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Hsu shu-cheng and the cancellation of self-government in outer mongolia Howard-Gibbon, John Edward 1971

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HSU SHU-CHENG AND THE CANCELLATION OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN OUTER MONGOLIA by JOHN EDWARD HOWARD-GIBBON B.A. University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1962 A thesis•submitted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t • o f the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts i n the department of Asian Studies We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard. THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA • May, 1971 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t fr e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that per- . mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Asian Studies The University of 'British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date: May 1, 1971 • This paper outlines the background to the i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s i n the Peking government and the Outer Mongolian government i n 1919, and re-lates how these c o n f l i c t s influenced the nego-t i a t i o n s for the cancellation of self-government. In conjunction with t h i s background the t r a n s l a -t i o n and analysis of the 1919 section of Hsu She-cheng's' nien-p 1 u provide a f a i r l y d e t ailed picture of the events i n Urga i n the l a t t e r months of 1919-Page ABSTRACT...... ' ' i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS i i i ' CHAPTER I I n t r o d u c t i o n 1 Map 10 CHAPTER I I T r a n s l a t i o n ,. 11 CHAPTER' I I I A n a l y s i s • 79 FOOTNOTES L i s t o f A b b r e v i a t i o n s 162 Chapter I . 163 Chapter I I 164 C h a p t e r I I I ' 172 BIBLIOGRAPHY ' ' 185 , APPENDIX 187 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my thanks f i r s t to Professor Edgar Wickberg who has imbued the word "advisor" with a new and sp e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e for me. I also extend my thanks to Tim L i for checking the t r a n s l a t i o n and to Lorna Germaine for typing the f i r s t d r a f t . My wife (a thankless job) has helped me, with encouragement, proof reading and the occasional prod - and I thank her. Pat Waldron, i n typing the f i n a l draft i n one week has sur-passed Hsu Shu-cheng i n merit and wins my admiration as well as. my thanks. F i n a l l y I must express my apprecia-t i o n to the Department of Asian Studies f o r i t s service as a most patient and understanding parent. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The return of Outer Mongolia to China i n 1919 was one of the most dramatic events i n the early history of the Chinese Republic; i f Outer Mongolia had been permanently' se-cured i t would have been one of the most important events i n the history of modern China. Outer Mongolia, over 1,300,000 square miles i n area comprised more than one-quarter of the t o t a l land area of the Chinese empire. 1 The p o t e n t i a l of t h i s land to supply foodstuffs and raw materials to an over-populated and slowly modernizing China was tremen-dous. So also her promise as an area f o r c o l o n i z a t i o n . Her p o l i t i c a l importance i n Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s has been con-siderable and w i l l continue to be so. China's f a i l u r e to r e t a i n Outer Mongolia i s i n good measure a r e s u l t of the way i n which she regained her, and the events there i n 1919 help reveal that the adverse e f f e c t s of bad p o l i t i c s i n Peking could not be l i m i t e d to China proper. Hsu Shu-cheng Hsien-sheng Wen-chi Nien-p'u Ho-k'an was published i n Taiwan i n 1962 by the Taiwan Commercial Publishing House, the author Hsu Dau-lin (Tao-lin) i s the son of Hsu Shu-cheng. The t r a n s l a t i o n which forms the second chapter of t h i s paper i s taken from the nien-p.'u i n t h i s work. Making allowances for the fact that the material co-vering the Outer Mongolian a f f a i r i n 1919, which i s t r a n s l a -ted here, makes up only a portion of the 'nien-p'u, and making a l l o w a n c e s t o o f o r t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e a u t h o r had t o c o n t e n d w i t h i n w r i t i n g o b j e c t i v e l y about h i s f a t h e r , who was w i d e l y condemned as a pro-Japanese t r a i t o r , , t h e r e a d e r , n o n e t h e l e s s , cannot h e l p but c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e D a u - l i n h a s w r i t t e n b a d l y . An o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n t h e n , i s , of what v a l u e i s a t r a n s l a t i o n of t h i s s e c t i o n of t h e nien-p'u? An e q u a l l y o b v i o u s answer i s t h a t I t i s . o f 'value because i n t h e E n g l i s h language we a t p r e s e n t have o n l y v e r y g e n e r a l coverage of 4 the events i n Outer M o n g o l i a I n 1919, and t h e r e f o r e , any- • t h i n g of a more d e t a i l e d n a t u r e w h i c h h e l p s f i l l t h i s h i a t u s seems.a j u s t i f i a b l e e n t e r p r i s e . But t h i s i s not a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n , f o r i t can be p o i n t e d out t h a t t h e r e are o t h e r Chinese works on t h e s u b j e c t w h i c h do not share i n the 5 f a u l t s of Hsu D a u - l i n ' s n i e n - p ' u. The main advantage t h a t t h i s n i e n - p ' u e x c e r p t has over t h e s e o t h e r works i s t h a t i t f o c u s e s s p e c i f i c a l l y upon Hsu Shu-cheng, the c e n t r a l f i g u r e i n t h i s C hinese attempt t o r e g a i n Outer M o n g o l i a , and t o some e x t e n t upon Ch'en I , h i s a d v e r s a r y . As a . r e s u l t of t h i s f o c u s the c o n f l i c t be-tween Hsu and Ch'en, and i t s r e l a t i o n t o c o n f l i c t s ' i n the P e k i n g government and i n the Outer M o n g o l i a n government i s made more a p p a r e n t . To my knowledge, .no one has y e t c o n s i d e r e d the e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h i s c o n f l i c t d e t e r m i n e d the c o u r s e o f e v e n t s i n Outer Mongolia. Hsu Dau-lin's treatment of t h i s period, although of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y , makes a good springboard f o r t h i s analysis. This paper w i l l attempt to make such an analysis. The power struggles which dominated the Peking and the Urga governments i n 1919 stemmed mainly from the c i r -cumstances of the creation of these governments at the f a l l of the Manchu Dynasty i n China. In 1911 the Manchus were overthrown i n China and a Republican government was established. But t h i s r a d i c a l change i n the form of government, quite understandably, was not accompanied by a r a d i c a l change i n the p o l i t i c a l percep-t i o n of the Chinese people. Government i n the name of Republicanism became i n r e a l i t y government for the sake of personal or l o c a l gain. Yuan Shih-k'ai was strong enough to ensure some degree of s t a b i l i z a t i o n , but his death i n 1916 l e f t no figure of s u f f i c i e n t stature to r e t a i n even the degree of s t a b i l i t y that existed under Yuan. Warlord-ism and p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e were to dominate China f o r the next decade. Outer Mongolia also declared her independence from the Manchus i n 1911 . The Chinese had looked abroad for a basis for t h e i r new government, the Mongols did likewise, basing t h e i r new government i n part on the example of Imperial China and i n part apparently on the West. A Ministry of f i v e p o r t f o l i o s was created, a bicameral parliament was established and the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan was elevated to the p o s i t i o n of Emperor and given a Chinese r e i g n - s t y l e . Much as the Chinese lacked the p o l i t i c a l experience to put a republican government into e f f i c i e n t operation, the Mongol government also lacked p o l i t i c a l experience and p o l i t i c s i n Urga much l i k e p o l i t i c s i n Peking became very much a matter of preserving one's personal advantage 7 or the advantage of one's group or party. Thus, the p o l i -t i c a l environment i n Peking and i n Urga was i n t h i s respect very s i m i l a r . That i t was not a s i t u a t i o n that promoted l a s t i n g solutions to d i f f i c u l t problems i s made adequately clear i n Chapter I I I of t h i s paper. It remains only to comment b r i e f l y on several of the more important people involved i n the Outer Mongolian a f f a i r i n 1 9 1 9 , .to a s s i s t the reader i n understanding the place of these figures i n the events of 1919 covered i n the t r a n s l a -t i o n . 8 Hsu Shu-cheng, the central figure i n t h i s paper, was born i n Hsiaohsien i n Kiangsu Province on November 4 , 1 8 8 0 , and was assassinated at Langfang on December 3 0 , 1 9 2 5 . A g i f t e d and energetic man, his p o l i t i c a l career began i n 1901 i n Tsinan when he met Tuan C h ' i - j u i , whose s t a f f he joined that same year. He was. sent by Tuan to m i l i t a r y school i n Japan and was to become Tuan's closest advisor, r e f e r r e d to as "the s p i r i t of Tuan Ch'i-1ui." His r e a l r i s e to prominence, following that of Tuan, came with the f a l l of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Hsu was co-founder of the Anfu Club which successfully promoted Tuan's i n t e r e s t s i n 1918. By 1919 when he was appointed F r o n t i e r Defense Commissioner he was at the peak of his power. Noted for his r u t h l e s s -ness and his a b i l i t y to get things done, he did much to 9 create dissensions within the Northern government. Ch'en I was born i n Huang-p'o Hsien i n Hupeh i n 1873. He held various lesser administrative positions be-fore his appointment as chief advisor to Ch'en Lu i n nego-t i a t i n g the Kiakhta Agreement i n 1915. Following this^he served as the Assistant Commissioner at U l i a s s u t a i u n t i l his appointment as Chief Commissioner i n August, 1917- It was i n t h i s capacity that he conducted negotiations f o r the ca n c e l l a t i o n of Outer Mongolian self-government. He was apparently opposed to the Anfu Clique, or at least his ac-tions i n Urga seemed to indicate t h i s , as did his re-appoint-ment to Urga a f t e r the defeat of the Anfu Clique i n 1920.'^ Chin Yun-p'eng was born i n 1877, probably i n Tsining i n Shantung Province. He was a graduate of Yuan Shih-k'ai's Peiyang M i l i t a r y Academy. Following the revolution i n 1911 he was c l o s e l y associated with Yuan Shih-k'ai and Tuan C h l ' l ' J u l . In 1916 and 1917 he supported Tuan In his bid for power. . He was administrative d i r e c t o r of the War Par-t i c i p a t i o n Army before t h i s post was given to Hsu Shu-cheng i n September 1918. He became Minister of War i n January 1919 and concurrently Premier i n September of that year. Because of Hsu Shu-cheng's manipulation of the Army and of the Cabinet a strong r i v a l l r y developed between these two men. Chin ultimately turned to the C h i h l i Clique which defeated the Anfu Clique i n July, 1 9 2 0 . 1 1 Hsu Shih-ch'ang was born i n 1885 probably i n Honan. He was a member of the Hanlin Academy and when he became President on October 1 0 , 1918 he was the f i r s t non-military President of Republican China. He had received support from Yuan Shih-k'ai as a student and remained c l o s e l y associated with Yuan thereafter. As President he became l i t t l e more than a puppet of Tuan C h ' i - j u i . To counter t h i s he supported Chin Yun-p'eng for the Premiership to l i m i t the hand of Hsu Shu-cheng, and intrigued with C h i h l i leaders and Chang T s o - l i n 12 to weaken the control of the Anfu Clique. Ch'en Lu was born i n 1876 i n Pukien Province. He was active i n the Chinese Foreign Service and i s mainly known for his work as China's chief negotiator f o r the Kiakhta Agree-ment i n 1915 . He was the f i r s t Chinese Commissioner to Urga following t h i s agreement, handing the post to Ch'en I i n 1917. In 1919 as Foreign Minister f o r a short time and as Vice Foreign Minister acting as Foreign Minister he was Ch'en I's chief source of communication with the Peking govern-ment. Although Ch'en Lu headed the Fro n t i e r Defense O f f i c e 1 f o r a time he i s said to: have been anti-Anfu i n sentiment. • Tuan C h ' i - j u i played an important role i n the de-velopment of the Peiyang Army. A strong supporter of Yuan Shih-k'ai during the l a s t years of the Ch'ing Dynasty he remained so i n the i n i t i a l years of the Republic, but his growing strength led to f r i c t i o n with Yuan Shih-k'ai and eventually he opposed Yuan's monarchical bid i n 1916. From .1916 to 1920 Tuan was the dominant figure i n the Peking government, holding the Premiership on four d i f f e r e n t occa-sions and manipulating the President's offee. Hsu Shu-cheng's r i s i n g power during t h i s period p a r a l l e l l e d that of Tuan. In 1919 Tuan was Director of the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Bureau and then of the F r o n t i e r Defense Bureau when the change i n name was made i n June. Despite t h i s p o s i t i o n he seems to have had l i t t l e to do with the events i n Urga i n 14 1919. There are three Mongol figures with whom we should deal here b r i e f l y . They are the Bogdo Gegen Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan, who w i l l be refer r e d to i n t h i s paper simply as the L i v i n g Buddha; the Minister of the I n t e r i o r and con-currently Prime Minister, Badmadorji; and the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Tserendorji. The Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu was the top ranking lama i n Outer Mongolia. He exhibited a good deal of independence i n his r e l a t i o n s with China and was more and more looked upon as the seat of Mongol authority by other high-ranking Mongols who were d i s s a t i s f i e d with the administrative re-forms of the Manchu's i n Mongolia. When'independence was declared, supreme authority was placed i n the hands of the L i v i n g Buddha. The nobles did not forsee that t h i s would 15 l i m i t t h e i r hand i n the new government. Tserendorji was a Khalkha commoner who fared r e -markably well i n the government of independent Outer Mongolia. He began as an o f f i c i a l i n the Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s and l a t e r became Foreign Minister. It was i n his capacity as Foreign Minister that he came i n contact with Ch'en I , and was as a r e s u l t of t h i s contact eventually made the representative of the nobles i n negotiations with Ch'en I for the c a n c e l l a t i o n of self-government. Tserendorji's a b i l i t i e s are attested to by the fact that he was also to serve as Prime Minister i n the Revolutionary Government esta-blished i n 1921. 1 6 Badmadorji, a lama, and Minister of the I n t e r i o r at the beginning of 1919, was concurrently appointed as Prime Minister by the L i v i n g Buddha following the death of Prime Minister Sain Noyon Khan to improve the c o n t r o l l i n g hand of the lamas i n government. As the eldest member of the government Badmadorji car r i e d considerable prestige and power, but because he had been passed over i n the granting of t i t l e s , he harboured a degree of resentment towards the Li v i n g Buddha. Hsu Shu-cheng was to take advantage of t h i s i n his negotiations f o r the c a n c e l l a t i o n of self-government. CHAPTER II TRANSLATION 1919 - Hsu Shu-cheng age f o r t y . Summary: In February 1919 peace negotiations between the North and South opened i n Shanghai, but ended without res u l t (May 13). On May 4 there' was,a student' demonstration which spread through-out the entire country (the May 4th Movement). On June 10 the government terminated the appoint-ments of ,Ts 1ai Ju-lin3 Chang Tsung-hsiang and Lu Tsung-yu. On June 13 Kung Hsin-chan headed the cabinet, replacing Ch'ien Neng-hsun. On June 24 Tuan C h ' i - j u i was given the.new p o s i t i o n of Director of the Frontier Defense Bureau. On September 24 Chin Yun-p'eng headed the cabinet, replacing Kung Hsin-chan. On November 22 Outer Mongolia cancelled her autonomy. In the Southwest Ch'en Ch'un-hsuan was s t i l l i n control of the M i l i t a r y Government. Important Changes i n the International Scene W h i l e on the s u r f a c e the r e a s o n f o r Tuan C h ' i - j u i t o have Hsu Shih-ch'ang i n s t a l l e d as P r e s i d e n t was t o a l l e v i a t e 4 the c o n f r o n t a t i o n between h i m s e l f and Feng Kuo-chang but Tuan a l s o thought t h a t s i n c e Hsu was an i n t e l l e c t u a l and w e l l on i n y e a r s (Hsu was th e n 6 4 ) , and s i n c e r e l a t i o n s between them had always been good, and f u r t h e r , s i n c e Hsu had r e -c e i v e d t h e p r e s i d e n c y t h r o u g h Tuan's s u p p o r t , t h a t Hsu would be r e l a t i v e l y more amenable t o h i s d e c i s i o n s . L i t t l e d i d Tuan know t h a t t h i s was a s e r i o u s misjudgment. Hsu was a c u n n i n g o l d f o x w e l l v e r s e d i n t h e ways of the w o r l d and t h e s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d Tuan was no match f o r him. A l s o Hsu had h i s own views o f domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y he f a v o u r e d the t r a d i t i o n a l s t r a -t e g y o f p l a y i n g o f f one f o r e i g n e r a g a i n s t the o t h e r and was opposed t o becoming o v e r l y dependent on any p a r t i c u l a r power. A l s o , he t h r o u g h o u t had somewhat c l o s e r a f f i n i t i e s w i t h t h e E n g l i s h and Americans [ r a t h e r t h a n w i t h t h e J a p a n e s e ] . Do-m e s t i c a l l y he was an i n t e l l e c t u a l w i t h broad w o r l d l y e x p e r i - • ence who sought t o a c h i e v e h i s aims t h r o u g h the m a n i p u l a t i o n of p e r s o n a l t i e s ; he d i d not approve of the use o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e a g a i n s t t h e South. Thus, i n both t h e s e i m p o r t a n t a r e a s he was i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n t o Tuan. A l s o , t h e r e had been -a change i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n t h a t was v e r y much t o Tuan's d i s a d v a n t a g e . I n the l a t t e r h a l f o f 1918 the war i n Europe was d r a w i n g t o a c l o s e and t h i s r e s u l t e d i n a r e n e w a l of B r i t i s h and American i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Par E a s t . No l o n g e r was Japan t o be a l l o w e d t o m o n o p o l i z e the p o l i t i c a l scene t h e r e . I n Japan t h e Hara-~ C a b i n e t t o o k o f f i c e i n September 1918 and, c o m p e l l e d t o adapt t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e changed i n t e r n a t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , they i n i t i a t e d t h e i r p o l i c y o f , " n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n C h i n e s e a f f a i r s " . (The huge, and f o r t h e most p a r t unguaranteed N i s h i h a r a Loans, s a i d t o range between 200 m i l l i o n and 300 5 m i l l i o n - y e n , were a l s o p a r t of t h e . r e a s o n f o r t h e d o w n f a l l 6 o f the T e r a u c h i C a b i n e t ) . On December 3 , 1918 Japan i s s u e d a p r o c l a m a t i o n s t a t i n g t h a t , " u n t i l C h i n a was u n i f i e d no f u r t h e r l o a n s nor any o t h e r form o f f i n a n c i a l a i d , would, be 7 g i v e n t o t h e Chinese Government". T h i s s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l a i n s t h e Japanese w i t h d r a w a l under p r e s s u r e from t h e West and t h e c r i t i c a l blow t h i s was t o Tuan's p l a n s f o r a m i l i t a r y r e -u n i f i c a t i o n of China. Under i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e ( o s t e n s i b l y t h i s was a p p l i e d because of the powers' d e s i r e f o r peace i n C h i n a , a c t u a l l y I t was an A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o u n t e r t o J a p a n ' s ' a i d t o Tuan) a peace c o n f e r e n c e was opened i n Shanghai on F e b r u a r y 20, 1919 t o which the N o r t h and the South b o t h send r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e s (Chu C h ' i - c h ' i e n headed the N o r t h e r n d e l e g a t e s and T'ang S h a o - i the. S o u t h ) . The major p o i n t o f c o n t e n t i o n a t t h e m e e t i n g was the "War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army" which Tuan C h ' i - j u i had s t a r t e d t r a i n i n g t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r . The S o u t h e r n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f e l t t h a t J w i t h the end of the war i n Europe t h e r e was no f u r t h e r r e a s o n f o r t h e maintenance of t h e War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army, and t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e m i l i t a r y agreement w i t h Japan s h o u l d have been a n n u l l e d , the Army d e m o b i l i z e d , and t h e War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Loans s t o p p e d . But Tuan had managed s h o r t l y b e f o r e the o p e n i n g o f the c o n f e r e n c e ( F e b r u a r y 15) t o have the e f f e c t i v e p e r i o d o f t h e m i l i t a r y agreement p r o l o n g e d . Under t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t h e c o n f e r e n c e was doomed t o f a i l u r e . C o n s e q u e n t l y i t l a s t e d l e s s t h a n a y e a r , i t s break-up b e i n g announced on May 13. ( I n August th e N o r t h once a g a i n made a g e s t u r e o f a t t e m p t i n g t o re-open t h e c o n f e r e n c e a g a i n w i t h o u t r e s u l t ) . The Program of t h e Northwest P l a n n i n g [Commission] A l t h o u g h t h e War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army had been main-t a i n e d , the name, "War P a r t i c i p a t i o n " , had become most i n -a p p r o p r i a t e , so i n t h e f a l l o f 1918 a Northwest B o r d e r P l a n n i n g O f f i c e was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h i n the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Bureau. Hsu Shu-cheng was -the d i r e c t o r o f t h i s new o f f i c e . T h i s was a s o r t o f p r e p a r a t i o n f o r u s i n g the term " F r o n t i e r Defense" t o r e p l a c e the term "War. P a r t i c i p a t i o n " . As chance would have i t the c o n f u s i o n i n R u s s i a at t h i s t i me as a r e s u l t of t h e October R e v o l u t i o n t o u c h e d o f f a r e - o r i e n t a t i o n towards C h i n a i n Outer M o n g o l i a . Hsu Shu-cheng' s Northwest F r o n t i e r p l a n s and h i s a c t i o n s t h e r e came about as a r e s u l t of t h i s c o i n c i d e n c e . Outer M o n g o l i a d e c l a r e d her Independence i n the h s i n -h a i y e a r (1911) - on t h e l u n a r c a l e n d a r , the 28th day o f the 9 12th month. The Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu assumed the t h r o n e i n . U r g a and t h e n a t i o n c a l l e d i t s e l f Ta Meng-gu Kuo, w i t h t h e r e i g n s t y l e , K u n g - t a i (^Ify, ) • T h i s was o f c o u r s e the r e s u l t of y e a r s o f R u s s i a n i n t r i g u e i n M o n g o l i a . 1 0 I n the S i n o -R u s s i a n D e c l a r a t i o n of November 22, 1913 C h i n a f o r m a l l y r e c o g n i z e d Outer M o n g o l i a ' s r i g h t t o s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ( A r t i c l e 2). C h i n a a l s o agreed t o p o s t n e i t h e r t r o o p s nor o f f i c i a l s , c i v i l o r m i l i t a r y , i n Outer M o n g o l i a , and t o stop the promo-t i o n of c o l o n i z a t i o n . " 1 " 1 T h i s marked the r e a l s e p a r a t i o n o f . Outer M o n g o l i a from C h i n a . On June 7, 1915 the K i a k h t a Agree-ment was s i g n e d by a l l t h r e e p a r t i e s - C h i n a , R u s s i a and M o n g o l i a . . I t r e a f f i r m e d a l l the a r t i c l e s s e t out i n t h e 1913 S i n o - R u s s i a n D e c l a r a t i o n . Thus were the t r e a t y bonds by which we l o s t our r i g h t s r e - a f f i r m e d and s t r e n g t h e n e d . I n 1917 as a r e s u l t of t h e u n s e t t l e d c o n d i t i o n s i n ' R u s s i a caused by the c o n t i n u i n g Communist r e v o l u t i o n the R u s s i a n s were l o s i n g t h e i r c o n t r o l o f Outer M o n g o l i a ; t h i s was p a r a l l e l e d by a g r a d u a l i n c r e a s e of Japan's i n t e r e s t i n t h e a r e a . By the s p r i n g o f 1919 the Japanese p l a n s t o make use of t h e B u r i a t Mongol,'Semenov, and the Mongol b a n d i t , Fushengge, i n Outer M o n g o l i a became d a i l y more p o s i t i v e . ( T h i s p l a n was t o c r e a t e a G r e a t e r M o n g o l i a w h i c h would i n c l u d e B u r i a t M o n g o l i a , I n n e r M o n g o l i a , Outer M o n g o l i a and H u l u n b u i r and a l s o be under the c o n t r o l o f the J a p a n e s e ) . C o n t r o l o f t h i s o p e r a t i o n was i n the hands of C o l o n e l M a t s u i , t h e Japanese m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s t a t i o n e d i n Urga. Our. G e n e r a l S t a f f O f f i c e o b t a i n e d some o f t h e i n v i t a t i o n s t o h i s meetings and banquets 12 w i t h the B u r i a t Mongols. But many o f the Outer Mongol n o b l e s were v e r y much a f r a i d o f t h e Japanese and t h u s f a v o u r e d renewing t h e i r t i e s w i t h C h i n a t o defend t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t the Japanese. . I t was j u s t at t h i s t i m e t h a t Hsu Shu-cheng had assumed h i s d u t i e s as D i r e c t o r of the Northwest B o r d e r Defense P l a n n i n g Commission and he was o f c o u r s e p a y i n g c l o s e a t t e n -t i o n t o developments i n Outer M o n g o l i a and w o r k i n g out p o s i - . t i v e p l a n s t o d e a l w i t h the a r e a . On March 26 t h e F r e n c h Ambas-sador s a i d he had heard t h a t t h e government had s u g g e s t e d , " s e n d i n g t r o o p s i n t o M o n g o l i a , " and Ch'en Lu r e p l i e d , "the t r o o p s would p r o b a b l y be l e d by L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Hsu Shu-„13 cheng." On A p r i l 17 Hsu p r e s e n t e d h i s , " P o l i c y O u t l i n e F o r the Northwest F r o n t i e r , " , and on June 10 i t was approved by p a r l i a m e n t . On June 13' the government gave him the s p e c i a l appointment o f , "Northwest F r o n t i e r P l a n n i n g Commissioner," and on June 24 c o n c u r r e n t l y a p p o i n t e d him a s , "Commander-in-C h i e f o f t h e Northwest F r o n t i e r Defense Army." E v e r y t h i n g he d i d from t h i s t i me on i n M o n g o l i a was based upon the p o l i c y he l a i d out i n t h i s r e p o r t . I am t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d i n g a complete t r a n s c r i p t i o n o f i t : Gentlemen: I have f o r some t i m e been making p l a n s f o r the Northwest F r o n t i e r a r e a . I have been o r -dered t o p r e p a r e a p o l i c y o u t l i n e and submit i t h e r e w i t h f o r your d e c i s i o n . The N o r t h w e s t e r n a r e a of C h i n a extends from T s e t s e n Khan. [Aimak] i n the e a s t t o the A l t a i M ountains i n the west, and from t h e b o r d e r w i t h R u s s i a i n the n o r t h t o Chahar and S u i y u a n i n t h e s o u t h . T h i s v a s t unbroken t e r r i t o r y o f over t e n m i l l i o n square l i _ i s i n h a b i t e d by t h e nomadic Mongol banners.- P o p u l a t i o n i s s p a r s e and t h e r e i s l i t t l e i n the way o f economic development. Whether the l a n d i s the p r o p e r t y of t h e s t a t e o r t h e p r o p e r t y o f the p e o p l e . h a s not y e t been c l e a r l y f o r m u l a t e d . T h e r e f o r e any a d m i n i s t r a t o r f o r t h i s a r e a w i l l have l i t t l e chance of d o i n g any good.unless he embraces a s t r o n g d e t e r m i n a -t i o n ' t o d e v e l o p t h e c o u n t r y and bear w i t h d i f f i -c u l t i e s and h a r d s h i p s , and u n l e s s he employs b o t h s e v e r i t y and l e n i e n c y [ i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e p e o p l e ] . When a man i s a p p o i n t e d f o r t h i s p o s i -t i o n the government must g i v e him f u l l a u t h o r i -t y t o a c t as c i r c u m s t a n c e s r e q u i r e , o t h e r w i s e h i s e f f o r t s w i l l u l t i m a t e l y come t o naught. Moreover' at t h i s time our t r e a s u r y i s d e p l e t e d , yet. what l i t t l e c a p i t a l t h e r e i s i s b e i n g used t o f o s t e r u s e l e s s p l a n s . G i v e n a l i t t l e more time I f e a r the t r e a s u r y w i l l be d r a i n e d d r y . T h i s i s enough t o arouse t h e i n d i g n a t i o n o f any statesman. Each of us has our own way o f d o i n g t h i n g s . The p r o p o s a l s I am p u t t i n g f o r w a r d may i n some cases seem u n s u i t a b l e and I do not expect everyone t o agree w i t h them as a whole. However, i f on c a r e f u l r e f l e c t i o n you d e c i d e t h e y s h o u l d not be i n s t i t u t e d t h e n they must be d i s c a r d e d , but i f they are adopted t h e n not a s i n g l e one o f the p r o p o s a l s may be i g n o r e d . 1. F i r s t , an o f f i c i a l t i t l e must be promulga-t e d w hich i s s u i t e d t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f the o f f i c e . F o r when names are c o r r e c t t h e n i n t e r c o u r s e can be f r u i t f u l , and w i t h c o r r e c t names and f r u i t f u l i n t e r c o u r s e s u c c e s s becomes p o s s i b l e . I f t h e t i t l e of the o f f i c e i s vague i t s o r d e r s w i l l l a c k w e i g h t , i f t o o p r e c i s e i t s o p e r a t i o n w i l l be con-s t r i c t e d . H o p e f u l l y i t w i l l be v a g u e l y y e t p r e -c i s e l y enough d e l i n e a t e d so t h a t the o f f i c e r can conduct h i s d u t i e s as he sees f i t , w i t h o u t s t i r -r i n g up e i t h e r i n t e r n a l o r o u t s i d e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . I f we o r d e r t h a t a g e n e r a l announcement be made s t a t i n g t h a t we are p l a n n i n g t o reduce the number of t r o o p s and t o b r i n g o r d e r and s e c u r i t y t o the p e o p l e and have t h e r e f o r e a p p o i n t e d a s p e c i a l o f f i c e r t o o v e r s e e the opening o f new l a n d we s h o u l d t h u s ease t h e minds o f b o t h the m i l i t a r y and t h e p o p u l a c e and c r e a t e some degree o f f a i t h i n t h i s o f f i c i a l , w h ich i s p r e c i s e l y , what we want-2. The a u t h o r i t y o f the o f f i c e must be e s t a -b l i s h e d i m m e d i a t e l y . I n e v e r y case where a u t h o r i t y i s not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d e f f i c i e n t o p e r a t i o n i s made d i f f i c u l t . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the t i t l e o f o f f i c e , i t seems t o me, s h o u l d be f o l l o w e d by the f o r m u l a t i o n o f a s y s t e m i z e d o r g a n i s a t i o n of s u b - o f f i c i a l s w h i c h s h o u l d be c l e a r l y e x p l a i n e d . P a r l i a m e n t s h o u l d be r e q u e s t e d t o d r a f t and p r o -mulgate r e g u l a t i o n s f o r i n t e r c o u r s e between the t u - h u ' s , t u - t ' u n g 1 s and t s o - l i ' s l 4 o f the n o r t h -w e s t e r n a r e a and the tuchuns and c i v i l g o v e r n o r s of a d j o i n i n g p r o v i n c e s . With r e g u l a t i o n s t o c o n s u l t we s h o u l d be a b l e t o a v o i d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e t i e - u p s . 3. R a i l r o a d s are t h e most u r g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t . I n d u s t r y , c u l t u r e , commerce and defense are a l l dependent on a communication system. The N o r t h -west i s a b o u n d l e s s d e s e r t w i l d e r n e s s and the p e o p l e are f o r t h e most p a r t nomadic h e r d e r s . As. a r e s u l t of t h i s communication i s not the s l i g h t -e s t b i t d e v e l o p e d . However, the. c o u n t r y i s l a r g e -l y f l a t w i t h o u t h i g h mountains or b r o a d r i v e r s d i v i d i n g any o f i t . A l t h o u g h t h e r e are expanses o f d e s e r t t h e y can be e a s i l y s k i r t e d . R a i l r o a d c o n s t r u c t i o n w i l l d e f i n i t e l y not be d i f f i c u l t . From K a l g a n t o M a n c h u l i i t i s r o u g h l y 1,500 l i , from' K u e i - s u i t h r o u g h S a i r Usa and Urga t o K i a k h t a i t i s somewhat over 2,000 l i . From S a i r Usa t h r o u g h U l i a s s u t a i and.Kobdo, t u r n i n g back t h r o u g h the A l t a i Mountains t o Urumchi, thence s t r a i g h t t o . S u i - t i n g amounts i n t o t a l t o 5,400 t o 5,500 l i . From U l i a s s u t a i t o T a n n u - U r i a n g h a i i s j u s t over 1,000 l i . These make up t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l e t r u n k l i n e s w h i c h s h o u l d be p l a n n e d and c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h the g r e a t e s t h a s t e i n o r d e r t o f a c i l i t a t e i n i t i a -t i o n o f o t h e r v e n t u r e s . I f s u f f i c i e n t c a p i t a l i s a v a i l a b l e they s h o u l d be c o n s t r u c t e d s i m u l t a n e o u s -l y , i f i t I s not t h e n t h e y s h o u l d be b u i l t i n sequence. When a c o n s t r u c t i o n s c h e d u l e has been worked out i t w i l l be a simple, m a t t e r t o w r i t e up c o n t r a c t s . As-soon'as the t r o u b l e i n R u s s i a has s e t t l e d down we can d i s c u s s an e x t e n s i o n n o r t h from K i a k h t a t o connect w i t h t h e T r a n s - S i b e r i a n R a i l w a y . T h i s would be most advantageous f o r t r a d e . 4. Motor v e h i c l e s can be used on the r o u t e s i n i t i a l l y . The c o n s t r u c t i o n of o ver 10,000 l i of r a i l r o a d l i n e s w i l l t a k e a c o n s i d e r a b l e l e n g t h o f t i m e . Motor v e h i c l e companies s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e be s e t up t o o p e r a t i o n a l o n g the r o u t e s o f t h e p r o -posed r a i l l i n e s . I n a d d i t i o n h orse drawn wagons, and camels can e x t e n d the s e r v i c e t o more d i s t a n t s t a t i o n s . Working t o g e t h e r t h e s e s e r v i c e s w i l l complement one a n o t h e r i n p r o m o t i n g the c i r c u l a -t i o n of merchandise. H o p e f u l l y , commerce w i l l come t o l i f e and when i t does t a x r e t u r n s w i l l improve day by day. 5. ' The .opening o f l a n d and h e r d i n g can be o r g a n i z e d i m m e d i a t e l y . The Northwest i s a v a s t and s p a r s e l y p o p u l a t e d a r e a w i t h a v e r y c o l d c l i -mate, and i n C h ' i n g t i m e s t h e r e are t o o many p r o -h i b i t i v e l a w s ; as a r e s u l t p e o p l e had no d e s i r e t o . s e t t l e t h e r e . Now the t i m e i s r i g h t t o open the l a n d and develop the h e r d s . Land can g r a d u a l l y be opened on b o t h s i d e s of t h e r a i l l i n e s and c a t t l e and sheep and o t h e r a n i m a l s can be r a i s e d i n l a r g e numbers. Horses are o f e s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e . G r a s s e s t h a t grow t h e r e a t p r e s e n t can be used t o e n r i c h t h e s o i l . These a r e r e a l i s t i c g o a l s . A l -though the l a n d o f t h e Northwest I s d i v i d e d by a r e a s o f d e s e r t t h e r e are a l s o v a s t g r a s s - c o v e r e d p l a i n s v e r y s u i t a b l e f o r c u l t i v a t i n g and h e r d i n g . A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s not an e x t e n s i v e r i v e r system c o a r s e g r a s s grows i n p r o f u s i o n w h i c h i s s u f f i c i e n t t o p rove t h a t the water i s not t o o f a r below t h e s u r f a c e and t h a t i t w i l l be an easy m a t t e r t o s i n k w e l l s t o i r r i g a t e t h e l a n d . 6. The e x t r a c t i o n o f m i n e r a l s can begin'imme-d i a t e l y . Northwest m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s are abundant. The A l t a i - T a n n u - U r i a n g h a i - K u b u s G o l a r e a and the K h a r c h i n - O r d o s r e g i o n have a l l the major m e t a l s i n l a r g e q u a n t i t y and of e x c e l l e n t q u a l i t y . F o r e i g n -er s have l o n g been eager t o e x p l o i t t h e s e areas.. Other, m i n e r a l s such as c o a l and s a l t a l s o e x i s t i n not i n c o n s i d e r a b l e amounts, and are on t h e s u r f a c e . so t h a t e x t r a c t i o n w i l l r e q u i r e l i t t l e l a b o u r . 7. Trade can be promoted. The p r o d u c t s o f t h e Northwest are not as numerous as t h o s e of C h i n a p r o p e r , but the volume of a n i m a l s and p l a n t s s h i p p e d t o and s o l d i n C h i n a i s q u i t e l a r g e . There are a l s o a l a r g e number of p r o d u c t s from C h i n a p r o p e r w h i c h are s o l d i n M o n g o l i a . Once t r a n s p o r t a t i o n - has improved t r a d e i s bound t o f l o u r i s h . . 8. M i l i t a r y o r g a n i s a t i o n s h o u l d a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n . Recent rumours'of u n r e s t i n the Mongol Banners are not' yet d e f i n i t e l y known t o be f a c t . Yet many m i l i t a r y men and p o l i t i c i a n s are b r i n g i n g f o r w a r d p l a n s f o r the immediate m o b i l i z a t i o n o f t r o o p s t o a t t a c h ' and s u p p r e s s t h e Mongols. Such an u n j u s t i f i a b l e use o f m i l i t a r y power w i l l a c h i e v e n o t h i n g . The Mongols are s u s p i c i o u s but eager t o g a i n p e t t y advantages and thus a r e e a s i l y won o v e r . To f r i g h t e n them w i t h a sudden i n c r e a s e i n t r o o p s might put them on- the d e f e n s i v e , l e a d them t o en- . gage f o r e i g n a s s i s t a n c e , and q u i t e c o n t r a r y t o what we want would cause t r o u b l e . Such a c t i o n c o u l d i n no way compare w i t h the e a r l y i n t r o d u c t i o n o f i n d u s t r y , commerce,, l a n d development and m i n i n g , which would draw them c l o s e r t o us. As our ven-t u r e s b e g i n d e v e l o p i n g we s h o u l d then i n c r e a s e our m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n o r d e r t o g i v e them p r o t e c t i o n . Not o n l y would t h i s cut down on m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i -t u r e s , i t would at t h e same time ease the p r e s s u r e of government f i n a n c e s . T h i s i s . i n d e e d t h e b e s t way t o manage the b o r d e r ; c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e w i l l be-come d a i l y more s e t t l e d and defense w i l l be p e r -manently s e c u r e . 9. E d u c a t i o n o f the Mongols must be s t a r t e d im-m e d i a t e l y . From the b e g i n n i n g of the C h ' i n g Dynas-t y up t o the p r e s e n t M o n g o l i a has b e l o n g e d t o C h i n a . - a p e r i o d o f r o u g h l y 300 years'. Throughout t h i s p e r i o d i t was t h e p o l i c y o f the government t o keep t h e Mongols i g n o r a n t . Such a p o l i c y runs c o u n t e r t o p r o p e r human r e l a t i o n s and m o r a l i t y . I n f u t u r e i f we want t o draw the Mongols c l o s e r t o u s , u n l e s s we make g r e a t e f f o r t t o draw the Mongols c l o s e r t o u s , u n l e s s we make g r e a t e f f o r t t o improve e d u c a t i o n and pass laws t o promote l e a r n i n g , s u c c e s s w i l l be d i f f i c u l t . Now,-the Mongols are a d u l l p e o p l e and i f we were t o suddenly f o r c e Chinese language and l i t e r a t u r e upon them t h e r e would not be one of them who would not r e j e c t i t . I t h i n k i t would be more s u i t a b l e t o have Chinese f i r s t study and a c h i e v e some- degree of p r o f i c i e n c y i n w r i t t e n and spoken M o n g o l i a n . Government o f f i c i a l s , c i v i l i a n s and c l e r k s s h o u l d study and p r a c t i c e t h e i r M o n g o l i a n t o -g e t h e r . As t h e i r M o n g o l i a n improves so t h e r e w i l l be a d a i l y improvement i n r e l a t i o n s between Ch i n e s e and Mongols. U l t i m a t e l y some Mongols w i l l b e g i n t o t o see the s h o r t c o m i n g s o f t h e i r own language and w r i t i n g system. Once t h i s happens t h e r e w i l l be concerned Mongols t a k i n g up the study of C h i n e s e . At t h a t p o i n t t h e r e w i l l be no need t o f o r c e them, f o r l e d on by t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n of the advantages f o r them, t h e y w i l l o f t h e m s e l v e s t u r n t o the r i g h t p a t h . 10. Customs and h a b i t s s h o u l d a l s o be g r a d u a l -l y changed. Up t o the p r e s e n t the i n c o n v e n i e n c e o f communication has l i m i t e d exchange between Mon-g o l s and C h i n e s e , and the g r e a t e s t r e a s o n f o r the l a c k of a common c u l t u r e has been t h i s l a c k o f communication. H e r e i n l i e s t h e seed o f many of t o d a y ' s problems. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , i n t h e Ch'ing Dynasty r e s t r i c t i o n s d i d not a l l o w i n t e r m a r -r i a g e between Mongol and C h i n e s e . As a r e s u l t t h e d i v i s i o n between the two p e o p l e s grew s t e a d i l y g r e a t e r w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t i n one c o u n t r y we have two c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r e s . P r e s e n t p l a n s r e q u i r e an o r d e r t o be I s s u e d removing a l l t h e s e r e s t r i c t i o n s . When men can t a k e t h e i r f a m i l i e s w i t h them and i n t e r m a r r y l o n g - s t a n d i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s w i l l be q u i c k l y c l e a r e d away, and o f f i c i a l s , f a r -mers, commercial men and m i n e r s w i l l be a b l e t o go t o M o n g o l i a w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s . When our p e o p l e l i v e t h e r e f o r l o n g p e r i o d s t h e r e w i l l be i n c r e a s e d communication between ho u s e h o l d s and i n t e r m a r r i a g e w i l l t a k e p l a c e of I t s own a c c o r d . I n the c o u r s e o f time t h e y w i l l adopt Chinese c u l t u r e and t h e s e -p a r a t i o n o f the two r e g i o n s w i l l be o b l i t e r a t e d . Everyone of t h e above p r o p o s a l s demands imme-d i a t e a t t e n t i o n and b e f o r e any o f them can be under t a k e n l a r g e sums o f money w i l l be r e q u i r e d . I f we put t h e s e p r o p o s a l s i n t o one a c t u a l p r a c t i c e we can expect some p o s i t i v e r e t u r n s i n t h r e e or f o u r y e a r s ; a f t e r t e n y e a r s the r e t u r n s w i l l be, tremen-dous. I submit h e r e w i t h a p l a n f o r s e c u r i n g t h e needed c a p i t a l . We must e s t a b l i s h our c r e d i t by i s s u i n g p u b l i c bonds, and a bank must be s e t up and banknotes i s -sued.. Both moves are n e c e s s a r y - f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f each w i l l depend upon the o t h e r . The amount of t h e bond i s s u e s h o u l d be enough t o c o v e r t h e c o s t o the f i r s t r a i l l i n e . . The o r d e r of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the l i n e s can follow--whatever i s most advantageous t o us. However, the S u i - y u a n - K i a k h t a l i n e s h o u l d be b u i l t f i r s t and s h o u l d be b u i l t im-m e d i a t e l y . Because t h i s l i n e might i n v o l v e c o m p l i c a t i o n s w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r e a t i e s , i f i t I s not done q u i c k l y t h e r e w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y be problems.15 With t h i s l i n e c o m p l e t e d , how-e v e r , t h e r e w i l l be l e s s chance o f t r o u b l e w i t h the o t h e r l i n e s . T h i s l i n e t o t a l s o v er 2,000 l i and each l i w i l l r e q u i r e over 20,000 yuan. At a rough c a l -c u l a t i o n t h e bond i s s u e w i l l have t o be f o r 50,000,000 yuan. They can be c a l l e d Domestic B o r d e r Development Bonds, the use of the funds w i l l be f i x e d , and b o r d e r v e n t u r e s w i l l be used t o guarantee them. A l t h o u g h i t would be d i f f i -c u l t t o s e l l bonds at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e , i t i s not n e c e s s a r y t o s e l l them i m m e d i a t e l y . We* need o n l y use t h i s t o show t h a t we are g o i n g t o p r o -mote b o r d e r development and as a b a s i s t o c r e a t e t r u s t i n our s e l l i n g a g e n t , and f o r the p r e s e n t i t w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t t o borrow two o r t h r e e m i l l i o n . I n a d d i t i o n a B o r d e r Development Bank must be e s t a b l i s h e d and g i v e n a u t h o r i t y t o i s s u e bank n o t e s . By s e l l i n g p u b l i c s hares i n t h i s bank a n o t h e r t h r e e or f o u r m i l l i o n yuan can be r a i s e d . T o g e t h e r w i t h funds r a i s e d by means of the bond i s s u e t h i s w i l l e a s i l y t o t a l no l e s s t h a n s i x m i l l i o n yuan. With s i x m i l l i o n yuan i n c a p i t a l 11 or 12 m i l l i o n yuan i n bank n o t e s can e a s i l y be put i n t o c i r c u l a t i o n . W ith t h e s e bank n o t e s s m a l l l o a n s can be made as time demands, and motor c a r and horse drawn wagon companies, farm-i n g , - h erding and m i n i n g , a l l t h e s e s o r t s o f ven-t u r e s , w i l l b e g i n t o f l o u r i s h w i t h i n a few months. When work on the r a i l l i n e g e t s under way i t w i l l be more and more viewed as a sound i n v e s t m e n t . Then the i n i t i a l d e b entures can be r e c a l l e d and the s a l e o f the bonds begun. The p l a n moves ste p by s t e p , i s sound, and w i l l not f a i l . A l l t h e government has t o do i s s e l e c t a competent man, c r e a t e t h e o f f i c e and g i v e him the n e c e s s a r y a u t h o r -i t y and c r e d e n t i a l s . The l o g i c a l n a t u r e o f the p l a n w i l l be apparent t o a l l ; a l l you w i l l have t o do i s s i t back and reap the rewards. The f e a r t h a t s i n c e the no r t h w e s t i s m o s t l y Outer M o n g o l i a n t e r r i t o r y and t h a t t h e r e f o r e any m i n i n g o r r o a d b u i l d i n g m i g h t , because of t r e a t i e s i n c u r troub'le w i t h R u s s i a , i s an un-founded one. The R u s s i a n t r e a t y s t a t e s t h a t C h i na i s f r e e t o b u i l d r a i l l i n e s i n Outer Mon-g o l i a , but t h a t i f Chinese funds are i n s u f f i -c i e n t any l o a n s must be n e g o t i a t e d w i t h Russia.16 At the p r e s e n t time the t u r m o i l i n R u s s i a i s at i t s peak. To seek a l o a n from her would be no l e s s t h a n t o r i d i c u l e h e r . T h e r e f o r e , i t i s bes t t h a t we r a i s e our money w i t h i n C h i n a . The Domestic Bonds w i l l i n v o l v e Chinese funds o n l y and the R u s s i a n s can i n no way r a t i o n a l l y oppose. The Russian-Mongol T r e a t y s i g n e d i n Urga has g i v e n the R u s s i a n s the r i g h t t o open mines f r e e l y i n O u ter M o n g o l i a , but we s h o u l d d e f i n i t e l y not impose r e s t r i c t i o n s upon o u r s e l v e s by r e c o g n i z -i n g t h i s t r e a t y . 1 7 F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e i s n o t h i n g I n t h i s p r i v a t e t r e a t y d e n y i n g the C h i n e s e t h e r i g h t t o open mines, so we s i m p l y i g n o r e i t . I have gone over t h i s problem v e r y t h o r o u g h l y and the p l a n i s complete i n every r e s p e c t . I humbly a w a i t your d e c i s i o n upon i t . Hsu Shu-cheng.18 On J u l y 8 Hsu Shu-cheng's C h i e f A d v i s o r , L i Ju-chang 1 9 a r r i v e d i n Urga w i t h one company o f men. The e n t i r e 7 t h 2 0 Regiment o f the 3 r d B r i g a d e g r a d u a l l y f o l l o w e d . E n r o u t e ..there was a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g over the purch a s e o f sheep and some h o r s e s were l o s t . The f o l l o w i n g e l e v e n t e l e g r a m s ex-p l a i n what o c c u r r e d and a t t h e same time they r e v e a l how Hsu managed h i s f o r c e s . 1 . Urga. August 3 1 , 1 9 1 9 A t t e n t i o n : F r o n t i e r P l a n n i n g Commissioner Hsu. C o n f i d e n t i a l . A c c o r d i n g t o the t e l e g r a p h e r at Ude, the 2 n d i n f a n t r y . a n d a r t i l l e r y u n i t of the Northwest F r o n t i e r Defense Army, commanded by [ M a j o r ] L i Ju-chang, p a s s e d t h r o u g h Ude on August 2 7 and gave t h e f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t : "On the e v e n i n g of August 26 a motor v e h i c l e was sent t o an encamp-ment of Mongol- t r o o p s s i t u a t e d o v er t h i r t y l i t o the southwest o f Ude.. They demanded sheep from the Mongol h e a d q u a r t e r s but were r e f u s e d . There was some disagreement and t h e Mongol t r o o p s and o f f i c e r s i m m e d i a t e l y l e f t and have not up t o t h i s t i me r e t u r n e d . T h i s has a l r e a d y been r e p o r t e d t o Urga.". The Outer Mongols and m y s e l f have t o g e t h e r hoped t h a t t r o o p s would be sent h e r e , and our r e l a t i o n s have been exceed-i n g l y good. B e f o r e t h i s whenever our Army came t o Urga i t was always w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d , had a v e r y good name and was p r a i s e d by a l l the Mongols. The d i f f i c u l t i e s of p r o v i s i o n i n g an Army are i n -deed r e a l , but p e a c e f u l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Mongols have always been m a i n t a i n e d . Goods have been' p u r c h a s e d a t f a i r p r i c e s and any d i f f i c u l t i e s have always been a m i c a b l y d i s c u s s e d . A l t h o u g h t h i s p a r t i c u l a r a f f a i r i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t I do not want t o see. our army's good name r u i n e d o ver s m a l l i s s u e s such as t h i s , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n must r e -quest you t o w i r e a w a r n i n g [ t o your t r o o p s ] im-m e d i a t e l y . I t i s my o p i n i o n t h a t i n t e l l i g e n t , r e s p o n s i b l e o f f i c e r s s h o u l d be p e r m a n e n t l y s t a -t i o n e d at P ' a n g - c h i a n g , P ' a n g - p e i , Ude, T'ao-nan, T ' a o - l i n and T'ao-pei21 t o o v e r s e e our a f f a i r s and see t h a t a l l p a r t i e s a r e s a t i s f i e d . I hope t h a t you w i l l check i n t o t h i s and a c t a c c o r d i n g l y . Ch'en I . August 31. 2. R e p l y t o Commissioner Ch'en. September 1, 1919.' A t t e n t i o n : Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I . C o n f i d e n t i a l . I have re a d y your r e p o r t s o f the 30th and 31st. I n r e g a r d t o t h e a f f a i r i n v o l v i n g - M a j o r L i Ju^-Chang's b a t t a l i o n . I am sure t h a t my men would not have r e s o r t e d t o such i n c o r r e c t b e h a v i o u r . There must be some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I have o r -d e r e d t h a t a s t r i c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n be made, and i f . t h e r e p o r t p r o v e s t o be t r u e t h e o f f e n d e r s w i l l be s e v e r e l y p u n i s h e d , and w i l l not be p r o t e c t e d by t h i s o f f i c e . I r e q u e s t t h a t you f i r s t of a l l n o t i f y t h e Mongol o f f i c e s of my v i e w s . Please' a s -c e r t a i n and r e p o r t the expenses o f the U r i a n g h a i o f f i c e - . 22 Hsu Shu-cheng. September 1. 3- Order t o the 3rd B r i g a d e . September 1, 1919. A t t e n t i o n : . B r i g a d e Commander Ch'u N o r t h -west F r o n t i e r Defense Army, Hsuan-hua.' C o n f i d e n t i a l . I have r e c e i v e d a r e p o r t t h a t M a jor L i J u -chang passed t h r o u g h Ude- on August 26. One o f the motor v e h i c l e s accompanying the f o r c e went /to a Mongol t r o o p encampment somewhat over 30 l i t o the southwest of Ude. They demanded some sheep but were r e f u s e d and t h e r e was a d i s p u t e o f s o r t s . The Mongols t h e n l e f t . I want you t o make an immediate i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o determine whether o r not t h i s i s t r u e , so t h a t a c t i o n can be take n . Hsu Shu-cheng. September 1. 4. Wire from Urga. September 1, 1919. A t t e n t i o n : Northwest F r o n t i e r Defense P l a n n i n g Commissioner, Hsu Shu-cheng. C o n f i d e n t i a l , Y e s t e r d a y I i n f o r m e d you of the a f f a i r i n which your t r o o p s i n p a s s i n g Ude. had r u n i n t o t r o u b l e w i t h Mongol o f f i c e r s o v er the p u r c h a s e of some sheep. I have j u s t been i n f o r m e d t h a t the e r r o r was not on the p a r t of your t r o o p s . Because the Mongol t r o o p s had l e f t and t h e y had nowhere t o buy sheep, t h e y r e q u e s t e d t h e s e r v i -ces of a Mongol o f f i c i a l t o o b t a i n some f o r them. T h i s f e l l o w was v e r y u ncouth and f o r m e r l y when Chahar t r o o p s were s t a t i o n e d t h e r e , t h e r e were many a l t e r c a t i o n s . I have a l r e a d y e x p l a i n e d t h i s t o the Mongol a u t h o r i t i e s . A c c o r d i n g t o T s e r e n d o r j i when our t r o o p s f i r s t s t a r t e d moving i n t o Mongol t e r r i t o r y t h i s f e l l o w made many r e -p o r t s t o the a u t h o r i t i e s u n t i l he was o r d e r e d t o mind h i s own b u s i n e s s . F o l l o w i n g t h a t he ceased making r e p o r t s . T h e r e f o r e p l e a s e put your mind -'at r e s t o v er t h i s m a t t e r and don't f o r g e t t o i n -form B r i g a d e Commander Ch'u. Ch'en I . September 1. 5- R e p l y t o Commissioner Ch'en, Urga. S e p t -ember -3 , 1919. A t t e n t i o n : Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I . C o n f i d e n t i a l . I have r e a d your w i r e o f September 1. M i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e must extend t o the s m a l l e s t m a t t e r s ; n o t h i n g s h o u l d be a l l o w e d j u s t because i t i s t r i f l i n g . Great r i v e r s are formed from s m a l l b r o o k s , and the l e s s o n s of a n t i q u i t y a re s t e r n . . I have a l r e a d y o r d e r e d t h a t t h i s m a t t e r be s e t t l e d s t r i c t l y . I w i l l r e p o r t a n y t h i n g f u r -t h e r t h a t I hear . Hsu Shu-cheng. September 3 . 6 . Wire from Commander Ch'u of the 3 r d B r i g a d e . September 7 - A t t e n t i o n : Commander-i n - C h i e f Hsu, P e k i n g . C o n f i d e n t i a l . Your w i r e of September 1 r e c e i v e d and r e a d . I o r d e r e d L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l C h a i t o i n v e s t i g a t e and have r e c e i v e d h i s r e p l y as f o l l o w s : " I have r e c e i v e d and r e a d your w i r e of September 3 -A c c o r d i n g t o Ch'en I t h e d i s t u r b a n c e at Ude i n -v o l v i n g M a j or L i Ju-chang and some Mongol t r o o p s was a r e s u l t of language d i f f i c u l t i e s . The Mon-g o l s o l d i e r s were t i m i d . The m a t t e r has a l r e a d y been d i s c u s s e d w i t h the Mongol a u t h o r i t i e s and they v i e w t h e Mongol t r o o p s as b e i n g i n t h e wrong."' I a l s o r e c e i v e d the f o l l o w i n g w i r e from Ch'en I on September 1 : " I n r e g a r d t o the a f f a i r i n which our t r o o p s t r i e d to.buy sheep and ended up h a v i n g t r o u b l e w i t h the Mongol o f f i c i a l s a t Ude, I have j u s t been i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e t r o o p s were l o o k i n g f o r sheep t o buy enroute and r e q u e s -t e d the h e l p of a Mongol o f f i c i a l . There was a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h the s t u p i d f e l l o w but e v e r y -t h i n g has been e x p l a i n e d t o the Mongol a u t h o r i -t i e s . You have a l s o been i n f o r m e d o f t h i s through. Commissioner Hsu.- .The t r o o p s a re f a t i g u e d from t h e i r l o n g j o u r n e y and I have r e q u e s t e d t h a t no f u r t h e r e n q u i r i e s s h o u l d be made." T h i s i s what I have heard t o d a t e . I clan send you a f u r t h e r more dependable r e p o r t a f t e r f u r t h e r c a r e f u l i n — • v e s t i g a t i o n . I have a l s o j u s t r e c e i v e d a t e l e g r a m from L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l C h a i i n Urga as f o l l o w s : "The e n t i r e 1 s t b a t t a l i o n of the 7 t h r e g i m e n t a r -r i v e d i n Urga on September 6 . " I am e s p e c i a l l y i n c l u d i n g t h i s r e p o r t a l o n g w i t h my w i r e . Ch'u C h ' I - h s i a n g . September 7 -7 . R e p l y t o B r i g a d e Commander Ch'u. September 8 , 1 9 1 9 - A t t e n t i o n : B r i g a d e Commander Ch'u, K a l g a n Northwest Re c o n n a i s s a n c e F o r c e . C o n f i d e n t i a l . I have r e a d your w i r e d a t e d September 7. When an army i s formed you must have r e g u l a t i o n s , f o r i f t h e r e are no r e g u l a t i o n s t h e n i t w i l l be u n r u l y . When a d i s p u t e o c c u r s o v e r the p u r -chase o f sheep t h e r e d e f i n i t e l y has t o be an e x a c t i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n and a c t i o n t a k e n . How can you use the words of Ch'en I i n o r d e r t o p r o -t e c t y o u r s e l f , namely, t h a t the t r o o p s have s u f -f e r e d from the l o n g j o u r n e y and no f u r t h e r en-q u i r i e s s h o u l d be made? How a b s u r d ! When you are a s o l d i e r t h e r e i s no time when l i f e i s not r i g o r o u s ; i t cannot be s a i d t h a t i t i s r i g o r o u s o n l y f o r t h o s e on the march and t h a t p e rmanently s t a t i o n e d t r o o p s l e a d a l i f e o f ease. I f you c o n t i n u e t o a l l o w your mind t o be e n t a n g l e d w i t h t h i s s o r t o f t h i n k i n g the d e f e a t o f your b r i g a d e w i l l not be l o n g i n coming. I s t i l l demand a s t r i c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n and a f u l l r e p o r t . A f t e r t h a t we w i l l t a k e the a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n . . L i e u -t e n a n t - C o l o n e l C h a i ' s v i e w s are a l s o m i s t a k e n , and you s h o u l d g i v e him an a p p r o p r i a t e r e p r i m a n d , w i t h the hope t h a t i n f u t u r e he w i l l make no f u r -t h e r such e r r o r s . Hsu Shu-cheng.. September 8. 8. Wire from Hsuan-hua. September. 19, 1919. A t t e n t i o n : Commander-in-Chief Hsu, Northwest F r o n t i e r Defense Army. C o n f i d e n t i a l . I have j u s t r e c e i v e d the f o l l o w i n g w i r e from L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l C h a i S h a o - t s u , d a t e d September 16: "The e n t i r e 3 r d b a t j t a l i o n of the 7 th r e g i m e n t a r r i v e d i n Urga w i t h o u t t r o u b l e on September 15. I have r e c e i v e d your o r d e r t o i n v e s t i g a t e i n t o the t r o u b l e .that Major L i Ju-cheng e n c o u n t e r e d i n buy-i n g sheep at Ude. I have checked i n t o the m a t t e r c a r e f u l l y . The s a i d b a t t a l i o n r e a c h e d Ude on August 27. The 9th company a r r a n g e d the purchase of sheep t h r o u g h a Chinese merchant at a p r i c e o f 6.4 yuan per head. That e v e n i n g t h e s a i d company sent L i e u t e n a n t . Chang t o the Mongol t r o o p s ' herd w i t h t h e money t o p i c k up t h e sheep. But t h e p r i c e demanded was t e n yuan per head. Because of t h i s d i s c r e p a n c y i n p r i c e Chang l e f t w i t h o u t f u r -t h e r words. There was no d i s c u s s i o n between him-and t h e Mongols. The next e v e n i n g the Mongols sud-d e n l y a r r i v e d a t t h e Chinese camp and drove o f f the p e o p l e , c a r t s and h o r s e s which had been h i r e d by the 11th company. Seventeen head of h o r s e s were l o s t . At t h a t time they had no i d e a o f t h e r e a s o n for the Mongols' actions. Captain Ts'ao was then sent by car, along with an int e r p r e t e r , to the Mongol encampment to,discuss the matter with T a i j i , who made many excuses for the ac-t i o n . It was found out from subsequent en-qui r i e s that merchants had often had t h e i r hor-•ses stolen i n t h i s area. They a l l had been stolen by the Mongol troops and would only be returned on the payment of some pr i c e . Merchants warned one another not to stop at t h i s point. Major L i , bearing the facts of the s i t u a t i o n i n mind, discussed the a f f a i r with the Taij± 2 3 who agreed that i f the c i v i l i a n carters who had been hired would pay 20 yuan to the 'local Mon-gols he would see that the lost horses were a l l returned. ' Major L i , seeing the horses had been returned, although i t meant the loss of 20 yuan, for the sake of preserving the army's good name was not w i l l i n g at that time to go any deeper into the matter. He planned rather to lay the whole matter before Commissioner Ch'en when he reached Urga, and through him request the Mongol o f f i -c i a l s to investigate and take any necessary ac-t i o n , to ensure that following troops would not get involved i n similar incidents. I believe that the o r i g i n a l wire to command headquarters re-porting t h i s a f f a i r was the work of the Mongol telegrapher at Ude covering over the error of the T a i j i . " Just i n what way t h i s matter should be handled I do not dare to presume. It i s for t h i s reason I am sending t h i s wire. I humbly await your decision. Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang. September 18. 9. Wire to the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I. September 20. Attention:. Urga Commissioner. Confidential. In reference to-the dispute our troops had buy-ing sheep en route. It has now been clearly, as-certained that the battalion•concerned reached Ude on August 27. There the 9 t h Company arranged the purchase of some sheep through a Chinese mer-chant, at the price of 6.4 yuan per head. That evening the company sent Lieutenant Chang with money to pick up the sheep from the Mongol troops' fl o c k . But they demanded 10 yuan per head. Be-cause of t h i s discrepancy i n price he returned without further words, making no attempt to negotiate The f o l l o w i n g e v e n i n g the Mongol t r o o p s unexpected-l y a r r i v e d and drove o f f the c a r t h o r s e s which had been h i r e d from t h e p e o p l e by t h e 11th company Seventeen h o r s e s were l o s t . At t h a t time the s a i d b r i g a d e d i d not know the p o s i t i o n o f t h e Mongol o f f i c e r s , and they i m m e d i a t e l y 'sent C a p t a i n Ts'ao by c a r , a l o n g w i t h an i n t e r p r e t e r , t o the Mongol camp t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h t h e T a i j i . The T a i j i made a l l s o r t s o f e x c u s e s , L a t e r I n v e s t i g a t i o n r e -v e a l e d t h a t merchants had on many o c c a s i o n s l o s t t h e i r h o r s e s at t h i s p l a c e . I n e v e r y case they were s t o l e n by t h e Mongol t r o o p s who e x a c t e d a p r i c e f o r t h e i r r e t u r n . Merchants warn each o t h e r not t o s t o p at t h i s s t a t i o n . M a j o r L i i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n n e g o t i a t e d w i t h t h e T a i j i and on the f o l l o w i n g day the c i v i l i a n c a r -t e r s p a i d t h e Mongol t r o o p s 20 yuan and t h e T a i j i o n l y t h e n r e t u r n e d a l l the h o r s e s . A l t h o u g h 20 yuan had been l o s t , because the h o r s e s had been r e t u r n e d Major L i was u n w i l l i n g t o p r e s s t h e mat-t e r f u r t h e r f o r the r e a l f e a r t h a t he might cause t r o u b l e f o r army u n i t s f o l l o w i n g l a t e r . I have j u s t i n f o r m e d t h e s a i d b r i g a d e t o o r d e r L i e u t e n -a n t - C o l o n e l C h a i Shao-tsu t o e x p l a i n t h i s t o you i n d e t a i l at the f i r s t o p p o r t u n i t y . T h i s i s what has been a s c e r t a i n e d by my t r o o p s ; p l e a s e r e p e a t i t t o Mongol h e a d q u a r t e r s . I f t h e Mongol t r o o p s i n t h i s a r e a show any u n u s u a l s i g n s l e t me know so I can l o o k i n t o the m a t t e r t h o r o u g h l y . I e s p e c i a l ' l y hope you pass t h i s on t o t h e Mongol government so t h a t we w i l l be a b l e t o work t o g e t h e r h o n e s t l y and i g n o r e p e t t y men who would cause t r o u b l e be-tween us. Hsu Shu-cheng. September 20. 10. Wire from Urga. October 5, 1919. A t t e n t i o n : F r o n t i e r Commissioner Hsu. C o n f i d e n t i a l . Your w i r e of September 20 r e c e i v e d and r e a d . My i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e i n c i d e n t * t h a t o c c u r r e d over the p u r c h a s e of some sheep i s i n complete a c c o r d w i t h t h e account i n your t e l e g r a m . The o f -f i c e r s of your army committed no e r r o r and Mongol h e a d q u a r t e r s i s i n agreement w i t h t h i s . I hope t h i s w i l l put your mind at ease. Ch'en I . October 5-11. Reply to the Urga Commissioner. October 7, 1919- Attention: Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I. Confidential. I have read your wire of October 5. In.refer-ence to your statement that "Mongol headquarters i s i n agreement," i t i s a mistake to say we can therefore rest easy. At t h i s time we cannot af-ford to cause misunderstandings with the Mongols,, therefore even the most t r i f l i n g a f f a i r must re-ceive our f u l l attention. Now that my forces are within your juris.diction would you please make periodic enquiries, both to avoid further mistakes and to better serve our country's advantage. This i s not just my private opinion. Hsu Shu-cheng.24 Ch'en I's Negotiations for Withdrawal of S e l f -Government and his 63 Conditions 25 At t h i s time the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I was negotiating' with the Mongol nobles for the withdrawal of self-government, but had talked himself into a hopeless po s i t i o n . The proposal to cancel self-government was f i r s t put forward by the Mongol nobles. The r u l i n g e l i t e i n Mongolia was o r i g i n a l l y divided into two p a r t i e s , .... the nobles were known as the black party, and .the lamas as the yellow party. Under the old system of the Ch'ing Dynasty the nobles controlled p o l i t i c s and the lamas controlled r e l i g i o n . . . the d i v i s i o n was very clear ... but from the time i n -dependence was declared and the l i v i n g Buddha was made the head of the government the yellow party consequently became the . o f f i c i a l s ... and monopo-l i z e d government authority ... The nobles'thus be-came very r e s e n t f u l . 2 6 Thus, the aim of the nobles i n proposing the cancellation of autonomy was not- reunion with the Chinese central govern-ment , but was to, "restore the old Ch'ing Dynasty system," i n order to regain the governmental authority which was now i n the hands of the lamas.' The representative of the nobles who took this position and who met Ch'en I was an o f f i c i a l i n the Autonomous Outer Mongolian government, the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Tserendorji. The discussion of the cancellation of autonomy be-tween Ch'en I and Tserendorji got under way i n January, 1919-But throughout there was no concrete progress. At the Great Council which opened i n Urga on August 4 the struggle between the nobles and the lamas came more and more to the surface. . As a result a number of nobles decided to sacrif ice autonomy i n order to escape the control of the lamas. . They named Tserendorji as their representative to discuss the condi-tions of the cancellation of autonomy. Both sides decided on a number of principles . The two most important points were: 1. The re-establishment of the old Ch'ing Dynasty system with the five aimaks under the direct control of an o f f i c i a l residing i n Urga (to replace the Living Buddha). 2. The establishment of local self-government conferences to be organized by the nobles (to get r i d of the lamas). The procedure to be used i n these negotiations was as follows: F i r s t the outline of the conditions was to be decided upon, while at the same time (actually the meaning here was, "following t h i s " ) the Mongol o f f i c i a l s would present t h e i r p e t i t i o n [to the Chinese government]. At t h i s time Neither the Russians nor the lamas had any idea of the talks that were going on.28 When Ch'en I reported to the central government the way the negotiations were going the Cabinet proposed that they be discussed at a cabinet meeting (August 21). They expressed no p a r t i c u l a r opinions on the contents of the . conditions proposed, but i n reference to the negotiations procedure they ordered that, The Outer Mongolian nobles as a body must f i r s t present a'request to the Chinese government for the restoration of the Ch'ing system of govern-ment, af t e r t h i s the government i n response to t h i s request w i l l discuss with the Mongols the re q u i s i t e conditions.2 9 Throughout the negotiations there was no way i n which Ch'en I could get th i s government demand accepted. Nonetheless, he carried on the discussion of the conditions with the nobles as before. Ch'en t r i e d to evade t h i s pro-blem by advising the government that, "The Mongols w i l l 30 'only agree i f we s e t t l e the conditions informally 31 d i s c u s s i o n s based upon th e " s e v e r a l t e n s o f c o n d i t i o n s p r o -posed by the Mongol o f f i c i a l s , " and i n broad terms agreement had been r e a c h e d . On October.1 S e c r e t a r y Huang Ch'eng-hsu was sent t o P e k i n g w i t h a rough d r a f t of the c o n d i t i o n s . These were the 63 c o n d i t i o n s which l a t e r became known as the 32 " C o n d i t i o n s f o r the R e h a b i l i t a t i o n of Outer M o n g o l i a . " As f a r as China's r e a l l o n g - t e r m advantage.was con-c e r n e d 'these 63 c o n d i t i o n s were not i n her f a v o u r . I p r e -sent below some o f the more i m p o r t a n t i t e m s . 1. "The c e n t r a l government may under no c i r c u m s t a n c e s • a l t e r t h e o r i g i n a l system of the d i v i s i o n o f Outer M o n g o l i a i n t o Leagues (>M) and Banners (3!J£) • The s h a b i C>^)^)3 league heads ('c|LSL.), chiang-chun j a s s a k s , shang-cho t'e-pa's (j^^ti'^j), e t c . of a l l the l e a g u e s and banners a r e t o r e t a i n f o r e v e r t h e i r g o v e r n i n g a u t h o r i t y as i t was under 33 the o l d C h ' i n g system. The c e n t r a l government a l s o may not i n t r o d u c e a program o f c o l o n i z a t i o n , r e - a s s i g n i n g Mongol l a n d t o o u t s i d e r s . " (Item No. 2 ) . 2. I n Urga one Amban >/) ) and one A s s i s t a n t Amban ( ^ l ^ i ^ j f l ) w i l l be i n s t a l l e d . ' I n U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo, T a n n u - U r i a n g h a i and K i a k h t a one a t t a c h e (\<\J) and one assis-^-t a n t a t t a c h e ( ^ p ^ j ^ ^ w i l l be i n s t a l l e d . I n each of t h e s e o f f i c e s o f the p r i n c i p a l s and a s s i s t a n t o f f i c i a l s one must be Chinese and' one Mongol and t h e p o s i t i o n s w i l l be a l t e r n a -t e d . (That i s t o sa y , i f i n the f i r s t term a Chinese s h o u l d hold the p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e with a Mongol as his subordinate, then in.the next term a Mongol w i l l be'given the p r i n c i p a l position'and a Chinese the subordinate one). Also the Chinese w i l l be limited to c i v i l o f f i c e s . (Items Nos. 6 and 8). Even' i n the Department of Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s i n Peking, of the director and assistant d i r e c t o r , one p o s i -t i o n must be held by a Mongol noble. (Item No. 12). 3 . "Concerning the maintenance of central government troops i n Outer Mongolia, the drawing up of such plans and the number of troops are to be settled between the Amban and Assistant Amban stationed.in Urga. (This also requires the approval of other Mongol o f f i c i a l s ) . If there are d i s t u r -bances which necessitate the dispatch of additional troops, when the emergency i s over these troops must be withdrawn. (Item No. 3 3 ) • 4 . "Chinese c i t i z e n s who wish to b u i l d homes, conduct commercial or i n d u s t r i a l enterprises, and those who wish to open new land, plant crops or cut wood or grass must f i r s t obtain the permission of the jassak concerned. (Item Nos. 43 and 4 4 ) . . 5- "Mining development and the opening of railway, telegraph and postal services must be dependent upon delibera-t i o n between the Amban and Assistant Amban stationed i n Urga. (Such development requires i n i t i a l Mongol approval). I f i t i s necessary" to borrow foreign money, i t must f i r s t be approved by a meeting of the Mongol government., before the loan can be arranged." (Item Nos. 45, 48 and 49). On the basis of these few items we can say that i n fact Ch'en I was aiding the Mongol nobles' "seizure" of autonomy from China, rather than working for the "cancella-t i o n of autonomy." The ministry of foreign a f f a i r s made the following c r i t i c i s m s of the 63 conditions: If we examine the 63 conditions' i n th e i r entirety ... we see that although the central government i n name regains control of governmental authority, i n fact these conditions leave us with r e s t r i c t e d .rights. Although Outer Mongolia has requested the cancellation of autonomy, under these condi-tions the s p i r i t and the foundation of autonomy continue to exist as before ... As.for the items which concern Russia ... a l l the advantages which Russia holds i n Outer Mongolia have decidedly not been lost.35 On November 1 Hsu Shu-cheng presented the following analysis of these conditions to the government: There are a number of unsatisfactory points i n the conditions for the cancellation of autonomy proposed by Commissioner Ch'en. I plan to await the a r r i v a l of Assistant Commissioner En i n order to have a thorough discussion of them with him. I already reported t h i s yesterday. F i r s t l e t me present my views and the opinions that I have gleaned from the Mongols i n the la s t few days. An examination of the 63 conditions reveals a number of large and glaring f a u l t s . Dating from the early years of the Ch'ing Dynasty, Mongolia has been under Chinese, govern-ment c o n t r o l f o r two or t h r e e hundred, y e a r s . I n the m i d d l e p e r i o d of the Dynasty, t h e r e was a change i n p o l i c y t o one. of k e e p i n g the Mongols i n i g n o r -ance, so t h a t they would remain backward, and t h e c o u n t r y poor. As a r e s u l t as soon as they were sub-j e c t e d t o s t r o n g f o r e i g n p r o v o c a t i o n t hey renounced t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h C h i n a . The p o i n t here i s t h a t u n l e s s we b r i n g about p r o s p e r i t y and r a i s e t h e l e v e l of c i v i l i z a t i o n our e f f o r t s w i l l not be l o n g remembered. A l t h o u g h t o implement i t t o o q u i c k l y would i m p l a n t doubts i n many Mongols minds, my p l a n i f i n s t i t u t e d g r a d u a l l y w i l l u l t i m a t e l y a c h i e v e I t s purpose. I t seems t h a t some o f t h e s e 6 3 c o n d i t i o n s appear t o have, i g n o r e d t h i s . These c o n d i t i o n s would suppress c i v i l i z a t i o n and t h a t i s my f i r s t o b j e c t i o n to.them. At t h e time o f t h e Yuan and C h i n D y n a s t i e s t h e Mongols m i l i t a r y might was supreme i n Europe and A s i a ; they t h e n f e l l n e ver t o r i s e a g a i n , and today t h e y a re at t h e i r l o w e s t ebb. The f a u l t l i e s i n t h e i r r e s t r i c t i v e r e l i g i o n and t h e i r s m a l l p o p u l a -t i o n . F u r t h e r because t h e l a n d i s p r i v a t e l y owned i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h governmental r e g u l a -t i o n s and make p e o p l e f o l l o w them thus g r a d u a l l y b u i l d i n g up t h e i r economy. The p o t e n t i a l o f the l a n d has been ognored and the c o u n t r y becomes d a i l y more poor. T h i s i s l i k e e a t i n g u n h u l l e d r i c e when one's c e l l a r i s f i l l e d w i t h g o l d . Under such con-d i t i o n s t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t h a t the government can do. The i m p o r t a n t t h i n g i n g o v e r n i n g t h e Mongols i s t o gui d e them towards p r o s p e r i t y and g i v e them c i v i -l i z a t i o n . I n t h i s way we w i l l b r i n g about g r e a t improvements. Even though we cannot f o r c i b l y r e -move t h e i r o l d h a b i t s , we must p r e p a r e them so t h a t when t h e time i s r i g h t t h e y w i l l r espond. These c o n d i t i o n s [ o f Ch'en I ] r e v i v e t h e c h r o n i c weaknes-ses o f the o l d system and p r o t e c t them. Even i f the y do not c a n c e l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t we can t a k e ad-vantage of p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s and r e s t o r e our a u t h o r i t y , t a k i n g the s t a n d t h a t Outer M o n g o l i a i s Chinese t e r r i t o r y . But t o c a n c e l autonomy [ w i t h t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ] would make i t i m p o s s i b l e t o p r o -mote c i v i l i z a t i o n among them. I t would s t r e n g t h e n the' . b a r r i e r s o f d a r k n e s s . T h i s i s my second o b j e c t i o n . What i s t o b e . v a l u e d i n t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f autonomy i s not t h e a c t i n name, but t h e a c t u a l r e -e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f government c o n t r o l . A s i d e from t h e f i r s t v e r y g e n e r a l i t e m of t h e s e p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n s • c o n c e r n i n g the r e t u r n of a u t h o r i t y - to. the c e n t r a l government the r e s t a l l i n c r e a s e the c o n t r o l o f t h e Mongol n o b l e s . I f we s e r i o u s l y f e a r t h a t t h e Mongols w i l l n o t . r e s p o n d s h o u l d we p l a y upon t h e i r n a t u r e s t o e n t i c e them th e n use f o r c e t o g a i n the ends we hoped f o r ? But can t h e government of a c o u n t r y o p e r a t e on the b a s i s of l i e s ? Throughout h i s t o r y has t h e r e ever been a government l i k e t h i s w h i c h endured? To do t h i s i s t o c o n f u s e the p e t t y w i t h t h e i m p o r t a n t . I t i s my t h i r d o b j e c t i o n . When autonomy has been c a n c e l l e d how are t a x e s and d u t i e s t o be r e v i s e d ? How i s the f i s c a l ad-m i n i s t r a t i o n g o i n g t o be o r g a n i z e d ? And what i s g o i n g t o be done t o d e v e l o p a g r i c u l t u r e , commerce and-mining? The c o n d i t i o n s make no mention- of, t h e s e p o i n t s . They speak o n l y o f government pay-ment of a l l the s a l a r i e s o f t h e n o b l e s , j a s s a k s and lamas, and of a l l t h e expenses f o r c h a n i n g s u t r a s and so on. I must be I g n o r a n t f o r I f a i l to. see where the funds t o pay t h e s e expenses a r e t o come from. I f you say t h e s e funds a r e t o be ob-t a i n e d from the Mongols t h e n t h e Mongol p e o p l e must pay t a x e s t o the c e n t r a l government. But s i n c e t h e r i g h t s - o f the n o b l e s and lamas are t o be r e i n -s t i t u t e d t h e p e o p l e w i l l have t o s u p p o r t them as b e f o r e . I n v i e w of t h e p o v e r t y of t h e Mongol p e o p l e how can we put up w i t h I n c r e a s i n g t h e i r burden? I f you say t h a t the funds s h o u l d come from t h e C h i n e s e t r e a s u r y , what of the f a c t t h a t today our t r e a s u r y i s so s h o r t o f funds t h a t i t r e q u i r e s a l l our e f -f o r t s t o t a k e c a r e o f our own domestic needs? How t h e n can we f u l f i l l t h e needs o f - t h e Mongols? I am a f r a i d t h a t i f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e i n s t i t u t e d . the government w i l l l o s e any f u n c t i o n i n g a u t h o r i t y i t might have had, and the o p p o r t u n i t y i n M o n g o l i a ' w i l l have b e e n - l o s t . Moreover, even I f t h e r e was a s u r p l u s i n the t r e a s u r y , t o use i t f o r t h i s p u r -pose would be l i k e b u y i n g a c r a c k e d g o b l e t when you don't have enough money t o buy a t h r o n e . To do so would be t o damage f i s c a l government and i s my f o u r t h o b j e c t i o n . The S i n o - R u s s i a n - M o n g o l i a n Agreement was s e t t l e d by t h e C h i n e s e and t h e R u s s i a n s , and i t i s known t o a l l n a t i o n s . S i n c e the Mongols cannot m a i n t a i n i t by t h e m s e l v e s t h e y t h e r e f o r e cannot u n i l a t e r a l l y a n n u l i t . I f we want t o a n n u l i t we s h o u l d n e g o t i a t e w i t h the R u s s i a n s . Perhaps you would say t h a t s i n c e the R u s s i a n s have no government we s h o u l d f o r t he time b e i n g a r r a n g e a t r e a t y w i t h the Mongols them s e l v e s i n o r d e r t o g a i n an advantage over R u s s i a . But do you r e a l l y t h i n k t h a t when the government i n R u s s i a i s r e - e s t a b l i s h e d we w i l l be a b l e t o c o u n t e r t h e i r c o m p l a i n t s w i t h t h i s agreement? And i f t h e R u s s i a n s don't p r o -t e s t and s i m p l y hold, t h a t the former agreement s t i l l a p p l y c o u l d you use t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s t o p r e v e n t t h e i r r e - e n t r y I n t o M o n g o l i a ? I f we ta k e advantage of R u s s i a n ' s p r e s e n t h e l p l e s s n e s s t o e s t a b l i s h r e a l t e r r i t o r i a l c o n t r o l o ver M o n g o l i a , which has always been o u r s , the Rus-s i a n s w i l l be un a b l e t o h i n d e r us. I f we were t o pay no a t t e n t i o n t o o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and i n s t i t u t e t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s w i t h the e x t r a v a -gant hope o f g a i n i n g q u i c k r e t u r n s , I f e a r that" f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i l l be p l a g u e d w i t h c o m p l i -c a t i o n s , t h a t we w i l l be f o r c e d i n t o a t r e a t y w h ich s a c r i f i c e s our p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t we w i l l become t h e l a u g h i n g s t o c k of the powers and y e t have g a i n e d no advantage w i t h a l . To do t h i s would be t o i g n o r e the purpose of making t r e a t i e s , and i s my f i f t h o b j e c t i o n . A l s o , the main purpose of t h i s agreement i s our d e s i r e t o be a b l e t o a n n u l the agreement w i t h R u s s i a . But i s n ' t h a v i n g the new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h a t i s proposed r o u g h l y p a t t e r n e d on t h e p a n - s h i h  t s o - l i and o t h e r o f f i c e s of the R u s s i a n t r e a t y a f u r t h e r p r o o f of t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e R u s s i a n t r e a t y ? 