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Myrdal, the state and political development Winterford , David B. 1972

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MYRDAL, THE STATE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT by DAVID B. WINTERFORD B.A.(Honours), U n i v e r s i t y o f A l b e r t a , 1971  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1972  In presenting  this thesis in partial  fulfilment of the  requirements for  an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make i t freely available for reference  and  study.  I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may by his representatives.  be granted by the Head of my  Department or  It is understood that copying or publication  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without written  permission.  Department of  Political  Science  The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  September,  1972  my  ABSTRACT A d i s c u s s i o n and a n a l y s i s Myrdal's  c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the theory of  development.  A t t e n t i o n i s focussed  r o l e of the s t a t e  as an a g e n t o f  The p a p e r i s  democracies  development  political  on h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f  of the s t a t e  of the West.  both affects  development  Part I i n the  We f i n d t h a t  and i s a f f e c t e d  o f t h e West  and e f f e c t i v e  --the  i n t e r l u d e , the o r g a n i z a t i o n of m a r k e t s ,  underestimates  the c r i t i c a l  democratic " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l Part  II discusses  - - i n terms of  of the " w e l f a r e  We f i n d  this  development  liberal  state."  state"  that Myrdal  requisites  for  Yet  ideals"  a  the  as  of  an  yet  state." M y r d a l ' s a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s model  i d e o l o g i c a l l y compatible w i t h those  development.  of  an e f f e c t i v e  that Myrdal  that  the  seriously  to the underdeveloped w o r l d .  who s t i p u l a t e  of  the spread  of development is  advanced  We d i s c u s s  capable,  "organizational  state  is  by t h e emergence  strong,  e q u a l i t y and t h e emergence  the  development.  an o r g a n i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . political  o f Gunnar  d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s .  concerned w i t h the development welfare  is offered  the s t a t e  H e r e we  find  elites  must be t h e m a i n a g e n t  of  through a d i s c u s s i o n of the " m o d e r n i z a t i o n  of s o c i a l i s m , p o l i t i c a l  as w e l l as t h e e x i g e n c i e s  d e m o c r a c y and s t a t e  o f c o r r u p t i o n and p e r s o n a l  planning  i n s e c u r i t y we do n o t f i n d infrastructure state.  an o r g a n i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l  underpinning the  strong, capable,  R a t h e r we f i n d t h e " s o f t - s t a t e . "  characterize  as r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l  i s m a r k e d by l o w c i t i z e n o b e d i e n c e on t h e is  c i t i z e n s by the p o l i t i c a l  little  and g r o u p s .  reasons  the  "soft-state"  and few o b l i g a t i o n s  leaders.  from the o u t p u t s of  unable to enforce that  In f a c t ,  We a r g u e  since  is  activity,  the  this s t a b i l i t y is  this  between  so many r e c e i v e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d byttwo  among t h e e l i t e s ;  placed  that  state  so  is  a network of c i t i z e n o b l i g a t i o n s .  the " s o f t - s t a t e "  ambivalence  state  effective  F o r what we  i n t i m a t e l y r e l a t e d t o the low degree of e q u a l i t y  individuals  Yet  and  We  find  things:  and, s t a b i l i t y of the  system.  a s t a b i l i t y of s t a g n a t i o n not  develop-  ment . On t h e b a s i s  of M y r d a l ' s d i s c u s s i o n of the a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r we s u g g e s t t h a t  t h e o n l y way t h e " s o f t - s t a t e "  h a r d e n e d i n t o a more c a p a b l e retrenchment  of state  state  activities.  is  through a  to those  groups  activities.  I t would appear t h a t  and who do n o t have (e.g.  a vested  the p r o g r e s s i v e  to secure  political  less  interest  bound by  encouragement convention  i n the s t a t u s  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s ) , i t may be  development,  that  is,  quo, possible  the development  an o r g a n i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , m a k i n g f o r strong,  capable,  and e f f e c t i v e  state.  the  interlude  M o r e o v e r , by g i v i n g  i n s o c i e t y who a r e  be  selective  underdeveloped w o r l d would p r o f i t from a l i b e r a l of reduced s t a t e  will  a  of  TABLE OF CONTENTS Section A.  INTRODUCTION PART I.  1  DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE IN THE WEST  B.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW: "THE OPPRESSOR STATE" . . . . . .  C.  ORIGINS OF STATE PLANNING . .  10  D.  EXTERNAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON STATE PLANNING  14  E.  INTERNAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON STATE PLANNING  15  F.  THE "ORGANIZATIONAL STATE" ... .  21  G.  PLANNING RE-VISITED  28  H.  AN EVALUATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATE  32  I.  NATIONAL INTEGRATION -- INTERNATIONAL DISINTEGRATION 42  ;  PART I I . THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES J.  AN OVERVIEW  K.  NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 60  L.  THE STATE AS THE MAIN AGENT FOR DEVELOPMENT  MM  THE ROLE OF THE STATE: THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF SOCIALISM  N. 0.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . .  THE ROLE OF THE STATE: THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY  65 72  . .74  THE ROLE OF THE STATE: THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF PLANNING . . . . . . . .  ii  55  75  P. Q.  MYRDAL RE-VISITED: THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATE PLANNING  79  THE INTELLECTUALS AND PLANNERS RE-VISITED: THE MEANING OF "DEMOCRATIC PLANNING" THE BS0FT-STATE"  83  R.  POLITICAL DECAY:  . .  89  S.  INDIA AS A "SOFT-STATE"  93  T.  THE "SOFT-STATE" AS A CORRUPT STATE  99  U.  PLAN CONTROLS IN THE "SOFT-STATE"  V.  AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN INDIA  W.  CONCLUSION  104 . . 108 115  BIBLIOGRAPHY  121  iii  A.  INTRODUCTION N a t i o n a l e l i t e s i n the underdeveloped  world  charge  the s t a t e w i t h immense r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n s e c u r i n g development.  These r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s are g e n e r a l l y grouped  under the "modernization ideals"^- and i n c l u d e such v a r i o u s and sometimes c o n f l i c t i n g elements  as:  development and  p l a n n i n g f o r development; r a i s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y ; r a i s i n g the standards o f l i v i n g  o f the masses; a c h i e v i n g s o c i a l and  economic e q u a l i z a t i o n ; improving or changing  institutions  and a t t i t u d e s ; c o n s o l i d a t i n g the n a t i o n - s t a t e ; e f f e c t i n g p o l i t i c a l democracy even i f i n a "guided" or narrow sense; m o b i l i z i n g the masses through democracy at the g r a s s - r o o t s ; and e f f e c t i n g development  ( g e n e r a l l y a move towards a  w e l f a r e - s t a t e ) by s t a t e p o l i c i e s decided through  "democratic  planning." I n d i v i d u a l l y a l l of these elements  i n the moderniz-  a t i o n i d e a l s c o u l d be the s u b j e c t f o r i n t e n s i v e r e s e a r c h and a n a l y s i s . and perhaps  Here we w i l l merely  o f f e r g e n e r a l comments  a few suggestions as t o how some o f these  c o u l d be e f f e c t u a t e d .  ideals  In t h i s r e s p e c t , under c l o s e r  s c r u t i n y a l l the elements  i n the m o d e r n i z a t i o n . i d e a l s share  two t h i n g s i n common:  first,  they are concerned  with  equality i n p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l , and economic r e l a t i o n s ;  1 For a f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n of the modernization i d e a l s , see Gunnar Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1968) pp. 57-69.  page 2  second, they i n v o l v e the s t a t e as a conscious  planning  agent f o r development. Both o f these f a c e t s o f development have occupied c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n i n the w r i t i n g s o f Gunnar M y r d a l . a n a t i v e of Sweden, has served various  as p r o f e s s o r  u n i v e r s i t i e s , as a cabinet m i n i s t e r  a  Myrdal,  o f economics at i n the S o c i a l -  Democratic government of Sweden and as head o f the U n i t e d Nations Economic Commission f o r Europe.  As such, he has  w r i t t e n q u i t e e x t e n s i v e l y on both the Western world and the underdeveloped  countries.  With respect  t o the former, Myrdal has been concerned  with the development and p e r f e c t i o n o f the welfare With respect  state.  t o the l a t t e r , h i s a t t e n t i o n has been d i r e c t e d  toward the means f o r a c h i e v i n g  the welfare  s t a t e i n the  underdeveloped world. The research  great moral p r i n c i p l e that has guided h i s  i s t h a t a l l human beings have equal r i g h t s and that  e q u a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r l i v i n g supreme i d e a l and should activity.  and working c o n d i t i o n s  be the e x c l u s i v e r e s u l t of s t a t e  For Myrdal, the u n i v e r s a l i t y and timelessness  t h i s e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i m p l i e s t h a t "on the highest of our v a l u a t i o n sphere, i t i s , i n f a c t , a moral of a l l mankind.  It i s a living  social reality:  a valuation a c t u a l l y perceived  to be m o r a l l y  2  York:  is a  right."  of  level  ambition  i d e a l and, as such, p a r t o f by people  2  Gunnar Myrdal, O b j e c t i v i t y i n S o c i a l Research (New Pantheon, 1969), pp. 88-89.  page 3  The can  either  equality  i n s t i t u t i o n s that make up frustrate  o r enhance the  a society  however,  o p e r a t i o n of  the  ideal"  People . . . obey d i f f e r e n t moral v a l u a t i o n s on d i f f e r e n t planes of l i f e . In t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s they have i n v e s t e d more than t h e i r everyday ideas which p a r a l l e l e d t h e i r a c t u a l behavior. They have p l a c e d i n them t h e i r i d e a l s of how the world r i g h t l y ought to be. The i d e a l s thereby g a i n f o r t i f i c a t i o n s of power and i n f l u e n c e i n s o c i e t y . . . . Besides t h e i r d i r e c t e f f e c t s on c i t i z e n s ' b e h a v i o r , l e g i s l a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , always have the i n d i r e c t e f f e c t s of propagandizing f o r c e r t a i n i d e a l s . The same i s t r u e of d e c i s i o n s , r e g u l a t i o n s and d e c l a r a t i o n s of other formal i n s t i t u t i o n s . In adhering to t h e i r i d e a l s , i n s t i t u t i o n s have a p e r t i n a c i t y matched only by t h e i r c o n s i d e r a b l e f l e x i b i l i t y i n l o c a l and temporary accomodat ion.3 In the and  state  has  become a c h i e f  propagandist f o r e f f e c t i n g  the  equality  i n P a r t I we  West, the  will  show that t h i s has  case, n e v e r t h e l e s s the  r e s u l t of the  toward g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y state.  Moreover, as the  c o u l d enact and  has  been the  state  ideal.  While  always been  the  e v o l u t i o n a r y process emergence of the  strong  i t s e l f became s t r o n g e r i t  implement f u r t h e r  culminate i n the  not  repository  emergence of the  equalizing full  measures that  democratic w e l f a r e  state. In the state  underdeveloped world, however, w h i l e  v o i c e s and  even enacts e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s i t i s  l a r g e l y unable to implement them. II,  i n the  state  but  "soft-state."  3 I b i d . , p. 4  As  we  s h a l l see  underdeveloped world there i s not the  the  4  In the  the  "soft-state"  37.  Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , 895-900, passim,  i n Part  strong  page 4  institutions  do n o t e n h a n c e  rather perpetuate this  respect  frustrate  the s t a t u s  the e x i g e n c i e s  the  the  spread of e q u a l i z a t i o n but  quo o f g r o s s o f government  the modernization i d e a l s state  the b a s i s  politics.  is that  p l a n n i n g emerged  of the e q u a l i t y i d e a l . laid  interest  intent  initial of  ideals.  planning. w i t h the economic  f u r t h e r enhanced the  of  In the spread  progress  strength  political  mean t h e emergence  of  development  o f an o r g a n i z e d  group i n f r a s t r u c t u r e under the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state.  In the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , p l a n n i n g i s  a  i d e o l o g y of the a r t i c u l a t e s t r a t a .  the  to p l a n f o r development  infrastructure  has e m e r g e d .  p l a n n i n g , dependent  development  of  However,  i s v o i c e d b e f o r e much  e q u a l i t y h a s b e e n a c h i e v e d and b e f o r e  state  largely  interest-group  As we p o i n t o u t i n P a r t I ,  framework o f the  central  of state  f o r the development  i n t h e West does i n f a c t  In  t h e s e c o n d common theme  concomitant  In f a c t ,  This, in turn,  the s t a t e .  itself  implementation of e g a l i t a r i a n  As we m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r ,  West,  inequality.  an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  I n P a r t I I we w i l l  as i t  is  on t h e p r i o r  discuss  political  an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , i s h e l d t o  be b o t h a means f o r s e c u r i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t c r e a t i n g the  how  i n s t i t u t i o n a l basis  both of these respects  we w i l l  for  its  find that  and  own s u c c e s s . state  for In  p l a n n i n g has  n o t e n j o y e d t h e r e m a r k a b l e s u c c e s s i t has h a d i n t h e advanced Western c o u n t r i e s . In b r i e f overview the  following w i l l  be  discussed  page 5 i n t h i s paper: and m e a n i n g  i n Part  of  relationship  of  the  strong  out  of the  its  infrastructure.  advanced w e l f a r e  stringent  realized  features  state that  for  see  the  Western c o u n t r i e s international  national  has  the  an  same t i m e  any  c o n t i n u a t i o n of the  its rather  state planning,  world.  II,  discuss  integration  of  • -  are not  As a means o f  had t h e u n f a v o r a b l e  I I , we w i l l  and a c t u a l  Our m a i n f o c u s w i l l and how t h i s  is  "corruption"  and t h e  policies.  pessimistic  of  and  being linking  Myrdal s  thesis  1  the  advanced  result  of  disintegration.  In P a r t theoretical  decides  i n the p o l i t i c a l base  i n Part  I I we s h a l l b r i e f l y  increasing  emergence  s h o u l d w a r n us o f  effective  i n the underdeveloped  that  at  of  nation-state.  actually  We w i l l  w h i c h as we w i l l  I with Part  of the  M o r e o v e r we s h a l l d i s c u s s  requirements  Part  and how b o t h  operation  w i t h r e s p e c t to the  heritage.  requirements  state  origins  the  i d e a l manner t h e  through the  certain precarious  democratic  discuss  consolidation  and how t h e  policies  easy complacency  its  the  i n a more o r l e s s state  institutional point  w i t h the  b e t w e e n p l a n n i n g and e q u a l i t y  depict  implements  concerned  s t a t e p l a n n i n g ; we w i l l  these i n turn affect We w i l l  I we a r e  operation  be t h e  of c e n t r a l  e x i g e n c i e s of  b o t h a c a u s e and e f f e c t i n a b i l i t y of the  To p r e v e n t  note  underdeveloped  be c o n c e r n e d w i t h  countries  state  the  of gross  on a  planning.  "soft-state"  state to  us f r o m e n d i n g  w i t h r e s p e c t to the  the  inequality,  implement completely  l i k e l i h o o d of  ever achieving  the  t h e momentum  for  page 6  development, reform. furnishes  we w i l l  What M y r d a l has  digress  of the  for  state  i n t o the  area  to say w i t h r e s p e c t t o  us w i t h b o t h a r e s t r a i n e d  concluding plea role  briefly  a re-direction  of  land  land reform  o p t i m i s m , and a o f o u r t h i n k i n g on  i n p o l i t i c a l and e c o n o m i c  the  development.  page 7  PART I DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE I N THE WEST  B.  A B R I E F OVERVIEW: THE OPPRESSOR STATE Prior  of the  to the  s t a t e was  liberal interlude,  to  s e r v e as  economic p r o c e s s e s t h a t economically groups  w e r e more a c t i v e  interests the  advancing  while they  organizational  a focus  sustained  and e f f e c t i v e  efforts  state  r e m a i n e d a means f o r  upper  classes.  of  had the others.  advancing  Given the h i g h moral value equality  it  i s not  of e a r l y Western  s u r p r i s i n g that  for  traditional  the  inequality.  and w e a l t h i e r  usually  the  regions  social  and  The and  social  i n organizing resources to Because of the...interests  their prevent  this, of  that Myrdal places he u t t e r l y  role  the the  on  condemns  much  history:  F e u d a l i s m was a huge c o l l u s i o n b e t w e e n t h e r i c h and t h e m i g h t y t o l a y a h o l d on t h e l a n d and s e i z e power t o t a x the p e a s a n t s . The c i t i e s e n f o r c e d t h e i r ' p r i v i l e g e s ' u p o n t h e s u r r o u n d i n g r u r a l r e g i o n s : t h e m e r c h a n t s and i n d u s t r i a l i s t s i n the c i t i e s p r o t e c t e d themselves against c o m p e t i t i o n from the o u t s i d e . In the c i t i e s the r i c h e r c l a s s e s p r o t e c t e d themselves e f f e c t i v e l y against the p o o r e r : l a b o r r e g u l a t i o n s , not o n l y i n the m e r c a n t i l i s t s t a t e but much e a r l i e r , w e r e w e i g h t e d a g a i n s t t h e w o r k e r s and t h e i r g e n e r a l p u r p o s e was t o k e e p down wages a n d t o k e e p up t h e supply of labor.  page 8  [This was] . . . the "oppressor Myrdal has nothing f a v o r a b l e the  "oppressor s t a t e . "  state."  t o say o f f e u d a l i s m  or  For him, i t s hallmark was not an  o r d e r l y s o c i e t y w i t h r e c i p r o c a l o b l i c a t i o n s between i n d i v i d u a l s but  intolerable inequality.  S o c i a l , economic and p o l i t i c a l  i n e q u a l i t i e s are "burdens" and " r i g i d i t i e s " that hamper the development of a s o c i e t y and i t s . c u l t u r e . This  concern w i t h e q u a l i t y should not be taken  lightly  f o r i t underpins much of Myrdal's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the study of p o l i t i c a l development i n both the advanced c o u n t r i e s and i n the underdeveloped world.  For the l a t t e r , the seeming  i n t r a c t a b i l i t y o f i n e q u a l i t y accounts f o r Myrdal's  rather  t r a g i c v i s i o n of the s t a t e as the major agent f o r development. In the West, the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n saw the breaking up o f many o f the r e g u l a t i o n s  o f the "oppressor  s t a t e " that p r o t e c t e d  the r i c h from the poor.  not  economic e q u a l i t y .  r e s u l t i n greater  But i t d i d  Keeping the l i v i n g  standards o f the masses low was e s s e n t i a l i n the p r e democratic, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c c a p i t a l i s t i c e r a i f l a r g e - s c a l e saving  and c a p i t a l formation was t o occur.  population the  increases  Eventually  with  and t e c h n i c a l advances i n a g r i c u l t u r e ,  supply o f l a b o r became so p l e n t i f u l that  depressing  wages d i d not r e q u i r e m e r c a n t i l i s t r e g u l a t i o n s .  Market  f o r c e s were s u f f i c i e n t . Yet,  as our h i s t o r y shows, the poor d i d r i s e up  Gunnar Myrdal, R i c h Lands and Poor [ B r i t i s h e d i t i o n : Economic 'Theory' arid Under-Developed Regions] (New York: Harper and B r o t h e r s , 1957) pp. 42-43. 5  page 9  against  the r i c h ,  peasants against revolts  the the  countryside  against  landowners.  quickly received  the  l e d by members  s a n c t i o n of  buildings  and r o a d s )  the  (e.g.  and  state. organizations,  pressured  common s e r v i c e s ,  the  state  public  and u l t i m a t e l y f o r e l e c t o r a l  reform.  Since the poor c o n s t i t u t e d the v a s t m a j o r i t y wherever franchise  was  equalizing  drawn, p o l i t i c a l  these reforms  t r a n s f e r r i n g more f u n c t i o n s smaller to ever l a r g e r u n i t s p a r i s h to the  of  state.  In the West,  f o r the  s h o r t l y be  p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t , economic  loyalty  and  from  the  and t h e n t o  state"  passed  and t r a n s f o r m e d  itself  into  of t h i s  development  of government  from t h e s e b r i e f although not  development the  economic  assumed a g r e a t e r  p e r m i t t i n g the  from  and  the  the its  and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  discussed.  As we c a n see  state policies  role  of  "oppressor  The d y n a m i c s  state."  gradually  effect  administration:  the  "welfare  implications  had t h e  l o c a l community t o t h e p r o v i n c e  interlude  i n the  champion  and more r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  through a l i b e r a l  will  soon had t o  the  reforms.  Increasingly,  central  parties  the  these  and i n t e r e s t e d  of the upper c l a s s ,  f o r e q u a l i z i n g measures  city  When s u c c e s s f u l ,  M o r e o v e r , p o p u l a r movements often  the  comments  always  the  state  a predominant  role,  of the Western c o u n t r i e s . and s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s egalitarian basis  s t a t e t o become  has  Through  have  thereby  a f i r m anchor of  citizen  affect.  The w h o l e  development  of the  state  i n Western  countries  page  has,  however,  b e e n a g r a d u a l and p i e c e m e a l p r o c e s s  many m a j o r d e m a r c a t i o n s .  state  and a  the e v o l u t i o n of the s t a t e  b e e n a " n a t u r a l " phenomenon. at the r o l e of the  without  T h i s has g i v e n an a p p e a r a n c e  r e a l i t y to the n o t i o n that  10  A c o n v e n i e n t means o f  has getting  i n t h e West i s t h r o u g h an  examination of state planning.  C.  ORIGINS OF STATE PLANNING E c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g i s b e c o m i n g an i n c r e a s i n g l y more  pervasive  feature  of l i f e  i n Western c o u n t r i e s .  f o r t h i s t r e n d are r i s i n g inequalities,  awareness  of differences  i d e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l  and u n i v e r s a l c o m p e t i t i o n from t h e  The  clashes,  reasons  and  and  intense  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  Although i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f u s i o n surrounds the n o t i o n o f e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g and i s m a n i f e s t e d i n an i n t e n s e of  a "free"  the debate life  a " p l a n n e d " economy,  does n o t r e f l e c t  i n the West.  practice ideal  versus  it  i s evident  P l a n n i n g has  i n - f a c t been a c c e p t e d This is  of a l l  f u n c t i o n i n accordance  the p r e s e n t  i n t h e economy h a s n o t come a b o u t deliberation.  t h e i r minds t h a t  the  the  economy  w i t h the m a j o r i t y  citizens.  Nevertheless,  political  in  so l a r g e l y b e c a u s e  o f e c o n o m i c p l a n n i n g i n t h e West h o l d s t h a t  interests  that  the r e a l i t y of p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c  i f not i n p r i n c i p l e .  c a n be b r o u g h t t o  discussion  stage of  state  interventions  as a c o n s e q u e n c e  of r a t i o n a l  W e s t e r n g o v e r n m e n t s n e v e r made up  they wanted economic p l a n n i n g .  Rather  the  page 11  s t a t e and i t s c i t i z e n s have been f o r c e d step-by-step  into  t a k i n g more and more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d i r e c t i o n c o n t r o l of the economy by the p r e s s u r e of events not conscious p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e we  choice.  I f we  take a broad,  can agree with Myrdal  and by  long-range  that:  No development has been more unplanned than the gradual emergence and i n c r e a s i n g importance of p l a n n i n g i n a l l Western c o u n t r i e s . Ideas and i d e o l o g i e s , t h e o r i e s and propoganda, p o l i t i c a l programs and p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n d i r e c t e d c o n s c i o u s l y towards promoting p l a n n i n g , have p l a y e d an a l t o g e t h e r i n s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e . 6 C e r t a i n l y the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n was  not the  result  of s t a t e p l a n n i n g f o r economic development towards higher standards  of l i v i n g  f o r the masses.  Although  this  formula  i s p r e s c r i b e d f o r the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , i n the West the I n d u s t r i a l R e v o l u t i o n was  the r e s u l t of u n d i r e c t e d  d i s p e r s e d a c t i v i t y of i n d i v i d u a l entrepreneurs exploit their s k i l l s  destroying  seeking  and i n v e n t i o n s f o r t h e i r own  T h i s type or s p i r i t  and to  profit.  of e n t e r p r i s e succeeded i n  ( a l b e i t , g r a d u a l l y ) much of the  traditional  o r g a n i c conception of s o c i e t y as w e l l as the g u i l d and s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s b u t t r e s s i n g that conception.  However, as  s h a l l see, once the l i b e r a l theory of economics was p r a c t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n i n people's  actual p o l i t i c a l  we  given  and  economic  behavior, c o u n t e r v a i l i n g f o r c e s were brought i n t o p l a y , had to be brought i n t o p l a y , to preserve o r g a n i z e d N e v e r t h e l e s s , even during the l i b e r a l  and  society.  interlude, state  ^ Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State;: P l a n n i n g and i t s I n t e r n a t i o n a l I m p l i c a t i o n s (New Bantom P r e s s , 1967), (p. 17.  Economic York:  page  intervention  i n the  everywhere.  But the n a t u r e  interventions  economy  changed.  remained frequent  and  and d i r e c t i o n o f  these  regulations  version  of  the  theory  of the  long term the  against  state  earlier  state  theories  like  l i b e r a l i n t e r l u d e was  some  non-intervention.  For reasons which w i l l  has b e e n  For while  w e r e s u p p o r t e d by i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  mercantilism,  important  Moreover t h e s e changes i n  i n t e r v e n t i o n were n o t p l a n n e d .  12  t o t a l volume  steadily  become e v i d e n t  and t h e  increasing.  Yet  s t a t e d i r e c t i o n of the  i n t r o d u c e d ad h o c ,  rate  of  later,  state  needs.  Indeed,  animosity  new m e a s u r e s w e r e  t o s e r v e what many c o n s i d e r e d  l i m i t e d and t e m p o r a r y  the  interventions  due t o p o p u l a r  economy,  over  to  be  t h e y were c a l l e d  forth  and a d m i n i s t e r e d by p o l i t i c a l f o r c e s w h i c h p r o c l a i m e d  them-  s e l v e s adverse t o economic  reflection  of the to  ideological  state  confusion  actions:  particular  temporary;  the  side-effects;  liberal  is  another  i n t h e West w i t h  the  forced  interventions  respect  lack  of  t o be damaging  of  disturbing  the  each  national  and i r r a t i o n a l .  interventions  proved  impossible  had b u i l t up b e h i n d  and p u b l i c s e r v a n t s  economic  be  of compatability w i t h  because v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s  proponents  its  t u r n e d out not t o  aims and p o l i c i e s  a b o l i t i o n of  politicians  to coordinate  i n t e r v e n t i o n p r o v e d t o have  and, t h e i r  community were f e l t Since  s t a t e was  acts of  and w i t h t h e  (largely  extant  This  interventions.  E v e n t u a l l y the  other  planning.  gradually  p l a n n i n g i n one f i e l d a f t e r  them),  became another.  page .13  The  ironical  f a c t i s that " s t a t e planning  was  o f t e n the more  'liberal'  a l t e r n a t i v e to the v e r i t a b l e mess c r e a t e d  by unco-  ordinated  and  In other  disorganising  State  interventions."'  words, s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n d i d not d e s i r e to tamper w i t h the theory  7  emerge from a conscious  economy but  to make the  liberal  operational. Yet  scope and  the  attempts at c o o r d i n a t i o n  ad hoc  i n nature.  New  were a l s o l i m i t e d i n  acts of s t a t e  again viewed as temporary, were c o n s t a n t l y the minimal amount of c o o r d i n a t i o n  added.  a t t a i n e d was  Because of t h i s approach to p l a n n i n g  intervention,  and  Soon, even  diminished. due  to  the 8  i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i t i c a l planning and  conditions  i n Western  countries,  became pragmatic and piecemeal --never comprehensive  complete.  Instead, planning  has  the nature of a p o l i t i c a l  compromise between d i f f e r e n t organized i n t e r e s t s seeking s o l u t i o n s to immediate p r a c t i c a l i s s u e s . The  major momentum f o r planning  was  continuous growth of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s , requiring coordination. the Western c o u n t r i e s  in facttthe interventions  More than anything e l s e , planning 9 tends to mean c o o r d i n a t i o n . It i s  in  Gunnar Myrdal, "The Trend Towards Economic P l a n n i n g , " Manchester School of Economic and S o c i a l S t u d i e s , XIX [January, 1951) , h~. See  below pp.  15-21  ^ Myrdal's r a t h e r cumbersome d e f i n i t i o n of p l a n n i n g b r i n g s out t h i s e s s e n t i a l p o i n t . He s t a t e s t h a t " p l a n n i n g " r e f e r s to the "conscious attempts by the government of a country - - u s u a l l y with the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of other c o l l e c t i v e bodies --to c o o r d i n ate p u b l i c p o l i c i e s more r a t i o n a l l y i n order to reach more f u l l y and r a p i d l y the d e s i r a b l e ends f o r f u t u r e development which are determined by the p o l i t i c a l process as i t e v o l v e s . " Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , p.  20.  