t h e s e p r o b l e m s i n t h i s t h e s i s s i n c e the unemployment r a t e w i l l be the g e n e r a l unemployment r a t e i n an u r b a n a r e a and the p a r -t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s w i l l be s e x - s p e c i f i c and f o r a g i v e n c e n s u s t r a c t . Where unemployment r a t e s f o r the t r a c t s a r e u s e d , t h e s e w i l l be the male unemployment r a t e s r e g r e s s e d on f e -male p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . 43 s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e t h a t A e s p e c i a l l y does add c o n s i d e r a b l y to the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t , as the model would p r e -d i c t . We are now l e f t w i t h o n l y the I f a c t o r s to con-s i d e r . Age w i l l i n f l u e n c e the p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s by i n -c r e a s i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y of g e t t i n g a job f o r those i n the prime working y e a r s -- u s u a l l y d e f i n e d as 25 to 54. N a t i o n a l o r i g i n may.play a p a r t by i n f l u e n c i n g e i t h e r P or u ( j ) . T h e r e f o r e we w i l l i n c l u d e v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g those who are French and those who are n e i t h e r B r i t i s h nor French. E d u c a t i o n i s expected to have a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e on l a b -our s u p p l y by i n f l u e n c i n g P and p o s s i b l y u ( j ) . A measure of s k i l l might a l s o have been i n c l u d e d h e r e , but none was a v a i l a b l e . M a r r i a g e i s expected to i n c r e a s e male p a r t i c i -p a t i o n r a t e s by i n c r e a s i n g P and p o s s i b l y u ( j ) and to de-creas e female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s by l o w e r i n g u ( j ) and p o s s i b l y P j . S i m i l a r l y , c h i l d r e n w i l l d e t e r female l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n , w h i l e the presence of o t h e r a d u l t s i n the home w i l l tend to encourage i t . By r e n d e r i n g the v a r i a b l e s i n the t h e o r e t i c a l model s t a t i s t i c a l l y t e s t a b l e as j u s t d e s c r i b e d , we can s p e c i f y r e l a t i o n s h i p s of the form Lawrence H. O f f i c e r and P e t e r R. Andersen, "Labour-Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics, I I , No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 278-287, 44 MPT = a + b xTUU + b £AMY + b^.FT + t>4OT + b EDT + b,AMT + b-.MRD + e , 1 Q v 6 7 m (.19) and FPT =: G + d xTUU + d2MUT + d^AMY + d^AFY + d^FT + d,OT + d -, EDT + d 0AFT + d nCF + d 1 A C F T + d MRD + e f (20) where a and c are c o n s t a n t s , the e's are random e r r o r terms and the b's and d's are the c o e f f i c i e n t s of the v a r i -a b l e s . The v a r i a b l e s themselves are as d e f i n e d i n the appen-d i x . E q u a t i o n s (19) and (20) w i l l be e s t i m a t e d by means of m u l t i p l e r e g r e s s i o n ; the l i n e a r form b e i n g adopted s i n c e t h e r e appears to be no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r u s i n g a more com-p l e x form. The r e s u l t s of the r e g r e s s i o n a n a l y s i s are g i v e n i n the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s . CHAPTER I I I EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 1961 We now t u r n to the e m p i r i c a l work of the t h e s i s . The main h y p o t h e s i s concerns the i n f l u e n c e of l a b o u r market con- • d i t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y the unemployment r a t e , on the l a b o u r s u p p l y . We w i l l t e s t the d i s c o u r a g e d versus added worker h y p o t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d i n the p r e c e d i n g model and w i l l t e s t the i n f l u e n c e o f . t h e v a r i a b l e s which our model has l e d us to b e l i e v e w i l l a f f e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . The h y p o t h e s i s t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n l a b -our f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s e x i s t among d i f f e r e n t income groups w i l l a l s o be t e s t e d . The t e s t s w i l l compare the r e -g r e s s i o n r e l a t i o n s h i p s f o r the d i f f e r e n t income groups as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l c o e f f i c i e n t s i n . t h e r e g r e s s i o n . The r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s . f o r males i n 1961 are g i v e n i n Table I w i t h the v a r i a b l e s as d e f i n e d i n the appendix and the s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of the c o e f f i c i e n t s g i v e n i n p a r e n -t h e s e s . The o b s e r v a t i o n s o r i g i n a l l y were census t r a c t s i n the e i g h t m e t r o p o l i t a n areas of Canada h a v i n g p o p u l a t i o n s over 250,000 i n 1961: M o n t r e a l , T o r o n t o , Vancouver, H a m i l -t o n , W i n nipeg, Ottawa, Edmonton, and C a l g a r y . C a l g a r y , how-e v e r , was r e p l a c e d by H a l i f a x to o b t a i n more g e o g r a p h i c d i -v e r s i t y even though the l a t t e r i s under 250,000 p o p u l a t i o n . 45 T a b l e I•. R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1961 D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e = MPT V a r i a b l e p M R C o n s t a n t 41. 3245*** 55 . 99 86*** 47 . 2617*** (1. 2086) (3. 7387) (3. 9486) TUU - 11. 3117*** - 6. 5917*** - 4. 7367*** (1. 2086) (0. 7603) (1. 0728) AMY 0 . 0063*** 0. 0007 - 0. 0007* (0. 0009) (0. 0009) (0. 0004) FT - 0. 0428*** - o. 0147 0 . 0096 (0. 010) (0. 0124) (0. 0213) OT - 0. 0333 0. 0146 0 . 0088 (0. 0215) (0. 0217) (0. 0271) EDT 0 . 0864 - 0. 0168 0. 2431*** (0. 1113) (0. 0862) (0. 0739) AMT 0 . 5475*** 0. 3 7 3" 0. 1685*** (0. 0591) (0. 0467) (0. 0520) MRD 0. 1256*** 0. 1708*** 0. 4844*** (0. 0475) (0. 0375) (0. 0620) R 2 0 . 6437 0 . 3930 0. 5454 S . E . E 4 . 3856. 5 . 8468 5 . 6808 * * * = s i g n i f i c a n t a t 1% ** = s i g n i f i c a n t a t 5% * = s i g n i f i c a n t a t 10% N u m b e r s i n p a r e n t h e s e s a r e s t a n d a r d e r r o r s o f c o e f f i c i e n t s . 47 A t t e n t i o n was c o n f i n e d to the l a r g e s t c e n t r e s s i n c e census t r a c t s i n s m a l l e r communities were not f e l t to be s u f f i -c i e n t l y homogeneous to p r o v i d e m e a n i n g f u l o b s e r v a t i o n s . The average incomes of f a m i l y heads i n each t r a c t were a d j u s t e d by a p r i c e i n d e x f o r the c i t y . Then, a l l t r a c t s were d i v i d e d i n t o q u a r t i l e s on the b a s i s of t h i s a d j u s t e d income f i g u r e . The l o w e s t income q u a r t i l e . w a s l a b e l l e d P; the m i d d l e two M; and the h i g h e s t R. In orde r to m a i n t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y between p e r i o d s , the t r a c t s were d i v i d e d on the b a s i s of income of the f a m i l y head'YHT i n s t e a d of f a m i l y income YFT because o n l y YHT was a v a i l a b l e f o r 1951. In examining the r e s u l t s , we l o o k f i r s t at the 'economic' v a r i a b l e s , TUU and AMY. The c o e f f i c i e n t on the unemployment v a r i a b l e i s n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t at the 1% l e v e l f o r a l l income groups i n d i c a t i n g a g e n e r a l predominance of d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r . T h i s i s i n agreement w i t h our model, w i t h e a r l i e r s t u d i e s made i n the U.S., and w i t h those Canadian s t u d i e s based on c r o s s - s e c t i o n d a t a . In Table I , the. R group e x h i b i t s the l e a s t d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t and the poor, the most. That a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n the magnitude of the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t e x i s t s can be seen i n the F v a l u e s i n Table I I . The e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e AMY behaves as expected i n the P t r a c t s . Here i t i s p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t at the 48 Table I I Chow3" Test R e s u l t s On R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1961 Data Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT Income Groups P & M M & R P & R V a r i a b l e s (Degrees of Freedom) F Values (1 & 790) (1 & 790) (1 & 522) TUU AMY FT 0T EDT AMT MRD 8.20*** 14 . 44*** 1.81 2.07 0.42 4.22** 0 . 44 1. 95 2 .79* 0 . 95 0 . 02 5 .21** 8.52*** 18.29*** 15 .04*** 37.57*** 4.36** 1.47 1.17 21.00*** 21.15*** (Degrees of Freedom) (7 & 790) (7 & 790) (7 & 522) T o t a l R e g r e s s i o n 7.04*** 3.54*** 13.07*** *** = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 1% ** = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 5% * = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 10% "''See Gregory C. Chow, "Tes t s of E q u a l i t y Between Sets of C o e f f i c i e n t s i n Two L i n e a r R e g r e s s i o n s , " Eoonometrica, X X V I I I , No. 3 ( J u l y , 1960), pp. 591-605. 49 1% l e v e l . The s m a l l magnitude of the c o e f f i c i e n t can be ex-p l a i n e d by r e c a l l i n g t h a t the e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e i s measured "in d o l l a r s . Hence, f o r low income men, h i g h e r e a r n i n g s do induce g r e a t e r r a t e s of l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . When we t u r n to the R t r a c t s , the c o e f f i c i e n t on AMY has a n e g a t i v e s i g n . B e f o r e we announce t h a t s t a t i s t i -c a l e v i d e n c e has been found f o r the e x i s t e n c e of a backward s l o p i n g s u p p l y curve of l a b o u r , some q u a l i f i c a t i o n s are i n o r d e r . F i r s t , i t w i l l be noted t h a t the c o e f f i c i e n t i s not s i g n i f i c a n t at even the 10% l e v e l . T h i s might i m p l y t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n between AMY and some o t h e r independent v a r i a b l e i n the r e g r e s s i o n has pushed the former i n t o i n s i g n i f i c a n c e . T h i s indeed appears to be the case. AMT i s - f a i r l y h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e EDT ( f o r example, i n 2 the R- t r a c t s R between. AMY and EDT = 0.7). Re-running the r e g r e s s i o n s f o r the M and R groups as i n Table I , but w i t h the EDT v a r i a b l e o m i t t e d does produce p o s i t i v e c o e f f i -c i e n t s on AMY, but these c o e f f i c i e n t s are s t i l l not s t a t i s -t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s l e a d s to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t an e x t r a d o l l a r of earned income i s not ve r y i m p o r t a n t i n i n f l u -e n c i n g the l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r of males i n the upper i n -come groups. S i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s can be reached c o n c