UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Li Li-San and the second left deviation Zonia , Margaret Elizabeth 1972

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0>  LI LI-SAN AND THE SECOND LEFT DEVIATION by Margaret Elizabeth Zonia B.A. Washington University,  1971  A thesis submitted i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements f o r the degree of Master of Arts  i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science  W& accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia July, 1972  In p r e s e n t i n g an  advanced degree at  the I  this thesis  Library  in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f  the U n i v e r s i t y  of  British  s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e  for  the  requirements  Columbia, I agree r e f e r e n c e and  f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f  f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may  the Head o f my  by  his  of  t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not  written  representatives.  be g r a n t e d by  It i s understood that  permission.  Depa rtment The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Columbia  be  that  study.  this  thesis  Department  copying or  for  or  publication  allowed without  my  LI LI-SAN AND  THE SECOND LEFT DEVIATION by  Margaret Elizabeth Zonia  ABSTRACT:  The controversy surrounding  the period 1928-1930,  the period of L i Li-san's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, i s the central topic of t h i s paper.  The controversy i t -  s e l f i s over what role the Comintern played i n the formation what is commonly referred to as the " L i i L i - s a n l i n e . "  of  The con-  clusions drawn i n t h i s paper show that, though the Comintern did play a small part i n the formation of L i ' 3 p o l i c y , that, nevertheless, his l i n e was of his own making. attempt at urban insurrection i n 1930  was  The  disastrous  of L i ' s own  doing: he  had been receiving signals f o r some time that his p o l i c i e s were contradictory to those of the Comintern. In order to give the reader a sense of how  t h i s leader-  ship controversy and the p o l i c y differences arose, there i s also a presentation of some of the background information  regarding  the labor movement and the CCP's role i n i t , and L i Li-san hims e l f - his part i n the labor movement and his own personality.  iii.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Page Introduction  1  Chinese Labor  6  Labor Strikes  12  L i Li-san  26  Tho L i Li-san Line  32  Conclusions  65  Bibliography  69  1  Introduction Most h i s t o r i c a l - p o l i t i c a l analyses of the r i s e and development of the Chinese Communist Party seem to center around the man and the strategy that led the Party to v i c t o r y .  That i s ,  they concentrate on Mao Tse-tung, h i s " r u r a l strategy", and his adaptation of Marx-Leninism to the Chinese s i t u a t i o n .  However,  It seems to go without saying that a good deal took place before Mao ascended to his p o s i t i o n of Party Chairman.  There were other  leaders and other strategies tested before Mao's p o l i c i e s were adopted, and yet these leaders and p o l i c i e s seem to be passed over i n many books, or covered with a few b r i e f chapters. Perhaps the most interesting of those who preceded Mao, and about whom l i t t l e i s written, i s L i Li-san.  L i led the last  desperate attempt to regain Party control of the urban areas. It is with the b e l i e f that the period of the 1920's, the Communist Party's role i n China's c i t i e s and i n the labor movement, and e s p e c i a l l y the efforts made during L i ' s period of leadership to bring the Party back to the c i t i e s are important elements i n the development of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that t h i s paper is being written. As most of the available information on him shows, L i Li-san was a most Interesting person.  Quite unlike the s e l f l e s s  image one gets of many of the leading figures i n the CCP, L i seems to have f i e r c e l y maintained his own Identity as something apart from the Party and i t s ideology.  L i ' s period of leadership (1928-  1930) Is surrounded by a good deal of controversy as to whether  2 or not he was  the "scapegoat" of the Comintern i n the development  of the p o l i c y which has become known as the " L i Li-san l i n e . " The main purpose of t h i s paper i s t o advance another interpretation of the events surrounding the period of L i Li-san's leadership of the  CCP.  The relationship between Comintern (CI) p o l i c y and policy formulated  by L i Li-san w i l l be examined.  to be some discrepancy  among authors who  as to whether or not L i was  the  There appears  deal with this period  following Comintern d i r e c t i v e s .  is the basis of the above-mentioned controversy.  This  Various Western  authors seem to f e e l great sympathy f o r L i , whom they f e e l was  mis-  directed and confused by the d i r e c t i v e s issued by the Comintern which, they say, were ambiguous.  And yet, there seems to be some  difference of opinion as to whether or not these d i r e c t i v e s were indeed ambiguous.  Por Richard Thornton and Hsiao Tso-liang, on  the other hand, there seems to be no question: were not ambiguous; L i ' s l i n e was  of his own  the d i r e c t i v e s  making and was  de-  cidedly not the same as the p o l i c y set down f o r China by the Comintern. Events preceding munist Party i n 1928  —  the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Com-  the Congress from which L i emerged as a  Politburo member -- w i l l be discussed only i n so f a r as they are relevant to the discussion of Li's leadership.  Some background  information as to the condition of the worker's movement i t s e l f , I f e e l , i s also relevant.  Thus, the May 30th Movement and  the  s i t u a t i o n that sparked i t w i l l be touched on, e s p e c i a l l y since L i Li-san played a part i n organizing the workers i n Shanghai i n  3  the i n i t i a l s t r i k e s .  Labor strikes dating before the Third Armed  Insurrection i n Shanghai and the coup of A p r i l 12, 1927,  w i l l be  discussed because they are pertinent to the change of party leadership at the Sixth Congress and germane to the condition of the Chinese Revolution at the time L i began his period of leadership. Some biographical information on L i Li-san w i l l be included, gathered primarily from Donald K l e i n and Anne Clark's  ..  1  Biographic  Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965  L i Ang's Hung-se IWu-t'al.  , and  It w i l l be necessary to present some  of this information on his background and a l i t t l e on his character  (through comments made by various people who worked with him  and knew him)  i n order to b u i l d as complete a case as possible  for my explanation of events during his period of leadership. ®hat i s important to bear i n mind when discussing the period of L i Li-san leadership i s that the objective s i t u a t i o n for the Chinese Communist Party had changed considerably by this time.  No longer part of the United Front, they were forced to  be an underground organization.  They had suffered t e r r i f i c losses  during the White Terror i n 192?.  Where there had been a base and  a p o s s i b i l i t y f o r real mass mobilization i n the c i t i e s , the executions and the blood bath of the TOiite Terror had done irreparable damage, not only i n terms of loss of membership, but also i n terms of the party's "image", especially to the workers. 1. 2.  Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965 (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). L i Ang, Hung-se Wu-t'ai (Chungking: Min-chung Shu Yin-hang, s  19/^2).  k L i was firmly committed to the workers' movement and to the party's connection with the trade union movement.  This was  the facet of organizational work with which he himself was most familiar.  His base was the c i t y , not the countryside.  And the  c i t y was where he staked his whole p o l i t i c a l future: to him the p r o l e t a r i a t was the backbone of the revolution. The fact that a f t e r 1927, the CCP's coirtrol of the labor movement had been almost completely destroyed c o n f l i c t e d with L i ' s plans. 1928  Especially a f t e r the l e g i s l a t i o n passed i n  by the Kuomintang (KMT), we see the s h i f t of the trade  unions and workers to compliance with the law and a l l i a n c e with the Kuomintang.  A l l unions not registered with the KMT were i l -  3  legal and subject to police action. The period of L i Li-san leadership i s referred to as  k the "Second Left Deviation" by the Chinese Communists.  It was  a period during which great damage was done to the Party organization.  The Russian, the Chinese and the Western authors a l l  have t h e i r own  interpretations of where the blame l i e s f o r the  mistakes made during this period.  My own interpretation i s  somewhat an amalgam of a l l three.  That i s , I f e e l that much of  what happened was the doing of L i Li-san himself.  I do not f e e l  that he was e n t i r e l y deceived and "used" by the Comintern.  How-  ever, I do believe the Comintern i t s e l f had not completely surrendered i t s hopes f o r revolution i n China's c i t i e s , as can be 3. 1|.  For .a copy of these laws, see Fang Fu-an, Chinese Labor (London: P.S, King and Son, Ltd., 1931), pp. 1 6 1 - 1 8 5 . Chen Po-ta, Notes on Ten Years of C i v i l War (1927-1936) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1951+), p. 23.  shown by the existence of the "Third Left Deviation" under Wang Ming and the Twenty-Eight Returned Students, prote'ges of Pavel Mif, Stalin's China expert.  This continuity w i l l also be d i s -  cussed, and the differences between the two leadership periods w i l l be pointed out.  6 Chinese Labor China, i n the early years of the 2 0th undergoing a period of turbulent change.  century, was  She? was evolving from  a semi-feudal, p r e - i n d u s t r i a l society to a modern, i n d u s t r i a l one.  This condition of the society as a whSle was  paralleled  by, i f not centered around, a s i m i l a r t r a n s i t i o n i n the Chinese labor force.  The changes within this labor force, the Chinese  urban working class, were an important element the  i n the course of  transformation of China. The struggle to gain leadership In the national revol-  ution included the struggle f o r hegemony In the trade union movement.  This was not simply a matter of the Kuomintang vs. the  Chinese Communist Party, but also Included the anarchists, the C h r i s t i a n reformers, Individual employers and t r a d i t i o n a l mutual 6 benefit and guild associations as well.  The workers  1  movement  was not uniformly developed i n a l l the major i n d u s t r i a l c i t i e s , nor was i t under u n i f i e d leadership during i t s early years of development. In comparison to the West, I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n came late to China.  In the late l800's, the foreigners began setting up  t h e i r industries i n China.  Chinese themselves became interested  i n establishing their own factories towards the end of the  19th  century. 5.  6.  Jean Chesneaux, "The Chinese Labor Force i n the F i r s t Part of the Twentieth Century, " i n The Economic Development of China and Japan, ed. by CD..Cowan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, P. i l l . Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 2 7 (Stanford, C a l i f . : Stanford University Press, 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. ^03-1+07. l A  China's industries were predominantly owned by the foreign c a p i t a l i s t s throughout the years which this paper w i l l cover.  The advantages of cheap labor and v i r t u a l l y no taxes  brought these entrepreneurs to China with the hope, and the l i k e l y p o s s i b i l i t y , that t h e i r investments would bring them more than just a "good" return. The Chinese Treaty Ports were crowded with the foreign i n d u s t r i a l and trading concerns.  Shanghai, f o r example, was  e n t i r e l y a foreign creation, and, by the 1920's was the largest i n d u s t r i a l c i t y i n China.  It was,  indeed, the most Westernized  c i t y i n the nation. As one author described the s i t u a t i o n i n 1925, "You cannot l i v e i n Shanghai f o r twenty-four hours without knowing that i n this c i t y of China, the Chinese are l a s t . 7  Every-  where the foreigner comes f i r s t . " And the foreigner came f i r s t especially with regard to industry.  The factories i n Shanghai were predominantly B r i t i s h  and Japanese owned, and the working conditions i n them c a l l to mind the s i t u a t i o n i n the West during the Industrial Revolution. Men,  women and children worked i n t e r r i b l e conditions f o r twelve,  fourteen and sixteen hours a day. cents a day.  Wages could be as low as eight  Child labor was a common phenomenon, many of these  children working as apprentices for eighteen to twenty hours a  8 day in return f o r a bowl of r i c e and a board to sleep on. 7. 8.  Paul Blanchard, "Great Shanghai Strike," World Tomorrow, August, 1925, p. 2lj.7. Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (2nd ed. Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a : Stanford University Press, I961),  pp. 6ij.-65.  8  In s p i t e many r e a s o n s  o f the poor working c o n d i t i o n s ,  why p e o p l e  jobs.  I n many p a r t s  living  i n the  to the c i t i e s chance  were a t t r a c t e d  countryside  dream was  side, and  were s t i l l  there  But,  land.  only  and r e s o u r c e s Little  of the  many C h i n e s e  i n the  the  urban in  the  the dear-  country-  glamorous  factories.  L i f e was much h a r d e r  Rather than being  life,  was  In the  the c i t y appeared  able  merely to s t a y  But  i n the  to enjoy  most f o u n d i t r e q u i r e d a l l 10  few cities  some  of  their  alive.  p u r p o s e w o u l d be s e r v e d  i n going  i n t o the  details  t h e a b o m i n a b l e w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s t o be f o u n d i n S h a n g h a i and other large  i n d u s t r i a l centers  The p i c t u r e p r e s e n t e d most d i s t u r b i n g . there  For years,  that  literature,  period.  however,  t h e s i t u a t i o n was t o l e r a t e d ; i n the m a t t e r .  one c o u l d be r e l a t i v e l y c o n t e n t .  number o f w o r k e r s was unaware  of China during t h i s  by the a v a i l a b l e  c o u l d be l i t t l e c h o i c e  employment,  9, 10.  there  t h e m , and t o many, 9  cities,  f o u n d t h e i r dreams f u l f i l l e d .  of c i t y  members  The dream o f a j o b and money was  i n the  t h a n most h a d i m a g i n e d .  seek  Their family connections  important to  i n comparison.  the pleasures  cities,  even so,  were  t o o many p e o p l e  t o some day r e t u r n t o t h e v i l l a g e .  one t o be f i l l e d  energy  In the  was f a m i n e and d r o u g h t ;  exciting  to  - f a m i l i e s h a d t o s e n d some  t o seek employment.  w o r k e r s were t i e d t o t h e  est  the c i t i e s  o f C h i n a , t h e r e were j u s t  t o e a r n some money.  countryside  to  there  s m a l l , and the workers  t h e i r conditions were atrocious  As l o n g as And as  is indeed,  one h a d  l o n g as  themselves  the  remained  and r i g h t f u l l y  needed  H a r o l d I s a a c s , Tragedy o f the Chinese R e v o l u t i o n , p . 3 3 . H . G . H . Woodhead, e d . , The C h i n a Y e a r b o o k , 1920 (Shanghai: The N o r t h - C h i n a D a i l y News and" H e r a l d , L t d . , 1 9 2 8 ) , p . 9 6 5 .  .9 to be improved,  r e b e l l i n g would have accomplished  little.  But, i t did not take the workers too long to realize that, unless they became organized, conditions would never change. As t h e i r numbers swelled, they came to know that docile to t h e i r s i t u a t i o n was not the only answer. strikes p r i o r to the May Lyth Movement i n 1919*  submission  There were some small However, i t was  with the May i|.th events that the workers' p o l i t i c a l strikes began to occur. "The year 1919 saw the beginning of a workers' strike movement which assumed wider and wider dimensions as time went on. Por example, i n 1918, the number of workers who took part i n strikes was 6,500; but i n 1919 the number grew to 91,500 (according to incomplete figures) and in 1921 i t had r i s e n to 108,000. In Shanghai, Peking, and other towns, the strikes mainly affected Japanese enterprises. The workers obtained p a r t i a l s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e i r demands. The f i r s t labor organizations were formed. In 1920 the trade unions of Shanghai celebrated for the f i r s t time i n China the f i r s t of May."  11  The trade union movement grew as v i c t o r i e s were won by various existing unions.  The most heroic victory was won by the  Hong Kong - Canton Seamen's Union in t h e i r s t r i k e and boycott against the B r i t i s h i n 1922.  They secured recognition of t h e i r  union and sizable wage increases.  As a result of the success of  various strikes, and the Influx of workers into the trade unions, the f i r s t national labor conference was in Canton.  convened i n May,  1922,  It was led by the Seamen's Union and was attended  by delegates of 230,000 union members.  "Under the direct pressure  of this strong new group, Sun Yat-sen's Kwangtung government revised the penal code to legalize union organization and the path 11.  Pavel,Mif, Heroic China, Fifteen Years of the Communist Party of China (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937) p. 1I4..  was cleared f o r further growth."  10  12  In the early years of the 1920's, progress was being made i n the workers' movement. l e g a l recognition.  Unions themselves had been given  Strikes were become an e f f e c t i v e means f o r  obtaining higher wages and better working conditions.  A feeling  13 of s o l i d a r i t y was developing  i n the workers' movement as a whole.  There was s t i l l repression and conditions were certainly not vastly  improved, but the f i r s t steps had been taken -- and had been  taken boldly. One important d i s t i n c t i o n that i s made i n the l i t e r a t u r e is the difference between p o l i t i c a l and economic s t r i k e s .  Working  conditions themselves were enough of a reason to s t r i k e , and wages, etc.,  often formed the only basis f o r a strike action.  But, a  number of strikes were begun f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons, e.g. f o r purposes of nationalism, or anti-imperialism.  L i n Tung-hai provides  a comprehensive d e f i n i t i o n of the two types of s t r i k e s : Economic: " i . increase of wages to meet the rise i n the cost of l i v i n g , i i . shorter hours, i i i . resting days and holidays with pay, i v . special p r i v i l e g e s f o r women workers during confinement, v. compensation for accident, sickness and death, v i . pay during period of s t r i k e , v i i . no a r b i t r a r y dismissals, v i i i . reinstatement of workers a r b i t a r i l y discharged, Ix. equal pay f o r equal work Irrespective of sex, x. seniority of workers to be f i n a n c i a l l y recognized. P o l i t i c a l : i . p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the National Revolution against foreign imperialism and dome s t i c militarism, i i . recognition of the right of association, of assembly, the freedom of speech, of the press, and the right to s t r i k e , i i i . noninterference with the workers' rights on the part of management, i v . p a t r i o t i c demonstrations, parades and movements. lij. 12. 