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Six perspectives on Finland's postwar relations with the Soviet Union Katona, Arthur 1972

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SIX PERSPECTIVES ON FINLAND'S. POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION by ARTHUR KATONA B.A. , University of Colorado, 1966 A THESIS >SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1972 In present ing th is •'"trie's is in part i a V ' f u l f'i'l merit o f the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ib ra ry sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I fu r ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representa t ives . tt is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of th is thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The Un ivers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date August 28, 1972 A b s t r a c t The purpose of t h i s t h e s i s i s to i n v e s t i g a t e F i n l a n d ' s postwar r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union from s i x d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s ( s y s t e n i c , s t r a t e g i c , domestic p o l i t i c a l , p e r s o n a l i t y , economic and c u l t u r a l ) i n order to (1) achieve a b e t t e r general understanding of t h i s unique s i t u a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and (2) make a systematic a n a l y s i s of the v a r i a b l e s which are most s a l i e n t i n d e s c r i b i n g and e x p l a i n i n g t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . The study i s approached mainly from the F i n n i s h p o i n t of view, although Soviet f a c t o r s and p e r s p e c t i v e s must o b v i o u s l y be i n c l u d e d , e s p e c i a l l y i n d i s c u s s i n g systemic and s t r a t e g i c v a r i a b l e s . I t i s hypothesized that the c r i t i c a l phase i n postwar F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s was the 1944-48 p e r i o d . Once Fi n l a n d ' s s t a t u s as a sovereign and independent b u f f e r - s t a t e was e s t a b l i s h e d , the development of her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Soviet Union can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by (1) her constant s t r i v i n g to widen her m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , and (2) the Soviet Union's i n c r e a s i n g l y l e n i e n t a t t i t u d e towards F i n l a n d as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n improved and as the Russians became more c e r t a i n of F i n l a n d ' s i n t e n t i o n to m a i n t a i n f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s and a c r e d i b l e n e u t r a l i t y . These developments are discussed i n the context of each of the s i x p e r s p e c t i v e s . The t h e s i s concludes w i t h an assessment of the r e l a t i v e importance of the p e r s p e c t i v e s i n a n a l y z i n g F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s and a d i s c u s s i o n of the r e l e v a n c e of the F i n n i s h model i n s t u d y i n g s m a l l power-great power r e l a t i o n s h i p s and n e u t r a l b u f f e r - s t a t e p o l i c i e s . i v Table of Contents I. Introduction 1 II. Historical Developments 13 A. 1944-48 13 B. 1949-56 21 C. 1957-61 28 D. 1962-present 34 E. Summary • • 43 III. The Systemic Perspective 45 A. The General International System and P o l i t i c a l Framework 45 B. Soviet Strategic Imperatives in Europe . .- . . 48 C. Finland's Role as a Neutral Buffer-State in European P o l i t i c s 57 IV. The Strategic Perspective 66 A. Soviet Strategic Imperatives in Northern Europe 66 B. Finnish Responses to the Strategic Conditions . 74 1. Neutrality Strategy 74 2. Nordic Strategy 77 3. Defense Strategy 82 V. The Domestic P o l i t i c a l Perspective 87 A. The Finnish P o l i t i c a l System 87 B. The Finnish Government 90 C. Finnish P o l i t i c a l Parties . . . 96 D. Domestic Po l i t i c s and Relations with the Soviet Union 103 V VI. The Personality Perspective 109 A. Decision-Makers and Personalities 109 B. Two Finnish Presidents 113 1. Juho Paasikivi • 113 2. Urho Kekkonen 116 C. Other Actors 120 1. Mannerheim 120 2. Stalin . . . . 120 3. Khrushchev 121 4. Kosygin-Brezhnev 122 VII. The Economic Perspective 124 A. The Finnish Economy 124 B. War Reparations and Reconstruction 129 C. Foreign Trade 133 1. Trends and Developments . 133 2. The Soviet Union 137 3. Economic Integration 142 4. Future Prospects 147 VIII. The Cultural Perspective 149 A. Finnish-Russian History 149 B. Some Aspects of Finnish Culture and Society . . 156 C. Finnish National Character 163 IX. Conclusion 167 A. The Multi-Perspective Approach 167 1. The Advantage of the Approach 167 2. An Assessment of Our Six Perspectives . . 170 B. The Finnish Model 173 v i Reference Footnotes .176 Bibliography 193 APPENDIX A 214 Lecture delivered at the International Press Association by Kalevi Sorsa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 14, 1972 APPENDIX B 220 Parliamentary Report on Finnish Defence APPENDIX C 225 Table I. Parliamentary Seats by Party, 1945-1972. Table II. Cabinets and their P o l i t i c a l Composition, 1944-1972. APPENDIX D 227 New Year's Address by the President of the Republic, January 1, 1972 APPENDIX E 230 Graph I. Finnish Imports from Six Leading Trade Partners, 1953-1971. Graph II. Finnish Exports to Six Leading Trade Partners, 1953-1971. Graph III. Finnish Imports from Trading Areas (EFTA, EEC, Eastern Bloc), 1960-1971. Graph IV. Finnish Exports to Trading Areas (EFTA, EEC, Eastern Bloc), 1960-1971. APPENDIX F 234 Table III. Finnish Foreign Trade by Main Product Group, 1971. Table IV. Finnish Foreign Trade by Countries and Trading Blocs, 1970-1971. This thesis is dedicated to my wife Raila as an expression of my deep respect for her homeland Lodged in the cold northeastern corner of Europe, i t i s far removed from the mainstream of world aff a i r s , yet i t is peculiarly affected by the slightest changes in the p o l i t i c a l and economic policies of the great powers. It i s the least advanced of the Scandinavian welfare states, yet i t hums with prosperity and enjoys one of the ten best standards of l i v i n g in the world. Above a l l , i t is a stubborn, individualistic, indomitable, res i l i e n t , resourceful and courageous nation, magnificent in i t s loneliness. Donald Connery The Scandinavians I. Introduction Finland's relations with the Soviet Union are unique in postwar international p o l i t i c s . The Republic of Finland is the only European country having a considerable land frontier with the Soviet Union in which the latter has tolerated a Western parliamentary democracy and a mixed capitalist economy. Despite Finland's physical vulnerability, she has successfully preserved her sovereignty and independence, and the Soviets have even supported and encouraged her policy of neutrality in conflicts between the Great Powers. In contrast with her East European neighbors, Finland today presents the image of a prosperous Scandinavian country whose citizens enjoy the l i b e r a l freedoms and rights so highly valued in Western society. While few observers question the existence and strength of Western social, p o l i t i c a l and economic values and institutions in Finland, there is some controversy over how much independence and neutrality she really enjoys vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Several 2 writers feel that Finnish neutrality is too controlled to be credible, that her independence rests fragily on Soviet whims, and that her internal p o l i t i c a l l i f e i s constrained and limited."'' These arguments are repeated with various inferences about the "feudal" nature of Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. However, the majority of authors do not view the situation so pessimistically. Some, for example, believe that while Finland is allowed complete control over her internal p o l i t i c s , the simple imperatives of geography place her within the Soviet sphere of interest in the "classical nineteenth century way," i.e., she i s limited in her total foreign policy by the need to maintain good 2 relations with the Soviet Union. Others point out that while Finland now enjoys considerable latitude in her external and especially her internal a f f a i r s , the Soviets are able to penetrate and influence Finnish a c t i v i t i e s in several key issue-areas closely related to Soviet defense interests; Finnish policy has thus been to eliminate contro-3 versy in these sensitive areas. And many authors, certainly the Finns themselves, feel that Finnish freedom, independence and neutrality are established facts, and that while they are based on the cooperation and understanding of the Soviet Union, Finland's advantageous situation w i l l not change as long as she continues to recognize the Soviets' legitimate defense interests in Northern Europe. They point out, furthermore, that such recognition does not imply ideological, p o l i t i c a l or economic subordination, and that since 1948 a l l Finnish decisions 3 regarding Soviet affa i r s have been made by the Finns themselves, 4 rather than having been imposed from outside. The more negative assessments of the Finnish situation have apparently been written in reaction to incidents where the Soviets have made their influence f e l t in Finland, or are based on r i g i d views of the Soviet Union as an inherently aggressive, disruptive and expansionist power. But Finnish-Soviet relations have been remarkably calm during the last ten years—with no serious Soviet influence or pressure— despite p o l i t i c a l and economic crises within Finland herself. The situation i s now quite stable in Northern Europe. A l l major powers have recognized Finland's neutrality."* And her unique situation seems to have acquired a degree of permanency in Soviet eyes that would belie any sceptical observations or pessimistic predictions. The abundant literature available in English also reinforces the image of Finland as an independent neutral: (1) studies on pluralism in the Finnish 6 7 8 p o l i t i c a l system, on Finnish democracy, on Finnish elections, on 9 10 the dwindling importance of the Communist Party, on foreign policy, 11 12 on neutrality, on voting patterns in the United Nations, and on 13 economic and trade relations; (2) statements and observations by 14 Finnish and Soviet p o l i t i c a l leaders and analysts; and (3) the many non-political but informative travel documentaries and impressionistic descriptions.^ As Tbrnudd notes, "It may be said that Finland i s the only European state to have achieved the situation envisaged 4 by the Western powers during World War II, when they recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet desire to have friendly neighbours while stressing that these states should be democratically governed.""'"^ Of course, the situation was not always as clear-cut as i t appears today. In the immediate post-World War II years, defeated Finland faced a d i f f i c u l t future at the hands of her Soviet victors. The c r i t i c a l phase in postwar Finnish-Soviet relations was the 1944-48 period. From the day the Moscow Armistice was signed in September 1944, ending the Continuation War between the two countries, to 1948, when the Treaty of Friendship was signed in April and the Communists were successfully excluded from the Finnish Cabinet in July without strong Russian protest, few observers could predict with certainty in what direction Finnish-Soviet relations would move. Since that time, the development of these relations has not been completely smooth and c r i s i s free. But once Finland's postwar status as a sover-eign and independent buffer-state was established, the basic trend became a gradual but constant improvement in Finland's position. ..Amidst a l l the confusion of postwar developments, Finnish relations with the Soviet Union have followed two basic lines: (1) convincing the Soviets of Finland's friendly intentions and her desire to remain out of Great Power disputes, and (2) attempting to achieve greater latitude and maneuverability in her internal and especially external p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e . At the same time, the Soviet Union's attitude can be characterized by an increasing leniency towards 5 Finland as the international situation has improved and as the Russians have become more certain of Finland's a b i l i t y to maintain friendly relations and a credible neutrality. The authors who have investigated these developments, in searching for explanations and causal relationships, have posited various factors and variables as being the salient determinants of Finnish-Soviet relations. Some writers, for example, have tended to emphasize the interrelation of nation-states on the European continent—or in the Nordic region—as determinants of Finland's present situation; they have emphasized the course of the Cold War, the postwar European balance of power, or the strategic interplay between North European countries.^ 7 Others have tended to place emphasis on Finnish national or internal factors as being prime determinants of Finnish-Soviet relations; they have noted how the Finns themselves—through their domestic p o l i t i c a l institutions and foreign policy diplomacy—have been able to direct 18 the fate of their nation. But in general, the determinant variables posited in the literature have been used in a rather unsystematic fashion. A disjointed "thicket of theories" about causal relationships has thus grown up which seems to prevent us from having a clear, overall view 19 of the situation. It would seem possible, however, to group these disparate sets of variables and determining factors into what might be termed conceptual categories, or perspectives, in which related variables are organized, 6 discussed and analyzed. The purpose of this thesis i s to use six such perspectives in an investigation of Finnish-Soviet relations in order to (a) achieve a better understanding of this unique situation in international p o l i t i c s , and (b) make a systematic analysis of the variables which are most salient in describing and explaining this relationship. The six perspectives are: (1) the systemic, (2) the strategic, (3) the domestic p o l i t i c a l , (4) the personality, (5) the economic, and (6) the cultural.* They have been consistently— although unsystematically and often unexplicitly—posited throughout the literature as the most important in Finnish-Soviet relations; in this thesis I have organized them as follows: (1) The Systemic Perspective. In this "world p o l i t i c s " perspective, postwar Finnish relations with the Soviet Union are placed in the context of the global arrangement of interacting nations, the inter-national system—providing a picture of the general political.framework in which Finland has had to operate. *The bureaucratic perspective, put in vogue by writers such as Allison, i s not used in this thesis.20 while such a perspective could conceivably include important and interesting f a c t o r s — focusing as i t would on Finnish foreign policy as the output of competition among bureaucracies and standard operating procedures within bureaucracies—there i s at present a scarcity of source material in English. • 7 The interrelation between nations within the system, especially between the Great Powers, i s discussed, and Finland's situation is analyzed as part of general Cold War developments. In particular, Finnish-Soviet relations are placed within the context of postwar developments in the European sub-system. Soviet domestic p o l i t i c s , foreign relations and strategic imperatives in Europe are also investigated as determinants of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union. Finally, the concept of Finland as a neutral buffer-state in European p o l i t i c s is discussed. This section treats Finland's position as (1) part of a cordon sanitaire of European countries around the Soviet Union, set up by the Russians after World War II as a protective shield to absorb the f i r s t blows of a possible land-based attack from the West; (2) part of a neutral zone, along with Sweden,physically separating the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs—serving as a military barrier and thereby helping prevent f r i c t i o n ; and (3) part of what I term the " p o l i t i c a l buffer-state" role of many nonaligned countries which, through the sponsorship of programs of peaceful coexistence, mediation and 8 negotiations between opposing military blocs, can help modify or lessen the p o l i t i c a l impact of confrontation or competition between the Great Powers. (2) The Strategic Perspective. In this perspec-tive, Finnish-Soviet relations are placed within the context of strategic imperatives in the North European regional sub-system. The security and status within this region of Russia, Finland and the other Nordic countries are emphasized as determinants of Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. As in the systemic perspective, Finnish domestic influences are abstracted from consideration here. The nation and a l l i t s groups and individuals are c o l -lapsed into a unitary actor which calculates foreign policy in regard to external conditions. Unlike the previous perspective, however, our strategic perspective emphasizes the security and status of Finland and her neighbors in the North European context—stressing the p o l i t i c a l , diplomatic and military relationships within this area and discussing the balance of power between Nordic countries and the Soviet Union. In this l i g h t , Russian strategic imperatives in Northern Europe are f i r s t analyzed as determinants of 9 postwar Finnish-Soviet relations; for example, the controversy over Soviet offensive or defensive intentions is discussed. Secondly, Finnish responses to the strategic situation are investigated: i.e., Finland's neutrality as a strategy for maintaining independence; her policies for remaining an essential part of the Nordic strategic balance; and the defensive military plans designed to maintain her sovereignty and the c r e d i b i l i t y of her neutrality. (3) The Domestic P o l i t i c a l Perspective. This perspective emphasizes the Finnish domestic p o l i t i c a l system, form of government and p o l i t i c a l parties as determinants of Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Unlike the two previous perspectives, the variables here are of an internal nature. For example, the strength of Western constitutionality in Finland, the organization of Finnish foreign policy decision-making, and the influence of the country's partisan party p o l i t i c s are discussed. In addition, Soviet influence on Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s i s analyzed as a factor in the relations between the two countries. (4) The Personality Perspective. Two main factors 10 are emphasized in this perspective: (a) the key role of high-level personal diplomacy in Finnish-Soviet relations, and (b) the importance of the two postwar Finnish presidents—as well as several other Finnish and Soviet l e a d e r s — i n determining the tone of relations between the two countries. Because of the relatively limited scope of this thesis and the paucity of biographical material on Finnish decision-makers in English, our personality perspective does not include a study of the psychological structures or cognitive processes of the leaders in question. There is no extensive biographical information or opera-tional-code study. Instead, we limit our investigation to the " p o l i t i c a l personalities" of various decision-makers as they relate to Finnish-Soviet relations; that i s , we discuss aspects of their p o l i t i c a l backgrounds and philosophies which seem to make them important individual determinants of these relations. Above a l l , our perspective emphasizes the attitudes of the Finnish presidents towards the Soviet Union, and the effect of these attitudes on their a b i l i t y to deal with Russian leaders and influence Finland's postwar developments. (4) The Economic Perspective. This perspective emphasizes economic factors as determinants of Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Finland's economic 11 system and framework are discussed, her postwar recovery i s investigated, and the present state of her economy is evaluated. The importance to the Finnish economy of foreign trade forms the main body of this perspective. In this context, we study the effect of Finnish-Soviet relations on Finland's trading patterns, as well as the specific question of economic and trade relations between the two countries. Finally, we review Finland's relationship to Western economic integration. C6) The Cultural Perspective. This perspective emphasizes such factors as Finnish-Russian history and the Finnish national character as determinants of Finland's postwar relations with the Soviet Union. Several other aspects of Finnish culture and society are also b r i e f l y investigated, such as the effect of Finland's Western cultural orientation on relations with Russia, and the role of the country's newspapers in the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s . The multi-perspective study i s preceded by a review of the his t o r i c a l developments since World War II. The thesis concludes with a summarization of our multi-perspective approach; an assessment of the relative importance of the different perspectives in analyzing 12 Finnish Soviet relations; and a discussion of the relevance of applying the Finnish model to studies of small power-great power relationships and neutral buffer-state policies. \ IT. Historical Developments A. 1944-1948 The Moscow Armistice, signed in September 1944, ended the so-called Russo-Finnish Continuation War, which had begun soon after Germany's Barbarossa invasion. It was a curious war. It was t a c i t l y assumed—even by the Soviet Union—that Finland was a "co-belligerent," not an ally,of Germany.''" Her war aims were limited to the recovery of territory she had lost during the 1939-40 Winter War, which had been fought partly because of her refusal to cede strategic areas near Leningrad to the Soviets. And she had no quarrel with Russia's a l l i e s , although she was technically at war with Great Britain. With Soviet troops engaged against the Germans, Finland soon regained control over the Karelian Isthmus, but wisely refused to take part in other Nazi operations such as the destruction of Leningrad. The Finnish Army settled down to a cautious three-year holding operation. 14 After Stalingrad, the Finns saw which way the wind was blowing, and started putting out peace feelers. They had never been on very amicable terms with Germany (in part because of Hitler's internal policies); and there was now a growing feeling that Finland's fate depended on some sort of accommodation with the Russians. In June 1944 the Soviets attacked along the Karelian frontier and penetrated approximately as far as during the Winter War, where they were temporarily stopped by the hard-fighting Finnish Army. Finland sued for peace. The Soviet Union, preoccupied with the Germans to the south, was only too glad to avoid a costly invasion. The Armistice was signed in September. The Red Army moved no further into Finnish territory, and Finland became one of the few European nations involved in the Second World War to avert a foreign occupation. Finland emerged from the War a crippled but s t i l l independent nation. However, the terms of the Armistice were particularly d i f f i c u l t , presenting four major problems whose solution was essential but at times doubtful: (1) The Finns were required to expel the 200,000 German troops stationed in northern Finland. After bloody fighting the Germans were driven out in April 1945, but they completely ravaged Finnish Lapland in their retreat. (2) The Russians annexed Petsamo province, thus cutting off Finnish access to the Arctic Ocean; they annexed the Karelian Isthmus— 15 one-tenth of total Finnish territory, including Vyborg (Viipuri, the second largest city) and 13 per cent of the country's national wealth; and they took over and f o r t i f i e d the naval base at Porkkala, only 2 several miles west of Helsinki. (3) Finland was required to pay reparations in kind to the amount of 300 million 1938 dollars; two-thirds of the payment was to consist of ships and machinery for which Finland had no existing industrial capacity. This had to be done in the face of a war-wrecked economy, a demolished Lapland, and a re-settlement problem involving some 443,000 Finnish refugees (10 per cent of the population) from Karelia. 3 (4) The most formidable problem was the p o l i t i c a l task of setting up a government which would not only be friendly to the Soviet Union, but would seem so in Soviet eyes. Finnish independence depended on the success of this venture. To this end, President Ris.to Ryti resigned shortly before the Armistice, and in his place Parliament elected Marshal Karl Gustaf Mannerheim, the conservative Army Commander who had nevertheless advocated accommodation with the Soviets in the late 1930s. In November, Juho Paasikivi became Prime Minister and formed a new caretaker Government. Paasikivi was one of the outstanding figures in postwar Finnish-Soviet relations; although a conservative anti-communist, he had for decades favored a conciliatory attitude toward the Russians, and was trusted by them. In 1944, he advocated a policy of friendly relations with the Soviet Union, but not to the 16 point of sacrificing Finland's freedom. One of the conditions of the Armistice was the legalization of the Finnish Communist Party. To bolster their strength, the Communists combined with dissident l e f t i s t members of the bourgeois-oriented Social Democrats to form the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL). In the March 1945 parliamentary elections, held without interference from the Soviet Union, the SKDL won 49 seats out of 200. Their strong showing in a country recently at war with Russia can be partly explained by the fact that the SKDL represented the only l e f t i s t p o l i t i c a l expression of the Finnish workers movement. As a result of the elections, three Communists, including Minister of the ** v Interior YrjB Leino, were included in the new Cabinet. The Social Democrats, while appealing to workers' interests, had developed a bourgeois orientation in the 1930s. Other factors involved in the SKDL's relatively strong showing w i l l be discussed in the chapter on domestic p o l i t i c s . * * To c l a r i f y any future misunderstandings, i t should be noted that Finnish parliamentary elections are normally held every four years, and the presidential election is held every six years. The two elections are thus separate p o l i t i c a l happenings. The Parliament is chosen through direct regional voting. The President is chosen by an electoral college system. The President selects a Prime Minister from among the Members of Parliament, and the Prime Minister in his turn forms a Cabinet. Due to the Finnish multi-party system (there were 8 parties in the January 1972 elections), the Cabinet is usually a coalition of some kind, reflecting .political strengths in Parliament. In case of a p o l i t i c a l impasse in the Government, which occurs rather frequently, the President may dismiss the Cabinet, appoint a new Prime Minister, or dissolve Parliament in an extreme case and order new elections. Although the Cabinet contains a Foreign Minister, the President is directly responsible for the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s . This places Finland's foreign relations partially outside partisan p o l i t i c a l i n -fighting, and also gives the President great power in international situations. 17 Early in 1946, Mannerheim resigned from the Presidency due to i l l health, and Parliament elected Paasikivi in his place. The new President appointed as Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala, a non-Communist member of the SKDL, and along with Leino and four other SKDL men, the 18-member Cabinet had a definite pro-Communist tinge. The now "classic" pattern of Communist domination in Eastern Europe seemed to be slowly developing in Finland. Old-line Finnish Communists were returning from exile in Moscow; the reorganized State Police was being molded into a Communist-controlled force; and many of the p o l i t i c a l strings in Helsinki were being pulled by the A l l i e d (Soviet) Control Commission, headed by Andrei Zhdanov. To many observors, i t seemed that the Soviets were bent upon sabotaging Finland's economic efforts in an attempt to sow internal disruption. The war reparations, already a heavy burden for a country struggling to feed and clothe i t s e l f , were s t r i c t l y controlled: delay fines on scheduled reparation deliveries were rigorously imposed, and quality specifications became unreasonably r i g i d . In addition, the Finns were obliged to comply with the humiliating demands of the Control Commission: wartime leaders were tried in Finnish courts for "war crimes" and sentenced to five and ten-year prison terms, and anti-Soviet or fascist-tinged politicians were requested to remove themselves from the Finnish p o l i t i c a l scene in the interest of "national security." But by 1947, despite much ominous foreboding, the situation 18 seemed to have changed in democratic Finland's favor. In February, the Peace Treaty between Finland and the A l l i e d and Associated Powers was signed in Paris, and after i t was r a t i f i e d by Moscow in September, the Control Commission became defunct. The p o l i t i c a l scene was relatively stable and quiet, relations with the Soviet Union were better, and reparation deliveries were proceeding f a i r l y well under more relaxed controls. Most significantly, the SKDL lost heavily in the December municipal elections."* Popular Communist support was waning, and i t was becoming apparent that the only r e a l i s t i c possibility for Communist consolidation would be through Soviet invasion or a coup from above. But this was indeed a danger. We have noted how the SKDL held key posts in the Government and the State Police (tut not the regular police forces or the Army). And 20,000 Soviet troops were stationed at the Porkkala naval base.^ 1948 was to be the pivotal year. In February, just one week after the coup in Czechoslovakia, Stalin sent Paasikivi an ominous note v i r t u a l l y commanding him to negotiate a military treaty along the lines of the Hungarian and Rumanian mutual defense treaties. This was a clear hint of impending disaster, and i t was not the only indication. General Savonenkov, who was known to favor the communization of Finland, returned to Helsinki as Soviet Minister. 7 Hertta Kuusinen, old-guard Communist Otto Kuusinen's daughter and Leino's wife, declared publicly in March that "the role *8 of Czechoslovakia is the role for us." And in mid-March the * Otto Kuusinen, who lived most of his l i f e in exile in the Soviet Union, had led an abortive Finnish provisionary government in Karelia during the Winter War. He later became a member of the Soviet Presidium. 19 Communists stepped up their heretofore low-key pressure on the government through violent street demonstrations and occupation of non-9 Communist newspaper offices. It i s not known to this day whether the Communists actually planned to stage a coup in March. It i s known, however, that at a crucial point, on March 19, Leino secretly visited General Aarno Sihvo, the Finnish Army Commander, and advised him of a forthcoming campaign of violence. Strong security measures were immediately taken: army garrisons were secured, State Police arsenals were taken over, and tank units were moved up to Helsinki. The possibility of a forced coup from within was eliminated. "^ Meanwhile, the Finnish negotiating team was preparing to leave for Moscow. Many thought the hour of Soviet expansion had come. Parliament would not freely accept a military pact, and the negotiators were preparing themselves for tough talks. Their chief purpose was to limit Finland's commitments to the basic minimum required to remove Russia's historic fear of a northern attack through Finland, and to avoid any military alignment. Soviet intransigence would probably mean disaster. However, the Russians made an apparent volte-face. The Finns found the Soviet leadership quite responsive and even understanding. The treaty that ensued, far from being a military pact, was based on Finnish proposals and a Finnish draft. The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed on April 6th, effectively ended the c r i s i s in Finland. It differs greatly from other East European treaties. Its military terms are precise and limited, placing Finland under the obligation to defend only herself should 20 Finland—or the Soviet Union through Finland—become the object of an aggression by Germany or any state a l l i e d with Germany. If Soviet assistance i s ever required, i t can be given only with the agreement of both parties. And the preamble expressly recognizes Finland's desire to keep out of "contradictions of interest" between the Great Powers.^ The treaty is not a document of alignment or mutual defense. And in Soviet eyes, i t became accepted as the guarantee of Finland's 12 neutrality and independence. This agreement seemed to banish many ambiguities with regard to Soviet intentions in Finland. The Soviet Government appeared satisfied with having secured i t s defensive interests on the northwest frontier behind the Finnish buffer-state, and i t did not press for any ideological concessions. This attitude was further demonstrated in the denouement of the domestic c r i s i s . In May, Interior Minister Leino was accused of irregularities in several 1945 deportation cases, was censured by Parliament, and dismissed by President Paasikivi. Deprived of the Ministry of the Interior and the State Police, the Communists attempted a general strike through their rank and f i l e labor organizations. It failed. There seemed to be no mass revolutionary following. Far from being upset over this turn of events, the Soviet Union in June cancelled half of the remaining war reparations, thus easing Finland's economic burden and freeing her goods for trade with 13 the West. In July, the SKDL lost 11 seats in the new parliamentary elections; the new Cabinet, excluding the SKDL, was formed under 21 Prime Minister Karl August Fagerholm, a Social Democrat. Although Moscow was opposed to Fagerholm's Government, no serious measures were taken to reinstate the Finnish Communists. The Soviets were unwilling to apply the strong pressures at their disposal, and they seemed to have accepted the basic status quo in "bourgeois" Finland. The p o l i t i c a l atmosphere had changed considerably by mid-1948. From a situation which seemed to be moving in a clas s i c a l Communist takeover pattern, the picture was altered to such an extent that radical l e f t i s t elements were excluded from the Government and other influential posts. This was indeed a dramatic turn of events. Finland was of course not free from the restrictions implicit in her situation; her reluctant refusal of Marshall Plan aid in August was ample evidence of t h i s . ^ But although Finnish-Soviet relations would be clouded over by subsequent incidents and mini-crises, Finland's basic status as a sovereign and independent buffer-state was now established. B. 1949-56 Fagerholm's minority Social Democratic Government soon attracted the enmity of both the Soviet leaders and the local Finnish Communists. The Prime Minister realized the necessity of maintaining an attitude of friendliness toward the Soviet Union, and repeated his assertions that Finnish-Soviet relations should conform to the s p i r i t and letter of the 1948 Treaty. But his independent actions, as well as the firm stand he took against the SKDL, resulted in strong Communist denunciation of his Government. He was c r i t i c i z e d for allowing his policies to be 22 dominated by the "ex-servicemen's junta" of Social Democrats who had fought in the War, and the Soviet press charged him with responsibility for the continued existence of ad hoc paramilitary counter-insurgency organizations which had sprung up after the War and s t i l l functioned under the guise of "hunting societies" and "shooting c l u b s . I n addition, Fagerholm released the last of the "war responsibles" from prison in May 1949, and also purged and later abolished the State Police. The Government's continued pressure on Finnish Communists s t i l l in i nfluential posts brought about strong retaliation, at f i r s t in the form of wild-cat work stoppages in late 1948. The labor unrest developed into full-scale strikes and local riots by mid-1949, and once again the Army was alerted for fear of a p o l i t i c a l coup. By September, however, the strikes lost their momentum, and the internal c r i s i s was over. The Finnish Communist Party was once again defeated by the lack of mass revolutionary fervor, the firm action taken by the authorities, and the reluctance of the Soviet Government to provide anything more tangible than propaganda support. On the international scene, Moscow accused Fagerholm of weakening Finland's relations with the Soviet Union when he attempted to increase contacts with Scandinavia and the West. In January 1949 the Soviets' distrust of Finnish intentions, plus the negotiations of Denmark and Norway for entry into NATO, caused many to fear that Moscow might invoke the "consultation clause" of the Treaty of 23 Friendship—thus seriously endangering Finland's nonaligned status. But these fears proved groundless, and the unease surrounding the international situation was dissipated at the same time the Communist-led strikes were broken. Nevertheless, the rhetoric in the Soviet and Finnish Communist press continued. The general deterioration of Finnish-Soviet relations was reflected in the criticisms levelled at Paasikivi himself during the February 1950 presidential election—despite the President's efforts to maintain Soviet confidence by staying aloof from the p o l i t i c a l unrest in his country. Paasikivi won the election by a sizable m a j o r i t y . I n accordance with parliamentary procedure, Fagerholm's Cabinet resigned. Paasikivi immediately called upon Dr. Urho Kekkonen, leader of the centrist Agrarian Party, to form a new Government. Kekkonen, who in subsequent years was to play a prominent role in Finnish-Soviet relations, was much more acceptable to the Russians. The new Prime Minister had not compromised himself in Soviet eyes during the War, and he was a p o l i t i c a l opponent of the Social Democrats. He had played a key role in the 1948 Treaty negotiations, and was closely identified with Paasikivi's foreign policy. Though Kekkonen led the comparatively conservative, anti-communist Agrarian Party, he f u l f i l l e d the basic requirements for getting along with the Russians. Kekkonen's minority Agrarian Government was beset with 24 internal economic and p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s , and he was soon forced to form a coalition Cabinet with the Social Democrats. A series of short-lived minority and caretaker Governments followed during the next six years, although Kekkonen and his supporters retained a dominant influence. Despite the frequent vacillations and changes of Cabinet, however, the Soviets seemed more and more satisfied that the Finns were intent upon maintaining good relations. Finnish foreign policy, after a l l , was in the hands of Paasikivi, who remained in over-all control of the domestic situation yet managed to stay aloof from partisan party squabbling. In addition, the Soviets were beginning to trust Kekkonen as much as they trusted the aging Finnish President. The f i r s t concrete evidence that the Russians were willing to do business with Kekkonen was the resumption in June 1950 of trade negotiations which had bogged down under Fagerholm; the ensuing agree-ments helped assure a commercial market for Finnish shipbuilding and heavy industry at a time when war reparation deliveries were almost completed. These agreements were re-negotiated in 1952 and 1954, to 18 Finland's economic advantage. The reparation payments themselves were completed in September 1952, and the celebration ceremonies demonstrated a new cordiality in Finnish-Soviet relations; once again the Finns had kept their word and paid their indemnity—thus earning the respect of the Soviet leaders.* x Finland had already acquired an international reputation as a conscientious debtor: she was the only country to repay her World War I debt to the United States. 25 Other indications marked the improvement of relations between the two countries: the Soviet press no longer attacked the Finnish Government, but limited i t s criticisms to the Social Democratic Party; in April 1951, General Savonenkov was withdrawn from service in 20 Helsinki, and was replaced by a career foreign service diplomat; Otto Kuusinen's duties in Moscow were relegated to a c t i v i t i e s unrelated 21 to Finland; the Russians made no protest when, in the July 1951 parliamentary elections, the SKDL slightly increased i t s strength but 22 was not included in Kekkonen's Cabinet; and in September 1954, 23 Paasikivi was awarded the Order of Lenin. At the same time, the Finns were steadily whittling away at the restrictions imposed upon them by postwar circumstances. In 1952, for instance, following a United States-Finland student exchange program, an agreement between 24 the two countries was made concerning Fulbright scholarships. After Stalin's death, there were even more tangible improvements. Up un t i l 1954, the Soviets had used their influence to restr i c t Finnish p o l i t i c a l and economic relations with the Western and Scandina-*25 vian countries. But with the emergence of Khrushchev and Bulgarin in the Kremlin, Finland was able to increase her foreign policy ventures As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Soviet pressure could come in many forms: the threat of invoking the "consultation clause"; the threat of sabotaging reparation payments or limiting trade relations; or the threat of diplomatic and p o l i t i c a l pressure on Finnish p o l i t i -cians perceived as being unfriendly to the Soviet Union, i.e.j the constant criticism of such politicians in the Soviet press, or the refusal to work with them or their associates diplomatically. 