e r n i n g the m i d d l e income group. The above can be e x p l a i n e d by p l a c i n g the emphasis on the word 'earned' i n the p r e v i o u s p a r a g r a p h . As one moves up the income s c a l e , p r o g r e s s i v e income tax r a t e s 50 arid o t h e r f a c t o r s may work to make e x t r a wages and s a l a r y income l e s s a t t r a c t i v e and unearned income more a t t r a c t i v e . Thus, a salesman might be more r e s p o n s i v e to the o f f e r of a company car which p r o v i d e s him w i t h the e q u i v a l e n t of s e v e r a l thousand d o l l a r s of tax f r e e income per year than to the o f f e r of even a s i z e a b l e wage i n c r e a s e . S i m i l a r con-s i d e r a t i o n s would not a p p l y i n low income t r a c t s . We l o o k now at the s o cio-demographic or I v a r i a b l e s , f i r s t examining FT and OT which r e p r e s e n t the per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n of French n a t i o n a l o r i g i n / and those of n e i -t h e r French nor B r i t i s h o r i g i n s r e s p e c t i v e l y i n each t r a c t . FT was o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r the P group. Elsewhere even the s i g n s were not c o n s i s t e n t . I t seemed u n a v o i d a b l e to conclude t h a t n a t i o n a l o r i g i n had l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e on l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s of males. Such a c o n c l u s i o n w i l l not be j u s t i f i e d f o r f e m a l e s , as w i l l be shown l a t e r . The n a t u r e of the census t r a c t data p r e c l u d e d b r e a k i n g down the e t h n i c v a r i a b l e s i n t o any f i n e r c a t e g o r i e s , a l t h o u g h . i t would have been i n t e r e s t i n g to see i f any s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t e d between sub-groups. S i n c e i t was f e l t t h a t the n a t i o n a l o r i g i n f a c t o r may have had d i m i n i s h i n g i n f l u e n c e as people became "Canadian-i z e d , " i t was d e c i d e d to t r y v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g New Cana-d i a n s to r e p l a c e FT and OT. However, these v a r i a b l e s were not s i g n i f i c a n t and i f a n y t h i n g , they ' e x p l a i n ' even l e s s of the v a r i a t i o n i n MPT than FT and OT. 51 With r e s p e c t to the e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e EDT we n o t i c e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s between income groups. For the P and M t r a c t s , e d u c a t i o n had no s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u -ence on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e EDT, i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , i s the p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n not i n s c h o o l who had at l e a s t s t a r ted . u n i v e r s i t y . I t may be asked why such a h i g h l e v e l of education-was chosen. A g a i n , an appeal must be made to the way i n which census t r a c t d a t a were broken down. In the c a t e g o r y below those w i t h at l e a s t some u n i v e r s i t y , those i n d i v i d u a l s who had f i n i s h e d h i g h s c h o o l and those who had o n l y p a r t l y completed h i g h s c h o o l , were lumped t o g e t h e r . I t was f e l t t h a t i n Canada, even i n 1961, b e i n g a h i g h s c h o o l drop-out d i d not c o n f e r much ad-vantage i n the l a b o u r market. When we move from the P and M to the R t r a c t s we f i n d t h a t EDT • i s p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t at 1%. T h i s c o n f i r m s the g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t more educated people w i t h i n t h i s c a t e g o r y are more . l i k e l y to be i n the l a b o u r force."-. The v a r i a b l e AMT or the p r o p o r t i o n of males over 15 i n the prime working years of 25 to 54, has a p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e and i s s i g n i f i c a n t at the 1% l e v e l . However, i t sh o u l d be noted t h a t the magnitude of the c o e f f i c i e n t i s r e l a t i v e l y h i g h f o r the P group, low f o r the M group, and lower s t i l l f o r the R group. Age seems to.be of 52 l e s s e r importance i n the d e c i s i o n to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the l a b -our f o r c e f o r the h i g h e r income than the lower- income men. One would expect t h a t the i n f l u e n c e of t h i s v a r i a b l e would be e x h i b i t e d by a tendency f o r r i c h e r people to remain i n the l a b o u r f o r c e a f t e r age 54 r a t h e r than to e n t e r i t much b e f o r e 25. T h i s can be e x p l a i n e d by the e d u c a t i o n f a c t o r w h i c h , as we have seen, was more i m p o r t a n t f o r the upper income groups and had the e f f e c t of i n c r e a s i n g l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n c r e a s e d e d u c a t i o n would tend to reduce p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s among those younger than 25. The g r e a t e r i n f l u e n c e of age on the l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r of P groups may be e x p l a i n e d p a r t i a l l y be de-mand-for-labour f a c t o r s . (Though we are p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h s u p p l y f a c t o r s i n t h i s t h e s i s , the f a c t t h a t the d a t a are ex post i m p l i e s t h a t a l l demand i n f l u e n c e s cannot be e l i m i n a t e d ) . Employers f i l l i n g l o w -paying j o b s appear to be more r e l u c t a n t to h i r e and l e s s r e l u c t a n t to f i r e those of advancing y e a r s than employers f i l l i n g w h i t e c o l l a r , p r o -f e s s i o n a l and e x e c u t i v e p o s i t i o n s which are u s u a l l y b e t t e r p a i d . T h i s may encourage more workers i n P areas to r e -t i r e e a r l i e r than those i n M and R a r e a s . Age s p e c i f i c data'would be n e c e s s a r y to t e s t these s p e c u l a t i o n s , but such d a t a are not a v a i l a b l e at the t r a c t l e v e l . Chow t e s t s con-f i r m t h a t s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t between groups. 53 The f i n a l independent v a r i a b l e to be d e a l t w i t h here i s MRD or the p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n over 15 i n the t r a c t . w h i c h i s m a r r i e d . I t would be expected t h a t m a r r i a g e would have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on the l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s of males, and t h i s indeed appears t o . be the case. However, we note t h a t as one moves from the lower to the h i g h e r income groups the p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e of m a r r i a g e becomes s i g n i f i c a n t l y s t r o n g e r . (See Table I I ) . Whether t h i s i s because m a r r i e d men i n h i g h e r income groups f e e l more o b l i g a t e d to work (or at l e a s t l o o k f o r work) than those i n lower income groups, or whether the former are more l i k e l y to postpone m a r r i a g e u n t i l a f i r m attachment to the l a b o u r market has been made, we cannot say. F i n a l l y , Chow t e s t s were run on the t o t a l r e g r e s s i o n s g i v e n i n Table I to t e s t i f noteworthy d i f f e r e n c e s c o u l d be found among the income groups i n t h e i r o v e r a l l l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r . As.can be seen i n Table I I , d i f f e r e n c e s s i g n i -f i c a n t at the 1% l e v e l were found f o r a l l p o s s i b l e p a i r s of groups. Thus, we conclude t h a t men at d i f f e r e n t income l e v e l s do d i f f e r i n l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . We now t u r n from r e g r e s s i o n s on . MPT f o r the v a r -i o u s income groups to the r e g r e s s i o n s on the female p a r t i c i -p a t i o n rate., FPT, which are g i v e n i n Table I I I . S o u r c e s , e t c . , are the same f o r t h i s t a b l e as f o r Table I . The co-e f f i c i e n t s of TUU are once more n e g a t i v e throughout and Table I I I R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1961 Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT Var i a b l e P M R Constant 84. 6877*** 96 . 75 89*** 127 . 0914*** (6. 0417) (4. 8995) (9 .4423) TUU - 7 . 3103*** - 7 . 7492*** - 4 .5857*** (1. 4837) (0. 8205) (1 .1700) MUT 0 . 1632 1. 1582*** 2 . 1766*** (0. 1563) (0. 2516) (0 .5595) AMY 0 . 0019 - 0. 0041*** - 0 .0025*** (0. 0013) (0. 0008) (0 . 0004) AFY 0 . 0083*** 0 . 0052*** 0 .0017 (0. 0016) (0. 0011) (0 . 0015) FT - 0. 0958*** - 0. 1357*** - 0 .0962*** (0. 0163) (0. 0113) (0 .0231) OT 0 . 0265 - 0. 0629*** - 0 .06 30*** (0. 0243) (0. 0183) (0 .0296) EDT 0 . 3635** 0 . 4040*** 0 .1654** (0. 1353) (0. 0762) (° .0769) AFT - 0. 407 8*** - 0. 3834*** - 0 .6994*** (0. 0619) (0. 0402) (0 .0782) CF 0. 192 8*** 0 . 1765*** 0 .5930*** (0. 0454) (0. 0672) (0 .1955) CFT - 6. 6832*** -10 . 6173*** -14 . 0012*** (1. 1919) (0. 9150) (1 .6192) MRD - 0. 5887*** - 0. 2760*** - 0 .6275*** (0. 0509) (0. 0315) (0 .0723) R 2 0 . 7566 0 . 7452 0 .5840 S.E.E. 4. 7119 4. 7428 5 .7712 *** = s i g n i f i c a n t at 1% ** = s i g n i f i c a n t at 5% * = s i g n i f i c a n t at 10% Numbers i n p a r e n t h e s e s are s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of c o e f f i c i e n t s . 55 s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t a g a i n , i n d i c a t i n g a g e n e r a l d i s c o u r a g e d worker effect."*" When we examine the c o e f f i c i e n t s on MUT, we come a c r o s s the f i r s t p i e c e of evidence of the e x i s t e n c e of any added worker b e h a v i o u r . S i n c e MUT r e p r e s e n t s the male unemployment r a t e w i t h i n the t r a c t , a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t e s t h a t i n c r e a s i n g unemployment among men i n a g i v e n neighbourhood encourages i n c r e a s i n g l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n among the women i n t h a t neighbourhood. ( I d e a l -l y , t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n would be at the household or f a m i l y l e v e l ) . In o t h e r words, we f i n d added worker b e h a v i o u r . Such b e h a v i o u r e x i s t s at a h i g h l e v e l of s t a t i s t i c a l s i g n i -f i c a n c e f o r women i n the M and R groups, but f o r P t r a c t s , the c o e f f i c i e n t on MUT was not s i g n i f i c a n t . We t u r n now to the r e l a t i o n s h i p between male e a r n -i n g s and female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . Theory would l e a d us to a n t i c i p a t e a n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p between these v a r i a b l e s and t h i s i s borne out. However, f o r the P t r a c t s , the co-e f f i c i e n t i s not s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s would im-p l y t h a t the range over which male incomes i n the P t r a c t s . S e x - s p e c i f i c urban .unemployment r a t e s were, t r i e d i n the r e g r e s s i o n s on both MPT and FPT r e p l a c i n g TUU, but d i d not pe r f o r m d i f f e r e n t l y and'were too c l o s e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h TUU to be used alon g w i t h i t . Hence, TUU was r e -t a i n e d as i n d i c a t i v e of g e n e r a l economic c o n d i t i o n s . 