13. -ll)..  Harold Isaacs, Tragedy of Chinese Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor L i n Tung-hai, The Labour Movement China (Shanghai: China United  Revolution, p. 65 Movement..., pp. 156-169. and Labour L e g i s l a t i o n i n Press, 193J), p. 6 5 .  11  It i s true that an economic strike may be made p o l i t i c a l , and visa versa.  However, i n so f a r as the CCP was involved i n  strike actions, Comintern approval c a l l i n g of p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s .  leaned more heavily toward the  The " p o l i t i c a l content" or the  p o l i t i c a l slogans (e.g. "Oppose the Warlords," foreign i m p e r i a l i s t s , " observers.  "Get r i d of the  etc.) were what impressed the Soviet  Strikes c a l l e d f o r purely economic reasons, whose  only demands were f o r higher wages and better working conditions, and whose/slogans were not p o l i t i c a l were not the kind the CCP was expected to lead.  This difference w i l l become Important when  examining the period of L i Li-san's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and i n looking at the changes i n Comintern directives, i n Comintern p o l i c y .  12 Labor  Strikes In t h i s s e c t i o n ,  it  t h e May 30th Movement a n d t h e s t r i k e s  t o u c h e d o f f , a n d t h e " T h r e e Armed W o r k e r s '  -£Zt ^  S h a n g h a i " ( > ; ^ > i~ One p u r p o s e  of this  )  discussion i s t o give  s t a t e o f t h e w o r k e r s ' movement  Insurrections i n will  be d i s c u s s e d .  an i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e  and t h e OOP's r o l e  i n i t prior to  t h e p e r i o d when L i L i - s a n was l e a d e r o f t h e p a r t y . purpose movement  the reader an idea of L i ' s role  i n t h e mid-1920's,  1928-1930.  from ing  i s to give  f a r as t h e y  be n e c e s s a r i l y  are supplementary  By 1925,  i n the workers'  a r o l e t h a t h e l p e d shape h i s a c t i o n s  It i s important to note,  descriptions w i l l  The o t h e r  however,  that  the f o l l o w -  b r i e f and Incomplete,  to the c e n t r a l core  there had occurred v a r i o u s  i n so  of the paper.  p o l i t i c a l changes  i n t h e n o r t h o f C h i n a w h i c h seemed t o s t i m u l a t e t h e g r o w t h a n d development  o f the workers'  movement.  The w a r l o r d s \fu P ' e i - f u , had,  by t h i s  time,  s p l i t w i t h Sun Y a t - s e n .  C h ' i - j u i was c o m p a r a t i v e l y ments  Chang T s o - l i n a n d Tuan  ineffective  t h a t h a d begun t o s p r i n g u p .  Ch'i-jui  The g o v e r n m e n t  i n supressing  o f Tuan  t h e mass  This ineffectiveness  move-  made i t  r e l a t i v e l y e a s y t o r e v i v e t h e s t r i k e movement a n d t o resume t h e activities  o f the workers'  strengthened time,  by Sun Y a t - s e n ' s  the a c t i v i t i e s  creased.  organizations.  15  The K u o m i n t a n g was  v i s i t t o P e k i n g a n d , a t t h e same  o f t h e CCP i n N o r t h a n d C e n t r a l C h i n a i n -  The s i t u a t i o n f o r t h e Communists h a d i m p r o v e d , a n d was c o n t i n u i n g t o do s o .  15.  B u t , w i t h the death o f Sun Y a t - s e n  P a v e l M i f , H e r o i c C h i n a . . . , p . 26.  i n March  13 1925, the s i t u a t i o n f o r the CCP a l t e r e d .  As Chang Kuo-t'ao  described i t : The CCP, while l a r g e r than before, nevertheless remained but a small sparrow dwarfed by the broad masses of the country. But the body of this small sparrow was replete with a f u l l complement of organs, and i t s revolutionary s p i r i t was mightily s t i r r e d . While Sun Yat-sen s t i l l lived, the CCP leaders always looked upon him as t h e i r senior and deferred to him. Now that Dr. Sun was dead, however, things were d i f f e r e n t . KMT r i g h t i s t s had become active ... The CC of the CCP now f e l t that i t must take the i n i t i a t i v e i n establishing a united front to carry out the revolution. 16 Communist Party a c t i v i t y within the workers' movement was i n creasing e s p e c i a l l y . In January, 1925, the Fourth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was convened.  Among the topics discussed was  the mass of work of the party.  Resolutions passed included  those pertaining to the trade union movement, work among youth, the peasant movement, work among women, e t c . There was also a discussion of what strategy to adopt i n order to combine the fight against Imperialism with the day-to-day struggles and immediate demands of the workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. The movement that had begun i n the f a l l of the preceding year,  17 the "movement f o r the restoration of the trade unions," was to continue. The membership of the party at this time t o t a l l e d  1,000.  The Young Communists had 9,000 members, 30$ of whom  we re wo rke rs .  18  In Shanghai, the seat of the Chinese Communist Party, party p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the workers' movement was e s p e c i a l l y notable. 16.  Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese Communist Pa>rty, 19211927. (Wichita7~Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1971),  p. lf.10.  17. 18.  Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement ... , p. 253. Pavel Mif, Heroic China ... , p. 2L\~.  Ik The Labor Movement Committee,  f o l l o w i n g the F o u r t h Party  was headed by Chang K u o - t ' a o .  Congress,  Among others a l s o working i n t h i s  branch of the p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n were L i u S h a o - c h ' i (Chang's tant),  and L i L i - s a n  The experiences  assis-  (engaged i n l e a d i n g the Shanghai trade u n i o n s ) .  L i had while f i l l i n g  this position (especially  with  regard to h i s r o l e i n the May 3 0 t h Movement) had a great impact on him and on h i s a c t i o n s as p a r t y l e a d e r a few years  later.  The May 3 0 t h Movement i t s e l f was an important event i n which the Chinese Communist Party was deeply  involved.  The a n t i -  i m p e r i a l i s t element of t h e i r p o l i c y was emphasized, while  class  20 struggle  was played down.  The s t r i k e s  movement were s i m i l a r to others  i n 1925,  K  associated with t h i s "...  h e l d mainly f o r  p o l i t i c a l ends, a l t h o u g h at the same time the workers employed by f o r e i g n firms t r i e d t o o b t a i n a s u b s t a n t i a l  improvement i n  21 t h e i r c o n d i t i o n s of employment." On May 1|,  1925,  there was a s t r i k e at the Nagai Wata  Kaisha Company at the number e i g h t m i l l .  The s t r i k e was  a protest  a sympathetic  f o r h i g h e r wages.  d e c l a r e d at f i v e  On May l l j t h ,  o t h e r Japanese m i l l s .  basically s t r i k e was  When the owners of the  c l o s e d i t down, the workers went t o t hem f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n . Japanese f i r e d  >  Cheng-hung. 19. 20. 21. 22.  22  mill The  on the crowd and the s t r i k e gained a martyr, Ku  Chang K u o - t ' a o , Rise o f the CCP . . . , p . J4.09. The g e n e r a l - p o l i c y was formed under the two slogans of " a n t i i m p e r i a l i s m " and " a n t i - f e u d a i - m i l i t a r i s m . " Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement . . . , p p . 2 7 ^ - 2 7 5 . See Robert Donald f/ard, May 3 0 t h Incident ln~S"h*anghal: Su-sa S h i h - C h i e n (M.A. T h e s i s , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971) f o r a complete account.  19  15 A demonstration of workers and students was held to protest the b r u t a l i t y of the foremen i n the Japanese m i l l s i n Shanghai,  and t o protest the murder of Ku Cheng-hung.  students and workers were arrested.  Several  Other demonstrators marched  to the police station on Nanking Road where they were being held to demand t h e i r release.  A B r i t i s h o f f i c e r panicked and ordered  the men to f i r e on the crowd, with the r e s u l t being that twelve students were k i l l e d , many wounded and many imprisoned. "After the Nanking Road Massacre, masses of the people  23 in Shanghai rose up i n opposition."  Shanghai was gradually  shut down, and the strike spread to many other c i t i e s i n the country.  The strikes which had begun i n Shanghai spread to  other c i t i e s .  One-hundred and t h i r t y - f i v e strikes resulted, from  the events of May 30th i n Shanghai "... involving nearly 1+0,000 workers from Canton and Hongkong i n the south to Peking i n the north." The Chinese Communist Party was very active i n these events.  In Shanghai,  i t "... led a l l classes of people i n the  c i t y to form a united battle l i n e , the workers went on sstrike, the students 'struck' their classes, the merchants closed down  25 the c i t y ; a l l the people (united) to attack imperialism." By May 31, the Shanghai General Labor Union (  il Jfj ^ J - -  )  w  which L i Li-san was involved.  a  s  formed, an organization with The f i r s t order of the union was  to c a l l f o r a general strike by June 1st. By June 5th, the union 23. San-shih nien l a i te Shang-haj kung-yun (The Shanghai Labor Movement Thirty Years Ago) (Shanghai: Lao-tung cb'u pan-she T7i5l), P. b. 2k. Harold Isaacs, Tragedy of Chinese Revolution, p. 70 25. San-shlh nien l a i ..... , p . ^ T  16 was leading more than one-hundred and seventy organizations, comp r i s i n g a membership of 200,000 workers, on s t r i k e .  The B r i t i s h  continued to use force to try to put down the s t r i k e s .  Even so  On June 12, over h a l f a m i l l i o n workers were on s t r i k e . The Chinese merchants joined the p o l i t i c a l strike of the workers and by June 1 a l l shops were closed. On June 3 a l l the Chinese banks ceased operations. The business l i f e of the c i t y came to a s t a n d s t i l l . "  26  The Nanking Road incident gradually set o f f strikes and protests i n many parts of China. ialism,"  The slogans were "Oppose Imper-  "Oppose the Unequal Treaties,"  "Get r i d of the foreign  27 troops," e t c . The s t r i k e I t s e l f continued in Shanghai u n t i l June 25, when the Chinese merchants opened t h e i r shops, ending the cooperation of the petty bourgeoisie with the p r o l e t a r i a t .  By that  time, some of the provisions f o r settlement of the strike had been generally agreed to by the Municipal Council, but, f o r the most part, the concessions were minor.  By the end of July, through  a series of rather cleger moves on the part of the Municipal Council, the workers became cut o f f from t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a l l i e s (e.g. the bourgeoisie and the students). (led  The General Labor Union  by the CCP) was attacked by the Federation of Labor Organiz-  ations for using the s t r i k e for i t s own p o l i t i c a l ends. e r a l Labor Union, r e a l i z i n g that i t s base of support  The Gen-  could dwindle  r t o nothing i f i t did not at t h i s time seek some kind of compromise settlement, did just that. i t s proposals public.  In the f i r s t days of August, i t made  The proposals, Interestingly enough, were  economic and not p o l i t i c a l i n nature. 26. 27.  LI Li-san was among the  Pavel Mif, Heroic China ... , p. 31 (emphasis added). San-shih nien l a i ... , p.~7  17 representatives of the General Labor Union who met with the Jap-  28  anese consul general to s e t t l e the s t r i k e . There are several points regarding the May 30th Movement that should be kept i n mind as relevant to the rest of the paper. The f i r s t i s that i t was probably the f i r s t t r u l y successf u l p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e to reach nation-wide proportions.  The May  30th Movement was, at the outset, a primarily a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t strike, aimed at and effecting mostly Japanese and B r i t i s h factories, especially i n Shanghai.  It cut across the class l i n e s ,  uniting Chinese bourgeois, petty bourgeois, students and workers against the "foreigners." Second, the CCP played an important role, through the General Labor Union, i n prolonging the s t r i k e . "Right from the 3 t a r t , CCP members i n Shanghai through t h e i r control of the labor unions and the newly established General Labor Union were able to control an important part of the strike movement. In fact, i t was from the Communists that major strategy came, although students and workers were l e f t with the task of carrying out that p o l i c y . Communists such as Liu Hua, L i Li©san, and Liu Shao-ch'i used the general strike to spread t h e i r complaints and ideology amongst various groups. More and more workers began to j o i n the CCP so that by the end of 1925, membership had jumped .... , and by the end of the summer of 192$, the General Labor Union under L i Li-san had swallowed up the Federation of Labor Unions and cont r o l l e d 220,000 workers." 29 L i Li-san was chairman of the General Labor Union almost from i t s beginning.  He was one of the chief spokesmen f o r the workers i n  the  L i gave the CCP i t s "... f i r s t r e a l taste of leading  party.  a workers' struggle."  28.  29. 30.  30  Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement ... , pp. 262-289. Robert Donald Wa7d7~1^3t)m^ncTae^t~TTT7""pT~232. Conrad Brandt, S t a l l n ^ ' m i ^ e ^ n ^ ^ m T - 1 9 2 k - 1 9 2 7 (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. $2 cited i n Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary ... , v o l . 1, p. 513.  18 Li's  experiences  The May  30th  i n t h e May  30th  Movement l e f t  e v e n t s seem t o h a v e h a d d i r e c t b e a r i n g on a c t i o n s  he w o u l d t a k e v l a t e r  as p a r t y l e a d e r .  strike  o r any m a j o r c i t y ,  i n Shanghai,  anti-imperialist  response  The i d e a t h a t  seems t o have  later.  In h i s  o f t h e Shanghai t r a d e unions and chairman  of the General Labor Union, m a k i n g h i s own d e c i s i o n s  L i had a great d e a l of l a t i t u d e i n  about  the d e s i r e d course  of a c t i o n ,  without c o n s u l t a t i o n conducted through p a r t y channels. t o be a " p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m " that  would c o n t r i b u t e The n e x t  referred  (  They t o o k p l a c e war.  1926-1927  expanded,  31.  32.  L i would c o n t i n u e  to h i s ultimate  labor strikes  to c o l l e c t i v e l y  i n Shanghai"  A  been  t o s e t o f f i n h i s own a t t e m p t  s t i m u l a t i n g urban i n s u r r e c t i o n f i v e years  p o s i t i o n as a l e a d e r  a political  c o u l d evoke: a s i m i l a r  i n other c i t i e s  what L i i m a g i n e d he w o u l d be a b l e at  t h e i r impression.  ~  t o r e l y on - - one  failure.  t o be c o n s i d e r e d a r e g e n e r a l l y  as t h e " T h r e e Armed W o r k e r s '  >  i n the years  I t was  Uprisings  *JL*£{ ^ 1926-1927,  )•^ the f i r s t year o f  was a l s o a p e r i o d d u r i n g w h i c h B o l s h e v i k  a n d a t i m e when p o l i t i c a l  strikes  predominated.  civil Influence  32  Chinese  S e v e r a l C h i n e s e l a n g u a g e s o u r c e s t h a t a r e r e l i e d on h e a v i l y for the i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h i s s e c t i o n are S a n - s h i h n i e n l a i t e S h a n g - h a i kung y u n (The S h a n g h a i L a b o r Movement T h i r t y Y e a r s A g o ) ; W e i F a n g - a i , gTbang-bai K u n g - j e n s a n t z ' u w u - c h u a n g c h ' i - i T^he T h r e e Armed W o r k e r s ' I n s u r r e c t i o n s I n S h a n g h a i ) ( P e k i n g : C h ' i n g - n i e n c h ' u p a n s E e , 1951); L i u C h a n g sheng and o t h e r s , Chung-kuo k u n g - c h ' a n - t a n g y u Shanghai kung-jen (The CCT a n d t h e S h a n g h a i W o r k e r s ) ( S h a n g h a i : L a o - t u n g c h ' u p a n s h e , 1951). W e i L i n , C h i n e s e L a b o r D i s p u t e s S i n c e 1919 ( N a n k i n g : M e i C h i P r e s s , 1932), p . 00.  19 workers,  w i t h the h e l p o f  the Chinese  Communist P a r t y ,  were  begin-  33 n i n g to develop  a real class  consciousness.  M i e n t h e N o r t h e r n E x p e d i t i o n was to  r o u t w a r l o r d c o n t r o l o f C h i n a , a new s u r g e  occurred. its  The l a b o r movement  support  shek,  —  of  i n an  labor  was  to cost  t h e CCP a n d t h e  t h e y were h e l p i n g t h e  lending  leadership of Chiang K a i -  who was now t h e h e a d o f t h e army a n d t h e p a r t y . t h e KMT made s e v e r a l  attempt  strikes  t h r o u g h the u n i o n s —  t o t h e KMT a r m y , u n d e r t h e  cooperation, was  launched,  victories.  l a b o r movement  W i t h CCP  But t h i s  dearly.  cooperation  The  victories  N a t i o n a l i s t s to w i n would u l t i m a t e l y  damaging t o t h e m s e l v e s ,  be  because of t h e i r l a c k of r e s i s t a n c e  to  3^ the c r i t i c i s m s of the r i g h t - w i n g . left-wing  a n d t h e CCP d i d do t h e m s e l v e s  i n g at the  becomes a p p a r e n t  T h r e e Armed W o r k e r s ' U p r i s i n g s I n The f i r s t  I t was a n a t t e m p t  (as  the  other  o f the  in  and t o p r e p a r e  to  Shanghai  for  rising  itself  lacked a general  Sun C h ' u a n - f a n g ,  33. 3k*  1927.  smaller  The w o r k e r s were  Niu Yung-chien.  led  The u p -  p l a n and was q u i c k l y p u t down by  who h a d many o f t h e  The s e c o n d i n February,  the b o u r g e o i s i e ,  the  troops.  number who a l s o p a r t i c i p a t e d w e r e u n a r m e d . of  1926.  overthrow  A b o u t o n e - h u n d r e d w o r k e r s were armed a n d a n o t h e r  by a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  look-  o n O c t o b e r 2l|,  two w o u l d a l s o b e )  Northern Expeditionary  the  Shanghai.  armed u p r i s i n g t o o k p l a c e  t h e m i l i t a r i s t Sun C h ' u a n - f a n g entrance  J u s t how much damage  leaders  executed.  armed u p r i s i n g a l s o f a i l e d . On F e b r u a r y 18,  the  It  took  Shanghai General  place Labor  E . g . s e e S . K . S h e l d o n T s o , The L a b o r Movement i n C h i n a ( S h a n g h a i : n . p . , 1928), C h . V i l . J e a n C h e s n e a u x , The C h i n e s e L a b o r Movement . . . , p . 318.  Union gave o r d e r s were o n s t r i k e .  22nd.  for a strike.  19, 360,000  By F e b r u a r y  fought  defeated  f o r one d a y a n d one n i g h t ,  by the m i l i t a r i s t ' s t r o o p s .  b u t were  The p l a n h a d b e e n  t o c l e a r t h e way f o r t h e N o r t h e r n E x p e d i t i o n a r y t r o o p s , this  time reached  hai.  B u t , there  t o be a b l e  workers  The armed i n s u r r e c t i o n b e g a n a t 6 p . m . o n t h e  The w o r k e r s  eventually  35  20  C h i a - h s i n g , about  who h a d b y  s i x t y m i l e s southwest  o f Shang-  h a d not been enough p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e w o r k e r s  to e f f e c t i v e l y  h o l d o f f Sun C h ' u a n - f a n g ' s  t h e N o r t h e r n E x p e d i t i o n ' s t r o o p s were n o t a b l e to help the workers.  One o f t h e m i s t a k e s  s e c o n d armed u p r i s i n g was t h a t among t h e t r o o p s  troops.  