26 in the West. A case in point was her adherence to the Nordic Council. In 1951, when the Council was f i r s t formed, Finland had remained out by choice, fearing that membership might provoke the h o s t i l i t y of the Kremlin. In 1954 Soviet reaction to Finnish membership was s t i l l negative. But by 1956 i t was clear that the Soviet leaders had changed their minds, and in January Finland became a f u l l member. Since then, Finnish participation in Council a c t i v i t i e s and projects has not been opposed by the Russians. Finland's admission to the United Nations in December 1955 was also indicative of her improving situation. Although there was some opposition within the country to UN membership—due to fears that Finland might risk involvement in Great Power confrontations—she had been trying to join the organization for seven years. Her admission was part of a general Soviet-American agreement not to oppose each others' candidates for membership. And while her voting has since been cautious and neutral, her participation in UN peacekeeping forces and development assistance work has won her the respect of the 26 international community. In 1956, her membership certainly freed her from a relative state of diplomatic isolation. In September 1955, the world got the clearest evidence that in Soviet eyes Finland had become more valuable as an example of peaceful coexistence than as a s a t e l l i t e , and that the Finns had convinced the Soviet leaders of their desire to maintain friendly relations. An agreement was signed pledging the return of Porkkala 27 to Finland and the withdrawal of a l l Russian forces from the naval base by January 1956. In addition, to the satisfaction of both parties, the Treaty of Friendship was renewed for a twenty-year period. And in February, at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the Russians referred to Finland as a neutral country for the f i r s t time 27 in an o f f i c i a l statement. The return of Porkkala, although i t has been dismissed as a cheap gesture, had profound implications for Finland. In the f i r s t place, i t removed Helsinki from the strain of l i v i n g l i t e r a l l y under Soviet guns. P o l i t i c a l l y , i t lent support to Paasikivi's thesis that Soviet interests in Finland were defensive and that the best policy was a "prudent appeasement" of those interests. Finally, i t opened the way to international recognition of Finland's emerging 28 position as a European neutral. In March 1956 Kekkonen was elected President by a one-vote majority in the 300-member electoral college, thus assuring continuation 29 of what was becoming known as the "Paasikivi Line." Internal p o l i t i c a l and economic unrest followed Kekkonen's election and the installation of a new Fagerholm Cabinet: in March, 200,000 union members and 500,000 non-union workers l e f t their jobs in a three-week general strike, demanding either a rollback in food prices or a rise in wages. And the next few years would show that the Soviets had s t i l l not overcome their suspicions over bourgeois Finland's policy intentions. But before Paasikivi died in December 1956, he could look with 28 satisfaction at having led his country from a position of despair in 1944 to that of established independence, developing neutrality, and growing economic prosperity just twelve years later. C. 1957-61 In 1957, there were indications that Finnish-Soviet relations would continue to improve. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Finland in June—the f i r s t v i s i t of top Soviet leaders to the West since World War II. The speeches made during the week-long stay were f u l l of glowing references to Finnish neutrality and independence, and there were important trade and cultural agreements. Kekkonen's return v i s i t 30 in May 1958 was an equally cordial occasion. It was also becoming clear that Kekkonen intended to move beyond the Paasikivi Line and follow a more active policy of neutrality. While Paasikivi had been intent upon a relatively passive foreign policy, Kekkonen f e l t that Finland's position vis-a-vis Russia could be best enhanced by increasing commercial and p o l i t i c a l ties with both East and West, and by actively contributing to the establishment of an inter-31 national atmosphere of peace and coexistence. This desire to increase Finnish security through promoting the relaxation of international tension was to become more evident in the 1960s and 1970s— in such ventures as the SALT talks and the proposed European Conference on Security and Cooperation. But even in the mid-1950s, a new "Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line" was emerging, with schemes such as Kekkonen's 29 plan for a neutral Scandinavian nuclear-free zone. However, the years 1956-58 were marked by party disunity and a series of Cabinet crises, and these internal conflicts were to have serious repercussions for Finnish-Soviet relations, resulting in the "mini-crises" or "night frosts" of 1958 and 1961. Domestic economic questions forced the resignation of Fagerholm's coalition Government in April 1957. A number of caretaker Cabinets were unsuccessfully attempted, and the i n s t a b i l i t y of the multi-party system at this time was reminiscent of the similar situation in France. In the July 1958 general elections, the disunity of the non-Communist parties made i t possible for the SKDL to become the largest party in Parliament, with 32 50 seats out of 200. The other parties were shocked into an uneasy truce, and Fagerholm again attempted to form an Agrarian-Social Democratic Government—to the exclusion of the Communists. But the Social Democrats, under the leadership of their newly-elected chairman, VHinB Tanner, were unable to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union, and the situation deteriorated badly. Tanner, a bitter r i v a l of Kekkonen, was viewed with extreme distrust by Soviet leaders, who f e l t he was one of the politicians most responsible for Finnish policy during the war years. Moscow reacted unfavorably to the post-election s i t u a t i o n — not so much because the Communists were out of the Government, or because of the Social Democratic platform, but because the Soviets 30 suspected that certain Social Democratic leaders intended to change the course of Finland's foreign policy. Despite Finnish protestations to the contrary, a freeze set in affecting many aspects of Finnish-Soviet relations: the Soviet Ambassador was withdrawn, economic and trade negotiations were ended, a l l b i l a t e r a l talks were postponed, and so forth. At the same time, an ominous rise in tension over Berlin increased everybody's anxiety. The Finnish people were understandably divided over what to do. Many f e l t Finland should stubbornly assert her right to order her internal matters without outside interference. Others, including Kekkonen, f e l t that in order to preserve the Finnish way of l i f e i t was much more important to regain Soviet confidence in Finnish neutrality. Finally, the President's view prevailed. A new minority Agrarian Cabinet—excluding both the SKDL and the Social Democrats— was formed under Vieno Sukselainen in January 1959. A personal Khrushchev-Kekkonen talk in Leningrad broke the ice shortly thereafter, and economic and p o l i t i c a l relations were restored to normal. From the points of view of Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s , Soviet tactics, and international tension over Germany, the second incident of strained Finnish-Soviet relations was actually a continuation of the f i r s t . For the February 1962 presidential election, the Social Democrats, incensed by what they f e l t was Kekkonen's collusion with Khrushchev in order to monopolize power for himself, a l l i e d themselves with the Conservatives to promote the candidacy of Olavi Honka. They insisted 31 their aim was to put an end to a corrupt regime, not a foreign policy. But Moscow, regarding Kekkonen as the guarantor of status quo s t a b i l i t y in Finnish relations, was hostile—even though observers f e l t that Honka had l i t t l e chance of defeating the incumbent President. The Finnish election campaign was getting under way at a time of high East-West tension in 1961. The United States and the Soviet Union were headed for a showdown over Berlin. Rhetoric was inflamma-tory. Nuclear testing reached new highs on both sides. The Berlin Wall went up in August, and the Geneva disarmament talks broke off in September. Soviet fears of German aggression-real or imagined—were renewed in an ominous sense for the Finns. In October, while Kekkonen was on an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to the United States, he received a note from the Soviets requesting military consultation in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and in light of an increased German "threat" in the North. The consternation must have been great on the part of the Finns. Military talks with the Soviet Union would have put them right in the middle of the Cold War, and their neutrality would have been tainted no matter what the outcome of the discussions. Kekkonen was unperturbed, at least on the surface. He did not even cut short his American v i s i t . He f e l t that a l l the Soviets really wanted was assurance that nothing would disrupt the friendly relations between the two countries. In November he met with Khrushchev in Novosibirsk, and was able to convince him that military consultations 32 would be l i k e l y to cause concern and perhaps even NATO-sponsored military preparations in other Scandinavian countries; therefore, by abandoning the military talks the Soviet Union could not only best serve her security interests in the North, but could provide evidence of her desire to follow a peaceful coexistence policy. At the same time, Honka decided to give up his candidacy in the "national interest." It i s probably that both Honka's resignation and Kekkonen's diplomacy were v i t a l to Khrushchev's f i n a l decision to postpone the military discussions. The most important lesson in these two mini-crises was that Soviet penetration into Finnish domestic politics i s limited to two key interrelated issue-areas: Finland's general policy of neutrality and friendship with the Soviet Union, and the high-level composition of the Government that would assure the continuity of that policy. There was no attempt to impose the Communists on the Finnish people; the Russians were not promoting a change in Finland's internal situation, but were anxious to preserve the status quo. Their involvement in Finnish aff a i r s was defensive, not ideological. They simply did not believe in the Social Democrat's commitment to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Khrushchev obviously exploited the international situation to gain advantage in Finland, but i t is doubtful the Russians would have ever invaded the country. The most significant point, as Jakobson notes, i s that the Finnish debate over the extent foreign 33 policy (relations with the Soviets) should be taken into account in domestic matters (formation of the Government) was a free one; at a l l times the decision as to what course to follow was taken by the Finns *33 themselves, rather than being imposed by a foreign power. S t i l l , the 1958 and 1961 incidents were at least temporary set-backs in Finland's relations with the Soviet Union. Other develop-ments at this time, however, showed the adroitness of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line in improving Finnish-Soviet relations to Finland's advantage. A good example was her acceptance as an associate member of the European Free Trade Association in March 1961. Although Finland had adhered to the General Agreement on Trade and Tarrifs (GATT) from i t s inception, the Soviets had been opposed to further Finnish participation in Western economic integration, and distrusted EFTA as 34 a hostile trade bloc. The Soviet Union was also opposed to any economic arrangement which might threaten her most^favored nation agreement with Finland. For their part, EFTA members were reluctant to 35 permit the extension of their free trade benefits to the Russians. But Finnish leaders were able to convince the Russians that member-ship in EFTA was necessary to the Finnish economy and therefore to Finnish internal s t a b i l i t y , and that Finland's need to compete in the * True, the Finns were at times under the threat of strong sanctions by the Soviet Union. But as I discuss in the chapter on domestic P o l i t i c s , this does not mean that Finnish actions were ordered speci-f i c a l l y by Soviet leaders. The Finns s t i l l had a latitude of responses to the Russian pressures. 34 world market was not p o l i t i c a l l y incompatible with Finnish-Soviet friendship. In the economic realm, the two countries agreed to ignore the most-favored nation principle in li e u of a special t a r i f f arrange-ment. The Soviet Union was satisfied, EFTA members f e l t that the integrity of the free trade area had not been violated, and Finland 36 became an associate member of the organization. International recognition of Finland's unique position was established during Kekkonen's 1961 v i s i t s to Western countries. In May, Prime Minister Harold MacMillan expressed his "understanding of Finland's policy of neutrality." And in October, President John F. Kennedy stated that the United States would "scrupulously respect Finland's chosen course." A year later President de Gaulle made similar pronouncements. In Finland, where for twenty years people had suffered from a sense of isolation, such declarations created 37 "fresh self-confidence and faith in the future." D. 1962-present It has been suggested that in 1961 Kekkonen was "playing footsy" with the Russians, using the international situation to his own p o l i t i c a l advantage. But the Finns apparently approved of his actions. A greater proportion of the electorate than ever before (over 80 per cent) turned up at the presidential election in February 1962 to give Kekkonen a two-thirds majority. As Jakobson notes, 38 "It was an impressive demonstration of national solidarity." 35 Although the Finns were puzzled about the motives that led Khrushchev to demand military consultations, the general feeling in Helsinki was that the Russians simply wanted assurances that there would be no change in Finnish foreign policy at a time of high European tension. Once this assurance was given, and confirmed by the election, they were no 39 longer particularly interested in Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s . The lessons for the Finns were clear. Two conditions were necessary for Finnish security: (1) the elimination of Soviet percep-tions of ambiguity in Finnish foreign policy and the intentions of high-level Finnish government personnel, and (2) the maintenance of a stable, tension-free international climate in Europe. Since 1962, the Finns have worked toward these two goals. After relations were restored to normal, the Finnish Government continued to expand i t s degree of latitude in contacts with both the Soviet Union and the West. In September 1962, for example, an agreement was signed under which Finland would lease the Soviet-owned section of the Saimaa Canal, which connected Finland's interior lake system with the Gulf of Finland through the Karelian Isthmus. In January 1963, the Finns convinced the Soviets and the British that, under conditions of modern military technology, the defense of Finnish neutrality required a reinterpretation of the 1947 Peace Treaty; as a result of these negotiations, Finland was allowed to acquire air-to-air and ground-to-36 air defensive missiles, balancing her purchases between East and West. At a Nordic Council meeting in February 1964 the Finnish President continued to press his proposals for the "Kekkonen Plan"—a Scandinavian nonnuclear zone—but again without success. And in July of the same year Finland established diplomatic relations with the European Economic Community. However, the Finns continued to exercise caution in the com-position of their Cabinets. From January 1959 u n t i l May 1966, amidst frequent cabinet changes over domestic matters such as taxation and agriculture policy, the Governments were a l l non-Socialist and dominated by the Agrarians. The only Soviet pressure against a leading government o f f i c i a l during this time involved Sukselainen, who was the object of attacks by the Soviet press for having attended AAA meetings of Estonian refugees in the United States and Sweden in 1964. In the meantime, the Social Democrats were trying to get out of the p o l i t i c a l dead end in which they had been trapped. In June 1963, * As we shall see in the section on Finnish defense strategy, the country's defense forces are severely limited under the Treaty. AA The Agrarians changed their name to the Centre Party in October 1965. AAA Sukselainen's p o l i t i c a l eclipse had actually begun years before, during a 1961 domestic scandal involving the misuse of national pension funds, and his failure to be re-elected Agrarian Party chairman in 1964 cannot be solely attributed to Soviet influence. 37 after several election failures, Tanner and his supporters were dropped from the party's executive committee, and Rafael Paasio was named the new party chairman. Paasio, as events were to prove, was quite acceptable to the Soviet leaders; during several v i s i t s to the Soviet Union he made i t clear that he intended to follow the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, and the Russians soon adopted a less c r i t i c a l attitude toward his Party. In the parliamentary elections of March 1966, the Social Democrats led 40 a major swing to the Left, increasing their seats from 38 to 55. A new "popular front" coalition Government, headed by Paasio, was dominated by the Social Democrats and Centrists, and included three SKDL members for the f i r s t time since 1948. Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964 aroused uneasiness among the Finns, to whom the ex-Soviet leader was at least a known quantity. But a series of exchange v i s i t s between Kekkonen and Kosygin soon quieted Finnish apprehension. Paasio and Centrist Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen also cemented personal relationships with the Russian leaders after 1966. At the same time, Kekkonen was expanding his reciprocal v i s i t s with Western and Third World statesmen to a degree unthinkable in Paasikivi's time. He and other Finnish government representatives exchanged v i s i t s with many countries: the United States, Yugoslavia, the two Germanies, Egypt, Israel, and so forth. Finland also continued her active participation in United Nations a c t i v i t i e s : while maintaining her neutral voting posture, she contributed men and money to 38 peacekeeping and mediation efforts in Lebanon, Kashmir, Suez, Cyprus and Laos, and set up a stand-by armed force specially trained for UN missions; she was also a member of the Security Council in 1969-70. Despite frequent political-economic d i f f i c u l t i e s within the country, Finland was making rapid economic progress. By December 1967, when she celebrated her 50th anniversary of independence, she was 41 ranked 15th in per capita GNP—a far cry from her 1944 days. Through EFTA, her trade with the West had expanded appreciably, although a chronic balance of payments d e f i c i t forced her to devalue the Finnish markka by 31 per cent in October 1967; the devaluation was accompanied by r i g i d price, rent and wage controls supported by both labor and management, and i t s success further contributed to Finland's prosperity. In December the country announced that i t was joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the membership became 42 o f f i c i a l in January 1969. Finland's 50th anniversary celebrations were accompanied by glowing commemorative speeches by Kosygin and Brezhnev. The foreign press talked of the "Finnish miracle," and the Finns themselves exuded 43 pride in their role as a "bridge between East and West." These signs of good relations were followed by a series of more tangible improvements: Kekkonen's public announcement in January 1968 that negotiations had been going on for some time over the return of certain territories ceded to the Soviet Union in 1944; the o f f i c i a l opening of 39 the rebuilt and expanded Saimaa Canal in August; the signing of new trade agreements advantageous to Finland a year later; and the renewal of the Treaty of Friendship in July 1970 for another twenty years. In February 1968, Kekkonen was re-elected President for a third term. His candidacy had the active support of the Social Democrats, and he won by an overwhelming majority. The new Cabinet was essentially similar to Paasio's 1966 coalition, although he was replaced in the top spot by Mauno Koivisto,also a Social Democrat. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 caused some concern in Finland. The reaction of the Finnish Government was under-standably mild, although Karjalainen made a c r i t i c a l speech to the United Nations. Kekkonen and Kosygin, conforming to an established pattern of personal high-level diplomacy during European crises, con-ferred in October, but there was never any sign of danger from the Soviets. The most interesting development in August was the strong attitude taken by the Finnish Communist Party, which unequivocally 44 branded the Soviet Union and her a l l i e s as aggressors. This condemnation revealed a deep s p l i t in the Party between the "St a l i n i s t s " and the " r e v i s i o n i s t s " — a s p l i t which continues to this day. The revisionists, who hold numerical superiority within the Party, have had to contend with a revolt from hard-liners who refuse to participate in any Government which seeks to associate i t s e l f with the EEC and 40 refuses to recognize East Germany. The i n a b i l i t y of these two factions to reconcile their differences has had some economic, p o l i -t i c a l and international consequences for Finland: (1) In the economic realm, the struggle resulted in militant Communist action in February and March 1971 over the "Kekkonen Package"— an attempt to resolve a deadlock in nation-wide labor disputes— and 46 the most serious strikes which Finland had experienced since 1956. These strikes caused an unforeseen balance of payments d e f i c i t in 1971 and hurt the country's economic growth. At the time of this writing, however, the labor-management situation appears to be stabilized, despite the current mild recession. (2) In the p o l i t i c a l realm, SKDL disunity has been a partial cause of the steady stream of Cabinet failures and crises since the March 1970 general elections. Following the strikes, the SKDL could not maintain caucus unity in Parliament, and was forced out of the Government. But since then, the Centre Party and Social Democrats have been sharply divided over agricultural policy, and have been unable to Following their policy of staying out of Great Power conflicts, the Finns recognize neither East nor West Germany, although they have trade missions in both countries. With improvements in the general European situation, however, there is every indication that the policy w i l l change. In fact, the three countries are now working on a September 1971 Finnish proposal for mutual recognition. 41 form a viable coalition. The old "popular front" s t a b i l i t y i s gone, and the special January 1972 elections did not solve the problem. The SKDL is s t i l l s p l i t (with 16 revisionists and 11 Stalinists in Parlia-ment) and is unable to participate in the Government. And the Centrists and Social Democrats are s t i l l unable to come to an agreement. For several months Paasio led a minority Social Democratic Government which 47 was recognized as only a "temporary solution." On July 19th, however, the Cabinet resigned and the situation i s unresolved at the time of this writing. (3) In the international realm, there was some confusion in Finnish-Soviet relations early in 1971. The Soviets had sent Alexei Beliakov to Helsinki as Ambassador in the hopes that he could patch up the differences within the Communist Party. But Beliakov took the side of the Stalinists and was even active in the organization of the strikes. Kekkonen was so furious that he publicly treated Beliakov "with rudeness," and the Russians soon withdrew their Ambassador for "health reasons." The Finns were angered over the incident, but most observers f e l t i t was due more to a breakdown in the complex Soviet bureaucracy and to the mistakes of one individual than to Russian 49 duplicity or interference. There was thus no Soviet protest over the removal of the SKDL from the Government: the responsibility lay with the Communists themselves. The above incidents have had no real effect on the basic tenor of Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, as a l l p o l i t i c a l parties 42 have continued to support the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. In fact, there have been developments on the international level vhich have been quite beneficial to Finland. The Finnish Government, for example, played an important role in the SALT talks, which resulted in the Nixon-Brezhnev arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow last May. And following Bonn's recent r a t i f i c a t i o n of the treaties with Moscow and Warsaw, as well as the Great Power Berlin agreement, the Finns are moving into high gear with plans for the European Security Conference—especially since NATO has now approved the Finnish invitation to hold the talks in H e l s i n k i . ^ Finland i s also pursuing her negotiations for association with the EEC. Detailed talks began in January 1971 and are continuing A now, especially since the plans for NORDEK seem to have been abandoned. It appears that the Soviets have now given tacit approval to the EEC negotiations, and despite many other d i f f i c u l t i e s , the Finns are 52 confident they can arrange an acceptable agreement. In the last ten years, there has been a decided decrease in A NORDEK is now. considered a dead letter. It would have gone far beyond the t a r i f f - f r e e structure already existing under EFTA and the economic arrangements under the Nordic Council: a true Scandinavian common market. But in April 1970, as i t was clear Denmark and Norway intended to negotiate for entry into the EEC, Kekkonen stated that Finland would rather "establish trade arrange-ments with the EEC providing this could be done without compromising Finland's policy of neutrality.51 43 * Soviet pressure on the F i n n i s h domestic scene. The general tenor of F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s has been c o n s t a n t l y improving. F i n l a n d ' s present s i t u a t i o n i s t r u l y remarkable i f we r e c a l l her bleak prospects back i n 1944. And f u t u r e developments look promising. I f the Finns can s u c c e s s f u l l y p u l l o f f t h e i r S e c u r i t y Conference and t h e i r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the EEC, we w i l l have f u r t h e r proof of the v i a b i l i t y of t h e i r hard-won indpendence and n e u t r a l i t y . E. Summary In the l a s t 28 y e a r s , F i n l a n d has had to accomplish a d e l i c a t e act of double-jeopardy t i g h t r o p e w a l k i n g . On the one hand, she has had to balance her s p e c i a l f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Soviet Union against her d e s i r e to e s t a b l i s h and m a i n t a i n an i n t e r -n a t i o n a l l y c r e d i b l e p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y . On the other hand, she has had to balance her d e s i r e f o r increased economic and p o l i t i c a l t i e s w i t h the West ag a i n s t her need to s a t i s f y both the Soviet d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y i n Northern Europe and Soviet trade i n t e r e s t s w i t h F i n l a n d . In other words, she has had to use t a c t and diplomacy to compensate f o r geographic v u l n e r a b i l i t y . I t i s my b e l i e f t h a t she has * The Sukselainen and B e l i a k o v i n c i d e n t s have already been discussed. A more recent example i s the May 1971 Soviet press r e a c t i o n to an a n t i - S o v i e t a r t i c l e i n the c o n s e r v a t i v e H e l s i n k i d a i l y Uusi Suomi.53 And p r i o r to the recent e l e c t i o n s , I z v e s t i a condemned s e v e r a l r i g h t - w i n g candidates.54 g u t these have been very minor i n c i d e n t s . 44 s u c c e s s f u l l y accompl ished t h i s t a s k . Our survey of h i s t o r i c a l developments has i l l u s t r a t e d s e v e r a l p o i n t s made i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y c h a p t e r . F i r s t , F i n n i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h the S o v i e t Union have f o l l o w e d two b a s i c l i n e s : (1) c o n v i n c i n g the S o v i e t s of F i n l a n d ' s f r i e n d l y i n t e n t i o n s and her d e s i r e to remain out of Great Power d i s p u t e s , and (2) a t t e m p t i n g to achieve g r e a t e r l a t i t u d e i n her i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and economic l i f e . Second, F i n l a n d ' s success i n these endeavors has been r e f l e c t e d i n the S o v i e t U n i o n ' s i n c r e a s i n g l e n i e n c y as the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n has improved and as the R u s s i a n s have become more c e r t a i n o f F i n l a n d ' s f r i e n d l y a t t i t u d e and c r e d i b l e n e u t r a l i t y . But the d i s c u s s i o n has thus f a r r a i s e d more q u e s t i o n s than i t has answered. H o p e f u l l y , our m u l t i - p e r s p e c t i v e s tudy w i l l c l a r i f y and e x p l a i n many u n r e s o l v e d problems. III. The Systemic Perspective A. The General International System and P o l i t i c a l Framework The smaller states of Europe are often regarded as "mere pawns on the chessboard of international p o l i t i c s . " x The minor states are subordinate actors on the p o l i t i c a l stage,, and the object of their foreign policy i s principally to adapt i t s e l f to situations created by the Great Powers. Finland is no exception to this general rule. True, her location in a remote corner of Northern Europe has kept her out of the mainstream of high European p o l i t i c s ; indeed, the whole Nordic region has not played an active role in the European balance of power in the last century. Unlike her small Central and East European neighbors, Finland has always lived in relative geographic and p o l i t i c a l isolation. Yet she too has been largely at the mercy 46 of other powers, and is strongly affected by political and economic changes in the international climate. This dependence is clearly illustrated in the dynamic relationship between Finland's security situation and the level of post-war international tension. The first decade after World War II saw the gloomy development of Cold War antagonisms: on the international scene, the World War allies consolidated their positions into opposing power blocs, and the rigid bipolarity was accentuated by numerous wars and crises (Czechoslovakia, Greece, Korea, Berlin)—not to mention the development of nuclear capabilities; on the domestic scene, the super-powers were somberly engaged in the ideological retrenchments of the "McCarthy era" and th.i "Leningrad affair." The endeavors of the two power camps toward firmer organization and increased concen-tration of their own resources tended to isolate the non-committed nations in a precarious political limbo. Small wonder that Finland played a passive, self-effacing role. During the immediate postwar decade, her situation in regard to foreign policy was delicate and her possibilities limited. The best policy she could hope for was to lay low—to stay outside the conflicts of interest of the Great Powers. The year 1955 was marked by what has been called the "spirit of Geneva," and the easing of Cold War tensions. This improvement in the international situation was reflected in Finland's heightened activity and increasing latitude in foreign politics: 47 m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e N o r d i c C o u n c i l a n d t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s g a v e h e r a v o i c e i n d i p l o m a t i c c i r c l e s , a n d t h e r e t u r n o f t h e P o r k k a l a b a s e g a v e h e r s o v e r e i g n t y a n d n e u t r a l i t y a n e w c r e d i b i l i t y . B u t t h e h e i g h t e n e d t e n s i o n o f t h e l a t e 1 9 5 0 s a n d e a r l y 1 9 6 0 s a l s o a f f e c t e d F i n l a n d ' s s t a t u s . I n t e r n a t i o n a l i n c i d e n t s s u c h a s t h e 1 9 5 8 a n d 1 9 6 1 B e r l i n c r i s e s , t h e U - 2 i n c i d e n t , Q u e m o y - M a t s u , a n d C u b a — t h a t i s , t h e b r i n k m a n s h i p p o l i c i e s o f b o t h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — w e r e f e l t d i r e c t l y o n t h e F i n n i s h p o l i t i c a l s c e n e . S i n c e 1 9 6 2 , h o w e v e r , t h e s i t u a t i o n i n E u r o p e h a s s h o w n a s t e a d y s l a c k e n i n g o f t e n s i o n . I n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r s o f p e o p l e s e e m t o r e g a r d t h e p r e s e n t t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s q u o a s p e r m a n e n t a n d s t a b l e . N o r a t i o n a l l e a d e r s e e k s t o c o n t i n u e E u r o p e a n d i p l o m a c y b y w a r l i k e m e a n s . A n d w i t h t h e g r a d u a l n o r m a l i z a t i o n a n d p e r h a p s e v e n t h e e v e n t u a l s o l u t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n p r o b l e m , t h e G r e a t P o w e r s a r e d i r e c t i n g 2 t h e i r m a i n a t t e n t i o n s a w a y f r o m E u r o p e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , a s w e s a w i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , F i n l a n d ' s s i t u a t i o n h a s b e e n i m p r o v i n g i n t h e l a s t d e c a d e , a c h i e v i n g a d e g r e e o f s t a b i l i t y a n d s e c u r i t y t h a t e v e n g o e s b e y o n d t h e p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e E u r o p e a n s i t u a t i o n . T h e p a r a l l e l b e t w e e n F i n n i s h s e c u r i t y a n d t h e s t a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s y s t e m i n g e n e r a l — a n d t h e E u r o p e a n s u b - s y s t e m i n p a r t i c u l a r — i s s t r i k i n g . B u t t h i s i s n o t t o s a y t h a t F i n l a n d ' s f a t e h a s b e e n s o l e l y d e t e r m i n e d b y e x t e r n a l f o r c e s . O f t h e m a n y s m a l l E u r o p e a n s t a t e s w h o s e i n d e p e n d e n c e d a t e s f r o m t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e E m p i r e s t r u c t u r e f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I , F i n l a n d i s t h e o n l y c o u n t r y t o 48 have retained the same p o l i t i c a l institutions to this day. She has not been submerged by the storms of the last 55 years. And she is now actively asserting herself more and more on the international stage, making a positive contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes. Finland's foreign policy, while inextricably linked with systemic variables beyond her control, can also be viewed as an i l l u s t r a t i o n 4 of "the significance of marginal power in international p o l i t i c s . " B. Soviet Strategic Imperatives in Europe The major systemic actor affecting Finland is of course the Soviet Union. If we want to get a feel for the general p o l i t i c a l framework in which Finland has to operate, and to understand how systemic variables affect Finnish p o l i t i c s , we must f i r s t of a l l look at Soviet strategic imperatives, particularly in Europe. This i s not to imply that the attitudes and actions of Western governments are inconsequential. Finland has long enjoyed a high standing and traditional goodwill in the West, particularly in the United States."* The f u l l repayment of her World War I debts gave her a unique reputation, and her plucky stand in the Winter War won the admiration of the international community. Writers such as Ulam even feel that Western sentiment during and after World War II had a decisive influence on the Russians: 49 At Teheran, the Western statesmen vigorously interceded on behalf of Finland, and the subsequent relatively lenient Soviet treatment of Finland and the fact that she neither was absorbed into the USSR nor became a ^ sa t e l l i t e may be traced largely to that intercession. Strong Western reaction to the 1948 coup in Prague may also have caused Stalin to think twice about trying the same thing in Helsinki. In addition, i t i s clear that the postwar international s t a b i l i t y so v i t a l to Finnish security is as dependent on Western powers as on the Soviet Union. But nevertheless, simple geography shows that Russia i s the key. The overriding concern of Soviet leaders in the immediate postwar period was their fear of Germany. The threat of German revanchism—real or imagined—was uppermost in Soviet minds. This concern was reflected, f i r s t of a l l , in Stalin's decision to forego the occupation of Finland and free his troops for the offensives against the Nazis in Central Europe. After the War i t was clear that this latter area, which had h i s t o r i c a l l y been a thorn in the Russian side, would get top strategic priority as the Soviets began to build a security belt of friendly governments around their country. Stalin made i t clear from the outset that the East European states should not f a l l under the control of hostile domestic governments, and the Western powers recognized his concern. But i t is open to question whether he had a long-term blueprint for Eastern Europe at that time. His main concern was security for his country and his regime, and he played his hand with caution. Stalin was trying to cope with the 50 paradox of Russia's postwar position: at home, the country lay in desperate ruins, while abroad, there were undreamed-of opportunities for diplomatic and strategic success.^ But there were also many dangers. It was not a time for ideological or revolutionary ventures— at home or abroad; the cautiousness of his foreign policy was reflected in the ideological retrenchment within his country. However, as the Cold War tension mounted, Stalin began to feel that the only way he could ensure undisputed Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was to apply controlled revolution from above. The fear of Germany, the trauma of the War, and a strong h i s t o r i c a l and ideological distrust of the West were dominant factors in Stalin's actions. And, in addition, the communization of the occupied European countries was ideologically j u s t i f i a b l e and quite desirable in the minds of Soviet Marxists—both for the Soviet Union and for the international workers' movement. The interplay of Communist ideology, Russian national security and pure power po l i t i c s in Soviet foreign policy i s a fascinating subject for study, and s t i l l open to much dispute. But Pethybridge, I believe, puts the submission of East European states to uncomprising Soviet rule in a proper perspective: We have noted that Stalin's primary aim in taking i n i t i a t i v e in areas bordering on the Soviet Union was to throw a geographical security belt around his country. Communist governments in Eastern Europe in 1945-6 were more a reflection of Stalin's anxiety to protect national Russian interests than to spread world revolution. Yet this secondary aim (of Sovietization) always seemed to remain at the back of his mind, just as i t had throughout the years of socialism in one country; and once his primary aim was achieved, the second one was pursued.^ 51 In the case of Finland, the Soviets achieved their primary * aim, and assured their defense and security through the 1948 Treaty. But the secondary aim, due to a great variety of factors we shall examine in this thesis, was impossible or too d i f f i c u l t in the Finnish context. Some of the factors working in Finland's favor were systemic: we have already mentioned the Western sympathies for Finland, especially after the Soviet-sponsored Czech coup. In addition, the Soviets were beset by more important d i f f i c u l t i e s in the spring and summer of 1948. At a time when the SKDL was being excluded from the Finnish Government, Stalin had to contend with a c r i s i s in the West (the Berlin blockade), as well as the f i r s t sign of rupture within his own bloc (Yugoslavia's exclusion from the Cominform). These Soviet systemic problems, along with many unique Finnish factors we shall soon study, probably helped the Finns avoid a Communist takeover of their country. The conservative tenor of Soviet foreign and domestic policy was f e l t by the Finns and reflected in their a c t i v i t i e s . On the one hand, Paasikivi's passive line was a judicious foreign policy response to Soviet imperatives, and on the other hand, strong-arm Russian The timing of Stalin's letter to Paasikivi in early 1948 coincided with the hardening of the division of Europe, although the proposal had been on the Soviets' agenda for at least ten years. ** And although Stalin might have approved a purely local Communist takeover in Helsinki, he had a well-known aversion for spontaneous revolution by foreign Communist parties. 52 tactics caused an appreciable loss of popular support for the local Communists—a development paralleled in other Western countries. After Stalin's death in 1953, Finland's isolation continued for several years, as Soviet p o l i t i c s were marked by contradictory movements and a lack of direction due to the power struggle in the Kremlin. But important innovations soon began to appear. The Soviet leaders, for example, started to grant recognition to "third camp" and neutral countries. And the Geneva summit meetings of July 1955 marked a new s p i r i t of guarded optimism in international relations, despite strong Soviet opposition to West Germany's NATO membership in October 1954, as well as the signing of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. The Austrian Peace Treaty was also signed in May, and the Soviets began seeking a reconciliation with Belgrade at that time. In a similar s p i r i t , Russia announced in September that the Porkkala base would be returned to Finland. Khrushchev's famous speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in June 1956 gave a new direction to Soviet foreign policy. Khrushchev recognized the importance of independence movements and the "peace zones" of neutral countries; he repudiated the Leninist principle that war is inevitable among capitalist nations; he said there were many roads to socialism, including the peaceful parliamentary path; and he increased his stress on the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. This shift in Soviet global policy had great significance for the Finns. As Hodgson noted in 1959: 53 the maintenance of the status quo in Finland is important for the propagation of the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful coexistence.' The Soviet leaders can Point to Finland and say that here i s a fine example of two countries with different social systems existing side by side.9 But the "Geneva s p i r i t " proved to be rather ephemereal. Although Finland was not seriously affected by the Hungarian Revolution (she abstained from a l l voting on the issue in the United Nations), she was affected by a new build-up of Soviet voluntaristic assertiveness on the international scene. After Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-party" group in July 1957, the Kremlin's new s t a b i l i t y was reflected in decisive, confidently planned policies and an increase in Soviet prestige. Soviet ICBMs were launched in the summer of 1957. The f i r s t earth s a t e l l i t e went up in October. The period up to 1962 was a dynamic phase in Soviet foreign policy, punctuated by acute periods of tension in relations with the West and growing dissension within the Communist camp i t s e l f (i.e., China). Much of the tension centred around Moscow's fears of Germany. The threat of a revived and possibly militant West Germany was instrumental in Khrushchev's November 1958 bid for the definitive recognition of East Germany and her frontiers by the West. The ensuing international c r i s i s was closely related to the "night frost" period in Finnish-Soviet relations. And although the situation in Finland soon calmed down, the gloomy course of global events continued. In January 1959 the Soviet Union proposed a 28-nation 54 conference to draw up a German peace treaty; the West declined the invitation, much to the Soviets' displeasure. Other well-known events followed: the U-2 incident, the aborted Paris summit in May 1960, the disappointing Vienna summit in June 1961, the Berlin Wall in August, and the resumption of nuclear testing in the atmosphere in the same month. East Germany, Berlin and NATO were again unquestionably the centres of world attention when Kekkonen received Khrushchev's note in October 1961, and Finland was cast into the midst of Great Power p o l i t i c s . The note indicted NATO and Western imperialists, c r i t i c i z e d the other Scandinavian countries, and claimed the German m i l i t a r i s t s were threatening the peace of Europe: A l l this meant, the note argued, nascent German military aggression threatening the security of Finland as well as the USSR. In view of this threat, the Soviets proposed discussions on the basis of the April 1948 treaty.!0 There was, however, no direct criticism of the Finnish Government, and Finland successfully weathered the storm, as she had in 1958. But two important points came out during these two Finnish-Soviet "mini-crises." In the f i r s t place, the effect of the incidents Finland managed to avoid the conference only by stipulating that her attendance would depend on universal participation. 