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The Wuerttemberg constitutional reform of 1906 : background and analysis Koth, Karl B. 1972

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CI THE WUERTTEMBERG CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM OF 1906: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS by Karl B. Koth B.A., Roosevelt University, 1965. A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August, 1972 In present ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I fu r ther agree that permission for extensive copying o f th is t h e s i s for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representa t ives . It is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion . Department of H i s t o r y The Un ive rs i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date 22nd. August, 1972 "YET OLD TRADITIONS DIE HARD." E. H. Carr i i ABSTRACT The hundredth year of the anniversary of the founding of the S,econd Reich is a f i t t ing moment to raise new questions and indicate possible new directions to the history of that period. German historiography of the nineteenth century had been mainly concerned with the foreign policy of Bismarck, or with the 'genius' of the creator of the Reich, himself. The most comprehensive accounts, such as Adalbert Wahl's four-volume Deutsche Geschichte 1871-1914, or Treitschke's six-volume, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century, although concerned with cultural as well as polit ical l i f e , reveal yet another bias: the identification of the Reich with Prussia. The only inclusive, detailed treatment of the subject in the English language, Hajo Holborn's three-volume, A History of Modern Germany, was no departure from main-stream interpretation of German history. Indeed, English language historiography s t i l l does not do justice to the richness and diversity of German constitutional development during the nineteenth century. An image has been created which reduces the role of the south german states to puppets, assuming that these had no or at most very l i t t l e part to play in the subsequent development of the Reich. A detailed history of the non-Prussian states, their relationship to and their contributions to the Reich remains to be written. • This thesis then is presented out of a sense of dissatisfaction with the manner in which historians continue to deal with the Second Reich, and is an attempt to indicate that there was another polit ical i i i iv tradition in Germany. Such an approach is all the more important since that edifice was survived by some of its component parts. Two alternatives to Bismarckian absolutism emerged in the nine-teenth century, parliamentary liberalism and revolutionary socialism. Both of these have come to be the form of government in the two German states which were created after World War II. Here I will be concerned with the former strand as i t evolved in the south German state of Wuerttem-berg. A similar account could be written for Baden, since both states or Laender shared many features of a liberal development in common. In both a vigorous parliamentary l i f e evolved in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centures which groomed many a politician for his role in the Weimar or later in the Federal Republics. It was Wuerttem-berg which was afforded the singular honour of providing one of its sons, Theodor Heuss, as the fir s t President of the Federal Republic in 1949. But principally, the availability of sources determined the concentration on this particular Land. Given this tradition of parliamentary liberalism and furthermore, the ability and opportunity to exercise its autonomy within the Reich, one may justifiably ask why ultimate parliamentary democracy only appeared when forced by the circumstances of the 1918/19 revolution? A detailed examination of Wuerttemberg constitutional l i f e in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the controversy surrounding the constitutional reform of 1906, sheds light on the continuing struggle which this tradition faced in the circumstances of the engrossing Prussian influence in the Second Reich. CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT . i i i ABBREVIATIONS vi i i CHAPTER I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 1806-47 1 A. Introduction 1 B. Wuerttemberg during the Napoleonic Era 5 C. The New Constitution 7 1. The Fight f o r 'Das Gute Alte Recht' 7 2. Summary 11 I I . FROM THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TO UNIFICATION 15 A. Introduction. The 'Vormaerz' i n Wuerttemberg 15 B. 1848-49 17 1. Party Origins and Programmes 17 2. The February Revolution 18 3. The Failure of Constitutional Reform 20 4. The Reaction of the F i f t i e s 22 5. German Unity and the Formation of the Volkspartei. . 25 C. Unification 27 1. The German Question Posed: Austria vs. Prussia . . 27 2. The German Question Solved: The 'Reichsgruendung' . 31 v I i vi CHAPTER Page I I I . THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 1871-1900 34 A. Wuerttemberg i n the Reich 1871-1894 34 1. Unification and defeat of the Volkspartei 34 2. P o l i t i c a l and Economic Effects of Unification . . . 36 B. Revival of the Volkspartei . . . 42 1. A New Generation 42 2. Renewal of the Demand for Reform 44 C. The Attempt and Failure of Constitutional Reform 1895-1900 46 1. Success of the Volkspartei at the Election of 1895 . 46 2. Von Mittnacht's Proposal of 1897 49 IV. THE 36th LANDTAG - 1st SESSION 1901-1904 54 A. Introduction 54 1. The Election of 1900 . 54 2. The Social Basis of the Parties and t h e i r Programmes 55 B. The Renewed Demand for Constitutional Reform 58 1. The Government 58 2. Freie Vereinigung 59 3. The Volkspartei 61 4. Deutsche Partei 63 5. The SPD 64 6. The Centre Party 66 C. The Kloss Motion 68 D. The Defeat of the School Reform B i l l 72 1. Introduction 72 2. The Volksschule 73 v i i CHAPTER Page 3. The School B i l l 74 4. Public Reaction to the Defeat 76 5. Parliamentary Reaction and the Haussmann. Resolution 76 V. THE 36th LANDTAG - 2nd SESSION 1904-1906 88 A. The Government takes the I n i t i a t i v e 88 1. Introduction . 88 2. The Throne Speech 89 3. The Government Proposal •• 90 B. The Debate on the Constitutional Reform B i l l 92 1. Preliminary Debate and Selection of Constitutional Commi ttee 92 2. The Committee Proposals 101 3. Second Reading i n the Lower House 102 4. The Committee Report of the Upper House 104 5. Third Reading in the Lower House 105 6. Second Reading in the Upper House 108 7. Fourth Reading i n the Lower House 108 VI. CONCLUSION I l l I l l u s t r a t i o n - Seating arrangement in the Lower House during the debate on the reform b i l l 120 Appendix A. Results of Wuerttemberg Elections 1868-1912 121 Appendix B. Biographical Data 122 BIBLIOGRAPHY 124 ABBREVIATIONS Parliamentary Records P.I.(77), p. 1 = Verhandlungen der wuerttembergischen Kammer der Abgeodneten. ProtokolIband I. Number 77, page 1. B.I.(94), p. 651 = Verhandlungen der wuerttembergischen Kammer der Abgeodneten. Beilagenband I. Number 94, page 651. Parties in the Landtag Bauerbuendler = Agrarian or Farmer's Party. Deutsche Partei (DP) = German Party (National Liberals) Freie Vereinigung = Free Association Konservativen = Conservatives SPD = German Social Democratic Party Volkspartei (VP) = Peoples Party Zentrum (Z) = Centre Party v i i i CHAPTER I THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 1806-1847 A. Introducti on In the light of existing literature i t is fairly easy to arrive at the conclusion that the non-Prussian members of the Second Reich were forced to give up their sovereignty in exchange for a facade of indepen-dence embodied in the 'federal f ic t ion. ' A closer examination, however, wil l reveal that this was not so. Not only did the south German states join the Reich because they felt that i t was in their interest to do so, but they brought with them a tradition of parliamentary liberalism which enabled them to maintain an autonomous internal l i fe and which appeared to offer a strong alternative to 1Prussianism.1 The steady liberalization of Wuerttemberg l i f e , the lack of censorship and police arbitrariness, as well as the effect of increased popular participation in the great questions of internal reform, were not without effect on the Prussians."' According to Franz Schnabel , this difference between north and south placed the latter suddenly in the forefront of German history at 2 the beginning of the century. Before the founding of the Second Reich Theodor Heuss, Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit (Stuttgart, 1967), p. 101. Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte (Freiburg, 1949), p. 87. 1 2 Bismarck was aware that parliamentary liberalism in south Germany was an influence that would have to be taken seriously into account. The standstill of the national movement in South Germany after 1867 was of deep concern to Bismarck. There can be no doubt that he wished to include the South German states in the con-federation, but he did not intend to buy their support by con-stitutional concessions that would have jeopordized the pre-dominance of royal power that he had established in the north and that had been a major reason for his willingness to leave., the South German states outside of the Confederation of 1866. In Prussia the liberal reforms which were inaugurated in the f i rs t decade of the nineteenth century were part of an autocratic, paternalistic tradition. The reformers were less motivated by any belief in the rights of man than by the realisation that this was the best way to avenge the defeats at Jena and Auerstaedt. How could a Prussian peasant, they asked, be expected to have any patriotic feeling towards a state in which he was 4 s t i l l held in bondage? During the course of the century this approach did not change. Reforms were never introduced because of the desire of the state to bring Prussia in line with modern developments in western Europe. A case in point was the much-heralded social reforms of the 1880's. In 1878 Bis-marck substituted the Social Democrats for the Catholics as his internal whipping-boy. Anti-socialist laws, which incidentally were renewed t i l l 1890, forbade the Social Democratic party to hold polit ical meetings and sharply curtailed its press. But in order to make his campaign more effective Bismarck also sought to alienate the working class from their Hajo Hoi born, A History of Modern Germany 1840-1945 (New York, 1969), p. 208. 4 Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London, 1955), pp. 40-41. 3 party by enacting a series of social legislation. Compulsory insurance was introduced protecting the worker against sickness, accident, in-5 capacity and old age. It is generally considered that the Prussian army acted as the cement of the Reich. Not only was i t the strongest in the Reich but military matters were the exclusive concern of the Kaiser. Certainly Bavaria was given token constitutional autonomy as regards her army and the Wuerttemberg king alone had the right to commission officers, but i t was considered everywhere that these were mere paper concessions. Yet the fact remains that a federal state could and sometimes did impose its wishes in this sacrosanct area of the constitution. In 1893 Wuerttemberg experienced hardship in the form of a poor harvest, so much so that i t was considered advisable to scale down previously planned army maneuvers. Her ambassador, Moser, was asked by Berlin to submit their formal request as early as possible as the Kaiser was about to leave on a trip to England. The request arrived only one day before the Kaiser's departure and was couched in such categorical terms that he was furious. Nevertheless, the request was granted. A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History (London, 1964), pp. 145-146. c J.C.G. Roehl, Germany Without Bismarck (London, 1967), pp. 100-101. This was an attempt by the Wuerttemberg Minister President, von Mittnacht, to embarrass and so get rid of the Reich Chancellor, General von Caprivi. Mittnacht felt that von Caprivi, who had given up the Prussian Chancellorship, had thus lost his power over the Prussian ministers, a fact which endangered the autonomy of the smaller states. Bismarck himself was aware of this possibil ity. Cf. Hans Goldschmitt, Das Reich  und Preussen im Kamp urn die Fuehrung (Berlin, 1931), pp. 311-312. 4 Opposition to the Reich was not of course confined to Wuerttemberg. Nor was the evolution of liberalism. The three south German states stand out in marked contrast to the north during the nineteenth century. At a time when Wuerttemberg, Bavaria and Baden were embarking on further liberalization of their constitutions the very opposite development was taking place in northern Germany. In 1896 Saxony replaced her liberal suffrage with the three-class Prussian voting system and in 1905 i t was considering further regressive changes. Luebeck in 1904 also abolished equal suffrage while in Hamburg the existing three-class system was reformed at the expense of the lower-class.^ . Similar development is to be noted in the area of education. The proponents of denominational education in Prussia managed to influence their government in 1904 to place the schools on a confessional basis; while, in Wuerttemberg in the same year, the failure of a school b i l l which would have placed school inspection securely in the hands of secular authorities, caused a reaction which had as an immediate result the pro-Q gressive reform of the constitution. The evolution of liberalism in south Germany did not derive exclusively from blind particularism, i .e. the desire to preserve auto-nomy vis a vis the encroachments of great-power autocracy. Nor was i t due solely to the influences of the French Revolution. It was mainly the result of a feeling among leading polit ical sectors, which included the 9 monarchs, that south Germany had a viable alternative to autocracy. 7Holborn, p. 364. - 8W. H. Dawson, The German Empire 1867-1914 (London, 1966), v. 2, p.312. g Inge Schlieper, Wurzeln der Demokratie in der deutschen Geschichte (Bonn, 1967), pp. 154-157. 5 This fe e l i n g was manifested very c l e a r l y by the middle-class in Wuerttem-berg as well as king William I, and found i t s expression i n the co n s t i -tutional settlement of 1819. Fostered also by the radicals of 1830 and 1848, i t gradually evolved as a t r a d i t i o n , and became firmly anchored i n the p o l i t i c a l platform of t h e i r successors, the Volkspartei. B. Wuerttemberg during the Napoleonic Era The history of modern Wuerttemberg dates from March 18, 1806. On that day the t e r r i t o r y of the old Duchy of Wuerttemberg was united with the motley c o l l e c t i o n of miniseule states, remnants of the recently deceased Holy Roman Empire, which lay between the lower portion of the I l l e r and the upper Danube r i v e r s . Together they became know as the Kingdom of Wuerttemberg. Almost s i x months before, Napoleon had defeated Austria at the battle of A u s t e r l i t z and had forced her to sign the Treaty of Pressburg. Among i t s provisions was the bestowal of kingship on the Electors of Bavaria and Wuerttemberg. In J u l y , 1806, Napoleon created the Confedera-tion of the Rhine, and a month l a t e r demanded, and achieved the d i s s o l u -tion of the Holy Roman Empire. By the Treaty of Pressburg, Wuerttemberg's t e r r i t o r y and popu-l a t i o n more than doubled to 19,500 sq. kilometers and 1.34 m i l l i o n inhabi-tants, r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^ Because of the differences i n corporate structure Ernst Marquardt, Geschichte Wuerttembergs (Stuttgart, 1962), p.304. See also Ernst Mueller, Kleine Geschichte Wuerttembergs (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 168-169, for a detailed l i s t of t e r r i t o r i a l gains. 6 i t would have been impossible for Frederick II (1797-1816) to extend the constitution of Old Wuerttemberg to the new territory. For the orthodox Lutheran clergy had now to coexist with the Catholics of southern Swabia, the conservative, class-conscious Old Wuerttemberg middle-class with the more liberal Buerger of the former Swabian Imperial c i t ies, and the middle-class Estates with the mediatised Swabian aristocracy. The confusion was further exacerbated by the presence of a.number of princely families who had been deprived of their.territories by the recent annexations. Consequently, New Wuerttemberg was governed directly, from the court through a centralized administrative apparatus. Yet Frederick's ambitions were not satiated by the annexations or the imposition of a centralized governmental structure in New Wuerttem-berg. For centuries, the two institutions of Old Wuerttemberg, monarchy and estates, had egoistically watched each other for a chance to extend their privileges. A constitution had been promulgated in 1770 under the guarantee of England, Prussia and Denmark, and had since been s t r i -dently defended by the Buergers against the encroachments of eighteenth century absolutism. Because of Napoleon's express support, Frederick was able to govern without the participation of the estates.^ The abrogation of the 1770 constitution was decidedly unpopular with Wuerttemberg's Buergers. It was obvious that only the backing of Frederick's powerful ally had enabled him to take such a step. And i t was equally clear that i f Napoleon were out of the way that the Buergers Erwin Hoelzle, Wuerttemberg im Zeitalten Napoleons und der  Deutschen Erhebung (Stuttgart, 1937), p. 4. 7 would take up the fight for what were considered ancient rights. C. The New Constitution 1. The Fight for 'Das Gute Alte Recht' Frederick set about the task of administering and governing his state by creating a central ministry (Staatsministeriurn) in place of the Geheim Rat which had previously acted as the link between monarch and estates. The new ministry was supported by an administrative re-organisation which encompassed the entire territory. At the same time the privileged position of the Lutheran Church was terminated by the Religionsedikt of October 15, 1806, which guaranteed freedom of religion as well as equality for the three Christian denominations - Roman Catholic, 12 Reformed and Lutheran - in the eyes of the state. By including the administration of the Lutheran Church property in the new finance ministry, Frederick completed the process of secularisation in Wuerttemberg which many European countries, eg. Bavaria, had entered upon decades before. His attempt at absolutism however, met with opposition in Wuerttem-berg as well as in the rest of Germany as soon as Napoleon abdicated. In keeping with the liberal-constitutional winds which were sweeping through Germany, the various German states were enjoined by Article 13 13 of the Federal Acts of 1815 to introduce constitutions. But the most 1 2Hoelzle, p. 115. 13 Bundesakte. Constitution of the Germanic Confederation created by the Congress of Vienna. 8 14 serious pressure was presented by the so-called 'German Movement' which paradoxically demanded a return to the corporative character of German l i fe while being inspired by the liberal reforms of the French 15 Revolution. In a preemptive effort, Frederick summoned the Landtag on May 15, 1815, and presented a new constitution.^ But he was met with the combined opposition of oligarchs from Old, and aristocrats from New Wuerttemberg, who demanded a return to the previous constitution of Old Wuerttemberg which had been dubbed 'Das Gute Alte Recht.' This Landtag was the f i rst in modern Germany to appeal to the constitutional theory of contract, based however, not on modern constitutional arguments, but on the rights of the estates as they had existed until 1806.^^ A renewed attempt by the king to draft a constitution acceptable to the oligarchic group by restoring the right to raise taxes and participate in legis-lation, was equally rejected. While these were acceptable in themselves the oligarchs had no intention of allowing the king to introduce a bi-cameral legislature which would have isolated the aristocrats and thus broken the alliance. On October 13, 1816, before any agreement was reached, Frederick died. He was succeeded by his son William I (1816-1864) who continued 14 Deutsche Erhebung. 1 5Hoelzle, p. 187. 1 6Walter Grube, Der Stuttgarter Landtag 1457-1957 (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 486. ^Ernst Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789 (Stutt-gart, 1957), V. I, p. 332. 1 8Grube, p. 498. Cf. Hoelzle, p. 267. 9 the negotiations but fared no better than his father. Any attempt short of a return to the old constitution was resisted by the oligarchs, and William was thus forced to continue to rule by administrative decree. Through a series of administrative reforms William was able to win the support of the public. His f i rs t edicts eliminated serfdom and l ifted emigration restrictions, to be followed quickly by the restoration of certain rights, the most important of which were the separation of the judiciary and administration at the county level, and the recognition of 19 municipal charters. Nevertheless, although these reforms brought the king a good deal of popularity, and although he did not want to be outdone by Bavaria and Baden, which had proclaimed their constitutions in May and August, 1818, respectively, the catalyst for agreement on the constitution came from external sources. With the murder of von Kotzebue, a Russian State Councillor reputed to be a spy, by a young nationalist student, the German Diet passed the Carlsbad Decrees in September, 1819, beginning the period of Metternichian reaction. Both William and his opposition had seen the writing on the wall and were eager to complete the constitution 20 before the Diet passed its repressive legislation. Now a shift in alignments within the Landtag enabled William to achieve a majority. The minority which had previously supported the new constitution were now joined by the greater portion of the 'Altrechtler 1 Grube, p. 501. Wrquardt, p. 277. Adherents of the old constitution. 10 who recognised the possibility of compromise. It seems that the spir i t of particularism, i.e. opposition to a centralized Germany, be i t of the liberal or reactionary variety, weighed more than the desire to return to the old days. In elections held June 10, 1819, the government party won a decisive victory, and after three months of negotiating, the new constitution was declared. This was remarkable in a number of ways. Not only did i t recognise 22 the principle of contract, but i t was able to incorporate many of the new constitutional ideas of the nineteenth century, at a time when consti-tutionalism was being attacked by Viennese reaction. Yet, i t was decidedly a compromise between the new ideas and 'Das Gute Alte Recht.' Of the old institutions, the Permanent Committee (Staendischer Ausschuss) and the Privy Council (Geheim Rat) were retained, as well as the right to levy taxes and self-administration for distr icts. The most important change was the adoption of a bi-cameral legis-23 lature, with an Upper House consisting of Lords and appointed members, and a Lower House consisting of 70 elected and 23 privileged members: 13 Gentry, 6 Protestant Superintendants, 3 Catholic Clergy, and the Chancellor of Tuebingen University, each elected by their own class or corporation. In addition, legislative init iat ive was reserved for the king, and the legislative period set for two sessions of three years each. Only tax-payers could vote, the highest-paying electing two-thirds of the representatives. 22 Fritz Hartung, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte vom 15te Jahr- hundert bis zur Gegenwart (Berlin, 1922), p. 129. 23 German aristocracy was divided into two groups, Standesherren and Ritterschaft, similar to the English Peers and Gentry. 11 The Landtag was thus to be dominated from now on by the ar is-tocracy and the oligarchy, government influence being ensured by a regu-24 lation which permitted civi1-servants to run for office. This new constitution could not be called democratic, but i t certainly went further towards recognising the principle of representation than had i t s pre-decessor, and furthermore i t appeared to be the result of an agreement 25 between monarch and people, an extraordinary admission in time of reaction. On paper at least, the Wuerttemberg constitution, along with that of Baden, was the most l iberal in Germany. 2. Summary Despite the anti-constitutional pressure from the most powerful member of the German Confederation (Austria), Wuerttemberg was able to complete the task of drafting and accepting a new constitution before the Carlsbad Decrees. This was an important achievement in that era of reaction. Yet, nothing would be further from the truth than the assertion that this was due exclusively to a more l ibera l atmosphere in southern Germany than that which existed in the rest of central Europe. Rather, the key to the underlying motivation for the promulgation of a constitution must be sought in the feverish attempts of Frederick and later William to successfully amalgamate the new terr i tor ies with the old Duchy of Grube, p. 507. 25 The word people sounds more inclusive than i t actually was. Peasants and labourers, i . e . a l l those who were not of the old Buerger class, were excluded from the category. 12 Of. Wuerttemberg. Only in so doing could they hope to maintain the t i t l e of king as well as hang on to the annexed terr i tor ies now that their former patron, Napoleon, was no longer present. The d i f f i cu l t i e s of consolidation lay in the differing social real i t ies of both ter r i tor ies . On the one hand were the mediatised ar is -tocracy of new Wuerttemberg, petty princes most of whom had themselves been sovereigns not long before and who had been social ly and legally on a par with the Duke of Wuerttemberg. They had formed an association which constantly lobbied the Vienna Congress for the restoration of 27 their rights. But because greed played a more important role at Vienna than 'class so l ida r i t y , ' Frederick was not opposed in his attempt to f i t the 'Standesherren' as these were now cal led, into the framework of his kingdom. What Vienna did demand, however, was that this be accomplished by a return to the Estate system. The other important social and po l i t i ca l element were the oligarchy from the old Duchy consisting of a few rich families who for nearly five hundred years had enjoyed a privileged position comparable to no other in the former Empire. They had managed to secure for themselves a consti-tution which allowed them considerable power even to the extent of main-taining a parallel and separate administration. And they were not hampered by having to defend their position against an ambitious aristocracy, for this had disappeared from Wuerttemberg public l i f e centuries before. Jacques Droz, Europe Between the Wars, 1815-1848 (London, 1967), p. 144. 2 7 Franz Schnabel, Vol. 2, p. 75. 13 Faced with resolute monarchs and supported only by superficial sympathetic utterances from Vienna, the aristocrats sought an alliance with the o l i -garchs which was the best way out of their dilemma. Together they rejected the proposals of Metternich which would have divided them and instead demanded the restoration of 'Das Gute Alte Recht,' as well as certain feudal rights. Frederick and William, partly by force, partly by alluding to the threat from Vienna, and partly through popular support eventually got both oligarchs and aristocrats to agree to a new constitution, which firmly recognised the principle of monarchical sovereignty. Yet, at the same time, this document acted as a bridge between eighteenth century absolutism and nineteenth century constitutional ideas, for while sover-eignty of the people as well as any division of powers were rejected, the constitution was not dictated by the monarch but appeared as a con-tract between the lat ter and the 'people.' Some concessions were also made to the old constitution, namely, the right of periodicity for the Landtag, the right to raise taxes and to participate in an advisory manner, in legis la t ion . Most important however, from the point of view of the state, was that the previously irreconcilable elements of the old and the new terr i tor ies were successfully united under the constitution and given an active part in public l i f e . The mediatised aristocracy were seated in the Upper House, while Knights, representatives of the Churches, the University and the towns sat side by side with elected representatives 28 of the county councils in the Lower House. No doubt i t is true that 2 8Schnabel, pp. 84-85. 