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The Dutch Army during World War I Bout, John Jacob 1972

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THE DUTCH ARMY DURING WORLD WAR I by John J . Bout B.A., Brock University, 1970 A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l F ulfilment of the Requirements f o r the Degree of Master of Arts i n the Department of History We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard The Unive r s i t y of B r i t i s h September, 19 72 Columbia In presenting th i s thes i s in pa r t i a l f u l f i lment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L ibrary sha l l make i t f ree l y ava i l ab le for reference and study. I fur ther agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thes i s for scho lar ly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representat ives. It is understood that copying or pub l i ca t ion of th i s thes is f o r f i nanc ia l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permission. Department of H \ ^ T p P-M The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date ^ Ut~y / ? /q 7£ ABSTRACT From August 1914 to November 1918 the Kingdom of the Netherlands maintained a mobilized army of roughly 200,000. men. In addition to the burden t h i s placed upon the country, the Dutch were very much affected i n other ways by the war outside t h e i r border.:, trade was disrupted, ships were l o s t , there were food and raw material shortages, and the pressures and demands from the b e l l i g e r e n t neighbours had to be endured i n order to avoid war. A l l these things would have caused problems f o r any nation occupying a s i m i l a r geographic p o s i -t i o n as the Netherlands, but f o r the Dutch people these were e s p e c i a l l y ; d i f f i c u l t years. On the one hand they were faced with the apparent necessity of maintaining an armed force to repel a p o s s i b l e invasion; on the other hand they possessed an inherent and century old d i s l i k e f o r things m i l i t a r y . A f t e r t h e * i n i t i a l months of uncertainty and fear, the nation was faced^with .the exceedingly d i f f i c u l t problem of main-ta i n i n g an armed force c o n s i s t i n g of men who had no i n t e r e s t i n serving, f o r a population which was at best apathetic and at worst h o s t i l e , led by a government divided on the question "of the need f o r such a large mobilized army. The primary function of the army—defending the country against a f o r e i g n invasion—was soon supplemented by a number of other r o l e s : caring f o r refugees and prisoners of war, preventing the extensive smuggling of goods along the borders, maintaining i n t e r n a l order, and f r u s t r a t i n g foreign i v attempts to use the Netherlands as a base f o r espionage and d r a f t i n g men f o r ser v i c e i n foreign armies. The army had to carry out i t s r o l e s while s u f f e r i n g from the d e t e r i o r a t i n g economic s i t u a t i o n , the increasing s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s within the country, as well as growing pressure and propaganda from the various a n t i - m i l i t a r y organizations. A f t e r four years of mobilization the army was on the verge of collapse and unable to f i g h t the forces threatening to destroy the nation from within. C i v i l i a n volunteers from a l l walks of l i f e had to be c a l l e d up while the army was sent home. Yet the nation learned nothing from the 1914-1918 experience. In f a c t , a l l the wrong conclusions were drawn i n the years following the Peace of V e r s a i l l e s . The general consensus was that the Netherlands had stayed out of the war because i t had wanted to remain neutral and had created and maintained an adequate defence force. In the post-war years the army was neglected again, a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m was given free voice, defence i n s t a l l a t i o n s were uncared f o r , foreign events were not considered i n the l i g h t of t h e i r p o s s i b l e conse-quences f o r the Netherlands, and warnings of an impending invasion were disregarded. The quick defeat at the hands of the German troops i n May 1940 caused many Dutch people to look i n anguish f o r the reasons f o r t h e i r i n g l o r i o u s surrender. Many writers have sought the explanations i n the twenty years before 1940, but the roots go back much fur t h e r . They were already growing before 1914, and became f i r m l y embedded during the Great War. V The Dutch people d i d not grasp the lessons of the 1914-1918 period, never changed t h e i r ideas or ways during and a f t e r that time, and were therefore an easy v i c t i m of German m i l i t a r y aggression i n 1940. The explanation f o r the f i a s c o of May, 1940 can be understood i f the Dutch national a t t i t u d e towards t h e i r m i l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s during the Great War i s understood. v i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT i i i LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS v i i i CHAPTER I. The Netherlands i n the Decades before 1914 1 1. Introduction 2. S o c i a l Conditions 3. The P o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n 4. Foreign P o l i c y 5. The M i l i t a r y CHAPTER I I . August, September, October, 1914 27 1. Mo b i l i z a t i o n and the Plan of Defence 2. The Condition of the Army 3. P o s i t i o n of the Government 4. Unexpected R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the Army 5. Problems Within the Army CHAPTER I I I . Smuggling, Censorship and Counter-espionage 65 1. Smuggling 2. Censorship and Counter-espionage CHAPTER IV. Problems Within the Army 90 1. National Sentiment 2. Missed Opportunities 3. Leaves and other Problems 4. A n t i - M i l i t a r i s m 5. Attempts to Make M i l i t a r y Service Popular CHAPTER V. C o n f l i c t i n g Ideas About Defence 1. The Problem 2. F i r s t C r i s i s 3. Second C r i s i s CHAPTER VI. October, November, 1918 1. The Riots 2. The Reaction 3. The L e f t and Right 4. The Aftermath CHAPTER VII. Consequences of Neglect 1. The Inter-War Years 2. National Myopia 3. Summation REFERENCES BIBLIOGRAPHY V l l l LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page Map of The Netherlands 199 Map of the S t e l l i n g Holland 200 Map of the Waterlinie Defences 201 Map of the S t e l l i n g Amsterdam Showing i t s 42 F o r t i f i c a t i o n s and Strong Points 202 CHAPTER I The Netherlands i n the Decades before 1914 1. Introduction The geographic l o c a t i o n of the Netherlands was an asset i n time of peace and a l i a b i l i t y i n time of a European war. S i t u -ated on the North Sea and s t r a d d l i n g the mouths of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt Rivers, the Netherlands occupied the natural l o c a t i o n f o r t r a n s f e r of goods from sea-going vessels to r i v e r c r a f t . In the event of a war i n v o l v i n g Germany and Great B r i t -ain on opposite sides, however, the Dutch were i n a precarious s i t u a t i o n . England would want to prevent goods from reaching Germany v i a the Netherlands and could p o s s i b l y want to invade her i n order to attack Germany from Dutch s o i l . From the Ger-man side an invasion would be even more l i k e l y because the excellent Dutch harbours would be a great asset f o r the German surface and submarine f l e e t , while at the same time the Nether lands would be denied as a p o s s i b l e base of operation to the B r i t i s h . In terms of numbers (roughly 6 m i l l i o n i n 1914) and indus-t r i a l might the Netherlands could not defend her whole t e r r i -tory against her two 'strong neighbours. By the turn of the century the Netherlands was s t i l l f a r from an i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nation; only one-third of the people derived t h e i r l i v i n g from industry." 1" Of al°l i n d u s t r i a l workers i n 1903, only 18 per cent worked i n establishments employing more than 500 workers. Many of the very small home i n d u s t r i e s were on t h e i r l a s t legs 2 Unable to compete with larger f a c t o r i e s and imported products they maintained themselves by f o r c i n g t h e i r workers to work very long hours f o r l i t t l e money. The government gave no stimu-lus to industry, but neither d i d i t c o n t r o l or standardize p r i c e s , production, or q u a l i t y . The country d i d not possess any raw materials except small q u a n t i t i e s of coal and by 1913 3 these could only meet 10 per cent of the domestic demand. Trade, the t r a n s f e r of goods, and a g r i c u l t u r e were the cor-ner-stones of the Dutch economy. Out of every 100 persons employed i n 1909, 27 worked i n a g r i c u l t u r e and 19 i n trade and 4 transport. A g r i c u l t u r e was not only important economically, the l o c a t i o n and extent of the f e r t i l e areas also made i t pos-s i b l e that the Netherlands could defend part of i t s t e r r i t o r y against a large invading force with a reasonable chance of success. Much of Holland"* l i e s below sea l e v e l and could be defended with the help of inundations. The r e s u l t i n g Vesting  Holland could f o r a time be fed from the farms within t h i s area. Most of the t r a n s f e r of goods through the Netherlands took place by water, and the multitude of r i v e r s , canals, and smaller waterways not only served as excellent and cheap trans-p o r t a t i o n a r t e r i e s , but also made i t d i f f i c u l t f o r an invading force not f a m i l i a r with the hazardous and treacherous nature of water and swampy ground. Discussing the Dutch geographic l o c a t i o n and economic strength i n the framework of defence p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s using the advantage, of hindsight and i s quite d i f f e r e n t from what the Dutch people were concerned with i n the decade before 1914. 3 Defence and m i l i t a r y matters were of no i n t e r e s t except when the f i n a n c i a l side was discussed. The country had not been i n -volved i n a war f o r 80 years (excluding a few minor c o l o n i a l skirmishes) and f o r more than 50 years various governments had pr a c t i s e d a p o l i c y of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y and i m p a r t i a l i t y . The Netherlands was a s a t i a t e d nation which could lose a great deal i n a war but win nothing. Vulnerable because i t was a trading nation, not s e l f s u f f i c i e n t i n raw materials, weak numerically and small geographically, the Dutch had long ago r e a l i z e d that they could not play a major power r o l e i n Europe as they had been able to do i n the seventeenth century. But neither d i d they t r y to win a p o s i t i o n f o r themselves as a small, but im-portant country. N e u t r a l i t y v/as not j u s t a matter of staying out of c o n f l i c t i n g questions among other countries, i t had become a sacred doctrine bordering very c l o s e l y on i s o l a t i o n i s m . Trade and p o l i t i c s were kept as separate as po s s i b l e , and the l a t t e r , as f a r as foreign events were concerned, was of very l i t t l e i n t e r e s t to the Dutch people. A n t i p a t h e t i c towards a l l things m i l i t a r y , and un w i l l i n g to spend any money on m i l i t a r y p r o j e c t s , the nation as a whole refused to consider foreign events as to t h e i r p o s s i b l e consequences f o r the Netherlands. The Dutch never asked themselves what would happen i f they remained neutral but B r i t a i n and Germany went to war against each other. F i f t y per cent of a l l the foreign trade of the Netherlands was with Germany and twenty per cent with Great 7 B r i t a i n . How much the Dutch depended on trade and the tra n s f e r of goods i s evident from the following f i g u r e s : i n 1872, 4 2.6 tons of goods moved across the borders f o r each of the 3.5 m i l l i o n inhabitants; by 1899 the population had increased 8 to 5 m i l l i o n and the per ca p i t a t r a n s f e r to 8.3 tons. In 1867, Dutch harbours handled 7.4 m i l l i o n tons; by 1910 t h i s had i n -9 creased 413 per cent to 37,932,000 tons. That much of t h i s trade and t r a n s f e r t r a f f i c would be destroyed by a war between Great B r i t a i n and Germany, even i f the Netherlands remained neutral, must have been obvious to anyone who gave i t a l i t t l e thought. But apparently no one d i d . The Dutch put a l l t h e i r stakes on one card, refused to cover any other bets, and thought themselves safe. School c h i l d r e n were taught a l l about the glorious Eighty Years War against Spain when the Netherlands, won i t s independence ( i n 1648); and the heroic sea b a t t l e s against the B r i t i s h during the seven-teenth century when the Dutch admirals were the best i n the world were covered i n great d e t a i l . Adults proudly sang the national anthem which speaks of freedom from tyranny and f i g h t -ing to the death against oppression. But the pride i n the h i s -tory of the Netherlands was seldom more than a sentimental g l o r i f i c a t i o n of the past without the conviction that one had to exert oneself f o r the fatherland. The Dutch people preferred to s p l i t i n t o a multitude of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s which were divided on a great many things and i n v a r i a b l y the question of the defences of the nation was one of them. Consequently, h a l f -hearted and l a c k a d a i s i c a l measures were introduced which f e l l f a r short of what was required considering the seriousness of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Europe i n the decade before 1914. 5 2. S o c i a l Conditions For a small country the people of the Netherlands were un-u s u a l l y diverse. A F r i s i a n farmer would barely be able to make himself understood i n the Hague or Rotterdam, and the same was true f o r a farmer or fisherman from the province of Zeeland. And the d i a l e c t s from these two provinces were so d i f f e r e n t that the people could not understand each other e i t h e r . Customs, dress, and habits were also very v a r i e d . Monetary returns and s o c i a l standing from a s i m i l a r profession i n d i f f e r e n t provinces were not the same. A mixed (dairy and grain) farmer from the province of Groningen ttfould have a good income and a high so-c i a l standing i n his v i l l a g e ; a s i m i l a r type farmer with the same acreage i n the province of Drente could only eke out a meagre l i v i n g on the poor sandy s o i l of his province. In the occupational sector there were also d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e s . Farmers and fishermen had very l i t t l e i n common, d i d not under-stand each other's problems and seldom had any s o c i a l contact. R e l i g i o n often created a very large b a r r i e r between people. The southern part of the nation, below the big r i v e r s , was pre-dominantly Roman Cath o l i c , while the north was Protestant. At times the mistrust and d i s l i k e was only s l i g h t l y l e s s than had been the case during the time of the Reformation. Often t h i s stemmed from ignorance and centuries of prejudice because many Protestants i n small northern v i l l a g e s had never met a Roman Cat h o l i c , and the reverse was true f o r a Roman Cat h o l i c from the southern part of Limburg. The introduction of the t r a i n and steam tram, followed a l i t t l e l a t e r by the b i c y c l e (which 6 became very popular) d i d diminish the separation between c i t y and country but there were s t i l l many areas which remained i s o l a t e d . In addition to a l l these separations there were the ones common to a l l nations—between the r i c h and the poor, the educated and i l l i t e r a t e . Perhaps a great many of these d i v i s i o n s were also present i n other European countries at t h i s time, but i t i s u n l i k e l y that there were so many, or that they went so deeply as was the case i n the Netherlands. The Dutch were p e c u l i a r i n t h i s be-cause they had been an independent nation for almost 300 years, had only one national language, and l i v e d i n such a small geo-graphic area (31,850 sq. km.—12,441 sq. m i l e s ) . ^ Certain things were the same throughout the Netherlands, however; the a g r i c u l t u r a l labourer had a hard l i f e whatever province he l i v e d i n . There were two types: the steady labourer and the day worker. The former usually l i v e d i n a house pro-vided by the farmer and had employment year round; the l a t t e r always had to count on a few months unemployment during the winter and the family had to save enough during the summer to bridge t h i s gap. With wages between 75 cents and one guil d e r a day (depending on area and length of working day) i t was always a l i f e of p o v e r t y . 1 1 The p l i g h t of the i n d u s t r i a l labourer was no better than that of his a g r i c u l t u r a l counterpart. The days were long, the rewards small. Earnings of about 7 guilders a week were average. Housing was very poor indeed; the 1899 census shoxved that 23 per cent of the Dutch people l i v e d i n a one room house, and 31 7 per cent i n a two room house. S o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n before 1890 was of l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n c e ; workers were expected to look a f t e r themselves. Trade unions before the turn of the century were not very strong, l a r g e l y because "the movement" had s p l i n t e r e d in t o various d i f f e r e n t groups. The main streams were Protes-tant, Roman Cathol i c and S o c i a l i s t trade unions. The S o c i a l i s t s were the most a c t i v e i n demanding l e g i s l a t i o n i n many f i e l d s , but not u n t i l 1888 d i d they e l e c t a S o c i a l i s t to the Second Chamber, and the Sociaal Democratische Arbeids P a r t i j (SDAP) was not formed u n t i l 1894. The i n d u s t r i a l workers were divided through t h e i r r e l i g i o u s convictions, weakened by not having strong representation i n parliament, and placed i n a defensive p o s i t i o n by the p r e v a i l i n g a t t i t u d e that a man should: be ;able to look a f t e r himself and not run to the government fo r help. In 1874 a "Children's Law" had been passed, s e t t i n g hours and conditions of work, but the law was wholly i n e f f e c t i v e and widely disregarded. A new law i n 1889 forbade c h i l d r e n under 12 years of age to be employed; youths from age 12 to 15 (and women) could not work longer than 11 hours a day and not at night or on Sunday. The arguments i n favour of these laws had been that c h i l d r e n could not bargain for themselves and needed to be protected, but i t was the thin edge of the wedge which eventually would make parliament responsible f o r the s o c i a l conditions within the nation. The process was hastened when i n 1887 property or tax q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r voting p r i v i -leges were lowered. 8 U n t i l 1887 only 150,000 people were allowed to vote; the new law of that year doubled t h i s number. When a further re-adjustment was made i n 1896 about 600,000 people were allowed to vote. Most men r e a l i z e d that there was now no l o g i c a l reason any more to withhold the vote from anyone f o r reason of pro-perty or tax q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , but a number of conservative p o l i t i c i a n s refused to accept the SDAP's demand that manhood suffrage be introduced. Since t h i s required a change i n the Constitution f o r which a two-third majority of the Chamber was necessary, the opponents of manhood suffrage managed to prevent i t s i ntroduction u n t i l 1917. More people voting meant more p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n the Netherlands ( a f t e r the 1918 e l e c t i o n s , 17 p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were represented i n the Second Chamber). Each small group, be i t based on r e l i g i o u s convictions, economic advantage, regional concern, c l a s s i n t e r e s t , or even personal pique thought i t had to have representation i n parliament. That governing such a nation with democratic methods became an endless compromise i s obvious, even more so when the character of the people i s considered. The main t r a i t s of the Dutch national character were a c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e , incessant complaining (kankeren), lack of impulsive action, strong individualism, conservatism, stubborness, r e l i g i o s i t y (as manifested i n the large number of churches, sects and r e v i v a l groups), an entrepreneurial s p i r i t , and strong i n t e r e s t i n r e t a i n i n g one's property. L i f e within a small c i r c l e was preferred, the family played a very impor-tant r o l e , a llegiance to a community, c i t y , or small area was 9 quite strong but bonds i n wider spheres were e a s i l y broken and 14 l o y a l t i e s switched from one to another. To govern such a people was not easy and the parliamentary system incorporating a l l the diverse i n t e r e s t s seldom provided the most e f f i c i e n t leadership. 3. The P o l i t i c a l S i t u a t i o n P o l i t i c a l power i n the Netherlands rested with the Second Chamber. The Queen s t i l l c a r r i e d much authority by. v i r t u e of t r a d i t i o n and her own p e r s o n a l i t y , but she reigned and d i d not r u l e . The F i r s t Chamber—elected by the p r o v i n c i a l governments— was more a check on hasty action by the Second Chamber than an e f f e c t i v e governing body. The l a t t e r had 100 members, was elected by the d i r e c t , p r e f e r e n t i a l voting system which made i t p o s s i b l e f o r even small p a r t i e s to get representation i n Parliament. With the increase i n voters came an increase i n the number of p a r t i e s . In the 1901 e l e c t i o n s , f o r instance, the right-wing (the r e l i g i o u s ) p a r t i e s obtained a majority made up of 25 Roman Catholics (RKSP), 24 Anti-Revolutionair (ARP), a staunchly C a l v i n i s t i c group, 7 V r i j Anti-Revolutionair, an off-shoot of the former who had s p l i t o f f f o r minor p o l i c y d i f f e r e n c e s and p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f l i c t s , 1 C h r i s t e l i j k e -H i s t o r i s c h e , a conservative who had l e f t the ARP, and one Friesche C h r i s t e l i j k e - H i s t o r i s c h e who would not j o i n the other because only he could take care of the s p e c i a l needs of h i s province. The l e f t consisted of 7 Sociaal-Democraten (SDAP), 10 9 Vrijzinnig-Democraten (somewhere between the l i b e r a l s and s o c i a l i s t s ) , 18 Unie-Liberalen and 8 V r i j - L i b e r a l e n . To lump the l i b e r a l s , s o c i a l i s t s and v r i j z i n n i g e together as "the L e f t " i s r e a l l y not quite accurate because there were fundamental d i f f e r e n c e s . The v r i j z i n n i g e were evolutionary, monarchists and n a t i o n a l i s t s , e g a l i t a r i a n i n so f a r that they held a l l p a r t i e s and groups to be equally important. The SDAP held the workers' c l a s s to be above a l l others i n importance, was against any defence expenditure, i n f a c t wanted to abolish the army and navy, was i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t i c instead of nationa-l i s t i c , and favouredca republican type government and there-fore was i n p r i n c i p l e against the r o y a l house although i n p r a c t i c e l i t t l e was said against the Q u e e n . T h e l i b e r a l s were s l i g h t l y to the r i g h t of the v r i j z i n n i g e (who had s p l i t o f f the l i b e r a l party e a r l i e r ) and d i d not want, fo r instance, manhood suffrage as demanded by the v r i j z i n n i g e and the s o c i a l i s t s . That " p o l i t i c s makes strange bed fellows" was e s p e c i a l l y true i n the Netherlands. In 1891 Dr. Abraham KUyper, leader of the ARP wrote that his party and the Catholics could never work together because "of the blood of the martyrs...and that clever grey headed man i n Rome who pretends to be the repre-16 sentative of C h r i s t on earth". But when the Queen asked Kuyper to form a government i n 1901, he accepted even though he had to take 3 Roman Cathol i c ministers i n his cabinet. The Anti-Revolutionaire Partij.and the Roman Catholics now viewed the l e f t as an ungodly force out to destroy the God-given 11 state as now constituted. Probably more important was the f a c t that both r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s wanted state subsidies f o r t h e i r respective schools. Such c o a l i t i o n governments were quite common i n the Nether-lands; no party was ever strong enough to form a majority government. Subsequently, a government was always a c o a l i t i o n government, sometimes from three or four p a r t i e s , with a l l the weaknesses thereof. P a r t i e s , whether part of the Government or the Opposition, seldom adhered to the l i n e adopted by t h e i r side of the Chamber; votes were cast according to the i n d i v i d -ual's or party's view of the proposed l e g i s l a t i o n . Frequently personal f r i e n d s h i p s , or a d e s i r e for revenge, or some other p r i v a t e matter determined a Member's vote. A f t e r the 1913 e l e c t i o n i t was not even p o s s i b l e to form a c o a l i t i o n government. The l e f t had a majority of seats (the SDAP had made the greatest gain, from 7 to 18 seats) but was s t i l l d i v ided i n four p a r t i e s . The SDAP refused on p r i n c i p l e to become part of any government and a f t e r a few f u t i l e attempts to form a government the Queen i n s t r u c t e d Cort van der Linden, an e x - l i b e r a l Minister of J u s t i c e to form an " e x t r a - p a r l i a -mentair" government. The men who f i n a l l y agreed to accept posts i n the cabinet were considered to be v r i j z i n n i g and were w i l l i n g to carry out the e l e c t i o n program of the left—manhood suffrage and old age pension. I t was thus i n the i n t e r e s t of the left-wing majority of the Chamber to support t h i s Cabinet. That a few cabinet ministers were not elected members of parliament was not unusual i n Dutch p o l i t i c s ; that a l l were 12 "extra-parliamentair" was, but i n Dutch p o l i t i c s much was pos s i b l e . The new Premier declared that his cabinet was based "on the w i l l of the people" since the l e f t had obtained a cle a r majority of votes and the men now forming the government 18 would carry out the wishes of the majority. I t was t h i s government that guided the Netherlands through four years of mobil i z a t i o n . 4. Foreign P o l i c y Regardless which p o l i t i c a l side formed the government i n the 50 years before 1914, one constant had remained and a l l p a r t i e s had adhered to i t — t h e Netherlands p r a c t i s e d a (passive) p o l i c y of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y . When i n 1867 the government sent a note to Russia condemning treatment of the Poles, the pu b l i c outcry and uproar i n parliament was tremendous and res u l t e d i n the resignation of the minister responsible f o r sending the note. A s i m i l a r storm of protest arose ten years l a t e r over a note to Turkey pr o t e s t i n g the treatment of i t s Russian 19 subjects. Even during the Boer War, with Dutch nation a l sentiment highly aroused and very much on the side of the Boers, no one suggested that the Netherlands should a c t i v e l y take the side of the Boers. When i n 1900 the government sent a warship to bring the aged President of the Republic, Paul Kruger, to Europe out of his e x i l e i n the Portuguese colony of Lourenzo Marquer, England was f i r s t consulted. Only a f t e r the Dutch knew that Great B r i t a i n had no objections was the 13 ship sent. Public opinion was more than s a t i s f i e d with t h i s action of the government and pro-Boer sentiment s a f e l y expended i t s e l f i n cheering Kruger wherever he appeared i n the Nether-lands. The Dutch government d i d o f f e r to mediate between the Boers and B r i t i s h but when the l a t t e r r e jected the o f f e r no more was done f o r the small nation which had such close t i e s 21 with the Netherlands. During Kuyper's ministry (1901-1905) there were numerous rumours that the Netherlands was abandoning i t s p o s i t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y to take sides i n the European a l l i a n c e system. Kuyper's pro-German sentiments were well known and h i s t r a v e l s to foreign c a p i t a l s kept speculation at a high l e v e l . Especially during h i s v i s i t to B e r l i n i n 1905 German newspapers were f u l l of s t o r i e s about a Dutch-German a l l i a n c e . Nothing has been found i n the archives, however, and the only evidence that Kuyper s e r i o u s l y considered such a move i s a l e t t e r from him to Queen Wilhelmina discussing the advantages and disadvantages of such an a l l i a n c e . The Queen reacted very strongly against 22 any departure from n e u t r a l i t y and the subject was dropped. During these years a movement began to bring the Netherlands and Belgium together. The Dutch general J.J.C. den Beer Poortu-gael and Eugene Bare, editor of the Brussels newspaper Le P e t i t  Bleu were the major exponents of t h i s plan. A committee was formed which met f o r a few years but by 1911 the whole idea had petered out f o r lack of o f f i c i a l and p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . The Dutch government"was not i n t e r e s t e d because Belgian protec-t i o n i s t ideas could not be reco n c i l e d with the fr e e trade 14 p r i n c i p l e adhered to by the Dutch, and i n any event the idea of union clashed with t r a d i t i o n a l Dutch n e u t r a l i t y . Many people questioned whether Belgium could accept a c l o s e r union with the Netherlands without f i r s t d i scussing i t with the 23 guarantors of her n e u t r a l i t y , France and Great B r i t a i n . In September 1909 the government, acting on a f i v e year old report of a parliamentary committee which had i n -vestigated the coa s t a l defences, proposed to spend 40 m i l l i o n guilders to modernize the f o r t s at Kijkduin, Ymuiden, Hoek van Holland, and Harssens, and to b u i l d a new f o r t at V l i s s i n g e n (Flushing). Immediately a storm blew up i n the Entente press. I t charged that the Dutch were acting under German pressure, that the Flushing f o r t would prevent the B r i t i s h f l e e t from aiding Antwerp i n case Belgium was attack-ed and that t h i s was a v i o l a t i o n of the 1839 agreement where-by the Netherlands was to t r e a t the Scheldt as neutral water and not place obstacles, r e a l or p o t e n t i a l , i n the way of the guarantors of Belgian n e u t r a l i t y . B r i t i s h i n q u i r i e s as to Dutch intentions and whether or not they acted under German pressure tended to be of a p r i v a t e nature, but i n France the Chambre des Deputes discussed :'. .t the Flushing f o r t on January 16, 1911. 2 4 The Dutch government, p a i n f u l l y surprised by a l l t h i s unexpected foreign c r i t i c i s m , withdrew the proposal i n 1910 before the Second Chamber had a chance to discuss i t . A French suggestion that the 1839 agreement dealing with the Scheldt should be reviewed by the guarantors of Belgian 15 n e u t r a l i t y was accepted by the Netherlands but was never 25 acted upon. The Dutch compensated f o r t h e i r supposedly pro-German a t t i t u d e by concentrating h a l f t h e i r f i e l d army on the German border during the Second Morocco C r i s i s i n 2 6 1911 and the Dutch Foreign Minister assured the B r i t i s h Ambassador that the Dutch people would staunchly defend 27 themselves against a German attack. A Landweer Law was passed i n parliament i n 1912, increasing the s i z e of the army. The ease with which the b i l l passed suggests that parliament was eager to show the Entente powers that the Netherlands was not neglecting her eastern border as had been charged i n the Entente press. Only a f t e r a l l t h i s was the gr e a t l y reduced b i l l f o r coastal defence re-introduced i n parliament; the government asked f o r (and got) 12 m i l l i o n g u i l d e r s . The f o r t at Flushing was never b u i l t ; when the Great War began only the foundations were ready. The eagerness with which the Dutch government and people t r i e d to please the Entente powers was a cl e a r example of how the Netherlands wanted to be i m p a r t i a l to a l l . The Netherlands was a s a t i a t e d nation; i t had come to r e s t , and now i t viewed the whole world as i f i t also was at r e s t . Every Dutchman could read extensive a r t i c l e s about world a f f a i r s i n his news-papers, but he never seemed to ask himself how matters i n foreign countries could a f f e c t him. He appeared convinced, as the government seemed convinced, that nothing would hap-pen to the Netherlands i f i t kept out of a l l a l l i a n c e s and t r e a t i e s and dealt equally f a i r with a l l countries. Nor d i d 16 i t seem necessary to the people of the Netherlands to pre-pare and maintain adequate forces to protect t h e i r beloved independence and guard against the p o s s i b i l i t y that neigh-bouring countries, involved i n a war, might f i n d i t e s s e n t i a l to v i o l a t e Dutch n e u t r a l i t y . 5. The M i l i t a r y 28 A n t i - m i l i t a r i s m had f o r centuries been part of the 29 Dutch nation a l character. Under Prince Maurice the Dutch army had reached i t s zenith; under William III (1672-1702) a short renaissance took place, but thereafter the m i l i t a r y might of the Netherlands had s t e a d i l y deteriorated. During "the French period" (as the Dutch c a l l the occupation under Napoleon) s o l d i e r s became detested and the stigma then attach-ed had not yet worn away by the beginning of the 20th century. The mobilization i n 1870 had c l e a r l y shown that defences and defenders were incapable of f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r task, but nothing had been done. For almost 30 years the m i l i t a r y urged the government to end what i t considered to be the biggest e v i l — the replacement system. This system made i t p o s s i b l e f o r the one who had been selected by l o t to serve i n the m i l i t i a to buy a replacement. Only the better classes of soc i e t y could use t h i s p r i v i l e g e and the army was thus fed r e c r u i t s from the poorer classes, adding another stigma. When i n 1898 General Eland i n hi s function as Minister of War (up to 1910 t h i s p o s i t i o n was always f i l l e d by a r e t i r e d or a c t i v e l y serv-17 ing o f f i c e r ) proposed a major modernization f o r the army, his proposals were voted down. Only the archaic replace-ment system was ended, and even then the Roman Cathol i c party voted s o l i d l y against because "they feared the demor-a l i z i n g influence of the b a r r a c k s " . ^ Apparently i t d i d not matter i f the poorer people were influenced. The period from 1898 to 1913 was marked by a great deal of p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t over the defence question. I t took 4 m i n i s t r i e s , 8 ministers of war, and 15 years before a few modest reforms were implemented. The M i l i t i a Law of 1901 increased the yearly number of conscripts from 10,400 to 16,900 and f i x e d the serving time i n the m i l i t i a at 5 years. An i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g period f o r the i n f a n t r y of 8-1/2 months (always from March to November) with 12 weeks r e - t r a i n i n g d ivided i n t o 3 periods over the remaining 4 years was deemed 31 su f f i c i e n t to create a good army. Af t e r 5 years i n the m i l i t i a , conscripts automatically became members of the landweer which meant one yearly inspection and 6 t r a i n i n g days per year. A l l t h i s was l i t t l e enough as f a r as providing adequate defence f o r c e s — a mobilized army of 170,000 men, 75,000 i n the f i e l d army, the remainder f o r f o r t r e s s and border se r v i c e , administration and s u p p l y — b u t i t had increased defence costs and t h i s became a contested issue i n the 1905 e l e c t i o n s . One of the hotly discussed questions was the number of s o l d i e r s wnich should be kept i n the barracks from November to March (when the new d r a f t s reported) to do the necessary chores and 18 maintenance. In 1901 t h i s s o - c a l l e d b l i j v e n d gedeelte (remaining portion) had been f i x e d at 7,500 and these men, chosen by l o t , had to serve f o r 12 months. The p o l i t i c i a n s thought t h i s number much too high and the cost too great; i t was suggested that a number of camps be closed f o r the winter to save even further on the defence budget. In the 1905 Speech from the Throne the new government ; promised to reduce defence costs through the novel method of demanding only a 4 month t r a i n i n g period f o r those who came in t o the army p h y s i c a l l y f i t and had f u l f i l l e d the pre-entrance conditions s t i p u l a t e d by the army. This, of course, was eager-l y grasped by the better classes to save themselves 4—1/2 months of gr e a t l y d i s l i k e d s e r v i c e time. The following year another measure was introduced to save money; the number of men forced to stay during the winter was reduced to 2,000 and i f a d d i t i o n a l chores had to be done c i v i l i a n s would be hir e d 32 for t h i s . The (professional) o f f i c e r s were extremely angry with these two measures and the Inspector of Cavalry resigned i n disgust. The " m i l i t a r y question" was now debated throughout the Netherlands. Army o f f i c e r s pointed to France and Germany where the percentage of prof e s s i o n a l s i n the army was higher, the number of conscripts per c a p i t a of the population larger, and the t r a i n i n g period f o r the new d r a f t s longer than i n the Netherlands. In p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s the argument was forwarded ' that the Netherlands should adopt a "people's army" (volks  leger) on the Swiss model. This would mean a co n s c r i p t i o n 19 army wherein everyone would s e r v e ; a s h o r t i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g p e r i o d augmented w i t h l o c a l m i l i t a r y e x e r c i s e s ; p h y s i c a l t r a i n i n g programs f o r youths; v e r y s h o r t r e - t r a i n i n g s e s s i o n s ; new c o n s c r i p t s and NCOs to be t r a i n e d by o l d e r d r a f t e e s so t h a t the p r o f e s s i o n a l c o r e c o u l d be kept as s m a l l as p o s s i b l e . C o n stant argument between the proponents of the " P r u s s i a n system" and the "Swiss system" brought no s o l u t i o n f o r the N e t h e r l a n d s , but everyone became i n v o l v e d i n the d i s c u s s i o n . In A p r i l 1905 the Queen had a l r e a d y w r i t t e n Premier Kuyper t h a t she thought the 8-1/2 month t r a i n i n g p e r i o d too s h o r t and had suggested a 12 month p e r i o d . I f t h e r e was not enough money a v a i l a b l e f o r t h i s perhaps a s m a l l e r , but b e t t e r t r a i n e d army 33 would be the s o l u t i o n f o r 'the N e t h e r l a n d s . When i n 1906 the "remaining p o r t i o n " had been reduced from 7,500 to 2,000 34 the Queen wrote the new Premier and demanded an e x p l a n a t i o n . On January 17, 1907, Premier de Meester e x p l a i n e d the government's p o s i t i o n to the Queen. He wrote t h a t i n view o f a r t i c l e 180 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n ( e v e r y a b l e man has a duty to m a i n t a i n the independence of the n a t i o n and defend i t s t e r r i t o r y ) i t was b e s t to c o n t i n u e on the p r e s e n t p a t h . A l -ready d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s were s e r v i n g i n the array (because o f the 1898 law) and t h i s brought a good i n t e r c o u r s e among the c l a s s e s . These young men would go back to s o c i e t y knowing more about each o t h e r and about the n e c e s s i t y of d e f e n d i n g t h e i r c o u n t r y . As more and more of t h e s e young men passed through the army the g e n e r a l mood of the c o u n t r y would change. E v e n t u a l l y a g e n e r a l c o n s c r i p t i o n would make a l l the p e o p l e 20 part of the country's defence. This s o - c a l l e d volks leger, i f f i n a n c i a l l y p o ssible, was the best answer fo r the Nether-lands. I t would be a long time before the general mood of the Netherlands was changed, however. Th.es discussions i n par-liament only dealt with finances; the fighting a b i l i t y of the troops and the necessary weapons were not even mentioned. The S o c i a l i s t s were loud i n t h e i r c r i t i c i s m ; they maintained that the Netherlands could not defend h e r s e l f against any big power anyway, so what was the point of spending a l l t h i s money. The L i b e r a l s and V r i j z i n n i g e f e l t about the same but were less 3 6 vocal i n t h e i r opposition. Constant c r i t i c i s m i n and out of parliament aoout "barbaric t r a i n i n g methods" and "Prussian d r i l l t a c t i c s " forced the army to s i m p l i f y i t s d r i l l move-ments, lessen the number of watches, cut out a l l big parades except on the Queen's birthday, and allow m i l i t a r y clubs f o r 37 o f f i c e r s and NCOs. In 1910 C o l i j n became Minister of War—the f i r s t c i v i l i a n to hold that post. An able parliamentarian and a f o r c e f u l p e r s o n a l i t y , he c l e v e r l y used the foreign c r i t i c i s m about the f o r t at Flushing, and parliament's desire to appear s t r i c t l y neutral, to get a landweer law passed i n 1912 and a Landstorm law i n 1913 which brought some improvements fo r the army. The d r a f t was increased to 22,400 men per year, m i l i t i a s e r v i c e was increased to 6 years and thereafter 5 years i n the landweer. Then the men became automatically members of the landstorm which made them e l i g i b l e u n t i l t h e i r 40th year 21 fo r c a l l - u p i n a second mo b i l i z a t i o n . The army was now also given the r i g h t to appoint men f o r NCO and o f f i c e r t r a i n i n g (which meant an extra 12 months ser v i c e f o r the former and 14-1/2 months fo r the l a t t e r ) .in an e f f o r t to provide better leadership. Up to now the army could not appoint men to t r a i n f o r a higher rank and since few of the more educated men wanted to remain one day longer than necessary i n the army there was always a chronic shortage of good leaders. T o t a l mobilized strength of the army would now come to 16 cavalry squadrons and 120 i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n s whereas i n 3 8 1898 i t had been 15 squadrons and 54 b a t t a l i o n s . The new laws were supposed to correct the shortcomings pointed out by the Committee of Defence which was i n s t i t u t e d i n 1908 to answer two questions: 1. What i s the purpose of our defence system? 2. How well does i t f u l f i l l that purpose? The answer had been that the army should defend the country, and also be capable of acting offensively; i f necessary out-s i d e the Dutch borders. The l a t t e r was out of the question, however. In r e l a t i o n to other countries the t r a i n i n g period was too short, there were almost no p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s ; after ten years of experimentation the Netherlands d i d not have an e f f e c t i v e army, i t was not well trained, the d i s c i p l i n e was poor, the men could hardly march properly, and the pro-f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s lacked self-confidence and a sense of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . E s p e c i a l l y on manoeuvres i t showed that t r a i n -39 ing, t a c t i c s and d i s c i p l i n e were not at a l l up to standard. 22 The "Laws of C o l i j n " (as they came to be called) d i d not r e a l l y c o r r e c t the shortcomings pointed out i n the Committee of Defence report. Six years i n the m i l i t i a s t i l l only c a l l e d for an a c t i ve t r a i n i n g period of 8-1/2 months aid a few days each year thereafter. The f i v e years i n the landweer meant a 6 days t r a i n i n g period i n one year and a one day equipment inspection i n each of the other 4 years. For those who had a rank the t o t a l t r a i n i n g days numbered 15 i n f i v e years, and any one t r a i n i n g period could not exceed 40 9 days. The landstorm law was not very u s e f u l e i t h e r . Everyone who was p h y s i c a l l y f i t and not serving i n the m i l i t i a or landweer was i n the landstorm. There was thus a "trained" r e s e r v e — t h o s e who had served i n the m i l i t i a and landweer, had been volunteers, or had been i n the army i n the Dutch East Indies; and there was an "untrained" reserve, those who had never been i n m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e at a l l . A l l these men, up to age 40, could be c a l l e d up i n case a second mobi l i z a t i o n was necessary, but t h i s would obviously occur only when the army (of the f i r s t mobilization) could not cope with the enemy. Considering the s i z e of the Netherlands, there would be l i t t l e of the country not occupied by the enemy, and there c e r t a i n l y would not be enough time to r e t r a i n the "trained" portion of the landstorm, not to mention t r a i n the "untrained" p o r t i o n . For the Dutch p o l i t i c i a n s , however, passing the laws gave the appearance that the volks leger was one step c l o s e r to r e a l i t y , and that was enough fo r them. 23 That a yearly c a l l up of 22,400 twenty year-olds d i d not tax a nation with a population of about 6 m i l l i o n overly much i s obvious. The f i g u r e was a r r i v e d at i n the following manner: each year about 55,000 youths reached the age they were to be conscripted; c e r t a i n categories were automatically excluded, e.g. i f the older brother(s) had served, i f he was studying for the ministry or a r e l i g i o u s occupation, i f he was an u n f i t character, i f the family could not survive f i -n a n c i a l l y without him (often the case i n large, poor f a m i l i e s ) , or i f he was the breadwinner of the family. Then followed the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n s f o r medical reasons and the abnormally high percentage of youths found u n f i t f o r service i n d i c a t e s that the general health of c e r t a i n classes of the population 41 was not very good. In 1913, 38.8 per cent was declared medically u n f i t f o r service; i n 1914 i t was even higher, 42.1 per cent. In 1914 the t o t a l number of conscripts f i t f o r service and not exempted was 26,000. Only 3,600 were thus 42 given t h e i r "freedom" by l o t . As long as the notion was maintained that conscripts should not serve longer than 8—1/2 months, i t was impossible to b u i l d up a r e a l standing army. The pr o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s were few and were kept busy t r a i n i n g the new r e c r u i t s . The "standing" army was thus barely 30,000 strong, and of t h i s number 22,400 were r e a l l y r e c r u i t s . To a c e r t a i n extent the army depended upon the ancient s c h u t t e r i j e n to augment the ranks i n case of danger. The 43 idea dated back to the schutters guilds of the 18th century but by the 19th century they had f a l l e n i n disuse. In 1867 24 they had been restored by r o y a l order, had been given r i f l e s and ammunition by the army and were allowed to use the army r i f l e ranges. A f t e r 1870 they degenerated i n t o s o c i a l clubs in t e r e s t e d only i n the s o c i a l aspect and i n competition shoot-ing matches during the summer. During the Boer War they re-gained a c e r t a i n measure of popularity. In 1900 there were 130 s o c i e t i e s with 11,295 members. The;- army t r i e d to i n t e r -est them i n having f i e l d manoeuvres with the army but t h i s d i d not please many people and by 1910 there were only 21 s o c i e t i e s with 896 members who bothered to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the organized manoeuvres of t h a t summer. The army expected that i n return f o r the weapons, ammunition and ranges supplied during a l l these years the s o c i e t i e s would j o i n as units i n case of m o b i l i z a t i o n . There were no d e f i n i t e commitments on the part of the s o c i e t i e s , however. When mobilization came i n 1914 no s o c i e t i e s joined and only 2 per cent of the 44 members volunteered f o r the army as i n d i v i d u a l s . That the weapons and equipment of the Dutch army were i n s u f f i c i e n t and woefully outdated goes almost without saying. Cannons cost money and parliament was not about to provide i t . I t reasoned that weapons which were bought would only become outdated and be superseded by others. F o r t i f i c a t i o n s were also badly i n need of r e p a i r and modernization, but l i t t l e had been done even though the whole plan of defence f o r the Netherlands rested on f i x e d defences based on f o r t s and large 45 inundations with Amsterdam as center. In 1898 the moderni-zation of the defences of Amsterdam was already i n progress, 25 but the yearly allowed expenditures were so small that the pr o j e c t would never be completed. A b i l l to provide suf-46 f i c i e n t funds was rejected by the Second Chamber i n 1907. In s p i t e of the outdated f o r t s and old fashioned weapons, the country at large believed the S t e l l i n g Holland i n v i n c i b l e i f 3 to 7 days grace were given to get the mobilized army within the f o r t r e s s l i n e s and to carry out the inundations. Considering how the " i n v i n c i b l e " f o r t r e s s e s i n Belgium f e l l during the Great War, i t i s obvious that the Dutch f a i t h i n t h e i r defences was an i l l u s i o n . Even had most Dutch people been aware of the inadequacy of t h e i r defences, they would not have cared very much. They d i d not care f o r things m i l i t a r y , believed that t h e i r country would be spared involvement i n a war as long as n e u t r a l i t y was adhered to, and resented any expenditures on m i l i t a r y objectives. The Dutch i n d i f f e r e n c e towards t h e i r n a t i o n a l defence was so obvious that fore i g n observers noticed i t and wondered about i t . The Belgian ambassador to the Netherlands (from 1903 to 1910) wrote i n 1906 that he was perplexed over the i n d i f f e r e n t and carefree a t t i t u d e found i n a l l l e v e l s of society regarding the conse-quences f o r the Netherlands should war break out i n which Germany, France, and Great B r i t a i n took part. Money had be-come the great i d e a l i n the Netherlands and people preferred to neglect i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s f o r fear c e r t a i n f i n a n c i a l s a c r i f i c e s had to be made i n order to 47 guarantee the safety of the nation. The B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y attache to the Netherlands wrote i n his 1907 year-report 26 that the Dutch had a "marvellous love of money and f o r i n d i v i d u a l well-being" which led i n growing measure to 48 apathy i n the question of the nation's defence. The foreign observers might have exaggerated s l i g h t l y , but generally speaking they were corr e c t . The army o f f i c e r s who pointed to the weak spots i n the Dutch defences were not l i s t e n e d .to, and the c i v i l i a n s who d i d care about the defences of the nation were not powerful enough p o l i t i c a l l y or economi-c a l l y to change the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . The majority of the Dutch nation was much too concerned with the pursui t of f i n a n -c i a l gain, or too involved i n i n t e r n a l quarrels to worry about events taking place outside the Dutch borders. The army was considered an object of squandered money by those who paid the taxes, a wasted year by those conscripted, an e v i l i n s t i t u t i o n by mothers who believed t h e i r sons would come under bad influence, and the means by which c a p i t a l i s t s maintained t h e i r power by the s o c i a l i s t s . With such e x i s t i n g a t t i t u d e s towards t h e i r army, so much complacency towards questions of national defence, and so much i l l - f o u n d e d confidence i n t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y the Dutch people entered the J u l y month of 1914. The shock was there-fore a l l the greater when war appeared i n e v i t a b l e and the nation was faced with a s i t u a t i o n f o r which i t had not prepared m a t e r i a l l y or mentally. Chapter II August, September, October, 1914 1. M o b i l i z a t i o n and the Plan of Defence The r a p i d i t y of events i n J u l y 1914 caught the Nether-lands, as well as every other country i n Europe by s u r p r i s e . Not u n t i l J u l y 27 d i d the Dutch r e a l l y become alarmed by the developments i n Europe and begin to act: the Queen moved to the Hague i n order to be a v a i l a b l e for immediate consultation; the Chief of S t a f f of the army returned home from h i s vacation i n Denmark; and the Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Louden, c a l l e d the Belgian Ambassador, F a l l o n , and asked about the Belgian plans f o r defence i n case they were attacked. Louden sugges-ted that the two nations pool information and resources since a German attack i n Liege would probably pass over Dutch Lim-burg i n order to avoid the f o r t s around Liege. In the follow-ing days Louden repeatedly pressed f o r an answer po i n t i n g out that a j o i n t defence of the Meuse River was v i t a l l y important. F a l l o n d i d not have an answer, however. The Belgian govern-ment refused to discuss m i l i t a r y strategy unless her n e u t r a l -i t y was a c t u a l l y i n f r i n g e d upon. 1 That the Dutch approached Belgium with a plan f o r m i l i t a r y cooperation i s i n d i c a t i v e of how worried they were and how f u l l y they expected an attack from the Germans. Previously there had been discussions between the m i l i t a r y of the two small nations, but they had been non-committal, desultory and of no s i g n i f i c a n c e l a r g e l y because the Dutch had l i t t l e 28 i n t e r e s t i n them. They had viewed active m i l i t a r y cooper-2 ation as a departure from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l n e u t r a l i t y . Now the Dutch were a f r a i d and they t r i e d everything to stave o f f a p o s s i b l e invasion. On the day Louden contacted the Belgian Ambassador, the cabinet also decided to keep the m i l i t i a troops who were to go home on August 1 i n active service f o r an i n d e f i n i t e period. The following day, J u l y 28, another past oversight was r e c t i f i e d : the cabinet asked the Queen f o r permission to appoint a Commander i n Chief of the armed forces. By some strange quirk of reasoning the Dutch government had always i n s i s t e d that i t was better not to have a Commander i n Chief armed forces, nor a Commander i n Chief army, i n peace t i m e — the army Chief of S t a f f had always been expected to look a f t e r the l a t t e r ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . Now that war threatened, i t suddenly became important to have a m i l i t a r y leader so the 62 year old Lt-General C.J. Snijders, Chief of S t a f f of the army, was asked to accept the appointment of Commander i n Chief armed forces and to combine i t with his present function. He was also promoted to f u l l general. Snijders was w i l l i n g to accept, but on condition that he be responsible to the government and not simply to the Ministers of War and Marine as had previously been the case. The cabinet agreed to t h i s s t i p u l a t i o n , not r e a l i z i n g that t h i s could put the two ministers i n a very d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n ; they were responsible f o r t h e i r depart-ments, but the man who a c t u a l l y ran these departments (the 3 army and navy) was only responsible to the government. 