UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

The study of two successive military coups in Burma and Peru. Langenbacher, Wolfgang 1972

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THE STUDY OF TWO SUCCESSIVE MILITARY COUPS IN BURMA AND PERU by WOLFGANG LANGENBACHER B.A., Kent State University, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1972 In present ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l fu l f i lment o f the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ib ra ry sha l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I fu r ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th is t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representa t ives . It is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of th is thes is fo r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion . Department of The Un ive rs i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date V i i ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis i s to study the dynamics of two successive military coups in Burma and Peru. Both of these nations have had a military coup, which was subsequently, after a relatively short period of c i v i l i a n rule, followed by another coup. A l l four of these coups have had some impact on the c i v i l bureaucracy, yet in both cases the impact after the second coup was much more pervasive. The question that the thesis i s concerned with answering i s why did the impact on the bureaucracy change as i t did the second time around. The answer l i e s in the military's dissatisfaction with the c i v i l bureaucracy after the 2nd coups. This dissatisfaction resulted from the following three factors: (1) changes i n the goals and purposes of the second coups; (2) changes in military personnel between the f i r s t and second coups; (3) experiences of military between coups. (a) Both of the f i r s t two coups were carried out for restricted goals and purposes. Consequently, the military had l i t t l e opportunity or need to extensively concern i t s e l f with the c i v i l i a n bureaucracy. For their less ambitious goals the bureaucracy was quite suitable. The second time around, both military coups occurred under quite different circumstances and for different goals and purposes. Contrary to the static orientation of the f i r s t coups, the second ones were carried out for the purpose of moving the nation to a more pro-gressive condition and due to the in a b i l i t y of c i v i l i a n groups to achieve this goal. The c i v i l bureaucracy had serious weaknesses which i i i did not allow i t to meet the military's governing needs and the military carried out extensive actions to rectify this. (b) Younger and more radical officers tended to displace the older and more conservative officers in the second coup, whereas the latter dominated the f i r s t coup in both countries. These younger officers more rural and of different social origins from the older officers, tended to be much more hostile to the urban middle c i v i l servants. (c) Some experiences between the coups exacerbated the officers' h o s t i l i t y toward the bureaucracy. That i s , in one case betrayal by c i v i l servants of military's programs in i t i a t e d during the f i r s t coup, in the other case having to step into an administrative void in rural areas which the military attributed to a weak and inefficient c i v i l service. TABLE OF CONTENTS iv Chapter Page INTRODUCTION . . 1 I PERU •• • • • • » * »» .7 A. Peruvian Bureaucracy .. .. .. 7 B. Impact of Military Coups on C i v i l Bureaucracy .. .. .. 14 1. The 1962 Coup .. 14 2. The 1968 Coup .. 15 C. Explanations for Impact on the C i v i l Bureaucracy .• .. .. 20 1. Goals of the 1962 Coup .. .. 20 2. Goals of the 1968 Coup .. .. 24 3. Changes in Officer Corps Between Coups .. .. .. 32 4. Experiences of the Military Between Coups „. .. .. 39 II BURMA A. Burmese Bureaucracy B. Impact of Military Coups on the C i v i l Bureaucracy 1. The 1958 Coup 2. The 1962 Coup C. Explanation for the Impact on the C i v i l Bureaucracy 1. Goals of the 1958 Coup 2. Goals of the 1962 Coup 3. Changes in Officer Corps Between Coups 4. Experiences of Military Between Coups 40 40 49 51 56 56 60 69 73 V Chapter Page III CONCLUSION A. The Suitability of Generalizing to Other Countries from the Findings Based on Burma and Peru 76 B. The Characteristics of the Military in Power .. • • 78 C. The Impact of Military Coups on the C i v i l Bureaucracy as Related to the Causes of Coups 82 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . 8 5 INTRODUCTION Military coups d'etat and military governments have beeen an extensively studied phenomenon in recent years. Numerous studies have decried their deleterious effect on democracy and on values associated with democracy. Some have attempted to investigate the s u i t a b i l i t y of military regimes for p o l i t i c a l and economic modernization. Others have attempted to classify the types of military takeovers and have striven to offer elaborate explanations for particular types of coups. However, few have focused their attention upon the effect of military takeovers and military governments on the c i v i l bureaucracies. This represents a surprising, indeed serious omission, considering the important role that the c i v i l service often occupies in the polities that have experienced military rule. The importance of bureaucracy may well be amplified under military regimes, as the new military governments tend to suppress most c i v i l i a n p o l i t i c a l activity, often leaving the bureau-cracy as the only c i v i l i a n organization capable of exercising some influence on policy inputs and outputs. In non-military governments the special a b i l i t y of the bureaucracy to influence governmental programs is also recognized, but i t s influence must compete with other p o l i t i c a l l y active c i v i l i a n groups and organizations. A gap of this magnitude in the f i e l d of comparative administration requires immediate attention and the thesis w i l l strive to deal with i t by considering the following two questions: (1) what happens to the c i v i l 2 service after a military takeover and (2) do different types of military takeovers have the same affect on the bureaucracy? The thesis w i l l attempt to answer these questions with a compari-son of two successive coups, 1958 and 1962 in Burma and 1962 and 1968 in Peru. Thus, both of these nations have recently experienced a military coup, which was subsequently, after a relatively short period of c i v i l i a n rule, followed by another coup. A l l four of these coups have had some substantial impact on the c i v i l bureaucracy, yet, in both countries the impact after the second coup was considerably more pervasive. In an effort to determine the cause of this different impact on the bureaucracy the second time around, i t is hoped that some light w i l l be shed on the larger, previously stated, questions. The thesis w i l l suggest that the answer l i e s in an increased dissatisfaction resulting from the following three factors: (1) changes in the goals and purposes of the 2nd coups; (2) changes in military personnel between and during the coups; (3) experiences of the military between coups. In essence, the argument w i l l take the following direction. 1. Both of the f i r s t coups were carried out for restricted goals and purposes. Moreover, they were intended to shift power for a short duration after which power was to be returned to c i v i l i a n hands. The military, thus, had l i t t l e opportunity or need to concern i t s e l f extensively with the c i v i l i a n bureaucracy. For their less ambitious goals the existing bureaucracy was quite suitable. The second time 3 time around, both military coups occurred under altered circumstances and for different purposes. Contrary to the limited goals of the f i r s t two coups, the second ones were carried out for the purpose of effecting a social and p o l i t i c a l revolution. To be more successful in i t s efforts than the overthrown c i v i l i a n s had been in theirs, the military required a relatively strong, reliable and efficient bureaucratic machine. In both cases, the c i v i l bureaucracy had serious weaknesses which prevented i t from meeting the military's needs. The military moved to rectify the situation. 2. Between and during the coups, younger and more radical officers tended to rise to positions of influence in the military, generally displacing older and more conservative officers who had dominated the f i r s t coup. This contributed not only to the changed goals of the second takeover, but also had some direct implications for the military's increased dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy. The younger officers, generally came from different social origins than the older officers and c i v i l servants and, therefore, tended to be much more hostile to the c i v i l servant. Ideological differences between younger officers and c i v i l servants, a consequence of age and background, also contributed their share to this increased dissatisfaction. 3. Experiences of the military between the coups in both cases exacerbated the military's already considerable h o s t i l i t y towards the c i v i l service and served to radicalize many of the previously mentioned younger officers. In one case, there was thought to be betrayal by 4 c i v i l s e r v a n t s o f m i l i t a r y p r o g r a m s i n i t i a t e d d u r i n g t h e f i r s t c o u p , a n d i n t h e o t h e r c a s e , t h e m i l i t a r y w a s t o f i l l a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e v o i d a n d s u c c e s s f u l l y c o m p l e t e p r o g r a m s m i s m a n a g e d b y c i v i l i a n s . A p a r t i a l w e a k n e s s o f t h i s t h e s i s m a y b e t h e t h i n e m p i r i c a l e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e f o r s o m e s e g m e n t s o f t h e a r g u m e n t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m u c h o f t h e d e s i r a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n i s j u s t n o t a v a i l a b l e , a s s o c i a l s c i e n c e d a t a i n b o t h c o u n t r i e s l e a v e s m a n y q u e s t i o n s u n a n s w e r e d . T h e p r o b l e m i s e x a c e r b a t e d b y t h e s e c r e c y s u r r o u n d i n g m a n y a s p e c t s o f g o v e n -m e n t a n d t h e a r m e d f o r c e s , b o t h i n P e r u a n d B u r m a , w h i c h o f t e n m a k e s t h e g a t h e r i n g o f e m p i r i c a l d a t a v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e . F e w p r o b l e m s o f d e f i n i t i o n a r e a n t i c i p a t e d f r o m t h i s r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e a n d s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c o m p a r i s o n . C o n f u s i o n s h o u l d n o t a r i s e f r o m t h e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e u s e o f t h e t e r m s m i l i t a r y a n d a r m y t h r o u g h o u t t h e t h e s i s . T h i s u s a g e s h o u l d b e p e r m i s s i b l e a n d u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , a s t h e a r m y i s , f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r p o s e s , t h e m i l i t a r y i n t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s . B o t h t h e i r A i r F o r c e s a n d N a v i e s a r e r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l a n d i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n c o m p a r i s o n t o t h e a r m y , w h i c h p r o v i d e s m o s t o f t h e p e r s o n n e l a n d l e a d e r s h i p m e n t i o n e d i n t h e t e x t . I n r e f e r r i n g t o b u r e a u c r a t s a n d c i v i l s e r v a n t s i n t h e t h e s i s , i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t p r i m a r i l y h i g h e r a n d m i d d l e l e v e l i n d i v i d u a l s w i l l b e t h e s u b j e c t , e x c e p t w h e r e s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d . M o s t o f t e n t h e s e a r e i n d i v i d u a l s a t t a c h e d t o t h e c e n t r a l d e p a r t m e n t s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d a r e n o t m e m b e r s o f t h e m a n y s u b s i d i a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s t h a t a r e o n g o v e r n m e n t a l p a y r o l l s , s u c h a s s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , 5 railroad employees, state dock workers, etc.. Although a large portion of the argument in the thesis w i l l be predicated on the motivations and goals of military governments, the thesis w i l l not attempt to define the question of when an aim becomes an achievement. This does not mean that the thesis is an apology for i t s subject, but only that concerns about the success of aims and goals requires the extensive infusion of values and conjecture into the discussion. The limited scope of the thesis necessarily restricts this activity to several minor comments in the text. The comparability of the two example nations may raise some objections, as they are as dissimilar in p o l i t i c s , culture and economics as they are geographically remote from each other. Both militaries and bureaucracies arose out of vastly different circumstances and traditions, in vastly different periods of history. Dissimilar patterns of thought, views of the world and attitudes towards p o l i t i c s have shaped their p o l i t i c a l environment. Yet, in spite of a l l of these differences, similar patterns of impact on the bureaucracy after the coups have emerged in both countries. The thesis w i l l take the following format for each of the two countries: a. The actual condition of the c i v i l service w i l l f i r s t be analysed so as to gain an understanding of what the military faced after each takeover. Only one such analysis is required since the nature of the 6 c i v i l service changed only marginally between coups. b. The actual impact of each coup on the bureaucracy w i l l then be presented, indicating conclusively that the impact the second time around was actually much more pervasive. c. The f i n a l section w i l l deal with the reasons for the greater impact outlined above. CHAPTER I PERU A. Peruvian Bureaucracy Peruvian public administration operates in a framework of Spanish colonial law, which is characterized by overlapping responsibility, duplication, and voluminous d e t a i l , a l l of which makes i t v i r t u a l l y impossible to comply with i t s formal dictates. Consequently, the operations of the bureaucracy have been imbued with a large degree of formalism,^" which is the amount of discrepancy between prescribed legal procedure and effective practice. Recent manifestations of this formalistic tradition abound in the governmental reforms (1950-1967) aimed at eradication of the c i v i l service's perennial deficiencies through the introduction of 2 innumerable new rules and regulations. As usual, l i t t l e more than l i p service has been given to these efforts and the traditional patterns continue. Formalism also marks the Peruvian bureaucracy's external relationships. In law, i t has extensive formal authority, but in practice i t has severely limited control in exercising that authority. This often results in the ignoring of i t s directives and orders by the persons '''Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries - The Theory of  Prismatic Society (Boston, 1964), pp. 15-18. According to Riggs, formalism in administrative system is present when one finds,elaborate formal structures, charts, and rules, yet, the people working under these formal facets are doing things quite differently from the formally prescribed. 2 Jack W. Hopkins, "Comparative Observation on Peruvian Bureaucracy," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 1, No. 3 (November, 1969), p. 306. 8 concerned. Equally as pervasive as formalism in Peruvian administration, is the widespread usage of personal contacts and influence. Most individuals will seek some sort of intermediary to expedite their business with the government, and inevitably lubricate these efforts with a bribe. All attempts made to lessen the influence of personalism in the c i v i l service have failed because "they (the public) do not trust automatic procedures because they have learned through long experience that paper flows 4 haltingly in the Peruvian bureaucracy. Formalism and personalism in Peruvian public administration are part of a Peruvian orientation towards government generally, which sees the state as the private domain of the individuals who control the apparatus at a given moment. Office holders in the administration consist of their personal dependents and followers. Virtually a l l public service positions "are awarded without regard to merit and achievement"^ and are instead controlled by these powerful representatives of the oligarchy. The relationship between c i v i l servants and their political masters tends to conform to a patron-client relationship and the 3 Ibid. ^ Hopkins, "Comparative Observations", p. 306. Carlos A. Astiz, Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics (Ithaca, 1969), p. 208. 9 continued employment of a particular group of bureaucrats is contingent on the p o l i t i c a l survival of the patron.