14 the middle-class oligarchy received a set-back from i ts position in the preceding century, but this was not necessarily a reactionary step. There was no question but that the Landtag under the new constitution reflected property interests; yet there was broader representation even though the mass of the people had to wait until the sixt ies for the right to vote. The constitution of 1819 thus charted the course of Wuerttemberg po l i t i ca l l i f e into the twentieth century. Indeed the basic provisions of the constitution remained unchanged t i l l 1906. And the themes which dominated that reform were obvious early in the century. The inclusion of the aristocracy as a privileged element with i t s strong denominational character was a sore which kept festering throughout the century. The demand for i t s removal from the Lower House became stronger. Yet the question was moot whether the removal of this,canker would result in any l ibera l iza t ion of Wuerttemberg po l i t i ca l l i f e . CHAPTER II FROM THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION TO UNIFICATION A. Introduction - The 'Vormaerz' in Wuerttemberg The years following the constitutional settlement were charac-terised by an intensive but uneventful parliamentary ac t iv i ty . The pressure of the great German powers prevented any extension of parliamen-tary authority, and they especially prevented any reiteration of the idea of German unity. This forced quietude was matched by the apathy of the populace. Only with the revolution of 1830 was there a quickening of interest in the parliament. At the opening of the Landtag in 1833, the streets were crowded with onlookers cheering their representatives. For the f i r s t time, also, there appeared in Wuerttemberg the beginning of po l i t i ca l parties which had their various supporting organi-zations across the country. The majority of the Lower House were members of the l iberal associations whose main tenets were an end to interference from the Bund as well as a guarantee of personal security. The king, motivated by a reluctance to give the powers any excuse for interference, tried his best to mollify this opposition. He was successful in so far as the next election gave him a majority of government supporters. The l ibe ra l s , on their part, decided that there was nothing for them in parliamentary l i f e , and most of their leaders, among them the poet Uhland, 29 retired. 2 9Grube, p. 517. 15 16 Not unti l the forties was there another outbreak of l iberalism in Wuerttemberg. By this time another generation had arrived on the scene who had not been discouraged by fruitless battles with the Bund. Led by one of the most respected of the older l ibera ls , Friedrich Roemer, familiar demands were made: freedom of the press, and a request to the government to use i ts vote at the Bundestag in favour of a German Schleswig-Hol stein. These demands coincided with the unrest that was brought about by the misery and hunger of the fort ies. Already in May, 1847, violence had broken out in Stuttgart, where the king was stoned. In January of the next year, the excitement produced by these events resulted in a public meeting of voters in Stuttgart. A l i s t of demands were drawn up which included freedom of the press and association, a people's m i l i t i a , public courts, extension of the vote, as well as the entry of a l l German 30 states into the Customs .Union. But before they could be debated in the Landtag, news of the Parisian events unleashed another wave of violence across the country. Petitions from Stuttgart and Tuebingen demanded the convocation of the Landtag and concession of the demands, among which was now the transformation of the Lower House into an elective chamber. The king, intimidated by pressures created by the demonstrations and by news that the wave of violence had crossed over from neighbouring Baden, 31 decided to form a l iberal ministry and concede the popular demands. 3 0Huber, v. I I , p. 507. 31 Ib id . , p. 508. There appears to be no unanimity on the extent of violence. Huber states that castles and government offices were looted and burnt. Cf. Marquardt, p. 285, and Grube, p. 527, who believe that i f violent at a l l , disturbances were purely loca l . 17 On March 18, the army took an oath to the constitution. But in that same month, the l iberal opposition had begun to s p l i t into,two dis t inct groups: constitutional-monarchist l iberals and radical democrats. There were even the f i r s t formations of workers clubs with definitely soc ia l i s t 32 ambitions. B. 1848-49 1. Party Origins and Programmes The origin of both the l ibera l and democratic parties, known later as the Deutsche Partei and Volkspartei, are to be found in the po l i t i ca l associations founded in the th i r t i e s , and which were or iginal ly known as the 'Vaterlands' Association or Liberals and the Peoples Asso-ciation also referred to as the radical Democrats. The only difference at that time between the two, lay in the reluctance of the lat ter to exclude the poss ib i l i ty of a republican constitution. Their leaders, Karl Mayer, Ludwig Pfau and Julius Haussmann, were the later founders of the Volkspartei. The program of this party was influenced greatly by a consciousness of Wuerttemberg's po l i t i ca l past, which could boast of almost 400 years 33 of constitutional government. Influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution as well as those of the 'Al t rech t le r ' , they looked towards the implementation of democratic principles as the basis for the formation 3 2Grube, p. 528. 3 3 I b i d . , p. 526. 18 34 of the state. They accepted the idea of a German national state, but on in which the people were sovereign. For this purpose they rejected both the forms of the Bund, as i t existed, and the centralised state. Their executive was envisaged as the national parliament, consisting of a single 3 5 chamber, which would choose and control a governing committee. And they fully expected that national unity would be brought about by the people once these had gained sovereign control of their provincial par-liaments. For the democrats, the people consisted of the large economical dependent mass, rural labourer and small farmer a l ike , as well as the free-professions. The question of unity, then was the main difference between the democrats and the l ibera ls . The l iberals fe l t that unity should be obtained f i r s t , and that freedom would follow. But in this point too, they were not on the same ground as the democrats. Freedom for the l iberals meant primarily economic freedom which would benefit the small section of property owners. 2. The February Revolution These party spl i t s did not prevent the Landtag, which convened on March 13, 1848, for two weeks, from accomplishing significant legis-lation which had been in demand since the th i r t i e s . Laws on freedom of assembly, and the formation of a m i l i t i a were passed; new legislat ion to end the remaining feudal obligations was hurriedly put together and 34 Gerhard Eisfe ld , Die Entstehung der l iberal en Parteien in  Deutsch!and (Bonn, 1969), p. 137. 35 Inge Schlieper, Wurzeln der Demokratie in der deutschen  Geschichte (Bonn, 1967), p. 169. 19 passed in both Houses. The crowning achievement was the acceptance i n 36 p r i n c i p l e of the idea of a united, free and strong Germany. Elect ions were held in May, resu l t ing i n a v ic tory for the l i b e r a l const i tu t ional-monarchis ts , with the radical Democrats also making a strong showing. Under pressure from his minis te rs , Wi l l i am was forced to accept the Declaration of Rights , which had been recently composed in Frankfurt. Wuerttemberg thus attained the d i s t i n c t i o n of being the f i r s t German state to accept and enforce th is s i g n i f i c a n t concept. S i m i l a r l y , Wi l l i am f e l t pressured into recognising the Frankfurt Cons t i tu t ion , 37 be l i ev ing this to be the only way of avoiding a revo lu t ion . In the meantime things had not gone well in Frankfurt. The parliament had suffered a serious blow to i t s prestige when the Prussian king rejected the proferred German crown. Consequently i t broke up in confusion with a number of deputies departing for Stut tgar t where they formed what was to be known as the 'Rump Parl iament . ' But they were soon prevented from carrying on by the very man who had gained the most radica l reputation during the 'Vormaerz' , F r iedr ich Roemer. Leader of the moderate l i b e r a l s and head of the Wuerttemberg cabinet, Roemer did not hesi tate 38 to use cavalry against both Frankfurt deputies and Wuerttemberg r ad i ca l s . Roemer's actions were cha rac t e r i s t i c of most German l i b e r a l s i n the revolut ion of 1848. I t was not the l i b e r a l s , but discontented and hungry art isans and ag r i cu l tu ra l labourers who had spontaneously i n i t i a t e d Alber t Adam, Ein Jahrhundert wuerttembergischer verfassung, (S tu t tgar t , 1919), pp. 85-86. 3 7 Grube , pp. 529-530. 3 8 I b i d . , p. 531. 20 39 the revolution. C a p i t a l i s i n g on the temporary shock which a f f l i c t e d the monarchs, the l i b e r a l s were able to have t h e i r demands accepted and attain power. Theirs, however, was not meant to be a revolution of and for the masses of the people, but only for the middle-class. From the beginning one of t h e i r greatest problems had been how to replace, "the 40 threatening revolution of the masses with a revolution of notables." Here then appears to be the main difference between the French and German revolutions of 1848: in France the aim of the leaders of the revolution was to overthrow the government; the aim of the leaders of the German revolutions, and c e r t a i n l y the Wuerttemberg revolution, was merely to change the constitution. Had the l i b e r a l s been able to overcome t h e i r ideology and promise the artisans r e s t r i c t i o n s to economic freedom, t h e i r leadership would have been unquestioned. But this would have reduced t h e i r program d r a s t i c a l l y , and so they could not concede. For the a r t i s a n , he was faced with the choice of accepting the leadership of men who had l i t t l e or no connection with him, and who cert a i n l y did not come from the people, or i n trusting himself to the paternal monarchism with which he 41 was most f a m i l i a r . 3. The Failure of Constitutional Reform Before the Landtag had ended i t s session, elections for a consti-tuent assembly were held according to a more democratic electoral law. 39" Theodore Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction (Princeton, 1966), pp. 85-87. 4 0Huber, I I , p. 504. 4 1 I b i d . , p. 155. 21 The result was a two-thirds majority for the democratic ' Vol kspartei. 1 As a result , the moderate ministry resigned, but not before William had forced Roemer to reject the Frankfurt plans for a united Germany under Prussian leadership. The succeeding cabinet was of an intensely bureau-crat ic complexion without any support in the House. Notwithstanding, the government proceeded to present i t s draft constitution. Now even the moderates were upset, for with the exception of the elimination of the aristocracy as a corporate constitutional entity, the draft offered nothing progressive. Although the privileged were to be removed from the Lower House, i t was proposed to introduce a class system of voting. The Upper House would continue to contain the Princes, but also would include nominees reflecting property interests. After a few stormy ses-sions, i t was obvious to the king that nothing would be accomplished, and the three-week old Landtag was prorogued. A second election brought an even greater majority for the radicals, and likewise the complete rejection of a new constitutional draft, one which had been subject to no serious changes. Similar also to the f i r s t assembly, the major disagreement between government and Landtag was over the German question. Once more the Landtag pressured the king to overcome his reluctance to accept the conclusions of Frankfurt and use his office to press for the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership. But William, intent on retaining his sovereignty, refused. A third effort brought no more success. With every passing day, the reactionary forces seemed to grow stronger; regaining i t s confidence, the government decided to schedule new elections for March, 1851, but this time only after declaring the val idi ty of the constitution and electoral law of 1819, 22 42 to which the l iberals and at least some radicals did not object. 4. The Reaction of the Fift ies Disadvantaged by the old electoral law, the radicals f e l l to 18 43 seats and the moderates to 14 in the new Landtag of 1851. For the next few weeks this bloc argued for the recognition of the electoral law of 1849, as well as for the recognition of the Declaration of Rights. But before any decision was reached, the restored Federal Diet at Frank-furt rescinded the la t te r , to be followed six weeks later by a similar decree on the part of the Wuerttemberg government. Realising that they had indeed lost , a majority of the Lower House voted to accept the govern-ment decree. By this vote, the Wuerttemberg constitution was o f f i c i a l l y 44 and legally restored in the form in which i t had been promulgated in 1819. Fearful of a reenactment of the events of 1848-49, the government then embarked on a series of repressive measures. Po l i t i ca l clubs as well as the student movement were forbidden. Po l i t i ca l censorship was reintroduced and the c iv i l - se rv ice purged of proto-revolutionary elements. Participants in the recent events including the leading, democrats were 45 rounded up and sentenced to long terms in prison. However, the last turbulent years were not without some lasting successes. The feudal 4? Grube, p. 532. Adam, p. 95ff. 43 Klaus Simon, Die wuerttembergischen Demokraten (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 9. 4 4Grube, p. 537. 45 Manfred Traub, Beitraege zur wuerttembergischen Geschichte  in der 'Reaktionszeit ' . (Inaugural Diss. , Tuebingen, 1937), pp. 69-70. 23 obligations disappeared forever from the scene, while the new system of oral court proceedings was retained. Yet, the most important change was of no immediate practical value. The revolutionary years had stimu-lated the formulation of po l i t i ca l ideas, faci l i ta ted their dissemination more widely among the population and encouraged the formation of po l i t i ca l parties. Furthermore, the constitutional battles had caused the a r t i -culation of those problems which were to dominate Wuerttemberg consti-tutional l i f e into the twentieth century; the questions of unicameral or bi-cameral legislature, representation of the aristocracy, Church and professions, democratisation of the electoral law and expansion of the 46 legislature s competence. Although the government was firmly in power, the intimidation of the legislature did not las t . The Crimean War in which Austria was involved again opened the German question. A demand to the Federal Diet for war appropriations led to a debate in the Landtag. With the exception of 15 votes, 14 of which were from the privileged members, the House voted in favour of a motion requesting the government to do 47 everything possible for German unity. And regaining i t s confidence, the House'went on to defeat a government draft, which had been presented through pressure by the aristocracy who \ for the loss of their feudal privileges. ' wanted additional compensation 48 4 6Grube, p. 538. 4 7Adam, p. 126. 4 8Grube, p. 538. 24 Disgusted with the reactionary Linden ministry, both l iberals and democrats decided to campaign together for the 1855 elections, and despite the government's attempt to manipulate the voting, the anti-government bloc was able to return a majority. Over 95% of the electorate had participated (which was s t i l l however, a small part of the population), aroused no doubt, by the reactionary demands of the aristocracy. The new Landtag, which lasted for s ix years, was almost at once embroiled in the question of the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church. The increasing militancy of a Catholicism which was demanding an end to state supervision in questions of education, pastoral duties, l i turgy 49 and dogma, had led to the signing of a Concordat between Wuerttemberg and the Papacy in 1857. Its provisions were made dependent on the accep-tance by the Landtag. Yet, the government without consulting the legis-lature went ahead with i ts proclamation. This clear violation of #85 of the constitution caused much disturbance. Basing i ts decision on the report by the relevant commission, the Landtag rejected the Concordat. Their argument was unimpeachable. No agreement with the Papacy was valid 50 unless arrived at through the legis la t ive process. The government was forced to back down. Subsequently, legis lat ion similar in extent to the Concordat was presented to the Landtag the next year and duly 51 passed. Because of this Wuerttemberg was spared the unpleasantness of the 'Kulturkampf'; indeed, this legislat ion remained to regulate the Mueller, p. 192. 'Adam, p. 129. Huber, I I I , p. 191. 25 relationship between Church and State until 1918. One side effect of the Landtag's stand was the formation of the 'For tschr i t t spar te i ' , con-s is t ing of former l iberals and democrats. Not to be outdone, the Evangelical Church also demanded equal treatment. Negotiations for this dragged on until 1867 when a Provincial 52 Church Council, separate from the Ministry of Culture was formed. Another result of the in i t i a t ion of the entire question of the relation-ship between Church and State led to a progressive step forward. The replacement of #27 of the constitution by a law separating the exercise of c i v i l rights from a religious qual i f icat ion, meant in effect the 53 l i f t i n g of restrictions against the Jews. In fact, the last res t r ic-tions against Jews were l i f t ed on 13th August, 1864. 5. German Unity and the Formation of the Volkspartei The coali t ion between the l iberals and democrats was fac i l i ta ted by the deliberately loose definition of the future German state, on the one hand, and domestic constitutional reform, on the other. But the defeat of Austria in 1859 reawakened interest in the German question and brought about a polarisation between those who opted for either 'Gross-deutsch' or 'Kleindeutsch' solutions. I t was expressed in the formation of the 'Nationalverein' in 1859, which led to a s p l i t in the newly-formed 54 coal i t ion . Unity among l iberals was only achieved again during the 52 53 Landessynode. Adam, p. 132. 54 Walter Tormin, Geschichte der deutschen Parteien sei t 1848, (Stuttgart, 1966), p. 56. See Traub, p. 83ff for a more detailed dis-cussion of the founding of parties also, and pp. 102-103 for the all iances. 26 Schleswig-Holstein affair through their c r i t ic i sm of Prussia and renewed demands for a German Parliament. Indeed, during these years, Wuerttem-55 berg's national policy was s t i l l motivated by a deep-seated particularism. Simultaneously, the return of the major democrats increased the expectation that a separate democratic party would be formed. Both Mayer and Haussmann had spent their years of exile in Switzerland, and Pfau in France. In 1864 they achieved a s p l i t in the remnants of the coali t ion by excluding those members who were more national than democratically incl ined, and with the rest founded the 1 Volkspartei' which now combined 56 the national question with a demand for constitutional reform at home. For the f i r s t time an attempt was made to formulate a clear ideological position so as to give the party a firm basis. They demanded f i r s t of a l l , the transformation of their homeland according to democratic principles. Further, as regards the German question, they rejected outright unity under Prussian hegemony, and therefore advocated the inclusion of Austria in any future solution, but maintained the idea, harking back to the Swiss model, of a federative German state. Recognising however, that both Austria as well as Prussia had contributed to the demise of the Frankfurt idea, they also demanded the formation of the smaller and middle states into an association so as to be better able to maintain a balance between the great powers. Called the Trias idea, this plan had been developed years ear l ier and had last been mentioned by king 57 William I himself as an attempt to combat the Bund in 1819. 55 Theodore Griewank and Fr i tz Hellweg, Wuerttemberg und die  Deutsche Politik in den Jahren 1859-1866 (Stuttgart, -1934), pp. 162-163. 5 6Simon, p. 10. 5 7 E i s f e l d , pp. 138ff. 27 The death in that year of the old king symbolised for Wuerttem-berg the end of an epoch. Through the reaction of the thir t ies and the stormy events of the fort ies, William had, except for a br ief period, held t ight ly , but by no means bluntly, to the reigns of power. For him, the main task had been to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of his state vis a vis the encroachment of an aggressive Austria and then an even more aggressive Prussia. But in his own country particularism was giving way steadily to the clamour for German unity. It was a tide that could not be stemmed. There was no question that unity would be achieved. But there was serious doubt that this would be in the s p i r i t of 1848. The Prussian eagle, dis l iked no doubt, would bring with i t many advantages. There should have been l i t t l e doubt which way the monarchies would even-tual ly swing. C. Uni f i cation 1. The German Question Posed: Austria vs. Prussia Both the Schleswig-Holstein question and the coronation of King Karl seemed to conjure up new energy in the Landtag. There was renewed hope that his reign would usher in a period of l ive ly and enlightened the two matters that dominated this Landtag: the German question and constitutional reform. Because of the growing estrangement between the two larger German powers which had as a result a weakening of the authority of the Diet, the king was able to accommodate some of the demands of the Lower House for a return to more l iberal conditions. In December of the same year 28 decrees forbidding associations and curtai l ing freedom of the press were l i f t e d . As regards constitutional reform, a proposal adopted by the Lower House recommending the secret bal lot , extension of suffrage and an end to the presence of privileged members in the Lower House, was pre-sented to the government. A month later a majority of representatives presented another l i s t which went considerably further. Demands included democratic guarantee of c i v i l r ights, freedom of legis la t ive i n i t i a t i v e and parliamentary immunity. Because of the extensive nature of the new demands i t was decided to withhold debate until the next Landtag in order to give the government time to study the proposals.^ Unfortunately the constitutional reform had to be postponed because of the serious situation within the German Confederation. The Schleswig-Holstein question had led to a serious battle for hegemony within the Confederation. Prussia now fe l t too strong to continue in a subordinate role in Austria. Yet the Confederation could not function i f the two largest states were at loggerheads. Although there was sympathy for Prussia in Wuerttemberg, public opinion in most quarters, part icularists 59 as well as democrats, favoured the retention of the Confederation. On the outbreak of war the Lower House, with only eight nays, voted the war appropriations in support of the Confederation, or rather, Austria. Although the outcome of the Austro-Prussian war was disappointing for Wuerttemberg, there was some advantage to be gained by Austria's defeat. Adam, p. 134ff. 59 Adolf Rapp, Die Wuerttemberger und die Nationale Frage 1863-71 (Stuttgart, 1910), pp. 209-210. 29 The demise of the Confederation and the completion of the North German Confederation lef t Wuerttemberg independent, a truly sovereign state, unlimited in her parliamentary and constitutional existence by Federal statutes. Par t icular is t opposition now attempted to muster i t s strength to defeat the military agreement which was being concluded with Prussia as well as the new Customs Union Law, but was unsuccessful. Wuerttem-berg's independence was thus short-l ived, for she was now bound m i l i t a r i l y and economically to the North. Yet, despite the distaste among the population for the 'Prussian system 1 ,^ there was much to be said for military security against France, and the poss ibi l i ty for further economic development. With the completion of these treaties, the constitutional questions were reopened, the House being motivated, by the example of the elections for the North German Parliament, which had been held according to a more 62 63 democratic procedure. Both the Volkspartei and the Deutsche Partei were in agreement that the Lower House should consist of elected members only. Other proposals were reminiscent of those presented before the war. But the government refused to be pressured, delaying action by presenting a draft on judicia l and legal matters. Their draft on consti-tutional reform, however, was not ready until December, 1867, only two months before the end of the electoral period. As i t was, this draft 60 Trutz and Schutz Buendnis. 61 Rapp, p. 233. 62 Grube, p. 541. German Party - founded in 1866, i t was the Wuerttemberg version of the Nationalverein. See, Preussische Jahrbuecher, 1884, Vol. 54, pp. 85-91, Politische Correspondenz, for a discussion of i t s platform. 30 provided for the retention of a bi-cameral legislature and contained none of the progressive demands such as c i v i l rights and an end to aristo-crat ic privi lege. The electoral commission of the Lower House therefore suggested that debate proceed only on the progressive section of the proposal, the new franchise, requesting the government to submit new proposals on the rejected portion for the next Landtag. Accordingly, the new electoral law was passed and signed on March 21, 1868. It provided for universal manhood suffrage and secret ballott ing without property qualif ications. It was the f i r s t important revision of the constitution of 1819. But although in i t s e l f a progressive step, the new electoral law was to become a barrier to further constitutional change. For despite differences, the former assembly had been united in one important respect: i t had exclusively reflected the propertied classes. Now however, the privileged members were cast into a role for which they were not intended, 64 i . e . as a counterpoise to the mass electorate. However, i t was not only in constitutional matters that the govern-ment was made to feel the force of the opposition. The outcome of the Austro-Prussian war had presented a dilemma to the country. The oppo-s i t i o n , inclined to particularism, would have nothing to do with sugges-tions of joining the North German Confederation. Instead, i t advocated a South German Union with Bavaria and Baden. But the government fe l t that the interests of the state would be less served by such a step than by a connection with the Confederation. Passage of the defence agreement was only secured by declaring that the government interpreted the agreement 65 in such a way that i t reserved the right to determine the casus foederis. 6 4Adam, p. 146. 6 5Huber, I I I , p. 690. 