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Study of the stages of moral development of married couples in an Anglican parish Hodgkinson, Arthur Douglas 1973

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f c A STUDY OF THE STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES IN AN ANGLICAN PARISH by ARTHUR DOUGLAS HODGKINSON B.A., University of Manitoba, 1962 B.Th., St. John's College, Winnipeg, 1966 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS In the Faculty of Education (Adult Education) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard: THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA JULY, 1973 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ADULT EDUCATION The University of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date July 26.1973 ABSTRACT Using the hierarchy of moral judgement stages developed by Lawrence Kohlberg as a theoretical framework, this study investigated the ways that adults make judgements about moral issues. Specifically examined were differences between the stages of moral development of husbands and wives, older and younger respondents, college and non college educated respondents, church attending and non attending respondents and working and non working women. Respondents were sixteen married couples randomly selected from the parish l i s t of St. Faith's Anglican Church, Vancouver. Data were collected by means of a structured interview, the Kohlberg Moral Dilemma Interview, Form A. A qualitative analysis of data from the interviews was done so that judgements of re-spondents could be assigned to stages in the hierarchy of moral judgements. Data were further analyzed using the Mann Whitney U. test, Wilcoxon Matched Pairs and Chi square. The majority of respondents were found to be at a con-ventional stage 3 and 4 level of moral judgement with about one quarter able to use principled forms of judgement. Most re-spondents used a mixture of stage thinking in the resolution of moral dilemmas. Less than one quarter were consistent from stage to stage. Over a l l , men and women tended to be at the same stage of moral development but husbands and their non working wives were found to be at different stages. Husbands were at stage 4 and their wives stage 3. There were no differences between men and working women. Working women tended to score higher on a test of moral judgement than non working women. They were also better educated. Neither age nor church attendance were found to be related to stages of moral development. Respondents who had completed college scored higher on a test of moral judgement than respondents who had not completed college. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v i ACKNOWLEDGEMENT v i i Chapter I. INTRODUCTION 1 THE CHURCH AS MORAL EDUCATOR 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 4 The Meaning of Moral 4 The Meaning of Developmental 9 Stages of Moral Development 10 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Stages 12 HYPOTHESES 14 PLAN OF THE STUDY 15 I I . REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 17 THREE THEORIES OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR 17 Learning Theory 18 Psycho-analytic Theory 21 Cognitive-developmental Theory 24 RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENTS 27 ADULTS 31 I I I . METHODOLOGY 35 POPULATION AND SAMPLE 35 DATA COLLECTION 36 The Instrument 36 V Chapter Page The Interview 37 Scoring 38 DATA ANALYSIS 40 IV. ANALYSIS OF DATA 43 STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 43 CONSISTENT AND UNMIXED RESPONSES 46 MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN 48 AGE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 50 ATTENDANCE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 50 EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 52 WORKING STATUS AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT . . 53 SUMMARY 54 V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 56 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 57 DESIGN OF THE STUDY 58 FINDINGS 60 DISCUSSIONS 61 IMPLICATIONS 64 REFERENCES 69 APPENDIX A 75 APPENDIX B 86 APPENDIX C 89 v i LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1. Distribution of Moral Judgement Types of Couples by Major Stage 44 2. Moral Maturity and Global Scores of Husbands and Wives 46 3. Distribution of Moral Judgement Types by Actual Global Score 48 4. Distribution of Ages of Respondents 51 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance of members of the thesis committee; Dr. Gary Dickinson for patient guidance through the whole project, Dr. James Thornton and Dr. Murray E l l i o t t for helpful c r i t i c a l comments. He is especially grateful to Dr. LeRoi Daniels for generous use of his library and time. Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION Many of the crises and turning points of adult l i f e involve moral issues. Career change, divorce, child rearing and leisure to name a few, are events that involve issues of the right and the good. But i t is not just the so called personal or private issues that can be called moral, even though the usual stereotype of moral issues is that they are interpersonal issues. Many public issues which generate active public debate are moral issues as well. The abolition of capital punishment, abortion on demand, soft drug use and amnesty for war resistors are examples of issues that have stirred the public conscience. The current Watergate affair highlights a concern for the public and private morality of public o f f i c i a l s . Inherent in the scandal is the conflict between loyalty issues and the maintenance of authority issues. The testimony of persons at the Watergate hearing is in fact a public chronical of the ways that people think about moral issues and act on them. Adults are confronted through the media and in the events of their own lives with a number of moral issues that they must resolve(45). How do they do it? That i s , what is the reasoning that people go through in order to resolve moral conflict? What do they consider relevant? THE CHURCH AS MORAL EDUCATOR 2. This study was undertaken to consider these questions. Although material has been developed by volunteer organizations like the church for moral education, very l i t t l e i s known about the way that adults in the church make decisions about moral issues. The purpose of the study was essentially exploratory and involved the acquisition of normative data regarding the moral development of married couples in a parish in the Anglican church. The population was of interest to the writer as an adult educator in the church because one of the basic themes of religious education is moral and values education with adults. Over and above internal concerns, the church has an educational role extending beyond i t s own membership. As an institution i t often finds i t s e l f on both sides of a public debate on such issues as abortion, capital punishment, drug use and amnesty. While this i s frustrating, i t is not surprising that a large institution finds no one simple answer to complex issues. Whatever the issue, i t i s important that the leadership of the church works on complex moral issues at the most mature level possible and that church adult education programs f a c i l i t a t e that process. Many shortcomings in the church's programs of moral education can be related to an inadequate treatment of moral theory that f a i l s to appreciate what moral judgement is(52:2) and a lack of understanding of developmental psychology, which 3. leads to an ignorance of the ways that people actually make moral judgements(23) or what could reasonably be taught about them(28). This study w i l l investigate the ways that adults in the church think about moral issues so that educational programs can be better implemented(34, 3 5 ) . The theory of Lawrence Kohlberg provides an effective model to explore the philosophical considerations inherent in a discussion of moral education and the practical concerns of a developmental psychology. These two f o c i , philosophical and psychological concerns, are discussed in this chapter in order to set a theoretical background to the study. The section on 'the meaning of moral' deals with the question of what moral discourse is for in human l i f e and what constitutes a moral decision. The writing of Kurt Baier(9) is used to describe a formalist approach to morality which holds that the nature of duty is determined by principles rather than merely consideration of the consequences of action. The section on the meaning of development l i s t s the c r i t e r i a by which behaviour change from childhood to adulthood is understood by the cognitive developmental theory of behaviour. Finally, this discussion of the theoretical background is brought together in a description of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. Kohlberg orders moral judgements in a hier-archy of six stages. He suggests that as people grow through various stages from childhood to adulthood, so also in their a b i l i t y to make moral judgements, they change by stages. These 4. stages are outlined in the theoretical background. This model provides a structure in which to understand the ways that adults work on morale decisions and w i l l help the educator c l a r i f y his understanding of the function of moral discourse(13:19). Data were collected and analyzed regarding some of the factors that influence the way adults work on moral decisions particularly age, sex, schooling and the work status of women. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Many studies of moral behaviour deal with morals from a so called value neutral position. That i s , certain values, attitudes and behaviours are catalogued and described with no attempt to evaluate the values beyond a description of what seems to be the consequences i f certain values are held. The assumption of formalists like Kohlberg is that certain ways of making moral decisions are better than others and that people can grow or develop in their a b i l i t y to make moral judgements. This use of the concepts 'moral' and 'developmental' is explained in this section and the characteristics of Kohlberg's stage theory are described. The Meaning of Moral A major confusion often arises in sociology and psychology over the use of the term 'moral-. This usually centers around a confusion between cultural and ethical relativism and these two terms are discussed and a definition of the term moral is 5. offered. In the sociological literature, moral and social development are usually defined as the internalization of the external norms of a given culture(6). This simply means that people learn what is generally acceptable and socially sanctioned behaviour even i f that behaviour is sanctioned only by a subculture of the larger society. It is said that different people behave differently in different cultures or even in the same culture so that behavioural standards are quite relative. What is moral for one is not for another. From this, two statements tend to follow which confuse cultural and ethical relativism(41:156). These are that a) moral principles are culturally variable for there are no standards accepted by a l l men, and b) such d i -vergence is logically unavoidable because there are no rational principles which could reconcile these observed differences because there are no standards that a l l men ought to accept ,(1). Statements a) and b) are often taken to mean the same thing, when theyc.do not. It is quite possible to assert the cultural r e l a t i v i s t stance that "everyone has his own values" without asserting the ethically r e l a t i v i s t stance "everyone ought to have his own values". It is one thing to have a certain ethical opinion and quite another for i t to meet standards and norms. In asserting that an ethical opinion needs to meet a standard i t is implied that there is some way an ethical opinion could be judged correct other than from one's own relative view point. Here, one is confronted with a paradox. If pre-sumption i s to be avoided, i t is necessary to question the arbitrariness of one's own culture and values, to be f a i r , to be objective. This concern not to impose one's own values or any one value as a universal is i t s e l f based upon the universal principle of justice which one holds and expects others to uphold i f some kind of rational discussion is to con-tinue. The principle of tolerance, which a l l cultural re l a t i v i s t s must uphold, is i t s e l f not a relative or arbi-trary principle. Thus the very basis on which tolerance of other cultures is jus t i f i e d precludes a r e l a t i v i s t view of a l l cultures since that basis contains a non-arbitrary universal principle. Kohlberg states the difference between re l a t i v i t y and tolerance when he states that saying 'no moral beliefs or principles are absolutely valid' is quite different from stating that ' i t is a valid moral principle to grant liberty and respect to any human being regardless of his moral beliefs or principles'(41:161) . This contrast points to the difference between holding to a principle and generating any obligation to blame and punish people who deviate from these principles. It may be denied that there are any precise rules for blaming and punishing._allf forms of stealing, without denying the basic principle of justice which makes i t an obligation for people not to steal or l i e or k i l l . Even i f the paradox is granted, i t is often assumed that there would be no adequate means for determining what is moral; 7. and that there are no culturally universal c r i t e r i a which might aid in defining the f i e l d of the moral. Kohlberg points out that i t is no more true of morals that they are "evalu-ations of actions generally believed by the members of a given society to be either right or wrong" than i t is of science that i t is "beliefs about the world generally believed by members of a given society to be true or false"(41:163). There may be disagreement in the sci e n t i f i c world about specific phenomena or even the formulation of some laws but there is no doubt about what science is for and what would constitute a s c i e n t i f i c investigation. In the same way, moral philo-sophers may disagree about specific moral questions but they do agree about what morals are for and what moral principles would look li k e . Baier states that: -Morality is designed to apply in those cases where self interests conflict... When there are conflicts of interest we^always look for a 'higher' point of view, one from which conflicts can be settled... By the 'moral point of view' we mean a point of view which is a court of appeal for conflicts of interest... Adopting the moral point of view means acting on principle. It involves conforming to rules even when doing so is unpleasant, painful or ruinous to oneself"(9:190). Rational moral judgements then, are not applications' of behaviour defined by a social group but are judgements about questions of right an wrong. These judgements are based on principles which are