55 on Finnish p o l i t i c s showed that developments in Finland gain increased importance for the Soviet Government when tension in Europe is on the rise."'"''" And secondly, the German fact clearly takes an overriding significance in Finnish-Soviet relations during periods of European 12 in s t a b i l i t y . These points were further confirmed by Soviet actions in the months after the Kekkonen-Khrushchev meeting in Novosibirsk. The Russian Premier's failure to press home his military demands on Finland was symptomatic of a general switch in Soviet tactics: incidents between the two sides in Berlin became less frequent, the attitude of Soviet authorities became less r i g i d , Soviet nuclear testing was abandoned, and Khrushchev dropped his December 1961 time limit for a conclusion of a German peace treaty. Another important result of the 1961 mini-crisis was the unwritten understanding by both governements that i t is now Finland— not the Soviet Union—who w i l l have the responsibility of invoking the consultation clause in times of possible future c r i s i s . The implication of this tacit agreement is clear: Russia has, apparently, relinquished the threat of military talks as a lever of influence over Finnish policies. At a time of high international tension, however, this understanding might be swept away by the force of circumstances. The 1962 Cuban missile c r i s i s , which was outside Europe and did not affect Finnish-Soviet relations, marked the end of Khrushchev's 56 breakthrough strategy. And since his overthrow by the pragmatic Breshnev-Kosygin team in 1964, there has been a definite process of deradicalization in Soviet foreign ventures, with a stronger emphasis on the country's pressing domestic needs. The August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia showed the essential conservatism of the Soviet leadership, and at the same time i t showed that even a potentially explosive European situation would leave Finland untouched i f i t were limited to the Soviet camp and i f NATO and Germany were not involved. In fact, despite such incidents, and despite the festering sores of Vietnam and the Middle East, there are many objective factors in the international environment causing the superpowers to cooperate in areas of common interest. The old bipolar world has now broken down into something loosely resembling multipolarity, and even the Cold War has lost i t s c e n t r a l i t y — e s p e c i a l l y in Europe. These optimistic developments have undoubtedly provided a more congenial international framework for Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, and a reversal of this trend would be unfortunate. But today, i t is even l i k e l y that Finnish-Soviet relations have become regularized to a degree that w i l l transcend any possible future tension involving Soviet strategic imperatives in Europe. 57 C. Finland's Role as a Neutral Buffer-State in European P o l i t i c s Nations become neutral for a great variety of reasons. These reasons are usually based upon national self-interest—the need to secure sovereignty, survival and.freedom—even in cases where neutrality is imposed or guaranteed by outside powers. For example, r e a l i s t i c appraisals of national strength and geographical position can moderate any impulse for an adventurous foreign policy and thereby lead slowly into neutrality, as in the cases of Switzerland and Sweden. Neutrality may also be a response to perceptions of an immediate threat, and i t may be considered the best way to avoid the danger of war and maintain the s t a b i l i t y and prosperity of a country. The prime motivation, especially for small states, comes from external conditions. Every nation must f i t i t s neutrality to i t s own special circumstances, and the maintenance of that policy depends on a complicated set of interrelated, interdependent variables. While no single factor has general predominance over the others, a thorough search of the literature on neutrality reveals that certain variables are consistently posited as the most salient. On the international level these are: (1) the structure of the system, (2) the general st a b i l i t y of the system and the character or nature of war, and (3) the attitudes, interests or demands of outside states. And on the national level they are: (1) geography, (2) military power and deterrence capability, and (3) the a b i l i t y to establish and maintain 13 c r e d i b i l i t y , including the attitudes of the population. 58 The definitions of neutrality have undergone considerable change since the end of the Second World War. At one time, neutrality was considered a legal status of nonbelligerency in war, based on 14 certain fundamental rules of rights and duties. But contemporary reality and popular usage have changed the concept of neutrality in the European context. In addition to the r i g i d l y l e g a l i s t i c definitions, neutrality also has a p o l i t i c a l meaning: the peacetime policy of noninvolvement in either general or local disputes and controversies which might impair the establishment and maintenance of c r e d i b i l i t y in the desire of a state to adopt a policy and legal status of abstention and nonbelligerence in war.15 The Finns define their neutrality in much the same way. Finnish definitions emphasize, in the f i r s t place, a determination "to remain outside the conflicts and controversies between the Big Powers, not only in times of war but also in times of p e a c e . T h e y also express the necessity of maintaining Finland's c r e d i b i l i t y by achieving "irreproachable relations with a l l her neighbors." X 7 But Finnish leaders never hesitate to point out that their policies in no way imply an abandonment of democratic principles and Western-oriented culture: 18 "Neutrality is not an ideological attitude." The establishment and maintenance of Finnish neutrality seems to be dependent on seven main variables: (1) the structure and s t a b i l i t y of the international system; (2) Finland's geographical position; (3) the strategic imperatives arising out of the above two 59 factors; (4) the policies of Finnish leaders in response to the above conditions and the support of neutral policies by the Finnish people; (5) the military capabilities to defend the nation's sovereignty; (6) the economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y within the country; and (7) last, but certainly not least, the belief of other systemic actors, especially the Soviet Union, in the c r e d i b i l i t y of Finnish policies. At the present time we w i l l limit our discussion to the systemic factors. Neutrality was not a total l y new strategy for Finland in 1944. But i t is d i f f i c u l t to speak of Finnish "neutrality" in the f i r s t decade after World War II. True, the 1948 Treaty expressed Finland's desire to remain outside Great Power disputes. But Finland played l i t t l e more than the passive role of a remote buffer-state in Russia's European cordon sanitaire. The word "neutrality" was rarely used. It was generally regarded with disfavor by the international community 19 at the end of the War. And Soviet leaders certainly looked askance at neutrality policies. In the clas s i c a l Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, the v a l i d i t y of a neutral policy depends on the character of the war or dispute in question; neutrality is impossible during an "unjust The Finns point out that the notion of neutrality has had an important impact on foreign policy opinion since Finland was joined to Russia in 1809. The concept of neutrality was further developed as a foreign policy line in the 1920s and 1930s, although i t was unsuccessful in 1939. 60 war" of imperial conquest or a "just war" of liberation from . , . , . 20 capitalist bondage. But neutrality saw a general revival of respectability in the mid-1950s in accordance with changing international conditions and the emergence of Third World countries. The Soviet leaders also changi their views. Extending the zone free of capitalist or Western p o l i t i c a l influence through sponsorship of neutral and neutralist policies became an integral part of Soviet policy. Soviet definitions changed, and neutrality became one form of struggle for peaceful coexistence: Neutrality i s a foreign policy course followed by a peace-loving state that pre-supposes non-participation in military blocs and groupings, refusal to grant the use of territory for foreign bases, and the establish-ment of friendly relations with other countries. 2 ± Finland, as we have seen, profited from this new development. Finnish leaders were able to change their policies from passive isolation to active neutrality. Finland was gradually able to expand her contacts with the West and free herself from Soviet restraints. This does not imply that she sought adherence to the Western camp. In the f i r s t postwar decade, Finland strived to prove that she did 22 not want "to play the role of a Western outpost against the East." This policy did not change. But since the mid-1950s, her aim has been to use her position as "a bridge between two different spheres 23 of culture." Her growing usefulness as a neutral mediator now seems to mean that her role has become that of both a physical and a 61 p o l i t i c a l buffer-state in international relations. Now that Finnish-Soviet relations have become regularized, this " p o l i t i c a l buffer-state" role is perhaps the most important aspect of Finnish foreign policy. Finnish neutrality is different from that of other European neutrals in that i t is founded neither on formal international agreements nor established tradition. On the one hand, i t i s based on the perception by a l l governments of Finland's desire and a b i l i t y to remain nonaligned and outside international disputes and conflicts. And on the other hand, i t is based on the Soviet Govern-ment's perception of Finland's commitment to uphold the practice of safeguards contained in the 1948 Treaty of Friendship in times of * c r i s i s or war. The Finnish c r e d i b i l i t y problem thus has two different systemic aspects, as WahlbHck notes: (1) In 'normal' times, the Treaty, by i t s mere existence, makes Finnish neutrality credible to the Soviet Union by assuring the Russians that Finland w i l l not again serve as participant or march route in an attack against the Soviet Union. If this function is understood in the West, i t should not diminish the c r e d i b i l i t y of Finnish neutrality in that camp. (2) In a ' c r i s i s ' period, however, when the Russians may—as in 1961—wish to put the Treaty provisions into effect by proposing consultations, Finnish c r e d i b i l i t y in the West would inevitably be a f f e c t e d . ^ This is not to imply that the Finns resent the special d i f f i c u l t i e s implicit in the 1948 Treaty. They feel that the Treaty i s the best guarantor of their freedom in the face of a unique objective situation; their security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union would be decreased without i t , and in fact they have favored i t s extension in 1955 and 1970. 62 The relationship of cr e d i b i l i t y to systemic s t a b i l i t y i s , of course, a problem endemic to a l l neutral countries. And the perception of cr e d i b i l i t y by other states is also dependent on many non-systemic factors. But the systemic relationship i s especially crucial to Finland. Finnish neutrality and independence depend on the perceived likelihood of activation of the Treaty, and this in turn depends on the general quality of international relations. Against this background, i t should be obvious that the improvement of East-West relations i s very much in Finland's interests. The Finns do not hide the fact that their foreign policy is self-serving. But they have also seen that they can help themselves best by contributing to a relaxation of tension and to progress toward 25 general disarmament and international arms control. An example of Finland's contributions can be seen in the United Nations. The objects of Finland's UN efforts have been to C l ) "make her attitude to international p o l i t i c s unambiguous and 26 place her beyond speculation"; (2) "promote patiently the peaceful 27 settlement of major problems"; and (3) "strengthen actively world 28 appreciation of the unaligned peaceful policy of neutrals." Finnish voting patterns in the UN have r i g i d l y conformed to these goals. The Finns have abstained from Big Power conflict voting, as 29 well as from votes involving "moral condemnation." In general, the whole Nordic group has displayed a consistently cohesive 63 voting pattern. But according to quantitative studies by Jacobsen and Kalela, Finland comes closest of a l l member countries to the 30 "neutral voting position"—on both the East-West and North-South axes. Finland is a strong believer in the principles of the United Nations. In Chapter II we noted her ac t i v i t i e s in UN mediation and peacekeeping forces. In addition, mention can be made of her two-year term as a Security Council member, which ended in 1970; as Karjalainen notes, "Finland's unusually perceptive contribution was 31 made possible by i t s neutral position." And f i n a l l y , Finland has channelled most of her developmental assistance to Third World * countries through multilateral UN programs. Mention should also be made of other Finnish " p o l i t i c a l buffer-state" a c t i v i t i e s . When the United States and the Soviet Union decided to begin their armament control negotiations, Helsinki was one of the sites chosen for the talks. Both parties f e l t that Finland met the requirements to be made of a neutral site for negotiations. The f i r s t phase of the SALT talks ended successfully in May 1972, when Nixon and Brezhnev signed the agreement son nuclear arms limitations In 1961 Finnish assistance amount to 888,210 U.S. dollars, or 0.02 per cent of the GNP. In 1970 Finnish assistance was budgeted for 9,294,714 dollars, or 0.1 per cent of the GNP. Until 1965 90 per cent of Finnish aid was multilateral, although recently she has also been developing b i l a t e r a l programs with certain countries, prin-cipally Tunisia, Peru, Ethiopia and Tanzania. In 1969, three-fourths of the approximately eight million dollar aid program was multilateral in form.32 64 in Moscow. Further talks w i l l continue in Geneva. In May 1969, Finland delivered a proposal to host a Conference on European Security and Cooperation to a l l European countries, including East and West Germany, and to the United States and Canada. The Finnish proposal reflected a desire to seek a peaceful solution to the unresolved differences in Europe. The Soviet Union had been actively favoring such a conference since 1966. The NATO countries, however, were i n i t i a l l y cool to the idea; the general international climate was not yet favorable, and they wanted to see a solution to the Berlin problem f i r s t . But with the recent conclusion of the four-power agreement over Berlin, and the ra t i f i c a t i o n of the Bonn-Warsaw and Bonn-Moscow treaties by the Bundesdag, there i s every indication that the conference w i l l take place; NATO has now advised 33 Helsinki of i t s acceptance of the Finnish proposal. Of course, there i s s t i l l plenty of ground to cover before the conference can start; the Finnish Government insists on making elaborate prepara-tions through multilateral preliminary discussions over adminis-trative, procedural and substantive problems. It stresses the need for unanimity in these preparations, and wants to take every 34 precaution to assure the success of the actual conference i t s e l f . The success of the Finnish i n i t i a t i v e , coupled with the f r u i t f u l SALT talks, w i l l benefit Finland in two ways: i t w i l l serve to bolster Finnish prestige and security, and i t w i l l help improve conditions of peace and security in Europe. 65 Finland seems to have found her place in the European constellation. On the basis of her good relations with the Soviet Union, she has b u i l t up her position as a neutral Scandinavian country. Finland's security and neutrality are of course dependent on systemic variables. But despite her size and geographic position, she i s able to make contributions toward lessening the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of armed conflict in Europe. The Finns realize, as one diplomat puts i t , that the fate of their country " i s closely connected with the fate of a l l Europe. IV. The Strategic Perspective A. Soviet Strategic Imperatives in Northern Europe A h i s t o r i c a l study of the p o l i t i c a l objectives of the Tsarist and Soviet governments in Northern Europe shows that traditional Russian interests have been primarily based on military and strategic considerations. The prime emphasis has been on defensive strategy. The main objective of Alexander I, for example, in detaching Finland from Sweden in 1809 was to secure the safety of Russia's northwestern frontier and i t s capital, St. Petersburg. Finland remained a semi-autonomous Grand Duchy. Throughout the nineteenth century and up to World War I, the object was to use "Finland as a defensive base against other Baltic powers; the Imperial General Staff apparently had no plans for the extension of Russian power to the Atlantic coast.^ There is no indication that the new Soviet rulers changed the traditional Russian defensive strategy in Finland. Their 67 t e r r i t o r i a l demands in Karelia in 1938-39, for instance, were not motivated by ideological expansionism, but rather by a desire to secure 2 Leningrad against a possible Nazi attack through Finland. This Soviet fear was h i s t o r i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d : in 1919, when the fate of Petrograd was in the balance, the B r i t i s h had used eastern Finnish ports for attacks on the naval base at Kronstadt. Soviet military men could 3 hardly ignore this episode. At the end of World War II, Soviet strategic imperatives in Northern Europe were not changed significantly. The primary objective was to keep that area—and especially Finland—from becoming a base for hostile military operations against important economic and military centres around the Leningrad and Murmansk regions. Since the War, Russian leaders have shown relatively l i t t l e interest in seizing territory not v i t a l to the country's defense; at the same time, they have maintained permanent vigilance that no other power should gain undue influence in that area. The purpose has been not to extend the Soviet bloc, but to keep the status quo—not to exploit the area, but to keep others from doing so. It seems l i k e l y that considerations such as these formed the basis for Soviet thinking about Finland during the crucial 1944-48 period. We have already noted how Finland, unlike her Central and East European neighbors, did not occupy strategically significant territory on a direct line between the Soviet Union and Germany. Furthermore, Finland was located in the Nordic area, adjoining neutral 68 Sweden and forming along with Denmark and Norway a military weak and potentially peaceful region. There was simply no strategic need for the Soviets to occupy or control the whole of Finland. The v i t a l areas of Petsamo, Karelia and Porkkala were sufficient—provided Moscow could be convinced of Finland's desire to f i l l the role of a neutral buffer zone. This shows the importance for both countries of the 1948 Treaty: Finland maintained her independence, and the Soviets obtained most of the same defensive guarantees they had earlier sought in 1938-39. In the postwar period, Russian leaders have been extremely sensitive about strategic questions in a l l of Northern Europe, and this general concern has been reflected in the specific development of Finnish-Soviet relations. Soviet moderation in Finland right after the War went hand in hand with a generally conciliatory attitude toward the other Nordic countries: The Red Army, in their military operations, had occupied part of Norway's northern-most Finnmark province as well as the Danish island of Bornholm, but the troops voluntarily withdrew in the summer of 1945. However, this attitude soon changed. There was sharp Soviet reaction to events in 1948-49, when the Nordic countries were actively organizing a Scandinavian defense alliance and considering adherence to NATO. When Norway and Denmark f i n a l l y joined the Atlantic Pact in 1949, the Soviets f e l t that northern power alignments had shifted very much to their disadvantage. In Finland, Moscow's extreme concern was reflected in i t s icy relationship with the Fagerholm Government, and Russian criticisms were even levelled at 69 Paasikivi himself during the 1950 presidential election. Noway and Denmark, however, eased Soviet fears somewhat by refusing to allow NATO bases on their s o i l or to accept nuclear arms. This self-imposed abstinence, along with the development of Soviet nuclear capability in the early 1950s and the slight easing of inter-national tension in the mid-1950s, served to reduce the strategic importance of Northern Europe in Soviet eyes. A clear manifestation of the Russians' diminished apprehension over their defensive posture in the North was the return of the Porkkala base. Apparently, the Gulf of Finland was no longer viewed as strategically vulnerable—at least to the point of requiring a naval base on i t s northern shores. But the events of 1961 demonstrated that the Soviets were s t i l l sensitive to changes in the strategic situation. A study of NATO moves in the Baltic Sea area at that time shows that Soviet fears of "German revanchism" were not entirely unjustified: there was concrete evidence of closer collaboration between West German, Danish and Norwegian military units; the three countries were preparing a new joint military command in the Baltic; and the West German navy had moved i t s headquarters from the North Sea to the Baltic. It i s of course possible that the Western moves were a reaction to the general international situation, but they did form an objective basis for the strategic concerns voiced in Khrushchev's note to Kekkonen. The dependence of Finnish-Soviet relations on Soviet 70 strategic imperatives in Northern Europe and on Soviet relations with the other Nordic countries has been explained by referring to the "Nordic balance." As Orvik describes i t , this i s the popular term for: a particular concept of Nordic security that revolves around (1) Finnish neutrality and the Russo-Finnish treaty of 1948, (2) Sweden's neutralist policies, and (3) the Norwegian-Danish reservation against foreign bases and nuclear weapons. The balancing mechanism is supposed to work as follows: according to the 1948 treaty the Soviet Union can ask for consultations with Finland i f i t feels that i t s security is threatened through Finland by German or... any member of NATO.... The balance theory maintains that the Soviets could be deterred from using the po s s i b i l i t i e s which the treaty offers or otherwise tightening their grip on Finland by a Norwegian and Danish threat to reconsider their reservations on bases and nuclear weapons.... Sweden might develop closer relations with the Western states, possibly consider membership in the NATO alliance. The theory assumes that the policy of 'calculated weakness' which the reservations on bases and nuclear weapons implies i s actually a position of strength. It supposedly provides the Scandinavians with a lever, a counter- ^ threat, which they could use against the Soviet Union. If one looks at the actual distribution of power in the North, the expression "Nordic balance" hardly seems adequate in terms of the military and economic might of the Nordic countries vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The unavoidable conclusion is that Russia has dominant superiority. But i f the expression refers to the strategic-p o l i t i c a l influence of the Nordic countries on Soviet decision-making— not as a military deterrent but rather as another variable determining Russian defensive Nordic strategy—the balance theory has some validity. For example, a Russian occupation or takeover of Finland is in no way 71 prevented by any military-strategic power balance in Northern Europe. But such an occupation, and an attempt to transform the country into a people's democracy, would have serious repercussions in the other Scandinavian countries. Such repercussions could hardly be regarded as opportune for Soviet defensive interests. The Nordic balance thus does not refer to a military balance of power, but to (1) the maintenance of a psychological status quo dictated to the whole area by the geographic imperatives and security arrangements of each country, and (2) the potential upset of that status quo in a c r i s i s situation which no country—certainly not the Soviet Union—is willing to undermine, as the consequences would be unpredictable and potentially harmful to everybody's security interests. Adherence to this interpretation of the balance theory does not contradict a belief in the defensive content of Soviet s t r a t e g y — i t merely gives i t a broader perspective. An additional element in the balance theory, voiced by analysts such as Hfcipker and Kissinger, i s the belief that the balance of power in Northern Europe is only upheld by the support of the big Western powers, and that NATO i s in effect responsible for Finnish independence.^ If our analysis of Russian strategic imperatives in Northern Europe is not totally wrong, then policies based on such views, as Jakobson has noted, are provocative rather than deterrent. 7 Soviet moderation in Northern Europe was, after a l l , 72 established long before NATO came into being. And as Herman Kahn said in 1968, "We have written off Finland—I would be very surprised i f the United States did anything in case Finland became the object of *8 a Soviet attack" But in another sense, this broader view of the Nordic balance does have some val i d i t y . The equilibrium in the North is part of a tenuous global balance of power. Any action anywhere which might upset that balance could have unpredictable consequences, and Soviet meddling in the North might lead, through a series of moves and counter-moves, to a situation where Soviet security would be in a precarious position. From this point of view, the Soviets must consider the equilibrium in the North as part of a larger equilibrium, and calculate their relations with Finland accordingly. To sum up, Soviet interests in Northern Europe are primarily defensive, aimed at preventing (1) the build-up of additional Western military influence in the area and (2) a possible attack through Finland, the Arctic Ocean or the Baltic Sea. And the balance theory is only valid as a reminder that decision makers in Moscow must * This view caused a flurry of comments, mostly sarcastic, in the Finnish press. The use of Murmansk and T a l l i n as bases for global Soviet naval operations (i.e., nuclear submarines) does not, in my opinion, invalidate the theory of defensive Soviet military interests in Northern Europe i t s e l f — a n y more than i t proves the existence of Soviet offensive designs for world conquest. 73 take the interests of the other Nordic countries into account in safeguarding their own security position. If the Soviets were offensive or ideologically oriented in their Nordic policy, the Nordic balance would have had l i t t l e effect on their a c t i v i t i e s — e s p e c i a l l y in the immediate postwar period. Today, the strategic significance of the Nordic countries has diminished considerably in Soviet eyes. Military technology has outmoded the possibility of a conventional land-based attack on Leningrad; ICBMs equipped with nuclear warheads are a much greater concern. Brundtland even feels that Moscow now has l i t t l e reason to fear possible NATO maneuvres in Norway, since the exercises "have no real military value 9 under present circumstances." Be that as i t may, the status quo s t a b i l i t y in Northern Europe seems even more permanent than in Europe as a whole, and the area has vi r t u a l l y ceased to be a strategic question mark. The dire warning that Orvik voiced in 1963—that the Soviets might try to probe NATO defenses in the "vulnerable northern flank" through "low-level, gradual extension of control"—has not been borne out."^ Fears of a Communist attack on the Northern Cap have proved as unfounded as Soviet fears of a similar attack by the West. As Brundtland notes, mismanagement of the future a f f a i r s in Northern Europe might set off escalation processes like the one conceived of in 1961, but any such development would be hard to defend on serious strategic grounds.H The strategic importance of Finland has thus been greatly 74 reduced as a result of military, p o l i t i c a l and arms developments. Pajunen rightly points out that Leningrad's defense problems must also appear completely different today, because an attack which as late as World War II required about thirty German divisions can now be carried out with the aid of nuclear missiles high above the Baltic land and sea area. The 1962 agreement leasing the Saimaa Canal to Finland i s clear proof of the diminished importance of the Karelian Isthmus for Russian defense plans.12 Geography has thus lost i t s former importance, and Finland's general position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has thereby become more stable and secure. B, Finnish Responses to the Strategic Conditions 1. Neutrality Strategy Postwar Finnish relations with the Soviet Union have been based on the belief that (1) Soviet strategy in Northern Europe i s defensive, (2) these defense interests are legitimate, and (3) the only way to maintain Finnish independence is to conduct a foreign policy that w i l l unambiguously eliminate Finland as a security problem in Soviet defense planning. In other words, the o f f i c i a l Finnish interpretation of Soviet interests i s that they are not expansionist; provided the Russians are convinced of the security of their north-western frontier and of Finland's determination to keep outside any alliance directed against the Soviet Union, they w i l l pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. The trauma of the wartime years played a major part in 75 determining this attitude. Prior to that time, Finland had tried to formulate a foreign policy along neutral Scandinavian lines. But the Soviet leaders were never convinced of Finland's a b i l i t y or even desire to maintain such a policy. The Finnish Government's assurances of non-alignment were hardly made credible by the antics of vocal right-wing forces (who wanted to move the Finnish borders down to the Volga), or by the obvious pro-German and anti-Russian attitude of appreciable segments of the population and p o l i t i c a l leadership. Ambiguities in Finland's o f f i c i a l relations with Germany and Sweden did not help matters, and the Winter War clearly revealed the failure of Finnish neutrality strategy. At the end of the War, there was only one conclusion to be drawn from the Finnish point of view: the Soviet Union had emerged as the uncontested leading power on the European continent, and the crucial national task was to ensure the security of Finland with their giant neighbor—not against i t . A modus vivendi had to be found. As we have noted, the label which came to be applied to Finland's postwar Eastern policy is the Paasikivi Line. There i s nothing ideological or i d e a l i s t i c about this policy. It is uncomplicated realpo l i t i k : The causes of mistrust and fear between Finland and her Eastern neighbour must be eliminated; mutual suspicion should be replaced by friendship and good neighbourly relations. Finland's independence and national existence can be secured only by eliminating the causes of conflict between Finland and her neighbour, not by military means. 76 This means that the Finns must change their attitude towards the Soviet Union and—with good faith and honest mind—pursue a policy of friendship.... According to the Paasikivi Line, the most important and only really essential Soviet interest vis-a-vis Finland is geopolitical and defensive-preventive.... The Soviet Union does not, of course, anticipate any aggression from Finland, but they must be sure that their potential great-power enemies are not able to make use of Finland as a spring-board. The Finns ought to be able to give the necessary assurance to their Eastern neighbours. If the Soviet Union i s satisfied with regard to this v i t a l point, Finland has every opportunity to continue her l i f e as a democracy of the Western and Nordic type.13 The Treaty of 1948 was essentially an o f f i c i a l recognition of this policy. Some circles after the War considered the Paasikivi Line opportunistic and dictated by force. But in time, the permanent value of the policy became evident. A case in point is the Porkkala base: apart from the important strategic significance of the Soviet withdrawal, the p o l i t i c a l implications of the concession lent powerful support to Paasikivi's theses. Prudent appeasement of Soviet security interests was the best strategy for securing Finnish independence. Since the mid-1950s, Finland has had improved p o s s i b i l i t i e s of emphasizing her neutrality strategy. Paasikivi's cautious line i s s t i l l the o f f i c i a l foreign policy, but i t has been extended considerably by his successor. The Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, as we have seen, refers to a more active policy involving recognition by major powers of Finland's status and participation in international efforts at peace and disarmament. But the Kekkonen innovations have also included Northern strategic changes, which we w i l l discuss in the following section. 77 As one Finnish writer notes, "The realization of the principles of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line means security and peace for 14 the Finns." This statement takes cognizance of a fact the Finns learned painfully in 1939: the simple declaration of a neutrality policy i s not sufficient to ensure c r e d i b i l i t y . The actions of the Finnish Government are even more important than i t s declaratory policy in influencing Soviet perceptions of Finnish attitudes. Today, through the actual realization of her stated policy, Finland has made her neutrality an essential part of the existing strategic status quo. It^ i s unlikely that any power would now attack Finland for the sake of Finland herself, or that, barring a general European war, any country would be tempted to violate Finland's land, sea or air space. Now that Finland's strategic importance to the Soviet Union has diminished, she is able to maneuvre with greater latitude than ever before, although she w i l l always have to give reassurances of continued friendly intentions toward her giant neighbor. 2. Nordic Strategy In view of the h i s t o r i c a l and geographical contacts Finland See Appendix A for a recent analysis of Finnish neutrality and general foreign policy in a lecture delivered by Kalevi Sorsa, Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 14, 1972. Note the references to Finnish-Soviet security in paragraph four. 78 has always had with the Nordic nations, i t is natural that a Scandinavian orientation is the second main line of Finnish foreign policy. Nordic strategy and Scandinavian integration are important elements in Finland's relations with the Soviet Union. Finland's position as a Scandinavian nation was emphasized by Paasikivi and other Finnish leaders,^ but since the early 1950s * Kekkonen has sought to expand Finland's role in the North. It i s &n the area of Nordic strategy that he has most obviously stepped beyond the Paasikivi Line. The Finnish President believes that a policy of caution in Northern Europe is not enough—that Finland must actively develop a Nordic program. For example, in a much-publicized speech delivered as Prime Minister in 1952, Kekkonen called upon Norway and Denmark to withdraw from NATO and help form a neutral Nordic defense union. In 1955 be again renewed the proposal. His i n i t i a t i v e s met with failure both times, but he did not abandon his desire to forge a special status for the Nordic countries. In May 1963, several months after the Cuban missile c r i s i s , Kekkonen publicly advocated the formation of a denuclearized zone in * The Scandinavian countries are: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Some authors refer to those countries as "Nordic," while only Denmark, Norway and Sweden are "Scandinagian." But in this thesis the two words are used interchangeably—a practice quite common in the literature. 79 ft Northern Europe: The Nordic countries already make up de facto a denuclearized zone. However, at this stage this condition rests only on unilaterally-taken positions. A strengthening of the present situation in this respect through mutual pledges as prescribed in the Unden plan would not bring about any change in the policy which the Nordic countries have adopted and would not weaken their security. Nor would i t upset the present balance of power in the world and thus i t would not have a damaging effect on the interests of any outside state. But I am convinced that a meaningful proclamation that the Nordic region i s a denuclearized zone would stabilized the positions of a l l the Nordic countries.17 Kekkonen went on to propose a specific treaty with Norway concerning the Norther Cap: It would be in our interest that no repercussions of a possible conflict between the Great Powers should threaten our security. With this in mind, Finland i s prepared to consider treaty arrangements with Norway that would protect the Finnish-Norwegian frontier region from possible military action in the event of a conflict between the Great Powers. The agreement which I have outlined would be in the interest of both Norway and Finland, as i t would lessen military tension in the area of the Northern Cap in times of international c r i s i s , and increase the capacity of both countries to preserve their t e r r i t o r i a l i n v i o l a b i l i t y in the event of a conflict between the Great Powers.18 Kekkonen's in i t i a t i v e s met with the approval of the Soviet Union. Although the Russians seem to view the present situation as acceptable in tension-free times, they maintain that a truly stable peace The new Kekkonen proposal had been preceded by two similar plans: (1) in October 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Central Europe, and (2) in November 1961, Swedish Foreign Minister Osten Unden introduced the concept of nuclear-free zones into the disarmament negotiations as one possible means by which the spread of nuclear weapons could be avoided.16 80 in Northern Europe can best be brought about by a weakening of NATO ties and an increase in the neutral climate of the region. But the proposals aroused opposition and even resentment in the other Nordic countries. The Scandinavian leaders claimed that such a plan would eliminate their security alternatives, that i t would leave. them vulnerable in case the Soviet leadership should get expansionist ideas, and that i t does not include denuclearizing the northwestern region of the Soviet Union. Therefore, despite the apparent lessening of the North's strategic importance, the Kekkonen Plan has been unsuccessful, even in neutral Sweden. The 1968 Czechoslovakian c r i s i s served only to cement the current strategic pattern: both Denmark and Norway unambiguously confirmed their intention to retain 19 NATO membership. There are even some indications that a strong element in Finnish strategic thinking i s not wholly in agreement with the rationale behind the Kekkonen Plan. Kekkonen himself, for example, used the psychological status quo of the Nordic balance to his advantage during the note c r i s i s of 1961. In Novosibirsk, he pointed out the strategic implications of Finnish Soviet military consultations: Kekkonen's supporters reply that areas bordering on the Baltic in West Germany are not included either. 81 the Danes and Norwegians might use the option of changing their base and nuclear weapon policies. And in the opinion of many Scandinavian leaders, the solidarity of the Nordic countries at that time provided 20 a "striking application of the balance theory." But i t would be a mistake to view the situation too simplisticly, for the events of 1961 had a rather complicated cause-and-effect relationship. Kekkonen's use of the "balance" argument, for instance, may never have been necessary i f there had been no unsettling NATO roaneuvres in the Baltic in the f i r s t place. There may never have been a 1961 note c r i s i s in a neutral Northern Europe. But this is in the realm of speculation. What does seem more certain is that despite proposals to alter the strategic situation in Northern Europe, the governments concerned w i l l continue to act conservatively, and there w i l l be no basic change in the foreseeable future. In spite of the different security strategies of the various Nordic countries, the degree of integration achieved in Scandinavia is 22 probably higher than in any other region in the world. This integration is a reflection of the peace and prosperity of a remarkable Aside from the "Kekkonen Plan" and "status quo" options, there is a third line propounded by Nordic activ i s t s : increased neutrality in a l l Scandinavia, altering Finland's whole orientation with the Soviet Union. This "Nordic defense union" option now has l i t t l e sympathy in Finland, which in the twentieth century has "received small coins but never hard cash" from the "Scandinavian bank of security."21 82 area where no acts of war between members have taken place for over 150 years, and where there are no t e r r i t o r i a l or ideological problems giving resort to violence. The Nordic countries, in fact, constitute an international security zone, and the effect of this stable situation on Finland's relations with the Soviet Union has been beneficial. 