31 Elections for the new Landtag were scheduled for July. Cam-paigning for the f i r s t time across the country and competing for the 66 mass vote as we l l , the parties put a new stamp on the election. With the government undecided as to whether i ts d is l ike of the Volkspartei was stronger than that for the Deutsche Par te i ,^ 7 the former were able to run a strong campaign. I t resulted in 40 seats for the VP, 14 for the DP, and 15 other assorted pro-government seats. With the 23 privileged members, therefore, the government could muster a s l ight majority, a l -68 though this was not guaranteed. In the new Landtag matters reached an impasse. The government had not presented any constitutional proposals, for which the House retaliated with a strongly worded answer to the throne speech. Since there was no hope of accomplishing much, the session was closed on the 23rd December, to allow the commission time to prepare a draft. It was to be 15 months before the Landtag could be convened again. 2. The German Question Solved: The 'Reichsgruendung' On the 15th March, 1870, the Landtag was convened. Without the report from the constitutional commission, however, there was precious l i t t l e that could be done in this direction. And with the increase of the left-wing to 45 seats through by-elections, the session was soon dominated by 'democratic' motions. The most important of these came Rapp, p. 303. 5 7 0 t to Elben, Lebenserinnerungen 1823-1899 (Stuttgart, 1931), p. 151. 6 8Adam, p. 146. 32 during the debate on the military budget, at which time the VP demanded the formation of a m i l i t i a , and a substantial cut in the budget. In order to allow the military commission time to investigate that poss ib i l i ty and prepare a report, the session was brought to an end. At the same time a number of ministers resigned or were asked to do so. The Ministry of War was then given to a man who was considered to be fanatically pro-Prussian. His appointment was seen as a sign that the government had no 69 intention of tampering with the military treaty. On July 19, 1870, before the assembly could be convened again, France declared war on Prussia. According to the military treaty Wuerttem-70 berg was obliged to come to the aid of the North German Confederation. Any anxiety on the part of Prussia, due to the d i f f icul ty of parliamentary rat i f icat ion had been unnecessary, for a l l Germany, including the South, was gripped by a wave of national indignation. 7^ Yet of a l l the south German states, Wuerttemberg was the last to vote war credits. Any anti-Prussian sentiment that was s t i l l present was certainly not among the population, or even the Landtag, but at court and among some members of 72 the Cabinet. Indeed, the Landtag voted, except for one lone voice, 73 credits in the sum of 5.9 mil l ion Florins. Once more, in October, Rapp, p. 345. 7 0Huber, I I I , p. 722. 7 1 Elben , p. 155. 72 Huber, I I I , p. 725 - Yet i t seems that the Cabinet was not unaware of i t s responsibil i ty. Before the general mobilization i t had voted un-animously to respect the treaty. Dr. Freiherrn von Mittnacht, Rueckblicke (Stuttgart, 1909), p. 55. Grube, p. 543. 33 the members came together to vote an additional sum. Then the Landtag was prorogued. Both government and party leaders had agreed that i t would be advisable to hold new elections before the approaching discussions on unification. In the meantime the king asked for the resignation of the remaining anti-Prussian ministers, the most important of which was Varn-bueler, who had been Chief Minister for some years. His place was taken by the able Hermann von Mittnacht, previous Minister of Justice, whose last great service to Wuerttemberg was later to be the preparation of the constitutional proposals which led to the reform of 1906. CHAPTER III THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 1871-1900 A. Wuerttemberg in the Reich 1871-1894 1. Unification and Defeat of the Vol kspartei While the battle against France was s t i l l raging, Prussia was holding the f i r s t exploratory talks on unification with Bavaria. In September of the same year Wuerttemberg acquainted the Prussian Chancellor with her willingness to begin negotiations on a treaty with the North German Confederation, and dispatched her chief minister, von Mittnacht to the conference held in Munich from September 22 to 26. The last of the states to sign the treaty creating the German Empire, Wuerttemberg seemed to be troubled by second thoughts. Influenced by the remaining anti-Prussians at court, the king had recalled Mittnacht and his assistant, von Suckow, from Munich before they had had a chance to sign the treaty. Only when confronted with their threats of resig-nation, recognising that this would have an unfavourable effect of the 74 pro-government parties in the coming election, did Karl give i n . On November 19, the king accepted the decision of his cabinet. Six days Huber, I I I , p. 736. Cf. Mittnacht, p. 139 who does not mention his threat to resign. Moreover, he states that the reason for his recall was to win time in order to see i f Bavaria would be offered better condi-tions. (In fact, she was.) 34 35 later with the signature of her plenipotentiaries, Wuerttemberg formally declared her willingness to accede to the Reich. Before this could become an accomplished fact, however, the Landtag had to give i t s approval. This proved no barrier, for in the elections held in December, the nationalist Deutsche Partei won an over-whelming victory with 33 seats. The opposition consisting of Catholics, democrats and a few Gross-Deutsche supporters, managed to win only 17. 20 additional seats went to a pro-government group. At the division over the Reich question taken in the same month, 74 voted for the treaty with 14 against, wh.ile the motion to adopt the terms Kaiser and Reich carried 75 81 to 7. On January 1, 1871, the German Reich was proclaimed. The Volkspartei which had had such electoral success just three years before, found i t s e l f swamped by the wave of national feeling. As an organization i t was almost completely shattered by the 1870 election, which produced great resentment in the party ranks. This was not exclu-sively of a po l i t i ca l nature however, but the expression of a group of people who fe l t themselves social ly excluded from the Reich as wel l . Nevertheless, through their single member in the Reichstag, and the handful in the Landtag, but also in the pages of their party news-paper, 'Der Beobacther', hefty c r i t ic i sm of the Reich was sustained. Not only did the democrats regret the loss of the poss ib i l i ty of a bour-geois-democratic solution to the German problem, but they also fe l t that the maintenance of humanist values would be lost through the Prussian grip. Some even saw the beginnings of German chauvinism and anti-French Huber, I I I , p. 749. 36 sentiments. But unsupported by the electorate, the Volkspartei had some-how to come to terms with rea l i ty . At the next provincial party meeting, their executive recognised'the formal legali ty of the German Empire, but stressed that this by no means meant approval of the change. Even-tually too, their c r i t i c i sm was transformed from blanket disapproval to the more positive review of individual institutions and measures. The least part of this c r i t ic i sm was concerned with the Gross-deutsch idea. Certainly in the sixt ies the party had expressed such sentiments, but they had almost always been more of a sentimental expression than the basis for practical p o l i t i c s . The democrats were thus faced with a number of dilemmas. They had been decisively beaten at the polls on the question of the German solution. But in order to carry on the fight they had to somehow accept the legali ty of the very inst i tut ion so as to battle within the system. Secondly, they would have successfully to combat the virulent c r i t ic i sm of their former l iberal colleagues as well as Bismarck, which damned them as enemies of the Reich. And th i rd ly , with such a depleted organisation, a decision would have to be taken as which was the more effective arena for their brand of combat: the Reichstag or the Landtag. 2. Po l i t i ca l and Economic Effects of Unification Wuerttembergls accession to the Reich was to prove a mixed blessing. On the one hand she relinquished a great portion of her independence when Gerlinde Runge, Die Volkspartei in Wuerttemberg (Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 177-181. 37 competence in foreign a f f a i r s and m i l i t a r y matters passed into the hands of the Reich. On the other, what she l o s t in independence was made up by the t e r r i f i c boost which accession had given to conservatism. The apparent danger from the democratic as well as the emerging s o c i a l i s t camps could be countered by an appeal to the Reich, i f necessary. More-over, now that i t s competence had been l i m i t e d , the Landtag could devote i t s time to questions of culture, inner administration and even consti-tutional reform, the l a t t e r being the issue which most dominated par-liamentary sessions u n t i l 1918. In this sense some of the immediate results of accession were indeed p o s i t i v e . Twenty-eight laws of the North German Confederation became v a l i d throughout the Reich. These included freedom of t r a v e l , end of police r e s t r i c t i o n s on marriage, reli g i o u s equality and the r i g h t to found commercial and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i -tutions, followed i n 1872 by more l i b e r a l criminal laws and l i m i t a t i o n of police powers. On the other hand, economic conditions which had been steadily deteriorating in Wuerttemberg since the turn of the century underwent no s i g n i f i c a n t improvement. Indeed, the integration of Wuerttemberg's economy with that of the Reich meant that the former would now be at the mercy of international and continental economic depressions. The con-version to a p r o t e c t i o n i s t policy with the adoption of a general customs t a r i f f in 1879 was a turning point for Germany as a whole. But not u n t i l the t a r i f f was quintupled i n 1887 did Wuerttemberg get a reprieve from foreign competition whose effects were s t i l l f e l t up to 1895. 7 7 7 7 J o s e f Griesmeier, "Die Entwicklung der wirtschaft und der Bevoelkerung von Baden und Wuerttemberg im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert," Jahrbuecher fuer S t a t i s t i k und Landeskunde von Baden und Wuerttemberg, I, (1954), p. 145. 38 In general the depression of the next two decades h i t the trades and agriculture, but especially the l a t t e r . Since the mid-sixties Wuerttem-berg 1 s railway net had been connected with the rest of the continent, one res u l t of which was the appearance of cheap grain, mainly Hungarian, on the market. From then on grain prices tended to f a l l . The price of grain and the high cost of labour made l i f e very d i f f i c u l t for the average 78 Wuerttemberg small farmer. Yet l i f e was not so desperate that the farmer considered so dras t i c a change as emigration, as had been the 79 case in the 1850's. Rather, Wuerttemberg was beginning to share the movement c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the r i s e of in d u s t r i a l i s m : the population s h i f t from country to town. However, the scale and r a p i d i t y of this s h i f t did not result i n the creation of those desperate conditions which have become associated with i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . The depression of 1879-80 did not af f e c t big industry to any extent. In fact between 1882 and 1895 80 the number of people employed i n large factories actually doubled. And for the same period the number of people on poor r e l i e f i n Stuttgart 81 was actually halved. Dislocation and alienation caused by i n d u s t r i a l i s m appear to have been minimised also by the tendency of industry i n Wuerttem-berg not to c e n t r a l i z e , so that in many cases workers were actually 78 Eckart Schremmer, "Die Auswirkung der Bauernbefreiung hinsicht-1ich der baeuerlichen Verschuldung, der Gantfaelle und des Besitzwechsels von Grund und Boden," in Moderne Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, ed. Karl Erich Born (Koeln-Berlin, 1966), p. 70. 7 9Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration 1816-1885 (Cambridge, 1964). 8 0Griesmeier, p. 148. 81 Wuerttembergische Jahrbuecher fuer S t a t i s t i k und Landeskunde (1897), IV, pp. 26-27. Percentage of population on poor r e l i e f 1883: 4.06%, 1897: 2.30%. 39 82 farmers in th e i r spare time. Thus the economic depression and the changes brought about by i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n did not lead to any immediate s i g n i f i c a n t r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Nevertheless, this period saw the emergence of the c l a s s , which, when organized would produce a serious challenge to t r a d i t i o n a l Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c s : the p r o l e t a r i a t . Because of the special conditions i n Wuerttemberg, therefore, this class did not have an immediate or important effect on the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . The Landtag elected in 1871 concerned i t s e l f mainly with the routine work of adapting the new laws to Wuerttemberg conditions, and with the new budget. The elections of 1876 brought no s i g n i f i c a n t changes in terms of government support or opposition. Of i n t e r e s t , however, was the gradual penetration of the idea of a Catholic party through to the provincial l e v e l . For some years the Catholics, organised as the Centre Party, had fought elections for the Reichstag. Although there was no provincial party, Catholics campaigned together with a platform 83 which stressed t h e i r r i g h t s , winning a total of 14 seats. Neither the 1877-80-,nor the 1880-82-session was concerned with the issues of constitutional reform. At the end of the second session, the leader of the VP, Karl Mayer, again reiterated his party's demands for a thorough going constitutional revision on the basis of a uni-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e . However, Minister President von Mittnacht declared R. L. Mehmke, "Entstehung der Industrie und Unternehmertum i n Wuerttemberg," Deutsche Z e i t s c h r i f t fuer Wirtschaftskunde ( L e i p z i g , 1939), V. 4, p. 58. Q O Tormin, p. 62. Cf. Ludwig Bergstraesser, Geschichte der p o l i - tischen Parteien in Deutschland (Munich, 1965), p. 73. 40 that constitutional change would only be achieved via reforms, not by a complete r e v i s i o n , and added that there was room for change on the ques-tion of the structure of the Lower House. Unfortunately Mayer's demands met with l i t t l e approbation even from his own caucus, and in the subse-quent election the VP was unable to achieve a majority, winning only 12 seats. In the throne speech which greeted the Landtag of 1883, the government promised that constitutional reform, especially the question of the privileged members of the Lower House, would be the most important task of the government during the session. But the promise remained u n f u l f i l l e d . I t was l e f t to the Minister of the I n t e r i o r , Hoelder, who was also leader of the DP and u n t i l 1881 President of the Lower House, to present proposals. I t was his ambition to attempt a reform of not only the constitution but of the entire state administrative apparatus. His plan called for a gradual reform beginning at the lowest adminis-t r a t i v e l e v e l , the county, and then working up to the four large d i s t r i c t s In this way he hoped to replace the privileged members of the Lower House. It was a subtle plan which would have given the oligarchy, in the Old-Wuerttemberg sense of the word, almost complete control of the Landtag. Even his successor as leader of the DP, Karl Goez, had to denounce the proposal. As he said, this would have meant delaying any meaningful constitutional reform t i l l the twentieth century. Adam, p. 169. Grube, p. 546. Hoelder had i n mind a return to a quasi corporate structure which would have enabled the middle-class to elect t h e i r own representatives in place of the pr i v i l e g e d . Naturally this would have meant additional representation for property. 41 In 1885 the government surprised the House wi th a completely new proposal. The intent and the reasons were obvious. For some time the Upper House had lapsed into a state of benign indolence. Through mortality, laziness and d i s i n t e r e s t i t seldom met, l e t alone completed any work; most of the time i t was impossible to achieve a quorum. Now, the government wanted not only to increase i t s membership, but also to provide for greater influence of the Lords. Naturally the b i l l was rejected by the Lower House. But the debate continued, the issue being the structure of the Lower House. The VP under Karl Mayer, wanted a uni-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e with elected members only. The DP on the other hand, had no objections to a retention of privileged or appointed members in the House, although they f e l t that one chamber was s u f f i c i e n t for the smaller states within the Reich. Furthermore, they did not feel that reform was urgent at this time. Of course, the privileged members of the Lower House, representing Knights, Churches and University, declared for the status quo. These f e l t that t h e i r special interests could best be protected from inside the Lower House. But i t was the government's pos i t i o n , articulated by von Mittnacht, that proved most i n t e r e s t i n g , for he was to u t i l i s e as an argument a reason which had only existed since the change to universal suffrage. The privileged members of the Lower House, he explained, now constituted a conservative element which was necessary as a counter-weight to the masses, who could now elect thei r representatives d i r e c t l y into the House. Accordingly, he would prepare a new proposal to be presented at the next session, but which Schneider, p. 259. 42 would not include any change in the structure of the Lower House. With that promise, the Landtag v/ent into recess. When i t met again, in the 1886-88 session, the government renewed i t s promise to work on the reforms, but instead of preparing a draft i t entered into d i r e c t negotiations with the party leaders. The suggestion was made whereby the privileged members would be transferred to the Upper House and replaced by additional representation from the c i t i e s , oc a l b e i t , elected by the highest paying taxpayers. After some time the government i t s e l f realised that the proposals were unfair. They would have thrown the greatest influence on the side of property and the towns at the expense of the a g r i c u l t u r a l , c i v i l and professional sectors. I t was an attempt to replace one conservative element, the feudal-o l i g a r c h i c , with another, the modern industrial/commercial bourgeoisie. For the attendant representatives then, the e x i s t i n g contemporary s i t u a t i o n was preferable to such a change. As the session came to an end, Mittnacht was obliged to admit his i n a b i l i t y to find a common formula with the parties. B. Revival of the Volkspartei 1. A New Generation After 1871 the a c t i v i t y of the VP remained at a minimum. S t i l l led by the old triumvirate, Mayer, Pfau and Haussmann, the VP found i t very d i f f i c u l t to adjust to the new circumstances, not l e a s t of a l l Adam, p. 177. 43 because of the diminished size of the party. But in the 80's new forces appeared on the scene which would bring new l i f e to the party. The f i r s t of these was Friedrich Payer, son of a beadle from the University of Tuebingen. Payer was educated at a protestant seminar i n Blaubeuern and l a t e r studied law. As the editor of the 'Beobachter' he attempted to get the party moving again and campaigned for and was elected to the Reichstag in 1877. In 1894, by now a mature p o l i t i c i a n , he entered the Landtag. At the same time, two other young aspiring p o l i t i c i a n s , by b i r t h as well as i n c l i n a t i o n , Friedrich and Conrad Hauss-mann, sons of J u l i u s , entered the scene. Both competent lawyers, Conrad was the f i r s t to enter the p o l i t i c a l arena. In 1887 he was elected to the Reichstag, and two years l a t e r to the Landtag. Friedrich was elected to the Landtag in 1890 and eight years l a t e r to the Reichstag. After t h e i r fathers death in 1889, the two came under the influence of Ludwig Pfau, the real theoretician of the party, and so the t r a d i t i o n of the 87 48ers was kept a l i v e by the new leadership of the Volkspartei. The period i n which this new triumvirate entered Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c s was dominated by the Liberal Deutsche Partei which had based i t s policy on cooperation with the government. This together with the continuing expectations of many people i n the benefits of unity created a very mild p o l i t i c a l atmosphere. But there were already signs of d i s -s a t i s f a c t i o n which was to be fanned by soci a l and economic changes. Theodor Heuss, Schwaben, Farben zu einem Portraet (Tuebingen, 1967), p. 153. Heuss also considers the constitutional reforms of 1906 a result of the ideological position of these 48ers. 44 2. Renewal of the Demand for Reform The election of 1889 brought l i t t l e change in the proportion of seats, although the q u a l i t y of debate received substantial stimulus by the election of men l i k e Adolf Groeber, hitherto a Centre MP in the Reichstag, and the twins Conrad and Friedrich Haussmann. No further progress was made on the question of constitutional reform and in the meantime the old king died and the throne passed to his nephew, William I I , who was destined to be the l a s t king of Wuerttemberg. One of the f i r s t tasks of the new monarch was to d e l i v e r the throne speech at the opening of the second session i n 1891. In i t he declared the intention of the government to persevere in t h e i r attempts to carry out constitutional reforms. Especially at this point one i s led to question the motives of the government, for there was l i t t l e or no vocal pressure on the government for change: the population apparently were hardly interested, the representatives seemed f a i r l y happy with the present structure, or at least they could not reach any s i g n i f i c a n t agreement as to how i t ought to be altered, and even Bismarck had com-municated his opinion that the status quo was the best thing for Wuerttem-oo berg at this time. During the second session Mittnacht again presented proposals. From the s t a r t they met with much opposition, for the one point on which a good majority of the House could agree, a uni-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e , was not up for negotiation. In f a c t , he declared, to change the Lower Grube, pp. 547-548. 45 House to a f u l l y representative i n s t i t u t i o n was not possible at this time. This speech of von Mittnacht contains the answer to the question posed above. He had become keenly aware of the potential p o l i t i c a l s i t u -ation which was being wrought by the intensive i n d u s t r i a l changes since 89 the Gruenderjahre. I t was necessary, he explained, for the government to preserve a strong counterweight i n the House against the threat of the opposition of the growing Marxist Social Democratic Party, as well as the Catholic. However, the government was prepared to compromise. They would reduce the privileged members of the House from 22 to 15, while including representatives from the technical university, agriculture and commerce. In addition, Stuttgart would be given 4 representatives instead of 1. Commensurate changes in the Upper House would provide seats for those who were leaving the Lower House. While the VP maintained i t s stand on the structure of the Lower House, the majority of members decided to try for a compromise. They declared acceptance of the government argument of a counterweight i n p r i n c i p l e , but decided to l i m i t the pri v i l e g e d to those who would remain after the change, i . e . without accepting representation from any other sources. In the subsequent debate, the proposal which had been drawn up by the commission was attacked from a l l sides. The Centre, which had been r e l a t i v e l y quiet throughout, put forward i t s own proposals. They were not against a bi-cameral system, declared t h e i r leader, Groeber, but wanted to see the rest of the aristocrats cleared out of the Lower House, and t h e i r replacements elected by a proportional vote. The L i t e r a l l y - foundation years. 46 government was not against this l a s t suggestion, but f e l t that the time was not yet ripe for such a step. Before the issue could come to a vote, the government decided that no two-thirds majority would be achieved, and withdrew the draft. The representatives were thus prevented from showing t h e i r choice on this issue. Worse yet, important l e g i s l a t i o n , eg. an addition to the elementary school law with better conditions for teachers, remained i n 90 suspension. C. The Attempt and Failure at Constitutional Reform 1895-1900 1. Success of the Volkspartei at the Election of 1895 The elections of 1895 came at a time of increasing unrest i n Wuerttemberg. The growth of ind u s t r i a l i s m was producing a working class which found p o l i t i c a l expression i n the Social Democratic Party. Although the population i n the c i t i e s and towns was s t i l l only 40% of the t o t a l , over 7% of the entire population had taken part i n 91 the s h i f t over the twenty year period 1875-1895. Besides emigration was steadily decreasing while the b i r t h rate was steadily increasing. I t i s true that real wages had been increasing since the 60's and were now 1/3 higher. But an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the work process had increased the needs of the working population for better n u t r i t i o n and lei s u r e Adam, p. 187. Griesmeier, p. 150. 47 periods, while the population increase was putting pressure on an a l -92 ready inadequate housing s i t u a t i o n . The pressures produced by the increase i n factory and c i t y popu-l a t i o n was bound to produce a r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l process. In addition, there was growing d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the lack of p o l i t i c a l and economic benefits which many people had expected with u n i f i c a t i o n . Especially since 1890, m i l i t a r y , colonial and world power-politics had gained ascendancy over domestic a f f a i r s i n the Reich. But the small businessmen, traders as well as manufacturers, had almost nothing to gain from the concomitant armaments program, not to speak of the farmers. In the f i r s t place, the traders were more interested i n good relations with the other developed countries than i n colonies, while the manufacturers stood to gain l i t t l e from the vast armaments industry. At the same time, the main fi n a n c i a l burden of power-politics f e l l heavily on the shoulders of this petty-bourgeoisie which bore the brunt of the i n d i r e c t taxes and 93 customs duties. I t was i n this atmosphere and among this section of the people that the Volkspartei went to work. Their main t a c t i c was the theme, which since 1819 at l e a s t , seemed to have become an important part of the psychological p o l i t i c a l make-up of every Wuerttemberger: the constitu-tional reform. And the results of the e l e c t i o n , with the extraordinarily high p a r t i c i p a t i o n of 73.9% of the electorate appeared to j u s t i f y the Juergen Kuczynski,. Die Bewegung der deutschen Wirtschaft von  1800-1946 ( B e r l i n - L e i p z i g , 1947), p. 102". Cf. J. H. Clapham, Economic  Development of France and Germany 1815-1914 (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 402-407. *°Simon, pp. 100-101. 