** It i s the patron that makes most decisions on any issue of substance for the c i v i l service, often even when he is not part of the regular administrative structure, and o f f i c i a l s loyal to him carry out his directives under the guise of normal administrative procedures. The overall result i s a highly po l i t i c i z e d public service, one that has frequently been a pawn in the power struggle of oligarchic factions and one that i s staffed by o f f i c i a l s of questionable qualifications. The impact of the patron-client relationship is exacerbated by the manner in which power is wielded in Latin p o l i t i c s . Power on a l l levels, particularly in the central government, i s generally concentrated in the hands of a few patrons in the executive. Furthermore, power i s considered to be indivisible and i t s delegation is seen as a sign of weakness and few individuals outside of the ruling clique are allowed to partake of i t . 7 This orientation towards power manifests i t s e l f in the operations of the central administrative departments, through informal flow of communication and relatively s t r i c t control by the patron at the 6 James Payne, "Peru: The P o l i t i c s of Structured Violence," Garrisons  and Governments, ed., Wilson C. McWilliams (San Francisco, 1967), p. 255. Patrons are generally cabinet ministers i f they are in the government at a l l . 7 Ibid. 10 top. The informal nature of the administrative system i s camouflaged by extensive concern with regulations and red tape, "with the evident design of giving the appearance of act i v i t y , while delaying a l l substan-g tive actions". Substantive actions await the personal attention of the patron. An outgrowth of the s t r i c t control over power in the executive i s the centralization of the relatively small Peruvian public service (with the exception of school teachers i t consisted of 110,000 individuals) at the center in the capital, where most actions concerning a l l levels of government and a l l regions are i n i t i a t e d . ^ Of the 5000 higher and middle level c i v i l servants in the Peruvian public service, as many as 75% are located in the Lima-Callao a r e a . ^ This has created an exaggerated urban orientation in the c i v i l service and has placed i t "out of touch" with the people. C i v i l servants view posting to the pro-vinces as exile and punishment and are highly resistant to any move away from the urban areas. When they do go into the provinces one observor Riggs, pp. 281-283. As Riggs points out, extensive centralization and control of administration at the center does not necessarily imply that "higher o f f i c i a l s impose effective control over subordinates, both in headquarters and f i e l d offices". In relation to provincial adminis-tration there i s , in fact, often under-centralization. In Peru, this holds true, as provincial patrons tend to control administration away from the capital and the central departments. 9 Astiz, p. 211. Ibid. 11 Ibid. p*a^ W does no-h-e^coA 12 describes c i v i l servants as acting lik e a group of tourists on vacation, 12 alienating most of the people whom they contact. The cumulative effect of the centralization of administration and the downgrading of rural posts, has been the neglect of provincial administration and services. The army has often been forced to counter this neglect through the use of i t s own administrative forces, to bring minimal services to forgotten areas (1950-1968). Peru has had relatively l i t t l e professionalization in the public service, with no serious efforts to reform the situation commencing 13 u n t i l the middle sixties. As already mentioned, for example, up to 1968 l i t t l e emphasis had been placed on educational and technical competence for c i v i l service recruitment and generally people of inferior quality had been retained. To complicate matters, Peru's university system provides few of the s k i l l s necessary to overcome these deficiencies and "in service training to make up for the absence 14 of adequate pre-service training has been scarce. One observor sums up the problems created by the poor quality of o f f i c i a l s staffing the apparatus: 12 Ibid. 13 Unlike the military's intense concentration on professionalization and high quality education, commencing in the late 1930's. 14 J. C. Honey, Towards Strategies of Public Administration Development  in Latin America (Syracuse, 1968), p. 148. 13 The bureaucratic machine in Peru, much of i t unchanged since colonial times is cumbersome, slow and in many cases may also be corrupt. For the ordinary citizen who has neither money nor p u l l , i t can be an agonizing experience trying to get action on quite simple things. I l l paid junior c i v i l servants are mostly nothing more than unwilling and inefficient wielders of rubber stamps - to obtain a decision on anything of substance i t is necessary to see a minister; indeed a l l really important decisions are taken by the President himself. With queues of petitioners lined up in their anterooms everyday seeking favours, i t is extremely d i f f i c u l t for the President or his Ministers either to give good service to the public or find time to deal with fundamental questions of policy; there is no competent body of permanent o f f i c i a l s to whose broad shoulders the burden of either of these two tasks can be transferred.15 As can be expected, a bureaucratic organization with so l i t t l e to commend i t , has generated considerable amounts of public h o s t i l i t y and cynicism. Hostility towards the c i v i l service, although prevalent in a l l sectors of society, i s particularly pervasive in the rural regions.^ Here reside the people with the most urgent needs for governmental action, yet, they have the least amount of pull or influence to generate programs to alleviate their n e e d s . T h e i r expectations are most l i k e l y to suffer from administrative neglect and from govern-mental inaction. In fact, a number of radical movements, several of which w i l l be described in a later section, have made headway in the rural areas with grievances arising out of central government neglect. 15 Robert Marett, Peru (London, 1969), p. 251. *^Astiz, p. 83. 1 7 I b i d . J 14 B. Impact of Military Coups on the C i v i l Bureaucracy The 1962 Coup The Peruvian bureaucracy was only marginally affected by the f i r s t coup in 1962, and the consequent one year military junta l e f t i t s operations v i r t u a l l y uninterrupted and continuing in the traditional manner. Eleven out of 15 c i v i l i a n Cabinet Ministers were displaced, 18 as military officers occupied a l l Cabinet positions, but on the whole the military made no special effort to occupy traditional c i v i l service positions. Even though, from time to time, "military men have held v i r t u a l l y every major office in Peruvian p o l i t i c a l and adminis-19 trative l i f e , from the Presidency to minor administrative posts", the military during the 1962 junta f i l l e d only those positions over which i t normally had jurisdiction, and in which i t acted as an institutiona-20 lized supplement to government. Moreover, with the exception of a few minor anti-corruption drives against some public service groups, the military did l i t t l e more to attempt to improve the human qualities of administration. Finally, other than by setting up a Planning Institute manned by army personnel, the army made no moves at further 18 Marett, p. 214. 19 Luigi Einaudi, The Military and Government in Peru, CAG Papers, Apr i l , 1970, p. 6. 20 lbid. p. 3. Positions in Service Related Departments, Education, National Planning and Development Institutes and Control of Remote Areas f e l l under this category. 15 rationalizing the processes of government. A l l in a l l , one could conclude that the 1962 coup had almost no impact of substance on the c i v i l service. The 1968 Coup The Peruvian c i v i l service was much more seriously affected by the military coup of 1968 and i t s subsequent government than by the earlier experience. After the second takeover, the military continued i t s previously described traditional role in administration but also went far beyond this role into positions normally held by non-military personnel. "Since the revolution, increasing numbers of officers have been assigned to non-military ministries, often occupying senior and even middle level posts previously occupied by c i v i l i a n s . This proliferation of military officers in what would normally be 21 considered c i v i l i a n functions," has extended to numerous boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies, involving 10% to 15% of the 22 Peruvian officer corps. (Not necessarily 10% to 15% of a l l former Einaudi, p. 28. Anibal Quijano, "Nationalism & Capitalism i n Peru," Monthly Review, Vol, 23, No. 3 (July-August, 1971), p. 76. The occupation of these positions cannot be attributed to a requirement for increased oppor-tunities of an expanding officer corps, since the total number of officers has held steady at 5000 individuals out of a total of 51,000 men, since the late f i f t i e s . It may be that the ever expan-ding and developing talents of the officer corps needed a creative outlet in the absence of external challenge. The expanding talents of the officer corps, according to Einaudi, indicated by an educational emphasis in the Peruvian military unequalled even by many of the armed forces of advanced western countries, has presented great frustrations for the officers. They have often been trained "beyond the military capacity or interests of their country, and often believe themselves better equipped than most c i v i l i a n s to deal with the problems of development." Einaudi, p. 4. 16 c i v i l i a n positions). In fact, because there has been a shortage of active army personnel to f i l l a l l of the positions that the regime wishes to have f i l l e d by military personnel, i t has even attempted to rec a l l many retired officers to f i l l the vacant positions. The extent of this large scale penetration and displacement of civi l i a n s has led one observor to state, "the current military inter-vention with i t s insistence upon military decision making and military control of key positions, suggests that the Peruvian military under the leadership of the army, i s attempting to erect i t s e l f as a super 23 bureaucracy dominating the state." In other words, an attempt has been made by the military to create a coinciding administrative framework with which to dominate and control most administrative and governmental a c t i v i t i e s . Immediately after the takeover, the military also initiated an intensive campaign to combat sloth and corruption in the Peruvian public service. The ensuing efforts were implemented in a broad public service, moralization measure which included everything from a series of prosecutions of corrupt o f f i c i a l s , the introduction of time 24 clocks, to creating an efficiency and corruption watchdog agency to supervise the whole c i v i l service. Instances of corruption and 23 Einaudi, pp. 29-30. 24 The introduction of time clocks was unheard of, especially since both supervisors and employees were subject to punching in. The traditional 9:30 to 2:20 workday was replaced by a f u l l day's work. 17 incompetence after the creation of the latter body have been harshly dealt with, to the point of being classified as "savage" by 25 some observors. In any case, the disruption of the traditional bureaucratic way of l i f e in Peru under these measures was so severe that i t sent a "shudder of fear throughout the whole c i v i l i a n 26 bureaucracy." Extensive re-evaluations and re-organizations of the public service were implemented and consisted of "the rationalization of the structure of the central government... including the d i v e r s i f i -cation of public administration to match the actual and projected 27 diversifications of the Peruvian economic process". To this effect six new ministries have been created while two have been eliminated. Several new co-ordinating bodies have been given super-vision to oversee the whole administrative structure and these were linked very closely to the military's National Planning Institute through overlapping membership. Re-organizations alone may mean very l i t t l e , but, when these are placed into the perspective of the other changes, they are significant. 25 Astiz, p. 92. ^ Einaudi, p. 27. 2 7 n •• -in Quijano, p. 77. 18 In addition, the much neglected National Office of Rationalization of Public Administration, which is responsible for "evaluation, modification, and technical development of administration and for the 28 maintenance of Graduate School of Public Administration," has been revitalized and has had i t s effectiveness restored. For example, i t s perpetual under-financing has been resolved with a budget increase 29 from $50,000 to $150,000. This agency has made serious efforts at improving the personnel of the bureaucracy, both through development of in-service training for c i v i l servants, primarily at the directorate and sub-directorate level, and with training arrangements with the reformed universities. In addition, i t has also altered the recruitment patterns for public service positions, introducing merit as the sole basis for hiring particular individuals. Technical expertise and specialist knowledge is now the primary prerequisite for hiring as the agency attempts to build the bureaucracy for the developmental require-ments of the country. Perhaps the best indication of the military's dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy the second time around was i t s reliance on religious personnel and on the Catholic Church bureaucracy for the displacement 28 Ibid. , pp. 77-78. 29 Jack W. Hopkins, The Government Executive of Modern Peru (Gainesville, 1967), p. 73. 19 30 of regular c i v i l servants. The clergy has been given numerous positions on public boards, commissions, and in the central government departments. The regime has also u t i l i z e d the pervasive church bureaucracy to implement programs normally handled by the c i v i l service. The most important of these programs, "the Young Towns", is designed to provide "technical assistance and public services to the teeming 31 shantytowns that encircle Peru's major c i t i e s " , and not accidentally, to defuse some of Peru's most volatile concentrations of population. Church-military cooperation has extended into many other facets of the new government's programs and a l l reform decrees are said to cross 32 the desk of the Cardinal of Peru before their promulgation. It would seem that priests are the only c i v i l i a n s that the military both trusts and who are available for service in the govern-ment. This trust, according to Astiz may be attributed to the priests' predominantly rural middle class background which i s similar to that 33 of many officers and the av a i l a b i l i t y of the clergy stems from i t s relatively strong educational background. Approximately 200 of 30 George Grayson, Jr., "Peru's Military Populism," Current History, Vol. 60, No. 3 (February, 1971), p. 76. 31 Ibid., p. 77. 3 2 Ibid., p. 78. 33 Astiz, p. 84. There are two primary avenues of economic and social advancement available to the Peruvian middle class, one i s the officer corps and the other i s the priesthood. Peru's 2500 priests have taken part in these a c t i v i t i e s and most of these have been younger men, such as 38 year old auxiliary Bishop of Lima, Monsignor Louis Bambaren. The use of the church and clergy by the military has been made possible because of the recent develop-ment in the younger sections of the priesthood of a commitment to social justice and because of the church's denial of the v a l i d i t y of the traditional power structure. C. Explanation for Impact on the Bureaucracy Goals of the 1962 Coup The goals and purposes of the military's 1962 intervention were quite limited and were of a negative rather than positive motivation. The coup was simply carried out to prevent undesirable candidates from assuming the Presidency. Goals of social progress and a sense of national mission were at best only minor considerations. The coup came at the conclusion of the 1962 general election; an election which marked the climax of several years of intensive p o l i t i c a l turmoil and confusion. The election saw three strong candidates emerge as the primary contenders, former military dictator Manuel Odria, 1956 second place finisher Fernando Belaunde Tery, and George Grayson Jr., "Peru Under the Generals," Current History, Vol. 62, No. 366 (February, 1972), p. 96. j 21 Haya de la Torre of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana 35 (APRA) party. The campaign, marked by riotous s t r i f e throughout, was closely fought and ended with a vote of 32.99% for Haya de l a Torre, 32.14% for Belaunde and 28% for Odria, with the remainder scattered among four minor candidates. Soon after the returns were counted, charges of voting fraud were levelled by Belaunde against the APRISTAS and a number of newspapers supporting him called for the army, the election supervisor, and incumbent President Prado to annul the election. Prado stood by the o f f i c i a l recount of the National Elections Board and refused to tamper with the results. The c a l l for annulment, however, found support in the army, whose a b i l i t i e s as election watchdog were called into question by the ever-escalating charges of fraud. 