universal, reversible, inclusive, rational, consistent and grounded in ideals. Mature moral behaviour is based on principle because i t deals with those problems that cannot be solved by application 8. of the conventional wisdom contained in custom or law. Moral rules apply to questions that group wisdom can't solve. They apply in those situations where both sides cannot appeal to law or custom to defend their point of view. While the conr: temporary issues of social dissent and resistance to war are extremely complex, they are at heart moral issues. On the one hand a country makes laws, including laws about compulsory military service, for the good of i t s citizenry and expects those laws to be obeyed and has the power to enforce them. On the other hand, a significant number of citizens may appear to conventions regarding k i l l i n g or injustice to disobey those laws. An appeal to the moral point of view may resolve the issue and indeed does for many people at some personal cost, for example, exile for the war resisters. It is important to notice that resolution of the problem is a matter of judgement rather than an appeal to other forms of law. Unlike laws and regulations, moral rules have not been lai d down by anyone so that i t is impossible to know the exact conditions under which behaviour is enjoined, forbidden or excepted. Moral maturity in a conventional sense means knowledge and consistent use of culturally prescribed behaviour, either custom law or tradition while moral maturity as used in this study means decision making (exercising judgement) at an increasingly principled level. The principles are for everybody (universal) and for the good of everybody alike (reversible). The claim that higher stages of moral judgement are more 9. mature is not based on an assumption that they are more complex or sophisiticated. This may only reflect verbal s k i l l . It is based on the fact that the decisions are increasingly more principled, inclusive, universal and consistent. The sense in which morality is used in this study is that morality applies to judgements that are made about right and wrong, that the moral point of view is a higher point of view than decisions based in law or custom, and that the moral point of view is appealed to when problems of conflicting interest cannot be solved from other points of view. One of the aims of the study is to determine the degree to which adults are able to use the moral point of view and i f using i t , the level of reasoning employed to resolve the conflict. The.^Meaning of Developmental Kohlberg establishes c r i t e r i a for the application of the term 'developmental' to the description of behaviour. Behaviour which changes in response to new or novel experience is not necessarily developmental in his view and he takes some care to define the way that 'developmental' is used in relation to moral reasoning(38). 1. Developmental involves a change in the general shape, pattern or organization of response rather than change in the frequency or intensity of emission of an already patterned response. 2. Developmental involves newness; a qualitative difference in response; a response which is different in form or organization. It is not a novel way of doing an old thing nor is i t a long forgotten be-haviour that is recalled for the situation. 3. Developmental involves an irreversible process. It cannot be reversed by the conditions and ex-periences that gave rise to i t . It cannot be extinguished by negative reinforcement. These general c r i t e r i a are applied to a stage theory of moral development which has several characteristics and which identify i t as a developmental model for understanding change in moral behaviour(37, 32, 41). Stages of Moral Development Piaget was one of the f i r s t to investigate the stages of moral development of children. His observations of the ways that children make up rules for games and justify them caused him to divide the moral development of children into two stages(55) The f i r s t stage he called heteronomy. This is a morality of constraint characterized by the yound child's inability to separate rules from the person who made them, the interpretation of rules r i g i d l y regardless of the situation, the definition of wrong by what is punished and by a regard only for the physical consequences of acts not intention. The autonomy of later childhood is characterized by the ab i l i t y to see rules as the result of group agreement, the ab i l i t y to account for intention in behaviour and the ab i l i t y to make moral judgements indep-dently of sanctions alone. Kohlberg's development of Piaget's original conception of moral stages provides the theoretical structures for this study(31). His six stage scheme incorporates many of Piagets concepts but is more elaborate and follows the development of the child well beyond the preadolescence of Piaget's study. Stages 1 and 2 of Kohlberg's scheme incorporate most of the elements described by Piaget as heteronomous and autonomous morality. Like Piaget, Kohlberg is interested in studying the reasons people give for their behaviour rather than the behaviour i t s e l f . He divides the forms of thought that people use into six stages of moral development. There are three levels of moral thinking, each containing two stages. The stages are outlined here and appear in Appendix B in expanded form. Stages of Moral Development Level I Preconventional or Premoral Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Level II Conventional Stage 3: Personal Concordance Stage 4: Law and Order Level III Post Conventional or Principled Stage 5: Social Contract Stage 6: Individual Principles 12. Characteristics of Stages The developmental model for understanding behaviour change implies that change occurs in an ordered sequence through various stages. This stage theory has certain characteristics which are reviewed here. Invariance. The stages are sequential, progressive and invariant. This means that each stage is gone through in order from stage one to six and no stage is skipped in the progression upwards, though persons may stop developing at any stage. In the early childhood years there is a pressure upwards and in late adolescence there is a tapering off. Progression to higher stages is dependent on completion of lower stages. Stage 2, for instance is a necessary prerequisite for stage 3 but pro-gression is not automatic. Development depends on a variety of environmental factors. Quality. The difference in modes of thinking is quali-tative rather than quantitative. Each mode is an increasingly sophisticated way of perceiving moral phenomena and not just a different preference depending on a person's upbringing. The use of higher stages is by definition a better way of deal-ing with moral questions because i t can cope with more and different input than lower stages(41:214) . Equilibrium. The use of higher stage thinking leads to greater equilibrium for the organizm. There are fewer situations that cannot be handled and fewer decisions that have to be decided as crises. Persons with higher stage thinking can deal with more dissonance than those at lower stage thinking. Integration. The movement from lower to higher stages is by integration and differentiation of the lower stages. Each new stage contains some of the elements of the old but is a more inclusive and flexible framework for dealing with mora conflict. It is capable of making more subtle distinctions in decisions. Situations are less black and white. Irreversibility. The stages are irreversible. Indi-viduals prefer to use the highest stage of reasoning available to them and once achieving that stage do not revert to previous stages(39, 41, 61, 67). A l l previously used stages are avail-able to an individual and can be used and understood, depending on the circumstances. Nevertheless, for serious moral dis-cussion an individual uses the stage of discourse most character i s t i c of him and does not revert to lower stages. Universality. The stages are universal, that is they can be assumed for a l l cultures. Cross cultural studies by Kohlberg show that though the content of moral decisions may differefrom culture to culture, the form of the decision making is a universal cross,cultural phenomenon(32, 3tf) . Though children in Taiwan, Yukatan, Turkey and the U.S.A. a l l live in quite different societies, the form of their thinking in relation to moral dilemmas in the culture is similar. A l l may go through the stages from 1 to 5. The differences between form and content is readily seen by reference to other developmentalists like Erickson(21) and Havighurst(27)• The ego development stages of Erickson's scheme describe the emotional content to decision making and the l i f e tasks of Havighurst's scheme describe the social content. In other words they describe 'what is going on' in the l i f e of a person; they describe the content. The stages of moral reasoning described by Kohlberg are the form in which decisions are made. The content is a much more obvious quality than the form. An adolescent, for instance does not care that he uses formal or principled forms of thinking but he does care that he is having an 'identity c r i s i s ' . The stages of moral development refer to the form in which, moral decisions are made and these stages are characterized by sequentiality, invariance, quality, equilibrium, integration, differentiation, i r r e f e r s i b i l i t y and universality. HYPOTHESES Based on the theoretical background presented in the preceding pages and on research findings discussed in the follow-ing chapter, seven research hypotheses were formulated to guide this investigation of moral development among adults in an Anglican parish. 1. Most respondents w i l l be at the "conventional" stage in their making of moral judgements. 2. Most respondents w i l l make unmixed and consistent responses to situations requiring moral judgement. 3. Men are at a higher stage of moral development than women. 4. The age of respondents is not related to their stage of moral development. 5. Attendance at church is not related to the stage of moral development. 6 . Working women tend to be at a higher stage of moral development than women who do not work. 7. Respondents who have completed college tend to be at a higher stage of moral development than re-spondents who have not completed college. PLAN OF THE STUDY This chapter has outlined the basic need for information regarding the decision making of leadership in the Anglican church in the area of moral judgements. It has described the way that the terms moral and developmental are used in the study and outlines the characteristics of Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. The second chapter is a review of literature relating to three theories of moral behaviour. The cognitive-development approach is reviewed in some detail with particular reference to Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates. Chapter 3 describes the procedures for collecting and analyzing data and the development of the instrument together with scoring procedures. An analysis of the results of testing 16 couples with the Kohlberg moral dilemmas is contained in chapter 4 and chapter summarises these results with a statement of implications for moral education in the church. Chapter 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE The search for a theoretical model to accommodate the various measures and indices of moral behaviour has resulted in three basic approaches; learning theory, psycho-analytic theory and cognitive-development theory. Many investigators have been influenced by more than one of the three main approaches, and in fact the theories have much in common. THREE THEORIES OF MORAL BEHAVIOUR Generally speaking, learning theory has tended to empha-size the behavioural aspect, psycho-analytic theory the feeling aspect and cognitive-development, as i t s name implies, the cognitive aspect of moral behaviour. Yet both psycho-analytic and learning theories may be based on the feeling aspect in that both assume that the satisfaction of certain needs produces feelings of pleasure. Both theories tend to be deterministic in the sense that learning theory has tended to state that i f enough were known about a person's history, his behaviour could be predicted with a high degree of accuracy. Psycho-analytic theory has assumed that behaviour for which an individual may be unable to account consciously does not occur by chance and the individual is 'made' to behave as he does. The traditional focus in the study of morals has been socialization, that i s , the ways in which an individual learns the behaviour appropriate to his culture and follows i t ( l , 7 ) . As one sphere of behaviour, moralization of an individual by society results in a set of norms of social behaviour being internalized by the individual and conformed to apart from supervision. Learning theory and psycho-analytic theory tend to blur the distinction between socialization and moral development. In this study, the moral upbringing of an individual by society does not mean the learning of social norms but describes the process by which an individual becomes capable of exercising moral judgement which may actually bring him into conflict with the norms of his society. This review of literature notes the assumptions of the three theoretical models and expands on the cognitive-developmental theory as a model for this study. Since i t is assumed that the formation of conscience happens at an early age, most research concentrates on children and adolescents. Learning Theory In general, learning theorists have assumed that moral behaviour and values are acquired by the same kind of processes as any other behaviour is learned. One can learn to be 'bad' in precisely the same way one learns to be 'good'. It a l l depends upon the kind of experiences one has, how one becomes socialized and what kinds of punishments and rewards have been applied. Learning theory thus sees training in good habits or the conditions of reinforcement of good behaviour as the means for socializing the child. The family, church, school and clubs are expected to use example and teaching as a means to i n s t i l l a conventional wisdom about acceptable behaviour in the child. This common sense approach to training in good habits unfortunately finds l i t t l e support in studies of character formation(3, 4, 25, 26, 54), Hartshorn and May, in their studies of character formation of over 40 years ago, found l i t t l e correlation between their various measures of character. These measures were honesty, co-operation and persistence. They found l i t t l e consistency between the amount of exposure to moral training and indices of conscience, no consistent relationship between the amount of parental demands and con-formity to these demands apart from the home and l i t t l e s t a b i l i t y over time in resistance to cheating. This means that a l l children cheated and that abstention one time was not predictive of abstention another time, even in the same kind of situation. Techniques of childraising