29 During the cabinet meetings of Ju l y 30—the day a f t e r the Austrian troops crossed the Serbian b o r d e r — i t was d e c i -ded to c a l l up the coast and f r o n t i e r guards the next day, to issue a mobi l i z a t i o n order f o r August 1, to send out a proclamation that no foreign war ships would be allowed i n 4 Dutch ports, and to publish a Declaration of N e u t r a l i t y . On August 1,the Netherlands began i t s mobilization; Germany declared war on Russia; France issued i t s m o b i l i z a t i o n order at 1545 hours and Germany at 1600 hours. The Dutch government f i n a l l y awoke to the f a c t (which had long been obvious to Dutch m i l i t a r y leaders) that i n a large scale European war her geographic l o c a t i o n was of great s t r a t e g i c importance. She c o n t r o l l e d the mouths of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt Rivers; she had many excellent harbours on the North Sea the possession of which was important f o r both Germany and Great B r i t a i n ; she bordered f o r hundreds of k i l -ometers on Germany's weakly protected western border; and she jutted f a r south with a t h i n s t r i p of land which protected a part of Belgium from immediate invasion from Germany. I t i s u n l i k e l y that the Dutch m i l i t a r y commanders knew about the German S c h l i e f f e n Plan, but i t was generally suspected i n m i l i t a r y c i r c l e s that i f Germany ever attacked France, i t would be through Belgium and Dutch Limburg. I t i s not very s u r p r i s i n g therefore that when i n the winter of 1913-1914 General Snijders wrote out a map ex^ercise f o r h i s senior o f f i c e r s which supposed a German attack on France, i t proved to correspond almost exactly to the plan followed by 30 the Germans i n August and September 1914. That the Germans d i d not come through Dutch Limburg as o r i g i n a l l y envisioned by S c h l i e f f e n was l a r g e l y due to his successor von Moltke. He, unlike S c h l i e f f e n , believed the Dutch would t r y to prevent the passage of German troops, and would probably allow B r i t i s h troops to enter the Netherlands to help them. Also, Moltke believed that a neutral Netherlands was a necessity as an economic windpipe through which Germany could breath when engaged i n a war on two f r o n t s . Whatever plans the Germans (or anyone else) might have had against the Netherlands, the Dutch had only one way of countering i t — a l l - a r o u n d defence. Since 1908 the General S t a f f had only concentrated on t h i s one plan; the p o s s i b i l i t y that' the Netherlands might j o i n one side to attack the other 7 was not even considered. The plan was quite simple. Of the roughly 200,000 men i n the mobilized army, about h a l f were part of the f i e l d army which consisted of 4 i n f a n t r y g d i v i s i o n s (of 18 b a t t a l i o n s each) and 4 cavalry regiments. Along the borders and the coasts t h i n l y held posts were to check small enemy - i n f i l t r a t i o n s . I f the enemy attacked i n strength, the border p a t r o l s were to withdraw inland to where the f i e l d army was sit u a t e d . This was to be a c e n t r a l l y s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n from where attacks could be mounted i n a l l d i r e c t i o n s to meet the incoming enemy. I f the enemy proved too strong, the army was to withdraw within the S t e l l i n g  Holland. By t h i s time inundations would have made the approaches impassable (except f o r a few high areas guarded by 31 f o r t s ) and the f i e l d army could j o i n the f o r t r e s s troops i n 9 a concerted defence. The inundated area of the S t e l l i n g was c a r e f u l l y chosen. I t began by the Zuider Zee southeast of Amsterdam, proceeded i n a generally southwardly d i r e c t i o n , included the c i t y of Utrecht within the S t e l l i n g and reached the junction of the Waal and Meuse Rivers east of Gorinchem. Except f o r a few small areas south of the big r i v e r s ( i n Noord Brabant), and parts of the province of Zeeland, the S t e l l i n g l i n e went west with the r i v e r s to the sea. Only the provinces of Noord and Zuid Holland and part of Utrecht were thus protected, but t h i s was the area with the densest population, greatest industry and busiest trade. The inundated area was 5 to 6 kilometers wide; the water met n a t u r a l l y higher ground on the enemy side so i t could not be drained away e a s i l y , but was held by dykes on the S t e l l i n g side. The water was obtained through s l u i c e s i n r i v e r and sea dykes and could be accurately regulated from within the S t e l l i n g : t h i s was important because only about one foot or so of water should cover the ground. Much more than t h i s would allow the enemy to use f l a t bottom boats. The depth vias s u f f i c i e n t to cover the multitude of large and small ditches which c r i s s c r o s s e d the inundated areas from view and thus made crossing by i n f a n t r y a very hazardous oper-ation while heavy equipment could not be brought through at a l l . Unfortunately f o r the Dutch, not everything went according to plan i n August 1914. For the f i e l d army to be e f f e c t i v e , i t had to act as one unit; but i f t h i s was done, the coast would have to be l e f t unguarded f o r long stretches because 32 there were not enough men to cover i t . Consequently, one d i v i s i o n had to be stationed along the North Sea coast. Of •fae remaining three d i v i s i o n s , one was stationed along the Rhine and Yssel Rivers (f a c i n g Germany), one was placed i n the province of Noord Brabant, and the fourth was kept i n reserve on the Veluwe. There could thus be no question of a concentrated attack on an invading enemy; at best two d i -v i s i o n s could slow down his advance. The three northern provinces (Groningen, F r i e s l a n d , Drente) could not be de-fended at a l l by the f i e l d army. As a surrogate measure some t e r r i t o r i a l troops under a separate command were placed there to combat weak enemy i n f i l t r a t i o n s . An even greater shortcoming i n the Dutch defences became v i s i b l e s h o r t l y a f t e r Germany invaded Belgium. The heavy German a r t i l l e r y had a much greater accurate range than had been an t i c i p a t e d by the Dutch army o f f i c e r s . The 5 to 6 kilometer wide inundated area proved too narrow. E f f e c t i v e l y aimed a r t i l l e r y f i r e could now bombard the old, l a r g e l y above ground f o r t r e s s e s guarding the high-ground approaches to the S t e l l i n g Holland. The Dutch had l i t t l e defence against t h i s ; adequate a r t i l l e r y to s i l e n c e enemy guns was not a v a i l a b l e and heavy industry to produce such cannons the Dutch d i d not possess. 33 2. The Condition of the Army The m o b i l i z a t i o n of the Dutch armed forces was success-f u l l y completed i n two days; on the evening of August 2, 90 to 100 per cent of a l l m i l i t i a and landweer troops were at 12 t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n . There had been no band playing, no flagwaving, and no women and c h i l d r e n throwing flowers as i n other countries. For the Dutch there was no such thing as a II 13 " f r i s s c h e r , f r o h l i c h e r k r i e g " . But there was no sign of the l a t e n t a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m so t y p i c a l of the nation; every-one r e a l i z e d the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n and d i d what he could do to help. The shortages of m i l i t a r y barracks necessitated quartering s o l d i e r s i n c i v i l i a n homes; t h i s was taken i n s t r i d e as was the r e q u i s i t i o n i n g of horses, cars, a few trucks, and dogs (to p u l l the l i g h t machine guns). On t r a i n s and s t r e e t cars m i l i t a r y had p r i o r i t y and c i v i l i a n s had to wait. By August 3 — t h e day Belgium refused passage to the German armies who invaded that e v e n i n g — a l l s t r a t e g i c places within the Netherlands were manned, r i v e r and sea estu-aries were mined where necessary, as were the roads and r a i l -14 way bridges leading to Germany. Once the army was i n p o s i t i o n the shortages i n equipment r e a l l y became noticeable. The army possessed 2,000 ( a l l c a l i b r e s ) a r t i l l e r y pieces but only 600 were modern r a p i d -f i r e cannons. Of these, 160 were i n the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and fo r coastal defence. There were only 240 modern pieces of 7.5 cm. f i e l d a r t i l l e r y , of which 156 were ready f o r s e r v i c e . In contrast, one German army corps (about 44,000 men), had 144 34 pieces of heavy a r t i l l e r y and 16 b a t t e r i e s of heavy ho-16 witzers. The Dutch possessed 780 machine guns, but 570 were old,•cumbersome, and v i r t u a l l y useless. Only 32 modern, l i g h t machine guns (using r i f l e ammunition) were ready f o r 17 s e r v i c e . The ammunition reserve was equally deplorable: for the modern a r t i l l e r y pieces only 700 shots per cannon were a v a i l a b l e : there were 80 m i l l i o n rounds f o r the r i f l e s 18 and the l i g h t machine guns. The army a i r arm had 4 a i r -planes and no industry within the country was capable of b u i l d i n g any. R i f l e ammunition was produced i n the Nether-lands i n l i m i t e d quantity, but a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s were not. Eventual production was p o s s i b l e i f the raw materials could 19 be procured abroad. Equally depressing was the condition of the s o l d i e r s ' personal equipment. A few years e a r l i e r the army had optim-i s t i c a l l y decided that the m i l i t i a should take i t s uniforms home when not on a c t i v e duty so that everyone could return i n uniform i n case of a mobilization while at the same time the army \^ould save storage space. The r e s u l t of t h i s was now v i s i b l e to everyone: boots.had been worn to work, uniforms had also been worn and were patched i n many places, some men had no socks and underwear anymore. The magazines were v i r -t u a l l y empty so l i t t l e could be replaced; consequently the army was already poorly dressed and equipped before i t even went i n t o b a t t l e . Even more serious was the shortage of good leaders. There was a "book" shortage of 5 70 o f f i c e r s and 540 non-35 commissioned o f f i c e r s . But since the 1915 d r a f t was also c a l l e d i n t o s e r v i c e (by a s p e c i a l b i l l through parliament on August 3), and some of the older landweer d r a f t s badly > needed to be r e t r a i n e d , the actual shortage was 700 o f f i c e r s 20 ;and 1,600 NCOs. The few o f f i c e r s and NCOs from the army i n the Dutch East Indies who happened to be on leave i n the Netherlands, and the r e t i r e d o f f i c e r s and NCOs w i l l i n g to return to a c t i v e duty, could not p o s s i b l y a l l e v i a t e the shortage. During the f i r s t few weeks the shortage of leaders, the s c r u f f y uniforms, the poor quarters, etc., d i d not matter very much. Everyone was cooperating and making the best of a bad s i t u a t i o n . Treub, the Minister of A g r i c u l t u r e , Trade and Commerce, l a t e r described the mood at t h i s time as "the s p i r i t of August"—a f e e l i n g of togetherness, t o l e r a t i o n and cooper-ation which had not existed i n the nation f o r a long time (and would soon depart again). The " s p i r i t of August" was not strong enough to over-come the aversion f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . On August 3 the government asked f o r volunteers f o r either the f i e l d army or the v r i j w i l l i g e landstorm. Any one from age 17 to 50 medi-c a l l y f i t was e l i g i b l e . Only 2,000 volunteered while there were 600,000 Dutchmen between the ages 17 to 40 who were not .. . . 21 m m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . That the v r i j w i l l i g e landstorm was such a sad f a i l u r e was i n part the f a u l t of the government and army leaders. 36 H a s t i l y conceived and i n s u f f i c i e n t l y prepared, the idea had been to e n r o l l c i v i l i a n s i n each l o c a l i t y , t r a i n them a few hours a week and so create a large number of trained men from whom the army could draw, or who could independently defend t h e i r own l o c a l i t y . Instead, the whole idea became a d i s a s t e r (at l e a s t i n the f i r s t few months). There were no uniforms a v a i l a b l e and i f the volunteers wanted them they had to buy them. The men were t o l d to t r a i n i n dark c i v i l i a n clothes and wear a wide orange band around t h e i r hats. This made them look s l i g h t l y s i l l y , and also s u p e r p a t r i o t i c which caused no end of comments by others not so i n c l i n e d . Sometimes i t took months before r i f l e s were issued. No o f f i c e r s or NCOs could be spared to t r a i n the men properly. D i s c i p l i n e was non-existent and the shortage of leadership was such that a few communities placed advertisements i n newspapers asking f o r a man " w i l l i n g and competent" to act as commander of t h e i r 22 l o c a l u n i t . The d i v e r s i t y within even a s i n g l e community was frequently so great that cooperation i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a v r i j w i l l i g e landstorm was v i r t u a l l y non-existent. In one small c i t y there were seven separate volunteer landstorm units who each used the same f i e l d to p r a c t i s e on, but who refused 23 to combine f o r regional and personal prejudices. S i m i l a r l y , of a l l the s c h u t t e r i j e n only seven volunteered f o r the land-storm; a l l the others wanted to remain independent, not t i e d to the m i l i t a r y hierarchy or to any kind of control from out-side. They p r a c t i s e d a t y p i c a l l y Dutch "stubborn i n d i v i d u a l i s m . " 37 3. P o s i t i o n of the Government While the army prepared i t s e l f f o r the expected war, the government anxiously t r i e d to discover the intentions of B r i t a i n and Germany. Good news a r r i v e d on the evening of August 2 when Ambassador Gevers wired from B e r l i n that Moltke personally had assured him that Germany would not v i o l a t e 25 Dutch n e u t r a l i t y . The assurance was repeated the following 26 morning by the German ambassador i n the Hague. That same afternoon (August 3) F a l l o n , the Belgian Ambassador approached Louden and requested cooperation between the commander of Liege and the Dutch commander of Maastricht. Germany had de-manded passage of her troops over Belgian t e r r i t o r y and since 27 t h i s had been refused a German attack was expected s h o r t l y . Louden answered that the Netherlands could not do so with-out giv i n g up i t s n e u t r a l i t y and therefore had to refuse the request. At 1400 hours, August 4, Louden telephoned F a l l o n and informed him that as long as B r i t a i n was neutral the Netherlands would not prevent B r i t i s h warships and troop ships from s a i l i n g up the Scheldt to Antwerp provided Bel-gium wanted t h i s a i d . What was the p o s i t i o n of the Belgian 28 government? Before Belgium had answered/the B r i t i s h u l t i -matum to Germany ran out (at 2300 hours August 4) putting her at war with Germany. The following morning the cabinet i n s t r u c t e d General Snijders to prepare the Scheldt f o r d e f e n c e — t o remove beacons and mine the entrance so that only Dutch p i l o t s could bring ships i n — a n d i f necessary to use force i n 38 29 preventing forei g n warships from entering. The major anxiety of the government was whether the B r i t i s h would accept the closure of the Scheldt or t r y to force the entrance i n order to aid Belgium v i a Antwerp. The matter was cleared up on August 6 when the message a r r i v e d : ...His Majesty's government w i l l respect n e u t r a l i t y of Netherlands, provided that i t i s not one-sided and that Great B r i t a i n i s given the same or equivalent advantages that Germany may be given or have taken. As long as these conditions obtain, His Majesty's government w i l l ^ g f course not attempt to send warships up the Scheldt. The warning i n the B r i t i s h message was c l e a r . The Netherlands was to t r e a t Germany and B r i t a i n exactly a l i k e and not favour one over the other. But at l e a s t f o r the time being the Netherlands seemed safe from invasion, e s p e c i a l l y so since Prime Minister Asquith declared i n Parliament on the evening of August 6: We are f i g h t i n g to v i n d i c a t e the p r i n c i p l e that small n a t i o n a l i t i e s are not to be crushed, i n defiance of i n t e r n a t i o n a l good f a i t h , by t h e ^ a r b i t r a r y w i l l of a strong and overmastering power. While the government had pas s i v e l y waited to see what the foreign powers decided, i t had been very active i n sol v i n g a number of urgent domestic problems. As early as J u l y 28 the Amsterdam Stock Exchange had closed i t s doors on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e . The Dutch were quick to take action i f finances were involved and the unsettled i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a -t i o n had caused a drop i n the market, so to prevent further losses the Exchange had been closed. The already j i t t e r y , public had taken t h i s as a sign that things were r e a l l y going wrong and a run on the banks had r e s u l t e d . Not only 39 was everyone withdrawing his money from the bank, but they were going s t r a i g h t to the food and cl o t h i n g stores and buying a l l they could. The r e s u l t i n g shortages i n the stores had driven p r i c e s up, while a number of storekeepers refused to s e l l t h e i r goods i n the hope that p r i c e s would climb higher yet. Everyone also began to hoard metal money; no one wanted to pay with coins anymore. The r e s u l t i n g shortage caused great unrest among the workers v^ ho used l i t t l e else but metal money (there was a one, and a two-and-a-half guilder coin i n c i r c u l a t i o n ) . Many were always paid i n metal money and the f a c t o r i e s could not procure enough to pay t h e i r workers. The government acted with speed. A meeting with banks and f i n a n c i e r s provided an emergency loan of 200 m i l l i o n guilders f o r the country; the Exchange was not reopened (for another s i x months) but a government committee now supervised a l l major business transactions; any owner who refused to s e l l h is stock at reasonable p r i c e to the p u b l i c (or to r e t a i l e r s i n the case of wholesalers) could have i t expropriated by the government; c i t i e s and m u n i c i p a l i t i e s were given the r i g h t to p r i n t "paper coins" (zilverbons) which could be used as metal money and would be redeemable at a l a t e r date; an extra 50 m i l l i o n guilders was provided for the War Department to cover the i n i t i a l cost of the mobilization; the 1915 d r a f t was c a l l e d up; an export p r o h i b i t i o n on several a r t i c l e s (e.g. gold, grain, hay, horses) was p a s s e d . ^ 40 When parliament met on August 3 (the Second Chamber had been i n recess since June 25) a l l the actions taken by the cabinet were passed without discussion. The law forbidding c e r t a i n exports was broadened so that the government could include or remove goods as i t deemed necessary. The " s p i r i t of August" was very much present i n the Second Chamber; even the leader of the SDAP, P.J.Troelstra, d i d not blame the government f o r the present i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , stated that the present m o b i l i z a t i o n was necessary, and promised support (with reservations) f o r the government i n the 33 future. The SDAP even voted i n favour of the 50 m i l l i o n guilders mobilization c r e d i t s even t h o u g h — i n a remarkable c o n t r a d i c t i o n — t h e y continued to vote against the regular 34 defence expenditures as they had always done. With parliament w i l l i n g to support the government, and the warring nations u n w i l l i n g to invade the Netherlands, i t might appear as i f few problems could arise.-: Just the oppo-s i t e happened. The export ban on grain imposed by the govern-ment had also included grain bought by German firms before the war but s t i l l i n trans-shipment from Rotterdam to Ger-many. The reaction from B e r l i n was immediate and h o s t i l e . 35 A great deal of diplomatic a c t i v i t y r e s u l t e d which d i d not r e a l l y end u n t i l the Netherlands had a s u f f i c i e n t reserve of grain again. At one point i n August the country had only a two week supply and dough fo r bread was made p a r t i a l l y with 36 r i c e and potato f l o u r . B r i t a i n also began to involve 37 i t s e l f with Dutch exports to Germany. On August 20, and 41 again on October 29 the B r i t i s h government by Order i n Council declared goods to be contraband i f they could be 38 re-exported from a neutral port to enemy t e r r i t o r y . Neutral shipping was to be taken to a B r i t i s h port where the owner of the cargo was to produce proof that the cargo, neither i n i t s o r i g i n a l state nor a f t e r processing, would be exported to the enemy. The Dutch protest that t h i s could well starve the Netherlands was disregarded. Eventually a way was found to get around the d i f f i c u l -t i e s with Great B r i t a i n . In November 1914 the Nederlandse  Overzee Trustmaatschappij (N.O.T.) was organized; a p r i v a t e company under government supervision, i t guaranteed that a l l imports consigned to i t would not be re-exported to the enemy either i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l state or a f t e r processing. In time, the N.O.T. won the t r u s t of the B r i t i s h , i f not the Germans who viewed i t as an economic weapon to boycott them. Germany also had an e f f e c t i v e weapon to force the Neth-erlands to do her bidding. B r i t a i n had her f l e e t , but Germany had coal and i r o n , both e s s e n t i a l f o r the Netherlands. Thus the Germans introduced the barter system. Every German licence to export was v a l i d only i f the exporter imported some commodity required by Germany from the country to which 39 the German exports went. Throughout these d i f f i c u l t i e s the government t r i e d to maintain as neutral a p o s i t i o n as possible, but there i s no denying that i n the f i r s t few months of the war many people, and also a few cabinet ministers believed i n the apparent 42 i n v i n c i b i l i t y of the German army. Years l a t e r , Treub r e l a t e d how most ministers were w i l l i n g to "give i n " to German demands much quicker than to B r i t i s h demands, and were very a f r a i d to take a strong stand against Germany.^ This became obvious i n the two stormy cabinet discussions on October 1 and 3 when, f o r the f i r s t and only time during the war, proposals were made that the Netherlands should take action i n r e l a t i o n to events happening outside her b o r d e r s — actions which could bring her i n t o the war. The topic was the imminent f a l l of Antwerp and the po s s i b l e consequences for the Netherlands. I f the Germans intended to r e t a i n Ant-werp a f t e r the war, Rotterdam could be bypassed as the t r a n s i t port f o r Germany, the Netherlands would be enclosed on two sides by Germany, and con t r o l of the Scheldt could well pass in t o German hands. The Netherlands would become i n f a c t , i f perhaps not i n name, a vassal state of Germany, 4 1 Treub, the Minister of A g r i c u l t u r e , Commerce and Indus-try ( l a t e r of Finance), suggested that a note be sent to Germany asking i f the capture of Antxverp was purely a m i l i t a r y objective or whether Germany planned to keep possession of the c i t y when h o s t i l i t i e s came to an end. Treub admitted that such a note could escalate i n t o a correspondence which eventually could force the Netherlands i n t o the war, but he thought t h i s r i s k should be taken because even i f the country did j o i n the c o n f l i c t i t \i?ould be with the Entente and thus on the side which fought f o r the r i g h t of the l i t t l e state to e x i s t . Bosboom, the Minister of War, supported Treub and 43 added that the de c i s i o n taken on August 5 — c l o s i n g the Scheldt to B r i t i s h warships—had been wrong and Germany should be informed that ships of those nations which had guaranteed Belgian n e u t r a l i t y i n 1839 would now be allowed to t r a v e l unhindered up the Scheldt. Rambonnet, the Naval Minister, supported the other two and added another point. The present neutral p o s i t i o n of the Netherlands l e f t the country at the mercy of external developments and could bring her int o a war as an a l l y of the side with which she d i d not sympathize. As an example he pointed out that a German army, pursued by an Entente army, could cross i n t o the Netherlands under a white f l a g and would be interned, but the pursuing army, not heed-ing Dutch n e u t r a l i t y , would have to be prevented by force of arms from entering the Netherlands, thus putting the country at war with England and France. Rambonnet i n s i s t e d that the Netherlands show the Germans that she was not i n d i f f e r e n t to the future of Antwerp, and was w i l l i n g to go to war over i t . The time to make t h i s d e c i s i o n was now because i t was favour-able f o r the Netherlands and unfavourable f o r Germany. The majority of the cabinet d i d not wish to run the r i s k of getting the Netherlands involved i n a war, however. They preferred a p o l i c y of "wait and see" and hoped that, somehow, i t would a l l work out a l l r i g h t . Arguments were forwarded that the colonies could be l o s t , that the country would become a battleground l i k e Belgium and that the Netherlands would, i n the end, gain nothing. B r i t a i n had already s a i d (on August 6) that i t would not send warships up the Scheldt, 44 so obviously was not i n t e r e s t e d i n r e l i e v i n g Antwerp v i a t h i s route. Besides, i t was too l a t e to save the c i t y now. In short, the other ministers retained the ideas held p r i o r to the war, namely, that i f they d i d nothing and l e f t everyone alone, everyone else would leave them alone. What the Netherlands should do now was maintain a p o s i t i o n of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , be f a i r and i m p a r t i a l to both sides, give no reason to doubt Dutch i n t e g r i t y and everyone would leave them i n peace. 4. Unexpected R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r the Army Army Headquarters made a number of fundamental mistakes i n the f i r s t few months of mobilization. No wooden barracks were b u i l t to house the s o l d i e r s because i t was to be a short war and therefore there was no need to spend a l l that money; only a few tent camps were constructed. In many places the men were placed i n schools and other p u b l i c buildings or i n p r i v a t e homes. The owners of the l a t t e r received 20 cents a day to house a s o l d i e r and another 80 cents i f they 42 also had to feed him. Most c i v i l i a n s d i s l i k e d having to take s o l d i e r s i n t o t h e i r homes; they s t i l l associated i t with the days long ago when i t was used as punishment f o r not having paid t h e i r taxes. The Dutch clannishness also played a r o l e ; the closeness of family l i f e allowed no room 43 for a stranger and he was not r e a l l y welcome. D i s c i p l i n e did not improve either by having the men spread a l l through 45 an area. At night they were free from supervision, as well as subject to (at times) bad influences from the people forced to put them up. E s p e c i a l l y along the borders i t soon proved a mistake to quarter troops i n c i v i l i a n homes. The t e r r i t o r i a l troops stationed along the border were supposed to guard road and railway crossings to Germany and Belgium. With the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , p r i c e s had r i s e n i n Germany and Dutch export p r o h i b i t i o n s made smuggling a very prosperous business. The regular number of custom o f f i c i a l s proved much too small to curb the new "sport" (as many c a l l e d i t ) , so a number of t e r r i t o r i a l troops were sworn i n as s p e c i a l p o l i c e constables which gave them the power to a r r e s t and charge smugglers." Since many of the t e r r i t o r i a l s were stationed i n or near t h e i r own municipality, and others were housed by a family dealing i n goods fo r smug-glers (or smuggled themselves), they did not prove very e f f e c t i v e i n ending the r a p i d l y increasing p r a c t i c e of smug-g l i n g . The army was soon forced to assign troops from the f i e l d army to the border areas with the consequent weakening 45 of that already widely dispersed force. Part of the problem at f i r s t was that the army d i d not have very much authority i n the border areas. Already on August 2 the Commander i n Chief had asked the government to declare the whole nation i n staat van oorlog ( l i t e r a l l y : state of war), and the f o r t r e s s and border areas i n staat 46 van beleg ( l i t e r a l l y : s tate of siege). The former gave the m i l i t a r y more authority " a f t e r consultation with the respon-46 s i b l e c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s " ; the l a t t e r obliged the c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s to carry out the orders of the army, i , e , (a 47 mild form of) ma r t i a l law. The government was loath to give a l l that power to the m i l i t a r y , however, unless abso-l u t e l y necessary. On August 5 and 10 laws placed c e r t a i n areas within the S t e l l i n g Holland and the southern provinces i n staat van oorlog, but not u n t i l August 29 were a few m u n i c i p a l i t i e s along the southern border put i n staat van  beleg. On September 8 t h i s was extended to the whole province of Limburg, most of Noord Brabant and a l l of Zeeuws Vlaan-deren. Continued smuggling forced the government to place the xtfhole eastern border i n staat van beleg on September 25, and to extend t h i s to the northern coast of F r i e s l a n d and 48 Groningen on November 10 and 21. The southern border became the r e a l danger point the further the German armies pushed i n t o Belgium. By the middle of August more than h a l f the Dutch f i e l d army (two d i v i s i o n s and one cavalry brigade) was stationed i n the south. When the attack on Antwerp began, one-third of the F i r s t D i v i s i o n (which was guarding the coast i n the provinces Noord and Zuid Holland) was also brought south. Army Headquarters was transferred from the Hague to •s-Hertogenbosch and from there to Oosterhout (north of Breda) where i t remained f o r 49 four years. Denuding part of the coast of defence forces had brought c r i t i c i s m i n parliament but was deemed e s s e n t i a l by Army Headquarters.^ 0 Their sound judgment was proven when the t r i c k l e of Belgian refugees turned i n t o a r i v e r . 47 The f i r s t refugees had been un w i l l i n g ones; from August 4 to 6 the Belgian government sent about 80,000 Germans l i v i n g i n Belgium out of the country and since they found i t impossible to t r a v e l d i r e c t l y to Germany they came to the Netherlands. There was l i t t l e problem looking a f t e r these people; s p e c i a l t r a i n s were provided to take them to Germany; those who wished to remain i n the Netherlands f o r the time being were allowed to do so (a number of the l a t t e r had never l i v e d i n Germany). Most of the ones who remained returned to Belgium once the f i g h t i n g had ceased.^ 1 Belgian refugees, driven from t h e i r homes by the f i g h t -ing, had entered the Netherlands from the beginning, but t h e i r numbers had been small and the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s along the border had looked a f t e r them. As the f i g h t i n g neared Antwerp, however, the numbers increased and once the c i t y was invested and consequently attacked the mass exodus to thee Netherlands began. During the f i r s t week of October about 100,000 refugees a r r i v e d i n the town of Roozendaal alone. Bergen op Zoom, with a population of 16,500 received 110,000 people, most of whom s l e p t i n the woods around the town. The immediate concern was to f i n d food and s h e l t e r f o r these people so the army b u i l t tent camps, converted o l d f a c t o r i e s and barracks, supplied blankets and emergency medical t r e a t -ment. F i e l d kitchens were set up to feed the people while m i l i t a r y bakers and butchers moved i n to a l l e v i a t e the bread and meat shortage. Commercial establishments could not pro-vide enough of the n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e , often because they 48 did not have s u f f i c i e n t s t a f f , so s o l d i e r s were put to work i n bakeries, f stores, with wholesalers, r e t a i l e r s , etc. Trans-port a t i o n was arranged and s p e c i a l t r a i n s provided to send as many people as p o s s i b l e to the north so that the human flo o d Calmost one m i l l i o n refugees entered the Netherlands) was evenly divided. By the middle of October there were 719,000 refugees i n 831 (of the 1120) m u n i c i p a l i t i e s of the Netherlands. The army continued to care f o r those who stayed 52 i n the provinces of Limburg and Noord Brabant. From the f i r s t the army had t r i e d to weed out the sus-p i c i o u s looking characters among the refugees. Since there was no time to i n v e s t i g a t e every case, a s p e c i a l camp was b u i l t and those who were under suspicion were placed there. I t was also necessary to keep a sharp eye out f o r Dutch p r o f i t e e r s . Now that the demand f o r a l l sorts of goods was so great, many stores, tradesmen and suppliers began to charge exorbitant p r i c e s f o r t h e i r goods. This tendency was nipped i n the bud whenever po s s i b l e . With the f a l l of Antwerp, f i g h t i n g i n Belgium was con-f i n e d to the established tr e n c h l i n e i n the southwest and General Snijders contacted the German a u t h o r i t i e s to e l i c i t t h e i r support i n returning as many refugees as p o s s i b l e to t h e i r homeland. On his urging the German Governor of Belgium issued a proclamation that no one would be interned on return, no Belgian youths would be drafted i n t o the German army, and no possessions would be taken away. A few well known Belgian p o l i t i c a l f i g ures (e.g. the mayor of Antwerp) were 49 allowed to t r a v e l to the Netherlands to address many of the refugees i n order to calm t h e i r fears and squash some of the f a n t a s t i c rumours that c i r c u l a t e d among them. Special t r a i n s f o r the journey home were arranged and Admiral Schroeder, Governor of Antwerp, issued passes f o r the Dutch o f f i c e r s on each t r a i n so that they could accompany i t to i t s d e s t i n a t i o n 53 i n Belgium. Out of the area of the Third D i v i s i o n alone, 427,000 refugees l e f t f o r t h e i r homes between October 16, 54 1914 and June 1, 1915. Of the roughly one m i l l i o n refugees only about 100,000 remained i n the Netherlands f o r the dura-t i o n of the war. A number of them d i d not return to Belgium but l e f t f o r Great B r i t a i n instead. The f a l l of Antwerp also brought 35,000 Belgian and 1,500 B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s (and 200 Germans who were t h e i r 55 prisoners) i n t o the Netherlands. During the war these numbers increased to 1,751 B r i t i s h , 1,461 Germans, 8 French and 4 Americans, l a r g e l y from f l y e r s forced to land i n the Netherlands, s a i l o r s from ships and submarines caught i n Dutch waters and interned, and ( i n the case of the Germans) 5 6 i n t e n t i o n a l border crossings and desertions. By June 1915, 15 camps had been b u i l t to house the various n a t i o n a l i t i e s , separate camps fo r the o f f i c e r s and other ranks, and a s p e c i a l camp at Flushing f o r those men not wanted by t h e i r own comrades and therefore better o f f housed independently. The internees were clothed from Dutch army stores, paid the same as the equivalent rank i n the Dutch army, and guarded 57 by the Dutch army. 50 Deserters ( a l l Germans) proved a s p e c i a l problem. I n i t i a l l y the Dutch border detachments allowed a German s o l d i e r to go free once he declared that he was a deserter. The army worked on the assumption that such a man d i d not belong to the army of the b e l l i g e r e n t power any more. As soon as the Minister of War heard of t h i s , he overruled the army a u t h o r i t i e s and ordered such men to be interned u n t i l a f u l l i n v e s t i g a t i o n was completed. I f they said they were deserters but had no proof, they were to be interned i n the camp i n Alkmaar with the other German s o l d i e r s . Obviously tensions ran high between the p a t r i o t i c internees who would rather be out f i g h t i n g f o r Germany and the ones who had deserted. A committee was set up by the c i t i z e n s of Alkmaar to get a separate camp fo r the "deserters". The press picked up the story and soon Bosboom was forced to defend his order i n parliament. He would not budge, however, u n t i l i n 1916 the German government supplied a l i s t of deserters f o r whom 58 they would not pay i n t e r n i n g costs a f t e r the war. These men were now set free, but when many by t h e i r conduct proved a nuisance and danger to the general p u b l i c they were picked up again and interned i n a s p e c i a l camp. Interned o f f i c e r s also caused major complications. The German, B r i t i s h and Belgian o f f i c e r s were a l l set free a f t e r they gave t h e i r word of honour and signed a written statement that they would not leave the Netherlands. When two German o f f i c e r s d i d return to Germany, they were returned by t h e i r government a f t e r .the Dutch had protested, but the German 51 a u t h o r i t i e s also stated that German o f f i c e r s were not allowed to sign such a document. Consequently, they a l l took t h e i r word back and were interned i n a camp i n Bergen. A few weeks l a t e r the B r i t i s h admiralty n o t i f i e d the Dutch government that B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s could not give t h e i r word of honour ei t h e r . Before a l l B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s could be interned again, a number had escaped. Three weeks l a t e r the B r i t i s h government changed i t s mind: the o f f i c e r s could give t h e i r word of honour. But now the Dutch would not set them free u n t i l the escaped o f f i c e r s were returned to the Netherlands. This was f i n a l l y promised by the B r i t i s h i n December 1915. In A p r i l 1916 the Belgian government announced i t s o f f i c e r s could give t h e i r word of honour and the German government followed -, x. 59 a year l a t e r . Escape attempts occurred quite frequently from the Belgian camps. E s p e c i a l l y at f i r s t when the camps were not properly constructed or adequately guarded, and Belgian refugees roamed a l l over the country, i t was very d i f f i c u l t to keep everything well organized. Refugees would stream to the camps to f i n d r e l a t i v e s or information about s o l d i e r s they had l o s t contact with. During these v i s i t s a great deal of food and alcohol was smuggled i n t o the camps and unrest remained at a very high l e v e l . F a c i l i t i e s f o r p r i v a t e v i s i t s from wives or g i r l f r i e n d s were us u a l l y non-existent and added to the complaints. On a number of occasions such major disturbances took place that the Dutch guards f i r e d i n t o the 6 0 camps, e.g. at Z e i s t and Soesterberg. The most serious 52 case was at Nunspeet where an attempted breakout cost the 61 Belgians 8 dead and 18 wounded. On i n v e s t i g a t i o n i t soon became known that escapees often received help from the people l i v i n g near the camps, i n food, c l o t h i n g as well as money. In order to curb t h i s , a l l the areas and towns i n the v i c i n i t y of camps were placed i n staat van beleg i n early 1915. By the summer of that year the s i t u a t i o n was improved; s p e c i a l guard detachments had been organized and the o v e r a l l organization entrusted to a s p e c i a l l y created department i n Army Headquarters, Sport and recreation f a c i l i t i e s were increased and when i n 1916 arrangements were made f o r those who wanted to go out and work i n industry or a g r i c u l t u r e , most of the problems were 6 2 ended. I t became possib l e f o r men to go on leave to Eng-land i f there were serious problems or sickness i n t h e i r immediate family. Many f a m i l i e s also came to the Netherlands to v i s i t the men i n t h e i r camps. In addition to guarding the i n t e r n i n g camps, helping refugees and preventing smuggling the army began to encounter a few other problems such as prejudiced reporting by Dutch newspapers, espionage, foreign war correspondents who used the Netherlands as a gathering place for information, and foreign consulates which operated as r e c r u i t i n g o f f i c e s f o r foreign armies. The l a t t e r d i d not r e a l l y begin u n t i l 1915, but the f i r s t s t a r t e d the day Germany invaded Belgium. On July 30, Minister Bosboom had sent a note to a l l newspapers i n the country i n s t r u c t i n g them not to publ i s h 53 anything about increases i n the armed forces, strength of the various units, conditions of f o r t s and strong points, the l o c a t i o n of stores, etc., and also to keep a "neutral" 6 3 a t t i t u d e when reporting a l l domestic and foreign news. Less than one month l a t e r the Commander i n Chief wrote the cabinet and urged i t to introduce censorship on a l l news-papers because the warning issued to them was not heeded 64 and an i m p a r t i a l a t t i t u d e was nowhere to be found. By t h i s time Headquarters had been flooded with a r t i c l e s cut out of newspapers by i r a t e o f f i c e r s and c i v i l i a n s who thought them 6 5 p r o - B r i t i s h , pro-German, anti-French, etc. The rather r i d i c u l o u s extent to which "matters of n e u t r a l i t y " could be taken d i d l i t t l e more than provide a massive amount of paper work fo r the army without s e t t l i n g anything. The government refused to censure newspapers and a l l the army could do was prevent newspapers from publishing f o r a c e r t a i n time provided they were pr i n t e d i n an area that was i n staat 6 6 van beleg. This was done, oc c a s i o n a l l y even by d i v i s i o n commanders, but the big d a i l i e s , p r i n ted i n Rotterdam and Amsterdam could not be touched. When the commander of the f i e l d army brought an editor to court, the judge pointed out that i n cases of espionage, or biased reporting, a man could only be punished under the e x i s t i n g c i v i l law i f i t was proved that the action had endangered the n e u t r a l i t y of the country. And t h i s was very d i f f i c u l t to prove. The only other avenue open to the army was to remove the man from 6 7 the area i n staat van beleg and f o r b i d his reentry. 