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American efforts to raise China to great power status: 1942-1945 Curmi, Charles Edward Stewart 1971

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AMERICAN EFFORTS TO RAISE CHINA TO GREAT POWER STATUS: by CHARLES EDWARD STEWART CURMI B.A., U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia, 1966  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master o f A r t s i n t h e Department of History  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o t h e r e q u i r e d standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA November, 1971  1942-1945  In p r e s e n t i n g an  this  thesis i n partial  advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y  the  Library  s h a l l make i t f r e e l y  f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r o f B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y .  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r extensive for by  that  copying o f t h i s  thesis  s c h o l a r l y p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r h i s representatives.  I t i s understood that  of t h i s  thesis f o rfinancial  written  permission.  Department o f  HISTORY  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a  Date  gain  November. 1971  Columbia  copying or p u b l i c a t i o n  s h a l l n o t be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my  ABSTRACT  From the o u t s e t o f i t s involvement i n the Second World War,  the  U n i t e d S t a t e s found i t s e l f p h y s i c a l l y i s o l a t e d from C h i n a .  With  the capture o f Singapore by the Japanese and the subsequent downf a l l o f the P h i l i p p i n e s , t h i s i s o l a t i o n i n c r e a s e d and cut China o f f from d i r e c t m a t e r i a l support. impasse  virtually  To counter t h i s  and m a i n t a i n the N a t i o n a l i s t s i n the war a g a i n s t  the U.S.  Japan,  r e s o r t e d t o diplomacy by sponsoring China as a founding  member o f the U n i t e d Nations with a permanent seat on the S e c u r i t y Council.  T h i s move, though opportune under the circumstances then  existing,  f a i l e d t o take i n t o account the growing p o t e n t i a l o f  the Chinese Communists and negated the long-range v a l u e o f r a i s i n g China t o g r e a t power s t a t u s .  The o b j e c t o f t h i s study i s t o examine the m a t e r i a l and d i p l o m a t i c h e l p p r o v i d e d China from P e a r l Harbour t o the Y a l t a and the motives which  l e d American  Conference  diplomacy t o support the  N a t i o n a l i s t s t o the e x c l u s i o n o f a l l o t h e r p o l i t i c a l  factions  w i t h i n China d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d .  Chapter I t r a c e s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the Open Door P o l i c y t o China from the f i r s t notes o f 1899,  down t o the Stimson  ii  Non-Recognition  D o c t r i n e o f 1932. U.S.  Some s t a t i s t i c s are a l s o given o f the scope o f  economic i n t e r e s t i n China up t o P e a r l Harbour.  Chapter I I  d e l v e s i n t o FDR's o v e r a l l a t t i t u d e toward China, the m a t e r i a l h e l p p r o v i d e d h e r t o 1942,  the l o g i s t i c s i n v o l v e d i n i t s d e l i v e r y ,  and the e a r l y American attempts t o i d e n t i f y China with the t h r e e g r e a t powers.  Chapter I I I f o l l o w s American d i p l o m a t i c moves t o  have China accepted by B r i t a i n and the U.S.S.R. i n t o the  U.N.  O r g a n i z a t i o n d u r i n g i t s formative y e a r s at the Moscow, C a i r o , and Teheran Conferences and the g r a d u a l r e l e g a t i o n of China t o a secondary r o l e i n the war  i n the P a c i f i c .  Chapter IV i n v e s t i g a t e s  the c o m p l e x i t i e s o f the S t i l w e l l M i s s i o n , some Chinese r e a c t i o n s t o i t , the modest h e l p p r o v i d e d China, and h e r r e l a t i v e n e g l e c t by the t h r e e g r e a t powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.  The  Y a l t a concessions t o f o s t e r the e n t r y o f the U.S.S.R. i n t o the war  i n the P a c i f i c are a l s o examined i n the context o f a  i n v a s i o n o f the Japanese mainland. t i v e v a l u e o f f o u r years o f U.S. concentrated  planned  Chapter V assesses the  rela-  diplomacy toward China which  on r a i s i n g the N a t i o n a l i s t s t o g r e a t power s t a t u s  with a seat i n the U.N.  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l w h i l s t i g n o r i n g the  growing p o t e n t i a l f o r power o f the Chinese Communists.  iii  Contents  Introduction:  1  I:  The Open Door as American Policy i n China: 1899-1932  3  II:  Franklin D. Roosevelt and China:  III:  China as a Great Power:  IV:  S t i l w e l l , The Chinese, Dumbarton Oaks and Y a l t a  65  V:  Four Years of Diplomacy:  92  1932-1942  Moscow, Cairo and Teheran  An Assessment  27 47  Bibliography:  121  Appendi c i e s:  136  iv  INTRODUCTION  T h i s study examines American d i p l o m a t i c attempts t o r a i s e China t o the l e v e l o f a g r e a t power from P e a r l Harbour t o the Y a l t a Conference.  The  study i n c l u d e s a survey o f Sino-American r e -  l a t i o n s as e x e m p l i f i e d by the Open Door P o l i c y d u r i n g the  years  1899-1932, then c o n c e n t r a t e s  dif-  on the f o l l o w i n g a r e a s :  The  f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n p r o v i d i n g China with m a t e r i a l and h e l p throughout the war; i s t s i n the U.N.  the s u c c e s s f u l s e a t i n g o f the  Organization;  advisory National-  some Chinese r e a c t i o n s t o the  mo-  dest h e l p r e c e i v e d , and an assessment o f the motives which l e d American diplomacy t o r a i s e N a t i o n a l i s t China t o g r e a t power s t a t u s w h i l s t i g n o r i n g the f u t u r e p o t e n t i a l o f the Chinese Communists i n t h e i r immediate and  long-range plans  f o r China.  The b u l k o f the m a t e r i a l used c o n s i s t s o f o f f i c i a l American d i s patches contained  i n the S t a t e Department p u b l i c a t i o n :  R e l a t i o n s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . D i p l o m a t i c years  1942-45.  Foreign  Papers, c o v e r i n g  T h i s m a t e r i a l i s supplemented by  the  s e l e c t e d memoirs  o f some o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d , g e n e r a l works by American and  other s c h o l a r s i n American diplomacy and a r t i c l e s and  period-  i c a l s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o Sino-American r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g period.  An appendix reproducing  this  the major documents r e f e r r e d t o  2  throughout t h i s study i s added t o the d e t a i l e d b i b l i o g r a p h y .  I  THE  OPEN DOOR AS AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA:  1899-1932  More than a hundred y e a r s b e f o r e the American Government showed an i n t e r e s t  i n the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y o f China, t h e  myth o f a fabulous China market had been f i r m l y implanted i n the minds o f many New England 1776-1780, with i t s tempting  traders. accounts  Cook's t h i r d voyage,  o f sea o t t e r  t r a d e not  o n l y c r e a t e d the myth, b u t l e d t o the i n i t i a l c o n t a c t s between Americans and Chinese. During the l a t e 1780's and the f i r s t h a l f o f the n i n e t e e n t h century, these c o n t a c t s centered on the i n d i v i d u a l t r a d e r s and whalers, y e t o f f i c i a l entirely lacking.  interest  forays of  i n the O r i e n t was not  The Wilkes e x p e d i t i o n o f 1838-1842 i n t o t h e  Southwest P a c i f i c and P e r r y ' s f o r c e f u l e n t r y i n t o Japan i n 1853 followed by the Rodgers' survey o f the North P a c i f i c i n 1853-1856, a l l provided needful data.  Rodgers i n f a c t , i n t e n d e d t r a c i n g a  commercial r o u t e from San F r a n c i s c o t o Shanghai b u t a l a c k o f funds on h i s r e t u r n from Japan put an end t o h i s scheme. ever, h i s v i s i o n o f Chinese  How-  goods b e i n g shipped a c r o s s the P a c i f i c  t o the C a l i f o r n i a c o a s t , then o v e r l a n d by r a i l t o the  Atlantic  and the markets o f Europe, was t o p e r s i s t w e l l i n t o the second  4  h a l f o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . With the l i n k i n g o f t h e Union and C e n t r a l P a c i f i c in  1869, Rodgers' e a r l y v i s i o n was  reality.  railroads  g r a d u a l l y transformed i n t o  Yet, t o the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f Americans, China was  t i n e d t o remain a r a t h e r nebulous e n t i t y . more d i s t a n t , China d i d not l e n d i t s e l f  des-  More " f o r e i g n " and  t o t h a t i n t e r e s t which  Europe has c o n t i n u o u s l y exerted on the American mind, both a t the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l l e v e l s o f e x p r e s s i o n .  The e a r l i e s t  bonds ran eastward t o B r i t a i n , and l a t e r , w i t h the f i r s t  ethnic im-  migrant f l o o d , spread t o I r e l a n d , t o Germany, and i n time, t o the whole o f Europe.  The Chinese l a b o r t h a t f i r s t e n t e r e d the west  coast i n 1848 was never a b l e t o achieve the degree o f i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t most o f i t s North European c o u n t e r p a r t s were t o win f o r themselves even b e f o r e t h e C i v i l  War.  I t was not u n t i l the end o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a t Sino-American r e l a t i o n s were c o n s i d e r e d important enough t o warr a n t the e f f o r t o f a major d i p l o m a t i c move.  The e a r l y t r e a t i e s  of Wanghia i n 1844, T i e n t s i n i n 1858, and Washington i n 1868, had r e s t r i c t e d themselves t o g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n s o f t r a d e and consular services. to  By 1899  something more s u b s t a n t i a l was  needed  cope w i t h the spread o f European i n t e r e s t s i n China, and t h e  t h r e a t t h a t these i n t e r e s t s might exclude America from a potentially  l a r g e market  f o r i t s manufactured goods, c u r t a i l the e x i s -  t i n g minimal t r a d e , and a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i t s growing m i s s i o n a r y  5  involvement i n t h a t c o u n t r y . I t should a l s o be remembered t h a t America was a t t h e h e i g h t o f i t s j i n g o i s t adventure i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s , which some viewed as a p o s s i b l e s t e p p i n g stone t o China.*  Others, such as Senator  Beveridge o f Indiana, Theodore Roosevelt, and h i s f r i e n d Henry Cabot Lodge, were i n f l u e n c e d by C a p t a i n Mahan's l u c i d :  The  I n f l u e n c e o f Sea Power Upon H i s t o r y . 1660-1783. and i t s p l e a f o r a two ocean navy t o keep t h e sea l a n e s open t o p r o s p e c t i v e colonies. These e x p a n s i o n i s t s , and a f a i r l y wide segment o f t h e American  p u b l i c whose t a s t e f o r empire had not y e t been soured  by the t e n a c i t y o f E m i l i o Aguinaldo, c o u l d h a r d l y be expected t o accept w i t h benign detachment the v a s t c o l o n i a l expansion o f B r i t a i n and Prance's  "New I m p e r i a l i s m . "  2  In the l a s t  thirty  y e a r s o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h century, B r i t a i n i n e f f e c t , i n c r e a s e d h e r empire by n e a r l y f i v e m i l l i o n square m i l e s , w h i l s t  France  m u l t i p l i e d h e r s t o over s i x m i l l i o n .  When t h e scramble f o r  A f r i c a ended i n 1898 and t h e European  powers t u r n e d t o China, t h e  U.S.  decided t o p r o t e c t what few i n t e r e s t s she had, o r hoped t o  develop i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s and on t h e A s i a n mainland. The f o l l o w i n g y e a r , a s e r i e s o f d i p l o m a t i c notes were sent t o t h e American  d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s i n Great  P a r i s , B e r l i n , S t . P e t e r s b u r g , Rome, and Tokyo.  Britain,  L a r g e l y t h e work  o f A l f r e d H i p p i s l e y , a B r i t i s h Commissioner o f Maritime Customs  6  i n China who  i n f l u e n c e d t o some extent Hay's Far E a s t e r n a d v i s o r  W i l l i a m R o c k h i l l , the Open Door Notes o f 1899-1900, s e t the f o r American p o l i c y i n China up t o and beyond December 7, The  first  set o f notes, those o f September 6, 1899,  stage  1941. were  worded t o convey the t r a d i t i o n a l abhorrence Americans h e l d f o r spheres  o f i n f l u e n c e , and suggested  t h a t a l l n a t i o n s should  equal access t o the t r a d e o f China.^  enjoy  As a f r e e t r a d e theory  p o s t d a t i n g Adam Smith by n e a r l y one and a q u a r t e r c e n t u r i e s , i t could h a r d l y c l a i m the g e n e s i s o f o r i g i n a l i t y . f e r e n t , was  What was  dif-  America's attempt t o i n f l u e n c e a h o s t o f European  c o u n t r i e s i n t o c o o p e r a t i n g with h e r t o guarantee the o f a country o u t s i d e h e r own  continent.  integrity  For a n a t i o n t r a d i -  t i o n a l l y wary o f f o r e i g n entanglements, here was  as r a d i c a l a  change i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y as any t h a t had o c c u r r e d s i n c e Washington's F a r e w e l l  Address.^  With t r e a t y r i g h t s i n China s i n c e 1844,  American commercial  i n t e r e s t s were r u d e l y shaken on November 18, 1897 s e i z u r e o f the p o r t o f Kiaochou i n Shantung.  by the German  Less than  five  months l a t e r , R u s s i a demanded the c e s s i o n o f Port A r t h u r at the t i p o f the Kwantung P e n i n s u l a , along w i t h the p o r t o f and an e x t e n s i v e l e a s e i n Southern  Talienwan  Manchuria.  T h i s move c r e a t e d a c e r t a i n t h r e a t t o American t r a d e i n Manchuria and Northern  China, areas which absorbed  o f a l l American exports t o China.  two-thirds  In Chefoo, f o r example,  one  7  of  the  treaty  ports  cotton,  textiles,  between  1894  and  1914,  American  total  U.S.  to  a  seas the  and  exports  deal  expansion overall  of of  size  as  Yet, to  of  one  were  less do  When v i e w e d  trade  was  of  no p e r c e i v a b l e  U.S.  exports  200-400  percent  considers than  not  as  a total  as  of amount  U.S.  over-  1897-1916,  insignificant on t h e  of  late  on t h e w h o l e  the years  such  effect  that  1 percent  against  12 p e r c e n t b e t w e e n  this  t o have  when  increases  trade. to  influence,  increased by  China  these  10  German  kerosene,  1897.^  exports,**  great  portions  now u n d e r  7  pro-  American  economy. In  spite  of  these  corporate  interest  Open  Notes  Door  American  politics foreign  and  an  real  of  the  threat  ports,  but  might be  cut  partitioning  amongst as  not  yet  This off  to  fear  from a that  LaFeber  of  rise  in  American  interpretations  widely  ignores  sense  read  critics  and W.A.  such  factors  mission  which  of  the  of  Williams. as  domestic  permeated  U.S.  period.  seems it in  immediate  such  Walter  this  when  right  of  economic  Times  notes  "is  crease...."  the  approach  during  the  China,  ingrained  T h e New Y o r k intent  no  policy  this  policy  and  persist  foreign  Unfortunately,  in  facts  to have  stated our  all  on  present  that  from the  trade  into  closer  February trade with  business  potentially  country  been  vast  closed  7,  with its  to  1898, all  future  community market  the  in  economic  real that  the  Chinese in-  that  it  China by spheres  of  the  8  interest,  had  probably  a  Hippisley-Rockhill-Hay even  considering Though  what  of  lations the  their with  and  identifiable  tinuing  in  the  ment a  to  the  within  in any  or  of  the  of  itself  power  within  or  control  this  could  Fourth,  preserving  prejudiced  its  within  having  again the  their  trade,  Russian mining  by  existing time that  China  for and  by of an  a  re-  both  reveals  had  railroad for  powers of  of  the  of  of  treaty  "may  the  interest." open market  advocate  will  rights  specifically  Americans any  Third,  Chinese  American  more  "to  treat-  States  exclusive  con-  been  navigation." United  an  admitting  plea  equality  "the of  and  European  portion  so  trade,  and  Britain  China  for  spheres  a preference to  of,  policy  treatment  so-called  turn  fact  in  this  the  persist,  of  of  any  imperil  analysis  statement  commerce and  over  of  American  1899  recognition  exclusive  restated notes  a  plea,  existing  through  powers  commerce,  another  to  notes  of  spheres  interest,  the  notes  and  world  for  commit  rights.  the  a  loss  guided an  definition  existing  'spheres'  spheres  that  "open-door"  commerce o f  for  comes  a  of  years, of  implementing  1890's.  intent  German,  n o way  Empire,..."  at  spite  of  the  forty  Second,  trade  said  disavowal  documents  First,  China.  in  As  British,  free  maintaining insure  of  to  in  immediate  the  as  over  effect  any  of  construction  trend.  existence  interests  for  the  than  depression  wording? China  greater  policy  speculation  wording  the  the  far  aimed  not  be  controlling Finally, for  world  "administrative  9  reforms ment  so  urgently  and m a i n t a i n i n g  western after  world  the  is  long  trade  to  nation's  that  aimed  China  at  and  the  success, ambiguous European whole were  China,  were  to  that  and This  to  rights  protect viewed  any  to  appeal  and p r o t e c t i o n as  a mere  though  of sop  i t  in  to  the  also in  China  even  as  on  to  somewhat  none  of  or  unlike  hopeful the  as  claimed  and  U.S.,  they, only  one  loudly  grounds,  The  which  Hay  no  evasive  privileges  force.  protecting  to  the  self-conceived  attitude  coming  the  to  the  the  U.S.,  answer  surface  beneficial  to  her  and  trading  was  reown  country.  Administration  seventeenth  guarantee  policy  expansion  that  pragmatic  and  through  statement,  deluded  couched i n  On p u r e l y eager  whole  home.  ...  were  the  Govern-  American missionaries  replies - 0  which  that,  though  addition  would  at  of  of  and  European  notes  all  idealism  Imperial  construed  notes,  stricted  McKinley  was  be  the  which  the  the  in  continuation  easily It  the  last  of  Japan's,  In  could  This  U.S.  western world,  in  the  China  the  powers  interests  of  evidence that  intent  to  over  supporters  terms."*  ready  strengthening  integrity  interests.  some  "the  for  concerned."^  pacifying  is  primary  alike  in  their  There  the  preamble  foreign  was  needed  century  assumed  existing  a l s o hoped  broad  the  spectrum as  old  efforts  of  Ricci,  Christianity  very  of  destiny,  that  future  in  American  China Schall  with  wording  the  as  of  rights, the  idealism;  the  sixteenth  and  Verbiest.  aid  of  Western  10  science of  c o u l d make  civilization.  raising of  ...  trade  an By  to  the  commercial  appreciable catering  to  level  of  a moral  in  China had  'rights'  'Open D o o r '  for  all  Unlike  the  Jesuits  onstrated  the  forcefully  attuned  By  in  to  and  two  impulse, issue, no  thousand McKinley  for  such  Verbiest,  astrology  the  First  missionary  mediately  Schall  managed  American missionary  Protestantism. medical  this  on  years was  "defense appeal  merely  as  the  nations...."^  superiority  Mandarins,  impact  to  who  evangelical set  the  landed  directed his  effort  to in  zeal  Canton  reach China  of  p a t t e r n was  in  efforts  who t h r o u g h  in  a  some was  of  June,  toward h e l p i n g  the  century  Parker  1834,  a  and  Chinese  such  prominent  humanitarians  as  Sherwood  Eddy  and Henry  Luce  dedicated themselves  the  conversion  eign the  of  Missions, work  in-China Hume,  and  initiated  of  T h e r e was  also  weak  which  and  by  the  through  the  Student  Presbyterian these  reached  Yale  Board  men w o u l d its  medical  t h e r e f o r e , more  move w h i c h  men a s  nation  the  p r o j e c t which  founder  lomatic  China  had  school  than  to  protect  disinterested  as  these,  divided  far,  sought  China.  no  This  raw not  under in  self-interest only  territorial of  its on  For-  the  YaleEdward  Hunan. in  a  dip-  traders,  but  the  of  concessions  secular  to  Later,  great  Changsha,  especially  mixture  the  Spear,  for  Missions.  continued by  apogee  sought  so  be  of  im-  Robert  Volunteers  Yale  people.  1887,  Sr.,  John Mott,  the  more  nineteenth Peter  dem-  part from  theology  a  and  a  11  commercial approach  self-interest  to  twentieth  China,  and  century.  was  persisted  T h e r e were  the  nationalist  explosion  the  issuance  the  With to  the  of  Vienna,  original  U.S.  will  sion  of  hold  her  of  was  to  China the  over  attempt  served  integrity In  was  to of  November  Departments, Samsah  Bay  as  what  the of to  myths,  intends  pledge  to  years.  during these  this  words,  t h e myth  that  under  to  pressure  naval  Fukien province.  and  other  This  2  and  a  the  ter-  statement crisis  tribute the  their  American  in  Finally,  every  is  China's  to  U.S.  very  made exis-  territorial foreign  f r o m t h e War territorial  Griswold,  state-  Chinese  period, yet  a  a  Americans,...  final  at  It  transgres-  rescuing  "preserve  regularity  forty-one  gain  and  the  follows  interests...."  1900,  to  Then  added  that  any  the  U.S.  1900.  a warning  anarchy,"  importance  Hay  3,  as  prompted  and L i s b o n  China.  e n t i t y ^  that  July  the such  which  "virtual  paramount  attempted in  in  of  however,  t h e Hague,  missionaries,  implement  perpetuate  on  American  middle  accountability"  monotonous  next  whole  Rebellion,  notes  American  administrative  the  opened w i t h  uttermost  an u n e q u i v o c a l  the  exceptions  Madrid,  officials,  to  into  Boxer  of  notes  legitimate  persistence  tence  the  uprising  repeated with  faced  no m a j o r  at  the  all  and  be  some  set  delineating  end w i t h  ritorial  the  "the  "American  [^including] notes  list,  of  intent  China:  second  well  extraterritorial rights  condemnation ment  of  Brussels,  to  fundamental  and  policy. Navy  concessions  commenting  on  this  12  apparent of  loss  Chinese  notes,  of  idealism,  integrity,  had  actually  to  1902,  the  acquire  the  U.S.,  any  of  U.S., ests  the  in  alone  of  notes  fact,  from the  1 , 1 3  that  outwardly that  "the  policy  Though  the  of  foreign  the  China,  sent  sought very  in  guarantees  powers  that  to  and  navy  even b e f o r e 1900 w e r e  erstwhile  loyal  t e r r i t o r i a l concessions.  exploitation  none  s t i l l  forsaken  concessions-scramble. and  states  pressed powers Yet,  the  its  policy  tried  to  in  China,  the  refused was  Rebellion,  to  Peking.  own a n d  China's  the  his  1901  pervasive  Boxer  were v i o l a t i n g  of  enter  again  in  so  addressed  for  the  champion  that  The inter-  latter*s  sov-  ereignty. Here inal in  intent:  China  deny  finally,  a  sense  does  to  protect  tecting for  to  the  her  interests.  the  the  territorial plunder  rebellion.  documents,  excesses official  and  of  which  Boxers,  position,  had  did  it  which  an saw  and  planners  of  1900,  and h e r  that  prevent,  in  effect  followed as  sharply  the  their  returning  but  pro-  on  Marilyn  in  to  inability  interest  little  U.S.  nationals not  from e x a c t i n g  the  orig-  is  an  attitude  their  This  China,  showed  concessions  some A m e r i c a n s  the  of  of  interests  policy  integrity,  Nor  some  pressures.  weakness  notes  reveal  American  amongst t h e  own  of  Notes  Japanese  appalling  Chinese of  and  of  the  rhetoric  adequately the  protection  idealism  China's  pression  for  of  reveal  The  Open Door  from European  it  rush  the  the  the supYoung  own  toll  contrast to  China  13  the r e p a r a t i o n s the I m p e r i a l Government had been f o r c e d t o  pay 14  f o r the l o s s e s Americans had  i n c u r r e d d u r i n g the  fighting.  Over the next t h i r t y - t w o y e a r s , American i n t e r e s t s on A s i a n mainland would be r e p e a t e d l y c h a l l e n g e d , w h i l s t  China,  saved from immediate p a r t i t i o n by the r i v a l r i e s o f the powers, would f i n a l l y emerge a t r u n c a t e d n a t i o n , her  the  concession  territorial  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e g r i t y a mere phrase i n an o l d d i p l o m a t i c note, with Japan f i r m l y h o l d i n g the balance  o f power i n the  Far  East. The  process was  Russia was  not long i n s t a r t i n g .  As e a r l y as  b a r r i n g American t r a d e i n Manchuria and c o n s o l i d a t i n g  i t s i n f l u e n c e i n a p a r t o f China i t had Boxer R e b e l l i o n .  The  from the area, Hay  preempted s i n c e the  f o l l o w i n g year, with U.S.  summed up the impact of U.S.  consulates  f o r granted," he t o l d T.R.  on A p r i l  28,  1903,  "I take i t  "that R u s s i a knows  do t h a t we w i l l not f i g h t over Manchuria, f o r the  reason t h a t we  cannot,... we  Russo-Japanese War  Portsmouth, New 5, 1905,  simple  c o u l d never get a t r e a t y through  the Senate the o b j e c t o f which was The  barred  domestic p o l i t i c s  on as independent a person as Theodore R o o s e v e l t :  as we  1902,  t o check Russian  aggression."*-  and the subsequent n e g o t i a t i o n s at  Hampshire, which ended the c o n f l i c t on  September  r e v e a l e d Japan as the s t r o n g e s t naval power i n the  Far  E a s t , and i d e n t i f i e d her as the g r e a t e s t s i n g l e t h r e a t t o the Open Door i n China.  Though Roosevelt  attempted t o  balance  14  Russian would  imperialism  ultimately In  Japan, the  May,  prompting  protect later,  the  status  the  Open Door  in in  administration, was  By House, Knox,  it  was  which  so  far  it  the  to  the  European  an  attempt  to  to  and  With the  the  in  both  of  sovereignty  in  the  to  of  end o f  equal  agreed Six  to  months  strengthened  U.S.  the  Philippines  exchanged  Roosevelt's  agreement  of  the  of  Philippines  and  second  the  Korea, the  "how  the  U.S.  Open Door  and  was  had  being  taken  integrity. H.  Taft  to  be  the  in  and  capital  participation  American bankers  the  White  secretary to  maintain  "Dollar-Diplomacy"  regent  railway  to  attempted  interested.  c o n t r o l l e d Hukuang  involve  where  force American  telegraph  allow  power  further  with  wonder  Japan! " - ^  The T a f t - K n o x  least  treaty  to  new p r e s i d e n t  new w o u l d h a v e China.  of  William  the  Pao  other  was  tacit  security  advent  in  any  security  territorial  to  Tung  integrity  the  with  personally him  Chinese  arbitration  Yinq  Manchuria  7  attempted not  an  Agreement,  the  evident  was  asking  in  in  China's  presence  as  and  ensconced  and  something  Chung China  for  Japan,  and  followed,  in  Chun,  over  that  if  China.^  securely  1909,  America's which  Asia  closed,  precedence  rage  presence  quo  power,  signed  Peking  Root-Takahira  the  gradually  the  U.S.  independence  the  Britain,  the  would  Japan's  through  Japanese  suffer.  1908,  Japanese  with  Taft of  in  China,  for  loan.  into  a  fact,  went  Prince  American T h e r e was  reforming  region  China's  capital also  15  currency. from the little no  Again,  Department  interest  immediate  China  the  Japan had  in  to  Hukuang  19,  was  R.  Japan,  pretext, her  by  China  presence  to  existence objected  as in  in  an a  South  the  to  the  to  1914, yet  China  the  by  Taft-Knox  American  conditions  impinge  on  to  place  Ambassador  to  China.  Southern  trade  for  loan  the were  idealism official,  January, and  from Germany  so  "administra-  a Y.M.C.A.  Britain  with  experiment  latter's  In  four  1915,  France and  as  a  increase  Manchuria.  Demands,"  ultimatum national  with  Shantung  the  in  1 8  the Wilsonian  attempt  secure  of  the  later,  alliance  support  with  investments  export  $78,700,000.  had  entity  previous  and  came  which  unknown  American  in  ended the  withdrawing  wartime  principle  Japanese  Shantung, cerned,  her  U.S.  "Twenty-One  amounted  the  as  By  initiative  capital,  American import  with  as  the  American  $7,299,000,  that  loan,  a virtually  Two m o n t h s  in  attempted  The  to  to  evident  using  in  administration  stating  Mott,  not  return.  "yearly"  independence." again  John  only  1913,  loan,  Hukuang  State,  exceeded that  unfavourable tive  of  the  investing  average  The W i l s o n on M a r c h  in  guaranteed  amounted  years,  as  which  Japan presented  which  threatened  entity.  Wilson  to  the  Ambassador Manchuria  demands.  on M a r c h  "territorial contiguity  after  latter's some  However,  13,  and E a s t e r n  the  stated  Inner  creates  to  very  hesitation,  Bryan that  Mongolia  special  China,  in  as  a  far  were  relations  note as conbetween  16  Japan  and  accept Japan  these  an  altered version  that  paired  the  the  U.S.  1 9  of  refused  Open Door  Two y e a r s "that  districts."  in  later,  the to  the  and,  consequently,  recognizes  that  Japan has  At  the  the  Treaty  Shantung, Chinese the  in  Samuel  to  of to  appease  Wilson  Wilson  settlement  also in  By Island,  by it  1921,  Japan  Shantung, North  and t h e  a  Japan  to  warned  that  im-  of  treaty  to  China,  of  in  treaty  2 0  hold  on  sacrificing the  idea  they and  and  relatives,  considered Britain  regard  with  sign  of  Bashford  Wilson's  what  to  particu-  her  in  Japan with  refusal  States  contiguous."  France  the  United  J a m e s W.  one  between  to  the  Germany." ^2  the  prewar  northern h a l f colonies  intervention  Manchurian  of  Railway.  in  1918, That  of  the  treaty  Sakhalin Pacific,  Port same  and  Arthur, year,  a  "abso-  China.  Germany's  Siberian  in  the  are  Bishop  both  a U.S.  recognized  and m a i n t a i n  and  in  of  disgust  that  controlled the  South  Bryan  relations  confirmed  obvious  stands  that  n o way b e n e f i t  the  Dairen,  as  explained  possessions  rationalization  answered  Agreement  interests  a missionary  bound themselves  Shantung  7,  forced  agreement  Government  Prom C h i n a ,  this  any  special  J a p a n was  Wilson's  Nations.  accept  issue.  lutely  since  of  the  special  Versailles  spite  creates  which her  J . Woodbridge,  refused  would  of  to  sovereignty  League  moral  part  finally  o n May  recognize  Lansing-Ishii  countries,  in  demands  was  China.  t e r r i t o r i a l propinquity  larly  When C h i n a  the  17  Washington  C o n f e r e n c e on  blance  of  Treaty  which  the  a balance  U.S.,  tion, and  emerged,  Britain  and  a  Japan,  of  disarmament  power  in  limited  and  Japan)  Four-Power eliminated  attempted to  Asia.  the to  The  signing  a  5-5-3  T r e a t y between  some A m e r i c a n h i s t o r i a n s  such  as  countries  the  R.L.  Five-Power  ratio  the Anglo-Japanese  reset  in  U.S.,  (including construc-  Britain,  saw  of as  sem-  Naval  naval  Alliance  Buell,  a  France,  1902,  which  one  of  the  followed  in  1922  22 main  causes  of  Japanese  by  a Nine-Power  to  respect  the  China's  principles  controversial allow  China  tence,  island to  granted in  to  with  and  enjoyed  Britain. west  its  the  both  of  Door the  itself,  Policy.  in  Asia  On t h e  policy  privacy  and  Japan  of  Versailles  at  had  reduced the  since  1902  not  the  to insis-  formulating  in  and  in  needed t o  the  the  advantage its  no  Pacific,  consolidate  commercial  kept  naval  fortifying  and  the  U.S.  naval  through  other hand by  maintained  up  agreed  apparently  Hawaii,  it  gave  and  Agreement. U.S.  Asia  agreed  integrity  also  and  the P a c i f i c and u l t i m a t e l y i n C h i n a . Apart from t h e s e t t l e m e n t of the Shantung  Treaty  Japan  Demands,  Shantung,  the  on p a p e r ,  of  U.S.  Twenty-One  itself  in  the  was  administrative  Lansing-Ishii  to  China,  possessions  Japan  V"  the  cost  support  which  t h e Open  reinstate  Japan had  alliance  plan  to  in  This  t e r r i t o r i a l and  "Group  little  open  which  of  terminated  At door  Treaty  expansion.  its  strategic the  U.S.  expansion  question, status  its  quo  the in  18  China  and weakened h e r  fully  aware  the to  right  of  22,  in  2  help  Sun  but an  The o n l y  south  is  Three  the  years  cation  of  China 1928,  the  to  countries  it  his  that  shows  Government Sun's  death  U.S.  the  with  "Unequal  sign  of  helping  1925,  U.S.  to  to  and  in  recognized reunifi-  over  give  of  On  China's  up p a r t  a host  system  us  achieve.  control  power  hope  great  partial  h a d managed  July  *  the  and t h e  Treaties"  2 /  open  lost  the  in  Japan  of  of  Russia. "  first  to  any  of  relinquished its  enjoyed along  under the  any  Government  Nationalists  or  Times  "We h a v e  on  appealed  even bother  frustration: France,  impose  people,  New Y o r k  Nanking  the  Chinese  the  country  the  the  Yat-sen,  continued to  interview in  thereby becoming  privileges  treaty  not  England,  after  Kai-shek's  tariffs,  the  Sun  did  Soviet  Chiang  28,  unification.  latter  gave vent  from America,  Powers.  July  limitations  Hughes,  letter. 3  1923,  the  the  at  self-determination of  Secretary  Sun's  of  of  attempts  of the  of  the  European nineteenth  25 century. During thirties,  the  the  confrontation Spreading had  of  explosion  twenties  speed with with  north  encompassed  sphere  late  of  on t h e  which  one  or  the  Great  Manchuria,  influence. South  and  early  Chinese  another  an  the  Wall, area  On S e p t e m b e r Manchurian  of  treaty  the  to  powers  Railway,  the  by  Japan as  following  a  nineteen  grew,  Nationalists,  assigned 18,  of  nationalism  the  the  part  made  a  inevitable. 1931, her  own  convenient  J a p a n e s e Army  oc-  19  cupied  Mukden  of  following  the  was  and began t h e  declared,  year,  and  the  invasion Japanese  Manchuria  of  Manchuria.  puppet  officially  state  On M a r c h  of  disappeared  1  Manchukuo as  a  Chinese  entity. With Hoover  the  U.S.  refused  to  on t h e react  China's  sovereignty,  and  Kellogg-Briand  the  after  a heated  Hoover  was  not  imposing  use  the  to  the  the  great  depression,  blatant  transgression  Open Door  Policy,  the  outlawing  with  sanctions  over  war.  Secretary  from p u b l i c l y  economic  uncertainty  of  Japan's  Pact  argument  dissuaded  verge  those  of  on  sanctions  fact,  State  Japan.  of  Nine-Power  In  announcing  Herbert  it  was  Stimson,  his  Treaty, only  that  intention  of  Stimson had hoped as  a means  of  to  pressuring  26 Japan the  out  of  League  League  to  bound by  Manchuria.  of  Nations,  take its  some  Though Stimson  action  7,  1932,  the  commitments  of  the  and  China  that  which  U.S.  was  nevertheless  against  not  a member  attempted  J a p a n who  as  to  of  get  a member  the  was  covenant.  On J a n u a r y  ment  the  ran  the  hobbled  Open Door  U.S.  counter  would to  the  not  by  Hoover's  Policy,  Stimson  recognize  Open Door  refusal  any  to  informed treaty  Policy,  honour  or  Japan  or  which  agreewas  27 a c h i e v e d b y means Stimson the  Non-Recognition  Open Door  Japanese  contrary  Policy,  conquest  of  to  the  Doctrine  had  Kellogg-Briand which  no v i s i b l e  Manchuria.  Nor  became  effect was  the  an  in  Pact.  The  appendage  stemming  League  of  to  the Nations  20  more  successful,  League  set  by  findings  the  world  any  of  the in  doubts  January would  more 7,  follow  spread  of  Japanese  March,  support than  the  troops,  time  limits  and when  withdrew  the  condemned  from  the  1933.  