correlated with moral be^ haviour, not because of any content of parental teaching but because of a relationship of warmth and acceptance(54). Children more frequently model nurturant parents. This difference may be largely a class matter in that middle(11) class parents tend to use love withdrawal as a measure of control with children and lower class parents tend to use physical punishment(3). Burton's studies show that there is a correlation between punitive discipline and aggressive behaviour(19). Home punishment may lead to inhibition in situations of possible punishment but not in permissive situations. The conclusion of Peck was that conforming behaviour may be determined by the situation but not by any internalized moral standard(54). B.F. Skinner - behaviourism. The most extreme state-ment of the determinism of learning theory can be found in Skinner(63, 64). As a strong advocate of positive reinforcement he confines himself largely to indicating the ways that the probability of individuals behaving according to the require-ments of a given socio-ethical system can be increased. Un-fortunately he never makes clear what the aims of a society should be. For him the idea of responsibility is misplaced for psychology and that to be moral is simply to conform to certain kinds of expectations of reinforcement which have their origin in reinforcement from others. To say that a person is 'held responsible' for an act is simply to say that he is usually punished for i t . Bandura - modeling. Bandura is a reinforcement theorist who regards classical conditioning as insufficient to explain moral and social learning(11). He is c r i t i c a l of Skinner on the grounds that some quite complex forms of behaviour may appear in children under conditions that make i t unreasonable to suppose that they have been built up by 'shaping'. In a study of .imi-tation and modeling in children, Bandura found that observation of models had more effect in altering children's moral judgements than direct reinforcement. He further found that imitation of models would continue even in the absence of reinforcement by observers or models and that such imitation.1-was especially l i k e l y in circumstances where observers did not know how they were expected to behave and were provided with no standards other than that provided by the model. He makes a good case for the importance of adults as the child's model for social and moral learning i f one is satisfied that experimental paradigms are actual tests of real l i f e social and moral learning. However he offers no explanation as to how imitation or modeling actually operates. Social learning and conditioning are extremely important aspects in the acquisition of moral behaviours. However, the results of character studies offer inconclusive and often contradictory results and the empirical studies of operant conditioning f a i l to account for complex forms of behaviour which arise without 'shaping'. Psycho-analytic Theory Psycho-analytic theory focuses on the mechanism of identification with parental authority as the means by which children are socialized(29). According to classical Freudian theory, an individual in early childhood models his behaviour after that of his parents for two reasons. The process of anaclitic identification means that he fears the loss of parental love and strives to be like them to please them, while defensive identification means that he fears the aggression of the bigger parents and wisely avoids conflict with them and gains approval by adopting their point of view. Failure to do this, that is to transgress, results in guilt and shame which act as controls 22. to behaviour. G u i l t i s taken to be conscious or unconscious awareness of the transgression of a standard and observable responses l i k e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m , self-blame, confession and o f f e r s of r e s t i t u t i o n are taken to be measures of g u i l t . Since i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and g u i l t are elusive q u a l i t i e s that are d i f f i c u l t to measure, investigators are required to use such p r o j e c t i v e measures as story completion(4) fantasy(59) r e c a l l or c h i l d rearing practises(19) and games(46). Hoffman points out that these measures are very i n d i r e c t ( 2 9 ) . Research on the e f f e c t of parental model-ing indicates that punishment and love withdrawal are important measures of con t r o l but not n e c e s s a r i l y e f f e c t i v e teachers of desirable behaviour. Hoffman concludes that c h i l d r e n are more concerned about receiving love than f e a r f u l of i t s loss and that the former i s more e f f e c t i v e than the l a t t e r ( 2 9 ) . Rau found a negative c o r r e l t a i o n between d o l l play measures of aggressive fantasy and resistance to temptation behaviour i n experimental s i t u a t i o n s . He concludes that punitive aggression by a parent leads to aggression by the c h i l d but not moral learning and that moral transgression may be a form of aggression against family authorities(58) . Aronfreed concludes that there i s a c o r r e l a t i o n between the wi l l i n g n e s s to make self-blame statements and behaviour conformity, but that these s e l f - c r i t i c a l responses were more l i k e l y when i n s t r u c t i o n s and standards of evaluation were made e x p l i c i t ( 4 ) . When expectations were vague c h i l d r e n were les s i n c l i n e d to be s e l f - c r i t i c a l . He considers responses of self'-blame, confession and o f f e r s of r e s t i t u t i o n to be for the purpose of reducing anxiety by obtaining forgiveness rather than as pain inducing responses for the purpose of s e l f - c o n t r o l ( 3 ) . Depri-vation of a f f e c t i o n increases s e l f - c r i t i c a l responses, due i n large measure to the anxiety induced over the period of time of deprivation, i n contrast to the immediate release of anxiety through swift punishment(5). Offers of reparation as d i s t i n c t from mere confession of wrong doing, were more l i k e l y to be made i n conditions where subjects had some control over what t h e i r punishment would be, that i s when they had decided the penalties for transgression themselves. Aronfreed found though that confession and reparation are quite d i s t i n c t and independent measures of g u i l t ( 5 ) . Con-fe s s i o n and s e l f c r i t i c i s m are responses that do i n d i c a t e a need for approval and forgiveness but these responses increase with the s o c i a l experience of the c h i l d and are not subconscious s e l f punishing acts of aggression(4, 29, 33, 59). Self c r i t i c i s m has an important cognitive dimension because t h i s act requires some ap p r a i s a l of the s i t u a t i o n and the a b i l i t y to match r e s u l t s with i n s t r u c t i o n s and expectations. The d i f f i c u l t y with psycho-analytic theory i s that the various concepts do not r e l a t e to one another i n a l o g i c a l l y t i g h t system. I t i s not c l e a r how forms of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r e l a t e to one another nor how g u i l t , shame, confession and reparation are controls or measures of control of behaviour. Do the various measures of p r o j e c t i o n measure the same thing? Locating controls and i n h i b i t i o n s to behaviour i n the super-ego means that psycho-l o g i c a l research has tended to under-rate the r a t i o n a l component 24. in moral behaviour(8, 14, 59) unlike the cognitive-developmental approach which tries to account for the role of the rational in moral behaviour. Cognitive Developmental Theory The cognitive-developmental approach is associated with the work of Piaget and his successors, especially Kohlberg. Stage theory is a well established model in psychology, ex-emplified by such writiers as Erikson, Havighurst, and Gesell. Piaget was one of the f i r s t to use this construct in the study of childrensi moral judgements and his main argument is that the development of moral thought involves a progression over time through a series of stages, each stage characterized by a particular 'quality' called heteronomy and autonomy(55). A child is stimulated to develop in the quality of his moral judgements, as he is in other areas of l i f e , by the quality and variety of social relations that require him to observe and adopt new roles. The a b i l i t y to see and act out new roles is the ab i l i t y to see things from a perspective different from one's own: If moral development is fundamentally a process of the restructuring of modes of role taking, then the fundamental social inputs stimulating moral development may be termed 'role taking opportunities ' (38 :95) . The individual develops in a continuous process of assimilating new experience by interpreting i t in terms which are currently meaningful to him and accommodating to new experience by reorganizing his own system of meanings to enable a more adequate system of functioning to be attained. The focus of cognitive developmental theory i s upon the human capacity for organizing experience into meaningful structures of i n -creasing complexity and abstraction. Moral development requires not merely responsiveness to experience and t r a i n i n g as i n learning theory nor i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of given p r e s c r i p t i o n s and pros c r i p t i o n s as i n psycho-analytic theory, but an active organizing process by which things and the values attached to them can be seen i n a new l i g h t . Cognitive structures are the rules f o r processing information. Cognition i s an active con-necting process rather than a passive r e p e t i t i o n or st o r i n g of information(37, 41). This a c t i v e connecting process i s developed through the opportunity to take a v a r i e t y of s o c i a l r o l e s which help develop the sense that the 'other' i s i n some sense l i k e ' o n e s e l f and that the 'other' i s responsive to the s e l f i n a system of complimentary expectations. These r e c i p r o c a l personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s are generalized into systems of j u s t i c e ( 3 7 , 40). Piaget believed that the change from a morality of con-s t r a i n t and heteronomy to autonomy came through the c h i l d ' s a c t i v e p a r t i c i p a t i o n with peers and not from having i t 'stamped i n - from the outside by adults. The pressure to change came from without i n terms of the c h i l d ' s environment (peers) and from within i n terms of the c h i l d ' s developing capacity f o r more abstract thought (cognitive s t r u c t u r e s ) . He believed that the capacity for moral thought was set early i n l i f e and that immature moral judgement was a r e s u l t of developmental retardation. 26. Kohlberg. The concept of development in Piaget is broadened by Kohlberg who advances a major theoritical frame-work for the consideration of moral judgement. He gives a much more adequate account of what moral judgements are rather than a simple account of how children made them, as did Piaget. Like Piaget, he stresses the cognitive component in behaviour organization and focuses on judgement a b i l i t y rather than overt behaviour as does learning theory, or fantasy as does the psycho-analytic apprpach(32, 37, 41). This cognitive approach to morality locates the control of moral choices clearly within the compe-tence of the ego. Moral learning is seen to be an age related sequence of changes in which higher forms of moral reasoning emerge from qualitatively different premoral attitudes and concepts(36, 39, 40). Though the changes from one stage to another are age and I.Q. related, there is no simple correlation between them. Changes occur through the individual's relation to his whole social world. Basic cognitive structures develop through the interaction between hereditary endowment (basic intelligence, maturation rate, health) and his environment (social class, child rearing practises of his parents and social s t a b i l i t y ) . These a l l affect the pace at which the person advances through the stages. Since cognitive theory stresses the ab i l i t y to make judgements and sees change in this a b i l i t y as related to i n -tellectural growth and development, i t might be asked whether tests of moral judgement a b i l i t y are at base tests of verbal a b i l i t y or intelligence. Kohlberg recognizes that, while there is a parallel between forms of logical and moral thought moral judgement i s not a simple direct application of level of intelligence to moral problems. Moral reasoning has i t s own sequential development because of the inner logical order of moral concepts. Intellectually, a person can be logically advanced but morally retarded but cannot be logically retarded and morally advanced. It is necessary to be cognitively mature in order to reason with a high level of moral judgement but i t is also possible to be cognitively mature and morally retarded. I.Q. i s a necessary but not sufficient condition of mature moral development(37, 41). Alston asks whether there i s any difference between having and using a concept; whether a mode of reasoning is used at the same time as the concepts needed for reasoning at that level are acquired. He posits that a person may intellectually have concepts but not use them(2:271). Rest, however, reports that people seldom understand higher modes of thinking that they do not use spontaneously(60, 61). Turiel found that people were able to understand reasoning one stage above their own but that reasoning two stages above only proved confusing for them(67). It seemed that reasoning one stage above introduced enough cog-nitive conflict that people were able to interact with the ideas expressed even i f they did not personally use them. RESEARCH ON ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS Kohlberg's studies of children indicate that they do progress through clearly age related stages of moral development from a premoral to conventional level(32, 33, 38, 41). Bull found that thirteen is a c r i t i c a l age for children to move from a premoral to conventional level(17, 18). By six.teen, a majority of adolescents function at a conventional stage 3 or 4 level. Some are at stage 5 and a very small percentage are s t i l l at the stage 1 level. Beck found in a study of high school students, that introducing arguments above a conventional student's level of reasoning promoted a temporary retrenchment at that position but a long term move to principled forms of moral judgement(14). Kramer's study of young adults and college students uncovered a paradoxical finding regarding the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of stages(43). A number of students, having obtained stage 4 or 5 by the end of High School, reverted to stage 2 in uni-versity. He called this a functional regression from convention-al to pre-moral egoistic instrumental hedonism ('do your own thing') in order to deal with the pressure of identity c r i s i s . The conventional morality