35 Many army officers were hostile to APRA as they had never forgiven the APRISTAS for the T r u j i l l o massacre of Army personnel in July 1932 in an abortive APRA-led uprising. The army holds yearly commemoration ceremonies for the men k i l l e d in that revolt and officers receive anti-APRISTA indoctrination in military schools. Furthermore, Haya de l a Torre, leader of APRA since i t s inception, has been an outspoken c r i t i c of the military and has pledged his support to i t s curbing in the event of electoral success. Although the most popular party in Peru, APRA has never been able to assume power, as military h o s t i l i t y and oppression have prevented this from occurring. L i i s a North, Ci v i l - M i l i t a r v Relations in  Argentina. Chile and Peru (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 48-49. 22 The situation became even more complicated since the Peruvian constitution required the leading Presidential candidate to have polled at least 33.33% of the vote to validly assume office. As none of the candidates had f u l f i l l e d this requirement the incoming Congress was constitutionally compelled to choose one of the three front runners for President. The weeks before the adjournment of the Congress were marked by considerable p o l i t i c a l intrigue as the three leading candidates attempted to form some type of compromise alliance. Belaunde f i n a l l y decided not to compromise with the other two, and Haya de l a Torre realizing his unacceptability to the military threw 36 his support behind Odria. In this unholy alliance, Odria was to become President and APRA second in command, Eduardo Seone, was to become f i r s t Vice-President. However, "Army leaders who would not tolerate Haya de l a Torre himself, also refused to let him dictate who would become President, 37 even though the choice was a former army general." The military, 36 Odria's term in office between 1948-1956 was marked by intensive suppression and arrest of APRA leaders and supporters. The alliance seems even stranger, when considering APRA's s o c i a l i s t , anti-oligarchical leanings and Odria's avowed support of the traditional e l i t e s . Raymond Estep, The Role of the Military in Peruvian P o l i t i c s (January, 1970), p. 24. There was l i t t l e l i k i n g for Odria in the military, as his style of p o l i t i c s and thinking were considered out of step with that of a majority of the active officers. 23 who had a l l along wanted Belaunde to assume the Presidency, decided to prevent the consummation of Haya de l a Torre's plans and led by Chief of Staff Ricardo Perez Godoy, staged a bloodless coup July 18, 1962. Immediately upon taking oyer, the military gave a declaration of reasons behind i t s actions, in which i t claimed that the charges of election fraud had undermined the confidence of the people in any government that could be formed out of the 1962 election. Therefore, as election regulator i t f e l t compelled to annul the elections and to hold new elections in eleven months. The military's goal for i t s one year in office was simply to keep order and maintain s t a b i l i t y u n t i l the new elections could be 38 held. Although the junta did dabble in a number of experimental programs such as low cost housing, agrarian reform, and land r e d i s t r i -bution, there was no specific desire among the leaders of the junta for the systematic achievement of social and economic progress. These programs were later in i t i a t e d by younger and more radical officers, who would find expanded expression of their desires during the military government of 1968. Having l i t t l e else in mind except order and s t a b i l i t y , the military had no need to alter the c i v i l service. As the c i v i l service 38 Edwin E. Erickson et a l . , U.S. Army Handbook for Peru - 1965 (September, 1965), p. 423. 24 was quite passive, i t presented no threat to s t a b i l i t y and order and the military was simply content to leave i t largely alone. The bureaucracy was more or less incidental to the officers, as most of the junta's a c t i v i t i e s , including many of the experimental programs li s t e d above, were handled through military channels. On June 9, 1963, the army, true to i t s word, allowed new national elections to proceed. The election again featured the same three main candidates as in 1962, but this time, with only one additional minor candidate. "With the military's animosity to Haya de l a Torre and Odria, evidenced by i t s intervention in the previous year's election, so fresh in their minds, the electorate undoubtedly were influenced to vote for a candidate whose inauguration the military would permit. Thus, with the tacit approval of the army, Belaunde polled 708,000 votes, Haya de l a Torre 623,000 and Odria 463,000."39 Goals of the 1968 Coup The 1968 coup d'etat resulted from vastly different circumstances than that of 1962 and was carried out with different goals and purposes in mind. By 1968, the military had grown weary of c i v i l i a n i n a b i l i t y to govern effectively and to change the social and economic conditions affecting the nation. It took matters into i t s own hands and tried to Estep, p. 18. 25 do the job the civ i l i a n s had failed to do. As one observor described the situation: In 1962, ironically enough, the object of the military intervention was to stop Haya de l a Torre and Odria to pave the way to the Presidency of Fernando Belaunde, whose social policies were f u l l y supported by the army leaders of that time. Six years later, in 1968, a new Joint Command of the Armed Forces found themselves in the unpleasant situation of having to dismiss a President whom the Army had supported, not because his policies were too radical for the military's taste, but because, in the view of the military, the country had been allowed to sink into chaos.^ Although Belaunde had a favourable beginning to his term in office and had seriously attempted to solve many of Peru's outstanding social and economic problems, his last two years in office were f i l l e d with repeated economic crises and increasing p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y . Belaunde's problems were compounded by continual Congressional resis-tance to his programs. Controlled by APRISTAS and Odristas, i t forced him to make compromises in numerous programs and often 41 brought government to a stan d s t i l l . . A f a l l in the price of fishmeal, Peru's main export, in world markets coupled with extensive foreign indebtedness of the Belaunde government" that required heavy outflows of capita! for i t s 40 Marett, p. 260. 41 Peter Ranis, Five Latin American Nations (New York, 1971), p. 118. This was particularly seen as a sign of weakness, since, in the Peruvian context, a President was expected to effectively control the legislature. 42 Belaunde had financed most of his development programs through foreign loans, and had $134,000 interest to pay back in 1967 alone. 26 amortization, resulted in balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s for the country. These two factors in addition to increasing governmental expenditures and money printing culminated in mounting inflation which reduced the value of the Peruvian sol from 36.82 to 45.56 to the U.S. 43 dollar between April 1967 and June 1968. On the heel of these crises came revelations of extensive corruption in a number of the economic development programs that had sunk Peru into such deep debt. Belaunde's government was thoroughly shaken when i t became apparent that 44 many of his high place appointments were responsible. The f i n a l blow to the Belaunde administration came about as a result of i t s handling of a long standing dispute with the International Petroleum Company (I.P.C.) concerning large tax claims and o i l f i e l d t i t l e s . Belaunde made a compromise agreement, the Act of Talara, with I.P.C, which gave the Standard Oil of New Jersey controlled company generous terms. I.P.C. gave up the t i t l e to i t s La Brea Y Parinas o i l fields in return for the cancellation of a $144,000,000 debt of unpaid taxes. Furthermore, I.P.C. was allowed to keep i t s Talara refinery, i t s national distribution network and i t s leases to Lobitos o i l f i e l d s ; i t received favourable monetary exchange rates and favourable terms for the processing of government extracted crude o i l , a l l in the face of nationalist demands for f u l l expropriation of a l l I.P.C. properties. Estep, p. 17. 44 Ibid. 27 The mildness of the agreement, plus the failure of Belaunde to make public an alleged secret page of the Act of Talara caused serious 45 p o l i t i c a l repercussions for the regime. Denunciations from many sectors of Peruvian society were immediately forthcoming and Belaunde's own party, the Accion Popular (AP), sp l i t over the agreement. This s p l i t was so severe that the various wings of the splintered party engaged in armed conflict over the control of party headquarters. The military became increasingly alarmed that AP factionalism and the general economic deterioration might permit an APRA victory in the coming 1969 Presidential election and moreover was generally "disillusioned with c i v i l i a n rule and particularly with Belaunde, 46 who had seemed so promising in 1963". Led by General Juan Alvaredo Velasco, i t overthrew the incumbent regime in a bloodless coup on October 3, 1968. The new military regime, the Revolutionary Government, allowed no doubts about i t s goals by publishing manifestos and statements e x p l i c i t l y stating them. In a speech to the nation on December 5, 1968, General Velasco set out a specific set of goals for the new government: Summary of Long Range Goals (a) to integrate the national population in order to bring about a f u l l u t i l i z a t i o n of the human resources as well as the basic p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the country; 45 For a fu l l e r explanation of the background of the I.P.C. controversy see Richard N. Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," The New Yorker, May 17,1968, pp. 41-109. 46 Grant H i l l i k e r , The Po l i t i c s of Reform in Peru (Baltimore, 1971), p. 71. 28 (b) to improve substantially the distribution of per capita income to no less than twice i t s present level; (c) to activate the contribution of the external sector to national development policy, reducing the present condition of dependence and vulnerability which are present in the economy. Medium Range Development Goals (1) To accelerate the process of agrarian reform throughout the country. (2) To begin the process of leading the country to a better distribution of the population within the economic scope of the state, reducing the concentration in the Lima Callao area, which w i l l continue to be the most dynamic pole of the economy. (3) To effect important changes in the national structure of production which are to be related to a scheme of regional development, designed to increase the participation in the G.N.P. of the strategic sectors of agriculture, cattle raising, mining, industry and building. (4) To increase the employment f i e l d especially in the areas of agri-culture, cattle raising and the building industry, as well as in a l l a c t i v i t i e s related to the poles of development. (5) To render more dynamic the contribution of the external sector, by promoting exports, obtaining a larger share of the profits generated by foreign investment, attracting new capital from abroad. (6) To strengthen the role of the Public sector as promoter of national development, using central planning as the principal instrument of the Revolutionary Government, stimulating a higher production of the strategic sectors and orientating the activity of the private sector toward the objectives of national interest. 29 (7) To make the instrument of credit accessible to even small and medium businessmen both in the city and in the rural areas. The state control of the sources of credit w i l l be assured. (8) To reform business enterprises, guiding i t towards a policy of workers sharing in the profits and in the management and the protection of workers co-operative enterprises organized by workers. (9) To establish the basis of a national policy with regard to technology, 47 such as w i l l assert the autonomy of national development. The goals projected in the preceding paragraphs were not just meant to be on paper and for public propaganda, but were apparently meant to be forged into concrete programs. In fact, most of the goals had a major effort directed towards their completion within one year of their promulgation. A sweeping agrarian reform law resulted in the expro-priation of 3.25 million hectares (8.1 million acres) including many of the 48 lands of the oligarchy. Expropriated lands were sold to peasants in rural co-operatives which were in turn given l i b e r a l financial backing to make them solvent. The regime expropriated numerous industrial and extractive enterprises, including a l l I.P.C. holdings in Peru. It Marett, pp. 274-277. Grayson, "Peru's Military Populism", p. 77. The agrarian reform law not only broke up large landholdings but also consolidated the numerous minifundias, small farms consisting of less than 2.5 acres. 30 entered into a number of other aspects of state capitalism, establishing many new industrial and commercial enterprises and assuming control of 49 the marketing of a l l Peruvian exports through new state marketing agencies. New guidelines on capital inflows were established and a l l new Peruvian enterprises had to be at least 66.66% Peruvian o w n e d . S t i m u l a t i o n of the private sector was implemented through tax incentives and develop-ment subsidies, and many foreign companies lost their concessions of mine resources for not developing their properties fast enough. Finally, the banking system was re-organized and extensive curbs on currency movements were initiated to keep Peruvian capital in the country. The most remarkable of the government's reforms was the creation of Industrial Communities. "Under the new organizations workers w i l l receive 10% of the profits before taxes of their employers and 15% of a company's earnings w i l l be used to purchase shares for an Industrial Community, which over a period of years w i l l acquire 50% equity in each enterprise. Constituted, owned, and democratically run by workers, the Industrial Community w i l l vote i t s stock as a bloc at shareholders 52 meetings." Numerous other reforms have been begun in education, culture, rural development and in urban slum areas, but they w i l l not be 49 Quijano, p. 80. 5 0 Ibid., p. 81. Grayson, "Peru Under The Generals", P. 116. 52 Grayson, Peru's Military Populism", p. 74. A l l companies with over 10 workers or $250,000 net turnover f e l l under this new law. j 31 catalogued for lack of space. In any case, i t is quite evident that the military's 1968 goals and actions were different from, and much more ambitious than those of 1962. For the implementation of these goals, the military required a workable and efficient bureaucratic apparatus; one that would not even inadvertently sabotage the programs of the revolution. It was evident to the military that, as General Ernesto Montagne, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government has stated, "absence of a well trained administrative and c l e r i c a l group threatens the successful 53 follow through on developmental and other governmental programs." However, unlike 1962, the new military government could not ignore the bureaucracy and simply use the military's administrative forces to i n i t i a t e and carry out innovative programs. Its ambitions this second time around were just too great for the military administration to handle alone; i t required the additional resources of the c i v i l bureaucracy. The actions taken towards the bureaucracy by the new military governemnt, particularly military officer penetration of c i v i l service positions, were carried out as the most suitable and speediest means of overcoming the bureaucracy's deficiencies. 53 Quoted in Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times (Lima), February 27, 1969, p. 2. 32 Changes in Officer Corps Between and During the Coups Changes that occurred in the Officer Corps between and during the coups exacerbated the dissatisfaction of the military with the bureaucracy and also accounted for the change in the goals of the second coup. In short, between the coups, the younger and more radical officers, who had been restrained during the f i r s t coup, gained pre-dominance within the military. This change resulted from the natural a t t r i t i o n through death and normal retirement that constantly alters a l l organizations, but was also significantly contributed to by a number of forced removals of conservative officers. The process had already begun during the junta of 1962, when General Ricardo Perez Godoy, the t i t u l a r head of the junta was removed from power by his colleagues. "He appeared to be growing closer to Odria - the military man who enjoyed the confidence of the e l i t e and who in fact, i s Perez Godoy's compadre. When Perez Godoy, the last of the old style generals, ignored the date of his mandatory retirement from the army, General Lindley seized the occasion to ease him out of the 54 junta and to retire him from the army and p o l i t i c s . " The process did not end u n t i l after the 1968 seizure of power, when within six months of that event, the last of the moderate and conservative officers f e l l from influence. The f i r s t to go was head of the Air Force, Lieutenant Richard W. Patch, "The Peruvian Election of 1963," Latin American  P o l i t i c s , ed., Robert Tomasek (Garden City, 1966), p. 504. 