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Environmental planning and decision making for large-scale power projects Le Marquand, David G. 1972

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ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING FOR LARGE-SCALE POWER PROJECTS by David G. LeMarquand B.A. The University of British Columbia, 1969 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the School of Community and Regional Planning We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1972 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree t h a t t h e L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f Community and Regional Planning The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8 , Canada Date ABSTRACT This study focuses on the institutional problems involved in planning for large-scale energy and resource projects i n B.C. ' Fundamental to planning for these projects i s the resolution of the tension between economic growth and environmental quality. Concern is expressed that, to date, planning has stressed economic values at the expense of environmental values held in society. A more equitable planning structure is needed whereby interested groups in society may present informed views to the planners and decision-makers to help them achieve solutions that more nearly represent the public interest. To reach a solution that reflects the public interest an advocacy approach to planning is suggested i n Chapter Two. This approach stresses interest group participation i n the "planning process" to conduct planning that meets public expectations. In order that environmental interests are incorporated into the planning and decision-making for major power and resource projects, an envir-onmental review agency i s proposed. This agency would have the power to conduct is own investigations into issues that might affect the environment and advocate i t s findings i n the debate over the proposed Projects. To test the su i t a b i l i t y i n British Columbia of the advocacy approach a number of c r i t e r i a are developed, The c r i t e r i a reflect i i i . some basic democratic values held in our society and the problems associated with institutional design. The c r i t e r i a include public participation and representation, information generation, efficiency, equality, professional humility, natural justice, liberty and p o l i t i c a l leadership. The characteristics of B.C.'s p o l i t i c a l milieu are examined in Chapter Three to see what problems the implementation of the ad-vocacy approach for environmental and resource planning might face in the province. Three characteristics of the p o l i t i c a l milieu are seen as possible constraints on the effective implementation of a review agency - materialist values held in the province, lack of strong interest groups and the dependence on resource extraction for economic prosperity. A case study of the planning and decision-making for the , Bennett Dam on the Peace River, presented i n Chapter Four, outlines the inadequacy of the planning process. Even though there have been some changes in planning procedures since the i n i t i a l planning for the Peace project, two principal deficiencies remain - there is v i r -tually no scope for public involvement in the planning process and the information produced i s too highly technical to make for effective public participation. As a consequence major energy and resource planning w i l l l i k e l y produce results that favour energy and develop-ment interests. The f i n a l chapter concludes that the creation of an environmental review agency would help redress the development bias and thus permit compromise solutions that more nearly approx-imate the public interest. Three other recommendations are also suggested - develop a more explicit advocacy relationship between interest groups in society and government departments, provide for more public participation under the provisions of the Water Act and demand greater federal involvement In projects of national significance. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract . . . . . . . . . • • . . • • • i i Acknowledgement . . . . . . ix CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . ••. . . ./. 1 INTRODUCTORY REMARK . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 1 PROBLEMS, . . . • . .... . . • • . . . . 1 Tension in Values . . 2 Planning and Decision-Making Institutions . . 5 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . •'. , 10 PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS . . 11 A Normative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Applicability of the Model . . . . . . . . . . 12 Case Studies . . . 13 The Planning Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 CHAPTER TWO - PLANNING CRITERIA • • • 1 7 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . .: 17 INTRODUCTION . . . 18 VALUES . . . . . . . . . . • .18, Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Information . . . . . . . . 19 Social Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Liberty. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Rectitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 v i . TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Page CHAPTER TWO RATIONAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION. . . . . . . .. . . .. 20 ADVOCACY PLANNING AND PLURALISM 24 ADVOCACY PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE . . . . . 27 A Metaphysical Reservation . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning for Public Goods with Limited Knowledge , • , . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Rational Individual . . 35 Organized and Unorganized Interests . . . . . . 36 P o l i t i c a l Leadership 38 Environmental P o l i t i c s 39 Government Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW AGENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 CRITERIA FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN . . . . . . • • 4 5 Public Participation and Representation . . . . 45 Information Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Efficiency . . . 46 Professional Humility 47 Natural Justice . . . \ • . 47 Liberty . . . 47 P o l i t i c a l Leadership 47 CHAPTER THREE - BRITISH COLUMBIA'S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. 48 SUMMARY 48 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . 49 Setting . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 MATERIALISM , , , . , . , • • ' • •• 5 1 Social Credit , . , 51 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Page CHAPTER THREE Other Parties 52 Immigration . . 53 Conservatism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Man-Nature 55 Consequences . . . . , . . . . . . . . . ./. . 56 INTEREST GROUPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Principle and Practice i n Pol i t i c s . . . . . . 57 Anti-Establishment Bias . . . . . . 59 Issue Manipulation ". . . . . . . 60 Plebiscite Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Consequences. . . . . . 62 RESOURCE BASED ECONOMY . . . . . . 63 Natural Amenities 64 Consequences. 65 CONCLUSION. 65 CHAPTER FOUR - CASE STUDY: . W.A.C. BENNETT DAM . . . . . 67 SUMMARY . 67 INTRODUCTION 68 GOAL IDENTIFICATION . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . 70 ALTERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 EVALUATION , . , . . . . . . . '.. . . . . . . . . • 76 Engineering Evaluation . . , . 76 Economic Feasibility and Evaluation. 79 Environmental Impact Evaluation ....... . . . . 84 Social Dislocation Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 87 FEEDBACK . . 88 The B.C. Water Act . . . . . . . . . . . 89 The Navigable Waters Protection Act 92 V l l l . TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Page CHAPTER FOUR The Fisheries Act. 95 Interprovincial Cooperation. 95 Legal L i a b i l i t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 REFORMULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 DECISION-MAKING . . . . . . . . . . ... 100 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • 100 Publication Participation and Representation . . . . , 100 Information Generation . . . 102 Efficiency . . , . . . . . . . . • .... ! 102 Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • 1 0 4 Professional Humility. . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • 105 Natural Justice • • • 105 Liberty. . . . . . .. . . • • • • 105 P o l i t i c a l Leadership . . . . 105 CHAPTER FIVE - RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 6 INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 RECOMMENDATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 RECOMMENDATION. , . . . . . I l l RECOMMENDATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 RECOMMENDATION. 116 REFERENCES . . . 1 1 7 APPENDIX A . . . •>.-. . . . • • • 1 2 8 APPENDIX B 137 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am indebted to Professor Irving K. Fox, my . advisor, for his guidance in helping me develop this thesis and an appreciation for the institutional issues associated with environmental planning. I also wish to thank my wife, Lesley, for her invaluable editing and support during my course of study. 1 CHAPTER ONE  INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTORY REMARK The f o l l o w i n g t h e s i s attempts to o u t l i n e the r o l e p l a n n i n g , as a d i s c i p l i n e , can perform i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f o r l a r g e - s c a l e energy resource p r o j e c t s i n B r i t i s h Columbia . The focus of the s tudy i s not on p l a n n i n g techniques u s e f u l f o r d e c i s i o n but r a t h e r on the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g i n which the techniques are u t i l i z e d . I t i s hoped t h a t t h i s focus w i l l h e l p serve as an impetus to i n s t i t u t i o n a l re form so t h a t p l a n n i n g t o o l s can be used to t h e i r b e s t advantage i n promoting environmenta l q u a l i t y . The t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e , empha-s i z e s the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g aspects of p l a n n i n g t h e o r y , the f a c t o r s w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u t h a t w i l l a f f e c t t h i s t h e o r y , and f i n a l l y the a c t u a l performance of the e x i s t i n g p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s f o r r e s o u r c e p r o j e c t s compared w i t h normat ive c r i t e r i a of how the s t r u c t u r e f o r r e s o u r c e p r o j e c t s should p e r f o r m . PROBLEMS C o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g the p l a n n i n g and c o n s t r u c t i o n of l a r g e - s c a l e power i n s t a l l a t i o n s i s t i e d to the " e n v i r o n m e n t a l c r i s i s " and "energy c r i s i s " . The env i ronmenta l c r i s i s i s seen as the f a i l u r e to understand the l e s s o n of b i o l o g y , t h a t i s , q u a l i t y c o n t r o l s q u a n t i t y (Mumford 1967) . Man's p r o l i f e r a t i o n and h i s g l u t t e n o u s m a t e r i a l i s t 2 a p p e t i t e s , which must be fed by some form of energy p r o d u c t i o n , are regarded as d e s t r u c t i v e to the g l o b a l environment and u l t i m a t e l y d e s t r u c t i v e to man h i m s e l f . The energy c r i s i s has a more p r o s a i c p e r s p e c t i v e _ the i n a b i l i t y to m a i n t a i n cheap sources of power a r i s i n g from p o l i t i c a l , t e c h n o l o g i c a l and economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , and the l i m i t e d f a c t o r s i n e f f o r t s to promote c o n t i n u e d economic growth (RFF 1971) . R e t r e a t i n g from t h i s " c r i s i s " h y p e r b o l e to a l e v e l of a n a l y s i s more a p p l i c a b l e to s p e c i f i c C a n a d i a n , and i n p a r t i c u l a r B r i t i s h Columbia problems, c o n t r o v e r s y over l a r g e - s c a l e power i n -s t a l l a t i o n s has two fundamental d i m e n s i o n s . F i r s t , i t e n t a i l s a b a s i c t e n s i o n between the v a l u e s of economic growth and e n v i r o n -mental q u a l i t y . Second, the present patchwork government o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i s i l l equipped to p r o v i d e s a t i s -f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n s that h e l p r e s o l v e t h i s t e n s i o n . Tens ion i n Va lues I n Canada, as i n o ther Western c o u n t r i e s , the e t h i c of economic growth and development has been deeply engrained i n our c o l l e c t i v e c o n s c i o u s n e s s . One r e s u l t of the success of t h i s e t h i c has been the i n c r e a s e i n the r a t e of e l e c t r i c a l consumption by up to 10% a y e a r . Consumption of e l e c t r i c i t y per c a p i t a i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s second o n l y to Norway ( B . C . Energy Board 1971) . W i t h the demand f o r power d o u b l i n g every ten y e a r s , governments and r e s o u r c e p l a n n e r s have p l a c e d a h i g h p r i o r i t y on f i n d i n g new r e s e r v e s of energy and d e v e l o p i n g new power i n s t a l l a t i o n s . In Canada hydro power has 3 been the p r i n c i p a l concern , as the l a b e l " h y d r o - e l e c t r i c " a t tached to the names of many Canadian power u t i l i t i e s i n d i c a t e s . I n B r i t i s h Columbia hydro power accounts f o r 89.1% of the t o t a l e l e c t r i c a l energy g e n e r a t i o n compared to 77.8% i n the r e s t of Canada and 17% i n the U n i t e d S ta tes (DBS 1971; FTC 1970) . To meet the e x p o n e n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n demand f o r e l e c t r i c i t y , governments have looked to more and l a r g e r i n s t a l l a t i o n s . I n B r i t i s h Columbia c o n t r o v e r s y has surrounded some of the l a r g e r schemes, i n p a r t i c u l a r the Peace and Columbia R i v e r p r o j e c t s . Concern has focused on the a b i l i t y of the p r o v i n c e to f i n a n c e the mass ive u n d e r - . t a k i n g s and , on a more t e c h n i c a l l e v e l , whether the proposed p r o j e c t s were the bes t a l t e r n a t i v e s to s a t i s f y f u t u r e power r e q u i r e m e n t s . These i s s u e s , e s p e c i a l l y the l a t t e r , are s t i l l c e n t r a l to the debate over c o n s t r u c t i o n of energy p r o d u c t i o n f a c i l i t i e s . In r e c e n t years p u b l i c concern f o r e n v i r o n m e n t a l q u a l i t y has become an i s s u e . Thermal g e n e r a t i n g u n i t s are c r i t i c i z e d f o r p o l l u t i n g the a i r , l a n d and w a t e r . Hydro schemes, on the o t h e r hand, are n o n - p o l l u t i n g but the d e s t r u c t i o n of v a l u e d w i l d e r n e s s areas and the d i s a s t e r o u s envi ronmenta l consequences a r i s i n g from p r o j e c t s l i k e the Aswan Dam i n Egypt have made these p r o j e c t s s u b j e c t to a t t a c k by those groups tha t p l a c e a h i g h v a l u e on e n v i r o n m e n t a l q u a l i t y . The example of the Aswan Dam i s cause enough to demand i n t e n s i v e envi ronmenta l impact assessments of proposed p r o j e c t s . That p r o j e c t i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d e c l i n e i n the E a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n s a r d i n e f i s h e r y r e s u l t i n g from the l o s s of n u t r i e n t - r i c h N i l e R i v e r 4 s i l t ; chemical f e r t i l i z e r s are now needed i n a g r i c u l t u r e to replace the s i l t ' s n a tural enrichment; the clear r i v e r water i s undermining the dykes and bridges downstream of the dam; the extensive network of i r r i g a t i o n canals without the f l u s h i n g a c t i o n of the annual floods i s extending the habitat of the Schistosomia carrying s n a i l s that spread the d e b i l i t a t i n g disease b i l h a r z i a ; and the r e s e r v o i r , located i n a porous sandstone area and subject to heavy evaporation, i s reducing the t o t a l amount of water a v a i l a b l e to the a r i d country ( S t e r l i n g 1971). The Aswan Dam i s the most dramatic example of myopic project planning but the Egyptian experience with unforeseen environmental consequences has been duplicated throughout developing and developed countries. If the economic growth of a region i s a high p r i o r i t y the defeat of p a r t i c u l a r projects by determined environmentalists may not provide an acceptable s o l u t i o n , even to the v i c t o r s . The oppo-s i t i o n to the b u i l d i n g of dams i n the Grand Canyon i n the United States i n the I960's which u l t i m a t e l y led to the defeat of the proposals r e s u l t e d i n a disasterous s o l u t i o n f or the nearby Four Corners area, bordering Arizona, New Mexico, Utah and Colorado. The r e j e c t i o n of the hydro schemes stimulated the development of a massive complex of coal-thermal generating plants. These plants have caused widespread a i r p o l l u t i o n over the Mohave desert, an increase i n s t r i p mining on the Black Mesa and the lowering of the water table i n that area from pumping ground water f o r the coal s l u r r y p i p e l i n e (Rff 1972). 5 Simplistic problem-solving approaches to complex issues involving basic social values and goals may work to defeat a par-ticular project. The issue w i l l remain to arise in another place or another time i f the goals motivating that project are not chal l -enged or accommodated. Hufschmidt (1971) warns, in this context, that single-minded conern for a specific goal and. its disregard for other important values has been found wanting in the fields of highway construction3 urban renewal and energy and mineral resource development. The mistakes of these programs should not be repeated in our zeal to carry out worthy environmental quality programs; (p. 234). The problem for planning institutions becomes;i how they are to accommodate these values i n a compromise solution that reflects the public interest. Planning and Decision-Making Institutions Mistakes i n resource planning often arise from f a i l i n g to see that two or more national objectives are i n conflict and the claims derived from these values cannot be resolved at a tech-nical or planning level. For example, the controversy over power plant siting often results from the failure of planners and decision-makers to accommodate demands for economic growth, which entail new power installations, and a newer widespread desire for envir-onmental quality along with economic prosperity. However, the compromises and trade-offs necessary for any decision-making affecting these basic values can only be performed i n our l i b e r a l -democratic society by the public and their representatives. 6 The functions of the planning process have a v i t a l role to play in informing the debate between project development and environmental quality. The planners can isolate and develop i n -formation on the c r i t i c a l points in the argument. More important, planning can demonstrate that desirable solutions w i l l require trade-offs in values and higher costs. To perform this role planning needs the sophisticated techniques of analysis which are being developed, such as environmental impact analysis, to integrate the recent concerns into decision-making. However, a fundamental obstacle to developing this role i s an institutional structure in many jurisdictions that frustrates the representation of the new social values and the planner's techniques of analysis that support these values. Although planning's concern for developing alternatives, and then evaluating them in terms of social goals and objectives offers to the decision-maker needed information, Haskell (1971) comments that i t has not been a favoured tool of environmental management. The more immediate concerns of setting standards, issuing permits, providing technical and financial assistance and conducting enforcement proceedings have taken precedence. Nevertheless, in the f i e l d of energy resource development there i s in British Columbia as elsewhere considerable planning effort. The Water Resource Service surveys future sources of supply and estimates possible demands; B.C. Hydro and Power Authority con-ducts their own studies to prepare for future needs; and f i n a l l y 7 the B . C . Energy Board i s i n s t r u c t e d to c a r r y out d e t a i l e d exam-i n a t i o n s of what the c a b i n e t t h i n k s i s r e l e v a n t to meet ing f u t u r e , power r e q u i r e m e n t s . There i s p l a n n i n g but i t i s b i a s e d . I t o n l y i n c o r p o r a t e s one se t of v a l u e s . - energy p r o d u c t i o n and economic growth . The p r i n c i p a l env i ronmenta l p r o t e c t i o n agency, the Department of R e c r e a t i o n and C o n s e r v a t i o n , has o n l y an a d v i s o r y r o l e . The 1971 Environment and Land Use A c t , S . B . C . 1971, C . 1 7 , p e r m i t s p u b l i c h e a r i n g s on r e s o u r c e i s s u e s by the committee se t up under the A c t . However, the Environment and Land Use Committee does not appear to have the resources or the p o l i t i c a l independence to o f f s e t the energy i n t e r e s t s . I n a d d i t i o n there i s good reason to b e l i e v e t h a t , d e s p i t e the c a b i n e t ' s power to s e t the terms of r e f e r e n c e f o r the Energy Board s t u d i e s and thus i n c o r p o r a t e new v a l u e s i n t o the p l a n n i n g s t r u c t u r e , the new envi ronmenta l awareness i s . no t ade -q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d i n the p l a n n i n g f o r new energy p o l i c i e s , p r o -grammes and p r o j e c t s . Two n e i g h b o u r i n g governments of B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , A l b e r t a and Washington, have taken s teps to i n c o r p o r a t e the " e c o l o g i c a l i m p e r a t i v e " i n t o t h e i r government o r g a n i z a t i o n to cope b e t t e r w i t h env i ronment a l i s s u e s . Washington 's Department of Ecology has r e s -p o n s i b i l i t y f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g envi ronmenta l q u a l i t y problems as w e l l as d e v e l o p i n g a water r e s o u r c e p l a n f o r the S t a t e . I t has the power to conduct envi ronmenta l impact rev iew of a c t i o n s and a c t i v i t i e s of 8 other state and local agencies including dam construction. It also has a Power Plant Site Evaluation Council which is restricted to investigating thermal power plants. The Governor, however, is under no obligation to adopt the Council's findings. In general the Department considers i t s e l f an environmental advocate that should represent the environment when i t s values are threatened. Assoc-iated with the Department of Ecology is the Ecology Commission. The Commission acts as a forum, where ether departments and the public can voice their feelings about the Department's actions or on other issues the Director feels are important. The legislation creating the Commission is not clear as to whether i t may veto Department actions (Haskell et a l 1971), The point is that these new agencies are not associated with the traditional conservation agencies and they are set up consciously as a countervailing force to the Department of Natural Resources and other departments that stress development, Like Washington, Alberta has made an explicit effort to offset the influence of the more traditional departments. In addition to the creation of a Department of the Environment, the government created the Environment Conservation Authority to mon-ito r public opinion and investigate environmental problems. The Department handles those matters pertaining directly to government administration, the activities of c i v i l servants and the integra-tion and implementation of Department programmes. The Environmental Conservation Authority has a more free-lance role. It holds 9 public hearings on controversial resource and environmental quality issues; i t has the power to seek out and investigate other problems that the Authority and/or the Cabinet considers pertinent; and f i n -a l l y , the Authority hears appeals from adjudication carried out by the Department of the Environment. Other reasons than matching government organization to the broad ecological relationships in nature or creating environ-mental advocates also motivate institutional reform. Establishing new agencies as symbols of government concern for the environment and increasing organizational efficiency and public accountability are other important considerations that may reflect p o l i t i c a l values in these institutional reforms. But in British Columbia there have been few institutional reforms that significantly alter the inputs into decision-making for large power projects. There is no department that can claim the preservation of environmental quality as i t s jurisdiction. The Environment and Land Use Committee has not the resources to cultivate constituents and thus i t s advisory power is unlikely to be highly regarded. The Pollution Control Board has jurisd i c t i o n over air and water quality but this limited responsibility i s further restricted to just issuing pollution permits; i t has l i t t l e power to abate or control pollution. The Department of Recreation and Conservation has an important role in this wilderness province to maintain w i l d l i f e values but environmental quality i s not limited to preservation of fish and w i l d l i f e . The Department of Lands, 10 F o r e s t s and Water R e s o u r c e s adopts t h e " b e s t u s e " e t h i c o f r e s o u r c e c o n s e r v a t i o n i s t s b u t from t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e t h e b e s t u s e o f r e s o u r c e s i s d evelopment. T h i s s t u d y assumes t h a t i f t h e s t r u c t u r e o f government and p u b l i c i n t e r a c t i o n remains unchanged, the p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n s t h a t r e s u l t w i l l r e f l e c t o n l y the power i n t e r e s t s and t h e g r o w t h .  