Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Why did Japan adopt the policy of 'separating economics from politics'? A look at post Second World… Park, Chungja Cho 1973

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1973_A8 P37.pdf [ 2.39MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0101443.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0101443-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0101443-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0101443-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0101443-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0101443-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0101443-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0101443-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0101443.ris

Full Text

WHY DID JAPAN ADOPT THE POLICY OF "SEPARATING ECONOMICS FROM POLITICS"? A Look at Post Second World War Sino-Japanese Relations from a Korean Standpoint by CHUNGJA CHO PARK B.A. , Ewha Womens University, 1950 B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University, 1954 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA January, 1973 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of Bri t ish Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of Br i t ish Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date February 26, 19 73 ABSTRACT Japan's foreign r e l a t i o n s with the People's Republic of China have been one of the most important and c o n t r o v e r s i a l issues since Japan regained her independence i n 1952. Geographical proximaty, h i s t o r i c a l t i e s that Japan has with China, and China being a major power with nuclear c a p a b i l i t y made i t v i t a l l y important for Japan to keep a p i p e l i n e open with her, and the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s permitted trade r e l a t i o n s with her. In t h i s thesis I am c h i e f l y Interested i n f i n d -ing out why i t was of utmost importance for Japan to adopt t h i s p r i n c i p l e of foreign p o l i c y toward Communist China. In the f i r s t s e c t i o n , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n and h i s t o r i c a l circumstances which eventually l e d Japan to adopt t h i s p o l i c y w i l l be explored. The second s e c t i o n w i l l deal with the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e and implications of t h i s p o l i c y . In section three I should l i k e to analyze how the actual negotiations on "trade" are used by both the Chinese leaders and the pro-Peking leaders i n Japan as a means of changing Japan's p o l i c y toward China. An important aspect of t h i s p o l i c y treated i n the l a s t s e c t i o n i s the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l impact i n Japan. F i n a l l y , I should l i k e to see how Korea w i l l be af f e c t e d by Japan's new r e l a t i o n s with the People's Republic of China. The chief cause of adopting and pursuing the p o l i c y of separating economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed from i n t e r n a t i o n a l circumstances i n which Japan found h e r s e l f as a defeated nation a f t e r the Second World War. I t was the nature of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the timing of the s i g n i n g , the i i attitude of Communist China and Japan's particular relation to the United States that made Japan recognize Nationalist China. Since neither Nation-a l i s t China nor Communist China would permit diplomatic ties with any country that recognized the other, i t was not possible for Japan to recognize both regimes. Therefore, Japan maintained only economic relations with Communist China without any direct p o l i t i c a l contact. Sino-Japanese trade relations were based on the reality of both Communist China and Japan. From Japan's point of view i t was a r e a l i s t i c approach to maximize economic opportunities and minimize p o l i t i c a l involve-ment unti l the right opportunity came for normalization. By adopting and practising the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , Japan looked for larger commercial opportunities in the future and i t also served as a pipeline between the two big countries i n Asia. From China's viewpoint, i t was an "accumulative" approach for the eventual normalization of relations with Japan. Trade was used as an instrument of p o l i t i c a l pressure and i t reflected China's p o l i t i c a l aims. The volume of trade fluctuated and the techniques China used varied according to the p o l i t i c a l objectives. China appealed to a "broad p o l i t i c a l spectrum" in Japan through private agreements and exchange of unofficial private delegations. China threatened Japan with suspension of trade, and manipulated her with "friendly trade" and "memorandum trade". Since the agreement for the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations was signed on September 29, 1972 the controversial issue of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " has become a story of the past. The admission of i i i i Communist China to the United Nations i n 1971, Nixon's v i s i t to China i n February, 1972, and the eventual change of the p o l i c y of the United Nations gave Japan an opportunity to change her p o l i c y and recognize the People's Republic of China. With the normalization of Sino-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , Korea must seek her r o l e by pursuing "independent and p o s i t i v e " action. The talks between North and South for the eventual u n i f i c a t i o n of Korea and the new co n s t i t u t i o n of South Korea which was adopted i n 1972 r e f l e c t Korea's attempts to adjust h e r s e l f to t h i s r o l e . iv CONTENTS Chapter Page Introduction 1 I Historical Background 5 II International Reasons 11 III Trade Negotiations 16 IV Internal P o l i t i c a l Reasons 31 Conclusion 39 Bibliography 43 INTRODUCTION As a South Korean, i t has been one of the most important issues for me to observe Japan's relations with the People's Republic of China. Korea is sandwiched between the two nations, each a giant: Japan, an economic power belonging to the group of free, democratic nations; China, a growing military power with her revolutionary zeal and communist reform. The impact of their relations i s f e l t immediately in Korea and her national interest and survival has been greatly affected by their moves. For the past twenty years between 1952 to 19 72, Japan has maintained ties with both Nationalist China and Communist China, one formal as the other informal, and this kind of relationship was a l l based on the policy of "Separating Economics from P o l i t i c s . " Separating economics from p o l i t i c s has been used to mean carrying on economic relations without direct p o l i t i c a l contact. With respect to Communist China this has meant that Japan has carried on tirade with China without diplomatic or other direct contact between the governments. Japan, in the meantime, has carried on both trade and diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Because neither of the two Chinas w i l l permit diplomatic ties with any country that recognizes the other, i t is not possible to recognize both regimes. Now that Japan established diplomatic relations with Peking and Taiwan had broken off diplomatic relations with Japan, Japan may try to carry out the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s 2 by maintaining i t s trade and other economic ties with Taiwan but having no direct diplomatic relations. Since the two Korean regimes also refuse to have relations with any country that simultaneously recognizes i t s r i v a l regime, Japan can maintain diplomatic and trade relations only with South Korea. It can, however, separate economics from p o l i t i c s by trading with the North Korean regime but have no diplomatic ties. D. C. Hellmann called this policy "schizophrenic"! -jo a South Korean in t e l l e c t u a l , this policy represents a typical side of an "economic animal" and the policy principle being manipulated by " p o l i t i c a l leaders o who have two faces and who c a l l for two different tunes at the same time." To former Prime Minister Ikeda, however, i t was the " r e a l i s t i c policy" in 3 relation to Communist China. Whatever the description or interpretation of this policy may be, Japan's foreign relations with Communist China have been one of the most important and controversial issues since Japan regained her independence in 1952. The People's Republic of China, after a l l , governs a l l the main-land of China, an area about twenty-six times greater than that of Japan, with a population of 800 million. Geographical proximity, h i s t o r i c a l ties that Japan has with China, and China being a major power with nuclear ^Donald C. Hellman, "Japan's Relations with Communist China," Asian Survey IV (October, 1964) , p.1092. ^Suh Bong Yuen, Choongang Ilbo, September 9, p.3. •^Chronology, Japan Quarterly, January 1964, p. 250. 