3. Defense Strategy A neutrality strategy needs a relatively strong defense to be credible. If a neutral lacks the potential to defend i t s sovereignty, i t s c r e d i b i l i t y w i l l be low in peacetime and i t s teritory w i l l be violated without hesitation in wartime i f military necessity so dictates. The examples of Switzerland and Sweden in the two World Wars show that a high degree of military preparedness can be at least partly responsible for the success of a neutrality policy. We have pointed out that the strategic importance of Northern Europe has diminished considerably, and that there are no objects of strategic significance in Finland herself that could be highly valued by the Great Powers. But the experience gained in the 1939-44 period showed the Finns that a mere declaration of neutrality does not suffice to protect a state against violations of her territory. The strong resistance of the Finnish Army during this period was undoubtedly a factor in the Soviets' decision not to occupy the country. And the avoidance of military occupation was one of the most important determining 83 factors separating Finland from the East European countries which 23 became part of the Communist bloc. Finland's postwar position as a neutral buffer-state did not diminish the importance to her security of well-equipped defense forces. In 1949, a review committee on defense wrote in i t s report: The task of Finland's defense forces is to create the military conditions necessary for the preservation of neutrality and necessary to remain aloof from way. At a minimum we must ensure that the nation, at least i t s v i t a l areas, are not conquered by surprise attack, that l i f e is not paralyzed, and that immediate mobili-zation cannot be prevented. If the nation in spite of a l l i t s efforts cannot remain neutral, i f the nation i s attacked, the goal of our defense forces i s to win time and to create the conditions for, on one hand, receiving assistance and, on the other hand, negotiations leading to peace.24 Finland's vulnerable geographical location is somewhat offset by the country's internal geography, which makes penetration d i f f i c u l t — as the Soviets discovered in 1939. The Finnish terrain offers few opportunities for rapid operations of armored troops. The Finnish archipelago can be made useless with the aid of mines and f o r t i f i e d shore batteries. Even in the most vulnerable area—Lapland—it is possible to make roads and communications unusable at river crossings and similar passages. In this latter area, where NATO and Warsaw Pact territories meet, the Finns have stationed special commando troops to discourage either side from the temptation of encroaching upon Finnish 25 territory. Finland contributes a relatively small proportion of her 84 GNP to national defense: about 1.4 per cent, or 5.75 per cent of the 26 State budget. This modest expenditure is largely due to the limitations imposed by the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, which restricts defense forces to the execution of tasks of an internal nature and to local defense of Finnish borders. On this basis, the ground forces may not excede 34,400 men, the navy 4,500 men and a 10,000 total tonnage, the air force 3,000 men and 60 aircraft. Nuclear weapons, missiles, 27 submarines and other special material are also forbidden. In Chapter II we saw how Finland managed to achieve a reinterpretation of the Peace Treaty, allowing her to acquire defensive ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and permitting her to maintain a credible defense of her a i r space. In addition, ground and sea defenses are bolstered by modern, sophisticated armaments and material. Despite the small military budget, Finland's mechanized armed forces represent, in the opinion of one military strategist, a high defensive standard "even 28 for Scandinavia." The Finnish defense forces are organized on the basis of a cadre system and a t e r r i t o r i a l structure. Basic manpower needs are furnished through universal conscription. The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and the military command is constitutionally subordinated to democratic p o l i t i c a l control. In wartime, i t was once possible for the President to turn over his command to military leaders. During the 1939-44 period, however, this led to a confusing dualism in p o l i t i c a l and military leadership. After World War II, steps were taken to concentrate the total defense of the country in the hands of c i v i l i a n leaders.29 85 Until recently, the Finnish defense system had not provoked much p o l i t i c a l controversy in the country. But a July 1971 parliamentary report on defense reflected the growing interest p o l i t i c a l parties have taken in this question. The review analyzes Finland's strategic position in Northern Europe and the present state of her defense preparedness, and concludes that while there is l i t t l e likelihood of general war or limited attack, the exigencies of neutrality demand * a vigilant defense posture. It i s perhaps strange to see a renewed interest in military matters at a time when Finland is actively engaged in sponsoring international arms control negotiations. But the Finns feel that a high state of military readiness i s v i t a l to their relations with the Soviet Union, as Jakobson notes: In a revealing remark to a Scandinavian v i s i t o r , the late Defence Minister Marshal Malinovski once pointed out that thanks to Finland's friendly neutrality only one Soviet division had to be maintained in the Murmansk region; i f Finnish policy were different, he said, much greater forces would have to be kept there. No doubt he would draw the same conclusion i f Finland were a military vacuum. The Soviet Marshals might then consider i t necessary in a c r i t i c a l situation to move their defence forward into that vacuum. Such a move, apart from any other possible consequences, would immediately destroy Finland's chances of staying outside the conflict.** 30 See Appendix B for an abridged copy of this report. ** Jakobson's point is well made, although one could question whether the Soviets really maintain only one division in that area. 86 It seems l i k e l y that, i f the Soviet Union deemed i t necessary, she could overrun Finland m i l i t a r i l y in a short space of time (although this was also the common belief in 1939). The chances of this occurring are extremely slim, and the primary aim of Finnish foreign policy is to ensure that the possibility does not arise. But i f the Soviets should invade, the Finnish armed forces—backed by more than 700,000 reservists—would probably cause considerable embarrass-ment to the Red Army, i f only through protracted guerilla and partisan operations. The same would go for any invading army. One of the most important aspects of Finnish military defense, as we shall discuss in Chapter VIII, is the stubborn w i l l of the people to defend the country, no matter what the odds. Such considerations, with a l l their nightmarish impli-cations, undoubtedly form part of the strategic military thinking of Finnish leaders. But in the present situation they remain very remote contingencies. The important point is that, even in the best of times, i t i s a paramount Finnish interest to maintain a credible defense capability. V. The Domestic P o l i t i c a l Perspective A. The Finnish P o l i t i c a l System Finland has a strong Western constitutional and p o l i t i c a l orientation, and the Finnish tradition of democracy goes back for centuries. During most of the 600 years of Swedish rule, Finland enjoyed the status of an equal partner with the mother country, and her j u d i c i a l and p o l i t i c a l systems were developed upon the same foundations. Besides participating, according to the ancient Nordic custom, in the election of the king, the Finnish people enjoyed the right to elect representatives to the Diet of the Four Estates (nobles, clergy, burghers and farmers), and to participate in the governing of their country. The Finnish concept of individual freedom also has roots buried deep in the history of the Swedish-Finnish realm. Serfdom was 88 never a part of the socio-economic l i f e . The existence of an independent class of land-owning farmers limited the influence of the nobility, and the mutual trust between the monarch and the people precluded a feudal system. Finland never suffered an actual autocracy, because the king was always bound by law. The dependence on law to safeguard individual l i f e , liberty and property was expressed and ordained in legal statutes as early as the middle of the fourteenth century, and a deep respect for the law became firmly implanted in the Finnish mentality."'" The separation of Finland from Sweden in 1809 did not signify her incorporation into the Russian state as a province. Finland was established as an internally autonomous Grand Duchy with the Tsar as sovereign, and the maintenance of the fundamental Swedish laws and the 1772 "Gustavian" constitution was guaranteed. Although the Tsar held a dominant position, his powers were limited as regards lawmaking 2 and taxation. In 1906 there was a change in Finland's p o l i t i c a l and legislative system from the Diet of the Estates to a unicameral 3 Parliament—purportedly the most democratic in Europe. At the same time, Finland became the f i r s t European country to grant suffrage to women. The transition from autonomy to independence in 1917 was thus not a complete upheaval in the country's internal l i f e . Finland 89 had been ripe for independence years before, and—because of her tradition of democracy, self-government and high popular education— she was probably the best prepared of a l l the states which arose out of the ruins of the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The continuity of independent Finland's p o l i t i c a l institutions has never been broken by revolution or occupation. This proved to be an important factor in the period immediately following World War II. In the East European countries which soon became People's Democracies, German fascism and the effects of the War had crushed the old bourgeois state and p o l i t i c a l apparatus. The puppet administrations disappeared after the defeat of the Nazis, leaving a vacuum of p o l i t i c a l confusing. By contrast, in Finland the traditional form of government survived. The p o l i t i c a l sytstem was so strongly entrenched that an effective, smooth Communist takeover could not have been pulled off in Helsinki. The strength of Saandinavian legal and constitutional traditions in Finland continues today. The Finnish Constitution, for example, i s the only one among those created in the aftermath of World War I which is s t i l l in force. There is a consensus on tha Western-type Democratic system stretching from the Conservatives to 4 the dominant wing of the Communist Party. The deeply rooted Nordic concept of freedom is probably a factor in Soviet moderation towards Finland, as the lack of autocratic rule has made the Finns unresponsive 90 to totalitarian forms of social and p o l i t i c a l organization. It has also set the tone for a certain limitation in Finnish-Soviet relations: Finnish leaders have consistently pointed out that their country i s not ideologically neutral, and in 1961 Kekkonen even told Soviet leaders that Finland would remain a Nordic type of democracy even i f "the rest of Europe should turn communist.""' B. The Finnish Government Finland is a republic, and thus calls for the classical t r i p a r t i t i o n of power. Alongside the 200-memBer unicameral Parliament, empowered to enact laws, and the executive branch, led by the President, there is an independent j u d i c i a l branch of government. The division of power is not similar to Anglo-Saxon systems, but is a combination of the presidential and parliamentary governmental structures. The President and Parliament are elected separately: the former indirectly through an electoral college system, the latter by popular regional voting through a variation of the d'Hondt system of proportional representation. Presidential elections normally take place every six years, and general parliamentary elections every four years, except when the President dissolves Parliament in exceptional circumstances and * For a brief explanation of the system, see the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Vol. 5, pp. 13-14. 91 calls for a new election. Most of the administrative duties are the responsibility of the Cabinet, which must enjoy the confidence of Parliament. The Cabinet is nominated by the President, who selects a Prime Minister from among the Members of Parliament; the Prime Minister in his turn forms a Government. Due to the Finnish multi-party system, the Cabinet is usually a coalition of some kind, reflecting p o l i t i c a l strengths in the legislature. Because of the rather vo l a t i l e nature of domestic p o l i t i c s and the dogmatic nature of party allegiance, Cabinets tend to be short-lived—with an average l i f e span of one year. Crucial p o l i t i c a l decisions are arrived at through the interaction of the President, the Cabinet and Parliament. The President of the Republic, however, has dominant power: he can appoint top o f f i c i a l s , veto or formulate legislation, and is Commander-in-Chief of the defense forces. Although he must exercise his authority in cooperation with the other organs of government, he is in a very independent position, generally aloof from the squabbles of partisan p o l i t i c s and under no p o l i t i c a l responsibility for the decisions he makes (except at election time). Kekkonen's relatively great constitu-tional power has even led observors to c a l l him the "De Gaulle of the North." In Finland, however, the system i s not limited to a single person, but " i s part of a flexible constitution based on history."^ The President's powers are most evident in the realm of 92 foreign policy. Although certain foreign relations a c t i v i t i e s require the approval of Parliament, the main leadership rests with the President. This constitutional role has important implications for Finnish-Soviet relations. The Russians are above a l l interested in st a b i l i t y in Finland's friendly attitude. Because of the precarious balance of the Finnish multi-party system, i t is d i f f i c u l t to conduct foreign affairs from the Cabinet. The President i s therefore a better representative of continuity i n foreign policy, and this p a r t i a l l y explains why the Soviets have never been unduly alarmed at the i n s t a b i l i t y of Finnish Governments. Foreign policy has thus proved to be the domain where the President—especially such powerful personalities as Paasikivi and Kekkonen—has been most active and infl u e n t i a l . The cooperation of Parliament is sometimes necessary before a formal decision on foreign policy can be made. Parliamentary approval i s required for (1) decisions as to peace and war, (2) the r a t i f i c a t i o n of treaties, and (3) the granting of appropriations. The importance of the parliamentary role has been decisive at several crucial points in postwar Finnish relations with the Soviet Union. Stalin, for example, was apparently worried in 1948 that Parliament would not r a t i f y the Treaty of Friendship, and his desire to avoid unnecessary complications in his effort to stabilize Russia's northwestern frontier may have been a factor in his moderate stance as Jakobson suggests: Probably Stalin in 1948 had not expected to get more than what he had proposed in 1938. In any event he 93 knew well that anything that had gone beyond what was f i n a l l y agreed would have met with strong resistance from the Finnish Parliament. On the eve of the departure of the Finnish delegation from Moscow, Molotov even expressed some doubt as to whether the treaty as signed _ would be r a t i f i e d in Helsinki.7 In contrast to the practices in other countries, discussions on foreign policy are rarely staged in the Finnish Parliament. The Constitution never even included provisions for a general debate on g foreign aff a i r s . Today, for practical reasons, Finland's relations with the Soviet Union cannot be a subject of parliamentary questioning and discussion. Nevertheless, Governments have usually tried to avoid a situation where they could be accused of neglect of the popular w i l l . Parliament is constantly kept abreast of foreign affairs through lia i s o n with the Foreign Affairs Committee. Since the early 1920s, in effect, Governments have been careful to secure the Committee's support for a l l important foreign policy matters. As we mentioned above, the frequent changes of Cabinet have made i t impossible to formulate a consistent foreign policy at the ministerial level. These changes are due to domestic disputes and Nousiainen even insists that debates over foreign affairs "have never *9 caused the dissolution of a cabinet." Because of Government This statement seems somewhat exaggerated; Fagerholm Governments, for example, have been weakened by their d i f f i c u l t i e s with the Soviet Union. But i t does underline the predominance of domestic issues behind cabinet failures. 94 i n s t a b i l i t y , the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not enjoy so great a measure of power, in his own f i e l d , as do his colleagues abroad. The tendency to "neutralize" the foreign affairs portfolio has been especially evident since the Second World War. Despite this diminished authority, however, i t is customary to select a Foreign Minister who can maintain excellent o f f i c i a l and personal relationships with the Soviet leaders. The Finnish Constitution is more flexible and adaptive than many other constitutions, especially in regards to the role of the j u d i c i a l branch. As opposed to Anglo-Saxon systems, the constitutionality of laws is normally investigated and determined in parliamentary committees before enactment. Traditional respect for the law and for expert constitutional opinion is so strong that, in the opinion of one Finnish j u r i s t , i t is d i f f i c u l t to find "a single case of conscious neglect of constitutional a r t i c l e s . " ^ Be that as i t may, the Constitution does provide explicit guarantees against majority dictatorship and rash decisions; exceptional unanimity in Parliament is required to alter or change a fundamental law. Such guarantees have significant ramifications for Finnish society and Finnish-Soviet relations. For example, i t would be legally impossible for a l e f t i s t majority in Parliament radically to change the structure of social, p o l i t i c a l or economic l i f e . As Kastari points out, 95 It is an unquestionable fact ... that the endeavours to nationalize private enterprise, which were in vogue in Finland during the post-war years, as in many other countries, broke down entirely in the face of the protection afforded by the articles of the Constitution and by their practical application to property r i g h t s . ± x For the same reasons, the Soviet Union, i f she tried, could not legally impose a basic change on Finnish society. The frequent change of Cabinets in Finland is peculiar in that i t does not reflect general domestic i n s t a b i l i t y , deep societal malaise, or economic backwardness. It i s instead attributable to the unstable balance between the p o l i t i c a l parties, which we shall presently investigate. Finnish society i s too deeply ingrained with a respect for law and constitutionality to be compared to France of the 1950s or postwar Italy. The dominant position of the President, who can stand aloof from the p o l i t i c a l battles and act as a unifying force, i s a strong factor in the basic s t a b i l i t y of Finnish society and the consistency of Finnish external policies. Certainly the Soviet leaders, while concerned with the composition of certain Cabinets, have never strongly reacted to the changes per se. The important point has been the s t a b i l i t y of foreign policy. In this respect, the present system of decision-making and division of powers seems to have functioned quite well. 96 C. Finnish P o l i t i c a l Parties The Finnish party system parallels a system common to a l l Nordic countries, with five major traditional parties: (1) the bourgeois right, (2) the bourgeois centre, (3) the farmers and country 12 dwellers, (4) the workers, and (5) the extreme l e f t . In Finland these parties are, correspondingly: (1) the National Coalition (Conservatives), (2) the Liberals, (3) the Agrarian-Centre Party, (4) the Social Democrats, and (5) the SKDL. In addition, there are today three relatively minor parties: (6) the Swedish Language Party (supporting the specific interests of the Swedish population), (7) the Rural Party (a right-wing splinter group from the Centre Party), and (8) the Christian League (a fundamentalist sect dedicated to eradicating such evils as pornography). Postwar Finnish party p o l i t i c s have been characterized by (a) the relative strength of the Communist-dominated SKDL, (b) the see-saw battle for dominance between the Centre Party and the Social Democrats, and (c) the fact that a l l parties have been minority parties. There is a f a i r l y sharp delineation between p o l i t i c a l parties, with an unusually high level of party identification and consistency in voting. The Finns are dogmatic about party allegiance; the habit of voting for a particular party is generally passed on from father to son (which partially explains the i n i t i a l success of the Communists in 1943—and also their i n a b i l i t y to increase their 13 following). 97 The sometimes passionate character of Finnish party po l i t i c s has been largely limited to domestic issues since 1944. Public opinion in Finland has been slow to react on questions of foreign policy. Generally speaking, relations with the Eastern countries have not been a central subject of discussion. After the Second World War a l l the parties acknowledged that the development of friendly relations with the Soviet Union was a necessity (fascist-oriented parties were banned outright), and that Russia should be accorded the status of a "most-favored" nation. Since then, no group 14 has o f f i c i a l l y claimed that this policy should be altered. The idea of absolute neutrality has also been accepted by a l l parties as their guiding principle. Both the Communists and the Right declare themselves supporters of such a program.''""' The general aim of the Paasikivi Line have thus been accepted with f u l l unanimity. But beginning in. the mid-1950s, there developed two different interpretations of the o f f i c i a l l i n e , and the means and details became disputed. .On the one hand, the Right and the Social Democrats interpreted the line in a l e g a l i s t i c manner, according to which the line should be followed to the very letter, yet a l l the time emphasizing that the Soviet Union does not have the right to interfere in Finland's internal affairs.16 On the other hand, the group led by the Agrarian-Centre Party— which in fact has determined the direction of Finland's foreign policy 98 under Centrist President Kekkonen—has interpreted the line from a psychological standpoint, emphasizing that the Treaty of Friendship and Assistance i s based on a Soviet confidence towards Finland, a confidence not to be shaken. Accordingly, the Soviet Union is presupposed to have the right to take care of her security interests in Finland, although this does not include ideological interests.17 Obviously, the Soviet Union considers the latter inter-pretation to be correct, and many of the ambiguities in Finnish-Soviet relations—especially in 1958 and 1961— can be attributed to the Russians' lack of faith in the Social Democrats' dedication to the Paasikivi Line. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Party has changed i t s "dead-end" Eastern policy, accepting the philosophy of the .Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line to the point of supporting Kekkonen in his 1968 re-election bid. The policy change helped the Social Democrats regain power in the Cabinet. Today, they are the largest single party in Parliament, and u n t i l July 19th Finland was ruled by a 18 minority Social Democratic Government. The present i n a b i l i t y to form a majority coalition reveals a chronic weakness in Finnish p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Since World War II, a solution to the Cabinet problem has primarily depended upon the relationship between the Agrarian-Centre Party and the Social Democrats. The greatest d i f f i c u l t y l i e s in the fact that the Centrists largely represent the farm producers, while the Social Democrats represent the so-called urban consumers. In a larger sense, Government s t a b i l i t y 99 requires an equitable solution to the problem of rapid social and economic change from an agrarian community to a modern industrial state. Both parties, however, represent what could be called the "broad centre" of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum, and their differences are not ideologically irreconcilable. The existence of a strong Communist Party is another characteristic of Finnish p o l i t i c a l l i f e . In 1944, the Communists emerged from a decade of underground activity, and formed a separate electoral organization—the SKDL. In 1945, the SKDL polled nearly 25 per cent of the popular vote. We have already noted that this i n i t i a l success was p a r t i a l l y due C I ) to the consistency of party identification in Finland, and (2) to the embourgeoisement of the Social Democrats in the 1930s, leaving the Communists as the only l e f t i s t p o l i t i c a l expression of the Finnish workers' movement. Since 1945, SKDL support has varied, but in the 1970 and 1972 general elections their following was down to about 17 per cent. Recent studies have shown that there are two distinct kinds of Communism in Finland: (1) the "Backwoods" or "Emerging Communism" of the rural northeast, thriving on economic insecurity, and (2) the "Industrial" or "Traditional Communism" of the urban 19 southwest, deeply rooted in left-wing radical traditions. Although the SKDL has obtained anywhere from 16 to 25 per cent of the popular vote, i t has had no mass base among the total Finnish electorate; 100 both Backwoods and Industrial Communism have been limited to definite class-based segments of the society. Left-wing radicalism in Finland has always maintained a peculiar balance between Marxism and nationalism—a "home grown Communism" that feeds on social protest and defiant reactions, but 20 which i s only loosely anchored in ideology. Voting Communist does not necessarily mean support of the Soviet Union; a striking continuity in Finnish p o l i t i c a l culture has been either latent distrust or clear h o s t i l i t y towards the giart Eastern neighbor, and 21 the Communist electorate i s not immune from this atmosphere. In 1939, for example, the Finnish Communists supported the Helsinki Government rather than the abortive Kuusinen Karelian Government. During the 1944-48 period, the SKDL was divided over tactics and basic philosophy: many members, in true Leninist fashion, believed that violence and disruption were the best means to power, while others, lik e Leino, were more "Menshevik" and parliamentarian in approach, and wanted a soci a l i s t but not a totalitarian Finland. When the crunch came in 1948, they "proved better Finns than Communists. Small wonder, then, that Moscow has shown a decided willingness to work with the Finnish bourgeois parties instead of giving f u l l support to the unpredictable Communists. This willingness has been enhanced by the strong commitment of the other parties to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line: 101 Alone among the Soviet Union's pre-war neighbors to the West, Finland ever since 1944 has had among it s traditional p o l i t i c a l e l i t e a number of politicians who have been willing to satisfy basic Soviet demands and who have thus made the Finnish Communists largely superfluous from the Soviet point of view. 23 In 1948 the Communist cause never enjoyed the popularity i t had, for example, in Czechoslovakia and the efforts of the SKDL were directed toward making the party respectable and developing organizational work at the precinct level rather than plotting an 24 actual government takeover. By 1966, the Party had clearly won a large measure of respectability, and three members were included in the f i r s t genuine "popular front" Government in Western Europe 25 since 1948. Contrary to expectations, there was no panic at that time—no flight of capital from Finland, as happened in Italy when the non-Communist Centre-Left coalition was formed in 1964. There are four possible explanations for the apparent acceptance of SKDL inclusion in the Government: (1) the Finnish Constitution makes nationalization or radical changes in the social structure v i r t u a l l y impossible; (2) the SKDL's participation was ultimately functional for capitalism, because i t provided guarantees of orderly labor discipline in the country; (3) the Finnish Communists had apparently found outdated the notion that the bourgeois state must be smashed; and (4) the "institutionalization" of Finnish-Soviet relations seemed to speak against undue Soviet influence through the SKDL ministers— who at any rate held only minor posts in the Cabinet. 102 Paradoxically, the popular front experience proved to be a determining factor in the recent s p l i t within the Communist Party and the SKDL's eventual exclusion from the Government. On the one hand, the minority Stalinist wing of the Party revolted against the "status quo" consequences of the popular front, and on the other hand, the reformists wanted to hold on to the reins of power, even at the expense of ideological orthodoxy. In other words, controversies similar to those of 1944-48 have returned to haunt the Party and remove i t from power. The popular front experience clearly belies Billington's assumption that once the SKDL got i t s feet in the Cabinet door, the 26 inevitable result would be, with Soviet help, Communist control. There are too many factors working against such an eventuality. For instance, despite chronic Cabinet i n s t a b i l i t y , a l l non-Communist parties are unequivocally united in their opposition to such a takeover of the country. To sum up, the multi-party system—and i t s chronic imbalance— is one of the most important determinants of Finnish p o l i t i c a l l i f e . A l l parties, of course, support the general theses of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. But there w i l l probably continue to be differences over detail and interpretation. It thus seems reasonable to conclude, as does Holsti, that the exact nature of future Finnish-Soviet relations w i l l depend to a large degree upon the development of party p o l i t i c s *27 in Finland. See Appendix C for tables showing party compositions in Parliament and the Cabinet, 1944-72. 103 D. Domestic P o l i t i c s and Relations with the Soviet Union It has become almost axiomatic to say that, in the case of small countries, foreign policy must take precedence over domestic policy. In Finland, the basic tenets of foreign p o l i c y — and especially relations with the Soviet Union—have not been a subject for general debate. However, that does not diminish their importance. Finnish-Soviet relations are a constant factor in Finnish p o l i t i c a l l i f e that must be taken into account, consciously or sub-consciously, at a l l times and in a l l areas of p o l i t i c a l decision-making. The security implications of domestic p o l i t i c s are especially crucial for Finland, because the Soviet Union continuously and carefully keeps abreast of internal developments in Finland and— when undesirable changes seem to be in sight—attempts to influence the course of events so that Finland's basic foreign policy w i l l not be changed as the result of some changes in the f i e l d of domestic policy. Provided the Soviet Union is convinced of Finland's determination to maintain her friendly relations, she does not inter-fere in Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s . But any time the Russians receive information, through their own channels, that individuals or groups they perceive as wishing to change the direction of Finnish foreign policy may be near the levers of power and influence, they have been sensitive to react. 104 Soviet penetration into Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s — described by Holsti as "techniques of influence" and by Forster as "the silent Soviet vote"—have been evident at several crucial periods 29 in postwar history. The extent of Soviet influence has varied. In the 1945 elections, for example, Soviet concern was merely re-flected in Pravda articles warning that the "Finnish elections could 30 not be considered an internal matter." Elections from 1951 to 1954, however, were free from undue Soviet influence—as they have been in the last several years. At times, the Russians have used the "carrot" approach towards Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s . In 1948, for instance, they tried to bolster SKDL popularity by relaxing war reparations and easing relations between the two countries. In 1955-56, the Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala, the extension of the 1948 Treaty, and Finland's United Nations and Nordic Council memberships were in part an effort to back Kekkonen's bid for the Presidency. The two most well-known cases of Soviet penetration occurred during the mini-crises of 1958 and 1961. In both cases the vo l a t i l e nature of the debates over domestic issues spilled over into the foreign policy sphere, arousing Soviet suspicions. Party leaders accused each other of i n f i d e l i t y to the policy of neutrality, and although the accusations had l i t t l e basis in fact, they were apparently taken seriously by Soviet diplomats and correspondents in 31 Helsinki. The tone of domestic p o l i t i c s in 1958 was particularly upsetting for the Russians: the SKDL was excluded from the Cabinet 105 although i t was the largest single party in Parliament; the Fagerholm Government was dominated by Social Democrats who favored the " l e g a l i s t i c " interpretation of the Paasikivi Line; and the conservative National Coalition Party—which the Soviets blamed more than any other group * for the conflicts of 1939-44—had scored well at the polls. The 1961 note c r i s i s , as we have seen, was really a continua-tion of the 1958 events. Once again the Soviets were worried that Finnish foreign policy might change as a result of domestic p o l i t i c a l disputes. They wanted, according to a letter sent by Andrei Gromyko in October, p o l i t i c a l guarantees concerning the continuation of the 33 Paasikivi Line. The presidential campaign mounting against Kekkonen, despite i t s lack of majority p o l i t i c a l support and despite opposition candidate Honka's adherence to established neutral policies, 34 was viewed by the Russians as a disruptive force. Honka and his p o l i t i c a l supporters were unknown quantities or had at one time provoked Soviet displeasure. The strain in Finnish-Soviet relations was not f i n a l l y relaxed u n t i l Honka resigned his candidacy. According to Allardt and Pesonen, the existence of Finland's p o l i t i c a l system is based on two fundamental requirements: The Soviet Union has not been the only Great Power trying to influence the Finnish domestic scene. Allegations have been made that the CIA was also intriguing in Finnish p o l i t i c s at this time, ^ supporting right-wing activists within the Social Democratic Party. 106 (1) adaptation of the foreign p o l i t i c a l situation and the handling of neighbor relations, particularly with Soviet Russia, and C 2 ) . maintaining a certain degree of integration and internal cohesion.35 Soviet leaders have apparently taken these two factors into account in their relations with Finland. When they have f e l t threatened by developments on the Finnish domestic scene, they have applied pressure at carefully aimed, specific targets, such as the Fagerholm Government in 1958 and the Honka campaign in 1961. The technique has worked when the Finns perceive that (.1) a certain response is desirable for Finnish-Soviet relations, and (2) the issue ±3 not so crucial that the basic independence and cohesion of society i s threatened. In other words, the Fagerholm Government and the Honka candidacy did not have such broad public support that their resignations endangered the Finnish body p o l i t i c . And given the ambiguous systemic and strategic situation at the time, Soviet concern was understood and even considered legitimate by important segments of the Finnish p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . The Russian techniques—considering Finland's international position, strategic situation, economic value, and the high patriotism and individualism of the people—are much more rational for Soviet defense interests than the direct control or takeover of Finland. Soviet influence has thus not been ideological, but pragmatic, logically derived from their security interests. In the light of Rosenau's contention that many domestic p o l i t i c a l issues have come to be more or less internationalized or 107 penetrated by outside interests in an increasingly interdependent 36 world, Soviet involvement in Finland should not surprise anyone. The amazing thing i s how.limited her manipulation really has been. The Soviets have simply not tried to c a l l the tune in most aspects of Finnish p o l i t i c s . There has been no attempt to impose the Communists on the country, no attempt to change the status quo. Above a l l , Finnish reaction to Soviet influence has never been automatic or reflexive. As we mentioned earlier, Jakobson notes that at a l l times the decision as to what course to follow has been taken by the Finns themselves, rather than been imposed upon them by a foreign power.37 In a certain sense, this statement can be interpreted as being rather naive and euphoric. After a l l , i t is undeniable that the Soviet Union has the potential for putting severe pressures on the Finnish people. The threat of strong Russian sanctions can be a powerful determining factor in Finnish governmental decision-making. The Soviet "presence" must always be taken into account. But this does not mean that Finnish actions have been the result of specific orders by Soviet leaders. Helsinki has not jumped obediently at Moscow's bidding. Jakobson seems to be pointing out that, despite Finland's p o l i t i c a l and geographical position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, the Finns have had a f a i r latitude of possible responses to Soviet pressures, even in c r i s i s situations. The actual responses have been the product 108 of free, often intense debates among decision-makers, and the possible alternatives have ranged from stubborn defiance to meek submission. Finnish foreign policy, I would suggest, has been a product of internal discussion and compromise among p o l i t i c a l parties and actors who have at times favored different programs for dealing with the Russians, different interpretations of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line, and different tactics for preserving Finnish indepen-dence; i t has not been the result of dictatorial decrees imposed from outside. The result has been a rather cautious, middle-of-the-road line that has appeased the Soviets but not sacrificed Finnish independence and neutrality. The calm nature of Finnish-Soviet relations in the last decade i s proof of the correctness of that l i n e , but i t i s not proof that the line has been dictated from Moscow. VI. The Personality Perspective A . Decision-Makers and Personalities In the postwar period, top-level Finnish decision-makers have succeeded in accomplishing things which few observors thought possible and in avoiding dangers which most observors thought imminent.x When one compares present-day Finland either with other small neighbors of the two superpowers, or with the situation the Finns had to start with in 1944, i t is clear that Finland has had remarkable success in her foreign policy. In my opinion, the reasons for this success go beyond external systemic and strategic factors: the role of Finnish decision-makers has been v i t a l in establishing the present relationship with the Soviet Union. Those responsible for Finnish p o l i t i c s have worked with s k i l l and good sense, and have brought home remarkable results from their encounters with Societ leaders. 110 It has been speculated that the Finns, from long coexistence, knew how to handle the Russians in the years following 2 World War II. Anyone who has studied Finland's clumsy and ineffective dealings with the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s would find i t d i f f i c u l t to reach such a conclusion. But something, perhaps the trauma of the Finnish-Soviet wars, or the absolute necessity for survival of getting along on correct terms with the Soviet colossus, seems to have brought rationality and realism into the thinking of Finnish p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s . The importance of the p o l i t i c a l personalities of decision-makers should not be underrated when analyzing Finnish-Soviet relations. Contacts between the two neighbors have been conducted on a highly personal basis, with many o f f i c i a l and unofficial meetings of top-level personnel. Throughout the years, Soviet trust and confidence has been directed only toward certain Finnish p o l i t i c a l leaders. And the Russians have not hesitated to indicate which other politicians 3 are or are not "suitable" for the continuation of good relations. Soviet penetration into Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s has been focused on two key interrelated issue-areas: (1) Finland's general policy of neutrality and friendship with the Soviet Union, and (2) the high-level composition of the government that assures the continuity of that policy. The connection between the Soviets' perception of personalities and Finnish-Soviet relations has been I l l demonstrated several times in postwar history. Fagerholm, for example, was never able to establish a viable working relationship with the Russians—neither in his 1948-50, 1956-57 nor 1958-59 Governments. The Soviets just never trusted the man, and although they would tolerate him to a certain degree, he could never bring about good Finnish-Soviet relations—despite his protestations of allegiance to the Paasikivi Line. Another Social Democrat leader, Vaino Tanner, was top man on the Soviets' l i s t of unacceptable politicians. They believed that Tanner was one of the men who carried Finland into the Winter War and that he was responsible for leading anti-Soviet opinion in Finland in the 1950s and early 1960s. Whatever the merits of these changes, the Soviets became extremely edgy anytime Tanner or his associates came near the reins of power. Tanner was most prominent on the p o l i t i c a l scene during the unstable 1958-61 period, and the Social Democrats were only able to re-establish themselves as a Government party after his removal as party chief in 1963. After that time, the Soviets slowly changed their attitude towards the Social Democrats, and, coincidently, the party made sweeping gains in subsequent local and general elections. A f i n a l example of Soviet pressure on personalities i s Honka's 1961 presidential campaign. The Russians were not so opposed to Honka himself as they were to any opposition to Kekkonen; Honka f i n a l l y withdrew his candidacy because, in his own words, "A statesman's 112 confidence abroad i s , in these times, more important than pacts 4 and agreements." In the past decade, there has been l i t t l e serious Soviet pressure on top Finnish decision-makers. The only known cases concern isolated incidents of Soviet displeasure—such as the 1964 Sukselainen a f f a i r — a n d there has certainly been no interference similar to the 1958-61 years. This does not mean the Russians have relinquished their tactics of influence over Finnish p o l i t i c a l personalities, but rather that the Finns themselves—and certainly the Finnish electorate—have practiced a form of "self-veto" over their own leaders. It is obvious that any foreign policy decision-maker who cannot get along with the Russians i s a bad security risk for the country—as is a p o l i t i c a l personality who i s willing to make too many concessions to the Communists. Finnish leaders must thus walk a narrow tightrope. The tendency in the postwar period has been to favor politicians of centrist or moderate leanings, as leaders to the right or l e f t of the p o l i t i c a l spectrum might be too committed, even subconsciously, to ideology or principle to successfully employ the diplomacy of consensus, conciliation, appeasement, status quo and pragmatism so v i t a l to the maintenance of neutrality—while at the same time maintaining the non-negotiability of independence. 