e t h i c . PURPOSE The p u r p o s e of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o d e v e l o p an i n s t i t u t i o n a l s e t t i n g t h a t c a n e n s u r e t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t a l v a l u e s and t h e p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e s t o l a r g e - s c a l e p r o j e c t s have th e o p p o r t u n i t y t o be i n -c l u d e d i n t h e p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f o r t h e s e p r o j e c t s . PERSPECTIVE From t h e p r e c e d i n g d i s c u s s i o n two p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e o f f e r e d i n r e l a t i o n t o p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g f o r l a r g e -s c a l e p r o j e c t s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a : 1. The p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g s t r u c t u r e s f o r m a j o r e n e r g y d e c i s i o n s a r e too o r i e n t e d t o w a r d s p r o b l e m s o l v i n g and p h y s i c a l p r o j e c t development t o i n c o r p o r a t e the e n v i r o n m e n t a l v a l u e s h e l d w i t h i n s o c i e t y . 2. An e n v i r o n m e n t a l r e v i e w agency i s an a p p r o p r i a t e ' u n i t o f government to e n s u r e t h a t p l a n n i n g and 11 decision-making for large-scale projects takes into account the environmental perspective. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS A Normative Model Although this thesis advances the suspicion that government behaviour i s not in accord with social and p o l i t i c a l values, to research this suspicion requires a method with which to direct the investigation and to test the findings. That there i s a bias against environmental values in decision-making and that some form of review agency can help redress the bias may be stated as working hypotheses. That i s , this outlook provides us with some-thing to go on and indicates the f i r s t steps for research (Kaplan 1964) Unfortunately, the working hypothesis offered i s not so specific as to provide a framework of analysis. To overcome this obstacle this study develops a normative model of an environmentally-oriented organization structure. Criteria are developed from basic democratic p o l i t i c a l values and from the precepts of organization theory. The c r i t e r i a indicate the c r i t i c a l features in the i n s t i -tutional structure that demand attention and the behaviour patterns that should be taken into account i f the institutions are to operate according to society's expectations. These c r i t e r i a in effect be-come an ideal model. The model i s the standard by which empirical structures are evaluated. In addition i t points out the direction institutional reform might take. As the c r i t e r i a outlines those 12 f e a t u r e s of an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e tha t are impor tant to c o n -s i d e r , i t can then serve as a framework f o r a n a l y s i s of e m p i r i c a l s t r u c t u r e s . Chapter Two of t h i s t h e s i s develops the model . The fundamental v a l u e s that t h i s w r i t e r f e e l s are h e l d w i t h i n s o c i e t y are p r e s e n t e d . T h i s chapter d i s c u s s e s the argument t h a t any bureaucracy p l a n n i n g s o l u t i o n to p r e s s i n g s o c i a l , env i ronmenta l and economic problems w i l l be won a t the expense of these b a s i c p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s . A d i r e c t i o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n might take to a v o i d t h i s b a s i c conundrum i s then o f f e r e d . A l s o , o t h e r l e s s fundamental problems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e n s u r i n g d e s i r e d o r g a n -i z a t i o n a l performance are ana lyzed to h e l p d e r i v e the c r i t e r i a tha t should d i r e c t environmenta l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . A p p l i c a b i l i t y of the Model The c r i t e r i a are developed w i t h i n the contex t of our l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c government. But w i t h i n the broad framework of democrat ic s o c i e t y wide v a r i a t i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s occur among d i f f e r e n t r e g i o n s . The p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u of a r e g i o n may a f f e c t the c h a r a c t e r of p o l i t i c a l and t e c h n i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Chapter Three d i s c u s s e s the b a s i c p o l i t i c a l parameters t h a t i n f l u e n c e the c h a r a c t e r of p l a n n i n g and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia and examines the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the c r i t e r i a w i t h i n the r e g i o n a l c o n t e x t . A s tudy of the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u can o n l y i n d i c a t e the 13 broad constraints that influence planning and decision-making. To achieve a fu l l e r understanding of the nature of these a c t i v i t i e s in British Columbia, Chapter Four considers the experience of the W.A.C. Bennett Dam across the Peace River in Northern British Columbia. A characteristic of hydro-electric projects on major rivers i s that they are rarely small-scale operations. The Bennett Dam is larger than most - i t is one of the largest e a r t h - f i l l dams in the world; the Williston Reservoir is more than double the size of the next largest lake in the province; the powerhouse w i l l have an installed continuous generating capacity of 2.3 million kilox^atts and by the time the f i n a l generators are installed in 1974 i t may have cost up to $850 million. Since the p o l i t i c a l energy and financial re-sources required to develop the project are so great, an analysis of i t s development under this pressure should reveal the essential characteristics of the planning and decision-making process for power projects. With the insight gained from this examination, Chapter Five makes some recommendations to improve planning and decision-making in accord with the c r i t e r i a developed i n Chapter Two. Case Studies Post-mortem studies of past projects are a legitimate, function of social-science research for they help strengthen the feedback process and thus the performance of the management structure (Judy 1969). However, the approach has some shortcomings that must be recognized.' 14 1. Context: Each planning operation and decision takes place within a different context and thus one case study does not represent the universe. This is especially true for large-scale projects where the circumstances are always different and there i s never any typical case.. 2* Feedback: Planning and decision-making occur at a point in time and the further from that point, the less applicable are the lessons learned from the project under: consideration. The actors learn from past experience and thus alter their subsequent behaviour. For example the somewhat comprehensive approach taken in studying the f e a s i b i l i t y of a possible Moran Dam may i n part be a reflection of the unforeseen environmental consequences caused by the Bennett Dam. 3. Hindsight: Hindsight must be tempered by appreciation of the much more limited perspective of the participants. Nevertheless this thesis i s concerned with diagnosis of the i l l s of planning not prediction of i t s behaviour. These i l l s can be detected i n the basic structural relationships within the planning process. An obvious manifestation of changes in these relationships i s the introduction of new legislation reorganizing government departments concerned with energy decisions. There have been alterations since the Peace project was initiated but none of these have altered the pattern of intergovernmental and public interation. Thus the interplay of forces which, the Peace project case study reveals should s t i l l be applicable today. We 15 would expect the same types of decision although perhaps more re-fined by past experience and more defensive in face of changing public attitudes. If greater p r e c i s i o n i s desired in. predicting or forecasting the behaviour of the system the significant case study approach i s inappropriate. However, i f the purpose of the study i s to understand how the system performs in terms of estab-lished c r i t e r i a , the case study approach, with the above mentioned reservations, i s acceptable. The Planning Function A problem in studying planning for large-scale energy projects in British Columbia is that there i s l i t t l e mention of planning. This situation i s highlighted by the scepticism and slight bewilderment expressed by many of the actors in the de-cisions when asked about the role of planning. In countries with. a planned economy the planning function i s quite easily identified. There often i s a national or regional plan from which energy pol-i c i e s , programmes and projects are derived. Planning i s ex p l i c i t l y recognized and set forth in a pattern that can be scrutinized. But in British Columbia the appellative 'planning* i s seldom used; when i t i s i t may refer to minor technical functions of construction scheduling or reservoir preparation. Planning may indeed be involved in these a c t i v i t i e s but at a low level of significance i n relation to the more fundamental problem of how or why the project i t s e l f was conceived. Is i t legitimate then to speak of planning for these projects? 16 The answer must be y e s . P l a n n i n g performs c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n s tha t i n v o l v e goa ls and the e v a l u a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s i n terms of those g o a l s . These f u n c t i o n s may a l l be o r g a n i z e d i n one department as many of the minor p l a n n i n g tasks a r e . T h i s form of o r g a n i z a t i o n would s i m p l i f y the e v a l u a t i o n of p l a n n i n g by c o n -c e n t r a t i n g i t s f u n c t i o n s i n an i d e n t i f i a b l e e n t i t y . N e v e r t h e l e s s i f p l a n n i n g i s not organized on t h i s f u n c t i o n a l b a s i s t h i s s i t u a t i o n does not mean there i s no p l a n n i n g . The f u n c t i o n s of g e n e r a t i n g i n -f o r m a t i o n and e v a l u a t i n g and weighing that i n f o r m a t i o n i n terms of g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s can be performed by a number of a g e n c i e s . P l a n n i n g can be ana lyzed i f a l l the f u n c t i o n s t h a t make up the p l a n n i n g process occur w i t h i n the context of a g i v e n d e c i s i o n s i t u a -t i o n , no mat ter what the number of p a r t i c i p a t i n g agencies and groups happensto be . 17 CHAPTER TWO  PLANNING CRITERIA SUMMARY . Government institutions are being c r i t i c i z e d for not being responsive to basic social values of which environmental quality i s a part. Institutions' own goals of survival and the operational techniques of "rationalist" planning to minimize or-ganizational uncertainty are seen by theorists as values that supplant the institutions' prescribed goals of meeting society's expectations and aspirations. A plu r a l i s t institutional structure supplemented by an advocacy planning philosophy offers a direction for institutional reform that can perhaps minimize negative i n s t i -tutional behaviour. Values and interests can be reflected by par-ticular organizations that have the resources and expertise to articulate these interests in p o l i t i c a l decision-making. However, the approach does have some shortcomings with regard to organiza-tional behaviour, systems analysis and environmental p o l i t i c s that frustrate the reflection of environmental interests. These weaknesses can to some extent be compensated for by the creation of a review agency. These considerations lead to a number of c r i t e r i a that should be satisfied i f environmental planning and decision-making are to reflect p o l i t i c a l values. 18 INTRODUCTION T e c h n i c a l a n a l y s i s of p r o j e c t s i s becoming more s o p h i s -t i c a t e d i n i t s attempts to i n c o r p o r a t e the s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a b l e s and a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r development. The p o l i t i c a l impact of t h i s p l a n n i n g f u n c t i o n and the t e c h n i c i a n ' s i n f l u e n c e on the p o l i t i c a l process have r e c e i v e d l e s s a t t e n t i o n . But the f u n c t i o n s of d e c i s i o n -making , p o l i c y f o r m a t i o n and p l a n n i n g are c l o s e l y t i e d together ( F r e i d r i c h 1971). Hence, i f p l a n n i n g techniques are to be examined s e p a r a t e l y , the r o l e p l a n n i n g p l a y s i n d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g can o n l y be v a g u e l y u n d e r s t o o d . Thus the techniques the d i s c i p l i n e develops to improve d e c i s i o n s may not be e f f e c t i v e . The Economic C o u n c i l (1971) comments, i n t h i s r e g a r d , t h a t What really matters is the approach to thinking about the choices that need to he made - a continuous, conscious and de-liberate weighing of alternative actions on the broadest possible basis of knowledge and participation (p. 63). To make t h i s statement more than a p l a t i t u d e the i n s t i t u t i o n a l : arrangements f o r p l a n n i n g deserve s e r i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n to make the p l a n n e r ' s e f f o r t s r e l e v a n t and e f f e c t i v e i n h e l p i n g accompl ish . , t h i s t a s k . VALUES There appear to be two f o r c e s a t work demanding i n s t i -t u t i o n a l changes f o r environmenta l i s s u e s . The f i r s t f o r c e demands t h a t o l d i n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements be r e p l a c e d by new ones that • 29 ' can effectively deal with the environmental problems we face today. The second force reflects a general dissatisfaction with the whole framework and direction of government activity. Government agencies are being c r i t i c i z e d for not being responsive to basic social values (Haskell et al., 1971). Bureaucratic organizations are being attacked for losing sight of the basic values that should sustain and direct their operations. To accommodate these critcisms of government organizations, considerations for institutional design should include and make explicit the values of society that are applicable to institutional design even though these values are often d i f f i c u l t to make opera-tional. Fox (1971) offers five basic values that he, as does this writer, feels are relevant for institutional design. Participation A basic value in our society i s the right of the indiv-idual to participate in making decisions that affect him. The com-plexity of modern society frustrates the ideal city state or town ha l l style of participatory democracy. Systems of representation have developed as necessary substitutes for direct participation. Institutions should allow the individual a reasonable opportunity to participate or be represented in decisions that affect him. Information For an individual to participate in the p o l i t i c a l process he requires at least a basic understanding of the factors involved 20 in the decision-making. The ideal of perfect knowledge i s d i f f i c u l t -to achieve yet information about the alternatives open to individuals remains important. The best practical information that can be pro-vided to determine the course of action an individual considers best in dealing with decisions that affect him should be made available. Social Efficiency Social efficiency requires that the costs and benefits to members of society be weighed. Although the problems of measure-ment and evaluation make an optimum solution impossible, the ideal serves as a model for institutions to maximize benefits to as many people i n society as possible. Liberty Individuals, i n a free society, must have the freedom to determine what trade-offs they can make among different values they wish to pursue. Institutions should then allow individuals to sat-is f y their preference subject to non-interference with the rights of others. Rec titude Institutions should function in accord with the concepts of integrity and equity. RATIONAL PLANNING ORGANIZATION Pessimism and fatalism have pervaded much of the theory of bureaucratic organization. The organizational imperative of survival 21 and the necessity of bureaucracy to deal with the randomness and uncertainty of environmental, economic and social conditions, many theorists feel, minimize the role of any normative social value other than the technician's value of rationality. Planning theories and institutions are intimately involved with this search for rational and comprehensive explanations of pressing social and economic problems to provide a basis for future planning policy and action. Hence planning may be regarded in this perspective as a process to maintain government institutional s t a b i l i t y rather than a means to improve social welfare. The desire and the need to minimize uncertainty in society is the basis of Weber's "law of increasing rationalization" or Parsons' "technological determinism". Progress i s equated with the progressive development of rational and specialized techniques and tasks to deal with uncertainty which can be sustained only i f the individual gives up his freedom to the large-scale organizations that can u t i l i z e these techniques (Wilson 1971). Gouldner (1955) has called this attitude "metaphysical pathos". He wrote that those theories "which promise to make man's own work more i n t e l l -i gible to himself and more amenable.to his intelligence are.infused with an intangible metaphysical pathos which insinuates in the very midst of new discoveries that a l l i s lost" (p. 496). / H.T. Wilson (1971) points out that these attitudes are predicated on a view of organization that i s hierarchical, dependent on status and authority, and requiring an elaborate differentiation 22 of functions. He expresses the point of view that a new form of organization i s emerging that is based on person specialization, not the task specialization needed to increase the efficiency of pro-duction of a good or service. The orientation is towards problem solving as opposed to decision-making - an approach applicable to large scale development projects. The need for f l e x i b i l i t y rather than formal structure in the rapidly changing world frees the i n -dividual from low discretion positions in a hierarchy and f a c i l i t a t e s more boundary spanning, inter-academic and profession cooperation. Though this trend towards "task force problem solving", or in ToffIer's term "ad-hocracy", may free the participant from the drudgery of formal organization i t might enslave the rest of society in a regime of experts. This problem is especially rele-vant for planning where there is a tendency to use social science techniques as i f they had the precision and predictability of math-ematical analysis (Dreyfus 1971). The individual, in this case, loses his freedom to the techniques of the expert whom he i s incap-able of refuting rather than to the methods of bureaucratic organiza-tion, which he is powerless to fight. The perfect technocratic society E l l u l (1964) envisages where human caprice crumbles before the necessity of rational techniques is unlikely to be attained. Institutional structures and rational techniques are not sophisticated enough to gain p o l i t i c a l control over the myriad of outside and internal variables that influence an organization; they cannot control the v a r i a b i l i t y 23 of human nature. This situation further complicates the problem of institutional design. Planning organizations that act on what they perceive to be the public interest w i l l in fact be interpreting their own organizational imperatives. What the organization con-siders to be rational planning w i l l be a reflection of their own members' values and responses to maintaining the organization's s t a b i l i t y in a changing p o l i t i c a l environment. Planning i s closely connected with decision-making. The. former i s largely technical i n character while the latter i s pol-i t i c a l . However, there is no r i g i d demarcation between the different functions. Rarely can planning be totally objective. The latitude allowed the planner in modifying goals and objectives and setting the range of alternatives to be considered frustrates value-free analysis and can be highly influential i n setting the decision-space that limits the range of p o l i t i c a l debate. Similarly, politicians may exert pressures on the planning process to minimize the possibility that technical analysis may destroy the c r e d i b i l i t y of pet policies or projects. Thus each element of the planning process has a p o l i t i c a l and normative facet to i t that can influence the planning-decision-making process. Haefele (1970) comments that when the p o l i t i c a l element i s introduced into the technological milieu we have "the worst of both worlds - technical analysis that i s debased by p o l i t i c a l judgements and p o l i t i c a l deals in which only a small number and perhaps the wrong 24 people may play" (p. 7). The technical or planning analysis does not cover the f u l l range of technical p o s s i b i l i t i e s and i t i s tem-pered by what experts judge to be p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . The p o l i t i c a l process is conducted by the wrong people, that i s , technicians, and the process is hidden behind technical findings that purport to be objective. Muddling the technical process with the p o l i t i c a l process gives the planner great power but with f a l l i b l e techniques of '• ..v analysis, a normative bias, and l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l accountability. Thus the individual loses his p o l i t i c a l freedom to the "ra t i o n a l i s t " objectives of ruling organizations. This situation is contrary to basic values i n our society regarding the individual's right to influence p o l i t i c a l decisions that may concern him. To achieve the best of the two worlds of technical analysis and p o l i t i c a l sen-s i t i v i t y to pressures and interests within society there needs to be a reaffirmation of some basic normative values. ADVOCACY PLANNING AND PLURALISM If the "omnipotent planner" approach to meeting social needs and expectations cannot succeed a more fragmented structural framework may be required where the various interests in. society can have agencies in the government to advocate their interests. The Ostroms (1971), for example, feel that bureaucratic organization needs to be based on a number of different c o l l e c t i v i t i e s capable 25 of providing public services in response to a diversity of commun-i t i e s of interest. The pluralist framework relieves an organization of the burden of having to interpret the public interest; i t need only represent particular interests. Consequently, i f the various inter-ests in society can find government advocates, the discrepancy be-tween bureaucratic goals and public values w i l l be reduced. The organization must remain sensitive to only the interests i t advoc-ates i f i t is to retain i t s p o l i t i c a l legitimacy. Nevertheless problems s t i l l remain concerning the a b i l i t y of organizatins to reflect public interests. These problems shall be outlined in dis-cussions further on in this chapter. This p l u r a l i s t framework i s also appropriate for our liberal-democratic society which stresses individual participation, bargaining and concensus on government actions. It provides the forum for the diverse views held within the community and the gov-ernment resources and expertise to articulate these views. The advocacy approach to planning requires that planning be viewed as a process in which a number of agencies participate to achieve the f i n a l decision on the particular course of action to follow. Fox (1970), for example, sees planning as a process to generate information about the consequences of alternative courses of action i n a systematic and authoritive fashion. He l i s t s a number of steps in this process: 26 1. The ascertainment of different goals relevant to the problem or objectives. 2. The preparation of alternative plans to achieve the objectives. 3. Review by the public. 4. Refinement and adjustment by the planner. 5. The f i n a l decision by public o f f i c i a l s . This process attempts to reveal a l l significant aspects of a problem to f a c i l i t a t e decision-making for the attainment of the objectives so that i t can achieve a consensus among those affected by the planning decision. However, just carrying out the process is not enough. At each stage there is room for manipula-tion and misrepresentation. Davidoff (1965) comments that "values are inescapable elements of any rational decision-making process" (p. 331). Values should be made explicit and subject to public approval or rejection. The process needs to be balanced by a plural-i s t institutional setting that can ensure that the goals found i n society are represented i n the alternatives generated by the planners To emphasize the social values of liberty, participation and even efficiency, the planning process should not be enclosed within one government department or agency. If each step of the process is carried out properly, the outcomes should meet with wide public acceptance. The decision may not be "right" in an absolute sense; such a question is unimportant. It is in the acceptance of the results that the process i s j u s t i f i e d . 