54 M a r t i a l law d i d give the army a great deal more power, but i t was not absolute. They could remove a man from the area i n staat van beleg without o f f i c i a l l y charging him, but they could not j a i l him, or f i n e him, without going through the c i v i l law process. This proved a great handicap when the f i g h t against the smugglers was i n t e n s i f i e d i n 1915. The case of the foreign correspondents proved equally elusive. Obviously these men found the Netherlands a haven for information, e s p e c i a l l y places as Maastricht, very close to the German and Belgian borders with many Dutchmen going across to v/ork each day and people coming from the other side to shop i n that c i t y . Flushing was also a very good place for information because there were many Belgian r e f u -gees i n the town waiting f o r the f e r r y to take them to England. Some of these people had only j u s t escaped out of Belgium and could t e l l a great deal f o r very l i t t l e money. On August 20, General Snijders had i n s t r u c t e d a l l his subordinates that foreign correspondents were to be removed from the areas i n staat van beleg, but t h i s was easier said than done. In October, f o r instance, correspondents from the Da i l y Express, D a i l y Mail, D a i l y News, D a i l y Telegraph, and The Times were found i n Flushing. The army t r i e d to keep these men out, but they kept s l i p p i n g back i n t o the pr o h i -b i t e d areas. In A p r i l 1915, f o r example, a Paris journal published an account of the Dutch defences against a German invasion i n t o the province of Zeeland. So e x p l i c i t was the information that a l l a r t i l l e r y emplacements and mined bridges 55 were a c c u r a t e l y i n d i c a t e d . The army d i d not r e a l l y s t o p the newspaper men u n t i l i t had l i s t s compiled of who they were and had t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s c i r c u l a t e d around the areas i n s t a a t van b e l e g . D u r i n g the f i r s t few months n e i t h e r B r i t a i n nor Germany seems to have had a v e r y e f f i c i e n t espionage system i n the N e t h e r l a n d s . Much of the i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d went v i a the v a r i o u s c o n s u l a t e s to the home cou n t r y , and the Dutch c o u l d l i s t e n i n on most telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n s to and from the 69 c o n s u l a t e s . By September the Dutch army knew t h a t Dr. G n e i s t , the German Consul i n Rotterdam was a v e r y a c t i v e spy f o r Germany, t h a t he r e c e i v e d i n f o r m a t i o n from a Dr. Brandt, Mr. Dirkzwager, Mr. H. van der S c h r i e k , and Mr. F. W. S c h l i e s s e r , d i r e c t o r N. V. Vereenigde D r o g i s t e n . But as l o n g as none of the i n f o r m a t i o n concerned the N e t h e r l a n d s , the 70 Dutch m i l i t a r y d i d not deem i t n e c e s s a r y to take a c t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , the B r i t i s h a l s o worked through t h e i r c o n s u l a t e , a l t h o u g h they soon s e t up the bogus Uranium Steamship 71 Company as a f r o n t f o r t h e i r espionage a c t i v i t i e s . The B r i t i s h were most i n t e r e s t e d i n i n f o r m a t i o n about Belgium and t r i e d t o get much of the i n f o r m a t i o n from B e l g i a n r e f u -gees. Ife seemed v e r y much a case of the two espionage groups f i g h t i n g each o t h e r , so the Dutch d i d n o t h i n g but observe. Be f o r e l o n g , however, Dutch t r a d e p r a c t i c e s would be so w e l l known to the two b e l l i g e r e n t s t h a t i t became extremely d i f f i c u l t f o r the N e t h e r l a n d s to do a n y t h i n g f o r one s i d e w i t h o u t the o t h e r demanding an e q u a l , or b e t t e r d e a l . 56 For Army Headquarters one of the biggest d i f f i c u l t i e s was that a l l these new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s needed men, and that these were i n short supply. The i n t e r n i n g camps had to be guarded, smugglers had to be caught, newspapermen had to be checked, telephones had to be l i s t e n e d i n to, spies had to be shadowed, etc., and although i n c e r t a i n cases the munici-pal p o l i c e forces could be employed, the army s t i l l had to use i t s own men. And t h i s went at the expense of the numbers a v a i l a b l e f o r the f i e l d and the f o r t r e s s e s . The S t e l l i n g Amsterdam f o r example, with a front l i n e almost 100 k i l o -meters long, with 36 f o r t s and strong points, was only 72 manned by 5 landweer b a t t a l i o n s . In October 1914, there was s t i l l no d e f i n i t e i n d i c a t i o n that the war of movement had come to an end f o r four years. The army o f f i c e r s s t i l l had to count on the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Germans be driven back so that f i g h t i n g along the southern border of the Netherlands would s t a r t again i n the spring. A l l the paper work involved i n reports and c i r c u l a r s only aggravated the already bad tendency i n the army toward bureaucracy. More and more o f f i c e r s and men ended up behind desks instead of i n the f i e l d , and t h i s angered those who had to remain out on a c t i v e duty and could not manage to f i n d a " s o f t job" 73 i n s i d e an o f f i c e somewhere. The p o s i t i v e side of a l l the extra work was that the army was busy, f e l t u s e f u l , gained a c e r t a i n measure of pride i n i t s e l f and was held i n higher esteem by the Dutch people. The f l o o d of Belgian refugees affected almost every 57 Dutch person, and i t brought home the r e a l i z a t i o n that only t h e i r own army guarding the borders could prevent a s i m i l a r f a t e b e f a l l i n g the Netherlands. For a few months the Dutch buried t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , overcame t h e i r l a t e n t a n t i -m i l i t a r i s m , and placed themselves as one people behind t h e i r leaders and t h e i r armed forces. The f e e l i n g of unity d i d not l a s t long. Once the immediate danger of invasion receded the Dutch returned to t h e i r o ld d i v i s i o n s , , l o c a l prejudices, and old antagonisms. The i n d i v i d u a l , or the small group, came f i r s t again and only serious and immediate national emergencies could bring a change i n that. Most Dutch people d i d not consider a trenchwar i n northern France a Dutch nation a l emergency. At best i t was i n t e r e s t i n g to read about i n the newspapers. L i t t l e support was therefore given i n the next few years to the people and organizations working to strengthen the defensive c a p a b i l i t i e s of the Netherlands. 5. Problems Within the Army During the f i r s t few months the troubles within the army were not yet large. The danger was s t i l l too great, there was too much to do and the s i t u a t i o n was too unusual for serious issues to a r i s e . Boredom, the great enemy of the coming years, had not yet set i n . But there were already a number of i n c i p i e n t problems which i n the coming years would gnaw away the l i t t l e v i t a l i t y the army possessed. 58 One of the f i r s t things the Dutch s o l d i e r began to grumble about was the inadequacy of the leaves. M o b i l i z a t i o n meant that d i v i s i o n and t e r r i t o r i a l commanders could not grant leaves, so everything had to be regulated by Army Headquarters. On August 19, General Snijders had issued anrt order that f o r t r e s s troops could get a 24 hour pass once every 7 days and the remainder of the army every 10 days. For anyone who could not get home the same evening that h i s leave began, a 48 hour pass every 14 (or 20) days would be 74 issued. From the Commander i n Chief's point of view i t was a l l quite reasonable; i t meant that 10-14 per cent of the army (about 20-23,000 men) would not be a v a i l a b l e f o r duty on any given day and that was already a very large number. Many s o l d i e r s , however, f e l t s l i g h t e d i n the d i f f e r e n t treatment between f o r t r e s s troops and others ( l a t e r the leave periods were made the same); almost everyone thought that a 10 day period away from home was i n t o l e r a b l e . The married men thought i t u n f a i r that the unmarried ones got as much leave as they did; those f a r from home looked askance at those stationed i n t h e i r home town and able to sneak home for an hour or so at night. Another reason f o r complaint was that some men quite soon managed to get away on an " i n d e f i n i t e " leave which i n f a c t got them out of the army u n t i l a second m o b i l i z a t i o n was c a l l e d . General Snijders had not wanted to issue any i n d e f i n i t e leaves but Bosboom had overruled him. Some people were simply indispensable i n c i v i l i a n l i f e and should not 59 be buried i n the army where t h e i r t alents would go to waste. Once the d e c i s i o n was made, however, a l l sorts of people thought themselves indispensable. Bosboom was c o n t i n u a l l y put under pressure by fellow parliamentarians who had a " s p e c i a l case", by mayors who wrote long l e t t e r s , by indus-t r i a l i s t s who r e a l l y needed various men now serving i n the army, etc. Army Headquarters was also buried under requests, and each had to be studied i n d i v i d u a l l y and judged on i t s own merits. Of the 3,452 requests General Snijders had received by December, he granted 1,235 men i n d e f i n i t e leave. 75 Bosboom granted an even larger number. Later another category, " s p e c i a l leaves" would complicate matters even more and would cause endless complaints from s o l d i e r s (not enough leaves) and from Army Headquarters (too many leaves). Closely connected with the complaints about leaves were those about pay. There were no le s s than 87 d i f f e r e n t pay categories (below the rank of o f f i c e r ) depending on rank, 76 age, s e n i o r i t y , s e r v i c e time, branch of service, etc. Actual pay varied from 2,25 guilders a day f o r senior war-rant o f f i c e r s to 10 cents a day for a rec e n t l y drafted 77 r e c r u i t . In addition, there were s p e c i a l mobilization costs for the i n d i v i d u a l such as loss of wages, loss of production, t r a v e l costs, cost of l i v i n g bonus, etc., which had to be repaid by the Crown. Obviously there was a great deal of confusion among the lower ranks as to what they should get paid, and a great deal of bit t e r n e s s when some of the inade-quacies of the system came to l i g h t . A draftee who had been 60 a baker's helper i n c i v i l i a n l i f e and was placed i n a m i l i -tary bakery was given 30 cents a day extra because "he knew his job", but the farmer's son digging trenches only received 78 his 10 cents a day. He who had volunteered f o r the army received 15 cents a day, but his cost of l i v i n g allowance was 10 cents a day while that of the draftee was 13 cents, 79 thus g i v i n g the former 2 cents a day more. Some of the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s continued to pay 60-80 per cent of the wages to t h e i r c l erks while they were i n the army, but others who 80 had had a less generous employer d i d not get anything. And so the s o l d i e r only had to look around him to f i n d rea-sons to complain and d i s l i k e the army a l i t t l e more each day. By law, the Crown had to ensure that no family was wanting when the breadwinner v/as c a l l e d i n t o the se r v i c e . For t h i s reason i t was possible to give a maximum of one guilder a day to a family of a m i l i t i a man, one and a h a l f guilders to a family of a landweer man, and two guilders to a landstorm man family ( l a t e r , when p r i c e s increased sharply, these amounts were r a i s e d ) . There was no l o g i c a l reason why the amounts paid to f a m i l i e s should have a d i f f e r e n t maximum except that a man serving i n the m i l i t i a would be much younger than one serving i n the landstorm, but t h i s was no c r i t e r i o n because family needs d i d not always vary with the age of the breadwinner. This extra money was given to the family i n addition to the man's army pay, but i t could not exceed the regular income the family had had before the man was c a l l e d to ac t i v e duty. I t v/as another sign of the low 61 esteem the m i l i t a r y was held i n — n o one was to be better of f i n the army than out of i t . To complicate things f u r t h e r , ; t h i s extra money f o r the family was f i r s t paid out of the l o c a l municipal funds (who then claimed i t from the Depart-ment of War), and the mayor had to decide which family needed extra money and how much was needed. There were three v a r i a -bles i n t h i s arrangement: one mayor would be more generous than another, the cost of l i v i n g betv^een country and c i t y was d i f f e r e n t , some men saved part of t h e i r army pay and sent i t home while others d i d not; but these were not taken i n t o consideration by the government and caused endless complaining by the s o l d i e r s . Many l i v e d i n fear that t h e i r 81 fa m i l i e s would not have enough to eat. The question of free t r a i n t r a v e l f o r s o l d i e r s was also made a needless source of i r r i t a t i o n . The Minister of War had decided that a man could only receive a f r e e - t r a v e l pass i f he r e a l l y needed i t . The commanding o f f i c e r s of the uni t s were to decide whether the head of a family v?as i n genuine need of free t r a v e l . I f the man was s i n g l e i t should also be investigated i f he r e a l l y needed tor.go home on his pass. If t h i s proved e s s e n t i a l , and he had no money, he could get 8 2 a free pass. The pettiness of many of these regulations r e a l l y i r k e d the s o l d i e r s . I t d i d nothing to l i f t the morale of the men, but rather r e s u l t e d i n e f f o r t s to forge passes, go home without o f f i c i a l leave, attempt to get extra leave by inventing s t o r i e s , and generally hastened the process of 62 demoralization. Many v/ould be more i n c l i n e d to earn a few guilders through aiding a smuggler than i f the army had treated them i n a better manner. The e f f o r t s to remedy the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of morale and s p i r i t which now began came tooc l a t e and were often on much too small a scale to be e f f e c -t i v e . Four and a h a l f years of waiting i n idleness i s d i f f i -c u l t enough i n i t s e l f without the added burden of petty rul e s and regulations. The various sources of i r r i t a t i o n f o r the men, the tendency of many o f f i c e r s to look f o r "safe" o f f i c e jobs, the bungling by the government i n s t i p u l a t i n g leave periods not the same for a l l men were a l l part of the lack of a m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n within the Netherlands, the i n d i f f e r e n c e with which many viewed the armed forces, and the u n f a m i l i -a r i t y of the new s i t u a t i o n . When a l l the heated discussions were taking place i n the previous decade about the need f o r better defence forces, no one had r e a l l y stopped to think what i t would mean for the Netherlands i f i t had a mobilized army of 200,000 men and had to maintain such a force f o r a c e r t a i n length of time. The m i l i t a r y leaders had worked out plans f o r a mobilization, had thought about the best defen-sive p o s i t i o n s and had prepared them as well as p o s s i b l e with the l i t t l e money given them. But they had not considered the p o s s i b i l i t y that the army would be forced to stand i n idleness f o r many months, even though the p o l i c i e s of a l l Dutch governments had always been d i r e c t e d at keeping the country out of a l l wars. The government, on the other hand 63 had never considered the e f f e c t of n e u t r a l i t y i n the context of the Dutch armed forces. I t had agreed to a mobilization plan, but had never asked the army o f f i c e r s how they planned to keep such a large army f i t and ready while i t was doomed to wait f o r events to happen. V i r t u a l l y a l l l e v e l s of Dutch society had adopted the same idea: wait p a s s i v e l y f o r things to happen, then take the minimum preventive steps necessary, and then wait again. Now that a war was raging j u s t outside the Dutch borders, and the Dutch army was c a l l e d out, the lack of preparations caused numerous complaints and d i s s a t -i s f a c t i o n among the people serving i n that army. And because no one was w i l l i n g to take adequate and far-reaching measures to a l l e v i a t e the problems they remained and got worse. These f i r s t few months of the war were a v i t a l t e s t f o r the Netherlands; i t was the time that the army leaders had to f i n d ways and means to increase the morale and bring the forces i n proper f e t t l e f o r any emergency that might occur; the government had to convince the nation at large of the precarious p o s i t i o n the country was i n , and that therefore everyone should do what he could to help; the people as a whole had to adapt to the new s i t u a t i o n , r e a l i z e the vulner-a b i l i t y of t h e i r l i t t l e nation, put aside old habits, differences with each other, a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c tendencies, and i n d i f f e r e n c e s toward a l l things not concerning them d i r e c t l y . How important nation a l unity of purpose i n time of war i s has been shown i n the l a s t few years i n the United States 64 of America. The Netherlands was not a c t u a l l y at war, but no one could p r e d i c t x^hen t h i s would change. If i t d i d come, the national e f f o r t would have to be much greater than the United States has to put f o r t h i n Vietnam; f o r the Dutch i t would become a matter of l i f e and death. There was as yet a short time to prepare, but no one took advantage of i t . The four years that followed were therefore a l l the more d i f f i c u l t and because no one ever t r i e d to change the e x i s t i n g apathy, pro v i n c i a l i s m , and myopia, the Dutch nation was caught i n a s i m i l a r p o s i t i o n i n the autumn of 1939. Nothing was done then ei t h e r ; i t d i d not seem necessary because i t had not proved necessary i n 1914. The p r i c e had to be paid from 1940 to 1945. Only a f t e r f i v e years of enemy occupation d i d the Dutch learn that i t i s sometimes necessary to spend money and e f f o r t preparing f o r something that may not happen, but can happen. The lesson learned from 1940 to 1945 could have been learned during the Great War. Smuggling, CHAPTER III Censorship and Counter-espionage 1. Smuggling Shortly a f t e r the outbreak of x-;ar the Dutch army was t o l d to stop the smuggling.along the Dutch borders; sixteen months l a t e r the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was given to the Department of Finance because the army had f a i l e d . The case of the elusive smugglers t e l l s something about the army, the government and the Dutch people i n general. The army was not prepared f o r the job and had never a n t i c i p a t e d that i t would ever have to deal with such matters. The m i l i t a r y leaders had prepared f o r a defensive war behind the inunda-tions and f o r t s of the S t e l l i n g Holland; they had never considered that the army might have to carry out other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . The p o l i t i c i a n s had not thought about i t either; they had l e t the army o f f i c e r s plan t h e i r defences, and had simply continued the passive n e u t r a l i t y p o l i t i c s of t h e i r predecessors i n o f f i c e . With no previous thought given to the po s s i b l e e f f e c t s of a Netherlands surrounded by nations at war, the army and the p o l i t i c i a n s had no ideas on how to deal with the problem. The Dutch people, a f t e r the f i r s t few months, acted as i f Europe was at peace with the only d i f f e r e n c e that there was now some money to be made i n areas where before t h i s had not been p o s s i b l e . The smuggling problem i s j u s t one example how the Dutch continued to serve t h e i r p r i v a t e , or small group 66 i n t e r e s t i n s p i t e of the war which raged about them. There was no nation a l drawing together to face the mounting problem of being a small neutral nation amidst a Europe at war, or to prepare f o r a p o s s i b l e invasion. Opinions and ideas hardly changed: the army was s t i l l viewed as an unavoidable e v i l (out of necessity now much larger) which one should t r y to outwit at the border inspection points rather than aid i n i t s e f f o r t s to keep as many goods i n the country as p o s s i b l e . Only when the s c a r c i t y of goods began to e f f e c t many people di d they turn on the government f o r not stopping the smug-g l i n g but then i t was s t i l l out of personal concern and not the national one. The p o l i t i c i a n s were also to blame; they continued to use peace time methods i n time of war. Reluctant to give the army the power i t needed, u n w i l l i n g to introduce severe punishments f o r smuggling, they presented the problem to the people as i f i t was simply an increase i n the i l l e g a l export of goods. No national campaign was mounted which showed smuggling as a weakening of the Dutch nation which could cause severe l i a b i l i t i e s i f the nation was put under strong m i l i t a r y or economic pressures from either Germany or Great B r i t a i n . The army a u t h o r i t i e s d i d not present the case to the s o l d i e r s i n t h i s manner ei t h e r . They continued to view smuggling co n t r o l as an "extra" r e s p o n s i b i l i t y placed upon the army which was not part of the main function, defence of the Netherlands. Because the matter was viewed i n t h i s l i g h t , the problem was a l l the more d i f f i c u l t f o r the army and might well be the main reason i t f a i l e d so badly. 67 The q u a n t i t i e s that were smuggled were not large enough to create a famine i n the Netherlands, but they d i d aggravate the s c a r c i t y ; nor could smuggled goods ever sustain the Ger-man war e f f o r t , but they d i d help. Had the goods been l e g a l l y exported to Germany, at l e a s t the Netherlands would have received valuable coal and i r o n i n return. Apart from those reasons, the urgency to stop smuggling increased as various developments took place during the war. At f i r s t i t had been a question of preventing the depletion of sto c k p i l e s i n the Netherlands; once the N.O.T. was i n s t i t u t e d i t also became necessary to p r o h i b i t goods imported by the N.O.T. from leaving the country i n whatever form. As the B r i t i s h and French governments improved t h e i r s u r v e i l l e n c e methods within the Netherlands more and more pressure was placed on the Dutch government to end the i l l e g a l export of goods. By 1917 the s c a r c i t y of many goods within the country made people a l l the more c r i t i c a l of a government which seemed incapable of keeping the much needed products at home. Certain news-papers kept p r i n t i n g a r t i c l e s about smuggling, and the f a n t a s t i c s t o r i e s that were c i r c u l a t e d not only kept the problem i n the news, but also made i t seem worse than i t was. Many people i n the lower income groups became suspicious that those who did well i n business must be smuggling and the derogatory term 0.W.ers (derived from Oorlog Winst, War P r o f i t s ) was used frequently. That a great many of the people who complained about the smuggling d i d so out of jealousy does not a l t e r the f a c t that d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and c i v i l unrest 6 8 was aggravated. In addition, the army came under c r i t i c i s m and f e l l i n t o greater disrepute because i t was unable to stop the smuggling. Although the army could have been much more e f f e c t i v e i n smuggling prevention, i t must be remembered that t h i s was a new r o l e f o r the army and there was no help forthcoming from the Germans or Belgians as had been the case i n peace time. The Germans were not adverse to having goods come i n t o t h e i r country—by whatever method. In Belgium the Germans.1 main concern was that the smuggled goods should come i n t o t h e i r hands and not i n t o those of the Belgian population. General von Zwehl, the German Governor of Antwerp, explained a f t e r the war that he could not have prevented smuggling even had he wanted to. German border guards often had to remain i n one p o s i t i o n f o r over a year which made them very vulner-able to bribes and influences from the indigenous population. Later the border guards were convalescing wounded, men 45 or older, or s o l d i e r s who had been too severely wounded to return to a c t i v e f r o n t l i n e duty. S t i l l l a t e r landstorm b a t t a l i o n s from the Russian f r o n t were sent to Belgium. The l a t t e r were v i r t u a l l y without d i s c i p l i n e , and could not care le s s about smugglers; i n f a c t , they a c t i v e l y p a r t i c i p a t e d themselves. 1 I f the Dutch wanted to prevent smuggling, they had to do i t by themselves. Those who t r i e d to prevent the smuggling had to contend with many d i f f i c u l t i e s . The border was 950 km. long; often i t ran through l i t t l e towns and v i l l a g e s and even i f that 69 was not the case, people on both sides spoke the same d i a -l e c t , had the same customs and habits, and knew each other w e l l . Furthermore, the l i s t of goods pro h i b i t e d f o r export was long, frequently items were added and sometimes sub-2 tracted. By 1917 there were more than 1,000 items on the l i s t . ^ L a s t l y , not a l l smugglers operated the same, and d i f f e r e n t methods f o r catching them had to be used. There were people l i v i n g near the border v/ho had small quantities of goods on t h e i r person to take across when v i s i t i n g , or ttfhen going to work i n Belgium or Germany. Many also made nocturnal voyages loaded with as much as they could carry. The p r o f e s s i o n a l smuggler s t o c k p i l e d his goods u n t i l he had a s u b s t a n t i a l quantity, hired 20 to 40 men who, f o r a nice reward, c a r r i e d the goods over the border at night at some lonely place. Then there were the businessmen who t r i e d to f a l s i f y papers, "buy" export licences from the " r i g h t " o f f i c i a l s , or hide tons of i l l e g a l goods i n ships or i n 4 f r e i g h t cars underneath l e g a l l y exported a r t i c l e s . O f f i -c i a l l y , the f i r s t two types of smuggling were categorized as consumptie-smokkel (consumer goods smuggling), the l a t t e r as fraude (fraud). At f i r s t a l l attention was focussed on catching people crossing the border with p r o h i b i t e d wares. Border posts were increased, numerous p a t r o l s walked up and down between f i x e d points, and s p e c i a l ambushes were set up at night to catch the bigger gangs. Much of t h i s was i n e f f e c t i v e , however. The gangs were d i f f i c u l t to detect at night, e s p e c i a l l y i n 70 wooded areas. Too many s o l d i e r s were stationed i n t h e i r own area and they were not w i l l i n g to apprehend smugglers who were good acquaintances, friends or r e l a t i v e s . Many s o l d i e r s p a s s i v e l y or a c t i v e l y aided the smugglers. Cries of f r u s t r a -t i o n by l o c a l commanders soon caused i n d i v i d u a l s , companies, or even b a t t a l i o n s to be posted to other locations, away from t h e i r own area.^ As already explained,^ the e x i s t i n g laws were of l i t t l e help to the m i l i t a r y . A smuggler who was caught had to be t r i e d i n a c i v i l i a n court and t h i s cost time and involved a great deal of paper work. Removing a person out of the area i n staat van beleg was a deterrent f o r those who had possessions or work there, but meant nothing to those who came from elsex\'here. When by November, 1914, the whole eastern and southern border was declared to be i n staat van  beleg, i t was an area one hour's walk wide (een uur g a a n s ) — roughly 5-6 km. Within t h i s area the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s issued a number of orders during 1915 designed to stop the consumptie-smokkel, e.g. food, small luxury items, l i v e s t o c k , etc. I t was forbidden f o r p r i v a t e persons to have more food i n t h e i r homes than necessary, and stores could have no larger reserves than they normally had. S t o c k p i l i n g of any sort was forbidden. A l l goods within the staat van beleg area moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of the border had to have a s p e c i a l permit from the a u t h o r i t i e s . Livestock was r e g i s t e r e d by type and colour and could not be grazed i n areas close to 7 the border. 71 The measures were intended to prevent s t o c k p i l i n g close to the border from where the goods could be e a s i l y trans-ported across. The army had some success, but the smugglers were usually one step ahead of the a u t h o r i t i e s . Unable to c o l l e c t t h e i r goods i n the staat van beleg area, they simply st o c k p i l e d them outside the area, walked a l i t t l e f urther at night, ran a s l i g h t l y greater r i s k of getting caught, and continued to smuggle. The ingenuity and audacity of the smugglers was tremen-dous. Horses conveniently broke loose or "got l o s t " and ended up across the border. Train engineers hid a r t i c l e s under and i n t h e i r locomotives and the coal cars. C a t t l e were towed across the r i v e r behind a row boat. Logs were hollowed out and f i l l e d with f a t . Eggs (which could then be exported) were c a r r i e d across and on examination proved to be of rubber whitened with lime. B i c y c l e t i r e s were f i l l e d with chocolate bars. Farmers who went to Germany to help with the harvest l e f t with young, healthy horses and returned with skinny old nags of approximately the same colour. Fat ladies proved to be skinny ones with s p e c i a l corsets f i l l e d with a l l sorts of goods. Drums with ( l e g a l export) lemonade syrup had double walls f i l l e d with ( i l l e g a l ) o i l or f a t . The number of t r i c k s g makes an endless l i s t . Those who were fortunate enough to have property r i g h t along the border could r e a l l y do w e l l . One Mr. Soeren whose garden bordered on Germany, b u i l t a shed with one door opening -on Dutch, the other door on German s o i l . Many things 72 were c a r r i e d i n t o the Dutch door, but nothing ever came back out. When the army clamped down, i t also discovered that a pipe had been constructed i n s i d e the house which ran under-neath the garden i n t o Germany. Reportedly i t g r e a t l y f a c i l i -tated the smuggling of gasoline and coal o i l . Another easy method was used near Maastricht where the Meuse River runs from Dutch i n t o Belgian t e r r i t o r y before returning f o r good to Dutch s o i l . Drums were dumped i n t o the r i v e r i n the Netherlands and were f i s h e d out again i n Belgium. At f i r s t the army d i d not have a f a s t boat and could only watch the drums d r i f t past. Eventually a boat was procured which put an end to i t . ^ A f a i r l y e f f e c t i v e s o l u t i o n was also found f o r the m i l i t a r y ambushes at night. A few men, empty handed, walked ahead of the gang carrying the smuggle ware. The p a t r o l , unable to see very much i n the dark, challenged when i t heard a few men walking. The "innocent" men stood and waited to be searched, while t h e i r comrades s a f e l y made o f f with the goods s t i l l i n t h e i r possession. The next night they would t r y again, and perhaps have more luck. The number of s o l d i e r s involved i n smuggling must have been large, but the number caught was small. The men r a r e l y wanted to t e s t i f y against a comrade, and because the nature of the involvement was often p a s s i v e — l o o k i n g the other way or not being at a c e r t a i n post at a given t i m e — d e t e c t i o n was d i f f i c u l t and proving involvement even more so.If they p a r t i c i p a t e d a c t i v e l y i t was often with expensive, small i n 73 volume, wares such as spices. These could be bought at home when on leave without arousing suspicion and sold to the German border guards."*"^ O f f i c i a l e f f o r t s to introduce a reward system were not very s u c c e s s f u l . A s o l d i e r could get up to 5 guilders (paid by the Department of Finance) i f he was p r o f i c i e n t i n catching smugglers or l o c a t i n g smugglers' 11 12 caches. Usually the reward was only about 1 or 2 guilders and t h i s was hardly an enticement. There was so much money to be made by helping smugglers that men whose turn i t was to go on watch were sometimes offered 10 g u i l d e r s or more by others to take the watch f o r them. A better idea was to give the men extra leave as a reward. The t e r r i t o r i a l com-mander of Limburg wrote General Snijders that he had been 13 very successful with t h i s . The d i f f i c u l t y here was that not too many men could be sent on extra leave since too few would remain to do the necessary work. In s p i t e of the shortcomings of the army, some goods were intercepted, smugglers were caught, and charges were l a i d . From January 1 to November 15, 1915 the following were intercepted: 774 horses 336,332 l i t e r o i l 1,944 kg. cheese 53 cows (various kinds) 3,978 kg. coffee 49 sheep 151,888 l i t e r coal o i l 10,050 kg. bread 20 pigs 2,686 l i t e r gasoline 25,527 kg. margarine 139,801:kg. potatoes 101,642 kg. grain 264,362 kg. grain products (e.g. f l o u r ) A great number of other products or materials (69 items i n 14 a l l ) i n le s s e r q u a n t i t i e s were also confiscated. What the m i l i t a r y d i d not catch can only be imagined. But i n 1917, 74 when cont r o l had been tightened and was much more e f f i c i e n t . General Snijders, N.O.T. o f f i c i a l s , and other a u t h o r i t i e s admitted that the intercepted goods of that year were probably only 10 per cent of the t o t a l that was being 15 smuggled. The goods intercepted during 1915 can probably be estimated to be between 1 per cent and 5 per cent of the t o t a l amounts that crossed the border i l l e g a l l y . In order to intercept those goods, the army had employed 23,445 m i l i t a r y personnel i n the " f i r s t l i n e " — i . e . on watches and p a t r o l s i n the area i n staat van beleg. During 1915, 127 m i l i t a r y were caught cooperating i n some way with smugglers; 62 smugglers were wounded or k i l l e d by the m i l i -tary; 1,29 7 people were removed from the area i n staat van  beleg; 36,6 79 charges were l a i d of which 803 were dropped for various reasons and 768 persons were declared not g u i l t y by the courts. That such a large number of s o l d i e r s had to be used against the smugglers was of great concern to Army Head-quarters. The s p e c i a l and regular leaves already removed many from the ranks, and with roughly 11 per cent of the army f i g h t i n g smugglers, between one-quarter and one-third of the mobilized strength of the army was unavailable f o r d a i l y t r a i n i n g or organized defence against a possi b l e attack. Since the army was not very e f f e c t i v e against the smugglers anyway, a law was passed on December 31, 1915 which returned the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r border c o n t r o l i n so 75 f a r as the passage of goods was concerned to the Department of Finance. This was to take e f f e c t A p r i l 1, 1916. There s t i l l were not enough regular customs o f f i c e r s and e s p e c i a l l y trustworthy s o l d i e r s were chosen to augment the ranks. Even-t u a l l y 6,000 men were drawn from the army. They performed t h e i r new function i n uniform, received 50 cents a day extra from the Department of Finance, and were expected to be i n c o r r u p t i b l e . The area i n staat van beleg was almost doubled i n width, and the laws against transporting and s t o c k p i l i n g goods within the area were toughened. A l l goods moving from the center of the country to the peripheries needed a "domestic passport", a transfer permit, or an export l i c e n c e . On the documents the make, type, rec e i v e r , transporter, date of departure and expected a r r i v a l as well as the route was 17 given. I t was hoped that these measures would end the p r a c t i c e of smuggling. General Snijders was extremely happy to be r i d of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y although he bemoaned the loss of 6,000 of his better men. The border guards were s t i l l expected to ar r e s t smugglers i f they ran int o them, and the customs o f f i c i a l s could request the cooperation of the army i f a large operation was planned. Considering the qua n t i t i e s of goods that were i n t e r -cepted, i t would appear that the new system was an improve-ment over the o l d . During the f i r s t four months of 1917, the following was confiscated: 76 6,190 kg. grease 157 horses 3,362 kg. cheese 202 cows and pigs 7,927 kg. peas and beans 4,636 kg. ;tea 26,124 kg. coffee 14,461 l i t e r o i l 18,802 kg. pepper 19,733 kg. cocoa and chocolate 56,040 kg. grain and f l o u r 29,422 kg. r i c e and groats (a barley prc-guct) 117,596 kg. soap and 62,131 bars of soap In addition, l e s s e r amounts of a large number of other goods such as leather, rubber, eggs, etc., were intercepted. These q u a n t i t i e s may not seem very large, but they only represent the goods intercepted during a four month period, and i f they are only 10 per cent of the t o t a l amounts smuggled as estimated by the various a u t h o r i t i e s the t o t a l s f o r the year 1917 become rather more s i g n i f i c a n t . I t meant, f o r instance, that 1,724,184 one-pound bags of coffee l e f t the Netherlands which the Dutch people were not able to buy them-selves and which, because of the u n r e s t r i c t e d submarine war-fare, were now almost impossible to replace from overseas countries. During 1917 only 15 m i l l i o n kg. coffee was imported (versus 145 m i l l i o n kg. i n 1913), and t h i s dropped to 3 19 m i l l i o n kg. i n 1918. The 1917 smuggled qu a n t i t i e s show that the s c a r c i t y of goods within the Netherlands did'not r e s t r a i n the Dutch from smuggling; the shortages i n Germany were even greater and large p r o f i t s could be made. There was now a strong s o c i a l stigma attached to war p r o f i t e e r i n g and people looked askance at the O.W.ers, but t h i s had l i t t l e e f f e c t . In one year 350 20 Dutchmen became m i l l i o n a i r s according to t h e i r tax returns. 77 How many others d i d as well without the Department of Finance knowing about i t w i l l never be uncovered, but there were probably a great many. Of course not everyone who made money was an 0.w.er; there were people who stayed within the law and simply took advantage of the new s i t u a t i o n i n Europe to earn a higher income. On the other hand, buying and s e l l i n g i l l e g a l l y now that many a r t i c l e s were rationed was pr a c t i s e d by almost a l l 21 Dutch people and no one thought i t r e a l l y wrong. The 0.W.ers were d i s l i k e d and even detested, but many who harboured these f e e l i n g s would have become war p r o f i t e e r s i f given the chance. Envy, suspicion and mistrust reigned supreme within the nation; everyone was suspected of buying or s e l l i n g i l l e g a l l y , or hoarding food, or of smuggling. The Dutch government could not be blamed f o r the scar-c i t y of goods within the Netherlands, but i t c e r t a i n l y could have acted sooner and more s t r i c t l y against the war p r o f i -teers and smugglers. In the l a s t three years of the war the 22 government spent 9 m i l l i o n g u i l d e r s on smuggling prevention; t h i s was hardly a large sum considering the government gave 23 out 1.5 b i l l i o n g u i l d e r s as " c r i s i s expenditure" during the four years of the war. S t i f f punishments f o r smuggling were introduced much too l a t e . Not u n t i l March, 1917 was a law passed which made i t p o s s i b l e to place suspected smug-gl e r s i n j a i l while waiting f o r t h e i r t r i a l date. I t made fo r tremendous overcrowding, new j a i l s had to be b u i l t , and 24 d i d reduce smuggling although i t d i d not end i t . 78 Smuggling by c i v i l i a n s might have been c u r t a i l e d some-what i n 1917; smuggling by s o l d i e r s increased sharply. This happened p a r t l y because the worsening economic conditions within the country and the r i s i n g p r i c e s increased the d e s i r e f o r more money, partly because boredom was a l l p r e v a i l i n g and smuggling was excitement, but l a r g e l y because many men i n uniform seemed to have f e l t that there was now nothing to hold them back because the army was not responsible f o r stopping the i l l e g a l trade anymore. Apparently many men had taken t h e i r r o l e s e r i o u s l y i n 1915 and early 1916; they had t r i e d to catch smugglers and had not considered doing them-selves what they had to prevent others from doing. But now that the army had no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y anymore, they thought i t a l l r i g h t to s t a r t smuggling. I t became a matter of out-smarting the customs o f f i c i a l s . The t y p i c a l Dutch mentality of seeing one's own group p i t t e d against another group or groups and t r y i n g to get the best of the s i t u a t i o n was also present i n the army; i n t h i s case i t became the s o l d i e r versus the customs o f f i c e r . The m i l i t a r y commanders t r i e d to curb the smuggling s o l d i e r s but had l i t t l e success. On February 9, 1917, the Commander F i e l d Army in s t r u c t e d the t e r r i t o r i a l commanders to place as many border areas as poss i b l e out of bounds f o r m i l i t a r y personnel. Only with written permission from the company commanders were men allowed i n such areas. Those who were on guard duty near the border would be checked at i r r e g u l a r times while at t h e i r posts f o r possession of i l l e g a l 79 goods. The m i l i t a r y p o l i c e and customs o f f i c e r s would carry 25 out these checks; regular troops were not r e l i a b l e enough. A few days l a t e r the commander of the F i r s t D i v i s i o n asked permission to set up a fund out of which to pay "cheaters" i n order to get more information about the s o l d i e r s who 26 smuggled and where they hid t h e i r goods. Nothing appears to have been successful. In September the t e r r i t o r i a l commanders were once again urged to rotate men, companies and b a t t a l i o n s as frequently as pos s i b l e , and 27 to charge, punish and post away every man caught smuggling. A few. days l a t e r General Snijders reproached h i s o f f i c e r s and t o l d them to hand out s t i f f e r sentences and to maintain s t r i c t e r c o n t r o l because the smuggling by m i l i t a r y was not 28 diminishing at a l l . Some of the s o l d i e r s were quite audacious. They would go out near the border, i n t e r c e p t a smuggler, present them-selves as a s p e c i a l customs o f f i c e r , confiscate the goods, appear lenient" and l e t the man go free, and proceed to s e l l the confiscated goods themselves. Others would agree to act as "forerunners" f o r a band of smugglers, cry "customs ambush"; the band would drop i t s wares and run o f f , and the "forerunners" and men of the "ambush" would c o l l e c t the wares 29 L and s e l l them. The (often exaggerated) s t o r i e s t o l d by the s o l d i e r s about t h e i r e x p l o i t s only brought more c r i t i c i s m against the government. The natural tendency of the Dutch to complain found a wide open f i e l d now that things were becoming very 8 0 d i f f i c u l t . More serious was the f a c t that f o r e i g n ambassadors also exerted pressure on the Dutch government to curb t h i s excessive smuggling. Foreign Minister Louden had f i r s t received complaints from the ambassadors i n the summer of 1915,^ but the t r i c k l e had become a stream when the Amster-dam newspaper, the Telegraaf, had organized i t s " a n t i -31 smuggling bureau" i n the autumn of that year. T n e Telegraaf was the enfant t e r r i b l e of the Dutch press. Widely read (3 editions a day), i t brought the news i n a sensational manner and t r i e d to make an issue out of as many things as p o s s i b l e . Whereas the p r i n c i p a l d a i l y Dutch newspapers strove to maintain a p u n c t i l i o u s n e u t r a l i t y i n t h e i r comments on the war, thus abiding by the government's request f o r s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y i n reporting, the Telegraaf from the beginning adhered to a strong p r o - B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e . N e u t r a l i t y as recommended by the government was to the Telegraaf a betrayal of Dutch i n t e r e s t ; i t meant f r i e n d l y intercourse with Germany and acceptance ( i f not approval) of the invasion of Belgium. The paper was vehement i n i t s e d i t o r i a l comment, wholesale i n i t s condemnation of every-thing German, and constant i n i t s f a u l t f i n d i n g of the p o l i c i e s of the Dutch government. The "anti-smuggling bureau" set up by the Telegraaf had Dutchmen and foreigners i n i t s service and kept a close watch on a l l goods going across the f r o n t i e r . When clandes-t i n e trade was discovered, the information was either p r i n t e d or forwarded to the French and B r i t i s h embassies. Augmented with t h e i r own information the embassies then launched pro-81 tests against the Dutch government. Considering the source of the information. Louden d i d not appreciate the protests, e s p e c i a l l y when the B r i t i s h Ambassador, Johnstone, began to send l i s t s of names, occupations, and addresses of suspected 32 smugglers. In August, 1916, Johnstone charged that at Eelde gangs of smugglers crossed the border unhindered. The Dutch sentries had become b l i n d and dumb on the approach of the gang. In September the charge was l a i d that two Dutch s o l -d i e r s had been caught, one with 90 kg. margarine, the other with 100 kg. Why d i d the Dutch government not do something 33 about this? In October Johnstone sent s i x pages of names, al i a s e s used, occupations, and addresses of smugglers and probable suppliers and suspicious persons. In an accompanying l e t t e r the ambassador explained: "I bring t h i s to your Excellency's knowledge i n the hope of a s s i s t i n g the Nether-land a u t h o r i t i e s to prevent breaches of Netherland law." In the margin opposite t h i s Louden's angry scrawl reads "Zeer V r i e n d e l i j k ! I I" (very f r i e n d l y ! ! ! ) , and above the l e t t e r , "Is de Telegraaf weer i n a c t i e ? " (Is the Telegraaf i n action a g a i n ? ) ^ 4 Such reports by themselves d i d l i t t l e harm, but the pressure that could be exerted from London i n so f a r as Dutch trade and imports were concerned was considerable. For Army Headquarters the extensive smuggling p r a c t i c e s of the m i l i t a r y should have been an i n d i c a t i o n that the r o t within the army was growing. This must have been e s p e c i a l l y obvious from the many reports of the m i l i t a r y p o l i c e that o f f i c e r s 82 were not above smuggling e i t h e r . In one case, four Dutch o f f i c e r s managed to s e l l 500 kg. c i g a r e t t e s to the Germans i n one month. Some of the commanders of out of the way 3 6 border posts managed to do exceptionally w e l l . That many men were not s u f f i c i e n t l y deterred from smuggling by the normal punishments—loss of leave, extra d r i l l , postings inland, or the stockade—should also have been a source of concern f o r the General S t a f f . Men who a f t e r repeated punishment s t i l l proved i n c o r r i g i b l e were posted to a s p e c i a l u n i t at Fort C r e v e r c o e u r — f a r from the border and under close 37 supervision. But not everyone could be posted there; the army was simply too small and could not a f f o r d the loss of too many men even i f they were not r e l i a b l e . Smuggling need not have been a major problem at a l l i f strong laws had been passed, and i f the army had been given a free hand and t o l d to clamp down. Even i f that had not been done, the problem could have been less important i f knowledge of the extent of smuggling had been confined l o c a l l y to the Netherlands. But the government was equally lax i n censuring newspapers and c l e a r i n g the nation of spies. The information that the warring nations gained as a r e s u l t i n e v i t a b l y led to greater pressures on the Netherlands. 83 2. Censorship and Counter-espionage One would expect that the army, being responsible f o r i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , would have various methods of gathering information about p o s s i b l y dangerous persons within the country. This was not the case, however. The information gathering s e r v i c e of the army was rather amateurish. The General S t a f f d i d not have an I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch u n t i l June 25, 1914. I t d i d not begin to work e f f i c i e n t l y u n t i l 1917 and during the war d i d not grow larger than 12 o f f i c e r s and a l i k e number of other ranks. Designated G.S. I l l , i t was confined to counter-espionage. I t received almost a l l i t s information from the somewhat l a t e r i n s t i t u t e d G.S. IV (censorship, l i s t e n i n g i n on telephone conversations), from the m i l i t a r y attaches created i n 1916, and from various detective branches of the larger municipal p o l i c e forces. Not u n t i l May 1919 were G.S. I l l and G.S. IV combined and was the scope of the Branch broadened. There was thus no c e n t r a l agency which c o l l e c t e d information about r a d i c a l s , anarchists, or other extreme elements who could endanger i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . The General S t a f f assumed that l o c a l p o l i c e forces would keep an eye on the a c t i v i t i e s of such 38 persons and organizations. G.S. IV was at f i r s t p r i m a r i l y concerned with providing information f o r G.S. I I I . In January 1915 the d e c i s i o n was made to censor l e t t e r s , telegrams and telephone conversations i n order to gain more information about i l l e g a l trade prac-t i c e s and smuggling. Even then the measures were half-hearted. 84 Royalty, Members of Parliament, highly placed c i v i l servants, o f f i c e r s and t h e i r f a m i l i e s , and foreign ambassadors were exempted from censorship. Mail within the Netherlands was only opened i f i t was addressed to a person l i v i n g i n the staat van beleg areas or came f E o m there, and even then only spot checks were made. A l l l e t t e r s going abroad (except from the exempted persons) were checked, but not i f they were going to a neutral country. Only persons suspected of smug-39 g l i n g had a l l t h e i r mail opened. That a great deal of information slipped past the censors speaks f o r i t s e l f . Everyone always knew when his mail had been opened because i t would be stamped "Geopend door de m i l i t a i r e a u t h o r i t e i t e n " (opened by the m i l i t a r y ,40 a u t h o r i t i e s ) . Those who thought, or knew, themselves to be under suspicion would f i n d other means to communicate. I r r i t a t e d people soon began to complain to Members of P a r l i a -ment about having t h e i r mail opened, about censorship slowing down the mail, or of not r e c e i v i n g t h e i r mail (for which the censor was always blamed). Questions i n Parliament r e s u l t e d i n a new r e g u l a t i o n that mail could only be opened "with cause". This brought an even larger number of complaints i n the autumn of 1916. Companies and p r i v a t e persons now objected because they were not g u i l t y of anything and t h e i r mail was s t i l l opened, or that the reason they were once under suspicion was long a thing of the past and there was 41 no need to check them now, etc. The i n e f f i c i e n t censorship s t i l l provided enough 85 information to show that a great many i l l e g a l p r a c t i c e s took place. Export licences could be "bought" from the " r i g h t " o f f i c i a l , a r t i c l e s being exported were marked "trans-shipment", e f f o r t s were made to get c e r t a i n items o f f the prohibited export l i s t , guarded language, and p r i v a t e codes were used to f o o l the censors. Even i f the a u t h o r i t i e s d i d obtain proof of i l l e g a l p r a c t i c e s i t was often too l a t e — t h e ship-42 ment was already over the border, or had j u s t been sold, etc. 43 A few good catches were made such as Dr. Brandt who had managed to bring together 700 tons of copper from various 44 ship-wrecking yards. The obvious i n t e n t i o n was to smuggle i t i n t o Germany i n some manner or other. In order to prevent a recurrence of t h i s s o r t of thing the areas where the yards xvere located (along the major r i v e r s ) were put i n staat van beleg. In time the army managed to c o l l e c t a 48 page (typed, s i n g l e space) l i s t of suspicious persons whose mail should 45 be checked and telephone conversations overheard. To t h i s must be added the 16 page l i s t of names supplied by the N.O.T.