113 B. Two Finnish Presidents The Finnish President has considerable constitutional powers in the conduct of foreign a f f a i r s . And i f the office i s held by a vigorous personality, those powers can be increased in depth and scope. The two principal postwar presidents, Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen, both favored a strong, dynamic role for the Finnish head of state. These two men, I would suggest, have been the personification of Finland's postwar relations with the Soviet Union. 1. Juho Paasikivi Guidelines: Finnish foreign policy is governed by our relations . with our great neighbour in the East, the Soviet Union. This is the real problem in our foreign policy, and we have to find a solution to i t , for the future of our nation depends on i t . We have just signed a truce with the Soviet Union.... We are a l l agreed that the provisions of this truce must be conscientiously f u l f i l l e d . But above and beyond this, we must establish a relationship of mutual trust with our great neighbour. Suspicion must be banished, friendship must prevail. I am convinced that i t is in the best interests of our nation that Finnish foreign policy should never be led into paths hostile to the Soviet Union.5 Prime Minister Paasikivi December 6, 1944 Good relations with Russia are, and always w i l l be of prime importance to Finland. Geography and history have determined this. In foreign policy we must think geographically, as I have said before, but one cannot repeat i t too often. Some people so easily forget to look at the map. And what does history teach us? Although i t does not always repeat i t s e l f , 114 as was once thought, i t i s tru e that a l l the m i l i t a r y engagements that we have been i n v o l v e d i n w i t h Russia i n the past 250 years have ended, i n d i s a s t e r f o r F i n l a n d , whereas we have o f t e n achieved worthwhile r e s u l t s when we have met the Russians round a t a b l e . In the h i s t o r y of our people the pen has r e p a i r e d what the sword had broken.6 P r e s i d e n t P a a s i k i v i J u l y 31, 1955 The p e r s o n a l i t y and values of P a a s i k i v i played a dominant r o l e i n i n f l u e n c i n g Soviet a t t i t u d e s toward F i n l a n d i n the f i r s t postwar decade, and P a a s i k i v i ' s b a s i c ideas s t i l l represent the foundation of F i n n i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y . A c o n s e r v a t i v e banker w i t h an impeccable record of o p p o s i t i o n to Communist id e o l o g y , P a a s i k i v i n e v e r t h e l e s s enjoyed the t r u s t and respect of Soviet l e a d e r s . He seemed to combine the e s s e n t i a l stance of c o n c i l i a t i o n toward Moscow w i t h the stubborn F i n n i s h q u a l i t i e s of shrewdness, p r i d e and independence—the i d e a l person to convince the Soviets that an i n d e -pendent Finland, could be t r u s t e d to respect Soviet defense i n t e r e s t s . P a a s i k i v i , i n 1944 a l r e a d y an e l d e r statesman of 74, had a l i f e t i m e ' s experience of d e a l i n g w i t h the problem of " r e c o n c i l i n g F i n n i s h n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s w i t h Russian i n t e r e s t s . " 7 As e a r l y as 1908, when he became a member of the F i n n i s h Government f o r the f i r s t time, he was advocating a c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e toward the Russians i n order to prevent severe acts of oppression by Russian 115 nationalist politicians. After the Bolsheviks had taken power, he did not believe that the new regime would last , but he continued to hold that "in negotiations with the eastern neighbor Finland should g be willing to make concessions." In 1920 he successfully negotiated the Finnish-Soviet peace treaty, wherein Finland's historic frontiers were recognized. In October 1939 he headed the Finnish delegation to Moscow, and i t was against his advice that Stalin's demands were rejected by his Government. Out of tune with the p o l i t i c a l currents of the time, he stayed out of p o l i t i c a l office during the war years, and was consequently untainted by association with Nazi Germany. During the crucial 1944-48 period, when he served as Prime Minister un t i l 1946 and thereafter as President, Paasikivi was one of the few genuinely credible leaders in Soviet eyes. At the same time, the Finnish people had confidence in his integrity and nationalism. He helped negotiate the 1944 Armistice, and in 1948 Stalin readily accepted his draft for the Treaty of Friendship. By arguing that the Russian interest in Finland was primarily strategic and defensive, and that i t was in the Finnish interest to accommodate Soviet security imperatives, Paasikivi was able to convince the Soviet leaders that Finland would not turn against them. He was also an effective domestic leader; he knew a l l the p o l i t i c a l ropes and could prevent the Communists from damaging Finland's basic democratic 9 processes, despite far-reaching concessions. to the Left. 116 In September 1954 Paasikivi was awarded the Order of Lenin—a reflection of the esteem and respect he had earned in Moscow. By the time of his death in December 1956, he could look with satis-faction upon his accomplishments. Important Soviet concessions had vindicated his foreign policy line, and his personal contribution as postwar leader played no small part in securing Finland's independence and way of l i f e . 2. Urho Kekkonen Guidelines: Normally i t would seem that when in a border country between West and East the influence of the Western world is on the increase, the influence of the East would correspondingly diminish. And in reverse, i f the influence of the Eastern world grows, the West must retreat. Finland is one of the countries on the border of West and East. But in our case, the better we succeed in maintaining the confidence of the Soviet Union in Finland as a peaceful.neighbour, the better are our opportunities for close co-operation with the countries of the Western World.... But we have also found that when mutual confidence between Finland and the Soviet Union for some reason is impaired and as suspicions arise, we must in our interest contract our sphere of activity in our relations with the Western world. As you see, the task of guiding our policy of neutrality in a world of paradoxes is d i f f i c u l t , yet fascinating. Neutrality, as I have said,is a way of solving our security problem. It i s not an ideological attitude. I have complete faith in the lasting strength of Finnish democracy, based on respect for the individaul and the idea of freedom under law.10 President Kekkonen October 17, 1961 117 The foreign policy of my own country ... is defined concisely as a policy of neutrality aimed at securing for the people of Finland the opportunity of developing i t s own l i f e , independent and free, within the social system i t has chosen i t s e l f . I have always thought that this aim includes positive moral values also in the international sense. A policy of-neutrality i s in i t s e l f peaceloving, for i t s basic goal, to be permitted to l i v e self (sic) in peace, contains the right of others as well to l i v e in peace. A policy of neutrality promotes the cause of inter-national understanding for the absolute condition of i t s success is broad cooperation between a l l peoples and a l l social systems. The 'open sesame' of the policy of neutrality is not the established w i l l of a state to pursue a policy of neutrality. A decisive factor—additional to t h i s — i s that foreign countries trust in i t . It i s not enough that distant nations trust in i t , what is most important i s that the neighbouring countries do not doubt i t s genuineness. It i s from this foundation that Finland pursues i t s active foreign policy. I may perhaps say without indulging in false pride: the tree is known for i t s f r u i t also in the sphere of basic foreign policy solutions.H President Kekkonen March 27, 1972 Kekkonen's place in postwar Finnish-Soviet relations is no less significant than that of Paasikivi. We have already seen how he changed Paasikivi's cautious isolation policy to an active li n e of neutrality that won. international recognition. Like Paasikivi, Kekkonen is respected by Soviet leaders. Unlike his predecessor, however, he was for many years unable to achieve a p o l i t i c a l consensus at home over a number of his policies. There are two possible reasons for his i n i t i a l failure in rallying broad p o l i t i c a l support around himself: (1) he has been a dedicated Agrarian-Centre Party 118 leader, who, contrary to Finnish custom, did not elevate himself above p o l i t i c s when he became President, and (2) his thinking with respect to the Soviet Union underwent a rapid change during World War II, exposing him to charges of opportunism and accommodation. Since the late 1930s, in effect, Kekkonen has been a controversial figure in Finnish p o l i t i c s . Although he was instrumental in banning the Patriotic People's Movement—a fascist extremist party—as a subversive organization in 1938, he was strongly opposed to making peace with the Soviet Union at the end of the Winter War in 1940. But the lessons of war soon brought him to the conviction that "Finland could not find safety through reliance on the protection 12 of other powers against the Soviet Union." He therefore stayed out of office during the latter stages of the Continuation War. During this period, under the pseudonym Pekka P e i t s i , he wrote a series of influential articles favoring Finland's exit from the war even at the cost of heavy sacrifices. These articles helped contribute to the spread of a r e a l i s t i c view of Finland's p o s s i b i l i t i e s in the struggle of the nation ... and the achievement of Finland's withdrawal 13 from the war." In 1948 Kekkonen played a key role in the Finnish-Soviet treaty negotiations: i t was largely due to his intercession that the crucial preamble (expressing Finland's desire to remain out of Great Power conflicts) was included. In the following years he 119 became closely associated with Paasikivi's foreign policy, and as both Prime Minister and President has enjoyed the confidence of Soviet leaders. Kekkonen's role in the 1958 and 1961 mini-crises, as we have seen, was crucial. Both incidents ended as a result of personal Kekkonen-Khrushchev meetings. While the development of these "frosts" in Finnish-Soviet relations was dependent on a variety of factors, Kekkonen's considerable tact and diplomatic s k i l l were undoubtedly important in finding successful solutions. Kekkonen's stature has now transcended his former image as a partisan p o l i t i c a l leader. Despite earlier fears that he might "Bolshevize" Finland or " s e l l out" Finnish p o l i t i c a l and economic interests to the Soviets, even Kekkonen's most ardent opponents treat * , him with a grudging admiration. Finland s present independent status i s to a large extent Kekkonen's responsibility and triumph. * In the 1950 general elections, for example, the anti-Kekkonen rallying cry was: "Neither Czechoslovakia nor Kekkoslovakia.' ** See Appendix D for a copy of Kekkonen's latest annual New Year's Day Address to the Finnish people. 120 C. Other Actors 1. Mannerheim In the f i r s t two years after the War, the Presidency was held by Marshal Mannerheim, whose immense authority and prestige helped ensure an orderly transition from war to peace. Mannerheim was often c r i t i c i z e d in the Soviet press. But in 1939 he had been one of the few in Finland who advised conditional compliance in the face of Russian demands, and he was acceptable to the Russians as a transitional, a p o l i t i c a l head of state. Because of his status as a military leader and statesman, according to Jakobson, he was the only man able to lead Finland safely out of the Continuation War."^ 2. Stalin Stalin's ruthless domestic measures were often combined with a very cautious foreign policy, and this prudence may well have led him to a conservative, "status quo" assessment of possible Soviet gains and losses in Finland. It is generally agreed that the Soviet dictator was a cynical and cruel despot, sli g h t l y paranoid, with a strong distrust of any situation he could not totally control. However, i t should be noted that some observors feel the Soviet leader might have had a "soft spot" for Finland—that he was "repaying a debt for good treatment which he received during a short stay in Finland as a p o l i t i c a l refugee in his early days.""^ 121 Be that as i t may, Stalin's apparently conciliatory attitude was evident both in 1918, when he was instrumental in recognizing Finnish independence, and in 1948, when he led the accommodating Soviet delegation which signed the Treaty of Friendship. 3. Khrushchev Finland was strongly affected by the innovations of the Khrushchev era. This complex Russian leader never enjoyed the absolute power of Stalin. But his influence was f e l t during the short period of relaxation of the mid-1950s, when Finland was able to break out of her postwar isolation, as well as during the brinkmanship years of the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Finnish-Soviet relations were at a low point. Khrushchev did not hide his concern about certain Finnish p o l i t i c a l figures and their "dangerous" anti-Soviet attitudes. In a September 1960 speech at a diplomatic luncheon in Helsinki, he noted: We understand that in various Finnish circles there are different opinions toward the Soviet Union, that there are those who hold a grudge and warn (the Finns) to be on guard against us. But try to understand that in such circumstances we too have to be on guard.... It i s known that in Finland not everyone approves of (Kekkonen's) policy toward the Soviet Union. You might declare that whatever occurs is your own internal a f f a i r . Naturally, these are intarnal affairs of the p o l i t i c a l parties. We recognize this. But to me, as a neighbour, and to our people, i t i s not at a l l a matter of indifference what policy toward the USSR 122 this or that party's ... representatives choose to follow—whether they espouse a policy of building friendship with their neighbor, or a policy which w i l l damage that friendship. Naturally we do not wish to interfere in your internal a f f a i r s , but I beleive we can express our opinions about certain individuals' position toward the USSR."I? Khrushchev's personal relationship with Kekkonen, however, was quite amicable. The two men exchanged informal v i s i t s and enjoyed hunting trips together. A good example of this rapport i s Khrushchev's 1960 v i s i t to Helsinki on the occasion of Kekkonen's sixtieth birthday, when among other things the "two balding and earthy 18 sexagenarians talked and joked together in a boiling Finnish sauna." 4. Kosygin-Brezhnev Since 1964, Finnish-Soviet relations have continued to be conducted on a highly personal—albeit more business-like—level. O f f i c i a l and unofficial v i s i t s have been made at frequent intervals by Finnish-Soviet leaders on various levels. Premier Kosygin has been Kekkonen's most common interlocutor, although the Finnish President has been received several times in Moscow by the f u l l Kremlin ruling t r o i k a — F i r s t Secretary Brezhnev, Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny— underlining Finland's (and Kekkonen's) special status. On a l l evidence, Russia's present rulers seem to be motivated by prudence and caution in their foreign aff a i r s . Through the SALT talks and the Moscow-Bonn accords, they have staked their p o l i t i c a l lives on some sort of detente with Western powers. This 123 policy can only benefit Finland, for the p o l i t i c a l ramifications in the West of undue Soviet pressure on the Finns would now be undesirable to the Russian leaders. It i s doubtful, in my opinion, that a change in top-level Soviet personnel w i l l produce a radical change in Finnish-Soviet r e l a t i o n s — a t least not to Finland's disadvantage. The Soviet leadership would probably continue their present strategies, dictated as they are by hist o r i c a l precedent, systemic imperatives and domestic needs. It i s also doubtful that the Finns w i l l make personnel changes that would endanger their relations with Russia. There are many able leaders, such as former Prime Minister Karjalainen, who have Moscow's confidence and are dedicated to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line. Personal relationships w i l l continue to play a v i t a l role, although i t now seems probably that both countries—especially F i n l a n d — w i l l continue to choose leaders who are compatible to the other side. VII. The Economic Perspective A. The Finnish Economy The greatest changes in Finnish society since World War II have been economic.^ Until recent times, Finland was predominantly an agricultural country. The l i f e sustenance of the people rested on the natural wealth of the country; agriculture and forestry. Over half the population obtained i t s livelihood from primary production. Vast forests—often termed Finland's "green gold"—cover more than two-thirds of the country's surface, and the production of basic agricultural necessities has traditionally been 2 Finland's largest branch of industry in terms of gross value. However, there have been considerable changes in the past twenty years. Agriculture and forestry no longer account for an overwhelming share of the national product. Now, in the early 125 1970s, Finland is extensively industrialized, and the process i s continuing at an accelerating rate. The metal and machine shop industries have been making rapid strides, increasing their exports 3 by about 150 per cent in the 1960s. Other industries, such as chemicals and textiles, are becoming more important. And consumer products such as glass, furniture, ceramics, cutlery and jewellery have made Finnish industrial design famous the world over. The Finnish economy has become increasingly dependent on foreign trade, as we shall see in the f i n a l section of this chapter. Finland's commercial policies have been important for her economic development, and trade has expanded at a faster rate than other sections of the economy. Finland's success in international trade, structural diversification and economic growth have resulted in a high standard of l i v i n g for the population. Taking per capita gross national product as the measure, Finland now ranks twelfth in the world, 4 having overtaken Great Britain in 1970. The average annual growth rate has been 5 per cent since World War II, the increase in exports has been 8 per cent a year, and worker productivity has increased 4 per cent annually.^ Since, as in other Scandinavian countries, the wealth i s rather evenly distributed, these rapid increases imply a high general standard of l i v i n g . Finland has truly come a long way since the lean days of 1944. 126 A remarkable aspect of these radical changes and improvements is that they were made without foreign takeovers of Finnish industry. Finland was aided, of course, by loans from abroad. But Finnish prosperity has not been achieved as a result of massive foreign ownership of the means of production as, for example, in Canada. Finnish law forbids the purchase of Finnish land by a non-citizen, and s t r i c t legislation limits foreign control of industry and transfers of capital out of the country. Despite the Soviet Union's limited penetration into Finnish domestic p o l i t i c s , there i s no similar penetration into the economic l i f e . Finnish companies are not owned or controlled by Soviet interests—nor by Western capital. The basic economic framework of the country's home-owned mixed capitalist system has never been modified. Most Finnish industry is controlled by private enterprise. It has proven constitutionally impossible to modify private property laws and transform Finland into a socialist-oriented economy. Exceptional cases exist where the government is the chief shareholder (trains, a i r l i n e s , communications and so forth), but in these cases i t plays l i t t l e active part. Only a third of the forestland belongs to the State, and the rest is divided into small private holdings. Farms are also of limited size, and non-governmental cooperatives are active in the distribution of agricultural produce.^ Finland's economy thus seems less "socialized" than the economies of Sweden or Great Britain, although 127 the government of course helps direct the economy in conjunction with labor, management and agricultural groups. Some authors even claim that the system i s so traditional that "economic power in Finland i s one of the most oligarchic in the world." 7 Be that as i t may, Finland's economy is radically different from those of her neighbors in Eastern Europe. Despite the many postwar economic changes noted above, the structure of Finnish production s t i l l differs from that of most industrialized countries. The centre of gravity i s s t i l l the forest industry. The traditional Finnish specialization in forest products has for a long time meant a certain dualism between an internationally competitive export industry of goods based on wood, and other g industries mainly directed toward the narrow domestic market. The Finnish economy has of course been striving to correct this structural imbalance. But the job i s far from complete. And the strains of this industrialization-diversification process have been reflected in the socio-political realm. Although one-half of the population today continues to l i v e in rural or semi-rural conditions, migration to the towns and c i t i e s has been rapid. This urbanization process, which started.on a large scale only in the 1950s, has been one of the prime sources of p o l i t i c a l and economic unrest within the country. For example, the p o l i t i c a l squabbles between the Agrarian-128 Centre Party and the Social Democrats have been largely the result of rapid economic changes—the transformation of a semi-agrarian to an industrial society. The Centrists have traditionally represented the rural-based producers, the Social Democrats the urban-based consumers. This conflict of interests has been responsible for much of the country's economic disruption—the strikes of 1949, 1956 and 1971, for instance—which has in turn led to the frequent changes of Cabinet. The re-emergence of the Social Democrats on the p o l i t i c a l scene in 1966 can be largely attributed to economic factors. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the dominance of the Agrarian Party led to an a r t i f i c i a l subsidization of the agricultural sector at the expense of growing urban industry. But by the mid-1960s the contradictions in the economy were becoming too great, and the electorate made a strong move toward p o l i t i c a l parties willing to support the emerging urban socio-economic forces. These p o l i t i c a l changes resulted in economic reform: a devaluation in October 1967 was successful due to comprehensive wage and price controls, and a sweeping economic boom followed during the 1968-71 period. Of course, Finland's economy i s to a large extent at the mercy of international forces beyond her control. Just as she is sensitive to changes in the systemic p o l i t i c a l environment, so she is sensitive to economic fluctuations abroad. The present slump 129 is largely a function of the uncertainty and deterioration in international financial circles. This can have ramifications for Finnish-Soviet relations. Historically, when Finland i s threatened by economic crises in the West she is forced to increase her reliance on trade with the Eastern bloc. The p o l i t i c a l tightrope Finland must walk between East and West is thus paralleled in the economic sphere. The Finnish economy is not controlled by the Russians, but i t is an important variable in Finland's relations with the Soviet Union. In spite of the d i f f i c u l t i e s outlined above, the Finnish economy has been and is basically sound. Finland's growth and pros-perity has offset her short-term problems, and the constantly improving economic pattern has probably meant the difference between socio-political s t a b i l i t y and chaos. Hence i t i s of great importance for Finland's security that she continue her economic development. Unstable development could result in serious p o l i t i c a l disturbances that would limit her a b i l i t y to maintain a cohesive, stable society 9 and a reasonable defense posture. B. War Reparations and Reconstruction The Soviet-Union—perhaps unwittingly—was directly responsible for the postwar changes in Finland's traditional economic structure. According to the terms of the basic agreement on war reparations signed in December 1944 and o f f i c i a l l y r a t i f i e d in the Paris Peace Treaty, Finland was obliged to deliver to the Soviet Union 130 war reparation products amounting to 300 million United States gold dollars within six years. The goods to be delivered were classified into the following groups: (1) 100.9 million dollars or 33.6 per cent for machines, installations and complete sets of machines for factories (2) 60.1 million dollars or 20.1 per cent for new watercraft; (3) 59.0 million dollars or 19.7 per cent for paper industry products; (4) 41.0 million dollars or 13.7 per cent for wood industry products; (5) 25.0 million dollars or 8.3 per cent for cable products; d (6) 14.0 million dollars or 4.6 per cent for existing ships of the merchant marine.^ To Finland, this schedule came as an unpleasant surprise, for in the prewar years wood and paper products had accounted for 12 80-90 per cent of her total exports. Obviously, both the structure and the productive capacity of Finland's trade and industry had to be changed. Finnish workshops and shipyards—until then aimed primarily at the home market—had to accommodate themselves to large-scale export deliveries. Efficient and modern heavy machine tools had to be acquired from abroad. E l e c t r i c a l machinery had to be purchased, and the technical equipment in the shipyards had to be supplemented and increased. Skilled workers had to be found. At the same time, the acute shortage of raw materials in the strained postwar market and the absence of financial l i q u i d i t y threatened the balance of deliveries The valuation was based on 1939 prices, although the world market prices in 1944 were 17 per cent higher. Finland was required to pay 80 gold dollars per inhabitant, compared to 30 and 15 dollars for Hungary and Rumania respectively. At today's prices the total value of the indemnity goods would be about 600 million dollars.10 131 A l l this had to be done in the face of an ambiguous p o l i t i c a l situation vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Russians were hot-and-cold about controlling the reparation payments. At times during the 1944-48 period, i t seemed that they might sabotage the Finns' efforts by enforcing stringent control measures. At other times, however, the creditors showed f l e x i b i l i t y when they were convinced the debtors were sincerely trying to f u l f i l l their commitments. In October 1945, for example, the Soviets unilaterally announced that the payment term would be extended from six to eight years. By the end of 1947 about 60 per cent of the total reparation obligation had been met, despite the additional d i f f i c u l t i e s of postwar 14 reconstruction and refugee resettlement. The Finnish people rightly believed that the punctual accomplishment of war reparation deliveries was one of the fundamental conditions of Finland's national independence. In July 1948 their perseverance paid off: the Soviets reduced the balance of goods due by one-half, so that the revised l i s t contained products of the metal industry almost exclusively. This meant, among other things, that the Finnish wood processing industries were able to concentrate on free exports; the Western currency thus earned helped launch Finland on her remarkable postwar 15 economic recovery. By the time the last reparation payment was made, in September 1952, Finnish industry had been transformed. Paying off the war indemnities had forced the industrialization and redevelopment of the 132 economy, and Finland emerged as a relatively strong European industrial country. Finland's effective efforts to f u l f i l l her obligations earned her the respect of the international community, and helped strengthen the Soviets' belief in Finnish r e l i a b i l i t y . As Jakobson notes, i t was "probably the f i r s t time in history in which a nation 16 has voluntarily f u l f i l l e d an obligation of this kind." The Finnish success can be attributed to three main factors: (1) the determination and perseverance of the Finnish people; (2) valuable financial support from the West, especially from Sweden and A the United States; and (3) the flexible war reparation policy of the Soviet Union. The importance of the Soviet leaders' attitude should not be underestimated. They had the economic power to destroy Finland's p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y , but did not take advantage of their position. Part of the reason, of course, was that Finnish deliveries were important for Russian reconsti-uction: "One does not usually k i l l the goose which 19 lays the golden eggs." The Russians also apparently realized that a free Finland would be a valuable future trading partner, with good AA relations between East and West and an access to Western technology. In August 1948, however, Finland had to give a f i n a l "no" to Marshall Plan aid because she "did not wish to take part in an under-taking that had become a subject of controversy between the Great Powers."17 This self-denial in the face of Soviet pressure was so important that Jakobson claims: "The Marshall Plan was designed to save Europe from Communism; Finland may have saved herself from Communism by saying no to the Marshall Plan."18 AA Indeed, in subsequent years, the Soviets helped the growing Finnish metal industry by concentrating their imports from Finland in this area. 133 But the important point, I would suggest, is that the Soviets' lenient attitude in economic matters reflected their basic strategic-defensive imperatives regarding Finland. True, the Russians exacted a heavy reparation payment, as was their right. But their primary and subsequent interest in Finland was not economic-exploitative any more that i t was ideological. The development of further trade relations between the two countries has corroborated this point. C. Foreign Trade 1. Trends and Developments Finland's economic and material well-being are greatly dependent on foreign trade. With only 4.7 million inhabitants, the home market i s very limited, and production geared to domestic needs 20 alone can be quite expensive. P o s s i b i l i t i e s of advance in the standard of l i v i n g thus depend to a large degree on developing good trade relations, for export makes mass production possible and increases opportunities for specialization. This i s of course true of many small countries. However, the See Appendix E for Graphs I and II showing the patterns of Finnish imports and exports with her six most important postwar trading partners (Great Britain, West Germany, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Norway, and the United States) from 1953-71; and Graphs III and IV showing patterns of trade with the EEC, EFTA and the Eastern bloc since 1960. 134 natural conditions for industrial l i f e in Finland make free foreign trade a matter of prime importance. The country is rich in raw materials, as we have seen, but these are almost exclusively products of the forest. Finland has none of the metals and fuels necessary for a modern industrial economy. The principal way of obtaining these necessities i s through the export of her own raw materials and finished products. The reserves of foreign currency earned in this way help buy foreign commodities for home consumption and raw materials for home industry. Since exports of goods and services accounts for nearly 28 per cent of the gross national product, Finland is v i t a l l y interested in maintaining her competitive position in inter-national markets. Products from the paper and wood industries naturally account for most Finnish exports. Finland is the third largest exporter of wood pulp in the world, and is second only to Canada as an 22 exporter of paper and cardboard. But the composition of exports has changed since the Second World War. Wood and paper represented 85 per cent of total exports in 1950, 75 per cent in 1960, and are 23 now down to about 55 per cent. The export of processed goods has risen sharply, although Finland i s by no means sufficiently diversified in her trade relations. The metal and engineering sector now ranks second on the export l i s t , accounting for about one-fourth of the total, compared with about 5 per cent 20 years ago. In the past ten years, since Finland's association with EFTA, the range of "non-135 traditional" exports (finished consumer goods and products of Finnish *24 design) has also expanded considerably. The composition of imports has not changed as much over the years. The majority s t i l l consists of necessary raw materials, fuels and lubricants, and investment goods. However, as Finns have grown more affluent, the import of durable consumer products has 25 increased most of a l l . The regional structure of Finnish foreign trade reveals a West European dominance, and the patterns today are remarkably lik e those of pre-independent Finland. The two largest markets for Finnish goods are the EFTA and EEC countries, with the Scandinavian EFTA members becoming more and more important. In 1971 more than 45 per cent of imports and exports were with EFTA countries, showing the importance of this preferential trade area. Exports to EEC countries formed 23 per cent of the total, and 27 per cent of the imports came from the European Community. Only about 14 per cent of Finland's exports were to Eastern bloc countries, and about 6 per cent to North America and Japan. The imports from these two areas were 18 and 6 2^ 6 per cent respectively. The regional composition of import and export See Appendix F, Table II, for a breakdown of export and import goods by type in 1971. ** See Appendix F, Table IV, for a l i s t of foreign trade by countries and areas in 1971. 136 goods i s described by V i i t a and Lomas: Broadly speaking, the Finnish metal and machine shop products are going East, while wood and i t s derivatives are going West. As regards imports, Finland is getting raw materials from the East and metal products and machines from the West. But this is only the overall picture. For example, the Western market for Finnish metal products i s growing in importance.27 Coming to individual countries, Great Britain is Finland's largest customer, taking 19 per cent of the total in 1971. Next is Sweden with 16 per cent, and then the Soviet Union, West Germany and the United States. Sweden now leads on imports into Finland, with 18 per cent of the total. West Germany supplies 17 per cent, and 28 then come Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The postwar years may be separated into two periods as Finnish commercial policy, with 1957 as the dividing point. The f i r s t period was characterized by s t r i c t regulation, high t a r i f f s and quotas, and stringent currency control. The Finns were quite protectionist and isolationist economically, and the country's position in international p o l i t i c s did not allow direct participation in Western European economic cooperation (i . e . , the Marshall Plan, and the OEEC). But, starting with a drastic devaluation of the Finnish markka in the autumn of 1957, Finland launched into a large scale change from a closed economy to a f a i r l y open one. She became an associate member of EFTA in 1961, and a member of the OECD in 1969. By 1969, practically a l l imports were free from quantitative r e s t r i c -29 tions, and two-thirds of Finnish industrial imports were duty-free. 137 This process of trade liberalization, combined with the general industrialization and diversification of the economy, produced severe strains and caused the balance of trade to be d e f i c i t throughout the 1960s. In October 1967 the Finns again devalued their money in an attempt to break the deficitory c i r c l e . Subsequent economic measures, such as the Government's Special Powers Act of 1968 (which, with the cooperation of management, labor and agricul-tural organizations, controlled price, rent and wage increases) helped ease inflationary pressure and made the devaluation a short-term success. The 1968-71 boom greatly improved Finland's overall trade balance. Today, however, the country is at the mercy of both internal economic dissension and an unstable international financial situation, and trade and economic growth have slowed down. In effect, Finland has always had to take the general situation created abroad into account when formulating her trade policy. She has had to adapt herself to the dominant trends in Europe. In addition, she is not able to base commercial policies on purely economic considerations. As we shall see, the Finns have had to modify their foreign trade in various ways because of external p o l i t i c a l factors. 2. The Soviet Union During the period between the two World Wars, Finnish trade with the Soviet Union was negligible. But in the postwar 138 years, Finland's powerful neighbor has emerged as an important trading partner. Although Finnish exports to the Soviet Union have been erratic, ranging from 25 per cent of the total in 1953 to 10 per cent in 1971, the import aide has comprised goods of v i t a l importance for the national economy, and has shown less fluctuation (down to 14 30 per cent from 20 per cent in 1953). Much of Finland's demand for grains, o i l products, coal and coke, and synthetic f e r t i l i z e r s has been satisfied through trade with the East. Finnnish exports of finished machine shop and shipyards products to Russia were especially v i t a l in the years immediately following the reparations period, when expanded Finnish industries had not yet opened up markets in the West. Thus, trade with the East has created new markets for products which would have been hard to s e l l in Western Europe, while at the same time i t has supplied Finland with v i t a l raw materials and producers' goods. Trade with the Soviet Union, in addition to being structurally important, has been a stable and profitable factor in the Finnish economy. Long-based agreements and contracts extending over several years, for example, have comprised fixed quotas of goods and have thus been removed from the fluctuations of Western supply and demand. Furthermore, the goods Finland has received have not required f u l l payment in hard Western currency—thus helping Finland's foreign exchange problems. Finally, a general feature of 139 Finland's trade with, the Communist countries has been i t s contraction during boom periods and expansion during recessions, thus absorbing some of the loss Finland -might take due to cy c l i c a l change in capitalist markets. Moscow's helpful trade policy toward Finland should not, however, conceal the fact that economic relations between the two countries can be a sensitive and potentially disruptive factor. Russia, too, has profited from trade with Finland; the import of Western technology and Finnish know-how—especially in the automation of wood and paper processing—has been qualitatively valuable for the Soviet economy. And at certain junctures in postwar history, economic relations have served as both a cause for dispute and a technique of Soviet influence. In 1958, for example, the Russians were concerned that the relative percentage of Finnish trade with the Communist bloc was dropping and showing an unmistakable orientation towards the West, especially West Germany. And a Finnish request that the accumulating ruble surplus in Finland's account be converted into Western currencies made matters 31 worse. The Soviets responded by cutting off trade negotiations and bringing most imports and exports to a s t a n d s t i l l — a t a time when unemployment in Finland was relatively high and the Finnish economy was particularly vulnerable to trade boycotts. In 1961, there were again clear links between Finnish-Soviet p o l i t i c a l and economic relations. As a result of Finland's adherence 140 to EFTA and her new open trade policy, Finnish foreign trade again showed a marked increase with- Western countries (particularly West Germany), while relative trade with, the Eastern bloc dropped. Furthermore, with the announcement that Finland's largest customer, Great Britain, was contemplating entry in the EEC, the Finns' interest in European integration increased. At that time, Moscow vi r t u a l l y equated the EEC with NATO and was suspicious of any contact between Finland and the Common Market. In the last ten years, however, Finnish-Soviet trade relations have reflected the more relaxed international p o l i t i c a l atmosphere. Although the percentage share of Finland's trade with the Communist countries has declined, there has been no concerted economic pressure by the Soviets, nor have p o l i t i c a l relations deteriorated. This i s even more remarkable when we note that trade between Finland and West Germany has more than tripled in the last decade, while trade with East Germany has remained at less that one 32 per cent of the total. There are several explanations for Moscow's apparent lack of concern over the relative decline in Finnish-Soviet trade. For one thing, the relative increase in trade with the West is not only a result of Finland's industrial diversification, but is necessary for the advance of her standard of l i v i n g and the maintenance of her economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y ; an impoverished and unstable 141 Finland would be an unpredictable factor for the Soviets in Northern Europe. For another thing, despite the percentage decline in trade, the absolute figures have continued to rise. Furthermore, the qualitative aspects have become increasingly beneficial to both countries. The Russians are cooperating in the construction of two nuclear power stations in Finland and a natural gas pipeline from the Soviet Union to Finland. And the Finns are constructing highly modern, automated pulp and paper processing plants in Soviet Karelia. Many of these cooperative efforts are overseen by the Permanent Soviet-Finnish Economic Cooperation Commission, established in February 1967 to expand "the economic foundation of neighbourly relations between the two 33 countries." More recently, in 1971, a ten-year Treaty on the Development of Economic, Technical and Insustrial Cooperation was signed by the two countries. It includes the extension of the most-favored clause, and deals with the exchange of patents, licenses and technical knowledge. It is the most comprehensive economic agreement ever 34 reached between Moscow and Helsinki. The paradox of Finnish-Soviet trade relations i s that the country most important for Finland p o l i t i c a l l y i s not the most important economically. Despite her geographical position near the Soviet Union, Finland is definitely Western in her economic orientation. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has not been exploitative in her trade relations with Finland. Finland is not an economic s a t e l l i t e . It is worth noting that the economic activity between the two countries has constituted on the whole a rare example of cooperation between two stat 142 with different economic and social systems. 3. Economic Integration In 1971, about 80 per cent of Finland's trade was with OECD countries. This figure alone shows why economic integration involving Western industrialized nations i s of prime importance for the Finnish economy. According to Tornudd, there are two economic-political imperatives that Finland must follow in her policy regarding European economic integration: (1) "Finland must not remain outside any preferential trade arrangement which includes Norway or Sweden together with any principle customer," and (2) "Finland must not disturb the c r e d i b i l i t y 36 of her policy or neutrality." In other words, she must take steps not to endanger any of her markets in the West vis-a-vis her main competitiors, but at the same time she must not endanger her neutrality by adhering to a politically-based organization, and she must certainly not make any moves that would threaten the s t a b i l i t y of her relations with the Soviet Union. A good example of the adroitness of the "Paasikivi-Kekkonen" economic diplomacy is Finland's acceptance in 1961 as an associate member of EFTA. It is also an example of the vali d i t y of the thesis that as long as the Soviets do not feel their border security or friendly relations are being jeopardized, they w i l l put l i t t l e pressure on Finnish contacts with the West. With the emergence of EFTA in 143 1959, Finland's competitive position with regard to such products as pulp and paper faced a severe handicap. Without membership, for example, the quarter of Finnish exports that went to Great Britain would be underpriced by such, member countries as Sweden. But Finland had to contend with Soviet opposition on both the p o l i t i c a l and economic levels. In the f i r s t place, the Soviet Union distrusted EFTA as a hostile trade bloc. And in the second place, not only did Finnish exports to the Soviet Union constitute one-fifth of her trade, but the Finns accorded her the most-favored nation principle. As an EFTA member, Finland could not maintain this trade without extending the most-favored nation benefits to the Soviet Union, and other EFTA members were understandably reluctant to permit this. In a subtle sense, the Finns put Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy to a test here. They were able to convince the Russians that membership in EFTA was necessary to the Finnish economy and therefore to Finnish internal s t a b i l i t y , and at the same time the Finns' need to compete in the world market was not incompatible with Finnish-Soviet friendship. In the economic realm, the two countries agreed to ignore the most-favord nation clause in l i e u of a special t a r i f f agreement whereby duties on Soviet imports would be reduced by the same amount as duties on EFTA imports. The Soviet Union was satisfied, EFTA members f e l t that the integrity of the free trade area 144 had not been violated, and the world got a further indication of Finnish independence and diplomatic s k i l l . As an associate member of EFTA, Finland has been able to develop and diversify her exports, especially in the Scandinavian market. Since 1968, a l l t a r i f f s covered by the EFTA Convention have been eliminated. But the greatest challenge Finland w i l l have to meet in the 1970s i s her relations with the Common Market. On the one hand, the preservation of traditional trade is at issue, since the overwhelming majority of Finland's commercial partners w i l l be members or associates of the European Community. On the other hand, the EEC offers new and hitherto unexploited opportunities for the development and diversification of Finnish exports. In the latter 1960s, Finland hoped she might solve her integration problems through the formation of a Nordic common market. But by 1970, with Denmark and Norway actively seeking membership in the EEC, i t was apparent that a special NORDEK organization had become an unrealistic venture. Finland had to find an alternate solution to her trading problems, while trying to avoid any situation creating t a r i f f barriers in the North. In November 1970 the Finnish Government announced that i t was ready to seek together with the EEC some formula for mutual t a r i f f concessions and commercial agreements which would not place Finland's traditional trading relations in question and which would be consistent with her policy of neutrality. Detailed negotiations were started in 145 December 1971, and are s t i l l continuing at the time of this writing. Although other "non-candidate" EFTA countries are having a f a i r degree of success in negotiating the Special Relations Agreements, Finland i s driving for a better bargain than is being offered by the EEC. The d i f f i c u l t i e s are summarized in an EFTA report: The crucial sector here i s paper. Because of the fears of the Community paper industries, the Community i s insisting on a twelve-year transitional period to arrive at free trade. Finland would be the main victim of such a regime because paper makes up sixty per cent of Finnish exports to the Communities. The Finns point out that the Community offer lacks balance because i t would ask Finland to reduce i t s duties on Community manufactures over five years but would allow the Community twelve years to reduce i t s duties on paper. During that time the Community paper industries would be able to take f u l l advantage of protection for their production. Finland is therefore asking for a maximum transitional period of eight years and is claiming that i t should have even better terms in this sector than are being offered to other non-candidate countries because of the predominant position which paper plays in her exports to the Communities. Like Austria, Finland is also asking that any special Community regimes for other important sensitive products, such as ferro-chrome or man-made fibres, should be r e c i p r o c a l . ^ These problems have caused considerable concern in Finland. There i s sharp disagreement with the terms offered, and considerable opposition to the proposed commercial ties. C r i t i c s charge that "decisions on the nature and l i v i n g environment in Finland would be made in Brussels on EEC terms," and that "the big Common Market, with i t s 250 million people and li b e r a l trade reputation is clamoring for 38 more protection than Finland, with less than five million people." This opposition, which oddly enough unites Conservatives and Communists 146 (albeit for different reasons), has had strong ramifications in domestic p o l i t i c s , and was partly responsible for saddling the country with a minority Government in February 1972. The resignation of Paasio's Cabinet in July was directly attributable to the EEC negotiations: "The Social Democrats decided they could not alone take the responsibility of signing the free trade agreement with the 39 European Common Market." As with the EFTA talks in 1960-61, the attitude of the Soviet Union is important here. The traditional Russian feeling toward the EEC has been quite negative and hostile. The Soviets have claimed that (1) mBmbership or association with the EEC implies de facto support of NATO, (2) association would endanger the sovereignty and independence of a neutral, (3) association would mean economic d i s c r i -mination towards t h i r d parties, and (4) close ties with the EEC 40 would endanger a neutral's c r e d i b i l i t y in time of war.' It i s for reasons such as these that Finland cannot contemplate f u l l membership in any trade bloc with p o l i t i c a l links to a Great Power military agreement. Yet, paradoxically, the Soviets do not seem to be opposed to the projected Special Relations Agreements at this time. For one thing, the international p o l i t i c a l situation is less threatening than i t has ever been. Secondly, Finland has calmed Soviet distrust with many of the same arguments she employed during the EFTA negotiations more than a decade ago. And f i n a l l y , as Neil Ulman notes in a recent Wall Street Journal a r t i c l e , Finland's tie to the Common Market has 147 already been t a c i t l y approved by the Soviets, but is really opposed by the United States. On the one hand, the Russians do not want to jeopardize the upcoming European Security Conference with their usual denunciation of the EEC. And on the other hand, the Americans object that preferential pacts with the EEC violate the s p i r i t of the GATT accords, and pose a further problem to the large United States balance 41 of payments d e f i c i t . Whatever the outcome of the EEC negotiations, a solution to the problem of economic integration remains one of Finland's most serious economic problems. The most promising point, however, i s that the Finns have avoided any move that might have caused the Soviet Union to commit herself openly against an arrangement between Finland and the Common Market. 4. Future Prospects The maintenance and raising of Finland's standard of l i v i n g depends to a large degree on the future development of foreign trade. The main question today i s how to uphold Finland's economic position in the whole of Europe and safeguard her competitiveness in every direction. Finland has to concern herself with increasing her exports at an appropriate rate. At the same time she must complete her program of structural diversification on order to balance her sources of income and take f u l l advantage of widening foreign markets. 148 Finland's special position between two power blocs has some dangerous economic implications. It is often d i f f i c u l t to draw the line between p o l i t i c s and economics, and a commercial approach could be interpreted as implying p o l i t i c a l tendencies as well. But up to now, Finland has generally used her position to advantage. She has profited from trade with both East and West. And the Soviet Union w i l l apparently remain unopposed to increased Western economic integration as long as i t leads to a p o l i t i c a l detente in Europe. Above a l l , the Russians are looking to a relaxation in East-West trade restrictions to help their own economy. They need Western technology and credits to develop and modernize their domestic industry. Moscow's incredible "restraint" in the recent American blockade of North Vietnam, I 42 believe, stems from economic considerations such as these. And every indication now points to increased trade relations between the 43 power blocs as the result of a detente. In this l i g h t , Finland's small but not insignificant position gives the Soviet Union a v i t a l , open link with the West. It i s therefore possible to maintain a reserved optimism about future prospects in Finland. The growing economic integration in Europe and the growing economic cooperation between East and West should improve Finland's position, both economically and p o l i t i c a l l y . VIII The Cultural Perspective A. Finnish-Russian History The fate of geography has been a dominant theme in Finnish history. Through centuries of precarious existence the Finns have been threatened, fought over, invaded and exchanged among powerful neighbors; with the Russians alone, for example, they have fought dozens of wars—and lost nearly a l l of them. The picture of Finland's p o l i t i c a l history began to take shape early in the middle ages—a picture in which the rivalry between East and West, and the various ways the Finns tried to adjust themselves to this r i v a l r y , became the most dominant features.^" The province of Finland was incorporated into the Swedish state early in the thirteenth century. Inclusion in the Swedish p o l i t i c a l system meant allegiance with Rome. It also meant that Finnish society would be similar to the Swedish, permeated by the same 150 social and p o l i t i c a l values. In addition, Finland's status was never that of a conquered nation; in 1362 she was legally recognized as the equal of the Swedish provinces when the Finns obtained the right to participate in the election of the Swedish king. The f i r s t boundary between Sweden-Finland and the Russian principality of Novgorod was l a i d down in 1323. This border, however, was indeterminate and unmarked. As Swedes, Finns, Karelians and Russians slowly migrated into the forestlands of Northern Europe, there were inevitable clashes, and the struggle between East and West in this region was to last for centuries. Finland's eastern border became a scene of bloodshed and war, and the Russians acquired the reputation of persecutors—an attitude that was to become deeply imprinted in 2 the Finnish consciousness. The feeling began to develop that the Russians, a nation of different faith, culture and societal structure, constituted a mortal danger to,Finland's existence. Defense came to 3 mean fighting the East and peace meant peace in the East. During the greater part of the middle ages, alternating pressures from East and West maintained themselves in a tenuous, conflict-ridden equilibrium. But when Sweden's stature as a major European power began to decline in the eighteenth century, the situation changed. Russian troops occupied Finland several times, leaving behind a legacy of torture, murder and deep h o s t i l i t y . By the end of the eighteenth century, however, i t became apparent that Finland must accommodate herself to the dominant power in the East: the Finns 4 had to find a modus vivendi with the Russians. 151 When Finland was definitively occupied by the Russian Army during the Napoleonic Wars in 1808-09, the disruption in the traditional way of l i f e was not as great as -might be supposed. Tsar Alexander I knew that the p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y situation in Europe was s t i l l unsettled, and i t was important that the defeated country near his capital be pacified. This was best done by offering the Finns better conditions than they had enjoyed under Sweden."* The country became a semi-autonomous Grand Duchy governed by the Finns themselves, separate from the Russian Government. The old Swedish-Finnish Constitution, laws, taxation system, societal structure, citizenship, borders, and way of l i f e were preserved. The Finns were understandably grateful to the Tsar for their special status: though at the mercy of power p o l i t i c s , they could continue to follow their own traditions. But as time went on, these traditions formed the basis for a growing movement of Finnish nationalism. In the period from about 1840 to 1870, Finnish society underwent a radical transformation. A cultural awakening, based on the untapped sources of Finnish language and folklore, came to symbolize the desire for integration of language and nationhood. A large quantity of books and poems, such as the Kalevala epic, expressed this new-found national consciousness. Both the Swedish and Finnish language groups began emphasizing specific national characteristics as distinct from the Russians. At the same time, 152 national liberation was demanded by greater and greater numbers of liberals and revolutionaries, and in some circles i t was even suggested that Finland be proclaimed a neutral state.^ These currents, however, became anathema to nineteenth century Russian nationalists. There was growing p o l i t i c a l pressure in St. Petersburg to incorporate Finland into Russia proper. In the latter part of the century, the Tsar sacrificed Finland's special position and restricted her autonomy. The February Manifesto of 1899 heralded a policy of Russification of Finnish society. The astounded Finns began a massive campaign of passive resistance. For several years, during the Russo-Japanese War, there was a relaxation in pressure: the Finns were able to reform their Parliament, enfranchise their whole population, and democratize their p o l i t i c a l system. But the Russians soon tightened their grip again. Parliament was disbanded, Finnish leaders were replaced by Russians, and new oppressive measures were taken by Tsarist o f f i c i a l s . But the Finnish nationalist movement had bolstered the national s p i r i t to such an extent that the Russification program had no real chance of success. Tsar Nicholas could temporarily impose his power by force, but only at the cost of "unrelenting hatred of the Russians." 7 The Fi r s t World War and the confusion in Russia in 1917 gave the Finns their chance. They declared their independence on December 6th. Although Lenin's Government was the f i r s t to recognize independent Finland shortly thereafter, Russia remained in Finnish eyes 153 the natural enemy of the country's freedom. A state of war existed between the two countries for several years. The Red Army, for example, gave some assistance to the Finnish. "Reds" during Finland's c i v i l war. After the victory of the Finnish "Whites" under Mannerheim in 1918, however, the new Finnish Government gave only limited assistance to the a l l i e d intervention in Russia—mainly because the White Russians strenuously opposed recognition of Finnish independence. Peace was not restored u n t i l the Treaty of Tartu in 1920. At that time, significantly, the Soviet Government asked for additional t e r r i -tory in the Karelian Isthmus to provide depth to the defense of Leningrad; i t was too weak to enforce such demands at that time, but the claims were not forgotten and were again taken up less than twenty years later. During the next two decades, Finnish foreign policy vacillated almost aimlessly, searching for some sort of identity. An alliance was unsuccessfully sought with the Baltic states in 1921-22, a non-aggression pact was signed with the Soviet Union in 1932, and neutrality along Scandinavian lines was proclaimed in 1935. But there was no unity and c l a r i t y of purpose. Inside the country, the p o l i t i c a l extremes of both Left and Right struggled against the Centre and the language despute between the Swedish-speaking minority and 154 the Finnish-speaking majority threatened to divide the country. The world-wide economic depression further exacerbated the internal situation. Above a l l , Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were ambiguous and poorly formulated. Finnish-Soviet relations were characterized by mutual suspicion and fear: Finnish fear of a Soviet threat to her independence, and Russian fear that Finland could provide the springboard for a Western power to march on Leningrad. Ambiguities in Finland's relations with Germany and Sweden, along with an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist attitude and a lack of appreciation for Soviet fears on the part of the Finns, hardly helped make Finnish assurances of neutrality seem credible. The Soviet Union, with v i t a l interests at stake in that unstable period, could not rationally put much fait h in the Finnish Government's professed position. The events of 1939 revealed how bad a failure Finland's Eastern policy had been. The language controversy often reached dangerous proportions throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The people of Swedish origin in Finland, much as the English minority in Quebec, comprised only ten per cent of the population, but held a disproportionate position economically, p o l i t i c a l l y and culturally. However, in the 1930s, those whose native language was Finnish gained positions of importance corresponding to their numbers, and l i b e r a l and equitable language laws were developed. Today, Finland serves as a model for bilingual nations; the problem has been solved to such a satisfactory degree that i t has disappeared as a p o l i t i c a l and cultural issue. 155 In both the Winter War and the Continuation War, the Russians badly misread the patriotism and fighting power of the Finnish people. The Finnish forces, though-heavily outnumbered, succeeded in stopping the Soviet advance in the Karelian Isthmus both times—an achievement which amazed the world and surprised the Soviet leaders, 9 who apparently had expected an easy march into Helsinki. In the end, of course, the Soviet Union won the War and the security she sought. But as Mazour notes, "In the wake of i t s sorrowful events i t l e f t the stunned Finnish people with a burning wound that w i l l take generations to close.""^ One of the most incredible aspects of the immediate postwar years was that the Finns were able to swallow their pride, take their defeat with dignity, and pursue a coldly rational, emotionless policy which convinced the Russians of the v i a b i l i t y of neutral, independent Finland as a secure buffer-state. This was a feat of major proportions: in Finland there is s t i l l a latent fear, a distrust and even hatred of the great power to the East, ingrained in the Finnish consciousness through centuries of s t r i f e and conflict. One of Finland's greatest tasks has been to overcome that attitude in the face of geographical reality. Yet the attitude has also been an important determinant in the tone of Finnish-Soviet relations. The Russians have realized that any attempt to dominate the country would meet deep resistance fed by h i s t o r i c a l experience. 156 Furthermore, the Finns' past has made them f u l l y a part of the Western world as participants in Western p o l i t i c a l , social, economic, religious and intellectual developments. While the Finns like to think of their present international position as being a bridge between two cultures, they themselves are hi s t o r i c a l l y oriented in their internal way of l i f e to the West and not the East—be i t Tsarist or Bolshevik. B. Some Aspects of Finnish Culture and Society We have already characterized Finland's geographical-p o l i t i c a l location as being remote, and we have noted that for many centuries Finland was on the front line in Nordic conflicts with Russia. These facts imply more than a history of frequent wars and border displacements on the fringe of Europe. They also suggest a marked isolation and slow cultural development: on the one hand, cultural influences from the East have not penetrated deeply; on the other hand, new cultural ideas and trends have usually f i l t e r e d up rather slowly from the West. Despite Finland's proximity to Russia, archeological finds in different parts of the country show that there has always been a clear preponderance of Western influence in the spheres of material and non-material culture. The Aaland Islands, for example, were in ancient times a centre of far-reaching commercial and cultural contacts with Western peoples. Finland's main Western exchanges have been with her Nordic neighbors. Her social structure and l i f e are Scandinavian. 157 By tradition, Swedes, Norwegians,and Finns tend to think in both a "Western European" as well as a "Nordic" way; this does not imply total intellectual isolation from the Continent, with which these nations are bound in many ways, but i t does mean a selective attitude of a kind toward new influences.^ These general cultural tendencies as Evers notes, make indisputable Finland's membership to the Western European cultural c i r c l e and are part and parcel of Finnish history and the national consciousness of by far the greatest segment of the Finnish people.^ Nevertheless, Finland's remoteness from the mainstream of these cultural ties cannot be denied. This isolation was for centuries strengthened by what could be termed the "impenetrability" of the Finnish language. Finnish i s not related to any of the major A languages in the world. It has no Indo-European roots. The reception of impulses from abroad and the communication of the nation's achievements to others have thus been subjected to certain limitations. Until the nineteenth century, when the Kalevala epic came to symbolize a genuine emerging national identity, cultural development was slow. But even since that time, Finnish cultural achievements have developed particularly in music, architecture, design and painting—the internationally expressive arts not dependent on language. A It i s similar to Estonian and distantly related to Hungarian. 158 The effect of Finland's physical and linguistic remoteness i s in a sense increased by the country's high degree of internal homogeneity. Finland i s , of course, a bilingual country: about 91 13 per cent are Finns and 8.5 per cent are Swedes. But there are no deep social or raci a l cleavages, and the overwhelming majority of the 14 country (94 per cent) i s Lutheran. This homogeneity has helped bring the nation together during periods of national emergency, and has facili t a t e d the achievement of almost universal consensus in the present general foreign policy line. But i t has not helped the Finns achieve any semblance of cultural diversity or receptivity to outside influences. However, especially since the Second World War, conscious efforts have been made in the f i e l d of cultural policies to offset any tendencies toward self-sufficiency and autarchy. As in other aspects of Finnish international relations, Finland was slow to progress in the f i e l d of cultural agreements with foreign countries. However, as Siikala notes, in the late 1950s "there was a widely f e l t need to c l a r i f y Finland's p o l i t i c a l and economic position and thus create the understanding and good w i l l that was considered necessary The most important exception to this general passivity was, significantly, the Nordic cultural cooperation program initiated in 1946-47.15 159 for an expansion of foreign trade, tourism and other similar 16 a c t i v i t i e s . " Questions of international cultural cooperation were thus connected with the general problem of Finland's information activities abroad. The f i r s t step Finland took in this direction was to join UNESCO in 1956. Since that time, numerous cultural societies have sprung up within Finland with the purpose of promoting relationships between Finland and the international community. The l i s t of societies is long: Finnish-American, Finnish-British, Finnish-Chinese, Finnish-Dutch, Finnish-French, Finnish-Hungarian, Finnish-Indian— ad infinitum. A l l these societies strive to promote an end mentioned in their rules: to make the country concerned and i t s culture known in Finland, and to disseminate knowledge of the country to the public at large."'"7 The rules of most of the societies expressly state that their aim i s not to take part in p o l i t i c a l activity, although the active promotion of international cultural contacts can have p o l i t i c a l 18 significance for a traditionally isolated country. Most of the above programs are privately sponsored, clear from governmental ties. The more important societies, however, do receive subsidies from the State, and the co-sponsoring of cultural agreements and programs of exchange with foreign countries by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Education attest to the desire of Finnish Governments to break out of the traditional isolation. / 160 The most significant aspect of this cultural activity is the promotion of relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. Apart from the private Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society and the government-sponsored Institute for Soviet Studies, there are frequent cultural agreements and exchanges involving music, dance, painting, design, programs of folk culture, and trade and commercial f a i r s . The best-known organization involving Finnish-Soviet relations and foreign p o l i t i c s in general is the Paasikivi Society,founded in 1958: From a modest beginning i t quickly rose to a position of prominence as a forum for foreign policy debate. It has been successful in obtaining eminent foreign politicians as guest speakers at i t s meetings, and President Urho Kekkonen has made some of his major speeches on foreign policy at these meetings also. It has no p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n , but many of i t s members consider the preservation of Finland's present line of foreign policy a task of importance.x^ Another important cultural aspect of Finnish society related to foreign affairs i s the position of Finland's newspapers. Freedom of the press is written into the Finnish Constitution, although in 1948 prudence made i t imperative to set down certain limitations, "making i t a criminal offense to damage Finland's relations with a 20 foreign state by publicly and intentionally abusing that country." This has been interpreted as limiting editorial comment on foreign events. But the main lines of the basic foreign policy have been supported unanimously by the press. And in practice, while the papers exercise prudent self-restraint in some areas, they can and do write 161 strongly on occasion. A study of the Finnish press certainly does not give the impression that i t is s t i f l e d or censored. Most Finnish newspapers are a f f i l i a t e d with the various p o l i t i c a l parties. The at times l i v e l y debate between the parties on details of foreign policy tactics and strategy takes place principally in the newspapers, and readers can get a rather diversified picture of the questions v i t a l to Finland. During the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, for example, there were three main tendencies in the Finnish press: (1) the Conservatives' Uusi Suomi and the Social Democrats' Suomen Sosialidemokraatti expressed strong disapproval of the Soviet action; (2) the independent Helsingin Sanomat and the Agrarian Maakansa reflected the cautious, neutral line taken by the Government; and (3) the Communists' Vapaa Sana gave unqualified 21 support to the Russians. These attitudes clearly revealed the contrast between o f f i c i a l Government policy and the opposition party views. They also had implications for Finnish-Soviet relations: what the papers wrote helped to form the attitudes the Soviet leaders later assumed toward the different parties during the events of 1958 22 and 1961. Despite the new interest Finns have been taking in international relations and cultural contacts with foreign countries, Finland remains—by the very nature of her neutral position—removed from the main axes of international activity and Cold War conflict. 162 Few observors who have spent any time in Finland can f a i l to ap-preciate the social and psychological advantages the country has gained from such a position. The social and economic systems have not been burdened by ri g i d ideological immobility and the seething discontent and constraints thereby produced in both East and West. The people have not been burdened with the polarizing rhetoric of the Cold War, so s t i f l i n g to free expression and thought in many Great Power and a l l i e d countries.* Above a l l , the average Finn i s certainly no less free to pursue his own self-fulfillment as he sees f i t than he would be i n any other Western democracy—and in many cases he i s even better off. The inner solidarity of the Finnish nation is not an insignificant factor in the Finns' present independence. People who have the same customs, norms of behavior and attitudes toward things that are the heritage from a common past—who have made common sacrifices for the good of joi n t l y defined aims and participated i n maintaining the security of their community—have a cultural s o l i -23 darity that i s d i f f i c u l t for a potential aggressor to penetrate. Such factors form one of the basic strengths that have kept Finland united and independent. The developments in world p o l i t i c s , for example, seem to be followed more impartially by the Finnish press than by the press of many larger countries. 163 C. Finnish National Character A discussion of national character and i t s relation.to p o l i t i c s is wrought with p i t f a l l s . The subjective nature of such an intangible factor makes i t d i f f i c u l t to assess as a determinant of p o l i t i c a l behavior. But I feel that a brief analysis of Finnish national characteristics can bring an important element into our understanding of Finnish-Soviet relations—an element that should not be underestimated or b e l i t t l e d . The Finnish Constitution decrees that every citizen shall * be protected by law as to l i f e , honour, personal liberty and property. The individualistic tenor of these four slogan-words symbolically reflects many of the basic precepts of Finnish society. In particular, the inclusion of the word "honour" (kunnia) i s a significant key to the national character of the Finns. There are certain Finnish character traits that seem to be universally recognized in the literature. The Finns are variously referred to as a r e s i l i e n t , vigorous, courageous, independent, stubborn, proud, intensely nationalistic people—reserved and introspective i n their remote Northern isolation and uniquely tough in their rude 24 Northern climate. These qualities were reflected in their defiant As compared to the Canadian low-key "peace, order and good government"; the American " l i f e , liberty and the pursuit of hap-piness"; and the French "liberty, equality, fraternity." 164 attitude during the Second World War—their dogged determination to remain free people—which apparently had a strong effect on Soviet perceptions of the Finnish situation in the postwar period. In the 1944-48 years, for instance, the Finns would have put up fierce re-sistance to any occupation of their country, and would have created 25 enormous d i f f i c u l t i e s for a Soviet-sponsored Communist regime. An example in point is the strong counterinsurgency movement during that period. The Finns were not about to lose to local Communists the independence they had successfully protected against the Soviets; hardened military veterans and bitter Karelian refugees, loosely organized in "target shooting" groups and controlling secret arms caches in regions of relative Communist strength, must have been frightening deterrents to many left-wing agitators. It i s no coincidence that the Finnish language has coined a special word—"sisu"—for the traits of hardiness and per-severance we have been discussing. It is also no coincidence that one of the most sacred customs in the Finnish way of l i f e — t h e sauna— requires extremes of personal determination on the part of a hardened sauna goer which are not unrelated to sisu and kunnia. The severity of l i f e in the North has fashioned the Finnish character i n a unique way: Billington even suggests that one of the most important factors preventing a Communist takeover "was the simple element of fear."26 165 In the backwoods a man must rely on himself, on his strength and his own inventiveness. The Finns have not known the feeling of solidarity and strength in numbers which are common to vi l l a g e dwellers in the plains.... The small holdings, scattered villages, the vast wilderness, and the natural freedom of the men of the forest, have moulded a se l f - s u f f i c i e n t , independent and yet a stubborn people. The extremes of the Finnish climate—a dark autumn, bright winter snows, an ex-plosive spring and a short summer of almost continuous daylight—have impressed upon generations of Finns the strength and immutability of the basic forces of l i f e . ^ 7 The Finnish character has thus been determined through more than a thousand years of written and unwritten history, and i s deeply i n -grained to the present day. At the height of the Winter War, Winston Churchill wrote: Finland a l o n e — i n danger of death, superb, sublime Finland—shows what free men can do. Today, there i s no reason to doubt the tenacity and strong w i l l of the Finnish people to resist any impingement on their basic freedoms and way of l i f e . Some writers have suggested that the relative af-fluence of modern Finnish l i f e has weakened the resolve and resistance of the people, and the policies of the Centre Party are cited as a 29 reflection of that weakness. But the traumatic feeling of being utterly alone in the Winter War, of having to forego help from the West, formed an underlying psychological basis for a healthy prudence, restraint and f l e x i b i l i t y ; i t did not result in a f a t a l i s t i c or indolent attitude of submission. If the Russians were ever to move 166 into Finland as they did in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, I believe, they would meet with an active, savage resistance that would create i n -superable internal and international problems. Fortunately, because of a variety of factors, there i s very l i t t l e likelihood that such a tragedy w i l l ever occur. But i f the Soviets have ever had such designs on Finland, their appreciation for the basic t r a i t s of Finnish character cannot be discounted as a significant restraining factor. In their relations with the Soviet Union, the Finns face the need for two opposite qualities. On the one hand they must be sto l i d and immovable—"the fixed point on which both East and West 30 can rely." On the other hand they must be fl e x i b l e and adaptable— f i t t i n g themselves into changing international patterns and integrating 31 their population into a domestic industrial society. Postwar history, I f e e l , has proved that both qualities are firmly part of the Finnish national character. IX Conclusion A. The Multi-Perspective Approach 1. The Advantages of the Approach With the myriad of facts, data and phenomena that must be assimilated when attempting to understand p o l i t i c a l processes, a student of foreign relations must have some sort of system for simpli-fying, categorizing and structuring the world around him—a perspective or model for discovering patterns of regularity (and irregularity) i n interaction and activity, and an approach that w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the investigation of cause and effect relationships in the international community. But since the study of foreign relations is so complex, there i s i n my opinion no single perspective, no matter how global or universal i n scope, which can adequately describe and explain the interaction of power, control and influence between men, groups of 168 men and nations. A comprehensive model or perspective i n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l science, I believe, is neither necessary nor desirable. And I doubt that i t is possible. Different areas of concentration seem to require different approaches: the choice depends on what one studies, where the subject i s located, the time span or epoch being investigated, whether the focus is on dynamic or static aspects, and the level of analysis. Above a l l , the investigator must determine what he wants to find out about his subject—the questions he wants answered. This is where the perspective as a method for understanding i s of prime importance; the results can be a direct function of the subjective biases and values that have determined the choice of perspective. The perspectives used by the various authors who have written about Fin-land are both prisms for simplifying and understanding reality, and tools for distorting reality to conform with their own value systems. For example, an observor who wants to underline the Soviet Union's influence in Finnish p o l i t i c a l l i f e could concentrate on the domestic p o l i t i c a l perspective, ignoring the systemic and strategic factors which helped determine Russian actions. Or a writer who feels that Finland has been a mere pawn of the Great Powers could downplay the personality and cultural perspectives, ignoring the significance of the Finns' own actions in shaping their destiny. Basing a p o l i t i c a l study on one or two perspectives, no matter how comprehensive, can 169 produce an imbalanced view of p o l i t i c s . Furthermore, p o l i t i c a l activity does not operate i n a vacuum. While i t is legitimate to separate the p o l i t i c a l from other aspects of society for analytical purposes, we must not forget that this separation is self-defeating i f p o l i t i c s i s not reintegrated into society and put into i t s proper place along with other determinant and co-existing forces. Beyond the basic p o l i t i c a l problems that interest us, there are other questions in international relations which must be.answered: Are there forces other than the p o l i t i c a l which shape a nation's destiny, and are these forces so important that p o l i t i c s i s secondary to them or determined by them? For example, i f we are interested i n understanding the power and influence relation-ships between nations, surely economic and cultural questions cannot be ignored. In other words, i n addition to the purely p o l i t i c a l aspects of Finnish-Soviet relations, one should systematically i n -vestigate the h i s t o r i c a l , geographical, social, economic and cultural processes at work inside the two countries, between them, and within a larger international context. The study of p o l i t i c s , by i t s very nature, seems to be inherently inter-disciplinary. No one model or perspective can pro-duce a satisfactory explanation of p o l i t i c a l relationships. The subject i s too complex, and the results of even the most objective study are subjectively preconditioned by the choice of perspective. 170 By systematically including a number of p o l i t i c a l and non-political perspectives i n a study of foreign relations, our understanding of p o l i t i c s i t s e l f can become richer and more complete. Such was the aim of this thesis. 2. An Assessment of Our Six Perspectives Postwar Finnish relations with the Soviet Union have been established and maintained through the conjunction of a com-plicated set of interrelated, interdependent variables, and our multi-perspective study has helped us isolate and study these variables independently, within separate conceptual categories. It i s of course important to take into account each of the six perspectives (and, conceivably, any additional perspectives which might be investigated—such as the bureaucratic) when analyzing Finnish-Soviet relations in general or an aspect of these relations in particular. This does not imply that a l l perspectives are equally significant. In some situations, one or two perspective might prove the most helpful in analyzing the salient determinants of Finnish and Russian actions, and might have the greatest potentiality as an explanatory or descriptive tool. In another situation, other perspectives might prove more important and valuable. But a l l per-spectives should be considered when making an evaluation. It would be a mistake, however, to assume a r e l a t i v i s t i c 171 attitude and say that the importance of each perspective i n under-standing and explaining Finnish relations with the Soviet Union can be determined a r b i t r a r i l y or i s dependent on specific events. There are, I believe, grounds for hypothesizing a hierarchical ranking of our six perspectives which would (a) form the underlying basis for the study of Finnish-Soviet relations, (b) f a c i l i t a t e the achievement of plausible explanations for most aspects of these relations, and (c) help lead to predictions associated with the explanations. In a general sense, this ranking was used in establishing the order of perspective presentations in the thesis. The three most important perspectives, i n descending order of importance, would seem to be: (1) the systemic, (2) the strategic, and (3) the domestic p o l i t i c a l . The order of the last three perspectives is open to more speculation, although in most periods of c r i s i s the relative ranking has been: (4) the personality, (5) the economic, and (6) the cultural. In other words, the objective conditions i n the inter-national environment (the systemic structure, the level of inter-national tension, and the strategic balance in Northern Europe) have had the most pervasive influence on Finnish-Soviet relations—even though the Finns have had l i t t l e control over these factors. When the world has been ridden with dispute and conflict, as in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Finnish-Soviet relations have been at their worst. When the overall atmosphere has been f a i r l y relaxed, as i n 172 the last few years, relations have been stable and cordial. This i s of course a generality; even i f the international environment were peaceful, Finnish-Soviet relations could deteriorate because of un-settling p o l i t i c a l events within Finland or economic d i f f i c u l t i e s between the two countries. And one should never neglect the Finns' own actions in determining their fate. But Finland's security seems to be more threatened when d i f f i c u l t i e s arise on higher perspective levels as we have ranked them. And she can be in a potentially precarious position, as during the mini-crises of 1958 and 1961, when problems arise on four or five levels at the same time—especially when both systemic and strategic factors are involved. Finnish p o l i t i c a l scientists such as Hakovirta are at present investigating the related concept of threshold as i t applies to the security of Finnish neutrality.