3 6 T h i s would be n u r t u r i n g a con-t r a d i c t i o n and i s my s i x t h o b j e c t i o n . I n t h e t a l k s t h a t have- been g o i n g on i n Urga a l l of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s have come from t h e sugges-t i o n s o f a few of the n o b l e s . The lamas are de-c i d e d l y not i n agreement, ,and even the n o b l e s a re l a r g e l y not y e t i n agreement. Moreover, as l o n g as the L i v i n g Buddha's c o n t r o l c o n t i n u e s t o e x i s t , even i f a l l t h e n o b l e s s h o u l d p r e s s him, i f he d i d not re s p o n d would i t not be I m p o s s i b l e t o a c c o m p l i s h a n y t h i n g ? T h e r e f o r e the lamas as a group cannot be c a r e l e s s l y i g n o r e d . I t i s my o p i n -i o n t h a t g i v e n t h e i r I gnorance the-Mongols can o n l y be u n i t e d by means o f t h e i r r e l i g i o n . The n o b l e s w i t h o u t the s t r e n g t h o f t h e ch u r c h would not be a b l e t o e x e r t t h e i r a u t h o r i t y over t h e p e o p l e of Mongolia. I cannot see any way i n which the nobles could, be e f f e c t i v e i n o f f i c e i f the church were left . out. Therefore 'in planning for the government we must, make use- of them both. To maintain a balance between•noble and lama we must use both r e s t r a i n t and leniency, we must entice them with g i f t s and advantages, we must bestow honours upon them, then none of them w i l l be un-w i l l i n g to come to us. To make- over-optimistic . plans which favour the n o b i l i t y and needlessly ignore the complaints of the lamas would be to plant the seeds of future r e b e l l i o n and give a strong neighbour (Japan) an immediate opportunity to step i n . Such a plan i s short sighted; t h i s i s my seventh objection. To lead the Mongols to cancel t h e i r autonomy i s , i n name a fine cause. To develop the poten-t i a l of a land and to enlighten i t s people i s , in f a c t , a fine action. To achieve i t i n name and i n fact i s t r u l y b e a u t i f u l . But to s e t t l e for only the empty name and to f a i l to ascertain whether i n fact one's proposals might be deleterious Is poor statesmanship. In the management of m i l l - ' tary a f f a i r s . I do not want to overstep my bounds and make offensive c i r t i c i s m s , but having the de-fense of the border entrusted to me I do not want to be remiss i n my r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The purpose I e s p e c i a l l y concentrate on i s to work for the improvement of the l i v e l i h o o d of the Mongol people i n our border area. After examining carefully, the suggestions i n my proposals, i f there i s anything at a l l that you f e e l should be adopted, then I ask you to order Commissioner Ch'en and his a s s i s -tants to redraft a set of more general conditions. There i s no need for t h i s to be done i n fine de-t a i l , and there i s no need to bring i n internation-a l r e l a t i o n s as t h i s would probably lead to com-p l i c a t i o n s . In my opinion the main point i n these conditions should be p o l i t i c a l and f i n a n c i a l controls. The government should decide on the requirements of the p o s i t i o n and then select people for the job. When there are problems these o f f i c i a l s w i l l con-sult .with the nobles and jassaks and they w i l l be handled i n a way suitable to both p a r t i e s . The r e l i g i o u s ceremonies should i n a l l cases be upheld by the government.. The s a l a r i e s of the .nobles and the lamas and l o c a l administrative, expenses . should be decided upon generously and paid by the government. In general the r i t e s , of i n -vestiture •' 'will • remain as they were before. In every case where local, safety i s endangered the government w i l l provide necessary protection, and foreign r e l a t i o n s w i l l without exception be handled by the government. These few conditions w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t . The more that i s written the more loopholes there w i l l be, and the more varying opinions w i l l be aroused, which w i l l only mean the more d i f f i c u l t i e s to content with i n future. Ir w i l l be much, better to say things i n a summary fashion. The Mongols w i l l be sa-t i s f i e d and there w i l l be no obstacles to our plans for development of Mongolia.37 The Defeat of Ch'en I's Negotiations Regardless of the contents of the 63 conditions, these negotiations were doomed to f a i l u r e . B a s i c a l l y Ch'en I was negotiating with a group of nobles whose aim was to destroy the power of the lamas. But the major portion of govern-mental authority i n Mongolia lay precisely i n the hands of . t h i s group of lamas. In addition to t h i s everyone i n Mon-g o l i a , lamas and nobles a l i k e , without exception worshipped and had superstitious f a i t h i n the Living Buddha (the 'Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu), but the Living Buddha placed his " utmost trust p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s group of lamas. How could Ch'en I have any hope of success when he avoided the lamas and had no way of approaching the L i v i n g Buddha, thinking instead to d i r e c t a l l his attention to the nobles i n an e f f o r t to. remove governmental a u t h o r i t y , from the lamas and the L i v i n g . Buddha? A l s o , e v e r y t h i n g t h a t he heard was the o p i n i o n of the nobles o n l y , and as a r e s u l t i t was n a t u r a l l y d i f f i c u l t f o r him to r e c o g n i z e the r e a l f a c t s c l e a r l y . Consequently he has made a number of m i s -taken judgments which were based on the d e s i r e s of one s ide o n l y . On August 19 he w i r e d the M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s : "As f a r as the lamas go, they have to accept what the nobles d i c t a t e . The L i v i n g Buddha a l s o has l o n g favoured the c e n t r a l government so there i s r e a l l y n o t h i n g to worry a b o u t . T h i s b a s e l e s s and b o l d s u p p o s i t i o n i s -the most important reason f o r the l a t e r defeat of h i s e f f o r t s . On September 2 6 when Ch'en I made a r e p o r t on the progress of the d i s c u s s i o n of the c o n d i t i o n s he s a i d : "As a r e s u l t of the s t r o n g e f f o r t s of the nobles to b r i n g about an u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l l the lamas have g i v e n t h e i r agreement to the c o n d i t i o n s . . . In r e g a r d t o the matter of i n v e s t i t u r e i n o f f i c e . . . the L i v i n g Buddha was a g a i n n o t i f i e d and he 40 too has g i v e n h i s c o n s e n t . " I do not know whether h i s r e p o r t i s u n t r u e , whether he was l i e d to by the n o b l e s , or whether the L i v i n g Buddha l a t e r changed h i s m i n d , but on the f i f t h day f o l l o w i n g t h i s wire - t h i s was a l s o the same day t h a t Huang Ch'eng-hsu l e f t f o r Peking c a r r y i n g the d r a f t copy of the c o n d i t i o n s (October 1 ) - the L i v i n g Buddha wrote a l e t t e r to. the President of China, and ordered f i v e lamas, including Mergen Khan CS-^'&^f)^^ on-October 19 to take the l e t t e r to Peking. This l e t t e r dated: "Today Ch'en I, the Chinese o f f i c i a l Resident In Urga, suddenly proposed the cancellation of autonomy ... he also presented his f i f t y - o d d conditions ... whereby the people of Outer Mongolia should unite and u n i l a t e r a l l y void the 1915 Treaty with Russia ... I am unresolute and undecided. There are many questions that worry me - I am 42 indeed deeply disturbed." -It Is very obvious from his words that he did not approve of the conference which had already s e t t l e d these conditions. With the passage of another twenty-odd days (October 24), a f r a i d that his f i r s t l e t t e r would not reach Peking, or that i t was not clear enough i n i t s intention, he wrote the following l e t t e r : For the .attention of the President. I have recently been informed by the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en I of the p e t i t i o n requesting the cancel-l a t i o n of our autonomy i n Outer Mongolia, and the f i f t y - o d d conditions which the Mongols must In future adhere to, and also of his private meetings and discussions of the conditions with various ministers. It i s my opinion that i f you are made aware of the si t u a t i o n you w i l l agree that we should wait u n t i l we have found a way to quel the re b e l l i o u s party led by Semenov and u n t i l we have c a l l e d a'meeting of a l l the Mongol nobles and jassaks and solved our i n t e r -nal d i f f i c u l t i e s , and that then you should be n o t i f i e d of t h i s . At present the Mongol jassaks are for the most part not i n agreement. Among them there are those who not only do not want our autonomy cancelled, but hope t h a t . i t w i l l c o n t i n u e j u s t as i t i s . I f the Mongol lamas, commoners, .subordinate, o f f i c i a l s ' , - e t c . hear of t h i s p r o p o s e d move t h e r e w i l l be', much t a l k a g a i n s t i t . From t h i s we can see t h a t u n l e s s t h e ' Outer M o n g o l i a n p e o p l e as a whole want to r e s t o r e , t h e - o l d C h ' i n g system i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o .enforce them t o f o l l o w i t . T h i s p r o p o s a l t o c a n c e l our autonomy was not the i d e a of the Outer Mongol m i n i s t e r s , i t was r a t h e r the sug-g e s t i o n o f Commissioner Ch'en, who wants t o t a k e advantage of the b o r d e r t r o u b l e t o c a n c e l our autonomy. I have g i v e n t h i s m a t t e r my c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r -a t i o n . We Outer Mongols have not been d e l u d e d by t h e s p e c i o u s words of the f o l l o w e r s o f Semenov, and have c o n s i s t e n t l y u p h e l d the t r i p a r t i t e t r e a t y and kept our autonomy i n t a c t . To t u r n our backs t o t h i s t r e a t y at t h i s p o i n t and t o r e q u e s t the c a n c e l l a t i o n o f our autonomy, would i n f a c t be u n s u i t a b l e i n many ways. But Ch'en I , t h e Commissioner of Urga, views the m a t t e r d i f f e r e n t -l y , he c o n t i n u a l l y f l a u n t s ' a u t h o r i t y h o l d i n g • p r i v a t e d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h ' t h e v a r i o u s m i n i s t e r s on t h i s m a t t e r , w i t h no c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r the ma-j o r i t y o p i n i o n . He has r e p e a t e d l y p r e s s u r e d peo-p l e , and t h i s has been even worse r e c e n t l y . He has even formed a f o r c e from th e t r o o p s t h a t are supposed t o be s t a t i o n e d a t K i a k h t a f o r i t s de-f e n s e and has s t a t i o n e d them c l o s e t o the Urga monastery and o t h e r lama q u a r t e r s , and t h e y have w i t h no a u t h o r i t y commandeered the homes of f o r -e i g n t r a d e r s . 43 These s o r t s of t r o u b l e - m a k i n g i n c i d e n t s r e a l l y go a g a i n s t the wishes of the p e o p l e , and I am d e e p l y concerned about i t . I have a deep f a i t h i n t h e s e c r e t o r d e r which you gave t o P r i n c e Ch'ao-k'o-t'u-erh P a - t a - e r h - h u & if e| 314$)421 and because of t h i s I am o u t -l i n i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s here f o r you and s e c r e t l y r e q u e s t t h a t you w i l l . l o o k i n t o t h i s . I- have e s -p e c i a l l y a p p o i n t e d S a - m i - t i - p a - k ' o Nomen Han B e l l e Kan-ch'an' Hutukhtu Ta-mu-t'ang-pa-cha-erh ^ t o go t o you w i t h g r e e t i n g s . a n d p r e s e n t s , and t o e a r n e s t l y r e q u e s t t h a t Commissioner Ch'en I , whom-we r e g a r d as s u i t a b l e , be t r a n s f e r r e d e l s e w h e r e , , and t h a t t h e autonomous•government be a l l o w e d t o remain i n e f f e c t as i t now i s . I n t h i s way t h e respect for lamaism w i l l increase and. gradually spread,, forever r e f l e c t i n g its. benevolence and mercy, and harmonious' rel a t i o n s between China and Outer Mongolia w i l l be further ensured.^6 The Living Buddha was a f r a i d that t h i s l e t t e r might not reach Peking' so he sent the Jalkhansa Li v i n g Buddha ^;|yitTy), next only to himself i n rank, to personally d e l i v e r i t to Peking. Chia-heng-tsun set out on'October 47 24 'and reached the c a p i t a l on November 1. The sending of t h i s l e t t e r marked the complete de-feat of two or three months work on the part of Ch'en I and the nobles. Of course, Ch'en I and the nobles were determined to make one f i n a l e f f o r t . Ch'en I, thus, received a p e t i -t i o n signed by the nobles only, which he wired to Peking on October 29 and 3 0 . Ch'en I claims that he was i n re-ceipt of thi s p e t i t i o n on October 14, but had been requested by the nobles, "not to wire Peking for the present time." On October 29 they requested that he wire t h e i r decision to Peking, but that they s t i l l desired that, for the time being t h i s should be kept secret, and not immediately made public. Their hope was that by waiting u n t i l the Jalkhansa Liv i n g Buddha had wired his answer to Urga perhaps they could undo the request of the lamas. "Otherwise they should wait u n t i l everything had been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y arranged i n Urga, and then Ch'en I could wire Peking to announce t h e i r request. After he had, sent the Jalkhansa Li v i n g Buddha to Peking bearing the l e t t e r I cannot .see how they could have got the Li v i n g Buddha of Urga to contradict t h i s . What, i n ' f a c t , could Ch'en I and the nobles have "arranged, with the L i v i n g Buddha and the entire body of lamas against them? Ch'en I said that the nobles themselves admitted that, ."We are already i n a precarious p o s i t i o n ... I f we do not succeed our fate i s i n t h e i r hands and our survival thus depends wholly on Peking ... Painful words, indeed." I suspect that at t h i s time Ch'en I was perhaps no less'distressed than the nobles. Because of the u n i l a t e r a l nature of this request, without the agreement of the lamas or the approval of the Urga Li v i n g Buddha, no matter how you choose to view i t , the most that can be said i s that a portion, of the nobles had turned against the autonomous government. It cannot be claimed that the autonomous government had requested the central government to cancel t h e i r autonomy. Even i f Ch'en I was stupid he could not possibly have missed t h i s point. Although t h i s defeat can be fundamentally defined i n t h i s way, In f a c t , the negotiations had been defeated before t h i s . There were a number of other people who had recognized that [to remain Mongolian] would give a tremen-dous boost to t h e i r careers and they were a f r a i d that someone else would snatch [ t h i s honour] from them. Thus, when these 6 3 conditions f i r s t reached Peking the Prime Minister of the Cabinet, .Chin Yun-p'eng, i n v i t e d a l l m i n i s t r i e s 'to send men to discuss them (October 2 7 ) • Even 50 the Navy was i n v i t e d , and participated. But the Frontier Defense Planning Commission, which l e g a l l y should have been the o f f i c e i n charge, was not n o t i f i e d of t h i s 51 meeting. On October 20 the Cabinet wired Ch'en I .as follows: "Frontier Planning. Commissioner Hsu w i l l arrive i n Urga within a few days to inspect our forces there. He i s to have no direct involvement with Mongolian a f f a i r s . F u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the same s t i l l l i e s with you. This is. to make clear the l i m i t s of his authority." This obviously i s the work of Chin Yun-p'eng, charging Ch'en I to maintain the secrecy of the negotiations, for the cancellation of autonomy. Ch'en I therefore wired to ask i f , "Commissioner 52 Hsu had read the conditions sent to.Peking?" On November 1 Hsu' wired Peking i n reference to these conditions, stating his "seven objections" and advocating that a decision be withheld u n t i l he had held a further meeting. In a Cabinet meeting Chin Yun-p'eng stated that he f e l t t h i s was, "decidedly wrong, and since we have a l -ready made a statement that after numerous Cabinet meetings-we have made our decision, we cannot go back on t h i s as t h i s would Injure our authority. Hsu's wire i s s e l f - c o n t r a -dictory. . As for Hsu convening a meeting of a l l subordinate o f f i c i a l s , he can only do t h i s concerning matters within the sphere of border defense, the matter of the cancella-t i o n of autonomy has been.delegated s p e c i f i c a l l y to Commissioner Ch'en and there i s no need for anyone else to i n t e r f e r e . When Ch'en I has arranged everything, even i f i t turns out that there i s something not to our advan-tage, we can begin the process again and nothing w i l l 53 have been lo s t ..." It i s d i f f i c u l t to accord the t i t l e of Premier to a man who, because his desire to manage everything himself had f a i l e d , would not allow the i n t e r -cession of the o f f i c i a l properly concerned and would l e t things degenerate to petty bickering, even i n a matter as urgent as the cancellation of Mongol autonomy. In regard to the 6 3 conditions, On October 2 2 Hsu Shu-cheng obtained access through the .Cabinet Secretariat to the o r i g i n a l copy of the conditions which had already been signed by the Foreign O f f i c e . On November 1 he issued his telegram of "seven objections." But on November 6 Ch'en I wired the Foreign O f f i c e to ask, "Am I permitted to l e t Commissioner Hsu see the conditions?" And on November 1 he again wired that he considered, "It would be 54 better to l e t him see them." We cannot but recognize that Ch'en I was f a r too naive. Conclusion of the Negotiations for the . Cancellation of Autonomy On October. 2 9 Hsu reached. Urga. On November 1 he issued the telegram pointing out his seven objections to the 63 conditions and i n addition advocating that a new set of conditions be drawn up, fewer i n number and less detailed 5 5 (see above). On November 6 he met the L i v i n g Buddha. On November'10 he discussed the conditions with Ch'en I who s t i l l spoke i n a guarded fashion. In his telegram of that date Hsu said: Attention: Northwest Frontier Office Confidential. Copies to: The President, the Cabinet, Director General Tuan [C h ' i - j u i ] and a l l M i n i s t r i e s . I have just made an appointment with Commission-er Ch'en for tomorrow night to discuss the 63 con-di t i o n s at my.office. I have, also arranged for the two Assistant Commissioners, L i and. En, to come, and I am also asking the Commander of the [3rd] Brigade. Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang and my Advisor, Yang Chih-ch'eng to come so that we may a l l take part i n the deliberations. . In t h i s way I hope to avoid the prejudiced views that might arise i n a discussion between just the two of us. If there i s any fear „ of information leaking out because so many men are involved, I can conduct the meeting under the rules of m i l i t a r y law. I knew Ch'en I's conditions soon after they were •drafted, and when he sent his chief secretary, Huang Ch'eng-hsu, to Peking I was also aware of that. Because he did not report to me I therefore did not go to question him. After Huang had been i n Peking six or seven days Ch'en I suddenly.wired me to say that Huang was coming to. Peking bearing an import-' ant secret, and requested' me to see Huang, person-a l l y . To my surprise, when I met Huang he was hesitant i n bearing and expression and covert i n his speech'. When I enquired about the important matter he bore he said i t was nothing of great Im-portance, only that he had requested a vacation to go to Fengtien and that Ch'en I had ordered that on the way he should make an ef f o r t to expedite the dispatch of a force [to Urga]. This amused me' and I sent him on his way. The day before I l e f t for Urga I paid my respects to the President and had the honour at that time to enquire about these conditions for cancellation of autonomy, and was ordered to get hold of them and examine them care-f u l l y . I then went to the Cabinet Secretariat where I borrowed the o r i g i n a l copy signed by the Foreign o f f i c e , which I took with me when I l e f t for the north. At a l l our stopping points I spent the evenings reading i t and am quite thoroughly f a m i l i a r with i t s advantages and weaknesses. My intention was that I must discuss It with Ch'en I personally when I.reached Urga, and I therefore made preparations i n advance. I also hoped that i n mak-ing plans for the development of the border regions I could e n l i s t the services of Commissioner Ch'en and a l l the Assistant Commissioners to work out a program with me which we could put into operation at the beginning of spring next year. This could prepare the country for the i n s t i t u t i o n of a new system of o f f i c i a l s and silence the ones who suppor-ted the treaty with Russia. The area then could gradually take over i t s own administration. Before I l e f t Peking I presented my ideas to the President whose response was, "Very good indeed, to e n l i s t the aid of Ch'en i s an excellent idea." Therefore the f i r s t evening i n Urga I took these secret conditions for the cancellation of Mongol autonomy with the idea of having a completely frank exchange of views with Ch'en I. But he was throughout evasive. Whenever the matter of the cancellation of autonomy was men-tioned he became covert In exactly the way that Huang had. There being no point i n further discussion I therefore wired you my plan to await the a r r i v a l of the .Assistant Commissioners L i and En so that we could discuss i t i n common. I afterwards discovered that Ch'en had received a secret order from someone in the government advising him that he did not have to. discuss the conditions with anyone, that he should concentrate on winning .oyer one or two Mongol o f f i c i a l s , ' make his own reports' and manage the a f f a i r himself. Since my a r r i v a l i n Urga my every word and action have been wired to the government. Every-thing that I have seen, heard or reckoned about the state o f - a f f a i r s here I- have thoroughly ana-lyzed. I have neither betrayed the government nor my p r i n c i p l e s . My command i n Outer Mongolia has f i t t i n g l y given me a great deal of authority •< - can you expect.me to be docile and cautious? Over the past years the 'authority of our country has been confined within Peking and there are many who look down on us. Therefore i f we want every-thing to be well regulated we must have laws f o r the people to follow. So here I again present my views for your examination. In my November 1 telegram I requested that you examine and make a decision on my proposed seven objections, and on my o v e r a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 63 conditions. I have received the reply of the Cabinet In which the President stated that my views revealed the depth of my experience and the long-range p r a c t i c a l i t y of my planning.. At our meeting tomorrow morning I am going to uphold these aims In [what I hope w i l l be] a harmonious and just discussion. Further, among the conditions there are some that infri n g e upon the pos i t i o n and au-th o r i t y of the Frontier Planning Commission. In general these items should be removed, then Commis-sioner Ch'en should be given the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to make suitable-arrangements with the Mongols. If he i s unable to do t h i s then t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y should be passed to me, and when I have made s a t i s -factory arrangements the credit for doing so should be given to Commission Ch!en. Although I have earnestly stri v e n to establish the authority of the Commissioner my concern l i e s only with national af-f a i r s , and I decidedly w i l l not l e t glory and fame in t e r f e r e with my intentions. B r i e f l y , the North-west Frontier Planning Commission i s an already established o f f i c i a l Outer Mongolian o f f i c e . The functioning and authority of the o f f i c e are nation-a l l y established law. Orders issued by the o f f i c e may not be altered nor can they be annulled a f t e r they are Issued.. I have received t h i s appointment, and, as long as I hold i t . w i l l perform my duties regardless of the consequences to me. Whether it.be i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , domestic Mongol a f f a i r s or questions of a l o c a l nature, I s h a l l in a l l cases bear f u l l .responsibility. If to-morrow I were freed, of my duties I might ride a donkey, wearing a kerchief, or wander at ease upon a lake, but today I s t i l l hold my p o s i t i o n and I w i l l not l e t anyone i n the least trans-gress upon i t , because such transgressions des-troy the law. 'The•Republic i s based upon law and to- destroy law would be to destroy the Republic. Thus anyone who i s an enemy of the Republic, even though he might be a close r e l a t i v e , I s t i l l must oppose him. I have been made a general by this, country and w i l l a l i k e share her i l l s and her good fortune. To preserve the law and to preserve the nation i s i n a l l cases the duty of us all°, and not just of the o f f i c e of the Frontier Commissioner. Hsu Shu-cheng. November. 10.56 • . • By November 11 Hsu had r e a l i z e d that Ch'en I was unsatisfactory and stated t h i s i n a wire: Ch'en I's words exceed his deeds. I would say that he i s too eager to achieve fame, that his mind i s incapable of deep and subtle reasoning. He himself thinks that he c l e a r l y sees even d i s -tant matters, but i n fact even present - matters' obscure themselves' from him. What his r e a l worth i s I dare not say, but this i s how he appears to • me, and I therefore cannot place f u l l trust i n him.57 Because of t h i s Hsu f i n a l l y decided to use his energies i n another way. He stated: After we had worked out which of the items, to r e t a i n and which to drop Ch'en I went to discuss t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n with the Mongols.. But I my-s e l f am independently devoting a l l my energies to t h i s problem. My' invest i g a t i o n of the problem-indicates that the matter should be se t t l e d quickly to. avoid wasting time, or the develop-ment of complications.' When the matter i s settled' s a t i s f a c t o r i l y I w i l l hand i t back to Ch'en I 3 f o r . I d e f i n i t e l y am not competing with him.58 Following t h i s , i n his November 13 telegram he states: ... I thus venture to d e f i n i t e l y say even with the passage of many years and months Ch'en I has not been able to accomplish any-thing./ He i s lacking In judgment and his emo-tions obscure things for him. From the very be-ginning he was making wrong moves and confusing matters. If at t h i s time 1 l e f t matters with him progress i n t h i s a f f a i r would come to a halt. To halt halfway through and watch our country lose respect and importance i s something I cannot endure ... You have wired that i t i s your desire to see autonomy cancelled; give me time and It w i l l be done. My previous telegram stated that a decision would be reached within three t-o f i v e days. Arrangements have a l l been made, and i f without the use of a single soldier or arrow our objective i s achieved t h i s w i l l indeed be our good fortune. I f i t does not succeed I w i l l make no excuses, and w i l l resign and return to the south and l e t Ch'en I bring things to a conclusion. I w i l l then, with a l l respect, • accept any judgment of neglect of duties.5 9 On November 12 the L i v i n g Buddha sent an i n v i t a t i o n for a banquet. I don't know .just who was discourteous, but Hsu Shu-cheng refused the i n v i t a t i o n . (I think that th i s was very possibly an excuse). The Living Buddha then sent the Mongol Premier and Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Badmadorji ( 5£j ), with the i n v i t a t i o n . Although few words were enchanged Hsu ascertained that i f . they wished to cancel, the autonomy of Outer Mongolia that t h i s was . , SO the key man. On November 13 Hsu made the following report to the government: Northwest Frontier Office Confidential. Attention: Secretary General Kuo, Deputy Secre-tary General Tseng. Forward to: the President, the Cabinet, Director General Tuan C h ' i - j u i , the Foreign O f f i c e . . Yesterday the Living Buddha sent me an i n v i -t a t i o n to a banquet. The i n v i t a t i o n was. incor-r e c t l y prepared and I therefore refused to go. He then sent the Mongol Premier Badmadorji to i n v i t e me. I sternly c r i t i c i z e d the L i v i n g Buddha's breach of decorum but warmly praised Badmadorji's own energies despite his old age. I also mentioned the L i v i n g Buddha's many i l l -nesses and that he would not l i v e too much longer. I spoke of the high esteem i n which' he was held by the lama r e l i g i o n , and he l e f t deeply moved. This i s a very profound man, well-versed i n foreign a f f a i r s , and i f we d i -rect our e f f o r t s toward t h i s man we should d e f i n i t e l y be able to affect the cancellation of autonomy. .When I mentioned t h i s to Commis-. sioner Ch'en he agreed with me completely. Commissioner Ch'en maintains that we should threaten the lama party, but i n my view the successful development of the border region and of m i l i t a r y control rests on nothing more than the combined use of severity and gentle-ness. But t h e i r use' throughout must be care-f u l l y calculated. By nature the Mongols are very suspicious and i t would be d i f f i c u l t to get close to them through.-'the use of severity. Therefore' we must f i r s t win them over through gentleness. Probably a f t e r a time they w i l l begin to see through t h i s and then we must use severity to break them. The Mongols have no r e a l power and. through fear w i l l be forced to • accept.' Then again we w i l l treat .them with kindness' i n order to. win t h e i r trust' so that . they w i l l not seek to engage foreign assistance In t h i s way r e b e l l i o u s elements1' w i l l be quelled forever. We can follow the p r i n c i p l e of cap-turing [the barbarian] and then releasing [him] " handed down to us by the Marquie of Wu6l - with a few changes to make i t more applicable - as a-basis for our long-range plans. This i s not a plan that looks only to the .present day. Ch'en I also agrees with t h i s . But t h i s can-not be done with empty words only. We must constantly pay attention to every matter and slowly we w i l l achieve our aim. As to whether or not I w i l l be able to turn these words into f a c t , I hope that by working out a l l c r i t i c a l plans ahead of time, and b y d i r e c t i n g operations and i n s t r u c t i n g people as the time demands I-w i l l achieve, success. I r e s p e c t f u l l y submit th i s for your examination. , -Hsu Shu-cheng. November 13• On November 14, i n accordance with these views, he took the matter into his own hands and applied pressure to Badmadorji, On that day he reported: -' Attention: Northwest Frontier O f f i c e , Peking. Confidential. Seal and forward to:. The President, the Cabinet Director-General Tuan C h ' i - j u i . The L i v i n g Buddha's four most important men are, Badmadorji, concurrently Premier and Minister of the I n t e r i o r , and the Great Shabi, Shang-cho-t' e-pa (0>^1).f$6), P ' eng-ch' u-k' o W*L1&) and Kun-pu ifi). They are a l l top- • ranking lamas and are the Living Buddha's only close advisors. A l l the nobles have a healthy respect for them. Nominally, the nobles' approval of the cancellation- of autonomy stems from t h e i r warm desire to return- to the central government, but i n fact i t i s a product of t h e i r struggle with the lamas for authority, and i f they should, succeed.. In gaining t h i s power for the nobles, there w i l l , be l i t t l e advantage in. i t for the Central Government.. Although the 63 conditions drafted by Ch'en. I are 'imprac--t l c a l , : unfortunately, a great deal of e f f o r t has already been expended on. them. .But the lamas have hampered t h i s move from within, for although the Living Buddha convened parliament a l l the lamas were ordered to follow a p o l i c y of setting the nobles against one another. The Living Buddha did not examine the question of whether or not the conditions should be. adopted, he only asked which of the members did not approve. None out of ten of the no-bles gave t h e i r assent and parliament was ad-journed. Although Ch'en I wanted to have things s e t t l e d quickly he c l e a r l y understood the threat of-the lamas and knew he had no way to curb them. Also, because he had list e n e d too much to the nobles he had ren-dered the lamas even more intractable and un-w i l l i n g to have any dealings with him so that they became an even greater obstacle. This i s what I was r e f e r r i n g to when I said, "If we should place our f a i t h in.Ch'en I and l e t him go ahead, even with the passage of years and months he would s e t t l e nothing." When I had ascertained t h i s I r e a l i z e d that when you want to catch thieves you should f i r s t catch t h e i r leader. For the time being we can ease off courting the nobles and do a l l we can to i n g r a t i a t e ourselves with the.lamas, then with the assistance of the p o l i c y of applying kindness and severity, i t i s hoped that my plan w i l l be successfully completed. My o r i -g i n a l Intention was to work together with Ch'en I. But how can t h i s be done when at every meeting, as soon as the subject of the lamas i s broached he earnestly voices the nobles requests, as though I bore a grudge against them and could not get along with them. It was f o r t h i s reason that I stated i n an e a r l i e r telegram that, "I could not place my complete trust i n him." From the time I gave the s t r i c t order to. the Tai-eh'ing-wang, P'eng-ch'u-k'o, I have continually sought to promote good r e l a -tions with the key lamas. I have also d i s -covered that Badmadorji had been given the rank of shang-cho-t'e-pa but had.later had i t removed by the Living Buddha, and .that .younger men were made f i r s t , .class princes .while he only held the:. rank of .second class s p r i n c e a n d . that . he was indignant because'of. this.• .Moreover, as Premier he' holds the reins of government and i s well acquainted with foreign a f f a i r s so he can understand what i s to.his advantage. Therefore I have paid speolal attention to winning him over through trust and gaining his gratitude through f r i e n d l i n e s s . At a l l the. large meetings I show my deference to him and revere him as my elder and praise him for his i n t e g r i t y . I have also talked to him about the L i v i n g Buddha's sickness and t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y that he could replace him. When he reviewed our troops they displayed t h e i r firm d i s c i p l i n e and high morale then he and the troops took a break together to watch a play. By j o i n i n g them i n t h e i r work and th e i r pleasure he was made to see the firmness of t h e i r s p i r i t . I am confident that I can win him over. I have had intimate talks with him i n which I always say that the opposition between the nobles 63 and the lamas i s detrimental to lamaism, and that he should advise the Living Buddha to es t a b l i s h his merit., strengthen his health and give up his superstitions. In truth, whether or not the Liv i n g Buddha responds favourably depends wholly upon the approval of these four men. Of these four men Badmadorji i s the eldest and the most emminent. Since the Living Buddha has less trust In him than the others. Badmadorji i s therefore spending a l l his e f f o r t i n seeking help from the central government. I have promised to do a l l within my power to help him i n these e f f o r t s , for which he i s very g r a t e f u l . Over the past three . days he has seen the Living Buddha a number of times, but the Liv i n g Buddha has resolutely re-fused to cooperate. When i t was suggested that we could not wait, to hold parliament he imme-dia t e l y claimed that t h i s could not be done be-cause of diplomatic questions. Yesterday even-ing, s t i l l complying with t h i s r e s t r a i n t Badmadorji pointed out that foreign a f f a i r s were the domain of the central government, that the matter could not await parliament, that the Li v i n g Buddha was not i n the habit of waiting on par-liament, to determine p o l i c y , and that i t was im- . possible to have him do so at t h i s time. I then asked him: "Just where, do you and the Living Buddha now stand? ' I f he has any objections I w i l l answer him. You, .even as old as you. are., are not a f r a i d to expend great e f f o r t to ensure, the well-being of the lama r e l i g i o n , but the Living Buddha, e v i l to an extreme,' i s unwilling, to give an inch. He or-ders the lamas to use. t h e i r pomp and power to harm the nobles. The nobles have long been uneasy and are bound to be thinking of revenge. With both sides seeking r e b e l l i o n lamaism w i l l be doomed. If Lamaism i s destroyed.then Outer Mongolia w i l l be scattered l i k e grains of sand, i t s demise i n -evitable. You have a compassion for Outer Mongo-l i a and for lamaism, but the L i v i n g Buddha p e r s i s -t i n g i n his own way w i l l cause r e b e l l i o n . Outer Mongolia i s Chinese t e r r i t o r y and I, as the senior o f f i c i a l here, have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of keeping i t under control. I am unable just to s i t back and watch. I request that you advise the L i v i n g Buddha that he must y i e l d tomorrow and that i f he does not that he w i l l be imprisoned and sent to the c a p i t a l , where he w i l l be sentenced by the government.'" Badmadorji b r i e f l y mentioned the Russian and Mongol troops, his implication was that i f we should do t h i s we would s t i r up-a lot of fear. I r e p l i e d , " I f there are any such fears produced they•can be attributed to the stupid L i v i n g Buddha for I am not the cause of them. But that you even . now s t i l l speak l i k e t h i s to preserve peace even more commands my respect - you are t r u l y the leader of your r e l i g i o n . " He promised to again do his best to convince the L i v i n g Buddha. When we talked -further of his complaints I promised that when the whole a f f a i r was s e t t l e d that his rank of Second Class Prince would be made o f f i c i a l and that his younger brothers would a l l be given double t h e i r salary. With that he again agreed to see me on the following evening. I was reconsidering the whole a f f a i r by myself th i s morning; that i f by any chance the Living Buddha 'should remain r e c a l c i t r a n t just how would I effect his arrest and deliverance to Peking. The thing to do would be to immediately warn his four top advisors that they were not to aid him and at the same time make preparations for his imprisonment i n order to frighten him, and at the same time begin formulating another plan. I hope that by a judicious mixture of leniency and firmness to preserve the awe i n which China i s held. . Just as I was deliberating on th i s matter Badmad-o r j i suddenly arrived i n his car. Shaking my hand he' t o l d me that after we had parted the previous evening, he had spent: .the whole night i n consultation with the Living Buddha carefully' laying out the ad-vantages and disadvantages of relinquishing autonomy, following t h i s up with tears. The Living. Buddha f i n a l l y came round and agreed to the cancellation of autonomy, but said that Ch'en I had sided with the nobles and that, he therefore d e f i n i t e l y did not want to abide by the 63 conditions that Ch'en pro-posed. Also he said that when Sain Noyon Khan^1* had died the Living Buddha's i l l e g i t i m a t e son had been- given a t i t l e . This had been done under the d i r e c t i o n of Ch'en I but now Ch'en had suddenly raised t h i s as an i l l e g a l action of the part of the Living Buddha. He also said that the Jalkhansa L i v i n g Buddha had been sent to Peking with a l e t t e r requesting the President to have Ch'en replaced, and thus, he requested that Ch'en I not be informed of t h i s present a f f a i r . Also he did not want the other lamas and nobles to know. His intent was that he and myself, Hsu, should work out the con-diti o n s and present them to the government. Badmadorji also presented a number of former mat-ters that the Liv i n g Buddha wished to maintain. In order not to lose t h i s opportunity I thereupon promised to go to the Living Buddha with him that evening to discuss the matter, and that I would-be very careful not to offend the Buddha, and to see that the lamas and the nobles received equal t r e a t -ment . Badmadorji expressed his'thanks and l e f t . When the time came to go we maintained s t r i c t secrecy, with the intent that when the matter was se t t l e d only then would he make i t public. When the meeting i s over I w i l l Immediately send you a detailed wire, but t h i s i s to inform you of progress to t h i s point. I request that you examine i t care-f u l l y . Hsu Shu-cheng. November 14.65,66 Applying pressure to Badmadorji was much l i k e using a very strong drug to counter a dangerous i l l n e s s . The speed of the cure was indeed dramatic. On November 15 the question of the cancellation of autonomy, which Ch'en I had negotiated for months with Tserendorji only to. end, i n f a i l u r e , was i the space of one day s a t i s f a c t o r i l y solved. There, follows the' three telegrams that. Hsu sent on the 15th:' Attention: Northwest Frontier Office Confidential: Copies to: The. President, the Cabinet, Director General Tuan C h ' i - j u i . On November 14 I went to Badmadorji's r e s i -dence to discuss the conditons for the cancella-t i o n of autonomy. With the purpose of removing the special r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s of the lamas I firmly demanded that the conditions must be kept general, that the d e t a i l s could be worked out l a t e r i n the regulations for conduct of the government. Or, I said, that i f no conditions were worked out, then the Living Buddha must draft a request for the cancellation of autonomy but leave a l l the d e t a i l s of operation to be worked out l a t e r , perhaps by having someone accompany me to Peking. He cunningly t r i e d to drag things out and i n s i s t e d that he should go to the L i v i n g Buddha for further consultation. But I gave him a firm order saying that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for f a i l u r e i n Mongolia would l i e on the lamas not on the Living Buddha. I gave him one day to conclude the arrangements, other-wise Imprisonment would not be limited to the L i v i n g Buddha but he himself, despite his age, would also be imprisoned. This frightened him and he promised that the a f f a i r would be s e t t l e d within one or two days. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15. Attention: ' Northwest Frontier Defense, Peking O f f i c e . C o nfidential. Copies to: The President, the Cabinet, Director-General Tuan C h ' i - j u i . You w i l l have already received my f i r s t t e l e -gram of t h i s date. Today Badmadorji calle d a plenum meeting of the. nobles and the lamas and they, decided to. f i r s t get the Liying Buddha's signature and seal on the letter' requesting the cancellation of autonomy. The conditions are a l l to be se t t l e d l a t e r . They sent a man to me to request that they not be required to complete the agreement that evening, but that i t would be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y concluded within 24 hours. I complied with t h i s request but s t i l l am deman-ding that i t be concluded with the utmost haste, and that the Living Buddha appoint some im-portant person to accompany me to Peking to con-vey t h e i r congratulations to the President. I am a f r a i d that they might have' misgivings and therefore must push for a speedy conclusion. I f e e l I must keep you informed, and submit t h i s for your perusal. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15, 2nd wire. Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense, Peking Of f i c e . C o nfidential. Copies to: the President, the Cabinet, Director-General Tuan C h ' i - j u i . In my second telegram today I reported the progress of the meeting of the Mongol o f f i c i a l s . They also requested that I not i n s i s t on a de-c i s i o n by t h i s evening. This was brought to me by one of the Commissioner's messengers and I was t o l d that the Mongol o f f i c i a l s had requested that he forward i t . After my last wire was sent someone asked Badmadorji why he was i n such a hurry, to leave the meeting before i t had sadj ourned He answered that Mr. Hsu had set the deadline for meeting him that day at six p.m. and that he was therefore•going back early to await him. It was only at t h i s meeting that I discovered that t h e i r decision making procedure was not quite as Ch'en I led us to believe. There was i n fact no pre-cedent for having the Living Buddha sign and seal t h i s agreement. F i r s t the heads of a l l depart-ments of government would sign and seal a docu-ment, then the decision of t h e i r meeting would be explained to the Li v i n g Buddha who would give his approval and request that t h e i r decision be made known to the whole government. If we. examine the withdrawal of the Ch'ing Dynasty royal family from government,, the Empress Dowager ordered the Grand Council to deal with, the o f f i c i a l s of the Republic.,, the emperor, himself, did .not have to sign •anything. Even' though Mongolia l i k e Yeh-lang, i s small, t h e i r monarch i s pleased with him-s e l f , but i f he does not sign his name no f o r -eign objection w i l l be. aroused so I agreed. Also' the gesture, of allowing this w i l l help make up for my roughness la s t evening. The documents w i l l be f i n a l i z e d at any moment now. This i s how matters now stand, please give t h i s your consider-ation. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 15, 3rd wire. On November 17 the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia prepared two copies of the p e t i t i o n requesting t cancellation of t h e i r autonomy, sending one to the Urga Commissioner, Ch'en L a n d one to the Northwest Fron t i e r Planning Commissioner, Hsu Shu-cheng. After i t s trans-mission to Peking the government announced i t s acceptance on November 22: The President's O f f i c e , November 22, 1919. According to the wire received from the Com-missioner i n Urga, our senior administrative o f f i c i a l , Ch'en I, the nobles and lamas of the outer Mongolian Government have together signed a p e t i t i o n whose contents i s as follows: "From the time of K'ang Hsi i n the former Ch'ing Dynasty Outer Mongolia has been subject to China. For over two hundred years she has emula-ted the Chinese. From the nobles to the common people-all have al i k e l i v e d i n peace without trouble. At the time of the Tao-kuang emperor a change was made from the old. system which offen-ded Mongol feelings and resulted i n the r i s e of suspicion, and resentment among them. When, the closing years of the. Ch'ing•Dynasty were reached the ministers i n government were e v i l and debauched and' the people were, f i l l e d , with anger and re.sent-. ment. At the time foreigners took advantage of the' opportunity to. i n c i t e 'the" Mongols and thus was started the movement f o r independence. When a treaty was concluded the independence of Outer Mongolia became a - r e a l i t y , and China gained only the empty name of suzerainty68 and the Mongol government l o s t . I t s r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s . Now, after several years of independence we have s t i l l not seen any s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s , and i t i s In-deed a saddening thing to think about past events. At the present time Russia i s i n a state of turmoil and since no united government exists they are powerless to uphold the treaty i f members of the r e b e l l i n g parties should transgress our bor-ders. Because she i s not able at the present time to control her own t e r r i t o r y the Buryats and others, without regard for the law have been leaguing with"" l o c a l bandits and forming parties which repeatedly send men to Urga pressuring us to comply with t h e i r plan to unite a l l Mongols into one Pan-Mongolian State. Every kind of incitement has been indulged i n and conditions are extremely c r i t i c a l . The usurpation of Chinese suzerainty and the destruc-t i o n of Outer Mongolian self-government are of no . advantage to us and the o f f i c i a l s of Outer Mongo-l i a are well acquainted with t h i s f a c t . These Buryat bandits i f we w i l l not comply, are going to send troops across the border and try to frighten us into compliance. Moreover Tannu-Urianghai has. always belonged to Outer. Mongolia, but now the White Russian Party have invaded i t and oppose both Chinese and Mongol government troops. The Red Russians then follow right behind them so that i t i s impossible to do anything about i t . The Outer Mongolian people have always had a most meager l i v e l i h o o d . F i n a n c i a l l y the country cannot meet i t s obligations and i s incapable of r e c t i f y i n g t h i s . We are short of arms and our army i s feeble - we are indeed i n dire s t r a i t s . Although the central government has already assumed the respon-s i b i l i t y , for many problems as well as assumed the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for protecting us, the development of industries has not yet been r e a l i z e d . At t h i s point the foreign p o l i c i e s of the Mongol govern-ment have deteriorated to a most dangerous point and i n order that our o f f i c i a l s might better ob-serve present conditions the nobles and lamas should be c a l l e d into frequent conferences to discuss t h e dangers and p o s s i b i l i t i e s the .future h o l d s and h o p e f u l l y we. can I n i t i a t e , a c t i o n i n t h e r i g h t d i r e c t i o n . .We 'are a l l u n i t e d , i n s a y i n g t h a t i n the l a s t few y e a r s good f e e l i n g s be-tween C h i n a and M o n g o l i a have been' c o n s o l i d a -t e d and t h a t we are d a i l y becoming c l o s e r . A l l s u s p i c i o n and resentment has been wiped out and we are of a common mind and s p i r i t . To s e c u r e a l o n g l a s t i n g peace f o r the p e o p l e , b o t h t h e Mongols and the Chinese d e s i r e the c a n c e l l a t i o n of autonomy and the r e i n s t i t u t i o n o f the former C h ' i n g system of government. The a u t h o r i t y o f t h e j a s s a k s i s s t i l l t o come d i -r e c t l y from the c e n t r a l government, and i n a l l cases t h e i r a u t h o r i t y w i l l be l i m i t e d t o domes-t i c a f f a i r s . To a v o i d any i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r o u -b l e s t hey w i l l r e l y on t h e s t r o n g s u pport o f the c e n t r a l government. The d e c i s i o n o f t h e p a r l i a m e n t has been r e p o r t e d t o the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hukukhtu and has a l r e a d y r e c e i v e d h i s a p p r o v a l . I t i s hoped t h a t i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the l i m i t s o f a u t h o r i t y o f t h e domestic Mongol government a l l d e c i s i o n s w i l l be f a i r ones based on c o n d i t i o n s i n M o n g o l i a . I n t h i s way a l l t he r e g u l a t i o n s f o r the r e - a c t i v a t i o n o f the economy w i l l not c o n f l i c t w i t h o v e r a l l C h inese a u t h o r i t y . W i t h government thus i n a c -c o r d w i t h Mongol c o n d i t i o n s the p e o p l e w i l l be a b l e t o e n j o y a l o n g - l a s t i n g peace. The b e t t e r -ment of M o n g o l i a i s t o t h e advantage o f t h e n a t i o n as a whole. The f i v e r a c e s e n j o y i n g peace t o g e t h e r and s h a r i n g t h e i r common good f o r t u n e i s what t h e o f f i c i a l s and p e o p l e o f M o n g o l i a have been p r a y i n g f o r . I n a d d i t i o n , the S i n o -R u s s i a n - M o n g o l i a n T r i p a r t i t e T r e a t y , and the Russo-Mongolian S p e c i a l Commercial Agreement and the S i n o - R u s s i a n D e c l a r a t i o n were a l l s i g n e d on t h e b a s i s o f an autonomous M o n g o l i a , but now t h a t we o u r s e l v e s have r e q u e s t e d t h e c a n c e l l a -t i o n o f autonomy and a l l the former t r e a t i e s a re a c c o r d i n g l y no l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e . As f o r t h e n e c e s s a r y arrangements f o r R u s s i a n s o p e r a t i n g c ommercial e n t e r p r i s e s i n M o n g o l i a , when R u s s i a ' s new government I s e s t a b l i s h e d the c e n t r a l g o v e r n -ment s h o u l d t a k e the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of i n i t i a t -i n g new s e t t l e m e n t s , , so t h a t t h r o u g h s i n c e r e f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s t h e i r o l d r i g h t s w i l l b e - r e s t o r e d . " We also have a report from the Northwest Plan-ning Commissioner,. Hsu Shu-cheng, on the same matter: "I have gone over, t h i s p e t i t i o n and f i n d it . very sincere. It i s very evident that the Pogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan and the nobles and lamas c l e a r l y understand that the p r i n c i p l e s of patriotism and. the f i v e races l i v i n g as one fami-ly rest upon perfect s i n c e r i t y of a l l p a r t i e s . We should immediately respond to t h e i r requests i n order to take advantage of t h e i r present f e e l i n g s . A l l the honours which are due to the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan and the benefits which should accrue to the shabi of the four leagues should a l l remain as they were under the old sys-tem. We should treat them well i n order that we may a l l enjoy the f r u i t s of the republican form of government forever." Your president has great hopes for t h i s . 6 9 After the cancellation of autonomy had been arranged, on November 18 Hsu sent a wire with his analysis of condi-tions and the strategy he had adapted: Attention: • Northwest Frontier O f f i c e , Peking. Confidential. Copies to: the President, the Cabinet and Director-General Tuan C h ' i - j u i . The views on the matter of cancellation are tangled and unclear; i t has been long discussed with with-out decision. I f at present we attach no condi-tions and are over-generous i n reaching an agree-ment there i s no t e l l i n g what might happen.70 When one checks into t h i s matter we see that Commissioner Ch'en has held repeated deliberations for half a year already. [If you wish to see] the petty sort of points involved refer to the report I have sent to the M i n i s t r i e s . The two Assistant Commissioners, L i and En have been dashing about t r y i n g to win over those nobles who are outside Urga thus per-forming a worthy service that cannot be ignored. But I know that your o f f i c e is.already aware of t h i s and there i s no need for me to recount the d e t a i l s here. The noble class are not sure which way to. turn. They want to. regain the rights, and. p r i v i -leges'that they have lost to. the -'lamas, so. on the one hand they have made the request to Ch'en I. But they.are also a f r a i d of the damage the L i v i n g Buddha could wreak upon them, and have accordingly also stated that they do not favour cancellation, of autonomy. The lamas are depen-dent upon the Li v i n g Buddha. They use the abuse of power and bribes the pressure the people to follow t h e i r wishes. They are a f r a i d that the cancellation of autonomy .will destroy t h e i r base of t h e i r power and they therefore b e l i t t l e the nobles for' t h e i r weaknesses and try t h e i r utmost to sway the Buddha to l i s t e n to them so that he w i l l support t h e i r actions although outwardly they try to cover t h i s over with specious t a l k . . From the time I arrived i n Urga and had acquain-ted myself with t h i s s i t u a t i o n I daily, sought to ing r a t i a t e myself with the lamas i n order to win t h e i r t r u s t . As I am a m i l i t a r y leader and f u r -ther, since I united with Kao Tsai-t'ien's r e g i -ment my prestige and power i s substantial here. Therefore the lamas saw me as a means to oppose Ch'en I and thus control the nobles. When the nobles saw that the lamas had support they had no choice but to a l l y themselves closer to Ch'en I to strengthen t h e i r own p o s i t i o n , to avoid' the p o s s i b i l i t y of being divided. I therefore had to concentrate my attention on drawing i n the lamas. To in v e i g l e them I used kindness, making use of endless f r i e n d l y t a l k , to control them I employed sterness, using awing language. In t h i s way, I confused them so they didn't know what to think.. At that time I quickly came to the point and accused them of misleading the Buddha and causing trouble. I also accused the nobles of a lack of re s o l u t i o n and the i n a b i l i t y to recognize what was to, or not to t h e i r advantage. For me to thus take up the sword of the nation and devise and guide such schemes holding a large army i n my hands, frightening the ignorant and helpless Mongols was l i k e taking up a two-edged sword and frightening a young c h i l d - an act' to bring shame upon a man. It was only because th i s matter had gone so long unsettled and because our country was running the r i s k of losing i t s prestige that I spared no e f f o r t i n drawing up t h i s poor plan. The plan I outlined, i n ray previous wire was exactly what I have, been describing here .- however .1. did >not expect the good fortune to. carry i t off. so p e r f e c t l y . Yet, I f I t had not been for. Ch'en I's s k i l l f u l management there.would not have been any opportunity to i n s t i t u t e i t , and i f i t had not been for our Kao's. regiment garrisoned there be-forehand even i f we had any prestige i t would have been d i f f i c u l t to achieve success so quickly. The merit for t h i s achievement l i e s e n t i r e l y with Ch'en I and Colonel Kao Tsai-t'ien's.regiment. My ef-f o r t s i n ending the impasse were•concerned wholly with future I have not paid any attention to the present. How could I dare say that t h i s matter was my success? My repeated telegrams have often ex-pressed a l i t t l e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with'Ch'en I but th i s arose from the fact that when wires from your o f f i c e had what I considered to be wrong views>of Ch'en I's work, my r e p l i e s were rather indignant. This was not because I had a grudge against Ch'en I. I beg your forgiveness i n t h i s matter. Hsu Shu-cheng.' 1 November 18, second wire. On November 19 he again issued a telegram to the Cabinet. Attention: the Cabinet, Peking. Confidential. I have received your wire of November 15. I am ashamed because I am not equal to the praises that you heap upon me. The Mongol government had agreed to request the cancellation of autonomy p r i o r to the establishment of conditions. The three Commis-sioners Ch'en, En and L i are i n complete accord. I have repeatedly wired you of my plans and re-quested that you check them over. My daily communi cations with Ch'en I were invariably heated. We . interpreted matters d i f f e r e n t l y and were unaware of the confusions that were' arising.. The Cabinet has been very tolerant and.has said nothing even though i t c e r t a i n l y had the right to do so.. I most sincerely acknowledge my. error and hope you w i l l pass on these expressions to Director Tuan C h ' i - j u i and a l l other m i n i s t r i e s . Hsu Shu-cheng. November 19.72 : At .this time Hsu dropped, his- h o s t i l i t i e s toward Chin Yun-p'eng, who had blocked him at. .every, .turn. On November 2 0.,. .just before returning to Peking, Hsu entertained the Mongol o f f i c i a l s and people with a play. He sent a report of t h i s event by wire: Attention: Northwest Frontier Defense O f f i c e , Peking. Confidential. Copies to: the President, Director-General Tuan, and a l l M i n i s t r i e s . I have decided to set off for Peking tomorrow morning. Many Mongol o f f i c i a l s have been coming to my o f f i c e to bid me goodbye and were most warm i n t h e i r friendship. For t h i s evening I have i n v i t e d Mongol o f f i c i a l s , a l l the Commissioners and a l l m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s above the rank of Cap-t a i n to a banquet. In addition I w i l l have a play performed, for t h e i r pleasure and have announced throughout the whole of Urga that a l l guards are . to be removed and that everyone, r i c h or poor, Mongol or Chinese, w i l l be allowed to attend. When a l l have assembled for the play I w i l l an-nounce to the crowd: "This gathering i s to cele-brate the cancellation of Mongol Autonomous go-vernment. I have long been aware that t h i s has been the desire of the Living Buddha, the Mongol o f f i c i a l s and of every banner. Therefore at t h i s time, without' awaiting further d e l i b e r a t i o n , I have so acted, displaying thus my patriotism and my a f f e c t i o n for Mongolia. Also, the respon-s i b i l i t y for submitting' t h i s l e t t e r requesting cancell a t i o n of autonomy to Peking rests upon me because I have been so closely concerned i n t h i s a f f a i r ; therefore my f e l i c i t a t i o n s are e s p e c i a l l y sincere. I celebrate both for the nation and for Mongolia, and also for myself. I again express my thanks to those who exerted themselves per-forming t h e i r various r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s over the past 20. odd days. What I desire to ascertain at present i s guidelines for future operation to en- . sure that everything w i l l run smoothly. But i t -i s only with your help that I w i l l succeed, -and i f I do i t w i l l be with much thanks to you. A l -though i n truth T have not been here long every-one has., treated me as c o r d i a l l y as i f I' were an old f r i e n d . Now to suddenly return to the south w i l l mean that I must leave without bidding adieu to many of these new friends. Although I am happy that, i t w i l l not be long before I re-turn. I nonetheless f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to e x p r e s s t h i s , and I. expect that many of you have s i m i l a r f e e l i n g s . We w i l l , however, be able to a l l e -v iate our loneliness through the mail and the telegraph." My main intention i n thus speaking to them i s to win t h e i r approval of t h i s request for cancel-l a t i o n of autonomy and thus ensure t h e i r s a t i s -f a c t i o n . In t h i s way no matter who should come i n to see the play, and t h i s w i l l most c e r t a i n l y include foreign agents, what they f i n d w i l l be to our benefit. I r e s p e c t f u l l y submit t h i s report f o r your inspection. Hsu Shu-cheng. November 20. 2nd wire.73 Colonel Matsui who was just at that time engaged i n t r y i n g to gain Outer Mongolia for the Japanese, sought 75 out Hsu on thi s day i n order to congratulate him. Hsu Shu-cheng reached Urga on October 29 and on November 21 he again l e f t for Peking. In the space of 22 days, without expending a sol d i e r or an arrow, he success-76 f u l l y completed his task of regaining Outer Mongolia. When Hsu reached Peking i n addition to making a re-port to the government he also wired, a report to Sun Yat-sen who was i n Shanghai (November. 24). Sun Yat-sen wired in.return congratulating'him on his success (November 26). The contents of t h i s telegram i n part were: I have just received, your wire,, and am f u l l y acquainted with the Mongol change of heart and. t h e i r return to China. It has been a long, time since our- country has had a Pan-Ch'ao or Fu Chieh-tzu.' Such success i n such a short space of time - when I- compare th i s with the ancients I. don't know who i s superior! From the closing years of the Ch'ing Dynasty our border areas have been turning away from us, and the size of the country has been diminishing at the rate of almost 100 - l i per day. Outer Mongolia has been i n a state of confusion for the last seven years, and now i n one day i t has returned to the f o l d , and. we again have the Republic composed of the f i v e races. This i s something that the nation may be t r u l y joyous about.77 Liang Yen-sun also sent a l e t t e r p r a i s i n g Hsu Shu-cheng, i n which he said, "He'braved the snow to march north ward to protect the peace of our northern borders. His diligence and perspicacity s t i r us to f a l l i n obiesance to On November 30 the Cabinet passed a resolution to eliminate the o f f i c e of the Urga Commissioner, and Ch'en I was reappointed the Wei chiang-chun of Honan Province. Com plete authority for the management of Outer Mongolian questions passed to the hands of the Frontier Planning Com-missioner. On December 1 the government appointed Hsu Shu-cheng Director of Outer Mongol A f f a i r s ; on December 2 he was appointed Special Commissioner for the Investiture of ' the'Living Buddha. On December 15.Tuan C h ' i - j u i personally headed a group of over 100 m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s giving a f a r e -well banquet for Hsu at the Pao-ho Tien. On December 16 Hsu Shih-ch'ang gave Hsu audience i n the Huai-jen T'ang 79 i t upon the L i v i n g Buddha. The t e x t of the i n v e s t i t u r e order was as f o l l o w s : In agreeing to the c a n c e l l a t i o n of autonomy the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan i s p l a n -n i n g f o r l a s t i n g peace i n Outer Mongolia. His benevolence and i n t e l l i g e n c e are e s p e c i a l l y worthy of high commendation. Let i t be known that i n order to d i s p l a y h i s s p e c i a l merit he i s being i n v e s t e d as the Outer Mongolian A s s i s -t e r of Reform and C i v i l i z a t i o n , the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan .80 Hsu Shu-cheng reached Urga f o r the second time on December 27- At t h i s time he was the S p e c i a l Commissioner f o r the I n v e s t i t u r e of the L i v i n g Buddha, and t h e r e f o r e , "the Outer Mongolian government o f f i c i a l s , n o b l e s , lamas, m i l i t a r y and the g e n e r a l populace were l i n e up f o r t e n l i from the c i t y to welcome me. There was much pomp and ceremony; t h e r e was an unbroken l i n e of observers along the road, young and o l d , male and female. The market p l a c e was 8 l festooned w i t h welcome banners." T h e . i n v e s t i t u r e c e r e -mony was to take p l a c e on January 1, 19-20. A l s o i t was ordered that a l l o f f i c i a l s t a k i n g p a r t i n the ceremony should follow a vegetarian diet for the three days from December 29 to the i n v e s t i t u r e i n order to display the s i n c e r i t y of t h e i r respect, and to add importance to the ceremony 82 and honour the L i v i n g Buddha. As f o r the actual things that were done when Hsu was i n Mongolia, for his government p o l i c i e s we have already seen his "General Plan for the Development of the Northwest F r o n t i e r . " I was unfortunately unable to bring other materials together i n time. At t h i s point I w i l l recount what I can of the events of that time.83 1. Concerning a f f a i r s i n Mongolia at that time I know that at that time Wang Y i n - t ' a i , the head of the General Service O f f i c e of the North-west Frontier Planning O f f i c e was the most we l l -informed. I have throughout urged him to record the important events to pass on to posterity (the l a s t time I so advised him was on Tiger Bridge i n Nanking in, 1 9 4 6 ) . Unfortunately he could s t i r no i n t e r e s t i n the subject. He died i n 1 9 6 1 . It seems that Wang Y i n - t ' a i served yet another function during the negotiations for the cancel-l a t i o n of autonomy. It was said that at that time the daughter-in-law of the Li v i n g Buddha's younger brother was also a p r o s t i t u t e . Her name, i f my memory serves me c o r r e c t l y , had the word "Hua" (flower) i n i t . This woman had a l o t of influence i n the government. At that time Wang was a handsome young man and t h i s Mongol woman was quite strongly attracted to him. As a r e s u l t they had an a f f a i r . It i s said she exerted a l o t of pres-sure i n getting the L i v i n g Buddha to agree to the can c e l l a t i o n of autonomy. In 1921 when our family was i n Shanghai I often heard Kuei Sen joking with Wang Yin-t'.ai, .".It is. .fortunate, that .the negotiations for the. 'cancellation .of autonomy were quickly concluded, otherwise 'I.'am :sure that we would have had to s a c r i f i c e you .to. madam 'Hua'". 2.. Education, was at the centre of Hsu's p o l i -cies for the government of Mongolia. In his General Plan for the Development of the Northwest Border he. said, "Mongolia has given her allegiance to China for roughly the la s t 300 years. The policy of the Chinese government throughout t h i s period was to keep the Mongol people ignorant -t r u l y a po l i c y which ignores basic p r i n c i p l e s of 'humanity. Prom now on I want to see harmonious re l a t i o n s with the Mongols, and t h i s w i l l be d i f -f i c u l t to achieve without a s p i r i t e d reform of education, a promotion of learning." K'o Shao-min stated, "When he (Hsu) reached the c a p i t a l I said to him, "Do you perhaps wish to use the chun-hsien system to govern these nomadic people of the Northwest?" He r e p l i e d , "Do you place your ' f a i t h i n what has been written on the subject, rather examine the plan that I have prepared." It i s obvious that t h i s was a serious expression of his views and not merely i d l e words. It Is said that as soon as he got to Urga he chastised the Shansi merchants, demanding that they be honest i n th e i r dealings with the Mongols, and forbade any further dishonest dealings. One of the common t r i c k s that the Shansi merchants used at that time to cheat the Mongols was the ex-tension of cr e d i t . Because they could thus get things without paying for them immediately the Mongols frequently used credit to buy goods for which they had no need. The Mongols used sheep as the medium of exchange i n th e i r trading. If the agreed upon price was 100 head of sheep, at the end of the year the Shansi merchant would arrive and demand 140 sheep. When the Mongol asked why they demanded the extra forty sheep the merchants would respond, "Have not our sheep had lambs?" The Mongols could not deny the logic of t h i s and would allow the merchants, to lead away the extra sheep. When Hsu arrived he ordered the mechants to avoid giving, credit at a l l costs, and i f that credit had to be given, then' at the time, of repay-ment the number of sheep i n the contracted debt could not be exceeded. The Mongols r e g a r d e d s i l v e r as. v e r y p r e c i o u s . O u t s i d e of Urga t h e r e was a very, deep gorge and i f a Mongol was. v e r y i l l and had had a lama r e a d s u t r a s f o r him t o no a v a i l , t h e n he would throw, s i l v e r i n t o t h i s gorge i n o r d e r t o g a i n the h e l p of buddha. When Hsu a r r i v e d i n Urga he e s t a b l i s h e d a bank ( L i T s u - f a was the d i r e c -t o r ) and. i s s u e d bank no t e s on which t h e r e was a p i c t u r e of a camel c a r a v a n , which p l e a s e d t h e Mongols g r e a t l y . One day when Hsu was i n the bank he saw a Mongol sun n i n g h i m s e l f a t t h e en-t r a n c e t o the bank. A f t e r a l i t t l e w h i l e he p u l l e d out a p i e c e o f s i l v e r from a v e r y g r e a s y l e a t h e r pouch, went i n t o the bank, and exchanged i t f o r a one d o l l a r bank n o t e . A g a i n he sunned h i m s e l f a t the bank e n t r a n c e amusing h i m s e l f l o o k i n g a t the d o l l a r b i l l . A f t e r a w h i l e he t o o k a n o t h e r p i e c e of s i l v e r from the pouch, r e - e n t e r e d the bank and exchanged i t f o r a f i v e d o l l a r b i l l , and a l i t t l e l a t e r he exchanged a n o t h e r p i e c e f o r a t e n d o l l a r b i l l . Hsu p a i d much a t t e n t i o n t o t h i s because he hoped t h a t the b i l l s would i n d u c e t h e Mongols t o put t h e i r s i l v e r i n t o the bank i n s t e a d o f t h r o w i n g i t i n t o the gorge. At one p o i n t t h e r e was a drought and the Mon-g o l s wanted Hsu Shu-cheng t o pray f o r r a i n . He donned the c e r e m o n i a l u n i f o r m of a g e n e r a l and under a v e r y i m p r e s s i v e banner r e a c h e d t h e moun-t a i n where he was t o p r a y f o r r a i n . F o l l o w i n g t h i s i t . a c t u a l l y r a i n e d and t h e Mongols were g r e a t l y p l e a s e d w i t h him. ' L a t e r , when Hsu was r e t u r n i n g t o P e k i n g h i s c a r got s t u c k on the r o a d and was p u l l e d out by a l a r g e number o f Mongol n o b l e s , a l l w e a r i n g t h e i r r e d h a t s of f e u d a l r a n k . T h i s i s one of h i s most well-remembered r e c o l l e c t i o n s of h i s t i m e i n M o n g o l i a . 3 - . W i t h t h e purpose of d e v e l o p i n g Outer Mongo-l i a ' s m i n e r a l r e s o u r c e s Hsu Shu-cheng i n v i t e d a c h e m i s t r y p r o f e s s o r from Germany, a D o c t o r Konrad B a r t e l t , who was a l s o a good f r i e n d o f Wang y i n -t ' a i . He a l s o i n v i t e d Johannes M u l l e r as an ad-v i s o r on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e law. I n a d d i t i o n t o g o i n g t o Urga w i t h Hsu, M u l l e r went t o many o t h e r p l a c e s i n c l u d i n g U l i a s s u t a l and S a i r Usu, and some, r a -t h e r , e x t e n s i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s w e re.undertaken. ( A f t e r t h e C h i h l i - A n f u war he s e r v e d as a p r o f e s s o r at T'ung Chi U n i v e r s i t y . During the Sino-Japanese war he. e s t a b l i s h e d a German h i g h -s c h o o l i n Shanghai. He has s i n c e then d i e d ) . 4.. Chang 'Chen-han,' t z u , yen-sheng, who was born i n Hsu-chou, and who at that time had l e d troops to. Urga. t o l d me. t h a t when they reached Urga there were no.vegetables at a l l i n the mar-ket . Hsu then ordered them to t r y p l a n t i n g T i e n t s i n cabbage and the experiment was a com-p l e t e , success . When Chang-Chen-han l e f t Mongolia two years l a t e r cabbage had become a common food i n Urga. He t o l d me a number of other t h i n g s as w e l l ; u n f o r t u n a t e l y these are the only t h i n g s t h a t I remember c l e a r l y . 5. I have heard men of Hsu's g e n e r a t i o n say t h a t when he was i n Urga he spent everyday from dawn u n t i l dark checking on the m i l i t a r y encamp-ment, o f t e n e a t i n g with the t r o o p s . On one occa-s i o n when they were having a p l a y to c e l e b r a t e the new year he helped i n the f e s t i v i t i e s by s i n g i n g a K'un ch'u. Every time he went to Urga' he took a f l a u t i s t , Fan Chin-ch'uan with him. A l s o , he was c o n s t a n t l y d i s c u s s i n g the c l a s s i c s w ith h i s subordinate o f f i c i a l s . . He was most p l e a s e d with h i s a b i l i t y to i n t e r p r e t Mencius. (In h i s "Chih yao-chung s h i h h s i u n g - t i shu" he has made r e f e r e n c e to t h i s ) . In 1919 f o l l o w i n g the May • 4 Movement there was a widespread development of the new-thought t i d e which was very o b v i o u s l y at odds wi t h people of the time who advoca-ted conservatism. L i n Ch'in-nan was a c e n t r a l f i g u r e among the c o n s e r v a t i v e s and my f a t h e r a t • t h e time was i n sympathy with the c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h e r e f o r e , L i n Ch'in-nan very much hoped that my f a t h e r would be able to take advantage of h i s government p o s i t i o n t o s t r i k e a blow a g a i n s t the new thought t i d e . - He p u b l i s h e d a novel at t h a t time e n t i t l e d , "Chlng Sheng," which c o v e r t l y expressed t h i s : Signs of the coming revolt .began .to. appear i n 1911 and a l l the important '.officials:'.began'.leaving the capital.' . Also,, the number, of tourists, in. the city, was extremely small. From N-an-cheng Hsien i n Shensi there was a fellow named' Ching Sheng. He was wandering about the' c a p i t a l on very l i t t l e money and was lodging i n the Western Chamber of the T'ao-t'ing. He had one shelf of books and a s t r i n g of coins which weighed 18' chin, which he hung on the wall. The p r i e s t did not dare to ask him i f he could make use of t h i s money,-but he was very s t r i k i n g and the p r i e s t knew he was a robust youth. At the T'ao-t'ing i n those days the o f f i c i a l s i n the c a p i t a l always used to come to drink and pass the time, but because of the p o l i t i c a l unrest i t was at t h i s time empty. On May 18. from down out of the mountains there came a small lackey carrying a great vessel of wine on his shoulders, followed by three carts carry-ing three young men. One of them, T'ien Ch'i-mai was' an Anhwei man, another, Chin Hsin-yi, was a Chekiang man, the other, T i Mo, I do not know where he came from. They had a l l recently arrived from America and were well-versed i n philosophy, but T'ien Ch'i-mei was especially g i f t e d . He had the a b i l i t y to c r i t i c i z e things that other men would not dare to c r i t i c i z e . Mr. Chin was well-versed i n l i t e r a t u r e . The three became bosom • friends and decided to wander through the h i l l s . When they arrived at the T'ao-t'ing they peered into Ching's room i n disdain and reckoned he was' an uneducated swaine, and i n d i f f e r e n t l y ignored him. They ca l l e d the monk to make up t h e i r room and to warm wine for them and bring them food. They sat engaging i n small t a l k , separated only a window from Ching's dwelling. Chin was s i t t i n g i n the middle and he said, "China i s f i n i s h e d and the blame l i e s with Confucianism. What reason i s there to lay so much- stress on human r e l a t i o n -ships? If the foreigners had wed t h e i r nieces how could they have become strong? . Man exists i n t h i s world - there are parents but what compas-sion do my parents have towards me?" T i Mo laughed loudly and r e p l i e d , "It i s written language which has misled men and brought them to. t h i s point." T.'ien put his hand on the table and said, "How can dead words produce l i v i n g learning? We must re-j e c t Confucianism and the theory of human r e l a -tionships." T i Mo said, "My idea i s that we must do away with c l a s s i c a l Chinese and r e p l a c e i t with c o l l o q u i a l , thus making' way. f o r the g e n e r a l spread .of knowledge. T h i s w i l l make i t p o s s i b l e f o r a l l men to. .get a. broad and general, e d u c a t i o n t h a t w i l l not be.' b l o c k e d by the o b s t a c l e of a d i f f i c u l t and a b s t r u s e l i t e r a r y , language. The. only problem w i l l be how Chin can remain s i l e n t and not e x p l a i n the s u b t l e t i e s of the wording." Chin laughed and s a i d , "You know, my name - i t i s Chin [ g o l d ] , no ..more. The nature of those named Chin i s to l u s t a f t e r g o l d . So anyone of t h i s name who would r a t h e r ex-p l a i n c h a r a c t e r s would be a s t u p i d i l l i t e r a t e . T very much want to a s s i s t you i n so spreading c o l -l o q u i a l language." With t h i s the three of them were very p l e a s e d and swore to act as b r o t h e r s i n doing what they c o u l d to d e s t r o y C o n f u c i u s . Sud-denly they heard a tremendous n o i s e and the boards f e l l o f f the w a l l s f a l l i n g on t h e i r t a b l e and s h a t t e r i n g the cups and bowls. A s p l e n d i d f e l l o w s t r o d e i n through the hole i n the w a l l and p o i n t i n g to the three of them s a i d , -"How can you speak l i k e t h i s ! For over 4 ,000 years China has used the theory of human r e l a t i o n -s h i p s as the b a s i s of the country. How can you j u s t destroy them? Why d i d Confucius become the sage of h i s time? At the time of the S p r i n g and Autumn annals r i t u a l was s t r e s s e d , but today s c i e n c e i s s t r e s s e d . J u s t suppose, f o r example, that Shu Liang-ho (Confucius f a t h e r ) was s e r i o u s l y i l l i n Shantung Province when Confucius happened to be i n Chiang-nan. When he heard the news would he use a telegram to express h i s concern, and would he go by t r a i n to see h i s f a t h e r ? Or would he s t i l l send a l e t t e r by the o l d post system and r i d e i n stages t a k i n g a month to reach Shantung, thus not s e e i n g h i s f a t h e r b e f o r e he died? Which do you t h i n k ? C h i l d r e n need t h e i r p a r e n t s . ' When they are s m a l l they must be s u c k l e d and as they grow they must be educated. I t i s by means of your mother's milk t h a t you become a man and i t i s through e d u c a t i o n that you become l i t e r a t e . Without the work of your parents you would be un-a b l e to. communicate as you do today. For example you have r e c e i v e d f i n a n c i a l help from others and y o u r . l i f e has not been l i v e d without help from others so t h a t i f you have a heart you must respond with kindness. Only i f your parents had not g i v e n you your s t a r t i n l i f e would you then be j u s t i f i e d i n u s i n g t h i s h e r e t i c a l t a l k . To me the thought of having no home and of abandoning my parents, i s unbearable. But you venture t o talk l i k e wild beasts: and confuse' my ears.'"'-' T'ieh s t i l l wanted to. argue against him, but . t h i s Imposing fellow thrust two. fingers against : his head and his brain hurt as though i t had been pierced by an awl. Then he kicked T i Mo causing an excruciating pain i n his kidneys. Chin was short-sighted - the fellow snatched his spectacles and threw them away. Chin was as frightened as a hedgehog for his l i f e and kowtowed repeatedly. The fellow laughed saying, "You have gone crazy just l i k e L i Chih you ce r t a i n l y are an oddity among men. I have just washed my hands and feet and shouldn't contact-your d i a b o l i c a l bodies. You f i l t h y vermin get out of here and don't s u l l y my plaque. I f I should k i l l you'I would become a f u g i t i v e from, j u s t i c e , wandering the mountains and swamps. Since I don't want that to happen i t i s better to l e t you go and l e t the s p i r i t s work t h e i r vengence." The three men looked at each other without speaking, a l l of them anxious to leave. When they glanced back up at the threatening veranda the fellow was s t i l l there, holding his plaque and laughing f i e r c e l y . Old L i said, "Mr. Ching was a r e a l busybody and quite a joke. When I stayed at a certain old gentleman's house i n Taiwan this fellow had over twenty dogs and there was barking contin-uously throughout the night, but I re s o l u t e l y went to bed and pretended that I did not hear them. Again when I stayed on Ts'ang-hsia Chou, where thousands of egrets nested i n the L i - c h i h trees I ignored the din they used to make at daybreak. Why? The animals of this world have t h e i r own tongue which i s of no concern to man." I had t h i s event related to me by a scholar named L i . It seems that Mr. L i did not approve of these three men and therefore with some pride and pleasure t o l d me about i t . When I heard i t I could not stop laughing. If i n t h i s impure world there are only vain .people l i k e T'ien and T i , where are we to f i n d anyone l i k e Mr. Ching? I have read Hsueh-chung-jen and I have seen the humbling, l e t t e r of General Wu and t h i s anecdote i s of the same- class as these works. - Perhaps Mr. L i had some purpose i n t e l l i n g me t h i s , and for t h i s reason I have recorded i t since i t helps f i l l a gap i n my t a l k s . The Mr. Ching, T'ien Ch'i-mei., Chin Hsin-i and. T i Mo i n t h i s story refer, respectively to. Hsu Shu-cheng, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'ien Hsuan-t'ung and' Hu Shi'h. Although the intention of the story was. very obvious Hsu Shu-cheng evidenced no reaction to i t . On March 4 of th i s year Hsu's mother died.. She was buried some time i n August or September. ' CHAPTER I I I ANALYSIS The t r a n s l a t i o n from Hsu Shu-cheng's nien-'p'u presented here i s the complete 1 9 1 9 .section, which extends from page 223 to page 2 6 6 of the o r i g i n a l text. This section of the nlen  p'u l i m i t s i t s e l f almost exclusively to an analysis of Hsu Shu-cheng's success i n re-establishing f u l l Chinese authority i n Outer Mongolia i n that year. This analysis can be broken down into f i v e main problems. F i r s t , a background to. the' p o l i t i c a l problems, i n North China i s given to indicate the o r i g i n of the Frontier Defense Army, Hsu Shu-chang's command of i t and his intere s t i n Outer Mongolia. Second, the Outer Mongolian background i s outlined. This section focuses i t s attention on Ch'en I.and his negotia-tions f o r the cancellation of autonomy. It i s made clear that these negotiations were bound to f a i l for two basic reasons: the conditions, because they catered to the advantage of the nobles were unacceptable to the Outer Mongolian government as a whole, and because they r e s t r i c t e d her authority they were also unacceptable to the Chinese government. The author considers the Liv i n g Buddha's second l e t t e r to President Hsu Shih-ch'ang, sent on October 24, as a signal of the f i n a l de-feat of Ch'en's negotiations. 1 Hsu Shu-cheng's a r r i v a l i n Urga on October 29 i s therefore seen as following the defeat of Ch'en I. The, t h i r d section covers Hsu Shu-cheng's assumption of negotiations and his successful conclusion of the cancellation of Outer Mongolian .autonomy. ..It' makes: up the bulk of the author's presentation of this period and w i l l .be the focal point of our attention. . The. fourth '.section, brief and disappointing, covers Hsu Shu-cheng's period of administration i n Outer Mongolia. It consists of a number of recollections 2 of l i t t l e h i s t o r i c a l value, which the author acknowledges. The concluding section of his analysis is a quotation from a novel by Lin Shu, a well known, conservative writer of the •5 early Republic, which seems to bear l i t t l e relevance to events in Outer Mongolia, but which serves both as favourable comment on the character of Hsu Shu-cheng and unfavourable comment upon his detractors. A detailed analysis of a l l the problems involved i n Hsu Shu-chengrs appointment as Frontier Commissioner and his work i n Outer Mongolia is beyond the scope of this paper. While reference w i l l be made to a l l the major problems, the following analysis w i l l concentrate on the two men, Ch'en I and Hsu Shu-cheng,- their qualifications for their place i n the . negotiations with the Outer Mongols, and upon some of the reasons for the ultimate fai lure of the Chinese attempt to regain control of Outer Mongolia. Hsu Dau-lin's analysis of the events, leading to his father's appointment as Frontier Commissioner takes into ac-count the' major international and domestic factors leading to the creation of this off ice, but this quick review is i n s u f f i c i e n t to. g i v e .the reader any- i d e a of the s o r t of man 4 t h i s appointment had been gi v e n t o , To do so we' must; :go back b r i e f l y t o the f a l l of Yuan . S h i h - k ' a i and the appointment of Tuan C h ' i - j u i as Premier on 5 August 1, 1916. Both L i Yuan-hung, the new P r e s i d e n t , and the Parliament which Tuan was f o r c e d t o convene opposed him to some extent and Tuan made the d e c i s i o n t o use h i s m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h to -control t h i s o p p o s i t i o n . . Yuan's f a l l i s g e n e r a l -7 l y regarded as marking the beg i n n i n g of warlordism, and i t i s d o u b t f u l t h a t Tuan c o u l d have operated o u t s i d e t h i s con-t e x t . To m a i n t a i n h i s c o n t r o l l i n g p o s i t i o n he r e q u i r e d more m i l i t a r y support. China severed d i p l o m a t i c t i e s with Germany i n March 8 1917- The ensuing argument over p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war i n Europe r e s u l t e d i n Tuan's d i s m i s s a l from the P r e m i e r s h i p 9 i n May. P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the war was, i n p a r t , seen as an excuse to i n c r e a s e m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h through Japanese a i d , which Tuan hoped would i n c r e a s e h i s c o n t r o l of the govern-ment."'"^ Chang Hsun's r e s t o r a t i o n of the Hsuan-t'ung Emperor i n June, 1917 was used by Tuan to get r i d of L i Yuan-hung, who opposed entry i n t o the war, and with L i removed war was 11 d e c l a r e d on Germany i n August, 1917-At the same time,' however, Sun Yat-sen, i n the South, 12 o r g a n i z e d a M i l i t a r y Government to oppose Tuan. The s t r u g g l e between the North and South which f o l l o w e d became one 01" the.' c o n t e n t i o n s , .'further w i d e n i n g t h e N o r t h e r n s p l i t i n t o t h e Anfu f a c t i o n o f Tuan C h ' i - j u i and t h e C h i h l i f a c t i o n l e d by Feng Kuo-chang. I n sum, the' more Tuan sought t o i n c r e a s e h i s m i l i t a r y power .the g r e a t e r t h e need f o r t h i s m i l i t a r y power became. On November ' 22, 1917 Tuan r e s i g n e d t h e P r e m i e r s h i p 13 when h i s m i l i t a r y p l a n s . w e r e f a i l i n g . J He r e m a i n e d , how-e v e r , i n f l u e n t i a l i n the government because of h i s m i l i t a r i s t 14 b a c k i n g . On December 18 Feng made him Commander-in-Chief i n charge of a l l f o r c e s t o f i g h t i n Europe and M i n i s t e r o f 15 War. T h i s h e r a l d e d i n a s t r o n g y e a r f o r Tuan and h i s f o l l o w e r s . T h r eatened by F e n g t i e n f o r c e s brought i n t o C h i h l i t h r o u g h the e f f o r t s of Hsu Shu-cheng, and by the tuchuns who s u p p o r t e d Tuan, Feng was f o r c e d t o make him P r e m i e r a g a i n i n March. I t was i n t h i s y e a r t h a t the N i s h i h a r a l o a n s were n e g o t i a t e d and used b a s i c a l l y t o b u i l d up t h e 17 War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army. A l s o , i n March of 1918 the Anfu . Club was formed s p e c i f i c a l l y t o m a n i p u l a t e the e l e c t i o n o f 18 t h e New P a r l i a m e n t i n June. T h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n was a l s o 19 s u p p o r t e d by t h e s e Japanese l o a n s . The Anfu Club d i d i t s j o b w e l l , f o r the new p a r l i a m e n t was c o m p l e t e l y under i t s c o n t r o l . Hsu Shu-cheng f i g u r e s l a r g e l y i n a l l o f t h e e v e n t s o f t h i s y e a r . I t was he' who' had e n g i n e e r e d t h e ' p r e s e n c e o f Fengtien troops within .the Great Wall,; and he was appoint-21 ed Vice Commander-in-Chief of t h i s force. He used some of the funds f o r t h i s army to b u i l d up a personal force which was to become part of the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army. In September he was made Co-director of the War P a r t i c i p a -22 t i o n Army. By the end of 1918 he was one of the strongest m i l i t a r y men i n the North, although he continued to operate under the aegis of Tuan C h ' i - j u i . Young, ambitious, arrogant and extremely capable, he had not achieved his success without a l i e n a t i n g a consider-able portion of the Northern government. It i s reported that one of the reasons for his appointment as Frontier Commissioner was to remove him from the center of Peking 23 p o l i t i c s . J It was Tuan C h ' i - j u i himself who ordered him to draw up a proposed Outline of Operation for the Northwestern F r o n t i e r , although Hsu had already been appointed Director of the Office of Northwestern Frontier A f f a i r s when i t was f i r s t established i n the f a l l of 1918. Hsu Shu-cheng was not picked for the o f f i c e of Frontier Commissioner because he was e s p e c i a l l y q u a l i f i e d for t h i s p o s i t i o n . The above resume indicates rather that he was to some extent backed into the p o s i t i o n . This does not mean that he was t o t a l l y without q u a l i f i c a t i o n s for the job nor that he did not undertake i t with some degree of earnestness. Hsu brought with him .to t h i s job his tremen-dous, energy, his ambition, and his a b i l i t y to carry things 25 through against srong opposition. He brought with him also t i e s with f i n a n c i a l sources both i n China and Japan 26 and some experience i n investment, and the m i l i t a r y power necessary to supply any protection that Urga might need 27 against White Russian insurgents. By 1919 the Chinese p o s i t i o n i n Mongolia had changed considerably from that i n 1915 when the Kiakhta Agreement was signed. The intervening period had seen a gradual re-establishment of Chinese influence i n Outer Mongolia and a corresponding weakening of the Russian p o s i t i o n . Conditions by the end of 1918 were favourable for a Chinese bid to secure i n some permanent way the ad-28 vantage she was gaining. The o f f i c i a l government l i n e at the beginning of 1919 was that China should negotiate to secure f o r hers e l f the commercial advantages that had been granted to the Russians by the Outer Mongolian government i n 1912, but 29 that self-government should not be terminated. This was a very conservative p o s i t i o n taken l a r g e l y because of fear of i n t e r n a t i o n a l objections to i l l e g a l breaking of t r e a t -i e s , and because of t h e i r reluctance to lay themselves open to the charge of v i o l a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r -30 mination. There was also a desire not to alienate the Mongols which was more than just a cold concern for Chinese advantage. China was a republic and whether or not i t s republican s p i r i t would stand up under close analysis,there were undoubtedly many Chinese who sincerely believed i n i t . It seems, however, that the loss of Outer Mongolia had never been f u l l y accepted by the Chinese, for with the change i n the Outer Mongolian scene a number of suggestions began to appear of a much bolder sort, advocating the r e -sumption of full.Chinese control there. These proposals ranged from advocation of outright m i l i t a r y takeover to much milder proposals f o r wooing the Mongols into the Chin-ese f o l d through acculturation. The bulk of these proposals 31 were submitted to the government i n March. Hsu Shu-cheng's border proposal was submitted on A p r i l 17 and i t s contents seem to indicate that he was thoroughly f a m i l i a r with a l l these previous plans. Hsu set out c l e a r l y and convincingly a plan to achieve the ends that were being increasingly voiced at the time. It represented a marked p o l i c y change from the government's former cautious p o s i t i o n , and there was thus some reluctance 32 on the part of the Foreign O f f i c e to give i t s approval. But the plan accorded with the r i s i n g aspirations of the time and provided the Anfu Party with an excuse to maintain i t s army, which was coming increasingly under pressure at t h i s t i m e . 