56 v a r y i s not s u f f i c i e n t to induce changes i n female p a r -t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . However, we may conclude t h a t as male e a r n i n g s i n P t r a c t s approach those of M or R t r a c t s , female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s would be reduced. Theory would l e a d us to b e l i e v e t h a t males or f e -males would respond p o s i t i v e l y to a change i n t h e i r own e a r n i n g s ; a c o n c l u s i o n which was not c o m p l e t e l y borne out i n Table I f o r reasons mentioned above. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t does appear to be v a l i d f o r Table I I I . The response i s s t r o n g e s t f o r middle income groups and l e s s s t r o n g i n the R groups where more women would be a b l e to o b t a i n j o b s o f f e r i n g ' f u l f i l l m e n t ' or o t h e r n o n - p e c u n i a r y s a t i s f a c t i o n s and i n P t r a c t s where n e c e s s i t y would encourage women to work at whatever wage l e v e l was p r e v a i l i n g . Next, we examine the I v a r i a b l e s b e g i n n i n g w i t h n a t i o n a l i t y . A l t h o u g h n a t i o n a l i t y f a c t o r s d i d not appear to have much i n f l u e n c e on the working p l a n s of men, t h e i r e f f e c t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f o r women. The FT and OT v a r -i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t the p r o p o r t i o n of the t r a c t p o p u l a t i o n which i s French and n e i t h e r B r i t i s h nor French r e s p e c t i v e l y . Both FT and OT s i g n i f i c a n t l y d e t e r female l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The e f f e c t i s l e a s t f o r the P group. I t -can a l s o be seen .that b e i n g of French o r i g i n i s more l i k e l y to d e t e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n of women than b e i n g a member of o t h e r n o n - B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i t i e s . We may t e n t a t i v e l y c onclude t h a t 57 the more t r a d i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e to women's r o l e s p r e v a l e n t i n these groups p r o v i d e d the d e t e r r e n t . I t w i l l be i n t e r -e s t i n g to see whether the i n f l u e n c e of these v a r i a b l e s has d i m i n i s h e d s i n c e 1961. As was the case i n the r e g r e s s i o n on MPT, i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t FT and e s p e c i a l l y OT may be m e r e l y . p r o x i e s f o r another v a r i a b l e such as i m m i g r a t i o n . C o n s e q u e n t l y , v a r i a b l e s r e p r e s e n t i n g i m m i g r a t i o n were t r i e d i n the r e g r e s -s i o n s r e p l a c i n g FT and OT. The c o e f f i c i e n t s were n e g a t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t , but a g a i n , the i m m i g r a t i o n v a r i a b l e d i d not 2 appear to ' e x p l a i n ' as much as FT and OT. A p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s c o n c e r n i n g a m b i g u i t y of the e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e EDT s i n c e the measure of e d u c a t i o n has not been broken down by sex. E d u c a t i o n of women, c e t . par. tends to encourage t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the l a b o u r f o r c e , but e d u c a t i o n of t h e i r husbands and the h i g h e r income which 2 The n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e of the i m m i g r a t i o n v a r i a b l e s came as somewhat of a s u r p r i s e s i n c e e a r l i e r s t u d i e s such as N. H.-W. D a v i s and M. L. Gupta's Labour Force Characteristics of- Post-War Immigrants and Native-Born Canadians, 1956-67 ( S p e c i a l Labour Force S t u d i e s No. 6, DBS, September 1968), i n d i c a t e h i g h e r female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s f o r immigrants than f o r n a t i v e - b o r n Canadians. T h i s r e s u l t may have been o b t a i n e d because Davis and Gupta, op. c i t . 3 "p. 16, s t a n d a r d -i z e d o n l y f o r age, but not f o r income, e d u c a t i o n , c h i l d r e n , e t c . Had,they taken these f a c t o r s i n t o account i t i s pos-s i b l e t h a t t h e i r r e s u l t s would have conformed more c l o s e l y w i t h those of t h i s t h e s i s . 5 8 r e s u l t s tend to d i s c o u r a g e female p a r t i c i p a t i o n . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e when the e d u c a t i o n i s of the p o s t - s e c o n d a r y 3 v a r i e t y . F u r t h e r m o r e , e d u c a t i o n of men and women -•- whether by household or t r a c t — i s o f t e n c o r r e l a t e d . Hence, any c o e f f i c i e n t on our EDT v a r i a b l e c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d by the predominance of one or the o t h e r of the i n f l u e n c e s j u s t men-t i oned. T h e . p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e appears to be c l e a r l y dominant. Whether t h i s i s because the p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e s p r o v i d e d by women's e d u c a t i o n ( b e t t e r j o b s and s a l a r i e s , more ' t a s t e ' f o r market work, e t c . ) outweigh the n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e of. more educated husbands, or whether i t i s because more edu-cated husbands are more l i k e l y to t o l e r a t e or even encourage working wives (though l a t e r r e s u l t s do not uphold the l a t t e r c o n c l u s i o n ) , we cannot say. N e v e r t h e l e s s , we can say q u i t e u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t the h i g h e r the e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t i n an a r e a , the more l i k e l y i t i s t h a t the women i n t h a t area are i n the l a b o u r f o r c e . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n h o l d s f o r a l l i n -come group s. The age v a r i a b l e f o r females AFT was s e t up i n a d i f f e r e n t manner than AMT. The l a t t e r was the p r o p o r t i o n of men i n the age group most l i k e l y to be .in the l a b o u r f o r c e i n a s o c i e t y such as ours.. A p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n w i t h MPT See, f o r example, John D. A l l i n g h a m and Byron G. Spencer, Women Who Work, Part 2, S p e c i a l Labour Force S t u d i e s , S e r i e s B, No. 2, DBS, December,,1968. 59 was expected and o b t a i n e d . For women, a s i m i l a r age v a r i -a b l e might have been used i n d i c a t i n g the p r o p o r t i o n . o f women who were i n the age b r a c k e t s beyond which they would l i k e l y be a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l and b e f o r e which they would c o n s i d e r r e t i r e m e n t . Cet. par., a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t would be exp e c t e d . However, o t h e r t h i n g s are not e q u a l . For women, the prime working years are the ones where c h i l d b e a r i n g and c h i l d r a i s i n g d u t i e s are l i k e l y to be . p a r t i c u l a r l y oner-ous. And the presence of c h i l d r e n , as we s h a l l see below, has a v e r y s t r o n g n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , AFT r e f e r s to the p r o p o r t i o n of the female p o p u l a t i o n over 15 who are 55 y e a r s or o l d e r , an age group f o r which the p r o b a b i l i t y of g e t t i n g , k e e p i n g or even d e s i r i n g a j o b i s l i k e l y to d i m i n i s h . AFT bears a n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t f o r a l l groups. The i n f l u e n c e of age i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y s t r o n g e r i n the R group as i s shown by the F v a l u e s i n Table IV. T h i s i s i n c o n t r a s t to what was found f o r AMT where the i n f l u e n c e of age was l e a s t i m p o r t a n t f o r the R group. In s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t men i n h i g h income areas tend to remain i n the l a b o u r f o r c e more than those of o t h e r income groups as age advances -- or perhaps even because of t h i s f a c t — women i n h i g h income areas tend to p a r t i c i p a t e l e s s i n market work as they grow o l d e r . The e f f e c t s of age f o r the M and P groups f o l l o w the same p a t t e r n f o r both sexes . Table IV Chow3" Test R e s u l t s On R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1961 Data Depend ent V a r i a b l e = FPT Income Groups P & M M & R P & R V a r i a b l e s (Degrees of Freedom) (1 & 782) F Values (1 & 782) (1 & 514) TUU 0.06 5.40** 1.90 MUT 11.31*-** 3 .26* 13.92*** AMY 14.05*** 2 .33 8.13*** AFY 2 .32 3. 60*- 8.21*** FT 4.00** 2 . 74* 0 . 00 OT 8.62*** 0 .00 5.45*** EDT 0.06 5.01** 1. 41 AFT 0. 10 15.00*** 8.62*** CF 0.04 4.93** 4.64** CFT 6.82*** 3.79** 13 .52*** MRD 27 . 12*** 23.61*** 0. 19 (Degrees of Freedom) (11 & 782) (11 & 782) (11 & 514) T o t a l R e g r e s s i o n 7.11*** 5.22*** 7 .51*** *** = r e g r e s s i o n at 1% c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t ** = r e g r e s s i o n at 5% c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t * = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 10% of See Gregory C. Chow, C o e f f i c i e n t s i n Two L i n e a r " T e s t s of E q u a l i t y Between R e g r e s s i o n , " op. c i t . Sets 61 We have a l r e a d y begun to a n a l y z e the i n f l u e n c e of f a m i l y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on. the working p a t t e r n s of females i n s e t t i n g up the age v a r i a b l e . F a m i l y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a l s o l i e behind the importance of the t h r e e v a r i a b l e s t h a t remain: CF, CFT, and MRD. CF stands f o r crowded f a m i l i e s and r e p r e s e n t s the p r o p o r t i o n of d w e l l i n g s i n each t r a c t i n -h a b i t e d by two or more f a m i l i e s . T h i s v a r i a b l e was suggested 4 by C a i n who used i t to e x p l a i n a h i g h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e f o r m a r r i e d Negro women than f o r m a r r i e d w h i t e women. In our s t u d y , as i n C a i n ' s , the i n f l u e n c e of CF i s p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t . The presence of more than one f a m i l y per household means t h a t t h e r e i s l i k e l y to be more than one woman to share the housekeeping and c h i l d care d u t i e s , mak-in g i t e a s i e r f o r at l e a s t one of them to remain i n the l a b o u r f o r c e . I t s h o u l d be noted t h a t t h i s v a r i a b l e i s not merely a proxy f o r crowded c o n d i t i o n s