of parents is apparently rejected in favour of a morality of self enhancement, without the recog-nition of reciprocal obligations. The college students didn't lose their stage 4 or stage 5 reasoning a b i l i t y for they adopt i t again in their early twenties. Young working adults of the same age did not seem to have to undertake the same regression however. Family antecedents. In another study of students, Haan compared the moral judgement stages, family- social background and self ideal descriptions of Peace Corps and University of California, Berkeley students(24) . She found that the type of students most lik e l y to be involved in the Free-Speech Move-ment sit-ins were stage 2 and stage 6 students. Stage 3 (nice kids don't do that), stage 4 (its against the law) and stage 5 (yes, the rules are dehumanizing but you contracted to come here of your own volition), tended to be minimally involved. The Independent Principled students (stage 5 and 6) reported more involvement in social and p o l i t i c a l matters through protest, more divergence from the ideas of their parents, who were them-selves 'li b e r a l ' and a moderate amount of intra family conflict when they were growing up. Their self concepts emphasized intern-personal reactivity and obligation, self expressiveness and willingness to liv e in opposition. Conventional students (stage 3 or 4) tended to be mini-mally involved in p o l i t i c a l groups and generally in agreement with their parents in most things. Their self concepts valued control, ambition, competitiveness and social s k i l l s rather than interpersonal responsiveness, doubting and rebellion. They report low intra family conflict in their growing up. The Instrumental Relativists (stage 2) were similar to the Independent Principled in p o l i t i c a l activity but where the Independent Principled students were c r i t i c a l , independent, involved, giving and responsive, the Instrumental Relativists were angry, disjointed, uncommited and narcissistic. They reported that they had experienced high intra family conflict. Identity. These findings are consistent with Marcia's study of moral development and ego identity states(50). Students who had experienced some ego identity struggle and who were able to express commitments to an occupation were found to subscribe to less authoritatian values than those students who reported no personal c r i s i s and a high degree of commitment to parents goals, values and aspirations. These students were very inclined to endorse many forms of authoritarian values. This points to a close relationship between identity and moral maturity(also 42). Persons who are moving between stages in moral development are also in transition in identity issues. These studies indicate that the movement away from conventional to principled morality involves considerable struggle and creative conflict(15, 24, 50, 65). Haan further suggests that the struggle is even more d i f f i c u l t for women, who are expected to be 'nice' and conventional. Sex differences. There are a number of studies that report difference in moral behaviour between boys and g i r l s . Bronfenbrenner notes that the use of psychological discipline fostering guilt and self criticism results in a different internalization for boys (guilt over the effects of their behaviour) than for g i r l s (anxiety over loss of parents love(16). Aronfreed states that g i r l s seem to rely more than boys upon external definitions of moral consequences and are more lik e l y than boys to give story endings involving apology on projective tests(6). Hartshorne and May found that g i r l s would cheat more than boys on tests where they thought there was no possibility of detection(25). Girls were more aware of socially acceptable responses and showed greater moral 'knowledge' on paper and pencil tests, Lehrer however points out that many sex differences are in fact class differences(46). She found that lower class boys cheated more than middle class boys but the reverse was true for g i r l s . Also, many tests have a built in sex bias. Girls cheat more on paper and pencil tests and boys cheat more in achievement oriented games(46). A halo effect surrounds g i r l s because they are expected to be 'nice'. Teachers and parents report less cheating by them on social histories (59) .. ADULTS £ -"•tits -The concept of development through age related stages serves less well in research on adults than i t does with children(10, 12, 53): We shall not understand the psychological rea l i t i e s of adulthood by projecting foreward the issues that are salient in childhood, neither the issues that concern children themselves, nor those that concern child psy-chologists as they study cognitive development...(53:121) The maturation model breaks down in studies of adulthood simply because the developmental goal of maturity is commonly taken t,o to be adult knowledge, adult success and adult social conformity. Maturity has usually meant being adult(38). Bayley states: Maturity as a general concept applied to adults is neither a specific point in time nor a static condition that extends over a span of years, but is rather a complex series of ever changing processes... each characteristic may be thought of as having i t s own schedule(12:127). The adult must engage in certain l i f e tasks for which there is a socially prescribed timetable for ordering the major events of life(21, 27). There are certain cultural expectations regarding age appropriate behaviour so that i t is appropriate to refer to behavioural change during adulthood as responses to the various crises that must be dealt with. But development in the Piagetian and Kohlberg sense means a change in the pattern and organization of responses rather than a change in the frequency of an established response. The moral crises of Identity, Intimacy, Generativity and Integrity which Eriksen defines may a l l well be dealt with at the same stage 3, or 4 level a l l through adulthood. Maturity, for the developmentalist requires not just new information but a new structure of response. Cognitive transformation is clearly not the key to adult moral development. Kramer reports that he sees no further increases in moral judgement maturity after age 25(43). In fact, High School scores are highly predictive of adult scores in moral maturity. He reports that continued growth in moral maturity in late adolescence and early adulthood is characterised more by a decrease in the use of the two lowest stages than an increase in the higher stages. Adult development is primarily a matter of dropping out of childish modes of thought (premoral) rather than the formation of new or higher modes. The trend is to a reduction in the use of different stages other than the pre-ferred stage, that is stage consistency rather than transition. Kramer further notes that i f a person has not mastered stage.r5 by adolescence he w i l l not do so in early adulthood but w i l l more li k e l y move from stage 3 to 4. This simply underlines the d i f f i c u l t y involved in acquiring principled forms of thought. The Haan study(24) found that some 2 3 % of the men under 25 employed stage 3 reasoning but Holstein(30) found very few men over 30 employing stage 3 reasoning (3 out of 5 3 ) . In her study of families in Piedmont City, California she found', that nonworking mothers tended to use stage 3 as a preferred stage whereas fathers found stage 4 a much more functional morality in business. The majority of the men were at stage 4 or 5. She suggests that the world of work stimulated de-velopment in moral reasoning. They then moved into a stage, the concepts of which they already understood. A l l the working mothers in her Piedmont study were at stage 5. Both Hostein and Kramer found that adults tend to be predominantly at the Conventional level of Moral reasoning and that women tend to be stage 3 and men stage 4 ( 3 0 , 4 3 ) . Holstein's sample ranged in age from 3 4 - 6 0 and she found that age bore no significant relation to the level of moral judgements. Conflict in adult l i f e may lead to greater consistency between thought structure and action in a person who has achieved some identity integration. Life experience is continually matched and sometimes forced to f i t a moral view(38, 4 4 ) . The experience of dissonance between modes of thinking and actual l i f e experience w i l l lead to greater efforts to reduce dissonance by avoiding s i t u a t i o n s and ignoring information that contradicts one's b e l i e f ( 2 2 ) . I t leads to dogmatic assertion of one's p o s i t i o n and perhaps r i g i d i t y i n consideration of r i g h t and wrong(22, 44). Though some studies of moral development have included investigations of young adults(24, 30, 43) very l i t t l e work has been done i n studies of the moral development of adults over t h i r t y . No work has focussed on a sample chosen from a church r e l a t e d population. Only one study b r i e f l y alluded to the influence of working status of women on t h e i r moral development(30). This study had such a very small percentage of working women that no conclusions were drawn from i t . Thus, these three areas, adults over t h i r t y , church r e l a t e d adults and working wives were the focus of i n t e r e s t i n t h i s study. Chapter 3 METHODOLOGY This chapter describes the procedures used for the collection and analysis of data and includes a description of the development of the instrument together with inter-viewing and scoring procedures(51). POPULATION AND SAMPLE The population for the study consisted of a l l married couples who were on the parish l i s t of St. Faith's Anglican Church on January 15, 1973, between the ages of 30 and 70 years. This parish is in the South Kerrisdale area of Vancouver and would be considered typical of middle class, urban,rresidential parishes in the Anglican Church of Canada. Because of the anticipated d i f f i c u l t y in administering the research instru-ment to a few couples who were in poor health they were eliminated from the population. As is typical of most parishes, the name of a person on a l i s t does not indicate either regular attendance or high commitment but at a minimum does signify some connection with the church. It usually means that at least one person in the household is an active member of the parish. A sample of 16 couples was chosen at random from the population. DATA COLLECTION Data were collected by means of a structured interview with each person in the sample. This procedure was developed by Kohlberg(32) and a copy i s contained in Appendix A. The Instrument The instrument for conducting the structured interview consists of 4 stories, each containing a moral dilemma. These dilemmas are not standardized tests of individual differences but rather useful tools for examining the reasoning process of individuals on moral questions. The focus of the instrument is on the moral judgement of individuals rather than on their moral behaviour. In each interview, the point of the story is to find the center of a person's thinking, his orientation to the conflict in the dilemma and the structure of his thought. Three forms have been developed by Kohlberg. Each form contains a different group of stories a l l designed to explore the same basic issues. They can be used as pre test and post tes instruments. Issues are the basic unit around which a conflict develops in situations requiring moral judgement. Form A deals with 8 issues and these are list e d in Appendix B. This form was chosen because a l l the scoring manuals use these particular stories as illustrations for scoring procedures so i t made the task of scoring the dilemmas much easier. The focus in each interview is not upon the reasons people give for doing the things they do but upon the reasons people think are, mora,! reasons f-o.i? what they- do, As stated earlier in the theoretical background, moral reasons are the reasons appealed to when reasons of affection, self interest, prudence, law keeping and ignorance are in conflict. Moral reasons have an arbitrating or refereeing function in human discourse. The interview was designed so that respondents would be forced to see an issue and i t s implications under different-conditions. Respondents were continually pressed for answers that would reveal basic commitments beyond i n i t i a l responses that tended to be superficial. This process involved some discomfort both for respondents and for the interviewer. The questions numbered in the schedule helped to standardize the interview but areas which arose in the interview which were not covered by the predetermined questions were freely pursued by the interviewer. The Interview Interviews were requested by letters sent to a random sample of parishioners. The letter was followed with a phone c a l l arranging an appointment. If prospective respondents refused to participate, further names were drawn from the l i s t . Twenty-four couples were contacted in order to obtain 16 who were willing to participate. Each interview took about 2 1/2 to 3 hours to complete. It was conducted by giving the printed form to one of the persons and asking him or her to complete i t on his own, while the investigator interviewed the spouse and wrote a verbatim account of the respondents answer. After the interview was completed, the roles were reversed and the f i r s t respondent was asked to take the form and edit i t to see i f there was anything he would like to add while the investigator went over the answers of the other respondent to c l a r i f y any that were not clear or to pursue issues that had been asnwered simply 'yes' or 'no'. This was considered to be the best strategy since pretesting had shown that written answers alone proved too cursory to make a judgement on; interviewing couples together only proved confusing and taped interviews were too costly to transcribe. The order of the interviews of husbands and wives was alternated so that i t was not always husbands or wives who were interviewed f i r s t . Scoring Even though manuals are available for scoring the dilemmas, they do not cover a l l the possible forms of phrasing and orientation to problems that appear in interviews. The manuals are rough guides at best. They were obtained from The Institute for Moral Education Research at Harvard University in mimeographed form and are in continual revision by Kohlberg and his associates(66). A score for each story was arrived at by examining the scores on each issue and making a judgement as to the stage of thinking they represent. Basically, a score was assigned for each story rather than for each issue. In general, story scoring tends to correlate highly with issue scoring as Kramer reports(43). A completed protocol is contained in Appendix C showing issue scores and story scores. From the story score, two other scores are calculated, a Global Score and a Moral Maturity Score (M.M.S.). The Global Score represents an overall estimate of the habitual orientation in a person's reasoning. It is compiled from each of the story scores and may bee either a pure score or a mixed score. A pure score represents thinking that is a l l at one stage. It is one number like 2, 3, 4 or 5. A mixed or transitional score represents thinking that is a combination of two stages. It is composed of a major stage which means that at least 50% of the thinking is at that stage and a minor stage which means that at least 25% of the thinking is at that stage. It is written with the major stage appearing f i r s t and the minor second, e.g. , 4(3) . The Moral Maturity Score is also an overall estimate of stage use resulting in a number which is sensitive to va r i -ance in the use of stages in thinking. It also provides a more useful number of s t a t i s t i c a l calculations. It can range from 100 (pure stage 1) to 600 (pure stage 6). For example, the Global and Moral::Maturity Scores are calculated as follows: 1. The f i n a l score for each story i s li s t e d . 