China's  the  Stimson  Doctrine  territorial integrity  words,  t h e r e were  relatively  next  seven y e a r s ,  American  few e x c e p t i o n s  Japanese  her  lingered before  For the  with  of  ignored  L y t t o n Commission,  s t i l l  solid  1932.  the  withdrawal  America would  anything  the  the  organization If  that  for  for  the  imperialism  ambiguous  in Asia,  path  whilst  few  with after  diplomacy of  at  denouncing the  same  28 time  indirectly  supporting  that  same i m p e r i a l i s m  through  trade.  NOTES  1 C h a r l e s D e n b y , t h e f o r m e r U . S . M i n i s t e r t o C h i n a saw t h e r e t e n t i o n o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s as an " a l t e r n a t i v e " t o a c q u i r i n g t e r r i t o r y in China. Quoted i n R.H. H o f s t a d t e r , The Paranoid S t y l e i n A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c s , a n d o t h e r E s s a y s (New Y o r k : Knopf, 1966), pp. 167-68. 2 Hofstadter states that " i t i s r e v e a l i n g that the underdog f o r c e s i n A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y showed a c o n s i d e r a b l y h i g h e r r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o t h e i d e a o f war w i t h S p a i n , t h a n t h e g r o u p s t h a t were s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r economic or p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s . " Ibid., p.  185.  See  3  For  also the  ibid..  full  pp.  text,  169-82.  see Appendix  I.  4 W.A. W i l l i a m s goes so f a r as t o s t a t e t h a t t h e Open Door P o l i c y " e x p r e s s e d t h e b a s i c s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s o f A m e r i c a ' s s e c u l a r and i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n i n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . When combined w i t h t h e i d e o l o g y o f an i n d u s t r i a l M a n i f e s t D e s t i n y , the h i s t o r y o f t h e Open Door Notes became t h e h i s t o r y o f A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s f r o m 1900 t o 1 9 5 8 . " The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World P u b l i s h i n g , 1959), pp. 39-40. 5  T.V.  Informal p.  Empire.  6  7  F.  1893-1901  its  Market:  America's  (Chicago:  vide  as an  not  p.  only  overseas as  that  Quadrangle  and  the  Press,  1936),  important  maintains this  Quest  for  Books,  be  Pratt  261,  market  Islands n.  81.  of  in  Foreign  1956),  p.  that  the  10 p e r c e n t w a s  "only"  J.W.  Expansionists  Spanish p.  that could  Press,  for  obtained  states  "a widespread b e l i e f  States."  Hawaii  Williams it  Tradition  Oklahoma  expansion.  1897  exceedingly  United  41.  of  "thought"  recovery but early  The A m e r i c a n  University  Williams,  increased ted  Tannenbaum, the  structure  the  China  1967),  91.  (Norman:  to  McCormick,  that the  1898:  (Baltimore:  that  corporate essential through there  C h i n a was  surplus  Policy  108.  to  exispro-  products  The A c q u i s i t i o n The Johns  Hopkins  of of  22  8  P.  6,  Van A l s t y n e  quoted  sees  administration Empire:  Its  in  McCormick,  domestic  into  pressures  supporting  Historical  p.  the  Pattern  91  as  (Italics  having  9 China White Paper: U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 7 ) , I, Appendix I.  R.W.  forced the  Open D o o r .  "The  and E v o l u t i o n , "  A s s o c i a t i o n P a m p h l e t , N o . 43 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 2 6 . p. 19; W i l l i a m s , pp. 37-39. For a sober t a t i o n s o f economic e x p l a n a t i o n s o f U.S. see H o f s t a d t e r , p. 183.  mine.)  McKinley  American  Historical  See a l s o McCormick, appraisal of the l i m i 19th c e n t u r y i m p e r i a l i s m ,  A u g u s t 1949 ( S t a n f o r d : Stanford 414-16. For t h e f u l l t e x t , see  10 F.R. D u l l e s , C h i n a and A m e r i c a : The s t o r y o f t h e i r l a t i o n s s i n c e 1784 ( P r i n c e t o n : Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 111. O . E . C l u b b a d d s t h a t " t h e R u s s i a n r e p l y was tinctly equivocal...." T w e n t i e t h C e n t u r y C h i n a (New Y o r k : Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1964), p. 28. 11 L . J . H a l l e , American Foreign P o l i c y : (London: A l l e n & Unwin, 1960), pp. 224-25. 12 China White Appendix II. 13  A.W.  Griswold,  States  (New H a v e n :  should  not  seas  from  lose such  Imperialist as  Carl  League,  latter, Peking's several the in  See  U.S.  as  15 of  of  some  of an  $3,000  groups  1898 w i t h  Press, Ament  of  ibid.,  pp.  192-97.  reparations,  the  latter  p.  Quoted  China  & Bros.,  over  as  such  United  p.  83.  One over-  Anti-  national  China  was  the  Policy  figures  Young lifted of  was  the of  singles "took  about  one  of  fifty looted  left...."  Ibid.,  million  awarded  $25 m i l l i o n  this  out  the  had been  $333  claimed  $10 m i l l i o n  1895-1901  Tewksbury,  palace  silver only  see  involvement  the  1968).  Of  Reality  text,  the  1962), U.S.  consisting  Although worth  of  and E . G .  legations  estate  full  dis-  vice-presidents.  American  W.  the  to  Jordan as  University  and  amount.  101. in  Griswold,  Theodore Roosevelt  Harper  in  Starr  the  Policy  Press,  domestic  furnished.  also  Eastern  Empire:  siege  For  opposition  Reverends  returned to  Tannenbaum,  the  [palaces},  fully  times,  191. 1907  the the  best  buildings, p.  of  after  Far  organized  Harvard  conduct  416-17.  University  of  and David  The R h e t o r i c  (Cambridge: the  The  Yale  sight  I,  influential  Schurz  14  Paper,  T h e o r y and  re-  1962),  and p.  p.  the 183.  84. Birth  See of  also Modern  G.E.  Mowry,  America  The  (New  Era  York:  23  Quoted i n P.C. Jessup,  16  Elihu  Root  (New Y o r k :  Dodd  Mead,  1938), I I , 43. For the f u l l  17 that his  text,  " a t t h e v e r y moment way t o W a s h i n g t o n  see Appendix  i t was s i g n e d  in  of China:  the bud."  Griswold,  states  diplomat  of negotiating  guaranteeing  The Root-Takahira  Griswold  a Chinese  i n t h e f o r l o r n hope  German-Chinese-American t r e a t y grity  III.  was on a  the t e r r i t o r i a l  Agreement  inte-  nipped h i s project  p . 130.  18 G r i s w o l d , p . 174, n . 3, q u o t i n g F . V . F i e l d Economic Handbook o f t h e P a c i f i c A r e a (Garden C i t y , D o u b l e d a y , 1934).  (ed.), N.Y.:  19 C h i n a W h i t e P a p e r . I, 433. E . T . Williams, the American C h a r g e ' i n P e k i n g , went so f a r as t o s u g g e s t t h a t J a p a n e s e i m m i g r a t i o n t o Manchuria might very w e l l ease t h e tense situation i n C a l i f o r n i a over Japanese land ownership. L i , T i e n - y i , Woodrow W i l s o n ' s C h i n a P o l i c y (New Y o r k : U n i v e r s i t y o f Kansas C i t y P r e s s , 1952), p . 113. A s t o W i l s o n ' s r e s p o n s e t o t h e c r i s i s , L i s t a t e s t h a t " P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n , l i k e any American P r e s i d e n t b e f o r e him, would n o t r e s o r t t o o t h e r than ' p e a c e f u l means' f o r t h e preservation o f Chinese t e r r i t o r i a l , administrative, or p o l i t i c a l integrity." I b i d . . p . 129. China White  20 agreement China,  goes  Paper.  on t o s t a t e  nevertheless, Wilson  21 quoted  obscure  logic,  the  the t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty  of  unimpaired.  t o Woodbridge,  Protestant  B y some  437.  that  remains  i n P.A. Varg,  American  I,  September  Missionaries, Missionary  2, 1919, W i l s o n  Chinese,  Movement  Papers,  and Diplomats:  i n China.  The  1890-1952  1958), p . 145. S e e a l s o A . S . L i n k , W o o d r o w W i l s o n a n d t h e P r o g r e s s i v e E r a . 1910-1917 (New Y o r k : H a r p e r & B r o s . , 1954), p . 81; E . M c B u r n s , T h e A m e r i c a n (Princeton:  Idea  Princeton University  of Mission:  Brunswick:  Concepts  Rutgers  a n d W. B u l l i t t ,  Study  (Boston:  each  December ships  Press,  Mifflin,  The  or  parity.  1957), p p . v i i , 262; S .  (New Y o r k :  A  Psychological  Appleton  Century  a n d 300,000 f o r J a p a n . Japan t o r e t a i n  prompted  and t h e U.S. two b a t t l e s h i p s  armament  (New  5-5-3 r a t i o r e p r e s e n t e d 500,000  5, t h e C o n f e r e n c e a l l o w e d  thereby negating  and destiny  1967), p . 268.  Conference  and Nagato which  purpose  Woodrow W i l s o n .  f o r t h e U.S. and B r i t a i n ,  Mutsu  "Hood," class,  Houghton  1922), p p . 103-34.  Crofts, tons  Thomas  The Washington  22  of national  University  Freud  Press,  t o a great  Britain  the battle-  t o complete t h e  o f t h e "West  extent  On  the very  Virginia" idea  of  dis-  24  23  Williams,  p.  24  Clubb,  121.  Borodin of  the  who Rosta  p.  arrived  102.  in  That Canton  News A g e n c y .  the  Chinese  Republic  the  Chinese  Revolution.  by  same in  For  1925,  year,  Lenin  October,  a view see  1925-1928  D.  of  sent  Mikhail  ostensibly U.S.  Borg,  American  (New Y o r k :  as  a  attitudes  member  toward  Policy  Octagon  and  Books,  1968). 25 F o r c e d on C h i n a t h r o u g h t h e 1842 T r e a t y o f N a n k i n g after t h e B r i t i s h O p i u m War o f 1 8 3 9 - 4 2 . These t r e a t i e s i n c l u d e d e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l rights for foreign concessions, the stationing of f o r e i g n t r o o p s and p o l i c e t o p r o t e c t them, t h e c o n t r o l o f f i v e treaty ports, the lowering of import t a r i f f s , the c o l l e c t i o n of t a r i f f s , t h e "most f a v o r e d n a t i o n " c l a u s e , t h e b u i l d i n g o f C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h e s , t h e o p e r a t i o n o f independent post o f f i c e s and telegraph agencies, the a r b i t r a r y leasing of Chinese t e r r i t o r y and t h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f spheres o f i n t e r e s t . In 1844, the T r e a t y o f Wanghia g r a n t e d U.S. c i t i z e n s i n C h i n a e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s i n b o t h c i v i l and c r i m i n a l c a s e s . Clubb, pp. 12, 83, 15859. For t h e f u l l t e x t , see Appendix IV. 26 E . E . M o r i s o n , T u r m o i l and T r a d i t i o n : A Study of the L i f e and Times o f Henry L . Stimson (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n , 1960), p. 383, n. 22. See a l s o W.A. W i l l i a m s , The S h a p i n g of American D i p l o m a c y ; r e a d i n g s and documents i n American f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s , 1750-1955 (Chicago: Rand M c N a l l y , 1 9 6 0 ) , p p . 6 9 0 706. The K e l l o g g - B r i a n d Pact o f August 27, 1928, t o which Japan was a s i g n a t o r y , h a d o u t l a w e d war a s a means o f s e t t l i n g i n t e r national disputes. 27 Borah, 28  China  White  February TABLE  commodities:  23, 1.  —  Paper. 1932, Total  1920-33.  I,  446-47.  ibid.. U.S.  Unit:  See  also  Stimson  to  447-50. trade  million  with  Japan & China,  dollars  all  throughout:  JAPAN Year  Export  %  of  T.E.  Import  %  of  Total  1920  377  1924  252  5.5  340  9.4  1930  164  4.3  279  9.1  1933  143  8.6  128  8.8  4.6  415  7.9  Import  25  CHINA Year  %  Export  of  T.E,  Import  1920  145  1.8  193  1924  109  2.4  118  1930  89  2.3  101  1933  63  3.8  43  2.  —  1936-39.  Total  Unit:  Japanese thousand  Year  trade with  1937 1938  Total  Import  the  Pacific  U.S.,  Area  all  (Garden  commodities:  dollars:  General  1936  of  3.7 3.3 3.3 3.0  F . V . F i e l d ( e d . ) , Economic Handbook o f t h e C i t y . N.Y.: Doubleday. 1934). pp. 470-71.  TABLE  %  Imports  General  Exports  246,062 365,502  175,818 188,090  260,667  123,836  U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f F o r e i g n and D o m e s t i c Commerce, F o r e i g n Commerce Y e a r b o o k : 1939 ( W a s h i n g t o n : U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e . 1942), p. 268.  TABLE  3.  —  1920-1941.  Total  Japanese  Unit:  trade  thousand  yen t o  Year  Import  Export  1920  873,182 664,992 442,882  565,017 1,000,253 506,220  1940  809,645 1,241  535,515 569  1941  572  278  1925 1930 1935  One H u n d r e d Y e a r s Statistics quoted by  Statistics  Department, Consulate  with  of  the  1936.  U.S.,  all  million  yen  Exchange 100 y e n  the  49.5/8 of 40.3/4  -  49.367 28.570  -  23.437  -  23.437  Japanese  Economy  of  Japan,  1966),  pp.  General  of  Japan,  Vancouver,  1936-41  inc:  Rate  -  Bank  commodities:  U.S.  (Tokyo:  290-93, February  320, 1.  1971.  26  TABLE 4. — T o t a l Japanese U.S. ( i n c . o i l s and f a t s ) : out: Year  imports of 1925-39.  Import  petroleum products Unit: m i l l i o n yen  %  of  Total  1925-29 1930-34  92.4 114.6  4.0  1935  116.7  1937 1939  297.8 212.5  6.7 7.9 9.0  P.V. F i e l d , K.R.C. Greene, Survey of the P a c i f i c Area IPR, 1942), p. 189.  from the through-  Trade  6.8  J.D. Phillips ( e d s . ) , An Economic (New Y o r k : International Secretariat,  II  FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND  CHINA:  1932-1942  The advent o f the second Roosevelt t o the p r e s i d e n c y d i d not  b r i n g any immediate  change t o Sino-American r e l a t i o n s , y e t  any assessment o f h i s r e a c t i o n s t o events i n A s i a from 1932  to  1942, must take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n the e x i s t i n g domestic cond i t i o n s i n America and h i s p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e toward C h i n a .  For  Roosevelt l i k e W i l s o n , by-passed the S t a t e Department and made his  own  f o r e i g n p o l i c y , a p o l i c y which a t times appeared  contra-  d i c t o r y , y e t r e f l e c t e d both o f the aforementioned f a c t o r s . In  1932 he became the f i r s t Democratic c a n d i d a t e t o r e p u -  d i a t e the League o f N a t i o n s , but the f o l l o w i n g y e a r he t r i e d t o r e d i r e c t the London Economic the  Conference from "banker's i s s u e s ... t o  r e a l i t i e s o f the w o r l d economic  dilemma,..." e a r n i n g i n the  p r o c e s s an a c c o l a d e from John Maynard Keynes who h e a d l i n e d h i s a r t i c l e i n the D a i l y M a i l : Right."*-  " P r e s i d e n t Roosevelt i s M a g n i f i c e n t l y  He f u l l y supported Stimson's Non-Recognition D o c t r i n e  and t o the o b j e c t i o n s o f h i s c l o s e s t a d v i s e r s , Moley and T u g w e l l , e x p l a i n e d t h a t he How  "had the deepest sympathy w i t h the C h i n e s e .  c o u l d you expect me not t o go along w i t h Stimson on  Japan?"  On December 6, 1934, he summed up h i s views on C h i n a :  2  28  "China has  been the  •money c h a n g e r s trol. to  It  will  eliminate  in  Mecca the  take  of  many y e a r s  months  p e o p l e whom I  Temple.'  them b e c a u s e  d a y . S o m e  the  the  l a t e r he  new C h i n a publicly  that  the  United  States  of  the  Father  of  country prayed that  to  and  an  Act  free."'  American  people  (the  act  was  was  signed  that  shall  the  1936 t o  the  Diego  as  remain  long -  ago  unentan-  internationalist  first  Neutrality  guaranteeing  the  a  overseas,  intervene in  cover  con-  up i n  San  remain,  1935,  not  the  f r o m an  the  revolutions  be b u i l t  at  might  reversal  would  absolute  continents  and must  October  U.S.  amended i n  in  r e i n f o r c e d by  in  in  several  cannot  it  called  s t i l l  stated  happens  apparent  stand  Roosevelt  what  America  This  4  isolationist  which  wars  our  are  and p o s s i b l y  Exposition  gled  "'despite  They  have  to  the  foreign  Spanish  Civil  War) . It lieved of  is he  possible could  Nations  sible  that  and  to  conflict  he had  premise but  steer  "territorial  as  come t o  some v a l i d i t y China,  explicitly integrity,"  away  of  a means  accept  suggests,  affairs  members  futility  neutrality  does have  which  its  the  when a p p l i e d t o  policy  Schlesinger  influence world  seeing  resorted  as  as  from o u t s i d e  keeping  a nation  far  as  with  defined America's it  raises  the  It  approach by the  unavoidable.  as  Roosevelt  from war.^  this of  that  is  League also  1935,  U.S.  be-  out  pos-  he of  a  This  logical  is  concerned,  Europe whom t h e  interest  more q u e s t i o n s  U.S.  shared  in  China's  than  it  a  actu-  29 ally  answers. It  does  not  for  intangibles  which  as  eminent  1969,  an  example  U.S.  recalling  Hong  a  in  throughout China  trade  him with  a  fifteenth  historic century so  he  and  long  which  of  his  sense  of  was  does  mission,  of  ability  developed,  it  Also,  seven. of  Sea  that  residual  mixture  some  Strong. of  American  to  cope with  added  into  a  an  great  Roosevelt  of  with  the  politics.  problems  sense  as  affinities,  domestic  immediate  deal  an  protestantism,  decisively  ingrained  as  he  nineteenth  cultural  in  the  his  views  such  Though  these  and  FDR  presented  on  the  of  evangelical  individualism  itself  of  society,  Josiah  had  for that  Delanos  Power...  some  break  evolve,  the  late  these  of  explain  and  to  sailed  tales  of  As  mother had  to  Roosevelt  translated  harped back  president  to  on C h i n a .  American  retained  intellectual  Theodore Roosevelt,  pragmatism,  first  and  of  enunciated by  the  age  Influence  spectrum  nationalism,  the  uncle,  Nor  views  Roosevelt's at  social  s t i l l  enjoyed the  Mahan's  a broad  tradition  To t h i s they  that  conservative  also  that  had  birthday.^  thoroughly  a born  life  copy  shared with  historian  square-rigger  his  the  affected Roosevelt's  intangibles, Kong  explain  of  sympathy  as  justice for  the  underdog. When  applied  paternalistic task  of  to  diplomatic  "noblesse  reconciling  the  oblige," free  relations was  trade  with  faced with  rhetoric  of  China, the the  this  near Open  insoluble Door  30  Policy,  which  aggressor, also  Japan,  keeping  rejects  p r e c l u d e d economic  the  America  the  out  revisionist  the  economic  the  U.S.  in  World  China  War  up t o  sincere  of  intent  foreign  thesis  determinists,  into  gression  with  sanctions  so  that  II, May,  of  wars.  1941,  belie  any  and  therefore  exploited  knowingly  reactions  main  China  writer  wholeheartedly  his  China's  helping  This  Roosevelt  for  against  to  precipitated  Japanese  such  by  ag-  pernicious  7 assumptions. In  April  the  Japanese  and  assumed  Asia." its  treaty  Japanese  the  faith  in  of  peace  on  July  monopolies  in  Manchuria.  policy in  a  and  and  China  a  North  China,  note 7,  statement  summed u p b y  the  the  Amau  Declaration,  a quasi-protectorate  "guardian the  of  in  "activities" and  publication  U.S.  in  issued  Open D o o r ,  abiding  of  same m o n t h ,  rights  Hull  the  themselves  role  commercial  Japanese the  with  granted  That  8  Cordell  1934,  order  to  in  Japan  protested The  principles  the of  eastern  reasserted  against year,  Chinese-  r e i t e r a t e d the that  China  following  concerning  stating  fundamental  over  truisms  U.S.  its  of  "had  traditional  9 policy."  In  intervention Policy. ceptible  It  other or  was  Japan  need  not  sanctions  on b e h a l f  of  not  1937  this  until  that  fear  China  direct  or  policy  the  American  Open  evinced  Door a  per-  change.  Following incident  words,  on  the  July  7,  pretext the  provided by  Japanese  the  launched  Marco their  Polo second  Bridge invasion  31  of  China.  the  Hoping  diplomatic  remained two  an  weeks  ples 10,  of  mind,  true,"  spreading. the  patients the  The been  the tion  order of  on  the  speech as  trality  State  contained  a guide  to  and  urge  calculated  the the  approves protect  mood  of  of and  of  The  was  so  immediately  disavow  the  plain  the and  until  seems  to  5,  be  world  quarantine the  that  unfor-  lawlessness  joins  of  the  concern  disease  in  in  probably  October  of  August  mediator  revealed his "It  war  princion  Portsmouth  bad,  sanctions  starts of  community  to the  against  could hardly  day however,  the  what  of  press  had  whose  "that  he  felt  meaning  of  his  re-  noninterven-  evidently reaction  compelled own  have  bellicosity  Torn between  Roosevelt public  a  l i t t l e  principle  relations.  American  speech"  as  the  responded  physical  annulled  intervene,  "quarantine  Hull  Door,  epidemic  next  reiterating  the  and  omitted  0  international to  of  not  the health  Department by  Open  publicly  economic  Japan.  State  services  was  they  redefining  Treaty  the  epidemic  threat  the  situation:  "that  disease."*-  insular  from the  world  an  to  It  Chicago  stated  When  implied  lost  lease  in  community  in  spread  he  the  offer.  speech  of  country's  with  of  statement  and  censure,  declaration  Secretary  policy  Japanese,  a  official  lengthy  deteriorating  tunately  an  offered his  The  in  of  international  one.  a  r e j e c t e d the  the  spread,  with  international  Roosevelt  is  undeclared  informally  over  escape  niceties  later  conflict. in  to  words.  to  neumisto  his  32  move  Even  direct  action  U.S.  foreign  policy  1937,  the  Japanese  Panay  and  three  Yangtze. that to  This  the  in  person  sations  to  the  Further trade  the  incident  extent,  a  note  on December  castigating and  the  memorandum  to  before  Tokyo,  the  to  the  central  30,  this  trade  specifically  that  the  Foreign  1938,  was  apologized  due  compen-  news.  including  restrictive  and Ambassador  issues to  disclaiming  Grew  Government.  and  Grew  the  Japanese  restrictions  as  any  the  handed  message  and w i t h  Japanese  time  an  was  Minister  from the  nationals  the  "unwarranted"  such  American  avoided  Minister,  up t o  in  answer  gunboat  flared  followed  Japanese  U.S.  reaction  disappeared  note  marked  12,  of  Japanese  lengthy  On D e c e m b e r  reaches  However,  a  second  in  against  well  to  upper  Ambassador  incidents  measures  complained  U.S.  neutrality.  failed  on t h e  wrote  the  nationals  tankers  Ambassador. Tokyo,  its  sank t h e  Oil  public  American  of  Force  personally  to  paid,  out  Standard  Japanese  retransmitted  Air  time,  Roosevelt  against  The  dispatched Foreign  "unjust" need  for  and a  Japanese  12 "new o r d e r " The treaty be 26,  in  in  following  torial  year  existence  cancelled. 1939,  Asia.  added  The  i n c r e a s e d when H u l l  U.S.  between the significance  some  integrity.  the  credence to  On M a r c h  30,  notified two of  countries such  U.S. 1940,  repudiated the  Japan that  a move  support the  since as of  commercial  1911  early China's  diplomatic  Japanese  a  puppet  would as  July  terri-  tempo  was  Government  in  33  Nanking. of  continuing  ment a  Hull  as  the  trade  on  embargo  indicated his  recognize  Chiang  government on  country's  of  aviation  Kai-shek's  China,  fuel  unequivocal  and  intention  Nationalist  and by  the  strategic  Govern-  end o f  metals  the  was  year,  imposed  Japan.  tended  the  defense less  6,  1941,  vital  to  process  method  and  it  South  in  has  November  with the  Secretary  the  Dutch  war.  (July  Hull,  In of  in  made a  oil  his  her neverthe-  torn  between  pressures  extend  off,  they  Indies  to  of  the  trade),  and  favored  policy  of  oil  probably  a year  there  and  neu-  in  go  to  own g o o d ,  for  the  freedom of  the  26), the  all  latter's  to  a  attempt  last  a  handed  defined  of  trade  answer  the  a  list  at  and  with  good  assets  of  the  of  the  defence  virtually  the  proposal  reaching  out  -  3  Japan in  call  the hope  war  seas.*-  with  have you  you might  keeping  Japanese  to  -  Japan,  -  would  ago,  was  two y e a r s the  document State  24,  p e o p l e who  justify  East  this  our  freezing  to  Therefore,  for  for  American  oil  ex-  dilemma:  later  arrogant,  Japan.  the  and  the  26,  not  Britain  Two d a y s ended with  did  letting  Pacific  Great  On J u l y  isolationism of  worked  and  domestic  cut  had  iron  the  own  the  scrap  Roosevelt  declaring  China,  attempted  we h a d  would have  on t h e  embargoes.  revealed his i f  of  the  Roosevelt  down t o  a  escape  to  policy,  publicly  U.S.;  majority  Now,  China,  of  the  (whose  gone  to  shift  of  commitment  industries  persistent  a major  Act  that  continued to  trality,  in  Lend-Lease  sentimental  oil a  to  sole  O n May  a  also  U.S.  that  a modus  On verged vivendi  the  Japanese  Ambassador,  of  specific  requirements  34  the  Japanese  would have  the  U.S.  these  As  Japanese  police  contained  to  meet  to  requirements  and  armed  no i m m e d i a t e  entailed  forces  promise  improve  their  the withdrawal  from China  to  l i f t  relations  the  and  with  of  Indochina  arms  and  oil  all and  embargoes,  14 the  offer  was  rejected.  violation  of  America's  support  On t h e  very  the  day  a  Bay;  on  December  7:55  A.M., With  of  the  free  trade  of  China's  Hull  Nomura,  Japanese  the the  Though  never  vention cally  a  ward  of  spoke to  direct  in  Asian  as  Japan's reaction  of  redirection of  into  an  since  of  1939,  integrity,  into  Pearl  to  free  and  immediate. to  Hittopapu  to  in  those  trade,  and  at  1941  each  to  aggression  the in  U.S.  it  was  succes-  third)  American  the  what  1937.  Roosevelt's avoid  aspects  lost  since  policy,  sovereignty,  inter-  unequivomore  Pacific,  in  than  China.  "Co-Prosperity"  interest she  of  from China  Japanese  from  the wind  salvage  exception  When  was  document  War,  interventionist  sufficient  latest  Harbour.  World  managed  Japanese  when  Policy  1800 h o u r s  with  China's  vital  Open Door  country's  dealt  turnabout to  this  the  turned  Second  the be  at  on  mainland.  This  apparent  an  (with  defense  area  the  that  r h e t o r i c would  on t h e  response as  intended  his  sail  fell  they had  administration its  set  bomb  of  reaction to  territorial  carriers  Policy  credibility  hoped  its  outbreak  little  sive  fleet  7,  basis  transmitted  first  Open Door  The Japanese  to  the  U.S.  occupied  the  island  efforts  had been of  southovertly  Hainan,  35  placing  herself  astride  Philippines  and t h e  1941,  signed  Japan  thereby  assuring  flank.  On J u l y  the  Japanese  2,  a  occupation  July  26,  the  total  line and  of  tin  the  a  of  southward  was  was  Asia. the  In  April  U.S.S.R.,  formally  endorsed  of  into  the  northern  the  process  cutting  a  usable  by  began  Indochina.^  imposed  Japan had been r e p r o c e s s i n g  to  on h e r  later  southern h a l f  embargo  with  respite  nineteen days  the  trade  Southeast  treaty  temporary  drive and  communication of  nonaggression  military  the  oil  rubber  herself  with  grade  the  on  off  the  low  aviation  fuel. T o what cupation ative that of  of  12,000  this  southern  source after  extent  of  26,  tons,  sanction  Indochina)  o i l ,  July  latest  is  forced Japan t o  debatable.  the  Japanese  could have  run  (imposed  The  Navy  out  of  fact  with oil  after  seek  an  remains  a  daily  in  the  oc-  altern-  however,  consumption  eighteen  months,  the  16 army the  in  twelve.  U.S.  ignored  secondary American  nature public,  There i s these of  facts.  China  that  also  in  l i t t l e  Nor  American  interest  in  transcended  economic  and p o l i t i c a l  observer  American  foreign  Our  of  anti-European  remain tion  s t i l l  in  the  are) Far  in  relation  American  to  our are  Europe.  isolationists  to  Yet,  persisted;  that  reinforce  mystique  (and  advocates are  as  to  one  not  can  only  those of  say the  which an  astute  that  interven-  isolationists that  typical  Western  the  the  'Asian-firsters*;  definition,  Perhaps regard  that  had been  militant by  fail  believe  noted:  Isolationists almost  to  diplomacy.  bounds  policy  most  they  China,  isolationists  East.  'Asian-firsters'  did  reason  Hemis-  36  phere, hope  but  for  Though shared  to  was  country. though the  his  China has  been  its  for  l i t t l e  world, not  the  well,  which  considered  of  immediate  not  materially  limits  his  China  greatly  continued  objective  of  winning  spite  vital alter  in to  vision  in  helped China  commitments  problems  Roosevelt,  his  he  be  was  interest  and  in  the attuned sen-  to  his  conviction,  in  the  war  the  secondary  war  also  his  throughout  of  the  in  of  this  Europe  Their  7  Americanization  in  of  in  isolationists  did  own p r e s e r v e .  Americanization.  political  Roosevelt  immediate  our  a world  Harbour  China's  as  isolationism  China's  Unlike  Pearl  Pacific, to  as  future.  timents,  within  East  hope  a broader  and  Far  t h e r e was  this  distant  the  both  importance of  these  theaters. The invasion  attack  on  of  Philippines,  the  confirmed beyond Japan's its as  both  had  U.S. faced  had  scattered  Island, 18  Japanese.  were  Harbour,  long-range had a  for  combined t o  Malaya,  reasonable  and  eligible  supplies  others, Wake  the  nations  become  these  any  immediate  history,  Pearl  and t h e  doubt  goals.  been t h r u s t  common e n e m y . Lend-Lease  already  found  throughout  the  the  simultaneous  Dutch  East  direction For  into  the  one  first  of  By  December  to  China,  their  in  such  scope  China's  goods.  Pacific  Indies,  time  May  way  of  and  In  their  destroyed before  the  that  surrender  to  the  China  some  whilst  outposts  in  wars  year, 7,  of  as  of  37  The Harbour major  difficulty was  This  restricted  to  tenuous  graft,  1941,  Air  the  the  ments  China  miles of  plies  to  flying  to  The  had  a  the  the  with  Japan's  access  tortuous and  also  be  Army  before  control  to  the  supply  the  route  northward had  China's  Nationalist  frequent  that  Pearl  of  made  attacks  remembered t h a t  been pushed  Japanese  arms  to  more of  by  the  December  Chunking  ravaged  large  in seg-  1937.  1942, by  the  found the  March,  Burma  Road  service  of  had been over  D.C.  India  rugged  inclemencies  of  the  17,000  Kunming  in  last  this  in  route  in  seasonal  the  a  hundred  practicable forcing  "Hump."  at  terrain  the  the  within  captured,  3's  to  involved  most  Japanese  Rangoon,  airlift  500 m i l e s  of  a  should  from Assam i n  some  added  to  shuttle  Himalayas  over  by  of  the  China  a  China.  It  Singapore;  access  Road;  mismanagement,  since  outset  of  Burma  Nationalists Province  The  fact  Force.  Szechuan of  China  complicated by  Government  Japanese  supplying  massively  ports.  by  of  This feet  Yunnan  all  sup-  involved over  the  Province,  necessitated world,  monsoon,  port  to  and  flying  which  at  the  was Chinese  19 end,  a total The  to  China  solved the  lack  problem in  and  war.  complained  spite  of of of  remained As of  late the  as  even  such  basic  delivering her to  what  physical  plague  October  logistical  logistics few  supplies  isolation  Sino-American 3,  1944,  drain  the  as  was  fuel. were  never  relations  Secretary  of  Hump a i r l i f t  War  available really throughout Stimson,  imposed  on  38  Operations  in  Europe:  T o d a y we a r e h a m s t r u n g  in  Holland  Scheldt  of  transport  River  lack  make  new a i r - b o r n e  lack  is  the in  crippling  mountains the  main  Difficult II,  China's  of  Singapore  developed  of  a  and  in  evinced  military  in  that  fair  war....  after  Pearl  diversion  of  that  of  neighborhood.  Italy.  This  to  us  cost  the  necessary  to  The  effort  an  same over  extra  winter  2 0  was  from  entry  the  Chinese  might  cause  and  goods  the  War  subsequent There  later  to  a marked and  World  complete.  Britain  outset  into  and t h e  near  Lend-Lease  from the v e r y  mouth  planes  Harbour  Philippines, reluctance  Burma  from  China.  aversion  sedulously Japanese  to  loss also  the  Britain to  avoided  any  overreact  India.  Faced with ful  nation,  the  Nationalist  the  five  days  four  great  This  gesture  pursue  great  bids  and t h e  before America's  cooperation with  operations toward  the  in  Northern  of  access  growing any  in  Burma  isolation  to  fact,  of  flights us  theater  U.S.S.R.  to  for  after  factors U.S.  Pearl to  This  sign  the  China.  first  from  separate  Declaration  initiated  peace.  2  as to  less to  1,  included  Second World War:  resources  tools  On J a n u a r y  C h i n a was  "Grand A l l i a n c e "  country's  a  the  deterred a  diplomatic  solidarity  committed each signing  of  to  Harbour,  Allied  throughout  power.  might have  resorted  Government  powers of  that  resource-  strengthen 1942,  twenty-  amongst  by  the  United  Nations.  a policy  the  to  China  treat  Churchill t h e war  termed  and bound  U.S. as  i t , each  was a  39  There was  no apparent o p p o s i t i o n at t h i s stage from e i t h e r  B r i t a i n or S o v i e t Russia t o China's new  s t a t u s , a move they  b a b l y viewed as l i t t l e more than a p a s s i n g  f a n t a s y from an  proally  n e i t h e r c o u l d a f f o r d t o s l i g h t , g i v e n the r a t i o of f o r c e s i n the world.  S t a l i n , a l r e a d y indebted  Roosevelt  t o the U.S.,  had  i n f a c t thanked  a few weeks e a r l i e r f o r a b i l l i o n d o l l a r l o a n f o r the 22  purchase of Lend-Lease goods. was  not t o l a s t however, and  Churchill's i n i t i a l on h i s r e t u r n from the  acquiescence Arcadia  Conference e a r l y i n January, he v o i c e d h i s doubts as t o China's relevance  t o the war  and the American assessment o f her c a p a b i l -  ities : At Washington I had found the e x t r a o r d i n a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e o f China i n American minds, even at the top, s t r a n g e l y out o f proportion. I was conscious of a standard o f v a l u e s which accorded China almost an equal f i g h t i n g power with the B r i t i s h Empire, and r a t e d the Chinese armies as a f a c t o r t o be mentioned i n the same b r e a t h as the armies o f R u s s i a . I t o l d the P r e s i d e n t how I f e l t American o p i n i o n overestimated the c o n t r i b u t i o n which China c o u l d make t o the g e n e r a l war. He d i f f e r e d s t r o n g l y . 2 3  C h u r c h i l l ' s pessimism, f o s t e r e d by h i s country's i a l experience new  i n A s i a , was  There was  colon-  heightened by the f e a r t h a t China's  s t a t u s would cause a r e d u c t i o n i n the flow o f war  to B r i t a i n .  long  materials  a l s o Chiang Kai-shek's d i r e c t i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n I n d i a ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s d u r i n g a short v i s i t t o C a l c u t t a on February 2 2 .  In an address t o the I n d i a n people, Chiang had  s t a t e d t h a t a f t e r the war,  B r i t a i n " w i l l as s p e e d i l y as p o s s i b l e  g i v e them r e a l p o l i t i c a l power.  The  f o l l o w i n g month,  40  Churchill's when  sensitivity  largely  without India  at  to  Imperial  Roosevelt's  success  to  reach  a  matters  insistence, political  the  was  further  Cripps  aroused  Mission  accommodation  with  tried  the  A l l  isolation,  and  Congress. In  view  Russia's Japan,  of  such  vested  what  did  China  amongst  State,  lists  attitudes,  China's  interest  in  American  diplomacy  the two  great prime  physical  maintaining  powers?  her  hope  to  Cordell  neutral achieve  Hull,  status by  then  with  including  Secretary  of  objectives:  T h e f i r s t was t h e e f f e c t i v e j o i n t p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e w a r . T h e s e c o n d was t h e r e c o g n i t i o n a n d b u i l d i n g u p o f C h i n a a s a m a j o r power e n t i t l e d t o e q u a l r a n k w i t h t h e t h r e e W e s t e r n A l l i e s , R u s s i a , B r i t a i n , and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , d u r i n g and a f t e r the war, both f o r the p r e p a r a t i o n of a postwar organiz a t i o n and f o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f s t a b i l i t y and p r o s p e r i t y i n the O r i e n t . ^ 2  The was  of  primary  China's masses  immediate  of  Japanese  thought  be  mind.  