27 In the planning process that must consider environmental resources, i t i s perhaps too much to expect that the forestry service, for example, develop alternative proposals for a forest region at the expense of their forestry interests. Likewise, the B.C. Energy Board, whose function i t i s to find possible sources of future power, should not be expected to consider more than the economic costs of damaging rare natural environments. The agencies concerned with the environment should take the responsibility as environmental advocates to ensure that these interests are repres-ented i n the f i n a l compromise outcome. Although the decision may be disastrous the public w i l l , i f the process i s effective, be forced to accept responsibility. This view that government planning and decision-making should be so open to public participation and scrutiny i s by no means widely accepted. Wisconsin, for instance, took an opposite position in their recent reorganization of government departments concerned with environmental issues. Trade-offs and bargaining on natural resource issues are seen as administrative matters, that only become confused and irrat i o n a l when "pol i t i c i z e d " (Haskell et a l 1971). British Columbia takes fundamentally the same position, as Chapter Four w i l l indicate. ADVOCACY PLANNING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES  A Metaphysical Reservation The pluralist approach i s , i n western democratic societies, not without i t s own metaphysical shortcomings since the achievement 28 of basic social goals may be frustrated. To reach a consensus there i s much emphasis on interaction and bargaining among the participants. Fox (1969) writes that the purpose "of the p o l i t i c a l process is to balance out the differing preferences that people hold so as to arrive at courses of action that serve the overall interest of society" (p. 1368). Reich (1966) has commented that such consensus policy-making tends to support the status quo.. No radical i n i t i a t i v e can survive the erosion of i t s principles in bargaining among the participants. Also, Reich comments, i t limits the planner's or decision-maker's scope of policy choice and range of facts and issues that he may be willing to explore for he tends to let the participants set the range of issues. In-stead of fundamental change the process produces incremental changes (Reich 1966; Lindblom and Braybrooke 1963). Macpherson (1965), writing on l i b e r a l democracy, puts this p l u r a l i s t process in a materialist perspective. A l l govern-ments, he writes, are double systems of power. They order relations in society between the government and the individual but also they order relations between citizens. Our democratic system evolved as a consequence of the individualist-liberal economic system of the nineteenth century that demanded the right of every individual to participate equally in those decisions that might affect his economic well-being. The resulting democratic structure, of which p l u r a l i s t bargaining i s such an important component, was designed to f a c i l i t a t e this economic system. The market cannot ensure equitable distribution 29 of economic w e a l t h , even a c c o r d i n g to the system's own p e r f e c t com-p e t i t i o n model . Hence the i n t e r e s t groups tha t the market produces w i l l have a d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e i n f l u e n c e i n d i r e c t i n g tha t change. T h i does not mean t h a t there e x i s t s a consc ious s t r a t i f i c a t i o n of power i n t o groups w i t h economic power and those w i t h o u t , a t h e o r y American p l u r a l i s t s l i k e P o l s b y (1963) s t r o n g l y r e j e c t . • I t s i m p l y means tha t t h e r e i s a b u i l t - i n b i a s i n favour of s t r o n g economic i n t e r e s t s . P l a n n i n g For P u b l i c Goods With L i m i t e d Knowledge Bross (1965) comments tha t "when v a l u e s are conver ted to a d o l l a r s and cents s c a l e . . . t h e c o n f l i c t of v a l u e s can be r e s o l v e d by a l i t t l e bookkeeping" ( p . 27) . As Macpherson p o i n t s out such bookkeeping i n a p r i v a t e market would r e s u l t i n a b a l a n c e i n f a v o u r of l a r g e r economic i n t e r e s t s . But many government d e c i s i o n s are concerned w i t h the e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r and e f f e c t s of p u b l i c goods and s e r v i c e s as w e l l as p r i v a t e goods. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of b e n e f i t s and c o s t s from government a c t i o n s and e x p e n d i t u r e s comes w i t h i n the realm of w e l f a r e economics . The p r i n c i p l e s d e r i v e d from the t h e o r i e s of w e l f a r e economics are d i r e c t l y a p p l i c a b l e to the d e s i g n of p l a n n i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r l a r g e p r o j e c t s . The Peace p r o j e c t , f o r example, produced d i s a s t r o u s down-stream consequences on the b i o l o g i c a l resources of the Peace-Athabasca D e l t a . The e l i m i n a t i o n of the s p r i n g r u n - o f f , i t i s a rgued , r e s u l t e d i n the d r y i n g up of the unique e c o l o g i c a l system of l a k e s and r i v e r s (Peace-Athabasca D e l t a Committee 1970) . 30 Philips and Hetland (1971) attest that the income flows generated from trapping and fishing by local residents were damaged along with the non-quantifiable values of a shattered l i f e - s t y l e . As well, they suggest Krutilla's (1967a) argument that the loss of v i s i t a t i o n and option demands by people who might wish to v i s i t the area or at least see that i t remains i n i t s natural condition .was another cost of the project. The costs from these negative externalities were not included i n the price of the project and thus the value of the power received from the project i s somewhat lower than the true cost of production. On the other hand, the benefit from reducing the flood threat downstream of the dam is not included i n the cost of production. The effort to reduce the externality of environmental degradation downstream of the dam would be the provision of a public good. If one person was to benefit many would gain and thus no individual could be excluded from the profit whether that person contributed anything or not to the attainment of the good. Market activity cannot internalize the costs of environ-mental deterioration. The government must therefore take action to compensate for this failure. Government activity to maintain environmental values or to remedy the "externalities" and " s p i l l -over effects" from the market activities i s a public good or service. Public goods are, in theory, only those goods that can be shared equally by a l l people. However, most of what we c a l l 31 p u b l i c goods are shared i n d i f f e r e n t p e o p l e ; not every i n d i v i d u a l b e n e f i t s to the same degree. A l s o p u b l i c goods, i n the sense used h e r e , may b r i n g b e n e f i t s to s e l e c t groups or i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y . I n p l a n n i n g , the p r o v i s i o n of a p u b l i c good i s e s s e n t i a l l y an o p e r -a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e to meet some g o a l or s a t i s f y some v a l u e . The government i s conf ronted w i t h severe i n f o r m a t i o n problems i n t r y i n g to assess the v a l u e s of p u b l i c goods. Those v a l u e s t h a t can be p r o v i d e d i n the market are r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e to d e r i v e through d e d u c t i v e and r a t i o n a l t e c h n i q u e s . But the v a l u e of the p u b l i c good, where there i s no common medium of exchange, i s more d i f f i c u l t to a n a l y z e . . The e v a l u a t i o n of p u b l i c goods as w e l l as the a t t a i n -ment of g o a l s and o b j e c t i v e s i s f r u s t r a t e d by a number of problems: 1 . G o a l - F u n c t i o n : E v a l u a t i o n i s dependent upon some c r i t e r i a d e r i v e d from a g o a l - f u n c t i o n . But the f o r -m u l a t i o n of t h i s f u n c t i o n i s seldom e x p l i c i t . The g o a l i n c o r p o r a t e s a l i s t of t a c i t l y i m p l i e d c o n d i t i o n s which may exc lude many s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d means to a c h i e v e the g o a l ( R i t t l e 1969) . Thus e v a l u a t i o n may be i t e r a t i v e ; tha t i s , the r e s u l t s obta ined may change the g o a l - f u n c t i o n and thus f o r c e a f u r t h e r r e - e v a l u a t i o n . 2, B e n e f i c i a r i e s : The broad d i f f u s i o n of b e n e f i t s makes the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the b e n e f i c i a r i e s d i f f i c u l t and o f t e n those who do g a i n are u n w i l l i n g to admit i t , to 32 avoid paying the cost of providing for the benefit. 3. U t i l i t y Functions: Individuals receive no common satisfaction from the provision of public goods. . They each make their own subjective evaluations, and thus they have no common u t i l i t y functions. Consequently, their u t i l i t i e s cannot be added to form a social welfare function from which the value of the good to society can be derived. 4. Non-quantifiable Values: Many values, such as aesthetic qualities, are impossible to define objectively. 5. Time Period: Another problem of evaluation i s the time period i n which the goods are provided (Rittle 1969). Since many of the benefits and costs of environmental management are long range and since their evaluation cannot be predicted beforehand, the estimation of net benefits of environmental expenditures l i k e l y w i l l be understated and grossly inaccurate (Stein 1971). The decision-maker must base his decisions on limited information about their actual consequences. Lindblom and Braybrooke (1963) suggest that this situation, not guided by a high level of understanding and typical of p o l i t i c a l l i f e , reinforces the incre-mental decisions of pluralist p o l i t i c s . Disjointed incrementalism produces small changes away from some existing e v i l towards an unknown destination. Though this form of decision-making responds to the p o l i t i c s of consensus and bargaining and thus i s sensitive to pressures in society, a technocrat's warning should be noted. Forrester (1971), a systems analyst, writes that complex systems often behave in a counter-intuitive manner. He notes three characteristics of systems of which decision-makers need be aware: 1. Social systems are inherently insensitive to most policy changes that people select in an effort to alter the behaviour of the system. In fact, a social system tends to draw our atten-tion to the very points at which an attempt to intervene will fail.... 2. Social systems seem to have a few sensitive influence points through which the behaviour of the system can be changed. These influence points are not in the location where most people expect...the chances are still that a person guided by intuition and judgement will alter the system in the wrong direction... 3. There is usually a fundamental conflict between the short-term and long-term consequences of policy changes. A policy which produces improvement in the short-run, within five to ten years, is usually one which degrades the system in the long run, beyond ten years,.,. (pp. 135-136). Unfortunately trusting planning and p o l i t i c a l decisions to the deterministic forecasts of simulation techniques cannot provide a very satisfactory answer i f we wish to work within the broad p o l i t i c a l constraints imposed by society. Dyckman (1971) observes in this regard that politicians have no desire to be unnecessarily constrained by numbers produced by such a process, least of a l l one which they do not understand and cannot affect. 34 The need to plan and make decisions without f u l l knowledge of the consequences i s aggravated by p o l i t i c a l expediency that gives politicians a foreshortened time horizon. Decision-makers tend to favour tangible, existing interests to the intangible and uncertain interests of future generations (Stein 1971). Environmental institutional design must concern i t s e l f with two basic problems -how to represent the various interests of society in planning and decision-making and how to ensure that competing demands do not encourage decisions destructive to long-run social welfare. The pluralist approach to interest group participation in planning and decision-making has been suggested above as the approach to ensure group representation. The pluralist p o l i t i c a l process can be rationalized in institutional design by organizing government units to match the domains of the various public goods and services that the government supplies. This domain should then encompass those specialized groups in society concerned with that good. The public goods would, in a sense, be packaged i f the boun-daries of the unit of government providing that good could encompass the externalities, thus internalizing them to the public served (Ostrom & Ostrom 1971; Dupre 1969). But for this pluralist re-organization to be effective, there must be some consideration of the behaviour of individuals, groups and institutions in relation to achieving their own interests.' 35 The Rational Individual Aristotle wrote "for that which i s common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon i t " . Hardin (1968) i l l u s -trates how the maximizing, self-interested rational individual in working for his won interest can eventually make himself and his society worse off when dealing with a common or public' good. A herdsman, to maximize his gain, must balance the positive and negative u t i l i t i e s from adding one more animal to his herd. By adding an animal to the common grazing land he i s able to achieve the f u l l benefit for himself which gives him a substantial positive u t i l i t y or profit. The negative u t i l i t y comes in with the minor deterioration from the overgrazing. But these effects are shared by a l l the herdsmen and thus to the single herdsman the cost i s not great. Hence the herdsman can profit from adding one more animal while the cost involved i s shared among a l l the herdsmen. This cost calculus applies to a l l the herdsmen though, and so they too add their extra animals to the common which, i n the end, seriously damages the grazing land and the welfare of the total group. Hardin applied this parable to the problem of over population but the lessons are applicable for institutional con-sideration. It shows the pressures to exploit what i s by heritage common to a l l , the lack of economic motivation to work for an ob-jective i n the name of the whole and the need to regulate for the 36 common welfare. In addition, although not within the s t r i c t assumptions of rational economic man, the marginal effects the individual may perceive affecting himself from his own neighbours' ac t i v i t i e s may blind him to the actions that need to be taken. Organized and Unorganized Interests If the rational economic man, acting in his:own interest to exploit a common or public good and able to perceive the damage, worsens his own as well as the rest of the communities' welfare the answer would seem to be for individuals to organize into groups and work for their collective interest. But Mancur Olson (1965), a theorist on group and individual organizing behaviour, writes that there i s l i t t l e or no incentive for rational economic men who desire the same ends to work for their common group interests. Unless each member can achieve a separate reward commensurate to his individual effort, economic man has no common interest i n paying the cost of providing for what i s , in effect, a public good. He writes "each would prefer the other pay the entire cost, and ordinarily would get any benefit provided whether he had borne part of the cost or not" (p. 45). Where groups do form, small scale organizations have an advantage over large scale organizations. In small groups at least some members are li k e l y to work for the goal because the gains w i l l be greater than the cost of organizing for those members. They would each receive separable benefits. 37 Olson sees three factors which hamper effective action by large organizations: 1. The larger the group the less l i k e l y any individual w i l l gain enough to bear the burden of providing even a small amount of the cost to achieve that public good. 2. The larger the group the less any single member of the group can benefit from achieving the group's common interest. 3. The larger the group the greater the cost and the higher the c r i t i c a l limits before any collective good i s achieved. The Ostroms (1971), outlining the theories of public choice, point out that Olson's theories can be augmented by Buchannan and Tullock's (1965) ideal of the representative i n -dividual. Such an individual organizes to influence public agencies' allocation of public goods and services. The repres-entative individual needs to account for two types of cost. 1. External costs or the cost of not obtaining the decision he desires. 2. Decision-making costs or those costs incurred in decision-making, such as the expenditure of resources, time, effort and opportunities foregone in decision-making. External cost would be least where the representative individual could count on f u l l support from his organization so 38 tha t he would have support to accept o n l y those d e c i s i o n s he d e s i r e d . But to r e a c h unanimi ty h i s d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c o s t s would be a t t h e i r h i g h e s t . Thus the c o s t m i n i m i z e r would s e t t l e f o r t h a t p o i n t where the e x t e r n a l and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c o s t curves i n t e r s e c t . But what of the d i f f u s e i n t e r e s t i n s o c i e t y ? The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g c o s t of a c h i e v i n g a n y t h i n g l i k e a . s i m p l e m a j o r i t y i s phenomenal, ye t these i n t e r e s t s should be p a r t of the d e l i b e r a t i v e p r o c e s s . P o l i t i c a l L e a d e r s h i p W i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l system the p o l i t i c i a n f u n c t i o n s to p r o v i d e l e a d e r s h i p f o r the v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y and a l s o to p r o v i d e a focus f o r p o l i t i c a l debate . But f o r the p o l i t i c i a n to become aware of and r e s p o n s i v e to any i n t e r e s t there needs to be a g r e a t d e a l of o r g a n i z a t i o n brought to bear to ensure a h e a r i n g . As we have seen the c o s t s are o f t e n too h i g h f o r those members of s o c i e t y w i t h many o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s who have no i n c e n t i v e to o r g a n i z e . The i n d i v i d u a l has the power to v o t e but tha t weapon can o n l y approve of or d i s a p p r o v e of a whole range of pas t a c t i o n s , p o l i c i e s and programmes f o r which the l e g i s l a t o r s are r e s p o n s i b l e . The v o t e i s much too crude a d e v i c e to b r i n g p r e s s u r e to bear on s p e c i f i c problems. 39 It i s unlikely the diffuse interests held within society can be f u l l y incorporated i n the p o l i t i c a l process. However, the intervention of agencies reflecting the disparate interests of their constituents can create a forum for p o l i t i c a l debate and thus provide a basis for potential leaders to develop. Environmental P o l i t i c s The new environmental interest groups are heirs to the conservation movement earlier, in this century. And, l i k e the earlier movement, the present one suffers a similar ambiguity in objectives that cannot be disguised by quoting Thoreau on the frontispieces of project evaluation critiques. McConnell (1971) suggests that the early conservation movement broke up in the United States when fundamental d i f f e r -ences in objectives were revealed over the building of a domestic water storage dam in Yosemite Park. Gifford Pinchot, who was chief spokesman for the conservationists, could find no fault with the dam because the benefits of the project were spread equally within society. His brand of conservation was motivated by an egalitarian desire to stop the waste and despoliation of the wilderness by Robber Baron types in order that the benefits of the common wilderness property might be equally shared within society. John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club, and his somewhat transcendentalist supporters opposed the project because i t represented violation of sacrosanct wilderness. 40 The Canadian experience has been somewhat less strident than the American. The smaller population has slowed the pace of resource exploitation. The result has been that Canadian conser-vation minded interest groups have never achieved the power of their American counterparts. Canadian federal and provincial governments have provided the bulk of the support for managing resources to meet long-run needs (Smith & Witty 1970). Thus what conflicts have existed over resource policy have, t i l l recently, been largely internalized within and between government and a few resource developers. Today, in Canada as in the United States, the cleavage has become wider between those people who are primarily interested in the economic distribution entailed i n the development of natural areas and those groups who value the land for i t s e l f . Both, groups are involved in the p o l i t i c a l struggles but the former i s more directly concerned with fighting within the same framework as the developers, by attacking the techniques and methods upon which the developer j u s t i f i e s his plan. Their concern is in finding a mechanism for an equitable distribution of environmental goods and services in which development of natural areas can be pursued, at a price. They desire to incorporate into project costs the scarcity value of natural phenomena. The assumption appears to be that i f the "real" price can be paid the need must be great enough within society to permit development. Their p o l i t i c a l approach i s i n the 41 mainstream of the pluralist tradition for i t permits a compromise solution in which there may be advantages and disadvantages for each group. However, the new environmental vigilantes are not concerned with economic values; they attack the concept of the need for any project (Wandesforde-Smith 1971). The natural environment i s the absolute value and economic development is relative. . Hence there is no room for bargaining and compromise. If this element becomes significant in the pluralist planning process a p l u r a l i s t i n s t i t u -tional setting may prove ineffective. Government Institutions An organization's desire for s t a b i l i t y in an unsettled and uncontrolled environment was seen, in an earlier discussion, as a basic reason for government institutions to follow their own values rather than the values society expects them to pursue. The pluralist approach was offered as a structure that can help reduce the gap between expectations and performance by binding an organization's p o l i t i c a l legitimacy to a specific interest within society. The following discussion outlines some less fund-amental advantages and problems of this approach as well as other general observations on government institutional behaviour. 1. P o l i t i c a l Representation: An agency must have a p o l i t i c a l basis of support with which i t can bargain with other 42 agencies to further i t s own goals and also to maintain or expand i t s area of operation. The pluralist bureaucracy does not attempt to frustrate these liaisons but furthers them by making the agencies recognized advocates for the interests they serve. The problems of interest group organization outlined earlier may hinder the representation of a l l substantial interests in the pl u r a l i s t bureaucracy. A majority of the population with a moderate interest in an outcome do not have the same incentive to make government agencies aware of their feelings as do smaller groups with a large interest in the outcome. Related to this point is the problem of scale. How finely or broadly should a public good be defined? From the dis-cussion on environmental p o l i t i c s , two distinct interest groups were noted - those who are concerned with the biased distribution of our natural wealth in favour of economic interests and those who have an absolute uncompromising interest i n preserving the wilderness. How should environmental planning organizations, represent the spectrum of views that l i e between these extremes? Unfortunately, these unresolved problems w i l l l i k e l y force trade-offs in the design of an actual structure. The conflict between the p l u r a l i s t concept that entails a multitude of interests and the limited a b i l i t y of governments to provide resources to seek out diffuse interests in society can work to frustrate the represen-tation of society's diverse interests i n decision-making. Hopefully though, the s t r u c t u r e can i n c o r p o r a t e the s i g n i f i c a n t i n t e r e s t s i n s o c i e t y , tha t i s those i n t e r e s t s t h a t f e e l some concern f o r the outcome. 2. Domain Consensus: The a l ignment of the boundar ies of p u b l i c goods w i t h the j u r i s d i c t i o n of p u b l i c agencies makes e x p l i c i t the domain of each agency; i t g i v e s to each agency the e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n over a p a r t i c u l a r p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . However, the agencies may compete to w i n p o l i t i c a l acceptance of m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e g o a l s such as w i l d e r n e s s maintenance or h y d r o - e l e c t r i c development f o r a s p e c i f i c r e g i o n . I f t h i s happens they may attempt to usurp the l e g i t i m a c y of the competing agency and thus the o ther a g e n c i e s ' p u b l i c good. T h i s w i l l h e l p m i n i m i z e the u n -c e r t a i n t y i n t h e i r task environment . 