48 94 t a c t i c . There was a decisive swing to the l e f t . The VP, which had campaigned s p e c i f i c a l l y for the removal of the privileged from the Lower House, for an end to l i f e tensure for d i s t r i c t head c i v i l servants as well as for a progressive income tax, emerged with 31 seats. Likewise, the newly-formed Wuerttemberg Centre Party, which campaigned together with the VP on these liberal-democratic p r i n c i p l e s , won 18 seats. But the Deutsche P a r t e i , although i t had run on a s i m i l a r platform suffered a resounding defeat and was reduced to 13 seats. Having been the majority party for the l a s t twenty f i v e years, the DP had become the electoral 95 scapegoat for the f a i l u r e to achieve any s i g n i f i c a n t reforms. The govern-ment party as w e l l , was completely wiped out, and even the Minister P r e s i -dent von Mittnacht l o s t his seat. Both the Wuerttemberg and Prussian governments were h o r r i f i e d by this s i t u a t i o n which was without precedent 96 in the Reich. In a c t u a l i t y many voters had come to d i s t r u s t the p o l i t i c a l position of this party which was supported mainly by c i v i l servants and i n the House 97 by the majority of pri v i l e g e d members. Of the rest of the seats, the Freie Vereinigung, consisting of a c o a l i t i o n of conservatives and Farmers party got 6, and for the f i r s t time the Social Democrats won 2. 94 ^Grube, p. 549. 95 Hannelore Schlemmer, Die Rolle der Sozialdemokratie i n den  Landtagen Badens und Wuerttembergs und i h r Einfluss auf die Entwicklung  der Gesamtpartei zwischen 1890-1914 (Inaugural Dissertation, Freiburg, 1953), p. 19. 96 c. c o Simon, p. 52. 97 Gottlob Egelhaaf, "Die allgemeine Entwicklung Wuerttembergs in den Jahren 1891 bis 1916," in Bruuns, Wuerttemberg unter der Regierung  Koenijq Williams II (Stuttgart, 1916), p. 27T 49 Despite the pressures against them, the VP were determined to exercise t h e i r rights as the majority party. At f i r s t von Mittnacht, pressured both by extreme conservatives and also the Prussian ambassador, was relucantant to deal with the VP. But he came to the r e a l i s a t i o n that there were other, far worse dangers i n s i g h t , which might be held o f f 98 through cooperation between government and VP. Until 1912 the Landtag was to be dominated by the VP. 2. Von Mittnacht's Proposal of 1897 In the throne speech, delivered on February 20, 1895, the king declared that the government v/as w i l l i n g to proceed with proposals to reform the c o n s t i t u t i o n , but that a presentation would f i r s t depend on a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the various tendencies within the House i t s e l f . Their answer, which had passed by 63 to 19, indicated the general d i r e c t i o n : an end to p r i v i l e g e of b i r t h and o f f i c e , replacement of p r i v i l e g e d by elected representatives, the ri g h t to l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e , and i n -99 creased representation for the c a p i t a l , Stuttgart. Von Mittnacht's answer was somewhat surprising. Exhibiting a willingness to oblige, which had not been present during his dealings with the previous, less radical Landtag, he explained that the government had no intention of being a mere spectator i n the matter of reforms. Rather, i t would attempt Simon, p. 53. Cf. Mueller, p. 204. Egelhaaf c a l l e d von Mitt-nacht's decision the clever deed of an Odysseus to ensure continued control of the Landtag. 99 Adam, p. 189. 50 to find a solution on the basis of the present situation, in other words, accepting an end to privilege. At the same time, the government did not intend to relinquish leadership in the matter, for in the face of the apparent division, 53 votes from the VP and Centre, a two-thirds majority could not be attained. Therefore, the government would be obliged to use its influence on the Lords i f success were to be achieved.^ Mittnacht's speech was greeted with considerable applause. But the compromise did not end there. After conducting exploratory talks with the Upper House, Mittnacht concluded that no proposal would be acceptable which did not include removal of the privileged from the Lower House. He therefore decided to do without his conservative counter-weight there, but to add the privileged to the Upper House while extending the Tatter's budgetary rights. And he reasoned further, that since the new members of the Lower House would in al l probability be elected by those who paid no income tax, i t would only be fair to the propertied classes, that in the case where the Upper House rejected a money b i l l with a two-thirds majority, the Lower House only be allowed to pass that b i l l i f i t could achieve the same margin. In addition, the government felt that removing the privileged to the Upper House would destroy the Catholic majority in that bodyJ*^ This situation, the result of the annexations of the early 19th century, was embarrassing in a predominantly Protestant kingdom. 100 101 Egelhaff, p. 29. Adalbert Wahl, Deutsche Geschichte 1871-1914, V. 4, p. 151 51 After studying his proposals, however, various parties began to have second thoughts. The newspaper of the DP accused Mittnacht of cleverly mixing reactionary with l i b e r a l changes in such a way that the government, with the help of the Upper House and the Centre i n the Lower 102 House, would be able to successfully r e s i s t l i b e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n . In part at le a s t , this was not an unfair c r i t i c i s m , for the Centre i t s e l f had thought i t s interests better served by the disappearance of the 103 Protestant aristocrats from the Lower House. The VP, who wanted to see t h e i r 'democratic' reform go through were not w i l l i n g to wait and thus decided to pay any price for removing the privileged from the Lower House, even that of extending the power of the Upper House. The Centre, seeing the Upper House as the protector of Wuerttemberg Catholicism, also agreed to the proposals. On A p r i l 5, 1898, the government proposal was put to the vote. I t carried with the necessary two-thirds majority, 69-18. But this was not the end of the story. The entire Landtag, not to speak of the population, was to have th e i r hopes shattered by the volte face of one of the most important voting elements. A few days after the vote had been registered, Groeber, leader of the Centre, returned from'Berlin, after attending a Reichstag session. Convincing his colleagues that they had overlooked an important point, i . e . putting the Catholics in the minority when the Protestant knights were transferred to the Upper House, the Centre now demanded as 104 compensation extended rights for t h e i r schools and relig i o u s orders. 1 0 2Adam, p. 191. 1 0 3Wahl, V. 4, p. 151 1 0 4Adam, p. 192. 52 Their proposal, describing the school as an annex of the church, would have resurrected the parochial school, and placed religious i n s t r u c t i o n e n t i r e l y under the direc t i o n of the Bishop. Besides, they demanded the right to found orders at w i l l without having to request state permission. The entire proposal would have meant an end to the secularisation of the previous century, and i t was too much for both the government as well as theother parties to accept. Mittnacht declared he f a i l e d to see any connection between the Catholic b i l l and constitutional reform. But the Centre was adamant. On December 21, 1899, f a i l i n g to achieve the necessary 105 ' two-thirds, the reform was defeated. At the beginning of the l e g i s l a t i v e session, i t seemed as i f the government had had every intention of embarking on a more progressive course and in carrying out the desired constitutional reform. In actual f a c t , however, the government was decidedly far from any ' l i b e r a l ' or 'democratic' conversion. Von Mittnacht's main fear at this point were the Social Democrats. And in order to give them no excuse for radical a g i t a t i o n , he was only too w i l l i n g to seek support of the VP, a calculable p o l i t i c a l r i s k no doubt, but one which enhanced the aura of constitu-t i o n a l i t y and even responsible ministry. The government was therefore w i l l i n g also to make concessions on the issue of the 'privileged' in return for a compromise from the VP. But the compromise which the govern-ment had in mind would be a l l in i t s favour. At best i t can be said that they were clever enough to adjust to new r e a l i t i e s which had been brought about by economic change. And as they implied from time to time, the Adam, p. 193. 53 adjustment consisted i n replacing an old conservatism, the feudal-o l i g a r c h i c , with a new one, the industrial-commercial. This was merely a r e f l e c t i o n of changes which had already been consummated i n the Reich i t s e l f . That Wuerttemberg was a few years behind, must be attributed to i t s special conditions. I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n in this south German state was less hectic and slower than the rest of Germany. Quite aptly, this Landtag, i n which reactionary forces had again s t a l l e d progressive l e g i s l a t i o n , was given the name of an e a r l i e r one, the 1Vergebliche. 1 The only mildly positive r e s u l t was a decision of the left-wing parties to work more closely together i n the f u t u r e . ^ 7 Indeed, the entire period since the founding of the Reich, had brought l i t t l e s i g n i f i c a n t change. ^ 0 6 L i t e r a l l y - 'do-nothing parliament.' ^ 0 7Schlemmer, p. 15. CHAPTER IV THE 36th LANDTAG - 1st SESSION 1901-1904 A. Introduction 1. The Election of 1900 New elections were held i n December 1900, but not before an important change in the government took place. One month before the elections, Minister President von Mittnacht, now 75 years of age, r e t i r e d from public l i f e . His successor was Freiherr Schott von Schottenstein. This ele c t i o n was fought under s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t circumstances than the previous one, with the discontinuation of the campaign c o a l i t i o n between the VP and the Centre. Also, the presence of the SPD again meant a further s p l i n t e r i n g of the l e f t vote. A l l ideological tendencies were represented at th i s election including the conservative Farmer's Party. The results confirmed the trend to the l e f t which had been apparent at the l a s t e l e c t i o n . The SPD p r a c t i c a l l y doubled i t s votes to gain f i v e seats and in by-elections reached a total of seven. Some of these seats were captured from the VP who f e l l to twenty-eight, and from the DP who 1 no l o s t one, while the Centre remained at eighteen. Egelhaaf, p. 33. 54 55 Because of the f a i l u r e of the previous attempt at reform, the election campaign had mainly been fought over this issue which resulted 109 i n a clear d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between the l e f t and right-wing parties. In the coming Landtag debates this polarization was to become more pro-nounced. 2. Social Basis of the Parties and t h e i r Programmes The electorate was s p l i t into three d i s t i n c t g r o u p s J 1 0 The f i r s t of these, the Centre party, formed i n 1894 in Wuerttemberg long after the Kulturkampf had been o f f i c i a l l y closed, drew i t s membership and votes primarily from Catholics of a l l so c i a l groups. Ideologically close to the democrats, i t s main aims were nevertheless, protection of Catholicism and l i b e r a t i o n of the Church from secular control. I t also stood up for greater independence for the German Laender. The second group which was easy enough to i d e n t i f y , although not very numerous in Wuerttemberg, was the Social Democratic party. A revolu-tionary marxist organization, i t s support came overwhelmingly from the working-class, which however, because of the special conditions i n Wuerttem-berg, grew only slowly. I n i t i a l l y republican, the SPD, especially i n south Germany, was to lose i t s revolutionary elan in the course of the next decades. Schlemmer, p. 51. ^ B e c a u s e of lack of records the social structure of the elec-torate i s d i f f i c u l t to distinguish. But some l i g h t has been thrown on i t by an investigation of local party records. Cf. Simon, pp. 25-37. 56 The rest of the electorate then, either supported the Deutsche  Partei or the Volkspartei, or the conservative bloc consiting of the Conservatives and the Farmers Party. The l a t t e r were both primarily defensive i n t h e i r p o l i t i c a l stance: the Conservatives, as a weight against the l i b e r a l s , and the Farmers Party, of mainly medium and larger farmers, who sought to protect t h e i r interests against the Social Demo-c r a t s . 1 1 1 Both the Deutsche Partei and the Volkspartei were the successors of early German l i b e r a l i s m , but as already noted, they had s p l i t on the question of German unity. Later i n the century the DP came to represent the interests of the new i n d u s t r i a l possessing classes. Its support came mainly from higher c i v i l servants, O f f i c e r s , Protestant clergy, p i e t i s t 112 c i r c l e s , big business and some aristocrats as w e l l . A d r i f t to the rig h t was unmistakeable i n this party which even saw an a l l i a n c e with the conservatives as necessary for a steady and orderly development of the 113 Reich. Although i t had been the main government supporter i n the Landtag from 1871-1895 i t appeared to have l o s t the i n i t i a t i v e , and was l e f t i n the ensuing period with the choice of a s s i s t i n g the VP with the constitutional reform or becoming t o t a l l y useless i n the eyes of the electorate. However, i t contributed i t s own version of the reform, with a strong lobby for the inclusion of professional representatives i n the Landtag. Schlieper, p. 172. Simon, p. 43. 2 Runge, p. 125. 3 S c h l i e p e r , p. 204. 57 The Volkspartei, on the other hand, claimed that i t was the party of the middle-class, and therefore t r i e d to r e c r u i t i t s members from a l l trades and professions. Its executive and local organizations were dominated by the free professions and independent small manufacturers, with a very high percentage of lawyers i n a l l leading positions. This i s not surprising as 28% of a l l the lawyers in Wuerttemberg were active in 114 either the DP or the VP. Before the SPD became a r e a l i t y in Wuerttem-berg, the workers too were i n c l i n e d to vote for and belong to the VP. But with the r i s e of the SPD, the VP tended to lose workers' votes in that d i r e c t i o n , as also the Farmers votes, which saw i n that party greater protection against the radical s o c i a l i s t s . The program of the VP was i n general to influence the Reich as far as possible in a democratic d i r e c t i o n , for they saw that e d i f i c e 115 as quite incomplete. They consistently took an a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t stand, seeing there the outcome of interests which did not emenate from the people and which were leading slowly to a dangerous chauvinism. The VP were p a t r i o t i c , but not in the aggressive, n a t i o n a l i s t i c sense of some of t h e i r Reichstag colleagues. They stood for a free Germany, one which was strong enough to defend i t s e l f , but also for a s t r i c t legal and moral interpretation of international a f a i r s . To achieve these goals, they campaigned for a free and equal electoral system i n a l l the German Laender, as well as the equality of women. And for the people to attain the requisite level necessary to e f f e c t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , 114 Runge,.p. 78. 1 1 5 I b i d . , p. 180. 58 they demanded an educational system free from religious manipulation. Because they realised the d i f f i c u l t y of implementing this program in the Reich, the VP concentrated t h e i r efforts in Wuerttemberg. The aware-ness that Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c a l l i f e was much ahead of the north made them even more determined to set the pace. And because t h e i r influence in the Reichstag was not great, they hoped to use the strength of t h e i r v position in the Landtag to control the Wuerttemberg vote i n the Bundesrat. This was cer t a i n l y no radical departure since the precedent for this had been set much e a r l i e r , in Bavaria, as w e l l . 1 1 7 With the Landtag of 1900, then, the VP decided to use a l l the means to whip up the sentiment for constitutional reform and not l e t the matter rest u n t i l i t had been achieved. They were not to know, that the other main plank in t h e i r platform, the school question, would provide the main impetus. B. The Renewed Demand for Constitutional Reform 1. The Government Although the draft proposal of 1897 had been defeated, the question of constitutional reform did not disappear. A l l the parties had campaigned fo r a representative Lower House and acknowledging this desire, the king in the throne speech on January 15, 1901, explained that: 116 117 Simon, p. 110. Ib i d . , p. 48. 59 At the l a s t attempt to change the constitution i n regards to the composition of the chambers, deep-seated differences of opinion have appeared. Changing the composition of both chambers remains one of the goals of my government; but as long as the differences of opinion have not been reconciled, my government w i l l not be able to offer any hope of success in a new e f f o r t J ^ This pessimistic attitude of the government was reiterated by the Minister President during the course of the subsequent debate. The reform, he explained, had floundered on d i f f i c u l t i e s within the Lower House i t s e l f , on the attitudes of the various p a r t i e s , and these d i f f i c u l t i e s did not seem to have disappeared since the election had not changed the strength of the protagonists s i g n i f i c a n t l y . He was of the opinion that the chances of a reform were less than those of s i x years 119 ago. A few days l a t e r , however, he assured the House that the govern-ment did not intend to relinquish the i n i t i a t i v e in the matter, nor was there any uncertainty as to how i t proposed to achieve the reforms. The government's position was s t i l l based on a transfer of the privileged to the Upper House. But a change in the representation of the Lower House was only feasible i f at the same time the Upper House were expanded 120 and given certain rights i n regards to the budget. 2. Freie Vereinigung Support for the government came i n i t i a l l y from the Conservatives, one of the groups which made up the loose c o a l i t i o n known as the Free 118 119 120 P.I.(69), p. 2. P.I.(69), p. 78. P.I.(69), pp. 130-131. 60 Association. Their leader, Kraut, declared that the time was not yet ripe to discuss constitutional reforms. The Conservatives f e l t that the government had chosen the right path by leaving the discussion of the reforms to those parties who were most interested i n i t . The whole question of constitutional reform was of no p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t to the people. These were more interested in questions of tax-reform or of 121 road-building. Similar opinions were expressed by representatives of the privileged. One of the knights, von Woellwarth, agreed with Kraut's observation of indifference among the people. On the other hand, before the e l e c t i o n , certain newspapers had prophesied that the Centre supporters would r e f l e c t t h e i r displeasure with the party who was responsible for the f a i l u r e of the reform by rejecting i t at the p o l l s . But nothing of the sort had happened. I f one analysed the votes for the Centre then one would have to conclude that the issue of constitutional reform had played no part in the election at a l l . I f any case, von Woellwarth did not believe that the question could be solved at this point. The Centre was not about to give i n , the VP would probably not agree to the proposed budget rights for the Upper House, and the knights could not agree to t h e i r own departure from the Lower House since this was not in the interest of the people as 122 a whole. In his closing remarks, von Woellwarth then read a declaration signed by twelve knights, which expressed t h e i r willingness to participate 1 2 1 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , p. 64. 1 2 2 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , p. 136. 61 in any negotiations for reform, but which also rejected the suggested replacement of the privileged with elected members on the basis of equal 123 suffrage. The declaration was not unanimous, however. Freiherr von Gemmingen, with some far-sightedness, expressed the desire for a f u l l y -elected Lower House, but f e l t that a strengthened Upper House was neces-sary as a conservative weight to check the absolute power of universal suffrage. Nevertheless, he hoped that such would not be accomplished by a compromise with the Centre, but by a c o a l i t i o n between the VP, the DP and the FV. 3. The Volkspartei The main reply to von Schottenstein's declaration was given by Conrad Haussmann, who attempted to c l a r i f y the ambiguity of the government position. The government, he argued, had merely announced i t s intention of doing nothing in regards to constitutional reforms, at least u n t i l i t was crystal clear that there was unity i n the House. What did this mean, in fact? According to Haussmann the government had maneuvered i t s e l f into a position of dependence on the opponents of reform, and thereby 124 l e f t i t s own supporters in the lurch. But in order for such a reform to be successful the government would have to take the lead by using a l l the administrative and l e g i s l a t i v e powers at i t s disposal. By thus loosening the reigns the VP f e l t that the government had strengthened P.I.(69), p. 142. P.I.(69), p. 75. 62 the hand of the opposition immeasurably. The VP were at a loss to explain this volte-face of the Government. The only feasible explanation was that the government was becoming so scared of the SPD that they f e l t the need of the assistance of the privileged to combat the growing electoral power of Social Democracy. But the government was making a mistake. The SPD could not be fought i n this manner. Some years previously the government had asked both the people and the opposition to have f a i t h in. i t , and that the reform would be successfully completed. But the VP f e l t that i t s present actions had destroyed that f a i t h and with i t the trust which was necessary for completing other l e g i s l a t i o n . I f the government remained adamant i n i t s unwillingness to take the lead, then there was nothing l e f t for the VP but to oppose the government at every turn. In time, they believed that the government would look back at 125 this step and r e a l i s e that i t had made a serious mistake. The next day Haussmann took the opportunity of answering certain accusationsmade by the Centre and of also r e i t e r a t i n g the position of the VP. According to t h i s , the l a t t e r were quite prepared to work with the Centre. On the question of the structure of the Upper House, the VP also declared th e i r willingness to participate i n discussions. The party considered the number and proportion of new members in the Upper House to be merely pr a c t i c a l and by no means 'principled' questions. But before they could formulate a po s i t i o n , they would have to examine the 126 proposals, a step which the VP were quite w i l l i n g to take. 1 2 5 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , pp. 76-78. 1 2 6 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , p. 127. 63 4. Deutsche Partei The DP, represented by von Gess and Dr. Hieber, adopted from the outset a less intractable position than that of Haussmann and the VP. Speaking on January 25th, von Gess, in supporting the government's tac t i c s explained that since 1849 seven constitutional drafts had been prepared, without any success. The DP were anxious to welcome an attempt that would be successful, but they f e l t that success would only be possible i f the various parties reached an agreement on fundamental questions. Clearly one should not blame the government, after so many f r u i t l e s s 127 attempts, for requesting p r i o r understanding within the House. A few days l a t e r his colleague, Dr. Hieber continued to outline the position of the DP by attacking the attitude of the knights. The DP regretted the reluctance of the 'privileged' to depart from the Lower House, and saw t h e i r declaration an added d i f f i c u l t y i n achieving the reform. As regards the government, the DP did not share the conviction of the others that i t would have been better for the government to have made i t s retention of the i n i t i a t i v e i n the constitutional question clear at the opening of the Landtag. Rather they were pleased that the govern-ment had moved away from passivity and reservation in the matter, and they hoped that the government would maintain the necessary leadership. In any case the DP wanted to leave no doubt i n anyone's mind that the whole question of constitutional reform was for them of the highest p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Taking up the question of the indifference of the population, Hieber argued that there was no other matter of greater P.I.(69), p. 91. 64 national concern than the question of reforming the structure of the Lower House. Furthermore, he feared that i f the reform were delayed, or were unsuccessful this time, that the consequences would put the govern-128 ment in a very d i f f i c u l t position. 5. The SPD In the south German states the SPD had gradually come to play a d i f f e r e n t role than in the north. Facing a l i b e r a l voting system, and c e r t a i n l y a more l i b e r a l parliamentary attitude on the part of the government, the SPD developed early that cooperative attitude which 129 was l a t e r branded as revisionism. At this time, when the SPD had at least a parliamentary group of workable s i z e , and where the p o l i t i c a l forces were neatly divided, the party decided to work closely with the left-wing democrats, i n this 130 case the VP. Besides they made i t quite clear that they intended to f i g h t for reform and for the implementation of t h e i r program i n a c o n s t i -tutional manner. On January 23, t h e i r spokesman, Hildebrand, declared t h e i r intention to work for the benefit and prosperity of the country, while rejecting emphatically the notion that they were in any way dan-131 gerous to the monarchy. The Social Democratic Party in Wuerttemberg saw i t s task as bringing about reforms which would make i t impossible for p a r t i c u l a r 1 2 8 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , pp. 141-142. 1 2 9Huber, IV, p. 121. 130 Schlemmer, p. 54. 1 3 1 P . I . ( 6 9 ) , p. 51. 65 families and 'estates' to further t h e i r ov/n interests through l e g i s l a t i o n . Their stated aim was a representative assembly in which a l l classes were represented proportionally. The SPD were ready to compromise with the Centre on the matter of reform, as Hildebrand stated, but the Centre had not responded. As far as the SPD were concerned this reluctance by the Centre was due s o l e l y to the fact that being the vanguard of aristocracy 132 in Wuerttemberg, they wished to prevent the reform. But the SPD did not put the entire blame on the Centre. Because of the statements by the government they had realised that other a n t i -reform currents were very strong. At the same time, however, they did not share the opinion that the attitude of the people was one of i n -difference, consequently they would not work p o s i t i v e l y on any other l e g i s l a t i o n which would only have the e f f e c t of delaying the reform. In the present Landtag the SPD had only won f i v e seats, but they had apparently learned how to use even such a minority vote to their own advantage. They considered the question of constitutional reform not of momentary but of h i s t o r i c importance. For them i t was the f i g h t of an entire people against the retention of p r i v i l e g e . They were the representatives of the working classes, and were quite conscious of the fact that t h e i r opponents in the House represented propertied and privileged i n t e r e s t s . The SPD viewed i t s task then, as seeking an end to those remnants of feudalism which gave special rights to the 133 propertied. 