As  essence power,  used  therefore,  separate  troops in  the  that  Hull's  a new C h i n a  U.S.  diplomacy  supply  to  the  to  of  out  situation  By  filling and  never  very  fact  far  it  void  of  from  left  by  Roosevelt  down  that  would  India. might  as  very a  great  the  im-  with  the  The  reach  Roosevelt's  became t h e China  Japan  of  tied  troops  exhaustion  treating  providing  against  inefficiency,  mere  the  war  the borders  objective,  policy.  the  mainland,  on  of  J a p a n was  second  its  or  in  For the  the Asian  China  was  China  U.S.  Pacific  with  of  possible  keeping  irrespective  agreement to  of  importance  resistance,  otherwise  a  goal  41  excuse he lective  needed t o  national control  29,  1942,  into his  Roosevelt  organization but  by  China. that  her  proposed  system  of  col-  security.  O n May  world  bring  more  the  the  Molotov.  specifically,  four  Molotov  to  great  a  powers:  assured  l a t t e r had  broached the This system the  Roosevelt  of  comprised  not  to  the  police  U.S.,  that  subject  U.S.S.R.,  Stalin  fully  s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned Great  an  inter-  only  arms  postwar Britain  agreed  Britain,  and  and the  27 U.S.,  and  "possibly  Five on  months  Roosevelt's  that  China  Chunking  later,  "Four  tainly  t h e r e would  States  in  any  in  be  spite of  faggot  to  liquidate  that  vote"  was  far  broader  long to  passed  its  peak.  confirm this  the  role:  "I  the to  of  the As  Eden  cannot  world side  war,  Though  questions  hypothesis,  yet  the  "do  as  draw  Cer-  Empire."  facet  of  something  Roosevelt  and  and  from that  progressed, Churchill  for  the  constantly  India  an  the  United  overseas  mere e x t i n c t i o n o f t h e war  regard  geography,  such  doubted  Power.  of  perceive a  need t o  commenting  world,  British  diplomacy hoped t o than  to  police  inherent  C h u r c h i l l on c o l o n i a l American  a minute  on t h e  failed  politics.  powers.  a great  vote  Chinese  use  emerge  a  realities  the  to  future  the  Kong,  had  Plan"  observation  of  policing  representing  feelings:  complexities prodded  as  the  Churchill in  Power  attempt  astute  Roosevelt's China,"  as  could perform i t s  Government  This  China"  Hong "faggot  empire  factors never  that  would  lost  the  2  42  impression Empire.  that  Roosevelt  Unfortunately  Churchill's  opposition  the  world  forming  plans  to  ease  for to  favored China,  dissolution  this  attitude  the American attempts  organization  China's  the  plight  and  stymied  through  some  of  the  British  strengthened to of  seat  China  Roosevelt's  direct military  action.  in  NOTES 1 Q u o t e d i n A . S . S c h l e s i n g e r J r . , "As t h e w o r l d moved t o w a r d w a r , FDR w a t c h e d a n d w o r k e d f o r p e a c e . " New Y o r k T i m e s Book R e v i e w . J u l y 6, 1 9 6 9 , p. 2. R. H o f s t a d t e r t a k e s a d i f f e r e n t v i e w o f FDR i n t h i s i n s t a n c e : " I t was h e J H o f s t a d t e r s t a t e s j , "who k i l l e d t h e L o n d o n E c o n o m i c C o n f e r e n c e i n 1 9 3 3 w i t h a m e s s a g e m i n i m i z i n g the importance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l monetary agreements a n d a f f i r m i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o g o i t s own way." T h e A m e r i c a n P o l i t i c a l T r a d i t i o n a n d t h e men who m a d e i t (New Y o r k : Knopf, 1965), p. 339. See a l s o W.E. L e u c h t e n b u r g , F r a n k l i n D . R o o s e v e l t a n d t h e New D e a l , 1 9 3 2 - 1 9 4 0 (New Y o r k : Harper & B r o s . , 1963), pp. 199, 200-05.  n.  2 14.  Hofstadter,  The American  Political  Tradition....  p.  339,  3 Roosevelt t o Morgenthau, J r . , quoted i n E.B. Nixon (ed.), F r a n k l i n D. R o o s e v e l t a n d F o r e i g n A f f a i r s . M a r c h . 1934-August, 1935 ( C a m b r i d g e : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 6 9 ) , II, 306. E a r l i e r i n t h i s memorandum, R o o s e v e l t h a d a d v i s e d M o r g e n t h a u to " p l e a s e remember t h a t I h a v e a b a c k g r o u n d o f a l i t t l e o v e r a century i n Chinese a f f a i r s , China i n the past hundred years has n o t c h a n g e d v e r y much i f y o u t h i n k o f C h i n a a s an a g g r e g a t i o n of four hundred m i l l i o n people." Ibid. T h i s background however, s e e m s n o t t o h a v e made h i m a w a r e o f some o f t h e s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l changes then t a k i n g p l a c e i n C h i n a . L e s s t h a n two months e a r l i e r , some n i n e t y t h o u s a n d C o m m u n i s t t r o o p s h a d b r o k e n o u t o f t h e K i a n g s i - F u k i e n a r e a t o b e g i n t h e e p i c o f t h e Long March and t h e u l t i m a t e c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f Mao T s e - t u n g ' s h o l d o n t h e s e c o n d most i m p o r t a n t p o l i t i c a l f a c t i o n i n C h i n a . 4  Quoted  5  himself  drift  how t o Review, 6  McBurns,  "Beginning  dressed world  in  to  avoid p.  to war?  at two  Ibid.  284.  start  problems:  and,  American  2.  the  p.  second,  of  his  term  first, i f  involvement."  the  (the  how t o drift  2nd| , h e slow  seemed  Schlesinger,  down  adthe  irresistible,  Times  Book  44  7 On May 6 , 1 9 4 1 , R o o s e v e l t e x t e n d e d t h e L e n d - L e a s e A c t t o C h i n a , d e c l a r i n g i n t h e p r o c e s s t h a t h e r d e f e n s e was v i t a l t o t h a t o f t h e U.S. On J u l y 2 6 , 1 9 3 9 , t h e U . S . h a d n o t i f i e d J a p a n t h a t i t would end t h e Commercial t r e a t y i n e x i s t e n c e between t h e two c o u n t r i e s s i n c e F e b r u a r y 21, 1911. The f o l l o w i n g works r e p r e s e n t some o f t h e m o r e v i c i o u s a t t a c k s a g a i n s t R o o s e v e l t i n this respect. Charles A. Beard, the founder of the "America F i r s t " movement, d e s e r v e d l y h e a d s t h e l i s t : P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t and t h e Coming o f t h e War. 1941: A study i n appearances and r e a l i t i e s (New H a v e n : Yale U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954). G . K o l k o , The P o l i t i c s o f War: The W o r l d and U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r e i g n P o l i c y . 19431 9 4 5 (New Y o r k : Random H o u s e , 1 9 6 8 ) . C C . T a n s i l l , Back door t o War: t h e Roosevelt f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 1933-1941 (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1952). Two o f t h e m o r e b a l a n c e d c r i t i q u e s o f A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o w a r d Japan i n t h e few weeks b e f o r e P e a r l Harbour a r e : H. F e i s , The Road t o P e a r l H a r b o r : t h e coming o f t h e war between t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and J a p a n ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1950), and G. Kennan, Memoirs: 19251950 ( B o s t o n : L i t t l e , Brown, 1 9 6 7 ) . For a comprehensive assessm e n t o f some m o r e r e c e n t r e v i s i o n i s t s , s e e I. Unger, "The 'New L e f t ' and American H i s t o r y : Some R e c e n t T r e n d s i n U n i t e d S t a t e s Historiography," AHR ( J u l y , 1 9 6 7 ) , L X X I I , N o . 4 , 1 2 3 7 - 6 3 . 8  Clubb,  9  China  p.  175;  White  Paper.  10  Williams,  The  11  Halle,  245.  12  China  13  New Y o r k  America's During  Far  the to  White  or  I,  Paper.  Eastern  White  I,  July  25,  Policy  some  percent  40  p.  15-16.  754.  1941,  quoted  (New Y o r k :  of  Dulles,  I,  460-62.  quarter  Japan.  Paper.  450-51.  Shaping....  Times.  first  $12,000,000., shipped  p.  China  1941, pp.  in  T.A.  Macmillan,  petroleum products of  the  total  of  all  Bisson,  1945), rose  p. to  221. almost  commodities  220-21.  14 H u l l t o Nomura, U.S. Department o f S t a t e , F o r e i g n R e lations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. 1931-1941. Japan (Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1943), II, 769. 15  The G r e a t e r  "new o r d e r " thern in  for  East  Asia.  In  Asia  Co-Prosperity  September  part  of  French Indochina;  control  of  the  south.  a  Sphere,  or  Japan's  1940,  Japan  occupied the  nominal  Vichy  regime  was  nor-  left  45  16  R.J.C.  Princeton 17  Butow,  University Halle,  p.  Tojo  and  Press,  the  1961),  coming pp.  of  234,  the  237,  war  (Princeton:  243.  259.  18 Lauchlan Currie to author, personal interview, S.F.U., F e b r u a r y 9, 1968. C u r r i e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t as " s p e c i a l a d v o c a t e f o r China" under Harry Hopkins, he had c o l l e c t e d b e f o r e P e a r l H a r b o u r , "odds and ends - h e r e and t h e r e , " f o r C h i n a . Ibid. A M a s t e r L e n d - L e a s e A g r e e m e n t w i t h C h i n a was n o t s i g n e d u n t i l J u n e 2, 1 9 4 2 . 19 An i d e a o f t h e t a s k p e r f o r m e d b y t h e I n d i a - C h i n a Div i s i o n o f t h e A i r T r a n s p o r t Command, i s e v i d e n t i n t h e f a c t t h a t by June, 1945, a t o t a l o f 33,938 American m i l i t a r y p e r s o n n e l were involved i n the process of f e r r y i n g supplies to China over the Himalayas (the Hump). These p e r s o n n e l were backed up by 47,009 c i v i l i a n s and 662.4 o p e r a t i o n a l a i r c r a f t ; d u r i n g O c t o b e r 1944, 35,131 tons were s a f e l y flown i n t o C h i n a . F . R o m a n u s a n d R. S u n d e r l a n d , T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n W o r l d War I I . Ill: Time Runs out i n C.B.I. (Washington: Department o f t h e Army, U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1 9 5 8 ) , 5 3 8 , q u o t i n g H i s t o r y o f S e r v i c e s and S u p p l y i n I n d i a - B u r m a T h e a t e r . 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . II, 383-86. 20  H.L.  a n d War  Stimson's esting, the  emphasis  especially  very 21  the  full 22  outset  value  of  of  Foreign text,  to  and  to  grant  FDR,  Soviet  of  1941-1945  II,  Service  538  theater  in  Peace  (Italics of  war  mine.)  is  inter-  ardently  supported  China  from  General.  I  25-26.  is  Great  (Moscow:  4,  1941.  Union  and  "Your the  Foreign  the  decision  interest-free  accepted by  Britain  Foreign  an  Ministry  between the  U.S.S.R.  (1960),  For  of  Chairman  President During  the  Languages  of  Soviet of  the  Great  to of  the  Council  U.S.A.  of  and  Patriotic  Publishing  the  Government  Affairs the  Mr.  loan  House,  the  War 1957),  15. 23  Fate  main  p.  V.  November  the  Ministers  of  the  1942.  Appendix  Correspondence the  On A c t i v e  1948),  hostilities.  U.S.S.R.,  of  as  f r o m a man who  gratitude...."  Ministers  Bundy,  & Bros.,  on E u r o p e  $1,000,000,000...  heartful  Prime  McG.  Harper  Relations.  see  Stalin  President, with  Stimson  (New Y o r k :  W.S.  Churchill,  (Boston: 24  (Boston:  Houghton  Documents World  The  Second  Mifflin,  on A m e r i c a n  Peace  World  1950),  Foreign  Foundation),  IV,  War,  IV:  The Hinge  133. Relations, 219.  1941-1942  of  46  25 II,  The Memoirs  of  Cordell Hull  (New Y o r k :  Macmillan,  1948),  1583. 26  History  See  R.E.  Sherwood,  (New Y o r k :  Harper  Roosevelt & Bros.,  1587. 27  Sherwood,  28  Churchill,  p. IV,  573. 562.  and Hopkins:  1948),  p.  740;  An  Intimate  Hull,  II,  Ill  CHINA AS A GREAT POWER:  In  MOSCOW, CAIRO AND TEHERAN  s p i t e o f C h u r c h i l l ' s r e l u c t a n c e , the S t a t e Department  continued t o f o s t e r China as an i n t e g r a l member o f R o o s e v e l t ' s Four Power P l a n . his  T h i s support was r e s e n t e d by Eden who expressed  doubts over China's f u t u r e r o l e d u r i n g a v i s i t t o Washington  e a r l y i n 1943.  To Roosevelt he s t a t e d t h a t he " d i d not much  l i k e the i d e a o f the Chinese running up and down the a f t e r the  Pacific"  war.^  During t h i s same v i s i t ,  Sumner W e l l s o u t l i n e d the  proposed  s t r u c t u r e o f the U.N.: a l l the U n i t e d Nations should be members of  one world-wide body which would recommend p o l i c y , i n t u r n ,  t h i s body would be a d v i s e d by g e o g r a p h i c a l l y determined councils.  regional  The r e a l d e c i s i o n s however, "should be made by the  U n i t e d S t a t e s , Great B r i t a i n , R u s s i a and China, who would ... p o l i c e the w o r l d . " to  2  Eden however, s t i l l remained  unconvinced as  the v a l u e o f China's membership. At the Quebec Conference  (August 19-24, 1943), C h u r c h i l l and  Eden somewhat r e s i g n e d t o China's new r o l e , approved  a draft of  a f o u r n a t i o n d e c l a r a t i o n b i n d i n g the B i g Four t o g e t h e r d u r i n g  48  and  after  with  the  keeping the of  the  Britain  ministers  the  declaration  without  any  American  in  the  the  in  appreciation  of  Hull  Before that  shed China  a  to  a  peace-  By  to  a  copy  October, meeting  of  could  China,  comments  deal  Churchill  the  departure,  included  good  in  sent  U.S.S.R.  Hull's  a  agreed  Hull's  the  document  impress  hostilities.  Union had  Europe.  they  to  acquiescence  of  and  Molotov.  interests for  end  Soviet  Department  occasion  Soviet  Moscow,  because  interesting,  the  getting  the  to  State  took  before  and  Declaration  informed  are  of  organization  foreign  the  Hull  importance  U.S.,  Nation  war.  of  Molotov  not a  accept  country  on t h i s  light  on  Four  refusal  the  1943:  The P r e s i d e n t and I b e l i e v e d , on t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t China had a r i g h t f u l p l a c e i n such a d e c l a r a t i o n . . . . Of keen i n t e r e s t t o us were t h e r e l a t i o n s between R u s s i a and C h i n a , who h a d t h e l o n g e s t common b o u n d a r y o f a n y t w o n a t i o n s in the w o r l d . . . . I was c o n v i n c e d t h a t R u s s i a n c o o p e r a t i o n would be o f g r e a t a s s i s t a n c e t o us i n r e h a b i l i t a t i n g and u n i f y i n g China a f t e r the war. Russia would have moral i n f l u e n c e on t h e C h i n e s e Communists, even though t h e i r t y p e o f c o m m u n i s m w a s n o t e x a c t l y t h e same a s t h e R u s s i a n s . 3 Hull a  seems  united  border. intent  of  The  and  to  have  in  does  Soviet the  been  spite he  the  his  seem t o  foreign  of  inherent  knowledge  have  policy  the  of  accurately  in  China,  Soviet  fear  long  common  their  assessed the  both  with  of  real  reference  to  Communists.  Four  Molotov  aware  of  Moscow C o n f e r e n c e  later  tioned  to  China, Nor  Chunking  days  not  Nation  that  began  on O c t o b e r  Declaration  China  had  been  was sent  nineteenth discussed. a  draft  and  and Hull  two men-  strongly  49  argued  for  her  Molotov  agreed  doubted  that  the  of  end  Soviets  to  her  the  China's formal  ization  with  signed  sums u p  in  signatory.  inclusion  written At  to  postpone  the  Chinese.  from Chunking  Ambassador  a  conference.  were t r y i n g  them p u b l i c l y  Hull  r e t e n t i o n as  the  arrived  the  approval  twenty-sixth,  declaration,  could be  point,  Hull  felt  any  action  that  would  On t h e  and two as  that  one  later  of  the  the four  what A m e r i c a n d i p l o m a c y  before the  identify  twenty-eighth  days  but  received  this  declaration  retrospect  in  On t h e  the  author-  Chinese great  had  powers.  just  achieved: Now t h e r e w a s n o l o n g e r a n y d o u b t t h a t a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t o keep the peace, by f o r c e i f necessary, would be set up a f t e r the w a r . . . . Had I n o t p e r s i s t e d i n t h e e f f o r t t o g e t C h i n a i n as one o f t h e o r i g i n a l s i g n a t o r i e s , her c l a i m t o permanent membership i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s would not have b e e n so s o l i d . ^ Hull  had  regime  in  effect  broadly  acceptable  public.  Now,  U.S.  assured  had  new w o r l d the East  time  whatever  after  the  the  with  U.N. only  with  a permanent his  seat  government  vicissitudes  a majority  organization. being)  to  the  itself  of  and war  in  the  vital  Furthermore,  the  U.S.  possibility  of  a  Soviet  to  a  political  the or  American  diplomacy,  council had  of  negated  hegemony  in  the  the  the (for Far  war.  On S e p t e m b e r the  guaranteed  the  21,  Congress  passing  twenty-nine  of  endorsed  the  dissenting  American  participation  Connally-Fullbright votes.  Approved by  in  Resolutions the  Senate  50  Foreign the  Relations  Senate  With  on November  a minimum o f  during  a war  1918.  The  part so  in  tragically  Britain  and  both  involve  Acting that  on  any  Andaman  the  the  were  Islands  now  to  quietly  and t o  Burma b e Bay  landing  was  opposed  Malaya  campaign  bog  t h e m down  in  the  November  General  Marshall  for  Chinese  commitment  in  of  in  an  the  played  U.S.,  Burma was  of  three  1943),  new  great  with  During  the  President the  the attempted  Chinese. suggested  capture  named  To role  Roosevelt  of  the  BUCCANEER,  outset  landing  joint  reminded the contingent  had  getting  by  craft  r e s e n t e d a n y move  the  its  i d e a l he  China's  itself.  the  in  and that  with might  Chiefs-of-Staff, British  on  this  the  jungles.**  23 m e e t i n g the  make  Code  of  doubt  equal basis.  from the v e r y  mind,  Burmese  an  preceded by  short  achieve  problem of  on  five.  accomplished  to  of  to  by  earlier.^  operations  Bengal.  woefully  fresh  Senate  China  prompting,  the  latter,  to  22-26,  military  no  China with  would have  in  The  had  faced the  (November in  the  accept her  allies  in  in  ratified  eighty-five  had  President  identifying  Kai-shek's  new a c t i o n  the  of  twenty-five years  U.S.  Conference  the  At  Roosevelt  passage  diplomacy  the A l l i e s  amphibious  a majority  dead  for,  to her  Chiang  British.  the  U.S.S.R.  this,  Cairo  the  succeeded i n  American  first  of  fought  powers,  credible,  by  resolutions  what Woodrow W i l s o n h a d b e e n u n a b l e  facilitating  accomplish  5,  the  hindrance,  specter  Having  to  Committee,  that  the  BUCCANEER.  He  51  further  stressed  certain  loss  Chinese  troops  slight  Sir  in  about cuss a  effort  strategy  ready  The  cated, view  occupied  that The  to  last  have  China  as  sensitive  Brooke's  of  place  even of  to  any  soon  the  to  dis-  Chinese  found  attention  of a  an  Cairo.  neglect symbolic of  her  implied or  Kong,  arrogance.  Such  sadly compli-  exaggerated  closeted  Chinese  at  proof  Hong  Japanese had  neces-  nothing  were  comprehended t h a t  tangible  for  lengthy,  who t o o k  was  feelings  prestige,  any  General  unfit  the  Staffs  w h i c h was  sphere,  Chiang's  ex-occupiers  whom t h e  of  to  Conference:  Generalissimo....  not  For  acutely  notice Alan ally  the  seems  offer  from the  story,  this  its  contempt  resented the  The P r e s i d e n t ,  instead  assuage  could  Chinese,  posed  with  against  toward  a  getting  alert  "understood  and A m e r i c a n  Chinese  Indian-Chinese  diplomacy. he  face to  to  on t h e  and were q u i t e  the  in  Chief-of-Staff,  sentiments  during  British  the  first  Churchill  sonal  Such  7  Chiang  operations,  argued  officers  tactics,  Chiang  the  by  conferences  ever  C h u r c h i l l who h e a r t i l y  of  the  land  strongly  Chiang's  and m i n o r . . . .  of  attempting  that  given  talks  Europe,  cause  difficulties  active  Churchill,  and h i g h e r  distracted  any  past  The G e n e r a l u n d e r l i n e d h i s  with  had  of  now w o u l d  supported by h i s  questions."  ear  Roosevelt  in  h e was  stating  these  view  avoided.  Brooke. by  In  committed t o  this,  Alan  Chinese  of  a withdrawal  face.  should be  weakening sity,  of  that  in  long  business  8  Roosevelt through kind, new  was  per-  was  a l l  status.  real  loss  of  could hardly  have  failed  from a  sup-  an  forced in  attitude 1940  to  temporarily  52  close  the  Burma  Road,  confirm Chiang's  was  doubts  doubly  as  to  resented.  the  It  also  effectiveness  of  helped the  to  Grand  Alliance. Roosevelt the A l l i e s Japan.  nevertheless  for  a more  Of h i s  Roosevelt  down t h e  Kai-shek."  9  This  equipping  of  ninety  after  t h e war  Manchuria, issued  at  enhanced by in  return,  North  of  being  2.  April with  that  due  1941,  of  this  the was  the  implied  was  now  supplying  the at  Soviet  one  to  of  that  to  view  this  of  Japan,  the China  including  declaration  status "three  some  time  Chiang  return to  the  the  at  press  against  BUCCANEER,  the  In  commit  conference,  Teheran  of  was  further  great  his  of  Roosevelt  f r o m November  nonaggression  treaty  from the meeting.  twenty-eighth,  fault  criticism  and  lost  t h e war  the  operation  to  powers,"1*  troops  in  ANAKIM).  fighting the  supporting  as  promised  excluded on t h e  states  Pescadores.  to  Marshall in  conference, China's  Stalin the  in  divisions,  the  following  to  was  Roosevelt  opinion  had  China  Hopkins  territories  the  through  with  entailed  referred  met w i t h  China,  and  (operation  Immediately Churchill  her  end o f  Chiang  Burma  line  Chinese  all  role  Harry  support  Formosa, the  active  sincerity,  "went  persisted  quality of  of  their  Chiang,  and t r a i n i n g  In  Stalin  the  informed  thirty  27,  to  with  1  1  informal  Chinese  a  Roosevelt, that  talk  [adding] avoiding  the  divisions  of  low  troops,...  Stalin  December  Japan  "expressed  Chinese  leaders."  an  and  U.S.  and  pro-  53  posed t o lowing role  supply  and t r a i n  day, Roosevelt  of the United First  -  sist  Second  body,...  U.S.S.R.,  composed -  not  resent  U.S.,  U.K.  doubted that  t o the peace  safeguarded  China  end o f t h e w a r .  another  Eastern  "The Four This,  - with  He t h e n  the small  suggested the U.S.,  o f Europe  1 3  would  He  also  position  at the  of committees, U.S.S.R.,  The composition by e i t h e r  the  immediately  emergency.  powerful  the idea  -  implied,  to deal  Policemen.  Britain,  C o m m i t t e e was n o t d i v u l g e d  name  conThe  Policemen'  its  nations  by the Four  European n a t i o n .  as  power  o r any sudden  would be i n a v e r y  European one c o m p r i s i n g sibly  agency  would  t h e U.K. and C h i n a . . . .  and C h i n a .  wondered whether being  fol-  of the United  an E x e c u t i v e Committee which  was what h e t e r m e d  any t h r e a t  Stalin  The  1 2  f o r the peace-keeping  o f a l l members  the U.S.,  would be t h e e n f o r c i n g with  ones.  Nations:  of the U.S.S.R.,  third  additional  unveiled h i s plans  an Assembly  Nations....  thirty  and  the  pos-  of the Far  Churchill  or  Hopkins. Roosevelt Churchill's Americas. "might  found  idea  1 4  this  regional  o f committees  Stalin  then  this,  Roosevelt  naval  and a i r  provided by Britain mitted h i s idea specific  islands  of  that  armies  and t h e Soviet  around  the Far East  the Four  the American  the "land  strong  too similar  of American troops  answered t h a t  forces,  f o r Europe,  stated  require the sending  approach  points  Japan.  overseas."  and t h e idea To  commitment w o u l d b e  . . . would have  Union."  both  Policemen  to  Stalin  to be  thereupon  sub-  i n and a r o u n d Germany and  He a l s o  emphasized that  any  54  peace-keeping military agreed, be  organization  occupation but  strong  sensing  enough  to  should have  ..."  of  these  that  Stalin  f u l f i l l  the  strong  was  these  power  for  points.  implying  duties,  he  "continued  Roosevelt  that  China would  told  the  not  Soviet  leader: He h a d Power the  insisted  weakness  farther nation  of  dealings also as  with  Alan  He  for  Stalin,  In the  Sir  The  lack  of  out  the war.  China  all  was  in  did  h e was  the  not  4  realize  thinking  China  better  a potential  was to  source  c h a r a c t e r i z e d much  a  have of  other  of  to  level  to  Brooke  than  the  meeting  would be b e t t e r for  this  a question  landing and  Roosevelt's  craft it  against  China's  of  30,  1  November of  landing  stated  that:  to  the  use  effort  Admiral  would,  as  South  landing  against  Leahy  would h e l p the  potential one. **  main  of  It  demographic  scarcity  (OVERLORD),  replied that  the Aegean  evaluate  chronic  BUCCANEER  BUCCANEER  in  the  Europe it  of  developed a c e r t a i n t r u s t .  inability  response  Alan  as  OVERLORD  at  it  be  of  could  the  to  Prance  1 7  enough The  t o wear  Chinese.  and i t  as  whom h e  that  allocated to  [ANVIL].  the  any  thought  used both  shortage  on  invasion  Germans. all.  in  concerned about  the  whether  but after  Combined C h i e f s - o f - S t a f f  s t i l l  craft  than  statement  Roosevelt's  Brooke,  craft  present, and t h a t  people,  rather  open  power  the  at  future  of  because he  1 5  reveals  At  participation  Moscow n o t  400 m i l l i o n  and  a great  at  China  the  friends  trouble. frank  of  into  them as  This  on t h e  Declaration  landing British,  craft with  was  to  plague  Churchill's  down R o o s e v e l t ' s  help,  insistence  The American C h i e f s - o f - S t a f f  the A l l i e s  on  used  this  actively  however,  had  through-  supporting made  55  their  position  quite  " t h e y had gone the  far  postponement  Marshall  clear  at  t o meet  of  Cairo  the  BUCCANEER  and A d m i r a l  King  where M a r s h a l l  British they  stated  Chiefs-of-Staff  c o u l d not  maintained  had  this  accept."  position  views  that but  Both  1 8  throughout  the  Teheran Conference. More cially  crucial to  China's  real  status  in  the  postwar  affecting  her  t e r r i t o r i a l sovereignty.  Soviet  Union's  main  goals  with  Japan had  the  of  U.S.S.R.  "security" Russia's  entry the  p e r i o d , were  into  conference.  survived  lack  her of  to  eastern  in  be  the  Pacific her  and  would  at  for  considered as  one  of  historic  no d o u b t  come u p  the  the treaty  Alliance,  forfeiting  such  espe-  Teheran  nonaggression  German-Japanese  frontiers,  power,  made  Roosevelt  compensated  ice-free ports  a great  decisions  However,  even the  would have  of  t h e war  the  as  and  the  topics for  as  dis-  cussion. At raised that  the the  lunch  of  question  the of  "Three Only,"  a warm-water  "Russia had V l a d i v o s t o k , "  icebound  and t h a t  Straits  of  that  "wished  he  traffic  Tsushima. to  government  of  who w i s h e d  nothing  Roosevelt  to  it  on November  port.  Stalin  the world more  the  for  this  Russian grievance  must be  entrusted to  themselves  then mentioned for  the  out  that  controlled  C h u r c h i l l agreed with  meet  Stalin  To C h u r c h i l l ' s  pointed  could be  30,  it  from  was the  logic  and  because,  the  satisfied  t h a n what first  comment  they  time here  stated  nations, had." at  1  9  Teheran  56  (and not as i s o f t e n assumed, at Y a l t a ) , t h a t the S o v i e t Union might have access t o the Port o f Dairen  i n Manchuria.  Stalin  immediately expressed the view t h a t the Chinese would o b j e c t , but Roosevelt reassured  him by  s t a t i n g that the Chinese would  agree were Dairen made a f r e e p o r t under i n t e r n a t i o n a l guarantee.  Hopkins' biographer R.E.  Roosevelt had Cairo.  discussed  Sherwood, maintains t h a t  the q u e s t i o n  o f Dairen with Chiang at  2 0  The  Teheran Conference ended on December 2, Roosevelt flew back t o C a i r o .  and  that same  day  C h u r c h i l l and  now  convinced t h a t S t a l i n would agree t o China's membership i n  the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l o f the U.N. however, was  T h i s promise had  The most important achievement  i n the P a c i f i c , upon Germany's d e f e a t .  Freed from the  against  Japan.  f u t u r e task o f a major l a n d i n g i n China, the  concentrate  her  i n Europe.  f o r c e s on winning the war  From t h i s p o i n t onwards, China  i n the P a c i f i c .  The  first  U.S.  i n the and  Southeast A s i a would be i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l e g a t e d t o the s i d e of the War  x  a profound impact on R o o s e v e l t ' s attempts t o  i n v o l v e the Chinese more a c t i v e l y i n the war  P a c i f i c and  was  S t a l i n ' s u n s o l i c i t e d assurance t h a t the U.S.S.R.  would enter the war  c o u l d now  Roosevelt  lines  step i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n was  the c a n c e l l a t i o n of BUCCANEER. At the meeting of the Combined C h i e f s on December 4 , t h i r d day  the  of the Second C a i r o Conference, Roosevelt p e r s i s t e d  57  against  increased  British  Churchill  in  after  monsoon.  that  the  turn  a definite  should  be  suggested  commitment  maintained.  then  needed  T h e r e was a  factor  linking Cairo were in  dependent  Chinese  the  Grouped under with  delivered the  operations  the  code  Myitkyina securing  by  for  the  to  tonnage  to  of  ultimate  the  the  an  streng-  Road, the  this  airborne  First  end landing  Stilwell-trained  latter  aim  it  survival,  at  further  a bridgehead the  to  Burma  insisted  included  name T A R Z A N ,  BUCCANEER China,  These  that  immediate of  had  Burma  stating  and  Europe.  reopening  in  replied  Chiang  resources  China's  Chiang  to  out  of  over  were  the  timed  increasing  now r e s t r i c t e d t o  the  Irriwady. to  the  coin-  tonnage  airlift  over  argued  that  Hump. The  British,  the  success  of  and  opposed  any  Europe. "we h a d not  and  the  China.  of  of  of  carried  Roosevelt,  countered by  invasion  on t h e  BUCCANEER.  capture  troops,  the  be  earlier  BUCCANEER  question  Western  on  the  BUCCANEER.  operation  supporting  Brooke  all  dependent  to  promote  h a d b e e n made  for  the  Conference that  Indaw,  cide  s t i l l  closely India  employ  to  the  King,  Alan  to  forces  that  Admiral  would be b e t t e r the  pressure  be  TARZAN was diversion  Roosevelt a moral  who w o u l d  finally  obligation  prepared to  forego  be  not of  primarily necessarily  the  scarce  ended t h e to the  involved,  do  dependent  landing  arguments  something  amphibious  for  on  craft by  BUCCANEER from  stating  China  operation,  that:  and h e except  would for  58  some very g r e a t and r e a d i l y apparent  reason."  2 2  The f o l l o w i n g  day, Alan Brooke r e t u r n e d t o the a t t a c k with the comment t h a t the whole importance  of BUCCANEER had been overemphasized.  I f i t was  not c a r r i e d out the Chinese might withdraw from TARZAN, but "reports suggested promising."  t h a t t h e i r t r o o p s now  i n a c t i o n were not too  2 3  With i n c r e a s e d pressure t o c a n c e l BUCCANEER, Roosevelt, a t C h u r c h i l l ' s i n s i s t e n c e , gave i n on the afternoon o f December  5.  T h i s d e c i s i o n r e b u f f e d the f i r s t  and  s i g n s of Chinese i n i t i a t i v e  e f f e c t i v e l y delayed the reopening of the Burma Road. undermined S t i l w e l l ' s attempts a c t i v e r o l e i n the war  It also  at g e t t i n g Chiang t o take a more  a g a i n s t Japan.  With the e x c e p t i o n of the  Second Burma Campaign, Chinese t r o o p s d i d not f i g h t a l o n g s i d e A l l i e d f o r c e s u n t i l the very end o f the  war.  Admiral King's biographer s t a t e s t h a t King knew "that the Chinese headed by Chiang s o l d out - which was  Kai-shek, would f e e l t h a t they had been  the case - and consequently would not  anything t o a i d S t i l w e l l . "  2 4  do  On December 23, i n h i s answer t o  Roosevelt's wire a d v i s i n g him o f the s c r a p p i n g o f BUCCANEER, Chiang's  resentment was  r e l e g a t i n g the China War to  f u l l y evident:  "the A l l i e d s t r a t e g y o f  Theater t o the background has given r i s e  s e r i o u s m i s g i v i n g s on a l l s i d e s .  the Burma Campaign i s a matter  The  success or f a i l u r e o f  of l i f e and death  for China."  2 5  Sherwood i n a s s e s s i n g the d i f f e r e n t f a c t o r s which Roosevelt  59  had  to  consider,  states  that  "it  problem emphasized by  Lewis  Roosevelt's  decision  a  purely  of  logistical  merit,  action. U.S.  reluctant  it  does  Writing  Army  point  not  Douglas  of  to  undoubtedly ...  this  explain  subject,  who  abandon  view,  however,  on t h e  was  the  the  shipping  influenced B U C C A N E E R . . . . F r o m  argument the  has  a good  subsequent  deal  British  official historians  of  the  state:  As f a r as t h e l a n d i n g c r a f t t h a t on C h u r c h i l l ' s i n s i s t e n c e w e r e t a k e n f r o m S E A C [ S o u t h E a s t A s i a Command} t o r e i n f o r c e ANVIL, s e v e r a l weeks l a t e r t h e B r i t i s h C h i e f s - o f - S t a f f , supp o r t e d b y t h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r , made t h e f i r s t o f s e v e r a l a t tempts t o have ANVIL c a n c e l l e d f o r o p e r a t i o n s e l s e w h e r e i n the Mediterranean.27 The vention  factors in  Chinese, as  potential  what in  Southeast  were t o o  a great  final  power, she  of  Teheran had  the  Pacific, on t h e  Germany's  in  1943,  for  China  after  have  Japan.  in  Soviet  in  t h e war  China, entry  to  Teheran,  The Second  the  Allied  resist.  whatever  a major  foothold  Cairo  Conference  the  against  lauded  strategic for  the  confirmed  Japan would be  l i b e r a t i o n would war  inter-  Though  lost  against  whose  into  a major  conjunction with  Roosevelt  e n j o y e d as  decided: not  against  waged  depend  Japan  after  defeat.  American its  Asia  great  might  invasion  largely  for  which mitigated  diplomacy had  postwar  Declaration"  had  policy  in  assured  succeeded i n  the  Far  China  a  East. solid  laying  the  The Moscow claim to  a  foundations "Four  seat  on  Nation the  60  future  U.N.  Security  Council.  forced  that  claim by  identifying  powers:  the  assured doing, sole  U.S.  the  reinforced the  Nationalists.  lifying  consider  political could  in The  draw  the  gical a  of  some  seated  in  American great  it  be  were  with  over  a  from powers  had  backwardness. gifted  not  great  Stalin  and  the  and as  to  assurances world  the  had in  so  the  place  in  Union,  the informed that  of  his  organization.  whole  and U.N.  that  Soviet  immediately  postwar  assumed  four  defeat,  acceptable  concrete  taking  Teheran,  rein-  process  of  prestige,  her  Chinese  social  mol-  failed and  sensitivities  mollified.  century  interests,  prime  then  the  Nationalists  U.S.  status  of  had  China.  diplomacy,  power  also  was  the  understandably  Especially  country  was  he had  changes  Chinese,  nineteenth  torial  be  fabric;  from,  face.  also  with  effect  of  were  Chiang  two  at  the  arrangements  for  the  of  the  2 8  with  Germany's  both  would  China  image  Government  And though  Unfortunately,  upon  to  promise,  government  future  China  Declaration  Finally,  China  acceptable  practical  Stalin's  of  constituted  Eminently  to  Britain.  liberation  legally  these  and  The C a i r o  with  to  importance  such  full  specific  over to  of  sensitive  further  taken The  century  as  foreign to  any  Britain  their  future  and  of  of  loss  Russia,  own e c o n o m i c  advantage issue  depredations  and  China's  national  to  of  who  in  terri-  technolo-  prestige  in  two  thousand  years  of  civilization,  all  Chinese.  