3 3 Hsu's plan can be broken in.to: f i v e main parts. In the f i r s t he explains that t h i s o f f i c e should be set up to give maximum power to the incumbent and to his o f f i c e , since he f e e l s that the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t h i s p o s i t i o n make t h i s necessary. He also asks that r e l a t i o n s h i p s between t h i s o f f i c e and the subordinate o f f i c e s with which i t would have to deal should be c l e a r l y demarcated to avoid confu-sion. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g that Hsu anticipates here a pro-blem that i n fact was to a r i s e . From the time of his preparation to leave f o r Urga, when he obtained a copy of the 63 conditions from the Foreign O f f i c e , u n t i l his return and the cancella t i o n of the o f f i c e of the Urga Commissioner the d i v i s i o n between Ch'en I's and Hsu's authority was never s a t i s f a c t o r i l y defined. This confusion appears to have had a marked eff e c t on the negotiations for the can-c e l l a t i o n of autonomy a f t e r Hsu's a r r i v a l i n Urga on Oc-tober 29, a problem we w i l l return to l a t e r i n t h i s paper. Hsu's requirements for t h i s o f f i c e are followed by a number of broad economic proposals for the development of herding, farming, mining and trade, a l l to be based on the gradual construction of a railway and highway network. He suggests the i n i t i a l establishment of horse and camel service, to be replaced by motor vehicles and r a i l r o a d s as development proceeds. A l l other development would follow along with the opening of t h i s communication network. Hsu counters any. o b j e c t i o n s to the tremendous d i s -tances i n v o l v e d w i t h the l a c k of any major o b s t a c l e s t o c o n s t r u c t i o n such as e x t e n s i v e r i v e r or mountain c r o s s i n g s . He c l a i m s that the f e a s i b i l i t y of i r r i g a t i o n i s i n d i c a t e d by the abundance of g r a s s . These c l a i m s f o r the produc-t i o n p o t e n t i a l of Mongolia are not unreasonable. C o n s i d e r -a b l e a t t e n t i o n was being d i r e c t e d toward Mongolia at t h a t time. The Russians, f o r example, had been making e x t e n s i v e 34 m i n e r a l surveys, and the May 17, 1919 e d i t i o n of the North China Herald c a r r i e d a f u l l - p a g e f e a t u r e - a r t i c l e on the economic p o t e n t i a l of Outer Mongolia which was every b i t as o p t i m i s t i c as Hsu Shu-cheng's p l a n . Hsu's g o a l s are rendered more r e a l i s t i c because they are e n v i s i o n e d i n a way they could be worked f o r g r a d u a l l y , because t h e r e were no major t e c h n i c a l problems (the m i n e r a l s f o r example c o u l d be surface-mined) and because of the abundance of r e s o u r c e s . T h i s p a r t of h i s p l a n must undoubtedly have c a r r i e d a good d e a l of appeal. Hsu's m i l i t a r y p r o p o s a l s are not what one would sus-pect from the man who had c o n t r o l of one of the l a r g e s t armies i n China at t h a t time. He c r i t i c i z e s the undertak-i n g of a l a r g e m i l i t a r y e x p e d i t i o n which he deems unneces-s a r y , and suggests i n s t e a d the employment of s m a l l f o r c e s which would accompany the expanding developments to a f f o r d them a l l necessary p r o t e c t i o n . T h i s p l a n was f i r s t suggested by Kao T s a i - t Men and i t must have had a l o t of appeal. Hsu seems c o r r e c t i n s a y i n g i t would ease m i l i -t a r y expenditure at a time when the government was short of funds, and i n s a y i n g i t would p r o v i d e adequate p r o t e c -t i o n f o r Chinese ventures and would be l e s s i n c l i n e d to arouse the o p p o s i t i o n of the Mongols. The next p o r t i o n of the p l a n d e a l s w i t h e d u c a t i o n and makes p r o p o s a l s t o promote the s i n i c i s a t i o n of the Mon-g o l s . Hsu's p r o p o s a l s i g n o r e g e o g r a p h i c a l determinants i n -v o l v e d i n the d i f f e r e n c e s between Mongol and Chinese c u l -t u r e and h i s p r o p o s a l s that the study of Mongolian by Chinese would l e a d to Mongol acceptance of Chinese c u l t u r e may not seem c o n v i n c i n g today, but i n the context of 1919 R e p u b l i c a n China t h i s p r o p o s a l seems p l a u s i b l e . At the same time t h a t he embodies r e p u b l i c a n sentiments he c a t e r s t o t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese a t t i t u d e s towards s i n i c i s a -t i o n of the b a r b a r i a n s . What he suggests i s a s o r t of "guided s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n " ' , which must have appealed q u i t e s t r o n g l y to the Peking .government at t h a t time. The p l a n concludes w i t h a scheme f o r r a i s i n g the necessary c a p i t a l to i n i t i a t e h i s proposed program. B r i e f -l y an i n i t i a l two or three m i l l i o n yuan was to be borrowed, backed by a f i f t y m i l l i o n yuan bond i s s u e f o r i n i t i a l r a i l w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n . A F r o n t i e r Development Bank was to be e s t a b l i s h e d and a c a p i t a l of t h r e e or f o u r m i l l i o n yuan c a p i t a l borrowed on the strength of the bond issue, was to be used as backing f o r the issuance of double t h i s sum i n bank notes, and t h i s l a t t e r sum would be s u f f i c i e n t to get 31 the program under way. This was perhaps not the firmest ground to begin from, but i f the economic p o t e n t i a l of Outer Mongolia could be considered to be anything l i k e the claims that were being made at that time, the plan must have seemed a f e a s i b l e one, and had several aspects to i t that must have been very appealing to the government at that time. F i r s t , the plan was set up so that i t could be i n s t i t u t e d with the use of then l i m i t e d Chinese funds. Hsu was t a l k i n g about a vast program, but the s i x m i l l i o n yuan required to put i t i n operation should not have been beyond the means of Chinese investors at that time. Second, an outright m i l i t a r y take-over of Outer Mongolia would involve f i n a n c i a l expenses that no one i n the government was w i l l i n g to undertake. Even i n periods of great wealth the cost of expeditions north of the Great Wall had been a heavy burden on the Chinese treasury. The Republic, with an empty treasury, was i n no p o s i t i o n to finance a large expedition to Outer Mongolia. Also, no one with the necessary m i l i t a r y power at that time, Hsu Shu-cheng included, would have been w i l l i n g to weaken his p o s i -t i o n i n China proper by removing his troops to the North. F i n a l l y , an outright m i l i t a r y takeover would have aroused strong i n t e r n a t i o n a l opposition, and the Chinese government as we have noted had a great fear of t h i s . Hsu o f f e r s i n -stead a plan that proposes b a s i c a l l y a non-military r e -assumption of Chinese contr o l . He sets i t up as a p r o f i t a b l e venture with Outer Mongolia not only re-entering the Chinese f o l d , but at the same time helping to replenish the depleted Chinese treasury. Hsu's plan can be judged from three points of view. If i t was going to be considered at a l l , the first'requirement was that i t be economically f e a s i b l e . The investment capi-t a l required was not excessive, the economic p o t e n t i a l i t i e s were there, although Hsu exaggerates a l i t t l e . The only point that seems to have been u n r e a l i s t i c from the economic point of view was his c a l l for r e l i a n c e on domestic c a p i t a l , but such a judgement i s based more upon what l a t e r occurred rather than upon the a v a i l a b i l i t y of domestic funds. Hsu's f i r s t move to begin t h i s development took place i n mid-February, 1 9 2 0 . Outer Mongolia had just rejoined China at t h i s point and t h i s should have been an opportune moment to promote the sale of Fro n t i e r Development Bonds, as they would have been received with some degree of optimism. But no e f f o r t to do so seems to have been undertaken and two large Japanese loans were negotiated for r a i l r o a d construc-t i o n and development. This, however, seems to be at least as much a p o s i t i v e desire to. use Japanese funds as i t does an i n a b i l i t y of the Chinese to raise, funds domestically. Hsu had as early as December 17 suggested that Japanese Ho funds be allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e . But whether Chinese funds were used or not,the plan looked b a s i c a l l y p r a c t i c a b l e . Assuming the economic v i a b i l i t y of the plan i t can then be judged from the p o l i t i c a l point of view, f i r s t i n Chinese terms then i n Outer Mongol terms. To judge the p o l i t i c a l v a l i d i t y of Hsu's proposals i n Chinese terms we can begin by asking what the motivations were behind the presentation of t h i s plan. As has already been mentioned, Hsu drew up these proposals on Tuan's order. It has been claimed that t h i s was done to get r i d of Hsu because he was becoming too powerful with his growing War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army, because he was becoming more obnoxious with his i n -creasing power, and was f a l l i n g out'of Tuan's favour '" In l a r g e l y because of these problems. A more immediately obvious reason f o r the presentation of the plan was the need to create an excuse for the continuance of the War P a r t i c i -pation Army and the creation of a means of r a i s i n g funds to 42 support i t . A t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y that has been raised i s that i t was somehow tied.in.with Anfu connections with Japan i n and even with Semenov. The p o s i t i o n of power enjoyed by Tuan, Hsu Shu-cheng and the Anfu Club was made possible through the receipt of vast loans from Japan i n late 1917 and. i n 1918. The l a s t of these .loans was made on September 28., .191.8 — the' twenty, m i l l i o n yen War P a r t i c i p a t i o n loan. ^ Seventeen' m i l l i o n yen of t h i s loan apparently l a i d untouched . .45 i n a Korean bank as l a t e .as March 1 9 1 9 . . Although the Japanese government stated i t had no control over the release of these funds i t appears that pressure from the A l l i e d Powers made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r the Northern government to make use of 46 t.hese funds. Hsu Shu-cheng had been intimately involved i n the crea-47 tio n of the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army. In September he had been made Co-Director, with Tuan, of t h i s army and had been 48 involved i n the negotiations for the above-mentioned loans. By 1919 the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army, which Hsu had been ex-panding since his appointment as Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Pengtien Army, had increased to a force of around 25,000 49 > men. ' It would have been l u c r a t i v e for Japan to support these forces through loans and m i l i t a r y assistance and t h i s would answer to the Chinese need. A number of incidents point to close cooperation between Hsu Shu-cheng, the Anfu Club and the Japanese. The arrangement of the September War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Loan coincides with Hsu's appointment as Co-Director of the War P a r t i c i p a -t i o n Army. In November 1918 he was sent to. Japan to study f i e l d maneuvers, but i t was rumoured, at the time that he was negotiating for further Japanese support i n return f o r concessions In Manchuria. ' On February 5 , 1919 Hsu signed for China the. agreement; for. the extension of the Mutual M i l i t a r y Assistance Pact, which allowed: for the presence of ' 51 Japanese troops i n China. On conclusion of the cancella-t i o n of Outer' Mongolian autonomy Hsu r e p o r t s being congratu- ' lated by Colonel Matsul, the' Japanese o f f i c e r who was sta-tioned i n Urga, and who had been associated with Hsu i n 52 negotiating•the M i l i t a r y Assistance Pact. While i n Peking following the cancellation of autonomy Hsu proposed that a domestic loan be arranged for extension of the Peking Suiyuan Railway to Kiakhta, but also suggested that Japanese funds be 53 allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e . In mid-February, 1920 he negotia-ted two large loans with Japan, one for regional development and the other for construction of a railway between Kalgan 54 and Kiakhta. According to an a r t i c l e i n the February 28 issue of the North China Herald these loans were made possi-ble when the loan embargo imposed upon China by Great B r i t a i n , France, the United States- and Japan was e f f e c t i v e l y broken with the of f e r by these powers to make a loan of f i v e m i l -l i o n pounds s t e r l i n g (approximately $ 1 7 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 ) to the Peking government on the condition that the major portion of i t be used to effect a p a r t i a l troop disbandment. A note to th i s effect was sent to. the Chinese Foreign O f f i c e on 55 February 5 anci rumours of i t appeared i n the February 7 I t appears that, the Peking government r e j e c t e d t h i s l o a n but t h a t i t e f f e c t i v e l y broke the embargo so they were 57 i n a p o s i t i o n to borrow from Japan. . Hsu's r e t u r n from 58 Urga at t h i s time was made i n great haste. The loans were arranged and Hsu was made D i r e c t o r of the proposed 59 r a i l w a y . Hsu d i d not r e t u r n to Urga u n t i l the b e g i n n i n g of May.^° When he d i d he remained there o n l y u n t i l mid-June. F o l l o w i n g the d e f e a t of the Anfu C l i q u e i n J u l y Hsu took r e -fuge i n the Japanese l e g a t i o n i n Peking where he remained f o r over t h r e e months. F i n a l l y he was hidden i n a w i l l o w 6 l basket and t r a n s p o r t e d to T i e n t s i n thence to Shanghai. I t i s f a i r l y c e r t a i n from a l l t h i s evidence t h a t t h e r e was some s o r t of understanding between Hsu and the Japanese about Mongolia and i t may w e l l have been t h a t h i s p l a n was conceived with the i n t e n t i o n of c r e a t i n g an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Japanese investment and m i l i t a r y a i d . In t h i s c o n n e c t i o n i t has a l s o been suggested t h a t the Japanese support of Semenov was i n p a r t at l e a s t t o c r e a t e an excuse f o r the e n t r y of Chinese f o r c e s i n t o Mongo-l i a , p o s s i b l y with Japanese a s s i s t a n c e i n the form of t r o o p s 6 2 but more l i k e l y i n the form of money and m u n i t i o n s . That the i n t e n t i o n s of the Japanese were as c i r c u i t o u s as t h i s seems r a t h e r u n l i k e l y : at i t s extreme, f o r example, one can e n v i s i o n Japanese t r o o p s w i t h Semenov f i g h t i n g Japanese troops with the Chinese. Probably F r i t e r s ' estimate that Japanese involvement with Semenov was under the aegis of the m i l i t a r y and. that the central government was reluctant to deny i t because of the strength of the m i l i t a r y i n the /To Japanese government, i s a correct one. In sum, there i s no doubt about Japanese connections with Hsu, Tuan and the Anfu Clique i n China proper and there i s l i t t l e doubt, although there i s no d i r e c t proof, that there was some sort of understanding between Hsu and at least some important m i l i t a r y or f i n a n c i a l contacts i n Japan, and that he perhaps had some sort of Japanese assurance of f i n a n c i a l support f o r his program i n Outer Mongolia. So from the point of view of Anfu p o l i t i c s the plan provided a viable solution to the need to get Hsu out of the centre of things. It provided a basis for maintenance of the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army without requiring that the bulk of the army be removed from China proper, for to have done so would have been contrary to the reasons for i t s existence. Also i t provided an excuse f o r the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Japanese c a p i t a l , money which could be used for other purposes when necessary, and which could quite l e g i t i m a t e l y be used f o r the Frontier Defense Army. The plan was designed to answer the p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of the time i n Peking, and to appeal to Chinese sentiments. The plan i n fact was so well-conceived and i n parts, seems so out of keeping with Hsu's character that one suspects that there may have been other hands i n i t s preparation, but we can assume that i t was Hsu's work, for since he presented i t i t bears his f i n a l approval. Although from the point of view of Chinese p o l i t i c s the plan was well-conceived, the plan shows almost no recog-n i t i o n of possible Outer Mongol reactions. In his proposals for changing the customs and habits of the Mongols Hsu attr i b u t e s the differences between Mongol and Chinese culture to Ch'ing Dynasty r e s t r i c t i o n s on emmi-gration and intermarriage and seems completely unaware of any of the reasons for the gulf between Mongol and Chinese culture, nor of Mongol r e j e c t i o n of Chinese culture. The centre of Hsu's attention i s very obviously upon the t e r r i -tory of Outer Mongolia and not upon the Outer Mongolian people. His proposals for r a i l r o a d construction and a l l other commercial a c t i v i t y show no recognition of the need for Mongol agreement. The proposals he i s making are simi-l a r to the administrative changes made at the close of the Ch'ing Dynasty, which were the di r e c t cause of the Mongol 64 break from China i n 1911. In the same vein he considers the question of breaking the t r e a t i e s with Russia only from the point of view of how the Russians w i l l react. He i g -nores the question of the Mongol reluctance to break these agreements. I f Hsu's proposals were to be accepted by the govern-ment they should have anticipated possible objections. Here c e r t a i n l y was an a r e a f o r o b j e c t i o n but t h e r e i s no e v i -dence t h a t any o b j e c t i o n s o f t h i s s o r t were r a i s e d by t h e government. The p r o b a b l e r e a s o n f o r t h i s was t h a t Hsu's a t t i t u d e s towards t h e Mongols would have been t h e same as t h o s e g e n e r a l l y h e l d by t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f C h i n e s e a t t h a t t i m e . I t would be p o i n t l e s s t o suggest t h a t t h i s o f -f i c e s h o u l d have been r e s e r v e d f o r someone who was c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e Mongol p o s i t i o n , f o r even i f such a p e r s o n c o u l d have been found i t i s v e r y l i k e l y t h a t any p r o -p o s a l s he might have made would have been r e j e c t e d because t h e y r a n c o u n t e r t o p r e v a l e n t a t t i t u d e s . There must have been o t h e r p e o p l e who, l i k e Ch'en I , were w e l l - a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f d e a l i n g w i t h t h e Mongols, but i f t h e r e were, t h e y made no c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l s , and even i f t h e y had, i t i s d o u b t f u l i f t h e i r n e c e s s a r i l y more r e s t r i c t e d p r o -p o s a l s would have been p r e f e r r e d o v e r t h o s e o f Hsu. I n sum, a l l t h e r e a s o n s f o r Hsu's p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e program a r o s e from i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l e x i g e n c i e s . Hsu's army, c r e a t e d t o c o n t r o l t h e government, engendered as i t grew more o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e government. F u r t h e r p r e s s u r e s a g a i n s t i t were caused by t h e B r i t i s h and American s u p p o r t o f t h e C h i h l i f a c t i o n and t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Anfu 65 C l i q u e s concept o f m i l i t a r y r e u n i f i c a t i o n . W i t h t h e l o a n s from Japan s t o p p e d i t became i m p e r a t i v e t o c r e a t e a l e g i t i -mate r o l e f o r t h i s army so t h a t funds f o r i t s s u p p o r t c o u l d be obtained. Hsu made i t clear with his well-conceived pro-posals that he was the man for the job; i t was also the job for Hsu. Animosity towards him made i t almost imperative to remove him from Peking;, the program provided an out f o r his army and promised some legitimate revenue. Given the oppor-tunity Hsu handled i t extremely well. His program empha-sized a self-supporting and economically f e a s i b l e development, with m i l i t a r y expense kept at a minimum. Despite the promise of Hsu's plan nearly two months passed before i t was adopted. The basic reason for t h i s had to be the reluctance of Tuan C h ' i - j u i and the Anfu Clique to remove any of t h e i r attention from Peking proper unless absolutely forced to do so. The increasing unpopulari-ty of the Anfu government with i t s Japanese connections 66 culminated i n the May 4 t h Movement, and pressures against the Anfu Clique following t h i s made i t imperative to do something about the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army.^ Another rea-son for reluctance may well have been a lack of f a i t h i n Hsu. His plan, as I have mentioned, seems rather out of character and i t was common knowledge that a major reason for the proposal was to provide an excuse for maintenance of the War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army. With the strength of the opposition to maintenance of the army i t was necessary that the Anfu government create some means of j u s t i f y i n g i t , and with the f e a s i b i l i t y of Hsu's program they were able to push i t through. Following approval of the plan on June 10 events moved quickly. On June 13 Hsu was appointed as the Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner. On June 19 the Commission was given control of Frontier M i l i t a r y A f f a i r s , and on June 24 Hsu was made 68 Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Frontier Defense Army. On t h i s date the entire War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army was redesig-nated as the Frontier Defense Army, with Tuan C h ' i - j u i con-69 tinuing on as Director-General. In Late June the f i r s t Frontier Defense troops were dispatched to Urga. This force of f i f t y men accompanied by 18 motor vehicles was of an exploratory nature. It was 70 led by Major L i Ju-chang. On July 18 the administrative 71 set-up of the Frontier Defense Office was promalgated. By September 15 the entire 7th Regiment of the 3rd Brigade, a force i n the neighbourhood of 3 5000 men, had reached Urga. No further troops were dispatched to Outer Mongolia. The preparation f o r the dispatch of t h i s force of troops to Urga must have began as soon as Hsu received his appointment as Commander-in-Chief. A July 11 report from Peking to the North China Herald describes preparations for the expedition at Kalgan. One hundred motor vehicles had been purchased - t h i s was to be the f i r s t large-scale motor-ized m i l i t a r y expedition to Outer Mongolia. Kalgan was apparently i n quite a mad state of confusion with the pre-sence of these troops and the noisy and unusual motor vehicles frightened the pack animals. It was noted i n the same edition of the Herald that these preparations were 71} causing considerable consternation i n Urga. The expedition f i n a l l y got under way sometime around the middle of August. By August 27.the f i r s t unit of .this force had entered Outer 75 Mongolian t e r r i t o r y . A l m o s t immediately there was the confrontation between Chinese and Mongol troops recounted i n the series of telegrams given i n the t r a n s l a t i o n . Ch'en I's concern for r e l a t i o n s between China and Outer Mongolia i s made very apparent i n these telegrams, which represent the f i r s t extended contact between Hsu Shu-cheng and Ch'en I. There are signs of further trouble caused by the pre-sence of these troops i n the L i v i n g Buddha's second wire to the President of China, on October 24, where he mentions that troops were stationed around the Urga monastery and other lama quarters and that they had commandeered the houses 7 6 of foreign traders. These were Hsu's troops. He had ordered that the L i v i n g Buddha's residence be guarded when he heard rumours that the L i v i n g Buddha was planning to f l e e 77 1 to Russia. In mid-September o f f i c i a l Russian complaints were made against Hsu's troops commandeering a Russian v i l l a 78 on the Tola r i v e r . The wording of the L i v i n g Buddha's l e t t e r seems to indicate that t h i s was not the only incident of t h i s nature, and i t i s f a i r l y c e r t a i n that these troops would have had an adverse e f f e c t on Ch'en I ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Urga. At t h i s p o i n t we must rev iew the background to these n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Urga . The i n i t i a l p e r i o d of Outer Mongol ian independence from December 1912 to November 1919 f a l l s i n t o two q u i t e d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s , the p o i n t of d i v i s i o n b e i n g the s i g n i n g 79 of the Sino-Russo-Mongol K i a k h t a Agreement on. June 7, 1915• The s i g n a t u r e of t h i s Agreement marked the f i r s t r e c o g n i t i o n by the Outer Mongol ian government t h a t Outer M o n g o l i a was 8 0 to remain Chinese t e r r i t o r y . P r o f e s s o r J a g c h i d r e f e r s to the f i r s t as the p e r i o d of Outer Mongol " independence," and 8 l to the second as the p e r i o d of " s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . " The r e l u c t a n c e of the R u s s i a n government to support Outer Mongol ian d e s i r e s f o r a complete and r e a l independence 8 2 l e d to c o n s i d e r a b l e Mongol d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h R u s s i a , and t h i s , a l o n g w i t h R u s s i a ' s i n a b i l i t y to assume the eco-nomic f u n c t i o n s f o r m e r l y f i l l e d by C h i n a , c r e a t e d a s i t u a -t i o n t h a t w a s , r a t h e r f a v o u r a b l e .to a r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Chinese i n f l u e n c e . The K i a k h t a Agreement r e c o g n i z e d C h i n a ' s s u z e r a i n r i g h t s i n Outer Mongol ia and made p r o v i s i o n f o r the e s t a -b l i shment of a Chinese Commissioner and A s s i s t a n t Commissioner at U r g a , K i a k h t a , U l i a s s u t a i and Kobdo. ^ The b a s i c f u n c - • t i o n s of these o f f i c i a l s were to ensure t h a t Chinese s u z e r a i n r i g h t s were not t r a n s g r e s s e d upon and to p r o t e c t the i n t e r -e s t s of Chinese Immi rants and merchan s i n Outer M o n g o l i a . The o f f i c e was very much l i k e a consulate i n nature, but would not.have been called so since Outer'Mongolia by the Kiakhta Agreement was s t i l l Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Thus, at the very outset the o f f i c e of the Urga Commissioner was to some extent an ambiguous one because of the rather ambigu-ous r e l a t i o n s h i p between Outer Mongolia and China. As a resul t the authority that was to accrue to the o f f i c e was to prove to be very much a matter of the a b i l i t y of the per-son i n the o f f i c e to negotiate with the Mongols. Ch.'en Lu, the p r i n c i p a l Chinese representative i n negotiating the Kiakhta agreement was given the post i n i -86 t i a l l y . ' He and Ch'en I, who replaced him on August .7, 87 1917 3 worked to improve the Chinese p o s i t i o n . In March of 19.16 Chen Lu began negotiating to get Outer Mongolian approval of Chinese i n v e s t i t u r e of the Liv i n g Buddha.. On July 8 an agreement was reached whereby the Urga Commission-er was granted the authority to perform the in v e s t i t u r e cere-mony. The Chinese considered t h i s an important gain because such a right was a further recognition of her, at that point, ambiguous s u z e r a i n t y . ^ In A p r i l , 1918 the f i r s t regular motor vehicle ser-vice between Kalgan and Urga was put into operation by Ch'en I, and promised to help promote closer t i e s and i n -89 creased commerce with China. Following the Independence of Outer Mongolia i n 1 9 H 3 Russia from the outset was unsuccessful i n assuming the commercial p o s i t i o n of China i n Outer Mongolia. This r e -91 suited i n considerable economic hardship for the Mongols, and led to a gradual re-establishment of the Chinese as the 92 dominant commercial group. Although there were other factors the major reason for Russia's f a i l u r e was her i n -volvement i n the 1st World War. The rouble which, despite the dominant commercial p o s i t i o n of the Chinese, had been the most common medium of exchange i n Outer Mongolia since 93 the l a t t e r decades of the 19th c e n t u r y ^ had dropped to o i l about half i t s pre-war value by 1917. Chinese merchants and many Mongols were by t h i s time refusing to accept the 95 rouble as a medium of exchange. Ch'en I at t h i s time began to negotiate with the Outer Mongol government f o r the 96 establishment of a branch of the Bank of China i n Urga. The Outer Mongolian government had obtained three loans from Russia i n 1913 and 1914 t o t a l l i n g 5,100,000 roubles. Ch'en I's f i r s t o f f e r was that China, taking advantage of the devalued rouble, would repay t h i s debt to Russia i n re-turn for the right to e s t a b l i s h a bank. Peking and Urga were i n agreement but the Ministry of Finance did not have s u f f i c i e n t funds to make the payment. In November 1918, by using the cancell a t i o n of debts and i n t e r e s t to the former Bank of the Board of Revenue and Population as a bargaining condition, Ch'en I f i n a l l y succeeded. A fourteen-point agreement was signed which gave China the r i g h t to e s t a b l i s h a bank and to issue currency which was to be used as the standard medium of exchange. This represented a considera-ble v i c t o r y for the Chinese government, although she was unable to take f u l l advantage of i t because of her own eco-97 nomic d i f f i c u l t i e s . In 1917 Ch'en I had also managed to have the duties on Chinese merchandise removed and had restored the Chinese 98 postal service. Generally speaking, with the weakening of the Russian a b i l i t y to represent her i n t e r e s t s i n Outer Mongolia the Chinese p o s i t i o n improved. F i n a l l y , i n the f a l l of 1918 - a clear sign of the altered p o s i t i o n of China - the troop l i m i t was broken and two companies of Kao 9 9 T s a i - t ' i e n ' s Suiyuan regiment were sent to Urga. This would be a force somewhere i n the neighbourhood of one thou-, 100 sand men. A l l of these changes brought some improvement i n the Chinese p o s i t i o n i n Outer Mongolia and each improvement would mean some a l t e r a t i o n i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Urga Commissioner. As a r e s u l t i t seems reasonable to assume that each improvement i n the Chinese p o s i t i o n , while i t brought an increase i n the authority of the Commissioner, i t would at the same time increase the ambiguity of his p o s i -t i o n — a p o s i t i o n which, as we have already pointed out, was from the beginning somewhat ambiguous. Although the Chinese p o s i t i o n i n Outer Mongolia was improving she was by no means i n a strong bargaining p o s i t i o n . The government i n China suffered generally from the heavy m i l i t a r y burden which was at the same time a product and a cause of the s p l i t between the North and South and the i n -t e r n a l dissensions within each of these c a m p s . T h e best that can be said i s that she was i n a r e l a t i v e l y better p o s i -t i o n than Russia v i s - a - v i s Outer Mongolia. There were, however, three factors which tended to improve the Chinese p o s i t i o n . There were the Outer Mongol disillusionment with the Russians (which we have already discussed) i n t e r n a l troubles i n the Outer Mongolian govern-ment, and the growing threat of attack from White Russian i n -surgents. Outer Mongolian o f f i c i a l s , mainly nobles, had be-l i e v e d at the time of alignment with Russia that t h e i r econo-102 mic p o s i t i o n would be improved. For example, the immense 103 debts to Chinese traders were cancelled. J But the p o s i -t i o n of the nobles i n fact deteriorated. The new p o s i t i o n of power accorded to the lamas by making the L i v i n g Buddha the head of government had not been forseen. Not only did the nobles lose the old emoluments they had received from the Chinese government, they also found t h e i r expenses i n -creased. The Kiakhta Agreement had allowed f o r Russian as well as Mongol use of the public post system and the expenses of t h i s system, which were borne by the nobles, proved onerous. The Russian loans to a large extent were used to t r a i n and maintain the army. The remaining funds were for the most part spent by the lama heirarchy on such non-essen-t i a l things as a wall around the L i v i n g Buddha's palace. One report dealing with the lama abuse of t h e i r p o s i t i o n ( 105 claims a purchase of ten thousand brass images of Buddha. The burden on the nobles was further increased by the maintenance of the tax-free p r i v i l e g e s of the shabinar, the serfs of the church, and t h i s was exacerbated by a large increase i n the number of shabinar i n order to evade taxa-t i o n . Roughly one-third of the working-age male population u v.- 106 were shabinar. In addition to the unsatisfactory economic s i t u a t i o n , the independent government posed a threat to the hereditary positions of the nobles, for In theory commoners could now r i s e to positions of rank. Tserendorji, the Minister of 107 Foreign A f f a i r s had been a commoner. ' The death of Sain Noyon Khan i n A p r i l 1919 was followed by rumours that he was poisoned by the lamas and provided thus a further reason for the nobles to look to China for the preservation of . ... 108 t h e i r p o s i t i o n . Generally speaking i t appears that i t was the nobles who f e l t they had suffered by the change to independent government, but i t i s misleading to assume f i r s t , that they were therefore pro-Chinese, and second, that a clear d i v i s i o n e x i s t e d between pro-Chinese nobles and pro-independence lamas. The m a j o r i t y o f government o f f i c i a l s were n o b l e s . Three of the f i v e M i n i s t r i e s were headed by nobles and of 109 the t e n d e p u t y - M i n i s t e r s only one was a lama. Some h i g h - r a n k i n g lamas were a l s o pro-Chinese. The J a l k h a n s a L i v i n g Buddha, second o n l y i n rank to the L i v i n g Buddha of Urga, was pro-Chinese and the m a j o r i t y of the lamas i n the Gendung monastory gave him t h e i r s u p p o r t . 1 1 ^ 1 The c r i t i -c a l f a c t o r was the o v e r - r i d i n g a u t h o r i t y of the L i v i n g Buddha of Urga and h i s dependence on the ad v i c e of a few very c l o s e a d v i s o r s , Badmadorji c o n c u r r e n t l y the M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r and the Premier b e i n g the most important of these. 1 1" 1" I t was c h i e f l y Badmadorji who b l o c k e d appro-112 v a l of the 63 c o n d i t i o n s . Much i n the same way th a t i t i s a mistake t o view the lamas as s o l i d l y a n t i - C h i n e s e , i t i s a mistake t o view the nobles as s o l i d l y pro-Chinese. F i r s t we should note t h a t the reasons f o r r e t u r n i n g to China were b a s i c a l l y ne-g a t i v e ones - t h a t i s , the i n t e n t i o n was to get out of a s i t u a t i o n they found u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . There was, as a r e -s u l t , an element of r e l u c t a n c e on the p a r t o f the nobles t o make t h i s move. T h i s i s evidenced f a i r l y c l e a r l y j u s t by the l e n g t h o f time the n e g o t i a t i o n s went on. The b a s i c r e a -sons f o r t h i s r e l u c t a n c e were the g e n e r a l d i s t r u s t of the Chinese by the Mongols, the knowledge t h a t a r e t u r n t o China would probably require repayment of the extensive debts which had been cancelled at the time of independence, and the ever-present example of what had happened to the Mongols of Inner Mongolia. Despite these factors creating a reluctance to nego-t i a t e with China there were several factors which promoted the consideration of returning to China. The p o s i t i o n of the Outer Mongolian government was somewhat paradoxical, f o r , surrounded by stronger neighbours, i t was able to achieve a degree of independence only through dependence on one or the other of i t s neighbours. The choice was b a s i c a l l y between China and Russia, but the growing strength of Japan i n the Far East and her involvement i n Korea and Manchuria had made her a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y . An attempt was made to contact the United States i n October 1919 but was successfully blocked by the Chinese. Japan, with her support of Semenov and the attempt to promote a pan-Mongol movement, was rejected by the Outer Mongols for a number of reasons. The Outer Mongolian govern-ment had been slight e d by the Japanese on two occasions, which had done nothing to promote good r e l a t i o n s between 113 them, but probably the Japanese treatment of Koreans was a more important deterrent. The year 1919 saw many a n t i -Japanese demonstrations i n Korea and these were c r u e l l y sup-pressed. In September 1919 the North China Herald reported an estimate that the Japanese had shot t h i r t y thousand 114 Koreans i n suppressing the trouble. Also the Outer Mongols were wary of a pan-Mongol state because of the i n -115 t e r n a t i o n a l implications. They were somewhat contemp-tuous, too, of other Mongols who had "sold out" t h e i r c u l -ture - the Buryats were thought to be Russified and Inner Mongols S i n i c i z e d . To j o i n with them would to some extent threaten 116 the continued existence of the t r a d i t i o n a l Mongol culture. This tends to portray the Outer Mongol desire for independence as a n a t i o n a l i s t i c or " c u l t u r a l i s t i c " motiva-t i o n . This i s true to an extent but can very e a s i l y be over-emphasized to the neglect of the fact that personal i n t e r e s t s were also involved. For example, Tserendorji, the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s who negotiated with Ch'en I was part 117 Chinese, Perhaps a better example was Sirning Damdin who was pushed by Ch'en I as a replacement f o r Premier Sain Noyon Khan when he died. Sirning Damdin was fluent i n Chinese and had l i v e d i n Peking for a number of years. His knowledge of China would have meant i t was to his inte r e s t to maintain closer t i e s with China. For t h i s reason he was 118 f i r m l y rejected by the Urga L i v i n g Buddha. Undoubtedly personal in t e r e s t s were the main reasons behind Badmadorji's r e j e c t i o n f i r s t of Ch'en I's conditions which threatened to reduce his personal power and his l a t e r cooperation with Hsu, both to counter Ch'en I and f o r the t i t l e s and advantages promised to him by Hsu. The foregoing constitute the major factors leading to and influencing Ch'en I's negotiations for the c a n c e l l a t i o n of Outer Mongolian self-government. In review they were: Outer Mongol disillusionment over Russia's reluctance to support a r e a l independence; Russia's economic f a i l u r e i n Outer Mongolia; the gradual reassertion of Chinese influence and the ambiguous nature of the o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Chinese representative; the continuing weakness of China's improved bargaining p o s i t i o n ; governmental dissensions i n Outer Mongolia the threat from Semenov; the long-standing d i s t r u s t of the Chinese and the int e r e s t i n personal gain of many of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . The negotiations between Ch'en I and the Outer Mongo-l i a n government i n 1919 were b a s i c a l l y a continuation of the Chinese attempts to improve her p o s i t i o n there while Russia was at a disadvantage. I n i t i a l l y the Chinese were i n t e r e s -ted i n gaining the commercial advantages that had been gran-120 ted to Russia i n the 1912 Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol. Although the p o s s i b i l i t y of cance l l i n g Outer Mongolian s e l f -government had been raised as early as January i t did not be-come the centre of negotiations u n t i l August 14 when the 121 Mongols themselves suggested i t . Thus, Ch'en I's negotia-tions with the Mongols i n 1919 f a l l into two f a i r l y d i s -t i n c t periods. A l t h o u g h Ch'en had some d i s c u s s i o n w i t h T s e r e n d o r j i 122 on the s u b j e c t i n the l a t t e r months o f 1918 the F o r e i g n O f f i c e d i r e c t i v e t o Ch'en I on J a n u a r y 5, 1919 i s g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d as the b e g i n n i n g o f n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n t h i s d i -r e c t i v e Ch'en I was a d v i s e d t o open n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h T s e r e n d o r j i f o r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of a new t r e a t y w h i c h c o u l d l a t e r be used as a b a r g a i n i n g p o i n t w i t h t h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n -123 ment when i t had s t a b i l i z e d . The I n t e n t i o n a t t h i s t i me was not t o c a n c e l autonomy, w h i c h i t was f e l t might a l i e n a t e the Mongols and a r o u s e • i n t e r n a t i o n a l o b j e c t i o n s . I n a d d i -t i o n t o g a i n i n g R u s s i a n commercial a d v a n t a g e s , w h i c h we have a l r e a d y m entioned, t h e hope was t o remove r e s t r i c t i o n s on t r o o p s and t o r e s t o r e as many of the o l d Ch'i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s 124 as p o s s i b l e . G i v e n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Outer Mongo-l i a and C h i n a a t t h i s t i m e , T s e r e n d o r j i , t h e M i n i s t e r o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s was t h e o f f i c i a l who p r o p e r l y r e p r e s e n t e d t h e Outer .Mongolian government i n n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h C h i n a . There was not at t h i s t i me any s u g g e s t i o n of t h e Chinese government f o s t e r i n g a d i v i s i o n between the lamas and t h e n o b l e s , a l -though Ch'en I was aware o f the f a c t t h a t t h e r e was some d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n among t h e n o b l e s over the lama c o n t r o l of 125 government. • F u r t h e r w i r e s i n J a n u a r y s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e purpose o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s was not t o c a n c e l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t 12 6 but was t o g a i n m a i n l y c o m m e r c i a l c o n t r o l s . On F e b r u a r y 14 T s e r e n d o r j i asked Ch'en t o draw up rough c o n d i t i o n s as a b a s i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n . On F e b r u a r y 21 Ch'en I reported, t h e s e 127 c o n d i t i o n s to. the c e n t r a l government. B r i e f l y t h e s e f i v e c o n d i t i o n s were: (1) s e l f government to.be m a i n t a i n e d , (2) the opening of f a r m . l a n d s and mines by f o r e i g n e r s t o be. r e s t r i c t e d , (3) China t o be g i v e n r i g h t t o conduct commercial n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Outer M o n g o l i a , (4) Chinese goods t o be t a x e d as f o r m e r l y t o meet Outer M o n g o l i a n ' a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ex-p e n s e s , (5) R u s s i a n debts t o be r e p a i d , and lamas to.be g i v e n good t r e a t m e n t . A l t h o u g h t h e r e seems t o have been good a c c o r d between Ch'en and T s e r e n d o r j i at t h i s p o i n t , t h e r e seems t o have been' l i t t l e p r o g r e s s beyond t h i s i n t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t knowledge of the p r o p o s a l s f o r a t a k e o v e r o f M o n g o l i a w h i c h r e a c h e d t h e i r peak i n March t o some e x t e n t dampened th e n e g o t i a t i o n s . I t i s more c e r t a i n t h a t t h e dea t h of S a i n Noyon'Khan on A p r i l 17 a f f e c t e d them. The d e a t h o f t h e P r e m i e r , the Mongols most a b l e nego-128 t i a t o r and the o f f i c i a l who had t o some e x t e n t c o n t r o l l e d t h e L i v i n g Buddha, had an adver s e a f f e c t on the n e g o t i a t i o n s i n two ways. F i r s t , rumour had i t t h a t he was p o i s o n e d by the L i v i n g Buddha, a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s some doubt as t o the 129 v e r a c i t y o f t h i s r e p o r t . T h i s rumour, p l u s the l o s s of the c o n t r o l l i n g i n f l u e n c e o f the Prime M i n i s t e r r e s u l t e d i n an i n c r e a s e i n t e n s i o n between the lamas and the n o b l e o f f i -c i a l s . A l s o , Ch'en sought t o s e i z e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e -p l a c e S a i n Noyon Khan w i t h . t h e s t r o n g l y p r o - C h i n e s e S i r n i n g Damdin. This aroused the opposition of the L i v i n g Buddha 13 0 ' and increased his d i s t r u s t o-f Ch'en I and the Chinese. During these i n i t i a l months of 1919 Semenov was ac-t i v e i n seeking the establishment of a pan-Mongol state i n 131 which the i n c l u s i o n of Outer Mongolia was e s s e n t i a l . But although he was received with d i s t r u s t by the Outer Mongols 132 who refused to deal with his Buryat representatives, his e f f o r t s were not yet seen as a threat to Mongol autonomy. In fact he was•not threatening the Mongols yet as much as wooing them, and he therefore cannot be viewed as a pressure promoting return to China for protection at t h i s time. The other major event at t h i s time which was to have • some influence on Ch'en I's negotiations with the Mongols was the presentation of Hsu Shu-cheng's Outline of Operation for the Northwest on A p r i l 17, although i t was not approved 133 by the Cabinet u n t i l June 10. This plan represented the creation of a second po l i c y towards Outer Mongolia. Ch'en I continued to negotiate on the. basis of the January p o l i c y but his negotiations were with l i t t l e doubt soon to be a f f e c -ted by t h i s new p o l i c y . Although these negotiations s t r i c t l y speaking brought, no r e s u l t s , they were b e n e f i c i a l i n that they established a mood of negotiation. They also made clear to both sides the issues involved i n the negotiations, at least t h i s seems to be indicated by the fact that the p r i n c i p l e s involved i n these o r i g i n a l l y set conditions form the basis of the major por-134 t i o n of the 6 3 conditions l a t e r elaborated. From January Ch'en I wired repeatedly for troops to 135 counter the Semenov threat. The North China Herald suggested that t h i s threat was being used an an excuse for 1 6 a troop build-up. For the period from January u n t i l A p r i l t h i s seems a pl a u s i b l e charge. It i s quite l i k e l y that Ch'en hoped that an increase i n China's m i l i t a r y pre-sence would improve his bargaining p o s i t i o n . After A p r i l , however, his requests for troops acquired.a basis i n f a c t . The Mongols seemed very reluctant to openly request the dispatch of Chinese troops but Semenov's forces were i n -creasing. Apparently i n the early months of 1919 Semenov was given f a i r l y strong Japanese support, but with the a r r i v a l of A l l i e d intervention forces Japan was r e s t r i c -137 ted to some degree. Also, revolt i n Korea diverted the 138 Japanese attention from Semenov. Semenov's army i n -creased considerably i n size however, during t h i s period by the i n f l u x of a large number of mostly Buryat bandit r e -139 c r u i t s . But the nature of i t s growth was r e s u l t i n g i n a very unruly army, and the lack of s u f f i c i e n t Japanese sup-port following the a r r i v a l of intervention forces meant that 140 the army had to resort to looting to support i t s e l f . In May the Outer Mongolian government made a f i r s t request to the Chinese government to help control banditry. On June 7 Tserendorji for the f i r s t time spoke to Ch'en I 143 142 of the threat from Semenov. At that time there were rumours that he was about to cut the Kiakhta-Urga road. It was just at this time that Hsu Shu-cheng's program was accepted (June 10) and Hsu given.his appointment as 144 Frontier Commissioner (June 13). On June 12 Ch'en I i n -formed Tserendorji that i f the Mongols accepted Semenov 145 China would use force. Semenov's large and unruly force included a large number of Buryats. The Outer Mongols were suspicious of and somewhat contemptuous of the Buryat Mon-gols and resented and to some extent feared the Buryat at-. 