132 133 P.I.(69), p. 109. P.I.(69), p. 111. 66 6. The Centre Party After the i n i t i a l debate, a motion was presented to the House on the question of the preparation and answer to the throne speech. I t was suggested that the House take this opportunity to make i t s position on the constitutional reform quite clear. In addressing himself to the motion, the leader of the Centre party, Groeber, took the opportunity to reconstruct the previous position of the House as well as the Centre party regarding the reform proposals. At the beginning of the previous Landtag, the main opposition had come from the pr i v i l e g e d . But then, maintained Groeber, a new s i t u a t i o n had been created with the suggestion to extend the membership of the Upper House as well as i t s competence in budgetary matters. Furthermore, i t had become clear that not only would that body gain additional members, but would gain them i n such a way that the Centre would have to request some constitutional guarantee for the Catholic minority, possibly in the form of the parochial school system. Yet, none of the other parties had even t r i e d to reach a com-promise with them, instead the issue had been abruptly terminated by c a l l i n g for a vote. As the matter stood now, the VP expected to move rig h t into a debate on the answer to the throne speech without indicating any willingness to compromise. In such circumstances the Centre could see no p o s s i b i l i t y of reaching agreement for a common program and would 134 therefore vote against the motion. Eight days l a t e r , opening the debate on the 1901-1902 budget, the Vice-President of the House and Centre representative, Dr. V. Kiene, P.I.(69), p. 20. 67 continued the exposition of his party's position. The Centre, he said, maintained the same position as i n 1894. As regards the structure of the Lower House they were in f u l l agreement with the others. But on the question of the Upper House there were deep differences. Their main con-cern was the protection of t h e i r r e l i g i o u s minority. I t was unfortunate that the throne speech did not include those many questions of p r i n c i p l e which were of importance to the country and i t s people. Not one s y l l a b l e had been l o s t on s p i r i t u a l - r e l i g i o u s matters, although the Centre would have expected that this would be one of the most important areas of government consideration. The most important task of the government should be the preservation of the monarchy, property, family, r e l i g i o n and authority which had t h e i r roots deep i n the Christian l i f e of the people. Freedom for the Church was the best way i n which this could be accomplished, and i t was the government's business to afford the Church a l l the help i t could in extending i t s influence. The future, he continued, belonged to the youth, and therefore the Church ought to be guaranteed 135 the means for t r a i n i n g them, which was the parochial school. After the government declaration on the previous Saturday, V. Kiene thought i t necessary to summarise for the Centre. His remarks i n fact stand as a summary of the state of the constitutional reform at that time. The government had i n fact introduced no new proposals, but had merely presented the House with a fragment of the former draft. No mention had been made of whether the priv i l e g e d from the Lower House P.I.(69), p. 44. 68 would be replaced, nor how this would be accomplished. Secondly, nothing was said about the structure of the Upper House nor i t s rights in respect 136 of the budget. Obviously, no progress at a l l had been made. C. The Kloss Motion The constitutional question, which had only been mentioned during the budget debate, came a l i v e again with the discussion of a motion to increase the representation of Stuttgart. On February 8, 1902, the SPD introduced this motion requesting the House: To p e t i t i o n His Majesty's government to introduce a b i l l changing No. 5 #133, Chapter IX of the Constitution so that the c i t y of Stuttgart be accorded stronger representation commensurate with i t s importance and population J 3 7 Because of the order of business the motion was not brought forward u n t i l February 11 , 1903. Kloss of the SPD opened the debate by j u s t i f y i n g the motion. Because of the silence of the government on the question of constitutional reform, the SPD were forced by the changing s i t u a t i o n to demand additional representation for Stuttgart. In 1839 Stuttgart had had l/43rd of the tota l population of Wuerttemberg, but by 1900 this proportion had risen to l/12th. Yet the number of seats in the House had remained the same, resulting in great i n j u s t i c e to the c i t i z e n s of that c i t y . I f a comparison were made with the rest of the country which had one representative for every 31,000 c i t i z e n s , then Stuttgart with a population of 180,000 should have 6 members in the House. Furthermore, P.I.(69), p. 145. P.III.(71), p. 2046. 69 the c i t y payed 1/6th of the total amount of direct taxes, a considerable . 138 amount. In answering, the government, represented by the new Minister President, Dr. von B r e i t l i n g , reminded the House that the government viewed the question favourably, that i n fact the constitutional proposals of 1897 had included increased representation for that c i t y . However, the government did not see the necessity of t r y i n g to solve that question independently while there was s t i l l the p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving an encompassing reform of Chapter IX of the constitution. Again, he reminded the House, according to the government declaration given in 1901, they were not about to relinquish the i n i t i a t i v e in that question, but present 139 a draft as soon as they f e l t there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of some success. The next speaker, von Gess of the DP, expressed his appreciation at the government's reassurance, and pointed out that as regards the composition of the Lower House the vast majority of representatives agreed that i t should be converted into an exclusively representative assembly, by way of general and d i r e c t voting. He f e l t that the motion regarding Stuttgart was j u s t i f i e d , , but that what they should consider was the fe e l i n g of the electorate: and the people wanted a general constitutional reform not a 'lex special i s ' for Stuttgart. Therefore the DP would not vote for the Kloss-motion. One the other hand the DP was prepared to continue work on the reform at the nearest opportunity, and at this time presented a resolution to the House, which, recognising 138 139 P.V.(73), p. 3314ff. P.V.(73), p. 3318. 70 the government's intent i o n , declared that the House too was ready to 140 participate in a modern revision of the constitution. Haussman of the VP expressed himself i n a s i m i l a r manner. He and his colleagues would have to vote against the motion because i n the f i r s t place i t was too pessimistic. I t l e t the government o f f the hook in having to present a draft reform. Besides, voting for the motion would give the government the opportunity of accusing the parties them-selves of doubting the f e a s i b i l i t y of achieving the reform. Furthermore, he was pleased at the way i n which the DP was now viewing the s i t u a t i o n . I f von Gess r e a l l y represented the views of the DP, then the VP were ready to work with them on that basis and would even be w i l l i n g to bury the suggestion of a proportional vote which had caused so much trouble in the previous Landtag. Consequently the VP asked the members of the House to support the von Gess resolution and thus indicate t h e i r desire 141 to continue working for the constitutional reform. Now, Prelate von Sanderberger, representing the 'privileged', read a declaration expressing th e i r intention to cooperate i n bringing about the reform. But, he added, the House had to r e a l i s e that they were the representatives of what had come to be known as conservatism, and therefore i t was of the utmost importance for them to decide whether this p o l i t i c a l ideology could 142 r e a l l y best be represented through the b a l l o t box. 140 141 142 P.V.(73), pp. 3321-3323 P.V.(73), pp. 3323-3325. P.V.(73), p. 3326. 71 With that declaration the 'privileged' had at least shown them-selves w i l l i n g to compromise, cert a i n l y a departure from t h e i r previous position. But with the Centre i t was the same old story. Dr. von Kiene explained that they would not support the Kloss motion, because i t was only a p a r t i a l reform, and especially because the government had shown i t s willingness to reopen the whole question. But the basic position of the Centre towards the reform had not changed. They accepted the idea of an elected Lower House, replacing the 'privileged' section by way of proportional voting i n large d i s t r i c t s . However, they f e l t that the Upper House should remain a House of Lords and not be extended with appointed members. Furthermore, they desired that the r a t i o between both House be kept as i t was. This reasoning they based on the program of the majority party for the future, and therefore did not intend to relinquish 143 the minority protection which obtained at the present. For the SPD, Kloss then declared that they were pleased to have reopened the question of the reform with t h e i r motion. I t was true that i t had expressed a certain pessimism, but since a l l the parties had indicated t h e i r desire to support another attempt, the SPD would with-draw t h e i r motion and support the von Gess resolution instead. However, in case that were defeated the SPD reserved the right to demand a vote 144 on the or i g i n a l matter. Haussmann then attempted to close the debate by reminding the House that the most important step had been taken by the FV when they declared t h e i r intention of making a positive contribution to the reform. The p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving a two-thirds majority with the help of the 'privileged' was cer t a i n l y on Haussmann's mind at this point. Von Ow, 1 4 3P.V.(73), p. 3327. 1 4 4P.V.(73), p. 3328. 72 one of the Knights and spokesman for the 'privileged', was careful to reply that the FV had no intention of replacing themselves with represen-tatives elected d i r e c t l y , without conservative guarantees. But at the same time, he did not refute the tone of von Sanderberger's message which 145 had indicated the p o s s i b i l i t y of cooperation. With a closing address from the Minister President, the resolution 146 was put to the vote, and with 84 members present, i t carried unanimously. D. The Defeat of the School Reform B i l l 1. Introducti on With the acceptance of the von Gess resolution a l l the parties in the Lower House had indicated t h e i r willingness to cooperate i n a renewed attempt to bring about constituional changes. Naturally they had done so only while declaring that there was no commitment to the type of change; this would have to be hammered out either i n debate or through negotiations among the party representatives. Nevertheless i t was an important step in reopening the question. But of perhaps greater importance was the agreement which seemed to have been reached between the VP and the DP, and the promised cooperation of the FV. For with the Protestant votes of the FV (21 out of 23) the pro-reform bloc in the Lower House would be able to reach the necessary two-thirds majority. 1 4 5P.V.(73), p. 3330. 1 4 6P.V.(73), p. 3332. 73 After the s i t t i n g , the representatives of the VP and DP sent i n -vitations to the various other parties suggesting they meet and begin negotiations. The f i r s t meeting took place in June 1903, with a l l parties 147 represented except the Centre. Von Gess was charged with preparing a memorandum on their behalf containing proposals for a constitutional reform. Eight months l a t e r , the proposal was ready. The idea had been to present these to the various parties for further study, to meet again to iron out any discrepancies and then possibly to present the accepted draft to the government. Before this could take place, however, the School Reform B i l l came to a vote in the Upper House. Its rejection was to give the greatest impetus yet, to the long-overdue constitutional reform. 2. The Volksschule Since the beginning of the nineteenth century the Wuerttemberg state apparatus had t r i e d to extend i t s e l f into the education f i e l d . Until 1836, administration of the education system had been shared between the protestant and catholic hierarchies, and school inspection had been carried out by c l e r i c s . But especially since 1848, the opinion that education belonged i n the realm of secular authority had been gaining ground. In 1858, the Minister of Education and Religion, Gustav Ruemelin, introduced a law designed to raise the quality of the schools by increasing teachers' s a l a r i e s . Most of the teachers had come to r e a l i s e that t h e i r Adam, p. 199. Cf. Dr. J. Hieber, Die Wurttembergische Ver- fassungsreform von 1906 (Stuttgart, 1906), p. 10. 74 social position was being judged according to t h e i r economic circum-stances, and began to demand a salary commensurate with t h e i r education. For this purpose a teachers' Association was founded which encompassed the vast majority in Wuerttemberg. Among th e i r demands was an end to the combination of t h e i r teaching duties with that of s a c r i s t a n , as well as 148 better teacher t r a i n i n g . But t h e i r most serious demand was to be r i d of inspection by c l e r i c s and to have the l a t t e r replaced with professionals. Consequently this led to frequent clashes with the Church authorities. Because of constant a g i t a t i o n , the Minister of Education, von Weizsaecker, introduced a comprehensive Education B i l l i n 1902 which among other things t r i e d to tackle the problem of inspection. 3. The School B i l l A commission was charged with drawing up a report on the govern-ment's B i l l which was duly presented to the House by Dr. Hieber of the DP. I t i s not necessary to go into the entire B i l l , for a l l that interests us here is Art. 4, concerning school inspection at the v i l l a g e and d i s t r i c t l e v e l s . According to the proposals the government did not intend to change the regulations at the v i l l a g e l e v e l . But a fundamental change was envisaged for the d i s t r i c t s . Here, the inspectorate was to become part of the d i s t r i c t council o f f i c e , which meant that non-clerics would also be e l i g i b l e for the position of inspector. Qualified were those persons who had proved t h e i r competence by virtue of t h e i r education and Wahl, IV, p. 169. 75 t h e i r previous experience in the f i e l d of education. Thus besides the 149 c l e r i c s , teachers were also eligible.. One the same day on which the report was presented, February 5, Art. 4 was passed with only a few minor changes. Voting against, were 150 the Centre and a few of the 'privileged.' Six days l a t e r the entire B i l l was accepted with 55 against 25. Apart from the Centre the only other opponents were the SPD who had voted according to party p r i n c i p l e which demanded complete secularisation as well as an end to. r e l i g i o u s 151 ins t r u c t i o n in the schools. In passing the Lower House only the f i r s t hurdle had been nego-ti a t e d because the B i l l had yet to be accepted by the Upper House. Here, of course, was to be found a Catholic majority, those whom the Centre were constantly referring to as protectors of the minority. They were of course a group who refused to make even the s l i g h t e s t concession to 152 the modern p r i n c i p l e of professional school inspection. Von Weizsaecker t r i e d everything to convince the Upper House and answer t h e i r objections. But his attempt was useless. The B i l l was not actually voted down, for before i t actually came to the vote, a simple majority (13 to 11) accepted a motion which would amend Art. 4 i n such a way that although the inspec-torate would be joined with the e x i s t i n g council o f f i c e , only c l e r i c s in fact could qualify as inspectors. The same day, the government was 1 4 9P.V.(73), p. 3124. 1 5 0P.V.(73), p. 3237. 151 Schlemmer, p. 54. 152 Wilhelm Kei1, Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, 2 vols (Stutt-gart, 1947-48), p. 225. 76 l e f t with no alternative than to retract the B i l l , acknowledging that i t s intent had been defeated. 4. Public Reaction to the Defeat The defeat of the School B i l l by the Catholic aristocrats i n the Upper House generated a public reaction among the protestant popu-153 l a t i o n , "as one had never seen before." Public opinion refused to accept the fact that a handful of aristocrats had been able to block the wishes of the government and parliament. A mass demonstration was or-ganised in the auditorium of the Song H a l l . The crowd, pressed together l i k e sardines, demanded an end to this s i t u a t i o n by a comprehensive 154 constitutional reform. VP, DP, and SPD a l l cooperated in this protest movement which was directed against the Upper House. But while the SPD and a few members of the other two parties demanded i t s complete a b o l i t i o n , the majority of the VP and DP merely called for i t s reform. On June 16, the Lower House meeting to hear the report of the Education Commission, took the opportunity of o f f i c i a l l y continuing the protest against the high-handed actions of the Upper House which had caused such disturbance and resentment. 5. Parliamentary Reaction and the Haussmann Resolution The session of June 16, 1904, opened with a report by the Chair-man of the House Education Committee, Dr. Hieber. The assembly had been 1 5 3 K e i l , p. 225. 1 R4 l 0 4Rapp, p. 124; K e i l , p. 226. 77 scheduled to debate petitions by the protestant and catholic teachers' associations, but because of the defeat of the B i l l , the committee saw no sense in that. A renewed discussion of the school inspection and organisation at this time, Hieber explained, would lead nowhere. I t was not without a fee l i n g of bitterness that he was forced to come to this conclusion. A moderate and caref u l l y compiled piece of modern l e g i s l a t i o n had been defeated by a small group of men who rep-resented the kind of c l e r i c a l opinions which were i r r e c o n c i l a b l e with the modern state. Yet despite the restrained approach of the House, the moderate b i l l had been defeated by an appeal to 'conscience.' Hieber f e l t at a loss to explain t h i s . He argued that much progressive l e g i s -l a t i o n had been accepted by the Catholic 'conscience' i n other German states. Did they believe, he asked, that the Protestants had no con-science? Or perhaps that only the Catholic conscience had a right to express i t s e l f in educational matters? The House should energetically protest and deny the opinion that the B i l l had been a danger to relig i o u s education. Had not the Protestant hierarchy supported i t ? And not only had the right to reli g i o u s education been confirmed by the b i l l , but also the right of supervision for the Churches. A l l this was of course unimportant now. The main question for the House at this point would be the consequences of the rejection and what further action they should take. F i r s t of a l l , the necessity for changes in the educational f i e l d were s t i l l present. A l l concerned bodies, including the Catholic authorities had approved the need for changes. Now, he f e l t that not only the schools but the Churches would continue to suf f e r , for no one could deny the tension that existed between 78 teachers and c l e r i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , and this would cer t a i n l y increase. Another consequence of the defeat of the b i l l would be renewed attempts by the government to achieve changes by way of the adminis-t r a t i o n , i . e . the budget. Possibly the Minister of Culture would include such a provision at the next budget debate. Therefore, the relationship between Church and State would be very strained, not between the Protes-tants and the State, but between the Catholics and the l a t t e r , for the Protestants in the House had from the beginning shared the opinion that school administration was properly the business of the state. What then, would happen now? Hieber believed that the l a s t few weeks had c l e a r l y shown that no progress could be achieved i n regards to school reform under present constitutional conditions. And these were not apt to change u n t i l the government i n consultation with the 155 House made the firm resolve to take the i n i t i a t i v e . There was no doubt that the events of the l a s t weeks had brought about a state-wide movement. I t was commonly held that every b i t of new l e g i s l a t i o n was plagued by having to take into consideration archaic rights and p r i v i -leges which continued to e x i s t from by-gone ages. In any discussion of the constitutional question, the most important point would be the structure of the Upper House. At the conclusion of Hieber's report, the Speaker then read a resolution signed by Hieber, von Gess, Haussmann, one of the knights von Gemmingen, and the protestant Prelate, von Sanderberger. Because of the defeat of the School Reform B i l l by the Upper House, the Lower House refers the pe t i t i o n of the Wuerttemberg P.VIII.(76), p. 5282. 79 Elementary School Teachers Association which requests a modern revision of the present school inspection clause, to His Majesty's government. At the same time the Lower House expects that the government w i l l be able to put through such reform, i f necessary by a revision of the consti tution J 5 6 Arguing for the motion, Haussmann then attacked the action of the Upper House by pointing to the excitement in the country. The gentlemen of that Chamber, he s a i d , made the mistake of moving i n exclusive c i r c l e s and con-sequently had no idea how the people were thinking. But i n fact the move-ment among the populace was so strong that anyone who did not see the necessity of getting r i d of the Upper House would be thought of as a weakling. He was sure that i f a vote were taken on the matter i n Wuerttem-berg that 2/3rds of the people would vote for an end to that body. The tragedy of the whole a f f a i r , was that this exclusive club was able with only two votes, to oppose the rest of the people. What they were r e a l l y saying, he explained, was that the teachers were incapable of inspecting the country's schools, and the state was incapable of running the schools properly. In r e a l i t y however, the Upper House had proceeded in a very shortsighted and imprudent manner; imprudent, because i n th i s way the Upper House had caused a l l eyes to be turned on them. The result of course, was a questioning of the entire material basis of the Upper House, and those who asked themselves why i t continued to e x i s t could only answer because t h e i r fathers were propertied. Even l e g a l l y the right of the House to e x i s t was questionable, for had i t not been abolished some years before, only to be a r t i f i c i a l l y r e i n s t a l l e d some years l a t e r ? Furthermore, Haussmann asked, what was the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the Lords i n P.VIII.(76), p. 5283. l e g i s l a t i v e matters? Was i t not true that the greater portion of the work of that body was discharged by the l i f e members? The action of the Upper House was imprudent also because i t had created a bloc of opposition, including Monarch and SPD and i n whose midst marched the Catholic Teachers Association. The government especially had always gone out of i t s way to please the Upper House, the thanks for which was the rejection of this moderate piece of l e g i s l a t i o n . In the next few weeks he expected that the movement among the populace would be i n t e n s i f i e d , and i t was the duty of the Lower House to accommodate this f e e l i n g , to show that they were ready to a s s i s t i n any measures necessary to end this unhealthy state of a f f a i r s . In fact a revision of the constitution was unavoidable now. Not that i t had not been neces-157 sary before, but now a new and very pressing reason had appeared. Von Sanderberger now rose to explain the attitude of his Church which he had previously only touched on. I t was with a heavy heart, he s a i d , that one was forced to the r e a l i s a t i o n that i t was only a few votes which had spelled defeat for a measure supported by the greater proportion of the population as well as the Lower House. I t had been stated not only by the Minister but also by the Upper House, that the i n i t i a l stimulus for Art. 4 had come from the Protestant Church Council. This ought to have been proof enough that there was no attempt to re-nounce the interests of the Church or to surrender i t s rights on the question of Christian education, rather that i t was an attempt to adapt 158 to new circumstances. 1 5 7 P . V I I I . ( 7 6 ) , p. 5285. 1 5 8 P . V I I I . ( 7 6 ) , pp. 5285-5286. 81 Groeber now t r i e d to defend his party. He too had noticed the excitement in the country but he was convinced that i t had been a r t i -f i c a l l y produced. Previous speakers had furthermore attempted to make i t seem as i f the opposition in the Parliament was between Catholics and Protestants. He for his part did not accept t h i s . The fact that the opposition in the Lower House happened to be Catholic was only coin-cidental. I f there had been a real conservative opposition i n the House that fact would have been only too clear. As proof of his contention he had to c i t e the fact that two Protestant Lords had also voted against the School B i l l , while c i r c u l a t i n g l e t t e r s from Protestant c l e r i c s . I t was clear that many Protestants viewed the matter unfavourably. Therefore i t was completely untrue that there were reli g i o u s contradictions in the House, rather what they were witnessing was a battle between Chris-tian-conservatism on the one hand, and l i b e r a l i s m on the other. But i t would seem, he continued, that the task of the Upper House was being interpreted i n such a way as to relegate that body to the status of 'yes-man' to the Lower House. I f this were the case then the Centre had to agree with the rest of the House that i t would be better to abolish the Lords. But i f the Upper House were to continue as an independent l e g i s l a t i v e body for the benefit of the state and the people, then one could not expect her to play that role. The truth was that the Democrats were playing a subtle game. No longer were they demanding an end to the Upper House. Now they were saying that the Upper House had to be changed and to achieve this i t would have to be strengthened. But this was for him paradoxical. The DP also appeared to support this position as could be seen from the draft prepared by von Gess. And as far as the 'privileged' 82 were concerned they seemed quite happy to remain where they were. The net res u l t of these d i s p a r i t i e s was that there was no p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving a reform at this time. Besides did the rest r e a l l y think that the Upper House, which was needed to pass such a reform, would participate i n doing away with or weakening i t s e l f in such a way that i t was merely useful to the Lower House? As f a r as the Haussmann argument went, he could only remark that i f this were so, then the entire body of l e g i s l a t i o n since 1850 was i n -v a l i d . In fa c t , a l l constitutional changes since then would be i n v a l i d , including the electoral law on which the membership of the present Lower House was based. Was i t not ludicrous to state that the entire consti-tutional l i f e of the l a s t 54 years be declared at one stroke null and void. In concluding there was one point which Groeber thought should be mentioned. Haussmann had expressed the hope that the government would now take a completely new position towards those who were responsible for the defeat of the b i l l , to put i t c l e a r l y , a precedent had been set in demanding that the government seek revenge on those who had voted against a piece of l e g i s l a t i o n . He, Groeber, hoped that i n the course of the debate the government would give them a clear answer to this 159 propositi on. The Minister of Education and Churches then addressed the House. They had met today, he reminded them, to discuss the teachers' p e t i t i o n s . But the debate had wandered from there to the defeated school b i l l and thence to constitutional reform. They would have to understand that P.VIII.