and low income. F i r s t , i t s i n f l u e n c e . i s even s t r o n g e r i n the R t r a c t s than i n the M and P a r e a s . That t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i s s i g n i f i c a n t can be seen i n Table IV. Second, CF was not h i g h l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h CDT, a v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t i n g crowded c o n d i t i o n s as measured by the number of persons per room. CDT had a n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on p a r t i c i p a t i o n Glen G. C a i n , Married An Economic Analysis (Chicago: 1966). Women in the Labour Force: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 6 2 r a t e s , p r o b a b l y b e c a u s e c r o w d e d c o n d i t i o n s m o s t o f t e n e x i s t w h e n t h e r e a r e m a n y c h i l d r e n p r e s e n t . I t w a s n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e f i n a l r e g r e s s i o n s i n c e t h e e f f e c t o f c h i l d r e n i s t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t b y t h e C F T v a r i a b l e , t o w h i c h w e n o w t u r n . O n e o f t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r s i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t a w o m a n w i l l b e i n t h e l a b o u r f o r c e i s w h e -t h e r o r n o t s h e h a s c h i l d r e n a t h o m e . I t i s u s u a l l y f e l t t h a t t h e y o u n g e r a n d m o r e n u m e r o u s t h e c h i l d r e n , t h e l e s s l i k e l y t h e w o m a n i s t o b e i n t h e l a b o u r f o r c e . A l s o , e a r -l i e r s t u d i e s h a v e u s u a l l y f o u n d t h a t t h e h i g h e r t h e l e v e l o f f a m i l y ( o r h u s b a n d ' s ) i n c o m e , t h e l e s s l i k e l y a w o m a n i s t o l e a v e h e r c h i l d r e n a n d e n t e r t h e l a b o u r m a r k e t . " ' C e n s u s t r a c t d a t a w e r e n o t b r o k e n d o w n s u f f i c i e n t l y t o a l l o w u s t o t e s t f o r t h e i n f l u e n c e o f c h i l d r e n ' s a g e , b u t o u r r e s u l t s c o n f i r m - t h a t t h e n u m b e r o f c h i l d r e n d o h a v e a s t r o n g n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e o n p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . T h e m a r r i a g e v a r i a b l e M R D i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e r e g r e s s i o n s f o r w o m e n , a s i t w a s i n t h e r e g r e s s i o n s f o r m e n , b u t i t s i n f l u e n c e t e n d s t o g o i n t h e o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , M a r r i a g e i n o u r c u l t u r e h a s ' g e n e r a l l y p r o v i d e d a n i n c e n t i v e f o r m e n t o e n t e r a n d r e m a i n i n t h e l a b o u r f o r c e . M a r r i a g e f o r w o m e n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y p r o v i d e d a " * S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , S y l v i a O s t r y , The Female Worker in Canada, 1 9 6 1 C e n s u s M o n o g r a p h , D B S , O t t a w a , 1 9 6 8 . 63 means of support a l t e r n a t i v e to e a r n i n g s i n the l a b o u r mar-ke t and an o c c u p a t i o n i n the form of household and c h i l d c a r e work a l t e r n a t i v e to a c a r e e r o u t s i d e the home. A l s o a s i g n i f i c a n t , i f d i m i n i s h i n g , amount of d i s a p p r o v a l i s aroused by m a r r i e d women w o r k i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i f they are a l s o the mothers of young c h i l d r e n . Hence, our v e r y s i g -n i f i c a n t and n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s on MRD f o r a l l income groups. We should note t h a t m a r r i a g e tends to be l e s s of a d e t e r r e n t to l a b o u r market a c t i v i t y i n the M income group than i n e i t h e r the P or R groups. No d i f f e r e n c e i n the i n f l u e n c e of ma r r i a g e was found between those i n the two extreme income groups.(See Table I V ) . One more v a r i a b l e was t r i e d i n the r e g r e s s i o n on FPT. I t r e p r e s e n t s the excess demand f o r female l a b o u r i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . However, t h i s v a r i a b l e d i d not add a n y t h i n g m e a n i n g f u l to the r e s u l t s and was dropped. As was the case i n the e q u a t i o n s on MPT, Chow t e s t s were run to determine whether the e q u a t i o n s f o r the d i f f e r e n t income groups were s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from each o t h e r . A l l groups were found to be s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t by t h i s t e s t at a l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e of 1 % , as shown i n Table IV. CHAPTER IV EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR 1951 In o r d e r to p r o v i d e a te m p o r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , r e g r e s -s i o n s analogous to those i n Tables I and I I I .were run on 1951 d a t a . Data were a v a i l a b l e f o r a s m a l l e r number of cen-sus t r a c t s i n 1951 than 1961 making some changes n e c e s s a r y . Only the th r e e l a r g e s t m e t r o p o l i t a n areas (Vancouver, Toroht and M o n t r e a l ) were used. To o b t a i n P & R t r a c t s , the lowest and h i g h e s t q u a r t i l e s of t r a c t s by income of f a m i l y head i n each c i t y were chosen. The r e m a i n i n g t r a c t s were c a l l e d . M. Thi s change was p o s s i b l e because the c i t i e s were more homo-geneous than was the case i n the l a r g e r sample used f o r 1961 Si n c e the c i t i e s were d i v i d e d i n t o income c a t e g o r i e s s e p a r -a t e l y , no adjustment f o r p r i c e d i f f e r e n c e s was needed. One i m p o r t a n t change i n the d a t a a v a i l a b l e was t h a t the ' a d u l t ' p o p u l a t i o n used i n d e t e r m i n i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , e t c . , was d e f i n e d as those 14 ye a r s o l d and o v e r , r a t h e r than those 15 years and over as was the case f o r 1961. However, s i n c e those 14 y e a r s o l d i n 1951 (born i n 1937.) r e p r e s e n t e d a f a i r l y s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a -t i o n , t h i s change s h o u l d not b i a s our r e s u l t s . F u r t h e r , age data f o r 1951 were not broken down by sex. The e f f e c t s of these changes w i l l be noted when examining the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d f o r AFT and AMT. 64 65 The 1951 r e g r e s s i o n s on MPT are p r e s e n t e d i n T a b l e V. L o o k i n g f i r s t at TUU, we f i n d t h a t the c o e f f i -c i e n t s on t h i s v a r i a b l e a g a i n have n e g a t i v e s i g n s i n d i c a t i n g d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r . However, f o r the R t r a c t s , the c o e f f i c i e n t , though n e g a t i v e , i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f -f e r e n t from zero i n d i c a t i n g t h a t i n 1951 the unemployment r a t e had l i t t l e , i f any, i n f l u e n c e on the w o r k i ng h a b i t s of wealthy-men. By 1961, as we have seen, t h i s group d i d e x h i b i t more d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r . The i n f l u e n c e of earned income was p o s i t i v e f o r the P group and n e g a t i v e f o r the .M group, w h i l e f o r R t r a c t s i t was z e r o . The l a s t can be e x p l a i n e d i n a manner s i m i l a r to t h a t used to e x p l a i n the i n s i g n i f i c a n t c o e f f i c i e n t s on AMY i n Table I . I t i s a l i t t l e more d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n the s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t i n the M group s i n c e i t i s u s u a l l y p o s t u l a t e d t h a t the m i d d l e c l a s s i s l e a s t l i k e l y to have a backward s l o p i n g s u p p l y curve of l a b o u r . When we t u r n to the v a r i a b l e s on n a t i o n a l i t y we a g a i n f i n d a s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t from t h a t p r e v a i l i n g i n 1961. In the l a t e r y e a r , n e i t h e r FT nor OT e x e r t e d any a p p r e c i a b l e i n f l u e n c e on male p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . In 1951, however, males i n p r e d o m i n a n t l y French areas i n low and m i d d l e income t r a c t s showed a g r e a t e r tendency to be Table V R e g r e s s i o n R e s u l t s f o r 1951 Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT Var i a b l e M Cons t a n t TUU AMY FT OT EDT AMT MRD R 2 S . E . E . 45 . 7323*** (7.8892) 10.3247*** (2.0560) 0.0118*** (0.0030) 0 . 1251*** (0 .0237) 0.0240 (0.0313) 0 . 0555 (0 .0785) 0.1949 (0.1286) 0.1004 (0.0818) 0.3994 5.7170 78.2331*** (5.3283) • 9.8351*** (1*1652) • 0.0057*** (0.0022) 0.0726*** (0.0149) 0.0099 (0.0259) 0.1451** (0.0650) 0.1477** (0.0711) 0.2463*** (0.05 90) 0.3416 4.0411 49.4208*** (5.5257) - 0.5611 (2.1157) 0.0000 (0.0009) 0.0369 (0.0314) 0.0283 (0.0410) - 0 .0407 (0.0818) 0 .0757 (0.1156) 0.4588*** (0.1046) 0.4231 6.0716 *** = s i g n i f i c a n t at 1% ** = s i g n i f i c a n t at 5% * = s i g n i f i c a n t at 10% Numbers i n p a r e n t h e s e s are s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of c o e f f i c i e n t s . 67 i n the l a b o u r f o r c e than o t h e r males. However, even between the-). P and M groups, a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e . e x i s t s . as shown i n Table V I . OT d i d not d i s p l a y any d i s c e r n i b l e e f f e c t . The e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e EDT o p e r a t e s as expected f o r the M group, though-at a lower l e v e l of s i g n i f i c a n c e than i t d i d i n 1961. However, i t has no e f f e c t i n e i t h e r the P or R a r e a s . At t h i s p o i n t i t may b e . w o r t h w h i l e to note a d i f f e r e n c e i n the d e f i n i t i o n of EDT f o r 1961 and 1951.. In the l a t t e r y e a r , EDT r e f e r r e d to the p r o -p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n not a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l who had at l e a s t one year of u n i v e r s i t y . In the e a r l i e r y e a r , the v a r i a b l e was the p r o p o r t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n h a v i n g 13 or more ye a r s of s c h o o l . T h i s i s a much more ambiguous d e f i n i t i o n s i n c e i n some p r o v i n c e s ( e . g . , Quebec), 13 years of s c h o o l , would i n c l u d e two years of u n i v e r s i t y , w h i l e i n o t h e r s (e.g. O n t a r i o ) , grade 13 w a s , i n c l u d e d i n the h i g h s c h o o l system. T h i s a m b i g u i t y p r o b a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d to the r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d . A second p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the l e s s e r s i g n i -f i c a n c e of EDT i n 1951 than i n 1961 may be o f f e r e d . I t w i l l be r e c a l l e d t h a t the e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e f o r 1961 was chosen because job r e q u i r e m e n t s were such t h a t t h i s amount of e d u c a t i o n was r e q u i r e d to g i v e a person an advantage i n the l a b o u r - m a r k e t . However, i n 1951, lower h i r i n g s t a n d a r d s and t i g h t l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s i n d i c a t e t h a t a lower l e v e l of s c h o o l i n g (perhaps n i n e or ten y e a r s ) 68 TABLE VL Chow Test R e s u l t s on R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1951 Data Dependent V a r i a b l e = MPT• Income Groups P & M M & R P & R V a r i a b l e s F Values (Degrees of Freedom) (1 & 394) (1 & 388) (1 & 268) TUU-AMY FT OT EDT AMT MRD 0.05 23.90-*** 4.05** 0.12 0 . 