146 tempts to set the course of Mongolia's future. The larger Semenov's force became the more necessary i t became for i t to achieve i t s ends, and thus the greater the threat it.became to Outer Mongolia. Semenov's group became desperate i n the summer and threatened Urga. The Outer Mongolian government bought time by agreeing to discuss j o i n -ing Semenov at a meeting of the representatives of a l l 147 Aimaks to be held July 17. This meeting was postponed 14 8 u n t i l August 4 at which time Semenov was rejected. But - i f the Outer Mongolian government was reluctant to j o i n Semenov there was an almost equal reluctance to consider China. Ch'en I's threat to Tserendorji was a mark of an im-pending change i n the attitude of China. By July Ch'en I's c a l l s for troops were based on r e a l fear of attack by Semenov. In a wire to Peking on July 4 he outlines the threatened lines of attack which would cut Urga o f f C O m -lljq p l e t e l y . Yet despite t h i s r e a l fear Ch'en must s t i l l have seen t h i s troop increase as an improvement i n China's bargaining p o s i t i o n . This imminent increase i n troops, how-ever, had adverse e f f e c t s on negotiations as well, for i t could not help but arouse Outer Mongolian suspicion of Chinese intentions. Another factor hindering progress was the noble-lama s p l i t which had i n t e n s i f i e d with the death of Sain Noyon 150 Khan. Ch'en I's attempt to get a pro-Chinese replacement i n s t a l l e d had caused a worsening of his r e l a t i o n s with the L i v i n g Buddha, and because the nature of the Outer Mongolian -Chinese r e l a t i o n s h i p had led to his negotiating through Tserendorji, Ch'en I must have been more and more i d e n t i f i e d with noble i n t e r e s t s . In summary, up to the August meeting, while the s i t u -ation had changed, the factors promoting a turn to China seemed to have been cancelled by factors against i t . Through a l l t h i s Ch'en I, who up to t h i s time had exhibited a great deal of patience i n his dealings with the Mongols, began to give way to an over-eagerness to get things done. Several 151 writers on the subject have charged him with t h i s . The meeting scheduled to begin on July 17 to discuss 152 the Semenov question did not begin u n t i l August 4. J Most of the o f f i c i a l s , however, had arrived i n Urga i n early . 153 July. It i s l i k e l y that considerable discussion took •place at t h i s time and that there was a certain c r y s t a l l i z a -t i o n of the complaints of the nobles against lama control of the government. When the meeting f i n a l l y got under way Semenov's de-mands were formally rejected. The Semenov threat was at i t s peak at t h i s time and t h i s r e j e c t i o n made t h e . p o s s i b i l i t y of 154 an attack against Urga almost a certainty. ^ The noble re-presentatives saw the opportunity to use t h i s threat as the basis of a proposal to return to Chinese control to.ensure protection, but t h e i r further intent was that t h i s return to China would remove control of the government from the lamas. 1 On August 14 Tserendorji, the obvious choice since he had been central i n a l l negotiations with Ch'en I, was nominated as the representative of the nobles of four Aimaks to act as 156 •their spokesman with Ch'en I. A condensed t r a n s l a t i o n of the conditions they worked out, as forwarded to Peking on October 1, with f i n a l Cabinet r e v i s i o n s , i s included i n an appendix. The conditions i n good measure r e f l e c t the desires of the Mongols as expressed i n Tserendorji's previous negotiations with Ch'en I. A l -though China's bargaining p o s i t i o n had improved i n the period following the Kiakhta Agreement, she was s t i l l i n a r e l a t i v e -ly weak po s i t i o n . Ch'en I was aware of t h i s and of the Thus, the conditions provide for a good degree of Mongol control and provide checks against much-feared ex p l o i t a t i o n by Chinese commercial firms. The conditions would indeed-place a r e s t r a i n i n g hand on Chinese development of Outer Mongolia, but on the other hand, because they accorded with Mongol aspirations^they seemed to provide, as Ch'en I states, 157 the basis for a l a s t i n g peace between China and Mongolia. Some discussion followed as to what•procedure should be adopted i n cancelling Outer Mongolia's self-governmeat. The p r i n c i p a l problem was the c o n f l i c t of the Outer Mongol desire that the conditions be f i r s t s e t t l e d informally with the Peking p o s i t i o n that the negotiations' should begin only after the p e t i t i o n for return to China had been presented. The Chinese p o s i t i o n was taken i n order to eliminate p o s s i -ble Russian and foreign accusations that Outer Mongolia had 158 been pressured. The Chinese government continued to i n -s i s t on t h i s point but ultimately waived i t on the Insistence 159 of Ch'en I. On September 26 he wired that with the ex-ception of a few d i f f i c u l t i e s the conditions were s e t t l e d and that i n a few days they would be sent to Peking with his 1SU .' 161 Chief-Secretary, Huang C h ' e n g - h s u . O n October 1 Huang l e f t f o r Peking with the conditions Actual discussion of the conditions began on August 21. Although the nobles were i n c o l l u s i o n with Ch'en I these conditions had to be discussed by the government as a whole since the approval of the L i v i n g Buddha and other lama o f f i c i a l s would be required to pass i t . It i s unclear to what extent.Ch'en I participated- i n these discussions, but the. Kiakhta Agreement stipulated his right to attend parliamentary meetings as the representative of the suzerain s t a t e . 1 ^ . Predictably, -a power struggle developed within the Mongol government. Two of the Ministers were lamas, Lobsang-baldan, the Minister of Finance and- Badmadorji the Minister 164 of the I n t e r i o r and Premier, whom, i t w i l l be remembered, was placed In t h i s p o s i t i o n following the death of Sain Noyon Khan to ensure the maintenance'of lama control. Lobsangb-aldan was apparently w i l l i n g to go along with the 1 6 5 majority decision, but Badmadorji was adamant on.two questions which involved the degree of authority of;the Living Buddha of Urga, of the lamas and, of course, of him-s e l f . These two questions concerned the 18th and the 22nd of the 63 conditions . The question involved i n the 22nd condition was whether.or not the L i v i n g Buddha was to have control.of the appointment of o f f i c i a l s . Badmadorji i n s i s t e d that he should, his intention undoubtedly being to preserve the lama advantage. The nobles were of course firmly against t h i s as the main purpose of return to China was to remove power from the Lamas. Ch'en I, through assurances to the nobles that t h e i r i n t e r e s t s would not be injured, f i n a l l y gained t h e i r consent. He was not so successful with the 1 8 t h condition. In the form t h i s condition was agreed to by the lamas i t read, "Any transactions which the L i v i n g Buddha has ordered to be c a r r i e d out cannot be altered.," The no-bles remained u n s a t i s f i e d with t h i s condition and Ch'en I, before forwarding the conditions to Peking, that i s , some-time between wiring Peking on September 2 6 and October 1 when he sent the conditions with Huang Ch'en-hsu, alt e r e d 1 6 8 t h i s condition to r e t a i n the good f a i t h of the nobles. The two characters (Hfl^j) were added so that the conditions now read " Any transaction which the L i v i n g Buddha has, i n accordance with regulations, ordered to be c a r r i e d out, cannot be al t e r e d . It Is not clear exactly when Badmadorji discovered t h i s addition, but because of his disapproval the i n i t i a l agreement to the conditions was reversed. This change took 169 place no l a t e r than October 1 9 . Badmadorji i n s i s t e d that a further meeting involving more outlying representatives 170 was necessary. This was not a f u l l about-face on the part of the leading lamas for there had been a c e r t a i n degree of reluctance on t h e i r part to the whole idea of returning to China. Ch'en's l e t t e r accompanying Huang Ch'eng-hsu and the conditions notes a lama request at that time for further 171 discussion before a decision. The a l t e r a t i o n of the 18th condition did not r e a l l y bring a change of heart, i t merely provided the lamas with a good excuse. It has been pointed 172 out as a t a c t i c a l error on the part of Ch'en I. Another factor probably influencing Badmadorji's opposition to the conditions was the fact that he had been deprived of the rank of Shangchotba by the Liv i n g Buddha i n 1911'on.the insistence of Santo, the Manchu Amban, which would very l i k e l y have created a considerable resentment towards Manchu-Chinese 173 authority. But undoubtedly the main question was the one of preservation of power. These negotiations seem i n good measure to have i n -volved Ch'en I as a mediator, an unenviable and f r u s t r a t i n g p o s i t i o n i n any case, but i t must have been rendered much more f r u s t r a t i n g by Ch'en I's Chinese committments. He has been accused of exhibiting impatience at t h i s point i n his negotiations, but his impatience i s understandable. It Is l i k e l y that i n addition to the f r u s t r a t i o n of being caught i n a power struggle, his impatience was increased by the seeming nearness of success and by the fear that Hsu Shu-cheng's growing presence might either r a i s e Mongol suspicion and reluctance, or else that Hsu might st e a l his glory. And f i n a l l y , he must have been aware that the threat of attack from Semenov had been severely reduced i n early September because of i n t e r n a l troubles i n Semenov's army which had resulted i n a revolt arid the k i l l i n g of.one of his former 174 chief deputies Fushengge. The Semenov threat i t must be remembered was the basis upon which the a d v i s a b i l i t y of can-c e l l i n g autonomy was-argued. This was the state of negotiations at the time of Hsu' a r r i v a l i n Urga, but before discussing how he responded to thi s situation,, we should sum up the factors influencing re-lations between Hsu Shu-cheng and Ch'en I. As was mentioned e a r l i e r , the signing of the Kiakhta Agreement created an ambiguous re l a t i o n s h i p between China and Outer Mongolia, for by i t Outer Mongolia was at one and the same time independent and a part of Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Thus the p o s i t i o n of the chief Chinese representative i n Urga could not but share i n t h i s ambiguity. The o f f i c e was i n function somewhat similar to a consulate, but could not be so c a l l e d because' i t was Chinese t e r r i t o r y . In addition, as the Chinese p o s i t i o n i n Mongolia improved, the authority of the Urga Commissioner expanded but t h i s altered authority -was not l a i d down i n any s p e c i f i c regulations. Ch'en I thus found himself i n the rather strange p o s i t i o n i n 1919 of i n e f f e c t , negotiating for the cancellation of his own o f f i c e The-only o f f i c i a l authority for his doing so was a d i r e c -17 5 t i v e from the foreign o f f i c e on August 21 of that year. Hsu Shu-cheng's authority In Outer Mongolia was based upon his proposals i n his Outline of Operation for the Northwest. That Hsu•somewhat ignored the diplomatic subtleties of-the Kiakhta Agreement i s indicated by the fact that his plan refers to Outer Mongolia.as China's Northwest and by the ommission of any consideration of the necessity of Mongol approval of his development proposals. Perhaps Hsu. was aware of the ambiguous p o s i t i o n of Outer Mongolia i n re-l a t i o n to the.Chinese government and that that i s at least part of the reason for his concern that his o f f i c e be given s u f f i c i e n t authority. But i t seems reasonably c e r t a i n that he did not anticipate the i n t e r n a t i o n a l nuances of the pro-blem. The p r e s i d e n t i a l mandate of July 1 8 gives Hsu control over the army and a l l aspects of development and education, and states that i n a l l areas mentioned the Urga Commissioner was to be subject to the control of the Planning Commission^ 1 7 6 er. S t r i c t l y speaking t h i s does not give Hsu authority over the cancellation of autonomy, since i t f a l l s under none of the categories mentioned i n the mandate. Ch'en I had been ordered by the foreign o f f i c e on January 5 to begin negotiations to cancel the Russian Treaty. Numerous other d i r e c t i v e s had followed, and on August 2 1 he was directed to proceed with the negotiations. But Hsu Shu-cheng had s p e c i f i c plans for the development of Mongolia. In his audience with the President before departure for Mongolia he claims he received P r e s i d e n t i a l approval for his plans. It i s not clear what was said about the ca n c e l l a t i o n of not have been put into operation otherwise. In- his wire of November 10 Hsu states that i n his meeting with the president before his departure for Urga, when he discussed his plans and received p r e s i d e n t i a l approval, that the Pre-177 sident advised him to get a copy of the 63 conditions.-This meeting cannot be reconstructed but there i s no doubt that Hsu. was aware of the existence of the 63 conditions. His wire of November 10 when he talked of his meeting with •Huang Cheng-hsu who had brought the conditions to Peking on 178 October 4, indicates t h i s . Hsu i n short, must have f e l t that he was being denied some of the authority that properly belonged to his o f f i c e . The. approval of Hsu's operation for the Northwest Frontier and the subsequent creation of the o f f i c e i n fact marked the adoption of a second p o l i c y for Outer Mongolia by the government i n Peking. Ch!en I's negotiations represent the i n i t i a l cautious p o l i c y of negotiations i n good f a i t h and Hsu's proposals represent the aggressive p o l i c y of forced acceptance of Chinese d i c t a t e s . Thus we have created to the north of the Great Wall a s i t u a t i o n that i n many respects p a r a l l e l e d the North-South s p l i t i n China proper and i n par-t i c u l a r the growing Anfu-Chihli s p l i t which was i n i t s e l f a r e f l e c t i o n of the North-South s p l i t . It i s not surprising that a government s p l i t over domestic issues should carry this s.plit into - since we can't quite say foreign a f f a i r s -other areas. • ' Such a conception of the si t u a t i o n i n Outer Mongolia i s rather i n t e r e s t i n g for i t helps make clear that Hsu viewed Ch'en as an extension of the opposition i n Peking. This fact coupled with the vague delineations of authority between Hsu and Ch'en i n regard to the cancellation of Outer Mongolian autonomy was bound to have a measurable effect on the actions of these two men. The f i r s t s i g n i f i c a n t interchange between Hsu Shu-cheng and Ch'en I was a series of telegrams which extended over an eight day period from August 31 to September 7. Ch'en had begun the negotiations for cancellation of autonomy on August 21 and these negotiations were i n progress. This 179 series of telegrams, which i s included i n the Nien-pu, stemmed from an incident involving the f i r s t unit -of Hsu's force, then on i t s way to Urga, and the Outer Mongol garrison stationed at Ude, the f i r s t stopping point on the Kalgan-Urga road which was actually i n Outer Mongolian t e r r i t o r y . There was a dispute concerning the purchase of sheep for Hsu's forces. ' To have trouble between Hsu's forces and the Mongols almost on the moment of t h e i r a r r i v a l i n Outer Mongolian t e r r i t o r y posed a threat to the successful conclusions of Ch'en's negotiations. At t h i s time the question of Hsu usurping Ch'en's authority had not yet taken form. Ch'en had a f t e r a l l been asking repeatedly for the dispatch of Hsu's 180 troops. Ch'en must have been aware that m i l i t a r y backing could well prove a mixed blessing. As a r e s u l t when he was informed of t h i s trouble he immediately wired Hsu Shu-cheng. The tone of his telegram i s that of a p o l i t e order. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n that Ch'en considers his p o s i t i o n to be less than Hsu's. Hsu Shu-cheng undoubtedly took considerable pride i n the d i s c i p l i n e of his forces. The 5th telegram of t h i s ser-i e s , for instance, indicates his concern for d i s c i p l i n e , as do a l l his d i r e c t i v e s here to Ch'u Ch'i-hsiang. In his t e l e -gram of November 14 he mentions with obvious pride the d i s c i -p l i n e and high morale displayed by his troops when reviewed l 8 l by Badmadorji. In item f i v e of Hsu Dau-lin's r e c o l l e c t i o n s of his father^ period of administration i n Urga i t i s recor-ded that Hsu "spent everyday from dawn u n t i l dark checking 182 on the m i l i t a r y encampment." It appears from the wires that followed that Hsu was i r r i t a t e d by Ch'en's c r i t i c i s m of his troops for his r e p l i e s were quite s t i f f . Ch'en, i t ap-pears, had been i n error and as we move through the series we f i n d him adopting an almost apologetic tone while Hsu by the c l o s i n g wire of the series has become exceedingly s t i f f . At t h i s point i t appears that neither Hsu nor Ch'en had en-visaged an authority problem. Hsu however gives us a f a i r l y strong i n d i c a t i o n of his unwillingness to take a back seat i n appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Northwest Frontier Defense Force,, a North China Herald reporter estimated just that: "Hsu's appointment will'mean action i n Outer Mongolia l83 as Hsu i s not wont to take a back seat." The preparation of the force for the expedition had probably taken up most of Hsu's time, and he had neither time nor reason to concern himself with the question of the' d i v i s i o n of authority i n Outer Mongolia. On the basis of .his appointment he could reasonably assume that he would be i n charge. Events between t h i s time and his departure for Urga on October 23 however, created some reason for Hsu to con-cern himself. Ch'en's i n i t i a l negotiations were completed by the end of September and on October 1 he sent Huang Ch'eng hsu to peking with a draft copy of the 63 conditions. It appears that Huang took 10 days to get to Peking for the con-ditions were not presented to the Foreign Office u n t i l 184 November 11. On October 14 the cabinet c a l l e d a secret meeting to discuss the cancellation of Outer Mongolian s e l f -185 government. On October 15 Chin Yun-p'eng requested a l l .cabinet ministries and bureaus to submit t h e i r recommenda-tions on the 63 c o n d i t i o n s , 1 ^ and on October 16 a pr o v i -187 sional committee was ordered to discuss the 63 conditions. , Hsu and the Frontier Defense Bureau were excluded from these deliberations. ' We know from Hsu's wire of November 10 that he was aware of the existence of the 63 conditions soon af t e r they were drafted. We can only guess as to his motiva-tions for leaving for Urga, but I t seems probable that i t was a r e s u l t of his exclusion from these discussions. On Novem-ber 20 the Foreign O f f i c e wired Ch'en I that Hsu would soon 189 be i n Urga. It was i n t h i s wire that the Foreign O f f i c e s p e c i f i c a l l y stated that Ch'en I was to remain In charge of the negotiations for the c a n c e l l a t i o n of self-government and that'Hsu Shu-cheng's authority was r e s t r i c t e d to m i l i t a r y matters. We also know from Hsu's telegram of November 10 that on October 22, the day before his departure for Urga, he met President Hsu Shih-ch'ang and, he says, "enquired about these conditions." Exactly what was said i s not known but apparent-ly the President ordered him to obtain and examine the condi-• 190 tions. Since the President apparently did not deny t h i s claim, we must assume that Hsu did have his approval. It i s probable, however, that Hsu Shu-cheng i n s i s t e d that he be given access to them and that Hsu Shih-ch'ang acceded, because he could f i n d no good reason not to. It i s at t h i s same meeting that we have the f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n , although not very strong, that Hsu considered•Ch'en.I to be under his authority, when Hsu quotes the President as responding to his plans for Outer Mongolia with the words, "Very good indeed, to e n l i s t the aid of Ch'en i s an excellent idea." If Ch'en was to ass i s t i t would seem that Hsu was to be i n charge. Hsu reached Urga on October 29 and had his f i r s t meeting with Ch'en I that evening. It appears to have been an exploratory meeting on the part of both of them with caution on both sides. Hsu claims he intended to have a "completely frank exchange of views with Ch'en I" over the 191 conditions, but states that Ch'en was evasive. He him-. s e l f however did not volunteer the information that he was f a m i l i a r with the conditions. This i s evident from Ch'en's wire of November 7, asking i f he should reveal the condi-192 tions to Hsu. Probably to t h i s point Hsu had not con-sidered Ch'en as a problem. He. had not taken kindly to Ch'en's c r i t i c i s m i n the. e a r l i e r series of telegrams and did not i n any way suggest acceptance of Ch'en as his su- ' perior. In his meeting with the President before his de-parture there was some evidence that he considered that Ch'en would be under him. By the time he arrived i n Urga he was thoroughly f a m i l i a r with Ch'en's conditions, which he had picked up from the Cabinet Secretariat. Although he does not say so i n his objections to Ch'en's conditions which he wired to Peking on November 1, i n his wire of November 1.0, he points 193 out that some of the conditions i n f r i n g e on his plan. The conditions conceived and worked .out under e n t i r e l y d i f -ferent circumstances than.Hsu's program, gave the Mongols a good deal o f ; c o n t r o l over development plans for t h e i r coun-t r y , over troop deployment, and created an administrative 19 4 structure that held no place for Hsu. J Also i n t h i s November 10 telegram, Hsu reveals his discovery that someone i n the government had informed Ch'en not to allow Hsu to take over. There i s no way of ascer-t a i n i n g when he made t h i s 'discovery but i t i s possible that he heard i t the following day (October 30), and that this information which would have confirmed any doubts he had about Ch'en's cooperation af t e r t h e i r f i r s t meeting, prompt-ed him to draft his objections to Ch'en's conditions i n an e f f o r t to have them removed. Hsu's concern at t h i s point i s understandable i f we r e c a l l that the basic reasons for.the creation of Hsu's pos i t i o n were to provide an excuse for the maintenance of the army and to shine up the Anfu image which was then on the wane. To t h i s we must add Hsu's ambition and his d i s l i k e of 195 playing second f i d d l e . Part of. his reason i n going to Outer Mongolia appears to have been that the negotiations were near conclusion and that i f he was to gain a part i n t h i s he must be there. To f i n d at t h i s late stage that he was to be excluded from the negotiations posed a threat to the .continuance of his army, to the Anfu cli q u e , to the future of his plans, and also placed a s t r i c t u r e upon his ambition. His discovery that Ch'en I was being supported by cabinet elements against him- and Hsu was undoubtedly aware that t h i s opposition centered i n Chin Yun-p'eng and Ch'en Lu - i n eff e c t rendered Ch'en I an extension of the s p l i t i n Peking. Thus, an i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n was de-veloping. The Anfu-Chihli s p l i t within the Northern govern-ment was i d e a l o g i c a l l y and to a large degree i n action, based on t h e i r disagreement as to whether the South should be reunited with the North through force, ( ^ )}M or through negotiation ). The scene i n Mongolia r e f l e c t e d t h i s s p l i t and the pa r t i c i p a n t s were aligned with the cor-responding groups i n Peking. The existence of t h i s split-goes back to the many proposals i n the spring of t h i s year concerning Outer Mongolia and to the acceptance of Hsu's plan i n June. This l a t t e r event marked, as has been said, the creation of a second p o l i c y l i n e for Mongolia. The breakdown i n communications suggests that even as lat e as October the government was unclear i n i t s p o s i t i o n . F i r s t , the meetings to discuss the 63 conditions were supposed to be secret. Yet Hsu learned of them and received the President's approval to pick them up from the Cabinet Secre-t a r i a t . Yet the government seems to have remained unaware that Hsu had seen them, since they did not inform Ch'en that Hsu knew of them - although Ch'en wired on November 6 and 7 to ask whether he should reveal them to Hsu. Neither was Ch'en informed by the government that Hsu had objected to his conditions, and strangely, although the government okayed 198 the conditions on October 28 they did not so advise Hsu, and i n f a c t , i n his November 10 wire he states that he received a reply from the Cabinet and President commenting 199 favorably on his seven objections. Even more strangely they did not advise Ch'en I u n t i l November 4 , that his con-20 di t i o n s had been approved and were being forwarded to Urga. Hsu Shu-cheng showed none of the indecision of the government. On November 4 Premier Chin Yun-p'eng rejected Hsu's objections, but as we have seen, Hsu apparently re-ceived, a wire approving them, p r i o r to t h i s . These objections were probably prepared i n great haste following Hsu's d i s -covery that he might not be able to employ Ch'en.to his ends as he had-planned. His introduction to the objections gives us some evidence of t h i s , for he states that the ob-jections w i l l include the opinions he has gathered from the Mongols since his a r r i v a l . The introduction could of course have been written after the objections were prepared, and i t i s only the seventh objection concerning Ch'en's re l i a n c e on the nobles which seems to r e f l e c t opinions he probably gleaned i n Urga. But the lack of any close analysis of the conditions and the presentation instead of very general c r i t i c i s m seems to suggest a hurried preparation. The c r i t i c i s m of the .63 conditions seems to be i n good measure based on the fact that they are i n i m i c a l to Hsu's own proposals. That they do not promote c i v i l i z a t i o n (objections 1 and 2 ) counterpoints 9 and 10 of his plan, that they r e s t r i c t China's administrative authority (objection 3 ) runs counter to a l l those parts of Hsu's plan that assume unrestricted Chinese rig h t s to develop communication, indus-t r y , and commerce. That they promise to increase China's f i s c a l burden (objection 4) runs counter to the premise upon which his plan was constructed - that Outer Mongolia could bring no returns at the same time the country was being de-veloped and s i n i c i z e d , and f i n a l l y that this negotiated settlement provided no guarantee that Russia would honour i t (objection 6 and 7 ) runs counter to Hsu's apparent con-ception that there was l i t t l e need to take account of Outer Mongolia's objections. That Hsu conceived force to be the best means to re - e s t a b l i s h Chinese control i s f a i r l y evident for example i n the following two quotations from his objec-t i o n s : "Even i f they do not cancel self-government we can take advantage of present conditions and restore our authori-ty, taking the stand that Outer Mongolia i s Chinese t e r r i -tory." and "If we take advantage of Russia's present help-lessness to est a b l i s h r e a l t e r r i t o r i a l control over Mongolia, which has always been ours, the Russians w i l l be unable to 2 0 1 hinder' us," Although i n the seventh objection he speaks of the-use of leniency and severity, even th i s ultimately was to be a matter of force. In his wire of November 1 3 speaking of his employment of leniency and severity he says, "Their use throughout must be c a r e f u l l y calculated. By nature the Mongols are very suspicious and i t would be d i f f i c u l t to use severity alone to pacify them. .Therefore we must win them over through leniency. Probably after a time they w i l l begin to see through t h i s and then we must use severity to 202 break them." Hsu's presentation .of his seven objections mark his decision to openly counter Ch'en's p o s i t i o n as chief nego-t i a t o r . He reveals however, i n the penultimate paragraph of his objections that he was aware of the problem of authority: "In the management of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s I do not want .to overstep my bounds and make offensive c r i t i c i s m s , but having the defense of the Outer Mongolian border entrus-2 ted to me, I do not want to be remiss i n my r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . As I have pointed out, the nature of China's position i n Outer Mongolia made the l i m i t s of authority of Ch'en I somewhat unclear. The c o n f l i c t i n Peking over what p o l i c y to follow as we have also seen, made the r e l a t i o n between Hsu and Ch'en even mo're unclear. It seems l i k e l y that t h i s state of a f f a i r s on the one hand created the opportunity for Hsu to claim more authority than he o r i g i n a l l y might have had, and at .the same time made him move more quickly both to take advantage of the s i t u a t i o n to improve his p o s i t i o n and to ensure that China's Interests (from his point of view) were best served. At the same time a number of things had occurred that must have served to make Ch'en I somewhat defensive. We have seen that the a r r i v a l of Hsu's troops caused a certa i n amount of a l i e n a t i o n of the Mongols, for example, Hsu's troops, as has been' noted, surrounded the L i v i n g Buddha's quarters p r i o r to. Hsu's a r r i v a l . At almost the same time as t h i s , Ch'en also learned through a source i n Urga that the L i v i n g Buddha had written to the President demanding Ch'en's removal. This demand was i n fact related to the surrounding of the L i v i n g Buddha's quarters with Hsu's troops, - the Liv i n g Buddha mentions t h i s s p e c i f i c a l l y i n his second l e t t e r to the Pre-sident which also contained .the demand for Ch'en's removal. There could have been no doubt i n Ch'en's mind but that Hsu posed a threat to the successful conclusion of his negotia-tions for' the cancell a t i o n of autonomy, and there was also very l i k e l y l i t t l e doubt i n his mind as to the intention of Hsu to usurp t h i s r o l e . Ch'en Lu's forwarning of Hsu's a r r i v a l re-affirming Ch'en's control, indicates f a i r l y c l e a r -204 ly the foreign o f f i c e estimate of Hsu's intentions. Ch'en I .could not but have shared t h e i r views. On October 29, 2 0 5 image was at stake and that great care must be taken. This was an expression of his fear that Hsu would cause-trouble. On November 4 Ch'en Lu informed Ch'en I that the 6 3 conditions had been accepted and would be returned to him shortly. With.success seemingly so near to being i n his hands he must have been extremely wary of Hsu's pre-sence. His fears probably -engendered a reluctance to deal with Hsu openly. Yet he was aware of the danger of Hsu's interference with his negotiations. On November 6 Hsu Shu-cheng had an audience with the Li v i n g Buddha. According to Jagchid Sechen Hsu was accompanied by troops i n a l l his 207 negotiations with the Mongols. This audience provided Ch'en with f a i r l y clear evidence that Hsu intended to by-pass him and take negotiations into his own hands. He accordingly on t h i s same day, wired Peking that the return of the 6 3 conditions be expedited for fear that Hsu would fi n d f a u l t with them, and that the confusion of two separate Chinese claiming authority for control of negotiations would 2 08 weaken the Chinese image. Ch'en I's estimate was well, considered, for th i s s p l i t was creating a s i t u a t i o n i n which the Mongols would have the opportunity to play Hsu.off against Ch'en. Surprisingly, the return of the 6 3 condi-tions does not seem to have been expedited, but perhaps more s u r p r i s i n g l y , Ch'en I was not informed of Hsu's objec-t i o n s , even on November 10th he appears to have been unaware of t h e i r existence. On November. 