page  important to bear t h i s i n mind f o r when we developed world i n Part  II i t w i l l be  i s h e l d to have a g r e a t e r  14  d i s c u s s the under-  apparent that  dynamic, complex and  planning  purposeful  character. At t h i s stage i n our d i s c u s s i o n , however, i t i s not adequate merely to note that there was of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s . " trend:  "a continuous growth  Reasons must be given  for this  i t i s through a d i s c u s s i o n of these reasons that  are able to present development and development.  both Myrdal's conception  the r o l e he  To  assigns  accomplish t h i s we  between e x t e r n a l and  of  we  political  to the s t a t e i n s e c u r i n g s h a l l d i v i d e our  discussion  i n t e r n a l f a c t o r s as they a f f e c t e d  planning  i n the West.  D.  :  EXTERNAL FORCES AND The  the t a c i t planning  THEIR EFFECT ON  STATE; PLANNING  growth i n the volume of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s  and  acceptance of the n e c e s s i t y f o r r a t i o n a l economic was  g r e a t l y a c c e l e r a t e d by the continuous upheavals  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , s t a r t i n g w i t h World War continuing The  to the  and  present.  national interest in internal  employment of workers, welfare undisturbed  I  of farmers and g e n e r a l l y i n  consumption and p r o d u c t i o n ,  governments to undertake new,  stability,  led national  and then r a d i c a l ,  i n a l l s e c t o r s of the n a t i o n a l economy.  interventions  When the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s abated, the removal of the  protective  page  measures was  seldom complete f o r the c r i s e s o f t e n l e f t many-  durable changes i n p o l i t i c a l and  abroad  15  and  economic c o n d i t i o n s at home  (e.g. sources of supply  while the g o l d standard  and the  were s e v e r e l y constrained.)  and markets were d i s r u p t e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a p i t a l market  Moreover as vested  interests  b u i l t up behind p r o t e c t i v e s t a t e p o l i c i e s i t became i n f e a s i b l e to abandon them. expanding r o l e f o r the  politically  A l l these f o r c e s presaged  an  state.  But perhaps more important, the disturbances  from  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system brought about a remarkable change i n attitudes.  People became accustomed to e x p e r i e n c i n g  changes and  turned  to the s t a t e to m i t i g a t e  Furthermore, a l l the  The  tended to l e s s e n r e s p e c t  i n h i b i t i o n s from changing s o c i a l  economic c o n d i t i o n s g r a d u a l l y diminished  E.  a l s o f o r advancing t h e i r own  INTERNAL; FORCES AND The  already  THEIR EFFECT ON  f o r the and  while people came to  t h i n k of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s as u s e f u l not p r o t e c t i n g but  their effects.  sudden and v i o l e n t changes, whatever  t h e i r cause or c h a r a c t e r , s t a t u s quo.  adverse  only f o r interests.  STATE PLANNING  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s merely a c c e l e r a t e d a t r e n d  independently i n motion under the dynamic push of  powerful i n t e r n a l s e c u l a r f o r c e s .  Myrdal has  i s o l a t e d the  o r g a n i z a t i o n of markets as perhaps the l e a d i n g i n t e r n a l institutional the  state.  f a c t o r accounting  f o r the  change i n the r o l e of  Moreover, i t seems that the o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  page 16  markets holds the key t o h i s conception  of p o l i t i c a l  as w e l l  as economic development both i n the West and i n the underdeveloped world. To see the r o l e p l a y e d  by the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f markets  i n the p o l i t i c a l development of the West, we must  first  b r i e f l y review the b a s i c assumptions of the l i b e r a l of p e r f e c t competition.  As we w i l l r e c a l l , t h i s theory i s  e s s e n t i a l l y s t a t i c and a t o m i s t i c . postulated unchanging.  theory  The s o c i a l frame,  and i d e a l i z e d by the theory,  was h e l d to be  Although t h i s may now appear to us as e x c e s s i v e l y  r i g i d , under the a t o m i s t i c assumption i t i s p o s s i b l e t o conceive of such a system where a l l elements move toward and p e r f e c t adjustment.  full  P r i c e s and aggregate supply and  demand were h e l d t o be beyond any i n d i v i d u a l ' s c o n t r o l . Moreover, p r i c e s as they were formulated performed smoothly and c o n t i n u o u s l y  i n the market  the f u n c t i o n of r e s t o r i n g  e q u i l i b r i u m a f t e r every change. The  theory  of p e r f e c t competition  holds that I f the  economic u n i t s are i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y small r e l a t i v e to the s i z e of the market, and i f they do not act together, by  then no u n i t  i t s own a c t i o n s can i n f l u e n c e market c o n d i t i o n s .  Markets  and p r i c e s are then independent v a r i a b l e s and form a s e t o f given  conditions  f o r i n d i v i d u a l behavior.  While i t was understood that the p e r f e c t market never e x i s t e d , i t was not r e a d i l y accepted that r e a l i t y was f u r t h e r and  f u r t h e r departing  from the l i b e r a l  ideal.  That i s ,  i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s d i d not act i n i s o l a t i o n but combined  together,  page  i n e f f e c t , organizing became c o n s c i o u s l y When the  the markets.  In a sense, markets  " r e g u l a t e d " by the p a r t i c i p a n t s .  assumption of atomism was  the assumed s t a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame was protected.  no  longer  no  I n d i v i d u a l s ceased to o b e d i e n t l y  p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s , accepting  rewards and  adjust  e f f e c t of t h i s on the  s t a t e was  to  burdens as  "combined") to i n f l u e n c e t h i s process and, more t h i s process to f i t t h e i r own  tenable,  longer  came (the l i b e r a l dictum); r a t h e r , they cooperated  to adjust  17  (or  importantly,  interests.  immediate and  they  The  dramatic:  [The s t a t e was compelled to undertake] l a r g e - s c a l e measures o f i n t e r v e n t i o n . They become necessary simply to prevent the a c t u a l d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of s o c i e t y , which would r e s u l t from the o r g a n i z a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l markets, i f t h i s development were not c o n t r o l l e d and c o o r d i n a t e d . And they are needed i n order to prevent those who have a c q u i r e d a stronger b a r g a i n i n g power from e x p l o i t i n g the others.-*u  As  soon as i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s i n the market become l a r g e  or when they j o i n together the  to i n f l u e n c e market  l i b e r a l r u l e s of the game are s h a t t e r e d .  conditions, Equilibrium i s  not guaranteed as a r e s u l t of market f o r c e s but may be r e s t o r e d by outside initial  (state) interventions.  Moreover, the  tendency to d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n of markets, and  s o c i e t y , i s apt to be very  have to  therefore  strong when s e v e r a l markets  are  j o i n t l y becoming organized  i n t h i s manner through the p r i c e 11 mechanism (e.g. the l a b o r and commodity markets). In any  event, s i n c e the n a t i o n - s t a t e s  10 Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , p. 1 1  Myrdal, "The  of the West were 29.  Trend Towards Economic P l a n n i n g , "  12.  page 18  more or l e s s e m o t i o n a l l y allowed  i n t e g r a t e d they c o u l d not have  u n l i m i t e d f r e e p l a y o f t h e market:  I t i s a paradox t h a t o n l y a w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d community can abide by t h e r u l e s o f economic c o m p e t i t i o n ; but t h a t an i n t e g r a t e d community w i l l m o d i f y the r u l e s i f changes i n p r i c e s impose t o o d r a s t i c a d e c l i n e i n the income o f any one s e c t o r , or r e q u i r e t o o sudden s h i f t s i n r e s o u r c e s o r , more g e n e r a l l y , i f the community f a v o r s a course o f economic development o t h e r t h a n the one t h a t would r e s u l t from the f r e e p l a y o f the market f o r c e s . 1 2 Moreover, a l l these changes i n t h e . i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework were f o l l o w e d by a t t i t u d i n a l changes. r a t i o n a l i s t i c p l i l o s o p h y , based as i t was on a hedonism, was e l a b o r a t e d  The  shallow  i n economics i n t h e m a r g i n a l t h e o r y  o f v a l u e and the u t i l i t a r i a n d e d u c t i o n o f the g e n e r a l out o f e n l i g h t e n e d  liberal  s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f the i n d i v i d u a l .  welfare However,  when r a t i o n a l hedonism a c t u a l l y s p r e a d and i n d i v i d u a l s began t o t h i n k and a c t l i k e the l i b e r a l "economic man,"  the r e s u l t 13  was t h a t "the bottom f e l l out o f l i b e r a l economic s o c i e t y . " P r i m a r i l y t h i s o c c u r r e d because the l i b e r a l assumptions o f atomism and a s t a t i c s o c i e t y assumed men t o be t r a d i t i o n a l i s t i c and s t r o n g l y i n h i b i t e d by s o c i a l t a b o o s . Now,  however, e v e r y t h i n g  was i n f l u x .  The  i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework o f the n a t i o n a l community was  shaken  by l a r g e - s c a l e s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s brought about by international crises.  The p r o p e r t y  taboos were shaken by  i n f l a t i o n and d e f l a t i o n w h i l e markets l o s t t h e i r h a l l o w e d aura.  Moreover, r i s i n g s o c i a l m o b i l i t y and  increased  1 2  Gunnar M y r d a l , An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economy: Problems and P r o s p e c t s , (New York: Harper and B r o t h e r s , 1956), p. 21""" 13 M y r d a l , "The Trend Towards Economic P l a n n i n g , " 9. x  page 19  i n t e r - c l a s s contacts were i n f l u e n t i a l i n denying economic i n e q u a l i t i e s t h e i r unquestioned " n a t u r a l n e s s " All  or n e u t r a l i t y .  of t h i s happened as d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l  process spread w i t h each i n c r e a s e l a r g e r s t r a t a o f the p o p u l a t i o n  i n the f r a n c h i s e .  As ever  achieved f u l l p o l i t i c a l power,  and  r e a l i z e d t h a t i t could be used f o r t h e i r own i n t e r e s t ,  the  s t a t e was p r e s s e d f o r l a r g e - s c a l e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  interventions  and p r o t e c t i o n  from the organized markets.  Therefore the p r i n c i p l e o f economic and s o c i a l equalization decisions. i f only  came i n c r e a s i n g l y t o dominate p o l i t i c a l Almost every s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n became 14  i n d i r e c t l y , by e g a l i t a r i a n motives.  s t a t e was compelled t o i n c r e a s i n g for  conditioned,  Moreover the  interventions  as demands  e q u a l i t y grew under the p r e s s u r e of the organized lower  classes.  Naturally  i t was i n the i n t e r e s t of the poor t o  press the s t a t e to c o d i f y i n d i v i d u a l norms and c o n t r a c t s i n t o g e n e r a l norms, laws, r e g u l a t i o n s  and agreements.  In  t h i s way, under the p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l i t y and i n c o n j u n c t i o n with u n i v e r s a l  suffrage, private relations  became p u b l i c r e l a t i o n s which only  increasingly  served t o b e n e f i t the  p o s i t i o n of the lower c l a s s e s . Furthermore, as Myrdal remarks: When the s t a t e becomes i n v o l v e d i n r e g u l a t i o n s o f the b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y and the business o f r e a l e s t a t e , such i n t e r v e n t i o n takes on, by p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y , the c h a r a c t e r o f s o c i a l housing p o l i c y . L i k e w i s e , when the p r o f i t a b i l i t y of farming becomes a matter o f p u b l i c p r i c e f i x i n g , the i n t e r e s t s o f the small farmer . . . must be taken care of. When wages are becoming r e g u l a t e d by ever more i n c l u s i v e n a t i o n a l settlements between o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n the l a b o r market, one general e f f e c t i s a tendency t o 1 4  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , p. 34.  page  20  d i m i n i s h the wage . d i f f e r e n t i a l s . . . . When commodities have to be r a t i o n e d , the p r i n c i p l e i s again e q u a l i t y . . . . Whenever new measures of s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n or s e m i - p u b l i c r e g u l a t i o n s are i n t r o d u c e d , even i f t h e i r purpose i s q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t one, they w i l l tend to be u t i l i z e d as a means of e q u a l i z a t i o n as w e l l . . . . [Therefore] the d r i v e f o r e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y becomes a p r e s s u r e or support f o r s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n , even outside the sphere of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l reform proper. 5  It must be only  admitted that  an appearance r a t h e r  poor.  Yet,  e d u c a t i o n and  e f f e c t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n w i l l be  development.  In the  demanded.  organization are not  be  of markets.  The  alone i n demanding economic  advanced Western s t a t e s , h i g h e r l e v e l s  of p r o d u c t i o n , consumption, investment and  incomes  constantly  to  urged.  competition, yet national  the  and more  There i s another i n t e r n a l f o r c e that must  underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s  give  increasing  into p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , greater  r e c o g n i z e d b e s i d e s the  may  than a f a c t of advantage to  with increasing  organization  state interventions  Part  of t h i s may  as i n d i v i d u a l s and  communities, we  be  due  are  international  as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n  are c o n t i n u a l l y seeking  additional  funds f o r new  a c t i v i t i e s deemed important and  T h e r e f o r e our  e n t i r e c u l t u r a l o r i e n t a t i o n , our very type  c i v i l i z a t i o n , places rewards that All upon the  a h i g h value on s t r i v i n g  urgent.  for  the  others have obtained. ,  of these f o r c e s have come together to  state increased  of t h i s i s not  the  responsibilities.  l i b e r a l s t a t e but  the  The  impress r e s u l t of a l l  "organizational  state. 1 5  of  I b i d . , pp.  34-35, my  emphasis.  16 i b i d , , p.  38.  page. 21  F . ; THE ORGANIZATIONAL STATEAs we have  seen,  Western c o u n t r i e s  have  experienced  g r a d u a l breakdown o f c o m p e t i t i v e markets under the of t e c h n i c a l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of people's even the market objective  itself  norms.  trend,  interests  Market p r i c e s accepted  has become  and  given,  increasingly  of the p a r t i c i p a n t s  in  the  i f the  to  state  had s t a y e d  s o c i e t y w o u l d have  l i b e r a l and d e c l i n e d disintegrated.  of the  state  i s produced,  to tax.  the value  of the  state  For a w h i l e the  is  l i b e r a l state  The  they w i l l  state.  have  Otherwise  d i d attempt  to  the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t  reasonably preserved.  the  Yet t h e measures  restore were  and s m a l l : t h e t r e n d c o u l d n o t be r e v e r s e d .  m a i n r e a c t i o n has b e e n t o a c c e p t such that  that  as  w o u l d be s e r i o u s l y u n d e r m i n e d .  working of the market."  ineffectual  o f money as w e l l  d i s t r i b u t e d and i n v e s t e d .  t o be c o n t r o l l e d and c o o r d i n a t e d by t h e raison d'etre  sovereign  For monopolies can decide w i t h i n  level,  consumed,  the  state  i m p l i e d u s u r p a t i o n of the  t h i s g o e s t h e more c e r t a i n i t  "free  Moreover,  o f m o n o p o l i e s o r c o m b i n e s , u n c h e c k e d by  broad l i m i t s the p r i c e  the  as  a  liberal  r e g u l a t i o n s , w o u l d have  further  as w e l l as  As we saw e a r l i e r , when c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h i s  existence  what  pressures  community.  intervene,  powers  a r e no l o n g e r  Economic l i f e  manipulated i n the national  attitudes.  a  the  t r e n d but to r e g u l a t e  i n o r d e r and e q u i t y  The r e s u l t  The  is that  is  "a powerful  but  it  page 22  state-controlled  infra-structure of c o l l e c t i v e  has come i n t o b e i n g ,  beneath the  organizations  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l frame o f  the  s t a t e . ""^ A l t h o u g h t h i s has m a r k e d t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of  state  i n t e r v e n t i o n and h e r a l d s  the p o l i t i c a l greater  development  scope f o r  state  to  a major step forward i n  of the West,  i t has  i n t e r v e n t i o n by p r i v a t e  The e q u a l i t y p r i n c i p l e i s strengthen  extension  at work here  left  even  organized  too f o r  interests.  i t has  t h e b a r g a i n i n g power o f w e a k e r  led  the  groups  e i t h e r by a i d i n g i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n o r by i m p r o v i n g  the  c o n d i t i o n s under which they b a r g a i n i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l infrastructure. All  of t h i s  of markets.  i m p l i e s a major change i n t h e  The l i b e r a l  i d e a l of  framework  f a i r p l a y of market  forces  has b e e n t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a demand t h a t w a g e s , p r i c e s , and p r o f i t s  be s e t t l e d  bargaining. to provide  It  by v a r i o u s  has become  the  types of  incomes  collective  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the  state  s u c h a f r a m e w o r k t h r o u g h l e g i s l a t i o n and  arbitration. Under p o l i t i c a l state to  pressure  from o r g a n i z e d workers  introduced various pieces of s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n  i m p r o v e c o n d i t i o n s o f employment and p r o t e c t i o n  risks.  However,  assumed when t h e  a more d i r e c t  7  Ibid.,  p.  39.  designed  against  i n the l a b o r market  s t a t e began t o a f f e c t  i n times o f h i g h unemployment,  1  role  the  t h e demand f o r  and, a f t e r  was  labor  W o r l d War I I ,  page  committing i t s e l f to preserve " f u l l s t a t e p o l i c i e s were put particularly The  i n t o e f f e c t i n other markets,  important p o i n t  to s t r e s s i s that the  been to improve the b a r g a i n i n g  e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y and in national  p o s i t i o n of  advance has  organizations  the  prompted i n c r e a s i n g  Usually  d i r e c t l y i n the b a r g a i n i n g established  by the  i f the  state  interventions.  agreements interfere  process i t i s because i t has  a near balance between the  in effect function  most important p o l i c y d e c i s i o n s  organized  T h e r e f o r e these  as organs f o r p u b l i c  Myrdal goes so f a r as to d e c l a r e  p a r l i a m e n t , and put  share  state,  s t a t e does not  i n t e r e s t s through p r e v i o u s i n t e r v e n t i o n . organizations  shared  r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s to  i n the market-place make b i n d i n g  f o r theirnmembers.  not  T h e r e f o r e the p r i n c i p l e of  Underoeonditions e s t a b l i s h e d  policy.  guiding  would otherwise have f a l l e n behind and  i n the n a t i o n a l development.  already  Similar  agriculture.  p r i n c i p l e has those who  employment."  23  that "many of  . . . are taken  the  outside  i n t o e f f e c t by other organs than those 18  of s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " organizations and This  perform t h i s p u b l i c r o l e , a l l p r i c e s , wages  supply and could not  demand curves become, i n a sense, be  f u r t h e r from the  theory.  Yet  can  f u n c t i o n because the  only  Moreover, because " p r i v a t e "  " f r e e market" of  liberal  i t i s c l e a r that a l l these q u a s i - p u b l i c s t a t e allows them to be  e x t e n s i o n of the more formal s t a t e 1 8  "political."  I b i d . , pp.  40-41.  structures.  organs an  page  All Now  of t h i s has  24  i t s e f f e c t on the r o l e of the s t a t e .  the government and the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , r e p r e s e n t i n g  p o i n t of view of c e n t r a l economic p l a n n i n g  the  and backed by i t s  sovereign powers to l e g i s l a t e , are faced with the task of l e a d i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s and c o n t r o l l i n g compromises between the organized power groups. organized,  As the e n t i r e s o c i e t y becomes more  i n t e g r a t i o n i s achieved  combines and p r i c e and multilateral  at higher  levels  income agreements reached through  c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g perhaps c o v e r i n g  e n t i r e economy.  through  Organizations  r e p r e s e n t i n g workers,  the farmers,  i n d u s t r i a l employees, bankers and consumers a l l p a r t i c i p a t e under government l e a d e r s h i p .  T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y Myrdal's  v i s i o n of a great o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e i n which and  consumption continue with t h r i f t  production  and e f f i c i e n c y under  s t a t e d i r e c t i o n or c o n t r o l . Moreover, i t i s because Western c o u n t r i e s went through a p e r i o d of l i b e r a l i s m t h a t the s t a t e i s able to assume such 19 massive r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  P r i m a r i l y i n Great  Britain  and  20 Scandanavia, i y  p o l i t i c a l l i b e r a l i s m c r e a t e d a strong  and  Myrdal,"The Trend Towards Economic P l a n n i n g , "  15.  20 p reasons which need not d e t a i n us here, Myrdal doubts the e f f i c a c y of the l i b e r a l i n t e r l u d e i n c r e a t i n g the " s t r o n g s t a t e " i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s . America has not achieved the s t r o n g , e f f i c i e n t and non-corrupt s t a t e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f , say, Great B r i t a i n . Moreover the o r g a n i z a t i o n of markets has not proceeded as f a r i n the U n i t e d States while c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s lower. For a l l these reasons "a more than d e s i r a b l e share" of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the d i r e c t i o n and execution of p u b l i c p o l i c y must be c a r r i e d out by f e d e r a l and s t a t e governments "which themselves l a c k the s t r u c t u r e t h a t would make them i d e a l l y f i t t e d f o r the t a s k . " See Gunnar Myrdal, Challenge to A f f l u e n c e (New York: Pantheon, 1962) 97, a l s o pp. 79, 83-85 and 93-96. o r  page  25  f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e s t a t e capable of l a t e r assuming a more dynamic r o l e . L i b e r a l i s m h e l d that the  s t a t e should  have very l i m i t e d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , but w i t h i n i t s spheres, the strong,  i n c o r r u p t and  eighteenth  and  efficient.  e a r l y nineteenth  s t a t e should  Although i n the  and  late  centuries p o l i t i c a l l i f e  the s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were g e n e r a l l y c o r r u p t ,  be  and  inefficient,  a r b i t r a r y , under the impact of l i b e r a l i s m fundamental  reforms were i n s t i t u t e d covering p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , parliament for  the  and the c i v i l  strong  service.  s t a t e , capable of undertaking massive  ventions  i n the economy, was  in  activities.  state Now  In other words, the  a compelling  ad hoc  i n c r e a s e the  reasons the r e s u l t was  importance of the s t a t e .  c e n t r a l s t a t e , as the  i n t e r f e r e n c e s i n the  need f o r a great  c o o r d i n a t i o n , that i s , s t a t e p l a n n i n g . e s s e n t i a l l y two  deal  Therefore, to  of  for  dramatically  F i r s t , only  the  c h i e f organ f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n of p u b l i c  p o l i c i e s , c o u l d p o s s i b l y cope with the massive task coordination.  inter-  l a i d i n a p e r i o d of retrenchment  however, w i t h a l l the  market, there was  basis  Second, as people combine together  of  i n the  market t h e i r a t t i t u d e s change such that they demand d i r e c t state intervention i n t h e i r favor. conditioned  to press  interventions.  Gradually,  people  are  the s t a t e f o r even more r a d i c a l  A f t e r a c e r t a i n p o i n t , the mass of  d i v e r s i f i e d s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s has  to be c o o r d i n a t e d  into  u n i f i e d s t r u c t u r e s of s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s w i t h i n a planned  page 26  economy.  As Myrdal p o i n t s out:  The s t a t e had t o a s s e r t i t s e l f as the f i n a l a r b i t e r . I t had t o l a y down r u l e s f o r what went on w i t h i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . I t had t o change the cond i t i o n s f o r c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g among the o r g a n i z a t i o n s and c o n t r o l them so as t o make the r e s u l t s , conform t o the public w i l l . I t i s only on the i n s t i g a t i o n of the s t a t e or w i t h i t s acquiescence and w i t h i n the framework o f i t s l e g i s l a t i o n and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , that these other m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f organized s o c i e t y are given p l a y --that they are allowed to f u n c t i o n , t o p l a n , and t o regulate.21 However w i t h i n the framework o f state, c o n t r o l s , the organizations greater  have gained not l o s t i n f l u e n c e .  r e a l power i n t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l f i e l d s .  the hallmark o f p o l i t i c s active functioning  They h o l d Therefore  i n the advanced w e l f a r e s t a t e i s the  o f an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e and  e f f e c t i v e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power. s t r e n g t h , number and a c t i v i t y o f o r g a n i z a t i o n s  The  increased  as w e l l as  new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s a l l o c a t e d t o r e v i t a l i z e d p r o v i n c i a l and municipal initiative  governments mean a spreading out o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and i n f l u e n c e over l e g i s l a t i o n t o more and more  people. The voting  p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f c i t i z e n s w i l l not be l i m i t e d t o  at i n t e r m i t t e n t e l e c t i o n s .  Although the e l e c t i o n s  themselves w i l l become much more important as presumably they w i l l be understood i n terms o f r e a l and concrete i n t e r e s t s . In a d d i t i o n , however, c i t i z e n s w i l l take an a c t i v e i n t e r e s t in t h e i r organizations,  being e l e c t e d to o f f i c e and d e c i d i n g  on what i s i n e f f e c t p u b l i c p o l i c y . It i s obvious that Myrdal's concept of the 2 1  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , pp. 42-43.  page. 2 7  "organizational  s t a t e " embraces h a l f - r e a l i t y and h a l f - h o p e .  Even though we do not have the complete o r g a n i z a t i o n a l h i s a n a l y s i s contains of d i r e c t s t a t e  the seeds f o r a p o s s i b l e  state  diminuation  interferences.  Through c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , i t may be p o s s i b l e t o pass much o f the regular  s t a t e a c t i v i t y from the bureaucracy t o the  organizations.  In a sense, communal c o n t r o l through the  pressure of e n l i g h t e n e d strength but  p u b l i c opinion  of o r g a n i z a t i o n s  might reduce the need f o r anything  a minimum o f s t a t e d i r e c t i o n . 22  "welfare c u l t u r e , "  and the b a r g a i n i n g  The e x i s t e n c e  of t h i s  e s s e n t i a l l y a more cooperative  community w i t h g r e a t e r n a t i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  national  solidarity  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l process o f p l a n n i n g represent  the completion of a f u l l  development:  would  c i r c l e of p o l i t i c a l  From the "oppressor s t a t e " o f mass p o v e r t y ,  much s o c i a l r i g i d i t y and gross i n e q u a l i t y of through the l i b e r a l  i n t e r l u d e of minimal s t a t e  purging the s t a t e aparatus of c o r r u p t i o n f o r the f i r m , e f f i c i e n t  opportunity; activity,  and l a y i n g the b a s i s  arid capable s t a t e ; to the p e r i o d o f  ad hoc i n t e r f e r e n c e s w i t h i n t e r m i t t e n t attempts at coordination;  t o the present p e r i o d o f d i r e c t and s t i l l  growing  volume o f s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e s ; and f i n a l l y t o the "welfare c u l t u r e " p e r i o d where people are a c t i v a t e d t o take care o f t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n very general the  democratic 2 2  state.  