Yet,  by  catering  solely  61  to  the  with  a  Nationalists, political  was  seriously  was  bitterly  assumption perceive  faction  diplomacy  whose the  greater  resented by  all  factions  a  cultural  entity  d i f f e r e n c e between  was  commitment  doubted by  that  the  American  as  the  to  identifying such  masses w i t h i n however, ancient  as  appearances  was  an  itself  intangible  China. the  theirs and t h e  What  myopic could  not  realities.  NOTES 1  Sherwood,  p.  2  Ibid..  717.  3  Hull,  4  p. II,  Ibid.,  (1957),  p.  716.  1256-57.  1307.  826.  See  For  the  also full  Foreign text,  Relations,  1943.  see Appendix  China  VI.  5 In p a r t , t h e r e s o l u t i o n s r e a d : "The U.S. a c t i n g through i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s , j o i n w i t h f r e e and s o v e r e i g n nations i n e s t a b l i s h m e n t and maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h power t o p r e v e n t a g g r e s s i o n and t o p r e s e r v e t h e p e a c e o f t h e world." H.B. W e s t e r f i e l d , F o r e i g n P o l i c y and P a r t y P o l i t i c s (New Haven: Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1955), p. 158. Westerfield points out t h a t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e U.N., b o t h p a r t i e s h e l d s u r p r i s i n g l y s i m i l a r v i e w s , w i t h t h e R e p u b l i c a n s k e e n l y aware o f a v o i d i n g t h e s t i g m a o f a new b e t r a y a l . I b i d . . pp. 165-67. 6 noted:  In  May,  "I  disliked  before  along  the miserable  which  go  to  sea-power, IV,  the  the  the  Washington  idea  of  communications  winner  amphibious  anyway  Conference,  reconquering  -  in  and  operations,  Assam.  thought  and key  Churchill  Burma b y I in  hated terms  points."  an  advance  Jungles of  air-power,  Churchill,  786. 7  A.  Collins,  Bryant,  1957),  p.  The  Turn of  the  Tide:  Closing  the  Ring  Churchill,  9  Sherwood,  p.  The U.S.,  Britain  10  Declaration,  V:  see p.  (1951),  328.  774. and  China.  Appendix  11  Sherwood,  12  Foreign  Relations.  (1961),  p.  Teheran  (London:  83.  8  Cairo  1939-1943  For  the  full  text  of  the  VII.  777.  484.  1943,  The C o n f e r e n c e s  at  -  Cairo  and  63  13  Sherwood,  p.  14  Ibid..  786.  p.  quoted him:  "He  contemplated  a  regional  785  does  (Italics  mine.)  Churchill  states  not  Supreme  seem t o h a v e  United Nations  committees would be  that  made  it  Council,  components."  Roosevelt clear of  mis-  that  which  I  also  the  C h u r c h i l l , V,  three  363.  15 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . C a i r o . . . . p . 532y S h e r w o o d , p . 7 8 7 . To M o u n t b a t t e n , sometime a f t e r O c t o b e r 28, 1943, R o o s e v e l t stated: "I r e a l l y f e e l t h a t i t i s a t r i u m p h t o h a v e g o t t h e 425 m i l l i o n C h i n e s e i n on t h e A l l i e d s i d e . T h i s w i l l be v e r y u s e f u l t w e n t y - f i v e or f i f t y years hence, even though China c a n n o t c o n t r i b u t e much m i l i t a r y o r n a v a l s u p p o r t f o r t h e m o m e n t . " E. &  Roosevelt, Pearce,  F.D.R.  1947),  His  II,  Personal  Letters  (New Y o r k :  Duell  Sloan  1468.  16 In a c a b l e t o C h u r c h i l l i n 1942, R o o s e v e l t s t a t e d t h a t he c o u l d " p e r s o n a l l y handle S t a l i n b e t t e r than e i t h e r your F o r e i g n O f f i c e o r my S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t . " C h u r c h i l l , IV, 201. The presumption of t h i s statement, addressed to the leader of a n a t i o n that had had years of experience with Russia, decades before t h e U . S . was e v e n f o r m e d , c o u l d h a r d l y h a v e g o n e u n n o t i c e d b y a s e x p e r i e n c e d an i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t as C h u r c h i l l .  was  17  Foreign  18  Ibid.,  19  C h u r c h i l l , V,  20  "It  not  cussed the  Foreign  Foreign Ibid..  3  from one some  this  [Dairen}  -  that  with p.  discussion  states} he had,  Chiang 792.  was  that in  Kai-shek  No  Roosevelt  fact, in  dis-  Cairo  documentary the  Sherwood,  Cairo....  pp.  Relations.  Cairo....  p.  675,  678?  a  evidence  discovered by  Relations.  p.  703.  felt,  officer  p.  758.  Chinese  Hunan?  about  [Sherwood  Sherwood,  this  received with  forces had, he Ibid..  561-62.  writer.  800.  22  report  point  of  p.  383.  my u n d e r s t a n d i n g  very  content  779,  2  is  Cairo....  365.  previously."  21 pp.  p.  merely guessing this  few days of  Relations.  For  Some V i e w s  (November  1967),  to  who was  too not into  see W.I.  Cohen,  on C h i n a ' s  Marshall  War  of  stated the  much w e i g h t . in  an i n s i g h t  111-15.  7,  the bad morale  been given  only,  troops,  On D e c e m b e r  regard  680.  contact  the  fighting  "Who  Effort."  It  with  fought JAS,  that  was  the  a  report  troops."  abilities the  "the  Chinese  of  Japanese  XXVII,  No.  I  in  64  24 York:  E.J. Norton,  1952),  II,  Whitehall,  26  Sherwood,  27  Romanus & S u n d e r l a n d ,  the  Relations. p.  Fleet Admiral  King  (New  525.  Foreign  Cairo....  p.  856.  800. II:  Stilwell's  Command  Problems  73.  28 [to  a n d W.M.  25  (1956) ,  to  King  To a effect  enter  the  comment b y that war  agreed,  adding  Foreign  Relations.  Churchill  " h e was in  "that  the it  very  was  678.  Second  lest  should  impossible p.  the  anxious  Pacific]  Cairo....  at  to  the  leak tell  Cairo  Conference  Russian  out." the  promise  Roosevelt Chinese."  IV  STILWELL,  After difficult China's in  the  the for  part  Second the  in  from our  tains  overland Qie  it  solely  it  was  on t h e  for  were  staggering.  d'etre  as  isolation  a of  was  six  pointless  to  fault  of of  To the of on  supply China  loss  this route  port to  and  of  latter  nature  ports  This  and r e s t r i c t e d what  of Europe  critic  of  without  in  to  of of  and  the  someone  plead  Cairo,  for main-  t h e war  that  "by  an  then  2  toward  China  received during the  early  1942.  access,  in  operative,  demand i n  March  China.  increasingly  American p o l i c y  of her  Rangoon i n  months  much."  mate'riel the supply  coming  actually  matter  capture  dependent  last  China  no mean  assessment  to  problems  solely  China,  YALTA  t h e war  a week p a s s e d  late  amount  war,  added the  the  too  to  winning  in his  the  became  secondary  himself  ally,  in  the  of  "hardly  Sherwood, only  was  task  Leahy,  that  route  would be  disguise  treated  And  supply  adds], It  Admiral  shabbily  that  to  DUMBARTON OAKS AND  Conference i t  overall  states  assistance."*-  Cairo  U.S.  the  Pacific.  Nationalists,  THE C H I N E S E ,  The  China in  l i t t l e  theater  1937,  was  Burma  Road,  its  raison  now l o s t last  the  blow  completed  tonnage  that  the  could  66  reach her land  to  route  the  to  logistics  replace  the  as  as  complete,  and  than  f e r r i e d over  that  F r o m 1942 the  amphibious  the  Italian  of  Europe.  to  Under  Lend-Lease  a  so  t h e huge  war  with  years.  In  spite  peace  the war;  a  of  the  much  disparity  tually  delivered.  people  endowed w i t h since  constant  such  of  moderate h e l p  all  before  slight,  last of  factor  the  was  side  the  of  some  invasion  of  policy its  Christ. of  every  the  Far  Russia.  In  soil  million  for  China  six  did  the  not  Allies for  a  for-  4  toward ally,  China but  and w h a t was  ceased  shadings  to  400  realities.  promised  appointment  Africa,  in  achievement  U.S.  never  subtle  the b i r t h  Soviet  provided  b e t w e e n w h a t was  This  the  aforementioned failure  of  own  in  industry  Europe,  attritions,  on  North  in  on h e r  inconsiderable  the  to  involved  American  of  not  long-terra in  Japan  in  entity  remained  the  over-  tonnage  and m u n i t i o n s  armies  cultural  of  less  cross-channel  Pacific,  and  hobbled by  the  this  also  at  rather  adroitness  the  had been  the  weapons  in  to  landing  programme,  providing  a  policy  not  "D D a y , "  China,  separate  Part lay  and  carried  also heavily  the  t h e war  t h e r e was  throughout eign  in  1945,  was  on  p e r i o d , was  consecutive sign  U.S.  and  the  second  3  Campaign,  East,  that  Hump.  Pacific,  involved  souls  September  the  A  Road r e q u i r e d t h r e e y e a r s  the  nation  addition,  Hump a i r l i f t .  in  this  Near  the  Burma  the  1945,  war  during  and  late  of  of  to  ac-  infuriate  a  diplomatic  Closely General  allied Joseph  to W.  67  Stilwell  as  Chief-of-Staff  Had most tion  of  the  been  an  ideal  simply an  toward  appointment  Roosevelt  and  later  Chiang,  of  for  a l l ,  what was In  hardware,  a high  in  fact,  addition,  between  Stilwell  dant  Chiang  of  of  the  field.  to  out  as  an  there  aircraft  who  anachronism;  tact  days  of  man  beyond i l l  he and  his disposed  never understood i l l  for  suited  for  the  the  substitute  confrontation,  in his  in  1942,  Chennault,  the  Flying  Chennault's  by-passing fuel  to  value  an  tasks  dealings  of  and  with  used  as  rivalry  Tigers,  confi-  and t h e  The r i f t of  writing  commander  c o n f l i c t by  endorsing  or the  in  quick  China.  not  weapon,  only  in  the  Stilwell,  solutions  ultimate  a n a c h r o n i s m who  5  com-  between  his  airpower easy  sharp  practice  Stilwell,  the  a  a personal  Fourteenth A i r f o r c e .  being  that  an h o n e s t  expected to  persuasion  o f f e r e d no  was  J o e " was  have  potentate.  deepened by  exaggerated  out  Obviously  and G e n e r a l C l a i r  added  as  corrup-  might  and p e r s o n a l l y  developed early  the  Stilwell  Stilwell  medieval  eastern  Roosevelt,  infantryman,  when t h e  of  China-based  Roosevelt  Chennault's  an  since  t w o men w a s  directly  degree  and  nevertheless  subtle  inherent  "Vinegar  carry  crudity  appointment.  t e m p o r i z e r , h e was  semantics  the  attempted to of  role  of  seriously,  point  for his  and t h e  pervasive,  the  reason  these  been l e s s  to  very  mander  factors  The t r a g e d y  soldier,  Frank  Chiang.  preceding  choice.  took h i s  means.  the  Kuomintang  excellent  above  of  to  in  an  age  stood  marched  with  68  his  men,  Chinese to  but  actually  soldier.  Chiang's  In  staff,  believed an  in  the  interview  Henry  L.  fighting  shortly  Stimson  potential  before his  noted  of  of  the  appointment  Stilwell:  He knows C h i n a t h o r o u g h l y a n d f o r more t h a n t w o y e a r s c a m paigned with the Chinese armies against Japan i n 1937-8-9. I n h a l f a n h o u r h e g a v e me a b e t t e r f i r s t - h a n d p i c t u r e o f the v a l o r o f the Chinese armies than I had ever r e c e i v e d before. Of t h i s v a l o r he had a v e r y h i g h o p i n i o n . 6 As  Secretary  Marshall, Chinese Both  War,  supported  Army  in  men a g r e e d  strikes the  of  Stilwell  with  used  were  of  the  logic  Japan  could  adequately  f e w men who  attempts  Chennault's  Stilwell's  against  one  in his  preference to  from China  airbases  S t i m s o n was  to  to  reorganize  emphasis the  not  protected  on  effect  be  with the  airpower.  that  effective  airunless  from Japanese  ground  attack.^ Vulnerable at  the  ority  the  Stilwell diary:  was  allotment  attempted "Roosevelt  but  when t h e Airforce: the  to  spectacular  -  supplies  1943,  case,  wouldn't  let  me  kept  pulling  but  speak away  Chennault,  granted  reaching  his  year, overran  "September Japs  May  of  as  him  China he  from the  first  over  noted  my p i e c e .  Roosevelt  the in  I  priHump.  his  interrupted  subject,  and  it  8  following Japanese  of  of  claims  state  Churchill  impossible." The  stop  the  Washington Conference in  twice,  to  about  Stilwell's the  forward  9 disaster 50,000  predictions airfields  approaching  were of  vindicated  the  Kweilin,  demoralized Chinese  in  Fourteenth nothing  the  area  to  69  against fields  nine  Jap d i v i s i o n s . . . .  tonight...."  Stilwell-Chennault "We h a v e to  the  ground  forces  to to  Stilwell's the  very  the  Chinese  following FDR:  On O c t o b e r  9  controversy  been unable  failure  task  save  support  had is  JWS:  I  FDR:  Well, many the  fully  heard  years.  I  through FDR:  I  take  Yes. be  Civil  great  Madame get  think  Chiang  situation  FDR:  Well,  JWS:  They would  FDR:  Yes,  they  just  between  Now,  we h a v e n ' t  overturn should  ....  Well  carry  with  day  Roosevelt:  news?  of  for  this  a  a  gre-e-e-at  feeling  out  there  build  this to  China  End  The v a l u e  of of  war  there  want  get  a  them i t  would  i t . . . .  How  will  loans.  loan be  of  a  difficult  long  do  you  a  repetition  of  last  May's  him.  be  for  some  looking  come t o the  other  man  or  group  us.  They r e a l l y  they  don't  aims  you  HAJ  for  us.  same  there  HAi  Conference. such  all  up.  are  HAJ  as and Yes,  like  the  like the  sir,  and  British.  British  remember,  us out  there  you're  you're  my  Ambassadors. JWS:  to  history.  million....  They w i l l  and  look  ourselves,  now,  AmbassadorsJ  On t h e  on.  probably would  to  of  stayed  wanted  told  reorganization  a Chinese  to  After  G-mo  serious  might to  Chinese  last?  is  t h e n we  men,  owing  of  bad  part  policy  agree  attack  the  China  have  a n d made  I  airfields:  is....  there,...  up.  the  to  can  The  I  our h e l p .  but  the  with  large  our  her  and  dollars,  JWS:  of  is  Build  Congress  attack  War,  it  need o f  Chiang  out  lost  betrayal  h e met  it  Y o u know  him  diary.  of  friends a  the  adequate  the  in his  how b a d  went  that  Yes.  a  billion to  the it  him:  think  ascribe  missionaries.  training  BUCCANEER,  been  the  Japanese  seemed t o  evident  yet  we've  of  on  0  assigned  of  light  in  demolition  summed u p  from t h e  what  do y o u  now,  My g r a n d f a t h e r JWS:  the  China  at  been  J o e , what  haven't  in  14,...  Stimson  Kunming."*-  cancellation  Well,  3,  Stilwell  resentment  that  the  to  protect  Army,  September  Draw  evidence,  your  though  own  conclusions.  debatable,  cannot  be  my  70  entirely was  ignored,  for  diametrically  Stilwell's  opposed  to  whole  position  Roosevelt's  most  vis-a-vis  pervasive  China  critics,  12 the  Republicans.  that of  under  the  America's  President's  limited  On O c t o b e r recalled twenty  What h e  19,  trained  cavalier  ability 1944,  Stilwell.  evidently  By  to  infantry  manner  help  Roosevelt  then,  to  lay  China's under  he had  divisions,  failed  an  war  acute  of  was awareness  effort.  pressure  provided three  perceive  the  from  Chiang,  Chinese  which  with  proved  to  be  13 of  exceptional  the  following  arming  the  quality. chapter)  that  Communists.  "United  Front"  and  Nationalists  the  There i s  in  evidence  Stilwell  at  one  a move,  in  spite  Such  precarious since  some  existence  1937,  was  time  in  considered  of  between  (discussed  the  the  politically  so-called  Communists  unacceptable  14 to  Chiang.  terness  What  that  Nationalist latter*s  primary the  ize  bulk  credit  that  underlying The ally early  more  of  Unable  goal  the  few o f causes  of  or  of  to  carry  successors  reactions  1943,  unwilling  army.  China's to  the  China's  of  the  his  accurately  bit-  plans it  with  the  never to is  reorganto  assessed  his the  1 5  visible  neglect  U.S.-Chinese  Foreign  the  Chinese  was  Nevertheless, so  is  compromise  Stilwell out  weakness.  feature  however,  with  self-survival,  Chinese his  evident  relations  needed t o  a permanent  August  readily  Stilwell's  freedom he  Chinese  became as  marked leader.  granted the  is  Minister,  of  a  wartime  relations. T.V.  Soong,  As  71  voiced his  doubts  as  power:  a  great  as  to  the  relative  value  of  China's  new  status  On many o c c a s i o n s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s G o v e r n m e n t h a s d e c l a r e d i t t o be i t s p o l i c y t h a t f o u r amongst t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s ... s h a l l a l s o assume t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e war and f o r t h e m a i n t e n a n c e o f p e a c e . . . . On no m a j o r issue, h o w e v e r , e i t h e r r e l a t i v e t o t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e war o r t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the f u t u r e peace, has t h i s p r a c t i c e been f o l l o w e d so f a r . . . . W h i l e t h e assumed e x i s t e n c e o f t h e F o u r Power l e a d e r s h i p c o n t i n u e d t o b e e m p h a s i z e d b y A m e r i c a n a n d B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s , no C h i n e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was i n v i t e d t o the Casablanca or Washington C o n f e r e n c e . . . . - ^ On t h e took the  place  day and  following China  deliberations.  summed u p t h e sibly  those  In  the  spot for  a  councils for  pacify  the  into  of  the  be  Chinese  as  there  now i s planes  public,  but  the  so  Roosevelt  announces Japan  The Japanese,  will lack  be of  and  Yet,  in  provided him t o promised  another drive  the  Communists  here.  announcement  in  of  time the  employment the  spite  North of  engage  and what  of  was  the  the  lag  of  of  its  West,  best  is  in  actually  war as  that  no  wish  against a  gesture  will  be  be  unchanged to  logical actual  and  and  public  use  base,  but  planning,  1 7  fighting  divisions  quite  the  the  will  and  reluctance  Japanese,  pos-  spot,  intention  years.  Kuomintang  /  China  only  intention  Chiang's the  -  at  Lin Yutang  and q u i t e  in  the  to  invade  even  policy  President  seated  no p l a n ,  that  as  not  a blind  to  ....  there  is  sent  basic  Conference  well:  there  China  a base  was  philosopher  partnership  more  American  silence,  the  Quebec  Nationalists  today,  China's  the  informed,"  year,  Why u p t o  There w i l l  between the  was  same  of  statement,  "kept  informed  Asia....  plan,  lulled  the  That  other  war  Japan? to  though  frustrations  of  is  this  in  naturally to  use  disparity  r e c e i v e d , was  the blockading omitted  the  mate'riel  between  real.  A  what fitting  72  example Cairo,  of to  this  neglect,  arm n i n e t y  On December during Three sion  of  t h e War  sumption of  Stalin  of  is  the  U.S.  would  reappeared i n  frequently Cairo  to  Chinese A  divisions. few weeks  memorandum T.V.  to  is  said  at  Cairo.  when far  I  Hurley  the  diary  Operations  regarding  on t h e  Divi-  the  Lend-  actually on t h e  timing  made as-  of  the  issue,  train  Roosevelt  and  equip  until  to  Roosevelt's States  sixty  August  Ambassador  told  11,  China  Chiang  to had  statement  would  equip  1945,  at  ninety  1 , 1 9  on  September  100  equip  that the  some  Chinese  ascertain  3,  we a r e  Chinese  b e e n made  The commitment  can  the  mentioned that  United  to  in  at  in his  proceeding  shelved  "President  whether  affirms  the  from the  inquires  action as  that  later,  to have  Hopkins  on  was  Truman:  commitment  We a r e  offer  President  commitments  President  Soong  the  ultimately  Byrnes.  effect  Chiang  implementation.  commitment  confuse  a wire  queried him  the  no  its  informed by  "The  The matter  State  discuss  known.  further  when  of  noted the  divisions  to  divisions.  Secretary  to was  made  to  1 8  Chinese it  not  President  Teheran, that  Cairo  Chinese  [Cairo}  the  Stilwell  Marshall  equipment."  At  1943,  pledge  divisions.  Department:  equipping  SEXTANT  flow  10,  later,  Roosevelt's  Chinese  conference at  weeks  Lease at  a  was  to  Byrnes  prepared to  divisions?  Chiang  by  apparently such 30  is  was  the  This  not  in  was  agreed  divisions  have  following  complete  President  commitment  theater  about  sent  our  commitment Roosevelt  writing. made  at  upon.... already  Mr.  Cairo So been  73  equipped  under  additional Four the  days  our  commitment  divisions  later  records had  to be  to  Chiang.  equipped.  Soong  Truman p e r s o n a l l y  i n f o r m e d Soong  failed to  any  produce  speaks  of  60  2 0  evidence of  that  a  search  of  Roosevelt's  promise.^ By  the  cession that  of  summer  Front,  1944,  the  Chinese  u n f u l f i l l e d promises  Roosevelt  Ostensibly  of  had  reactions  grown  dispatched Vice-President  charged with  the main  the  objective  when on J u n e 2 2 ,  Chiang  of  task  of  to  Wallace  reviving  appeasing  such  the  Chiang  informed Wallace  to  a  long  suc-  proportions to  Chunking.  defunct  somewhat  United  backfired  that:  The C h i n e s e p e o p l e had fought f o r seven y e a r s under c o n d i t i o n s o f g r e a t h a r d s h i p , and t h a t t h e y had e x p e c t e d h e l p from a b r o a d ; t h a t t h e y h a d e x p e c t e d an a l l - o u t Burma C a m p a i g n e a r l y t h i s y e a r and t h i s would have r e s u l t e d i n b r i n g i n g r e l i e f to the Chinese Army.... The C h i n e s e p e o p l e f e l t that they had been d e s e r t e d . . . . He s a i d t h a t P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t h a d p r o m i s e d a n a l l - o u t c a m p a i g n i n Burma e a r l y i n 1944 b u t t h a t a t T e h e r a n P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t h a d r e v e r s e d his decision.... He . . . w e n t b a c k a g a i n t o t h e C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e Burma C a m p a i g n , s t a t i n g that i f i t c o u l d have been c a r r i e d out t h e e f f e c t on morale i n China would have been very great.... 2  Faced with diplomacy  to  placate  nominal h o l d i n g Hull China  had to  Dumbarton  such  role  a  reaction, the  first  Oaks  nonaggression  and m a i n t a i n h i s  against  the  U.N.  the  with  Japanese  British  and  Organizational  near Washington pact  once  Chiang,  approached both the  U.S.  2  Japan,  was  the  troops China. Russians  Conference to  on A u g u s t it  in  again  21.  agreed  turned in  their  In  May,  to  admit  be h e l d  Given the that  to  at  Soviet  separate  con-  74  current  conferences would be h e l d  Union with  This  in  24,  of  did  outline  reservations had  earlier  formed  of  sibility  as  was not  being  were  and  the  of  the  talks.  to  the  efficiency of that of  matter 21,  It  the  the  talks,  Soviet  phase  soon  developed  Security  Council,  none  occurred over  permanent  Hull's seat  goes  so  that  t h e r e was  ciples  far  amount  the  tify  to  not  a very He  agreement final  end  itself  of  Soviet  large  with  simultaneously  in  the  that  -  enough of  for  proposals  Soviet  phase,  China  was  the  four  he  be  the  solved  not  immediately  obviating known.  China's  by  capitals  1 , 2 3  year  several  in  days  a  issuing the  "the  fact  prin-  British,  gratifying settle  reluctance  powers  in  China's  basic  Nations  the  the  revealed  the  conference to a United  and  Thanks  Moscow, Hull,  on  achieved  latter*s  in  membership.  t h r e e weeks,  of  pos-  procedures  agreement  for  the  in-  conference began,  voting  had  the  a  for  of  the  given  security,  thus  after  only  phase.  Chinese  renegotiated.  of  delegations  were  Soviet  be  some  first  area  the  would  had  previous  be  they  Roosevelt  over  the to  that  adds  draft the  have  state  and American  of  proposed At  as  insistence  did  involved.  Russian,  the  that  publicly  deadlock  to  Chinese  Chinese  "becoming  the  during  seems  a  largely  seating  informed that  discussed  occur,  progress  the  On A u g u s t though  Chinese  instructed  the of  the  what  fact  general  avoid  China.  On J u l y appraised  to  final  upon  a  Charter."^ to  iden-  communique'  involved.  75  The with did  following  Britain  any changes  sitting t o what  of publishing  a n y amendments  Government  first  would  China's  delay.  [u.S.S.R.},  American apparently  States  had been given  long-range tangible  China's  seat  a potential  of  Unfortunately,  Asia.  continuity reached  t e r ' s entry Late  policy  source some  into  goals  such  between t h e U.S. t h e war i n t h e  6, t h e  accepted i t ,  amendments  of  2  at the  were clearly  . . . representa-  the United  Kingdom,...  the  6  i t s immediate  for the Far East. t o remain  Council,  of influence factors  Soviet  C o u n c i l was  accomplished  encouragement  of the second goal  at Yalta  consist  China...."  on t h e S e c u r i t y  acquiring  which  to offer  of America,  of  alterations,  when t h e p r o p o s a l s  should  diplomacy had again  its  without  i n the Security  Council  the Republic  reminded o f t h e  On O c t o b e r  2 5  delegation  On t h e n i n t h ,  "The S e c u r i t y  text  began  been accepted, and  promptly  the right  membership  of the United  through  The Chinese  China.  require referral to the  retaining  U.N. Conference.  published,  tives  i n with  the present  and t h e r e f o r e i n v o l v e  not without  stated:  phase  had already  document was r e a d t o t h e C h i n e s e though  29) t h e C h i n e s e  attempted t o do so t h e y were  desirability since  (September  and t h e U.S.  n o t make  when t h e y  day  and  Chiang  i n t h e war, and  t h e U . S . was  i n t h e postwar  mitigated  as t h e s e c r e t  structure  against the agreements  and t h e U.S.S.R.  for the  lat-  Pacific.  i n 1944, t h e war i n Europe h a d progressed  t o such  an  76  extent  that  December  Germany's  16,  Eisenhower  however,  baclc t o  Bulge.  Though  initial  success,  launch  held  reacted  to  in  this  evidence  Meuse  fact  thrust, an  an  "Marshall  and h i s  essential  to  a  nearly  the  lacked  they  eve  That  effort  is  Yalta,  associates  clear  view  where  were  the  the  and  speedy  existed  December  at  this  quote  had  In  of  date  preover-  December  a  view  s t i l l  Pogue:  Russian  culmination  their  grossly  F.C.  that  under  late  Allies  Allies  On  the  exploit  prevailed,  to  of  to  today.  convinced  successful  troops  Battle  s t i l l  hopes  a year.  the  logistics  the  different  of  pushed  could  victory.  German  within  disruptive  the  dissipated  entirely  on t h e  in  that  early  last  seemed p o s s i b l e  Germans  Germans  the  for  1944 h o w e v e r ,  the  the  the  a major  viously  defeat  the  aid war  was in  Europe...."27 If  doubts  Germany's would  few would  surrender.  islands in  defeat,  any  that other  respondingly In  this  ling  with  of  war  on  the  guess  as  defending  theater  with  a  exact to  date  when  the  casualties  Japan  outer  ferocity on b o t h  of  rim  of  unequalled sides  cor-  high: six-month  forces  some  were  20,000  some  20,000  lost  more  to  suffer  some  Iwo  Japanese  at  wounded....  than  destroyed.  casualties  campaign  Japanese....  ...  numbered  were  homeland  and were  a  screened t h e i r  300,000  killed  1944  hazard  The Japanese  last  American  in  100,000  But  United  39,000,  afloat  were  of  to  clear  60,000 Jima a  Okinawa States  10,000  with  the  of ...  More  whom 7 , 3 0 0  Philippines,  casualties  ...  cost  dead.  the  nearly the  than  Army ... 5,000  and were  while  Marine  7,000  Japanese 7,800 Marine dead.  dead.  k i l -  Corps dead force  planes casualties Naval  Japanese  77  planes So the  an  the  be  vasion  large  spite  of  of  1944  some  the  By  close  the  eral  end o f  country,  forces,  China  the  did  exist  after  1944  the  the  U.S.  defeat to  the  Herbert Tokyo  Feis  area  in  of  sur-  Manchuria,  Korea. cost  one  And of  an  or  even in-  million  support war,  miles  this  state  and by  view.  against  some  pyres.  ninety Only  Nagasaki  largest  cities four  and  these  cities  Force. cities,  destroyed,  that  So  had  major  Sapporo  Japan....  become cities  of  all a  l i t in  the  remained  bombs  thoroughly  the  ex-  committed  [Tokyo-Yokohama,  with  end  that: had  B-29  that  the  Two  strength  [1945]  of  Japan,  actually  their  Hiroshima,  targets.  the  of  funeral  sections  square  in  Japan  conquest  guarantee  to  of  received nearly half  103.22  basis  Airforce believed  ...  them as  the  the Americans  enemy T w e n t i e t h A i r  major  But  and  a million  Kobe,  NagoyaJ  increased  On t h e  2 9  estimated  five  the  during  predicted that  1946.  the  the  the  month.  itself  in  that  casualties  undamaged,... by  defense  Rwantung Army  estimates,  July  Kyoto,  in  °  3 0  portion  ash-choked  not  forces  accomplish  of  per  December  from h a l f  writing  a minor  Japanese  12,750  did  these  others.  Chiefs-of-Staff  Japanese  evidence  pilots  only  U.S.  such  could unaided,  Japanese  to  independent  casualties.  368  1945 A m e r i c a n  islands  of  it  By  the  overall  of  Japan v a r i e d  American In  the  damaged  defeated before  the help of  and  3,200  the highly  equally  without  was  of  J a p a n e s e home of  ships  months  evidence,  not  render the  seven  average  such  could  36  tenacious  first  from of  sank  Osaka-  dropped  gutted  were  combined t o t a l  Americans  of  eliminated  3 1  adds March  that  "one A m e r i c a n  £ 9 - 1 0 * ] 1945  did  incendiary  more  damage  air and  raid killed  on  78  and  i n j u r e d more  half  square  ranged  miles  precise  effect  considered Of  at  prime  invasion promise  of to  home  what  the  of  of  With  this  in  resist  was  and  a  casualties  It  3 3  should  "after  could  the  be  Yalta,"  not  have  Japanese  their  been  Stalin  in  and  Moscow  had  cabled the  casualties  course  Korea,  the  in  such  an  Russians  of  their 1944,  Harriman), intervention.  an i n t e r v i e w w i t h  results  an  defeat.  December  (Averell  and  Stalin's  from r e i n f o r c i n g  Roosevelt  expected for  f o u r t e e n t h , Harriman  of  political  upon Germany's  troops  mind,  from a  estimated  Pacific  Manchuria  in  both  T h e r e was  the  Ambassador  day  to  entail.  a mass  compensations  following  and t h e  occurred  Roosevelt,  view,  China,  from h i s  sixteen  1  raids  will  to  t h e war  in  Hiroshima;"- ^  conference.  point  islands.  On t h e  these  Japan would  prevent  inquired  of  importance  intervening  at  three hundred t h o u s a n d .  Japan's  that  enter  than  Tokyo were d e s t r o y e d ,  to  all on  a humanitarian  would  of  from e i g h t y  noted here that  By  Japanese  Stalin  the meeting  to  and  the  President: He  [Stalin]  went  He  said  be  returned to  part  of  Dairen ports you i f the  that the  the  saying  that  question  wished  to  in  He  the  and t h e  drew a  Russians wished area. this  the  need f o r  P a c i f i c . . .  the  lower  line  including I in  Russia  Chinese-Eastern  at  to I  should  and  lease  these  recalled  Teheran and  said  map. Southern  Arthur  initiated  t o have  Stalin  a  Sakhalin  Port that  fact  out  around the  again  said  question  c o r r e c t , you had  the  lease  room and b r o u g h t  Peninsula  discussed  of  next  Islands  surrounding  and he had  port  Kurile  Liaotung  and t h e  the  Russia....  my m e m o r y i s  water  into  access  that,  yourself to  a  further that  Railway....  He  that  said  warm he the  79  o n l y c o n s i d e r a t i o n he had not mentioned at Teheran was the r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e s t a t u s quo i n Outer Mongolia - the maintenance o f the R e p u b l i c o f Outer Mongolia as an independent identity. 3 4  At the M a l t a Conference on February 2, 1945, R o o s e v e l t w i t h the aforementioned i n f o r m a t i o n i n hand t o l d C h u r c h i l l t h a t t h e War  i n Europe would end i n 1945, b u t t h a t t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t  Japan might c o n t i n u e u n t i l December 1 9 4 6 .  35  That same day at  the meeting o f the Combined C h i e f s , C h u r c h i l l q u e r i e d R o o s e v e l t on the r e a l i t i e s o f C h i n a .  The P r e s i d e n t answered t h a t "three  g e n e r a t i o n s o f e d u c a t i o n and t r a i n i n g would be r e q u i r e d b e f o r e China c o u l d become a s e r i o u s f a c t o r . " t h e r e f o r e , R o o s e v e l t was  3 6  On t h e eve o f Y a l t a  f u l l y aware o f the human c o s t an i n -  v a s i o n o f Japan would i n c u r ; he knew the p r i c e the S o v i e t Union would exact f o r e n t e r i n g the war i n the P a c i f i c , and he had a l i m i t e d view o f China's power p o t e n t i a l .  In Europe, t h e B a t t l e  o f the Bulge had a l s o demonstrated t h e i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y o f the S o v i e t armies, who  under Zhukov, were l e s s than a hundred m i l e s  from B e r l i n when t h e conference began on February  4.  37  On the f i r s t day o f the Y a l t a Conference Harriman Roosevelt t h a t S t a l i n would r a i s e the q u e s t i o n o f f o r h i s e n t r y i n t o the war i n the P a c i f i c .  reminded  compensations  R o o s e v e l t answered  t h a t he wanted t o c o n s u l t w i t h Chiang over the s t a t u s quo i n Mongolia, but was  ready t o go ahead on S t a l i n ' s o t h e r demands.  On February 8, d u r i n g t h e R o o s e v e l t - S t a l i n meeting at L i v a d i a  80  Palace,  Roosevelt  would be of  in  Sakhalin  and  the  port  of  that  "he h a d  not  with  Marshal  Chiang  the  yet  Chinese."  could  conversion  national postwar the  right  of  peated the  this, "it  would be  Once excuse  that  in  much  a  the  their  so  use  stated  to  to  the  that  at  he  discussions to  that  "there  southern  Russia  the  of  had  Teheran  this  could  half  end  (FDR)  at  discuss  t h e r e f o r e he  of  port  but  matter  not  i f  not  him  was  speak  and  said  controversy  to  the  the  interest  Dairen,  re-  with  a  Russian." were  on  com-  To  not  met,  explain  to  t h e war  against  Japan...."  placate  question  Stalin with  known  followed,  s t i l l  inter-  in  again  or  to  t h e m was  What  that  to  form o f  this  one  the  leasing,  interest  demands  Molotov  attempted  hours."  some  of  and  basic  entering  which  Roosevelt  use  Chinese his  discussed  "anything  the  by  outright  basing  Czars.  for  that  Roosevelt  twenty-four  the  "one  Russia  port:  Railways,  of  for  means  c o n t r o l l e d by  suggested up  the  the  then mentioned h i s  enjoyed by  difficult  the  going  discussed  Stalin  emphasized  that  of  the free  made  he had  regard  opportunity  Manchurian  access  again  phasizing world  into  p e o p l e why  an  in  Roosevelt  acquire  possibly  query  reminded S t a l i n  Kai-shek,  conditions  Stalin  Soviet  of  of  then  had  in  Islands  Dairen  commission. use  mission  Stalin's  3 9  Nevertheless, U.S.S.R.  Kurile  Roosevelt  3 8  mentioned the  its  to  no d i f f i c u l t y w h a t s o e v e r  the w a r . "  for  answer  rages  the  with  the  Chiang,  em-  to  the  whole  forms  the  nucleus  over  the  question  of  81  Yalta:  Roosevelt's  Marshal not that He  Stalin  think he  it  done.  set  it  entering  in  (February  war  in  become  the  free  operated by  a  joint  not  wish  China  was  interested without  t o have Port  to  amendment,  Stalin  it  on t h e  same  had  and  the  the  to  by  the  t h a Mlt  demands:  said  he  Chinese  Supreme  — I — .  a  Russia  mediately  see  agreed  Soviet.  these  three this  did  and con-  powers.  c o u -III l d I —b e  —Mil ...HIH,  II  make  to  Stalin's  First,  second,  "felt of  informed Molotov  Port  the  sure  these  in  immediately  Arthur  and Railways  Commission. the  the  In  President  two m a t t e r s  concurrence of  difficulty  conditions  Manchurian  that  in  on  which  General-  comprehending  called  of  this  Roosevelt  who  spot.  free  after  port  different, required a  Roosevelt,  that  he  the  some  approached Harriman Dairen  Harriman to  finally  Harriman  afternoon  A r t h u r was  Stalin  dispose  so  therefore  upon  of  Chinese-Soviet  added t h a t  Molotov  4 1  That  to  he t h o u giWJlh |t| | — — •  10),  ports,  would  endorsed  Stalin's  leave here with  Pacific.  