7 Ch'en and Hsu met and discussed the negotiations but Ch'en s t i l l did not re-210 veal the 63 conditions. Hsu Shu-cheng informed Ch'en I that i f the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy did not c o n f l i c t w i t h the a u t h o r i t y o f h i s o f f i c e , he would • 211 not i n t e r f e r e . Ch'en f e l t that he should reveal the conditions to Hsu to ward off the p o s s i b i l i t y of trouble 212 between them. Hsu s t i l l considered that he was to be i n charge, however, as i s revealed i n his statement "If we are at variance on some points, I w i l l s t i l l bear r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 213 for d i r e c t i o n of matters concerning the Mongols.. On November 7 Assistant Commissioners L i Yuan and En Hua ar-rived i n Urga and Ch'en met with them and presumed that they were i n agreement, with him. By November 10 either Hsu had revealed to Ch'en I that he knew of the conditions or Ch'en I had informed him of them, for on that day they ar-ranged to discuss the conditions at Hsu's o f f i c e on November 215 11. It i's also i n th i s wire of November 10 that Hsu asserts that he i s going to involve himself i n these nego-t i a t i o n s . He points out that he has received approval of his objections, and that the conditions Infringe upon the authori-ty of his o f f i c e . . He has ca l l e d a meeting for the following day, November 11, to discuss the changes he fe e l s should be made. Hsu had no authority to a l t e r the cabinet decision on the 63 conditions yet he was not ordered not to i n t e r - • fere. In t h i s same wire he says he has arranged to have the two Assistant Commissioners L i Yuan and En Hua, his ad-v i s o r Yang Chih-ch'eng, and the commander of the 3rd B r i -gade, Chu Ch'i-Hsiang, take part i n his discussion of the 2l6 conditions with Ch'en i n order to ensure a f a i r judgment. It Is doubtful that t h i s was his intention. Two of these people were his own m i l i t a r y subordinates, and would un-doubtedly support him. It seems l i k e l y that he was also sure of the support of the Assistant Commissioners, or at least that he would be able to force t h e i r agreement. His l a t e r commendation and employment of these two men c e r t a i n l y suggests that they cooperated with him i n blocking Ch'en's 217 conditions. At the meeting on the morning of November 11 Hsu l a i d down four p r i n c i p l e s which he i n s i s t e d the conditions must uphold: that the administration must allow for improving of Mongol c i v i l i z a t i o n ;that administrative controls must go to the central government, not to the nobles; that neither the lamas nor the nobles be favoured; and that they must not i n -2l8 fringe upon the authority of his own o f f i c e . With t h i s as a basis for his argument, Hsu i n s i s t e d that Ch'en's con-d i t i o n s be scrapped and replaced with eight general condi-219 t i o n s . Ch'en I was instructed to begin re-negotiating 220 on the basis of these new conditions that afternoon. This day marks a turning point i n negotiations. November 11, thus, marks Hsu's assumption of authority for the negotiations. He did. not however, i t appears, receive approval o f . t h i s action from Peking other than that, he was not ordered not to i n t e r f e r e . It seems safe to as-sume that he therefore.realized the necessity of moving quickly, not only because of the dubious authority of his p o s i t i o n , but also because he could not be sure-that Ch'en I would not continue to w.ork against him. These factors very l i k e l y contributed to the speed with which Hsu drew his negotiations to a conclusion. On November 11 Hsu for the f i r s t time openly condemns Ch'en I. He also openly states that he i s assuming charge of the negotiations. Yet he s t i l l recognizes that he i s functioning i n a temporary capacity and states as he did i n ; his wire of the 10th, when he suggested that he should take charge of negotiations, that when the negotiations were can-221 c e l l e d , he would hand the matter back to Ch'en I. It i s possible that Hsu was insincere i n these statements and that he made them to smooth the opposition to his takeover. But for a number of reasons, i t seems just as l i k e l y that he intended to act as he said. As we have seen, Hsu's intere s t i n Mongolia arose from p o l i t i c a l and economic pressures i n China. His p o l i t i c a l career to t h i s point was very much Peking-centered. He wait-ed to the l a s t minute before going to Outer Mongolia and, i n a l l , spent very l i t t l e time there because of his deep involvement i n the government i n Peking. To take over the administration of Outer Mongolia would, remove him from the centre of p o l i t i c a l influence. Secondly, i f he successful-l y negotiated the return of Outer Mongolia to China, the retention of the Fro n t i e r Army would have been j u s t i f i e d and the Anfu image measurably improved, which were the i n i -t i a l aims behind his involvement i n the Outer Mongolian question. I f he i n fact had intended to return Ch'en's p o s i t i o n to him, perhaps to l a t e r replace him with someone el s e , we must account for Hsu's change of mind. Although anything we say must remain i n the realm of speculation, i t i s f a i r l y easy to account for such an a l -t e r a t i o n i n Hsu's plan. Hsu rose to p o l i t i c a l prominence, following Yuan Shih-k'ai's death, under the wing of Tuan C h ' i - j u i . Despite the fact that he was tremendously capa-ble, energetic and ambitious, he remained very much a cog i n Tuan's machine. He was also younger than most of the northern p o l i t i c i a n s with whom he was associated. Tuan, for example was 15 years his senior and President Hsu Shih-chang 222 at 64 was 26 years his elder. Hsu was popularly referred to at the time as " L i t t l e Hsu" to d i s t i n g u i s h him from "Big 223 Hsu" the President. We have no record of Hsu Shu-cheng objecting to this sobriquet, but i t seems reasonable to sug-gest that his ambitions were less than s a t i s f i e d with the Very touchy about v i o l a t i o n s of his authority, i t i s l i k e l y that the confusion i n Outer Mongolia which resulted i n Hsu's seizure of authority, l e f t him with an authority that was somewhat i n question. It seems reasonable to sug-gest that t h i s led Hsu to act i n a more p r e c i p i t a t e way than he otherwise might have. The events that follow his assump-ti o n of control on November 11 seem to bear t h i s out. On November 12 Hsu met Badmadorji for the f i r s t time and quickly ascertained that t h i s was the point at which to 224 apply pressure. Although he does not say so, he must have been aware that i t was Badmadorji who had blocked accep-225 tance of Ch'en's conditions. The other factors he saw. as rendering Badmadorji the key man were that Badmadorji as Premier held the reigns of government, that (probably because of Badmadorji's power) the Living Buddha had less trust i n him than i n his other top advisors, that Badmadorji had once been stripped of the rank of Shangchotba by the L i v i n g Buddha and had been passed over i n the granting of t i t l e s , and therefore harboured considerable resentment towards the 226 L i v i n g Buddha of Urga.. Badmadorji, although pressured by Hsu, was much i n the same way as. Hsu, forced to move quickly because of the power struggle between the lamas and the nobles. There was no certainty at t h i s point that Ch'en I, or .the nobles had negotiated with the nobles i t would be neither to the lamas, nor to Badmadorji's advantage. The events of the few days from Hsu's assumption of control to the acquiescence of the Outer Mongols seems to bear this out. F i r s t , Hsu did not seek out Badmadorji on November 12. The Living Buddha had sent an i n v i t a t i o n to Hsu to at-227 tend a feast. It is doubtful that this was simply a gesture of friendship. It seems, rather, that the Living Buddha had been advised by his top advisors, notably Bad-madorji, that Hsu could be used to counter Ch'en I. The nobles at a meeting on November 13 approved cancelling s e l f -228 government. This meeting had to have been arranged be-forehand, and i t seems l i k e l y that Badmadorji at least realized the necessity of acting before the nobles i n order to protect lama Interests as much as possible. Once Badma-dorj i had met Hsu there i s no evidence of his reluctance to negotiate. He attended a play in company with Hsu and i t 229 i s unlikely that this was forced upon him. J Hsu was determined to move quickly in cancelling autonomy but i t i s very l i k e l y that he was provoked to move faster by the news of the nobles decision on November 13. Although Hsu was not informed of the nobles position u n t i l November 14 he probably knew of i t on the 13th. Secrets seemed to have short life-spans i n Urga at this time. Hsu, f o r example, had f a i r l y q u i c k l y l e a r n e d o f the w i r e t o Ch'en I a d v i s i n g him Hsu was not t o c o n t r o l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Ch'en I h e a r d v e r y q u i c k l y of the L i v i n g Buddha's r e q u e s t to have him removed. Given the u n s t a b l e p o s i t i o n of Outer M o n g o l i a a t t h e t i m e , i t ' i s l i k e l y t h a t a number of p e o p l e endeavoured t o keep a f o o t i n b o t h camps t o ensure t h e i r f u t u r e and t h a t i t was t h r o u g h t h e s e p e o p l e t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n l e a k s were c h a n n e l e d . R e g a r d l e s s o f whether Hsu a c t u a l l y knew of t h e n o b l e p o s i t i o n on November 13, he d e l i v e r e d h i s u l t i m a t u m t o B a d m a d o r j i on t h a t day, the day a f t e r he had met him, t h r e a t e n i n g to. i m p r i s o n the L i v i n g Buddha i f they s h o u l d r e -f u s e t o comply! Hsu must have been q u i t e s u r e t h a t the s i t u a t i o n was r i p e i n o r d e r t o have i s s u e d t h i s u l t i m a t u m , but as sure as he might have b e e n 3 i t was s t i l l a r a t h e r p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n . The f o l l o w i n g day when Ch'en i n f o r m e d him o f the n o b l e s ' p e t i t i o n , Hsu had a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d h i s u l t i m a t u m . A l t h o u g h he w i r e d t h e government t h a t they c o u l d make use of t h i s p e t i t i o n t o c a n c e l s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t and t h a t he would o n l y r e m a i n t o keep the peace, he went t h a t e v e n i n g t o Bad-m a d o r j i ' s q u a r t e r s accompanied by h i s o f f i c e r s and p r e s s e d B a d m a d o r j i t o a c c e p t h i s own e i g h t c o n d i t i o n s o r e l s e agree t o t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f autonomy w i t h o u t any c o n d i t i o n s . ultimatum extending h i s t h r e a t o f imprisonment to Badmadorji 230 as w e l l as the L i v i n g Buddha. On the morning of the 15th a l l Mongol o f f i c i a l s , lamas 231 and n o b l e s , met to d i s c u s s the ultimatum. T h i s was q u i t e a tumultuous meeting and i n i t i a l l y the nobles and lamas as 232 a group, demanded r e s i s t a n c e to Hsu's ultimatum. A c c o r d -i n g to Ch'en I the Outer Mongolian o f f i c i a l s at t h i s p o i n t not only r e j e c t e d Hsu's e i g h t g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s , they de-manded t h a t the 63 c o n d i t i o n s must be the b a s i s of n e g o t i a -233 t i o n s . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e to a s c e r t a i n i f t h i s was so, but i t seems l i k e l y t h a t i t was. But d e s p i t e t h i s s t r o n g oppo-s i t i o n to Hsu, the Outer Mongolians f i n a l l y agreed to Hsu's demands, although they r e j e c t e d a l l c o n d i t i o n s , r a t h e r than 234 accept h i s e i g h t c o n d i t i o n s . No doubt the major reason f o r t h e i r acquiescence was a r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e r e was no way they c o u l d a v o i d i t . Yet i t i s l i k e l y t h a t noble-lama d i f f e r e n c e s a l s o prompted acceptance, f o r both s i d e s must have f e a r e d t h a t i f they r e f u s e d , the oth e r s i d e would take advantage of t h i s t o accept the Chinese o f f e r i n hopes of g a i n i n g some advantage. The r e j e c t i o n of Hsu's c o n d i t i o n s and the p e t i t i o n d r a f t e d f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n to China t o some degree seem to r e -f l e c t t h i s c o n t i n u i n g power s t r u g g l e . Although Hsu's con-d i t i o n s c o u l d have been r e j e c t e d by both s i d e s because they were too authoritarian, i t i s possible that i t was a con-cession to the nobles. Ch'en's conditions, which i n a way represented the noble p o s i t i o n , had been rejected, therefore Hsu's conditions, to some degree i d e n t i f i e d with the lamas, should also be rejected. This i n i t s e l f seems i n s u f f i c i e n t to support such an argument, but the p e t i t i o n f i n a l l y pre-sented by the Mongols on November 17 was almost verbatim the p e t i t i o n which the nobles had presented to Ch'en I i n Octo-235 ber. ^ This plus the fact that the p e t i t i o n was presented to Ch'en I seems to be an i n d i c a t i o n of an e f f o r t to appease the noble element. The o f f i c i a l p u blication of the p e t i t i o n by the Peking government on November 22 included a report from Hsu Shu-cheng which advised acceptance and the granting of honours and benefits to the L i v i n g Buddha and the Shabinar. It appears that these honours and benefits were those men-2^6 tioned to Hsu by Badmadorji on November 14, J a f i n a l i n d i -cation that power in t e r e s t s remained important even through the debate of Hsu's ultimatum. Hsu Shu-cheng i n his wire of November 18 r e l a t e s his recognition of t h i s outer Mongolian power-split and his u t i -l i z a t i o n of i t . At the same time he denies any competition between himself and Ch'en I and admits that Ch'en I's negotia-tions had created the conditions that made i t possible for him to conclude the c a n c e l l a t i o n of self-government, and that therefore much of the credit . should have gone to Ch'en I. Hsu i n e a r l i e r wires, stated that i t ' was his intention to push for successful conclusion of the cancellation of s e l f -government, and that he overrode Ch'en because he feared Ch'en was unable to do so. At that time he said that when the negotiations were concluded he would .place control back 2 3 8 i n the hands of Ch'en I. Ba s i c a l l y there are only two possible interpretations of these early statements. The f i r s t being that Hsu from the outset intended to replace Ch'en and that these statements were p o l i t i c a l l i e s , meant simply to help counter any resistance to his takeover, but i f t h i s was the case, there:-was i n fact l i t t l e need for him to l a t e r accredit the success i n good measure to Ch'en, for to do so would to some extent provide ammunition for his -opponents guns. I f , on the other hand we assume that Hsu was sincere i n stating his intention to return control to Ch'en I after the negotiations were successfully concluded, i t i s f a i r l y easy to account for the change which occurred i n Hsu's pos i -t i o n i n the twenty-odd days he was i n Urga. Hsu had planned to make use of Ch'en to i n s t i t u t e his plans for Outer Mongolia, but af t e r his a r r i v a l i n Urga he discovered that Ch'en was supported to some extent by the opposition to himself i n the cabinet. As late as November 13 he was advised by the cabinet to leave negotiations i n 239 Ch'en's charge. With the successful .negotiation of the cancellation•of autonomy a l l of these i n i t i a l aims were achieved. He could well have returned control to Ch'en I at this point, but a number of factors worked against t h i s . The Mongols tended to turn to Ch'en I following Hsu's pre-sure, for example, i n Ch'en's wire of November 17 he claims . 24 they have asked for a r e - i n s t i t u t i o n of the 63 conditions. In fact a number of events indicated Ch'en's superior po-s i t i o n at t h i s time. Ch'en had supported the Mongols i n r e s i s t i n g Hsu's demand for a formal presentation of the pe-t i t i o n and when the p e t i t i o n was delivered, the Mongols re-24 fused to send i t to Hsu and presented i t instead to Ch'en. Only at Ch'en's request did'they prepare a copy of i t to 242 present to Hsu Shu-cheng. Hsu at t h i s point also bowed to Ch'en's judgment that there should be no ceremony i n -volved i n the Outer Mongol presentation of the p e t i t i o n to 243 avoid causing them to lose face. There i s l i t t l e doubt that Ch'en and Hsu had taken a personal d i s l i k e to each other. They seem to have been very d i f f e r e n t i n personality. Hsu had come to Urga and usurped Ch'en's position and taken from under his nose the success he had been working towards for several months. Hsu's com-ments i n his wires leave no doubt as to his opinion of Ch'en I. The Mongols, on the other hand, preferred to recognize Ch'en I's authority, and t h i s undoubtedly irked 24S Hsu Shu-cheng. In his wire of November 18 he acknowledges the c r u c i a l part played by Ch'en I i n negotiations, but there i s l i t t l e doubt that the course of events i n Outer Mongolia, and p a r t i c u l a r l y of the interference over the pre-sentation of the p e t i t i o n on November 17, were leading him to the view that Ch'en I's continued presence i n Outer Mongolia would be a threat to his own p o s i t i o n . In his i n i t i a l wires Hsu Shu-cheng had stated that i t was not his intention to usurp Ch'en's p o s i t i o n i n Urga but that he f e l t It was necessary to ensure the successful con-clusion of negotiations and that he would not i n t e r f e r e with Ch'en once t h i s had been accomplished. But i t seems that developments i n Outer Mongolia altered t h i s view. We have already mentioned two of these f a c t o r s : one, that the nature of Outer Mongolia's r e l a t i o n s h i p to China contributed to an ambiguity i n the l i m i t s of Ch'en I's and Hsu's o f f i c e s and two, that t h i s was exacerbated by the fact that the c o n f l i c t i n Urga became an extension of the c o n f l i c t i n Peking. This had led to Hsu moving more quickly than he might have, applying more pressure than he might have, a l l of which re-sulted In his extraordinary success i n concluding these negotiations. This success, I think, changed his conception change did not occur of course overnight but evolved over the period of his work i n Outer Mongolia, influenced and furthered by the problems that arose each day. By November 19 the change i n his conception of the part Outer Mongolia could play i n his own career begins to emerge c l e a r l y . In his f i r s t wire of t h i s day, he points out that his i s the superior o f f i c e and that Ch'en I's o f f i c e , i f i t i s to continue, must operate s t r i c t l y In i t s subordinate 246 capacity. In his second telegram of t h i s date, he sug-gests the a d v i s a b i l i t y of moving the headquarters of his of-247 f i c e to Urga. These suggestions i n themselves might be taken as quite l o g i c a l conclusions considering the changed status of Outer Mongolia. The o f f i c e of the Urga Commission-er was created to supervise Chinese i n t e r e s t s i n independent Mongolia. Independence was terminated therefore the o f f i c e had become superfluous. Since Hsu's was the o f f i c e In charge of f r o n t i e r development, Hsu could l o g i c a l l y argue that he should move headquarters to Urga. Following events, however, seem to indicate that there was more involved than these administrative adjustments. In his wires of November 20, the day before his de-parture for Peking, he again j u s t i f i e s his interference with Ch'en I and i n his proposed address to the Mongols, It i s 248 made clea r that he intends to remain i n charge. When he Ch'en I under guard and put Ghu-Ch'i-hsiang i n charge dur-249 ing his absence. Following his a r r i v a l i n Peking on 250 November 24 he set to work to have Ch'en I removed. On December 1 the o f f i c e of the Urga Commissioner was abolished, 251 Ch'en I was. given an appointment i n Honan, and Hsu was 252 appointed Director of Outer Mongolian Re h a b i l i t a t i o n . Hsu was treated as a conquering hero on his return to Peking on November 24. Sun Yat-sen compared him to three t r a d i t i o n a l 253 culture heroes who had been p a c i f i e r s of barbarians. Hsu's p o l i t i c a l prestige before his departure for Urga had been somewhat In question. Now i t was at i t s peak. Hsu 254 himself considered that he was the hero of his age, J and not without reason. Sun Yat-sen stated the case quite pre-c i s e l y ; China had been suffering setback a f t e r setback, from . the closing years of the Ching Dynasty, and now i n a matter 255 of. days Hsu had regained Outer Mongolia. Hsu had. gone to Urga with the intention of p a r t i c i p a -t i n g i n the negotiations for the cancellation of autonomy. The i n i t i a l objectives had been to create an excuse for the maintenance of the former War P a r t i c i p a t i o n Army, and to ease somewhat, the pressure created by Hsu/s presence i n Peking. The i n s t i t u t i o n of the f r o n t i e r program i t s e l f , though probably•of secondary importance, was also part of the plan. Hsu's discovery on his a r r i v a l i n Urga, f i r s t , that Ch'en I would not cooperate, then that Ch'en I had been t o l d not to cooperate, plus the ambiguous l i m i t s of Ch'en's and his own authority, then seemed to have forced Hsu to move much more quickly than he otherwise might have done. His extraordinary success coupled with his i r r i t a t i o n over the authority question moved his thoughts i n a new d i r e c t i o n . He began, I think, sometime during t h i s period, to conceive of Outer Mongolia as a t e r r i t o r i a l base to provide him with s u f f i c i e n t power to operate as a warlord i n his own r i g h t . " L i t t l e Hsu" was a f t e r a l l proving himself to be quite big. Hsu had referred to himself as "King of the Northwest" ) soon afte r his appointment as Fro n t i e r Commissioner. Thus, equating himself with Chang Tso-Lin, the "King of the Northeast" At that time these words could not have been anything more than a boast, but with his spectacu-l a r success i n Urga they must have seemed almost a r e a l i t y and i t i s understandable that he should begin to consider i t as such. Hsu's attempted assumption of such a role was i n fact a contributing reason to the f i n a l break between the Anfu and C h i h l i Cliques i n July, 1920. It was also the f i n a l cause of Chang Tso-lin's turn against the Anfu Clique,' 1 and thus i t may be said that Hsu i n attempting to further secure his p o s i t i o n brought about his own defeat. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o s p e c u l a t e at t h i s p o i n t what might have o c c u r r e d i f Hsu had f o l l o w e d h i s o r i g i n a l l y s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n s of r e s t o r i n g Ch'en I upon c o n c l u s i o n of the n e g o t i a t i o n s . I f he had done so, i t might w e l l have se-cured the permanent re-alignment of Outer Mongolia wi t h China. Because of h i s o p p o s i t i o n to Hsu, and h i s a c t u a l t a k i n g o f the Mongol s i d e i n a number of i s s u e s , the n e g o t i a -t i o n s w i t h Hsu would have rendered Ch'en I much more accep-t a b l e t o the Mongols. China's c o n t r o l r e - e s t a b l i s h e d Hsu co u l d t o some extent have served as a scapegoat. Ch'en I, not c l o s e l y i n v o l v e d i n Peking p o l i t i c s , would not have com-p l i c a t e d Mongol a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w i t h Peking problems and would have served to a degree as a check a g a i n s t such a s i t u a t i o n o c c u r r i n g . His past experience i n n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h the Mongols would bear him i n good st e a d w i t h the new Outer Mongolian p o s t , and he c o u l d a l s o t o some extent have served as a check on u n s u i t a b l e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o p o s a l s emanating from Peking. The a u t h o r i t a r i a n way t h a t Hsu had o v e r r i d d e n Outer Mongolian wishes would a d m i t t e d l y have r a i s e d a s c a r not e a s i l y e r a s e d , and Ch'en might, we must admit, have been abl e t o do l i t t l e t o m i t i g a t e t h i s resentment. He was, however, not to be g i v e n the chance, f o r by the c o n c l u s i o n of the n e g o t i a t i o n s , Hsu was determined t o have him removed. Hsu's involvement i n Outer Mongolia, as we have s a i d , came about as an intended s o l u t i o n t o i n t e r n a l Chinese p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s . A l though Hsu was an ex-tremely capable man, I n t e l l i g e n t , ambit ious and tremendously e n e r g e t i c , he was the wrong man f o r what was an e s s e n t i a l l y d e l i c a t e d i p l o m a t i c p o s i t i o n , f o r p a r o d o x i c a l as i t might seem, i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between China and Outer M o n g o l i a c r e a t e d by the K i a k h t a Agreement was based on a s u b t l e f i c -t i o n , the r e l a t i o n s h i p remained much the same w i t h the nominal r e t u r n of f u l l Chinese a u t h o r i t y . That the f u l l r e t u r n of Chinese a u t h o r i t y was nominal i s , I t h i n k , made s u f f i c i e n t l y ev ident by the Outer Mongol ian t u r n t o S o v i e t R u s s i a i n 1921. Hsu's u n s u i t a b i l i t y f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n became e v i d e n t even before h i s a r r i v a l i n U r g a , he r e s o r t e d t o the t h r e a t of f o r c e i n every stage of h i s n e g o t i a t i o n s . F i r s t he w i r e d from Ude to have the L i v i n g Buddha headquarters surrounded as he had heard a rumour t h a t the L i v i n g Buddha was about t o 258 f l e e to R u s s i a , t h i s f l a t t e r i n i t s e l f powerfu l test imony to the unfavourable i n f l u e n c e of Hsu 's t r o o p s and Hsu on Ch 'en I ' s n e g o t i a t i o n s i n Urga . He throughout the n e g o t i a -t i o n s r e v e a l e d l i t t l e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Mongol reverence f o r the L i v i n g Buddha. He r e f u s e d the L i v i n g Buddha's i n -259 v i t a t i o n which would be regarded as an i n s u l t . I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h Badmadorji he c a l l e d the L i v i n g Buddha s t u p i d and e v i l . ^ ° He b r i b e d Badmadorji by g i v i n g him a car, which, according to the Dilowa Hutukhtu, incensed the 26l other Mongols. He took troops with him to a l l negotia-262 tions as a measure of coercion and when pushing through his ultimatum at one point apparently had his troops enter Tserendorji ' s o f f i c e . Immediately following the removal of Ch'en I, Hsu moved to consolidate his p o s i t i o n i n Urga. On December 2 the Mongols were disarmed by Hsu's troops and the Chinese 264 m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s occupied the former Mongol m i n i s t r i e s . 265 Mongol troops were then disbanded. J The Mongols were also required to bear the expense of provisioning the Chinese . 2 6 6 garrison troops. Some of these moves were i n i t i a t e d while Hsu was i n Peking, where i n addition to making arrangements f o r his return to Urga, he was re-consolidating the p o s i t i o n of the Anfu C l u b . 2 6 7 Around December 20 he again l e f t for Urga a r r i v i n g 268 there on December 2 7 . He immediately made arrangements for the i n v e s t i t u r e of the L i v i n g Buddha on January 1, 1920, and once again, his conduct showed no consideration of Mongolian reactions. The Mongols had planned a celebration on December 31 to commemorate t h e i r 1911 independence. To prevent t h i s Hsu ordered that a three-day fast be observed and suggested that the celebration be observed at the same time as the i n v e s t i t u r e of the L i v i n g Buddha.on January 1. T h i s upset the Mongols f o r two reasons: i t i g n o r e d t h e i r independence c e l e b r a t i o n and i t i n s u l t e d the L i v i n g Buddha. As P r o f e s s o r J a g c h i d Sechen p o i n t s out, the L i v i n g Buddha was a symbol of p u r i t y ; by the touch of h i s hand he c o u l d c l e a n s e a s i n n e r , and i t was t h e r e f o r e an o f f e n s e to r e q u i r e 270 t h a t he a b s t a i n t o p u r i f y h i m s e l f . In the a c t u a l c e r e -mony on January 1 the L i v i n g Buddha was made to fa c e North and to bow to a photograph of the Chinese P r e s i d e n t , both 271 a c t s c o n s i d e r e d degrading by the Mongols. F o l l o w i n g the i n v e s t i t u r e of the L i v i n g Buddha on January 1, 1920 Hsu remained i n Urga l e s s than two months, r e t u r n i n g t o Peking i n the middle of February t o n e g o t i a t e two loans w i t h the Japanese, one f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the Kalgan-Urga Railway of which he was made the d i r e c t o r , and the 272 ot h e r f o r f r o n t i e r development. Boorman s t a t e s t h a t he r e t u r n e d t o Urga soon a f t e r t h i s , but r e p o r t s i n the North China H e r a l d i n d i c a t e h i s presence i n Peking over the months of March and A p r i l , h i s r e t u r n to Urga being d e l a y e d u n t i l 273 the b e g i n n i n g of May. During t h i s p e r i o d he was deeply i n v o l v e d i n the s t r u g g l e t o m a i n t a i n the advantage of the Anfu c l i q u e . He was so s u c c e s s f u l i n t h i s t h a t Chin Y'un-p'eng was unable to conduct c a b i n e t b u s i n e s s , because Hsu had ordered the M i n i s t e r s of Fi n a n c e , J u s t i c e and Communica-274 t i o n s to absent themselves from c a b i n e t meetings. On March 15 Tuan C h ' i - j u i c a l l e d over t h i r t y Peiyang o f f i c e r s t o h i s headquarters to reprimand them and p r i v a t e l y p r e s s u r e d Hsu to r e s t o r e harmony to the c a b i n e t . Only then was Chin 275 a b l e to conduct c a b i n e t b u s i n e s s . Even a f t e r h i s r e t u r n to Urga, Hsu in. e a r l y June wired Tuan that he was coming back to Peking to counter the o p p o s i t i o n , but was ordered 276 by Tuan to remain i n Urga. So, of the roughly s i x months th a t Hsu was i n charge of Outer Mongolian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n he spent l e s s than f o u r months t h e r e , and the month of June he spent t h e r e , so to speak, under duress. The focus of h i s i n t e r e s t undoubtedly was s t i l l Peking. F u r t h e r evidence of h i s m a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Urga Is a r e a d i l y e v i d e n t , although i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to make an a c c u r -ate assessment of h i s work th e r e s i n c e most of the i n f o r m a -t i o n i s r a t h e r g e n e r a l and at present cannot be v e r i f i e d . I t appears t h a t with the r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of Chinese a u t h o r i -t y , the Chinese f i r m s whose debts had been c a n c e l l e d f o l l o w -i n g the break from China i n 1 9 1 1 , moved back i n and demanded 277 repayment of debts p l u s accumulated I n t e r e s t . Armed 278 b a c k i n g was used to e n f o r c e c o l l e c t i o n . The d i s c o n t e n t , a c c o r d i n g to Dilowa Hutukhtu, r e s u l t e d i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the Mongols to send a d e l e g a t e to Peking t o request the i n s t i t u t i o n of Ch'en I's 63 c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s o c c u r r e d i n the M a r c h - A p r i l i n t e r i m when Hsu was i n Peking. . Apparently on Hsu's instructions LI Yuan, the former Assistant Commissioner under Ch'en I, went to t h i s meeting and announced that anyone who proposed the i n s t i t u -27 9 t i o n of Ch'en's conditions would be shot. y This was not the only outlet of discontent for delegations were also 2 8 0 sent to Ungern-Sternberg and to Lenin. Choibalsang and Sukhebator, the p r i n c i p a l .leaders of the Outer Mongolian 2 8 revolutionary Government i n 1 9 2 1 headed these delegations. A delegation .was even sent to Harbin to seek a loan from 2 8 2 Japan for the purchase of munitions. A l l that we have said to t h i s point concerns nega-t i v e aspects of Hsu's administration;, but when we seek for p o s i t i v e aspects we f i n d l i t t l e evidence that there were any. Hsu Dau-lin includes i n the nien-p'u a series of anecdotes which apparently are intended as favorable comment on his fathers period of administration. Unfortunately, there i s l i t t l e . . useful information i n the anecdotes. More than anything else they tend to portray the g u l l i b i l i t y , or the c h i l d l i k e nature of the Mongols. They show no e v i -dence of the sort of concern for Mongol l i v e l i h o o d that Hsu Shu-cheng l a i d claim to. They reveal rather than Hsu Shu-cheng held t r a d i t i o n Han Chinese attitudes of the i n f e r i o r i -ty of non-Han barbarian peoples l i k e the Mongols, and of the i n v i n c i b i l i t y of the.Chinese culture. The pervasiveness of these attitudes i n Hsu's time i s c l e a r l y revealed i n Sun Yat-sen's congratulatory telegrams. Sun, the father of Chinese republicanism and the leading exponent of the doc-t r i n e of the equality of the f i v e races, i n these telegrams compares Hsu to three Chinese culture heroes, a l l of whom 284 were p a c i f i e r s of- barbarians. Ethnocentric values such as t h i s (by no means li m i t e d to the Chinese) situated as they are at the very centre of the national ego, die a very slow death. It i s f a i r l y obvious by the i n c l u s i o n of these anecdotes that Hsu Dau-lin shares b a s i c a l l y the same a t t i -tudes towards the Mongols as did his father. These a t t i -tudes are not irr e l e v a n t for they undoubtedly must have worked to the detriment of Sino-Mongol r e l a t i o n s . If these anecdotes express Hsu Dau-lin's attitudes towards the Mongols and towards his father's work among the Mongols, his conclusion to the 1919 section of the nien-p'u expresses his attitudes towards his fathers c r i t i c s . Hsu Shu-cheng has been generally branded as a Japanese-lover and a t r a i t o r and has been accused of a l i e n a t i n g Outer Mon-2 8 *5 g o l i a from China permanently. In the introduction to the nien-p'u Hsu argues that his father was neither of the 286 former two and i n the 1919 section of the nlen-p'u he presents his father's work i n Outer Mongolia as a successful tour de force. In 1936 In the p e r i o d i c a l Tu-Li P'ing-lun he argued that the f a i l u r e of the Peking government to support his father i n Urga was good measure responsible for 287 the ultimate loss of Outer Mongolia. The quotation from I.in Ch'in-nan's novel, Ching Sheng novel, which presents Hsu (Ching Sheng) as a stronghold of t r a d i t i o n a l virtues L i n concludes with two anecdotes from Mr. L i , the supposed narrator of the story, both with the intent of showing that c i v i l i z e d man must ignore the din made by wild animals, and that Ching Sheng should have ignored the clamorings of these three fools who would negate 288 t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese values. The p a r a l l e l i s not exact but the suggestion seems too strong to ignore: that Hsu Dau-lin advises his readers to ignore the wild clamouring of those who would detract from his father's success. It appears i n fact that the author's reaction to his father's c r i t i c s was a major motivation for the writing of the nien-p'u. It i s unfortunate that t h i s was the case for his desire to place his father i n the best l i g h t possible has resulted i n very bad writing. account The f a u l t s i n Hsu Dau-lin's are for the most part so obvious that there i s no need to point them out. A l l we need here i s a few examples to refresh the reader's memory. Perhaps the most obvious f a u l t i s the author's acceptance of his father's words as proof of his father's actions. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n presenting his father's program fo r the Northwest, he makes the statement that a l l his father's 289 actions i n Outer Mongolia were based upon t h i s plan. We are given no evidence that t h i s was the case. Already obvious to the reader, he makes t h i s f a u l t even more ob-vious i n the anecdote i n which he claims that education was c e n t r a l i n his p o l i c i e s for Outer Mongolia, and r e f e r s 290 the reader back to the plan. ^ The reader has t r a v e l l e d f u l l c i r c l e but seen nothing. A not so obvious shortcoming i s Hsu Dau-lin's exclu-sion of information that would weaken his arguments for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of his father's p o s i t i o n . For example, he deletes the c l o s i n g paragraph from the f i r s t telegram from the L i v i n g Buddha of Urga, which f a i r l y c l e a r l y ac-knowledges the L i v i n g Buddha's.acceptance of the return to China: Further, I earnestly hope that when Outer Mongolia and China have been united that you w i l l share my desire to have my intentions c a r r i e d out, and that the r i g h t s we request w i l l be granted to us completely.291 Likewise, almost from the f i r s t mention of the conditions which Ch'en I has been negotiating, he assumes t h e i r defeat, but he ignores completely the fact that i t was Hsu who blocked t h e i r presentation to the Outer Mongolian government. These shortcomings are symptomatic of the weakness of the nien-p'u as a whole. It i s not s u r p r i s i n g that the Chinese reviews of i t c r i t i c i z e i t severely. .Hsu Dau-lin would have written much better i f he too, l i k e old Mr. L i , had shut out the wild clamourings of the c r i t i c s , f o r by not doing so he only subjected himself to a revived din — 292 t h i s time directed not at his father, but at himself. FOOTNOTES Abbreviations Boorman: Ch'e-chih: Cheng-chlh shin: Clubb: CYB: • P r i t e r s : Jagchid: NCH: Nien-p'u: P o l i t i c a l History: Rupen: Shih-hua: Shih-liap: T and A: Biographical Dictionary' of Republican China 20th Century China  China Year Book Outer Mongolia and i t s International Position  North China Herald The P o l i t i c a l History of China: 1840-1928. Mongols of the Twentieth Century. # IM nm^M Outer Mongolia: Treaties, and Agreements. Footnotes to Chapter I 1. CYB: 1919, p. 1. . 2. It forms approximately o n e - f i f t h of; the' ni'e'n-p''u. 3. " Nien-p'u, preface, pp. 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 -4. Even Gerard F r i t e r s ' , ' Outer Mongolia' '-rid Its Interna-t i o n a l 'Position, the' most thorough book on the subject i n English, passes very quickly over the events of 1919, and contains a number .of f a i r l y serious errors. 5. L i Yu-shu's,' Wai Men'g-ku, Ch'.' e-chlh' We'n-ti and Jagchid Sechen's monograph,' Wai Meng-ku de " T u - l i " "Tze-chih" ho "Ch'e-chih," are both well-written and reasonably objective. ' 6. Because the records of the Frontier Defense Of f i c e were destroyed . (Hsu Dau-lin,' T u - l i Ping l u n , No. 209 (July 12, 1936, "Tsai Lun Wai-Meng Ch'e-chih," p. 1 3 ) we are forced to resort to detective work for much, of t h i s analysis. A l l the wires that we have that were sent to the Frontier Office are presumably preserved be-cause they were sent with instructions to forward • copies to some other o f f i c e . 7. CYB: 1 9 1 9 , p. 587. 8. For convenience i n typing a l l umlauts have been dropped from Chinese names. 9. P o l i t i c a l History, pp. 359-363-10. ; fv f ^M^llMJ^.)' P. 370, Ch'e-chih, pp. 34-35. 11. :Boorman, Vol. 1, pp. 382-384. . 12. Boorman, Vol. 2, pp. 136-140. 13- Boorman, Vol. 1, pp. 211-213. 14. Boorman, Vol. 3, pp. 330-335-15- F r i t e r s , p. 345; Rupen pp. 59-60; CYB: 1919, p. 465-16. Fri t e r s , ' p'. 346, Rupen, p.' 67. 17- Shih-Iiao, p. 543-Footnotes to Chapter II 1. (tr.) Since he was born on November 4 Hsu Shu-cheng was actually 39 years of age for the greatest por-ti o n of 1919. 2. ( t r . ) The author precedes important years of the nien-p'u with a summary of some- of-the major events of the ensuing twelve months. 3 . ( t r . ) A number of the persons Hsu Dau-lin refers to i n t h i s section of the nien-p'u have no s i g n i f i c a n t r e l a t i o n s h i p to Hsu Shu-cheng.'s period In Mongolia. For brevity i t has been decided to omit footnotes In such cases. It may therefore be assumed that any person not footnoted on f i r s t appearance, f a l l s i n -to t h i s category. 4. ( t r . ) Feng Kuo-chang was Acting President from July .1917 to October 1918. He was leader of the C h i h l i Clique which opposed and f i n a l l y defeated the Anhwei fa c t i o n of Tuan C h ' i - j u i . 5. (tr.) Hsu Dau-lin i s inaccurate here. Tao Chu-yin i n the Shih-hua estimates that Japanese loans to the Peking government were close to 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 yen. He then makes an estimate based on the boast of General Terauchi•himself that loans to China during his period i n o f f i c e amounted to three times a l l former Japanese loans to China. Since T'ao reckons former loans at 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 yen he concludes that the Nishihara loans could have been i n the neighbourhood of 3 6 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 yen. 6. Shih-hua, Vol. 4', p. 167. 7. .Shih-hua, Vol. 4, p. 1 8 3 . ' 8. . (tr. ) The nien-p'u has.been c r i t i c i z e d for the forms i t uses to r e f e r to Hsu Shu-cheng. (Liu Feng-han, Hsu  Shu-cheng' hsien-sheng nien-p'u te shang-ch'ueh, p. 21) . To avoid confusion the tra n s l a t o r has taken the l i -berty to use Hsu's surname, or his f u l l name where the surname alone might be confusing', to replace the several d i f f e r e n t forms of reference used by the author. 9 . ( tr.) The hsin-hal year on the lunar calendar extends well into 1 9 1 2 , the 2 8 t h day of the 1 2 t h month was February 1 5 , 1 9 1 2 . The formal announcement of inde-pendence was made to the Manchu Amban, Santo, at Urga on November 3 0 , 1 9 1 1 . 1 0 . Ch'e-chih, p. 6 . 11. Ch'e- •chih, P- 2 7 . 12. Shih- l i a o , PP . 411 and 433 13. Shih- l i a o , ' P- 353. 14. (tr.) Following the Kiakhta Agreement China was given permission to est a b l i s h a Commissioner i n Urga (^'M'iilO ». with a guard of 2 0 0 men. His Assistant Com-missioners, one i n Kiakhta and one i n U l i a s s u t a i , were ca l l e d t s o - l i Cf-s^.). The functions of these commis-sioners were sim i l a r to those normally taken by a consulate, but since Outer Mongolia was not a separate state the term Consulate, would be inappropriate. The tu-t' ung (%y^) or M i l i t a r y Governors referred to were those i n charge of m i l i t a r y administration of Inner 'Mongolia. 1 5 . ( t r . ) I have, been unable to ascertain just what i n -ternational complications might be involved with t h i s l i n e . In 1 9 2 0 Hsu arranged a loan with Japan for construction of t h i s r a i l l i n e ; i t i s possible that this had been arranged during Hsu's t r i p to Japan at the end of 1 9 1 8 , and that he envisioned i n t e r n a t i o n a l objections, as there was a loan embargo on China at this time. When the loan embargo was broken by the Consortium agreement to a large loan i n 1 9 2 0 , Hsu rushed back from Mongolia to arrange i t (NCH, Vol. 1 3 4 . (February 2 8 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 5 2 3 ) . 1 6 . ( t r . ) Hsu's reference i s to A r t i c l e 5 of the Russo-Mongolian Railway Agreement signed September 3 0 , 1 9 1 4 . He has interpreted t h i s a r t i c l e rather f r e e l y and I have for th i s reason included the text: In view of the fact that the Mongolian government has a right to construct r a i l -roads within the confines of i t s t e r r i t o r y , the Imperial Russian government s h a l l not int e r f e r e i f the Mongolian Government should desire to construct a useful r a i l r o a d with i t s own means. However, as regards the granting of r a i l r o a d concessions to anyone, the Mongolian Government s h a l l , by vir t u e of the relations of close friendship with the neighbouring Great Russian Nation, previous to granting the concession, enter into conference with the Imperial Russian government and consult with i t as to whe-ther the projected r a i l r o a d i s not i n j u r -ious to Russia from an economic and s t r a -tegic standpoint (T and A, p. 29). 17. (tr.)' The Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol signed November 3, 1912 makes reference to Russian rights to open mines i n Outer Mongolia i n A r t i c l e ' 7 s p e c i f i c a l l y , and i n a r t i c l e s 1 and 2 i n d i r e c t l y . None of these a r t i c l e s include the word, " f r e e l y . " (T and A, pp. 19-20). .18. Shih-liao , pp. 380-382. 19- Ch'e-chih, p. 145. 2'0. ( t r . ) Typographical error: chien (i'-f ) for san ( ^ ) . 21. ( t r . ) The telegram gives us three characters (p'ang (ytf ), wu, (/%)), t'ao ( v^) to Indicate the names of the points at which o f f i c e r s should be stationed. These characters could r e f e r to only three, or a t o t a l of six stations. Given the condition of the route, and the speed at which troops could be moved along i t , i t i s more l i k e l y that he meant a l l six (for the condi-t i o n of route see Shih-liao , page 613). 22. (tr.) A small Chinese force had been a s s i s t i n g Outer Mongolian troops i n c o n t r o l l i n g f i g h t i n g between Soviet and White Russians i n Urianghai .As -Frontier Defense Commissioner Hsu was responsible for any m i l i t a r y ex-penditures (see Shih-liao, pp. 424 f f . ) . 23. (tr.) The t a i j i were the lowest rank of Mongol n o b i l i t y . 24. Shih-liao, pp. 508-511. 25. Ch'en I, tzu, Shih-k'o (^"^ ). Born i n Hupeh,- Ch'en I was the grandson of the, famous general of the Ch'ing Dynasty rest o r a t i o n , Ch'en Shih (pi^y^_). At the time of the attempted restoration Ch'en I was given the po s i t i o n -of Vice-President of the Board of Posts and Communication. He had already taken up t h i s post, but when the restoration attempt f a i l e d he f l e d from Peking. "He was captured at Huang-ts'un Station, where the resident army cut o f f his queue, made him pledge that he would never take part i n another r e s t o r a t i o n attempt, and then l e t him go. In 1915 Ch'en I f i r s t went to Mongolia as a deputy Commis-sioner. He became a commissioner i n August 1917-(Shih-hua Vol. 3 , p. 209 , and Yeh Hsia-an Nien-p'u 1946 , p. 5 2 ) . 26 . S h i h - l i a o , p. 4 6 0 , (Ch'en I wire, August 1 4 ) . 27 . S h i h - l i a o , p. 3 0 8 , (Ch'en I wire, January 1 8 ) . 28. S h i h - l i a o , pp. 4 6 1 - 4 6 2 , (Ch'en I's second wire, August 1 4 ) . 29. S h i h - l i a o , p. 473 (Cabinet wire, August 2 1 ) . 30. The word "informally" i s r e a l l y meaningless here. 3 1 . S h i h - l i a o , p. 5 0 . 32. For the complete text see, S h i h - l i a o , pp. 5 3 8 - 5 5 3 . 33- ( t r . ) The leagues were the administrative d i v i s i o n s imposed on Outer Mongolia by the Manchus. They cor-responded to the o r i g i n a l Outer Mongol aimaks which were hereditary administrative d i v i s i o n s . Each aimak was composed of a number of banners, each banner under the control of a hereditary jassak or prince. The banners were further divided into somon, and each somon was administered by a chiang-chun. The Shabi, or shabinar i n the p l u r a l , were lama novices. They formed a large class of serfs attached to various lamas. Shang-cho-t'e-pa was a high lama rank. (CYB: 1919-, P- 576 f f . ) . 34. ( t r . ) The Ambans and t h e i r assistants were the oversee-ing Manchu Residents i n Outer Mongolia (China Year Book, 1 9 1 9 , p. 4 6 3 ) . 35- S h i h - l i a o , pp. 557-558 (Foreign O f f i c e Memorandum). 36 . ( t r . ) The o f f i c e s allowed t o ; China i n a r t i c l e 7 of the Kiakhta Agreement signed by China, Russia and Outer Mongolia on June 7 , 1 9 1 5 . 37- Shih-liao, pp. 574-576. 38. (tr.) Typographical error: August 19 should read August 1 6 . 39- Shih-liao, p. 465. 40. Shih-liao, p. 500 (tr.) The sentence without the dele-t i o n reads: "In regard to the matter of i n v e s t i t u r e i n o f f i c e , the lamas demand that a l l appointments must be approved by the Living Buddha f i r s t , then sent i n to . the central government. But the nobles firmly opposed thi s and f i n a l l y persuaded the lamas to approve that appointments should be reported d i r e c t l y to the cen-t r a l government by the Amban. They only asked that the impressive ceremonies of the L i v i n g Buddha be pre-served. The Living Buddha was again n o t i f i e d and has given his consent." To have the L i v i n g Buddha approve a l l appointments would have put the lamas i n an ad-vantageous p o s i t i o n , therefore the nobles opposed i t . 41. K'an-p'u i s a lama t i t l e . The CYB, 1919 translates i t as, "abbott" (p. 464). 42. Shih-liao, p. 579 (October 1 l e t t e r ) . 43. (tr.) These were Hsu Shu-cheng's Fro n t i e r Defense troops which had a l l arrived i n Urga by September 6 (see above, p. 26). 44. ( t r . ) I have been unable >to ascertain who t h i s man was and what secret order was given. 45. ( t r . ) ^ This i s the f u l l t i t l e . o f one man. The Jalkhansa (|£ ) Living Buddha, referred to i n the paragraph following (Jagchid, p. 119). 46. Shih-•liao-, P • 5 7 3 . 4 7 . Ch'e- •chih, P- 2 2 3 . 48. Shih- l i a o , P- 5 6 8 . 4 9 . Shih- l i a o , P. 5 8 6 . 5 0 . Shih- l i a o , P- 5 2 9 . 51. Functions of the Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner (issued July 18, 1919)'. 