3 capability made i t v i t a l l y important for Japan to keep a pipeline open with her giant neighbour, and the policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " permitted informal friendly relations with her. In a way, i t was not a front door diplomacy; i t was a back door diplomacy waiting for a ripe opportunity for normalization of relations. The ripe time has just arrived; with Prime Minister Tanaka's v i s i t to Peking and the policy of sei kei bun r i (separation of economics and poli t i c s ) i s about to be reversed. The principle of " p o l i t i c s " w i l l be applied to Communist China and the Japanese leaders hope that the principle of "economics" w i l l apply to Formosa. In this thesis I am chiefly interested in finding out why i t was of utmost importance for Japan to adopt this principle of foreign policy toward Communist China. In order to do so, I shall devote the f i r s t section to exploring the international situation and h i s t o r i c a l circumstances which eventually led Japan to adopt this policy. The second section w i l l deal with the international significance and implications of this policy. It was the policy which gave the means for Japan to maintain informal friendly relations with Communist China without the formality of recognizing her and yet get around the objections and demands of Japan's friends, the United States and Formosa. In section three I should like to analyze how the actual negotia-tions on "trade" are used by both the Chinese leaders and the pro-Peking leaders in Japan as a means of changing Japan's policy toward China. The process of negotiations was a constant pressure and reminder for the Japanese 4 p o l i t i c a l leaders to be aware of the "China problem". An important aspect of this policy treated in the last section is i t s internal p o l i t i c a l s i g -nificance in Japan. The "China problem" s p l i t the p o l i t i c a l leaders, even within the government party of the Liberal Democratic Party. The policy offered the means to mollify the opposition forces, and circumvent the dominant group in the government party. It was one of the big issues which the candidates for the election of Prime Minister debated during the recent election in July of 1972. In section four, I should like to see how Korea w i l l be affected by Japan's new relations with the People's Republic of China. 5 I The policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " is not enun-ciated by one individual, nor does i t spring from any single source. The policy has evolved and grown out of Japan's particular geo-political s i t -uation, and is heavily circumscribed by the logic of events that have taken place i n the world. After the Second World War, in the s t r i c t sense of the word, f u l l sovereignty in foreign relations started when the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect on April 28, 1952. Even with the freedom to pursue her i n -dependent course of action in foreign policy, Japan had to accept and follow an already-established course. It seems, therefore, very important to ex-amine and analyze just what the international conditions were that eventually led Japan to adopt the policy principle of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s . " In the f i r s t place, Japanese foreign policies cannot be considered without taking into account her relations with the United States. Until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed and went into effect, Japan was under the occupation of the A l l i e d Forces and the core of the A l l i e d Forces was the United States Army. The Supreme Commander of the A l l i e d Forces was the American general, Douglas McArthur, who actually ruled Japan and his rule was directly influenced by the United States foreign policy towards Asia and toward the entire world. When Japan regained her independence i n 1952, the world was divided into two blocs each dominated by the two superpowers, the United States 6 and the Soviet Union. Japan, under the occupation and influence of the United States, had to choose her side in the Cold War, and i t was almost the natural course of action that Japan stood on the side of the Western powers. Prime Minister Yoshida had this to say, that, "since the United States and the Soviet Union, the two major powers, are in opposition to each other, one supported by a group of free countries, the other by the s a t e l l i t e Communist nations, the only logical policy for (both West Germany and) Japan to adopt in foreign affairs is co-operation with the United States as mem-bers of the group of free nations. The San Francisco Peace Conference i t s e l f was the product of the Cold War, i and the Treaty was drafted and signed under the assumption that "Japan would do her best to contribute towards the strengthening of a close and solid relationship with the United States."^ The timing and signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in Sept-ember 1951, and not before, was very important because at that time the United States was fighting in Korea as a member of the United Nations Forces against North Korean communists and the "volunteer" forces of Communist China. Had the Treaty been signed and r a t i f i e d as the United States f i r s t intended to do in 1947^ the Japanese course of action would have been quite different. Japan, as a defeated nation under the severe terms of punishment and reparations, might have chosen a "neutral" policy and her collaboration with the United Shigeru Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1961), p. 111. 'ibid., p. 250. Richard N. Rosecrance, Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951 (London and New York: Cambridge University Press for Melbourne University Press, 1962), p. 148. 7 States would not have been so close. It was the Korean War which had the decisive impact on the negotiations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Only sixteen months before the Korean War started i n June 1950, the United States Secretary of the Army, Kenneth Royall, said in Tokyo that Japan and the Far East were of secondary importance in the world strategic situation and the United States forces might be withdrawn in the event of war with the Commun-i s t s . 7 When John Foster Dulles was undertaking his mission i n preparatory negotiations for the Treaty, he had two choices i n the formulation of United States' policy. One was to build up Japanese strength and do everything pos-sible to keep Japan on the United States' side, and the other was to try to detach Communist China from the Soviet Orbit and l e t China take her former 8 position on the Anglo-American side of the balance. The Korean War made the latter course impossible and Mainland China was labelled "aggressor" after she sent "volunteer" forces to Korea. Throughout the war, Japan was the rear base for the United Nations forces i n Korea, and Japan had to be counted upon as a free world member state when the Treaty was signed in 1951. From the outset Communist China adopted a hostile policy toward Japan. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed i n October 1949 and China concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in February 1950. This agreement provided for a joint defensive stance against Japan, and Article I stated that the signatories undertook jointly to "adopt a l l necessary measures at their disposal for the New York Times, February 17, 1949, p. 10. ^Frederick S. Dunn, Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 127. 8 purpose of preventing the resumption of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly in acts of aggression." It i s notable that the wording of the Treaty was focussed on Japan and i t i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to understand why both the U.S.S.R. and Commun-i s t China overestimated Japan's strength. Japan, in 1950, i n fact, was s t i l l a defeated nation, completely disarmed and i t s war-making capacity entirely eliminated by i t s new constitution. Harold C. Hinton suggests that, " i t was probably Stalin, rather than Mao, who preferred to name Japan instead of the United States as the power whose alleged aggressive tendencies the alliance was explicity directed, but i t must be taken into account that China was the direct victim of Japan-ese imperialism and was fearful of the revival of Japanese militarism and . imperialism. Compared with Japan, Communist China practically had no ex-perience i n international p o l i t i c s , and i t is not very surprising that Com-munist China in the wake of her success i n defeating Nationalist Chinese con-sidered Japan a threatening power. Japan had yet to formulate her policy to-ward Communist China, but China had already adopted a hostile policy toward Jap an. When the question of which of the two Chinas should be represented at the peace conference came up, according to the recollection of Yoshida, the United States had insisted that she would not on any account sign a Harold Hinton, Communist China in World P o l i t i c s (Boston: Houghton, Mif-f l i n Company, 1966), p. 123. 9 treaty in company with Communist China, while the United Kingdom maintained that of the two Chinese governments, the one that should be seated and sign at the conference was Communist China. In the end i t was agreed that China should not be represented at the conference, and that Japan could sign a separate peace treaty later with whichever of the two Chinese governments she chose to recognize."*"^ Indeed, on the surface, Japan was l e f t with the freedom to pick either Nationalist China or Communist China to be the other party i n conclu-ding peace with Japanand Article 26 of the Peace Treaty gave the legal base for i t , but i n actuality Japan didn't have much choice. It was the Nation-a l i s t Chinese with whom Japan had conducted the war, and her position in the Security Council in the United Nations was a very important factor for Japan. Until the end of 1951, Japan adopted the cautious policy of welcoming friendly and intimate economic relations with Taiwan, but at the same time, avoiding any form of ties with Taiwan which would probably win the strong disapproval 12 of the newly established Communist China. When John Foster Dulles made his fourth v i s i t to Japan in December 1951, he answered to a newspaperman i n Japan that he had no intention of i n -posing upon Japan which of the two governments of China she should choose to make a peacy treaty. However when the question of what the United States' Senate would do i f Japan didn't make i t clear that she intended to make a ^Yoshida, op_. c i t . , p. 253. "^Morinosuke Kajima, A Brief Diplomatic History of Modern Japan (Rutland and Tokyo: Charles F. Tuttle & Co., 1965), p. 151. 