to reach  And  Shanghai  made b y t h e CCP i n t h i s  i t h a d done l i t t l e p o l i t i c a l w o r k  o f t h e w a r l o r d o r among t h e  petty-bourgeoisie.  Consequently,  t h e s t r i k e s p r e a d no f u r t h e r t h a n t o p a r t o f t h e  proletariat.  The c l a s s  F e b r u a r y 23,  b a s e o f t h e u p r i s i n g was t o o n a r r o w .  t h e s t r i k e was c a l l e d o f f .  On  The s e c o n d u p r i s i n g was  36 also a f a i l u r e . T h e r e was a g r e a t d e a l o f r e p r e s s i o n i n S h a n g h a i t h e two a t t e m p t e d u p r i s i n g s . strengthen. workers,  t h e two f a i l u r e s .  poor and even the p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s i e ,  the leadership  t o s t r i k e , t e n days b e f o r e  36.  following  F o r t h e t h i r d u p r i s i n g , t h e CCP d e c i d e d  The p a r t y armed  35.  s p i r i t seemed t o  The CCP d i d a g r e a t d e a l o f p o l i t i c a l w o r k among t h e  the c i t y ' s  would take  But the w o r k e r s '  following  it  position.  5,000  workers,  and got the r a i l w a y  workers  t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n , t o k e e p Chang T s u n g -  The S h a n g h a i G e n e r a l L a b o r U n i o n ' s a c t i v i t i e s h a d b e e n s e m i l e g a l ( r a t h e r t h a n c l a n d e s t i n e ) s i n c e 1926, due t o S u n Ch'uan-fang's repression. See J e a n C h e s n e a u x , The C h i n e s e L a b o r M o v e m e n t . . . , p p . 283-28I4.. Ho K a n - c h l h , A H i s t o r y o f M o d e r n C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n ( P e k i n g : F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P r e s s , 1959), P P . li^-liUf..  21 chang's troops from aiding Sun Ch'uan-fang once the uprising began. Soon a f t e r the railway workers went on strike, the Northern Expedition's troops captured Lunghua, only a few miles from Shanghai.  On March 21,  1927,  the Shanghai General Labor  Union issued the order f o r the general strike and what would be known as the Third Armed Insurrection. There was (1)  a three-point plan issued for the uprising:  On March 21 at 2 o'clock, the s t r i k e was t o begin; (2)  From  1 to 3 o'clock, surprise armed attacks were to commence, in order to capture the arms kept at the police stations; (3)  A f t e r the  police stations were attacked, a l l groups were t o meet (at an appointed place) and form troops to fight the Shantung Army (Sun Ch'uan-fang's troops) and to capture a l l the c i t y ' s governmental organizat ions. At noon on the 21st, throughout  Shanghai.  about 800,000 workers struck  The c i t y was e f f e c t i v e l y shut-down and the  workers were victorious under the leadership of CCP members l i k e Chou E n - l a i , Lo I-nung, and Hsiao Shih-tan.  Chapei was the s i t e  of the longest and bloodiest battle, but even here they were eventually victorious.  Unfortunately, t h e i r victory was not long-lived  Chiang Kai-shek's plan had been to remain outside of Shanghai u n t i l the workers had defeated the warlord's troops. Then, with one adversary eliminated, he and his troops (with the aid of h i s own personal "connections" i n Shanghai) would enter the c i t y and eliminate his other adversary: the workers' Communist and left-wing leaders.  Chiang's was an alliance with the  against the p r o l e t a r i a t — 12,  192 7,  against the Communist Party.  bourgeois On A p r i l  he began h i s attack on the workers, giving the "order"  22 that  It is better  to m i s t a k e n l y k i l l  t o l e t one p e r s o n evade p u n i s h m e n t .  one t h o u s a n d p e o p l e ,  than  (  The  *L^J^er&3l*£L*$,4}Al®^.) ^  "White T e r r o r " had begun.  37  Many b o o k s o n t h i s p e r i o d d e a l e x t e n s i v e l y events the  s u r r o u n d i n g t h e coup on A p r i l  "white  t e r r o r " w h i c h ensued^.,  done t o t h e C h i n e s e The c o m p l e t e  12 by C h i a n g K a i - s h e k , a n d  i n w h i c h tremendous  Communist P a r t y a n d t h e w o r k e r s '  set of circumstances,  w i t h the  cast  of characters  damage was movement. and s u b t l e  38 undercurrents,  plots  O n l y a few r e l e v a n t  and c o u n t e r p l o t s w i l l details  will  n o t be d e a l t  with here.  be m e n t i o n e d i n p a s s i n g .  Through t h e " a p p r o v a l " o f t h e C o m i n t e r n , S t a l i n and t h e Soviet  advisers  General"),  (who were a l l s t i l l  h a i l i n g C h i a n g as a "Red  Chiang entered Shanghai w i t h the f u l l  t h e CCP a n d t h e G e n e r a l L a b o r U n i o n , a v o i d open s t r u g g l e . S h a n g h a i became  less  The t o n e and l e s s  cooperation of  w h i c h had been a d v i s e d  o f t h e new f o r c e s  to  controlling  bold.  And  37. 38.  39.  " . . . s t e p b y s t e p , t h e Communist p a r t y i n S h a n g h a i a b dicated i t s opportunities. G o v e r n m e n t power i n t h e c i t y c o u l d be e x e r c i s e d o n l y i n c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h t h e b o u r g e o i s l e a d e r s o r n o t a t a l l . ' L a w a n d o r d e r ' were s u r r e n d e r e d t o ' t h e army a n d t h e m e r c h a n t s ' . The f i g h t a g a i n s t i m p e r i a l i s m was t o be g u i d e d o n l y ' b y t h o s e who a r e h i g h e r t h a n w e ' a n d a n y s e t t l e m e n t made was u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y accepted i n advance. F i n a l l y , i f anyone s u g g e s t e d t h a t p r e p a r a t i o n s w e r e u n d e r way t o smash t h e Communist p a r t y a n d t h e u n i o n s , he was g u i l t y o f c i r c u l a t i n g c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y rumors d e s i g n e d t o d i s t u r b t h e ' n a t i o n a l united front'. " 39 F o r an e x c e l l e n t l i t e r a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n of the events s u r r o u n d i n g t h e 3rd U p r i s i n g , s e e A n d r e ' M a l r a u x , M a n ' s F a t e (New Y o r k : Random H o u s e , 19ol). See f o r e x a m p l e , J e a n C h e s n e a u x , The C h i n e s e L a b o r Movement . . . , H a r o l d I s a a c s , The T r a g e d y o f t h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n , a n d h i s F i v e Y e a r s o f K u o m i n t a n g R e a c t i o n ( S h a n g h a i : C h i n a Forum P u b l . C o . , 1932) a n d many o t h e r s . H a r o l d I s a a c s , T r a g e d y o f C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n , p p . 169-170.  23 By A p r i l armed p i c k e t e r s April  6,  Chiang's basic  intentions  were b e c o m i n g c l e a r .  1 2 , he h a d " r e a c t i v a t e d "  his  regarding  Between t h a t  contacts  date  w i t h the  the  and  Shanghai  ho underworld. blast  At 4 a . m . ,  on A p r i l  from C h i a n g ' s h e a d q u a r t e r s ,  Disarming the p i c k e t s  was  12, at the  the machine-guns  began  firing.  the r e a s o n g i v e n f o r the a c t i o n s  Government p o l i c y was d e s i g n e d t o c o n t r o l t h e d i s c i p l i n i n g l a b o r when i t  sound o f a b u g l e  t o o k on t a s k s  labor  s e e n as  taken.  movement,  "...  detri1+1  m e n t a l t o t h e movement a n d d i s t u r b i n g o f l a w and o r d e r So, properly  t h e l a b o r movement and t h e Communist P a r t y  'disciplined'.  C h i a n g was  fundamentally seeking  end CCP c o n t r o l o f t h e mass movement, it  ...  to h i m s e l f ,  i n o r d e r t o keep i t  to t r a n s f e r  in line with  " were to  c o n t r o l of bourgeois  interests. April surrounded, Chiang,  12 saw t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s  of the G e n e r a l Labor Union 1+2  and a l l w o r k e r s who r e s i s t e d b e i n g d i s a r m e d were  w i t h t h e a i d o f h i s armed f o r c e s ,  o f the f o r e i g n p o l i c e associated  w i t h the  and g a n g s t e r s ,  strikes.  i n the Shanghai s t r e e t s , Movement, a l l w o r k e r s '  together  gathered  w i t h the  up a l l  "Communist P a r t y ,  aid  workers  The b l o o d o f t h e w o r k e r s  and t h e  shot.  flowed  Trade  Union  o r g a n i z a t i o n s , were smashed t o p i e c e s and 43 driven into i l l e g a l i t y . " 4O. P o r C h i a n g ' s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e S h a n g h a i u n d e r w o r l d , see H a r o l d I s a a c s , Tragedy of the Chinese R e v o l u t i o n , p p . 80-81. 2+1. H . G . W . Woodhead"; C h i n a Y e a r E o o k , p . 1006": 2+2. Pavel M i f , H e r o i c C h i n a . . . , p p . 39-lj.O. 43. C . L . R . J a m e s T ^ o r l d R e v o l u t i o n , 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 3 6 , The R i s e a n d F a l l o f t h e Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l (New Y o r k : P i o n e e r P u b l i s h e r s .  mr.  2h Three hundred workers f e l l i n the o r i g i n a l attacks on the General Union headquarters. workers were k i l l e d on A p r i l 13.  Approximately one hundred more One thousand f i v e hundred  people were wounded, f i v e thousand workers driven from t h e i r jobs, and approximately another five thousand workers and students 1+5  were arrested. Possibly the labor movement could have t r i e d to oppose Chiang.  But they were faced not only with Chiang's troops but  also those of many other divisions stationed In the Lower Yangtze region.  Japanese troops had also been brought i n to help cope  with the labor uprising.  Faced with such overwhelming  the general strike subsided: on May 13th, on the 15th, 63,000.  opposition,  there were 111,000 s t r i k e r s ,  there were 104,000, and by the l6th, there were only  By t h i s time also, Chiang had declared a l l left-wing  1+6 organizations I l l e g a l . The Chinese Communist Party, now that the United Front had dissolved, was driven underground. Shanghai i n fear of losing t h e i r l i v e s .  Many of i t s leaders f l e d 2+7 Chiang's General Feder-  ation of Workers and Employees took over what had previously been the role of the General Union. The CCP lost i t s base i n Shanghai and i t s access to l e g a l channels f o r contact with the workers.  S t a l i n , though d i s -  1 +1).. Jean with Chesneaux, The of Chinese Labor Movement ... , p. appointed the loss Shanghai as a party center, had 370. gained 45. Harold Isaacs, Five Years of KMT Reaction, p. 5. 46. Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement ... , pp. 370-371. 47. See Kai-yu Hsu, Chou E n - l a i . China's Gray Eminence (New York: Doubleday and Company, i960), pp. 63 - 62+, f o r an account of Chou's escape from Shanghai.  25 something through t h i s d e f e a t .  That  T r o t s k y i s m was  outcome  way was c l e a r  j u s t i f i e d by t h e  f o r S t a l i n to determine  is,  h i s own o p p o s i t i o n t o of  the  events course  i n 1927.  The  of a c t i o n  needed  in China. The p r o l e t a r i a t h a d b e e n d e f e a t e d  i n Shanghai.  l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e CCP was condemned by B u k h a r i n , w h i l e s h i f t e d p o l i c y to the immediate t a s k f o t  left,  t h e CCP b y J u l y .  f o r mass r e v o l t  on the grounds  that  Party of  set  A new l e a d e r s h i p was into action.  the p a r t y would o n l y s u f f e r  was s i l e n c e d and t h o s e  ationists.  a t t h e A u g u s t 9,  Union  19 7, 2  selected, raised  more f r o m s u c h liquid-  the CCP a n d t h e Communist  (C.P.S.U.) issued a joint  joint  an  Opposition,  o p p o s e d were condemned as  The C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f  the S o v i e t  Stalin  making the f o r m a t i o n of S o v i e t s  and t h e c o u r s e  action,  The  declaration  session:  The C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n i s n o t o n l y n o t on t h e e b b , b u t h a s e n t e r e d u p o n a new h i g h e r s t a g e . . . N o t o n l y i s t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e t o i l i n g masses o f C h i n a n o t y e t e x h a u s t e d , b u t i t i s p r e c i s e l y o n l y now t h a t i t i s b e g i n n i n g t o m a n i f e s t I t s e l f i n a new a d v a n c e o f the r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e . Not u n t i l  s e v e r a l more bloody.y d e f e a t s  of the  CCP b y  t h e KMT o c c u r r e d was t h e U n i t e d F r o n t f o r m a l l y a b a n d o n e d . Moscow s t i l l  preached the  stage and i n e v i t a b l e  I4.8.  C.L.R.  r i s i n g of the  revolution to a higher  victory."  James, W o r l d R e v o l u t i o n . . .  "But  , pp.  265-266.  26 Ll  Li-san Before  t o 1930,  a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e events i n China from  a few w o r d s r e g a r d i n g L i L i - s a n h i m s e l f m i g h t  1928  provide  some b a c k g r o u n d i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f h i s p e r i o d  49  of  leadership. L i was b o r n i n Hunan p r o v i n c e  in  1899»  making h i m s t i l l  a v e r y y o u n g man b y t h e t i m e o f t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s t o l e a d e r s h i p o f the Chinese he s p e n t of  i n school,  I n 1917,  L i responded  rise  During the years  he seems t o h a v e b e e n i m p r e s s e d w i t h  revolutionaries.  E d g a r Snow,  Communist P a r t y .  and h i s  tales  a c c o r d i n g t o a r e p o r t g i v e n by  to an a d v e r t i s e m e n t  in a local  paper,  50 and met Mao T s e - t u n g , LI,  however,  who was t r y i n g t o s e t up a s t u d y  decided not to  I n 1918,  L i left  group.  join. China f o r France, w i t h the help o f  an o r g a n i z a t i o n i n P e k i n g t h a t h a d e s t a b l i s h e d  a work-study  arrangement  i n France,  there  f o r Chinese  students.  Mille  and w o r k e d w i t h T s ' a i H o - s h e n , Chao S h i h - y e n ,  Chou E n - l a i ,  Y e n - n i e n a n d C h ' e n C b M a o - M e n ( t h e l a t t e r t w o , sons Tu-hisiu).  51  in various  •  He s p e n t h i s t i m e s t u d y i n g ,  factories.  the F r e n c h p o l i c e , others  were  '  However,  I n 1921,  L i met Ch'en  of Ch'en  o r g a n i z i n g and w o r k i n g after  a n d s e v e r a l weeks I n j a i l ,  an i n c i d e n t w i t h L i and s e v e r a l  deported.  There  i s some d i f f e r e n c e  o f o p i n i o n as t o w h e t h e r he  50.  Much o f t h e E n g l i s h s o u r c e m a t e r i a l comes f r o m K l e i n a n d C l a r k , B i o g r a p h i c D i c t i o n a r y . . . , volume 1, p p . 512-519. See E d g a r Snow, Red S t a r o v e r C h i n a (New Y o r k : G r o v e P r e s s .  51.  K a l - y u H s u , Chou E n - l a l  49.  1961), p p . ikk-=n^~.  ...  , pp.  30-33.  27 52 r e t u r n e d t o C h i n a i n 1921, his  return,  the p a r t y  where he e s t a b l i s h e d  o r I n 1922.  assigned a workers'  acquire  s c h o o l and a w o r k e r s '  a f o l l o w i n g among t h e m i n e r s  i n the  a n d managed  d e c i s i o n of the  an  to  area.  Third Party  t o c o o p e r a t e w i t h t h e KMT, e s p e c i a l l y  p l a c i n g the  "club"  i n f o r m a t i o n i n K l e i n and C l a r k ,  v e r y much o p p o s e d t o t h e i n 1923  after  E v i d e n t l y , he was q u i t e  s p e a k e r and a good l a b o r o r g a n i z e r ,  According to  i n 1922,  him to the An-yuan Coal Mines,  ( a euphemism f o r a t r a d e u n i o n ) . effective  But,  L i was Congress  w i t h regard  to  l a b o r u n i o n movement u n d e r KMT c o n t r o l .  In  192l|,  he went t o S h a n g h a i ,  involved with labor organization. u n d e r whom he w o r k e d ,  where,  again,  A c c o r d i n g t o Chang  L i L i - s a n was  "...  a political  he  was  Kuo-t'ao, agitator,  53 with a proclivity for Li workers".  t a l k i n g and  arguing."  c o u l d be c a l l e d one o f  He was  very s t r o n g l y  the p a r t y ' s  opposed  "practical  t o a n y moves t o  central-  i z e p a r t y power i n the C e n t r a l Committee. He was " . . . C o m p l e t e l y a man o f a c t i o n , he l o o k e d o n l y f o r r e s u l t s , a n d he was u n a c c u s t o m e d t o r e s t r i c t i o n s from the o r g a n i z a t i o n . H i s work i n l e a d i n g the t r a d e u n i o n movement i n S h a n g h a i g e n e r a l l y c a l l e d f o r h i m to d e a l w i t h problems t h a t r e q u i r e d immediate s o l u t i o n s . He c o u l d n o t b e a r t o h a v e t h e s e p r o b l e m s go t h r o u g h meetings o f the Shanghai D i s t r i c t Committee, the L a b o r Movement Committee o f t h e C C , a n d t h e CC i t s e l f , t o h a v e them d i s c u s s e d a t e a c h l e v e l b e f o r e a s o l u t i o n was d e c i d e d u p o n . He a l w a y s i n s i s t e d t h a t he ' h a d t o h a v e a n i m m e d i a t e s o l u t i o n ' ; a n d he a s k e d f o r a j o i n t m e e t i n g o f t h e t h r e e o r g a n s <Sr f o r t h e d e s i g n a t i o n o f 52.  53.  Compare K a i - y u H s u , Chou E n - l a i . . . , p . 33 a n d K l e i n a n d C l a r k B i o g r a p h i c D i c t i o n a r y . . . , p . 513, who s a y 1921, and L i A n g , H u n g - s e W u - t ' a i , p . bO who s a y s 1923, and Chang K u o - t ' a o who says 1922. Chang K u o - t ' a o , P e r s o n a l i t i e s o f C h i n e s e Communist L e a d e r s as R e c a l l e d b y Chang K u o - t ' a o (Xerox pamphlet at Hoover Institute, Stanford University, Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a ) .  28 " . . . an a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e t o d e a l w i t h h i s u r g e n t problems. M o r e o v e r , he b r i d l e d a t l i s t e n i n g t o I n s t r u c t i o n s f r o m M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t s , who he f e l t would d i s r u p t things w i t h t h e i r conference-table discussions. In the course of l e a d i n g the Shanghai l a b o r movement, he commonly r e s o r t e d t o r a t h e r f o r c e f u l methods i n s t e a d o f d e p e n d i n g u p o n p e r s u a s i o n . He f e l t t h a t a c t i o n b a s e d on t h e p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s was t h e most i m p o r t a n t t h i n g . He i n s i s t e d t h a t a l l the t a l k about ' c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f power' and ' h a l f b a k e d d o c t r i n e s a n d d o g m a s ' was p u r e r u b b i s h . " 54 Prom Chang K u o - t ' a o ' s i m p a t i e n t man, q u i t e  d e s c r i p t i o n , we see  disinterested  In theories  a problem through the proper c h a n n e l s . immediate mittees  response  came u p .  w h i c h are mentioned above, w i l l  logical persuasion",  H i s use  and h i s demands  of for  force  i n t e r p r e t e d by h i m s e l f ) ,  are a l s o q u a l i t i e s  come  an e f f e c t i v e greatly  laborrorganizer for  Mien the  under the d i r e c t i o n of  55  chairman.  a meeting  55.  rather  importance  than  of L i ' s  "ideobased  were  personality  leadership.  of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y ,  the CCP.  L i was  His reputation  of the  S h a n g h a i G e n e r a l L a b o r U n i o n was the Chinese  Communist P a r t y ,  A l s o , because of the p a r t  May 3 0 t h Movement,  54•  into  com-  was  e n h a n c e d by h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e May 3 0 t h Movement  i n Shanghai.  its  demanded  as t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s  Into play during h i s period of Quite aside from questions  approaching  immediate a c t i o n  (generally,  very  The a c t i o n  a g a i n come  on p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s  that  and i n  He was a man who  t o any p r o b l e m t h a t  when L i t o o k o v e r t h e p a r t y .  