2. A weight of 3 is assigned for a pure score. For a mixed or transition score, a weight of 2 is assigned to the major score and 1 to the minor. 3. The totals for each stage are added and converted to a percentage. A r e s p o n d e n t may r e c e i v e f o r e x a m p l e a s c o r e o f 4 ( 3 ) o n t h e f i r s t s t o r y , 4 o n t h e s e c o n d , 3 ( 4 ) o n t h e t h i r d a n d 4 o n t h e f o u r t h . T h u s : S t a g e 3 S t a g e 4 S t o r y 1 S t o r y 2 S t o r y 3 S t o r y 4 4 ( 3 ) I I 2 4 3 S t a g e 3: 3/12=25% 3 ( 4 ) 2 1 S t a g e 4: 9/12=75% 4 3 T o t a l s 3 9 T h e G l o b a l S c o r e i s 4 ( 3 ) . Th e M o r a l M a t u r i t y S c o r e i s : S t a g e 4 x 75%=300 S t a g e 3.KX 25%= 75 375 I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t a G l o b a l S c o r e o f 4 ( 3 ) w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e a M.M.S. o f 3 7 5 . I f a r e s p o n d e n t r e c e i v e d s c o r e s o f 3 ( 4 ) , 4, 3 ( 4 ) a n d 4 o n t h e f o u r s t o r i e s h e w o u l d r e c e i v e a M o r a l M a t u r i t y S c o r e o f 363 r e f l e c t i n g t h a t 6 6 % o f h i s r e s p o n s e s w e r e a t s t a g e 4 a n d 3 3 % a t s t a g e 3. T h e l o w e r M o r a l M a t u r i t y S c o r e r e f l e c t s m o r e s t a g e 3 u s e t h a t i s n o t o b v i o u s f r o m t h e G l o b a l S c o r e . T h e n u m b e r 375 r e f l e c t s m o r e u s e o f s t a g e 4 r e a s o n i n g . T h i s e x a m p l e p o i n t s o u t t h e u s e f u l n e s s o f t h e M o r a l M a t u r i t y S c o r e f o r i t a l l o w s s t a t i s t i -c a l c a l c u l a t i o n s a p p r o p r i a t e t o o r d i n a l d a t a . DATA A N A L Y S I S .r T h e q u e s t i o n h a s b e e n r a i s e d b y some w r i t e r s .-whether the stages form an ordered hierarchy of progression or whether they are six different descriptions of moral attitudes that are somehow related but are in no order from 'higher' to 'lower'(2, 30). Calling them a hierarchy i t s e l f involves a value judgement. If the stages were given lettered designa-tions they would imply no upward progression as numbers do. The reasons why moral judgements can be assigned to an ordered hierarchy have been adequately defended by Kohlberg and these reasons are reviewed in Chapter 1(37, 41). The literature supports the assumption that the data are sufficiently ordinal to use non-parametric tests appropriate to ordinal data(17, 30, 48, 60, 67). Following Siegel(62), these s t a t i s t i c a l procedures were used: 1. Simple frequencies were used to compare the stage scores of a l l respondents. 2. The Mann-Whitney U. test was used to determine any significant differences between the scores of work-ing and non-working women, college and non-college educated respondents, older and younger persons and those who attended church versus those who did not. 3. The Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test was used to determine any significant differences between the scores of husbands and wives and between the scores of non-working wives and their husbands. The Chi-square test was used to determine differences in the distribution of respondents by age and edu-cational background. Chapter 4 ANALYSIS OF DATA The results of testing a group of 16 married couples with the Kohlberg dilemmas are analyzed and described in this chapter. Seven hypotheses were tested to determine whether people in the sample were predominantly "conventional" in their making of value judgements, whether these judgements were consistent, and whether there were significant differences between the Moral Maturity Scores of husbands and wives, working and non working women, college educated and non college educated re-spondents, older and younger persons and those who attend church and those who do not. Appendix C contains further anecdotal material from the interviews illustrating responses typical of stage 4. STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT The study hypothesized that the respondents would be characterized as "conventional" in their making of moral judgements. The majority of respondents were at the conventional level. Three (10%) of the respondents were at the pre-moral stage 2 level, twenty (68%) were at the conventional level and nine (28%) were able to use principled forms of reasoning as their preferred orientation to the solving of moral dilemmas (Table 1). There was an equal number of people at stage 3 and stage 4. Moral Maturity Scores ranged from 200 (pure stage 2, husband) to Table 1 D i s t r i b u t i o n of Moral Judgement Types of Couples by Major Stage Stage Husbands Wives Tot a l • No. % No. % No. % KP.O.) 1 0 ! i ' 0 0 CO 0 CO 2(1.R.) .i 2 ! 13 1 7 3 10 30P.C.) 4 i 25 6' 37 10 31 4(L.O.) 5 ! 31 5 31 10 31 5(S.C.) i 5 ! 31 4 25 9 28 6(1.P.) 0 | 0 0 0 0 0 T o t a l 16 | 100 16 100 32 100 Punishment and Obedience Instrumental R e l a t i v i s t Personal Concordance Law and Order So c i a l Contract Individual P r i n c i p l e s 500 (pure stage 5). The median Moral Maturity Score for a l l respondents was 368 which reflects a 4(3) stage of thinking (Table The median M.M.S. for husbands was 368, the same as for a l l respondents and the M.M.S. for wives was 363. There was no s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant difference in the distribution of 2 husbands and wives at the conventional level. (X = .533, p= .50, df=l) The hypothesis that respondents w i l l be pre-dominantly conventional in their making of moral judgements is accepted. These results are similar to those found by Hostein(30). In that study, 70% of the respondents were at the conventional level and 23% at the principled level. She found none at the pre moral level however and three at the stage 6 level, while in this study there were three at the stage 2 level and none at stage 6. Kohlberg(38) suggests that no more than 4-5% of the population are Independent Principled thinkers, so their absence in this study is not surprising. CONSISTENT AND UNMIXED RESPONSES The study hypothesized that respondents would make consistent and unmixed responses to situations requiring moral judgement. It was expected that because adults would presumably have settled on one modal stage of moral reasoning after age 25 that this modal stage would be a 'pure' type of response rather than a mixed or transitional stage. Respondents would use one type of ju s t i f i c a t i o n within each story. It was further expected that not only would adults be consistent within stories but T a b l e 2 M o r a l M a t u r i t y a n d G l o b a l S c o r e s o f H u s b a n d s a n d W i v e s C o u p l e H u s b a n d s W i v e s No. M.M.S. G.S. M.M.S. G.S. 1 500 5 3 7 5 4 ( 3 ) 2 475 5 ( 4 ) 4 1 5 5 ( 4 ) 3 400 4 325 3 ( 4 ) 4 258 3 ( 2 ) 231 2 ( 3 ) 5 500 5 4 5 0 5 ( 4 ) 6 246 2 ( 3 ) 4 1 0 4 ( 5 ) 7 392 5 ( 4 ) 3 2 5 3 ( 4 ) 8 33 0 3 ( 4 ) * 3 63 4 ( 3 ) 9 45 8 5 ( 4 ) 378 4 ( 3 ) 10 200 2 4 1 6 5 ( 4 ) 1 1 * 368 4 ( 3 ) 4 0 0 4 12 3 6 3 4 ( 3 ) 249 3 13 429 4 ( 5 ) 258 3 ( 2 ) 14 325 3 ( 4 ) 3 00 3 15 4 0 0 4 500 5 16 249 3 249 3 W=40, p= .129 * = m e d i a n that they would be consistent from story to story. Even i f they used mixed stage thinking they would use that same mixed stage in a l l the stories. This did not prove to be the case. The majority of respondents used mixed stages. Eight (25%) used pure stages while 24 (75%) used mixed stage thinking (Table 3)• Scores were considered to be consistent i f the same major stage was used in a l l four stories. It was not necessary that the minor stage be the same for a l l the stories. The eight respondents who used 'pure' type thinking were obviously consistent from story to story. There were four other re-spondents for a total of twelve (38%) who were stage consistent from story to story. Twenty (62%) of the respondents were inconsistent from story to story. The hypothesis that respondents would make unmixed and consistent responses is not accepted. MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEN AND WOMEN IxCLAj. LL,'<;10, • t OTIC. W O U ? . ! ' -The study hypothesized that men w i l l be at a higher stage of moral development than women. It was expected, on the basis of other research(30, 38), that women would be pre-dominantly stage 3 and men would be predominantly stage 4 in moral development. This was not the case. The Moral Maturity Scores of the husbands ranged from 200 to 500. The median score was 368 which was the same as the median for a l l scores. This reflected a median Global Score of 4(3). The Moral Maturity Scores of wives ranged 4 8 . T a b l e 3 D i s t r i b u t i o n o f M o r a l J u d g e m e n t T y p e s b y A c t u a l G l o b a l S c o r e S t a g e No. o f R e s p o n d e n t s % o f R e s p o n d e n t s 2 1 3 2 ( 3 ) 2 6 3 ( 2 ) 4 13 3 1 3 3 ( 4 ) 5 16 4 ( 3 ) 4 23 4 3 9 4 ( 5 ) 3 9 5 ( 4 ) 6 19 5 3 9 T o t a l 32 100 from 231 to 500 with a median of 363 reflecting a median Global Score of 4(3) also. Exactly the same number of wives as husbands used stage 4, six wives and four husbands used stage 3 as a modal stage. There was no s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant difference in 2 the distribution of husbands and wives at stage 3 (X = .202, p= .60, df= 1). Husbands and wives both use stage 3 with equal frequency. When the M.M.S. of the wives who do not work is compared with that of their husbands a difference appears. The median M.M.S. of wives who do not work is 325 reflecting a median Global Score of 3(4). The median score of their husbands is 400 reflecting a clear stage 4 level. The Wilcoxon Matched Pairs test shows a difference at the .02 level. (N=8, W=3, p= .02) Women who do not work tend to score at the stage 3 level, significantly lower than their husbands. The median M.M.S. of wives who do work is 410 and that of their husbands is 368. There is no significant difference between the scores of husbands and wives who work. (N=7, W=10, P= .50) The hypothesis was accepted with qualification. When the scores of a l l respondents were compared there was no significant difference between the level of moral judgement of men and women. When the scores of husbands and non working wives were compared, the husbands were seen to be at a higher stage of moral development. Husbands were predominantly stage 4 and t h e i r wives were stage 3. AGE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT The study hypothesized that the age of the respondents would not be re l a t e d to the stage of moral development. The ages of respondents ranged from 32-66 years (Table 4). The median age for a l l respondents was 43 years; f o r husbands, 46 years and f o r wives, 43 years. As would be expected with married couples, there was no s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the mean ages of husbands and wives. (U=113, P= .28) There were no s i g n i f i c a n t d ifferences between the Moral Maturity Scores of those respondents older than the median age and those respondents younger than the median. (Mann Whitney U=102, p= .163) Even when the scores of those eleven r e -spondents over age 50 i s compared with those of the eleven respondents under age 40 there i s no s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e . (U=47, p= .20) The hypothesis of no r e l a t i o n s h i p between age and stage of development i s accepted. This r e s u l t i s consistent with the expectation that once adults reach the age of 25 t h e i r moral development s t a b i l i z e s and remains at the same l e v e l throughout t h e i r adult l i f e . ATTENDANCE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT At;:.-' .•• _.v. _ -i. ' ' -' Juien,-The study hypothesized that attendance at church w i l l not be rela t e d to the stage of moral development. Twenty-three (71%I persons report that they attended T a b l e 4 D i s t r i b u t i o n o f A g e s o f R e s p o n d e n t s A g e H u s b a n d s W i v e s T o t a l No. % No. % No. % 3 1 - 4 0 5 3 1 . 2 5 6 3 7 . 5 1 1 3 4 . 3 4 1 - 5 0 5 3 1 . 2 5 5 3 1 . 2 5 10 3 1 . 2 5 5 1 - 6 0 4 25 5 3 1 . 2 5 i 9 28.2 6 1 - 7 0 2 1 2 . 5 - - 2 6.25 16 100 16 1 0 0 32 1 0 0 church at least once per month in the past year. Four state that they attended infrequently, about four to six times in the past year. Five others reported that they did not attend church at a l l , although their spouse did. The Sign Test indicates that wives attend slightly more frequently than their husbands. (N=9, x=2, p= .090) The Mann Whitney U test indicates that there are no significant differences in Moral Maturity Scores between those who report they attend frequently and those who do not. Even when a comparison is made between the eleven respondents who attend at least four times per month and those five respondents who do not attend at a l l , no significant difference appears. (U=35, p=>.05) The hypothesis of no relation between church attendance and stage of moral development is accepted. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT r« -^.ticr.tl Backgru^iir a".' ' i_\ l _ " . . " i l ..ru^ nt The study hypothesized that the educationalbbaekgroundoof the respondents w i l l be related to the stage of moral develop-ment . A l l respondents reported that they had completed high school. Sixteen (50%) had completed college; six wives and ten husbands. Five husbands reported that they had done graduate work. Nine respondents reported that they had done 'some college' but had not completed i t for one reason or another; six wives, three husbands. Of the husbands, 62.5% had completed college, compared to 37% of the wives. None of the wives had done graduate work. The Sign Test shows a significant difference in the schooling of husbands and wives. (N=12, x=2, p= .02) Husbands tend to have higher education than their wives. The median Moral Maturity Score for those completing college is 400 compared to a median of 315 for those not com-pleting. There is a significant difference between the scores of those who have completed college and those who have not. (U=62.5, p= .01) Those who have completed college tend to score higher. There is no significant difference between the scores of men and women who have completed college. (U=34, p=>.05) The hypothesis that educational background is related to stage of moral development is accepted. The completion of college is positively related to the development of higher moral development. WORKING STATUS AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT . • : £ - ..-.• i-r; . • pro en. The study hypothesized that there w i l l be a relationship between the stage ofiimioral development and the work status of women. Seven women reported that they work outside their home and nine have not worked since marriage. Five of the seven women who work have completed college while only one of the nine non working wives has. Six of the non working wives report that they had done 'some' college but did not complete the course Women who work tend to have higher schooling than women who don't The result is not surprising in that higher education tends to lead to greater employability although i t is not clear whether higher education leads to greater motivation to work outside the home. The median M.M.S. of those who worked was 410 reflect-ing a stage 4 orientation. The median M.M.S. for those who were at home was 325 reflecting a stage 3 orientation. There was a significant difference between the Moral Maturity Scores of working and non working wives. (U=16, p= .06) Working wives tend to score higher on a test of moral judgement than non working wives. There were no significant differences between the scores of the seven women who work and the scores of a l l the working men. (U=47, p= .27) This is a further confirmation that the world of work provides the greater social experience necessary for growth in moral development. The hypothesis that there w i l l be a relationship between moral development and work status of women is accepted..' Women who work tend to be higher in moral judgement a b i l i t y . SUMMARY Seven hypotheses were tested in the study. Two hypotheses referred to the manner in which moral judgements were made by respondents and five hypotheses referred to factors in moral judgement making. These factors were sex, age, church attendance, working status of women and educational background. The f i v e hypotheses that were accepted showed that respondents were conventional i n t h e i r judgement making, that age and attendance at church was not rela t e d to stage of moral development and that the working status of women and educational background of a l l respondents was related to moral development. Respondents did not make consistent and unmixed r e -sponses to s i t u a t i o n s requiring moral judgement. Men were not at a higher stage of moral development than women when a l l respondents were compared. However, the husbands of non working wives were found to be at a higher stage while the husbands of working wives were at a s i m i l a r stage to t h e i r wives. Chapter 5 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION Moral judgement is an increasingly important competence for adults in a time of rapid social change. Issues that i n -volve questions of the right and the good confront adults both through the media and in the events^of their own lives. His-tor i c a l l y , adult educators have been concerned with values issues implicitly by teaching the values presumed necessary for good men to li v e in a democracy and explicitly by offer-ing courses in value education(20, 47). The church, which presumes to be a moralizing agent in society, i s concerned that i t s leadership be enabled to work on complex moral issues at the most mature level possible and that church-related adult education courses f a c i l i t a t e that process. This study investigated ways that adults in the church make judgements about moral issues so that educational programs can be better planned and implemented. The study makes a dis-tinction between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Moral judgement is seen to be an intellectual capacity to decide what action would be considered right in a situation even i f the actor does not actually do i t or does i t for reasons other than moral ones. Kohlberg(41:229) cites evidence that the higher one is on the scale of moral judgement the more likely one is to do what is intellectually decided to be right. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND The terms 'morality' and 'socialization' are often taken to mean the same thing. Morality in this sense implies the learning of external behaviour norms appropriate to a given cul-ture and internalizing these forms so that they are followed apart from supervision. People learn what is generally socially sanctioned behaviour and morality in this sense means acting according to the conventional wisdom. In this study, the moral point of view is taken to be a higher point of view than custom or law. It is the point of view appealed to when problems of conflicting interest cannot be resolved from other points of view. It is taken that some moral judgements are better than others because they are better examples of what moral judgements ought to look lik e . Mature moral judgements in this study are moral judgements grounded in principle rather than social customs and laws. These principles are universal, reversible, inclusive, rational, consistent and grounded in ideals. The development from immature to mature moral judgement proceeds through six stages, according to Lawrence Kohlberg. These stages describe the form by which moral judgements are made and j u s t i f i e d . The movement from stage to stage follows an orderly, invariant sequence and each stage marks an increasingly sophisticated way of perceiving moral phenomena and leads to greater equilibrium in moral conflict 58. Each lower stage is integrated into the next higher stage and once higher stages are achieved individuals do not revert to the use of lower stages. These forms of making moral judgements areaa cross-cultural phenomenon even where different societies have a quite different social content to moral decisions. The stages of moral judgement examined in this study are: Level I Preconventional or Premoral Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist - Level II Conventional Stage 3: Personal Concordance Stage 4: Law and Order Level III Post Conventional or Principled Stage 5: Social Contract Stage 6: Independent Principled DESIGN OF THE STUDY Sixteen married couples between the years of 30 and 70 were chosen at random from the parish l i s t of St. Faith's Anglican Church in the South Kerrisdale area of Vancouver, to obtain data on their stages of moral development. Seven hypotheses were tested in order to determine whether respondents would be conventional (stage 3 and 4) and consistent in their making of moral judgements and whether five factors (sex, age, attendance at church, working status of women and educational background) would be related to the stages of moral development of the respondents. Data were collected by means of a structured interview developed by Kohlberg. This interview schedule contains four stories each involving a moral dilemma(Appendix A). Respondents were pressed by questions in the interview to give reasons why they perceived certain actions in the story to be right or wrong. The data analysis consisted of two parts. F i r s t , a qualitative analysis of material from the interviews was done so that the judgements of respondents could be assigned to stages in the hierarchy of moral judgements. This was done with the help of manuals obtained from The Institute for Moral Education Research, Harvard University. Following the qualitative analysis, two scores were computed. The Global Score was compiled from the scores obtained on each of the four stories in the interview. This score represents an overall estimate of the modal stage used by a respondent in resolving moral dilemmas. The Moral Maturity Score also represents an estimate of stage use but i t results in a number ranging from 200 to 500 that is much more sensitive to variance in the respondent's use of different stages. Simple frequencies were compiled to determine the percentage of respondents who were conventional and consistent in their thinking. Chi square tests were used to determine significant differences in the 'distribution of husbands and wives at the conventional level and to compare distributions of data lik e age, attendance, schooling and working status. The Mann-Whitney U. test was used to determine s t a t i s t i c a l l y sig-nificant differences in the Moral Maturity Scores of working and non-working women, college and non-college educated re-spondents, older and younger respondents and those who attend church versus those who do not. The Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed Ranks test was used to determine significant differences between the overall scores of husbands and wives and husbands and their non working wives. FINDINGS The majority of respondents were found to be at the conventional level. Sixty three percent of the respondents used either stage 3 or 4 and 28 percent were able to use principled (stage 5) forms of reasoning as their preferred orientation to moral dilemmas. Men and women used stage 3 and 4 with equal frequency. The hypothesis that respondents would make consistent responses both within and between stories was not accepted. Seventy-five percent of the respondents used mixed stage thinking and only 25 percent used the same major stage in each of the four stories. No s t a t i s t i c a l l y significant differences were found between the Moral Maturity Scores of husbands and wives. Men and women scored with equal frequency in a l l the stages. Over-a l l , men and women were at the same stage of moral development. However, husbands and their non working wives were found to be at different stages, the husbands being predominantly stage 4 and the wives stage 3. Women who do not work tend to be at one stage lower than their husbands while women who work tend to be at the same stage. Neither age nor attendance at church was found to be related to stage of moral development. This was consistent with the expectations that there are no further changes in moral development after age 25, and that church and non church people look to general cultural standards for the basis on which to make moral judgements. Working women tended to score higher on a test of moral judgement than non working women. They also tended to be better educated. Working women tended to be stage 4 and non working women stage 3 in their stages of moral judgement. Significant differences were found in the education of men and women. Overall, husbands tended to be better educated than their wives. Respondents who had completed college (median M.M.S.=400) scored higher on a test of moral judgement than respondents who had not completed college (median M.M.S.=315) Educational background was therefore related to stage of moral development. DISCUSSION Most adults in the study used at least two forms of 62. jus t i f i c a t i o n of moral judgements. These forms were typical of stage 3 and 4 which are the levels called conventional. Conventional moral judgement is a society-maintaining form of morality in that i t tends to be determined by conventional norms enforced by social custom and sanction. Stage 3 norms, for instance, are the norms that 'good' and 'nice' people follow. Behaviour advocated by stage 3 people i s 'what everybody/nobody does'. These are the norms of close relationships and the standards of behaviour acquired through the conventional wisdom of the subculture or family to which one belongs. Stage 4 norms are an extension of stage 3 for they are cultural norms codified by law so that they apply equally to a l l people. The maintenance of these laws to prevent social chaos i s the aim of the stage 3 and 4 person. About one quarter of the respondents were able to use principled forms of judgement(stage 5 and 6). Principled people see law as agreed upon regulations which can be changed by j u d i c i a l interpretation. The function of law is to protect the rights of individuals rather than to restrain anti-social behaviour or disorder. The move to stage 5 thinking requires a quantum leap in the concepts one uses for moral judgement. Most people stay at conventional levels because i t i s a natural reflection of the cultural wisdom and easier to acquire. The move to stage 5 thinking i s much more painful and difficult(15, 24, 50, 65) and involves creative conflict for i t s internalization. It is not surprising, then, that the sample proved to b predominantly conventional in i t s moral judgement making. It is entirely consistent with the role of the entrepreneurial middle class that i t be conventional and society maintaining. The two variables in this study seen to be most i n f l u -ential in the development of moral maturity were education and work status of women. Both of these variables are related to the factor of social participation, identified by Kohlberg as the most important stimulus to the development of moral ma-turity. He states that the fundamental social inputs stimu-lating moral development may be termed 'role taking oppor-tunities ' (38 : 95) . Both college education and work are l i f e experiences that provide opportunities to observe and copy a variety of social roles. Holstein(30) and Haan(24) both found that as young adults moved out of high school and college into the world of work, their Moral Maturity Scores increased. For women, the world of work entails a higher degree of social participation, responsibility and decision making than the world of home-making. While husbands and wives are certainly both responsibl traditionally fathers assume an additional responsibility in providing material necessities for the family. Stage 3 moral reasoning which is characteristic of homemakers is highly consistent with a maternal role. This role puts a high premium on the maintenance of warm relations within the family and self-sacrifice for the sake of loved ones. It stereotypically considers intention, and the concept of 'meaning well' is central to the role. On the other hand, the stage 4 reasoning of husbands and working women puts a high premium on procedures for making decisions and the con-sistent application of rules. This is a functional morality in the world of work. Since the working women had worked since marriage, i t i s not clear whether women who work were morally more mature than non working women from the beginning or whether they became more mature through the greater responsibilities associated with work. Since working women were better educated i t is suggested that they were more mature from the start. The most significant difference in the study was found between those who had completed college and those who had not. College education does not simply represent wider social experi-ence than that provided by home making or even the world of work. The time at which that education occurs is important. Attendance at college usually occurs in late adolescence which is a time when values commitments are most under pressure to change. College attendance provides an opportunity to liv e a l i f e style in which new social roles can be adopted and tested without loss of social