^ They are trying to discover which variables, and to what quantitative degree, determine the point beyond which their country i s no longer perceived as being stable and neutral—and what variables can and should be altered to raise the threshold level i t s e l f . Our multi-perspective study has given us some insights into this problem. We have provided the basis for an understanding of many of the actions taken by the Finnish people in their attempt to remain on friendly but independent terms with the Soviet Union. Above a l l , they have been actively seeking to improve the international 173 p o l i t i c a l environment in Europe and the strategic s t a b i l i t y of the Nordic area. They have also sought to remove their domestic p o l i t i c a l situation as regards foreign policy from the realm of doubt and speculation, and they have exercised a prudent self-restraint in the election of their top-level decision-makers. Finally, they have handled their economic and trade relations with s k i l l , and have sought to eliminate their relative cultural isolation. Their success in these ventures has been one of the dominant themes of this thesis. B. The Finnish Model Indeed, Finland has been so successful that one might well ask whether other small countries l i v i n g i n the shadow of a Great Power could follow her example. The countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America, for example, might see Finland's neutral buffer-state position as a viable solution to the problem of Big Power influence, exploitation and hegemony. There i s , however, l i t t l e concrete evidence to support such use of the Finnish model in the above cases. It now seems clear that the Soviet Union w i l l not tolerate any form of neutrality among her s a t e l l i t e neighbors, as the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian examples proved. Latin American countries are linked to the United States economy in a multitude of inextricable ways, and a break in these ties would probably result in American h o s t i l i t y and a d r i f t towards the Soviet or 174 Chinese bloc instead of towards neutrality—as we have seen in Cuba. A Western application of the Finnish model has also been suggested for Norway, but the arguments have not met with any favorable response i n that country and there i s no indication that alignments in Northern Europe w i l l change in the near future. Compared to the above countries, Finland's situation i s unique. It results from a conjuction of h i s t o r i c a l and geographical circumstances d i f f i c u l t to find elsewhere in the world. Many variables have combined to determine Finland's present status: the balance of power in postwar Europe; the Soviet Union's strategic-defensive attitude in Northern Europe; Finland's strong Western cultural, p o l i t i c a l and constitutional orientation; the avoidance of foreign occupation after World War II; astute postwar Finnish leadership; the historical relationship with Russia; and the strength and determination of the Finnish people. Application of a Finnish-model solution to another country would probably be a r t i f i c i a l l y con-trived and would not readily take root unless many similar conditions * were present. But i n another sense, Finland could have much to teach other countries. The diplomatic s k i l l s the Finns have shown in adapting to their situation—the adroit tightrope walking and tenacious a b i l i t y Some similar conditions may be present, however, in countries such as Burma or Afghanistan.^ 175 to guard against outside encroachments—might be studied and used to advantage by other p o l i t i c a l leaders. The firm support of Finnish diplomats for peaceful solutions to international problems could serve as an example i n strife-torn situations. In addition, as Kuusisto notes, the generally satisfactory experience of both East and West in adjusting to Finland may have generated some f a i t h in tolerance, i f not encouragement, of alternative third-state formulae for survival 3 and prosperity i n future years. The tone of this thesis has clearly been optimistic. The enthusiasm expressed for Finland's future prospects has been the pro-duct of both a detailed program of research and a deep respect for the Finnish people. If I have succeeded i n communicating to my readers an increased admiration for Finland, as well as a greater appreciation and understanding of the Finnish situation, the main purpose of may thesis w i l l have been achieved. 176 Reference Footnotes I. Introduction 1. Wolfgang HBpker, "Finland—Showcase of Coexistence?" Modern World, 1965-66, pp. 121, 129. 2. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet  Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, New York, Praeger, 1968, p. 363. 3. K. J. Holsti, "Strategy and Techniques of Influence i n Soviet-Finnish Relations," Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1964), pp. 80-81. 4. Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign  Policy Since the Second World War, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 81, 109. 5. Ibid., p. 48. 6. see Jaakko Nousiainen, The Finnish P o l i t i c a l System, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. 7. see L. A. Puntila and others, Democracy in Finland: Studies in  P o l i t i c s and Government, Helsinki, Finnish P o l i t i c a l Science Association, 1960. 8. see Klaus TBrnudd, The Electoral System of Finland, London, Hugh Evelyn, 1968. 9. see John H. Hodgson, "The Finnish Communist Party and Neutrality," Government and Opposition, vol. 2, no. 2 (January-April 1967), pp. 269-287. also Jaakko Nousiainen, "Research on Finnish Communism," Scandinavian P o l i t i c a l Studies, vol. 3 (1968), pp. 243-252. 10. see Risto Hyvarinen and others, eds., Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , Vammala, Finnish P o l i t i c a l Science Association, 1963. 177 also Ilkka Heiskanen and others, eds., Essays on Finnish Foreign  Policy, Vammala, Finnish P o l i t i c a l Science Association, 1969. 11. see Jakobson, op_. c i t . 12. see Kurt Jacobsen, "Voting Behavior of the Nordic Countries in the General Assembly," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 2 (1967), pp. 139-157. 13. see Wilhelm Evers, "Finland between East and West: A Historical, Geographical, and Economic-Political Analysis," Modern World, 1965-66, pp. 131-163. 14. see Urho Kekkonen, Neutrality: The Finnish Position, London, Heinemann, 1970. also two items in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press: (1) "In Honor of President of Finnish Republic: Speech by N. S. Khrushchev," vol. 12, no. 47 (1960), pp. 15-16; and (2) "Finland Signs Economic Pact," vol. 23, no. 17 (1970), pp. 10-14. 15. see Robert Graves, "Finland; Plucky Neighbor of Soviet Russia," The National Geographic Magazine, vol. 133, no. 5 (May 1968), pp. 587-629. also H i l l a r Kallas and Sylvie Nickels, eds., Finland: Creation  and Construction, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1968. 16. Klaus Ttfrnudd, "The Finnish Model: Neutral States and European Security," International Journal, v o l . 24 (spring 1969), p. 350. 17. for example, see Jens A. Christophersen, "The Nordic Countries and the European Balance of Power," Cooperation and Conflict, v o l . 1 (1965), pp. 39-52. 18. for example, see John H. Hodgson, "Postwar Finnish Foreign Policy: Institutions and Personalities," Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (March 1962), pp. 80-92. 19. see James R. Kurth, American Hegemony: A Thicket of Theories, prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian P o l i -t i c a l Science Association, St. Johns, Newfoundland, June 8-11, 1971, p. 3. 20. see Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban  Missile C r i s i s , Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. 178 11. Historical Developments 1. Ralf TBrngren, "The Neutrality of Finland," Foreign Affairs, v o l . 39 (July 1961), p. 602. 2. Ibid., p. 603. 3. J. Hampden Jackson, "Finland Since the Armistice," International  Affairs, vol. 24, no. 4 (October 1948), p. 505. 4. John H. Hodgson, "The Paasikivi Line," The American Slavic and East  European Review, vol. 18, no. 2 (1959), p. 153. 5. James H. Billington, "Finland," Communism and Revolution: The  Strategic Uses of P o l i t i c a l Violence, eds. C y r i l E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964. 6. Hans P. Krosby, "The Communist Power Bid in Finland i n 1948," P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, vol. 75, no. 2 (June 1960), p. 236. 7. Ibid., p. 235. 8. Ibid., p. 236. 9. Ibid., p. 235. 10. Billington, op_. c i t . , p. 129. 11.. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 16 (1947-48), p. 9228. 12. see footnote 14, Chapter I. 13. Hans P. Krosby, Finland's Relations With the Soviet Union, 1940- 1952, Vancouver, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1958, p. 195. 14. Billington, op_. c i t . , p. 130. 15. Jakobson, op_. c i t . , p. 59. 16. Billington, op. c i t . , pp. 125, 131. 17. Krosby, op_. c i t . (1958), p. 286. 18. Kent Forster, "The Silent Soviet Vote i n Finnish P o l i t i c s , " Inter- national Journal, vol. 18, no. 3 (summer 1963), p. 345. 19. Krosby, op_. c i t . (1958), p. 294. 20. Ibid., p. 292. 179 21. Forster, op_. c i t . , p. 345. 22. Krosby, op_. c i t . (1958), p. 293. 23. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1959), p. 162. 24. Allan A. Kuusisto, "The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy," Western P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, vol. 12 (March 1959), p. 45. 25. Hols.ti, op_. c i t . , p. 71. 26. Krosby, op_. c i t . (1958), pp. 298-300. 27. Jakobson, op_. c i t . , p. 47. 28. Ibid., pp. 47-48. 29. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1959), p. 164. 30. "Finland," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1970, pp. 3-4. 31. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1959), pp. 166-167. 32. see Forster, op_. c i t . , p. 346. 33. Jakobson, op. c i t . , pp. 78-81. 34. Ibid., p. 59. 35. Evers, op_. c i t . , p. 65. 36. Jakobson, op_. c i t . , p. 65. 37. Ibid., p. 48. 38. Ibid., pp. 81-82. 39. from The Economist, London, March 3, 1962, quoted i n "Finland," op. c i t . , p. 8. 40. "Finland," op_. c i t . , p. 13. 41. United Nations, S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook, 1968, vol. 29, pp. 585-589. 42. "Finland," op_. c i t . , p. 17. 43. see articles by Finnish leaders in Look at Finland, Helsinki, no. 1 (1967). 44. "Finland," 0 £ . c i t . , p. 19. 180 45. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 18 (1971-72), p. 24658. 46. Loc. c i t . 47. "Social Democratic Minority Government for Finland," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 9/72 (1972), p. 1. 48. "Finland Gov't Resigns," The Vancouver Sun, July 19, 1972, p. 2. 49. Roland Huntford, "Mistaken Moves in Finland Lead to Recall of Russian," The Vancouver Sun, June 19, 1972. 50. see "Finland and the Conference on European Security and Coopera-tion," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign A f f a i r s , no. 6/72 (1972). also "NATO eyes East-West Sta b i l i t y , " The Vancouver Sun, May 31, 1972, p, 17. 51. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 18 (1972), pp. 24047-24048. 52. see Pentti Uusivirta, "Background to the Opening of the EEC Negotiations," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 31/71 (1971). also "Negotiations on Trade Arrangements Between Finland and the EEC: Opening Statement of Finland, December 13th, 1971," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. \ 29/71 (1971). 53. see "Provocative Sally by Finnish Newspaper," Pravda, May 14, 1971, p. 5, and Izvestia, May 14, 1971, p. 2, in The Current Digest of  the Soviet Press, vol. 23, no. 19 (1971), p. 33. also "Statement by V. Leskinen," Pravda, May 15, 1971, p. 5, and Izvestia, May 16, 1971, p. 2, in The Current Digest of the Soviet  Press, vol. 23, no. 20 (1971), pp. 37-38. 54. "Finland on the Eve of Elections," Izvestia, December 26, 1971, p. 2, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 23, no. 52 (1971), p. 16. 181 III. The Systemic Perspective 1. Jakobson, oj>. c i t . , p. 1. 2. PHivH HetemSki, "Vignettes of Independence," Finland 1917-1967:  An Assessment of Independence, eds. Jouko Hulkko and others, Helsinki, Kirjayhtyma, 1967, p. 36. 3. Heikki Eskelinen, "Independence and After," Finland: Creation and  Construction, op. c i t . , p. 40. 4. Max Jakobson, "The Foreign Policy of Independent Finland," Finnish  Foreign Policy: Studies i n Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 34. 5. Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, no. 6 (September 1963), p. 22. 6. Ulam, op_. c i t . , p. 356. 7. R. W. Pethybridge, A History of Postwar Russia, New York, New American Library, 1966, p. 17. 8. Ibid., p. 118. 9. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1959), p. 172. 10. John H. Wuorinen, "Finland and the USSR—1945-1961," Journal of  International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1 (1962), p. 44. see also Hodgson, op. c i t . (1967), p. 282. 11. Aimo Pajunen, "Finland's Security Policy," Essays on Finnish Foreign  Policy, op. c i t . , p. 18. 12. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1967), p. 282. 13. see Arthur Katona, Neutrality: Concepts and Propositions, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, unpublished manuscript, 1972, pp. 49-50. 14. see Erik J. J. Castren, The Present Law of War and Neutrality, Helsinki, Suomalainen Kirjallisuuden Seura Kirjapainon Oy, 1954, pp. 422-424. 15. Katona, op_. c i t . , p. 17. 16. Jakobson, op. c i t . (1968), p. 52. 182 17. Keijo Korhonen, "Finland and the Soviet Union," Essays on Finnish  Foreign Policy, op. c i t . , p. 39. 18. Kekkonen, op_. c i t . , p. 90. 19. Peter H. Lyon, "Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism," Review of P o l i t i c s , April 1960, p. 265. 20. Heinz Fiedler, "Neutrality as Conceived by the Free and Communist World," Modern World, 1962-63, pp. 56-58. 21. Ganyushkin, 1958, quoted in Daniel Tarschys, "Neutrality and the Common Market: The Soviet View," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 6, no. 2 (1971), p. 67. 22. Katarina Brodin, K j e l l Goldmann and Christian Lange, "The Policy of Neutrality: O f f i c i a l Doctrines of Finland and Sweden," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 3 (1968), p. 43. 23. Eskelinen, op_. c i t . , p. 60. 24. Krister WahlbHck, "Finnish Foreign Policy: Some Comparative Perspectives," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 289-290. 25. Jakobson, op. c i t . (1968), pp. 49-50. 26. Jaakko Ilvessalo, "Finland and the Great Problems of the United Nations," Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 117. 27. Ahti Karjalainen, "The International Role of Finnish Foreign Policy/' Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign A f f a i r s , no. 3/71 (1971), p. 2. 28. Loc. c i t . 29. Ilvessalo, op_. c i t . , pp. 126-127. 30. Jacobsen, op_. c i t . , pp. 155-156. Jaakko Kalela, "The Nordic Group i n the General Assembly," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 2 (1967), p. 168. 31. Karjalainen, op_. c i t . , p. 2. 32. Ulf Sundqvist, "Finland and Cooperation in Development," Coopera- tion and Conflict, vol. 5 (1970), pp. 103"-104. Nousiainen, op_. c i t . (1971), p. 379. 183 33. see "NATO Eyes East-West Sta b i l i t y , " The Vancouver Sun, March 31, 1972, p. 17. 34. see "Finland and the Conference on European Security and Coopera-tion," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 6/72 (1972). 35. Korhonen, op_. c i t . , p. 39. IV. The Strategic Perspective 1. Holsti, op_. c i t . , pp. 64-65. 2. Ibid., p. 66. 3. Eskelinen, op_. ext., p. 48. 4. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1967), p. 283. 5. Nils Orvik, "Scandinavia, NATO, and Northern Security," Inter- national Organization, vol. 20, no. 3 (summer 1966), pp. 383-384. 6. Hb'pker, op_. c i t . , p. 125. Henry A. Kissenger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of  American Foreign Policy, New York, Harper, 1960, p. 154. 7. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 93. 8. Ttfrnudd, op_. c i t . (1969), p. 341. 9. Arne Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance—Past and Present," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 1 (1966), p. 54. 10. Orvik, op_. c i t . (1963), pp. 7, 33. 11. Brundtland, op_. ext., p. 52. 12. Pajunen, op_. c i t . , p. 16. 13. Korhonen, op_. c i t . , pp. 35-36. 14. HetemHki, op_. c i t . , p. 37. 15. Korhonen, op_. c i t . , p. 36. 1 8 4 16. see Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1967), p. 274. also Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 94. 17. Pajunen, op_. c i t . , pp. 25-26. 18. Ibid., p. 27. 19. Nils Andren, "The Future of the Scandinavian Security System," in "Notes and Comments: Scandinavian Perspectives," International  Journal, vol. 24 (spring 1969), p. 342. 20. Brundtland, op_. c i t . , p. 46. 21. Pajunen, op_. c i t . , p. 27. 22. see GBran von Bonsdorff, "Finland as a Member of the Nordic Com-munity," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, op_. c i t . , p. 72. also Nils Andren, "Nordic Integration," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 1 (1966), p. 5. also Nousiainen, op_. c i t . (1971) j p. 373. 23. Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy; A Historical Analysis, New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 149. 24. Nousiainen, op_. c i t . (1971), p. 385. 25. Pajunen, op_. c i t . , pp. 21-22. 26. "Parliamentary Report on Finnish Defense," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 2/72 (1972), p. 4. 27. Nousiainen, op_. c i t . (1971), p. 383. 28. see Pajunen, op_. c i t . , pp. 28-29. 29. Kullervo Killinen, "The Relation Between the P o l i t i c a l and the Military Direction in Finland," Democracy in Finland: Studies  in P o l i t i c s and Government, op. c i t . , pp. 78-80. 30. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 89. 185 V. The Domestic P o l i t i c a l Perspective 1. Paavo Kastari, "Constitutional Protection of C i v i l Rights i n Finland," Democracy in Finland: Studies in Po l i t i c s and Govern- ment, op. c i t . , pp. 59-60. Kauko Sipponen, "The Constitution and P o l i t i c a l L i f e , " Finland  1917-1967: An Assessment of Independence, op. c i t . , pp. 20-21. L. A. Puntila, "The Historical Basis of P o l i t i c a l L i f e in Finland," Democracy in Finland: Studies in P o l i t i c s and Government, op. c i t . , pp. 9-10. Sven Lindman, "The 'Dualistic' Conception of Parliamentary Govern-ment i n the Finnish Constitution," Democracy in Finland: Studies  in P o l i t i c s and Government, op. c i t . , pp. 44-45. Eskelinen, op_. c i t . , p. 41. WahlbHck, op_. c i t . , p. 284. Korhonen, op_. c i t . , p. 32. Sipponen, oj). c i t . , p. 26. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 44. Bengt Broms, "The Parliament of Finland and Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, op. c i t . , p. 110. Jaakko Nousiainen, "The Parties and Foreign Policy," Finnish  Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 182. 10. Kastari, op_. c i t . , pp. 66-67. 11. Ibid., p. 72. 12. GBran von Bonsdorff, "The Party Situation in Finland," Democracy in Finland: Studies in P o l i t i c s and Government, op. c i t . , pp. 18-19. 13. John H. Hodgson, Communism in Finland: A History and Interpre- tation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 226-227. Htipker, op_. c i t . , p. 128. 14. Nousiainen, op_. c i t . (1963), p. 186. 15. Ibid., p. 184. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 186 16. Harto Hakovirta, "The Finnish Security Problem," Cooperation  and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), p. 250. 17. Loc. c i t . 18. "Social Democratic Minority Government for Finland," Finnish  Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign A f f a i r s , no. 9/72 (1972), p. 1. "Finland Gov't Quits," The Vancouver Sun, July 19, 1972, p. 2. 19. Erik Allardt, "Social Sources of Finnish Communism: Traditional and Emerging Radicalism," International Journal of Comparative  Sociology, vol. 5, no. 1 (March 1964), pp. 57-58. 20. HBpker, op_. c i t . , p. 128. 21. Korhonen, op. c i t . , p. 32. 22. Robert G. Wesson, Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective, Homewood, 111., Dorsey Press, 1969, p. 225. 23. WahlbMck, op_. c i t . , p. 294. 24. Billington, £p_. c i t . , p. 125. 25. Pertti Hynynen, "The Popular Front i n Finland," New Left Review, vol. 57 (September-October 1969), p. 3. 26. Billington, op_. c i t . , p. 140. 27. Holsti, op_. c i t . , p. 81. 28. Hakovirta, op_. c i t . , p. 253. 29. see Holsti, op_. c i t . , pp. 63-82. see Forster, op. c i t . , pp. 341-352. 30. Forster, op_. c i t . , p. 342. 31. Holsti, op. c i t . , p. 77. 32. Hynynen, op. c i t . , p. 6. 33. Holsti, op_. c i t . , p. 78. 34. Hodgson, "The Finnish Communist Party and Neutrality," op_. c i t . (1967), p. 284. 187 35. Erik Allardt and Pe r t t i Pesonen, "Cleavages in Finnish P o l i t i c s , " Party Systems and Voter Alignments, eds. Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, New York, The Free Press, 1967, p. 361. 36. James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," Approaches to Comparative and International P o l i t i c s , ed. R. Barry F a r r e l l , Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 53-54. 37. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 81. VI. The Personality Perspective 1. WahlbHck, op_. c i t . , p. 294. 2. Arthur Spencer, "Finland Maintains Democracy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 31, no. 2 (January 1953), pp. 304-305. 3. Holsti, op_. c i t . , p. 74. 4. Ibid., p. 79. 5. H i l l a r Kallas and Sylvie Nickels, eds., op_. c i t . , p. 37. 6. Ibid., p. 38. 7. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 33. 8. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1959), pp. 147-148. 9. Krosby, op_. c i t . (1960), p. 241. 10. Kekkonen, op_. c i t . , pp. 89-90. 11. Urho Kekkonen, "On the Security of Peoples," Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 11/72 (March 27, 1972), p. 2. 12. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 48. 13. Kullervo Killinen, "The Press and Foreign Policy," Finnish Foreign  Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 203-204. 14. Hodgson, op_. c i t . (1962), p. 89. 15. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 33. 188 16. Spencer, op_. c i t . , p. 304. 17. Holsti, op_. c i t . , pp. 76-77. 18. Billington, op. c i t . , p. 137. VII. The Economic Perspective 1. Johannes Virolainen, "Development after World War I I , " Finland  1917-1967: An Assessment of Independence, op. c i t . , p. 68. 2. Veikko Konttinen and Herbert Lomas, "The Changing Structure of Industry," Finland: Creation and Construction, op. c i t . , pp. 79, 84. 3. Ibid.,' p. 84. 4. from the World Bank Atlas, 1971, quoted in Finnfacts, Helsinki, Finnfacts Institute, no. 1/72 (1972), p. 4. 5. Pentti Uusivirta, from a lecture delivered to the German-Finnish Society i n Bonn, February 24, 1972, i n Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 10/72 (1972), p. 1. 6. Konttinen and Lomas, op_. c i t . , p. 78. 7. Hynynen, op. c i t . , p. 12. 8. Erkki MHentakanen, "Finland and Regional Economic Integration i n Western Europe," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, op. c i t . , p. 81. 9. see Mats Bergquist, "Trade and Security in the Nordic Area," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), p. 246. 10. Jaakko Auer, "Finland's War Reparation Deliveries to the Soviet Union," Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 67, 69, 80. 11. Ibid., p. 68. 12. Loc. c i t . 13. Pentti V i i t a and Herbert Lomas, "Foreign Trade," Finland: Creation  and Construction, op. c i t . , p. 93. 14. Ibid., p. 94. 189 15. Auer, op_. cit., p. 74. 16. Jakobson, op_. cit. (1968), p. 29. 17. Ibid., p. 59. 18. Ibid., p. 60. 19. Krosby, op_. cit. (1958), p. 188. 20. United Nations, Demographical Yearbook, 1970, p. 110. 21. Pentti Uusivirta, op_. cit. (1972), p. 1. 22. Viita and Lomas, op_. cit., p. 92. 23. Pentti Uusivirta, op_. cit . (1972), p. 1. 24. Ibid., p. 2. 25. Loc. cit. 26. Finland, Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 3 (March 1972), p. 11. 27. Viita and Lomas, op_. cit., p. 96. 28. Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 11. 29. MHentakanen, op_. cit . , p. 82. 30. Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin, vol. 46, no. 3, p. 11. also Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin, vol. 28, no. 2 (1956), p. 12. 31. Hodgson, "The Finnish Communist Party and Neutrality," op_. cit. (1967), pp. 281-282. Forster, op_. cit., pp. 246-247. 32. Hannu Vesa, "The Problem of Germany in Current Finnish Foreign Policy," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 46. 33. Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, pp. 334-335. 34. John D. Mcintosh, Soviet Relations with Finland Since the Fall of  Khrushchev: A Look at the Brezhnev-Kosygin Line, Vancouver, University of British Columbia, unpublished manuscript, 1972, pp. 10-11. 190 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. VIII. 1. 2. 3. 4. Korhonen, op_. c i t . , p. 38. Klaus THrnudd, "Finland and Economic Integration i n Europe," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 64-65. "Brussels Negotiations—The Final Phase," EFTA Reporter, Washing-ton, D.C., EFTA Information Office, no. 240 (June 30, 1972), p. 2. "Common Market Deadlock?" Finnfacts Newsletter, no. 1, 1972, p. 7. "Growing Dispute over EEC," Finnfacts Newsletter, June 1972, p. 1. "Finland Gov't Resigns," The Vancouver Sun, July 19, 1972, p. 2. see also "Special Relations Agreements Signed," EFTA Reporter, Washington, D.C., EFTA Information Office, no. 241 (August 4, 1972), p. 1. Tarschys, op_. c i t . , pp. 72-74. Neil Ulman, "Finland Seeks V i t a l Tie to Common Market; Oddly, U.S. Opposes, Soviet Tacitly Concurs," The Wall Street Journal, A p r i l 12, 1972, p. 32. see I. F. Stone, "Running Dogs of U.S. Imperialism," reprinted from the New York Review in The Vancouver Sun, July 8, 1972, p. 5. see "The Arrival of a New Era," TIME Magazine, vol. 100, no. 3 (July 17, 1972), p. 46. The Cultural Perspective Lauri HyvkmHki, "Finland in the Mainstream of European Thought," Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 140. Mikko Juva, "A Thousand Years of Finland," Finland: Creation and  Construction, op. c i t . , p. 23. Ibid., p. 24. Pentti Renvall, "The Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Finns during the Swedish Rule," Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign  P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 19. 5. Juva, op_. c i t . , p. 26. 191 6. Jaakko Numminen, "Finland's Foreign Policy as an Autonomous Grand Duchy and the Winning of Independence," Finnish Foreign  Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , p. 27. 7. Juva, op. c i t . , p. 34. 8. Jakobson, op_. c i t . (1968), p. 4. 9. Ibid., p. 13. 10. Anatole Mazour, Finland between East and West, Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1956, p. 200. 11. HyvHmHki, op_. c i t . , p. 139. 12. Evers, op. c i t . , p. 137. 13. "Finland General Data," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 1972, p. 1. 14. Loc. c i t . 15. Kalervo Siikala, "Finland's International Cultural Relations," Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, op. c i t . , p. 90. 16. Ibid., p. 91. 17. P e r t t i Pesonen, "Finnish Societies for International Contacts," Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign P o l i t i c s , op. c i t . , pp. 166-167. 18. Ibid., pp. 157-158. 19. Mauri K. Elovainio and Jukka Huopaniemi, "Finland and the Study of International Relations, 1960-1964," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 1 (1965), p. 61. 20. Lance Keyworth, "The Press," Finland: Creation and Construction, op. c i t . , p. 264. 21. Killinen, op_. c i t . , p. 209. 22. Ibid., p. 211. 23. Keijo Korhonen, "Our Security in a Changing Europe," Finnish  Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 3/72 (December 6, 1971), p. 2. 24. see Sylvie Nickels, "The Finnish Way of L i f e , " Finland: Creation  and Construction, op. c i t . , p. 273. 192 also Forster, op_. c i t . , p. 352. also Wendy Hall, Green Gold and Granite; A Background to Finland, London, Max Parrish, 1957, pp. 36-43. 25. see Wuorinen, op_. c i t . , p. 39. also Orvik, op. c i t . (1963), p. 22. also Evers, op_. c i t . , p. 147. 26. Billington, op. c i t . , p. 147. 27. Juva, op_. c i t . , pp. 17-18. 28. Graves, op_. c i t . , p. 587. 29. see, for example, Billington, op_. c i t . 30. 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Tarn, R. S. "Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy." Readings in Russian  Foreign Policy, eds. Robert A. Goldwin and others, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 689-704. Tarschys, Daniel. "Neutrality and the Common Market: The Soviet View." Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 6 (1971), pp. 65-76. Ttfrngren, Ralf. "The Neutrality of Finland." Foreign Affairs, vol. 39 (July 1961), pp. 601-609. TtJrnudd, Klaus. "Composition of Cabinets in Finland, 1917-1968." Scandinavian P o l i t i c a l Studies, v o l . 4 (1969), pp. 58-70. Ttfrnudd, Klaus. "Finland and Economic Integration i n Europe." Cooperation  and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 63-71. TiJrnudd, Klaus. "Finland in the United Nations during the 1960's." Essays  on Finnish Foreign Policy, eds. Ilkka Heiskanen and others, Vammala, Finnish P o l i t i c a l Science Association, 1969, pp. 50-59. Ttfrnudd, Klaus. "The Finnish Model: Neutral States and European Security." International Journal, vol. 24 (spring 1969), pp. 349-355. THrnudd, Klaus. "A New Contribution to the Theory of Neutral Foreign Policy." Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 5 (1970), pp. 282-285. Toynbee, Arnold J. "Russia and the West." Readings in Russian Foreign  Policy, eds. Robert A. Goldwin and others, New York Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1959, pp. 680-688. VHyrynen, Raimo. "A Case Study of Sanctions: Finland-USSR, 1958-59." Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 205-233. Vesa, Hannu. "The Problem of Germany in Current Finnish Foreign Policy." Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, eds. Ilkka Heiskanen and others, Vammala, Finnish P o l i t i c a l Science Association, 1969, pp. 41-49. 206 V i i t a , Pentti and Herbert Lomas. "Foreign Trade." Finland; Creation  and Construction, eds. H i l l a r Kallas and Sylvie Nickels, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1968, pp. 92-98. Virolainen, Johannes. "Development after World War II . " Finland 1917- 1967; An Assessment of Independence, eds. Jouko Hulkko and others, Helsinki, Kirjayhtyma, 1967, pp. 61-72. WahlbHck, Krister. "Finnish Foreign Policy: Some Comparative Per-spectives." Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 4 (1969), pp. 282-298. Wuorinen, John H. "Finland and the USSR—1945-1961." Journal of  International Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1 (1962), pp. 38-46. Wuorinen, John H. "Russia, Scandinavia and the Baltic States." Current History, vol. 28, no. 12 (February 1955), pp. 70-74. Zartman, I. William. "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia." Western,Political Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (1954), pp. 125-160. Zi l l i a c u s , Konni. "Coexistence at Work: Soviet-Finnish Relations." The Nation, vol. 181, no. 18 (October 29, 1955), pp. 361-363. II. Newspaper Articles Huntford, Roland. "Mistaken Moves in Finland Lead to Recall of Russian." The Vancouver Sun, June 19, 1971. "Finland Gov't Quits." The Vancouver Sun, July 19, 1972, p. 2. "NATO Eyes East-West S t a b i l i t y . " The Vancouver Sun, May 31, 1972, p. 17. "Socialists Big Winners." The Vancouver Sun, January 4, 1972. Stone, I. F. "Running Dogs of U.S. Imperialism." Reprinted from the New  York Review in The Vancouver Sun, July 8, 1972, p. 5. Ulman, Neil. "Finland Seeks V i t a l Tie to Common Market; Oddly, U.S. Opposes, Soviet Tacitly Concurs." The Wall Street Journal, A p r i l 12, 1972, p. 32. 207 III. Books and Manuscripts Alenius, Sigyn. Finland between the Armistice and the Peace. Helsingfors, S8derstrdm & Co., 1947. Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile  Cr i s i s . Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1971. Alopaeus, Simone. La politique etrangere et la cooperation de l a Finlande  avec 1'Europe. Helsinki, Finnish Institute of International A f f a i r s , 1969. Andren, Nils. Government and P o l i t i c s in the Nordic Countries: Denmark,  Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964. Aragon, Louis. Histoire parallele: l'URSS. Paris, Presses de l a Cite, 1962. Armstrong, John A. Ideology, P o l i t i c s and Government in the Soviet Union. New York, Praeger, 1967. D'Astier, Emmanuel. Sur Staline. Paris, L i b r a i r i e Plon, 1963. Bacon, Walter. Finland. London, Hale, 1970. Barghoorn, Frederick C. P o l i t i c s in the USSR. Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 1966. Black, C y r i l E. and others. Neutralization and World P o l i t i c s . Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968. Bottomore, T. B. and Maximilien Rubel, eds. Karl Marx: Selected Writings  in Sociology and Social Philosophy. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1961. Bradley, David. Lion among Roses: A Memoir of Finland. New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. Castren, Erik J. J. The Present Law of War and Neutrality. Helsinki, Suomalainen Kirjallisuuden Seura Kirjapainen Oy, 1954. 208 Collier, David S. and Kurt Glaser, eds. The Conditions for Peace in  Europe: Problems of Detente and Security. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1970. Connery, Donald S. The Scandinavians. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1966. Conquest, Robert. Power and Policy in the USSR. New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1961. Dallin Alexander and Thomas Larson, eds. Soviet P o l i t i c s since  Khrushchev. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1968. Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin: A P o l i t i c a l Biography. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, 1966. Deutscher, Isaac. The Unfinished Revolution: Russia 1917-1967. London, Oxford University Press, 1967. Dinerstein, Herbert S. F i f t y Years of Soviet Foreign Policy. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Dixon, C y r i l W. Society, Schools and Progress in Scandinavia. New York, Permagon Press, 1965. Fainsod, Merle. How Russia i s Ruled. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. Gardner, Lloyd C , Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau. The Origins of the Cold War. Waltham, Mass., Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970. Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Policy; A Historical Analysis. New York, Praeger, 1966. Hall, Wendy. Green Gold and Granite: A Background to Finland. London, Max Parrish, 1957. Banna, George H., translator. Outline History of the USSR. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960. Hayter, Sir William. Russia and the World; A Study in Soviet Foreign  Policy. London, Seeker & Warburg, 1970. Helin, Ronald A. Economic-Geographic Reorientation in Western Finnish  Karelia; A Result of the Finno-Soviet Boundary Demarcations of  1940 and 1944. Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1961. Hodgson, John H. Communism in Finland; A History and Intrepretation. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967. 209 Holsti, K. J. International P o l i t i c s : A Framework for Analysis. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1967. Hook, Sydney, ed. World Communism. Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1962. Horelick, Arnold L. and Myron Rush. Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign  Policy. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966. Jakobson, Max. The Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-1940. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961. Jakobson, Max. Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy  Since the Second World War. New York, Praeger, 1968. Jensen, Bartell C. The Impact of Reparations on the Post-War Finnish Economy: An Input-Output Study. Homewood, 111., R. D. Irwin, 1966. Jutikkala, Eino. A History of Finland. London, Thames and Hudson, 1962. Katona, Arthur. Neutrality: Concepts and Propositions. Vancouver, University of British Columbia, unpublished manuscript, 1972. Kekkonen, Urho. Neutrality: The Finnish Position. London, Heinemann, 1970. Kissenger, Henry A. The Necessity for Choice; Prospects of American  Foreign Policy. New York, Harper, 1960. Khrushchev, Nikita S. The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to  the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York, The New Leader, 1962. Krosby, Hans Peter. Finland's Relations With the Soviet Union, 1940- -1952. Vancouver, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, unpublished M.A. Thesis, 1958. Kurth, James R. American Hegemony: A Thicket of Theories. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Association, St. Johns, Newfoundland, June 8-11, 1971. Kuusi, Pekka. Social Policy for the Sixties: A Plan for Finland. Hel-sinki, Finnish Social Policy Association, 1964. Linna, VHinB. The Unknown Soldier. Porvoo, Finland, Werner SHderstrtfrn, 1954. Lundin, C. Leonard. Finland in the Second World War. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1957. Lyon, Peter H. Neutralism. Leicester, England, Leicester University Press, 1963. 210 Mcintosh, John D. Soviet Relations with Finland Since the F a l l of  Khrushchev: A Look at the Brezhnev-Kosygin Line. Vancouver, University of British Columbia, unpublished manuscript, 1972. MacKintosh, J. M. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London, Oxford University Press, 1962. Mazour, Anatole. Finland between East and West . Princeton, Van Nostrand, 1956. Mead, William R. An Economic Geography of the Scandinavian States and  Finland. London, University of London Press, 1958. Mead, William R. and Helmer Smed. Winter in Finland. London, Evelyn, 1967. Mendel, Arthur P., ed. Essential Works of Marxism. New York, Bantam Books, 1965. Morgenthau, Hans. P o l i t i c s Among Nations; The Struggle for Power and  Peace. New York, Knopf, 1960. Nousiainen, Jaakko. The Finnish P o l i t i c a l System. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971. Nyberg, Rene, ed. Educational Reform i n Finland i n the 1970s. Helsinki, Ministry of Education, 1970. Ogley, Roderick, comp. The Theory and Practice of Neutrality i n the  Twentieth Century. New York, Barnes and Noble, 1970. Olin, Saul C. Finlandia: The Racial Composition, the Language and a  Brief History of the Finnish People. Hancock, Mich., The Book Concern, 1957. Orvik, Nils. Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union. Cambridge, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, no. 6, September 1963. Paige, Glenn D. Proposition-Building in the Study of Comparative Administration. Unpublished manuscript prepared for the Indiana University Summer Seminar of the Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, June 17-August 9, 1963. Pethybridge, R. W. A History of Postwar Russia. New York, New American Library, 1966. Piatt, Raye R., ed. Finland and Its Geography. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1955. 211 Rintala, Marvin. Four Finns: P o l i t i c a l Profiles. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969. Rintala, Marvin. Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish  P o l i t i c s . Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962. Ronimois, H. E. Russia's Foreign Trade and the Baltic Sea. London, Boreas Pub. Co., 1946. Rothstein, Robert L. Alliances and Small Powers. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. Rubenstein, Alvin Z., ed. The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union. New York, Random House, 1966. Rush, Myron. P o l i t i c a l Succession in the USSR. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968. Salokorpi, Asko. Modern Architecture i n Finland. New York, Praeger, 1970. Schildt, G8ran. Modern Finnish Sculpture. New York, Praeger, 1970. Segerstad, Uft Hard af. Modern Finnish Design. New York, Praeger, 1969. Shearman, Hugh. Finland: The Adventures of a Small Power. London, Stevens & Sons, 1950. Sletten, Vegard. Five Northern Countries Pull Together. Copenhagen, Henry Thejls, 1967. Smith, John B. Modem Finnish Painting and Graphic Art. New York, Praeger, 1970. Snow, Edgar. Stalin Must Have Peace. New York, Random House, 1947. Sobel, Robert. The Origins of Intervention: The United States and the  Russo-Finnish War. New York, Bookman Associates, 1961. Somme, Axel C. Z. A Geography of Norden: Denmark, Finland, Iceland,  Norway, Sweden. London, Heinemann, 1968. Steinby, Torsten. In Quest of Freedom: Finland's Press, 1771-1971. Helsinki, Government Printing Centre, 1971. Sykes, John. Direction North: A View of Finland. London, Hutchinson, 1967. Tatu, Michel. Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev's Decline to  Collective Leadership. London, Collins, 1969. 212 Tb'mudd, Klaus. The Electoral System of Finland. London, Hugh Evelyn, 1968. Tucker, Robert C. The Soviet P o l i t i c a l Mind; Studies in Stalinism and  Post-Stalin Change. New York, Praeger, 1963. Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence; The History of Soviet Foreign  Policy, 1917-1967. New York, Praeger, 1968. Upton, Anthony F. Finland in Cr i s i s , 1940-41; A Study in Small-Power  P o l i t i c s . London, Faber and Faber, 1964. Viherjuuri, H. J. Sauna; The Finnish Bath. Helsinki, Kustanausosa-keyhtio Otava, 1964. Vuorela, Toivo. The Finno-Ugric Peoples. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1964. Warner, Oliver. Marshal Mannerheim and the Finns. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. Wendt, Frantz W. The Nordic Council and Cooperation in Scandinavia. Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1959. Wesson, Robert G. Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective. Homewood, 111., Dorsey Press, 1969. Wolfe, Thomas W. Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Wuorinen, John H. A History of Finland. New York, American-Scandinavian Foundation, Columbia University Press, 1965. Wuorinen, John H. Scandinavia. Englewood C l i f f s , N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1965. IV. Documents and Reference Materials The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Columbus, Ohio, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Deadline Data on World Affairs. Greenwich, Conn., McGraw-Hill. Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. EFTA Reporter. Washington, D.C., EFTA Information Office. Finland. Bank of Finland. Monthly Bulletin. 213 Finland. Ministry of Finance. Division for Economic Affair s . Economic  Survey. Finnfacts. Helsinki, Finnfacts Institute. Finnfacts Newsletter. New York, Suite 3501, 777 Third Avenue. Finnish Features. Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affai r s . International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 1968. New York, MacMillan. Keesing's Contemporary Archives. London, Keesing's Publications Ltd. Off i c i a l Statistics of Finland. Helsinki, K e i s a r i l l i s e n Senaatin Kirja— paino. United Nations. S t a t i s t i c a l Yearbook. New York, S t a t i s t i c a l Office of the United Nations. United Nations. Demographical Yearbook. New York, S t a t i s t i c a l Office of the United Nations. Yearbook of Nordic Statistics. Stockholm, Nordic Council. World Bank Atlas. Washington, D.C., International Bank for Re-construction and Development. 214 APPENDIX A Lecture delivered at the International Press Association by Kalevi Sorsa, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on March 14, 1972: After the negotiations between the p o l i t i c a l parties had failed to produce a government with a broad parliamentary backing and the non-soc i a l i s t parties expressed their unwillingness to form a government, the only alternative was to form a Social Democratic minority government. This is the third minority government formed by the Finnish Social Demo-cratic Party. The previous two entered office with d i f f i c u l t economic and social as well as p o l i t i c a l problems facing them. Both held o f f i c e for a relatively long time. S t i l l , history does not repeat i t s e l f and no expectations concerning this government should be based on earlier experiences It i s naturally dangerous to say anything about the l i f e -expectations of this government. Complicated economic and social questions, for which solutions are essential for the balanced development and i n -creased well-being of the Finnish people, could be better dealt with by a government with a secure parliamentary majority. Even though this proved to be impossible, the programme of the present government reflects the achievements of the thorough negotiations between the parties in January and February. We hope that the basis of this government can be broadened in due course. Until such a time, our government w i l l set out without hesitation to translate i t s programme into action. The most important tasks are, of course, on the home front. But i t i s equally clear that these have a direct relevance to our foreign policy insofar as st a b i l i t y at home i s a prerequisite for the trust-worthiness of any country on the international scene. In i t s foreign policy the government w i l l — i n the words of i t s programme—carry out the policy of neutrality with peace and inter-national co-operation as i t s aim, in accordance with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. Finland pursues a policy of good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union. The corner stone of these relations i s the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed in 1948 and extended in 1955 and 1970. This treaty defines the mutual security aims of the two countries and lays ground for a peaceful de-velopment in the Nordic area. Moreover, this Treaty gives the frame-work for a practical and and ever expanding co-operation between Finland and the Soviet Union in several f i e l d s . The nature of the Finnish-Soviet relations has once again been reaffirmed in last month's com-munique after the v i s i t of President Kekkonen to the Soviet Union. With regard to the further development of these relations, the 215 question of economic, technical and s c i e n t i f i c co-operation i s of special importance. Nearly a year ago, a comprehensive Treaty on this co-operation was signed in Moscow. We have been able to register notable successes in the f i e l d of common projects, and one of them i s now in the f i n a l stage of negotiations. These giant projects mean also a new phase qualitatively, and we can say that our economic co-operation with the Soviet Union is now more extensive than ever before. On the other hand, there are some features in the recent de-velopment of trade that lead us to seek further ways of intensifying our exports to the Soviet Union. Our position as one of the leading non-so c i a l i s t trading partners of the Soviet Union is by no means something permanently established. On the contrary, Western competition as well as the development within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance compel us to think seriously about the ways of securing future growth in this co-operation that i s and has been of essential importance to us. In view of this we have initi a t e d the f i r s t direct contacts with the CMEA. The next think i s to explore the p o s s i b i l i t i e s for organisational forms of co-operation between Finland and the CMEA and through i t s organs with the group of s o c i a l i s t European countries. We find i t natural and inherent in a neutral foreign policy that we should make equal efforts to ensure an equitable expansion of our foreign trade with a l l countries and with every part of Europe. In the past few years, the general situation i n Europe has been developing more favourably than at any time since the Second World War. The calls for a conference on European security and co-operation have led to a l i v e l y discussion in a l l parts of the continent. Since 1966, when the idea was put forth by the s o c i a l i s t countries, i t has steadily approached the stage of concrete preparations. It seems that in Europe—which s t i l l carries the marks of global confrontation—there now is a basic understanding on the need for such a gathering of states. We have now arrived at stage where the next big step would be multi-later a l preparations for the convocation of the conference. In this respect i t seems probable that this year w i l l prove to be decisive. Finland has played an active role i n trying to make such a conference a reality. The Social Democrat Party adopted already i n 1966 a positive attitude towards the organising of such a conference. In May 1969 the Finnish government offered Helsinki as a possible s i t e for the conference. The following year, in November 1970, the govern-ment proposed that b i l a t e r a l contacts between representatives of the European countries as well as the United States and Canada and Finnish Foreign Ministry could begin in Helsinki with a view to giving an im-petus to this idea. It was foreseen that such contacts would then de-velop into multilateral preparations for the conference i t s e l f . The Finnish government also appointed Mr. Ralph Enckell in 1970 as roving ambassador on questions concerning the conference. The answers we have received in the course of soundings and 216 various discussions have in the main proved to be positive. Finland has been able to note with pleasure that there seems to be a basic under-standing both in East and in West, on beginning the preparatory phase in Helsinki. We, on our part, are ready for the multilateral phase. The technical prerequisites have been explored and necessary machinery can be set into motion at a very short notice. As far as the technical side i s concerned, the preparatory phase—or the conference i t s e l f , to that matter—can start six weeks after the date, when an understanding about i t has been reached. A series of b i l a t e r a l contacts has already taken place be-tween representatives of a number of European countries and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Should the participants during the multilateral, preparatory phase so decide, we are also capable of organising the f a c i l i t i e s for the conference i t s e l f , and i f required, s t i l l i n this year. We have restricted ourselves in the i n i t i a t i v e s we made in 1969 and 1970 as well as in the a c t i v i t i e s of Mr. Enckell purely to fact-finding work on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a general consensus on the convening of the conference. Of course, this already reflects our conviction that a conference on European security and co-operation would serve the interests of a l l European countries. Our ac t i v i t y stresses the fact that the conference should be well prepared. The various proposals brought forth by European countries include for instance the creation of a permanent organ for European security questions. Behind the present discussions, we can thus a l -ready discern some institutional forms of a new system of security in our continent. But a l l this optimism must be combined with realism and cautiousness. Many of the questions that l i e behind the division of Europe are such that progress in them i s l i a b l e to be slow. Some questions must be seen in global perspective and treated accordingly. This i s especially true in the relations between the great powers. But in the purely European f i e l d , i t should be possible to achieve a break-through into sensible and mutual advantageous era of co-operation. An example of how this i s possible i s provided by the foreign policy of the Federal German government under the present Social Democratic Chancellor, Mr. Willy Brandt. With the treaties signed i n Moscow and Warsaw—that have paved the way towards a settlement on the status of West-Berlin—and with the introduction of discussions between the two German States Chancellor Brandt has begun an era of dialogue and reapproachment across the most sensitive border-line of the cold war period. This naturally serves the interests of peace and co-operation of the whole continent. Serious ruptures in this development would certainly bring into doubt the positive results already achieved and the prospects now in front of us would grow very much dimmer indeed. This in turn would shatter quite a few of the hopes on which specially the small and neutral states have bu i l t their participation in the recent process safeguarding the peace in Europe. 217 After the negotiations in the heart of Europe had led to the signing of the quadripartite agreement last September, defining the status of West-Berlin, the Finnish government made an i n i t i a t i v e to the both German states proposing a comprehensive agreement on the arrange-ment of the relations between Finland and the two states. In accordance with our policy of balanced relations with both states, the i n i t i a t i v e s presupposed a factual p a r a l l e l i t y between the proposals made to each of the two governments, neither of which has rejected our i n i t i a t i v e . We hope that i t w i l l be possible to start negotiations with both as soon as possible, on the basis of our i n i t i a t i v e . Already in September we considered that the time was ripe for progress in this f i e l d . It i s our hope that we could enter into the phase of concrete negotiations without any undue delay. Nordic co-operation i s traditionally one of the main features in our foreign policy. The deepening of Nordic co-operation as well as the maintenance of the Nordic area outside of international conflicts i s the logical aim of any Finnish government. We have well-established forms of co-operation, for instance in co-ordinating social legislation, the common Nordic labour market and the cultural f i e l d . The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nordic countries consult each other regularly. In order to expand the co-operation between the Nordic countries, the Nordic Council has established a Council of Ministers, which began i t s work last year. The latest institutional step has been the decision on the establishment of a permanent secretariat. On the other hand, the possible membership of Denmark and Nor-way i n the European Economic Community may upset also the present pattern of co-operation between the f i v e Nordic countries. Proposals concerning the development of Nordic co-operation, i f an enlarged Common Market brings about changes in the market situations i n Scandinavia, were presented to the Nordic Council at i t s last session here i n Helsinki, in February. Especially the proposals by the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Palme, are now under study. It seems, however, that participation i n West-European integration may cause certain restrictions for Denmark and Norway in further developing some central areas of Nordic co-opera-tion. If this is the case, our economic contacts with Sweden w i l l be of even greater importance. Our attitude towards West-European economic integration takes into account two factors. F i r s t of a l l we must safeguard our consequent policy of neutrality. Secondly we have to safeguard the best possible competitive position for Finnish work i f and when the market situation changes in Western Europe. The EEC, after i t s enlargement and after breaking up of the EFTA, w i l l answer for an even more substantial part of our foreign trade. The safeguarding of our neutrality i s for us the starting point sine qua non. It means that f u l l membership, association or agreements envisageing an increasing participation in the a c t i v i t i e s of the Com-munity and i t s policy making are out of the question. 218 We have been carrying out negotiations in Brussels for a free trade agreement for industrial goods. However, the terms so far offered by the Community and especially the proposed treatment of our exports of paper-products would mean an economic burden which i s not acceptable to us. Furthermore, the future arrangement of our relations with the Community—whatever form i t might take—must be seen also in relation to our domestic markets. The possible consequences of any solution to our internal development w i l l be thoroughly explored. The f i n a l de-cision w i l l be made taking into consideration, besides the forementioned factor that is neutrality and safeguarding of our competitive position, also a balanced development of Finnish society, the prospects for f u l l employment and a more equal distribution of income. These aspects should not be forgotten. We stand for the abolishment of discriminatory economic arrangements. It i s our hope that the improving p o l i t i c a l atmosphere in Europe would open a perspective of all-European economic co-operation as well. The conference on European security and co-operation could contribute to this process. The Economic Commission for Europe i s carrying out research work in the problems of trade between East and West. The amount of this trade has been so far small, and i t would be regrettable, i f the West-European integration would mean further set-backs i n this respect. The talks on the limitations of strategic arms between the Soviet Union and the United States have their next round here i n Helsinki beginning from March 28th. There i s every reason to welcome the delegations in Helsinki, especially when the course of these negotiations seems to give r i s e to cautious optimism. In general, disarmament i s one of the main contemporary tasks a l l over the world. This i s not only valid for the great powers with their strategic arsenals and their programmes for the development of yet more deadily weapons. Smaller nations have come forth with i n i t i a t i v e s for regional disarmament, and the question of a reduction in the forces and armaments in Europe i s one that concerns closely a l l countries of our continent. Security in Europe i s in the f i n a l analysis i n d i v i s i b l e from attempts to achieve a globally secure pattern of co-operation and co-existence between a l l nations. This i s the chief aim of the United Nations. I think that the Finnish ac t i v i t y in the international f i e l d w i l l have to be judged by the aims and the achievements we can present in realising the tasks of the United Nations Charter. International security i s also closely interwoven with the im-provements of the positions of the developing countries. Besides our participation in the a c t i v i t i e s of the United Nations in this f i e l d we are also intensifying other efforts to this effect. In view of the task of overcoming the remnants of colonialism, the course of events in certain dependent areas of Africa give cause for anxiety. The endeavours 219 of national liberation movements to build a just and equal foundation for the unimpeded realisation of the desires of these peoples s t i l l under colonial rule deserve due support. In a world of hunger and inequality, with many peoples s t i l l l i v i n g under oppression and r a c i a l discrimination, no one can permanently nurture the i l l u s i o n of a static state of security. Thus we can see the main lines of Finnish foreign policy steadily developing, in accordance with the lin e we have adopted. Peace and stable development, both in Europe and a l l over the world, are the prerequisites for the secure l i f e of any country, and this i s doubly true for the small and neutral states. Within our own framework we strive to do our best to realize the great task of promoting peace and understanding between states and their peoples. (Source: Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 12/72 (1972).) 220 APPENDIX B Parliamentary Report on Finnish Defence . A Parliamentary Report on the Finnish Defence has been pub-lished, the f i r s t of i t s kind since the war. It stresses the primary importance of foreign policy for Finnish security policy: 1. Origins and composition of the Committee The preparation of a parliamentary defence report was included in the o f f i c i a l programme of the Karjalainen Government (1970-1971). Defence has been accorded more importance in the platforms of several p o l i t i c a l parties in the last few years.... In autumn 1970, a Parliamentary Defence Committee (PDC) was appointed to define "the tasks to be f u l f i l l e d by the armed forces as a part of our security policy, and the military capability of the armed forces." The report was to be submitted by A p r i l 1, but this date was later extended to July 1, 1971.... 2. Features of the defence appreciation affecting Finland The analysis of the PDC report starts with a summary of inter-national security policy trends. The developing countries are mentioned— "a focal point of power conflicts." The United Nations i s seen as a negotiating instrument and a forum of opinion rather than as an active or effective source of assistance for states in need. Northern Europe i s the basic military frame of reference for the factors affecting Finland. It does not seem to belong to the top p r i o r i t i e s in international p o l i t i c s , but an unfavourable turn of events might be reflected here. Listed f i r s t among the strategic features of Fenno-scandia are the common boundary lines between the great power blocks in the southern Baltic and the North Cap (where Norway and the Soviet Union have a common frontier). The Nordic Countries are also interposed between the two economic systems of Europe, and both stra-tegically and economically their most important territory i s washed by the southern Baltic. Naval strategy plays the important role in the far North. A fundamental feature of the Nordic security situation is the NATO membership of Norway, Denmark and Iceland and the proximity of the Soviet Union. "For NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Finland and Sweden con-stitute an area that is not at the disposal of either." The PDC notes 221 that i t is in the interest of NATO to maintain i t s freedom of action at sea and in the air in the Baltic Sea and, in the north, towards the Barents Sea. For the Soviet Union, the security of Leningrad i s now better ensured since the Warsaw Pact countries control the south-east and east coasts of the Baltic. It seems to be important for the Soviet Union to have free access to the North Atlantic from the ice-free ports on the Kola Peninsula. And the Baltic Sea can be used to protect the Central European flank of the Soviet Union. The Danish Straits and i t s coastal territories are of importance to the USSR only in relation to access to the high seas and the v i t a l matter of the security of Leningrad. The strong Swedish defence force and, even more, the consistent Swedish policy of neutrality are seen as important factors. The PDC i s of the opinion that the strategic importance of the Aland Islands has diminished, but as they form a military vacuum they s t i l l have a military significance even in a minor c r i s i s . Finland must be prepared to defend this part of i t s territory as foreseen in the international agreement on Aland. The PDC notes that Finland's position in the international p o l i t i c a l scene has improved during the postwar period. It stresses especially the importance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union. "International recognition of the Finnish policy of neutrality and Finnish foreign policy aspiring actively for the furtherance of peace have increased Finnish prestige in a way that has a direct bearing on i t s security policy." Finland i s further removed from areas of international c r i s i s than before. "This has improved Finland's military p o s s i b i l i t i e s of preserving i t s neutrality also i n situations of c r i s i s . " It i s not l i k e l y that Finland would have to face a limited offensive on i t s own. "Should Finland be exposed to a military threat, i t w i l l inevitably be part of a c r i s i s between the great power blocks and a potential armed con f l i c t . " The PDC observes that an active, peace-oriented, neutral foreign policy is the best instrument of Finnish security policy. The success of this policy depends on the confidence shown in i t by other states, but, again, this policy does not run counter to the v i t a l interests of the states with a sphere of influence in this region. "This not-withstanding, the most important component of our policy i s to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must be con-fident that Finland w i l l in a l l circumstances pursue a policy of good-w i l l towards the Soviet Union and react in accordance with the treaty." The task of defence activity i s to support foreign policy and, in this way, to achieve two goals: "To safeguard Finnish t e r r i t o r i a l integrity effectively, and to ensure that Finnish s o i l w i l l not in an emergency be used for military action against other countries." 222 Great importance is attached to effective counter-measures against t e r r i t o r i a l violations. This is envisaged as safeguarding neutrality at the frontier. Third states can demand an adequate Finnish defence capability when Finnish sovereignty has been violated. The PDC does not consider c i v i l resistance to be a means of safeguarding the frontier or meeting the aims of a neutral policy. But the f i e l d of c i v i l resistance is interesting and worth studying. It also shows some promise in a situation where, e.g., the armed battle has been lost. In conclusion, the PDC specifies three main areas of possible enemy action: Lapland, the Baltic Sea (the southern part of Finland) and Finnish air space. The Defence Forces must prepare for defence of a l l parts of the country. 3. Doctrine and "hardware" The Finnish defence system i s not geared for a nuclear war, but neither i s a nuclear war i n Europe considered to be very l i k e l y . The main problem—the horns of the dilemma—for Finnish defence appropriations is formulated as follows: "The main problem of the Fin-nish defence system is the need to adjust to different kinds of situations: f i r s t , to safeguard t e r r i t o r i a l integrity and neutrality; second, to re-pel an attack against the country or through i t . The f i r s t requirement is met i n time of peace, especially with the a i r and naval forces. For the second, the infantry plays the central role. Neither one of these two requirements can be down-graded at the expense of the other. Top priority must be given to equipping the forces to a state of pre-paredness for action against violations of neutrality and limited surprise attacks." Among the possible forms of offensive mentioned by the PDC are attacks on trade routes and air raids against c i v i c and administra-tive centres. A direct offensive against the country can start as a surprise attack or a major assault on certain parts of the country or the entire territory. In the present thinking, there would be no front lin e in either of these eventualities. Deep penetration, fast-changing situations and surprise moves are l i k e l y , also by the defending forces. In ac-cordance with this, the Finnish forces are made up of different cate-gories cf units. Those formed by the older age groups, some of them poorly equipped, w i l l be assigned to defend v i t a l points (a i r f i e l d s , administrative centres, factories, etc.). These are classified as local units. The young, highly mobile, well trained and well equipped units are prepared to and capable of engaging the enemy on equal terms. These are the protective units. 223 In the opinion of the PDC, the draft (compulsory military service) system, with certain modifications, i s s t i l l the one best suited to meet these requirements. It provides a large reserve of infantry and leaves the regular forces for use only on highly sophisti-cated and technical assignments. With reference to these requirements, the PDC recommends the following hardware: New, short-range radar equipment, effective under-water con-t r o l equipment and some other control instruments. The necessary pro-curements would amount to Fmks 70 million over a period of five years. The air defence sector requires a reconnaissance f l i g h t , h e l i -copters and signalling equipment. The cost of these procurements i s estimated to be Fmks 160 million (Finland w i l l receive one wing of Draken interceptors during the 1970s). Mines, minesweepers and patrol boats are part of the naval programme. One naval unit should be available for use i n the area of the Aland Islands, a second for patrolling the Gulf of Finland. Cost: Fmks 185 million. The infantry requirements include mortars, ammunition, light bazookas, a r t i l l e r y pieces, radio equipment and motor vehicles. The b i l l i s estimated at Fmks 220 million. A l l in a l l , the new basic procurements plan implies an annual increase of Fmks 25 million in expenditure. Thus, by 1976, expenditure on this item would be Fmks 250 million higher than i t i s today. Defence expenditure in the 1971 Budget amounts to 1.4 per cent of the GNP and 5.75 per cent of the State Budget. The proposed plan would bring expenditure up to 1.5 per cent of the GNP. The PDC stresses that this proposal does not imply any belief that the situation i n Europe has worsened. On the contrary, tension has eased. But most European countries, both those within and those without power blocks, s t i l l maintain a very high level of armaments and the risks s t i l l exist. The Finnish plan is simply designed to close a gap already in existence because of very limited funds. 4. Increased parliamentary control The PDC report contains a very interesting chapter on the decision-making process for defence policy and the internal problems of the army. The PDC considers i t important to place the armed forces under c i v i l i a n jurisdiction in peacetime. The conflict between democracy and the military hierarchy should be minimised without jeopardising the 224 general defence capability. A new investigation i n depth should be conducted into the internal problems of the forces. Parliament should play a bigger role. It does not have enough say in military matters. The Government should make regular reports on defence and security policy. The annual budget estimates should contain a security analysis. The parliamentary responsibility of the Minister of Defence should be widened and the existing Standing Committees for Foreign Relations and Defence should be amalgamated into a joint security committee with two sections. 5. Dissenting opinions Three parties wrote dissenting opinions into the PDC report. The Conservative Party members thought that the proposed financing plans were too limited. The Rural Party did not l i k e the idea that the armed forces could be used to maintain law and order and the p o l i t i c a l system through "an order accepted by the majority of the people." Mr. Vennamo called this tinkering with the rights of the minority and contrary to the constitution. The Communists appended a long report of their own. They protest against the idea that manpower (i.e., a trained reserve) should compensate for inadequate armament, which they consider to be inherent in the current doctrine: "This cannon fodder policy i s i n -human." They also protest against rising defence costs on the ground that the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance has solved Finnish security problems and that an Independent defence by "the mobilisation of a l l available means" only reflects a wish from the Finnish side not to enter into consultations with the Soviet Union at the earliest possible stage in the event of a military threat. (Source: Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2/72 (1972).) Table I . Parliamentary Seats by Party, 1945-1972. (Sources: Off ic ia l  Stat is t ics of Finland, Deadline Data on World Affairs, Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Elec-tion year National Coalition Party Liberal People's Party Swedish People's Party Parties Agrarian Party; Centre Party Social Democratic Party SKDL Rural Party and Others 1945 28 9 14 49 50 49 1 1948 33 5 14 56 54 38 -1951 28 10 15 51 53 43 -1954 24 13 13 53 54 43 -1958 29 8 14 48 48 50 3 1962 32 13 14 53 38 47 3 1966 26 9 12 49 55 41 8 1970 37 8 12 36 52 36 19 1972 34 7 18 35 55 37 22 T a b l e I I . C a b i n e t s a n d T h e i r P o l i t i c a l C o m p o s i t i o n , 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 7 2 . ( S o u r c e s : O f f i c i a l S t a t i s t i c s  o f F i n l a n d , D e a d l i n e D a t a o n W o r l d A f f a i r s , K e e s i n g ' s C o n t e m p o r a r y A r c h i v e s . ) P a r t i e s S o c i a l C a r e -P r i m e C o a l i - A g r a r i a n S o c i a l D e m o t a k e r , M i n i s t e r p e r i o d i n o f f i c e t i o n L i b e r a l S w e d i s h C e n t r e ' D e m o L e a g u e S K D L I n d e p . * 2 8 . U . C a s t r e n 9 . 2 1 . 4 4 - 1 1 . 1 7 . 4 4 1 1 1 4 6 - — 3 2 9 . P a a s i k i v i I I 1 1 . 1 7 . 4 4 - 4 . 1 7 . 4 5 - 1 2 4 4 - 4 3 3 0 . P a a s i k i v i I I I 4 . 1 7 . 4 5 - 3 . 2 6 . 4 6 - 1 1 4 4 - 5 2 3 1 . P e k k a l a 3 . 2 6 . 4 6 - 7 . 2 9 . 4 8 - - 1 5 5 - 6 1 3 2 . F a g e r h o l m I 7 . 2 9 . 4 8 - 3 . 1 7 . 5 0 - - - - 1 5 - - 1 3 3 . K e k k o n e n I 3 . 1 7 . 5 0 - 1 . 1 7 . 5 1 - 2 3 1 0 - - - -3 4 . K e k k o n e n I I 1 . 1 7 . 5 1 - 9 . 2 0 . 5 1 - 1 2 7 7 - - -3 5 . K e k k o n e n I I I 9 . 2 0 . 5 1 - 7 . 9 . 5 3 - - 2 7 7 - - 1 3 6 . K e k k o n e n I V 7 . 9 . 5 3 - 1 1 . 1 7 . 5 3 - - 3 8 - - - 3 3 7 . T u o m i o j a 1 1 . 1 7 . 5 3 - 5 . 5 . 5 4 4 * 3 * 2 * - - - - 6 * 3 8 . T b r n g r e n 5 . 5 . 5 4 - 1 0 . 2 0 . 5 4 - - 1 6 6 - - 1 3 9 . K e k k o n e n V 1 0 . 2 0 . 5 4 - 3 . 3 . 5 6 - - - 6 7 - - 1 4 0 . F a g e r h o l m I I 3 . 3 . 5 6 - 5 . 2 7 . 5 7 - 1 1 6 6 - - 1 4 1 . S u k s e l a i n e n I 5 . 2 7 . 5 7 - 1 1 . 2 9 . 5 7 - 3 3 6 - - - 1 a f t e r 7 . 2 . 5 7 - 4 - 9 - - - 1 a f t e r 9 . 2 . 5 7 - 2 - 6 5 - - 2 4 2 . v o n F i e a n d t 1 1 . 2 9 . 5 7 - 4 . 2 6 . 5 8 - - - 4 * - - - 1 0 * 4 3 . K u u s k o s k i 4 . 2 6 . 5 8 - 8 . 2 9 . 5 8 - 1 * - 5 * 4 * - - 4 * 4 4 . F a g e r h o l m I I I 8 . 2 9 . 5 8 - 1 . 1 3 . 5 9 3 1 1 5 5 - - -4 5 . S u k s e l a i n e n I I 1 . 1 3 . 5 9 - 7 . 1 4 . 6 1 - - 1 * 1 4 - - - -4 6 . M i e t t u n e n 7 . 1 4 . 6 1 - 4 . 1 3 . 6 2 - - - 1 2 - - - 3 4 7 . K a r j a l a i n e n I 4 . 1 3 . 6 2 - 1 2 . 1 8 . 6 3 3 2 2 5 - - - 3 4 8 . L e h t o 1 2 . 1 8 . 6 3 - 9 . 1 2 . 6 4 - - - - 1 * - - 1 4 * 4 9 . V i r o l a i n e n 9 . 1 2 . 6 4 - 5 . 2 7 . 6 6 3 3 2 7 - - - -5 0 . P a a s i o I 5 . 2 7 . 6 6 - 3 . 2 2 . 6 8 - - - 5 6 1 3 -5 1 . K o i v i s t o 3 . 2 2 . 6 8 - 5 . 1 4 . 7 0 - - 1 5 6 1 3 1 5 2 . A u r a I 5 . 1 4 . 7 0 - 7 . 1 5 . 7 0 1 * 1 * - 3 * 4 * - - 4 * 5 3 . K a r j a l a i n e n I I 7 . 1 5 . 7 0 - 1 0 . 2 9 . 7 1 - 1 2 4 5 - 3 -a f t e r 3 . 2 6 . 7 1 - 1 2 4 8 - - -5 4 . A u r a I I 1 0 . 2 9 . 7 1 - 2 . 2 3 . 7 2 1 * 1 * - 3 * 4 * - - 4 * 5 5 . P a a s i o I I 2 . 2 3 . 7 2 - 7 . 1 9 . 7 2 - - - - 1 5 - i 5 6 . ? c a r e t a k e r 7 . 1 9 . 7 2 - _ J 227 APPENDIX D New Year's Address by the President of the Republic, January 1, 1972: Citizens, I begin my New Year speech with the usual review of the economy. It is to be regretted that the state of our national finances at the end of the past year was weaker than usual. Total production grew by a l i t t l e over one per cent, as compared with an annual growth on the average of eight per cent during the previous two years. This rather poor result is partly due to factors for which we were responsible, such as the strikes and shutdowns in the early part of the year and a substantial r i s e in l i v i n g costs. But the principal reason for the regression i s the deterioration in the inter-national conjuncture. Despite the considerable expansion and d i -versification of this country's economy, our production and exports alike s t i l l rest on a relatively narrow basis. Our entire national economy, therefore, i s highly sensitive to fluctuations in the con-juncture abroad. To reduce our vulnerability and, i n general, to strengthen our formation of revenue during the next few years, we need a selective policy of growth and structural improvement in every branch of the economy. To remedy the present shortcomings, we must raise our home production at an even faster pace. The Home Industries Commission has indeed declared 1972 as a Home Industry Year. I hope that during this Year every sector of the population w i l l devote increasing attention to the gravity of home production i n our international trade and, above a l l , as a means of raising employment. Our total incomes policy in recent years has resulted generally in a steady and f a i r l y rapid growth of real earnings. Efforts have been made, with considerable success, to improve the position of low-income groups. Even so, there are s t i l l large sectors of the population whose income has not kept pace with the generally favourable development. Such deficiencies should be remedied in the forthcoming collective agreements. These low-income groups include not only the aged, but also the tens of thousands of victims of the present wave of retrenchment who are now unemployed and have no regular income. Everything that can be done should be done to relieve the present unemployment, and to narrow down the con-tinuing regional differences in employment. I am not too optimistic about economic development in the coming year. It is true that the uncertainties besetting international currency arrangements were brought to an end two weeks ago and that a 228 gradual recovery can be expected. But i t w i l l take some time for i t s benefits to be f e l t in Finland, so we can hardly expect more than a three per cent growth in our total production in 1972. From the present prospects, i t seems that the upswing in the conjuncture w i l l not get really under way u n t i l 1973. New income policies are needed in this country in the near future. The disputes on the distribution of incomes of past years must be settled amicably and the decisions must be based on real potential growth. Continued inflation w i l l benefit no one, certainly not the poor. Unnecessary as i t might seem, we must remind ourselves that extra i n -comes can only be distributed i f there i s extra income to distribute. Assured economic growth and international competitivity are important for income and other policies; only in this way can we put our economy on a solid basis and secure better conditions for ourselves in the future. Growing attention has been paid in recent socio-political debate to the problem of pollution, the gradual dissipation of natural resources and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the developing countries. It i s be-coming increasingly clear that, even in industrialized countries, the industrial organization is unable to satisfy certain basic human needs, and that we have failed to avoid poverty in a relative sense. Further-more, poverty is no longer regarded purely from the viewpoint of social justice. It has been found that a society i n which much of the popula-tion enjoys a measure of well-being cannot afford continued poverty, be-cause this raises social costs too high. Thus i t is in the interests of every member of the community to fight against poverty. The experts are well aware of a l l these problems. The im-portant thing now is to find solutions to them. One thing i s certain in any case: the solutions w i l l c a l l for major financial sacrifices. It seems inevitable that industry w i l l have to be directed more and more to satisfying these public needs by authoritative measures, and that the freedom of action of private enterprise w i l l have to be curtailed. It also seems indispensable, among other things, to alter price structures so that the costs of anti-pollution are included i n the prices of pro-ducts. The problems I have mentioned only come to the attention of the public when their gravity and extent reach a certain threshold. The question then i s : w i l l the general public realize the absolute need for financial sacrifices and restrictions of individual freedom that their solution calls for? And how quickly w i l l this realization come? In any case there i s no escaping the fact that, in the last resort, the pro-blems are economic and, above a l l , p o l i t i c a l , and that their solution w i l l not be found with out-of-date modes of thought. What i s needed i s a complete change of attitude. A l l this may sound very radical, but i t can be read i n last year's OECD Report. It remains to be seen how far-reaching the changes in the so-called free market system must be for the structural a l t e r -nations to the economy that I have just mentioned to be effected. An 229 added d i f f i c u l t y i s that no country—least of a l l a small one—can achieve the changes alone. Action within an international economic organization i s subject to the conditions imposed by the organization i t s e l f . More than ever before, the freedom of movement of individual States i s being hamstrung by the formation of closed trade associations and the growth of big supernational enterprises. It i s , of course, possible that the necessary steps w i l l be opposed in the name of economic freedom. If this occurs—as I assume i t will—we w i l l be in the golden age of the demagogue. But without radical measures, mankind w i l l be moving on a fateful course. Indeed, the prophets of total destruction are growing in number. Sometimes a poet sees the future more clearly than a p o l i t i c i a n embroiled in day-to-day problems. Here I quote from a poem written by Paavo Haavikko in 1970: "World sales of fascism are growing. They have grown." But even i f fascism, with i t s implicit rejection of a l l rational thought, raises i t s head—and a few politicians to pro-minence at the same t i m e — i t cannot put a stop to inevitable develop-ment. At the most i t w i l l delay progress, to the cost of us a l l . In keeping with the traditions, I wish my listeners and the whole Finnish nation a Happy and Successful New Year. (Source: Finnish Features, Helsinki, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, no. 1/72 (1972).) Graph I. F i n n i s h Imports from Six Leading Trade Partners, 1953-1971. (Source: Bank of Finland, Monthly B u l l e t i n . ) Soviet Union United Kingdom _ Western Germany Sweden United States _. Norway 53 -5$ 53 7% V=j ^ 5-9 go £1 Zl 6l & 6l 6?6 67 6"8 §9 70 71 G r a p h I I . F i n n i s h E x p o r t s t o S i x L e a d i n g T r a d e P a r t n e r s , 1953-1971. ( S o u r c e : o f F i n l a n d , M o n t h l y B u l l e t i n . ) 4 0 % — I S o v i e t U n i o n U n i t e d K i n g d o m _ W e s t e r n G e r m a n y . S w e d e n U n i t e d S t a t e s _ . N o r w a y 30 % ~ 20 % 10 % — 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 Graph IV. Finnish Exports to Trading Areas (EFTA, EEC, Eastern Bloc), 1960-1971. (Source: Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin.) 234 APPENDIX F Table III. Finnish Foreign Trade by Main Product Groups, 1971. (Source: Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin.) mil mk* % Exports: •• Agricultural products 546.8 6 Round and hewn timber 88.5 1 Wood industry products 1653.3 17 Paper industry products 3720.7 37 Metal, engineering industry products 2323.0 24 Other goods 1564.9 15 9897.2 100 Imports: Raw materials and producer goods 4638.5 39 Fuels and lubricants 1560.9 13 Finished goods: investment goods 3428.0 29 Finished goods: consumer goods 2110.8 19 11738.2 100 (*0n December 31, 1971, 1 $ Canadian equaled 4.148 Finnish markka) 235 Table IV. Finnish Foreign Trade by Countries and Trading Blocs, 1970-1971. (Source: Bank of Finland, Monthly Bulletin.) % Exports 1970 mil mk* % 1971 mil mk* % Imports 1970 mil mk* % 1971 mil mk* OECD countries in Europe 70. 5 6832. 1 72. 4 7163. 4 72. 7 8043 .5 73. 2 8586 .6 Austria 0. 8 77. 0 0. 9 92. 6 1. 3 141 .8 1. 5 171 .4 Belgium-Luxembourg 1. 9 185. 8 1. 9 185. 2 1. 9 215 .5 1. 7 193 .4 Denmark 4. 1 398. 9 4. 0 392. 6 3. 3 368 .3 3. 2 378 .1 France 3. 8 363. 8 3. 8 376. 8 3. 4 373 .8 3. 1 366 .4 Western Germany 10. 6 1027. 4 10. 4 1028. 9 17. 0 1880 .8 16. 8 1974 .1 Italy 2. 4 230. 6 2. 1 211. 8 1. 9 213 .3 2. 0 236 .8 Netherlands 4. 6 443. 5 4. 2 418. 5 3. 6 399 .0 3. 5 414 .5 Norway 3. 6 349. 0 3. 7 370. 9 2. 4 268 .1 2. 7 312 .6 Portugal 0. 3. 33. 4 0. 2 23. 2 0. 7 75 .8 0. 6 64 .6 Spain 1. 0 102. 3 1. 0 94. 1 0. 4 44 .8 0. 8 90 .1 Sweden 15. 9 1543. 4 16. 3 1610. 9 17. 4 1924 .3 18. 1 2130 .0 Switzerland 1. 9 179. 9 2. 3 229. 2 3. 4 372 .6 3. 6 416 .7 United Kingdom 17. 7 1715. 0 19. 3 1906. 2 15. 7 1736 .2 15. 4 1809 .9 other 1. 9 180. 1 2. 3 222. 5 0. 3 29 .2 0. 2 28 .0 OECD outside Europe 5. 9 571. 2 5. 7 560. 6 6. 5 716 .9 6. 5 763 .6 Canada 1. 0 93. 0 0. 7 72. 8 0. 3 35 .5 0. 3 32 .9 Japan 0. 2 24. 9 0. 2 18. 2 1. 8 198 .5 2. 0 232 .3 United States 4. 7 453. 3 4. 8 469. 6 4. 4 482 .9 4. 2 498 .4 Eastern Bloc 15. 8 1528. 4 14. 2 1409. 6 16. 1 1788 .1 18. 1 2130 .1 Czechoslovakia 0. 6 55. 5 0. 7 66. 0 0. 5 53 .4 0. 5 61 .9 Eastern Germany 0. 8 73. 8 0. 6 60. 0 0. 6 67 .6 0. 6 74 .9 China 0. 5 54. 0 0. 5 50. 2 0. 2 24 .0 0. 4 45 .7 Poland 1. 2 114. 6 0. 9 93. 1 1. 5 164 .8 1. 9 228 .4 Soviet Union 11. 9 1151. 4 10. 6 1049. 7 12. 4 1375 .6 13. 9 1632 .1 other 0. 8 79. 1 0. 9 90. 6 0. 9 102 .7 0. 8 87 .1 Latin America 2. 8 266. 1 2. 4 242. 3 3. 1 345 .2 0. 9 107 .0 Other 5. 0 488. 9 5. 3 521. 3 1. 6 177 .7 1. 3 150 .9 GRAND TOTAL 100. 0 9686. 7 100. 0 9897. 2 100. 11071 .4 100. 11738 .2 of which EFTA countries 44. 5 4308. 2 46. 9 4641. 1 44. 2 4895 .6 45. 1 5296 .4 EEC countries 23. 3 2253. 1 22. 4 2221. 1 2718 3082 .5 27. 1 3185 .2 OECD countries 76. 4 7403. 3 78. 1 7724. 0 79. 2 8760 .4 79. 7 9350 .2 (*On December 31, 1971, 1 $ Canadian equaled 4.148 Finnish markka) 

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