Ibid.,, p. 78.  r u l e s e s t a b l i s h e d by  page  28  G. ; PLANNING- RE-VISITED I£ we re-examine p l a n n i n g i n the Western world we get a glimpse  as to why  s t a t e " as the hallmark ment.  Moreover we  Myrdal  can  views the " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  of c u r r e n t Western p o l i t i c a l  can tap more c l e a r l y the  develop-  relationship  between p l a n n i n g and n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n , a r e l a t i o n s h i p that perhaps o f f e r s another  aspect to the p e c u l i a r problems  ing i n t e g r a t i o n i n the underdeveloped world.  affect-  Indeed, as  we  s h a l l see i n Part I I , the o p e r a t i o n of n a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g i t s e l f i s c l e a r l y i n f l u e n c e d by the degree of n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n present  i n an underdeveloped  In the West we state.  Rather we  country.  do not as yet have an advanced w e l f a r e  have an i d e o l o g i c a l commitment to i t . T h i s  commitment i s r e l a t e d to the broad goals of economic ment, f u l l  develop-  employment, e q u a l i t y of o p p o r t u n i t y , s o c i a l  and p r o t e c t e d minimum standards  of income, n u t r i t i o n ,  security housing,  h e a l t h and education f o r a l l r e g i o n s and a l l s o c i a l groups within a nation-state. The w e l f a r e s t a t e was  not planned,  Western c o u n t r i e s i t i s s t i l l not planned comprehensive manner.  indeed i n some i n any  Instead, numerous p o l i c y  initiatives  are adopted that have the e f f e c t of g r a d u a l l y r e a c h i n g goal of the w e l f a r e s t a t e .  As we  saw  the  e a r l i e r , coordination  becomes imperative due to a l l the unplanned i n t e r f e r e n c e s . Yet c o o r d i n a t i o n does not l e a d to p l a n n i n g , i t i s p l a n n i n g . Both the goals o f the democratic  w e l f a r e s t a t e and  the  page 2 9  gradual reaching political  of these goals  attitudes.  The  reflect  a converging  of  once important d i v i s i o n s of  opinion  on the p r i n c i p l e s of the w e l f a r e s t a t e are c l e a r l y l e s s important now.  For example, few people now  should have p r o g r e s s i v e are more l i k e l y to be taxation.  taxation.  The  we  p o i n t s of disagreement  about the r a t e s and  Although there  deny that  the  extent of such  are d i f f e r e n c e s and people do  shortcomings i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l community and  see  i t s laws  . . . the d i f f e r i n g p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e s to the community as i t i s f u n c t i o n i n g and c o n s t a n t l y developing dwindle to r i p p l e s on the surface of the fundamental s i m i l a r i t i e s , to v a r i a t i o n s b u i l t around a main theme. . . . T h i s t e s t i f i e s to the general community of i d e a l s i n our Western c i v i l i z a t i o n . ...23 This converging of a t t i t u d e s i s r e a d i l y apparent. P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s now  compete i n propagating new  sweeping r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l reforms. threats  No  longer  and more  are  reactionary  to dismantle the w e l f a r e s t a t e taken s e r i o u s l y j u s t  as t h r e a t s of i n d i s c r i m i n a t e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n are r a r e l y put f o r t h by s o c i a l - d e m o c r a t i c  parties.  As Myrdal puts i t , i n 24  the West we  have a c e r t a i n degree of " p o l i t i c a l harmony"  among c i t i z e n s .  Yet  harmony p o s t u l a t e d "created  t h i s harmony i s not  by l i b e r a l theory.  harmony," c r e a t e d  the  automatic  Rather i t i s a 25  by s t a t e p o l i c i e s .  accomodation between c l a s h i n g i n t e r e s t s , the  In seeking s t a t e undertook  an ever i n c r e a s i n g number of i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t 23 Myrdal, An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economy, p. Myrdal,, Beyond the Weifare S t a t e , p. 2 4  25 I b i d . , p.  69.  31. 66.  gradually  page 30  turned the w e l f a r e s t a t e i n t o an i d e a l f o r the whole  nation.  While t h i s process evolved, our s o c i e t y became an increasingly regulated only w i t h i n ultimate  one, l e a v i n g " f r e e " e n t e r p r i s e t o move  a frame marked by a system o f c o n t r o l s under the  a u t h o r i t y o f the s t a t e .  w i t h respect  to p r o p e r t y ,  f i r i n g , a l l became subject  Moreover, i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s  disposable to s t a t e  income, f o b s , h i r i n g and regulation.  Perhaps the remarkable t h i n g i s not t h e degree o f r e g u l a t i o n o f our l i v e s but the f a c t that so many people do not n o t i c e , or i f they n o t i c e , do not mind l i v i n g life.  Part  o f the reason f o r t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s  i s the f a c t t h a t  a regulated  to obey laws  i n the democratic welfare s t a t e c i t i z e n s  both p a r t i c i p a t e i n government and r e c e i v e t a n g i b l e from s t a t e a c t i o n .  benefits  As Myrdal puts i t , "most people have good 26  reason t o f e e l f r e e r , not l e s s f r e e i n the Welfare Undoubtedly the very success o f the w e l f a r e enhances i t s l e g i t i m a c y .  Tangible  benefits plus  State." state  dispersion  of a u t h o r i t y l e a d c i t i z e n s to f e e l that they have improved the  conditions  under which i n d i v i d u a l choices  are made. I t  i s through p a r t i c i p a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a t i o n made p o s s i b l e by the e q u a l i t y i d e a l , that n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with state a c t i v i t i e s , regulations  and demands i s p o s s i b l e .  Besides the t a n g i b l e economic b e n e f i t s , the a b i l i t y of the broad mass o f people t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n d e c i s i o n making i f they wish, allows the s t a t e to make t r u l y extraordinary 2 6  demands o f the people.  I b i d . , p. 73  As we: s h a l l see i n  page  Part  I I , the  ability  of the  s t a t e i n underdeveloped,  to make s i m i l a r heavy demands i s g r e a t l y  31  countries  circumscribed.  In the West, c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n decision-making and  i n the  influence  fruits  of economic advance has  on the p o l i t i c a l  tended to make people's  system.  had  These two  a wholesome f a c t o r s have  attitudes  more s p e c i f i c and more r e l a t e d to t h e i r r e a l , even i f narrow - - i n t e r e s t s - - t h e i r opinions w i l l be more w o r l d l y and i n that sense more r a t i o n a l . . . . T h e i r p o l i t i c a l choices w i l l be b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d against the i n f l u e n c e of free-wheeling phantasts and demagogues, d e a l i n g i n slogans and e m o t i o n a l l y - c h a r g e d and d i s t o r t e d s t e r e o t y p e s . As t h i s r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of people's a t t i t u d e s i s m a t e r i a l i z i n g . . . democracy i s undoubtedly strengthened."2 7 A l l these e f f e c t s of s t a t e p l a n n i n g are reducible  to the  f a c t that  o r i e n t a t i o n of the able  to p l a c e  due  to the  psychological  c i t i z e n s toward the  s t a t e , the  state i s  tremendous burdens on i t s c i t i z e n s .  t h i s because the p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l i t y has groups to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Myrdal has  largely  do  allowed a l l s o c i a l  rewards of s t a t e  called this psychological  It can  activity.  s t r e n g t h e n i n g of  the 28  moorings of the Up  s t a t e "the  to now  we  of the  sovereign  development i n the West.  that p o l i t i c a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e we  agree that h i s conception of t h e " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l I b i d . , p.  Although  development means the  or c r e a t i o n of an i n t e r e s t - g r o u p  2 7  state."  have been content merely to r e l a t e Myrdal's  conception of p o l i t i c a l agree w i t h him  miracle  emergence cannot  state" is  89.  Gunnar Myrdal, "Towards a More C l o s e l y I n t e g r a t e d Free World Economy" i n N a t i o n a l P o l i c y f o r Economic Welfare At Home and Abroad, ed. by Robert Lekachman (New York: R u s s e l l and R u s s e l l , 1961), 251. 2 8  we  page  without fundamental f l a w s .  In f a c t , as our e v a l u a t i o n  the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e w i l l make e v i d e n t , e f f e c t i v e planning  32  of state  i s p r e d i c a t e d on r a t h e r s t r i n g e n t requirements,  requirements t h a t are by no means assured advanced welfare  e i t h e r i n the  s t a t e s of the West or i n the underdeveloped  countries.  H.  AN EVALUATION; OF THE State p l a n n i n g ,  ORGANIZATIONAL STATE  e s p e c i a l l y the d e c e n t r a l i z e d  planning  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e , i s based on many necessary and  sufficient  c o n d i t i o n s that may  or may  not  be  present. F i r s t , t h i s type of p l a n n i n g  r e q u i r e s a great d e a l  s e l f - r e s t r a i n t on the p a r t of those i n the organized structure.  P u b l i c p o l i c y can be delegated  are w i l l i n g  public w i l l .  and  the  A c o n t i n u a l problem would seem to be to prevent i n t e r e s t s i n a market.  example, as consumers are weakly organized  presents  of the p u b l i c  able to c a r r y i n t o e f f e c t  c o l l u s i o n among the organized  the temptation  infra-  to these organs  only as long as they have a c l e a r conception good and  of  For  almost everywhere,  to pass on unreasonable p r i c e  increases  s e r i o u s problems f o r a democratic s t a t e .  Second, (and t h i s i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to our  first  p o i n t ) Myrdal's model depends on a f i n e l y balanced institutional infrastructure.  E f f e c t i v e d e l e g a t i o n of s t a t e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i s not p o s s i b l e i f some o r g a n i z a t i o n s  are  p a g e 33  g r o s s l y predominant over o t h e r s .  Moreover the problem of  l i m i t i n g p o w e r and p r i v i l e g e may p r o v e than the r u l e s it  is  and r e g u l a t i o n s  a l l e g e d by some o b s e r v e r s  much i n f l u e n c e  of the that  f a r more state.  intractable  For example,  t r a d e u n i o n s may h a v e  in polito-economic decision-making.  If  too  this  s h o u l d be t h e c a s e i t may p r o v e e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t f o r  a  democracy t o curb t h i s type  the  of power.  As we a r e a w a r e ,  f o r m a t i o n o f t r a d e - u n i o n s grew o u t o f t h e d e m o c r a t i c and was i n f a c t  i n s t r u m e n t a l i n humanizing the "oppressor  F o r a democracy t o c h a l l e n g e amount t o r e j e c t i n g p a r t o f measures  ideal  the organized lower class its  own h e r i t a g e .  As  state."  would  such,  t o curb t r a d e u n i o n s c o u l d evoke m a s s i v e p u b l i c  r e s i s t a n c e w h i l e at the  same t i m e t h e p u b l i c r e m a i n s  ambivalent  over t r a d e u n i o n power. Moreover, the infrastructure For example, political  is  anonymous i n f l u e n c e  of c o r p o r a t i o n s i n our  In t h i s case,  the  a class  structure,  d i r e c t o r s h i p s , and l o w p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e  organizational appearance  d i r e c t i o n as w e l l .  s e l d o m d e m o c r a t i c a l l y b a l a n c e d by  o r g a n i z e d power o f c o n s u m e r s . interlocking  organizational  c o u l d work i n t h e o p p o s i t e  the  life  imbalance i n the  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e w o u l d t e n d t o g i v e more an  than a r e a l i t y to reform measures.  Above a l l ,  whole n o t i o n of a b a l a n c e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e h e a v i l y dependent that  is  on a c l e a r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p u b l i c  common t o a l l members o f t h e T h i r d , Myrdal holds that  r e m a i n a l o o f f r o m t h e power s t r u g g l e s  is  interest  nation-state.  a parliament w i l l  the  somehow  i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  page  infrastructure  w h i l e remaining the c u s t o d i a n of  conception of the " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " state  some p u r e  A l l actions of  the  w o u l d seem t o c o n f o r m t o a n d e n h a n c e t h e p u b l i c g o o d .  For M y r d a l , groups  it  seems c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t  themselves  interest.  are  cognSzant'tof  He does n o t  bargaining"  a l l the  organized  the " c o r r e c t " p u b l i c  seem u n d u l y c o n c e r n e d t h a t  ated against  of s o c i e t y w i l l  as t h e y w i l l  rather  be p e r p e t u a l l y  n o t have t h e p o l i t i c a l  combat o t h e r , more h i g h l y o r g a n i z e d o r o t h e r w i s e interests.  "collective  f o r t h e common g o o d may n o t emerge b u t  that various sectors  discrimin-  power  to  acceptable  Moreover, h i s d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p u b l i c p o l i c y  t o p r o v i n c i a l and m u n i c i p a l g o v e r n m e n t s q u a s i - p u b l i c o r g a n s may n o t r e s u l t of  34  collective  interests  as w e l l as t h e  other  i n any h a r m o n i o u s p r o m o t i o n  and common c a u s e s i n f u l f i l l m e n t o f  any " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " u n l e s s  the " p u b l i c " i s  severely  restricted. F o u r , what i s will  have  the v e s t e d  interests  f o r m e d a t t h e p r o v i n c i a l , m u n i c i p a l and  group l e v e l  from d e f y i n g the c e n t e r  l e g i t i m a c y to act areas?  to prevent  that  interest  and h e n c e d e n y i n g  its  i n p r e s c r i b e d w a y s and e v e n i n p r e s c r i b e d  E a c h o f t h e s e b o d i e s may h a v e t h e i r own " p l a n "  t h e y may n o t w i s h t o see blueprint.  deflected  central-state  In other words, the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e  on a g r e a t d e a l o f g i v e In f a c t ,  s u b o r d i n a t e d t o any  and t a k e  t h a t may n o t be  frustrating  any w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o m p r o m i s e  depends  present.  l e g i t i m a c y and c i t i z e n l o y a l t y c o u l d e a s i l y t o some " l o w e r " l e v e l o f g o v e r n m e n t ,  that  be  thereby  interests.  page 35  Five,  the  organizational  If  t h e y do n o t p a r t i c i p a t e  but  i s b a s e d on a c t i v e  to continuously p a r t i c i p a t e  oligarchies at the  autocracy  become  at  level  as w e l l .  b u t t h e more p r o b a b l e  for  citizen  level,  result  organizat-  a widespread the  is  be  process.  the  complex  state  I t c o u l d be an  and p l a i n c o r r u p t i o n .  organized interests  its  i n the p o l i t i c a l  an i n t e n s e  the b a s i s  and  c i t i z e n s must  f u n c t i o n i n g not only beneath  state  profiteering  state  The c r u c i a l p r o b l e m i s t h a t  ions could e a s i l y of  f u n c t i o n i n g of the  substructure  participation. willing  entire  level  enlightened  a mire of c o l l u s i o n ,  Without a balance  of  and s u s t a i n e d c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n we  must c o n s i d e r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t M y r d a l ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f advanced w e l f a r e "oppressor  state  will  be b u t  a v a r i a t i o n of  organizations  if  individuals f a i l  they w i l l  to p a r t i c i p a t e  l i k e l y a l s o be a p a t h e t i c  obligations  as c i t i z e n s o f  that  o r g a n i z e d i n f r a s t r u c t u r e does n o t  i f the  the  state.  according to the " p u b l i c i n t e r e s t " organizations  become  may be c o m p e l l e d t o prevent  possession  the  of the  It  (that  is,  state  central  state  i n the  standards of  conduct  argued  the then the  controls.  of are  institutional infrastructure.  Yet  what  Indeed  some so  state  the  oligarchical interest?  i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t to conceive i f the  if  from becoming c o r r u p t or  strongest  their  function  c o r r u p t and o l i g a r c h i c a l ) i n t r o d u c e more d i r e c t  in their  about  c o u l d be  becomes  different  the  state."  Moreover,  will  the  it  "pure"  completely Surely  there  page 36  would be a congruence e f f e c t  or a s t r a i n toward u n i f o r m i t y  - - i n t h i s case meaning the p e n e t r a t i o n of the s t a t e by now  perverted organizational i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . A  argument c o u l d be a p p l i e d to the p r o v i n c i a l and governments. say,  I f they become b o s s - r i d d e n  an unwatching and  the  similar municipal  and c o r r u p t due  a p a t h e t i c c i t i z e n r y , w i l l much be  accomplished by t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e i r " l o c a l " f u n c t i o n s to central  to,  the  state? Myrdal i s not unaware of the problems o f  citizen participation.  He  maintaining  states that:  . . . p a r a d o x i c a l l y enough, the very success of the modern democratic Welfare State i n a t t a i n i n g a h i g h degree of 'created harmony' of i n t e r e s t s [?] . . . may a l s o decrease some of the s t i m u l a n t s to p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 9  2 9  For example, the emotional trade unions might be l o s t establishment;  with f u l l  appeal  of c o o p e r a t i v e s  as they become p a r t of the n a t i o n a l  employment guaranteed there may  l e s s i n c e n t i v e to b u i l d up  and maintain  organizations  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s to defend workers' i n t e r e s t s . hand, those who citizenry will  aggregation  welfare  t h r i v e i n such an environment. articulation  f u n c t i o n s of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n an advanced  s t a t e , he does seem to charge p a r t i e s with  preserving p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  Yet  the and  s u r e l y with a l l the power  s t r u g g l e s t a k i n g p l a c e between organized pressure 2 9  other  might p r o f i t the most from an a p a t h e t i c  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c o n t i n u a l v i g i l a n c e i n b u i l d i n g up  "  be  and  On the  Although Myrdal seems to deny the i n t e r e s t and  and  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , p.  45.  groups,  page  p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s would be l i t t l e more than s o c i a l providing pleasant  37  clubs  d i v e r s i o n s while the hard b a t t l e f o r power  takes h o l d i n a p o s s i b l y o l i g a r c h i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  infra-  structure. It i s not  t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l be  absolutely  low,  r a t h e r , Myrdal's " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e " demands such e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y high p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s i f i t i i s e f f e c t i v e while remaining democratic. be a c l e a r conception p a r t i c i p a n t s and to disagree may  to  be  Moreover, there must  of the p u b l i c good both among the  at the s t a t e l e v e l .  w i t h Myrdal and  Therefore  one  i s forced  conclude that the welfare  w e l l remain " t h a t r a t h e r shallow b u r e a u c r a t i c ,  state  strongly  c e n t r a l i z e d , i n s t i t u t i o n a l machinery, manipulated by c r a f t y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l entrepreneurs and  vested  S i x , c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n and organizations  and  interests. . .  c o n t r o l of both  the p r o v i n c i a l and m u n i c i p a l  ,"  JKJ  the  governments i s  a l s o e s s e n t i a l i f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power i s to occur.  Yet  to achieve d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n would r e q u i r e  determined e f f o r t of immense d i f f i c u l t y to d i s l o d g e c e n t r a l s t a t e bureaucracy. dismissing personnel, automatic p a t t e r n s accepted by the  and  G i v i n g up  administrative  shaking loose  state administration.  The  the bureaucrats and  institutional  3 1  p.  86  i b i d - , p.  96  ;>  controls,  are not t h i n g s that would be r e a d i l y  i t s vested  Ib"id.  the  from p r i v i l e g e s and  of which Myrdal warns, has  3 0  a  i n the  "meddlesome s t a t e , "  i n t e r e s t s both among infrastructure.  On  page  t h i s Myrdal i s s t r a n g e l y  silent.  In a d d i t i o n , the "welfare  c u l t u r e " t h a t would support  d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n assumes a c u l t u r a l homogeneity and of n a t i o n a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n w i t h u n d i v i d e d exist  anywhere o u t s i d e  a degree  l o y a l t y that may  of h i s n a t i v e Sweden.  To  be necessary f o r an rhfteffiimiiltee p e r i o d .  intensity.  is  s e c t i o n a l or  l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , thereby encouraging vested  f o r c e s w i l l not  center  Indeed, there  every reason to assume t h a t by strengthening  g r a v i t a t e towards those centers  not  counteract  these c e n t r i f u g a l f o r c e s d i r e c t i n t e r v e n t i o n from the may  38  i n t e r e s t s to  of power, the c e n t r i f u g a l  only p e r s i s t but w i l l  Moreover, i t seems naive  increase  i n scope  and  to b e l i e v e that a weakened  c e n t r a l s t a t e c o u l d long w i t h s t a n d the predatory  adventures  of t h r i v i n g p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . Seven, we against we  should  a l s o be  regimentation.  aware that Myrdal  In p a r t i c u l a r , and  s h a l l r e t u r n i n Part  welfare  a matter to which  I I , Myrdal warns against  out" of d i r e c t s t a t e i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n the  inveighs  the  economy.  s t a t e i s to remain the s t r o n g , e f f i c i e n t ,  "spreading I f the  incorrupt  s t a t e then d i r e c t s t a t e c o n t r o l s must be h e l d i n check. 32 "Petty t i n k e r i n g " to enforce  s i g n i f i e s the l a c k of w i l l and  r e s o l u t e l y general  non-discretionary  strength  controls.  Moreover, a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of r e g u l a t i o n s , r u l e s and serves  to endanger the  i n government.  National  ccommunal c o o p e r a t i o n 3 2  I b i d . , p.  standards of m o r a l i t y  96.  i n business  integration, solidarity,  apparently  are not  controls  sufficient  and  and checks  on  page  either since  private the  (albeit traits  or p u b l i c m o r a l i t y .  liberal interlude  i s not  Myrdal's "organizational w i t h the  both private  The d i l e m m a i s l i k e l y t o be  state"  "liberal state"),  is  shares  p a r t i c i p a t i o n or  decentralization?  reasonable  democratic ities  citizen,  i n the  it  already  some to  to expect that  infrastructure  will  potentially  corruptable  h i s own i n t e r e s t s i n the v a r i o u s prevent  even  if  i n the  levels  of balancing  M y r d a l ' s model b e a r s a s u s p i c i o u s  collectively securing  i n d i v i d u a l goals  resemblance Individuals  appears  a communal s p i r i t o r a s e n s e o f  to achieve  organizational  very  The p r o b l e m strength  are  of  organize for  framework.  sacrifice  "for  conception the  organized  limited p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c goals.  state there  but  to a sort  t o be l i t t l e  E v e n t h o u g h i n d i v i d u a l s may be c o l l e c t i v e l y merely  to  whether  g o a l s but  in a collective  there  is  and  and i n d i v i d u a l i s m .  not p r i m a r i l y f o r c o l l e c t i v e  In other words, of  state.  means?  organizational  t h e norms o f c o o p e r a t i o n  "cooperative—Hobbesian"  what  advantage a v a i l a b l e  or perverse  i s m o t m e r e l y one o f b a l a n c i n g  pursuing  infrastructure  state apparatus,  every  obtained through honorable  over  individual is busily  organizational  him from s e c u r i n g  time,  officials?  every  of the  the  have t h e  o r a b i l i t y t o be a c o n t i n u o u s - w a t c h d o g  Moreover,  the  responsibil-  inclination  state  ensure  greater  b u r d e n e d w i t h immense  organizational  similar  f a l l i n g b a c k on  dubious p l e a f o r greater Is  this:  repeated  i t possible  and p u b l i c m o r a l i t y w i t h o u t  39  few s u p e r o r d i n a t e  or  nation." it In  is the  "national"  page 40  goals that c o u l d act as an i d e o l o g i c a l glue b i n d i n g the m u l t i p l i c i t y of c e n t e r s of power. Would i t be p o s s i b l e to have a democratic n a t i o n s t a t e w i t h i n t e n s e a r t i c u l a t i o n of l i m i t e d goals but w i t h i f any,  aggregation of i n t e r e s t s ?  little,  Myrdal would argue that  the s t a t e should act as an umpire between competing o r g a n i z ations. ality  But as we  have seen, who  or m o r a l i t y of the s t a t e ?  c o m p e t i t i v e and  can guarantee  the  imparti-  Indeed, w i t h a f i e r c e l y  ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y ) balanced  institutional  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e coupled with a l i m i t e d aggregation of i n t e r e s t s , why  should we  expect the s t a t e to produce  any  " c o r r e c t " d e c i s i o n between e s s e n t i a l l y m o n o p o l i s t i c power structures? E i g h t , our e a r l i e r statements  about the w e l f a r e  state,  i t s development and i t s p o l i c i e s , have emphasized t h a t i t s c h i e f concern i s w i t h one n a t i o n .  In other words, an  advanced democratic w e l f a r e s t a t e i s n a t i o n a l i s t i c . we  suggested,  c o n t r a r y to Myrdal's  But  as  e x p e c t a t i o n s , the w e l f a r e  s t a t e i s n a t i o n a l i s t i c only to the extent that people b e l i e v e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l wants and d e s i r e s can be f u l f i l l e d w i t h i n the boundaries structures.  of the s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g  T h i s does not imply i t i s n a t i o n a l i s t i c  i n the  sense of having many o v e r a r c h i n g v a l u e s or goals t h a t a l l s t r a t a s u b s c r i b e to and are w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e f o r t h e i r attainment. Myrdal's  " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e " i s an economic s t a t e  c i r c u m s c r i b e d by a p o l i t i c a l boundary.  The  rewards f o r  page- 41  participating  i n t h i s s t a t e are not u n q u a n t i f i a b l e i n t a n g i b l e s :  they are s p e c i f i c , : concrete economic rewards.  As l o n g as  these economic rewards are forthcoming the w e l f a r e s t a t e i s s e c u r e l y moored i n people's a t t i t u d e s and e x p e c t a t i o n s . Only i f we  grant the assumption  of c o n t i n u o u s l y h i g h  and i n t e n s e c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s i t p o s s i b l e to conceive of such a s t a t e b u i l d i n g up other forms of p o l i t i c a l A f f e c t and l o y a l t y c o u l d emerge i f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n oligarchic-authoritarian rule.  Otherwise  prevented  l e g i t i m a c y and  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the s t a t e are dependent on economic growth.  credit.  continuous  The dependence on economics would seem to  account  f o r the " s p i r i t u a l d e s e r t " that Myrdal  welfare  state:  sees i n the  What i n the end, are we going to do w i t h our wealth, except to i n c r e a s e i t a l l the time and make i t ever more c e r t a i n t h a t a l l of us have an equal o p p o r t u n i t y to a c q u i r e i t ? I admit that we are not there y e t . But to reach i t i s d e f i n i t e l y w i t h i n our grasp. What then, on the other side^o'f „ theo h i l l s , i s our d i s t a n t goal? What s h a l l we s t r i v e f o r ? ;  •  •  •  While the dreamers, p l a n n e r s , and f i g h t e r s of e a r l i e r generations are f i n a l l y g e t t i n g almost a l l they asked f o r , somehow the " b e t t e r l i f e " i n a moral and s p i r i t u a l sense, the c r a v i n g f o r which was t h e i r supreme i n s p i r a t i o n , i s slow i n d e v e l o p i n g . . . .33 But we  should not underestimate  economic rewards.  The  the importance  of the  economic success of the w e l f a r e s t a t e  has v i r t u a l l y f r o z e n o p p o s i t i o n to i t .  As t h i s " s e r v i c e  state"  comes about, people are i n c r e a s i n g l y u n w i l l i n g to dismantle it  or even s l i g h t l y r e t r e n c h on i t s i d e a l s and 33 Myrdal, Ah I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economy, p. 32 2. 3 4  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare S t a t e , p.  138.  accomplishments.  page 42  Indeed, the. v e r y experience o f l i v i n g  and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n  an e f f e c t i v e w e l f a r e s t a t e induces p s y c h o l o g i c a l state  approval o f  actions. Undoubtedly i f the " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  according  s t a t e " develops  t o Myrdal's model we would share h i s r a t h e r  o p t i m i s t i c conclusions.  