Harriman  last  to  to  security]  speak  agreed  wanted  addition,  issimo."  to  security  writing  Roosevelt  the  should  would be  the  i n• d i c ||a t•• •e d that | — ^ ^ — | WI III  later  amendments  Dairen  |  Chinese yet  would be w e l l  forth  writing,  4 0  Two d a y s  for  (poor  necessary  could guarantee  T hI e P r• e s i dI e| —n —t I II II II  three  agreed  was  added t h a t  ditions  acquiescence i n  under it  joint  formal  said  that  conference " h e was  international  was  to  lease."  which he  R u s s i a be  now a c c e p t e d a  and  the  granted  be  did, a  entirely  and the  lease  Chinese-Soviet  to  willing  c o n t r o l , but  a Russian  Harriman  meeting,  naval  base  suggested he President Port  that  im-  there-  Arthur.  commission  for  and  the  82  Manchurian needed. also  Railroads,  He  give  to  his  then  which  the  until  Soviet  protocol  of  the  Roosevelt's year its  later.  4  a  open d i p l o m a c y , the  President  of  fully  vention  the  With  these  segments lives, of  to  China  that  role  the  East.  China's  from e i g h t Port  the  secret  t h e war  to  nature  at  of  necessity  Nor  was  he  of  at  guarantee  for any in  Yalta, to the  a  the  to  one  and  believe  in  who  accused  the  Yalta  and  Soviet  inter-  illusions Eastern  as  to  Europe.  abandoned  save  American  ultimate  occupation.  Mongolia  from  two  4  playing  integrity  Japanese  Outer  under  by  exactly  approached  the  so,  in  detractors 4  do  11),  agreement  encouraged  Roosevelt  Roosevelt  press  the  to  Pacific,  placed  the  Yalta.  were  the  4 2  of  agreement  Omitted  d o c u m e n t was  of  and  in  Germany.  Roosevelt's  armies  war,  Arthur,  of  China  mind,  years  (February  signed  should  Chinese  day  the  that  the  following  released  to  inform  was  Mongolia."  President  this  territorial  the  to  traditionally  doubt  in  Generalissimo  the  enter  and  cause  Soviet  concurrence  advised  defeat  convinced  Far  shorten  Dairen,  to  betraying  factors  of  the  nation  gave  Conference  t h e huge  Stalin  safe  One n e e d h a r d l y  in  The  conference,  in  Chiang's "the  not  (Stalin)  Unfortunately,  3  secrecy,  he  U n i o n was  personal  that  Roosevelt  and  after  that  |"the3 s t a t u s q u o i n O u t e r  agreed.  Churchill  t h r e e months  to  asked  Roosevelt  Roosevelt,  to  consent  decisions  which  agreed  emphasized however,  Stalin these  and  large  liberation  Given  the  portions  fact of  83  Manchuria since  had been out  1905,  China's  it  can be  territorial  maintained.  Chinese  argued  nation  Cairo  was  as  some  of  further  discredited the  great  created  for  January  American prestige added  another  inflicted  The  China  item to  years  Government an  in  on C h i n a  Three  Declaration,  since  the  since  after  Information  editorial  comment  editorial  According about end  war.  The  Roosevelt himself Yalta  The  at  had  of  nature  it  of  in  Doctor  H.K.  Roosevelt Dr.  had Tong  conversion  Yalta  to  of  was  existence  such  of  the  commitment  differed  was  not  the  from what  President known  to  was  1899.  queried  and  of  had  Chinese on  Mercury.  Sherwood's edition  discussed  of  with  Chiang  answered: Roosevelt,...  the later  inquired  into  free  port  was  that  he  when t i m e  came,  sovereignty made b y  President  Chiang the  of  the  1948,  Chiang of  had  and  t h e West  Post  Dairen  a proposal  i n [fringement?J  made. of  of  President  the  1946  factions  Tong,  28,  have  diplomacy  Notes of  Evening  the August  Dairen.  critics  to  reduced  grievances  serialized portion  suggested to  commitment  time  a  The r e p l y no  also  political  my r e c o l l e c t i o n P r e s i d e n t  t h e r e was  China.  list  Shanghai  that  of  consideration  vided  the  effect  possibility  of  give  to  all  It  Director  to  disposal  1942.  the  the  affront  contradicted  image A m e r i c a n  the war,  Colliers,  the  it  Open Door  in  an  Roosevelt's  the  and H o p k i n s . . . .  Cairo  1,  amongst  Office,  instances  great  before  Roosevelt  at  of  as  some  a n d when r e v e a l e d i n  power  long  referred to  the  not  in  a f f e c t e d however,  essence  China  control,  this  integrity  To the the  of  at  proof  President  Roosevelt  Cairo.  Government  at  might  of  The China  at  4 5  document h a s  never been  denied by  the  84  State  Department  b e made  for  at  time.  that  prewar  and  acting  U.S.  it  is  doubtful  otherwise,  Such  critics  Ambassador  to  whether  given  as  the  Herbert  Japan,  a  logical  state Feis,  Joseph  C.  of  Chinese  G.A.  Grew  case  could  security  Lensen,  (amongst  and  the  others),  46 have  roundly  often  neglected  agreement with was  in  China this  in  and  of  issues  this  which  to  War  criticism  Russia  assist  promise  Secretary gent  condemned R o o s e v e l t ' s  in  t h e war  between the  is  promises her  Stimson  role  at  the  to  was  the  a  Union  What  clause  to  (early  postpone  and t h e  of  is the  nonaggression  from J a p a n .  Pacific  "willing  Soviet  final  sign  liberation in  Yalta.  So  in  pact  crucial  1945),  all  United  the  that  diver-  States..."  47 to  achieve  MacArthur the  this  Manchuria."  also the  was  being  assured  reap  the  to  the  would  by  that  It  continue  internal  engaged  treaty,  he  of  after  of by  no  the  Yalta,  J a p a n was the  even  General  contingent  Russians  This  Chinese  China  on  in  the  in  in  Agreement for its  one y e a r political  from eight  years  Nationalists  relative  policy,  Yalta  Nationalists,  released  other  of  the  assistance  was  reassured  policy  U.S.,  Soviet  freeing  also its  the  treaty  and  for  affairs.  to  survival  When t h e  credit  occupation.  invasion  "heavily  importance  Kuomintang Japan.  the  days  4 8  prime  vital  from  Seventeen  believed that  Japanese  Of  end.  it  promised  liberation later,  since  of  that  at  Chiang  faction  would  Japanese the  noninterference in  effect  was  least  U.S.S.R. Chinese 1937,  85  was  never  the  misconceptions  none  equalled  Chinese for  fully  understood  that  Communists  China  was  of  by  American  which  affected  which  assumed  over  vital  the  U.S. that  diplomacy. Chinese the  Nationalists  interest  to  Soviet  For  wartime  ascendancy in  the  Far  of  power  Eastern  all  relations,  of  the  struggle policy.  49  NOTES 1 F l e e t A d m i r a l W.D. L e a h y , I was t h e r e : The P e r s o n a l S t o r y o f t h e C h i e f - o f - S t a f f t o P r e s i d e n t s R o o s e v e l t and Truman B a s e d o n H i s N o t e s a n d D i a r i e s M a d e a t t h e T i m e (New Y o r k : M c G r a w - H i l l , 1950), p. 100. 2  Sherwood,  p.  774.  3 S t a r t e d i n 1942, t h e r o a d r a n from Ledo i n Assam p r o v i n c e I n d i a , i n t o N o r t h Burma a n d u l t i m a t e l y t o Kunming i n W e s t e r n China. T h i s l a t t e r c o n n e c t i o n was n o t s e c u r e d u n t i l J a n u a r y 2 6 , 1945; C h i a n g t h e r e u p o n renamed t h e r o a d i n t r i b u t e t o S t i l w e l l . In September 1945, t h e tonnage d e l i v e r e d t o China through t h e S t i l w e l l Road was: 31.0 thousand short t o n s , t h i s i n c l u d e d 12.4 thousand short tons c a r r i e d through the p i p e l i n e that p a r a l l e l e d the road. T h e Hump a i r l i f t d u r i n g t h i s same m o n t h f e r r i e d 4 9 . 2 thousand short tons i n t o China. H e r b e r t F e i s , The C h i n a T a n g l e : The American E f f o r t i n C h i n a from P e a r l Harbor t o t h e M a r s h a l l Mission (Princeton: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1953), p. 275, n. 16. 4 always  Sherwood the  peace."  Sherwood,  Roosevelt  at  formed him Chinese  "that  In  could  of  a  but 1942,  supplies  On November continuing  without  6  Stimson  7  Ibid.,  the  downfall  had  p.  of  214.  also  shipping."  538.  p.  of  Clair At  Japan."  530.  that  cabled had  C L .  to  given  105  Chennault, (New  Way  York:  Conference  10,000  tons  severely  damage  "more  225-26.  the  bombers,  with  pp.  i n -  1584.  12 h e a v y  the Washington  and  Ibid.,  that  on,  was  separate  offers  II,  Lee Chennault  boasted sink  Hull  peace  claimed  a  Chunking  Hull,  later  & Bundy, p.  make  and  1949),  of  to  success."  in  "there  make  1943,  had  Chennault tons  29,  Chennault  per month, he would  a million  might  t h e A m e r i c a n Embassy  The Memoirs  & Sons,  1943,  believed that  Kuomintang  30 m e d i u m b o m b e r s  "accomplish  Putnam's  Roosevelt the  740.  that  October  Fighter:  that that  J a p a n was  fighters,  he  May  p.  Cairo  Government,  5 modern  states  possibility  of  of than  87  8 Sloan  T . H . White & Pearce,  Stimson: sity at  A Study  Press,  the  in  1954),  a meeting  in  broad  in his  White  205.  215.  On t h e as  The House  pp.  327,  R.N.  (New Y o r k : Current,  Brunswick:  following "that  evidence of p.  Papers  also  (New  "Peanut,"  Sherwood,  (ed.),  See  Statecraft  p.  cables  conclusion. 9  The S t i l w e l l  p.  the White  Chinese...."  Chiang  (ed.).  1948),  Rutgers  month,  Stilwell  Univer-  Roosevelt  obviously  Stilwell's  Roosevelt  Duell  Secretary  was  stated  hated  reference  to  drawing  rather  a  739.  330.  10 Stimson & Bundy, p. 538. In h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h S t i l w e l l b e f o r e the l a t t e r ' s appointment t o C h i n a , Stimson warned t h a t h i s e n e m i e s i n h i s new p o s i t i o n w o u l d b e f o u r k i n d s : "Japanese, C h i n e s e , B r i t i s h , and A m e r i c a n . " I b i d . . p. 532. 11  White  (ed.),  pp.  251-54.  12 F o r i n s t a n c e , h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o arm t h e C h i n e s e Communists along with the N a t i o n a l i s t s , a suggestion vehemently condemned i n t h e U.S. d u r i n g t h e M c C a r t h y e r a . See U.S. Cong r e s s , S e n a t e , Committee on F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , S t a t e Department Employee L o y a l t y I n v e s t i g a t i o n : Report. 81st Cong., 2nd. Sess. S e n a t e R e p o r t No. 2108 ( W a s h i n g t o n : U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1950). R.Y. Koen q u o t e s one o f C h i a n g ' s s t r o n g e s t supporters i n the China Lobby, to the e f f e c t that " S t i l w e l l for p e r s o n a l reasons a b e t t e d i t [the s o - c a l l e d Department o f State p l o t t o subvert the cause of the N a t i o n a l i s t s t o t h a t of the Communists! t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t by h i s a c t i o n s and c e r t a i n l y d i d nothing t o oppose i t . " The China Lobby i n American P o l i t i c s (New Y o r k : M a c m i l l a n , 1960), p. 191, q u o t i n g A. K o h l b e r g , "China V i a S t i l w e l l R o a d , " The C h i n a M o n t h l y ( O c t o b e r 1 9 4 8 ) , IX, 283-87. 13 These were t h e t h r e e d i v i s i o n s t r a i n e d at Ramgarh, India, which w i t h two a d d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s f o u g h t under S t i l w e l l i n t h e S e c o n d Burma C a m p a i g n . The r e m a i n i n g f i f t e e n were t r a i n e d i n Yunnan P r o v i n c e C h i n a and fought i n t h e Salween Campaign. 14 Front sity  See L . P . in  Chinese  Press,  Van  Slyke,  Communist  1967),  pp.  Enemies History  and  Friends:  (Stanford:  The  United  Stanford  Univer-  92-99.  15 "I judge Kuomintang and Kungchantang [communist P a r t y ] , b y what I saw: [K.M.T.] c o r r u p t i o n , n e g l e c t , chaos economy, t a x e s , words and d e e d s . Hoarding, black market, trading with enemy. Communist program . . . r e d u c e t a x e s , r e n t s , i n t e r e s t . R a i s e p r o d u c t i o n and standard o f l i v i n g . Participate in govern-  88  ment. P r a c t i c e what they preach." Undated e n t r y b e f o r e h i s 1944 r e c a l l , quoted i n White (ed.), p. 316. 16 Soong t o Stimson, Washington, August 18, 1943, F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1943. C h i n a , p. 94. 17 Between T e a r s and Laughter (Toronto: Longmans Green, 1943), pp. 110-11. See a l s o i b i d . . pp. 63, 173. 18  Romanus & Sunderland, I I , 64.  19  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . C a i r o . . . , p. 889.  20  I b i d . . pp. 889-90.  21  I b i d . , p. 890.  22 China White Paper. I I , 551-52. H u l l s t a t e s t h a t t h e t r i p "was w i t h o u t b e n e f i c i a l e f f e c t . " H u l l , I I , 1585-86. 23 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1944. G e n e r a l . I (1966), 623, n. 19. See a l s o H u l l , I I , 1650. 24  H u l l , I I , 1684.  25 U.S. Department o f S t a t e , Postwar F o r e i g n P o l i c y Prepar a t i o n (Washington: U.S. Government P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , 1949), p. 332. 26 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1944. G e n e r a l . I , 893. F o r t h e f u l l t e x t , see Appendix V I I I . 27 Quoted i n J.N. S n e l l (ed.). The Meaning o f Y a l t a : B i g Three Diplomacy and t h e New Balance o f Power (Baton Rouge: L o u i s i a n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956), pp. 29-30. C a p t a i n B.H. L i d d e l l H a r t , s t a t e s t h a t t h e German t h r u s t o f December 16, 1944, "gave t h e A l l i e s t h e i r b i g g e s t shock s i n c e 1942...." The German Generals T a l k (New York: B e r k l e y , 1958), p . 238. See a l s o i b i d . . pp. 239-43? R.E. Merriam, The B a t t l e o f t h e Bulge (New York: B a l l a n t i n e Books, 1947) ? G e n e r a l F., von Senger und E t t e r l i n g , N e i t h e r Fear Nor Hope (New York: Dutton, 1964), p. 324. As t o R o o s e v e l t ' s knowledge o f t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e atomic bomb a t Y a l t a , Pogue contends t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t , M a r s h a l l and Stimson were n o t i f i e d by t h e end o f December 1944, t h a t an atomic bomb "possessing enormous d e s t r u c t i v e power would be ready f o r use about the f i r s t o f August, 1945...." Quoted i n S n e l l (ed.), p. 199. 28  Pogue, quoted i n S n e l l  (ed.), pp. 31-32.  89  29  I b i d . . p. 33.  30 The h a l f m i l l i o n c a s u a l t y e s t i m a t e i s Truman's. Memoirs o f H a r r y S. Truman (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p. 315. The one m i l l i o n e s t i m a t e i s Stimson's and e n t a i l s a t o t a l p r o j e c t i o n o f a l l U.S. c a s u a l t i e s . P e i s , Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and t h e End o f t h e War i n t h e P a c i f i c ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1961), p. 12, q u o t i n g Stimson, "The D e c i s i o n t o Use t h e Atomic Bomb," Harper's Magazine (February, 1947). See a l s o J.R. Dean, The Strange A l l i a n c e : The S t o r y o f American E f f o r t s at Wartime C o o p e r a t i o n w i t h R u s s i a (New York: V i k i n g P r e s s , 1947), p. 225? J . H e f f e r n a n , "The bombing o f Hiroshima Truman's d e c i s i o n a l o n e , " Vancouver Sun (August 6, 1970), p. 7, and espec i a l l y Hans Bethe's l e t t e r t o t h e New York Times (February 28, 1971), p. 12, e n t i t l e d : " Y a l t a : Lack o f Communication on Bomb," i n which he s t a t e s t h a t by February 1945 t h e r e e x i s t e d a 90 p e r cent p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e atomic bomb would i n f a c t explode. 31 O. Masatake, J . H o r i k o s h i & M. C a d i n , Z e r o : The I n s i d e S t o r y o f Japan's A i r War i n t h e P a c i f i c (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 276-78. Y e t t h i s carnage was accomplished b y v i r t u a l l y few r a i d s . G e n e r a l L.S. Kuter who r e p r e s e n t e d A r n o l d at Y a l t a , s t a t e s : "By March 9, 1945, o n l y 22 s m a l l - s c a l e B-29 s t r i k e s had been flown a g a i n s t Japan from t h e Marianas.... I t was s i x t y - f i v e days ( a f t e r Y a l t a ] b e f o r e t h e f i r s t f i v e - h u n d r e d a i r p l a n e s t r i k e c o u l d be d e l i v e r e d . . . . " Airman a t Y a l t a (New York: D u e l l , S l o a n , & Pearce, 1955), pp. 4, 9, quoted i n S n e l l (ed.), p . 201. The h i g h l y combustible c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Japanese urban d w e l l i n g s as w i t n e s s e d by t h i s w r i t e r i n these c i t i e s i n 1951-54, was no doubt r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e ease w i t h which they c o u l d be e l i m i n a t e d through r e l a t i v e l y l i g h t f i r e bombings.  Yalta  32  F e i s , Japan Subdued.... p. 180.  33  Masatake e t a l . . pp. 276-77.  34 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1945. The Conferences a t M a l t a and (1955), pp. 378-79. 35  G.A. Lensen, quoted i n S n e l l  (ed.), p. 143.  36  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , M a l t a . . . . p. 544.  37  Pogue, quoted i n S n e l l  38  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . M a l t a . . . . p. 768.  (ed.), p. 31.  90  39 I b i d . . p. 769. D u r i n g t h i s same c o n v e r s a t i o n o f F e b r u a r y 8, 1945, R o o s e v e l t i n f o r m e d S t a l i n on t h r e e d i s t i n c t occasions t h a t he had not had the o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i s c u s s with C h i a n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f D a i r e n and t h e M a n c h u r i a n Railways. Ibid. F o u r t e e n months e a r l i e r however, R o o s e v e l t h a d a s s u r e d the Soviet leader that the Chinese would agree t o Soviet access t o D a i r e n w e r e i t made a f r e e p o r t u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e . Sherwood s t a t e s t h a t R o o s e v e l t h a d i n f a c t d i s c u s s e d t h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f D a i r e n w i t h C h i a n g at C a i r o a few days b e f o r e Teheran. Sherwood, p. 792. On J u n e 2 3 , 1 9 4 4 , d u r i n g a c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h V i c e - P r e s i d e n t W a l l a c e , C h i a n g s t a t e d t h a t "he h a d discussed the matter (disposition of Dairen} with President R o o s e v e l t at C a i r o and had i n d i c a t e d h i s agreement p r o v i d e d t h e U.S.S.R. c o o p e r a t e d w i t h C h i n a i n t h e F a r E a s t and p r o v i d e d t h e r e was no i m p a i r m e n t o f C h i n e s e s o v e r e i g n t y . " China White Paper. II, 558. See a l s o t h e comments o f D r . H.K. T o n g o f A u g u s t 2 8 , 1 9 4 8 , t h i s p a p e r , p. 83.  this  40  Foreign  41  Ibid..  p.  894.  42  Ibid.,  p.  895  43  Ibid..  p.  984.  44  The Chunking  myth  throughout  echoed t h i s "The  war...." see  1970),  Clemens,  pp.  Foreign  46  H.  Koen,  1953),  Stalin  took  desires Grew, 1945  less the  (Boston: to  Marquis  than  Far  of  to  111.  actively  Senator  get For  Joe  FDR  Stalin  X.  policy: sold  into  a recent view  -  Vandenberg,  China  where  IX  fostered  Arthur  America's  Chiang  the  of  Oxford University  in  Cairo....  p.  Roosevelt  Stalin:  Jap  Yalta,  Press,  states of  a  Mifflin, was  not  Record  1942),  until  tentative  Snell II,  four  draft  of  T h e War  They  Princeton  that  an h o u r  Quoted i n  A Diplomatic it  891.  (Princeton:  Lensen  a quarter  East."  that  Kido  mine.)  see A p p e n d i c i e s  Lobby"  1949,  stated  Sought  513-15;  Houghton  note  (Italics  244-55.  Turbulent Era:  esting that  in  p.  Churchill  pp.  text  "China In  (New Y o r k :  Waged a n d T h e P e a c e T h e y Press,  full  order  Relations.  Feis,  769  T e h e r a n and Y a l t a  in  Yalta  216-25,  45  to  p.  integral.)  the  U.S.  when h e  river  Quoted i n  D.S.  For  financed  goes back  down t h e  Malta....  (Italics  the  attitude  'crime'  Kai-shek  Relations.  to  consider  (ed.), of  University  "Roosevelt p.  and Russian  147;  Forty Years: 1444.  months  It  is  "after  a proposal  for  J.C. 1904inter-  Yalta" the  91  Emperor, the in  noted:  latter  e v e r y way  peror  of 47  "The  half  of  for  Japan  prosecuting  (New  Current,  statistics  the year  p.  Jersey:  we  appended  shall  war."  ...  reveal  completely L.  Mosley,  Prentice-Hall,  lose  that our  after power  Hirohito:  1966),  p.  Em-  294.  226.  48 W. M i l l i s ( e d . ) , T h e F o r r e s t a l D i a r i e s (New Y o r k : V i k i n g Press, 1951), p. 31. A d m i r a l L e a h y s h a r e d an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t outlook however: "I w a s o f t h e f i r m o p i n i o n t h a t o u r war a g a i n s t Japan h a d p r o g r e s s e d t o t h e p o i n t where h e r d e f e a t was o n l y a m a t t e r o f t i m e a n d a t t r i t i o n . T h e r e f o r e we d i d n o t n e e d S t a l i n ' s h e l p t o d e f e a t o u r enemy i n t h e P a c i f i c . The Army d i d not agree with m e . . . . " Leahy, p. 293. See a l s o i b i d . . p.  317.  49 Clemens s t a t e s t h a t S t a l i n reminded Roosevelt at Y a l t a t h a t "he [ S t a l i n ] c o n s i s t e n t l y b a c k e d a u n i t e d f r o n t p o l i c y , and (as f a r b a c k as t h e 1 9 2 0 ' s , i n f a c t ) h a d i n s i s t e d on i t . He assured Roosevelt t h a t he had never agreed with i t s dissolution." Clemens, p. 251. See a l s o Van S l y k e , p p . 9 2 - 9 6 , 106, 1 1 3 - 1 6 . It i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note i n view o f S t a l i n ' s above a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e U n i t e d F r o n t d i d n o t e n t a i l any f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e s s i o n s on t h e p a r t o f t h e C h i n e s e Communist P a r t y (or t h e Kuomintang) to e i t h e r fundamental ideology or u l t i m a t e g o a l s . I b i d . . p. 121. C h i a n g ' s i n s i s t e n c e on a S i n o - S o v i e t t r e a t y d u r i n g h i s convers a t i o n w i t h W a l l a c e on June 23, 1944, i s t r e a t e d i n C h i n a White P a p e r . II, 558. F o r some C h i n e s e a n d A m e r i c a n r e a c t i o n s t o t h e t r e a t y , s e e i b i d . , I, 120-23.  V  POUR YEARS OF DIPLOMACY:  AN ASSESSMENT  In attempting t o assess t h e motives which prompted American diplomacy January  t o f o s t e r t h e image o f China as a g r e a t power from  1, 1942 t o Y a l t a , one i s immediately  faced w i t h t h e l a c k  o f c r e d i b i l i t y such an e f f o r t was d e s t i n e d t o evoke.  I f , as t h i s  w r i t e r m a i n t a i n s , China's new s t a t u s amounted t o n o t h i n g more t a n g i b l e than convenient tokenism, why d i d t h e U.S. go t o such l e n g t h s t o c r e a t e t h i s image d u r i n g t h e war and attempt  t o insure  i t s p e r p e t u a t i o n i n t o t h e postwar e r a ? Four p o s s i b i l i t i e s present themselves  to this writer:  F i r s t , t h e obvious n e c e s s i t y o f m a i n t a i n i n g China i n t h e war a g a i n s t Japan t o ensure h e r continued o c c u p a t i o n by masses o f Japanese t r o o p s t h a t would otherwise be used a g a i n s t t h e U.S. and her a l l i e s i n the P a c i f i c .  This factor increased i n relevance  as t h e war approached t h e Japanese home i s l a n d s , and America faced t h e prospect o f a l a n d i n g i n Japan and a mammoth b a t t l e f o r the P l a i n o f Tokyo.  The estimated c a s u a l t i e s t h e U.S. would  i n c u r i n such an a c t i o n were so h i g h as t o d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e the concessions o f Y a l t a .  F o r not o n l y was i t deemed v i t a l t h a t  93  China  maintain  Russia  was  forces  in  also  a war  China,  the  all  underline  the  the  Yalta  effect,  was  friendship  in  This tional U.S.  American  China  of  after  these  actually  Stilwell attest  the  liberation  alliance  of  the  U.N.  Yalta with  approach  toward  China  problems, security  set  and  faction  a  sees  series  against  the  the winning  U.S.,  war.  the  for  aid.  Even  their  con-  Russian  Russia a  thereby had  The  construction  conclude  U.S.  in  pact  of  assuring  managed  of  exemplifies; the  Roosevelt's of  pragmatic  overriding the war.  the  to  to  1  therefore,  which as  the  the  of  nevertheless  China. to  was  submitted  explicit  Nationalists,  Council.  possibility  of  engaged  isolation  the  and  the  Agreement  the  political  Security  been  r a t i o n a l i z e d , both  in  nation  continuous  and  Japanese  Harbour  delivered,  this  assist  a  Pearl  throughout  Pacific,  the  on  drawbacks,  mission  to  large  physical  Evidence has  it  can be  the  mainland,  defeat.  demand  to  the  concensus  immediate  and  coupled  spite  the  equally  Germany's  in  first  policy  the  war  and  the  on t h e A s i a n  Nationalists  road  bound by  survival  supply  offer  than  Hump,  the  to  of  in  the  concessions  commitment  seat  more  the  to  after  power.  that  Ledo-Stilwell  tribution  the  fact  assisted  over  Korea  could  a great  promising  airlift  engage  continents, U.S.  of  the  and  occupied  on t o  pressures  the  materially  of  counted  on two  appearances  though  Japanese  Manchuria  Given in  the  tradi-  decisions  and  reactions  priority Such  of  involved  to  94  participants  as  Cordell  E.R.  Stettinius,  have  been  supported  Schlesinger The Left the  Jr.,  second  Revisionist  reasons  to  The whole Council  war  N.  d'etre seen  period  so  far  interest  to  To as  United  W.A.  global  as  this to  in  the  Kong,  and  the  America's States  thinly  and  economic power.  3  Security China  U.S.  in  policy  veiled powers  of  New  imperialism. for  its  'imperialists' and  to  gap,  Korea,  -  and  substitute he  junior  would  Kolko,  solely  U.N.  the  attempts from  most  post-  recent  that:  from China  f i l l  vote"  One  G.  control  colonial  thesis.  state  they  A.M.  of  a great  economic  Roosevelt's  expel the -  Britain, possibly  American  sought  to  promote  partner  in  Asia.  control  China  such  an  approach  scope  of  U.S.  capitalism,  1899  to  investors in  China  old  this,  some  Williams, ascribe  "faggot  the  extent  and  from  economic the After  the  occupy  4  Unfortunately,  why A m e r i c a n  and  as  and Hong  J apan....  the  China's  exclude  Japan  Union  the  to  hoped  and  seating  In  2  expounded by  enhance American  credence to  Indochina  of  as  some  including  a p r e m e d i t a t e d move t o  Council,  hegemony....  of  as  to  war  goes  France,  view  of  reference to  Roosevelt  war,  one  China  the  Soviet  and  to  others.  of  add  exponents  amongst  such  Chomsky,  historians  the American treatment  Security  Asia,  Smith,  of  to  then  throughout  number  and  explanation.  be  postwar  the  G.  this  would  Churchill's in  a  historians  raison  is  by  and  Dean A c h e s o n ,  advocated  possibility,  semanticist  the  have  Hull,  risking  from their  capital  so  1945 in  easily  accepted today  fails  showed China.  a  to  explain  near  total  Nor  does  it  in  lack  95  sufficiently domestic  consider  politics,  even a minimal a  reciprocal  such  the  China  industrial  or  crucial Lobby,  basis  extractive  third  approach  is  to  future  basis  of  in  China,  Chiang  to  being  the  that  exclusion  the  American help) This  approach  Roosevelt's fact  of  that  Russia  By the  ignore  other  balance  shift more  seat  might such  the  difficult help in  to  the  an  accepting  that  refute,  Security the  possibility  Roosevelt  was  either  corruption  of  Nationalists  man w h o s e As China's personal  naivete'to  early war  the  forseeable  whole as  public March  potential,  assistants,  the  assumption (with  postwar an  some Asia.  assessment  the war,  Council  however,  continued  such  in  aforesaid  of  ascribe  supply  misread  the  for  during  amount  the  of  supported  enough  power  impressive  in  Roosevelt  strong  an  debacle  absence  developed to  factions;  of  Chiang  to  the  as  the  and  solid  the  balance,  of  hope  all  add  hypothesis.^  this  that  to  U.N.  contribute  China,  consequently,  to is  reasoning  and  would be  exclusive  to  conclude  all  in  factors  5  Nationalists  China's  credence  of  and  sufficiently  trade.  A  power  contributing  life 15,  of  7  One  the  on h i s Currie,  it  art  return  President  of  or  of  the  to  the  probable to  statesmen, the  from a  of  accept  chose  difficult  foremost  one  also  indicated  finds  America's  1941,  of,  and t h e i r  epitomized the  Lauchlan  warned  unaware  evidence which  future.  one  one must  a  possible.® survey  of  Roosevelt's political  weak-  96  ness  of  that  while  war  Kuomintang: internal  there is  bility in  the  in  December  suggested that replace a  for  the  of  duration with  China has great that graft  to  which were  Department  suggest  J.P.  1  1  to  In  July  also  such  a  though  such  members  constant  embassy  that  in  1  flow  foreign  his of  warned Washington t h a t  and O . E .  Chunking.  popular  Clubb, support  a  policy  it  cabinet.  of  the was  China  embassy passing  with  would  be  to him,  some  1 4  State  C.E.  as  a  Roosevelt's  the  Headed by  as  believed  riddled  to  "that  herself  of  for  conver-  believed  spite  reports  was  together  w e r e unknown  own  experienced analysts  Davies,  In  3  he  biased,  was  at  greatly  in  reestablish  obviously  to  noted that  Hull  sta-  Roosevelt  found  and t h a t  he h i m s e l f  opinions of  be  h e was  1944,  establishment  formulating  to  the  Conference  that  China holding  p o l i t i c s . . . . "  that  shared by  from i t s  s t a f f e d by  Service,  power in  maintains  China  as  admitted that  Stimson,  1 2  involvement  T h e r e was  and  time  is  political  Cairo  Stettinius  to  stated}  minimum d u r i n g  Second  "stated  relative  e n t i r e C h i n e s e war  inaccurate  year,  [he  maintaining  the  f i f t y - f i f t y chance t o  and p e r s o n a l  personal  of  a  of  biographer  had  the w a r . . . . "  power...." "the  first  Beaverbrook  only  At  9  following  outlook  the  be h e l d t o  a l t e r n a t i v e might have  Roosevelt  the  apprehensive  sation  The  1 0  meeting  concerned with  period."  an  conclusion  prospect  Stilwell's  maybe  Chiang.  cabinet  dubious  postwar  1943,  general  conflict will  a very  the  "My  Gauss,  J.S.  repeatedly out  of  the  97  hands  of  the  Early  in  January  J.P.  Nationalists  Davies,  Yenan were Japanese  1944,  stated  regime  in  the  in  " t h e most  and  into  Second  those  of  Secretary  a memorandum t h a t  cohesive,  China,...  of  the  disciplined  the  the  greatest  Communists. Embassy  in  Communists  and  China,  in  aggressively  single  anti-  challenge  ...  to  15 the  Chiang  Gauss Hull  Kai-shek  government...."  r e i n f o r c e d Davies* that  Chinese  a reliable  Communists  memo w h e n h e  eyewitness  had  On F e b r u a r y 8 ,  had  Ambassador  informed Secretary  informed him that  achieved broad  support  of  State  the  from a l l  classes  16 in  the  areas  under t h e i r  message  to  sen had  accorded J.S.  to  allow  Hull,  her  Madame her in  to  visit  the  to  Kuomintang  of  given  t h e y may  an  equal  position  should be  associated  with  (1944)  s t i l l  and the  is  to  of  the  to  opportunity  most  the  to  strained  since  sympathetic  Democratic  Some  strong  that  United  against  Kuomintang,  s i t u a t i o n . 18  the  a report the  Communists  is,  another  Sun  Kuomintang's  officials  remembered however,  the  the  to  Yat-  refusal  and  that  to  Madame  them.  On t h e  substance  was  added t o  in and  other  for  this  been  then  an i n c i p i e n t Chiang  the  1 7  Sun h a d  a n d was  d i r e c t l y blamed  mes-  for  Madame  one.  1930's  Parties,  a  supplies  Japan....  and d i f f i c u l t  the  sent  Communists  other  of  publication  appealing  Chinese  fight  disapproval  the  she had  States  receive medicine  now a  Federation of  opposition  refusal  in  the blockade  that  Sun's  Weekly....  organizations  in  U.S.:  the  to  sixteenth,  i n t e r v i e w Madame  discuss  ascribed  order  critical  Service  and h i g h  removal  hand,  commented on an  Sun  Reynolds  It  On t h e  family  sage  be  Gauss  control.  form  of  China's charge  by  98  Representative January  3,  Roosevelt to  a  1945, that  death  report  Mansfield  a  "disastrous  on h i s  from a m i s s i o n  conscription  sentence.  with  when  in  results"  the  which  China,  the  On t h e  1 9  speech  in  to  return to  Chinese  sixteenth  House  he  in  accrued  Washington  reported  army was  he  from using  to  tantamount  followed  which he  on  up  his  referred  to  the  300,000  Nationalist  20 troops  to  blockade  With  the  the  resignation  appointment  of  attempts  mediate  to  General  were  initiated.  laid  by  the  to  place  military  Hurley, ically  the  factions.  detailed  the  observers to  Kuomintang  any  of  and  quoted  from h i s  in  Yenan.  on  February a  the  This  report  17,  from a  Gauss  these  of  of  a  the  Communists  had  in  Yenan  rapprochement  and  was  Nationalists, between the  and  in  questioned  between  report written with  by Chou  two  impact  those  evident  Hurley  assess  categor-  reduce the  staff  collusion  to  been  Unfortunately,  and t h e  conversation  official  assistance,  experience,  partiality  subsequent  1944,  Communists.  own e m b a s s y  The  30,  and  section  Chiang  which  the  had  contributed to  in  and  negotiations  direct  Chinese  alleging  Japanese.  excerpts  for  diplomatic  also  northwest.  Nationalists  observer  criticism  attitude  of  the  no  the  on November  Roosevelt's  possibility  reports  Hull  authenticity  Evans,  to  His  Hurley  an A m e r i c a n  faint  the  patch  with  in  Ambassador  between the  relatively  opposed  negated  P.J.  potential  with  of  The groundwork  Gauss who,  managed  Communists  a  from disthe  the a  Captain 21 En-lai.  of  99  That  same  advantage State.  of  In  embassy's  month  Hurley's  a  lengthy  political  provide  arms  "secure  the  the  to  visit  officers,  the  the  Communists  to  arms  of  Russia...."  2 2  of  question  Such of  side  of  with  Atcheson  all  our  a  wired the  the  help  taking Secretary  of  all  of  recommended t h a t a  policy,  China's  rather  assisting  Stilwell,  (Atcheson) ,  Washington  Communists.  hold  been i n i t i a t e d by  to  China  expose' w r i t t e n  cooperation  The whole  Charge' i n  forces  than  the  he in  throw  the  U.S. would  war,  them i n t o  Communists  suggestion which  the  the  stated,  in  played  of  to the  Yenan a  had  major  23 role a  in  Chiang's  recommendation  specialists of  the  for  spite  China  1945,  late  as  1945,  spot,  in  direct  ambassador It  Chiang  themselves In  in  as  attention.  partiality sing  on h i s  on t h e  absent  Hull's  insistence  such  continued to  the Assistant  (Chase),  also  submitted  have the  the  extent  embassy  of  such  political  to  failed  the  to  to  policy  attract  which  staff  from  Hurley's expres-  Washington.  i n t e r f e r e n c e however, reach  Chief  impact  the  contradiction  indicates  constrained  The  supported by  could hardly  freely to  of  recall.  of  the  State  the  a memorandum  reports  Department.  Division  of  emphasizing  on  On M a r c h  Chinese the  conditions 1,  Affairs  degree  of  cor-  24 ruption then following of  his  evident  day,  Under  concern over  in  the  Kuomintang  Secretary Chiang's  of  State  administration. Grew i n f o r m e d  "intransingent  attitude"  The Roosevelt toward  the  100  Communists. of  Grew t h e n  suggested that  February could very well  stay the of  in  Washington.  observer  in  Yenan,  c o l l a b o r a t i o n between the  Nationalist  War  One week arming such all  only  later  the  a policy other  Zone  20,  J.S.  recommendations  Hurley  Service,  during  on d u t y  alleged  commanding  the  his  with  instance  Second  Japanese.  