3. I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n : Government agencies a c t i n g as advocates f o r t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s i n s o c i e t y h e l p break down c l o s e d i n f o r m a t i o n g e n e r a t i o n by making the p l a n n i n g process e x p l i c i t . P l a n s from any p a r t i c u l a r agency need not n e c e s s a r i l y be a c c e p t e d . The c o m p e t i t i o n to advance an agency 's own p o s i t i o n or d e t r a c t from a n o t h e r ' s should t h e r e f o r e expose the wide range of a l t e r - . n a t i v e s necessary f o r groups w i t h i n s o c i e t y to come to t h e i r own d e c i s i o n s . 4. P r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n : Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n of i n s t i -t u t i o n a l behaviour which i s not e x p l i c i t l y r e c o g n i z e d i n the p l u r a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n i s the tendency of agencies to have g o a l s t h a t r e f l e c t 44 the e d u c a t i o n and background of t h e i r s t a f f . S e w e l l (1971) i n a s tudy of the p e r c e p t i o n s of B r i t i s h Columbia engineers and p u b l i c h e a l t h o f f i c i a l s found that " t h e i r v iews seem to be h i g h l y c o n -d i t i o n e d by t r a i n i n g , adherence to s tandards and p r a c t i c e s of the r e s p e c t i v e p r o f e s s i o n s and a l l e g i a n c e to the agency ' s or f i r m ' s g o a l or m i s s i o n " . ( p . 3 3 ) . I n a d d i t i o n , he found t h a t they f e e l they are h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d and tha t they act i n the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . They f e e l contac t w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o ther agencies or the g e n e r a l p u b l i c i s e i t h e r unnecessary or p o t e n t i a l l y h a r m f u l . To h e l p overcome t h i s i s o l a t i o n i s t tendency the s t a f f i n g of the agency should r e f l e c t the v a l u e s of i t s c o n s t i t u e n t s . ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW AGENCY The preceding d i s c u s s i o n s have i n d i c a t e d tha t the p l u r a l i s t approach has many advantages i n terms of emphasiz ing some of the b a s i c v a l u e s of our s o c i e t y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the d i s c u s s i o n a l s o i n d i c a t e d tha t some b a s i c f a u l t s and a number of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l drawbacks may prevent an e q u i t a b l e outcome to t h i s p l a n n i n g approach . Unrepresentated and unorganized i n t e r e s t s , o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o m p l e x i t y and b i a s e s , l i m i t e d knowledge, r a t i o n a l i n d i v i d u a l i s m and group i n t r a n s i g e n c e are some f a c t o r s t h a t f r u s -t r a t e p l u r a l i s t p l a n n i n g as a s e l f - r e g u l a t i n g process t h a t produces near optimum s o l u t i o n s . A more e x p l i c i t advocacy approach tha t accepts p l u r a l i s m ye t compensates f o r some of i t s shortcomings i s needed. 45 An environmental review agency may be what i s required to ensure effective environmental representation in the planning for major energy and resource projects. The agency could be designed to seek out environmental views in society, produce, studies and reports on proposed projects, to inform these views and advocate . i t s findings i n the internal government bargaining that proceeds development of major projects. The review agency would provide a countervailing force to the power and development interests. "Pluralism", Dyckman (1971) writes, "has no mechanism or even ideology to adequately rationalize group conflict engendered by the clash of community interests" (p. 331). Environmental advocacy planning does not solve these problems but i t can perhaps define the issues and relevant interest more clearly for the elected o f f i c i a l s who must ultimately make the f i n a l trade-offs between growth and environmental values. CRITERIA FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN The preceding discussions on normative values that people hold and on the problems for institutional design lead to a number of c r i t e r i a that reflect these considerations (as well as the per-ceptions of this reviewer). Public Participation arid Representation Planners and politicians are not omnipotent. If their actions are to account for public preferences, that public or 46 their representatives must have the opportunity to. significantly contribute to and influence the planning process. Also, the major interest groups within society should have advocates in both the p o l i t i c a l and technical spheres of government to reflect their interests i n planning and decision-making. Information Generation The planning process must produce sufficient information so that individuals and groups can assess for themselves the impacts of particular policies and projects and their alternatives. This c r i t e r i a i s of particular relevance to parliamentary societies where only a prodding and criticism of the opposition parties offers an institutional check on government power. Efficiency Institutions should, as far as possible, be bounded i n jurisdiction to the public goods that they produce so that the externalities and spillover effects may be internalized. Also, the provision of such goods through planning should be provided in the most efficient manner given the goals of the constituents. Equality The pressures towards unequal representation i n government due to the economic system and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of group organization should be recognized and efforts should be made to compensate for l i k e l y inequalities. The sol i c i t a t i o n of interests poorly represented should be made by government agencies to f a c i l i t a t e equal representation. 47 Professional Humility Institutions and planners should recognize that their techniques of analysis are f a l l i b l e . Thus when dealing with groups at the margin of subsistence who are unlikely to be well represented special efforts should be made to maintain their welfare. Natural Justice Institutions in the pluralist framework should adhere to the principle of audi alteram partem, i.e., the parties with an interest in a proceeding should be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before the decision-makers. Liberty There must be provision for free association of interests in society to build a consensus to influence government decision-making . P o l i t i c a l Leadership The pluralist organizational framework should be used to provide a forum which fosters p o l i t i c a l leadership. Spokesmen for groups in society should be able to use the information available from government and the conflict of competing interests to define issues and focus attention on the c r i t i c a l arguments. 48 CHAPTER THREE  BRITISH COLUMBIA'S POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY Three characteristics of the p o l i t i c a l milieu in B r i t i s h Columbia are important for consideration of institutional design. F i r s t , the province appears to have a stronger materialist orient-ation than most regions. This factor in p o l i t i c s limits meaningful debate to financial considerations and tends to lessen the impact of the environmental quality values in decision-making. Second, within the province there are few strong interest groups upon which to base public-government agency liaisons. The lack of inter-mediate groups tends to polarize p o l i t i c a l debate'and thus frus-trates discussion of relevant alternative policies and projects. Third, the economy is dependent on resource extraction as an economic base. Although the preservation of the natural amenities of the province i s a strongly held value, p o l i t i c a l success i s oriented more towards ensuring economic growth, with, a consequent increase in resource, extraction and decrease i n environmental quality. These considerations indicate that institutional reform , i s i n order to reflect envirionmental values. However, these re-forms may be d i f f i c u l t to make effective in face of an -undeveloped interest group structure and a pervasive concern for economic growth. • 49 INTRODUCTION The p o l i t i c a l milieu within a region is one key element in guiding institutional behaviour within society. Differing l i f e s t y l e s and perspectives from one culture to another w i l l pro-duce differing policies, programmes and projects to enhance the general welfare within the society. The p o l i t i c a l milieu w i l l have a direct bearing on the form of development; a lack of under- . standing of the attitudes guiding development w i l l frustrate attempts to design effective institutional frameworks to stimulate other social and p o l i t i c a l objectives. Too often planners assume a view of real i t y derived from an academic discipline or from another geographical region and then impose techniques and structures compatible to their own background but alien to the society in which they are working. The results are often wasteful, i f not destructive of intricate social and p o l i t i c a l relationships that hold the society together. This chapter intends to explore the p o l i t i c a l milieu of. British Columbia in the context of decision-making for the preser-vation and the planned use of natural resources within the province. In British Columbia, i t is especially important to consider the factors influencing p o l i t i c a l attitudes because the provincial government has control of a l l natural resources and thus i s directly responsible for their development. The focus of this chapter i s on the characteristics of the p o l i t i c a l environment and the implications these considerations have for institutional design. 50 The S e t t i n g Premier Bennett and the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y have dominated p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n t h i s p r o v i n c e s i n c e 1952. Former F e d e r a l A g r i c u l t u r e M i n i s t e r A l v i n H a m i l t o n comments on t h i s p e r i o d t h a t the Premier and h i s Government " o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ass igned a p r o v i n c e , has changed the map, the tempo and the economic s t r u c t u r e of B r i t i s h Columbia . We may not ye t reckon a l l the c o s t s . We may not y e t a p p r e c i a t e a l l the b e n e f i t s . But these t h i n g s have occurred because of p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p -and , I would be w i l l i n g to s t a t e , p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p a l o n e " (Sherman 1966, p . v i i i ) . Though the most m a n i f e s t f e a t u r e of the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u i s the present p r o v i n c i a l l e a d e r s h i p i t would be wrong to c o n s i d e r the S o c i a l C r e d i t l e a d e r s h i p and i t s " p o l i t i c s of p e r s o n a l i t y and h y p e r b o l e " as the m i l i e u i t s e l f . The l i f e s t y l e s and the s o c i o -economic s t r u c t u r e s tha t have evolved w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e e a s i l y t o l e r a t e t h i s extravagent p o l i t i c a l s t y l e . Another p a r t y , i f i t were to w i n power, might be more subdued but the u n d e r l y i n g p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s might not r a d i c a l l y a l t e r p o l i t i c a l b e h a v i o u r . I f t h i s s t y l e of p o l i t i c s i s p e r v a s i v e then the d e s i g n of new i n s t i t -u t i o n s cannot w a i t u n t i l the present government i s f o r c e d o u t ' o f o f f i c e . The new i n s t i t u t i o n s that emerge must be des igned to w i t h -stand the p r e s s u r e s the p o l i t i c a l environment g e n e r a t e s . An examinat ion of t h i s p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u r e v e a l s three important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s tha t make B r i t i s h Columbia d i f f e r e n t , 51 at least in degree, from most other areas in the country. These characteristics are the essential materialism of the province, the lack of mediating interest groups within the p o l i t i c a l structure and the dependence on natural resources for economic growth. These features influence the way the government institutions operate and the manner in which natural resources are treated. MATERIALISM Most Western societies have a strong materialist bias but their p o l i t i c a l activity i s tempered by non-economic constraints . of tradition and socio-cultural loyalties. In British Columbia, on the other hand, there are few non-economic considerations to direct p o l i t i c a l debate. Though there are a number of p o l i t i c a l alternatives to the existing Social Credit Government they a l l share the same basic materialist or, with respect to the environ-ment, u t i l i t a r i a n orientation. Social Credit The ruling Social Credit Party i s above a l l , economically oriented. Unlike their Social Credit brethren in Alberta, the Brit i s h Columbia party has been a prosperity party. The party emerged from the corruption and the p o l i t i c a l stagnation of the post-war years on the mounting wave of the early 1950's economic boom. It was not a protest party reacting to the economic system that allowed the depression but a new v i t a l rejuvenating force. 52 For the party, prosperity has always meant resource extraction. The Premier's vision has focused on the development of an infra-structure upon which the natural wealth of the province could be extracted. The massive spending on roads, the extensions . of the Pacific Great Eastern Railway, the o i l and gas pipelines and the giant hydro-electric developments have a l l been essential in giving this dream a concrete structure. This infra-structure was to benefit "not big business or big labour but ordinary people". Within the grand scheme public investments that do not generate further investment capital, such as education and welfare, receive minimum support. Other Parties The other p o l i t i c a l parties play essentially the same economic games. The stakes are the same, p o l i t i c a l power; and the rules are the same, the manipulation of economic policies and criticism to ensure continued prosperity. Only the tactics vary. For example, the New Democratic Party in the dispute over the various alternative sites for the dams on the Columbia River, favoured the federal government's McNaughton Plan. They f e l t this plan would give the province greater economic benefits even though i t would flood more of Canadian land in the East Kootenays than the f i n a l Libby Dam proposal. The concern was not for the environment or the dislocation of residents but with the financial return of the projects. The whole tortured two-riyer controversy was essentially 53 which development and/or combination of developments was financially feasible and would maximize the financial benefits? Black comments on the limits of debate over resource development "even when the perspective i s adopted that the resource belongs to the people and ought to be developed for their benefit, the questions of which people and Today or Tomorrow remain unasked and unanswered" (Black 1968, p. 33). As environmental p r i o r i t i e s are gaining some p o l i t i c a l support the,economic orientation in p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s producing ambiguity. For example, in the recent International Joint Commission hearings over the proposed flooding of the Skagit . Valley the testimony of two Liberal Party politicians,Pat McGeer and Dave Brousson railed against the flooding of this environ-mentally important valley. After enumerating the significant features of the valley they concluded their argument by saying the Provincial Government was accepting a ridiculously low com-pensation price for the flooded land (I.J.C. 1971). The price was not right. Tactically the argument might be j u s t i f i e d as a means of raising the cost of development for Seattle City Light beyond their willingness to pay, thus forcing them to abandon the project, but the rationale was not strongly put forward. Immigration More than half the population of B r i t i s h Columbia was not born here. Many of the people were drawn by the economic 54 opportunities the region offers. For some people these opportunities may mean the chance to engage in some private enterprise while for others the high wages offered by the labour union movement may be the attraction. In addition to the economic motivations the natural amenities, the area offers are a further inducement to immigrants. Black argues that the steady influx of new people has inhibited the growth of local customs and traditions. Even those people who were born here have not been able to successfully develop cultural identities because many of their teachers are also new to the province. With few local cultural values and with the continual influx of newcomers without p o l i t i c a l loyalties, the p o l i t i c a l parties have never been able to develop a solid basis for support. The only tradition that remains i s the one which brought many people here, the desire to advance economically. It i s this consideration that gives p o l i t i c a l l i f e in the province form and substance. Conservatism Though the province i s poor in customs and traditions there remains a strong conservative bias in p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Robin (1966) feels this conservatism can in part be explained by the heter-ogenous nature of the agricultural economy. The diversity of agricul-tural production "has arrested the development of a homogenous rural culture and leadership..." (p. 204). Also the high capital investment needed for many of the types of agricultural production such as f r u i t 55 t r e e and d a i r y farming and the s t a b i l i t y of a g r i c u l t u r a l markets r e l a t i v e to the monocultures on the p r a i r i e s makes f o r r a t h e r g e n t e e l f a r m e r s . He w r i t e s that " t h e B r i t i s h Columbia farmer i s more l i k e l y to be found r e a d i n g K i p l i n g than Marx" (p . 205) . '•' A n o t h e r , perhaps more p e r v a s i v e s t r a i n of c o n s e r v a t i s m can be found i n the r e l i g i o u s n a t u r e of many p e o p l e , e s p e c i a l l y among those people who support the S o c i a l C r e d i t P a r t y . The r e l i g i o u s conservat i sm i s not as s t r o n g as i n A l b e r t a , where the m e s s i a n i c q u a l i t i e s of " B i b l e B i l l " A b e r h a r t and h i s s taunch d i s c i p l e E r n e s t Manning gave p o l i t i c a l l i f e i n tha t p r o v i n c e a b l a t a n t l y f u n d a m e n t a l i s t t o n e . The r e l i g i o u s f u n d a m e n t a l i s t i n B r i t i s h Columbia i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the e v a n g e l i c a l d r y l a n d farmer but more the " n o n - c o n f o r m i n g " p u r i t a n who has r e j e c t e d the e s t a b l i s h m e n t norms and i n s t i t u t i o n s of h i s home and moved West to b u i l d a career i n a l e s s encumbered s o c i e t y . The former E a s t e r n e r , Premier B ennet t , who almost turned down a p o l i t i c a l c a r e e r f o r the m i n i s t r y , r e f l e c t s these f u n d a m e n t a l i s t f e e l i n g s of h i s f o l l o w e r s i n such p o l i c i e s as h i s l i q u o r and tobacco l e g i s l a t i o n . Man-Nature B a s i c to any c u l t u r e i s an e x p r e s s i o n of a Man-Nature r e l a t i o n s h i p . In B r i t i s h Columbia w i t h i t s u n d i l u t e d m a t e r i a l i s m and f u n d a m e n t a l i s t i n c l i n a t i o n s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f f e r e d i n Genesis 1 : 20-28 i s l i k e l y to be the most w i d e l y a c c e p t e d . "Man i s to have dominion over the f i s h of the sea and over the b i r d s of the a i r and over every l i v i n g t h i n g that moves upon the e a r t h " . 56 Glacken (1970) feels that Western society has interpreted this contrast between Man and Nature as the struggle with and the control over nature to depict the progress of c i v i l i z a t i o n . He writes "in i t s material aspect c i v i l i z a t i o n meant this - the purposive changes in nature, the overcoming of natural obstacles by bridges, drainage, roads ..." and we might add pipelines, railroads and dams (p. 131). This interpretation may be especially applicable to British Columbia. Since the province has few traditional cultural measures of c i v i l i z a t i o n large-scale projects may not only be symbols in the p o l i t i c a l game but they may be used to satisfy a quasi-religious measure of the region's level of c i v i l i z a t i o n . Consequences Glacken argues that this exploitive view of nature i s modified by the perception of cumulative damage, but the s t i l l prevalent utterances by politicians about the "boundless wilderness" and "limitless resource opportunities" indicate that this Board of Trade verbiage may limit perception of the costs to the envir-onment u n t i l we are a l l too aware of them. With the materialist culture there i s l i t t l e countervailing pressure to force a c r i t i c a l examination of resource exploitation and development policies on any-thing other than narrow economic grounds. The assumption that the game being played i s a variable sum game in which a l l the players can win, delegates the environment to 57 the r o l e of a bank w i t h i n e x h a u s t i b l e r e s e r v e s . Emerson's h o l i s t i c o b s e r v a t i o n that "more i s l e s s " i s o n l y b e g i n n i n g to have s i g n i f i c a n c e i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of t h i s p r o v i n c e . The r e c e n t e n v i r o n m e n t a l movement i s a t l e a s t i n t r o d u c i n g the v o c a b u l a r y of r e s t r a i n t i n t o the p o l i t i c a l b i d d i n g . However, i t may be some time b e f o r e even the l i m i t e d p r e c e p t s of w e l f a r e economics that r e c o g n i z e the e x t e r n -a l i t i e s and s p i l l - o v e r cos t s and b e n e f i t s of development become f u l l y understood w i t h i n the p o l i t i c a l m i l i e u . INTEREST GROUPS The second major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the p o l i t i c a l system appears to be the r e l e a t i v e l a c k of i n t e r e s t groups w i t h i n the p r o v i n c e - an e x c e p t i o n be ing labour u n i o n s . B l a c k (1968) c o n -s i d e r s arguments t h a t p o w e r f u l economic l o b b i e s c o n t r o l d e c i s i o n -making i n the present government to be unfounded. R a t h e r , he sees the S c o i a l C r e d i t P a r t y as an " i n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e s t a g a i n s t e s t a b -l i s h e d s o c i a l e l i t e s " . The r e l a t i v e l y w e l l educated E n g l i s h speak ing immigrant to the p r o v i n c e has no need of e t h n i c bosses to h e l p i n t e -g r a t e h i m s e l f i n t o h i s adopted s o c i e t y . I n s t e a d , the government can appeal d i r e c t l y to the m a t e r i a l i s t and o f t e n a n t i - e s t a b l i s h m e n t sent iments tha t have drawn people h e r e . P r i n c i p l e s and P r a c t i c e i n P o l i t i c s The problem of m a i n t a i n i n g a c o n s i s t e n t p o l i t i c a l p o s t u r e over t ime i s not easy . Parekh (1908) , a commentator on p o l i t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , w r i t e s that a p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y over t ime " t e n d s to 58 acquire a number of features that tend to pull in a different d i r -ection, causing concern among i t s practitioners as to what precisely i t i s doing i n i t s name" (p. 153). Robin (1966) writes that the fundamental principle of Social Credit i s the preservation intact of a modified free enterprise system. . But the Social Credit Gov-ernment has enacted some of the most soci a l i s t legislation in the country. The expropriation of the B.C. Electric Co. and the Black Ball Ferries and the introduction of homeowner grants are just some of these policies. Sherman (1966) comments on Premier Bennett's conception of free enterprise: " i t i s a d i v i s i b l e , f l e x i b l e thing. He used to favour free enterprise, period. Then when i t became p o l i t i c a l l y necessary, he said he was against monopoly free enter- / prise. Finally he became a main-street free enterpriser. Semantically, in fact, he became Everyman, t i l t i n g with Everything Big, and letting every man know about i t " (p. x). This s o c i a l i s t tendency has been explained by the govern-ment as State Capitalism, the provision of the necessary i n f r a -structure so that the "main-street entrepreneur" can have the oppor-tunity to share in the wealth of the province rather than leave resource exploitation to the established economic giants. Black (1968) has pointed out that again this entails a contradiction for to economically exploit the region's resources only large scale enterprises can afford the necessary capital investments to ensure the rational use of the resources. A small lumber firm, for example, can afford only to cut down the best trees, leaving the rest as waste. 