L i as a  L i became  he p l a y e d  in  L i was s e n t b y t h e p a r t y t o Moscow t o  P r o f i n t e r n as  one o f  China's  Chang K u o - t ' a o , JBlse o f t h e CCP . . . L i A n g , H u n g - s e w \ i - t ' a i , p . 66~.  , pp.  formed,  the attend  representatives.  4ll-4l2.  29 I n 1927,  L i was  went t o p a r t i c i p a t e headed  the  mittee.  i n Wuhan, and i t was  i n the  Political  Nanch'ang U p r i s i n g .  Security  Later i n the year,  Bureau under the  from here  that  he  At Nanch'ang,  Li  R e v o l u t i o n a r y Com-  L i and Chang K u o - t ' a o  were f o r c e d  to  56 e s c a p e on a j u n k t o Hong K o n g . saw L i once  1928 S i x t h Congress  of the  CCP.  a g a i n i n Moscow, t h i s t ime f o r Various reasons  holding the  Congress  Congress).  A c c o r d i n g to authors  Congress  i n Moscow ( a t  was h e l d h e r e  the  like  have been g i v e n  same t i m e as t h e  eradicate  for  Comintern  Benjamin Schwartz,  i n order to " . . .  the  the  heretical  ele-  57  m e n t s " w i t h i n t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y . An a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t seems r e a s o n a b l e i s t h a t " . . . i t c o u l d n o t h a v e met i n C h i n a . T h e r e t h e p o l i c e w o u l d have made s u r e t h a t d e l e g a t e s a t t e n d i n g i t would have been s e i z e d - and executed soon a f t e r assembling. I n s t e a d , the d e l e g a t e s d r a n k w i s d o m a t i t s v e r y f o u n t a i n h e a d ; any d e c i s i o n made i n Moscow was n a t u r a l l y M o s c o w ' s . " 58 All  authors  there  is  agree t h a t ,  a great  as  sanctity  by v i r t u e  of the f a c t  Comintern  supervision.  that  the  final  attached  indicates,  to the S i x t h Congress'  p o l i c y of united front  decisions direct  Ch'u C h ' i u - p a i ' s leadership  condemned as a l e f t - w i n g d e v i a t i o n .  countryside,  above  i t was h e l d I n Moscow, u n d e r  At the S i x t h Congress,  from i t s  statement  C h ' i i had t a k e n the  was  party  to open I n s u r r e c t i o n i n c i t y  and had c a l l e d f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f S o v i e t s .  and Under  Ch'u 56. 57. 58.  Chang K u o - t ' a o , P e r s o n a l i t i e s no page n u m b e r s . B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , C h i n e s e Communism a n d t h e R i s e o f Mao ( C a m b r i d g e , M a s s . : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1966"), p . Conrad Brandt, S t a l i n ' s F a i l u r e i n China . . . , p . 168.  116.  . . . On A u g u s t 7, 1927, t h e CP c o n f e r e n c e supported a manifesto to c o r r e c t the e r r o r of Ch'en T u - h s i u ' s o p p o r t u n i s m , a n d a f t e r t h i s m e e t i n g many u p r i s i n g s t o o k p l a c e i n s u c h p l a c e s as Hankow and C h a n g s h a . A t t h i s t i m e t h e w o r k e r s ' u n i o n s s t i l l h a d much h i d d e n power. But t h e s e u p r i s i n g a l l f a i l e d . . . (T)he l a b o r l e a d e r s had d e c i d e d upon the p o l i c y o f u p r i s i n g s a g a i n s t t h e R i g h t whom t h e y c o n s i d e r e d c o u n t e r - r e v o l u t i o n a r y , though a l l the l a b o r u p r i s i n g s f a i l e d to succeed." 59 11  These o n l y succeeded t h e KMT. jobs  f u r t h e r attempts  by t h e  workers from  u n i o n members were d i s m i s s e d f r o m t h e i r  and i n e x p e r i e n c e d w o r k e r s w e r e b r o u g h t  i n from the  provinces  them. According to L i u S h a o - c h ' i ,  t i m e were 1)  that  the  Communists  d i d n o t know how t o r e t r e a t that,  the  i n p r o v o k i n g more s u s p i c i o n a n d r e p r e s s i o n  Former a c t i v e  to replace  2)  CCP t o a r o u s e  because  (who l e d t h e  labor  this  movement)  w e l l In o r d e r to m a i n t a i n t h e i r  i n the past  n o t t r a i n e d t o do s e c r e t  "The weak p o i n t s a t  t h e y h a d done  work w e l l ; 3)  open w o r k ,  that  they  t h e CP made  power; were  Leftist  60 errors;  and 4 ) t h a t  the white  The d i s a s t r o u s  t e r r o r was v e r y  failures  strong."  o f b o t h t h e Autumn H a r v e s t  U p r i s i n g s a n d t h e C a n t o n I n s u r r e c t i o n i n 1927  spelled  Ch'u C h ' i u - p a i ' s  Communist  And a f t e r  the  secretaryship  of the  Chinese  C a n t o n Commune e n d e d i n t h e  Communist b l o o d , t h e p o w e r o f  spilling  the w o r k e r s '  the  end  Party.  of yet  u n i o n s was  of  more  completely  destroyed. The new P o l i t b u r o t h a t  emerged  from the  i n c l u d e d H s i a n g C h u n g - f a as S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l , 59« 60.  Sixth  Congress  Chou E n - l a i  as  H e l e n F o s t e r Snow, f r o m t h e Nym W a l e s C o l l e c t i o n , H o o v e r I n s t i t u t e , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , w i t h M r s . Snow's p e r m i s s i o n . H e l e n F o s t e r Snow, Nym W a l e s C o l l e c t i o n .  31  head of the Central Organizational Bureau and head of the Array, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai as representative to the Comintern and L i Li-san as the nead of the propaganda Bureau, the Labor Movement Chairman  61 and editor of the party paper. Hsiang Chung-fa was ineffective as  Secretary-General,  and L i gradually took over leadership of the party.  L i ' s actual  period of "rule", from 1928-1930, was another series of defeats f o r the CCP.  Aside from the L i Li-san l i n e , best known f o r the  series of events which led to the attempted urban insurrections, and which ended i n defeat, L i Li-san as party leader was not respected by party members.  Prom the accounts of Chang Kuo-t'ao  and L i Ang, L i Li-san seems to have been highly e g o t i s t i c a l and very c e r t a i n of himself and of the urban labor movement.  Mien  he came to o f f i c e "... Only the Shanghai workers s t i l l had hidden power. So ... Shanghai was the center of the labor movement of China. During the period of L i Li-san's l i n e , the power of the Shanghai workers' Unions was also destroyed." 62 It w i l l now be explained what i s meant by the L i Li-san l i n e and how this line developed i n r e l a t i o n to Comintern d i r e c t i v e s .  61. 62.  L i Ang, Hung-se Wa-t'ai, pp. 52-53, and Chang Kuo-t'ao, Personalities ... ... Helen Foster Snow, Nym Wales C o l l e c t i o n .  32 The L i L i - s a n L i n e The N i n t h P l e n u m o f t h e E x e c u t i v e Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l Comintern Congress  (January-February,  (July-September,  on t h e S i x t h P a r t y Congress the development surrounds intern:  o f the Chinese  t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between  cation?  A good d e a l o f  of t h e Comintern? desire  mistakes  o n l y t o b e made t o t a k e  controversy o f t h e Com-  was t h e L i  was L i L i - s a n  for self-justifi-  was L i p u r p o s e l y m i s l e d b y t h e C o m i n t e r n i n t o  failure,  effect  Communist P a r t y and o n  L i ' s l i n e and t h a t  v i c t i m o f the C l ' s (and S t a l i n ' s )  able  and the S i x t h  was he o r was he n o t f o l l o w i n g C l p o l i c y ?  L i - s a n l i n e i d e n t i c a l to that the  1928)  of the  b o t h had a g r e a t  1928)  of the L i L i - s a n L i n e .  Committee  a l l t h e blame  Inevit-  f o r the  himself? Many W e s t e r n a u t h o r s  sponsible  f o r the mistakes  that  seem t o f e e l w e r e made,  that that  L i was n o t r e the Comintern  63 was a t f a u l t . tern directives Party  i n 1928  line of entirely about  A c c o r d i n g t o one s t u d y , f o r the S i x t h Congress "... laid  1929-1930."  the basis  f o r example,  the Comin-  o f the Chinese  Communist  f o r the disastrous  L i Li-san  64  responsible  O t h e r a u t h o r s seem t o f e e l t h a t L i was f o r h i s m i s t a k e s , t h a t he p u r p o s e l y s e t  t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f h i s own l i n e , k n o w i n g f u l l y t h a t  it  65 differed 63.  64. 65.  considerably  from t h a t  o f Moscow.  S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , C h i n e s e Communism . . . , Harold I s a a c s , Tragedy o f t h e Chinese R e v o l u t i o n ^ Robert N o r t h , Moscow a n d C h i n e s e Communists (2nd e d , ; S t a n f o r d , C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d . U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963 ). J o h n K . F a i r b a n k , The U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C h i n a (New Y o r k : V i k i n g P r e s s , 1967), p . 230. The two I r e f e r t o i n p a r t i c u l a r a r e R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The Comi n t e r n a n d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s . 1928-1931 ( S e a t t l e , W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 1969), a n d H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , Power R e l a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e C h i n e s e Communist Movement, 1930-1934 (Seattle, W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , l96l).  33 I n my own e s t i m a t i o n , on L i a r e c o r r e c t .  However,  blame f o r the m i s t a k e s , issued after ately  e n t i r e l y blameless their directives,  why L i ' s b a s i c  perhaps  deliber-  i n China. L i ' s onthe  cities  The C o m i n t e r n c a n n o t b e  count e i t h e r ,  due t o t h e v a g u e n e s s o f on the bases i n  i n the c i t i e s ; there  who were q u i t e d i r e c t l y u n d e r t h e  of the L iL i - s a n l i n e l i e s This  I hope t o be a b l e  Politburo after  the  faced w i t h s e v e r a l d i f f i c u l t  from a p r e v i o u s l y urban-based one.  most  t o show.  a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C o m i n t e r n , was t o a g r a r i a n  decisions  failure  L i and the C o m i n t e r n , but  head o f the  L i L i - s a n was  influence  S o , t h e "blame" f o r the  between  i s what  As t h e de_ f a c t o Party Congress,  country-  i s some e x p l a n a t i o n n e e d e d a s t o  C o m i n t e r n and P a v e l M i f .  h e a v i l y onL i .  none h a d w o r k e d i n t h e  with  p o l i c y was c o n t i n u e d u n d e r Wang M i n g and t h e  Returned Students,  u p h e l d the  Comintern  t h e y a l l had a h i s t o r y o f envolvement  And, o f course,  The c h a n g e ,  t h e outcome  t h e i r own c o n t i n u e d d e p e n d e n c e  (i.e.  l a b o r movement  of the  blame  a n d t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e new P o l i t b u r o members i t  h e l p e d choose  side).  from the  i n h i s c o n t i n u i n g dependence  on t h i s  the  h e was n o t e n t i r e l y t o  because the d i r e c t i v e s  success o f the r e v o l u t i o n .  the c i t i e s ,  that  the C I whatever  b i g g e s t m i s t a k e was  the  I feel  h i s r e t u r n t o E h i n a were a m b i g u o u s ,  so t o p r o t e c t  f o r the  t h e a u t h o r s who p l a c e  Sixth tasks.  revolution  The S i x t h C o m i n t e r n C o n g r e s s  o f the Second Congress  (influenced by Lenin)  66  on t h i s  66.  issue.  J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l , I919-I9I13, Documents (3 v o l s . ; New Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , I 9 6 0 ) , v o l . I I , p . 530.  3h At t h i s Second Congress, that  i n the p r e c a p i t a l i s t  were t o g i v e  t h e i r support  were d e v e l o p e d movement feudal  2)  volutionary character  of the East,  were  the l a n d l o r d s ,  survivals;  i t h a d been  t o the p e a s a n t r y .  a t t h e Congress  against  exploited  nations  i n 1920,  to give  movement  p o s s i b l e u n i o n between  parties  the  that peasant  and a l l  t h e most r e -  the peasants and a l l the  i n t o S o v i e t s as f a r a s p o s s i b l e ;  the c l o s e s t  to support  landownership,  the peasant  by o r g a n i z i n g  Communist  Lenin's theses  " . . . 1)  large  decided  a n d 3)  to  establish  t h e Communist p r o l e t a r i a t  Western Europe and the r e v o l u t i o n a r y peasant  movement  of  of the  67 Eastern countries." ambiguity concern  seen  itself  of the p a r t y , bourgeois  i n l a t e r Comintern d i r e c t i v e s : with the agrarian question b u t , a t t h e same t i m e ,  interests  the w o r k i n g c l a s s Several of the peasant  L e n i n ' s t h e s e s c o n t a i n an element  ECCI plenum's  1926,  . . . At the present  was t h e o n l y c l a s s  "  movement.  a l s o made m e n t i o n o f t h e  F o r example,  of the Chinese  stage,  TBTd".,. pp. 20-21.  question  r e v o l u t i o n at the  i t was p o i n t e d o u t , t h e p r o l e t a r i a t  t h a t was i n a p o s i t i o n t o c a r r y  68  importance  t h e S e v e n t h Plenum o f t h e  . . . proclaimed the a g r a r i a n  agrarian policy i n China." 67. Hsiao T s o - l i a n g , Chinese s i d e (Hong K o n g : SrTfnese  68.  from t h e founding  i t was t o u n i t e w i t h t h e  through the trade union  t o be t h e ' c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n ' time  t h e CCP was t o  o f t h e KMT a n d t o t r y t o g a i n a f o o t h o l d o n  movement.  EGCI, h e l d i n l a t e  right  of the  on a r a d i c a l  T h u s , t h o u g h t h e p r o l e t a r i a t was Communism i n 1927, C i t y v s . C o u n t r y U n i v e r s i t y o f Hong K o n g , 1970), p. 6  34 a important,  and i n d e e d ,  was t h e v a n g u a r d o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n , t h e  Comintern had considered  the peasantry  element  i f t h e r e v o l u t i o n was t o be  t o be c o n s i d e r e d By  1928,  reorganization CCP  in  Communist P a r t y .  was t o c o n t i n u e ,  i n the c i t i e s  i n the c o u n t r y s i d e .  as a " d i v e r s i o n a r y "  at t h e S i x t h Congress  t h e CCP was t o l d t o c o n c e n t r a t e and  for?was  to support  The b a s e o f t h e  This concept  element,  any s t r i k e s ,  t o keep the c i t i e s  That i s ,  on expanding g u e r i l l a  chosen f o r the of  The CCP was i n -  t e r r o r and s u b v e r s i o n were  i n a state of  activities,  w i t h no e x p e r i e n c e  working w i t h peasants o r i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . structed that  of the  C I d i r e c t i v e s and  o f t h e CCP.  p a r t y members,  on t h e  may be e x a m i n e d  the r u r a l Soviets, but the leaders  p a r t y were a l l c i t y - b a s e d  the  m a i n l y as a d i v e r s i o n a r y  t h e l i g h t o f t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n between  Moscow's o r d e r s  necessary  successful.  f o r t h e KMT, t o k e e p t h e KMT f r o m c o n c e n t r a t i n g  S o v i e t s t o be c r e a t e d CCP  t h e C o m i n t e r n was p r e s s i n g  of the Chinese  i n the c i t i e s  tactic  what  i n t h e E a s t as a  designed  turmoil.  "The i m m e d i a t e o b j e c t i v e o f t h e C o m i n t e r n was n o t , i t appears, the r a p i d overthrow of the N a t i o n a l i s t r e g i m e b y means o f armed u p r i s i n g s c a r r i e d o u t i n the l a r g e r c i t i e s a l l o v e r C h i n a . The C o m i n t e r n seems t o h a v e e n v i s a g e d a p r o t r a c t e d s t r u g g l e d u r i n g w h i c h t h e Communists w o u l d g r a d u a l l y weaken t h e KMT and b u i l d up t h e i r own s t r e n g t h . . . ( F ) r o m t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s o f t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y i n 1928 o n w a r d , t h e C l i n s t r u c t e d t h e C h i n e s e Communists t o carry out a broadly conceived strategy of g u e r i l l a warfare and p o l i t i c a l s u b v e r s i o n . " 69 With the "beheading" urban p r o l e t a r i a t 69.  after  1927,  o f t h e Communist l e a d e r s h i p there  of the  b e g a n a downward t r e n d i n t h e  R i c h a r d C . T h o r n t o n , "The Emergence o f a New C l S t r a t e g y f o r C h i n a : 1928," i n The C o m i n t e r n : H i s t o r i c a l H i g h l i g h t s , E s s a y s , R e c o l l e c t i o n s a n d Documents," E d . b y M i l o r a d M. - D r a c h k o v i t c n and B r a n k o L a z i t c h (New Y o r k : P r a e g e r . P u b l . , 1966), p . 109.  35 percentage  o f p a r t y members who were w o r k e r s ,  the percentage bers,  with  members,  of peasants.  In  w i t h an increase  in  1927, t h e CCP c l a i m e d 60,000 mem-  58$ i n d u s t r i a l w o r k e r s ; i n 1929, t h e r e were 100,000  with  10$ w o r k e r s ; i n 1930, t h e r e were 120,000 members, 70  2.5% o f whom were w o r k e r s . The b a s e o f t h e CCP i n t e r m s o f m e m b e r s h i p was c h a n g i n g . A c c o r d i n g t o M . N . Roy " . . . i n t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1929, t h e b u l k o f i t s m e m b e r s h i p was i n t h e v i l l a g e . It lost p r a c t i c a l l y a l l f o o t i n g i n t h e c i t i e s . . . ( I ) t must be a d m i t t e d t h a t b y 1930, t h e Communist P a r t y i n I t s s o c i a l c o m p o s i t i o n , h a d v i r t u a l l y become a p e a s a n t s ' p a r t y . " Ch'u C h ' i u - p a i at the S i x t h Congress to give  its full  also  support t o the a g r a r i a n  71  " . . . urged the Comintern revolution, that  i s , to  72 peasant  i n s u r r e c t i o n i n the c o u n t r y s i d e . " It i s true that  S i x t h Congress therefore, tern. Besso  t h e new P o l i t b u r o members c h o s e n a t t h e  o f t h e CCP were t h e c h o i c e  c o u l d be e x p e c t e d  On t h e e x t r e m e  left  t o be h e a v i l y  at the Congress  L o m i n a d z e a n d H e i n z Neumann.  to overthrow the N a t i o n a l i s t s . Chang K u o - t ' a o ,  i n f l u e n c e d by the Cominwere  Ch'u Ch'iu-pai,  They a d v o c a t e d  On t h e r i g h t ,  immediate  action  were B u k h a r i n and  who w i s h e d t o c o n t i n u e c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e  Communists and t h e p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s middle,  o f the Comintern, and,  but c l o s e r  to the l e f t ,  elements  were  i n China.  S t a l i n (demanding  In the protracted  73 g u e r i l l a warfare),  P a v e l M i f , and L i L i - s a n .  By t h e e n d o f t h e C o n g r e s s ,  t h e new l e a d e r s h i p  excluded  C h ' u C h ' i u - p a i , who was condemned f o r p u t s c h i s t t e n d e n c i e s , a n d who 70. H a r o l d I s a a c s , T r a g e d y o f t h e C h i n e s e R e v o l u t i o n , p . 393. 71. M . N . Roy, R e v o l u t i o n and C o u n t e r - R e v o l u t i o n i n C h i n a ( C a l c u t t a : R e n a i s s a n c e P u b l i s h e r s , 1914.6), p . 569. 72. R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . 19. 73. R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . 68.  36  r e m a i n e d i n Moscow. Secretary-General  H s i a n g C h u n g - f a was s e l e c t e d  f o r the  o f t h e p a r t y as a c o m p r o m i s e c a n d i d a t e  B u k h a r i n and S t a l i n .  new by  L i L i - s a n was a p p o i n t e d t h e h e a d o f  P r o p a g a n d a B u r e a u , b u t became t h e de f a c t o h e a d o f t h e  the  party.  "As p a r t y l e a d e r , L i L i - s a n was c h a r g e d w i t h t h e twin d i r e c t i v e s of re-extending Central c o n t r o l o v e r t h e movement and o f b u i l d i n g a Red A r m y . Li's d i l e m m a was t h a t i f he s u p p o r t e d t h e b u i l d - u p o f a Red Army b e f o r e he c o n t r o l l e d i t , he w o u l d u n d e r c u t h i s own p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n a n d make i t e a s i e r f o r t h o s e who d i d c o n t r o l t h e Red Army t o d i s p l a c e h i m a t some f u t u r e d a t e . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , i f he d i d n o t s u p p o r t t h e b u i l d - u p o f a Red A r m y , L i w o u l d f i n d h i m s e l f i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to the Comintern. I t was n o t i n L i L i - s a n ' s i n t e r e s t t o weaken h i s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s any Communist l e a d e r w i t h a s p i r a t i o n s to power. The * L i L i - s a n l i n e ' was t h e r e f o r e L i ' s a t t e m p t t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i l e m m a . " 7I4. On b e c o m i n g l e a d e r o f t h e p a r t y , position.  The C o n g r e s s  L i was  had d e c i d e d a g a i n s t  i n a very  attempting the  delicate immediate  o v e r t h r o w o f t h e N a t i o n a l i s t s , f o r w h i c h Ch'U C h ' i u - p a i h a d b e e n condemned.  A f t e r the  d i s a s t e r at  Canton,  CCP s h o u l d t u r n f r o m i n s u r r e c t i o n t o the  C e n t r a l Committee  i n November,  I t was d e c i d e d t h a t  organization.  1928,  said that  u n i o n s h a d s h r u n k t o a l m o s t n o t h i n g and t h a t cities  were s c a t t e r e d .  the masses.  h i s base, not 7U. 75*  its  Yet L i ' s experience  t r a d e u n i o n movement. i n the  the red  the c e l l s  The CCP, by c a l l i n g t o o o f t e n  and i n s u r r e c t i o n s , h a d weakened  75  A letter  His " o f f i c e s "  i n the  cities  from  trade  i n the for  own s t r e n g t h a n d h a d lay  the  strikes alienated  and I n t h e  were i n S h a n g h a i ;  there  was  countryside.  R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l  xv. ... , vol.  II, p.  530.  37 The o r d e r t o o r g a n i z e thing that  t h e p a r t y w o u l d seem t o be  L I , who was known a s a g o o d l a b o r o r g a n i z e r ,  have been a b l e t o d o .  However,  though e f f e c t i v e  as a d m i r a b l e I n a l e a d e r ,  Li's  not the peasants, active  elements  of the  and a l not  demonstrate.  on t h e f o r m a t i o n o f S o v i e t s however,  and  part  He knew t h e u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t ,  and " ( t ) h e  Li  for  i t was  were t o  o f a s t r o n g Red Army w e r e n o t ,  previous experience.  lost,  a strike -- organizer,  a s e v e n t s i n 1930  Comintern i n s i s t e n c e the development  and c h a n n e l s  T h i s h a b i t was one he h a d n o t i n a labor --  should  as Chang K u o - t ' a o p o i n t e d o u t ,  was a man o f a c t i o n , who d i s l i k e d c o m m i t t e e s making d e c i s i o n s .  some-  but  o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y and t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y army came f r o m t h e  of  most  peasantry  76  ...."  L i was h i g h l y s u s p i c i o u s o f  working i n the countryside Li's experiences  experience  and i n t h e  Red Army ( e . g .  as a l a b o r o r g a n i z e r ,  o f t h e May 3 0 t h Movement,  look for p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s , of the  t h e power h e l d by  and n o t  Mao  greatly  than i s  l e d him t o c o n t i n u e  economic o n e s .  t o h i s own r i s e  the terms  supposed.  i n the p a r t y .  Tse-tung).  especially  The  May 3 0 t h Movement may h a v e p l a y e d more o f a p a r t  mining L i ' s actions  those  Those e v e n t s They,  to  successes in  ddeter-  contributed  perhaps,  dictated  on w h i c h he was g o i n g t o p l a y o u t h i s r o l e as p a r t y ]&  leader.  U r b a n I n s u r r e c t i o n , s p a r k e d by p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s ,  to those  associated  w i t h the  one o f L i ' s " o b s e s s i o n s . " ful,  the  similar  May 3 0 t h Movement, seems t o h a v e  But,  f o r a p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e t o be  a h i g h l y organized structure of party c e l l s  was  been success-  absolutely  77 necessary. ^ 77.  The p a r t y c o u l d n o t w o r k t h r o u g h t h e i r Red U n i o n s ,  M . N . Roy, R e v o l u t i o n . . . , p . 5 7 1 . K e r m i t E . M c K e n z i e , C o m i n t e r n and W o r l d R e v o l u t i o n , 1928-I9I4.3 (New Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y " P r e s s , I96J4J, p p . 9 6 - 9 7 .  38 because a f t e r  t h e y were I l l e g a l ,  1928,  a n d " ( t ) h e Communists  had a p o l i c y o f not p e r m i t t i n g t h e i r f o l l o w e r s  to  j o i n the  ... 'yellow'  78 unions u n t i l  1930  ...  Of a l l t h e party headquarters  " strikes  were l o c a t e d ) ,  h u n d r e d c o u l d be c l a s s i f i e d four  in  1929,  f r o m 1928  two i n  1930  i n Shanghai  o n l y t w e l v e out  as p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s  o f about (six  in  (where six 1928,  1930).  The u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t but  to  was  still  to lead  L I , l i k e C h ' u C h ' i u - p a i b e f o r e h i m , was  difference  on t h e p a r t  i n g to the  instructions  f o r armed i n s u r r e c t i o n  of  t h a n on b e c o m i n g  revolution,  confronted with i n -  the u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t .  of the Comintern,  the  The CCP,  s p e n t more t i m e  the  representative  accordpreparing o f 'the  80 economic that  demands  of the  began w i t h o u t  and t h a t  workers.  P u r e l y economic  strikes,  ones  overtones of nationalism or a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m ,  c o u l d n o t be t u r n e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l s t r i k e s ,  b e e n s e e n by Moscow as e v i d e n c e  w o u l d have  of Trotskyism or r i g h t i s t  tenden-  cies . In the nowhere activity  is  resolutions  countryside,  and p u t f o r w a r d as a c o r r e c t  78. 79. 80.  N i n t h Plenum o f the  a p o l i c y o f urban i n s u r r e c t i o n emphasized.  i n the  protracted  of the  one.  covering  large  areas,  was  tactic.  The s t r u g g l e  was  ECCI, Guerilla discussed s e e n as  a  Also  H e l e n P o s t e r Snow, Nym W a l e s C o l l e c t i o n . N a n k a i W e e k l y S t a t i s t i c a l S e r v i c e , volume 2, n o . 16, n o s . 1 a n d 46. B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , C h i n e s e Communism . . . , p . 127.  volume  4,  39 " ( I ) t should be noted that nowhere i n (the) resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communists i s there advocated as immediate p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y the organizing of a nationwide uprising to overthrow the Nationalist regime. The slogan 'setting up a soviet regime In one hsien or several hsien' obviously did not have t h i s meaning, but rather meant the organizing of l o c a l revolts in small d i s t r i c t s . " 8l So, the question remains, why  did L i Li-san f a l l into the same  pattern of putschist tendencies as Ch'u  1  Why  Ch'iu-pai before him?  did L i i n s i s t on believing that the revolution had reached  a high tide and would surely spread throughout the nation, when a CI representative had t o l d the Sixth CCP Congress most emphatic a l l y that "... an insurrection begins i n some provinces and  later  spreads to other provinces; i n some places i t f a i l s , in some places 82 i t succeeds ... " The fact that the revolution was  developing unevenly  in China was one which L i must surely have perceived, even though later he was  accused of not r e a l i z i n g i t .  His task was to de-  velop contacts with the urban p r o l e t a r i a t , in order to equalize revolutionary development between the c i t i e s and the countryside. Li's misperception of the objective s i t u a t i o n i n China was  tied to the "wave" concept of revolutionary development.  wave concept  This  "... supplied the theoretical background f o r a l t e r -  nating periods of a c t i v i t y and preparation, revolution would spread in a series of stages corresponding  to the existing status of the  83 'revolutionary wave'." The defeats of 1927 were a trough between 81. Richard Thornton, The Comintern..., p. $0. (emphasis i n o r i g i n a l ) 82. Ibid., p. 13. 83. James P. Harrison, "The L i Li-san Line and the CCP i n 1930," (Part I) China Quarterly, number (April - June, 1963) p. 185.  ko two w a v e s :  L i was t o be p r e p a r e d  f o r the  appearance  of the  new  wave. S t a l i n ' s p o s i t i o n on t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e u t i o n was one d i c t a t e d b y h i s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s was ary,  "forced"  to declare  the  Trotsky.  s i t u a t i o n i n C h i n a was  g i v e n h i s o p p o s i t i o n to T r o t s k y ,  had p r o c l a i m e d the had  that  Chinese  and t h e  fact  that  revolStalin  revolutionTrotsky  s i t u a t i o n t o be c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y .  Trotsky  said n  We m a i n t a i n e d , b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e autumn o f 1927, t h a t a p e r i o d o f ebb i s a h e a d i n C h i n a , o f t h e r e t r e a t o f the p r o l e t a r i a t , the t r i u m p h of the c o u n t e r revolution. What was s t a l i n ' s p o s i t i o n ? "On F e b r u a r y 7, 1928, Pravda wrote: "The C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y i s h e a d i n g t o w a r d s an armed i n s u r r e c t i o n . The w h o l e s i t u a t i o n i n C h i n a s p e a k s f o r t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s i s the c o r r e c t course... E x p e r i e n c e p r o v e s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y must c o n c e n t r a t e a l l i t s e f f o r t s on t h e t a s k o f the d a y - t o - d a y and w i d e s p r e a d c a r e f u l p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e armed i n s u r r e c t i o n . " &k But,  t h o u g h P r a v d a may h a v e b e e n w r i t i n g o f armed I n s u r r e c t i o n ,  was n o t one o f t h e p r o g r a m s w h i c h L i was s e n t ou,J>.  When  he r e t u r n e d t o C h i n a , t h e  volutionary.  The p a r t y h a d l o s t  his  Actually, ning to detect  control over by e a r l y  Thus,  L i and t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e ,  operating  forces  of  C o m i n t e r n was  powerless  begin-  i n China,  In Shanghai,  illegally.  the  re-  movement,  he was n e a r l y  developing  there.  carry  organization.  when t h e  controversy  were r e a l l y two s e p a r a t e movements  were t h e g r o w i n g  s i t u a t i o n was n o t r e a l l y  the p a r t y  1929,  a "high tide"  to C h i n a to  c o n t r o l of the w o r k e r s '  and L i h a d no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e A r m y . to consolidate  back  this  there  there were  In the  country-  Red Army and t h e  Soviets,  side  there  8lj..  Leon T r o t s k y , Problems o f the Chinese R e v o l u t i o n (3rd e d . ; York: P a r a g o n Book R e p r i n t C o r p . , 19bb), p . 294.  New  about which l i t t l e was  r e a l l y known.  "The central committee i n  Shanghai continued to i n s i s t on the importance of the urban centers, and to predict an early resurgence of the revolutionary tide 85 there."  For example, a party c i r c u l a r in November, 1928,  stated that "... the main objective of our a c t i v i t i e s among the masses must be the broad laboring masses i n the c i t y p a r t i c u l a r l y the i n d u s t r i a l workers. Without the leadership of the workers, there is l i t t l e prospect of victory i n the v i l l a g e . Thusy the restoration of our urban a c t i v i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y within the workers' movement, is now the party's most urgent task. Unfortunately, our union organizations have been reduced to a minimum, our party units i n the c i t i e s have been pulverized and isolated. Nowhere In China can we find one s o l i d , i n d u s t r i a l c e l l ... Therefore, the Central Committee has now decided to concentrate i t s main strength i n such i n d u s t r i a l and p o l i t i c a l centers as Shanghai, Wuhan, Nanking, Tientsin, Dairen, Harbin, etc. In every province we must concentrate our main strength i n the important p o l i t i c a l and i n d u s t r i a l centers ...We must not go to extremes and simply abandon r u r a l a c t i v i t i e s i n order to carry on exc l u s i v e l y in the c i t i e s . A c t i v i t i e s i n the v i l l a g e should not be ignored. Relatively speaking, however, greater emphasis must be placed on urban a c t i v i t i e s . 86 The party and the revolution had suffered considerable set-backs by the time L i took o f f i c e .  Organization became the  most important element of his program on his return to China.  The  Sixth Congress of the CCP and the Comintern had both emphasized the need for re-organization of the party and the need f o r central contro.1.  L i Li-san seems to have taken this as a mandate to estab87  l i s h his own personal p o l i t i c a l machine.  To a great extent,  this f e l t need on his part for a p o l i t i c a l machine was  dictated  by p o l i t i c a l necessity, though personal aggrandizement may have 85. 86. 87.  Jane Degras, The Communist International volume III, p . l . Quoted i n Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism pp. 128-129. Richard Thornton, The Comintern p. 6J~.  U2 a l s o b e e n an i n g r e d i e n t . fined  to a r e l a t i v e l y  L i ' s s u p p o r t w i t h i n t h e p a r t y was  s m a l l number o f p e o p l e  t h i s narrow base o f s u p p o r t w i t h i n the p a r t y . t o what a p p e a r e d  His desire  upsurge  of h i s  L i needed t o c u r b the g r o w t h o f t h e  b e c a u s e he f i r m l y b e l i e v e d t h a t  was i n e x t r e m e l y  o p p o s i t i o n l e d him  the development  h a d t o be l e d b y t h e w o r k e r s .  Beyond  L i f a c e d much o p p o s i t i o n  to muzzle t h i s  the o n l y s o l u t i o n :  p o l i t i c a l machine. movement,  i n the c i t y ,  i n Shanghai.  also  t h e new r e v o l u t i o n a r y  But the w o r k e r s '  movement  poor c o n d i t i o n .  i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n by t h e C o m i n t e r n , b u t t h e  "...  letters  own  peasant  Importance had been g i v e n t o the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f peasantry  con-  warned o f the dangers  o f F e b r u a r y and O c t o b e r ,  of  Comintern  'peasant m e n t a l i t y '  and  exhorted the party  1929  the  to  88 strengthen  i t s work i n the c i t i e s . "  "peasant m e n t a l i t y " almost Moscow. Li  In a l e t t e r  L i began h i s a t t a c k  on  as s o o n as he r e t u r n e d t o C h i n a f r o m  t o a l l p a r t y members,  dated October,  1928,  said: As a r e s u l t o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s t r u g g l e i n the c o u n t r y s i d e d u r i n g the p a s t y e a r , and t h e f a c t t h a t p e a s a n t s now c o n s t i t u t e 70 t o 80 p e r c e n t o f o u r p a r t y m e m b e r s h i p , t h e p e a s a n t ment a l i t y i s now r e f l e c t e d i n o u r p a r t y . . . The Communist P a r t y acknowledges t h a t the p e a s a n t r y i s an a l l y o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n . A t t h e same t i m e , ( t h e p a r t y ) r e c o g n i z e s t h a t the p e a s a n t r y i s p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s and cannot have c o r r e c t i d e a s r e g a r d i n g s o c i a l i s m , t h a t i t s c o n s e r v a t i s m i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g , and t h a t i t l a c k s organizational a b i l i t y . Only a p r o l e t a r i a n m e n t a l i t y can l e a d us onto the c o r r e c t r e v o l u t i o n a r y r o a d . Unless  88.  James P . H a r r i s o n , "The L i L i - s a n L i n e . . . , " p . 179. F o r the C I l e t t e r s f o r F e b . . 8 and O c t . 26, 1929, see J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l . . • , v o l . I l l , p p . 1-8, 8I4.-89. N o t e : I n t h e F e b . l e t t e r , t h e E C C I w a r n e d t h e CCP n o t t o be o v e r a n x i o u s i n a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e new r e v o l u t i o n a r y h i g h t i d e - and y e t not t o f a i l t o keep a b r e a s t of i t s u p s u r g e . Ambiguous???  i+3 we p r o c e e d t o c o r r e c t t h e d a n g e r s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s p e a s a n t m e n t a l i t y , i t may l e a d t o a c o m p l e t e d e s t r u c t i o n of the r e v o l u t i o n and o f the P a r t y . 89 P a r t o f L i ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o the "peasant in h i s desire  to centralize  t h e command t o o r g a n i z e centralize  the party,  the party.  i n an attempt t o c a r r y out  L i interpreted  t h i s need t o  as a n e e d t o e l i m i n a t e h i s p e r s o n a l d p p o s i t i o n .  more n a t u r a l e n e m i e s  c o u l d he have t h a n t h o s e  were c o n t i n u i n g t o e m p h a s i z e ment,  mentality" lay  and l i k e w i s e ,  mined t o s i l e n c e  'Ifaat  I n t h e p a r t y who  the importance o f the a g r a r i a n  t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e Red Army?  h i s opponents,  a n d was so e f f e c t i v e  move-  L i was that  deter-  " . . . few  90 critics  dared t o speak  out u n t i l  L i was r e p u d i a t e d by t h e C o m i n t e r n . "  L i was v e r y much o f t h e b e l i e f high tide  was a t h a n d .  the " . . . p r e c o n d i t i o n s the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  that  the revolutionary  The P o l i t b u r o h a d d e t e r m i n e d f o r i n s u r r e c t i o n were:  fervor  o f the workers  1)  the upsurge  struggle  general  the l i k e l y c o l l a p s e  of the r u l i n g c l a s s ; opposing  3)  2)  had developed  the c i t y dwellers  the r u l i n g class  and f a v o r i n g  of  - the i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n and  e x p a n s i o n o f t h e d a i l y economic p o l i t i c a l struggle;  i n 192 7 t h a t  at large  into a  o f the regime h a t i n g and  i t s d o w n f a l l ; and  the  t e c h n i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n arid o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y of the working c l a s s . "  As t o t h e f i r s t  that  the workers'  was g a i n i n g  89.  J o h n R u e , Mao T s e - t u n g i n O p p o s i t i o n , 1927-1935 (Stanford, C a l i f . : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19bb), p . 138. T s i - a n H s i a , The G a t e o f D a r k n e s s , S t u d i e s on t h e L e f t i s t L i t e r a r y Movement i n C h i n a ( S e a t t l e , W a s h . : U n i v e r s i t y o f W a s h i n g t o n P r e s s , 19btW, p . 212. H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , C h i n e s e Communism i n 1927 p p . 113-111;. A l s o , H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , ''The D i s p u t e o v e r a Wuhan I n s u r r e c t i o n i n 1927," C h i n a Q u a r t e r l y , Number 33 ( J a n u a r y - M a r c h , 1 § 6 8 ) , p . III4..  