criticized  Nationalists,  t h r e a t e n e d not  with  r e p o r t e d on an  general  and t h e Chase  important  discussed  On M a r c h  2 5  section  be  Atcheson's  in  the American p o l i c y  a memorandum h e  only  to  non-Kuomintang  alienate  stated  the  of that  Communists  but  groups:  I f o p p o s i t i o n t o C h i a n g c o n t i n u e s t o grow a t i t s present r a t e , s u c h a n a l i e n a t i o n w o u l d m e a n t h a t we w o u l d s o o n f i n d the majority of p o l i t i c a l l y conscious Chinese embittered a g a i n s t us f o r s u p p o r t i n g a m i n o r i t y regime which c o u l d not maintain i t s e l f without our support. It would a l s o set the stage for a head-on c o l l i s i o n with Soviet Russia. 2 7  O n May a  State  War,  and t h e  and  within  Chase's  Department  policies. army  28,  Paper  Navy,  After  to  circulated to  c o n c e r n i n g U.S.  castigating  airforce,  China  memorandum was  it  the  referred  present  considerations  the  opposed  Kuomintang  to  Communists Anhwei,  and  the in  the  paper  in  to  the  Chinese  the  national  further  postwar the  "widespread government.  Shensi,  addition  to  Shansi,  of  State,  Nationalist dissatisfaction" Under  political then  Government: Hopei,  a population  by  military  groups which were  controlled National of  emphasis  Secretaries  Kuomintang,  defined the  provinces  Kiangsu,  the  given  of  The  Shantung,  about  20  to  101  50 m i l l i o n ; federation Yunnan,  the of  Democratic  minor  Kwangsi,  Tsinghai,  political  and t h e  Sikang,  League,  and  which  parties;  i t  t h e war  semi-independent  Ninghsia,  whose  defined  as  lords  military  allegiance  a  in  loose Szechuan,  rulers  to  the  of  National  28 Government With  considered  even t h i s  credulous perceive  was  in  the  the  largely  nominal.  minimal  evidence  available,  extreme t o  conclude  that  decreasing  support  for  the  it  would  Roosevelt  be  failed  Nationalists  to  throughout  29 China.  Nor  blind  to  the  under  their  to  indicate  or  the  out  the  it  realistic  popular  that  No  was  Department  12,  of  change  Communists  on A p r i l  maintain  tangible  a major  State  to  acceptance  control.  Chinese  by  death  is  the  that  policy  time  of  possibility  therefore,  can be  Although  aware  of  conditions  in  weakness  of  evidence  ensuing  failure  Roosevelt on,  yet  some  China.  internal  Nationalists indicative of  U.S.  adhered t o  the broader in  as  the  the  regions however,  Nationalists or  carried  President's  1945.  third  such  the  Roosevelt,  The  the  in  remained  uncovered  toward  i n i t i a t e d by the  long  Communists  e v i d e n c e was  in  up t o  he  reasons  of  does  myopic exist  China  plans  for  which  tends  the  continued  to  collapse  Asia. can  accepted:  the  chose  future  approach  why h e m i s j u d g e d  and  Roosevelt  Chiang's  postwar  this  evidence  regime,  generally  and  Precisely  only to  ignore  be  why  conjectured  outline  future basis  the  of  some  of  power  102  This  evidence  Roosevelt's nation  constitutes  failure  the fourth  to perceive that  could through  possibility  a largely  i t s own e f f o r t s ,  achieve  and  entails  nonindustrialized genuine  great  power  30 status.  It  also  involves  those  observers  ness"  of the Chinese  relations  with  fountainhead apparatus  most  favourably  recognized  appendage.  key  makers,  believed before Reds,  that  i f  entrance  Russia' s influence  ficult  to  circles  Roosevelt  ascertain,  neither  Union  Soviet  assistance  the  Yalta  U.S.S.R.  as  was a l s o  itself  will 1  shared  he long  postwar  3  monolithic  shared Even  split  were by  some  Stilwell  was n o t h e a l e d  naturally  this  limited  acceptance  plans  a  "the  gravitate  to  2  unaware  nor Hull  in  view  of  its  reservations in this  existence.  3 3  in  fact,  he might have  China  the saw  Roosevelt  same d o c u m e n t  Nationalist  dif-  to involve  Hull  in China.  is  Government  hesitated  for Asia,  factor  by insisting to assist  ,  remain  a unifying  a s s u a g e d what  Agreement bind  accessible,  fully  a  future  as t h e  t h e war i n t h e P a c i f i c ,  y e t i t s wide  in their  other hand,  into  their  Communists  some h i s t o r i a n s .  the President  Soviet  the  attitude  what  controlled  the Chinese  and c o n t r o l . . . .  precluded that  However,  This  and l a t e r ,  immediately  Whether  facto,  even  "progressive-  The U.S.S.R.  t h e Kuomintang-Communist  the Soviet being  3 1  in predicting  Communism  shared by  by the  Union would b e .  of international ipso  rigidity  impressed  Communists,  the Soviet  o f which  policy  t h e marked  in its  on  had over  that  the  liberation  103  from the some  Japanese.  cautious  lomatic policy  said  speculations  thinking with  Having  on  China.  this,  on t h e  degree  cannot to  but  advance  which American  dip-  Sino-Soviet  relations  affected its  wartime  In  was  any b a s i s  the  essence,  mentioned  rigid  degree  c o o p e r a t i o n between the  of  one  assessment  of  there  Soviet  intentions  U.S.S.R.  in  to  China  and t h e  afore-  and  the  Chinese  Communists? Early American there  in  was  Chunking  no  assured  to  the  Chinese  3  Tse-tung  Chinese  in  that  other  be  In  the  as  Soviet no  in  previously  none b e t t e r had  and t h e  Ambassador longer  and would  Stalin  Votaw,  Information,  c o u n t r y was  June,  he had  of  organization  countries,  3 5  supported  his  informed Maurice  Ministry  same y e a r ,  r e i t e r a t e d what  not  a  that Soviet to  giving  give  aid  to  conversation  told  Roosevelt,  arisen  to  an  with that  replace  6  February  Moscow Embassy had with the  Dr.  a  1945,  J.P.  Ministry  faction  of  of  the  f o r m e r member o f  added t h a t  the  Davies,  informed the  Chen Hanseng,  British  pro-Soviet Ming,  Chiang  Communists.  must  In  in  the  That  3 4  Communists  Harriman,  Mao  c o n n e c t i o n between h i s  Party.  aid  Chiang  1944,  employee o f  Communist  him.  July  present  now S e c o n d  Secretary an  of  outstanding  Information. Chinese  the  State  of  Dr.  Communist  the  in  the  of  he  had  Chinese  C o m i n t e r n , was  leaders  Secretary  Chen Party  a talk  intellectual stated  headed by  now d e f u n c t .  Communist  that  Party  and  the  Wang  He espe-  104  cially  Mao,  "who h a s  Russian t i e s . " " '  In  3  observer  section  ments  touching  by  Chinese  never been out  in  March, Yenan,  on  Communist  some  J.S.  China,  Service  added of  of  the  in  were w i t h o u t  a report  from  credence to  Dr.  Chen's  fundamental  concepts  strong the  state-  of  the  Party:  The Communist c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e war a g a i n s t J a p a n as a n a t i o n a l w a r o f l i b e r a t i o n [ w h i c h } m u s t a t t h e same t i m e , i n o r d e r f o r i t s s u c c e s s , b e an i m p o r t a n t and p r o g r e s s i v e stage i n the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n . . . . By an e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s logic, t h e Communist l e a d e r s f e e l t h a t t h e p e r m i t t i n g o f g e n e r a l expectation of easy s a l v a t i o n (as C h i a n g e x p e c t e d f r o m U . S . A . and RussiaJ t h r o u g h R u s s i a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n w i l l b e an i m p e d i ment t o t h e war e f f o r t and t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f i t s u n d e r lying revolutionary objectives. 3 8  As  to  Service  Soviet  noted  in  military his  report  c o n n e c t i o n between Yenan 1942.  On t h a t  Lanchow  searching  There were Russians radio.  3  evident the  also  in  in  at  lack  1945  ceived troops,  Lin  from the  In was  they  time  March  Soviet of  of  an  that  to  last  early  as  spent  leave  report, Tass  help  Government:  the "None  [he  nothingJ... Japanese  two  their only  ally of  they  days  at  area. three a  one-way  was  also  Manchuria  t h e war w i t h Chinese  direct November,  men w i t h  ideological  after  Communists,  the  relinquishment  interview  no a d v i s o r s ,  Chinese  Communists  plane  Soviet  from t h e  23,  and two  a s k e d what  took  the  Service's  Orloff  the  to  ended as  Chinese  support  an  Soviet  no weapons,  supplies  of  during  Piao  the  a Dr.  of  a n d Moscow  last  the  Yenan,  This  9  the  Nationalists.  Strong,  war  occasion  assistance  Anna  to  Louise  Communists  re-  answered]....  No  Whatever took  into  arms  or  Russia  105  or  destroyed In  Edvard  on t h e  1948,  Stalin,  Kardelj  Chinese  the  Kuomintang.  ment. of  Communists  seek  gested  to  the  conversation with he had  went  a modus  tried  so  far  such  the  the  to  the  war  suggest and  Civil  to  and  dissuade  that  shoddy  govern-  treatment  might  course  to  the  join his  War  probable  Dimitrov  armed o p p o s i t i o n  Stalin's  Spanish  Department  after  Chiang  evidence,  Georgi  their  as  vivendi with  during  State  4 0  from c o n t i n u i n g  Stalin  Republicans  a  that  Even without  4 1  the  in  stated  the  Communists  spot."  have  of  sug-  Soviet  42 relations specific general  toward the hindsight  question  Writing in  1945,  in  that  and  not  a  view  strong a  not  as  Kennan  industrial long  By  time  1949,  in  thereof."  some  of  it  present  power.  for  4  and  1947  showed  future."  e v o l u t i o n had  4  of  as  from t h i s that  stated  early  security-  of  later  For  at  fifty  security  the  the  State  Chinese  shortsightedness.  " C h i n a was  no p r o m i s e  more Asia.  much a s  'consumer'  such  in  the war.  especially  was  power  analyst  condition  perhaps a  on t h e  a great  Two y e a r s  3  digression  She  as  a l t e r e d by  China,  in  been l a c k i n g  role  the main be  l i t t l e  the  and  the war,  in  Unfortunately,  an A m e r i c a n  materially  after  saw  have  Affairs,  evaluation  showed  to  future  "past  be  'dispenser'  Communists  for  Pacific  Communists.  also  China's  China w i l l  Department's  The  of  a generation  years....  seems  China's  dependency w i l l least  Chinese  of  not  a  becoming  one  4  taken  place within  the  State  106  Department strength  and more  of  conference of  China  Vinacke  emphasis  nationalism early  as  in  a  October  Fairbank,  amongst  as  was  gauge  one  of  laid  of  on t h e  great  attended by  Lattimore,  others,  being  power  such  Reischauer,  the  potential status.  well  known  Rossinger  participants  (G.E.  In  a  analysts and  Taylor)  stated: T h e m a j o r f o r c e i n A s i a t h a t c a n b e u s e d a g a i n s t Communism is nationalism.... In C h i n a t h e Communists a r e u s i n g C h i n e s e n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r i d i n g i n f o r t h e i r own p u r p o s e s . . . . They a r e f i g h t i n g u s on t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l e v e l , institutional level, military level. We h a v e t o m e e t t h e m o n a l l levGX s•••• Unfortunately, unifying  catalyst  Kuomintang, during  World  War  further  Communist levels those  realization that  which  came t o o  f a c t i o n which been  the  the  late  II.  By  would  potential  to  of  had been  international denied i t  in  American  policy  the  end o f  the war,  the  mainland  unify  China  their  China  struggle  four  influence.  at  all  of  ideological  Communism, its  usurped  affect  from American  had been ignored,  had  to  inherit  estranged  Communists  nationalism  and  the  goals  a modicum  against  the  was  from  the the  toward  China  political years  later  The  Chinese  had  aforementioned confused of  with  material  common  help  enemy,  Japan. In  essence,  pragmatism China  under  failed  American to  Communist  take  foreign into  control  policy  account  for  the  c o u l d become  all  its  inherent  demonstrated a great  power  fact  that  without  107  American h e l p , following faction  a  sustained  than  relevant  without  in  the so  assess  the  spread  appeal  hobbled by of  its  its  far  to  American shek  historical  of  of  to  its  Chinese  to  Communism  and  ideological  ends  failed  accept  This  is  only  accurately  and  its  the  possibility self-help  one  considers a  great  with  similar  as  wide-  a means  U.S.  was  permeated  War  that ethic  the  all  to  in  the  provide  status,  shortsighted  could  surely  moves  in  the  mass  achieve fact  Far  great  of  East, Chiang  stands  facets  shield  agrarian  additional  power  II  an  of  also  preeminence tended t o  a  as  revolution  preeminence which  World  yet  policy  these  own o r i g i n s ,  during  expedient  different  achieve  and  past  a  to  a  machine  nationalism.  from the  When  4 6  That  foreign  structure.  nationalism  effort  was  nature  spite  developed i n d u s t r i a l  war.  unwilling  makers  Government most  U.S.  technological  status.  China's  the  a  policy  power  as  Chinese  in  national  driven by  civil  indigenous  change  fully  Kuomintang  Historically social  a  as  the Kai-  one  the h i s t o r y  of  of U.S.  diplomacy. In Colonial  an  analysis  Experience.  dilemma  of  in  relations  [he  U.S.  of  American  all  study  The A m e r i c a n s :  John Higham i n a d v e r t e n t l y diplomacy  with  s t a t e d 3 ••• grows  rejects  Boorstin's  ideologies  China out in  of the  and  possibly  during an  World  empirical  name  of  long  the War  The  summed u p crucial II:  "The  conservatism, established  the  factor Americans which insti-  108  tutions." behind of  4  The N a t i o n a l i s t s  7  them and  ideology  whilst for  the  the  to  an  solutions  suit  of  sought  China  as  in to  stabilize  an  great Par  Roosevelt  cum o f  material help to  policy  been  laid  tined  to  study,  China.  against  unduly  existence  4 8  government  substantial  guarantee  any  It  justified  Chinese  maintain  amount is  support  of  to  policy  evidence  providing Had  Davies,  that  Soviet  the  the  a  and  modi-  such  Clubb,  in  a Atcheson  would  have  military  e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d was  possible  for  in  a political of  immediate  own a n a l y s t s  sympathetic basis  with  an  policy.  long-term  Communists.  Service, a  the  foreign  even the  quarters  President's  the  in  China  Communists.  suggest decisions  des-  prevalent  intentions  Chinese  affected the denied.  of  of  been  struggle  the American e f f o r t  uncovered t o  be  to  to  e v i d e n c e was  cannot  any  devoid  complex  On t h e b a s i s  Stilwell,  an i n c r e a s i n g  their  a  relations  mitigated  spicion  the  in  as  for  in  no  as  future  se  power  conservatism,  failed  suggested,  suspicion  American per  of  suitably  presented too  Japan,  status  repeatedly  unite  of  e v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d by h i s  would have  adopted  f a c t i o n which  to  against  East.  China,  been  peasant,  sixteen years  Japan were  ideologists  refused  power  in  Chase  with  immediate measure  quoted  and  this  war  an e m p i r i c a l approach  t h e war  the  the  Chinese  by  of  1942 w i t h  prerequisites  as  e n t i t y which  Nationalists  to  the  the  Successful  raise  years  Communists  mind  entity,  five  by  that  this  on C h i n a ,  Though suits  109  This  writer  possibilities government of  China,  That  t h e r e f o r e agrees  stated  which  in  shortly  in  President  the of  of  Mainland  by  the  light  the China  expulsion  of  United to of  the the  chapter:  after his  thereby negating  contemporary events  evident  this  with  the  add  of  lost four  seat  and t h e  in  Chinese.  fourth  supported  years  of  this  Peking  October  made v a c a n t  Nationalist  to  and  effective  credence to  proposed v i s i t  States,  third  Roosevelt  death  the value  seem t o  the  the  25,  control  diplomacy. opinion by  1971  U.N.  a  is  the election  Organization  NOTES 1 For t h e f u l l t e x t o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t T r e a t y o f August 1945, see Appendix X I .  14,  2 In h i s " L e t t e r o f T r a n s m i t t a l " p r e f a c i n g t h e China White Paper, Acheson s t a t e s : "The u n f o r t u n a t e but i n e s c a p a b l e f a c t i s t h a t t h e ominous r e s u l t o f t h e C i v i l War i n China was beyond the c o n t r o l o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Nothing t h i s country d i d o r c o u l d have done w i t h i n t h e r e a s o n a b l e l i m i t s o f i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s c o u l d have changed t h a t r e s u l t ; nothing t h a t was l e f t undone by t h i s country has c o n t r i b u t e d t o i t . I t was t h e product o f i n t e r n a l Chinese f o r c e s , f o r c e s which t h i s c o u n t r y t r i e d t o i n f l u e n c e b u t c o u l d n o t . " I b i d . . I , x v i . For an a p p r a i s a l o f American concensus h i s t o r i a n s , see J . Higham, "The C u l t o f the 'American Concensus,"* Commentary. XXVII, No. 2 (February, 1959), 93-100. A.M. S c h l e s i n g e r J r . w i t h h i s c o n s i s t e n t defense o f R o o s e v e l t ' s domestic and f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s , e p i t o m i s e s t h i s s c h o o l o f thought. As r e c e n t l y as 1968, another exponent o f t h i s approach commenting on wartime Sino-American r e l a t i o n s , s t a t e d t h a t t h o s e i n v o l v e d i n i t s f o r m u l a t i o n "committed no h e i n o u s b l u n d e r s . True, t h e y might have acted otherwise and changed t h e outcome, b u t the odds are t h a t the change would have been f o r the worse, not b e t t e r . " G. Smith, "Last view o f t h e Chinese Scene," Times Book Review (February 25, 1968), p. 35. 3 W i l l i a m s , The Tragedy...; W i l l i a m s , The Shaping.... Kolko, The P o l i t i c s o f War...; Kolko, The Roots o f American F o r e i g n P o l i c y : An A n a l y s i s o f Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon, 1969). N. Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (Harmondsworth: P e l i c a n Books, 1969). One c o u l d a l s o i n c l u d e W. LaFeber, who i n The New Empire.... a p p l i e s the same narrow d e t e r minism t o n i n e t e e n t h century Sino-American r e l a t i o n s . For a comp r e h e n s i v e view o f the New L e f t , see Unger, AHR ( J u l y , 1967), LXXII, No. 4, 1237-63. A l s o C. Jencks, " L i m i t s o f the New L e f t , " New R e p u b l i c (October 21, 1967), pp. 19-21. In two a r t i c l e s , Z b i g n i e v B r z e z i n s k i a t t a c k s some o f the fundamental concepts o f the New L e f t : "The American T r a n s i t i o n , " i b i d . (December 23, 1967), pp. 18-21, and "Revolution and C o u n t e r r e v o l u t i o n , " i b i d . (June 1, 1968), pp. 23-25. The f o l l o w i n g y e a r , A.P. Mendel took B r z e z i n s k i t o t a s k i n "Robots and R e b e l s , " i b i d . (January 11, 1969), pp. 16-19. See a l s o M. H a r r i n g t o n ' s review o f C.  Ill  L i c h t h e i m ' s , The O r i g i n s o f S o c i a l i s m , i b i d . ( F e b r u a r y 8, 1969), pp. 30-32, and t h e B r z e z i n s k i - M e n d e l l e t t e r s under " C o r r e s p o n d e n c e , " i b i d . . p. 32. M . D u b e r m a n a l s o s h e d s some l i g h t o n t h e New L e f t i n h i s r e v i e w o f C . L a s c h ' s , T h e A g o n y o f t h e A m e r i c a n L e f t . T i m e s B o o k R e v i e w ( M a r c h 2 9 , 1 9 6 9 ) , p p . 1, 3 4 - 3 5 . F o r an i n t e r e s t i n g a r t i c l e on a symposium a t P r i n c e t o n on A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y w h i c h i n c l u d e d B r z e z i n s k i , S. H o f f m a n , and J . L i f t o n , s e e I. S h e n k e r , "6 E x p e r t s , i n t e r v i e w e d i n P r i n c e t o n , U r g e Comp l e t e R e v i e w o f U . S . F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " New Y o r k T i m e s ( D e c e m b e r 8 , 1968), p. 7 6 . O n t h e same t o p i c , A . D . B a r n e t t e x p r e s s e s some v i e w s i n "New b a l a n c e o f p o w e r i n E a s t p r e d i c t e d b y specialist on A s i a , " T o r o n t o G l o b e and M a i l ( A p r i l 16, 1970), p. 57. On t h e neglect o f domestic f a c t o r s by the economic d e t e r m i n i s t s in a s s e s s i n g U.S. f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n A s i a , M. P f e f f e r s t a t e s : "Do we r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t d o m e s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e U n i t e d States and A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n g e n e r a l a r e not f a c t o r s influencing China? A n d m o r e t h a n t h a t , c a n we b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s e f a c t o r s do n o t a f f e c t r e l a t i o n s between C h i n a and t h e U n i t e d States, i f o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i r i m p a c t on A m e r i c a ' s C h i n a p o l i c y ? Such a b e l i e f would be p a t e n t l y absurd." Quoted i n A.D. Barnett & E.O. Reischauer ( e d s . ) , The U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a : The Next Decade (New Y o r k : Praeger, 1970), p. 22. J . Garraty states that the "New L e f t h i s t o r i a n s a r e u n a b a s h e d l y p r e s e n t - m i n d e d ; t h e i r attack on t h e c o n c e n s u s s c h o o l f o c u s e s on t h a t g r o u p ' s f a i l u r e t o h a v e p r o v i d e d them w i t h a ' u s a b l e p a s t , ' meaning a h i s t o r y o r i e n t e d around questions of c u r r e n t concern l i k e poverty, the Negro, and imperialism." " A T h e n F o r a N o w , " T i m e s B o o k R e v i e w (May 1 2 , 1968). There i s a good d e a l o f v a l i d i t y t o such a s t a t e m e n t , e s p e c i a l l y when v i e w e d a g a i n s t t h e l a c k o f i n t e r e s t e v i n c e d f o r such e m b a r r a s i n g q u e s t i o n s as t h e u n e q u a l t r e a t i e s . 4  Clemens,  Stettinius "The  country  is  white  man's  rule  A trusteeship  is  211.  Omitted  in  1949,  and  the in  top  lowing the  of in  part:  old.  the  p.  550. the  next  -  new B r i t i s h day  its  In  China  it  China  was is  Foreign  made b y  make  it  in  Relations  a  be  talk  to  a  free  was  The of....  published of  June  Vol. VI,  21,  II,  which  Chiang  the  reads fol-  "'Churchill to  China  Ibid.,  p.  at  pub-  text  Hongkong  port.'"  on  in  China.  the  Roosevelt: give  ago.  portion  Chunking  President  stated:  proud  it  was  1944.  with  Stettinius,  appears  replaced by  will  to when  1967,  ellipses  President  Government  Paper  in  Chiang  then quoted  a  a hundred years nothing  White  are  in  Roosevelt  solution."  reedition with  1944,  Indochina,  practical  ellipses  will  March  of  i n d i c a t e d by  Wallace  statement A  than  conversation  1967, "Mr.  only  in  in  status  [France's]  from the  The o m i s s i o n  lished  Early  off  there  again  Wallace's  1944.  245.  postwar  worse  p.  H.A.  p.  on t h e  is  and 223.  112  5 For China's i n d u s t r i a l b a s i s i n March 1941, see F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1941. The Far E a s t . IV (1956), 18-95; f o r h e r economic s i t u a t i o n i n 1945, see China White Paper. I I , 127-30. 6 1945,  For the composition see Appendix X I I .  o f the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l as o f May  4,  7 H u l l s t a t e s t h a t "Chiang Kai-shek kept some o f h i s b e s t d i v i s i o n s near h i m s e l f , t r a f f i c continued between the Chinese and Japanese Zones, and the Government seemed more i n t e r e s t e d i n the blockade a g a i n s t t h e Communists than a g a i n s t Japan." I b i d . , I I , 1587. The S t a t e Department estimated t h a t i n January 1944, the t r o o p s b l o c k a d i n g the Communists amounted t o " p o s s i b l y more than 400,000...." F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1944. China. VI, 308. See a l s o R e p r e s e n t a t i v e [now Senator] M.J. M a n s f i e l d ' s r e p o r t t o Roosevelt on h i s r e t u r n from China, January 3, 1945, i n which he r e f e r s t o the N a t i o n a l i s t s o l d i e r as h a v i n g "no food and l i t t l e equipment. They are s t a r v e d and p o o r l y equipped because o f g r a f t up above. The commanders hang on t o much o f the s t u f f they r e c e i v e and then f l o o d the b l a c k markets and e n r i c h themselves." F o r e i g n Rel a t i o n s . 1945. The Far E a s t . China. VII (1969), 7. See a l s o i b i d . , pp. 75-76, 177, 293-94, 304. 8 Yet Roosevelt was capable o f some a p p a l l i n g o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s , such as h i s comment t o S t a l i n a t Y a l t a t o the e f f e c t t h a t "the Indochinese were people o f s m a l l s t a t u r e , l i k e the Javanese and Burmese, and were not w a r l i k e . " F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . M a l t a . . . . p. 770. The s u r v i v o r s o f the defense o f Dienbienphu might not e n t i r e l y agree with such an assessment o f the IndoChinese. As t o d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on the Far E a s t and s p e c i f i c a l l y China, t h e r e was, apart from the S t a t e Department and i t s embassy i n Chunking, the I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s with i t s 1,200 p u b l i c a t i o n s and the data i t had been accumulating s i n c e 1926 through c o n t a c t s with e l e v e n c o u n t r i e s i n t h e g e n e r a l area o f the P a c i f i c . 9  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1941.  10  See t h i s paper p.  11  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1944.  The  Far E a s t . IV, 82-86.  69. China. V I ,  230.  12 H u l l , I I , 1586. Beaverbrook answered t h a t t h e r e was "a f e e l i n g i n B r i t a i n t h a t the Government of Chiang Kai-shek was not a r e a l f i g h t i n g Government but was 'something p l a s t e r e d on t o p o f China l i k e a b u t t o n on a c o a t . " " Ibid.  113  13 Stimson & Bundy, p. 533. The wartime c o n s c r i p t i o n s y s tem o f t h e Kuomintang i s a f a i r example o f t h i s g r a f t a t t h e lower l e v e l s : " T h e c o n s c r i p t i o n o f f i c e r s made t h e i r money i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h t h e o f f i c i a l s and through t h e i r p r e s s g a n g s . . . . T h e d e a l e r m i g h t g i v e $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 CN t o t h e man who s e l l s h i m s e l f , or to the family or to the o f f i c i a l . He s e l l s t h e man f o r $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 CN t o t h e H s i e n c h a n g o r c o n s c r i p t i o n o f f i c i a l who j u s t l e f t o f f a p e a s a n t ' s son f o r $100,000 C N . . . . M a n y o f t h o s e w h o r u n away r u n o f f d u r i n g t h e f i r s t few d a y s . L a t e r t h e y a r e t o o weak t o r u n away. T h o s e who a r e c a u g h t a r e c r u e l l y b e a t e n . They w i l l be c a r r i e d a l o n g w i t h b r o k e n l i m b s and w i t h wounds i n maimed f l e s h i n which i n f e c t i o n t u r n s q u i c k l y i n t o b l o o d p o i s o n i n g and b l o o d poisoning into death." Romanus & S u n d e r l a n d , I I I , 369-70. One might c o n t r a s t t h i s treatment with t h a t accorded the r e c r u i t s i n Yenan as o b s e r v e d b y J . S . S e r v i c e , F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1944. C h i n a . VI, 519. See a l s o , J . M y r d a l , R e p o r t from a C h i n e s e V i l l a g e (Harmondsworth: Penguine Books, 1967), pp. 132-33. 14 H . J . Morgenthau s t a t e s that "the course of American p o l i c y t o w a r d Germany and J a p a n d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l phase o f t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War was d e t e r m i n e d p r i m a r i l y b y P r e s i d e n t i a l a c t i o n I n 1 9 4 4 , 1 t r e a t y was c o n c l u d e d a s c o m p a r e d t o 74 e x e c u t i v e a g r e e m e n t s , i n 1945 t h e f i g u r e s w e r e 6 - 5 4 . "Who M a k e s Those Commitments? C o n g r e s s o r F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " New R e p u b l i c (June 14, 1 9 6 9 ) , p. 18. Lensen s t a t e s t h a t "the State Department h a d n o r e p r e s e n t a t i v e who s a t w i t h t h e J o i n t C h i e f s - o f - S t a f f , and u n t i l l a t e 1944 i t d i d n o t e v e n h a v e a l i a i s o n o f f i c e r w i t h t h e White House." Quoted i n S n e l l ( e d . ) , p. 144. 15  Foreign  16  Ibid..  p.  328.  17  Ibid.,  p.  341.  1  Ibid..  p.  490.  8  Relations.  19  Foreign  20  Ibid.,  p.  21  Ibid.,  pp.  22  Ibid.,  wire  as  an  over  that  recalled."  act same  See  Relations  p. of  China.  VI,  307.  also  ibid..  pp.  477,  1945.  The  Far  East.  494,  China.  513. VII,  7.  177. 220-23. 246.  Hurley's  disloyalty  issue  Ibid.,  1944.  p.  (he  added]  261.  r e a c t i o n was  on t h e that  part  of his  General  to  stigmatize  staff:  Stilwell  "It had  the was  been  114  23 On O c t o b e r 2 1 , 1 9 4 4 , a t a m e e t i n g o f t h e S t a n d i n g C o m m i t t e e of the Kuomintang, Chiang i s a l l e g e d t o have s a i d "that S t i l w e l l h a d b o a s t e d t h a t i f h e went t o Yenan h e w o u l d b e a b l e t o g e t t h e Red Army t o c o o p e r a t e i m m e d i a t e l y . 'That i s nonsense* said Chiang. *I w i l l n e v e r p e r m i t S t i l w e l l t o g o u n t i l t h e C o m m u n i s t s s u b m i t t o my o r d e r s ; t h e r e c a n b e n o c o m p r o m i s e w i t h t h e C o m m u n i s t s ; i f we g i v e i n now we s h a l l h a v e t o s u r r e n d e r m o r e later.'" F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1944. C h i n a . VI, 265. 24 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s 1945. The F a r E a s t . C h i n a . VII, 61. I n p a r t t h e memo r e a d : "Such c o n d i t i o n s i n c l u d e c o n s c r i p t i o n abuses, n e g l e c t o f t r a i n i n g and d i s c i p l i n e , incompetent l e a d e r s h i p , u n d e r p a y , s h o c k i n g u n d e r n o u r i s h m e n t and l a c k o f m e d i c a l c a r e , d e f e c t i v e and c o n f u s e d o r g a n i z a t i o n , p e r s o n a l a l l e g i a n c e s , nepotism, g r a f t , smuggling, oppression of the people, sickness and low m o r a l e . " Ibid. 25 I b i d . , p. 254. Grew s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e y d i s c u s s "the E m b a s s y ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t h a t we c o n s i d e r g i v i n g w a r supplies t o t h e C h i n e s e Communists as w e l l as t o G e n e r a l i s s i m o C h i a n g . " Ibid. 26 I b i d . , pp. 293-94. S e r v i c e had been i n Yenan w i t h t h e o b s e r v e r s e c t i o n s i n c e t h e Summer o f 1 9 4 4 . H i s r e p o r t o f March 20 ( h i s 2 0 t h ) , s t a t e d i n p a r t , t h a t t h e g e n e r a l ' s " p o s i t i o n is so o b v i o u s t h a t even t h e most c h a r i t a b l e minded c a n n o t assume t h a t C h u n k i n g d o e s n o t know t h e s i t u a t i o n . " I b i d . , p. 294. 27  Ibid..  by  a political  of  Chiang's  immediate 28 paper  p.  304.  officer  lack  of  This in  China  was  pp.  74-78.  Originally  transmitted  o n May  mission  28,  of  War  in  May  the  (Vincent), 1945,  Provincial  report  to  informing troops  to  to  a  Chinese  part, at  strong  this  a  covering  on U.S. this time  Asiatic  Included  in  Hurley Hurley  Service'  of  of  State,  China  in  dated "It  rearm China  power w o u l d b e  1945,  the  the the  Department  January the  the  trans-  memo b y  State  p o l i c y by  memo r e a d : to  the  3,  memo f r o m  from a p r e v i o u s  Affairs  Secretary  a query In  undertaken  m i g h t become  of  the Acting  answer  28 w i t h  dated A p r i l  Committee.  were q u o t a t i o n s  Division  and Navy.  measures  a  Service),  for  Coordinating  of  the  to  area. Ibid..  of  (R.M.  support  State-War-Navy Chief  memo r e f e r r e d  29,  Secretarie  is  believed  in  order  that  that  it  impracticable....  It does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t China should be u n i f i e d under Chiang Kai-shek. However, w i t h r e g a r d t o the s h o r t - t e r m o b j e c t i v e , C h i a n g a p p e a r s t o b e t h e o n l y l e a d e r who now o f f e r s a h o p e for unification. The a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e support o f C h i a n g f o r  115  the a t t a i n m e n t o f our immediate o b j e c t i v e might be c h a o s . " I b i d . . p. 78. S e e a l s o memo b y t h e S e c o n d S e c r e t a r y i n C h u n k i n g (R.P. L u d d e n ) , a s s e s s i n g t h e p o p u l a r s u p p o r t e n j o y e d b y t h e Communists i n North China. I b i d . . pp. 200-04. Ludden's assertions are endorsed by E.F. Dumright. I b i d . . p. 204, n. 66. 29 T h i s e v i d e n c e , c o v e r i n g a p e r i o d from March 15, 1941, t o A p r i l 3, 1 9 4 5 , c o n s i s t s o f q u o t a t i o n s f r o m two d i r e c t r e p o r t s t o R o o s e v e l t , one a d d r e s s i n t h e House o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , one S t a t e Department P o l i c y P a p e r , two o f t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s conversations, a n d t w e l v e r e p o r t s a n d memorandums r a n g i n g f r o m t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e t o t h e p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r s on d u t y w i t h t h e o b s e r v e r s e c t i o n i n Yenan. T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n was g l e a n e d f r o m t h e d o c u m e n t a r y sources o f the State Department p u b l i c a t i o n . F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s of the United States, Diplomatic Papers. 30 to  the  power  One means industrial  in  the  31 the  In  Far  that  of  Chinese  the  from Moscow."  VII,  59.  Affairs  conflict now  and  strongly  report s t i l l  of  2,  "In  commits  they w i l l  link  Communist exist  is  likely State  23,  Party such  Russia  troops North  the  exists."  stated  p.  77.  Russia  On A p r i l commenting  reinforced  the  in  "Russia  China:  principle in  reality  would  of  a  State  only  i f  23,  in  the  amount  China, demands to  p.  "It  a wire  is  is  the  think  to  on this  Chinese the  does it 3,  believed  a  that  a pro-  Communists. from  interview with  that of  Service  contact I  his  Chinese  much more  Stettinius  suspicions  are In  On A p r i l  also  e n t i r e l y ready  knowing of  to  253.  assistance it  Depart-  inevitable  Yenan,  304.  sup-  Eastern  which  "What  Chinese  recent  domination  p.  the  Far  Far  seems  in  is  give  to  China.  State  the  troops  Union:  the  of  between the  Government;  on H u r l e y ' s stated]  to  assist  Department's  [he  'united'  ultimately  will  it  Ibid.,  Ibid..  East.  many  Governments.  part:  even more u n l i k e l y  Soviet  Kennan,  in  of  section  not  of  (Chase),  support  Far  enters  contact  Chief  Division  Communist  Soviet  contact  controlled National  Ibid..  prior  great  i n d i r e c t moral  to battle,  some  Parties,  Kuomintang  G.F.  for  a  Department  The  fears  Russia  observer  bable  that  1945.  China."  two  Paper  is  of  that  Chinese  from the  State derive  echoed the  event  Soviet  and t h a t  Department  Soviet  here, been  the Assistant  memo f r o m t h e  t h e r e was  between the  that  the  up with  believed that  the  Relations  another  entrenched i n  March  fact  no d i r e c t m a t e r i a l  unquestionably  (Dumright)  personnel:  that  status  in  1945,  of  lends  Foreign  On M a r c h  1,  Affairs  Russia  latter  port  Eastern  power  East.  "while  Communists,  ment  great  China had  a memo d a t e d M a r c h  Division  stated  "relative" revolution,  Soviet to  Moscow, Stalin,  intentions  support  could be  Communists, government,  the  achieved which could  be  116  realized...." wired  Stettinius,  accord with the  in  pp. part  established  possibility  pressing of  Ibid..  of  he  Four  stated:  with  the  necessity  Russia."  days  "It  R u s s i a n methods  collaboration with  Yenan with  solidarity  342-44.  