59 Only a large company can invest heavily in equipment that can then make use of what would otherwise be l e f t . A low level of economic activity with a high level of waste can be tolerated but as pressures increase on the resource base, more efficient use i s imperative. Thus of necessity in time the government must learn to accommodate the economic elites at the expense of small-scale entrepreneurs. Anti-Establishment Bias Sproule-Jones (1972) attempts to prove that the anti-establishment bias in British Columbia p o l i t i c s i s not significant. In an electoral analysis of the voting patterns i n the Saanich electoral d i s t r i c t he found that the unorganized working classes and the lower middle classes are not strong supporters of the Social Credit, while the managerial elites are not repelled by that party. Only the support of the small and middle sized businessman, he argues, supports Black's anti-establishment thesis. Sproule-Jones1 correlation analysis indicates only that f i r s t preferences for the other parties are not strong. In fact, the electorate's lack of strong identification with other parties may p a r t i a l l y support the idea of anti-elites for the voters may appreciate the position of the other parties but are not infatuated with the politicians. The survey just confirms the perennial obser-vation that the Social Credit Party always wins the elections but no one knows anyone who voted for them. . • 60 Issue Manipulation Without many influential intermediate groups to help define the issues for the electroate, the weakly committed voter has the issues defined for him by the political parties. Sproule-Jones (1972) explains, within an American frame of reference, that electoral alternatives are rarely structured in ideological terms. Rather, issues are determined through feedback between the electorate and the politician. In British Columbia, however, there is strong ideological conflict in elections. Robin (1966) explains this conflict in terms of class cleavages between the possessing classes in favour of free enterprise and the working class socialists. . But the relative pro-sperity of the trade union movement weakens any argument about class cleavages. Sproule-Jones' (1972) explanation of "sponsored conceptual ideology" is more satisfactory. He argues that the government can define the election issues in dichotomous terms and then the electorate is forced to decide a l l issues within this one dimensional perspective. For example, in the 1960 election, P.A. Gaglardi defined the issue as: "We don't want any Jimmy Hoffas in B.C. We don't need gangsterism in labour." —• despite the fact there had never been any suggestion of gangsterism (Sherman 1966, p. 186). In the 1969 election Premier Bennett defined the election issues as "free enterprise" or "socialism". The lack of mediating groups that might influence voter behaviour has left the electorate directly exposed to a "one-step flow of information" coming from the governing and opposition parties. The 61 i n a b i l i t y of the e l e c t o r a t e to g a i n any k i n d of a p e r s p e c t i v e on the r e a l i s s u e s i n v o l v e d f o r c e d the independent and weakly i d e n t i f i e d p a r t i s a n v o t e r i n t o the S o c i a l C r e d i t "camp" a t e l e c t i o n time. (Sproule-Jones 1971). In the 1969 e l e c t i o n , the debate over " f r e e e n t e r p r i s e " or " s o c i a l i s m " was presented i n such, strong b l a c k and white terms that many t r a d i t i o n a l L i b e r a l P a r t y supporters and c l o s e . f r i e n d s of the L i b e r a l P a r t y Leader, Pat McGeer, voted S o c i a l C r e d i t The a b i l i t y to de f i n e i s s u e s i n t h i s manner lessens the need to d e f i n e a c o n s i s t e n t p o l i t i c a l posture f o r the p r a c t i c e s not i n harmony w i t h b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s can be glossed over i n the Manichean p o l i t i c a l de-bates that precede e l e c t i o n s . P l e b i s c i t e Democracy Once i n power the government i s not much, bothered or con-s t r a i n e d i n i t s a c t i o n s by w e l l organized l o b b y i s t s . T h i s s i t u a t i o n s u i t s the philosophy of government expressed by Premier Bennett: True democracy is that the elected must govern, and must not be governed by the electors. .. . . If the electors govern, you have anarchy. In other words, people in a democratic way select people to do a job. Then they must have auth-ority to do a job and they must boldly do that job, and they must not ask questions and have royal commissions all the time. They should, take responsibility and bold-actions. Then when election time comes, the people should kick them out if they are not doing the job. (Sherman 1966, p. ix). Black (1968) c a l l s , t h i s p o l i t i c a l philosophy G a u l l i s t . P o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y conceived as such a d i r e c t mandate has immediate con-62 sequences for the design of any government institution that has pre- . tensions for rational management. Consequences The f i r s t consideration i s the d i f f i c u l t y of ensuring that views counter to government policy can have some effect in p o l i t i c a l decision-making. At present professional and interest group views conflict with distressing frequency (Black 1968). Pearse (1968) picks up this theme in a discussion of British Columbia'a natural resource policies. He sees experts on natural resources divided into three schools of thought, the "conservationists", the "promoter" and the "technocrats". Each group feels its.point of view maximizes the net benefits of resources for society. Conservationists wish government to impose regulations and controls on resource develop-ment to enforce restraint and prudence on the part of private indus-tries in natural resource development (p. 49). The promoters think natural resource exploitation i s the key to growth while the techno-logists set out to obtain such goals as "maximum physical growth of timber or f i s h , and an equal annual harvest, without reference to whether these objectives represent the most desirable systems on economic or social grounds" (p. 50). The latter group exists largely within the c i v i l service. The promoters, in that they are action-oriented, have a sympathetic ear in the Social Credit Government.. The conservationists, t i l l now, have been a weak coalition of w i l d l i f and hunting groups. The weakness and conflicting opinions of these 63 groups allow the government to manipulate their views rather than trying to win a consensus of opinion. A second consideration i s the d i f f i c u l t y of ensuring the rational u t i l i z a t i o n of expertise within the government. The Social Credit Government does not broach interference from experts but i t recognizes their values. Sherman (1966) states that Premier Bennett is eager for advice in making policy but "that no one man was his advisor. He listened to many men and their advice. He kept some, rejected some, amended some and his policy formed more or less instinctively" (p. 246). The dispersion of expert advice into fragmented government departments without any coordinating boards to rationalize overall policies i s at present the simple technique used to defuse possible internal c i v i l service constraints on power. In a p o l i t i c a l structure that rules through direct power with l i t t l e countervailing p o l i t i c a l pressure any form of planning or comprehen-sive information generation other than the government's eclectic u t i l i z a t i o n of expertise w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to institute. RESOURCE BASED ECONOMY The third major characteristic of the p o l i t i c a l milieu i s the dependence on resource extractive industires as the basis for economic growth. The high standard of liv i n g that attracts many people to the province is directly dependent on natural re-sources. Though the direct contribution of the extractive sector of the economy is less than 10% most of the remaining sectors are 64 dependent on these i n d u s t r i e s . For example, i n 1961, 60% of the manufacturing sector was involved with the processing of raw material while much of the remaining manufacturing was " e i t h e r a u x i l i a r y to the basic resource i n d u s t r i e s or by-products of these i n d u s t r i e s " (Shearer 1968; p. 11). And, of course, much of the service sector i s a u x i l i a r y to the basic sector. I t i s apparent that the extractive i n d u s t r i e s have a high m u l t i p l i e r e f f e c t throughout the region. The severe f l u c t u a t i o n s i n economic a c t i v i t y i n B r i t i s h Columbia suggests that these products have a high e l a s t i c i t y of export demand. However, the comparative advantage the region enjoys i n e x t r a c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s has tended to favour fur t h e r ex-p l o i t a t i o n of the resource base to covercome depressed markets rather than developing a more diverse economic base. The v i c t i m ^ of t h i s v i c i o u s c i r c l e are the natural amenities offered by the region. Natural Amenities In ad d i t i o n to the high standard of l i v i n g o f f e r e d by the province another reason people migrate i s the n a t u r a l amenities offered by the region. These q u a l i t i e s are also the basis of the economically important t o u r i s t industry. When the population was smaller and resource development proceeded at a slower r a t e , the wilderness and high q u a l i t y r e c r e a t i o n a l resources seemed inexhaustible. Now the population i s increasing r a p i d l y and the rate of resource 65 e x p l o i t a t i o n i s a c c e l e r a t i n g . T h e r e a r e l i m i t s t o t h e r a t e t h e r e g i o n ' s r e s o u r c e s c a n b e e x p l o i t e d w i t h o u t s e r i o u s l y e n d a n g e r i n g t h e a t t r a c t i v e n a t u r a l q u a l i t i e s t h a t s o m a n y r e s i d e n t s e n j o y . C o n s e q u e n c e s T h e e m e r g i n g c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e r e t e n t i o n o f a m e n i t y v a l u e s a n d r e s o u r c e e x t r a c t i o n h e l p s p r o v i d e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r g o v e r n m e n t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n t o b e t t e r a i r t h e c o n f l i c t . B u t i t w i l l s t i l l b e d i f f i c u l t f o r t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l a r g u m e n t s t o b e r e s p e c t e d . T h e p o l i t i c i a n s a r e n o t l i k e l y t o e n d a n g e r t h e r e g i o n ' s e x p o r t b a s e u p o n w h i c h t h e i r p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d s . W i t h r e -g a r d t o g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c i e s , B l a c k ( 1 9 6 6 ) a r g u e s t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t c a n n o t p o s s i b l y a f f o r d t o h a n d o v e r p o l i c y - m a k i n g i n c r i t i c a l a r e a s . P o l i t i c a l s u c c e s s r e l i e s t o o m u c h o n c o n t i n u e d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t f o r a n y c o n f l i c t i n g e x p e r t t o c a r r y a n y w e i g h t . C O N C L U S I O N T h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f f a i l i n g t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e p r e s s u r e s t h e p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e g e n e r a t e s i n t h e d e s i g n o f g o v e r n m e n t i n s t i -t u t i o n s i n B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a i s l i k e l y t o l e a d t o a n i n e f f e c t i v e a n d i r r e l e v a n t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b o d y . N e w i n s t i t u t i o n s m u s t c h a l l e n g e t h e r e s o u r c e - e x p l o i t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s o f e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t u p o n w h i c h p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s s a t i s f y t h e i r m a t e r i a l i s t o r i e n t e d e l e c t o r a t e s . A l s o t h e y m u s t a t t e m p t t o i n f l u e n c e p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g i n g o v e r n -m e n t s t h a t h a v e l i t t l e n e e d t o p l a c a t e p r e s s u r e g r o u p s o r d e s i r e t o b a s e p o l i c i e s u p o n c o m p r e h e n s i v e p l a n n i n g p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s w i l l b e a d i f f i c u l t task. Hopefully as the province matures the residents w i l l recognize that the quality of the environment i s an important aspect of the standard of living and w i l l introduce this concept as a significant restraint to the p o l i t i c a l process. 67 CHAPTER TOUR  CASE STUDY; THE W.A.C. BENNETT DAM SUMMARY When the power potential of the Peace River was revealed in 1957, a large-scale hydro dam to develop the river's potential became a top pr i o r i t y of the government. It satisfied a number of goals and p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a which from the government's perspective no other project was lik e l y to meet. P o l i t i c a l debate over the project centered on whether i t was a better alternative than the Columbia River dams. There was not a clear understanding in the debate that northern development was as powerful a goal as power production to the government. Thus there was no real discussion of the val i d i t y of the goals or discussion of alter-natives to meet these two major goals. With the decision made early in the planning process to promote the development of the Peace project the role of planning became to determine whether the project was feasible. The organiza-tional structure of the government for such projects i n Bri t i s h Columbia i s strongly biased in favour of engineering concerns. Thus evaluation of the physical site plans was extensive. Financial f e a s i b i l i t y also received much attention. There was l i t t l e economic or environmental input into the overall project evaluation, This was a reflection of the attitudes of the time. 68 The problem today Is that the attitudes have changed yet there have only been minor modifications to ins t i tu t ional structure. Hence the planning and decision-making practiced during the Peace project (and with some changes practiced today) are quite different from the ideal model as expressed initerms of the c r i t e r i a derived i n Chapter Two. INTRODUCTION There i s no "absolute" objective function or socia l welfare function from which planning and decision-making pol icies can be rigorously derived. Without r ig id direction from above planning and p o l i t i c a l values cannot help but intrude on the decision function. I f the alternatives and evaluations produced are to be biased they should at least attempt to reflect the biases of those groups i n society concerned with the outcome of the f ina l decision. This perspective was developed i n Chapter Two, In this chapter the c r i t e r i a derived from that perspective w i l l be used as the standard by which to evaluate the planning and decision-making for the W.A.C. Bennett Dam on the Peace River. The concern of this thesis for the representation of environmental values in decision-making has only recently become a signficant p o l i t i c a l value. Thus discretion i s necessary i n examining the environmental input into planning. However, the purpose of this examination i s not to see whether these values were included i n the development of the project. The purpose 69 i s rather to examine the inter-action between the p o l i t i c a l element and the technical and organizational structure to find out whether the c r i t e r i a are incorporated into the planning process. It is the c r i t e r i a that makes possible the representation of environmental values in decisions for large-scale power projects. Therefore, the evaluation of planning i n terms of the c r i t e r i a determines the s u i t a b i l i t y of the planning and decision-making process. The process of planning includes the following elements which w i l l serve as the framework of investigation: 1. Goal Identification: the expressions of desirable future conditions that satisfy f e l t needs within society and that give direction and meaning to planning. 2. Alternatives: the formulation of alternative, methods of action to achieve the goals of society subject to basic p o l i t i c a l , professional and ethical constraints. 3. Feedback: the, contribution of elements outside government to the planning process. 4. Reformulation; re-working objectives and plans in accordance with the changes suggested by govern-ment and the public, 5. Decision; f i n a l choice by the p o l i t i c a l authorities. 70 Many problems remain in defining these elements of planning more specifically. For example, goals, objectives and action alternatives l i e on an ends-means continuum. The given con-text may determine whether a goal is actually a goal or merely an alternative means of action (Bromley, Schmid & Lord 1971). However, the identification of these elements, even i f vague, does provide a framework with which to study the planning process for a given case study. GOAL IDENTIFICATION The Wenner-Gren Development Co,, a Swedish company intent on exploiting the resources of northern British Columbia with the government's blessing (Memorandum of Agreement 1956), discovered the hydro-electric potential of the Peace River in 1957, Previously the river was thought to have a potential of just 500,000 kilowatts,, but Wenner-Gren Development estimated i t s potential at over 3 million kilowatts. Once the power resources of the Peace River were established the government pressed Wenner-Gren Development and i t s successor Peace River Power Development Co, (incorporated in November, 1958) to proceed with a large-scale power dam. The government had found a project that could satisfy two important goals - development of the north and the development of energy sources to meet long term power needs (Williston 1959-1962). In addition, such a power project was seen in 1957 as means to get the province's economy moving (Williston, 71 quoted in Province, Feb. 13, 1965). The energy goal was given a high p r io r i ty because of a forecasted power shortage by 1968, In the context of the goal of northern development a massive project on the Peace River was a means to achieve that end while also solving the impending power problems. Sherman quotes Wi l l i s ton , Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources, as l i s t i n g six benefits from a dam on the Peace River that would fac i l i t a t e development of the north: 1. A Peace River dam would assure an industr ia l power supply that would attract integrated resource industries l i ke pulp m i l l s . 2. A servicing area would be developed near the dam si te that would be suitable for further expansion once the dam was completed, 3. Increased construction ac t iv i ty i n the area would make possible road and r a i l extensions. 4. The reservoir would provide water routes to hitherto inaccessible regions. 5. The reservoir would permit large scale timber salvage and open new areas for forestry exploitation. 6. Also, the reservoir would open up a vast area for recreation (Province, Nov. 23, 1962), Xn the late 1950's and early I960's much of the debate over the proposed power project centered about the goal of power development 72 which was the better river to develop, the Peace or the Columbia? But as K r u t i l l a (1967b) points out, the government regarded the two hydro developments as separate instruments for achieving different goals, not as alternative sources of future e l e c t r i c a l energy. Williston (1972) argues that the government believed both projects would be necessary and the Columbia projects would be b u i l t no matter what happened. But i f the Columbia project:; was developed f i r s t , the Peace would have to wait perhaps another twenty years. The opportunity to develop the north at that time would thus be lost. A notable feature of the whole controversy was that there was l i t t l e debate over the goals. They were handed down by the p o l i t i c a l party in power, Social Credit, and few people chose to question whether they were appropriate for British Columbia or not. Not many people realized that the Premier was deadly serious about northern development, that i t was essential to his p o l i t i c a l vision, and thus there was l i t t l e discussion on the goal and the objectives needed to accomplish this end. The power goal was accepted and the debate ranged only over the means to achieve i t . Without a clear understanding of what the government had i n mind much of the debate was wasted, ALTERNATIVES Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) describe a situation i n which public policy problems arise not from the identification of 73 an unachieved goal but by the identification of a new means, useful in achieving a variety of ends. Planning in this context i s turned upside-down. There i s no agreement on overall objectives; therefore comparison of alternatives i s meaningless. The extension of this situation i s that the analyst determines whether the project i s technically feasible; the p o l i t i c i a n , especially i f he proposes the policy, determines whether the electorate w i l l accept i t . This situation appears to i l l u s t r a t e what happened with the Peace project and why so few alternatives were discussed. The Peace project, when i t became a p o s s i b i l i t y , satisfied a number of p o l i t i c a l c r i t e r i a which restricted the search for further alternatives. Besides the two major goals mentioned previously the project could dramatically i l l u s t r a t e to the public the government's vision and dynamic character. In addition to satisfying the govern-ment's p o l i t i c a l image, the project gave the government a strong bargaining position in the negotiations with the federal and American governments over development of the Columbia River, an important p o l i t i c a l objective. The Columbia was important to British Columbia only i f the province could receive downstream benefits related to the value created. This was a concept the Americans were reluctant to accept, especially when they f e l t that British Columbia would be forced to develop the Columbia anyway to meet future power needs. Williston (i960) commented on the resolution of this situation i n a Throne Speech Debate: 74 ... as soon as the -power potential of the "Peace River was known,'a change in American strategy became evident. The desire to negotiate f i n a l l y became so keen that it has been d i f f i c u l t to find time to formulate and adopt a united Canadian position on the best Columbia plan of development (p. 14). As mentioned previously, the Columbia was not, i n the government's view, an alternative to the Peace but another less important goal. Other alternatives to the Peace were unlikely to maximize the p o l i t i c a l values i t represented, especially the visionary component. Therefore from the Premier's perspective such alternatives would be less than optimal, Needless to say, . a policy that maximizes p o l i t i c a l advantage, as the ruling party sees i t , does not necessarily maximize social welfare particularly when society i s l e f t unaware of possible alternatives. There was only one organization outside government that had the resources and expertise to come up with alternative plans to meet the province's power needs, This was the B r i t i s h Columbia Elect r i c Co., the largest power u t i l i t y and potential market for e l e c t r i c i t y in the province. The company's planners actively sought out alternatives by looking at the Peace River, the Columbia River and their own interests in the Hat Creek coal deposits. The company refused a long-term commitment to what i t considered non-competitive Peace power. Also, in 1960 the company's engineers fore-cast a dropping off i n the load growth curve (Mainwaring 1965), The load growth turned out to be 9,97%, not the 6,4% estimated. The company agreed only to buy power from the Peace at the rate i t 75 received "dump power" from the United States, a rate less than half of the estimated cost price of producing i t on the Peace. The company's expropriation on August 1, 1961, for refusing to sign a letter of intent to buy Peace power illustrates the high p r i o r i t y the government gave to the Peace project, As the debate progressed there was l i t t l e public concern that no alternatives to the Peace project were being developed, The analysis and criticism that did emerge was, in large part, a spinoff from criticisms of the Columbia projects and nationalist-feeling against the Columbia Treaty, A group of University of British Columbia professors, including J.D. Chapman, A.D. Scott and H.V. Warren, produced a report c r i t i c i z i n g the Columbia Treaty and as a side issue the Peace project. They concluded that both the Columbia and Peace projects were more expensive than a Moran Dam, Hat Creek coal or the Burrard Thermal Plant (Chapman et a l 1962). The report recommended that "the Peace River project be delayed u n t i l , by comparison with these other projects, i t i s shown to be the most desirable" (p. 10). F.J, Bartholomew, a retired e l e c t r i c a l engineer and determined nationalist c r i t i c of the Columbia Treaty, in devel-same oping his criticisms of the Columbia, arrived at much the/, conclusions (Correspondence F.J. Bartholomew to R.G, Williston A p r i l 24, 1963). Jack Davis (1963), former director of planning and research for B.C. Electric and present federal Minister of the Environment, called for * A.D, Scott 1972: personal communication. 