90.  91.  movement  precondition,  force  i n intensity.  L i felt  The words  hh "high tide culars  o f r e v o l u t i o n " began a p p e a r i n g  and d o c u m e n t s ;  period.  i t became t h e  Mao Tun - a member o f t h e  d e s c r i b e d the  i n g o u t t h e empty m e a n i n g o f t h e s e  catchword League  s i t u a t i o n i n Shanghai  frequently  in his  of  of the Leftist  novel,  i n party Li  cir-  Li-san  Writers  Tzu-yeh,  -  point-  words:  As T s a i C h i n l o o k e d a t i t , t h e q u e s t i o n was s i m p l e e n o u g h : "The w o r k e r s ' s p i r i t o f s t r u g g l e was r u n n i n g h i g h b e c a u s e t h e " h i g h t i d e o f r e v o l u t i o n " was a t t h i s moment s w e e p i n g t h e c o u n t r y ] S i n c e M a r c h t h e r e had been s t r i k e s by the bus and t r a m d r i v e r s i n the I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e t t l e m e n t a n d by w o r k e r s i n t h e p o w e r house i n the F r e n c h C o n c e s s i o n . The " s p o n t a n e o u s struggle" o f t h e w o r k e r s had been k e p t up w i t h o u t a b r e a k i n f a c t o r i e s a l l o v e r S h a n g h a i , and e v e r y " e c o n o m i c s t r u g g l e " h a d a way o f t u r n i n g i n t o a " p o l i t i c a l s t r u g g l e " w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t " t h e r e v o l u t i o n h a d now r e a c h e d a h i g h tide". T s a i Chen h a d h e a r d t h i s t i m e a n d a g a i n and h a d a d o p t e d i t as h e r own f o r m u l a f o r t h i n k i n g . T h i s " f o r m u l a " sounded s i m p l e , c l e a r and " r e a s o n a b l e " , and, a l o n g w i t h a l o t of o t h e r j a r g o n , had been f i r m l y memorized... 92 I f the advent it  followed  develop party  faster  ("the  a policy of them.  that  of  the r e v o l u t i o n a r y h i g h t i d e  the peasant  than that  movement  c o u l d n o t be a l l o w e d  o f the urban p r o l e t a r i a t ,  vanguard o f the p r o l e t a r i a t " ) "tailism"  was  or else  w o u l d s o o n be  the  pursuing  - f o l l o w i n g the masses r a t h e r t h a n  revolution.  i n saying that  the  But,  as  events proved,  L I was  Comintern d i d not f u l l y understand  to the  leading  The C o m i n t e r n i t s e l f h a d seemed o p t i m i s t i c r e g a r d i n g  stage of  near,  the  correct  the  situ-  ation i n China. F o r a l l the  92.  instructions  Quoted i n T s i - a n H s i a ,  L i was  given before  The G a t e o f D a r k n e s s  ...  leaving  , pp.  211-212.  U5 Moscow, he  still  was v e r y much a f r e e  structions  were c o n f l i c t i n g ,  o r at  L i was t o l d t h a t he c o u l d assume o f the  enemy as t h e  passivity, Likewise, victory the  act  least,  many o f t h e  confusing.  in-  For  example,  any s i g n o f w e a k n e s s o n t h e  part  s i g n a l o f t h e new r e v o l u t i o n a r y wave a n d he  c o u l d sound the c a l l he f a i l e d t o  agent:  for action.  The D i l e m m a f o r L i was t h a t  a t t h e r i g h t moment, he was g u i l t y o f  and i f he a c t e d t o o  soon,  he was h a n d e d t h e mandate  i n one o r s e v e r a l  he was g u i l t y o f to prepare  provinces,  for  opportunist putschism.  the  initial  b u t he was w a r n e d t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s o f a new r e v o l u t i o n a r y h i g h t i d e  if  already  unless  existed,  93 no v i c t o r y  c o u l d be By e a r l y  a i m o f w h i c h was those  realized.  1929*  to undercut  p a r t y members  a  d  developed  his policy,  t h e power o f t h e  affiliated  m a x i m i z e h i s own p o w e r . c o u l d obey  Li h  L i was  with this  movement,  o f the C e n t r a l Committee i n Shanghai t o t h e  up t h e hope proletariat.  i n the c i t i e s , it,  until  gradually destroying  of r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g  was d o i n g , his 93.  his  soviet  own p o w e r and  party contacts  opposition,  f o r once  the  w i t h the  the  The  C h i n e s e Communism . . .  base  silence  C I knew what to  , p.  in  silencing  Li  demonstrate  plan. Benjamin Schwartz,  support  urban  least  he w o u l d n o t be g i v e n much o f a c h a n c e  He  giving  the p a r t y ' s  or at  and  to  movement  he c o u l d h a n d t h e C o m i n t e r n a " v i c t o r y " .  o f h i s o p p o s i t i o n was n e c e s s a r y ,  movement  i n order  to give  O r , he c o u l d s e e k t o r e c a p t u r e eliminating his  chief  faced w i t h a r e a l dilemma.  the C o m i n t e r n and t r y t o c o n t i n u e  the c o u n t r y s i d e ,  soviet  the  127.  1+6 Quite aside i n February "news"  from the  and O c t o b e r  1929>  letters there  was  from the ECCI t o the another  indication  o f L i ' s p l a n - L i ' s " l i n e " - had r e a c h e d  met w i t h  Moscow,  the b o u r g e o i s i e , Comintern's  and h a d  of the  much l a r g e r  under dispute  o r i g i n a l plan for  issue  o f what  t o do  the  CCP h a d b e e n one  p o l i c y t o one o f c o m p l e t e  i t i o n to these r i c h p e a s a n t s . of non-antagonism,  the s o v i e t  alliance  elimination of  his  and a l s o  in direct  altered  CI p o l i c y ,  as a means o f  policy,  i n w h i c h the poor p e a s a n t r y  f o r m an  c o n t r a d i c t i o n to " d i l u t i n g " Mao's  formed the  the  own c o n t r o l  L i e v e n i n s t r u c t e d Mao t o  r i c h peasants,  oppos-  In f o l l o w i n g  i n order to f a c i l i t a t e  movement.  w i t h the  L i had p e r s i s t e d  the  non-antag-  Bukharin,  the  w i t h the  of  However,  S t a l i n had changed  about  between B u k h a r i n and S t a l i n ,  onism toward the r i c h p e a s a n t s .  over  that  disfavor. As a p a r t  policy  CCP  foundation  the peasant  of  the  94 Communist movement  i n the  Out o f t h i s and L i ' s chosen disapproval  countryside.  fundamental  difference  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n came t h e  of L i .  between CI  i n d i c a t i o n of  T s ' a i H o - s h e n , b y 1929,  was t h e  policy  Moscow's  only  remain-  95 ing r i g h t i s t policy  i n the  i n the  Politburo.  Politburo,  since  He c o u l d h a v e no e f f e c t he seemed t o be v o t i n g  on  "alone".  "He t o l e r a t e d t h i s s i t u a t i o n o n l y a few months b e f o r e r e t u r n i n g 9l+. R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p p . 87-88. 95. Chang K u o - t ' a o h a d "remained i n Moscow a f t e r t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s , and H s i a n g Y i n g h a d b e e n s e n t o u t o f S h a n g h a i t o w o r k i n t h e Wuhan p a r t y b r a n c h .  hi to the Soviet  U n i o n t o a c t as C o m i n t e r n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  from  1929."  China,  around the time o f t h e Second Plenum,  i n June,  Before  he l e f t ,  with L i over h i s  however, T s ' a i had d i s a g r e e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f party p o l i c y toward published  i n "Bolshevik"  to a l l i a n c e  magazine,  Ts'ai  w i t h the Kulaks, which,  It would appear  that  this  l e a v e C h i n a f o r Moscow.  difference Once  the k u l a k s . stated  96  In an a r t i c l e  his opposition  i n d e e d was now C l p o l i c y . of opinion led Ts'ai  i n Moscow,  he w r o t e  to  another  article,  "The H i s t o r y o f O p p o r t u n i s m i n t h e C C P " , w h i c h seemed t o be c o n demning L i L i - s a n as a p a r t y was e n d o r s e d  leader.  Ts'ai's  initial  b y t h e C o m i n t e r n a n d condemned b y L i .  t o Chang K u o - t ' a o ,  article  According  t h e C o m i n t e r n a n d L i were a t v a r i a n c e  from  97 the  time o f t h i s  incident  (June,  1929),  A t t h e CCP S e c o n d P l e n u m , o b j e c t was t o c o n s o l i d a t e made a t t h i s power.  convened  i n June,  h i s power o v e r t h e p a r t y .  plenum c l e a r l y  showed t h a t  1929,  Li's  The d e c i s i o n s  L i L i - s a n was i n d e e d i n  Though l i t t l e p r o g r e s s h a d b e e n made  gaining the allegiance the  on.  o f the p r o l e t a r i a t ,  I n the c i t i e s  the r e s o l u t i o n s  in give  i m p r e s s i o n o f g r e a t o p t i m i s m a n d o f some d e g r e e o f s u c c e s s .  Guerrilla a c t i v i t i e s  were s t i l l  only  I t w o u l d seem t h e p l e n u m was c a l l e d  i n their  formative  stage.  t o t r y t o make L i ' s p o l i c i e s  seem t h e same a s t h o s e p u t f o r t h a t t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s . " I n s p i t e o f i t s o f f i c i a l o p t i m i s m , based on t h e a p r i o r i a s s e r t i o n s o f t h e S i x t h Congress o f t h e C o m i n t e r n a n d t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s o f t h e CCP t h a t t h e C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n was now i n a s t a g e o f ' u p r i s i n g * , 96. 97.  R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . 65. H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , Power R e l a t i o n s T . . , p . 27, t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p p . 59-90.  and R i c h a r d T h o r n -  1+8 a c l o s e r e a d i n g o f t h e document ( i . e . t h e r e s o l u t i o n s o f t h e S e c o n d P l e n u m ) g i v e s u s some i n s i g h t i n t o t h e a c t u a l d i f f i c u l t i e s w h i c h t h e CCP f a c e d i n i t s a t t e m p t t o w i n o v e r t h e u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t . . . The CCP h a s t o p o s t u l a t e a ' R e v i v i n g S t r u g g l e I n t h e W o r k e r s ' Movement', whether such a p o s t u l a t l o n accords w i t h the f a c t s o r n o t . The P l e n u m d o e s c a l l f o r a v i g o r o u s l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e p e a s a n t movement a n d an e x p a n s i o n of g u e r i l l a a c t i v i t i e s . " 98 The r e s o l u t i o n s l e n g t h t h e dangerous  o f t h e Second Plenum a l s o d i s c u s s e d a t  element  of t h e r i g h t i s t v a r i e t y . words o f t h e p a r t y members  of opposition w i t h i n the party,  Besides  this  rightist opposition,  mostly i n the  present,  "The P l e n u m r e c o g n i z e s t h a t , s i n c e t h e S i x t h C o n g r e s s , P a r t y l i f e h a s shown a new s p i r i t . H o w e v e r , some c o m rades s t i l l advocate peace w i t h i n t h e P a r t y , and c a l l f o r a b s o l u t e democracy, thus undermining the p r i n c i p l e s o f d e m o c r a t i c c e n t r a l i s m . . . The P l e n u m deems i t n o t only necessary f o r the Party t o apply c o r r e c t l y the p o l i t i c a l l i n e , b u t a l s o t o c a l 1 f o r a n enforcement of i r o n d i s c i p l i n e w i t h i n the P a r t y . " 99 The d e e p e n i n g o f t h e w o r l d r e v o l u t i o n a r y c r i s i s ,  an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f e v e n t s f o r w h i c h L i w o u l d be condemned i n Moscow i n l a t e was a l s o n o t e d a t t h e S e c o n d P l e n u m . t i d e " was b e g i n n i n g t o a p p e a r ;  100  whether  justify  of the p a r t y .  above shows t h a t  L i was a t t e m p t i n g t o  h i s own i n c r e a s i n g c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e p a r t y ,  democracy/centralism continuum. 1930,  The " r e v o l u t i o n a r y r i s i n g  i t w o u l d come s o o n e r o r  l a t e r w o u l d be d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e e f f o r t s The s e c t i o n q u o t e d  L i would answer t h e r e q u e s t  1930,  L a t e r i n 1929 f o r greater  on t h e  and e s p e c i a l l y i n democracy  p a r t y w i t h the formation o f " a c t i o n committees"  i n the  w h i c h were  " . . . s p e c i a l organs o f p a r t y power, which appear to have b e e n s u p e r i m p o s e d o n e x i s t i n g p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s 98.  99. 100.  Conrad B r a n d t , J e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , John K. K a i r b a n k , A Documentary H i s t o r y o f C h i n e s e Communism (New Y o r k : Atheneum P r e s s , 1966),  p p . Ib5-lt>6. Ibid., Ibid.,  pp. pp.  176-177. 169-I7I.  h9 by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d e c r e e s . An a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e c o m b i n e d t h e f u n c t i o n s and a u t h o r i t i e s o f o t h e r Communist o r g a n i z a t i o n s . . . The k e y s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a c t i o n c o m m i t t e e s , I t s e e m s , was t h a t t h e i r formation-fallowed L i L i - s a n t o n e u t r a l i z e o p p o s i t i o n t h a t he c o u l d n o t o t h e r w i s e e l i m i n a t e . " 101 The C h i n e s e E a s t e r n R a i l w a y c r i s i s of  1929,  prompted the  from the ECCI.  Close  c a t i o n of the a l r e a d y a t i o n of the  O c t o b e r 26  letter  reading of  this  obvious  to the  letter  differences  s i t u a t i o n i n C h i n a and the  of  the  second  CC o f t h e  yields  between  CCP  some  Li's  half  indi-  interpret-  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of  the  Comintern. The l e t t e r national c r i s i s " ,  talks  but  about  says " ( I ) t  the n a t i o n a l c r i s i s w i l l develop  102  situation."  The E C C I was  "rising tide i n g between  of r e v o l u t i o n "  is  the d e p r e s s i o n  the worsening o f Even though the  w h i c h w o u l d seem t o  impossible  a "phase  careful  not t o use  the  contradictions  i n many i n d u s t r i e s ,  words  that  the  of  between  the  of the p r o l e t a r i a t ,  r e v o l u t i o n was  the  etc.  103  conditions  indeed  hand,  i t a l s o c r i t i c i z e d the CCP: . . . the i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e o f the CCP and t h e l e v e l o f w o r k i n g - c l a s s o r g a n i z a t i o n l a g b e h i n d t h e g r o w t h o f mass d i s c o n t e n t , t h e m o u n t i n g r e v o l u t i o n a r y e n e r g y , and t h e s p o n t a n e o u s movement. Few o f t h e r e d t r a d e u n i o n s a r e mass o r g a n i z a t i o n s , w h i l e t h e I n f l u e n c e o f t h e y e l l o w KMT u n i o n s i s s t i l l g r e a t . . . The c o m m u n i s t p a r t y i s f a r f r o m  101. 102.  R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l p . 85. Ibid.  103.  fight-  agrarian  l e t t e r began by t a l k i n g about  indicate  when  revolutionary  i n r e l a t i o n to the outbreak  the c o n d i t i o n s  of  to predict  Into a d i r e c t l y  the m i l i t a r i s t s and the  imperialists, crisis,  China entering  118. . . . , volume  at  III,  50 having r a l l i e d to i t s side the r e v o l u t i o n a r y cadres o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l w o r k e r s ; s t i l l l e s s has i t a c c o m p l i s h e d the t a s k o f w i n n i n g the m a j o r i t y o f t h e working class . . . The p a r t y h a s n o t y e t become t h e p i o n e e r , o r g a n i z e r , and l e a d e r o f t h e d i r e c t l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e o f the broad masses. 101; The E C C I f u r t h e r  e a u t t h a t  " I n t h e new c o n d i t i o n s , t h e p r i m a r y a n d f u n d a m e n t a l t a s k o f t h e CCP i s t o w i n t h e l e a d i n g r o l e i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. K h i l e not p e r m i t t i n g any r e p e t i t i o n of past putschist mistakes the p a r t y must do a l l i t c a n t o s t i r up and s h a r p e n c l a s s c o n f l i c t s , l e a d and g u i d e t h e i n d i g n a t i o n o f t h e m a s s e s , and as t h e c o n f l i c t s d e v e l o p r a i s e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y h i g h e r demands, c a r r y i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s t r u g g l e to even h i g h e r stages . . . " 105 The C o m i n t e r n made a g r e a t p o i n t o f t h e its  estimation,  situation was,  the  fact  CCP was n o t t a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f t h e  i n China.  according to Richard Thornton,  C.E.R.  situation,  t h r o u g h use o f  i n t e r n a l problems got  the  to handle  Soviet  wide  these,  Union.  106  to  bad enough,  The CCP was increase  Increase  strikes  The E C C I l e t t e r , it  specifically  ment lOlf.. 105. 106. 107.  ...  i n the  the  CCP as  mentioned the a r e a s where  the  over  a diversionary  the o f f e n s i v e  i n s t r u c t e d not  its  the element:  activities  its  against  to seek n a t i o n -  in city  and promote g u e r r i l l a  however,  letter  t h e KMT w o u l d h a v e t o u s e  and w o u l d " r e l a x "  r e v o l u t i o n , but to  countryside,  "crisis"  to i n s u r e p r o t e c t i o n o f  U n i o n f r o m f u r t h e r f i g h t i n g w i t h t h e KMT t r o o p s  troops  in  The u n d e r l y i n g m o t i v a t i o n b e h i n d t h i s  Soviet  if  that,  and activities.  p u t L i i n a n awkward p o s i t i o n :  strengthening  Mao T s e - t u n g  o f the  "partisan  a n d Ho~Lung a r e  Jane D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ibid., p . 89": R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . Ibid. '  ... 101  move-  active."  , volume  III,  107 p.87.  51 Li  c o u l d no l o n g e r s a f e l y  to c a r r y the  out t h i s  Red A r m y .  oppose  C I command,  But,  p r o v i n c i a l committees indirectly,  i t was  f o r the  L i Li-san line.  and p a r t y  activities  i n the  He a l s o  of the  Li persisted was t h e most  was  7,  These  committees",  laid  1929,  were a l s o  to the  (not)  to  CI l i n e .  'important large apparent  continued to t a l k of  new r i s i n g t i d e  were i n t e g r a l p a r t s  December  countryside  and t a k i n g  108  p a r a t i o n f o r the  "action  Industrial strikes  to bring L i close  Red Army i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e structions."  command  L i c o n t r o l l e d the Army.  the b a s i s  of attacking  order  build-up of  t o be u n d e r t h e  LI c o n t r o l l e d through h i s  C i r c u l a r Number 60,  policy  In  not t h e m i l i t a r y commanders.  Central  o f w h i c h seemed  rival.  L i provided for the  he s a i d t h a t  of the p r o v i n c i a l committees,  so t h a t ,  Mao, h i s c h i e f  down  were t o  begin,  increase,  all  But h i s  cities'  "...  with  the  i n Comintern i n the need f o r  of r e v o l u t i o n .  Both of  pre-  these  L i Li-san line.  in his belief  i m p o r t a n t element  i n the  that  the urban  revolution,  proletariat  even  though,  b y e a r l y 1930, o n l y e i g h t p e r c e n t o f p a r t y m e m b e r s h i p c o u l d be t e r m e d w o r k i n g c l a s s , o f w h i c h o n l y two p e r c e n t were i n d u s t r i a l  109  workers. Through v a r i o u s Li  revealed  his plans.  articles  He d i d n o t b e l i e v e  c o u l d be r e l i e d u p o n t o c a p t u r e 108. 109.  w h i c h appear  large  that  i n Hung C h ' I , the  urban areas.  R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . 105. R o b e r t C . N o r t h , Moscow and C h i n e s e Communists S t a n - f o f d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1953), p . 132.  Red Army He s a i d , (Stanford:  52 "All  the t a l k of surrounding the c i t i e s  o f r e l y i n g o n t h e Red Army t o t a k e hollow b l u f f . "  I n an a r t i c l e  with the countryside,  the c i t i e s  and  i s nonsense and  i n M a y , he a g a i n c l a i m e d t h e p r o -  110 letarlat  had the leading The f r a m e w o r k  it  role  i n the r e v o l u t i o n .  