But we must keep i n mind that Myrdal's  a n a l y s i s presupposes r a t h e r s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s s u c c e s s f u l democratic w e l f a r e s t a t e : balanced o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  fora  self-restraint; a  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; a c l e a r conception  of the p u b l i c good among a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s ; a h i g h and intense  l e v e l o f c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n ; a competent and  incorruptable  state administration  degree o f p r i v a t e m o r a l i t y ;  i n conjunction  w i t h a high  and a w i l l i n g n e s s on the p a r t o f  the  s t a t e bureaucracy to i n e f f e c t dismantle  I.  NATIONAL INTEGRATION -- INTERNATIONAL DISINTEGRATION The  nationalism  itself.  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the democratic  w e l f a r e s t a t e p l a c e s Myrdal i n a l a r g e l y u n r e s o l v e d dilemma. While he i s a f i r m b e l i e v e r i n the i d e a l s and accomplishments of the w e l f a r e s t a t e , he i s at the same time a committed internationalist.  Myrdal's main t h e s i s i s t h a t the  n a t i o n a l i s t i c economic p o l i c i e s o f the w e l f a r e s t a t e are c o n t i n u a l l y strengthening  the very a t t i t u d e s among the people  who are s t r i v i n g f o r even f u r t h e r advances along these p o l i c i e s . That i s , the t r e n d  i s toward i n c r e a s i n g economic  nationalism  i n a l l c o u n t r i e s w i t h consequent d e s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t s on the  page  international As issue.  system.  t h i s point  We  s h a l l do  i t i s pertinent so f o r three  means of r e i t e r a t i n g and second, i t puts the perspective  of the  f o r us to. d i s c u s s  reasons: f i r s t ,  summing up the  this  i t is a  argument thus f a r ;  development of the w e l f a r e s t a t e i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system; t h i r d , i t i s a  means of i n t r o d u c i n g i n Part  43  i n broad form the  arguments to  follow  I I , d e a l i n g w i t h the underdeveloped world. During the n i n e t e e n t h century the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system was  dominated by an i n t e g r a t e d p a r t i a l world community  c o n s i s t i n g of n o r t h e r n and western Europe, North America Australia.  These n a t i o n s ,  of r i c h and p r o g r e s s i v e  today forming the e x c l u s i v e  s t a t e s , a l s o stood at the  world s o c i e t y at that e a r l i e r time. s i m i l a r and were e c o n o m i c a l l y , and  and  circle  apex of  They were c u l t u r a l l y i n a sense p o l i t i c a l l y ,  integrated. As we l e d to the  have seen r e c u r r i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s have  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h i s p a r t i a l world community.  In f a c t , the p o l i t i c a l development of the Western was  not  countries  compatible w i t h continued i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n . During the  last  c a p i t a l , enterprise severely  distorted.  s i x t y years the movement of persons,  as w e l l as goods and  s e r v i c e s has  Exchange r a t e s are now  regulated  been by  35 Gunnar Myrdal/"Economic N a t i o n a l i s m and I n t e r n a t i o n a l ism," A u s t r a i l a n Outlook, XI (December, 1957) 3-50. For f u r t h e r comments: a l s o see Myrdal, Beyond the- Welfare S t a t e , pp. 117-48, 167-87, and Myrdal, An I n t e r n a t i o n a l ; Economy, pp. 32-55 and 299-335.  page 44  central words,  governments the  direct  international  as  are  imports  cause o f  economic  the  system  a d o p t e d by i n d i v i d u a l s t a t e It forced  is  true  that  on g o v e r n m e n t s  several  and e x p o r t s .  disintegration  real  Yet n a t i o n a l p o l i c i e s  i n t u r n l e d t o new d e f e n s i v e a l l the w h i l e  i n the  almost  to  state  completely  world.  and i n t h e i r  demanding  national  relations  aftermath  greatly  somewhat l e s s p r e d i c t a b l e  to formulate  Of c o u r s e ,  These  by t a b o o s on  powerful  opportunity,  increased  the  the newly  system.  advanced underdeveloped number  liberty,  international  inter-  system  competitive. itself  a  liberated nations  own n a t i o n a l  international  integration.  aggravating  of  develop-  scope of  of c o l o n i a l empires,  other  a  undermined  of a large  in their  the  was  w i t h the  w h i l e much more  force,  policies  f u r t h e r weakened  of  w h i l e making the  destabilizing  the  between the  relationships  With the break-up  international  i n t e r n a t i o n a l power  relations  equality  ment and i n d e p e n d e n c e  major  loosening  L i b e r a t i o n from c o l o n i a l r u l e  countries  of  disintegration.  W o r l d War I I  established  This occurred both i n the countries  part  economy.  intervention, the  aggrevated  p o l i c y measures  A l t h o u g h W o r l d War I and i t s stimulant  measures  on n a t i o n a l  also  crises  intervention  old  or imagined e f f e c t s  and h e n c e s p u r r e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l  state  this  t h e s e p o l i c y measures were i n by t h e  governments  other  governments.  crises  individual  of  has been t h e p o l i c y  international p o l i t i c a l crises  economies.  In  interest.  factor  was  the  began This  45  page  enormous are  increase  a l l aware, t h e economic  i n c l u d e the and t h e not  i n t h e power  armaments  decisive,  Generally,  irrational,  perverting,  As we  development  m i l i t a r i z i n g of n a t i o n a l  strategic  elements i n a l l  relations.  Soviet Union.  consequences of t h i s  race,  i n t r o d u c t i o n of  of the  interests,  as  international  important,  if  economic  a l l these developments and c o n f u s i n g  economies  force  threw  "an  i n t o almost  all  36 problems  of n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  As we d i s c u s s e d was  evolving  the  accelerating role  of  the  attempts  the  state took  to  i n t h e West  regions  economic  to e x i s t  proportions  as  and p o l i t i c a l  citizenship  were  to m a t e r i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n I t was no  to a l l o w i n d i v i d u a l s , groups outside  the  in  longer  expansionary  or  spread  same t i m e ,  economic  progress  of  permitted  c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the p o l i t i c a l machinery.  brought  the  economic  accordance: w i t h the opportunity.  system ideals  In t u r n ,  d i s t r i b u t i n g , economic 3 6  of  The  development.  At the wider  right  rights  of n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t i o n .  conceivable  were  economic p r o g r e s s  Meanwhile the  process  integration.  on new and m a s s i v e  i n c l u d e the  historical  s t a t e s o f t h e West  w e r e made t o e n s u r e  fruits  whole  advanced  while this  t h e i r march toward n a t i o n a l  democratization. enlarged  earlier,  policy."  to operate i n ever of  This  closer  l i b e r t y , and e q u a l i t y  of  b y a l l o w i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n and by rewards  the  s t a t e was  able  to  increase  Myrdal,"Economic N a t i o n a l i s m a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , " 10.  page- 46  c i t i z e n obedience and t o make ever i n c r e a s i n g demands on individuals. The  net e f f e c t with respect  to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  system, however, was the i n t r o v e r s i o n or l o c a l i z a t i o n o f a t t i t u d e s and apathy towards events beyond the n a t i o n a l boundary.  The concern f o r l i b e r t y and e q u a l i t y  definitely  d i d not extend to a l l mankind. Yet  t h i s was not an i r r a t i o n a l response on the p a r t  of Westerners.  For the p r o t e c t i v e p o l i c i e s o f the " o r g a n i z -  a t i o n a l s t a t e " meant c l o s e d systems of merit  and s e n i o r i t y  were b u i l t up as n a t i o n a l standards and defended by n a t i o n a l organizations.  Furthermore the welfare s t a t e i s expensive:  heavy burdens o f t a x a t i o n , insurance premiums and membership fees made i t only n a t u r a l t h a t people would want maximum b e n e f i t s from a n a t i o n a l w e l f a r e s t a t e which they had b u i l t and p a i d f o r .  Moreover, the very o p e r a t i o n  organizational  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e was w i t h i n  The  o f the  a national  framework.  r e s u l t o f a l l o f t h i s was that c u l t u r a l d i f f e r e n c e s on  different  s i d e s o f a border, perhaps i n i t i a l l y minor, grew i n  importance. Concomitant with the i n t r o v e r s i o n o f a t t i t u d e s was a 37 drift  toward n a t i o n a l autarchy.  Although no c l e a r d i s t i n c t -  i o n can be made between, on the one hand, the p o l i c y measures designed to p r o t e c t n a t i o n a l economies from disturbances i n the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system and, on the other hand, w e l f a r e  state  p o l i c i e s per se, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e t t i n g o f the d e v e l o p i n g Myrdal, Ah I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economy, p. 38.  page  w e l f a r e s t a t e has  been one  of p r o g r e s s i v e  As we: have seen, n a t i o n a l "organizational permitting  s t a t e " or the  full  the n a t i o n a l national  tendency.  boundary.  the  s t a b i l i t y extend only as f a r  Little  as  concern i s shown f o r i n t e r -  goals of e q u a l i t y and  progress  f l e x i b i l i t y of the w e l f a r e s t a t e international  employment, p o l i t i c a l  crises.  an  integration.  changes i n the  cannot be  s t a t e , " while  P o l i c i e s : d i r e c t e d towards w e l f a r e ,  employment and  Meanwhile, the restrict  the  a r e a l growth i n s o c i a l democracy, has  inherent a u t a r c h i c equality,  disintegration.  planning i n  "service  47  system.  democracy and  The  i n adjusting  i d e a l s of  e q u a l i t y of  e a s i l y s a c r i f i c e d i n attempts to meet In f a c t , even i f these i d e a l s had  i n s t i t u t i o n a l r a m i f i c a t i o n of the inhibits flexibility. advanced w e l f a r e s t a t e  severely to  full  opportunity international  p e r m i t t e d i t , the  developing w e l f a r e  state  As Myrdal warns, the p o l i c i e s of  the  are:  . . . i n t r i n s i c a l l y a u t a r c h i c and they are now f i r m l y entrenched i n our n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s and ways of l i f e . The n a t i o n a l economy has been changed towards a maximum of i n t e r n a l a d j u s t a b i l i t y which i n c r e a s i n g l y makes i t more p o s s i b l e to p r e s e r v e i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y , but only at the expense o f l l e s s e r e x t e r n a l f l e x i b i l i t y , which must r e s u l t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t a b i l i t y and d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . Examples abound of n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s , a l b e i t adopted f o r r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l  reasons, t h a t c o u l d  be  39 d e t r i m e n t a l to i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n : s t a b l e markets, s t a b l e  employment and  high u t i l i z a t i o n  38 Myrdal, "Economic N a t i o n a l i s m and 3 9  Myrdal, An  International  the need f o r of  Internationalism,"  Economy, pp.  47-48.  15.  page  plants  and  equipment implies  foreigners;  full  discrimination  employment r e q u i r e s  redistributional  schemes r e q u i r i n g  against  p o l i c i e s to  e x p o r t s , imports, f o r e i g n exchange and  48  control  f o r e i g n payments;  comprehensive f i s c a l  and  s o c i a l p o l i c i e s generate s o l i d a r i t y , a s o l i d a r i t y which i s c o n t a i n e d by n a t i o n a l  boundaries; a g r i c u l t u r a l  another i n d i c a t i o n of n a t i o n a l "dumping" on the rates  and  protection,  solidarity, is reflected in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l market; t a r i f f s ,  a l l the  transportation  buying of s t a t e a u t h o r i t i e s tends to empha-  s i z e the p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l  integration.  While these n a t i o n a l i s t i c p o l i c i e s strengthen trend  the  toward i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n , they were adopted  p a r t l y i n response to i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s e s . c o n t i n u e s , the  functioning  of the  As  "organizational  becomes set i n a matrix of economic  of e q u a l i t y  and  The  the  flow of m a t e r i a l  increasing  process  state"  nationalism.  Moreover, through these p o l i c i e s the becomes s t r o n g e r .  the  state  itself  rewards, the  spread  opportunity for c i t i z e n s , t o  c o n t r o l or p a r t i c i p a t e i n s t a t e  actions  integration  obedience of c i t i z e n s .  But i s not  and the  the  l o y a l t y and  increase  i n i n t e n s i t y and  r e s t r i c t e d to the  brought the  collapse  advanced s t a t e s .  of the  equality.  r a p i d spread of the nationalism  national  scope of  nationalism  World War  c o l o n i a l empires w i t h  consequent emergence of scores of new l i b e r t y and  enhances  states  II  the  demanding both  I d e o l o g i c a l l y t h i s represents  i d e a l s o f Western c i v i l i z a t i o n .  the Yet  i n the underdeveloped world a l s o r e p r e s e n t s a  page  d e s t a b i l i z i n g e f f e c t on the For one  t h i n g , the  that characterized longer  exists:  i n t e r n a t i o n a l system.  favorable  international setting  the o l d , p a r t i a l world community  the ratioiiof- p o p u l a t i o n  is less favorable;  there  49  i s no  to n a t u r a l  easy access to  no resources  inexpensive  f o r e i g n c a p i t a l ; o u t l e t s f o r e m i g r a t i o n are c l o s e d ; and, i t i s no  longer p o s s i b l e to i n d u s t r i a l i z e through e x p l o i t a t i o n  of s u p p l i e r s of raw  materials  and markets f o r manufactured  goods. I n t e r n a l l y , the more r i g i d i n e q u a l i t y , the  i n d i f f e r e n c e towards the  l a c k of t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l of p o l i t i c a l  s o c i a l structure marked by  democracy and  rule  o£ law,  the  independence, the d i s t o r t i o n  the d i f f e r e n t sequence o f  c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s a l l represent  l e s s s t i m u l a t i n g prods to  e n t e r p r i s e , e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p and  i n d i v i d u a l advance. ^ 4  Moreover, i n the underdeveloped world there r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l reforms before there national productivity.  are demands f o r  i s much i n c r e a s e  in  In the West, h i g h e r p r o d u c t i v i t y  made i t p o s s i b l e to move c l o s e r to e q u a l i t y of which i n t u r n enhanced n a t i o n a l p r o s p e r i t y .  opportunity,  For a l l these  reasons i t i s c l e a r that t h e path to development c u r r e n t l y adopted by the c o u n t r i e s the West.  bears l i t t l e  resemblance to t h a t  In the underdeveloped world we: do not  planning  emerging a f t e r economic advance, r a t h e r ,  planning  f o r t h a t advance.  Yet  an open i n v i t a t i o n to economic  as we  see  of  state  i t is  have seen, p l a n n i n g  is  nationalism.  40 Myrdal, "Economic N a t i o n a l i s m  and  Internationalism,"  18-19.  page 50  However, even aside from the economic needs for state planning and therefore nationalism, the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the underdeveloped countries dictates that nationalism i s a necessary,  indeed an essential, element.  P o l i t i c a l nationalism  represents a s o c i a l force that creates the conditions for and fuels broad s o c i a l , educational and economic p o l i c i e s that would at least make substantial development conceivable. Moreover nationalism could provide a framework and a spur for national integration and more to the point, the development of a strong state.  Myrdal i s keenly aware of this  imperative  of p o l i t i c a l development: The new nations must' be -moIded into; e f f e c t l w p o l i t i c a l ; e n t i t i e s which can decide upon, arid enforce, tnose f a r r e a c h i n g p o l i c y measures which can release t h e i r peopleiY from c u l t u r a l and economic stagnation. The primary task facing p o l i t i c a l leaders i s to attempt to l i f t people out of apathy and f r u s t r a t i o n , inspire them to f e e l the unity of nationhood, give them the v i s i o n of economic development and i n s t i l l the d i s c i p l i n e among them to s t r i v e e f f e c t i v e l y for accomplishment of this development.41 ;  Yet as we s h a l l see i n Part I I , ten years after this statement was written Myrdal i s profoundly d i s i l l u s i o n e d with and more alert to, the weakness of the state i n the underdeveloped countries. As we have t r i e d to suggest, nationalism i s important in the development of the underdeveloped world.  Myrdal  accepts this realism but i s perhaps overly-optimistic.  While  he c a l l s for a heavy dose of nationalism (albeit a "sane and Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," 25/ my emphasis". 4 1  page 51  soiffid nationalism") ^ to transform "the amorphous, dispersed 4  and divided masses of p e o p l e , "  43  l i v i n g under ancient mores  and s p l i t i n castes and classes, into national communities guided by an effective state, he rather sublimely assumes that the expansionary momentum of economic development ( i f i t occurs), w i l l create a common nationalism and a common culture.  He seems strangely unaware that nationalism,  with or without economic development and compatible with both states, may  not lessen but may well increase communal  hostility. For one thing, there i s no reason why  awareness of  others must bring with i t a f f e c t i o n or i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with those others as common c i t i z e n s with the same c i t i z e n s h i p rights.  Moreover, i n the West one could predict that  national integration, f i r e d by economic development, would increase feelings of s o l i d a r i t y and cohesion.  But i n the  West, the nation-states thus formed were of greater c u l t u r a l homogeneity than i s true of much of the underdeveloped world. Indeed, even i n the Western states, communalism and ethnic antagonisms are by no means e n t i r e l y absent. warns of "nationalism beyond r e a s o n "  44  Although Myrdal  his concern i s with  i t s effects on the international system not the domestic political  life.  Nevertheless,  just as i n the welfare states of the West,  4 2  Myrdal, Rich Lands arid Poor, p.  68.  4 3  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State, p.  4 4  Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism,"  173. 27.  page 5 2 nationalism i n the underdeveloped world accelerates the trend toward international d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . Feelings of oppression and discrimination may into d i s l i k e of foreigners.  e a s i l y deflect nationalism  Along with this d i s l i k e  may  come discriminatory state p o l i c i e s designed less as an inducement to national developmenttthan as a means of thwarting  foreign nations.  Since nationalism i s an obvious way masses and usually to secure support  to arouse the  from the educated e l i t e ,  i t becomes an e f f e c t i v e means, indeed perhaps the only means, of acquiring and retaining p o l i t i c a l power.  45  Again the  result can be both anti-foreign and anti-development p o l i c i e s . In addition, i f the r i c h nations of the West f e e l undue discrimination they can e a s i l y slow c a p i t a l movements and r e s t r i c t investments thereby hampering economic development in a poor country.  The general r e s u l t w i l l be international  i n s t a b i l i t y and consequent d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . Myrdal once called for a "welfare world" ** as a means 4  of counteracting international d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . As this became patently u n r e a l i s t i c for the i n d e f i n i t e future, he 47 lowered his sights to advocate "more education" and a 45 Myrdal notes that "once more the old adage i s validated that nothing i s so easily popularized as nationalism. The whole of the i n t e l l i g e n t s i a and the tiny middle class w i l l naturally be unanimous i n their intense nationalism, however varied t h e i r other p o l i t i c a l i n c l i n a t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s ; but the p l i a n t , i l l i t e r a t e masses can also be aroused by n a t i o n a l i s t i c appeals." An Iriterriatiorial' Economy, p. 154. 4 6  Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism and Internationalism," 31.  4 7  Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State, p.  164.  page 53  coordination  of national p o l i c i e s , that i s , international  4.8  planning. °  Myrdal*s dilemma of national integration  international disintegration could only be resolved harmonizing and i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z i n g the existing  and  by  structures  of national economic p o l i c i e s . However i t i s obvious that the obstacles  to internation-  a l planning are not merely r e s t r i c t e d to securing d i f f i c u l t though that may  be.  agreements,  On a deeper l e v e l , what  Myrdal i s advocating i s the s a c r i f i c e of some portion of a nation's "national i n t e r e s t " of sovereignty in an international system lacking the degree of human s o l i d a r i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the advanced welfare states of the West. Indeed, who  would popularize  cooperation i n the "organizational  the ideals of international state"?  As Myrdal himself  remarks, "the national state and a l l that goes on within i t s framework becomes the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t y for everybody, while i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t s t r i v i n g s are impractical dreams." more basic l e v e l , an ideal l i k e international affects individuals i n a general and dispersed  49  At a  integration way.  In a  national community of intensely organized but limited interests, a general goal with dispersed p r a c t i c a l l y doomed.  How  support i s  would i t s advocates counteract the  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n e r t i a and vested interests of l e g i s l a t i o n and administration?  organizations,  In e f f e c t there i s a  gaping i n s t i t u t i o n a l imbalance between the forces working for 4 8  Ibid., pp. 221-22.  4 9  Ibid., p. 150.  See also An Iriterriatiorial •Economy, p.  237.  page 54 national and international integration.  The paradox i s that  the s o l i d a r i t y evident i n the i n d i v i d u a l welfare states has meant a shrinking of international s o l i d a r i t y .  Moreover,  Myrdal himself once characterized the international system as an "indeterminate crackpots  ocean of power p o l i t i c s , where the  and the demagogues swim with great  pleasure." ^ 5  A l l of this means that the advanced Western countries are primarily interested i n preserving the status quo. Change i s d i f f i c u l t to bring about as "the psychological s o l i d a r i t y basis among the peoples and the imagination and 51 daring among their p o l i t i c a l leaders are largely lacking." Moreover, e f f e c t i v e and acceptable international planning presupposes the development, or at least the i n i t i a t i o n of development, i n the underdeveloped world.  As  we s h a l l see i n Part I I , even Myrdal's optimism and b e l i e f i n the e f f i c a c y of the state i n ensuring development i s severely strained by the actual circumstances i n that part of the world.  Myrdal, An International Economy, p. 112. Myrdal, Rich Lands arid Poor, p. 73.  page 55  PART II , THE  J.  ROLE OF THE  STATE IN UNDEHTJEVELOPTiD COUNTRIES  AN OVERVIEW From Part I we can derive Myrdal's assumption that  general economic progress i s necessary for granting greater degree of equality of opportunity.  a  At the same time,  equalizing opportunity i s a condition for sustained  economic  progress while i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n the development of an organizational infrastructure.  These relationships account for  national integration i n the advanced countries and as w e l l , they are necessary for integration i n the underdeveloped countries.  Moreover, their lack constitutes the prime  reasons why  these l a t t e r countries  are not "moving":  The equality issue i s central i n the development problems of the underdeveloped countries. Inequality relates to a l l s o c i a l and economic relationships. . . . Inequalityarid the trend toward' r i s i n g IriequalIty stanfl as a complex of inhibitions' arid obstacles to; development"^ I I consequently, there i s an urgent need for reversing the trend and creating equality as a condition for speeding up development. 52  Furthermore, economic integration i n the West was  a  r e s u l t of the e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l organization of individuals who  combined to i n i t i a t e p o l i c i e s progressively r e a l i z i n g the 5 2  York:  Gunnar Myrdal, The Chal1erige'of World' Poverty. (New Pantheon, ,1970) , 49-50. I t a l i c s i n the o r i g i n a l .  page 56  ideal of equality. saw  Each advance toward economic integration  a further refinement of this p o l i t i c a l technique.  Meanwhile market forces became increasingly regulated  through  d i r e c t state p o l i c i e s . As we  saw  e a r l i e r , the i n i t i a l conditions  underdeveloped countries characterized  i n the  are quite d i f f e r e n t from those that  the early phases of development i n the West.  As such, these differences suggest that large-scale state intervention and planning w i l l be necessary i f development is to be secured.  Yet, unlike the West, the underdeveloped  countries do not possess an e f f i c i e n t , capable state able to place heavy demands on i t s c i t i z e n s while both enacting implementing development l e g i s l a t i o n .  and  Moreover, at present,  these countries seem unwilling to go through a l i b e r a l interlude that would permit a purging of the incompetent, corrupt state.  Therefore, a major problem for the under-  developed countries  i s securing the strong state while at the  same time carrying out massive state  interventions.  While the sequence of development i s d i f f e r e n t , Myrdal i s quite emphatic that the same relationships between p o l i t i c a l , economic, and s o c i a l conditions hold true i n the underdeveloped world.  Economic progress, the a b o l i t i o n of  s o c i a l and economic b a r r i e r s , and the r e a l i z a t i o n of  greater  equality of opportunity are a l l i n t e r l i n k e d i n cause and effect relationships.  In the advanced Western countries,  economic progress and the r i s e i n the levels of l i v i n g 5 3  See section I, p. 49  page 57 meant more elbow room f o r everyone: the ideals of r a t i o n a l generosity could be given freer expression f o r there were more rewards that could be distributed; p r i v i l e g e s could more e a s i l y be given up and the costs of common burdens were more bearable.  A l l of this strengthened economic progress and  gave a firmer basis f o r additional e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s . 54  This,  in turn, strengthened p o l i t i c a l democracy. In the underdeveloped  countries the means f o r  i n i t i a t i n g a l l the changes implied i n these relationships i s held to rest on purposeful, dynamic and e f f e c t i v e state action. Yet as we s h a l l see i n Sections P through T i n c l u s i v e , the state i s f a r removed from the requisite c a p a b i l i t y and effectiveness. In Myrdal*s e a r l i e r writings he shows reasonable optimism with respect to the p o l i t i c a l and economic development of underdeveloped independence,  countries.  He views the spread of  the i n i t i a l chorus of demands f o r p o l i t i c a l  democracy and economic progress, and what he once saw as an emerging national s o l i d a r i t y , as "the victorious spread of Western ideals. spiritually.  We are f i n a l l y conquering the world  This i s the reason why we have not the  Myrdal has remarked that: "The more e f f e c t i v e l y a national state becomes a welfare state --motivated i n a way which approaches a more perfect democracy and having at i t s disposal national resources b i g enough to carry out largescale e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s with bearable s a c r i f i c e s on the part of the regions and groups that are better o f f --the stronger w i l l be both the urge and capacity to counteract the b l i n d market forces which tend to r e s u l t i n . . . i n equality." ' Rich Lands arid Poor, p. 41. 5 4  page 58  capacity to fight this development. . . ."55  As w i l l become  evident, this optimism has turned to disillusionment.  Myrdal  did warn, however, of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that might r e s u l t from the f a i l u r e to achieve economic development: . . . i f the underdeveloped countries do not achieve r e a l and substantial success i n their s t r i v i n g s for economic development, they w i l l be faced with very serious dangers of p o l i t i c a l cataclysms. . . . But . . . great care should be exercised before suggesting the precise nature of these possible cataclysms. In many cases a further spread of m i l i t a r y dictatorships or other forms of Fascist rules seems, indeed, a more probable outcome, at least i n the short run; i n some other cases the r e s u l t could be merely s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l decay and bottomless misery, perhaps l a s t i n g for decades.56 Committed to p o l i t i c a l democracy, the e a r l i e r writings betray Myrdal's hope that this form of rule w i l l r e s u l t i n economic development.  However, i n l a t e r years he becomes  much less sanguine about the existence of real as opposed to formal or guided democracy, while much more i n s i s t e n t upon the necessity of more extensive equality i f development i s to occur.  