—which had i t s own inspectors p r i m a r i l y concerned 46 with following the goods imported under N.O.T. consignments. There were thus enough suspected persons, and many charges were l a i d . But because i t sometimes took months before a case could be handled by the overloaded courts, and because a maximum j a i l penalty of 3 months, or 100 guil d e r s f i n e could be given to smugglers, the deterrence v/as not very ,4. 47 great. Many o f f i c e r s disapproved of the way the censorship 86 was handled. A report' prepared by Headquarters F i e l d Army i n February 1918 declared that the censorship was i n e f f e c t i v e because: the "black l i s t " check was no good; those on i t would use other means of communication; the " t r a v e l l i n g censor" who p e r i o d i c a l l y v i s i t e d small post o f f i c e s to carry out spot checks was i n s u f f i c i e n t . . The report recommended that a l l l e t t e r s should be checked, and that a means should be a v a i l a b l e to open c e r t a i n l e t t e r s without i t being v i s i b l e afterwards. Too much slipped past the (too few) 48 censors and the whole system ought to be reorganized. Checking telephone conversations was easier than cen-soring l e t t e r s because there were r e l a t i v e l y few telephones yet and the l i n e s to f o r e i g n countries ran -.through a small number of exchanges. I t was therefore soon known to the Dutch that a large number of "part-time" spies were ac t i v e i n the Netherlands. They were frequently Belgians working f o r the French, B r i t i s h , or t h e i r own government. The Germans preferred to employ men of t h e i r own n a t i o n a l i t y . I f such a suspicious person was ordered out of the area i n staat van  beleg, often a formal complaint from the respective ambassa-dor would follow. The army was then charged with i n t e r f e r i n g i n a man's l e g a l business t r a v e l s . Since proof of spying was seldom a v a i l a b l e the person was u s u a l l y allowed back i n to . . 49 keep i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r i c t i o n to a minimum. Such a c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y only hurt the Netherlands i n general and the government i n p a r t i c u l a r . The spies might have been employed to f e r r e t out information about eith e r 87 Germany or Great B r i t a i n , but they tended to f i n d out l i t t l e b i t s of information about Dutch trade p r a c t i c e s and the extent of the smuggling. The respective employers of the spies would piece a l l the b i t s of information together and achieve an extensive knowledge of the Dutch economy. Espe-c i a l l y the United Kingdom was quick to use t h i s knowledge to put pressure on the Dutch government and to threaten ever greater economic sanctions i f things were not changed. England was very quick to castigate the Dutch f o r t h e i r " i l l e g a l " actions, but was not above p r a c t i s i n g some of them h e r s e l f i f they benefitted her. Smuggling goods across the North Sea was out of the question because of the distance and the danger of mines, but bringing men i l l e g a l l y from the continent to the B r i t i s h I s l e s was attempted quite frequently. The Dutch army knew that the B r i t i s h and Belgian governments t r i e d to r e c r u i t young men f o r t h e i r armies. These men were contacted i n Belgium and t r a v e l l e d v i a the Netherlands to Great B r i t a i n . As long as such a person said he was on h i s own, had a pass from h i s consul i n the Nether-lands, he could not be stopped. The consuls were clever enough to make the passes out for " t r a v e l purposes", or "seeking f a c t o r y employment", so they could not be accused 50 of r e c r u i t i n g on foreig n s o i l . Only when cxvilxan r e c r u i t -ing bureaus sent a number of men i n organized and super-vised groups through the Netherlands to Great B r i t a i n could the Dutch army act. And t h i s could seldom be proven. The Germans also knew that Belgian youths were leaving 88 t h e i r country to j o i n the armies of the "other side". In order to prevent t h i s , a high-tension e l e c t r i c fence was 51 constructed along the Dutch-Belgian f r o n t i e r . I t d i d stop people not f a m i l i a r with the border areas from crossing i n t o the Netherlands, but usually someone could be found who knew a way of getting through. I t d i d not stop the smugglers, who used long cutters with in s u l a t e d handles to cut the wire. Before a p a t r o l had found the break the smugglers had long departed. Others used hollow wooden boxes or b a r r e l s to crawl under the l e t h a l wire. Young lads from the border v i l l a g e s would crawl under the wire and back again i f given a 5 cent piece. The Dutch army d i d not prove i t s e l f very e f f i c i e n t i n preventing smugglers from carrying out t h e i r trade, or i n stopping Belgian youths from going to England to j o i n the army. Counter-espionage was a l i t t l e more successful, but i n essence t h i s was not very important f o r the Netherlands. The government and Army Headquarters were derided f o r t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to stop i l l e g a l t r a d e — a s the O.W.ers were f o r p r a c t i s i n g i t . To the i n d i v i d u a l s o l d i e r who smuggled no stigma was attached; he was f e l t to be i n a bad s i t u a t i o n so he might as well make the most of i t and i f he could earn a few extra gu i l d e r s through smuggling, a l l well and good. Most people knew they would do the same thing i f they were i n his p o s i t i o n . But the army as an i n s t i t u t i o n suffered; the l i t t l e esteem i t had had i n August 1914 was gone by 1918. 89 I n e f f i c i e n c y i n preventing smuggling or applying censorship were only part of the overrall major mistake the Netherlands made from 1914 to 1918. The Dutch continued to p r a c t i s e t h e i r pre-war passive n e u t r a l i t y and refused to recognize that the Netherlands should now adopt an aggressive and f o r c e f u l a t t i t u d e . Had the nation placed i t s e l f f u l l y behind the armed forces, had smuggling been combated f i r m l y , and censorship been applied to a l l p u b l i c a t i o n s , while at the same time the espionage e f f o r t s of the b e l l i g e r e n t s had been forbidden and those p r a c t i s i n g i t sent out of the coun-try , the Netherlands would have had a much easier time of i t . I f Great B r i t a i n and Germany had been forced to view the Netherlands as an enigma of which they knew l i t t l e except that i t was armed, determined, and w i l l i n g to f i g h t f o r i t s r i g h t s , much less pressure would have been exerted upon her. Such a p o l i c y would not have been easy and would have r e -quired a great e f f o r t on every Dutchman's part. The Dutch f a i l e d to change while a l l about them the old, 19th century Europe was f a l l i n g apart. By remaining i n e r t at t h i s time they l a i d the foundation f o r t h e i r own defeat two decades l a t e r . When danger threatened Europe then, they would con-tinue to look back to the Great War and point out that they had come through i t unscathed without taking any extra measures to speak of; they would therefore come through t h i s new p e r i l also i f they only p r a c t i s e d passive n e u t r a l i t y . CHAPTER IV Problems Within the Army 1. National Sentiment An army's e f f i c i e n c y and f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t s t r a i n i n g , weapons and morale. A l l three are i n d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d (at l e a s t i n a n a t i o n a l l y con-s c r i p t e d army) to the c i v i l i a n population out of which the army i s drawn and f o r whose protect i o n i t e x i s t s . I t has already been r e l a t e d that the Dutch d i d not think i t neces-sary to provide t h e i r army with up-to-date weapons, nor d i d they believe that any kind of harsh t r a i n i n g methods should be employed. As soon as that happened the cry of "Prussian d r i l l t a c t i c s " was heard which was the magic word to bring about a storm of protest. In the Dutch mind Germany was often equated with Prussia and the Dutch character found something r e p u l s i v e i n the arrogant and superior Prussian a t t i t u d e . The love f o r uniforms, weapons and a l l things m i l i t a r y so prevalent i n Germany was a vexation f o r a large section of the Dutch people who preferred peace and trade to war. In addition c e r t a i n Pan-Germans had hinted that the Netherlands should become part of the new M i t t e l Europa and t h i s d i d not s i t well with the Dutch e i t h e r . A l l t h i s should not be taken to mean that the Dutch people were therefore very anti-German. The Dutch were a l l too well aware that h a l f t h e i r n a t i o n a l trade was with Ger-many and t h i s was a very important point f o r many people. 91 Besides,the B r i t i s h were not exactly loved either because many remembered the Boer War when Dutch sentiment had been decidedly a n t i - B r i t i s h . Only c e r t a i n staunchly C a l v i n i s t i c groups, and a few orthodox Roman Catholics, f e l t a stronger antipathy against heathen France, "seat of revolu t i o n " , than against Germany. E s p e c i a l l y f o r the orthodox Protestants, (the 1 Christian) Wilhelm II and the Evangelical Church were objects of admiration. Kuyper, leader of the Anti-Revolu-t i o n a i r e P a r t i j (and Premier from 1901 to 1905) even t r i e d to excuse the German invasion of Belgium i n the party organ De Standaard. "There can be", he wrote, "a s i t u a t i o n where a government has to break written laws i n order to maintain absolute j u s t i c e . " ^ The number of Dutchmen who thought t h i s way was very small, however. For m i l l i o n s i t was no question fo r debate who had st a r t e d the war—Germany had invaded Belgium and that was the end of the discussion. Because the Dutch d i d not have any strong f e e l i n g against eit h e r the B r i t i s h or the Germans, i t was an arduous task to create and maintain a good morale i n the army. A f t e r the f i r s t few months the population at large d i d not believe the Netherlands would be invaded any more, and they promptly returned to t h e i r i n d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e towards the Dutch army. Among the Dutch p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r corps there were a great many who admired Germany f o r her m i l i t a r y organization, the status accorded to the army, and the a l l - p r e v a i l i n g d i s c i -2 p l i n e . These o f f i c e r s wanted the object of t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n a l admiration to defeat the enemies of the Reich, and the 92 apparent i n v i n c i b i l i t y of the German armies i n 1914 made them a l l the more eager to i n s t i l l some of t h i s m i l i t a r i s m i n the thousands of Dutch s o l d i e r s now serving i n the army. But here they ran i n t o the a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c a t t i t u d e of the common s o l d i e r . Unlike t h e i r German counterpart, Dutch youths were not att r a c t e d to uniforms, cursed t h e i r bad luck when drafted, and only l i v e d f o r the day they would be discharged. D i s c i -p l i n e f o r the sake of d i s c i p l i n e was not accepted, nor was i t c l e a r to very many why someone had to be obeyed simply because he had a higher rank. Recruits s a i d repeatedly that they d i d not wish to be commanded by NCOs from t h e i r own dr a f t s (who were t h e i r own age), nor by someone from t h e i r 3 own v i l l a g e . The r e c r u i t s knew that t h e i r a t t i t u d e was shared by the people back home, and so d i d the o f f i c e r s . With no nationa l pride to provide the impetus f o r a tough and w e l l - t r a i n e d army the o f f i c e r s could do l i t t l e . The task of the commanding o f f i c e r s was e s p e c i a l l y t r y i n g . On the one hand they received s u r l y obedience from the s o l d i e r s , on the other hand small thanks (or none at a l l ) from the p u b l i c . The p u b l i c blamed the o f f i c e r s f o r the sloppiness and bad d i s c i p l i n e i n the army, and the o f f i c e r s held the p u b l i c l a r g e l y responsible because i t held the o f f i c e r s i n such 4 s l i g h t esteem. I r o n i c a l l y , the Dutch people laughed at the severe Prussian d r i l l methods, d i d not want that s o r t of thing introduced i n t o the Netherlands, but nevertheless would have l i k e d to see t h e i r own army march about smartly 93 and look s h a r p — a l l without spending money on uniforms and equipment and without very much d i s c i p l i n e being used to achieve that e f f e c t . The Dutch could not have i t both ways and since money and i n d i v i d u a l i s m weighed the heaviest the nation kept a sloppy and i l l d i s c i p l i n e d army. 2. Missed Opportunities The lack of popular support f o r the army may have been an extra burden i n crea t i n g a good morale i n the army, but the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s proved themselves somewhat les s than imaginative i n the programs to achieve t h i s aim. On the whole, the army t r i e d few constructive measures to improve the s p i r i t among the s o l d i e r s . A number of good (and rather obvious) chances f o r winning the men were neglected or were i n i t i a t e d too l a t e . The Netherlands probably had more news-papers per ca p i t a of the population than any other country i n Europe, but the army's f i r s t e f f o r t was to introduce a t h r i c e weekly newspaper, the Soldatencourant. The purpose fo r the s o l d i e r ' s own newspaper was "to bring and maintain within the army a cheerful s p i r i t " as well as provide 5 " i n t e r e s t i n g news". Each issue would have 50,000 copies and would cost one cent. The f i r s t issue went out to the troops on August 19, 1914. Ten days l a t e r General Snijders was asking a number of b a t t a l i o n commanders why the Soldatencourant was not read, why c e r t a i n companies had sent the bundles with papers back, 94 and why others had refused to accept the bundles. The answers were many and v a r i e d : some men d i d not think the paper worth the one cent, many preferred to read t h e i r own newspapers because they were more i n t e r e s t i n g , others never read a 7 newspaper, and some men could not read at a l l . The Soldaten-courant never d i d f u l f i l l the function i t was created f o r ; i t was simply too much to ask that one newspaper "maintain within the army a cheerful s p i r i t " . The paper never became very popular e i t h e r , p a r t l y because i t soon received a great deal of competition. Many things i n the Netherlands came i n f o u r s — n e u t r a l , S o c i a l i s t , Protestant, and Roman C a t h o l i c . This was true f o r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , trade unions and news-papers. Next to the (neutral) Soldatencourant there were soon s p e c i a l newspapers f o r the s o l d i e r s from the three major streams of Dutch thinking. M i l i t a r y r e c r e a t i o n a l centers (Tehuizen) also came i n fours. The o f f i c i a l army canteens i n the barracks had never been s a t i s f a c t o r y because they were us u a l l y bleak and unpleas-ant. Protestant and C a t h o l i c Tehuizen had been i n existence f o r a long time and stemmed l a r g e l y from a d e s i r e by the respective r e l i g i o u s groups to have a "safe" place f o r " t h e i r " young men to r e l a x . The centers set up by the S o c i a l i s t s a f t e r August soon proved to exert the greatest influence and caused the greatest d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the army. But the can-teens were not improved and the men continued to seek t h e i r r e l a x a t i o n outside the compounds. A good chance to acquire p o p u l a r i t y and esteem was l o s t 95 by the Department of Defence when i t d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the organized evening education classes f o r m i l i t a r y person-n e l . Local, p r o v i n c i a l , and a n a t i o n a l committee sprang to l i f e i n September 1914 to provide an opportunity f o r addi-t i o n a l education f o r s o l d i e r s . Many teachers volunteered (a number of them serving i n the army) without demanding f i n a n c i a l reward, transportation companies provided free t r a v e l , and buildings could be used free of charge. A large number of s o l d i e r s took advantage of the chance and enroll e d i n a course. The necessary monies were obtained from p r i v a t e donations, but proved i n s u f f i c i e n t i n the end. The M i n i s t e r of War decided to give a subsidy of 10,000 guilders ( l a t e r increased to 25,000). Bosboom had to be asked f o r t h i s money, he di d not o f f e r i t , nor d i d he consider taking part i n the planning and execution of the educational courses. He thought i t much better to leave everything to the c i v i l i a n volun-8 t e e r s i When by spring the d i s i l l u s i o n e d committees analyzed t h e i r e f f o r t s they found l i t t l e to cheer about and, of course, the army received the blame. Very few of the eager s t a r t e r s had f i n i s h e d t h e i r course because schedules had been interrupted by manoeuvres, guard duties, night exercises, 9 etc. In essence no one had r e a l l y been at f a u l t . The c i v i l -ians had known too l i t t l e about m i l i t a r y procedure and work-ing methods and the commanders had not considered the e f f o r t s on behalf of the s o l d i e r s because they had l i t t l e contact and knowledge of what was being done. The winter had thus 96 been l o s t , many teachers were d i s i l l u s i o n e d and many s o l -d i e r s angry that they had not had a chance to continue t h e i r studies or improve t h e i r meager education. In June 1915 the army f i n a l l y took over the idea of educational classes and created a s p e c i a l department of Ontwikkeling en Ontspanning (education and r e l a x a t i o n ) . That a great need existed was soon obvious; 40,000 men took the 70 courses that were offered. That winter 600 i l l i t e r a t e s were taught to read and write. The next winter i n t e r e s t had not slackened; 15,500 men took grade school subjects, or repeated part of t h e i r grade school education. Another 950 i l l e r a t e s were taught to read and w r i t e . I t was unfortunate that the army had not r e a l i z e d i n 1914 the very large r o l e i t could play i n educating men who had never had that oppor-tu n i t y i n c i v i l i a n l i f e . Another area where the Department of Defence could have done much, but d i d not, was the care f o r discharged s o l d i e r s . There was no law that employers were to take back workers c a l l e d up f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e , and many had to look f o r new employment when t h e i r eight and one h a l f months were f i n i s h e d . In 1904 a group of men had set up the Hationale Vereeniging t o t steun aan M i l i c i e n s (National Organization to help Conscripts) and i n the ten years before 1914 at l e a s t 3,000 men had been given f i n a n c i a l assistance or had been helped i n f i n d i n g employment. The Vereeniging obtained i t s money from volunteer contributions, but these would f a l l f a r short of what was necessary once the thousands 97 of mobilized s o l d i e r s would be discharged. Arrangements were made with the Nationaal Steun Committee (National R e l i e f Committee) and other s p e c i a l organizations to obtain money and the Vereeniging could recoup 75 per cent of i t s expendi-tures; the remainder had to come from volunteer contributions. During the mobilization, 260,000 requests for help from d i s -charged s o l d i e r s were received; 237,000 were a s s i s t e d (37,000 twice) with short term f i n a n c i a l a i d , obtaining working clothes, t o o l s , employment, l i v i n g quarters, e t c . 1 1 E f f o r t s to have employers promise to take back t h e i r workers a f t e r t h e i r tour of duty were not very succe s s f u l . Eventually, i n 1918, the Department of Defence shouldered the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the discharged men. By that time, almost one-quarter of a m i l l i o n men had a b i t t e r taste i n t h e i r mouths about the way they had been treated. Forced to serve f o r t h e i r country, i t had discarded them without a thought when i t was f i n i s h e d with them. They had to go and ask f o r assistance, f o r clothes, f o r t o o l s , etc., and the whole experience had done nothing to make them l i k e the army, or be w i l l i n g to do i t again. That such people i n the decades that followed d i d not i n s t i l l i n t h e i r c h i l -dren any enthusiasm to serve t h e i r country whenever po s s i b l e i s perhaps understandable. The Dutch t r a d i t i o n a l d i s l i k e f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e was thus continued by a new generation and would bear i t s ©viltfruit two decades l a t e r . The whole Great War experience which f o r the Dutch i n a l l walks of l i f e and i n a l l c i v i l i a n or m i l i t a r y functions could have 98 been a time to re-evaluate past values and re-adjust them to the new conditions i n Europe was wasted. The many petty and s i l l y regulations within the army which make l i f e so needlessly miserable f o r the common s o l d i e r were continued because they had always existed. Such regulations occur i n every army but the Dutch had an excep-t i o n a l l y large number of them. R e s t r i c t i o n s on fre e t r a i n t r a v e l and the many gradations i n pay have already been mentioned. Other reasons f o r complaints were the archaic 12 m i l i t a r y laws (not revised since 1815) which were t o t a l l y unsuitable f o r an army of the 20th century, the f a c t that canteens i n the barracks were run by c i v i l i a n s who bid f o r the p r i v i l e g e and thus charged higher p r i c e s than i f they had been run non-profit by the army i t s e l f , and the i l l -f i t t i n g and rough uniforms.which, by the Commander i n Chief's 13 own admission, detracted from a s o l d i e r l y bearing and were uncomfortable. The o l d regul a t i o n that everyone higher i n rank ( o f f i c e r s as well as NCOs) had to be saluted was s t r i c t l y enforced. For the p r i v a t e t h i s was an i r r i t a t i n g nuisance; walking through his camp or along the s t r e e t of a garrison town he would c o n t i n u a l l y have to salute h i s numer-ous superiors. I t made walking arm i n arm (as was the custom) with one's wife or g i r l f r i e n d an embarrassing experience rather than a pleasure. For the corporals i t was also a regulation which made l i f e needlessly d i f f i c u l t . They usu a l l y s l e p t i n the same large barrack rooms as the pri v a t e s and thus got on a f r i e n d l y and comradely footing with them. 99 Once outside the barrack room, however, they had to salute each other and use a l l the f o r m a l i t i e s prescribed i n the m i l i t a r y code. I t was very d i f f i c u l t to maintain d i s c i p l i n e under these circumstances. The excessive attention paid to cursing, swearing and rough language perhaps made sense to a serious young C h r i s t i a n (a d e f i n i t e minority), but not to a young s o c i a l i s t from the Rotterdam harbour d i s t r i c t . P l a -cards i n a l l the barracks forbidding bad language had no influence whatever and were fo r many a source of d e r i s i o n . 1 3. Leaves and other Problems One s o l u t i o n f o r the s o l d i e r was "to get away from i t a l l " by going on leave. As mentioned before, leaves were hard to get, but one could always t r y w r i t i n g a M i n i s t e r and i f that proved unsuccessful, employ an "expert". Advertise-ments i n the NRC (Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant) i n November 1914, urged s o l d i e r s who "suffered m a t e r i a l l y " from the mobilization to send a l l relevant information to the follow-ing address. Competent people would then write a request f o r i n d e f i n i t e leave (or s p e c i a l leave) to the Minister and 15 chances of success were good. Other help f o r the barrack-shackled s o l d i e r came from parliament and the Minister of War. The l a t t e r had from the beginning had d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion with General Snijders about the p o l i c y that should 16 be followed i n r e l a t i o n to leaves. Many questions i n parliament, l e t t e r s from numerous organizations, and personal 100 requests f i n a l l y forced the General (against his w i l l ) to increase the regular leave periods s l i g h t l y , to allow as many people as p o s s i b l e to go home for the big holidays such as Christmas and Easter, and to set up s p e c i a l leaves f o r c e r t a i n occupation groups. The men i n these 30 d i f f e r e n t occupation categories could get from three to s i x weeks continuous leave, at the time of year when they were busiest 17 i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r profession or trade. Students could get between 3 and 14 days leave when c e r t a i n examinations had to be written. So as not to end i n complete chaos, i t was decided that the Commander i n Chief would be s o l e l y responsible f o r the regular leaves, the Minister of War f o r the i n d e f i n i t e leaves, and a newly created department would look a f t e r the 19 s p e c i a l leaves. The new measures d i d not please everyone. The u n s k i l l e d workers f e l t s l i g h t e d because they could never take advantage of the s p e c i a l leaves while those with a trade (plumbers, painters, t a i l o r s , etc.) could get up to 24 days. Landowners (dairy farmers, fruitgrowers, bulbgrowers, etc.) could get three, four or s i x weeks leave. But the labourer was l e f t out. The General S t a f f , and e s p e c i a l l y General Snijders, i d i d not l i k e the new arrangements e i t h e r . He pointed out that i n 1914 harvesting had proceeded without the mobilized men and nothing had been l e f t i n the f i e l d s . Furthermore, the Netherlands was beginning to experience an unemployment 101 problem, so why not use the people who had no work? In Ger-many 10 per cent of the population was i n m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e , i n France i t was even higher, 13 per cent; i n the Netherlands i t was barely four and one-half per cent and a l l sorts of 20 s p e c i a l leaves had to be granted. To the General i t made no sense that the Dutch army be so weakened. The o f f i c e r s saw the M i l l i o n e n Heere across the border, knew the puniness of the Dutch defensive forces, and wanted every a v a i l a b l e man. P o l i t i c i a n s viewed the matter d i f f e r e n t l y . They con-sidered the greatest danger now past (some had already urged p a r t i a l demobilization), thought that there would be enough time to c a l l a second mob i l i z a t i o n i n case of necessity, and reasoned that a s a t i s f i e d army was more important than a numerically large one. In t h e i r case, " s a t i s f a c t i o n " was 21 often equated with "preparedness". Also, the p o l i t i c i a n s looked at the f i n a n c i a l aspects of the matter. Those on inde-f i n i t e leave d i d not get paid, of course, but neither d i d the ones away on s p e c i a l leave. General Snijders" concern was understandable, however. U n t i l the winter of 1916 there were always roughly 46,000 men away on s p e c i a l or regular leave. Thereafter the percent-22 age was increased so that about 66,000 were away. To the f i r s t number must be added the 23,500 engaged i n preventing smuggling, and to the l a t t e r number the 6,000 "on loan" to the Department of Finance. The e f f e c t i v e , d a i l y strength of the army was thus reduced by more than one-third. 102 The d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion between the p o l i t i c i a n s and the o f f i c e r s were r e a l l y a continuation from t h e i r pre-war b a t t l e s , only the numbers had changed. The a t t i t u d e of the o f f i c e r s was l o g i c a l ; they were given the task to defend the country and they wanted to prepare themselves as best as p o s s i b l e . For them t h i s meant that they should make the army as numerically strong as p o s s i b l e . Considering the n a t i o n a l e f f o r t s put f o r t h i h France, Germany and Great B r i t a i n , they believed that the Netherlands could do more. The p o l i t i c i a n s were much les s l o g i c a l i n t h e i r reasoning. They had thought i t necessary to mobilize the armed forces and believed the s i t u a t i o n warranted a continued mobilization, but then they st a r t e d to w h i t t l e away at those forces and t r i e d to pare them down without a c t u a l l y demobilizing part of them. I t was very hard f o r them to shake loose from the pre-war mentality that everything should be weighed on the monetary scale and that every group i n the country should, i f at a l l possible, be granted i t s demands. The government was s t i l l so t i e d to the idea that n e u t r a l i t y meant p a s s i v i t y and that therefore no very strong measures were required that i t never even thought of c r e a t i n g a strong army which would not only provide a better defence but also could be used as a lever i n dealing with the b e l l i g e r e n t nations. There was only a small group of people i n the Netherlands who believed t h i s could and should be done, and they never managed to gain s u f f i c i e n t p o l i t i c a l i n fluence to get t h e i r ideas 103 accepted. They d i d work behind the scenes hoping to get the army enlarged but were unsuccessful. An attempt i n Ju l y 1915 to increase the number of s o l d i e r s i n the army miscarried. A proposal was introduced to broaden the 1912 Landstorm law so that those who d i d not have to serve then, could as yet be drafted. A long acrimoni-23 ous debate took place m the Second Chamber, the outcome of which was that a general c o n s c r i p t i o n law was passed, which became a " r e l i e f law"—once the older landstorm d r a f t s were trained the oldest serving landweer and m i l i t i a d r a f t s 24 were to be sent home. The portion a c t u a l l y serving would thus not increase numerically, only the trained reserve would. Eventually an army of 450,000 men would be a v a i l a b l e (on paper), but of the 100 "extra" b a t t a l i o n s , none had ever 25 worked together. The good o f f i c e r s and NCOs continued to be busy t r a i n i n g new r e c r u i t s , while the many changes of whole d r a f t s , i n d i v i d u a l t r a n s f e r s and postings, and the men going on s p e c i a l leave, made i t v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r 2 6 o f f i c e r s and NCOs to get to know t h e i r men. In addition, i t was now pos s i b l e to have a "numbers debate" whenever the question of the numerical strength of the army was discussed. The o f f i c e r s would i n v a r i a b l y t a l k about the strength of the army i n actual numbers serving, while the p o l i t i c i a n s would t a l k about the p o t e n t i a l numbers that could be c a l l e d up. I t was again a question of viewing f o r e i g n events d i f f e r e n t l y . The m i l i t a r y leaders believed that a sudden invasion of the Netherlands could take place without warning, which e s p e c i a l l y 104 i n the case of Germany, would not leave time f o r a second mobilization because a large part of the country would be i n enemy hands within a few days. The c i v i l i a n leaders believed that there would be plenty of warning before an attack on the Netherlands would be undertaken and therefore there would be enough time to undertake the necessary measures. In b e l i e v i n g t h i s the p o l i t i c i a n s n a i v e l y disregarded the example of Be l -gium. In s p i t e of the f a c t that the Dutch were not i n t e r e s t e d i n m i l i t a r y matters, the army received a great deal of pub-l i c i t y — m o s t of i t of a negative nature. In parliament frequent c r i t i c i s m was heard—from the L e f t that the m i l i t a r y had too much power, that d i s c i p l i n e was too severe, and that 27 i t was time f o r demobilization; from the acid-tongued Vrijzinnig-Democrat Marchant that Minister Bosboom was a "yes" man to the General S t a f f , and from the Right that the Minister and the o f f i c e r s d i d not pay enough attention to 28 the " s p i r i t u a l w e ll being" of the men. These c r i t i c i s m s found t h e i r way i n t o the press, so everyone could read what was wrong with the army. In addition, newspapers themselves sought to f i n d f a u l t i n the m i l i t a r y . The Netherlands was blessed.(?) with 92 d a i l y newspapers, 9 of which had 2 d a i l y e d i t i o n s , and 3 had 3 d a i l y e d i t i o n s . Then there were more than 650 weekly, 29 twice weekly, or t h r i c e weekly newspapers i n the nation. There were thus always some reporters wandering around an army camp or t a l k i n g to a few s o l d i e r s i n a cafe, and 105 e s p e c i a l l y the l e f t - l e a n i n g papers were eager to p r i n t a l l the complaints voiced by the men. Poor leadership, bad food, heavy t r a i n i n g , unjust punishment by taking away leave p r i v i l e g e s , d r a f t y and cold barracks, excessively expensive items i n canteens, etc., were a l l f o i s t e d on the p u b l i c 30 often without any more proof than one man's word. Complaining came n a t u r a l l y to Dutch s o l d i e r s ; they di d i t frequently and f o r long periods. Many also thought i t natural to procrastinate, malinger and simulate i n order to get out of as much d a i l y work as p o s s i b l e . When a long march was the program f o r the day, i t was not at a l l unusual to have 10 per cent of the b a t t a l i o n go on s i c k - c a l l i n the 31 morning. For those not able to get out of the march, the next best thing was to drop out from "exhaustion", "sickness", "sore f e e t " , or whatever else one could think of, and make one's own casual way back to camp. Often sympathetic c i v i l -ians lavished food and drink on the "poor exhausted fellows". 32 A drop-out rate of 50 per cent on a march was not uncommon. "Theft, forging leave passes, re f u s i n g to salute, being absent without leave" were other favourites and p r a c t i s e d 33 frequently. When i n A p r i l 1916 the government had to cancel a l l leaves because of a German threat, thousands of s o l d i e r s 34 went home for Easter anyway. I t was d i f f i c u l t to shape such a group of men i n t o a cohesive armed force, e s p e c i a l l y since the small number of p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s and NCOs had to be employed i n t r a i n i n g r e c r u i t s and the majority of people and parliament refused to allow strong d i s c i p l i n a r y 106 measures to be employed. 4. A n t i - M i l i t a r i s m A n t i - m i l i t a r i s m increased g r e a t l y i n the Netherlands a f t e r the outbreak of the Great War. Generally speaking, i t can be c l a s s i f i e d i n three separate streams, which frequently intermingled only to go t h e i r separate ways again at a l a t e r date. F i r s t there were the many e f f o r t s made to bring the war to a conclusion. Among these can be included the Antie-Oorlogsraad (Anti-War Council) i n s t i t u t e d by Parliament i n 35 October 1914 to f i n d ways and means of bringing the warring nations to the conference table but never achieved anything. T r o e l s t r a , leader of the Dutch S o c i a l i s t s , attempted to bring the s o c i a l i s t s of the warring nations together i n order to bring the war to an end; a f t e r many t r a v e l s and discussions 3 6 a meeting was f i n a l l y held i n Stockholm i n 1917 but nation-alism proved very much stronger than i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m and Tro e l s t r a ' s e f f o r t s came to nought. Less well known people i n the Netherlands spent time and e f f o r t t r y i n g to end the war and were equally u n s u c c e s f u l l . T e c h n i c a l l y these people cannot be c a l l e d a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c , but many of the persons involved i n t h i s work looked with favour upon the a c t i v e a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t s operating i n the Netherlands and aided t h e i r e f f o r t s . Second, there were the anarchists, communists and inde-pendent s o c i a l i s t s (the SDAP at t h i s time was i n favour of a 107 defensive force) who l i k e d to work through p u b l i c a t i o n s and clubs to influence the men already serving i n the army or were about to be conscripted. Third, there were those who based t h e i r a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m on r e l i g i o u s convictions. Working p u b l i c l y through the use of manifestoes, they obtained the greatest p u b l i c i t y but were not s o l e l y concerned with i n f l u -37 encing the men already m uniform. That the streams ran through each other i s shown, f o r instance, by the f a c t that Rev. N. J . C. Schermerhorn was d i r e c t o r of the i n 1904 organized Internationale A n t i - M i l i t a r i s t i s c h e Vereeniging (IAMV) which had anarchists as i t s strongest supporters, while communists and s o c i a l i s t s also contributed to i t s . 38 upkeep. The r e l i g i o u s a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t s d i d not a l l belong to one church or one p o l i t i c a l party. They were a group of people (many pastors among them) who took the Bi b l e l i t e r -a l l y , saw the army as an i n s t i t u t i o n designed f o r k i l l i n g , and therefore opposed i t because the Bible stated, "Thou sh a l t not k i l l " . One had to turn the other cheek regardless of what happened. Such an a t t i t u d e was not shared by a l l churches; many Roman Catholics and Gereformeerden had a d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f o r t h e i r B ible and d i d support the army, but i n the Netherlands such extreme r e l i g i o u s groups were (and s t i l l are) quite common. Today there are-»still s i z a b l e groups who are against a l l forms of insurance, or against t e l e v i s i o n , or against a l l i n o c u l a t i o n s . I f a member of a church (which happens to believe that t e l e v i s i o n i s a 108 sin) buys a t e l e v i s i o n set, he i s cut o f f as a member of that church. The s i t u a t i o n was quite s i m i l a r during the time of the Great War and a pastor frequently had so much power and authority i n h i s congregation that he could make his convictions accepted by most of the members of his church. The pastors were not s a t i s f i e d by s t a t i n g t h e i r views from t h e i r p u l p i t s ; some went out to preach t h e i r message to the men already serving i n the army which n a t u r a l l y brought them i n c o n f l i c t with the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s who frowned upon t h i s kind of p r o s e l y t i z i n g . Already i n September 1914 Rev. de Jong was preaching i n C h r i s t i a n M i l i t a i r e Tehuizen that war was immoral, against God's Word, and only served the i n t e r e s t of a few e v i l per-sons. Removed from the area i n staat van beleg he entered i t 39 somewhere else again and had to be removed once more. When Rev. B. de L i g t , preaching a s i m i l a r message, was also removed from the area i n staat van beleg and refused permis-sion to preach to m i l i t a r y personnel again, one c l a s s i s of the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (the l a r g e s t Protestant church i n the Netherlands), declared i t s e l f "saddened and indignant" that the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s prevented the 40 preaching of the Gospel. In the summer of 1915 a number of pastors came out with a Manifesto, signed by 180 people who 4 promised to go to j a i l rather than go i n t o m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . By December of that year a fourth e d i t i o n of the Manifesto was out and had 577 signatures, the f i f t h e d i t i o n had over 42 900 signatures. 109 E f f o r t s by the army to s i l e n c e the ministers came to nought. The m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s could only order people out of the area i n staat van beleg; prosecution had to be l e f t to the Department of J u s t i c e . The mild mannered Minister of Ju s t i c e , Ort, d i d prosecute, but the whole issue was l e f t i n 43 limbo on some t e c h n i c a l i t y during the f i r s t t r i a l . Under A r t i c l e 85 of the (1815) m i l i t a r y laws, r e f u s a l to carry out a m i l i t a r y order was punishable by death. The s o c i a l and moral climate i n the Netherlands, however, made such a punishment t o t a l l y unacceptable. Consequently, those advo-cating (or actua l l y ) r e f u s i n g m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e were generally charged under A r t i c l e 133 of the C i v i l Law Code " i n c i t i n g an unlawful act", which c a r r i e d a maximum sentence of three months i n j a i l . 4 4 There was no law ( u n t i l 1923) which allowed conscientious objectors freedom from m i l i t a r y service, and t h i s increased the problem f o r the a u t h o r i t i e s . People got very excited about court cases dealing with freedom of con-science and r e l i g i o n and because of the p u b l i c i t y the matter was often allowed to drop. A n t i - m i l i t a r i s m on a very d i f f e r e n t base was found i n the M o b i l i z a t i e Klubs, which were the S o c i a l i s t answer to the Protestant and Roman Ca t h o l i c M i l i t a i r e Tehuizen, and offered r e c r e a t i o n f o r the non-religious s o l d i e r . The SDAP always defended any attacks on the clubs, i n as well as out of parliament, even though the party d i d not play a very a c t i v e d i r e c t i v e r o l e i n the clubs, nor supervise them c l o s e l y . I t was therefore p o s s i b l e f o r the leadership of the 110 clubs to frequently come i n hands of more extreme elements who used the clubs f o r a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c propaganda. Renaming the clubs Onafhankelijke Ontwikkeling Klubs (Independent Development Clubs) to show t h e i r independence from the SDAP, they soon became a great concern f o r the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s . Programs within the clubs v a r i e d g r e a t l y . Some had outside speakers come i n who explained how the men were trained to f i g h t a war which only benefitted r i c h c a p i t a -l i s t s . Other clubs employed more subtle methods such as plays, musical evenings, poetry reading—almost always with an a n t i -45 m i l i t a r y s l a n t . Most of the forbidden l i t e r a t u r e would be offered f o r sale and therein the s o l d i e r was urged to do everything from personal preparation f o r the coming revolu-t i o n to refusing m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e — w h i c h would only get him three months i n m i l i t a r y prison where l i f e was not that bad. In March 1915 the army investigated the "O en O" club (as they were popularly known) i n Leiden and decided that here was the cause of much unrest. Checks i n other garrison towns showed the existence of at l e a s t 12 other O en 0 46 clubs. The Department of J u s t i c e refused the request of 47 the General Staff to act against the few c i v i l i a n s involved. General Snijders wrote a l l his senior o f f i c e r s , explained about the clubs, pointed out the danger, urged caution i n dealing with them, and ordered that he be kept informed. The Volksdagblad, organ of the SPD ( i n 1918 renamed Kommunist-ische P a r t i j Holland) was forbidden f o r a l l m i l i t a r y per-i 48 sonnel. I l l A l l senior o f f i c e r s seemed to have had the same i d e a — get r i d of the a c t i v e propagandists. The commanders of the F i r s t and Fourth D i v i s i o n s , as w ell as the Commander F i e l d Array, requested that c e r t a i n men be posted out of t h e i r command. In A p r i l the o f f i c i a l organ of the IAMV, De Wapens Neder (Down the Weapons), was also forbidden and t h i s proved the beginning of a l i s t which numbered at l e a s t 14 49 d i f f e r e n t p ublications by 1918. General Snijders had wanted to end a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y by s o l d i e r s , regardless of the p o l i t i c a l views held or p a r t i e s involved, and had issued an order to t h i s e f f e c t i n August, 1917. The new M inister of War, De Jonge, was very upset by t h i s order and a f t e r a heated a l t e r c a t i o n Snijders agreed to withdraw the o r d e r . ^ The prohibited l i t e r a t u r e was d i f f i c u l t to keep out of the barracks. Some s o l d i e r s received i t i n p l a i n wrappers i n the mail; others c a r r i e d i t around i n s i d e one of the four " l e g a l " army newspapers. Transferring the a c t i v i s t s from the 0 en 0 clubs to other units d i d not solve the problem. These men continued to preach t h e i r doctrine i n t h e i r new surroundings and new converts were made because boredom and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n were everywhere. Many of the a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t s were a cut above t h e i r fellow s o l d i e r s . General Weber, commander of the Fourth D i v i s i o n , wrote about one of them, p r i v a t e Rinkema: He i s dangerous because he i s an excellent s o l d i e r , very eager, never yet punished, c l e a r headed, speaks calmly and s a r c a s t i c a l l y ; a man with 'dare', a man who, because of h i s q ^ a l t i e s , has to have a great influence on his comrades. 112 The general's fears are e a s i l y understood when i t i s r e a l i z e d that many p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s , as indicated by the report 52 over Rev. de Jong, viewed t h e i r men as d u l l , u n o r i g i n a l and e a s i l y influenced by good speakers who blamed a l l the s o l d i e r s ' troubles on the sneaky r i c h c a p i t a l i s t s f o r whom th i s war was fought. The de Jong report o v e r s i m p l i f i e s the matter. There were d u l l and uneducated men i n the army w i l l i n g to follow the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . But t h e i r number was not large. Almost everyone d i s l i k e d m i l i t a r y service, but that d i d not make them revolutionary. In Reformed and Roman Cat h o l i c c i r c l e s the House of Orange was held i n very high esteem and any t a l k that the Netherlands should become a r e p u b l i c was an anathema. Many farmers' sons, and middle c l a s s people would not hear of a s o c i a l i s t country. Close t i e s with the church were s t i l l held by many Roman Cath o l i c s , Gereformeerden, C h r i s t e l i j k Gereformeerden, the small groups r i g h t of i t , as well as by the orthodox wing of the Hervormde Kerk, and none of these churches had any i n c l i n a t i o n of overthrowing the e x i s t i n g order. The argument that workers of a l l nations should band together had l i t t l e appeal f o r the workers now i n the army. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y of the working c l a s s had c l e a r l y not materialized i n 1914, and was now further away than ever. Enough was known about T r o e l s t r a ' s f r u i t l e s s e f f o r t s i n getting s o c i a l i s t leaders from various countries to agree upon a formula f o r peace that most Dutch workers knew i n t e r -113 nationa l cooperation of the working c l a s s to be a myth. What everyone wanted was to go home and be released of t h i s bore-dom. The occasional, l a t e r increasing to frequent, unrest i n the camps had l i t t l e to do with revolutionary a c t i v i t y ; i t was a sign of weariness, disgust, and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n whereby immediate and personal gripes took on an importance out of a l l proportion to r e a l i t y . The highest m i l i t a r y court (3 c i v i l i a n judges, 2 army and 2 naval o f f i c e r s ) became extremely busy judging the ser-ious misdemeanors. E s p e c i a l l y the cases i n v o l v i n g r e f u s a l to serve i n the armed forces, or those w i l l i n g to serve but ref u s i n g to bear arms, caused great d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the court. The 1815 law had no r e a l answer f o r the l a t t e r two. A lawyer f o r the accused could be heard to argue that the s t i p u l a t e d punishment—"the r i g h t to serve i n the m i l i t a r y forces be hereby taken away"—be imposed, while the prose-cutor would argue that the prescribed punishment should not 53 be imposed. The laws were not revised, however, and the court continued to struggle on, tremendously overburdened by the great increases i n cases i t had to handle. In 1915, the f i r s t f u l l year of mobilization, the court handled 3,836 cases; i n 1916 t h i s number increased to 5,952, i n 1917 to 54 9,735, and i n 1918 to 10.562 cases. The d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the armed forces speaks loud and c l e a r from these f i g u r e s . The treatment of those u n w i l l i n g to serve (or bear arms) by c e r t a i n segments of the population d i d not help the s i t u a -t i o n . Unwisely the army i n the beginning had placed those 114 u n w i l l i n g to bear arms i n separate barracks i n the regular army camps. (Not u n t i l the summer of 1917 were those who refused to bear arms placed i n a separate camp.) Of course t h i s led to frequent demonstrations and f i g h t s between those w i l l i n g to serve and those who refused. I r o n i c a l l y , and i n d i c a t i v e of the Dutch people's mentality, the l a t t e r group was often sent flowers and pastry by the general p u b l i c l i v i n g 55 near the camps. Another writer r e l a t e s how one man who had refused to serve altogether had "done" his three months i n j a i l and on returning to his v i l l a g e had been led around i n triumph behind the l o c a l band. This sort of thing happened 56 not infrequently. Since the government refused to take strong action, i t became progressively more d i f f i c u l t to maintain proper d i s c i p l i n e among the troops and demonstra-tions and minor r i o t s took place with increasing frequency and i n t e n s i t y . During the f i r s t large scale disturbances of the mobil-i z a t i o n , i n T i l b u r g i n August 1915, a r e l a t i v e l y small per-centage of the 10,000 s o l d i e r s i n the c i t y took part. No attempt was made to take over the b a r r a c k s — o n l y windows were broken and f u r n i t u r e was smashed. On i n v e s t i g a t i o n the complaints proved to be the u s u a l — b a d food, poor housing, no t r a i n i n g uniform, not enough leave, not enough payment f o r 57 the family back home, stationed too f a r from home, etc. The small r i o t s i n Maastricht on January 31, 1916, had s i m i l a r causes. The men there were predominantly from the province of F r i e s l a n d , thought themselves too f a r from home, d i d not 115 get enough leave, etc. In A p r i l , 1916, about 30 s o l d i e r s l e f t t h e i r barracks i n Leiden and went home; they were fed 59 up. Most of them had to be arrested i n t h e i r homes. Such disturbances continued, but they also increased i n violence as the mobilization dragged on. On November 6, 1917, s o l d i e r s i n Laren threw stones through the windows of the o f f i c e r s ' quarters and the o f f i c e r s ' mess (while the o f f i c e r s were eating). The men had been d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r food that 60 afternoon. These actions show a d i f f e r e n t mentality from an e a r l i e r case where s k i l l f u l p u b l i c i t y and a c a r e f u l l y hidden threat were used to get r e s u l t s . In J u l y 1915 a company of b i c y c l i s t s stationed i n Helmont sent a telegram to Queen Wilhelmina: Request immediate i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the inhuman treatment given the F i r s t Company B i c y c l i s t s as^^ otherwise serious clashes w i l l be unavoidable. A few hours a f t e r the telegram was sent the colonel of the b a t t a l i o n promised an i n v e s t i g a t i o n and thereafter s u b s t a n t i a l improvements were made. In the l a s t two years of the war, troops had to be used quite often to q u e l l minor c i v i l i a n food r i o t s i n the big c i t i e s . I t happened not i n f r e q u e n t l y that s o l d i e r s refused to act against the c i v i l i a n s (often women) and marched back 6 2 to t h e i r barracks, or made common cause with them. Such incidents were u s u a l l y reported i n the newspapers and d i d nothing to heighten the a u t h o r i t i e s ' confidence i n the army, nor increase the morale and unity among the troops. Apart from the differences of opinion whether one should serve or 116 refuse to bear arms, there was the a d d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n whether one should act against the c i v i l i a n population. By the summer of 1918 the mood had become grimmer, but not n e c e s s a r i l y more revolutionary. Complaints increased, and i n t y p i c a l Dutch fashion, so d i d the number of organiza-tions—perhaps more aptly described as pressure groups or i n t e r e s t groups. A Vereeniging van Landstormplichtigen was born, as well as a Bond van Landweermannen. Both had the ob-vious function of looking a f t e r the i n t e r e s t of t h e i r p a r t i -cular draftees. The mobilization clubs had also tightened t h e i r organization and by l a t e 1917, Matthijsen, party sec-retary of the SDAP managed to combine the three aforementioned organizations i n t o the Bond van Nederlandsche D i e n s t p l i c h t i g e n ( A l l i a n c e of the Dutch C o n s c r i p t s ) — w i t h a t o t a l membership 6 3 of 7,000. The Bond supported the SDAP i n the 1918 e l e c t i o n s . Among the NCOs there were grievances about pay and the lack of democratic d e c i s i o n making and they set up t h e i r own organization. This soon m u l t i p l i e d i n t o the f a m i l i a r four organizations, but they a l l worked together during the e l e c t i o n and managed to get one man (W. Wijk) i n t o parliament. The p o l i t i c a l party of the NCOs was known as either the Onderofficieren 64 P a r t i j , or the Democratische Weermachtspartij. The m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of p a r t i e s and organizations i n d i -cates that there were many grievances held by almost a l l groups. I t also i n d i c a t e s , by the kind of pressure the groups t r i e d to exert, that the great majority wanted to employ the l e g a l means open to them and not use the revolutionary path 117 the few s y n d i c a l i s t s , anarchists and communists advocated. 5. Attempts to Make M i l i t a r y Service Popular A few attempts were made to bend the national character i n t o a more p o s i t i v e d i r e c t i o n regarding the a t t i t u d e to-wards m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . On the o f f i c i a l l e v e l , m i l i t a r y parades were organized, exhibitions were held, manoeuvres were conducted to which the general p u b l i c was i n v i t e d , and the Queen on numerous occasions inspected the troops, an event always given a great deal of p u b l i c i t y . There were people who had i n t e r e s t i n the army or navy, eithe r because they were part of old, established army or naval o f f i c e r s ' f a m i l i e s , or because they had vested i n t e r e s t s i n the Dutch East Indies and wanted a powerful f l e e t , or simply because they s i n c e r e l y believed that the Netherlands should have as strong a defence force as p o s s i b l e . Many of these people were w i l l i n g to spend time and money i n the hope of winning more Dutch people to t h e i r point of view. The most notice-able r e s u l t of these e f f o r t s were a number of nice, glossy, monthly pub l i c a t i o n s such as Onze Vloot (Our F l e e t ) , Ons 6 5 Leger (Our Army), and Onze N e u t r a l i t e i t (Our N e u t r a l i t y ) , which t r i e d to show the i n t e r e s t i n g side of m i l i t a r y l i f e , urged support f o r the armed forces, and impressed upon the pu b l i c the need f o r a strong defensive force i n these pre-carious times. The people behind these pu b l i c a t i o n s t r i e d repeatedly to get the Dutch press to p r i n t a r t i c l e s which 118 would f o s t e r i n t e r e s t i n the armed forces, but the national press showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t because such a r t i c l e s were not read. The proponents of a well armed Netherlands fought an u p h i l l b a t t l e and never breached the wall of t r a d i t i o n a l Dutch i n d i f f e r e n c e and d i s l i k e toward things m i l i t a r y . An excellent example of Dutch unwillingness to exert themselves f o r t h e i r country occured i n 1915. A group of prominent persons conceived the idea of preparing l i s t s of people who i n an emergency would be ready to help the govern-ment. A l l one had to do was give one's name, address, age, occupation or profession, and any a d d i t i o n a l s k i l l s one might have. L i s t s would be compiled of a l l those occupations and professions with cross references so the government could immediately s e l e c t a c e r t a i n person with a c e r t a i n s k i l l i n any l o c a l i t y . The idea was promoted with much p u b l i c i t y ; many areas were canvassed, pamphlets were sent out and by December 27, 1915, the government was presented with the com-p l e t e l i s t . I t had 496 names. By the organizers' own r u e f u l 6 6 admission a very much shorter l i s t than a n t i c i p a t e d . The extent of such apathy c l e a r l y demonstrates that people d i d not care. Parliament was equally u n w i l l i n g to lake preventive measures. Thousands of laws were passed during these four years, but almost a l l were a reaction to a new s i t u a t i o n or condition which had arisen through domestic circumstances or from foreign pressures or actions. To look ahead and take f o r c e f u l preventive action against p o s s i b i l i t i e s which might 119 a r i s e was not i n the nature of parliament. This was so i n the controversy with General Snijders regarding the defence of the Netherlands (see next chapter) as well as with the proposal f o r a law whereby everyone not already serving i n the armed forces would be at the di s p o s a l of the government i n case of a nation a l emergency. Introduction of t h i s pro-posal came when f o r the second time during the war (the f i r s t time was i n A p r i l 1916) the Netherlands was very close to being invaded by Germany. But the Second Chamber refused to discuss the proposal; the s i t u a t i o n was not taken s e r i o u s l y , and to pass such a d r a s t i c measure f o r p o s s i b l e future war 6 7 seemed much too extreme a deed f o r the parliamentarians. The old saying "every nation gets the government i t deserves" i s e s p e c i a l l y apt f o r the Netherlands during the time of the Great War. I t was d e f i n i t e l y more d i f f i c u l t to create i n t e r e s t and enthusiasm f o r m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e i n the Netherlands than i n the nations at war. There, chauvinism, patriotism, hatred f o r the enemy, and f i g h t i n g f o r a cause, were powerful ideas and emotions used to draw men i n t o the armies. Heroism, death at the f r o n t , was something to be proud of (at l e a s t i n the beginning). In the Netherlands most of these f i n e phrases could not be used. N e u t r a l i t y meant i m p a r t i a l i t y so there was no enemy to hate. Catching smugglers was hardly heroic, nor was s i t t i n g i d l e i n a f o r t . Pride i n defending your country was hardly an argument f o r the matter-of-fact Dutch. 120 A f t e r the f i r s t few months most said "no one i s going to attack us, why a l l the bother?" On the other hand, the government d i d not attempt to make ser v i c e a t t r a c t i v e by providing comfortable quarters or uniforms, by paying well, by having good equipment and modern weapons. The army was not shielded from excessive and useless c r i t i c i s m i n press and parliament. Everyone could say what he l i k e d , and the army had no voice with which i t could answer. No one i n parliament was ignorant of the shortcomings of the army. They a l l had heard the Minister of War speak time and again about the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of getting much needed weapons from abroad, and about the unwillingness or i n a b i l i t y of domestic i n d u s t r i e s to accept army orders for d i f f i c u l t to make equipment. During the l a s t three years, each issue of the Soldatencourant c a r r i e d two to four columns of "correspon-dence" which amounted to endless questions by s o l d i e r s about pay, leave, promotion, cost of l i v i n g allowance, etc. There was a general unhappiness about things and that the s o l d i e r s wrote the " o f f i c i a l " paper so often i s i n d i c a t i v e of the s i t u -ation and also of the o f f i c e r s who should have been asked these questions. The men e i t h e r d i d not t r u s t them enough, or found them hard to approach. Any senior o f f i c e r reading between the l i n e s of the Soldatencourant could know what bothered the army—and could have worked for an amelioration of the s i t u a t i o n . The government could have done much more i n a very d i f f e r e n t f i e l d . I t could have acted much more f o r c e f u l l y i n 121 i t s foreign p o l i c y . N e u t r a l i t y as pr a c t i s e d by the govern-ment (and which the army had to be ready to defend) was a p o s i t i o n of weakness from which then one, then the other warring nation made use—and misuse. In turn they accused the Netherlands of helping the opponent and punishment would follow; the punishment always h i t the economy, making the country progressively weaker. Not once d i d the government consider creating a strong, e f f i c i e n t army and t e l l i n g Germany " s e l l us the coal and i r o n we need or we j o i n the a l l i e s " or t e l l i n g Great B r i t a i n , "allox* our ships to t r a v e l unhindered or we w i l l side with Germany". The balance of forces during the war was often so close that both sides would rather have made some concessions than face an extra h a l f m i l l i o n trained men. Even i f the Dutch had never intended to j o i n the c o n f l i c t , such a strong p o s i t i o n could have improved the economy of the nation; i t would have pro-vided a psychological l i f t f or the s o l d i e r s and i n s t i l l e d pride i n them knowing that the threat of involvement had forced t h e i r big neighbours to be a l i t t l e more considerate. But the government (and the nation) adhered to i t s pre-war conception of n e u t r a l i t y — f a i r n e s s and i m p a r t i a l i t y to a l l — not r e a l i z i n g that i n a World War even neutrals should act more f o r c e f u l l y . CHAPTER V C o n f l i c t i n g Ideas About Defence 1. The Problem I t was common knowledge i n the Netherlands that the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s held d i f f e r e n t views on the number and extent of leaves necessary, the severeness of d i s c i p l i n e required, the e s s e n t i a l s i z e of the mobilized army, etc., but i t was not generally known that there were diverging opinions about the s t r a t e g i c defence of the coun-t r y . S u p e r f i c i a l l y the two a u t h o r i t i e s appeared i n harmony because both were determined to defend the Netherlands against an invasion, but on the basic measures necessary to withstand such an attack the two sides held diverging views. Although the di f f e r e n c e s were very important f o r the Netherlands at t h i s time, such contrary views were not t y p i -c a l l y Dutch; c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y leaders frequently do not see eye to eye when i t comes to questions of defence, weapons, war, or n e u t r a l i t y . The l a t t e r tend to view things only from the m i l i t a r y vantage point and begin to see the safety of t h e i r country as the only important objective to which a l l others must be subordinated. The former have to take a broader view and consider defence as only one of the problems facing the nation. In war, or i n times of extreme tension, the question of defence takes on a greater urgency; so i n the Netherlands. 123 The government understood Dutch n e u t r a l i t y as a f r i e n d l y notice to the warring nations that the Netherlands did not wish to become involved i n t h e i r q u arrel. I t meant c e r t a i n duties and o b l i g a t i o n s on the part of the Netherlands, but as long as these were f u l f i l l e d , there was l i t t l e chance that anyone would attack the country. The m i l i t a r y men d i d not believe that the Declaration of N e u t r a l i t y would n e c e s s a r i l y preserve the Netherlands from aggression by the b e l l i g e r e n t s and therefore were concerned with being prepared at a l l times to meet a p o t e n t i a l invasion. I t was therefore to Dutch ad-vantage i f the number of p o s s i b l e enemies was reduced to a minimum. The government, on the other hand, thought that an i m p a r t i a l and f a i r a t t i t u d e towards a l l and a prepared de-fence against a l l p o s s i b l e enemies was the best f o r the Netherlands. General Snijders, as head of the armed forces and as the man responsible f o r the t a c t i c a l deployment of the troops and f l e e t , thought the government's conception of n e u t r a l i t y very dangerous from a s t r a t e g i c point of view. The General wrote many notes to the government suggesting that he be given more d e f i n i t e i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding the defence of the country because his forces were simply too weak to guard against p o s s i b l e attacks from three d i r e c t i o n s . In h i s f i r s t memorandum dealing with t h i s subject (on February 22, 1915) 1 Snijders wanted to know i f the government thought war with one side a p r i o r i unthinkable, and whether a l l i n t e n t i o n a l i n f r i n g e -ment on Dutch sovereignty must be combatted with armed force 124 even i f t h i s meant full-scale war. F i n a l l y , Snijders deman-ded that, i f r e l a t i o n s with one side deteriorated to such an extent that war was considered l i k e l y , help be sought from the other side before h o s t i l i t i e s commenced. This was es-p e c i a l l y urgent i n case the enemy was to be Germany because the war should, i f at a l l p o s s i b l e , be fought outside the Dutch borders and t h i s could not be done without a i d from the Entente. 3 Four days l a t e r the General had his answer. The gov-ernment r e a l i z e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n maintaining 4 defensive p o s i t i o n s against three sides (south, west, east) , but i t could not change i t s r e l a t i o n s to the countries at war and an a p r i o r i exclusion of h o s t i l i t i e s with one side was not v i s u a l i z e d . I t was unfortunate that the Dutch government saw no other way than a continuation of i t s passive and timid f o r -eign p o l i c y . A more p o s i t i v e and stronger stand on the part of the Netherlands might well have made things much easier f o r the country. There are several i n d i c a t i o n s that Germany was quick to adopt a cautious and accommodating a t t i t u d e when the Netherlands acted more f o r c e f u l l y . On March 25, 1915, the Dutch ship, Medea, was torpedoed i n the English Channel, and the same l o t b e f e l l the Katwijk on A p r i l 14 when i t was r i d i n g at anchor near the l i g h t - s h i p Noord-Hinde. The two sinkings aroused anger i n the Netherlands, and the government sent a strong protest to Germany demanding r e s t i t u t i o n f o r 125 the losses. The B r i t i s h t r i e d to take advantage of the s i t u -ation by o f f e r i n g the Dutch an a l l i a n c e and promised 150,000 men to support the Netherlands from a German a t t a c k . 5 Alarmed by the turn of events the Germans sent a formal apology, r e -imbursed the cost of the Katwijk and i t s cargo, and ordered i t s submarine commanders to take the utmost precaution not to sink Dutch vessels "as the mood of the Dutch i s very h o s t i l e because of the sinking of the Katwi jk" . Bethmann Hollweg i n a telegram to von Tr e u t l e r , one of the Kaiser's adjutants, voiced the fear that the Netherlands would not defend h e r s e l f against a B r i t i s h landing on her coast but would side with the invaders. I t would therefore be wise f o r Germany to curb t a l k of annexing Belgium because t h i s only made the Dutch 7 more anti-German. Had the Dutch maintained t h e i r f o r c e f u l stand, quite conceivably they would have had less p r e s s u r e — a t l e a s t from the German s i d e — i n the coming years. Instead, the government sank back to a submissive p o s i t i o n of t r y i n g to please both sides, accepting ever more trade r e s t r i c t i o n s from the B r i t i s h and sinking of ships from the Germans. In August, 1915, Snijders once again t r i e d to convince the government that i t should reconsider the neutral p o s i t i o n g of the Netherlands. The Commander i n Chief may well have been prompted to write his long memorandum because of c r i t i c i s m i n parliament where the deployment of the Dutch for c e s had been termed "chaotic". Snijders explained that as long as he had to be prepared f o r a l l e v e n t u a l i t i e s , f had to prevent smuggling 126 and had to guard the i n t e r n i n g camps, with the few troops at h i s d i s p o s a l , i t was impossible to deploy the army i n any other way. The F i e l d Army could not be maintained as an i n t e g r a l force, even d i v i s i o n s had to be broken up and assigned i n d i v i d u a l defensive p o s i t i o n s . The large number of leaves weakened the army, there was a chronic shortage of men, and the second mobilization the parliamentarians always talked about could not be counted upon to solve the problems i n case of a sudden attack. In such an event the railways would have to transport the scattered troops to t h e i r proper locations as well as bring the called-up men to t h e i r destinations and t h i s could not be done i n one day. If the attacker were Germany, extensive disruptions of the transportation network could be expected by the second day. S n i j d e r s 1 persistence d i d r e s u l t i n a top l e v e l meeting between several senior o f f i c e r s , the Premier and the Minister of War; they decided however, to bring no change i n the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . ^ The Dutch Commander i n Chief was an able m i l i t a r y leader, but l i k e many older generals during the Great War he was i n -fatuated with numbers. Snijders tended to neglect the im-portance of better weapons and new t a c t i c s and saw the an-swer f o r the Netherlands i n a ^numerically increased army, more i n t e r n a l power fo r the m i l i t a r y , and a reduction i n the number of p o s s i b l e enemies. He can be c r i t i c i z e d f o r think-ing the numbers game, as Falkenhayn, Haig, N i v e l l e , etc., were doing, and f o r neglecting the p o s s i b i l i t i e s offered by 127 the p e c u l i a r Dutch topography to b u i l d very strong defences. Since the o f f i c i a l Dutch p o s i t i o n d i d not consider anything but defence, Snijders could have sought the answer i n i n -creased defensive p o s i t i o n s as e a s i l y as i n more men. The Dutch general d i d not have the imagination to think of anything d i f f e r e n t than the e x i s t i n g , m i l i t a r y solutions and conse-quently could only suggest two things to his government: r e -duce the p o s s i b l e enemies and enlarge the army. The Dutch government, t i e d to i t s pre-war conception of n e u t r a l i t y and very much aware of the people's a n t i - m i l i t a r y sentiments, would not accept the Commander i n Chief's suggestions. M i l i t a r y - c i v i l i a n d i f f e r e n c e s such as t h i s were not con-fi n e d to the Netherlands. In France, B r i t a i n and Germany s i m i l a r c o n f l i c t s took place. The s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e d there only i n that the power struggle centered on what was necessary to win the war; i n essence the problem was the same as i n the Netherlands. The m i l i t a r y always demanded more than the c i v i l i a n s were w i l l i n g , or able, to give. In B r i t a i n , Kitchener v i r t u a l l y had h i s way, but Haig had much more d i f f i c u l t y get-t i n g what he thought he needed when Lloyd George became Prime Min i s t e r . The c o n f l i c t between the l a t t e r two i s well known and need not be enlarged upon here. In Germany the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s gained tremendous power—not only as f a r as strategy and man power were concerned; they also managed to get the economy of the country i n the s e r v i c e of the armed f o r c e s . 1 0 Such power was never obtained, nor desired by the Dutch m i l i -tary leaders: a l l they wanted was a reasonable chance of 128 success i n the event t h e i r country was attacked. The Dutch government f r u s t r a t e d the aims of the m i l -i t a r y because i t t r i e d as much as p o s s i b l e to continue a peace-time economy even though most of Europe was engulfed i n war. Such an economy was maintained by means of r a t i o n i n g schemes, subsidies, surrogates, bartering with other nations, and sometimes begging the warring powers to allow more imports to enter the Netherlands. Such attempts were not wrong, but l i k e the proposals of General Snijders, they d i d not get be-yond the f a m i l i a r , e x i s t i n g frame of thought. The p o t e n t i a l of the Netherlands was not explored. The nation, small as i t was, was not used as a weight which could conceivably t i p the m i l i t a r y balance i n the stalemated war. The Dutch p o l i -t i c i a n s were too timid to adopt such a p o l i c y , the people too l e t h a r g i c to demand i t , and the m i l i t a r y too defence-minded to consider i t . Two serious c r i s e s during the war proved that p a s s i v i t y d i d not guarantee the Netherlands freedom from foreign threats and pressures. 2. F i r s t C r i s i s That sudden and dangerous emergencies could occur with-out warning was demonstrated on March 30, 1916. On that date Ambassador Gevers wired from Berlin"'"'*' that State Secretary von Jagow had n o t i f i e d him that the B r i t i s h were concentrating ships and troops i n the Thames and Humber Rivers for an attack 129 on the Scheldt estuary. The German government demanded guar-antees that the Dutch would defend themselves against t h i s attack otherwise Germany would take the necessary measures even i f t h i s involved infringement on Dutch n e u t r a l i t y . Immediately there was great tension i n the government which knew nothing of any B r i t i s h preparations but neverthe-12 less thought i t had to act. I t wanted a l l leaves cancelled, but General Snijders, a f t e r consultation with h i s s t a f f de-clar e d himself against t h i s ; the army d i d not believe the Gert-mans. Snijders pointed out that t h i s s i t u a t i o n was exactly what he had written about i n February, 1915. Would the govern-ment now take a stand as to whan to f i g h t and whomto side with? The government refused. I t maintained i t s r e s o l u t i o n to de-fend against both sides, i n s p i t e of the army's objection that i n the f l a t i slands of Zeeland the Dutch forces would be destroyed. A f t e r discussions with the Minister of War, i t was decided to cancel regular leaves but to allow those on s p e c i a l and i n d e f i n i t e leave to remain at home. The order went out the morning of the 31st, but the government neglec-ted to inform the country why t h i s measure was taken. Conse-quently the wildest rumours started, a run on the banks re-sulted, and people began to s t o c k p i l e food. On A p r i l 2 a reassuring telegram a r r i v e d from Ambas-13 sador Gevers. The Germans had made a mistake; they were pleased with the way the s i t u a t i o n had been handled, and they were sorry f o r the inconveniences they had caused. On Gevers' question whether the Germans had not been looking f o r an excuse 130 to occupy part of the Dutch coast l i n e von Jagow answered with a d e f i n i t e no. The Dutch government was now faced with a p o l i t i c a l problem. I t believed that the leaves could not be r e i n s t a t e d immediately without i t being accused of panicking f o r nothing and acting against the advice of the army. Leaves remained cancelled which caused a l l sorts of misery f o r the army o f f i c e r s because the s o l d i e r s were embittered that s p e c i a l leaves continued while they could not go home for Easter. Thousands simply l e f t f o r home without a pass when that time 14 ar r i v e d and when Snijders ordered punishment f o r those who had done so he was c r i t i c i s e d severely i n parliament and the press. On May 12 the government announced that regular leaves would s t a r t again on June 1 which prompted the obvious ques-t i o n how the government could know three weeks i n advance that the c r i s i s would then be over. The reasons f o r the German warning on March 30 are of importance because they show how the German m i l i t a r y leaders viewed the Netherlands, and that they projected the same at t i t u d e they had when they invaded B e l g i u m — i f i t i s necessary f o r m i l i t a r y purposes i t must be done—onto Great B r i t a i n . As long as the Germans believed that "perfidious Albion" might invade the Netherlands with the same lack of compunction they themselves had had i n invading Belgium, they would keep the Netherlands under c a r e f u l m i l i t a r y s u r v e i l l a n c e . General Snijders thought that the March warning had been an act of s p i t e on the part of the German General S t a f f because 131 t h e i r two attempts to take up contact with the Dutch m i l i t a r y 15 a u t h o r i t i e s ( i n 1915 and February 1916) had been rebuffed. What the German intentions were with these " f e e l e r s " can only be guessed; presumably i t was an attempt f o r c l o s e r m i l i t a r y cooperation with the Dutch against a poss i b l e B r i t i s h attack. German apprehensions about the Netherlands being an open gate through which B r i t i a n could enter stemmed from before the war. In 1912 the well-known General F r i e d r i c h von Bernhardi had written: [In case of h o s t i l i t i e s ] the a l l i e d Great Powers would attempt to turn our s t r a t e g i c r i g h t flank through Belgium and Holland and penetrate i n t o the heart of Germany through the gap i n the f o r -tresses between Wesel and Flushing... Our Western f r o n t i e r , i n i t s e l f strong, can be e a s i l y turned on the north through Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong f o r t r e s s e s , are there to oppose a h o s t i l j g i n v a s i o n , and n e u t r a l -i t y i s only a paper bulwark. As mentioned before, the German Chancellor alluded to the same problem i n 1915 and General von Kuhl, Chief of S t a f f of the 4th Army, and l a t e r of Prince Ruprecht's Army-Group, expanded 17 on the idea i n his book. Now that the f r o n t was s t a b i l i z e d and neither side seemed capable of a breakthrough the German High Command se r i o u s l y considered the p o s s i b i l i t y of the B r i t i s h t r y i n g to come i n through the back door. They t r i e d something of t h i s nature i n the Dardenelles i n A p r i l 1915, while i n 1809 they had attempted to reach Antwerp through a landing on the i s l a n d , Walcheren. A landing there now would enable them to i n s t a l l heavy a r t i l l e r y and s h e l l Zeebrugge with impunity 132 making i t untenable as a German submarine base. And they would pose a constant threat to the rear of the 4th Army because they could put 15,000 men across the Scheldt i n 12 hours. The Germans, not possessing equipment to cross the Scheldt, would have to f i g h t t h e i r way through Brabant and along the narrow, e a s i l y defended neck of Zuid Beveland i n order to reach the B r i t i s h . I f the B r i t i s h landed i n Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, the rear of the 4th Army would be immediately threatened and a link-up with, the B r i t i s h forces i n Flanders was q u i t e conceivable. Under Falkenhayn things d i d not move beyond the planning stage; once Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the d i r e c t i o n of the armed forces on August 29, 1916, action was taken. A separate coastal defence and f r o n t i e r guard command was set up under Lt-General U s e . Because Germany was deeply engaged i n Rumania only two marine d i v i s i o n s could be spared, but once more troops became a v a i l a b l e the command was strengthened so that by January 1917, two commando groups and 9-1/2 i n f a n -t r y d i v i s i o n s were present on the Dutch f r o n t i e r and along the 18 Belgian coast. General Snijders and the Dutch General S t a f f could not know a l l that the German commanders were thinking but from a s t r a t e g i c point of view i t was obvious that Zeeuws-Vlaanderen and the Scheldt area were of great importance to both Germany and B r i t a i n . The Dutch had strengthened Walcheren and Zuid-Beveland (against a sea as well as a land attack) but the e f f o r t s were puny compared to what B r i t a i n or Germany could bring to bear. Snijders considered the s i t u a t i o n very precarious 133 because a B r i t i s h landing would immediately bring a German invasion as well and he was expected to defend against both. Snijders d i d not think that the B r i t i s h would v i o l a t e Dutch n e u t r a l i t y as e a s i l y as the Germans assumed, but he d i d not exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y that, i f f o r instance the United States came int o the war and the Western Front remained immobile, the a l l i e s would attack through the Netherlands. In the hope of r e c e i v i n g more d e f i n i t e i n s t r u c t i o n s than "defence against three sides" Snijders wrote again to Premier 19 Cort van der Linden on January 30, 1917. The Commander i n Chief drew the attention of the govern-ment to a recent p u b l i c statement by General W i l l e , Commander i n Chief of the Swiss forces, that Switzerland would f i g h t any invader, would automatically consider the other side an a l l y and i n v i t e i t s troops i n t o Switzerland to f i g h t the f i r s t attacker. Snijders thought t h i s p o s i t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y very much more e f f e c t i v e than that of the Dutch government. I t could j u s t as e a s i l y be made the Dutch p o s i t i o n and would act as a deterrent against B r i t a i n as well as Germany. I f the government did not wish to follow the Swiss example an order should be issued, based upon the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n of the moment, on who would a p r i o r i be excluded from becoming an enemy. The condition of the armed forces of the Netherlands, and her geographic l o c a t i o n d i d not allow the present s i t u a t i o n to continue. 20 On February 9, 1917 the government sent i t s answer — nothing was to change. Minister Bosboom had added a l i s t of 134 p o s s i b l e s i t u a t i o n s that could a r i s e and the probable action that should be taken i n each case. Snijders' comments i n the margin of the document c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e he rejected some of the hypotheses as t o t a l l y u n r e a l i s t i c and others as not dealing with the s i t u a t i o n as i t existed. He was e s p e c i a l l y angered that the Minister seemed to think there would be time f o r consultation (even protests against the attackers), or c a l l i n g a second mobilization. The commander i n Chief's anger and disappointment are easy to see i n his answer to the govern-21 ment. He must have been astonished at the apparently casual manner the government treated h i s demands, as i f nothing could p o s s i b l y harm the Netherlands. Yet Snijders knew, as the government knew, that the Ambassador to France had sent two 22 separate warnings obtained from two d i f f e r e n t sources, that Germany was planning an attack on the Scheldt estuary. To the Dutch General S t a f f t h i s seemed a l o g i c a l move because on February 1 the Germans had started t h e i r u n r e s t r i c t e d submar-ine warfare and the harbours i n the Scheldt estuary, as well as opening the port of Antwerp, would g r e a t l y benefit the submarines. The Dutch knew that there were about 40,000 Ger-man troops drawn together near t h e i r border and since Germany was s t i l l flushed with i t s v i c t o r y over Rumania, an attack 23 seemed quite probable. A l l the more astonishing then to have Bosboom write Snijders on February 17 and only t a l k about c a n c e l l i n g s p e c i a l leaves as well as regular ones when i t proved necessary to take such a s t e p . ^ 4 135 The following day Ambassador Gevers reported on a con-25 versation he had with Dr. Kriege (Director, Department of Foreign A f f a i r s ) wherein he was t o l d that Ludendorff expected a B r i t i s h attack on the Scheldt i n order to destroy Zeebrugge and h i t the 4th Army i n the rear. Dr. Kriege emphasized the importance of a Dutch defence against t h i s because Germany could not remain a passive observer i f the Dutch could not handle the s i t u a t i o n . In such an event there would be no time f o r consultation, and i t would therefore be advantageous for both sides i f some discussion could be held now. Gevers p o l i t e l y declined the i n v i t a t i o n . That same day (February 18) G.S. IV intercepted a • 26 telegram from the German m i l i t a r y attache i n the Hague wherein he urged his superiors to sink a l l Dutch ships found i n the forbidden zones. According to him there was nothing to fear from the Dutch as long as the German troops remained on the border. Snijders sent the intercepted telegram to the Cabinet, perhaps i n the hope that a firmer stand would be adopted now that the Germans were becoming so bold. He also complained that Ambassador Gevers should have been much firmer i n refus-27 ing the o f f e r of Dutch-German consultation. A l l the Commander i n Chief obtained f o r his e f f o r t s was a l e t t e r 28 2 from Bosboom, r e i t e r a t e d by Cort van der Linden on March 8, t e l l i n g him that the Dutch armed forces had no other goal than defending Dutch t e r r i t o r y and that t h i s s t i l l meant defence against three sides. 136 A f t e r Snijders had received the l a s t communication he seemed at h i s wits end. He s c r i b b l e d i n the margin of the document, "But what am I supposed to do now? The government 30 knows I w i l l NOT f i g h t against both sides." The government did not know t h i s because the Commander i n Chief had never made i t e x p l i c i t l y c l e a r . He must have believed he had, however, because he wrote the Commander of the Scheldt and Meuse estuaries: I t o l d the government e x p l i c i t l y that the Dutch armed forces could not f i g h t both b e l l i g e r e n t s simultaneously, and that such an order could not be accepted. The government h^s accepted my reasons f o r such a d e c i s i o n . With such misunderstanding between the government and the Commander i n Chief, i t was very fortunate f o r the Netherlands that no B r i t i s h invasion took place. Snijders expected one, e s p e c i a l l y now that the United States seemed ready to j o i n 32 the c o n f l i c t (and d i d so A p r i l 6, 1917). The Germans apparently s t i l l believed i n i t also because they continued to r e i n f o r c e t h e i r defences along the south-west Dutch b o r d e r — something which d i d not go unnoticed by the Dutch. In May, 1917 General von Moser was appointed to organ-i z e the Hollandstellung and coordinate the e f f o r t s of Generals U s e and von Kuhl and Admirals von Holtzendorff (Chief of the Admiral Staff) and von Schroeder (Commander 33 Marine Corps). The various e f f o r t s and plans included, among others, a s p e c i a l "Scheldt D i v i s i o n " which was to cross the r i v e r and land between Bath and Krabbendijke where i t was to hold the narrow neck of land and prevent the 137 B r i t i s h from breaking out u n t i l other German troops had a r r i v e d v i a Brabant. The heavy "Batterie Wilhelm I I " (305 mm. s h e l l s weighing 1,000 pounds) near Knokke had the exact range of V l i s s i n g e n , Middelburg and other Dutch c i t i e s to hinder a B r i t i s h landing and prevent troop concentrations 34 thereafter. No invasion materialized and the new Minister of War, Jhr, de Jonge, who replaced Bosboom fo r p o l i t i c a l reasons i n June, had a few months to get used to his p o s i t i o n . There was soon tension enough again. The United States demanded the use of Dutch ships i n return f o r grain; B r i t a i n i n s i s t e d that the transfer of sand and gravel from Germany to Belgium v i a the Dutch waterways be stopped, while Germany wanted i t to continue. 3. Second C r i s i s The sand and gravel shipments had been a source of f r i c t i o n since 1915. Germany i n s i s t e d that the increase i n tonnage was due to the f a c t that Belgian imports from France and B r i t a i n now had to come from Germany; and that much war damage to quays and dikes had to be repaired. B r i t a i n and France maintained that the extra amounts were used f o r f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . For three years a great deal of diplomatic energy was expended i n attempts to reach a s o l u t i o n accept-able to both sides. No compromise could be reached and on October 7, 1917 B r i t a i n punished the Netherlands by ref u s i n g 138 a l l f a c i l i t i e s f o r the transmission of cable messages (which v i r t u a l l y cut a l l overseas l i n k s f o r the Netherlands). Hard diplomatic work caused the embargo on wireless transmissions to be l i f t e d i n February 1918 with the understanding that Great B r i t a i n would take any steps she thought necessary i f 35 by March 15 the d i f f e r e n c e s were not resolved. By that date the s i t u a t i o n had become very serious f o r the Netherlands. Since the beginning of the year the United States had demanded that a large part of the Dutch merchant f l e e t be placed at the di s p o s a l of the a l l i e s . The Germans wanted the railway l i n e from Dalheim (Germany) to Hamont (Belgium), which went through the narrow neck of Limburg, reopened. ( I t had been closed at the outbreak of war.) The strongest pressure was f i r s t applied by the a l l i e s — t h e Netherlands would not get the 100,000 tons grain i t desper-a t e l y needed unless the Dutch allowed the a l l i e s the use of t h e i r ships. And i n the event that the Netherlands s t i l l refused, the a l l i e s would take the ships under the old Right of Angary. The Netherlands f e l t i t had no choice and on March 20 gave i n under strong protest. They d i d so i n s p i t e of the German threat that a l l coal and i r o n exports would be stopped. The a l l i e s gained 700,000 tons of merchant shipping. Unrest and indignation was great i n the country. General Snijders 3 6 demanded that a second mobilization be c a l l e d . T r o e l s t r a , leader of the SDAP., warned the government that i t was too 37 s o f t and gave i n too e a s i l y to foreign pressure, and those who had i n t e r e s t s i n the Dutch East Indies were incensed 139 with the government because now a l l connections with the 38 colonies were broken. The German press accused the Nether-lands of p a r t i a l i t y i n favour of the a l l i e s . By March 22 the excitement had died down a l i t t l e ; the unexpected German offensive on March 21 held everyone's at t e n t i o n . The offensive was the c a t a l y s t f o r the most serious c r i s i s the Netherlands had to face during the war. Ludendorff v/as gambling his l a s t card on his March Offensive and would jus t as soon invade the Netherlands as have i t take a d e c i -sion detrimental to the German war e f f o r t . He now needed every poss i b l e transportation artery to keep his attack going and that meant the Dalheim-Hamont l i n e had to be opened. The German Supreme Command had obtained extensive p o l i t i c a l power i n Germany by t h i s time; Ludendorff was corresponding d i r e c t l y 39 with German ambassadors abroad. On March 21 he wrote the German Ambassador to the Netherlands, Dr. Rosen, and i n s t r u c t e d him to t e l l the Dutch government that i n compen-sation f o r having given t h e i r ships to the a l l i e s they would have to open the railway l i n e and allow the tr a n s f e r of troops on i t , allow passage of the German ships s t i l l i n Antwerp (since 1914), consent that sand and gravel as well 40 as war materials be shipped through Dutch waterways. Dr. Rosen was well disposed toward the Netherlands, did not think she could have prevented her ships from f a l l i n g i n A l l i e d hands, and d i d not want to see her at war with Germany. He therefore d i d not d e l i v e r the note, t r i e d to convince Foreign Minister Louden of the seriousness of the 140 s i t u a t i o n and when t h i s d i d not prove p o s s i b l e took the unusual step of contacting Dutch party leaders and explained 41 to them the precarious p o s i t i o n of t h e i r country. By the time Rosen handed Louden the o f f i c i a l German demands (on , 42 A p r i l 24 and 25) they had been watered down somewhat—no troops or war material would be sent across Dutch t e r r i t o r y — but enough information had leaked out that the mood i n the Netherlands was very tense. On A p r i l 23, Snijders had already warned a l l commanders to be prepared f o r c a n c e l l a t i o n of leaves and a p o s s i b l e second m o b i l i z a t i o n . He also asked f o r a l l p o s s i b l e information on German troop concentrations i n 43 Germany and Belgium. The Premier, the Minister of War, and the Commander i n Chief had several meetings during these tense days, and Snijders seemed quite p e s s i m i s t i c about Dutch chances of defending themselves. Cort van der Linden blamed t h i s p e s s i -44 mism on the f a c t that the General's wife had r e c e n t l y died and d i d not attach any other s i g n i f i c a n c e to i t . Within a few days the matter would come up again, however, and t h i s time with serious consequences. A f t e r the second German demand had been received on A p r i l 25 the government appeared suddenly to r e a l i z e the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n . Leaves f o r the armed forces were cancelled, and a (closed) emergency debate of the Second 45 Chamber was held. The debate was stormy but most Members thought i t the better part of valour to give i n to the German demands. 141 The Netherlands remained out of the war, but the p r i c e had been the loss of her merchant f l e e t and having German tr a i n s moving across Dutch t e r r i t o r y . L u c k i l y the A l l i e s d i d not "up the ante" by demanding the Netherlands now give them another concession i n turn. They were very hard pressed by the German attacks i n France, perhaps were rather ashamed i n the way they had acquired the Dutch f l e e t , and r e a l i z e d that the Dutch could not e x t r i c a t e themselves from the German 46 demands without either g i v i n g i n or going to war. For the Dutch people the loss of t h e i r f l e e t was a b i t t e r humiliation and the anger and f r u s t r a t i o n was great. Acquiescence to the German demands had caused less indigna-t i o n but many f e l t r e s e n t f u l that t h e i r nation was so help-l e s s . There was no p u b l i c outcry f o r a more f o r c e f u l a t t i t u d e , however; the reports of the b i t t e r f i g h t i n g i n France soon convinced most people that the Netherlands should be thankful to remain out of the holocaust. In the next decades the Dutch remembered only that they had stayed out; they forgot the humiliation and f r u s t r a t i o n of being pushed around by others. They also refused to consider that a more f o r c e f u l a t t i t u d e might have commanded more respect i n other countries and therefore meant les s pressure on the Netherlands. Generally speaking, the two c r i s e s taught the Dutch nothing. One important consequence of the 1918 c r i s i s was a major c o n f l i c t between General Snijders and the Minister of War de Jonge. On A p r i l 26 the Minister of War had had a 142 meeting with the Commander i n Chief and the l a t t e r had declared, i n fr o n t of Major Insinger and Captain R o e l l that defence against Germany was "useless" while a war against the 47 A l l i e s was "l e s s unfavourable". From A p r i l 27 to May 8 de Jonge talked with Maj-General Burger, Vice-Chief of the General S t a f f , Lt-General Pop, who had become Chief of St a f f i n 1917, Colonel van der Voorst Maarschalk, Commander of the Waterlinie, Colonel Fabius, Commander Groep Naarden, and 48 Lt-General Terwisga, Commander F i e l d Army. Of these men only General Pop shared General Snijders' opinion that defence against Germany was useless; the other four men thought i t f e a s i b l e — t o a greater or les s e r d e g r e e — t o defend against the German forces f o r a c e r t a i n length of time. On May 8 de Jonge wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet wherein he re l a t e d the various opinions, sketched the s i t u a t i o n i n the Dutch army, gave a b r i e f account of the weapons a v a i l a b l e , declared to have l o s t f a i t h i n the Commander i n Chief, and 49 suggested he be r e l i e v e d of h i s post. Two days l a t e r de Jonge asked General Burger i f he would be w i l l i n g to take over as Commander i n Chief. The answer was a f f i r m a t i v e . ^ 0 For obvious reasons de Jonge passed over General Pop who e a r l i e r had been recommended by Snijders as h i s replacement i n case of h i s own sickness or death. The Cabinet discussed de Jonge*s memorandum, d i d not quite know what to do with i t and asked the Queen f o r advice. She wanted both men to stay at t h e i r posts. There would be an e l e c t i o n soon and resignations now would only cause unrest 143 and needless speculation. Both men agreed to stay but the matter d i d not end there. On May 29, Snijders wrote a long 52 memorandum to the government explaining that the word "useless" d i d not mean the immediate collapse of the Dutch forces as soon as the Germans entered, but rather that i n a very short time the Netherlands would be defeated. For support Snijders c i t e d the reports of h i s m i l i t a r y attache i n B e r l i n , Muller-Massis, who had repeatedly written that Germany, picking i t s own time and place, would disrupt the Dutch second mobilization and very q u i c k l y reach the S t e l l i n g 53 Holland. Snijders further pointed out that the army had enough a r t i l l e r y s h e l l s for 10 f i g h t i n g days, 2 hand grenades per man, 10,740 s t e e l helmets, and only 5,130 gas masks which gave protection against the new German gases. F a c t u a l l y Snijders' report d i d not d i f f e r much from that of de Jonge (of May 8), but the conclusions were v i r t u -a l l y opposite. De Jonge appears to have discounted the need for gasmasks, nor d i d he seem impressed with the German March Offensive—where on the f i r s t day the Germans advanced 40 miles a f t e r f i r s t breaking the B r i t i s h l i n e . Snijders, on the other hand, must have been very impressed with t h i s feat of arms, as well as with the German achievements i n the j u s t begun Third B a t t l e of the Aisne (May 27-June 6) when the Germans broke the strong French defensive l i n e "Chemin des Dames" and advanced 13 miles that f i r s t day. The Dutch Commander i n Chief must have wondered how f a r the Germans would come i n one day against the inexperienced and poorly 144 equipped Dutch forces. This was an e s p e c i a l l y worrisome question since Snijders three days e a r l i e r (on May 26) had received a report from his m i l i t a r y attache i n London about possib l e m i l i t a r y assistance from the A l l i e s i n case of a 54 German attack. Snijders had v e r b a l l y i n s t r u c t e d Captain Tonnet to contact the A l l i e s and prepare such a report. The Commander i n Chief d i d not inform the government of t h i s action because i t would have been considered a breach of the n e u t r a l i t y p o s i t i o n of the Netherlands. Nor d i d Snijders mention the information he had received i n his memorandum to the government. Among other things, the A l l i e s demanded, according to Captain Tonnet: The whole defence of the Netherlands must imme-d i a t e l y become subordinate to the A l l i e d Supreme Command.... The Netherland F i e l d Army must not take action, outside i t s prepared defences, i n order to prevent an invasion of troops of the Central Powers. To Snijders i t was c l e a r from t h i s that no immediate help would be forthcoming and that the A l l i e s only saw the defence of the Netherlands i n the larger sphere of defeating Germany. The Dutch forces must only defend the S t e l l i n g Holland which would serve as a bridgehead f o r the A l l i e s . Queen Wilhelmina wrote General Snijders on June 14 to 55 express her confidence i n him, but Minister de Jonge got 56 i n the l a s t blow. He l e f t a memorandum for his successor wherein he voiced his misgivings about Snijders' a b i l i t i e s as Commander i n Chief as well as l i s t e d a number of things l e f t undone—certain defensive works had not been constructed, there was no c e n t r a l inundation bureau, there were too many 145 "loose" b a t t a l i o n s which should have been brought i n t o brigade or d i v i s i o n formation, the bulk of the forces was s t i l l i n the south from where they should have been removed long ago. To what extent the new Minister of War was influenced by t h i s document i s d i f f i c u l t to say. Certain i s that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between him and Snijders was never very c o r d i a l and that they soon became embroiled i n a new controversy. In the end i t was Snijders who had to leave. Before the e l e c t i o n s took place (on J u l y 3) the cabinet had decided i t would resign regardless of the outcome of the e l e c t i o n . In 1917 the C o n s t i t u t i o n had been changed and t h i s was the f i r s t e l e c t i o n with f u l l male suffrage. The r e s u l t s were i n t e r e s t i n g although hardly designed f o r e f f i c i e n t government—over 30 p a r t i e s contested the e l e c t i o n and 17 obtained at l e a s t one seat i n parliament. Eight p a r t i e s captured one seat. The l a r g e s t party was the RKSP (Roman Catholics) with 30 seats, followed by the SDAP with 22. Two other S o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s were represented by one man each, while the Communists held two seats. Because the SDAP s t i l l refused to form part of any government, the government was formed by the " r i g h t " (the various L i b e r a l p a r t i e s had l o s t a great many seat s ) . I t took over two months to form a new government; by September 9, Ruys de Beerenbrouck (RKSP) f i n a l l y managed to form a government composed of men of his own party, the Anti-Revolutionaire P a r t i j (ARP), and the 5 7 C h r i s t e l i j k e H i s t o r i s c h e Unie (CHU). 