f o r L i ' s p l a n was f o u n d i n Hung C h ' i ;  c o n s i s t e d o f three major p r o p o s i t i o n s : F i r s t , t h a t a n I n i t i a l v i c t o r y i n one o r s e v e r a l p r o v i n c e s was c o n t i n g e n t u p o n a n a t i o n w i d e r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n ; s e c o n d , t h a t w h i l e v i c t o r y must be a c h i e v e d b y t h e f u l l employment o f a l l t h e r e v o l u t i o n ' s f o r c e s — p e a s a n t u p r i s i n g , Red Army a t t a c k s , t r o o p r e b e l l i o n s , a n d so f o r t h — t h e k e y t o v i c t o r y w o u l d be t h e p r o l e t a r i a n s t r u g g l e i n m a j o r c i t i e s , w h i c h L i L i - s a n saw a s t h e p r i m a r y objectives; t h i r d , that the a r r i v a l of a d i r e c t r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n w o u l d be s i g n a l e d b y a n outburst of the p r o l e t a r i a n struggle i n the large c i t i e s . I l l Li's  Inprecorr,  l i n e i s even found r e f l e c t e d  w r i t t e n by an L . Magyar,  i n an a r f i c l e  in  who s a y s  "The CP o f C h i n a r e a l i z e s t h a t t h e f a t e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n w i l l , i n t h e l a s t r e s o r t , be d e c i d e d i n S h a n g h a i , Hankow, T i e n t s i n , C a n t o n , e t c . It i s q u i t e aware t h a t . . . t h e p r o l e t a r i a t i s v e r y weak i n t h e d i s t r i c t s e m b r a c e d b y t h e S o v i e t movement. O u r Communist P a r t y o f C h i n a i s a w a r e t h a t t h e c o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n cannot be v a n q u i s h e d b y t h e e l e m e n t a r y movement o f t h e p e a s a n t s w i t h out t h e c o o p e r a t i o n o f the w o r k e r s . The P a r t y knows t h a t t h e p e a s a n t r y , e v e n when l e d b y t h e C o m m u n i s t s , c a n n o t be v i c t o r i o u s w i t h o u t t h e working c l a s s . . . 112 n  L.  M a g y a r may h a v e b e e n one o f t h e two r e l a t i v e l y  unusually  silent  Li-san period. 110. 111. 112.  CI representatives (The a v a i l a b l e  anonymous a n d  i n Shanghai d u r i n g the L l  literature  g i v e s no i n d i c a t i o n  R o b e r t C . N o r t h , Moscow a n d C h i n e s e Communists ( S t a n f o r d : S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 19537, p . 13!+. R o b e r t N o r t h , Moscow . . . , p . 121+. L . M a g y a r , " C r i s i s a n d t h e R e v o l u t i o n a r y Movement i n C h i n a , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l P r e s s C o r r e s p o n d e n c e , volume 10, number 18 ( A p r i l 10, 1930). N o t e : Inprecorr was a n o f f i c i a l o r g a n o f t h e C l , p u b l i s h e d i n Moscow b y t h e C l .  53 who t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and,  were.)  Magyar, however,  i f indeed the CI r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ,  out o f l i n e w i t h CI d i r e c t i v e s since various authors Li  quite  T h i s m i g h t make  sense,  ( e . g . Thornton and Hsiao) p o i n t out t h a t  CC I n S h a n g h a i s e c r e t  f r o m t h e C I i n Moscow t o t h e  from the r e s t  p r e s e n t e d by Magyar, however,  of the party.  could also  reflect  The a t t i t u d e the wavering  o f t h e C o m i n t e r n - a n o t h e r one o f t h e a m b i g u i t i e s  i n f o r m a t i o n c o m i n g f r o m Moscow. latter,  seems t o have b e e n  for China.  k e p t much o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  attitude  s p o k e no C h i n e s e ,  since  The a n s w e r  i t seems h a r d t o b e l i e v e  i n I n p r e c o r r w o u l d n o t have  that  in  i s more l i k e l y t h e an a r t i c l e p r i n t e d  t h e s a n c t i o n o f t h e C I o r w o u l d be  out o f l i n e w i t h Comintern p o l i c y . I n May, 1930, from the s o v i e t laws, Union.  was t h e f i r s t c o n f e r e n c e  of  delegates  w h i c h adopted p r o v i s i o n a l l a n d and l a b o r  and passed a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r defense  of the Soviet  The l a n d l a w c a l l e d f o r t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f l a n d a n d  advocated Li  areas,  there  immediate e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of collective  and s t a t e  farms.  was a t t e m p t i n g t o s k i p a s t a g e o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a n d go  straight  113  to s o c i a l i s m . was e l e c t e d preparations  At t h i s  conference  " . . . a special  committee  and charged w i t h the t a s k o f making a l l the f o r the F i r s t All-China  was s c h e d u l e d t o c o n v e n e  Congress  1  o n December 11th  necessary  of Soviets,  which  o f t h e same y e a r ,  but  114 w h i c h d i d n o t a c t u a l l y meet u n t i l n e a r l y e l e v e n months The J u n e 11, i m p o r t a n t document:  1930  R e s o l u t i o n o f t h e CCP P o l i t b u r o i s an.  I t i s the essence o f the L i L i - s a n  Hsiao T s o - l i a n g p r o v i d e s a r a t h e r comprehensive  113. 114.  later."  i  See H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , P o w e r R e l a t i o n s V i c t o r A . Y a k h o n t o f f , The C h i n e s e S o v i e t s McCann, 1934), p . 130  line.  explanation of p p . 18-20, f o r t h e (New Y o r k : C o w a r d -  the f o u r major p o i n t s  of the  document  of t h i r t y - f i v e  sections:  I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , L i L i - s a n assumed t h a t i n t h e g l o b a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y wave o f t h e t i m e a r e v o l u t i o n c o u l d f i r s t b r e a k o u t i n C h i n a and t h e n e n g u l f t h e whole w o r l d . C o n d i t i o n s were r i p e f o r a r e v o l u t i o n i n C h i n a , and t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c c r i s i s was growing e q u a l l y a c u t e i n a l l p a r t s o f the c o u n t r y . I t w o u l d t h e r e f o r e be i n e v i t a b l e t h a t once a g i g a n t i c s t r u g g l e o f w o r k e r s was s t a r t e d i n k e y c i t i e s , i t w o u l d i m m e d i a t e l y make f o r a n a t i o n w i d e r e v o l u t i o n a r y upsurge - a d i r e c t r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n . S e c o n d , p r e l i m i n a r y s u c c e s s e s i n one o r more p r o v i n c e s c o u l d o n l y be a c h i e v e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e g e n e r a l r e v o l u t i o n a r y s i t u a t i o n i n t h e whole n a t i o n . The c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e t i m e made i t n e c e s s a r y t o t a k e Wuhan as a c e n t e r f o r w i n n i n g s u c h p r e l i m i n a r y s u c c e s s , s i n c e Wuhan o c c u p i e d a s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n i n C e n t r a l C h i n a , h o l d i n g the key t o the success o f the r e v o l u t i o n throughout the c o u n t r y . T h i r d , the s t r u g g l e o f workers i n urban centers would be a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n t h e n a t i o n w i d e r e v o l u t i o n a r y movement. To be s u c c e s s f u l , i t n e e d e d o n l y t o be a i d e d b y o t h e r f o r c e s , s u c h as p e a s a n t u p r i s i n g s , s o l d i e r i n s u r r e c t i o n s , and Red Army a s s a u l t s . F o u r t h , t h e r e v o l u t i o n a t t h e p r e s e n t s t a g e was e s s e n t i a l l y an a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n l e d by w o r k e r s , w h i c h was t h e n a t u r e o f a d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n . But where t h e d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n s u c c e e d e d , i t s h o u l d immedi a t e l y p a s s t o a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n and t h e r e s h o u l d n o t be any i n t e r v a l b e t w e e n t h e m . I t w o u l d be a g r o s s mistake to postpone the s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n u n t i l a f t e r t h e s u c c e s s f u l c o m p l e t i o n o f the d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n a l l over the c o u n t r y . 115 There plans of the  are  some s t r i k i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n s betv/een  and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s Comintern.  Problem,  dated  o f t h e s i t u a t i o n i n C h i n a and t h e  The E C C I ,  J u l y 23,  Li's  1930  in its (just  f o u r days b e f o r e  variance  w i t h the  Chinese  the  assault  on C h a n g s h a )  was a t  utlon  of the  CCP P o l i t b u r o .  115.  H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , Power R e l a t i o n s p . 22. See a l s o , R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p p . 151|-155. F o r a c o m p a r i s o n o f the major p o i n t s of c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e two d o c u m e n t s , see H s i a o T s o - l i a n g , P o w e r R e l a t i o n s p . 168.  116.  considerable  R e s o l u t i o n on t h e  beliefs  June 11  Resol-  116  55 The C o m i n t e r n d i s a g r e e d  w i t h L i and s a i d  "there  is  not  117 yet  an a l l - C h i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  the  formation of  task,  a central  CI,  urban areas,  the  but  for opposition  first  to  activities while  strengthening  duty of the  support  the  the  were c o n c e r n e d ,  L i was a d v o c a t i n g The C I a l s o  more s t a g e s b e f o r e  the  the  important  Red A r m y .  Accord-  government.  while  the  l a b o r movement.  to  Comintern As f a r as  a t t a c k s on u r b a n  that  the  Chinese  attack  L i had  CI suggested cautious  direct  stated  the b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c  of  believed  t h e most  Red Army was n o t  soviet  to the Yellow Unions,  u s i n g them t o s t r e n g t h e n  The C I  s o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t was  along with continued  ing to the  situation."  called  advocated guerrilla  increases,  bases.  r e v o l u t i o n was  s t a g e and w o u l d have t o go t h r o u g h  i t w o u l d become a s o c i a l i s t  in many  revolution.  Li,  118 however,  was a l r e a d y  t a l k i n g of  a socialist  revolution.  B o t h R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n and H s i a o T s o - l i a n g emphasis fiable,  on the  July  to point  out  23rd  letter  dating before  ever,  T h o r n t o n assumes t h a t  approved  the  of  the  attempted  L i received and t h a t  the  Comintern.  It  cities  i s n o t t o be  that  i n terms  once he c o u l d g i v e  of h i s  much  differently.  117.  Richard Thornton, Richard Thornton,  line  - that  The C o m i n t e r n The C o m i n t e r n  is  w o u l d not  be  168.  168-175.  safe  that  situation  they would t r e a t  ..7,  23rd,  it  them a v i c t o r y  p. pp.  How-  on J u l y  forgotten  the  justi-  L i Li-san  because of t h i s  a t t a c k on t h e  great  uprising.  letter  Comintern d i d not understand  a n d he f e l t  accomplished  118.  failure  L i knew h i s  o f by the  L i was s u r e China,  the  I f i n d no e v i d e n c e ,  t o assume t h a t  which i s  Comintern disagreement w i t h the  line,  f o r which  from the ECCI,  place  in -  one  him  56  L i had r e c e i v e d d i d not approve letter  on J u l y  does e x i s t the  indications that  (and I s e r i o u s l y June,  d a t e d one m o n t h l a t e r . and knew f r o m i t  i n dissonance Briefly,  w i t h the  the  Comintern  Whether or not L i r e c e i v e d doubt  the  directions  t h a t he d i d ) ,  much o f what  Doubtless, that  the there  - an E C C I R e s o l u t i o n on  1930  question - which contains  resolution, was  23rd  stand.  a document d a t e d  Chinese  letter  of his  earlier  is  in  L i was aware  of  CCP r e s o l u t i o n o f coming from t h e  the major p o i n t s o f t h i s  June,  the this  June  11  Comintern. resolution  1930  were: 1)  The w o r k i n g c l a s s  and p e a s a n t r y  revolutionary  struggle,  Congress;  The c o n d i t i o n s  2)  have w o r s e n e d ;  3)  with a task of activities  beginning to r i s e  as p e r t h e r e s o l u t i o n s  There  i n C h i n a as a w h o l e ;  are  o f the p r o l e t a r i a t  i s no o b j e c t i v e l y  1+) The s o v i e t  c a r d i n a l Importance,  of a c e n t r a l Soviet kulaks  r e v o l u t i o n of the  p o o r and m i d d l e p e a s a n t s ;  must s e c u r e destined  i n the  t o p l a y an immense r o l e  p a r t y must e x t e n d  movement; democratic  9)  i n the  the  expand the  The C h i n e s e  r e v o l u t i o n not  the  a  6 ) T h e r e s h o u l d be  o f the  7)  The  develop  revolutionary  party  Red A r m y ,  f u r t h e r development  revolution differs  party  T u r n away f r o m  8 ) To i n s u r e p r o l e t a r i a n hegemony,  t h e s t r i k e movement,  i m p e r i a l i s t movement,  5)  situation  and d i r e c t  Sovier areas;  c o n t r o l and l e a d e r s h i p  revolutionary struggle;  peasantry  - t h e a g r a r i a n r e v o l u t i o n must be  economic p o l i c i e s complete  and  a  Sixth  confronts  to organize  Government;  the  revolutionary  movement  a l l i a n c e w i t h the  no p r e m a t u r e  of  to  the  the  and l e a d the independent  from the u s u a l  o n l y i n the c o m p o s i t i o n o f the  of  antimass bourgeois-  moving  57 forces, are of  and n o t o n l y by t h e f a c t  engaged i n a s t r u g g l e reasons,  that  against  a t t h e same t i m e a n a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  being  revolution,  the  for proletarian dictatorship From t h e t o n e  l o o k more a n d more l i k e a Meanwhile, against  t o be t h e s i g n a l s Li Nanchang,  of this  prepares  and the  resolution,  socialist L i began t o  putschist.  Feng Y u - h s i a n g  Chiang K a i - s h e k .  F o r a number  revolution i n China,  119  revolution.  and p e a s a n t s  the bourgeoisie.  the bourgeois-democratic  pre-requisites  the workers  L i took  was i n r e v o l t  this  i n the North  and t h e g r e a t  depression  w h i c h w o u l d l e a d t o t h e new r e v o l u t i o n .  ordered  Chu T e h a n d Mao t o go w i t h t h e i r t r o o p s  K i a n g s i - the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  T e - h u a i was o r d e r e d  t o Changsha,  high tide  Hunan.  h a d come.  The two were t o  to P'eng  later  meet a n d s u r r o u n d i i u h a n . Chu f a i l e d at  Changsha,  basis  at Nanchang.  scored  of a Soviet  L i p r o c l a i m e d o n J u l y 29, government  i n China.  c a l l of the r e v o l u t i o n .  meeting response  i n Changsha  to celebrate  on t h e p a r t  o f t h e May 119.  policy.  In other c i t i e s  30th  3,000  workers  was a l s o  f o r L i ' s new s o v i e t .  Movement was n o t g o i n g t o be  Jane D e g r a s ,  The Communist  P P . 114-120. :  :  This  i n a 'sovietized There  On t h e  the estab-  1930,  once t h e y  the v i c t o r y .  of the workers  invalidated L i ' s "pro-city" of s o l i d a r i t y  But, only  victory  L i had once s a i d  t h e masses w o u l d r i s e u p i n t e n s o f t h o u s a n d s the  an i n i t i a l  r o u t i n g t h e w a r l o r d Ho C h i e n f r o m t h e c i t y .  of the v i c t o r y ,  lishment  P'eng  International  that  heard  attended  a  apathetic city' no g e s t u r e The s p i r i t  repeated. volume I I I ,  58  Meanwhile, Ho Chien had gotten aid from America,  Britain  and Japan, whose troops began to s h e l l the c i t y of Changsha.  Even  this attack from outside and from imperialists did not spark the workers to r a l l y to the party's cause.  On August 5 ,  P'eng's army  was forced to evacuate Changsha, where, on entry of the m i l i t a r i s t ' s troops, f i v e thousand  Reds and suspects were executed.  L i was not pleased by the retreat of the Red Army, and he ordered Chu to take his troops to Changsha to help P'eng try to recapture the c i t y . 13, 1930,  The combined forces fought u n t i l September  on the outskirts of Changsha.  fight on was useless, Mao, from the Central treat to Kiangsi.  Then, seeing that to  Chu and P'eng decided to defy orders  Committee.  On t h e i r own,  they ordered a re-  Many among the troops disagreed, but Mao's  aim was to t r y to preserve the few forces that were l e f t , rather  120 than to allow the entire Red Army to be destroyed. Upon receiving the report of the i n i t i a l victory at Changsha and hearing of the declaration of a Soviet government (something for which i t had been pressing f o r a long time), the Comintern organ Inprecorr praised the situation on August  7:  Changsha, the c a p i t a l of the province of Hunan, one of the most important provinces in the heart of China, was captured on the 28th of July by the v i c t o r i o u s l y advanced F i f t h Red Army of the Chinese Soviet t e r r i t o r i e s . Supported by the insurgent workers and peasants ... and by the mutiny of some of the government soldiers ... ( i ) n a surprisingly short time, the whole of Changsha was covered with a sea of red flags ... The Soviet Power, the power of the workers, peasants and soldiers was proclaimed 120. 121.  121 ...  K.S. Karol, China, the Other Communism (New York: H i l l and Wang,. 1967), "pp. 8 2 - 8 2 . Robert North, Moscow p. 138.  59 But, failed, the  regardless  of t h i s  he c o u l d no l o n g e r s i l e n c e  CCP.  P a v e l M i f had a r r i v e d  "Returned  initial  praise,  once L i ' s  opposition to himself  i n China i n e a r l y  policy  within  with  1930  his  Students".  "The p r i m a r y m i s s i o n o f t h e r e t u r n e d s t u d e n t s was to undermine L i ' s p o s i t i o n i n the p a r t y , perhaps i n time to depose h i m . Characteristically, just as L i (had b e e n ) s t r e n g t h e n i n g h i s own p o s i t i o n i n the Chinese p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n against i n t e r n a l r i v a l s , t h e C o m i n t e r n seems t o h a v e b e e n e m p l o y i n g t h e r e t u r n e d s t u d e n t s t o s t r e n g t h e n i t s own p o s i t i o n vis-Vvis L i L i - s a n . " 122 All  this time,  izing L i . seated,  Ho M e n g - h s i u n g a n d C h ' e n T u - h s i u h a d b e e n  Though i t  the  p a t h was  on L i , a n d t o t r y  w o u l d be clear  critic-  some t i m e b e f o r e he c o u l d be u n -  f o r the o p p o s i t i o n to begin  to b r i n g the  CCP i n t o l i n e w i t h t h e  its  attack  Comintern's  policies. . The  "attack"  on L i b e g a n w i t h t h e  w h i c h convened  at  September  I t was h e a d e d  28.  L u s h a n on S e p t e m b e r  of  rectifying  placed began. that  rather  122.  by the  than lose  w i t h a n eye  S i x t h Congress  f o r the  on  En-lai,  express  t o becoming t h e next  office  Politburo  when t h e T h i r d  self-preservation,  members  Plenum  C h ' u a n d Chou  P o l i t b u r o at  the  Ho a n d c o v e r up L i ' s e r r o r s .  Richard Thornton,  head  decided  themselves along w i t h L i (since  t h e i r p l a c e s on t h e  would ignore  Union,  the r e m o v a l o f a l l the  Por reasons of  had g a i n e d they  demanded  in office  Soviet  CCP,  the L i L i - s a n l i n e .  