1. The Government has especially established the Northwes't Frontier Planning Commission i n order that Northwest Border affairs' may be regulated, and also i n order that production may be activated i n a l l areas. 2. The Northwest Frontier Planning Commissioner i s to be especially appointed by the President. He. w i l l be i n charge of the planning-"and d i r e c t i o n of communi-cations, p o l i c e , f o r e s t r y , mining, the extraction of s a l t , commerce and education i n a l l areas, and i n defense requirements the forces deployed i n a l l areas w i l l be under his d i r e c t i o n . In reference to the above arrangements, the Urga Commissioner w i l l work under the guidance of the Frontier Planning Commissioner, i n a l l matters, and a l l -o f f i c e r s under him w i l l also be. subject to the au-th o r i t y of the Fron t i e r Planning Commissioner. This has been planned to meet a l l eventualities (Min-kuo  yeri-i, p. 685 . ) . 52. -'Shih-liao, p. 516 (Ch'en I's wire, October 21) . 53- Shih-liao, p. 576 (Foreign Office wire to Ch'en I, November 4 ) . 54. Shih-liao, p. 582, (Ch'en I wires, November 6 and 7 ) . 55- Shih-liao, p. 582, (Ch'en I wire, November 6 ) . 56. Shih-liao, pp. 5 8 4 - 5 8 5 . 57- Shih-liao, p. 587 (November 11 wire). 58. Shih-liao, p. 587 (November^11 wire). 59. Shih-liao, p. 607. 60. Ch'en I also knew that t h i s was the man who had de-feated the 63 conditions. (Shih-liao, p. 522, October 25 wire). 61. ( t r . ) (%W*>% ) was a t i t l e given to Chu-ko Liang. (Chung-Kuo Jen-mln T'a Ts'e-Tien, p. 1607). 62. Shih-liao,•p. 588. 63. ( t r . ) Typographical error: should read (X A ) . 64. ( t r . ) The former Premier of Outer Mongolia. 65. Shih-liao, p. 593. •66. It was also on November 14 that Ch'en I f i n a l l y revealed to Hsu the nobles independent request for the cancella^-t i o n of autonomy. Hsu considered that: "The government could make use of thi s to order the cancella t i o n of autonomy f i r s t and other matters could be worked out l a t e r ... rather than working everything out . f i r s t ... which would delay the achievement' of our aims. I w i l l remain here for the present to keep the peace and to ensure that nothing•untoward occurs." (November 14 wire. Shih-liao, p. 59). But by November 15 conditions had so changed' that t h i s proposal was already i r r e l e -vant . (tr. ) This author's note contains two typographical, errors.^ The character yen (f|) i s mistakenly used for yuan (ffifj ) i n ch' ing-yuan, meaning p e t i t i o n or request, u s u a l l y ^ i n the sense of a p e t i t i o n made to the govern-ment. A more serious mistake' i s the misprinted page reference, page 59j which should read page 590. 67. Shih-liao, p. 594. 68. ( t r . ) Typo, text reads graphical error. O r i g i n a l reads (£•$•¥&), 69. Shih-liao, PP. 601-602. 70. ( t r . ) Hsu not the 63 i s r e f e r r i n g here to his general conditions of Ch'en I. conditions, 71. Shih-liao, p. 598. 72. Shih l i a o , p. 598. , 73. S h i h - l i a o , p. 604. 74. ( t r . ) This Japanese o f f i c e r had been posted i n Urga for over a year. His attempts to negotiate with the Mongols were apparently unsuccessful (NCH, Vol. 131 ( A p r i l 5 , 1919), P. 2 0 ) . 75. S h i h - l i a o , p. 604. 76. He reached Peking on November 24 (Shih-hua, Vol. 5 , p. 9 0 ) . 77- Hsin-sheng Puo, Taiwan, December 13, 1958. Chih-Weng, "Ku-ch'un feng-lou so-chi." This congratulatory telegram from Sun Yat-sen aroused the opposition of a party member, Ling Yueh. Sun Yat-sen answered t h i s opposition: "Hsu's regain-ing of Outer Mongolia surpasses Pu Chieh-tzu and Ch'en T'ang i n merit. Public recognition of t h i s cannot be suppressed." (December 23, see Kuo-fu  nien-p'u, p. 474) . In fact from about July or August of 1919 Tuan's f a c t i o n had been moving closer to Sun Yat-sen. Since i n the north the C h i h l i and the Anfu Cliques were at that time coming out i n open opposition and i n the South Sun Yat-sen had already long been under pressure from the Kwangsi Clique, therefore, with the union between the C h i h l i Clique and the Kwangsi Clique i t was only natural that Tuan's Clique should f a l l i n with Sun Yat-sen (see Sun Yat-sen's " P ' i - l i n Hsiu-mei Shu," Kuo-fu nien-P'u, p. 4 7 ) . 78. Liang Yen-sun nien p'u. Vol. 2, p. 58. 79- Tu-chun-t'uan Chuan, pp. 239-240. 80. Min-kuo Yen-i, p. 695-81. S h i h - l i a o , p. 612. 82. S h i h - l i a o , p. 612. 83. ( t r . ) Because of the d i f f e r e n t nature of t h i s material the author had i t set i n smaller type. I have there-fore single-spaced but not indented i t , to set i t o f f from both the body of the text and from the quotations. 84. ( t r . ) This was a type of folksong which originated i n the K'un-lun Mountain region (Ts'e-hai, p. 987) . Footnotes to Chapter III 1 . See p. 4 4 . 2 . See p. 71. 3 . May 4 t h , pp. 64-65-4 . The complete' nien-p'u does, of course, give the reader quite a good picture of Hsu Shu-cheng. 5 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p. 3 3 2 . 6 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , P- 3 3 2 . 7. Sheridan,. p. 8 . 8 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p. 3 3 2 . 9'. Boorman, Vol. 3 , P- 3 3 2 ; Houn, p. 2 0 7 n. 1 0 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p. 3 3 3 -1 1 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p. 3 3 2 . 1 2 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p..' 3 3 2 ; Houn, pp. 1 3 7 and 142. 1 3 . Clubb, p. 6 7 . 14. P o l i t i c a l History, pp. 3 8 1 - 3 8 2 . 1 5 . P o l i t i c a l 'History, p. 3 8 2 . 1 6 . Clubb, p. 6 8 . 1 7 . P o l i t i c a l History, p. 3 8 3 . 1 8 . M a y . 4 t h , p. 7 8 . 1 9 . P o l i t i c a l History, p. 3 8 4 . 2 0 . P o l i t i c a l History, p. 3 8 4 . May 4 t h , p. 7 8 . 2 1 . Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 144. 2 2 . . Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 144/ 2 3 . 'NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 (June 2 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 6 2 . 24. See p. 14.. 2 5 . Nien-p'u, pp. 140-141. 2 6 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 (May 17, 1 9 1 9 ) , p.. 417. 2 7 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 0 (March 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 5 2 6 . 2 8 . F r i t e r s , pp. 1 8 4 - 1 8 5 -2 9 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 6 6 . 3 0 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 3 1 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 1 4 8 - 1 6 6 . 3 2 . S hih-liao, p. 3 2 3 -3 3 - Jagchid, p. 1 1 3 -3 4 , F r i t e r s , p. 1 1 1 . 3 5 - NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 (May 1 7 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 4 0 7 3 6 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 1 5 3 - 1 5 6 . 3 7 . Hsu's cost estimate of 2 0 , 0 0 0 yuan per l i seems to be i n l i n e with constructions costs given i n CYB: 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 . pp. 742 f f . 3 8 . Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia, p. 1 0 . 3 9 - Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 145. 40. NCH, Vol. 1 3 3 (December 2 0 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 4 4 . 41. NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 (June 2 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 6 2 . 42. NCH, Vol. 1 3 2 (July 1 2 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 9 2 . 4 3 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 (June 2 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 6 3 . 4 4 . Cheng-chih shih, p. 5 2 6 . 4 5 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 0 (March 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 6 8 3 . 46. NCH, Vol. 1 3 0 (March 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 6 8 3 . 47. Shih-hua, Vol. 5 , p. 1 3 0 . 48. 4 9 . NCH,. Vol.. 1 3 0 - (March 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 5 2 6 . 50. Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 144.' 5 1 . L iu Feng-hau, p. 2 5 . 5 2 . Shih-liao, p. 6 0 1 . 5 3 - NCH, Vol. 1 3 3 (December 2 0 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 4 4 . 5 4 . Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 1 3 5 -5 5 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 4 , (February 14, 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 4 0 7 . 5 6 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 4 (February 7 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 3 8 6 . 5 7 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 4 , (February 2 8 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 5 2 3 . 5 8 . NCH, Vol.' 1 3 4 , (February 2 8 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 5 2 3 -5 9 . Boorman, Vol. 2 , p. 145. 6 0 . NCH, V o l . 1 3 5 , (May 1 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 245. 6 1 . Nien-p''u, p. 2 7 8 . 6 2 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 , (June 2 1 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 7 6 3 . 6 3 . F r i t e r s , . p, 2 3 0 . 64. F r i t e r s , pp. 1 5 9 - 1 6 0 . 6 5 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 3 5 . 6 6 . P o l i t i c a l History, p. 3 9 2 . 6 7 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 3 3 -6 8 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 3 7 . 6 9 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 3 7 . 7 0 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 1 7 7 and 244. 7 1 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 3 7 . . 7 2 . Shih-liao, Chronology, p. 2 7 . Since there were roughly 1 0 0 0 troops In Urga previous to the a r r i v a l of this force and since, the t o t a l number of troops subsequent to t h i s increment was. about 4000. (CYB, 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , p. 5 7 6 ) t h i s force had to be i n the neighbourhood of 3 0 0 0 men. 7 3 - NCH, Vol. 1 3 2 , (July 1 9 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 1 5 3 -7 4 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 2 , (July 19', 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 1 5 4 . 7 5 . See p. 2 3 . 7 6 . See p. 4 3 . 77- Tu-Li p'ing-Tun, No. 203 (May 3 1 , 1 9 3 6 ) , p. 14 . 7 8 . Shih-liao, p. 4 9 8 . 7 9 - T and A, p. 3 2 . 8 0 . Professor Jagchid Sechen i s a-Chahar Mongol who re-sides i n Taipei and teaches Mongol at Taiwan National University. His excellent monograph on the subject of the cancellation of Outer Mongolian self-government i s e specially valuable i n that i t gives us a Mongol point of view on the subject. 8 1 . Jagchid, pp. 39 f f . 8 2 . F r i t e r s , p. 1 7 4 . CYB: 1 9 1 9 , p. 5 8 7 . 8 3 . T and A, p. 3 3 ; Ch'e-chih,' p. 3 1 . 84. 8 5 . 8 6 . 8 7 . 8 8 . 8 9 . 9 0 . CYB: 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , p. 575 9 1 . CYB: . I 9 I . 9 , p. 5 8 8 . Ch' 1 e-•chih, pp. 3 1 - • 3 2 . Ch' 'e- chih, P • 2 5 6 . Ch' 'e- chih, P. 3 1 . Ch' e- chih, pp. 3 4 - 3 5 . Ch' ' e-chih, pp. . 3 2 - 3 3 . Ch' 1 e= c h'i'h, pp. 3 5 - 3 6 . 92. Ch'e-chih, p. 42. 93. Ch'e-chih, p'. 37. 94. Ch'e-chih, p. 37-95. NCH, Vol. 131, (May 17, 1919), p. 430. 96. Ch'e-chih, p. 37-97. Ch'e-chih, pp. 37-40. 98. F r i t e r s , p. 185. 99. Ch'e-chih, p. 71. 100. CYB, 1921-22, p. 515, gives troop numbers i n various m i l i t a r y u n i t s . 101. NCH, Vol. 130, (March 8, 1919), p. 607. 102. Rupen, p. 59-103. Rupen, p. 59. 104. Jagchid, pp. 103-104. 105. This report was i n the North China Herald. It i s very l i k e l y an exaggeration, but i s i n d i c a t i v e of the free spending of the lama-dominated government. 106. Jagchid, p. 104. 107. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 33-108. Jagchid, p. 104. 109. S h i h - l i a o , pp . 633-634. 110. Ch'e-chih, p. 215. 111. Hsu Shu-cheng points t h i s out i n his November 13 wire See p. 53. 112. Ch'e-chih, p. 211. 113. F r i t e r s , p. 221. 114. NCH, Vol. 132 (September 20, 1919), P- 733-115. Rupen, pp. I l l and 136. 1 1 6 . Rupen, p. 1 1 1 . 117- Dilowa Memoirs, p. 3 3 . IIS. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 6 . 119- See p. 5 7 . 1 2 0 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 6 6 . 1 2 1 . Shih-liao,p. 5 6 9 . 1 2 2 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 2 . 1 2 3 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 6 6 / 124. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 6 6 . 1 2 5 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 4 . 1 2 6 . S h i h - l i a o , chronolc 'gy, P-1 2 7 . S h i h - l i a o , p. 3 2 6 . 1 2 8 . F r i t e r s , p. 81 - 8 3 ; Rupen, 1 2 9 - Rupen, p. 9 5 . 1 3 0 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 5 -1 3 1 . Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 8 . 1 3 2 . Jagchid,-p. 1 0 2 . 1 3 3 - See pp. 1 6 - 2 3 . 1 3 4 . See appendix. 1 3 5 . Shih-liao, chronology, pp. 1 5 - 2 5 -1 3 6 . For example, NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 , ( A p r i l 5 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 20 1 3 7 . Ch' 'e-chih, P- 140. 1 3 8 . 'Ch1 1 e-chih, P- 140. 1 3 9 . Ch' '"e-• ch'ih, P- 140. 140. Ch1 ' e-•chih, P • 140. 141. Ch'e-chih, p. 143.' 142. Ch'e- chih j P- 142.' 143. Ch' e-chih, P • 142. 144. Ch' e-chih, P • 2 3 7 -145. ,Shih- l i a o P- 410. 146. Ch'e- chih j P- 146. 147. Ch'e- •chih, P- 177-148. Ch' e-•chih, P- 178. 149. Ch'e- •chih, P • 145. 150. CYB: 1921--22 , P-151. Jagchid, p. 118. 152. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 8 . 153. Ch'e-chih, pp. 177 and 180-181. 154. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 7 9 . 155. Ch'e-chih, p. 210. 156. Ch'e-chih, p. l'8l. 157. Shih-liao., p. 512. 1 5 8 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 1 9 2 - 9 3 . 159. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 9 3 . 160. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 9 3 . 161. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 9 3 . 162. Ch'e-chih, p. 1 9 3 . 1 6 3 . T and A, p. 3 4 , a r t i c l e 10. 164. Sh i h - l i a o , pp. 6 3 3 - 6 3 4 . 165. Jagchid, p. 118. 1 6 6 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 20.4 .and 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 . 1 6 7 . Ch' e-•ch'ih, P • 2 1 1 . 1 6 8 . Ch'e-•chih. P • 2 0 6 . 1 6 9 . Ch'e- chih, P • 2 1 1 . 1 7 0 . Ch'.e-•chih , P- 2 1 0 . 1 7 1 . Shih- l i a o , P- 5 1 1 -1 7 2 . Jagchid, p. 1 1 8 . 1 7 3 . Jagchid, p. 1 1 8 . 1 7 4 . Rupen, p. 1 3 6 . 1 7 5 . Shih-liao, p p . 4 7 2 - 4 7 3 . 1 7 6 . See p. from footnotes to Chapter I I , p. 1 6 9 . 1 7 7 . See p. 4 9 . 1 7 8 . See pp. 4 8 - 4 9 . 1 7 9 . See pp. 2 3 - 3 0 . 1 8 0 . Shih-liao, chronology, pp. 15-25, l i s t s Ch'en I's many requests for troops. 1 8 1 . See p. 5 6 . 1 8 2 . See p. 7 4 . . 1 8 3 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 , .(June 2 8 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p.. 8 3 3 -1 8 4 . Shih-liao, p. 5 1 1 . 1 8 5 . Shih-liao, chronology, p. 2 8 . 1 8 6 . Shih-liao, p. 5 1 4 . 1 8 7 . Shih-liao, chronology, p. 2 8 . 1 8 8 . See p. 4 6 . . 1 8 9 . See p. 4 6 . 1 9 0 . See p. 4 9 . 1 9 1 . See p. 4 9 . 1 9 2 . See p.' 4 7 . 1 9 3 . See p. 5 0 . It would perhaps have been i m p o l i t i c to mention t h i s e a r l i e r . 1 9 4 . See appendix . 1 9 5 . NCH, Vol. 1 3 1 , (June 2 8 , 1 9 1 9 ) , p. 8 3 3 . 1 9 6 . Clubb, pp. 63 f f . 1 9 7 . See p. 4 7 . 1 9 8 . Shih-liao, p. 5 6 0 . 199- See p. 5 0 . 2 0 0 . Shih-liao, chronology, p. 2 9 . . 2 0 1 . See p. 3 8 . 2 0 2 . See p.'5 3 . 2 0 3 . See p. 3 9 -2 0 4 . See p. 46. 2 0 5 . Shih-liao, p. 5 6 6 . 2 0 6 . Shih-liao, chronology, p. 2 9 . 2 0 7 . Jagchid, p. 1 2 7 . 2 0 8 . Shih-liao, p. 5 8 2 . 2.09. He, of course, was aware by t h i s time that Hsu knew of-the conditions. 2 1 0 . Shih-liao, p. 5 8 2 . 2 1 1 . Shih-liao, p. 5 8 2 . 2 1 2 . Shih-liao, p. 5 8 2 . 2 1 3 . S h i h - l i a o , p. 5 8 2 . 214V Shih-liao, p. 5 8 2 . 2 1 5 . See p. 48. 2 1 6 . See p. 48. 2 1 7 . For example, they were appointed his special assistants for [ i n v e s t i t u r e of the Living Buddha], '(Shih-liao, chronology, p. 3 1 ) . 2 1 8 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 5 2 . 2 1 9 . Ch'e-chih, p . 2 5 6 . 2 2 0 . See p. 5 1 . 2 2 1 . See p. 5 0 . 2 2 2 . Boorman, Vol. 3 , p . 3 3 0 , Vol. 2 , p. 1 3 6 . 2 2 3 . ' .Rupen, p. 1 5 3 . 224. Shih-liao, p. 5 7 8 . 2 2 5 . Ch'e-chih, pp. 2 1 0 - 2 1 2 . 2 2 6 . See pp. 5 5 - 5 6 . 2 2 7 . See p. 5 3 . 2 2 8 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 5 8 . 2 2 9 . See p. 5 6 . • 2 3 0 . See p. 5 9 . 2 3 1 . Ch'e-chih, p. 2 5 8 . 2 3 2 . CYB: 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 , p. 5.77. 2 3 3 . Ch'e-chih,' p. 2 5 7 . 2 3 4 . I have been unable to locate a s p e c i f i c record of these eight conditions. Possibly they were the eight conditions he gives at the end of his seven objec-tions (See pp. 39-40), or else, were based on these. The eight conditions recorded by the Dilowa Hutukhtu i n his memoirs, however, d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y from the above set: 1 . China to b u i l d c i v i l and m i l i t a r y schools on a large scale, 2 . China to d i r e c t planting and c u l t i v a t i n g of land, 3 . China to construct h o s p i t a l s , 4. Mongolia to be divided into, counties and provinces l i k e China proper, 5. China to build Urga-Kalgan railway, 6. Lamas under 40 to be allowed to marry, 7- China to open mines, 8. China to construct racetracks. It i s d i f f i c u l t to account f o r t h i s discrepancy. The Dilowa Hutukhtu, of course, could--be as biased a source as any other, yet i t i s hard to accept that his conditions are a f a b r i c a t i o n . More l i k e l y , there was a good deal of popular discussion of these conditions and they were altered somewhat i n -the transmission at that time and through the ensuing years. Nonetheless,, they suggest that there must have been some difference between our record of Hsu's suggestions and the l a t e r p l a t -form of.action. Since the p e t i t i o n for cancel-• l a t i o n of autonomy carried no conditions there was no need for Hsu to base his administration on the points he presented. 235. Shih-liao, pp. 5 6 8 - 5 6 9 . 236. See p. 58. 237. See p. 66. 238. See p. 50. 2 3 9 - S h i h - l i a o . p. 5 8 8 . There i s obviously some o o n f l i c t between t h i s statement. and the.cabinet's e a r l i e r ap-proval of Hsu's objections (see p. 5 0 ) . 240. Shih-liao, pp. 5 9 1 - 5 9 2 . 241. , Jagchid, p. 128. 242. Ch' e-chih,. p. 260. 243. Jagchid, p. 1 2 8 . 244. See p. 51. 245. ' Ch'e-chih, p. 2 5 8 . 246. • Shih-liao, p. 600. 247. Shih-liao, p. 600. 248. See p. 6 7 . 249- NCH, Vol. 133, (November 29, 1919), p. 546. There was some fear for Ch'en's l i f e . 250. His eagerness to reach Peking i s indicated by the fact that he covered the 1200 miles from Urga to Peking i n half the normal t r a v e l l i n g time. 251. I have not been able to v e r i f y i t , but i f my memory serves me correctly, wei-chiang-chun was an empty t i t l e ; Ch'en had been "kicked up s t a i r s . " 252. See p. 69. 253- See p. 69. 254. Shih-hua, Vol. 5 , p. 90. 255. See p. 69. 256. Shih-hua, Vol. 5 , pp. 90 and 129-257. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145. 258. Jagchid, p. 130. 259. Jagchid, p. 126. 260. See p. 57. 261. Dilowa Memoirs, p. 43. 262. Jagchid, p. 127. 263. CYB: 1921-22, p. 577. 264. CYB: 1921-22, p. 578. 265. CYB: 1921-22, p. 578. 266. Boorman, Vol. 2, p. 145. 267. Shih-hua, Vol. 5 , p. 90. 268. See p. 70. 269. Jagchid, p. 132. 270. Jagchid, p. 132. 271. Jagchid, p. 132. 2 7 2 . Boorman, Vol. 2, . p. 145.. 2 7 3 - . NCH, Vol. 135 (May 1 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 245-2 7 4 : NCH, Vol. 134 (March ' 2 0 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 7 4 9 . 2 7 5 . NCH, Vol. 134 (March 2 0 , 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 7 4 9 -276, NCH, V o l . 135 (June 5 4 1920), p, 57-1. 277-• F r i t e r s , p. 1 9 0 . 2 7 8 . F r i t e r s , p. 1 8 5 . 2 7 9 . Dilowa Memoirs, p. 46 . 2 8 0 . Jagchid, p. 1 3 3 . • 2 8 1 . Jagchid, p. 1 3 3 . 2 8 2 . Jagchid, p. 1 3 3 . 2 8 3 . See pp.' 7 1 - 7 4 . 2 8 4. See pp. 69 and 2 8 5 . Boorman, Vol 2 , p. 1 4 3 -2 8 6 . Nien-p'u, pp. 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 . 2 8 7 . Hsu Dau-lin,' T u - l i P'ing-lun, No. 2 0 3 (May 3 1 , 1 9 3 6 ) , "Wai-meng Wen-t'i hui-ku te I-wen," p. 1 6 . 2 8 8 . See p. 7 7 -2 8 9 . See p. , 16. 2 9 0 . See p. 7 2 . 2 9 1 . Shih-liao, p. 5 7 9 . 2 9 2 . The reviews of Hsu Dau-lin'' s book by Liu Feng-han and L i Ao are unmercifully v i t r i o l i c . BIBLIOGRAPHY • • Bibliography Boorman, L. Howard, Ed.' Biographical Dictionary' of the  Republic of China. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1970, Vol. 1-3-Clubb 0 . Edmund. ' '20th 'Century China, New York, Columbia University Press, 1964. Dilowa Hutukhtu. Memoirs. (Manuscript i n Owen Lattimore's possession). F r i t e r s , Gerard M. ' Outer' Mongolia and its' 'International Position . Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. The North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette. Shanghai, Vols. 130-136 NS (January 1 , 1919 - August 3 1 , 1 9 2 0 ) . Outer Mongolia: Treaties and Agreements. Washington, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1 9 2 1 . Rupen, Robert A. Mongols of the Twentieth Century: Part 1_. Bloomington, Indiana University Publications, 1 9 6 4 . (Ural and A l t a i c Series, Vol. 3 7 ) . Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy I n g a l l s , trans and ed. The P o l i t i c a l  History of China: 1 8 4 0 - 1 9 2 8 , by L i Chien-nung. Prince-ton, Van Nostrand, 1956. Woodhead, H.G.W., ed. The China Yearbook: 1 9 1 9 , London Routledge, 1 9 2 0 . The China Yearbook: 1 9 2 1 - 2 2 . T i e n t s i n , The T i e n t s i n Press. . APPENDIX CH'EN I'S 63 CONDITIONS This i s a condensed t r a n s l a t i o n of the conditions for cancellation of self-government negotiated .by Ch'en I and the Outer Mongolian nobles. The more important c o n d i -tions are given more complete t r a n s l a t i o n s , but considerable d e t a i l has. been omitted and the t r a n s l a t i o n i s intended for reference purposes only. It i s taken from the f i n a l form of the conditions as presented to Ch'en I, with the Chinese Cabinet revisions appended. The Chinese text i s i n Shih- l i a o , pp. 538-553. 1. The government of Outer Mongolia requests the cancella-t i o n of self-government. Outer Mongolia w i l l be one of the "special"regions of China, with a l l administrative r i g h t s reverting to the Central Government. No r e v i s i o n 2. The Central Government w i l l not a l t e r the system of leagues and banners. O f f i c i a l s are to r e t a i n t h e i r o r i g i -nal authority. The Central Government w i l l not undertake colonization nor' the sale of banner lands. No r e v i s i o n 3. Outer Mongolia endorses the Republican system of China. The Central Government must treat Outer Mongolia i n accor-dance with the p r i n c i p l e of the equality of the f i v e races. 4. Chinese must a c c o r d lamaism and lamas good t r e a t m e n t . No r e v i s i o n 5 . A l l the government o f f i c e s of the former system w i l l be p l a c e d under the o f f i c e o f the C h i e f A d m i n i s t r a t o r i n ' U r g a (>%&J^J$f j^b )• A 1 1 l e s s e r o f f i c e s i n the-Kobdo, U l i a s -s u t a i , U r i a n g h a i and K i a k h t a a r e a s w i l l be p l a c e d under the o f f i c e s o f t h e o f f i c i a l s ) f o r t h o s e r e s p e c t i v e a r e a s . No r e v i s i o n 6. T h e r e • s h a l l be one S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a t o r and one A s s i s -t a n t S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a t o r s t a t i o n e d i n Urga. They s h a l l be i n g e n e r a l charge of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f a l l Outer M o n g o l i a as w e l l as a d m i n i s t r a t i n g t h e Tushetu' Khan League and the T s e t s e n Khan League. At U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo, U r i a n g h a i and K i a k h t a t h e r e w i l l be s t a t i o n e d one A d m i n i s t r a t o r and one A s s i s t a n t A d m i n i s t r a t o r . The U l i a s s u t a i o f f i c e w i l l a d m i n i s -t r a t e the S a i n Noyon Khan League and the J a s a k t u Khan League. The Kobdo o f f i c e w i l l be i n charge of league and banner a f f a i r s . a p p r o p r i a t e - t o i t . The U r i a n g h a i o f f i c e w i l l be i n charge of a f f a i r s i n the .Urianghai a r e a . The K i a k h t a o f f i c e w i l l be i n charge of b o r d e r d e f ense s t a t i o n s and c r o s s - b o r -der t r a d e . A l l of t h e s e o f f i c e s w i l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f the Urga o f f i c e . C h i n e s e o f f i c i a l s w i l l be chosen from among c i v i l - o f f i c i a l s on the basis of govern-ment experience, good nature, i n t e g r i t y and knowledge of Mongol l i f e . Mongol o f f i c i a l s w i l l be chosen on the basis of character, a b i l i t y and reputation. Revision:•There w i l l be one Senior Administrator stationed at Urga. He w i l l be s p e c i a l l y appointed by the President and may be either Mongolian or Chinese. There w i l l be two Assistant Senior Administrators stationed at Urga one Mongol and one Chinese. These three o f f i c i a l s s h a l l be i n general charge of the administration of a l l Outer Mongolia as well as administrating the Tushetu Khan League and the Tsetsen Khan League: At U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo, Urianghai and Kiakhta there w i l l be .stationed one Administra-tor who may be either Mongol or Chinese and two Assistant Administrators, one Mongol and one Chinese. (Remainder un-changed ). 7. Positions i n a l l public o f f i c e s w i l l be open to both Mongols and Chinese. No r e v i s i o n 8. Both Mongol and Chinese are e l i g i b l e , for the positions of Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator and Administra-tor and Assistant Administrator. Length of term i n o f f i c e i s to be se t t l e d and Central Government w i l l appoint Mongols and Chinese to these positions on a ro t a t i o n basis. O f f i -c i a l s i n the same o f f i c e must be i n agreement on a l l dec i -sions . Revision: [The r e v i s i o n of condition 6 made condition 8 i r r e l e v a n t ; only the f i n a l sentence was retained]. 9. In conducting t h e i r administration the o f f i c e s at U l i a s s u t a i , tKobdo, Urianghai and' Kiakhta w i l l normally get p r i o r approval from Urga. In emergencies they must inform the President and a l l concerned Central Government organs at the same time they inform Urga. ' . No r e v i s i o n 10. A l l l o c a l o f f i c i a l s i n conducting t h e i r administration' must make a l l required reports d i r e c t l y to the o f f i c e . o f the senior o f f i c i a l concerned. No r e v i s i o n 11. The nobles and common people of Mongolia have the right to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the government of China and to be elected . to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. No r e v i s i o n 12. In the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s either the Director or the Deputy-Director must be an .Outer Mongo-l i a n noble, or following the precedent of the form Ch'ing Dynasty an additional Outer Mongolian Assistant to the D i -rector s h a l l be appointed. A l l appointments below t h i s l e v e l may be f i l l e d by Outer Mongols. A l l other o f f i c e s outside the c a p i t a l may employ Outer Mongols whose education i s of s u f f i c i e n t c a l i b r e . Revision: The .Office of Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s w i l l appoint a Vice-President from among the Outer Mongolian nobles. [Remainder unchanged]. 13. When the people of Outer Mongolia consider that the administration i s unfair or that an'unjust judgment has been made against them, they may bring the matter to the Admini-s t r a t i v e Court or the Supreme Court [ i n Peking]. No r e v i s i o n 14. In Urga a l o c a l Outer Mongolian Assembly s h a l l be set up, to which a l l aimaks w i l l elect representatives. The Senior Administrator and Assistant Senior Administrator w i l l oversee t h i s Assembly, which may make decisions on a l l mat-ters a f f e c t i n g the welfare of a l l banners-and on a l l matters brought before i t by the Administrators. When the necessity arises the Assembly may request the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s to inform the President requesting the mat-ter be put before Parliament [ i n Peking]. Revision: In Urga a l o c a l Outer Mongolian Assembly for self-government s h a l l be set up ... [Remainder un-changed] . • 15- The t i t l e of the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu Khan and a l l accompanying ceremonies s h a l l be forever maintained. [Each new Bogdo Jebtsundamba. Hutukhtu] s h a l l be invested with the t i t l e National Teacher and Patriarch of Lamaism i n the North. No r e v i s i o n 16. The positions of advisor to the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu s h a l l be maintained. Pour of them, w i l l be chosen from among the nobles and lamas who w i l l request the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrators to request the President to i n s t a l l them. ' Their s a l a r i e s w i l l be decided by the government and paid .annually. The service of a l l other nobles i n Urga w i l l be on the old annual r o t a t i o n basis. No r e v i s i o n 17 . I f important national or r e l i g i o u s matters arise the Liv i n g Buddha has the authority to wire the President d i r e c t -l y . 18. • Any orders that the Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu has promulga-ted may not be altered. No r e v i s i o n 19. T h i r t y - s i x thousand ounces of s i l v e r for the'annual ex-penses of Sutra chanking s h a l l be paid by the Central Govern-ment. The Central Government w i l l also grant the t i t l e of Hubilgan to the reincarnations of every generation. No r e v i s i o n 2 0. The hereditary ranks and awarded t i t l e s of a l l o f f i c i a l s , nobles and lamas s h a l l continue to be granted by the P r e s i -dent . No r e v i s i o n 21. A l l o f f i c i a l s , nobles and t i t l e d lamas s h a l l be given seals and credentials or credentials only, by the President, i n accordance with the regulations of the Republic of China. No r e v i s i o n 22. In Outer Mongolia a l l reincarnations of Hutukhtu's and lamas and inheritance of h e r i d i t a r y t i t l e s by nobles and o f f i c i a l s must f i r s t be reported to and approved by the Bogdo Jebtsundamba.Hutukhtu. In accordance with custom a l l such •matters under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Urga o f f i c e w i l l be reported to the President and the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan a f f a i r s . ' A l l matters of re-incarnation and i n h e r i -tance In the U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo and Urianghai regions w i l l ' be reported d i r e c t l y to the President and to the Of f i c e of .Mongolian and Tibetan A f f a i r s and at the .same time to- Urga. Aside from re-incarnations and inheritance, for such other special awards the U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo and.Urianghai o f f i c e s should act only on advice from Urga. Revision: In Outer Mongolia- a l l re-incarnations of Hutukhtu's and lama's must f i r s t be reported to and approved by the Bogdo Jebtsundamba Hutukhtu. [Remainder unchanged]. 23- The Senior Administrator and Assistant Senior Admini-strator must inform the President of a l l appointments f o r league-head, somon-head, etc. No r e v i s i o n 24. In the se l e c t i o n of k'an-pu's,shangchotba's,ta lama and h s i e h - l i - t a i j i , aside from those under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Urga o f f i c e which the Urga o f f i c e w i l l present d i -r e c t l y , nominations under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the U l i a s s u t a i , Kobdo and Urianghai o f f i c e s w i l l be forwarded to the Urga Off i c e which w i l l i n turn present them [to the President]. 25. Lesser o f f i c i a l s i n the banners w i l l , according to regulations, on the request of the jassak, be appointed by the league-head, who w i l l report the appointment to the appropriate o f f i c e at the f i r s t opportunity. No r e v i s i o n 26. A i l o f f i c i a l s and nobles s h a l l be given annual s t i -pends according to rank and duty. The funds for t h i s w i l l be dispatched from the Central Government treasury to the appropriate o f f i c e s which w i l l give them to the r e c i p i e n t s . No r e v i s i o n 27. A l l nobles and lamas i n Outer Mongolia s h a l l pay t h e i r annual v i s i t s to the Central Government as before. In case of i l l n e s s or extraordinary circumstances they may submit a report so that t h e i r t r i p to the c a p i t a l may be omitted. Th malpractices of the Ch'ing Dynasty of sending o f f i c e r s to v e r i f y i l l n e s s e s and.to extract bribes s h a l l be abolished. The decision to go to the Capital i s a private a f f a i r and s h a l l be l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l . No r e v i s i o n •28. The present sutra chanting expenses and administrative expenses of the positions of the. Urga K'an-pu Nomon Khan, Lan-tsung Nomon Khan and the Erdeni Shangchotba w i l l be annually,provided by the Central Government. The stipends of the Ta Lamas and others are also to be discussed and fixed. No r e v i s i o n 29. The Erdeni Shangchotba of Urga s h a l l wear his t r a d i -t i o n a l ruby cap, and embroidered robes of Prince of the f i r s t c l a s s , and s h a l l be next i n rank to the Khans. Ta Lamas s h a l l wear t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l ruby caps and the .em-broidered robes of the Beidze, and s h a l l be next to Dukes i n rank. No r e v i s i o n 30. A l l the re-incarnated Hutukhtus, the Beile Khans and . Shangchotbas of a l l Leagues and Shabi s h a l l be granted annual sutra chanting expenses and administrative expenses. No r e v i s i o n 31. The expenses of the o f f i c i a l i n charge of a public o f f i c e such as wages, l i v i n g quarters, equipment f u e l , water and horses s h a l l be provided by the public funds of the o f f i c e . The leagues and banners cannot be [further] assessed for these expenses. : No r e v i s i o n 32. League heads and commanders s h a l l s e l e c t s u i t a b l e l o -c a t i o n s i n a l l l e a g u e s and banners where they w i l l s e t up permanent o f f i c e t o handle league a f f a i r s . The funds r e -q u i r e d t o s e t up t h e s e o f f i c e s w i l l be p r o v i d e d by C h i n a . 'The number o f t h o s e who. work f o r t h e league-heads and somon-heads s h o u l d be f i x e d and s a l a r i e s p r o v i d e d . No r e v i s i o n 33- The C e n t r a l Government i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e defense and m a i n t a i n peace may g a r r i s o n t r o o p s i n M o n g o l i a p r o p e r } and at s t r a t e g i c p o i n t s a l o n g the b o r d e r . The S e n i o r and A s s i s t a n t A d m i n i s t r a t o r i n Urga s h a l l d e t e r m i n e s i z e and l o -c a t i o n o f f o r c e s . R e i n f o r c e m e n t s may be i n t r o d u c e d i n emer-gency but must be withdrawn a f t e r w a r d s . F o r c e s w i t h i n Outer M o n g o l i a may be t r a n s f e r r e d from p l a c e t o p l a c e by t h e Ad-m i n i s t r a t o r s . M i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n Outer M o n g o l i a s h a l l not i n t e r f e r e w i t h l o c a l government. No r e v i s i o n 34. The s i z e of a l l m i l i t a r y f o r c e s w i l l be s e t by t h e S e n i o r and A s s i s t a n t S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a t o r i n Urga. They • w i l l be under the c o n t r o l o f ttie somon-heads i n each league and a l l w i l l be s u b j e c t t o the c o n t r o l o f the Urga A d m i n i -s t r a t o r s . 35- Central Government troop expenses w i l l be borne by . the Central Government. Expense of Mongol troops w i l l be .borne by the Urga treasury with tax receipts from the regional government. No r e v i s i o n 36. For convenience i n moving troops livestock herds w i l l be established. The Urga Administrators w i l l delegate nobles to maintain these herds. No r e v i s i o n 37- The m i l i t a r y must purchase livestock at current prices No r e v i s i o n 38. Rations to banner troops are to be discontinued when th e i r duties terminate and they return to t h e i r banners. No r e v i s i o n 39•• T n e Central Government w i l l from time to time replenish the equipment of the league and banner m i l i t a r y forces^ No r e v i s i o n 40. A l l shabinar and a l l t a i j i and the servants of the t a i j i w i l l be .exempt from m i l i t a r y service. 41. The post stations are for the 'use of o f f i c i a l s and . troops on public business, and for the mails. The Central Government i s to replace the post system within f i v e years. Present stations should be regularly Inspected. • Those who abuse the system w i l l be punished. The post stations are to supply only quarters, horse s,. camels ,.'fuel and water. Provisions and equipment must be p r i v a t e l y arranged. The people operating the post service may not turn i t to t h e i r personal advantage. No r e v i s i o n 42. M i l i t a r y forces are to use the post system only i n emergency. In these cases a l l banners must a s s i s t i n sup-plying camels and horses. When the emergency i s over these horses and camels must be returned to t h e i r o r i g i n a l banners, and persons accompanying these animals must be compensated by the o f f i c e r s concerned. No r e v i s i o n 43. Chinese people, i n accordance with regulations, i n a l l settlements and a l l banners may request a location for a-market place, and with the approval of the jassak con-cerned, may carry on business there. No r e v i s i o n 44. Chinese who wish to open land, plant crops, cut wood or mow hay, must f i r s t make a written request to the appro-priate o f f i c e , which w i l l in. turn order the jassak concerned to look into the matter and make a decision. If i t does not i n t e r f e r e with sacred areas or grazing lands, when the jassak's approval has been received and a guarantee signed the land may be'rented. No o f f i c i a l s , jassaks, or clerks may p r i v a t e l y rent land. Public companies must follow the same-procedure, as private i n d i v i d u a l s . No r e v i s i o n 45. In the case of mining operations In a l l . leagues, whether they are to be government or commercially operated, the Senior and Assistant Senior Administrator i n Urga must discuss them with the chief agency concerned and make a decision. I f they are approved an i n v e s t i g a t i o n must f i r s t be undertaken '[of .the proposed mine]. The procedure f o l -lowed w i l l be as i n the previous condition. No r e v i s i o n 46. In the case o f - a l l government and commercially operated mines, and a l l farms, wood-lots and hayfields rented by Chinese, the ownership of the land i s to remain with the banners. 47. L o c a l t a x a t i o n i n Outer M o n g o l i a should, be based on former r e g u l a t i o n s . These r e g u l a t i o n s w i l l be d e c i d e d by the government i n Urga. I n accordance w i t h former r e g u l a -t i o n s a l l banners and s h a b i s h o u l d be g i v e n the expenses f o r o p e r a t i o n o f t h e i r o f f i c e s . No r e v i s i o n 48. A l l r a i l r o a d , t e l e g r a p h l i n e s and p o s t a l service.s w i l l be r e - o r g a n i z e d by the C e n t r a l Government, but w i t h t h e p r i o r a p p r o v a l of the S e n i o r and A s s i s t a n t S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a -t o r i n Urga, P r o v i d e d t h a t they do not v i o l a t e s c a r e d a r e a s r a i l w a y r i g h t - o f - w a y s w i l l be examined and approved by t h e j a s s a k s concerned. No- r e v i s i o n 49. M i n e s , r a i l r o a d s and any o t h e r i n d u s t r y a f f e c t i n g t h e l a n d must be u n d e r t a k e n w i t h d o m e s t i c f u n d s . I f t h i s i s i m p o s s i b l e t h e n t h e S e n i o r and A s s i s t a n t S e n i o r A d m i n i s t r a -t o r must a d v i s e the l o c a l Assembly w h i c h w i l l a s c e r t a i n whether or not i t would be t o t h e d e t r i m e n t ' o f the c o u n t r y , and o n l y t h e n may such a l o a n be made. N e i t h e r l a n d nor any i n d u s t r y r e l a t e d t o communication may be used t o s e c u r e l o a n s , nor l e a s e d , or s o l d t o f o r e i g n e r s . R e v i s i o n : I n l i n e w i t h the r e v i s i o n o f c o n d i t i o n 14 the t e r m , " s e l f - g o v e r n i n g * has been added b e f o r e "Assembly." y 5 0 . Courts must be established at a l l market places to handle complaints involving Chinese and Mongols. . Each court i s to have a chief and a deputy magistrate and both Mongols and Chinese may f i l l these positions. They are not to i n -terfere with the a f f a i r s of the jassaks and shangchotbas of these areas. No r e v i s i o n 5 1 . Chinese offenders should be t r i e d i n the o f f i c e of the chief l o c a l o f f i c i a l , but he i s not to administer punishment except i n cases where there has been an actual disturbance of the peace. No r e v i s i o n 5 2 . When the punitive law of the former Ch'ing Dynasty c o n f l i c t s with present Mongol law i t must be corrected on the basis of l o c a l custom and conditions, and on the -basis of i t s s u i t a b i l i t y to both Mongols and Chinese. No r e v i s i o n 5 3 - A l l government owned enterprises i n Outer Mongolia w i l l be administered by the chief o f f i c i a l i n the. o f f i c e concerned 5 4 . Budgets w i l l be p r o j e c t e d f o r ' t h e r e o r g a n i z e d l o c a l governments, and w i l l be covered by taxes set by the Urga government w i t h C e n t r a l Government a p p r o v a l . I f funds are i n s u f f i c i e n t the c e n t r a l government w i l l t e m p o r a r i l y p r o v i d e a s s i s t a n c e , but when the tax s t r u c t u r e has been adjusted t h i s a s s i s t a n c e w i l l be t e r m i n a t e d . When t h e r e are s u r p l u s revenues they w i l l be used to pay accrued debts to the Centra l .Government . No r e v i s i o n 5 5 . . The debt of 3 , 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 r o u b l e s s t i l l owed t o ' t h e R u s s i a n government w i l l be r e p a i d from the R u s s i a n funds of the M i n i s t r y of F i n a n c e . [ I n U r g a J . No r e v i s i o n 5 6 . A l l debts w i t h commercial f i r m s c o n t r a c t e d by the leagues banners and s h a b i which bear a government s e a l or which do not bear a government s e a l but can be v e r i f i e d must be r e -p a i d . To ease the d i f f i c u l t y f o r the Mongols the government w i l l f i x t ime l i m i t s f o r repayment, and repayment w i l l be made in- equal i n s t a l l m e n t s . No r e v i s i o n debts i n c u r r e d p r i v a t e l y w i t h Chinese t r a -c o l l e c t e d from the banner i f the debtor i s No r e v i s i o n 5 7 - I n f u t u r e , ders may not be unable to- pay. 5 8 . E x i s t i n g mining contracts with Russians and. the contract with the Bank of China are to remain i n e f f e c t . No r e v i s i o n 5 9 . When the Central Government revises the former Ch'ing statutes representatives of a l l leagues, banners and shabi should take part.-No r e v i s i o n 60. The Sino-Russo-Mongol T r i p a r t i t e [Kiakhta] Agreement, the Russo-Mongol Trade Protocol and the Slno-Russian Declar-ation are by t h i s agreement naturally annulled. China w i l l be responsible for re-negotiating new trade agreements be-tween China and Russia [ i n Mongolia]. Revision: Any items of the Kiakhta Agreement or the Sino-Russian Declaration which c o n f l i c t with t h i s agreement, w i l l be annulled. 6 l . Russian'traders may conduct business as before i n Outer Mongolia. Old commercial contracts w i l l remain i n force u n t i l t h e i r expiry dates when new contracts must be negotia-ted. 6 2 . If there are any regulations that' .should, be included i n the above conditions they should be entered immediately help ensure that the. conditions w l l be.upheld. No r e v i s i o n 6 3 . These conditions become e f f e c t i v e on promulgation. No r e v i s i o n 

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