(76), pp. 5286-5288. 83 he was not in a position to make any further comments on the government position. However, concerning the motion before them, he would assume that the government had no objections. As far as the Groeber request went,'he believed that Haussmann's remarks had been misconstrued. He had not asked for any policy of revenge from the government and the l a t t e r had no such thoughts i n mind. But i t should be obvious that the government would not look askance at the events and neglect i t s respon-s i b i l i t y . 1 6 0 Theodore Liesching (DP) then went on to analyze Groeber's conten-tion regarding the ideological s p l i t i n the House. He had always f e l t that the Protestants had been represented most ably by the Protestant Prelate. He would have been happy i f they had been as l i b e r a l as Groeber thought. On the contrary, these gentlemen had approved of the School B i l l by declaring that they saw no danger here to the rights of the Church. As to the remark that a protestant c l e r i c had written to two members of the Upper House he could not take seriously, f o r the l a t t e r did not even l i v e in Wuerttemberg, 1 6 1 and therefore could hardly be acquainted with local conditions. Even i f a c l e r i c did write a l e t t e r this could hardly be interpreted as mirroring the o f f i c i a l position of the Church which anyhow was represented by the Protestant Prelate. As for the argument that the Upper House was to be put in a position of merely echoing the conclusions of the Lower House, he could , D U P . V I I . ( 7 6 ) , pp. 5288-5289. 1 6 1 A few members of the Upper House were actually c i t i z e n s of Holland or Austria, a further example of the anachronistic composition of the Upper House. 84 remember many occasions previously in which that body had rejected deci-sions of the Lower House. The fact was, however, that the unpopularity of the Upper House had reached a decisive juncture when something had to be done. What did they believe would happen i f in another province, eg. Bavaria a Protestant majority in the Upper House had acted s i m i l a r l y ? Such a structure existed i n no other province in Germany. Everywhere the members of Upper Chambers were people who were closely connected with the business of t h e i r country. But i n Wuerttemberg they had to put up with a condition: Whereby a Prince Windischgraetz, who was President of the Austrian Imperial Council, Prince Fuerstenberg, who li v e d i n Baden and Bohemia, and Prince Thurn and Taxis, who only came to Wuerttemberg to v i s i t his forest property, a l l had a say i n Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c s . I 6 2 The patience of the Wuerttemberg people had been exhausted. Liesching then explicated his party's position regarding the Upper House. The DP did not expect that the total a b o l i t i o n of that body could be achieved at the present time. In the meantime they were s a t i s f i e d to reconstruct i t in a way which would align i t with the modern demands of Wuerttemberg public l i f e . The reaction to the June 8 vote had surprised the Lords, who had not expected that t h e i r action would have been considered so provocative. But the opposition to the Upper House was by no means confined to the press. I t was f e l t i n the smallest v i l l a g e , in so far as that were protestant. There was no doubt i n Lie-sching's mind that the vote had awakened a popular movement which would 163 not rest u n t i l the School reform had been achieved. 1 6 2 P . V I I I . ( 7 6 ) , p. 5290. 1 6 3 P . V I I I . ( 7 6 ) , pp. 5289-91. 85 The Social Democrats, although 'they too had voted against the B i l l , lent t h e i r weight to the c r i t i c i s m s of the Upper House and the Centre. Hildenbrand, t h e i r main speaker, reaffirmed the antagonism in the House between the two 'Weitanschauungen.' The one maintained that the School could only f u l f i l l i t s task under the dire c t i o n of the Church, while the other stressed the state's educational r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of equipping every c i t i z e n with the tools of s u r v i v a l . In such a s i t u a t i o n he f e l t that i t was obvious that the government would have to take the side of the l e f t . For the SPD the main problem was the Upper House. They accepted the fact that to reform the school system a change i n the structure of Upper House was mandatory. But the ways in which this had been suggested were f a l s e . By removing the 'privileged' to the Upper House, the Catholic majority there would c e r t a i n l y be broken, but this would not mean an end to conservatism, the hindrance of progress. There was no guarantee that other progressive l e g i s l a t i o n would be passed. They f e l t that the Upper House by i t s very existence was an obstruction to progress which no reform could ameliorate. Reminding the House of the words of the old Chancellor of Tuebingen, von Weizsaecker, father of the present minister, Hildenbrand said that i f progress could not be achieved by peaceful 164 means then violence would res u l t . The next two speakers, Rembold (C), and von Sanderberger took the opportunity to clear up one or two points of misunderstanding. But i t was l e f t to Haussmann to summarise the arguments for the motion. The ta c t i c s of the Centre, he said was to encourage the SPD i n every way to P.VIII.(76), pp. 5291-5293. 86 make radical demands f o r getting r i d of the Upper House. In that way they hoped to discourage the conservatives, in pa r t i c u l a r the ' p r i v i -leged' to vote against any constitutional reform. But they had no inten-tion of f a l l i n g into the trap. I t was true that one of his fundamental desires was to see an end to the Upper House, but i t was not always possible to achieve what one wanted. He would work therefore, for any reform that was t r u l y a progressive step. Whoever voted for his resolu-tion was not comitting themself to any p a r t i c u l a r reform, but was only 165 acknowledging that the present s i t u a t i o n could not continue. For the Conservatives, Kraut declared that although they were against the Simultanschule, 1^ and some of t h e i r colleagues had expressed reservation, they had indeed voted for the B i l l . There was considerable agitation on the question of the structure of the Upper House and even some conservative c i r c l e s were casting a favourable eye on reform. There-fore, they would d e f i n i t e l y support the Haussmann motion, while reserving a free hand for the negotiations. Likewise, the representative of the Farmers Party, Haug, expressed t h e i r support for the School B i l l , the constitutional reform and the Haussmann motion. The l a s t two members to speak were Keil (SPD) and Groeber. But while the former contented himself with r e i t e r a t i n g the fundamental position of his party to the reform, and reminding the House that the SPD were s t i l l intent on abolishing the Upper House, Groeber chose to attempt to strengthen the position of his party by presenting the House , D 3 P . V I I I . ( 7 6 ) , pp. 5299-5300. ^ S i m u l t a n s c h u l e - expression for a unified inter-denominational school in which the Churches had an equal right in re l i g i o u s education. 87 with a threat. F i r s t of a l l , he explained, there were some Protestant teachers who had not supported the b i l l . And to the question of consti-tutional reforms no one could expect the Centre to agree to proposals that were contrary to t h e i r i n t e r e s t s . I f indeed, a c o a l i t i o n were created with the intention of restructuring the Upper House in such a way as to allow the School B i l l and other l i b e r a l measures to pass, no one should expect any help from the Centre, for We reject fundamentally any revision of the constitution for p o l i t i c a l reasons. You w i l l j u s t have to try i t with-out us, i f you think i t at a l l possible.167 A vote was then c a l l e d on the Haussmann motion. There were at this time 79 members present i n the House, of which 62 voted a f f i r m a t i v e l y . 168 The 17 nays were of course members of the Centre party. The next battle would be what form the revision should take. 167 168 P.VIII.(76), pp. 5302-5303. P.VIII.(76), p. 5304. CHAPTER V THE 36th LANDTAG - 2nd SESSION 1904-1906 A. The Government Takes the I n i t i a t i v e 1. Introducti on The extent of the June protests had had some effect on the govern-ment which now decided to continue to attempt to reach some agreement on the constitution with members of the House af t e r the f i r s t session closed. During August and September yon B r e i t l i n g held exploratory talks with the speaker of the Lower House, Payer (VP) as well as the l a t t e r ' s c o l -league, Liesching. Von B r e i t l i n g was so convinced of the necessity of the reform that he informed the king that he considered himself com-mitted by these talks to introduce a reform proposal and at a l l events to see i t through, otherwise the entire government would have to r e s i g n . ^ Von B r e i t l i n g ' s decision was f a c i l i t a t e d by the fact that in dealing with the VP and also the DP, he was basing his support on a majority of the elected members of the Lower House. Furthermore, the VP had made i t clear during the demonstrations that although they were in p r i n c i p l e for a to t a l a b o l i t i o n of the Upper House, they realised that the p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving this goal was remote. VP delegates 169 Klaus Simon, Die wuerttembergischen Demokraten (Stuttgart, 1969), p. 67. 88 89 therefore refrained from excluding the p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving a p a r t i a l success in the form of an elected Lower House within the bi-cameral system. 1 7 0 2. The Throne Speech Whatever the exact reasons behind von B r e i t l i n g ' s decision, the throne speech which opened the second session of this Landtag was of a markedly different tone than previous ones. In the f i r s t place the issue of constitutional reform was given precedence over a l l other l e g i s l a t i o n , and the government declared i t s firm resolve to i n i t i a t e and lead the reform movement, since i t could envisage no progress were the i n i t i a t i v e l e f t to the Lower House i t s e l f . Broad guidelines were l a i d down within which the government expected the reform to be accomplished. These were f i r s t of a l l the creation of a Lower House on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, the retention of the bi-cameral system, but with a modern reform of the Upper House. This was to be accomplished, further-more, within the exi s t i n g constitutional framework. 1 7 1 But before the proposals could be presented to the House, l e f t -over business from the previous session had to be completed. And not un t i l June 15, 1905, then, was the House ready to consider the new proposal. Theodor Liesching, Zur Geschichte der wuerttembergischen  Verfassungsreform im Landtag 1901-1906 (Tuebingen, 1906), p. 13. Cf. K e i l , p. 228. 1 7 1 P . I . ( 7 7 ) , p. 1. 90 3. The Government Proposal On Thursday, June 15, von B r e i t l i n g presented the government draft proposals a f t e r an introductory speech. Summarising the history of his government's attempts to reform the c o n s t i t u t i o n , he explained the reasons for now doing so. A year before, the Upper House had been accorded by the Lower House a share in determining the new income tax, which meant that one of the p r i n c i p l e objections to the reform proposals of 1897 no longer existed. Secondly, negotiations for the amalgamation of three suburbs with Stuttgart necessitated additional representation for that c i t y . Thirdly, the Upper House was in great need of reform, since i t s numbers had declined since they were l a s t determined i n 1819. F i n a l l y , the government was convinced that a reform would only be success-ful i f they created the foundation for agreement, as well as the fact that i f there were any further delay the chances of a completion would be very un l i k e l y . As indicated in the throne speech, the government viewed the retention of the bi-cameral system as an indispensible re q u i s i t e . The more the masses of the people were given the r i g h t to participate i n public l i f e , the more did the government feel i t necessary to preserve a moderating element in the form of a viable Upper House. In regards to the Lower House, the departure of the 'privileged' was considered natural. For a replacement, the government intended to extend the representation of Stuttgart, but did not see the necessity for additional members. Stuttgart would therefore be represented by 6 members to be elected according to a proportional vote. 91 Of prime importance for the government was the reform of the Upper House. They f e l t that the a r i s t o c r a t i c character of that body should be changed to one which could encompass those people who had excelled either through t h e i r social and h i s t o r i c a l positions, or t h e i r experience in the i n t e l l e c t u a l , religious or economic sectors, and who in t h e i r support for the state would be best able to further the public inte r e s t . For this reason i t was proposed, in addition to the royal members, the Lords and the life-members, to appoint representatives from the Knights, the Churches and the Universities as well as commerce, industry and agriculture. The l a t t e r category would consist of 2 members 172 each, bringing the total membership of the Upper House to 47. Very popular with the Lower House was the introduction of q u a l i -f i c a t i o n s according to which members of the Landtag had to be residents AS WELL AS c i t i z e n s of Wuerttemberg. Also the r i g h t of voting by proxy was greatly c u r t a i l e d . In the question of budget r i g h t s , i t was suggested that the Upper House be allowed to amend dr a f t s , while the Lower House would be forced to debate these. The r e s u l t would then be binding on both Houses, but i n the case where the Upper House rejected the entire budget, both Houses would be united for the purpose of voting and a simple majority would count. After his short introduction, von B r e i t l i n g then handed the 173 draft to the speaker for d i s t r i b u t i o n . 172 B.I.(94), p. 651. In the written introduction to the d r a f t , i t was pointed out that since 1819 the membership of the Upper House had f a l l e n from 55 to 29. 1 7 3 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , pp. 2495-2498. 92 B. The Debate on the Constitutional Reform B i l l 1. Preliminary Debate and Selection of Constitutional Committee The general debate on the constitutional draft began on June 26, with a presentation by the spokesman for the majority party, Haussmann. I t came as more than a surprise to the House that he chose to resurrect an old issue in the form of a demand for the restoration of the consti-tution of 1848-49. I t was surprising less because of i t s obscure v a l i d i t y than by the fact that the VP, during the demonstrations of the previous year, had indicated t h e i r intention of dropping the issue, since a two-thirds majority i n the Lower House was needed for i t s resurrection anyway, and such could not be obtained with the opposition of the Centre and con-174 servatives. Haussmann s reason for this step was a precaution against the defeat of the present b i l l , and he reminded the government that i n such a case they could use the emergency clause of the constitution to summon the representatives of the counties to a constitutional conference. His opponent, Groeber (C), rose immediately to take Haussmann up on the point. The Centre, he declared, would tend to agree with Haussmann that the debate on the constitutional reform could not be carried out u n t i l the legal commission had examined c a r e f u l l y the circum-stances of the constitutional events of 1848-50. He then handed the speaker a resolution expressing this desire. Haussmann accused Groeber Liesching, p. 14. 1 7 5 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2569ff. The revolutionary constitution of 1848-49 had been rescinded by royal decree, but the l e g a l i t y of that move had never been c l a r i f i e d . 93 and the Centre of using this as a delaying t a c t i c because they had no 17fi intention of discussing the question. Certainly Haussmann had made a point. The Centre was obviously against the reform which would have wiped out the Catholic majority in the Upper House. On the other hand they would have been i n a worse position with the convening of a consti-tutional conference, for there was the p o s s i b i l i t y that such would again result in the ab o l i t i o n of the Upper House. Groeber therefore answered that they were w i l l i n g to withdraw t h e i r resolution i f Haussmann did the same. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to say what motives underlay Haussmann's demand. A consummate p o l i t i c i a n , he must have been aware that his motion had no chance of carrying. Perhaps he was trying to draw the Centre out and i n some way commit them to participate p o s i t i v e l y in the debate. In any case the VP were on very shaky ground, for as the Minister President pointed out, the former leader of the VP, Karl Mayer, on behalf of his party, had relinquished the right to demand the restoration of the revolu-tionary constitution of 1849. 1 7 7 Furthermore, he reiterated the govern-ment's position as proclaimed i n the throne speech, which was to carry out the reform according to the l i m i t s of the constitution of 1819. The government was supported i n this by Prelate Sanderberger, who ex-plained that in no way would his group support a reform except according to the outline of the government. Haussmann, seeing that his motion had received the anticipated opposition decided to withdraw, followed by Groeber. With t h i s , the 176 177 P.IV.(80), pp. 2574-2575. P.IV.(80), p. 2576. 94 f i r s t discussion of the b i l l was closed. The main speakers on the following day, when the actual discussion of the b i l l began, represented those forces which had been cool towards the government proposal and who preferred to reserve t h e i r judgement for a l a t e r date. They were curiously enough the representatives of the Knights, von Ow, and the radical l e f t , Keil (SPD). For Keil and the SPD, the reform was almost senseless since i t did not forsee a modernization of the Wuerttemberg constitution by i n t r o -ducing a uni-cameral l e g i s l a t u r e . As far as they were concerned, the continuation of the Upper House was an anachronism. Worse yet, i t s proposed strengthening was even more an i n s u l t to the people, for the government was attempting to introduce beside the representatives of feudalism, those of property in the modern sense. There were also, the SPD were convinced, no h i s t o r i c a l grounds for an Upper House. Here they were quite correct, in that an Upper House was a novelty in Wuerttemberg constitutional l i f e , nevertheless, i f h i s t o r i c a l precedent were v a l i d , an Upper House had existed for almost a hundred years. Keil's argument was that whatever the government decided to do with that body, the Wuerttem-berg people would not rest u n t i l i t had been abolished. Thus the present 179 reform would not remove the main cause of constitutional c o n f l i c t . Von Ow agreed with Keil on this l a s t point. He f e l t that he could see no peace in this question in the future, since the demand for the ab o l i t i o n of the Upper House would be constantly raised by the left-wing 1 7 8 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2581. 1 7 9 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2584ff. 95 180 p a r t i e s , whose strength appeared to be growing. But i f the reform were to be carried out, then he would have to suggest a much stronger conservative replacement than had been suggested by the government. Von Ow suggested that the Upper House have at least 50 members, with a 181 strong contingent from the i n d u s t r i a l and commercial sectors. And in order to wipe out the disparity that would be caused by changing the Lower House to an elected assembly, he suggested that the Upper House be 182 afforded the same rights in budgetary matters as the Lower House. The f i r s t to speak on the side of the proponents was Liesching (VP). He reminded the House that nothing positive had yet been said on the reform. After agreeing with Keil that the bi-cameral system was also not in t h e i r program, he held up to his colleagues the fact that no other state in Germany, not even Baden, which had j u s t completed a reform i t s e l f , had done away with this system. In f a c t , not even the "I Q O SPD members had requested any such thing. Liesching was of the opinion that an a b o l i t i o n of the Upper House was i n the future. But quite cor-r e c t l y , he observed that the movement for such a step did not have the 184 support of a majority of the electorate i n Wuerttemberg. As for the substance of the reform i t s e l f , Liesching f e l t that i n the f i r s t place no extra budgetary rights should be given to the Upper House. As the 180 181 182 183 184 P.IV.(80), p. 2596. P.IV.(80), p. 2598. P.IV.(80), p. 2600. Liesching was r e f e r r i n g to the Baden SPD. P.IV.(80), pp. 2602-2603. 96 reform stood, the government intended to place 75 elected representatives vis a vis 47 appointees of the Upper House. This would place the budget in danger, since the Upper House, together with the SPD, who were i n the habit of voting against the budgets, could defeat any money b i l l s . Therefore, Liesching declared that they would suggest to the House that a replacement of the 'privileged' be considered by using the entire country as a constituency and electing according to the proportional system. In this way they would be able to keep the o r i g i n a l constituen-cies which the electorate were used to. For the Upper House, Liesching was against the provision that the king appoint representatives from the i n d u s t r i a l sector, et a l . Rather, he wanted the l a t t e r to be chosen by t h e i r various organisations, 185 eg. the Chamber of Commerce, and merely confirmed by the monarch. Speaking for the DP, Hieber stressed that the government proposal was ce r t a i n l y a compromise, in i t s e l f a good thing, since none of the parties could expect to have t h e i r complete program accepted i n the House. But the DP were not against the retention of the bi-cameral system, especially since none of the more progressive European states had opted for such a structure. They, however, did feel that there should be a replacement for the 'privileged.' Hieber then declared his support for the main ideas of the VP, but f e l t i t necessary to stress that the DP intended in no way to weaken the rights of the Lower House regarding the budget. Their position was supported by the representatives of 1 8 5 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2606. 1 8 6 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2622. 97 the Agrarians and the Conservatives, Kraut and Haug, who, however, ex-pressed some concern for the lack of an appointed conservative weight in 107 the Lower House. During the course of the debate, Minister von B r e i t l i n g had to clear up one or two points regarding the draft. On the 28th, he explained that as far as the government were concerned i t was an open question in what manner the Upper House were extended. But, i f the 'privileged' were to leave the Lower House, i t was absolutely necessary that the government see the addition of a conservative counterpart i n an extended and viable Upper House. As the throne speech had indicated, the retention 188 of a bi-cameral system was the sine qua non of the entire reform. The l a s t group to make a contribution to the debate was the Centre. Their position was awaited with great expectation, since they were the only group who had formally indicated t h e i r opposition to the reform. Groeber's speech was somewhat longwinded, the major portion being taken up with t r y i n g to prove that the government had gone back on i t s declarations a number of times, and without consistency. As far as he could see, therewas no more agreement in the House than when the govern-189 ment had made this a condition for resuming the reform. In turning to the draft i t s e l f , he remarked that the proposals did not appear to be such that there was enough compromise for everyone. Groeber considered the plans for professional representation i n the Upper House quite inadequate. 1 8 7 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , pp. 2614 and 2623. 1 8 8 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2611. 1 8 9 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2626. 98 He f e l t that the idea was meritorious, but the way i n which i t was set up would res u l t merely i n the addition of people who would r e f l e c t the government's in t e r e s t . He would prefer to see complete representations of a l l the professional bodies in the Upper House. For the Lower House, Groeber saw the need for a replacement for the 'privileged', f o r , from a pra c t i c a l point of view, t h e i r removal 190 would result in a weakening in that body. Most important of a l l for the Centre, was the opinion that the reform would do nothing to appease the constituonal s i t u a t i o n as i t had developed i n the l a s t few years. They f e l t that they were witnessing only the beginning of a concerted movement to get r i d of the Upper House. And they pointed with a l a c r i t y at what they saw as the dangers of a radi c a l i s e d Lower House. The pro-posals of the government would only serve to sharpen the struggle, cer-t a i n l y not to mitigate the differences. For the Centre, the correct way out was to replace the 'privileged' with representatives of the professions and trades, who would be able to look a f t e r the interests 191 of the farmers, the middle-class and the Church. Groeber then took his seat indicating that his party would have to wait on further develop-ments before they could make any contribution. On the t h i r d day of the debate, von B r e i t l i n g took the oppor-tunity of countering some of the arguments that had been presented es-pe c i a l l y by the Centre and the Knights. Both had accused the government of inconsistency in regards to the p a r t i c u l a r aspects of the reform P.IV.(80), p. 2629. P.IV.(80), p. 2630. 