of  later,  would  to  hold  Chiang hewing  as  Kennan  not be  out  open and a means  closely  to  again of  exploit of  the  imline  Ibid.  32 White ( e d . ) , p. 322. H a r r i m a n went so f a r as t o s t a t e a t a m e e t i n g w i t h F o r r e s t a l a n d K i n g o n May 1 1 , 1 9 4 5 , t h a t "once t h e R u s s i a n s g e t i n (to C h i n a } , t h a t t h e two o r t h r e e h u n d r e d m i l l i o n s i n t h a t c o u n t r y w o u l d m a r c h when t h e K r e m l i n o r d e r e d . " Millis ( e d . ) , p. 55. F e i s , w r i t i n g i n The C h i n a T a n g l e . . . . s t a t e s t h a t " e v e r y l i n e about S o v i e t s t r a t e g y must h a v e s u g g e s t e d t h e q u e s t i o n a s t o what t h e s i t u a t i o n w o u l d b e i f C h i n a was s t i l l m i s e r a b l y d i v i d e d when t h e R u s s i a n t r o o p movement b e g a n , a n d i f a r e b e l l i o u s C o m m u n i s t army was r o a m i n g o v e r t h e n o r t h e r n r e g i o n s of China which the Soviet f o r c e s might r e a c h . " I b i d . . p. 227. Lensen sees even Roosevelt as s h a r i n g t h i s l i m i t e d view o f the Chinese Communists: " R o o s e v e l t knew, o f c o u r s e , t h a t what Stalin r e a l l y w a n t e d [at Y a l t a } , was t h e e n t r a n c e o f C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s i n t o the n a t i o n a l government at C h u n k i n g . . . . " Quoted i n S n e l l (ed.), p. 146. T h e e p i t o m y o f t h i s a t t i t u d e s u r f a c e d some f i v e y e a r s a f t e r t h e w a r , when on F e b r u a r y 9 , 1 9 5 0 , S e n a t o r J.R. McCarthy i n h i s d e n u n c i a t o r y a d d r e s s i n W h e e l i n g , West V i r g i n i a , stated in part: " F o r y e a r s , t h e R u s s i a n Communists had p l a i n l y s t a t e d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e v o l u t i o n was t h e i r a i m . An i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s p i r a t o r i a l a p p a r a t u s was u n d e r t h e i r c o n t r o l a n d i n t h i s a p p a r a t u s the C h i n e s e Communists h a d i m p o r t a n t p l a c e s . T h e i r h o p e o f c a p t u r i n g t h e w h o l e o f C h i n a was f r e e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d , t h e i r u m b i l i c a l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Moscow w e l l u n d e r s t o o d . " Quoted i n Koen, p. 120. 33 1943,  Hull  would be China  Writing of  after  on t h e  states: great  "I  eve was  of  convinced that  assistance  the war.  Russia  to  Communists,  even though  exactly  the  the  47.  34  Foreign  35  Ibid..  36  Ibid.  37  Foreign  See  also  as  in  their  Russians."  Relations. p.  us  1944.  Russian  moral  type  Hull, China.  October  and  influence  of  unifying on  Communism was  II, VI,  of  cooperation  rehabilitating  would have  Chinese  same  t h e Moscow D e c l a r a t i o n  the not  1257. 538.  793.  Relations  ibid..  247,  1945, n.  18.  The F a r  East.  China.  VII,  246-  117  38  Ibid..  p.  280.  39  Ibid..  p.  302.  40 Q u o t e d b y Nym W a l e s , " A n n a L o u i s e S t r o n g , T h e C l a s s i c F e l l o w - T r a v e l l e r , " New R e p u b l i c ( A p r i l 2 5 , 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 1 9 . Strong a l s o q u o t e d t h e r e m a r k s o f a S o v i e t m a j o r on t h e C h i n e s e Communist r e a c t i o n to t h i s a t t i t u d e : "The C h i n e s e Communists were v e r y a n n o y e d . . . w h e n we t h r e w t h e m o u t o f M u k d e n a n d p u t C h i a n g ' s men i n . C h i n e s e Communists h a d been t h e r e f i r s t . But w h a t c o u l d we d o ? We h a d o u r t r e a t y w i t h C h i a n g . " Ibid. 41 N.R. C a r v e r , Moscow a n d C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s (Stanford: S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1963), p. 222. See a l s o C B . McLane, S o v i e t P o l i c y a n d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s . 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 4 6 (New Y o r k : Columbia U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958), p. 161, and e s p e c i a l l y t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f t h e R o g o v a r t i c l e , o f A u g u s t 1, 1 9 4 3 i n V o i n a i rabochii Klass. McLane, pp. 167-70. Also V. A v a r i n ' s a r t i c l e o f D e c e m b e r 1, 1 9 4 4 . I b i d . . pp. 170-71. McLane c o n c l u d e s t h a t S o v i e t c r i t i c i s m o f t h e K u o m i n t a n g was much l e s s s e v e r e t h a n t h a t i n U.S. and E n g l i s h l i b e r a l p e r i o d i c a l s . He a l s o states t h a t " u n t i l t h e R u s s i a n s c o u l d o b s e r v e t h e C h i n e s e Communists at c l o s e hand, they appear not t o have a c c e p t e d these r e p o r t s (communist s t r e n g t h i n China] as r e l i a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e . In t h e meantime d i r e c t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o the Communists, i n o r d e r t o a l t e r t h e b a l a n c e o f power i n C h i n a i n f a v o r o f Y e n a n , was o f c o u r s e o u t o f t h e q u e s t i o n so l o n g as t h e war w i t h J a p a n c o n t i n u e d and so l o n g as Moscow w i s h e d t o p r e s e r v e t h e w a r t i m e a l liance with the United States." I b i d . . p. 181. See a l s o h i s summary o f t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s at the end o f t h e war. I b i d . , p. 195. 42 Bros., the  Writing 1961),  Hugh  The  Russia  Berlin with  Caballero the  send  munists." public with  regard  Soviet  arms by  with  toward was  any to  making  Ibid.,  p.  misgivings,  were  actually  gold  r e s e r v e had been  ment. he  sent  To t h e to  Spain.  used  on  294.  This and  Spanish  of  in  the  not  the  Before entire  order  as  of  to  Re-  project  Soviet  of  to Com-  the  weapons  remaining  out  Largo  complain  Russia  security  to  Soviet  Spanish  aid  and m i l i t a r y 'stay  1936,  embittered  the  Soviet  Russia  technicians  by  Hernandez t o for  &  able  upon t h e whole  Spain. to  28,  been  embargo  failure  sums u p  soil,  the  arms  Jesus  Harper  September  s i t u a t i o n had  entering  dispatched gave  (New Y o r k :  difficult  Thomas  no r i s k s  Stalin  as the  led  very  "Stalin,  few R u s s i a n  Spain  of  attache' "that  that took  that  violation  things  War  T i p p e l s p i r c h , had  Soviets  military  Civil  states  Moscow,  the  stating  Spanish  Thomas  German Charge' i n  provide  to  in  Spanish  for  pay-  experts  whom  the  range  of  118  artillery  fire."*  Ilya  Ehrenburg  that  in  the  the  ciple  people  the  of  fought  writing  thirties  Spanish  Franco,  Ibid..  (Cleveland:  after fascism  broken?  43  D.N.  44  and  Memoirs:  was:  Corp.,  XVIII,  (Boston:  of  p.  1  of  helped  Soviet  prin-  army  men  1945-54  304.  the  No.  states  declared the  Years:  in  126.  death  dictators  1967),  Security  p.  "The r e s i s t a n c e  a handful  Post-War  Affairs.  1925-1950  Stalin's  fascist  only  "Collective  Pacific  Krivitsky,  hypocritically  side."  Publishing  Rowe,  American View,"  the  democracies  Republican World  quoting  saw w h a t  non-intervention,  on t h e  298,  some y e a r s  he  was  Western  p.  Pacific:  (March,  Little,  An  1945),  Brown,  13.  1967),  pp. 373-74. As t o Kennan's misjudgement o f the p o t e n t i a l o f t h e Chinese Communists, he s t a t e s t h a t he "doubted at t h a t time £ 1 9 4 7 ) , a n d v e r y w r o n g l y s o , t h e a b i l i t y o f t h e C h i n e s e Commun i s t s t o e s t a b l i s h and m a i n t a i n t h e i r r u l e f o r l o n g o v e r a l l o f China.... I n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e y s h o u l d s u c c e e d . . . i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t they would themselves remain f o r long under Russian control." I b i d . , p . 374 ( I t a l i c s integral.) 45 United  U.S.  Department  States  Services, 46  Policy  October On t h e  Owen L a t t i m o r e October  6-8,  in  6-8,  of  speaking  at  stated  the  b e t w e e n A m e r i c a n money on  with  may b e  levels  American  poses."  posits  logical  nation,  ideology  presenting  also the  nature  conflicts in  contact  essence flict  of  some of  are  the  of  Central  expertise,  Conference simply  on  and A m e r i c a n know-how. are  its  sufficient  No.  that  46,  No.  of  rather  to  of  joint  Know-how  monopoly. low  defeat  2  whole  United are  ideas,  as  compared  American  pur-  China  time  t h e West  not  the  367.  ideoi f  aim  and  its  Principles,"  J.K.  Fairbank  China:  "In  cultural  and Chinese  on d i f f e r e n t b a s e s .  that  resorted  when t h e to  by  that  world  states],  Americans  an  ones,  And Our  [he  Stanley  symbols  dilemma w i t h  operating  i n t e r a c t i o n was  insoluble,  of  Past  1968),  American  every  were  and  vision  Our  is  99.  ideological  emotions  (January, with  1959),  States  not  global  Style:  relationship arose  (February,  "the  and  on t h e  they  2  policies  a body  inevitably  became  rely  which  XXVII,  light  because  Department  cannot  know-how  systematic  our  "we  an A m e r i c a n  but  of  technological  isn't  "The American  Affairs.  sheds  with  it  idea  and  a  and  Problems  B21.  the  one means  history...." Foreign  p.  Commentary.  Hoffman  at  of  levels  Ibid.,  47  levels  on  Division  B24-25.  State  that  exists There  pp.  obsession  action  several  Conference  (Washington:  1949),  American  1949,  State.  China  cultural  force...."  were The con-  Quoted  119 i n R.M. P f e f f e r (ed.), No More Vietnams: The War and t h e f u t u r e of American F o r e i g n P o l i c y (New York: Harper & Bros., 1968), p. 19. Speaking a t t h e f i r s t n a t i o n a l c o n v o c a t i o n on "The U n i t e d S t a t e s and C h i n a : The Next Decade," h e l d i n New York C i t y on March 20-21, 1969, P f e f f e r added some candor t o American a n a l y s i e s o f C h i n a . I n p a r t he s t a t e d : " I f we do not succeed i n understanding o u r s e l v e s , can we understand China - a c o u n t r y conc e r n i n g which our c u l t u r a l and p o l i t i c a l b i a s e s , compounded by our a n x i e t i e s and i g n o r a n c e , have produced s t u p i d p o l i c y and, t o o f r e q u e n t l y , poor j o u r n a l i s m and mediocre s c h o l a r s h i p ? " Quoted i n Barnett & Reischauer (eds.), p. 24. I t f e l l t o H.S. Commager t o i n t r o d u c e a touch o f i n t e l l e c t u a l h u m i l i t y t o h i s c o u n t r y ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e world's most populous n a t i o n . W r i t i n g i n t h e Times Magazine o f March 12, 1967, he s t a t e d t h a t "we [the U.sTJ do not, however, have t h e m a t e r i a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l o r moral r e sources t o be a t once an American power, a European power and an A s i a n power." "How not t o be a World Power," i b i d . , p. 28. 48 I n a r e c e n t e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d "Well, w e l l , l o o k who's h e r e , " The N a t i o n attempted t o v i n d i c a t e t h e p o l i c i e s advocated some 26 y e a r s ago by S e r v i c e , Davies and Clubb: "There they were, t h e i r photographs on t h e f r o n t page o f The New York Times. John Stewart S e r v i c e and John Paton Davies, d i s t i n g u i s h e d former f o r e i g n s e r v i c e o f f i c e r s o f t h e s t a t e department, who had conc l u d e d t h e i r testimony b e f o r e a c l o s e d s e s s i o n o f t h e Senate f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s committee. One Newspaper had s u b t i t l e d t h e photographs 'The R e s u r r e c t i o n . ' I t must have seemed l i k e a r e s u r r e c t i o n t o t h e s e men who had been hounded out o f t h e s e r v i c e i n the 1950s and have s i n c e l i v e d i n o b s c u r i t y . S e r v i c e as a l i b r a r y o f f i c i a l a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a , i n t h e Centre f o r Chinese S t u d i e s , and Davies as a f u r n i t u r e maker i n L a t i n America. 'If t h e p r e s e n t approach t o Mao and Chou had taken p l a c e 25 y e a r s ago,' Davies i s quoted as s a y i n g , 'we might have been spared two wars.' And so we might. Then one f i n d s a f u l l page i n Newsweek devoted t o O.E. Clubb, a c o l l e a g u e o f S e r v i c e and D a v i e s , w i t h the c a p t i o n 'A Diplomat V i n d i c a t e d . ' The s t o r y does not mention t h a t Clubb's t r o u b l e s began when t h e l a t e Whittaker Chambers mal i c i o u s l y r e l a t e d a meaningless i n c i d e n t about him. He was, o f course, v i n d i c a t e d even then, i n 1952, b u t r e s i g n e d from t h e s e r v i c e b i t t e r l y contending t h a t h i s c a r e e r had been i r r e p a r a b l y damaged. 'We've had 20 y e a r s o f e r r o r , ' he i n s i s t s , and who can doubt t h a t statement? Then from Time one l e a r n s t h a t 'few Weste r n e r s are as f a m i l i a r w i t h China and i t s l e a d e r s ' as Edgar Snow. Can anyone doubt i t ? But what happened t o Snow a f t e r The Saturday Evening Post l e t him l e a v e f o r l a c k o f assignments? I f he i s an o u t s t a n d i n g a u t h o r i t y now, and he i s , why wasn't any g r e a t e r use made o f h i s j o u r n a l i s t i c s k i l l and s p e c i a l knowledge  120  d u r i n g a l l t h o s e i n t e r v e n i n g y e a r s when h e l i v e d more o r l e s s as a reporter-in-exile? Reading these s t o r i e s about the 'resurr e c t i o n ' a n d ' v i n d i c a t i o n ' o f t h e s e men s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t and t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t p r e s s were i n e f f e c t saying ' s o r r y about t h a t . ' B u t c a n 15 o r 20 y e a r s c a r v e d o u t o f t h e c a r e e r s o f s u c h men b e r e p l a c e d w i t h a p h r a s e o r a photograph? A l l f o u r men h a v e b e e n m a g n a n i m o u s a b o u t t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e , o n e h a v i n g s a i d ' o h , w e l l , i t was an age o f s t u p i d i t i e s . ' But was i t o n l y s t u p i d i t y t h a t drove S e r v i c e , Davies and Clubb from t h e s e r v i c e t o w h i c h t h e y h a d d e v o t e d s o many y e a r s ? Stupidity, yes, b u t cowardice as w e l l — t h e f a i l u r e o f t h o s e who knew t h e r e a l f a c t s t o come t o t h e i r d e f e n c e — and t h e c r a s s s e l f - i n t e r e s t o f p o l i t i c i a n s e a g e r t o e x p l o i t t h e theme ' t h e Democrats h a v e g i v e n China t o the Communists.' T h e r e i s no p o i n t i n naming t h e s e politicians — and t h e l i s t would be t o o l o n g — but the best known o f them h a s a n n o u n c e d h e w o u l d s o o n b e f l y i n g t o P e k i n g . " Q u o t e d i n t h e V a n c o u v e r S u n ( A u g u s t 24, 1971), p . 5. 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"China's F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l . XXI, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), 312-22. Unger, J . "The 'New L e f t ' and American H i s t o r y : Some Recent Trends i n U n i t e d S t a t e s H i s t o r i o g r a p h y , " American H i s t o r i c a l Review. LXXII, No. 4 ( J u l y , 1967), 1237-63. Van A l s t y n e , R.W. "The American Empire: I t s H i s t o r i c a l P a t t e r n and E v o l u t i o n , " H i s t o r i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n Pamphlet. No. 43 (1960). Wales, N. "Anna L o u i s e S t r o n g : The C l a s s i c F e l l o w T r a v e l l e r , " New R e p u b l i c ( A p r i l 25, 1970), pp. 17-19. Wu, T i e n - w e i . "Chiang Kai-shek's March Twentieth Coup d ' E t a t o f 1926," J o u r n a l o f A s i a n S t u d i e s . XXVII, No. 3 (May, 1968), 585-602.  136  APPENDIX  I  S E C R E T A R Y HAY TO T H E AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER  IN 6,  GREAT 1899  BRITAIN  SIR: The Government o f Her B r i t a n n i c M a j e s t y has d e c l a r e d t h a t i t s p o l i c y and i t s v e r y t r a d i t i o n s p r e c l u d e d i t from u s i n g any p r i v i l e g e s w h i c h m i g h t b e g r a n t e d i t i n C h i n a as a weapon f o r e x c l u d i n g c o m m e r c i a l r i v a l s , and t h a t freedom o f t r a d e f o r G r e a t B r i t a i n i n t h a t E m p i r e meant f r e e d o m o f t r a d e f o r a l l t h e w o r l d alike. W h i l e c o n c e d i n g b y f o r m a l a g r e e m e n t s , f i r s t w i t h Germany and t h e n w i t h R u s s i a , t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f " s p h e r e s o f i n f l u e n c e o r i n t e r e s t " i n C h i n a i n which t h e y are t o e n j o y s p e c i a l r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s , more e s p e c i a l l y i n r e s p e c t o f r a i l r o a d s and m i n i n g e n t e r p r i s e s . Her B r i t a n n i c M a j e s t y ' s Government has t h e r e f o r e s o u g h t t o m a i n t a i n a t t h e same t i m e w h a t i s c a l l e d t h e " o p e n d o o r " p o l i c y , t o i n s u r e t o t h e commerce o f t h e w o r l d i n C h i n a e q u a l i t y o f t r e a t m e n t w i t h i n s a i d " s p h e r e s " f o r commerce and navigation. T h i s l a t t e r p o l i c y i s a l i k e u r g e n t l y demanded b y t h e B r i t i s h m e r c a n t i l e c o m m u n i t i e s and b y t h o s e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , as i t i s j u s t l y h e l d b y them t o be t h e o n l y one w h i c h w i l l improve e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , e n a b l e them t o m a i n t a i n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s i n t h e markets o f C h i n a , and e x t e n d t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s in the future. W h i l e t h e Government o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l i n no way commit i t s e l f t o a r e c o g n i t i o n o f e x c l u s i v e r i g h t s o f any power w i t h i n o r c o n t r o l o v e r any p o r t i o n o f t h e C h i n e s e E m p i r e u n d e r such agreements as have w i t h i n t h e l a s t y e a r b e e n made, i t c a n n o t c o n c e a l i t s a p p r e h e n s i o n t h a t u n d e r e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s t h e r e i s a p o s s i b i l i t y , even a p r o b a b i l i t y , o f c o m p l i c a t i o n s a r i s i n g b e t w e e n t h e t r e a t y p o w e r s w h i c h may i m p e r i l t h e r i g h t s i n s u r e d to the United States under our t r e a t i e s with China. T h i s Government i s animated by a s i n c e r e d e s i r e t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f o u r c i t i z e n s may n o t b e p r e j u d i c e d t h r o u g h e x c l u s i v e t r e a t m e n t b y any o f t h e c o n t r o l l i n g powers w i t h i n t h e i r so-called "spheres o f i n t e r e s t " i n C h i n a , and hopes a l s o t o r e t a i n t h e r e an open m a r k e t f o r t h e commerce o f t h e w o r l d , remove d a n g e r o u s sources o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i r r i t a t i o n , and h a s t e n t h e r e b y u n i t e d o r c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n o f t h e powers a t P e k i n i n f a v o r o f t h e admini s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s so u r g e n t l y needed f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e I m p e r i a l Government and m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i n t e g r i t y o f C h i n a i n  137  which the whole western world i s a l i k e concerned. It believes t h a t s u c h a r e s u l t may b e g r e a t l y a s s i s t e d b y a d e c l a r a t i o n b y the v a r i o u s powers c l a i m i n g " s p h e r e s o f i n t e r e s t " i n C h i n a o f t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s as r e g a r d s treatment o f f o r e i g n t r a d e t h e r e i n . T h e p r e s e n t moment s e e m s a p a r t i c u l a r l y o p p o r t u n e o n e f o r i n f o r m i n g Her B r i t a n n i c M a j e s t y ' s Government o f t h e d e s i r e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o s e e i t make a f o r m a l d e c l a r a t i o n a n d t o l e n d i t s support i n o b t a i n i n g s i m i l a r d e c l a r a t i o n s from the v a r i o u s powers c l a i m i n g " s p h e r e s o f i n f l u e n c e " i n C h i n a , t o t h e e f f e c t that each i n i t s r e s p e c t i v e spheres of i n t e r e s t or i n f l u e n c e . First. W i l l i n no w i s e i n t e r f e r e w i t h any v e s t e d i n t e r e s t w i t h i n any s o - c a l l e d " s p h e r e l e a s e d t e r r i t o r y i t may h a v e i n C h i n a .  t r e a t y p o r t o r any of i n t e r e s t " or  Second. That the Chinese t r e a t y t a r i f f of the time being shall apply t o a l l merchandise landed or shipped t o a l l such p o r t s as are w i t h i n said "sphere of i n t e r e s t " (unless they be "free p o r t s " ) , n o m a t t e r t o w h a t n a t i o n a l i t y i t may b e l o n g , a n d t h a t d u t i e s so l e v i a b l e s h a l l be c o l l e c t e d by t h e C h i n e s e Government. Third. T h a t i t w i l l l e v y no h i g h e r h a r b o r d u t i e s on v e s s e l s o f a n o t h e r n a t i o n a l i t y f r e q u e n t i n g any p o r t i n such " s p h e r e " t h a n s h a l l b e l e v i e d o n v e s s e l s o f i t s own n a t i o n a l i t y , a n d n o h i g h e r r a i l r o a d charges over l i n e s b u i l t , c o n t r o l l e d , or operated within i t s " s p h e r e " on m e r c h a n d i s e b e l o n g i n g t o c i t i z e n s o r s u b j e c t s o f other n a t i o n a l i t i e s t r a n s p o r t e d through such "sphere" than shall b e l e v i e d o n s i m i l a r m e r c h a n d i s e b e l o n g i n g t o i t s own n a t i o n a l s transported over equal distances. The r e c e n t ukase o f H i s Majesty t h e Emperor o f R u s s i a , d e c l a r i n g t h e p o r t o f T a - l i e n - w a n open t o t h e merchant s h i p s o f a l l nations d u r i n g the whole of the l e a s e under which i t i s to be h e l d by R u s s i a , removing as i t does a l l u n c e r t a i n t y as t o t h e l i b e r a l and c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y o f t h a t power, t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e a s s u r a n c e s g i v e n t h i s Government by R u s s i a , j u s t i f i e s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t H i s Majesty w i l l c o o p e r a t e i n such an u n d e r s t a n d i n g as i s h e r e p r o p o s e d , and our ambassador a t t h e c o u r t o f St. P e t e r s b u r g has been i n s t r u c t e d a c c o r d i n g l y t o submit t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s above d e t a i l e d t o H i s I m p e r i a l M a j e s t y , and ask t h e i r early consideration. C o p y o f my i n s t r u c t i o n t o M r . T o w e r i s herewith inclosed for your c o n f i d e n t i a l information. The a c t i o n o f Germany i n d e c l a r i n g t h e p o r t o f K i a o c h a o a " f r e e p o r t , " and t h e a i d t h e I m p e r i a l Government has g i v e n C h i n a i n the establishment there of a Chinese custom-house, coupled with t h e o r a l a s s u r a n c e c o n v e y e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b y Germany t h a t o u r i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n i t s " s p h e r e " w o u l d i n no w i s e b e a f f e c t e d b y its occupation of t h i s portion of the province of Shang-tung, tend to s h o w t h a t l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n may b e a n t i c i p a t e d f r o m t h a t p o w e r t o the desired declaration. The  interests  of  Japan,  the  next  most  interested  power  in  the  138  trade  of  China,  rangement,  and  the  year  are  so  that  its  hearty  You w i l l , ations  to  will  at  Her  line  inclose  herewith  a  Berlin bearing  the honor  to  be  its  statesmen views  confidently  as  of on  the  the  request copy  by  of  the the  [etc.]  principal  their  submit  the  last  on. the  secretary  instruction  ar-  expressed,  counted  immediate  above  proposed within  here  practicable,  Majesty's  and  served  with is  date  Britannic  I  at  in  early  affairs  have  clearly  cooperation as  foreign  I  so  declaration  entirely  for  bassador  be  consider-  of  state  consideration. sent  to  our  am-  subject. JOHN  HAY.  1  139  APPENDIX  II  S E C R E T A R Y HAY TO A M E R I C A N D I P L O M A T I C R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S A T P A R I S , L O N D O N , ROME, S T . P E T E R S B U R G , V I E N N A , B R U S S E L S , T O K Y O , T H E H A G U E , AND L I S B O N . WASHINGTON,  JULY  3,  BERLIN, MADRID,  1900  I n t h i s c r i t i c a l p o s t u r e o f a f f a i r s i n C h i n a i t i s deemed a p p r o p r i a t e t o d e f i n e t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as f a r as present circumstances permit t h i s t o be done. We a d h e r e t o t h e p o l i c y i n i t i a t e d b y u s i n 1857 o f p e a c e w i t h t h e C h i n e s e n a t i o n , o f f u r t h e r a n c e o f l a w f u l commerce, and o f p r o t e c t i o n o f l i v e s and p r o p e r t y o f o u r c i t i z e n s b y a l l means g u a r a n t e e d u n d e r e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l t r e a t y r i g h t s and by t h e law o f n a t i o n s . I f wrong be d o n e t o o u r c i t i z e n s we p r o p o s e t o h o l d t h e r e s p o n s i b l e authors to the uttermost accountability. We r e g a r d t h e c o n d i t i o n a t P e k i n as one o f v i r t u a l a n a r c h y , whereby power and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e p r a c t i c a l l y d e v o l v e d upon t h e l o c a l p r o v i n c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s . So l o n g a s t h e y a r e n o t i n o v e r t c o l l u s i o n w i t h r e b e l l i o n a n d u s e t h e i r p o w e r t o p r o t e c t f o r e i g n l i f e a n d p r o p e r t y , we r e g a r d t h e m a s r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e , w i t h whom we s e e k t o r e m a i n i n peace and f r i e n d s h i p . The purpose o f t h e P r e s i d e n t i s , as i t has been h e r e t o f o r e , t o a c t c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h e o t h e r powers? f i r s t , i n o p e n i n g up communication w i t h P e k i n and r e s c u i n g t h e A m e r i c a n o f f i c i a l s , m i s s i o n a r i e s , a n d o t h e r A m e r i c a n s who a r e i n danger? secondly, i n a f f o r d i n g a l l p o s s i b l e p r o t e c t i o n everywhere i n C h i n a t o American l i f e and p r o p e r t y ? t h i r d l y , i n g u a r d i n g and p r o t e c t i n g a l l l e g i t i m a t e A m e r i c a n i n t e r e s t s ? and f o u r t h l y , in a i d i n g t o prevent a spread of the disorders to the other provinces o f t h e Empire and a r e c u r r e n c e o f such d i s a s t e r s . It is of c o u r s e t o o e a r l y t o f o r e c a s t t h e means o f a t t a i n i n g t h i s l a s t r e s u l t ? b u t t h e p o l i c y o f t h e Government o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s to s e e k a s o l u t i o n w h i c h may b r i n g a b o u t p e r m a n e n t s a f e t y a n d p e a c e t o C h i n a , p r e s e r v e C h i n e s e t e r r i t o r i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e n t i t y , p r o t e c t a l l r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d t o f r i e n d l y powers by t r e a t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and s a f e g u a r d f o r t h e w o r l d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l and i m p a r t i a l t r a d e w i t h a l l p a r t s o f the C h i n e s e E m p i r e . You w i l l communicate t h e p u r p o r t minister for foreign affairs.  of  this  instruction  to  JOHN  the HAY.  2  140  APPENDIX  THE JAPANESE  III  AMBASSADOR ( T A K A H I R A ) TO S E C R E T A R Y W A S H I N G T O N , NOVEMBER 3 0 , 1 9 0 8  ROOT  SIR: The exchange o f views between u s , which has t a k e n p l a c e at the s e v e r a l i n t e r v i e w s which I have r e c e n t l y had the honor of h o l d i n g w i t h y o u , h a s shown t h a t J a p a n and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s holding important outlying i n s u l a r possessions i n the region of t h e P a c i f i c O c e a n , t h e Governments o f t h e two c o u n t r i e s a r e a n i m a t e d b y a common a i m , p o l i c y , a n d i n t e n t i o n i n t h a t r e g i o n . B e l i e v i n g t h a t a f r a n k avowal o f t h a t aim, p o l i c y * and i n t e n t i o n would not o n l y t e n d t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e r e l a t i o n s o f f r i e n d s h i p and good neighborhood, which have immemorially e x i s t e d between Japan and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , but would m a t e r i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f the g e n e r a l p e a c e , the I m p e r i a l Government have a u t h o r i z e d me t o p r e s e n t t o y o u a n o u t l i n e o f t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h a t common a i m , p o l i c y , a n d i n t e n t i o n : 1. I t i s t h e w i s h o f t h e two Governments t o e n c o u r a g e t h e f r e e and p e a c e f u l d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e i r commerce on t h e P a c i f i c O c e a n . 2. The p o l i c y o f b o t h Governments, u n i n f l u e n c e d by any a g g r e s sive tendencies, i s d i r e c t e d to the maintenance of the existing s t a t u s quo i n t h e r e g i o n above mentioned and t o t h e d e f e n s e o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r commerce and i n d u s t r y in China. 3. They are a c c o r d i n g l y f i r m l y spect the t e r r i t o r i a l possessions said region.  resolved reciprocally to r e belonging t o each other i n  4. T h e y a r e a l s o d e t e r m i n e d t o p r e s e r v e t h e common i n t e r e s t o f a l l powers i n C h i n a b y s u p p o r t i n g b y a l l p a c i f i c means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t h e independence and i n t e g r i t y o f C h i n a and t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r commerce and i n d u s t r y o f a l l n a tions i n that Empire. 5. S h o u l d any event o c c u r t h r e a t e n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo as above d e s c r i b e d o r the p r i n c i p l e o f equal o p p o r t u n i t y as above d e f i n e d , i t r e m a i n s f o r t h e two Governments t o communicate w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n o r d e r t o a r r i v e a t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g as t o what measures t h e y may c o n s i d e r i t u s e f u l t o t a k e . If the foregoing ment o f t h e U n i t e d confirmation. I  take  [etc.]  outline States,  accords I shall  with the view of the Governbe g r a t i f i e d t o r e c e i v e your K.  TAKAHIRA  141  S E C R E T A R Y ROOT TO T H E J A P A N E S E AMBASSADOR W A S H I N G T O N , NOVEMBER 3 0 , 1 9 0 8  (TAKAHIRA)  EXCELLENCY: I have the honor t o acknowledge the your note of today s e t t i n g forth the r e s u l t of the views between us i n our r e c e n t i n t e r v i e w s d e f i n i n g s t a n d i n g o f t h e two Governments i n r e g a r d t o t h e i r region of the P a c i f i c Ocean.  receipt of exchange o f the underp o l i c y i n the  It i s a p l e a s u r e t o inform you t h a t t h i s e x p r e s s i o n of mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s welcome t o t h e Government o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e h a p p y r e l a t i o n s o f t h e two c o u n t r i e s and as t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a c o n c i s e m u t u a l a f f i r m a t i o n o f t h a t a c c o r dant p o l i c y r e s p e c t i n g t h e F a r E a s t w h i c h t h e two Governments have so f r e q u e n t l y d e c l a r e d i n t h e p a s t . I am h a p p y t o b e a b l e t o c o n f i r m t o of the United States, the declaration embodied i n t h e f o l l o w i n g words: 1. It i s the wish of the and p e a c e f u l development o f  y o u r e x c e l l e n c y , on b e h a l f o f t h e two Governments  two Governments t o e n c o u r a g e t h e f r e e t h e i r commerce on t h e P a c i f i c O c e a n .  2. The p o l i c y o f b o t h Governments, u n i n f l u e n c e d by any a g g r e s sive tendencies, i s d i r e c t e d t o the maintenance of the existing s t a t u s quo i n t h e r e g i o n above m e n t i o n e d , and t o t h e d e f e n s e o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r commerce and i n d u s t r y in China. 3. They are a c c o r d i n g l y f i r m l y spect the t e r r i t o r i a l possessions region.  resolved reciprocally to r e b e l o n g i n g t o each other i n said  4. T h e y a r e a l s o d e t e r m i n e d t o p r e s e r v e t h e common i n t e r e s t s o f a l l p o w e r s i n C h i n a b y s u p p o r t i n g b y a l l p a c i f i c means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e and i n t e g r i t y o f C h i n a and t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y f o r commerce and i n d u s t r y o f a l l nations i n that Empire. 5. S h o u l d any e v e n t o c c u r t h r e a t e n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo as above d e s c r i b e d o r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y as above d e f i n e d , i t r e m a i n s f o r t h e two Governments t o communicate w i t h each o t h e r i n o r d e r t o a r r i v e at an u n d e r s t a n d i n g as t o what measures t h e y may c o n s i d e r i t u s e f u l t o t a k e . Accept  [etc"]  ELIHU  ROOT.  3  142  APPENDIX IV TREATY OF WANGHIA (CUSHING TREATY), JULY 3. 1844 [EXTRACT] ARTICLE I I  C i t i z e n s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r e s o r t i n g t o China f o r t h e purposes o f commerce w i l l pay the d u t i e s o f import and export p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e T a r i f f , which i s f i x e d by and made a p a r t o f t h i s Treaty. They s h a l l , i n no case, be s u b j e c t t o other o r h i g h e r d u t i e s than a r e o r s h a l l be r e q u i r e d o f the people o f any other n a t i o n whatever. Fees and charges o f every s o r t a r e wholly a b o l i s h e d , and o f f i c e r s o f t h e revenue, who may be g u i l t y o f e x a c t i o n , s h a l l be punished a c c o r d i n g t o t h e laws o f China. I f the Chinese Government d e s i r e t o modify, i n any r e s p e c t , t h e s a i d t a r i f f , such m o d i f i c a t i o n s s h a l l be made o n l y i n c o n s u l t a t i o n with Consuls o r other f u n c t i o n a r i e s t h e r e t o duly a u t h o r i z e d i n b e h a l f o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and with consent t h e r e o f . And i f a d d i t i o n a l advantages o r p r i v i l e g e s , o f whatever d e s c r i p t i o n be conceded h e r e a f t e r by China t o any other n a t i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , and t h e c i t i z e n s t h e r e o f , s h a l l be e n t i t l e d thereupon, t o a complete, e q u a l , and i m p a r t i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e same. 4  143  APPENDIX  V  J O I N T D E C L A R A T I O N BY U N I T E D N A T I O N S , A  JANUARY  1,  1942.  J O I N T D E C L A R A T I O N BY T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S OP A M E R I C A , T H E U N I T E D KINGDOM O F GREAT B R I T A I N AND NORTHERN I R E L A N D , T H E U N I O N O F S O V I E T S O C I A L I S T R E P U B L I C S , CHINA, A U S T R A L I A , BELGIUM, CANADA, COSTA R I C A , CUBA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DOMINICAN R E P U B L I C , E L S A L V A D O R , G R E E C E , G U A T E M A L A , H A I T I , HONDURAS, I N D I A , L U X E M B O U R G , N E T H E R L A N D S , NEW Z E A L A N D , N I C A R A G U A , NORWAY, PANAMA, POLAND, SOUTH A F R I C A , Y U G O S L A V I A The  Governments  signatory  hereto.  