12 Ibid., p. 151. 10 peace treaty with Nationlist China, the answer was, "In case Japan rec-ognized Communist China unexpectedly, the Senate might not ra t i f y the 13 Peace Treaty." The result of the Dulles v i s i t ended with a l e t t e r from Yoshida to Dulles on December 24, 1951, affirming that "Japan has no intention of concluding a b i l a t e r a l treaty with Communist China" and assured him that "Japan i s ready to formalize relations with the Nation-a l i s t government in accordance with the principles l a i d down i n the San »14 Francisco Peace Treaty. As the incident of this l e t t e r indicates, Japan was already oriented toward the "Washington l i n e , " and the pressure was on her to recognize and have diplomatic relations with Nationalist China. Accordingly, on April 28, 1952, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was concluded with Nationalist China. So far, I have examined the simple question why Japan chose Nation-a l i s t China instead of Communist China to conclude the Peace Treaty and to establish diplomatic relations with. The fact that Japan was a member of the Western bloc does not necessarily answer the whole question. The United Kingdom, for instance, recognized Communist China in 1949. It was the process and nature of the San Francisco Treaty, the timing of the sign-ing, the attitude of Communist China, Japan's particular relation to the United States, and a certain pressure as well as an expectation from the United States, that were a l l woven together for Japan to adopt the policy of recognizing Nationalist China. The root of the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s started at this point. Asahi Shinbun, December 11, 1951, p. 1. Asahi Nenkan, 1952, p. 105. 11 II Because of the reasons stated above, Japan's relations with Com-munist China cannot be considered without taking into account her relations with the United States and Nationalist China. Japan's external policy had to comply within the framework of the United States' overall foreign policy. It i s essential to correlate Japan's relations with f i r s t the United States and secondly with Nationalist China. The policy of separating economics from po l i t i c s emerged and evolved out of the triangle relationship between Japan, the United States and Nationalist China. When Japan regained her independence i n 1952, the overall foreign policy of the United States was the policy of "containment." The policy of containment, before the Korean War started, was mainly aimed to stop the expansion of communist influence in Europe exercised by the Soviet Union. According to George F. Kennan who f i r s t proposed this policy i n his a r t i c l e , "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," there were three postulates regarding Soviet beliefs and expectations. The f i r s t of these was the Kremlin's acceptance of the fundamental antagonism between capitalism and communism. The second was that the Soviets believed that capitalism i n this competition was doomed and therefore there was no need to engage in all-out war. The third was the Soviet assumption of Kremlin i n f a l l i b i l i t y made i t useless to negotiate with Russian diplomats since a l l important decisions were made at top le v e l . He, therefore, came up with the policy which he summarized: 12 "In these circumstances i t i s clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."-^ After this article was published the term "containment" was picked up and elevated to the status of a "doctrine" which was then identified with 16 the foreign policy of the United States. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the policy of containment came to be applied to the Far East. President Truman stated on June 27, 1950: "The attack upon Korea makes i t plain beyond a l l doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to con-quer independent nations and w i l l now use armed invasion and war."" Accordingly he ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support. Regarding Nationalist China, i n the same statement, President Tru-man reversed the position he had enunciated on January 5 that same year. In that statement he said that Taiwan had already become Chinese territory in keeping with the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, and that the fighting between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists was a c i v i l war in which the U.S. •^Goerge F. Kennan, under the pseudonym of "Mr. X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol 25, No. 4 (July 1947), p. 375. 16 George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Brown and Company 1967), p. 356. 17New York Times, June 28, 1950, p . 1. 13 Forces would not be used. But his new policy statement was that, "In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces perform-ing their lawful and necessary function i n that area. Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa . . . The Seventh Fleet w i l l see that this i s done." 1 9 Within six months the policy of the United States toward Asia had changed radically, and i t indicated that the United States viewed the Korean War as an extension of Soviet communist power i n Asia. From the viewpoint of the United States, South Korea and Nationalist China were not considered to be parties to a mere c i v i l war, but frontlines i n a struggle between communism and the western world. Japan also became very important in this struggle, for without Japan, the United States would lose a v i t a l communication, supply and strategic base in the Far East. Thus, South Korea, Nationalist China and Japan became embroiled i n the defence of the "free world" and the United States established a series of alliances aimed at the containment of communism. The Mutual Defence Treaty was concluded with the Republic of Korea i n October 1953, and with the Republic of China a military assistance agreement i n February 1951 and a Mutual Defence Treaty in December 1954. With Japan, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was signed in 1951. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United New York Times, January 6, 1950, p. 1. New York Times, June 28, 1950, p. 1. 14 States of America and Japan tied Japan directly to the United States, for Japan depended entirely on the United States for national defence. Arti c l e V provided: "Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to i t s own peace and safety and declares that i t would act to meet the common danger in accordance with i t s constitutional provisions and processes." The treaty went on to say in Arti c l e VI that, "For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and maintenance of peace and security i n the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by i t s land, air and naval forces of f a c i l i t i e s and areas i n Japan." In these circumstances i t was the natural course of development that Japan had to cooperate and be party to the accomplishment of the policy of containment in Asia. Japan and the United States became indispensable partners to each other. As a result of Treaty commitments, Japan followed the United States policy of non-recognition of Communist China and established formal diplomatic ties solely with the Nationalist government in Formosa. As far as Japan's relations with Nationalist China are concerned, Japan recognized the Nationalist government as the de jure government of China by concluding the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in April 1952, and the state of war between Japan and China was terminated. At f i r s t Japan might have appeared to recognize Nationalist China wholely under pressure from the United States, but Japan on her part, is "indebted" to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek who re-nounced a l l right to claim any reparations from Japan. He had earlier issued 15 proclamation to "repay enmity with, virtue" and safely repatriate more than 20 two million Japanese soldiers from the Chinese Mainland. Thus Japan's relations with Communist China emerged as the result of Japan's overall relations with the United States and Nationalist China. Non-recognition of Communist China suited Japan's three fundamental object-ives of foreign policy since her independence, which are the "Cooperation with the free world community," "Support of the United Nations," and "being 21 a staunch member state of the Asian community." Japan also was able to insure her security by being a member of the "free world," for American con-tainment of Communist China meant at the same time protection for Japan under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. In order to "contain" Communist China, the United States had i t s nuclear base in Okinawa, i t s Seventh Fleet i n Taiwan Strait, military bases in South Korea, and later in Vietnam. Japan was able to become the third economic power in the world by completely rely-ing upon the United States for her national defence. The policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed from the basic assumption that Japan wanted to maximize benefits with friendly nations and at the same time minimize h o s t i l i t y with Communist China. In this aspect, Japan did not follow unswervingly the line of the United States policy toward Communist China. By adopting the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , Japan carried on non-strategic trade with China but did not invite the feeling of betrayal from the United States, Nationalist China and South Korea. Yet, she was able to maintain a pipeline with Communist China. Morinosuke Kajima, op. c i t . , p. 139. Ibid., p. 191. 