position in a way that the working worldcdoes not. Proceeding from high school to work or marriage seldom provides the freedom to test alternative:>social roles in the way that college does. This does not mean that alternative roles cannot be tried else-where only that college gives more permission for i t to happen. IMPLICATIONS The purpose of the study was to develop data about the ways that adults make moral judgements so that moral education programs may be better planned. Adults are prepared to engage in more serious moral discourse than the church has provided opportunities. This implication arises, not from the findings of the study, but from a reflection on the process by which data were collected. It was observed that most respondents found the dilemmas in -triguing and were prepared to work hard on them. Far from feeling embarrassed when their position was exposed, adults were most anxious to discuss the dilemmas and to contribute material out of their own experience that related to the stories. Respondents often remarked that they'';"-hadn,'t had a work out lik e that for a long time" or that they should "do this kind of thing more often". It suggests that the technique of discussion of moral dilemmas w i l l be welcomed by church members and dealt with as a serious learning situation. The expectation that church members w i l l provide moral leadership in the community is unrealistic. The moral development of the majority of frequent church attenders tends to be con-ventional and indistinguishable from infrequent or nonattenders. Moral standards seem to be learned from the wisdom of the domi-nant culture and not from the church community. While this does not mean that the church community cannot provide moral leadership at some time i t does mean that the majority of people 66. are so i d e n t i f i e d with conventional forms of moral judgement that the pr o v i s i o n of leadership would involve major s h i f t s i n t h e i r world view at a time of l i f e that makes that un-l i k e l y . The development of programs for moral education with adults requires consideration of differences i n s t y l e s of moral judgement by adults as well as consideration of c r i t i c a l factors i n the development of moral maturity. This implies that since adults already have the "content" for t h e i r d e c i s i o n making then the focus of moral education i n the church oughttto be on forms of judgement making. Adults can be helped i n understanding, i n a more formal way, t h e i r own manner of judgement making so that they w i l l be equipped with tools that they can use themselves to continue t h e i r own value a n a l y s i s . The goals of value education are not simply either answers to questions nor value c l a r i f i c a t i o n alone, but some help i n deciding what constitutes an adequate r e -sponse to a moral issue. A l t e r n a t i v e s can be proposed i f people are d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r own s t y l e . An appreciation f o r p r i n c i p l e d thought can be given to those at a conventional l e v e l . Also, since much moral discussion tends to be theo-r e t i c a l and at a p r i n c i p l e d l e v e l , i t w i l l f a i l to be under-stood by those at a personal concordance conventional level(14, 67). This suggests that those who conduct educational programs i n value c l a r i f i c a t i o n , s o c i a l ethics and personal morality need to remember that participants w i l l be at a variety of levels of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Many w i l l not be able to respond to materials or leadership that operates from a principled level, which the c l e r i c a l leadership of the church tends to be. On the other hand, many of the church's membership w i l l f a i l to respond to ju s t i f i c a t i o n which appears to them to be at an immature or inadequate level. Sensitivity to the differences between form and content in judgement making w i l l help leaders enable moral education to happen at a more significant level for their group members. Finally, i t is commonplace to observe that different people have different understandings of right and wrong. It is not often appreciated that they have different reasons for their different understandings as well. 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Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963. 34. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Education in Schools: A Developmental View". The School Review, 74:1, 1966. 35. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral and Religious Education and the Public Schools: A Developmental View". In T. Sizer, Religion and Public Education. Boston: Houghton and M i f f l i n , 1967. 36. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Development". International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 10:1968. 37. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization". In David A. Goslin, Handbook of Socialization and Research. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 347-480. 38. Kohlberg, Lawrence.and R. Kramer. "Continuities and Dis-continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development". Human Development. 12:93-120, 1969. 39. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Stage of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education". In C. Beck, Moral Education. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970. •72. 40. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Education for Justice". In T. Sizer, Moral Education: Five Lectures. Cambridge: Howard University Press, 1970. 41. Kohlberg, Lawrence. "From 'Is to Ought': How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It". In T. Mischel, Cognitive Development and Epistemology. New York: Academic Press Ltd., 1971, pp. 151-235. 42. Kohlberg, Lawrence.and Carol Gilligan. "The Adolescent as Philosopher". Daedelus, 100:1051-1084, 1971. 43. Kramer, Richard Bruce, "Changes in Moral Judgement Response Pattern During Late Adolescence and Young Adulthood; Retrogression in a Developmental Sequence". Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968. 44. Kuhlen, Raymond C. "Aging and Li f e Adjustment". In James K. Birren, Handbook of Aging and the Individual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 852-892. 45. Kurtz, Paul. "Moral Problems in Contemporary Society". Englewood Cliffs.N.J. Prentice Hall, 1969. 46. Leher, Leah. "Sex Differences in Moral Behaviour Amongst Pre adolescents". Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968. 47.. Lindeman, Edward. The Meaning of Adult Education. Montreal: Harvest House, 1961. 48. Lorimer, R. "Changes in the Development of Moral Judgements in Adolescence". Canadian Journal of Behavioural  Science. 3:1, 1-9, 1971. 49. Lormier, R. "Moral Education in a New Social Order". Teacher Education, 5: Spring, 1972. 50. Marcia, James E. "Development and Validation of Ego-Identity States". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 3:5, 551-558, 1966. 51. Miller, Delbert C. Handbook of Research Design arid Social Measurement. New York: David McKay, 1970. 52. National Council for the Social Studies. Values Education. Forty-first Year Book, Washington: National Education Association, 1971. 53. Neugarten, B.L. "Continuities and Discontinuities of Psycho-logical Issues". Human Development, 12:121-130, 1969. 73. 54. Peck, Robert F. and Robert Havighurst. The Psychology of Character Development. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960. 55. Piaget, Jean. The Moral Judgement of the Child. Glencoe 111. : Free Press, 1948. 56. Proudman, Colin. Values: A Simulation Game. Cincinnati: The Friendship Press, 1972. 57. Raths, L.M. Harmin and Sidney Simon. Values and Teaching. Columbus: CE. M e r r i l l Books, 1966. 58. Rau. L. "Conscience and Identification". In Robert R. Sears et a l . Identification and Child Rearing. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. 59. Rebelsky, Freda, Wesley Allinsmith and Robert Grinder. "Resistance to Temptation and Sex Differences in Children's Use of Fantasy Confession". Child Development, 34:955-962, 1963. 60. Rest, James, E. Turiel and Kohlberg, L. "Level of Moral Development as a Determinant of Preference and Compre-hension of Moral Judgements Made by Others". Journal  of Personality, 37:2, 225-253, 1969. 61. Rest, James R. "The Hierarchical Natur.eoof/iMoralJJ.udgement; A Study of Patterns of Comprehension and Preference of Moral Stages". Unpublished mimeo, 1970. 62. Siegel, Sidney. Non Parametric Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences. Toronto: McGraw H i l l , 1956. 63. Skinner, B.F. Science and Human Behaviour. New York: MacMillan, 1953. 64. Skinner, B.F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Knopf, 1971. 65. Sullivan, Edward, George McCullogh and Mary Stager. "A Developmental Study of 'the Relationship Between Conceptual, Ego and Moral Development". Child Development, 41:2, 399-411, 1970. 66. Taylor, Nancy and N. Porter. "A Handbook for Assessing Moral Reasoning". Unpublished mimeo, 1972. 67. Turiel, E. "An Experimental Test of the Sequentiality of Developmental Stages in the Child's Moral Judgement". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3:611-618, 1966. A to C Kohlberg Dilemmas Form A, Stories III, IV, I, II 7 6 , The purpose of these stories and questions is to get at your opinions and ideas of right and wrong. Please answer as fu l l y as you can, writing down a l l the ideas and feelings you have rather than giving 'yes' or 'no' answers. If there is not enough space on the page use the other side of the page, noting the number of the question you are answering. I would also like a minimum of biographical information from you so that we can see i f there are differences between respondents. Thanks for your interest. Respondent Number Length of time you have been married Wife: Do you work outside your home? Yes No If no, have you worked since being married? Yes No Age Years of Schooling: 1. Grammar School 2. Some High School 3. High School Grad. 4. Some College 5. College, Nursing, Tech. Sch. Grad. 6. Graduate Work Where did you li v e for the f i r s t 18 years of your l i f e ? Farm Town (approx. what size) City Do you attend religious services? If 'yes', how many times per month in the past year? Form A 7 7 . III. In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a special form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently perfected. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $ 2 0 0 for the radium and charged $ 2 , 0 0 0 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $ 1 , 0 0 0 which was half what i t cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to s e l l i t cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No. I perfected the drug and I'm going to make money from i t . " So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. 1. Should Heinz have done that? Was i t actually wrong or right? Why? 2. Is i t the husband's duty or obligation to steal the drug for his wife i f he can get i t no other way? Would a good husband do it? 7 8 . Did the druggist have the right to charge that much when there was no law actually setting a price limit? Why? Answer the following only i f you think he should steal the drug. 4. Does the wife have the right to expect him to steal the drug to save her l i f e i f there is no other way? Why? If the husband does not feel very close or affectionate to his wife, should he s t i l l steal the drug? Why? 6. Suppose i t wasn't Heinz's wife who was dying but i t was his best friend. His family was not willing to steal the drug and his friend had no money also. Should Heinz steal for his friend in that case? Why? 7. Suppose i t was someone dying who wasn't close to you, but there was no one else to help him. Would i t be right to steal the drug for a stranger? If i t weren't his wife who was dying but the man's pet dog which he loved very much, would he be justi f i e d to steal the drug to save his beloved pet? Why? Answer the next two questions i f you think Heinz should hot steal  the drug. 9. Would you steal the drug to save your own wife's l i f e ? Why? 10'.' If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough, would you steal to save your own lif e ? Heinz did break in and stole the drug and gave i t to his wife. He was caught and brought before the judge. 11. Should the judge send Heinz to j a i l for stealing or should he let him go free? Why? 12. The judge might think he would steal too i f he were the husband. He might also think about having to uphold the law. How should he decide between the two? The drug didn't work, and there was no other treatment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the doctor knew that she had only about six months to l i v e . She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain k i l l e r like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, but in her calm periods she would ask the doctor to give her enough to k i l l her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die anyway. 13. Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug that w i l l make her die? Why? 14. Does the woman have the right to decide what to do with her own l i f e in this case? Why? 15. When a pet animal is badly wounded and w i l l die, i t is k i l l e d to put i t out of i t s pain. Does the same apply here? 16. Would you blame the doctor in any sense for giving her the drug? Why? 81. 17. Suppose she had asked her husband for the drug, is that the same as for the doctor? 18. Some countries have a law that doctors could put away a suffering person who w i l l die anyway, some do not. What would be right for the doctor to do where i t wasn't against the law? 19, Should the law permit or prohibit it? 20. The doctor f i n a l l y decided to k i l l the woman to put her out of her pain, so he did i t without consulting the law. The police found out and the doctor was brought up on a charge of murder. The jury found him guilty even though they knew the woman had asked him. What punishment should the judge give the doctor? Why? 82. 21. Would It be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence. 22. Do you believe the death sentence should be given in some cases? Why? Joe i s a 14-year-old boy who wanted to go to camp very much. His father promised him he could go i f he saved up the money for i t himself. So Joe worked hard at hi s paper route and saved up the $40 i t cost to go to camp and a l i t t l e more besides. But, j u s t before camp was to s t a r t , h i s father changed h i s mind. Some of h i s friends decided to go on a s p e c i a l f i s h i n g t r i p , and Joe's father was short of money. So, he t o l d Joe to give him the money had had saved from the paper route. Joe didn't want to give up going to camp, so he thought of refusing to give h i s father the money. 1. Should Joe refuse to give h i s father the money? Why? 2. What would be the most important reason for giving his father the money? 3. What would be the most important reason for refusing his father the money? 