H a v i n g s u b s c r i b e d t o a common p r o g r a m o f p u r p o s e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s embodied i n the J o i n t D e c l a r a t i o n o f the P r e s i d e n t o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a and t h e Prime M i n i s t e r o f t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o f G r e a t B r i t a i n and N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d d a t e d A u g u s t 14, 1 9 4 1 , known a s t h e A t l a n t i c C h a r t e r . Being convinced t h a t complete v i c t o r y over t h e i r enemies is e s s e n t i a l t o d e f e n d l i f e , l i b e r t y , i n d e p e n d e n c e and r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m , a n d t o p r e s e r v e h u m a n r i g h t s a n d j u s t i c e i n t h e i r own l a n d s a s w e l l a s i n o t h e r l a n d s , a n d t h a t t h e y a r e now e n g a g e d i n a common s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t s a v a g e a n d b r u t a l f o r c e s s e e k i n g t o subjugate the world, DECLARE: (1)  Each  sources, partite  Government  military Pact  and  pledges  itself  to  or  economic,  against  its  adherents  with  employ  those  which  its  members  such  full of  rethe  government  is  Triat  war. (2)  Each  Governments or  Government signatory  peace with  the  pledges hereto  itself  and  not  to to  cooperate with make  a  separate  the armistice  enemies.  T h e f o r e g o i n g d e c l a r a t i o n may b e a d h e r e d t o b y o t h e r nations w h i c h a r e , o r w h i c h may b e , r e n d e r i n g m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e and contributions i n the struggle for v i c t o r y over H i t l e r i s m . Done  at  January  WASHINGTON First,  1942.  144  The U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a b y F R A N K L I N D. ROOSEVELT The  United  Britain by  Kingdom  of  & Northern  Great Ireland  WINSTON C H U R C H I L L  On b e h a l f the  of  Union  the of  Government  Soviet  of  Socialist  Republics MAXIM L I T V I N O F F Ambassador National  Government  Republic  of  of  the  China  TSE-VUNG  SOONG  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  145  APPENDIX  VI  D E C L A R A T I O N OP FOUR N A T I O N S ON G E N E R A L MOSCOW, O C T O B E R 3 0 , 1 9 4 3  The Governments o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Kingdom, t h e S o v i e t Union and C h i n a ;  of  SECURITY  America,  the  United  united i n t h e i r determination, i n accordance with the Declara t i o n b y t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o f J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 4 2 , a n d s u b s e q u e n t declarations, to continue h o s t i l i t i e s against those Axis powers w i t h w h i c h t h e y r e s p e c t i v e l y a r e a t war u n t i l such powers h a v e l a i d down t h e i r a r m s o n t h e b a s i s o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l s u r r e n d e r ; conscious of t h e m s e l v e s and aggression;  their responsibility to the peoples a l l i e d with  secure the l i b e r a t i o n of them from t h e menace o f  r e c o g n i z i n g t h e n e c e s s i t y o f e n s u r i n g a r a p i d and o r d e r l y t r a n s i t i o n f r o m war t o p e a c e and o f e s t a b l i s h i n g and m a i n t a i n i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e a c e and s e c u r i t y w i t h t h e l e a s t d i v e r s i o n o f t h e w o r l d ' s human a n d e c o n o m i c r e s o u r c e s f o r a r m a m e n t s ; jointly  declare:  1. That t h e i r united a c t i o n , pledged f o r the prosecution t h e war a g a i n s t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e n e m i e s , w i l l b e c o n t i n u e d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and m a i n t e n a n c e o f peace and s e c u r i t y .  of for  2. T h a t t h o s e o f t h e m a t w a r w i t h a common e n e m y w i l l act t o g e t h e r i n a l l m a t t e r s r e l a t i n g t o t h e s u r r e n d e r and disarmament o f t h a t enemy. 3. That they w i l l necessary to provide upon t h e enemy.  t a k e a l l m e a s u r e s deemed b y them t o b e a g a i n s t any v i o l a t i o n o f t h e terms imposed  4. That they recognize the necessity of e s t a b l i s h i n g at the e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e date a general i n t e r n a t i o n a l e q u a l i t y of a l l p e a c e - l o v i n g s t a t e s , and open t o membership by a l l such states, l a r g e and s m a l l , f o r t h e maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and security. 5. That f o r the purposes of maintaining i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y p e n d i n g t h e r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f law and o r d e r and t h e i n a u g u r a t i o n o f a system of general s e c u r i t y , they w i l l consult w i t h one a n o t h e r a n d a s o c c a s i o n r e q u i r e s w i t h o t h e r members o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s w i t h a v i e w t o j o i n t a c t i o n on b e h a l f o f t h e community o f nations.  146  6. That a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s they w i l l not employ t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s w i t h i n the t e r r i t o r i e s o f other s t a t e s except f o r the purposes envisaged i n t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n and after joint consultation. 7. That they w i l l c o n f e r and cooperate w i t h one another and w i t h other members o f the U n i t e d Nations t o b r i n g about a p r a c t i c a b l e g e n e r a l agreement w i t h r e s p e c t t o the r e g u l a t i o n o f armaments i n the postwar p e r i o d . 6  147  APPENDIX  COMMUNIQUE O P T H E F I R S T  VII  CAIRO  CONFERENCE  P r e s i d e n t R o o s e v e l t , G e n e r a l i s s i m o Chiang K a i - s h e k and Prime M i n i s t e r C h u r c h i l l , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e m i l i t a r y and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference i n North A f r i c a . T h e f o l l o w i n g g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t was i s s u e d : "The s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n s have agreed upon f u t u r e m i l i t a r y operations against Japan. The t h r e e g r e a t A l l i e s e x p r e s s e d t h e i r r e s o l v e t o b r i n g u n r e l e n t i n g pressure a g a i n s t t h e i r b r u t a l enemies by sea, l a n d and a i r . This pressure is already rising. "The t h r e e g r e a t A l l i e s a r e f i g h t i n g t h i s war t o r e s t r a i n and punish the aggression of Japan. They c o v e t no g a i n f o r t h e m s e l v e s and h a v e no t h o u g h t o f t e r r i t o r i a l e x p a n s i o n . It i s their purpose t h a t Japan s h a l l be s t r i p p e d o f a l l t h e i s l a n d s i n t h e P a c i f i c w h i c h she h a s s e i z e d o r o c c u p i e d s i n c e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e f i r s t W o r l d War i n 1 9 1 4 , a n d t h a t a l l t h e t e r r i t o r i e s J a p a n has s t o l e n from t h e C h i n e s e such as M a n c h u r i a , Formosa, and t h e Pescadores, s h a l l be r e s t o r e d t o the Republic o f China. Japan w i l l a l s o be e x p e l l e d from a l l o t h e r t e r r i t o r i e s which she has t a k e n by v i o l e n c e and g r e e d . The a f o r e s a i d t h r e e g r e a t powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined t h a t i n due c o u r s e K o r e a s h a l l become f r e e and i n d e p e n d e n t . "With t h e s e o b j e c t s i n view t h e t h r e e A l l i e s , i n harmony w i t h t h o s e o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a t war w i t h J a p a n , w i l l c o n t i n u e t o p e r s e v e r e i n t h e s e r i o u s and p r o l o n g e d o p e r a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o procure the unconditional surrender of Japan." 7  148  APPENDIX V I I I  EXTRACT PROM THE DUMBARTON OAKS AGREED PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION  CHAPTER V I .  S e c t i o n A.  THE SECURITY COUNCIL  Composition  The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should c o n s i s t o f one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f each o f eleven members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America, t h e U n i t e d Kingdom o f Great B r i t a i n and Northern I r e l a n d , the Union o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , the R e p u b l i c o f China, and, i n due course, France, should have permanent s e a t s . The General Assembly should e l e c t s i x s t a t e s t o f i l l the non-permanent s e a t s . These s i x s t a t e s should be e l e c t e d f o r a term o f two y e a r s , t h r e e r e t i r i n g each y e a r . They should not be immediately e l i g i b l e f o r r e e l e c t i o n . In the f i r s t e l e c t i o n o f t h e non-permanent members t h r e e should be chosen by the General Assembly f o r one-year terms and t h r e e f o r two-year terms. S e c t i o n B.  P r i n c i p a l F u n c t i o n s and Powers  1. I n o r d e r t o ensure prompt and e f f e c t i v e a c t i o n by t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n , members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n should by t h e C h a r t e r c o n f e r on t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y and should agree t h a t i n c a r r y i n g out these d u t i e s under t h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i t should a c t on t h e i r b e h a l f . 2. In d i s c h a r g i n g these d u t i e s t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should set i n accordance w i t h t h e purposes and p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Organization. 3. The s p e c i f i c powers c o n f e r r e d on t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i n order t o c a r r y out those d u t i e s a r e l a i d down i n Chapter V I I I . 4. A l l members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n should o b l i g a t e themselves t o accept t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and t o c a r r y them out i n accordance w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C h a r t e r .  149  5. I n order t o promote t h e establishment and maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y with t h e l e a s t d i v e r s i o n o f the world's human and economic r e s o u r c e s f o r armaments, t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , with t h e a s s i s t a n c e o f t h e M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee r e f e r r e d t o i n Chapter V I I I , S e c t i o n B, paragraph 9, should have the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r f o r m u l a t i n g p l a n s f o r t h e establishment o f a system o f r e g u l a t i o n o f armaments f o r submission t o t h e members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . S e c t i o n C.  Voting  ( N o t e . — The q u e s t i o n o f v o t i n g procedure i n t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i s s t i l l under d i s c u s s i o n . ) S e c t i o n D.  Procedure  1. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should be so o r g a n i z e d as t o be able t o f u n c t i o n c o n t i n u o u s l y and each s t a t e member o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should be permanently r e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e headquarters o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n . I t may h o l d meetings a t such other p l a c e s as i n i t s judgment may b e s t f a c i l i t a t e i t s work. There should be p e r i o d i c meetings a t which each s t a t e member o f t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c o u l d i f i t so d e s i r e d be r e p r e s e n t e d by a member o f t h e government o r some other s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . 2. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should be empowered t o s e t up such b o d i e s or agencies as i t may deem necessary f o r t h e performance o f i t s f u n c t i o n s i n c l u d i n g r e g i o n a l subcommittees o f t h e M i l i t a r y S t a f f Committee. 3. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should adopt i t s own r u l e s o f procedure, i n c l u d i n g t h e method o f s e l e c t i n g i t s P r e s i d e n t . 4. Any member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n should p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f any q u e s t i o n brought b e f o r e t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l whenever t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l c o n s i d e r s t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h a t member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n a r e s p e c i a l l y a f f e c t e d . 5. Any member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n not h a v i n g a seat on the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and any s t a t e not a member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n , i f i t i s a p a r t y t o a d i s p u t e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , should be i n v i t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g t o the d i s p u t e . 8  150  APPENDIX  Attachment DRAFT  1 -  O F MARSHAL S T A L I N ' S R U S S I A ' S ENTRY  IN  IX  Translation POLITICAL  CONDITIONS  T H E WAR A G A I N S T  FOR  JAPAN  The l e a d e r s o f t h e t h r e e G r e a t Powers - t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America and Great B r i t a i n have agreed t h a t in two o r t h r e e months a f t e r Germany h a s s u r r e n d e r e d and t h e war i n E u r o p e h a s ended t h e S o v i e t U n i o n s h a l l e n t e r i n t o t h e war a g a i n s t J a p a n on t h e s i d e o f t h e A l l i e s on c o n d i t i o n t h a t : 1. Status quo i n Republic) should be  the Outer Mongolia preserved;  2. The former r i g h t s a t t a c k o f J a p a n i n 1904 a) the jacent to Union.  of Russia should be  (the  Mongolian  v i o l a t e d by the restored v i z :  Peoples  treacherous  s o u t h e r n p a r t o f S a k h a l i n as w e l l as t h e i s l a n d s adt h i s part of Sakhalin should be r e t u r n e d t o the Soviet  b) possession restored,  of  Port  Arthur  and D a i r e n  on  lease  should  be  c) the r i g h t s possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war t o t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e C h i n e s e - E a s t e r n R a i l r o a d and t h e S o u t h - M a n c h u r i a n R a i l r o a d p r o v i d i n g an o u t l e t t o D a i r e n s h o u l d b e r e s t o r e d on t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t C h i n a s h o u l d c o n t i n u e t o possess f u l l sovereignty i n Manchuria; 3. T h e K u r i l e i s l a n d s s h o u l d b e han.ded o v e r t o t h e S o v i e t Union. Heads o f t h e t h r e e G r e a t Powers h a v e a g r e e d t h a t t h e s e claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied a f t e r Japan has been d e f e a t e d . For i t s part the Soviet Union expresses i t s w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o n c l u d e w i t h t h e N a t i o n a l Government o f C h i n a a p a c t o f f r i e n d s h i p a n d a l l i a n c e b e t w e e n t h e USSR a n d C h i n a i n o r d e r t o r e n d e r a s s i s t a n c e t o C h i n a w i t h i t s armed f o r c e s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f l i b e r a t i n g China from the Japanese yoke.  151  Attachment  2  MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN Item 2. b ) : possession l e a s e o f t h e p o r t areas o f Port A r t h u r and D a i r e n en l e a s e should be r e s t o r e d , o r t h e s e areas should become f r e e p o r t s under i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l . Item 2. c ) : Add t h e f o l l o w i n g a f t e r t h e word "Manchuria," a t t h e end o f the paragraph "or these r a i l r o a d s should be p l a c e d under the operat i o n a l c o n t r o l o f a C h i n e s e - S o v i e t Commission." Item 3.: Add f i n a l paragraph: " I t i s understood t h a t the agreement c o n c e r n i n g t h e p o r t s and r a i l w a y s r e f e r r e d t o above r e q u i r e s t h e concurrence o f G e n e r a l i s s i m o Chiang K a i - s h e k . " 9  152  APPENDIX X  AGREEMENT REGARDING ENTRY OF THE SOVIET UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN TOP  SECRET AGREEMENT  The l e a d e r s o f the t h r e e Great Powers - the S o v i e t Union, the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America and Great B r i t a i n - have agreed t h a t i n two or t h r e e months a f t e r Germany has surrendered and the war i n Europe has terminated the S o v i e t Union s h a l l e n t e r i n t o the war a g a i n s t Japan on the s i d e o f the A l l i e s on c o n d i t i o n t h a t : 1. The s t a t u s quo i n Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) s h a l l be p r e s e r v e d ; 2. The former r i g h t s o f R u s s i a v i o l a t e d by the t r e a c h e r o u s a t t a c k o f Japan i n 1904 s h a l l be r e s t o r e d , v i z : a) the southern p a r t o f S a k h a l i n as w e l l as a l l the i s l a n d s adjacent t o i t s h a l l be r e t u r n e d t o the S o v i e t Union, b) the commercial p o r t o f D a i r e n s h a l l be i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e d , the preeminent i n t e r e s t s of the S o v i e t Union i n t h i s p o r t b e i n g safeguarded and t h e l e a s e o f Port A r t h u r as a n a v a l base of the USSR r e s t o r e d . c) the C h i n e s e - E a s t e r n R a i l r o a d and the South-Manchurian R a i l r o a d which p r o v i d e s an o u t l e t t o D a i r e n s h a l l be j o i n t l y operated by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a j o i n t S o v i e t - C h i n e s e Company i t b e i n g understood t h a t the preeminent i n t e r e s t s o f the S o v i e t Union s h a l l be safeguarded and t h a t China s h a l l r e t a i n f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y i n Manchuria; 3. The K u r i l i s l a n d s s h a l l be handed over t o the S o v i e t Union. I t i s understood, t h a t the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the p o r t s and r a i l r o a d s r e f e r r e d t o above w i l l r e q u i r e concurrence o f G e n e r a l i s s i m o Chiang Kai-shek. The P r e s i d e n t w i l l take measures i n order t o o b t a i n t h i s concurrence on a d v i c e from Marshal S t a l i n . The Heads o f the t h r e e Great Powers have agreed t h a t these c l a i m s o f the S o v i e t Union s h a l l be unquestionably f u l f i l l e d a f t e r Japan has been d e f e a t e d .  153  For i t s p a r t t h e S o v i e t Union expresses r e a d i n e s s t o conclude with t h e N a t i o n a l Government o f China a pact o f f r i e n d s h i p and a l l i a n c e between t h e USSR and China i n o r d e r t o render a s s i s tance t o China w i t h armed f o r c e s f o r the purpose o f l i b e r a t i n g China from t h e Japanese yoke.  K.CTAJtHH FEBRUARY 11, 1945.  FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT WINSTON S. CHURCHILL  10  154  APPENDIX  XI  T R E A T Y O P F R I E N D S H I P AND A L L I A N C E BETWEEN T H E R E P U B L I C O F C H I N A AND T H E U . S . S . R . , A U G U S T 1 4 , 1 9 4 5  The P r e s i d e n t o f t h e N a t i o n a l G o v e r n m e n t ' o f t h e R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a , and t h e P r e s i d i u m o f t h e Supreme S o v i e t o f t h e U . S . S . R . , Desirous o f strengthening t h e f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s that have always e x i s t e d between China and t h e U.S.S.R., through an a l l i a n c e and good n e i g h b o r l y postwar c o l l a b o r a t i o n . Determined t o a s s i s t each other i n t h e struggle against agg r e s s i o n on t h e p a r t o f enemies o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s i n t h i s w o r l d w a r , a n d t o c o l l a b o r a t e i n t h e common w a r a g a i n s t J a p a n u n t i l her unconditional surrender. Expressing t h e i r unswerving a s p i r a t i o n t o cooperate i n the cause o f m a i n t a i n i n g peace and s e c u r i t y f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e peoples o f both c o u n t r i e s and o f a l l t h e p e a c e - l o v i n g nations. A c t i n g upon t h e p r i n c i p l e s e n u n c i a t e d i n t h e j o i n t d e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s o f J a n u a r y 1, 1 9 4 2 , i n t h e f o u r p o w e r D e c l a r a t i o n s i g n e d i n Moscow o n O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 4 3 , a n d i n t h e C h a r t e r of the International Organization of the United Nations. Have d e c i d e d t o c o n c l u d e t h e p r e s e n t appointed as t h e i r p l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s : The  President China;  His  Excellency  of the National D r . Wang  Treaty  Government  Shih-chieh,  to this  effect  o f the Republic  Minister  for Foreign  of the Republic of China, The P r e s i d i u m o f t h e Supreme S o v i e t o f t h e U . S . S . R . ; H i s E x c e l l e n c y M r . V . M. M o l o t o v , t h e P e o p l e ' s Commissar Foreign A f f a i r s of the U.S.S.R., Who, a f t e r e x c h a n g i n g t h e i r F u l l P o w e r s , form, have agreed as f o l l o w s : ARTICLE  found  i n good  and  of Affairs  of and due  I  The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s u n d e r t a k e i n a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r U n i t e d N a t i o n s t o wage w a r a g a i n s t J a p a n u n t i l f i n a l v i c t o r y i s won. The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s undertake mutually t o r e n d e r t o one another a l l n e c e s s a r y m i l i t a r y and o t h e r assistance and support i n t h i s w a r .  155  ARTICLE I I The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s undertake not t o enter i n t o sep a r a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Japan and not t o conclude, without mutual consent, any a r m i s t i c e or peace t r e a t y e i t h e r w i t h the present Japanese Government or w i t h any other government or aut h o r i t y set up i n Japan which do not renounce a l l a g g r e s s i v e intentions. ARTICLE I I I The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s undertake a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n o f the war a g a i n s t Japan t o take j o i n t l y a l l measures i n t h e i r power t o render i m p o s s i b l e a r e p e t i t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n and v i o l a t i o n o f the peace by Japan. In the event o f one o f the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s becoming i n v o l v e d i n h o s t i l i t i e s w i t h Japan i n consequence o f an a t t a c k by the l a t t e r a g a i n s t the s a i d C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t y , the other High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t y s h a l l a t once g i v e t o the C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t y so i n v o l v e d i n h o s t i l i t i e s a l l the m i l i t a r y and o t h e r support and a s s i s t a n c e w i t h the means i n i t s power. T h i s a r t i c l e s h a l l remain i n f o r c e u n t i l such time as the o r g a n i z a t i o n "The U n i t e d N a t i o n s " may on request o f the two High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s be charged w i t h the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r e v e n t i n g f u r t h e r a g g r e s s i o n by Japan. ARTICLE IV Each High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t y undertakes not t o conclude any a l l i a n c e and not t o take any p a r t i n any c o a l i t i o n d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the other High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t y . ARTICLE V The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s , h a v i n g r e g a r d t o the i n t e r e s t s o f the s e c u r i t y and economic development o f each o f them, agree t o work t o g e t h e r i n c l o s e and f r i e n d l y c o l l a b o r a t i o n a f t e r the coming o f peace and t o a c t a c c o r d i n g t o the p r i n c i p l e s o f mutual r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and o f n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f the other c o n t r a c t i n g party. ARTICLE VI The High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s agree t o render each other every p o s s i b l e economic a s s i s t a n c e i n the post-war p e r i o d w i t h a view t o f a c i l i t a t i n g and a c c e l e r a t i n g r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n both c o u n t r i e s and t o c o n t r i b u t i n g t o the cause o f world p r o s p e r i t y .  156  ARTICLE VII Nothing i n t h i s t r e a t y s h a l l be so construed as may a f f e c t the r i g h t s or o b l i g a t i o n s o f the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as members of the o r g a n i z a t i o n "The U n i t e d N a t i o n s " . ARTICLE V I I I The present T r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d i n the s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time. The exchange o f the instruments o f r a t i f i c a t i o n s h a l l take p l a c e as soon as p o s s i b l e i n Chungking. The T r e a t y comes i n t o f o r c e immediately upon i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n and s h a l l remain i n f o r c e f o r a term o f t h i r t y y e a r s . I f n e i t h e r o f the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s has g i v e n n o t i c e , a y e a r b e f o r e the e x p i r a t i o n o f the term, o f i t s d e s i r e t o t e r minate the T r e a t y , i t s h a l l remain v a l i d f o r an u n l i m i t e d time, each of the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s b e i n g a b l e t o terminate i t s o p e r a t i o n by g i v i n g n o t i c e t o t h a t e f f e c t one y e a r i n advance. In f a i t h whereof the P l e n i p o t e n t i a r i e s have signed the present T r e a t y and a f f i x e d t h e i r s e a l s t o i t . Done i n Moscow, the Fourteenth August, 1945, corresponding t o the Fourteenth day o f the E i g h t h month o f t h e T h i r t y - f o u r t h year of the Chinese R e p u b l i c , i n two c o p i e s , each one i n the Russian and Chinese languages, both t e x t s b e i n g e q u a l l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e . THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R.  THE PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.  157  THE PEOPLED COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MOLOTOV) TO THE CHINESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (WANG) AUGUST 14, 1945 YOUR EXCELLENCY, With r e f e r e n c e t o the T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p and A l l i a n c e signed today between t h e R e p u b l i c o f China and t h e U.S.S.R., I have the honor t o put on r e c o r d the understanding between the High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as f o l l o w s : 1. In accordance w i t h the s p i r i t o f the aforementioned T r e a t y , and i n order t o put i n t o e f f e c t i t s aims and purposes, the Government o f t h e U.S.S.R. agrees t o render t o China moral support and a i d i n m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and other m a t e r i a l r e sources, such support and a i d t o be e n t i r e l y g i v e n t o the Nat i o n a l Government as the c e n t r a l government o f C h i n a . 2. In the course o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g D a i r e n and Port A r t h u r and r e g a r d i n g the j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f the Chinese Changchun Railway, the Government o f the U.S.S.R. regarded t h e Three East e r n P r o v i n c e s as p a r t o f China and r e a f f i r m e d i t s r e s p e c t f o r C h i n a s f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y over the Three E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and r e c o g n i z e t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n t e g r i t y . 3. As f o r the r e c e n t developments i n S i n k i a n g the S o v i e t Government confirms t h a t , as s t a t e d i n A r t i c l e V o f the T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p and A l l i a n c e , i t has no i n t e n t i o n o f i n t e r f e r i n g i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s o f China. I f Your E x c e l l e n c y w i l l be so good as t o c o n f i r m t h a t the understanding i s c o r r e c t as set f o r t h i n t h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a graphs, the present note and Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s r e p l y t h e r e t o w i l l c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t o f the aforementioned T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p and Alliance. I take ( e t c 3 V. M. MOLOTOV 1  158  THE CHINESE MINISTER COMMISSAR  FOR  FOREIGN A F F A I R S  FOR  FOREIGN A F F A I R S  AUGUST  YOUR E X C E L L E N C Y : Your  Excellency's  I Note  have of  (WANG)  14,  PEOPLE'S  (MOLOTOV)  1945  the honour today * s  TO THE  to  date  acknowledge  reading  as  receipt  of  follows:  "With r e f e r e n c e t o t h e T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p and A l l i a n c e signed t o d a y between t h e R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a and t h e U . S . S . R . , I have t h e honour t o put on r e c o r d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g between t h e High C o n t r a c t i n g P a r t i e s as follows: "1. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e s p i r i t o f t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d T r e a t y , and i n o r d e r t o p u t i n t o e f f e c t i t s aims and p u r p o s e s , t h e Government o f t h e U.S.S.R., agrees t o r e n d e r t o C h i n a moral s u p p o r t and a i d i n m i l i t a r y s u p p l i e s and o t h e r m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s , such support and a i d t o be e n t i r e l y g i v e n t o t h e N a t i o n a l Government as t h e c e n t r a l Government o f C h i n a . "2. In t h e c o u r s e o f c o n v e r s a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g D a i r e n and P o r t A r t h u r and r e g a r d i n g t h e j o i n t o p e r a t i o n o f t h e C h i n e s e Changchun Railway, t h e Government o f t h e U.S.S.R. r e g a r d e d t h e T h r e e E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s as p a r t o f C h i n a and r e a f f i r m e d i t s r e s p e c t f o r C h i n a ' s f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e T h r e e E a s t e r n P r o v i n c e s and r e c o g n i z e t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e integrity. "3. As f o r t h e r e c e n t developments i n S i n k i a n g t h e Soviet Government c o n f i r m s t h a t , as s t a t e d i n A r t i c l e V o f t h e T r e a t y o f F r i e n d s h i p and A l l i a n c e , i t h a s no i n t e n t i o n o f i n t e r f e r i n g i n the internal a f f a i r s of China. "If Your E x c e l l e n c y w i l l be so good as t o c o n f i r m t h a t the u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s c o r r e c t as set f o r t h i n t h e p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h s , the p r e s e n t note and Your E x c e l l e n c y ' s r e p l y t h e r e t o constitute a part of the aforementioned Treaty of Friendship Alliance." I as  have set  I  the honour  forth  avail  to  confirm that  the  understanding  is  will and  correct  above.  [etcjj  WANG  SHIH-CHIEH  1 1  159  APPENDIX X I I  AMENDMENTS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PROPOSED BY THE U.S. [AMENDMENTS INDICATED IN ITALICS]  CHAPTER V I .  THE SECURITY COUNCIL  S e c t i o n A.  Composition  The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should c o n s i s t o f one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f each o f e l e v e n members o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f the U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America, the U n i t e d Kingdom o f Great B r i t a i n and Northern I r e l a n d , t h e Union o f S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , the R e p u b l i c o f China, and, i n due course, France, should have permanent s e a t s . The General Assembly should e l e c t s i x s t a t e s t o f i l l t h e non-permanent s e a t s , due r e g a r d b e i n g s p e c i a l l y p a i d i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f members o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n towards t h e maintenance o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and securi t y and towards t h e other purposes o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n , and a l s o t o e q u i t a b l e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n . These s i x s t a t e s should be e l e c t e d f o r a term o f two y e a r s , t h r e e r e t i r i n g each y e a r . They should not be immediately e l i g i b l e f o r r e e l e c t i o n . In the f i r s t e l e c t i o n o f t h e non-permanent members t h r e e should be chosen by t h e General Assembly f o r one-year terms and t h r e e f o r two-year terms. S e c t i o n D.  Procedure  2. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should be empowered t o s e t up such b o d i e s o r agencies as i t may deem necessary f o r the performance o f i t s f u n c t i o n , irnelHdii^-»egi©nai-9HbeeHBRitfeees-of-'fehe-Milita»y Sfeaff-GeiHmitfeee. 3. Any member o f t h e O r g a n i z a t i o n n o t h a v i n g a seat on t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and any s t a t e not a member o f the O r g a n i z a t i o n , i f i t i s p a r t y t o a d i s p u t e under c o n s i d e r a t i o n by t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , should be i n v i t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e d i s p u t e . I n t h e case o f a non-member, t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l should l a y down such c o n d i t i o n s as i t may deem j u s t f o r the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f such a non-member. 12  160  NOTES 1 China White Paper. I , 414-16, q u o t i n g F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1899. p. 131. 2 China White Paper. I , 416-17, q u o t i n g F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1900. p. 299. 3 China White Paper. I , 427-28, q u o t i n g 1908. pp. 510-11.  Foreign Relations.  4 China White Paper. I , 413, q u o t i n g Hunter M i l l e r (ed.), T r e a t i e s and Other I n t e r n a t i o n a l A c t s o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f America. IV, 559-60. 5  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . 1942. G e n e r a l . I , 25-26.  6  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1943. I , 755-56.  7  F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . C a i r o . . . . pp. 448-49  8 October 9, 1945, Postwar F o r e i g n P o l i c y p. 614.  ( I t a l i c s mine.) Preparation,  9 F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s . M a l t a . . . . pp. 896-97. Attachment 1, i s a copy o f t h e o r i g i n a l d r a f t as g i v e n t o Harriman by Molotov, February 10, 1945, 2:00 p.m. a t Yusupov Palace, Y a l t a . A t t a c h ment 2, t h e amendments made t o t h e aforementioned d r a f t by Harriman i n Molotov's presence and submitted t o R o o s e v e l t , who approved them t h e same day a t 4:30 p.m. f o r r e s u b m i t t a l t o Molotov. Note: P o r t i o n s c r o s s e d out a r e d e l e t i o n s and p o r t i o n s u n d e r l i n e d a r e a d d i t i o n s t o o r i g i n a l document. I b i d . . p. 984. T h i s i s t h e f i n a l d r a f t c o n t a i n i n g t h e Harriman amendments o f February 10, 1945. 1 0  11 China White Paper. I I , 585-88, q u o t i n g Department o f S t a t e B u l l e t i n (February 10, 1946), pp. 201-04. 12 Postwar F o r e i g n P o l i c y P r e p a r a t i o n , pp. 682-83. Subm i t t e d t o t h e San F r a n c i s c o Conference, May 4, 1945. (Crossed out s e c t i o n s a r e d e l e t i o n s . )  

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