99 proposals. The charges were not d i f f i c u l t to substantiate, but as von B r e i t l i n g pointed out, the government were r e a l l y trying to introduce a reform that was generally acceptable and were therefore forced at times 192 to change this or that clause so as to make i t acceptable to the House. The major contention of this day, was the Centre proposal that professional representatives, elected by the proportional system, replace the 'privileged', conservative element. Von B r e i t l i n g explained that this would defeat the entire purpose of the reform which was to transform the Lower House into a body representing electorate as such, and reminded the Centre that in t h e i r party program up to and including 1900, they had demanded the replacement of the 'privileged' with generally elected 103 members. As for the charge of r a d i c a l i s a t i o n , von B r e i t l i n g f e l t that i t was better for the government to proceed f a i r l y and i n keeping with the wishes of the majority; any other action, p a r t i c u l a r l y any overt attempts at suppression of the SPD would probably mean increased r a d i -194 calism, not less. In terms of the suggested extension of the Lower House, von B r e i t l i n g said that the government would keep, for the time being, to t h e i r o r i g i n a l proposal, but were ready to discuss the possi-195 b i 1 i t i e s during the same committee sessions. Von Kiene, deputy speaker of the House, and deputy leader of the Centre, now continued the argument for his party. I t was t h e i r opinion that the use of the proportional system in large constituencies was quite compatible with universal suffrage, and i t was this system which they would l i k e to see e l e c t the professional representatives 1 9 2 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2638. 1 9 3 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2641. 1 9 4 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , pp. 2641-2642. 1 9 5 P . I V . ( 8 0 ) , p. 2640. 100 in the Lower House. 196 Liesching, Haussmann and Hieber, as well as the Minister of the I n t e r i o r , a l l rejected von Kiene's argument. They f e l t that the election of professional groups, even using the proportional system, was not commensurate with the concept of a general e l e c t i o n . Von Pischek explained that the Centre's suggestion was paradoxical. Professional representatives could never be elected generally, they would have to be elected or nominated by t h e i r own groups before being 197 presented to a general electorate. He agreed that proportional elections would encourage men of perhaps greater c a l i b r e and far-sighted-ness to run, but there was no guarantee for t h i s . And i t c e r t a i n l y would 198 not be any guarantee against further r a d i c a l i s a t i o n of the House. Groeber t r i e d his best to prove that this was not so and that t h e i r suggestion would not in any way disturb the concept of general elections. But perhaps he saw that this t a c t i c would get nowhere, for he switched to another point, that of the danger from the Social Democrats, which had only been mentioned previously. On the basis of s t a t i s t i c s , Groeber t r i e d to prove that the dangers were greatest in Wuerttemberg, where the SPD had received 27% of the popular vote. Compared with Baden and Bavaria, the Centre was much weaker. There was of course a l o g i c a l reason for this as Wuerttemberg had less Catholics, for i t was i n c i d e n t a l l y one of the'original Protestant areas. Thus i t was not strange that the 199 Centre only received 24% of the popular vote. But Groeber's argument 196 P.IV.(80), p. 2644. 197 P.IV.(80), p. 2647. 198 P.IV.(80), p. 2648. 199 P.IV.(80), p. 2650. 101 was designed to convince not the government, who they realised wanted the reform, but the Knights, who had not yet committed themselves, but whose support was necessary for a two-thirds majority. At the end of this f i r s t reading, i t v/as not yet clear how the forces i n favour of the reform stood; but almost certainly a two-thirds majority was not yet to be found. The Centre would naturally vote against the reform, and i t looked as i f twelve votes from the uncertain and sceptical Knights could not yet be counted af f i r m a t i v e l y . In any case a decision to press on was taken with the approval of a motion to select a constitutional committee. 2 0 0 On July 1, 1905, 16 members were entrusted with the task of studying the government proposals and reporting back to the House. I t included members of a l l the pa r t i e s , who chose Liesching (VP) as the committee chairman. 2. The Committee Proposals No time was l o s t by the committee. I t took the chairman only ten days to gather the various petitions and position papers, and when he was ready the committee met. The deliberations lasted from July 10-14, and on July 20 the draft went through i t s second committee reading 201 and was ready for presentation to the House. The proposals forsaw the replacement of the 'privileged' with 17 MP's in the general election but according to the proportional system, P.IV.(80), p. 2661. Liesching, p. 27. 102 and using the entire country as one constituency. The Upper House was to be expanded to include 7 representatives of the Knights, 2 from commerce and industry, 2 from agriculture, and 1 from the artisan's guild. These were to be chosen d i r e c t l y by t h e i r various organizations. The budgetary rights for both Houses were accepted as l a i d out 202 in the government proposals. 3. Second Reading i n the Lower House Although the committee had been ready with t h e i r report at the end of J u l y , the House was not scheduled to discuss the question u n t i l a f t er the New Year because of other l e g i s l a t i o n . On January 24, 1906, the report was presented and the second reading commenced. This lasted u n t i l February 1, when the f i n a l vote was taken. There were two major points which had to be considered. During the preliminary debate, the Knights had indicated t h e i r displeasure with the proposed extension of the Upper House. Now, through a motion, they requested, in addition to an increase of t h e i r own numbers to 8, the inclusion of the three Lord Mayors of the largest towns, 3 represen-tatives of the counties, besides 3 from industry and agriculture respec-203 t i v e l y , and 2 from the artisans. There now occurred one of those curious events, which through pure chance, resulted in the removal of what could have been an important obstruction to the reform. In order to achieve t h e i r desired extension 2 0 2 B . I V . ( 9 7 ) , p. 35ff. 2 0 3B.IV.(97), p. 467, #204. 103 of the Upper House, the Knights had entered into an agreement with the Agrarians, whereby i f the l a t t e r voted for the extension, the Knights would have sustained the attempt of the Agrarians to eliminate the clause on run-off elections. A removal of this clause would have worked to the disadvantage of the two l i b e r a l p a r t i e s , the VP and DP in the coming elect i o n s , although i t would have most l i k e l y brought some gains to the Centre, SPD and Agrarians, i n other words those parties mainly dependent on the working-class or farmers' vote. However, when the vote on the amendments for the Upper House was taken, the Agrarians voted against the appointment of the Lord Mayors, because they had not been properly 204 instructed by th e i r party whip. The VP on the other hand, without p r i o r consultation, had aided the Knights i n achieving t h e i r other goals, namely, the increase of t h e i r own numbers i n the Upper House to 7, as 205 well as the clause covering the professions. Nevertheless, the Knights were angry at the desertion of t h e i r supporters and considered the bargain nul l and void. This was of course the opening for the reformers. In short order a motion by the Centre to introduce a simple majority for the constituency elections was defeated with the help of the Knights, while a second motion of the DP to resurrect the o r i g i n a l clause of the govern-?0fi ment dr a f t , i . e . the run-off vote, was accepted. This was an important v i c t o r y , as the introduction of a simple majority would have forced the VP and DP, who had the most to lose, to reject the entire reform. The question never reappeared again. 2 0 4 L i e s c h i n g , p. 29. 2 0 5P.V.(81), pp. 3148 and 3158. 2 0 6P.V.(81), p. 3171. The remaining paragraphs, d e t a i l s only and of no importance to this essay, were read the next day. The only other point of importance were the budget r i g h t s , and af t e r a short debate a vote was taken which resulted in the acceptance of the committee's proposal, which was i n fact the or i g i n a l government draft. According to t h i s , the Upper House was given the right to make amendments to the budget, which then had to be considered by the Lower House, although the l a t t e r ' s f i n a l vote was binding. No changes were envisaged i n the necessity for consultation in the question of tax revis i o n . But then both House were required to vote on the entire budget b i l l , and in the case where i t was rejected by the Upper House, the ayes and nays of both were counted together, a 207 simple majority deciding the fate of the b i l l . With this completed, the president called for a vote on the entire d r a f t , with the amendments of the second reading. 89 of the 93 members were at the time present, and 69 voted f o r , and 20 against the b i l l . The opponents were again of course the Centre with the assistance of two Knights. With this vote, the most important hurdle had been passed. The necessary two-thirds majority had been obtained and the b i l l was ready for the next hurdle, the Upper House. 4. The Committee Report of the Upper House Two weeks after the decision of the Lower House, the committee of the Upper House, whose work was carried out in absolute secrecy, presented i t s proposals to the Lords. These then deliberated from B.IV.(97), p. 64. 105 May 22-25, and f i n a l l y presented t h e i r draft back to the Lower House. In general, the draft of the Upper House consisted mainly in returning to the or i g i n a l proposals of the government. The 17 additional members from the Lower House were rejected, as well as the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of residence for the Lords. Also they demanded the r i g h t of the monarch to replace a deceased Lord with another member from the aristocracy. The number of Knights v/as reduced to 6, and the representatives of the professions to 4. But as regards the budget, there now developed what could have turned out to be an impasse, for although the Lords did not demand complete equality with the Lower House in the budget, they wanted equal rights i n 208 matters of general taxation. As the representatives of landed property, the Lords could envisage themselves i n a position where the Lower House could introduce taxation b i l l s , especially income tax, which would have put the main burden on the upper classes. On the other hand, for the Lower House to concede such an equality was tantamount to relinquishing one of t h e i r most sacred rights. 5. Third Reading in the Lower House This proposal was returned to the committee in the Lower House, which, completing i t s work in two days, presented i t s report on June 12, 1906. 2 0 9 'Liesching, p. 33. B.V.(98), pp. 137-140. 106 The f i r s t clause which came up for debate was a most important one for most members of the Lower House: the rejection by the Lords of the 17 additional members. Von B r e i t l i n g , on behalf of the government, recognised that i t would be d i f f i c u l t to ask the Lower House to concede this point in the face of the Lord's demands vis a vis the budget. The government, he declared, would with a heavy heart have to accept the wishes of the Lower House regarding the replacement or he could see no 210 successful outcome to the reform. A vote on the motion produced a result of 75 to 5, one of the few times that the Centre voted a f f i r m a t i v e l y . This took care of the Lower House. But as regards the Upper House, they f i r s t of a l l rejected the requested nomination of hereditary members i n the case of death or other departure, and likewise the reduction of Knights to 6. This l a t t e r point was very touchy with the Lower House, because as Haussmann explained, . . . i t would not have been loyal for us to accept this reduction, since in the most serious hour, the vote on the reform d r a f t , the Knights supported us against the threats of the Centre. 2" 1 2 With the professional representatives, the Lower House decided to keep i t s original d r a f t , but accept the suggested form of t h e i r elec-tion. Instead of being elected d i r e c t l y into the Upper House, the doubled number would be nominated by the respective groups, and then chosen by 213 the king. For the q u a l i f i c a t i o n of e l e c t i o n , the Lower House retained UP.VI.(82), p. 4065. ]P.VI.(82), p. 4067. 2P.VI.(82), p. 4069. 3P.VI.(82), p. 4073. 107 i t s o r i g i n a l 25-year old clause, as well as the residency requirement. But i t was the budget question, hotly debated on June 13 in two s i t t i n g s , which was to bring the most surprise. The Upper House had demanded extensive rights i n the budget, especially in the area of taxes. S p e c i f i c a l l y , they were demanding equal rights in setting the level of taxes with a fixed rate, as well as the income tax. Now, the committee indicated to the House i t s acceptance of the demands of the Lords. Their reasoning was quite e x p l i c i t . There are great d i f f i c u l t i e s in the way of an agreement with the other House on these questions. On the other hand, accor-ding to the declaration of the Upper House, as well as the government, without a compromise i n this question, we may as well forget about any constitutional reform.214 The main opposition to this point came from the Centre, which, contrary to e a r l i e r arguments, viewed this concession as a considerable 215 weakening of the t r a d i t i o n a l rights of the Lower House. I t was an unsubtle t a c t i c , however, for the other members of the House were aware that Groeber had been the o r i g i n a l p e t i t i o n e r for the extended budget rights of the Upper House. Haussmann was vociferous i n his condemnation of the Centre. Had they not themselves declared i n 1897 that they had no intention of working towards a constitutional reform that did not 2 1 ft include the restoration of monastic orders and parochial schools? The charge was correct. But i t was hyp o c r i t i c a l coming from the mouth of the speaker of the party that had made the greatest concession to pr i n c i p l e in order to achieve the reform. 2 1 4B.V.(98), p. 142. 2 1 5 P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , p. 4107. 2 1 6 P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , p. 4120. 108 Despite the opposition of the Centre, and i n c i d e n t a l l y the SPD, the motion of the committee carried. A l l that was l e f t now was to vote on the complete draft. Again, despite the opposition of the Centre, success was achieved, the vote being 64 to 23. The second hurdle had been successfully negotiated, and i t seemed as i f there was l i t t l e to 217 stand in the way of eventual success. 6. Second Reading in the Upper House On July 30, 1906, the Lords had t h e i r chance of reconsidering the draft with i t s concessions. Now they decided themselves to make concessions and accepted the required extension of the Lower House by 17 members, changed however the voting pattern so as to divide the country into two constituencies, while accepting the minimum age of 25. Also, they accepted the rejection of the right of the crown to nominate hereditary members, restored the number of Knights to 8, but returned to the o r i g i n a l government proposal of 5 representatives of the professions. Even the residence requirement was accepted. Naturally, they approved the budgetary changes of the Lower House with minor amend-218 ments. 7. Fourth Reading in the Lower House On July 6, the Lower House again considered the revisions of 2 1 7 P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , p. 4127. 218 Adam, p. 207. Cf. K e i l , p. 232. Considerable pressure was exerted by the government and king in order to obtain these concessions. 109 of the Lords. The only d i f f i c u l t y remaining was over the professional representatives, which the Upper House for the second time had reduced to 5. The committee of the Lower House, in consideration of the request of the Knights, had retained t h e i r o r i g i n a l proposal of 8. But the committee chairman, Liesching, as f i r s t speaker, entered a resolution on behalf of the VP to accept the amendment of the Lords so as not to endanger the success of the reform over this r e l a t i v e l y minor point. 219 Strenuous objection was registered by the Knights. The SPD now expressed the sentiments of what was probably a majority of the House. As Keil observed, his party could have no i n t e r e s t in supporting representatives from industry i n the Upper House, since in the f i r s t place the working-class was not represented there. Moreover, the p o s s i b i l i t y of those groups having t h e i r interests looked a f t e r 220 was adequately assured by general elections. The opposition was naturally the Centre who maintained that they would have l i k e d to see these groups in the Lower House. With some of the Knights they managed to increase the nays on that f i n a l motion to 30. And although the 58 ayes were the lowest recorded vote of the entire question, the motion carried. ^ P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , pp. 4456-4458. Cf. Liesching, pp. 38-39. He i s incorrect in stating that this objection was only raised at the l a s t minute. The Knights had been adamant throughout the various sessions, and on this day t h e i r objection was registered right a fter Liesching's report. Furthermore, Liesching's comment that the Upper House communi-cated t h e i r unwillingness to make a compromise, during the debate in the Lower House, i s not v e r i f i a b l e from the parliamentary report. Between Liesching's report and the f i n a l vote, only a few minutes could have passed. 2 2 0 P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , p. 4459. 110 A l l that was l e f t now was to clear up some minor points; then the House adjourned for lunch. The afternoon session was the moment a l l had been waiting for. As many representatives as could make i t , even 221 the sick ones, showed up. The re s u l t was what many people, the govern-ment, the teachers, the two l i b e r a l p a r t i e s , and many of the electorate had been hoping for: by 65 votes to 23 the constitutional reform b i l l 22 passed the Lower House. Now only the formalities were l e f t . On July 9, j u s t three days l a t e r , the Upper House accepted the draft unanimously, and on July 16, the b i l l was signed by King William and became law. Adam, p. 207. Cf. Liesching, p. 37. The debate had not been without i t s tragic side. Two representatives, Friedrich Haussmann and Haug, had succumbed to the physical stress, the former had collapsed during the t h i r d reading. 2 2 2 P . V I . ( 8 2 ) , p. 4478. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION On July 16, 1906, Wuerttembergers were able to salute the com-pletion of a campaign that had lasted for ten years but which had been brewing for at least half a century. This achievement, the reform of the constitution so as to create a representative assembly, was hailed 223 as a great victory for l i b e r a l i s m , one which properly extended the rights and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the electorate. In place of a Lower House of 93 members in which 25% were not elected, 22 elected members, some by d i r e c t vote, others through the proportional system, were to take t h e i r place as representatives of the people, making a total of 92. The r i s e in importance and population of Stuttgart was recognised, for i t received 6 representatives, thus reducing the r a t i o of voters to representatives to only double that of 224 the countryside. In this respect the reform was no less than a clear recognition of the changed social circumstances created by the develop-ment of industry. Elsewhere in Europe, as w e l l , this development had 223 By both contemporaries and l a t e r writers a l i k e . Cf. Grube, p. 553. 224 In Stuttgart each representative was now elected by approx. 40,000 voters, compared with 1:20,000 in the other constituencies. I l l 112 225 caused the transformation of rural labourer to urban p r o l e t a r i a t . The breakthrough i n the use of the proportional voting system was important. I t secured the p o s s i b i l i t y of the election of represen-tatives of minorities which may not have been elected by the ordinary constituencies, and i t also gave a greater guarantee for the election of party leaders. Indeed, Wuerttemberg was the f i r s t German state to use the proportional system. As regards the Upper House, i t s most important r e s u l t was the increase to 50 members, which ended the Catholic majority there. This was likewise a popular move, for the Catholic majority had not reflected the confessional r e a l i t i e s i n Wuerttemberg. The removal of the 'privileged' from the Lower House was c e r t a i n l y a measure that corresponded to l i b e r a l thinking of the time, as was also the end to Catholic hegemony in the Upper House. Yet despite these positive aspects, the reform also meant a considerable strengthening of the influence of the government. At the same time, the extension of the Upper House revived that chamber as a parliamentary body, which from now on could r e f l e c t government interest and policy through i t s . . 227 majority. But by far the greatest disadvantage of the reform was the price with which i t had to be bought. Hitherto in Wuerttemberg, as in most 2 2 5 M u e l l e r , p. 203. 2 2 6 K a r l WeiIer, Die Staatsumwalzung in Wurttemberg 1918-20, (Stutt-gart, 1920), p. 15. 227 The Catholic opposition had come from within the 19 hereditary Lords. These were now opposed by the following who could be expected to represent the government: 4 Royal Princes, 6 appointed l i f e members, 8 Knights, 4 Protestants, 2 Chancellors, 6 professional representatives. 113 other parliamentary states, budget rights were considered the sacred province of the elected chamber. Now however, the Upper House was given the ri g h t to refuse any increase in the income tax, so as to avoid any arbitrary s h i f t i n g of the tax burden by a coincidental majority of the 228 Lower House. As for the practi c a l results of the reform, these were not readily perceivable, especially in the question as to how the proportional vote would affect the d i s t r i b u t i o n of seats. But in the elections held at the end of 1906 some trends were immediately v i s i b l e . Because of the increased representation for Stuttgart with i t s working-class population, the SPD was able to make the jump to 15 seats. A s i m i l a r r i s e was recorded by the c o a l i t i o n of Conservatives and Farmers. Another winner was the Centre which increased to 25 seats. The loser this time was the VP 229 which dropped to 24, while the DP remained at 13. In effe c t the voting line-up of the Lower House was not altered, for whereas the conservatives, the pri v i l e g e d and the Centre, which one may c a l l the conservative bloc, had been able before to regist e r about 40 out of the 93 votes, this r a t i o after the election of 1906 was s t i l l preserved. In the 1912 elec-t i o n , the polarisation between right and l e f t appeared to continue, the losers being the l i b e r a l parties. In Wuerttemberg therefore, the apparently paradoxical s i t u a t i o n was to be found whereby a democratic constitutional reform brought about not only an increase in the representation of the 230 l e f t , but also of the rig h t . Exactly how paradoxical this was, however, 2 2 8 W e l l e r , p. 16. 229Wmbg. Jhb. S.L. (1907), 2nd Bk., p. 1. 230 Wahl, V. 4, p. 154. Wahls interpretation at this point i s very biased, for he concedes a conservative growth, but f a i l s to mention the l e f t . 114 i s a moot point. For i t i s quite v a l i d to argue that the now strong showing of p o l i t i c a l forces which had hitherto been quite n e g l i g i b l e , was due to the constitutional recognition of the presence of new social forces which had not been able to f i n d t h e i r r e f l e c t i o n in the consti-tution of 1819. But by far the most inter e s t i n g question concerning this reform, i s the behaviour of the VP. Why. did this party, the protangonists of democratic l i b e r a l i s m , and the strongest party in the House, even when bolstered by a strong popular demonstration, decide to make such important concessions in order to achieve the removal of the 'privileged' from the 231 Lower House? And the co r o l l a r y to the question i s , of course, why did the government choose to accommodate them? The f i r s t fact that stands out regarding the government i s i t s i n i t i a t i v e in the reform, despite even the pressures against such a step 232 which were emanating from Prussia. I t was obvious during the fiasco surrounding the school b i l l that here was a sit u a t i o n that a government could hardly tolerate. Even before t h i s , however, under Minister President von Mittnacht, the government had indicated i t s desire to reform the constitution. This was mainly due to von Mittnacht who had realised that the changing s i t u a t i o n c a l l e d for constitutional changes and that in order to maintain the government's influence i t was best to make some 233 concessions to the democratic left-wing. Thus the government was 231 K e i l , p. 227. According to K e i l , the demonstrations were so massive, that although the Upper House would have l i k e d to bring charges against him for slander, they were advised against t h i s . 232 Liesching, p. 16. 2 3 3 M u e l l e r , p. 204. 115 w i l l i n g to exert a l l the pressure i t could muster to influence the conser-vative section of the House, the 'privileged' in the direction of the 234 reform. The reasons for which the VP were w i l l i n g to concede important points are not, however, as e a s i l y discernible. They must be sought within the context of parliamentary l i f e i n Wuerttemberg. The constitution of 1819 had put the reigns of government i n the hands of a state ministry which was appointed by the monarch. A l l laws had to be approved by both Houses and the king, and although the Lower House possessed l e g i s -l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e since 1894, this was only used twice u n t i l 1895. Only in matters of taxation did the Lower House have any far-reaching powers, since the budget had to be approved every two years. Besides, the king was guaranteed the right to suspend the constitution without consulting the parliament at any time that he considered this to be i n the best interests of the state, a rig h t which not even the Prussian king possessed. What were the reasons then for the prevalence of such a l i b e r a l tone i n the constitutional l i f e of Wuerttemberg? In the f i r s t place i t seems that the cataclysmic developments of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n which had so rapidly transformed other parts of Germany were not present to the same extent in Wuerttemberg. Because of a lack of natural resources Wuerttemberg did not develop as a centre of heavy industry. Consequently, an i n d u s t r i a l p r o l e t a r i a t developed quite l a t e , and not in the numbers common to other parts of Germany. At the end K e i l , p. 232. 'Simon, pp. 47-48. 116 of the nineteenth century, the i n d u s t r i a l working-class in Wuerttemberg numbered only 20% of the working population i n contrast to 33.4% i n the Reich. Moreover, because of the d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of the various smaller i n d u s t r i a l enterprises, the workers were not torn from t h e i r connection with the land. Then, of course, landed estates were a r a r i t y . In 1882, 77.52% of agr i c u l t u r a l land was divided up into small farms of not larger than approximately 45 acres, compared to the Reich average of 44.52%. Large estates only covered 2% of a g r i c u l t u r a l land. The democratic l e f t wing in Wuerttemberg, whose p o l i t i c a l expression was the VP, thus found i t s r e c r u i t i n g ground among the small farmers and entrepreneurs, as well as white-collar workers, and a l l in a l l may best be described as a petty-bourgeois party, par excellence. From these reasons i s to be explained the p o l i t i c a l practice as i t developed in Wuerttemberg i n the second hal f of the century. Neither king K a r l , nor William were i n c l i n e d to autocrasy , and the l a t t e r es-p e c i a l l y , l e f t much in the hands of his ministers. Itwas clear to him that monarchical powers were on the wane and that real power was now to 237 be found in other areas, especially that of big business. Responsible ministry, although never prescribed by the co n s t i -tution before 1918, had developed to some extent. In 1870, by reason of a vote of no confidence, von Mittnacht had declared that he would make way for another ministry should a majority of the Lower House so desire. And i n the following years his p o l i c i e s were based on the support of the Simon, pp. 5-6. Weller, p. 2. 