33 General Alberto Lopez Causillas, followed by the Minister of Finance, General Angel Valdivia Morriberon and Minister of Development, General Alberto Maldano Yanez. Finally, the last and most prestigious of the moderates to be eliminated was General Jose Benavides, "the Minister of Agriculture (in charge of the land reforms) the son of a former President and a member of one of Peru's wealthiest families which had high social connections and which s t i l l held large agricultural and industrial properties. A l l of the eliminated and retired officers were replaced by younger officers, most of them only recently promoted from colonel to general. "With the departure of Valdivia, Maldano, and Benavides, control of the cabinet passed to the so-called "Earthquake Group", an advisory commission responsible for formulating most of the junta's policies. This group often spoken of as the colonels, as opposed to the more senior generals, encompassed the nationalists and dessarollistas (developers). Thus, within a few months after the coup i t became increasingly apparent that the driving force behind the coup was and had been the more radical and younger officers, not senior , „56 personnel. 55 Estep, p. 3. Benavides was forced to resign over a dispute concerning his resistance to the radicalization of the land reform programs, which were designed "to break a l l large land holdings, the backbone of the oligarchy. 5 6Patch, p. 504. J 34 These younger officers were trained at the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), the military's school of Public Affairs established in 1954 by General Jose del Carmen Marin. The purpose of the creation of CAEM was to attempt to raise the social and intellectual consciousness of the officer corps. In accordance with this goal the affected officers received a concentrated study of the social, p o l i t i c a l , and economic problems of Peru, couched in predominantly l e f t i s t terms. They were thought not only the d i f f i c u l t circumstances of their nation, but also the necessity to change them.^7 In sum, they were given an intense period of radical training that had not been available to the older officers. The effects of the CAEM efforts were not f e l t overnight, but by the late 1950's and early 1960's results were noticeable as was 58 evident from the a c t i v i t i e s of some officers during the f i r s t coup. 57 Francois Bourricaud, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (London, 1970), p. 314. The CAEM had influenced the officer corps in a variety of ways: i t had interested them in the 'state of the nation', and had at the same time given them grounds for belief in their own mission. Richard Lee Clinton, "The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XXIV,No. 4 (Spring, 1971), p. 50. CAEM teaching never reached more than 25% of the officer corps, however, those that were reached were the officers who showed the most promise and who had been subject to the fastest promotion, with according to Clinton, most of the colonels who formed the major part of the governing Revolutionary Council being part of that group. 58 Clinton, p. 56. j 35 By 1968 the effects were quite pervasive and upon gaining control of the government, the radicalized officers implemented the teaching that they had received at CAEM, which incidentally, as indicated by several publi-cations of the CAEM during the early sixties, had as one of i t s main tenets the notion that a major obstacle to change and improvement in 59 Peru is an inefficient and parasitic government executive. The younger and more radical officers generally differed in their social and economic background from that of the bureaucrats and from the older officers, stemming primarily from rural middle class and mestizo origins. The latter two groups, on the other hand, tended to be more white and urban middle class oriented.^ As a partial indication of the officers' differing backgrounds the following two tables are presented. TABLE I Distribution of Senior Executives and Senior  Military Officers by Region of Birth 61 Region 1950 Population of Region % Senior Executives Military Officers in Region % Born in Region % Northern Peru *Central Peru Southern Peru Selva Total 30.9 30.8 32.9 5.4 100.0 18.9 58.5 17.5 5.2 100.0 17.8 59.4 19.7 3.1 100.0 *Central Peru contains Lima-Callao region which i s 70% of the region's population. 59 60 61 Ibid., p. 57. Astiz, p. 207. Hopkins, "Government Executive", p. 42. 36 TABLE II 1969 Peru Degree of National Degree of Military Urbanization Urbanization 37% 40% 62 Cadets born in Capital City - 20% From the Table i t i s evident that the background of higher level officers and c i v i l servants is quite similar, at least according to area of origins. If the Lima-Callao urban complex and other urban centers over 20,000 represent 80% of the population of the central region, than i t is f a i r to assume that officers and c i v i l servants shared a common urban background. In other figures, based on 1969 figures seem to show a difference in officer background. (Unfortunately similar figures for c i v i l servants are not available.) F i r s t , military urbanization, which from the chart based on 1950 st a t i s t i c s seemed to be quite high, did not even according to 1969 st a t i s t i c s keep up with national trends. Second, only 20% of officer cadets stem from the capital urban complex, a trend that such observors as Marett and Clinton claim began in the middle f i f t i e s . This seems to indicate that officer concentration from urban backgrounds has been reduced since the 1950 figures were created. That c i v i l servants also shifted to more rural origins is doubtful, since v i r t u a l l y a l l sources u t i l i z e d in the thesis concerning c i v i l servants attribute urban origins to c i v i l servants' backgrounds. The rural background of the younger officers, tentatively based on the evidence in the tables, can be considered important in connection with the already documented neglect of rural needs by the ci t y based 0 bureaucracy and government apparatus. One might be able to conclude that this has given them a "built in prejudice" against those responsible for the neglect, a prejudice common to most rural people 62 Inter-American Development Bank, Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, Eighth Annual Report, (Washington D.C., 1969), pp. 342-343. 37 in Peru. The older officers, generally more similar to c i v i l servants in background, were more l i k e l y to lack this prejudice and were not 63 as l i k e l y to be hostile to c i v i l servants. Experiences of the Military Between the Coups The Peruvian military had several experiences between the coups which reinforced their already considerable h o s t i l i t y towards the bureaucracy and which enhanced their CAEM bred desire for social and economic change. Most important of these experiences was the pacification of armed guerrila activity and extensive non-armed peasant unrest in the 64 Peruvian sierra from 1963 to 1966. Bejar suggests that in the process of pacification many officers, particularly younger ones, came to be reacquainted with the grievances of the peasants and came to believe that inadequate governmental and administrative attention to the needs of the peasants was instrumental to the outbreak of unrest. The army that squashed the revolutionaries and defused much of the peasant unrest, became increasingly aware that the only lasting solution that could prevent i t s recurrence had to come through positive govern-mental measures designed to alleviate the oppressive conditions of the peasantry. The lessons of this experience affected the younger 63 This paragraph can only be considered hypothetical as there i s insufficient evidence to conclusively prove causation. 64 Hector Bejar, Peru - 1965 (New York, 1969), p. 157. As many as 300,000 peasants were involved in these a c t i v i t i e s (land invasions, rioting, looting) at one time or another. 38 CAEM trained o f f i c e r s more than t h e i r older colleagues since the former, majors and colonels, l e d the actual f i e l d operations, while the former d i r e c t e d the operations from the comfort of t h e i r bases. The younger o f f i c e r s were not altogether pleased with having to chase g u e r r i l l a s and peasants through the mountains and being continuously compelled to present t h e i r coercive face to the p u b l i c . That could only serve to undermine the peoples' regard f o r the army. Besides, t h e i r new self-image, as generated at CAEM, was d i r e c t e d much more to p o s i t i v e actions by the m i l i t a r y to solve economic and s o c i a l problems than to p o l i c e a c t i v i t i e s . I r o n i c a l l y , contrary to t h i s new self-image, the o f f i c e r s were thrust into the awkward p o s i t i o n of having to subdue people whom they genuinely wished to help, and whose conditions they were now convinced needed immediate improvement. Their blame f o r having been put into t h i s uncomfortable s i t u a t i o n , was dire c t e d at the c i t y based governmental apparatus, which "out of touch" with the people and too conservative i n i t s thinking, had done l i t t l e f o r the peasants. Due to i t s continued neglect and i n a c t i o n i t was l i k e l y once again to plunge the m i l i t a r y into the r o l e of M it 65 suppressor . A p o s i t i v e experience of the m i l i t a r y which contributed to i t s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the c i v i l bureaucracy l a y i n the many developmental and community se r v i c e projects that i t engaged i n 65 Bejar, p. 119. 39 community development projects, persuading local residents to supply the labour while the engineering corps contributes the technological expertise needed to construct new educational or recreational f a c i l i t i e s , c l i n i c s , and roads. There is scarcely an area where military men, cooperating with local residents are not at work on road construction programs. Armed forces personnel have even begun to work in the slums of Lima, frequently in collaboration with Peace Corps volunteers from the United States, on a variety of projects aimed at improving the standards of l i v i n g . These experiences, coupled with the military's relative ad-ministrative success during the 1962 junta,gave i t confidence in i t s own administrative and modernizing a b i l i t i e s . It became evident that technically trained and properly dedicated individuals organized into a disciplined group could accomplish progress and forge improvements in seemingly hopeless situations. Moreover, the military's success in i n i t i a t i n g improvements and implementing positive programs under-scored the corresponding weakness of the c i v i l service in this regard The latter's programs seemed to constinuously f a l l short of their goals and were pulled under by the weight of inefficiency, red tape, and a lack of dedication. The contrast was not lost on the military. 66 Frederick P. Pike, The Modern History of Peru (London, 1967), p. 326. 40 CHAPTER II BURMA A. Bureaucracy The Burma C i v i l Service (B.C.S.) and Burmese public administration have been ridden by contradictions ever since independence and their position in society and government has been ambiguous. The contradictions and ambiguities w i l l be evident in an examination of three broad categories: 1. Loyalty, 2. Education, 3. Efficiency. 1. Loyalty The contemporary Burma C i v i l Service developed out of the British Empire's Indian C i v i l Service (I.C.S.) during the end of the 19th century. Although both the I.C.S. and later the B.C.S. were heavily dominated by British personnel at the top, their indigenous members formed the top status group of their society. The superior status of the indigenous c i v i l servants derived from the fact that he was the main contact of society with the foreigner, that his administrative machinery was the government in the absence of indigenous p o l i t i c a l organizations 41 and that he had a relatively high degree of westernization.^ Independence and the withdrawal of the Br i t i s h removed two of the props to their prestige and changed the conditions under which the B.C.S. existed. C i v i l servants came under the dominance of indigenous p o l i t i c a l masters whom they considered their inferiors. 1 James F. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," Asian  Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the Br i t i s h Tradition, ed., Ralph Braibanti (Durham, 1966), pp. 373 & 404. Guyot claims that v i r t u a l l y a l l Burmese members of the B.C.S. were educated either in England or in English schools in India before independence and that they represented by far the most westernized element in Burmese society. In "The 'Clerk Mentality' in Burmese Education," Man, State, and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia, ed., Robert 0. Tilman (New York, 1969), pp. 213 & 222, Guyot suggests that the Westerni-zation of c i v i l servants after independence was s t i l l considerable and that the B.C.S. was s t i l l the most westernized element in Burma. For example, in a cross sample of B.C.S. o f f i c i a l s taken in 1965, 61% of c i v i l servants in the senior grades had visited the west, 30% had studied in the west at least three months or more, and 53% of those who had professional degrees had got them in the west. In contrast only 29% of senior army officers had even visited the west. "More fundamentally, the c i v i l servants are descendants of successive generations of relatively Westernized families of the colonial period. The politicians and military men represent a new, and, in some ways, anti-western class catapulted into power during the Japaneses occupation." Moreover, many of the c i v i l servants educated in Burma after independence were educated in private English-run or English-style schools. Guyot found that a considerable proportion of the B.C.S. o f f i c i a l s were educated in an e l i t e private Rangoon secondary school, run by foreign missionaries. C i v i l servants were not the only group that considered the politicians to be inferior. According to Colonel Maung Maung: "When the Second World War was over and we had obtained independence, the cream of the resistance movement stayed with the Burma Army, and most of the rest became politicians. It was irksome to find that those who could not hold their own in the Army came in time to be our p o l i t i c a l superiors." Quoted from Richard Butwell, "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma," Studies in Asia, ed.,by Robert K. Sakai (Lincoln, 1961), p. 75. 42 However, because they continued to adhere to western values, they consequently found i t d i f f i c u l t to transfer their loyalty to these new masters, whose goals, when they were not obscure often represented values that contradicted the c i v i l servants' own. In sum, the c i v i l servants found themselves in the ironic situation of having to work in an independent Burma for "capricious" and "i n f e r i o r " new masters, when in fact, they had expected to be the new Burma's sole 3 p o l i t i c a l e l i t e . "Much of post-war p o l i t i c s in Burma can be explained by the tensions between those who viewed the state with an essentially western eye and those who found the authority of the state to be alien and who are bent on grafting indigenous values and institutions on 4 the state to make i t more familiar." Because of the c i v i l servant's 3 Lucian Pye, "The Army in Burmese P o l i t i c s , " The Role of the Military  in Underdeveloped Countries, ed., by John Johnson (Princeton, 1962), pp.240-243. The disappointment of losing out to the politicians has, according to Pye, made the administrative e l i t e in Burma a class of "backward lookers", constantly referring to the good old days of the Bri t i s h empire when they were at the height of their glory. 4 John H. Badgley, "Two Styles of Military Rule: Thailand and Burma," Government and Opposition, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter, 1969), p. 106. 43 continued identification with the values of the West and their reluctance to accept the dominance of the politicians, they became caught up in this conflict, which led to suspicion and criticism of the c i v i l service by many nationalist groups (These groups, incidentally, remembered the c i v i l service as the 'instrument of suppression of a l l nationalist movements' under colonial rule). As these tensions increased between nationalist and westernized elements, ever more vocal tirades were delivered against the c i v i l servants, accusing them of everything from treason to immorality and many were arrested or otherwise harrassed. Many of the charges were unfair and only served to undermine the morale of the c i v i l service.