16 III The third important aspect of the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s i s the fact that this policy, despite the o f f i c i a l protest and the counter-claim by China of the principle of "inseparability of pol-i t i c s and economics," was accepted by i t , and Sino-Japanese trade was car-ried on from the establishment of the People's Republic. The attitude of Communist China towards Japan in this aspect, was quite different from i t s attitude towards the United States. It seems appropriate to examine what i t i s which made this policy work with Communist China. The policy of sep-arating economics from p o l i t i c s would not have worked unless Communist China was willing to trade with Japan. From the position of Communist China, what advantage could i t gain? Communist China's attitude to trade with Japan has been quite d i f -ferent from that of the United States toward China trade. Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State, in a speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, underlines this difference. He said: "Much speculation has turned around the question of possible commercial relations . . . between private American firms and Communist China. Peking's own policy, however, seems crystal clear on this point. Peking apparently wants none of i t , " and Hilsman quoted one Chinese o f f i c i a l as saying that, "we won't trade with the United States because the United States Government i s hostile to us," 17 and he emphasized Mao's maxim that " p o l i t i c s and economics are inseparable." The oft-repeated Chinese o f f i c i a l emphasis that " p o l i t i c s and ec-onomics are inseparable" collided directly with the principle of separating economics from p o l i t i c s . The United States refused to trade with China, but trade with Japan was a different story. Marius B. Jansen brought out this point saying that the story of Sino-Japanese trade relations i s f u l l of irony. Economics and p o l i t i c s are inseparable, according to Chairman Mao, but i n 23 fact the Chinese have been willi n g to separate them for the Japanese. There are two main interests involved between Japan and Communist China i n their trade relations. One is an economic interest, and the other, a p o l i t i c a l interest. One certainly cannot deny the economic advantages of trade between Japan and Communist China. A developing China and an indust-r i a l l y advanced Japan could benefit each other by promoting close trade rela-tions. Geographical proximity, for one, reduces shipping costs. An example of these savings i s shown underneath in Japan's trade with the United States after Japan followed the embargo on trade with Communist China. In 1956 Japan imported coal from the United States at $26.50 per ton, while i t was possible to import some from Communist China at $12.20, less than half the amount. With salt, Japan paid $18.10 per ton from the United States while i t cost only $9.50 from Communist China. The items of trading goods are also complementary to each other. Japanese items such as f e r t i l i z e r , machinery and steel goods are just what 22 New York Times, December 14, 1968, p. 2. 23 Marius B. Jansen, "China and Japan," Policies Toward China: Views from Six  Continents, edited by A.M. Halpern (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 460. 18 Table I China U.S.A. Average price of total imports Coal (ton) $12.2 $25.5 $24.0 Iron Ore (ton) $13.7 $20.3 $18.6 Salt (ton) $ 9.4 $18.1 $12.9 Source: Ministry of Finance, Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of Japan r(Tokyo), No. 74 (Jan.-Dec. 1956), cited by Leng Shao-Chuan, Japan and Communist China (Tokyo: Doshisha University Press, 1958), p. 60. China needs and many Japanese products are more suited to Chinese people than similar products manufactured i n Western countries. And some Chinese products such as soy beans have a ready market i n Japan but v i r t u a l l y none in Europe. Besides, from the position of Japan, foreign trade has always been a major consideration in the foreign policy of contemporary Japan and China is a big market with 800 million people. Japan, l i k e Britain, i s i n a posi-tion to "trade or fade" and has to follow the line of " p o l i t i c s is p o l i t i c s , 2 A trade is trade." But as a trade partner, Japan i s vastly more important 25 to China than China is to Japan. More important than trade i t s e l f , other p o l i t i c a l and practical considerations promoted trade between Japan and Communist China. In this aspect, they used trade as a means to achieve their p o l i t i c a l aims, and this 24 Young Hum Kim, East Asia's Turbulent Century (New York: Appleton L. Century-Crofts Division of Meredith Publishing Company, 1966), p. 174. 25 L. W. Beer, "Some Dimensions of Japan's Present and Potential Relations with Communist China," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 3 (March, 1969). 19 is particularly so with Communist China. Peking always injected p o l i t i c s into trade. Accordingly, what Japan w i l l s e l l and buy and the terms and conditions of trade w i l l be determined by Chinese Communist leaders to f i t 26 their own p o l i t i c a l aims rather than their own or Japan's economic needs. At the core of the p o l i t i c a l nature of Sino-Japanese trade are the major objectives of Chinese foreign policy toward Japan. The f i r s t objective was to separate Japan from the influence of the United States, and the second was to prevent Japan from dealing with "two Chinas." The immediate policy which China adopted varied according to the domestic and international situation, but there were no changes as far as their major 27 objectives i n principle was concerned. "The inseparability of p o l i t i c s and economics" is the principle aimed to achieve these ends, and the Chinese government hoped to build up pressure i n Japan, through trade, to attain the eventual normalization of relations between the two countries. From the very beginning of trade relations the Chinese had these objectives in mind, and they are clearly maintained throughout the history of trade relations. J. Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa divide the Sino-Japanese relations between 1950 and 1970 i n terms of four linkage per-iods, and i t is convenient to follow their division, since they bring out the immediate aims of Communist China very clearly and the fluctuations of trade between Japan and China. The f i r s t , an ideological linkage under the "people's diplomacy," and second, p o l i t i c a l linkage with "peace diplomacy," 'Wilbur Martin, "Japan and the Rise of Communist China," Japan between East  and West, edited by Hugh Borton (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959), p. 201. r Tadao Ishikawa, "Communsit China's Policy toward Japan," The Future of Com- munist China, edited by Joon Yup Kim (Seoul: Bum Moon Sa, 1967), p. 393. 20 the third, economic linkage with "friendship trade," and the last, quasi-28 diplomatic linkage with "L-T Trade." The f i r s t two linkages cover the "unofficial," "private" trade agreements between 1950 and 1957. During this period, the trade volume was small, but as the result of opening a regular trade channel, a number of private organizations were established in Japan to promote Sino-Japanese trade, including the Japan-China Friend-ship Association, the Association for the Promotion of International Trade, and the Japan-China Importers' and Exporters' Association. Through these associations, Individual Japanese leaders and p r i -vate firms, Peking's main objectives during this period were to cultivate Japanese friendship, to encourage Japan to detach i t s e l f from the U.S.-Japan alliance and to support Japanese domestic radicals favouring China over the United States. Thus, Peking worked to increase the p o l i t i c a l pressures on the Japanese government to grant at least de facto recognition of Communist China. This kind of approach, however, did not bring the desired results, and the arguments over the principle of separating economics from p o l i t i c s had already started. When the Japanese trade, fairs were held i n Peking and Shanghai i n 1956, Ta Rung Pao pointed out, i n praising the trade f a i r , that trade ought not to be separated from p o l i t i c s even though the Japanese em-bargo on strategic goods had prevented many Japanese products from being on 29 display i n the trade f a i r . On the part of the Japanese government, Prime J. Stephen Hoadley and Sukehiro Hasegawa, "Sino-Japanese Relations 1950-1970," International Quarterly. Vol. 15T No. 2 (June, 1971). 9 ' Ta Kung Pao, October 29, 1956, cited by C. P. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," Asian Survey. Vol: IX (December; 1969), p. 907. 