Ho M e n g - h s i u n g , of the p a r t y ,  and a d j o u r n e d  1930  b y C h ' u C h ' i u - p a i and Chou  who had b o t h r e t u r n e d f r o m t h e purpose  2i|,  T h i r d Plenum o f the  The C o m i n t e r n  ...  , p.  Sixth Thus,  150.  they  Congress), this  plenum  6o discussed  the opportunist  l i n e o f Ho M e n g - h s i u n g r a t h e r t h a n  crediting  L i , w h i c h had been t h e C I ' s i n t e n t i o n .  c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e p l e n u m was t h a t tactics  rather than of l i n e  serious  crime).  policies  Hsiang Chung-fa  said  were o n t h e w h o l e c o m p l e t e l y the C e n t r a l Committee,  months,  i n c o r r e c t l y overestimated  c a r r y i n g o u t armed u p r i s i n g s  " . . . that  of  - w h i c h was a while the  party's  i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e Com-  especially  and i t s s p e e d o f d e v e l o p m e n t . "  The g e n e r a l  had been those  (meaning t h e o r e t i c a l  intern,  against  L i ' s errors  dis-  over  the l a s t  the revolutionary  The m i s t a k e s  i n several  situation  numbered  cities,  three  three:  tactics  i m p e r i a l i s m , and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a c t i o n  ...  employed  committees.  123 These had a l r e a d y been  corrected,  Ho M e n g - h s i u n g ,  whose  influence  i n S h a n g h a i made h i m a c o n t e n d e r general  o f the p a r t y ,  according  to Hsiang.  w i t h the party  f o r the p o s i t i o n o f  continued to c a l l  f o r another  Comintern disapproval o f t h e actions T h i r d P l e n u m came of  in a letter  t h e C C P , d a t e d November 16,  succeeded  i n deposing Li's  L i .  1930.  Thus,  the Comintern had t o  w h o l e p o l i c y was condemned as " a n e n t i r e  He was condemned as a n o p p o r t u n i s t his errors  Committee  The T h i r d P l e n u m h a d n o t  letter.  12lj..  conference.  from the ECCI t o t h e C e n t r a l  and a n t i - M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t v i e w s "  123.  secretary-  t a k e n a t the  of erroneous  Briefly,  masses  intervene. system  i n t h e November Trotskyist.  consisted o f the f o l l o w i n g :  R i c h a r d T h o r n t o n , The C o m i n t e r n . . . , p . 191J see a l s o B r a n d t , S c h w a r t z , a n d F a i r b a n k , D o c u m e n t a r y ' H i s t o r y . . . , p p . 200-208, and L i - ' f f e i - h a n ( L o - M a i ) , T s e n - y a n g S u - c r T ' i n g L i - s a n l u - h s i e n (Hoover I n s t i t u t e , S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y ) , f o r s i m i l a r r e p o r t s on t h e n a t u r e o f L i ' s e r r o r s . J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l . . . , volume I I I , p . 137. '  61 1) He ignored the unevenness of revolutionary development in China; 2) He overlooked the fact that the peasant movement had far outpaced the workers' movement; 3) He ignored the strength of the imperialists, especially present i n large urban areas and i n d u s t r i a l centers; 4) His economic p o l i c i e s in the countryside were premature; no real groundwork had been l a i d for true soviet governments; 5) He overestimated  the strength of the Red Army.  125  Shortly a f t e r the l e t t e r arrived, L i was called to Moscow (where he would remain f o r f i f t e e n years) to answer f o r his errors, and the stage was set for the Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party. The Fourth Plenum was convened on January 16, 1931. The Ho-Meng-hsiung faction was e s s e n t i a l l y silenced once again, this time by Pavel Mif. The Plenum attacked L i Li-san, saying "Comrade Li-san, basing himself upon t h i s absolutely incorrect l i n e , carried out a struggle against the CI l i n e , disobeyed CI d i s c i p l i n e , and adopted the arguments used by the l e f t i s t and r i g h t i s t rebels against the d by saying that the CI did not understand the Chinese situation and could not lead the Chinese revolution." 126 At this time, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai was condemned as responsible  127 for the f a i l u r e of the Third Plenum. The new leadership that emerged from the Fourth Plenum was Hsiang Chung-fa as the Secretary General, Chou E n - l a i as a member of the Central standing committee, with a l l other posts to be held by the Returned Students, Mif's protege's. 125. 126. 127. 128.  128  Ho  Jane Degras, The Communist International ... , volume III, pp. 138-I4O. Brandt, Schwartz, Fairbank, Documentary History ... , pp.209-216. Richard Thornton, The Comintern ... , p. 215, (Hsiang and Chou had "defected" to Mif.) ' Richard Thornton, The Comintern ... , p. 215.  62 M e n g - h s i u n g and a l l h i s f o l l o w e r s  had l e f t  the plenum, to h o l d a  s e c r e t m e e t i n g o f t h e i r own on J a n u a r y 17. by t h e p o l i c e a t t h e KMT.  t h i s meeting,  They were  and w e r e e x e c u t e d  i n F e b r u a r y by  Wang M i n g and t h e 28 B o l s h e v i k s h a v e b e e n a c c u s e d  r e v e a l i n g the meeting place  of  t h i s g r o u p to  1931,  of  t h e KMT i n o r d e r  to eliminate t h e i r p o t e n t i a l l y powerful opposition. 2I4.,  apprehended  129  H s i a n g C h u n g - f a was c a p t u r e d by t h e KMT a n d  Thus i t was t h a t Wang M i n g became t h e a c t i n g  On J u n e  130  executed.  secretary-general  o f the CCP. Wang M i n g ' s t e r m as been c a l l e d the  secretary-general  "Third Left Deviation".  b y P a v e l M i f and was a c r e a t u r e he made l e f t i s t  mistakes  C h ' i u - p a i becore the answer  to  him?  this  ment, w i t h o u t the  What f o l l o w s  from the  it  is a b r i e f explanation  establishment  r e l y i n g on an u r b a n b a s e ,  Wang M i n g ' s p o l i c y ,  guided that  o f L i L i - s a n and C h ' u  C o m i n t e r n i n November,  importance of the  i n the  indeed  t h e C o m i n t e r n , how i s  s i m i l a r to those  f a i l u r e of L i ' s attempts  t h i s brought  I f he was  CCP h a s  of  question.  The l e t t e r emphasized the  of  of the  to take  Comintern.  had  1930,  of a Soviet  a necessity  govern-  emphasized  Changsha and t h e  reaction  T h i s became a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t  o r what t h e r e  was o f h i s  by  of  policy.  The F o u r t h P l e n u m h a d b e e n m a r k e d by t h e h i g h d e g r e e of f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n the p a r t y .  Not o n l y was  t h e new  leader-  s h i p c o n f r o n t e d b y t h e Ho M e n g - h s i u n g o p p o s i t i o n , b u t a l s o 129.  130.  J o h n R u e , Mao i n O p p o s i t i o n . . . I b i d . , p . 2I45T  , p.  2k0.  by  63 t h e Chu-Mao f o r c e s  i n the  Red a r e a s ,  growing ever s t r o n g e r  vis-a-  131 vis  the  Shanghai-based  C e n t r a l Committee.  Wang M i n g was i n t e r e s t e d Red A r m y , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t  i n promoting the growth of  of a central soviet  government,  the  and  the  132 formation of a r u r a l t e r r i t o r i a l base f o r the was s t i l l  CCP.  The  t a l k i n g about a s t a t e o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y c r i s e s ,  M i f was e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e e d t o m a i n t a i n some c o n t a c t urban p r o l e t a r i a t . Comintern  Wang M i n g ,  and P a v e l  w i t h the  I t w o u l d seem, was t r y i n g t o  offensives  l a u n c h e d by C h i a n g K a i - s h e k - t h e  campaigns". third,  July,  1931.  the  1931,  Wang was v i r t u a l l y b l o c k e d f r o m i m p l e The r e a l d e v e l o p m e n t s  i n K i a n g s i , where Mao was c o n s o l i d a t i n g h i s Ihile  the  "encirclement  The s e c o n d o f t h e s e was l a u n c h e d i n A p r i l ,  m e n t i n g much o f a n y p o l i c y . place  follow  policy. A n o t h e r p r o b l e m f a c i n g Wang was t h e b e g i n n i n g o f  the  CI  important F i r s t A l l - C h i n a  were  taking  power.  Congress  of  Soviets  was t a k i n g p l a c e i n J u i c h i n , K i a n g s i , i n N o v e m b e r , 1931, Wang M i n g was i n .Moscow; t h e r e a s o n f o r h i s l e a v i n g C h i n a was n e v e r f u l l y  133  explained. He d i d n o t r e t u r n u n t i l 1937. According to Benjamin Schwarts, " H i s r e t u r n t o Moscow was more i n t h e n a t u r e o f a n e x i l e f r o m t h e s o u r c e s o f p o w e r i n t h e C h i n e s e Communist movement t h a n a c l i m b t o new h e i g h t s o f power . . . I t must be e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e p o w e r o f t h e C h i n e s e Communist l e a d e r s a f t e r 1931 d i d n o t d e r i v e s o l e l y f r o m t h e mandate o f Moscow, b u t was s o l i d l y b a s e d o n c o n t r o l o f a m i l i t a r y f o r c e , a  131.  132.  133.  B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , C h i n e s e Communism . . . , p.171. Note:Wang M i n g e t a l . h a d no p a r t i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n u p t o t h i s t i m e : t h e y were i m p o s e d on t h e p a r t y and were h i g h l y d e p e n d e n t on M i f and t h e C I b e c a u s e o f t h i s . J a n e D e g r a s , The Communist I n t e r n a t i o n a l . . . , v o l u m e I I I ,  p p . 167-176.  K l e i n and C l a r k , B i o g r a p h i c D i c t i o n a r y . . .  ~ ~  , volume  I,  p.129.  eh t e r r i t o r i a l base, Thus, He was n o t  and a g o v e r n m e n t a l  Wang M i n g was l e a d e r o f  i n C h i n a when Mao o f f e r e d  apparatus  ...  t h e movement  "  i n name  the Shanghai-based  The S e c r e t a r i a t  left  o r September,  Shanghai i n August  Wang c o n t i n u e d , w h i l e China,  accepted  only.  Central  Committee p r o t e c t i o n from t h e w h i t e t e r r o r i n S h a n g h a i , w o u l d come t o J u i c h i n .  I3I4.  if  they  his offer,  and  1932.  i n Moscow and when once a g a i n  in  t o make c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e c a u s e b y w r i t i n g o n p a r t y  policy.  I n 1933  s t r e s s the  and 193U,  while s t i l l  i n Moscow, he c o n t i n u e d  to  importance o f a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t p o l i c i e s , and began 136  support of the tributions  " n a t i o n a l s a l v a t i o n movement".  But, his  con-  were m i n o r . Though M a o ' s l e a d e r s h i p  the Long March, secretariat  nonetheless,  dependent  is  s a i d n o t t o h a v e begun  w i t h Wang M i n g i n Moscow, and  o n Mao a n d t h e  Red Army f o r  its  p o l i c y statements Liu Shao-ch'i,  "...  after  policy.  leading  came more a n d more f r o m Mao, Chou E n - l a i  Ch'en Po-ta,  and C h ' e n Y u n . . .  (Wang M i n g ) and t h e o t h e r r e t u r n e d s t u d e n t s sense p u r g e d .  1937,  the  protection,  some q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s as t o who was r e a l l y m a k i n g p a r t y I t has been w r i t t e n t h a t e s p e c i a l l y  Rather,  what  Ch'en  until  ...  Shao-yu  were n o t i n any  t h e y l o s t was c o n t r o l o f  the  highest 137  Party offices  and t h e i r p o s i t i o n s as p r i n c i p a l P a r t y  I t w o u l d seem t h a t a difference indeed, 131;. 135. 136. 137.  there  between  the  spokesmen."  r e a l q u e s t i o n i s not i f there  t h e L i L i - s a n and t h a t  o f Wang M i n g ,  was r e a l l y a "Wang M i n g l i n e " a t  but,  was if  all.  B e n j a m i n S c h w a r t z , C h i n e s e Communism . . . , p p . I 8 6 - I 8 7 . R o b e r t N o r t h , Moscow . . . , p . 1 5 0 . K l e i n and C l a r k , B i o g r a p h i c D i c t i o n a r y . . . , volume I , p . 1 3 0 . I b i d . , volume I , p . 1 3 2 .  65 Conclusions In t h i s paper, a t i o n on t h e before  the  status  rise  I have  t r i e d to give  o f the Chinese  of L i L i - s a n ,  some b a s i c  Communist P a r t y i n t h e  and a l s o  to give  was v e r y much i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c t i v i t i e s I feel  the  cities  an e x p l a n a t i o n  t h e e v e n t s w h i c h o c c u r r e d w h i l e he h e a d e d t h e p a r t y .  1928,  inform-  w i t h i n the  i n f o r m a t i o n on t h a t p e r i o d i s  Since L i cities  before  germane.  Some e m p h a s i s has b e e n g i v e n a n d a few p a r a l l e l s between L i ' s a c t i o n s labor organizer,  as  leader of  I d i d not f i n d documented e v i d e n c e  to  to  the e f f e c t  i m p a c t on L i w h i c h I a t t r i b u t e  similarities  are s t r i k i n g .  recurrence  to capture strikes, desire  (or to have  like  for  those  i n 1925,  were a l s o  o f the  immediate s o l u t i o n s  he m a i n t a i n e d w h i l e  sions g i v e n through the with L i , leave  one w i t h t h e f e e l i n g  and s t u b b o r n man.  and many o f  those  But,  a  Movement. move-  however,  the  was l o o k i n g when he  to  for  attempted  Political  aims.  His  problems,  i n L i , and a  of the p a r t y .  charac-  The  impres-  who knew and w o r k e d  t h a t he was a r a t h e r these are  who have w r i t t e n a b o u t  obnoxious,  simply impressions,  L i may h a v e  been  prejudiced  him. P r i m a r i l y what  L i - s a n was aware that  leader  l i t e r a t u r e by t h o s e  egotistical  against  the  as  this  Changsha.  one o f h i s  labor organizer  that  it,  i n 1925  Red Army c a p t u r e )  immediate a c t i o n ,  was a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c teristic  the  to  L i , as p a r t y l e a d e r ,  o f events s i m i l a r to those  30th  t h e May  ment h a d t h e  the  drawn  t h e CCP and h i s a c t i o n s  with s p e c i a l reference  of  of the  I have wished  of the basic  C o m i n t e r n f o r some  to p o i n t out  differences time b e f o r e  between the  is that  his line  launching of  L i >. and the  66 attempted  i n s u r r e c t i o n at  his  Open o p p o s i t i o n t o L i b y t h e  own.  from the s e r i e s 1929.  Changsha.  of a r t i c l e s  a m b i g u i t y on t h e p a r t o f t h e  f o r r e v o l u t i o n , but  putschist.  However,  he had no e x p e r i e n c e  formation of Soviets  were t h e two t a s k s seem t h a t willing  the  activities  too  late,  either  C I was a l i t t l e u n s u r e o f  attempted  lay  itself  i n the  power t o h i m s e l f ,  keep h i s o p p o s i t i o n s i l e n t . eventually,  he  Basically,  or these would  quite  L i was  forced  from h i s  base  coordinate  and t o l a u n c h g u e r r i l l a  t o u n d e r c u t t h e power o f p e o p l e  It  and not  he was e x p e c t e d i t o  t h r o u g h the use  cities:  ArM y e t ,  weakness,  s o l u t i o n f o r t h i s p r o b l e m was t o  for  he was a  to p e r f o r m .  c h i e f contenders  of  he was a r i g h t i s t  L i had no c o n t r o l o v e r t h e c o u n t r y s i d e :  f o u n d t h e r e were among t h e  result  i n guerrilla warfare  w h i c h he was e x p e c t e d  Prom t h i s b a s e ,  the  too soon,  i n the c o u n t r y s i d e .  i n the c o u n t r y s i d e  The p o i n t i s ,  his  i f he a c t e d  from a p o s i t i o n o f r e l a t i v e  i n Shanghai.  early  L i h a d t o be r e a d y  t o s u r r e n d e r t h e u r b a n a r e a s t o t h e KMT.  to operate  But,  i n part  frame o f r e f e r e n c e  whatever,  date  reconsider his p o s i t i o n .  l i n e was  i f he a c t e d  L i ' s whole  C o m i n t e r n seems t o  Comintern.  the s i g n a l s  i n the  to  the f o r m a t i o n of t h i s  opportunist.  essentially  w r i t t e n by T s ' a i H o - s h e n i n  L i thus had a whole y e a r  Doubtless,  L i ' s l i n e was  attacks. the  leaders  f o r p a r t y power. t r y to t r a n s f e r  of a c t i o n committees.  all  He h a d  l i k e Mao, and he h a d t o t r y  He was s u c c e s s f u l  f o r about  Li's  one  to year.  failed. L i f a i l e d b e c a u s e he r e l i e d t o o h e a v i l y  " p o l i t i c a l Instincts" for  self-preservation:  he knew t h e  on city  67 a n d how t o c o n d u c t a s t r i k e , f o r hira t o e m p h a s i z e .  By t h e  the S i x t h P a r t y Congress, with the  Politburo.  illegally,  was  logical  t i m e he r e t u r n e d t o C h i n a  t h e power o f  element  d i d not prove too  the p a r t y  i n the  The  the peasant  lie  party's  power r e a l l y r e s i d e d .  The d r i v e  emphasis  away  t r y i n g to  of r e v o l u t i o n .  The o b j e c t i v e  s i t u a t i o n was n o t a g o o d o n e .  was n o t r i p e f o r t h e t y p e o f  The t i m e  i n s u r r e c t i o n s L i was t r y i n g  to  I t seems t h a t t h e C o m i n t e r n p e r c e i v e d t h i s , b u t  n o t f i r m enough i n I t s  stand.  a t i o n may have b e e n t h e r e , t h e wrong s e t  of leaders  The p e r c e p t i o n o f  the d i f f e r e n c e  a t i o n In China, a power s t r u g g l e  was  the r e a l  situ-  b u t t h e C o m i n t e r n seems t o h a v e  chosen  f o r t h e CCP.  In L i ' s p e r i o d o f l e a d e r s h i p , t h e r e was  in  movement g a i n e d s t r e n g t h d a i l y :  f r o m w h i c h b a s e t h e P o l i t b u r o was s t i l l  the business  conduct.  d i d not  revolution.  to e s t a b l i s h Soviets n a t u r a l l y took c o n s i d e r a b l e  conduct  after  successful.  i n the c o u n t r y s i d e t h a t  from the c i t y ,  elements  h a d b e e n d e m o l i s h e d and w o r k i n g u n d e r g r o u n d ,  Meanwhile, it  were t h e  The w o r k e r s seemed t o be u n i n t e r e s t e d  being the l e a d i n g c l a s s base i n the c i t i e s  so t h o s e  t h e r e were  several  crises:  b e t w e e n h i s own p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e  and t h e p e r c e p t i o n s  of  g o i n g on w i t h i n the  situ-  the C o m i n t e r n ; t h e r e  CCP i t s e l f ,  was  w i t h people  like  Ho M e n g - h s i u n g and L o P h u n g p r e s s i n g f o r e c o n o m i c s t r i k e s  i n the  cities,  the  and people  a g r a r i a n movement. inherent  like  Mao e m p h a s i z i n g t h e  Besides  i n the development  this, o f the  there  importance of  was a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  Red Army as o p p o s e d t o  Li's  68 c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f h i s own p o w e r ,  the  r o l e the m i l i t a r y  h a d c h o s e n f o r t h e army a n d t h e one t h a t n e e d e d t h e Army t o t r y t o l a u n c h t h e  commanders  L i had i n m i n d .  Li  i n s u r r e c t i o n s from o u t s i d e  the c i t i e s ,  s i n c e the p a r t y had been unable t o arouse and  the workers  from i n s i d e the c i t i e s .  B u t , even though v e r y  e n t o n t h e a r m y , L i h a d t o be v e r y s u s p i c i o u s o f stantial leaders  increase  i n the power and p r e s t i g e  s i g n a l l e d a decrease This paper is n o t ,  of the  Li  it,  depend-  f o r any  o f t h e army and  however, its  designed  role  own m i s t a k e s .  d i d commit were o f h i s own d e s i g n .  its  t o be a  defense  i n these events.  That  B u t , many o f t h e e r r o r s His fear  of l o s i n g  L i was n o t a f o o l i s h man o r a c l u m s y p o l i t i c i a n :  not the  "scapegoat" of the Comintern.  that  central  c o n t r o l o f t h e p a r t y u n d o u b t e d l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o much o f what did.  sub-  i n h i s own p o w e r .  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