^ Thus, "During the f i r s t years of independence (1950-1958) the administrator f e l t himself powerless and victimized. Many l e f t government service and those who remained sought to avoid risk and responsibility by narrowing the scope of their authority."^ Morale became v i r t u a l l y non-existent in the B.C.S. as a general atmosphere of dispiritedness dominated administrative l i f e . As can be expected, public administration suffered in effectiveness and was unable to contribute much to the process of nation building. P o l i t i c a l expediency was responsible for most of the charges, as politicians attempted to cover their own mistakes and failings through blaming the c i v i l servants. Pye, "The Army in Burmese P o l i t i c s , " p. 241. 44 2. Education Burma's administrative e l i t e , l i k e that of many other countries, has traditionally placed tremendous importance on formal training and on the achievement of academic degrees, so that i t has generally been the most educated sector in Burmese society. In one cross sample of the administrative class, 94% held a B.A. degree, most with honors. 7 Their extensive education distinguished them from the masses of the people and helped to ju s t i f y their superior position in Burmese society. As i t also distinguished them from the p o l i t i c i a n and military sectors of society, which had no more than 30% university graduates in their ranks, i t also reinforced their feelings of superiority in relation to their indigenous masters. The education of the c i v i l servants as already mentioned was primarily British or based on the Br i t i s h model, with v i r t u a l l y a l l entrants to the B.C.S. having experienced a l i b e r a l arts oriented curriculum, one dedicated to the development of general intellectual a b i l i t i e s , rather than to specific s k i l l s . The nature of this education, despite i t s unquestionable quality, has reduced the usefulness of the c i v i l service for nation building, because g i t has made the B.C.S. "inimical to the specialists and experts". Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma", p. 430. Ibid., Burmese Buddhism also has l i t t l e room for science and technology and reinforced the educational prejudice of the B.C.S., a prejudice which was shared by the politicians. 45 This has led to the undermining of sorely needed s c i e n t i f i c and technical talent in the B.C.S. and individuals with these talents have suffered in recruitment and have had lower status and 9 renumeration compared with the generalists. For example, Class I specialist services had a top salary of R.S. 1350, whereas generalist B.C.S. o f f i c i a l s earned up to R.S. 2500. A l l in a l l , their l i f e has been made d i f f i c u l t by the generalist bias of the public service, and the specialist services, consequently, have been poorly staffed, emasculated, and i n e f f e c t i v e . 1 0 3. Efficiency Although both of the preceding two factors have contributed to the doubtful efficiency of the B.C.S., a plethora of other factors also played their part. As Pye puts i t , , one of these i s that: The Burmese administrative class suffers from confusion between r i t u a l and rationality. To a large extent Burmese anxieties about the importance of rituals of administration can be traced to their experiences under colonial rule. The British did not intend to imbue the individual Burmese recruited to the government service with iniative and drive for change. Anxious to develop the most economical system of administration possible under existing conditions, they relied heavily on the i n i t i a t i v e and talents of a few highly trained B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s , while depending for routine operations upon large numbers of Burmese and Indian subordinates.... The non-scientific orientation of the B.C.S. has generated h o s t i l i t y by the military, whose educational training, although not as degree oriented as that of the B.C.S., at least has attempted to produce technical and specialist trained people, providing the army with an excellent specialist service. 10 Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma", p. 383. This does not mean that the concept of the generalist administrator is inferior 46 The Burmese were trained to see the machine as a completely impersonal structure within which communi-cation must follow formal channels and set procedures. Their concept of impartiality and justice became confused with the belief that security and wisdom - to say nothing of prudence - called for an inflexible adherence to rituals. In sum, the Burmese were trained in the s p i r i t of the clerk while believing that they were being trained to take part in the decision making process.il Just as in many other bureaucracies, to the Burmese c i v i l servants, s t r i c t adherence to r i t u a l , rules, and regulations was the paragon of efficiency. Apparently, they could not realize the d i s a b i l i t i e s that this system, built for the economic considerations of a foreign empire, presented to the i n i t i a t i o n of innovative programs and to the nation building process. Along with reliance on r i t u a l , Burmese public admini-12 stration also suffers from overwhelming reliance on formal communication. Without the benefit of 'reinforcing and mutually compatible' informal patterns of communication, a l l problems, both major and minor are handled in the same formalistic manner. As a result, the government process in Burma has tended to be r i g i d and overly centralized. 10 (cont'd.) to the specialist administrator, only that the desirable balance between the two was prevented by the ingrained prejudice. ^Lucian Pye, P o l i t i c s , Personality, and Bation Building (New Haven, 1962), p. 218. 12 Pye, " P o l i t i c s , Personality, and Nation Building", p. 217. 47 The upper levels of the Burmese administrative system, especially the Cabinet, have to handle a whole range of minor decisions along with important decisions. This naturally tends to reduce the a b i l i t y of the apparatus to respond to i t s inputs and unmercifully overloads the already over-burdened cabinet ministers. Another dimension of the obstacles to rational and efficient administration in Burma, is the tendency of governmental departments to conflict over jurisdiction. Since independence, this problem has grown much worse as the number of governmental departments has increased from ten to forty. Even though, in the "conditions of today (post-independence) i t has produced deadlock" in many adminis-trative programs and cases, "the proliferation of departmental regulations and rules of procedure to protect jurisdictional boundaries 13 is continuing." This problem, departmentalism, has also 'spread i t s c o i l s ' into d i s t r i c t s and local administration. Where formerly the d i s t r i c t officer had f u l l supervision over a l l administrative a c t i v i t i e s in an area, now no less than eighteen central departments have posted independent o f f i c i a l s in the d i s t r i c t s , uncoordinated and unconnected with one another. The conditions arising from this confusion of o f f i c i a l s have seriously compromised effective administration 14 in many d i s t r i c t s . 13 Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma (London, 1967) Fourth Edition, p. 192. 14 Ibid., p. 193. J 48 Last but not least, Burmese public administration has been handicapped throughout the independence period by i t s role as a patronage f a c i l i t y for the politicians in power. This has resulted in a swellling of bureaucratic ranks with o f f i c i a l s p o l i t i c a l l y reliable but lacking sufficient training and s k i l l s . Administrative capabilities, particularly at the lower levels, have suffered from these additions creating a condition described as "a lack of dis-cipline and casual chaos throughout the c i v i l service". As a result there i s an "amateurish atmosphere in the governmental offices", much of which is attributable to the "appointment of a large number of p o l i t i c a l nominees. These nominees are appointed almost always because of some p o l i t i c a l or personal association with someone in power; their posts are temporary and prospects for promotion are negligible: there i s l i t t l e incentive to do more than laze away the days, secure 15 from dismissal, but debarred from advancement." The p o l i t i c a l appointees, particularly at the lower levels, have been prone to petty corruption in their everyday dealings with private citizens, undermining public respect for the c i v i l service. This has been their most notable accomplishment. Tinker, p. 134. 49 B. Impact of Military Coups on the C i v i l Bureaucracy The 1958 Coup The coup d'etat of 1958 and the subsequent Caretaker government had a f a i r l y substantial impact on Burma's public service. This impact manifested i t s e l f in the following four ways: 1. The c i v i l service was given greater power and responsibility under the Caretaker government than i t was ever accustomed to under the c i v i l i a n regimes. For example, high ranking c i v i l servants of secretariat rank were awarded most of the Cabinet posts vacated by the politicians. The only military officer in the Cabinet was Chief of Staff General Ne Win. Furthermore, the military restrained p o l i t i c a l party o f f i c i a l s from interfering with administrative a c t i v i t i e s and for the f i r s t time since independence the c i v i l service was relatively 16 p o l i t i c a l l y unhindered in i t s day to day a c t i v i t i e s . 2. However, the c i v i l service did not receive these benefits unchecked, as i t was supervised by the military in the form of army officers i seconded to c i v i l i a n posts. The number of these officers who held c i v i l i a n posts during the Caretaker regime was not large, no more than 70 officers according to one o b s e r v o r 7 4 according to 16 C i v i l servants attributed many of the problems of public adminis-tration in Burma to interference in administrative affa i r s by local p o l i t i c a l bosses. J. S. Furnivall, The Governance of Burma (New York, 1960), p. 158. 50 another,^ and 150 according to s t i l l another.''"9 Nevertheless, they were a highly visible group occupying key finance, trade, police, and security posts, infusing a sense of purpose and s p i r i t into public administration, that was sorely lacking before. 3. The c i v i l service was subjected to a.program of 'moral rehabilita-tion' under the guidance of the army and more than 3000 public servants, few of whom were B.C.S. officers, were purged on charges varying from 20 corruption to incompetence. Moreover, according to Furnivall, punctuality and f u l l work days were reinstated for the f i r s t time since independence; the leisurely pattern of administration was severely disrupted. 2 1 4. The army uti l i z e d i t s Defense Services Institute (D.S.I.) , later called the Burma Economic Development Company, to supplant the c i v i l service in a number of economic enterprises. Owner of numerous 22 productive and commercial enterprises and managed by army officers, the D.S.I, was an economic conglomerate through which the army attempted to generate capital in order to pa r t i a l l y sustain i t s e l f 18 Moshe Lissak, "Social Change, Mobilization, and Exchange of Services Between the Military Establishment and the C i v i l Society: The Burmese Case," Economic Development and Cultrual Change,Vol. XIII, No. 1 (October, 1964), p. 12. 19 Frank N. Trager, Burma - From Kingdom to Republic (New York, 1966) p. 182. 2 0 F u r n i v a l l , p. 152. 2 1 I b i d . 22 Banking, Shipping Lines, Hotels, Department Stores, Construction, General Stores, and numerous other enterprises. 51 to provide lucrative careers for retiring officers. The D.S.I. was completely independent of the c i v i l bureaucracy and was total l y subordinate to military channels. The c i v i l bureaucracy also owned and operated numerous economic enterprises through i t s Industrial Development Corporation (I.D.C.), " a huge sprawling monster in need 23 of streamlining. 1 1 The Caretaker government stripped the I.D.C. of many of i t s enterprises that were supposedly beeing poorly run and attached them to the D.S.I. Other than this and the reduction of government departments from 40 to 13, the military made no efforts to reorganize the bureaucracy. To conclude, " i n the Caretaker government c i v i l servants took the place of politicians as ministers and the c i v i l service i t s e l f , purged of several thousand corrupt and inefficient members and cajoled by a scattering of officers on special duty, became the , J n . ..24 active partner of an action oriented military. The 1962 Coup The second time around, in the aftermath of the coup of 1962, the military had a considerably altered and much more severe impact on the B.C.S. Unlike the Caretaker government two years previously, the new military regime of 1962 did not view the c i v i l servants of the B.C.S. in a comradely li g h t : Maung, Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay,.1969), p. 287. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma", p. 439. 52 1. Instead of becoming the military's partners as before, within a year of the second takeover many c i v i l servants had been forced to r e t i r e , and a l l but a few posts in the Secretariat, the nerve center of the B.C.S., were occupied by army officers. Army officers displaced c i v i l servants, not only at this highest rank, but also in middle grade positions such as deputy secretary posts and as directors of departments. Moreover, the main force in the governing process during the second military government was the Revolutionary Council, a so-called advisory body composed solely of military officers, 25 and a l l but one of the cabinet ministers were drawn from the Council. Military men also reassumed control of the many economic boards, commissions and state corporations that i t had penetrated during the Caretaker government, although increasing i t s role in this area in the wake of numerous nationalizations and the creation of a variety of new regulatory commissions. The number of officers that were involved in these various operations the second time around went well beyond the maximum 150 individuals of the Caretaker govern-26 ment, approaching 600 officers according to one source and 700 according to another. 2 7 25 F.S. V. Donnison, Burma (London, 1970), p. 167. 2 6 Norma Bixler, Burma - A Profile (New York, 1971), p. 84. 27 The Guardian, May 30, 1963, p. 2. 53 2. The c i v i l service as a whole, particularly in the f i e l d , was placed under the s t r i c t control and supervision of the military through the creation of Security and Administrative Councils (SAC's). Tied to the army staffed Secretariat in Rangoon, SAC's have taken over responsibility from formerly independent administrative o f f i c i a l s , ranging a l l the way from commissioners, deputy commissioners, sub-divisional officers, to village headmen. Instead of acting alone as before these o f f i c i a l s are now part of a council composed of the local police chief 28 and the army commander in the area. The chairman of these councils, with the exception of village levels where the village chief continues to act as chairman, are army officers of the appropriate rank. They control and direct the councils, u t i l i z i n g the other components in staff service or advisory capacities, with themselves making a l l real decisions. The senior c i v i l administrators on the councils are now l i t t l e more than clerks providing technical advice and information, and have consequently, suffered a severe deprivation of power and authority. In fact, the c i v i l service as a whole, again particularly in the f i e l d , i s losing powar to the councils, being increasingly bypassed as many of i t s specialized and technical functions are turned over to 28 In an effort to decentralize and democratize administration members of the government's Burma Socialist Programme Party, influential rural leaders and other key c i v i l i a n s have been invited to p a r t i -cipate on the SAC's. 54 29 experts directly responsible to one of the councils. The SAC's provide the army with a reliable system of control which i s tied to the center and held together by both regular administrative channels and by the more important additional military hierarchy. In any case "under this new structure the entire country is tightly linked together through army representatives, who can be given discretion and responsibility for carrying out programs, since 30 they are trusted members of a guild." 