21 Minister Kishi stated i n June 1957 during his v i s i t to Washington that Japan had no intention to extend p o l i t i c a l recognition to Peking, and this state-ment clearly reflected Japan's policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s . Private, un-official trade was suspended after concluding the fourth Sino-Japanese agreement on March 5, 1958. The reasons for suspen-sion given by the Communist Chinese trade corporations were the refusal to f u l l y honour the fourth Japan-China private trade agreement by the Kishi administration and an insult to the Chinese national flag i n Nagasaki, which 30 had been torn down by a student who had not been punished. However, the real motivations of Peking could be interpreted as one of trying to i n f l u -ence the outcome of the Japanese general election of that month by holding Kishi responsible for the suspension of trade. Peking also might have hoped to influence Japanese p o l i t i c a l groups to pressure the Kishi government i n -31 to concessions to Peking. After two years of trade suspension, i t was Communist China which again initiated the opening of "friendship trade" in 1960. It was begun by Premier Chou and Chinese p o l i t i c a l objectives during the third linkage period are seen clearly in their demands. This trade was so named because the Chinese wanted to trade with only a few "friendly" Japanese companies which pledged to respect Chou's three p o l i t i c a l principles and oppose the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Chou's three politick, principles were: 1) not to adopt policy inimical to China, 2) not to join a plot to recog-nize two Chinas, and 3) not to hamper attempts to normalize Sino-Japanese 30 Uemura Sachisei, "Around the Nagasaki National Flag Incident," Asahi  Janaru, Vol. 14, No. 35 (September 1, 1972), p. 12. 31 CP. Jan, "Japan's Trade with Communist China," Asian Survey, Vol. IX (December, 1969), p. 910. 22 32 relations. Under these conditions, the Chinese held the ultimate right to decide which companies are "friendly" and which were not, and whether to recognize or reject Japanese companies. The firms were also easily able to obtain favorable commercial terms i n such specific arrangements as 33 pricing, inspection, arbitration and shipping. The "friendly" firms which China chose, however, were small and weak, and the p o l i t i c a l objectives of establishing channels of communica-tion and influence upon the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and major in -dustries were only partially affected. In order to supplement and enlarge the channels opened by "Friendship" trade, an L-T Trade was signed on Nov-ember 9, 1962, and China entered a quasi-diplomatic, linkage period. The trade was called "L-T Trade" because i t was signed by Liao Cheng-Chih and Takasaki Tatsunosuke and i t covered an "over-all trade" for five years be-tween 1963 and 1967. . The L-T Trade had a semi-official nature since Takasaki was one of the Liberal Democratic Party leaders in the Diet and he had the support of a substantial portion of the L.D.P. Diet members as well as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. From the L.D.P. leaders' viewpoint, the agreement was satisfactory since the Chinese leaders genuinely recog-34 nized the necessity of dealing with the Japanese conservatives and i t showed that the Chinese f i n a l l y accepted the r e a l i t i e s by t a c i t l y consenting 32 Asahi Nenkan, 1963, p. 305. 33 Chae-Jin Lee, "The P o l i t i c s of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-68," Pacific Affairs, XLII CSummer, 1969), p. 129. 34 A.M. Halpern, "China and Japan," China in Crisis, edited by Tang Tsou (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 447. 23 to tolerate the Japanese government's established principle of "separ-ating economics from p o l i t i c s . " From the position of Communist China, the agreement gave them the opportunity to maintain two trade channels of "friendship trade" and "L-T Trade." Their calculation on maintaining separate trade channels were again p o l i t i c a l . Friendship trade serves China's short-range goals such as stim-ulation of Japanese l e f t wing p o l i t i c a l support for China and Mao and opposi-tion to the Sato government policy toward Taiwan and the United States, while L-T Trade serves long-range goals such as an encouragement of top conserva-tive L.D.P. leaders recognition of China as a legitimate and respected nei-35 ghbor. They aimed at small pay-offs in the short run while deferring to I prospect of large pay-offs such as the normalization of relations between the two countries. The conclusion of L-T Trade also gave Communist China a good ex-cuse to engage in quasi-diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s . The "Japan-China Over-All Trade Liaison Council" was founded i n Tokyo with Takasaki Tatsunosuke as i t s f i r s t chairman to f a c i l i t a t e the implementation of the L-T Trade agree-ments. Also, on August 13, 1964, Communist China was authorized to open a trade liaison office in Tokyo, headed by Sun Ping-hua. Since the open-ing of this office, i t continued to function more as a p o l i t i c a l agency than as normal trade mission, and the Chinese gradually engaged in a wide 36 range of open p o l i t i c a l activities against the Japanese government. This kind of activity i s well illustrated by the statement of Liao Cheng-chih\ during a v i s i t to the Tokyo Liaison Office who said, on September 9, 1967, that Sato's v i s i t to Taiwan, "constituted a criminal interference in China's 35 Hoadley and Hasegawa, op. c i t . , p. 151. ~^Lee, op. c i t . , p. 135. 24 domestic affairs and the act of p o l i t i c a l provocation against the Chinese people." To this statement the Japanese o f f i c i a l of the Ministry of For-eign Affairs showed his displeasure "that the liaison office which should be concerned for the promotion of Japan-China trade should not utter such 37 p o l i t i c a l statements." Communist China was also able to manipulate the competitive rela-tionship between friendship and L-T Trade agreements. As Table 2 shows, the Sino-Japanese trade volumes were almost equally divided between the two unt i l 1965. In 1966, however, the "friendly" firms trade accounted for 67 per cent and the L-T Trade only 33 per cent. By 1967, the propor-tion of L-T Trade in total volume further declined to 27.7 per cent. This decline was a direct result of Communist China's increasingly hostile a t t i -tude toward Sato's government. This h o s t i l i t y was heightened by the "private le t t e r " of Yoshida which gave the assurance to the Nationalist government in Taiwan that the Japanese Import and Export bank would no longer be used to 38 finance Japanese industrial exports to Peking. This "private l e t t e r " was produced as a result of protest from Nationalist China when the Kuroshiki Rayon Company of Japan agreed to export a $22 million nylon plant to Com-munist China, and in August 1963 the Japanese government approved the ex-port under a five-year deferred payment plan. "Yoshida's le t t e r " gave a series of set-backs to Peking's prestigei and interests, and in retaliation in 1965 the Chinese delayed renewal of the L-T Trade arrangement, but permitted the friendly trade to increase. Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 1967, p. 3. !Asahi Shinbun, March 6, 1968, p. 7. 25 Table 2 The Evaluation of the "Friendly Firms" Trade and the L-T Trade i n Sino -Japanese Trade (unit : 1,000 dollars) Year Volume of Trade Compared to Previous Year (%) Composition (%) Friendly Firm Trade L-T Trade Friendly Firm Trade L-T Trade Friendly Firm Trade L-T Trade 1963 73,577 63,439 — — 53.7 46.3 1964 181,947 128,542 247.3 202.6 58.6 41.4 1965 285,133 184,608 156.7 143.6 60.7 39.3 1966 416,329 205,058 146.0 111.1 67.0 33.0 1967 403,022 154,408 96.8 75.3 72.3 27.7 Source: Chugoku Kenkyusho (China Research Institute) ed. , Shin Chugoku Nen-kan (New China Yearbook), Tokyo: Toho Shoten, 1968, p. 179. They also intensified their propaganda campaign against Sato's "Anti-China" policy. Another reason that Communist China put the pr i o r i t y on "friendly" trade i n 1966 and 1967 was that the large firms and industries which joined the L-T Trade were p o l i t i c a l l y uncontrollable, compared with "friendly firms" which engaged in pro-Chinese act i v i t i e s on behalf of Peking. The L-T firms were large and carried on trade on the basis of long-term arrangements with China. They were, therefore, less dependent on China and less susceptible 39 to Chinese p o l i t i c a l pressure. Since detailed arrangements under the L-T Trade agreement had to be negotiated on a yearly basis, Peking was able to drive a hard bargain Lee, op. c i t . , p. 132. 26 before i t signed the annual trade agreement. After the expiration of the five year L-T Trade agreement in 1967, Mainland China refused to sign an-other long term agreement. Their immediate fury was due to the Sato v i s i t to Taipeh in September and to Washington in November 1967. During those v i s i t s , Sato referred to the threat posed by Communist China to her neigh-40 bors, and Peking attacked this saying that, "Sato's trip to Taiwan was a component part of a fcig anti-China, anti-Communist, anti-people."^ Con-cerning Sato's v i s i t to Washington, Jin Min Jih Pao declared that "the-out-cry against the threats of China's nuclear weapons i s a big conspiracy by 42 the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries." On March 7, 1968, a memorandum for one year's trade was signed. To secure the new agreement, the Chinese made the Japanese L.D.P. Diet members sign a statement where they recognized Chou's three p o l i t i c a l prin-ciples and they reaffirmed the principle of inseparability of economics and 43 p o l i t i c a l matters. This reference was specifically intended to rebuke the Japanese government for i t s policy which continued to permit economic rela-tions with Communist China without granting diplomatic relations. Deputy Vice Minister of'Foreign Trade, Liu Hsi-Wen warned at a reception for the returning Japanese delgates that "the escalation of Sato's reactionary for-eign policy would generally endanger the future of memorandum trade. 40 Asahi Shinbun, September 9, 1967, p. 3. 