146 The new Minister of War, G. A. A. A l t i n g von Geusau, was kind enough to show General Snijders the memorandum l e f t by de Jonge, but there seems to have been no discussion about i t . The Minister d i d not l i k e the 1914 i n s t r u c t i o n s which made the Commander i n Chief responsible to the whole Cabinet and wanted to change i t ; Snijders vigorously opposed 58 such a change and i t appears he had his way. A l t i n g von Geusau had the l a s t word, however. A f t e r the r i o t s i n the m i l i t a r y camps on October 25 and 26 he i n s t i t u t e d a committee of i n v e s t i g a t i o n under the chairmanship of the ex-Minister de Jonge. Snijders' strong protests against t h i s were to no a v a i l . By t h i s time the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Commander i n Chief and the government, and the general s i t u a t i o n i n the Netherlands, had deteriorated to such an extent that the government decided to get r i d of General Snijders. The c o n f l i c t between the Commander i n Chief and the various Ministers of War cannot be s o l e l y blamed on person-a l i t y clashes. There was a basic dichotomy between the m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n leaders on a number of points. Both sides agreed that the Netherlands should remain neutral, and while the government p r a c t i s e d t h i s n e u t r a l i t y from a p o s i t i o n bordering on weakness, the army was expected to accept t h i s and play the r o l e given i t . But no army can operate from a p o s i t i o n of weakness. The i n t r i n s i c base of any army must be that i t i s capable of f u l f i l l i n g i t s given f u n c t i o n — i n t h i s case defending the Netherlands—and i t i s not p o s s i b l e to begin with the idea that submissiveness i s an asset. There-147 fore the Dutch o f f i c e r s wanted a l l the men and the equipment i n so f a r as the country could provide them. And because the c i v i l i a n s i n o f f i c e d i d not see the necessity of p l a c i n g the country on a ivar f o o t i n g while s t i l l at peace, c o n f l i c t r e s u l t e d . That Snijders a f t e r four years of mobilization was r e a l i s t i c enough to t e l l his government that a German army could wipe out the Dutch forces i n a very short time should have been appreciated by the government, who instead t r i e d to l a b e l the man a d e f e a t i s t . Snijders had attempted to row with the oars he had: he had f u l f i l l e d the extra functions such as guarding the i n t e r n i n g camps and catching smugglers for which the army had not been given any extra men. He had protested against the use of excessive leaves, e s p e c i a l l y the s p e c i a l or occupational leaves which to him seemed unnecessary with so much unemployment i n the country. But the nation had given him very l i t t l e support. The government had allowed c r i t i c i s m to be flung at the army from a l l sides; i t had not i n s t i t u t e d a modern M i l i t a r y Code but l e f t the forces with the archaic 1815 version; i t had not given the army power to act against the m o b i l i z a t i o n clubs, nor i n t r o -duced adequate censure; the government had, i n f a c t , expected the army to operate from a p o s i t i o n of impotence while i t knew that i f the country was ever attacked i t had to f i g h t from a p o s i t i o n of strength. The c r i s e s i n March 1916 and March 1918 had brought no deeper i n s i g h t f o r the government, nor f o r the people at large. CHAPTER VI October, November, 1918 1. The Riots Near the end of the war the Netherlands experienced an upheaval which demonstrated the extent the army had d e t e r i -orated, but also showed that many Dutch people, contrary to the a t t i t u d e they had displayed i n the war years, were w i l l i n g to f i g h t f o r t h e i r country. When i n October 1918 i t became obvious that the war would soon be over, the Netherlands became much more i n f l u -enced by the p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l moods and discontents sweeping Europe than had been the case i n previous years. "New" Imperialism, nationalism, m i l i t a r i s m had not af f e c t e d the Netherlands; that one had to f i g h t f o r one's place i n the sun, f o r one's country, f o r the r i g h t of small nations to e x i s t (or whatever other slogans were used during the Great War) had not impressed many Dutchmen. But the forces of socialism, communism, anarchism, etc. had found a more f e r t i l e s o i l . In part t h i s was due to the apparent success of s o c i a l i s m and communism—e. g. the Bolshevik R e v o l u t i o n — but i t was also because the government had never acted very d e c i s i v e l y against forces working to undermine the l e g a l government. Riots i n several m i l i t a r y camps were the c a t a l y s t that set everything i n motion. These erupted as a r e s u l t of the c a n c e l l a t i o n of leaves on October 2 3 — a measure decided upon 149 by the government because of the large number of troops i n the proximity of the southern border. In at l e a s t 20 camps r i o t s and disturbances broke out; i n some i t got no further than wild t a l k , i n others barracks were set on f i r e . At the l a r g e s t camp i n the Netherlands, Harskamp, barracks were burned, o f f i c e r s were shot at, and f o r two days and one night the s o l d i e r s were i n c o n t r o l . 1 When the s i t u a t i o n was near normal again on October 27, General Snijders appointed an i n v e s t i g a t i o n committee composed of two generals and one colon e l . He also handed out s t i f f sentences to the "mutineers" i n the following days. The Minister of War wanted his own i n v e s t i g a t i o n committee and appointed one on November 1 — with the ex-Minister of War, Jhr. de Jonge, as chairman. Understandably, Snijders f e l t himself s l i g h t e d . He protested vigorously without r e s u l t , considered handing i n h i s resigna-2 t i o n but decided to stay on. The two reports d i d not d i f f e r g r e a t l y i n t h e i r f i n d -3 ings. The o f f i c e r s r e s t r i c t e d themselves to the Harskamp a f f a i r while de Jonge investigated a l l the disturbances (the l a t t e r report was not completed u n t i l January 1919). The o f f i c e r s were blunt: the camp and brigade commanders were accused of i n d e c i s i o n and weakness; "they held discus-sions and meetings while they should have issued orders". De Jonge's committee d i d not disagree with that, but found that the reasons f o r the unrest had been the usual ones: leaves cancelled, bad food, poor barracks, too f a r from home, fa m i l i e s not r e c e i v i n g enough money, men held c o l l e c t i v e l y 150 responsible f o r t h e f t and damages i n each barrack, o f f i c e r s and NCOs not providing proper leadership. The junior o f f i c e r s and NCOs, on the other hand, were very angry at the poor pay they received and consequently f e l t no urge to exert them-4 selves. The report stressed that there was no revolutionary a c t i v i t y responsible f o r the unrests. According to the report, the basic problem underlying everything was that "ons volk i s geen m i l i t a i r e volk" (our people are not a m i l i t a r y people).^ From t h i s followed that m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e was a heavy, joyless burden which a f t e r a l l these years had j u s t become too much. That t h i s axiom was used as a reason, almost an excuse, to explain the r i o t s was r e a l l y a condemnation of the Dutch leadership during the Great War. The authors of the report 3 d i d not r e a l i z e t h i s , and c e r t a i n l y d i d not mean i t as such; nevertheless, by s t a t i n g "our people are not a m i l i t a r y people", they put t h e i r f i n g e r on something which had been known to the government i n 1914 and e a r l i e r . Why had nothing been done to ameliorate t h i s s i t u a t i o n ? Why had 200,000 men been mobilized but not paid, housed, clothed and armed properly? Since 1914 the government had had enough warning that things were not as they ought to be: the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s had pointed out the danger of the mobilization clubs and the c r i t i c i s m i n the press; there had been the f a i l u r e to prevent smuggling; there had been the minor r i o t s i n the camps, and the r e f u s a l s to act against c i v i l i a n s during food r i o t s . A l l these things added up to the f a c t 151 that the Dutch armed forces were u n r e l i a b l e and were not l i k e l y to be able to f u l f i l l the function they had been c a l l e d up f o r : defending the nation against foreign aggression. The answer to the question why the government d i d not act has already been stated i n previous chapters: a r e f u s a l to adapt to the changing s i t u a t i o n i n Europe and a stubborn i n s i s t e n c e to continue the pre-war Dutch pattern of l i f e . The government had worked too much for the people and not enough with the people. The " s p i r i t of August" had shown that the Dutch were w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e personal i n t e r e s t for the n a t i o n a l one i f impressed with the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n ; they proved t h i s again now that an:;.internal threat appeared ready to destroy t h e i r way of l i f e . Dutch leaders could have tapped t h i s deeply hidden national unity to bring the people together during the Great War, rather than allow mistrust, disharmony and schisms to increase. Had t h i s been done the "almost-revolution" of November would probably not have taken place and the sharply increased antagonism between the L e f t and the Right r e s u l t i n g from t h i s upheaval could have been prevented. 152 2. The Reaction That the r i o t s and unrest had only been a r e s u l t of mobilization fatigue was not obvious to the Dutch people who read about the Harskamp a f f a i r i n t h e i r newspapers. T r o e l -s t r a , and other members of the SDAP, thought the army showed a r e a l revolutionary s p i r i t , that the r u l i n g classes had now l o s t t h e i r main support, and that i t was time to act. Leaders of the SDAP, NVV (the s o c i a l i s t labour union), and the Bond van D i e n s t p l i c h t i g e n met i n Amsterdam on October 28, November 2 and 3 ? By t h i s time the mutiny i n K i e l had broken out (October 28) and was spreading to Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck, which strengthened c e r t a i n Dutch s o c i a l i s t s i n t h e i r b e l i e f that the r e v o l u t i o n i n the Netherlands was only a matter of time. Others saw no such development and wanted to maintain the old party l i n e that changes only be brought about v i a the l e g a l , parliamentary method. The leaders of the Bond van Dienstplichigen c l e a r l y stated that there was 7 no revolutionary mood i n the army, only d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Unresolved d i f f i c u l t i e s within t h e i r ranks did not prevent T r o e l s t r a and other SDAP Members of Parliament from attacking the government i n the Second Chamber on November 5 and demanding immediate demobilization and the removal of General Snijders as Commander i n Chief. The f i r s t was refused; the l a t t e r became a f a c t within the next three d a y s — i f not g s o l e l y because the S o c i a l i s t s had demanded i t . Relations between the Commander i n Chief and the Minister of War were strained over the de Jonge Committee; severe c r i t i c i s m i n 153 the press had followed the s t i f f punishments given the "mutineers"; and on top of that came the SDAP demand. The following day (November 6) Geusau asked Snijders to resign because he had f a i l e d to understand the s p i r i t of the new times; the government was planning army reforms and he was not the man to lead i t because he p e r s o n i f i e d the "ancien  regime". Snijders resigned. That these reforms i n no way heralded a new govern-mental a t t i t u d e towards the army w i l l be seen sho r t l y ; the government was looking f o r a scapegoat and the Commander i n Chief was the obvious choice because he had so often been c r i t i c i s e d by the press and parliament. Many Dutch people believed Snijders to be too s t r i c t , too eager to use "Prussian d r i l l t a c t i c s " , and therefore unsuitable to be leading the Dutch armed forces. Dutch p o l i t i c i a n s had resented Snijders' demands fo r more m i l i t a r y authority, more troops, and more e x p l i c i t guidelines i n case of an invasion. On the other hand, removing the Commander i n Chief i n t h i s manner caused much anger, e s p e c i a l l y among the pro-f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s . General Terwisga, Commander F i e l d Army, resigned i n disgust. Many thought the government had handled General Snijders shabbily and had given i n to left-wing 9 pressure. The d i v i s i o n s within the Dutch nation were thus exacerbated a l i t t l e more:-again. The p o l i t i c i a n s were quick to take advantage of S n i j -ders' departure. The moment he was gone work on a l l the defensive l i n e s was stopped—the p a r t i a l l y completed st r u c -154 tures were s t i l l unusable i n May, 1940. Parliament was not scheduled to meet from Friday, November 8, u n t i l Tuesday, November 12, and i n those four days a great deal happened. On Friday a number of Roman Catholics (some were Members of Parliament) met to discuss the l i k e l i h o o d of a S o c i a l i s t takeover. I t was decided to do everything p o s s i b l e to prevent the Roman Catholic workers (who had t h e i r own labour union) from being swept away by s o c i a l i s t propaganda. A number of concerned Protestants also met that day; worried about SDAP intentions and the apparent slackness of the government, they sought contact with the l o c a l m i l i t a r y commander i n The Hague. They also sent a long memorandum to De Savorin Lohman, leader of the C h r i s t e l i j k e  H i s t o r i s c h e Unie party, v o i c i n g t h e i r fear that a small number of r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s could obtain enough popular support to gain c o n t r o l of the government buildings and the palace ( i n The Hague). The group thought the p o l i c e l a r g e l y s o c i a l i s t i c , the army u n r e l i a b l e and c e r t a i n l y not w i l l i n g to act i f even a very few s o l d i e r s chose the side of the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . They proposed to hand-pick good s o l d i e r s , e s p e c i a l l y NCOs and o f f i c e r s , arm them with machine guns and have them guard the arsenals, government buildings and palace. The government as yet d i d l i t t l e . On Saturday Premier Ruys de Beerenbrouck met with leaders from the V r i j z i n n i g e p a r t i e s who showed no i n i t i a t i v e and l i t t l e backbone; they 12 did not think the r e v o l u t i o n could be stopped. On Sunday, 155 ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II appeared at the border and wanted to be admitted as a p r i v a t e c i t i z e n , and t h i s f u l l y occupied the government's att e n t i o n . That the once mighty Wilhelm II now had to ask i f he could please be admitted i n t o the Netherlands as a p r i v a t e person must have made an impression on the government. Late Sunday evening the Premier, the Ministers of War, J u s t i c e , and Foreign A f f a i r s decided that p a r t i a l demobilization of the armed forces must begin immediately. When the Cabinet met the next morning, one of i t s f i r s t decisions was to place m i l i t a r y food supplies at the d i s p o s a l of the c i v i l i a n 13 population, but as yet to keep t h i s measure a secret. Rapid, p a r t i a l demobilization i n t h i s ad hoc manner created near chaotic s i t u a t i o n s i n the army. The c a r e f u l l y prepared demobilization plan was discarded. Each u n i t acted on i t s own as soon as i t received i t s orders; since these were received over a span of three days (November 9, 10, 11), one u n i t would be b u s i l y preparing to go home while the next watched enviously and wondered why i t was not allowed to go also. The confusion was compounded when some units received orders to leave f o r one of the three big c i t i e s (Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague) to guard against p o s s i b l e c i v i l i a n unrest. The reports of u n i t commanders describing the demobil-i z a t i o n a l l read the same: "everything was done abnormally h a s t i l y , l i t t l e care was taken to store weapons and equipment 14 properly, things were a mess, i t was chaos," etc. Within a week a l l the 1916 and older d r a f t s had departed (except 156 f o r a few cavalry u n i t s ) . These men had served the longest and therefore had a r i g h t to be sent home f i r s t , but they were also the ones who had the most grievances, and had been 16 more susceptible to left-wing propaganda. Another r e s u l t of the r a p i d demobilization was that the l e s s stable elements went to the big c i t i e s to celebrate t h e i r "freedom". Drunken s o l d i e r s , f i g h t s , and a few cases of stores being plundered were the r e s u l t and heightened the tension i n the big c i t i e s . To an uninformed observer i t might well have appeared that a l l d i s c i p l i n e i n the army had broken down and that the men were taking things i n t o t h e i r own hands. 3. The L e f t and Right On Sunday, November 10, the SDAP leaders held another meeting to decide what to do. Opinion was s t i l l d ivided. K. ter Laan, the party's m i l i t a r y expert i n parliament pointed out that the many associations and clubs i n the army were i n no way revolutionary s o l d i e r s councils."*"^ I t was decided to p r i n t a manifesto s t a t i n g the SDAP demands and to hold a number of large meetings i n Rotterdam on Monday night. Rotterdam was e s p e c i a l l y chosen because the c i t y seemed ready to hand over to the S o c i a l i s t s . On Saturday, H.P. Nijgh, president of the Scheepsvaart Vereeniging (ship owners asso-c i a t i o n ) and Mayor Zimmerman had discussions with the S o c i a l i s t s Heykoop and Brautigam, r e s p e c t i v e l y president and secretary of the Centrale Bond van Transportarbeiders 157 (teamsters and dock workers union), and had v i r t u a l l y pro-mised to hand over c o n t r o l of the c i t y and the harbours to a 19 new s o c i a l i s t government. On Monday morning the Manifesto h i t the s t r e e t s . I t 20 had f i f t e e n demands of which the three most extreme ones were immediate demobilization with f i n a n c i a l support f o r those not able to f i n d employment; s o c i a l i z a t i o n of businesses which were s u i t a b l e f o r t h i s ; and abolishment of the F i r s t Chamber. When the l a r g e s t Rotterdam newspaper, NRC, discussed the demands i n a long, f r o n t page a r t i c l e , i t found nothing that was extreme, and thought a l l these demands could be f u l f i l l e d within a reasonably short time. The paper argued that most of the demands were no more than was j u s t and needed to be implemented i n the new s o c i e t y which would be b u i l t i n Europe now that the war was over. The mayor and c i t y c o u n c i l of the c i t y met again with S o c i a l i s t leaders and promised to stay on under a new government f o r as long 21 as necessary. Excitement mounted when i n one of the f i v e SDAP meet-ings i n Rotterdam that evening T r o e l s t r a , flushed with the apparent successes of that day and c a r r i e d away with h i s own 22 r h e t o r i c v i r t u a l l y announced the r e v o l u t i o n — a l b e i t not on 23 the v i o l e n t Russian model. The workers were promised that the next day, at one o'clock, T r o e l s t r a tvould announce i n parliament that the r e v o l u t i o n was a f a c t . The threat seemed e s p e c i a l l y serious because Butselaar, president of the Bond  van D i e n s t p l i c h t i g e n promised the meeting that the army 158 would support the S o c i a l i s t s . That Butselaar had also been c a r r i e d away with the enthusiasm of the workers and had spoken against h i s own c o n v i c t i o n s ^ 4 few people knew with c e r t a i n t y that evening. The "counter-revolutionary" forces had not been i d l e i n those two days. The Protestants contacted a number of 25 V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm o f f i c e r s and the Keeper of the Palace Stables, and arranged to have 25 armed men stationed i n the stables. The C a t h o l i c group had c a l l e d the leaders of a l l Roman Cathol i c organizations to The Hague. They decided to p r i n t a manifesto of at l e a s t h a l f a m i l l i o n copies, to have a massive open a i r meeting i n The Hague the next Sunday, and to organize c i t i z e n guards (burgerwachten) wherever 26 p o s s i b l e . When Parliament met at one p.m. on Tuesday, November 12, i t soon became c l e a r that the S o c i a l i s t s ' thunder had been stolen. The Premier announced that the d a i l y bread rat i o n s would be increased from 200 (about 5 s l i c e s ) to 280 grams per person, that shipments of food were on the way from England and America, but that these were addressed to the Royal Netherland Government and hence would not be d e l i v e r e d to another government which had obtained i t s power by uncon-27 s t i t u t i o n a l means. The Minister of War announced a s e r i e s of reforms f o r the army, as well as the p a r t i a l demobiliza-28 t i o n . T r o e l s t r a spoke next, he denounced the use of force to obtain p o l i t i c a l ends but warned the government that i t d i d not have the support of the p o l i c e and army any more, 159 while the workers were getting impatient with the govern-29 ment. The next speaker, J . B. Bomans (RKSP), however, immediately challenged T r o e l s t r a ' s claim that he spoke f o r a l l the workers. Bomans pointed out that the Roman Cat h o l i c workers had only that very morning promised t h e i r support to the government. By Wednesday i t was c l e a r that the threat of a revolu-t i o n was past. I t had never been serious to begin with. The SDAP shunned the use of force, ( i t d i d not have any weapons anyway), d i d not have the support of the army or the p o l i c e , and d i d not have the r i g h t leaders. T r o e l s t r a was not the man to lead a r e v o l u t i o n : very popular i n h i s party and beyond, he was too much an i d e a l i s t and a dreamer who had been c a r r i e d away with his own dreams. Only the Communists t r i e d something concrete on Wednesday. They organized a march to one of the barracks i n Amsterdam to " l i b e r a t e " the s o l d i e r s . The l a t t e r refused to be l i b e r a t e d , f i r e d a few shots, and there was no more trouble."* 0 The i n a b i l i t y of a l l the "revolutionary" forces to work t o g e t h e r — t h e eternal sickness of the L e f t — and the absence of a r e a l revolutionary leader were probably the main reasons the S o c i a l i s t s never even got star t e d on t h e i r r e v o l u t i o n . 160 4. The Aftermath In the days that followed, the curious phenomenon took place that i n Parliament the n o n - S o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s (including those forming the Government) discussed the 15 demands of the S o c i a l i s t Manifesto, and agreed that many 31 could and should be implemented. At the same time, fever-i s h a c t i v i t y continued by the government and the "counter-revolutionary" groups to prepare the country against a take-over the shadow of which had already departed. On Tuesday night the Cabinet discussed the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n with the acting Commander i n Chief, General Pop. I t was decided to c a l l up as many r e l i a b l e troops as could be found and to guard a l l p u b l i c buildings i n the three big c i t i e s . The V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm would also be c a l l e d up the following day because the General thought only the cavalry could be trusted and perhaps a few i n f a n t r y regiments, but the remainder of the army would probably not want to act 32 fo r or against the government. This judgement was under-l i n e d by the l a r g e s t (of the four) non-commissioned o f f i c e r s associations, Ons Belang (Our I n t e r e s t ) , when i t refused to sign a p e t i t i o n promising obedience to the government. Instead, Ons Belang sent a telegram to a l l i t s members with 33 the simple message, "Be c a r e f u l , don't burn yourself". On Wednesday the government issued a lengthy p r o c l a -mation, which was d i s t r i b u t e d a l l over the country. I t d i d not sound very a u t h o r i t a t i v e ; but was more a desperate pro-mising of future cornucopias i f everyone would only remain 161 quiet and not s t a r t a r e v o l u t i o n : i In these very d i f f i c u l t times the government i s forced to c a l l upon the support of a l l the people. The war i s over but the economic l i f e i s not yet restored. Only when we apply a l l our strength i n the coming times can we prevent a d i s a s t e r . I f disorder prevents the normal development, the worst must be expected. THE EXAMPLE OF RUSSIA i s before us. The order to demobilize has already been given. Care i s taken that the EX-SOLDIER WILL NOT BE WITHOUT FOOD. M i l i t a r y s t o c k p i l e s are placed at the d i s p o s a l of the people. This w i l l enable many now without l i g h t to get COAL-OIL; 500,000 PAIR MILITARY SHOES w i l l become a v a i l a b l e . CHEAP CLOTH w i l l become av a i l a b l e on a large scale....[followed three paragraphs with promises of what would become a v a i l a b l e s h o r t l y ] ALL ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN NATIONS WILL BE (PLACED) ON SHAKY GROUND IF THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY IS ATTACKED. May the common sense of the large majority of the people, and e s p e c i a l l y of the lower classes, save us from countless miseries which w i l l b e f a l l us i f normal r e l a t i o n s are disrupted. People of the Netherlands, you have your own destiny i n your hands. Against the announcement of a minority that i t w i l l take the power i n i t s own hands, the govern-ment has decided, i n the i n t e r e s t of the r i g h t s and freedoms of the whole nation, TO MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER. [signed by a l l the (11) ministers] The part about law and order was very short compared to a l l the promises, but the government spent the most time and e f f o r t on i t . That Wednesday evening 400 V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm troops were i n Rotterdam (a f u l l 24 hours before 3 5 regular troops a r r i v e d ) , and another 600 i n The Hague. In these two c i t i e s the Roman Cat h o l i c and Protestant trade unions announced that they had 7,000 volunteers a v a i l a b l e f o r the c i t i z e n guards. Competition between the l a t t e r and the V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm as to who would get the a v a i l a b l e weapons and who would have authority over whom had already 162 started. The government also issued orders f o r the creation of a Bijzondere (Special) V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm. This would be an organization of ex-service men, eithe r j u s t demobilized or with previous s e r v i c e , who would be drawn up i n l o c a l u n i t s , would be paid, armed, dressed, and transported to where they were needed by the government. They would be used s o l e l y f o r the maintenance of law and order, but would be under the co n t r o l and d i r e c t i o n of the Commander i n Chief 37 Armed Forces. A l l these precautions were a l i t t l e excessive. There was no danger of an armed takeover at a l l . But every r e l i -gious organization, i n f a c t v i r t u a l l y everyone except the Le f t , sent messages of support, manifestoes, l o y a l t y t e l e -grams, etc., to the c a p i t a l . The Roman Cathol i c mass meeting drew 40,000 people on Sunday. There i t was announced that the Queen would appear the following day at the Malieveld (a large, grassy f i e l d i n The Hague). When she ar r i v e d , thousands and thousands were there to welcome her. Under loud cheering a company of s o l d i e r s removed the horses from i n f r o n t of the Royal carriage and p u l l e d i t themselves. This "spontaneous" action l a t e r proved to have been c a r e f u l l y 38 rehearsed , but that d i d not matter; the whole nation was suddenly super p a t r i o t i c and the House of Orange better loved than at any time since William the S i l e n t . Considering the weak a t t i t u d e of the Dutch government against foreign nations i n four years of war, i t s f l a c c i d p o s i t i o n against the extreme left-wing elements within the 163 Netherlands d e s i r i n g to undermine the army, and the lack-l u s t e r and i n d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e of the majority of the Dutch people, the sudden resurgence of strength, a c t i v i t y and determination on the part of those wanting to maintain the e x i s t i n g order was rather s u r p r i s i n g . For years the country had d r i f t e d between nations at w a r — f i r s t i t was pushed t h i s way, then the other v/ay. A l l v i t a l i t y , pride, and f o r c e f u l -ness appeared gone. But when danger threatened, a small number of men proved a l e r t and d e c i s i v e enough to o f f e r resistance and before long many Dutch proved w i l l i n g to put national i n t e r e s t f i r s t . Such sentiment should have been used by the government to introduce some r e a l army reforms, p a r t i c u l a r l y now that i t was r i d i n g such a c r e s t of popu-l a r i t y . I t was an e s p e c i a l l y good time to begin with the younger d r a f t s s t i l l serving because they were very busy with use f u l work and therefore quite s a t i s f i e d . Those sent to the big c i t i e s f e l t t h e i r presence had p o s s i b l y prevented a revolution; others had been transported to Limburg where (beginning on November 12) 70,000 German troops crossed i n t o the Netherlands from Belgium, were disarmed and c a r e f u l l y watched as they made t h e i r way across Dutch t e r r i t o r y to 39 Germany. The interned s o l d i e r s (roughly 35,000) were eager to go home and arrangements had to be made. The same was true f o r the 16,000 wounded German and English prisoners of 40 war who had been i n the Netherlands since 1917. 164 Constructive action and modernization of the Dutch army did not take place, however. The demobilization contin-ued. By the middle of February, 1919 the 1917 d r a f t had gone home. By the f i r s t week i n A p r i l one-third of the 1918 d r a f t 41 (the youngest) had also departed. The army was now reduced below i t s prewar strength. And the "modernization" which was to take place and f o r which General Snijders d i d not have the r i g h t mentality? Presumably i t had already been i n s t i -tuted. On November 14, 1918 the plans were already worked out because the Queen (at her own request) received an o u t l i n e : 1. O f f i c e r s would receive i n s t r u c t i o n s on the new officer-men r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 2. I f a s o l d i e r was punished, he could submit his case to a committee i n the composition of which he had had a vote/voice. 3. A s p e c i a l committee would be i n s t i t u t e d to i n v e s t i g a t e a l l complaints. 4. There would be a committee to i n v e s t i g a t e a l l material care: housing, food, cantines, etc. 5. New guidelines would be published f o r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between commanding o f f i c e r s and the various clubs and associations of o f f i c e r s , non-commissioned o f f i c e r s , and men. 6. More attention would be paid to the s p i r i t u a l health of the s o l d i e r s . The law forbidding cursing and swearing would be enforced more s t r i c t l y . What a l l the modernization amounted to then was another three committees, more power f o r the clubs and associations, a s l i g h t lessening i n d i s c i p l i n a r y r u l e s , a review of sen-tences, and a more (outwardly) " C h r i s t i a n " army which d i d not curse or swear. A few of the s i x points had merit and needed to be done, but the program was f a r short of what was necessary. 165 Considering the d e f i c i e n c i e s that had come to l i g h t over the years and the way d i s c i p l i n e had broken down major recon-s t r u c t i o n was required, not a half-hearted patch job. The only event the government drew a lesson from was the almost-Revolution of November. The then created Bijzondere V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm (BVL) was retained i n the interwar 43 years and placed under a separate command. The BVL could only be c a l l e d out when law and order was threatened and was 44 only paid when c a l l e d out. I t thus became an "insurance" force of armed c i v i l i a n s under m i l i t a r y command to protect the i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y of the country; t h i s could not be l e f t s o l e l y to the regular army because i t was not considered r e l i a b l e enough. No e f f o r t was made to reconstruct the regu-l a r forces so that they would be r e l i a b l e . The government also created a Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency (Centrale I n l i c h t -ingendienst) which was hidden from p u b l i c and parliament's view by having i t s budget placed under General S t a f f expen-45 d i t u r e s . Never large, the new department of 4 o f f i c e r s , 46 3 c i v i l i a n s , and 8 t y p i s t s , was expected to gather i n f o r -mation about revolutionary elements within the country. Apart from these two measures designed to guard against danger from within, no other precautions were taken. The p o s s i b i l i t y of danger from outside the borders was not considered at a l l . In view of the nature of successive governments one would expect that the shortcomings i n the m i l i t a r y would be remedied. For the next 20 years the governments were always 166 formed by the p a r t i e s from the R i g h t — t h e men i n favour of having an army, the men who had come to the aid of the nation i n November. Unfortunately, "the Right" was anything but a homogenous body; divided along economic, geographic and r e l i g i o u s l i n e s , i t was seldom that there was a united p o l i c y i n favour of anything. They opposed, to a greater, or lesser degree^ the SDAP and a l l those l e f t of i t , and were generally i n favour of a defensive force; but the s i z e of that force, the f i n a n c i a l o bligations i t should place on the nation, and the magnitude of the danger threatening the Netherlands were a l l questions viewed d i f f e r e n t l y by the groups making up "the Right". Even during the f i r s t f i v e years of H i t l e r ' s Chancellorship few Dutch people asked themselves whether the independence of the Netherlands was i n danger. Consequently there was never any e f f o r t made to strengthen the defences of the nation; the Great War experience, which should have served as an example and a blue p r i n t f o r what was required fo r the future was ignored. What the government took precau-tionary measures a g a i n s t — a p o s s i b l e r e v o l u t i o n — n e v e r came; what the government did not think necessary to guard a g a i n s t — a foreign i n v a s i o n — d i d come. CHAPTER VII Consequences of Neglect 1. The Inter-War Years From the experience of the Great War the Netherlands could draw one of three conclusions: 1. the country should be and could be defended provided much money and e f f o r t were expended 2. the Netherlands was tod small and weak to f i g h t against big nations and therefore there was no point i n having an army at a l l 3. a moderate force, reasonable defences, and i m p a r t i a l i t y i n p o l i t i c s would s u f f i c e to keep the Netherlands safe. Looking back on the four years that rent Europe many Dutch people drew the conclusion that the Netherlands had remained out of the c o n f l i c t because i t had been neutral before, and continued to be scrupulously i m p a r t i a l during the war. In s p i t e of the many memoirs of Dutch p o l i t i c i a n s , German generals, B r i t i s h statesmen and many others i n p o s i -tions of authority during the war—which c l e a r l y showed that the Netherlands simply had been l u c k y — t h i s notion was maintained f o r years. Out of i t the f a l l a c i o u s b e l i e f was born that the Netherlands, having stayed out twice now (1870, 1914) would "na t u r a l l y " stay out of any future war. Joining Europe i n the cry of "never again", the Netherlands threw i t s e l f wholeheartedly i n t o the anti-war movement. The euphoria of the new peaceful Europe so obviously manifested i n the demise of m i l i t a r i s t i c Germany, a Naval Agreement 168 (1922), the Locarno Treaties (1925), a Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), and guaranteed by the League of Nations, r e a l l y took hold i n the Netherlands. But apart from j o i n i n g the League of Nations i n 1920, the Dutch d i d nothing else because n e u t r a l i t y s t i l l meant i m p a r t i a l i t y — a l s o i n peaceful Europe. Foreign a f f a i r s became once again something to read about i n the newspapers without asking what foreign events might mean for the Netherlands. The popular b e l i e f that the Netherlands had some so r t of permanent lease on n e u t r a l i t y was strengthened when i n 1923 a Dutch h i s t o r i a n (A. A. Struycken) wrote that the n e u t r a l i t y of the Netherlands was a necessity f o r the p o l i t i c a l balance i n Europe. Presumptuous as t h i s sounds, the idea was accepted; as l a t e as 1938 the former Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s (1918-1929) Van Karnebeek used these words to defend the Dutch p o s i t i o n of neutrality.^" I t was not thought necessary to ensure that the neu-t r a l i t y of the Netherlands (and presumably thereby the p o l i t i c a l balance i n Europe) was guaranteed by adequate defences. Long, acrimonious dabates i n Parliament i n 1921 and 1922 r e s u l t e d i n very severe cuts i n the defence budget. 2 From f l . 207 m i l l i o n i n 1919 the budget was reduced to f l . 127 m i l l i o n i n 1920 and to 92 m i l l i o n two years l a t e r . From that point i t went s t e a d i l y downwards u n t i l the low point of 74 m i l l i o n i n 1934 and 75 m i l l i o n i n 1935 was reached. A fund of f l . 106 m i l l i o n was promised to buy new 3 weapons; the promise was never f u l f i l l e d . 169 For some people the reductions of 1921 and 1922 were s t i l l not enough. The Vrijzinnig-Democratische Bond wanted t o t a l disarmament because "the Netherlands could not defend i t s e l f anyway"; the SDAP considered armed defence "national s u i c i d e " ; some of the r e l i g i o u s s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s , e.g. the 4 Christelijke-Democratische Unie, were also p a c i f i s t i c . T o tal disarmament d i d not occur, but what happened was not very d i f f e r e n t . Mistakes from before and during the war were repeated as i f they were the most normal and l o g i c a l thing i n the world. The post. Commander i n Chief Armed Forces, was once again made vacant to be f i l l e d when the country needed such a man. The Chief of the General Staff was to look a f t e r the army i n the meantime, but since the Commander F i e l d Army was of the same rank (sometimes higher) and the Minister of War was us u a l l y a r e t i r e d o f f i c e r , much wrangling and i n - f i g h t i n g took p l a c e . 5 Not that there was much to f i g h t about; the number of conscripts was reduced to 19,500, and t h e i r t r a i n i n g period to f i v e and one-half months and even t h i s could be decreased to one and one-half months i f a person took 300 hours "pre-training" with the BVL. Once again the better men took advantage of the option and the army suffered. Those who were conscripted had to serve f o r 15 years, but only two r e t r a i n i n g periods f o r a t o t a l of 40 days (reduced to 30 days i n 1928) were thought necessary. (Belgium drafted 55,000 men i n 1921). The p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s , disgusted with the state of a f f a i r s , r a p i d l y disappeared from the army. 170 In 1918 there were 1050 of them; by 1936 only 625 remained. Most of the ones who remained found a haven i n the several s t a f f s or ( v i r t u a l l y empty) s t a f f c o l l e g e s . The p r o f e s s i o n a l NCOs were s i m i l a r l y reduced i n numbers; only the older ones, waiting out t h e i r time u n t i l retirement and pension remained. The euphemism f o r the "reforms" of the army was.that 7 the "Swiss system" was being introduced. The twisted reasoning behind the new "system" i s d i f f i c u l t to follow. From 1915 to 1918 there had been a Swiss system i n so f a r as a l l able-bodied men served i n the forces. Now only 19,500 served out of the 49,000 medically f i t to do so. Consequently, i n a mobilization (as happened i n 1939) men i n t h e i r t h i r t i e s were c a l l e d up while thousands i n t h e i r e arly twenties (often unemployed) remained at home. The Dutch conveniently forgot that the Swiss spent a great deal more time, money, and e f f o r t on t h e i r defences than the Netherlands. The Swiss also had a short f i r s t t r a i n i n g period but thereafter f r e -quently had extensive manoeuvres which acted as " t e s t -mobilizations" and brought men repeatedly together i n large Q formations to get used to working with each other. Except f o r 40 days i n 15 years the Dutch "troops" d i d not work with each other at a l l . The argument can be forwarded that the Netherlands had no reason to spend money on defence i n the decade and a ha l f following the Great War. Europe was at peace, Germany was disarmed, there was a League of Nations, everything appeared to ensure a long period of s t a b i l i t y . A country as l i t t l e as 171 the Netherlands c e r t a i n l y d i d not need to exert i t s e l f spending large sums against a phantom enemy who might never mat e r i a l i z e . This argument i s not acceptable i f the long-range view i s taken—which must always be done i n questions of national defence. The Netherlands had had a very cheap t r a i n i n g period from 1914 to 1918;it had not been invaded yet had discovered a l l the shortcomings of i t s defence c a p a b i l i t i e s . The various d e f i c i e n c i e s ( i n f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , weapons, d i s c i p l i n e and training) had been of such nature that they could not be r e c t i f i e d i n a short period of time. The Great War had shown that no weapons could be procured abroad i n time of extreme i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension or war. I t had also become c l e a r that the Netherlands would need years to develop i t s own armament industry. Building defensive l i n e s could not be started when the enemy crossed the b o r d e r — t h i s had been true i n the Great War and with armies becoming more mobile became truer every day. Training an.Iefficient army took time i n any country but especially, i n the Netherlands where there was r e a l l y no base to b u i l d on. That nothing happened during the twenties i s perhaps understandable. A n t i - m i l i t a r i s m was strong i n the Netherlands; there was no foreign threat. But i n the early t h i r t i e s the s i t u a t i o n changed; i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension increased (as i t had before 1914). Careful statemen should have heeded the w a r n i n g — e s p e c i a l l y i n the Netherlands. From 1918 to 1940 the ten governments (under three premiers) were always made 172 up from the three lar g e s t r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s (Anti-Revolu-t i o n a i r e P a r t i j ; C h r i s t e l i j k e - H i s t o r i s c h e Unie; Rooms 9 Katholieke Staats P a r t i j ) . These were the men who had been in.favour of a defence force since before 1914, who had voted against demobilization on a number of occasions from 1914 to 1918, who had rushed to the aid of t h e i r country i n November 1918, who wanted to keep an army i n 19 21 when the L e f t had wanted to abolish i t . During the twenties the Right had accepted the minimum; one would expect that i n the t h i r t i e s they would want more, e s p e c i a l l y since the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l climate became more favourable for t h i s . There was s t i l l very l i t t l e unity i n the Netherlands; the 54 p a r t i e s who contested the 1933 e l e c t i o n showed the malaise i n the country. But there were a growing number of people who began to desire more authority, more s e c u r i t y and a more f o r c e f u l national p o l i c y . In part t h i s stemmed from Mussolini's "example" i n I t a l y , i n part from the 1929 depression which caused so much upheaval i n so many l i v e s . A more concrete example was the continuing existence and growth of the Bijzondere V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm. I t had between 45,000 and 60,000 members during the twenties; by 1934 t h i s number had increased to 80,000, by 1938 to 93,000. 1 0 These were the men who thought i t necessary to be ready i n 11 case t h e i r country should become endangered. The BVL was not a large group i n a population of roughly 8 m i l l i o n ; but others also would have accepted a more f o r c e f u l defence p o l i c y . 