117 DP, one of v/hose members, Hoelder, was appointed minister of the i n -O O Q t e r i o r . Such cooperation was not confined to domestic a f f a i r s either. Under von Mittnacht too, i t became part of the p o l i t i c a l practise for the government to seek the approval of the Landtag before voting on 239 important matters in the Reich Bundesrat. Over the years then, the VP gradually emerged as a party which was w i l l i n g to forget the 1848-49 episode, and give up i t s radical platform which c a l l e d for a change of the entire system. I t was thus able to compromise with the government by relinquishing the demand for a b o l i t i o n of the Upper House when i t realised that to achieve the reform this point would have to go. And mainly due to the influence of the president of the Lower House, Payer, his party agreed to make the necessary concessions to the Upper House. Indicative of t h i s atmosphere of cooperation and p o l i t i c a l com-promise was the attitude of the SPD which managed to rest r a i n i t s more radical wing and play the game by the established rules. Because of th i s r e l a t i v e l y l i b e r a l constitutional environment, the p o l i t i c a l parties i n Wuerttemberg t r i e d not to maneuvre the government into a position which would have resulted i n intransigency and would have meant a s t r i c t i n t e r -240 pretation of the l e t t e r of the law. In one sense then, the constitutional reform of 1906 was a solu-tion to the compromise that had been made i n 1819 with the proponents of 'Das Gute Alte Recht', and which, in turn, had arisen because of the 238 Liesching, p. 27. 239 Simon, p. 50. 2 4 0Wahl, V. 4, p. 155. 118 acquisition of new t e r r i t o r y . In the words of Engels i t was, . . . the clearing away of the h i s t o r i c a l l y transmitted rubbish of the petty states which stood in the way of the free development of trade and manufacture.241 The reform was a victory for the government and the parties which had been i t s sponsors, and therefore a victory for the people. But i t was decidedly not a victory of the people. Despite the l i b e r a l tone of the government and the willingness of the parties to compromise, the changes produced by the constitutional reform of 1906 were l a t e , and therefore eventually not able to withstand the demand for f u l l sovereignty of the people. But the willingness of the various i n s t i t u t i o n s to accommo-date this idea within the system led to a much easier t r a n s i t i o n to the Weimar Republic, and must be counted as one of the great achievements of Wuerttemberg constitutionalism. In another sense, however, the reform was the l a s t plank i n the platform of the '48 democrats. Those forces which had been dormant since the revolution came to the fore again in the unrest produced during the Wilhelmine period. And they u t i l i s e d the unrest s k i l f u l l y in an e f f o r t to influence the Reich i n a democratic, parliamentary d i r e c t i o n . The Volkspartei realised that they could accomplish very l i t t l e in the Reich-stag. Even a c o a l i t i o n with t h e i r Prussian counterparts was not possible. So they turned t h e i r attention to the Landtag, campaigning in 1894 on the one issue which was now something of a t r a d i t i o n in Wuerttemberg: constitutional reform. Once in power, with t h e i r reputation enhanced as well by the success of the reform, they could turn to the Reich, and 241 Hamerow, pp. 381-382. 119 attempt to influence i t s direction through the use of the Wuerttemberg 242 vote i n the Bundesrat. Their e f f o r t s were notable, for t h e i r influence far outweighed t h e i r numbers. The fact that the south Germans, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the Wuerttemberg democrats steadily assumed a responsible role in the Reich, and that they used this to push i t in a parliamentary d i r e c t i o n , despite t h e i r mistakes and at times lack of courage, must stand to t h e i r credit. 1 But without the p o l i t i c a l practise and administrative experience which they attained in Wuerttemberg, they would never have been able to assume these roles. Simon, p. 115. 243 Payer, former president of the Lower House, was vice-chan-c e l l o r of the Reich in the Hertling and Max von Baden cabinets. Conrad Haussmann was state secretary i n the Chancellery. Both were leaders of the democratic-SPD bloc in the Reichstag. Other Wuerttembergers in leading roles were men l i k e Erzberger arid Groeber, and the Reich Chief of General S t a f f , Groener. Sitzordnil riff der wurtt. Kammer dnr AbgeordnetcnJaniiarWOd APPENDIX A RESULTS OF WUERTTEMBERG ELECTIONS 1868-1912 DP Government Party FV VP Gross. Deutsch Z SPD 1868* 14 15 41 - -1870 33 20 17 - -1889 29 20 21 - -1895 13 6 31 - 18 2 1900 12 5 28 - 18 7 ** 1906 13 15 24 - 25 15 1912 10 20 19 - 26 17 *In 1868, 1870 and 1889, Volkspartei and Grossdeutschen ran as one party. ** Reflects the increase of 22 seats after the 1906 reform. APPENDIX B BIOGRAPHICAL DATA A. Wuerttemberg Monarchs 1. Friedrich I I , 1806-1816. 2. Wilhelm I, 1816-1864. 3. Karl I, 1864-1891. 4. Wilhelm I I , 1891-1918. B. Wuerttemberg Minister-Presi dents 1. von Linden, 1850-1870. 2. von Mittnacht,1870-1900 (member of Lower House 1861-1895). 3. Schott von Schottenstein,.1900-1902. 4. Von B r e i t l i n g , 1902-1906. Members of the Lower House 1. von Gemmingen, Knight. 2. von Gess 1828-1905, judge, DP, LMP, RMP 1878-1881. 3. Groeber 1854-1919, judge, Centre leader, LMP 1889-1919, RMP 1887-1919. 4. Haug, leader of Farmers Party, LMP. 5. Haussmann, C. 1857-1922, lawyer, VP, LMP 1889-1922, RMP 1890-1922. 6. Haussmann, F. 1857-1907, lawyer, VP, LMP 1891-1906. 7. Hieber 1862-1951, DP, LMP., RMP. 8. Hoelder 1819-1887, lawyer, DP, LMP 1862-1881, RMP 1871-1881. president Lower House 1875-1881, min. of i n t e r i o r 1881-1887. 9. Hildebrand, SPD, f i r s t SPD member in Lower House. 10. K e i l , j o u r n a l i s t , SPD, LMP 1900-1933, RMP 1910-1932, president Weimar constituent assembly 1919-1920. 11. von Kiene 1852-1919, judge, Centre, LMP 1894-1918, RMP 1894-1918, vice president Lower House. 12. Kloss, SPD, MP for Stuttgart. 13. Kraut 1857-1935, lawyer, Conservative leader, LMP 1901-1918, president Lower House 1912-1918. 14. Liesching 1865-1922, DP, LMP 1900-1918, RMP 1912-1918, chairman constitutional committee 15. Mayer 1819-1889, e d i t o r , co-founder of VP, LMP, RMP. 122 16. von Ow, c i v i l servant, spokesman for Knights i n Lower House, 1877-1906, RMP, 1881-1890. 17. Payer 1847-1931, lawyer, VP, president Lower House 1895-1912, Reich vice-chancellor, 1917-1918, LKP 1893-1912, RMP 1877-1917. 18. Rembold, Centre LMP. 19. von Sanderberger, Protestant Prelate i n Lower House 1890-1906. 20. von Woellwarth, Knight, L. 1870-1906. order of data = name, b i r t h and death dates, profession, p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n , Landtags member of parliament, Reichstags member of parliament, other positions. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Documents Jahrbuecher fuer S t a t i s t i k und Landeskunde von Baden-Wuerttemberg. (abbrv. JbbBw.) Verhandlungen der wuerttembergischen Kammer der Abgeordneten: P r o t o k o l l - , und Beilagenbaender. Wuerttembergische Jahrbuecher fuer S t a t i s t i k und Landeskunde. (abbrv. Wjbb.) B. Memoirs and P o l i t i c a l Tracts Egelhaaf, Gottlob. Lebenserinnerungen, ed. a. Rapp. A member of the Wuerttemberg educated middle cl a s s , Egelhaaf played a prominent part in i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e and also in the protes-tant hierarchy. An early proponent of Klein-deutschland he was a symbol of the close association between protestant c i r c l e s and the DP. His memoirs are ri c h i n personal anecdotes and vignettes of his class. One of the few p o l i t i c a l reminiscences i s the reform of 1906. Elben, Dr. Otto. Lebenserinnerungen, 1823-1899 (Stuttgart, 1931). As editor of the Schwaebisheer Merkur, Elben grew up i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n of the 1 A l t r e c h t l e r . ' His memoirs read l i k e a p o l i t i c a l philosophy of Wuerttemberg l i b e r a l i s m . Heuss, Theodor, Der Mann, Das Werk, Die Zeit (Stuttgart, 1967). This work, composed of a selection of l e t t e r s , pictures and documents, in chronological order from the Heuss estate, was o r i -g i n a l l y published as a catalogue for the Heuss exposition at the S c h i l l e r National Museum. Heuss, Theodor, Erinnerungen 1905-1933 (Tuebingen, 1963). Memoirs covering the period from his f i r s t job to 1933. As a member of the Naumann National Socials, Heuss had many dealings with Conrad Haussmann and the Volkspartei. 124 125 K e i l , Wilhelm. Erlebnisse eines Sozialdemokraten, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1947-48). These two volumes are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g as they give insi g h t into a man who rose from simple worker to president of the Weimar constituent assembly, and who was p o l i t i c a l l y active i n the four periods of German p o l i t i c s from Wilhelmine Germany to the Federal Republic. Keil allows us to follow the t r a n s i t i o n of a s o c i a l i s t revolutionary to r e v i s i o n i s t p o l i t i c i a n . V. 1 was of in t e r e s t for this thesis since i t covers the reform of 1906. Mittnacht, Dr. Freiherrn von. Rueckblicke (Stuttgart, 1909). This was useful only f o r the period up to 1870. A strong supporter of Bismarck, Mittnacht's intention here was to vindicate Wuerttem-berg's, and his own personal role i n the u n i f i c a t i o n of 1871. He disputes the thesis that King Karl and indeed Wuerttemberg, were unwilling to j o i n the Reich. unsigned, Die Parteien i n Wuerttemberg, i n Preussisschen Jahrbuecher, v. 54, 1884. This i s a very short discussion of the aims and t a c t i c s of the DP in the 1870's. Its main in t e r e s t i s the discussion of the groups from which the DP t r i e d to garner support, eg. p i e t i s t s , conser-vatives. C. Secondary Works Adam, Albert E. Ein Jahrhundert wuerttembergische Verfassung (Stuttgart, 1919). Written to commemorate the centenary of the Wuerttemberg con s t i -tution in 1919, and using the parliamentary debates as the main, and at times only source, this i s r i c h i n d e t a i l on the p a r t i c u l a r subject, but lacks h i s t o r i c a l perspective. Bruuns, G. Wuerttemberg unter der Regierung Koenig Wilhelms II (Stutt-gart, 19T6TT Although over 50 years o l d , and limited to the 25 year period of William I I , this volume contains a wealth of information on various aspects of Wuerttemberg l i f e , from p o l i t i c s and culture to church and economic history. Craig, Gordon A. The P o l i t i c s of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London, , 1955). The standard English language work on the Prussian army covering 300 years of German and Prussian history. Clapham, J . H. The Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914 (Cambridge, 1968). : S t i l l the only English survey of German economic development in the nineteenth century. Somewhat pedantic but extremely useful. 126 Dawson, W. H. The German Empire 1867-1914, 2 vols. (London, 1966). For a long time the standard English history of Germany in the nineteenth century, Dawson saw the u n i f i c a t i o n of Germany as the central fact in European history of the nineteenth century. A l -though largely p o l i t i c a l , there i s some discussion of soc i a l issues. Droz, Jacques. Europe Between the Wars, 1815-1848 (London, 1967). A short but l u c i d synthesis of European history between the restoration and the Vormaez. E i s f e l d , Hans. Die Entstehung der l i b e r a l e n Parteien i n Deutschland (Hannover, 1960). A study of the origins of the l i b e r a l parties i n Germany between 1858 and 1870. Unfortunately this work concentrates on Prussia, only one chapter being devoted to the smaller states. E i s f e l d sees the s p l i t of German l i b e r a l i s m into two d i s t i n c t groups as the main reason for the l a t e r triumph of conservatism. Goldschmitt, Hans. Das Reich und Preussen im Kampf urn die Fuehrung ( B e r l i n , 1931). Interesting compilation of documents showing the tensions that governed relations between p a r t i c u l a r i s t Prussia and the Reich. Griesmeier, Josef. Die Entwicklung der Wirtschaft und der Beveolkerung  von Baden und Wuerttemberg im neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhun-dert i n JbbBW, 1954, Bk. I. S t a t i s t i c a l essay on economic and demographic development i n both Baden and Wuerttemberg i n the nineteenth century. Points out the r e l a t i v e l y slow i n d u s t r i a l growth which acted as a moderating factor on p o l i t i c a l l i f e . Griewank, Th., und Hellweg, F r i t z . Wuerttemberg und die deutsche P o l i t i k  i n den Jahren 1859-1866 (Stuttgart, 1934). Documents the attempt of Wuerttemberg to lead the small and middle states within the Confederation, the growth of the Trias idea and i t s use to prevent the exclusion of Austria. Also, an evaluation of the King who t r i e d to achieve a ' l i b e r a l i z a t i o n ' of the Confederation. Grube, Walter. Der stuttqarter Landtag 1457-1957 (Stuttgart, 1957). This work celebrated the 500th anniversary of the beginning of Wuerttemberg constitutional l i f e i n 1457. Mainly concerned with the Landtag, i t contains l i t t l e other information and i s disappoin-ting for i t s lack of c r i t i c i s m . Hamerow, Theodore. Restoration, Revolution and Reaction (Princeton, 1966). This excellent work investigates the social and economic back-ground of Germany during the era of the Confederation. I t makes available to us for the f i r s t time i n the English language, the role of artisans and rural labourers in the revolution of 1848. 127 Hartung, F r i t z . Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte vom fuenfzehnten Jahr- hundert bis zur Gegenwart (.Berlin, 1922). A short, comprehensive but balanced overview of the main develop-ments of German constitutional history from the 15th century to the f i r s t two decades of the twentieth. Hieber, Dr. Johannes. Die wuerttembergische Verfassungsreform von 1906 (Stuttgart, 1906). A short pamphlet written to inform Wuerttembergers of the consti-tutional changes of 1906. The main body i s preceded by a short account of the various attempts to reform the cons t i t u t i o n . I t gives the impression that the DP was especially enthusiastic about the reform. Hoi born, Hajo. A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York, 1969). The l a s t two volumes of this t r i l o g y deal with Germany i n the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This i s a very l u c i d account of the major s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l trends in modern Germany, but i s no departure from main-stream interpretation. Hoelzle, Erwin. Wuerttemberg im Z e i t a l t e r Napoleons und der deutschen  Erhebung (Stuttgart, 1937). Hoelzle blames Wuerttemberg particularism and especially the 'Alt r e c h t l e r ' as major factors i n the f a i l u r e to achieve German unity. This interpretation i s no longer v a l i d , but the work does contain useful descriptions of Wuerttemberg during the Napoleonic era. Huber, E. R. Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte s e i t 1789, 4 vols. (Stutt-gart, 1957T A comprehensive and detailed study, this work was Huber's attempt to validate his thesis of the uniqueness of German constitutional development. Kuczynski, Juergen. Die Bewegung der deutschen Wirtschaft vom 1800-1946 (B e r l i n-Lei pzig, 1947). Not to be confused with his voluminous study on capitalism, Kuczynski traces the major economic developments in Germany from a Marxist point of view. Liesching, Theodor. Zur Geschichte der wuerttembergische Verfassungsreform  im Landtag 1901-1906 (Tuebingen, 1906). ' A pamphlet by the Chairman of the constitutional committee i n 1906 written to ensure the appreciation of the part played by the VP in achieving the reform. I t i s not always accurate. Marquardt, Ernst. Geschichte Wuerttembergs (Stuttgart, 1962). This l a t e s t history of Wuerttemberg covering some thousand years of p o l i t i c a l history i s symbolic of the d i f f i c u l t y i n breaking new ground. Eleven out of the fourteen chapters deals with the history to the end of the eighteenth century, and an attempt i s made to syn-thesise economic and c u l t u r a l factors. But, the discussion i s 128 fragmentary and we are l e f t with no new ideas on the wider im p l i -cations of Wuerttemberg's development. Mehmke, R. L. Entstehung der Industrie und Unternehmertum in Wuerttem- berg, in Deutsche Z e i t s c h r i f t fuer Wirtschaftskunde ( L e i p z i g ) , v. 4, 1939. A pamphlet dealing with the major entrepreneurs in Wuerttemberg, but marred by excessive discussion of t h e i r r a c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Mueller, Ernst. Kleine Geschichte Wuerttembergs mit Ausblicken auf  Baden (Stuttgart, 1963). A short work covering the period from the Tuetonic migrations to the Federal Republic. Mueller concentrates on Wuerttemberg but includes developments i n Baden as w e l l , t r a i n i n g his sights on the fusion of the two after 1945. Rapp, Adolf. Die Wuerttemberger und die nationale Frage 1863-1871 (Stuttgart, 1910). Although obviously a supporter of the Klein-deutsch s o l u t i o n , Rapp acknowledges the part played by the VP in giving Wuerttemberg i t s own peculiar p o l i t i c a l tone. Roehl, J.C.G. Germany without Bismarck (London, 1967). A thought-inspiring, recent study which recognises the d i f f i c u l t y i n holding the Reich together a f t e r Bismarck's departure, and appre-ciates the f r a i l t y of that i n s t i t u t i o n . Roehl sees this as the reason forcing the Kaiser into an autocratic role and preventing further parliamentary development in the Second Reich. Runge, Gerlinde, Die Volkspartei in Wuerttemberg von 1864-1871 (Stutt-gart, 1970). A discussion of the ideas of the '48 democrats and t h e i r influence in the formation of the Volkspartei between 1864 and 1871. Runge i s aware of a rightwards d r i f t in the VP, but i s not w i l l i n g to recognise this compromise with Reich i n s t i t u t i o n s as a symptom of the weakness of the future Weimar republic. Schlemmer, Hannelore. Die Rolle der Sozialdemokratie i n den Landtagen  Badens und Wuerttembergs und i h r Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der  Gesamtpartei zwischen 1890-1914 (Inaugural d i s s e r t a t i o n , Freiburg im Breigau, 1953). Schlemmer sees the parliamentary experience of the Social Democrats in South Germany as the main factor i n the success of revisionism. Schlieper, Inge. Wurzeln der Demokratie in der deutschen Geschichte (Bonn, 1967). An attempt to trace the development of freedom i n German consti-tutional l i f e from the 16th century. I t includes short discussions of party programs and the origins of constitutionalism i n the smaller states, but does not follow up on these throughout the nineteenth century, and instead concentrates on Prussia. 129 Schnabel, Franz. Deutsche Geschichte, 4 vols. (Freiburg, 1949). This predominantly i n t e l l e c t u a l and cultural history was i n i -t i a l l y intended to replace Treitschke's n a t i o n a l i s t i c work. Schnabel did not succeed i n his intention to get past 1848. The second volume, with i t s description and appreciation of south German l i b e r a l i s m i s s t i l l unsurpassed. Schremmer, Eckhardt. Die Entwicklung der Bauernbefreiung der Gantfaelle  und des Besitzwechsels von Grund und Boden, in Moderne Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte, ed. K. E. Born (Koeln-Berlin, 1966) Argues that the freeing of the peasants in Wuerttemberg did not have any adverse effects on small farming, but that peasant bank-ruptcies were due mainly to general economic depressions. Simon, Klaus. Die wuerttembergischen Demokraten. Ihre Stellung und  Arbeit im Parteien- und Verfassungssystem im Wuerttemberg und im  Deutschen Reich 1890-1920 (Stuttgart, 1969). A detailed analysis of the Wuerttemberg Democrats and t h e i r role in provincial as well as Reich p o l i t i c s . Simon i s aware of the f a i l u r e of the Democrats to take the i r ideas to l o g i c a l conclusions, but f a l l s short of a c r i t i c i s m i n this sense. Taylor, A.J.P. The Course of German History (London, 1964). One of his best known works, which attacks the idea of deter-m i n i s t i c factors in German history, and especially any necessary evolution towards national socialism. Tormin, Walter. Geschichte der deutschen Parteien s e i t 1848 (Stuttgart, 1966). Mainly concerned with p o l i t i c a l parties at the Reich l e v e l , a l -though we are given some information on the Laender. He includes a short discussion of the o r i g i n of German p o l i t i c a l parties to 1848, as well as one on the a n t i - H i t l e r resistance. Traub, Manfred. Beitraege zur wuerttembergische Geschichte in der  'Reaktionszeit' 1849-1859 (Inaugural d i s s e r t a t i o n , Tuebingen, 1937). A b r i e f discussion of Wuerttemberg during the reactionary 50's and 60 1s. Using mainly newspaper reports as sources, Traub argues the reluctance of Wuerttemberg to accept the Prussia solution of the German problem. Wahl, Adalbert. Deutsche Geschichte 1871-1914 ( B e r l i n , 1929), 4 vols. For a long time the d e f i n i t i v e synthesis of social and c u l t u r a l , as well as p o l i t i c a l history of the Second Reich, this conservative work t r i e s to convince of the necessity and greatness of a united, imperial Germany. Written in the 1920's, Wahl places Germany's cultu r a l achievements on a par with the p o l i t i c a l . There i s an unmistakeable presence of l a t e r national s o c i a l i s t jargon 130 Walker, Mack. Germany and the Emigration 1816-1885 (Cambridge, 1964). This short work on German emigration in the 19th century i s the only available treatment of the subject in English. Walker shows the connection and influence of the emigration of the f o r t i e s on l a t e r c o l o n i a l i s t opinion. Weller, Karl. Die Staatsumwaelzung in Wuerttemberg 1918-1920 (Stuttgart, 1930. This book includes a b r i e f discussion of Wuerttemberg under William I I . Weller argues that i t s p o l i t i c a l l i f e before the revo-l u t i o n of 1918-1919 gave a prestige to i t s leaders which enabled them to exert a moderating influence during the revolution. D. Other Works Consulted Bergstraesser, Ludwig. Geschichte der politischen Parteien i n Deutsch- land.. A comprehensive history of German p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , i t contains an extremely useful, 120-page bibliography. Blume, Dr. Wilhelm von. Die Wuerttembergischer Verfassung i n a l t e r und  neuer Z e i t (Stuttgart, 1919). Extremely b r i e f excursion into Wuerttemberg constitutional history in order to claim a unique democratic capacity of i t s people. Cars ten, F. L. Princes and Parliaments i n Germany (Oxford, 1959). An exceptional English language work dedicated to the r i s e of constitutionalism in the small and middle German states from the 15th to the 18th centuries. Cars ten sees the decline of towns as the main factor behind the success of autocracy. Dehlinger, Alfred. Wuerttembergs Staatswesen in seiner geschichtlichen  Entwick.lung bis heute (Stuttgart, 1951). A b r i e f history of the development of administration in Wuerttem-berg in the 19th century. Goessler, P. Der Dualismus zwischen volk und Regierung im Denken der  vormaerzlichen Liberal en von Baden und Wuerttemberg (Inaugural d i s s e r t a t i o n , Tuebingen, 1932). An analysis of the main p o l i t i c a l ideas influencing Wuertemberg l i b e r a l s at the end of the 18th century, and the continuation of 'Dualist' ideas after 1819. Goez, K. von. Verfassungs revision und yerwaltungsreform i n Wuerttemberg, in Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, v. 1 , 1907. A legal-constitutional explanation of the Wuerttemberg consti-tutional reform. 131 Hartmann, E. Regierung und Staende im Koeniqreich Wuerttemberg 1806- 1894, in Wjbb, 1894, Bk. I. A useful l i s t of a l l Wuerttemberg p o l i t i c a l figures, 'privileged' as well as elected members of both Landtag and Reichstag. Koch, Ingeborg. Die Bundesfuersten und die Reichspolitik in der Zeit Wilhelms I I . A discussion on the relationship of the German Kings and Princes to the Reich. Koch decides that the passivity of the monarchs, which was by no means c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y necessary, worked in favour of a strong, centralised Reich. Koestlin, Christian R. Wilhelm der Erste, Koenig von Wuerttemberg und  die Entwicklung der wuerttembergische Verfassung (Stuttgart, 1841). An outdated, but as yet unreplaced work on William I, and his role in the constitution of 1819. L i s t , Albrecht. Der Kampf urns Gute Alte Recht 1815-1819 (Tuebingen, 1913). An analysis of the p o l i t i c a l ideas of the two l i b e r a l tendencies during the struggle for the old constitution 1817-1819. Losch, Dr. G. Die Entwicklung der Bevoelkerung Wuerttembergs von 1871- 1890, in Wjbb., 1894, Bk. I. S t a t i s t i c a l essay on demographic developments i n Wuerttemberg from 1871-1890. Martenson, Sten. Wuerttemberg und Russland im Z e i t a l t e r der deutschen  Einigung 1856-1870 (Guppingen, 1970). An examination of the consequences of Wuerttemberg-Russian dynastic connections for Wuerttemberg's foreign policy. Neth, U l r i c h . Standesherren und l i b e r a l e Bewegung,(Stuttgart, 1970). An account of the struggle between the mediatised n o b i l i t y i n Wuerttemberg and the state. I t i s lacking in any systematic analysis of the economic background to the struggle. Rapp, A. Die oeffentliche Meinung in Wuerttemberg 1866. Wuerttembergische Vierteljahreshefte fuer Landesgeschichte, v. 16, 1907. From newspapers, party documents, church archives as well as the Landtage debates, this essay shows the e s s e n t i a l l y pro-Confederation position of Wuerttemberg from the Schleswig-Holstein c r i s i s to the Austro-Prussian war. Reinoehl, Walther. Uhland als P o l i t i k e r (Inaugural d i s s e r t a t i o n , Tuebingen, 1911). An appreciation of one of Wuerttemberg's great poets and his role in the formation of public opinion during the constitutional struggle of 1817-1819, as well as his subsequent p o l i t i c a l career. Schneider, Eugen. Aus der wuerttembergische Geschichte (Stuttgart, 1926). Various essays on episodes from Wuerttemberg histo r y , the most useful of which i s a short biography of von Mittnacht. 132 Siebert, Dr. A. Die Entwicklung der direkten Besteuerung in den sued- deutschen Bundesstaaten im letzten Jahrhundert, in Z e i t s c h r i f t fuer die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, #68, 1912. An account of the development of the tax system in the south German states during the nineteenth century. Treue, Wolfgang. Deutsche Parteiprogramme, s e i t 1861. A compilation of documents concerning the p o l i t i c a l parties from 1861-1967. Treitschke, Wilhem. History of Germany in the nineteenth century (London, 1919), 6 vols. In i t s day the most celebrated and v i r u l e n t n a t i o n a l i s t history of Germany to 1848. 


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