Moreover, the utter apathy of the lower classes i n  iLarge part tempers his e a r l i e r prediction of ''explosive politics."  In a sense, Myrdal's l a t e r personal and t r a g i c  dilemma i s that he i s unable to see either democracy or equality emerging i n the underdeveloped  countries.  The i n i t i a l strong and emotional drive for economic development and p o l i t i c a l independence has meant that development has become an intensely p o l i t i c a l matter, a 55 Myrdal, An International Economy, p. 158 56 T b l d l , pp. 134-35.  p a g e 59  matter  for  the  state.  In the West, the engine o f  p r o g r e s s was l e d by t h e  individual  entrepreneur  economic  a i d e d by  57 d i v e r s e and ad h o c s t a t e was i m m e d i a t e p r o f i t w o r l d , however,  and p r o d u c t i o n .  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  standards of  exceptionally  ambivalent  t h a t the  if  not  state  underdeveloped  or n e c e s s i t y of  raising  I n S e c t i o n s R , S and U articulate  conflicting  development g o a l s t h a t have s e r v e d to inactivate  goal  i s m o t i v a t e d b y an  the masses.  h o w e v e r , we w i l l p o i n t o u t  The p r a c t i c a l  In the  economic development  ideological force: the l i v i n g  interventions.  strata  views  frustrate  has  on  and  policy.  The West went t h r o u g h devolving citizenship rights  a particular on the  economic development w i t h o u t r a i s i n g  sequence o f  individual the  that  living  permitted  standards  of  CO  the masses. funneled  The g a i n s o f  into profits;  s a v i n g s w h i c h were  investment,  The p o l i t i c a l  "acquisitive  s o c i e t y " was o r d e r l y  political  were  basis for  this  raised  individualist  government  of  usually  which, in turn,  production.  law - - n o t  progress  the consequent unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n  income made p o s s i b l e l a r g e ploughed back i n t o  industrial  and  and t h e r u l e  of  democracy.  The u n d e r d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r , seem t o be 57 J o s e h p A . S chump e t e r , C a p i t a l i s m . . S o ' c i a r i s m ' a n d D e m o c r a c y (New Y o r k : H a r p e r a n d Row, 194ZJ particularly Part 11. S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , R e i n h a r d B e n d i x , N S t i o n - B u i l d i n g and C i t i z e n s h i p (New Y o r k : J o h n W i l e y a n d S o n s , 19b4J e s p e c i a l l y chapter 3. 5 8  page 60  i d e o l o g i c a l l y devoted to creating " i n i t i a l w e l f a r e "  59  directly  out of poverty and with Cat l e a s t , theoretical) p o l i t i c a l democracy.  Yet, as we point out i n Section R, the necessity  of c a p i t a l formation and the requirements this imposes on individuals are riot demands the state either w i l l or can make on the c i t i z e n .  Moreover, due to i t s ideological appeal, the  work of international organizations, and the "demonstration e f f e c t " of advanced countries, the modern welfare s t a t e " t h e crowning result of decades of heavy saving and rapid i n d u s t r i a l development under the most favorable conditions, is becoming a revolution exported to the stagnant, poverty- < stricken r e g i o n s " ^ 6  Myrdal's concern i s with effecting the welfare state in the underdeveloped countries; our concern i s with the means chosen to this end and the " s o f t " variables of p o l i t i c s as they relate to those means.  As such, the "revolution,"  perhaps doomed from the s t a r t , has been hampered i f not completely aborted, under the impact of largely internal forces i n the underdeveloped  countries.  K.; - NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Although national integration i s not compatible with international i n t e g r a t i o n , 5 9  61  Myrdal foresees economic and  Myrdal,' An Iriternatiorial Economy, p. 165  6 0  Ibid., p. 166.  6 1  See Section I.  page 61 s o c i a l stagnation unless the under-developed countries become 62 consolidated n a t i o n - s t a t e s .  However he does not conceive  n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n to be simply a matter of economic change. As he points out, i n many underdeveloped countries t h i s bias conforms with the powerful vested i n t e r e s t s of o l i g a r c h i c groups.  They desire economic development but want i t  without any changes i n the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e s w i t h i n which they occupy p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n s .  6 3  As we warned e a r l i e r , Myrdal i s emphatic i n h i s b e l i e f that development i s not p o s s i b l e without s u b s t a n t i a l changes i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s , i n t u r n , i s premised on the i d e a l of e q u a l i t y of opportunity p r o g r e s s i v e l y implemented through d i r e c t state a c t i o n . When economic change h i t s a s o c i e t y of closed minds and entrenched s o c i a l r i g i d i t i e s , s o c i a l values are destroyed almost by n e c e s s i t y . . . . [Yet] to prepare the way f o r economic development [underdeveloped countries] need i n i t i a l reforms of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e on a vast s c a l e ; without them there w i l l be no n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n and so no development. 64  He l a t e r adds t h i s somewhat cautious  statement:  ... i f the p o l i t i c a l necessity, of r a p i d economic development i s assumed, the obvious conclusion i s that c u l t u r a l and s o c i a l changes have to be planned and c o n t r o l l e d , to a certain: extent they may even have to' be induced. . . . opening the way f o r economic development and s t e e r i n g the "In a l l the underdeveloped countries the economic development problem i s p r i m a r i l y a problem of seeking n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n i n i t s necessary combination with economic progress, the one being both the r e s u l t of and the c o n d i t i o n of the other." Myrdal, An Iriterriatiorial Economy, p. 167. 6 2  6 3  See Section  Q.  6 4  Myrdal, An Irite'rnatiorial  Economy, p.  170.  page 62  s o c i a l changes towards wholesome [Western] a d j u s t m e n t s "  6 5  We s h o u l d note here t h a t these e a r l i e r statements a r e n o t q u i t e as s t r i d e n t o r i n s i s t e n t as t o t h e d e c i s i v e r o l e o f t h e state.  M y r d a l ' s b e l i e f i n t h e e f f i c a c y o f the s t a t e and h i s  d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h t h e s t a t e become much more obvious i n A s i a n Drama. The  "wholesome a d j u s t m e n t s " o f w h i c h M y r d a l speaks  i n c l u d e d e s i r e s f o r e f f i c i e n c y and m a t e r i a l advancement, r a t i o n a l i s m , e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n and e n t e r p r i s e , s o c i a l m o b i l i t y , the removal o f a l l " r i g i d i t i e s " i n t h e s o c i a l system, a respect  f o r t h e r u l e o f l a w , and t h e removal o f c o r r u p t i o n ,  a r b i t r a r i n e s s and i n e f f i c i e n c y i n t h e s t a t e These " m o d e r n i z a t i o n i d e a l s " sweeping changes.  6 6  administration.  c e r t a i n l y represent  Y e t i t i s vrorthwhile t o note t h a t M y r d a l ' s  e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s c o n t a i n l i t t l e h i n t o f t h e means f o r a t t a i n i n g them. This question  o f means i s i m p o r t a n t .  Although Myrdal  i s t h o r o u g h l y opposed t o the e t h n i c , c u l t u r a l o r r e l i g i o u s chasms i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s , he does n o t y e t o f f e r any e f f e c t i v e p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r t h e i r removal. against "dual c u l t u r e s , dual populations as meaning s e g r e g a t i o n  and t h e r e f o r e  He  and d u a l  inveighs economies"  discrimination.  Even  though he admits t h a t these d i v i s i o n s may r e p r e s e n t some s o c i a l l y u s e f u l f u n c t i o n s and may n o t be " i r r a t i o n a l , " they are n o t v o l u n t a r y  since  and s i n c e they v i o l a t e t h e i d e a l o f  6 5  Ibid.,  6 6  M y r d a l , A s i a r i Drama, I , pp. 47-69.  page 63 equality they must be  eradicated.  67  Besides remaining s i l e n t on the means f o r t h e i r •V eradication," Myrdal ignores the costs otherwise) of inducing  ( f i n a n c i a l or  these "wholesome adjustments."  It i s 68  assumed that a l l the "hardened i n s t i t u t i o n s of inequality" are a l l equally damaging to development.  Their  forced  removal, presumably by the state, i s alleged to r e s u l t i n f u l l benefit for economic development. this problem i n our  We s h a l l return to  conclusion.  In the area of class relations and t h e i r effects on national integration, Myrdal*s early analysis i s to a degree superficial.  It i s not u n t i l AsTan Drama that he works out  an i n c i s i v e argument against  inequality of wealth.  Neverthe-  l e s s , i t i s pertinent to mention a few points here. Inequalities i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth and income pose a heavy burden on both the p o l i t i c a l and economic development of the underdeveloped countries. continued existence,  Moreover, t h e i r  exclusive of any benefits to the lower  classes (Myrdal i n c o r r e c t l y sees none) implies a passive acceptance on the part of the masses which i s i t s e l f a cause of stagnation.  Furthermore, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , apathy  among the masses i s also a fundamental reason for the weakness of the state while i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n a low degree of p o l i t i c a l  development.  fin  Myrdal, An InterriatTonal Economy, p. 178. fLQ  Myrdal," Rich Lands and Poor, p. 60.  page 64  For reasons of population d i s t r i b u t i o n and rates of growth as well as the need for r a i s i n g productivity, the main thrust of the equality ideal must be towards land reform. Land reform i s essential i f the masses are to i d e n t i f y with the state and to grant legitimacy to the demands of the state. Myrdal i s keenly aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  carrying through tenancy reforms against the powerful and deeply entrenched vested interests of the upper classes.  Yet  his  e a r l i e r writings suggest a d e f i n i t e optimism i n spite of  the  difficulties.  . . . the reforms are not l i k e l y to be handed down to the poor masses of people merely because of the r a t i o n a l i t y and benevolence of the p r i v i l e g e d classes; as always before i n h i s t o r y , reforms have to be fought for and won against the f i e r c e resistance of most of those \>rho have to accept s a c r i f i c e s . . . . the decisive struggle has to be waged on the homeground. The reforms w i l l have to come as a r e s u l t of a gradually more e f f e c t i v e domestic p o l i t i c a l process. However, without equality of p o l i t i c a l power, this •'decisive struggle" w i l l only r e s u l t i n r u r a l poverty and backwardness.  Ideals and s o c i a l conscience are weak as  propelled forces originating reforms.  As we saw  self-  i n Part I,  the lower classes must become p o l i t i c a l l y organized to press Land reform occupies a c r u c i a l part i n our l a t e r arguments therefore we s h a l l return to i t i n Section V. On the question of land reform also see Gunnar Myrdal " W i l l We Prevent Mass Starvation?" New Republic .•Vol. GLII (April 24, 1965) 14-15. "Jobs, Food, and People." ^riteTriatiorial Development Review Vol. VII (June, 1965) Z-o. "Land Reform In Its Broader Economic and Social Setting," Economic Planning, V o l . II (.1966), 5-10. "Paths of Development," New Left Review, Vol; XXXVI (March-April, .1966) , ,65-74 (also reprinted as "Economic Development i n the Backward Countries," Dissent, Vol. XIV, [March-April, 1967] 180-91). t  70 Myrdal, An Iriterriatiorial Economy, p.  185.  page 65  for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l reforms. At this stage i n his career, Myrdal drew no clear connection between the entrenched vested interests thwarting land reform at the l o c a l l e v e l , and the existence of these and similar interests at the state l e v e l .  These same  interests systematically prevent e f f e c t i v e land reform from 71 being enacted, or i f enacted, from being implemented,  while  frustrating the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the masses i n the p o l i t i c a l process. Later Myrdal w i l l write: The main impediments to development are p o l i t i c a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l and a t t i t u d i n a l . The power i n many underdeveloped countries i s i n the hands of reactionary people who have or shortsightedly believe they have --an interest i n preventing those changes i n landownership and tenancy that would increase the opportunities and incentives for the peasantry to t r y and improve t h e i r l o t . Indeed, i n many countries where there are enlightened national leaders i n p o l i t i c a l control they are made impotent by the landlords, moneylenders and other middlemen who have the power i n the v i l l a g e s as well as i n the parliament and who use i t to prevent the implementation of the leader's decisions, even when they are put i n the form of l e g i s l a t i o n . And the poor . masses often do not protest; they are sunk i n apathy, ignorance and superstitious b e l i e f s caused and maintained by their p o v e r t y . 72  L. THE STATE AS THE MAIN AGENT FOR DEVELOPMENT A l l the changes that Myrdal sees as necessary for development could not emerge through piecemeal and ad hoc 1 For a useful d i s t i n c t i o n between the "enactment" stage and the "enforcement" stag:e of l e g i s l a t i o n see James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine P o l i t i c s , and Social Change" American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. LXIII (December, 1969 7  1142-59.  Myrdal, "Jobs, Food, and People," 6.  page 66  interventions by the state, as occurred of the West.  i n the development  Without r a d i c a l involvement of the state i n a  planned and coordinated  manner, stagnation, even  retrogression, not development, w i l l be the r e s u l t . meaning and o r i g i n of state planning  The  i n the underdeveloped  world are dealt with i n Sections 0 and Q.  Here we wish  merely to mention several pertinent f a c t s . In the poor nations, development cannot be secured through unhampered market forces.  A fundamental reason for  underdevelopment i s p r e c i s e l y that market forces by themselves are neither as strong nor as  e f f e c t i v e i n - advancing  the s o c i a l system to any sort of "take-off""  Rather, i n an  unhampered free market the "spread e f f e c t s " (the b e n e f i c i a l inputs derived from an i n i t i a l expansionary momentum) tend to be outweighed by the "backwash e f f e c t s " ( a l l relevant adverse 73 changes).  The result i s great regional, and  therefore  i n d i v i d u a l , inequality. This r e s u l t was  evident during the c o l o n i a l period  when the play of market forces, i f i t l e d to any development at a l l , tended to be one of an "enclave" type.  The  implications of t h i s for national integration are serious: If things were l e f t to market forces unhampered by any policy interferences, i n d u s t r i a l production, commerce, banking, insurance, shipping and, indeed, almost a l l those economic a c t i v i t i e s which i n a developing economy tend to give a bigger than average return --and, i n addition, science, a r t , l i t e r a t u r e , education and high culture generally --would cluster i n certain l o c a l i t i e s and regions, leaving the rest of the country more or less i n a backwater. 7 3  7 4  Myrdal, Rich Lands arid Poor, pp. 30-31. i b i d . » P»  2 6  •  page 67  Clearly, no national government could afford to r e s t r i c t i t s interventions i n the economy unless i t was  prepared to accept  the consequences of the p o l i t i c a l decision for this type of development. Moreover, i t i s not merely a question of the state guiding or releasing entrepreneurial a c t i v i t y to act i n accordance with the national i n t e r e s t .  In these countries  there i s l i t t l e existence of a " v i g i l a n t and enterprising 75 business c l a s s , "  consequently entrepreneurs are lacking  --the state must create them and take on functions i t s e l f .  As our discussion of planning w i l l show,  the real task of state planning building."  entrepreneurial  State actions may  i s that of " i n s t i t u t i o n -  well serve to enhance not  discourage private enterprise: If the underdeveloped countries are to succeed, t h e i r national economies are going to contain, even i n an early stage of development, large elements of socialism, larger even than i n the nationally highly integrated and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countries. . . . "Capitalism" . . . modified i n a fundamental fashion as a result of a reorganization under c o l l e c t i v e , public, quasi-public and private influences and containing substantial elements of socialism --has today perhaps a greater momentum than ever. . . . [In the West] i t i s youthful, robust, expanding and anything but i n decay. In most of the underdeveloped countries, however, . . . capitalism and private enterprise are weak and show only the most feeble tendencies to develop by themselves. . . . Only as a r e s u l t , and \^ithin the general framework, of state planning and large-scale state promotional a c t i v i t y from the very beginning i s there any hope for eventually fostering some kind of capitalism and private enterprise i n these countries. Due 7 5  to the weakness of market forces, most of the state  Myrdal, An International Economy, p. ' Ibid.', p. 211.  257.  See also Myrdal, Rich Lands- arid Poor, p.  82.  page 68  investment i s not l i k e l y to be p r o f i t a b l e i n the ordinary sense.  Indeed, because of "external economies"  workers, expanding markets) i t may in terms of costs and p r o f i t s .  77  (trained  be incorrect to calculate  In f a c t , even i n the usual  meaning of costs and p r o f i t s , i t i s because investments were unprofitable from a market point of view that development took place.  little  I f the state were to follow the  same c r i t e r i a , there would likewise be l i t t l e state intervention and therefore continued  stagnation.  factors cannot be the determining  As such, economic  factors i n state planning.  The plan and i t s targets are therefore decisions which represent p o l i t i c a l  choices.  Unlike the other economists, Myrdal demonstrates an admirable a b i l i t y to see the essential p o l i t i c a l nature of 78  national economic choices,  yet he f a i l s to draw out the  implication of t h i s for national planning i n the underdeveloped countries.  Besides the i r r a t i o n a l i t y i t may  intro-  duce from an economic point of view, this also means that the decisions of the state i n the national plan are both the c r i t e r i a and the ihstrumerits of development.  In other words,  the actions of the state by d e f i n i t i o n accord with the national i n t e r e s t . be the case.  We only need to remark that t h i s need not  For example, using scarce resources  i n "show- '  piece" public works or other forms of conspicuous public consumption may  or may  not serve a short-term  77  Myrdal, Rich Lands arid Poor, p. 90 7 8  Myrdal, Asian Drama, I I I , pp. 1878-98.  function of  page 69  enhancing national pride while i t may be extremely detrimental to the "national i n t e r e s t " i n conserving materials and administrative competence. In addition, a major dilemma i s that the state i s so u t t e r l y weak that the demands placed upon i t f a r o u t - s t r i p i t s present capacities. Economic l i b e r a l i s m , .currently ruled out by ideological reasons, i s presently not conceivable as a means of launching a strong, capable, and e f f e c t i v e state. Yet demands are pressing: not only must the masses be "awakened" and brought to p a r t i c i p a t e i n national a f f a i r s , but the entire economic and p o l i t i c a l infrastructure must be b u i l t and maintained.-  O r i g i n a l l y Myrdal warned against over-  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n i n trying to cope with these demands. His advice was "to p r e s e r w i t h utmost care" whatever exists of voluntary, i n d u s t r i a l or other organizations including l o c a l self-government.  Yet we w i l l f i n d that i n Asian Drama, he  no longer views these organizations as "agencies f o r democratic development" but rather props f o r stagnation. State-planning i n the underdeveloped countries i s confronted by vast problems largely absent from the Western experience: there i s no highly integrated national community with well-entrenched  legal t r a d i t i o n s ; no extensive network  of organizations for protecting economic interests or s o c i a l ideals; no vigorous democracy at the p r o v i n c i a l or municipal l e v e l ; no p o l i t i c a l l y mature and p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d c i t i z e n r y ; 79  Myrdal, An International Economy, .210.  page^ 70  and we  above a l l , no e f f e c t i v e and d i s c u s s i n Sections  incorrupt c i v i l  service.  R through T a l l these f a c t o r s  As  adversely  a f f e c t the r o l e of the s t a t e as the main agent f o r development. In the main, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e beneath the s t a t e l e v e l i s weak and c o u n t r i e s l a c k completely  i n i m i c a l to development.  p r o v i n c i a l or m u n i c i p a l  that could f u n c t i o n as agencies f o r c o o p e r a t i v e ment.  Appointed o f f i c i a l s o f t e n r u l e and  c i t i e s and  r u r a l areas while  structures  self-govern-  e x p l o i t people i n  t a k i n g orders  from a c e n t r a l  s t a t e which i s u s u a l l y dominated by l a n d l o r d s and rural elites. --the  Therefore  Many  the tasks of p o l i t i c a l  development of a s t r o n g , capable and  other  development  effective  state  underpinned by an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e --face onerous o b s t a c l e s . For Myrdal, i t i s l a r g e l y through s t a t e p l a n n i n g means f o r e f f e c t i v e s t a t e planning e a r l i e r w r i t i n g s demonstrate l i t t l e consequence of these o b s t a c l e s concept of p l a n n i n g  itself.  w i l l be c r e a t e d .  that  But  his  awareness of the  on the i d e a l , the  very  His r e a l i z a t i o n of these 80  consequences f u r n i s h e s yet another p e r s o n a l  tragedy  for  him.  A s t a t e p l a n , to be e f f e c t i v e i n meeting i t s goals and  in creating a p o l i t i c a l  j u s t a general  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , must be more than  statement about i n t e n t i o n s and hopes.  I t must  show i n d e t a i l the o v e r - a l l d i r e c t i o n of development, the amount of c a p i t a l r e q u i r e d , the p r o p o r t i o n s allocated in different 8 0  See  Section  P.  s e c t o r s , and  of c a p i t a l to  the s p e c i f i c  be  inducements  page and  c o n t r o l s to be used to r e a l i z e these d i r e c t i v e s .  In a  word, the p l a n must be " o p e r a t i o n a l "  That t h i s  case i n most underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s  i s c l e a r l y evident  S e c t i o n U, where we  p o i n t out  p l a n " i s a r e f l e c t i o n and  that the  i s not  the from  "non-operational  a cause of the weak s t a t e .  Note t h a t what Myrdal means by " p l a n n i n g "  i n the  underdeveloped world i s not mere " c o o r d i n a t i o n . "  It i s  superplanning  71  by Western standards --superplanning  which  must take p l a c e w i t h i n a framework of a weak government  and  administration. All  the  t i o n of g r e a t e r  immense s o c i a l changes as w e l l as the  realiza-  e q u a l i t y are h e l d to be a r e s u l t of d i r e c t  state intervention.  Myrdal i s a f i r m b e l i e v e r i n the  "big  81 push" approach to development.  The  " b i g push" w i l l  come about through d i r e c t s t a t e a c t i o n . not  j u s t changing a t t i t u d e s but  only  Moreover, i t i m p l i e s  changing the  s t r u c t u r e s that b u t t r e s s those a t t i t u d e s .  institutional  The  problem i s t h a t  changing a t t i t u d e s r e q u i r e s a heavy dose of compulsion; compulsion, i n t u r n , r e q u i r e s a c o n s o l i d a t e d n a t i o n w i t h a strong  and  effective state.  Yet,  as we  will  argue l a t e r ,  strong  and  e f f e c t i v e s t a t e i s not p o s s i b l e without f i r s t  the sec-  u r i n g a b a s i s f o r c i t i z e n compliance.  Heavy demands on  c i t i z e n are not  citizen is a participant  conceivable  i n the c o n t r o l of the  unless  s t a t e and  rewards of s t a t e a c t i v i t y .  the  i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of  In essence, we  Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I, p. 115,  and  the  agree w i t h Myrdal  that e q u a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l f o r economic development. 8 1  the  I I I , pp.  Yet 1897-1912.  page 72 equality w i l l not come about u n t i l organized pressure groups are created that w i l l press the state to implement as well as enact l e g i s l a t i o n favorable to the lower classes.  M. THE ROLE OF THE STATE:' THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF SOCIALISM Three components of the modernization ideals bear d i r e c t l y on the role of the state: the ideologies of planning, democracy and socialism.  A l l the aspirations embodied i n  these ideologies are far above the actual accomplishments. Although socialism has a vague and s h i f t i n g meaning i n the underdeveloped world, i t i s often hailed by the a r t i c u l a t e 82 strata as a goal, i f not an actual achievement.  During the  l i b e r a t i o n and post-independence periods, free trade and free enterprise were i d e n t i f i e d with capitalism to the consequent detriment of a l l three.  The prevalent  poverty and stagnation,  and the reaction of i n t e l l e c t u a l s to these conditions, l e d to an intense resentment against private business. Liberation was held to include not only p o l i t i c a l independence but freedom from the c o l o n i a l structures of capitalism.  Yet the psychological  impetus of socialism  varies from country to country: i n some i t refers to the public interest with private benefit (e.g. India); i n others "socialism" means depriving a l i e n groups of t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s (e.g. i n Ceylon and generally throughout south A s i a ) . 8 2  Myrdal, Asian Drama, I I , p. 801.  The  page • .73 p r i n c i p l e , however, i s usually to replace a l i e n c a p i t a l i s t s with indigenous ones. Moreover the concept of socialism contemplates only limited, i f any, state ownership and management. include n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of large-scale industry  It may (of"which  there i s l i t t l e ) , u t i l i t i e s , banking and insurance but i n general the goal seems to be to improve existing private enterprises not t h e i r transfer to the public s e c t o r .  8 3  With  respect to the largest economic a c t i v i t y , agriculture, decentralization of ownership and management i s held as the ideal even i n " s o c i a l i s t " Any  India.  8 4  debate over whether to develop large-scale  industry by investment i n the public or private sector has usually been solved more by ad hoc p r a c t i c a l considerations than by any ideological commitment. Even i n the area of heavy industry, i n the exceptional  case when private  investors have come forward, they have been allowed to pursue t h e i r projects.  What Myrdal says of Ceylon i s  perhaps of more general import: The main reason f o r the state to go into i n d u s t r i a l • e n t e r prise i s the dismal lack of w i l l i n g , honest, and competent private entrepreneurs. Unfortunately . . . there i s nothing to suggest that the state i s more competent than private enterprise to undertake i n d u s t r i a l development on a large s c a l e . 8 5  8 3  Ibid., pp. 810-11.  8 4  Ibid., p. 807.  8 5  Ibid., p. 831.  page 74  N. ' THE ROLE OF THE STATE: :  THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY. Along with socialism, democracy i n the form of universal suffrage was hailed as a benefit of the  independence  struggle.  achievement  Indeed i t was thought essential to the  of s o c i a l and economic equality. Unlike the West where universal suffrage was the triumph of education, p o l i t i c a l agitation and  initiative,  8 6  In the underdeveloped world p o l i t i c a l rights were often granted from above without the masses ever having been organized to demand them or to know and understand what these rights implied.  This has had the unfortunate result that the  masses do not f e e l or behave as active participants i n the nation-building process hence both economic and p o l i t i c a l development i s hampered.  This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n  India where "democracy" seems to have the greatest, oven i f s u p e r f i c i a l , appeal: India's f a i l u r e to make more progress i n the d i r e c t i o n of welfare democracy r e f l e c t s the fact that no s i g n i f i c a n t attempts were made to organize the masses, or to impress upon them t h e i r stake i n agitating for a break-up of the country's r i g i d l y i n e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i a l and economic structure. The impressive facade of parliamentary democracy cannot hide the fact that p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n in any meaningful sense i s confined to small upper-class groups (including the urban "middle-class" and the " r u r a l e l i t e " of landowners and middlemen). The p o l i t i c a l behavior of the masses i s largely controlled by individual personali t i e s who appeal to r e l i g i o u s sentiments, caste, or to regional l o y a l t i e s and antipathies. India's parliamentary system has proved to be remarkably stable, but i t i s the s t a b i l i t y of stagnation.87  7  See above pp. 8-10 and note 58. Myrdal, Asian •Drama ,11, p. 776.  