76 t h e government t o f o r g e t t h e e x p e n d i t u r e i t had made on t h e Peace and r e c o n s i d e r t h e p r o j e c t . He f e l t c h e a p e r and s m a l l e r s c a l e t h e r m a l a l t e r n a t i v e s were more a p p r o p r i a t e f o r the p r o v i n c e . The c r i t i c i s m s f r o m p r i v a t e s o u r c e s were d e r i v e d f r o m a l r e a d y p u b l i s h e d r e p o r t s . These gro u p s d i d n o t have t h e r e s o u r c e s t o f u l l y d e v e l o p and s u b s t a n -t i a t e t h e i r arguments. EVALUATION As s u g g e s t e d by B r a y b r o o k e and L i n d b l o m ' s example t h e e v a l u a t i o n p r o c e s s f o r t h e Peace p r o j e c t was l a r g e l y r e s t r i c t e d t o d e t e r m i n i n g t h e f e a s i b i l i t y o f t h e s t a t e d p o l i t i c a l p o l i c y . E n g i n e e r i n g E v a l u a t i o n A n o n - e n g i n e e r has d i f f i c u l t y a s s e s s i n g t h e adequacy o f t h e p r o c e d u r e u s e d f o r dam d e s i g n . T h e r e f o r e o n l y t h e s t e p s i n t h i s p r o c e d u r e w i l l be o u t l i n e d and a few o b s e r v a t i o n s i n c l u d e d , 1, S i t e T e s t s and Dam D e s i g n ; 1957-1959. I n O c t o b e r 1957 Wenner-Gren Development c o m m i t t e d i t s e l f and i t s s u c c e s s o r , the Peace R i v e r Power Development Co., t o t e s t i n g the e n g i n e e r i n g f e a s i b i l i t y o f a h i g h g e n e r a t i n g c a p a c i t y P e a c e . R i v e r dam. I f a dam was p r o v e n f e a s i b l e a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p l a n p r o v i d i n g f o r t h e maximum economic development o f t h e Pe a c e R i v e r ' s p o t e n t i a l was t o be s u b m i t t e d t o t h e C o m p t r o l l e r o f Water R i g h t s b e f o r e December 3 1 , 1959 (Memorandum o f Agreement O c t o b e r 1 9 5 7 ) , James and Lee (1970) i n t h e i r w a t e r p l a n n i n g t e x t b o o k s u g g e s t t h a t t h i s phase 77 of a project usually takes: a minimum of three to five years. Working under tremendous pressure to complete the plans the engineers and Peace River Power Development Company finished, the f e a s i b i l i t y report by the deadline (B.C. & B.B. Power Consultants 1959). The forecast power shortage was the stated reason for the rush but the more sub-stantial reason appears to have been the government's desire to come up with an alternative to counter the federal government's Columbia River proposals (Mainwaring 1965). The eight volume plan proposed the largest earth-filled dam then i n existence. A 650 foot high dam was to be constructed at the head of the Peace River Canyon, It was to have a 2,535,000 kilowatt rated capacity based on a 60% load factor. In addition a smaller dam, Site 1, with a 650,000 kilowatt rated capacity on the same load factor was proposed for the foot of the canyon. The longest and highest capacity transmission system outside of Russia was pro-posed to carry the power in 500,000 volt lines from the dam to the t i e - i n with the B.C. Electric grid at L i l l o o e t . 2. Engineering Evaluation of the Water Comptroller; 1960. . The preliminary review of the site plans by the Water Comptroller before application for a water licence was a special feature of the agreement between the government and Wenner-Gren Development; the Br i t i s h Columbia Water Act makes no provision for such evaluation. The Water Comptroller;, Arthur Paget, disclaimed any competence to review these plans with his small staff. Hence, the government spent $200,000 getting independent evaluations. The Comptroller reported 78 that the plan was feasible from an engineering point of view. He recommended that further consideration be given to proposed slopes of the dam. As well he recommended that the dam have a minimum of 25 feet of freeboard instead of the 15 feet shown in the plans. He did not report on the economics of the project although he did say that i f another project was constructed there would not be a market for the power from both schemes in British Columbia, 3, British Columbia Hydro Review: 1961-1962. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, the publicly owned successor to B,C, Electric and Peace River Power Development, had their own consultants review the plans and substantial changes were made. Site 1 was dropped from immediate consideration, The dam height of 650 feet and the maximum reservoir level of 2,250 feet above sea level were reduced by 50 feet with 30 feet of free-A -board. These changes decreased the volume of f i l l needed for the dam from 65 million to 57 million cubic yards and the reservoir volume from 88 million to 57 million acre feet, The reservoir under the new scheme covers 625 square miles, The smaller reservoir made i t unnecessary to relocate parts of the Hart Highway, the Pacific Great Eastern Railway, the West-Coast Transmission gas pipeline and the Western Pacific O i l pipeline. The decrease i n flooded area elim-inated the need to reduce leakage i n two natural saddles on either side of the river (Miles 1969). The generating capacity was reduced * On April 4, 1972 an amendment to Conditional Water Licence No. 27721 permits B.C. Hydro to raise the level of the reservoir five feet to a maximum elevation of 2,205 feet above sea level, an increase in storage of 500,000 acre feet of water. (See Appendix A). 79 to 2,270,000 kilowatts but the design changes were estimated to cut the cost of the project by $100 million, 4, Water Licence Applications: 1962, Further extensive review of the project occurred i n 1962 when B.C, Hydro applied for licences to store 32 million acre feet of water a year and to release water during f i l l i n g of the reservoir and for generation of power (Appendix A - Conditional Water Licence No. 27721 and 27722), The application was under review from February 1962 u n t i l December 1962. The International Commission on Large Dams was the consultant. The three members proposed a number of small changes such as altering the cross section of the dam to make best use of nearby construction materials, Economic Feas i b i l i t y arid Evaluation The government's p o l i t i c a l motivation for the Peace River and the Columbia River projects differed but much of the p o l i t i c a l debate was centered on which project would produce the cheaper power at the load center i n Vancouver. Peace River Power Development had i t s consultants, Chantrill and Stevans (1961), do some preliminary investigation on the cost of delivering Peace power but the figures they derived were not for the load centers and thus they had l i t t l e effect on the debate. In late 1960 the Peace project was i n jeopardy. B.C, Electric would not commit i t s e l f to buying Peace power and the 80 Columbia River Treaty was about to be signed. Faced with the problem of losing the market for the Peace e l e c t r i c i t y to the Columbia i t appears that the Premier was receptive to arguments that severely c r i t i c i z e d the Columbia River Treaty. His friend W.C. Mainwaring (President of the Peace River Power Development) who held very c r i t i c a l opinions of the Columbia Treaty takes credit for suggesting to the Premier that the B.C. Energy Board give an independent evaluation of both projects to come up with comparable cost figures. He advised that the evaluators should have had no connection with either the Peace or Columbia projects and offered to Dr. Shrum, Chairman of. the Energy Board, a l i s t of British firms that would satisfy this c r i t e r i a (Mainwaring 1965). Without a technical argument that could compare the Peace favourably with the Columbia further promotion of the Peace would be d i f f i c u l t to jus t i f y . The problem of what to do with the re-calcitrant B.C. Electric would have to be handled i n another more dramatic fashion. The federal government's failure to get complete approval from British Columbia before signing the Treaty gave Bennett the leeway to write a letter to Ottawa expressing "engineering and financial doubts" about the Columbia project. This allowed him to postpone an immediate commitment to development of the Columbia that would l i k e l y scuttle the Peace and await word from the Energy Board. The Energy Board hired two British engineering consulting 81 firms, Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners, and Merz and McLelland. They looked at the power delivered to Vancouver by both projects. Costs were examined in terms of 1. capital investment 2. method of financing 3. annual operating costs 4. market for the energy during and after completion of the project and 5. amount of energy provided at the load centers (B.C. Energy Board 1961). The consul-tants were also asked to look at thermal power. They looked at some figures B.C. Electric had compiled and concluded that thermal power "xrould not be any more economical than the development of the hydro resources in the Province" (Gibbs, Merz & McLelland 1961). They did not f e e l i t necessary to investigate that alternative further despite the fact that i t was the most promising alternative to Columbia and Peace power. The Energy Board report, submitted the day B.C. Elect r i c and Peace River Power Development were expropriated, concluded that private Peace power was not competitive with public Columbia power. But i f the two projects were financed publicly the cost of power from each project was v i r t u a l l y indistinguishable, Also the "two river policy" was advocated for the f i r s t time from the technical side, i f an export market could be found for Columbia power. In retrospect, the 1961 Energy Board report appears to have been the most c r i t i c a l technical input of the planning and decision-making process, It provided the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the Peace project; i t j u s t i f i e d the expropriation of B.C, Electric and 82 Peace River Power Development; i t j u s t i f i e d the Columbia as being of lesser importance for i t only accomplished one goal and that no more effectively than the Peace project. As the report was crucial for subsequent developments some observations are in order, 1, Submitting his project to an independent review was a gamble for the Premier but the odds were stacked in his favour. He gambled heavily for he could not be sure what the report would con-clude yet he went through with plans to expropriate B.C. Ele c t r i c . Although the Energy Board report came out the day B.C. Elec t r i c and Peace River Power Development were taken over, August 1, 1961, the Premier had l i t t l e warning of the happy conclusions of the report. For i n June the consultants had, according to the terms of reference of their study, reported to Dr. Shrum that Peace power was not com-petitive with the Columbia. Shrum flew to London that month to find out why for he was sure i t must have been comparable from the infor-mation he derived from earlier reports. When he discovered i t was because of the increased cost of financing for a private concern he made the adjustment in terms of public financing, If the Peace had proven inferior the Premier would have been i n an awkward position, having taken over B.C. Electric without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It i s unlikely he could have proceeded with the Peace project (Shrum 1972; Williston 1972), But his gamble was i n part based on support for the Peace by experts like Shrum, Paget and "Mainwaring, who f e l t the Peace was a 83 competitive alternative. Incidently, Williston (1972) comments that Mainwaring told him that i f the Peace project was to go ahead, B.C. Electric along with his own Peace River Power Development would have to be expropriated to ensure a market and s t i f l e federal opposition to the project. 2. For a report that was to signal the go ahead for a massive project the terms of reference for the study were very narrow. Only the costs of power were examined - no real economic analysis was considered, or alternatives developed. In defence of the terms of reference Shrum (1972) feels they were adequate for they reflected the concerns of the p o l t i i c a l debate at the time. He also commented that a l l the economists were so busy trying to determine the costs of the power that they had no time to consider benefits and costs. In fact, few economists in British Columbia were involved or even interested i n resource projects of this kind. E l e c t r i c a l engineers were the only people concerned with the techni-• * ' • • ' cal aspects of project evaluation. 3. There i s no formal economic or even financial review mechanism for this type of project. The Energy Board serves this purpose but only at the discretion of the cabinet. It is possible to conceive of a project, involving less controversy, proceeding without even this meager evaluation. * A.D. Scott 1972; personal communication. 84 Environmental Impact Evaluation When the Peace River project was conceived and developed the lessons of ecology were only dimly understood by the project's planners and decision-makers. Consequently the few studies of the effects of the proposed dam were single purpose; there was no attempt to relate the inter-connectedness of the project's impacts to achieve an overall environmental evaluation. The Department of Recreation and Conservation i n 1959 conducted a study of the then proposed 800 square mile reservoir to evaluate possible fisheries problems. The empirical investiga-tion was funded out of department revenue and consisted of a five day canoe trip up the river by two men to count the number of f i s h species in the river, A primary concern of the trip was to estab-l i s h whether northern pike, Esox lucius, inhabited the river above the Peace River Canyon. D.C. Lindsey, a University of B r i t i s h Columbia fisheries biologist, expressed concern that northern pike might be introduced into the Fraser River system i f the reservoir backed up into the swampy headwaters of a Fraser River tributary. Pike are predators of salmon and they carry a tapeworm parasite, Triaenbphorous crassus, not yet found in Pacific salmon. No pike were found. The 20 page report that followed made four recommenda-tions : 1, Efforts must be made to prevent entry of pike into the Fraser River drainage system. * I.L. Withler 1972: personal communication. 85 2. Adequate clearing of the reservoir must be under-taken to ensure preservation of the fishing and general recreational worth of the reservoir under storage conditions. 3. Water releases sufficient to maintain fisheries requirements must be allowed to pass the dam during construction, reservoir f i l l i n g and storage. 4. 1 The development company should provide access to the reservoir and provide recreational facilities for the general public (Withler 1959), No further investigation was carried out on the reservoir area t i l l after the Water Licences were issued i n December 1962, The water Licence stipulated that B.C, Hydro had to support a two man $10,000 study, conducted by the Department of Recreation and Conservation, to investigate further the po s s i b i l i t y of pike i n -troduction to the Fraser River. The subsequent study concluded that this p o s s i b i l i t y was highly unlikely. There were no other studies conducted by the government t i l l 1968-1969 when, in advance of the rising reservoir waters, the same department investigated the habitat loss for moose, The • purpose of the study, soon to be released, was to assess the loss of w i l d l i f e habitat within the flooded area and to examine the capability of the new perimeter area for w i l d l i f e support. The 86 Regional Supervisor for the Prince George D i s t r i c t , R. Goodlad, comments that "financing was from normal operating budgets and was * not adequate for more than cursory evaluation of the habitat. The federal government's Water Resources Branch and Inland Waters Branch conducted some studies of the hydrologic effects caused by the dam. Collier (1960) f e l t that the dam would lower the level of Lake Athabasca after i t was completed. Coulson and Clark (1962) wrote that during the f i l l i n g of the reservoir the maximum level of Lake Athabasca might be three feet below normal, an accurate prediction. Bailey (1971) comments that none of these early reports forecasted the extreme low levels within the Delta i n the v i c i n i t y of Fort Chipewyn. A programme of sediment data collection i n the Lower Athabasca and Peace Rivers was indefinitely postponed i n 1962 because of austerity measures (Correspondence, T,M, Paterson, Director Water Resources Branch to A. Paget, Sep, 5, 1962), It appears that the flood control benefits and f e a s i b i l i t y of hydro sites on the Peace i n Alberta made possible with completion of the Bennett Dam negated the only expressed fear of the Alberta and Federal governments' possible nav-igation damage. No other studies seem to have been conducted by either of these governments t i l l the dam was completed, Coulson and Adamcyk (1969) found that low water i n 1968 on Lake Athabasca could i n part be attributed to the Bennett Dam. However, l i t t l e concern was expressed, Dirschl (1970) indicated * R, Goodlad 1972: personal communication. 87 the poss ib i l i ty of ecological damage from lower water levels in the .. Delta, By 1970 the damage to the Delta area from the low water re-leases from the dam and natural below normal spring runoffs became apparent and considerable p o l i t i c a l pressure was generated. Pamphlets l ike Death of a Delta (Peace-Athabasca Delta Committee 1970) and tele-vis ion programmes plus a symposium sponsored by the University of Alberta's Water Resources Centre (1971) promoted further government action. Perhaps symtomatic of past ecological myopia, an impressive inter-governmental and interdisciplinary research effort i s being conducted to rect ify the damage caused by the construction of the Bennett Dam, Br i t i sh Columbia, however, is not involved i n any of. these studies. The few meager reports that were produced prior to con-struction of the Bennett Dam are self-evident expressions of the poverty of the environmental evaluation for that project. Social Dislocation Evaluation Within the reservoir area there were 38 Indians, 6 resident farmers, 6 summer residences and 14 traplines. Consequently there was l i t t l e socia l constraint to influence decision-making. The lack of comprehensive environmental impact studies, of course, blinded the government to the disasterous economic and socia l dislocation the dam would cause to the 1500 natives of the Peaces-Athabasca Delta, Planning's evaluation function did impose constraints on the p o l i t i c a l sphere, but i n the sense Bromley, Schmid and Lord (1971) 88 suggest. Where the real reasons for a project are not e x p l i c i t l y stated or not f u l l y understood the monetary measure of the project's f e a s i b i l i t y becomes the principal constraint. These writers suggest that a benefit-cost ratio of at least unity becomes the c r i t e r i a for acceptance; for the Peace project, a cost of power competitive with the Columbia became the c r i t e r i a . Like the benefit-cost r a t i o ^ the cost figures were "the focus of concern and criticism, while the real but unstated objectives of planning drew l i t t l e attention" (p, 1), Needless to say such analysis precludes explici t evaluation of the whole range of quantitive and qualitive benefits and costs that arise from a project. Hence the project i s developed without a f u l l understanding of possible impacts that may result, FEEDBACK Since inputs to the planning process came from a number of departments and private concerns and there was no formal arena to coordinate these inputs i t is d i f f i c u l t to determine what ultimate consequences were influenced by outside review. The f i n a l engineering design of the dam was quite different from the original design, the result of extensive, though internal, government review and feedback -an interplay between the Water Rights Branch, their consultants, and i n i t i a l l y Peace River Power Development, their consultants followed by B.C. Hydro and their advisors. But the impact of other contri-butions is less easy to discern, 89 Legislative and less formal provisions of the planning -process provide one indication of the range of outside inputs that may be incorporated i n planning. Whether or not these inputs are ut i l i z e d provides evidence of the effectiveness of outside feed-back. These provisions, in the context of the Peace project, include: The B.C. Water Act The Water Act, A.S.B.C. 1960, c.405, denies the common law concept of riparian rights and gives to the province "the property in and the right to the use of a l l water at any time i n any stream in the province" (Section 3), Private rights are granted under licence. Thirteen rights to water are l i s t e d i n order of pr i o r i t y in the Act, from domestic purposes to conveying and land improvement purposes, Power i s l i s t e d seventh; there are no pro-visions for f i s h , w i l d l i f e or recreation purposes (Paish 1967), Those persons who hold rights to water can object to a new applica-tion for water rights i f there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y the new user w i l l en-danger existing rights, Established rights take precedence in order of the dates of the licences. The only other entities that can object to a new application are the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, the Deputy Minister of Recreation and Conservation and the Deputy Attorney-General, The Comptroller, at his discretion, may c a l l a public rearing to hear a l l those who are entitled to object (Section 9,2) or for his own information to determine any matter under his j u r i s -diction (Section 29). , 90 For B,C, Hydro's application two hearings were called t one -in Chetwynd on August 2, 1962 under Section 9.2 and another in Victoria on October 15, 1962 under Section 29 of the Water Act (Water Comptroller 1962). There were 70 formal objections to the application, that i s there were 70 legal entities with rights affected by the application. In the f i r s t hearing representatives of B.C. Hydro were at hand to answer questions of the objectors and the Comptroller, Of the objectors only some major petroleum interests, a representative of Indian Affairs and the Department of Recreation and Conservation made presentations; a few individual objectors with mineral interests had their letters read into the record. Most of the objectors were only concerned with compensation. The representative for the Indians i n the area presented a brief; his aim was to have flooded reservation land replaced by provincial Crown Land rather than receive monetary compensation. A Fish and Wildlife fisheries biologist testified that the reservoir would devastate the big game in the area by wiping out essential grazing area and disrupting the migration patterns, There had been no f i e l d investigation to evaluate the extent of this loss. Based on the findings of the scanty 1959 report prepared by the Branch on possible fisheries problems in the reservoir the author of that report t e s t i f i e d that grayling game fish i n the river would be dim-inished, while lake trout would li k e l y flourish, Again concern was' expressed that northern pike might be introduced into the Fraser system. Finally the recommendations'of the earlier report were read into the record (Withler 1959). 91 An interesting exchange took place between the Comptroller, A. Paget, and B.C. Hydro's Chief Engineer, J.H. Steede. B.C. Hydro had no schedule of water releases to be approved. Steede said that releases would be at the Comptroller's discretion. Paget replied that an "arbitrary exercise of the power of ordering releases could destroy the economics of the project, because you couldn't meet a production period i n 1968 i f I set some high limit on water releases" (p. 45). Steede then said that the design for the turbines was based on the assumption that there would be sufficient storage for them to operate by September, 1968. The impression was l e f t that the Comptroller was expected to authorize releases that would meet the operating deadline, This impression was rather confirmed by subsequent events when minimum releases of 10,000 cubic feet per second (cfs) set out i n the water licence were amended to as l i t t l e as 1,000 cfs at B.C. Hydro's request i n 1968, This change was to compensate for the unusually low spring runoff that year (Amendment to Clause (q) of Conditional Water Licence No. 27722, July 15, 1968). According to the Water Act prior licences take precedence over new applications, Paget in the hearings expressed this prin-ciple as "our instincts are always to protect our licensees, and after that, of course, we worry about the new applicants", The hearing i n Victoria and a substantial amount of .the water licence application correspondence f i l e s are devoted to the objections of 92 West-Coast Transmission. The company's McMahon Refinery at Taylor, downstream of the damsite, held a prior licence and the company o f f i c i a l s were concerned that . 