81 0.14 2 .31 18.07*** 4.29** 1.35 0 . 16 3.37* 0.30 3 . 69* 10.94*** 12.94*** 5 .08** 0 . 00 0.72 0.47 7 .2 4*** (Degrees of Freedom) (7 & 394) T o t a l R e g r e s s i o n 4.15*** (7 & 388) 5.79*** (7 & 268) 5.06*** * * * = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 1% ** = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 5% * = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 10% See Gregory C. Chow, "Tes t s of E q u a l i t y Between Sets of C o e f f i c i e n t s i n Two L i n e a r R e g r e s s i o n s , " op. a i t . 69 might have been a more s u i t a b l e c u t - o f f p o i n t . T h i s c u t -o f f was not used, however, i n o r d e r to m a i n t a i n c o m p a r a b i l -i t y between the r e g r e s s i o n s over t i m e . The AMT v a r i a b l e , though p o s i t i v e as e x p e c t e d , i s s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y f o r the M group because the age d a t a f o r 1951 were not broken down by sex. Thus the v a r i a b l e i n d i c a -ted the per cent of the t o t a l a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n i n the r e l e -vant age group, i . e . i n the prime working y e a r s of 25-54. Hence, we must assume t h a t the age d i s t r i b u t i o n of each sex i n a t r a c t i s i d e n t i c a l to the age d i s t r i b u t i o n of the pop-u l a t i o n as a.whole. To the e x t e n t t h a t t h i s assumption i s not v a l i d , the v a r i a b l e w i l l not measure what we d e s i r e i t to measure. J u d g i n g by the r e s u l t s i n the r e g r e s s i o n , the assumption was not e n t i r e l y j u s t i f i e d by the d a t a . The v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t i n g m a r r i a g e performs as ex-p e c t e d . I t was noted i n 1961 t h a t the magnitude of t h i s i n c e n t i v e appeared to be weakest f o r the lower income group. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n i s c o n f i r m e d by the 1951 r e s u l t s , where the e f f e c t of m a r r i a g e on the l a b o u r f o r c e b e h a v i o u r of low i n -come males has shrunk to an i n s i g n i f i c a n t magnitude. In summary, we conclude t h a t the 1951 r e g r e s s i o n r e s u l t s f o r MPT c o n f i r m the 1961 c o n c l u s i o n s . The most noteworthy d i f f e r e n c e s are the s i g n i f i c a n c e of the FT v a r i a b l e f o r the two lower income groups i n 1951, the chang-i n g e f f e c t s of e d u c a t i o n and the s p o r a d i c b e h a v i o u r of the 70 e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e . AMY. The changes i n .the'-.performance of the:age v a r i a b l e AMT are l a r g e l y due to i t s d i f f e r e n t , s p e c i f i c a t i o n . However, our e a r l i e r • c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the predominance of d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s i s u p h e l d . A l s o upheld, and demonstrated by Chow t e s t s i n Table VI i s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e i n the r e g r e s s i o n s among the t h r e e income groups.' S i m i l a r i t i e s between the 1951 and 1961 r e s u l t s e x i s t i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t 1951 was a much more \ p r o s p e r o u s and booming year than was 1961, and i n s p i t e of the f a c t t h a t Chow t e s t s show t h a t the r e g r e s s i o n s i n 1951 are s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t (at the 1% l e v e l ) from those of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g income groups i n the same c i t i e s i n 1961. The l a t t e r would i n d i c a t e t h a t d e f i n i t e changes had o c c u r r e d over time. The r e s u l t s f o r FPT are not so c o n s i s t e n t . The 1951 r e g r e s s i o n s are shown i n Table V I I . The f i r s t and most impor-t a n t d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t f o r the R group, the TUU v a r i a b l e i s p o s i t i v e and v e r y s i g n i f i.cant. T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t i n 1951 women i n h i g h e r income areas.responded to a w orsening of eco-nomic c o n d i t i o n s by e n t e r i n g the l a b o u r f o r c e . More r e l e v a n t to the 1951 p e r i o d , they responded to an improvement i n l a b o u r market c o n d i t i o n s by l e a v i n g the l a b o u r f o r c e . . T h i s i s the o n l y case i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n s where such added worker be-h a v i o u r i s found. Table V I I R e g r e s s i o n • R e s u l t s f o r 1 9 5 1 Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT 7 1 V a r i a b l e p M R Constant' 1 2 3 . 4 7 8 0 * * * 1 0 7 . 4 5 0 9 * * * 1 2 6 . 2 4 7 7 * * * ( 1 0 . 5 1 2 1 ) . ( 5 . 6 6 5 1 ) ( 8 . 1 5 6 5 ) TUU - 4 . 4 0 3 4 * - 3 . 3 6 3 0 * * * 5 . 9 1 5 1 * * * ( 2 . 7 1 3 3 ) ( 1 . 1 9 2 6 ) ( 1 . 7 6 2 0 ) MUT 0 . 3 3 7 1 0 . 2 8 4 8 - 1 . 9 3 6 2 * * ( 0 . 4 1 1 . 6 ) . . . ( 0 . 3 6 0 9 ) ( 0 . 9 0 2 9 ) AMY 0 . 0 1 6 4 * * * - o . 0 0 0 3 - 0 . 0 0 2 3 * * * ( 0 . 0 0 3 7 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 6 ) ( 0 . 0 0 0 6 ) AFY - 0 . 0 1 4 3 * * * - 0 . 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 0 2 4 * ( 0 . 0 0 3 0 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 7 ) ( 0 . 0 0 1 4 ) FT - 0 . 0 9 0 1 * * * - 0 . 0 6 5 0 * * * - 0 . 1 6 9 6 * * * ( 0 . 0 2 8 9 ) ( 0 . 0 1 2 7 ) ( 0 . 0 2 9 8 ) OT - 0 . 0 5 5 2 * - 0 . 1 0 6 0 * * * - 0 . 0 6 1 0 * * ( . 0 . 0 3 4 2 ) ( 0 . 0 1 9 4 ) ( 0 . 0 2 7 7 ) EDT 0 . 5 4 2 0 . H 2 5 * * * 0 . 0 9 0 3 * (. 0 . 0 8 5 7 ) ( 0 . 0 4 5 9 ) ( 0 . 0 5 5 9 ) AFT - 0 . 6 9 3 2 * * * - 0 . 3 4 0 8 * * * - 0 . 7 1 9 9 * * * ( 0 . 1 5 5 5 ) ( 0 . 0 5 7 7 ) ( 0 . 1 0 1 1 ) CF - 0 . 0 5 2 6 - 0 . 0 5 9 4 - 0 . 3 2 6 1 * * ( 0 . 0 5 5 9 ) ( 0 . 0 4 1 6 ) ( 0 . 1 2 9 5 ) CFT - 1 0 . 8 7 3 0 * * * - 1 1 . 3 6 0 4 * * * - 9 . 5 3 9 9 * * * ( 1 . 9 4 1 3 ) ( 1 . 0 0 9 6 ) ( 2 . 0 1 3 6 ) MRD - 1 . 1 2 6 7 * * * - 0 . 7 3 2 8 * * * - 1 . 0 5 9 0 * * * ( 0 . 0 8 9 1 ) ( 0 . 0 4 4 4 ) ( 0 . 0 8 2 3 ) R 2 0 . 7 1 8 8 0 . 8 5 8 1 0 . 8 0 8 3 S * E - E • 5 . 8 6 2 7 2 . 7 7 1 1 3 . 8 3 7 4 *** = s i g n i f i c a n t ** = s i g n i f i c a n t * = s i g n i f i c a n t at 1% at 5% at 1 0 % Numbers i n p a r e n t h e s e s c o e f f i c i e n t s . are. s t a n d a r d e r r o r s of 72 However, f o r the P and M groups, the TUU v a r i a b l e was n e g a t i v e , i n d i c a t i n g a d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t . The magnitude of t h i s e f f e c t and, f o r the P group, it's s i g n i f i c a n c e --' i s l e s s than i t was i h 1961. MUT, the male unemployment r a t e i n the t r a c t , has d i m i n i s h e d to i n s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the M and P groups i n 1951. In 1961 ev i d e n c e of added worker b e h a v i o u r was found i n the M group. R i c h women, however, tend to d i s - ' p l a y a s i g n i f i c a n t amount of d i s c o u r a g e d .worker b e h a v i o u r i n response to MUT. We now see t h a t f o r h i g h income women a r e v e r s e p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r p r e v a i l s i n the two year s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In 1951 added worker b e h a v i o u r i s found i n response to g e n e r a l economic c o n d i t i o n s , but d i s c o u r a g e d worker p a t t e r n s p e r s i s t i n response to the l o c a l unemployment r a t e . In 1961 the o p p o s i t e o c c u r s . 'Whether'this change i s due to a lon g run s h i f t i n the a t t i -tudes of these women to the l a b o u r market, or whether the change i s i n response to the d i f f e r e n t phases of the b u s i n e s s c y c l e which p r e v a i l e d . i n thel.t-wo y e a r s , i s not the s u b j e c t of t h i s s t u d y . The 1961 r e s u l t s showed a n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t on the male e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e AMY and a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t on female e a r n i n g s . In 1951 t h i s p a t t e r n p r e v a i l s f o r the R group. 7 3 The l e v e l of e a r n i n g s , e i t h e r t h e i r own or t h a t of the men, had v i r t u a l l y no i n f l u e n c e on women workers i n the mid d l e income range i n 1951. T h i s f i n d i n g i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the r e s u l t s we have found f o r men i n the h i g h e r income group i n 1951 and f o r men i n both the M and R groups i n 1961, where we concluded t h a t f a c t o r s o t h e r than the number of d o l l a r s earned determined the d e c i s i o n to work. For men, we s p e c u l a t e d t h a t unearned income e s p e c i a l l y i n the form of f r i n g e b e n e f i t s was i m p o r t a n t . For women, we may s p e c u l a t e the t a s t e f o r or..against work may dominate the d e c i s i o n to e n t e r or l e a v e the l a b o u r f o r c e (cet.par.) so t h a t the e f f e c t of an e x t r a d o l l a r of income becomes n e g l i g i b l e . Of c o u r s e , one would not expect t a s t e s to remain unchanged from 1951 to 1961 e s p e c i a l l y i n a f i e l d l i k e female p a r t i c i -p a t i o n r a t e s where so much change has been observed. Con-s e q u e n t l y , we sh o u l d not be s u r p r i s e d to see t h a t as more women.entered and remained i n the l a b o u r f o r c e from 1951-1961, they became l e s s enamoured w i t h the i d e a o f . w o r k i n g and more s e n s i t i v e to changes i n income — t h e i r own or t h a t of the men i n t h e i r f a m i l i e s . As noted above, such a s e n s i t i v i t y was ob s e r v e d , e s p e c i a l l y f o r middle income women i n both years of o b s e r v a t i o n . The b e h a v i o u r of women i n the lower income group and the change-in t h a t b e h a v i o u r over the r e l e v a n t decade appear to be more complex. The s i g n s on AMY and AFY 7 4 are the o p p o s i t e to what t h e o r y would l e a d us to p r e d i c t . AMY now has a p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t and AFY a n e g a t i v e one. One p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s to say t h a t the s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t on AMY r e f l e c t s a p a t t e r n of d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r . I f male e a r n i n g s are c o n s i d e r e d and responded to not on l y as. a component of f a m i l y income, but a l s o as an i n d i c a t o r of g e n e r a l economic c o n d i t i o n s , lower income women may respond to i t as they d i d to the o t h e r g e n e r a l economic i n d i c a t o r TUU namely by the d i s p l a y of d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r . Though lower male e a r n i n g s may d i s c o u r a g e p a r t i c i p a -t i o n of. f e m a l e s ; when these e a r n i n g s approach z e r o , i . e . when men become unemployed, t h e r e i s a s h i f t from a d i s c o u r a g e d worker to an added worker b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n on the p a r t of lower income women a l t h o u g h the magnitude of the l a t t e r be-h a v i o u r i s s l i g h t . The n e g a t i v e s i g n on the AFY c o e f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t e d t h a t poor women i n 1951 a l s o tended to p r e s e n t a backward s l o p i n g s u p p l y curve of l a b o u r . Some h y p o t h e s i s i s r e q u i r e d as to why such a s u p p l y curve might e x i s t . In 1951 women i n the lower income groups d i d not have a f i r m attachment to the l a b o u r market, which, t h e i r strong" d i s c o u r a g e d worker b e h a v i o u r c o n f i r m s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , they would o n l y e n t e r the l a b o u r f o r c e i n or d e r to r e a c h some immediate monetary g o a l . Thus the sooner enough money has been saved to pay f o r the f a m i l y 7 5 v a c a t i o n , c a r , or a down payment on a home, the sooner women w i l l l e a v e the l a b o u r f o r c e . Eence, a f t e r a g g r e g a t i n g , h i g h e r female e a r n i n g s would l e a d to lower p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . I t i s not d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n why t h i s t a r g e t s a v i n g p a t t e r n of be h a v i o u r i s not more g e n e r a l l y found. Perhaps the reason i s m e r e l y ' r i s i n g t a r g e t s . The i n c r e a s i n g number of consumer d u r a b l e s (and n o t - s o - d u r a b l e s ) c o n s i d e r e d n e c e s s a r y , the amounts of h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n one i s expected to p r o v i d e f o r c h i l d r e n , and.the c o s t of h o u s i n g , f o r example, are a l l r i s - : i n g r a p i d l y . Such fact o r ' s . a s t h e s e , p o s s i b l y i n t e n s i f i e d by i n f l a t i o n a r y p r e s s u r e s , would make t a r g e t s l e s s and l e s s e a s i l y a t t a i n a b l e r e s u l t i n g i n a more c o n t i n u o u s attachment to the l a b o u r f o r c e . The i n s t i t u t i o n of consumer c r e d i t which became more wi d e s p r e a d by 1961 has done much to e l i m i n a t e the need f o r s a v i n g s . People buy now and are f a c e d w i t h the problem of m a i n t a i n i n g income at a l e v e l s u f f i c i e n t to pay l a t e r . Thus, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t by 1961 women i n the low income groups were d i s p l a y i n g a p o s i t i v e response to t h e i r own e a r n i n g s l e v e l . The e t h n i c v a r i a b l e s ; i n 1951 had a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same i n f l u e n c e as i n 1961. One e x c e p t i o n concerns the i n -f l u e n c e of ET, the French v a r i a b l e on h i g h e r income women. In 1951 b e i n g French was most l i k e l y to keep a r i c h woman out of the l a b o u r f o r c e , w h i l e by 1961, r i c h women were de-7 6 t e r r e d from l a b o u r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n l e s s than m i d d l e income women by the f a c t of b e i n g F r e n c h . O b v i o u s l y , a change of v a l u e s has o c c u r r e d w i t h i n the decade. The e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e f o r women i n 1951 d i s p l a y s a p a t t e r n not too d i s s i m i l a r to t h a t found f o r men of the same y e a r . I t i s p o s i t i v e t h r o u g h o u t , but i s o n l y s t r o n g l y s i g n i f i c a n t f o r midd l e c l a s s women.. The e x p l a n a t i o n s o f f e r -ed would.be s i m i l a r to those used i n e x p l a i n i n g the i n f l u e n c e of EDT on MPT f o r 1951. A l l c o e f f i c i e n t s on the age v a r i a b l e AFT d i s p l a y the expected n e g a t i v e . s i g n . ( I t - w i l l be remembered t h a t AFT r e f e r s to the p r o p o r t i o n of p o p u l a t i o n over 54 ye a r s o l d ) . The o n l y e x p l a n a t i o n f o r the good r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d w i t h AFT as opposed to the much l e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y ones o b t a i n e d w i t h AMT i s t h a t . t h e o l d e r age groups were f a i r l y e v e n l y p o p u l a t e d by the two se x e s , w h i l e the prime aged group which was used to c a l c u l a t e AMT was not. We now t u r n to the f a m i l y v a r i a b l e s , namely CF, C FT, and MRD". The CF v a r i a b l e r e f e r s to the p r o p o r t i o n of households i n h a b i t e d by more than one f a m i l y . I n 1951 the i n f l u e n c e of CF was n e g l i g i b l e f o r the P and M groups and n e g a t i v e .for the R groups. In 1951 a p p r o x i -m a t e l y 12% of a l l the households under c o n s i d e r a t i o n were o c c u p i e d by more than one f a m i l y . Though some of these may 7 7 have been doubled up because of a r e s i d u a l h o u s i n g s h o r t a g e l e f t over from the Second World War, i t i s more l i k e l y t h a t a c o n s i d e r a b l e p o r t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n s t i l l a c c e p t e d the i d e a t h a t g r a n d p a r e n t s , f o r example, s h o u l d remain i n m a r r i e d c h i l d r e n ' s homes. These a t t i t u d e s would be more l i k e l y to p r e v a i l i n more t r a d i t i o n a l l y o r i e n t e d homes and these homes would be the.ones where s i m i l a r t r a d i t i o n s would p r e v a i l a g a i n s t women, e s p e c i a l l y m a r r i e d or o l d e r women, w o r k i n g . Hence, the n e g a t i v e . o r i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n f l u e n c e of CF . i s not s u r p r i s i n g . . By 1961, however, o n l y a p p r o x i m a t e l y * 5% of a l l households c o n t a i n e d more than one f a m i l y . By t h i s time the i d e a t h a t every n u c l e a r f a m i l y s h o u l d m a i n t a i n a s e p a r -ate d w e l l i n g had become the g o a l and the p r a c t i c e of the v a s t m a j o r i t y of f a m i l i e s . Of those few f a m i l i e s who s t i l l d oubled up, some would m a i n t a i n t h a t s t a t e v o l u n t a r i l y so t h a t the households and c h i l d c a r e d u t i e s c o u l d be shared and at l e a s t one woman would be f r e e r to go to work. Even i n those cases where f a m i l i e s were doubled up by n e c e s s i t y r a t h e r than c h o i c e , i t i s q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t the s i t u a t i o n would be taken advantage of by at l e a s t one woman now e n t e r -i n g the l a b o u r f o r c e . Another p o s s i b l e reason f o r the d i f f e r i n g i n f l u e n c e of CF i n the two ye a r s i s the a v a i l a b i l i t y of a l t e r n a t e s o u r c e s of household h e l p . I n 1951 i t was s t i l l p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n f u l l - t i m e household h e l p r e a s o n a b l y r e a d i l y , 78 e s p e c i a l l y i n the h i g h e r income group. By 1961, however, such h e l p was much more c o s t l y and d i f f i c u l t to o b t a i n , so t h a t even w e a l t h y women w i s h i n g to go to work would have to r e l y more on r e l a t i v e s to p r o v i d e h e l p at home. CFT, the v a r i a b l e r e p r e s e n t i n g c h i l d r e n , d i s p l a y s l i t t l e change'from 1951 to 1961. The m a r r i a g e v a r i a b l e a l s o works i n the p r e d i c t e d d i r e c t i o n , but the magnitude of i t s e f f e c t ' i s much l a r g e r i n 1951 than i n 1961. T h i s i s not s u r p r i s i n g s i n c e the t r a d i t i o n a l o b j e c t i o n s to m a r r i e d women working have d i m i n i s h e d s i n c e the e a r l i e r y e a r . Table V I I I shows t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s between the l a b -our f o r c e b e h a v i o u r p a t t e r n s of women i n the t h r e e income groups e x i s t e d i n 1951 as they d i d i n 1961. A f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r u n a v o i d a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n the da t a and c e r t a i n changes i n t a s t e s , our c o n c l u s i o n s are t h a t the 1951 r e s u l t s tend to c o n f i r m the 1961 . r e s u l t s . The most s t r i k i n g d i f f e r e n c e i s t h a t added worker b e h a v i o u r was so s t r o n g l y dominant f o r women i n the h i g h e r income areas i n 1951. There was a l s o -some a m b i g u i t y on the i n f l u e n c e of the e a r n i n g v a r i a b l e . 7 9 Table V I I I . Chow"'" Test R e s u l t s On R e g r e s s i o n C o e f f i c i e n t s 1951 Data Dependent V a r i a b l e = FPT Income Groups P & M M & R P & R V a r i a b l e s F Values (Degrees of Freedom) (1 & 386) (1 & 380) (1 & 260) TUU MUT AMY AFY .FT OT EDT AFT CF CFT MRD (Degrees of Freedom) T o t a l R e g r e s s i o n 0.18 0 . 03 18.32*** 13.20*** 0.64 1.60 0 .23 6.26** 1.59 0.07 17 . 15*** (11 & 386) 3 . 81*** 18.02*** 5.42** 1.55 2.27 11. 09 1.63 0.01 1 1 . 4 9 * * * 4.95** 0.75 12 . 65*** (11 & 380) 4 . 3 9 * * * 10.11*** 3.45** 32.15*** 26 . 42*** 3 . 02* 0 .01 0 . 12 0.02 4.70** 0 . 18 0.26 (11 & 260) 5.31*** *** = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 1% ** = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 5% * = r e g r e s s i o n c o e f f i c i e n t s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t at 10% 1 S e e Gregory C. Chow, "Tes t s of E q u a l i t y Between Sets of C o e f f i c i e n t s i n Two L i n e a r R e g r e s s i o n , " op. c i t . CHAPTER V COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS We have now o b t a i n e d r e s u l t s . o n l a b o u r f o r c e behav-i o u r by census t r a c t f o r a l l the years f o r which a p p r o p r i a t e d a t a ' a r e a v a i l a b l e . These r e s u l t s w i l l be compared w i t h those o b t a i n e d i n the s t u d i e s d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter I . 