173 In February, 1933, a mutiny broke out on the old c r u i s e r De Zeven Provincien stationed i n the Dutch East Indies. When the mutineers s a i l e d the ship along the coast of Sumatra the government sent a bomber which dropped one bomb on the s h i p — 2 3 dead, 14 wounded. The mutineers handed 12 over the ship. Before the government took t h i s action, H. C o l i j n , leader of the Anti-Revolutionair P a r t i j , had t o l d j o u r n a l i s t s , " i f need be the ship must be torpedoed and sent 13 to the bottom of the ocean." Strong protest from the SDAP and other left-wing p a r t i e s followed C o l i j n " s words and even more so the government's (Premier Ruys de Beerenbrouck) action. But when the e l e c t i o n s were held two months l a t e r ( A p r i l , 1933), the ARP, with C o l i j n as i t s leader, gained two seats and increased i t s vote from 390,000 to almost 14 500,000 while the SDAP l o s t two seats. In addition, one of the few new s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s which managed to get i n t o Parliament (14 p a r t i e s of the 54 did) was the Verbond van  Nationaal Herstel, under the leadership of General Snijders. The main point i n the e l e c t i o n campaign of t h i s party had been that the Netherlands needed a better defence p o l i c y . F i n a l l y , the SDAP protested the bombing of De Zeven  Provincien, but i n 1937 the party voted f o r the f i r s t time i n favour of the defence budget and also scrapped the party dictum that the Netherlands should become a r e p u b l i c . These two changes did not come over-night, they had been debated f o r years within the party. The d i v i s i o n i n the L e f t , and i t s gradual acceptance that the Netherlands should prepare 174 to defend i t s e l f , was an i n d i c a t i o n how the p o l i t i c a l climate was changing. The government could have, i n 1934 or 1935, started to strengthen the Dutch army without encountering too much opposition i n the country. No such measures were undertaken, however. Premier C o l i j n (1933-1939) was as myopic as his predecessors i n judging changing att i t u d e s i n foreign countries. In A p r i l 1 9 3 9 — a f t e r A u s t r i a and Czechoslovakia had f a l l e n to H i t l e r — he sa i d i n a radio speech: ...There i s no reason at a l l to be concerned. Of course we c a r e f u l l y watch the world s i t u a t i o n , but that i s very d i f f e r e n t from fe a r i n g f o r our immediate safety. For sujh. f e a r — I repeat i t — I do not see any reason. With such p o l i t i c a l leaders, and a population apathetic towards foreign events i t goes almost without saying that no defence measures were undertaken. From 1921 to 1939 the Netherlands spent only 1.7 per cent of i t s t o t a l n a t i o n a l income on defence. In 1932, of some 14 European countries, the Netherlands spent the lowest percentage of i t s nation a l budget on defence—8.7 per cent. Belgium spent 16.7 per cent, Denmark 16.3. In the year that H i t l e r came to power and Japan and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations, the Dutch government i n s t i t u t e d the Commissie Idenburg which had to f i n d ways of paring another 25 m i l l i o n guilders from the defence budget. That same year the Netherlands spent f l . 6.22 per capita for defence; Denmark spent f l . 9.70, Belgium f l . 11.47, and Switzerland f l . 13.40. 1 6 In 1935, when H i t l e r introduced conscription and announced that Germany would 175 rearm, the Dutch increased t h e i r defence budget by one m i l l i o n (to f l . 75 m i l l i o n ) , discontinued the "pre-training" program (as a means of saving money!), and established a Defence Fund of f l . 31 m i l l i o n to buy new weapons (while i n 1921 f l . 106 m i l l i o n had been thought necessary!). The 1937 defence budget of f l . 94 m i l l i o n returned the nation to the 1923 l e v e l of expenditures. Only i n 1938, a f t e r the occupa-t i o n and annexation of A u s t r i a and the Sudetenland, d i d the Dutch begin to act. The Defence Fund received f l . 14 m i l l i o n (and another f l . 39 m i l l i o n i n 1939), the m i l i t a r y budget was increased to f l . 152 m i l l i o n , the d r a f t expanded from 17 19,500 to 27,500 and service time lengthened to 11 months. I t was a l l a l i t t l e sad and very much too l a t e ; i t was also very contradictory and hopelessly i l l o g i c a l . In 1936 the Netherlands declared that i t d i d not consider i t s e l f bound by the c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y clause of the League of Nations (then to be used f o r the f i r s t time against I t a l y fo r i t s attack on E t h i o p i a ) . Thus the Netherlands returned completely to i t s World War I p o s i t i o n , declared once again that i t withdrew i t s e l f from developments i n Europe, and would not take sides with, or against anyone. On i t s e l f t h i s was a l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n f o r the Netherlands given i t s past h i s t o r y , but seen i n the l i g h t of the developments i n Europe since 1918, i t d i d not make sense to adopt such a p o l i c y without having adequate forces to back i t up. H i t l e r ' s moves could not be foreseen, but another war between Germany and France had to be considered a p o s s i b i l i t y . The Dutch knew 176 that France and Belgium had b u i l t , and were s t i l l b u i l d i n g , extensive defensive works along t h e i r eastern borders, conse-quently i t was l o g i c a l to expect a German attack to come through the Netherlands and turn south to h i t Belgium i n her weakly defended northern flank. (The Dutch General Staff had pointed t h i s out to the government.) There was no reason to maintain the myth about the Great War and the way the Netherlands had escaped i t . Moltke's Erinnerungen, B r i e f e , 18 Dokumente, had been i n p r i n t since 1922, and c l e a r l y demonstrated that only h i s idea that a neutral Netherlands was worth more to Germany than an occupied one had spared the country. The next German Commander i n Chief might not think the same way, and then the Netherlands would be attacked. The previous chapters have shown that the Dutch forces would not have been able to stop a determined enemy from defeating the Netherlands from 1914 to 1918. This same information must have been known to the Dutch government. There was even more reason to worry now because armies had gained the extra dimension of a i r power, and had gr e a t l y increased i n mo b i l i t y and f i r e power as w e l l . The Dutch army i n 1939 (even with service time increased to two years) v/as much weaker than i n 1914. By the end of 1939 only about 50,000 men had received a reasonable amount of t r a i n i n g ( i . e . 11 months); i t would thus take several more years before the army was well trained. Since the day General Snijders was removed from command there had 177 been no work done on the defence i n s t a l l a t i o n s . The Vesting Holland, already old i n 1914, was i n 1939 the same as i n 19 1890. In 1937 discussions were held on the need f o r a new defensive l i n e east of the Vesting Holland; i t was autumn 1939 before the f i r s t spade went i n t o the earth to dig the a n t i -tank canal: no unemployed c i v i l i a n s were allowed to work on i t . Even then m i l i t a r y projects were not to be a means of 20 creating work f o r the unemployed. What took place i n the year before the German invasion of the Netherlands was a sad r e p e t i t i o n of the 1914-1918 21 period. Only the names and numbers were d i f f e r e n t . Most of the money i n the Defence Fund could not be spent; a l l foreign weapon manufacturers were working f o r t h e i r own governments. In May 1940 the Dutch had 4.5 pieces of (mostly old) a r t i l -l e r y per i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n (Belgium had 10.2, Switzerland even more). Some of the a r t i l l e r y pieces f i r e d at the incom-ing Germans had been b u i l t i n 1880 and 1878. The a i r f o r c e consisted i n 1932 of 29 o f f i c e r s and 10 NCOs, by the out-break of the war i t had 125 (older) planes. The Netherlands did not possess one tank. The mobilized s o l d i e r earned f l . 2.23 a week—32 22 devalued g u i l d e r cents a day. The uniforms had been changed since 1918, but General Snijders' condemnation of the old ones was as e a s i l y applied to the new ones: "they were i l l f i t t i n g , rough and uncom-23 f o r t a b l e , and detracted from a s o l d i e r l y bearing". E s p e c i a l l y i r r i t a t i n g were the high c o l l a r s of the great 178 coats and the puttees. The l a t t e r had been adopted from the B r i t i s h , but instead of having them only around the ankles and of s o f t , p l i a b l e material, the Dutch had them come to the knee, and made them of a cheap, s t i f f cotton. In order to keep them on, they had to be t i e d so t i g h t l y i t hindered the c i r c u l a t i o n . The Quartermaster assumed that each draftee would have a p a i r of good boots and proper underwear of his own—obviously a f a l l a c i o u s (and rather stupid) assumption. When mobilization was c a l l e d on August 28, 1939, not enough uniforms were i n stock; some s o l d i e r s had to t r a i n f o r weeks i n c i v i l i a n clothes. Canteen and mess k i t were made of cheap t i n with soldered seams; they could thus not be heated over a f i r e because the solder would melt. These might seem l i k e minor matters but they were not. An i l l - f i t t i n g uniform, or having to drink cold coffee because i t can not be heated i s very aggravating i f i t i s a d a i l y occurance. Such things r e a l l y a f f e c t the morale of a s o l d i e r . E s p e c i a l l y f o r the Dutch army these things were bad. By nature not i n c l i n e d to s o l d i e r i n g , never having experienced a war, any kind of discomfort or hardship was reason f o r extensive complaining. Having been t o l d time and again that the Netherlands had remained out of the Great War because of i t s s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y , and having been assured by the p o l i t i c a l leaders that there was nothing to worry about, few Dutch conscripts took t h e i r m i l i t a r y duties s e r i o u s l y . They grumbled as much as t h e i r fathers had done 25 years e a r l i e r , and t h i s time with more j u s t i f i c a t i o n . They b u i l t 179 l i s t l e s s l y and c a r e l e s s l y on t h e i r defensive l i n e s , not expecting that they would ever have to use them—after a l l , 24 thexr fathers had not had to use the ones they had b u i l t ! Desire to volunteer was as l i m i t e d as i n 1914. The government asked i n A p r i l , 1939, f o r volunteers from among those without work. There were over one-quarter m i l l i o n unemployed men i n the Netherlands, yet fewer than 3,000 25 joined the armed forces. A great deal was thus the same i n 1939 as i n the pre-vious war; and they were a l l the wrong things that were s i m i l a r . No Commander i n Chief was appointed u n t i l the army was mobilized; he was General Reynders who had been Chief of the General S t a f f since 1934. He remembered the l a s t war, did not want to have a recurrence of the mobilization clubs and simply forbade a l l p o l i t i c s and propaganda within the army. The Minister of War (A. Q. H. Dijxhoorn, himself a former o f f i c e r ) thought t h i s went too f a r and wanted some sort of happy medium, only forbidding the "bad" mobilization clubs ( i . e . an exact recurrence of the Snijders-de Jonge 2 6 a l t e r c a t i o n ). The two men could not reach an agreement. Reynders also wanted the whole nation placed i n staat van  beleg so that far-reaching measures could be taken the moment they were necessary. This was refused by the govern-ment and only a few areas were put under martial law with the r e s u l t i n g problem of spies, undesired or suspicious looking people gathering information about the Dutch forces and defences. F i n a l l y , the General wanted a great deal of 180 money to increase the defences of the Grebbelinie, east of the Vesting Holland. Dijxhoorn would only consent to t h i s i f i t became the main defensive l i n e , rather than a temporary one (as Reynders planned) to hold up the enemy, complete the inundations around the Vesting, and withdraw the army within i t once everything was ready. Reynders refused to promise t h i s , considered the strategy of the government unsound, and 27 resigned on February 5, 1940. Because the government repeated World War I mistakes, the Netherlands was without a Commander i n Chief, s t i l l had problems with spies, mobilization clubs, and strategy (not to mention a l l the shortages i n weapons, equipment, and defence i n s t a l l a t i o n s ) . In addition, now that the army was mobilized, and t r a i n i n g on a large scale was f i n a l l y p o s sible, i t v/as hampered because once again extensive business, a g r i c u l t u r a l , study, etc., leaves had to be pro-28 vided (as well as regular leaves, of course). General H. G. Winkelman, r e t i r e d from 1935 to 1939, then returning to active duty as Commander A i r Defence Utrecht-Soesterberg, became the new Commander i n Chief. The General needed seven weeks to orientate himself and then decided to defend the Grebbelinie. During a l l t h i s time there had been no contact with Belgium, France, or Great B r i t a i n ; no m i l i t a r y exchange of b a t t l e or defence plans was allowed by the Dutch government. The only concession made was that the Dutch Ambassadors i n London, Brussels and Paris had sealed envelopes containing the Dutch plans of 181 defence (and a request to France f o r troops). The envelopes were not to be opened and the contents imparted to the respec-t i v e governments u n t i l the Netherlands was a c t u a l l y attacked. N e u t r a l i t y , taken f a r enough, can sometimes become s t u p i d i t y . The Dutch government had received plenty of warning that the Netherlands would be invaded. Even though the Dutch ignored the examples of A u s t r i a , Czechoslovakia and Poland, there were s p e c i f i c i n d i c a t i o n s that H i t l e r had designs on 29 the Lowlands. In October, 1939, a number of people were arrested f o r t r y i n g to smuggle Dutch p o l i c e , custom o f f i c e r s , and army uniforms i n t o Germany—an obvious i n d i c a t i o n that the Germans had a plan to capture Dutch border posts and bridges i n t a c t when they invaded the Netherlands. On Novem-ber 9, a Dutch o f f i c e r of the General S t a f f , accompanying two B r i t i s h i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r s , was shot near the German border by an SS squad and the four men (including a Dutch driver) were dragged i n t o Germany. Dutch protests about the "Venlo incident" were ignored. The most pointed warnings about German intentions came from the Dutch m i l i t a r y attache i n B e r l i n , Gijsbertus Jacobus Sas. He received h i s informa-t i o n from Hans Oster, head of the Zentralabteilung, Amt  Ausland-Abwehr,of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German; army's c e n t r a l i n t e l l i g e n c e agency). Sas warned the Dutch government many times that H i t l e r was planning to invade the Netherlands; he also on a number of occasions stated the date i t would happen. But because H i t l e r changed the date of the invasion frequently Sas appeared to be wrongly informed and 182 the Dutch government ignored his warning. In the f i r s t few days of May, 1940, the Dutch government received warnings from three separate sources that a German invasion was immi-31 nent. The recent invasion of Norway and Denmark must have made i t c l e a r to everyone that no neutral country was safe, but the warnings were not heeded. When Sas telephoned from B e r l i n on Thursday evening, May 9, "Tomorrow morning at dawn, he was s t i l l not believed. The Germans came with nine and one-third d i v i s i o n s , two of which were airborn and were dropped i n s i d e the Vesting Holland.,Outclassed materially, outwitted s t r a t e g i c a l l y , outweighed numerically, the Dutch forces v i r t u a l l y collapsed i n chaos. When Rotterdam was bombed, the war which was already l o s t came to an end. The army capitulated—2,032 32 Dutch s o l d i e r s had died i n f i v e days f i g h t i n g . A long, very long, f i v e years of occupation lay ahead of the Nether-33 lands. Although t h i s thesis i s only concerned with the Dutch army during World War I, the interwar years had to be covered b r i e f l y because they show the l o g i c a l outcome of the contin-uation of the unchanged 1914-1918 defence p o l i c y . The f i a s c o i n May 1940 can be understood i f the national a t t i t u d e during the Great War i s understood. The p r i n c i p a l points towards defence, the m i l i t a r y establishment i n general, and the developments i n foreign nations d i d not d i f f e r during the Great War and the twenty years that followed. 183 2. National Myopia The reasons f o r the Dutch l a c k l u s t e r and half-hearted defence e f f o r t s from 1914 to 1918 are many, but although they are various, they cannot be treated as separate e n t i t i e s because they are a l l c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d . Apathy and indo-lence c e r t a i n l y played a large r o l e , but so d i d in d i v i d u a l i s m and a strong entrepreneurial s p i r i t — a t t i t u d e s which may appear contradictory but are yet c l o s e l y t i e d together. The lack of p o s i t i v e thought and actions towards defence of the nation were strongly rooted i n h i s t o r y . N e u t r a l i t y had become a matter of course; there had long been a tendency to look inward from the borders and seldom were foreign events con-sidered i n the framework of po s s i b l e consequences f o r the Netherlands. The apathy and indolence were also 1due to a natural desire to focus one's attention on the family, l o c a l community, church and/or p o l i t i c a l party, so that national i n t e r e s t remained i n the background. In addition, because of the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c character of the people, few l i k e d to be t o l d what to d o — e i t h e r s e l f i n t e r e s t or a resistance to having the apathy shaken out of them brought opposition to m i l i t a r y l i f e . Only f o r a r e l a t i v e l y small number was a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m based on genuine p a c i f i s t i c or communistic p r i n c i p l e s — t h e f i r s t b e l i e v i n g a l l violence to be bad, the l a t t e r arguing with Lenin that i t was a c a p i t a l i s t i c war and should therefore not be fought by the workers. With such a background a s i t u a t i o n resulted where only the most violent-threat could shake the country out of i t s lethargy and arouse 184 i t to a few e f f o r t s f o r s e l f defence. As soon as the immediate danger appeared to have receded, the majority sank back to t h e i r pre-war l e v e l and only viewed the measures which had been taken as perhaps excessive and i f not that, c e r t a i n l y a nuisance and burden which d i d not r e a l l y require the i n d i v i d u a l ' s wholehearted support. The conduct of the Netherlands from 1914 to 1918 was a continuation of the p o l i c i e s of the previous 100 y e a r s — during which time n e u t r a l i t y and i m p a r t i a l i t y had become sacred objectives. Before 1914 t h i s had cost l i t t l e n a t i o n a l e f f o r t and involved no personal s a c r i f i c e s . During the war something had to be done, but i t was seldom more than the minimum thought necessary. One excellent example: the m i l i t a r y forces had cost less than 10 per cent of the annual national income i n those years. The t o t a l reached two b i l l i o n g u i l d e r s . In comparison, the Dutch l o s t one and one-quarter b i l l i o n g u i l d e r s — t w o - t h i r d s of the t o t a l defence budget f o r four years—when the Bolsheviks refused to honour the Tzar's 35 foreign o b l i g a t i o n s . When the Harskamp Investigation Committee wrote i n 1919, "our people are not a m i l i t a r y people", i t stated an axiom which had been true i n 1909 as well as 1879, and only proved that the Netherlands had not changed during the war. The basic problem remained: unless danger was imminent and e a s i l y recognizable, the Dutch people were indolent towards the question of t h e i r s e c u r i t y and apathetic i n taking preventive measures to guarantee t h e i r safety. 185 To prepare s e r i o u s l y f o r the defence of t h e i r nation the Dutch d i d not have to become infatuated with the m i l i t a r y as, f o r instance, had been the case i n Germany before 1914. There i s a great d i f f e r e n c e between wanting to defend one's country and preaching war as a " p u r i f i c a t i o n " method that destroys the weak and strengthens the strong. Undoubtedly the Netherlands would have fought i n August, 1914, had she been attacked—but how long and how well can only be a matter of speculation. I n i t i a l Dutch action i n that month appeared promising and t e s t i f i e d to a national unity and cooperation not seen for a long time previously. The unity did not stand the t e s t of time; once the immediate danger appeared past, national cooperation also departed. From 1914 to 1918, as well as during the l a t e t h i r t i e s , the Dutch refused to take strong, prolonged, preventive measures. Reasons f o r t h i s are p a r t l y 3 6 to be found i n the national character: individualism, stubbornness, conservatism, preference f o r l i f e i n a small c i r c l e were no t r a i t s which saw immediate or long range returns from investments i n things m i l i t a r y . By simply ignoring events i n other countries and only looking inward from the Dutch borders, apathetic and s l i g h t l y antagonistic attitudes towards the m i l i t a r y could, and were maintained for a long time. The n a t i o n a l myopia was not r e s t r i c t e d to the war period, i t c a r r i e d beyond; nor were only c e r t a i n classes a f f l i c t e d with i t , the whole nation was permeated. A good example of t h i s i s a s e r i e s of lectures given on 186 December 14 and 15, 1939, at Leiden U n i v e r s i t y . The speeches were held by three well-known academicians from three Dutch u n i v e r s i t i e s and dealt with the values held by the Dutch people, the r o l e the nation could play i n the commonwealth of people, and the part each i n d i v i d u a l Dutch-3 8 man could have i n t h i s . What the speakers sai d was impor-tant, but what they d i d not say was i n d i c a t i v e of the shortsightedness of the Dutch nation as a whole. They men-tioned that the i n i t i a t i v e f o r the speeches and the suggested topics had come from the four d i f f e r e n t student organizations and that t h i s was already a sign that the Netherlands was changing. More i n t e r e s t was taken i n the world beyond the borders. They spoke about the d i v e r s i t y i n the Dutch nation a l character, as well as the t i e s that bound the people to-gether. From 1914 to 1918 the Netherlands had only had one thought, "How do we stay out of i t ? " During that time, 39 " n e u t r a l i t y was a completely passive, negative concept". But t h i s time the neutral nations, foremost among them the Netherlands, were a c t i v e l y searching f o r ways to e s t a b l i s h a permanent pe a c e . 4 0 In t h i s connection Mr. Dr. J. van Waldre de Bordes repeated a sentence from Premier de Geer's radio speech on November 13, 1939: Every neutral country i s now a bright l i g h t i n the darkness which has f a l l e n over our continent. If a new dawn i s ever to a r i s e over Europe, i t must come from the neutral countries. What the professors d i d not mention i n t h e i r speeches was the p o s s i b i l i t y that the Netherlands might not be able 187 to remain n e u t r a l — t h a t the fa t e of A u s t r i a , Czechoslovakia, or Poland could e a s i l y b e f a l l the nation. This d i d not appear to occur to the speakers. They a l l spoke as i f neu-t r a l i t y was a one-sided p o s i t i o n which could only be changed by the Netherlands. Students were not warned to prepare to f i g h t f o r t h e i r country because the danger was imminent. There i s not one word about a po s s i b l e invasion i n any of the three speeches. The most i r o n i c (and sad) part about the lectures i s that the speakers c l e a r l y recognized what had been wanting i n the Dutch a t t i t u d e towards n e u t r a l i t y , without r e a l i z i n g that the exact same a t t i t u d e s t i l l per-s i s t e d i n 1939. And i n f a c t , that they themselves shared t h i s a t t i t u d e because they f a i l e d to r e a l i z e that the Neth-erlands must f i r s t prepare i t s e l f f o r i t s own defence before i t could turn to help e s t a b l i s h peace i n Europe. I t i s not su r p r i s i n g that one of the speakers quoted the aforemen-tioned l i n e s of Premier de Geer's speech, and d i d not take issue with the manner i n which the Premier had begun his speech: I t has come to the attention of the government that i n the past few days rumours have c i r c u l a t e d that a great danger threatens our country, and that these rumours have caused unrest i n many people. I j u s t wanted to t e l l you that there i s no reason f o r t h i s at a l l . . . Continuing, the Premier used the example of the F i r s t World War; many had then also been a f r a i d that the war would involve them, but that fear had proved quite groundless. "One should view the s i t u a t i o n as not being any d i f f e r e n t now."* 188 Leaving aside f o r the moment the disastrous e f f e c t t h i s had for the m i l i t a r y leaders who were desperately t r y i n g to prepare the Dutch forces f o r war, i t i s cl e a r that the Premier, as ti/ell as the academicians at Leiden, had not r e a l i z e d the close escape that the Netherlands had had i n the Great War. Linking the F i r s t World War to 1939 i n d i -cates that the Premier saw no d i f f e r e n c e between the per-iods and circumstances. He f u l l y expected the s i t u a t i o n to develop as i t had 25 years e a r l i e r , and the Netherlands would "na t u r a l l y " remain neutral. The great majority of the Dutch thought the same as t h e i r Premier—and had done so since 1918. Indicative of the mood of the nation was the tremendous popularity of the i n 1928 published novel, Frank van Wezels  Roemruchte J a r e n — N o t i f i e s van een Landstormman (Frank van Wezels' Glorious Y e a r s — D i a r y of a Landstorm Soldier). 4"^ Written i n a d i a r y s t y l e , the book merc i l e s s l y r i d i c u l e s the Dutch army during the l a s t two years of i t s m o b i l i z a t i o n . While E. M. Remarque i n A l l Quiet on the Western Front, (also very popular i n the Netherlands) shows the s t u p i d i t y and useless loss of l i f e i n war, but also portrays the comradeship i n an army as something good i n an i n s t i t u t i o n used f o r e v i l purposes, A. M. de Jong only shows the negative side of army l i f e . Real comradeship i s only present among a l l those who d i s l i k e the army and do t h e i r utmost to get out of as much work as p o s s i b l e . Often quite humourous, the 189 book r i d i c u l e s the army as an i n s t i t u t i o n , but never i s there an attempt made to look f o r the reason f o r the e x i s t -ence of the army. The Dutch loved the book, laughed h e a r t i l y , applauded the sketches and plays taken out of the book and performed on many occasions and agreed with the writer that the army was a stupid and useless i n s t i t u t i o n . In so doing, the people subconsciously turned the larger problem—Europe at w a r — i n t o a domestic i s s u e — t h e Dutch army—divorced the l a t t e r from the former, and so f e l t j u s t i f i e d heaping d e r i s i o n on the Dutch defence e f f o r t s . Unwilling, or unable, to make a d i s t i n c t i o n between a s o l e l y defensive army and one used f o r conquest, the Dutch lumped both together and rejected the idea that the former was e s s e n t i a l i f the l a t t e r was present i n a neighbouring state. Having been free for so long, no one could imagine what t o l l defeat and subjugation extracted from a country. Being a s a t i a t e d nation, they projected t h e i r own mentality onto others and believed themselves safe. For t h i s national myopia the Dutch paid dearly from 1940 to 1945. Placing men i n uniform does not make them s o l d i e r s ; i n a democratic state an army i s only as strong as the people from whom i t i s drawn, which explains the underlying reason for the weakness of the Dutch army. The Dutch nation was very d i v e r s e — a conglomeration of d i f f e r e n t i d e a l s , p r i n c i p l e s , classes and i n t e r e s t s , divided by i t s r i v e r s , canals, ditches d i f f e r e n t d i a l e c t s , r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s and s o c i a l norms. I t was held together by a bond of h i s t o r i c a l development, the 190 House of Orange, and an e v e r l a s t i n g f i g h t against the sea. The Netherlands was very much l i k e a progressive, modern family where father, mother and c h i l d r e n each have diverse i n t e r e s t s which each member pursues without i n f r i n g i n g too much upon other family members' i n t e r e s t s . Yet each person knows himself to be part of one family. The Netherlands could e x i s t quite n i c e l y i f no large, overriding problems existed. The war was such a problem, however, and caused some sort of infringement on everybody: the one which concerned almost everyone i n some way or another was the large (for the Netherlands) armed force. Each member of the family, according to his ideas or i n c l i n a t i o n s reacted d i f f e r e n t l y towards t h i s problem. But almost everyone reacted i n a negative way because the person or group f e l t i t s freedoms and i t s exemption from r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were i n f r i n g e d upon. The l a t t e r had f o r many become, without r e a l l y r e a l i z i n g i t , a cherished r i g h t to be retained except i n times of extreme emergencies. In the previous chapters i t has been shown that the Dutch never solved the problem of maintaining an army f o r as long as danger threatened, even though s u p e r f i c i a l l y the i l l u s i o n was created that the problem was solved. The weapons, ammunition, equipment, d i s c i p l i n e , deployment and state of readiness a l l l e f t so much to besdesired that Great B r i t a i n , and e s p e c i a l l y Germany, would have had l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n defeating the Netherlands. This was not j u s t the f a u l t of the Dutch m i l i t a r y forces, the whole nation 191 was responsible. As a nation they c o n s i s t e n t l y refused to put national i n t e r e s t f i r s t . The population at large demonstrated t h e i r s e l f i s h a t t i t u d e i n a number of ways. F i r s t , the many thousands who smuggled food and other items in t o Belgium and Germany were aware that, e s p e c i a l l y during 1917 and 1918, every k i l o that l e f t the Netherlands made the food s i t u a t i o n more precarious. The Netherlands as a whole was therefore made weaker and more vulnerable to foreign pressure. The smuggled quantities were not large enough to make a noticeable d i f f e r e n c e i n Germany, but i t was nevertheless providing sustenance to a nation which at any moment could become an enemy. A l l those who smuggled served only themselves, to the detriment of the c o l l e c t i v e i n t e r e s t . Second, the general a t t i t u d e of the population towards the army, the men who had to protect them from an enemy, was one of s l i g h t d e r i s i o n , i n d i f f e r e n c e or apathy. The s o l d i e r who went home without permission, who dropped out during a march, who bragged about the money he made smuggling, was viewed by very many as a small hero, a clever fellow who "got away with something". The Dutch people did not condemn him, d i d not stigmatize such action as undesirable. Third, the people seldom i f ever condemned those refusing to serve, or those preaching insubordination or d r a f t dodging. The a u t h o r i t i e s were seen as the v i l l a i n , the insubordinate s o l d i e r as the poor v i c t i m of the system. Yet the army had no other reason f o r existence than to pro-t e c t the people of the Netherlands from invasion and 192 occupation as had b e f a l l e n Belgium. Many parliamentarians frequently placed party i n t e r e s t s before n a t i o n a l ones. The constant c r i t i c i s m about the army, the demands for demobilization by the SDAP and V r i j z i n n i g -Democraten were simply a return to pre-war p o l i c y without consideration f o r the changed s i t u a t i o n within Europe. That four and one-half per cent of the population was serving i n the m i l i t a r y forces was c e r t a i n l y not excessive, nor was the amount of money spent on defence. The c r i t i c i s m should have been that too l i t t l e was done, rather than that too much was done. That members of the r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s appeared to care only for the s p i r i t u a l well-being of the s o l d i e r s was also bowing to party i n t e r e s t s . There were c e r t a i n l y greater problems within the forces than cursing and swearing. The parliamentarians retained the " s p i r i t of August" f o r no longer than the population at large. The men who formed the government, who i n 1913 had set themselves somewhat above parliament by saying that they were 44 to carry out "the w i l l of the people" cannot be accused of a l a c k l u s t e r performance regarding c e r t a i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . Almost 200 " c r i s i s organizations" were created, most of them i n r e l a t i o n to food and raw material r a t i o n i n g ; the national debt increased by one and three-quarter b i l l i o n g uilders i n 45 . . f i v e years — a n astronomical f i g u r e f o r those years. The government had done everything p o s s i b l e to prevent the collapse of industry from lack of raw materials, or a 46 d i s a s t e r among c e r t a i n groups of people from lack of food. 193 Nevertheless, i n other areas the government d i d not act very d i f f e r e n t l y from the people i t l e d . The at t i t u d e of the powers at war was accepted as a "given", and so was pre-war t r a d i t i o n a l n e u t r a l i t y and i m p a r t i a l i t y . Working within t h i s f i x e d framework the government had to manoeuvre as best as i t could between German and B r i t i s h demands. This timid a t t i t u d e against both these countries quite probably made things more d i f f i c u l t f o r the Netherlands than they needed to have been. Forcing the Dutch army to defend the nation against a l l comers would c e r t a i n l y have res u l t e d i n the Netherlands becoming a battleground had B r i t a i n landed troops i n the Scheldt estuary. Defence against three sides made no s t r a t e g i c sense at a l l . The government could have supported the army much more; the points have already been mentioned: care f o r demobilized s o l d i e r s , b u i l d i n g better barracks, modernizing the m i l i t a r y lawicode, i n s t i t u t i n g a c e r t a i n amount of censorship on newspapers, and helping the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s combat extreme and damaging a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c propaganda. Laxness i n these matters was p a r t l y due to the "newness" of the s i t u a t i o n , of not knowing what to do, but was due more to the t y p i c a l l y Dutch lack of i n t e r e s t i n the m i l i t a r y as well as the fear that parliament and the people would l a b e l them m i l i t a r i s t i c . C e r t a i n l y a few of the min-i s t e r s held the suspicion that the army always wanted more power, and f e l t the c i v i l i a n a u t h o r i t i e s must guard against t h i s — o n e of the reasons the staat van beleg was never extended as soon and as f a r as the army demanded. Considering 194 the power such men as Ludendorff or Kitchener obtained, the fears of the Cabinet and Parliament were c e r t a i n l y excessive. There were no secret funds, unchecked by Parliament, with which the army could gain influence or finance secret pro-j e c t s . Nor i s there any record that the m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s t r i e d to gain p o l i t i c a l influence i n the country. I f any-thing, the m i l i t a r y leaders should have been c r i t i c i s e d f o r t h e i r l a c k l u s t e r performance, f o r not f i g h t i n g harder f o r what they knew to be necessary to b u i l d an adequate defence force. The o f f i c e r s were not free from g u i l t f o r the poor condition of the army. They d i d labour under the torpor of the pre-war decades and the p a r a l y s i s of a s o c i a l climate that d i d not appreciate them; few of the o f f i c e r s managed to shake loose from t h i s and r i s e above i t . Once the threat of imminent war receded somewhat, and l i f e became near normal again, many senior o f f i c e r s sought a nice, safe desk job and shunned t r a i n i n g new men or spending time i n the f i e l d with the troops. The p r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s ( a n d to a le s s e r extent the pro f e s s i o n a l NCOs), formed a sort of p r i v a t e club and d i s -associated themselves from the conscripted o f f i c e r s a n d NCOs. They became d i f f i c u l t to approach f o r the men and followed the Dutch pattern of f i n d i n g a small group and neglecting the larger, n a t i o n a l arena. Many of the older o f f i c e r s , e s p e c i a l l y those who had returned from retirement to a c t i v e s e r v i c e (Minister Bosboom was a r e t i r e d o f f i c e r ) , d i d not grasp the need f o r extensive 195 sport and recreation i n an army doomed to a long period of idleness. More f l e x i b i l i t y , also i n r e l a t i o n to such things as free t r a i n t r a v e l , leave s t i p u l a t i o n s , education, evening passes, etc., would have prevented many grievances. Closer cooperation with NCO and s o l d i e r associations and clubs could have a l l e v i a t e d many minor i r r i t a t i o n s and created a greater understanding of the various problems. Enough has been said about the actions of the common so l d i e r to r e a l i z e that he only d i d what was absolutely necessary, t r i e d to get out of as much work as possible, smuggled, went absent without a pass, and complained and grumbled incessantly. Not everyone was l i k e t h i s , but so many had one or two weak points that the r o t affected v i r -t u a l l y every u n i t . The army, as the nation that produced i t , did as l i t t l e as possib l e and put p r i v a t e i n t e r e s t ahead of the national whenever given the chance. A f i n a l , and perhaps the best, example of pla c i n g i n d i v i d u a l , c l a s s , r e l i g i o u s , or group i n t e r e s t above the national one was the 1918 e l e c t i o n . Held at a time when there was no sign of a German collapse (voting day was June 3), on the heels of the most serious c r i s i s the Netherlands had gone through during the war, the nation erupted i n a s p l i n -t e r i n g of i n t e r e s t s . Seventeen p a r t i e s gained at l e a s t one seat i n Parliament, even more contested the e l e c t i o n . As with the professors at Leiden, what was NOT said during the el e c t i o n was symptomatic of the Dutch mentality; not one party based i t s campaign on the need f o r a firmer foreign 196 p o l i c y , stronger defence measures, or more f o r c e f u l action against those vjorking to undermine the d i s c i p l i n e within the armed forces. Every party or group talked about c e r t a i n p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s ; what should have been the overriding n a t i o n a l concern was barely mentioned. The groups contesting the e l e c t i o n simply accepted the p o s i t i o n of the Netherlands as a given, paid no further attention to i t , and concentrated on i n t e r n a l matters. The large p a r t i e s were no d i f f e r e n t ; two months of p o l i t i c a l wrangling before a new Cabinet could be formed hardly t e s t i f i e s to a unity of purpose. Four years of b i t t e r war i n Europe did not change the Dutch mentality. Rather than r e a l i z e the f r a i l t y of t h e i r peaceful existence, they became a l l the more convinced that they were destined to remain outside any war as long as they desired to remain out of i t . With such a mentality i t became natural to pay only l i p s e r v i c e to the problems of national defence, something which was made a l l the easier by the apathetic and indolent nature of the Dutch i n s o f a r as national i n t e r e s t was concerned. 197 3. Summation Since 1945 much soul-searching has taken place i n the Netherlands to f i n d the causes f o r the quick and t o t a l defeat i n May 1940. Many pu b l i c a t i o n s , of which the most recent, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden i n de Tweede Wereld-oorlog, i s no exception, s t i l l search f o r the e l u s i v e answer. World War I has received very l i t t l e a ttention since 1945, 47 except where i t concerns the November Revolution; the inter-war years, on the other hand, have been thoroughly covered, and each writer finds a d i f f e r e n t cause: the 48 depression, unwillingness to recognize the danger of 49 50 fascism, a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m , or old, conservative leaders. The above no doubt'were s i g n i f i c a n t i n the immediate r o l e s they played, but they were only influences superimposed on a national character which had developed through many years. To understand the fundamental makeup of t h i s national character i s to grasp the most basic reasons f o r the d i s a s t e r of May 1940. World War I i s important because the Netherlands apparently manoeuvred s u c c e s s f u l l y through t h i s period and t h i s served to consolidate the f a t a l attitudes towards defence int o a complacent whole. The roots of the May 1940 collapse go back to the years before 1900. In t h i s period must be sought the explanations fo r the national d i v i s i v e as well as cohesive forces, the r e l i g i o u s d i v e r s i t i e s , and the myopia. The stress and tension of the Great War might have accentuated the unifying forces. The p r o b a b i l i t y of being drafted, and once drafted, the 198 s o l d i e r ' s l i f e that had to be led was one thing a l l male c i t i z e n s had i n common. But a study of the four years of the F i r s t World War shows that the diverse c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , i d i o s y n c r a c i e s and s o c i a l norms prevalent before 1914 had not changed appreciably by 1918. The confidence i n a h i s t o r y of n e u t r a l i t y , the lack-a d a i s i c a l a t t i t u d e toward foreign events, a minimum of e f f o r t and money spent on a m i l i t a r y force had been s u f f i c i e n t to come through World War I unscathed. There was thus nothing to motivate a change, and the Netherlands l i v e d through the i n t e r -war years e s s e n t i a l l y ignoring the f a c t that the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s a l l about them were changing, and required an adjustment i n foreign p o l i c y and defence measures. For the Netherlands the Great War could and should have been the time to draw together, to r e a l i z e that the nation a l unity should take p r i o r i t y over the nation a l d i f f e r e n c e s . When t h i s d i d not happen, one can only conclude that the Dutch had l o s t much of t h e i r e a r l i e r (16th and 17th century) greatness. They could not r i s e to meet the challenge and prepare themselves to defend t h e i r country and t h e i r freedom. Even the moderate s a c r i f i c e s f o r t h e i r own defence were often too much. That an army, drawn from such a nation, was l i t t l e more than a facade i s obvious. The Dutch refused to see i t , but May 1940 proved i t . 199 ^Wakheren • Jijjddejburg • SSSj WIERINGERMEER-NOORD- JE ;Alkmaar I • C^Z^H^ ;ljmuiden/« * ^ J^^ZZZ-Haarleml • . . T x y ^ •—~7~-1 A m i t c r d o m — \ ^ — -Hilversurr^  < DRENTE Cm Meppel 3 Zwolle ^ / • L e i d e n . V.Wassenaar NUtrechu' ^Scnevenmgen * \ Soeif» p7« Putlen Barnaveld • Apeldoorn *Amersfoort r ## » G r a « n h a S ^ UTRECHT S GELDERL/ sift* ZUID- /tf£J^ Wageningen 'Delft S v Rotterdam « w VJNw Schoonhoyen ^  .HOLLAND . P o ^ " * ^ •Omme n \ i ^ o OVERIJSEL ^ • Almolo Hengelo^ Enschede* ^Zutphen ' \ ^ AND Winferswijk t^O" i r \ * Deventer Nijmegen • Moerdijk Roosendaa! 8 # r e d a HeutdenV* -, *~ ' **s'Hortogenboich*tv . Vught. f ft u St. Michleisgeitel \ . naren # • *> ^ . — < . „ , Tilburg. NOORD- I V f Z E E J L A N ^ ^ o p Z o o m ^ BRABANT S o) Eindhoven t Roermondit 'enlo \ O 5 K> 200 S t e l l i n g H o l l a n d 1. F o r t r e s s Den H e l d e r 2« S t e l l i n g Amsterdam 3. W a t e r l i n i e 4 . Meuse and S c h e l d t e s t u a r y d e f e n c e s 5. Zeeland defences The Waterlinie Defences 202 S t e l l i n g Amsterdam Showing i t s 42 F o r t i f i c a t i o n s and Strong Points 203 REFERENCES CHAPTER I I I. J . Brugmans, Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht—Sociaal- Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland 1795-1940 (Den Haag, 1969), pp. 312-313. 2 H. van Hulst, A. P l e y s i e r , and A. Scheffer, Het Roode  Vaandel Volgen Wij. (SDAP 1880-1940) (Den Haag, 1969), p. 19. 3 I. J . Brugmans, Paardenkracht, p. 353. 4 I ^ i d . , p. 385. 5 In accordance with Dutch use, the term "the Netherlands" i s iused to describe the whole nation, while "Holland" denotes the:7 provinces of Zuid and Noord Holland and the low-lying western areas of Noord Brabant. ^ See p. 31. 7 I. J . Brugmans, Paardenkracht, p. 386. 8 Ibid., pp. 313, 345. 9 Ibid., p. 366. 1 0 Winkler Prins Encyclopedia, XIV (Amsterdam, 1952), p. 306. I I N. Bosboom, In M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden (Gorinchem, 1933), p. 373. The author gives 85 cents a day as average for f i e l d workers. The information i n the two paragraphs i s p a r t l y based on information received i n personal conversations with Mevr. J . Blaauw, Mej. M. Muilwijk, Mr. V. Vleming, and others. 12 Hulst et a l , Het Roode Vaandel, p. 18. 13 I. J . Brugmans, Paardenkracht, p. 414. 14 Hajo Brugmans, Geschiedenis van Nederland onder de  Regering van Koningin Wilhelmina (Amsterdam, 1938), p. 35. H. T. Colenbrander, "De Internationale P o s i t i e van Nederland t i j d e n s , voor, en na den Wereldoorlog," i n Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans (Amsterdam, 1920), p. 103. P. H. R i t t e r j r . "De Ontwikkeling van het Nederlandsche Volkskarakter," i n Nederland i n d e Branding, ed. W. E. van Dam van I s s e l t (Baarn, no date), pp. 11-28. A. S. de Leeuw, Nederland i n de Wereldpolitiek van  1900 tot heden (Z e i s t , 1936), pp. 7-9. 204 15 C. K. Elout, Figuren en Momenten u i t de P o l i t i e k  van Koningin Wilhelmina's t i j d (Amsterdam, 19 38), pp. 61-63. 16 Quoted i n W. J . van Welderen baron Rengers, Schets  eener Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland, Deel III (Den Haag, 1955), p. 2. Unless otherwise s p e c i f i e d , a l l quotations are translated by J. J . Bout. 17 For more information see P. J . Oud, Honderd Jaren  1840-1940 (Assen, 1946), p. 199. 1 8 Ibid., pp. 236-237. 19 J. A. vanHamel, Nederland tussen de Mogendheden (Amsterdam, 1918), p. 393. 20 J. A. A. de Beaufort, F i j f t i g Jaren u i t onze  Geschiedenis 1868-1918, Deel I (Amsterdam, 1928), p. 241. 21 C. Smit, Hoogtij der Nederlandse P o l i t i e k . De Buiten-landse P o l i t i e k van Nederland 1899-1919 (Leiden, 1959), p. 18. 22 Ibid . , p. 63. 23 Hajo Brugmans, Nederland onder Wilhelmina, pp. 8 7-88. Beaufort, F i j f t i g Jaren, Deel. I I , pp. 89-95. 24 The documents fo r the f o r t Flushing a f f a i r are i n G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, ed., B r i t i s h Documents on the  Origi n of the War 1898-1914, Vol. VIII (London, 1932), pp. 649-721. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 721. 2 6 Smit, Hoogtij, p. 98. 27 Welderen, Schets, Deel I I I , p. 223. 28 The term " a n t i - m i l i t a r i s m " , throughout t h i s thesis i s taken to mean the opposition to a m i l i t a r y s p i r i t , the i d e a l s and attitudes of p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s , and the g l o r i f i c a t i o n of such a s p i r i t or i d e a l s present i n a nation as a whole, a government, or a m i l i t a r y caste i n a government. In addition, i t means the opposition to the p o l i c y of main-ta i n i n g a strong armed force and being ready and w i l l i n g to use them: i . e . aggressive preparedness. 29 "National character" i s defined as the enduring pe r s o n a l i t y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and unique l i f e s t y l e s found among populations of p a r t i c u l a r national states. See David L. S i l l s , ed.. International Encyclopedia of the  S o c i a l Sciences, Vol. XI (New York, 1968), p. 14. 205 30 C. Smit, Nederland i n de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Eerste Deel: Het Voorspel (1899-1914) (Groningen, 1971), p. 139. 31 For more information see i b i d . , pp. 139-142. W. H. Terwisga, "Het Leger," i n O f f i c i e e l Gedenkboek  ter gelegenheid van het 25 j a r i g e Regeerings Jubileum van  H. M. Koningin Wilhelmina" ed. Hajo Brugmans (Amsterdam, 1923), pp. 161-163. C. J . Snijders, "De Nederlandse Landmacht 1898-1923," i n Gedenkboek 1898-1923, ed. W. G. de Bas (Voorschoten, 1923), p. 206. ~~ 3 2 See i b i d . , p. 206. Smit, Eerste Wereldoorlog. Het Voorspel, pp. 142-143. 33 Rijks Geschiedkundige P u b l i c a t i e n . Grote Serie, No. 128. "Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse P o l i t i e k van Nederland," Buitenlandse Bronnen 1899-1914, ed., C. Smit ('s-Gravenhage, 1968), No. 492. A l l future references to documents published i n the Ri j k s  Geschiedkundige P u b l i c a t i e n w i l l be indicated by the accepted Dutch abbreviation,"RGP", followed by the se r i e s number and thereafter the document number. For the periods covered by the RGP see bibliography under "Published Sources". Ibid . , No. 494. Ibid . . No. 496. 34 35 3 6 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p; 40. Smit, Eex'ste Wereldoorlog. Het Voorspel, p. 148. 37 Snijders, "Landmacht," Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, pp. 206-208. 38 For'more;information see Terwisga, "Het Leger," Jubileum, ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 164. Welderen, Schets, Deel I I I , p. 223. 39 Smit, Eerste Wereldoorlog. Het Voorspel, pp. 148-150. 40 J. Kooiman, ed., De Nederlandse Strijdmacht en hare  M o b i l i z a t i e (Arnhem, no date), pp. 46-48. 41 For instance, p r i o r to World War I i n the Hague 16 out of 100 in f a n t s of f a m i l i e s paying the lowest rent died, while i n f a m i l i e s paying the highest rent only 3 out of 100 died. L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden i n de Tweede  Wereldoorlog, Deel I: Voorspel ('s-Gravenhage, 1969), p~. 22. 206 4? See "Legervorming," Nederlandse Strijdmacht, ed. Kooiman, pp. 17-130. See e s p e c i a l l y pp. 46-48 from which t h i s i s taken. 4 3 The eighteenth century schutters guilds were created to ensure the safety i n t h e - c i t i e s . They consisted of men belonging to (trade) gu i l d s , but given permission to carry weapons when on guard duty. The nineteenth century s c h u t t e r i j e n were more or less " r i f l e associations", or "gun clubs", but with t h i s d i f f e r e n c e that they were expected as clubs to either j o i n the army when danger threatened or to defend t h e i r l o c a l i t y against an invader. 44 Op. c i t . . pp; 70-71. W. J. M. Linden, "De V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm," Orgaan der  Vereeniging ter Beoefening van het Krijgswetenschap, 1916-1917, pp. 465-556. See e s p e c i a l l y p. 467. 