3. The Revolutionary Government also reinstated a campaign of moral 31 rehabilitation to which 4500 public employees f e l l victim. Most were forced to resign, but many were simply placed on indefinite leave: One observer claims this was often done on flimsy grounds and without adequate investigation. This campaign differed significantly from the one initiated under the Caretaker government in that i t has become much more pervasive than the former through extensive spying on government employees by the military's Intelligence Service and by "busibodies" in the Burma Socialist Programme Party. Many individual employees were observed "at work and i n their leisure 32 to see what company they keep and what they do with their spare time." 29 John H. Badgley, "Burma's Zealot Wungyis: Maoists of St. Simonists," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 1 (January, 1965), p. 59. 30 Josef Silverstein, "Burma," ed.,Government and P o l i t i c s in Southeast  Asia, ed. George McTuman Kahin (Ithaca, 1964), p. 137. 31 The Guardian, January 6, 1963, p. 2. 32 Donnison, p. 181. 55 C i v i l servants have the consolation that they are not the only objects of this campaign, that in fact, i t has been directed against a l l sectors of society. 4. The regime has also directed i t s efforts at improving the organization of the administrative machinery by forming a Ministry of National Planning, with responsibility for integrating a l l economic development activity, and an Economic Development Board, a super cabinet agency staffed by military officers, responsible for coordina-ting and supervising a l l developmental a c t i v i t i e s . However the government has placed priority on improving the human resources of the c i v i l service. Extensive retraining programs in administration were provided for B.C.S. o f f i c i a l s , and even many of the new military administrators were encouraged to participate i n them. The e l i t i s t structure of the c i v i l service was severely shaken as distinctions between B.C.S. and lower o f f i c i a l s were reduced, culminating in March of 1972 with the elimination of the prestigious 33 Secretariat. Although distinctions between grades of o f f i c i a l s remain, inferior c i v i l servants have received vastly improved leave, promotion, and pension benefits. Finally, in an effort to break the power of the generalist and to improve the quality of administration, the regime has reversed the recruitment patterns of the B.C.S., stressing technical and s c i e n t i f i c competence rather than general intellectual a b i l i t i e s as the basis for f i l l i n g c i v i l service positions. M. S. Tun, "Burma: Sudden Death of a Dragon," Far Eastern Economic  Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 14 ( A p r i l ! , 1972), p. 8. 56 C. Explanation for Impact on the Bureaucracy Goals of 1958 Coup The coup d'etat of 1958 resulted from administrative and p o l i t i c a l chaos spawned by internal feuding and disintegration of the ruling independence party. This party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), was formed by Burma's leader of independence, Brigadier Aung San, in an effort to form a relatively unified coalition of various nationalist elements with which to confornt the British . After Aung San's assassination in 1947, on the eve of independence, one of his more able lieutenants, Thakin U Nu, assumed the leadership of the party and he became independent Burma's f i r s t Prime Minister. Nu was able to maintain f a i r l y adequate unity in the party u n t i l 1956, when f i n a l l y internal dissension and disagreements among his lieutenants began to introduce irreparable fissures into AFPFL operations. The party and government limped on u n t i l " i n April 1958, a violent p o l i t i c a l eruption s p l i t U Nu's party into two violently feuding factions, the Nu led Clean-AFPFL and the Kyaw Nyein - Ba Swe . 34 led Stable-AFPFL." For several months after the s p l i t severe p o l i t i c a l fighting both in the party and government completely disrupted the already shaky s t a b i l i t y of the Union. Private armies began to. operate in support of both factions and a wave of lawlessness pervaded 34 Trevor N. Dupuy, "Burma and Its Army," The Antioch Review, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Winter, 1960-61), p. 430. 57 the whole nation. Moreover, in response to the increasing chaos affecting the Union, many of the only recently subdued ethnic rebel groups began to increase their military activity, once more raising the spectre of c i v i l war, s t i l l so fresh in the minds of most ^ Burmese. Many people feared that once again insurrections of the magnitude of 1948 to 1951 could arise, and perhaps permanently destroy 35 Burma's fragile union. "By September 1958, government in Burma had come to a st a n d s t i l l , and p o l i t i c a l considerations were seemingly 36 the only ones that influenced o f f i c i a l decision making". "Violence, bloodshed, c i v i l war, foreign intervention, and dis-37 integration of the Union were in prospect." As chaos escalated and conditions worsened, the army had begun to voice ever more dissatisfaction with the events and many individual officers l e t i t be know that they favoured a military assumption of power. However, the leader of the armed forces, General Ne Win, although increasingly urged to stage a coup by many of his colleagues, wavered in making the decision to move. Nu realizing that i t was only a matter of time u n t i l General Ne Win f i n a l l y grew disgusted with the domestic situation and since he was losing control of the p o l i t i c a l battle anyway, decided to pre-empt the military by 35 Although the rebels were gradually subdued after 1951 and Burma experienced several years of relative calm, there remained enough insurgent strength around which another f u l l scale rebellion could develop. 36 Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma (Stanford, 1963), p. 209. 37 Maung, Maung, p. 248. 58 asking General Ne Win to form a government. The General accepted the invitation, and as both factions of the AFPFL agreed to the move (both requiring a breathing period to build their organizations) the Burmese Parliament unanimously voted him Prime Minister on October 28, 1958. "The assumption of authority was completely legal and constitutional and this facade was maintained throughout the military's term in office, as Parliament continued to function and passed laws on the recommendation of the military leadership. In i t s confirmation of Ne Win's assumption of the Prime Ministership, the Burmese Parliament charged him with the task of restoring s t a b i l i t y and curbing violence with as much dispatch as possible, so that peaceful elections could be held to resolve the p o l i t i c a l crises that contributed so heavily to the chaos. The goals of the military throughout i t s term in office was the efficient and successful completion of the tasks that the 39 Parliament had set out for i t . In short, the military was to restore peace, s t a b i l i t y , and the rule of law, to implant democracy and to establish some economic improvement,(to ensure the maintenance of the Union, to prevent certain groups from taking advantage of Amry Vandenbosch & Richard Butwell, The Changing Face of Southeast  Asia (Lexington, 1966), p. 256. 39 Trager, p. 181. 59 the politicians' d i s a b i l i t i e s and to re-establish governmental and administrative v i a b i l i t y . The military genuinely considered i t s e l f a Caretaker Administration and neither changed the ideology nor goals of the earlier governments, i t merely pushed forward with greater drive and efficiency what the c i v i l i a n s had failed to do. in to 'clean up the mess', and one observer describes the results: The military gave Burma some of i t s best government since independence and by the end of 17 months, Burma's economy was more prosperous than ever. (This hardly means that Burma ceased being an exceptionally poor nation) The insurgents, though not completely eliminated, had been reduced to small bands of harassed bandits... There was a dramatic drop in the crime rate to levels below the pre-war days under British rule. Rangoon was a clean, healthy cit y ; garbage was collected regularly; the former squatters (200,000) were resettled in newly created, carefully planned sattelite towns ringing the national capital.40 The military, although somewhat ambivalent towards the c i v i l service, judged i t to be adequate as a partner in these efforts the B.C.S. had merely been victimized by the politicians and that with the elimination of a few 'bad apples' and the injection of a new s p i r i t and a sense of purpose into public administration there was no Immediately after his "election", General Ne Win plunged to place the nation on the right path again. 41 It was f e l t that reason why c i v i l servants could not be helpful. 42 As the military 40 Dupuy, p. 432. 41 Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," p. 437. 42 Donnison, p. 158. 60 government was not dedicated to innovation and to the i n i t i a t i o n of vast new programs, but only to more efficient day to day administration, i t was only necessary to see that c i v i l servants carried out their responsibilities more ef f i c i e n t l y . In fact, the military f e l t that the bureaucracy was an "appropriate trained instrument of government" for the purpose of maintaining law and order, 43 for which the British had created i t . Although requiring more time than at f i r s t anticipated to accomplish his limited goals, General Ne Win allowed national elections to take place in February 1960. In the elections, U Nu's Clean-AFPFL annhilated the opposition Stable faction receiving an overwhelmeing majority and a significant mandate. Its job finished, the army returned to i t s former military role. The 1962 Coup Upon reassuming the Prime Ministership, U Nu had many factors working in his favor, a l l the way from a sizeable Parliamen-tary majority, to good internal security, to relative economic health. For several months his government coasted along quite contendedly with the momentum provided by the Caretaker government. However, after this honeymoon period, d i f f i c u l t i e s again arose which would eventually force the return of the army. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," p. 436. 61 Once again factionalism and dissension developed in the ruling party, this time in Nu's newly formed Union party. Security declined with the renewed rise of insurrectionist activity and new demands for autonomy by minority groups again seemed to threaten the unity of the nation. In addition, a general deterioration in government set in and as one observer saw i t : "Prices are once again soaring, garbage goes uncollected and administration appears to have slipped back into the old ways of perpetual buck passing. There is every indication that day to day government has dropped back to the old 44 standards of inefficiency and possible corruption." These problems were compounded by conflict over Nu's proposal to establish a state religion and by serious economic disruption stemming from devastating monsoon floods. In the midst of a l l of the tensions and d i f f i c u l t i e s Nu decided to step down from the leadership of the Union party, though intending to remain as Prime Minister for several more years. This move precipitated a severe power struggle within the party over his succession, a struggle that s p l i t the Union party into violently feuding factions. Factional conflict worse than in 1958 broke out and Burma was once again plunged into the kind of administrative and govern-mental chaos that had characterized the earlier crises. A number of observers f e l t that Nu could have saved the situation at this point, 44 Butwell. "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma", p. 81. 62 by resorting to his s t i l l large personal popularity. Instead he stayed aloof from the conflict of. his lieutenants and refused to 45 i n i t i a t e any remedial action. Nu's failure to halt the struggle quickly undermined public confidence in the politicians and this resulted "in widespread dissatisfaction with the politicos as i t became apparent that they had learned nothing from the military takeover. They talked much but did nothing. They had not the courage to tackle unpopular tasks. Instead, their energies were consumed in the endless combining, recombining, and 46 intriguing for power." The renewed failure of the politicians triggered the anger of the military and on March 2, 1962, the armed forces, again led by General Ne Win, staged a lightning coup "that contrasted sharply with 47 the constitutionally camoflauged seizure of 1958." General Ne Win 45 Numerous explanations have been offered for Nu's loss of control again, the second time around. They range a l l the way from accusations that he spent too much time contemplating religious a f f a i r s , to apologies blaming his poor advisors for the failure, to studies of his personal psychological d i s a b i l i t i e s . For example, Louis J. Walinsky, "The Rise and F a l l of U Nu," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVIII, Nos. 3 & 4 ( F a l l -Winter, 1965-1966), pp. 269-281, suggests that Nu's lack of practical governmental and administrative experience and his lack of executive follow through were at fault for his failure. This was exacerbated by his spur of the moment decision making style and his mentally lazy attitude towards l i f e . 46 Donnison, p. 165. 47 Butwell, U Nu of Burma, p. 269. 63 unilaterally eliminated the constitution and immediately dissolved both Houses of Parliament. A l l j u d i c i a l , executive and legislative powers were abrogated to the new government and a l l conceivable opponents of the coup, including Nu and most of his ministers, were arrested and placed into indefinite confinement. The goals of the military after this second coup were as different from 1958 as the manner in which the takeover occurred the second time around. No doubts and ambiguities were allowed to exist as to what the goals consisted of, since they were systematically published shortly after the coup, in the document, The Burmese Way to Socialism. In the document, the military indicated i t s dissatisfaction with the course of Burma's post-war history and placed the destiny of the Union in i t s own hands, i t pledged the new government to the unrealized goals of independence; the achievement of a truly s o c i a l i s t society. To accomplish this, the Revolutionary government decided to implement a re-orientation of the social, economic, and p o l i t i c a l values and structures of the state. Economically, the Revolutionary Government had the following intentions: The economic goal i s to expand production so that the standard of l i v i n g for a l l rises, unemployment disappears and everyone is assured a means of lovelihood. To gain this end, agriculture, industrial production, distribu-tion, communication, and external trade w i l l be nationalized and owned in one of three ways: by the state, by co-operative societies or by collective unions. Of the three, state ownership should form the main basis of the economy. 64 An area of private capital w i l l exist during the transitional phase to socialism, i t w i l l be in Burmese hands and s t r i c t l y limited. The transitional and new society w i l l not be egalitarian because men d i f f e r both physically and mentally; however, the aim of the government w i l l be to narrow the gap between the wealthy and poor. It recognizes that wholesome morality is possible only when the stomach i s full.48 Politically,the army sought to replace parliamentary democracy with socialist democracy, since the former, due to i t s 'defects, weaknesses, loopholes, abuses, and the absence of a mature public opinion', had failed to produce a truly soc i a l i s t society. Under the new system, the true socialists (i.e. army) w i l l lead and the people w i l l follow. It w i l l combine the w i l l and i n i t i a t i v e of the individual man and group with the centralized guidance of society. Socially, the Revolutionary Government placed i t s main emphasis on improving the conditions of the peasants and workers; these two groups were to become the central participants in the new society. Not only did they have to be given a stake in the new society, but they also were to be re-educated to f i t better into that society. The people would have to be taught to develop a positive s p i r i t inside themselves and to discard their traditional "slave psychology". The new s p i r i t was to be based on the principle that human dignity i s derived from one's own labor. Another integral part of the social revolution was to be a re-orientation of the goals and curricula of Silverstein, "Burma", p. 133. Trager, p. 192. j 65 education. Now, "the goal of a l l education w i l l be to make the student a useful member of a soci a l i s t society concerned with the interests of that society, not with his own personal ambitions.""^ In an effort to make students more useful, they would be compelled to follow a s c i e n t i f i c and technical course of study, rather than the traditional l i b e r a l arts curriculum. In a l l of these efforts the military government pledged to respect the uniqueness of Burmese culture and values by being non-dogmatic and flexible. "In setting forth their programs as well as in their concrete actions, i t i s declared, the Revolutionary Council w i l l study and appraise the concrete r e a l i t i e s and also the. natural conditions peculiar to Burma objectively. On the basis of the actual findings derived from such study and appraisal i t w i l l develop i t s own ways and means to progress."