2 The g e n e r a l U.S. s t u d i e s were m a i n l y concerned w i t h the r e l a t i v e magnitude of the d i s c o u r a g e d and added worker e f f e c t s . On t h i s p o i n t , t h e r e i s c o n s i d e r a b l e agree-ment between our f i n d i n g s and the works c i t e d , s i n c e a l l ' t hese s t u d i e s found a predominance of the d i s c o u r a g e d work-er e f f e c t . E x c e p t i o n s are found by Bowen and Finegan f o r prime aged males- i n 1940 and by C a i n [1967] f o r non-white One may wonder to what e x t e n t v a l i d comparisons may be made between t h i s t h e s i s and o t h e r s t u d i e s which use d i f -f e r e n t c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s , d i f f e r e n t breakdowns of the l a b o u r f o r c e , f r e q u e n t l y do not take the income f a c t o r i n t o account and o f t e n a p p l y to d i f f e r e n t time p e r i o d s and/or c o u n t r i e s . I f the r e s u l t s of our t h e s i s do not agree w i t h those of the e a r l i e r s t u d i e s , we would then be j u s t i f i e d i n e x p l a i n i n g the d i f f e r e n c e s as bei n g due to the d i f f e r e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n s of the models. However, i f -- i n s p i t e of these d i f f e r e n c e s i n s p e c i f i c a t i o n ,the r e s u l t s . a r e s t i l l s i m i l a r ; we are p r o b a b l y j u s t i f i e d i n t r e a t i n g t h i s as a c o n f i r m a t i o n of our r e s u l t s . 2 See M i n c e r , C a i n , T e l i a and Bowen and Finegan i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y . 80 81 wives and female f a m i l y heads. In a l l cases not h a v i n g a d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t , the urban employment v a r i a b l e was i n s i g n i f i c a n t . No i n s t a n c e . o f a s i g n i f i c a n t l y p o s i t i v e e f f e c t of urban employment was found, f u r t h e r weakening the case f o r added worker b e h a v i o u r . However, added worker b e h a v i o u r was not c o m p l e t e l y n o n - e x i s t e n t . Evidence f o r i t was found i n the p r e s e n t work by p o s i t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t s on l o c a l male unemployment r a t e s f o r a l l women i n 1961 and women i n P and M t r a c t s i n 1951. The women i n h i g h e r income t r a c t s a c t u a l l y r e a c t e d p o s i t i v e l y to the urban employment r a t e , thus g i v i n g some . ver y s t r o n g e v i d e n c e of added worker b e h a v i o u r . S i m i l a r e v i d e n c e of added worker b e h a v i o u r has been found i n these e a r l i e r s t u d i e s and some c o n t r o v e r s y has a r i s e n over i t . M i n c e r , i n h i s survey a r t i c l e , reaches the same c o n c l u s i o n (based l a r g e l y on Cai n ' s f i n d i n g s on non-white women) t h a t the added worker i s l i k e l y to be a low income p e r s o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n c o n t r a d i c t s our r e s u l t s a n d ' a l s o those of o t h e r s t u d i e s t h a t d e a l t ' s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h p o v e r t y . Perhaps an e x p l a n a t i o n may l i e i n the f a c t t h a t M i n c e r ' s c o n c l u s i o n was based o n d a t a f o r Negro women and female f a m i l y heads. While t h e r e i s a p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a -t i o n between.being Negro or b e i n g a female f a m i l y head and be i n g poor, t h e r e i s c e r t a i n l y no i d e n t i t y and oth e r f a c t o r s would need to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n . For example, 82 a woman,heading a f a m i l y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e c i a l c i r ^ cumstances t h a t some c a u t i o n must be used b e f o r e g e n e r a l -i z i n g from her b e h a v i o u r to t h a t of a l l low income p e o p l e . A p o i n t of i n t e r e s t i n Bowen and Finegan.'s c r o s s -s e c t i o n study concerns e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e s i n r e g r e s s i o n s on male p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s . In the p r e s e n t study the e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e tended to g i v e ambiguous r e s u l t s . I t was i m p o s s i b l e to take unearned income i n t o account be-cause data were l a c k i n g . Bowen and Finegan take both earned and unearned income i n t o account and f i n d t h a t male p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s are p o s i t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d w i t h earned and n e g a t i v e l y c o r r e l a t e d . w i t h unearned incomes. We may p o s t u l a t e t h a t s i m i l a r r e s u l t s would have been o b t a i n e d i n the p r e s e n t t h e s i s had complete earned and unearned income da t a been a v a i l a b l e . In the U.S. s t u d i e s examined, we found t h a t the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t tends to predominate w h i l e v e r y l i t t l e added worker b e h a v i o u r e x i s t s . I n e a r l i e r work done u s i n g Canadian d a t a , the r e s u l t s are not so c o n s i s t e n t , and much more e v i d e n c e of added worker b e h a v i o u r i s found. For example, S w i d i n s k y ' s t h e s i s r e v e a l s i n time s e r i e s a n a l y s i s t h a t added worker b e h a v i o u r predominates f o r a l l men except those under 19 and over 64 and f o r women over. 45 . 83 The r e s u l t s of S w i d i n s k y ' s c r o s s - s e c t i o n work con-form more to the r e s u l t s of the p r e s e n t t h e s i s . No ev i d e n c e was found f o r added worker b e h a v i o u r w h i l e d i s c o u r a g e d work-er b e h a v i o u r was found f o r a l l men except those 35-54 and f o r women under 35. For the r e m a i n i n g age-sex groups no s i g n i f i c a n t r e a c t i o n to the unemployment r a t e s was found. The d i f f e r e n c e s between S w i d i n s k y ' s c o n c l u s i o n s and those i n t h i s t h e s i s may be e x p l a i n e d by the d i f f e r e n c e s i n the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the model. U s i n g time s e r i e s a n a l y s i s , P r o u l x reaches c o n c l u -s i o n s s i m i l a r to S w i d i n s k y , n o t a b l y the d i s c o v e r y of s t r o n g added worker b e h a v i o u r on the p a r t of men as a group and 3 women over 45. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the added worker be-h a v i o u r which appears so c o n s i s t e n t l y f o r women over 45 can be c o r r e l a t e d w i t h the added worker b e h a v i o u r found f o r h i g h e r income women i n t h i s s t u d y , s i n c e the m a j o r i t y of f a m i l i e s w i t h wives i n the 45 and over age group would be i n t h e i r peak income y e a r s . O f f i c e r and Andersen a l s o found added worker be-h a v i o u r f o r a l l females, except the youngest. However, they found t h a t the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t predominated f o r male groups . P i e r r e - P a u l . P r o u l x , "La v a r i a b i l i t y c y c l i q u e des taux de p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l a main d'oeuvre au Canada," Canadian Jour-nal of'Economics3 I I , No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 268-77. 84 L e t us now compare our r e s u l t s w i t h those s t u d i e s t h a t are concerned w i t h p o v e r t y . Mooney d e a l s almost ex-c l u s i v e l y w i t h low income t r a c t s i n the l a r g e m e t r o p o l i t a n areas of the U.S., but devotes most of h i s a t t e n t i o n to the d i f f e r e n c e s between r a c i a l groups r a t h e r than to the d i f f e r -ences between income groups. He.does f i n d a g e n e r a l d i s -couraged worker p a t t e r n p r e v a i l i n g f o r most women i n the low income t r a c t s (as we do) and a l s o f i n d s t h a t f o r women the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t . i s g r e a t e r i n s p o v e r t y areas than i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n areas as a whole. A s i m i l a r com-p a r i s i o n was not made f o r men. His r e s u l t s agree w i t h ours where the d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t was l a r g e r f o r the P than f o r the R t r a c t s , w i t h the M t r a c t s u s u a l l y f a l l -i n g i n between, but c l o s e r to the P t r a c t s . The l a s t comparison to be made i s between our work and t h a t . o f P a r k e r and Shaw. Si n c e t h i s study was most analogous to ours i n f o r m a t , a more d e t a i l e d comparison can be made, P a r k e r and Shaw.'s o b s e r v a t i o n s are census t r a c t s i n U.S. m e t r o p o l i t a n areas d i v i d e d , as are o u r s , i n t o h i g h , medium, and low income a r e a s . T h e i r data are taken from the 1960 U.S. Census and so w i l l be comparable to the 1961 d a t a used h e r e . In t h e i r r e g r e s s i o n s on male p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , the unemployment" v a r i a b l e i n d i c a t e d a d i s c o u r a g e d worker e f f e c t which was s t r o n g e s t i n the P t r a c t s and d i m i n i s h e d 85 to i n s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the R t r a c t s . T h e i r e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e (median y e a r s of s c h o o l i n g of p o p u l a t i o n over 25) was p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t o n l y i n the P t r a c t s , p o s s i b -l y s u g g e s t i n g the u s e f u l n e s s of our d i f f e r e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of t h i s v a r i a b l e . The e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e tended to be p o s i -t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t over a l l income groups but not f o r the P t r a c t s -- a g a i n c o n t r a d i c t i n g our r e s u l t s . However, a l l P a r k e r and.Shaw's e a r n i n g s v a r i a b l e s were taken f o r the m e t r o p o l i t a n area as a whole r a t h e r than at the t r a c t l e v e l , which may have had some e f f e c t . In f a c t , i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see the r e l e v a n c e of t h e i r v a r i a b l e s i n c e e a r n i n g s w i l l ob-v i o u s l y be d i f f e r e n t i n the d i f f e r e n t t r a c t s . T h e i r age v a r i a b l e , which was s p e c i f i e d i d e n t i c a l l y to o u r s , was p o s i -t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t throughout and a l s o of g r e a t e s t magni-tude i n the lower income t r a c t s . A c o l o u r v a r i a b l e was i n -t r o d u c e d and a m a r r i a g e v a r i a b l e was not. P a r k e r and Shaw's f i n d i n g s f o r men i n American c i t i e s are s i m i l a r to the r e s u l t s we found f o r Canadian c i t i e s , except i n cases where compari-son i s p r e c l u d e d by the d i f f e r e n c e s i n s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the models . When we t u r n to r e g r e s s i o n s on female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s , we f i n d , once a g a i n , t h a t the r e s u l t s are s i m i l a r , but w i t h some minor d i f f e r e n c e s . A g a i n , a d i s c o u r a g e d work-er e f f e c t i s found i n response to the urban unemployment r a t e , but i t r i s e s w i t h income. In the Canadian c a s e , the 86 discouragement e f f e c t f a l l s