1. there might not be enough water to meet the company's needs as the reservoir f i l l e d 2. low water 1 levels might expose the refinery's water intake, and 3. a change in water temperature resulting from the dam's operation might affect the plant's operation. This latter objection was dismissed by the Comptroller as being outside his jurisdiction. Otherwise the company was successful in influencing the water release schedule to meet i t s needs. These hearings were the only opportunity for outsiders to directly participate and influence some of the major actors in the planning process, namely the Water Rights Branch, the Comptroller, and B.C. Hydro. The participants were restricted to the Department of Recreation and Conservation and those entities who held rights to the water. And of those who were entitled to participate i t appears that only those large corporations with the resources to sponsor lawyers and technical witnesses f e l t competent to participate. As only six farms were i n the proposed reservoir area, the Department of Agriculture l i k e l y f e l t i t had no special interest to protect and thus did not appear. The Navigable Waters Protection Act Procedures for dam construction should, on a navigable river, be approved by the federal "Minister of Transport, as specified 93 in the federal Navigable Waters Protection Act, R.S,C, 1970, c.N-19. No definition of navigable waters i s provided i n the Act but the courts have called rivers that can be navigated by canoe or log boom navigable (Lucas & Franson 1971), No provisions for public hearings are included i n the Act, B.C. Hydro never applied to the federal government for permission to construct the Bennett Dam, However, Williston (1972) comments that when the project was f i r s t i n i t i a t e d by Peace River Power Development, his department, Lands and Forests, applied to the federal government to have the Peace River above the damsite declared navigable, The intention of this application was to make the Department of Transport responsible for i n s t a l l i n g and main^ taining the navigation aids in the proposed reservoir thus relieving the provincial government of this financial burden, The federal government was aware of this motive, the Minister declares, and i t refused to consider the river as navigable, After B r i t i s h Columbia took over the Peace project from ' the private developers, the federal Minister of J u s t i c e , E . D. Fulton, threatened to invoke the Act to block or s t a l l the project so that his pet project, the Columbia, could be started f i r s t (Sherman, Province Sept. 14, 1961), The provincial government then simply ignored Ottawa. Williston was later quoted as saying that there was no need for federal approval "for from the earliest days of Mackenzie and the fur traders, people had to portage around the 94 canyon area and never was there any navigable stretch i n that part of the river" (Sun Jan. 7, 1971). Shrum (1972) said that B.C. Hydro's counsel, Senator Farris, told the company that i f i t approached Ottawa with any questions on the matter the federal government would l i k e l y declare that stretch of the river navigable and make them apply for a permit, Ottawa was concerned as i s illustrated by the following letter from H,A. Young, Deputy Minister of Public Works, to Dr. Shrum; Co-chairman of B.C. Hydro, dated October 24, 1962: White an application under the Navigable Waters Protection Act has been received from you in connection with the Columbia River Power Devel-opment, I can find no record of a request relative to the Peace River Power Development. Up to the present, I appreciate that much of the work was preliminary and planning. However, in the Sept. 1962 issue of the Engineering and Contract Record, I note in an article by Mr. James G. Ripley that definite plans are now underway. It is indicated that some $20 million has already been spent on preliminary work and plans for a contract for the main dam are underway for next spring. In these circumstances, it seems approp-riate that I might write to you about the Navigable Waters Protection Act. Insofar as the Peace River is concerned, it perhaps would seem that navigation wilt not be affected. On the other hand, we have received - considerable comment on how this might affect, adversely, boat travel in the Athabasca, Great. Slave and MacKenzie Rivers, For these reasons, we consider the Navigable Waters Protection Act should be taken into account. The letter i t appears was not answered and the federal government . let the matter drop. 95 It i s clear that the tension between the federal and provincial governments at that time frustrated a federal contribution to planning for the dam. This input might have resulted i n some investigation of downstream impacts and possibly some of the pro-blems that arose later may have been avoided. The Fisheries Act The Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c, F-14, which has such potential power over possible dams on the Fraser River was not applicable to the Peace River, The Act calls for the maintenance of an unobstructed passage for migrating f i s h . There was no fis h migration on the Peace River; the Peace River Canyon, the damsite, was a natural barrier to upstream movement of f i s h . Some interest was expressed by the Department of Fisheries over possible pike introduction to the Fraser River. However, the Department only wanted assurance from the province that this problem would not occur (Correspondence, W,R. Hourston, Director Pacific Area, Department of Fisheries to A, Paget, May 31, 1962). Interprovincial Cooperation There are no specific legislative provisions at a pro-v i n c i a l or national level requiring cooperation on interprovincial rivers but prudence would make cooperation advisable. Peace River Power Development contacted the Alberta government and agreed to -maintain a flow of 6,000 cfs at the Alberta border Correspondence,: 96 F.J. Pine, Peace River Power Development, to A. Paget, Jan. 14, 1960), When that company was expropriated there was no further correspondence with Alberta u n t i l after the water licences were issued. (Appendix A outlines the correspondence between Alberta and British Columbia t i l l A p r i l , 1969). The Water Comptroller ignored the previous agreement and allowed B.C, Hydro to release as l i t t l e as 1,000 cfs during part of the period the dam was being f i l l e d , although downstream tributaries increase that flow by the time i t reaches Alberta, I n i t i a l l y B.C, Hydro wanted to raise the question of downstream flood and power benefits with Alberta but some questions arose about possible interference to MacKenzie River navigation from Northland Navigation, a federal Crown Corporation, so British Columbia decided not to contact Alberta and risk.a dispute (Shrum, 1972). Williston (1972) adds that there was some verbal communica^ tion between the governments in which both parties f e l t the pro-ject was self-evidently beneficial for everyone, hence there was l i t t l e need for close cooperation, B.C. Hydro did not investigate possible ecological and environmental downstream damage that would require interprovincial cooperation because,, in Shrum's (1972) and Williston's (1972) view, no one raised i t as a problem. Legal L i a b i l i t y A developer has certain obligations to society other than those imposed by federal and provincial statutes. These 97 obligations should make him sensitive to possible external impacts from proposed projects to avoid court action from those people whose interests may be damaged. The correspondence f i l e after the water licences were issued i n 1962 indicates that Alberta was concerned about possible damages at Peace River, Alberta from the proposed water release schedules during the reservoir f i l l i n g . Yet the town of Peace River i s suing B.C. Hydro for $84,624.93 for damages done to their water supply system. (Alberta Supreme Court 1971). This court case now being heard i n Alberta i l l u s t r a t e s some legal responsibilities the developer should consider. Also, the circumstances influencing B.C. Hydro's actions indicate why the corporation failed to take i t s legal responsibilities seriously. B.C. Hydro i s being sued for adversely affecting the town's water supply by having "wilfully, unlawfully and intentionally contravened the Navigable Waters Protection Act", But i n addition to f a i l i n g to satisfy this legislative provision the corporation i s being sued for negligence and for depriving the town of i t s riparian rights. A fourth grounds for damage i s nuisance, defined as a use of land that unreasonably interferes with other uses of land. This remedy is not appropriate with which to challenge B.C. Hydro for Section 52A of the B r i t i s h Columbia and Power Authority Act, S.B.C. 1964, c,7, prohibits actions brought against the corporation for nuisance (Lucas & Franson 1971). 98 Lucas and Franson outline some other general problems related to bringing B.C, Hydro to court for downstream damages. 1. The p l a i n t i f f must be specifically injured. This stipulation would apply for the town of Peace River but the claim becomes a l i t t l e more fuzzy i f the natives of the Delta attempt court action. 2. If the statutory permits and authorizations are clear i n per-mitting damage there i s no legal remedy for those so damaged. 3. The interjurisdictional nature of the case complicates the question of whether the statutory authorization concept or Section 52A can constrain private legal action i n Alberta, 4, If the case i s brought to court i n Alberta that court could only ask for monetary compensation. The court could not claim supervisory functions outside i t s jurisdiction. This would satisfy the town of Peace River but i f the Delta residents were to sue they might want re-medial action so that they could resume their traditional pattern of l i f e , 5, The financial burden of bringing the case to court is too great for most groups, especially i f there is a chance they w i l l lose and then also have to pay court costs. Lucas and Franson warn that their discussion is general and this summary further simplifies the complex legal issues, but the point that emerges for the planning process is clear. The few legal constraints on the government developer are not sufficient to force i t to be sensitive to the environmental and social impacts i t s projects may create. 99 Throughout the planning of the project there was consider- -'. able discussion and debate on i t s merits and failings by the opposition, interested groups and the public. But, with some exceptions, much of the debate was lik e MacBeth's view of l i f e " f u l l of sound and fury, signifying nothing". There was l i t t l e information generated that could inform public opinion. The plans of Peace River Power Development, the Comptroller's evaluation of those plans, the 1961 Energy Board Report, their consultant's report, the 1962 Water Comptroller's hearing and the water licence correspondence were open to public scrutiny, i f any of them could be located. But these reports are for the most part of marginal interest for they deal with detailed engineering and i n some cases financial findings. This is not the stuff of informed debate to determine whether such a project reflects society's needs and aspirations. Innocuous sen-tences that hint at some more basic issue or possible internal government dispute kept debate fueled for weeks i f not months. Paget Ts comments i n his engineering review of the Peace River Power Development plans that Peace power could be marketed i n B r i t i s h Columbia i f no other major project came along to capture part of the market is an example. Without the resources to contribute substan-tive arguments the only feedback from the public that could be trans-mitted to the planners and decision-makers was various groups'; opposition or approval of the project. 100. REFORMULATION Without the feedback from the public and other levels of government the process of reformulating the objectives was, as has been indicated, an almost entirely internal matter. DECISION-MAKING From the preceding discussions i t should be clear that the major decisions were made early on i n the planning process. The subsequent planning was carried out largely to confirm that decision and make i t a re a l i t y . Within their frames of reference those people performing the technical functions might at times question aspects of the decision or even threaten i t (e.g., the i n i t i a l conclusion about the non-competitiveness of Peace power by the Energy Board's consultants). However their investigations were conceived so narrowly and the structure of the planning process was so limited no attractive alternative was l i k e l y to emerge to threaten the original decision. CONCLUSIONS Public Participation:and Representation There was v i r t u a l l y no scope for public involvement even at a'public hearings level. There i s a danger i n using today's values of public participation to evaluate a project that happened ten or more years ago. However, the ideal of public representation 101 has been i n vogue for a long time and by this standard the planning process does not fare too well. Within the government only a small number of agencies were involved and these represented a small cross-segment of opinion i n society. B.C. Hydro reflects the energy interest in the province. This interest touches everyone but not deeply i n terms of portion of income spent for e l e c t r i c i t y . The technicians and decision-makers reflect a strong engineering concern. The Water  Resources Service and the Comptroller are concerned with protection and regulation of water licencees and new applicants. But within the department research and regulation into major hydro-electric concerns is a significant feature, A close connection exists between these concerns and B.C. Hydro. The staff i s again engineering-oriented. The B.C. Energy Board's responsibilities, to seek out and assess new energy sources to meet future demands, closely a l l y i t with the pre-vious two agencies who must also be considered i t s clientele along with the Cabinet. The consultants they have hired have almost always been engineers or engineering cost accountants although for their most recent studies ecologists and biologists have been consulted. The Department of Recreation and Conservation - Fish arid Wildlife Branch can only advise in water resource issues and has no real power . except through persuasion and the power of prestige, Until recently i t s clientele group has been the sport fishermen and hunters. Attempts are being made to broaden this clientele. Biologists characterize their staff. 102 Information Generation The government organization structure i s set up so that only a small 0group of technical people contribute to the planning decisions and these people are for the most part engineering-oriented. Within this structure the information generated is highly technical and unlikely to enliven debate or offer alternatives. This is what happened on the Peace project, Unless the structure of government and public interaction i s significantly altered, future planning w i l l continue to generate information of l i t t l e value to the public. Alberta and the federal government must suffer some criticism for their negligence in not protecting their own interests (Alberta) and not maintaining the wider national perspective (federal government). These governments had an opportunity to broaden the interests represented and produce information relevant to the planning and decision-making debate before f i n a l approval of the project. There are genuine p o l i t i c a l and legal reaons why their role was so minimal but their presence does not offer a potential for opening up future planning. Efficiency Without alternatives to compare i t was d i f f i c u l t to deter-mine at the time whether the Peace was the most eff i c i e n t solution to meet the goals. There was argument to suggest that i t was not the most economical solution to satisfy the power objectives but there 103 were l i t t l e resources available to substantiate these assertions. With hindsight we can see that, at least in: terms of cost of power generation, the Bennett Dam was remarkably successful. With eight generators installed power i s being generated at the forecast 8 mils. When the two peaking generators are installed, power w i l l be delivered at the 4.4 mils price estimated 11 years ago (Williston 1972). Part of this success is bound up with the development of the north which this project helped stimulate. Development increased load growth rates so the potential of the river was u t i l i z e d earlier reducing interests costs and hence offsetting rising construction costs. Cost for Columbia power w i l l be, on the other hand, many times more expensive than earlier estimated. The financial success of the Peace project speaks well of the agencies responsible for i t s completion, however, such success may i n part have been achieved through a failure to account for the economic welfare aspects of the project. This i s , in effect, a failure of the organizational structure to provide a government department responsible for environmental quality. The interprovincial aspect of damage to the Peace-Athabasca Delta complicates the efficiency c r i t e r i a in terms of organizational structure derived i n Chapter Two, No B r i t i s h Columbia department can be responsible for defending en-vironmental values in Alberta. But there is no department that i s responsible for identifying and weighing possible environmental ex-ternalities and spillover effects from large-scale projects that 104 occur in B r i t i s h Columbia, Without an organization prepared to -provide this public good, or rather service, the planning and decision-making process i s ill-prepared to make a comprehensive evaluation of the total benefits and costs to society from such large-scale power projects like the Peace. Equality Everyone has an equal chance to participate in government decision-making by writing or appearing before public hearings i f they are entitled. Nevertheless the public participation and. repre-sentation c r i t e r i a indicates the government structure frustrates a broad range of interests in decision-making. Evaluation of the Peace project in terms of the equality c r i t e r i a shows that corporate interests dominate the public review of the dam's construction and operation. The petroleum interests, in this case, had interests to protect and the legal and financial resources to defend them. The impact of private corporations on the more basic decisions as opposed to the impact of other groups in society is harder to dis-cern, We can only say that they had a disproportionate opportunity to make their views known because of their special interests i n the decisions and their resources, The new Environmental Land Use Act w i l l provide more opportunity for the public to be heard in future power decisions and an awakening of interest in environmental values w i l l ensure that these values are presented. But without the resources, of the economic groups to back their concerns i t i s unlikely these 105 interests w i l l achieve a hearing in government proportionate to the corporate groups. Professional Humility In the Peace project there may well have been professional arrogance towards those people to be affected by the project. However, the responsibility for the ecological and social damages i n the Peace-Athabasca Delta would appear to rest with public and professional attitudes at the time that were not cognizant of environmental external-i t i e s from such projects arid an organization structure that promoted engineering planning views above a l l others, Natural Justice The public hearings provision of the new Environmental Land Use Act should correct the f a i l i n g of the planning for the Peace project that did not allow the public's views to be formally presented to the government. Liberty There i s no indication that the free association of indiv-iduals that opposed or approved of the project was denied. P o l i t i c a l Leadership Although there was considerable debate over the Peace project, many of i t s opponents were more interested i n discrediting the govern-ment than the dam. Without strong interest group concern for the Peace project i t s e l f , there was not much of a basis for any new strong p o l i t i c a l leaders to emerge, , 106 CHAPTER FIVE .RECOMMENDATIONS INTRODUCTION . From the previous discussions two basic approaches are offered i n deriving the following general recommendations to improve planning and decision-making for large-scale power projects i n accord with the proposed c r i t e r i a . To broaden the developer's planning for power projects an extension of private and c i v i l legal remedies open to the public i s offered. This approach i s designed to force the developer to consider very basic questions of the planning pro-, cess, i . e . , whether the project i s i n fact necessary and whether the proposed project i s the only j u s t i f i a b l e alternative. But as large-scale projects are invariably closely connected with govern-ment policy a p o l i t i c a l approach i s needed to ensure that environ-mental interests are able to influence government decisions. To accomplish this task an environmental review agency that can s o l i c i t public views and challenge the f e a s i b i l i t y of the project i s suggested. Also interest group representation and federal government participa-tion i s stressed to ensure that in the f i n a l outcome of the planning process those groups who are concerned w i l l have their views taken into account. The two approaches are not necessarily complementary and the functions they serve may overlap but the reliance on one approach may not ensure that the c r i t e r i a are observed. 107 RECOMMENDATION Create an Environmental Review Agency Hydro and engineering interests predominate in the planning and decision-making for large-scale power projects. These interests do not necessarily reflect the social preferences that exist i n Bri t i s h Columbia for there is l i t t l e opportunity for other interests to participate in the crucial planning stage. Planning is conducted by a closed group of engineering concerns that consider only those outside interests that are defined in the Water Act. Also the information generated i n the planning stage of these projects has been inadequate. It has not been able to i n -form the various interests i n the province of the broad economic and environmental costs and benefits of these projects. This situa-tion has further decreased the opportunity of outside interests to effectively present their views to the planners and poli t i c i a n s . Consequently the planning that precedes these projects may not adequately isolate social goals and the compromise alternatives that reflect the public interest, To compensate for the ineffective public participation and inadequate information generation in planning for large-scale power projects this thesis recommends that an environmental review agency be created. The agency should be consciously designed to attract the 108 views of significant interests i n society regarding the environmental -case for major resource decisions. Also i t should have the resources to generate information that can inform these and other interests i n society. The agency would be i n effect a countervailing force to the predominant hydro and engineering interests, or more generally, the resource development interests i n the province, The agency would have the independence to pursue matters of i t s own choosing rather than carry out. studies ordered by the government. Thus when the proposals are put forward for a major power project, the agency could prepare a report on the proposal i n which i t could recommend against acceptance, suggest modifications or even offer alternatives to the project. Hopefully the review agency's recommendations, based on comprehensive analysis of the complex nature of social and ecological systems, would produce arguments that would induce strong support among environmental interests within society. These groups would in turn exert pressure on the cabinet, the f i n a l decision-maker, to uphold the recommendations. The organization of the review agency should be designed to offset many of the problems beset by government institutions. One major problem, especially for institutions involved i n the planning process, i s how to ensure that administrative bodies do not usurp the p o l i t i c a l functions of decision-making. The number 109 of and complexity of major energy and resources issues often allows the administrators or planners to shape the decision-space for the po l i t i c i a n , i n effect making the decisions for the elected leader. The creation of an advocate environmental review agency can help expose this internal decision-making by attacking the assumptions made by those other government agencies and departments that are planning the projects. The public interplay between the different agencies.should expose the relevant issues for the elected o f f i c i a l s to decide. The review agency must thus be assured of a free-lance role i n the total government structure so that i t i s free to c r i t i c i z e other government departments' proposals even though those proposals might be part of government policy. The review agency should be as free as possible from direct p o l i t i c a l control. It could be given a constitution much lik e a crown corporation where the agency would be l e f t to run i t s own affairs u n t i l such time as the government feels i t must intervene to force a change or disband the agency. The fact that the agency would not have any direct power other than i t s own integrity makes continuous accountability to the cabinet less important. The agency would, of course, be obliged to give some account of i t s a c t i v i t i e s and expenditures and remain open for public scrutiny. A second related problem concerns the internal integrity of the agency. The internal structure must reflect the environmental concerns the agency defends and the independent role i t must maintain. 