^ 1 As in Peru, the goals of the Burmese military were not just meant to be on paper, but were intended to be implemented into positive 52 programs. To the best of i t s a b i l i t i e s , the Revolutionary Bixler, p. 205. ^ Maung, Maung, p. 296. 52 This does not mean that a l l of the goals of the military government were ever f u l l y implemented, nor that they necessarily benefitted Burma, which in fact, i s quite doubtful. It only attempts to emphasize the military's motivation. 66 government has "in a systematic, i f not spectacular manner, launched 53 an administrative and economic revolution." In an effort to implement i t s economic goals, the military has initiated a variety of actions ranging a l l the way from extensive nationalizations to "demonetization", with as one observer claimed, "almost bewildering s p e e d " . F o r example, in a period of one month, a l l banks, both indigenous and foreign owned, the Burmah O i l Company and Tin and Steel Companies were nationalized, in addition to which the government assumed monopolistic control of a l l foreign trade, exchange offices, import businesses, department stores, and food markets. This was only the beginning and numerous other facets of Burma's economic l i f e have come under government control. The f i n a l blow to the economic system that i t inherited in 1962 came with the military's "demonetization" law, which by outlawing the ownership of a l l large bank notes was f i n a l l y and irrevocably to destroy a l l large hoardings of liquid wealth.• The social goals, particularly those concerning peasants, received top priority and were implemented in a number of measures including land reclamation, peasants were rewarded with a new regulation which protected their lands and implements from confisca-tion due to bad debts. This was an effort to keep peasants from 53 John H. Badgley, "Burma's Military Government: A P o l i t i c a l Analysis", Garrisons and Governments, ed., Wilson C. McWilliams (San Francisco, 1967), p. 171. 54 Donnison, p. 256. 67 losing their lands to money lenders, who had since 1960 alone, taken 150,000 acres of land from the peasants. In the education sector curricula have been revised to stress technical training and Burmese cultural values. New educational institutions in science and technology have been created and the majority of new students have been placed into these institutions. Students themselves have been encouraged to practice self-discipline in study and loyalty in service to the nation.^ P o l i t i c a l l y , the military has sought to mobilize the nation under i t s central direction and guidance. In this effort i t has created the already mentioned Burma Socialist Programme Party, which is dominated and run by army officers. It has attempted to build an extensive, interconnecting cadre system throughout the nation. This party, along with a new labor union system based on Soviet lines and the creation of government controlled Worker's Councils, has given the military tight control over most aspects of public l i f e . In any case, both in word and deed, the military's goals and purposes the second time around were far different and far more radical. The changes at the universities were not welcomed by the students, to whom self-discipline was a foreign concept, and they resisted the new directives with violent r i o t s , which in the process of pacification resulted in scores (some say as many as 100) of dead and injured students. Josef Silverstein, "Burma," Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 2 (February, 1967), p. 36. 68 In the s p i r i t of these goals i t is quite understandable that the army would also wish to have a socialist bureaucracy to work with, one which can accomplish "the extension of state activity into a l l fields of trade and industry."^ 7 It requires l i t t l e imagination to see that both for practical and ideological considerations, a c i v i l service identified with western values and elitism, and 58 "dedicated to a policy of laissez faire in economic matters", would not be regarded highly by a government dedicated to economic and cultural revolution. If not an ideal s o c i a l i s t oriented bureaucracy, the minimum the military required was an efficient and reliable bureaucratic machine capable of innovation and imagina-tion rather than just the maintenance of the status quo, s t a b i l i t y , and law and order. Since the bureaucracy could not even successfully, 59 according to most observers, meet this minimum requirement, the military attempted to implement a l l of the measures such as penetration of c i v i l service positions and the creation of the SAC's described in the earlier section. 57 Tun, p. 8. 5 8 Ibid. Pye, P o l i t i c s , "Personality and Nation Building", pp. 215-216; Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma", pp. 387, 395, 413, 418; Tinker, p. 104. 69 Changes in Officer Corps Between and After the Coups The military that took control of the government in 1962, although again led by General Ne Win, was not the same military as in 1958. Changes in military personnel began soon after Nu was returned to power, and continued u n t i l shortly after the second military takeover. The f i r s t major change in army personnel took place February 7, 1961, when " i t was announced that recently promoted Brigadiers Aung Shwe and Maung Maung would be named ambassadors, five senior colonels would be assigned abroad as military attaches and five w i l l resign to go into p o l i t i c s or b u s i n e s s . M o s h e Lissak suggests the following explanation for these events: After the turnover of power to Nu in April 1960, the army was divided into three groups, the f i r s t group, composed mostly of young officers, looked with reluctance to the withdrawal of the army to the barracks and considered i t a mistake. The second group held the opposite position and argued that the army should not interfere in any way with p o l i t i c s . The third group saw the army performing limited but s t i l l v i t a l roles i n national development. The resignation of some high ranking officers in February 1961 is explained by Tinker and others to be the result of this internal conflict. ^ There i s no doubt the f i r s t group had defeated the others. The removed personnel were a group of senior officers who, along with General Ne Win, had their origins in the nationalist agitations Trager, p. 192. Lissak, p. 14. 70 of the t h i r t i e s and who had fought together against the Japanese. They shared these o r i g i n s , along with a common l i b e r a l s o c i a l i s t i d e a l , with most of the postwar p o l i t i c a l leaders, whose f a m i l i a l 6 2 t i e s interlocked them with the m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . In t h e i r renewed e f f o r t s at generating another m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n they were not d i s s a t i s f i e d with the goals and i d e a l s of the p o l i t i c i a n s , rather they believed themselves to be more e f f i c i e n t i n governing 6 3 and working for the common id e a l s than the p o l i t i c i a n s . The second major change came about with the r e s i g n a t i o n i n e a r l y 1 9 6 3 of Brigadier Aung Gyi, Deputy Chief of S t a f f and second i n command to General Ne Win.- Up to the time of h i s sudden resignation he was considered to be the mastermind of the Revolution-ary Government's p o l i c i e s , which, due to h i s influence, showed a r e l a t i v e l y moderate and gra d u a l i s t mark, lacking ideology and 6 4 doctrine. However, i n a showdown with advocates of more r a d i c a l reforms, h i s approach was defeated and he was forced to r e s i g n . His res i g n a t i o n meant the end of the influence of moderate s o c i a l i s m i n the army, and l e f t the way open f o r the dominance of more r a d i c a l , _ . 6 5 doctrines. 6 2 Pye, "The Army i n Burmese P o l i t i c s , " p. 2 3 4 . 6 3 Vandenbosch & Butwell, p. 2 5 9 . 6 4 I b i d . ^ S i l v e r s t e i n , "Burma," p. 1 3 5 . The main implementation of exten-sive n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s and increased controls over the economy was c a r r i e d out within weeks of Aung Gyi's removal. 71 Aung Gyi and the other l i b e r a l socialists were defeated and replaced by younger officers, more rigi d in ideology and doctrine, described by some as vindictive s o c i a l i s t s . ^ Butwell and Vandenbosch suggest that these officers, led by Brigadier Tin Pe, the new number two man in the junta and army, are mostly avowed Marxists and are determined to thoroughly alter the status quo,**7 and who, according 68 to Butwell were most dissatisfied with course of c i v i l i a n rule. These changes in the composition of the officer corps not only explain the more radical course of policies after the second coup, but also had specific consequences for the B.C.S., since i t increased the likelihood of military h o s t i l i t y towards and dissatisfaction with bureaucrats. F i r s t , the more moderate officers were relatively sympathetic to the c i v i l servants and were not as l i k e l y as their radical replacements to be c r i t i c a l of them. This was mainly because the formers' brand of socialism was quite mild as already indicated, and could tolerate the non-socialist tendencies of the c i v i l service. Moreover, whatever h o s t i l i t y they had for c i v i l servants as nationalists was modified by a respect for them stemming from having grown up at a time when the c i v i l servant was held in esteem by 6 6 Vandenbosch & Butwell, p. 259. 6 7 Ibid., p. 260. 68 Butwell, "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma," p. 75. j 72 69 hi s s o ciety. The l a t t e r group, on the other hand, l a r g e l y composed of d o c t r i n a i r e s o c i a l i s t s and having matured l a t e r than the older o f f i c e r s , had much l e s s tolerance f o r the c i v i l servants and l i t t l e regard for t h e i r former g l o r y . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the somewhat " f r i e n d l y tolerance" for the f a i l i n g s of the c i v i l servants (that could be said to characterize the a t t i t u d e of the purged o f f i c e r s ) i s generally lacking i n the younger ones. Second, the replacement o f f i c e r s were oriented towards science as an i d e a l , both through t h e i r t r a i n i n g and as part of t h e i r Marxist ideology, 7^" i n contrast to the purged o f f i c e r s , who, i f they had any schooling of s i g n i f i c a n c e , were l i k e l y to have been influenced by the t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l a r t s , g e n e r a l i s t curriculum. Consequently, the l a t t e r could f e e l comfortable with the s t y l e of government represented by the bureaucracy, whereas, the r a d i c a l o f f i c e r s came with an i n t e l l e c t u a l and i d e o l o g i c a l bias against the n o n - s c i e n t i f i c methods of the B.C.S. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," p. 437. i John H. Badgley, Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two P o l i t i c a l Traditions," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 2 (February, 1963), p. 92 For a f u l l e r explanation of the scienticism and Marxism of the younger officers see Badgley, "Burma's Zealot Wungyis". Some of the older officers were also Marxist oriented, but never formed a significant force in the military. 73 Experiences of the Military Between the Coups Several situations experienced by the military between the two coups increased i t s dissatisfaction with c i v i l servants. The f i r s t of these was the apparent betrayal of military initiated reform programs after the return of the politicians. As one participant in the Caretaker government has stated "some senior c i v i l servants who had during the Caretaker government spoken only i l l words about 'those politicians' now had only derisive things 72 to say to their p o l i t i c a l chiefs about 'the trousered rulers', meaning the soldiers. Those c i v i l servants started joyously to undo many of the good things that the Caretaker government had done. Many projects in which good progress was being made were stopped, 73 seemingly merely to emphasize who the new masters were." One of the f i r s t projects to be dropped was the, especially dear to the military, cleanup of Rangoon and the removal and resettlement of i t s many thousands of squatters. Although General Ne Win told his officers "that they must not feel hurt i f some of the things they 74 had done were changed or undone", as this characterized a l l governmental turnovers, many officers were in fact angered by the 72 Most Burmese wear traditional Burmese garb and not trousers. 73 Maung Maung, p. 287. 7 4 I b i d . 74 often summary and casual treatment of their accomplishments. Second, although relinquishing p o l i t i c a l control in 1960, the army continued to be an active administrative power through i t s Defense Services Institute despite efforts by U Nu to bring i t under c i v i l i a n control, running numerous economic enterprises with continued success. Furthermore, the army, "due to i t s greater knowledge and dedication" compared with c i v i l servants, was called upon to perform numerous duties that might ordinarily be expected of the c i v i l i a n administration or p o l i t i c a l appointees. Some of these duties are of major impor-tance to Burma today. Army Colonel Saw Myint, for example, i s head of the Frontier Areas Administration which directly rules large areas of crucial border territory. It i s the army too, that has been given the very important function of leading in the settlement of vast new areas of the country with limited population. Army personnel and their families have been sent to Israel to learn the ways of communal l i f e and then return to Burma to help the government settle the more sparsely and underdeveloped parts of the country.75 Success in both the administrative and the already mentioned economic enterprises 7^ between the coups reinforced the military's successful managerial and administrative experiences of the Caretaker government and increased i t s self-confidence. This l i s t of almost unqualified successes contrasted poorly with the endemic failures of Butwell, "Civilians and Soldiers i n Burma," p. 81. Guyot, "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," p. 400. 75 bureaucratically implemented programs and activities. As the military's confidence in its own abilities received these reinforce-ments, its respect for the administrative abilities of the c i v i l service accordingly declined. r 76 CHAPTER III CONCLUSIONS I. The Suitability of Generalizing to Other Countries From the Findings Based on Burma and Peru It i s clear from the evidence presented in the thesis that military coups and the subsequent military governments in Burma and Peru had a substantial impact on the c i v i l bureaucracy. It i s equally as clear that the nature and extent of this impact was largely determined by the types of goals that the particular military governments had set out for themselves and by the types of military officers that were placed into power by the coup. Whether this same pattern w i l l also be found in other nations that have experienced military interventions i s not clear. Although in some countries, such as Egypt and Pakistan, the same pattern of army penetration of c i v i l service positions, campaigns to improve morality, and reorganization and re-orientation of the bureaucracy, had at one time characterized their coup aftermaths in others, such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Thailand (1932), quite different results were the case. In the latter countries the bureaucratic status quo was also permenently altered by military coups, but due to different h i s t o r i c a l , social, and even accidental circumstances, the results 77 differed from those found in Burma and Peru. Instead of the pattern presented in the thesis, the bureaucracy in these countries was either raised to or maintained in a high position by the military, joining the army as partners in ruling the state. For example, Richard Harris suggests that for the f i r s t time in their contemporary history, the bureaucracies in Nigeria and Ghana ended their relative unimportance and achieved a position of power under the military regimes."'' Similarly, as Badgley points out, the bureaucracy and military in Thailand came to form a close partnership and mutually 2 benefitted each other in jo i n t l y running the state. The differing result in Thailand can be attributed more to his t o r i c a l and accidental factors, such as the absence of colonialism and no war of liberation, whereas in the two African examples, complex social and structural forces were at work. Such African factors as the relatively small size of the armed forces (which often reach no mora than several battalions in size); the late and simultaneous development of institutional h o s t i l i t i e s between the two); the t r i b a l dynamics (which enhance the co-operation between the military and 1 Richard Harris, "The Effects of P o l i t i c a l Change on the Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December 1968), pp. 386-401. 