41 Peking Review, September 1967, p. 32. 42 Quoted in Peking Review, Decemher 1, 1967, p. 31. 43 Asahi Shinbun, March 7, 1968, p. 2. 44 Asahi Shinbun, March 7, 1968, evening edition, p. 1, 27 Hereafter anti-Japanese government statements appears i n con-nection with a l l the trade agreements signed between Japan and Communist China. When the Friendship trade agreement for 1967-1968 was signed, the p o l i t i c a l statement contained phrases which praised the Cultural Revolu-tion and Mao's thoughts. It also included a statement on a struggle against four common enemies of the Chinese and Japanese people: U.S. imperialism, Soviet revisionism, Japanese reaction, and the Japanese Communist Party. The Chinese negotiator even stated that " p o l i t i c s i s the basis, l i f e and s p i r i t of economics" and suggested that Mao's doctrine should be 45 the foundation of Sino-Japanese trade. Communist China f u l l y capitalized on the opportunity to conclude a new trade agreement every year to let the Japanese delegates recognize the Chinese principle of "inseparability of p o l i t i c s and economics" and attack the policy of the Japanese government toward China. In the new agreement signed on April 20, 1970, Communist China showed her fury on the Sato-Nixon Communique signed i n November 1969 by adding Chou's fourth prin-ciple as a new condition in trading with Japan. Sato acknowledged Japan's commitment to the defence of Taiwan which China feared would lead to a revival of Japanese militarism against China. The essence of Chou's fourth principle was that Communist China would not trade with Japanese firms and 46 companies trading with and assisting Taiwan or South Korea. At the end of the new agreement both Communist Chinese and Japanese negotiators agreed that the deterioration of relations between the two countries was created Lee, op. c i t . , p. 136. Sei Ichi Tagawa, "Chou's Four Principles," Bungei Shunju CAugust 1970). 28 by Sato's government and that the Japanese delegates would make an effort to dispel this obstruction. The study of the patterns and techniques used throughout the hist -ory of Sino-Japanese trade relations shows that Communist China took the i n i t i a t i v e and Japan responded. The volume of trade fluctuated according to p o l i t i c a l events such as: the Nagasaki flag incident, "Yoshida's p r i -vate l e t t e r , " Sato's v i s i t s to Taiwan and the United States, and the Sato-Nixon Communiques. The techniques Communist China used varied according to the short-term objectives of Communist China. China appealed to a "broad p o l i t i c a l spectrum" in Japan^ 7 through private agreements and exchange of unoffic-i a l private delegations. China threatened by way of suspending trade. China demanded and this demand appeared in the form of Chou's four p o l i t -i c a l principles. Finally, China manipulated Japan especially with "friendly trade" and "memorandum trade." In short, trade was used as an instrument of p o l i t i c a l pressure and i t reflected China's p o l i t i c a l aims. Sino-Japanese trade went on, despite the fundamental differences in their concepts of the principle of "inseparability of p o l i t i c s and ec-onomics" and the principle of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s . " It was because they both agreed at one point that principle i s principle and reality i s rea l i t y . They both claimed their own principle, but accepted the reality and compromised. From China's viewpoint, i t was an "accumula-tive" approach for the eventual normalization of relations between the two countries. From Japan's point of view i t also was a r e a l i s t i c approach A.M. Halpern, New York Times, March 4, 1966, p. 6. 29 to maximize economic opportunities and minimize p o l i t i c a l involvement unti l the right opportunity came for normalization. By adopting and practising the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , Japan looked for a bigger commercial opportunity in the future and also i t served as a pipeline between the two big countries in Asia. Furui Yosh-imi, who headed the Japanese negotiations for trade negotiations as a member of the L.D.P. had these words to say: "Trade i s the only p o l i t i c a l pipeline which connects Mainland China and Japan. In the case of Sino-U.S. relations, there i s ambassadorial talk at Warsaw. Between Washington, D.C. and Moscow, there i s a 'hot-line' connected. Imagine the rel a -tions between Japan and Mainland China without this pipeline? This lin e may be small and narrow, but i t has a tremendous p o l i t i c a l significance for the future. Yoshimi Furui, "Is 'Sino-Japanese Negotiation' an Humiliating Diplomacy?" Burigei Shunju, July 1970, p. 96. 30. Table 3 JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CHINA, 1950-1971 (U.S. $1,000*3) Exports to China Imports from China T o t a l s A B A + B Year $ Value % Prev. Yr. $ Value % Prev. Yr. $ Value % Prev. Yr. 1950 $ 19,633 0 $ 39,328 0 $ 58,961 0 1951 5,828 29.7 21,606 54.9 27,434 46.5 1952 599 10.3 14,903 69.0 15,502 56.5 1953 4,539 757.8 29,700 199.3 34,239 220.9 1954 19,097 420.7 40,770 137.3 59,869 174.9 1955 28,547 149.5 80,778 198.1 109,325 182.6 1956 67,339 235.9 83,647 103.6 150,968 138.1 1957 60,485 89.8 80,483 96.2 140,968 93.4 1958 50,600 83.7 54,427 67.6 105,027 74.5 1959 3,648 7.2 18,917 34.8 22,565 21.5 1960 2,726 74.7 20,729 109.6 23,455 103.9 1961 16,639 610.4 30,895 149.0 47,534 142.1 1962 38,460 231.1 46,020 149.0 84,480 177.7 1963 62,417 162.3 74,599 162.1 137,016 162.2 1964 152,739 244.7 157,750 211.5 310,489 226.2 1965 245,036 160.4 224,705 142.4 469,741 151.3 1966 315,150 128.6 306,237 136.3 621,387 132.3 1967 288,294 91.5 269,439 88.0 557,733 89.8 1968 325,439 122.9 224,185 83.2 549,624 98.5 1969 390,803 120.1 234,540 104.6 625,343 113.8 1970 568,878 145.6 253,818 108.2 822,696 131.6 1971 587,188 101.6 323,172 127.3 901,360 109.5 SOURCE: Asahi Janaru (Customs Division, Ministry of Finance, Japan), September 15, 1972, p. 19. 31 IV So far, the policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " has been examined within the frame of international circumstances and how ex-ternal factors outside Japan, including the attitude of Communist China, affected the Japanese government in pursuing this policy. No less import-ant than external factors are the internal factors which influenced the formation and practice of this policy. It seems of utmost importance to analyze the internal aspect of Japanese p o l i t i c s in this l a s t section. Apart from trade interests which we observed i n section three, the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s served mainly two purposes. One was that, to a certain extent, i t met the popular demand for improved relations with Communist China, and the other was that i t served the need of appeasing the opposition parties in Japan as well as the anti-^mainstream factions within the governing Liberal Democratic Party. The former was re-lated to the Japanese people in general and the latter was connected with Japanese internal p o l i t i c s . Popular demand is a vague expression, but i t represents the fe e l -ing of the Japanese people. At the bottom of their hearts, they have a feeling of guilt for the past acts of Japan. During eight years of war be-tween 1937 and 1945 the Japanese army k i l l e d more than ten million Chinese and caused five b i l l i o n dollars i n war damage. Without the legal termina-tion of war with Mainland China, twenty-seven years have passed, and during these years the Japanese have been somewhat frustrated by the feeling of 32 need to atone for Japan's past crimes. This feeling in general i s well represented by the act of Prime Minister Tanaka when he stated his "pro-49 found self-examination for the great troubles Japan i n f l i c t e d on China" at his f i r s t banquet in Peking in September last year. Besides the feeling of guilt, there also i s a feeling of a f f i n -i t y between the Chinese and Japanese, rooted in their common cultural, l i n g u i s t i c and r a c i a l background. For the Japanese, China has always stood "inside" and the western nations "outside," "Orientals" and "fellow Asians" are the words often used to describe this kind of a f f i n i t y . Stemming from this feeling i s the sort of moral sympathy toward China. Both Japan and China went through the painful process of modernization; Japan successfully with "Meiji Isshin""^ and China not so successfully with the "Movement to Westernize" and a large segment of the Japanese intellectuals i s sympathetic to the efforts of the Chinese people to modernize their society, even i f these efforts are being made under the Communist regime.^ It i s very d i f f i c u l t to describe this kind of feeling as a "na-tional feeling," but i t may be safe to say that the Japanese, in general, tend to be swayed by the "feeling" or the "mood" rather than by sound logical reasoning. This common cultural feeling cut across the p o l i t i c a l lines and culminated in a popular demand for better relationships with Mainland China. The policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " didn^t meet this demand a l l the way, but a trading relationship was better than 49 Asahi Shinbun, September 29, 1972, p. 3. "*^ A movement to modernize Japan in the era of Emperor Meiji. "'"'"Jun Eto, "The Views from Japan," speech for Japan Society in New York, Chuo Koron (December, 1971), p. 66. 