110 The staffing of the agency should be from professions that identify with environmental concerns so that the agency can pursue i t s ad-vocacy role with vigour, Also there should be a permanent technical and administrative staff as a basis for the investigations i t would conduct. The agency would also need to have a secure source of funding so that i t would remain independent of direct government control. To achieve some financial independence, the budget could be worked out on a long-term basis, perhaps two to four years. A third problem i s the need to ensure that the review agency is able to reflect the environmental interests held within society. To overcome this problem the agency's governing body should be selected from a number of different groups within society -labour, industry, wild l i f e groups, etc. A slightly more d i f f i c u l t task w i l l be to ensure that the unorganized interests i n society w i l l also be reflected. Judicious selection of the members of the governing board, instructions to the permanent staff to seek out un-represented views and the use of. public hearings could help incorporate these unorganized interests into the planning process although achieve-ment of this objective i s unlikely to ever be completely satisfactory. The p o l i t i c a l f e a s i b i l i t y of the recommendation for a review agency rests with the willingness of the government i n Bri t i s h Columbia, that i s generally unencumbered by administrative constraints, to share I l l i t s power in this p o l i t i c a l l y sensitive f i e l d . Chapter Three i l l u s -trated the essential materialism in the province with the subsequent toleration of resource extraction for economic growth. Hence, unless environmental awareness becomes more acute, the cabinet might ignore the review agency's findings with distressing frequency. But i t would be an ex p l i c i t l y p o l i t i c a l act counter to the public advice of the government's own environmental experts. The government would have made a conscious value trade-off between environmental quality and economic growth. If the review agency does not produce environmentally satisfactory results immediately, the creation of an environmental review agency should at least 1. aid i n the generation of compre-hensive information from an environmental perspective, 2. introduce new public hearings into the planning process, and 3. give environ-mental representatives a more significant role i n planning for large scale power projects. PvECOMHENDATION Mobilize p o l i t i c a l support for government agencies concerned with  energy decisions. To reinforce the planning process i n accord with the proposed c r i t e r i a other p o l i t i c a l reforms can be adopted. To f a c i l i t a t e the efficiency and equality c r i t e r i a government depart-ments could be reorganized so that they reflect specific interests in society, Environmental quality, for example, i s becoming an issue 112 upon which many governments are organizing new departments. Tradi-tional departments such as the natural resource and conservation departments only tangentially reflect this concern and thus new departments representing these interests are being proposed. B r i t i s h Columbia might follow Alberta's lead in this regard by establishing a Department of the Environment with jurisdiction over environmental quality. The review agency might have the same relationship as Alberta's Environment Conservation Authority has with the Department of the Environment. The Department carries out administrative tasks of regulation, standard setting etc., while the Authority has a freer hand to investigate and make recommendations on specific issues and problems. The point of the reorganization would be to give public access to government departments that represent their interests. The temptation to consolidate a l l existing agencies that have jurisdiction over some aspect of particular fields l i k e the environment must be avoided. The internalization of natural conflicts between, for example, a resource development agency and a conservation agency permits trade-offs to be conducted by technicians. Holden (1966) points out a problem that must be taken into account for those agencies that have regulatory functions. There i s a tendency for the agencies to adopt the perspective of those groups they are attempting to regulate, The cultivation of a constituency by organizations to sustain 113 their legitimacy i s universal. What this recommendation envisages . is that a department's constituency is also equivalent to the public goods or services that i t i s most suited to provide. Thus natural resource or conservation agencies would be inappropriate units of government to ensure that the environmental quality interests are represented in the planning and p o l i t i c a l process. There would be conflicts of interest between the types of services they would have to perform. A new organization would have to be created. The old agencies would only lose those responsibilities for which they are ill-equipped to perform, This organizational efficiency could be enhanced by attempting to strengthen the ties between government departments and the interests they serve. The various departments could make available personnel to articulate and represent the less organized and more diffuse group interests. This proposal would require a conscious desire on behalf of government to counterbalance the more well organized voices and overcome the external and decision-making costs that frustrate the organization and representation of certain kinds of interests i n govern-ment decisions, RECOMMENDATION Include i n the B.C. Water Act, f i s h , w i l d l i f e arid recreation rights  to water. The Water Comptroller hearings stipulated under the Water Act 114 are restricted to only those objectors with rights to water i n terms . of licenses. But more important, legal appeal to the Water Comptroller 1 decisions i s restricted to these same licensees. The straight-forward system of licensing in terms of date of issue and priority use of water has been a remarkably effective administrative practice; there have been v i r t u a l l y no legal appeals to the Comptroller's decisions (Raudsepp 1967). If the rights to water are extended to include f i s h , w i l d l i f e and recreation rights, the Water Comptroller's internal-ization of conflicts w i l l not be so easy to accomplish. Fish, wild-life and recreation interests are more nebulous to define than the traditional interests, hence, there could not be any specific license holders. Nevertheless groups with interests i n these fields could be entitled to appear at the hearings as well as appeal the Compt-r o l l e r ' s decisions. Although the greater scope for legal appeal to the Comptroller's decisions might frustrate the smooth operation of administrative procedures the wider representation of interests would achieve more satisfactory planning solutions. The goal iden-t i f i c a t i o n and alternative evaluation steps of the planning process that are necessary to inform the public would have to be made ex-p l i c i t , Once in the courts, legislation might be so defined that wi l d l i f e interests, for example, would have to contend that w i l d l i f e would be unnecessarily affected. If we assume that hydro interests 115 are legitimate users of water the onus would be on these interests to prove either that there would be no significant destruction of w i l d l i f e or the project was so necessary that w i l d l i f e damage would be unavoidable, i.e., that the project proposed is the most satis-factory alternative.. The w i l d l i f e interests could then challenge the developers'justification for the project. It i s hoped this legal constraint would force the developer to make explicit the project's aims and alternatives whether he i s challenged i n court or not. To permit non-licensed interests to object and appeal would require a change in traditional practice; a much broader standing to sue would have to be allowed. At present, i f the pub-l i c interest i s damaged only the Attorney-General has the right to take legal action. Needless to say he i s unlikely to challenge a project that i s part of government policy. This recommendation would require extensive investigation to determine i t s f e a s i b i l i t y but i t does offer potential for 1, broadening the range of interests that can affect planning and decision-making, and 2. producing basic information and argument that i s useful to public debate over planning p r i o r i t i e s and alternatives, However, as we have seen, the theoretical problems of interest group organization, the practical problems associated with a weakly defined interest group structure i n British Columbia and the problems of financial and professional resources to argue 116 such cases would lessen the impact of this recommendation. Also such an approach f a i l s to grapple with the basic conflict i n values between environmental quality and natural resource-based economic growth. The developer would most l i k e l y s t i l l have the advantage for with his resources, expertise and connection with government policy, he could set the parameters for the case. RECOMMENDATION Encourage the federal government to assert their powers where  projects affect the national interest. Major projects are not solely a provincial concern for they affect large areas that may be of national importance. Where the national interest is affected the government has the duty to report to the nation the impact the project may have on national values. If the federal government has the jurisdiction i t should work to protect those values in the planning for the projects. A more vigorous federal involvement might strain federal-provincial relations even more than now is the case. However, this involvement should enhance the planning process by increasing the information needed to inform public debate and widen the opportunities for representation i n planning, , REFERENCES Alberta Supreme Court 1970: Statement of Claim: Town of Peace River vs. B.C. Hydro and Power Authority, A p r i l 1, 1971. Judicial D i s t r i c t of Peace River. 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H y d r o  a n d P o w e r A u t h o r i t y f o r a L i c e n s e t o D i v e r t a n d S t o r e  W a t e r O u t o f t h e P e a c e R i v e r a n d i t s T r i b u t a r i e s , B e f o r e  A . F . P a g e t , C o m p t r o l l e r , P r o c e e d i n g s , C h e t w y n d , B . C . A u g u s t 2 , 1 9 6 2 a n d V i c t o r i a , B . C . O c t o b e r 1 5 , 1 9 6 2 . N e w W e s t m i n s t e r : O f f i c i a l C o u r t R e p o r t e r s . W a t e r R e s o u r c e s C e n t r e . 1 9 7 1 P r o c e e d i n g s o f t h e P e a c e - A t h a b a s c a D e l t a S y m p o s i u m . E d m o n t o n : U n i v . o f A l t a . W e n g e r t , N o r m a n . 1 9 7 1 P u b l i c P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n W a t e r P l a n n i n g : A C r i t i q u e o f T h e o r y , D o c t r i n e a n d P r a c t i c e . W a t e r R e s o u r c e s  B u l l e t i n . 7 : 2 6 - 3 2 . W i l l i s t o n , R . G . 1 9 5 9 A d d r e s s D e l i v e r e d D u r i n g t h e T h r o n e S p e e c h D e b a t e , J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1 9 5 9 . M i m e o . V i c t o r i a . 1 9 6 0 A d d r e s s D e l i v e r e d D u r i n g T h r o n e S p e e c h D e b a t e , F e b r u a r y 3 , 1 9 6 0 , M i m e o . V i c t o r i a . 1 9 6 1 A d d r e s s D e l i v e r e d D u r i n g T h r o n e S p e e c h D e b a t e , F e b r u a r y 8 , 1 9 6 1 . M i m e o . V i c t o r i a . 1962 Address D e l i v e r e d During Throne Speech Debate, February 1, 1962, Mimeo. V i c t o r i a , 1 9 6 3 A d d r e s s D e l i v e r e d D u r i n g T h r o n e S p e e c h D e b a t e , F e b r u a r y 7 , 1 9 6 3 . M i m e o . V i c t o r i a . 1 9 6 3 P o w e r D e v e l o p m e n t s i n B . C . P a p e r r e a d a t t h e 2 3 r d A n n u a l C o n v e n t i o n o f t h e N o r t h w e s t P u b l i c P o w e r A s s o c i a t i o n , A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 6 3 , S e a t t l e . 1 9 7 2 I n t e r v i e w w i t h D , G , ' L e M a r q u a n d , M a y 2 , 1 9 7 2 . ' V i c t o r i a , , W i l s o n , H . T . 1 9 7 1 T h e D i s m a l S c i e n c e o f O r g a n i z a t i o n R e c o n s i d e r e d . C a n a d i a n P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 1 4 : 8 2 - 9 9 . W i t h l e r , I . L . 1 9 5 9 F i s h e r i e s P r o b l e m s A s s o c i a t i o n w i t h D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e P e a c e R i v e r a n d I t s U p p e r T r i b u t a r i e s f o r H y d r o - E l e c t r i c P u r p o s e s . F i s h e r i e s M a n a g e m e n t R e p o r t N o . 3 1 . V i c t o r i a . F i s h a n d W i l d l i f e B r a n c h ^ D e p t . o f Recreation a n d C o n s e r v a t i o n . 128 APPENDIX A Province of WATER RESOURCES SERVICE Department of Lands, British Columbia WATER RIGHTS BRANCH Forests and Water Resources CONDITIONAL WATER LICENCE NO. 27721 British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority of Vancouver, B.C., i s hereby authorized to divert and use water as follows:-(a) The Sources of the water supply are the Peace River and i t s tributaries. (b) The point of diversion is to be located approximately as shown on the attached plan. (c) The date from which this licence shall have precedence is 14th February, 1962. (d) The purpose for which the water is to be used i s Power. (e) The maximum quantity of water which may be diverted is 58,300 cubic feet per second. (f) The period of the year during which the water may be used i s the whole year. (g) This licence is appurtenant to the undertaking of the licensee. (h) The works authorized to be constructed are a dam, penstocks, power house, spillway, low level outlets and switch yard which shall be located approximately as shown on the attached plan, and substations and transmission lines on a route or routes to be selected by the licensee to convey e l e c t r i c a l energy so developed to places of use. (i) The construction of the said works shall be commenced on or before the 31st day of December, 1963 and shall be completed and the water beneficially used on or before the 31st day of December, 1978. 129 (j) The licensee shall not commence construction of any part of the works authorized under clause (h) hereof u n t i l the.plans for such part have been approved by the Comptroller of Water Rights. (k) The licensee's rights issued under this licence shall be deemed to be subsequent to any rights granted under any licence or licences which may be issued at any time for the consumptive use of water. A.F. Paget, Comptroller of Water Rights. FILE NO. 0242651 Date Issued: December 21, 1962 LICENCE NO. 27721, 130 CONDITIONAL WATER LICENCE No. 27722 Brit i s h Columbia Hydro and Power Authority of Vancouver, B.C., i s hereby authorized to store water as ' follows :-' a (a) The sources of the water supply are the Peace River and i t s tributaries. (b) The storage works are to be located approximately as shown on the attached plan, Exhibit "A". (c) The reservoir comprises those portions of the Peace River and i t s tributaries and the areas adjacent thereto as may be flooded by the works authorized under this licence. (d) The date from which this licence shall have precedence i s 14th February, 1962. (e) The purposefor which the water is to be used is as set out i n Conditional Water Licence No. 27721. (f) The maximum quantity of water which may be stored i s 32,000,000 acre feet per annum. (g) The period of the year during which the water may be stored i s the whole year, subject to clause (q) hereof. (h) This licence is appurtenant to the undertaking of the licensee. (i) The works authorized to be constructed are a dam and auxiliary works, which w i l l store water to a pool elevation not to exceed 2,200 feet. (j) The construction of the said works:shall be commenced on or before the 31st day of December, 1963 and shall be completed and the water beneficially used on or before the 31st day of December, 1978. (k) The licensee shall not commence construction of any part of the works authorized under clause (i) hereof u n t i l the plans for such part have been approved by the Comproller of Water Rights. (1) The licensee shall clear the reservoir i n the manner and to the extent as directed by the Comptroller after consultation with the Deputy Minister of Forests. (m) The licensee shall provide public access to the reservoir area as may be directed by the Comptroller. 131 (n) The licensee shall make available an amount not to exceed $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) to the Department of Recreation and Conservation in the year 1963 to conduct a study and make a report on such remedial measures as may be determined to be necessary for the protection of fisheries and wi l d l i f e . (o) The licensee shall undertake and complete such remedial measures for the protection of fisheries and w i l d l i f e as the Comptroller may direct following receipt of the aforesaid report from the Department of Recreation and Conservation. , (p) The licensee shall construct and operate such components of a hydrometeorological network as may be directed by the Comptroller of Water Rights and shall make the information available to the Comptroller as he directs. (q) The licensee shall unless otherwise directed by the Comptroller make such minimum releases from the reservoir as are shown in the attached Exhibit "B", and in addition shall make such .•• further releases as may be directed by the Comptroller from time to time in the public interest. (r) The licensee's rights issued under this licence shall be deemed to be subsequent to any rights granted under any licence or licences which may be issued at any time for the consumptive use of water. A. F. Paget, Comptroller of Water Rights. FILE No. 0242651 Date issued: December 21, 1962 LICENCE NO. 27722. 132 WATER RESOURCES SERVICE WATER RIGHTS BRANCH EXHIBIT " B " Minimum flows to be maintained by releases of water from the reservoir pursuant to Clause q of Conditional Water Licence No. 27722. December 1 to March 31 • » • » April 1 to July 15 July 16 to September 15 September 16 to November 30.. Calculated natural inflows to the authorized reservoir. 10,000 cubic feet per second or the natural flow whichever is the lesser, as measured on the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources' gauge located near Taylor, B.C. 10,000 cubic feet per second, as measured on the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources' gauge located near Hudson Hope, B.C. 10,000 cubic feet per second or the natural flow, whichever i s the lesser, as measured on the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources' gauge located near Taylor, B.C. Provided also that a flow of not less than 1000 cubic feet per second shall be released from the dam at a l l times. DATED at Victoria, B.C., this 21st day of December, 1962. A.F. Paget Comptroller of Water Rights FILE No, 0242651 AMENDMENTS to Conditional Water Licence No. 27722 Being satisfied that no person's rights w i l l be affected, I hereby amend clause (n) of Conditional Water Licence No, 27722, Peace River and i t s tributaries, to read: (n) The licensee shall make available an amount not to . exceed $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) to the Department of Recreation and Conservation during the period ending 31st March, 1964, to conduct a study and make a report on such remedial measures as may be determined to be necessary for the protection of fisheries and w i l d l i f e . 27th February, 1963. . A.F. Paget, Comptroller of Water Rights. 134 DEPARTMENT OF LANDS, FORESTS AND WATER RESOURCES WATER RESOURCES SERVICE . WATER RIGHTS BRANCH Victoria, B.C. In accordance with Clause (q) of Conditional Water Licence 27722, being satisfied that i t is in the public interest and that the rights of downstream users w i l l be adequately protected by the licensee, I hereby direct that, during the period commencing on the 16th of July 1968 and ending on the 30th of September 1968, the licensee shall maintain a minimum release of 1,000 cfs from the dam, or such higher release as may be required to maintain adequate water levels at Taylor, B.C. in accordance with the requirements of the holders of prior licences on the Peace River. The requirements of Exhibit "B" shall hot apply during the above-mentioned period. 15th day of July, 1968. H.D. DeBeck, Comptroller of Water Rights. DEPARTMENT OF LANDS, FORESTS AND WATER RESOURCES WATER RESOURCES SERVICE, WATER RIGHTS BRANCH Victoria, B.C. In accordance with Clause (q);of Conditional Water Licence 27722, being satisfied that i t i s i n the public interest and that the rights of downstream users w i l l be adequately protected by the licensee, I hereby direct that, during the period commencing on the 1st of December 1968 and ending on the 31st March 1969, the licensee shall maintain a minimum flow of water measured at the Water Survey of Canada gauge at Taylor, B r i t i s h Columbia of 10,000 c.f.s. or the natural flow at that point, whichever is the lesser. The requirements of Exhibit "B" shall not apply during the above-mentioned period. 15th day of November 1968. H.D. DeBeck, Comptroller of Water Sights DEPARTMENT OF LANDS, FORESTS AND WATER RESOURCES WATER RESOURCES SERVICE . WATER RIGHTS BRANCH Victoria, B.C. Being satisfied that no person's rights w i l l be injuriously affected I hereby amend Clause (i) of Conditional Water Licence 27722, Peace River and i t s tributaries, to read as follows: (i) The works authorized to be constructed are a dam and auxiliary works, which w i l l store water to a pool elevation not to exceed 2,205 feet. 30 day of March, 1972 H.D, DeBeck, Comptroller of Water Rights 137 APPENDIX B The following correspondence between the Alberta and British Columbia governments concerning the W.A.C. Bennett Dam reveals the lack of communication between the two governments during construction of the dam. The l i s t of correspondence was compiled by R. Reirson, then acting Minister of Agriculture i n Alberta and sent to Ray Williston, Minister of Lands, Forests and Water Resources in British Columbia, on March 11, 1970. The water licenses which permitted construction of the dam were issued in December 1962. A l l formal communication between the two govern-ments was after that date. August 22, 1961. R. Perrault, B.C. Liberal M.L.A. to R.E. Bailey, Chief,Engineer, Water Resources Branch, Alberta. Perrault asks about a statement made by Mr. Hunter, General Manager of Northern Transportation, who stated that the Peace project might seriously lower the level of Lake Athabasca and the Slave Lakes. August 24, 1961. F.L. Grindley, Director of Water Resources, Alberta to R. Perrault. Grindley replied that the Peace project would have a beneficial effect for i t would absorb the flood peaks and provide an even flow of 40,000 cfs downstream which might make a power site in Alberta feasible, He did not want to comment on possible lower 138 lake levels for i t was a federal matter and they were studying that . possib i l i t y . January 9, 1963. Harry Strom, Minister of Agriculture, Alberta to F.L. Grindley, Director of Water Resources, Alberta. Strom expresses concern about the recent issue of the water license for the Peace project and refers to a meeting held with members of Peace River Power Development on July 9, 1959. He writes, "I feel certain that the Town of Peace River w i l l be in trouble with their intake i f a flow of 1,000 cfs i s reached. We a l l agreed on a minimum flow of 6,000 cfs throughout the year. I am also certain our ferry crossing in Alberta w i l l be i n d i f f i c u l t y i f low flows were less than 6,000 cfs. Sewage dilution below Peace River town is.also important". January 11, 1963. Harry Strom, Minister of Agriculture, Alberta, to R. Williston, Minister of Lands and Forests, B.C. Strom refers to the 1,000 cfs permitted i n the water license and comments that Peace River Power Development had agreed to a minimum flow of 6,000 cfs, an agreement Alberta would l i k e to see upheld. January 22, 1963. R. Williston to Harry Strom. Williston replies that "providing for a flow of 1,000 cfs as a minimum release from the dam at a l l times is to correct a pro-blem peculiar to B.C. alone and necessary to maintain some water flow 139 at the Village of Hudson Hope. This situation more than l i k e l y would, be necessary between the period of A p r i l 1 to September 15 when flows from tributaries downstream from Hudson Hope would be high but there would be l i t t l e or no inflow in the short stretch between the dam and the village". He concluded that " i t would seem a flow of 10,000 cfs would be maintained at Peace River, Alberta". March 26, 1963. R. Williston to Harry Strom. Williston refers to a let t e r dated March 18, 1963, and . comments "with respect to your remarks concerning promises by the Peace River Power Development Co., i t i s f i r s t recorded that this government was not associated with these presentations and does not feel bound by pronouncement of i t s o f f i c i a l s . However, i t could be noted that only once in the period of record has the flow at Peace River, Alberta been as low as 6,350 cfs which was during March 1919. Extremely low flows are l i k e l y the consequence of ice jams acting as temporary dams and would not be corrected by increased flows". Ap r i l 22, 1963. Harry Strom to R. Williston Strom says he is not worried about midwinter flows but about f a l l discharges. He writes that "according to a study several periods in the past when the inflow between the dam site and Peace River Town was so low that holding back a l l but 10,000 cfs (sic-1,000?) at Hudson Hope or at Taylor as per "Exhibit B" (of the water license) would have presented the town with serious d i f f i c u l t i e s " . 140 May 27, 1963. R. Williston to Harry Strom. Williston writes that he i s aware that there might be a problem in the f a l l but he expects the dam to be in operation by then so there w i l l not be a problem in 1968. He also comments that " i t appears that the dam could theoretically be operated in such a manner as to produce low water at the town's intake, but there, i s no reason why this should occur i n the normal operation of the dam. It is the concern of the government and B.C. Hydro that this does not occur". November 12, 1963. J.L. Reid, Secretary, Alberta Power Commission, Alberta to A. Paget, Water Comptroller, B.C. Reid asks for information on the diversion and f i l l i n g schedule for the dam so that he might know how i t might affect Peace River, Alberta. November 19, 1963, A. Paget to J.L. Reid. Paget gives information on the dam and comments that he does not see any problem for downstream users because there should be enough storage for the dam's operation before the f a l l of 1968. May 7, 1964, J.P. Ottersen, Project Manager, B.C. Hydro to J.L. Reid. Welcomes Alberta Power Commission for a tour of the Peace project on May 12. • '.May 14, 1964, J.L, Reid to A. Paget. Reid apologizes for the cancelled trip to the Peace, 141 November 15, 1968, H.D. DeBeck, Water Comptroller, B.C. to R.E. Bailey. DeBeck comments that amendments to the water license w i l l have l i t t l e effect downstream. Apri l 11, 1969, J.L. Reid to H.K. Pratt, B.C. Hydro. Reid refers to a letter dated A p r i l 9, 1969, that outlines the quarterly flow estimates and comments that Alberta has nothing to be concerned about. October 10, 1969. H.D. DeBeck to R.E. Bailey. Agrees to send to Alberta weekly flow estimates, 

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