2 Badgley,x "Two Styles of Military Rule: Burma and Thailand", op. c i t . 78 bureaucracy when the two are composed of members of the same tribe as i s sometimes the case; since t r i b a l origins and loyalty play an important part in the winning of appointments to the public service and military); and f i n a l l y the extensive and pervasive 3 anglicized education of the military officers, have a l l contributed to the differing outcome. For these reasons the military in these countries (Ghana, Nigeria, and Thailand) was satisfied with the bureaucratic machinery 4 which i t inherited, and i t did not develop h o s t i l i t y towards the c i v i l service as Peru and Burma. As a result, i t could trust c i v i l servants with the goals and responsibilities of i t s governmental programs. II. The Characteristics of the Military in Power According to most of the literature on military governments and supported by the evidence from Peru and Burma, the military in power tends to exhibit several general characteristics: 3 Robert Pr ice , "A Theoretical Approach to Mi l i t a ry Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," World P o l i t i c s , Vol . XXIII, No. 3 (April 1971), pp. 399-430. 4 The satisfaction does not l i e in the higher quality of African administrative systems, since these are aff l ic ted with most, i f not more, of the deficiencies attributable to the B.C.S. or the Peruvian c i v i l service. 79 1. Puritanism - Excessive concern with private and public morality and criticism of luxurious l i f e styles."* 2. Nationalism - Military governments tend to stress the values of their own country and economy, often doing this at the expense of other nations.** 3. Action-oriented method of operations - Military governments tend to engage in a great deal of activity and tend to push unswervingly for the completion of their programs. However, this often prevents proper thinking through of the programs and a lack of follow up and adjustments along the way. Instead, they follow a narrow one-track path to comple-tion of the programs often ending up with quite unexpected res u l t s . 7 4. Lack of a b i l i t y to compromise or mediate disputes or to accept opposition sentiments - Military governments lack the democratic communication s k i l l s necessary to govern effectively in a climate of differing opinions. They press forward regardless of opposition and the feelings of the people affected by the programs. Military training is geared towards the following and completion of orders at a l l costs 8 and allows l i t t l e room for other sentiments to intrude. "*S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York, 1962). John J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962). ^Morris Janowitz, The Military in the P o l i t i c a l Development of New  Nations (Chicago and London, 1964). 7Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs Presidents (New York, 1964). g William F. Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York, 1965). 80 For example, a l l four military governments discussed in the text were found to have instituted campaigns to improve morality, which in the case of Burma pervaded the whole body p o l i t i c . In addition, a l l four exhibited nationalist tendencies over and above those Nof their c i v i l i a n forerunners, as indicated by their furthering of national cultural values at the expense of foreign values, and by the making of foreign and domestic policies geared towards neu-tralism and nationalization of foreign enterprises. Moreover, in both countries i t was apparent that once a military government had determined a course of action or program, i t was ruthlessly pushed to completion and opposition sentiments were not tolerated. (Even opposition from the people whom programs were designed to help, were ignored in many cases) This may be acceptable for Caretaker Governments quickly attempting to restore peace and order, but for long term rule and programs designed to alter social and economic conditions i t i s not advisable, since projects pushed with utmost dispatch to their completion under these conditions often tend to do more harm than good and can have quite unexpected consequences. For example, in the case of the Burmese economic reforms under the second military regime, this tendency caused serious long term economic problems and disruption of economic a c t i v i t i e s . Finally, both militar found i t d i f f i c u l t to accept and incorporate opposing views and ideas 81 into their programs and planning. Violent suppression of student unrest in Burma and the continued attacks on the APRA party in Peru under the military governments were the most overt examples of this. At a more fundamental level, this deficiency of the military l e f t l i t t l e place for local i n i t i a t i v e and local ideas and feelings. The military governments tended to guide the people through most decisions and actually undermined the p o s s i b i l i t y of giving local people a greater stake in their society, a goal that a l l of the military governments wished to accomplish. Although there is general agreement among scholars about these characteristics of military governments, such agreement is by no means universal. One exception to this agreement i s Robert Price. Writing about Ghana, Price suggests that several of the above li s t e d factors, particularly nationalism and puritanism, do not f i t his findings. The military government in Ghana exhibited a non-nationalis-t i c and non-puritanical operational code, which he attributes to the 9 values derived from the military's Sandhurst training. Whether the Ghanian military also failed to exhibit an action-orientation and an i n a b i l i t y to mediate opposition sentiments is not clear, since these factors were not dealt with by Price. 9 Price, op. c i t . 82 III. The Impact of Military Coups on. the C i v i l Bureaucracy as Related to the Causes of Coups There are four main factors contributing to the occurrence of military coups that emerged from the study: 1. The military must be dissatisfied with the course that their country is following: usually a result of violence, disorder, chaos, factionalism,and a lack of social and economic progress. 2. Military intervention becomes l i k e l y when the army feels i t s e l f directly threatened. In Burma for example, at the height of the p o l i t i c a l chaos of 1968, leading AFPFL politicians denounced the military in nationwide broadcasts while at the same time feeding rumours of impending assassinations of high ranking military officers. Moreover, the Union Military Police, a para-military force attached to the Ministry of Interior was being expanded to the point of becoming a threat to the regular military forces and shortly before the 1958 coup this force moved into positions around Rangoon. Why this move took place is s t i l l not clear, but i t nevertheless served to scare the military. In Peru, p o l i t i c a l and economic chaos threatened to allow the electoral victory of the military's chief enemy ,Haya de l a Torre. In addition, prior to both coups, the Peruvian military faced financial cuts and promotion d i f f i c u l t i e s from the c i v i l i a n governments. 83 3. The probability of military intervention i s increased by certain types of training that officers receive. If this training makes the officers more sensitive to and aware of the problems of their country and increase their non-military talents in such areas as economic planning, management, and lo g i s t i c s , i t w i l l enhance the officers' understanding of and self-confidence to tackle these national problems. Since their military careers most often leave insufficient outlets for these new a b i l i t i e s and energies, the need to find outlets for these energies w i l l , as in Peru and Burma, influence the military to stage a coup. This i s especially so when the educational and training experience are reinforced by practical a c t i v i t i e s in the f i e l d . 4. The last factor that contributes to the likelihood of a military coup i s the previous occurrence of a coup. In a sense, once the "ice is broken", the likelihood of more military coups i s enhanced. At least there w i l l not be as much hesitation on the second or even third time around. The impact of a coup on the bureaucracy depends on which combination of factors from this l i s t led to the coup. If i t stems mainly from reaction to chaotic domestic conditions or from threats to the military i t s e l f , as occurred with the f i r s t coups in both 84 c o u n t r i e s , then l i t t l e impact i s l i k e l y to happen to the c i v i l s e r v i c e . I f , however, the coup develops from more p o s i t i v e m o t i v a t i o n s , which r e s u l t from the m i l i t a r y ' s t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e s , then i t i s l i k e l y tha t there w i l l be a more s u b s t a n t i a l impact on the c i v i l s e r v i c e . j 85 BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Public Administration and the Bureaucracy in Developing Countries Berger, Morroe, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Diamant, Alfred, Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes: A Bureaucratic Model for Developing Societies (Bloomington: CAG Occasional Papers, 1964). Heady, Ferrel, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966). Heady, Ferrel & Stokes, Sybil L., eds., Papers in Comparative Administration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1962). Montgomery, John D. & S i f f i n , William J., eds., Approaches to Development: P o l i t i c s , Administration and Change (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966). Riggs, Fred W., Administration in Developing Countries - The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1964). Swerdlow, Irving, ed., Development Administration Concepts and Problems Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1963). II. Military in Developing Countries Finer, S. E., The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962). Fisher, Sydney N., ed., The Military in the Middle East (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963). Gutteridge, William F., Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) Harris, Richard, "The Effects of P o l i t i c a l Change on the Role Set of Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 13, No.3 (December 1968), pp. 386-401. 86 Huntington, Samuel P., P o l i t i c a l Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). Janowitz, Morris, The Military in the P o l i t i c a l Development of New Nations (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1964). Johnson, John J., ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Johnson, John J., ed., The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Lenczowski, George, "Radical Regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq: Some Comparative Observations on Ideologies and Practices," Journal of P o l i t i c s , Vol. 28, No.l (February 1966), pp. 51-55. Lieuwen, Edwin, Generals vs. Presidents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). McWilliams, Wilson C., ed., Garrisons and Governments (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967). Price, Robert, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," World P o l i t i c s , Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (April 1971) pp. 399-430. Putnam, Robert D., "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin America," World P o l i t i c s , Vol. 20, No. 2 (October 1967), pp. 101-102, 106). Pye, Lucian, Armies in the Process of P o l i t i c a l Modernization (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). III. Peru Astiz, Carlos A., Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian P o l i t i c s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). Bejar, Hector, Peru - 1965 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969). Bourricaud, Francois, Power and Society in Contemporary Peru (London: Faber and Faber, 1970). 87 Clinton, Richard Lee, "The Modernizing Military: The Case of Peru," Inter-American Economic Affairs, Vol. XXIV, No.4 (Spring 1971), pp. 43-66. Einaudi, Luigi, The Military and Government in Peru (CAG Papers: Rand Corporation, 1970). Erickson, Edwin E. et a l . , eds., U.S. Army Handbook for Peru - 1965 (Washington D.C.: The American University, No. 550-42) Estep, Raymond, The Role of the Military in Peruvian P o l i t i c s (Air University: Documentary Research Division Aero-space Studies Institute, 1970). Grayson, George Jr., "Peru's Military Populism," Current History, Vol. 60, No. 354 (February 1971), pp 74-81. Grayson, George Jr., "Peru's Under the Generals," Current History Vol. 62, No. 366 (February 1972), 91-97 & 116 H i l l i k e r , Grant, The P o l i t i c s of Reform in Peru (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971). Honey, John C., Toward Strategies of Public Administration Development in Latin America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968). Hopkins, Jack W., The Government Executive of Modern Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967) Hopkins, Jack W., "Comparative Observations on Peruvian Bureaucracy," Journal of Comparative Administration, Vol. 1, No. 3 (November 1969). Marett, Robert, Peru (London: Ernst Benn Limited, 1969). North, L i i s a , C i v i l - M i l i t a r y Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1966). Payne, James, "Peru: The P o l i t i c s of Structured Violence," Garrisons and Governments, ed. Wilson C. McWilliams (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967). Pike, Frederick B., The Modern History of Peru (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967). 88 Quijano, Anibal, "Nationalism & Capitalism in Peru," Monthly Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (July-August 1971). Ranis, Peter, Five Latin American Nations - A Comparative P o l i t i c a l Study (New York: The McMillan Company, 1971). Patch, Richard W., "The Peruvian Elections of 1963," Latin American P o l i t i c s , ed. Robert Tomasek (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1966). IV. Burma Badgley, John H., "Burma's Zealot Wungyis: Maoists or St. Simonists?," Asian Survey, Vol. V. No.l (January 1965). Badgley, John H., "Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two P o l i t i c a l Traditions," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 2 Badgley, John H., "Two Styles of Military Rule: Thailand and Burma," Government and Opposition, Vol. IV, No.l (Winter 1969). Badgley, John H., "Burma's Military Government: A P o l i t i c a l Analysis," Garrisons and Governments, ed. Wilson C. McWilliams (San Grancisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967). Bixler, Norma, Burma - A Profile (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). Butwell, Richard, U Nu of Burma (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). Butwell, Richard, "Civilians and Soldiers in Burma," Studies on Asia, ed. , Robert K. Sakai (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1961). Donnison, F. S. V., Burma (London: Ernst Benn Ltd., 1967). Dupuy, Trevor N., "Burma and Its Army," The Antioch Review, Vol. XX, No. 4 (Winter 60-61). Furnivall, J. S., The Governance of Burma (New York: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1960). Guyot, James F., "Bureaucratic Transformation in Burma," Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the Bri t i s h  Imperial Tradition, ed. Ralph Braibanti (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966). j 89 Lissak, Moshe, "Social Change, Mobilization, and Exchange of Services Between The Military Establishment and The C i v i l Society: The Burmese Case," Economic  Development and Cultural Change, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (October 1964). Maung, Maung, Burma and General Ne Win (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1969). Pye, Lucian, P o l i t i c s , Personality and Nation Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Pye, Lucian, "The Army in Burmese P o l i t i c s , " The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed., John Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Silverstein, Josef, "Burma," Governments and P o l i t i c s of Southeast Asia, ed. George McTurnan Kahin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964). Silverstein, Josef, "Burma" Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 2 (February 1967). Tinker, Hugh, The Union of Burma (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). Trager, Frank N., Burma - From Kingdom to Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966). Tun, M. C., "Burma: Sudden Death of a Dragon," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXXVI, No. 14 (April 1, 1972). Vanderbosch, Amry & Butwell, Richard, The Changing Face of Southeast Asia (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966). Walinsky, Louis J., "The Rise and F a l l of U Nu," Pacific A f f a i r s , Vol. XXXVIII, Nos. 3 & 4 (Fall & Winter 1965-66). 


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