4. Does giving the money have anything to do with being a good son? 5. Does h i s father have the r i g h t to t e l l Joe to give him the money? 6. Who has the right to the money and the tri p , the son or the father? Why? 84. 7. What should be the authority of a father over a son in a case like this or in general? Why? What is the base of it? 8. Which is worse, a father breaking a promise to his son or a son breaking a promise to his father? 9. Why should a promise be kept? 10. In terms of fairness, what is the most important issue? Joe wanted to go to camp but was afraid to refuse to give his father the money. So he gave his father $10 and told him that was a l l he made. He took the other $40 and paid for the camp with i t . He told his father the head of camp said he could pay later. So he went off to camp and the father didn't go on the fishing t r i p . Before he went to camp he told his older brother Alex that he really made $50 and that he lied to his father and said he'd only made $10. Alex wonders whether he should t e l l his father or not. 1. Should the older brother t e l l his father that Joe had lied about the money or should he keep quiet? Why? 2. What would be the best reason for telling his father, in this case or in general? 3. What would be the best reason for keeping quiet? 4. Does whether Alex should t e l l depend on what they've agreed before or whether Joe has told on him in the past? 5. Which is more important, being a loyal son or brother? What should a brother think of here? How should he choose between what he should do as a brother and a son? APPENDIX B DESCRIPTION OF STAGES I. THE PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL At this level the person is responsive to cultural roles and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic conse-quences of action, punishment, reward, exchange of favours or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine i t s goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Stage 2: The Instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which intrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Reciprocity is a matter of you scratch my back and I ' l l scratch yours. II. THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable in i t s own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order but of loyalty to i t , of actively maintaining and supporting and justifying the order and of identifying with the group or persons involved in i t . Stage 3: The "good boy-nice g i r l " orientation. Good behaviour is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to images of what is majority behaviour. Stage 4: The law and order orientation. An orientation toward authority, fixed rules and the maintenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the social order for i t s own sake. III. THE POST CONVENTIONAL, AUTHONOMOUS OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL At this level there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have applications apart from the authority of the groups and persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. Stage 5: The social contract-legalistic orientation. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards which are c r i t i c a l l y examined and agreed upon by the whole society. An emphasis on procedural rules for reaching consensus. It i s the o f f i c i a l morality of democratic government. Stage 6: The Universal ethical principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self chosen ethical principles appealing to l o g i -gal comprehension, universality and consistency. These principles area; abstract and ethical li k e the Golden Rule and not moral imperatives l i k e the Ten Commandments. At heart these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. ISSUES Moral situations involve recurrent issues which are in conflict with one another. Issues define the concrete objects of concern or of value to the subject in the situation. It is a term describing the general units in a moral situation which are seen as in potential conflict with one another. They are the things to be defined and chosen between in the situation. Issues define the moral conflict. In stories 3 and 4 there are conflicts between the druggist' demands for money, the wife's claim to live and the laws about stealing. As general recurring issues theseeare " I . " property rights, "Hv" value of l i f e and "A." law. These issues are also called values. A person values law, property and l i f e and these values come in conflict with one another. Issues examined in this study are: A Rules and laws. B Conscience as guilt or fear of punishment. C Roles and obligations of personal affection and welfare. D Roles and obligations of authority. F Contract, Promises, Trust and Reciprocity. G Punishment and punitive justice. H Li f e and i t s value. I Property values and rights. APPENDIX C SAMPLE PROTOCOL Guidelines 1. The pages of the interview schedule were separated so that each dilemma could be analyzed separately in detail. 2. The issues were sidelined, that is identified by letter at the side of the page. 3. Responses to particular issues were collected and summarized at the end of the protocol. 4. A judgement was made, by reference to the manuals, as to the level of thought exhibited by the answers. 5. Scores for each issue were entered on the issue chart. 6. Therprocedure was repeated for each respondent for stories 3 and 4. After these stories were scored, stories 1 and 2 were done. 7. A story score was calculated on the basis of over 50% of the issue scores comprising a major stage and over 25% comprising a minor stage. Answers and Sidelining Sample protocol showing respondent's answers to questions of stories 3 and 4, sidelining, issue summary and issue table. FORM A, STORIES 3 AND 4, RESPONDENT 6 1. Should Heinz have done that? Was i t wrong or right? Why? A NO, IT WAS ACTUALLY WRONG TO STEAL, BOTH MORALLY AND LEGALLY. HE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN SOME OTHER COURSE OF ACTION SUCH AS APPEALING TO THE COURTS OR THAT PART A OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT DEALS WITH SOCIAL WELFARE OR ASSISTANCE TO PEOPLE. THE CODES BY WHICH WE LIVE IS BASED ON THE TEN COMMAND-I MENTS WHICH STATE "THOU SHALT NOT STEAL". IF STEALING WAS RIGHT THEN EVERYONE WOULD HAVE TO KILL IN ORDER TO PROTECT WHAT HE HAD. THIS STORY GIVES AN EXTREMEMEXAMPLE OF HOW A PERSON CAN BE PUSHED BEYOND WHAT HE KNOWS IS RIGHT. THE DRUGGIST WAS CHARGING TOO MUCH BUT TWO WRONGS DON'T MAKE A RIGHT REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 90. 2. Is i t the husband's duty or obligation to steal the drug for his wife i f he can get i t no other way? Would a good husband do it? C I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS THE HUSBAND'S DUTY OR OBLI-GATION TO STEAL. HE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WITHIN HIS POWER TO OBTAIN THE DRUG SHORT OF BREAKING THE LEGAL AND/OR MORAL CODE. IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, MANY GOOD HUS-BANDS WOULD STEAL. THIS WOULD DEPEND ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS STRENGTHS. UNDER STRESS AND STRAIN ONE MIGHT STEAL EVEN IF YOU KNOW IT IS WRONG. IF YOU WERE DIS-TRAUGHT, NOT THINKING CLEARLY. 3.1 Did the druggist have the right to charge that much i f there was no law actually setting a price limit? Why? I NO, THE DRUGGIST WAS BREAKING THE MORAL CODE AS MUCH AS THE ONE WHO STOLE THE DRUG. THE DRUGGIST HAS THE RIGHT TO CHARGE A FAIR PRICE BUT TO DEMAND UNREASONABLE PAYMENT IS MORALLY WRONG. THIS IS ILLUSTRATED IN SHAKESPEAR'S "THE MERCHANT OF VENICE". IN MOST CASES THE COURTS WOULD OBTAIN THE DRUG AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL WELFARE. Answer the next two questions i f you think Heinz should not steal the drug. 9. Would you steal the drug to save your own wife's li f e ? Why? C I DON'T THINK SO BUT THEN I HAVE NEVER BEEN PUT TO THIS TEST. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT I WOULD DO, UNDER MY PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES I DON"T BELIEVE I WOULD STEAL THE DRUG. I REALIZE THE TEMPTATION WOULD BE THERE BUT I BELIEVE THERE WOULD BE OTHER SOLUTIONS IF YOU KEEP CALM, TALK, PLAN AND PRAY. If you were to steal, what would be a good reason? C THERE ISN'T A GOOD ENOUGH REASON. LOVE MY WIFE, STOP HER PAIN, KEEP HER LIVING, I SUPPOSE SELFISHNESS BE^ CAUSE LIFE WOULD BE LONLIER WITHOUT HER. YOU WANT TO KEEP HER WITH YOU AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. 10. If you were dying of cancer but were strong enough would you steal to save your own li f e ? c I DON'T THINK SO. I THINK I WOULD FOLLOW THE SAME THINK-ING AS THAT GIVEN IN QUESTION 9. I'M SURE THAT MY CLOSE FRIENDS WOULD HELP ME WORK OUT A SOLUTION. Heinz did break in and stole the drug and was caught and brought before the judge. 11. Should the judge send Heinz to j a i l for stealing or should he let him go free? Why? THE JUDGE MUST FIND HIM GUILTY AND HEINZE MUST BAY FOR THE DRUG BY INSTALMENTS IF NECESSARY. THE JUDGE SHOULD GIVE HEINZ A SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND PUT HIM ON PROBATION UNTIL THE DEBT IS PAID. THESE ARE EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES AND NOTHING WOULD BE GAINED BY JAILING HEINZ. 12. The judge might think that he would steal too i f he were the husband. He might also think about having to uphold the law. How should he decide between the two? THE JUDGE IS INETHE VERY FORTUNATE POSITION THAT HE DOESN'T HAVE TO DECIDE BETWEEN THE TWO. THE LAW SAYS IT IS A CRIME TO STEAL AND PROVIDED HEINZ WAS PROVED GUILTY OF STEALING THEN THE JUDGE MUST UPHOLD THE LAW. BUT THE"R JUDGE CAN BE COMPASSIONATE AND SUSPEND THE SENTENCE AS LONG AS RESTITUTION IS MADE TO THE INJURED PARTY. 13. Should the doctor do what the woman asks and give her the drug that w i l l make her die? Why? NO, MORALLY THE DR. CANNOT PLAY GOD. HE CAN EASE THE SUFFERING BUT NOT DO ANYTHING THAT WILL PROLONG HER LIFE BUT HE DOESN'T HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOWINGLY TAKE HER LIFE. HOW DOES HE KNOW THAT A CURE MAY NOT BE FOUND BEFORE HER SIX MONTHS ARE UP? 14. Does the woman have the right to decide what to do with her own l i f e in this case? Why? NO, THAT IS THE SAME AS COMMITING SUICIDE AND ALL OUR TEACHING PLUS THE LAW STATES THAT YOU CANNOT TAKE A LIFE (YOUR OWN OR SOMEONE ELSES). THIS IS THE SAME AS PLACING YOURSELF ABOVE GOD AND IT IS AGAINST ALL THAT I HAVE BEEN TAUGHT AND BELIEVE. 15. When a pet animal is badly wounded and w i l l die i t is k i l l e d to put i t out of i t s pain. Does the same apply here? THEORETICALLY IT PROBABLY DOES JUST AS MUCH AS YOU SHOULD NOT SPRAY FLOWERS AND VEGETABLES TO KILL INSECTS AS THEY ARE ALL GOD'S CREATURES, BUT THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME REASONING POWER AND IT IS ONE OF THE FAILINGS OF MAN THAT HE CONSIDERS IT MURDER TO KILL A HUMAN AND NOT A LOWER SPECIES OF LIFE. 92. 16. Would you blame the doctor in any sense for giving the drug? Why? A YES. FOR ALL THE REASONS IN THE PRECEDING QUESTION. HE SHOULD RELIEVE PAIN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BUT HE CAN-NOT TAKE A LIFE. THAT IS THE SAME AS KILLING UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE*. 17. Suppose she had asked her husband for the drug, is that the same as for the doctor? H YES, IT WOULD BE HARDER FOR THE HUSBAND TO REFUSE BUT HE MUST AS HE IS NOT GOD, AND AS STATED EARLIER A CURE C COULD BE JUST AROUND THE CORNER AND HE MAY BE PREMATURE IN GIVING THE DRUG. 18. Some countries have a law that doctors could put away ausuffering person who w i l l die anyway, some do not. What would be right for the doctor to do where i t weren't against the law?' A I STILL FEEL THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE A HUMAN LIFE REGARDLESS OF THE LAW. ALL OUR CHRISTIAN TEACHING TELLS US WE SHOULD NOT WILLINGLY TAKE A LIFE. 19. Should the law permit or prohibit i t . Why? A PROHIBIT FOR ALL THE REASONS STATED ABOVE. 20. The doctor f i n a l l y decided to k i l l the woman.... What punishment should the judge give the doctor? Why? G HE SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SENTENCE OF A MURDERER. THIS IS LAW AND IF THE SENTENCE IS ANYTHING LESS THEN THE LAW A WILL HAVE NO MEANING. IT IS THE CODE BY WHICH WE LIVE AND WHICH JESUS CHRIST TAUGHT US. I.E. OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND. 21. Would i t be right or wrong to give the doctor the death sentence? G IF THE DEATH SENTENCE WAS THE SENTENCE FOR PREMEDITATED MURDER THEN HE SHOULD BE GIVEN THE SENTENCE. 22. Do you believe the death sentence should be given in some cases? Why? G YES. THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR PREMEDITATED MURDER OR WHEN MURDER IS COMMITTED WHILE THE MURDERER IS COMMITTING A CRIME. THIS IS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT ON CRIME IN OUR SOCIETY. NO ONE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANOTHERS LIFE WITHOUT BEING WILLING TO GIVE HIS OWN. 93. Summary Issues Stage 3(4) Story 3 Laws must be obeyed categorically or else chaos results. Laws are based on God's higher laws, the Ten Commandments. You can't take the law into your own hands as there are helps through the government i f you follow the right procedures. You can always get help from your friends. Unable to conceive of government and authority not being helpful. Husbands are obligated to help wives short of breaking the law regardless of love for her. However, i f he did steal because of his love for her, i t would be because he were not thinking clearly. Heinz must be found guilty and make restitution The law must be satisfied although nothing would be gained by sending him to j a i l . The judge can be lenient as long as the druggistiisppaid back. Druggist has freedom to charge a f a i r price but he breaks moral code when he charges an exorbitant amount. His rights are minimized because he played on someone elses misfortune. He was not being a 'good' druggist (role occupant). Story 4 Law is based on God's law, even when 'human' law 4 could permit we must obey the higher law. The doctor is obligated to maintain the law. Doctor must relieve pain and not do anything to 3(4) prolong painful l i f e but he is bound by the role of good doctor and can't fp-lay God'. Doctor must receive a l l the penalties of murder 4 because punishment acts as deterrent. Willingness to give up his own l i f e as payment to satisfy the law. Life is from God and taking someone else's l i f e or 4 one's own l i f e i s the same as murder. Value of l i f e l i e s in i t s being given from God. Inconsistent on this point since he allows k i l l i n g by the state but not by the doctor. I s s u e S h e e t S t o r y S t o r y S c o r e A 0 D F G H_ .3 4 4 4 3 ( 4 ) 4 4 4 3 4 4 C o n b i n e d 4 ' 4 4 ( 3 ) 4 ( 3 ) 4 1 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 C o m b i n e d 4 4 4 4 G l o b a l S c o r e 4, M o r a l M a t u r i t y S c o r e 4 0 0 M a r r i e d 19 y e a r s A g e 48 y e a r s E d u c a t i o n C o l l e g e c o m p l e t e 5 L i v e d i n c i t y W o r s h i p 4 t i m e s / m o n t h 

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