page 75  Myrdal i s convinced that when democracy f a l t e r s or f a i l s i n an underdeveloped country i t i s not because the masses have so e f f e c t i v e l y organized  themselves that the ruling  e l i t e f e l t compelled to take d r a s t i c action to protect t h e i r privileges.  8 8  Rather p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s take place above  the heads of the masses; the only perceptible difference might be a coup which replaces one set of e l i t e s with another. As an aside, i t i s worthwhile to note that the so- ' c a l l e d "modernizing m i l i t a r y , " highly regarded by some Western scholars, i s not that e f f e c t i v e i n securing either economic or p o l i t i c a l development.  A "modernizing" oligarchy  may achieve some i n i t i a l limited success yet i t i s u n l i k e l y to e f f e c t basic s o c i a l s t r u c t u r a l changes. incompatible  It i s , of course,  with real as opposed to "guided" democracy. For  this reason alone i t i s s u r p r i s i n g that some Westerners should advocate r e s t r i c t i n g p a r t i c i p a t i o n (a consequence of o l i g a r c h i c a l rule) instead of e f f e c t i v e l y broadening i t .  0. THE ROLE OF THE STATE:' THE MODERNIZATION IDEAL OF PLANNING The central ideology of the e l i t e s , and the route chosen to secure development, i s that of central state planning.  In the underdeveloped world, planning means that  the state should take an active, decisive role i n the economy; 8 8  Ibid., I I , p. 780.  page 76  through state intervention i n investment and enterprise  and  by i t s various controls over the private sector, the state is held responsible for i n i t i a t i n g and d i r e c t i n g economic development. planning  Economic development i n turn, usually means  for heavy i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n .  Often i t i s held that  the state should plan for a " s e l f - r e l i a n t " economy as national consolidation i s alleged to depend on producing most 89 of the c a p i t a l goods at home. earlier:  national planning  This reinforces what we said  i s not primarily an economic  exercise but rather a p o l i t i c a l program that r e f l e c t s the 90 p o l i t i c a l choices a government has made. Once the idea of inducing changes through  coordinated  state p o l i c i e s i s accepted, most of the inherited s o c i a l p o l i t i c a l conditions appear undesirable This conception  and  and i n need of reform.  of the state's role originated with the small  i n t e l l e c t u a l e l i t e , spread h o r i z o n t a l l y among the a r t i c u l a t e strata while gradually some of i t seeped down to the broad masses (largely through l i b e r a t i o n movements, independence and the functioning of p o l i t i c s and  administration).  Although planning has not been a success i n most of the underdeveloped countries, mainly because of the d i s c i p l i n e that i t demands and the power of vested interests in thwarting  state actions, the ideology of planning  has  served as a r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n for interventionist p o l i c i e s . Moreover, governments everywhere want to claim that state Ibid., I I , p. 1162. Ibid., I l l , p. 1881. 8 9  9 0  page 77 p o l i c i e s have been instrumental  i n securing development.  Every advance i s h a i l e d as a r e s u l t of successful state p o l i c i e s while every f a i l u r e gives a rationale f o r austerity. E a r l i e r we mentioned some of the reasons why state planning was chosen as the path f o r development. "demonstration e f f e c t " of the welfare  91  The  state i n the West posed  a sharp contrast to the r e l a t i v e stagnation i n the poor countries.  It was f e l t that a strong induced impetus was  needed to end that stagnation as market forces were weak. Moreover, the international c a p i t a l market has l a r g e l y become a concern of governmental of quasi-governmental organizations. These lenders demanded to see "projects" as part of a development plan before committing funds.  Since these funds  were at any rate i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r economic development, the problem remained to "squeeze" and "twist" consumption so as to extract resources from the people.  A l l of this implied  large-scale state intervention i n export and import controls. Moreover entrepreneurial talent was lacking and had to be created.  The wealth of the country was the monopoly of the  few and they together enterprise.  declined to r i s k money i n productive  Instead, this upper class preferred  speculative  quick p r o f i t and conspicuous consumption and investment. The  i d e o l o g i c a l basis f o r planning  n a t i o n a l i s t era of l i b e r a t i o n struggles. a protest against c o l o n i a l 1 aissez;-faire'. 9 1  See Section I, pp. 49.-50.  stems from the Planning  expressed  In e f f e c t , planning  page 78 * became a symbol of nationhood, a reminder o f past b a t t l e s fought f o r the n a t i o n and  an e x p r e s s i o n  of  anti-imperialism.  Furthermore, s i n c e p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e and were a s s o c i a t e d w i t h c o l o n i a l i s m and o f t e n suspect  by n a t i o n a l  capital  imperialism  they were  leaders:  Beyond any doubt, the i d e o l o g y o f planning contained an element of resentment against p r i v a t e , e s p e c i a l l y f o r e i g n , b u s i n e s s ; t h i s resentment was a f o r c e f o r i t s r a p i d spread, p a r t i c u l a r l y among the i n t e l l e c t u a l s . . . . [This] remains so today, even when p u b l i c d e c l a r a t i o n s and p o l i c i e s seem f r i e n d l y enough. 92  In a d d i t i o n , p o l i t i c a l  independence f o r c e d  everywhere to b e g i n to frame and the n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . task and  the scarce  o f t e n had  was  implement p o l i c i e s to  to the sheer magnitude o f  resources  implementation, planning leaders  Due  unavoidable.  a goal or v i s i o n o f a " b e t t e r s o c i e t y " that to be  achieved.  authoritarian-  submissiveness to a u t h o r i t y --although i n  r e a l i t y detrimental leaders  the  Indeed, n a t i o n a l i s t  legacy o f c o l o n i a l i s m - - p a t e r n a l i s m ,  ism and p a s s i v e  serve  available for policy  r e q u i r e d d i r e c t i o n from the s t a t e i f i t was The  leaders  to a strong  s t a t e , inbued n a t i o n a l  and government o f f i c i a l s w i t h a p s y c h o l o g i c a l  o r i e n t a t i o n to organize  and  do t h i n g s  f o r the  people.  Although i t i s u n l i k e l y the masses ever went through a " r e v o l u t i o n of r i s i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s "  t h a t suddenly awakened 93  them to the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of s t a t e p l a n n i n g , have come to expect that some o f f i c i a l 92  Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , p. 9 3  I b i d . , I I , P.  730.  724.  should  they may  well  do more f o r  page 79  them.  However t h i s does n o t imply t h e y u n d e r s t o o d t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s o f s t a t e p l a n n i n g o r t h a t they were t o press e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e i r  P.; MYRDAL RE-VI SI TED:  organized  rights.  THE REQUIREMENTS' OF STATE PLANNING-  M y r d a l ' s e x p e c t a t i o n s were u n d o u b t e d l y t h a t s t a t e p l a n n i n g would l e a d t o a type o f " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e " s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e West.  F o r example, he s t a t e s t h a t :  The p o l i t i c a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e i n a l l c o u n t r i e s o f South A s i a p e r m i t s o n l y a l i m i t e d degree o f c o o r d i n a t i o n by means o f c e n t r a l government command. . . . So l o n g as a measure 6£ autonomy f o r s t a t e s , p r o v i n c e s and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s i s p r e s e r v e d and . . . so l o n g as p r o d u c t i o n and t r a d e have n o t been c o l l e c t i v i z e d and brought under d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f t h e c e n t r a l government, t h e r e g u l a r mode o f . o p e r a t i o n i n p r e p a r i n g a p l a n and implementing i t becomes e s s e n t i a l l y that o f negotiation with a l l sorts o f c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s beneath t h e c e n t r a l s t a t e . . . . I n these n e g o t i a t i o n s t h e government s h o u l d have t h e upper hand and be a b l e t o an e x t e n t , t o induce these o t h e r c o l l e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o f a l l i n t o l i n e w i t h i t s purposes. I t can e x e r t a u t h o r i t y . . . by p l a y i n g o f f i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t each o t h e r . . . . I t has a l s o a t i t s d i s p o s a l a number o f l e v e r s of c o n t r o l --inducements as w e l l as r e s t r i c t i o n s --which i t can, when n e c e s s a r y , i n c r e a s e . 9 4  However, because i t depended on a c l e a r c o n c e p t i o n  of the  p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , a u n i t e d government, a government f r e e o f v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s , law and o r d e r , p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y ,  internal  u n i t y , s e l f - r e s t r a i n t and a f o r t u i t o u s c o m b i n a t i o n o f leadership s k i l l  and a b i l i t y , M y r d a l ' s r a t h e r o p t i m i s t i c  c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e " r e g u l a r mode o f o p e r a t i o n " o f s t a t e p l a n n i n g was i n c r e a s i n g l y s h a t t e r e d by t h e r e a l i t y o f p o l i t i c s in  t h e underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . 9 4  I b i d . , pp. 734-35.  page 80  Myrdal foresaw planning as y i e l d i n g a dividend of massive c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government.  In e f f e c t ,  planning would b r i n g about not only economic development but p o l i t i c a l development and a democratization of the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l framework as a multitude of diverse organizations encapsulated  an ever i n c r e a s i n g number of c i t i z e n s .  All  these people would therefore have an i n t e r e s t i n preserving and enhancing the s t a t e .  Moreover, the c o n t i n u a l increase of  persons with a very r e a l vested i n t e r e s t i n planning would gradually l e v e l concentrations of power and wealth.  Under  the pressure of e f f e c t i v e democracy the i d e a l s of s o c i a l  and  economic e q u a l i t y would r u l e supreme with b e n e f i t s heretofore denied to the poor g r a d u a l l y working t h e i r way  downward.  Why  would the upper c l a s s f r u s t r a t e the growth of greater e q u a l i t y ? As Myrdal sees i t , the push f o r e q u a l i t y would not  impoverish  the wealthy but e n r i c h them. However, as we s h a l l see, the flaw i n Myrdal's argument i s that we cannot depend on the s t a t e to create the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e that w i l l i t s e l f enhance the strength of the s t a t e .  Granted e q u a l i t y i s e s s e n t i a l , but  e q u a l i t y w i l l not be had u n t i l the masses are e f f e c t i v e l y organized to press f o r t h e i r i n t e r e s t s .  I t i s naive to  b e l i e v e that an upper-class dominated s t a t e w i l l undertake the means of i t s own d e s t r u c t i o n .  We cannot expect s e l f - d e n i a l  95  from the p r i v i l e g e d groups. 9 5  Myrdal himself points out that India i s p a r t i c u l a r l y  page 81  Not as paradoxically as i t may  seem, although the  e l i t e s have proclaimed greater equality as a universal goal of planning, marked inequality s t i l l e x i s t s .  Indeed, i n  spite of a l l the attempts at planning equality between the s o c i a l s t r a t a has not decreased,  i f anything i t has increased.  Part of the problem i s d i r e c t l y related to the weakness of the state.  For example, tax avoidance and tax evasion are  pervasive while taxes on mass consumption have increased and 97 are more e f f e c t i v e l y collected. deeper:  But the problem goes  the b e n e f i c i a r i e s of supposedly  e g a l i t a r i a n state  p o l i c i e s have not been the poor but the middle and upper classes.  Moreover, s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n to aid the poor,  motivated by the ambitions  and pretensions of  e l i t e s , rarely gets to the implementation  Westernized  stage.  Of course,  this too i s a r e f l e c t i o n of the weakness of the state: i t w i l l not be altered u n t i l the masses are p o l i t i c a l l y organized to press for their i n t e r e s t s . It i s evident that Myrdal*s type of planning i s dependent on the advanced p o l i t i c a l development c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the West.  For the underdeveloped countries, we see an  increasing r e a l i z a t i o n that the exigencies of p o l i t i c a l  life,  plagued by endless moral exhortations to the r i c h to share i n the "common struggle" and show greater " s e n s i t i v i t y " to the poor. Of course, this inheritance from the Ghandi era i s i n e f f e c t u a l . "Moral fervor alone cannot eliminate t r a d i t i o n a l i n e q u a l i t i e s . " See' Asian" Drama, I I , p. 764. 9 6  Ibid., I I , p.  756.  9 7  Ibid., I I , p.  762.  p a g e 82  the almost complete l a c k of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l t h e power o f v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s  i n p r e s e r v i n g t h e ' s t a t u s ' quo  and t h e d i s m a l l e v e l o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n national of  affairs  infrastructure,  precludes effective  o f t h e masses  in  operation of this  type  planning. However M y r d a l * s c o n c l u s i o n seems t o be t h a t  planning w i l l  in effect  achievement.  If  c r e a t e the c o n d i t i o n s  the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  state planning w i l l  create  not p r e s e n t , planning w i l l affect  for  the s t a t e  is  citizen participation will  bring  it  it;  especially his  induce i t ;  r e t u r n to  We w i l l  c r e a t e an i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t go w i t h i t  this  is  and  r a i s e them;  non-existent,  point  if  planning  development,  --political  r  enter-  H e r e we s h a l l  direct  state  action  o f o r g a n i z e d b a r g a i n i n g and a l l  even though t h i s  came a b o u t  The c r e a t i o n o f  development towards  --becomes a c o n d i t i o n f o r , Later, ou  later.  in effect  taneous development i n the West.  point w i l l  as a s p o n this  the strong  and c o n s e q u e n t o f ,  infrastate  effective  be t h a t e f f e c t i v e  i n these c o u n t r i e s .  state  state  Perhaps we, along w i t h  have to r e c o n s i d e r the r o l e o f t h e  to  the  simply not p o s s i b l e g i v e n the a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s  life  Myrdal, w i l l  consolidation  t o be d i s c a r d e d , i s s i m p l y n o t  m e r e l y n o t e t h a t M y r d a l wants  political  lacking,  c o n c e p t i o n o f p l a n n i n g , i s u n w o r k a b l e and n o n -  tained.  planning is  own  is  legitimacy  that planning for  ought  planning.  if  low, planning w i l l  viable therefore  structure  infrastructure  national  is virtually  its  about.  The p o s s i b i l i t y  things  if  for  state  state  in  of  page .83  development.  Q.  THE •INTELLECTUALS- AND- PLANNERS' RE"-VISITED: THE MEANING OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING • The a r t i c u l a t e strata place great f a i t h i n "democratic  planning" as a means of achieving development.  However what  they mean by "democratic planning" has sharp differences from the model presented i n Part I. Although the concept of "democratic planning i s uncertain, i t does seem to include two s p e c i f i c things: f i r s t , democratic planning should e n l i s t the support and active participation  of the masses i n plan preparation and  implementation; second, popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n  should emerge  "Voluntarily, that i s , state p o l i c i e s should not require , . 98 compulsion. The rationale for the "quest of mass involvement" i s that development w i l l ultimately require changes i n the way people think, f e e l and act.  Individually, they w i l l have to  work harder and more e f f i c i e n t l y ; c o l l e c t i v e l y , they w i l l have to cooperate to improve t h e i r society and i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s . This f a i t h i n democratic planning rests on the b e l i e f that the masses,, as they become aware of their dismal l i v i n g conditions and are shown the e f f i c a c y of state p o l i c i e s i n improving those conditions, w i l l respond by supporting the adoption of those p o l i c i e s and f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e i r f u l f i l l m e n t . 9 8  Tbld., I I , p. 850.  page 84  The  d i f f i c u l t i e s with this " o p t i m i s t i c b i a s "  r e a d i l y apparent: based  are  t h i s conception of democratic p l a n n i n g i s  on a n o n - e x i s t e n t e q u a l i t y w h i l e i t i s h e l d to r e s u l t  i n g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y between i n d i v i d u a l s and s o c i a l Planners and i n t e l l e c t u a l s g r e a t l y underestimate  groups.  the  t e n a c i t y of i n h e r i t e d s o c i a l arrangements w h i l e they g r e a t l y overestimate the a b i l i t y  to e f f e c t the i d e a l s of p l a n n i n g  without more s t a t e compulsion.  Although without  this bias  the i d e o l o g y o f p l a n n i n g would d i s i n t e g r a t e , i t does appear that p l a n n i n g cannot wait f o r the v o l u n t a r y surge approval o f the unorganized masses. may  of  In other words, p l a n n i n g  w e l l be u n s u c c e s s f u l simply because the s t r i n g e n t  requirements  e s s e n t i a l f o r i t s o p e r a t i o n are not present i n  the g e n e r a l s o c i e t y . Moreover, i n the absence of e f f e c t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n and without  s t a t e compulsion  political  i t i s d i f f i c u l t to  conceive any g r e a t e r e q u a l i t y i n the i n t e r e s t s o f the masses. The wealthy w i l l not w i l l i n g l y forego t h e i r p r i v i l e g e s w h i l e the masses w i l l not w i l l i n g l y change t h e i r i n h e r i t e d p a t t e r n s of  interaction. Planners and i n t e l l e c t u a l s g e n e r a l l y assume g r e a t e r  s o c i a l and economic e q u a l i t y through v o l u n t a r y mass support for planning.  However, given the p e r v a s i v e  inequality, p o l i t i c a l p r e p a r a t i o n and  socio-economic  equality i s v i r t u a l l y non-existent.  implementation  The  of p l a n n i n g i s predominantly  i n the c o n t r o l o f p r i v i l e g e d groups who  may  voice egalitarian  page 85  intentions yet largely f r u s t r a t e t h e i r implementation. One  of the c r u c i a l differences between planning i n  the West and planning  i n the underdeveloped countries i s the  time sequence, that i s , the ideal of planning has been adopted in the underdeveloped world before much development has actually been accomplished. why  This i s one of the main reasons  state p o l i c i e s for e f f e c t i n g s o c i a l and economic  equality as well as p o l i t i c a l democracy are largely i n e f f e c t u a l . There i s simply not the same basis of an expanding economy that would make greater generosity possible Myrdal concludes that a greater role for the state i s necessary i f popular support i s to be mobilized for development.  The  imperatives  of development dictate that  these countries cannot wait for the emergence of voluntary or spontaneous support from below: . . . i f a modern infrastructure cannot be created by state intervention, there i s scant hope for any development at a l l that might l a t e r generate the appropriate spontaneous response. . . . There i s no choice but to create the i n s t i t u t i o n a l infrastructure by government p o l i c y and to spur i t s growth by government i n t e r v e n t i o n . I " 1  Or l a t e r he  says:  . . . i n the stagnant v i l l a g e s of South Asia this voluntary p a r t i c i p a t i o n does not emerge spontaneously as i t did i n Western Europe; i t needs to be fostered and directed by Scott has termed the psychological dynamics that emerge i n a poverty-stricken country the "constant-pie orient a t i o n . " E s s e n t i a l l y i t r e f l e c t s the severely l i m i t e d a v a i l - ' a b i l i t y of power, prestige, wealth, land and status and the effect this has on increasing insecurity while precluding cooperative action. See James C. Scott, PoTitlcaT Ideology i n Malaysia', (New Haven: Yale University Press, J.yb8j Chapter s i x . 1 0 0  1 0 1  Myrdal, Asian' Drama, I I , p.  869.  page 86  the government. The great poverty and rapid population increase rules out gradualness; the alternative to rapid development i s no development at a l l or even regression. 1® 2 However as we noted e a r l i e r , the state i s an i n s t i t u t i o n controlled by the p r i v i l e g e d groups.  Is i t  l i k e l y they would enact and e f f e c t i v e l y implement state p o l i c i e s designed to create an organizational  infrastructure that  would only serve to undermine t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d positions? Moreover, the e f f i c a c y of an organizational  infrastructure,  i f i t i s not merely to perpetuate o l i g a r c h i c a l r u l e , depends on broad and intense  citizen participation.  us right back to the problems of equality.  This too brings Furthermore, even  i f i t could be accomplished without a monolithic state, d i s c i p l i n e d r u l i n g party and a network of zealous cadres, a state-created  i n s t i t u t i o n a l infra-structure could be a d i r e c t  challenge to democracy.  I t i s hard to conceive of such an  infrastructure resulting i n less not more c e n t r a l i z a t i o n . Fred Riggs makes the v a l i d point that i f the state creates  an interest group infrastructure then these interest  groups w i l l function both i n the input processes of government (as originators of policy) and i n the output or administrative  functions  (as implementators of p o l i c y ) .  With  low c i t i z e n p a r t i c i p a t i o n the problem i s to prevent the i n s t i t u t i o n a l infrastructure from becoming a mere appendage of state control.  In this instance,  the organizational  infrastructure i s then not a means o f popular control over 1 0 2  Ibid.;, I I , p. 878.  page  government but r a t h e r an instrument  of popular  87  regimentation. 103  We would then have p o l i t i c i z a t i o n but without Nevertheless, institutional resources  the c r e a t i o n and  o p e r a t i o n of an  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e assumes immense powers  and  at the command of c e n t r a l s t a t e s t r u c t u r e s that  are c l e a r l y beyond reach. emerges t h a t "planning that may  democracy.  T h e r e f o r e , the  possibility  f o r development" i s an i l l u s o r y  w e l l weaken the whole development  effort.  Moreover, Myrdal i s ambivalent over the 104 of mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  goal  desirability  His dilemma i s t h a t he wants a  s t r o n g , c a p a b l e ^ e f f e c t i v e and benevolent s t a t e t h a t w i l l e f f e c t s o c i a l reforms.  However, i t i s c l e a r that due  to  the power of v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s and the tendency toward i n e f f e c t u a l o l i g a r c h i c a l r u l e i t becomes imperative  that  the masses p a r t i c i p a t e more, not l e s s i n t e n s e l y i n decision-making  structures.  Furthermore  this  p a r t i c i p a t i o n must be organized independently l U b Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and P o l i t i c a l Development: A P a r a d o x i c a l View" i n Bureaucracy and P o l i t i c a l Development, e d i t e d by Joseph LaPalombara ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963) 120-67. Riggs a l s o s t a t e s that the b u r e a u c r a t i c organs (what we have termed the "planning organs") "are not a spontaneous product of c i t i z e n demand i n response to f e l t needs. The groups extend the reach of the bureaucracy p r o v i d i n g i t w i t h t r a n s m i s s i o n b e l t s through which t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n can, p o t e n t i a l l y , be achieved. Hence the growth of s t a t e sponsored i n t e r e s t groups augments b u r e a u c r a t i c c o n t r o l without n e c e s s a r i l y strengthening any centers of autonomous p o l i t i c a l power capable of b r i n g i n g b u r e a u c r a t i c machines under popular c o n t r o l . " See pp. 140-41. See f o r example A s i a n Drama, I I , pp. 879, 883. Also, Gunnar Myrdal, " P o l i t i c a l F a c t o r s i n Economic A s s i s t a n c e , " S c i e n t i f i c American, V o l . CCXXVI ( A p r i l , 1972), 19. i U 4  page 88  of the central state structures i f the power of vested interests i s to be broken at that l e v e l .  It i s through this  p r i o r p o l i t i c a l organization that equality of opportunity be effected to gradually dissolve the perpetuators status  will  of the  quo. Wherever the state i s a preserve of a landed oligarchy  i t has not shoivn any remarkable benevolence i n e f f e c t i n g e g a l i t a r i a n reforms such as land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Yet i n  countries l i k e India, the absence of land reform  precludes  e f f e c t i v e mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a state-created public or quasi-public i n s t i t u t i o n a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . ^ 1  5  As Myrdal diagnoses, land reform has been kept i n e f f e c t i v e by state l e g i s l a t u r e s , administrators notables  i n the v i l l a g e s .  Due  and  local  to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of  p o l i t i c a l power, state interventions have not helped the poor but rather the rural e l i t e and the upper c l a s s e s . l ^  6  No amount of sermonizing w i l l change this as i t i s caused by the basic i n e g a l i t a r i a n power structure.  If "democratic  planning" i s an i l l u s i o n so i s the idea of a "benevolent state." Undoubtedly the great stress on "voluntariness" by  the  i n t e l l e c t u a l s and planners i s related to the equality issue. Although Myrdal i s content merely to castigate this "weak" approach and to  decry the "indulgence"  shown towards the  107 people, 105 1 0 6  1°  7  i t would seem to have a quite r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l W e  r e  t u r n to the issue of land reform i n Section V.  Myrdal, Asian Drama, I I , p. 889. Ibid., I I , p. 911 and pp. 1140-41.  page 89  basis. How could p o l i t i c a l leaders, planners and i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n s i s t that the masses assume greater obligations when pervasive inequality prevents the people from p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n decision-making rewards?  or the d i s t r i b u t i o n of  Because the people receive so much less from the  outputs of state a c t i v i t y and contribute so l i t t l e to the inputs,  ° they could hardly be asked to assume greater  burdens than t h e i r poverty already imposes. P o l i t i c a l leaders, aware of the low l e v e l of benefits actually reaching the lower classes, wisely r e s i s t enforcing additional burdensome obligations.  Therefore, although the  "extreme l a x i t y " of d i s c i p l i n e and the state p o l i c y of using the carrot rather than the s t i c k appear as i r r a t i o n a l f o r economic development, they are e n t i r e l y r a t i o n a l f o r maintaining p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , that i s , stagnation and the p o l i t i c a l status' quo.  R. POLITICAL DECAY: THE "SOFT-STATE" A l l the problems of socialism, democracy, planning, popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n and the power of vested interests come together to form not the strong, capable and effective state Apathy and d i s i n t e r e s t are, of course, a form of input into the p o l i t i c a l system. Although these "support" p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y , i t i s a s t a b i l i t y of stagnation. Therefore these e f f e c t i v e popular inputs must be held detrimental to p o l i t i c a l development.  page 90 but the " s o f t - s t a t e . "  1 0 9  As Myrdal sees i t , , the " s o f t - s t a t e " has a notorious lack of s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e marked by deficiencies i n l e g i s l a t i o n p a r t i c u l a r l y i n law observance and enforcement. Moreover, there i s a general lack of obedience  to rules and  directives as they are handed down to lower levels of public officials.  In f a c t , these o f f i c i a l s often act i n c o l l u s i o n  with the powerful vested interests whose conduct they should regulate.  Generally, throughout  society there i s a general  i n c l i n a t i o n of people i n a l l strata to r e s i s t public controls and their  implementation.  From our perspective, for p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l the state requires very l i t t l e of i t s c i t i z e n s .  reasons  There are  few obligations either to do things i n the community interest or to avoid actions opposed to that interest.  Moreover, even  those obligations that do exist are enforced inadequately, i f at a l l .  Myrdal warns that i n the underdeveloped countries,  democratic planning does not primarily mean that p o l i c i e s should be decided by democratic p o l i t i c a l procedures  or that  they should be implemented with cooperative and shared r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of l o c a l and sectional communities rather i t 110 is implied that p o l i c i e s should not require compulsion. Yet successful democratic planning requires the readiness and Myrdal, Asian Drama, I I , p. 893 and I I I , p. 1863. Also see, Gunnar Myrdal, "The Soft States of South Asia: The C i v i l Service Problem," B u l l e t i n of the Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , XXV CApril, 1969), 7-10. 