45 46 47 48 Smit, Eerste Wereldoorlog. Het Voorspel, p. 23. Snijders, "Landmacht," Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, p. 216. RGP 128, No. 397. RGP 128, No. 167 subsection 61. Dutch h i s t o r i a n s held views s i m i l a r to the foreign observers. See e.g. H. T. Colenbrander, "De Internationale P o s i t i e , " Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 103. 207 REFERENCES CHAPTER II General Galet, S. H.•le Roi A l b e r t Commandant en-chef  devant 1'invasion allemande, pp. 42-44. Quoted i n Smit, Hoogtij, p. 121. 2 RGP 106, Nos. 608-611, 684, 699, 701. 3 Welderen, Schets, Deel I I I , pp. 27,28n. D. van der Berg, Cornelius Jacobus Snijders 1852-1939 (Den Haag, 1949), pp. 78-81. ' RGP 109, No. 26. See notes underneath the p u b l i c a t i o n ; the Declaration of N e u t r a l i t y was issued 16 times i n a l l , the l a s t time on August 1, 1918, when Costa Rica declared war on Germany. ^ D. van der Berg, Snijders, pp. 69-71. ^ A. S. de Leeuw, Nederland i n de Wereldpolitiek, Ch. 2. H. von Moltke, Erinnerungen, B r i e f e , Dokumente (Stutt-gart, 1922), pp. 16-17, 429-431. Gerhard R i t t e r , The S c h l i e f f e n Plan: C r i t i q u e of a-Myth, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson (London, 1958), pp. 43, 58, 73, 136-137. 7 . C. J . Snijders, "Nederlands M i l x t a i r e p o s i t i e gedurenden den Wereldoorlog," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1923), p. 539. Q For a complete breakdown of the f i e l d army see Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 38. 9 G. A. A. A l t i n g von Geusau, Onze Weermacht te Land (Amsterdam, no date), pp. 4-28. Snijders, "Nederlands M i l i t a i r e p o s i t i e , " M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1923), pp. 540-542. ^® A l t i n g von Geusau, Onze Weermacht te Land, pp. 27-36. 1 1 Snijders, op. c i t . , p. 541. 12 Snijders, "Landmacht," Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, p. 218. 13 P. H. R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I (Den Haag, 1931), pp. 30-37. P. J. van Munnekrede, "De M o b i l i z a t i e van de Landmacht," Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans (Amsterdam, 1920) p. 23. 14 Snijders, "Landmacht," Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, p. 218. 208 15 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 32. See also Terwisga, "Het Leger," Jubileum, ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 169. 1 ^ N. Japikse, Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkrieg (Gotha, 1921), p. 41n. 17 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 32. 1 8 Ibid., pp. 33. 1 9 I b i d . , pp. 105-144. 2 0 Ibid., p. 30. 21 Munnekrede, " M o b i l i z a t i e , " Nederland i n den Oorlogs-t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, pp. 2 7-29. 2 2 Ibid., pp. 30-31. 2 3 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 51. 24 Cited i n i b i d . , p. 50. 2 5 RGP 109, Nos. 18,19. Gevers to Louden, August 2. 2 6 RGP 109, No. 22. 2 7 RGP 109, No. 24, see note p. 12. 2 8 RGP 109, p. 17n. See also Smit, Hoogtij, p. 122. ?9 RGP 109, Nos. 12,33. Cort van der Linden to Snijders. 3 0 RGP 109, No. 40. 3 1 Cited i n Welderen, Schets, Deel I I I , p. 20. 3 2 A l l the governmental a c t i v i t y cannot be traced here. See Welderen, Schets, Deel IV, Ch. I. M. W. F. Treub, Herinneringen en Overpeinzingen (Haarlem, 1931), ch. 4. For the f i n a n c i a l d i f f i c u l t i e s see: - O o r l o g s t i j d . Herrineringen en Indrukken (Amsterdam, 1917), chs. 4,5,6. N.•J. van der F l i e r , War Finances i n the Netherlands (Oxford, 1923). 3 3 Welderen, Schets, Deel IV, pp. 38-40. 3 4 Oud, Honderd Jaren, p. 240. 209 3 5 RGP 109, Nos. 66, 67, 74, 94, 99. 3 6 RGP 109. No. 66. 37 For instance, see Louden's explanations f o r the amounts exported during-August. Louden-to Marees van Swinderen, September 19, 1914. RGP 109, No. 148. 38 A. C. B e l l , The Blockade of the Central Empires  1914-1918 (London, 1961), pp. 712-713. Both Orders i n Council are c i t e d . ) 3 9 I b i d . , PP. 150-151. 40 E. van Raalte, "Treub's houding gedurende Wereldoorlog Nr. I," V r i j Nederland, 6-12-1958. 41 Information i n the follottfing paragraph from the Notulenvan de Ministerraad van 3 October, 1914. In RGP 109, No. 171, pp. 145-159. The o r i g i n a l document seen by me. 42 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 151. 4 3 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 49-50. 44 C. van Tuinen, "De M i l i t a i r e Handhavmg van N e u t r a l i -t e i t en Gezag," Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 99. AS Snijders, "Nederlands M i l i t a i r e P o s i t i e , " M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1923), p. 547. 4 6 RGP 109, No. 17. 47 See RGP 109, note 1 and 2, p. 8. Because the Dutch m i l i t a r y d i d not obtain the same extensive powers as our armed forces do when martial law i s declared, the Dutch term staat van beleg w i l l be used rather than the inaccurate t r a n s l a t i o n "martial law". 48 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 303. 49 RGP 109, No. 321, pp. 306-307. Snijders to Cort van der Linden, February 22, 1915. 50 D. van der Berg, Snijders, p. 108. 51 J. H. van Zanten, "De Zorg voor Vluchtelmgen u i t het Buitenland Tijdens den Oorlog, " Nederland. i n -,den  O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 325. 5 2 I b i d . , pp. 330-331. Munnekrede, " M o b i l i z a t i e , " i b i d . , pp. 37-40. 210 Archief Ministerraad 1914-1918, Nr. 147B, "Correspon-dentie met Opperbevelhebber," Dossier Opperbevelhebber, part 2, 1914. 54 Munnekrede, " M o b i l i z a t i e , " op. c i t . , p. 38. 55 Smit, Hoogtij, p. 136. 56 C. van Tuinen, "Handhavmg van Gezag," Nederland m  den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 68. 57 The two Peace Conferences had discussed i n t e r n i n g and the agreed upon Regulations had been signed by the Netherlands on July 1, 1909. The most important a r t i c l e s were: Art. 11 The i m p a r t i a l Power who allows troops to enter her t e r r i t o r y belonging to the armies of the nations at war, i s to i n t e r n them as f a r from the war scene as pos s i b l e . She can guard them i n camps or even imprison them i n f o r t r e s s e s or s u i t a b l e places. She decides whether the o f f i c e r s can be allowed free on t h e i r word of honour that they w i l l not leave the t e r r i t o r y of the i m p a r t i a l Power without p r i o r permission. Art. 12 In the absence of any s p e c i a l arrangement the i m p a r t i a l Power provides the internees with food, c l o t h i n g and the necessary help... At the end of h o s t i l i t i e s the costs of i n t e r n i n g w i l l be reimbursed. 5 8 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 325-328. 59 Ibid., pp. 330-333. 6 0 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 147-150. P. J. T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel I I I , Branding (Amsterdam, 1932), p. 317. 6J. Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 345-348. 6 2 Ibid., pp. 354-358. 6 3 Archief Generale S t a f f Koningklijke Land en Zeemacht  1813-1918, Omslag 341, Pak CLXXXII, Bundel 2, 1867GS. 64 Archief Ministerraad. 147B, Part I I , August 23, 1914. 6 5 Archief Hoofdkwartier Veldleger 190 7-1942, Omslag 149, Dossier 1120. Some of the a r t i c l e s seem quite harmless, others are d e f i n i t e l y slanted i n favour of one side or another. Almost a l l the a r t i c l e s are concerned with foreign news (German b e s t i a l i t i e s i n Belgium, B r i t a i n choking o f f Dutch trade, e t c . ) , but already a few small a r t i c l e s deal with the complaints of the Dutch s o l d i e r s . 6 6 Archief Generale S t a f f , op. c i t . , 5428GS. 211 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 184, Dossier 5461. 68 3 Archief Buitenlandse Zaken, 0 VI, Varia, Dossier 51, "Vreemde Oorlogscorrespondenten". Similar information i s i n Archief Veldleger, Omslag 262, Dossiers 688, 796, 869. 69 Ten years e a r l i e r a law had been passed, January 11, 1904, Staatsblad No. 7, that a l l telephone and telegraph messages could be checked by the m i l i t a r y when the country was i n danger. 70 Information compiled from Archief Ministerraad, 147B, Part I, f o l d e r s marked "October, November". 71 Ibid., and, Jan Nieuwenhuis, "Spionage v i a Nederland Tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog," E l s e v i e r Weekblad, October 17, 24, 31; November 7, 14, 1964. 72 Snijders, "Nederlands M i l i t a i r e P o s i t i e , " M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1923), p. 547n. 73 W. E. van Dam van I s s e l t , "De Geest i n het Leger en de Burgerwachten," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1919), p. 153. 74 Snijders, op. c i t . , pp. 548-549. Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 245-246. 75 Ibid., Bosboom, p. 252. 7 6 Ibid., p. 370. 77 K. B. of March 17, 1909, "Traktament en Sol d i j e n voor M i l i t a i r e n beneden den rang van O f f i c i e r , " Recueil  M i l i t a i r , derde stuk, 1908-1911, pp. 17-29. 78 Soldatencourant, October 4, 1914. A l l issues are i n Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Kanaalweg 2, The Hague. 7 9 Ibid., October 2, 1914. 8 0 I b i d . , October 4, 1914. 81 Factual information from Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandig-heden, pp. 371-372. 8 2 Soldatencourant, September 6, 9,^1914. < 212 REFERENCES CHAPTER III D. van Voorst Evekink, "Herrinneringen u i t den Wereldoorlog," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1920), pp. 102-106. The author obtained part of his information from an a r t i c l e by General von Zwehl i n the Deutsche Rundschau, November-December, 1919. 2 Archief Veldleger. Omslag 180, Dossier 5124 1, 1915, D1870. For instance, on March 5, 1915, a new l i s t came out and to "leather" was added, "and a l l a r t i c l e s made thereof". Such a minor change on paper added a large number of items to the l i s t which the customs o f f i c e r s now had to watch f o r . 3 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 12. 4 J. de Kruyff, "De B e s t r i j d m g van den Smokkelhandel," Nederlandse Strijdmacht, ed. Kooiman, pp. 506-514. 5 Many documents deal with t h i s problem. The headings of a few of them speak f o r themselves. Archief Veldleger. Omslag 159, Dossier 5711, "Smokkelarij; vervanging van personeel van de landweer." Omslag 170, Dossier 22934, "Vervanging 1 Company reserve van C b a t t a l i o n . " Omslag 171, Dossier 24456, "Onbetrouwbare elementen b i j grenstroepen." Omslag 159, Dossier 5394, "Onbetrouwbare landweer i n Goesbeek. 6 See pp. 45-46. 7 C. van Tuinen, "Handhaving van Gezag," Nederland i n  den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, pp. 98-101. Q R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 181-183, 225-227, 332, 364-365; Deel I I , p. 193. Treub, Herinneringen en Overpeinzingen, pp. 350-351. J. de Kruyff, "De B e s t r i j d i n g van den Smokkelhandel," Nederlandse Strijdmacht, ed. Kooiman, pp. 506-514. 9 Archief Buitenlandse Zaken, A 250D, 46447, Johnstone to Louden, October, 1916. Archief Veldleger, Omslag 180, Dossier 5124, l e t t e r s D1210 (January 14, 1915), D1320 (January 23, 1915). 10 Archief Generale S t a f f , Omslag 486, stuk CCLXVIII, Dossier 1. 1 1 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 180, Dossier 5124 1, D2151a, March 29, 1915. 213 1 2 I b i d . , Omslag 206, Dossier 25525 1 1' 1 3 I b i d . , Omslag 182, Dossier 5124 1 1 1, D6060. 14 Archief Generale S t a f f , Omslag 488, Pak CCLXVIII, Dossier 4, D11636. 1 5 I b i d . , Omslag 486, Stuk CCLXVIII, Dossier 1, 7890GS. 1 6 I b i d . , Omslag 488, Pak CCLXVIII, Dossier 4, D11636. 17 Archief Buitenlandse Zaken, A250d, 2223. Staatsblad Nr. 533, 1915. I Q J Archief Veldleger. Omslag 232, Dossier 46686 , D56863. 19 E. C. van Dorp, "Handel en Nijverheid," Nederland i n  den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 221. To give an other i n d i c a t i o n how the war affected Dutch trade, i n 1913, 10,203 ships entered the harbours of Rotterdam, i n 1917 only 1,374 ships entered t h i s port, i n 1918 only 1,048. See i b i d . , p. 223. 20 L. de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Beel I, p. 42. 21 C. K. Elout, "De Nederlandse Oorlogspsyche," Nederland  i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 366. The information i n the paragraph comes l a r g e l y from t h i s a r t i c l e . 22 Ibid., pp. 365-366. 23 M. W. F. Treub, "De Economische toestand van Nederland," i n i b i d . , pp. 184-187. This amount was i n addition to the regular expenditures; the 1913 budget was f l . 240 m i l l i o n . 24 L. de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 43. 2 5 A r c h i e f Veldleger. Omslag 232, Dossier 46686 1, 48748. 2 6 I b i d . , 49252. 2 7 A r c h i e f Generale S t a f f , Omslag 486, Stuk CCLXVIII, 8026GS. p o Archief Veldleger. Omslag 225, Dossier XXVII, F1997. 29 Ibid ., D48245. Xerox copy i n my possession. 30 See Archief Buitenlandse Zaken. A250d, Nos. 53803, 46587, 43793, 30647, 31 The information i s obtained from R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 332-340. A. J . Barnouw, Holland under Queen Wilhelmina. (New York, 1923), pp. 173-175. 214 32 Archief Buitenlandse Zaken, A250d, 44080. 33 Loc. c i t . 3 4 I b i d . . 46447. 35 Archief Generale S t a f f . Omslag 486, Stuk CCLXVIII, Dossier 2, 1917. 36 37 38 Ibid., 6349GS. Archief Veldleger, Omslag 171, Dossier 24456. Information from H. J . Scheffer, November 1918:  Journaal van een Revolutie die n i e t doorging, (Amsterdam, 1968), B i j l a g e , pp. 293-296. 39 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 172, Dossier 6040, "Censure 1915/16." 40 41 42 43 44 Loc. c i t . Ibid., Omslag 173, Dossier 16406, "Censure 1915/17. See i b i d . , Omslag 172, Dossier 13516,for examples. See p. 55. Archief Ministerraad, 147B, Dossier Opperbevel-hebber, Deel I, 1915, February 15, 23. 45 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 222, Dossier 47612, G307, 1917. 46 Ibid., G284. 4 7 Archief Ministerraad, 147B, Dossier Opperbevel-hebber, Deel I I , 1915. 48 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 172, Dossier 16380, M70, "Censure 1915/18". 4 9 Archief Generale S t a f f , Pak GGLXXI, 1917. 50 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 279, Dossier 5647. 5 1 Ibid., Omslag 293, Dossier 26786, H3412. 52 D. van Voorst Evekink, "Herinneringen u i t den Wereldoorlog," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1920), pp. 102-106. R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, p. 226. 215 REFERENCES CHAPTER IV I Cited i n de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 39. 2 Elout, "De Nederlandse Oorlogspsyche," Nederland i n  den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 358. 3 G. C. A. Fabius, De Verhouding tussen Volk en  Weermacht (Amsterdam, 1916) , p~. 23. 4 Barnouw, Holland under Queen Wilhelmina, pp. 58-59. 5 Archief Generale S t a f f . Omslag 341, Pak CLXXXII, Bundel 2, 2950GS. 5 I b i d . . 4297GS IV. 7 I b i d . , 4363GS IV. Q Bosboom. M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 226-227. 9 Ibid., p. 228. Ibid. , p. 232. I I H. J . Elh o r s t , "De Kbninklijke Nationale Vereeniging tot steun aan M i l i c i e n s , " Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, pp. 114-117. 12 C. C. H. Schepel, "De M i l i t a i r e Rechtspraak t i j d e n s de M o b i l i z a t i e , " Nederlandse Strijdmacht, ed. Kooiman, , pp. 257-259. 13 D. van der Berg, Snijders, pp. 85-86. 14 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 225-226. 15 NRC, November.9, 1914. Found i n Archief Generale  S t a f f , Omslag 341, Pak CLXXXII, Bundel 2, 7138GS. 16 Bosboom, op. c i t , pp. 24, 261. His l e t t e r to Snijders of June 5, 1 9 1 5 , i n B i j l a g e F, pp. 406-411. Snijders'' l e t t e r of• complaint, May 19, 1915, i n Archief  Ministerraad, 147B, Dossier Opperbevelhebber, Deel I. 17 Bosboom, B i j l a g e G, pp. 412-413. 18 Ibid., B i j l a g e H, pp. 414-415. 1 9 I b i d . . pp. 261-263. 20 Snijders' l e t t e r of May 19, 1915. See note 16 above. 21 Bosboom, p. 247. 216 22 Snijders, "Nederlands M i l i t a i r e p o s i t i e , " M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1923), p. 553. 2 3 Welderen, Schets. Deel IV, pp. 80-84. 24 These were the men who were to have gone home on August 1, 1914. The r o t a t i o n began i n the summer of 1916. 25 Snijders, op. c i t . , p. 549. 2 6 I b i d . , pp. 550-551. 27 Welderen, Schets, Deel IV, pp. 65, 66, 73. 28 Throughout h i s book Bosboom complains- about t h i s . 29 Couranten-Catalogus 1916. In my possession. 3 0 Archief Generale S t a f f , Omslag 341, Pak CLXXXII, Bundel 2, 5428GS. 31 Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, p. 183. 3 2 I b i d . , p. 183. Fabius, Volk en Weermacht, pp. 20-21. W. E. van Dam van I s s e l t , "De Geest i n het Leger en de Burgerwachten," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1919), pp. 147-170. 33 Snijders, "De Nederlandse Landmacht," Gedenkboek, ed. Bas, p. 225. 34 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I I , p. 13. 35 Welderen, Schets, Deel IV, p. 61n4. 36 T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, Ch. I, IV. 37 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 258-263. 38 I. Cornelissen, G. Harmsen, R. de Jong, eds. De Taaie Rooie Rakkers (Utrecht, 1965), pp. 99-100. 39 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 263, Dossier 1354, 1914. 40 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, p. 224. 41 One copy of the Manifesto i s i n my possession. •^2 ' B. de L i g t , Opruiers? Het dienstweigerings-manifest voor de rechtbank te Utrecht verdedigd (Amsterdam, 1916). 4 3 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I, pp. 260-261. Archief Ministerraad, Dossier Opperbevelhebber, 147B, September, 1915. 217 4 4 B. de L i g t , Opruiers?, pp. 6-8. 45 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 348, Dossier I. 46 Archief Ministerraad. 147B, 1915. 4 7 Ibid., correspondence of March 30, 31, 1915. 48 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 280, Dossier 8452, 1915. 49 Ibid., Omslag 348, Dossier I. The extent and d i v e r s i t y of the a n t i - m i l i t a r i s t i c propaganda i s obvious from the l i s t : S o c i a l i s t i s c h e Liederenbundel Het Anker  De Soldaten-Tribune Recht door Zee De Stem der Jongeren Haar de V r i j h e i d De Soldatenalmanak De Arbeider De Verboden Vrucht De. Propagandist De V r i j e S o c i a l i s t De' Tribune 50 S. L. van der Wal, Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr; B.C.  de Jonge met brieven u i t z i i n nalatingschap (Utrecht, 1968), p. 31, note 17 on p. 31. 51 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 280, Dossier 8452. 5 2 I b i d . , Omslag 263, Dossier 1354, 1914. 53 Schepel, " M i l i t a i r e Rechtspraak," Nederlandse  Strijdmacht, ed. Kooimanr, pp. 257-259. A. A. van Nijnatten, " D i s c i p l i n a i r e S t r a f f e n — s t r a f s t e l s e l en tuchtraad," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1919). 54 Schepel, op. c i t . 5 5 Van der Wal, Herinneringen, pp. 32-33. 56 C. C. de-Gelder, "Dienstweigering," M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1917), pp. 175-195. The c i t e d example i s from page 194n. 57 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 282, Dossier 14714. Xerox copy i n my possession. 58 Ibid., Omslag 297, Dossier 2770. 59 T Loc. c i t . 6 0 I h i d . , Omslag 297, Dossier I I I , 1917. fi 1 Ibid., Omslag 280, Dossier 8452, " A n t i - m i l i t a i r e propaganda, 1915". 62 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort. Deel I I , pp. 179-180. Van der Wal, Herinneringen, pp. 30-31. rr *\\ T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 171-172 64 P. J . Oud, Het Jongste Verleden. Parlementaire  Geschiedenis van Nederland 1918-1940, Deel I (Assen, 1958-1960), pp. 48, 398. 6 5 I have examined these p u b l i c a t i o n s i n Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Kanaal Weg 2, The Hague. They are f i l e d there under Archief 131. 66 Archief Ministerraad, B i j l a g e n t ot de notulen 1913-1915, Nr. 146. 6 7 Welderen, Schets, Deel IV, pp. 222-223. 219 REFERENCES CHAPTER V I RGP 109, No. 321. O r i g i n a l seen by me. 2 Snijders probably alluded to something s i m i l a r as the example put forward by the Minister of Marine during the October, 1914, Antwerp controversy, see pp. 42-44. 3 RGP 109, No. 322. 4 The north of the Netherlands was almost impossible to invade because of treacherous currents, i r r e g u l a r t i d e s , sand banks, and deep "cuts" i n the shallow sea bottom. 5 RGP 109, Nos. 360, 372. 6 A. von T i r p i t z , P o l i t i s c h e Dokumente, Band II (Hamburg and B e r l i n , 1926) , p~. 332. 7 Telegram i n i b i d . , pp. 344-345. 8 RGP 109, No. 420. 9 C. T. de Jong, "De Nederlandse N e u t r a l i t e i t t i j d e n s de Eerste Wereldoorlog," T i j d s c h r i f t voor Geschiedenis, Vol. 65 (1952), p. 261. 1 0 See f o r instance, Helmuth Weber, Ludendorff und d i e  Monopole. Deutsche K r i e g s p o l i t i k 1916-1918 ( B e r l i n , 1966). I I RGP 109, No. 522. 12 Information i n the following paragraph comes from, Bosboom, M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, pp. 264-270. R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I I , pp. 15-22. De Leeuw, Nederland i n de Wereldpolitiek, pp. 174-177. 1 3 RGP 109, No. 525. "*"4 Bosboom, op. c i t . , p. 268. R i t t e r , op. c i t . , pp. 12-13. 1 5 RGP 116, No. 45. 16 F. von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, trans. A l l e n R. Powles (New York, 1914), pp. 147, 151. This book, written i n 1912 became very popular i n Germany; i t went through three editions i n four years. 1 7 H. von Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg 1914/18, Band II ( B e r l i n , 1920), pp. 116-117, 475, 515. See also, Reichskriegsministerium, Der Weltkrieg  1914 bis 1918 ( B e r l i n , 1938), Band XI, pp. 13, 18, 501-502, Band XII, p. 425. 220 18 19 20 21 22 Ibid., Band XI, p. 501. Band XII, p. 75. RGP 116, No. 1. Ibid., No. 10. Ibid ., No. 15. The warnings were received on December 30, 1916, and January 5, 1917. RGP 109, Nos. 717, 725. RGP 116, p. 26n. Strange as i t may seem, the German troops were there to protect against a Dutch attack. In August 1916, Kuehlman, then Ambassador to the Netherlands, had warned that an attack from the Netherlands and Denmark could be expected i f u n r e s t r i c t e d submarine warfare was started, see G. A. von Mueller, The Kaiser and His Court, pp. 140, 20 7. No troops could be spared i n August so the date was delayed; precautions were taken i n January, 1917, i n case Kuehlman had been correct, see Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 243, 314, Vol. I I , p. 404, and T i r p i t z , Erinnerungen, p. 375. 24 RGP 116, No. 18. 2 5 RGP 116, No. 21. 2 ^  The telegram i s part of S n i j d e r s 1 l e t t e r to the Premier on February 20, 1917. RGP 116, No. 23. 27 De Jong, "De Nederlandse N e u t r a l i t e i t , " T i j d s c h r i f t  voor Geschiedenis, Vol. 65 (1952), p. 265. 2 8 RGP 116, No. 34. 2 9 RGP 116, No. 49. 30 RGP 116, p. 62 note 4. Snijders' i t a l i c s . 31 Cited i n J . A. van Houtte, et a l . eds. Algemene  Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, Deel XII, ( Z e i s t , 1958), pi 71. 32 Snijders, "Nederlands M i l i t a i r e P o s i t i e , " M i l i t a i r e  Spectator (1923), pp. 558-559. 33 0. von Moser, Feldzugaufzeichnungen 1914-1918 (Stuttgart, 1920), pp. 281-286. J. J . G. van Voorst t ot Voorst, "Een document betref-fende voorbereide Duitse landingen op Zuid-Beveland i n 1917," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1920), pp. 398-404. 34 Emile Buysse, "Tussen de Knokse Oosthoek en't Sl u i s e Fort Sint-Donaar," P r o v i n c i a l e Zeeuwse Courant, December 11, 19 221 35 There i s a wealth of information about the sand and gravel problem. See the index (Register van Zaken) i n RGP 109 and RGP 117. The l a t t e r contains the index f o r RGP 116. 3 6 RGP 116, No. 429. 37 T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, p. 87. 38 De Leeuw, Nederland i n de Wereldpolitiek, p. 178. 39 F. Rosen, Aus Einem Diplomatischen Wanderleben. Band III (Wiesbaden, 1959), Ch. 4. 4 0 I b i d . , pp. 154-155. 4 1 I b i d . , pp. 158-162. T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 88-91. Note German Ambassador, A p r i l 9, 15, 1918, i n RGP 116, Nos. 440, 442. Lette r s C o l i j n to Lohman, A p r i l 17; C o l i j n to Louden, A p r i l 19, i n RGP 116, Nos. 445, 447. 4 2 RGP 116, Nos. 457, 459. 4 3 RGP 116, No. 453. 44 Archief Ministerraad, 147A, Geheime B i j l a g e , A p r i l 22, 1918. 4 5 Minutes are i n RGP 116, No. 463, pp. 474-482. 4 6 Notes from the B r i t i s h and French Ambassadors, A p r i l 29, and Louden's discussion with them i n RGP 116, Nos. 473, 477. 47 Archief Ministerraad, 147A, Geheime B i j l a g e , A p r i l 26, 1918. 4 8 I b i d . . A p r i l 2 7-May 28, 1918. 49 Memorandum i n RGP 116, No. 499. 5 0 Op. c i t . , 147A, May 10, 1918. 51 Correspondence between the Cabinet and the Queen i n i b i d . , May 14-17, 1918. De Jonge's note to the Cabinet, June 8, i n RGP 116, No. 531. 5 2 RGP 116, No. 523, see note 'a' on pp. 544-545. 222 53 Muller-Masses appears to have been a very capable o f f i c e r . In a number of campaign studies of both the Eastern and Western fronts he gives a cl e a r analysis of German strengths and weaknesses i n officer-men r e l a t i o n s , equipment, and weapons. He knew the German army we l l . His papers are i n Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis, Kanaalweg 2, The Hague, and are f i l e d under Handschrift 189. 141/2, 142/1. 54 p. 527. Report i n RGP 116, No. 518; c i t e d excerpts from Archief Ministerraad, 147A, Geheime B i j l a g e , June 14, Ibid . , July 11, 1918. 55 1918. 56 5 7 See Oud, Het Jongste Verleden. Deel I, Chapters I, I I , f o r e l e c t i o n and cabinet information. Two months to form a new government was not unusual i n the Netherlands; i n 1925 i t took 113 days before a government could be formed. The record (up to now) i s 117 days, set i n 1956. 58 De Jong, "De Nederlandse N e u t r a l i t e i t , " T i j d s c h r i f t  voor Geschiedenis, Vol. 65 (1952), p. 270. REFERENCES CHAPTER VI I See, Commissie t o t onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid  i n het leger ('s-Gravenhage, 1919). 2 De Jong, "De Nederlandse N e u t r a l i t y l t , " T i j d s c h r i f t  voor Geschiedenis, Vol. 65 (1952), p. 270. 3 "Army Report" i n Archief Ministerraad, 147B, Dossier Opperbevelhebber, Nr. 5828. Commissie t o t onderzoek i n l i b r a r y , Sectie K r i j g s -geschiedenis. 4 Commissie tot onderzoek, pp. 13, 22-25. 5 Ibid ., p. 14. 6 Scheffer, November 1918, p. 20. 7 Ibid . , pp. 26-33. T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 181-187. 8 Scheffer, November 1918, pp. 21-24. Oud, Jongste Verleden, Deel I, pp. 79, 83. J. J . C. P. Wilson, V i j f oorlogsdagen en hun t i v i n t i g - j a r i g e voorgeschiedenis (Assen, 1960), pi 18. 9 R i t t e r , De Donkere Poort, Deel I I , pp. 404-405. Japikse, Die Stellung Hollands, p. 297. 1 0 Wilson, V i j f oorlogsdagen, p. 18. I I Information from, Scheffer, November 1918, pp. 35-41, J. C. van der Does, et a l , A l s ' t Moet. November 1918 en de Bijzondere V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm ('s-Gravenhage, 1959), p. 60. 1 2 Scheffer, November 1918, p. 59. 13 Archief Ministerraad, B i j l a g e n t ot de notulen, November 11, 1918. 1 4 Archief Veldleger, Omslag 312, Dossier 88689 "Verslag Demobilizatie 1918." 15 Van Munnekrede, "De m o b i l i z a t i e van de landmacht," Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 45. Archief Veldleger, Omslag 348, Dossi 6559GS "Soldatenraden." 17 Van der Does, A l s ' t Moet, p. 100. 224 1 O Scheffer, November 1918, p. 74. 1 9 I b i d . , pp. 45-58. T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 192-195. 20 Manifesto i s i n Oud, Jongste Verleden, Deel I, p. 84. 2 1 Scheffer, November 1918. pp. 90-91. 22 By his own admission, see Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, p. 206. 23 As reported i n Het Volk, November 12, 1918, c i t e d i n van der Does, A l s 1 t Moet, p. 289. 24 T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 208-209. 25 See pp. 35-36; they had been improved since 1914, now numbered about 6,000, had uniforms and weapons; see also van der Does, A l s ' t Moet, p. 62. ? ft Scheffer, November 1918, pp. 106-109. 2 7 See RGP 117, No. 789. This had been a clever, l a s t minute move by C o l i j n , leader of the ARP, who was i n London at t h i s time. Normally shipments were simply addressed to "the Government of the Netherlands." ? fl T r o e l s t r a , Gedenkschriften, Deel IV, pp. 210-211. 29 See Oud, Jongste Verleden, Deel I, pp. 91-93. 3 0 Van der Does, A l s ' t Moet. pp. 96-97. 3 1 0 u d / QP. c i t . , pp. 93-95, 99-101. 32 Minutes from the Cabinet meeting c i t e d i-n Scheffer, November 1918, pp. 117-119. 33 Cited i n van der Does, A l s ' t Moet, p. 100. 3 4 Copy of the Manifesto i s i n Archief Ministerraad, Bijlagen t o t de notulen 1916-1918, Nr. 147. C a p i t a l i z e d words were pr i n t e d i n heavy, black l e t t e r s i n the o r i g i n a l . The Manifesto measured about 2x3 fe e t . 3 5 Van der Does, A l s ' t Moet, p. 103. 3 6 Scheffer, November 1918, pp. 146, 163. 3 7 Op. c i t . , pp. 104-105, 162-164, B i j l a g e IV, p. 302. 3 8 Scheffer, November 1918. pp. 223-224. 225 39 Oud, Jongste Verleden, Deel I, p. 103. F u l l d e t a i l s i n De Ridder, "De doormars door Limburg," M i l i t a i r e Spectator (1921). 40 These men had been wounded i n such ways that they would never f i g h t again, and had a l l been i n prisoner of war camps f o r 18 months or longer. They came to the Nether-lands a f t e r long discussions i^ith the respective governments; t h e i r number was l i m i t e d to 16,000 because of the food shortage i n the Netherlands. See C. van Tuinen, "Handhaving van n e u t r a l i t e i t en gezag," Nederland i n O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, pp. 81-82. 4 1 Munnekrede, " M o b i l i z a t i e van de Landmacht," i n i b i d . , p. 45. 4 2 Archief Ministerraad, Bij l a g e n tot de notulen 1916-1918, Nr. 147, November 14, 1918. 43 For the complete story read van der Does, A l s ' t Moet. 4 4 Ibid., pp. 193-194. 4 5 See pp. 83-84. 46 De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, pp. 55-57. 226 REFERENCES CHAPTER VII The words van Karnebeek r e f e r r e d to came from A. A. H. Struycken, De Hoofdtrekken van Nederlands Beleid (Arnhem, 1923). '•De h i s t o r i e a l s p o l i t i e k maxime van de a l l e r e e r s t e orde heeft voortgebracht en bevestigd dat de ongereptheid en onafhankelijkheid van ons grondgebied onmisbare voor-waarde i s voor het p o l i t i e k evenwicht i n Europa." (History as p o l i t i c a l maxim of the f i r s t order has i n t r o -duced and affirmed that the i n t e g r i t y and independence of our country i s e s s e n t i a l for the p o l i t i c a l balance i n Europe.) Cited i n J . J . van Bolhuis, et a l , eds., Onderdrukking en  Verzet. Nederland i n O o r l o g s t i j d , Deel I (Amsterdam, no date), p. 31. 2 The sign for gui l d e r i s f l . (from the old name for the g u i l d e r — f l o r i n ) . 3 De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 64. 4 For the viewpoints of the p a r t i e s , and the debates i n parliament, see Oud, Jongste Verleden, Deel I I , pp. 175, 213; Deel IV, pp. 102, 105, 110, 282-293. 5 See de Jong, op. c i t . , pp. 89-90. ^ Information f o r t h i s , and the following two para-graphs comes from i b i d . , pp. 64-67. Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, pp. 22-24, 27. Bolhuis, ed., Onderdrukking en Verzet, pp. 126-127. 7 See pp. 18-20 f o r the way the "Swiss system" was supposed to work, g Wilson, op. c i t . , pp. 24-25. g Ruys de Beerenbrouck (RKSP) was Premier from 1918-1925; 1929-1933: C o l i j n (ARP) from 1925-1926; 1933-1939: de Geer (CHU) from 1926-1929; 1939-1940. In the l a s t Cabinet of de Geer were two SDAP ministers; the party had consented to j o i n the government i n 1937. 1 0 Van der Does, A l s ' t Moet, B i j l a g e XVII. 1 1 These numbers do not include the men taking"pre-t r a i n i n g " p r i o r to going i n t o the regular army. No one i n the BVL was a member of a f a s c i s t organization, t h i s was forbidden i n 1933, see i b i d . , p. 250. Many members of the BVL were from C a l v i n i s t i c or Roman Catholic background. In deferrence to those who refused to work on the Lords Day, no parades, exercises, etc., were held on Sunday, see i b i d . , p. 279. 227 12 For the f u l l story of the mutiny see J . C. Mollema, Rondom de M u i t e r i j op "De Zeven Provincien", (Deventer, 1934). Casualty f i g u r e s , p. 199. 13 Cited i n de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 191. 1 4 Ibid., pp. 193-194. 15 Cited i n i b i d . , p. 630. Seven months l a t e r , a f t e r the f a l l of Poland, Premier de Geer gave an equally reassuring speech (see pp. 186-187). The speeches give a good idea of the p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t of the Dutch Premiers. Information from i b i d . , pp. 597-598. Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, pp. 21, 28-29. 17 Bolhuis, ed., Onderdrukking en Verzet, pp. 127-8, 133. 1 8 The Dutch did not even have to go to foreign p u b l i -cations. The brother of General Snijders was co-author of a book about the invasion of Belgium which showed how narrowly the Netherlands escaped. A s i m i l a r study was written by J . J . G. van Voorst t o t Voorst, "De Manoeuvre om Limburg," published i n the M i l i t a i r e Spectator as x^ell as i n pamphlet form. 19 Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, p. 21. 2 0 I b i d . , p. 47. 21 Information from i b i d . , pp. 31-35. De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, pp. 66-69. 2 2 De Jong, i b i d . , Deel I I , p. 385. 23 See p. 98. 2 4 Generale S t a f f , "Beknopt overzicht van de K r i j g s -verrichtingen der Koninklijke Landmacht," c i t e d i n Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, p. 68. 25 De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 632. 2 6 See pp. 141-145. 2 7 Enque'ttecommissie Regexingsbeleid 1940-1945 ('s-Gravenhage, 1949). Deel 1 , "Algemene I n l e i d i n g / M i l i t a i r B e l eid 1939/1940," deals with the differences between Reynders and Dijxhoorn i n d e t a i l ; Deel 1 are the minutes of the hearings. 28 Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, p. 67. 2 2 8 29 Much has been written about the warnings received by the Dutch. See f o r instance, Harold Deutch, "The Conspiracy against H i t l e r " , The Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1960). Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen, "Die Niederlande und der 'Alarm 0 im Januar 1940," V i e r t e l j a h r s h e f t e f u r Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 8 (January, 1960), pp. 17-36. E s p e c i a l l y i n the Netherlands there i s a great deal written about t h i s subject. The most comprehensive, and extremely well documented p u b l i c a t i o n i s de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I I , Neutraal. For the c l o t h i n g caper and the German plans see pp. 73-77; the Venlo-incident, pp. 80-115; f o r the warnings communicated to Sas by Ost_er see pp. 116-120, 272-274, 464-466, etc. Ibi d . . p. 136. The attack date f o r F a l l Gelb was set 19 times by H i t l e r and changed 18 times. 3 1 See i b i d . , pp. 438-442. 3 2 There are many books i n the Netherlands about the f i v e f a t a l days i n May; the best are probably Wilson, V i j f Oorlogsdagen, and de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I I I , Mei '40. 33 The best sources f o r the f i v e year occupation are i n Dutch. One good book i n English dealing with t h i s period i s Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch under German Occupation  1940-1945 (Stanford, 1963). The cost of the occupation i n l i v e s l o s t , property destroyed, and misery suffered can never be f u l l y documented. O f f i c i a l Dutch estimates ( c i t e d by Warmbrunn on pp. 60, 68, 77, 78) prepared i n 1960 state that between 300,000 and 400,000 Dutchmen were forced to work i n Germany of whom 5,000 died. Between 2,000 and 3,000 persons were exe-cuted i n the Netherlands and 600 died i n concentration camps. Approximately 20,000 perished i n prison and concen-t r a t i o n camps i n Germany. In addition, between 104,000 and 105,000 Dutch Jews were exterminated, most of them a f t e r deportation to the East. The t o t a l cost of the occupation, i n c l u d i n g f l . 3,600,000,000 worth of goods taken, to Germany, has been estimated between f l . 11,400,000,000 and f l . 15,000,000,000 (i n 1938 value g u i l d e r s ) . 34 No d e f i n i t e f igures are a v a i l a b l e . For a discussion of the problem and sources see, de Jong, op. c i t . Deel I, p. 58. 35 M. W. F. Treub, "De economische toestand van Nederland gedurende den oorlog," Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d , ed. Hajo Brugmans, p. 167. 3 6 See pp. 8-11. 229 3 7 Nederland i n O o r l o g s t i j d , "Redevoeringen gehouden te Leiden op December 14 en 15 door Prof. Dr. F. Muller, Prof. Mr. A. C. Josephus J i t t a , Mr. Dr. van Waldre de Bordes, Mr. J . L i n t h o r s t Horman," (Leiden, 1940). 38 39 40 41 Ibid., p. v i i i . I b id., p. 29. Ibid., pp. 37-41, 46-47. Cited i n i b i d . , p. 36. 42 II, 43 Speech c i t e d i n de Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I I , p. 131. A. M. de Jong, Frank van Wezels Roemruchte J a r e n —  N o t i t i e s van een Landstormman (Amsterdam, 1958). By 1954 the book had already gone through 16 e d i t i o n s . 4 4 See p. 12. 45 De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, Deel I, p. 58. 46 For the economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , see the bibliography for the books by Brugmans, Welderen, and Treub. 47 The two most recent books are Scheffer, November 1918, van der Does, A l s ' t Moet. Only C. Smit has written about the 1914-1918 period recently, Hoogtij der Nederlandse P o l i t i e k . De Buitenlandse P o l i t i e k van Nederland 1899-1919, and t h i s i s very heavily based on the documents i n the RGP s e r i e s which he edited. Of h i s proposed three volumes Nederland i n de  Eerste Wereldoorlog (1899-1919), only the f i r s t volume i s completed and deals with the pre-war years. Unfortunately, i t i s very much l i k e his Hoogtij, and adds l i t t l e new i n f o r -mation or i n s i g h t . 48 J. Beishuizen, E. Werkman, De Magere Jaren. Nederland  i n de C r i s i s t i j d 1929-1939 (Leiden, 1968). 49 H. van Galen Last, Nederland voor de Storm. P o l i t i e k  en L i t e r a t u r e i n de jaren d e r t i g (Bussem, 1969). 50 De Jong, Tweede Wereldoorlog, 3 Delen. I t i s not f a i r to judge on these three volumes; they are only the s t a r t of the 10 or 12 volumes which w i l l complete t h i s ( o f f i c i a l , government sponsored) work. De Jong does mention i n the preface of the f i r s t volume that he w i l l * come back to c e r t a i n topics, i . e . t r e a t them out of t h e i r chro-n o l o g i c a l order. So f a r , however, he has not indicated that he sees Dutch measures during World War I as a manifestation of the weaknesses i n the national character which, not being changed by that war, made the f i a s c o of May 1940 a l o g i c a l culmination. 230 -BIBLIOGRAPHY Unpublished Sources: Algemeen R i j k s a r c h i e f . Bleyenburg 7, Den Haag: Archief Ministerraad 1914-1918, b i j l a g e n t o t de notulen  1913-1918. (146.147) Geheim Dossier Snijders-de Jonge. (147A0 Correspondentie met Opperbevelhebber. (147B) C o l l e c t i e Bosboom. Algemeen R i j k s a r c h i e f , Hulpdepot Schaarsbergen. Koningsweg 13C, Schaarsbergen: Archief Generale Staff Koningklijke Land en Zeemacht 1813-1918 (1939). Archief Hoofdkwartier Veldleger 1907-1942. Archief Buitenlandze Zaken. Hooftskade 1, Den Haag: Legatie archief Duitsland. (A250d) Dossiers Q 3VI, Q 3VII, 0 5X. Sectie Krijgsgeschiedenis en Ceremonieel van het Hoofd-kv/artier der Koninklijke Landmacht. Kanaalweg 2, Den Haag: Dossiers Geheime Dienst ( l e g e r ) . Dossier Muller Massis. (141/2, 142/1, Handschrift 189) Published Sources: Commissie t o t onderzoek naar de ontevredenheid i n het  leger. 's-Gravenhage: Landsdrukkerij, 1919. Doorvoer door Nederland u i t Duitsland naar Belgie, en i n  omgekeerde r i c h t i n g . B r i e f w i s s e l i n g met de B r i t s e  en Duitse Regeringen. 2 Delen. 's-Gravenhage: Landsdrukkerij, 1917, 1918. Enquettecommissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945. Deel i A e n B / 2 A e n b , 8C-J-, QC11. 's-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkeri j , 1949. Gooch, G. P. and H. Temperley. B r i t i s h Documents on the  Origins of the War 1898-1914. Vol. 8. London: 1932. Oranjeboek, J u l i e 1914-December 1916. "Diplomatiek betreffende den verscherpte duikbotenoorlog." . 's-Gravenhage: Landsdrukkerij, 1917. Recueil M i l i t a i r . Derde Stuk, 1908-1911. "Gegevens van K.B. van Maart 17, 1909, •Traktament en s o l d i j e n voor m i l i t a i r e beneden den rang van o f f i c i e r . ' " Den Haag: Landsdrukkerij, 1918. 231 Rijks Geschiedkundige P u b l i c a t i e n . (RGP) Grote Serie. "Bescheiden betreffende de buitenlandse p o l i t i e k van Nederland 1848-1919." Derde Periode J899-1919. Smit, C. ed. 's-Gravenhage: N i j h o f f , 1957-1968. 1899-1914, No. 128 (Buitenlandse bronnen), 1968 1899-1903, No. 100, 1957 1903-1907, No. 102, 1958 1907-1914, No. 106, 1961 1914-1917, No. 109, 1962 1917-1919, Nos. 116,117, (2 Vols.) 1964. Memoirs, D i a r i e s , Speeches, etc. : Bas, W. G. de, ed. Gedenkboek 1898-1923. Voorschoten: Fongers, 1923. Bosboom, N. In M o e i l i j k e Omstandigheden, Augustes 1914- Mei 1917. Gorinchem: Noordduyn, 1937. Brugmans, Hajo, ed. Nederland i n den O o r l o g s t i j d ; De  Geschiedenis van Nederland t i j d e n s 1914-1918. Amsterdam: E l s e v i e r , 1920. Brugmans, Hajo, ed. O f f i c i e e l Gedenkboek ter gelegenheid van het 25 j a r i g e Regerings jubileum van H.M. Koningin  Wilhelmina. Amsterdam: van Hoekema en Haendorf, 1923. Easton, C. Jaren van S t r i j d . Amsterdam: 1917. Easton, C. Jaren van C r i s e s . Den Haag: Naeff, 1923. Kuehlmann, R. von. Erinnerungen. Heidelberg: 1948. Ludendorff, E r i c h . My War Memoirs. 2 v o l s . London: Hutchison, no date. Moltke, H. von. Erinnerungen, B r i e f e , Dokumente. Stuttgart: 1922. Moser, O. von. Feldzugaufzeichnungen 1914-1918. Stuttgart: Belsersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920. Nederland i n O o r l o g s t i j d . "Redevoeringen gehouden te Leiden op December 14 en 15 door Prof. Dr. F. Muller, Prof. Mr. A. C. Josephus J i t t a , Mr. Dr. van Waldre de Bordes, Mr. J. L i n t h o r s t Horman." Leiden: S t e r e f o r t Kroes, 1940. Rosen, F r i e d r i c h . Aus Einem Diplomatischen Wanderleben. Band I I I , IV. Ed. Herbert Mueller-Werth. Wiesbaden: Lirnes Verlag, 1959. T i r p i t z , A. von. Erinnerungen. L e i p z i g : 1920. 232 Treub, M. W. F. Herinneringen en Overpeinzingen. Haarlem: Tjeenk W i l l i n k , 1931. Treub, M. W. F. O o r l o g s t i j d : Herinneringen en Indrukken. Haarlem: Tjeenk W i l l i n k , 1917. T r o e l s t r a , P. J . Gedenkschriften. 4 Vols. Amsterdam: E. M. Querido, 1931-1935. Secondary Sources: Barnouw, A. J . Holland under Queen Wilhelmina. London: Scribner's sons, 1923. Beaufort, J . A. A. de. F i j f t i g Jaren u i t onze Geschiedenis  1868-1918. 2 vo l s . Amsterdam: 1928. Beishuizen, J . and E. Werkman. De Magere Jaren. Nederland  i n de c r i s i s t i j d 1929-1939. Leiden: S i j t h o f f , 1968. B e l l , A. C. The Blockade of the Central Empires 1914-1918. London: H.M. Stationary O f f i c e , 1961. Berg, D. van der. Cornelius Jacobus Snijders, 1852-1939. Den Haag: 1949. Bernhardi, F r i e d r i c h von. Germany and the Next War. trans. A l l e n R. Powles, New York: Longmans & Green, 1914. Bolhuis, J . J . van. et a l . , eds. Onderdrukking en Verzet. Nederland i n O o r l o g s t i j d . Deel I. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, no date. Brugmans, Hajo. Geschiedenis van Nederland onder de Regering van Koningin Wilhelmina. Amsterdam: 1938. Brugmans, I. J . Paardenkracht en Mensenmacht—Sociaal- Economische Geschiedenis van Nederland, 1795-1940. Den Haag: N i j h o f f , 1969. Colenbrander, H. T. Studien en aantekeningen over Nederlandse  p o l i t i e k 1909-1919. 's-Gravenhage': 1920. Cornelissen, J . et a l . , eds. De Taaie Rooie Rakkers. Utrecht: Ambo-boeken, 1965. Dam van I s s e l t , W. E. van. et a l . Nederland i n de Branding. Baarn: Hollandia-drukkerij, no date. Does, J . C. van der. et a l . A l s ' t Moet. November 1918 en  de Bijzondere V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm. 's-Gravenhage: Nijgh en van Ditman, 1959. 233 Elout, C. K. Figuren en momenten u i t de p o l i t i e k van  Koningin Wilhelmina's t i j d . Amsterdam: 1938. Fisher, F r i t z . Germany's Aims i n the F i r s t World War. New York: Norton, 1967. F l i e r , N. J . van der. War Finances i n the Netherlands  up to 1918. Oxford: 1923. Galen Last, H. van. Nederland voor de storm. P o l i t i e k en  l i t e r a t u r e i n de jaren d e r t i g . Bussem: Fibula-van Dishoek, 1969. Hamel, J . A. van. Nederland tussen de Mogendheden. Amsterdam: 1918. Herre, Paul. Die Kleinen Staaten Europas und die Entstehung  des Weltkrieges. Muenchen: Verlag Beck'sche, 1938. Houtte, A. A. van. et a l . , eds. Algemene Geschiedenis der  Nederlanden. Delen XI, XII. Z e i s t : de Haan, 1958. Hulst, H. van. et a l . Het Roode Vaandel volgen wij (SDAP  1880-1940). •s-Gravenhage: Kuseman, 1969. Japikse, N. Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkriege. Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1921. Jong, L. de. Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden i n de Tweede  Wereldoorlog. Deel I, I I , I I I . 's-Gravenhage: N i j h o f f , 1969, 19 70. Karnebeek, H. A. van. De Internationale p o s i t i e van Nederland i n de l a a t s t e v e e r t i g jaren (1890-1938). 's-Gravenhage: 1938. Kooiman, J . ed. De Nederlandse Strijdmacht en Hare  M o b i l i z a t i e . Arnhem: de Ruyter, no date. Kuhl, Hermann von. Der Weltkrieg 1914/1918. 2.vols. B e r l i n : Wilhelm Rof, 1929. Leeuw, A. S. de. Nederland i n de Wereldpolitiek van 1900  tot heden. Z e i s t : de Torenkrans, 1936. Mollema, J . C. Rondom de M u i t e r i j op "De Zeven Provincien". Deventer: van Hoeve, 1934. Mueller, Georg A. von. The Kaiser and His Court, ed. Walter G o e r l i t z . New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964. Oud, P. J . Het Jongste Verleden. Parlementaire Geschiedenis  van Nederland 1918-1940. 6 v o l s . Assen: van Gorcum, 1958-1961. 234 Oud, P. J . Konderd Jaren—Hoofdzaken der Nederlandse  Staatkundige Geschiedenis 1840-1940. Assen: van Gorcum, 1946. Raalte, E. van. Het Nederlandse Parlement. •s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij, 1963. Reichskriegsministerium. Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918. Vols. 11, 12, 14. B e r l i n : M i t t l e r , 1938-1942. R i t t e r , Gerhard. The S c h l i e f f e n Plan: C r i t i q u e of a Myth, trans. Andrew and Eva Wilson. London: Wolff, 19 58. R i t t e r , P. H. De Donkere Poort. 2 v o l s . Den Haag: Daarnen, 1931. Scheffer, H. J . November 1918: Journaal van een Revolutie  die n i e t doorging. Amsterdam: de Arbeiderspers, 1968. Smit, C. De Hoogtij der Nederlandse p o l i t i e k . De buitenlandse  p o l i t i e k van Nederland 1899-1919. Leiden: S i j t h o f f . 1959. Smit, C. Nederland i n de Eerste Wereldoorlog. Eerste Deel: Het Voorspel (1899-1914). Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 19 71. T i r p i t z , A. von. P o l i t i s c h e Dokumente. 2 v o l s . B e r l i n : 1926. Vagts, A. A History of M i l i t a r i s m . New York: Meridian, 1959. Vanderbosch, A. Dutch Foreign P o l i c y since 1815. The Hague: N i j h o f f , 1959. Wall, S. L. van der. Herinneringen van Jhr. Mr. B. C. de Jonge met brieven u i t z i j n nalatenschap. Utrecht: H i s t o r i s c h Genootschap, 1968. Warmbrunn, Werner. The Dutch under German Occupation  1940-1945. Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1963. Weber, Helmuth. Ludendorff und die Monopole: Deutsche  K r i e g s p o l i t i k 1916-1918. B e r l i n : Akademie Verlag, 1966. Welderen. W. J . van. Schets eener Parliamentaire  Geschiedenis van Nederland. Deel I I I , IV. 's-Gravenhage: N i j h o f f , 1955. Wilson, J . J . C. P. V i j f Oorlogsdagen en-nun t w i n t i g j a r i g e  voorgeschiedenis. Assen: van Gorcum, 1960. 235 Contemporary A r t i c l e s , Pamphlets, Neivspapers: A l t i n g von Geusau, G. A. A. Onze Weermacht te land. Amsterdam: no date. Baumstetten, B. Wird Holland E i n g r i f f e n ? L e i p z i g : Verlag Otto Hillmann, 1917. Capellen, R. Neerland's z e l f s t a n d i g h e i d i n gevaar? Fabius, G. C. A. De verhouding tussen Volk en Weermacht. Amsterdam: 1916. Gargas, S. K r i e g s w i r t s c h a f t l i c h e Probleme i n Holland. Dresden: 1918. L i g t , B. de. Opruiers? Het dienstweigerings Manifest voor  de rechtbank te Utrecht verdedigd. Amsterdam: 1916. M i l i t a i r e Spectator. A great many a r t i c l e s from the 1914 to 1923 issues have been used. MAVORS—Maandschrift voor M i l i t a i r e en V e r l o f s o f f i c i e r e n . I have used the 1914-1918 issues. Orgaan der Vereeniging ter beoefening van het Krijgswetenshap. The 1914-1918 issues have been used. Soldatencourant.(Augustes 1914—December 1918} In addition, I have used various a r t i c l e s from the Telegraaf, Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (NRC), Haagse  Dagblad, and le s s e r known newspapers from the 1914-. 1918 period. Verheul, Az. A. De V r i j w i l l i g e Landstorm te plattelande. Utrecht: no date. Verwey, A. Holland en de Oorlog. Amsterdam: 1916. Vries, Max de. De Landstormwet een noodzakelijkheid. Breda: no date. Zee, D. van der. Het M i l i t a i r e Vraagstuk en de S o c i a l i s - t i s c h e beweging. Schiedam: 1915. A r t i c l e s and P e r i o d i c a l s : Buysse, Emile. "Tussen de Knokse Oosthoek en't S l u i s e f o r t Sint-Donaar", P r o v i n c i a l e Zeeuwe Courant, December 11, 19 71. Jong, C. T. de. "De Nederlandse N e u t r a l i t e i t t i j d e n s de Eerste Wereldoorlog", T i j d s c h r i f t voor Geschiedenis. v o l . 65, 1952, pp. 257-271. Nieuwenhuis, Jan. "Spionage v i a Nederland t i j d e n s de Eerste Wereldoorlog", E l s e v i e r Weekblad, October 17, 24, 31; November 7, 14, 1964. Raalte, E. van. "Treub's houding gedurende Wereldoorlog Nr. I", V r i j Nederland, December 6, 1958. Schoeffer, J. "Het Trauma van de Nederlandse Nederlaag", T i j d s c h r i f t voor Geschiedenis, vol.84, 1971, A f l e v e r i n g 4. Novels: Jong, A. M. de. Frank van Wezels Roemruchte J a r e n —  N o t i t i e s van een Landstormman. Amsterdam: E. M. Querido, 1958. Remarque, E.M. A l l Quiet on the Western Front. New York: L i t t l e , Brown & Co., 1958. Vrande, F. van de. Grensleven. Velsen: Schuyt, no date. 

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