33 no relationship at a l l . It was short of normal, diplomatic relations, but i t provided a r e l i e f or comfort that a Japan-China relationship i s there i f only i n the form of trade. The policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s " gave them the hope that the policy would eventually end up with the normalization of relations between the two countries. In defending the policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s , " former Prime Minister Sato said that the principle w i l l not continue forever, and the government 52 is just waiting for the right time for normalization. The impact of the China policy upon Japanese internal p o l i t i c s has always been one of the intense and controversial issues in Japanese p o l i t i c s . The opposition parties sharply opposed the government policy of "separating economics from p o l i t i c s , " but the policy also divided the members of the governing Liberal Democratic Party. Before the signing of the agreement for the normalization of diplomatic relations on September 29 of last year, the opposition parties have been constant c r i t i c s of the policy. The China policy of opposition parties varied. The policy of the Japan Socialist Party, the major opposition party in Japan, appeared very clearly i n i t s four principles for Sino-Japanese friendly, diplomatic rela-tions which J.S.P. announced after the f i f t h v i s i t to China by the members of that party in November, 1970. The four principles contained: 1. The J.S.P. opposes U.S. imperialism and the restoration of Japanese militarism. 2. The party is against the government policy of treating China as an enemy and upholds the view that there is only "One China." It also urges the abrogation of Japan-As ahi Shinbun, December 26, 1969, p. 2. 34 Nationalist China Peace Treaty. 3. It accepts the view of the inseparability of p o l i t i c s and economics, and, 4. It has organized a united front to accommodate a l l the forces which stand for an early agreement to Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. The party also urged the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese non-aggression pact immediately following the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Japan Democratic Socialist Party, the second major opposition party, is less drastic in opposing the government policy than the J.S.P. It upheld the idea of "One China and One Taiwan" but ar,gued that Peking, not Taipeh, should be regarded as the legitimate government of China. The Na-tionalist government should be recqgnized as a temporary government of the area i t now controls, and the ultimate status of Taiwan should be determined by the w i l l of the Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese residents on Taiwan. The D.S.P. also urged the government to change i t s foreign policy that blindly followed the United States and undertake an early conclusion of diplomatic 54 relations with Communist China as a basis for peace in Asia. The Japanese Communist Party, the smallest segment of the opposi-tion, in terms of representatives in the Diet ( 36 seats in the lower house ) advocated the immediate abrogation of the peace treaty with Tai-wan and immediate restoration of relations with Communist China. This policy, in i t s apparent form, was similar to that of the J.S.P., but the J.C.P. stood more firmly against the United States' Far-Eastern policy. It also urged Mainichi Shinbun, November 4, 1970, p. 4. Kokumin S e i j i Nenkan, 1969, p. 789. 35 the "end" of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The impact of these differing views and policies toward Commun-i s t China held by the opposition parties upon Japanese government i s not very significant, as would be the case in the United States where the major two-party system i s practised, but the successive L.D.P. government had to take them into consideration for p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y as well as for the survival of their own party. As far as Japanese-China policy was concerned, the government in pursuing the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s has been in the defensive side in the face of those views which came from the opposition parties. Much more significant than the views and claims of opposition parties i s the s p l i t cf opinions and factions on the China policy among the L.D.P. members. On the China issue, L.D.P. has been divided into a pro-Peking group and a pro-Taiwan group. The pro-Peking group was a combina-tion of about 86 Diet members from both houses and represented by the Asian Africa Study group (Ajiya-Afurika Mondai Kenkyu Kai). The group was led by such members as Fujiyama Aiichiro, Matsumura Kenzo, Furui Yoshimi, and Miki Takeo, the most outspoken c r i t i c s within the governing party. To them i t was unrealistic to recognize Nationalist China as the only legitimate government of China. It is Communist China, after a l l , which has controlled the mainland with 800 million people since 1949, and i t was unnatural that Japan should leave her relations with China in a state of war and follow the 56 "policy of containment." They, therefore, favored the recognition of Peking Ibid., p. 798. Fujiyama Aiichiro, "The Base of Negotiations with Peking," Chuo Koron (October, 1972), p. 146. 36 instead of Taipeh, and pressed for the expansion of trade through the con-clusion of an o f f i c i a l agreement and not by means of unofficial agreements. The Pro-Taiwan group, on the other hand, based i t s claim on the basis that i t i s with Chiang Kai-shek's government that Japan fought and Japan must be bound by the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. Japan also should not forget the generous "favours" which Chiang Kai-shek provided right after the end of the Second World War by returning two million Japanese l i v i n g in China safely to Japan and not claiming any reparations from Japan. The Pro-Taiwan group was represented by about 161 Diet members who belong to the Asian Problems Study Group (Ajiya Mondai Kenkyu Kai). The group i n -cluded such senior members of L.D.P. as Kishi Nobusuke, Fukuda Takeo and I s h i i Mitsujiro who have been the chief faction leaders backing Sato. They are the more right-wing conservatives who have pursued an anti-communist line, and they maintained the r i g i d position that Taiwan should continue to receive recognition as the only legitimate representative of China. They, however, had no objection to trade with Communist China, provided that i t did not damage relations with either Taiwan or the United States. If the claims of pro-Taiwan group, as represented by the govern-ment policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , are carefully examined, this group did not deny the necessity of eventual normalization of diplo-matic relations with Communist China. It only hesitated to betray Japan's friendly a l l i e s , the United States and Taiwan. Fukuda, as the foreign min-iste r of Japan under Sato, called Japan's policy toward China "duck diplo-macy." "A duck in i t s appearance doesn't seem to be swimming, but under the surface of water i t is paddling constantly."^ 7 He also defended the ^Mainichi Shinbun, November 20, 1971, p. 4. 37 government policy saying that "the normalization of diplomatic relations with Communist China i s our national task. We are working to achieve this 58 goal, but we should keep our international faith in the process." The s p l i t over the China issue among L.D.P. members cut across the main fact-ional divisions and i t s impact i s f e l t every two years when there i s the party presidential contest. Actually, the chief objective of a faction 59 is to obtain Cabinet, Diet and party leadership posts for their members, -but China policy is often used as the focal point to improve their position i n the inner party leadership contest. Aiming at the presidential election which was held i n July last year, anti-main stream factions made a big issue of the China policy of the mainstream. The Dietmen's League for Normaliza-I tion of Japan-China Relations was formed on October 21, 1970 and this supra-party league included the opposition party members of the J.S.P., D.S.P. and Komeito, as well as 28 L.D.P. members and they severely c r i t i c i z e d the China policy of the Sato government. Especially after Communist China was admitted to the United Nations i n October 1971, 12 members of the L.D.P. abstained in the non-confidence vote against Fukuda, the foreign minister, along with opposition party members. It was the f i r s t time the anti-Sato factions acted out their discontent i n not voting for the government, and they included such pro-Peking members as Fujiyama, Utsunomiya and Furui. Miki Takeo was in the forefront of c r i t i c i s i n g the government when he said "The Prime Minister ignored the opinion of the inner party, group" for Japan's Mainichi Shinbun, October 18, 1971, p. 2. I Frank C. Langdon, "Japanese Liberal Democratic Factional Discord on China Policy," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 (Fa l l , 1968), p. 405. 38 policy toward China. Thus, in Japanese p o l i t i c s , factionalism, policy issues, and vote-getting measures for the party leadership post intermingled together, and the eventual aim of raising the China policy issue was to get the votes for the leadership contest. It may sound paradoxical that the governing party members such as Fujiyama, Matsumura and Furui, committed to the promotion of trade with Communist China, openly c r i t i c i z e d so often the policy of their own party government, but the Sato government was unoff i c i a l l y able to use them for leading to the eventual diplomatic normalization between both countries. Mairiichi Shinbun, October 26, 1971, evening edition, p. 1. 