1 0 9  110 Myrdal, Asian Drama, I, pp. 66-67.  page  91  the a b i l i t y to p l a c e o b l i g a t i o n s on people i n a l l s o c i a l s t r a t a . To enforce  these o b l i g a t i o n s r e q u i r e s d e c i s i v e doses of  compulsion. E a r l i e r we  saw  came i n t o e x i s t e n c e  that i n Western Europe the strong  as the networks of o b l i g a t i o n s  encompassed ever l a r g e r p o l i t i c a l u n i t s .  i n scope and  gradually  More recent  i n d i c a t e that c i t i z e n o b l i g a t i o n s have i n c r e a s e d  state  trends  tremendously  degree w h i l e the burdens and b e n e f i t s have been  more e q u i t a b l y d i s t r i b u t e d .  As  such the strong  state, in  e f f e c t a by-product of l i b e r a l i s m , c o u l d both demand and r e c e i v e g r e a t e r c i t i z e n compliance w h i l e a r b i t r a r i n e s s under the  reducing  impact o f the p a r t i c i p a t i o n ethos.  In the underdeveloped world, however, these same processes have not o c c u r r e d .  L i b e r a t i o n movements were  e s s e n t i a l l y r e b e l l i o n s against r e s i s t a n c e to a u t h o r i t y T h i s has  authority with  (e.g. India) being  passive  a prime weapon.  r e s u l t e d i n an " o p p o s i t i o n a l mentality""'"''"  1  that 11  2  plagues governments everywhere i n the underdeveloped world. Moreover, t h i s legacy of a n a r c h i s t a t t i t u d e s has i d e o l o g i c a l and use  against  used a g a i n s t  emotional f o r c e d e r i v i n g from i t s s u c c e s s f u l  the c o l o n i a l power.  Now  t h i s same legacy  r e s i s t a n c e o f the lox^er  _  Edward Shi Is,' P o l i t i c a l Development I n the New(The Hague: Mouton, 1962) , pp. 34-36.. We are excluding Communist p a r t y . 1 1 2  i s being  the n a t i o n a l i s t governments.  Concomitant w i t h the p a s s i v e 111  an  those s t a t e s c o n t r o l l e d by  a  States  page 92 classes, there i s a r a t i o n a l reluctance among the a r t i c u l a t e strata to place citizens under s p e c i f i c obligations sanctioned by state power.  The reluctance to use  compulsion,  in effect a countervailing force to the c o l o n i a l legacy of authoritarianism and paternalism, has resulted i n the enactment but not the implementation legislation.  of broad reform  Therefore one of the main explanations of the  " s o f t - s t a t e " i s that most p o l i t i c a l power i s i n the hands of the upper classes.  This upper class can afford to voice  e g a l i t a r i a n laws and p o l i c i e s but are i n the unchallenged 113 p o s i t i o n to prevent t h e i r  implementation.  To counteract these obstacles or " i n d i s c i p l i n e , " to enact and enforce a system of community rules, i s not an easy task.  The i n e g a l i t a r i a n i n s t i t u t i o n s that prevent the  masses from receiving t h e i r due benefits also make them considerably less susceptible to government control. Furthermore, the inauguration of the strong state i s handicapped by the inhibitions of the p o l i t i c a l r u l e r s . Scott's comments are worth noting: The fact that there i s more uncertainty (less consensus) about behavioral norms and community goals i n t r a n s i t i o n a l society than i n either i n d u s t r i a l or folk societies has another important consequence. Where the means and goals of p o l i t i c s are more s e t t l e d , administration occupies an increasingly important place v i s - a - v i s p o l i t i c s . But where c o n f l i c t over means and goals s t i l l prevails as i t does i n t r a n s i t i o n a l society p o l i t i c s achieves primacy. The society that has not yet attained a viable consensus on ultimate goals, which values should be emphasized (equality? freedom? progress?) and how they should be achieved - - i s the p o l i t i cized society par e x c e l l e n c e . I 14  113 Myrdal,' Challenge to World Poverty, pp. 221-22. 1 1 4  Scott; •Political- Ideology i n Malaysia:.• p.  137.  page 93 The r e s u l t of the " p o l i t i c i z e d society" i s that: The risks of p o l i t i c s . . . are so imposing as to discourage long-run strategies. The concern with holding on to one's post at a l l costs and the generally high l e v e l of opportunism . . . i l l u s t r a t e s a short-run, e x p l o i t a t i o n i a t orientation toward the rewards of p o l i t i c s . It i s not surprising that many p o l i t i c a l leaders i n new nations, finding themselves i n this s i t u a t i o n , attempt to maximize t h e i r security of tenure by whatever means are at their disposal and, f a i l i n g that, eschew long-run commitments and concentrate instead on the short-term material and status rewards of o f f i c e . The very real f r a g i l i t y and u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the p o l i t i c a l world, as of the economic and, to a lesser extent, the bureaucratic environment, lend a quite r a t i o n a l quality to the pursuit of short-run, personal values. Perhaps a better appreciation of the exigencies the ."soft-state" would be achieved at developments i n India since  S.  of  i f we looked more closely  1947.  INDIA AS A "SOFT-STATE" Following  independence, India's p o l i t i c a l  leaders  generally abandonned Ghandi's advice to lead the ascetic l i f e . Instead, through ostentatious l i v i n g an attempt was  made to  recreate the imperial pomp and ceremony of B r i t i s h India. Naturally this increased the economic and emotional distance between the rulers and the ruled,and,:'in  f a c t , was  upheld by  the i n e g a l i t a r i a n structures that prevented broad mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n national a f f a i r s .  Myrdal has written that:  Because of the narrow s o c i a l base of the e l i t e and the absence of any pressure from the masses, the leaders were under no compulsion to govern vigorously and d i s i n t e r e s t e d l y . 1 1 5  Ibid., pp. 142-43.  page 94  [Moreover] India's acute problems . . . made i t seem imperative to avoid issues that might threaten the unity of the a r t i c u l a t e upper strata. The urgency of achieving order and s t a b i l i t y induced most leaders to shelve ideological commitments and acquiesce i n postponing the implementation of the f u l l Congress program. 11  The result of this was a strange ambivalence  of  radicalism i n p r i n c i p l e but conservatism i n p r a c t i c e .  Many  s o c i a l reforms were i n t e n t i o n a l l y permissive (e.g. banning dowries, c h i l d marriages and untouchability) with the r e s u l t that enacted laws were rarely enforced.  In fact the  dichotomy between professed ideals and r e a l i t y , between enacted l e g i s l a t i o n and i t s implementation, i s a prime c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the " s o f t - s t a t e . " This ambivalence was r a t i o n a l i z e d as the necessity of getting the "modernization i d e a l s " firmly accepted before implementing  the necessary reforms.  However this approach to  modernization has had unfortunate results for Indian development: [It has] strengthened not merely conservative but often reactionary forces, thereby making the r e a l i z a t i o n of the modernization ideals ever more d i f f i c u l t . . . . The postponment of the promised s o c i a l and economic revolution, which was to follow India's p o l i t i c a l revolution, i s thus in danger of becoming permanent. Even the p o l i t i c a l revolution i s less of a r e a l i t y than the ideological leaders expected. India i s s t i l l very f a r from being controlled by the majority of i t s people, or even having i t s p o l i c i e s devised so as to be i n the interests of the masses. 11  Rather than leading to mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government, therefore a movement toward e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l reform, universal suffrage has compelled p o l i t i c a l leaders to seek 1 1 6  M y r d a l . Asian Drama,- I, p. 275.  1 1 /  accomodation  Ibid., I, p. 278.  page 95 with the dominant interests i n society: the rural e l i t e , merchants, and moneylenders.  This has meant not the removal  but the s o l i d i f i c a t i o n of the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l structures. The " p o l i t i c a l mechanism" which has led to this f r u s t r a t i o n of the development e f f o r t s i s as f o l l o w s :  1 1 8  With i n i t i a l high hopes, the Congress party, as the major party, achieved a few immediate successes which helped to establish state authority; this success provided a rationale for not carrying through a more sweeping s o c i a l and economic revolution; as India became more of a " s o f t - s t a t e " p o l i t i c a l leaders were increasingly i n h i b i t e d from carrying out reforms; as the n a t i o n a l i s t leaders were gradually replaced, the upper class slipped into positions of power and abstained from enacting p o l i c i e s that contravened t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d positions; since Congress needed the f i n a n c i a l support of the wealthy, the s o c i a l and economic s t r a t i f i c a t i o n systems were enhanced and the masses were kept poor, ignorant and passive; meanwhile, the operation of the democratic processes strengthened the power of conservative and reactionary groups who lacked the e g a l i t a r i a n visions of e a r l i e r Congress leaders; consequently, the absence of s o c i a l and economic reforms hampered national consolidation and economic development while i t enhanced the negative features of the "soft-state'.' In e f f e c t , Congress went from an i d e a l i s t i c , n a t i o n a l i s t party of l i b e r a t i o n to an opportunistic, special-interest 1 1 8  Ibid., I, pp. 280-81.  page 96  forum.  "As p o l i t i c s became increasingly concerned with.  p r a c t i c a l issues, so the pressure of vested interests on the p o l i t i c i a n s grew stronger and with i t , corruption and 119  nepotism became p r o f i t a b l e . "  We have characterized this  as p o l i t i c a l l y r a t i o n a l given the environmental constraints. Yet i t has had the unfortunate effect of leading to an early stagnation  i n s o c i a l reform.  Nor has i t had a b e n e f i c i a l  influence on p o l i t i c a l l i f e : " P o l i t i c s now i s commonly considered an avenue to p r i v i l e g e s and patronage; to be a p o l i t i c i a n i s to be regarded as a self-seeker and opportunist.' Most of the members of parliament and the state assemblies, elected by universal suffrage, belong to the p r i v i l e g e d classes.  While they frustrate e f f e c t i v e reform  l e g i s l a t i o n that would benefit the masses, they quickly vote 121 themselves salary and housing accomodation above average. Meanwhile, through the bestot^al of p o l i t i c a l jobs and favors they often gain s t i l l more advantages as "representatives of the people."  While this may be p e r f e c t l y r a t i o n a l for  securing t h e i r p o l i t i c a l positions, i t does indicate that i n conditions o f gross inequality, universal suffrage, without effective p o l i t i c a l organization  of the lower classes, i s an  i n e g a l i t a r i a n not an equalizing t o o l . Therefore the "soft-state',' although i t may be highly 1 1 9  Ibid., I, p. 290.  1 2 0  Ibid., I, p. 292.  1 2 1  I b i d . , 1 1 , p. 766.  page s t a b l e , i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p o l i t i c a l  and  economic  E f f e c t i v e s t a t e a c t i o n r e q u i r e s enforcement at the l e v e l s of the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e --the due  stagnation. lower  states,districts,  and  localities.  and  apathy of the masses p l u s the h a b i t u a l dependence on  passive  Yet  to the p o v e r t y , i n s e c u r i t y , ignorance  submissiveness to people of wealth (as we  a r a t i o n a l response), l e v e l s i s h e l d by  97  and  have s t a t e d ,  e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l power at the  lower  l a n d l o r d s , merchants and moneylenders.  It  i s p r e c i s e l y these groups which stand to b e n e f i t i f reform measures are  thwarted.  Moreover, s i n c e these groups f u n c t i o n as brokers who  political  c o n t r o l the votes of the poor unorganized  122 masses,  n a t i o n a l l e a d e r s , even when they are so i n c l i n e d ,  are c o n s t r a i n e d  from i n i t i a t i n g  broad s o c i a l  reforms:  Suffrage has given the r u r a l e l i t e a power t h a t s t a t e m i n i s t e r s and l e g i s l a t o r s must r e s p e c t . Political d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , or panchayat r a j , has strengthened t h e i r p o s i t i o n s t i l l f u r t h e r by o f f e r i n g them more o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e arid patronage. Democracy i t s e l f thus p l p i a y s n i n t ohfche.ahandsfo^ .125 I f the goal i s p o l i t i c a l achieved. s t a t e and  Yet  stability,  i t has been achieved  an i n n o v a t i n g  political  then i t has  been  at the expense of a strong  system.  T h i s suggests that  u n i v e r s a l s u f f r a g e i n a h a r s h l y i n e g a l i t a r i a n and  extremely  poor s o c i e t y w i t h unorganized lower c l a s s e s does not  l e a d to  James C. S c o t t , " P a t r o n - C l i e n t P o l i t i c s and P o l i t i c a l Change In Southeast A s i a , " American; P o l i t i c a l Science; Review, LXVI (March, 1972), 91-113. 1 2 2  123 Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , p. 293. original.  Emphasis i n the  page a popular " r e v o l u t i o n " of any  sort.  Indeed, the  " s o c i a l i s m " or " p l a n n i n g " from above p l u s popular pressure from below are vested i n t e r e s t s .  the  s t a t e strong  increasing  i n e f f i c a c y of  lack  of  i n d i c a t i v e of the power of  Moreover, i t should c a u t i o n ,  have cautioned Myrdal, against about p u r g i n g the  the  any  --while at the  and  should  c a v a l i e r suggestions  s t a t e of s o c i e t a l i n f l u e n c e s  --of making  same time p o s i t i n g an  ever  burden of s t a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  I f these s t a t e s were not  " s o f t - s t a t e s , " then  "democratic p l a n n i n g " could have reduced the power of r u r a l e l i t e s and  the upper c l a s s e s .  "soft-state":  as the poor remain i n a r t i c u l a t e and  p o s i t i n g or demanding an i n c r e a s e d greater  the  Y e t . i t seems that  p l a n n i n g i s i n f a c t a main prop of the long  98  state as  unorganized,  r o l e f o r the  state  gives  scope f o r the machinations of p r i v i l e g e d groups;  furthermore, each f a i l u r e of s t a t e p l a n n i n g has l e d to the  cry f o r g r e a t e r ,  rather  paradoxically  than l e s s , s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n , thereby a g a i n l l a y i n g the b a s i s  for  further  frustration. While s t a t e p l a n n i n g has  been a r e l a t i v e success i n  the West, i t s r e l a t i v e f a i l u r e i n the  " s o f t - s t a t e s " of  underdeveloped world should induce a r e - d i r e c t i o n of thoughts. benefits stringent  C l e a r l y Myrdal can be  our  f a u l t e d f o r e x t o l l i n g the  of c e n t r a l planning.whHe himsetLfelias  diagnosed  the  r e q u i s i t e s f o r p l a n n i n g as w e l l as t h e i r almost  t o t a l l a c k i n the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . the  the  difficulties  i n p l a n n i n g f o r the  strong  Furthermore, s t a t e are more  page s t a r k when we  r e a l i z e that  the  "soft-state" is a  99  corrupt  state.  TV ; THE  "SOFT-STATE"; AS A CORRUPT STATE Myrdal claims  dominant t r a i t  of the  the  " f o l k l o r e of c o r r u p t i o n " i s a  "soft-states.""'"  r e f e r s to i n d i v i d u a l b e l i e f s attached  to those b e l i e f s and  c o r r u p t i o n by  24  Generally,  about c o r r u p t i o n , the the v a l u a t i o n s  i n d i v i d u a l s i n the p u b l i c and  this emotions  placed private  on spheres.  Myrdal holds t h a t i f i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s b e l i e v e corruption  i s widespread, e s p e c i a l l y among high  officials,  then c o r r u p t i o n  society.  What Myrdal has  rampant c o r r u p t i o n  government  e a s i l y spreads to a l l s e c t o r s  among the  general  public.  psychic  s t a t e of " w e l l , i f everybody seems c o r r u p t ,  shouldn't I be  of  i n f a c t found i n South A s i a i s  i n government, b u s i n e s s and  The  that  " f o l k l o r e of c o r r u p t i o n " has  created  a  why  corrupt?"  I n c r e a s i n g l y t h i s r e s u l t s i n the to massive p l u n d e r i n g  s t a t e being  subject  for individual benefit:  While i t i s . . . exceedingly d i f f i c u l t i n South A s i a to i n t r o d u c e the p r o f i t motives and market behavior i n t o the the s e c t o r of s o c i a l l i f e where they operate i n the West --that i s , the economic sphere - - i t i s . . . d i f f i c u l t to e l i m i n a t e m o t i v a t i o n s of p r i v a t e gain from the s e c t o r where they have been suppressed i n the West --the sphere of p u b l i c r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and p o w e r . I "  4  I b i d . , I I , p.  940.  1 2 5  I b i d . , I I , p.  948.  1  2  page  However, s u r e l y t h i s i n d i c a t e s that we  100  should not  be  p r i m a r i l y concerned with e r a d i c a t i n g c o r r u p t i o n i n the p u b l i c s e c t o r but encourage the  r a t h e r we  seek means t h a t would  development of s i m i l a r behavior p a t t e r n s  the p r i v a t e sphere. securing  should  That i s , a p s y c h o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n of  the g r e a t e s t  expense of other  in  i n d i v i d u a l gain even i f i t i s at  citizens.  the  P r i m a r i l y , t h i s would mean  s t i m u l a t i n g a c q u i s i t i v e n e s s and  r i s k - t a k i n g while leaving  the s t a t e the f u n c t i o n of maintaining  broad l i m i t s as  to  t o l e r a b l e behavior. Myrdal i s u n f l i n c h i n g i n h i s condemnation of and  i t s e f f e c t s on development.  Yet he does not  corruption  clearly  i n d i c a t e t h a t c o r r u p t i o n i s both a r e f l e c t i o n o f , and inducement f o r , the gross i n e q u a l i t y and the great poverty of the " s o f t - s t a t e s . " holding  i n r e l a t i o n to low  absolute  For example, the b e n e f i t s  any p u b l i c o f f i c e are enormous while the  f o r attempting to o b t a i n one  an  of  penalties  by b r i b e r y are r e l a t i v e l y minor  standards of l i v i n g or pressure  from  1 27 relatives for favors. l ^ b wertheim w r i t e s t h a t : " j u s t as i n the e i g h t e e n t h century as a new sense of values broke through i n keeping w i t h the maxim p u b l i c r i g h t i s p u b l i c duty, so now a new sense of values i s developing that might be summed up . . . p r i v a t e r i g h t i s p u b l i c duty. . . . [Therefore] i n t h e i r present c o n d i t i o n of t e n s i o n , [the Southeast A s i a n s t a t e s ] cannot p o s s i b l y f i n d a secure f o o t h o l d i n a n i n e t e e n t h century m o r a l i t y which i s becoming o b s o l e t e . " See W. F. Wertheim, " S o c i o l o g i c a l Aspects of C o r r u p t i o n i n Southeast A s i a , " P o l i t i c a l C o r r u p t i o n , e d i t e d by A r n o l d J . Heidenheimer, (New York: H o l t , Reinhart and Winston, 1970), 210. I C o l i n Leys, "New States and the Concept of i n Heidenheimer, P o 1 i t i c a1 C o r r u p t i o n , 341-45 . 2 7  Corruption,"  page 101  Furthermore, Myrdal f a i l s to see that when c o r r u p t i o n i s widespread i n the s o c i e t y , s t r i c t a c t i o n c o r r u p t i o n only corruption.  serves  t o i n c r e a s e the o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r  Likewise,  h i s rather p u r i t a n i c a l attitudes  suggest a d e n i a l o f the b a r g a i n i n g to p o l i t i c s . worth  against  In t h i s respect  and compromise e s s e n t i a l  Huntington's o b s e r v a t i o n i s  repeating.  The e s c a l a t i o n of standards i n a modernizing s o c i e t y and the concomitant d e v a l u a t i o n and r e j e c t i o n o f p o l i t i c s represent the v i c t o r y o f the values o f modernity over the needs of s o c i e t y . 128 ~ Myrdal remains convinced that c o r r u p t i o n  counteracts  attempts at n a t i o n a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n , decreases r e s p e c t f o r and  a l l e g i a n c e t o the government and endangers  In a d d i t i o n , c o n t r a r y  stability.  t o i t s name, "speed money" or b r i b e s  given w i t h the hope of e x p e d i t i n g  bureaucratic  a c t u a l l y i n h i b i t s decision-making while  procedures,  introducing  129 "irrationality"  i n plan  fulfillment.  He does not c o n s i d e r  the c o n t r a r y p r o p o s i t i o n , namely,  that c o r r u p t i o n , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f i t s e f f e c t s on economic development, at l e a s t keeps important groups w i t h i n the political  system and i n f a c t r e p r e s e n t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the s t a t e .  a c e r t a i n type o f  L i k e machine or vv  c l i e n t e l i s t i c p o l i t i c s , corruption provides concrete  s p e c i f i c and  b e n e f i t s t o groups and i n d i v i d u a l s who might  Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and C o r r u p t i o n , " i n Heidenheimer, P o l i t i c a l C o r r u p t i o n , 494. 1 2 8  129 Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , pp. 951-55.  page 102  otherwise be t o t a l l y a l i e n a t e d from the p o l i t i c a l However, we must admit t h a t p e r v a s i v e  system.  corruption of  t h i s s o r t may s u b s t i t u t e f o r e f f e c t i v e reforms w h i l e defusing  the impetus f o r any r e v o l u t i o n a r y changes.  Huntington may w e l l be c o r r e c t when he s t a t e s that 130 i s p o s s i b l y conducive t o p o l i t i c a l a s t a b i l i t y of s t a g n a t i o n .  stability.  In f a c t , corruption  Yet i t i s  Furthermore, the r e l a t i o n s h i p  that Huntingdon p o s i t s between c o r r u p t i o n and p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n may not be as c l e a r as he suggests: r a t h e r than c o r r u p t i o n enhancing  institutionalization,  perhaps c o r r u p t i o n , through i t s adverse e f f e c t s on the e q u a l i t y i d e a l and i t s negative  i n f l u e n c e on s o c i a l  a c t u a l l y f r u s t r a t e s attempts t o organize  reforms,  the masses and  i n c r e a s e t h e i r popular p a r t i c i p a t i o n . S c o t t ' s o b s e r v a t i o n i s p e r t i n e n t here: the patronage and b r i b e s d i s t r i b u t e d t o the unorganized poor represent a "side-payment" which a l l but precludes b a s i c s t r u c t u r a l change that might improve the c o l l e c t i v e access of the poor to economic o p p o r t u n i t i e s and make those o p p o r t u n i t i e s l e s s ephemeral.1^1 The  b e l i e f s that underpin a c o r r u p t  for himself  society  (everyone  at the expense of the common good) suggest that  the " s o f t - s t a t e s " are not amenable to Myrdal's type of planning,  that i s , h i s type o f planning  cooperative  a c t i o n and c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g .  i t presumes a c l e a r conception 1 3 0  calls for In a d d i t i o n ,  of the p u b l i c good and a  Huntington, "Modernization and C o r r u p t i o n , " 498.  James C. S c o t t , Comparative P o l i t i c a l C o r r u p t i o n , (Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n t i c e H a l l , 1972) p. 149, my emphasis. 1 3 1  page 103 harmony of i n t e r e s t s , c r e a t e d by s t a t e p o l i c i e s .  In the  absence o f a community of goals and a s o l i d n a t i o n a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n perhaps more encouragement to  should be given  the type o f behavior that Myrdal f i n d s so o b j e c t i o n a b l e . Since he p o s i t s such a l a r g e r o l e f o r the s t a t e i n  s e c u r i n g development, Myrdal i s p a r t i c u l a r l y alarmed at the extent of c o r r u p t i o n i n the bureaucracy: The s t a t e both as entrepreneur and as c o n t r o l l e r of p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e has to r e l y on p u b l i c s e r v i c e s as the instrument o f c a r r y i n g out i t s p o l i c i e s . The very f a c t of p l a n n i n g , t h e r e f o r e , enhances very d e c i s i v e l y the r o l e of the p u b l i c s e r v i c e s f o r development. These c o u n t r i e s w i l l have l i t t l e chance of r a p i d and c o n t i n u i n g development i f they do not succeed i n b u i l d i n g up an e f f i c i e n t cadre of p u b l i c s e r v a n t s , reaching from the h i g h e s t p o s i t i o n s . . . down to . . . a l l the others employed by p u b l i c authorities.132 He i s p a r t i c u l a r l y opposed to o v e r s t a f f i n g or the great number of "hangers-on" who  do l i t t l e  have low e f f i c i e n c y i n work performance.  u s e f u l work and However h i s  p r e s c r i p t i o n i s merely t o give b e t t e r t r a i n i n g to  civil  servants as t h i s would "reduce the need --and the excuse 133 --of having overgrown s t a f f s . " T h i s naive view t o t a l l y ignores what we know o f the modus operandi of c l i e n t e l e 134 networks. Myrdal, "The Soft States of South A s i a : The Servant Problem," 8. Servant Problem," 8. I b i d . , 9. 1  3  Civil  3  * Among the recent l i t e r a t u r e on p o l i t i c a l c l i e n t e l i s m see Rene Lemarchand, " P o l i t i c a l C l i e n t e l i s m and E t h n i c i t y i n T r o p i c a l A f r i c a : Competing S o l i d a r i t i e s i n N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g , " APSR, LXVI (March 1972) 69-70; Rene Lemarchand and K e i t h Legg, " P o l i t i c a l C l i e n t e l i s m and Development," Comparative P o l i t i c s , IV (January 1972) 149-78; John Duncan P o w e l l , "Peasant S o c i e t y 3 4  page  O v e r s t a f f i n g may  reflect  incompetence but  i t i s not  p r i m a r i l y caused by incompetent p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s . the search  f o r s e c u r i t y , the pressure  v i l l a g e or l o c a l i t y f o r c e s o f f i c i a l s  Rather,  of f a m i l y , k i n , to give  consideration  to the p l e a s f o r employment made by f r i e n d s and  relatives.  U n t i l these environmental f a c t o r s are d e a l t w i t h , t r a i n i n g or other s u s t a i n e d pressure words, i_f the  "reforms" are not from the general  better  l i k e l y to w i t h s t a n d society.  s t a t e i s to have a l a r g e and  In  As  continuing  features  increasing role  our  l a t e r argument  important d i g r e s s i o n s : f i r s t , we must  the nature of c o n t r o l s used i n the must b r i e f l y look at the  and  of p u b l i c bureaucracy.  a means of strengthening  must make two  the  other  i n development, the problems of o v e r s t a f f i n g , nepotism g r a f t w i l l be  104  state plans;  i s s u e s of land reform  we  consider  second,  we  and  agricultural policy.  U. • PLAN CONTROLS; IN THE  "SOFT-STATE"  Besides p l a i n g r a f t , nepotism and prevalence of c o r r u p t i o n w i t h i n the and  "speed money," the  s t a t e i s both encouraged  r e f l e c t e d by the type of o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l s used to  r e g u l a t e the  economy.  Even though there  i s a shortage of competent  and  and C l i e n t e l i s t P o l i t i c s , " APSR, LXIV (June 1970) 411-25; and, James C. S c o t t , Patron C l i e n t P o l i t i c s and P o l i t i c a l change i n Southeast A s i a , " APSR,. LXVI (March 1972) 91-113.  page honest a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , the plans sense of having  are not  105  o p e r a t i o n a l i n the  the l e v e r s of p o l i c y planned i n advance.  There i s a marked p r e f e r e n c e  f o r d i s c r e t i o n a r y as opposed 135  to n o n - d i s c r e t i o n a r y  controls.  T h i s seems to r e f l e c t  of the " o p p o r t u n i s t i c b i a s e s " of which Myrdal warns: by keeping the plans n o n - o p e r a t i o n a l , political  l e a d e r s can c o n v e n i e n t l y  from the reforms and implementation e.g.  frequently planners  and  divert their attention  other measures necessary f o r p l a n little  a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d to 136  taxes or e f f e c t i v e l a n d reform.  r e f l e c t s the e x i g e n c i e s  planning  Of course t h i s  those groups i n t e r e s t e d i n p e r p e t u a t i n g it  one  aids  the s t a t u s quo  while  of the " s o f t - s t a t e . "  E a r l i e r i n h i s c a r r e e r Myrdal c l e a r l y warned of  the  negative consequences of d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s : The system tends e a s i l y to c r e a t e cancerous tumors of p a r t i a l i t y and c o r r u p t i o n i n the very centre o f the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , where the s i c k n e s s i s c o n t i n u o u s l y n u r t u r e d by the f a v o r s d i s t r i b u t e d and the g r a f t s r e a l i z e d and from which i t tends to spread out to every limb of society. I n d u s t r i a l i s t s and businessmen are tempted to go i n f o r shady deals i n s t e a d of steady, r e g u l a r b u s i n e s s . I n d i v i d u a l s who might have performed u s e f u l tasks i n the economic development of t h e i r country become i d l e hangerson, watching f o r loopholes i n the decrees and dishonesty i n t h e i r implementation. T h i s i s a l l the more dangerous as a general weakness i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . . . -L^* D i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s i n v o l v e i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s by an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a u t h o r i t y with the power to act on i t s own d i s c r e t i o n . N o n - d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s are c o n t r o l s which are a p p l i e d a u t o m a t i c a l l y f o l l o w i n g the f o r m u l a t i o n of some d e f i n i t e r u l e . Further d i s t i n c t i o n i s made between p o s i t i v e and negative c o n t r o l s : the former are aimed at s t i m u l a t i n g or encouraging p r o d u c t i o n or consumption w h i l e the l a t t e r are meant t o prevent or l i m i t p r o d u c t i o n or consumption. Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , p. 904. 5  1 3 6  See  a l s o I b i d . , I I I , p.  2010.  page  106  i s that t h e i r business c l a s s e s are too much i n c l i n e d to-,37 look f o r easy p r o f i t s i n p l a c e of s u s t a i n e d i n t e r p r i s e . The  r e s u l t of numerous and o f t e n c o n f l i c t i n g  i s t h a t few minor nand no major d e c i s i o n s i n the s e c t o r can be taken without p r i o r permission administrative controls  authorities.  The  existence  (e.g. import c o n t r o l s , low  holidays)  of  controls  private the  of p o s i t i v e  i n t e r e s t r a t e s , tax  designed to encourage p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e  often  c a l l f o r t h compensatory n e g a t i v e c o n t r o l s when the parameters of f o r e i g n exchange and reached.  The  paradoxical  resource a l l o c a t i o n are  r e s u l t i s that "while everyone  t a l k s about the n e c e s s i t y of encouraging p r i v a t e  enterprise  and while a g r e a t e r number of c o n t r o l s are i n s t i t u t e d w i t h t h i s i n view, most o f f i c i a l s have to devote most of t h e i r 138 time and  energy to l i m i t i n g or stopping  enterprise."  By  encouraging p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e beyond p r a c t i c a l l i m i t s , a huge b u r e a u c r a t i c  system of d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s i s needed  to r e s t r a i n business a c t i v i t y . a competition  T h i s would seem to: r e f l e c t  between which path of development to  follow,  that i s , p r i v a t e or p u b l i c investment. An  important e f f e c t of these c o n f l i c t i n g c o n t r o l s i s  that e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y high p r o f i t s can be made by s u c c e s s f u l i n working t h e i r way  those  through the system.  explains, why c o o r d i n a t i o n and s i m p l i f i c a t i o n i s not 137 M y d a l , An I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economy, p. 283. r  138  Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , p.  925.  This effected:  page  the c o n t r o l s g i v e wealth and power to those o f f i c i a l s p o l i t i c i a n s who already  administer  them; the system f a v o r s  e s t a b l i s h e d firms and,  107  and  big,  i n f a c t , p a r t l y accounts f o r  what Myrdal sees as a t r e n d toward i n c r e a s i n g o l i g o p o l y i n 139 these  1  countries. For these reasons, Myrdal's "remedy" seems l a r g e l y  i r r e l e v a n t : he  advocates " b e t t e r " planning  which w i l l  the need f o r so many d i s c r e t i o n a r y c o n t r o l s . i s , who vested  will  enact and  question  c a r r y through t h i s reform?  i n t e r e s t s i n both business and  p r o f i t from the  The  s t a t u s quo.  reduce  Entrenched  government g r e a t l y  Moreover, s i n c e we  are i n e f f e c t  d e a l i n g w i t h a problem of s o c i e t a l c o r r u p t i o n as w e l l , i s i t conceivable  to have a l a r g e and  expanding i n c o r r u p t  that c o u l d w i t h s t a n d the predatory community?  The  existence  advances from  of c o r r u p t i o n and  a little  the  the " f o l k l o r e of  c o r r u p t i o n " on which i t i s based w i l l not be if  state  abolished  even  t i n k e r i n g w i t h the c o n t r o l s i s e f f e c t e d .  What Myrdal wants i s a purge of c o r r u p t i o n and c r e a t i o n of a s t r o n g - s t a t e w h i l e the  the  state i s b u s i l y  expanding i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s - - c r e a t i n g an  organizational  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , e f f e c t i n g massive reforms, l e a d i n g the i n economic development and and  living  standards of the poor.  power of vested exigencies 1 3 9  r a i s i n g the h e a l t h , What we  way  educational  have s a i d of  i n t e r e s t s , the absence of e q u a l i t y and  the the  of the " s o f t - s t a t e " would normally l e a d us to a  I b i d . , I I , pp.  929-30.  page  t o t a l l y pessimistic conclusion developments o c c u r r i n g . has  to say  about the  However i f we  108  l i k e l i h o o d of such  look at what Myrdal  of land.reform, i t becomes p o s s i b l e  to suggest  an a l t e r n a t i v e to continued economic and p o l i t i c a l  stagnation  V. ; AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN INDIA Myrdal bases any  hope he may  have f o r economic  development on e f f e c t i n g changes i n the These changes, long thwarted by the s t a t e , " perhaps o f the  exigencies  1  "soft-  effects  enhancing p o l i t i c a l development.  major problem c o n f r o n t i n g  i s the n e c e s s i t y  of the  p r o v i d e a c l u e to overcoming the  " s o f t - s t a t e " and The  agricultural sector.  of i n c r e a s i n g  the  a g r i c u l t u r a l sector  both the u t i l i z a t i o n  g r e a t l y u n d e r u t i l i z e d l a b o r f o r c e and  of  the p r o d u c t i v i t y  the of  141 those engaged i n a g r i c u l t u r e . great  hope on the  Although Myrdal  a p p l i c a t i o n of modern s c i e n t i f i c  places technology  142 and  a r e d i r e c t i o n of a g r i c u l t u r a l r e s e a r c h ,  and  a t t i t u d e s remain the major impediments to e f f e c t i n g highe  p r o d u c t i v i t y , better labor u t i l i z a t i o n mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n n a t i o n a l As we 1 4 0  See  and  institutions  enhancement of  development.  mentioned e a r l i e r , l a n d reform measures were note  69.  141 Myrdal, A s i a n Drama, I I , p. 1244. U n l i k e most Westerners, Myrdal r e j e c t s the n o t i o n that a g r i c u l t u r e i s " l a b o r - i n t e n s i v e " i n South A s i a . Rather low y i e l d s per acre r e f l e c t a " l a b o r - e x t e n s i v e " economy where the l a b o r input i s low i n terms of nam-hours and e f f i c i e n c y .  page  l a r g e l y f r u s t r a t e d i n the post-independence p e r i o d . i s o f t e n a t t r i b u t e d to the p o l i t i c a l pressure l a r g e landowners who and  However t h e i r i n f l u e n c e can be  of a p o l i t i c a l l y organized " i t must not be  lower c l a s s .  As Myrdal p o i n t s of b i g  have vetoed  radical  i t r e c e i v e d massive popular support.  emerge i n the a r t i c u l a t e s t r a t a on r a d i c a l The  low p l a c e d  anti-reform  bloc.  land  d i f f u s i o n of land ownership among the  urban upper c l a s s and the r u r a l e l i t e and  lack  to the nature of i n t e r e s t s i n v o l v e d , a consensus  reform p o l i c i e s .  high  political  exaggerated.  assumed that a handful  a g r a r i a n l e g i s l a t i o n had  d i d not  by  a t t r i b u t e d to the  landowners, however w e l l p l a c e d , c o u l d  Due  exerted  i n the r u l i n g  I n a c t i o n i n land reform must a l s o be  out,  This  e a r l y j o i n e d the n a t i o n a l i s t movements  t h e r e f o r e were w e l l represented  parties.  109  (here  i n c l u d i n g many  government o f f i c i a l s ) c r e a t e d  a powerful  Aththe v i l l a g e l e v e l i n f l u e n t i a l peasant  l a n d l o r d s opposed n e a r l y a l l types of land reform measures. The  r e s u l t was  that the  s t a t e r e l i e d on c o o p e r a t i o n  "community development" as a means of  and  rationalizing  agriculture. But as we saw e a r l i e r , s i n c e t h i s by-passed the e q u a l i t y i s s u e , benefits, o the e q u a l i t y i s s u e , b e n e f i t s accrued to the upper s t r a t a i n the v i l l a g e s not the "cooperative"  lower c l a s s e s .  institutions  --and  given f o r t h e i r "development --had 1 4 2  I b i d . , I I , pp.  1251-1301  1 4 3  I b i d . , I I , p.  1303.  Therefore  the government the net  the subsidies  e f f e c t of c r e a t i n g  page more,  not  less,  inequality.  I t w o u l d seem t h a t  the  community  development  p r o g r a m s w e r e doomed f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g . the  ideological  or "panchayat with a basic consistent  F o r one  p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r l y i n g community  r a j " presupposed  that  harmony o f i n t e r e s t s  w i t h Ghandhi's concept  the v i l l a g e  of v i l l a g e  C o n f l i c t n o t harmony i s  between  and s o c i a l  the economic  interests  i n the v i l l a g e  institute  l a n d reforms  frustrated  services group,  heirarchy plus  the very  other  reforms.  benefitting  enhanced the  state  the very  a i d was  attempt  p a t t e r n has had t h e e f f e c t  1  1  reasons  of to for  the  4 4  community  development  extension  forthcoming  landlord  for  l a n d l o r d s became  through this  less  r e d i s t r i b u t e d to the to  was  follow a  poor.  socialist more  14g have a i d e d t h e b e t t e r - o f f s  the p o l i t i c a l consequence  4  Ibid.,  I I , pp.  4 5  Ibid.,  I I , p.  4  this  t h e norm  of making a g r i c u l t u r e  S i n c e t h e s e programs the p o o r ,  at  life,  Although  i d e a t h a t money c o u l d be o b t a i n e d  disposed to having t h e i r holdings  .. . . • capitalistic.  a unit  i n f l u e n t i a l peasant  R e a l i z i n g t h i s , peasant  In other words,  was  failure  Agricultural  m a i n l y the  m o d e r n i z a t i o n and t h a t purpose.  the  efforts.!  attempt  development  This clash  fundamental  o f community development Moreover,  has  groups.  are the  thing,  among i t s mambers.  and i s u n r e a l i s t i c .  failure  110  1343-44. 1345.  is  that  the  most  not  Page 1 1 1 o p p o r t u n e moment f o r a r a d i c a l l a n d r e d i s t r i b u t i o n may h a v e passed: Sweeping changes m i g h t p e r h a p s have been a c c o m p l i s h e d i n the r e v o l u t i o n a r y environment o f t h e immediate p o s t - w a r anand p o s t - i n d e p e n d e n c e y e a r s . But i f consent f o r a f u n d a m e n t a l change i n p r o p e r t y a n d t e n a n c y r i g h t s m i g h t . have b e e n won t h e n , i t i s n o t p o s s i b l e now. The p i e c e m e a l r e f o r m s t h a t have b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d have b o l s t e r e d t h e p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , and economic p o s i t i o n o f t h e r u r a l upper s t r a t a on w h i c h t h e p r e s e n t governments depend f o r drucial support. Not o n l y has t h e p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e o f t h i s group i n c r e a s e d , b u t i t s i n t e r e s t i n p e r p e t u a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s quo h a s b e e n e n h a n c e d . I t s stake i n t h e e x i s t i n g order i s , o f c o u r s e , shared by t h e m i d d l e and u p p e r s t r a t a o f t h e u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n , whose members o f t e n own l a n d . I n combination, these forces exert a strong pressure f o r conservatism i n regard to the agrarian s t r u c t u r e , however r a d i c a l t h e t o n e o f p o l i c y r e s o l u t i o n s and c e r t a i n l a w s . . . . P i e c e m e a l r e f o r m s h a v e t h u s dimmed t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r r a d i c a l r e f o r m i n a g r i c u l t u r e , d e s p i t e t h e d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n t h e s t a t u s o f t h e weaker members o f t h e r u r a l h i e r a r c h y a n d t h e r a p i d i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r members, b o t h a b s o l u t e l y a n d r e l a t i v e l y . 1 4 6 Therefore,  rejecting  r a d i c a l land r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f ,  c o n s o l i d a t i o n as p o l i t i c a l l y i n f e a s i b l e , 1 4 7 M y r d a l  advocates T AO  the development State  policies  of agriculture  on c a p i t a l i s t  l i n e s . ^°  i n i t i a t e d up t o now ( l a n d r e f o r m s ,  protection of tenants,  community development  legal  programs and  149  agricultural  extension  services)  p o s i t i o n o f t h e upper r u r a l progressive  peasant  have  strata,  landowners  strengthened the  and i n t h a t  and p r i v i l e g e d  group t h e tenants.  H o w e v e r , due t o t h e r a d i c a l t o n e o f p o l i t i c a l discussion,  the f u l l  from w i t h i n t h i s  potential for agricultural  latter  group has n o t y e t been  146 I b i d . , I I , p . 1367. 147 i b i d . ,  I I , p p . 1375-77.  . 14a ' I b i d , T 1  4  9  Ibid.,  improvement tapped. P . 1380.  I I , p p . 1323-56.  page  Uncertainty, p r e v a i l s w i t h respect state  action.  At the  to  anticipated  same t i m e , p r e s e n t  have b e e n d i s s i p a t e d i n an u n s u c c e s s f u l greater  equality.  discouragement  The r e s u l t  Since the  dictate of the  "soft-state"  abandoned the approach.  socialist  t h a t what  in  effect and o p t e d  required is  concentrating  fact  a retrenchment  quo.  should reduce  on s p e c i f i c  Currently status  state  state  of  that  his  does seem state  activity.  cannot t o l e r a t e Furthermore, take  the  call  society.  a genuinely passive  while  the  "guided  f o r t h and i n d u c e a m a j o r F o r one t h i n g , as  and p a r a s i t i c  owners:  Myrdal  development  landownership.  c a p i t a l i s t o p t i o n need not  to r e t a i n t h e i r l a n d ,  for  largely perpetuate  c a p i t a l i s t path of  away l a n d f r o m l a r g e  agent  activities  A "guided c a p i t a l i s m " rather than a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the points out,  its  evident  areas.  interventions  democracy"would however,  role  development.  R a t h e r t h a n a s s u m i n g a n a l l - e m b r a c i n g r o l e as t h e the  for  realities  our c o n c e p t i o n of the  does n o t mean l a i s s e z - f a i r e , i t  development,  been  and u n a b l e  I t w o u l d seem t h a t p o l i t i c a l  as t h e m a j o r a g e n t f o r  is  greater  has not  alternative  W h i l e M y r d a l makes much o f t h e alternative  promote  equality,  i s both u n w i l l i n g  t h a t we s h o u l d r e a d j u s t state  to  and r e w a r d e d .  r a d i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s , M y r d a l has  completely a liberal  has been l e s s  future efforts  attempt  and c y n i c i s m , w h i l e e f f i c i e n c y  suitably recognized  to pursue  state  112  necessarily  i t w o u l d m e r e l y mean  a b s e n t e e and u n p r o d u c t i v e  that  landowners  page  would have to g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e of t h e i r h o l d i n g s . per  se need not  the  e f f i c i e n c y and  Therefore l a r g e s c a l e land  be  regarded as an  113  production  ownership  evil.  Moreover, such an approach would s t r i p away the facade of " s o c i a l i s m " and and  " e q u a l i t y " that breeds  apathy among the poor and  progressive. would not  have any Any  adverse e f f e c t s of a c a p i t a l i s t  o f f s e t by  s t a t e p o l i c i e s r e s t r i c t i n g the  know i n the West the protecting  It was to p l a c e  state i s quite  In  importation  addition,  active in  agriculture.  s t a t e d e a r l i e r that the  heavy demands on the  of c i t i z e n s r e c e i v e  agriculture  ( i f i t were t o occur at a l l )  of unnecessary c a p i t a l - i n t e n s i v e equipment.  promoting and  state  responsibility for agricultural  such as l a b o r displacement  as we  the  Such a r e d i r e c t i o n does not mean the  development.  could be  i n s e c u r i t y among  cynicism  so few  " s o f t - s t a t e " i s unable  c i t i z e n s because the  benefits  great  from government.  T h e r e f o r e , besides g i v i n g p o s i t i v e encouragement to a g r i c u l t u r a l e n t r e p r e n e u r s , a p o l i c y of l i m i t e d land would i n c r e a s e an i n c e n t i v e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the  for greater  mass  productivity.  s t a t e while  capitalist reform supplying  From Myrdal's study  i t would appear that land i s a v a i l a b l e f o r a modest r e s e t t l e m e n t and  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l scheme. 1  escape completely from the  equality  50  We  issue.  It seems reasonable to conclude that the 1 5 0  I b i d . , I I , pp.  1261-72.  cannot  capitalist  page 114  a l t e r n a t i v e would a l s o enhance p o l i t i c a l another sense.  development i n  What i s needed i s e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p t o  organize the lower c l a s s e s to press f o r f u r t h e r e g a l i t a r i a n measures.  This leadership  capitalist  agriculturalists.  face s t i f f o p p o s i t i o n  c o u l d be p r o v i d e d  These a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  from the vested  T h e r e f o r e i t would  i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s t o organize the p o t e n t i a l p o l i t i c a l  power o f the lower c l a s s e s to f i g h t the entrenched and  will  i n t e r e s t s that have  f o r so long perpetuated the s t a t u s quo. be  by the  inertia  r e s i s t a n c e o f the upper s t r a t a . In a l a t e r p e r i o d  i t i s conceivable  c l a s s e s w i l l generate t h e i r own l e a d e r s h i p  t h a t the l a b o r i n g cadre.  The r e s u l t  of the c o n f l i c t between these organized i n t e r e s t s might then be  a dynamic t h a t leads  to f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l  an escape from the d e b i l i t a t i n g  features  development and  o f the " s o f t - s t a t e . "  For Westerners, i t i s p e r f e c t l y reasonable t o hope that t h i s development w i l l be i n the d i r e c t i o n o f the modern democratic w e l f a r e s t a t e . conclusion, not  f u r t h e r i n the  so much depends on s e l e c t i v e s t a t e retrenchment  s t a t e expansion.  achieve given ideology  Y e t , as we d i s c u s s  Undoubtedly t h i s would be d i f f i c u l t t o  the vested  i n t e r e s t s o f the bureaucracy, the  o f the a r t i c u l a t e s t r a t a , and the b e n e f i t s o f the  s t a t u s quo t o o l i g o p o l i s t business and o l i g a r c h i c a l groups. However so much remains t o be done and so l i t t l e  has been  accomplished that we must r e t a i n a r a t i o n a l i s t f a i t h other a l t e r n a t i v e s w i l l not be completely  rejected.  that  page 115  W.  CONCLUSION Our  conclusion  i s l e s s a summation o f what has been  s a i d e a r l i e r than a p l e a f o r a r e d i r e c t i o n o f t h i n k i n g  vis-  a - v i s the r o l e o f the s t a t e . As we saw i n Part  I, the strong  s t a t e , i n e f f e c t an  " o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e , " had i t s b a s i s i n the l i b e r a l interlude of l i m i t e d state a c t i v i t i e s .  Within  i t s sphere  of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the s t a t e was r e q u i r e d t o be e f f i c i e n t , competent and i n c o r r u p t . Under the impact of harsh e x t e r n a l and i n t e r n a l f o r c e s the s t a t e g r a d u a l l y assumed the r o l e o f umpire between competing organized structure.  i n t e r e s t s i n the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  infra-  While the o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t a t e i s h e a v i l y  dependent on balanced i n t e r e s t groups, i n t e n s e  citizen  p a r t i c i p a t i o n and a high degree o f s e l f - r e s t r a i n t which i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l  - - a l l of  and not guaranteed --the s t a t e has  i n c r e a s i n g l y secured i t s p s y c h o l o g i c a l moorings and i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s to e f f e c t broad r e d i s t r i b u t i o n a l reforms culminating  i n the welfare  state.  Through the o p e r a t i o n o f  the e q u a l i t y i d e a l , the s t a t e i s able t o p l a c e  tremendous  demands on the c i t i z e n s p r e c i s e l y because the c i t i z e n s r e c e i v e t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t s from s t a t e  actions.  However when we: come t o the underdeveloped world, we do not f i n d the s t r o n g , capable, e f f e c t i v e and e f f i c i e n t  Page s t a t e but the  "soft-state."  The  state i s required  116  to e f f e c t  massive s o c i e t a l changes, to be the engine of development, when i t i s i n f a c t not responsibilities. the  capable of d i s c h a r g i n g  Under the e x i g e n c i e s  i d e o l o g i e s of p l a n n i n g ,  i n a d i s t o r t e d and  twisted  its  o f the " s o f t - s t a t e "  s o c i a l i s m , and  democracy emerge  form.  I f anything i s the hallmark of the " s o f t - s t a t e " i t i s not  i t s low  e l i t e s voice  s o c i a l d i s c i p l i n e but  e g a l i t a r i a n d e s i r e s but  implementation; because there conception of who  frustrate their  i s a vague and  shifting  should l e a d development, s t a t e  both encourage and the  r a t h e r i t s ambivalence;  hamper p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e .  controls  The  "ambivalent s t a t e " i s p o l i t i c a l , economic and  r e s u l t of social,  stagnation. However, as our b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of land sought to demonstrate, there confusing  and  reform  i s an a l t e r n a t i v e to  d e b i l i t a t i n g features  the  of t h e " s o f t - s t a t e , "  namely, a commitment to f o l l o w a c l e a r path of  capitalist  development.  adoption of  the  Above a l l ' e l s e , t h i s e n t a i l s the  l i b e r a l conception of the As we  pointed  out,  l i b e r a l i s m could not  the West once "economic man" wrongly assumed he --atomism and  already  s t a t e ' s r o l e i n development. function in  began to behave as the did.  The  theory  assumption of l i b e r a l i s m  a s t a t i c s o c i a l framework - - i m p l i e d  prevalence i n s o c i e t y of i n d i v i d u a l s who opposite  of the r a t i o n a l i s t "economic man"  theory.  People had  were the of the  the very liberal  to be t r a d i t i o n a l i s t i c , non-experimenting  page 117  n o n - r e f l e c t i n g , non-questioning, c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t s . p r e c i s e l y these t r a i t s state."  It i s  that g e n e r a l l y p r e v a i l i n the " s o f t -  T h e r e f o r e , while l i b e r a l i s m d i d not work i n the  West i t may f i n d a comfortable home i n the underdeveloped world or at l e a s t have a f i g h t i n g chance o f s u r v i v i n g i n t h i s more or l e s s h o s p i t a b l e Our two  discussion  reasons.  orientations  First,  envoronment.  of c o r r u p t i o n  i s pertinent  here f o r  i t i n d i c a t e s that the p s y c h o l o g i c a l  o f p r i v a t e gain  at p u b l i c expense f l o u r i s h and  t h r i v e both i n the s t a t e and i n the general s o c i e t y . they have the o p p o r t u n i t y people w i l l  If  seek t o enhance t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l p o s i t i o n p r e c i s e l y because t r a d i t i o n a l i s m has prevented the emergence o f a higher conception o f the p u b l i c interest. In t h i s sense, the behavior p a t t e r n s terms " c o r r u p t i o n "  that Myrdal  are so mainly because the laws are not i n  conformity w i t h the c u l t u r a l o r i e n t a t i o n .  For example, g i f t - ,  g i v i n g t o s t a t e o f f i c i a l s can only be c a l l e d " c o r r u p t i o n " i f both the doner and the r e c e i v e r have some common conception of the p u b l i c good. c l i e n t networks.  Likewise f o r the existence  of patron-,  In f a c t , however, a common c o n c e p t i o n o f  the p u b l i c good or the n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t does not e x i s t .  T h e r e f o r e , w h i l e the l i b e r a l harmony o f i n t e r e s t s d i d not spontaneously emerge but had t o be c r e a t e d  i n the West  through s t a t e p o l i c i e s , i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e that i n the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s . state p o l i c i e s f r u s t r a t e rather  i t w i l l emerge  In t h i s r e s p e c t ,  current  than f a c i l i t a t e the c r e a t i o n  page  of the p u b l i c good. development. Part  At the  I I , i n d i c a t e s that the  f o r the the  same time, they hamper  Secondly, a l l of what we  i t s f i e l d of o p e r a t i o n . state.  s t a t e has  have s a i d e a r l i e r i n  s t a t e should r e s t r i c t not  With respect  to " c o r r u p t i o n " ,  i t i s because  been expanding i t s a c t i v i t i e s at a f e v e r i s h  in corruption.  c a p a b i l i t i e s of the has  Meanwhile, as the  s t a t e are  intentions, reactionary of s t a g n a t i o n  or not  little  Since  i n g e n e r a l a l l the state  the  forces  structures.  been to undermine a l l reforms whether detriment of the upper  classes.  advocate s e l e c t i v e retrenchment of  a c t i v i t i e s f o r these a d d i t i o n a l reasons: f i r s t , encouraging c e r t a i n groups i n s o c i e t y progressive  and  i n announcing i t s e g a l i t a r i a n  groups and  they would be to the T h e r e f o r e we  resources  development.  have g r a v i t a t e d toward the  e f f e c t of t h i s has  a rapid  spread so t h i n l y , v e r y  been accomplished i n s e c u r i n g  a r t i c u l a t e s t r a t a i s vocal  The  expand  What i s needed i s a s e l e c t i v e r o l e  pace i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s t h a t Westerners p e r c e i v e increase  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s ) the  be  state  by  ( f o r example  s t a t e may  indiredtly establish countervailing  the  able  to  f o r c e s that could  in  t u r n d i r e c t l y c h a l l e n g e the power of v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s . e f f e c t , i n the  long-run t h i s would create  an  i f the  the  resources ( f i n a n c i a l  otherwise) that could be more f r u i t f u l l y Second: , through retrenchment of s t a t e 1  In  s t a t e were to encourage a c a p i t a l i s t  development i t would conserve scarce and  In  "organizational  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e " through "back-door" p o l i c i e s . interim,  118  deployed. activities  page those members o f the  articulate strata deriving benefit  from s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s would be t a l e n t s toward p r o d u c t i v e  f o r c e d to t u r n t h e i r many  enterprise.  No  be p o s s i b l e to have massive p l u n d e r i n g individual profit. would have to be  longer would i t  of the  This e s s e n t i a l l y passive  abandoned  state for i n occupation  i n f a v o r of the more l u c r a t i v e  opportunities  emerging i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r .  i t may  that businesses i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r  evolve  themselves e l i m i n a t e d e t r i m e n t a l search  119  Furthermore,  behavior p a t t e r n s  f o r g r e a t e r p r o d u c t i v i t y and  will as  they  profit.  It i s apparent that t h i s approach would g r e a t l y s a c r i f i c e the e g a l i t a r i a n i d e a l . operation  But  as we  i s l a r g e l y f r u s t r a t e d anyway.  complete abandonment may  not  our d i s c u s s i o n of c a p i t a l i s t l a b o r i n g c l a s s e s may organization.  have seen, i t s  Nevertheless i t s  be necessary.  For  example,  a g r i c u l t u r e suggested that  prove f e r t i l e ground f o r p o l i t i c a l  That i s , p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s may  well  achieve  a more dynamic r o l e . i n development r a t h e r than being preserves  of v e s t e d  to t h e i r own  interests.  i n t e r e s t s and  egalitarian policies.  Laborers could be  organized  to pressure  educated for  Yet  due  to the now  effective  f r a n c h i s e members pftfehiscdbass would have  to compromise some of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n p r e s e r v i n g status  the  A simultaneous o r g a n i z a t i o n might  occur among the upper c l a s s e s . enlargement of the  the  the  quo. Moreover what we  of s t a t e a c t i v i t i e s .  advocate i s s e l e c t i v e retrenchment  In other words the  s t a t e would  still  page 120 pursue e g a l i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s but would have a r a t h e r than a d i s p e r s i o n o f i t s : resources administrative over c a p i t a l i s t  competence. enterprises  i n the West even d u r i n g  concentration  o f money and  Besides having broad  regulations  (which as we have seen e x i s t e d  the l i b e r a l i n t e r l u d e ) and pursuing  p o l i c i e s that encourage r a t h e r than thwart p r i v a t e the s t a t e c o u l d devote much o f i t s energies educational  business,  t o r a i s i n g the  and h e a l t h requirements o f i t s c i t i z e n s .  Myrdal ably demonstrates i n A s i a n D r a m a , h e a l t h and e d u c a t i o n a l  151  As  lownnutfitional,  standards are a great o b s t a c l e t o  increased p r o d u c t i v i t y .  Moreover they d r a i n the s t r e n g t h  of the mass of poor w h i l e encouraging apathy and d i s i n t e r e s t in national a f f a i r s .  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the s t a t e and  n a t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n w i l l not be p o s s i b l e u n t i l the great masses o f poeple r e c e i v e t a n g i b l e b e n e f i t s from s t a t e I t i s o f course h i g h l y d o u b t f u l capitalist be  approach t o p o l i t i c a l  that the l i b e r a l - . ;  and economic development w i l l  adopted i n the underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s .  "planning," exert  activities.  Central  and " s o c i a l i s m , " i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e i r  state  failure,  a tremendous appeal to the "modernizing" e l i t e .  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