as income r i s e s . In response to the male unemployment r a t e i n the: t r a c t , no s i g n i f i c a n t added w o r k e r - b e h a v i o u r i s found by the a u t h o r s . In f a c t , t h e r e i s e v i d e n c e of more discouragement i n the P t r a c t s ( i . e . a s i g n i f i c a n t l y n e g a t i v e c o e f f i c i e n t ) . In the Cana-d i a n c a s e , added worker b e h a v i o u r was found i n response to MUT f o r both the M and R groups. In the U.S. s t u d y , e d u c a t i o n had a p o s i t i v e i n -f l u e n c e on p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s i n the P t r a c t s , a nega-t i v e i n f l u e n c e i n the R t r a c t s , and an i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n -f l u e n c e f o r the m i d d l e income women i n the U.S. s t u d y . We found i t to be p o s i t i v e and s i g n i f i c a n t t h r o u g h o u t . A g a i n , the d i f f e r e n t s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the v a r i a b l e may'provide a re a s o n . Both here and i n the P a r k e r and Shaw s t u d y , the e d u c a t i o n v a r i a b l e was not d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by sex. U n l i k e our r e s u l t s , female e a r n i n g s f o r P a r k e r -and Shaw had a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s i t i v e i n f l u e n c e arid male e a r n i n g s had a s i g n i f i c a n t n e g a t i v e i n f l u e n c e on female p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s o n l y f o r the h i g h income group. The female age v a r i a b l e was r a t h e r s t r o n g l y s p e c i f i e d to be the p e r c e n t a g e of the female p o p u l a t i o n over 14 who' were 18 to 24 and 35 to 59 y e a r s , and was o n l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n the lowest income groups.. C h i l d r e n and m a r r i a g e a l s o had the expected e f f e c t s and a.demand v a r i a b l e proved i n s i g n i -f i c a n t . 87 A race, f a c t o r (per cent non-.wh.ites) was' s i g n i f i -cant o n l y f o r the m i d d l e income group and was p o s i t i v e . M i n o r i t y groups i n Canada as r e p r e s e n t e d by FT and OT , tend to have lower r a t h e r than h i g h e r , female p a r t i c i p a t i o n 2 r a t e s . The R 's f o r the P a r k e r and Shaw r e g r e s s i o n s v a r i e d from 0.45 to 0.61, i n d i c a t i n g t h a t the v a r i a b l e s c o n s i d e r e d tended to ' e x p l a i n ' l e s s of the v a r i a t i o n i n female p a r t i -c i p a t i o n r a t e s i n the U.S. than they do i n Canada. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY A l l i n g h a m , John D., -and Spencer, Byron G, Women Who Work: Part 2. S p e c i a l Labour Force S t u d i e s , S e r i e s B, No. 2, Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , December, 1968. B a r t h , P e t e r S. "A C r o s s - S e c t i o n a l A n a l y s i s . o f L a b o r - F o r c e ' P a r t i c i p a t i o n Rates i n M i c h i g a n . " Industrial and Labor-Relations Review, XX, No. 2 (J a n u a r y , 1967), pp. 234-' 249 . "Unemployment and Labor Force P a r t i c i p a -t i o n . " Southern Eoonomio Journal, XXXIV, No. 3 (J a n -uary , 1968) , pp. 375-82 . B e c k e r , Gary S. "A Theory of the A l l o c a t i o n of Time." Eco-nomic Journal, LXIV, No. 299 (September, 1965), pp. 493-517. Bowen, W i l l i a m G., and F i n e g a n , T. A. "Labor Force P a r t i c i -p a t i o n and Unemployment," i n Employment Policy and the Labor Market, A r t h u r M. Ross (ed.-). B e r k e l e y : U n i v e r -s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press,' 1965. C a i n , G l e n G. Married Women in the Labour Force: An Economic Analysis. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , 1966. 'Unemployment and La b o r - F o r c e P a r t i c i p a t i o n of Secondary Workers." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XX, No. 2 ( J a n u a r y , 1967), pp. 275-97. Chow, Gregory C. "Test s of E q u a l i t y Between Sets of C o e f f i c -i e n t s i n Two L i n e a r R e g r e s s i o n s . " Econometrica, X X V I I I , No. 3 ( J u l y , 1960), pp. 591-605. D a v i s , N. H. W., and Gupta, M. L. Labour Force Characteristics of Post-War Immigrants and Native-Born Canadians 1956-67. S p e c i a l Labour Force S t u d i e s , No. 6. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , September, 1968. Dougl a s , P a u l H. : The Theory of Wages. New York: M a c m i l l a n Co., 1934. 88 89 Mencher,. Samuel.. Poor Law to. Poverty. Program, Economic^ Security. P o l i c y in B r i t a i n and United States. P i t t s -burgh: U n i v e r s i t y of P i t t s b u r g h P r e s s , 1967. M i n c e r , Jacob. "Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n of M a r r i e d Women: A Study of Labour S u p p l y , " i n Aspects of Labour Econo-mics; A Conference of the U n i v e r s i t i e s N a t i o n a l Bureau Committee f o r Economic Research. P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1962. . "Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Unemploy-. ment,"• i n . P r o s p e r i t y and Unemployment, R. A. Gordon and M. S. Gordon ( e d s . ) , New York: John W i l e y and Sons, 1966. , and C a i n , G l e n G. "Urban P o v e r t y and Labor Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n : Comment." American Economic Review, L I X , No. 1 (March, 1969), pp. 185-94. Montague, J . T.; and Vanderkamp, John. B r i t i s h Columbia Labour Force: A Study in Labour Market Adjustment. U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia: I n s t i t u t e of Indus-t r i a l R e l a t i o n s , 1966. Mooney, Joseph D . • "Urban P o v e r t y and Labour Force P a r t i c i -p a t i o n . " American Economic Review, L V I I , No. 1 (March, 1967), pp. 104-119. O f f i c e r , Lawrence H., and Andersen, P e t e r R. "Labour-Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Canada." Canadian Journal of Economics, I I , . N o . 2 (May, 1969), pp. 278-87. O s t r y , S y l v i a . The Female Worker in Canada. 1961 Census Monograph. Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , 1968. P a r k e r , John'E., and Shaw, L o i s B. "Labour Force P a r t i c i -p a t i o n i n M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a s . " Southern Economic Jour-nal, XXXIV, No. 4 ( A p r i l , 1968), pp. 538-47. P r o u l x , P i e r r e - P a u l . "La v a r i a b i l i t y c y c l i q u e des taux de p a r t i c i p a t i o n a l a main d'oeuvre au Canada." Canadian Journal of Economics, I I , No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 268-2 7 7 .. Smith,-Adam. The Wealth of Nations (177-6) . Edwin Cannan ( e d . ) . New York; Modern L i b r a r y , 1937. S w i d i n s k y , R o b e r t . "A Note on Labour^Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n and Unemployment." Canadian Journal of Economics, I I I No. 1 ( F e b r u a r y , 1970), pp. 146-51. . "Unemployment and Labour Force P a r t i c i -p a t i o n : The Canadian E x p e r i e n c e . " U n p u b l i s h e d D o c t o r ' d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of M i n n e s o t a , August, 1969. T e l i a , A l f r e d . "The R e l a t i o n of Labor Force to Employment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, X V I I , No. 3 ( A p r i l , 1964), pp. 454-69. "Labor Force S e n s i t i v i t y to Employment by Age, "Sex." Industrial Relations, IV, No. 2 ( F e b r u a r y , 1965 ) , pp. 69-83. U h l e r , R u s s e l l S., and K u n i n , R o s l y n . "A Theory of Labour Force P a r t i c i p a t i o n . " Discussion Paper No. 35. U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia: Department of Economics, March, 1970. 9 1 APPENDIX NAMES OF VARIABLES A l l Data From 1961 and 1951 Censuses AFT per cent of females 15 y e a r s and over (% o f . t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n . 1 4 years and o v e r ) * i n a census t r a c t who are over 54 y e a r s of age. AFY average annual earned income of females i n a cen-sus t r a c t i n $. AMT per cent of males (% of t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n ) * 15 ( 1 4 ) * yea r s and over i n a census t r a c t who are 25-54 yea r s of age. AMY average annual earned income of males i n a census t r a c t i n $. CDT the number of d w e l l i n g s i n the t r a c t h a v i n g more than 1.0 persons per room as a per cent of t o t a l o c c u p i e d d w e l l i n g s i n the t r a c t . CF households i n the t r a c t o c c u p i e d by two or more f a m i l i e s as*a per cent of the t o t a l number of households i n the t r a c t . CFT average number of c h i l d r e n per f a m i l y i n the t r a c t . C6T per cent of f a m i l i e s i n the t r a c t h a v i n g c h i l d r e n l i v i n g at home. EDT number of peop l e i n the t r a c t h a v i n g at l e a s t one year of u n i v e r s i t y (13 or more y e a r s of s c h o o l i n g ) * as a per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n of the t r a c t not a t t e n d i n g s c h o o l . FPT female l a b o u r f o r c e ( i . e . those working or l o o k i n g f o r work) as a per cent of the female p o p u l a t i o n 15 ( 1 4 ) * years and over i n the t r a c t . FT per cent of p o p u l a t i o n i n the t r a c t of French n a t i o n a l o r i g i n . Changes i n p a r e n t h e s e s r e f e r to 1951 d a t a . 92 FUU. unemployed females ( i . e . those l o o k i n g f o r work) as a per cent of a l l females.15 ( 1 4 ) * y e a r s and over i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . IMGR per cent of p o p u l a t i o n i n the t r a c t which immigra-ted to Canada s i n c e 1946. IMGT per cent' of p o p u l a t i o n i n the t r a c t which was not b o r n ^ i n .Canada. MPT male l a b o u r f o r c e ( i . e . those working or l o o k i n g f o r work) as a per cent of those males 15 ( 1 4 ) * years"and over i n the t r a c t . MUT unemployed, males ( i . e . those l o o k i n g f o r work) i n the t r a c t as a per cent of males 15 ( 1 4 ) * y e a r s and over i n the t r a c t . MUU unemployed males ( i . e . those l o o k i n g f o r work) i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a as a per cent of males 15 ( 1 4 ) * yea r s and over i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . MRD per cent of p o p u l a t i o n 15 ( 1 4 ) * y e a r s and over i n the t r a c t which i s m a r r i e d . OT per cent of p o p u l a t i o n i n the t r a c t , of n e i t h e r B r i t i s h nor French n a t i o n a l o r i g i n . TUU a l l people l o o k i n g f o r work i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a as a per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n 15 ( 1 4 ) * and over i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . YFT average annual e a r n i n g s per f a m i l y i n a census t r a c t i n $ . YHT average annual e a r n i n g s per f a m i l y head i n a census t r a c t i n $ . Changes i n p a r e n t h e s e s r e f e r to 1951 d a t a . 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0102153/manifest

Comment

Related Items