39 V Now that the agreement for the normalization of Sino-Japan rela-tions i s signed as of September 29, 1972, the controversial issue of "sep-arating economics from p o l i t i c s " has become a story of the past. Japan recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate govern-ment of China and Japan f u l l y understood and respected the Chinese claim that Taiwan i s an "inalienable part" of Chinese territory. From the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s , which was the o f f i c i a l policy of Japan between 1952 and 1972, the following conclu-sions can be drawn. The chief cause of adopting and pursuing the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s stemmed, above anything else, from international circumstances in which Japan found herself as a defeated nation after the Second World War. The opposition voices in Japan c r i t i c i z e d the China policy, saying that the policy was based on a f i c t i o n that the National-i s t government in Taiwan represented the whole of China. But from the position of the Japanese government, i t was not be-cause the government did not realize the existence and importance of Com-munist China on the mainland that she did not recognize Communist China. There was not much room for Japan to follow an independent course of action toward China. The policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s was based on the reality of international p o l i t i c s and i t represented a "wait and see" a t t i -tude u n t i l the right time for the change came. 40 The admission of Communist China to the United Nations in 1971, Nixon's v i s i t to China in February, 1972, and the eventual change of the policy of the United Nations gave Japan the opportunity to change her policy and recognize mainland China. In this respect, Japan even jumped ahead of the United States in the normalization of diplomatic r e l a -tions and Japan now claims that she is ready for "independent diplomacy" in a new era for Asia. The policy of separating economics and p o l i t i c s allowed Japan to be able to put her one foot on Taiwan and one on China, without hurting any a l l i e d countries. Trading relationships with China were possible be-cause China also saw the advantage of maintaining that relationship. Since the agreement on normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, Japan now appears eager to maintain trading relationships with Taiwan, and hence the adoption of the policy of separating economics from p o l i t i c s for the other China. But, that policy toward Taiwan w i l l not cause much controversy i n Japan-ese internal p o l i t i c s as i t did toward Communist China. Korea also has to readjust her policy toward North Korea and Communist China according to the changes and shifts of the policies of the United States and Japan. In order to do so, i t is very important to evaluate where Korea should stand in the newly established relationship between Japan and Communist China. Historically, Japan has pursued a Korean policy by which Japan could check the influence of other nations in Korea which threatened Japan. The main cause of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904 stemmed from Japan's belief that the influence of either China or Russia was the immediate threat to Japan. The Taft-Katsura agreement 41 i n 1905 gave Japan a f r e e hand i n Korea, and i t opened the way f o r Japan 61 to p r o c l a i m o u t r i g h t annexation i n 1910. The T a f t - K a t s u r a agreement gave Japan complete domination of Korea and expressed hope f o r peace i n the Far East, but i t became the main cause of unrest and war between Japan and China. A f t e r the Second World.War Korea was d i v i d e d i n t o two s e c t i o n s along the 38th p a r a l l e l . Instead of a l l o w i n g one power to dominate Korea, Korea came under the i n f l u e n c e of three b i g powers, China, the S o v i e t Union and the United S t a t e s , and Korea became a f o c a l p o i n t i n the c o l d war. The Sato-Nixon Communique of 1969 r e a f f i r m e d Japan's commitment to Korean de-fence i n . A r t i c l e 4 that s a i d , "the s e c u r i t y of the R e p u b l i c of Korea was e s s e n t i a l to Japan's own s e c u r i t y . " Thus, Korea i n the past has experienced three d i f f e r e n t waves of i n f l u e n c e from the b i g powers around her, and she now has to f i n d her new r o l e i n the changing circumstances of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . On-one hand, Korea has to face a new Japan that emerged as an economic b i g power and may s t a r t to take the p l a c e of the United States as the guarantor of s e c u r i t y i n non-Communist A s i a . On the other hand, Korea a l s o has to accept the r e a l i t y that Communist China now has a new forum i n which to press her views on Korean a f f a i r s through her admission to the United N a t i o n s . S i t u a t e d between these two b i g powers i n A s i a , Korea should get over the " c o l d war consciousness" and h a l t the p o l i c y of unmitigated h o s t i l -i t y toward North Korea and Communist China. Korea a l s o should be c a r e f u l t h a t Japanese economic power i n Korea should not turn i n t o p o l i t i c a l or m i l -i t a r y power. Communist China has already warned ag a i n s t s i g n s of r i s i n g m i l i t a r i s m i n Japan and any s i g n of such a move by Japan would invoke 61 Woo-keun Han, The H i s t o r y of Korea (Honolulu: East-West Center P r e s s , 1970), p. 447. 42 immediate reaction from Communist China. History in Korea t e l l s the les-son that Korea should not invite one power to chase the other power from the Korean peninsula. This has been Korea's fate since the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. With the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, Korea also should find her role i n pursuing "independent and positive" action in this new relationship. The talks between North and South for the eventual unification of Korea and the new constitution of South Korea which was adopted in 1972 reflect Korea's attempts to adjust herself to this role. 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Borton, Hugh, edited, Japan between East arid West (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957). Dunn, Frederick S., Peace-Making arid the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Fukui,Haruhiro, Party in Power (.Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970). Halpern,A.M., edited, Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965). Han, Woo-keun, The History of Korea (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1970). Hellmann, Donald C., Japanese Domestic Polit i c s and Foreign Policy, (Berk-eley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969). Hinton, Harold, Communist Chiria in World P o l i t i c s (Boston: Houghton Mif-f l i n Company, 1966). 1 Kajima, Morinosuke, A Brief Diplomatic History of Modern Japan (Rutland, Vermont and Tokyo, Japan: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1965). Kennan, George F., Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston: Brown and Company, 1967). Kim, Joon Yup, edited, The Future of Communist China (Seoul: Bum Moon Sa, 1967) i n Korean. Kim, Young Hum, East Asia's Turbulent Century (New York: Appleton L. Century Crofts Division of Meredith Publishing Co., 1966). Leng, Shao-Chuan, Japan and Communist China, (Kyoto: Doshlsha University Press, 1958). Rosecrance, Richard N., Australian Diplomacy and Japan, 1945-1951 (London and New York: Cambridge University Press for Melbourne University Press, 1962). Tsou.Tang,. edited, China in Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Yoshida,'+Shigeru, The Yoshida Memoirs (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1961). 44 Periodicals Araki,Tokugoro, "Around the Nagasaki National Flag Incident," Sekai (December, 19 72) . Beer, L.W. , "Some Dimensions of Japan's Present and Potential Rela-tions with Communist China," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 3 (March, 1969). Eto,Jun, "The Views from Japan," Chuo Koron (December, 1971). Fujiyama,Aiichiro, "The Base of Negotiations with Peking," Chuo Koron (October, 1972). Furui,Yoshimi, "Is 'Sino-Japanese Negotiation' a Humiliating Diplomacy?" Bungei Shunju (July, 1970). Hellmann, Donald C., "Japan's Relations with Communist China," Asian  Survey, Vol. L, No. 10 (October, 1964). Hilsman, Roger, "United States Policy toward Communist China," speech delivered on December 13, 1963). Hoadley, J. and Hasegawa Sukehiro, "Sino-Japanese Relations 1950-1970," International Quarterly (June, 1971). Hong, Seung Myun, "Japan's Policy toward Communist China," Chung Kyung  Yun Ku, (June 1965). Jan, CP., "Japan's Trade with Communist China," Asian Survey, Vol. IX, No. 12 (December, 1969). Kennan, George F., "A Fresh Look at Our China Policy," The New York Times  Magazine (November 22, 1964). Kennan, George F., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs (July, 1947). Langdon, Frank C., "Japanese Liberal Democratic Factional Discord on China Policy," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLI, No. 3 ( F a l l , 1968). Lee, Chae-Jin, "The P o l i t i c s of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-68," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XLII (Summer, 1969). Tagawa, Seiichi, "Chou's Four Principles," Bungei Shunju (August, 1970). Uemura,Sachisei, "Around the Nagasaki National Flag Incident," Asahi Janaru Nol. 14, No. 35 (December 1, 1972). Vinacke, Harold M., "United States Policy Towards China: An Appraisal," ' Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 29, No. 5 (May, 1960). Newspapers Asahi Shinbun Choongang Ilbo Jenmin Jihpao Mainichi Shinbun New York Times 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0101443/manifest

Comment

Related Items